40 CFR 190
ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION PROTECTION
REQUIREMENTS FOR NORMAL OPERATIONS
OF ACTIVITIES IN THE
URANIUM FUEL CYCLE
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT
VOLUME II
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Office of Radiation Programs
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CONTENTS
VOLUME TWO
IX. RESPONSE TO COMMENTS , 1
A. Scope of the Rule or «fche Environmental Statement 2
B. Statutory Basis 9
C. Rationale for the Standards , 10
D. Technical Issues 17
1. Environmental Pathways 17
2. Health Effects and Dosimetry , 23
3. Control Capability, Costs, and Availability 32
a. General , 32
b. Mills , 32
c. Reactors 33
d. Reprocessing , 34
4. Cost-Effectiveness , 39
E. Impact of the Standards , 42
1. Health and Environmental Effects 42
2. Implementation 43
3. Impact on Energy Supply , 58
F. Alternatives 59
G. Miscellaneous , 61
REFERENCES , 65
APPENDIX
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IX. RESPONSE TO COMMENTS
This Chapter of the Final Environmental Statement addresses all
comment letters submitted on the Draft Environmental Statement. Notice
of availability of the draft statement was published May 29, 1975, and
the comment period expired on September 15, 1975. Testimony, both
written and oral, received in connection with the public hearing on
these standards held on March 8-10, 1976, and letters related to that
hearing are not included here. These are addressed in other material
issued by the Agency concerning this rulemaking. However, those
materials were considered in framing the responses to comments contained
herein.
Specific items of common concern to a number of commenters have
been consolidated so that they could be addressed by a single response.
Each comment is followed by code numbers to identify each of the letters
which raised the issue covered by the comment. All of the comment
letters are reproduced in the Appendix, together with an index which
provides a guide to locating the comment letters by code number. A few
very general comments which indicated only general agreement or
disagreement with the draft statement or that were not accompanied by
any supporting data or other arguments were not included. In addition,
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minor comments that address editorial errors and the like have been
reflected in the final statement, but are not addressed here.
The comments are grouped by subject matter into several general
areas of concern, which generally correspond to the organization of
material in Volume I. The responses are intentionally brief, and make
reference to Volume I and its supporting documents when more detailed
technical information is appropriate.
A.
SCOPE OF THE RULE OR THE ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT
COMMENT 1: The Environmental Statement should address the
total potential impact of radioactive materials from the
nuclear power industry, and describe EPA's total program for
protection of the public from radioactivity from the entire
fuel cycle. EPA cannot restrict the scope of its analysis
because it does not believe its authority extends to all
sources of potential radiation doses from the fuel cycle.
(P-25)
RESPONSE: It is true that this environmental statement applies
neither to the total potential impact of radioactive materials
from nuclear power, per se, nor to EPA*s radiation program as a
whole, but rather to a specific proposed regulation limiting
the public health and environmental impact of normal operations
of the uranium fuel cycle only. The Agency believes that it is
appropriate to address this voluntary environmental statement
to the limited scope addressed by the proposed regulation. To
do otherwise would be to imply decisions and judgments that are
not being made by the Agency as a part of this proposed
regulation.
COMMENT 2: EPA has not justified singling out the uranium fuel
cycle for the establishment of generally applicable standards.
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The standard should also address contributions to exposure from
other fuel cycles, noncommercial fuel cycle use, non-U.S. fuel
cycle user atmospheric weapons testing by other countries,
and/or research applications. (P-25,1-4,1-25,3-15)
RESPONSE: The standard addresses the uranium fuel cycle
because this cycle comprises the overwhelming majority of
current commercial nuclear power production activity in the
U.S. Since the standard is based upon an analysis of the costs
and benefits of exposure reduction for a specific set of
related operations, those comprising the uranium fuel cycle,
contributions to public exposure from other miscellaneous U.S.
and foreign sources are not germane to that analysis. Other
U.S. sources will be addressed by the Agency, to the extent
that its authority permits, when and if they become significant
sources of public exposure.
COMMENT 3: The standard should address the plutonium fuel
cycle, since fuel reprocessing is unlikely to occur in the
absence of use of recycled plutonium, and/or because of the
urgency that this toxic material be addressed by environmental
standards. (P-23,P-25,1-25,S-ll)
RESPONSE: The Agency will consider modification and/or
additions to these standards for nuclear power operations to
cover the plutonium fuel cycle when and if that cycle is
approved for commercial use by the NRC. A recent analysis (1)
of the economics of the tail end of the fuel cycle by the
industry indicates that recovery of uranium alone, without
recycle of plutonium, is sufficient justification for the
reprocessing of spent fuel. To the extent that plutonium
exists as a part of the uranium fuel cycle, environmental
releases of this material would be limited by the standard for
transuranics.
COMMENT 4: The standards should include effluents from mining
operations. It is not necessary for EPA to interpret the
Atomic Energy Act in the same restrictive manner as has the
AEC. (P-7,P-23,P-25,S-18)
RESPONSE: Liquid effluents from mining operations are covered
under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972 (P.L. 92-500). Interim effluent limitation guidelines for
uranium mines (40 CFR Part 440.53) were published on November
6, 1975 (40FR51722). Reinterpretation of the Atomic Energy Act
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to include mines would require redefinition of source materials
to encompass lower concentrations of uranium and thorium than
those presently covered. Such reinterpretation would then
require licensing of mines by NRC or Agreement States, and
through this mechanism EPA standards could be enforced. The
Agency has determined thatr for the present, to seek such a
major change is not warranted. This situation will be reviewed
when the need for future control of radon-222, the principal
airborne effluent from mining, is considered by the Agency.
COMMENT 5: The final statement should include a discussion of
EPA1s views on whether a variance is being considered to
"grandfather" mills which are presently not operating within
the limits of the standard. (S-15)
RESPONSE: The standards apply only to doses delivered as the
result of discharges of radioactive materials from licensed
sites beginning two years following the promulgation date.
Inactive tailings piles that are not on the site of active
milling operations and therefore included in an active license
for a uranium fuel cycle operation are therefore exempted from
the standard.
Inactive mill tailings piles are the subject of joint
investigation by the EPA and ERDA to determine the appropriate
handling of these piles. This effort will determine the
current condition of all inactive sites in order to provide the
basis for recommendations to the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy with regard to legislation for remedial measures at
these sites. The Agency anticipates that this program will
adequately respond to the hazards presented by these inactive
tailings piles. Further, these tailings piles are not covered
under present licensing regulations of NRC. In order to
include them under the standard, it would be necessary for NRC
regulations concerning the definition of source material to be
revised. Since we believe that the problems are currently
being adequately addressed, we do not find that it is
reasonable to try to have existing NRC regulations modified.
COMMENT 6: Effluents from low-level waste disposal sites
should be included within the scope of the standard, since some
sites have experienced releases beyond their boundaries, or
plan release of radioactive materials as a part of their normal
operation. (P-7,P-11,P-25,S-6,S-11)
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RESPONSE: A basic goal for shallow land burial of radioactive
waste is that the waste will not migrate from the burial site
to the general environment. Thus, there should be no planned
releases to be subject to the standard.
COMMENT 7: The effects of waste disposal cannot be ignored for
long-lived radionuclides, such as iodine-129 and plutonium.
These materials once separated cannot be just buried and
forgotten. (P-l)
RESPONSE: It is true that some long-lived radioactive wastes
will require management for extremely long periods of time. It
is clear, however, that such management, even though it carries
some possibility of failure, represents a major improvement
over direct dispersal into the environment. The Agency is
actively working with the Council on Environmental Quality, the
U.S. Geological Survey, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
and the U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration to
achieve an optimum solution for the ultimate disposal of long-
lived radioactive wastes.
COMMENT 8: The standard should include radiation exposures of
the public due to non-operating facilities and due to the
decommissioning of facilities. (P-25)
RESPONSE: The standard applies to normal operations of NRC and
Agreement State licensees. This includes periods when
facilities under an active license are not actually operating.
It is the responsibility of the licensor to require measures to
be taken that will provide assurance that exposure of the
public will be minimal following decommissioning, before
allowing a license to lapse. It is the Agency's expectation
that such exposures should be well below those established for
operating facilities by these standards.' It would, therefore,
be inappropriate to condone doses to the public at the level of
these standards by including decommissioned facilities within
the scope of these standards for normal operations of active
facilities. The Agency will maintain cognizance of this issue
and take appropriate action, if it appears necessary in the
future, to insure that doses from inactive facilities are
minimal.
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COMMENT 9: The restriction of the standard to facilities only
to the extent that they support commercial electrical power
production could unnecessarily restrict its applicability.
(P-25)
RESPONSE: The Agency believes the wording is clear.
"Commercial electric power production" is simply electric power
generated for commercial use. Any facility in the United
States that generates or supports the generation of electric
power for commercial use by means of the uranium fuel cycle
would be subject to the standard, regardless of its owner or
the nationality of its customers. The Agency does not believe
that it is either appropriate or necessary to include research
facilities within the scope of these standards, because the
impact of these activities is minimal and an adequate basis for
determination of appropriate operating levels does not exist.
COMMENT 10: The standard excludes milling of uranium bearing
ores containing less than 0.05X uranium without justification.
Future demand may require the use of such ore. (P-25)
RESPONSE: The comment is correct, and the restriction has been
removed from the standard.
COMMENT 11: The standard should include limits on the release
of carbon-14 and/or tritium. Such limits could easily be
scheduled in advance of their actual implementation, as are the
limits for iodine-129 and krypton-85. The final statement
should also provide a thorough discussion of control technology
for long-lived radionuclides, including carbon-14 and tritium.
(P-14,P-18,P-25,S-2,S-4,S-6,S-15)
RESPONSE: The knowledge base is not yet adequate for the
assessment of tritium and carbon-14 control technology that is
required in order to establish equitable limits on the release
of these materials. The Agency has studies of controls for
both of these materials underway and expects to be able to make
proposals regarding carbon-14 promptly, with consideration of
proposals for tritium following at a later date. Control
technology for those long-lived radionuclides covered by the
standard is discussed in references 4 and 5, and a detailed
discussion of krypton-85 has been added to this final statement
(Section V1II-B). Control technology for tritium and carbon-14
will be discussed when standards are proposed for these
materials.
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COMMENT 12: Carbon-14 should be studied, but it is misleading
to show potential health effects until more detail is known.
It is recommended that consideration of health effects due to
carbon-14 be deleted from the FES. (1-4,1-12)
RESPONSE: The assessment of carbon-14 pathways leading to
exposure of human populations has been carried out at a
relatively sophisticated level using a multicompartmental
worldwide model (6). The principle area of current lack of
knowledge regarding establishment of standards for this
radionuclide is control technology, not potential health
impact. The assessment of potential health effects is included
in order to provide the basis for the Agency's commitment to
future consideration of a standard for this long-lived
radionuclide.
COMMENT 13: The standard should include a limit on the release
of strontium-90, cesium-137, and/or radon-222. The present
level of knowledge for control of these radionuclides is at
least as great as that for krypton-85 and iodine-129. (P-l,
P-13,P-25,P-27,F-2)
RESPONSE: The standard does not include specific limits on the
quantities of strontium-90 (half-life 28 years) or cesium-137
(half-life 30 years) released to the environment because they
are expected to be adequately limited by the dose limits for
individuals. These radionuclides typically comprise only 10X
or less of the total activity released in liquid effluents from
reactors (no releases of these radionuclides are expected to
occur from other operations). However, in light of the
deletion of curie limits from Appendix I (in contrast to
Appendix I as it was originally proposed) the Agency will
maintain continuing cognizance of releases and environmental
behavior of these radionuclides. If operational experience
indicates that the releases of these radionuclides are higher
than anticipated or that there is a buildup in the environment,
the Agency will consider these facts during periodic review of
the adequacy of the standard.
As discussed in the notice of proposed rulemaking for these
standards (40FR23420) , sufficient uncertainties are associated
with our knowledge of both the health impact and costs and
efficacy of control measures for radon-222 that the Agency does
not consider it advisable to propose standards for this
radioisotope as part of this rulemaking. The Agency has this
problem under continuing study.
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COMMENT 14: The standard should address accidental releases,
as well as planned releases, since the former may have the
largest public health impact and cannot be distinguished from
normal releases after they have entered the environment.
(P-llfP-13,P-19,P-24,P-25,S-15)
RESPONSE: Although accidental releases could have a
significant public health impact and may, in some cases, not be
distinguishable from normal releases, it is not feasible to
include accidents within the scope of this standard, which has
been derived out of a consideration of the costs and associated
health benefits of controls over planned releases. Such an
analysis of accidental releases has not been made. Protection
against the consequences of accidents is provided by emergency
response plans based, in part, upon Radiation Protective Action
Guides recommended by this Agency.
COMMENT 15: Implicit in the duty to establish standards is the
responsibility to monitor implementation and ensure compliance.
The standards should address these aspects of EPA's
responsibility for radiation protection of the public from
nuclear power operations. (P-25)
RESPONSE: The Agency will review the implementation of these
standards through review of NRC's implementing regulations and
normally reported monitoring data, and by occasional EPA field
studies at selected facilities. It would not, however, be
appropriate to incorporate these functions into the standards
themselves, since the responsibility for implementing EPA's
standards rests with the NRC, not EPA. The Agency believes
that the above procedures will adequately insure satisfactory
implementation of these standards. (See, also, comments 91,
94, 103, 104, and 107.)
COMMENT 16: The standard and the Final Environmental Statement
should be modified to include provision for and analysis of
nuclear energy parks. (P-14,1-6,1-13,1-14,1-22,1-26,F-5)
RESPONSE: An extended discussion of the relation of the
standard to the nuclear energy center concept has been added to
this statement (see Section VI-F). The recent NRC study
"Nuclear Energy Center Site Survey" (NUREG-0001) implies that,
based upon use of current LWR effluent control technology and
projected energy center siting practices, the standard will be
satisfied. However, the Agency recognizes that uncertainty
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must remain regarding any such proposals for the distant
future, and will review any specific proposals that may be made
and consider the need for revision of the standards in the
future, if this appears to be necessary.
B. STATUTORY BASIS
COMMENT 17: The standards should be expressed in terms of
population dose, or dose to suitable samples of the public,
since this is properly the domain of EPA's authority, not
individual doses, which are the responsibility of NRC.
(P-22,I-U,I-9)
RESPONSE: There is no such limitation on EPA's authority.
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, which transferred to EPA the
authority formerly exercised by the AEC to set environmental
radiation standards, specifically provides for "...limits on
radiation exposures..." without qualification. In addition,
this same authority was used by AEC, before it was transferred
to EPA, to establish all of the 10CFR20 limits on individual
do se s.
COMMENT 18: The standards limiting the total quantity of
specific long-lived radioactive materials entering the
environment are not "generally applicable standards," since the
designated isotopes are released principally from one type of
operation only (fuel reprocessing), and because these limits
depend upon the amount of power produced. EPA should, instead,
limit the concentration of these materials in the environment.
(I-19,F-4,F-5)
RESPONSE: The transfer to EPA of authority to establish
generally applicable environmental radiation standards
specifically provides for "...limits on...quantities of
radioactive materials...." This authority does not require
that a limited radioisotope be released from more than one type
of operation or that the amount permitted be independent of the
size of the operation. It should also be noted that several
long-lived materials released from the fuel cycle are emitted
from a variety of fuel cycle operations in any case (e.g.,
tritium and carbon-14) . Limits on concentration would not
provide adequate environmental protection since they would not
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limit the quantity released and, therefore, the total impact of
these materials.
COMMENT 19: The environmental analysis should include the
impact on occupational workers and their progeny. (P-25,3-15,
F-6)
RESPONSE: EPA's authority to establish environmental standards
is limited to "...the general environment outside the
boundaries of locations under the control of persons possessing
or using radioactive material..." and, therefore, does not
include occupational workers. However, the Agency is presently
reviewing the adequacy of Federal Radiation Guides and guidance
for occupational exposure under its more general Federal
radiation guidance authority. (See, also. Comment 85.)
C. RATIONALE FOR THE STANDARDS
COMMENT 20: Cost-effectiveness is useful for determining the
most effective alternative to achieve an objective. However, a
cost-benefit analysis is needed to justify the reasonableness
of the objective. (1-24,1-3,3-15)
RESPONSE: The standard has as its objective the reduction of
the potential public health impact of radioactive effluents
from the uranium fuel cycle. The cost-effectiveness of various
options to achieve this end were examined, and a judgment made
that the limiting rate of spending appropriate to achieve this
objective was in the range of 100 to 500 thousand dollars per
health effect averted. Such a procedure will insure that the
total (internal plus external) environmental and public health
cost of the activity is minimized. A cost-benefit analysis has
a different purpose. Such an analysis would attempt to
determine the net benefit of the activity (production of
electrical power by use of the uranium fuel cycle) by
accounting for all costs, including residual external
environmental and public health costs (at some level of
control, such as that required by the standard). This net
benefit could then be examined: a) to determine if it is
negative or positive (in the former case the activity should be
abandoned), and b) in comparison with the net benefits of
alternative nteans (solar, fossil, or other nuclear fuel cycles)
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to achieve the same end (electrical power) , so as to form a
judgment on the most beneficial alternative. However desirable
such an analysis might be, it is not germane to the process of
choosing the appropriate level for standards to limit normal
releases of effluents from a particular fuel cycle, a process
which is merely one of the preliminary judgments required as an
input to an overall cost-benefit analysis.
COMMENT 21: EPA should await the results of the EPA-sponsored
National Academy of Sciences' study on cost-effectiveness
methodology before proceeding. EPA should also await the
promised NRC rulemaking to determine a cost per dose commitment
standard for use in cost-benefit applications. Finally, EPA
should join with NRC in this rulemaking to establish
appropriate monetary values for reduction of radiation doses to
the population. (1-4,1-13,1-25,S-15)
RESPONSE: The National Academy of Sciences' study is directed
toward assessment of the benefits of radiation, not the cost-
effectiveness of exposure reduction. It is therefore not
germane to this rulemaking. The NRC interim assessment of a
limiting value to be placed on partial assessments of
population dose reduction within a 50-mile radius of a light-
water-cooled reactor has not been reviewed or accepted by EPA
as an appropriate measure of the value to be placed on total
population exposures from the entire fuel cycle, or from
radiation exposures in general. EPA and NRC are considering
the feasibility and appropriateness of a joint effort to
consider this or equivalent quantitative measures of the value
of population dose reduction, but unless and until both the
scope and timetable for such an effort are mutually agreed upon
the applicability to this or future EPA and NRC rulemakings
must remain speculative.
COMMENT 22: Appendix I uses $1000 as a reasonable dollar
expenditure per man-rem for population exposure reduction.
This would have been a better technical basis for establishing
the standards. (1-14)
RESPONSE: EPA believes that placing a limiting dollar value on
spending for the avoidance of health effects in large
populations provides a more meaningful basis for deriving
standards to protect public health than establishing a dollar
value for a unit of dose. In addition, when translated into
dollars per health effect avoided, $1000 per man-rem to the
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whole body yields a rather high value - $1,400,000 per health
effect. it is not clear that this interim NRC value, which is
higher by a factor of 3-1U than that used by EPA, is an
appropriate limiting value for such spending. (See, also,
Comment 20.)
COMMENT 23: The standards, in effect, represent an application
of "as low as practicable." This principle was never intended
to apply to the establishment of standards, but was intended,
rather, as guidance to "...those responsible for irradiation
of...members of the public." (P-15)
RESPONSE: A distinction must be made between numerical
criteria intended for use as general guidance, such as the
Federal Radiation Guides or the recommendations of various
bodies associated with the scientific community and/or
professional groups, and standards established by the Federal
government for the regulation of an industry much of which is,
as it should be in our free enterprise system, subject to the
profit motive. The standards are not general radiation
guidance; they are, instead, the doses to members of the
general public which the Agency has concluded are appropriate
maxima specifically for operations of the commercial nuclear
power industry as it exists today. It would not be either fair
or appropriate to leave such decisions to the managers of
individual facilities. Operational use of the "as low as
practicable" principle, although it is essential for
encouraging good day-to-day health physics practice, provides
no criteria for how "low" is "practicable," and does not
adequately address environmental contamination by long-lived
radionuclides.
COMMENT 24: The standards and their cost-effectiveness are not
supported by the data and information in the draft statement.
The maximum annual dose limits appear to be based on an
analysis of the best performance capability of fuel cycle
facilities. This is likely to be not cost-effective. (1-14
F-5)
RESPONSE: Data on the cost-effectiveness of typical controls
required to satisfy the standards are provided in Section V-A
and its associated references. Best performance capability is
considerably better than these control levels (usually at least
an order of magnitude better) and was not used as a basis for
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the standards, since it is generally not cost-effective, as the
comment suggests.
COMMENT 25: EPA appears to be lowering environmental limits
because the industry has demonstrated the capability to operate
below present limits, rather than out of a need to provide
public health protection beyond that now achieved by the
industry. (1-16,1-17,F-5)
RESPONSE: The limits have been justified specifically upon the
basis of the additional public health protection they would
provide, and not on the basis of using best current technology
regardless of the cost or the benefit derived.
COMMENT 26: Current Federal Radiation Guides coupled with
existing NRC regulations are adequate to protect the public.
There is therefore no need for the standards.
(1-2 a,1-25,1-26,F-4,F-5)
RESPONSE: The Agency does not believe that the Federal
Radiation Guides alone are adequate as standards for regulation
of a major source such as the uranium fuel cycle. The reasons
have been set forth in Section II of this statement. NRC
regulations, such as Appendix I, in addition to not being
standards, exist in the form of so-called "ALAP" design
guidance only for light-water-cooled reactors, provide no upper
limits on public exposure from reactor or any other fuel cycle
sites, other than the unnecessarily permissive Fe aral
Radiation Guides, and do not address long-lived r.. iioactive
materials.
COMMENT 27: The draft statement has not justified the maximum
dose levels, since it is not shown how the information in the
draft statement and supporting documents was used to arrive at
the standards. (1-14,1-17,1-19,I-25rF-5)
RESPONSE: The Final Environmental Statement has been expanded
to provide a more extended exposition of the relation between
the capabilities of control technology, the benefits of reduced
dose to individuals and populations, the costs of achieving
these benefits, and the standards (see Section V.D.). In
general, however. Table 3 of the statement specifies the dose
levels attainable using typical cost-effective levels of
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control, and the standards in most cases simply reflect these
1^*1« r,i,,e consideration of the need for a margin of operating
COMMENT 28: The objective of the standard is to "...assure
protection of the general public from unnecessary radiation
exposures...in the general environment." EPA should establish
the standard to apply to a suitable sample of the population
rather than to any member of the public. (1-4)
RESPONSE: These standards are not Federal Radiation Guides.
which, in any case, also include numerical guides for
individuals in order to provide protection to the general
£ i?« The definition °f "* suitable sample of the public" is
too difficult a problem for regulatory application in a
standard of the kind proposed. Protection of the general
public is believed to be quite adequately provided for, in any
case, by the combination of individual dose limits and limits
on quantities of long-lived radioactive materials to be
released to the general environment.
COMMENT 29: The quantity of health effects potentially
produced, whether Appendix I or EPA's standard is in force, is
Ip^p^iV^*16'11- Therefore' the standard is not needed,
RESPONSE: The potential health impacts of Appendix I and the
standard are not the same (see Table 10) . In addition, it is
important to make a distinction between the guidance provided
by Appendix I and the uranium fuel cycle standard. The former
provides design objectives for radioactive material in liqht-
water-cooled nuclear power reactors and specifies levels at
which reporting and corrective action is required during
operation, while the latter provides a standard for the entire
uranium fuel cycle (excluding mines, transportation, and waste
management). in addition, the standard limits the release of
long-lived materials (Appendix I does not), which are
responsible for the majority of the potential health impact of
the fuel cycle.
COMMENT 30: The model used to determine the total population
dose should have a cutoff point (generally considered to be
less than 1 mrem/yr) below which the radiation dose to
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individuals is small enough to be ignored. For excimple, doses
to populations beyond 80 km from the source, or beyond the time
of plant shutdown should not be considered. In particular,
holdup of krypton-85 is not justified since the average total
body dose rate by the year 2000 is expected to be only 0.04
mrem/yr. (1-15,1-25)
RESPONSE: Radiation doses caused by man's activities are
additive to the natural radiation background of about 80-100
mrem/yr whole-body dose to which everyone is exposed. It is
extremely unlikely that there is the abrupt discontinuity in
the dose-effect relationship, whatever its shape or slope, at
the dose level represented by the natural radiation background
that would be required to justify a conclusion that some small
additional radiation dose caused by man's activities can be
considered harmless and may reasonably be ignored.
For this reason, it is appropriate to sum small doses
delivered to large population groups to determine the
integrated population dose. The integrated population dose may
then be used to calculate potential health effects to assist in
making judgments on the risks resulting from radioactive
effluent releases from uranium fuel cycle facilities, and the
reasonableness of costs that would be incurred to mitigate
these risks.
COMMENT 31: EPA used worldwide populations in deriving the
health benefits of krypton control. Only United States
population exposure should be used until there are
international agreements on krypton standards. United States
industry could be placed in an adverse marketing position
because of the added cost of controls. (1-5,1-17,1-26,F-U)
RESPONSE: The Agency does not believe that domestic industry
should obtain an improved marketing position at the expense of
subjecting the world's population to a potential adverse health
impact through the unrestricted release of a radioactive gas to
the world's atmosphere. It is also not logical to limit the
calculation of the health benefit of krypton-85 control to the
U.S., or any other limited population, since the environmental
distribution of krypton-85 cannot be similarly limited.
COMMENT 32: The standard requires the scheduled application of
control technology on a commercial scale prior to a
demonstration that the technology can limit releases to levels
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required by the standard. EPA should delay the standards on
iodine, krypton, and mill tailings until the control technology
has been shown to be effective or provide additional
information to justify its conclusion that such systems will be
available by 1983. (1-1,1-4,1-11,1-17,1-25, S-18,F-l,F-6)
RESPONSE: EPA has determined to its satisfaction that the
required technology is either now available or has a high
probability of being available well before the effective date
of the applicable portion of the standard. Additional
information on these points is presented in Section VIII-B and
in reference 5. Furthermore, it is the policy of the Agency to
provide as much advance notice of new requirements as possible,
so that industry may have adequate time for advanced planning
in order to minimize difficult and expensive retrofit
situations. If it should develop that any of the controls
required to implement the standard does not achieve expected
performance capability at reasonable cost and in a timely
manner, the Agency will take this into account in its periodic
review of the standards and make any adjustment that appears
warranted at that time.
COMMENT 33: EPA should not adopt regulations requiring krypton
effluent controls not yet successfully demonstrated or
commercially available. (1-1,1-4,I-llr1-15,1-17,1-25,S-18,F-1)
RESPONSE: Cryogenic distillation systems are presently beinq
offered commercially for both light-water reactors and fuel
reprocessing plants. The Brunswick boiling water reactor is
using or about to use a cryogenic distillation system to treat
its condenser air ejector offgas, while the Japanese are
installing the same type of system on the Tokai-Mura fuel
reprocessing plant. Exxon's Nuclear Fuel Recovery and
Recycling Center will also incorporate a cryogenic distillation
system as a prototype facility on an "as low as reasonably
achievable basis." Therefore, it would appear that cryogenic
distillation systems are now commercially available. With
further development, selective adsorption systems could also be
made available for fuel reprocessing plants. Thus, there is
enough time before 1983 to determine whether or not these
systems, which are being used or are about the be used, will be
successful.
COMMENT 34: EPA should justify the statement that waste
management is an improvement over dispersal. (S-15)
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RESPONSE: This matter is discussed in Section VI-E. It is
believed to be self-evident that containment and removal from
the biosphere, with only a small possibility of accidental
release, represents an improvement over unrestricted dispersal
into the biosphere.
D. TECHNICAL ISSUES
1. Environmental Pathways
COMMENT 35: EPA environmental transport models are
inadequately documented or of questionable validity.
(I-U,1-5,1-15,I-23,I-25,I-27,F-5)
RESPONSE: The Agency believes that the models used in the
analysis which supports the standard are valid and adequate for
that purpose. These models are documented in the supporting
documents entitled, "Environmental Analysis of the Uranium Fuel
Cycle" (2-5) and are not, therefore, discussed in the statement
itself. In instances where commenters have identified specific
cases of alleged lack of documentation or validity, these are
addressed in subsequent comments. However, the Agency believes
that the documentation of models provided is adequately
detailed to assess the validity of these results, which, in any
case, can also be directly compared to other findings using
alternative models, effluent measurements at operating
facilities, and environmental measurements. While some
individual parameters in EPA models may vary somewhat from
certain parameters in other models, the overall results do not
vary substantially in most cases.
In general EPA has used standard models in deriving its
conclusions for these standards. They are not intended to be
either overly conservative or liberal, but to be as
representative as possible of actual practice and conditions.
The Agency did not feel constrained to use models based on past
practices if more recent information indicated that changes
were justified. This was particularly true regarding dose
conversion factors (i.e., for plutonium and uranium
particulates) where basic data compiled by the ICRP in 1959 (7)
has been superseded by more recent material. These departures
from "standard" practice are noted in the supporting, documents
referenced above.
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The Agency, of necessity, used generic models for each class
of facility in the uranium fuel cycle to achieve a common base
for the consideration of radiation doses and the capabilities
of radioactive effluent control technology. Generic models are
expected to provide a reasonable approximation to conditions at
actual plant sites, but will not be valid for particular sites
in the sense that if site-specific meteorological conditions,
distance to nearest residence, local food pathways, etc. are
substituted for model site parameters, then the projected doses
are likely to be somewhat different from those calculated for a
generic facility. Such differences may slightly alter the
level of control technology required.
COMMENT 36: The validity of EPA environmental transport models
is questionable because these models differ between various EPA
documents, as well as with NRC models, such as those used to
derive Appendix I values. (1-2,1-4,1-10,1-23)
RESPONSE: The Agency agrees that it would be desirable for the
models used by the Agency in its analyses to be consistent in
all documents. However, when documents are prepared at
different times and advances in knowledge of parameters take
place in the meantime, differences are inevitable. Two
examples of inconsistencies in supporting documents (2-5) have
been identified: 1) uranium dose conversion factors differ
between references 2 and 5, and 2) iodine pathway and dose
conversion factors differ between references 3, 4, and 5.
These differences are discussed below in Comments 37 and 38.
The Agency does not believe that EPA and NRC models need be
consistent for the purposes of justifying the standard. While
use has been made of many of the source terms, diffusion
equations, pathway models, and dose conversion factors used by
the NRC, the Agency does not use these values when it believes
that more accurate and recent information is available or when
the use of more simplified models is, in its opinion,
justified. For certain types of facilities, such as
conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication facilities, and
for calculation of the environmental dose commitment of long-
lived materials, no NRC models are currently available.
COMMENT 37: The dose conversion factor for lung doses due to
aerosols containing alpha-emitters is not consistent with the
ICRP II and differs by a factor of two in different EPA
publications. (1-23)
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RESPONSE: In recent Agency analyses of doses from mills (5) ,
the dose conversion factors for insoluble alpha-emitting
aerosols in the lung have been reduced by a factor of two
compared to previous analyses, because the effective half-life
for such particles in the lung was reduced from 1,000 days to
500 days in accordance with what is becoming accepted practice.
Accordingly, previous calculations (2) concerning the dose to
the lung from the inhalation of insoluble particulate matter
should be reduced by a factor of two. In addition to the
changes noted above for mills, this change is also significant
in the analysis of doses from conversion facilities (ref. 2,
Section 3). The maximum dose to the lung of an individual
living near a conversion plant using the wet solvent extraction
process is now estimated to be 15 mrem/yr; and for a plant
using the hydrofluor process, 35 mrem/yr. This class of
facility is now likely to satisfy the standard with little or
no additional control, depending on the exact parameters of the
specific plant and plant site.
COMMENT 38: Iodine pathway and dose assumptions vary widely
between different EPA reports, and are not consistent with NRC
models. (1-23)
RESPONSE: Changes in many of tv various iodine-131 milk
ingestion pathway model parar ^ers have occurred over the years
for a variety of reasons. We discuss, as a typical example,
those for an average infant. The ratio of iodine concentration
in milk to that in pasture air has increased from 620 to 1200
pCi/liter per pCi/m3 because the surface specific deposition
velocity of 0.5 cm/sec initially used was found to be in error,
and has been changed to 1.0 cm/sec. The grazing factor was
changed from 1 to 0.5 because it is considered more realistic
to assume cows are fed for half a year on stored feed. The
milk consumption rate for an infant was reduced from 277 to 183
liters per year to account for the 38% of infants who do not
consume cow's milk. The dose conversion factor has been
,increased from 0.015 to 0.020 mrem per pCi ingested due to
updating of internal dosimetry assumptions, principally
regarding the energy of the radiation emissions. The overall
result of these changes has been to decrease the value of the
dose equivalent rate conversion factor from 2700 to 1700
mrem/yr to an average infant per pCi/m3 of iodine-131 in
pasture air.
Similar changes have occurred in iodine-129 milk ingestion
pathway model parameters. However, since the half-life of
iodine-129 is extremely long, there is no decay of iodine-129
19
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on stored feed and the correct value for the grazing factor for
iodine-129 is unchanged at one. In addition, the dose
conversion factor for iodine-129 changed from 0.023 to 0.026
mrem per pCi ingested due to updating of internal dosimetry
assumptions. The overall result of the changes has been to
increase the value of the dose equivalent rate conversion
factor from 15,000 to 23,000 mrem/yr to an average infant per
pCi/m3 of iodine-129 in pasture air. None of these changes are
large enough to significantly affect the conclusions upon which
the standards are based.
COMMENT 39: The expected 1-131 doses in the vicinity of a
reactor have been found to be an order of magnitude lower than
those calculated by models used in the Draft Environmental
Statement, but the draft statement ignores this fact when
estimating 1-131 impact. (1-15)
RESPONSE: The Agency is well aware of recent field studies of
iodine pathways and potential thyroid doses, having taken part
in them jointly with the AEC (now NRC). Results of these
studies at four reactor sites indicate that actual iodine
concentrations in milk are at least an order of magnitude lower
than those projected by previously used models for the milk
pathway. The exact reason for this difference is not yet
known; however, past models probably overestimated radioiodine
milk concentrations because adequate attention was not given to
the chemical form of the radioiodine (e.g., elemental versus
nonelemental) and site-specific dispersion characteristics
(e.g., plume rise and deposition rate). Realistic treatment of
these parameters is expected to more accurately estimate
radioiodine concentrations in milk in the future. Federal
agencies are presently incorporating some of these changes into
radioiodine-milk pathway models. Furthermore, the results of
these field studies are taken into consideration qualitatively
in the Final Environmental Statement (Section V-C) with respect
to the environmental impact of iodine-131 discharges from
reactors.
Conclusions leading to the values for the standards would
not be altered by the use of a more liberal milk pathway model.
Should present estimates of maximum thyroid dose prove to be
conservative because of future changes in milk pathway models,
then less, not more, control equipment will be necessary to
meet the standard.
It should also be noted that results of these field studies
may not apply to other facilities in the fuel cycle, because
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the results are a function of the chemical state of the
radioiodine at the time of its discharge, which in turn is
likely to be influenced by inplant conditions that are
different in other fuel cycle facilities.
COMMENT 40: The environmental dose commitment estimates made
by EPA should be clarified and more fully defined. (1-25,F-5)
RESPONSE: The environmental dose commitment has been
previously defined in detail in reference 8 (Appendix A) and
pathway assumptions described in reference 4, as well as in
reference 8 (Section III-B, and Appendices Br C, arid D) . As
more information becomes available concerning environmental
pathways of long-lived radioactive materials and dose modeling
the Agency will, if it is appropriate, revise its environmental
dose commitment estimates. Until such time, however, the
Agency believes that the present estimates, which use the best
information currently available, are quite adequate* for the
assessments needed to provide the basis for these standards.
COMMENT 41: The analysis of the impact of long-lived materials
is inadequate, since it omits all exposures of human
populations beyond 100 years following release to the
environment. (P-1,P-14,P-25,P-27,I-13,F-5)
RESPONSE: It does not appear to be feasible to calculate
exposures for periods greater than 100 years, given the present
state of knowledge of environmental pathways of most
radioactive materials. In some cases, such as for tritium or
krypton-85, there is a negligible possibility for cidditional
impact on decisions for the appropriate levels of environmental
releases, since almost all of the environmental dose commitment
has been delivered in 100 years. In others there could be an
impact on such decisions because of the extremely long half-
lives of some radioactive materials. However, in all cases
where knowledgeable judgment is possible for these
radionuclides, the impact during the first 100 years exceeds
that in any suceeding century. It should also be noted that in
the case of the longest-lived materials covered by the
standards (iodine-129 and the transuranics) the required level
of effluent control is that achievable by the best available
technology - i.e., further analysis could not reasonably result
in a more restrictive standard in the near future. (See, also,
Comment 79.)
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COMMENT 42: Environmental transport models that consider very
large areasr such as the eastern U.S., are not justified. Most
of 1-129 and transuranic releases deposit within a few hundred
miles of the source because such particulate material is
removed from the air by settling and rain-out. These effects
are particularly effective when particulate materials are
released at low elevations. (1-15)
RESPONSE: The Agency's environmental transport models for
airborne releases of 1-129 and the transuranics consider both
regional deposition of these radionuclides (within 80 km of the
point of release) and deposition upon the eastern half of the
United States. While most of the radioactive material does
deposit within 80 kms of the release point, the Agency believes
it realistic to assume that a significant fraction of the
material may remain airborne for considerably longer distances.
The total population exposure is related directly to the
product of the soil surface concentration and the population
density, and increasing the assumed deposition area will
decrease the soil surface concentration, but at the same time
increases the number of persons exposed. As a result, the
total population dose will remain approximately the same. In
fact, the regional population density used in the Agency's
model is slightly higher than the population density of the
eastern United states. Thus, limiting the area of deposition
to 80 km would increase the projected population dose, not
reduce it. However, the calculation of total population
exposure is relatively insensitive to the choice of deposition
area, and the model used is judged to provide a reasonable
representation of the actual situation.
COMMENT 43: The draft statement fails to take into
consideration the experience at the Nuclear Fuel Services'
reprocessing facility cited in BNWL-1783 which reports a 200-
fold decline in 1-129 content of milk samples in the year
following cessation of operations. EPA, therefore, also
assumes that 1-129 is available for longer than 100 years
without adequate reasons. (1-4,1-15)
RESPONSE: The Agency's calculation of the 100-year
environmental dose commitment for 1-129 uses a short-term first
pass pathway containing air-deposition-milk compartments and a
long-term pathway consisting only of plant uptake from the
soil. These two pathways result in different milk
concentrations of 1-129. The difference, which is on the order
of a factor of 200, accounts for the experience at NFS.
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Over the long termr 1-129 becomes available in all food
products, not just in milkr because of its long half-life and
measurable uptake in plants. It is expected that most
environmental 1-129 will not be available to plants for periods
comparable to its 17-million-year half-life, because it will
gradually be removed from the root-zone of soil by water runoff
and further penetration into the soil. At a removal rate of 1%
to 5% per year little 1-129 will remain in the root zone after
100 years. Although some 1-129 may remain available in the
biosphere for exposure of populations beyond 100 years, because
iodine is a readily soluble element, the population dose is
expected to be much lower than that during the first 100 years.
EPA did not base its calculations of the impact of 1-129 on any
doses that would occur more than 100 years following its
release to the environment.
2. Health Effects and Dosimetry
COMMENT 4U: EPA dose calculations for tritium should be
lowered by a factor of three through the use of more reasonable
assumptions as to humidity and atmospheric dispersion. (F-5)
RESPONSE: The Agency has carefully reviewed its tritium dose
calculations and believes them to be correct. It should be
noted that EPA's tritium model considers the dose resulting
from absorption of tritium through the skin, in addition to
that resulting from inhalation, which doubles the equilibrium
amount of tritium in the body. Also, under chronic conditions,
tritium will be incorporated into body tissue, as well as in
body water; this will increase the whole-body dose by a factor
of 1.5. The combination of these factors increases the total
dose to three times that computed using incomplete simpler
models that only consider the inhalation of tritium and its
incorporation into body water.
COMMENT 45: Table 2 does not adequately present principle
critical organs by radionuclide (e.g., carbon-14 bone dose
exceeds whole body dose; bone, liver, and lymph are critical
organs, as well as the lung for plutonium, as is skin for noble
gases in addition to whole body). (F-5)
RESPONSE: The comment appears to be based on obsolete
information. The criterion for inclusion in Table 2 was not
organs selected as critical by the ICRP and NCRP in the 1950's,
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but rather the risk to humans as estimated from the 1972 NAS-
BEIR report. Since man is 23% carbon and bone is less than 15%
carbon, it is unlikely that the carbon-14 dose will be higher
to bone than the total body under equilibrium conditions. Even
if these doses were comparable, the number of health effects
due to total body irradiation are a factor of 30 greater (per
rem) than those due to bone irradiation. For inhaled
Plutonium, which is assumed to be released as an insoluble
particulate effluent, the principal organ at risk is the lung,
not bone or liver. Lymph nodes, though they receive a high
dose, are not considered an organ at risk and have recently
been specifically excluded by the ICRP as a critical organ.
EPA agrees at present with this reasoning, since animal studies
with inhaled particles do not indicate that radiogenic cancers
originate in lymph nodes. Finally, the principal risk due to
krypton-85 exposure results from dose to the whole body. As
shown in the supporting documents (4), the skin cancer risk is
small compared to the whole body cancer risk.
COMMENT 46: The environmental statement should include an
analysis of doses to all types of biota, not just humans.
(P-18,P-25,P-26)
RESPONSE: The Agency has followed the BEIR Committee reasoning
that if individual humans are adequately protected, it is
highly unlikely that any biological population in the
environment will be adversely affected. Such strict criteria
are not applicable to other biota where protection of
populations, not individual members, is the chief concern.
COMMENT 47: The linear dose-effect relationship does not
provide an adequate scientific basis for estimating the health
impact of the standards. without such a scientific basis the
standard is not justified. (P-11,P-12,P-14,P-15,1-7,1-9,
1-11,1-15,1-16,1-19,1-3,1-25,1-26,1-28)
RESPONSE: Estimates of health risk due to radiation exposure
were established on the basis of the best scientific data and
judgments available. In 19"*0, at the request of the former
Federal Radiation Council, the National Academy of Sciences-
National Research Council established the Biological Effects of
Ionizing Radiation (BEIR) Committee. The Committee consisted
of five subcommittees which examined: (1) general and societal
considerations, (2) environmental effects, (3) genetic effects,
(4) somatic effects, and (5) effects on growth and development.
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In its report, submitted to the Agency in 1972, the Committee
reviewed the available scientific data on risks at low levels
of exposure to ionizing radiations; selected the scientific
basis it recommends that the Agency use for establishing
radiation standards; provided quantitative estimates of the
risk to human health of low doses of ionizing radiation; and
clearly delineated the interpretations and meaning that should
be attributed to these recommended estimates of health risk.
The Committee considered a broad spectrum of somatic, genetic,
and growth and development bioeffects. These recommendations
of the BEIR Committee were used to establish the health risk
estimates presented in the draft statement. As recommended by
the Committee, the linear, nonthreshold assumption was made for
the relationship between doses at these levels of exposure and
potential health impact. The Agency has also reviewed the
subsequent radiation dose-effect literature and sees no reason
at this time to depart from the recommendations made by the
BEIR Committee in 1972. (See, also. Section VIII-C.)
COMMENT U8: The BEIR report extrapolates, by a factor of
greater than 1000 in dose and by factors from 100 million to a
billion in dose rate, from the level of observed effects to the
levels encountered by the general population. However, no
studies have demonstrated deleterious effects at these levels
of naturally-occurring radiation, even in areas of high-level
background. (P-12,P-15,1-2,1-11,1-19,1-25,1-26)
RESPONSE: The BEIR report acknowledges and discusses these
factors, particularly in regard to low-LET radiation and dose-
rate aspects. The Agency, at present, sees no valid reason to
depart from the BEIR report estimates. It should be pointed
out that radiation effects, including carcinogenesis, have been
reported at doses 2 to 100 times the annual background dose for
both high- and low-LET radiation. Chromosome abberations and
other radiation effects which, if not health effects per se,
are closely related, have also been reported at dose-rates
slightly above background and in areas of high-level background
for high- and low-LET radiations.
COMMENT 49: The data-base for estimating health effects should
include animal as well as human data, and not be restricted to
information considered in the BEIR Report. (1-11,1-13,1-17)
RESPONSE: Although the BEIR Report emphasized human data, it
also considered relevant animal data. The primary reason for
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using human rather than animal data is that the former is
considered to provide the most reliable information on
carcinogenesis in humans due to ionizing radiation. The Agency
believes that conjectures about the radiation dose-response
relationship based upon experimental results for carcinogenesis
in animals, and the extrapolation of such data to man for the
purpose of making estimates of carcinogenesis in humans is
subject to many uncertainties. These include the short life
span of animals compared to man and differences in the
specificity of animal and human cancers and, possibly,
mechanisms of induction.
COMMENT 50: Estimates of health risk to non-U.S. populations,
especially in underdeveloped countries, are grossly exaggerated
because they are based on U.S. life expectancy. In a country
where life expectance is 45 years, the risk is probably three
times smaller. (P-16,S-18)
RESPONSE: The point is well taken, although we do not agree
with the quantitative evaluation. The NAS-BEIR estimates of
risk are based on U.S. vital statistics for 1967. Similar data
are not available for developing countries. However, it is not
clear that the error introduced by using U.S. data is very
large. The relative risk of certain cancers is higher in some
developing countries, which tends to counterbalance the effect
of shorter life expectancy. It also cannot be assumed that
life expectancy will not increase in the developing countries
over the effective lifetime in the biosphere of some of the
more significant radionuclides released from the fuel cycle.
Much of the world's population already has a life expectancy
comparable to that in the U.S. Therefore, in the Agency's
judgment, the use of U.S. risk estimates is not unduly
conservative for the purpose of estimating the long-term impact
of radionuclides.
COMMENT 51: The linear hypothesis is not necessarily
conservative or always prudent; several scientists have
considered convex dose-response relationships which project
more risk per rad at low doses. All identifiable and estimable
uncertainties should be factored explicitly into the cost-
benefit analysis in the final statement. (P-25,P-26)
RESPONSE: The Agency is aware that some scientists have
proposed a convex dose response relationship and the Agency is
closely following these studies. The Agency notes that
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currently none of the proposed convex relationships have been
developed to the point of quantitative description that would
permit risk estimation. Additional reasons for preferring to
use a linear dose-response function are discussed in the
Agency's Policy Statement on the relationship between radiation
dose and effect (see Appendix B of Volume I). It is the
Agency's judgment that neither upper nor lower bounds of risk
can usefully be used in the cost-benefit balancing, since these
span such a wide range, and, in any case, it is not possible to
assign to them quantitative estimates of confidence. The risk
estimates used are those judged to be most likely to be
accurate on the basis of existing scientific knowledge.
COMMENT 52: The analysis of health impact should be revised to
reflect a report by Dr. John Gofman, "The Cancer Hazard from
Inhaled Plutonium," which predicts a much larger health impact
than the health-effects estimates prepared by EPA. In
addition, if Dr. Edward Martel's paper on "Tobacco
Radioactivity and Cancer in Smokers," were properly considered,
it might significantly alter cost-benefit ratios of the
standards. (P-ll)
RESPONSE: The Agency has carefully reviewed the health effects
estimates of Dr. Gofman and believe that he has made errors in
developing his estimates. Dr. Gofman takes, as a starting
point, BEIR Committee results for lung cancer and assumes their
estimate is based on the average lung dose, rather than the
dose to the bronchial epithelium, as clearly stated in the BEIR
report. This error leads to invalid conclusions. The Agency
is aware of Dr. Martel's hypothesis and follows the results of
his studies closely. His investigations are still in an early
stage and information that would allow quantitative risk
estimates, as are needed for cost-benefit balancing, is
unlikely to be available for several years.
COMMENT 53: The estimates of health risk due to plutonium do
not consider the hot particle problem or other recent analyses
of the hazards of plutonium. (P-25)
RESPONSE: Estimates of health risks due to plutonium have been
re-evaluated in view of recent controversy concerning the
radiocarcinogenicity of inhaled plutonium. The Agency's
initial judgment that the present practice of averaging the
dose over the whole lung is sufficiently conservative has been
upheld by a recent NAS study of the hot particle problem (9) .
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As noted in that report, it is current practice to evaluate
risk of lung cancer in terms of observed human cancers in the
bronchial epithelium following radiation exposure. However,
inhaled particles give higher doses to the pulmonary region
where the cancer risk in humans is less. Therefore, use of the
average lung dose to evaluate lung cancer risks is considered
to be conservative.
COMMENT 54: The radiation dose-effect relationship is probably
concave in nature; and thus, the linear, nonthreshold
hypothesis overestimates the health risks. Furthermore, the
linear hypothesis is an oversimplification of more complex
responses especially at low doses and dose rates. These
considerations may make it inappropriate to base health risk
estimates on assessments of population dose. (P-10,P-12,
P-15,P-16,P-22,1-2,1-11,1-15,1-19,1-25,1-26,F-U,F-5)
RESPONSE: While some scientists believe that concave upwards
dose-effect models (such as the sigmoidal, quasi-threshold,
quadratic and dose-squared models) prevail due to repair
processes or for other reasons, especially at low doses and
dose rates where low-LET radiation is involved, this hypothesis
has not been generally accepted, particularly for
radiocarcinogenesis. Caution should be taken not to confuse
and translate many of the well-known radiation injury studies,
where cellular, organ depletion and survival experiments
demonstrate clearly that biological repair occurs, to the case
of radiation carcinogenesis, because of the lack of knowledge
of whether the same mechanisms apply. (See, also.
Section VIII-C.)
It may be the case that an overall dose-response model
should contain some degree of a dose-rate effectiveness factor
(DREF) for low-LET radiation, as asserted, for example, in the
Reactor Safety Study (10). However, introduction of a
speculative and uncertain DREF before it is more fully
comprehended and validated is, in the view of the Agency, not
warranted by the evidence available at this time for the
prupose of risk estimation for the establishment of standards
to protect public health. As additional research is conducted
and evaluated, however, perhaps use of a DREF to reduce
estimates of health impact may prove to be appropriate, just as
use of a multiple stress effectiveness factor to increase
estimates of health impact due to synergistic bioeffects may be
found necessary to fully describe the overall health hazards
associated with radiation in the environment. The Agency will
maintain cognizance of developments in these areas and, if it
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appears appropriate, willr in the future, propose any changes
in these standards that would be justified by new scientific
information.
COMMENT 55: Dose rate plays an important role in the
evaluation of health risks, and has not been adequately
considered in the analysis. (P-4,P-12,P-15,P-22,1-11,1-13,
1-25,F-U)
RESPONSE: The Agency is aware that the variation of radiation
health effects with dose rate is an active area of theoretical
analysis and experimental investigation. However, as discussed
at length in Section VIII-C, the Agency does not believe that
current arguments to the effect that low dose rates will
increase or decrease the NAS-BEIR risk coefficients are
persuasive.
COMMENT 56: EPA did not include the "genetically-related
component of diseases, such as heart diseases, ulcers, and
cancer, as well as more general increases in the level of ill-
health in its estimates of genetic effects." These effects are
important and should be included in the analysis. (P-11,S-15)
RESPONSE: The NAS-BEIR report estimate of genetic effects
employed by EPA includes many constitutional and degenerative
diseases, as well as other diseases of complex etiology,
although it is true that the genetic component of certain
common diseases is not. A specific estimate of increase in
general ill-health was not made, since the basis for a
quantitative estimate of ill-health is tenuous. A substantial
fraction of the actual risk due to genetically related ill-
health is encompassed in the NAS-BEIR estimates of diseases due
to complex etiology mentioned above, and is in any case judged
most likely not to be so large as to affect the conclusions of
the analysis.
COMMENT 57: Reference to "nonspecific life shortening" is
inappropriate, since it is not included in the analysis and its
significance at low doses is questionable. (F-5)
RESPONSE: The Agency agrees and this statement has been
deleted from the final statement.
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COMMENT 58: EPA estimates the cost of implementing the
standard to be less than $100,000 per potential case of cancer,
leukemia, or serious genetic effect averted, or $75 per man-
rem. This translates to 750 cases per million man-rem, which
would be viewed by many radiobiologists as a very high
estimate. (P-21,I-2)
RESPONSE: The values quoted have been rounded, and were
calculated based on 400 cases of cancer, plus 300 serious
genetic effects or 700 cases per million man-rem (see reference
4, Appendix C). These are median values derived directly from
the report of the National Academy of Sciences (11).
COMMENT 59: The EPA risk estimates are derived solely from the
NAS-BEIR report and do not take into account other evaluations
of risk, such as the 1972 UNSCEAR report, NCRP-43, WASH-1400,
and draft documents which may be published by ICRP and NCRP.
(P-14,1-4,1-6,1-9,1-11,1-13,1-15,1-17,1-19,1-20,1-21,1-23,1-3,
1-25,1-26,F-3,F-5)
RESPONSE: The Agency has reviewed and considered all the
published documents cited in the development of these
standards, including NCRP Report No. 43 (12) and the 1972
UNSCEAR report (13). As outlined in the discussion of health
risk (Section VIII-C), the Agency does not concur with all of
the conclusions and inferences of NCRP #43. The Reactor Safety
Study (WASH-1400) (10) had not been published at the time the
standard was proposed. The scientific data used in WASH-1400,
however, was not new, and thus was considered in developing the
standard. The Agency has recently published a review of that
study (14). The Agency's staff has not had access to ICRP and
NCRP draft publications. However, the Agency believes it is
not desirable to base Federal regulations on unpublished
materials, which are not available to the general public and
which have not withstood the test of peer review and analysis.
The Agency also notes that risk estimates prepared by the
UNSCEAR generally agree with those prepared independently by
the BEIR Committee. While UNSCEAR did not advocate the use of
their estimates at low doses and dose rates, they applied them
in their own report to some of the effluent releases from the
uranium fuel cycle.
COMMENT 60: EPA should use the "upper," "central," and "lower"
bound estimates set forth in WASH-1400 for assessing health
risks, including use of a dose-rate effectiveness factor.
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Alternatively, the statement should indicate that its risk
estimates are upper bounds, and that the true risk falls
somewhere between zero and the values given in the draft
statement. (1-15,F-4)
RESPONSE: The Agency has carefully reviewed the Reactor Safety
Study and published its findings in reference 14 (see Comment
59). The estimates characterized as "upper bound," "central
bound," and "lower bound" in that report are not supported by
this Agency; the upper bound estimate refers to the lower range
of estimates for the linear, nonthreshold dose-effect model;
the central bound estimate is calculated using a dose-rate
effectiveness factor, and the lower bound estimate assumes that
a threshold dose for radiocarcinogenesis exists.
The Agency believes that a more balanced consideration
should have been provided. This would have been accomplished
if the upper, central and lower bound risk estimates were
defined in terms that truly reflect the several dose-response
concepts that have been proposed by the scientific community,
namely: a) the convex upwards response, b) the linear response,
and c) concave upwards responses. Since the report did not use
such a balanced definition for each category, the estimates of
health risks given are unduly biased toward lower estimates of
risk.
The use of a dose-rate effectiveness factor for cancer
induction in humans is not believed to be justified by
presently available data; and thus the reduction in the
estimated number of cancers by a factor of five, as compared to
linear estimates, by the report is not justified. (See, also.
Section VIII-C).
COMMENT 61: EPA should wait until the findings of several
ongoing reviews of radiation risk are completed, including
those of the NCRP and ICRP on dose-rate effectiveness and organ
dose allocation. (1-11,1-13)
RESPONSE: Radiation risk estimation is an area in which
considerable experimental and theoretical activity exists, and
no final results can be expected in the foreseeable* future.
Awaiting the completion of any particular study would not, in
the view of the Agency, be in the public interest if further
delay in the promulgation of regulations would result. Such a
policy could easily result in indefinite protraction of action,
and is not necessary in view of the Agency's commitment to
review its regulations at regular intervals. The Agency
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expects that future ICRP organ dose allocation recommendations
will be in reasonable agreement with BEIR Committee results,
although such allocation schemes are not appropriate to the
problems addressed by these standards. The NAS has recently
undertaken a review of the plausibility of dose-rate effects
for radiocarcinogenesis for the Agency, but this study will not
be completed until 1978.
3. Control Technology Capability, Costs, and Availability
a. General
COMMENT 62: EPA should solicit cost information from industry
to establish realistic costs for use in the cost-effectiveness
evaluation. Generally the costs used were underestimated and
an incorrect factor for transforming equipment cost to
installed cost was used. (1-4,1-5,1-15,1-16,1-25,S-18,F-6)
RESPONSE: The cost information used was derived from a number
of sources, including industry sources, and is considered to
represent costs typical for the dates the specific documents
were prepared during the period 1972 to 1976. The factor used
by the Agency to transform equipment cost to installed cost is
the same as that used by the NRC in the Draft Environmental
Statement for Appendix I (15) and currently recommended for use
by industry in NRC's Regulatory Guide 1.110 (16). (Se
however, Comments 67 and 68.)
b. Mills
COMMENT 63: Although mills can meet the standards based on
consideration of mill stack discharges and available control
systems for particulate materials, based on data from operating
mills, the standards cannot be met for tailings. More
information is needed in the Final Environmental Statement
concerning the control of windblown releases from tailings
piles. (S-15,F-1,F-U)
RESPONSE: EPA has reviewed the available literature concerning
the 17 uranium mills operational in 1975. Based on this survey
it is concluded that seven mills are already in compliance with
the standard, while ten would require remedial measures of
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varying severity. For these ten cases a variety of
demonstrated control methods are available to provide the
temporary (or permanent) stabilization appropriate to assure
that the standards are satisfied. (See, also, reference 5 for
additional information on control measures for windblown
releases from tailings.)
COMMENT 64: The control of mill tailings is not justified
because the levels of emissions are so low that the standard
hardly seems worthwhile. (1-3)
RESPONSE: EPA's analyses of the environmental impact of
inactive uranium mill tailings piles, based on many studies
over extended periods of time (17,18), indicate that levels of
exposure resulting from emissions from such tailings piles are
significant. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume (19,5)
that emissions from active mill tailings piles are significant
also, and there is no justification to exclude them from the
standard on the basis that levels of emission will be
insignificant.
c. Reactors
COMMENT 65: Because of the complexity of calculating the dose
due to nitrogen-16 gamma radiation, and since this source is
not covered in Appendix I to 10CFR50, it should not be a part
of this standard. Furthermore, circumstances could arise for
BWR1s where the 5 to 20 mrem/yr direct radiation dose added to
5 mrem/yr whole body noble gas and a 10 mrem/yr critical organ
liquid pathway dose would result in a site containing a single
unit exceeding the standard. The EPA should indicate how the
high dose levels at Nine Mile Point and Bailly nuclear power
plants can be corrected. It appears that a redesign of the
shielding would be warranted in this case. (1-25,S-15)
RESPONSE: It appears to be no more difficult to assess
nitrogen-16 doses than those from any other source (see
reference 5). The absence (or presence) of design objectives
in Appendix I for specific types of radioactive effluents has
no direct implication for this generally applicable standard.
The Appendix I design objective dose of 10 mrem/yr to any
critical organ via the liquid pathway is primarily intended to
address thyroid doses from 1-131. The whole body design
objective dose for liquid releases (which is comparable to
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nitrogen-16 skyshine doses) is 3 mrem/yr. Recent studies at an
800 MW(e) BWRr with minimal turbine building shielding,
indicate that at any point more than 500 meters from the center
line of the turbine, in any direction, the annual exposure rate
will be less than 10 mrem (20). Considering the probability of
the maximum design level dose from both the liquid and gaseous
pathway occurring at the same point, the probability of a plant
operating at 100% of capacity and using realistic occupancy
factors, EPA considers it highly unlikely that any individual
could be subjected to anything even near 23 mrem/yr from a
single unit 1200 MW(e) BWR plant.
The potential for high doses at Nine Mile Point and Bailly
nuclear stations can be reduced, if necessary, through the
provision of either restricted access or additional shielding,
as appropriate (5).
COMMENT 66: EPA should consider, in its estimation of the
monetary cost to society for implementing these standards, the
added cost (extra shielding, greater setback of turbines from
rivers, etc.) necessary to insure that multiple reactor
facilities on the same site do not exceed the whole body limit
of 25 mrem/yr, due to direct radiation from nitrogen-16 decay
in the turbine buildings. (1-1,1-15,8-15)
RESPONSE: Although the Agency did consider the cost of
shielding, it did not consider costs associated with providing
greater setback of turbine buildings from rivers, since this is
only one of many considerations to be evaluated in the siting
phase of facility design. Costs associated with increased
shielding and consideration of nitrogen-16 doses from multiple
units on a single site are provided in reference 5. It should
be noted that it is extremely unlikely that nitrogen-16 doses
from different units will be additive, since the exposure field
associated with this source falls off very rapidly with
distance.
d. Reprocessing
COMMENT 67: The cost information presented in the draft
statement for iodine controls at fuel reprocessing plants are
low, and neglect some important items. These cost estimates
should be revised and such additional factors as operating
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costs, storage costs and disposal costs should be included.
(1-15,1-19,F-6)
RESPONSE: The Agency agrees, and the appropriate revisions
have been made (5). Cost estimates for iodine control were
based on the ORNL work (21) for mercuric nitrate scrubbers and
on other investigators1 early estimates (25) for AgZ adsorbers.
The cost information that has now become available as a result
of experience at the Barnwell plant represents the first real
figures on capital costs for such systems at reprocessing
plants. The Agency believes the costs from this experience are
more appropriate for use in determining the cost-effectiveness
of iodine control systems and cost data in the analyses have,
therefore, been changed. The capital cost for scrubbers has
been increased to $600,000 and for AgZ adsorbers to $1.25
million in the Agency's analysis. The operating costs remain
constant, since no operating experience is available to
validate revised costs.
Storage and disposal costs have been neglected in the
Agency's analysis, since meaningful data on such costs cannot
be developed until a determination is made on the final
disposition of fuel cycle waste. However, since the additional
iodine-129 waste that the standard will require be collected is
very small compared to that which will be collected under
current practices, the incremental cost of storage and disposal
are expected to be insignificant.
COMMENT 68: For fuel supply and fuel reprocessing facilities,
the cost estimates for effluent controls are low because of the
older estimates used in the support documents. (1-25)
RESPONSE: The cost estimates contained in "Environmental
Analysis of the Uranium Fuel Cycle" (2,4) were prepared on the
basis of cost estimates available in 1973. Updated costs are
supplied in "Environmental Analysis of the Uranium Fuel Cycle,
Supplementary Analysis - 1976 (5)." The revised cost estimates
contained in this document do not alter the conclusions upon
which the standards are based.
COMMENT 69: Adequate cost estimates are not possible for
krypton-85 control, since the removal technology has not yet
been fully developed. (1-1,1-13,1-15,S-15,F-5)
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RESPONSE: Adequate cost estimates are possible for at least
one type of krypton-85 control, cryogenic distillation, as it
is already being offered commercially for reactors and fuel
reprocessing plants. (See Section VIII-B and reference 5.)
COMMENT 70: The costs of krypton-85 removal systems should
include structures, shielding, design, engineering, testing,
and other such nonequipment costs. (1-4,F-5)
RESPONSE: The Agency has performed an exhaustive reevaluation
of the costs of krypton control, which includes the above
items. (See Section VIII-B and reference 5.)
COMMENT 71: The cost of krypton control should include waste
storage and long-term disposal. (1-4,1-5,1-13,1-15,S-15,F~5,
F-6)
RESPONSE: Until a final determination is made concerning the
ultimate disposition of radioactive wastes from the nuclear
industry, it is premature to estimate the cost for krypton
storage and long term disposal. However, because of its
relatively short half-life (10.8 years) compared to other long-
term wastes, these costs should be only a very small fraction
of the total cost for ultimate waste disposal.
COMMENT 72: The 40-year equipment lifetime assumed in the
analysis of effluent control at fuel reprocessing (4) is
inappropriate for krypton control equipment. (1-4)
RESPONSE: The comment is correct, a 40-year lifetime is
probably inappropriate for krypton control equipment. In the
updated analysis of krypton control technology (5), a 20-year
equipment lifetime has been assumed.
COMMENT 73: Krypton removal is not cost-effective, based on
its projected impact on the U.S. population alone. (1-17,
1-19,F-4)
RESPONSE: Since krypton-85 is a noble gas, it is rapidly
dispersed into the entire world's atmosphere and has no
significant environmental sinks. Since dispersal of krypton-85
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cannot be limited to the U.S. atmosphere, it is not appropriate
to consider the cost-effectiveness of control of this
radioactive gas on the basis of its impact on the U.S.
population alone.
COMMENT 74: EPA should provide a cost-benefit analysis in
terms of $/man-rem for krypton-85 removal. (S-15)
RESPONSE: Cost-benefit analyses are most meaningfully carried
out in terms of the actual benefit achieved, in this case the
reduction of health effects, rather than in terms of a
surrogate, such as population dose. However, such an analysis
is contained in Section VIII-B of the Final Environmental
Statement (as well as in previous material).
COMMENT 75: Cryogenic removal of krypton-85 carries the danger
of accidental releases of krypton-85 through the potential for
inplant explosions. (1-4)
RESPONSE: Accidental releases of krypton-85 are not included
under the provisions of these environmental radiation
protection standards for the uranium fuel cycle. Nevertheless,
designers of cryogenic distillation systems are aware of the
potential for explosions and systems are designed to minimize
the possibility of such accidents. Specifically, some designs
provide for complete removal of oxygen from the system, while
others provide for oxygen and hydrocarbon removal on a
continuous basis from those streams with explosion potential.
COMMENT 76: The limits on 1-129 should be increased to 40
mCi/GW(e)-yr to reflect technology that is expected to be
achieved on a routine basis for fuel reprocessing.
Decontamination factors of 100 are more likely than the 1000
anticipated by EPA. This would allow a period of performance
evaluation after which EPA could re-examine the standard.
d-4)
RESPONSE: Conformance with the limit of 5 mCi/GW(e)-yr (0.225
Ci/yr or 1.4 kg/yr for iodine-129 from a 1500 MTHM facility) by
1983 will require a plant decontamination factor (DF) of no
less than 300. This would be readily achieved by utilization
of iodine evolution followed by the iodox process. Successful
achievement of this level of cleanup without use of the iodox
37
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process will depend to some extent upon future operating
experience with less sophisticated systems. Present estimates
of their performance are quite conservative because of a
paucity of operating experience, especially regarding their
performance with iodine-129. However, it is anticipated and
highly probable that DF's greater than 300 for iodine-129 will
be achieved by 1983 using appropriate combinations of scrubbers
and silver zeolite, since a variety of options are available
for improving, if necessary, the conservative levels of
performance currently projected. (See, also, reference 5.)
COMMENT 77: The 0.5 mCi/GW (e)-yr transuranic limit is
unrealistically low. The standard should be increased based on
past experience and prospects for transuranic control
technology. (1-15,1-25)
RESPONSE: A typical filter installation consists of a
prefilter (roughing filter) followed by two HEPA filters in
series or by a HEPA filter and a sand filter. The prefilter
generally has a rating of greater than 75% (Group III for 1.0
micrometer particles) and offers a considerable cost savings by
reducing mass loadings on the more costly HEPA filters. The
HEPA filters themselves are rated at a minimum efficiency of
99.9% for 0.3 micrometer particulates. The reported efficiency
of deep-bed sand filters for submicrometer particles is greater
than 99%. Thus, the overall decontamination factor for the
filters themselves should be considerably in excess of 103,
which when combined with the anticipated separation factor of
the process itself between liquid and air phases of 10*, leads
to an overall process decontamination factor in excess of 109.
These estimates are based on a well-established technology.
Releases under actual performance are, therefore, expected to
be no more than one-half the standard.
There may have been some misinterpretation of the wording of
the standard by some commenters. Only alpha-emitters with
half-lives greater than one year are subject to the standard
and Pu-241 is, therefore, only to be considered to the extent
that it is an alpha-emitter (2.3xlO~3%).
COMMENT 78: The limit set for transuranics is so low that very
minor by-passes or miscellaneous losses at reprocessing plants
would result in exceeding the limit. In addition, some portion
of allowable releases will have to be assigned to reactor
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effluents, which result in reducing even further allowable
releases from reprocessing plants. (1-25,F-U)
RESPONSE: It is not evident that minor by-passes or
miscellaneous losses of transuranic contaminated process
streams would lead to discharges of such transuranics to the
environment in excess of the limit. While losses from process
streams containing high concentrations of these hazardous
materials could possibly occur, it does not follow that these
materials will be discharged to the environment. Good design
practice provides for the collection and treatment of such
losses as waste. Since the operating philosophy and practice
in waste management is containment of waste, no planned
discharges of waste are contemplated by this standard.
The potential for discharge of transuranics from reactors is
not anticipated to be a problem, since the only releases of
transuranics measured to date from BWR's are about 1 curie per
year of neptunium-239, which is a beta emitter and has a half-
life of 2.35 days. Neptunium-239 decays to Pu-239 and if the
neptunium is considered to be converted to plutonium the
release rate of Pu-239 is less than 1 microcurie per year, or
less than 1% of the standard. Unless additional evidence
regarding transuranic discharges from reactors is found, the
contribution of this transuranic source can be considered
negligible and, thus, neglected.
4. Cost-Effectiveness
COMMENT 79: Doses and potential health effects are summed for
100 years, yet operating costs are present worthed. Unless
doses or health effects are treated on an equivalent basis,
then annual costs should be summed and not discounted. Thus,
the costs are understated. (1-25)
RESPONSE: The use of present worth methodology for expressing
the current value of a future train of dollar costs is well-
established in economic theory. However, the question "what is
the value society places or should place on avoiding a death or
serious impairment of health - as a function of how far into
the future it occurs," is not directly addressable within the
context of economic theory. It is clear that there is no
intrinsic theoretical basis for application of the exponential
function associated with present worthing of future dollar
costs to this problem, which is, essentially a moral or an
ethical one. The Agency has taken the view that, to the extent
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that such projected health effects can be reasonably well
projected (and 100 years has been judged to mark the limit, for
such projections), no devaluation is appropriate; and for
periods beyond this timeframe, no quantitative assessment can
usefully be made. Although the above bases are recognized as
somewhat arbitrary, they are considered to be not unreasonable
for the purpose of making the judgments required to establish
these standards to protect public health.
COMMENT 80: The risk reduction items shown in Figure 3 have a
slope of approximately $500,000 per health effect. The
methodology for arriving at the stated $100,000 per health
effect should be presented. (1-26,F-5)
RESPONSE: Considerations bearing on the range of acceptable
costs for risk avoidance are discussed in Chapter IV. The
example quoted ($100,000) was specifically for the removal of
long-lived radionuclides covered by the standard. As a result
of new information generated since the Draft Environmental
Statement was prepared, cost estimates for krypton-85 removal
systems have been increased, and it is now estimated that the
cost of implementing the standard for this material at newly
designed facilities will be on the order of $150,000 per health
effect averted. Costs for a facility that must be backfitted
may be up to a factor of two or three higher. Section VIII-B
of the Final Environmental Statement and reference 5, contain
detailed discussions of these revised cost estimates.
COMMENT 81: Shielding for turbine shine and means for reducing
transportation doses should be evaluated on a cost-effective
basis. (1-15,F-5)
RESPONSE: Turbine shine results primarily in individual and
occupational doses; it does not produce an appreciable dose to
populations. For those rare instances in which additional
shielding may be required to reduce public exposure to satisfy
the standards, therefore, the requirement is based upon
consideration of equity to individuals and the small cost of
providing this protection. An evaluation of costs for reducing
transportation doses is difficult because the principal
mechanism of dose control is through operational measures, such
as preventing unnecessary public access to shipping casks by
avoiding stop-overs in public places and routing shipments
through sparsely populated areas. Such operational measures
can be carried out at small cost.
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COMMENT 82: Figures 3 and U in the draft statement are not
clear. There is insufficient information to show how the
figures were derived, the use of mils/kwh is misleading, the
basis for the choice of systems is in error, and the cost of
base case controls has been omitted. (1-15,1-25,1-26,F-5)
RESPONSE: These figures are intended to be illustrative of the
types of systems available to achieve effluent control
throughout the uranium fuel cycle. A far larger number of
systems were examined and discussed in the technical support
documents (2-5). The figures are intended to display only the
basic characteristics of the cost-effectiveness of various
major types of effluent control for the fuel cycle.
The display of costs in terms of mils/kwh is shown for
perspective only and was not the basis for selection of the
standards.
The choice of a zero point for the horizontal axis of these
figures (or "base case") does not alter the conclusions drawn
from them, as long as there is a clear statement of the
starting point of the calculations. Any facility handling
radioactive materials must have some degree of effluent
control, and the amount has varied in time. The base cases
assumed were those typical of operation at the end of the last
decade, or prior to consideration of Appendix 1 for reactors.
Except in the case of light-water reactors, the cost of base
case controls is assumed to be zero. For liquid effluent
control at reactors, the base case includes the cost of tankage
to provide minimal holdup before release. The estimated
present worth per GW(e) of base case controls for liquids at
PWR's and BWR's is $0.3 million and $1.1 million, respectively.
In addition, for the control of noble gas effluents at BWR's a
nominal 30-minute delay line and 100-meter stack was assumed
for the base case, as this was formerly a typical design
practice; this system was estimated to have a present worth of
about $3.5 million. However, with improved offgas treatment
designs (i.e., charcoal adsorption, principally) costs that
would have applied to the old 30-minute delay and 100-meter
stack system would now be invested in an improved offgas
treatment system. These considerations would shift the
horizontal scale of Figures 3 and 4 by $0.3 million for the PWR
case and, at most, $U.6 million for the BWR case.
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E. IMPACT OF THE STANDARDS
1. Health and Environmental Effects
COMMENT 83: The growth of commercial nuclear facilities
projected by EPA appears to be overestimated by about 50%r this
thereby overestimates the health benefits claimed in the draft
statement. More recent estimates should be used. (1-4,1-13)
RESPONSE: Estimates of future growth of nuclear power have
changed considerably during the past few years. The
projections used in the draft statement were those current at
the time it was prepared. The final statement has been revised
to explain the choice of the growth projection now used and the
implications of other possible projections.
COMMENT 84: The risk of storing krypton-85 should be
evaluated. (1-4,F-5,F-6)
RESPONSE: The risk of storing krypton-85 has been evaluated by
the Exxon Nuclear Company, Inc., in its preliminary safety
analysis report for a fuel reprocessing facility submitted to
the NRC January 28, 1976. For the case of the instantaneous
release of a storage cylinder containing 940,000 curies of
krypton-85, it was estimated that a whole body dose equivalent
of 15 mrem and a skin dose equivalent of 140 mrem would result
at the site boundary. These estimates of dose equivalents
appear reasonable and are well within (by two orders of
magnitude) the 10CFR100 regulations applicable to power
reactors.
COMMENT 85: The limits on quantities of effluents do not
consider the costs of increased overall population exposure
through higher worker exposure. (P-14,1-15,1-19,S-l5,F-5)
RESPONSE: Occupational doses should be limited to the lowest
practicable levels independently of requirements for the
control of public exposure, through the provision of capability
for remote handling or by shielding, as is appropriate. In
general, however, it is not believed that these standards would
have any substantial net impact on occupational doses. In some
cases the standards should have the additional benefit of
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reducing occupational doses (e.g., at mills and at those
reactors where additional shielding for turbine shine is
required). In others, occupational doses may increase (e.g.,
as a result of krypton-85 and iodine-129 control), although it
is anticipated that such increases will be small. The cost
estimates for control of these materials include provision for
remote handling and shielding, which will minimize occupational
exposures.
COMMENT 86: EPA has not considered atmospheric effects of
krypton-85 in proposing these standards. (P-5)
RESPONSE: As a result of comments on these proposed standards
and testimony at public hearings held on March 8-10 in
Washington, B.C., the Agency has been made aware of possible
atmospheric effects of the uncontrolled release of krypton-85
to the environment, while it is presently difficult to
quantify these effects, they do not appear to present an
imminent hazard. Although the standards are based upon the
direct potential public health impact of ionizing radiation
from krypton-85, they should also serve to prevent any possible
atmospheric effects as a side benefit. The Agency will remain
cognizant in this area and reassess the effectiveness of these
standards as more information develops on this potential aspect
of krypton-85's environmental impact.
2. Implementation
COMMENT 87: EPA has presumed that the NRC can easily implement
the standard. It appears that implementation could impose a
significant administrative burden on the NRC without a
significant change in environmental impact. EPA should provide
an implementation plan to substantiate the feasibility and
practicality of implementation. (P-14,1-1,1-13,1-15,1-25,
I-26,S-15,F-4,F-5)
RESPONSE: The Agency has considered the basic elements
required of an implementation plan (see Section VIII-A), and
concluded that a significant administrative burden would not
accrue to NRC.
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COMMENT 88: There is no provision in the standard to require
that the regulatory body consider the cost-effectiveness of the
regulations they might set. (1-17)
RESPONSE: Although it is presumed that NRC will consider the
costs associated with any implementation requirements they
impose, EPA has also made clear its conclusions that these
standards can and should be implemented without imposing any
substantial additional costs (Section VIII-A).
COMMENT 89: The implementation schedule or plan should be
developed jointly by EPA, NRC, and ERDA. There must be
coordination between the Federal agencies involved before the
standard is issued. (1-15,1-19,1-25)
4
RESPONSE: The feasibility of implementation has been examined
by the Agency, as well as by other affected government
agencies. It is the conclusion of the Agency that
implementation is readily achievable by methods similar to
existing NRC requirements (with small modifications in some
cases) at light-water-cooled reactors. It is, therefore,
considered neither reasonable nor desirable to delay issuance
of these standards pending development of detailed implementing
regulations.
COMMENT 90: Alternative implementation plans including
economic and environmental impacts must be provided in the
environmental statement in order to comply with the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969. (1-13,1-20)
RESPONSE: Since the environmental and economic impact of
proper implementation is judged to be negligible, a discussion
of alternatives would not be useful, and is not required.
COMMENT 91: Procedures should be provided for EPA review of
regulatory agency implementation of the standard and industry
compliance with the standard. The procedure should ensure that
the information be reported to the public and the Congress.
(P-25)
RESPONSE: Such procedures will be initiated when the standards
become effective. EPA will request annual reporting from NRC
on the state of compliance, and will report to the public in
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its ongoing annual report on the "Quality of the Radiological
Environment." The Agency will also continue to review NRC
regulations implementing the standard and to conduct detailed
environmental studies of selected nuclear facilities.
COMMENT 92: The standards should be delayed until NRC
establishes the necessary implementing rules, and, in
particular, should be delayed pending completion of the
implementation of Appendix I to 10CFR50. (1-8,1-9,1-17)
RESPONSE: Development of implementation procedures cannot
logically precede development of the standard being
implemented. Appendix I implementation is expected to be
completed within the three-year period provided for
implementation of these standards for reactor units, with the
exception of the updating of models, which can be expected to
continue on an indefinite basis. (See Section VIII-A.)
COMMENT 93: Implementation will involve costs which were not
addressed in the draft statement or support documents and are
not reflected in the cost-effectiveness evaluations. (F-U,
F-5,F-6)
RESPONSE: Implementation costs are judged to be essentially
the same as or comparable to those already required by the NRC
of its licensees. (See Section VIII-A.)
COMMENT 94: EPA should review the NRC analytical dose models
used to implement the standard and indicate possible
modifications for doses to "real people." It is impossible to
determine accurately the actual doses to specific individuals.
(1-15,F-U)
RESPONSE: The Agency routinely reviews NRC dose models and
will continue to do so in the future. Conformance with the
standard is to be ascertained through use of currently accepted
dose models, not microdosimetry on actual individuals, which
is, as the commenter states, an unrealistic objective.
COMMENT 95: Evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of the
standard is not possible without specification of compliance
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modelsr because these models are as important as the actual
value of the standard itself. (1-15)
RESPONSE: The Agency expects that conformance with the
standards will be demonstrated using the most reasonable andr
as required, realistic models available. However, we do not
believe that the irrpact of these compliance models on the cost-
effectiveness justifications for the standard will be
significant.
COMMENT 96: EPA should publish the models required for
compliance with the standard. (P-25,1-4rI-27)
RESPONSE: Implementation of the standard will require models
expressly designed for use in assessing compliance. It would
be clearly inappropriate for the Agency to specify these models
in detail, since enforcement responsibilities, including the
development of implementation procedures and models, reside in
the NRC. The Agency's "compliance" activities with respect to
models will consist principally of review of the environmental
transport models that NRC uses in order to assess their
adequacy. Models intended for use for implementation have
recently been published by the NRC for reactors (16,22). In
addition, models are available for other types of facilities
(23). These models are, in general, acceptable to the Agency
for implementation. The NRC appears to be committed to the use
of realistic models and recognizes the need for periodic
revision of models as new information becomes available.
Regulatory Guide 1.109 (22) and the series of documents on
"as low as practicable" control technology recently developed
by ORNL (23) both utilize computer codes that use the
dosimetric criteria of the International Commission on
Radiological Protection (ICRP) and other recognized
authorities. Although these codes generally implement models
of internal radiation dose to man set forth in 1959 by the ICRP
"Report of Committee II" (ICRP II), both codes have undergone
modifications over the years to incorporate more recent data,
particularly with respect to radionuclide decay schemes, and to
add radionuclides. In addition, Regulatory Guide 1.109 also
provides age-dependent dose conversion factors.
The Agency agrees, in principle, with this approach to the
calculation of dose conversion factors. However, much of ICRP
II is now out of date and requires revision. The Agency
believes that ICRP II should not be used to calculate dose
conversion factors for the purpose of implementation of these
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or any other standards without continuing review of the various
biological and physical parameters to ensure that they reflect
critical review of the most up-to-date information available.
The Agency further believes that dose conversion factors should
be calculated as a function of age when there is sufficient
reason to do so. Radioiodine dose calculations are the most
obvious example.
COMMENT 97: The mechanics of dose apportionment or allocation
should be addressed as well as the associated issue of
population definition. (1-6r1-7,1-10,1-15r1-17,1-19,1-20,
I-21rI-22rI-25,S-20rF-l,F-5)
RESPONSE: Since the standard sets no direct limits on
population dose, there is no requirement for definition of
populations. Verification of compliance with the individual
dose limits will require identification of critical receptors
at each site, as is already required by NRC Regulatory Guide
4.8 (24). Dose allocation is not generally required. In those
rare cases where a critical receptor may receive a significant
(>5%) contribution of dose from a secondary source, it will be
necessary to adjust technical specifications for each site
slightly downward to allow for this eventuality.
COMMENT 98: The standard should specify whether the release
quantities for Kr-85, 1-129, and transuranics refer to all
spent fuel or only that which results from electrical power
generation after January 1, 1983. (F-4,F-6)
RESPONSE: The quantity limits (40CFR190.10(b)) apply to
radioactive materials generated as a result of electrical power
production after the effective date.
COMMENT 99: EPA should present a means for allocating Kr-85,
1-129, and transuranic releases among various fuel cycle
facilities. An accounting system should be developed that
would show if it is practical to set a standard on the basis of
electrical power generation and on what basis allowable
releases can be calculated. (1-1,1-2,1-4,1-7,1-9,1-10,1-15,
I-17,1-22,I-25,1-26,F-4,F-5)
RESPONSE: The requested analysis has been performed, and is
referenced in Section VIII-A of the final statement.
47
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COMMENT 100: It is not clear whether the standard applies to
the "fencepost" or to the nearest real receptor. (1-15)
RESPONSE: The standard applies to real receptors. If, for
purposes of simplifying compliance assessments, it is more
convenient to use more conservative assumptions (such as
"fencepost" receptors) , this is acceptable.
COMMENT 101: The more conservative and more readily determined
approach of applying the standards to a hypothetical person at
the site boundary is a more practicable approach to
implementation. (S-15)
RESPONSE: The standard applies to real individuals, so that in
cases where no doses can be delivered unreasonable control
requirements are avoided. This does not preclude any licensee
from adopting, if it is more convenient, the more conservative
approach of designing compliance in terms of hypothetical
individuals at the site boundary.
COMMENT 102: EPA should incorporate into its standard an
official statement that compliance with Appendix I provides
satisfactory irrplementation of the standard. (1-8,1-13,1-20,
I— 26)
RESPONSE: It would not be appropriate to directly incorporate
another agency's regulation into EPA«s standard. However the
Agency has clearly stated its judgment on this matter and'
anticipates that NRC will design its regulatory implementation
in a realistic manner so that, in all but the most extreme
situations, conformance with Appendix I can be used to
demonstrate compliance with these standards for up to 5
reactors on a single site. (See Comments 87, 92, 97, 106, 111.
112, 113, 114, 117, and 118, for related matters.)
COMMENT 103: The standards are vague and too easily permit
variances for deviations from numerical standards fP-1
P-24,P-25,S-2,S-11) l '
RESPONSE: The wording of the variance is deliberately broad in
order to provide the implementing agency-wide flexibility in
its use. However, the standards require full reporting of the
nature and basis of each variance granted, as well as the
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schedule for achieving compliance. The Agency will review
these reports to insure that unnecessary use of the variance
provision does not occur.
COMMENT 104: EPA should establish procedures for EPA review of
the granting of each variance and provide guidelines for use of
the regulatory agencies. (P-25)
RESPONSE: Implementation of these standards is the
responsibility of NRCr not EPA. The Agency will review
guidelines established by NRC for the granting of variance, and
will also review reports of variances granted.
COMMENT 105: Variances should be permitted only for electrical
generating stations and not for other fuel cycle facilities,
since the closing of other fuel cycle facilities for short
periods would not influence the "orderly delivery of electrical
power." (P-25)
RESPONSE: Orderly delivery of electrical power could be
affected by fuel cycle facilities other than power reactors
under some circumstances. It is not intended that
justification for use of the variance be limited to emergency
situations. The variance provision has been expanded to
clarify the Agency's intent that the variance be available to
any facility which is committed to an approved program to
achieve compliance capability when this is judged to be in the
public interest. If prompt, good-faith corrective actions are
taken and the level of emissions is not extreme, shut-down
would not normally be the regulatory course of action which is
in the public interest. However, use of the variance provision
is also predicated upon a showing that the condition causing
the violation is temporary and unusual (i.e., not a normal
performance expectation).
COMMENT 106: The variance mechanism should work
retrospectively, as well as prospectively. (1-7)
RESPONSE: The Agency agrees that it may be appropriate to
establish procedures for emergency use of variances without
prior determinations under specified conditions, and encourages
NRC to consider the feasibility of establishing such
regulations.
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COMMENT 107: It is not possible to accurately measure the
potential exposure of any member of the public at the low dose
levels of the standard. This is complicated by the fact that
regulatory controls imposed on individual facilities will have
to include a margin of safety to ensure compliance. The
measurements could be very costly and even confused by other
sources of radioactivity, such as hospital discharges. (1-1.
1-15,1-16,1-22,S-20,F-5)
RESPONSE: Routine verification of compliance with the
standards should be established using the existing system of
effluent measurements related to doses to the public by use of
NRC»s environmental pathway models. Only in the case of
possible noncompliance would additional supplementary
measurements beyond site boundaries be appropriate.
Measurements at the levels set by the standards are readily
achievable using currently available environmental monitoring
techniques.
Facility designers already include an operating margin in
designing equipment to satisfy such regulatory criteria as
those provided by Appendix I to 10CFR50; this standard would
not require, in general, any additional margin. Other sources
of radioactivity (such as the rare case of use of sewage
treatment plant effluents, which contain hospital and
laboratory derived radioactivity, as coolant water) are not
expected to be significant at the level of the standard. If
they were, independent measurements of the contribution should
be made and attributed to that source.
COMMENT 108: EPA should determine the effect of the standard
on site criteria. The low dose limits may make distance
requirements dependent on normal releases rather then potential
accidental releases. (F-U)
RESPONSE: The Agency believes that normal releases will not
supercede potential accidents as the controlling basis for site
distance requirements. In those few instances where current
reactor designs (particularly regarding on-site gamma radiation
sources) could make significant contributions at minimum-sized
sites, inexpensive shielding modifications can remove this
source of potential exposure or, as an alternative, the site
can be enlarged in the critical direction.
50
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COMMENT 109: Implementation should recognize that commercial
nuclear fuel cycle facilities may provide services to national
defense and foreign utilities. (I-U)
RESPONSE: Commercial fuel cycle facilities providing services
to foreign utilities, or for defense-related activities have no
special requirements known to the Agency that would make it
unreasonable to meet the same environmental requirements that
are appropriate for the domestic fuel cycle. However, if
situations should arise in which a substantial fraction of a
facility's operations are conducted for purposes not serving
the commercial production of electric power, that portion of
the facility's operation would not fall under these standards.
COMMENT 110: Backfitting of operating facilities may be
required because of the standard. This should be discussed in
the final statement and consideration should be given to
exempting operating facilities for a period extending past the
effective date. (I-15rF-lrF-6)
RESPONSE: No cases have been identified for which backfitting
of power reactors will be required, beyond backfits required to
satisfy existing regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (Appendix I to 10 CFR 50) and the possible need for
additional shielding against direct and skyshine radiation at
one reactor (Bailly). Among other fuel cycle facilities,
significant backfitting of some mills may be required. It is
anticipated that such backfitting can be reasonably
accomplished within the three (four in the case of mills) years
elapsing between promulgation of these standards and their
effective dates. The milling industry has not indicated that
it will be unable to comply within this period. Backfitting of
one or two fuel reprocessing plants for krypton-85 and improved
iodine-129 control may be required. However, the effective
date for these isotopes, 1983, should provide ample time for
the necessary planning and installation.
COMMENT 111: The standards appear to have been developed based
upon the proposed Appendix I to 10 CFR 50, rather than the
version finally promulgated. The implications of the changes
between these two versions should be addressed, particularly
with respect to deletion of quantity limits and per reactor
limits in favor of per site limits by final Appendix I.
(P-25,1-13,1-15,1-21,I-22,1-23,1-25,1-26,F-4,F-6)
51
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RESPONSE: The standards, although they reflect the findings of
the NRC regarding* practicability of effluent controls for
reactors, are not based upon Appendix I. It should be noted
that the NRCr in promulgating Appendix I commented that, "If
the design objectives and operating limits established in this
decision should prove to be incompatible with any generally
applicable standard hereafter established by EPA, these
objectives and limits will be modified as necessary." The
quantity limits contained in proposed Appendix I are of
significance relative to these standards principally with
respect to releases of the long-lived materials cobalt-60 and
cesium-137. This matter is addressed by the response to
Comment 112. The Agency has examined the issue of multiple
reactors on a site (see Section VI-F) and concluded that
Appendix I should, in general, provide a suitable design basis
for assurance that these standards would be satisfied in normal
operations for up to five reactor units on a site. Minor
modifications in Appendix I would appear to be required to
provide for review of extremely unusual siting situations and
for cases involving more than five reactors on a site.
COMMENT 112: If the EPA standards are adopted as proposed,
using quantity limits, the NRC will have to amend Appendix I
because it is based on calculated doses. (1-6)
RESPONSE: The EPA quantity limits have no relation to the
design and operating criteria of Appendix I for reactors. They
apply to long-lived radionuclides, which are released in only
minute quantities from reactors. If, in the future, EPA
quantity limits were established for long-lived radionuclides
emitted from reactors, such as tritium or carbon-14, revision
of Appendix I may be required to incorporate these additional
requirements.
COMMENT 113: EPA does not provide an adequate model of multi-
unit sites or nuclear parks. In particular, sites whose units
satisfy the requirements of Appendix I may well exceed EPA's
standard with as few as three reactors per site. The model by
which a multi-unit site can demonstrate compliance is not
provided. (1-25,F-U)
RESPONSE: These issues have been discussed in Sections VI-F
and VIII-A of this statement. It is concluded that sites with
multiple units can demonstrate compliance using the same models
as are used for single units. (See, also. Comment
52
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The Agency did not use its own independently developed
models in its consideration of sites containing more than two
reactors, but relied on examples provided by the NRC.
COMMENT 114: EPA's analysis of multiple reactors on a single
site was based on the proposed Appendix I to 10 CFR 50. Under
the requirements of final Appendix I the standard of 25 mrem is
impractical for a site with more than two or three large units,
particularly in the case of boiling water reactors. (I-lr
1-5,1-6,1-7,1-10,1-11,1-13,1-17,1-19,1-20, 1-21,1-22,1-23,
I-25,I-26,F-4)
RESPONSE: Several hypothetical cases have been developed which
purport to show that the standards will limit the number of
large boiling water reactors on a single site to two or three.
Each case is predicated on one or more of the following
assumptions:
(1) Appendix I dose limits for liquid and gaseous pathways
will be typical rather than limiting for each unit's
operation, these limiting doses from different units will
occur simultaneously at the same location, and this
location will be occupied by a single individual 100% of
the time.
(2) Minimum site boundary distances for multi-unit sites will
be the same as those for single unit sites.
It is true that any number of hypothetical siting and
operating arrangements can be postulated which result in these
standards limiting the number of units on a site. It is also
true that in order to do this one must ignore previous siting
practices and use unrealistic assumptions.
In order to assess siting practices for multiple units, we
have examined the combined effects of turbine shine, gaseous
effluents and liquid effluents for sites with two, three, and
four BWR units with capacities that are greater than 1000
MW (e). All those sites were included for which doses from
boiling water reactors have been assessed to date in final
environmental statements; this includes seven 2-unit sites, one
3-unit site, and two 4-unit sites. The table below gives
average doses for these multiple unit sites.
Direct radiation doses for 2- and 3-unit sites are those
that would be experienced at the site boundary, for the 4-unit
cases the dose is a 500-hour occupancy dose on the river bank
53
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(these model differences are a result of differences in the NRC
models). The air submersion dose is the whole body dose at the
nearest residence for the 2- and 4-unit sites and at the site
boundary for the 3-unit case (nearest residence doses are not
given). The pathway yielding maximum dose due to liquid
effluents was used for the liquid pathway, and was generally
fish ingestion:
No. Units Direct Radiation Air Submersion Liquid Total All
Per Site Dose* Distance** Dose* Distance** Pathway* Sources*
2
3
4
*mrem/yr
**meters
2.7 905
0.6
.02 1055
.85
1.6
.2.9
1913 .86
< .01
2287 .45
4.4
2.2
.76
The trend for maximum doses for the unit exhibiting the
highest doses in each of the three categories is the same as
that shown in the Table for average dose. The worst two unit
case has a total dose from all sources of 9.9 mrem/yr compared
to 1.1 mrem/yr for the worst 4 unit case. It should be noted
that doses from these three pathways will not actually occur at
the same locations; therefore, the totals given are
overestimates of doses that would be expected to occur to real
individuals.
Based on analyses of actual sites such as these, it is
difficult to give credence to hypothetical worst case
scenarios, and the Agency believes that current siting criteria
of the NRC and industry practice will preclude any problems in
meeting these standards for several boiling water reactor units
on single sites. For sites with more than four reactors, the
site size will probably increase and/or the site layout of the
additional facilities may be varied so that the possibility of
additive doses from multiple units will be even smaller. Sites
with pressurized water reactors will have even less difficulty
because direct radiation, as well as gaseous sources, are
smaller than those from boiling water reactors. In view of
current schedules for the construction of reactors (which show
only 5 potential 4-unit sites, and no larger proposed
agglomerations through 1985), if there proves to be a real
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problem there is ample time to consider it in the periodic
review of these standards (at least every five years).
COMMENT 115: It will be impossible to implement the standards
for uranium mills because of windblown particulate material
emissions from uranium mill tailings piles. (I-3,S-15,F-U)
RESPONSE: Temporary (or, if the mill operator so elects,
permanent) stabilization methods for active tailings piles are
available that would be adequate to demonstrate compliance with
the standards at mills (see, also. Comment 63). Offsite
contamination that predates the standard is not retroactively
covered by the standard.
COMMENT 116: EPA should consider the impact of the standard if
the 25 mrem/yr limit is applied to surface radiation levels of
shipping containers. The proposed use of nonstop shipment of
spent fuel is incompatible with State and Department of
Transportation regulations. (1-18)
RESPONSE: It is not necessary to require the modification of
existing packaging and shielding requirements to satisfy the
levels specified by the standards. Simply providing locations
to which public access is restricted during layover periods for
shipments of high-level materials, such as spent fuels, would
be sufficient to insure doses below the level of the standards.
Of course densely populated areas along the route should be
avoided. With such precautions there should be very little
chance that a person could receive a dose in excess of the
standard. While it is true that there are State and local
regulations which restrict the movement of radioactive
shipments at certain times, careful scheduling and routing can
usually overcome this problem and make nonstop shipments
possible; this practice should be encouraged whenever feasible.
However, if this is not possible, measures could be taken to
prevent public exposure during layovers. For reasons not
related to the above considerations, however, transportation
has been deleted as an operation covered by these standards.
COMMENT 117: Selection of equipment to meet design objectives
during the licensing process is always based on the higher SAR
source terms. Thus, the implementative effect of the EPA
55
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limits must be judged based on SAR values, not environmental
impact statement values. (1-25)
RESPONSE: Engineering judgments concerning the degree of
conservatism appropriate to meet design objectives have been
taken into account by NRC in establishing the design objectives
of Appendix I, which arer in turnr judged adequate for
implementation of the standard for current siting practices.
It is concluded, therefore, that the impact of the EPA standard
for light-water-cooled reactors will be essentially identical
to that of Appendix I.
COMMENT 118: For any facility, an important aspect of
implementation is the assumption made with regard to potential
future occupancy locations by humans. The standard may require
expensive retrofits if incorrect assumptions are made.
(1-15,F-6)
RESPONSE: This will always be the case. This situation
currently holds for the design of facilities to meet 10CFR20
standards and 10CFR50 guidance. It is not anticipated that the
standard would introduce any burden in this regard that differs
in kind from that imposed, for example, by Appendix I to
10CFR50.
COMMENT 119: Enforcement of the standard will be extremely
difficult in the case of fuel cycle operations in close
proximity to each other and for the transportation of nuclear
materials. (I-5,I-19,I-23,I-18,S-2,F-4)
RESPONSE: The Agency is aware of no case in which the close
proximity of sites would make implementation of the standard
difficult. (See, also. Comment 97.) The Agency, also,
believes that measures can and should be taken to provide
reasonable assurance that transportation-related doses will not
exceed 25 mrem/yr under any reasonably postulable situation.
(See, however, Comment 116.)
COMMENT 120: The standard does not define "normal" operations,
as opposed to "abnormal" operations. Such a distinction is
essential for application of the limits to real situations
(P-19,P-25)
56
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RESPONSE: The NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.21 "Measuring,
Evaluating and Reporting Radioactivity in Solid Wastes and
Releases of Radioactive Materials in Liquid and Gaseous
Effluents from Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants" defines
an abnormal release as an unplanned or uncontrolled release of
radioactive material from the site boundary. Any such releases
are reported separately from planned and controlled releases.
COMMENT 121: According to NRC models, the Barnwell Nuclear
Fuel Plant will not be able to meet the standard with respect
to maximum iodine thyroid dose rate within two years after
promulgation of the standards. (F-4)
RESPONSE: The Agency considers NRC source assumptions for this
facility regarding 1-131 to be unreasonably conservative for
operations during the foreseeable future. For example, it is
assumed that all fuel will be processed at 160 days cooling.
Because of the projected backlog of spent fuel waiting to be
processed, it is reasonable to expect that all fuel processed
in the foreseeable future will have been cooled longer than two
years. The thyroid dose from 1-131 will not be significant
under those conditions. The Agency expects the Barnwell
facility to be able to comply with the standard.
The NRC has indicated in testimony that fuel reprocessing
plants designed and licensed after 1980 will be able to comply
with the standard, presumably under the conservative assumption
that 160 day cooled fuel will be reprocessed at that time.
COMMENT 122: The timing of the implementation of control of
krypton-85 is questioned as being either too soon or too late.
These comments reflect varying assessments of the need for
control of krypton-85 in the next decade and of the
availability of controls by 1983. (P-13,P-16rP-18,1-9,1-13,
1-17,1-19,I-22,F-3,F-6)
RESPONSE: The choice of 1983 as the date of implementation for
the control of krypton-85 was made both to allow time for the
final development of treatment systems presently in a very
advanced state of design and to provide control of these
releases before any substantial potential health impacts could
occur. It should be noted that the Brunswick boiling water
reactor is using or about to use a cryogenic distillation
system to minimize condenser air ejector noble gas releases.
This system uses the same technology that could be applied to a
b7
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fuel reprocessing plant. The Japanese are also installing a
cryogenic distillation system on the Tokai-Mura fuel
reprocessing plant, which is presently undergoing cold testing,
and thus considerable operating experience should be available
prior to 1983. While it is probably true that it is
technically possible to install and use krypton control
technology before 1983, the Agency does not believe that a more
accelerated schedule is desirable or justified, in view of the
small amount of reprocessing that will occur before that date,
and the present lack of operating experience with krypton
controls.
COMMENT 123: States conduct environmental radiation surveys
outside the boundaries of nuclear power plants. it is likely
that new measuring procedures not presently available to the
States will be necessary to ensure compliance with the
standard. It is recommended that the EPA provide the states
with detailed procedures and necessary laboratory control
procedures to ensure verification measurements. (S-12)
RESPONSE: Although the responsibility for implementation rests
with NRC, the Agency will continue to provide assistance to the
States, to the best of its ability, regarding quality assurance
and new methodology for environmental measurements of
radioactivity.
3. Impact on Energy Supply
COMMENT 124: The final statement should discuss the impacts on
site development for multi-reactor sites and nuclear energy
centers. site developers must know the impact of the standard
upon siting because these decisions are made many years prior
to actual power plant operation. (P-14,1-6,1-13,1-17,1-19)
RESPONSE: The relationship of multi-reactor sites and nuclear
energy centers to the standards is discussed in Section VI-F.
Although it is possible that the standard could influence the
selection and utilization of sites, it is far more likely that
other factors, such as thermal and safety requirements, will be
determining. Review of past siting practice shows that multi-
unit sites have been selected in such a manner as to provide
large enough sites that current levels of control technology
can readily maintain doses to the public within the levels
required by the standards, and the Agency expects that these
58
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practices will continue. Thus, the standards are expected to
increase awareness of public radiation dose in site selection,
but to not materially alter current practices. (See, also,
Comments 113 and 114.)
Nuclear energy center site selection and planning is still
in preliminary stages. Evidence from the recent NRC report
"Nuclear Energy Center Site Survey" (NUREG-0001) indicates that
other factors, such as thermal dissipation, will be limiting on
site utilization and that radiation doses can be maintained
within the standards for up to 20-40 units on a site.
COMMENT 125: The final statement should include a discussion
of the possible influence of the standards on the mix of BWR's,
PWR's, and HTGR's. (S-15)
RESPONSE: PWR's and BWR1s equipped with radioactive waste
treatment ^systems typical of currently designed plants will
conform to the EPA standards, and HTGR»s are generally expected
to have lower environmental impacts than light-water-cooled
reactors. HTGR's operate on the thorium fuel cycle and
therefore are not included in the present standard. EPA has
studies underway to assess the thorium fuel cycle with the goal
of establishing standards. Since light-water reactors of both
types equipped with control technology at the level required to
satisfy the standards have been purchased by utilities, EPA
sees no reason to believe that the standards will have any
influence on the mix of these three reactor types.
F. ALTERNATIVES
COMMENT 126: The economic resources required to satisfy these
standards could be more effectively spent to reduce health
impact in areas other than nuclear power. The standards should
be developed with such consideration of other activities. Such
consideration would be in accordance with the recommendation of
the BEIR report that "...there should not be attempted the
reduction of small risks even further at the cost of large sums
of money that spent otherwise, would clearly produce greater
benefit." (P-10,P-12,P-16,P-22,I-4,I-5,I-19,I-20,1-25,1-26,
F-2,F-4)
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RESPONSE: It will probably always be true that, for any given
social expenditure, an alternative choice can be found that
would yield a greater return. However, it will usually also be
found that the resources involved are not transferrable. In
any case, the possibility that greener fields may exist
elsewhere for health effects reduction does not absolve the
Agency from ensuring that appropriate measures be taken by the
uranium fuel cycle. In no case does the Agency believe that
the costs that would be incurred to satisfy these standards
represent an unreasonable use of the Nation's resources.
COJyiMENT 127: The standards can be viewed as a determination of
"as low as practicable" radiation levels for the entire uranium
fuel cycle. As such, either Appendix I and similar future
findings by the NJRC, or these standards are redundant and
therefore unnecessary. (1-16,1-24,1-27, F-4,F-5)
RESPONSE: Although the standards reflect existing findings
regarding "as low as practicable" design levels for effluent
controls for fuel cycle facilities, such findings are not a
substitute for standards. For example, Appendix I provides
guidance on the design objectives appropriate for light-water-
cooled power reactors, but it provides no numerical limits on
exposure of members of the public from reactor sites. In
addition, the NRC is considering suspending pursuing such
findings for other types of fuel cycle facilities. The Agency
believes, however, that future findings concerning design
objectives for fuel cycle facilities by NRC would provide
extremely useful guidance to the industry on the design of
controls appropriate for the implementation of these standards.
COMMENT 128: The final statement should consider the
alternative of control via an emissions tax. (S-15)
RESPONSE: The Agency does not have legislative authority to
provide radiation protection through this mechanism, nor does
any other agency, under existing law. The alternative is,
therefore, not realistically available.
60
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G. MISCELLANEOUS
COMMENT 129: The statement on page 39 of the Draft
Environmental Statement that "There are no other types of
facilities in the fuel cycle which produce whole body doses of
significance in comparison to these types of facilities" is
incorrect. Doses from tailings piles or use of abandoned mine
overburdens can cause exposures greater than those from the
facilities listed. (S-18)
RESPONSE: The comment is correct, and this statement has been
revised in the final statement.
COMMENT 130: The cost of electricity (30 mils/kwh) used in
Figure 12 of the draft statement is very high, according to
recent AIF figures. The figure should be corrected. (S-15)
RESPONSE: The use of mils/kwh is illustrative and does not
enter the cost-effectiveness determination. The value used was
based on the typical final cost to the consumer and is correct.
The AIF survey showed the cost of generation to be
approximately 9 to 12 mils/kwh, but this value does not include
distribution and other costs to the consumer.
COMMENT 131: The final statement should give more attention to
deep well disposal of tritium. (1-4,S-15)
RESPONSE: Tritium is not a subject of the standard. The
Agency will consider deep well disposal in evaluations of
alternative waste disposal techniques and in any future
standard-setting considerations for this radionuclide. Deep-
well injection would only be recommended if it is demonstrated
to be an environmentally acceptable method of disposal.
COMMENT 132: The NRC has estimated that implementation of the
standard will cost about $100 million. Such a major regulatory
proposal as 40 CFR 190 is required by Executive Order 11821 to
be accompanied by an inflationary impact statement. (1-4)
RESPONSE: Inflationary impact statements are required for
Agency regulatory proposals under Executive Order 11821 only if
61
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the additional national annualized costs of compliance within
any calendar year by the attainment date, or within five years
of implementation, will total $100 million. Even if the Agency
concurred in the NRC estimate, which it does not, that estimate
is of the total cost through the year 2000, the annualized
costs are clearly much less, and thus an inflationary impact
statement is not required.
COMMENT 133: The basis for the 1983 implementation date should
be given in the environmental statement. (1-6,I-25,F-6)
RESPONSE: This date was based on the Agency's judgment that it
would provide adequate time for installation of the required
control equipment, and that an earlier date was not required to
satisfy public health protection requirements. (See, also.
Section VIII-B.)
COMMENT 134: The draft statement does not properly qualify
health risks, and represents the health impact as absolute,
rather than providing proper qualification. (P-14,1-5,1-15,
F-6)
RESPONSE: The Agency has issued a policy statement on the
dose-effect relationship (Appendix B to Volume I), which
provides the appropriate qualification of estimates of health
risk, as did the supporting documents (2-5); and the draft
statement consistently refers to "potential" health impact, in
order to emphasize the uncertainty associated with any
projection of health impact due to exposure to radiation.
COMMENT 135: EPA should not assess the health hazards
associated with environmental radiation, since this could be
carried out more appropriately by a national or international
forum such as the NCRP and ICRP, respectively. (P-12,P-14,
RESPONSE: Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970 transferred to EPA
the responsibility of the former Federal Radiation Council for
advising the President on all radiation matters affecting
health. In order to carry out this responsibility the FRC
requested a complete review and report on health effects due to
low level radiation from the National Academy of Sciences in
1970. EPA received this report in 1972. This information,
62
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which included specific estimates of health risks, was used, in
conjunction with any more recent data that was pertinent in
making the judgments required for these standards. In carrying
out its statutory responsibility the Agency also maintains
cognizance of the reports and deliberations of the NCRP and the
ICRP. However, to date these groups have not provided specific
estimates of levels of risk that can be usefully applied to the
derivation of numerical standards for specific sources, such as
these standards for the uranium fuel cycle.
COMMENT 136: It is reasonable to consider the existing Federal
Radiation Protection Guides as adequate for the use of the
nuclear industry. (F-5)
RESPONSE: Since the bioeffects of radiation are assumed to
exhibit a linear nonthreshold dose-effect relationship, it is
appropriate to reduce the number of potential health hazards
from radiation whenever costs of control justify the reduction
in health risks. Operation of nuclear facilities so as to
deliver doses to members of the public of the order of 500
mrem/yr is completely unjustified, given a proper consideration
of the feasibility and costs of reducing doses to small
fractions of this level.
COMMENT 137: EPA should provide comparative risk estimates in
order to place the impact of nuclear power on public health in
perspective. Included in such a comparison should be natural
background radiation, medical exposure, debris from weapons
testing, and the risk from other fuel cycles such as coal or
oil. (1-5,1-13,1-15,1-19,1-25,1-26,1-28,3-15,F-5)
RESPONSE: A comparative risk assessment would be appropriate
if this environmental statement had as its objective an
analysis of nuclear power, versus other methods of producing
electrical power. It is not, however, the purpose of this
statement to justify or make recommendations for or against
nuclear power. It is, rather, the purpose of the statement to
examine the alternatives and associated environmental impacts
of standards to limit normal, or planned, releases of
radioactive materials from the uranium fuel cycle. These
alternatives and their associated environmental impacts are in
no way affected by considerations such as natural background
radiation, medical exposure, debris from weapons testing, or
the risk from other fuel cycles, such as coal or oil.
63
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COMMENT 138: EPA should attempt to obtain international
agreements to capture krypton-85. (P-5,1-17,S-4,F-3,F-4)
RESPONSE: EPA fully supports the development of international
agreements to capture krypton-85. It is therefore encouraging
to see that the Japanese are going ahead with krypton control
(cryogenic distillation) on their first fuel reprocessing
facility,the Tokai-Mura plant, and that West Germany is
actively considering control of krypton-85 in its first fuel
reprocessing facility. It is hoped that, combined with the
precedent established by these standards, these actions will
constitute a major step towards international cooperation in
controlling krypton-85 releases from fuel reprocessing plants.
It is also of interest that the IAEA is currently in the
process of developing guidance on the procedures for
establishing limits for the release of radioactive material
into the environment, which includes consideration of the
worldwide impact of krypton-85, as well as other long-lived
international pollutants, such as tritium and carbon-14. The
Agency is actively participating in the development of this
guidance.
-------
REFERENCES
1. Chalister, R.J., Rodger, W.A.r Frendbergr R.L., Godfrey, W.L.r
Know, W., and W.B. Sumner, Nuclear Fuel Cycle Closure
Alternatives, Allied-General Nuclear Services (April 1976).
2. Environmental Analysis of the Uranium Fuel Cycle, Part I - Fuel
Supply, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA-520/9-73-003-B
(October 1973) .
3. Environmental Analysis of the Uranium Fuel Cycle, Part II -
Nuclear Power Reactors, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
EPA-520/9-73-003-C (November 1973).
4. Environmental Analysis of the Uranium Fuel Cycle, Part III -
Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
EPA-520/9-73-003-D (October 1973).
5. Environmental Analysis of the Uranium Fuel Cycle, Part IV -
Supplementary Analysis: 1976, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, EPA-520/4-76-017 (August 1976).
6. Machta, L., The Role of the Oceans and Biosphere in the Carbon
Dioxide Cycle, in Changing Chemistry of the Oceans, Nobel
Symposium 20, Gothenberg (August 1971).
7. Report of Committee II, Permissible Dose for Internal Radiation,
ICRP Publication 2, Pergamon, New York (1959) .
8. Environmental Radiation Dose Commitment: An Application to the
Nuclear Power Industry, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
EPA-520/4-73-002 (February 1974).
9. Health Effects of Alpha-emitting Particles in the Respiratory
Tract, National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council,
Washington, D.C. (1976).
10. Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S.
Commercial Nuclear Power Plants (WASH-1400) , Appendix VI, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-75/014 (October 1975).
11. The Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing
Radiation, Report of the Advisory Committee on the Biological
Effects of Ionizing Radiation, National Academy of Sciences-
National Research Council, Washington, D.C. (November 1972).
65
-------
12. National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, 1975r
Review of the Current State of Radiation Protection Philosophy,
NCRP Report No. 43, pp.50 (January 1975).
13. Ionizing Radiation: Levels and Effects, Vol. II: Effects, United
Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation,
United Nations, New York (1972).
14. Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400): A Review of the Final Report,
Office of Radiation Programs, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, EPA-520/3-76-009 (June 1976).
15. Draft Environmental Statement Concerning Proposed Rule Making
Action: Numerical Guides for Design Objectives and Limiting
Conditions for Operation to Meet the Criterion 'As Low As
Practicable1 for Radioactive Material in Light-Water-cooled
Nuclear Power Reactor Effluents, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
(January 1973).
16. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide 1.110, Office
of Standards Development, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(March 1976).
17. Swift, J.J., Hardin, J.M., and H.W. Galley, Potential Radiological
Impact of Airborne Releases and Direct Gamma Radiation to
Individuals Living Near Inactive Uranium Mill Tailings Piles, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, EPA-520-76-001 (January 1976).
18. Douglas, R.L. and J.M. Hans, Jr., Gamma Radiation Surveys at
Inactive Uranium Mill Sites, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Technical Note ORP/LV-75-5 (August 1975).
19. Sears, M.B., et al., Correlation of Radioactive Waste Treatment
Costs and the Environmental Impact of Waste Effluents in the
Nuclear Fuel Cycle for Use in Establishing "As Low As Practicable"
Guides - Milling of Uranium Ores, Oak Ridge National Laboratory,
two volumes, ORNL-TM-4903 (May 1975).
20. N-16 Skyshine Survey at a 2400 MW(t) Nuclear Power Plant, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, EPA-520/5-75-018 (December 1975).
21. Finney, B.C., et al., Correlation of Radioactive Waste Treatment
Costs and the Environmental Impact of Waste Effluents in the
Nuclear Fuel Cycle for Use in Establishing "As Low As Practicable"
Guides - Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing, Oak Ridge National Laboratory,
ORNL-TM-4901 (May 1975).
66
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22. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide 1.109,
Calculation of Annual Doses to Man from Routine Releases of
Reactor Effluents for the Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10
CFR 50f Appendix I, Office of Standards Development, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (March 1976).
23. McKay, L.R. (Editor), A Methodology for Calculating Radiation
Doses from Radioactivity Released to the Environment, Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, ORNL-4992 (1975).
24. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide 4.8, Office
of Standards Development, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(December 1975) .
25. Pence, D.T., Duce, F.A., and W.J. Maeck, Application of Metal
Zeolites to Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant Off-Gas Treatment,
American Nuclear Society Transactions .15:1, Las Vegas (1972) .
67
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APPENDIX
COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT STATEMENT
INDEX TO COMMENT LETTERS
COMMENT LETTERS
-------
-------
INDEX TO COMMENT LETTERS
A. PUBLIC
P-l Dr. Marvin Resnikoff, Rachel Carson College
P-2 Mrs. Robert Stronczek
P-3 Larry Beans
P-4 Dr. Ernest J. Sternglass, Univ. of Pittsburgh
P-5 Dr. William L. Boeck, Niagara University
P-6 Philip & Denison Levy
P-7 R.G. Wolfe, Eugene Future Power Comm., Inc.
P-8 Linda Cook
P-9 Michael Cook
P-10 Dr. Robert L. Morris & Dr. Rolf M.A. Hahne
University of Iowa
P-ll Skip Laitner, Critical Mass
P-12 Dr. Daniel C. Kasperski, Council on
Energy Independence
P-13 Dorothy Boberg
P-14 J.M. Selby, HPS
P-15 Dr. Lauriston S. Taylor, NCRP
P-16 Bernard L. Cohen, Univ. of Pittsburgh
P-17 Ellen F. Beans
P-18 Dr. Bob E. Watt, Sierra Club
P-19 John Abbotts, Public Interest Research Group
P-20 Neal E. Wilson
P-2] Jerry L. Cohen, IAEA/IIASA
P-22 Andrew P. Hull, Brookhaven National Lab.
DATE
6/24/75
7/03/75
7/09/75
7/09/75
7/11/75
7/14/75
7/15/75
7/14/75
7/17/75
7/17/75
7/23/75
7/23/75
7/23/75
7/23/75
7/24/75
7/25/75
7/27/75
7/23/75
7/28/75
7/29/75
7/28/75
8/12/75
PAGE N
A-5
A-9
A- 9
A- 10
A- 10
A-12
A-13
A-13
A-14
A- 14
A- 15
A-17
A-20
A-21
A- 24
A-25
A-28
A- 29
A- 30
A-31
A-32
A-32
A-l
-------
A. PUBLIC (continued)
P-23 Ilene Younghein
P-24 Ilene Younghein
P-25 Dr. Terry R. Lash, NRDC
P-26 David L. Eakle
P-27 Robert 0. Pohl, Cornell University
P-28 Dr. Elise Jerard, IPBKESG
B. INDUSTRY
1-1 Commonwealth-Edison, Chicago, Illinois
1-2 American Mining Congress, Washington, D.C.
1-3 American Mining Congress, Washington, D.C.
1-4 Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., Rockville, Md.
1-5 Northeast Utilities, Hartford, Conn.
1-6 Edison Electric Institute, New York, N.Y.
1-7 Georgia Power Company, Atlanta, Ga.
1-8 Babcock & Wilcox, Power Generation Group
Lynchburg, Virginia
1-9 Sargent & Lundy Engineers, Chicago, 111.
1-10 Pacific Gas & Electric Company
San Francisco, California
1-11 Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., Baltimore, Md.
1-12 Florida Power & Light Co., Miami, Florida
1-13 Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc., New York, N.Y.
1-14 Washington Public Power Supply System
Richland, Washington
1-15 General Electric, San Jose, California
1-16 Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., Oklahoma City, Okla,
DATE
9/03/75
9/06/75
9/15/75
9/30/75
10/13/75
10/13/75
7/18/75
7/28/75
9/15/75
7/28/75
7/24/75
7/24/75
7/25/75
7/25/75
7/25/75
7/25/75
7/25/75
7/25/75
7/25/75
7/25/75
7/25/75
7/26/75
PAGE NO
A- 36
A-37
A- 38
A-75
A-76
A-88
A-89
A-90
A-93
A-95
A-104
A- 106
A-107
A-109
A-110
A-112
A- 11 3
A-114
A-115
A-119
A-120
A-127
A-2
-------
B. INDUSTRY (continued)
1-17
1-18
1-19
1-20
1-21
1-22
1-23
1-24
1-25
1-26
1-27
1-28
C. STATE
General Atomic Company, San Diego, Calif.
General Atomic Company, San Diego, Calif.
Allied-General Nuclear Services, Barnwell, S.C,
Yankee Atomic Electric Co., Westborough, Mass.
Duke Power Company, Charlotte, N.C.
Stone & Webster Engineering Corp.
Boston, Mass.
Westinghouse Electric Corp., Pittsburgh, Pa.
Consolidated Edison Co., New York, N.Y.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts, & Trowbridge, Wash., D.C,
Consumers Power Co., Jackson, Michigan
Bechtel Power Corp., San Francisco, Calif.
Wisconsin Electric, Milwaukee, Wisconsin
S-l State of Maine
S-2 State of Maryland
S-3 South Dakota Dept. of Environmental Protection
S-4 South Carolina Dept. of Hlth & Envtl Control
S-5 State of Kansas Dept. of Health & Environment
S-6 Commonwealth of Kentucky
S-7 Office of the Governor, Arizona
S-8 Executive Chambers, Hawaii
S-9 State of Nevada
S-10 State of Connecticut
S-ll Minnesota Pollution Control Agency
DATE
7/28/75
9/10/75
7/28/75
7/28/75
7/28/75
7/29/75
8/11/75
8/11/75
9/15/75
9/15/75
10/03/75
3/04/76
6/25/75
6/27/75
7/01/75
7/08/75
7/11/75
7/09/75
7/15/75
7/15/75
7/22/75
7/23/75
7/28/75
PAGE NO
A-128
A-131
A-132
A-135
A-137
A-138
A-139
A-142
A-144
A-171
A-173
A-180
A-182
A-182
A-183
A-184
A-184
A-185
A-186
A-187
A-187
A-18S
A-188
A-3
-------
C. STATE (continued)
S-12 State of Wisconsin
S-13 State of Georgia
S-14 State of Ohio, EPA
S-15 New York State Dept. of Envtl Conservation
S-16 The Resources Agency of California
S-17 State of Mississippi
S-18 Texas State Dept. of Health
S-19 Commonwealth of Virginia, Council on
the Environment
S-20 Office of the Governor, State of Oklahoma
D. FEDERAL
F-l Tennessee Valley Authority
F-2 Department of the Interior
F-3 Department of Commerce
F-4 Nuclear Regulatory Commission
F-5 Energy Research & Development Administration
F-6 Federal Energy Administration
DATE
7/29/75
8/07/75
8/06/75
8/12/75
8/15/75
8/15/75
8/25/75
8/27/75
9/23/75
7/25/75
8/08/75
8/29/75
9/15/75
9/25/75
10/24/75
PAGE NO
A-189
A-190
A- 191
A- 19 2
A-196
A-197
A- 19 7
A-202
A-203
A-204
A-205
A- 2 06
A-209
A-230
A- 240
A-4
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p-1.
Director
Page 2
June 24, 1975
Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460 " Re: Proposed 40CFR Part 190
To the Director:
INTRODUCTION
The proposed standards, 40 CPR Part 190, represent a vast
improvement over 10 CFR Part 20. Limits, comparable to Appen-
dix I for reactors, would be set for other components of the
nuclear fuel cycle, and limits on the build-up of certain harm-
ful long-lived radionuclides would also be set for all the com-
ponents of the nuclear fuel cycle. The Environmental Protection
Agency should be commended for this forthright action in the
public interest.
This having been said, we believe that the EPA has made
certain compromises in these proposed standards. Protecting
the public health is not done in a political vacuum. Other
agencies, more inclined toward the nuclear industry, and the
nuclear industry itself, will be very critical of the proposed
standards. In compromising, the EPA should bear in mind that
the public has lost confidence in these industries and their
supporting agencies, and has begun to place more trust in the
EPA. If the EPA is not faithful to its responsibility of pro-
tecting the public health and the environment, then the nublic
will more and more place their confidence in itself and the
courts.
This critique of the proposed standards will point out
that the EPA has not gone far enough, that certain compromises
A-5
have been made which are not in the public interest. We will
deal primarily with the proposed standards, as they apply to
fuel reprocessing plants, except for a discussion of the tail-
ings piles at uranium mills.
We will point out that the EPA, by delaying proposed stan-
dars for mill tailings piles, has ignored one of the major con-
tributors to potential health effects in the uranium fuel cycle.
Next, we will show that the 100 year cut-off is arbitrary, and
has the effect of grossly underestimating the potential health
effects due to the uranium fuel cycle. Finally, we will show
that the variance for unusual operations may allow the industry
to continue polluting the environment for some time.
ONE HUNDRED YEAR CUT-OFF
The EPA has chosen to consider the potential health effects
of radioactive materials during the first 100 years following
their introduction to the environment. The EPA has limited it-
self to this hundred year period, "because of our inadequate
understanding of their long term behavior (p.74)." This 100
year cut-off severely underestimates the potential health ef-
fects of certain radionuclides, and imbalances the risk reduc-
tion vs. cost analysis of Fig.3 (p.37).
Uranium Mill Tailings.
The EPA has previously calculated the health effects due
to uranium mill tailings (EPA-520/9-73-003-D, "Environmental
Analysis of the Uranium Fuel Cycle", Oct.,73). A model uran-
ium mill services 5-3 model reactors for 30 years. The health
effects from the uranium mill tailings pile for these 30 x 5.3
= 159 reactor years number 200 throughout the Northern Hemi-
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Director
Page 3
Director
Page 4
sphere, not including the potential health effects in the im-
mediate vicinity of the uranium mill. In arriving at the fig-
ure, 200 health effects, the EPA has assumed a 100 year cut-
off period.
The 100 year cut-off is not justifiable in this case be-
cause there is an adequate understanding of the long-term be-
havior of the emissions from the tailings pile, as well docu-
mented in the above quoted EPA reference. Uranium ore initially
resides at depths 100 to ^50 feet below the surface of the earth.
In general, these ores are uncovered in strip mining operations.
The residue from this uranium ore, after the uranium is leached
from the ore, are called tailings. These tailings are left, be-
hind dams and allowed to dry at the surface of the earth. The
principal component of the tailings, thorium-230, decays to ra-
dium-226, which subsequently decays to radon-222. This radon-
222 is an inert gas, and escapes the pile. Since thorium-230
has a half-life of 80,000 years, the tailings pile will radiate
radon-222 indefinitely.
If a projection as to health effects can be estimated for
100 years, it can be estimated for future times as well; it is
well-known how an inert gas will emanate from the tailings pile
and distribute itself in the atmosphere. If one underestimates
the health effects by assuming an 80,000 year cut-off, the half-
life of thorium-230, the health effects due to this tailings
pile increase to 800 x 200 = 160,000, or about 1.000 health
effects per reactor year. If one follows the EPA's advice
and follows radionuclide effluents, "for as long a period as
they may expose human populations (p.35)", the effects are
greater yet.
The basis for these potential health effects may be rather
easily established, and the control is straight-forward. The
uranium ore has been brought to the surface where the thorium-
230 decays to radon-222 in which form it can easily be released.
When the natural uranium is buried 100 feet or more below the
surface, the radon-222 can decay on its way to the surface; the
emissions to the human environment are negligible. The obvious
solution to the problem is to bury the tailings 100 feet or more
below the surface. If one assumes potential health effects for
80,000 years, it would be cost-justifiable to bury the tailings
pile to greater than a 20foot depth. However, assuming a 100
year cut-off, it becomes only marginally cost-justifiable to
bury the tailings to a 2 foot depth.
The health effects from uranium mill tailings constitute one
of the more serious health hazards of the uranium fuel cycle.
The 100 year cut-off undersestimates the potential health effects
and limits the remedial solution to rather ineffective means,
namely, burial at a 2 foot depth. It is clear that burying the
tailings to a 100 foot depth would raise the cost of uranium
fuel enormously, but so be it. Intervenors have long argued
that all the costs should be laid out so that comparisons bet-
ween coal and uranium fuel cycles are honest.
The EPA, in the proposed standards, has exempted radon and
its daughters, from consideration till some later time. This
exemption cannot be justified; radon should be included.
A-6
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Director
Page 5
Iodine.
Iodine-129 is in a highly mobile form at a reprocessing
plant when the spent fuel is dissolved in nitric acid. The
iodine is contained at a reprocessing plant with a DP = 10;
thus 10$ is released. These are projections for the Barnwell
facility by the NRC; the figures for Nuclear Fuel Services are
worse. It is known how iodine distributes itself in the envir-
onment. Of that 105? which is released at a reprocessing plant,
the potential health effects for the half-life of 1? million
years can be estimated. The one hundred year cut-off is arbi-
trary and should more properly be justified by the EPA. It is
clear that a period of 1? million years would greatly increase
the potential health effects, making the standards much more
restrictive.
Of that iodine which is captured on silver zeolite beds,
or in the intermediate level waste system of reprocessing plants,
the EPA should follow the waste disposal aspects. Material with
a half-life of 1? million years cannot be just buried and for-
gotten. The EPA has separated the waste disposal aspects of
the fuel cycle from these standards, which ignores the 90$ of
the iodine produced. While we agree with the EPA that it is
preferable to capture iodine than have it released, still the
effects of waste disposal cannot be ignored for a radionuclide
with a half-life of 1? million years.
It can be plainly admitted that if the EPA did consider
the health effects for a period of time on the order of millions
Director
Page 6
of years, that no nuclear industry could contain the material
with the confinement factor required. So be it. The EPA is
compromising people's health with this arbitrary 100 year cut-
off.
Plutonium.
A similar consideration applies for plutonium at reproc-
essing plants. The EPA assumes that any plutonium which becomes
air borne will be captured on HEPA filters. It is assumed that
these plutonium contaminated filters will then be buried at a
Federal Repository. Then what? Because of the 2^,000 year half-
life of plutonium-239, this is not the end of the problem. Bjr
neglecting waste disposal aspects, and by assuming a 100 year
cut-off, the EPA has limited itself to a small part of the plu-
tonium problem.
HOW LONG IS "TEMPORARY"?
As part of the proposed standards, the EPA has proposed a
variance for unusual operations, allowing the proposed standards
to be exceeded if a "temporary and unusual operating condition
exists and continued operation is necessary to protect the over-
all societal interest with respect to the orderly delivery of
electrical power". But how long is "temporary"? One year?
One hundred years? The EPA has provided no guidance. This var-
iance is a loophole for continued pollution.
One example will serve to illustrate the point. The EPA
has mainlined, for some time, that krypton-removal equipment
is presently available; the NRC has argued the contrary. In
A-7
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Director
Page 7
the FES for the Midwest Fuel Recovery Plant, GE accepted three
bids for kr-removal equipment. The availability date was 1977,
five years following the FES. In the construction permit hear-
ing for the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant, September, 1974, the
NRC claimed that kr-removal equipment would not be available
for five years, or 1979, and further, that it was not cost-
justifiable to install the equipment. There seems to be a
pattern of delay here and it will be interesting to observe
the attitude of the NRC, when and if the construction permit
hearing for Nuclear Fuel Services takes place.
The EPA has granted the industry a leeway, by not imposing
the proposed standards, which will require kr-removal equipment
until January 1, 1983. However, the NRC could grant a variance
for any number of reasons: the danger of handling krypton tanks,
the unreliability of the equipment and the need for more develop-
ment, radiation effects to workers, etc. Unless the EPA provides
some guidelines and tightens this variance in some manner, the
use of kr-removal equipment could be put off indefinitely.
THE PROPOSED STANDARDS ARE INEQUITABLE
The proposed standards are five times higher than Appen-
dix I standards for reactors. The reason for this inequality
can be traced to the method of analysis, namely, cost-benefit
analysis. Because of the natureof reprocessing facilities
and nuclear reactors, it is less costly to contain the radio-
activity from reactors. Therefore, on a cost-benefit basis,
it could be cost-justifiable to lower the whole body dose re-
Director
Page 8
ceived near reactors to five mrems per year, while the maxi-
mum dose received near fuel reprocessing plants is 25 mrems
per year. As a result, simply by living near a reprocessing
plant, the residents are subject to greater risk than those
near a reactor. Reprocessing residents are second class citi-
zens.
We believe that this is essentially a poltical problem,
and not an error by the EPA. Residents near a reprocessing
facility, such as Barnwell, S.C. or West Valley, N.Y., enjoy
less of the benefits of electrical generation, yet assume more
of the burden. Whether these residents will allow this to
occur remains to be seen. If not, then certain additional costs
will be passed on to the utilities, and to the utility rate
myers, or additional costs may be passed on to the reprocessing
facilities which simply make them unprofitable. They may have
to be operated by the Federal government.
Just becauseAcertain parts of the nuclear industry 4I4M*- »vu>*«
: controllUn radioactivity is no reason for
the local residents to suffer greater risk.
CONCLUSION
In general, we support this move by the EPA to limit maxi-
mum doses near other parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, and to
limit the build-up of long-lived radionuclides in the environ-
ment. However, we believe that the EPA has not gone far enough
in their proposed standards.
A-8
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P-2
P-3
July 9, 1975
130 Endeavor Dr.
Corte Mqdera, Ca. 914-91
I would like to affirm the pronosed redudtion
in radiation allowed by a factor of ?0 times. This
is a good sten in the right Direction. Tests on
animals have demonstrated that there is no known
safe dosage of Plutonium (Alpha Rays) that does not
cause cancer.
I would like to see further reductions
in radiation allowed until it approaches the
natural radiation that is not man made.
Sincerely,
A-9
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P-4
University of Pittsburgh
SCHOOL OF MEDICINE
Department of Radiology
July 9, 1975
NIAGARA UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE or ARTS AND SCIENCE*
NIAGARA UNIVERSITY. N. Y.
DEPARTMENT OP PHYSIC*
July 11, 1975
P-5
Director, Criteria and Standards Division
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
Dear Sir:
I hereby request permission to present testimony at the proposed
rule-making hearings relating to the Environmental Protection Re-
quirements for Normal Operations of Activities in the Uranium Fuel
Cycle, to be scheduled by your agency at the end of the public com-
ment period.
Specifically, my testimony will relate to the adequacy of the proposed
radiation dose limits in the light of recent scientific data that the
rate at which doses are received plays a major part in the evaluation
of their health effects, along the lines of a recent scientific paper
presented at the Eighth Midyear Topical Symposium on Population Ex-
posure, October, 1974.
Sincerely yours,
ejs/dk
s^ge^. fjL<_
Ernest J. Sternglass, Ph.D.
Professor of Radiological Physics
Director
Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
RE: Comments on the Draft Environmental Statment -
Environmental Radiation Protection Requirements
for Normal Operations of Activities in the
Uranium Fuel Cycle.
Dear Sir:
I am in favor of the proposed standards, however, I believe
two additional steps are necessary to accomplish the desired
results.
First, an understanding should be reached with the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission so that krypton-85 removal systems will
be designed to release no more than 4000 curies per gigawatt
year of krypton-85 and will be operated in a manner to achieve
design performance. The proposed standard alone would allow
the design and operation of systems with only minimum capabil-
ities (50,000 curies of krypton-85 released per gigawatt-year)
until 1988, when the standard would be reviewed.
Second, "The prevention of unlimited discharges of krypton-85
to the environment from fuel cycle operations is of high prior-
ity because of its potential for significant long-term public
health impact over the entire world" (p. 130). The EPA should
"advise the President with regard to radiation matters, directly
or indirectly affecting health" (p. 16) that there is a need for
an international treaty limiting the atmospheric discharge of
radioactive gases and vapors with a radioactive half-life of
over one year.
I would like to illustrate my point by means of an analogy.
Suppose a village just outside a heavy industrial area such
as Niagara Falls or Gary, Indiana adopted a very strict air
pollution code to protect the health of its citizens. A very
PRESBYTERIAN-UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL PITTSBURGH. PA 15261
A-10
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NIAGARA UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
NIAGARA UNIVERSITY. N. Y.
DEPARTMENT OF PHYSICS
p. 2
DEPARTMENT OF PHYSICS
NIAGARA UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
NIAGARA UNIVERSITY. N. Y.
valid report, justifying the code, could be prepared to show
how much the citizens would benefit by controlling the air
pollution sources in the village. The report would be in-
complete without a discussion of the quality of the incoming
air and the potentially large benefits to the citizens if air
pollution sources outside the village were also controlled.
The fact that operations within the village did not further
degrade the air they breathe remains as only partial solution
to a public health problem.
Krypton-85 passes freely and easily across national boundaries
as well as oceans and mountain barriers. Since krypton-85 is
not labeled by country of origin, an analysis that considers
only that portion of the krypton-85 produced in the U.S. is
incomplete and lacking in perspective. I suggest that the
section on Environmental Impact (p. 74-81 and figures 6,7,8)
be revised to include projections of the global inventories
of krypton-85, carbon-14 and tritium from all sources includ-
ing fusion plants until the year 2025. There should also be
a comparison between the uncontrolled global inventories and
the global inventories if only the U.S. adopts containment
policies. Estimates of the effect on the global inventory of
a containment policy adopted by other individual countries- or
regions, on a country by country basis,would be very helpful.
An examination of those comparisons would make the need for
international cooperation apparent. The responsibility of the
EPA to the american people seems to require the EPA to make
some effort to secure a treaty limiting the krypton-85, tritium
and carbon-14 concentrations in air coming into our country.
There are several specific areas where additional information
would improve the accuracy or completeness of the draft state-
ment.
A. The draft statement does not mention the quantity
of krytpon-85 per gigawatt-year in an uncontrolled
• release. A private communication states 370,000
curies per gigawatt-year was the figure assumed for
the statement.
B. The decontamination factor mentioned on p. 80 should
be changed from 10 to 7.6.
C. It should be made clear that the model projections
on p. 38 are significantly different from the pro-
posed standard. The difference between 50,000
curies per gigawatt-year and 4000 curies per
gigawatt-year is large enough to question the
validity of applying that model to the proposed
standard.
The vertical axis in figure 8 should be given in
terms of the global atmospheric inventory, since
there is no distinction in properties or health
effects produced between U.S. origin krypton-85
and krypton-85 from any other source. Figure 8
should indicate a range of concentrations as
limited on one hand by a decontamination factor
of 100 and on the other hand by a decontamination
factor of 7.6 (the actual D.F. under the proposed
standard).
Comments on containment of carbon-14 by a krypton
containment system (eg. p. 38, p. 82, p. 84)
should be modified to indicate that no such bene-
ficial effect is expected from the selective ab-
sorption in flourocarbons type system favored by
fuel reprocessing plant operators.
Projections of atmospheric krypton-85, carbon-14
and tritium should be compared to the atmospheric
inventories of these isotopes of natural origin.
The sum of the atmospheric ionization rates due
to projected concentrations of krypton-85, carbon-
14 and tritium should be compared to natural back-
ground ionization rate expressed in the same units,
for typical land and sea stations. This last com-
parison will show that the ionization rate produced
by the concentration of krypton-85, projected for
2025 will approach the natural background ionization
rate at oceans stations. An inescapable conclusion
is that natural phenomena related to atmospheric
ionization will be affected as the ionization rate
is increased by reactor by-products in the atmos-
phere. In my opinion, an environmental impact state-
ment that focuses on radiobiological effects to the
exclusion of other phenomena is incomplete.
A-11
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NIAGARA UNIVERSITY
COLLIOI OF AHTS AND SCIINCIS
NIAOAKA UNIVERSITY. N. Y.
P-6
* JlO 1 OCjRA.r HY Architecture Landscape Commercial
Philip R. Levy
DIPAMTMINT OF PHYSICS
p. 4
5161 NE Wistaria Dr.
Portland, Oregon 97213
(503) 287-3675
N?L P TT exPressed in this letter are my own. My employer
Niagara University, has made no official statement regarding
atmospheric radioactivity or nuclear facilities. 9arain9
Very truly yours,
William L. Boeck, Ph.D
Professor
Department of Physics
Niagara University
WLB/ca
July 14, 1975
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
Dear People :
My wife and I are quite concerned about the various hazards
involved in the nuclear industry, especially the as yet
unknown effects of loner term radiation exposure. Future
generations deserve the most conservative evaluation of
"permissible" radiation levels. As I understand it, your
proposed standards for radiation protection (published
*?• 2; 1975) assume a direct linear relationship between
radiation exposure and biological functioning, uertainly
this position seems very logical and understandable in
light of much published concern about radiation exposure.
And most importantly, your position will afford a greater
level of protection for all life on the planet, now and for
many, many years to come.
Thank you for your understanding.
Sincerely,
Philip and nenison Levy
A-12
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P-7
P-8
EUGENE FUTURE POWER COMMITTEE INC.
P.O. Box 5274 •
July 15, 1975
Eugene, Oregon 97406
Director of Criteria and Standards (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, DC 20^60
Dear Sir:
(Ref: Fed. Reg/
May 29, 1975
pp. 23*1-20 ff. )
I am writing on behalf of the Eugene Future Power Committee and
myself to support the new radiation protection standards (refer-
enced above) proposed by the Environmental Protection Agency.
Composed of citizens in the Eugene, Oregon area, the Eugene Future
Power Committee was organized in 1968 for the purpose of delaying
construction of a nuclear power plant sponsored by their municipal
utility, the Eugene Water and Electric Board. A four-year delay
was implemented through initiative petition and a vote of the citi-
zens of this city. The utility has benefited by the delay to de-
termine that it is not advisable to proceed further with nuclear
power, and they have turned to alternative energy source development.
The Eugene Future Power Committee has continued its interest in
nuclear and other energy problems. Our studies of the nuclear power
technology indicate that there are still many unanswered questions,
an important one of which is the subject of £PA • s revised protection
standards.
The Eugene Future Power Committee endorses the proposed revised
radiation standards and emphasizes the need for a careful study of
the entire nuclear fuel cycle (from exploration and mine to final
storage or disposal tff fission-activation products). We feel that
the long-term health impact on the total population is in need of
further study and that conservative standards are desirable in the
public interest pending more detailed knowledge of nuclear power
technology.
We ask to be notified of public hearings on this matter. It is
probable that one or more representatives of the Eug«ne Future
Power Committee will wish to present testimony.
We appreciate the fine work done by the EPA in this and other areas
of environmental vulnerability.
Sincerely yours,
RG.Jn
R. G. Wolfe
(Professor of Chemistry,
University of Oregon)
for the Board of Directors
Eugene,Future Power Commitee
A-13
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P-9
'Che University of Jowa
P-10
State MygicHic JCabotatory
MICROBIOLOCY
StROLOGY
VIROLOOY
MEDICAL LABORATORY BUILDING. IOWA CITY, IOWA 52242
TaltphoiM—ATM Jj»; U3-5TM
17 July 1975
Director
Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D. C. 20460
Dear Sir:
We offer the following comments on the proposed EPA Radiation Protection
Requirements for Normal Operations of Activities in the Uranium Fuel Cycle.
I. The vast majority of nuclear facilities already meet or exceed the proposed
requirements.
2. The assumption throughout, for example lines 6-8 on p. 73 is that with
more restrictive standards there will be (significant) positive public health
results. We feel it can be argued that the effects will be nil or negligible.
This proposal seems to be unscientifically based since an earlier standard is
easily met and EPA proposes only to tighten it significantly since the economic
impact at the moment is negligible, but with little evidence presented to warrant
the change.
3. Over the long run, such requirements, in an energy-starved society could
prove extremely short-sighted. It would appear that it is appropriate to spend
perhaps»5 x 10 to prevent one radiation-induced health effect, but it is surely
much less cost effective than that, considering the conservative nature of the
estimates made.
In a technological society, each of us is subjected to a variety of deleterious
influences which we would prefer not to be subjected to: incompetent drivers
cigarette smoke from others, general air pollution, a variety of food additive's,
etc. Many of these are known to present a vastly greater hazard than the 34 000
"potential health effects" (p. 82, Table 10) predicted thru the end of this century
A-14
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17 July 1975
Director - Criteria and Standards Division
Page 2 -
if individuals at site boundaries were subjected to 170 mrem/year. To argue for
a half million dollar expenditure to prevent one of these "health effects"
seems unjustified. The money could certainly be spent in better ways to
improve or protect public health.
4. Philosophically we disagree with what is being proposed. The studies of
the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission indicate that anticipated health
effects in irradiated Japanese and their offspring were much' smaller than
anticipated - at doses of 90 rem and above - 3000x greater than what EPA
proposes.
5. Considering the State of Iowa individually, it is our judgement that
prognosticated future nuclear plant developments for power generation is
environmentally compatible with not only the current standards, but could
meet the proposed criteria if all available facilities and agencies for
planning are utilized at appropriate technical and administrative levels and
periods.
6. Since Iowa is a vital food production state instrumental to feeding the
nation and the world, it is hoped long time storage or processing of
radioactive wastes in our state would be discouraged. For the same
reasons, we are most interested in seeing these materials transported
to and from our power stations by adequate means. We are deeply interested
in protection of the well being of our citizens, but our productive land and
water so important to the whole world is an added responsibility.
In summation, while we feel the proposed tighter standards are
academic and indefensible from a real cost-benefit standpoint, they can
probably be met under current design conditions and those immediately
ahead of us.
Rolf M. A. Hahne, PhD
Assistant Director
cc: Mr Larry Crane
Mr Elmer H Vermeer
Robert L Morris PhD
Associate Director
p-11
July 23. 1975
THE CITIZENS MOVEMENT TO
STOP NUCLEAR POWER
P.O. Box 1538, Washington, D.C. 20013
Director, Criteria and Standards Division
Office of Radiation Programs
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
401 M St. W.W.
Washington, D.C. 20460
The following are coments to the Draft EnviroruwtntalStatement
prepared by the Environmental Protection Agency on the BMVTROHMBMTAL
RADIATION PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR NORMAL OPERATIONS OF ACTIVITIES
IH THE URANIUM FUEL CYCLE»
1. On page 17 the EIS properly notes that "EPA is not limited
to specific criteria for setting such standards.* Yet the EPA is
arbitrarily accepting such criteria when it notes on page 4 a pro-
jection that "well over 300,000 megawatts of nuclear electric gener-
ating capacity based on the use of uranium fuel will exist within the
next twenty years." Throughout the text of the BIS, the acceptance
of a given output of nuclear generated electricity forms the basis
for determining what an "acceptable" level of population exposure
to radioactive effluents should be.
EPA should not be an apologist for either the Administration or
other federal agencies. The intent of BPA's enabling legislation was
to establish an independent review and regulatory agency in matters
of environmental concern. In order to determine what set of exposure
standards should be established, EPA should explore what the level
of emissions would be under a limited or zero nuclear growth and to
determine if such a scenario were feasible. If it can be shown that
a limited nuclear dependency were practicable, then the present stan-
dards of exposures could then be shown to be too high. EPA, therefore,
might find that a standard of zero emissions might, in fact, be a
"reasonable" standard.
There has been ample discussion of the potential of conservation
to reduce the demand for electrical consumption and the availability
of alternative sources to replace nuclear power. The Ford Foundation's
study, A Time to Choose, found, for example, that with an annual energy
growth rate of two percent, a major energy source such as coal or nu-
clear could be eliminated without detrimental economic effects. Sim-
ilar conslusions were reached by the Public Interest Research Group's
review of energy scenarios (available from PIRG, 2000 P St. N.W.,
Washington, D.C.) and the Rand Corporation study California's Elec-
tric Quandry.
These independent reviews suggest that credible estimates of
the need for nuclear power, other than those offered by the Administration,
exist. EPA's critique of the EIS of the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder
A-15
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Reactor suggests that the agency is fully capable of examining
?ieS^ i **"?** projections. EPA would be remiss, therefore, if
it did not include a discussion *f a zero emission level in the con-
text of a limited nuclear scenario.
2) The standards proposed by EPA are based only on routine
operation and ignore accidental releases. Yet the large amount of
radioactivity from an unplanned release may be serious enough to
warrant that no variances from the proposed standards be issued.
The former Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), in an effort to
determine the probability and extent of a major accident from an
£ft£*^ng.t nuclear reactor, funded a Reactor Satetv Study (RSS,
WASH-1400) which was issued in draft form last August. The RSS
found that in the event of the worst possible accident, 2300 immediate
S^*i S1!**!!0!!1^00011;- EPA *nd **•*"« Regulatory Staff independently
concluded that there had been a factor of 10 underestimation in RSS
The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) and Sierra club, in a sep-
arate study, identified a factor of 16 underassessment. These dis-
cussions, confirmed by a report issued by the American Physical
?°?nn^ S/S™1: 1«5' 8We11 the P°tential number of fatalities from
2,300 to 23,000 to 36.000. This set of figures is for prompt fatal-
ities and does not include lethal cancers or genetic defects and
is still more than double EPA's estimate of total health effects
given on page 82. If only one such accident were sustained, a
possibility which is receiving increasing attention, the cost-
benefit ratio developed for a given level of reactor operation
would be completely rewritten.
The RSS considers one accident which is small compared to the
large one above, but one with relatively large probability Here
RSS predicts 62 prompt fatalities, 300 latent and ultimately fatal
cancers and 300 genetic defects. Correction of RSS figures using
AEC. EPA and the UCS/SC estimates of errors yields the following
consequences:
Consequence
prompt fatalities
lethal cancer
genetic defect
RSS Result
62
300
300
Corrected Result
620-990
10,000-20,000
3,000-20,000
This scenario, because of its relatively high probability coupled
with uncertainties of human failure, sabotage and-poor quality con-
trol, could occur several times by the year 2000. If such conse-
quences were to happen only once, this could result in total health
effects four times higher than EPA projections for routine operation
alone. Clearly, consequences of this magnitude should be figured
into a benefit-cost analysis, if a negative ratio is found to develop,
EPA should state that with its proposed standards, no variances would
be granted and that unless a facility could offer reasonable assur-
ances that it would not exceed such standards (i.e., no accidents),
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission could not allow it to operate.
3) The waste disposal sites currently used, while serving pri-
weapons program.
significant unplanned releases have occurred such that EPA should
again consider the inclusion of unplanned releases into its benefit-
cost ratios and proposed standards.
4) A report released by Dr. John Gotman in May, 1975 suggests
that the standard for transauranics may be too high. or. Gofman's
estimates suggest that if the population exposure reaches the limit
of .5 millrems per year, 7,000,000 extra fatal lung cancers can be
expected to develop in male smokers per generation. For non-smokers
the figure would be 60,000. since these would occur over a 30-year
period, it can be expected that 235,000 extra fatal cancers would
develop per year in men (compared to the current lung cancer fatality
rate of 63,500 from all causes). This data should certainly be ex-
amined and standards set according to revised benefit-cost ratios.
(Dr. Gofman's report, "The cancer Hazard from Inhaled Plutonium,"
may be obtained by writing to the Committee for Nuclear Responsibility,
Box 2329, Dublin, CA 94566.)
5) Dr. Edward Kartell, in a paper entitled "Tobacco Radioac-
tivity and Cancer in Smokers," reprinted in American Scientist.
July, 1975, suggests that it is alpha irradiation of lung cells brought
about by the presence of 210P. which is a likely cause of cancer
and a contributing factor in the early development of artherosclerosis
in smokers. His work provides a valuable guide to the possible con-
sequences of chronic exposure to the inhalation of insoluable par-
ticles of moderate-to-low alpha activity and if properly considered,
may significantly alter the benefit-cost ratios of EPA's proposed
standards.
6) EPA's failure to include "genetically-related component
of diseases such as heart diseases, ulcers, and cancer as well as
more general increases in the level of ill-health from estimates of
genetic effects" (p. 83) is irresponsible in view of developing solid
evidence that low levels of radiation considered "safe" a few years
ago are able to produce cumulative genetic degradation that can lead
to leukemia and other diseases in future generations. See, for example,
the paper by Bross and Natarajan in Preventive Medicine. Sept. 1974,
pp. 361-369. Inclusion of this type of data on genetic effects may
significantly alter EPA's benefit-cost ratios presented in support
of its proposed standards.
In its review of the information available to it, EPA will find
that much of the information on the effects of radiation is speculative.
The advice offered by Ralph and Mildred Buchsbann in their book,
Basic Ecology (Pittsburgh, 1957) is particularly appropriate: "When
information is incomplete, changes should stay close to the natural
processes which have in their favour the indisputable evidence of
having supported life for a very long time."
Respectfully yours
Skip Laitner
Coordinator, Critical Mass
A-16
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P-12
Council on Energy Independence
P. 0. Box 328
Chicago, Illinois 60690
July 23, 1975
Director, Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D. C. 20460
Dear Sir:
Comments of the Council on Energy Independence on the Environ-
mental Protection Agency's proposed 40 CFR 190 are hereby
forwarded for your consideration in accordance with the request
for comments printed in the Federal Register, vol. 40, No. 104,
page 23424 of May 29, 1975.
We
appreciate this opportunity to make our views known.
Very truly yours,
A
Daniel C. Kasperski, Ph.D., P.E.
Director
DCK:dr
Enclosure
cc: The Honorable Mike McCormack (1/1)
It is indeed unfortunate that the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) has felt the need to modify the Federal Radiation
Protection Guidelines for industries in the uranium fuel cycle.
While we have no question as to the EPA's authority to do so as
a result of Reorganization Plan No. 3, we question whether these
proposed modification are in fact in the best interests of the
country. If it is the EPA's intent to further reduce the man-
rem dose to the general population, it would appear to be
reasonable to begin this task with those sources of exposure
which cause the greatest man-rem dose. In its own report(D, the
EPA noted that the greatest source of radiation dose in the
United States is from natural radiation. Though a number of
studies have been performed, none has yet demonstrated deleterious
effects on a human population living in natural radiation environ-
ments even considerably higher than those existing in the United
States. Thus, the concept that low levels of low-LET (linear
energy transfer) radiation exposure delivered at low dose rates
is indeed dangerous must be questioned. Moreover, attempts to
lower man-made dose commitments should be thoroughly justified
•with the benefits clearly demonstrable.
With respect to man-made radiation, the EPA, in the same report,
stated that medical diagnostic radiology accounts for a full 90%
of the total man-made radiation dose to which the United States
population is exposed. This in turn accounts for only 35% of
the total radiation dose from all sources, including natural
radioactivity. Thus, by its own figures, the EPA admits that all
other sources of man-made radiation taken together, including
fallout from nuclear weapons, occupational radiation exposure,
miscellaneous exposure to things like color television, consumer
products, and air travel, and other peaceful uses of atomic energy
(including the generation of electric power) accounts for less
than 4% of the total man-rem dose. Furthermore, the total man-rem
dose from the miscellaneous category above accounted for 50 times
the man-rem dose from nuclear electric power production in 1970,
again according to the EPA's own figures. The average per capita
dose in the year 2000 from all nuclear power plants and fuel re-
processing plants expected to be constructed by that time has
been estimated by the EPA to be 0.4 millirem per year, or about
4 tenths of one percent (0.4%) of natural background. This is
well below the variation in natural background within the United
States, which may vary by a factor of two or more (e.g., from
100 mrem/yr in Chicago to 200 mrem/yr in Denver). Thus the con-
tribution to population exposure from nuclear facilities is
truly negligible. A considerably greater man-rem dose reduction
could be saved by the EPA proposing to ban the construction of
brick and concrete structures and allow only wooden buildings,
-1-
A-17
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since the terrestrial dose rate from such building materials
average 100, 70, and only 50 mrem/yr. Hence, it appears of
little merit to change the Federal Radiation Protection Guide-
lines for this one industry, and yet take little action on
reducing the major sources of man-rem exposure, if indeed it is
even necessary, especially during these days of energy scarcity.
In spite of the small percentage of the total man-rem dose re-
sulting from radioactive effluents of the uranium fuel cycle,
the nuclear industry conforms to the "as low as practicable"
(ALAP) philosophy. This concept was first proposed by the
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP)--
a nonprofit corporation of renowned scientists chartered by
Congress to formulate radiation protection recommendations—in
a 1949 report (published in 1954 as NCRP Report 17)(2). since
then, this philosophy has been incorporated into the licensing
requirements of all facilities licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC), and design objectives for light-water-cooled
nuclear power reactor effluents are contained in 10 CFR 50,
Appendix IU). The guidelines contained in Appendix I were
arrived at only after many months of review and public hearings
initiated in 1971 by the Atomic Energy Commission, the NRC's
predecessor. Even though the present Appendix I limits for in-
dividual and population exposure are more restrictive than those
proposed by the EPA, we oppose the EPA's proposal as there is a
definite distinction between design objectives, as under the
NRC's Appendix I, and new federal standards as proposed by the
EPA. Dr. Lauriston S. Taylor (President of NCRP) must have
foreseen the attempt by government agencies to further reduce
the already low radiation protection limits for the nuclear
industry. In a letter to Nuclear News (4), he pointed out that
it must be made abundantly clear that the reason for the pro-
posed reduction (ALAP) is not a change in the basic radiation
protection standards, but only because experience has shown that
it is cheap and feasible to operate light-water-cooled nuclear
power plants at very low levels." He continued, "it must, thus,
be clear that the reasoning underlying the constant pressure to
reduce dose limits is more of a political than a scientific
nature." The prestigious International Commission on Radiological
Protection (ICRP) agrees with Dr. Taylor and the NCRP, and has
issued a statement indicating that on the basis of their recent
and exhaustive examination of the question, they have decided
^™onh^?resent standards (essentially those contained in 10
CFR 20 ^>)not only do not have to be lowered, but could in fact
be raised if there was any special reason to do so (6).
In its attempt to justify these proposed new limits as standards,
the EPA quotes from the 1972 Report of the Advisory Committee on
the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR Committee) of
the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council. The
quotes presented may leave the mistaken impression that the
BEIR Committee recommends the lowering of present radiation
protection limits. The BEIR Committee never made such a
recommendation, however, and even admitted that "it is not
within the scope of this Committee to propose numerical limits
of radiation exposure"(7). (Furthermore, although these quotes
were taken from the section on Summary and Recommendations,
the point on Radiation Protection Guides quoted was never addressed
in the body of the text, thus leaving the statement open to con-
siderable interpretation and criticism.) In fact, it is the
NCRP which has been chartered by Congress to "collect, analyze,
develop, and disseminate in the public interest information and
recommendations about (a) protection against radiation and (b)
radiation measurements, quantities, and units, particularly
those concerned with radiation protection"(8). in a recent •
report {NCRP 43) entitled "Review of the Current State of
Radiation Protection Philosophy"(9), the NCRP thoroughly
investigated all pertinent material on the biological effects
of radiation, including the BEIR Committee report. In it, the
Council takes the firm position that "no change is required at
this time" in the present radiation protection standards. While
continuing to support the ALAP philosophy, it differs with the
BEIR Committee's estimate of somatic damage from low level
exposure, and is in better agreement with the 1972 report of the
United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic
Energy (UNSCEAR) (10). The BEIR Committee Report differs from
the UNSCEAR Report and the NCRP position in presenting numerical
estimates of carcinogenic risk at radiation levels far below the
observed data levels, and it errs in extrapolating "by a factor
greater than 1,000 in dose and by factors from 100 million to
a billion in dose rate, from the level of observed effects to
the levels encountered by the general population"(9). The
NCRP continues to hold the view that "radiogenic cancers at low
doses and low dose rates derived on the basis of linear (pro-
portional) extrapolation from the rising portions of the dose-
incidence curves at high doses and high dose rates cannot provide
realistic estimates of the actual risks from low level, low-LET
radiations, and have such a high probability of overestimating
the actual risk as to be of only marginal value, if any, for
purpose of realistic risk-benefit evaluation." Hence, "such
risk estimates by themselves do not constitute justification for
urgent action to make numerical radiation protection standards
more restrictive than they now are, assuming that the application
of such standards adheres to the basic principle of 'lowest
practicable levels' of dose".
Of the EPA's use of the man-rem concept for purposes of formulating
standards such as the ones proposed, the NCRP says the following:
-2-
-3-
A-18
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"The linear dose-effect hypothesis has been coming into
frequent use in analyses in which population exposures
are expressed in the form of person-rem, including doses
of one millirem per year or less to population groups
and doses to individual organs, with linear extrapolation
to damage estimates through the use of the NAS-BEIR
Committee Report values. The indications of a significant
dose rate influence on radiation effects would make
completely inappropriate the current practice of summing
of doses at all levels of dose and dose rate in the form
of total person-rem for purposes of calculating risks to
the population on the basis of extrapolation of risk es-
timates derived from data at high doses and dose rates." iy>
In perhaps its most strongly worded statement to date on the sub
ject, the NCRP certainly appears to disagree with the implementa
tion of the EPA's proposed standards:
"The NCRP wishes to caution governmental policy-making
agencies of the unreasonableness of interpreting or
assuming 'upper limit' estimates of carcinogenic risks
at low radiation levels, derived by linear extrapola-
tion from data obtained at high doses and dose rates,
as actual risks, and of basing unduly restrictive poli-
cies on such an interpretation or assumption. The
NCRP has always endeavored to insure public awareness
of the hazards of ionizing radiation, but it has been
equally determined to insure that such hazards are not
greatly overestimated. Undue concern, as well as
carelessness with regard to radiation hazards, is con-
sidered detrimental to the public interest." (9)
from other sources than in reducing public exposure from
nuclear power plants and fuel reprocessing facilities.
Terrill (ID , for instance, has presented a comparative cost-
benefit analysis for radiation dose reduction from medical
and from reactor-produced exposures. He indicates that then
current (1971) doses to the U.S. population resulting from
reactor plant effluents were 430 man-rem compared to 18.7 million
man-rem from diagnostic x-rays. Yet, he found that costs per
man-rem reduction were about $7.00 for medical exposure (from
the use of automatic collimators on diagnostic x-ray equipment),
compared to his estimated cost of $10,000 to 1 million dollars
per man-rem for reducing reactor-produced radiation. How the
EPA justifies their proposed regulations in the light of such
data is uncertain.
In conclusion, as it has not been demonstrated that the man-rem
doses to the population from the uranium fuel cycle are indeed
harmful, beyond that which can be accepted in light of the
benefits received and compared to the risks from other and
alternate technologies, we feel that the proposed 40 CFR 190 is
unnecessary and scientifically unsound, and should be rescinded.
Both the NCRP and the BEIR Committee agree on one point. With
respect to performing benefit-risk analyses, the NCRP holds that
it "is important to avoid the expenditures of large amounts of
the limited resources of society to reduce very small risks still
further with possible concomitant increase in risks of other
hazards or consequent lack of attention to existing greater
risks". (9) The BEIR Committee concurs in stating "there should
not be attempted the reduction of small risks even further at
the cost of large sums of money that spent otherwise, would
clearly produce greater benefit". In light of the previous com-
ments by the NCRP with respect to performing estimates of somatic
disease based on ultra-conservative assumptions, the EPA does
everyone a disservice by its perfunctory risk analysis which
predicts an expense of $100,000 per assumed cancer reduction
if these proposed standards become effective.
Studies of radiation protection indicate that there are far
greater economies in reducing public (environmental) exposure
-4-
-5-
A-19
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P-13
(3)
(1) U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Estimates of
Ionizing Radiation Dose in the United States, 1960-
2000", USEPA, Rockville, Maryland, 1972.
(2) National Committee on Radiation Protection, "Permis-
sible Dose from External Sources of Radiation, NCRP
Report No. 17", published as National Bureau of Stan-
dards Handbook 59, U. S. Government Printing Office,
Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appen-
dix I, "Numerical Guides for Design Objectives and
Limiting Conditions for Operation to Meet the Criterion
As Low as Practical' for Radioactive Material in Light-
Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor Effluents".
(4) Lauriston S. Taylor, President, National Council on
Radiation Protection and Measurements, letter to
Nuclear News, November 1973.
(5) Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 20, "Stan-
dards for Protection Against Radiation".
(6) Health Physics, Vol. 24, p. 360, 1973.
(7) Report of the Advisory Committee on the Biological
Effects of Ionizing Radiation, "The ffects on
Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing
Radiation," National Academy of Sciences-National
Research Council, November 1972, Washington, D.C.
(8) Charter of the National Council on Radiation Protection
and Measurements, p. 39, NCRP 43, see reference 9.
fwrRP^ D 4-'^ °n Racted 6«9°° h«alth effects from krypton 85 (2/3 fatal)
by 2020. (Environmental Radiation Dose Commitment« An Application to the
Nuclear Po*er Industry). Is this acceptable to EPA?
Joseph Knox and Kendall Peterson stated in Nuclear Safety Vol. 13-2
P 130, Although methods have been developed to retain at least part of the
krypton 85, to date these techniques are costly and have not been used
commercially."
Other scientists maintain that there is no known method of permanently
containing gases — they ultimately escape into the environment.
EPA is providing no protection to the public from krypton 85, iodine
129 and tritium. Why notsay so directly?
EPA is failing, as its predecessors failed, to protect the public
from radon emissions. Many other dangerous isotopes are not even mentioned 1
Section 190.10 "Standards for normal operations" and section 190.11
Variance for unusual operations" are meaningless for these reasons:
1. There is no way to measure which radiation has entered the hunan
A-20
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P-14
body or the food chain from "planned discharges" as opposed to "temporary
and unusual operating conditions", or for that matter from fallout or
other sources.
2. People living near nuclear plants are already eating food and
drinking water which give them more than 25 millirems per year.
5. Variances can be granted to all the standards.
A. The standards for krypton 85 and iodine 12p are delayed until
1963 (and if they cannot be met by operating plants, then what?)
Any intelligent citizen reading these proposed standards must conclude
that they were written byi
1. fools
2. the nuclear power industry
J. intimidated civil servants
4. ignoramuses
or5. those who do not care what happens to people
The cancer death rate is increasine by \% a year. One of five deaths
of those over 45 and under 14 is due to cancer or leukemia. Some of these
deaths are from radiation. What increase in deaths is acceptable to EPA
in exchange for nuclear power?
Sincerely,
Dorothy Boberg
COMMITTEE CORRESPONDENCE
J. M. Selby
Battelle-Northwest
P.O. Box 999
Richland, WA 99352
July 23, 1975
Director
Criteria & Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D. C. 20460
Dear Sir:
The proposed Part 190 of 40 CFR, "Environmental Radiation Standards for Nuclear
Power Operations" and the Draft Environmental Statement, "Environmental Radi-
ation Protection Requirements for Normal Operations of Activities in the
Uranium Fuel Cycle" have been reviewed by members of the State & Federal
Legislation Committee of the Health Physics Society. We appreciate the op-
portunity to provide our comments.
Our comments are addressed primarily to the Draft Environmental Statement; how-
ever, generally it is our opinion that the issuance of Part 190 regulations is
premature since the Environmental Statement from which these regulations stem
is still in draft and problems associated with that draft have not been resolved.
It appears that the Draft Statement is an excellent example of a government agency
pretending to place reliance on the relationship between population dose and po-
tential health effects as assumed in the BEIR Report1, contrary to the recommen-
dations of NCRP Report #432. The following paragraph is taken from page 4 of
that report.
"The NCRP wishes to caution governmental policy-making agencies
of the unreasonableness of interpreting or assuming "upper limit"
estimates of carcinogenic risks at low radiation levels, derived
by linear extrapolation from data obtained at high doses and dose
rates, as actual risks, and of basing unduly restrictive policies
on such an interpretation or assumption. The NCRP has always en-
deavored to insure public awareness of the hazards of ionizing
radiation, but it has been equally determined to insure that such
hazards are not greatly overestimated. Undue concern, as well as
carelessness with regard to radiation hazards, is considered detri-
mental to the public interest."
A-21
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Director
Criteria & Standards Division
July 23, 1975
Director
Criteria & Standards Division
-3-
July 23, 1975
The proposed action by the EPA is opposed to the position taken by the NCRP
and BEIR Committee Reports were published. It is of continuing concern to
professional health physicists that the Environmental Protection Agency is
proposing actions which are contrary to the evaluations and recommendations
ot independent and recognized authoritative entities in this field of science.
EPA generally presents the case as if adopting these standards will in fact
and without question, reduce total health effects through the year 2000, by'
1000 as compared to what would occur based on present 10 CFR 50 Appendix I
limits Emphasis on the theoretical nature of that calculation is needed
especially since the statement published in the Federal Register4 as a pre-
lncluded as Appendix to the Draft Statement
"However, the environmental models used for making these assess-
ments, while useful for making estimates of potential health
impact, are not considered to be so well-defined as to allow
standards for populations to be expressed directly in terms re-
quiring their explicit use."
Interestingly, if one makes a calculation using the argument EPA developed, one
can conclude that NRC's 10 CFR 50 Appendix I Sta; .lards are resulting in the
v±C™nn ^"^ i30'™0 ("9°%) °f the P°tential health effects through the
CxL ? H? "0mPfred C° What W°Uld °CCUr based on Present FRC guidance for the
anoT ^nnn ! might 1uestion whether the cost and effort to produce
another 1 000 reduction makes sense at all, especially since no apparent atten-
nucLar economy0 "^^ ^^ °f "' S" activiti" « P*« of a world-wide
to'oS thY^ 2°°°- ^ tMS 6arlier reP°rt EPA CStimated for the ye.« "60
.. °^ShaLth* P!!,!!P,ita d?Se t0 the P°P^tion would actually decrease
-. . , ra nvronments
Statement fails to evaluate the potential occupational dose impact of the
proposed action in further increasing the concentration of radioactive materials
6
of
Particularly disturbing and worthy of additional comment is the position EPA takes
relative to "*C. From the tables of potential health effects, it is clear that
a case has been made for ^C being the principal radionuclide of concern with
current operating practices. For some reason, after developing this point it
is not pursued and the position has been taken that ^C control and retention can
be addressed at a later date. The single most important contribution the Draft
Impact Statement makes may be in presenting the long-term 14C problem. If the
data are correct and the presentation is representative of reality, then the
Impact Statement has shown an area where the development of improved control
systems can make a significant reduction in the theoretically calculated health
effects.
The proposed five year delay before reviewing and amending the proposed standards
seems to us to be completely untenable, not only because of the indicated 14C
problem, but also because of the potential impact on proposed nuclear energy
centers. It may be true, as stated in the Draft Statement, that such centers
are not apt to be in full operation for 10 years or more, but planning and
decision-making are underway now. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission for
example, is required to submit a report to Congress in October 1975 on the
comparative impacts of integrated vs. dispersed fuel cycle facilities. Any
.realistic evaluation of the impact of the proposed standards must take into
consideration any effective limitations on the nuclear energy center concept.
^^^^^=^^;^^- srsss; £
ss s-pSL^STSLsrss. i: --irs sxisssf
much less individual facilities, and the inevitable legal procedures wlich
sSgSs; alThrc8uaiTie years of reguiat°^ «*• -^4 -s^sStSS
see is fC^h H ^°mpletely -"accounted for socioeconomic impact that we fore-
Seitee1
Sc' berabln8hinH8
so incomplete and subject to change Yet It ~* ^ thel,needed data base is
relationship to relative organdoses,' nd criterl baseHn "^
releases rather than relative radiosensitivitTwill "
twroimpssiononhe
establishing good technical
ke litt
^^
A-22
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Director
Criteria & Standards Division
-4-
July 23, 1975
-5-
standards to the lowest value that is practicable. Certainly standards and
guidance contained in FRC Report No. I6, ICRP Publication No. 97, NCRP Report
No. 39 , and 10 CFR 50 Appendix I are good examples of "external source of
standards or guidance" for control of exposure including the "environmental
point of view".
We recommend the delay of adoption of proposed 40 CFR 190 until the points above
including the C and nuclear energy center issues have been resolved and in-
corporated in the approved Environmental Statement.
Very truly yours,
ij 71 j '~N -//'(,
^/- Hi ^ 1 * It '•"j
;'/'
J. M. Selby, Chairman
State & Federal Legislation Committee
JMSrlsp
cc: Paul L. Ziemer, President, Health Physics Society
Committee Members
References
^he Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation.
Report of the Advisory Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radia-
tion, National Academy of Sciences - National Research Council (November, 1972)
2NCRP, Review of the Current State of Radiation Protection Philosophy. NCRP
Report No. 43 (1975).
3Ionizing Radiation: Levels and Effects. A Report of the United Nations
Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation to the General Assembl'
United Nations (1972). ~~~ ' '
4Environmental Protection Agency, 40CFR190 "Environmental Radiation Protection
for Nuclear Power Operations: Proposed Standards," Federal Register, Vol. 40
No. 104, May 29, 1975, p. 23421.
5USEPA, Estimates of Ionizing Radiation Doses in the United States 1960-2000,
ORP/CSD 72-1 (1972).
Background Material for the Development of Radiation Protection Standards.
FRC Report No. 1, Federal Radiation Council (1960).
7Radiation Protection: Recommendations of the International Commission on
Radiological Protection. ICRP Publication No. 9 (1965).
8Basic Radiation Protection Criteria. NCRP Report No. 39, National Council on
Radiation Protection and Measurements (1971).
A-23
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P-15
National Council on Radiation Protection
and Measurements
7910 WOODMONT AVENUE, SUITE 1016, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20014 AREA CODE (301) 657-2652
LAURISTON S. TAYLOR, Preside,
E. DALE TROUT, Vice President
W. ROGER NEY, Executive Directi
July 24, 1975
Director
Criteria and Standards Division
(AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D. C. 20460
Dear Sir:
The Board of Directors of the National Council on Radiation
Protection and Measurements (NCRP) has reviewed the proposed standards
(40 CFR Part 190) which the Environmental Protection Agency published
in the Federal Register, Volume 40, No. 104 on May 29, 1975, and we
are availing ourselves of your invitation for comments.
The dose limits which you proposed in subpart B, paragraph 190.10
are substantially lower than the dose limits proposed for individual
members of the public not occupationally exposed as given in NCRP
Report 39 under paragraph 245. However, paragraphs 178 and 179 in
NCRP Report 39 also recommend that any radiation be kept at a level
that is as low as practicable. This admonition was never intended to
lead to the setting of new standards lower than those exemplified by
the maximum permissible dose equivalents (mpd). The mpd values are
believed to be adequate for reasonable protection of any individual.
The admonition "as low as practicable" was made to discourage the
development of any policy by which radiation workers or members of the
public would be indiscriminately exposed at the mpd level. It was
intended to force discretion on those controlling the source of radiation.
The limits you propose may be consistent with the capabilities of
control technology and may possibly be achieved without undue
expenditures, although both of these concepts must necessarily remain
somewhat vague.
As such, the limits may represent an appropriate determination of
what is as low as practicable. However, we are concerned about the
substitution of regulatory controls for the discretion we feel is best
exercised by those responsible for irradiation of workers or members of
the public. The distinction should certainly be made between the use of
limits for design and control purposes on the one hand, as compared to
the basic standards on the other hand. The NCRP and the ICRP have been
independently studying the question of exposure of the population to
ionizing radiation and at the moment there appears to be little
likelihood that either organization can find scientific or technical
justification for changing their currently published values.
We find ourselves in decided disagreement with some of the premises
you state. NCRP Report 43 stresses the serious limitations of linear
extrapolations of dose-effect relations. Since the assumption of such
linearity is implicit in the concept of the "person-rem" we deprecate
its use and advise reconsideration of your announced intention to employ
it in future formulation of standards. Furthermore, while the assumption
of linearity between dose equivalent of the order of 1 rem and of a few
millirem is uncertain, the assumption of linearity between doses of the
order of 100 rem and of 1 rem is even more uncertain particularly in the
case of low LET radiations. The implication that a dose equivalent of
1 rem will result in some 750 major impairments per 10° population is
based upon such an extrapolation and its validity is at best conjectural.
The Environmental Protection Agency should become aware of increasing
doubts regarding such calculations within the very group of scientists
who have produced the experimental data upon which the calculations are
based.
.-^"Sin
cerely yours,
Lauriston S. Taylor
LST:hr
A-24
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P-16
Comments on
Draft Environmental Statement
Environmental Radiation Protection Requirements
for Normal Operations of Activities in the Uranium
Fuel Cycle (May 1975)
and Federal Register Vol. 40, No. 104
1. The NRC and its predecessor, AEC, has a magnificent record of attention to
the environment on the matter of routine emissions of radioactivity. This is
acknowledged in your document (and could easily be further demonstrated) and
indeed much of your proposed rule is a codification of their standards. The
only exception is the requirement for krypton retention at fuel reprocessing
plants.
NRC has been studying this problem intensively (indeed all EPA information
on it seems to be derived from their studies) and has been contemplating a
krypton retention requirement. It therefore seems inappropriate for EPA to
"jump the gun" on this and 'force the hand" of NRC.
It should be noted that the situation regarding fuel reprocessing is a
very delicate one at this time, and there may well be subtleties that EPA is
overlooking as regards the impact of this rule-making. We should like to urge
EPA to check carefully with NRC on whether these rules are acceptable.
2. In this action, EPA seems to be "penny-wise and pound foolish". To cite one
example within EPA jurisdiction, the average American gets a hundred times
more radiation from building materials than he will ever get from the nuclear
energy industry. It therefore seems inappropriate for EPA to worry more about
the former, which is receiving no other regulatory attention, than about the
latter which is being competently handled by NRC. For example, some building
stones give 50 mrem per year to occupants more than others; shouldn't EPA
restrict the use of the former, or at least issue warnings about it?
continued ...
A-25
Page 2
There are, as is well known, far larger "fish to be caught" in radiation
problems outside of EPA jurisdiction, especially in medical and dental x-rays.
If EPA is interested in limiting radiation exposure, wouldn't it be wiser to
consider the problem as a whole and exert its influence on other agencies and
on Congress to this end. For example, a requirement on use of lead apronSover
the body for x-rays of the head, arms, or legs would save hundreds of times more
radiation exposure than this rule-making, and would be far cheaper.
3. The section (p. 20, 21) justifying use of the linear - no threshold - dose rate
independent model for estimating health effects gives the impression that this
model represents the average thinking of biomedical experts. This is clearly
not the case. The principal support for it, as referenced in the EPA document,
has come from the BEIR Report, but that report clearly states that it is a
conservative assumption, much more likely to over-estimate than to under-estimate
the effects. In fact it is our understanding that only two members of the 20
member BEIR committee strongly favored use of this model, and none thought it
was not sufficiently conservative.
The U.S. National Committee on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP)
has strongly criticized this model (NCRP Report No. 43) as grossly over-estimating
effects of low levels of radiation. The United Nations Scientific Committee on
Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) has pointedly refused to accept it as a
method of estimating risks.
In view of this situation, it would seem appropriate for EPA to state
that these rules "might possibly save lives" rather than "will save lives."
4. In estimating lives saved by Kr &C retention, there is no mention that 94 percent
of these lives would be non-American. Clearly it should not be implied that
we are unconcerned about killing people in foreign lands, but when one is
putting a dollar value on human life as is done in the EPA report, it should be
kept in mind that we could save many times more lives in underdeveloped countries
continued
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Page 3
with about $1000 per capita worth of food or medical supplies.
In fact, for these people the calculations of radiation effects are
grossly exaggerated because they are based on U.S. life expectancy. In a
country where life expectancy is 45 years the number of radiation induced cancers
per man-rem would probably be about three times smaller.
Hans A. Bethe
Professor of Physics
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY
Thomas Connolly
Professor of Mech. Eng.
Stanford University
Stanford, CA
Bernard L. Cohen
Professor of Physics
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
5. The EPA estimates are based on 700 x lo"6 serious health effects per man-rem.
It is shown in the attached paper that this is much higher than is justified; that
paper was sent to EPA several weeks ago, and no objections to it have been raised.
(This item was added by B. L. Cohen at the last minute, and there was insufficient
time to check it with the other two co-signers.
Conclusions of the BEIR and UNSCEAR Reports on Radiation Effects per
Man-rem
Bernard L. Cohen
University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260
ABSTRACT
It is shown that the BEIR Report estimate of cancer risk ts ISOxlO"6 deaths
per man-rem irrespective of how the dose is administered. For genetic defects,
the BEIR Report gives 33 to 800 x 10"6 per man-rem whereas the UNSCEAR Report
gives 135 x 10" per man-rem to the entire population.
A-26
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The BEIR and UNSCEAR Reports were prepared by very prestigeous committees,
and many groups working on radiation effects claim to use their conclusions.
However, the numbers they derive from these Reports seem to vary considerably.
For example, the cancer deaths per man-rem from the BEIR Report is taken by the
Environmental Protection Agency to be 200 x 10"6 whereas the AEC Reactor Safety
$May used 100 x 10 . The numbers used for genetic defects vary even more widely.
It is the purpose of this paper to clarify this matter.
We begin with cancer risk. There are several different calculations of
<^-;.> risk in the BEIR Report but none of them is accepted in the final conclusion.
The final judgment of the Committee, as expressed in the Summary of the Report,
is "an additional exposure of the U.S. population of 5 rem per 30 years would
cause approximately 6000 cancer deaths annually." The dose rate given there
corresponds to 167 mrem per year (5000*30), or a population dose of 33xl06 man-rem
D
per year based on a 2x10 population. The risk per man-rem is therefore
•C00(h33xl06 = ISOxlO'6 cancer deaths per man-rem.
It may be argued that this is for an equilibrium situation from chronic
exposure whereas accidents involve a single large exposure. However, with the
linearity hypothesis, this can make no difference. To prove this, we may proceed
-------
P-17
defects. Maintaining the population of the US would require about 3 x 10 live births
per year (close to the present rate) so we should expect about 900 genetic defects
per year per rem of exposure to males prior to conception. If all Americans were
exposed to an additional 100 mrem/year, a population exposure of 2 x 10 man-rem
per year, the average father would have accumulated 3 rem prior to conception so there
would be 2700 additional genetic defects per year. The number of genetic defects
per man-rem is then 2700*2x10 = 135 x 10"6. This is very close to the logarithmic
median of the range given by the BEIR Report (160 x 10 ), so it seems reasonable
to accept a number between them such as 150 x 10~ genetic defects per man-rem.
REFERENCES
1. The Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation
(BEIR Report), National Academy of Sciences, Nov. 1972.
2. Ionizing Radiation: Levels and Effects (Report of United Nations Scientific
Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation ) U.N. (New York), 1972.
130 Endeavor Dr.
Corte Medera, Ca.
July 27, 1975
Director of Critical Studies
Office cf Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
W^shinton, D. C. 20460
Dear Sir:
I am writing to express my concern and shock
after reading how you bave set up the new radiation
standards. It is very cle-^r from reading your
recent report (40 CFR Part 190) that cost and
economics are of a higher priority than that of
preserving the life and health of human beings.
You state on page 6 of that report, "§ince poten-
tial effects from radiation exposure are assumed to
occur at any level of exposure, it is not possible
to specify sclely on a. health basis an acceptable
level of radiation exposure for either individuals
or populations; It is necessary to balance the
health risks asrociated with any level of exposure
against the costs cf achieving that level." That
says to me that you are tnking it upon yourselves
the perogative to inflict injury, cancer, and death
on thousands of people in our country all for
the sake of making electricity and nuclear rowerlI
Your report irplies that there is n_£ safe limit of
radiation, ^r. John Gofman's studies coincide with
your position here. How can you then set standards
as you have and work under the name of the
Environmental Protection Agency?
Your basic premise that nuclear power is
absolutely necessary for our country to function
is a questionable premise. People's energy con-
sumption has dropped dramatically the last 18 months,
My family's energy consumption is down 25# from
1973. VVe_ d_o not need nuclear power. |he risks
far outweigh the benefits. And as I and others
work to educate people on the effects of radiation
A-28
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on their lives and ihe lives of generations to come,
there will emerge a large voice to say we will not
accept the risks that you feel are acceptable.
I urge you to reconsider the whole issue.
Are you willing to subject your life and those of
your family ^nd children to cancer?
Ellen F. Beans,
mother of 2 daughters
member of Project Survival
P-18
v^LLJlS Mills Tower, San Francisco 94104
Nuclear Energy Policy Subcommittee
R. E. Watt, Ch.
1447 45 th
Los Alamos, N.M. 87544
July 23, 1975
Director, Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
Dear Sir:
Comments offered below are made in response to the Federal Register
notice on p 23420 of Vol. 40, #104, dated May 29, 1975 and titled
40CFR Part 190 FRL 376-1, Environmental Radiation Protection for Nuclear
Power Operations, Proposed Standards.
Using data included in the AEC's Final Environmental Statement WASH-
1258 it is clear that the Environmental Protection Agency's proposed
standards would have major impact on both national and worldwide environmental
conditions, therefore an Environmental Statement is needed.
Life on Earth has developed with most organisms exposed to the
natural radioactive background. Most humans receive a radiation dose from
natural sources in the range 80 - 200 mrem/yr (from ORP/SID-72-1), which
can be taken as typical for organisms living on Earth's surface. For brevity
in this letter the natural background will be taken to be 100 mrem/yr. The
proposed standard would allow increases of 25Z for the whole body and any
organ other than the thyroid, and a 75% increase to the thyroid. Claarly
this would be a major increase over normal exposures.
Some of the radionuclides proposed for release would persist in the
biosphere for long periods. Our inadequate understanding of the effects of
low radiation dose rates and the probability of significant biological
concentration factors in many organisms requires that we not pollute our
world without more knowledge of the effects that would be produced.
Responses given in the FES WASH-1258 show that the limit of 5 mrem/yr
can be met with current technology. Most objections to meeting the AEC's
proposed 5 mrem/yr limit were made on the basis of cost and the assertion
that the "cost/benefit" ratio was too high.
Using a value $100/man-rem for radiation damage and the proposed
25 mrem/yr exposure level, each individual receiving that dose suffers a
radiation damage loss of $2.50 per year.
A relatively simple and reliable calculation can be given for the
case of krypton 85 (85Kr) releases. Most of the 85Kr remains in the
A-29
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P-19
atmosphere, and nixing distributes the gas throughout the troposphere.
Mixing between the northern and southern hemispheres may require a few
years, but the world-wide man-ren product is only slightly affected by a
non-uniform distribution. World population is approximately 3.9 x 10^
persons, so a world-wide radiation dose of 0.1 mrem would cause damages
of $3.9 x 10 to humans, and an unknown amount of damage to other organisms.
An accurate estimate of the cost of "^Kr capture and storage is not available
so the "cost /benefit" ratio can't be computed. It seems probable that the
cost of 85Kr control would be less than $4 x 107.
A radioactive 8^Kr concentration of 10~H Ci/ffl^ would give a dose rate
of approximately 0.1 mrem/yr and would be achieved by distributing 3.4 x 10'
Ci of ^Cr uniformly throughout .the atmosphere. At the proposed rate of
release (5 x 10 Ci/Gw-yr) the dose rate would reach 0.1 mrem/yr after
energy production of 670 Gw-yrs. Using the energy production rates given
in Table 2.3.1 on pages 2.3-5 of the Draft Environmental Statement WASH- 15 39
the dose rate of 0.1 mrem/yr would be surpassed in 1983, and the dose
commitment at that time would be 1.5 mrem. The corresponding world-wide
damage commitment would be $6 x 10 . Clearly restrictions on the rate of
release of 85Kr will be needed before 1983 and the permissible rate should
not exceed 2.2 x 106 Ci/yr for the entire world. The United States' share
of such releases should probably not exceed 10^ Ci/yr. More accurate
calculations for all significant isotopes are clearly needed, and can best
be discussed in the proposed Environmental Statement.
We request that the Environmental Protection Agency:
(1) set whole body dose rates no higher than 5 mrem/yr and thyroid dose
rates no higher than 15 mrem/yr for the general public, pending new regulations
to be based on a review of WASH- 1258 and a new DES as proposed below.
(2) limit releases of long-lived radionuclides to values such that the
combined dose rates produced by them does not exceed 1 mrem/yr to any
organism.
(3) follow the procedures specified in the National Environmental Policy
Act to propose, and get public comments on, permissible radiation exposure
rates for individuals near site boundaries and for larger groups uhich may
be irradiated by releases of specific radionuclides including *T, C, "Rr
and
131
I.
The DES should be broad enough to provide exposure estimates for
essentially all species of flora and fauna. Areas considered may be different
for each radionuclide, depending in its half-life and transport properties,
and should be large enough to include at least 901 of the total "organism-rad"
dose produced by proposed releases. :
Economic damage estimates should be provided wherever possible.
Comparison of the social costs to produce a given amount of electric
energy by nuclear fission and by alternate means, particularly by coal
fired power plants, under EPA's proposed rules should be provided.
Respectfully submitted,
Dr. Bob E. Watt, Ch. Nuclear Energy Policy
PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP
2ODD P STREET. N. W.
SUITE 711
WASHINGTON. D C. 2DD36
(202) B33-97DO
July 28, 1975
Director
Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, B.C. 20460
Dear Sirs:
I wish to submit some rather brief comments on the Environmental
Protection Agency's (EPA) proposed radiation standards for the nuclear
fuel cycle (40 PR 23420). I regret that other demands have prevented
me from submitting more detailed comments.
1. The proposed EPA standards would reduce the allowed annual
dose to a member of the general population from 500 mrem (or 170 mrem,
depending upon interpretation) to 25 mrem whole body dose. In a
general philosophical sense, this action should be commended. At a
time when the Administration seems bent on rolling back or postponing
environmental standards in other areas—as evidenced by proposed
amendments to the Clean Air Act, the proposed automobile emission
standards moratorium, the strip mining veto, and questionable appointments-
it is encouraging that in one area, standards are being tightened.
I will, however, withhold comment at this time on the absolute
adequacy of the proposed standards. Others concerned with the public
interest, and with greater expertise than myself, will be submitting
detailed comments on the standards' adequacy.
2. There is one aspect of the standards which is disturbine.
The language of the proposed standards states these standards are for
"planned" releases of radioactivity. There are two aspects of this
language which are bothersome. First, there is no definition of "planned",
Does this mean, for example, that if a licensee releases an excessive
amount of radiation, he can characterize it as "unplanned" and
circumvent any restrictions on his emissions for the remainder of the
year? Secondly, although EPA has performed an evaluation of the
environmental effects of planned releases, there has not been, to my
knowledge, any evaluation of the effects of unplanned releases. Each
unplanned release appears to be considered a "case closed" with a
utility or Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) announcement that no
persons were injured. There has not been an evaluation of what the
cumulative effects to the environment and the public of all spills,
leaks, and unplanned releases might have been.
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P-20
It would seem that such an evaluation of "unplanned" effects
would be necessary to adequately set standards for "planned" releases.
If the expected unplanned releases would cause significant health
effects, then it would be necessary to compensate by redi;"' ':\~ standards
for planned releases. I recommend that the EPA or NH'"1 |» -I'drm or;
evaluation of the cumulative effects of unplanned releases from the
nuclear fuel cycle. Without such an evaluation, there can be no
assurance that the standards for planned releases will keep the
combined health effects from planned and unplanned releases at
"acceptable" levels. Vi.
Yours truly,
John Abbotts
A-31
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INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
AGENCE INTERNATIONALE DE L'ENERGIE ATOMIQUE
MEttflVHAPOAHOE AFEHTCTBO F1O ATOMHOPl 3HEPTHM
ORGANISMO INTERNACIONAL DE ENERGIA ATOMICA
P-21
TELEX: Ot-lMi
CABLE INATOM VIENNA
KARNTNER RING 11. PO BOX 590, A-1011 VIENNA. AUSTRIA
0/340-8?
P-22
BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY
ASSOCIATED UNIVERSITIES. INC.. UPTON. LI.. N.Y. 11973
HEALTH PHYSICS & SAFETY DIVISION
TELEPHONE: (516) 345-4210
August 12, 1975
1975-07-28
Dear Bill,
I've recently reviewed your proposed EPA standards for environ-
mental protection for nuclear power operations and would like to
commend you and your staff on a job well done. I believe the
approach you have taken is a step in the right direction and should
be continued.
We have had a problem, however, in understanding how the
estimated cost effectiveness of S 75/person-rem (cost for implementing
proposed standards) was derived. In the same regard we have had
difficulty in reproducing the cost effectiveness curves in
Part III (Fuel Reprocessing and Waste Management) of your "Environ-
mental Analysis of the Uranium Fuel Cycle",
I would greatly appreciate it if you could provide us with the
assumptions and calculations on which these figures were based.
Thank you very much.
Sincerely yours,
Jerry J, Cohen
Joint IAEA/IIASA
Research Project
Mr. William D. Rowe
Office of Radiation Programs
U.S0 Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
United States of America
Dr. William A. Mills, Director
Criteria & Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Protection Programs
Washington DC 20460
Dear Dr. Mills:
Enclosed are comments with regard to the Proposed Standards on
"Environmental Radiation Protection for Nuclear Power Operations",
40 CFR Part 190 as published in the Federal Register on May 29, 1975.
Due to the pressure of other professional responsibilities, I have not
been able to complete them by the indicated end of the comment period.
I remain hopeful that they are not unduly late for consideration.
The indicated intent of the proposed standards is the "protection
of the general public for unnecessary radiation exposures and radio-
active materials in the general environment resulting from the normal
operations of facilities comprising the uranium fuel cycle". Upon
first consideration, such an intent appears commendable and appropriate
to EPA's mandate under Reorganization Plan No. 3. However, a review of
the experience to date and projections from it of future expectations
under the aegis of licensing and regulatory agencies (particularly the
former Atomic Energy Commission and its successor Nuclear Regulatory
Commission), discloses few loopholes involving what might be adjudged
an "unnecessary" exposure of the public that would be closed by the
proposed standards. Additionally, in many specifics the proposed
standards depart from their announced intent to protect "the general
public", and become de facto standards for the protection of individuals
in the immediate vicinity of nuclear facilities. Insofar as this is so,
they seem to me redundant, confusing and to contribute little if any to
meaningful health protection of the general public.
Additionally, in my judgment, the inclusion of specific quantity
release limits in a standard for the protection of the general public
is inappropriate, especially when unaccompanied by any indication of
the environmental pathway model and assumptions insofar as it may mis-
lead the public as to the significance of such releases and of the pro-
tection being afforded by the proposed limitations.
As indicated in the published explanatory preface to the proposed
standards, the current guidance for radiological protection of the
public from nuclear facility operations has had as its primary focus
A-32
INFORMATION OPERATOR |516| 345-2123
-------
Dr. William A. Mills
August 12, 1975
Dr. William A. Mills
August 12, 1975
the most exposed individual, rather than the limitation of the dose to
the total population from a specific type of activity. However, it
should be observed in this connection that Part 20 "Standards for
Protection Against Radiation" [Paragraph 20.106(e)] does consider a
"suitable sample of an exposed population" and the restriction of
effluents from a given facility if it appears that daily intake by
such a population group of radioactive material, averaged over a
year, would exceed the daily intake from continuous exposure at one-
third of the concentration guides generally corresponding to a whole
body dose of 500 mrem/yr or an individual organ dose of 1,500 mrem/
yr.
The explanatory preface of the proposed standard suggests that
with the anticipated expanded development of the nuclear industry,
it appears as important to consider the potential radiological im-
pact on the surrounding (and in some cases worldwide) population,
as on the most exposed individuals most nearby to a nuclear facility.
In point of fact, effluent discharges from most AEC-NRC licensed or
operated nuclear facilities have been small fractions (a few percent)
of release limits derived from current radiation protection standards
based on direct exposure of individuals in unrestricted areas or con-
centration guides for air, water or foods consumed by the most exposed
nearby individuals.
Of the several steps in the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear power
reactors currently appear to produce the largerst population dose,
and fuel reprocessing facilities the next largest. The other steps,
mining, milling, fabrication and waste disposal seem relatively in-
significant. In the extreme, airborne effluents from a few nuclear
power reactors appear to have produced a few hundred person-rem/year
in the surrounding population with 80 km, and more typically, a few
tens of person-rems. Liquid effluents have been insignificant by
comparison, as a source of general population exposure. By compari-
son, the average yearly dose from naturally occurring radioactivity to
a typical population (1.5 x 10^ persons) in the vicinity of a nuclear
power facility is about 2.0 x 10* person-rems.
After making what appeared to me a strong and convincing argument
for population related standards based on total dose commitment expressed
in person-rems, a complete reversal is made in the explanatory preface to
support individual dose and quantity release limits. It is stated
that, "the environmental models used in deriving these (population
dose) assessments, while useful for making estimates of potential
health impact, are not considered to be so well-defined as to allow
standards for the populations to be expressed directly in terms re-
quiring their explicit use". In the absence of supporting evidence,
this appears an arbitrary judgmentjWhich effectively circumvents the
OMB Direction of 12/7/73 limiting EPA's authority to settling standards
for the "total amount of radiation in the environment from all facil-
ities". It is difficult to comprehend why the environmental models
used by EPA to estimate health effects with seeming great confidence
(lacking any indication of range) in undergirding reports such as
EPA 520/4-73-002, EPA 520/9-73-003, cannot be used with equal con-
fidence to set population standards directly in person-rems.
As indicated in Table IV of the enclosed paper, "Reactor Effluents:
As Low as Practicable or as Low as Reasonable" (Nuclear News. 15:11,
November 1972), other countries have made population dose allocation for
the nuclear fuel cycle. I cannot understand why this was not done in
the U.S. several years ago. On one hand, it would have made sense as
a precautionary measure to prevent any one sector (including the nuclear
power fuel cycle) from utilizing the entire general population 30 year
dose limit of 5.0 rem, as recommended by the ICRP. On the other, it was
obvious from the early experience of the industry that population doses
occasioned by it were small fractions of the ICRP limit. In my judgment
a reasonable allocation based on this experience would have cost very
little, and would have removed any basis for the unfounded inferences
made widely a few years ago by Drs. Gofman and Tamplin, that nuclear
power might produce a U.S. population-wide exposure "at the FRC limit
of 170 millirems per year" and thereby produce 16,000 or 32,000 or
even 104,000 cancer deaths per year.
By setting forth somewhat better founded and somewhat less
sensational numbers of "health effects" without careful qualification
that under the circumstances of the assumption of the linear hypothesis
these are very likely upper limit estimates for which the lower limit
may approach zero , in my judgment EPA is playing the Gofman-Tamplin
game of using the public's hyperphobia of radiation and radioactivity
for its own ends. Numbers of health effects, when set forth without
this qualification, and with no attempt to place them in the context of
their overall prevailing incidence, seem more calculated to alarm than
to inform as a basis for sound public policy.
For many, if not most nuclear effluent releases, the most exposed
individual is immediate or adjacent to the originating facility site
boundary. Thus, although the proposed standards are supposedly intended
to "assure the protection of the public from unnecessary radiation ex-
posures"; when set in the form of limits "applicable to any member of
the public", they become de facto facility standards. Via the back
door, they put EPA in the business of superseding the judgment of NRC
on matters in which the latter appears to have more competence by
virtue of first-hand knowledge, experience and staff to make pertinent
in depth analyses. As illustration, I suggest the impressive detail
in the AEG Regulatory Staff (now NRC) backup materials for the Appendix
I proceedings.
In the prefatory explanation of the proposed standards it is
furthermore argued that, "it is inequitable to permit doses to
specific individuals (presumably those who reside close to a nuclear
site) that might be substantially higher than those to other members
of the public from other radionuclides. Although this argument has
egalitarian appeal, I find that it does not seem to be uniformly
applied as an overall EPA protection philosophy. In Table V of the
enclosed paper, "Comparing Effluent Releases from Nuclear and Fossil-
Fueled Power Plants" (Nuclear News. 16:4, April 1974), I have shown
that using average meteorology, yearly average air concentrations
of S02 and NOX approach or exceed EPA "population" air quality stan-
dards at the site boundary of large coal- and oil-fueled power plants.
A-33
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Dr. William A. Mills
August 12, 1975
Dr. William A. Mills
August 12, 1975
Clearly, the most nearby individuals are at greater health risk from
these agents than populations more distant. In my oral testimony of
6/6/74 to the AEC Commissioners, a copy of which is also enclosed, in
the section on "Risk Comparisons" (pages 6-7) I have also commented
specifically on the incongruity of holding radiation risks to a much
lower level than those from power plant effluents (at current esti-
mates) and on the inconsistency of limiting site boundary radiation
exposures to acceptable "general population" levels, as compared to
the generally prevailing attitude for conventionally hazardous tech-
nological activities.
The specific limits proposed in the standards, 25 millirems to
the whole body, 75 millirems to the thyroid, and 25 millirems to any
other organ, appear reasonable and achievable, if applied on a general
population, rather than individual basis. However, in my judgment, it
would be desirable to have these limits related to the benefit, the
amount of installed power capacity (or that produced). In the paper,
"As Low as Practicable or As Low as Reasonable", I have proposed such
a scheme which I commend to your attention.
Although not as qualified to speak to the availability, practic-
ability and economics of radwaste control technology as I am to envi-
ronmental radioactivity; as indicated above, I have serious reservat-
ions about the wisdom or appropriateness of including quantity release
limits in an environmental radiation protection standard. In my judg-
ment, the pertinent issue is the dose to the population and not the
amounts released. The derivation of quantity release limits from the
latter necessitates an environmental model and many assumptions about
pathways, transfer co-efficients, discrimination factors and uptake
rates. The current poor definition of these models, is alluded to in
the EPA argument against directly stated population dose limits. It
seems to me that the same argument applies against quantity release
limits (with the possible exception of 85}^ for which the environment-
al model is least complicated).
or
Specifically with regard to Kr, from my calculations I assume
that the intent of the proposed standard is that it be substantially
removed from fuel reprocessing plant off-gas streams, and contained for
"long-term" waste disposal. I would encourage such removal and contain-
ment for the reason that the anticipated atmospheric concentrations of
°5Kr by the year 2000 without such measures could be a major annoyance
in low background counting, long before they could pose a significant
radiological problem. I question the need or cost-effectiveness of the
application of such removal technology to power reactor effluent gas
streams.
129
Although I has an effective "infinite" half-life, with regard
to the human time scale, even without any removal the total amounts
created by the nuclear fuel cycle during the next century seem small
relative to the total world-wide inventory of long-lived naturally oc-
curring radioactivity on or near the earth's surface. However, since
iodine removal at or close to 10^ is commonly employed for the removal
of 131I from gas streams, the cleanup of "9j from fuei reprocessing
plant off gas streams by a comparable factor should be practicable.
However, this is more sensible with a view toward minimizing local con-
centrations, than with the questionable one of "containing" 129j for
even an appreciable fraction of its half life.
The proposed release limit for long-lived transuranics seems extra-
ordinarily restrictive, considering the experience with them to date.
Unclassified references (i.e. G.P. Dix and T.J. Dohry, "Critical Para-
meters in Plutonium Safety Evaluations", Health Physics. 22:6, 569-574,
June, 1972) suggest that about 5 x 10^ Ci of ^-^Pu and lesser amounts of
other transuranics have been distributed over the surface of the earth
as a result of atmospheric weapons testing. The current Northern Hemi-
spheric deposition of 239pu is about 2 nCi/m^ (or about 2 x 10 Ci over
the land area of the U.S.). A related 18-year (1954-1972) dose to the
lung of 15 mrem has been calculated (B.C. Bennett, "Fallout ^39^ Dose
to Man", HASL-278, 1/1/74). The release of 0.5 mCi/Gw(e)-year from ~
1,000 Gw capacity for 50 years, if uniformly deposited over the U.S.
would accumulate to 2,500 Ci. Scaling from the fallout Pu experience,
a 50 year dose to the lungs of about 5 mrem would be anticipated. This
seems a considerable overestimation, since most of the ^39pu reieaseci
at ground level or from stacks of AEC facilities appears to have remain-
ed deposited nearby, so that the EPA assumption of U.S.-wide distribut-
ion of analogous materials from the nuclear fuel cycle seems question-
able. If, as claimed by EPA, a standard of 0.5 Ci/Gw(e)-year is "reas-
onably achievable using currently available control methods", then well
and good. But, it does not seem a goal worth pushing very hard toward,
when one considers that the alpha dose to the basal cells at the bronchi
from the inhalation of naturally occurring 222Rn range from 280-1,490
mrem/yr (Table 15, Vol 1, UNSCEAR, 1972).
It is indicated that "the standards represent the lowest radiation
levels at which the Agency has determined that the costs of control are
justified by the reduction in health risk." The assumptions of the lin-
ear hypothesis and of BEIR risk-estimates is acknowledged. Obviously,
the evaluation of benefit (health risk reduction) achieved under the pro-
posed standard is crucially dependent on the validity of the above assum-
ptions. In a recent paper, "Radioactive Effluent Releases and Public
Acceptance at Nuclear Facility Sites" [Siting of Nuclear Facilities. IAEA
SM-188 (1975)], I have reviewed evidence for doubting the pertinence of
this assumption and of the BEIR risk estimates. It is my belief that
scientific standards setting groups may soon give official recognition to
the evidence of a reduced risk from low-dose, low dose-rate radiations
(such as those occasioned by effluents from the nuclear power cycle).
Since there seems no current urgency for the proposed EPA standards, I
would urge that they be delayed until these pronouncements are made or
until the need does seem more urgent.
Two orders of magnitude greater whole-body environmental doses to
the U.S. population are expected from natural radiation than those anti-
cipated from the nuclear power activities energy in the year 2000 (see
Table 11-26, ORP/CSD 72-1). If EPA is concerned about reducing hypo-
thetical health effects in the general population from low-level radia-
tion, then it seems to me that a correspondingly higher priority should
be given to this background and the related health effects than to
nuclear power cycle. Although natural radiation is a "given" there are
obvious strategies (choice of location, building materials, diet) that
could minimize such exposures. Until their cost-benefit effectiveness
is examined, I am not convinced that the promulgation of standards to
limit small increments from nuclear power are where EPA should be
putting its efforts. In this connection I call attention to the lack
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Dr. William A. Mills
August 12, 1975
of discernible health effects in populations living in high background
areas within the U.S., as revealed by a recent study of the state by
state incidence of cancer in the U.S. between 1950 and 1967 (N. Frigerio
et al, ANL/ES-26 (1973), which is also summarized in the above paper.
Beyond the questionable priority which the proposed standards have
within overall priorities for the protection of the public from unnecess-
ary exposure to radiation, I suggest that they are even more questionable
when viewed within the overall context of public health priorities. In
my judgment, it is not sufficient simply to make a cost-effectiveness
assessment within the narrow confines of radiological health. Rather
such standards and the expenditures they may occasion should be viewed
within the context of the overall level of risk-benefit for the total
spectrum of health standards, risks and expenditures. The following
table of representative U.S. public health and safety risks is illustra-
tive. The projected hypothetical risk and mortality from nuclear power
(which may be exaggerated at the BEIR dose-effect risk estimates) ,
appears to be orders of magnitude less than most (if not every) other
health risk for which actual mortality data is available.
As a health physicist who has been involved for a number of years
in public information efforts, I am well aware of the climate of popu-
lar misunderstanding and fear which prevails with regard to radiation
hazards. Clearly, the public is entitled to whatever degree of radia-
tion protection it desires. But it seems to me that the radiation pro-
tection community has a professional obligation to do its best to mini-
mize these fears, to set the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth (as best we perceive it) before the public. In my judgment this
means stating candidly that the present and projected risks from nuclear
power, as influenced by the current ICRP-NCRP-FRC standards, are insig-
nificant relative to a broad spectrum of man-made and naturally occasioned
risks (as enumerated in Table I), and that public expenditures for the
betterment of health might more rewardingly be directed to these areas
than toward still more radiation effluent control technology and environ-
mental monitoring effort.
In summary, let me suggest that however much the proposed standards
wear the "god and motherhood" mantle of protecting the public from un-
necessary radiation exposures; applied to nuclear power it focuses on
an insignificant source of such exposures, and ignores the major sources
of the exposure of the public to radiation. As such, they seem to me
more like a cynical attempt on EPA's part to look good politically than
to offer any meaningful increment of public health protection that
would not occur in the absence of the standards.
Yours truly,
Table I
U.S. Public Health & Safety Risks
Average Annual
Individual Risk
Heart Disease 5 x 10
Cancer 1.5 x 10"
Accidents 6 x 10"
Automobile Accidents 2.5 x 10*
Suicide 1 x 10"
Air Pollution* 7.5 x 10~
Homocide 5 x 10"
Tuberculosis 3 x 10"
Natural Radiation (130 mR/yr, BEIR) 2.6 x 10"
Electrocution 2 x 10~
X-Rays (~100 mR, linear hypothesis) 2 x 10"
Choking 1.8 x 10"
Natural Disasters 1 x 10~
Nuclear Power, 1,000 Gw(e) reactors 3 x 10
(for average** population dose of
0.15 mR/yr)
-8
Total Approximate
Annual Mortality
1,000,000
300,000
120,000
50,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
6,000
5,200
4,000
4,000
3,600
200
6
About 50% from fossil-fueled power plant effluents.
Table 11-26, ORP/CSD 72-1. An "individual" site boundary of 25 mR/yr can
be projected to produce a somewhat smaller average population dose.
Andrew P. Hull
A-35
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Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
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Natural Resources Defense Councu, Inc.
Director
Criteria and Standards Division
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
September 15, 1975
Page two
Finally, we urge EPA to hold at least one hearing on the West
Coast in order to afford a more practical opportunity for participa-
tion by citizen groups and individuals in the West. Hearings in
the East rarely can be attended by western citizens due to the high
expense of travel and the difficulty in making enough time available.
Sincerely yours
TRL:gg
Enclosure
664 HAMILTON AVENUE
PALO ALTO, CALIF. Q43O1
415 3*7-1080
Washington Office
917 15TH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 2OOO5
xoi 737-5000
New York Office
15 WEST 44TH STREET
NEW YORK, N.Y. 1OOJ6
Jit 869-0150
Terry R. Lash, Ph.D.
Staff Scientist
Comments
Of The
Natural Resources Defense Council
On The
Environmental Protection Agency's
Draft Environmental Statement
ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION PROTECTION
REQUIREMENTS FOR NORMAL OPERATIONS
OF ACTIVITIES IN THE URANIUM FUEL CYCLE
And
PART 190-ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION
PROTECTION STANDARDS FOR NUCLEAR
POWER OPERATIONS
Submitted by:
Terry R. Lash, Ph.D.
With the assistance of:
John W. Gofman, M.D., Ph.D.
September 15, 1975
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
II.
THE DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL
AND HEALTH EFFECTS IN THE DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT IS TOO NARROW, INCOMPLETE
EFFECT^ N°T ADEQUATELY CONSIDER CUMULATIVE
A. The Entire Uranium Fuel Cycle Must Be
Considered.
Uranium Mining
Radioactive Waste Management Facilities
a. Low-level waste burial
b. High-level waste disposal
c. Uranium mill tailings
Plutonium Recycle
Research and Development Facilities
5. Decommissioning of Facilities
B. The Total Health Effects Caused By The
Release of Radionuclides Must Be Estima-
ted For The Entire Period That The
Radionuclides Remain Potentially
Hazardous.
C. The Health Effects On Future Members Of
The General Population Due To Radiation
Exposure Of Nuclear Workers Should Be
Assessed.
THE DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT DOES
AN ADEQUATE COST-RISK-BENEFIT
III.
IV. THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS ARE TOO WEAK VAGUE
AND DO NOT ADEQUATELY IMPLEMENT THE ENVIRONMENTAL
12
13
15
17
21
22
26
35
36
37
39
42
46
D.
E.
F.
There Are No Procedures Providing For
EPA Review Of The Implementation Of And
Compliance With The Proposed Standards.
Vague And Unduly Restrictive Definitions
Further Limit The Usefullness Of The Pro-
posed Standards.
Uranium Fuel Cycle
Site
Uranium Ore
Member of the Public
Normal Operations
The Proposed Standards Should Set Limits
On Total Releases Of All Critical Radio-
nuclides.
1. Carbon-14
2. Radon-222
The Scope Of The Proposed Regulations
Should Be Expanded To Include All
Nuclear Fuel Cycles.
The Proposed Regulations Should Contain A
Section Limiting Occupational Exposures
That Result In Damage To Future Members
Of The General Population.
The Proposed Standards Should Set Limits
On The Total Releases Permissible Due To
Abnormal Operations.
V. CONCLUSION
48
54
55
57
57
58
59
59
61
63
65
66
68
69
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INTRODUCTION
The Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (HRDC) sub-
mits these comments on the draft environmental impact statement,
Environmental Radiation Protection Requirements for Normal Opera-
tions of Activities in the Uranium Fuel Cycle, and the proposed
regulations, "Part 190—Environmental Radiation Protection
Standards for Nuclear Power Operations," prepared by the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (SPA).-' The draft state-
ment analyzes proposed limits for radiation exposure of the
general public and the release of some radionuclides to the en-
vironment due to the planned operation of the nuclear power
industry. For the reasons stated in detail below, we believe that
the draft statement and the course of inquiry reflected therein
do not satisfy the requirements of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970).
Most importantly, we submit that EPA, in preparing this
impact statement and proposing new regulations, must first con-
i/ 40 Fed. Reg. 23240 et seq., May 29, 1975. These comments sup-
pi ementTNRDC's July 1, 1974, submission in response to EPA's
announcement of intent to promulgate environmental radiation pro-
tection standards (39 Fed. Reg. 16906, May 10, 1974).
sider and evaluate fully the total cumulative radiological.damage
that may result from the radioactive emissions of a large scale
nuclear power industry. Second, EPA must describe completely
its program to ensure adequate protection of the general public
and the environment from radiation exposure due to releases of
radionuclides from the uranium fuel cycle. The fundamental
issue is whether or not the perceived short-term benefits of the
electricity generated at nuclear power plants will be worth the
inevitable very long-term radiation exposure of the public and
radioactive contamination of the environment. However, by
narrowly restricting the scope of the draft statement to an
incomplete analysis of the radiological damage from only a few
radioactive contaminants during just 100 years, instead of con-
sidering all significant radionuclides for the thousands of
years that some of the contaminants will remain hazardous, and
by ignoring entirely the serious ill-health effects that will
be imposed on future generations from prior occupational exposures
of nuclear workers, EPA has substantially underestimated the
total, human ill-health and deleterious environmental effects of
a large nuclear power industry. In fact, despite assurances
that a comprehensive approach was adopted, the draft statement
never seriously considers the total public health and environ-
mental implications of possible future national reliance on
nuclear power as a major source of electrical energy generation.
To compare the consequences of releasing various amounts
of radioactive materials to the environment and to evaluate the
-2-
A-41
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necessity for more or less strict limits on such releases for
decision-making purposes, the total long-term impact of all
significant radionuclides that may be released to the environment
from the entire uranium fuel cycle must be evaluated. No impor-
tant radionuclide can be omitted from the analysis; no portion
of the fuel cycle can be excluded,. The draft statement fails to
compare alternative regulatory schemes on such a comprehensive basis.
Even worse, however, the draft statement ~ apparently
based on its incomplete and wholly inadequate analysis of the
potential hazards — enthusiastically touts nuclear power as
playing ". . .an essential and major role in meeting national
power needs during the next several decades." (p. l)2/ since
the draft statement contains no analysis of "national power
needs"or of alternative methods for meeting those needs, EPA's
assertion stands completely unsupported. In NRDC's view, it is
also inaccurate and out of place in view of EPA's responsibilities.
The strong promotional tone in the draft statement forcefully
raises a substantial question of whether or not the primary aim
of the new regulations is to protect the public health and en-
vironment fully from radiation damage or to facilitate the rapid
commercialization of nuclear power. This latter purpose would be
wholly inappropriate in a draft statement prepared by the Agency
with principal responsibility for protecting the public from
2/
- Unless otherwise indicated, page numbers refer to pages of
the draft environmental impact statement. See also pT 9.
an unhealthful environment.—
The following major deficiencies exist in the draft
statement:
1. The entire uranium fuel cycle is not considered;
specifically, the deleterious effects of radioactive releases
from uranium mines, mill tailings piles, mixed-oxide fuel
fabrication plants, non-operating facilities (including facili-
ties undergoing decommissioning), and waste disposal sites are
not evaluated.
2. The long-term human ill-health effects due to the
routine release of several potentially significant radionuclides,
£.£., radon-22 (and its decay products), strontium-90, and cesium-
137, are not assessed.
3. The total human ill-health effects resulting from the
release of radionuclides, with very long half-lives, such as
carbon-14, are substantially underestimated, because the analysis
is arbitrarily terminated at only 100 years after the radionuclides
enter the environment.
4. The significant deleterious health effects in subse-
quent generations produced by gonadal and fetal radiation exposure
of workers at nuclear facilities are excluded from evaluation.
- In any event, if a strong claim for the necessity of a large
flf=^ar £°Wer 12duftry is to *>e made in the statement, all of the
disadvantages of the large-scale development of nuclear power must
for- miirana^Zed a?d comPared to all reasonable alternative means
for meeting the nation's energy needs. Of course, this draft
^o^f1^ failf totallv to substantiate such a claim, or even to
attempt to conduct such an analysis. Rather, the conclusion is
m " "ser^d- *? li(?ht of the serious technical, economic and
= PPA^O" f currently facing the nuclear power industry,
,^,,~ _ _..^_ ^i__ Q^ nuclear
-3-
A-42
-4-
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5. The possible extent of "unplanned" releases of
radionuclides is not assessed.
6. There is no consideration of the release of radio-
nuclides due to either industry or government-sponsored nuclear
power research and development activities.
7. The potential deleterious impacts on non-human
organisms due to radioactive releases from the nuclear power
industry are not evaluated at all.
8. The overall levels of uncertainty associated with
the amounts of radioactive releases, possible human exposure
pathways and the extent of injury from chronic, low-level ex-
posure are not adequately considered.
9. The total program, and all reasonable alternatives
to its various subparts, for meeting EPA's duties to protect the
public and environment from excessive radiation damage are not
fully described.
10. The cost/benefit analysis is grossly incomplete,
does not adequately consider the potential margin of error in
cost calculations, and does not include a risk assessment.
The proposed regulatipns are inherently inadequate
and fundamentally incomplete because, as indicated above, they
were not derived from a complete analysis of the potential
ill-health and adverse environmental effects of a large commercial
nuclear power industry. In particular, the proposed regulations
do not establish specific limits on the release of some radio-
nuclides, e.g., radon-222and carbon-14, and specifically exempt
-5-
some nuclear facilities, e.g., mixed-oxide fuel fabricating
plants, that are clearly shown in the draft statement and other
reports to have a potentially greater adverse impact on the
public health than the radionuclides and facilities that are
covered by the proposed regulations. NRDC concludes that the
proposed regulations, even in the event they are fully enforced,
would inadequately protect the public and environment from the
radiation damage that may be produced by the planned operations
of a large nuclear power industry.
Additionally, however, the regulations are seriously
defective because they are vague, too easily permit deviations
from numerical standards, do not provide for adequate super-
vision and enforcement by EPA,3jL/ and do not provide for sufficient
public notification of the extent of the nuclear power industry's
compliance with the regulations. Thus, the proposed action fails
by a large margin to achieve its major purpose of assuring . . .
adequate radiation protection of public health and the environ-
ment." (p. 15)
In' conclusion, we generally support the adoption of the
Environmental Radiation Dose Commitment concept as a proper,
stricter standard for protecting public health and the environment.
3a/ The importance of EPA supervising NRC's enforcement of the
proposed regulations is underscored by the recent preliminary
finding of discharges from uranium mines and mills in New Mexico
that exceed the maximum permissible limits established both at
10 C.F.R. Part 20 and proposed by EPA under the Safe Drinking
Water Act (40 Fed. Reg. 34324, August 14, 1975). See, Rouse and
Hatheway, National Field Investigations Center - Denver, EPA,
"Preliminary Report on New Mexico Uranium Mine and Mill Survey,
Grants, Mineral Belt, New Mexico," June 2, 1975.
-6-
A-43
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We also support EPA's proposed establishment of lower permissible
levels of radiation exposure and the setting of maximum total
releases of krypton-85, iodine-129 and alpha-emitting transuranic
radionuclides. NRDC agrees with EPA's judgment that currently
permissible limits on radiation exposure are "unnecessarily high."
(P. 13)
However, in order to correct the serious deficiencies
outlined above, NRDC strongly urges EPA (1) to adopt modified
regulations that will more adequately protect the public and the
environment from the cumulative effects of releases of radio-
active materials, and (2) to issue a comprehensive environmental
impact statement (a) that more fully considers the potential long-
term, cumulative effects of radioactive pollutants in the environ-
ment, (b) that clearly describes EPA's overall programmatic effort
to fulfill its responsibilities to protect the environment and
public from excessive radiation damage, and (c) that devotes itself
to the regulation of, rather than the promotion of, the large-
scale development of nuclear power.
Finally, NRDC again requests prompt, affirmative action
on its petition seeking lower permissible levels of human ex-
posure to "hot particles" of plutonium and other alpha-emitting
radionuclides.!/ Eighteen months have passed since the original
petition was submitted; and still, six months after submission
of NRDC's supplemental statement on EPA's public hearings,A/
EPA has not conducted the needed adjudicatory hearing or ruled on
the petition. Furthermore, the draft statement does not, as it
should, discuss either NRDC's petition or the special hazards posed
by Plutonium. Such a discussion 'is particularly important because
the detailed analysis in other EPA documents,-!./ which provide fche
technical bases for the proposed standards, do not themselves con-
sider the hot particle problem or other recent analyses of the
hazards of plutonium when it is not in the form of hot particles.!/
r
aranim Elements," tauary 24 ll?5
° the
<">d ">e Trans
K la
'1 P1Ut°niUm ™« the ^ansuraniuf Elements?™
-7-
—8 —
A-44
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II
THE DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL AND HEALTH EFFECTS
IN THE DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT IS TOO NARROW,
INCOMPLETE AND DOES NOT ADEQUATELY CONSIDER CUMULATIVE EFFECTS.
The Environmental Portection Agency has too narrowly
focused the draft statement. The result is a significant under-
estimate of the potential long-term human ill health and adverse
environmental effects resulting from releases of radionuclides
from nuclear power plants and their supporting facilities. Indeed,
we find the omissions in this draft's analysis to be inconsistent
even with EPA's own intention to conduct ". . .as complete an
assessment ... as possible." (p. 19)
The stated purpose of the proposed administrative
action to establish new radiation protection regulations is
". . .to insure that the anticipated major expansion of nuclear
power takes place with assurance of adequate radiation protection
of public health and the environment." (p. 75). In order to
achieve this goal EPA must, first, conduct a thorough analysis
of all potentially significant radiation sources associated
with the generation of electricity at nuclear power plants,
and, second, promulgate and enforce appropriate standards to
protect the public and environment from unduly harmful levels
of radiation from these sources.
This draft statement by EPA must provide the analysis
supporting the proposed regulations. Furthermore, the statement
must also consider those potentially significant radiation
sources from the nuclear power industry that EPA has not
attempted to.control at this time. In particular, the scope
of EPA's analysis cannot properly be constrained simply
because EPA currently believes that it does not have authority
8 /
to regulate some radiation sources.—
Unfortunately, the statement's failure to consider
carefully all potentially significant sources of radioactive
contaminants and radiation in the uranium fuel cycle is
made more serious by the draft statement's representation, in
several prominent places, that the analysis in fact is compre-
hensive. For instance, in the "Introduction," the draft state-
ment proclaims that ". . .the Agency has made a comprehensive
assessment of planned releases of radioactive materials associated
with nuclear power generation . . . ." (p. I, emphasis added)
And, in the discussion of alternative methodologies for radiation
protection, the draft statement endorses the environmental radia-
tion dose concept because "... it provides an assessment of
the potential public health impact of the entire industry." (p.
25, emphasis added) This is a seriously misleading representa-
tion in light of the incompleteness of the statement's analysis
and the serious deficiencies in the regulations.
8/ The Guidelines on the Preparation of Environmental Impact
Statements (40 C.F.R. Part 1500) by the Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) and court decisions under NEPA are clear on this
point. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton,
458 F.2d 827, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
-10-
-9-
A-45
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Furthermore, the importance of comprehensiveness in
the statement's analysis is underlined by EPA's stated, but in
our opinion unfounded,-?-7 belief "... that national needs
for electric power cannot be met without a large increase in
the fraction of electric power produced by nuclear energy,
given the present lack of availability of alternative sources,
at least within the next few decades." (p. 9, footnote deleted)
As we stated above, such a broad sweeping assertion about
nuclear power is wholly inappropriate in this draft statement.^'
In any event, the deficiencies in the draft statement make such
an assertion unjustified therein.
Regarding the cumulative adverse effects on public
health and environmental quality, the major gaps in the analysis
10/
9 /See, for instance, Cochran, Speth and Tamplin "A Poor Buv "
Environment 17 (No. 4), pp. 18-19 (June 1975)? Tte American Y'
JyS1990 " p 3rChifrS^ ? N!ti0n °f Ener^ Efficient "Swings
cy 1990, p. 3; and Ford Foundation Energy Policy Project A
Time to Choose, Ballinger Publishing Co.? p. 223 (1974* ~
analvsis of environmental and public health
eve h™*?leaSeS °f radi°™clides were complete, we
or n^o ?? EPA'S. ^valuation of the overall advisability
an ?™n * y USlng nuclear P0^ should not be a part of
menS radf^eSSment/elated tO the P^^tion of new environ-
mental radiation rotection standards. The nuclear issue is
One.involvin9 consideration of^for instance,
t.^H be reduced to protect plutonium
P°ssibilities of catastrophic accidents, the
the feaibilv ^^ econ?mics °f nuclear power plants, and
the feasibility of permanently disposing of long-lived wastes,
to name only some. If EPA wants to urge the rapid development
allow Tl ??T' ^ Sh°Uld d° S° Within another context thl?
upnrV ?eta1ll!d evaluation of all the relevant issues. To
NRDC's knowledge, EPA has never completed such an analysis.
y''henSiVe EP WaS referenced in
contained in the draft statement are: (1) the failure to '
consider radioactive emissions from (a) waste disposal sites
(including mill tailings piles), (b) facilities undergoing
decommissioning, (c) uranium mines, and (d) mixed-oxide fuel
fabrication plants; (2) the neglect of the ill-health effects
on future members of the general, public due to gonadal and
fetal exposures of nuclear workers; (3) the omission of an
assessment of the possible total magnitude of "unplanned" re-
leases; (4) the lack of an evaluation of the impact of some
potentially significant radionuclides, e.g., radon and its
decay products, strontium-90, cesium-137; and (5) the arbitrary
neglect of the effects of long-lived radionuclides, e.g.,
carbon-14, beyond 100 years following their release to the
environment. Each of these points is discussed further below.
A. The Entire Uranium Fuel Cycle Must Be Considered.
Clearly, in order for EPA to develop an effective set
of standards for adequately protecting the public and environ-
ment from radiation resulting from the generation of electricity
at nuclear power plants, consideration of all potentially
significant sources of radiation within the entire fuel cycle
must be included in the draft statement. This is true even
if: (1) EPA believes there is insufficient information
available about some potential radiation sources, e.g.,
radon from mill tailings piles, to promulgate standards
-12-
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A-46
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now;-li/ (2) EPA does not believe that it has authority to
regulate some potential sources, e.g., occupational exposure
sources; or (3) EPA, for another reason, has determined that
the proposed radiation protection standards will not apply
to some potentially important radiation sources, e.g., emissions
from mixed-oxide fuel fabrication plants, at this time. Unfor-
tunately, to the contrary, EPA, using all three of the above
inadequate justifications, has decided to exclude improperly
several potentially important aspects of the uranium fuel
cycle.
1. Uranium Mining — Without adequate explanation,
one type of facility not evaluated in the draft statement as
a potential radiation source is the uranium mine. (See,
e.g., pp. 8, 30, 141.) Perhaps, EPA believes that it has no
responsibility for radioactive releases from uranium mines;
or EPA judges that, in any event, the radiological impact of
uranium mining on the general public is insignificant. Neither
belief, even if correct, would be sufficient for not at least
generally,discussing the potential radiological consequences
of uranium mining and the reasons for omitting them from coverage
by the proposed regulations. Additionally, since under Reorganiza-
tion Plan No. 3, EPA was delegated the authority of the former
ll/ Two purposes would be served by this type of assessment.
First, uncertainties in the full magnitude of deleterious impacts
of nuclear power would be indicated. This is important informa-
tion for consideration by decision-makers considering commitments
to nuclear power. Second, EPA and other agencies would have
a better assessment of what research and analysis should be
sponsored in order to be better able to adopt comprehensive
radiation protection standards.
Federal Radiation Council to issue guidance for permissible
occupational exposure to workers, EPA's intentions with
respect to issuing additional guidance for the protection
of uranium miners should be explicitly discussed in the final
statement, in any event.
There is information suggesting that the radiological
impact of uranium mining on the general public is not always
negligible. For instance, substantial quanitites of radon-222,
radium-226, and thorium-230 are spewed into the atmosphere from
Rio Algom's uranium mine near La Sal, Utah. Residents at the
nearby Redd Ranch receive 42 mrem/year to bone, and 11 mrem/year
to lung, evidently as a result of the combined releases from
the mine and the nearby mill. Members of the public at the
unfenced boundaries of the mill site could receive 200 mrem/year
12/
to bone and 74 mrem/year to lung.—' These radiation exposure
levels are well above the proposed standards for protection of
members of the general public. An appreciable fraction of these
potential doses is evidently due to releases from the ventilation
shaft of the mine. In general, we are concerned that, unless
access to mining sites is more strictly controlled than at
Rio Algom's mine, members of the public could receive significant
doses of radiation due to exposure to radon gases expelled
through ventilation shafts at underground mines.
12/ U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Draft Detailed Statement
On The Environmental Considerations . . . Related To The Pro-
posed Issuance Of A License To The Rio Algom Corporation For
The Humeca Uranium Mill, Docket No. 40-8084, pp. 35-37 (December
1972) .
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A-47
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Apparently, due to the leaching of radionuclides by
water invading underground uranium mines in New Mexico, EPA
has recently discovered dangerously high levels of radioactivity
in drinking water. A preliminary EPA report stated, for
instance, that the concentrations of gross alpha and radium-226
in the drinking water supply near one min.e "grossly exceed
the proposed standards and may pose a health hazard to employ-
ees and their families."—/
2- Radioactive Waste Management Facilities — There is
no clear explanation in the draft statement for not discus-
sing radioactive waste storage and disposal facilities and
including them for coverage by the proposed regulations. (See
p. 94.) The absence of detailed consideration of waste manage-
ment is particularly puzzling in light of the admission that
the waste management issue ". . .is basic to the environmental
viability of nuclear power . . . ." (p. 94)
However, two reasons for this limited approach are
suggested in the statement. First, perhaps EPA simply has not
yet completed an analysis of possible future exposure pathways
from waste storage or burial sites, (p. 94) Although this may
be true and, if so, would be a very practical excuse, it is
not a reasonable explanation from the Agency mandated by Congress
to protect the environment and public health.
IV J.V. Rouse and J.L. Hatheway, National Field Investigations
£?n^ * Me?Tec' EPA' "PreliminarY Report on New Mexico Uranium
Mine and Mill Survey, Grants, Mineral Belt, New Mexico," p 9
(June 2, 1975).
-15-
The second possible reason, while more explicitly
stated, is no more valid: "... [waste management] has been
treated as separable from the question of reasonable levels
of planned effluents because the wastes generated by effluent
control systems represent a miniscule addition to the total
waste management problems of the. industry." (p. 95) In other
words, the draft statement suggests that, because its proposed
regulations will not themselves result in the generation of
large amounts of waste in comparison with what the nuclear
power industry would generate anyway, EPA has no obligation
at this time to review the issue. This is an absurd explana-
tion on its face. Indeed, if EPA restricted its entire analysis
on the same basis, there would be little substance to discuss
in the impact statement. For instance, will EPA's proposed
regulations result in the handling of additional amounts of
Plutonium at reprocessing plants that will have to be prevented
from entering the environment?
There is, in fact, a great need for EPA's full considera-
tion of waste management issues in this draft statement and
coverage of waste storage and disposal facilities by the proposed
regulations, for, unfortunately, there is a substantial long-term
threat posed by current waste storage and disposal operations.
The threat is made more real by the lack of adequate plans
for the safe management of long-lived wastes. Furthermore, there
already have been significant releases of radionuclides into
the general environment due to the improper handling of uranium
mill tailings and low-level wastes. Thus, at least so far,
-16-
A-48
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mill tailings and low-level wastes have not been so much
stored, as disposed.
a. Low-level waste burial — Current practice is to
permit the burial of low-level wastes, including transuranic
wastes, in shallow earthen trenches. Apparently, containers
are not designed to retain these, wastes for the long periods
of time required for the radioactivity to decay to innocuous
levels. EPA has previously expressed concern about the lack
of detailed documentation about the possibility that the
long-lived components of low-level waste may escape into the
general environment, as follows:
"EPA has reviewed the engineering and hydro-
geological reports prepared for the licensing
of the existing commercial burial grounds. In
our view these were preliminary reports
suitable for identifying potentially accep-
table burial sites. The AEC should present
or directly reference in the final statement
the results of any studies which have been
conducted at these commercial burial sites,
subsequent to the beginning of burial oper-
ations, which corroborate or validate the
conclusions reached in the original evalua-
tion and which demonstrate that '. . . after
burial the radioactive material in the waste
will be retained at the site and not migrate
from the vicinity of the burial location,'
and which show that, 'to date, there has
been no indication of migration of radioac-
tivity from any commercial burial site.'"
"Monitoring data or other evidence which con-
firms that the plutonium now buried has remained
immobile at the place of burial and does not
constitute a threat to man or the biosphere
should also be submitted or directly refer-
enced. Due to the large volumes and activities
of waste which are destined for disposal in
these land burial sites, such validation
-17-
studies are vital to assess their current
and potential environment impact."14/
Additionally, a recent study by the U.S. Geological
Survey suggests that a complete safety analysis has not yet
been completed for any commercial low-level waste burial
site, and further, that at least some of the sites would not
qualify as safe by the strict criteria set forth.—'
The amounts of alpha-emitting wastes— that may be
buried in shallow trenches are large in comparison with the
amounts of alpha-emitting radionuclides that could be dis-
charged to the general environment under the proposed regula-
tions. For instance, in the year 1980, the projected pro-
duction of alpha wastes will contain about 2 million curies of
alpha-emitting radionuclides. Since the average nuclear generating
14/ EPA, Comments (D-AEC-A00107-00) on Management of Commercial
High-Level and Transuranium-Contaminated Radioactive Waste
(WASH-1539), p. 11 (November 1974).See, also, EPA's Comments
on the Proposed Final Environmental Statement on the Liquid
Metal Fast Breeder Reactor Program, April 1975, which indicate
that the requested copies of documentation demonstrating the
safety of the low-level waste burial sites have not been pro-
vided to date.
15/ Papadopulos and Winograd, U.S. Geological Survey, "Storage
of Low-Level Radioactive Wastes in the Ground; Hydrogeologic
and Hydrochemical Factors with an Appendix on The Maxey Flats
Kentucky Radioactive Waste Storage Site: Current Knowledge
and Data Needs for a Quantitative Hydrogeologic Evaluation,"
Open-File Report 74-344 (EPA-520/3-74-009), 1974.
16/ As EPA has recognized elsewhere, categories of radioactive
wastes are not well-defined. Here, alpha wastes mean only
the "alpha wastes" identified in Blomeke, Kee, Nichols, Projections
Of Radioactive Wastes To Be Generated By The U.S. Nuclear Power
Industry, ORNL-TM-3965, February 1974. The smaller quantities
of alpha-emitting radionuclides in "alpha-beta-gamma wastes"
are ignored. The bulk of the alpha wastes will be generated
in plutonium recycle facilities, specifically fuel preparation
and fabrication facilities.
-18-
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capacity for the year will be about 114 GWe, there will be
about 17,500 curies of alpha-emitting transuranics per
average installed GWe-year in 1980.—/ This is 35 million
times more than is permitted for release to the general
environment under the proposed regulations.
Furthermore, the amounts-of alpha-emitting radionuclides
in the low-level alpha wastes are significant in comparison with
the alpha-emitting component of high-level wastes. For instance,
by one estimate "[ajbout 45% of the initial alpha radioactivity
is in high level wastes, 45% is in alpha wastes, and 10% is
in ore tailings."—/ This means that "... the long-term
toxicity of low-level wastes contaminated with actinides may
equal or exceed that of high-level wastes."—/
Another scientist estimates that, ". . .the amount of
Plutonium lost to the low-level wastes in reprocessing, fuel
preparation and fabrication operations is greater than the
amount of plutonium associated with the high-level fission-product
wastes. . . . The amounts of plutonium in all of these wastes
^J^u01" Bourse, this is an underestimate since only a portion
attr^ih? triCi*E gfnera^ed at the nuclear power plants is
attributable to the fissile plutonium contained in the fuel.
Jansen, Schneider, and Hammond, Battelle Pacific Northwest
IV Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Program for
the Management of Hazardous Wastes for the Environmental Pr
tection Agency, ottice of Solid Waste Management Programs.
Final Report, p. 152 (July 1973). - -
are significant, and it is important that careful attention
be given to a waste management program which insures careful
control of all of these wastes."I?/
In September 1974, the AEC, recognizing the potential
long-term hazard posed by the low-level wastes, proposed
a new regulation requiring federal custody of wastes containing
more than a very low concentration (10 nanocuries per gram)
of transuranic radionuclides.*±/ However, following the trans-
fer of the AEC's responsibilities to ERDA and NRC, and the ERDA
Administrator's subsequent decision to withdraw the environmental
impact statement considering the proposed regulation and to pre-
pare a new statement,*!/ the fate of the proposed regulation
is uncertain.2!/ Thus/ for fche foreseeable future/ trans_
uranic wastes will continue to be buried in shallow earthen
trenches at six commercial disposal sites.
Already there are measurements of off-site radioactivity
that suggest radionuclides in the low-level wastes are migrating
Radioactivity In Plutonium, Americium and
Policy
21/ 39 Fed. Reg. 32921, September 12, 1974.
9' 1975' from Robert C' Seamans, Jr.
tomir n r °' Pastore' Chairman, Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, Congress of the United States.
' from Donald A« Nussbaumer,
M t°r Materials Agreements and Translation,
P a • Materials and Fuel Cycle Facility Licensing, NRC,
R.A. Kreiss and T.R. Lash, NRDC.
-19-
-20-
A-50
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away from the burial trenches. For instance, last year a multi-
agency state study found that: "The radioactive waste disposal
site at Maxey Flats, Kentucky is contributing radioactivity
to the environment. . . Man-made radionuclides measured in
certain individual samples collected in the unrestricted environ-
ment identified Tritium, Cobalt 6-0, Strontium 89 and 90,
24/
Cesium 134 and 137, and Plutonium 238 and 239."—' Similarly,
due to the flooding of burial trenches at the West Valley,
New York low-level waste disposal facility, radionuclides have
moved off-site into adjacent waterways.—
Thus, after only about a dozen years of operation
low-level wastes, containing significant quantities of
very long-lived radionuclides, are contributing to the general
environmental burden of radioactive materials. EPA's draft
statement and proposed regulations should analyze and consider
this potential radiation source thoroughly.
b. High-level waste disposal — Currently, no high-level
wastes are produced at commercial facilities, although about
600,000 gallons of neutralized liquid is stored at West Valley,
24/Kentucky Department of Human Resources, Bureau for Health
Services, Office of Consumer Health Protection, Radiation and
Product Safety Branch, Project Report, "Six Month Study of Ra-
diation Concentrations And Transport Mechanisms At The Maxey
Flats Area Of Fleming County, Kentucky," p. 17 (December 1974).
25/ See, New York State Department of Environmental Conserva-
tion, NYS Environment, April 1 and July 1975; and Nuclear News,
p. 64 (May 1975) .
New York, from previous reprocessing operations. Since both
ERDA and NEC are reviewing plans for the management of commer-
cial high-level wastes, now is the appropriate time to establish
regulations governing potential discharges of radioactive
materials from high-level waste management facilities, before
hard-to-reverse decisions are finalized. .These limitations
on the release of radionuclides could then be incorporated
into the NRC's and ERDA's criteria for an acceptable design"
for licensing and operating purposes, respectively.
c. Uranium mill tailings — Apparently, mill tailings
piles were excluded from consideration in the draft statement
on the vague grounds that:
"There exists considerable uncertainty
about the public health impact of existing
levels of radon in the atmosphere, as well
as over the best method for management
of new sources of radon created by man's
activities, which remove this naturally
occurring material and its precursors
from beneath the earth's protective
crust." (pp. 133, 134)
The draft statement further alleges, without elaboration,
"... that the problems associated with radon emissions are
sufficiently different from those of other radioactive materials
associated with the fuel cycle to warrant separate considera-
tion. . ." (p. 134).
These two cursory assertions are not persuasive for at
least three reasons. First, about two years ago, EPA itself con-
ducted an assessment of the possible long-term radiological
-22-
A-51
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effects of radon gas emanating from uranium mill tailings
? fi /
piles.— This earlier EPA analysis seems to be about as
thorough as the analyses of other aspects of the uranium
fuel cycle, that form the technical basis for this draft
statement and proposed regulations. Second, there has been
no showing that the degree of uncertainty concerning the actual
effects of radon released from tailing piles is significantly
greater than in the case of other radioactive releases, e.g.,
carbon-14 (p. 68), that are evaluated in the draft statement.—7
And, third, while there is no general agreement>on the "best
method for management" of radon from mill tailings, this
situation is certainly not unique to radon effluents. For
instance, options for controlling releases of krypton are only
at the research, development, and demonstration stages,—/ yet
this situation did not prevent EPA from analyzing the radio-
logical impacts of, and proposing appropriate limitations on
26/ EPA, Environmental Analysis of the Uranium Fuel Cycle,
kart|viT^The Fuel~§uPP1V- EPA-52Q/9-73-Otn-Rr pp si-74
JDGJT 1973) .
27/ "[D]ue to very large uncertainties concerning . . . environ-
mental behavior [of plutonium and other transuranics] over long
periods of time, as well as a lack of definitive information
concerning the relationship between exposure to these materials
and health effects, the limits of this potential impact cannot
be more than roughly estimated." (pp. 129-130)
£!/ EPA, Environmental Analysis of the Uranium Fuel Cycle,
Part III - Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing, EPA-52-/9-73-003-D.
pp. B-14, B-16 (October 1971TT
-23-
releases of, krypton gas. To compensate for the uncertainty
in their availability, the Agency has explicitly stated that
if at least one of these control technologies does not prove
out, the proposed regulations will be re-evaluated with that
in mind. (p. 36) A similar approach may be appropriate in
regard to radon releases from uranium mill tailings piles.—7
Furthermore, methodologies for limiting the emanation
of radon from uranium tailings are not technologically compli-
cated or speculative. In a recent report (that may have been
known to EPA in draft form well over a year ago), scientists
at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory identify, and discuss'
in terms of cost and degree of practicality, several procedures
for virtually eliminating the escape of radon from tailings
into the general environment.—7 Indeed, the effectiveness
of a thick (e.g., 20 foot) layer of earth in preventing the
emanation of radon from tailings piles has been known for years.
The draft statement should have assessed the desirability of
several means to control releases of radon.
31/
2V Naturally, the draft statement should also consider the
magnitude and effects of releases of other radionuclides,
e.g., radium-226, from tailings piles.
30/ Sears et al., Correlation of Radioactive Waste Treatment Costs
and the Environmental Impact of Waste Effluents in the Nuclear
Fuel Cycle for Use in Establishing "as Low as Practicable"
Guides - Milling of Uranium Ores, ORNL-TM-4903, Vol. 1 (May 1975).
2V Schroeder and Evans, "Distribution of Radon and Radon Fluxes
within Multilayered Systems," M.I.T. Radioactivity Center Annual
Progress Report on Radium and Mesothorium Poisoning and Dosimetry
and Instrumentation~Techniques in Applied Radioactivity, MIT-952-
4, p. 316 (May 1967.~
A-52
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-------
Thus, there appears not to be a good reason for the
draft statement's failure to consider radon gas escaping from
mill tailings. On the other hand, the large number of human
deaths (ca. 400 per gigawatt-year) potentially caused by
simply leaving mill tailings on the earth's surface with
little, if any covering,—' is ample justification for a full
discussion of the environmental and health hazards posed by
the tailings.—'
32/ Generally; if tailings piles are "stabilized" at all, less
than two feet of earth is placed on top. (See, AEC, Final
Environmental Statement related to operation of Shirley Basin
Uranium Mill, Utah International, Inc., Docket No. 40-6622,
p. IV-20 (December 1974).) Even if this covering remained
intact for the thousands of years that the critical radio-
nuclides remain potentially hazardous, such a thin layer is
inadequate to reduce significantly the amount of radon released.
See preceeding footnote.
33/ The total number of human deaths resulting from the emanation
oT radon gas from mill tailings piles has recently been estimated
using EPA's environmental radiation dose commitment concept, to
be greater than the human deaths caused by coal-fired power
plants. See, Pohl, Cornell University, "Nuclear Energy: Health
Effects of Thorium-230," submitted to Technology Review; and
omey, "The Legacy of Uranium Tailings," The Bulletin of Atomic
•rientists, pp. 42-45 (September 1975).
-25-
3. Plutonium Recycle — Evidently, the basis for
excluding consideration of plutonium recycle in the draft
statement is the fact that, "The liquid metal fast breeder
reactor, which would make possible the extensive production
and utilization of plutonium fuel ... is not expected to be
commercially available before the late 1980's, at the earliest."
(p. 3) Plutonium recycle, unfortunately, may not be that remote,
for, as is recognized in the draft statement, "substantial
quantities of plutonium-239 are produced by light-water-cooled
reactors" (p. 3) and "some commercial use of recycled plutonium
in light-water-cooled reactors is proposed for the near future."
(p. 4)
In fact, again as is admitted in the draft statement,
virtually the sole purpose of reprocessing spent fuel from
light-water-cooled reactors, an activity that is discussed in
the draft statement, is ". . .to recover substantial quantities
of unused uranium and reactor-produced plutonium for future
reuse." (p. 4)—/ For this reason, there is as sound a basis
for fully considering the use of the recovered plutonium in
fuel for light-water-cooled power reactors as there is for
assessing the potential radiological effects of spent fuel
reprocessing.
34/ The regulatory division of the former U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC) has stated that reprocessing of spent fuel
from light-water-cooled reactors would not be economically
justified if plutonium cannot be recycled. See, AEC, Draft
Generic Environmental Statement Mixed Oxide Fuel, WASH-1327,
Volume 1, p. S-ll (August 1974). Hereinafter, "DRAFT GESMO".
A-53
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More generally, there are two deficiencies with EPA's
analysis that are particularly troublesome with regard to
Plutonium recycle activities: (1) failure to consider the
magnitude of uncertainties in the projected levels of control
of radioactive releases; and (2) failure to assess the impacts
of abnormal, unplanned or unusual-operations. These matters
are crucially important because "the actinides are, in general,
very long-lived materials and their eventual total impact over
many centuries may be many times that experienced during the
first 100 years following release."^/
EPA, in the draft statement, assumed that only one-
— Q
billionth (10 ) of the alpha-emitting transuranic radionuclide
inventory would be released to the general environment if there
were no plutonium recycle. However, this assumption grossly
underestimates the likely health effects for th . case of plu-
tonium recycle. As EPA has stated, "when allowance is made
for inclusion of cumulative releases from the variety of fuel
processing operations as well as transportation and handling
throughout the entire fuel cycle, the fractioned loss of plu-
tonium and the actinides to the environment for the entire
fuel cycle must be assumed to be greater than that from a
single operation. In this context "the fractional release of
the actinides is not realistically expected to exceed 10~7 of
the total amount handled in any given year."—/ Thus, the
35/ EPA, Environmental Radiation Dose Commitment: An Applica-
tion To The Nuclear Power Industry, EPA-520/4-73-002D ?3
(February 1974).
36/ Id. at p. 16 (emphasis added).
-27-
draft statement seems to underestimate the actual health
effects due to the release of long-lived transuranic radio-
nuclides by at least a factor of 100.
For the purposes of this draft statement and proposed
rulemaking, EPA implies that the overall impact of radiation
doses due to unplanned or unusual releases will be "minimal".
(p. 137) No studies are cited to substantiate this claim,
however. On the other hand, over two years ago an EPA official
stated that
"[m]ore information is critically re-
quired for unknown or inadvertent
releases from facilities processing
Plutonium. Currently, the AEC is un-
able to account for one part in 103~4
of this material in such facilities.
Environmental releases must be main-
tained to less than one part in 108~9.
Careful studies of some representative
facilities will be made."37/
The final statement should present the results of these "careful
studies" as evidence that unplanned or abnormal releases of
transuranic radionuclides will not far exceed the limits for
"normal operations" contained in the proposed regulations.
Unfortunately, the sad history of the handling of
plutonium strongly suggests that even the 10~7 fractional
release estimate is too low. The safety record at the Nuclear
Fuel Services' reprocessing plant at West Valley, New York;
the Kerr-McGee fuel fabrication plant at Crescent, Oklahoma;
and the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation fuel
37/ EPA, "Environmental Radiation Exposure Advisory Committee,
Minutes of Tenth Meeting, March 20-21, 1973," p. 9.
A-54
-28-
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fabrication plant at Apollo, Pennsylvania are discussed b^
Robert Gillette in a Science article, "Plutonium (I): Questions
of Health in a New Industry". Gillette reports:
"The safety record compiled by the
three main commercial processors [NFS
(West Valley), Kerr McGee, and NUMEC] is
subject to differing interpretations,
but from a review of'inspection reports
made public by the AEC, It is hard to
see that any of them is quite in command
of the technology.
The record reveals a dismal repetition
of leaks in glove boxes; of inoperative
radiation monitors; of employees who
failed to follow instructions; of mana-
gers accused by the AEC of ineptness and
failing to provide safety supervision or
training to employees; of numerous vio-
lations of federal regulations and license
requirements; of plutonium spills tracked
through corridors, and, in half a dozen
cases, beyond plant boundaries to auto-
mobiles, homes, at least one restaurant,
and in one instance to a county sheriff's
office in New York."38/
Also, Gulf United's P-lutonium Facility at Pawling,
New York, was permanently closed following a chemical explosion,
a fire and a second explosion on December 21, 1972. This
accident resulted in extensive plutonium contamination within
the facility, a breach in the exhaust system in the plutonium
handling room area, and the release of an undetermined quantity
of plutonium from the building through blown out windows.
According to Gulf United1s analysis of the accident,
"[a]t the time of the explosion, one em-
ployee was standing directly in front of a
large window in the north wall of the facil-
ity. He observed that the window was intact
when he left the building. It was sub- -
sequently found that every pane in this
window had been blown out or broken,
which suggests that a second explosion
took place, presumably when all of the
employees were at the remote assembly
building 0.9 mile away, and the pluton-
ium facility itself was unattended. It
is evident that a fire followed the ini-
tial explosion and it is plausible that
this fire caused one-of the bottles of
flammable solvent to gradually heat up
and rupture, dispersing its contents in
air to form another explosive mixture.
That no one heard a second explosion is
understandable if it occurred when all of
the personnel were in the remote assembly
building."39/
Following the explosions and fire at Gulf United's
facility, AEC inspections at this facility between December 21,
1972 and October 31, 1973 identified the following violations
and safety items:
"A. Violations
1. Failure to continuously evaluate the stack
effluent."4^/ [Gulf United failed to make
such surveys as were necessary to assure com-
pliance with 10 C.F.R. 20.106, "Concentrations
in effluents to unrestricted areas."]
B. Safety Items
"Accepted radiological and nuclear safety
practices dictate that: (1) procedures,
facilities, and equipment are adequate for
effective control during emergencies; and
(2) that emergency drills be routinely
conducted.
3_8/ Gillette, Robert, "Plutonium (I) : Questions of Health in
a New Industry," Science 185 (20 September 1974), pp. 1029-1030.
-29-
A-55
39/ Gulf United Nuclear Fuels Corporation, "Report of Incident
at Gulf United's Plutonium Facility at Pawling, New York,"
Elmsford, New York (January 19, 1973), p. 11.
40/ U.S. AEC, Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Region I.
Inspection Report No.: 70-903/72-02," special inspection con-
ducted by Mr. Lorenz on December 21, 22, 26, 27 and 29, 1972 of
activities authorized by AEC License No. SNM-871 at "Licensee:
Gulf United Nuclear Fuels Corporation, Grasslands Road, Elmsford,
New York," Docket No. 70-903.
-30-
-------
a. Contrary to the above, your [Gulf
United's] emergency alarm signal
system was inadequate in that the
alarm was not audible to all persons
at the main site location.
b. Contrary to the above, your [Gulf
United's] Emergency Policy and Pro-
cedures were not maintained by the
current emergency call list. . . .
c. Contrary to the above, and as prescribed
in your [Gulf United's] Emergency Policy
and Procedures, no annual emergency
training drill was conducted in 1972,
and the formal training program for
personnel was not scheduled.
d. Contrary to the above, your [Gulf
United's] remote assembly building
was inadequate for personnel decon-
tamination in that drain water from
shower and wash facilities could not
be collected and analyzed prior to
release.
e. Contrary to the above, your [Gulf
United's] procedures did not provide
that proper survey instruments accom-
pany injured contaminated personnel . ,
when referred for medical treatment."—'
A subsequent AEC inspection in June 1973, during cleanup
operations identified the following additional violations:
"1. Failure to have waste drums properly
stored inside building. The drums of
unrecoverable waste were stored outside
of any buildings. . . .
2. Failure to have a contamination survey
station at the exit of the Plutonium
Laboratory and to require personnel to
perform surveys prior to leaving the
contamination zone. . . .
41/ Letter from James P. O'Reilly, Director, U.S. AEC Directorate
of Regulatory Operations, Region I, to Gulf United Nuclear Fuels
Corporation in reference to Docket No. 70-903, dated May 17, 1973,
Enclosure No. 2, Description of Safety Items.
-31-
3. Failure to either provide a criticality
monitoring device for material stored
in the Plutonium Laboratory vault or to
analyze whether or not a criticality
monitoring device located about 15 feet
away with about 3 feet of intervening
concrete would provide the required
radiation detection."42/
Gulf United is not unique in its failure to follow
regulations. NUMEC was recently fined $13,720 for a sixteen
count violation of AEC regulations ranging from failing to
follow radiation monitoring to failure to comply with certain
43/
safeguards requirements.—' One of these pertained to the
failure to install an adequate fire alarm system, and another
pertained to the storage of flammable materials in a glove box.
Similarly, NFS Erwin facility was recently cited for five
44/
licensing violations all related to health and safety.—These
cases represent a small sample of the total AEC licensing vio-
lations, and the cases where fines have been levied, such as
NUMEC, are rare. On August 25, 1974, the New York Times
reported,
"For the year ending June 30, for example,
commission inspectors found a total of 3,333
violations in 1,288 of the 3,047 installations
they examined.
A-56
42/ U.S. AEC, Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Region I.
Inspection Report No. 70-903/73-02," routine-unannounced inspec-
tion conducted by Mr. Kinney on June 28-29, 1973 of activities
authorized by AEC License No. 871 at "Licensee: Gulf United
Nuclear Fuels Corporation, Grassland Road, Elmsford, New York,"
Docket No. 70-903.
43/ AEC News Releases, Vol. V (August 14, 1974), p. 4.
447 Letter from N. C. Moseley, Director, U.S. AEC Directorate
of Regulatory Operations, Region II, to Mr. William Manser, Jr.,
Plant Manager, Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., Erwin, Tennessee
(18 October 1974), Re: "RO:II:FJL 70-143/74-01."
-32-
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According to the commission's own defini-
tion, 98 of these charges were considered
to be the most serious of three categories
of violation. By this definition, they posed
a health threat in that they caused or were
likely to cause radiation exposures to em-
ployees or the public in excess of permitted
limits, involved the release of radioactive
materials in the environment beyond per-
mitted limits or were a security threat.
During the year, however, the commission
imposed punishments on only eight occasions.
It revoked the license of two small companies
and levied civil penalties against six others
totaling $37,000."
The same article quotes Anthony Mazzocchi, legislative director
for the Oil Chemical and Atomic Workers,
"The fact that the A.B.C. finds violations
in one-third of the installations it inspects
is clear evidence the regulations do not work,. . ."
Mazzocchi also noted that,
"he was aware of a number of situations where
inspectors had found repeated violations but
had taken no action.
He cited Nuclear Fuel Services of Erwin,
Tenn., where he said there had been at least
15 separate incidents since 1969 in which
more than 50 workers had been exposed to
radiation above permissible limits. Despite
these repeated incidents a commission spokes-
man confirmed Mr. Mazzocchi1s statement that
the agency had never suspended or revoked or
otherwise penalized Nuclear Fuel Services."
Finally, we note that the violations cited by the AEC probably
represent a small sample of the total. For example, the violations
at the NFS Erwin facility, noted above, were discovered only
after production workers requested a meeting (held August 13,
1974) with AEC to complain about unsafe working conditions at
that facility, and we would hasten to add that NFS is not unique
in this respect. The final statement should present data for
all plutonium handling facilities, including NFS-Erwin, Exxon
and DOW-Rocky Flats, for each year of operation. Where data
is not available an explanation should be given, for example,
with respect to the total release from NUMEC. This table should
also present data on the yearly plutonium throughput.
In sum, the full radiological consequences resulting
from plutonium recycle, and their implications for limits on
releases from nuclear facilities, need to be fully analyzed in
the final environmental impact statement because: (1) plutonium
recycle is not speculative or unlikely;— (2) indeed, the
principal purpose of spent fuel reprocessing, which is dis-
cussed in the draft statement and covered by the proposed
regulations, is to recover plutonium for reuse in nuclear
fuel; (3) plutonium has a "high toxicity" and persistence that
could cause a "large" cumulative impact if released to the
environment (p. 129); and (4) the potential magnitude of planned
and unplanned releases of plutonium and other transuranic
radionuclides will be substantially increased during the fab-
rication of plutonium-containing fuel.—Thus, EPA should
45/ See, e.g., Nucleonics Week, p. 7 (August 7, 1975) and
p. 3 (July 31, 1975).
46/ Indeed, it seems that the annual planned release of
alpha-emitting transuranic radionuclides due to plutonium
recycle would exceed the Section 190.10(b) standard by four-
fold: "The annual dispersal into the environment of 2 alpha
millicuries per GWy(e) . . . may result from handling pluton-
ium in the mixed oxide fuel cycle ..." DRAFT GESMO, Vol. 3,
p. IV J-7. In our opinion, based on the history of existing
plants that have handled plutonium, the AEC's estimate of
possible routine releases is grossly overly optimistic. See,
Cochran and Speth, NRDC Comments on WASH-1327, General Comments,
pp. 13-16, 24-26.
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A-57
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fully analyze in the final statement the potential radioactive
releases and human radiation exposure attributable to plutonium
recycle, including the operation of mixed-oxide fuel prepara-
tion and fabrication plants.
Additionally, in the final statement, EPA should
clearly present the methodology and procedures that will be
used to determine the amount of plutonium and other alpha-
emitting radionuclides (per gigawatt-year of nuclear generation)
released to the general environment due to normal and abnormal
operations of all plutonium recycle facilities, including
reprocessing plants and mixed-oxide fuel preparation and
fabrication plants. This information needs to be presented
in detail because there is reason to believe that EPA cannot,
in practice, determine that its standards have been met.
4. Research and Development Facilities — A source
of radioactive emissions and radiation exposure that is not
even mentioned are the research and development facilities
which are necessary for the "commercialization" of nuclear
power. These releases should also be counted as part of the
environmental contamination caused by the nuclear power industry.
The magnitude and potential effect of such releases should be
presented in the final statement, and the proposed regulation
should be rewritten to limit their effects in accordance with
EPA's radiation protection objectives.
Furthermore, EPA should take cognizance of the possib-
ility that large facilities, heretofore considered "commercial"
-35-
facilities, may now be designated "developmental" and involve
federal participation in their operation. Apparently, for
instance, the large spent fuel reprocessing plant at Barnwell,
South Carolina, is a candidate for conversion from a "commercial1
to a "developmental" facility.—' Thus, EPA's environmental
analysis should evaluate the impact of, and possibilities of
reducing, radioactive effluents from research and development
facilities to the extent that they support the nuclear power
industry. Furthermore, the limitations on radioactive releases
in the proposed regulations should be applicable to such
facilities.
In the final statement, EPA should declare whether
or not it has evaluated the extent of radioactive releases
and radiation exposure from both governmental and private
research and development facilities, and assessed the avail-
ability of control procedures to limit releases and radiation
exposures attributable to the growth of the nuclear power
industry. In any event, EPA should explicitly state whether
or not the proposed regulations apply to such facilities.
5. Decommissioning of Facilities — Another potential
radiation source that is too quickly dismissed from analysis
in the draft statement and coverage by the regulations is the
decommissioning of retired facilities. (pp. 6, 95) Certainly
decommissioning procedures have not been adequately planned.—
A-58
47/ See, e.g., Nucleonics Week, p. 7 (August 7, 1975).
48/ Ford Foundation Energy Policy Project, A Time To Choose,
Ballinger Publishing Co., p. 210 (1974). See also, Yarbro,
Harrington and Joy, Effluent Control In Fuel Reprocessing Plants,
ORNL-TM-3899, pp. 14-17 (March 1974).
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In light of this uncertainty about how decommissioning will be
accomplished, the statement should carefully consider whether
or not there is the potential in the future for genetically
significant or fetal radiation exposure of workers—' or
exposure to the general public. Furthermore, there should be
a specific explanation for not including the decommissioning
of facilities in the proposed standards.
The magnitude of this potential problem is, perhaps,
indicated by the release of plutonium during decommissioning
of Building 12, a plutonium laboratory at Los Alamos Scientific
Laboratory. The annual release from that facility is estimated
to have been 13 microcuries (alpha),—while the release when
it was torn down was about 1,400 microcuries (alpha)—' or
about 100 times the annual release.
B. The Total Health Effects Caused By The
Release Of Radionuclides Must Be Estimated
For The Entire Period That The Radionuclides
Remain Potentially Hazardous
The potential health effects caused by releases of
radioactive materials are calculated only for 100 years following
49/ AS discussed below, radiation exposure of nuclear workers
that can result in genetic defects or injury to fetuses must
be evaluated in the final statement. Furthermore, EPA must
regulate such exposures in order to protect future members of
the general public.
50/ DRAFT GESMO, p. IV D-28.
51/ AEC, Plutonium Information Meeting Transcript, Los Alamos,
N.M., p. 66 (January 4, 1974).
their discharge. (p. 12) However, the draft statement admits
that,
"The total significance of environmental
burdens of carbon-14, iodine-129, and the
long-lived transuranics, which have half-
lives of 5700 years, 17 million years and
from 18 to 380,000 years, respectively,
cannot be quantitatively assessed, but
must be assumed to be considerably greater
than that anticipated during the first
100 years alone." (p. 80)
Unfortunately, the draft statement does not consider this
issue, and, thereby, obscures the true dimensions of the
potential ill-health effects of the nuclear power industry.
Furthermore, the failure to evaluate the total, cumulative
health effects distorts the cost-benefit analysis.
Consider the carbon-14 problem alone. The draft
statement lists 12,000 health effects over 100 years for the
carbon-14 releases through the year 2000. (p. 82) With a
half-life of 5700, however, only 0.012 of the released
carbon-14 has decayed by that time. At the same rate, as
for the first 100 years, then, the remaining carbon-14 could
cause a total of one million health effects. Similar calcula-
tions can be made for the other long-lived radionuclides.
While such calculations may overestimate the total
impact of the released radionuclides, it seems prudent to use
these estimates of total effects for the purposes of assessing
the potential impact of the nuclear power industry and rulemaking.
Naturally, the estimates can be reasonably reduced if there
is evidence of a significant amount of sequestering of the
radionuclides away from human exposure pathways.
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C. The Health Effects On Future Members Of
The General Population Due To Radiation
Exposure Of Nuclear Workers Should Be
Assessed
During the six year period 1969 through 1974, the
average person-rem per megawatt-year was about 1.3, with a
range from 0.9 to 1.6.—' An earlier study suggests that as
the large nuclear power plants age, the average person-rem
per plant tends to increase due to the accumulation of radio-
active crud.—' The total person-rems for individual plants
needing substantial repairs can be considerably higher.—'
Assuming a projected 1,200 gigawatts of nuclear capacity
by the year 2000 (p. 9), then the total annual occupational
exposure at these plants could be about 1.6 X 106 person-rems.
Since EPA estimates that the general world population exposure
due to the current operation of the American nuclear power
industry is 0.1 person-rems per megawatt (p. 103), the expec-
tation in the year 2000 is for a total of 1.2 X 10 person-rems
of exposure directly to the general world population. In
other words, the total occupational exposure is 13 times the
general population exposure.
52/ NEC, "Occupational Radiation Exposure At Light Water Cooled
Power Reactors, 1969-1974," NUREG-75/032, p. 7 (June 1975).
53/ Pelletier, et al., "Compilation and Analysis of Data on
Occupational Radiation Exposure Experienced at Operating Nuclear
Power Plants," prepared for Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.,
pp. 11-16 (September 1974).
54/ For instance, during a few months to repair Indian Point-1,
a 265 MWe plant, the total exposure was 3,500 person-rem.
Nuclear News 18, p. 56 (September 1975) .
This is a significant point because the occupational
exposure affects the world's genetic pool just as though the
radiation dose were given directly to the general population
without the intermediacy of the occupationally exposed. Thus,
EPA errs when it states that "a standard of 1 person-rem per
MW(e) would have no impact whatsoever on either population
exposures due to short-lived radionuclides or on local or
worldwide environmental buildup of long-lived radionuclides."
(p. 103) The final statement should reevaluate the advantages
of alternatives taking into consideration the genetically
significant dose received by nuclear workers.
The genetically significant dose received by nuclear
workers should also be factored into consideration in the
statement's discussion of whole body dose at the boundaries
of reactor sites. (pp. 38, 39) That is, EPA seems to provide
assurance that the average whole body dose to the population
is vanishingly small, since the maximum whole body dose at the
boundaries of a reactor site would be less than 6 millirem
per year.. This is a misrepresentation, however, in that the
genetically significant dose to nuclear workers, averaged over
the entire child bearing population, is roughly equivalent to
this maximum whole body dose at the boundary.—' The final
statement should include a discussion of this effective added
55/ For the year 2000, the occupational exposure is 1.6 million
person-rems to be distributed into the population. Assuming
roughly one-half of the population is of childbearing age,
there would be 800,000 person-rems distributed into 100 million
people, for an average genetically significant dose of 8 millirems.
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gonadal exposure to the general population in the section on
the radiation effects of nuclear power reactors.
Using the NAS Committee estimates for genetic effects
induced in the general population by radiation exposure of 5
rem per generation, 1.6 million person-rems annually to workers
for 30 years would eventually result in about 3,000 to 75,000
serious genetic diseases in the nuclear workers' descendants.—
EPA should carefully consider this impact in its evaluation
of the total harm caused by the nuclear power industry.
567
56/ NAS-NRC, Division of Medical Sciences, Report of the
Advisory Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radia-
tions, The Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels
of Ionizing Radiation, p.57(November 1972).
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III
THE DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
DOES NOT CONTAIN AN ADEQUATE
COST-RISK-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
The calculation of the economic costs and benefits
of the proposed action and alternatives is wholly inadequate
because it fails entirely to consider (1) uncertainties in
the extent of health effects caused by radiation exposure
of the population, (2) the effects of radionuclides released
to the environment during the entire time they emit radiation,
(3) the genetic effects on members of the general population
due to occupational exposures of nuclear workers, and (4) the
extent of radionuclides released during unplanned, unusual
or abnormal operations.
The last three issues have been discussed in Chapter
II, above, and will, we hope, receive adequate attention in
the final statement. The issues of the extent of harm poten-
tially caused by chronic, low-levels of radiation also requires
consideration by EPA in the final statement.
The draft statement concludes that the linear, non-
threshold, dose-rate-independent model "... is the prudent
one for use in deriving radiation standards to protect the
public." (p. 21, footnote deleted) We agree that it is
reasonable to use that model for calculational purposes. How-
ever, because the linear hypothesis is not necessarily conser-
vative, NRDC does not agree that the linear hypothesis is
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always "prudent".
Professor Karl Z. Morgan has recently commented on
the possible reasons that the linear hypothesis may not be
conservative as follows:
"Often it is stated in the literature that
the linear hypothesis, as presently applied,
is a very conservative assumption. During
the past few years, however, many studies
have indicated that this probably is not
true in general and that at very low doses
and dose rates somatic damage per rad pro-
bably is usually greater than would be
assumed on the linear hypothesis. There
are many reasons for this, some of which
are:
1. The linear hypothesis is based on extra-
polations to zero dose of effects of radia-
tion on humans at intermediate to high doses.
The points used on the curves at high doses
may be on the down part of the curve . . .
i.e. from the portions of the curve where a
large fraction of the highly exposed died
of other types of radiation damage and did
not survive to die of the radiation effect
under study.
2. The extrapolations are made on human
data which in general relate human damage
such as bone cancer for observation periods
of no more than about 20 years. Many of
the conclusions are based on studies of
animals of life spans less than 10 years.
Since man lives for more than 70 years, the
slopes of these curves can only increase as
more human data are accumulated over his
entire life span.
3. The linear hypothesis assumes that man
is a uniform and more or less homogeneous
population. It applies to the average man
and may not be sufficiently conservative for
the fetus and for old people. It never takes
into consideration special groups such as
. . . [children with allergies, bacterial
or viral diseases].
4. There may be cell sterilization at inter-
mediate and high doses. By this we mean there
may be many cells in the body which are likely
targets to become precursors of a clone of
cells which are malignant but they are
killed by the higher doses. In other words,
these cells may already have two of the
'series cancer switches' closed and a low
dose of radiation would likely close the
last switch in the final step toward cancer
production. A high dose, however, might
kill most such cells as it does in radia-
tion therapy which is used to destroy a
cancer.
5. For many types of radiation damage the
best fit curve is a plot of equation E = CDn
in which E = effect, C = constant, D = radia-
tion dose, and n = constant. For the linear
hypothesis n = 1. In some cases n > 1 indi-
cating lesser damage at low doses but in
many cases the best fit to experimental data
is obtained when n < 1. Baum (16) recently
showed a best fit for cancer induction when
n = 1/2. In such case the linear hypothesis
would be non-conservative.
(16) Baum, J., "Population Heterogeneity
Hypothesis on Radiation Induced Cancer," given
orally at Houston, Tex. meeting of the Health
Physics Society, July 10, 1974."57/
A recent National Academy of Sciences report indicated
that there are three major unknowns which limit our knowledge
of the possible full impacts of a specified level of radiation
exposure. These are uncertainty about (1) the length of the
plateau period for solid tumors, (2) the latent periods for
types of cancer not yet thought to be radiogenic, and (3) whether
or not "radiation acts to multiply or to add to spontaneous
58/
levels."— As additional information becomes available during
577 K. Z. Morgan, "Reducing Medical Exposure to Ionizing
Radiation," Landauer Memorial Lecture given at Stanford
University, September 27, 1974. [AIHA 36_ (May 1975)].
58/ National Academy of Sciences, Report of an Ad Hoc Panel
of the Committee on Nuclear Sciences, National Research Council,
"Research Needs For Estimating The Biological Hazards Of Low
Doses Of Ionizing Radiations," p. 29 (1974).
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the next 20 or 30 years, the NAS panel concluded that
". . . present risk estimates [could be refined] down by a
59 /
factor of 2 or up by a factor of 3 to 4."—
All identifiable and estimable uncertainties should
be factored explicitly into the cost-benefit analysis in
the final statement.
IV
THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS ARE TOO WEAK,
VAGUE AND DO NOT ADEQUATELY IMPLEMENT
THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY'S
RADIATION PROTECTION GOALS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES
Five years ago the President's Reorganization Plan No. 3
transferred from the former Atomic Energy Commission to the
Environmental Protection Agency responsibility for setting
"... generally applicable environmental standards for the
protection of the general environment from radioactive material."
(p. 117) Pursuant to this new responsibility under the Reorgan-
ization Plan, in September 1973, EPA had prepared, in draft form:
a "Statement of Considerations" in setting environmental radia-
tion standards for the uranium fuel cycle, a Federal Register
notice of proposed rulemaking, and proposed standards.—' Due
to a decision at a higher executive level outside the Agency,—'
EPA did not formally publish these materials. The regulations
now proposed (40 Fed. Reg. 23420 et seq., May 29, 1975) differ
in several significant ways from the earlier regulations.
59/ Id. at p. 30.
—' Statement dated January 10, 1974, and attachments provided
by Director, Criteria and Standards Division (HM-560), Office
of Radiation Programs, EPA.
— Memorandum dated December 7, 1973, from Roy L. Ash, Director,
Office of Management and Budget, to Russell E. Train, Administra-
tor, EPA and Dr. Dixy Lee Ray, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission.
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Unfortunately, the changes uniformly reduce the effectiveness
of EPA's general radiation protection standards, rather than
strengthen them.
A comparison of the two sets of regulations suggests
that during the past two years the nuclear proponents within the
Administration were successful in forcing EPA to back down from
its earlier stronger regulatory stance. The specific provisions
that were weakened since 1973 include, for instance, the condi-
tions under which a "variance" from numerical standards may be
obtained, the availability of information to the public, the
maximum permissible annual dose equivalent to the whole body or
any organ, and the effective date of the standards. Additionally,
the currently proposed regulations include other serious deficien-
cies, which were also present in the 1973 draft regulations^
These shortcomings and suggested ways to overcome them are dis-
cussed in detail below.
In general, we find that the regulations unnecessarily
and improperly delegate to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission too
much of EPA's responsibility to enforce "generally applicable
environmental standards for the protection of the general environ-
ment from radioactive material." Implicit in a duty to establish
standards is the responsibility to monitor implementation and
ensure compliance. However, the proposed regulations do not
assign to EPA any required role in reviewing the detailed implemen-
tation of the general standards it is preparing to promulgate.
Nor is EPA directly involved in verifying compliance, reviewing
variances or in making available to the public, information
about the effectiveness of NEC's implementation of the standards.
The lack of adequate supervision of implementation of the
regulations and control over the issuance of variances is at odds
with the purpose of Section 2(a)(6) of the Reorganization Plan,
which is intended to give EPA the responsibility to protect the
environment and public from radia'tion damage due to the release of
radioactive substances by the nuclear power industry.
While recognizing that constraints were placed on EPA's
role by the Ash Memorandum and the AEC-EPA Memorandum of Under-
standing (38 Fed. Reg. 24936, September 11, 1973), we believe
that EPA has gone too far in relinquishing control over the
effectiveness of its regulations. The specific revisions sug-
gested below do not exceed the boundaries established by the
Ash Memorandum, in our opinion, and would still substantially
increase EPA's role of assuring that, in practice, the proposed
standards increase protection of the public and environment
from unwarranted radiation damage.
A. There Are No Procedures Providing For EPA
Review Of The Implementation Of And Com-
pliance With The Proposed Standards
Clearly, simply promulgating the proposed standards will
not protect the public and environment from excessive radiation
damage. The regulations must also be strictly enforced. There
are basically three reviewing functions that EPA must perform
in order to meet its responsibility in assuring compliance with
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the environmental radiation protection standards.
First, EPA should formally review the procedures and
criteria adopted by the regulatory agency to implement EPA's
standards. Such review should include detailed analysis of the
adequacy of (1) computational models that the regulatory agency
allows licensees to use in estimating radiation doses, (2) pro-
cedures used in surveying, monitoring and reporting levels of
radioactivity around licensed facilities, and most importantly,
(3) the specific numerical guidelines or standards for each type
of facility,which are established by the regulatory agency to
implement EPA's generally applicable environmental radiation
protection standards. After completing its review of these
matters, EPA should periodically report to Congress and to the
public its conclusion about the adequacy of the regulatory agency's
implementation program and, where the program is deficient, make
specific recommendations for achieving the needed improvements.
Second, EPA should review the data generated by the
licensees and regulatory agency. The AEC-EPA Memorandum states
that the AEC will supply EPA with data relevant to radioactive
effluents. However, the detailed mechanisms for transmittal of
the data are not specified, nor are there adequate provisions for
making the information available to the public in an easily
understandable form. To correct these deficiencies EPA's regu-
lations should specify how, what and when data are to be
transmitted from the regulatory agency to the EPA. Furthermore,
there should be specific procedures for making both the regulatory
agency's data and EPA's evaluation of the adequacy of the data
available to the public upon request.
For instance, annually the regulatory agency should report
to EPA about (1) emissions of radioactive materials, in curies
by radionuclide, leaving the boundary of each licensed facility,
(2) the maximum annual dose equivalent to the whole body and
the thyroid to any member of the public as the result of all
licensed activities, (3) the estimated total population exposure
in person-rems resulting from all licensed activities, and
(4) the total person-rems of the gonadal and fetal occupational
exposures at each licensed facility, during the previous calen-
dar year. (These reports to EPA should be made available to the
public upon request.) Within a reasonable time, EPA should pub-
lish a report analyzing the data submitted by the regulatory
agency and state whether or not the generally applicable radia-
tion standards — as set forth as proposed Section 190.10 (a) and
(b) — had been met.
The EPA should also independently conduct an environmental
radiation 'survey around all facilities either granted a variance
by the regulatory agency or shown by the data submitted to EPA
of potentially being in violation of the proposed standards in
Section 190.10(a) and (b). The results of each survey and EPA's
conclusions based on the survey and other pertinent information
should be made publicly available within a reasonable period of
time.
Third, EPA should review the granting of variances by the
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regulatory agency to ensure that any variances granted do not
produce significant levels of human exposure to radiation and
releases of radionuclides to the environment in comparison with
EPA's standards.
Proposed Section 190.11 allowing variances is too vague
and permissive. In order to correct these deficiencies, the
proposed section should be revised to correspond more closely
to Section .22 of the September 1973 draft regulations. In
particular, the regulations should specify the information to be
provided by an applicant for a variance and the procedures and
criteria to be followed by the regulatory agency in evaluating
the application for a variance. EPA should require the regulatory
agency to prepare a statement setting forth the nature and dura-
tion of the variance as well as the detailed reasons for the
action prior to the actual granting of a variance. Also, the
procedures and requirements for making information about variances
available to the public must also be clearly specified.
Additionally, because the only reason put forward to
justify the issuance of a variance is "to protect the overall
societal interest with respect to the orderly delivery of elec-
trical power," (p. 143) variances should be permitted by the
regulatory agency only for electrical generating stations.—/
— We can see no need to allow variances for other fuel cycle
facilities, e.g., spent fuel reprocessing plants, in order to main-
tain the "orderly delivery of electrical power," (p. 8) if, as EPA
hopes, variances will be granted for short durations only (p. 137).
In the event that variances are required for facilities other than
power plants, e.g., to alleviate a serious regional or national
economic situation, or a long-term energy shortage, there should be
ample time for special consideration and review, including public
input, by EPA.
-51-
Furthermore, variances for operation of light-water-cooled reac-
tors should not be permitted unless a portion of the power which
could be generated by such a reactor is required to prevent a
power emergency and only then subject to the following conditions;
1. Releases of radioactive substances are kept as
low as technically po'ssible;
2. The operator of the reactor utilizes the variance
only as long as is deemed necessary by the regu-
latory agency to meet the power emergency;
3. All power available from inside or outside of the
utility system has been utilized and/or purchased
and appropriate load shedding has occurred;
4. The annual whole body and organ dose equivalent
limits specified in Section 190.10(a) for individuals
of the general public are not exceeded; and
5. Notice of issuance of the variance is published
concurrently in the Federal Register and a news-
paper of general circulation in the affected area,
and a statement justifying the variance is made
available to the public.
The notice should include the name and location of the facility
the nature of the emission for which the variance is being
granted, the anticipated duration of the variance, the maximum
individual dose estimated to result from the variance and the
reason for the variance.—'
A-66
63/
— See, EPA, Draft Environmental Radiation Protection Standards
for Normal Operations of Activities in the Uranium Fuel CycTe^
Subpart C, Section .22 (September 1973).
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Finally, in order to assist the regulatory agency as
far in advance as possible, we suggest that EPA's detailed evalu-
ation regarding the adequacy of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's
recently*promulgated Appendix I to 10 C.F.R. Part 50, which
establishes numerical guides for light-water-cooled reactors,
be included in the final statement. (40 Fed. Reg. 19439 et seq.,
May 5, 1975) Unfortunately, Appendix I, as adopted, differs
significantly from the proposed Appendix I, a version which EPA
indicated would be consistent with the generally applicable en-
vironmental radiation protection standards, (p. 137) In particular,
we call EPA's attention to the following provisions of Appendix
I which do not appear to us to be consistent with EPA's radiation
protection philosophy and proposed standards:
1. NRC places emphasis on the annual dose or dose
commitment of premitted releases, and not on
the environmental dose commitment concept en-
dorsed by EPA.
2. Specific numerical limits on the amounts of
radionuclides that can be released are not
established, as would be required by Section
190.10(b) of EPA's proposed standards.
3. Radiation exposure limits are on a per reactor
basis rather than on a per site basis. Thus,
Appendix I may not set stringent enough limits
to meet EPA's proposed standards for energy
centers.
4. The licensee is not required to initiate
corrective action unless "... rates of
release of quantities and concentrations
in effluents actually experienced over any
calendar quarter indicate that annual rates
of release were likeiy to exceed 2 times
the design objectives . . . ." (40 Fed.
Reg. 19441). Such a policy does not seem
consistent with EPA's hopes that unplanned
releases will be small and of short dura-
tion.
B. Vague And Unduly Restrictive Definitions
Further Limit The Usefullness Of The
Proposed Standards
The definitional section of the proposed regulations is
very important. It should be intended to eliminate any ambigui-
ties in the body of the standards. Unfortunately, many of the
definitions in the proposed standards are themselves unduly
ambiguous and, in some cases, overly restrictive.
Some of these ambiguities are enumerated below; clari-
fying language and interpretation are suggested for consideration
in drafting new definitions. Generally, NRDC believes that to the
extent a definition reduces the applicability of the regulations
to potential radiation exposure from activities associated with
the generation of electricity at nuclear power plants, such
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limitations must be justified in detail in the environmental
impact statement. It should be noted that Section 2(c) of the
Reorganization Plan contains no indication of a limitation on
the scope of EPA's authority in this regard. Therefore, limi-
tations of applicability are permissible only if justified by a
showing that the possibility of Exposure from the excluded
sources of radiation are insignificant or that the benefits
of exclusion from regulatory control substantially outweigh
the risks from exceeding the standards.
1- Uranium Fuel Cycle - (a) The principal failing of
this definition in the proposed standards is the omission of
mixed-oxide fuel fabrication plants. Because, as discussed
above, the NRC is seriously considering licensing such facili-
ties, as part of the light-water-cooled reactor cycle, there
should be no exclusion for fuel fabricating plants that use
Plutonium.
Additionally, as discussed above, uranium mines and low-
and high-level waste burial facilities should not be excluded.
Such facilities are integral parts of the fuel cycle and should
be operated in uniformity with EPA's radiation protection standards.
(b) This definition also excludes from coverage
facilities which have stopped "conducting operations." Thus,
at least one important potential source of radiation exposure,
abandoned uranium mill tailings, apparently would be exempt from
the standards. Because studies show that the gamma radiation
dose rate at three feet above uranium mill tailings may be
1 mrem/hr or more, —/there does not appear to be any justification
for this limitation. Furthermore, as was discussed above, the
long-term release of radon gas from tailings piles may have a
substantial overall adverse effect on the public health. We
suggest adding the words "or have conducted" immediately after
the word "conducting." This would have the additional benefit
of extending coverage to the "decommissioning" of facilities.
(c) The meaning of the phrase "all facilities. . . to
the extent that these support commercial electrical power produc-
tion utilizing nuclear energy. . . ."is also open to overly
restrictive interpretations. For instance, this phrase might
be read as limiting the applicability of these regulations to only
that fraction of a facility's activities which supports commercial
nuclear power in the United States. EPA should make clear that
all effluents from facilities which even partially support the
production of electricity in the United States or elsewhere are
covered by the proposed standards.
Furthermore, use of the word "commercial" might be
interpreted to exclude reactors and other facilities operated
by governmental agencies, even though the electricity generated
is used in the private sector. In light of recent suggestions
that the federal government purchase nuclear power plants,— we
-55-
—/ Harris, et al., "Environmental Hazards Associated With The Milling
of Uranium Ore:A Summary Report," HASL-40, p. 15, Table X (June 4,
1958); Duncan and Eadie, U.S. EPA,"Environmental Surveys of the
Uranium Mill Tailings Pile and Surrounding Areas, Salt Lake City,
Utah," p. 33 (August 1974).
—/ See, for instance, Carter, "Nuclear Power: Westinghouse Looks
to Washington for a Customer" in Science 189, p. 29 (4 July 1975);
U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration, Nuclear Fuel
Cycle, ERDA-33, p, xiii (March 1975): and Nucleonics Week, p. /
(August 7, 1975).
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believe that this potential loophole should be firmly closed.
A third ambiguity in this definition is the applicability
of the standards to reactors, such as the N-reactor on the Han-
ford Reservation, which supply steam for the generation of
electricity for sale to utilities as a by-product to its primary
purpose — the production of plufonium.
2. Site — The meaning of controlled access is improvi-
dently left to future interpretation. One can control access of
the public by many possible means ranging from erecting an
impenetrable physical barrier to posting "Keep Out" signs.
EPA should give guidance concerning the degree to which access
should be "controlled."
3. Uranium Ore — The restriction to ore containing only
0.05% or more of uranium by weight is evidently based on the AEC's
definition of source material (10 C.F.R. 40.4(h)). However, the
reasoning that led the AEC to exempt from licensing requirements
activities involving less than 0.05% uranium by weight (10 C.F.R.
40.13(a)), may not be valid for excluding less rich ores from EPA's
generally applicable radiation protection standards. If demand
for uranium increases sharply and' there is a commensurate increase
in the price of uranium, lower grade ores may be processed to
obtain uranium.—We suggest that no reference be made to the
quality of ore in the definition. The crucial point is whether
or not uranium is extracted for eventual us- in light-water-
cooled power reactors. However, if the Agency wants to exclude
lower grade ore, then the final statement should discuss this
point and explicitly give the Agency's reasoning for the
exclusion.
4. Member of the Public — This definition is unjusti-
fiably restrictive. The higher allowable dose for individuals
exposed while working in a nuclear fuel cycle facility is usually
justified on the basis that such individuals reap directly the
benefits of such exposure and have voluntarily submitted them-
sevles to the risks. This rationale is not valid, however, to
genetic or fetal doses since it is not the workers but their
progeny, who will be harmed by the exposure. Thus, the injury
from genetic and fetal doses are suffered by individuals who,
like the members of the general public, neither reap a direct
benefit nor have voluntarily assumed the risk of exposure. The
proposed regulations should explicitly include restrictions on
genetic and fetal exposures of nuclear power workers.—
—' See, for instance, Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories,
Assessment of Uranium and Thorium Resources in the United States
and the Effect of Policy Alternatives, pp. 5.21-5.30(December
1974) .
—If EPA adheres to the view that it is prohibited by the
Reorganization Plan or the Ash Memorandum from setting standards
limiting genetic and fetal doses, then EPA should use its author-
ity from the former Federal Radiation Council at least to advise
the President about the need to reduce the maximum permissible
genetic and fetal doses of nuclear workers.
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5. Normal Operations — Although Section 190.10
appears to restrict application of the proposed standards to
"normal operations," the definitional section (S 190.02) does
not specify what are "normal operations," in comparison with
"unusual operations" for which a variance is required by
S 190.11. A major difficulty, we believe, is determining
which releases from individual facilities may result in violation
of the overall primary standards.
In order to reduce this difficulty, the regulatory
agency should be required quickly to establish limits on the
releases of all critical radionuclides from individual facilities
under typical operating conditions, consistent with EPA's gen-
erally applicable radiation protection standards. EPA should
then certify, first, that individual facilities can, in fact,
typically operate within the NRC's limitations and, second,
that with all facilities operating under such conditions, EPA's
overall standards would be met. Then, "abnormal" or "unusual"
operating conditions could be defined in terms of the NRC
release limits for individual facilities.
C. The Proposed Standards Should Set Limits On
Total Releases Of All Critical Radionuclides.
The proposed regulations set limits on the total amounts
of krypton-85, iodine-129 and alpha-emitting transuranic radio-
nuclides (including plutonium-239) that can be released to the
general environment annually. EPA has correctly adopted an
approach to radiological protection of the public involving
emphasis on the actual long-term health effects rather than,
for instance, on the rate of exposure caused by a particular
radiation source. However, EPA's proposed regulations do not
contain limitations on two radionuclides, radon-222 and carbon-14,
that, according to EPA's own analyses, would contribute more to
human exposure than the radionuclides that would be controlled
by the proposed regulations. Furthermore, at least two addi-
tional radionuclides, strontium-90 and cesium-237, are not even
considered in EPA's analyses, although EPA has admitted elsewhere
that they potentially may cause significant long-term human
68/
exposure.—'
EPA should correct this problem by setting firm limits
on releases of carbon-14 and radon-222 consistent with the
likely development of control technology. EPA also should set
out a schedule for determination of the potential health effects
that may be caused by planned releases of strontium-90 and
cesium-137 and for promulgation of standards limiting their
release into the general environment. This information
should be provided within the context of the proposed rulemaking
in order to give as much advance notice as possible to the
nuclear power industry about the standards it will have to meet
in the future.
68/ Environmental Radiation Dose Commitment; An Application
to the Nuclear Power Industry, EPA-520/4-73-002, p. 11(Febru-
ary 1974).
-59-
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1. Carbon-14 — The analysis in the draft statement
shows that the total number of ill-health effects caused by
the unregulated radionuclide carbon-14, even on the basis of
EPA's arbitrary and improper calculation which is limited to 100
years following discharge, may be more than 10-fold greater than
the reduction in the ill-health effects achieved under the pro-
posed standards (i.e., 12,000 compared to 1210-180 = 1030).
p. 82) If the number of effects are calculated over the full
lifetimes of the radionuclides, the relative hazard of carbon-14
is probably even greater.
EPA states that a limit for carbon-14 was not proposed
"... only because control technologies . . . are not yet
commercially available." (p. 81) EPA, however, promises
"... carefully [to] follow the development of new knowledge
concerning both the impact and controllability of these [carbon-14
and tr,itium] radionuclides." (p. 133) We submit that this is
an inadequate response to EPA's duties to protect the environment
and public health from the potential hazards posed by a bur-
geoning nuclear power industry.
The excuse that carbon-14 should not be restricted by
the newly proposed regulations simply because adequate control
systems are not now commercially available rings hollow for two
reasons. First, and most importantly, this type of argument in
general is inappropriate for setting radiation protection stan-
dards. Standards are devised to protect the public, not to
permit the industry to proceed apace. It is the industry that
must modify its practices to conform with the standards required
to protect the public health, not the other way around. The
burden of proof should be on the industry that an exemption
to reasonable standards is necessary. At this time, EPA should
not make a judgment to risk the public health unduly without
detailed evidence that control of carbon-14 is not feasible
in the next few year's and that the release of carbon-14 is
amply justified by the benefits obtained from the processes
producing carbon-14.
Second, the fact that equipment to control releases of
krypton-85 below the proposed standards is not now commercially
available did not prevent EPA from proposing those limits.
And rightly so. Furthermore, as EPA admits, control of a
"substantial fraction" of the impact of carbon-14 releases
"... may be achievable through inexpensive modification of
systems that are installed to meet the requirements of the
proposed standards for krypton." (p. 84) However, if the
industry finds that technology cannot be developed to meet the
standards, then the industry must make its case, fully and publicly,
before EPA takes steps to relax a proposed standard for carbon-14.
Thus, EPA should, consistent with the proposed standards
for krypton-85, set a limit on the total release of carbon-14,
which may be one to three or more orders of magnitude more harmful
than the projected releases of krypton-85. Besides appro;.riately
giving the public and environment greater protection if fully
implemented, a proposed.limit on carbon-14 releases at this time
would put the industry on advance notice about EPA's intentions
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and force it to conduct, as it should, the necessary research
and development for controlling releases within the standard.
2. Radon-222 - The radionuclide radon-222, which ema-
nates in large quantities from uranium mines, mills and mill
tailings piles, and its decay products are specifically excluded
from the proposed standard for maximum dose; and no limit is
Placed on the amounts that the industry may discharge into the
general environment each year. (pp. 133-314) The draft state-
ment suggests three reasons for this major exemption. "There
exists considerable uncertainty [,first,] about the public health
impact of existing leveis of radon in the atmosphere _ _ _ ^^
second, about] the best method for management of new sources of'
radon created by mans' activities . . . .- (p. 133) And,
third, " Exposures from radon and its daughters have previously
been the subject of Federal Radiation Protection Guidance, in
the case of underground uranium miners . . . , and of guidance
from the Surgeon General, in the case of public exposure due to
the use of uranium mill tailings in or under structures occupied
by members of the general public. ..." (p. 134)
These justifications are not consistent with EPA's
approach in regulating other radionuclides and, in any event,
are not persuasive. The draft statement, in fact, contains
no valid reasons for not including radon (and its decay products)
exposure in the maximum permissible dose and for not setting
a limit on the total amount of radon that can be released to
the general environment each year.
There is "considerable uncertainty" in the calculation
of the health effects due to the release of radionuclides that
are covered by the proposed regulations. For instance, the
draft statement admits that the total impact of transuranic
radionuclides is only very approximately known.(pp. 129-130)
Furthermore, the amount of plutonium, for instance, already in
the environment due to weapons testing is large. Yet,- EPA
has correctly argued in the case of transuranic radionuclides
that restrictions on additional planned releases are justified.
Similarly, the fact that a substantial amount of
naturally occurring radon exists in the air does not change
the fact that an additional quantity, which could produce harm-
ful effects, will be generated by man. Since this additional
amount is controllable, whereas the level of naturally occurring
radon is not, EPA should focus on how to reduce man-caused releases
of radon. Also, we note that EPA was able, in its technical
back-up report for rulemaking, to estimate the potential ill-
health effects due to the emanation of radon from uranium mill
tailings piles.—/
Furthermore, general agreement at this time on the "best
method" for limiting radon releases is not required before stan-
dards are proposed. There is no such agreement in the case of
krypton either. Yet, quite correctly, EPA is proposing limitations
on releases of krypton. However, several technically and
Analygis °f the Uranium Fuel Cvclg. P
.
j-B, pp. 51-74 (October 1973):
-63-
A-72
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economically practical means exist for substantially reducing
the amounts of radon released from uranium mill tailings, accor-
ding to a detailed report for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.^7
Therefore, EPA has avilable to it an assessment showing
that technically economically practical methods are available
to reduce substantially the emanation of radon from tailings
piles. This is all that is required prior to the inclusion of
radon releases in the proposed standards.
D. The Scope Of The Proposed Regulations Should
Be Expanded To Include All Nuclear Fuel Cycles.
Section 190.10, "Standards for Normal Operations,"
applies only to the uranium fuel cycle. As discussed above,
we believe that EPA has defined the "uranium fuel cycle" too
narrowly by excluding plutonium recycle operations and other
activities and facilities associated with the complete uranium
fuel cycle. Additionally, however, the restriction of the
proposed radiation protection standards to the full uranium fuel
cycle, that is, including the activities now omitted, would
still not sweep broadly enough for the purposes of Section 190.10.
The nuclear power industry and ERDA will be placing
increasing reliance on the thorium fuel cycle. Already, one large
commercial High Temperature Gas Reactor, which uses thorium fuel,
70/ Sears et al., Correlation of Radioactive Waste Treatment Costs
- the EnvTro^mental Impact of Waste Etf luejits_in_ the Nuclear Fuel
O.I1U 1,11C U11V J-J- wmm^t*_y**-»- _.».*** r-*-—- — ^ _ , t
Cvcle for Use in Establishing "as Low as Practicable
Milling of Uranium Ore, ORNL-TM-49UJ, vol. 1, May 19
has been constructed. HTGR's will increase in number to about
15% of new non-breeder additions by 1990.^ In our opinion,
EPA should include the thorium fuel cycle within the purview
of its proposed regulations in order to protect the environment
and public consistent with its overall regulatory objectives
and in order to give the infant thorium industry adequate advance
notice about the standards it will have to meet.
E. The Proposed Regulations Should Contain A
Section Limiting Occupational Exposures That
Result In Damage To Future Members Of The
General Population.
As discussed above, two radiological consequences of
the nuclear fuel cycle are an increased number of deleterious
genetic mutations affecting future members of the general popu-
lation, and radiation damage to fetuses (or unborn members of
the general population). Gonadal and fetal exposures do not
fall within the usual meaning of "occupational exposures" in
the sense that no direct benefit is received to compensate for
the potential harm and the future members of the population
have no choice as to whether or not they receive the radiation
exposure. Thus, in our opinion, it is appropriate to set limits
71/ Testimony of Roger W.A. Legassie, Assistant Administrator for
Planning and Analysis, ERDA, at U.S. ConOT1f ^e°£n^^t *
SiS-M« ^?1^1^=*535 - - '"Nuclear
Energy, p. 10 (April 28, 1975).
-66-
-65-
A-73
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on gonadal and fetal radiation exposures within the context
of the proposed regulations.
In order to protect the fetus, the International Com-
mission on Radiological Protection and the National Council on
Radiation Protection and Measurements recommend that fertile
women workers (with respect to the fetus) receive no more than
a maximum dose of about 0.5 rem during the gestation period.^/
This lower dose is consistent with the conclusions in the
BEIR report that the human fetus may be particularly susceptible
to leukemogenesis and other carcinogenesis following radiation
exposure.—'
When the genetic effects to future generations, as
estimated in the BEIR report™/ are considered, a reduction in
the maximum permissible exposure to 0.5 rem per year for all
nuclear workers appears amply justified.Z§/ The proposed
regulations should limit the genetically significant dose and
the fetal dose to 0.5 rem per year in order to protect adequately
future members of the general population.
, Review of the Current State of Radiation Protection
Philosophy, Report No. 43. pp. J4-Jb l.lann^y m_ iu,kj_
Zl/ National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, The
E/fects on Population of Exposure to Low Levels of lonizina -
Radiation, p. 89 (November 107?), -- — - *•
7J/ Id., p. 57.
2S/ NRDC is in the process of preparing a report on this matter
and will submit it to EPA for consideration in the near future.
F- The Proposed Standards Should Set Limits.On
The Total Releases Permissible Due To Abnormal
Operations.
The limits that would be established by the proposed
standards apparently pertain only to normal operations of the
uranium fuel cycle. EPA optimistically assumes that unplanned
releases will not significantly contribute to the environmental
burden of radioactivity and radiation exposure of humans.
On the other hand, there is reason to doubt that the
industry will continually meet the justifiably high standards
proposed by EPA. If "abnormal" releases of radionuclides
were regularly to exceed the values in the proposed standards,
then, obviously, the effectiveness of the standards would be
substantially reduced. Therefore, in order to ensure that
unplanned, abnormal, or unusual releases do not become
excessive, NRDC recommends that the proposed limitations
on total releases of radionuclides include all releases from
the nuclear fuel cycle without the current implied exemption
for "abnormal" or "unusual" operations.—/
76.7 In any event, the phrases "normal operations" and "unusual
operations" should be clearly defined and not left unduly am-
biguous, as they are now. In particular, EPA should spell
out in detail how the regulatory agency would determine when
a variance is required.
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P-26
CONCLUSIOH
For the reasons set forth in detail above, NFDC
finds that the draft statement does not meet the requirements
of the National Environmental Policy Act. Furthermore, NRDC
finds that the proposed standards are wholly inadequate to-
achieve the objective of protecting the public and environ-
ment from unduly high levels of radiation from operations
of the nuclear power industry.
P. 0, Box 1393
*»tura, Ca. 93001
September 30, 1975
Director, Criteria and Standards DivUion (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D. C. 20^.60
Dear Sir:
Rnfai-ance vour invitation for comments from the public. The
P^POsel sSSaSsfor Radiation Prot action fo r Nucl ear Power
Operations, Federal Register , Thursday May29, 1975,Vol 1*0.
Number 10lj.| part II, are in disregard of h»an and animal life
and are therefore totally unacceptable.
The
standards are legally, morally, socially, and
not justify the continued long tern tlon
our environment and the associated disease, death, and destruction
of our genetic inheritance. For example largely because or
the nuclear pollution of our environment to date one in four
or around 50, 000, 000 Americana are expected to develop oancer_«
This is more individuals than were put to death during WWII I
believe, and cancer of course is only one aspect of the public
health problem being created. Economically, when the total
costs of the public health problems created are added to the
overall costs of nuclear power production, the economic cost
is astronomical and totally unacceptable, indeed destroying
the economic viability of our system,
Since the nuclear industry has clearly demonstrated its inability
to produce electrical power consistant with the economic, social,
moral, and legal best interest of our society over the last
quarter of a century, existing nuclear power production facilities
should be converted to use natural gas or other convenient
fuel rather than nuclear fuel as the heat source for the generation
of steam to produce electricity. The nuclear reators can be
retained on site for use in the case of a national emergency
or any future energy difficulties which would justify their
use, and can be used if needed until the alternate boilers
are installed and operational.
-69-
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P-27
I would appreciate a copy of the results of the air, water,
oil, tobacco, and food samples your agency has monitored this
y?a?v a11 foms of radiation contamination, and the results
ol the members of the general public checked for radiation
?~ £ ^ 6n?' a3 wel1 as animals and fish so monitored, particularly
in California and Nevada. Has there been a Significant increase
in nuclear pollution this year, and is it caused by the increased
nuclear weapons testing in Nevada or increased world wide pollution
from weapons testing, etc.? What facilities are available
to the public in California that will perform body burden testing?
What is the cost involved? Are imported oil and foodstuffs
monitored for radiation?
Finally I would like to know the status of your involvement
in standards for non-ionizing radiation. The public health
SPth« ™MT £'*???* nu°lear Pollution problem is second only
to the public health problem created by the non-control of
??2 °? ?£ radiation, causing damage to the CNS and thus
airecting the performance of the EPA.
President Pord
Congressman Lagomarsino
Until the world ends,
Cornell University
LABORATORY OF ATOMIC AND SOLID STATE PHYSICS
CLARK HALL • ITHACA, NEW YORK 14853
October 13, 1975
Director
Criteria and Standards Division
AW-560
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
Gentlemen:
„ -4 LWlS!l t0 comment on vour "Draft Environmental Statement on the Environmental
Radiation Protection Requirements for Normal Operations of Activities in the
Uranium Fuel Cycle" (May 12, 1975).
Based on a study of the United States Environmental Protection Agency it
has been shown (see enclosure) that the radon-222 emanating from the uranium
mill tailings piles in the U.S. alone will, be the year 2000, increase the
average atmospheric radon concentration in the U.S. by -0.5%, if the nuclear
energy consumption develops according to current forecasts and if no disposal
methods for the tailings will be introduced. Since the radon results from the
decay of thorium-230, whose half-life is 76,000 years, the man-made increase of
the radon concentration will persist into the indefinite future, even though the
half-life of the radon is short (3.8 days). If the current rate of radon-induced
lung cancer deaths in the U.S. is estimated as 4,000/year, then the additional
radon will cause 20 additional cases every year in the U.S., and another 20 in
'1''1 Hemisphere» assumlnK the population to remain constant at the present
Since your draft considers carefully the health impact of krypton-85 a
comparison between these two isotopes may be useful: Based on the concept of
the environmental radiation dose commitment, the health impact of krypton-85
i.e. the number of serious health ef fects/GW(e)y of electrical energy produced
is 0.034/GW(e)y for krypton-85. The amount of the tailings quoted above will
generate approximately 104 GW(e)y in LWR's. Hence, the krypton from that energy
would be expected to cause a total of 3.4 x 10~2 x 104 = 340 cases of serious
health effects, worldwide. The radon from the tailings accumulated from the
generation of the same energy will cause the same number of serious health effects
in less than 10 years. Over a period of 100 years, it will cause 4,000 such
effects, and so on.
In view of this comparison it seems highly desirable to include radon
emission standards into your draft, and to present estimates of the costs of
avoiding the health impact of this isotope. Note that the only responsible
solution is one that would guarantee isolation from the biosphere for periods on
the order of the half-life of thorium-230 and that seems to exclude all disposal
A-76
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juiy
Director
October 13, 1975
Page 2
methods other than to reseal the tailings in deep mines.
Sincerely yours,
Robert 0. Pohl
Nuclear Energy: Health Effects of Thorium-230
Robert 0. Pohl
(The author is professor in the Physics Department,
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853)
The uranium mill tailings represent a substantial and so far largely neglected
health hazard in the nuclear fuel cycle.
Introduction
In every debate on nuclear energy, its proponents emphasize two points:
1) The costs of nuclear energy in terms of human health are between one
hundred and ten thousand times smaller than those of energy produced from coal.
2) Although the nuclear waste is highly toxic, it is concentrated in a
small volume which simplifies its safe disposal.
In this paper, we want to show that both of these claims are incorrect,
because the waste generated at the uranium mill has not been taken into account.
The following discussion is based to a large part on "Environmental Analysis
of the Uranium Fuel Cycle", a report published by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency in October, 1973 (1).
As an introduction, it may be useful to review what we consider to be
the only acceptable method of determining the health costs of nuclear energy
(2): The generation of a certain amount of electrical energy W in a fission
reactor results in a certain number nQ ± of radioacti- e nuclei of a certain
isotopic species, i. A fraction of these nuclei will enter the biosphere,
and as they decay with a certain decay rate (unit: Curie) characterized by
their half-life T , they will cause a radioactive dose rate to be absorbed
1/21 i
by every person (unit: rem/year). The entire population will receive the
so-called population dose rate RI from these nuclei (unit: man rem/year);
R varies with time. By the time all nuclei have decayed, i.e. after many
half-lives, the nuclei will have caused a certain integrated dose among the
A-77
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- 2 -
population (unit: man rem). Because of the long half-lives of some isotoplc
species, this dose may be spread over many generations. The technical term
for this dose is environmental radiation dose commitment, D (3). A certain
number NA of somatic and genetic health effects will be caused by D .
The connection between dose and health effect has recently been reviewed in
the BEIR Report (4). Some of these health effects, say F , will be fatal,
and hence one can express the Impact of the energy W on the health of the
present and of all future generations as the sum F of all F caused by
the different isotopes resulting from the generation of W divided by this
energy W (unit: Number of deaths/unit of energy. As the unit of energy we
9
will use the GW(eV = 10 watt year of electrical energy.) Let us call F/W the
health Impact (it can be translated into health costs by assigning a certain
dollar value to a life lost). Note that F is the number of people committed
to die as result of the energy produced, regardless of when they die. In
that sense, F/W corresponds to what the economists call the "forward costs"
of a product, to be distinguished from the annual costs, which are like
installment payments.
Previous estimates (5) of the health impact of nuclear energy have been
of the order of 0.01 deaths/GW(e)y among the general public, and 1 death/GW(e)y
among workers in the nuclear industry (only part of the latter were caused by
radiation, the rest by injuries). Similarly, estimates of the impact
of electrical energy from coal were about 100 deaths/GW(e)y (70% among the
general public, mostly from air pollution, and 30% from occupational accidents).
A critical look at the assumptions made and the models used which resulted
in these favorable numbers for nuclear energy would be of interest (6). For
the sake of brevity, however, this will not be done in this paper. Instead,
we will consider only the contribution of one single Isotope, thorium-230,
through some of its radioactive daughters. Their health effects had not been
considered in the earlier studies. We will ignore the health effects
of all other Isotopes and all health effects due to accidents in the nuclear
industry.
Thorium-230 and its Daughters
The generation of 1 GW(e)y in a reactor burning uranium-235, operating
with a 33% conversion efficiency from thermal to electrical energy requires
fissioning of 1.16 tons of uranium-235. Natural uraniup contains 0.71% of
this isotope, the rest is uranium-238. Hence, 1 GW(e)y of electrical energy
requires the mining of 162 tons of uranium. Presently mined ore contains
0.1 - 0.2% uranium (by weight), and hence 8 x 104 to 1.6 x 105 tons of ore
have to be mined in order to generate 1 GW(e)y. Since both uranium isotopes
are naturally radioactive, the ore will also contain their daughters. The
decay series for uranium-238 is listed in Table I. In'equilibrium, the rate
of decay of any one of the daughters is equal to its rate of generation
("secular equilibrium"). From this we can calculate the numbers of each
isotopic species present in the ore in equilibrium with the parent isotope.
At the uranium mill, the ore is crushed and ground, and the uranium if
chemically separated (7). The residue, containing all the non-uranium
daughters in a water insoluble form, is discarded on the tailings pile.
From there, the chemically inert noble gas radon-222 can escape into the
atmosphere and can be carried over long distances. Thus, radon and its
daughters can affect large numbers of people. The EPA study estimated the
health effects of this gas and its short-lived daughters polonium-218.and 214, lead-214
and bismuth-214. It was found that from a pile resulting from the mining
of the uranium required to supply 159 GW(e)y, ~60 health effects (lung cancer)
would be committed during the first 100 years after milling (8). At least 95%
of these lung cancers are estimated
A-78
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APPENDIX
COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT STATEMENT
INDEX TO COMMENT LETTERS
COMMENT LETTERS
-------
-------
INDEX TO COMMENT LETTERS
A. PUBLIC
P-l Dr. Marvin Resnikoff, Rachel Carson College
P-2 Mrs. Robert Stronczek
P-3 Larry Beans
P-4 Dr. Ernest J. Sternglass, Univ. of Pittsburgh
P-5 Dr. William L. Boeck, Niagara University
P-6 Philip & Denison Levy
P-7 R.G. Wolfe, Eugene Future Power Comm., Inc.
P-8 Linda Cook
P-9 Michael Cook
P-10 Dr. Robert L. Morris & Dr. Rolf M.A. Hahne
University of Iowa
P-ll Skip Laitner, Critical Mass
P-12 Dr. Daniel C. Kasperski, Council on
Energy Independence
P-13 Dorothy Boberg
P-14 J.M. Selby, HPS
P-15 Dr. Lauriston S. Taylor, NCRP
P-16 Bernard L. Cohen, Univ. of Pittsburgh
P-17 Ellen F. Beans
P-18 Dr. Bob E. Watt, Sierra Club
P-19 John Abbotts, Public Interest Research Group
P-20 Neal E. Wilson
P-2] Jerry L. Cohen, IAEA/IIASA
P-22 Andrew P. Hull, Brookhaven National Lab.
DATE
6/24/75
7/03/75
7/09/75
7/09/75
7/11/75
7/14/75
7/15/75
7/14/75
7/17/75
7/17/75
7/23/75
7/23/75
7/23/75
7/23/75
7/24/75
7/25/75
7/27/75
7/23/75
7/28/75
7/29/75
7/28/75
8/12/75
PAGE N
A-5
A-9
A- 9
A-10
A- 10
A-12
A-13
A-13
A-14
A- 14
A- 15
A-17
A-20
A-21
A- 24
A-25
A-28
A- 29
A- 30
A-31
A-32
A- 32
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A. PUBLIC (continued)
P-23 Ilene Younghein
P-24 Ilene Younghein
P-25 Dr. Terry R. Lash, NRDC
P-26 David L. Eakle
P-27 Robert 0. Pohl, Cornell University
P-28 Dr. Elise Jerard, IPBKESG
B. INDUSTRY
1-1 Commonwealth-Edison, Chicago, Illinois
1-2 American Mining Congress, Washington, D.C.
1-3 American Mining Congress, Washington, D.C.
1-4 Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., Rockville, Md.
1-5 Northeast Utilities, Hartford, Conn.
1-6 Edison Electric Institute, New York, N.Y.
1-7 Georgia Power Company, Atlanta, Ga.
1-8 Babcock & Wilcox, Power Generation Group
Lynchburg, Virginia
1-9 Sargent & Lundy Engineers, Chicago, 111.
1-10 Pacific Gas & Electric Company
San Francisco, California
1-11 Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., Baltimore, Md.
1-12 Florida Power & Light Co., Miami, Florida
1-13 Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc., New York, N.Y.
1-14 Washington Public Power Supply System
Richland, Washington
1-15 General Electric, San Jose, California
1-16 Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., Oklahoma City, Okla,
DATE
9/03/75
9/06/75
9/15/75
9/30/75
10/13/75
10/13/75
7/18/75
7/28/75
9/15/75
7/28/75
7/24/75
7/24/75
7/25/75
7/25/75
7/25/75
7/25/75
7/25/75
7/25/75
7/25/75
7/25/75
7/25/75
7/26/75
PAGE NO
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A-88
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A-109
A- 110
A-112
A-113
A-114
A-115
A-119
A-120
A-127
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B. INDUSTRY (continued)
1-17
1-18
1-19
1-20
1-21
1-22
1-23
1-24
1-25
1-26
1-27
1-28
C. STATE
General Atomic Company, San Diego, Calif.
General Atomic Company, San Diego, Calif.
Allied-General Nuclear Services, Barnwell, S.C,
Yankee Atomic Electric Co., Westborough, Mass.
Duke Power Company, Charlotte, N.C.
Stone & Webster Engineering Corp.
Boston, Mass.
Westinghouse Electric Corp., Pittsburgh, Pa.
Consolidated Edison Co., New York, N.Y.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts, & Trowbridge, Wash., D.C
Consumers Power Co., Jackson, Michigan
Bechtel Power Corp., San Francisco, Calif.
Wisconsin Electric, Milwaukee, Wisconsin
S-l State of Maine
S-2 State of Maryland
S-3 South Dakota Dept. of Environmental Protection
S-4 South Carolina Dept. of Hlth & Envtl Control
S-5 State of Kansas Dept. of Health & Environment
S-6 Commonwealth of Kentucky
S-7 Office of the Governor, Arizona
S-8 Executive Chambers, Hawaii
S-9 State of Nevada
S-10 State of Connecticut
S-ll Minnesota Pollution Control Agency
DATE
7/28/75
9/10/75
7/28/75
7/28/75
7/28/75
7/29/75
8/11/75
8/11/75
9/15/75
9/15/75
10/03/75
3/04/76
6/25/75
6/27/75
7/01/75
7/08/75
7/11/75
7/09/75
7/15/75
7/15/75
7/22/75
7/23/75
7/28/75
PAGE NO
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A-183
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A-184
A-185
A-186
A-187
A-187
A-18S
A-188
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C. STATE (continued)
S-12 State of Wisconsin
S-13 State of Georgia
S-14 State of Ohio, EPA
S-15 New York State Dept. of Envtl Conservation
S-16 The Resources Agency of California
S-17 State of Mississippi
S-18 Texas State Dept. of Health
S-19 Commonwealth of Virginia, Council on
the Environment
S-20 Office of the Governor, State of Oklahoma
D. FEDERAL
F-l
F-2
F-3
F-4
F-5
F-6
Tennessee Valley Authority
Department of the Interior
Department of Commerce
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Energy Research & Development Administration
Federal Energy Administration
DATE
7/29/75
8/07/75
8/06/75
8/12/75
8/15/75
8/15/75
8/25/75
8/27/75
9/23/75
7/25/75
8/08/75
8/29/75
9/15/75
9/25/75
10/24/75
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p-1.
June 24, 1975
Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460 ' Re: Proposed 40CFR Part 190
To the Director:
INTRODUCTION
The proposed standards, 40 CPR Part 190, represent a vast
improvement over 10 CFR Part 20. Limits, comparable to Appen-
dix I for reactors, would be set for other components of the
nuclear fuel cycle, and limits on the build-up of certain harm-
ful long-lived radionuclides would also be set for all the com-
ponents of the nuclear fuel cycle. The Environmental Protection
Agency should be commended for this forthright action in the
public interest.
This having been said, we believe that the EPA has made
certain compromises in these proposed standards. Protecting
the public health is not done in a political vacuum. Other
agencies, more inclined toward the nuclear industry, and the
nuclear industry itself, will be very critical of the proposed
standards. In compromising, the EPA should bear in mind that
the public has lost confidence in these industries and their
supporting agencies, and has begun to place more trust in the
EPA. If the EPA is not faithful to its responsibility of pro-
tecting the public health and the environment, then the uublic
will more and more place their confidence in itself and the
courts.
This critique of the proposed standards will point out
that the EPA has not gone far enough, that certain compromises
A-5
Director
Page 2
have been made which are not in the public interest. We will
deal primarily with the proposed standards, as they apply to
fuel reprocessing plants, except for a discussion of the tail-
ings piles at uranium mills.
We will point out that the EPA, by delaying proposed stan-
dars for mill tailings piles, has ignored one of the major con-
tributors to potential health effects in the uranium fuel cycle.
Next, we will show that the 100 year cut-off is arbitrary, and
has the effect of grossly underestimating the potential health
effects due to the uranium fuel cycle. Finally, we will show
that the variance for unusual operations may allow the industry
to continue polluting the environment for some time.
ONE HUNDRED YEAR CUT-OFF
The EPA has chosen to consider the potential health effects
of radioactive materials during the first 100 years following
their introduction to the environment. The EPA has limited it-
self to this hundred year period, "because of our inadequate
understanding of their long term behavior (p.74)." This 100
year cut-off severely underestimates the potential health ef-
fects of certain radionuclides, and imbalances the risk reduc-
tion vs. cost analysis of Fig.3 (p.37).
Uranium Mill Tailings.
The EPA has previously calculated the health effects due
to uranium mill tailings (EPA-520/9-73-003-D, "Environmental
Analysis of the Uranium Fuel Cycle", Oct.,73). A model uran-
ium mill services 5-3 model reactors for 30 years. The health
effects from the uranium mill tailings pile for these 30 x 5.3
=159 reactor years number 200 throughout the Northern Hemi-
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Director
Page 3
sphere, not including the potential health effects in the im-
mediate vicinity of the uranium mill. In arriving at the fig-
ure, 200 health effects, the EPA has assumed a 100 year cut-
off period.
The 100 year cut-off is not justifiable in this case be-
cause there is an adequate understanding of the long-term be-
havior of the emissions from the tailings pile, as well docu-
mented in the above quoted EPA reference. Uranium ore initially
resides at depths 100 to ^50 feet below the surface of the earth.
In general, these ores are uncovered in strip mining operations.
The residue from this uranium ore, after the uranium is leached
from the ore, are called tailings. These tailings are left, be-
hind dams and allowed to dry at the surface of the earth. The
principal component of the tailings, thorium-230, decays to ra-
dium-226, which subsequently decays to radon-222. This radon-
222 is an inert gas, and escapes the pile. Since thorium-230
has a half-life of 80,000 years, the tailings pile will radiate
radon-222 indefinitely.
If a projection as to health effects can be estimated for
100 years, it can be estimated for future times as well; it is
well-known how an inert gas will emanate from the tailings pile
and distribute itself in the atmosphere. If one underestimates
the health effects by assuming an 80,000 year cut-off, the half-
life of thorium-230, the health effects due to this tailings
pile increase to 800 x 200 = 160,000, or about 1_.OOQ health
effects per reactor year. If one follows the EPA's advice
Director
Page U
and follows radionuclide effluents, "for as long a period as
they may expose human populations (p.35)", the effects are
greater yet.
The basis for these potential health effects may be rather
easily established, and the control is straight-forward. The
uranium ore has been brought to the surface where the thorium-
230 decays to radon-222 in which form it can easily be released.
When the natural uranium is buried 100 feet or more below the
surface, the radon-222 can decay on its way to the surface; the
emissions to the human environment are negligible. The obvious
solution to the problem is to bury the tailings 100 feet or more
below the surface. If one assumes potential health effects for
80,000 years, it would be cost-justifiable to bury the tailings
pile to greater than a 20foot depth. However, assuming a 100
year cut-off, it becomes only marginally cost-justifiable to
bury the tailings to a 2 foot depth.
The health effects from uranium mill tailings constitute one
of the more serious health hazards of the uranium fuel cycle.
The 100 year cut-off undersestimates the potential health effects
and limits the remedial solution to rather ineffective means,
namely, burial at a 2 foot depth. It is clear that burying the
tailings to a 100 foot depth would raise the cost of uranium
fuel enormously, but so be it. Intervenors have long argued
that all the costs should be laid out so that comparisons bet-
ween coal and uranium fuel cycles are honest.
The EPA, in the proposed standards, has exempted radon and
its daughters, from consideration till some later time. This
exemption cannot be justified; radon should be included.
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Director
Page 5
Iodine.
Iodine-129 is in a highly mobile form at a reprocessing
plant when the spent fuel is dissolved in nitric acid. The
iodine is contained at a reprocessing plant with a DP = 10;
thus 10# is released. These are projections for the Barnwell
facility by the NRG; the figures for Nuclear Fuel Services are
worse. It is known how iodine distributes itself in the envir-
onment. Of that 10$ which is released at a reprocessing plant,
the potential health effects for the half-life of 1? million
years can be estimated. The one hundred year cut-off is arbi-
trary and should more properly be justified by the EPA. It is
clear that a period of 17 million years would greatly increase
the potential health effects, making the standards much more
restrictive.
Of that iodine which is captured on silver zeolite beds,
or in the intermediate level waste system of reprocessing plants,
the EPA should follow the waste disposal aspects. Material with
a half-life of 1? million years cannot be just buried and for-
gotten. The EPA has separated the waste disposal aspects of
the fuel cycle from these standards, which ignores the 90$ of
the iodine produced. While we agree with the EPA that it is
preferable to capture iodine than have it released, still the
effects of waste disposal cannot be ignored for a radionuclide
with a half-life of 17 million years.
It can be plainly admitted that if the EPA did consider
the health effects for a period of time on the order of millions
Director
Page 6
of years, that no nuclear industry could contain the material
with the confinement factor required. So be it. The EPA is
compromising people's health with this arbitrary 100 year cut-
off.
Plutonium.
A similar consideration applies for plutonium at reproc-
essing plants. The EPA assumes that any plutonium which becomes
air borne will be captured on HEPA filters. It is assumed that
these plutonium contaminated filters will then be buried at a
Federal Repository. Then what? Because of the 2^,000 year half-
life of plutonium-239, this is not the end of the problem. Bjr
neglecting waste disposal aspects, and by assuming a 100 year
cut-off, the EPA has limited itself to a small part of the plu-
tonium problem.
HOW LONG IS "TEMPORARY"?
As part of the proposed standards, the EPA has proposed a
variance for unusual operations, allowing the proposed standards
to be exceeded if a "temporary and unusual operating condition
exists and continued operation is necessary to protect the over-
all societal interest with respect to the orderly delivery of
electrical power". But how long is "temporary"? One year?
One hundred years? The EPA has provided no guidance. This var-
iance is a loophole for continued pollution.
One example will serve to illustrate the point. The EPA
has mainlined, for some time, that krypton-removal equipment
is presently available; the NRG has argued the contrary. In
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Director
Page 7
the FES for the Midwest Fuel Recovery Plant, GE accepted three
bids for kr-removal equipment. The availability date was 1977
five years following the FES. In the construction pem.it hear-
ing for the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant, September, 197*, the
NRC claimed that kr-removal equipment would not be available
for five years, or 1979, and further, that it was not cost-
justifiable to install the equipment. There seems to be a
pattern of delay here and it will be interesting to observe
the attitude of the NRC, when and if the construction permit
hearing for Nuclear Fuel Services takes place.
The EPA has granted the industry a leeway, by not imposing
the proposed standards, which will require kr-removal equipment
until January 1, 1983. However, the NRC could grant a variance
for any number of reasons: the danger of handling krypton tanks,
the unreliability of the equipment and the need for more develop-
ment, radiation effects to workers, etc. Unless the EPA provides
some guidelines and tightens this variance in some manner, the
use of kr-removal equipment could be put off indefinitely.
THE PROPOSED STANDARDS ARE INEQUITABLE
The proposed standards are five times higher than Appen-
dix I standards for reactors. The reason for this inequality
can be traced to the method of analysis, namely, cost-benefit
analysis. Because of the natureof reprocessing facilities
and nuclear reactors, it is less costly to contain the radio-
activity from reactors. Therefore, on a cost-benefit basis,
it could be cost-justifiable to lower the whole body dose re-
Director
Page 8
ceived near reactors to five mrems per year, while the maxi-
mum dose received near fuel reprocessing plants is 25 mrems
per year. As a result, simply by living near a reprocessing
Plant, the residents are subject to greater risk than those
near a reactor. Reprocessing residents are second class citi-
zens.
We believe that this is essentially a poltical problem,
and not an error by the EPA. Residents near a reprocessing
facility, such as Barnwell, S.C. or West Valley, N.Y., enjoy
less of the benefits of electrical generation, yet assume more
of the burden. Whether these residents will allow this to
occur remains to be seen. If not, then certain additional costs
will be passed on to the utilities, and to the utility rate
payers, or additional costs may be passed on to the reprocessing
facilities which simply make them unprofitable. They may have
to be operated by the Federal government.
»T c«*Vs
Just be cause Certain parts of the nuclear industry «4tf*. w»o*e Vo
&&&8&* controrjHUi radioactivity is no reason for
the local residents to suffer greater risk.
CONCLUSION
In general, we support this move by the EPA to limit maxi-
mum doses near other parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, and to
limit the build-up of long-lived radionuclides in the environ-
ment. However, we believe that the EPA has not gone far enough
in their proposed standards.
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P-3
P-2
July 9, 1975
130 Endeavor DP.
Corte M^dera, Ca. 9U-9c
Dear Director of Critical Studies,
I would like to affirm the nronosed redudtion
in radiation allowed by a factor of ?0 times. This
is a Rood sten in the right direction. Testa on
animals have demonstrated that there la no known
safe dosage of Plutonium (Alpha Rays) that does not
cause cancer.
I would like to see further reductions
in radiation allowed until it apnroaches the
natural radiation that is not man made.
Sincerely,
A-9
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P-4
University of Pittsburgh
SCHOOL OF MEDICINE
Department of Radiology
P-6
NIAGARA UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE or ARTS AND SCIENCES
NIAGARA UNIVERSITY. N. Y.
DEPARTMENT Or PHYSICS
July 9, 1975
July 11, 1975
Director, Criteria and Standards Division
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 2Qk60
Dear Sir:
I hereby request permission to present testimony at the proposed
rule-making hearings relating to the Environmental Protection Re-
quirements for Normal Operations of Activities in the Uranium Fuel
Cycle, to be scheduled by your agency at the end of the public com.
ment period.
radi«t i7' ** .testim™y w111 "late to the adequacy of the proposed
raS atvhfT/ " ^ "*" °f "^ sci«*ific data that the
It their £2Vh°8£ T reCSiVed PlayS a BaJ°r Part in the evaluation
of their health effects, along the lines of a recent scientific paper
"
ejs/dk
Sincerely yours,
Sya
Ernest J. Sternglass, Ph.D.
Professor of Radiological Physics
Director
Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
RE: Comments on the Draft Environmental Statment -
Environmental Radiation Protection Requirements
for Normal Operations of Activities in the
Uranium Fuel Cycle.
Dear Sir:
I am in favor of the proposed standards, however, I believe
results'" are necessarv to accomplish the desired
First, an understanding should be reached with the Nuclear
be9d^onYH C°mmis1sion so that krypton-85 removal systems will
be designed to release no more than 4000 curies per giqawatt
year of krypton-85 and will be operated in a manner to achieve
design performance. The proposed standard alone would allow
itLf fsn"nnn operati°n of systems with only minimum capabil-
unM! qSfi °°° cur^s of krypton-85 released per gigawatt-year)
until 1988, when the standard would be reviewed.
Second, "The prevention of unlimited discharges of krypton-85
i?v £tenVlrCTe2t fr°m fUSl CYCle °Pe"tions is of high prior-
hP«lfh ? ltS P°tential for significant long-term public
health impact over the entire world" (p. 130). The EPA should
Mrtn» Y min9 the atmospheric discharge of
radioactive gases and vapors with a radioactive half-life of
over one year.
I would like to illustrate my point by means of an analogy.
as N?Hnar VP ^fgS JU^ outside a heavY industrial area such
oonna? a I °r GarY' Indiana adopted a very strict air
pollution code to protect the health of its citizens. A very
PRESBYTERIAN-UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL. PITTSBURGH. PA. 1526
' (412)682-8100
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NIAGARA UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OP ARTS AND SCIENCES
NIAGARA UNIVERSITY. N. Y.
NIAGARA UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OP ARTS AND SCIENCES
NIAGARA UNIVERSITY. N. Y.
DEPARTMENT OP PHYSICS
P- 2
DEPARTMENT OP PHYSICS
valid report, justifying the code, could be prepared to show
how much the citizens would benefit by controlling the air
pollution sources in the village. The report would be in-
complete without a discussion of the quality of the incoming
air and the potentially large benefits to the citizens if air
pollution sources outside the village were also controlled.
The fact that operations within the village did not further
degrade the air they breathe remains as only partial solution
to a public health problem.
Krypton-85 passes freely and easily across national boundaries
as well as oceans and mountain barriers. Since krypton-85 is
not labeled by country of origin, an analysis that considers
only that portion of the krypton-85 produced in the U.S. is
incomplete and lacking in perspective. I suggest that the
section on Environmental Impact (p. 74-81 and figures 6,7,8)
be revised to include projections of the global inventories
of krypton-85, carbon-14 and tritium from all sources includ-
ing fusion plants until the year 2025. There should also be
a comparison between the uncontrolled global inventories and
the global inventories if only the U.S. adopts containment
policies. Estimates of the effect on the global inventory of
a containment policy adopted by other individual countries or
regions, on a country by country basis,would be very helpful.
An examination of those comparisons would make the need for
international cooperation apparent. The responsibility of the
EPA to the american people seems to require the EPA to make
some effort to secure a treaty limiting the krypton-85, tritium
and carbon-14 concentrations in air coming into our country.
There are several specific areas where additional information
would improve the accuracy or completeness of the draft state-
ment.
A. The draft statement does not mention the quantity
of krytpon-85 per gigawatt-year in an uncontrolled
' release. A private communication states 370,000
curies per gigawatt-year was the figure assumed for
the statement.
B.
C.
The decontamination factor mentioned on p.
be changed from 10 to 7.6.
80 should
gigawatt-year is large enough to question the
validity of applying that model to the proposed
standard.
D. The vertical axis in figure 8 should be given in
terms of the global atmospheric inventory, since
there is no distinction in properties or health
effects produced between U.S. origin krypton-85
and krypton-85 from any other source. Figure 8
should indicate a range of concentrations as
limited on one hand by a decontamination factor
of 100 and on the other hand by a decontamination
factor of 7.6 (the actual D.F. under the proposed
standard).
E. Comments on containment of carbon-14 by a krypton
containment system (eg. p. 38, p. 82, p. 84)
should be modified to indicate that no such bene-
ficial effect is expected from the selective ab-
sorption in flourocarbons type system favored by
fuel reprocessing plant operators.
F. Projections of atmospheric krypton-85, carbon-14
and tritium should be compared to the atmospheric
inventories of these isotopes of natural origin.
The sum of the atmospheric ionization rates due
to projected concentrations of krypton-85, carbon-
14 and tritium should be compared to natural back-
ground ionization rate expressed in the same units,
for typical land and sea stations. This last com-
parison will show that the ionization rate produced
by the concentration of krypton-85, projected for
2025 will approach the natural background ionization
rate at oceans stations. An inescapable conclusion
is that natural phenomena related to atmospheric
ionization will be affected as the ionization rate
is increased by reactor by-products in the atmos-
phere. In my opinion, an environmental impact state-
ment that focuses on radiobiological effects to the
exclusion of other phenomena is incomplete.
It should be made clear that the model projections
on p. 38 are significantly different from the pro-
posed standard. The difference between 50,000
curies per gigawatt-year and 4000 curies per
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NIAGARA UNIVERSITY
COLLIOI or ART* AND SCIINCM
NIAOARA UNIVKMSITV. N. Y.
PHOTOGRAPHY
P-6
Architecture Landscape Commercial
DIPAMTMINT OF PHYSIO
Philip R. Levy
p. 4
5161 NE Wistaria Dr.
Portland, Oregon 97213
(503) 287-3675
The opinions expressed in this letter
are my own.
to
duly 14, 1975
Very truly yours,
William L. Boeck, Ph.D
Professor
Department of Physics
Niagara University
WLB/ca
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
Dear People :
My wife and I are quite concerned about the various hazards
involved in the nuclear industry, especially the as yet
unknown effects of lone term radiation exposure. Future
generations deserve the most conservative evaluation of
"permissible" radiation levels. As I understand it. your
proposed standards for radiation protection (published
May 29, 1975) assume a direct linear relationship between
radiation exposure and biological functioning, uertainly
this position seems very logical and understandable in
lif °£ ?uch Publisbed concern about radiation exposure.
And most importantly, your position will afford a greater
level of protection for all life on the planet, now and for
many, many years to come.
Thank you for your understanding.
Sincerely,
Philip and iienison Levy
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EUGENE FUTURE POWER COMMITTEE INC.
P-7
P-8
P.O. Box 5274 •
July 15, 1975
Eugene, Oregon 97405
Director of Criteria and Standards (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, DC 20460
Dear Sirs
(Ref! Fed. Reg/'
May 29, 1975
pp. 23^20 ff.)
I am writing on behalf of the Eugene Future Power Committee and
myself to support the new radiation protection standards (refer-
enced above) proposed by the Environmental Protection Agency.
Composed of citizens in the Eugene, Oregon area, the Eugene Future
Power Committee was organized in 1968 for the purpose of delaying
construction of a nuclear power plant sponsored by their municipal
utility, the Eugene Water and Electric Board. A four-year delay
was implemented through initiative petition and a vote of the citi-
zens of this city. The utility has benefited by the delay to de-
termine that it is not advisable to proceed further with nuclear
power, and they have turned to alternative energy source development.
The Eugene Future Power Committee has continued its interest in
nuclear and other energy problems. Our studies of the nuclear power
technology indicate that there are still many unanswered questions,
an important one of which is the subject of EPA's revised protection
standards.
The Eugene Future Power Committee endorses the proposed revised
radiation standards and emphasizes the need for a careful study of
the entire nuclear fuel cycle (from exploration and mine to final
storage or disposal
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P-9
University of Jowa
ENVIRONMENTAL SANITATION
MICROBIOLOGY
SEROLOGY
VIROLOGY
P-10
State MygicMic JCabomtory
MEDICAL LABORATORY BUILDING. IOWA CITY, IOWA 52241
T*l»plwn«—ATM :
17 July 1975
Director
Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D. C. 20460
Dear Sir:
We offer the following comments on the proposed EPA Radiation Protection
Requirements for Normal Operations of Activities in the Uranium Fuel Cycle.
1. The vast majority of nuclear facilities already meet or exceed the proposed
requirements. v "*>"»«"
2. The assumption throughout, for example lines 6-8 on p. 73 is that with
more restrictive standards there will be (significant) positive public health
results. We feel it can be argued that the effects will be nil or negligible
This proposal seems to be unscientifically based since an earlier standard is
easily met and EPA proposes only to tighten it significantly since the economic
impact at the moment is negligible, but with little evidence presented to warrant
the change.
3. Over the long run, such requirements, in an energy-starved society could
prove ejtremely short-sighted. It would appear that it is appropriate to spend
perhaps»5 x 10 to prevent one radiation-induced health effect, but it is surely
much less cost effective than that, considering the conservative nature of the
estimates made.
In a technological society, each of us is subjected to a variety of deleterious
influences which we would prefer not to be subjected to: incompetent drivers
cigarette smoke from others, general air pollution, a variety of food additives
etc Many of these are known to present a vastly greater hazard than the 34,000
potential health effects" (p. 82, Table 10) predicted thru the end of this century
A-14
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17 July 1975
Director - Criteria and Standards Division
Page 2 -
if individuals at site boundaries were subjected to 170 mrem/year. To argue for
a half million dollar e^enditure to prevent one of these "health effects"
seems unjustified. The money could certainly be spent in better ways to
improve or protect public health.
4. Philosophically we disagree with what is being proposed. The studies of
the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission indicate that anticipated health
effects in irradiated Japanese and their offspring were much smaller than
anticipated - at doses of 90 rem and above - 3000x greater than what EPA
proposes.
5. Considering the State of Iowa individually, it is our judgement that
prognosticated future nuclear plant developments for power generation is
environmentally compatible with not only the current standards, but could
meet the proposed criteria if all available facilities and agencies for
planning are utilized at appropriate technical and administrative levels and
periods.
6. Since Iowa is a vital food production state instrumental to feeding the
nation and the world, it is hoped long time storage or processing of
radioactive wastes in our state would be discouraged. For the same
reasons, we are most interested in seeing these materials transported
to and from our power stations by adequate means. We are deeply interested
in protection of the well being of our citizens, but our productive land and
water so important to the whole world is an added responsibility.
In summation, while we feel the proposed tighter standards are
academic and indefensible from a real cost-benefit standpoint, they can
probably be met under current design conditions and those immediately
ahead of us.
Rolf M. A. Hahne, PhD
Assistant Director
cc: Mr Larry Crane
Mr Elmer H Vermeer
Robert L Morris PhD
Associate Director
p-11
23, 1975
THE CITIZENS MOVEMENT TO
STOP NUCLEAR POWER
P.O. Box 1538, Washington, D.C. 20013
Director, Criteria and Standards Division
Office of Radiation Programs
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
401 M St. H.W.
Washington, D.C. 20460
The following are coments to the Draft Environmental statement
prepared by the Environmental Protection Agency on the BMvTROHMBBTAL
RADIATION PROTECTIOH REQOIRBMBIITS FOR HORMAL OPERATIONS OF ACTIVITIES
IN THE URANIUM FUEL CYCLE*
1. On page 17 the EXS properly notes that "EPA is not limited
to specific criteria for setting such standards." Yet the EPA is
arbitrarily accepting such criteria when it notes on page 4 a pro-
jection that "well over 300,000 megawatts of nuclear electric gener-
ating capacity based on the use of uranium fuel will exist within the
next twenty years." Throughout the text of the BIS, the acceptance
of a given output of nuclear generated electricity forms the basis
for determining what an "acceptable* level of population exposure
to radioactive effluents should be.
EPA should not be an apologist for either the Administration or
other federal agencies. The intent of EPA's enabling legislation was
to establish an independent review and regulatory agency in matters
of environmental concern. In order to determine what set of exposure
standards should be established, EPA should explore what the level
of emissions would be under a limited or zero nuclear growth and to
determine if such a scenario were feasible. If it can be shown that
a limited nuclear dependency were practicable, then the present stan-
dards of exposures could then be shown to be too high. EPA, therefore,
might find that a standard of zero emissions might, in fact, be a
"reasonable" standard.
There has been ample discussion of the potential of conservation
to reduce the demand for electrical consumption and the availability
of alternative sources to replace nuclear power. The Ford Foundation's
study, A Time to Choose, found, for example, that with an annual energy
growth rate of two percent, a major energy source such as coal or nu-
clear could be eliminated without detrimental economic effects. Sim-
ilar conslusions were reached by the Public Interest Research Group's
review of energy scenarios (available from PIRO, 2000 P St. N.W.,
Washington, D.C.) and the Rand Corporation study California's Elec-
tric Quandry.
These independent reviews suggest that credible estimates of
the need for nuclear power, other than those offered by the Administration;
exist. EPA's critique of the BIS of the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder
A-15
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Reactor suggests that the agency is fully capable of examining
?ZeS^ i ?•»»«<» projections. EPA would be remiss, therefore, if
;.„* /°MD?iU2* * dl»cu«»ion »f * *«o emission level in the con-
text of a limited nuclear scenario.
2) The standards proposed by EPA are based only on routine
operation and ignore accidental releases. Yet the large amount of
radioactivity from an unplanned release may be serious enough to
warrant that no variances from the proposed standards be issued.
The former Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), in an effort to
determine the probability and extent of a major accident from an
S?*^*^?., nuclear reactor, funded a Reactor Satetv Study (RSS.
WASH-1400) which was issued in draft form last August. The RSS
*^f^at ** ^* -vent of the worst Possible accident. 2300 immediate
S?i S 2**r*?lSL°CC1?^ PA *nd th«MC Regulatory Staff independently
concluded that there had been a factor of 10 underestimation in RSS
The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) and Sierra club, in a sep-
arate study, identified a factor of 16 underassessment. These dis-
cussions, confirmed by a report issued by the American Physical
f°300 L S^Snn1; ^Z5™8,"61!.?1* P°tential ™*« of fatalities from
2,300 to 23,000 to 36.000. This set of figures is for prompt fatal-
ities and does not include lethal cancers or genetic defects and
is still more than double EPA's estimate of total health effects
given on page 82. If only one such accident were sustained, a
possibility which is receiving increasing attention, the cost-
benefit ratio developed for a given level of reactor operation
would be completely rewritten.
The RSS considers one accident which is small compared to the
large one above, but one with relatively large probability. Here.
RSS predicts 62 prompt fatalities, 300 latent and ultimately fatal
cancers and 300 genetic defects. Correction of RSS figures using
AEC, EPA and the UCS/SC estimates of errors yields the following
consequences:
Consequence
prompt fatalities
lethal cancer
genetic defect
RSS Result
62
300
300
Corrected Result
620-990
10,000-20,000
3,000-20,000
This scenario, because of its relatively high probability coupled
with uncertainties of human failure, sabotage and-poor quality con-
trol, could occur several times by the year 2000. If such conse-
quences were to happen only once, this could result in total health
effects four times higher than EPA projections for routine operation
alone. Clearly, consequences of this magnitude should be figured
into a benefit-cost analysis. If a negative ratio is found to develop,
EPA should state that with its proposed standards, no variances would
be granted and that unless a facility could offer reasonable assur-
ances that it would not exceed such standards (i.e., no accidents),
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission could not allow it to operate.
3) The waste disposal sites currently used, while serving pri-
marilX as 8J:£ra.9eAsit*8..f.or J»aste generated by the weapons program.
significant unplanned releases have occurred such that EPA should
again consider the inclusion of unplanned releases into its benefit-
cost ratios and proposed standards.
4) A report released by Dr. John Ootman in May, 1975 suggests
that the standard for transauranics may be too high. Dr. Gofman's
estimates suggest that if the population exposure reaches the limit
of .5 millrems per year, 7,000,000 extra fatal lung cancers can be
expected to develop in male smokers per generation. For non-smokers
the figure would be 60,000. Since these would occur over a 30-year
period, it can be expected that 235.000 extra fatal cancers would
develop per year in men (compared to the current lung cancer fatality
rate of 63,500 from all causes). This data should certainly be ex-
amined and standards set according to revised benefit-cost ratios.
(Dr. Gofman's report, "The Cancer Hazard from Inhaled Plutonium,"
may be obtained by writing to the Committee for Nuclear Responsibility,
Box 2329, Dublin, CA 94566.)
5) Dr. Edward Martell, in a paper entitled "Tobacco Radioac-
tivity and Cancer in Smokers," reprinted in American Scientist.
July, 1975, suggests that it is alpha irradiation of lung cells brought
about by the presence of 210P. which is a likely cause of cancer
and a contributing factor in the early development of artherosclerosis
in smokers. His work provides a valuable guide to the possible con-
sequences of chronic exposure to the inhalation of insoluable par-
ticles of moderate-to-low alpha activity and if properly considered,
may significantly alter the benefit-cost ratios of EPA's proposed
standards.
6) EPA's failure to include "genetically-related component
of diseases such as heart diseases, ulcers, and cancer as well as
more general increases in the level of ill-health from estimates of
genetic effects" (p. 83) is irresponsible in view of developing solid
evidence that low levels of radiation considered "safe" a few years
ago are able to produce cumulative genetic degradation that can lead
to leukemia and other diseases in future generations. See, for example,
the paper by Bross and Natarajan in Preventive Medicine. Sept. 1974,
pp. 361-369. Inclusion of this type of data on genetic effects may
significantly alter EPA's benefit-cost ratios presented in support
of its proposed standards.
In its review of the information available to it, EPA will find
that much of the information on the effects of radiation is speculative.
The advice offered by Ralph and Mildred Buchsbann in their book,
Basic Ecology (Pittsburgh, 1957) is particularly appropriate: "When
information is incomplete, changes should stay close to the natural
processes which have in their favour the indisputable evidence of
having supported life for a very long time."
Respectfully yours,
!£«UX,V.,l5?2V:*g* •."*•• ^or waste generated by tli
gBa^tPSiMSaapa^^
Skip Laitner
Coordinator, Critical Mass
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P-12
Council on Energy Independence
P. 0. Box 328
Chicago, Illinois 60690
July 23, 1975
Director, Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D. C. 20460
Dear Sir:
Comments of the Council on Energy Independence on the Environ-
mental Protection Agency's proposed 40 CFR 190 are hereby
forwarded for your consideration in accordance with the request
for comments printed in the Federal Register, vol. 40, No. 104,
page 23424 of May 29, 1975.
We appreciate this opportunity to make our views known.
Very truly yours,
Daniel C. Kasperski, Ph.D., P.E.
Director
DCK:dr
Enclosure
cc: The Honorable Mike McCormack (1/1)
It is indeed unfortunate that the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) has felt the need to modify the Federal Radiation
Protection Guidelines for industries in the uranium fuel cycle.
While we have no question as to the EPA's authority to do so as
a result of Reorganization Plan No. 3, we question whether these
proposed modification are in fact in the best interests of the
country. If it is the EPA's intent to further reduce the man-
rem dose to the general population, it would appear to be
reasonable to begin this task with those sources of exposure
which cause the greatest man-rem dose. In its own reportd), the
EPA noted that the greatest source of radiation dose in the
United States is from natural radiation. Though a number of
studies have been performed, none has yet demonstrated deleterious
effects on a human population living in natural radiation environ-
ments even considerably higher than those existing in the United
States. Thus, the concept that low levels of low-LET (linear
energy transfer) radiation exposure delivered at low dose rates
is indeed dangerous must be questioned. Moreover, attempts to
lower man-made dose commitments should be thoroughly justified
•with the benefits clearly demonstrable.
With respect to man-made radiation, the EPA, in the same report,
stated that medical diagnostic radiology accounts for a full 90%
of the total man-made radiation dose to which the United States
population is exposed. This in turn accounts for only 35% of
the total radiation dose from all sources, including natural
radioactivity. Thus, by its own figures, the EPA admits that all
other sources of man-made radiation taken together, including
fallout from nuclear weapons, occupational radiation exposure,
miscellaneous exposure to things like color television, consumer
products, and air travel, and other peaceful uses of atomic energy
(including the generation of electric power) accounts for less
than 4% of the total man-rem dose. Furthermore, the total man-rem
dose from the miscellaneous category above accounted for 50 times
the man-rem dose from nuclear electric power production in 1970,
again according to the EPA's own figures. The average per capita
dose in the year 2000 from all nuclear power plants and fuel re-
processing plants expected to be constructed by that time has
been estimated by the EPA to be 0.4 millirem per year, or about
4 tenths of one percent (0.4%) of natural background. This is
well below the variation in natural background within the United
States, which may vary by a factor of two or more (e.g., from
100 mrem/yr in Chicago to 200 mrem/yr in Denver). Thus the con-
tribution to population exposure from nuclear facilities is
truly negligible. A considerably greater man-rem dose reduction
could be saved by the EPA proposing to ban the construction of
brick and concrete structures and allow only wooden buildings,
-1-
A-17
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since the terrestrial dose rate from such building materials
average 100, 70, and only 50 mrem/yr. Hence, it appears of
little merit to change the Federal Radiation Protection Guide-
lines for this one industry, and yet take little action on
reducing the major sources of man-rem exposure, if indeed it is
even necessary, especially during these days of energy scarcity.
In spite of the small percentage of the total man-rem dose re-
sulting from radioactive effluents of the uranium fuel cycle,
/*?»£» f" industry conforms to the "as low as practicable"
ALAP) philosophy. This concept was first proposed by the
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP)—
a nonprofit corporation of renowned scientists chartered by
V^oSS t0 formulate radiation protection recommendations—in
a 1949 report (published in 1954 as NCRP Report 17)(2). since
then, this philosophy has been incorporated into the licensing
requirements of all facilities licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC), and design objectives for light-water-cooled
nuclear power reactor effluents are contained in 10 CFR 50,
Appendix IU). The guidelines contained in Appendix I were
arrived at only after many months of review and public hearings
initiated in 1971 by the Atomic Energy Commission, the NRC's
predecessor. Even though the present Appendix I limits for in-
dividual and population exposure are more restrictive than those
proposed by the EPA, we oppose the EPA's proposal as there is a
definite distinction between design objectives, as under the
NRC s Appendix I, and new federal standards as proposed by the
EPA. Dr. Lauriston S. Taylor (President of NCRP) must have
toreseen the attempt by government agencies to further reduce
the already low radiation protection limits for the nuclear
industry In a letter to Nuclear News (4), he pointed out that
it must be made abundantly clear that the reason for the pro-
posed reduction (ALAP) is not a change in the basic radiation
protection standards, but only because experience has shown that
it is cheap and feasible to operate light-water-cooled nuclear
power plants at very low levels." He continued, "it must, thus,
0e clear that the reasoning underlying the constant pressure to
reduce dose limits is more of a political than a scientific
nature. The prestigious International Commission on Radiological
Protection (ICRP) agrees with Dr. Taylor and the NCRP, and has
issued a statement indicating that on the basis of their recent
and exhaustive examination of the question, they have decided
r™ onhe5Present standards (essentially those contained in 10
CFR 20 ^>)not only do not have to be lowered, but could in fact
be raised if there was any special reason to do so (6).
I* i^L3tte"'pt t0 3ustify these Proposed new limits as standards,
the EPA quotes from the 1972 Report of the Advisory Committee on
the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR Committee) of
the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council The
quotes presented may leave the mistaken impression that the
BEIR Committee recommends the lowering of present radiation
protection limits. The BEIR Committee never made such a
recommendation, however, and even admitted that "it is not
within the scope of this Committee to propose numerical limits
of radiation exposure"(7). (Furthermore, although these quotes
were taken from the section on Summary and Recommendations,
the point on Radiation Protection Guides quoted was never addressed
in the body of the text, thus leaving the statement open to con-
siderable interpretation and criticism.) In fact, it is the
NCRP which has been chartered by Congress to "collect, analyze,
develop, and disseminate in the public interest information and
recommendations about (a) protection against radiation and (b)
radiation measurements, quantities, and units, particularly
those concerned with radiation protection"(8). in a recent •
report (NCRP 43) entitled "Review of the Current State of
Radiation Protection Philosophy"O), the NCRP thoroughly
investigated all pertinent material on the biological effects
of radiation, including the BEIR Committee report. In it, the
Council takes the firm position that "no change is required at
this time" in the present radiation protection standards. While
continuing to support the ALAP philosophy, it differs with the
BEIR Committee's estimate of somatic damage from low level
exposure, and is in better agreement with the 1972 report of the
United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic
Energy (UNSCEAR) (10). The BEIR Committee Report differs from
the UNSCEAR Report and the NCRP position in presenting numerical
estimates of carcinogenic risk at radiation levels far below the
observed data levels, and it errs in extrapolating "by a factor
greater than 1,000 in dose and by factors from 100 million to
a billion in dose rate, from the level of observed effects to
the levels encountered by the general population"(9). The
NCRP continues to hold the view that "radiogenic cancers at low
doses and low dose rates derived on the basis of linear (pro-
portional) extrapolation from the rising portions of the dose-
incidence curves at high doses and high dose rates cannot provide
realistic estimates of the actual risks from low level, low-LET
radiations, and have such a high probability of overestimating
the actual risk as to be of only marginal value, if any, for
purpose of realistic risk-benefit evaluation." Hence, "such
risk estimates by themselves do not constitute justification for
urgent action to make numerical radiation protection standards
more restrictive than they now are, assuming that the application
of such standards adheres to the basic principle of 'lowest
practicable levels' of dose".
Of the EPA's use of the man-rem concept for purposes of formulating
standards such as the ones proposed, the NCRP says the following:
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A-18
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"The linear dose-effect hypothesis has been coming into
frequent use in analyses in which population exposures
are expressed in the form of person-rem, including doses
of one millirem per year or less to population groups
and doses to individual organs, with linear extrapolation
to damage estimates through the use of the NAS-BEIR
Committee Report values. The indications of a significant
dose rate influence on radiation effects would make
completely inappropriate the current practice of summing
of doses at all levels of dose and dose rate in the form
of total person-rem for purposes of calculating risks to
the population on the basis of extrapolation of risk es-
timates derived from data at high doses and dose rates." *9'
In perhaps its most strongly worded statement to date on the sub
ject, the NCRP certainly appears to disagree with the implementa
tion of the EPA's proposed standards:
"The NCRP wishes to caution governmental policy-making
agencies of the unreasonableness of interpreting or
assuming 'upper limit' estimates of carcinogenic risks
at low radiation levels, derived by linear extrapola-
tion from data obtained at high doses and dose rates,
as actual risks, and of basing unduly restrictive poli-
cies on such an interpretation or assumption. The
NCRP has always endeavored to insure public awareness
of the hazards of ionizing radiation, but it has been
equally determined to insure that such hazards are not
greatly overestimated. Undue concern, as well as
carelessness with regard to radiation hazards, is con-
sidered detrimental to the public interest." (9)
from other sources than in reducing public exposure from
nuclear power plants and fuel reprocessing facilities.
Terrill (ID , for instance, has presented a comparative cost-
benefit analysis for radiation dose reduction from medical
and from reactor-produced exposures. He indicates that then
current (1971) doses to the U.S. population resulting from
reactor plant effluents were 430 man-rem compared to 18.7 million
man-rem from diagnostic x-rays. Yet, he found that costs per
man-rem reduction were about $7.00 for medical exposure (from
the use of automatic collimators on diagnostic x-ray equipment),
compared to his estimated cost of $10,000 to 1 million dollars
per man-rem for reducing reactor-produced radiation. How the
EPA justifies their proposed regulations in the light of such
data is uncertain.
In conclusion, as it has not been demonstrated that the man-rem
doses to the population from the uranium fuel cycle are indeed
harmful, beyond that which can be accepted in light of the
benefits received and compared to the risks from other and
alternate technologies, we feel that the proposed 40 CFR 190 is
unnecessary and scientifically unsound, and should be rescinded.
Both the NCRP and the BEIR Committee agree on one point. With
respect to performing benefit-risk analyses, the NCRP holds that
it "is important to avoid the expenditures of large amounts of
the limited resources of society to reduce very small risks still
further with possible concomitant increase in risks of other
hazards or consequent lack of attention to existing greater
risks". (9) The BEIR Committee concurs in stating "there should
not be attempted the reduction of small risks even further at
the cost of large sums of money that spent otherwise, would
clearly produce greater benefit". In light of the previous com-
ments by the NCRP with respect to performing estimates of somatic
disease based on ultra-conservative assumptions, the EPA does
everyone a disservice by its perfunctory risk analysis which
predicts an expense of $100,000 per assumed cancer reduction
if these proposed standards become effective.
Studies of radiation protection indicate that there are far
greater economies in reducing public (environmental) exposure
-4-
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A-19
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P-13
(1)
(2)
U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Estimates of
9nnn«inLRadiation Dose in the United States, 1960-
2000", USEPA, Rockville, Maryland, 1972.
National Committee on Radiation Protection, "Permis-
sible Dose from External Sources of Radiation, NCRP
Report No. 17", published as National Bureau of Stan-
dards Handbook 59, U. S. Government Printing Office,
(3) Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appen-
dix I, "Numerical Guides for Design Objectives and
Limiting Conditions for Operation to Meet the Criterion
w*L^°r *f ^raCt!Ca1' f°r Radioactive Material in Light-
Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor Effluents".
(4) Lauriston S. Taylor, President, National Council on
Radiation Protection and Measurements, letter to
Nuclear News, November 1973.
(5) Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 20, "Stan-
dards for Protection Against Radiation".
(6) Health Physics, Vol. 24, p. 360, 1973.
(7) Report of the Advisory Committee on the Biological
Effects of Ionizing Radiation, "The •ffects on
Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing
Radiation," National Academy of Sciences-National
Research Council, November 1972, Washington, D.C.
(8) Charter of the National Council on Radiation Protection
and Measurements, p. 39, NCRP 43, see reference 9.
mcpnor °"wRadiation Protection and Measurements
(NCRP) Report 43, "Review of the Current State of Radia-
tion Protection Philosophy", January 15, 1975, Washington,
(10) United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of
in??1* Radiation' "Ionising Radiation, Levels and Effects",
United Nations, New York, 1972.
(11) H«,?;»,T»rri1^' Jr" Paper Presented at the American Public
Chica9°' Illinois
-6-
10912 Nestle Ave.
Northridge, Ca. 91J24
July 23, 1975
Re: Proposed Standards -
Radiation Protection for
Nuclear Power Operations
Director, Criteria and Standards Division (AW 560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
Dear Friend,
I was very hopeful that the new EFA radiation standards based on the
concept of environmental doae commitment" would be meaningful and improve
±,H H ** £pr°teCWO? situation- I « "«y di.tllu.ioned after hiving
studied the EPA proposal. 6
You state, "The prevention of unlimited discharges of krypton 65 to
the environment from the fuel cycle operation is of high priority because
of its potential for significant long-term public health Impact over the
entire world , and then you delay standard setting until 19851 Some
priority!
w <** G*?!g! f!!g °f th* Univors"y °f Rochester School of Medicine ha.
written that the naturally non-radioactive krypton in the atmosphere has
already been so enriched with krypton 85 that people working with krypton
gas have to be protected from exposure to radiation."
x ^JPV88 ProJected 6'900 health effects from krypton 85 (2/3 fatal)
by 2020 (Environmental Radiation Dose Commitment, to Application to th.
Nuclear Power Industry). Is this acceptable to EPA?
Joseph Knox and Kendall Peterson stated in Nuclear Safety Vol. 15-2
P 150, Although methods have b.en developed to retain at least part of th.
krypton 65, to date these techniques are costly and have not been used
commercially."
Other scientists maintain that there is no known method of permanently
containing gases — they ultimately escape into the environment.
ion F? ,1S Providin« 2° Protection to th. public from krypton 85, iodine
129 and tritium. Why notsay so directly?
EPA is failing, as its predecessors failed, to protect the public
from radon emissions. Many oth.r dangerous isotopes are not even mentioned 1
Section 190.10 •standards for normal operations" and section 190.11
Variance for unusual operations" are meaningless for these reasons!
1. There is no way to measure which radiation has entered the human
A-20
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P-14
body or the food chain from "planned discharges" as opposed to "temporary
and unusual operating conditions", or for that matter from fallout or
other sources.
2. People living near nuclear plants are already eating food and
drinking water which give them more than 25 millirems per year.
5. Variances can be granted to all the standards.
4. The standards for krypton 85 and iodine 129 are delayed until
1985 (and if they cannot be met by operating plants, then what?)
Any intelligent citizen reading these proposed standards must conclude
that they were written byj
1. fools
2. the nuclear power industry
5. intimidated civil servants
4. ignoramuses
or5. those who do not care what happens to people
The cancer death rate is increasine by \% a year. One of five deaths
of those over 45 and under 14 is due to cancer or leukemia. Some of these
deaths are from radiation. What increase in deaths is acceptable to EPA
in exchange for nuclear power?
Sincerely,
Dorothy Boberg
COMMITTEE CORRESPONDENCE
J. M. Selby
Battelle-Nor-thwest
P.O. Box 999
Richland, WA 99352
July 23, 1975
Director
Criteria & Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D. C. 20460
Dear Sir:
The proposed Part 190 of 40 CFR, "Environmental Radiation Standards for Nuclear
Power Operations" and the Draft Environmental Statement, "Environmental Radi-
ation Protection Requirements for Normal Operations of Activities in the
Uranium Fuel Cycle" have been reviewed by members of the State & Federal
Legislation Committee of the Health Physics Society. We appreciate the op-
portunity to provide our comments.
Our comments are addressed primarily to the Draft Environmental Statement; how-
ever, generally it is our opinion that the issuance of Part 190 regulations is
premature since the Environmental Statement from which these regulations stem
is still in draft and problems associated with that draft have not been resolved.
It appears that the Draft Statement is an excellent example of a government agency
pretending to place reliance on the relationship between population dose and po-
tential health effects as assumed in the BEIR Report1, contrary to the recommen-
dations of NCRP Report #432. The following paragraph is taken from page 4 of
that report.
"The NCRP wishes to caution governmental policy-making agencies
of the unreasonableness of interpreting or assuming "upper limit"
estimates of carcinogenic risks at low radiation levels, derived
by linear extrapolation from data obtained at high doses and dose
rates, as actual risks, and of basing unduly restrictive policies
on such an interpretation or assumption. The NCRP has always en-
deavored to insure public awareness of the hazards of ionizing
radiation, but it has been equally determined to insure that such
hazards are not greatly overestimated. Undue concern, as well as
carelessness with regard to radiation hazards, is considered detri-
mental to the public interest."
A-21
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Director
Criteria & Standards Division
-2-
July 23, 1975
Director
Criteria & Standards Division
-3-
July 23, 1975
The proposed action by the EPA is opposed to the position taken by the NCRP
which recommends, particularly in regard to extrapolated cancer risk, that no
change in radiation protection standards be made pending further review and
evaluation of additional data that has become available since the 1972 UNSCEAR3
and BEIR Committee Reports were published. It is of continuing concern to
professional health physicists that the Environmental Protection Agency is
proposing actions which are contrary to the evaluations and recommendations
of independent and recognized authoritative entities in this field of science.
EPA generally presents the case as if adopting these standards will in fact
and without question, reduce total health effects through the year 2000, by'
1000 as compared to what would occur based on present 10 CFR 50 Appendix I
limits. Emphasis on the theoretical nature of that calculation is needed
especially since the statement published in the Federal Register4 as a pre-
lates'3 (phei23V°Sed ^ ^ "^ ^ lnCluded 3S APPendix to the °raft Statement
"However, the environmental models used for making these assess-
ments, while useful for making estimates of potential health
impact, are not considered to be so well-defined as to allow
standards for populations to be expressed directly in terms re-
quiring their explicit use."
Interestingly, if one makes a calculation using the argument EPA developed, one
can conclude that NRC's 10 CFR 50 Appendix I Sta; Jards are resulting in the
" Snnn °f ""^ 13°'°00 (%9°%) °f the P°tentlal heal'h effects through the
year 2000 as compared to what would occur based on present FRC guidance for the
maximum individual. One might question whether the cost and effort to produce
another 1 000 reduction makes sense at all, especially since no apparent atten-
tion is given to the relative impact of U. S. activities as part of a world-wide
nuclear economy.
It should be noted that the EPA, prior to proposing a reduction in the radiation
standard, estimated5 the environmental radiation doses caused by the nuclear
electric power production process to be less than 1% of the natural radiation
d°S9nnn ^ ^ 2°°°- In thls earlier "port EPA estimated for the years 1960
to 2000 that the per capita dose to the population would actually decrease
K ? vJ °thCr hand f°r the Same period it: was estimated the annual
whole body doses to the U. S. population from occupational exposure from
industrial practice would increase by 2-1/2 times. The Draft Environmental
Statement fails to evaluate the potential occupational dose impact of the
proposed action in further increasing the concentration of radioactive materials
in industrial practice; which from EPA reports, appears to be a significant source
or population exposure.
Particularly disturbing and worthy of additional comment is the position EPA takes
relative to C. From the tables of potential health effects, it is clear that
a case has been made for ^C being the principal radionuclide of concern with
current operating practices. For some reason, after developing this point it
is not pursued and the position has been taken that 14C control and retention can
be addressed at a later date. The single most important contribution the Draft
Impact Statement makes may be in presenting the long-term J1*C problem. If the
data are correct and the presentation is representative of reality, then the
Impact Statement has shown an area where the development of improved control
systems can make a significant reduction in the theoretically calculated health
effects.
The proposed five year delay before reviewing and amending the proposed standards
seems to us to be completely untenable, not only because of the indicated 1J»C
problem, but also because of the potential impact on proposed nuclear energy
centers. It may be true, as stated in the Draft Statement, that such centers
are not apt to be in full operation for 10 years or more, but planning and
decision-making are underway now. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, for
example, is required to submit a report to Congress in October 1975 on the
comparative impacts of integrated vs. dispersed fuel cycle facilities. Any
.realistic evaluation of the impact of the proposed standards must take into
consideration any effective limitations on the nuclear energy center concept.
unSUPported ^sumptions made, perhaps the most questionable is
- be
"diation
r e°"aYloSw°ansSlble I? U?**""
so incomplete and subject to cnang^ ^t itlef "J" ^ v^^ *"" baSe ls
pounded these difficulties in two ways Not o^vh "* *£" tl" E?A haS COm~
the body other than thyroid. Since the ra"tln °f S± ^ °rganS °f
lon.bip to rel.tlv,
. „.„„ th,n
Utt
A-22
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Director
Criteria & Standards Division
-4-
July 23, 1975
-5-
standards to the lowest value that is practicable. Certainly standards and
guidance contained in FRC Report No. I6, ICRP Publication No. 97, NCRP Report
No. 39«, and 10 CFR 50 Appendix I are good examples of "external source of
standards or guidance" for control of exposure including the "environmental
point of view".
We recommend the delay of adoption of proposed 40 CFR 190 until the points above
including the "*C and nuclear energy center issues have been resolved and in-
corporated in the approved Environmental Statement.
Very truly yours,
C 7] I - ~N - / /' :
^ y In - ! " -L u *-"j
J. M. Selby, Chairman
State & Federal Legislation Committee
JMS:lsp
cc: Paul L. Ziemer, President, Health Physics Society
Committee Members
References
^he Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation.
Report of the Advisory Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radia-
tion, National Academy of Sciences - National Research Council (November, 1972).
2NCRP, Review of the Current State of Radiation Protection Philosophy NCRP
Report No. 43 (1975).
3Ionizing Radiation: Levels and Effects. A Report of the United Nations
Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation to the General Assembly
United Nations (1972).~~
^Environmental Protection Agency, 40CFR190 "Environmental Radiation Protection
for Nuclear Power Operations: Proposed Standards," Federal Register, Vol. 40
No. 104, May 29, 1975, p. 23421.
5USEPA, Estimates of Ionizing Radiation Doses in the United States 1960-2000,
ORP/CSD 72-1 (1972). ~ ~~
Background Material for the Development of Radiation Protection Standards.
FRC Report No. 1, Federal Radiation Council (1960).
7Radiation Protection: Recommendations of the International Commission on
Radiological Protection. ICRP Publication No. 9 (1965).
BBasic Radiation Protection Criteria. NCRP Report No. 39, National Council on
Radiation Protection and Measurements (1971).
A-23
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M |p ID) ID)
IKJ lb 1A\ IT
P-15
National Council on Radiation Protection
and Measurements
7910 WOODMONT AVENUE, SUITE 1016, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20014 AREA CODE (3011 657-2652
LAURISTON S. TAYLOR, President
E. DALE TROUT, Vice President
W. ROGER NEY, Executive Director
July 24, 1975
Director
Criteria and Standards Division
(AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D. C. 20460
Dear Sir:
The Board of Directors of the National Council on Radiation
Protection and Measurements (NCRP) has reviewed the proposed standards
(40 CFR Part 190) which the Environmental Protection Agency published
in the Federal Register, Volume 40, No. 104 on May 29, 1975, and we
are availing ourselves of your invitation for comments.
The dose limits which you proposed in subpart B, paragraph 190.10
are substantially lower than the dose limits proposed for individual
members of the public not occupationally exposed as given in NCRP
Report 39 under paragraph 245. However, paragraphs 178 and 179 in
NCRP Report 39 also recommend that any radiation be kept at a level
that is as low as practicable. This admonition was never intended to
lead to the setting of new standards lower than those exemplified by
the maximum permissible dose equivalents (mpd). The mpd values are
believed to be adequate for reasonable protection of any individual.
The admonition "as low as practicable" was made to discourage the
development of any policy by which radiation workers or members of the
public would be indiscriminately exposed at the mpd level. It was
intended to force discretion on those controlling the source of radiation.
The limits you propose may be consistent with the capabilities of
control technology and may possibly be achieved without undue
expenditures, although both of these concepts must necessarily remain
somewhat vague.
- 2 -
As such, the limits may represent an appropriate determination of
what is as low as practicable. However, we are concerned about the
substitution of regulatory controls for the discretion we feel is best
exercised by those responsible for irradiation of workers or members of
the public. The distinction should certainly be made between the use of
limits for design and control purposes on the one hand, as compared to
the basic standards on the other hand. The NCRP and the ICRP have been
independently studying the question of exposure of the population to
ionizing radiation and at the moment there appears to be little
likelihood that either organization can find scientific or technical
justification for changing their currently published values.
We find ourselves in decided disagreement with some of the premises
you state. NCRP Report 43 stresses the serious limitations of linear
extrapolations of dose-effect relations. Since the assumption of such
linearity is implicit in the concept of the "person-rem" we deprecate
its use and advise reconsideration of your announced intention to employ
it in future formulation of standards. Furthermore, while the assumption
of linearity between dose equivalent of the order of 1 rem and of a few
millirem is uncertain, the assumption of linearity between doses of the
order of 100 rem and of 1 rem is even more uncertain particularly in the
case of low LET radiations. The implication that a dose equivalent of
1 rem will result in some 750 major impairments per 10 population is
based upon such an extrapolation and its validity is at best conjectural.
The Environmental Protection Agency should become aware of increasing
doubts regarding such calculations within the very group of scientists
who have produced the experimental data upon which the calculations are
based.
.-•'"jjincerely yours,
Lauriston S. Taylor
LST:hr
A-24
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P-16
Comments on
Draft Environmental Statement
Environmental Radiation Protection Requirements
for Normal Operations of Activities in the Uranium
Fuel Cycle (May 1975)
and Federal Register Vol. 40, No. 104
1. The NRC and its predecessor, AEC, has a magnificent record of attention to
the environment on the matter of routine emissions of radioactivity. This is
acknowledged in your document (and could easily be further demonstrated) and
indeed much of your proposed rule is a codification of their standards. The
only exception is the requirement for krypton retention at fuel reprocessing
plants.
NRC has been studying this problem intensively (indeed all EPA information
on it seems to be derived from their studies) and has been contemplating a
krypton retention requirement. It therefore seems inappropriate for EPA to
"jump the gun" on this and 'force the hand" of NRC.
It should be noted that the situation regarding fuel reprocessing is a
very delicate one at this time, and there may well be subtle'ties that EPA is
overlooking as regards the impact of this rule-making. We should like to urge
EPA to check carefully with NRC on whether these rules are acceptable.
2. In this action, EPA seems to be "penny-wise and pound foolish". To cite one
example within EPA jurisdiction, the average American gets a hundred times
more radiation from building materials than he will ever get from the nuclear
energy industry. It therefore seems inappropriate for EPA to worry more about
the former, which is receiving no other regulatory attention, than about the
latter which is being competently handled by NRC. For example, some building
stones give 50 mrem per year to occupants more than others; shouldn't EPA
restrict the use of the former, or at least issue warnings about it?
continued ...
A-25
Page 2
There are, as is well known, far larger "fish to be caught" in radiation
problems outside of EPA jurisdiction, especially in medical and dental x-rays.
If EPA is interested in limiting radiation exposure, wouldn't it be wiser to
consider the problem as a whole and exert its influence on other agencies and
on Congress to this end. For example, a requirement on use of lead aproniover
the body for x-rays of the head, arms, or legs would save hundreds of times more
radiation exposure than this rule-making, and would be far cheaper.
3. The section (p. 20, 21) justifying use of the linear - no threshold - dose rate
independent model for estimating health effects gives the impression that this
model represents the average thinking of biomedical experts. This is clearly
not the case. The principal support for it, as referenced in the EPA document,
has come from the BEIR Report, but that report clearly states that it is a
conservative assumption, much more likely to over-estimate than to under-estimate
the effects. In fact it is our understanding that only two members of the 20
member BEIR committee strongly favored use of this model, and none thought it
was not sufficiently conservative.
The U.S. National Committee on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP)
has strongly criticized this model (NCRP Report No. 43) as grossly over-estimating
effects of low levels of radiation. The United Nations Scientific Committee on
Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) has pointedly refused to accept it as a
method of estimating risks.
In view of this situation, it would seem appropriate for EPA to state
that these rules "might possibly save lives" rather than "will save lives."
4. In estimating lives saved by Kr sc retention, there is no mention that 94 percent
of these lives would be non-American. Clearly it should not be implied that
we are unconcerned about killing people in foreign lands, but when one is
putting a dollar value on human life as is done in the EPA report, it should be
kept in mind that we could save many times more lives in underdeveloped countries
continued
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Page 3
with about $1000 per capita worth of food or medical supplies.
In fact, for these people the calculations of radiation effects are
grossly exaggerated because they are based on U.S. life expectancy. In a
country where life expectancy is 45 years the number of radiation induced cancers
per man-rem would probably be about three times smaller.
Hans A. Bethe
Professor of Physics
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY
Thomas Connolly
Professor of Mech. Eng.
Stanford University
Stanford, CA
Bernard L. Cohen
Professor of Physics
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
5. The EPA estimates are based on 700 x lo"6 serious health effects per man-rem.
It is shown in the attached paper that this is much higher than is justified; that
paper was sent to EPA several weeks ago, and no objections to it have been raised.
(This item was added by B. L. Cohen at the last minute, and there was insufficient
time to check it with the other two co-signers.
Conclusions of the BEIR and UNSCEAR Reports on Radiation Effects per
Man-rem
Bernard L. Cohen
University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260
ABSTRACT
It is shown that the BEIR Report estimate of cancer risk is 180x1O"6 deaths
per man-rem irrespective of how the dose is administered. For genetic defects,
the BEIR Report gives 33 to 800 x 10"6 per man-rem whereas the UNSCEAR Report
gives 135 x 10" per man-rem to the entire population.
A-26
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1 2
The BEIR and UNSCEAR Reports were prepared fay very prestigeous committees,
and many groups working on radiation effects claim to use their conclusions.
However, the numbers they derive from these Reports seem to vary considerably.
For example, the cancer deaths per man-rem from the BEIR Report is taken by the
Lrwironmental Protection Agency to be 200 x 10" whereas the AEC Reactor Safety
s^ijay used 100 x 10 . The numbers used for genetic defects vary even more widely.
It is the purpose of this paper to clarify this matter.
We begin with cancer risk. There are several different calculations of
u-v:; risk In the BEIR Report but none of them is accepted in the final conclusion.
The final judgment of the Committee, as expressed in the Summary of the Report,
is "an additional exposure of the U.S. population of 5 rem per 30 years would
cause approximately 6000 cancer deaths annually." The dose rate given there
corresponds to 167 mrem per year (5000^30), or a population dose of 33xl06 man-rem
Q
per year based on a 2x10 population. The risk per man-rem is therefore
•C000v33xl06 = ISOxlO"6 cancer deaths per man-rem.
It may be argued that this is for an equilibrium situation from chronic
exposure whereas accidents involve a single large exposure. However, with the
linearity hypothesis, this can make no difference. To prove this, we may proceed
-------
P-17
defects. Maintaining the population of the US would require about 3 x 106 live births
per year (close to the present rate) so we should expect about 900 genetic defects
per year per rem of exposure to males prior to conception. If all Americans were
exposed to an additional 100 mrem/year, a population exposure of 2 x 107 man-rem
per year, the average father would have accumulated 3 rem prior to conception so there
would be 2700 additional genetic defects per year. The number of genetic defects
per man-rem is then 2700*2x1O7 = 135 x 10"6. This is very close to the logarithmic
median of the range given by the BEIR Report (160 x 10"6), so it seems reasonable
to accept a number between them such as 150 x 10"6 genetic defects per man-rem.
REFERENCES
1. The Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation
(BEIR Report), National Academy of Sciences, Nov. 1972.
2. Ionizing Radiation: Levels and Effects (Report of United Nations Scientific
Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation ) U.N. (New York), 1972.
130 Endeavor Dr.
Corte Madera , Cf).
July 27, 1975
Director of Critical Studies
Office cf Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Hashinton, D. C. 20460
Dear Sir:
I am writing to express my concern and shock
after reading how you have set up the new radiation
standards. It is very clear from reading your
recent report (40 CFR Part 190) that cost and
economics are of a higher priority than that of
preserving the life and health of human beings.
You state en page 6 of that report, "§ince poten-
tial effects from radiation exposure are assumed to
occur at any level of exposure, it is not possible
to specify solely on a health basis an acceptable
level of radiation exposure for either individuals
or populations; It is necessary to balance the
health risks asrociated with any level of exposure
against the costs cf achieving that level." That
says to me that you are taking it upon yourselves
the perogative to inflict injury, cancer, and death
on thousands cf people in our country all for
the sake of making electricity and nuclear rowerll
Your report inplies that there is no safe limit of
radiation, •"r. John Gcfman's studies coincide with
your position here. How can you then set standards
as you have and work under the name of the
Environmental Protection Agency?
Your basic premise that nuclear power is
absolutely necessary for our country to function
is a questionable premise. People's energy con-
sumption has dropped dramatically the last 18 months,
My family's energy consun-ption is down 25% from
1973. We do not need nuclear power. Jhe risks
far outweigh the benefits.And as I and others
work to educate people on the effects of radiation
A-28
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on their lives and the lives of generations to come,
there will emerge a large voice to say we will not
accept the risks that you feel are acceptable.
I urge you to reconsider the whole issue.
Are you willing to subject your life and those of
your family and children to cancer?
Ellen F. Beans,
mother of 2 daughters
member of Project Survival
SIERRA CLUB
P-18
Mills Tower, San Francisco 94104
Nuclear Energy Policy Subcommittee
B. E. Watt, Ch.
1447 45 th
Los Alamos, N.M. 87544
July 23, 1975
Director, Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
Dear Sir:
Comments offered below are made in response to the Federal Register
notice on p 23420 of Vol. 40, #104, dated May 29, 1975 and titled
40CFR Part 190 FRL 376-1, Environmental Radiation Protection for Nuclear
Power Operations, Proposed Standards.
Using data included in the AEC's Final Environmental Statement WASH-
1258 it is clear that the Environmental Protection Agency's proposed
standards would have major impact on both national and worldwide environmental
conditions, therefore an Environmental Statement is needed.
Life on Earth has developed with most organisms exposed to the
natural radioactive background. Most humans receive a radiation dose from
natural sources in the rang* 80 - 200 mrem/yr (from ORP/SID-72-1), which
can be taken as typical for organisms living on Earth's surface. For brevity
in this letter the natural background will be taken to be 100 mrem/yr. The
proposed standard would allow increases of 251 for the whole body and any
organ other than the thyroid, and a 751 increase to the thyroid. Claarly
this would be a major increase over normal exposures.
Some of the radionuclides proposed for release would persist in the
biosphere for long periods. Our inadequate understanding of the effects of
low radiation dose rates and the probability of significant biological
concentration factors in many organisms requires that we not pollute our
world without more knowledge of the effects that would be produced.
Responses given in the FES WASH-1258 show that the limit of 5 mrem/yr
can be met with current technology. Most objections to meeting the AEC's
proposed 5 mrem/yr limit were made on the basis of cost and the assertion
that the "cost/benefit" ratio was too high.
Using a value $100/man-rem for radiation damage and the proposed
25 mrem/yr exposure level, each individual receiving that dose suffers a
radiation damage loss of $2.50 per year.
A relatively simple and reliable calculation can be given for the
case of krypton 85 (85Kr) releases. Most of the 85Kr remains in the
A-29
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P-19
atmosphere, and mixing distributes the gas throughout the troposphere.
Nixing between the northern and southern hemispheres may require a few
years, but the
non-uniform distrib
pers
of $3*9 x 10 to humans, and an unknown amount of damage to other organisms.
An accurate estimate of the cost of 85Kr capture and storage is not available
so the "cost /benefit" ratio can't be computed. It seems probable that the
cost of °^Kr control would be less than $4 x 10?.
world-wide man-rein product is only slightly affected by a
stribution. World population is approximately 3.9 x 10'
rsons, so a world-wide radiation dose of 0.1 mrem would cause damages
$3*9 x 10 to humans, and an unknown amount of damage to other organ
A radioactive 8^Kr concentration of 10~H Ci/m3 would give a dose rate
of approximately 0.1 mrem/yr and would be achieved by distributing 3.4 x 10'
Ci of ^Cr uniformly throughout the atmosphere. At the proposed rate of
release (5 x 10 Ci/Gw-yr) the dose rate would reach 0.1 mrem/yr after
energy production of 670 Gw-yrs. Using the energy production rates given
in Table 2.3.1 on pages 2.3-5 of the Draft Environmental Statement WASH-1539
the dose rate of 0.1 mrem/yr would be surpassed in 1983, and the dose
commitment at that time would be 1.5 mrem. The corresponding world-wide
damage commitment would be $6 x 10 . Clearly restrictions on the rate of
release of 85Kr will be needed before 1983 and the permissible rate should
not exceed 2.2 x 106 Ci/yr for the entire world. The United States' share
of such releases should probably not exceed 10^ Ci/yr. More accurate
calculations for all significant isotopes are clearly needed, and can best
be discussed in the proposed Environmental Statement.
We request that the Environmental Protection Agency:
(1) set whole body dose rates no higher than 5 mrem/yr and thyroid dose
rates no higher than 15 mrem/yr for the general public, pending new regulations
to be basvd on a review of WASH-1258 and a new DES as proposed below.
(2) limit releases of long-lived radionuclides to values such that the
combined dose rates produced by them does not exceed 1 mrem/yr to any
organism.
(3) follow the procedures specified in the National Environmental Policy
Act to propose, and get public comments on, permissible radiation exposure
rates for individuals near site boundaries and for larger groups which may
be irradiated by releases of specific radionuclides including *T, C, 85Rr
and 131I.
The DES should be broad enough to provide exposure estimates for
essentially all species of flora and fauna. Areas considered may be different
for each radionuclide, depending in its half-life and transport properties,
and should be large enough to include at least 901 of the total "organism-rad"
dose produced by proposed releases.
Economic damage estimates should be provided wherever possible.
Comparison of the social costs to produce a given amount of electric
energy by nuclear fission and by alternate means, particularly by coal
fired power plants, under EPA's proposed rules should be provided.
Respectfully submitted,
PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP
2DDO P STREET. N. W.
SUITE 711
WASHINGTON. D. C. 2OD36
(2O2) B33 97OQ
July 28, 1975
Director
Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20160
Dear Sirs:
I wish to submit some rather brief comments on the Environmental
Protection Agency's (EPA) proposed radiation standards for the nuclear
fuel cycle C40 PR 23^420). I regret that other demands have prevented
me from submitting more detailed comments.
1. The proposed EPA standards would reduce the allowed annual
dose to a member of the general population from 500 mrem (or 170 mrem,
depending upon interpretation) to 25 mrem whole body dose. In a
general philosophical sense, this action should be commended. At a
time when the Administration seems bent on rolling back or postponing
environmental standards in other areas—as evidenced by proposed
amendments to the Clean Air Act, the proposed automobile emission
standards moratorium, the strip mining veto, and questionable appointments-
it is encouraging that in one area, standards are being tightened.
I will, however, withhold comment at this time on the absolute
adequacy of the proposed standards. Others concerned with the public
interest, and with greater expertise than myself, will be submitting
detailed comments on the standards' adequacy.
2. There is one aspect of the standards which is disturbins.
The language of the proposed standards states these standards are for
"planned" releases of radioactivity. There are two aspects of this
language which are bothersome. First, there is no definition of "planned",
Does this mean, for example, that if a licensee releases an excessive
amount of radiation, he can characterize it as "unplanned" and
Dr. Bob E. Watt, Ch. Nuclear Energy Policy
year? Secondly, although EPA has performed an evaluation of the
environmental effects of planned releases, there has not been, to my
knowledge, any evaluation of the effects of unplanned releases. Each
unplanned release appears to be considered a "case closed" with a
utility or Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) announcement that no
persons were injured. There has not been an evaluation of what the
cumulative effects to the environment and the public of all spills,
leaks, and unplanned releases might have been.
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P-20
It would seem that such an evaluation of "unplanned" effects
would be necessary to adequately set standards for "planned" releases.
If the expected unplanned releases would cause significant health
effects, then it would be necessary to compensate by re^i:"' MI* standards
for planned releases. I recommend that the EPA or NH1"1 |» 'Tni*m on
evaluation of the cumulative effects of unplanned releases from the
nuclear fuel cycle. Without such an evaluation, there can be no
assurance that the standards for planned releases will keep the
combined health effects from planned and unplanned releases at
"acceptable" levels. Vi.
Yours truly,
^J^
John Abbotts
A-31
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INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
AGENCE INTERNATIONALE DE L'ENERGIE ATOMIQUE
MEXCflVHAPOAHOE ATEHTC1BO no ATOMHOM 3HEPFMM
ORGANISMO INTERNACIONAL DE ENERGIA ATOMICA
KARNTNER RING II, P.O.BOX 590, A-I011 VIENNA, AUSTRIA
P-21
TELEX: Ot-2645
CABLE: INATOM VIENNA
0/340-8?
P-22
BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY
ASSOCIATED UNIVERSITIES, INC.. UPTON. L.I.. N.Y. 11973
HEALTH PHYSICS & SAFETY DIVISION
TELEPHONE: (514) 345-4210
August 12, 1975
1975-07-28
Dear Bill,
I've recently reviewed your proposed EPA standards for environ-
mental protection for nuclear power operations and would like to
commend you and your staff on a job well done. I believe the
approach you have taken is a step in the right direction and should
be continued.
We have had a problem, however, in understanding how the
estimated cost effectiveness of $ 75/person-rem (cost for implementing
proposed standards) was derived. In the same regard we have had
difficulty in reproducing the cost effectiveness curves in
Part III (Fuel Reprocessing and Waste Management) of your "Environ-
mental Analysis of the Uranium Fuel Cycle".
I would greatly appreciate it if you could provide us with the
assumptions and calculations on which these figures were based.
Thank you very much.
Sincerely yours,
Jerry J. Cohen
Joint IAEA/IIASA
Research Project
Mr. William D. Rowe
Office of Radiation Programs
U.S0 Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, B.C. 20460
United States of America
Dr. William A. Mills, Director
Criteria & Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Protection Programs
Washington DC 20460
Dear Dr. Mills:
Enclosed are comments with regard to the Proposed Standards on
"Environmental Radiation Protection for Nuclear Power Operations",
40 CFR Part 190 as published in the Federal Register on May 29, 1975.
Due to the pressure of other professional responsibilities, I have not
been able to complete them by the indicated end of the comment period.
I remain hopeful that they are not unduly late for consideration.
The indicated intent of the proposed standards is the "protection
of the general public for unnecessary radiation exposures and radio-
active materials in the general environment resulting from the normal
operations of facilities comprising the uranium fuel cycle". Upon
first consideration, such an intent appears commendable and appropriate
to EPA's mandate under Reorganization Plan No. 3. However, a review of
the experience to date and projections from it of future expectations
under the aegis of licensing and regulatory agencies (particularly the
former Atomic Energy Commission and its successor Nuclear Regulatory
Commission), discloses few loopholes involving what might be adjudged
an "unnecessary" exposure of the public that would be closed by the
proposed standards. Additionally, in many specifics the proposed
standards depart from their announced intent to protect "the general
public", and become de facto standards for the protection of individuals
in the immediate vicinity of nuclear facilities. Insofar as this is so,
they seem to me redundant, confusing and to contribute little if any to
meaningful health protection of the general public.
Additionally, in my judgment, the inclusion of specific quantity
release limits in a standard for the protection of the general public
is inappropriate, especially when unaccompanied by any indication of
the environmental pathway model and assumptions insofar as it may mis-
lead the public as to the significance of such releases and of the pro-
tection being afforded by the proposed limitations.
As indicated in the published explanatory preface to the proposed
standards, the current guidance for radiological protection of the
public from nuclear facility operations has had as its primary focus
A-32
INFORMATION OPERATOR (516| 345-2123
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Dr. William A. Mills
August 12, 1975
Dr. William A. Mills
August 12, 1975
the most exposed individual, rather than the limitation of the dose to
the total population from a specific type of activity. However, it
should be observed in this connection that Part 20 "Standards for
Protection Against Radiation" [Paragraph 20.106(e)] does consider a
"suitable sample of an exposed population" and the restriction of
effluents from a given facility if it appears that daily intake by
such a population group of radioactive material, averaged over a
year, would exceed the daily intake from continuous exposure at one-
third of the concentration guides generally corresponding to a whole
body dose of 500 mrem/yr or an individual organ dose of 1,500 mrem/
yr.
The explanatory preface of the proposed standard suggests that
with the anticipated expanded development of the nuclear industry,
it appears as important to consider the potential radiological im-
pact on the surrounding (and in some cases worldwide) population,
as on the most exposed individuals most nearby to a nuclear facility.
In point of fact, effluent discharges from most AEC-NRC licensed or
operated nuclear facilities have been small fractions (a few percent)
of release limits derived from current radiation protection standards
based on direct exposure of individuals in unrestricted areas or con-
centration guides for air, water or foods consumed by the most exposed
nearby individuals.
Of the several steps in the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear power
reactors currently appear to produce the largerst population dose,
and fuel reprocessing facilities the next largest. The other steps,
mining, milling, fabrication and waste disposal seem relatively in-
significant. In the extreme, airborne effluents from a few nuclear
power reactors appear to have produced a few hundred person-rem/year
in the surrounding population with 80 km, and more typically, a few
tens of person-rems. Liquid effluents have been insignificant by
comparison, as a source of general population exposure. By compari-
son, the average yearly dose from naturally occurring radioactivity to
a typical population (1.5 x 10° persons) in the vicinity of a nuclear
power facility is about 2.0 x 10-" person-rems.
After making what appeared to me a strong and convincing argument
for population related standards based on total dose commitment expressed
in person-rems, a complete reversal is made in the explanatory preface to
support individual dose and quantity release limits. It is stated
that, "the environmental models used in deriving these (population
dose) assessments, while useful for making estimates of potential
health impact, are not considered to be so well-defined as to allow
standards for the populations to be expressed directly in terms re-
quiring their explicit use". In the absence of supporting evidence,
this appears an arbitrary judgmentjwhich effectively circumvents the
OMB Direction of 12/7/73 limiting EPA's authority to settling standards
for the "total amount of radiation in the environment from all facil-
ities". It is difficult to comprehend why the environmental models
used by EPA to estimate health effects with seeming great confidence
(lacking any indication of range) in undergirding reports such as
EPA 520/4-73-002, EPA 520/9-73-003, cannot be used with equal con-
fidence to set population standards directly in person-rems.
As indicated in Table IV of the enclosed paper, "Reactor Effluents:
As Low as Practicable or as Low as Reasonable" (Nuclear News. 15:11,
November 1972), other countries have made population dose allocation for
the nuclear fuel cycle. I cannot understand why this was not done in
the U.S. several years ago. On one hand, it would have made sense as
a precautionary measure to prevent any one sector (including the nuclear
power fuel cycle) from utilizing the entire general population 30 year
dose limit of 5.0 rem, as recommended by the ICRP. On the other, it was
obvious from the early experience of the industry that population doses
occasioned by it were small fractions of the ICRP limit. In my judgment
a reasonable allocation based on this experience would have cost very
little, and would have removed any basis for the unfounded inferences
made widely a few years ago by Drs. Gofman and Tamp1in, that nuclear
power might produce a U.S. population-wide exposure "at the FRC limit
of 170 millirems per year" and thereby produce 16,000 or 32,000 or
even 104,000 cancer deaths per year.
By setting forth somewhat better founded and somewhat less
sensational numbers of "health effects" without careful qualification
that under the circumstances of the assumption of the linear hypothesis
these are very likely upper limit estimates for which the lower limit
may approach zero , in my judgment EPA is playing the Gofman-Tamp1in
game of using the public's hyperphobia of radiation and radioactivity
for its own ends. Numbers of health effects, when set forth without
this qualification, and with no attempt to place them in the context of
their overall prevailing incidence, seem more calculated to alarm than
to inform as a basis for sound public policy.
For many, if not most nuclear effluent releases, the most exposed
individual is immediate or adjacent to the originating facility site
boundary. Thus, although the proposed standards are supposedly intended
to "assure the protection of the public from unnecessary radiation ex-
posures"; when set in the form of limits "applicable to any member of
the public", they become de facto facility standards. Via the back
door, they put EPA in the business of superseding the judgment of NRC
on matters in which the latter appears to have more competence by
virtue of first-hand knowledge, experience and staff to make pertinent
in depth analyses. As illustration, I suggest the impressive detail
in the AEC Regulatory Staff (now NRC) backup materials for the Appendix
I proceedings.
In the prefatory explanation of the proposed standards it is
furthermore argued that, "it is inequitable to permit doses to
specific individuals (presumably those who reside close to a nuclear
site) that might be substantially higher than those to other members
of the public from other radionuclides. Although this argument has
egalitarian appeal, I find that it does not seem to be uniformly
applied as an overall EPA protection philosophy. In Table V of the
enclosed paper, "Comparing Effluent Releases from Nuclear and Fossil-
Fueled Power Plants" (Nuclear News. 16:4, April 1974), I have shown
that using average meteorology, yearly average air concentrations
of SOo and NOX approach or exceed EPA "population" air quality stan-
dards at the site boundary of large coal- and oil-fueled power plants.
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Dr. William A. Mills
August 12, 1975
Dr. William A. Mills
August 12, 1975
Clearly, the most nearby individuals are at greater health risk from
these agents than populations more distant. In my oral testimony of
6/6/74 to the AEC Commissioners, a copy of which is also enclosed, in
the section on "Risk Comparisons" (pages 6-7) I have also commented
specifically on the incongruity of holding radiation risks to a much
lower level than those from power plant effluents (at current esti-
mates) and on the inconsistency of limiting site boundary radiation
exposures to acceptable "general population" levels, as compared to
the generally prevailing attitude for conventionally hazardous tech-
nological activities.
The specific limits proposed in the standards, 25 millirems to
the whole body, 75 millirems to the thyroid, and 25 millirems to any
other organ, appear reasonable and achievable, if applied on a general
population, rather than individual basis. However, in my judgment, it
would be desirable to have these limits related to the benefit, the
amount of installed power capacity (or that produced). In the paper,
"As Low as Practicable or As Low as Reasonable", I have proposed such
a scheme which I commend to your attention.
Although not as qualified to speak to the availability, practic-
ability and economics of radwaste control technology as I am to envi-
ronmental radioactivity; as indicated above, I have serious reservat-
ions about the wisdom or appropriateness of including quantity release
limits in an environmental radiation protection standard. In my judg-
ment, the pertinent issue is the dose to the population and not the
amounts released. The derivation of quantity release limits from the
latter necessitates an environmental model and many assumptions about
pathways, transfer co-efficients, discrimination factors and uptake
rates. The current poor definition of these models, is alluded to in
the EPA argument against directly stated population dose limits. It
seems to me that the same argument applies against quantity release
limits (with the possible exception of 85Kr, for which the environment-
al model is least complicated).
Specifically with regard to "Kr, from my calculations I assume
that the intent of the proposed standard is that it be substantially
removed from fuel reprocessing plant off-gas streams, and contained for
"long-term" waste disposal. I would encourage such removal and contain-
ment for the reason that the anticipated atmospheric concentrations of
°5Kr by the year 2000 without such measures could be a major annoyance
in low background counting, long before they could pose a significant
radiological problem. I question the need or cost-effectiveness of the
application of such removal technology to power reactor effluent gas
streams.
129
Although I has an effective "infinite" half-life, with regard
to the human time scale, even without any removal the total amounts
created by the nuclear fuel cycle during the next century seem small
relative to the total world-wide inventory of long-lived naturally oc-
curring radioactivity on or near the earth's surface. However, since
iodine removal at or close to 103 is commonly employed for the removal
of 131I from gas streams, the cleanup of ^^I from fuei reprocessing
plant off gas streams by a comparable factor should be practicable.
However, this is more sensible with a view toward minimizing local con-
centrations, than with the questionable one of "containing" 129j for
even an appreciable fraction of its half life.
The proposed release limit for long-lived transuranics seems extra-
ordinarily restrictive, considering the experience with them to date.
Unclassified references (i.e. G.P. Dix and T.J. Dohry, "Critical Para-
meters in Plutonium Safety Evaluations", Health Physics. 22:6, 569-574,
June, 1972) suggest that about 5 x 10^ Ci of ^-^Pu and lesser amounts of
other transuranics have been distributed over the surface of the earth
as a result of atmospheric weapons testing. The current Northern Hemi-
spheric deposition of 239Pu is about 2 nCi/m2 (or about 2 x 10* Ci over
the land area of the U.S.). A related 18-year (1954-1972) dose to the
lung of 15 mrem has been calculated (B.C. Bennett, "Fallout 23^Pu Dose
to Man", HASL-278, 1/1/74). The release of 0.5 mCi/Gw(e>-year from ~
1,000 Gw capacity for 50 years, if uniformly deposited over the U.S.
would accumulate to 2,500 Ci. Scaling from the fallout Pu experience,
a 50 year dose to the lungs of about 5 mrem would be anticipated. This
seems a considerable overestimation, since most of the 23^Pu released
at ground level or from stacks of AEC facilities appears to have remain-
ed deposited nearby, so that the EPA assumption of U.S.-wide distribut-
ion of analogous materials from the nuclear fuel cycle seems question-
able. If, as claimed by EPA, a standard of 0.5 Ci/Gw(e)-year is "reas-
onably achievable using currently available control methods", then well
and good. But, it does not seem a goal worth pushing very hard toward,
when one considers that the alpha dose to the basal cells at the bronchi
from the inhalation of naturally occurring 2^2Rn range from 280-1,490
mrem/yr (Table 15, Vol 1, UNSCEAR, 1972).
It is indicated that "the standards represent the lowest radiation
levels at which the Agency has determined that the costs of control are
justified by the reduction in health risk." The assumptions of the lin-
ear hypothesis and of BEIR risk-estimates is acknowledged. Obviously,
the evaluation of benefit (health risk reduction) achieved under the pro-
posed standard is crucially dependent on the validity of the above assum-
ptions. In a recent paper, "Radioactive Effluent Releases and Public
Acceptance at Nuclear Facility Sites" [Siting of Nuclear Facilities. IAEA
SM-188 (1975)], I have reviewed evidence for doubting the pertinence of
this assumption and of the BEIR risk estimates. It is my belief that
scientific standards setting groups may soon give official recognition to
the evidence of a reduced risk from low-dose, low dose-rate radiations
(such as those occasioned by effluents from the nuclear power cycle).
Since there seems no current urgency for the proposed EPA standards, I
would urge that they be delayed until these pronouncements are made or
until the need does seem more urgent.
Two orders of magnitude greater whole-body environmental doses to
the U.S. population are expected from natural radiation than those anti-
cipated from the nuclear power activities energy in the year 2000 (see
Table 11-26, ORF/CSD 72-1). If EPA is concerned about reducing hypo-
thetical health effects in the general population from low-level radia-
tion, then it seems to me that a correspondingly higher priority should
be given to this background and the related health effects than to
nuclear power cycle. Although natural radiation is a "given" there are
obvious strategies (choice of location, building materials, diet) that
could minimize such exposures. Until their cost-benefit effectiveness
is examined, I am not convinced that the promulgation of standards to
limit small increments from nuclear power are where EPA should be
putting its efforts. In this connection I call attention to the lack
A-34
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Dr. William A. Mills
August 12, 1975
of discernible health effects in populations living in high background
areas within the U.S., as revealed by a recent study of the state by
state incidence of cancer in the U.S. between 1950 and 1967 (N. Frigerio
et al, ANL/ES-26 (1973), which is also summarized in the above paper.
Beyond the questionable priority which the proposed standards have
within overall priorities for the protection of the public from unnecess-
ary exposure to radiation, I suggest that they are even more questionable
when viewed within the overall context of public health priorities. In
my judgment, it is not sufficient simply to make a cost-effectiveness
assessment within the narrow confines of radiological health. Rather
such standards and the expenditures they may occasion should be viewed
within the context of the overall level of risk-benefit for the total
spectrum of health standards, risks and expenditures. The following
table of representative U.S. public health and safety risks is illustra-
tive. The projected hypothetical risk and mortality from nuclear power
(which may be exaggerated at the BEIR dose-effect risk estimates),
appears to be orders of magnitude less than most (if not every) other
health risk for which actual mortality data is available.
As a health physicist who has been involved for a number of years
in public information efforts, I am well aware of the climate of popu-
lar misunderstanding and fear which prevails with regard to radiation
hazards. Clearly, the public is entitled to whatever degree of radia-
tion protection it desires. But it seems to me that the radiation pro-
tection community has a professional obligation to do its best to mini-
mize these fears, to set the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth (as best we perceive it) before the public. In my judgment this
means stating candidly that the present and projected risks from nuclear
power, as influenced by the current ICRP-NCRP-FRC standards, are insig-
nificant relative to a broad spectrum of man-made and naturally occasioned
risks (as enumerated in Table I), and that public expenditures for the
betterment of health might more rewardingly be directed to these areas
than toward still more radiation effluent control technology and environ-
mental monitoring effort.
In summary, let me suggest that however much the proposed standards
wear the "god and motherhood" mantle of protecting the public from un-
necessary radiation exposures; applied to nuclear power it focuses on
an insignificant source of such exposures, and ignores the major sources
of the exposure of the public to radiation. As such, they seem to me
more like a cynical attempt on EPA's part to look good politically than
to offer any meaningful increment of public health protection that
would not occur in the absence of the standards.
Yours truly,
Table I
U.S. Public Health & Safety Risks
Average Annual
Individual Risk
Heart Disease 5 x 10
Cancer 1.5 x 10"
Accidents 6 x 10
Automobile Accidents 2.5 x 10
Suicide 1 x 10"
Air Pollution* 7.5 x 10~
Homocide 5 x 10"
Tuberculosis 3 x 10"
Natural Radiation (130 mR/yr, BEIR) 2.6 x 10"
Electrocution 2 x 10"
X-Rays (~100 mR, linear hypothesis) 2 x 10"
Choking 1.8 x 10"
Natural Disasters 1 x 10"
Nuclear Power, 1,000 Gw(e) reactors 3 x 10
(for average** population dose of
0.15 mR/yr)
-8
Total Approximate
Annual Mortality
1,000,000
300,000
120,000
50,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
6,000
5,200
4,000
4,000
3,600
200
6
About 50% from fossil-fueled power plant effluents.
Table 11-26, ORP/CSD 72-1. An "individual" site boundary of 25 mR/yr can
be projected to produce a somewhat smaller average population dose.
Andrew P. Hull
A-35
-------
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A-37
-------
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
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ihe.
Washington Office
917 15TH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. SOOO5
*°* 7S7-5°°°
664 HAMILTON AVENUE
PALO ALTO, CALIF. 945O1
415 3*7-1080
September 15, 1975
Nev York Office
15 WEST 44TH STREET
NEW YORK, N.Y. 1OOJ6
tl* 869-0150
Director
Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
Re: Draft Environmental Statement, Environmental
Protection Requirements for Normal Operations
in the Uranium Fuel Cycle, and Proposed Regula-
tions to be added to Title 40, Code of Federal
Regulations, "Part 190-Environmental Radiation
Protection Standards for Nuclear Power Plants."
Dear Sir:
Enclosed are the comments of the Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. (NRDC) on the above-captioned matters. If any
questions arise about our comments, do not hesitate to contact us.
We encourage the Environmental Protection Agency to hold meaning-
ful hearings on the proposed regulations and supporting environmental
impact statement. However, in considering whether or not to send a
representative on behalf of NRDC, we will have to weigh carefully the
cost in time and money to attend the hearing compared to the likeli-
hood of enriching and advancing the discussion on the adequacy of
the proposed regulations and environmental impact analysis. We will
also want to know in advance, for instance, the membership of the
Hearing Board, the Board's responsibilities, and the procedures for
the Hearing. In our opinion, the Board should not be closely identi-
fied with the nuclear industry, and the Board should be sympathetic
to citizen participation in the Hearing and the setting of EPA's
standards. We also favor an opportunity for participants to ask EPA
officials and other participants questions, including follow-up
questions.
Additionally, we ask EPA to respond formally to written submis-
sions prior to public hearings. In this way, the public will be
better able to build on a full exchange of information and viewpoints
and will not be reduced to repeating the previously submitted comments,
an exercise that has little substantive value in our view.
A-38
100% Recycled Paper
-------
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
Director
Criteria and Standards Division
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
September 15, 1975
Page two
Finally, we urge EPA to hold at least one hearing on the West
Coast in order to afford a more practical opportunity for participa-
tion by citizen groups and individuals in the West. Hearings in
the East rarely can be attended by western citizens due to the high
expense of travel and the difficulty in making enough tune available.
Sincerely yours,
TRL:gg
Enclosure
664 HAMILTON AVENUE
PALO ALTO, CALIF. Q43O1
415 3*7-1080
Washington Office
917 1JTH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 2OOO5
SOS 737-5000
Terry R. Lash, Ph.D.
Staff Scientist
Comments
Of The
Natural Resources Defense Council
On The
Environmental Protection Agency's
Draft Environmental Statement
ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION PROTECTION
REQUIREMENTS FOR NORMAL OPERATIONS
OF ACTIVITIES IN THE URANIUM FUEL CYCLE
And
PART 190-ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION
PROTECTION STANDARDS FOR NUCLEAR
POWER OPERATIONS
New York Office
15 WEST 44TH STREET
NEW YORK, N.Y. IOOj6
tit 869-0150
Submitted by:
Terry R. Lash, Ph.D.
With the assistance of:
John W. Gofman, M.D., Ph.D.
September 15, 1975
A-39
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
II. THE DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL
f£&%£ssnaiis$ssss: ssssgr1
EF?E??SS N°T ADEQUATELY CONSIDER CUMULATIVE
A. The Entire Uranium Fuel Cycle Must Be
Considered.
1. Uranium Mining
2. Radioactive Waste Management Facilities
a. Low-level waste burial
b. High-level waste disposal
c. Uranium mill tailings
3. Plutonium Recycle
4. Research and Development Facilities
5. Decommissioning of Facilities
B. The Total Health Effects Caused By The
Release of Radionuclides Must Be Estima-
ted For The Entire Period That The
Radionuclides Remain Potentially
Hazardous.
C. The Health Effects On Future Members Of
The General Population Due To Radiation
Exposure Of Nuclear Workers Should Be
Assessed.
THE DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT DOES
AN ADE°-UATE COST-RISK-BENEFIT
III
IV. THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS ARE TOO WEAK, VAGUE
AND DO NOT ADEQUATELY IMPLEMENT THE
12
13
15
17
21
22
26
35
36
37
39
42
46
A. There Are No Procedures Providing For
EPA Review Of The Implementation Of And
Compliance With The Proposed Standards.
Vague And Unduly Restrictive Definitions
Further Limit The Usefullness Of The Pro-
posed Standards.
B.
Uranium Fuel Cycle
Site
Uranium Ore
Member of the Public
Normal Operations
C. The Proposed Standards Should Set Limits
On Total Releases Of All Critical Radio-
nuclides.
1. Carbon-14
2. Radon-222
D. The Scope Of The Proposed Regulations
Should Be Expanded To Include All
Nuclear Fuel Cycles.
E. The Proposed Regulations Should Contain A
Section Limiting Occupational Exposures
That Result In Damage To Future Members
Of The General Population.
F. The Proposed Standards Should Set Limits
On The Total Releases Permissible Due To
Abnormal Operations.
V. CONCLUSION
48
54
55
57
57
58
59
59
61
63
65
66
68
69
A-40
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INTRODUCTION
The Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (WRDC) sub-
mits these comments on the draft environmental impact statement,
Environmental Radiation Protection Requirements for Normal Opera-
tions of Activities in the Uranium Fuel Cycle, and the proposed
regulations, "Part 190—Environmental Radiation Protection
Standards for Nuclear Power Operations," prepared by the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (SPA).-' The draft state-
ment analyzes proposed limits for radiation exposure of the
general public and the release of some radionuclides to the en-
vironment due to the planned operation of the nuclear power
industry. For the reasons stated in detail below, we believe that
the draft statement and the course of inquiry reflected therein
do not satisfy the requirements of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970).
Most importantly, we submit that EPA, in preparing this
impact statement and proposing new regulations, must first con-
i/ 40 Fed. Reg. 23240 et seq., May 29, 1975. These comments sup-
pi ement~NRDC' s July 1, 1974, submission in response to EPA's
announcement of intent to promulgate environmental radiation pro-
tection standards (39 Fed. Reg. 16906, May 10, 1974).
sider and evaluate fully the total cumulative radiological .damage
that may result from the radioactive emissions of a large scale
nuclear power industry. Second, EPA must describe completely
its program to ensure adequate protection of the general public
and the environment from radiation exposure due to releases of
radionuclides from the uranium fuel cycle. The fundamental
issue is whether or not the perceived short-term benefits of the
electricity generated at nuclear power plants will be worth the
inevitable very long-term radiation exposure of the public and
radioactive contamination of the environment. However, by
narrowly restricting the scope of the draft statement to an
incomplete analysis of the radiological damage from only a few
radioactive contaminants during just 100 years, instead of con-
sidering all significant radionuclides for the thousands of
years that some of the contaminants will remain hazardous, and
by ignoring entirely the serious ill-health effects that will
be imposed on future generations from prior occupational exposures
of nuclear workers, EPA has substantially underestimated the
total, human ill-health and deleterious environmental effects of
a large nuclear power industry. In fact, despite assurances
that a comprehensive approach was adopted, the draft statement
never seriously considers the total public health and environ-
mental implications of possible future national reliance on
nuclear power as a major source of electrical energy generation.
To compare the consequences of releasing various amounts
of radioactive materials to the environment and to evaluate the
-2-
A-41
-------
necessity for more or less strict limits on such releases for
decision-making purposes, the total long-term impact of all
significant radionuclides that may be released to the environment
from the entire uranium fuel cycle must be evaluated. No impor-
tant radionuclide can be omitted from the analysis; no portion
of the fuel cycle can be excluded,. The draft statement fails to
compare alternative regulatory schemes on such a comprehensive basis.
Even worse, however, the draft statement — apparently
based on its incomplete and wholly inadequate analysis of the
potential hazards — enthusiastically touts nuclear power as
playing "... an essential and major role in meeting national
power needs during the next several decades." (p. I)2-/ since
the draft statement contains no analysis of "national power
needs"or of alternative methods for meeting those needs, EPA's
assertion stands completely unsupported. In NRDC's view, it is
also inaccurate and out of place in view of EPA's responsibilities.
The strong promotional tone in the draft statement forcefully
raises a substantial question of whether or not the primary aim
of the new regulations is to protect the public health and en-
vironment fully from radiation damage or to facilitate the rapid
commercialization of nuclear power. This latter purpose would be
wholly inappropriate in a draft statement prepared by the Agency
with principal responsibility for protecting the public from
- Unless otherwise indicated, page numbers refer to pages of
the draft environmental impact statement. See also p. 9.
an unhealthful environment.—
The following major deficiencies exist in the draft
statement:
1. The entire uranium fuel cycle is not considered;
specifically, the deleterious effects of radioactive releases
from uranium mines, mill tailings piles, mixed-oxide fuel
fabrication plants, non-operating facilities (including facili-
ties undergoing decommissioning), and waste disposal sites are
not evaluated.
2. The long-term human ill-health effects due to the
routine release of several potentially significant radionuclides,
£_.£., radon-22 (and its decay products), strontium-90, and cesium-
137, are not assessed.
3. The total human ill-health effects resulting from the
release of radionuclides, with very long half-lives, such as
carbon-14, are substantially underestimated, because the analysis
is arbitrarily terminated at only 100 years after the radionuclides
enter the environment.
4. The significant deleterious health effects in subse-
quent generations produced by gonadal and fetal radiation exposure
of workers at nuclear facilities are excluded from evaluation.
-3-
- In any event, if a strong claim for the necessity of a large
nuclear power industry is to be made in the statement, all of the
disadvantages of the large-scale development of nuclear power must
oe rully analyzed and compared to all reasonable alternative means
tor meeting the nation's energy needs. Of course, this draft
statement fails totally to substantiate such a claim, or even to
attempt to conduct such an analysis. Rather, the conclusion is
merely asserted. In light of the serious technical, economic and
political difficulties currently facing the nuclear power industry,
we believe EPA's conclusion about the advisability of nuclear
power is wholly unjustified.
A-42
-4-
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5. The possible extent of "unplanned" releases of
radionuclides is not assessed.
6. There is no consideration of the release of radio-
nuclides due to either industry or government-sponsored nuclear
power research and development activities.
7. The potential deleterious impacts on non-human
organisms due to radioactive releases from the nuclear power
industry are not evaluated at all.
8. The overall levels of uncertainty associated with
the amounts of radioactive releases, possible human exposure
pathways and the extent of injury from chronic, low-level ex-
posure are not adequately considered.
9. The total program, and all reasonable alternatives
to its various subparts, for meeting EPA's duties to protect the
public and environment from excessive radiation damage are not
fully described.
10. The cost/benefit analysis is grossly incomplete,
does not adequately consider the potential margin of error in
cost calculations, and does not include a risk assessment.
The proposed regulations are inherently inadequate
and fundamentally incomplete because, as indicated above, they
were not derived from a complete analysis of the potential
ill-health and adverse environmental effects of a large commercial
nuclear power industry. In particular, the proposed regulations
do not establish specific limits on the release of some radio-
nuclides, e.g., radon-222 and carbon-14, and specifically exempt
-5-
some nuclear facilities, e.g., mixed-oxide fuel fabricating
plants, that are clearly shown in the draft statement and other
reports to have a potentially greater adverse impact on the
public health than the radionuclides and facilities that are
covered by the proposed regulations. NRDC concludes that the
proposed regulations, even in the event they are fully enforced,
would inadequately protect the public and environment from the
radiation damage that may be produced by the planned operations
of a large nuclear power industry.
Additionally, however, the regulations are seriously
defective because they are vague, too easily permit deviations
from numerical standards, do not provide for adequate super-
vision and enforcement by EPA,3jL/ and do not provide for sufficient
public notification of the extent of the nuclear power industry's
compliance with the regulations. Thus, the proposed action fails
by a large margin to achieve its major purpose of assuring . . •
adequate radiation protection of public health and the environ-
ment." (p. 15)
In conclusion, we generally support the adoption of the
Environmental Radiation Dose Commitment concept as a proper,
stricter standard for protecting public health and the environment.
3a/ The importance of EPA supervising NRC's enforcement of the
proposed regulations is underscored by the recent preliminary
finding of discharges from uranium mines and mills in New Mexico
that exceed the maximum permissible limits established both at
10 C.F.R. Part 20 and proposed by EPA under the Safe Drinking
Water Act (40 Fed. Reg. 34324, August 14, 1975). See, Rouse and
Hatheway, National Field Investigations Center - Denver, EPA,
"Preliminary Report on New Mexico Uranium Mine and Mill Survey,
Grants, Mineral Belt, New- Mexico," June 2, 1975.
-6-
A-43
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We also support EPA's proposed establishment of lower permissible
levels of radiation exposure and the setting of maximum total
releases of krypton-85, iodine-129 and alpha-emitting transuranic
radionuclides. NRDC agrees with EPA's judgment that currently
permissible limits on radiation exposure are "unnecessarily high."
(P- 13)
However, in order to correct the serious deficiencies
outlined above, NRDC strongly urges EPA (1) to adopt modified
regulations that will more adequately protect the public and the
environment from the cumulative effects of releases of radio-
active materials,and (2) to issue a comprehensive environmental
impact statement (a) that more fully considers the potential long-
term, cumulative effects of radioactive pollutants in the environ-
ment, (b) that clearly describes EPA's overall programmatic effort
to fulfill its responsibilities to protect the environment and
public from excessive radiation damage, and (c) that devotes itself
to the regulation of, rather than the promotion of, the large-
scale development of nuclear power.
Finally, NRDC again requests prompt, affirmative action
on its petition seeking lower permissible levels of human ex-
posure to "hot particles" of plutonium and other alpha-emitting
radionuclides.I/ Eighteen months have passed since the original
petition was submitted; and still, six months after submission
of NRDC's supplemental statement on EPA's public hearings,—/
EPA has not conducted the needed adjudicatory hearing or ruled on
the petition. Furthermore, the draft statement does not, as it
should, discuss either NRDC's petition or the special hazards posed
by plutonium. Such a discussion 'is particularly important because
the detailed analysis in other EPA documents,—/ which provide the
technical bases for the proposed standards, do not themselves con-
sider the hot particle problem or other recent analyses of the
hazards of plutonium when it is not in the form of hot particles.-/
4/NRDC, "Petition to Amend Radiation Protection Standards
14, 1974 T° H0t Particles'" Submitted to EPA on February
_&/ Tamplin and Cochran, "NRDC Supplemental Submission to the Environ-
mental Protection Agency Public Hearings on Plutonium and the Trlns-
uranium Elements," February 24, 1975.
- See, EPA, Environmental Radiation Dose Commitment; An Applica-
tion To The Nuclear Power Industry, EPA-520/4-73-002, pp—D-8 to—
°"1? (February 1374); and Environmental Analysis of the Uranium
Fuel Cycle, Part Ill-Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing. EPA-.S2(WQ-7-3-nm-n
pp. C-10 to C-ll and C-21 to C-23(October 1973). '
7/
See, for instance, Karl Z. Morgan, "Suggested Reduction of
Permissible Exposure to Plutonium and Other Transuranium Elements "
Accepted for publication in the American Industrial Hygiene
r°prgal; J^n W.Gofman, "The Cancer Hazard From Inhaled Plutonium,"
CNR Report 1975-1-R, May 14, 1975; Edward A. Martell, "Basic
Considerations in the Assessment of the Cancer Risks and
Standards for Internal Alpha Emitters," Presented at the EPA
Public Hearing on Plutonium and the Transuranium Elements,
January 10, 1975.
-7-
-8-
A-44
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II
THE DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL AND HEALTH EFFECTS
IN THE DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT IS TOO NARROW,
INCOMPLETE AND DOES NOT ADEQUATELY CONSIDER CUMULATIVE EFFECTS.
The Environmental Portection Agency has too narrowly
focused the draft statement. The result is a significant under-
estimate of the potential long-term human ill health and adverse
environmental effects resulting from releases of radionuclides
from nuclear power plants and their supporting facilities. Indeed,
we find the omissions in this draft's analysis to be inconsistent
even with EPA's own intention to conduct ". . .as complete an
assessment ... as possible." (p. 19)
The stated purpose of the proposed administrative
action to establish new radiation protection regulations is
". . .to insure that the anticipated major expansion of nuclear
power takes place with assurance of adequate radiation protection
of public health and the environment." (p. 75). In order to
achieve this goal EPA must, first, conduct a thorough analysis
of all potentially significant radiation sources associated
with the generation of electricity at nuclear power plants,
and, second, promulgate and enforce appropriate standards to
protect the public and environment from unduly harmful levels
of radiation from these sources.
This draft statement by EPA must provide the analysis
supporting the proposed regulations. Furthermore, the statement
must also consider those potentially significant radiation
sources from the nuclear power industry that EPA has not
attempted to.control at this time. In particular, the scope
of EPA's analysis cannot properly be constrained simply
because EPA currently believes that it does not have authority
8 /
to regulate some radiation sourc.es.—
Unfortunately, the statement's failure to consider
carefully all potentially significant sources of radioactive
contaminants and radiation in the uranium fuel cycle is
made more serious by the draft statement's representation, in
several prominent places, that the analysis in fact is compre-
hensive. For instance, in the "Introduction," the draft state-
ment proclaims that ". . .the Agency has made a comprehensive
assessment of planned releases of radioactive materials associated
with nuclear power generation . . . ." (p. 1, emphasis added)
And, in the discussion of alternative methodologies for radiation
protection, the draft statement endorses the environmental radia-
tion dose concept because "... it provides an assessment of
the potential public health impact of the entire industry." (p.
25, emphasis added) This is a seriously misleading representa-
tion in light of the incompleteness of the statement's analysis
and the serious deficiencies in the regulations.
«/ The Guidelines on the Preparation of Environmental Impact
Statements (40 C.F.R. Part 1500) by the Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) and court decisions under NEPA are clear on this
point See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton,
458 F.2d 827, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
-10-
-9-
A-45
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Furthermore, the importance of comprehensiveness in
the statement's analysis is underlined by EPA's stated, but in
our opinion unfounded,—7 belief "... that national needs
for electric power cannot be met without a large increase in
the fraction of electric power produced by nuclear energy,
given the present lack of availability of alternative sources,
at least within the next few decades." (p. 9, footnote deleted)
As we stated above, such a broad sweeping assertion about
nuclear power is wholly inappropriate in this draft statement.—/
In any event, the deficiencies in the draft statement make such
an assertion unjustified therein.
Regarding the cumulative adverse effects on public
health and environmental quality, the major gaps in the analysis
_9_/.See, for instance, Cochran, Speth and Tamplin, "A Poor Buy "
Environment 17 (No. 4), pp. 18-19 (June 1975); The American
hv^qqn*" Architects, "A Nation of Energy Efficient Buildings
oy isyu, p. 3; and Ford Foundation Energy Policy Project A
Time to Choose, Ballinger Publishing Co., p. 223 (1974). ~~
10/ Even if the analysis of environmental and public health
effects due to releases of radionuclides were complete, we
believe that EPA's evaluation of the overall advisability
or necessity of using nuclear power should not be a part of
an impact assessment related to the promulgation of new environ-
mental radiation protection standards. The nuclear issue is
a very complicated one involving consideration of, for instance,
civil liberties that will be reduced to protect plutonium
from theft, the possibilities of catastrophic accidents, the
reliability and overall economics of nuclear power plants, and
the feasibility of permanently disposing of long-lived wastes
to name only some. If EPA wants to urge the rapid development
of nuclear power, it should do so within another context that
allows detailed evaluation of all the relevant issues. To
NRDC a knowledge, EPA has never completed such an analysis.
Certainly, no comprehensive EPA analysis was referenced in
the draft statement.
contained in the draft statement are: (1) the failure to
consider radioactive emissions from (a) waste disposal sites
(including mill tailings piles), (b) facilities undergoing
decommissioning, (c) uranium mines, and (d) mixed-oxide fuel
fabrication plants; (2) the neglect of the ill-health effects
on future members of the general, public due to gonadal and
fetal exposures of nuclear workers; (3) the omission of an
assessment of the possible total magnitude of "unplanned" re-
leases; (4) the lack of an evaluation of the impact of some
potentially significant radionuclides, e.g., radon and its
decay products, strontium-90, cesium-137; and (5) the arbitrary
neglect of the effects of long-lived radionuclides, e.g.,
carbon-14, beyond 100 years following their release to the
environment. Each of these points is discussed further below.
A. The Entire Uranium Fuel Cycle Must Be Considered.
Clearly, in order for EPA to develop an effective set
of standards for adequately protecting the public and environ-
ment from radiation resulting from the generation of electricity
at nuclear power plants, consideration of all potentially
significant sources of radiation within the entire fuel cycle
must be included in the draft statement. This is true even
if: (1) EPA believes there is insufficient information
available about some potential radiation sources, e.g.,
radon from mill tailings piles, to promulgate standards
-12-
-11-
A-46
-------
now;!!'' (2) EPA does not believe that it has authority to
regulate some potential sources, e.g., occupational exposure
sources; or (3) EPA, for another reason, has determined that
the proposed radiation protection standards will not apply
to some potentially important radiation sources, e.g., emissions
from mixed-oxide fuel fabrication plants, at this time. Unfor-
tunately, to the contrary, EPA, using all three of the above
inadequate justifications, has decided to exclude improperly
several potentially important aspects of the uranium fuel
cycle.
1. Uranium Mining — Without adequate explanation,
one type of facility not evaluated in the draft statement as
a potential radiation source is the uranium mine. (See,
e.g., pp. 8, 30, 141.) Perhaps, EPA believes that it has no
responsibility for radioactive releases from uranium mines;
or EPA judges that, in any event, the radiological impact of
uranium mining on the general public is insignificant. Neither
belief, even if correct, would be sufficient for not at least
generally.discussing the potential radiological consequences
of uranium mining and the reasons for omitting them from coverage
by the proposed regulations. Additionally, since under Reorganiza-
tion Plan No. 3, EPA was delegated the authority of the former
ll/ Two purposes would be served by this type of assessment.
First, uncertainties in the full magnitude of deleterious impacts
of nuclear power would be indicated. This is important informa-
tion for consideration by decision-makers considering commitments
to nuclear power. Second, EPA and other agencies would have
a better assessment of what research and analysis should be
sponsored in order to be better able to adopt comprehensive
radiation protection standards.
Federal Radiation Council to issue guidance for permissible
occupational exposure to workers, EPA's intentions with
respect to issuing additional guidance for the protection
of uranium miners should be explicitly discussed in the final
statement, in any event.
There is information suggesting that the radiological
impact of uranium mining on the general public is not always
negligible. For instance, substantial quanitites of radon-222,
radium-226, and thorium-230 are spewed into the atmosphere from
Rio Algom's uranium mine near La Sal, Utah. Residents at the
nearby Redd Ranch receive 42 mrem/year to bone, and 11 mrem/year
to lung, evidently as a result of the combined releases from
the mine and the nearby mill. Members of the public at the
unfenced boundaries of the mill site could receive 200 mrem/year
12/
to bone and 74 mrem/year to lung.—' These radiation exposure
levels are well above the proposed standards for protection of
members of the general public. An appreciable fraction of these
potential doses is evidently due to releases from the ventilation
shaft of the mine. In general, we are concerned that, unless
access to mining sites is more strictly controlled than at
Rio Algom's mine, members of the public could receive significant
doses of radiation due to exposure to radon gases expelled
through ventilation shafts at underground mines.
12/ U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Draft Detailed Statement
On The Environmental Considerations . . . Related To The Pro-
posed Issuance Of A License To The Rio Algom Corporation For
The Humeca Uranium Mill, Docket No. 40-8084, pp. 35-37 (December
1972).
-13-
A-47
-14-
-------
Apparently, due to the leaching of radionuclides by
water invading underground uranium mines in New Mexico, EPA
has recently discovered dangerously high levels of radioactivity
in drinking water. A preliminary EPA report stated, for
instance, that the concentrations of gross alpha and radium-226
in the drinking water supply near one mine "grossly exceed
the proposed standards and may pose a health hazard to employ-
ees and their families."—/
2- Radioactive Waste Management Facilities — There is
no clear explanation in the draft statement for not discus-
sing radioactive waste storage and disposal facilities and
including them for coverage by the proposed regulations. (See
p. 94.) The absence of detailed consideration of waste manage-
ment is particularly puzzling in light of the admission that
the waste management issue "... is basic to the environmental
viability of nuclear power . . . ." (p. 94)
However, two reasons for this limited approach are
suggested in the statement. First, perhaps EPA simply has not
yet completed an analysis of possible future exposure pathways
from waste storage or burial sites, (p. 94) Although this may
be true and, if so, would be a very practical excuse, it is
not a reasonable explanation from the Agency mandated by Congress
to protect the environment and public health.
±^/ J.V. Kouse and J.L. Hatheway, National Field Investigations
Center - Denver, EPA, "Preliminary Report on New Mexico Uranium
Mine and Mill Survey, Grants, Mineral Belt, New Mexico," p 9
(June 2, 1975) .
-15-
The second possible reason, while more explicitly
stated, is no more valid: "... [waste management] has been
treated as separable from the question of reasonable levels
of planned effluents because the wastes generated by effluent
control systems represent a miniscule addition to the total
waste management problems of the. industry." (p. 95) In other
words, the draft statement suggests that, because its proposed
regulations will not themselves result in the generation of
large amounts of waste in comparison with what the nuclear
power industry would generate anyway, EPA has no obligation
at this time to review the issue. This is an absurd explana-
tion on its face. Indeed, if EPA restricted its entire analysis
on the same basis, there would be little substance to discuss
in the impact statement. For instance, will EPA's proposed
regulations result in the handling of additional amounts of
Plutonium at reprocessing plants that will have to be prevented
from entering the environment?
There is, in fact, a great need for EPA's full considera-
tion of waste management issues in this draft statement and
coverage of waste storage and disposal facilities by the proposed
regulations, for, unfortunately, there is a substantial long-term
threat posed by current waste storage and disposal operations.
The threat is made more real by the lack of adequate plans
for the safe management of long-lived wastes. Furthermore, there
already have been significant releases of radionuclides into
the general environment due to the improper handling of uranium
mill tailings and low-level wastes. Thus, at least so far,
-16-
A-48
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mill tailings and low-level wastes have not been so much
stored, as disposed.
a. Low-level waste burial — Current practice is to
permit the burial of low-level wastes, including transuranic
wastes, in shallow earthen trenches. Apparently, containers
are not designed to retain these, wastes for the long periods
of time required for the radioactivity to decay to innocuous
levels. EPA has previously expressed concern about the lack
of detailed documentation about the possibility that the
long-lived components of low-level waste may escape into the
general environment, as follows:
"EPA has reviewed the engineering and hydro-
geological reports prepared for the licensing
of the existing commercial burial grounds. In
our view these were preliminary reports
suitable for identifying potentially accep-
table burial sites. The AEC should present
or directly reference in the final statement
the results of any studies which have been
conducted at these commercial burial sites,
subsequent to the beginning of burial oper-
ations, which corroborate or validate the
conclusions reached in the original evalua-
tion and which demonstrate that '. . . after
burial the radioactive material in the waste
will be retained at the site and not migrate
from the vicinity of the burial location,'
and which show that, 'to date, there has
been no indication of migration of radioac-
tivity from any commercial burial site.'"
"Monitoring data or other evidence which con-
firms that the plutonium now buried has remained
immobile at the place of burial and does not
constitute a threat to man or the biosphere
should also be submitted or directly refer-
enced. Due to the large volumes and activities
of waste which are destined for disposal in
these land burial sites, such validation
studies are vital to assess their current
and potential environment impact."14/
Additionally, a recent study by the U.S. Geological
Survey suggests that a complete safety analysis has not yet
been completed for any commercial low-level waste burial
site, and further, that at least some of the sites would not
qualify as safe by the strict criteria set forth.—'
The amounts of alpha-emitting wastes—' that may be
buried in shallow trenches are large in comparison with the
amounts of alpha-emitting radionuclides that could be dis-
charged to the general environment under the proposed regula-
tions. For instance, in the year 1980, the projected pro-
duction of alpha wastes will contain about 2 million curies of
alpha-emitting radionuclides. Since the average nuclear generating
14 / EPA, Comments (D-AEC-A00107-00) on Management of Commercial
High-Level and Transuranium-Contaminated Radioactive Waste
(WASH-1539), p. 11 (November 1974).See, also, EPA's Comments
on the Proposed Final Environmental Statement on the Liquid
Metal Fast Breeder Reactor Program, April 1975, which indicate
that the requested copies of documentation demonstrating the
safety of the low-level waste burial sites have not been pro-
vided to date.
15/ Papadopulos and Winograd, U.S. Geological Survey, "Storage
of Low-Level Radioactive Wastes in the Ground; Hydrogeologic
and Hydrochemical Factors with an Appendix on The Maxey Flats
Kentucky Radioactive Waste Storage Site: Current Knowledge
and Data Needs for a Quantitative Hydrogeologic Evaluation,"
Open-File Report 74-344 (EPA-520/3-74-009), 1974.
16/ As EPA has recognized elsewhere, categories of radioactive
wastes are not well-defined. Here, alpha wastes mean only
the "alpha wastes" identified in Blomeke, Kee, Nichols, Projections
Of Radioactive Wastes To Be Generated By The U.S. Nuclear Power
Industry, ORNL-TM-3965, February 1974. The smaller quantities
of alpha-emitting radionuclides in "alpha-beta-gamma wastes"
are ignored. The bulk of the alpha wastes will be generated
in plutonium recycle facilities, specifically fuel preparation
and fabrication facilities.
-17-
-18-
A-49
-------
capacity for the year will be about 114 GWe, there will be
about 17,500 curies of alpha-emitting transuranics per
average installed GWe-year in 1980.—/ This is 35 million
times more than is permitted for release to the general
environment under the proposed regulations.
Furthermore, the amounts-of alpha-emitting radionuclides
in the low-level alpha wastes are significant in comparison with
the alpha-emitting component of high-level wastes. For instance,
by one estimate "[a]bout 45% of the initial alpha radioactivity
is in high level wastes, 45% is in alpha wastes, and 10% is
18 /
in ore tailings."—' This means that "... the long-term
toxicity of low-level wastes contaminated with actinides may
equal or exceed that of high-level wastes."—/
Another scientist estimates that, "... the amount of
Plutonium lost to the low-level wastes in reprocessing, fuel
preparation and fabrication operations is greater than the
amount of plutonium associated with the high-level fission-product
wastes. . . . The amounts of plutonium in all of these wastes
^]_/ Of course, this is an underestimate since only a portion
of the electricity generated at the nuclear power plants is
attributable to the fissile plutonium contained in the fuel.
^£/ Jansen, Schneider, and Hammond, Battelle Pacific Northwest
Laboratories, "A Conceptual System for Handling Alpha-bearinq
Wastes," BNWL-SA-5001, October 1974.
IV Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Program for
the Management of Hazardous Wastes for the Environmental Pro-
are significant, and it is important that careful attention
be given to a waste management program which insures careful
control of all of these wastes."—/
In September 1974, the AEC, recognizing the potential
long-term hazard posed by the low-level wastes, proposed
a new regulation requiring federal custody of wastes containing
more than a very low concentration (10 nanocuries per gram)
of transuranic radionuclides.il/ However, following the trans-
fer of the AEC's responsibilities to ERDA and NRC, and the ERDA
Administrator's subsequent decision to withdraw the environmental
impact statement considering the proposed regulation and to pre-
pare a new statement,&/ the fate of the proposed regulation
23/
is uncertain.— Thus, for the foreseeable future, trans-
uranic wastes will continue to be buried in shallow earthen
trenches at six commercial disposal sites.
Already there are measurements of off-site radioactivity
that suggest radionuclides in the low-level wastes are migrating
te
gction Agency. Office of Solid Waste Management Program's";
Final Report, p. 152 (July 1973).
20/ T.H. Pigford, "Radioactivity In Plutonium, Americium and
Curium In Nuclear Reactor Fuel" (A Study for the Energy Policy
Project of The Ford Foundation), p. 36 (June 1974).
£V 39 Fed. Reg. 32921, September 12, 1974.
|i/ See, Letter dated April 19, 1975, from Robert C. Seamans, Jr
to the Honorable John O. Pastore, Chairman, Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, Congress of the United States.
23/ Letter, dated August 20, 1975, from Donald A. Nussbaumer,
Assistant Director for Materials Agreements and Transporation
Division of Materials and Fuel Cycle Facility Licensing, NRC,
to R.A. Kreiss and T.R. Lash, NRDC.
-19-
-20-
A-50
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away from the burial trenches. For instance, last year a multi-
agency state study found that: "The radioactive waste disposal
site at Maxey Flats, Kentucky is contributing radioactivity
to the environment. . . Man-made radionuclides measured in
certain individual samples collected in the unrestricted environ-
ment identified Tritium, Cobalt 6-0, Strontium 89 and 90,
24/
Cesium 134 and 137, and Plutonium 238 and 239."—' Similarly,
due to the flooding of burial trenches at the West Valley,
New York low-level waste disposal facility, radionuclides have
257
moved off-site into adjacent waterways.—
Thus, after only about a dozen years of operation
low-level wastes, containing significant quantities of
very long-lived radionuclides, are contributing to the general
environmental burden of radioactive materials. EPA's draft
statement and proposed regulations should analyze and consider
this potential radiation source thoroughly.
b. High-level waste disposal — Currently, no high-level
wastes are produced at commercial facilities, although about
600,000 gallons of neutralized liquid is stored at West Valley,
24/Kentucky Department of Human Resources, Bureau for Health
Services, Office of Consumer Health Protection, Radiation and
Product Safety Branch, Project Report, "Six Month Study of Ra-
diation Concentrations And Transport Mechanisms At The Maxey
Flats Area Of Fleming County, Kentucky," p. 17 (December 1974).
25/ See, New York State Department of Environmental Conserva-
tion, NYS Environment, April 1 and July 1975; and Nuclear News,
p. 64 (May 1975).
New York, from previous reprocessing operations. Since both
ERDA and NRC are reviewing plans for the management of commer-
cial high-level wastes, now is the appropriate time to establish
regulations governing potential discharges of radioactive
materials from high-level waste management facilities, before
hard-to-reverse decisions are finalized. .These limitations
on the release of radionuclides could then be incorporated
into the NRC's and ERDA's criteria for an acceptable design'
for licensing and operating purposes, respectively.
c. Uranium mill tailings — Apparently, mill tailings
piles were excluded from consideration in the draft statement
on the vague grounds that:
"There exists considerable uncertainty
about the public health impact of existing
levels of radon in the atmosphere, as well
as over the best method for management
of new sources of radon created by man's
activities, which remove this naturally
occurring material and its precursors
from beneath the earth's protective
crust." (pp. 133, 134)
The draft statement further alleges, without elaboration,
"... that the problems associated with radon emissions are
sufficiently different from those of other radioactive materials
associated with the fuel cycle to warrant separate considera-
tion. . ." (p. 134).
These two cursory assertions are not persuasive for at
least three reasons. First, about two years ago, EPA itself con-
ducted an assessment of the possible long-term radiological
-22-
A-51
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effects of radon gas emanating from uranium mill tailings
piles.— This earlier EPA analysis seems to be about as
thorough as the analyses of other aspects of the uranium
fuel cycle, that form the technical basis for this draft
statement and proposed regulations. Second, there has been
no showing that the degree of uncertainty concerning the actual
effects of radon released from tailing piles is significantly
greater than in the case of other radioactive releases, e.g.,
carbon-14 (p. 68), that are evaluated in the draft statement.—
And, third, while there is no general agreement on the "best
method for management" of radon from mill tailings, this
situation is certainly not unique to radon effluents. For
instance, options for controlling releases of krypton are only
at the research, development, and demonstration stages,—/ yet
this situation did not prevent EPA from analyzing the radio-
logical impacts of, and proposing appropriate limitations on
27/
26/ EPA, Environmental Analysis of the Uranium Fuel Cycle,
^art,L~.The Fuel Supply, EPA-520/9-73-003-B, pp. 51-74 (Octo-
ber 1973).
2]_/ "fDjue to very large uncertainties concerning . . . environ-
mental behavior [of plutonium and other transuranics] over long
periods of time, as well as a lack of definitive information
concerning the relationship between exposure to these materials
and health effects, the limits of this potential impact cannot
be more than roughly estimated." (pp. 129-130)
28/ EPA, Environmental Analysis of the Uranium Fuel Cycle,
Part III - Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing, EPA-52-/9-73-003-D,
pp. B-14, B-16 (October 1973).
-23-
releases of, krypton gas. To compensate for the uncertainty
in their availability, the Agency has explicitly stated that
if at least one of these control technologies does not prove
out, the proposed regulations will be re-evaluated with that
in mind. (p. 36) A similar approach may be appropriate in
regard to radon releases from uranium mill tailings piles.—/
Furthermore, methodologies for limiting the emanation
of radon from uranium tailings are not technologically compli-
cated or speculative. In a recent report (that may have been
known to EPA in draft form well over a year ago), scientists
at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory identify, and discuss'
in terms of cost and degree of practicality, several procedures
for virtually eliminating the escape of radon from tailings
into the general environment.—' Indeed, the effectiveness
of a thick (e.g., 20 foot) layer of earth in preventing the
emanation of radon from tailings piles has been known for years.—
The draft statement should have assessed the desirability of
several means to control releases of radon.
29/ Naturally, the draft statement should also consider the
magnitude and effects of releases of other radionuclides,
e.g., radium-226, from tailings piles.
30/ Sears et al., Correlation of Radioactive Waste Treatment Costs
and the Environmental Impact of Waste Effluents in the Nuclear
Fuel Cycle for Use in Establishing "as Low as Practicable"
Guides - Milling of Uranium Ores, ORNL-TM-4903, Vol. 1 (May 1975).
_31/ Schroeder and Evans, "Distribution of Radon and Radon Fluxes
within Multilayered Systems," M.I.T. Radioactivity Center Annual
Progress Report on Radium and Mesothorium Poisoning and Dosimetry
and Instrumentation Techniques in Applied Radioactivity, MIT-952-
4, p. 316 (May 1967.
A-52
-24-
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Thus, there appears not to be a good reason for the
draft statement's failure to consider radon gas escaping from
mill tailings. On the other hand, the large number of human
deaths (ca. 400 per gigawatt-year) potentially caused by
simply leaving mill tailings on the earth's surface with
little, if any covering,—' is ample justification for a full
discussion of the environmental and health hazards posed by
the tailings.—/
32/ Generally, if tailings piles are "stabilized" at all, less
than two feet of earth is placed on top. (See, AEC, Final
Environmental Statement related to operation of Shirley Basin
Uranium Mill, Utah International, Inc., Docket No. 40-6622,
p. IV-20 (December 1974).) Even if this covering remained
intact for the thousands of years that the critical radio-
nuclides remain potentially hazardous, such a thin layer is
inadequate to reduce significantly the amount of radon released.
See preceeding footnote.
33/ The total number of human deaths resulting from the emanation
57 radon gas from mill tailings piles has recently been estimated
using EPA's environmental radiation dose commitment concept, to
be greater than the human deaths caused by coal-fired power
plants. See, Pohl, Cornell University, "Nuclear Energy: Health
Effects of Thorium-230," submitted to Technology Review; and
omey, "The Legacy of Uranium Tailings," The Bulletin of Atomic
•:ientists, pp. 42-45 (September 1975).
-25-
3. Plutonium Recycle — Evidently, the basis for
excluding consideration of plutonium recycle in the draft
statement is the fact that, "The liquid metal fast breeder
reactor, which would make possible the extensive production
and utilization of plutonium fuel ... is not expected to be
commercially available before the late 1980's, at the earliest."
(p. 3) Plutonium recycle, unfortunately, may not be that remote,
for, as is recognized in the draft statement, "substantial
quantities of plutonium-239 are produced by light-water-cooled
reactors" (p. 3) and "some commercial use of recycled plutonium
in light-water-cooled reactors is proposed for the near future."
(p. 4)
In fact, again as is admitted in the draft statement,
virtually the sole purpose of reprocessing spent fuel from
light-water-cooled reactors, an activity that is discussed in
the draft statement, is ". . .to recover substantial quantities
of unused uranium and reactor-produced plutonium for future
reuse." (p. 4)—/ For this reason, there is as sound a basis
for fully considering the use of the recovered plutonium in
fuel for light-water-cooled power reactors as there is for
assessing the potential radiological effects of spent fuel
reprocessing.
34/ The regulatory division of the former U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC) has stated that reprocessing of spent fuel
from light-water-cooled reactors would not be economically
justified if plutonium cannot be recycled. See, AEC, Draft
Generic Environmental Statement Mixed Oxide Fuel, WASH-1327,
Volume 1, p. S-ll (August 1974).Hereinafter, "DRAFT GESMO".
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A-53
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More generally, there are two deficiencies with EPA's
analysis that are particularly troublesome with regard to
Plutonium recycle activities: (1) failure to consider the
magnitude of uncertainties in the projected levels of control
of radioactive releases; and (2) failure to assess the impacts
of abnormal, unplanned or unusual-operations. These matters
are crucially important because "the actinides are, in general,
very long-lived materials and their eventual total impact over
many centuries may be many times that experienced during the
first 100 years following release."—/
EPA, in the draft statement, assumed that only one-
— Q
billionth (10 ) of the alpha-emitting transuranic radionuclide
inventory would be released to the general environment if there
were no plutonium recycle. However, this assumption grossly
underestimates the likely health effects for th-. case of plu-
tonium recycle. As EPA has stated, "when allowance is made
for inclusion of cumulative releases from the variety of fuel
processing operations as well as transportation and handling
throughout the entire fuel cycle, the fractioned loss of plu-
tonium and the actinides to the environment for the entire
fuel cycle must be assumed to be greater than that from a
single operation. In this context "the fractional release of
the actinides is not realistically expected to exceed 10~7 of
the total amount handled in any given year."—/ Thus, the
35/ EPA, Environmental Radiation Dose Commitment: An Applica-
tion To The Nuclear Power Industry, EPA-520/4-73-002. p 23
(February 1974) .
36/ Id. at p. 16 (emphasis added).
-27-
draft statement seems to underestimate the actual health
effects due to the release of long-lived transuranic radio-
nuclides by at least a factor of 100.
For the purposes of this draft statement and proposed
rulemaking, EPA implies that the overall impact of radiation
doses due to unplanned or unusual releases will be "minimal".
(p. 137) No studies are cited to substantiate this claim,
however. On the other hand, over two years ago an EPA official
stated that
n[m]ore information is critically re-
quired for unknown or inadvertent
releases from facilities processing
plutonium. Currently, the AEC is un-
able to account for one part in 103~4
of this material in such facilities.
Environmental releases must be main-
tained to less than one part in 108~9.
Careful studies of some representative
facilities will be made."37/
The final statement should present the results of these "careful
studies" as evidence that unplanned or abnormal releases of
transuranic radionuclides will not far exceed the limits for
"normal operations" contained in the proposed regulations.
Unfortunately, the sad history of the handling of
plutonium strongly suggests that even the 10~7 fractional
release estimate is too low. The safety record at the Nuclear
Fuel Services' reprocessing plant at West Valley, New York;
the Kerr-McGee fuel fabrication plant at Crescent, Oklahoma;
and the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation fuel
37/ EPA, "Environmental Radiation Exposure Advisory Committee,
Minutes of Tenth Meeting, March 20-21, 1973," p. 9.
A-54
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fabrication plant at Apollo, Pennsylvania are discussed bi
Robert Gillette in a Science article, "Plutonium (I): Questions
of Health in a New Industry". Gillette reports:
"The safety record compiled by the
three main commercial processors [NFS
(West Valley), Kerr McGee, and NUMEC] is
subject to differing interpretations,
but from a review of'inspection reports
made public by the AEC, it is hard to
see that any of them is quite in command
of the technology.
The record reveals a dismal repetition
of leaks in glove boxes; of inoperative
radiation monitors; of employees who
failed to follow instructions; of mana-
gers accused by the AEC of ineptness and
failing to provide safety supervision or
training to employees; of numerous vio-
lations of federal regulations and license
requirements; of plutonium spills tracked
through corridors, and, in half a dozen
cases, beyond plant boundaries to auto-
mobiles, homes, at least one restaurant,
and in one instance to a county sheriff's
office in New York."38/
Also, Gulf United's P-lutonium Facility at Pawling,
New York, was permanently closed following a chemical explosion,
a fire and a second explosion on December 21, 1972. This
accident resulted in extensive plutonium contamination within
the facility, a breach in the exhaust system in the plutonium
handling room area, and the release of an undetermined quantity
of plutonium from the building through blown out windows.
According to Gulf United1s analysis of the accident,
"[a]t the time of the explosion, one em-
ployee was standing directly in front of a
large window in the north wall of the facil-
ity. He observed that the window was intact
when he left the building. It was sub- .
sequently found that every pane in this
window had been blown out or broken,
which suggests that a second explosion
took place, presumably when all of the
employees were at the remote assembly
building 0.9 mile away, and the pluton-
ium facility itself was unattended. It
is evident that a fire followed the ini-
tial explosion and it is plausible that
this fire caused one-of the bottles of
flammable solvent to gradually heat up
and rupture, dispersing its contents in
air to form another explosive mixture.
That no one heard a second explosion is
understandable if it occurred when all of
the personnel were in the remote assembly
building."39/
Following the explosions and fire at Gulf United"s
facility, AEC inspections at this facility between December 21,
1972 and October 31, 1973 identified the following violations
and safety items:
"A. Violations
1. Failure to continuously evaluate the stack
effluent."4^/ [Gulf United failed to make
such surveys as were necessary to assure com-
pliance with 10 C.F.R. 20.106, "Concentrations
in effluents to unrestricted areas."]
B. Safety Items
"Accepted radiological and nuclear safety
practices dictate that: (1) procedures,
facilities, and equipment are adequate for
effective control during emergencies; and
(2) that emergency drills be routinely
conducted.
3_8/ Gillette, Robert, "Plutonium (I) : Questions of Health in
a New Industry," Science 185 (20 September 1974), pp. 1029-1030.
-29-
A-55
39/ Gulf United Nuclear Fuels Corporation, "Report of Incident
at Gulf United1s Plutonium Facility at Pawling, New York,"
Elmsford, New York (January 19, 1973), p. 11.
40/ U.S. AEC, Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Region I.
Inspection Report No.: 70-903/72-02," special inspection con-
ducted by Mr. Lorenz on December 21, 22, 26, 27 and 29, 1972 of
activities authorized by AEC License No. SNM-871 at "Licensee:
Gulf United Nuclear Fuels Corporation, Grasslands Road, Elmsford,
New York," Docket No. 70-903.
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a. Contrary to the above, your [Gulf
United's] emergency alarm signal
system was inadequate in that the
alarm was not audible to all persons
at the main site location.
b. Contrary to the above, your [Gulf
United's] Emergency Policy and Pro-
cedures were not maintained by the
current emergency call list. . . .
c. Contrary to the above, and as prescribed
in your [Gulf United's] Emergency Policy
and Procedures, no annual emergency
training drill was conducted in 1972,
and the formal training program for
personnel was not scheduled.
d. Contrary to the above, your [Gulf
United's] remote assembly building
was inadequate for personnel decon-
tamination in that drain water from
shower and wash facilities could not
be collected and analyzed prior to
release.
e. Contrary to the above, your [Gulf
United's] procedures did not provide
that proper survey instruments accom-
pany injured contaminated personnel .. .
when referred for medical treatment."—
A subsequent AEC inspection in June 1973, during cleanup
operations identified the following additional violations:
"1. Failure to have waste drums properly
stored inside building. The drums of
unrecoverable waste were stored outside
of any buildings. . . .
2. Failure to have a contamination survey
station at the exit of the Plutonium
Laboratory and to require personnel to
perform surveys prior to leaving the
contamination zone. . . .
41/ Letter from James P. O'Reilly, Director, U.S. AEC Directorate
of Regulatory Operations, Region I, to Gulf United Nuclear Fuels
Corporation in reference to Docket No. 70-903, dated May 17, 1973,
Enclosure No. 2, Description of Safety Items.
-31-
3. Failure to either provide a criticality
monitoring device for material stored
in the Plutonium Laboratory vault or to
analyze whether or not a criticality
monitoring device located about 15 feet
away with about 3 feet of intervening
concrete would provide the required
radiation detection."42/
Gulf United is not unique in its failure to follow
regulations. NUMEC was recently fined $13,720 for a sixteen
count violation of AEC regulations ranging from failing to
follow radiation monitoring to failure to comply with certain
safeguards requirements.—One of these pertained to the
failure to install an adequate fire alarm system, and another
pertained to the storage of flammable materials in a glove box.
Similarly, NFS Erwin facility was recently cited for five
44/
licensing violations all related to health and safety.— These
cases represent a small sample of the total AEC licensing vio-
lations, and the cases where fines have been levied, such as
NUMEC, are rare. On August 25, 1974, the New York Times
reported,
"For the year ending June 30, for example,
commission inspectors found a total of 3,333
violations in 1,288 of the 3,047 installations
they examined.
A-56
42/ U.S. XEC, Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Region I.
""Inspection Report No. 70-903/73-02," routine-unannounced inspec-
tion conducted by Mr. Kinney on June 28-29, 1973 of activities
authorized by AEC License No. 871 at "Licensee: Gulf United
Nuclear Fuels Corporation, Grassland Road, Elmsford, New York.-"
Docket No. 70-903.
43/ AEC News Releases, Vol. V (August 14, 1974), p. 4.
447 Letter from N. C. Moseley, Director, U.S. AEC Directorate
of" Regulatory Operations, Region II, to Mr. William Manser, Jr.,
Plant Manager, Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., Erwin, Tennessee
(18 October 1974), Re: "RO:II:FJL 70-143/74-01."
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According to the commission's own defini-
tion, 98 of these charges were considered
to be the most serious of three categories
of violation. By this definition, they posed
a health threat in that they caused or were
likely to cause radiation exposures to em-
ployees or the public in excess of permitted
limits, involved the release of radioactive
materials in the environment beyond per-
mitted limits or were a security threat.
During the year, however, the commission
imposed punishments on only eight occasions.
It revoked the license of two small companies
and levied civil penalties against six others
totaling $37,000."
The same article quotes Anthony Mazzocchi, legislative director
for the Oil Chemical and Atomic Workers,
"The fact that the A.E.G. finds violations
in one-third of the installations it inspects
is clear evidence the regulations do not work,. . ."
Mazzocchi also noted that,
"he was aware of a number of situations where
inspectors had found repeated violations but
had taken no action.
He cited Nuclear Fuel Services of Erwin,
Tenn., where he said there had been at least
15 separate incidents since 1969 in which
more than 50 workers had been exposed to
radiation above permissible limits. Despite
these repeated incidents a commission spokes-
man confirmed Mr. Mazzocchi1s statement that
the agency had never suspended or revoked or
otherwise penalized Nuclear Fuel Services."
Finally, we note that the violations cited by the AEC probably
represent a small sample of the total. For example, the violations
at the NFS Erwin facility, noted above, were discovered only
after production workers requested a meeting (held August 13,
1974) with AEC to complain about unsafe working conditions at
that facility, and we would hasten to add that NFS is not unique
in this respect. The final statement should present data for
all plutonium handling facilities, including NFS-Erwin, Exxon
and DOW-Rocky Flats, for each year of operation. Where data
is not available an explanation should be given, for example,
with respect to the total release from NUMEC. This table should
also present data on the yearly plutonium throughput.
In sum, the full radiological consequences resulting
from plutonium recycle, and their implications for limits on
releases from nuclear facilities, need to be fully analyzed in
the final environmental impact statement because: (1) plutonium
recycle is not speculative or unlikely;—(2) indeed, the
principal purpose of spent fuel reprocessing, which is dis-
cussed in the draft statement and covered by the proposed
regulations, is to recover plutonium for reuse in nuclear
fuel; (3) plutonium has a "high toxicity" and persistence that
could cause a "large" cumulative impact if released to the
environment (p. 129) ; and (4) the potential magnitude of planned
and unplanned releases of plutonium and other transuranic
radionuclides will be substantially increased during the fab-
rication of plutonium-containing fuel.
46/
Thus, EPA should
45/ See, e.g., Nucleonics Week, p. 7 (August 7, 1975) and
pT 3 (July 31, 1975).
46/ Indeed, it seems that the annual planned release of
aTpha-emitting transuranic radionuclides due to plutonium
recycle would exceed the Section 190.10(b) standard by four-
fold: "The annual dispersal into the environment of 2 alpha
millicuries per GWy(e) . . . may result from handling pluton-
ium in the mixed oxide fuel cycle ..." DRAFT GESMO, Vol. 3,
p. IV J-7. In our opinion, based on the history of existing
plants that have handled plutonium, the AEC's estimate of
possible routine releases is grossly overly optimistic. See,
Cochran and Speth, NRDC Comments on WASH-1327, General Comments,
pp. 13-16, 24-26.
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A-57
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fully analyze in the final statement the potential radioactive
releases and human radiation exposure attributable to plutonium
recycle, including the operation of mixed-oxide fuel prepara-
tion and fabrication plants.
Additionally, in the final statement, EPA should
clearly present the methodology and procedures that will be
used to determine the amount of plutonium and other alpha-
emitting radionuclides (per gigawatt-year of nuclear generation)
released to the general environment due to normal and abnormal
operations of all plutonium recycle facilities, including
reprocessing plants and mixed-oxide fuel preparation and
fabrication plants. This information needs to be presented
in detail because there is reason to believe that EPA cannot,
in practice, determine that its standards have been met.
4. Research and Development Facilities — A source
of radioactive emissions and radiation exposure that is not
even mentioned are the research and development facilities
which are necessary for the "commercialization" of nuclear
power. These releases should also be counted as part of the
environmental contamination caused by the nuclear power industry.
The magnitude and potential effect of such releases should be
presented in the final statement, and the proposed regulation
should be rewritten to limit their effects in accordance with
EPA"s radiation protection objectives.
Furthermore, EPA should take cognizance of the possib-
ility that large facilities, heretofore considered "commercial"
-35-
facilities, may now be designated "developmental" and involve
federal participation in their operation. Apparently, for
instance, the large spent fuel reprocessing plant at Barnwell,
South Carolina, is a candidate for conversion from a "commercial"
to a "developmental" facility.—' Thus, EPA's environmental
analysis should evaluate the impact of, and possibilities of
reducing, radioactive effluents from research and development
facilities to the extent that they support the nuclear power
industry. Furthermore, the limitations on radioactive releases
in the proposed regulations should be applicable to such
facilities.
In the final statement, EPA should declare whether
or not it has evaluated the extent of radioactive releases
and radiation exposure from both governmental and private
research and development facilities, and assessed the avail-
ability of control procedures to limit releases and radiation
exposures attributable to the growth of the nuclear power
industry. In any event, EPA should explicitly state whether
or not the proposed regulations apply to such facilities.
5. Decommissioning of Facilities — Another potential
radiation source that is too quickly dismissed from analysis
in the draft statement and coverage by the regulations is the
decommissioning of retired facilities. (pp. 6, 95) Certainly
decommissioning procedures have not been adequately planned.—
A-58
47/ See, e.g., Nucleonics Week, p. 7 (August 7, 1975).
48/ Ford Foundation Energy Policy Project, A Time To Choose,
Ballinger Publishing Co., p. 210 (1974). See also, Yarbro,
Harrington and Joy, Effluent Control In Fuel Reprocessing Plants,
ORNL-TM-3899, pp. 14-17 (March 1974).
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In light of this uncertainty about how decommissioning will be
accomplished, the statement should carefully consider whether
or not there is the potential in the future for genetically
significant or fetal radiation exposure of workers— or
exposure to the general public. Furthermore, there should be
a specific explanation for not including the decommissioning
of facilities in the proposed standards.
The magnitude of this potential problem is, perhaps,
indicated by the release of plutonium during decommissioning
of Building 12, a plutonium laboratory at Los Alamos Scientific
Laboratory. The annual release from that facility is estimated
to have been 13 microcuries (alpha),—/ while the release when
it was torn down was about 1,400 microcuries (alpha)—/ or
about 100 times the annual release.
B. The Total Health Effects Caused By The
Release Of Radionuclides Must Be Estimated
For The Entire Period That The Radionuclides
Remain Potentially Hazardous
The potential health effects caused by releases of
radioactive materials are calculated only for 100 years following
4_9/ As discussed below, radiation exposure of nuclear workers
that can result in genetic defects or injury to fetuses must
be evaluated in the final statement. Furthermore, EPA must
regulate such exposures in order to protect future members of
the general public.
5_0/ DRAFT GESMO, p. IV D-28.
5JL/ AEC, Plutonium Information Meeting Transcript, Los Alamos,
N.M., p. 66 (January 4, 1974).
their discharge. (p. 12) However, the draft statement admits
that,
"The total significance of environmental
burdens of carbon-14, iodine-129, and the
long-lived transuranics, which have half-
lives of 5700 years, 17 million years and
from 18 to 380,000 years, respectively,
cannot be quantitatively assessed, but
must be assumed to be considerably greater
than that anticipated during the first
100 years alone." (p. 80)
Unfortunately, the draft statement does not consider this
issue, and, thereby, obscures the true dimensions of the
potential ill-health effects of the nuclear power industry.
Furthermore, the failure to evaluate the total, cumulative
health effects distorts the cost-benefit analysis.
Consider the carbon-14 problem alone. The draft
statement lists 12,000 health effects over 100 years for the
carbon-14 releases through the year 2000. (p. 82) With a
half-life of 5700, however, only 0.012 of the released
carbon-14 has decayed by that time. At the same rate, as
for the first 100 years, then, the remaining carbon-14 could
cause a total of one million health effects. Similar calcula-
tions can be made for the other long-lived radionuclides.
While such calculations may overestimate the total
impact of the released radionuclides, it seems prudent to use
these estimates of total effects for the purposes of assessing
the potential impact of the nuclear power industry and rulemaking.
Naturally, the estimates can be reasonably reduced if there
is evidence of a significant amount of sequestering of the
radionuclides away from human exposure pathways.
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A-59
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C. The Health Effects On Future Members Of
The General Population Due To Radiation
Exposure Of Nuclear Workers Should Be
Assessed
During the six year period 1969 through 1974, the
average person-rein per megawatt-year was about 1.3, with a
CO/
range from 0.9 to 1.6.—' An earlier study suggests that as
the large nuclear power plants age, the average person-rem
per plant tends to increase due to the accumulation of radio-
active crud.—' The total person-rems for individual plants
54/
needing substantial repairs can be considerably higher.—
Assuming a projected 1,200 gigawatts of nuclear capacity
by the year 2000 (p. 9), then the total annual occupational
exposure at these plants could be about 1.6 X 10 person-rems.
Since EPA estimates that the general world population exposure
due to the current operation of the American nuclear power
industry is 0.1 person-rems per megawatt (p. 103), the expec-
tation in the year 2000 is for a total of 1.2 X 10 person-rems
of exposure directly to the general world population. In
other words, the total occupational exposure is 13 times the
general population exposure.
52/ NRC, "Occupational Radiation Exposure At Light Water Cooled
Power Reactors, 1969-1974," NUREG-75/032, p. 7 (June 1975).
53/ Pelletier, et al., "Compilation and Analysis of Data on
Occupational Radiation Exposure Experienced at Operating Nuclear
Power Plants," prepared for Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.,
pp. 11-16 (September 1974).
54/ For instance, during a few months to repair Indian Point-1,
a 265 MWe plant, the total exposure was 3,500 person-rem.
Nuclear News 18, p. 56 (September 1975).
This is a significant point because the occupational
exposure affects the world's genetic pool just as though the
radiation dose were given directly to the general population
without the intermediacy of the occupationally exposed. Thus,
EPA errs when it states that "a standard of 1 person-rem per
MW(e) would have no impact whatsoever on either population
exposures due to short-lived radionuclides or on local or
worldwide environmental buildup of long-lived radionuclides."
(p. 103) The final statement should reevaluate the advantages
of alternatives taking into consideration the genetically
significant dose received by nuclear workers.
The genetically significant dose received by nuclear
workers should also be factored into consideration in the
statement's discussion of whole body dose at the boundaries
of reactor sites. (pp. 38, 39) That is, EPA seems to provide
assurance that the average whole body dose to the population
is vanishingly small, since the maximum whole body dose at the
boundaries of a reactor site would be less than 6 millirem
per year.. This is a misrepresentation, however, in that the
genetically significant dose to nuclear workers, averaged over
the entire child bearing population, is roughly equivalent to
this maximum whole body dose at the boundary.—7 The final
statement should include a discussion of this effective added
55/ For the year 2000, the occupational exposure is 1.6 million
person-rems to be distributed into the population. Assuming
roughly one-half of the population is of childbearing age,
there would be 800,000 person-rems distributed into 100 million
people, for an average genetically significant dose of 8 millirems.
-39-
A-60
-40-
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gonadal exposure to the general population in the section on
the radiation effects of nuclear power reactors.
Using the NAS Committee estimates for genetic effects
induced in the general population by radiation exposure of 5
rem per generation, 1.6 million person-rems annually to workers
for 30 years would eventually result in about 3,000 to 75,000
serious genetic diseases in the nuclear workers' descendants.—'
EPA should carefully consider this impact in its evaluation
of the total harm caused by the nuclear power industry.
Ill
THE DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
DOES NOT CONTAIN AN ADEQUATE
COST-RISK-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
56/ NAS-NRC, Division of Medical Sciences, Report of the
Advisory Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radia-
tions, The Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels
of Ionizing Radiation, p.57(November 1972).
The calculation of the economic costs and benefits
of the proposed action and alternatives is wholly inadequate
because it fails entirely to consider (1) uncertainties in
the extent of health effects caused by radiation exposure
of the population, (2) the effects of radionuclides released
to the environment during the entire time they emit radiation,
(3) the genetic effects on members of the general population
due to occupational exposures of nuclear workers, and (4) the
extent of radionuclides released during unplanned, unusual
or abnormal operations.
The last three issues have been discussed in Chapter
II, above, and will, we hope, receive adequate attention in
the final statement. The issues of the extent of harm poten-
tially caused by chronic, low-levels of radiation also requires
consideration by EPA in the final statement.
The draft statement concludes that the linear, non-
threshold, dose-rate-independent model ". . .is the prudent
one for use in deriving radiation standards to protect the
public." (p. 21, footnote deleted) We agree that it is
reasonable to use that model for calculational purposes. How-
ever, because the linear hypothesis is not necessarily conser-
vative, NRDC does not agree that the linear hypothesis is
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A-61
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always "prudent".
Professor Karl Z. Morgan has recently commented on
the possible reasons that the linear hypothesis may not be
conservative as follows:
"Often it is stated in the literature that
the linear hypothesis, as presently applied,
is a very conservative assumption. During
the past few years, however, many studies
have indicated that this probably is not
true in general and that at very low doses
and dose rates somatic damage per rad pro-
bably is usually greater than would be
assumed on the linear hypothesis. There
are many reasons for this, some of which
are:
1. The linear hypothesis is based on extra-
polations to zero dose of effects of radia-
tion on humans at intermediate to high doses.
The points used on the curves at high doses
may be on the down part of the curve . . .
i.e. from the portions of the curve where a
large fraction of the highly exposed died .
of other types of radiation damage and did
not survive to die of the radiation effect
under study.
2. The extrapolations are made on human
data which in general relate human damage
such as bone cancer for observation periods
of no more than about 20 years. Many of
the conclusions are based on studies of
animals of life spans less than 10 years.
Since man lives for more than 70 years, the
slopes of these curves can only increase as
more human data are accumulated over his
entire life span.
3. The linear hypothesis assumes that man
is a uniform and more or less homogeneous
population. It applies to the average man
and may not be sufficiently conservative for
the fetus and for old people. It never takes
into consideration special groups such as
. . . [children with allergies, bacterial
or viral diseases].
4. There may be cell sterilization at inter-
mediate and high doses. By this we mean there
may be many cells in the body which are likely
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targets to become precursors of a clone of
cells which are malignant but they are
killed by the higher doses. In other words,
these cells may already have two of the
•series cancer switches' closed and a low
dose of radiation would likely close the
last switch in the final step toward cancer
production. A high dose, however, might
kill most such cells as it does in radia-
tion therapy which is used to destroy a
cancer.
5. For many types of radiation damage the
best fit curve is a plot of equation E = CD
in which E = effect, C = constant, D = radia-
tion dose, and n = constant. For the linear
hypothesis n = 1. In some cases n > 1 indi-
cating lesser damage at low doses but in
many cases the best fit to experimental data
is obtained when n < 1. Baum (16) recently
showed a best fit for cancer induction when
n = 1/2. In such case the linear hypothesis
would be non-conservative.
(16) Baum, J., "Population Heterogeneity
Hypothesis on Radiation Induced Cancer," given
orally at Houston, Tex. meeting of the Health
Physics Society, July 10, 1974."57/
A recent National Academy of Sciences report indicated
that there are three major unknowns which limit our knowledge
of the possible full impacts of a specified level of radiation
exposure. These are uncertainty about (1) the length of the
plateau period for solid tumors, (2) the latent periods for
types of cancer not yet thought to be radiogenic, and (3) whether
or not "radiation acts to multiply or to add to spontaneous
eg/
levels. " = °/ As additional information becomes available during
57/ K. Z. Morgan, "Reducing Medical Exposure to Ionizing
Radiation," Landauer Memorial Lecture given at Stanford
University, September 27, 1974. [AIHA 3_6 (May 1975)].
58/ National Academy of Sciences, Report of an Ad Hoc Panel
of the Committee on Nuclear Sciences, National Research Council,
"Research Needs For Estimating The Biological Hazards Of Low
Doses Of Ionizing Radiations," p. 29 (1974).
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the next 20 or 30 years, the NAS panel concluded that
". . . present risk estimates [could be refined] down by a
factor of 2 or up by a factor of 3 to 4."—'
All identifiable and estimable uncertainties should
be factored explicitly into the cost-benefit analysis in
the final statement.
IV
THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS ARE TOO WEAK,
VAGUE AND DO NOT ADEQUATELY IMPLEMENT
THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY'S
RADIATION PROTECTION GOALS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES
Five years ago the President's Reorganization Plan No. 3
transferred from the former Atomic Energy Commission to the
Environmental Protection Agency responsibility for setting
"... generally applicable environmental standards for the
protection of the general environment from radioactive material."
(p. 117) Pursuant to this new responsibility under the Reorgan-
ization Plan, in September 1973, EPA had prepared, in draft form;
a "Statement of Considerations" in setting environmental radia-
tion standards for the uranium fuel cycle, a Federal Register
notice of proposed rulemaking, and proposed standards.—/ Due
to a decision at a higher executive level outside the Agency,—/
EPA did not formally publish these materials. The regulations
now proposed (40 Fed. Reg. 23420 et seq., May 29, 1975) differ
in several significant ways from the earlier regulations.
5£/ Id. at p. 30.
— Statement dated January 10, 1974, and attachments provided
by Director, Criteria and Standards Division (HM-560), Office
of Radiation Programs, EPA.
— Memorandum dated December 7, 1973, from Roy L. Ash, Director,
Office of Management and Budget, to Russell E. Train, Administra-
tor, EPA and Dr. Dixy Lee Ray, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission.
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Unfortunately, the changes uniformly reduce the effectiveness
of EPA's general radiation protection standards, rather than
strengthen them.
A comparison of the two sets of regulations suggests
that during the past two years the nuclear proponents within the
Administration were successful in forcing EPA to back down from
its earlier stronger regulatory stance. The specific provisions
that were weakened since 1973 include, for instance, the condi-
tions under which a "variance" from numerical standards may be
obtained, the availability of information to the public, the
maximum permissible annual dose equivalent to the whole body or
any organ, and the effective date of the standards. Additionally,
the currently proposed regulations include other serious deficien-
cies, which were also present in the 1973 draft regulations^
These shortcomings and suggested ways to overcome them are dis-
cussed in detail below.
In general, we find that the regulations unnecessarily
and improperly delegate to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission too
much of EPA's responsibility to enforce "generally applicable
environmental standards for the protection of the general environ-
ment from radioactive material." Implicit in a duty to establish
standards is the responsibility to monitor implementation and
ensure compliance. However, the proposed regulations do not
assign to EPA any required role in reviewing the detailed implemen-
tation of the general standards it is preparing to promulgate.
Nor is EPA directly involved in verifying compliance, reviewing
variances or in making available to the public, information
about the effectiveness of NRC's implementation of the standards.
The lack of adequate supervision of implementation of the
regulations and control over the issuance of variances is at odds
with the purpose of Section 2(a)(6) of the Reorganization Plan,
which is intended to give EPA the responsibility to protect the
environment and public from radia'tion damage due to the release of
radioactive substances by the nuclear power industry.
While recognizing that constraints were placed on EPA's
role by the Ash Memorandum and the AEC-EPA Memorandum of Under-
standing (38 Fed. Reg. 24936, September 11, 1973), we believe
that EPA has gone too far in relinquishing control over the
effectiveness of its regulations. The specific revisions sug-
gested below do not exceed the boundaries established by the
Ash Memorandum, in our opinion, and would still substantially
increase EPA's role of assuring that, in practice, the proposed
standards increase protection of the public and environment
from unwarranted radiation damage.
A. There Are No Procedures Providing For EPA
Review Of The Implementation Of And Com-
pliance With The Proposed Standards
Clearly, simply promulgating the proposed standards will
not protect the public and environment from excessive radiation
damage. The regulations must also be strictly enforced. There
are basically three reviewing functions that EPA must perform
in order to meet its responsibility in assuring compliance with
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the environmental radiation protection standards.
First, EPA should formally review the procedures and
criteria adopted by the regulatory agency to implement EPA's
standards. Such review should include detailed analysis of the
adequacy of (1) computational models that the regulatory agency
allows licensees to use in estimating radiation doses, (2) pro-
cedures used in surveying, monitoring and reporting levels of
radioactivity around licensed facilities, and most importantly,
(3) the specific numerical guidelines or standards for each type
of facility,which are established by the regulatory agency to
implement EPA's generally applicable environmental radiation
protection standards. After completing its review of these
matters, EPA should periodically report to Congress and to the
public its conclusion about the adequacy of the regulatory agency's
implementation program and, where the program is deficient, make
specific recommendations for achieving the needed improvements.
Second, EPA should review the data generated by the
licensees and regulatory agency. The AEC-EPA Memorandum states
that the AEC will supply EPA with data relevant to radioactive
effluents. However, the detailed mechanisms for transmittal of
the data are not specified, nor are there adequate provisions for
making the information available to the public in an easily
understandable form. To correct these deficiencies EPA's regu-
lations should specify how, what and when data are to be
transmitted from the regulatory agency to the EPA. Furthermore,
there should be specific procedures for making both the regulatory
agency's data and EPA's evaluation of the adequacy of the data
available to the public upon request.
For instance, annually the regulatory agency should report
to EPA about (1) emissions of radioactive materials, in curies
by radionuclide, leaving the boundary of each licensed facility,
(2) the maximum annual dose equivalent to the whole body and
the thyroid to any member of the public as the result of all
licensed activities, (3) the estimated total population exposure
in person-rems resulting from all licensed activities, and
(4) the total person-rems of the gonadal and fetal occupational
exposures at each licensed facility, during the previous calen-
dar year. (These reports to EPA should be made available to the
public upon request.) Within a reasonable time, EPA should pub-
lish a report analyzing the data submitted by the regulatory
agency and state whether or not the generally applicable radia-
tion standards — as set forth as proposed Section 190.10 (a) and
(b) — had been met.
The EPA should also independently conduct an environmental
radiation 'survey around all facilities either granted a variance
by the regulatory agency or shown by the data submitted to EPA
of potentially being in violation of the proposed standards in
Section 190.10(a) and (b). The results of each survey and EPA's
conclusions based on the survey and other pertinent information
should be made publicly available within a reasonable period of
time.
Third, EPA should review the granting of variances by the
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regulatory agency to ensure that any variances granted do not
produce significant levels of human exposure to radiation and
releases of radionuclides to the environment in comparison with
EPA's standards.
Proposed Section 190.11 allowing variances is too vague
and permissive. In order to correct these deficiencies, the
proposed section should be revised to correspond more closely
to Section .22 of the September 1973 draft regulations. In
particular, the regulations should specify the information to be
provided by an applicant for a variance and the procedures and
criteria to be followed by the regulatory agency in evaluating
the application for a variance. EPA should require the regulatory
agency to prepare a statement setting forth the nature and dura-
tion of the variance as well as the detailed reasons for the
action prior to the actual granting of a variance. Also, the
procedures and requirements for making information about variances
available to the public must also be clearly specified.
Additionally, because the only reason put forward to
justify the issuance of a variance is "to protect the overall
societal interest with respect to the orderly delivery of elec-
trical power," (p. 143) variances should be permitted by the
regulatory agency only for electrical generating stations.—'
—' We can see no need to allow variances for other fuel cycle
facilities, e.g., spent fuel reprocessing plants, in order to main-
tain the "orderly delivery of electrical power," (p. 8) if, as EPA
hopes, variances will be granted for short durations only (p. 137).
In the event that variances are required for facilities other than
power plants, e.g., to alleviate a serious regional or national
economic situation, or a long-term energy shortage, there should be
ample time for special consideration and review, including public
input, by EPA.
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Furthermore, variances for operation of light-water-cooled reac-
tors should not be permitted unless a portion of the power which
could be generated by such a reactor is required to prevent a
power emergency and only then subject to the following conditions!
1. Releases of radioactive substances are kept as
low as technically po'ssible;
2. The operator of the reactor utilizes the variance
only as long as is deemed necessary by the regu-
latory agency to meet the power emergency;
3. All power available from inside or outside of the
utility system has been utilized and/or purchased
and appropriate load shedding has occurred;
4. The annual whole body and organ dose equivalent
limits specified in Section 190.10(a) for individuals
of the general public are not exceeded; and
5. Notice of issuance of the variance is published
concurrently in the Federal Register and a news-
paper of general circulation in the affected area,
and a statement justifying the variance is made
available to the public.
The notice should include the name and location of the facility
the nature of the emission for which the variance is being
granted, the anticipated duration of the variance, the maximum
individual dose estimated to result from the variance and the
reason for the variance.—
A-66
—' See, EPA, Draft Environmental Radiation Protection Standards
for Normal Operations of Activities in the Uranium Fuel Cycle,
Subpart C, Section .22 (September 1973) .
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Finally, in order to assist the regulatory agency as
far in advance as possible, we suggest that EPA's detailed evalu-
ation regarding the adequacy of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's
recently promulgated Appendix I to 10 C.F.R. Part 50, which
establishes numerical guides for light-water-cooled reactors,
be included in the final statement. (40 Fed. Reg. 19439 et seq.,
May 5, 1975) Unfortunately, Appendix I, as adopted, differs
significantly from the proposed Appendix I, a version which EPA
indicated would be consistent with the generally applicable en-
vironmental radiation protection standards, (p. 137) In particular,
we call EPA's attention to the following provisions of Appendix
I which do not appear to us to be consistent with EPA's radiation
protection philosophy and proposed standards:
1. NRC places emphasis on the annual dose or dose
commitment of premitted releases, and not on
the environmental dose commitment concept en-
dorsed by EPA.
2. Specific numerical limits on the amounts of
radionuclides that can be released are not
established, as would be required by Section
190.10(b) of EPA's proposed standards.
3. Radiation exposure limits are on a per reactor
basis rather than on a per site basis. Thus,
Appendix I may not set stringent enough limits
to meet EPA's proposed standards for energy
centers.
4. The licensee is not required to initiate
corrective action unless "... rates of
release of quantities and concentrations
in effluents actually experienced over any
calendar quarter indicate that annual rates
of release were likely to exceed 2 times
the design objectives . . . ." (40 Fed.
Reg. 19441). Such a policy does not seem
consistent with EPA's hopes that unplanned
releases will be small and of short dura-
tion.
B. Vague And Unduly Restrictive Definitions
Further Limit The Usefullness Of The
Proposed Standards
The definitional section of the proposed regulations is
very important. It should be intended to eliminate any ambigui-
ties in the body of the standards. Unfortunately, many of the
definitions in the proposed standards are themselves unduly
ambiguous and, in some cases, overly restrictive.
Some of these ambiguities are enumerated below; clari-
fying language and interpretation are suggested for consideration
in drafting new definitions. Generally, NRDC believes that to the
extent a definition reduces the applicability of the regulations
to potential radiation exposure from activities associated with
the generation of electricity at nuclear power plants, such
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limitations must be justified in detail in the environmental
impact statement. It should be noted that Section 2(c) of the
Reorganization Plan contains no indication of a limitation on
the scope of EPA's authority in this regard. Therefore, limi-
tations of applicability are permissible only if justified by a
showing that the possibility of Exposure from the excluded
sources of radiation are insignificant or that the benefits
of exclusion from regulatory control substantially outweigh
the risks from exceeding the standards.
1. Uranium Fuel Cycle - (a) The principal failing of
this definition in the proposed standards is the omission of
mixed-oxide fuel fabrication plants. Because, as discussed
above, the NRC is seriously considering licensing such facili-
ties, as part of the light-water-cooled reactor cycle, there
should be no exclusion for fuel fabricating plants that use
Plutonium.
Additionally, as discussed above, uranium mines and low
and high-level waste burial facilities should not be excluded.
Such facilities are integral parts of the fuel cycle and should
be operated in uniformity with EPA's radiation protection standards.
(b) This definition also excludes from coverage
facilities which have stopped "conducting operations." Thus,
at least one important potential source of radiation exposure,
abandoned uranium mill tailings, apparently would be exempt from
the standards. Because studies show that the gamma radiation
dose rate at three feet above uranium mill tailings may be
1 mrem/hr or more,— there does not appear to be any justification
for this limitation. Furthermore, as was discussed above, the
long-term release of radon gas from tailings piles may have a
substantial overall adverse effect on the public health. We
suggest adding the words "or have conducted" immediately after
the word "conducting." This would have the additional benefit
of extending coverage to the "decommissioning" of facilities.
(c) The meaning of the phrase "all facilities. . . to
the extent that these support commercial electrical power produc-
tion utilizing nuclear energy. . . ."is also open to overly
restrictive interpretations. For instance, this phrase might
be read as limiting the applicability of these regulations to only
that fraction of a facility's activities which supports commercial
nuclear power in the United States. EPA should make clear that
all effluents from facilities which even partially support the
production of electricity in the United States or elsewhere are
covered by the proposed standards.
Furthermore, use of the word "commercial" might be
interpreted to exclude reactors and other facilities operated
by governmental agencies, even though the electricity generated
is used in the private sector. In light of recent suggestions
that the federal government purchase nuclear power plants,— we
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^f Harris, et al., "Environmental Hazards Associated With The Milling
of Uranium Ore:A Summary Report," HASL-40, p. 15, Table X (June 4,
1958); Duncan and Eadie, U.S. EPA,"Environmental Surveys of the
Uranium Mill Tailings Pile and Surrounding Areas, Salt Lake City,
Utah," p. 33 (August 1974).
i5-/ See, for instance, Carter, "Nuclear Power: Westinghouse Looks
to Washington for a Customer" in Science 189, p. 29 (4 July 1975);
U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration, Nuclear Fuel
Cycle, ERDA-33, p. xiii (March 1975); and Nucleonics Week, p. /
(August 7, 1975).
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believe that this potential loophole should be firmly closed.
A third ambiguity in this definition is the applicability
of the standards to reactors, such as the N-reactor on the Han-
ford Reservation, which supply steam for the generation of
electricity for sale to utilities as a by-product to its primary
purpose — the production of plut'onium.
2. Site — The meaning of controlled access is improvi-
dently left to future interpretation. One can control access of
the public by many possible means ranging from erecting an
impenetrable physical barrier to posting "Keep Out" signs.
EPA should give guidance concerning the degree to which access
should be "controlled."
3. Uranium Ore — The restriction to ore containing only
0.05% or more of uranium by weight is evidently based on the AEC's
definition of source material (10 C.F.R. 40.4(h)). However, the
reasoning that led the AEC to exempt from licensing requirements
activities involving less than 0.05% uranium by weight (10 C.F.R.
40.13(a)), may not be valid for excluding less rich ores from EPA's
generally applicable radiation protection standards. If demand
for uranium increases sharply and' there is a commensurate increase
in the price of uranium, lower grade ores may be processed to
obtain uranium.—' We suggest that no reference be made to the
quality of ore in the definition. The crucial point is whether
or not uranium is extracted for eventual us- in light-water-
cooled power reactors. However, if the Agency wants to exclude
lower grade ore, then the final statement should discuss this
point and explicitly give the Agency's reasoning for the
exclusion.
4. Member of the Public — This definition is unjusti-
fiably restrictive. The higher allowable dose for individuals
exposed while working in a nuclear fuel cycle facility is usually
justified on the basis that such individuals reap directly the
benefits of such exposure and have voluntarily submitted them-
sevles to the risks. This rationale is not valid, however, to
genetic or fetal doses since it is not the workers but their
progeny, who will be harmed by the exposure. Thus, the injury
from genetic and fetal doses are suffered by individuals who,
like the members of the general public, neither reap a direct
benefit nor have voluntarily assumed the risk of exposure. The
proposed regulations should explicitly include restrictions on
genetic and fetal exposures of nuclear power workers.—/
—See, for instance, Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories,
Assessment of Uranium and Thorium Resources in the United States
and the Effect of Policy Alternatives,pp.5.21-5.30(December
1974).
—If EPA adheres to the view that it is prohibited by the
Reorganization Plan or the Ash Memorandum from setting standards
limiting genetic and fetal doses, then EPA should use its author-
ity from the former Federal Radiation Council at least to advise
the President about the need to reduce the maximum permissible
genetic and fetal doses of nuclear workers.
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5. Normal Operations — Although Section 190.10
appears to restrict application of the proposed standards to
"normal operations," the definitional section (§ 190.02) does
not specify what are "normal operations," in comparison with
"unusual operations" for which a variance is required by
S 190.11. A major difficulty, we believe, is determining
which releases from individual facilities may result in violation
of the overall primary standards.
In order to reduce this difficulty, the regulatory
agency should be required quickly to establish limits on the
releases of all critical radionuclides from individual facilities
under typical operating conditions, consistent with EPA's gen-
erally applicable radiation protection standards. EPA should
then certify, first, that individual facilities can, in fact,
typically operate within the NRC's limitations and, second,
that with all facilities operating under such conditions, EPA's
overall standards would be met. Then, "abnormal" or "unusual"
operating conditions could be defined in terms of the NRC
release limits for individual facilities.
C. The Proposed Standards Should Set Limits On
Total Releases Of All Critical Radionuclides.
The proposed regulations set limits on the total amounts
of krypton-85, iodine-129 and alpha-emitting transuranic radio-
nuclides (including plutonium-239) that can be released to the
general environment annually. EPA has correctly adopted an
approach to radiological protection of the public involving
emphasis on the actual long-term health effects rather than,
for instance, on the rate of exposure caused by a particular
radiation source. However, EPA's proposed regulations do not
contain limitations on two radionuclides, radon-222 and carbon-14,
that, according to EPA's own analyses, would contribute more to
human exposure than the radionuclides that would be controlled
by the proposed regulations. Furthermore, at least two addi-
tional radionuclides, strontium-90 and cesium-237, are not even
considered in EPA's analyses, although EPA has admitted elsewhere
that they potentially may cause significant long-term human
exposure.—'
EPA should correct this problem by setting firm limits
on releases of carbon-14 and radon-222 consistent with the
likely development of control technology. EPA also should set
out a schedule for determination of the potential health effects
that may be caused by planned releases of strontium-90 and
cesium-137 and for promulgation of standards limiting their
release into the general environment. This information
should be provided within the context of the proposed rulemaking
in order to give as much advance notice as possible to the
nuclear power industry about the standards it will have to meet
in the future.
68/ Environmental Radiation Dose Commitment; An Application
to the Nuclear Power Industry, EPA-520/4-73-002. p. 11 (Febru-
ary 1974).
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1. Carbon-14 — The analysis in the draft statement
shows that the total number of ill-health effects caused by
the unregulated radionuclide carbon-14, even on the basis of
EPA's arbitrary and improper calculation which is limited to 100
years following discharge, may be more than 10-fold greater than
the reduction in the ill-health effects achieved under the pro-
posed standards (i.e., 12,000 compared to 1210-180 = 1030).
p. 82) If the number of effects are calculated over the full
lifetimes of the radionuclides, the relative hazard of carbon-14
is probably even greater.
EPA states that a limit for carbon-14 was not proposed
"... only because control technologies . . . are not yet
commercially available." (p. 81) EPA, however, promises
"... carefully [to] follow the development of new knowledge
concerning both the impact and controllability of these [carbon-14
and tritium] radionuclides." (p. 133) We submit that this is
an inadequate response to EPA's duties to protect the environment
and public health from the potential hazards posed by a bur-
geoning nuclear power industry.
The excuse that carbon-14 should not be restricted by
the newly proposed regulations simply because adequate control
systems are not now commercially available rings hollow for two
reasons. First, and most importantly, this type of argument in
general is inappropriate for setting radiation protection stan-
dards. Standards are devised to protect the public, not to
permit the industry to proceed apace. It is the industry that
must modify its practices to conform with the standards required
to protect the public health, not the other way around. The
burden of proof should be on the industry that an exemption
to reasonable standards is necessary. At this time, EPA should
not make a judgment to risk the public health unduly without
detailed evidence that control of carbon-14 is not feasible
in the next few year's and that the release of carbon-14 is
amply justified by the benefits obtained from the processes
producing carbon-14.
Second, the fact that equipment to control releases of
krypton-85 below the proposed standards is not now commercially
available did not prevent EPA from proposing those limits.
And rightly so. Furthermore, as EPA admits, control of a
"substantial fraction" of the impact of carbon-14 releases
"... may be achievable through inexpensive modification of
systems that are installed to meet the requirements of the
proposed standards for krypton." (p. 84) However, if the
industry finds that technology cannot be developed to meet the
standards, then the industry must make its case, fully and publicly,
before EPA takes steps to relax a proposed standard for carbon-14.
Thus, EPA should, consistent with the proposed standards
for krypton-85, set a limit on the total release of carbon-14,
which may be one to three or more orders of magnitude more harmful
than the projected releases of krypton-85. Besides appropriately
giving the public and environment greater protection if fully
implemented, a proposed.limit on carbon-14 releases at this time
would put the industry on advance notice about EPA's intentions
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and force it to conduct, as it should, the necessary research
and development for controlling releases within the standard.
2. Radon-222 — The radionuclide radon-222, which ema-
nates in large quantities from uranium mines, mills and mill
tailings piles, and its decay products are specifically excluded
from the proposed standard for maximum dose; and no limit is
Placed on the amounts that the industry may discharge into the
general environment each year. (pp. 133-314) The draft state-
ment suggests three reasons for this major exemption. "There
exists considerable uncertainty [,first,] about the public health
impact of existing levels of radon in the atmosphere . . . [and,
second, about] the best method for management of new sources of
radon created by mans1 activities . ...» (p. 133) And,
third, "[exposures from radon and its daughters have previously
been the subject of Federal Radiation Protection Guidance, in
the case of underground uranium miners . . . , and of guidance
from the Surgeon General, in the case of public exposure due to
the use of uranium mill tailings in or under structures occupied
by members of the general public. ..." (p. 134)
These justifications are not consistent with EPA's
approach in regulating other radionuclides and, in any event,
are not persuasive. The draft statement, in fact, contains
no valid reasons for not including radon (and its decay products)
exposure in the maximum permissible dose and for not setting
a limit on the total amount of radon that can be released to
the general environment each year.
There is "considerable uncertainty" in the calculation
of the health effects due to the release of radionuclides that
are covered by the proposed regulations. For instance, the
draft statement admits that the total impact of transuranic
radionuclides is only very approximately known.(pp. 129-130)
Furthermore, the amount of plutonium, for instance, already in
the environment due to weapons testing is large. Yet,- EPA
has correctly argued in the case of transuranic radionuclides
that restrictions on additional planned releases are justified.
Similarly, the fact that a substantial amount of
naturally occurring radon exists in the air does not change
the fact that an additional quantity, which could produce harm-
ful effects, will be generated by man. since this additional
amount is controllable, whereas the level of naturally occurring
radon is not, EPA should focus on how to reduce man-caused releases
of radon. Also, we note that EPA was able, in its technical
back-up report for rulemaking, to estimate the potential ill-
health effects due to the emanation of radon from uranium mill
tailings piles.—/
Furthermore, general agreement at this time on the "best
method" for limiting radon releases is not required before stan-
dards are proposed. There is no such agreement in the case of
krypton either. Yet, quite correctly, EPA is proposing limitations
on releases of krypton. However, several technically and
|i/ EPA, Environmental Analysis of the Uranium Fuel Cycle, Part I
Fuel Supply, EPA-520/9-73-003-B, pp. 51-74 (October 1973) .
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economically practical means exist for substantially reducing
the amounts of radon released from uranium mill tailings, accor-
ding to a detailed report for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.^'
Therefore, EPA has avilable to it an assessment showing
that technically economically practical methods are available
to reduce substantially the emanation of radon from tailings
piles. This is all that is required prior to the inclusion of
radon releases in the proposed standards.
D. The Scope Of The Proposed Regulations Should
Be Expanded To Include All Nuclear Fuel Cycles.
Section 190.10, "Standards for Normal Operations,"
applies only to the uranium fuel cycle. As discussed above,
we believe that EPA has defined the "uranium fuel cycle" too
narrowly by excluding plutonium recycle operations and other
activities and facilities associated with the complete uranium
fuel cycle. Additionally, however, the restriction of the
proposed radiation protection standards to the full uranium fuel
cycle, that is, including the activities now omitted, would
still not sweep broadly enough for the purposes of Section 190.10.
The nuclear power industry and ERDA will be placing
increasing reliance on the thorium fuel cycle. Already, one large
commercial High Temperature Gas Reactor, which uses thorium fuel,
70/ Sears et al., Correlation of Radioactive Waste Treatment Costs
iHd the EnvTrSHmenFal Impact of Waste Ettiuents in the Nuclear Fuel
Cvcle for Use in Establishing "as Low as Practicable' Guides -
Milling of Uranium Ore, ORNL-TM-49UJ, vox, i, May 1975.
-65-
has been constructed. HTGR's will increase in number to about
15% of new non-breeder additions by 1990.H/ In our opinion,
EPA should include the thorium fuel cycle within the purview
of its proposed regulations in order to protect the environment
and public consistent with its overall regulatory objectives
and in order to give the infant thorium industry adequate advance
notice about the standards it will have to meet.
E. The Proposed Regulations Should Contain A
Section Limiting Occupational Exposures That
Result In Damage To Future Members Of The
General Population.
As discussed above, two radiological consequences of
the nuclear fuel cycle are an increased number of deleterious
genetic mutations affecting future members of the general popu-
lation, and radiation damage to fetuses (or unborn members of
the general population). Gonadal and fetal exposures do not
fall within the usual meaning of "occupational exposures" in
the sense that no direct benefit is received to compensate for
the potential harm and the future members of the population
have no choice as to whether or not they receive the radiation
exposure. Thus, in our opinion, it is appropriate to set limits
Energy, p. 10 (April 28, 1975)
-66-
A-73
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on gonadal and fetal radiation exposures within the context
of the proposed regulations.
In order to protect the fetus, the International Com-
mission on Radiological Protection and the National Council on
Radiation Protection and Measurements recommend that fertile
women workers (with respect to the fetus) receive no more than
a maximum dose of about 0.5 rem during the gestation period.^/
This lower dose is consistent with the conclusions in the
BEIR report that the human fetus may be particularly susceptible
to leukemogenesis and other carcinogenesis following radiation
exposure.—'
When the genetic effects to future generations, as
estimated in the BEIR report™/ are considered, a reduction in
the maximum permissible exposure to 0.5 rem per year for all
nuclear workers appears amply justified.ZI/ The proposed
regulations should limit the genetically significant dose and
the fetal dose to 0.5 rem per year in order to protect adequately
future members of the general population.
Review of the Current State of Radiation Protection
n Deport wo. 4j, pp. J<»-jb (January Ib, iy/bj .
Zl/ National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, The
Effects on Population of Exposure to Low Levels of lonizina ~
Radianon. p. 89 fNnvpmhoT- 16??). - izinq
7_4/ Id., p. 57.
25/ NRDC is in the process of preparing a report on this matter
and will submit it to EPA for consideration in the near futureT
F- The Proposed Standards Should Set Limits.On
The Total Releases Permissible Due To Abnormal
Operations.
The limits that would be established by the proposed
standards apparently pertain only to normal operations of the
uranium fuel cycle. EPA optimistically assumes that unplanned
releases will not significantly contribute to the environmental
burden of radioactivity and radiation exposure of humans.
On the other hand, there is reason to doubt that the
industry will continually meet the justifiably high standards
proposed by EPA. If "abnormal" releases of radionuclides
were regularly to exceed the values in the proposed standards,
then, obviously, the effectiveness of the standards would be
substantially reduced. Therefore, in order to ensure that
unplanned, abnormal, or unusual releases do not become
excessive, NRDC recommends that the proposed limitations
on total releases of radionuclides include all releases from
the nuclear fuel cycle without the current implied exemption
for "abnormal" or "unusual" operations.—/
76/ In any event, the phrases "normal operations" and "unusual
operations" should be clearly defined and not left unduly am-
biguous, as they are now. In particular, EPA should spell
out in detail how the regulatory agency would determine when
a variance is required.
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A-74
-68-
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P-26
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in detail above, NRDC
finds that the draft statement does not meet the requirements
of the National Environmental Policy Act. Furthermore, NRDC
finds that the proposed standards are wholly inadequate to-
achieve the objective of protecting the public and^environ-
ment from unduly high levels of radiation from operations
of the nuclear power industry.
P. 0, Box 1393
l«itura, Ca. 93001
September 30, 1975
Director, Criteria and Standards DivUion (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D. C. 2014.60
Dear Sir:
Reference your invitation for comments from the public. The
Proposed Standards for Radiation Protection for Nuclear Power .
Operations, Federal Register , Thursday May 29, 1975, yol.^°!_
Number lOij., part II, are in disregard of Teaman and animal life
and are therefore totally unacceptable.
The proposed standards are legally, morally, socially, and
economically unacceptable. Legally, the proposed standards
are not in accordance w ith the United States Constitution which
guarantees life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Morally,
the production of electrical power by nuclear reactors does
not justify the continued long term widespread poisoning or
our environment and the associated disease, death, and destruction
of our genetic inheritance. For example largely because of
the nuclear pollution of our environment to date one in four
or around 50,000,000 Americana are expected to develop cancer.
This is more individuals than were put to death during WWII I
believe, and cancer of course is only one aspect of the public
health problem being created. Economically, when the total
costs of the public health problems created are added to the
overall costs of nuclear power production, the economic cost
is astronomical and totally unacceptable, indeed destroying
the economic viability of our system.
Since the nuclear industry has clearly demonstrated its inability
to produce electrical power consistant with the economic, social,
moral, and legal best interest of our society over the last
quarter of a century, existing nuclear power production facilities
should be converted to use natural gas or other convenient
fuel rather than nuclear fuel as the heat source for the generation
of steam to produce electricity. The nuclear reators can be
retained on site for use in the case of a national emergency
or any future energy difficulties which would justify their
use, and can be used if needed until the alternate boilers
are installed and operational.
-69-
A-75
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P-27
I would appreciate a copy of the results of the air, water.
oil, tobacco, and food samples your agency has monitored this
year for all forms of radiation contamination, and the results
ol the members of the general public checked for radiation
in LSX!n?' aV?ii:L a8 a*11*1*18 a*"1 fish s° monitored, particularly
in California and Nevada. Has there been a significant increase
P°llu]:ion.thi3 year, and is it caused by the increased
Resting in Nevada or increased world wide pollution
?;*1?. •*«•» What facilities are available
Califoria ^at will perform body burden testing?
Finally I would like to know the status of your involvement
in standards for non-ionizing radiation. The public health
S thA « K?f E1"88!?* nuclear Pollution problem is second only
nor, ?o P flio !al!? Problel11 created by the non-control of
n?n~io?lzing radiation, causing damage to the CNS and thus
alfecting the performance of the EPA.
President Ford
Congressman Lagomarsino
Until the world ends,
Cornell University
LABORATORY OF ATOMIC AND SOLID STATE PHYSICS
CLARK HALL • ITHACA, NEW YORK 14853
October 13, 1975
Director
Criteria and Standards Division
AW-560
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
Gentlemen:
o ^ I/1Sh t0 comment on vour "Draft Environmental Statement on the Environmental
Radiation Protection Requirements for Normal Operations of Activities in the
Uranium Fuel Cycle" (May 12, 1975).
Based on a study of the United States Environmental Protection Agency it
has been shown (see enclosure) that the radon-222 emanating from the uranium
mill tailings piles in the U.S. alone will, be the year 2000, increase the
average atmospheric radon concentration in the U.S. by -0.5%, if the nuclear
energy consumption develops according to current forecasts and if no disposal
methods for the tailings will be introduced. Since the radon results from the
decay of thorium-230, whose half-life is 76,000 years, the man-made increase of
the radon concentration will persist into the indefinite future, even though the
half-life of the radon is short (3.8 days). If the current rate of radon-induced
lung cancer deaths in the U.S. is estimated as 4,000/year, then the additional
radon will cause 20 additional cases every year in the U.S., and another 20 in
the Northern Hemisphere, assuming the population to remain constant at the present
Since your draft considers carefully the health impact of krypton-85 a
comparison between these two isotopes may be useful: Based on the concept of
the environmental radiation dose commitment, the health impact of krypton-85
i.e. the number of serious health effects/GW(e)y of electrical energy produced
is 0.034/GW(e)y for krypton-85. The amount of the tailings quoted above will
generate approximately 104 GW(e)y in LWR's. Hence, the krypton from that energy
would be expected to cause a total of 3.4 x 10~2 x 104 = 340 cases of serious
health effects, worldwide. The radon from the tailings accumulated from the
generatl0n of the same energy will cause the same number of serious health effects
in less than 10 years. Over a period of 100 years, it will cause 4,000 such
effects, and so on.
In view of this comparison it seems highly desirable to include radon
emission standards into your draft, and to present estimates of the costs of
avoiding the health impact of this isotope. Note that the only responsible
solution is one that would guarantee isolation from the biosphere for periods on
the order of the half-life of thorium-230 and that seems to exclude all disposal
A-76
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Director
October 13, 1975
Page 2
sthods other than to reseal the tailings in deep mines.
Sincerely yours,
Robert O. Pohl
Nuclear Energy: Health Effects of Thorium-230
Robert O. Pohl
(The author is professor in the Physics Department,
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853)
The uranium mill tailings represent a substantial and so far largely neglected
health hazard in the nuclear fuel cycle.
Introduction
In every debate on nuclear energy, its proponents emphasize two points:
1) The costs of nuclear energy in terms of human health are between one
hundred and ten thousand times smaller than those of energy produced from coal.
2) Although the nuclear waste is highly toxic, it is concentrated in a
small volume which simplifies its safe disposal.
In this paper, we want to show that both of these claims are incorrect,
because the waste generated at the uranium mill has not been taken into account.
The following discussion is based to a large part on "Environmental Analysis
of the Uranium Fuel Cycle", a report published by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency in October, 1973 (1).
As an introduction, it may be useful to review what we consider to be
the only acceptable method of determining the health costs of nuclear energy
(2): The generation of a certain amount of electrical energy W in a fission
reactor results in a certain number n of radioactive nuclei of a certain
isot opic species, i. A fraction of these nuclei will enter the biosphere,
and as they decay with a certain decay rate (unit: Curie) characterized by
their half-life T ,0 , they will cause a radioactive dose rate to be absorbed
1/2 f i
by every person (unit: rem/year). The entire population will receive the
so-called population dose rate R from these nuclei (unit: man rem/year);
R varies with time. By the time all nuclei have decayed, i.e. after many
half-lives, the nuclei will have caused a certain integrated dose among the
A-77
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- 2 -
- 3 -
population (unit: man re*). Because of the. long half-lives of some Isotoplc
species, this dose may be spread over many generations. The technical term
for this dose is environmental radiation dose commitment. D (3). A certain
number NA of somatic and genetic health effects will be caused by D .
The connection between dose and health effect has recently been reviewed in
the BEIR Report (4). Some of these health effects, say F , will be fatal,
and hence one can express the impact of the energy W on the health of the
present and of all future generations as the sum F of all F caused by
the different isotopes resulting from the generation of W divided by this
energy W (unit: Number of deaths/unit of energy. As the unit of energy we
g
will use the CWfefcr = 10 watt year of electrical energy.) Let us call F/W the
health Impact (it can be translated into health costs by assigning a certain
dollar value to a life lost). Note that F is the number of people committed
to die as result of the energy produced, regardless of when they die. In
that sense, F/W corresponds to what the economists call the "forward costs"
of a product, to be distinguished from the annual costs, which are like
installment payments.
Previous estimates (5) of the health impact of nuclear energy have been
of the order of 0.01 deaths/GW(e)y among the general public, and 1 death/GW(e)y
among workers in the nuclear industry (only part of the latter were caused by
radiation, the rest by injuries). Similarly, estimates of the Impact
of electrical energy from coal were about 100 deaths/GW(e)y (70% among the
general public, mostly from air pollution, and 30% from occupational accidents).
A critical look at the assumptions made and the models used which resulted
in these favorable numbers for nuclear energy would be of interest (6). For
the sake of brevity, however, this will not be done in this paper. Instead,
we will consider only the contribution of one single isotope, thorium-230,
through some of its radioactive daughters. Their health effects had not been
considered in the earlier studies. We will ignore the health effects
of all other Isotopes and all health effects due to accidents in the nuclear
industry.
Thorium-230 and its Daughters
The generation of 1 GW(e)y in a reactor burning uranium-235, operating
with a 33% conversion efficiency from thermal to electrical energy requires
fissioning of 1.16 tons of uranium-235. Natural uraniuE contains 0.71% of
this isotope, the rest is uranium-238. Hence, 1 GW(e)y of electrical energy
requires the mining of 162 tons of uranium. Presently mined ore contains
0.1 - 0.2% uranium (by weight), and hence 8 x 104 to 1.6 x 105 tons of ore
have to be mined in order to generate 1 GW(e)y. Since both uranium Isotopes
are naturally radioactive, the ore will also contain their daughters. The
decay series for uranium-238 is listed in Table I. In'equilibrium, the rate
of decay of any one of the daughters is equal to Its rate of generation
("secular equilibrium"). From this we can calculate the numbers of each
isotopic species present in the ore in equilibrium with the parent isotope.
At the uranium mill, the ore is crushed and ground, and the uranium 1?
chemically separated (7). The residue, containing all the non-uranium
daughters in a water insoluble form, is discarded on the tailings pile.
From there, the chemically inert noble gas radon-222 can escape into the
atmosphere and can be carried over long distances. Thus, radon and its
daughters can affect large numbers of people. The EPA study estimated the
health effects of this gas and its short-lived daughters polonium-218 and 214, lead-214
and bismuth-214. It was found that from a pile resulting from the mining
of the uranium required to supply 159 GW(e)y, ^60 health effects (lung cancer)
would be committed during the first 100 years after Billing (8). At least 96%
of these lung cancers are estimated
A-78
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- 4 -
- 5 -
to be fatal, corresponding to a health impact rate of (60 x 0.95/159 = 0.36
deaths/GW(e)y)/100 y, apparently a rather small number.
Now, however, comes the important point: The isotope from which the
radon and its daughters are produced in the mill tailings is the very long-
lived Isotope thorium-230. During the 100 years considered in the EPA report,
only a minute fraction (dn/n ) of the thorium-230 will have decayed, namely
0.091%. The rest will decay later, with an exponential time dependence,
as illustrated in Fig. 1. The number of thorium nuclei which decay during
the first 100 years is represented by the area of the trapezoid under the
curve as indicated, of the width dt = lOOy; on the scale of the drawing, this
width is actually invisibly narrow. Hence, the total number of health effects
to be expected will be larger by the ratio of the total number of thorium-230
nuclei orginally in the pile divided by the number of nuclei which decay
during the first 100 years, or by the ratio of the area under the curve out
to an infinite number of years divided by that of the trapezoid. Hence, the
health impact resulting from the thorium-230 is FTh_23(^W--0.36/0.091% =
396 deaths/GW(e)y (9).
This number completely dwarfs the previous estimates of the health impact
of nuclear energy, and makes it comparable to that of energy from coal. The
mass of the waste containing the thorium is also comparable to that resulting
from burning coal: About 3 x 106 tons of coal are burned, and an average of
3 x 105 tons of fly ash are produced during the generation of 1 GW(e)y of
electrical energy.
The comparison of these numbers demonstrates that the much publicized
differences between coal energy and nuclear energy as mentioned in the
introduction are indeed non-existent, and that the only important difference
apparently is that for energy from coal, we have to pay ourselves, while for
nuclear energy, we let future generations pay. In the next section, we will
take a critical look at these findings.
Discussion
We will try to ask and to answer some of the questions which may have
occurred to the reader during the preceding section.
1) Q: How reliable are these numbers?
A: We believe that the order of magnitude is certainly correct -
at least within the assumption of the linear, non-threshold dose-effect
relationship, on which all present calculations of the health effect of low-
level ionizing radiation are based (4). In the Appendix, we will repeat the
EPA calculation for a greatly simplified model of the atmospheric distribution
of the radon t:^s, with which we will verify the numbers presented by the KPA.
2) Q: The dose rate to the individual resulting from the tailings piles
must be very small indeed. Isn't the assumption of a linear, non-threshold
dose-effect relationship rather dubious in this case?
A: The natural radon background results in an estimated dose rate of
0.; *vm/> to the bronchi of the average individual, as will be reviewed in the
Appendix. We have, unfortunately, no reason to believe that this rate is below
t>- ,shold. Once the threshold is exceeded, the linear hypothesis is a good
approximation for any additional radiation dose rate, no matter how small this is.
3) Q: The rate with which the health effects are caused by the radon from
the piles is very small. Is it worth paying attention to such effects?
A: The rate with which the radon affects the human health is 3.6 x
10~3/GW(e)y/y, i.e. every GW(e)yof electrical energy produced will result in
3.6 x 10~3 deaths among the worlds population every year for thousands of years,
as we saw above. The question whether this is a large or a small rate Is a
moral one, to which people will have different answers. It should be pointed out,
T
A-79
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- 6 -
however, that this rate is higher than the one resulting from the fission product
isotope krypton-85, which is 2 x 10~3/GW(e)y/y at the time of its generation (10).
The health effects caused by this isotope have been a matter of concern for a
long time, and have resulted in much research and engineering effort to devise
means of retaining and storing this isotope. Hence it seems logical that the
radon should receive similar attention. Note, however, a crucial difference
between the two isotopes: The krypton-85 will cease to cause health effects
on a time scale of its half-life, which is 10.76y. For the radon, this time
scale is 76,000y, and hence the total number of health effects committed is
approximately ten thousand times larger.
4 ) Q: The thorium-230 in the ore would have decayed also without
having been mined. Why isn't that effect subtracted?
A: In the EPA report, it is emphasized that the radon can escape
far more readily from the finely divided tailings than from the *olid ore in
the ground. This shielding effect is illustrated by the fact that a 20 ft.
thick earth cover over the tailings pile would reduce the radon escape rate
by 90% (11) (present earth covers are no thicker than 2 ft). Hence, the
radon that escapes from the tailings pile was essentially isolated from the
biosphere prior to the mining.
3) Q: In this case, shouldn't the thickness of the pile itself provide
a reduction of the escape rate of the radon?
A: This was taken into account in the EPA study. With an average
thickness of 5 meter, only 23% of the radon set free in the pile was assumed
to get out (12). Were it not for this shielding, the health impact figure
would be ~* times larger, or ~1,700 deaths/GW(e)y. As the pile spreads by
erosion etc, this shielding effect would be reduced.
A-80
6) Q: Is it realistic to assume that the parent isotopes of the radon
will remain confined to the tailings pile for thousands of years?
A: The long-term effects of wind and water erosion and of leaching
cannot be predicted. As was pointed out in the answer to the preceding
question, though, these effects don't necessarily lead to a reduction of the
radon emission rate. Within the limits of the accuracy of the estimate
presented here, the assumption of a stable mill tailings pile appears to be
a reasonable compromise.
7) Q: Can't the health effects of the thorium-230 be eliminated by
re-burying the tailings in the mines from which the ore came?
A: Certainly, just as we could clean up the effluents from coal
fired plants, but the volumes involved in either case are very large indeed.
A 1 GW(e) coal fired plant, burning coal with a 10% ash content, produces
5
3 x 10 tons ash per year, which is the same order of magnitude as the mass
of the tailings (~10 tons/GW(e)y). The only solution which currently appears
to offer a reasonable promise of isolation for times of the order of 104 - 105
years is to re-seal the tailings in abandoned deep mines. Since the tailings
are less densely packed than the ores, and since about 50% of the ore
presently mined come from open pit mines, abandoned' uranium mines will not
have enough capacity. The alternative method of chemically concentrating
the toxic substances and burying them with the high level waste appears
highly inadvisable at this time in view of the many unsolved problems
associated with the high level waste disposal.
Anyway, some quick decision is urgently needed, or else the total volume
alone will preclude any action we might later wish to take: As of 1970, there
were more than 8 x 10 tons of uranium mill tailings, corresponding to ~1030W(e)y
of electrical energy, occupying 8.5 x 106m2 in the U.S. (13).
8) Q: Coal also contains uranium and hence thorium-230. How large
are the health effects committed by it? •
-------
-8 -
- 9-
A: The average uranium concentration of coal is~10 gram uranium/gram
6
coal (= Ippm). During the generation of 1 GW(e)y, 3 x 10 tons of coal are
burned, containing 3 x 10 gram = 3 tons of uranium. As we saw before, 1 GW(e)y
of nuclear electric energy required mining 162 tons of uranium. Hence, ~60
times more thorium-230 is set free in the nuclear fuel cycle. From this we
estimate the health impact to be ~7 deaths/GW(e)y from thorium-230 and its
daughters set free by burning coal, which is minor relative to the other
health effects of coal (most of this radioactive health effect can also be
eliminated by burying the ash which contains most of the uranium and its daughters)..
9 Q: But what about the uranium-238 in the coal? It will act as a
source of thorium-230 for times extending for billions of years.
A: The activity of the thorium-230 set free by burning coal follows
the exponential time dependence shown in Fig. 1, except that, per GW(e)y, the
scale on the vertical axis will be 50 times smaller. The uranium in the ash,
however, will cause the thorium activity to remain constant for the order of
a billion years, since the decaying thorium-230 is constantly replenished by
the uranium-238. Of course, the same problem will be encountered with the
uranium-238 presently stored at the nuclear fuel enrichment plant, unless ways
are found of either burning it in a breeder, or else disposing of it safely.
10) Q: Clearly, many of our activities will influence the well-being
of future generations, in a negative as well as in a positive way. Why
focus on one single aspect, whose detrimental effects are spread over
hundreds of thousands of years and hence are highly dilute?
A: The purpose of this paper was merely an attempt to rectify two
misconceptions. The way in which these facts should influence our decisions
is an entirely different question. It is to be hoped, however, that our
concern about the long-range commitment inherent in nuclear energy should
open our eyes to other, and potentially far more serious threats for future
life on our planet - for instance, the threat of a man-made change of the climate.
Let us return to the question of whether the radon effects should really be
considered "dilute".' The following calculation may help to visualize the
magnitude of the health effects we are committing by not properly disposing
of the mill tailings: According to a frequently quoted forecast of the
expansion of the nuclear industry, the cumulative amount of natural uranium
required In the U.S. to fuel its reactors between 1973 and 20OO is approximately
2 x 106 tons (14), even if breeder reactors become available as early as 1990.
Breeders can burn uranium-238 and hence use the uranium far more efficiently.
162 tons of uranium commit, through the thorium-230 in the mill tailings, a
total of 396 deaths worldwide, or a constant number of 0.0036deaths every
year for times of the order of 10 years, as we saw above. Hence, the
2 x 106 tons uranium needed to supply the U.S. nuclear energy during the next
twenty-five years will result in a commitment of ~45 deaths per year, every
year, for the coming tens of thousands of years.
Conclusion
Based on the "Environmental Analysis of the Uranium Fuel Cycle" published
by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, we have shown that the two
standard claims made by proponents of nuclear energy are indeed untenable:
As far as health effects and the amount of waste is concerned, nuclear energy
is at least as bad as coal. The radon hazard in itself is no catastrophe for
nuclear power, because we can, in principle, bury the tailings. What Is
disturbing, however, is that for such a long time the health effects committed
by the thorium-230 have not received their proper attention. Consequently,
we must ask ourselves, how many other serious threats to the health of ourselves
and our descendants may still be unknown? This question should not be
restricted to nuclear energy; it Is, however, undeniable that an industry
which is developing and expanding as rapidly as the nuclear Industry, must
be particularly carefully scrutinized.
A-81
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The initial stimulus to explore this matter resulted from the probing
question by my colleague, David M. Lee. Much of the background study was
done with the support of a fellowship by the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial
Foundation, which is gratefully acknowledged. I also wish to thank
Dr. N. S. Nelson from the Environmental Protection Agency for his advice.
- 11-
Appendix
Model Calculation of the Health Impact
The model tailings pile contains the mill tailings from the ore mined
2
= 500 x 10~12 Curie/m2 sec (12). From
to produce 159 GW(e)y of electrical energy. Its surface area is a = 1 km2,
its radon emission rate is
this, the projected health impac* rate is dF^^lt =(60 x O.c5=)57 deaths/159GHr(e)y)/
100 y. In order to verify this crucial number, on which the conclusions in
the text are based, we use the following simple model for the distribution of
the radon gas through the atmosphere. As the gas escapes from the plle>
it immediately distributes itself uniformly over the conterminous U.S. (area
6 2
A = 7.7 x 10 km ), to which it remains confined as it decays. The natural
background radon emission rate is of the order of r = 10~12 Curie/m2 sec (1 S)
This emission rate gives rise to a ground level atmospheric radon activity of
P
nat
—10 3
Curie/m (l6)> In our model. ^e emission rate from the pile
will cause the following average ground level radon activity:
pile
pile
'nat
A "nat
6.5 x 10~15 Curie/m3.
(1)
The EPA report lists the conversion factor d/p from radon concentration in the
atmosphere to dose rate to the critical portions of the lungs (17):
d/p = (4 x 10~3rem/year)/ (10~12 Curie/m3). (2)
Hence, the activity resulting from the pile causes the bronchial population
dose rate
8 3
Rn X ppile d/p = 5 -2 x 10 •»«» rem/year. (3)
The BEIR report (18) has determined the conversion factor from bronchial
population dose to lung cancer fatalities, and we use their value as used in
the EPA report (I9):
50 deaths (4)
lung cancer fatalities
bronchial population dose
10 man rent
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- 1.3-
From this and from RRn we compute the health impact rate of the pile radon as
(dF /At)/ W = (0.26 deaths/159 GW(e)y)/y, or
Rn
= «26 deaths/159 GW(e)y)/100 y.
,(57 deaths/159GW(e)y)/100y,
The agreement with the value derived in the EPA study^s encouraging,
although the closeness is probably fortuitous to some degree. Contrary to
what one might suspect, though, the confinement of the radon to the U.S. is not
too unrealistic, because the population density of the U.S. is rather close
to that of the Northern Hemisphere (2 x 108/7-7x 106 km2 = 26 km'2 vs. 3.5 x 109/
2.6 x 108 km2 = 14 km"2 Hence, as we increased the
radon density in our model by restricting the gas to the U.S., we simultane-
ously decreased the exposed population by thfe sa«factor, which leaves the
population dose unchanged. Still, our model suffers from not considering
the radioactive decay as the radon gas spreads from the mill tailings pile,
but the error introduced by this simplifying assumption appears to be small!
with a modest windspeed of lOmph the radon will travel ~1000 miles during its
half-life (3.8 days).
The most uncertain step in the calculation of the health impact is the
conversion from the atmospheric radon concentration to the bronchial dose
rate (17). It depends critically on the thickness of the mucus layer and
the cells which the u-particles have to penetrate before reaching the basal
cells of the bronchial epithelium believed to be the critical biological
target (20)- As a control, we calculate the incidence rate of fatal lung
cancers expected from the natural background radon emission, using the
conversion factor used by the EPA (d/p, eq.(2)). From this we obtain
R =2x10— p^=8xlO man rem/year, (5)
Rn,nat p 'nat ' '
as the bronchial population dose rate to the present U.S. population. Using
the conversion factor from dose to fatalities (eq. (4)), we obtain the
fatality rate from natural background radon:
dF
Rn,nat _ R '. 50 deaths' _ 4,000 deaths/year. (6)
ijj. — Rn, nat g —
10 man rem
This is ~8% of the present rate of fatal lung cancer occurences (~60,OOO/year),
a somewhat large but probably not unreasonably large fraction.
To summarize, the crude estimates presented in this appendix yield results
whose orders of magnitude agree with those obtained in the EPA study. Although
these estimates must not be viewed as a simpler way of obtaining the same
results, the agreement does show that the order of magnitude of the EPA figures
is indeed quite reasonable.
A-83
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- 1 5-
References
*• Environmental Analysis erf the Uranium Fuel Cycle, Part I - Fuel Supply,
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Radiation Programs,
Washington, D.C. 20460. EPA-520/9-73-003-B, issued October, 1973.
2. The health impact of other modes of energy production, such as the
burning of coal, is determined in an analogous manner.
3. The importance of the environmental radiation dose commitment for the
determination of the health impact of nuclear energy has been emphasized
by the Environmental Protection Agency for some time. See, for instance,
A.C.B. Richardson, "The Historical Development of Concepts of Radiation
Dose Commitment", paper presented at the Symposium on Population Exposures,
Oct. 21-24, 1974, Knoxville, Tennessee, and "Environmental Radiation Dose
Commitment: An Application to the Nuclear Power Industry", U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, EPA-520/4-73-002, Feb. 1974.
4. "Biological Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing
Radiation" (BEIR report), National Acade.ny of Sciences, Washington, D.C. 1972.
5. L.A. Sagan, "Human Costs of Nuclear Power", Science 177, 487 (1972) and
"Health Costs Associated with the Mining, Transport, and Combustion of
Coal in the Steam-electric Industry", Nature 250, 107, 1974; B. L. Cohen,
"Perspectives on the Nuclear Debate", Bull. Atomic Scientist 30, 35,
(Oct. 1974); Richard Wilson "Kilowatt Deaths", Physics Today 25, 73,
(Feb. 1972), and Richard Wilson and William J. Jones, "Energy, Ecology, and
the Environment", Academic Press 1974, in particular p. 351.
6. A common mistake is that of determining only the health costs resulting
from the radiation dose rate absorbed during the time in which the power P
is generated, which corresponds to the "annual installment payment"
mentioned in the text. Although this method includes the accumulation in
the biosphere of previously generated isotopes, it ignores the effects
of the long-lived isotopes, whose health effects are spread over hundreds
- 14 _
of years and longer. In the method used in the text, which is based on
the environmental radiation dose commitment, all these effects are
included, regardless of the time during which they will occur.
7. Ref. (1), page 21 ff.
8. m ref. (1), page 71 and Table 2-17, the number given is 200 instead of
60. It had been derived with a simple model of the atmospheric distribu-
tion of the radon; furthermore it was assumed that the U.S. population
would grow linearly with time from 205 million in 1970 to 300 million in
2020, and would stabilize at this level, while the world population
would grow with a rate of 1.9% (doubling time 37y) during the entire period.
The number of health effects quoted in the present text is taken from a
recent communication by Dr. W. H. Ellett, Acting Chief of the Biophysics
and Analysis Branch of the EPA. It is based on a more sophisticated
model of the atmospheric distribution; assuming a constant U.S. population
of 208 million, 32 health effects ai* expected in the U. S. over the next
100 y. Based on the present world population, the health effects outside
of the U.S. boundaries are estimated with this model to be comparable
to those occurring within the U.S. boundaries. If a popul.tion growth
rate equal to that used in the EPA,study (ref. 1) were included into this
more recent computation, we estimate that the health effects in the U.S.
would increase to ,44, and in the rest of the world to -80, thus increasing
the number used in the text by roughly a factor of 2. This uncertainty
should be kept in mind in the rest of this paper. See also ref. 9.
9- la this extrapolation as well as ia the following calculations we have
assumed the U.S. and the world population to remain constant (208 million
and 3.5 billion, respectively). Any increase of the steady state population
would result in a proportionate increase of the number quoted In the text.
For example, were the U.S. to stablize at 300 million, and the world at
10 billion, the health Impact would increase to ^80 deaths/GW(.)y.
A-84
-------
- 16 -
9
10. The population dose commitment for a population of 3.5 x 10 people resulting
5
from 3.5 x 10 Ci Kr-85 per GW(e)y can be obtained from (he UNSCEAR report
"ionizing Radiation, Levels and Effects", Report of the United Nations
Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, United Nations, 1972,
Vol. 1, Annex A, Tables 75, 55, and 22: 62 man-rem/GW(e)y for whole body, and
75 man-rem/GW(e)y for gonadal irraditation. With the dose to health effect
conversion factors listed in ref. 1, Part III - Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing,
Appendix D (for lung cancers, other fatal cancers, and serious genetic effects),
_2
these dose commitments translate to 3 x 10 serious health effects/GW(e)y,
4
over 10 times smaller than for radon. Because of the short half-life of Kr-85,
_3
however, the initial rate with which these effects are caused is 2 x 10 /GW(e)y/
y, almost as high as those for radon.
ll . Ref. (1), page 61, Table 2-13.
12. Rev. (1), page 57. In the EPA calculation it was assumed that 23% of
the radon generated in the pile would be free to diffuse through it, while
the rest remained trapped within the particles of the mill tailings (23%
may in fact be too low). Of these 23%, again only 23% would make it to the
surface. of the 5 meter thick pile before decaying. This means that only
5% of the radon generated in the pile make it to the surface, causing the
radon emission rate rRn = 500 x 10~12 Curie/m2 sec used in the EPA study,
and also in the appendix of this paper. The shielding effect referred to
in the text is that caused by the diffusion through the pile, i.e. the
second 23%.
13. Ref. (1), page 51.
14. "Nuclear Power Growth" 1974-2000, United States Atomic Energy Commission,
WASH-1139 (74), Washington, D.C., Feb. 1974, page 3.
15. Ref. (D, PaSc 58 •
16. UNSCEAR report, Vol. I, Tables 12 and 13, pages 79 and 80. Pnat varies
considerably between different locations, and also varies with time.
17. Ref. (1), page 70. For a detailed discussion of the radon-222 dosimetry,
see pages 63 ff, also ref. 15, pages 33 ff.
1 a Ref. (4), page 150.
19 Ref. (1), page A-18, Table A-ll.
20. Ref. (1), page 63 ff, and N. S. Nelson, private communication.
A-85
-------
Table I
Decay series of uranium-238, which constitutes 99.3% of the natural
uranium, n is the number of nuclei mined in order to obtain enough
uranium-235 for the generation of 1 GW(e)y of electrical energy. No allowance
has been made for the uranium-235 which is presently not extracted at the
isotopic enrichment plant, which is approximately 33% of the uranium-235
sent to the reactor (see Wilson and Jones, ref. (5), page 348), since it is
assumed that this uranium-235 (340 kg) will eventually also be separated
and utilized when the technology becomes available. In secular equilibrium,
i.e. after times comparable to the half-life of the longest lived daughter, and
provided that the rock has remained undisturbed (leaching etc.) during that period,
the activity of all daughters is equal to that of the parent, which is 55
Curie/GW(e)y (except for the nuclei on branches). From this, and the know-
ledge of the half-lives, one can compute »o>. for all isotope. This has
been done for a few of them. The last column lists the particles emitted
during the decay, and their energies.
Table I
Radionuclide
i
U238
234
Th
_ 234
Pa
u234
_230
Th
226
Ra
222
Rn "
_ 218
Po
214
Pb
214
Bi " (a)
_.210
Tl
_ 214
Po
210
Pb x
D,210
Bi
_ 210
PO
_206
Pb
Half-life
4.5 x 109y
24.1 d
6.75 h
2.47 x 105 y
4
7.6 x 10 y
1600 y
3.823 d
3.05 m
26.8 m
19.7 m
1.3 m
—A
1.64 x 10 s
21 y
5.01 d
138.4 d
stable
Number Particle omitted
no i lt>s energy (MeV)
OQ
4.1 x 10"* a> 4.3
6 x 1018 S> 0.19(b)
3, 0.51 (b>
2.25 x 1025 u, 4.86
7 x 10 u> 4.77
1.46 x 1023 a> 4.78
9.6 x 1017 a> 5.5
a, 6.0
ft 0 fi(b>
P, O,6
ft ^1 (b)*
P» >i
(b)
3, 1.9
a, 7.68
1.93 x 1021 ft, 0.015(b)
H T 9(b>
p, 1.2
u, 5.3
(a) Bi214 decays to Pb210 either via Tl210 or via Po214 (branching).
(b) maximum energy of most Intense £
* or u, 5.5 MeV
- 18-
A-86
-------
Figure Caption
Figure 1 While mining enough ore to obtain fuel for 1 GW(e)y, 55 Curies
of uranium-238 and of each of its daughters are mined. Thorium-230
is the longest-lived daughter that remains with the tailings. It
continuously generates radon-222. The curve shown, therefore, is
proportional to the radon emission rate from the tailings pile.
Thorium-230 Activity, Curie
A-87
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P-28
INDEPENDENT PHI BETA KAPPA ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY GROUP
Elise J»r«rd - Chtirman
CITIZENS RIGHTS COMMITTEE
M fr-'-T c^ttt, Hirt-ivillt. HT K V. 4WG1
1 15 Central Park We«t, N.Y., N.Y. 10023
October 13, 1975
Mr. Russell Train
Environmental Protection Agency
lj.01 M Street S.W.
Washington, D. C. 2C%60
Dear Mr. Train:
I write as chairman of the Independent Phi Beta Kappa
Environmental Study Group, a research society of professionals;
and as chairman of the Citizens Rights Committee, with
participants in 32 states, also as a member of the Scientists
Advisory Committee of Environmental Defense Fund and of the
Scientists Institute for Public Information. My work for the
doctorate was in biological sciences.
A report in the current Nucleonics Weelc of a letter to
the EPA from Mr. Nossick of the" NRC places us squarely on the
side of the EPA in relation to full participation in nuclear
power regulation and enforcement. It is our position that the
EPA's intentions to safeguard the environment and public health
have not been thoroughly realized in its draft impact statement
nor in its proposed standards but we appreciate fully that hope
for the protection of the people of the United States, the
present and future members of this society, rests to an awesome
extent on the integrity and efforts of the Environmental
protection Agency.
We hope indeed that you will hold a hearing on the problems
of the total nuclear cycle and consequent diverse and crucial
emissions problems, and that the qualified citizen advocates
may speak their minds, while those members of the public who
have strong convictions and in some cases neglected evidence,
scientific or experimental, may submit statements — the whole to
be available in a record for the use of the American people and
all others whom it may concern.
We wish to make our own contribution.
We are aware of pressures on the Environmental Protection
Agency. But we deplore deeply any influence to make nuclear
power promoters of the EPA, even by a largely unsubstantiated
statement in the body of an impact statement that nuclear power
is essential for several decades.
The one solely protectionist government organization
relied on by the citizBHs of this nation is the EPA which
should be solely concerned with environmental and human
safeguards and not with promotion of a technology.
In our view the purpose of the abolition of the
Atomic Energy Commission will be defeated if the Environmental
Protection Agency is routed or weakened in its proper purpose
with respect to the most complicated and fateful of
environmental issues, that of the nuclear cycle and its
impact.
Looking forward to an adequate public hearing,
EJ:eh
A-88
-------
Commor alth Edison
One First Na,.^nal Plaza. Chicago. Illinois
Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767
Chicago, Illinois 60690
1-1
Commonwealth Edison Comp.. /
Environmental Protection Agency
July 18, 1975
Page Two
July 18, 1975
Director
Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D. C. 20460
Subject:
Proposed Standards Concerning
Radiation Protection For Nuclear
Power Operations
Dear Sir:
Commonwealth Edison Company's personnel have stu-
died the proposed regulations and we hereby submit cer-
tain initial comments. Our most important concern is
with the need for further study and further rulemaking
proceedings. While the proposals at first glance ap-
pear workable, careful consideration reveals potential
problems with respect to administrative and technical
feasibility. To resolve these concerns, we request that
the EPA reach its final decision on the record after a
hearing in accordance with the following guidelines:
1. All documents utilized by EPA in pre-
paring the proposal and the accompany-
ing statements should be made available
for review for an adequate period.
2. All comments submitted in response to
the May 29, 1975 Federal Register no-
tice should be made available for an
adequate period.
3. If comments from the NRC do not con-
tain definitive information on the
possible means of implementing such a
standard, the NRC should be requested
to supply such comments.
4. A prehearing conference should be held
after the documents described in guide-
lines 1, 2 and 3 have been reviewed. At
this conference, parties desiring to make
oral statements could be identified and
ground rules established for examination
and other hearing procedures.
5. A public hearing should be held with
an opportunity for oral statements and
examination of witnesses. It is impe-
rative that NRC witnesses be available
for examination with respect to whether
that Agency can implement the regula-
tion as contemplated and with respect
to the manner of such implementation.
6. There should be a final opportunity
for briefs or further written comments.
It is our understanding that Mr. W. Rowe of the EPA
expressed receptiveness toward the concept of a further
hearing at a meeting with an Atomic Industrial Forum com-
mittee. We do not suggest that such a hearing need be
labeled "adjudicatory" with concomitant rights such as
discovery among all parties but at least the procedures
described above are necessary.
The administrative problems we foresee involve both
apportionment among fuel cycle facilities and the determi-
nation that no member of the public receives excessive ex-
posure. Until there is clear understanding of the feasi-
bility of implementing the regulation, its viability can-
not be determined.
Turning to substantive matters, our review indicates
that the dose limits proposed for Section 190.10(a) should
be achievable as a result of most, but perhaps not all, ope-
rations in the uranium fuel cycle. In this context, pro-
blems may arise with direct radiation at certain power
plants, with reprocessing plants since there is rela-
tively little actual operating experience, and with multi-
unit sites. The regulation may impose a particular problem
at sites where new units are added to existing units. We
are even more concern about the emission limits of Section
190.10(b). With respect to krypton 85 and iodine 129, we
do not believe regulations should be adopted before control
technology is successfully demonstrated. The adoption of
regulations before such a demonstration inevitably biases
future reevaluations. Moreover, the level of economic and
environmental costs associated with such treatment cannot
A-89
-------
Commonwealth Edison Comp^
Environmental Protection Agency
July 18, 1975
Page Three
1-2
1100 Ring Bldg., Wnhhifton, D.C. 20036
T.tephom: 202/331-8900
TWX 710-822-0126
now be determined. With respect to the proposed limitation
on alpha emitting transuranics, the infinitesimal release
limits contemplated require extremely careful evaluation.
Measurement is extraordinarily difficult at such low levels
and, in view of measurement uncertainty, the level of treat-
ment necessary to assure compliance may yield substantial
effluent control and waste management problems. Each of
these matters and the adequacy of available data must be
investigated.
In a hearing such as we have requested, we would ex-
pect that the adequacy of the EPA's analysis of the tech-
nical feasibility and economic reasonableness of control
mechanisms would be fully explored and the questions out-
lined above resolved.
Very truly yours,
R. L. Bolg«
Assistant Vice-President
July 28, 1975
Director
Criteria and Standards Division (AW 560)
Office of Radiation Program
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D. C. 20460
Dear Sir: Subject: Standards for Environmental Radiation
Protection for Nuclear Power Operations,
40 CFR Part 190, Proposed Federal Register
May 29, 1975
In response to the invitation in the Federal Register May 29, 1975, the
American Mining Congress hereby submits the following comments on proposed
environmental standards for the nuclear fuel cycle, 40 CFR Part 190. The American
Mining Congress is a national trade association of the mining companies that produce
most of the nation's metals and industrial, agricultural and other minerals, including
the uranium mining and milling firms responsible for most of the uranium oxide
production in the United States.
The American Mining Congress objects to the proposed regulations,
particularly as to their application to the uranium milling industry. These objections
are based on the analysis of EPA's proposed standards and the referenced documents
cited in support of this proposal, prepared by Dr. Robley D. Evans for the American
Mining Congress. A copy of Dr. Evans' letter of July 18, 1975 is enclosed and is
included as a part of the AMC statement.
We will appreciate a careful review of these comments.
Enclosure
Sincerely,
A-90
IAN MocGREGOR
C/M/nn«n
FRANK R. MILLIKEN
N. T. CAMICIA
H. S. HARRISON
CHARLES t. BARBER
ROBERT W. FORT
CHRISTIAN F. BEUKEMA
Vic* Chilrmtn
I. ALLEN OVERTON, JR.
Pn*ld*nt
HENRY 1. DWORSHAK
SocroDjry tnd Tnmtunr
DIRECTORS
CHARLES J. POTTER, Indiana, Pa.
•CHRISTIAN F. BEUKEMA. Pimburgh
•FRANK R. MILLIKEN. Now York
*W. A. MARTING, Cl.v.land
•IAN MocGRECOR, N.w York
•N. T. CAMICIA. Now York
E. P. LEACH, BorhMiom, Pa.
GEORGE B. MUNROE, N.w York
•E. W. LITTLEFIELO. San FronciKo
ROBERT H. ALLEN, Houiton
STONIE BARKER, JR., Loxington, Ky.
•H. S. HARRISON, Cl.v.lond
PLATO MALOZEMOfT, Now York
•CHARLES F. BARBER. Now York
E. R. PHELPS, St. Louit
•ROBERT W. FORT Cl.voland
JOHN B. M. PLACE, Now York
ELTON HOYT III, Clovolond
R. G. MILLER, JR., Chicago
OTES BENNETT, JR., Ckvoland
JOHN C. DUNCAN, Now York
C. F. FOGARTY, Now York
•T. A. HOLMES, Woodcliff Lak.. N.J.
H. MYLES JACOB, Morrirtown, N.J.
WILLIAM H. LOVE, Pinohunt. Idaho
D. A. McGEE, Oklahoma air
^TSEB^r™
THOMAS L. DINEEN. Milwauk..
PAUL C. HENSHAW, San Franciico
ROBERT W. HUTTON, Groonwich, Ct.
RICHARD A. LEMON, Libertyvillo, Ill
J. E. YATES. Pimburoh
t HERBERT C. JACKSON, Clovoland
tANMEWJLETCHER. Now York
•Exoci/fry* Comm/ffM
tr/onon/y
-------
ROBLEY D. EVANS
4621 FAS r CRYSTAL LANE
SCOTTSDALE, ARIZONA 85253
July 18, 1975
Mr. J. Allen Overton, Jr., President
American Mining Congress
1100 Ring Building
Washington, D. C. 20036
Subject: EPA's proposed new 40CFR190
Dear Mr. Overton:
This is to confirm and summarize my previous reports to Mr.
Johnson particularly with respect to the impact of the proposed
rule 40CFR190 on uranium mills.
Reference will be made to the EPA's discussion of the pro-
posed rule as published in the Federal Register for May 29, 1975,
pp. 23420-23425 (hereafter called "FR") , to EPA's "Draft Environ-
mental Statement: Environmental Radiation Protection Require-
ments for Normal Operations of Activities in the Uranium Fuel
Cycle" (hereafter "ES") dated May 1975, to their "Environmental
Analysis of the Uranium Fuel Cycle, Part I - Fuel Supply", EPA-
520/9-73-003-B, dated October 1973 (hereafter "EA"), and to the
BEIR Committee's report dated November 1972, (hereafter "BEIR")
referred to on FR page 23420, column 2, and used by EPA as the
primary basis of their estimates of health effects^
The application of the present proposed rule 40CFR190 to
uranium milling is discussed mainly in the middle paragraph of FR
p. 23422, column 1. The EPA notes that the impact on populations
due to off-site effluents from uranium milling should generally
be small because of their "predominantly remote locations and lack
of widespread dispersion.". The governing rule for uranium mills
would be only that part of para. 190.10(a), FR p. 23424, which
specifies a maximum annual dose equivalent of 25 millirems to any
organ of any member of the general public, because milling opera-
tions do not contribute significantly to whole-body y-ray exposures
off-site, and they do not generate any radioactive isotopes of
iodine which could contribute to a thyroid dose.
Twenty-five millirems per year is a very small dose rate,
scarcely measurable with present field or plant instrumentation.
It is less than cosmic radiation at sea level in the United States,
and corresponds roughly to the increase in cosmic radiation which
Mr. J. A. Overton, jr.
-2-
July 18, 1975
takes place between sea level and 6000 ft. elevation. It is less
than the normal gamma-ray background in anybody's back yard. It
is comparable with the gonadal irradiation by the potassium-40
found in all normal human muscle tissue.
There appear to be major inconsistencies between EA, ES, and
40CFR190, with respect to releases from mills, which should be
clarified by EPA before adoption of 40CFR190, especially if EA
is ever to be referred to by NRC for guidance in evaluating com-
pliance with 40CFR190.
The major unresolved problem with respect to mill effluents
is as follows. Paragraph 190.10(a) of 40CFR190 reads in part,
"The annual dose equivalent shall not exceed ... 25 millirems to
any other organ of any member of the public ..." . By "any member
of the public" I would understand, under the definitions in 40CFRl90j
Subpart A, paragraph 190.02 (c) and (d), any "off-site" location.
To me, this means that the 25 mrem/yr applies at the plant boun-
dary, i.e., it's a "fence post value". This would be in accord
with EPA's remarks about protection of individuals who live near
a site boundary (FR p.23421, column 2), rather than averaging over
a population area.
Dosimetrically the organ which is primarily at risk from air- •
borne mill effluents is the lung. The skeletal and whole-body
doses from water effluents are judged to be negligible compared
with the lung dose wherever reasonable care is taken of waste water
(e.g., EA, pp. 36-37). Regarding mills, the paragraph on mills
in FR p. 23422 observes that the impact on populations due to off-
site effluents should be small. The implication is clear that EPA
expects that mills would have an easy time complying with 40CFR190.
Turning to the ES document of May 1975, this reassurance re-
garding mills such as Humeca, Highland, and Shirley Basin is found
in Table 6 on page 54 and in the middle paragraph on page 57, where
"... in the general environment ..." "... relatively small doses
are projected to the lung and bone at mills ...". Note that Table
6 gives comfortably small dose-equivalent values, (misnamed "expos-
ure") , but does not say where they apply. Possibly, from the
text on page 57 they apply "in the general environment" (not quan-
titatively defined) rather than at the fence post.
The October 1973 EA document carries none of these assurances.
This earlier EPA analysis considers a hypothetical "model mill"
(p. 24) which annually processes 600,000 metric tons (MT) of ore
A-91
-------
Mr. J. A. Overton, Jr.
-3-
July 18, 1975
Mr. J. A. Overton, Jr.
-4-
July 18, 1975
and produces 1,140 MT of yellowcake, therefore containing 1000 MT
of uranium element. The presumed airborne releases of U, Ra-226,
and Th-230 from this mill are tabulated on p. 27. These seem to
me to be incredibly small. For example, take the 0.1 Ci/yr release
of uranium. Because of EPA's definition of a Ci of U (EA p. A-l)
1 MT of u is about 0.67 Ci. Thus the airborne annual release of U
postulated is 0.15 MT, which is only 0.015% of the annual output
of u. Aside from a small percentage of u left in the tailings or
process water, this is a recovery of greater than 99.98%. The
EPA describes dust control measures on EA pp. 40-41 and develops
"... an effective system control of about 99%.". That's not 99.98%.
The EPA's waterborne effluent control measures are described on
pp. 44-50, and are also rated as giving less than 0.1 Ci U (p. 34)
or 0.015% release from the site.
From these tiny airborne releases, EA then introduces a long
series of ad hoc assumptions regarding lung dosimetry, which lead
to a dose-equivalent of 450 mrem/yr to the lung at the plant boun-
dary (EA p. 36 and p. A-20). On page 72 they call this the dose
to "individuals that might live within 1 km of the plant". That's
not "less than 25 mrem/yr11. This lung dose from their "model
mill" would seem to be in severe violation of the proposed 40CFR190.
The skeletal dose attributed to drinking 2 liters per day of their
postulated water released at the plant boundary is 13 mrem/yr (p. 37)
I suggest that EPA should clarify the apparent conflict be-
tween their 40CFR190 25 mrem/yr to any organ of any member of the
public, and their estimated lung dose of 450 mrem/yr at the plant
boundary of the "model mill?'. Both of these postulates cannot be
simultaneously correct.
It may be noted that in several places the BEIR report points
out that its use of a linear nonthresholdmodel at all dose-rates
and all dose ranges is not based on radiobiological findings but
rather is used as the only mathematically "workable approach to
numerical estimation of risk in a population" (e.g., BEIR pp. 88,
89). The linear extrapolation from the dosage domain in which
radiobiological effects are actually observed down to the dosage
domain of radiation protection standards is often by a factor of
more than a million. The extrapolated incidence of radiobiological
effects at the level of the prudent radiation protection standards
have been viewed as upper limits, since the introduction of the
linear nonthreshold model for mathematical convenience in assessing
dose commitments from atmospheric weapon tests by the United Nations
Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) in
1958. The BEIR report's extrapolated value for this maximum
absolute risk of lung cancer from a-particle irradiation of the
bronchial epithelium is (BEIR, p. 150) 1 case/yr per million
person-rems. Thus this risk to one individual receiving continuously
a fence-post lung dose of 450 mrem/yr for 20 years is 1 in 100,000,
a value which is many orders of magnitude below the natural inci-
dence. The EPA's Environmental Analysis translates this lung
cancer risk into a "health conversion factor" of 50 events/million
person-rems (EA, Table 11, p. A-18) "over a period of years" (EA,
p. A-19) without stating how many years. Overall, the EPA estimates
the cost to industry of its proposed rule 40CFR190 "to be less than
$100,000 per potential case of cancer, leukemia, or serious genetic
effect averted", or "less than $75 per person-rem". This translates
into 75/100,000 = 750 cases per million person-rem, which would
be viewed by many radiobiologists as a very high estimate of the
actual potential risk per rem.
Radon and radon daughter effluents are explicitly exempt from
40CFR190 at present (FR p. 23423, col. 1, and p. 23424, para.
190.10(a)). However "The Agency ... has underway an independent
assessment of man-made sources of radon emissions and their manage-
ment" (FR p. 23423, col. 1). The "Environmental Analysis ...",
EA, written about 2 years ago devotes much space to the uranium
mill tailings problem. Their treatments in EA of radon flux, migra-
tion, daughter product disequilibria, and dosimetry contain many
serious scientific errors. Major qualitative and quantitative re-
visions will be required for any realistic evaluation of any process
involving radon release, such as the uranium mill tailings piles.
One pretty obvious "suggestion" to EPA, which may apply to some
companies which are members of the AMC, is to clarify whether the
proposed rules 40CFR190 apply only to the uranium fuel cycle (as
stated in Subpart B, para. 190.10, p. 23424) or to any nuclear fuel
cycle (as stated in Subpart A, para. 190.01).
With best wishes.
Cordially yours
RDErmms
Robley D: Evans
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MINING
Eit«bll«h.d 1897
1-3
1100 Ring Bldg., Washington, D.C. 20036
Telephone: 202/331-8900
TWX 710-822-0126
ROBI.EY D. EVANS
4621 K.\M CKIM VL L.\\t
SCOIISDALI:, ARIZONA S5253
September 10, 1975
September 15, 1975
Director
Criteria and Standards Division (AW 560)
Office of Radiation Program
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D. C. 20460
Dear Sir: Subject: Standards for Environmental Radiation
Protection for Nuclear Power Operations,
40 CFR Part 190, Proposed Federal Register
May 29, 1975
By letter of July 28, 1975, the American Mining Congress submitted its
comments on the proposed environmental standards for the nuclear fuel cycle,
40 CFR Part 190, published in the Federal Register May 29, 1975. The comments
and objections were based on an analysis of the proposed standards prepared by
Dr. Robley D. Evans.
The notice in the Federal Register August 15 extending the time for
comment to September 15, 1975 has provided Dr. Evans with the opportunity to
prepare additional comments on the proposed standards based on further studies
of the subject matter. The American Mining Congress hereby transmits a copy of
Dr. Evans1 letter of September 10, 1975 as further objections by the AMC to the
proposed regulations.
Your careful review of this material will be appreciated.
President
Allen Overton, Jr.
President
Enclosure
H. S. HARRISON
CHARLES f. BARBER
ROBERT W. FORT
CHKISTIAN f. BEUICEMA
Vic* CHlImm
>. ALIEN OVERTON. JR.
HENRY I. DWORSHAK
DIRECTORS
CHARLES J. POTTER, Indiana, Pa.
•CHRISTIAN F. BEUKEM , Pittsburgh
•FRANK «. MILLIKEN, N.w York
•W. A. MARTING, Cl.v and
•IAN MacGREGOD, N.w York
•N. T. CAMICIA, N.w ork
E. P. LEACH, B.thl.h. . Pa.
GEORGE B MUNHOE, New York
•E. W. LITTLEFIELO, So Franci.co
ROBERT H. ALLEN, Ho lion
STONIE BARKER, JR., xington, Ky
•H. 5. HARRISON, Cl.v.lond
PLATO MALOZEMOFF, N.w York
•CHARLES F. BARBER, N.w York
E. R. PHELP St. Louii
•ROBERT W. ORT, Cl.v. land
JOHN B. M PLACE, N.w York
ELTON HOY III, Cl.v.land
R. G. MULE , JR., Chieago
OTES BENN TT, JR., Cl.v.land
JOHN C. 0 NCAN, N.w York
•TC 'I 5SKI sVo'ollV/Lok., N.J.
H MYLES J COB, Morritlown, N.J.
WILLIAM H LOVE, Pin.hurit, Idaho
D. A. MtGEE, Oklahoma City
JOHN A. LOVE, D.nv.r
THOMAS L. OINEEN, Milwaukee
PAUL C. HENSHAW, San Franci.to
ROBERT W. HUTTON, Gr.mwich. Ct.
RICHARD A. LENON, Lib.rtyvill., III.
J. E. YATES. Pimburgh
D W BUCHANAN, JR., Chicago
E B LEISENRING, JR., Philadelphia
JOHN CORCORAN, Pitl, burgh
t HERBERT C. JACKSON, Cl.v.land
t ANDREW FLETCHER, N.w Yark
t RAYMOND E. SALVATI, F«. LauoWdal.
tCIIS DOBBINS, D«ivw
•Ey.cut/v* Comm/fTM
Mr - J. Allen Overton, Jr.,
American Mining Congress
1100 Ring Building
Washington, D. C. 20036
Subject: Additional comments on EPA's proposed new 40CFR190
Dear Mr. Overton:
The EPA having provided an extension of time (F.R. 40_,
34417) for comments on 40CFR190, I would like to make the follow-
ing supplement to the comments in my letter to you dated July
13, 1975.
In the third paragraph of that letter I assumed with EPA
that "... milling operations do not contribute significantly to
whole-body y-ray exposures off-site...". However, one should
consider the fact that near some older operating mills and in-
active mills windblown particulates from the mills and especially
from their associated tailings piles will have created local
areas of higher than normal y-ray background.
The possible impact of windblown particulates on the 25
mrem/yr provision in 40CFR190 has come to mind because I have
had the opportunity this week to study portions of ORNL-TM-4903,
Vol. 1, "Correlation of Radioactive Waste Treatment Costs and the
Environmental Impact of Waste Effluents..." by M- B- Sears et al.,
also to examine some y-ray survey data by the Colorado Department
of Health, and to recall some of my own experiences while doing
y-ray surveys around homes in Grand Junction with the C.D.H.
several years ago. A good many homeowners were convinced that a
rich admixture of tailings sand in their gardens did wonders,
especially for the roses, and y-ray levels of 0.1 mR/hr or above
were not uncommon for gardens.
The ORKTL document states (on page 189) that "Both EPA and
AEC-Regulatory have taken soil samples in the vicinity of tailings
piles. No detectable increase has been noted in the off-site
activity except where there has been visible migration of sand
dunes.". However, scintillometer y-ray surveys by C.D.H. personnel
do tend to show far-from-pile y-ray values such as 0.015 to 0.020
A-93
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Mr. j. A. Ovsrton, Jr.
-2-
September 10, 1975
Mr. J. A. Overton, Jr.
-3-
September 10, 1975
mR/hr but y-ray values more in the domain of 0.02 co 0.03 mR/hr
at distances of a few blocks from the tailings. These small dif-
ferences are of no radiobio logical consequence. However, the 25
mrem/yr provision of 40CFR190 corresponds to an average exposure
rate of less than 0.003 mRAr. Hence an elevation from 0.02 to
0.03 mRAr corresponds to more than 3 times the 25 mrem/yr of
40CFR190 for planned releases.
Table 9.27 (on page 250) of the ORNL document gives some y-ray
exposure levels on the tailings pile and at an unstated but remote
distance from the tailings for 4 well-known tailings piles, but
unfortunately gives no y-ray levels at distances such as 1/4 or
1/2 mile.
The entire matter of present y-ray levels merits detailed
study before any regulation at such low differential levels as
0.003 mR/hr is enacted. Indeed it may be permanently hopeless
to identify locations near mills and tailings piles where new
depositions of windblown particulates elevate preexisting local
levels by 0.003
Further, because a 20 -year life is inherent in the planning
of new mills, the future annual windblown particulate deposition
of fixed activity (not removed by rain, etc.) could only corres-
pond to l/20th of 0.003 mRAr or 0.00015 mR/hr per year, which
simply cannot be measured reliably against a cosmic ray level of
0.006 mR/hr and an inhomogeneous local y-ray level of the order
of 0.01 to 0.02 mRAr. Such a regulation would be unenforceable.
It may be timely to recall how small the proposed 25 mrem/yr
is, as was mentioned briefly in the 4th paragraph of my letter of
July 18, 1975. It is well known that no radiobiological effects
have been observed in the populations of Guarapari, Brazil, and
of the Kerala Coast of southwest India, who have lived for many
generations on monazite sand, where the annual y-ray exposure of
some individuals exceeds 2000 mR/yr, or an average continuous
level of about 0.23 mRAr. On the Kerala Coast the epidemiological
study involved a population of 13,000 households, involving 70,000
persons, and included over 13,700 pregnancies in over 2400 married
couples. More than 10,000 personal TLD dosimeters were worn and
showed that some 25% of the households experienced annual expos-
ures exceeding 500 mR, 8.8% exceeded 1000 mR, and 1.1% exceeded
2000 mR. No epidemiological difference could be found between
the residents of the Kerala Coast and those of Bombay where the
total annual background radiation is about 100 mR.
The basis for the choice of 25 mrem/yr in 40CFR190 is not self-
evident. Would it be reasonable to continue, instead, with the
so-called "Surgeon General's action levels", (Itr. Dr. Paul Peterson
to Dr. Roy Cleere, July 27, 1970) taking the lowest of the 3 well-
known brackets, namely 0.05 mRAr above background, as the exposure
level below which no remedial action is indicated.
In Summary:
At older mill sites there are elevated y-ray levels around both
operating and inactive mills and tailings piles, created by wind-
blown particulates, and exceeding 0.003 mR/hr (25 mrem/yr), but
generally not exceeding the Surgeon General's "no remedial action
level" of 0.05 mRAr above background. It is neither feasible nor
radiobiologically necessary to decontaminate these areas.
An annual fixed deposition of airborne dust which would not
exceed 25 mrem/hr of y-ray exposure in its 20th year would have
to be at the rate of only 0.00015 mRAr per year. This could not
be measured reliably. Such a regulation could not be monitored
or enforced.
The Surgeon General's "no remedial action level" of 0.05 mRAr
above background is suggested in place of the 25 mrem/yr of 40CFR190.
The geographical distribution of y-ray exposure levels in towns
with old mills invites much more detailed study before any numerical
limitations on new depositions are adopted.
Local variations and seasonal variations will far exceed 25
mrem/yr (0.003 mRAr), whereas only persistent increases in indi-
vidual local values could be interpreted as related to milling
and tailings management.
S incerely yours,
RDE:mms
Robley D. Evans
A-94
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NFS
1-4
Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. 6000 Executive Boulevard, Suite 600, Rockville, Maryland • 20852
A Subsidiary of Getty Oil Company (301) 770-5510
July 28, 1975
Director, Criteria and Standards
Division (AW-560)
Offices of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D. C. 20460
Re: Federal Register Notice, May 29, 1975, P. 23420
Gentlemen:
Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. has reviewed the changes
proposed to 40 C.F.R. 190 as published in the Federal
Register on May 29, 1975 and offers the comments and sug-
gestions attached hereto. Our review and comments also
include the "Draft Environmental Statement, Environmental
Radiation Protection Requirements For Normal Operations of
Activities in the Uranium Fuel Cycle: and the supporting
EPA documents entitled "Environmental Analysis of the
Uranium Fuel Cycle, Parts I through III."
Pursuant to the referenced notice, we also at this
time wish to indicate our desire to participate in any public
hearing on this proposed rulemaking. NFS will continue its
review of this matter and at the time of such hearing, NFS
would intend to elaborate or supplement on the enclosed
comments.
NFS' COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS
RELATIVE TO THE PROPOSED CHANGES
TO 40 C.F.R. 190 AND THE SUPPORTING
DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT
JULY 24, 1975
NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES, INC.
ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND
J. R. Clark, Manager
Environmental Protection
and Licensing
JRC:jm
Enclosure
A-95
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A. BASIS FOR THE PROPOSED STANDARDS
1. Irrespective of the significance of the radioactive dis-
charges from the commercial uranium fuel cycle, the pro-
posed standards would apply to only a small component
of the national and world-wide discharges of radioacti-
vity. Contrary to the summary statement No. 3a of the
Draft Environmental Impact Statement, the proposed
standards will not "limit the contamination of the...
national and global environment." The proposed standards
apply only to the fuel cycle, including the reactors,
for the commercial generation of electric power by
light water reactors. It does not apply to and there-
fore does not limit similar effluents from:
a. the fuel cycles in 38 other countries of the
world which have a commitment to 294,000
net MWg of power generation, i.e., almost
identical to the U.S. commitment.
b.
the military applications of nuclear power in
the U.S. and abroad
the nuclear research being conducted in the
U.S. by the Energy Research and Development
Administration and others
the production, use, transportation and dis-
posal of radioactive by products used in medi-
cal and commercial applications
the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons by
France, the Peoples Republic of China and
others. Atmospheric weapons testing has been
I ^ \
estimated by USAECV"' to contribute 500 to
5000 Ci/yr of plutonium to the global environment.
the High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (HGTR)
and its fuel cycle although according to Page 4
of the DES the HGTR "...is expected to be avail-
able for extensive commercial use by the end of
this decade."
3.
We do not believe that such a piece meal approach to
standard setting satisfies the direction of Reorgani-
zation Plan No. 3 which transferred to the EPA the
"... explicit responsibility to establish generally
applicable (underline added) radiation standards for
the environment."' We recommend that the proposed
standard be withdrawn and a "generally applicable"
standard be developed which puts the nuclear industry
contribution in proper perspective.
The growth of the U.S. commercial nuclear facilities
projected by the EPA in Figure 2 of the Draft Environ-
mental Impact Statement appears to be overestimated
by about 50% thereby overestimating the "benefits"
in the cost/benefit analysis. The growth projections
and the attendant cost/benefit analysis should be re-
vised.
The proposed EPA standards are based (refer to pages 13
and 15 of the DES) upon the conclusions of the BEIR(2>
Report which included in its several conclusions that
"... it appears that ... needs can be met with far
lower... risk than permitted by the current Radiation
Protection Guide. To that extent, the current Guide
is unnecessarily high." We believe that the correct
context for the interpretation of this conclusion by
the National Academy of Sciences is that the commercial
nuclear industry has been able to maintain its radio-
active effluents well below the releases corresponding
to the Radiation Protection Guides. This interpretation
about "unnecessarily high" relative to industry perfor-
mance rather than to safety was also made by NRC in
establishing their "as-low as practicable" design
objectives for the radioactive releases from liqht
(3)
water reactors.1 We therefore believe that the conclu-
A-96
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-4-
sions and finds of the BEIR Report if considered in their
entirety would not justify the proposed standards.
In its advance notice (May 10, 1974) of its itent
to propose generally applicable environmental stan-
dards for the nuclear fuel cycle, the EPA indicated
that " EPA will reflect AEC's findings as to the
practicability of emission control in its delibera-
tion. It should also be noted that the NRC has
recently advised the EPA that, since some types
of commercial fuel cycle facilities have so little
operating experience, it is inappropriate to establish
generally applicable standards near the estimated
operating capabilities of the technology.
The rationale for the proposed EPA standards rests
heavily on some of the conclusions of the BEIR Report;
however, the National Council on Radiation Protection
and Measurements has recently admonished the use of
the BEIR Report for revising the Radiation Protection
Guides. The differences between the two reports should
be resolved in the Final Environmental Impact Statement.
The proposed standards (40 C.F.R. 190.10(b)) include
limitations on the release of long-lived radionuclides
(krypton-85, iodine-129, plutonium and transuranics)
from commercial nuclear fuel cycle facilities. A
thorough consideration of the development of this pro-
posed limitation indicates that it is based upon two
fundamental factors. These are:
release of materials are evaluated on a
world-wide basis, and
b. the criterion is that up to $100,000
be spent on emission control to avoid each
assumed potential health effect.
We believe that these two factors are so fundamental
to the consideration of any (non-radioactive as well
as radioactive) proposed environmental standard that
EPA should immediately consider their use in a
separate generic environmental impact review.
B. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSED STANDARDS
In other proceedings , the EPA has recognized that "...when
standards are set, they must be capable of being implemented
and enforced in a way that is visible, traceable and reportable
and can be substantiated in an evidentiary manner in the courts".
The following comments on the proposed EPA standards are made
relative to the above EPA guidance on standard setting.
1. The annual dose equivalent limits proposed for 40 C.F.R.
190.10(a) are so low as to be not directly measurable.
Compliance must be demonstrated by calculation; there-
fore, for the proposed limits to be rational and enforce-
able, a specific model must be included in the regula-
tions to transform measured effluents to a computed,
annual dose equivalent. We recommend that such a model
be:
a. proposed by EPA,
b. offered for public comment and
c. incorporated into the proposed 40 C.F.R. 190
as an Appendix.
Such incorporation of the compliance model into regula-
tion appears to have precedence in that EPA has in-
cluded test methods in the Appendices to 40 C.F.R.
Part 60 and Part 61.
A-97
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We believe that the models for computing annual
dose equivalents as presented in the three parts
of the EPA's "Environmental Analysis of the Fuel
Cycle" are neither consistent among themselves
nor consistent with those developed, considered
and adopted by the NRC in the Appendix I hearings(3)-
2. The application, via 40 C.F.R. 190.10, of the annual
dose equivalent standard to "...any member of the
public" does not appear to be necessarily within the
responsibility assigned to the EPA for the establish-
ment of "...generally applicable environmental stan-
dards for the protection of the general environment
from radioactive material" and may well cause dual
and inconsistent regulatory requirements on the
operators of fuel cycle facilities. The two areas of
probable conflict between EPA and NRC (and/or DOT)
would involve:
a. the individual computed to be maximally
exposed to the facility's potential efflu-
ents due to his proximity to the facility's
site boundary, and
b.
the individual assumed to be maximally ex-
posed to the radiation attendant to the
transport of radioactive material.
We believe that the maximum exposure to any member of
the public should continue to be limited by regula-
tory limitations of Titles 10 and 49 of the Code of
Federal Regulations while the maximum exposure to
any suitable sample of the exposed population could
be limited by the EPA standards as proposed for
Title 40 CFR. Such a distinction would be consistent
with the Federal Radiation Council's development of
the Radiation Protection Guides.
-6-
Another difficulty in implementing the proposed stan-
dard which is not recognized by the Draft Environmental
Impact Statement is that many of the present and future
commercial nuclear fuel cycle facilities will provide
nuclear material and/or services important to the
national defense and/or the U.S. balance of payments
(via services to foreign utilities). The DBS recognizes
only benefit to the U.S. public that occurs via the
U.S. production of electric power. It would be equitable
but difficult to prorate the fuel cycle effluents and
off-site doses for those operations which are unrelated
to commercial power generation.
For fuel cycle facilities such as reactors and repro-
cessing plants, it may be practical to correlate
effluents and the net electrical generation; however,
for the front-end of the fuel cycle facilities (such
as mills, conversion, enrichment and fabrication) such
a correlation is somewhat conjectural. In an expand-
ing industry such as that of nuclear power, the annual
operations of the front-end of the fuel cycle have no
discernible relationship to the power generated within
that year. We conclude that the proposed 40 C.F.R.
190.10(b) will be difficult to implement equitably and
rationally.
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C. CONTENT OF DBS AND PROPOSED 40 C.F.R. 190
In addition to those comments and suggestions made above, NFS
offers the following relative to the Draft Environmental
Impact Statement and the Proposed Rulemaking.
1. Neither the proposed 40 CFR 190 nor the DES de-
fine the term "transuranic" although Part 190.02
includes extensive definitions and Part 190.10(b)
would limit "transuranic" effluents. The
scientific definition of a transuranic element
is any element whose atomic number exceeds 92.
The inclusion of a transuranic element definition
in Part 190.02 is important because at present
the proposed regulation is ambiguous as to whether
or not the EPA intended to limit uranium effluents
by Part 190.
2. The proposed Part 190.10(b) would limit the dis-
charge of "... alpha-emitting transuranic radio-
nuclides with half-lives greater than one year.
This contrasts with the DES Summary Statement No.
3a which indicates that "...proposed standards would
limit... alpha-emitting transuranics (half lives 18
years to 2 million years)." We recommend that any
such limit on transuranic effluent be applicable
only to those whose half-life exceeds 18 years since:
a. the half-life criterion would be consis-
tent with the Kr-85 half-life (10.7
years);
b. Pu-236 (2.85 years), which would be impracti-
cable to measure, would be eliminated;
c. Pu-241 (13.2 years), which is primarily a
beta emitter and which often confuses the
definition of the term "alpha-emitter",
would be eliminated; and
d. the limitation would be consistent with the
technical justifications (Table C.2 of Part
III of the "Environmental Analysis" ) where
it is shown that Pu-241 has only 1/1000 the
relative effect of Pu-239 on a per curie
basis.
3. The DES Summary Statement No. 3c is that "there are no
anticipated adverse environmental effects of the pro-
posed standards." Such a statement is erroneous
since it ignores:
a. the possible effect that unwarranted and 'impracti-
cable standards will discourage the orderly entry of
fuel cycle facilities thus jeapordizing or
frustrating both the President's plan for U.S.
energy self-sufficiency and ERDA's plan for
energy development.
b. the real inflationary impact of raising the
capital for such controls. Section VI.C. of
the DES expresses such capital costs in per-
centages; however, the important aspect is
raising the huge capital dollars needed.
c. the diversion of funds and manpower from the
development, implementation and surveillance
of environmental standards which could be
much more beneficial to the improvement of
the human environment.
4. The second paragraph of Section II of the DES implies
that the 190.10(a) limits were meant to apply only to
radionuclides other than those identified in 190.10(b).
This should be clarified.
A-99
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6.
The expressed basis3 for the proposed Part 190.10(b)
is to limit the persistent exposure possibly re-
sulting from radioactive materials which have long
half-lives. The EPA evaluated such potential expo-
sure in its "environmental dose commitment" where
the potential radiation doses due to the release of
radioactive materials were estimated for the 100
years subsequent to the releases. There is no
presentation in the DES that supports the position
that the potential doses from transuranics and
radioiodine effluents beyond the first year are
relatively important. Rather there are tabulations13
presented in the EPA's "Environmental Analysis" which
indicate that potential doses from uranium effluents
during the years 2 through 100 following release are
not significant in comparison to the first year's
potential dose. It appears that the EPA's own
sensitivity evaluation discredits the importance of
the environmental dose commitment and need for some
of the limitations on the commercial fuel cycle such
as the proposed 40 C.F.R. 190.10 (b).
As stated in the DESC, EPA based their proposed
standards upon "an analysis of the cost-effectiveness
of risk reduction". We believe that their analysis
was substantially in error in that:
b.
it over-emphasizes the potential risk by
a series of assumptions and extrapolations
such that the conclusions are heavily
weighted by the world population (a large
absolute number) which counteracts the
potential risk (a very small absolute
number) due to fuel cycle effluents.(a)
the costs of effluent control are, in some
cases based upon minimal investigation and
developed by inconsistent and invalid
methodology.^
c. the DES does not consider how the "costs-
might be better utilized in reducing health
risks.
7- On Page 24 of the DES, EPA appears to indicate that the
proposed Plant 190.10(a) was developed under the premise
that the environmental risks to individual members of
the public should be consistent with the direct benefits
accruing to that individual because of the operations
causing the risk. We do not believe that such a direct
correlation is either appropriate or possible in
setting environmental standards. The overall true benefits
to the American public of an increased and sufficient
isnit and
a. Page 21, Paragraph 2 of the DES
b. Table 1-2 of Reference 6 and Page C-2 of Reference 7
c. Page 23, Paragraph 2 of the DES
References 6, 8, ,nd 7, respectve".
D of
A100
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-12-
129
The proposed standard of less than 5 mCi of I per
Gw(e)-yr corresponds to about 99.6% retention of the
T 9 Q
I that is in produced power reactor fuel. As in-
dicated in Note 3 to Table 3 of the DES, "some un-
certainty exists concerning the performance of
immediately available systems." We believe that great
uncertainty exists that retention factors of 99.6% to
99.9% can be routinely achieved by systems which must
be installed and operational by 1983 to comply with
Part 190.12(b). We believe that a 98 to 99% overall
retention can be routinely achieved and therefore
recommend that any standard limitation on 1-129 allow
at least 40 mCi per Gw(e)-yr. Since the EPA intends
(Page 3 of the Proposed Rulemaking) to formally
review any such environmental standards every five
years, the setting of the limitation of the 40 mCi/
Gw(e)-yr level would probably cause minimal interference
with orderly development of the fuel cycle but yet
allow a period of performance evaluation.
The proposed standard limitation on Kr-85 release would
require about 90% retention by a fuel reprocessing
plant. Such retention is probably eventually
achievable but has not been demonstrated on any
commercial scale when treating off-gas streams with
compositions similar to those at reprocessing plants.
(a)
It would appear to be premature to require Kr-85
recovery without any demonstration of technical feasi-
bility on a significant scale of operations -
especially since the effective date would be 1983 and
EPA will formally review any such limitation in 1980.
10. Notwithstanding the lack of demonstrated, available
commercial-scale technology for the retention of
Kr-85, the proposed requirement for the recovery of
Krypton at the fuel reprocessing plants appears to
be counter to the conclusion of the BEIR Report
that "...the public must be protected from radiation
but not to the extent that the degree of protection
provided results in the substitution of a worse
hazard..." It must be considered in the cost/benefit
evaluation of Kr-85 recovery that:
a. the exposure of plant workers will be
increased,
b. the storage of large quantities of re-
tained krypton of a single location will
involve as yet unevaluated risks,
c. some of the potential processes for the
retention of krypton involve explosive
potential and thereby some risk of
accidental release of radioactivity.
11. Notwithstanding the lack of demonstrated technology nor
the lack of complete evaluation of the potential
environmental costs (Items 9 and 10 above), the reten-
tion of krypton is not justified as "cost/effective"
by the supporting document (Appendix D, Part III of
"Environmental Analysis"). As presented, the economic
analyses supporting the EPA's proposed requirement
for krypton recovery (as well as the other proposed
standards) is simplistic, inconsistent and in some
aspects invalid. Difficulties with the economic
enalyses include:
a. See also the NRC conclusion in Reference 4.
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a. It is not clear to why Table D.2 "Estimate
of the Economics of a 5 MTU/Day Reprocess-
ing Plant" is germane to the economic
analysis of pollution control devices in
such a plant. In any event, the Table
D.2 is taken from a short course seminar
where it was undoubtedly used for illustra-
tive purposes rather than rigorous analysis.
Table D.2, for example, assumes a 5 MTU/day
reprocessing plant will cost $60-80 million
in 1972 dollars where a more realistic
estimate is about $500 million in 1975 dollars.
b. It does not appear that any of the cost
estimates in Appendices B or D have been
escalated.
c. It does not appear that the "control system
costs" of Table D.3 includes anything other
than the mechanical equipment. The costs of
structures for shielding and protection
against the significant release of radioactivity
subsequent to natural phenomena events is
expected to be far greater than the cost of
the process equipment.
d. The "first costs" of Table D.3 should include
design, engineering, licensing, purchasing,
construction, installation, quality assurance
and pre-operational testing.
e. For krypton, the control system cost must in-
clude the facility for the long-term storage,
surveillance and eventual disposal of the re-
covered krypton and its decay products.
f. It is inappropriate to assume a 40 year
economic life-time for a developing control
system such as krypton recovery which is
employed in an industry such as the nuclear
fuel cycle which is subject to frequent
regulatory changes.
g. As recognized on Page B-16, the cost of
krypton recovery will be significantly more
in the existing reprocessing plants than in
future plants that might be able to reduce
the volumes of off-gases from dissolution..
12. Although the proposed EPA standard does not include limi-
tations on the discharge of tritium or carbon-14, EPA
will continue to consider the practicability of such
control (page 132 of the DES) therefore, we believe
some comments are in order concerning these effluents.
a. Deep-well disposal of tritiated water received
only one sentence of evaluation (page B-22 of
Reference 7 ) in the documents supporting the
DES. Since 1) the technology of deep-well is
well established in comparison to the other
alternative (voloxidation) and 2) deep-well
is far less expensive(a' than voloxidation, it
would seem that deep-well disposal is worthy of
far more serious and extensive study by the
EPA. We note that regulation of deep-well dis-
posal is apparently within the EPA's authorized
responsibilities.
a. EPA estimates are $400,000-$500,000 for deep-well and $31
million for voloxidation.
A-102
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-15-
b. Based upon NFS' experience and testing by
EPA(9)'(10) at the NFS reprocessing plant,
the EPA estimate of 800 Ci H released per
tonne of fuel irradiated to 33,000 Mwd/MTU
is believed to be 2 to 4 times too high.
c. As indicated in the DES (Pages 82 and 132),
knowledge on the extent of the impact of
C-14 effluents is currently limited and
considerations on the appropriate method of
control are just beginning. We concur that
the C-14 is worthy of further intensive
study; however, we believe that with the
meager amount of presently available data
it is potentially greatly misleading to dis-
play the "potential" world-wide health
effects due to C-14 such as was done in
Table Ic of the DES. We recommend that 1)
C-14 evaluations be eliminated from the
FES, 2) EPA in conjunction with NEC and ERDA
determine what quantity and form of C-14
really is in irradiated nuclear fuel, and
3) the EPA's "Environmental Analysis of the
Uranium Fuel Cycle" be revised to incorporate
the results of substantive C-14 investigations,
REFERENCES
1. "Proceedings of Public Hearings, Plutonium and the Other
Transuranic Elements, Volume 1", ORP/CSD-75-1, Washington,
D.C., December 1974.
2. "The Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of
Ionizing Radiation, Report of the Advisory Committee on
the Biological Effects of loning Radiation, National
Academy of Sciences - National Research Council,
November 1972.
3. "Numerical Guides For Design Objectives and Limiting .
Conditions For Operation to Meet the Criterion "As Low
As Practicable" For Radioactive Material in Light-Water-
Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor Effluents", NRC Docket No.
RM-50-2.
4. Letter from L.V. Gossick, Acting Executive Director For
Operations, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to
R.E. Train, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Dated, February 25, 1975.
5. "Review of the Current State of Radiation Protection
Philosophy", NCRP No. 43, January 15, 1975.
6. "Environmental Analysis of the Uranium Fuel Cycle, Part I,
Fuel Supply", EPA-520/9-73-003-B, October 1973.
7. "Environmental Analysis of the Uranium Fuel Cycle, Part
III, Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing", EPA-520/9-73-003-D,
October 1973.
8. "Environmental Analysis of the Uranium Fuel Cycle, Part II,
Nuclear Power Reactors", EPA-520/9-73-0003C, October 1973.
A-103
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1-5
REFERENCES (Con't)
9. "An Investigation of Airborne Radioactive Effluents From
A Operating Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant", BRH/NERHL
70-3 Cochran et. al., U.S. Dept. of Health Education and
Welfare July 1970.
10. "The Observation of Airborne Tritium As a Source and
Environmental Waste Discharge From a Nuclear Fuel Repro-
cessing Plant, Cochran et. al., EPA Office of Radiation
Program, May 1972.
I I fit ii*ir=ffz p ° BOX 27°
"-* * •*-** • »C3S3 HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06101
203-666-6911
July 24, 1975
Director, Criteria and
Standards Division (AW-56O)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D. C. 2O46O
Dear Sir:
Comments on Proposed Standards 40CFR190
entitled
"Radiation Protection for Nuclear Power Operations"
We are taking this opportunity (FEDERAL REGISTER notice, May 29,
1975) to comment on the proposed Standards, Title 4O, CFR Part
190 entitled "Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for
Nuclear Power Operations," and to request the opportunity to
participate in a public hearing on the proposed rulemaking.
We have reviewed the Draft Environmental statement that supports
these proposed standards. We find that there is a high degree
of unwarranted conservatism in the models and assumptions used
which result in overly restrictive proposed standards which will
have serious financial and operating penalties if they are imple-
mented unchanged. Because of the importance of these proposed
standards and the nature of our concerns about them, we there-
fore respectfully request that the Environmental Protection
Agency hold a rulemaking hearing of an adjudicatorv nature to
permit a proper and more detailed examination by interested
parties of the bases for these proposed standards.
We believe that a timely evaluation of existing standards for
public exposure to radiation is appropriate and responsive to
the concerns of many members of society. This is a sensitive
issue and, if the evaluation indicates it, the standards should
be so changed. We, however, believe that before such a
the effluents is essential.
A-104
THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY
THE HARTFORD ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY
WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY
HOLYOKE WATER POWER COMPANY
NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY
-------
The nuclear industry has recently gone through a long and exten-
sive proceeding on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Appendix I
to 10CFR50. Detailed technical information was prepared by the
Consolidated Utilities Group (of which we were a member) and the
NRC for light water reactors on the same subject with the objec-
tive of determining the state of the art for effluent control, its
costs, and as low as practicable design limits. The final version
of Appendix I to 10CFR50, issued May 5, 1975, does demonstrate that
a little realism in the models goes a long way in alleviating un-
necessary restrictions and at the same time does not compromise
public health and safety. We are dismayed to note that the EPA
proposed regulations refer to an earlier version of the Appendix I
to 10CFR5O that was later changed significantly. The Director
should reevaluate these proposed standards in the light of the
final version of Appendix I and the spirit of realism that it
generated. It is our upinion that the models and assumptions
used by the EPA in the proposed standards collectively lead to
a degree of conservatism that makes the proposed numerical limits
more restrictive by a factor of anywhere from 5 to 1O than if more
reasonable assumptions and models were used. The estimated capital
costs in equipment per GWe (1Q3 MWe) for effluent control systems
to meet the proposed standards of $4.5 x 106 (PWR) to $8.5 x 106 (BWR)
on a 1972 base are grossly underestimated. Electric utility systems,
especially those such as Northeast Utilities with operating multi-
unit sites and a heavy future commitment for nuclear power are con-
cerned with the impact on ratepayers of these increased costs for
the entire fuel cycle from mining to fuel reprocessing.
Appendix I to 1OCFR50 provides in the operating technical specifi-
cations for a factor of two increase in operating limits over the
engineering design limits, i.e., 1O instead of 5 millirem/year per
reactor for the whole body dose from gaseous effluents. This pro-
vides for flexibility in operation. For a two-unit site, the oper-
ating limit would be 20 millirem in any one year. Since the EPA
proposed standard is based on the entire fuel cycle, the contri-
bution from fuel and waste transportation must be added to the
nuclear station effluent radiation exposures. Fuel and waste
transportation can add a few millirem/year to the individual radia-
tion exposure. Hence the EPA proposed standard of 25 mrem/year to
an individual from the entire fuel cycle will thus limit a new site
to two reactors. In the case of multi-unit sites (more than two
units) the NRC, in implementing these proposed standards, would be
There are additional concerns with the apparent lack of perspec-
tive in the proposed standards and their supporting material and
they are listed briefly below:
a) Treating estimated health effects as real instead of poten-
tial effects that occur after chronic exposure over a period
of 25 to 30 years.
b) Medical sources account for 9O% of all man-made exposure,
which could be reduced by at least a factor of two with a
minimum of control. In comparison, the nuclear industry
which you are proposing to restrict accounts for only about
1% of the exposure.
c) The proposed standards should be based on the United States
population and on cost-effective dollar values applicable
to the United States economy. This would be a realistic and
reasonable approach as these proposed standards are obviously
not enforceable elsewhere.
d) The costs for long-term storage of radioactive waste from
fuel reprocessing should be considered.
Companies of the Northeast Utilities system have direct and indi-
rect ownership interests in a number of nuclear generating plants
in New England, including Millstone Unit 1, Connecticut Yankee,
Maine Yankee, Vermont Yankee, and Yankee Atomic, which are oper-
ating, and Millstone Units 2 and 3, Montague Units 1 and 2, Sea-
brook Units 1 and 2, and Pilgrim Unit 2, which are under construc-
tion or proposed for construction. They thus have a substantial
interest in the proposed standards and their effects on existing
and proposed plants and sites.
We request that there be adequate opportunity for the discussion
of the details of these concerns through the holding of a public
rulemaking proceeding and that the companies of the Northeast Uti-
lities system be allowed to participate fully therein.
Very truly yours,
NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY
r\r. .f
/^/v^v ^-^
D. C. Switzer
Executive Vice-President
DCS/mr
A-105
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1-6
EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE
90 PARK AVENUE . NEW YORK 1OO16 . (a, „) 573.87OO
July 24, 1975
Director, Criteria and
Standards Division (AW560)
Page 2
July 24, 1975
Director, Criteria and
Standards Division (AW560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, DC 20460
Dear Sir
In accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of
1^54, as amended, and Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970
The Environmental Protection Agency gave notice in the '
Federal Register, May 29, 1975, of proposed standards
on Radiation Protection for Nuclear Power Operations"
for adoption as 40 CFR Part 190. The intent of the
proposed standards is commendable but their implemen-
tation is unclear.
The standards will lead to problems of appor-
tionment of dose among various contributors We are
unable to assess the impact these standards will have on
individual plants. Since most nuclear power plants are
not currently located near mining, milling, or reproces-
sing facilities, the 25 mrem dose limit could be inter-
preted as a limit for individual sites. Taking into
a?C?£nt™° CFR Part 5° APPendi* I limits, enforcement
of the EPA standards could restrict the number of reactors
at a site to three. We are concerned about this because
some utilities have long-range plans for installation
of more than five nuclear units on a single site It
should be noted, in addition, that there are a limited
number of acceptable sites available.
The standards do not deal with the problem
of future nuclear parks meeting the proposed dose and
release limits, merely stating that since no nuclear
...continued
parks will exist for at least ten years, the standards
can be modified in the future to allow for them. By
specifically excluding nuclear parks from the standards,
EPA makes utility planning for the design, purchase and
construction of future nuclear power plants difficult.
Further, being denied the opportunity to locate multiple
units at a site can be very costly for a utility. One
company estimated in 1973 that if it were not allowed
to co-locate another unit with two installed nuclear
power plants it would involve incremental costs in excess
of $70 million to build at a different site.
The proposed standards and their supporting
draft environmental statement are based, in part, on the
proposed Appendix I, rather than Appendix I as adopted.
Since 1971, through four years of hearings on Appendix
I, it was clearly shown that the limits for normal oper-
ation were calculated doses, not amounts of radionuclides
released. If the EPA standards are adopted as written,
using curie quantity limits, the NRC will have to amend
Appendix I. The end result will certainly cause licensing
problems.
It is regrettable that the EPA radiation dose-
risk estimates are based solely on the BEIR Report which
assumes the no-threshold linear theory. NCRP43 "Review
of the Current State of Radiation Protection Philosophy"
should also have been considered in setting dose limita-
tions.
85 with regard to specific limits to I129 and
Kr , the standards would impose requirements that cannot
be met with today's technology. The supporting report
assumes that the technology will be available by 1983
when the EPA standards become applicable.
In summary, the standards are commendable as
a societal goal but they do not take into consideration
the methodology for their implementation. Apportionment
of annual dose equivalent is undefined in the standards.
...continued
A-106
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Director, Criteria and
Standards Division (AW560)
Page 3
July 24,
1975
1-7
July 25, 1975
Any dose and/or release limits should be applied individ-
ually to each part of the fuel cycle rather than to the
entire fuel cycle. This would allow Appendix I limits to
be imposed on reactors without change.
The standards give no basis for their effective
dates. In light of this, and reflecting on the industry's
concerns, we recommend that the standards not be promul-
gated as written. Instead, we recommend that EPA should
hold a rulemaking hearing. We understand that several
utility companies would like a public hearing to provide
an opportunity to question those personnel who developed
the standards.
Sincerely yours
W Donham Crawford
President
/
ph
Director, Criteria and Standards
Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
Re: Proposed 40 C.F.R. Part 190
Dear Sir:
Georgia Power Company welcomes the opportunity to comment
on EPA's proposed "Environmental Radiation Protection Standards
for Nuclear Power Operations," which were published at 40 Federal
Register 23420, May 29, 1975.
Georgia Power Company, a part of The Southern Company system,
is a public utility providing electrical service to over a million
customers in Georgia. As part of its commitment to meet its service
area's growing electrical demand in the most economical manner possi-
ble, consistent with other legitimate societal goals, Georgia Power
Company plans to rely on nuclear energy for an increasing portion
of its generation capacity. As a utility with existing and planned
nuclear generating plants, the Company is directly and substantially
interested in EPA's proposed regulations.
We note that EPA intends to hold a public hearing on these
regulations, and, while we believe a formal adjudicatory hearing
would be more appropriate, we do desire to participate, either in-
dividually or as part of a group of similarly interested utilities,
in whatever hearing is held.
A-107
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Director, Criteria and Standards
Division (AW-560)
July 25, 1975
Page Two
Director, Criteria and Standards
Division (AW-560)
July 25, 1975
Page Three
The May 29 Federal Register notice states that single copies
of EPA's Draft Environmental Statement on these regulations and an
"Environmental Analysis of the Uranium Fuel Cycle" are available
upon request. Please send a copy of each of these two documents
to my office at your earliest convenience.
Our principal criticism of these proposed regulations relates
to the agency's use of a scientifically unproven "linear non thres-
hold dose-effect relationship" which assumes some impact on public
health at all levels of exposure to ionizing radiation and an impact
proportional to exposure. EPA and Georgia Power both recognize
that we live in a world with a natural background of exposure and
that serious harm results at man-made exposure levels much greater
than background. However, EPA has extrapolated this relatively
well-known serious harm-exposure level relationship back to back-
ground levels in a linear fashion with no allowance for the human
body's possible capability to handle near background levels of
exposure. EPA does this even though recognizing "that sufficient
data are not now available to either prove or disprove these assump-
tions, nor is there any reasonable prospect of demonstrating their
validity at the low levels of expected exposure with any high degree
of certainty." 40 Fed. Reg, at 23420.
EPA's linear non threshold dose-effect assumption, admittedly
based on nonexistent scientific foundations, cannot legally stand
in light of Ethyl Corporation v. EPA. No. 73-2205, (D.C. Cir.,
January 28, 1975). In Ethyl, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, over Judge Wright's dissent,
invalidated EPA's regulations on lead additives in gasoline because
EPA did not have sufficient proof of the "causal connection" between
lead emissions and harm to public health. The Ethyl majority wanted
to see "a measurable increment of lead to the human body, and that
this measurable increment causes a significant health hazard to a
substantial portion of the general population." (Ethyl slip opinion
at 12). The court in Ethyl would not let EPA make a "reasoned judg-
ment on a border area of scientific knowledge and policy choice"
(slip opinion at 11), and it is likely that a court reviewing EPA's
proposed Part 190 would reach the same result.
Although the Ethyl case is being reconsidered e_n bane, there
is no such cloud over the similar reasoning and holdings in Reserve
Mining Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir. 1974), appli-
cation for order vacating stay denied, 95 S.Ct. 287 (1974), final
decision allowing Reserve a reasonable time to abate its discharge,
7 E.R.C. 1620 (8th Cir. 1975).
A second objection to the proposed standards is that their
limitations on radiation releases apply to the whole fuel cycle on
a per gigawatt-year basis. The standards do not assign portions
of the limit to any segment of the fuel cycle. As a result, no
such segment can determine the standards' impact on its operations.
Surely nuclear power plant operators are entitled to know what
numerical limits they are expected to meet.
A third objection is to the prospective-only application of
the variance mechanism provided in section 190.11. Because an
operator of a nuclear power plant may not know ahead of time when
a "temporary" or "unusual operating condition" will arise, and
since continued operation of the plant may best serve public in-
terest, the variance mechanism should work retrospectively as well
as prospectively.
Our final comment regarding EPA's proposed standards is that,
notwithstanding EPA's apparent belief that the standards are not
inconsistent with Appendix I to 10 C.F.R. Part 50, the EPA standards
can be more restrictive than Appendix I, particularly at multi-
reactor sites. The substantial effort expended by many highly com-
petent people as part of the Appendix I rulemaking proceeding should
not be lightly or inadvertently disregarded by EPA at this point.
There are a number of other potential technical flaws in the
proposed regulations, particularly with some of the cost-effective-
ness assumptions regarding methods of meeting the proposed standards.
Georgia Power Company believes that the best and only appropriate
way of considering these potential flaws is in a formal adjudicatory
A-108
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1-8
Babcock&Wilcox
Power Generation Group
Director, Criteria and Standards
Division (AW-560)
July 25, 1975
Page Four
proceeding, and the Company therefore suggests that such a proceeding
be undertaken by EPA before finally promulgating these regulations.
Please direct any questions about these comments, as well as
notice of any hearings to be held on the proposed regulations, to
my office. Georgia Power Company appreciates the opportunity to
participate in this rulemaking procedure and urges EPA to give
serious consideration to these comments.
Sincerely,
W. E. Ehrensperger '
Senior Vice President,
Power Supply
WEE:TEB:ETH
P.O. Box 1260, Lynchburg, Va. 24505
Telephone: (804)384-5111
July 25, 1975
Director, Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D. C. 20460
Dear Sir:
On Thursday, May 29, 1975, the EPA published in the Federal Register
(FR 75-14017) proposed standards entitled "Radiation Protection for Nuclear
Power Operations", 40 CFR Part 190. B6.W has reviewed the proposed standards,
and we would like to offer the following comments with respect to its imple-
mentation.
B&W recognizes that it may not be the province of the EPA to establish
how the proposed regulations will be applied to individual facilities or indi-
vidual sites. However, it does not appear that it is in the best interest of
the general public, nuclear industry, or nuclear regulators to establish regula-
tions while the matter is silent on implementation. For this reason, it is
recommended the following approaches be considered for incorporation into the
proposed regulation:
1. 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix I, "Numerical Guides for Design Objectives
and Limiting Conditions for Operation to Meet the Criterion "As Low
As Practicable' For Radioactive Material in Light-Water-Cooled
Nuclear Power Reactor Effluents," provides guidelines for control
of radioactive materials in gaseous and liquid effluents produced
during normal reactor operations, including expected operational
occurrences. Appendix I became effective June 4, 1975, and since
both Appendix I and the proposed 40 CFR Part 190 are oriented to
the same objective, 40 CFR Part 190 should be modified to recognize
that a facility complying with Appendix I satisfactorily meets the
proposed 40 CFR 190 rather than just stating it as an EPA view.
2. For facilities other than light-water reactors, or all facilities
if approach 1 above cannot be used, implementation of the proposed
regulations should be delayed until such time as the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission establishes corresponding rules for application
of the proposed regulations.
3. An alternative to approach 2 would be to issue the proposed regu-
lations as recommendations and not mandatory until such time as the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission establishes the necessary corres-
ponding rules.
A109
The Babcock & Wilcox Company / Established 1867
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Babcock&Wilcox
1-9
Sk
SWGICTB1DR8
Director,
Criteria and Standards Division
Page 2
July 25, 1975
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 6O6O3
CABLE ADDRESS - SAHLUN-CHICAi
B&W recommends that a public hearing be considered so that interested
parties can better understand the bases for the proposed regulation. The
schedule for public hearing should be such that the participants have time to
adequately prepare for it.
B&W appreciates the opportunity to offer these comments.
Very truly yours,
BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY
Kenneth E. Suhrke
Manager, Licensing
KES/db
July 25, 1975
Director, Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D. C. 20460
Dear Sir:
Attached are our comments on proposed 40 CFR 190.
We appreciate having been given the opportunity to comment.
Yours very truly,
S. Loomis
Head, Nuclear Safeguards and
Licensing Division
JSL/ns
Enclosure
cc: L. E. Ackmann (1/1)
W. A. Chittenden (1/1)
G. F. Hoveke (1/1)
File 1B-4
A-110
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COMMENTS ON PROPOSED 40 CFR PART 190
While it is accepted that the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) has been granted the authority to inaugurate the proposed
standards, we believe that it is somewhat unfortunate that it
has chosen this time to do so. For the past few years, the
nuclear industry has been working very hard, together with the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), in finalizing the implemen-
tation of Appendix I to 10 CFR 50. This effort is a continuing
one. While the proposed standards do go somewhat beyond the
scope of Appendix I, there would seem to be no doubt that its
implementation will directly affect the implementation of
Appendix I. Since no guidance is given by the EPA for such im-
plementation, the efforts of the past few years may be seriously
negated; one questions what further delays in the licensing of
new nuclear plants will result. Such delays are clearly not in
the national interest.
In basing its cost-benefit analyses solely on the work of the
BEIR Committee, the EPA neglects a great body of evidence (in-
cluding that in the 1972 Report of the United Nations Scientific
Committee on the Effects of Atomic Energy - UNSCEAR, and Report
43 of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measure-
ments) which indicates that estimates of carcinogenic risks
based upon an extrapolation of data gathered at high doses and
dose rates may be in considerable error.
Furthermore, it would appear to be more appropriate for the EPA
to set more general standards, perhaps in terms of the total
man-rem to the population per gigawatt-year, as has been done
in other countries, than to set dose limits to individuals as
proposed in paragraph 190.10 (a). It is felt that such indi-
vidual dose limits are already adequately covered by Appendix I
design criteria requirements.
The wording of paragraph 190.10 (b) would require an apportion-
ment of total Curie discharged from different elements of the
uranium fuel cycle. While such an apportionment could be made
at one instance in time, the limits so imposed would of neces-
sity change with time as more facilities are built, others are
decommissioned or temporarily put out of service, etc. Such a
policy will be difficult to implement, and may hamper the in-
creased use of nuclear fuels to provide for our nation's energy
needs. In view of the fact that the technology to limit the
releases of Kr85, I129, and Pu239 to the Curie quantities pro-
posed may not be commercially feasible by 1983, and that other
nations are free to release substantially greater quantities of
effluents into the environment, the provisions of paragraph
190.10 (b) appear to be somewhat premature, and might be more
appropriately proposed following technical evaluation of avail-
able technology, and the acceptance of international agreements
limiting effluent releases.
A-111
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1-10
GkA.S A3STD ELECTRIC C O HS/E FA-ITY
77 BEALE STREET • SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF
July 25, 1975
Director, Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D. C. 20460
Re: Comments on the Proposed EPA Standards Entitled
"Environmental Radiation Protection Standards
for Nuclear Power Operations"
Gentlemen:
In response to the May 29, 1975 Federal Register Notice
(40 F.R. 23420), we have reviewed the EPA's proposed standards en-
titled "Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Nuclear
Power Operations" along with the related Draft Environmental State-
ment "Environmental Radiation Protection Requirements for Normal
Operations of Activities in the Uranium Fuel Cycle."
We acknowledge the intent of the proposed radiation standard
fr. the complete nuclear cycle and recognize the EPA's responsibility
f >r Betting such standards, as transferred to them from the Federal
I .ation Council. However, it is believed that the standard, as
\ tten, creates undue administrative and operational difficulties
to all individual parts of the nuclear cycle without any significant
change in the already minimal environmental impact from the generation
of electricity by nuclear power.
Since the standard is written for the uranium fuel cycle as
a whole, it is not clear how the curie quantity limits and the single
dose limit can be apportioned and implemented for the individual parts
of the cycle. Further, the current industry practice for minimizing
the environmental impact from nuclear power plants is to use multi-unit
sites. Based on current reactor designs, implementation of the new
standards may limit the number of reactors per site and thereby increase
the overall environmental impact for a fixed installed nuclear capacity
by requiring development of additional sites. It is also unclear that
the environmental dispersion models used by the EPA to derive these
standards are sufficiently similar to the models that the NRC would use
to implement these standards to achieve the desired public health and
safety considerations.
Director, Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560) July 25, 1975
Office of Radiation Programs
U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Page 2
Based on these uncertainties, we believe that hearings
should be held by the EPA to present all background material used to
develop these standards and to provide the opportunity for industry
representatives to examine the rationale and methods used to develop
them.
These comments are submitted with the intent of being con-
structive and maintaining the present minimal environmental impact of
the civilian nuclear power industry.
Very truly yours,
A-112
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-11
Director
- 2 -
July 25, 1975
BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
BALTIMORE. MARYLAND 212O3
July 25, 1975
Director
Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
Subject: Comments on EPA's Proposed Environmental
Radiation Protection Standards for Nuclear
Power Operations (Federal Register Vol. 40,
No. 104. Part II. May 29. 1975)
Dear Sir:
Pursuant to the notice of EPA's proposed environmental radiation protec-
tion standards published in the Federal Register, 40 FR, No. 104, Part II, May 29,
1975, the following comments and recommendations are made for your review and con-
sideration:
Summary and Recommendations
1. The proposed standards are unnecessarily restrictive. The maximum dose limit
of 25 mrem to the whole body and any organ except the thyroid could prove more
restrictive in the case of multi-reactor sites than the guides set forth in
Appendix I to 10 CFR, Part 50.
2. The proposed curie limit for Kr-85 will require Kr-85 removal at fuel repro-
cessing plants. The technology including its cost effectiveness for such a
removal has not yet been demonstrated.
3. There is no new evidence of radiation effects calling for changes in the cur-
tent national radiation protection standards. The EPA's application of the
BEIR estimates of risks is scientifically invalid in developing the proposed
s tandards.
'. Hie comments period should be extended up to September 2, 1975.
We believe that the EPA's proposed action of setting national environ-
-„!::_ ^adiation protection standards would have a significant impact on the nu-
?er industry. It would also have a significant impact on the public in
ierstanding and appreciation of the health risks associated with the
uLal rauitt'-i'ju exposure from nuclear power operations. It is recog-
ia. nuclear electric power is a vital and indispensable component of this
s near-tern as well as long-term energy supply. In view of this, it is
;ary that a thorough review be made of the proposed standards, the draft
ronmental statement, and reevaluation made of the information contained in
three volumes of the technical report entitled "Environmental Analysis of
le Uranium Fuel Cycle."
Within the limited time period allowed by the EPA in its request for
comments, it has not been possible for us to complete such a review and reeval-
uation. Since we would like to submit detailed comments on this subject in time
for your consideration, we request you to extend the comments period up to
September 2, 1975. In the meantime, we submit some general comments as follows:
The EPA proposed maximum dose limit of 25 mrem to the whole body and
any organ except the thyroid could prove more restrictive in the case of multi-
reactor sites than the guides set forth in Appendix I to 10 CFR, Part 50.
The proposed curie limit for Kr-85 will require Kr-85 removal at fuel
reprocessing plants. The technology including its cost effectiveness for such a
removal has not yet been demonstrated.
The proposed standards are certainly unnecessarily restrictive. It ap-
pears that in proposing these standards, the EPA has been guided by the philoso-
phy - "if it can be done, it must be done, and it must be legislated." This is a
relatively new concept in public health protection from radiation and deserves
thoughtful scrutiny. It is a concept which has also appeared recently in public
health areas other than radiation and leads to the ultimate goal where all envi-
ronmental contaminants are maintained forever at zero or near zero. Such a goal
has certain attractions to some people who do not count the cost; but the cost
must be counted, and it must be paid.
It appears that in developing these standards, the EPA chose to be
guided by the NAS-BEIR Committee Report published in November, 1972 and ignored
the recommendation of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of
Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) Report (Ionizing Radiation: Levels and Effects) pub-
lished at about the same time. While both these reports are based on essentially
the same data, different assessments and conclusions have been drawn and different
applications have been proposed. Some of these differences are extremely impor-
tant, particularly the question of the use of the linear hypothesis in risk esti-
mations at low radiation levels and the question of the use of such risk estimates
in setting radiation protection standards.
The BEIR Report extrapolated by a factor greaterNl,000 in dose and by
factors from 100 million to a billion in dose rate, from the level of observed
effects to the levels encountered by the general population and estimated the
risks at low doses and low dose rates of low LET radiation. These risk estimates
are applied by the EPA in developing the proposed radiation standards.
commendations, indicates the possible factors that might invalidate linear extra-
polation as a means of estimating risks at low doses and low dose rates of low
LET radiation.
In contrast with tiie SA3-BEIR Report, the UNSCEAR imposed limitations
in its approach to risk estimation and concluded that:
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Director
- 3 -
July 25, 1975
1-12
P. O. BOX 013100, MIAMI, FLORIDA 33101
"Estimates of risk per unit dose derived from epidemiological investi-
gations are valid only for the doses at which they have been estimated and they
can be applied to a range of doses only if there is a linear relationship between
dose and incidence since extrapolations beyond that range may lead to gross errors.1
The DNSCEAR Report stressed the uncertainty of extrapolations of avail-
able data to low radiation levels, does not attempt such extrapolations, and indi-
cates the need for consistency between conclusions drawn from epidemiological data
and established general findings in radiobiology, making a special point in this
connection concerning the functional relationship between RBE of high-LET radiation
and dose and dose rate. The UNSCEAR Report indicated that the data from Hiroshima,
involving mixed gamma and neutron radiations, and the uncertainty of the neutron
RBE at low radiation levels, constitutes a strong argument against extrapolation
from these data obtained at high doses and dose rates to estimate even upper limits
of risk at low doses and dose rates, especially for low-LET radiation.
It is appropriate to state that the NCRP in its Review of the Current
State of Radiation Protection Philosophy (NCRP Report No. 43 issued January, 1975)
finds no new evidence of radiation effects calling for changes in the current
national radiation standards. Furthermore, the NCKP has cautioned governmental
policy-making agencies of the unreasonableness of interpretting or assuming "upper
limit" estimates of carcinogenic risks at low radiation levels, derived by linear
extrapolation from data obtained at high doses and dose rates, as actual risks,
and of basing unduly restrictive policies on such an interpretation or assump-
tion. But we regretfully note that the EPA chose to ignore all this, destroying
the confidence in the NCRP standards which are surely the most firmly based and
carefully conceived.
It is our position that before considering any further restriction of
the current radiation protection standards, it behoves EPA to obtain realistic
values for ri8ks and benefits for weighing these in decision making. This ap-
proach is important in order to avoid the expenditures of large amounts of the
limited resources of society to reduce very small radiation risks still further,
with possible concomitant increase in risks of other hazards or consequent lack
of attention to existing greater risks.
Several scientific committees of the NCRP are currently engaged in re-
viewing and evaluating the data on effects of radiation on animals and man and
analyzing additional evidence that has been adduced since the 1972 UNSCEAR and
NAS-BEIR Committee Reports were published. Concurrently, the adequacy of all
radiation protection standards as they apply to all members of the public in-
cluding those occupationally exposed is under continued surveillance.
In addition, the NCRP has constituted several scientific committees to
evaluate exposures of the public from different radiation sources, and to consider
the question of radiation apportionment. Should new evidence emerge from these
NCRP studies, the current radiation protection standards may then be appropriately
revised.
Very truly yours,
AR:jcm
A. Rafi
Senior Engineer
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
July 25, 1975
L-75-375
Director, Criteria and Standard Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D. C. 20460
Dear Sir:
Florida Power & Light Company wishes to respond to the
May 29, 1975 Federal Register notice (Volume 40 number
IU4, Part II) by supporting the comments submitted by
the Atomic Industrial Forum. FPL has membership on the
;?iri;SJad H°C Working Gr°up on Radiation Criteria and
ALAP and wishes to reinforce the Committee's comments
as submitted.
It is the feeling of the Florida Power & Light Company
that the EPA should hold a rule-making hearing in regard
to their proposed uranium fuel cycle radiation standards.
inis hearing should furthermore provide the opportunity
for EPA personnel. We believe that this hearing should
be deferred until such a time as further studies on the
EPA standards can be conducted.
Yours_truly,
.
Robert E. Uhrig
Vice President
REU:JAD:nch
cc: Jack R. Newman, Esquire
A-114
HELPING BUILD FLORIDA
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1-13
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Atomic Industrial Forum. Inc.
475 Park A venue South
New York. New York 10016
Telephone: (212) 725-8300
Cable: Atomforum Newyork
July 25, 1975
Director, Criteria and Standards Division
July 25, 1975
Page Two
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Di rector
Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
Subjects: Comments of the Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc. on
Proposed EPA Standards entitled "Radiation
Protection for Nuclear Power Operations"
Dear Sir:
In response to the May 29, 1975 Federal Register notice (Volume 40,
number 104, Part II) the Forum's Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiation
Criteria and ALAP has prepared comments on the EPA's proposed stan-
dard entitled "Radiation Criteria for Nuclear Power Operations",
and the "Draft Environmental Statement" (DES) associated therewith.
Though the comments contained herein were prepared by the above
mentioned Ad Hoc Working Group, they were also endorsed by the Forum's
Fuel Cycle Services Committee the membership of which is indicated
in Attachment 1.
Due to the breadth of information that must be reviewed to prepare
detailed technical comments, the Working Group members wish to
emphasize that additional and more substantive comments to those
contained herein would be presented at the requested rulemaking
hearing (see AIF letter dated July 24, 1975).
The following individuals are members of the Ad Hoc Working Group
and participated in the preparation of comments:
Eric N. Sloth, Chairman
John G. Robinson, Chairman
Subcommittee on EPA
Standards
Marvin S. Fertel, Secretary
Robert A. Adams
R.L. Ashley
R.B. Borsum
Robert A. Burns
George F. Caruthers
John Davis
Owen Davis
Weldon D. Oil low
Richard W. Englehart
Joseph A. Franco
Nebraska Public Power District
Yankee Atomic Electric Company
Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.
General Atomic Company
Bechtel Power Corporation
The Babcock & Wilcox Company
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
Combustion Engineering, Inc.
Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
Tennessee Valley Authority
NUS Corporation
Ebasco Services, Inc.
John C. Golden
Lee Hairr
Wade Larson
Lionel Lewis
James Muckerheide
Reginald C. Rodgers
Kevin L. Rooney
George Rymer
Robert L. Schlegel
Noel C. Shirley
James M. Smith, Jr.
Harvey F. Story
Walter Strodl
Edward A. Warman
Commonwealth Edison Company
Environmental Analysts, Inc.
Boston Edison Company
Duke Power Company
Boston Edison Company
Northeast Utilities Service Co.
Sargent & Lundy Engineers
Westinghouse Electric Corp.
NUS Corporation
General Electric Company
General Electric Company
Florida Power & Light Company
Consumers Power Company
Stone & Webster Engineering Corp.
This letter presents the group's overall impressions of the proposed
standards as well as specific comments pertaining to the content and
philosophy of the standards.
The working group acknowledges the intent of the proposed standards
and the recognition by EPA of the need for flexibility under unusual
circumstances of operation. Our major concerns with the proposed
standards are, the degree of over conservatism in the models used to
arrive at the numerical limits and the uncertainty regarding imple-
mentation of the proposed standards. Since the standards are written
for the uranium fuel cycle as a whole, it is not clear how individual
components of the fuel cycle (mills, fabrication plants, reactors,
reprocessing facilities, etc.) will be affected.
Implementation
The Working Group recognizes that it will be NRC's responsibility
and not EPA's to implement the standards. However, we believe it
is incumbent on the EPA to ensure that the standards can be im-
plemented. In this regard we find the DES deficient in its dis-
cussion of the implementation procedures associated with the
standard. The discussion pertinent to implementation is contained
in Chapter VI-D of the DES and basically states that the EPA
standards would be easily accommodated within existing NRC regu-
lations (i.e. 10 CFR 50 Appendix I) or, easily reconciled by the
NRC, DOT, etc. These conclusions are not substantiated within
the DES. Rather, it appears that the EPA has presumed the NRC
can easily implement the standards, a presumption which is, in
our opinion, unsupported by the documentation available.
A 115
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Director, Criteria and Standards Division
July 25, 1975
Page Three
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Furthermore, the method utilized to implement the standards
could affect the environmental and economic impact analysis
associated with the standards. Therefore, the DES should con-
tain a discussion of the alternative methods of implementing
the standards and their associated environmental and economic
impacts. The fact that NRC must implement the standard should
not relieve EPA of the responsibility for ensuring that the
standard can be implemented and of evaluating the alternatives
associated with that process. The inclusion in the DES of a
detailed discussion of alternative implementation procedures
would appear to be within the spirit and intent of NEPA as well
as in accord with President Ford's request that the regulatory
agencies consider the impact of new regulations on the state
of the economy.
Health Effects and Dose Modeling
As presently proposed, the standards are not applicable to
nuclear parks. The Working Group agrees with the intent of
not imposing the numerical criteria as contained in the pro-
posed standards to a nuclear park. However, since the planning
and development of a nuclear park or simply a multi-reactor
site would necessitate knowing what regulations and standards
are applicable, the EPA should at this time include proposed
numerical criteria applicable to such situations. In the case
of multi-reactor sites, we believe the uncertainty surrounding
implementation of the standards would be accentuated and that
the EPA would have to reevaluate the definition for the term
site as presently contained in the proposed standards.
We believe it is unfortunate that the EPA radiation dose-risk
estimates appear to be based solely on the BEIR Report A
more recent document which differs significantly from the BEIR
Report in the use of the linear extrapolation in setting dose
standards is NCRP Report No. 43, "Review of the Current State
of Radiation Protection Philosophy". As stated in this document:
"In its continuing efforts to provide recommendations
with respect to possible radiation hazards and radiation
standards, the NCRP has taken the following actions:
(a) It has directed NCRP Scientific Committee 40 on
Biological Aspects of Radiation Protection Criteria to
review and evaluate the data on effects of radiation on
animals and man and to analyze additional evidence that
has been adduced since the 1972 UNSCEAR and BEIR Committee
r
Director, Criteria and Standards Division
July 25, 1975
Page Four
Reports were published. A substantial amount of
animal data has become and is becoming available, even
since the publication of those reports. Special atten-
tion will be paid to factors influencing dose-effect
relationships, e.g., dose, dose rate, and relative
biological effectiveness (RBE). The group will attempt
to determine as accurately as possible the true risk of
cancer from exposure to low-LET radiations and high-LET
radiations of low doses and dose rates...."
Utilization of NCRP, No. 43 would undoubtedly have led to con-
clusions that higher dose limitations than those presently pre-
scribed would be compatable with both the need to protect the
overall societal interest with respect to health and safety and
the need for electric power.
While the BEIR Report derives values for estimated health effects
per man-rems of exposure, assuming the no threshold linear
theory, the DES treats the estimate of health effects as real
and not as an estimate of "potential" health effects. This
thought follows through the report which concludes that these
new standards will prevent a cumulative 1,000 less health
effects by the year 2000. Unless these potential health
effects are put on a comparative basis, such as relative to
the potential health effects from natural background radiation,
this concept is misleading. In addition, since medical expo-
sure currently accounts for about 90% of all man-made exposure
and the nuclear industry accounts for about 1%, we believe it
is misleading to the public to discuss the nuclear industry
contribution without placing it in the proper perspective.
Cost-Benefit
While the industry would hope that your projection of 1,200
gigawatts in the year 2000 may be realized or at least closely
approached, it would appear more appropriate for reasons of a
cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness analysis to employ the
latest authoritative estimates for the growth of nuclear power
between now and the year 2000. A review of the recently pub-
lished ERDA report ("A National Plan for Energy Research,
Development and Demonstration") projected the maximum nuclear
capacity on line in the year 2000 as 800 gigawatts or only 2/3
of the 1,200 gigawatts value used in the DES analysis. This
overestimate in radiation releases coupled with an optimistic
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Director, Criteria and Standards Division
July 25, 1975
Page Five
view of both the development and cost for control technology
gives rise to a fallacious cost-benefit analysis and we
believe a dose standard that is unnecessarily restrictive.
The extensive hearings conducted by the AEC in regard to
Appendix I of 10 CFR 50 discussed in detail cost-benefit
analyses and methodology. EPA has utilized a cost-effectiveness
analysis rather than a cost-benefit methodology thus, "ignoring"
the information developed at the Appendix I hearings. Since
NRC will be the responsible agency for implementing the stan-
dards it is, in our opinion, necessary for the EPA and NRC to
resolve the differences in cost-benefit versus cost-effectiveness
methodolgies and establish a consistent approach applicable to
both the development of the standards and their implementation.
We trust that prior to finalizing the standards EPA will resolve
these differences and than utilize a rulemaking hearing as the
forum through which additional detail and conceivably more
accurate information pertinent to the cost-benefit or cost-
effectiveness analysis and the establishment of both dose and
curie limitations can be obtained.
Curie Effluent Limitations
The curie quantity limits particularly for Kr85 requires the
application of technology that is not commercially available
today nor demonstrated in a large scale operation. The EPA
report in assuming the availability of the technology by 1983
also dismisses as negligible any problems involved in the
collection and waste management of Kr85. Since the storage of
these radioactive^ substances have an environmental impact and
associated cost, they should be a definite part of the environ-
mental impact and cost-benefit analyses.
In section 190.12 of the proposed standard no basis for the
selection of the effective dates is given, and the January
1983 date, under section 190.12 (d), seems completely arbi-
trary. Since the 1983 date is 8 years away, and since com-
mercially available technology for collecting and storage of
these isotopes is presently unavailable, there appears to be
no significant environmental advantage to including the curie
limits in the proposed regulations at this time. Furthermore,
the date for imposition of the standards should be related to
the most accurate projection for nuclear power growth, the
latest estimate of which, as stated previously, is much lower
Director, Criteria and Standards Division
July 25, 1975
Page Six
r
than that contained in the DES. Additional effort and study
should be conducted to ensure that the standards implementa-
tion dates are compatible with both ensuring public health and
with practicable technology.
We question the apparently arbitrary selection of 100 years
for determination of the environmental dose commitment, nor
do we believe that models exist today which can realistically
define the behavior of the radionuclides in the environment
during a 100-year period. The 100-year time period as well
as the models bear further explanation prior to finalization
of the proposed standards.
Relationship to Appendix I
The DES discusses reasons why new radiation standards are
required—two of which are:
1. The radiation protection guide for annual dose to
individuals is unnecessarily high for use by the
industry.
2. Application of the concept "As Low As Practicable"
must include explicit consideration of both total
population exposure and the costs of effluent controls.
Consideration of both of the above items are already incorporated
in the "as low as practicable" Appendix I rulemaking proceedings
conducted by the AEC (now NRC) during the period 1971 through
1975. Through active industry participation in this proceeding,
substantial changes have been incorporated by NRC into Appendix I
which became effective June 4, 1975.
The final version of Appendix I differs significantly from the
proposed version of Appendix I. As stated in the statement of
consideration for 40 CFR 190, "...the agency has carefully
examined the guidance for design objectives and limiting condi-
tions for operation of light-water-cooled nuclear power reactors
as set forth recently by the NRC in Appendix I to 10 CFR 50.
It is the view of the agency that this guidance for reactors
will provide an appropirate and satisfactory implementation for
these proposed environmental radiation standards..." From the
Working Groups review of the content of the DES, it is our
belief that the proposed EPA standards are based upon the
proposed and not the final version of Appendix I. We, therefore,
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Director, Criteria and Standards Division
July 25, 1975
Page Seven
Attachment 1
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reconmend that the EPA reconsider their standards based upon
the extensive analyses and hearings resulting in the final
version of Appendix I.
As presently proposed the EPA standard could be more limiting
to current siting practices than Appendix I. Appendix I dose
limits are 3 millirem per year per reactor for liquid releases
and 5 millirem per year per reactor for gaseous releases. It
is possible that the implementation of the dose limits could
be construed as a limitation of 8 millirem per reactor per
site which, combined with the EPA dose standard of 25 millirem
per year per site (including direct radiation) could limit the
number of reactors at a site below current siting trends. We
believe the current trend towards multiple reactor sites is
both cost-effective and compatible with satisfying the nations
environmental and energy goals.
In view of the foregoing, it would seem logical and appropriate
for EPA to recognize the results obtained from the extensive
proceedings at the Appendix I hearing and to accept its final
version by incorporating in Part 190, a statement that compliance
with Appendix I to 10 CFR 50 (effective June 4, 1975) provides
satisfactory implementation of the Part 190 regulation.
The Forum and Working Group have submitted these comments with intent
to be constructive. We welcome any opportunity to pursue this matter
further with EPA or to clarify any statement contained herein.
Sincerely,
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Services Committee
HJL/jri
Attachment
R.W. Deuster, Chariman
E. Gordon, Secretary
A.E. Aikens, Jr.
E.R. Astley
R.B. Atwater
W.W. Brandfon
J. Cagnetta
A.B. Carson
R. Chastain
W.P. Chernock
B.H. Cherry
J. Coughlin
P. Courcier
J.K. Davidson
R.E. Kettner
F.W. Kramer
P.M. Krishna
C.R. Johnson
T.A. Flynn
R.C. Murphy
H.C. Ott
G.B. Parks
R.W. Peterson
W.J. Price
G. Rifakes
J.K. Pickard
G.E. Shay
H.B. Stewart
L. Sonz
R.J. Tallman
K.D. Vrooman
W. Witzig
B. Wolfe
New Members
K. Cohen
L.L. Grumme
R.F. Mantey
Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc.
Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.
Dames & Moore
Exxon Nuclear Company
Consumers Power Company
Sargent & Lundy
Northeast Utilities Service Co.
General Electric Company
Southern Services, Inc.
Combustion Engineering, Inc.
GPU Service Corporation
Public Service Indiana
Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann
Nuclear Associates International
Nuclear Assurance Corporation
Westinghouse Electric Corporation
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
The Babcock & Wilcox Company
Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation
Houston Lighting & Power Company
Ebasco Services, Inc.
Kerr-McGee Corporation
Allied-General Nuclear Services
Allied-General Nuclear Services
Commonwealth Edison Company
Pickard, Lowe & Associates
Pennsylvania Power & Light Company
General Atomic Company
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Bonneville Power Administration
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
Pennsylvania State University
General Electric Company
General Electric Company
Washington Public Power Supply System
Philadelphia Electric Company
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1-14
Washington Public Power Supply System
A JOINT OPERATING AGENCY
July 25, 1975
Director
Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
EPA
Washington DC 20460
Subject:
PROPOSED RULEMAKING: 40CFR190 "ENVIRONMENTAL
RADIATION PROTECTION FOR NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIONS"
Reference: 1) EPA 520/9-73-003 Parts I, II and III
Dear Sir:
The Washington Public Power Supply System appreciates the opportunity to
comment on the proposed rulemaking.
One area of concern is the 25 mrem annual dose equivalent to the maximum
individual in the population, as well as the 25 mrem organ dose except for
the, thyroid. An examination of reference one gave no technical basis for
such a limit for either whole body or organ exposure, nor does it give an
adequate cost-benefit analysis of such a dose limit decision. An unfortunate
effect of this dose limit might possibly be to abort the energy-park concept
before its feasibility and social benefits can be established. As you know,
the NRC was directed by Congress to review this concept and its impacts. It
would appear ill-timed to promulgate rules that would preclude our nation
this option before it has been fully explored.
While reduction of exposure to the public is a laudabl-e goal, unjustified
reduction past prudent limits cost our society many options without a commen-
surate return in social benefits. The 10CFR50 Appendix I rulemaking used a
$1000 per person-rem as a reasonable dollar expenditure for reduction of
population exposure. It would appear that such an approach would have been
a useful analytical tool in reference one, especially in Volume III, and would
have afforded you a better technical base to establish the proposed limits.
Office of Radiation Programs
- 2 -
July 25, 1975
It is unclear as to why the individual organ dose was set at the same level
as the whole-body dose. This action runs counter to the recommendations of
thelCRPand NCRP. It is well known that the individual organs can generally
tolerate a larger insult than the total organism, no matter what the source
of the elevated stress. This is particularly true of the thyroid and the
skin. With proposed 40CFR190 already acknowleding this fact with the higher
thyroid dose limit, it is suggested that a factor of six times the whole-body
dose be used for the thyroid and skin and three times for all other individual
organs. This would bring the proposed regulations into agreement with present
state of our knowledge, the established standards and practices.
We will be glad to discuss these matters in greater detail with your staff
to further this rulemaking.
Sincerely yours,
N. 0. STRAND, Assistant Director
Generation and Technology
NOS:WLN:ho
A-119
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GENERAL^ ELECTRIC
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, 175 CURTNER AVENUE, SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA 95125
Mail Code —683 Phone (408) 297-3000, TWX NO. 910-338-0116
July 25, 1975
1-15
NUCLEAR ENERGY
DIVISION
BWR PROJECTS DEPARTMENT
GENERAL ELECTHiC
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, 175 CURTNER AVENUE, SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA 95125
Mail Code pnone (40fi) 297-3000, TWX NO. 910-338-0116
NUCLEAR ENERGY
DIVISION
July 25, 1975
Recommendations and Comnents by the Nuclear Energy Division
General Electric Company on Environmental Protection Agency
Proposed Rulemaking 40CFR Part 190
Environmental Radiation Protection for Nuclear Power Operations
Director, Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
United States Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
Dear Sir:
SUBJECT:
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PROPOSED RULEMAKING,
40 CFR PART 190, ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION PROTECTION FOR
NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIONS
In accordance with the notice in the Federal Register, Volume 40,
Number 104, Thursday, May 29, 1975 at 23,420-25, the Nuclear Energy
Division of the General Electric Company hereby transmits our recommen-
dations with regard to the associated public hearing on the subject
proposed rulemaking, and our initial comments on the proposed standard
and its associated guidance and Draft Environment Statement. Our
comments represent a general outline of the testimony we plan to develop
for presentation at the public hearing.
Our indication of desire to participate in the public hearing on the
proposed rulemaking was transmitted in our previous letter dated
July 22, 1975.
Sincerely,
Attachment
A. Summary Comments
Our review considers the proposed regulation 40CFR190 and tts associated
guidance, draft environmental statement and other EPA documentation
released May 23, 1975.
The general intent of the proposed regulation to minimize public health
impact due to radiation of nuclear power facilities is a stated policy of
the Company. Our interest in the development of reasonable and proper
regulations toward this objective is indicated by our full participation in
the Appendix K (ECCS) and Appendix I (ALAP) hearing processes. We plan
to participate in the regulatory development process on the subject EPA
proposal to the fullest extent possible.
Our experience in the above referenced and other hearings indicates to us
that full technical interchange is essential in the development of such
regulations to provide better assurance that the result is reasonable,
proper, and practicable. Therefore, we have included in our comments
below recommendations to achieve this goal.
An important aspect of the proposed regulation is that it will be promul-
gated by the EPA and implemented in the licensing process for facilities by
the NRC. Our experience indicates that the methods of implementation are
of equal importance to the regulation itself. Therefore, it is essential
that the review and hearing process permit adequate presentation and review
of implementation and enforcement methods to be used. There has been an
historic tendency in the nuclear industry to use calculational techniques
which conservatively estimate future potential impact due to radiation.
This tendency developed to assure a high probability of conformance to
permissible doses. Now that regulations are developing specifying control
to a few percent of historic permissible levels, and where actual doses may
be not too far below the tighter controls^ it is important that implementa-
-Ton ue on a "best-estimate" basis. Any tnvironmental Statement evaluation
should indicate expected impacts; we find that the subject DES continues
many of the conservative assumptions and analytical methods that have been
prevalent. Any overestimate of dose has a directly misleading effect on
cost-benefit analysis which is one of the fundamentals of the EPA standards
development process.
BE SURE TO INCLUDE MAIL CODE ON RETURN CORRESPONDENCE
A-120
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GENERAL tf ELECTRIC
GENERAL^ ELECTRIC
For purposes of establishing radiation protection standards, the responsible
technical bodies for some years have used the assumption that there is a
linear relationship between radiation dose and health effect. As most of
the data on human effects from radiation have been from high doses and/or
dose rates, the UN committee, the NCRP, and the NAS-BEIR Committee
have cautioned against the use of risk coefficients at doses and dose rates
orders of magnitude lower than the data base. Thus, in the evaluation of
dose levels, such as those of the proposed regulation, there is a real
probability that the use of such risk coefficients at low dose rates can
further distort cost-benefit conclusions.
It is true that the current Federal Radiation Protection Guide (500 mrem
per year to individuals in the public) is "unnecessarily high" (BEIR
Report) with regard to operation of nuclear power cycle facilities. This
has arisen from the fact that commercial nuclear facility design and opera-
tion always has had the objective of maintaining doses well below such a
level. The FRPG never has been used as a design basis. With regard to
reactors, the recently promulgated Appendix I insures that doses from
effluents will stay at the desired low level. The increased scope of the
proposed regulation to include direct radiation from facilities requires
careful evaluation to insure that the cost-benefit fundamental of EPA
standards development is achieved.
There is no timewise urgency in applying the proposed dose limits. The
EPA documentation states that for reactors, conformance to Appendix I
will provide conformance to the proposed regulation. We are concerned
that this conclusion was reached on the basis of the 1974 proposed Appendix I
and needs review on the basis of Appendix I as promulgated on April 30, 1975.
With regard to the proposed curie emission limits for certain long-lived
radioisotopes, the impact would arise principally from facilities later
in the fuel cycle. Thus, the operating experience data base is not yet
available to determine the practicability and cost-benefit aspects of
application. The assumptions used for source terms and environmental
behavior of these materials may be conservative, and thus the probable
impact may be considerably less than evaluated in the DES. A significant
implementation problem is foreseen with regard to apportionment of
emission limits to various segments of the cycle, and relation to a power
plant year. Since there is even less time urgency for institution of such
emission limits, it is recommended that they be deferred for study and
development.
Our comments are expanded in the sections which follow which include:
B)
r\
Df
E)
F
G
H
I
J)
Estimation of Risk
Delation to Appendix I
Implementation
Cost-Benefit Evaluation
Reactor Impact and Evaluation
Impact on Fuel Reprocessing
Impact on Fuel Manufacturing
Technical Comments on Proposed Part 190
Recommendations for Public Hearing
B. Estimation of Risk
The guidance for the proposed standard (at pages 4 and 5) refers to the use
of the linear dose-effect assumption as a basis for standards, and that the
range of estimates of health risks derived from existing data is broad.
However, all the estimates in the DES of potential health risks are based
on the linear assumption. Risk coefficients based on the linear assumption
are valid only for the data base of high dose and/or dose rate, and thus
are unduly conservative for the doses and dose rates considered here and
are not appropriate.
The status of radiation protection philosophy is succinctly summarized in
the statement of February 10, 1975 by the Board of Directors of NCRP,
accompanying the announcement of publication of NCRP Report No. 43. The
Report concludes that no changes are required in the NCRP 1971 conclusions.
NCRP has studied both the BEIR Report (referenced by the EPA in this proposal)
and the 1972 UN Committee Report. Available human data are mostly from high
dose rate experience. The use of the linear assumption for standards
establishment according to NCRP "does not imply acceptance of this hypo-
thesis as either proven or highly probable. Numerical estimates of risk
based on this conservative assumption could prove eventually to be very
unrealistic."
Also the NCRP indicated that a dose delivered over a long period of time at
low dose rate not only diminishes the frequency of an effect but the latent
period may be so long that the effect will not occur within the human life-
time.
On calculating risk coefficients, the NCRP says:
"The linear hypothesis, by its very nature, makes it possible to
calculate risk coefficients, i.e., the number of cancers or other
effects that would be expected to occur in an exposed population,
of a given size, per unit of radiation dose. It must be emphasized,
as noted earlier, that risk coefficients derived from the linear hypo-
thesis are based on data obtained at high doses and high dose rates.
The National Academy of Sciences (BEIR Committee), in its 1972 report,
cautioned against the use of risk coefficients at doses and dose rates
orders of magnitude lower than those at which observations were made.
The United Nations Committee, in its 1972 report, expressed a strong
opinion that the uncertainties in the linear hypothesis are such as to
make it inadvisable to use risk coefficients except in reqions where
data exist. The evidence for both dose rate effect and departure from
linearity are such that the NCRP believes that the concern expressed
by each of the committees is warranted."
The EPA documentation, while containing some limited qualification, bases
its estimates of potential health effects on direct use of the linear assump-
tion. Cost-benefit are on the same basis. The EPA news release of May 23,
1975 on this subject says:
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"Train estimated that the potential health effects impact of the
proposed standards limiting releases of these materials over the next
25 years would be a reduction of more than 1000 cases of cancer and
serious genetic effects."
Public understanding of problems on risk is illustrated by the Wall Street
Journal translation of this as:
"The stricter standards would prevent 1000 cases of cancer or
serious genetic damage during the enxt 25 years, Mr. Train said."
At several places in the EPA documentation, a potential effect at the begin-
ning of a long sentence becomes an effect (unqualified) at the end of the
sentence.
The EPA-DES at page 82 is quite misleading on the potential health effects
from short-lived materials from reactors. Although the Federal Radiation
Guides refer to permissible dose levels, all commercial reactors have been
designed and operated to limit neighbor dose to a few percent of permissible
dose. Consequently, the implication that Appendix I will prevent 34,000
potential health effects is misleading.
It is noted that the reduction of the 1000 potential health effects is
directly associated with the controllable long-lived materials,. Kr-85,
1-129, and Pu-239. Detailed review is needed as to the extent these potential
effects are based on calculations which include overly conservative assump-
tions as to the subsequent behavior of these materials in the biosphere.
A point of perspective would be provided if the potential health effects
of the hundreds of thousands of curies of plutonium already in the biosphere
from weapons, testing and other non-commercial sources, were similarly
evaluated.
If the potential impact of H-3 and C-14 are to be included at all in this
documentation, these materials not being included specifically in the proposed
stanrdard, it is suggested that they be put in perspective by comparison
with natural inventories of these isotopes as well as tritium from weapons
testing.
It is recommended that the documentation indicate that potential health
effects calculated from the linear hypothesis may range from zero to the
numbers quoted, and that cost-benefits be estimated similarly.
It is suggested that the EPA should significantly qualify all the potential
risk and cost-benefit conclusions based on the above considerations, to
aid in proper public understanding of nuclear power impact and in evaluation
of the proposed regulation.
C. Relation to Appendix I
The first GE meeting with the AEC Commissioners and Staff on "as low as
practicable" for reactor effluents occurred in March .1970. The technical
wifh Sf £ ™Uearning process had many facets starting with meetings
with the Staff m January 1971, an initial proposal, two stages of hearings
with extensive testimony, a DES with comments thereon, an FES which was
a substantial revision of what had gone before, closing statements a
ThP°nl!T?POta^/epl^St?tementS' and fina11* oral argument in June 1974.
The promulgated Append!x I of April 30, 1975 built on this entire record
was quite different than the thoughts of 1970 and the proposal of 1971
tven today the development process continues as the proposed methods of
implementation are yet to be issued.
In any such regulation, the methods of implementation are of equal impor-
tance with the regulation itself, and this is recognized in Appendix I
Ba!S0nnqthStion °" the CUrrent EPA Pr°P°sal is "°" ^ will be implemented.
Kn 56 lea™in.9 experience on Appendix I, it appears essential that
development of the EPA proposal consider how it will be implemented
conservatisms in implementation can make any reasonable objective
unreasonable to achieve or to demonstrate compliance.
Even as applied to water reactors, the EPA proposal is quite different
than Appendix I. One specifies limits with undefined variance; the other
specifies objectives and defined flexibility factors. One is applied in
effect as a site (or combined nearby sites) limit; the other is clearly
per reactor plant. One includes direct radiation (shine) from the
facility; the other is clearly limited to effluents. In the EPA proposal,
P^P±? K*t UST ?f the Ski" and eye as Or9ans> it is not evident how
external beta radiation is to be handled, and what will be the limiting
organs. 3
The EPA documentation indicates that for water reactors, conformance to
Appendix I as promulgated will also be conformance to the EPA proposal
For reasons of the above stated basic differences, there is concern that
this may not prove to be so. It is feared that downward racheting of
Appendix I might result. This would be a serious consequence considering
the extensive development and effort that went into Appendix I which
concluded that the dose objectives and associated requirements did achieve
f/Z^ntfiT6 °fALAP. objectives, including public health. This concern
is augmented by noting that in a number of places the EPA-DES and Statement
refers to proposed Appendix I (of February 1974) rather than Appendix I
as promulgated on April 30, 1975.
For other portions of the fuel cycle, and for the moment assuming that the
cM^«™°Sa AaL>heJame.as low as reasonaDly achievable (ALARA, the
IiSSf ?L °AuP) obJectlves- the EPA proposal has the effect of imposing
ALARA without the operating experience base, the technical interchange, "
and development process necessary to determine whether the proposal is
indeed practicable and would achieve the public health benefits claimed
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D. Implementation
The implementation of and indication of conformance to any radiation
standard where the dose objective or limit is at a level not too far
above expected operational results is crucially dependent on the use of
best-estimate rather than arbitrarily conservative methods of dose evalua-
tion. This is quite different than indication of conformance to the long-
established permissible dose limits for the general public. As
facilities have been designed to limit off-plant dose to a small portion
of permissible dose, this permits the luxury of conservative and sometimes
unrealistic assumptions with the result of still showing conformance with
a margin of one to two orders of magnitude.
The need to use best-estimate dose estimation methods was clearly indicated
in the ALAP hearing record, and was recognized in Appendix I. The oft
quoted statement of ALAP Hearing Board Member, Dr. Walter H. Jordan,
aptly summarized the problem:
"(I)nterpretation of Appendix I is almost going to be as important
a factor in what is practicable as the regulation itself."
(RM-50-2, Tr. 2547-48)
Page 3 of the EPA statement of considerations for the proposed regulation
makes it clear that the responsibility for implementation and enforcement
of both the guidance and the proposed standards is now vested in the NRC.
Therefore, it is essential that the NRC participate in this comment and
hearing process, and that their contribution adequately defines their
intended implementation methods. The optimum procedural approach needs
to be worked out so that the guidance, regulation, and implementation
aspects can be considered as a package. The ALAP hearing showed that this
was necessary. It is equally true for the current proposal.
We believe that the NRC Opinion on Appendix I said that the prior
implementation methods of the Staff were on the conservative side of
"best-estimate". The Staff is currently revising the associated draft
regulatory guides to implement the Opinion. On the important radioiodine-
milk pathway the current EPA-DES at pages 62-63 properly indicates the
conservatisms that merit correction. Similar attention needs to be given
to each facet of the proposed EPA regulation at each application phase of
the fuel cycle for each of the radioactive effluent pathways.
The proposed regulation includes a new area of concern, direct radiation
(shine) from a facility which needs particular attention. Since direct
radiation was not a consideration in Appendix I, the current oroposal is
the first which will consider this at the ALARA level. Thus, it is impor-
tant that trie hearing record establish that the proposed regulation can
encompass this additional facet with full regard to'cost-benefit.
Neighbor location and occupancy factor assumptions to be used in implemen-
tation are of great importance due to the very rapid attenuation with
distance of direct radiation.
Implementation to be used for the curie emission limits for long-lived
Isotopes will be of importance primarily at fuel reprocessing facilities
and fuel manufacturing facilities using recycled uranium fuel. Due to
the lack of sufficient operational experience base, such implementation
is currently largely uncharted territory. Thus, implementation methods
developed now must await operating experience to indicate their feasibility.
For any facility, an important aspect of implementation is the assumption
made with regard to potential future occupancy locations by humans.
To the extent that implementation and enforcement are based on off-piant
monitoring, particular care will be needed to determine the dose contri-
bution to any person from radioisotopes released from facilities not a
part of the fuel cycle. This may be especially true of radioisotopes
discharged to the nation's waterways, if the story is true that hospitals
discharge more curies than do nuclear facility liquid discharges.
Perhaps an extreme example of this is indicated in the Palo Verde DES of
April 1975 where it is stated that about half of the radioiodine-131
emission to the atmosphere from the plant will be due to iodine intake
in plant makeup cooling water of Phoenix sewage origin.
The subject of backfitting of existing facilities is not specifically
considered in the proposed regulation or guidance. The intent of the EPA
and the views of the NRC are needed before interested parties can comment.
E. Cost-Benefit Evaluation
We have not as yet made the required in-depth study of the cost-benefit
calculation methods and assumptions used in reaching the conclusions
reached in the EPA documentation.
Values for various types of man-rem due to radiation dose'are necessary.
It is noted that the NRC Appendix I Opinion designated an interim value
of $1000 for off-plant dose reduction, emphasized that this is a conser-
vative outer limit figure, and that the NRC proposed to initiate a further
rulemaking to ascertain the worth.
It is not evident in the EPA documentation that the additional occupational
man-rem dose due to the augmented treatment systems, particularly at
reprocessing plants, and its cost have been factored into the cost-benefit
calculations.
It is not evident that the EPA documentation includes the costs of the
additional waste storage facilities required for the additional radioactive
material to be retained.
Real costs of future augmented treatment systems, now only at the laboratory
or pilot plant scale, are nebulous. Future real costs have a tendency
to exceed current estimates.
With regard to reactors, apparently the EPA cost-benefit evaluations are
based on data available in mid-1973, prior to the environmental phase of
the Appendix I hearing. Reference to and use of the cost-benefit testimony
of the Consolidated Utility Group would provide a more realistic estimate
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of the value of each augmented system considered in the AEC-ALAP-FES in
1973. At the same time, the overestimates of off-plant dose were covered
in the GE testimony, closing and reply statements, and oral argument. The
combination of underestimation of costs and overestimation of dose significantly
impact on cost-benefit conclusions. It is noted that the EPA documentation
refers to the fact that certain of the expensive augmented treatment systems
suggested in 1973 by the AEC Staff, particularly charcoal filtration of
large ventilation exhausts, may not be needed. We firmly believe that
Appendix I with proper implementation will indicate that this is clearly so.
Thus, we suggest revision of the bases and conclusory statements with regard
to the costs of BWR effluent treatment.
It appears that the EPA feels that costs and benefits involved in this
proposed regulation are adequately considered by a balance of costs of
control and potential health effects. General Electric believes that this
view is unnecessarily restrictive and ignores broader cost-benefit consi-
derations.
F- Reactor Impact and Evaluation
Comments applicable in part to impact on reactor plants of the proposed
regulation are included in previous comment sections on Appendix I,
Implementation, and Cost-Benefit.
It is noted that Table 10 of the DES shows 170 potential health effects up
to the year 2000 from short-lived material which is mostly from reactors,
based on an evaluation using the AEC proposed Appendix I of February 1974.
The DES needs to reevaluate this potential effect based on Appendix I as
promulgated. The result would then be compared with the 160 potential
health effects ascribed in the DES assuming the proposed regulation is
implemented. The difference would then be a first indication of the impact
of the proposed regulation on reactor plants.
The expected whole body doses in the model projections of the DES Table 3
apparently are "fence post" doses without regard to occupancy factors and
other real mitigating effects. The summary results do not agree with the
new plants of Table 5. The thyroid doses apparently assume that there is
a milk cow and a baby drinking raw milk at the nearest farm. Apparently
twice the expected iodine emission was evaluated. Table 3 includes no
evaluation of direct radiation from the facilities.
As indicated in the DES, at pages 41 and 62-64, the expected doses from
radioiodine-131 emission are probably at least an order of magnitude lower
than that resulting from the calculational models used in the DES and in
project Environmental Statements. Apparently the DES ignores this fact
in determining doses and the cost-benefit balance.
The DES Table 5 obviously does not consider Appendix I as promulgated.
The entire table is of little current informational value as it was
obviously prepared some time ago. It is based on source term assumptions
and calculational models of draft regulatory guides now being revised;
thus, most of the doses listed, and many of the footnotes, are incorrect.
The "site gamma" doses do not reflect information in the environmental
statements in all cases; certainly the 500 hours at the site boundary is an
improper evaluation base in many cases. Footnote references to turbine
building effluent and the various required fixes are generally wrong. It
is difficult to condense so much information into a simple table unless
extensive footnotes are provided in many cases. The entire table should
be updated or deleted. Similar comments probably apply to Tables 4 and
6 also.
In the DES Table 7 there is no virtue in showing calculated urshielded
fence post doses without some attempt to estimate doses to actual persons
in the vicinity. Such an estimate would show that actual dose was in the
range of a few percent of permissible dose which was the general design
objective for these plants when built. The "baseline" value of Figure 5
apparently refers to a design basis source term, unrelated to actual release.
One of the two basic principles for standards establishment adopted by
the EPA is cost-benefit. Thus careful consideration is needed of the limit
proposed for whole body dose with regard to direct radiation (shine) from
nuclear facilities. This is of particular interest for radiation from
Nitrogen-16 in steam cycle equipment for Boiling Water Reactors. Plants
'with equipment geometries of the large plants now in design and construction
have only recently gone into operation. The first sensitive field
measurements of direct radiation from such typical plants have been made
only in recent months. Initial results show that off-plant levels at a
typical site would be within the normal variation of natural background
radiation dose. Studies to date indicate that further reduction of this
dose contribution are very unfavorable if a balancing of cost and benefit
is done.
The EPA appears to conclude that this dose contributor will not be
significant based on the data from Environmental Statements for reactors
as listed in the DES Table 5 where most sites are shown as less than one
mrem per year. This is strongly dependent on occupancy time and location
assumptions, and we note that in a number of cases, different approaches
were taken in the Applicant's Environmental Report ana the Commission's
Environmental Statement. In some cases, the location of probable
maximum actual dose may not have been considered in the Environmental
Statements or was not reflected in Table 5.
For the newer larger plants in the Table, cost penalties which do not
appear in the EPA evaluation have already been taken in the form of additional
shielding or other costly steam cycle equipment arrangements. These steps
have been taken in the absence of quantitative guidelines in the past and
in anticipation of possibly restrictive future requirements. Thus to
conclude that there are no costs in meeting the proposed whole body dose
limit is not correct.
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As cost-benefit is a fundamental in the EPA standards establishment process,
it appears that sufficient information on the cost of direct radiation
shielding has not been considered.
G. Impact on Fuel Reprocessing
Proper consideration of the impact of the proposed regulation on fuel
recovery plants is necessary. The proposed emission limit for transuranics
would require more capital investment in gaseous effluent filtration than has
hereto fore found to be necessary. The AGNS recovery plant has a proposed
Technical Specification limit on alpha effluents of one curie per year. It
is our understanding that they have an engineered capability of holding
emissions to 0.135 curies per year, but the proposed EPA standard would
limit it to 0.022 curies per year.' (This is based on the equivalence
given in the EPA DES, Table 1, page 30 of a 1500 MTU/Yr recovery plant
supporting 43 LWRs, taken to be equivalent to 43 GWe-years.) This example
is based on no allowance for emission of transuranics anywhere else in
the fuel cycle.
The justification presented by the EPA is highly biased to provide support
for their proposed regulation. In attributing a long-term dose commitment
to 1-129, the report fails to take into consideration the relatively rapid
disappearance of this material from its point of deposition. BNWL-1783
reports that 1-129 in milk samples from cows near NFS declined from 2 to
0.01 pCi/Ji in a one year period following cessation of operation. The
EPA assumes that 1-129 is available for greater than 100 years.
In presenting the potential future impact of tritium and carbon-14, the EPA
report does not provide any comparison of the amounts originating from
nuclear power production with that in the Earth's existing inventory.
Until after the end of the century, the nuclear fuel cycle adds but a small
quantity in comparison to natural inventory and that from weapons testing.
Further, reference 16, cited in the DES, quantifies additional exposure at
the end of the century due to C-14 from the world nuclear power industry
as being 0.2 mrem per year (whole body).
The DES also overplays the buildup of Kr-85. Reference 16 quantifies the
whole body exposure from Kr-85 from the world power industry as 0.04 mrem
per year at the end of the century.
In equating health effects with the dose commitment from long-lived alpha
emitters, it appears that the EPA has assumed that release of the alpha
emitters will automatically produce exposure. The intentional grazing of
cattle on Pu contaminated pasure (NVO-142) failed to produce the anticipated
Pu uptake. Without any additional regulation, the projected release
(EPA-DES, p. 79) of transuranics of the order of 10 curies in the next
several decades should be compared with the current biosphere inventory
from weapons testing which is four orders of magnitude greater.
10
H. Impact on Fuel Manufacturing
1. General Comments
The proposed regulation could have a significant impact on fuel
manufacturing activities. The principal areas of concern are:
a. Conformance with the more restrictive annual dose limits cannot
be established by direct measurement, and the method of appor-
tioning such limits among the various fuel cycle facilities is
not defined.
b. Activity releases for the steps in the uranium fuel cycle utiliz-
ing recycled uranium will be regulated by the amount of power
generated by the fuel cycle. The values proposed are not based on
operating experience nor is any indication given as to how such
values would be generated or applied.
The proposed regulation appears to be issued without thought as to how
it can be implemented, nor is it based on demonstrated technology.
It therefore provides a basis for more rulemaking with built in
conservative conditions to as.sure meeting limits. The resulting
impact on business could be extensive.
2. Specific Comments
a. It is recommended that the portion of the proposed regulation that
specifies a release limit for plutonium and other transuranics
in terms of power generated by the fuel cycle be deferred until
operating information is available.
b. There is a need to define the methodology to be utilized for
determining the allowable release in a given year. This method-
ology should be made available for comment. Complete comments
cannot be made on the proposed regulation without having the
proposed methodology available.
c. There is a need for a development document for the proposed
regulation. This document should include:
i. Definition of the limit of plutonium and transuranics in
reprocessed uranium used to establish the standard for
each of the fuel cycle segments.
ii. Demonstration of how plutonium and the transuranics would
be expected to concentrate or be spread through each of the
steps in the reprocessing, enrichment, and conversion steps.
iii. A demonstration as to how the millicurie and exposure limits
would be determined for each step of the cycle.
iv. A demonstration as to how the millicurie and exposure limits
would be applied to each step of the cycle at specific
manufacturing sites.
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The information in this development document should be based
on operating information obtained from the fuel cycle including
fuel reprocessing and fuel fabrication utilizing recycled uranium
Such items as demonstrated residual limits of plutonium and
transuranics in reprocessed fuel, and how these residuals con-
centrate in the fuel fabrication process steps should be
included.
d. The methodology should be defined which will be utilized for
measuring, recording and finally determining compliance with the
dose limits. This methodology should be available for comment.
Technical Comments on Proposed Part 190
In proposed section 190.02 (c) and (d) the definitions of "general environ-
ment and site appear to be different than definitions of somewhat
similar terms in the various NRC regulations. Differences should be
minimized where possible. Possible problem areas may arise where portions
of a site, such as roads, are established as being subject to access
control during postulated accident situations, but where there is no
thought of control being needed during "normal" operations. The problem
Shi?!;CfhanCy adJa«nt waterways is referred to in the EPA documentation.
While there are a number of references to the use of factors for time of
occupancy, there is no such reference in the proposed regulation itself.
In technical definitions such as for "dose equivalent" in 190 02(i) it
is recommended that a definition such as by ICRU be used or referenced
with regard to organs excluded (dermis, epidermis, cornea) in 190 02M)
see comments below on 190.10(a). ^u.u^j;,
A major problem with the "gigawatt-year" in 190.02(k) is how such a unit
of power produced in a certain year at a power plant is to be applied
in judging conformance of the proposed curie limits at other portions of
the fuel cycle where the time relation may be a number of years before
or after the year of power production.
In the proposed annual dose limits of 190.10(a), it is not evident why
the limits for the various organs are not numerically related in proportion
to permissible doses recommended by ICRP. Since the skin is excepted
it is not clear how external beta dose is to be handled, and how practi-
cable it may be to conform to the proposed limit for "any other organ"
from such external beta dose. The method of relating "whole body" dose
to its proposed limit should be defined. For example, it is not clear if
the proposed thyroid limit includes contribution from external radiation
an- . rcm internal dose from material in adjacent organs. As indicated
above in the first paragraph, occupancy factor implementation is crucial
This is particularly true for direct radiation from the facility considering
its rapid attenuation with distance. Until further definition on such
concerns is available in a proposal, it is not feasible to evaluate the
practicability and impact of the proposed dose limits
12
The curie emission limits of 190.10(b) impact principally on those portions
of the fuel cycle in which there is currently an inadequate operating
experience base. It is recommended that such proposals be deferred until
the operating experience is available for use in formulating meaningful
limits.
The variance provisions of 190.11 need clarification with regard to "a
temporary and unusual operating condition." Was it intended that Section IV
of Appendix I be an example of such a provision? In that case, the period
of implementation was the calendar quarter. Is this compatible with
"temporary"? Part 190.11(b) may require public documentation at levels not
required by Appendix I.
Recommendations for Public Hearing
Our recommendations are based on our experience in the past several years
at several EPA and AEC legislative type hearings, and our full participation
in the RM-50-1 hearing on Appendix K to 10CFR50 on ECCS and in the RM-50-2
hearing on Appendix I to 10CFR50 for reactor effluents. Because the
proposed regulation obviously has, a greater scope and impact than Appendix I
General Electric feels that it is important that the hearing on the regula-
tion now proposed by EPA elicit all the information of significance with
regard to impact, cost, and benefits so that the regulation promulgated
will be reasonable and practicable. In particular, General Electric
suggests that:
1. The information requested in these c6mments be made available. This
should be done prior to a public hearing on the proposed regulation.
The comments of all parties on the DES and proposed regulation be
made publicly available for public review and copying.
The deficiencies in the DES noted in these comments are sufficiently
serious as to require re-issuance of the DES. This should be done
prior to a public hearing.
After re-issuance of the DES, a public hearing on the DES and proposed
regulation should be held prior to issuance of the Final Environmental
Statement (FES).
5. Any additional information which EPA makes available in response to
these and other comments should be made available well ahead of any
hearing, preferably as a part of a new DES. This will permit the
new information to be considered in the preparation of parties parti-
cipating in the hearing.
With regard to a regulation of the importance of that being proposed by
the EPA, there is concern that a hearing consisting of submitted written
testimony and brief "limited appearance" type summary presentations by
interested parties will not permit the degree of interchange of technical
information considered essential to achieve a reasonable and practicable
regulation. On the other hand, we do not feel the time, expense, and
2.
4.
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complexity of a full adjudicatory hearing is necessary.
procedure is needed.
Some middle ground
We recommend a procedure which may in part achieve the needed interchange.
The total EPA initial input for the hearing should be available by a
certain date. Testimony of interested parties should then be filed 60
days thereafter to permit a reasonable review of EPA testimony, and should
be circulated to all parties filing testimony. Supplemental testimony
based on analysis of the interchange would then be filed 60 days thereafter.
At the hearing, summary position statements would be orally presented and
filed. In addition to questioning by the Hearing Board of any party, it
is recommended that participating parties be permitted to address questions
to the EPA to permit understanding of the remaining technical issues.
Thirty days after the hearing transcript is available, the participating
parties should have the opportunity to file closing statements in the
record. It is clear from the initial AEC Staff proposals that without this
kind of interchange, Appendix I might have been quite different in content
from its actual final form.
The suggested schedule has the additional advantage that time will be
available to review and analyze all the backup documentation and references
used by the EPA in preparation of the recently issued DES and Statement.
The comment period expiring on July 28, 1975 has not been sufficient for
the required in-depth review.
KERR-MCGEE NUCLEAR CORPORATION
July 26, 1975
Di rectorate
Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
Gent!emsn:
Please refer to the publication in the Federal Register of
Thursday, Kay 29, 1975, of proposed environmental regula-
tion protection standards for the nuclear power operations,
40 CFR 190.
Kerr-McGee Corporation has been actively engaged in opera-
. tions in the nuclear fuel cycle since the establishment of
a Uranium mine and mill in 1953. Subsequent expansions of
our interests have involved Uranium Fuel Fabrication, Plu-
tonium Fuel Fabrication and UFg Conversion. In the operation
of these facilities, a highly qualified technical staff has
been assembled dealing with the various problems discovered
and controls established as the industry grew to its current
state of maturity. Throughout this period, we have continu-
ously observed that in the industry, application of health
and safety precautions has generally met the absolute require-
ments of public health. The safety record of the industry
speaks for itself. Kerr-McGee has promptly and effectively .
reacted to each technical improvement and each additional.
burden evolved by the ever-expanding body of regulation. As
a consequence, we have, in the company of other dedicated firms
in the Nuclear industry, demonstrated the ability to control
public exposure to radiological hazards to less than 1% of
the regulations imposed by the authoritative agency.
In the case of the current proposal and in view of the Nuclear
industry performance, it is our current position that:
14
A-127
-------
1-17
Directorate
Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
July 26, 1975
GENERAL ATOMIC COMPANY
P.O. BOX 81608
SAN DIEGO. CALIFORNIA 92138
(714)JMBOWK 455-2823
In Reply
Refer To: GEN-609
July 28, 1975
The proposed regulation disregards the effective efforts
of industry and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to
cable31" releases of radioactivity to as low as practi-
Extensive reliance has placed upon "the capabilities of
controls anticipated by the NRC for all sites"
without speaking to the necessity of such improved control
The proposed regulation adopts as a basis the linear
±°UJhrei-9nitl'?n °f the many qualifications
when the linear hypothesis was established.
1.
2.
3.
anrf *h ,;-- dollar estimates of the cost of these controls
and the benefit of them without industry participation in
the development of these costs. Ha«.,un m
5' hpempT?POSHVtand.ardJS °ne for which compliance cannot
be measured directly but approximated by extensive theo-
retical calculation without direct measurement of the
individual dose involved since it is a very small portion
of background plus other man caused sources of radiation
as enumerated in ORP/CSD-72-1, "Estimates of Ionizing
Radiation Doses in the United States 1960-2000."
ILll fhe P°si*1on ?f Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corporation that the
control of nuclear industry radiation exposure to the ge'neral
adequately demonstrated; control of other man
th» Wn exP°s"re does not exist; background radiation
the proposed standard; the linear dose relationship
th1! It not "seful in very low ranges, therefore, we be-
that the establishment of the standard proposed has not
been demonstrated to be in the best interest of the pub? c or
the continued vitality of the nuclear industry.
W./J. Shelley, .Director
Regulation and'Control
•/Xerr-McGee Nuclear Corporation
Director
Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D. C. 20460
Subject:
Environmental Radiation Protection
For Nuclear Power Operations
This letter presents General Atomic Company's response to the May 29, 1975
notice in the Federal Register (Vol. 40, Number 104, page 23424) requesting
comments on the EPA's proposed regulation, 40 CFR 190, entitled "Environmental
Radiation Protection Standards for Nuclear Power Operations." These comments
are general in nature due to the wide Breadth of technical information which
must be considered.
General Atomic Company supports the establishment of well founded radiation
standards related to normalized electrical power production and the allowed-for
flexibility in operation necessary to meet both the intent of the standards and
the need to supply electrical power. There are, however, major questions
(discussed below) which must be answered before this proposed regulation can
become realistic and enforceable. These questions are (1) implementation of
the proposed standard, (2) need to address the "nuclear park" concept,
(3) limits on total curie releases of various radioactive isotopes, and
'(4) whether there is in fact a need for reduced standards. We therefore
request that the proposed rulemaking be postponed until the NRC determines
the cost effective radiation levels for each type of fuel cycle activity.
A. Implementation of the Proposed Standard
The first question concerns the implementation of the proposed regulation.
While the Environmental Protection Agency states, "the responsibility for the
implementation an^ enforcement of both this guidance and these standards lies,
in most casjs, in agencies other than EPA as part of their normal regulatory
functions," the cognizant regulatory agency could interpret the proposed
regulation in a manner that does not take into account the differences among
the various facilities constituting the uranium fuel cycle and in a manner
contrary to the considerations under which the proposed regulation was written.
WJS:ml
1. Federal Register, Vol. 40, Number 104, page 23420, dated May 29, 1975
A-128
A GULF AND ROYAL DUTCH/SHELL COMPANY
-------
Director - EPA
-2-
GEN-609
July 28, 1975
Director - EPA
-3-
GEN-609
July 28, 1975
The proposed regulation was written with the idea that nuclear power industry
standards consider, "(1) the total radiation dose i;o populations, (2) the
maximum dose to individuals, (3) the risk of health affects attributable to
these doses, including the future risks arising from the release of long-lived
radionuclides to the environment, and (4) the effectiveness and costs of the
technology available to mitigate these risks through effluent control." And
yet without guidance as to how the proposed regulation is to be implemented,
it is impossible to ensure that the above considerations can be met. Specifi-
cally, what may be an economically feasible control program for one component
of the uranium fuel cycle (a nuclear power reactor, for example) may not be
economically feasible for another component (a fuel reprocessing plant, for
example). There is no provision in the proposed regulation to require that
the regulaory body consider the cost effectiveness of the standards they might
set when apportioning the total radiation dose and effluent curie limits stated
in 40 CFR 190. Also, the question of communication between different cognizant
regulatory agencies is left open. This can lead to overlapping and contradictory
interpretations of the proposed regulation.
One solution to this problem would be for the NRC to conduct a cost/benefit
analysis for each type of facility comprising the uranium fuel cycle. This type
of study would be similar to the analyses performed to determine the standards
set for normal effluent releases for light-water-cooled nuclear power plants
published as Appendix I to 10 CFR 50. These studies would definitively ascertain
the lowest practicable effluent release standards from each uranium fuel cycle
facility. Writing specific guidelines for each facility would also alleviate the
need for apportioning the total allowable doses and releases from the entire
uranium fuel cycle as is presently proposed in 40 CFR 190, among the various
facilities. Since the EPA acknowledges that "major portions of the industry now
operate at approximately one-tenth of the level permitted by the current guides,"
there is little immediate incentive to force a reduction in standards without
(1) ascertaining the cost effectiveness of the new standards, (2) quantification
of the dollar value of the risked health effects, and (3) comparison with other
radiation sources (including alternate energy sources, medical, etc.). Now that
the final version of Appendix I to 10 CFR 50 is in effect, it can be used as
the standard for the light-water-cooled nuclear power plant portion of the
uranium fuel cycle. Upon completion of the cost/benefit studies for the other
areas of the fuel cycle, the resulting standards can then be referenced in
40 CFR 190.
B. Need to Address the Nuclear Park Concept
The proposed standards for normal operations is stated in 40 CFR 190.lOa
to be "the annual dose equivalent shall not exceed 25 millirems to the whole
body, 75 millirems to the thyroid, and 25 millirems to any other organ of any
member of the public as the result of exposure to planned discharges of radio-
active materials, radon, and its daughters excepted, to the general environment
from uranium fuel cycle operations and radiaton from these operations." Since
ibid
Draft Environmental Statement concerning 40 CFR 190, page 13
radiation doses are a strong function of distance, if no uranium fuel cycle
facilities overlapped "exposure" zones, the maximum dose to any member of
the public could be 25 millirems to the whole body. Appendix I to 10 CFR 50
limits the exposure to an individual due to effluents from a light-water-cooled
nuclear power plant to be less than 8 millirems to the whole body from gaseous
effluents and 3 millirems to the whole body from liquid effluents. Hence, one
effect of a 25 millirem limit in 40 CFR 190 would be to limit the number of
light-water-cooled nuclear power plants at one site to three, or, for single
reactor sites, the operator could operate at levels higher than those
stipulated in Appendix I to 10 CFR 50.
The NRC had a similar problem, when writing Appendix I, in deciding
whether to write the standards on a per facility or a per site basis, and
chose the per facility basis. By using the per facility basis, one minimizes
the radiation exposure of human beings from effluents while still producing
a needed benefit (electrical power) at a reasonable cost for effluent control.
While the EPA agrees that these standards will have to be re-examined for
multi-reactor sites sometime in the future, utilities and companies planning
reprocessing facilities need to know years in advance the acceptability of
potential sites. Once the regulation is implemented, there is no assurance
that it will be amended to consider the nuclear park concept and thus would
be detrimental to future expansion of the nuclear industry.
C. Limits on Total Curie Releases of Various Radioactive Isotopes
The proposed regulation would also limit "The total quantity of radioactive
materials entering the general environment from the entire uranium fuel cycle,
per gigawatt-year of electrical energy produced by the fuel cycle to less than
50,000 curies of krypton-85, 5 millicuries of iodine-129 and 0.5 millicuries
combined of plutonium-239 and other alpha-emitting transuranic radionuclides
with half-lives greater than one year." The summary of the draft Environmental
Statement claims that "the proposed standards would limit irreversible contam-
ination of the local, national, and global environment due to releases of
radioactive krypton-85 (half-life 10.7 years), iodine-129 (half-life 17 million ,
years), and alpha-emitting transuranics (half-lives 18 years to 2 million years).
Similar wording also appears on page 9 of the draft Environmental Statement.
The word "irreversible" should not be used in the draft Environmental Statement
(1) since isotopes do decay with the given half-lives, the contamination is not
irreversible, and (2) statements such as these tend to mislead the public.
Also, the proposed standards cannot limit the contamination of either the
local, national, or global environments. Krypton-85 is an isotope which is
transported globally, and standards set in the United States alone will not
assure a limiting impact. Since the United States produr.es only a fraction of
the krypton-85 released to the atmosphere, total environmental dose commitment
of krypton-85 is not controlled by United Statems limitations. Furthermore,
the technology required to meet the limits of the proposed regulation do not exist
today.
IT.Federal Register, Vol. 40, Number 104, page 23424, dated May 29, 1975
5. Draft Environmental Statement on 40 CFR 190, page 5
A-129
-------
Director - EPA
-4-
GEN-609
July 28, 1975
Director - EPA
-5-
GEN-609
July 28, 1975
The technology available to the industry to control krypton-85 and
iodine-129 has been, as the EPA admits, only demonstrated in the laboratory.
There is no assurance that a scale-up to commercial size units is feasible
or even knowledge of what the costs will be. The EPA, in the draft Environ-
mental Statement, uses such phrases as "should achieve" (page 42) "are antici-
pated (page 42), "may permit" Cpage 43), etc., which recognize the lack of
specific information concerning the feasibility, effectiveness, and cost of
the control techniques. With all these acknoledged uncertainties, what benefit
is there for setting possibly unachievable and impracticable standards that
are not to be implemented until 8 years into the future (January 1 1983 as
proposed in 40 CFR 190.12(b)).
If controls are deemed necessary for krypton-85 and/or iodine-129 releases
the chosen standards and effective dates should be chosen by a cost/benefit
analysis for each type of uranium fuel cycle facility. The problem of appor-
tionment is as important in this area as it is in the individual dose area
Since (1) the technology does not yet exist to meet these (krypton and iodine)
standards, (2) there is a lack of knowledge with respect to its cost/benefit
(3) setting standards in the United States will have little impact on the global
environmental dose commitment, and (d) the standards are not to be implemented
until January 1, 1983, there appears to be no significant advantage for including
these standards in the proposed regulation. These standards should be withheld
pending further studies and analyses to ensure that the standard is practi-
cable. Also, the standard on krypton-85 should be withheld pending international
agreements on its control, possibly through the International Atomic Energy
Agency. OJ
D- Is There a Need for Reduced Standards
It is not obvious that "it has become increasingly clear that the
current Federal Radiation Protection Guide for limiting radiation exposure
of the public is unnecessarily high." The statement used to defend this
view is a quotation from "The Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low
Levels of Ionizing Radiation," which is a report of the Advisory Committee
on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation. The quotation as stated
in the draft Environmental Statement on page 13 is quoted out of context
It should read: "The present guides of 170 millirems per year grew out of
an effort to balance societal needs against generic risks. It appears that
these needs can be met with far lower average exposures and lower generic
and somatic risks than permitted by the current radiation protection guide.
To this extent, the current guide is unnecessarily high." The EPA feels
that present radiation protection guidance, as it applies to the nuclear
power industry, requires expansion to satisfy the needs of the times."
Reactors have operated far below the 170 millirem limit of the Federal
Radiation Council. There is doubt, for lack of experience, about just how
far below them the fuel cycle as a whole, reprocessors in particular, can
or should hold their effluents.
It appears that the EPA has decided to lower the general environmental
exposure limits because the industry has demonstrated a capability to operate
below the present limits which would not be established if appropriate cost/
benefit studies of sufficient depth had been prepared and applied. Within
the total fuel cycle there is very limited experience in reprocessing, and
the effects of low-level radiation in the order of the existing guide
remain quite unproven, so it follows that lowering the limits now, albeit
that the industry is keeping far below them, will be an action taken in
part on intuition.
It is unfortunate that the result presented in the draft Environmental
Statement is based solely on the BEIR report. The values derived in the
BEIR report, which assumed the no threshold linear theory, are estimates of
potential health effects, and yet, are treated as real by the EPA. THe EPA
concludes that the standards of proposed 40 CFR 190 will prevent a cumulative
1,000 less health effects by the year 2000. If another report had been
compared to the BEIR report (NCRP Report No. 42, "Review of the Current State
of Radiation Protection Philosophy," for example) completely different con-
clusions and standards may have been arrived at.
Without (1) detailed cost/benefit analyses, (2) consideration of other
valid radiological health effects reports and (3) putting the "potential"
health effects on a comparative basis with the health effects of other un-
regulated sources of radiation, the proposed rulemaking should not be
undertaken.
Very truly yours,
Douglas T. Farney v
Licensing Administrator
Nuclear Materials Control Division
General Atomic Company
DTF/lm
6. Draft Environmental Statement on 40 CFR 190, page 15
A-130
-------
1-18
GENERAL ATOMIC COMPANY
P.O. BOX 81608
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92138
455-2823
In Reply
Refer To:
696-618
September 10, 1975
Director
Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D. C. 20460
Subject: EPA Proposed Rulemaking
Proposed Standards for Radiation Protection
for Nuclear Power Operations
Ref:
(a) Federal Register dated 5/29/75, pp. 23420-5
(b) General Atomic letter dated 7/28/75; GEN-609
Gentlemen:
General Atomic Company submitted response (Ref. b) to the subject rule-
making (Ref. a). We wish to include additional comments for your consideration
in the subject rulemaking.
The proposed rule defines a member of the public as any individual that
can receive a radiation dose in the general environment. The definition of
general environment is so broad that it could include areas next to highways,
railroads and waterways on which radioactive materials may be transported and
where people may randomly or occasionally be present.
The EPA statements reflect findings by NRC and DOT that actual exposures
to employed individuals participating in the transportation of radioactive
materials have been very small and that members of the public should receive
significantly lesser exposures. The proposed rule would impose what we believe
is an unintentional and potentially troublesome 25 mR/yr limit on all exposures
including surface radiation from vehicles used in normal transportation of
radioactive materials. Such imposition would require NRC, DOT, etc. to signi-
ficantly modify their existing package criteria, probably beyond a point of
practicability or cost effectiveness. For example, because cask weights are
limited by various regulations, reduced surface radiation levels from the casks
would require a decrease in radioactive material per cask and would lead to a
corresponding increase in the number of shipments.
Director/EPA
-2-
696-618
September 10, 1975
We therefore recommend that the proposed definitions and/or text of the
rule be modified so as to avoid the unintended effect of requiring surface
radiation levels to meet standards different from those currently required
by NRC and DOT.
The above comment reinforces GAC's earlier arguments that the proposed
rule should not be promulgated in its existing form.
Very truly yours,
r , -
A <---<^f-<- * ^fc-t^<^\p
Douglas T. Farney -
Licensing Administrator
Nuclear Materials Control Division
General Atomic Company
DTF/lm
A GULF AND ROYAL DUTCH/SHELL COMPANY
A-131
-------
1-19
A. E. Schubert
Allied-General Nuclear Services
Post Office Box 847
Barnwell, South Carolina 29812
July 28, 1975
Director Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D. C. 20460
Subject: Comments on Proposed EPA Environmental Radiation
v J---n_ standards for Nuclear Power Operations
o-j •, „ _ ^^^ ^^
Gentlemen :
In response to the subject Federal Register notice, we offer the
following comments. In addition, we direct your attention to
o.
standarSf at ST'!!*' "e SU?geSt '"" ""alization of the proposed
Page Two
Director, Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
JUSTIFICATION FOR STANDARDS AND METHODOLOGY USED
h of c°nsideration accompanying the proposed standards
. the other supporting information provided by EPA fails
™*"^ ^sissrs b£s -
certinty"
exposure with any degree of
s
those
radiation exposure and
-
The above points were addressed in a letter from AGNS to the AEC
letter oTjune 2J741Q74CT ? "^ W&S attached tO ^ -ferfnced
A!C AGN! stated?' 19?4 WhlCh We Sent t0 EPA- In the l««er to the
A-132
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Page Three
Director, Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Page Four
Director, Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
"Further, it is our opinion that the FRC guidance of
maintaining exposures ALAP was not intended to be
extrapolated to extremely low doses which are then
multiplied by world-wide population numbers, the product
of which is then used to assess potential health effects.
Such assessments are theoretical and, to our knowledge,
there is no mechanism by which the impact can be measured.
Thus, it is our recommendation that world-wide man-rem
estimates be used only as a basis for making relative
comparisons of similar facilities."
Continued application of the world-wide man-rem concept apparently
relied on to-date by EPA would result in essentially no lower limit
being placed on reducing already immeasurable impacts. We believe
that such use is not only inappropriate but is also contrary to the
main thrust of the BEIR Report(D which apparently was used exten-
sively in arriving at the proposed standards. In that Report, on
page 2, subparagraph b, it is stated:
"The public must be protected from radiation, but not to
the extent that the degree of protection provided results
in the substitution of a worse hazard for the radiation
avoided. Additionally, there should not be attempted the
reduction of small risks even further at the cost of large
sums of money that spent otherwise would clearly produce
greater benefit." (Emphasis added)
The proposed requirements for limiting emissions of Krypton 85
and Iodine 129 do not appear to consider the full range of costs
of such activities, including increased overall population exposure
through higher worker exposure, and including the costs and feasi-
bility of the storage and disposal of the collected wastes. Because
the environmental radiation levels from such isotopes are so low', it
may well be that continued dispersing of the quantities presently
projected will be less than the impact of collecting and storing
such wastes in concentrated form at a given location for a period of
several years. Further, the proposed standards imply that the pro-
posed reduction of emissions of Kr-85 will substantially reduce the
world-wide radiation exposure from that isotope. Such simply is not
the case. First, it is not stated in quantitative terms what that
reduction would amount to. Moreover, it is debatable as to whether
the total exposure from Kr-85 would be significant until perhaps well
beyond the year 2000, Also the emissions from U. S. facilities accour
for only a fraction of total world-wide releases, and until such
emissions are limited on a world-wide basis, reduction, or even
total elimination, of releases from U. S. facilities would result
in only a miniscule reduction in world-wide radiation exposure from
Kr-85.
The methods and the exact citations from the listed references which
were used by EPA, are not specified nor described adequately in the
environmental statement to enable independent verification of the
evaluations. It appears that EPA, in conformance with its own stand-
ards which it applies to the environmental statements of others,
should expand the present accompanying environmental statement to
describe clearly the methods which were used, as well as the under-
lying assumptions, including the cost bases, so that independent
assessment can be made as to the justification for the changes.
Finally, while it appears that the EPA has the authority to issue
generally applicable environmental standards, there are serious
questions as to whether or not EPA's authority extends to the speci-
fication of emission limits on specific radionuclides, even though
such emission limits are spread over as broad an area as the uranium
fuel cycle. This appears to have the potential effect of attempting
to specify directly the emission limits for individual facilities.
EPA should specify generally acceptable levels of environmental radia-
tion from nuclear facilities, and then leave it to the regulatory
agency having direct authority over such facilities to determine how,
or if, to prorate such total limits among the various radionuclides
of interest.
APPLICATION OF PROPOSED STANDARDS
The impact of the whole-body, thyroid, and organ doses to the indi-
vidual which are specified cannot be determined accurately until
more guidance is provided as to the intended application of the pro-
posed standards. The potential impacts range from no curtailment or
shutdown if the standards are site standards to potentially severe
impact if the standards are to be prorated over the entire fuel cycle.
For example, it is not certain whether the permissible exposure is
based on a single uranium fuel cycle site or on exposure to an indi-
vidual at a given location from all such sites affecting him. It
appears that the EPA intent is to use individual exposure as control-
ling, which could require all facilities affecting that individual be
allocated some prorata share of the specified environmental standards.
However, if such is the intent of EPA, it should be clarified in the
proposed standards, and any related guidelines for application of the
standards should be clearly set forth.
(1) The Effects on Population of Exposure to Low Levels of
Ionizing Radiation, Report of the Advisory Committee on
the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation, National
Academy of Sciences - National Research Council, November
1972.
A-133
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Page Five
Director, Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Page Six
Director, Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
In regard to transportation, it is impractical to attempt to
Ev^nCffe 3 P™rata ^hare for this element of the fuel cycle.
fb^Um- ° all°cated' the determination of the dose received and
the administration of controls would be effectively impossible
to «Moh° v, ^ essentlally uncontrolled environmental conditions
to which shipments are subjected. However, dose rates are low
enough that individual and population exposures during the course
-
OI
FEDERAL AGENCY COORDINATION
n°tiCe n°r the suPP°rting information indicates
no« * programs necessary for implementation of the pro-
posed standards on the schedule set forth by EPA have been, or are
an^ Elemented. Such lack of coordination in the
the.Federal Agencies involved must be
as industry cannot assume the role of
ments of ™n ° 3Ct S° that indusfcry c*n Comply with the require-
S and ERDA =h ^T^ ™ the schedules specified. Therefore, EPA,
NRC, and ERDA should present a joint schedule showing that all the
rm "11 P°ress or *™ ^™* °n a coordinated
tS responsibilities
PROVISIOM FOR MULTI-FACILITY SITING
h the envir<"»»entai radiation protection standards are
based primarily on controlling individual radiation exposure with
VS f°r UPP" limit' "rict^Inerenci to
In summary, we must question whether the environmental radiation
protection standards proposed in the subject notice are not pre-
mature at this time. This is particularly so as the standards
relate to specific emissions such as Kr-85 and 1-129. We believe
that a definite schedule for reduction in emissions should not be
specified at this time, and that the approach to be followed for
H-3 and C-14 be followed especially for Kr-85 and 1-129 pending
further investigation and research into the validity of the "total
population dose" concept to determine the need for such reductions
Accordingly, we request that the proposed standards not be published
as a regulation or that if so published, the schedule for implementa-
tion of Kr-85 and 1-129 recovery be eliminated from the standards.
We appreciate the opportunity to present these comments for your
consideration, and we would be pleased to provide further clarifi-
cation or elaboration of any of the points raised if this would be
helpful to EPA. In addition, we request that we be kept informed
of further actions which are taken by EPA, or proposed to be taken,
so that we can evaluate the most appropriate avenue for our continued
participation in this important proceeding.
Sincerely yours,
AES:j t
allow such siting until the facilities are in operation
A-134
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1-20
Telephone 617 366-9011
YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY
20 Turnpike Road Westborough, Massachusetts 07587
July 28, 1975
Director, Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
Subject: Comments of the Yankee Atomic Electric Company
on Proposed EPA Standards entitled "Radiation
Protection for Nuclear Power Operations"
Gentlemen:
In response to the May 29, 1975 Federal Register notice
(Volume 40, number 104, Part 11) the Yankee Atomic Electric Company
herein submits its comments on the EPA's proposed standards entitled
"Radiation Criteria for Nuclear Power Operations" and the "Draft
Environmental Statement" associated therewith.
Implementation
Our outstanding concern with the proposed standard centers on the
high degree of uncertainity regarding its implementation. Since the
standards are applicable to the uranium fuel cycle as a whole, it is
not clear how the individual components of the fuel cycle will be
affected. Because of ambiguities in apportionment of radiation dose
and radioactive material releases throughout the fuel cycle, it is
difficult for us to access the impact of these standards on our facility.
The EPA should make clear its intent in setting the annual dose
limits contained in Section 190.10 of the proposed regulation. Are
these limits to be specifically applied to an individual facility or
in cases where several facilities may be located within a geographical
region are the proposed annual doses to be allocated between facilities
according to some pro rata share? The structuring of Part 190 into a
workable regulation requires precise definition relative to where and
how the dose limitation to the general public must be applied. Lack of
specificity in this regard poses the potential for legal entanglements
at the public hearing stage of the licensing process. We, therefore,
suggest that the regulations incorporate appropriate wording that will
clarify this ambiguity.
Director, Criteria and Standards Division (AW-5t>0)
Page 2
July 28, 1975
We believe the Draft Environmental Statement must present a
detailed discussion of alternative implementation procedures together
with an assessment of the environmental and economic impacts associated
with each alternative. In this respect, the Draft Environmental State-
ment is deficient and perhaps exposes EPA to challenge under NEPA.
We recognize that it will be the responsibility of NRC to implement
the standard, however, it is our opinion that EPA, as originator of
this regulation, is under the obligation to ensure that the standard
can be reasonably implemented.
Basis For Standards
EPA has relied heavily upon the BEIR Report as justification for
setting the numerical limits expressed in the standards. The Draft
Environmental Statement contains many selective quotes from the BEIR
Report. We wish to call attention to the admonition on Page 2 of the
BEIR Report, subparagraph b, which states:
The public must be protected from radiation,
but not to the extent that the degree of pro-
tection provided results in the substitution
of a worse hazard for the radiation avoided.
Additionally, there should not be attempted
the reduction of small risks even further at
the cost of large sums of money that spent
otherwise would clearly produce greater
benefit.
This concern is supported in the more recent document prepared by
the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements entitled
"NCRP Report No. 43 - Review of the Current State of Radiation Protection
Philosophy". The current position of the NCRP as stated on Page 4 of this
document is:
The NCRP wishes to caution governmental policy-
making agencies of the unreasonableness of
interpreting or assuming "upper limit" estimates
of carcinogenic risks at low radiation levels,
derived by linear extrapolation from data obtained
at high doses and dose rates, as actual risks,
and of basing unduly restrictive policies on
such an interpretation or assumption. The
NRCP has always endeavored to insure public
awareness of the hazards of ionizing radiation,
but it has been equally determined to insure
that such hazards are not greatly overestimated.
Undue concern, as well as carelessness with
regard to radiation hazards, it considered
detrimental to the public interest.
A-135
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P^Ts01"' Crlteria and Standards Division (AW-5bO)
July 28, 1975
hC fTf0^8 W°Uld SUggSSt that ^asonably achievable limits
" *™ th°Se Present1 -0 would not be incon-
lteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
July 28, 1975
Present1^
with respect
Multi-plant Sitinp
- » >
th K ? rulemaking hearing be held to fully explore
the basis and impact of this proposed regulation. P
Very truly yours,
YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY
JRG/peb
Donald E. Vandenburgh
Vice President
Appendix I
For the past several years, the nuclear industry has been an
errective June 4, 1975. It is generally conceded by industry that
Appendix I is now a workable regulation. industry that
in the^uSar'nLn^" ** ^ Pr°P°SeS "" rePrese"t a major setback
Rulemaking Hearing
A-136
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1-21
DUKE POWER COMPANY
422 SOUTH CHURCH STBEET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242
Director, Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Page 2
July 28, 1975
July 28, 1975
Director, Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D. C. 20460
Subject: 40 CFR Part 190
Environmental Radiation Protection for Nuclear Power Operations
Comments on Proposed Rules
Dear Sir:
Pursuant to FR Doc 75-14017, Duke Power Company hereby submits comments
on the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) proposed Part 190,
"Environmental Radiation Protection for Nuclear Power Operations," to
40 CFR.
While Duke is in agreement with the philosophy of the proposed rules,
our basic concern is that the manner in which the limits on individual
doses to members of the public are expressed results in these limits
being difficult to interpret. The impact of compliance with proposed
40 CFR Part 190 will be dependent upon the apportionment of the dose
criteria to the various segments of the fuel cycle. Cost benefit analysis
of the proposed rules cannot be performed without knowledge of the
criteria to be applied to each segment of the fuel cycle. Likewise, until
such an apportionment of the criteria is performed, implementation of
the proposed rules will be extremely difficult and impractical. There-
fore, it is suggested that proposed 40 CFR Part 190 be revised to
specifically address the limits to be applied to each of the various
affected segments of the nuclear fuel cycle.
With regard to the limits specified, we note that the proposed rules are
not consistent with the provisions of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 as
recently adopted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The 10 CFR
Part 50 Appendix I criteria were established by the NRC after extensive
and lengthy studies and rule making hearings and are well founded and
environmentally acceptable. Therefore, it would appear that the EPA
should give due consideration to the content of Appendix I, and the
factors which led to the NRC's adoption thereof, in the establishment
of 10 CFR Part 190. Of particular concern are the difficulties which
could arise at multi-unit nuclear power reactor sites as a result of the
current differences between Appendix I, as adopted, and the Agency's
proposed Part 190.
It is also noted that the Agency considered the BEIR report ("The Effects
on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation, National
Academy of Sciences, November, 1972) in the formulation of the proposed
rules, but apparently did not consider The National Council on Radiation
Protection's Report No. 43, "Review of the Current State of Radiation
Protection Philosophy." NCRP Report No. 43 differs significantly from
the BEIR Report's methodology in the use of linear extrapolation for
setting dose standards. It is felt that the Agency should recognize the
findings of NCRP Report No. 43, in addition to the BEIR Report, in the
establishment of environmental radiation protection standards for nuclear
power operations.
Based on the above, therefore, Duke Power Company recommends that the
EPA not promulgate the standards as written but rather that proposed
40 CFR Part 190 be revised to:
1. Specifically address the limits to be applied to each of the various
affected segments of the nuclear fuel cycle;
2. Consider the content of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 and the factors
which led to the adoption by the NRC of Appendix I;
3. Recognize the findings of NCRP Report No. 43 in addition to the BEIR
Report.
Pursuant to FR Doc 75-14017, Duke Power Company also hereby indicates
its interest in participating in a public hearing on the proposed 40 CFR
Part 190 rule making. As a part of such a public hearing, we are
particularly interested in being provided an opportunity to discuss the
proposed rules with those personnel who developed the standards.
A-137
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1-22
STONE 6 WEBSTER ENGINEERING CORPORATION
225 FRANKLIN STREET, BOSTON. MASSACHUSETTS
CSD
July 29, 1975
Director July 29 1975
Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, B.C. 2Ok60
Dear Sir:
Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation wishes to respond to the invitation
of the Environmental Protection Agency to comment on proposed to CFR 190
Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Nuclear Power Operations "
as published in the Federal Register of May 29, 1975. Stone & Webster is
vitally interested in these proposed regulations since they will undoubtedly
affect the design and regulatory review of commercial nuclear power plants^
which we design, engineer, and construct.
Because of the nature of these proposed standards, and their potential effect
upon the nuclear industry, it is believed that the EPA should hold public
hearings to pursue all aspects and implications of these standards. These
SSSfS Sh°^d.a?dress as a »>inim»n: (D regulatory implementation of the
standards, (2) interrelationship between the EPA and Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) in applying radiation requirements, (3) availability of
effluent control technology, (4) radiation dose models, (5) effect of stand-
ards upon development of "nuclear parks" and (6) backfltting requirements.
In addition, the hearing format should allow in-person questioning of EPA
personnel responsible for the proposed standards by participantTof the
proceedings. In scheduling these hearings, the EPA should provide adequate
time for the participants to prepare substantive comments.
A considerable amount of effort, time, and money has been expended by industry
£? H^^T ^ ^V^ ^ ^ Practicable" rulemaking hearingl (Docket
No. Rm-50-2). As a result of these hearings, the HRC has recently issued the
final version of 10CFR50, Appendix I, "Numerical Guides for Design Objectives
and Limiting Conditions for Operation to meet the Criterion "As Sw As
Sn10^ * Radioa<=tive Material in Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power
Reactor Effluents. Upon comparing these proposed standards with Appendix I
it appears that the two documents are not mutually consistent. This is
particularly true when considering multiple reactor sites. There are a
number of potentially serious shortcomings in the proposed standards con-
cerning "nuclear parks" and multiple unit sites.
Since the standards are proposed for the entire uranium fuel cycle it is
not clear how the NBC will be able to apply the standards to individual
components of the fuel cycle. Because of this uncertainty in apportionment
of doses and release limits, it is difficult to assess how these standards
will apply to individual facilities (which, of course, must be designed
and licensed, individually).
The introduction to the proposed standard states: "The Agency recognizes
that implementation of the standards for Krypton-85 and Iodine-129 hy the
proposed effective date of January 1, 1983, will require successful demon-
stration of control technology for commercial use that is now in the advanced
stages of development If substantial difficulty should develop for
implementing the standards for Krypton-85 and Iodine-129 with respect to the
proposed levels, facility safety, or cost, the Agency will give these factors
careful and appropriate consideration prior to the effective date." Stone &
Webster recommends that the EPA follow the development of control technology
and apply the standard only when the technology has been proven instead of
before the fact. This would mean deletion of Krypton-85 and Iodine-129
from Paragraph 190.10 (b) and deletion of Paragraph 190.12 (b).
Relative to implementation, a number of questions are raised in regard to
enforcement. One example is the question of how the radiation exposure of
a real person can be determined. This could involve such things as whole
body counting, urinalysis, and a whole range of dosimetric problems.
Insummary, it is believed that the technical bases and means of implemen-
tation of these proposed standards should be explored in a publidralemaking
^v^f;?6' "T includljle» overlapping of federal agency responsibilities,
backfitting requirements, radioactive effluent control technology status,
multiple unit sites and nuclear energy parks, relative risk assessments and
dose modeling should also be considered in detail in such a proceeding.
We thank you for this opportunity to comment on proposed to CFR 190.
Very truly yours,
H. L. Vener
Supervisor of Licensing
HLV:kf
A-138
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1-23
Westinghouse Electric Corporation Power Systems
PWR Systems Division
Box 355
Pittsburgh Pennsylvania 15230
August 11, 1975
NS-CE-751
Di rector
Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D. C. 20460
Re: Environmental Radiation Protection
for Nuclear Power Operations --
Proposed Standards
Gentlemen:
This is in response to the Environmental Protection Agency's request for
comments on the proposed standards for Environmental Radiation Protection
for Nuclear Power Operations contained in 40 Fed. Reg. 23420, dated
May 29, 1975.
Westinghouse concurs with the EPA that it is important to assure that
our society is not burdened with unreasonable expenditures to minimize
the potential risks of nuclear power operations in order to gain the
necessary benefits of electric power. Therefore, we suggest that because
of the substantive differences between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's
proposed Appendix I to 10 CFR 50 and the finalized version of Appendix I
effective June 4, 1975 and the impact these differences will have on the
cost-benefit analysis utilized by EPA in its Draft Environmental Statement,
a reissue of the EPA's Draft Environmental Statement and proposed stand-
ards is necessary.
We do not feel that the EPA proposed standards are consistent with the
NRC Appendix I. The NRC Appendix I sets separate design objectives on
liquid and gaseous pathways and requires action to be defined if the
actual quarterly releases exceed one-half the annual design objective.
There is a distinct possibility that a licensee can be fully in compliance
with the NRC requirements set forth in Appendix I, and at the same time
and under the same circumstances be in violation of the EPA's proposed
standards. The inconsistency between EPA and NRC regulations can be
demonstrated via the following two scenarios:
U. S. Environmental Protection -2-
Agency
August 11, 1975
NS-CE-751
(D
(2)
A two reactor unit site is releasing radioiodine in liquids
and gases at such a rate that the first unit is just below
the point where a course of action is required to be defined
by Appendix I and the second unit is just above the design
objective. Under Appendix I, operation could continue, status
quo, indefinitely while the new EPA standard would require
operation of one unit to be modified.
A four reactor unit site is located across the river from a
fuel reprocessing plant. The four reactor units are releasing
radioiodine at the design objective limits in both gases and
liquids while the reprocessing plant is operating at a level
equivalent to twice the design objectives for LWR's. In this
case, no action is required under Appendix I while:
(a)
the operation is 133% of the EPA standard only
considering the four reactor units and,
(b) the operation is ^200% of the EPA standard con-
sidering all the facilities.
The EPA standard would result in the NRC altering operation of
the four reactor units without considering operation of the
reprocessing plant. Additionally, NRC would be required to
take further action to alter further operation of the reactors
and/or to alter operation of the fuel reprocessing plant.
With the increased interest in multi-reactor sites and the urgent need for
more fuel reprocessing plants, we feel that these scenarios could exist
in the future. Therefore, we conclude that the two regulations are incon-
sistent.
Westinghouse urges that the required environmental impact statement and
the proposed standards be redrafted to completely and accurately reflect
the guidance for design objectives and limiting conditions for operation
of light-water-cooled nuclear power reactors set forth by the NRC in the
final Appendix I to 10 CFR 50. An additional reason for this recommendation
is that in our view the standards proposed would require modification of
the proposed Appendix I and the NRC methods of limiting effluent releases.
Additional revision of Appendix I as a result of the proposed EPA standard
will require the additional expense of time-consuming reanalysis. There
are also decisions being made concerning the necessary equipment required
A-139
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U. S. Environmental Protection
Agency
-3-
August 11, 1975
NS-CE-751
U. S. Environmental Protection
Agency
-4-
August 11, 1975
NS-CE-751
* i i J -S Practl?able criteria of Appendix I. The uncer-
tainty involved in implementing the proposed EPA standard does not
facilitate rendering such decisions. Issuance of the EPA standard in
its present form and at this time would further impede the licensing
process without significant benefits. "tensing
mit - "2te that' 1n 1ts fl'™lized Appendix I, the NRC
omitted that portion of its regulations relating to total quantities of
radioactive materia released in effluents-the rationale being that the
more ™iportant consideration was the dose the individual might receive
rather than the quantity of material released from the plant. We would
recommend therefore, that the EPA consider deleting the quantity 1 im Its
specified in Section 190.10(b) of EPA proposed regulation in favor of a
dose commitment concept.
Consistent with the EPA concern that society should not be excessively
burdened with unreasonable expenditures to minimize potential risks
?o DotInH,UlieSt fc5v Phe nUCl?3r P0wer industry Shou1d not be subjected
to potentially conflicting or inconsistent agency actions. We feel the
implementation of the proposed standards will impose uncertainties due
to the inconsistencies in the numerical values of the terms to be used
to calculate radiation doses in different parts of the fuel cycle
Westinghouse is aware that EPA in the past has utilized different 'dose
conversion factors for relating air concentration of radioiodine to the
dose received by an individual, neither of which is consistent with the
daff^Td 5Yhe NR£' The ma9m'tude Of the inconsistency b^een Se
different models is shown in the attached Table 1. Further illustration
?I eh* ^consistency between the EPA and NRC ^^ ^ s^n ^ ^^ ^
It should be noted that, with regard to the bone dose from the uranium
in the *ater, the EPA model differs from the NRC model by three orders of
^ FM H ^J^P6^ to the lung dose from insoluble uranium in air,
the EPA model differs from the NRC model by over one order of magnitude.
Since the NRC is responsible for implementation of the proposed standards,
it should be made clear that the NRC dose conversion factors are applicable
for determining compliance with the proposed standards. Thus, EPA should
com llance conversion factors are not applicable for determining
The basis of the potential health effects presented in the EPA Draft
Environmental Statement are recommendations resulting from the low levels
NCRP No £ nJ th c 9KVeV" th^BEIR report- A more recent report,
RF?R ™*h t^1S.Si'bjeC^ c°nsiders the recommendations made by the
BEIR committee and states, "The NCRP wishes to caution government policy
SSI- XEJL'V16 unreasonableness of interpreting^ asSnS ' pper
limit estimates of carcinogenic risks at low radiation levels, derived
by linear extrapolation from data obtained at high doses and dose rates
iss-
On the basis of the above comments, Westinghouse believes that a new
should be prepared and the
wul tnt
would like to take
°ffered by EPA f°r a 0»b"c "earing onlhe scientific
°n WhlCh ^ pr°POSed standa^s are based. Wes?fnghoSse
is opportunity to indicate that it would be interested
in participating, if such a public hearing is held. However! the extent
°rPaTC1PatT rld be dePende"' "Pon the nature anS scope of the
and upon the disposition of the above-mentioned recommendations
de!1r!-t0 Pursue any of the matters contained herein, we
15^ * J?6"1 WUh y°U' Thank you for this °PP°rtunity
the rulemaking process.
yours,
/smh
C. Eicheldinger, Manager
Nuclear Safety Department
A-140
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TABLE 2
TABLE 1
MILK CONCENTRATION OF 1-131 FROM GIVEN INPUT CONCENTRATIONS AND
CORRESPONDING DOSES
(millirem/year per pCi/m in air)
Age Grouping
Infant
4 Yr. Old
Adult
EPA*"
Nuclear Fuel
Reprocessing
2700
Not Given
180
Nuclear Power
Reactors
1700
1900
62
Nuclear Power
Reactors
3560
1470
396
COMPARISON OF EPA WITH
NRC (ICRP-2) DOSE CONVERSION FACTORS
FOR URANIUM
Pathway
Inhalation of insoluble U
via air (lung dose)
Inhalation of soluble U
in air (bone dose)
Dose Conversion Factor
NRC
(ICRP-2. 1959)
pCi/nT
pci/rrT
EPA Model. 1973
(5)
10,000
pCi/m"
pCi/nr
Water ingestion of U
(bone dose)
7.5 x 10
-3 mrem/yr
mrem/yr
pCi/lite
mrem/yr
(1) EPA-520/9-73-003-D, "Environmental Analysis of the Uranium
Fuel Cycle Part III, Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing," October 1973,
U. S. EPA, Washington, D. C.
(2) EPA-520/9-73-003-C, "Environmental Analysis of the Uranium
Fuel Cycle, Part II, Nuclear Power Reactors," November 1973,
U. S. EPA, Washington, D. C.
(3) WASH-1258, "Final Environmental Statement Concerning Proposed
Rulemaking Action: Numerical Guides for Design Objectives
and Limiting Conditions for Operation to Meet the Criterion
'As Low As Practicable1 for Radioactive Material in Light-
Water-Cooled Nuclear Reactors," Volume 2, Analytical Models
and Calculations, USAEC (July 1973).
*Values for NRC Model obtained by dividing maximum permissible does (MPD)
by the maximum permissible concentration (MPC) based on ICRP-2 MPD and MPC
values. JJJ2. for insoluble U in air = 15'000 mrem/!/r . 40 pci/m3 is
40 pCi/m3
MPD
utilized for low enrichment (2-4 w/o U-235) uranium, r^- for U water
ingestion = 30.000 mrem/yr = 7_5 x 1Q-3 ^_
40 x 10"° pCi/1
Comparable values for natural U would be twice as large since the MPC
air and water values according to ICRP-2 are only half as large.
(4) Health Physics. Vol. 3, pp. 1-380, June 1960, K. I. Morgan,
Editor-in-Chief.
(5) EPA-520/9-73-003B, "Environmental Analysis of the Uranium Fuel
Cycle, Part I, Fuel Supply, October 1973, U. S. EPA, Office of
Radiation Programs, Field Operations Division, Washington, D. C.
Appendix A.
A-141
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Carl L. New
Vice President
Consolidated Edison Company of New York. In
4 Irving Place. New York. N. Y. 10003
Telephone (212) 460-5133
1-24
Director, Criteria and Standards
Division (AW-506)
Page 2
August 11, 1975
August 11, 1975
Director, Criteria and Standards
Division (AW-506)
Office of Radiation Programs
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
Washington, DC 20460
Dear Sir:
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, (Con Edison)
respectfully submits below its comments on proposed EPA
regulations, 40 CFR Part 190, "Environmental Radiation
Protection Standards for Nuclear Power Operations".
Con Edison recommends that the environmental radia-
tion standards currently applicable to nuclear power plants
and fuel cycle facilities not be changed unless and until
EPA shows, based on a reasonable cost-benefit analysis,
that such a change is in the public interest. For the
reasons discussed below, we do not believe that in its
proposal, EPA has made such a showing.
The Proposed Standards are Unnecessary
Con Edison believes that the currently applicable
environmental radiation dose guidelines, as established
by the Federal Radiation Council [F.R. Docs. 60-4539,
61-9402], have not been shown to present an unacceptable
risk to the public health. Furthermore, there is ample
evidence that doses to members of the public, due to
sources other than natural background and medical and
dental exposures, are significantly below these limits
and will not approach them in the foreseeable future.
For example, doses from power reactors are limited to a
small fraction of the FRC guideline values by the regu-
lations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). There
is thus no urgent necessity for EPA to set new dose stan-
dards or allocate existing guidelines among the various
sources.
While we believe that the allocation of environmental
dose limits to various sources is a reasonable long-range
task for EPA to undertake, we believe that the Agency's
priorities are confused. EPA has commenced its task with
the nuclear power industry and its fuel cycle components,
a source of public radiation exposure that is currently
subject to stringent regulation by an expert regulatory
agency specifically established for that purpose. It
would seem more appropriate to concentrate on establishing
limits for exposure to radiation from radioactive materials
and radiation sources not covered by the Atomic Energy Act
and the Government Reorganization Act of 1974.
The Proposed Standards are Confusing
Although it is EPA's contention that its proposed
standards are compatible with NRC's 10 CFR 50 Appendix I,
we believe that the existence of two separate standards
covering, in effect, the same facilities, can only cause
confusion. Since EPA agrees that at present Appendix I
is satisfactory to protect the public health, there is no
need for establishment of an additional numerical stan-
dard for radiation from reactor effluents. The existence
of this second set of standards adds a source of confusion
and permits the litigation of any real or imagined incon-
sistency that may develop. We can discern no possible
benefit to the public health of such a dual regulatory
system. Furthermore, we believe that the NRC's orderly
development of standards for the other components of the
fuel cycle industry as it develops is a reasonable and
safe approach to the regulation of such facilities, and
that additional EPA limits are not needed at this time.
The Proposed Standards are not based on a Reasonable Cost-
Benefit Analysis
The statement justifying the proposed EPA standards
A-142
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Director, Criteria and Standards
Division (AW-506)
Page 3
August 11, 1975
Director, Criteria and Standards
Division (AW-506)
Page 4
August 11, 1975
does not specify the methodology or data used to justify
these standards from a cost-benefit standpoint. No eval-
uation of the benefits of nuclear power is presented.
The rationale used is one of "cost-effectiveness." This
method is useful for determining which of several alter-
native means is most effective in achieving a particular
end. It does not, however, enable one to determine the
reasonableness of the end.
EPA's analysis used is predicated upon a linear, non-
threshold dose-effect relationship. In its report NCRP-43,
the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements
(NCRP) cautions governmental policy-making agencies "of
the unreasonableness of interpreting or assuming 'upper
limit1 estimates of carcinogenic risks at low radiation
levels, derived by linear extrapolation from data obtained
at high doses and dose rates, as actual risks, and of
basing unduly restrictive policies on such an interpretation
or assumption". NCRP-43 also warns that "the use of over-
estimates of risk for one alternative, e.g. one involving
radiation exposure, unless counter balanced by commensurate
overestimates of risks from other alternatives, could deny
benefits to society and could conceivably incur greater
risks in some circumstances". Although recognizing that
sufficient data are not available to prove (or disprove)
its assumptions, the EPA nonetheless states that its bases
are "prudent". Furthermore, EPA seems to be using this
basis as more than an "assumption", when it refers to
radiation as "a non-threshold pollutant", without any
qualifying phrase, in justifying its cost-effectiveness
approach. Thus EPA, in attempting to establish the pro-
posed standard, appears to be doing precisely what the
NCRP cautioned against.
The National Academy of Sciences Advisory Committee
on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR)
presented numerical estimates of carcinogenic risks at
low doses and dose rates by extrapolation from the effects
of large doses, delivered at high dose rates; such extrap-
olation was justified on pragmatic rather than scientific
grounds. The BEIR Report is referenced by the EPA in its
standard, although references to reports with differing
approaches are conspicuous by their absence. For example,
the Report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on
the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) did not attempt
such extrapolation, maintaining that the "estimates of
risk per unit dose from epidemiological investigations
are valid only for the doses at which they have been
estimated . . .", and was not referenced by EPA. Similarly,
there is no reference to NCRP-43.
The idea that radiation releases should be kept, "as
low as practicable" is not in dispute, nor is the prudence
of the assumption that there is no completely safe level
of exposure to ionizing radiation. Cost-benefit analysis,
however, should be based on realistic risk estimates at
the exposure levels experienced. Since the possible
expenditures involved for compliance and the risks of
alternatives may be substantial, the usefulness of cost-
benefit analyses to both society and industry is totally
negated by the use of arbitrary, overly conservative risk
estimates. The result is to deny society a substantial
benefit.
Con Edison appreciates the opportunity to present
its views to EPA. We hope that these comments will prove
helpful to the Agency.
Very truly yours,
CLNrrc
A-143
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1-25
SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBF
SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE
9IO SEVENTEENTH STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 2OOO6
September 15, 1975
Director
Criteria and Standards Division
(AW-560) '
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
Re: Proposed Standards for Environ-
mental Radiation Protection for
Nuclear Power Operations
Dear Sir:
On May 29, 1975, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) published in the Federal Register (40 Fed. Reg. 23420-25)
a notice of proposed "Environmental Radiation Protection Stand-
ards for Nuclear Power Operations," inviting comment or sugges-
tions on the proposed standards by July 28, 1975. The comment
period was subsequently extended to September 15, 1975 (40 Fed.
Reg. 34417) in response to requests from numerous interested
persons.
These comments are submitted on behalf of the follow-
ing named companies who to date have decided to consolidate
Director, Criteria and Standards Division
September 15, 1975
Page Two
their participation in this rulemaking proceeding as a single
Utility Group:
Alabama Power Company
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company
Boston Edison Company
Carolina Power & Light Company
Commonwealth Edison Company
Consumers Power Company
Duke Power Company
Duquesne Light Company
Florida Power & Light Company
Georgia Power Company
GPU Service Corporation
Long Island Lighting Company
Pacific Gas & Electric Company
Portland General Electric Company
Southern California Edison Company
Virginia Electric & Power Company
Wisconsin Electric Power Company
Yankee Atomic Electric Company
Appended to this letter as Attachments A and B are
preliminary comments prepared by technical consultants to the
Group. These comments are necessarily restricted to an out-
line of the material we will present at the public hearing
concerning the impact and cost-effectiveness of the proposed
regulation. Proper analysis of the proposed regulation is far
too complex an undertaking to complete within the period allowed
for comment. Further, we are badly handicapped in our analysis
by the difficulties we have encountered in trying to relate the
conclusions in the Draft Environmental Statement to the tech-
nical reports on which the Statement relies and by the errors
A-144
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Director, Criteria and Standards Division
September 15, 1975
Page Three
Director, Criteria and Standards Division
September 15, 1975
Page Four
and inconsistencies we find in these documents. In particular
the underlying reports do not have an adequate identification
of all of the release assumptions and dose calculational models
and do not contain the intermediate calculations on which EPA's
dose estimates and cost-effectiveness conclusions are based.
As matters now stand, it will be necessary for us to reconstruct
these calculations ourselves utilizing to the extent possible
data developed in the course of NRC's Appendix I proceeding.
In addition to submitting these preliminary comments
the Group wishes to question seriously not only the reasonable-
ness but the timeliness of EPA's proposed standards and to make
certain suggestions as to how further public participation in
the rule-making proceeding might best be handled.
In Reorganization Plan No. 3, which became effective
on December 2, 1970, EPA was charged with responsibility for
the establishment of "generally applicable environmental stand-
ards for the prc-tection of the general environment from radio-
active material." EPA's initial public action carrying out
this mandate has .oeen its promulgation in May, 1975, of pro-
posed "standards which would assure the protection of the general
public from unnecessary radiation exposures and radioactive
materials in the general environment resulting from the normal
operations of facilities comprising the uranium fuel cycle."
40 Fed. Reg. 23420. No adequate basis has been provided by EPA
for either its selection of the uranium fuel cycle for initial
standards-setting treatment, nor the need at this time for pro-
mulgation of standards for this source of radioactivity to the
general environment.
Presently, the releases of all light-water nuclear re-
actors are subject to meeting the limitations expressed in Ap-
pendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 which quantifies the as low as prac-
ticable concept for radioactive releases from these facilities.
Appendix I limits were derived after more than four years of
rulemaking endeavors on the part of the NRC's (then the AEC's)
regulatory staff, industry representatives, states and intervenor
organization representatives. Central to Appendix I is the cost
effectiveness of adding treatment systems on effluent streams to
reduce the quantity of radioactive materials released—the same
yardstick used by EPA to support its proposed standards. As to
the remaining principal contributor of radioactive materials in
the uranium fuel cycle sought to be covered by EPA's standards—
the reprocessing segment of the fuel cycle—there are no such
facilities presently operating in this country. When they do
operate they will have been designed to meet the low-as-practi-
cable requirements of 10 CFR 50.34a and 50.36a and will include
most of the controls considered by EPA to be cost-effective.
A-145
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SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBR
Director, Criteria and Standards Division
September 15, 1975
Page Five
Under these circumstances the need for immediate
promulgation of EPA standards, especially standards which we
believe are subject to severe criticism, must be questioned.
We suggest the more prudent course of action for EPA is to
defer action on the proposed regulation until it has a more
solid basis for regulation in at least the following areas:
(a) It is essential that the plans for imple-
mentation of the EPA standards be formu-
lated and made available for public comment
prior to their adoption. Methods for allo-
cating to the specific segments of the fuel
cycle their allowable contribution to a
generally applicable standard are crucial.
Allocation may not prove necessary in the
case of the 25 mrem individual dose limit,
although consideration will somehow have
to be given in licensing individual facil-
ities to existing or potential dose contri-
butions from other sources. Allocation
will, however, be indispensable in admin-
istering the industry-wide limits on quan-
tities of long-lived radioactive elements
Director, Criteria and Standards Division
September 15, 1975
Page Six
per gigawatt of electrical generation. Absent
any guidance on allocation, or implementation,
no segment of the cycle is able to assess
meaningfully its ability to comply with the
standards. Even within one segment, take for
example reactors, questions arise as to whether
backfitting will be required, whether plants
at a specific location will be judged on a
first-come, first-served basis, how allowable
variances will be established, and so on. Re-
sponsible governmental standards-setting can-
not be conducted in a vacuum. It is incumbent
upon EPA, which seeks to establish standards
for industry on the basis of practicability
and cost-effectiveness, to take into account
whether those standards can realistically be
implemented. We are aware in this regard of
the problems experienced to date on the divi-
sion of responsibilities between EPA and the
regulating agencies such as NRC, and do not
suggest that EPA should on its own develop
and attempt to administer implementing regu-
lations for its standards. It is our position,
A 146
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SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBR
SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWB
Director, Criteria and Standards Division
September 15, 1975
Page Seven
Director, Criteria and Standards Division
September 15, 1975
Page Eight
however, that EPA must consider the impact
of its standards by evaluating, coincident-
ally with the establishment of the standards,
the implementation schemes for applying
those standards either by detailed assess-
ment of existing regulations of the imple-
menting agencies to determine the workability
of the standards under existing regulations,
or by coordinating with those same agencies
for their coincident development of imple-
menting regulations which will work. Fur-
ther it is as important that interested
persons be afforded an opportunity to par-
ticipate in the formulation of implementation
plans as in the standards themselves. Until
implementation of the proposed standards has
been given the requisite coincident attention,
the validity of the standards and their prac-
ticability cannot be meaningfully measured.
We urge EPA to coordinate with the imple-
menting agencies before proceeding further in
its present rulemaking endeavors.
(b) Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 was published
in May of this year following an extensive,
though disciplined, adjudicatory rulemaking
proceeding. Many of the assumptions on
which Appendix I is based, however, especi-
ally some of its source term assumptions
as applied to very low level releases, re-
main to be tested. Operating experience
testing those assumptions could be invalu-
able to consideration by EPA of "cost-
effective" standards. So to will operating
experience of reprocessing plants provide
concrete data on releases from those facil-
ities living under NRC's generally appli-
cable as-low-as practicable standards. It
is incumbent upon EPA to consider the benefit
of applying this experience to the standard-
setting process in relation to the establish-
ment now of possibly unrealistic standards
for want of such a data base.
(c) EPA's standards, as proposed, are based on
unproven technology principally in the area
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Director, Criteria and Standards Division
September 15, 1975
Page Nine
Director, Criteria and Standards Division
September 15, 1975
Page Ten
of controlling releases from reprocessing
facilities. Specifically, in the case of
Kr-85, the practicability of attaining EPA
standards assumes the commercial applica-
bility of processes still in the pilot plant
stage of development to large scale repro-
cessing plants. Based on this assumption
(and the underlying assumptions of associ-
ated costs) EPA would establish standards
now and postpone implementation until a date
(1983) when that agency conceives the assumed
technology shruld be available. By 1983
and for a number of years thereafter the
contribution of Kr-85 from U. S. reprocess-
ing plants to the atmosphere will be extremely
small. We urge that EPA await the technolog-
ical advances and that based on those tech-
nologies which prove themselves establish
at that time standards which can be shown truly
to be cost-effective. Similarly, EPA's ap-
proach to standards for specifically enumer-
ated isotopes other than Kr-85, such as the
transuranic elements, should await actual data
not now available on the amounts of material
actually released in operating facilities.
(d) EPA should await the results of several on-
going studies and regulatory developments
before it proceeds further in the conduct
of its own rulemaking endeavors. Among the
more significant on-going reviews and pro-
ceedings is a study to determine the most
appropriate methodology for the use of the
cost-effectiveness approach in standards-
setting, a sine qua non it would appear to
the further expenditure of time and resources
in this proposed rulemaking. The study is
being conducted for EPA by the National
Academy of Sciences. Release of the report
of this study to EPA is anticipated by the
end of this year (and release to the public
one month later). The report should be re-
viewed and their results evaluated before
proceeding further on the standards scheme
presently proposed by EPA. Such a temporary
stay in this proceeding will derive other
A-148
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Director, Criteria and Standards Division
September 15, 1975
Page Eleven
Director, Criteria and Standards Division
September 15, 1975
Page Twelve
substantial benefits which themselves should
constitute cause for a minor postponement of
these proceedings. Thus, during this period,
NRC may commence its promised rulemaking to
determine a cost per dose commitment standard
for use in cost-benefit applications. This
would provide further basis for the yardstick
EPA should apply in determining cost-effective-
ness.
(e) Promulgation of the proposed standards should
await the NRC's GESMO proceeding and its de-
termination with respect to the recycle of
Plutonium in light-water reactors. This de-
termination will bear significantly on the
need for and timing of EPA standards. In fact,
if plutonium recycle is not permitted the fuel
cycle on which EPA's proposed standards are
based will simply not exist. Based on our
estimate of future reprocessing costs it will
not make economic sense to reprocess fuel
solely for the sake of recovering uranium,
and reprocessing plants will not be a factor
in the fuel cycle. Conversely, if plutonium
recycle is allowed, it makes no sense to ex-
clude from consideration, as the proposed
standards now do, radioactive emissions asso-
ciated with the use of recycled plutonium fuel,
(f) EPA has relied on a suspect application of
the dose linearity concept to establish its
radiation standards. Thus, through reliance
on selected portions of the November, 1972,
report by the National Academy of Sciences-
National Research Council, "The Effects on
Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of
Ionizing Radiation, Report of the Advisory
Committee on the Biological Effects of Ioniz-
ing Radiation," EPA bases its standards on
the assumption that the concept of dose-
effect linearity is properly applied to ex-
tremely small variations in dose commitment.
EPA, we believe, should reassess its reliance
on the BEIR Report, bearing in mind that the
BEIR report acknowledges the high probability
that the linear hypothesis overstates the
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Director, Criteria and Standards Division
September 15, 1975
Page Thirteen
Director, Criteria and Standards Division
September 15, 1975
Page Fourteen
risk and the BEIR Committee admonition that
"there should not be attempted the reduction
of small risks even further at the cost of
large sums of money that spent otherwise,
would clearly produce greater benefit." EPA
should also factor in additional data which
have become available since the BEIR Report
and the 1972 United Nations report on ioniz-
ing radiation effects (the UNSCEAR Report)
were published, and in particular, take into
account the latest public pronouncement by
the National Council on Radiation Protection
in its Report No. 43 issued in February of
this year. On calculating risk coefficients,
the NCRP has cautioned:
"The linear hypothesis, by its
very nature, makes it possible
to calculate risk coefficients,
i.e., the number of cancers or
other effects that would be
expected to occur in an exposed
population, of a given size,
per unit of radiation dose. It
must be emphasized, as noted
earlier, that risk coefficients
derived from the linear hypoth-
esis are based on data obtained
at high doses and high dose
rates. The National Academy of
Sciences (BEIR Committee), in its
1972 report, cautioned against the
use of risk coefficients at doses
and dose rates orders of magnitude
lower than those at which observa-
tions were made. The United Nations
Committee, in its 1972 report, ex-
pressed a strong opinion that the
uncertainties in the linear hypoth-
esis are such as to make it inadvis-
able to use risk coefficients ex-
cept in regions where data exist.
The evidence for both dose rate
effect and departure from linearity
are such that the NCRP believes
that the concern expressed by each
of the committees is warranted."
EPA cannot ignore this advice from a prominent
standards-setting body. We urge EPA to elicit
specific input from NCRP on the bounds of jus-
tified application of the linearity theory and
to incorporate NCRP's and others' views on this
subject before adopting its presently proposed
application.
(g) To facilitate public comment on the proposed
regulation and to provide a meaningful basis
for a public hearing, EPA should supplement its
DBS with a complete identification of the source
term assumptions, dose calculational models and
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Director, Criteria and Standards Division
September 15, 1975
Page Fifteen
intermediate calculations on which its
dose estimates and cost-effectiveness
determinations have been made. Only
confusion and delay can result if par-
ticipants in the public hearing are
left to reconstruct these matters for
themselves.
Before deciding the timing and format for EPA's
planned public hearing, we suggest that EPA first provide
through a preliminary hearing or less formal conference a
further opportunity to all interested persons to discuss
the matters of timing and format with EPA. Such a prelim-
inary proceeding would not now deal with the substantive
questions of the practicability of the proposed standards
or their cost-effectiveness. It would instead be concerned
with the comments made by this Group and others concerning
the timeliness of the proposed standards. The questions
to be considered would include the present need for the
standards taking into account existing NRC regulations and
possible gaps or deficiencies therein; the feasibility of
adopting standards prior to the development of plans for
their implementation; the possible advantages to be gained
Director, Criteria and Standards Division
September 15, 1975
Page Sixteen
in accumulating further operating data, including the feasi-
bility of new control technologies, on which to measure the
practicability and effectiveness of the proposed standards;
and the desirability of awaiting the outcome of further studies
as to the validity of applying the linear dose hypothesis to
very low levels of radiation. We believe that if these ques-
tions are not considered in some form of preliminary proceed-
ing, argument on these questions will occupy a large part of
the public hearing concerned with the substantive issues of
practicability and cost-effectiveness of the proposed stand-
ards and divert needed attention to these subjects.
When the time comes for the main public hearing, we
believe that careful attention should be given to formulating
in advance clear and reasonably formal procedures for the
hearing. We do not advocate, primarily because of the large
number of participants, a full-blown adjudicatory process.
We do believe that at a minimum EPA should make available for
questioning its personnel who have been responsible for de-
veloping the proposed standards, who can explain their pur-
pose and meaning, and who can speak to the detailed bases for
the numerical values selected. To facilitate such questioning
and to avoid duplication EPA might well ask that participants
with common interests participate in the questioning through
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SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROW&. OGE
Director, Criteria and Standards Division
September 15, 1975
Page Seventeen
a panel approach. Following the public hearing EPA should
also provide a mechanism, as did the NRC in the Appendix I
proceeding, whereby the EPA Administrator looks to independent
advisors for an objective evaluation of the record of the pub-
lic hearing rather than to staff advocates of a particular
position.
Sincerely,
SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE
By
Attachments
George F. 'Trowbridgpf
Counsel for Utility Group
The P
Attachment A
PRELIMINARY TECHNICAL COMMENTS ON EPA
PROPOSED RADIATION PROTECTION STANDARDS
Standards Are More Restrictive Than Appendix I.
Although we understand it was not EPA's intent that the proposed
limits be more restrictive than Appendix I, it is not, in fact, true.
The proposed standards are more restrictive than Appendix I guides in
several important ways, particularly for multi-reactor sites. This anomaly
is quite likely due to the fact that EPA's proposed limits were con-
ceived as being compatible with the final AEC (NRC) Staff position paper
on Appendix I. A restructuring of the proposed limits to make them
compatible with Appendix I as it was finally issued is very much in
order, particularly so since both the proposed EPA limits and the NRC-
issued Appendix I place so much stress on cost-benefit.
Appendix I permits a whole-body dose from gaseous releases of
5 mrem/year per reactor plus 3 mrem/year from liquids and specifically
excludes direct radiation. The proposed EPA standards would limit the
total body dose from all pathways from the entire fuel cycle to 25 mrem/year.
The EPA limit includes direct radiation, whereas this pathway is speci-
fically excluded in Appendix I. Furthermore the EPA limit of 25 mrem
applies to organs other than thyroid and skin. For liquid releases,
other organ doses are usually controlling. Appendix I permits 10 mrem/year
dose to any organ from liquids from each reactor.
A-152
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The inclusion of the direct radiation dose by EPA is of particular
concern—the more so for BWR. The direct radiation dose from a BWR
will, in many of not most instances, be quite significant relative to
the proposed limit. The NRG review plan for Safety Analysis Reports
includes a section on direct radiation dose assessments which includes
dose assessment methods and acceptance criteria.— Acceptance criteria
for general plant shielding and outside storage tanks are equivalent
to 1 mrera/year at 500 m for each source. Upper and lower limit results
from the NRC model for estimating turbine N-16 doses are shown in Figure 1.
At 500 meters the annual dose is expected to range from 13 mrem to
240 mrera for full time exposure to one 1000 MWe BWR. A plant with a
well-shielded turbine which gives an annual dose of 13 mrem is acceptable
to NRC. Higher doses may be accepted if supported by cost-benefit
analysis.
Doses from turbine building N-16 are not yet known very accurately.
Results of calculations by Steyn et al- and measurements by Hairr et al-'
are included in Figure 1 for comparison. The lower bound NRC curve
does not appear unrealistic.
It is evident from Figure 1 that the location of the nearest resident
is crucial in determining the importance of direct radiation dose. Data
on distances to nearest residences are also sparse, but data on distances
to site boundaries of 64 sites have been summarized by NRC.— The average
site boundary distance is 740 meters, but 10 of 64 sites have site boundary
distances less than 500 meters.
It is concluded that the dose to a resident at 500 m from direct
radiation from a 1000 MWe BWR would probably be in the range of 10-40 mrem
per year, assuming full time exposure. If the nearest residence were more
than 1000 meters from the plant, the dose would be less than 1 mrem per
year. The direct radiation dose from a 1000 MWe PWR would be less than
2 mrem/year at 500 m, assuming full-time exposure. Allowing for a 50%
shielding and occupancy factor the dose at 500 m would be about 1 mrem
for PWR and 5-20 mrem for BWR.
Now combining all of the above, the dose to an individual residing in
the immediate vicinity of a single lOOO-MW(e) reactor which is meeting
Appendix I limits in all respects could be:
Dose Rate, mrem/year
PWR BWR
5
10
5-20
Radiation Source
Immersion (Noble Gas)
Liquid (Critical Organ)
Direct Radiation
Total ~-S 16 20-35
Thus for BWR a single reactor could use up or even exceed the entire
EPA limit; a single PWR would use two thirds of the limit. The proposed
limit is clearly more restrictive than Appendix I for multi-BWR sites, in
fact, it is almost certain that additional, non-cost-effective equipment
not required by Appendix I would be required if there were more than one
BWR at a site and if the limits were adopted as proposed by EPA.
Whether or not multiple PWR could be placed at a single site would
depend on what assumptions were made as to the additivity of doses from the
A-153
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multiple reactors. Traditionally NRC considers that multiple units are
completely additive at the levels permitted by Appendix 1. Utility
applicants in considering the consequences of possible shutdown of gener-
ating capacity due to potentially exceeding the EPA limit would also be
likely to make this same c .iservative assumption. It is our understanding
that EPA may not have intended this to be the case (see page 40 of the DES).
But the need for a clear spelling out of EPA's intention and of the inclusion
of specific models for additivity is apparent.
It should be noted that the source terms, release path models, dose
models, occupancy factors and other parameters needed to make dose calcu-
lations even for a single reactor are given in the DES and in the supporting
technical documents only incompletely and in some instances in a contra-
dictory manner. Models and methods for adding doses at multi-reactor sites
are completely lacking. The DES should be supplemented by much more detail
for the calculational models, inclusion of intermediate calculations, and
a clear indication of how the transition is made from the backup technical
documents to the DES. Failing this, it is the intention of Che Utility
Group to present detailed testimony at the public hearing on these proposed
standards which will elaborate on the above points, suggest appropriate
models and assumptions for use in adding doses at multi-reactor sites, and
indicate what the dose limit (as proposed by EPA) would have to be in order
that the limit will not be more restrictive than Appendix I.
Finally the DES includes two Tables (4 & 5) which purport to show that
sarly all the current reactor applicants expect to meet exposure levels
below the proposed limit. Two points should be made concerning these
tables. First, most of these applications were developed during the formative
period of Appendix I and many include cost-ineffective control measures
which are not required by final Appendix I. Second, the values quoted are
from Environmental Impact Statements, not from Safety Analysis Reports.
EIS are traditionally developed using source terms considerably lower than
the SAR source terms. Selection of equipment to meet design objectives,
during the licensing process, is always based on the higher SAR source terms.
Thus the implementive effect of the proposed EPA limits must be judged
based on SAR values, not EIS values.
Limits on Long-Lived Isotopes.
EPA has proposed limits on the release of long-lived isotopes from
the entire fuel cycle as follows:
1) Kr-85 50,000 curies/gigawatt-year(e)
2) 1-129 5 millicuries/gigawatt-year(e)
3) Plutonium and other
a-emitting transuranic
isotopes with half-
lives greater than
1 year 0.5 millicurie/gigawatt-year(e)
Quite apart from the unworkability of a system in which it would be
necessary to establish an equitable allocation of the proposed limits* to
*Note that unlike the 25 mrem/year limit, which could be assumed to apply
equally to all fuel cycle facilities, since in most cases the problem of
overlap is almost non-existent, these quantity limits would have to be
allocated since they are based on unit energy production, and are additive
throughout the entire fuel cycle whether or not there is overlap of actual
releases from any of the facilities.
A-154
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the various parts of the fuel cyclei these limits are unnecessarily lowt
will be shown in the case of Kr and I to be grossly cost-ineffective, and
in the case of the actinides may not even be attainable at any cost,
let alone on a cost-effective basis.
The required processes for the removal of Kr and I are not now ready
for commercial application to fuel reprocessing. They could not today
be licensed by a commercial operation. To believe that they could actually
be developed! licensed, designed, built, and put into commercial operation
by EPA's 1983 deadline is wholly unrealistic. This date, 1983, is a good
decade too early, both as to need and as to availability.
The proposed limit of 0.5 millicurie per gigawatt(e) year of transuranic
alpha emitters with half-lives greater than one year is out of line with the
experience of the only commercial reprocessing plant which has been operated
to date in this country, i.e. the NFS West Valley plant, with the expectations
of the two present reprocessors, and with the established permissible concen-
trations for the unrestricted release of these isotopes to air and water.
Comparison with MFC
There are about 30 tonnes of spent fuel discharged per year for each
gigawatt(e). The pertinent transuranic content of this fuel is:
% of Total
Curies/gigawatt-year
8.6E+04
9.7E+03
1.4E+04
6.0E 00
3.0E+01
5.0E+03
5.4E+02
7.6E+04
Total 1.9E+05
45
5
7.3
0.003
0.015
2.6
0.28
39.7
100
By way of illustration, an expanded West Valley plant, capable of
handling 750 tonnes/year of fuel, would handle the fuel from 1/15 of a
gigawatt(e) each day. Suppose the entire fuel cycle limit, 0.5 mC., were
allocated to the liquid waste from that plant. Then the allowable release
rate from that plant would be
0.5 x 10 = 33 microcuries/day.
The
Isotope
Pu-238
Pu-239
Pu-240
Pu-241
Pu-242
Am-241
Am-243
Cm- 244
15
effective MPC for the
% of Total
45
5
7.3
0.003
0.015
2.6
0.28
29.7
above mixture of
MPC
HC /cc
5E-06
5E-06
5E-06
2E-04
5E-06
4E-06
4E-06
7E-06
transuranics is
Effective MPC
JiC./cc
1
2.25E-06
2.50E-07
3.65E-07
6.00E-09
7.50E-09
l.OOE-07
1.10E-08
2.80E-06
5.80E-06
Then the 33-microcurie/day limti would be diluted to drinking water MPC
by a total flow of 200 cubic feet/day:
33
5.7E+06 cc/day of water = 200 cuft/day.
5.8E-66 )iC./cc
The small stream which flows through the West Valley site, Cattaraugus
Creek, has an average flow of 358 cfs. So the allowable release proposed
by EPA would require the flow of that stream for just over half a second to
dilute the entire allowable daily output (from the entire fuel cycle)
to drinking water tolerance. This proposal by the Agency then is equivalent
A-155
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to reducing the existing MFC for the West Valley site by a factor of about
170,000.
Or similarly, assume that the entire fuel cycle limit of 0.5 mC were
to be allocated to the gaseous discharge from West Valley. Again the
allowable release would be the same 33 ViC./day or 3.8E-04 jiC./sec. The
annual average X/Q at West Valley for their stack release is 7E-14 sec/cc.
Then the average site boundary concentration of the transuranics would be
2.5E-17 HC./cc. This can be compared to effective MFC of
Soluble Isotopes 1.5E-13
Insoluble Isotopes 2E-12.
If the released material is insoluble, as it certainly will be, the effect
of the 0.5 millicurie limitation is to reduce MFC by just about 100,000.
Even if one were to use the soluble isotope MFC, the reduction factor is
about 6000.
A similar calculation for the Barnwell plant gaseous discharge follows.
Since Barnwell proposes to process 1500 tonnes of fuel/year (equivalent to
0.14 gigawatt-year/day) the allowable release, if the entire 0.5 millcurie
were assigned to their gaseous release, would be 66 microcuries/day or
7.9E-04 y.C /sec. The annual average X/Q for Barnwell is 2E-13 sec/cc. Thus
the average site boundary concentration would be about 1.5E-16 jic/cc, so
the reduction of MFC relative to the Barnwell site is about 12,000 for
insoluble releases and about 1000 for soluble releases.
Operating Experience
It is also instructive to compare the proposed limit with actual
operating experience at West Valley. During 1971, a year in which NFS
processed the equivalent of about 0.8 gigawatt(e) of fuel the following
liquid releases were measured at the discharge weir:
Total Curies
Time Period
First Quarter
Second Quarter
Third Quarter
Fourth Quarter
Grossa
-
-
0.009
0.019
Pu-238
0.015
0.0011
0.00025
0.0014
0.0043
Pu-239
0.002
0.0016
0.00036
0.00084
0.0048
Pu-238+Pu239
Grossa
-
-
0.067
0.12
The total discharge of Pu-238 + 239 for the year was then about 9 millicuries.
It would be expected that about twice this much total transuranic content
was released, or about 20 millicuries from 0.8 gigawatt-year of production.
This is about 50 times the proposed limit for the entire fuel cycle—from
one single waste stream.
In 1968 and 1969, years in which NFS processed a total of about 1.5
gigawatt-year of fuel, and when they had only a single set of HEPA filters
in their ventilation system, they released a total of about 40 millicuries of
grossa--about 25 millicuries/gigawatt-year. If we assume that the ratio of
transuranics to gross alpha is the same as noted above, about 0.2, then the
release with the ventilation air was about 5 millicuries/gigawatt-year.
Since 1969 NFS has had a second set of HEPA in the system. The gross alpha
releases have dropped to about 1 to 2 millicurie/gigawatt-year and again, if
A-156
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the above ratio of transuranics to gross alpha holds, the release would be
0.2-0.4 millicurie/gigawatt-year--just barely below the entire fuel cycle
limit for a single waste stream.
Prospective Reprocessors' Expectations
Consider now the performance which NFS predicts for its expanded and
upgraded plant and also that predicted by AGNS, both as expressed in their
SAR on the respective installations. NFS shows the following expected
releases of the transuranic isotopes covered by the proposed EPA standard:
(7)
Isotope
Pu-238
Pu-239
Pu-240
Cm-244
Am-241*
Am- 243*
Total
Liquid
curie/yr
5.7E-03
5.9E-04
8.9E-04
0.13
8.3E-03
8.9E-04
146E-03
Gaseous
curie/yr
7.6E-03
8.7E-04
1.3E-04
2.5E-03
1.6E-04
1.8E-05
11.3E-03
*inferred by assuming same removal factors as for curium.
Thus from the processing of 25 gigawatt-years of fuel the liquid
releases are expected to be 146 millicuries and the gaseous releases 11
millicuries. This is equivalent to
Liquid 6 millicuries/gigawatt-year
Gaseous 0.45 millicuries/gigawatt-year
AGNS, which plans to boil excess liquid up the stack and thus has no
liquid discharges, expects the following gaseous emissions of the pertinent
(8)
transuranics:
Isotope
Pu-238
Pu-239
Pu-240
Am-241
Am-243
Cm- 244
Total
Gaseous
curie/year
4. 1E-03
3.8E-04
6.6E-04
l.OE-03
--
1.2E-02
1.8E-02
Thus from the processing of 50 gigawatt-years of fuel AGNS expects to
release about 0.35 millicurie/gigawatt-year.
Note that both AGNS and NFS predict they will be able to meet the
proposed limit with their gaseous discharges, but just barely. Clearly
almost the entire proposed limit would have to be assigned to the repro-
cessor leaving very little to be assigned to fuel fabrication and reactors.
The wisdom a setting a limit so far below established MPC and so close to
predicted performance capability when there is so little actual operating data
and almost none based on full burnup fuel most indeed be questioned.
Miscellaneous Losses
Both NFS and AGNS predict that they may be able to release just under
0.5 mC^gigawatt-year from their controlled, treated ventilation releases.
Neither has looked at the possibility of other miscellaneous releases, small
by-passes which have always been trivial in relation to established MPC, but
which become significant when measured against microscopic release limits
based upon the presumed capability of treating the known and controlled
waste streams. It is just this trap into which AEC fell in proposing
11
A-157
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Appendix I limits in the first place. True, the air ejector off-gaSi a
small contained stream, can be treated to reduce its contribution to dose
to values in the order of 1% of MFC. But once this controllable stream has
been taken care of, miscellaneous losses which have always in the past been
lost in the major release now become controlling. It is axiomatic that
treatment of these miscellaneous losses is difficult, if possible at all,
and most likely to be highly cost-ineffective.
We venture to predict that EPA is building just such a trap by setting
a limit of 0.5 mC^/gigawatt-year for transuranics. This limit is so low
that very minor by-passes or miscellaneous losses would result in exceeding
the proposed limit. For instance, the dissolver solution at a reprocessing
plant has the following approximate concentration of the pertinent trans-
uranic isotopes:
Dissolver Solution Concentration
millicuries/cc
7.2E-01
8.1E-02
1.2E-01
4.2E-02
4.5E-03
6.4E-01
Total 1.6E 00
Thus if NFS were to lose control of the equivalent of 8cc in a year
due to spills of samples, by-passes of filters, leaks to unventilated areas,
etc, they would have exceeded the entire annual limit for the entire fuel
cycle for 25 gigawatts. The loss of such a small quantity in miscellaneous
ways would seem to be almost a certainty. In any event, efforts (which have
not been made to date) should be made to obtain actual operating data on
such miscellaneous losses before so low a limit is set.
Reactors
Unless reactors are specifically excluded from consideration in determing
the fuel-cycle contribution of transuranics, they cannot simply be dismissed
as not contributing any significant amount of transuranics. They too will
have to face this limit. As we have seen by far the bulk of the limit will
have to be assigned to the reprocessor. But something will have to be
assigned to the reactor. Suppose as much as 5% were assigned to the reactor.
Assuming it is a lOOO-Mw(e) unit, its allowable discharge for the entire
year would be 25 microcuries! Let us assume that half of this is assigned
to gaseous releases and half to liquid releases. Also assume that the
average ventilation flow is 150,000 CFM and the annual discharge of liquids
is 150,000 gal. The concentrations which would then have to be measured in
the vent release and the liquid releases in order to prove compliance are
in the range of:
Gases 5E-15 Hc/cc
Liquids 2E-08 HC/CC
To measure such low levels on a routine basis (particularly the gases)
is going to be extremely difficult at best and may be impossible particularly
in view of the fact that there will be four times as much Cm-242 as the
total of the applicable transuranics which would have to be subtracted
out from the gross counts.
12
A-158
13
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Cost Effectiveness
The Agency states (on FR page 23421) that "such a limit (25 mrem/year)
is readily satisfied at all sites...by levels of control which are cost-
effective...". The Agency also states (FR page 23422) that "the proposed
limits on long-lived isotopes can be met at a cost of less than $75 per
person-rein."
Neither statement is correct and in our detailed testimony to be
presented at the public hearing we propose to go extensively into cost-
effectiveness analyses.
Fundamentally we believe that the Agency has consistently understated
costs and overstated benefits. As a result the cost-benefit ratios,
and the resulting claims of cost effectiveness of control measures,
are in many instance grossly in error.
Figures 3 & 4 of the Draft Environmental Statement purport to depict
the cost effectiveness of the more than three dozen control measures
which EPA examines. In a sense they do but these figures suffer from
the following deficiencies:
1) The DES contains no detailed backup table for Figures 3 & 4.
Likewise it contains no discussion whatsoever to indicate how the exhibits
of the DES were obtained from the three-volume technical document
(PB-235-804, -5, & -6) upon which the DES is based. Since these tech-
nical documents are incomplete and riddled with errors and inconsistencies,
it becomes a Herculean task to attempt to cross check the information
presented in the DES.
2) While EPA avoids some of the worst offenses of the AEC Staff
in their early presentation of "cost-benefit" analyses, they still
persist, as in the case of liquid radwaste systems for reactors for example,
in lumping a number of treatments together into a single "case" so as
to hide the incredibly poor cost effectiveness of some of the components
of those cases.
3) These figures (3 & 4) are in error in that the "zero" point,
mis labelled "no control," is plotted at a cost of zero, whereas in
actuality this base case has already spent 6 million (present worth)
1970 dollars for the BWR case and 2.0 million 1970 dollars for the
PWR case.
4) The inclusion of the "cost of electricity to consumer" in
mills/Kwh(e) obscures the very large sums of money involved. All kinds
of nonsense can be "justified" on the basis that it "adds little to the
cost of power in mills/Kwh."
5) There is no indication on either figure that nearly all "cost-
effective systems" even as defined by the EPA's own calculations
(with which we have serious quarrel) are now, and have been for a long
time, standard industry practice. The implication is strong that all
of these things will be brought about by the EPA proposed standard—
and this is simply not true.
Figure 12 of the DES lists 22 items which EPA claims are required
to meet the proposed standard for PWR. These are listed in attached
14
A-159
15
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Table 1. Of the 22 items only eleven are cost effective even by EPA's
own definition (with which we disagree both as to cost and benefit).
Of these 11, 9 are already industry practice. The two which are not
are both related to reprocessing plants and will be discussed later.
Eleven of the required controls are not cost-effective even by EPA's
own values. Of these eleven non-cost-effective controls, industry is
already using seven, despite their lack of cost-effectiveness.
There are six control measures which are not present industry prac-
tice—two which EPA claims are cost-effective (and we dispute) and four
which even EPA does not show are cost-effective—which would be required
by the proposal. The total annual cost of these six control measures
which are not now used by industry is (using EPA costs)
$ * $
Kr-85 removal l,400,000£eproc plant = 33,000/gigawatt(e)
Ag Zeolite 225,000£eproc plant » = 5,000/ "
Liquid PWR-3 115,000/reactor = 115,0007 "
2nd bag filter 1,500/conversion plant = 507 "
HEPA drying 1,500/mill = 3007 "
2nd bag filter 23,000/conversion plant = 8507 "
~ ^155,000/gigawatt(e)
Our preliminary analysis of the PWR cases listed on Figure 12 of
the DES (an analysis which will be detailed and extended in our Hearing
testimony) indicates that, for a single PWR at a site, the gaseous re-
* Cost multiplied by 1.45 to bring to 1975 dollars.
** Does not include large unknown operating costs.
quireraents of the EPA proposal would appear to be incompatible with
Appendix I so long as NRC did not adopt EPA organic iodine dose models.
For liquids, however, this is not the case. EPA makes the same mistake
that was used in the Appendix I Draft Environmental Statement, i.e.,
setting up a completely unrealistic system as a "base." In addition none
of the EPA PWR liquid cases have any real meaning since they treat
clean and dirty wastes together in a single system—which is not general
PWR practice. Finally the whole EPA analysis obscures the terribly poor
cost-effectiveness of some of the components since between their cases
2 and 3, three equipment pieces are added; between cases 3 and 4, five
pieces are added. Our preliminary evaluation of the PWR liquid control
measures suggests the following.
Waste Stream
Clean Waste
Dirty Waste
Required by EPA
(Fig 12. DES)
Required by
Appendix I
Evaporator, Demineralizer Evaporator
Evaporator, Demineralizer Two Deminerallzers
Steam Generator Blow- Two Demineralizers
down
Turbine Bldg Drains No Treatment
Laundry Wastes No Treatment
One Demineralizer (River)
Nothing (Lake & Seacoast)
No Treatment
No Treatment
It is hard to see how EPA justifies their control measures, but
assuming that the DES is correct (in this instance) then the additional
liquid treating equipment required for a single unit—let alone a multi-
reactor site—which the EPA proposal would require over that required
by Appendix I would cost over $100,000/year for each reactor.
16
A-160
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Figure 12 of the DES also lists 23 items which EPA claims are re-
quired to meet the proposed standard for BWR. These are listed in attached
Table 2. Of the 23 items only twelve are cost-effective even by EPA's
own definition. Of these twelve, all but the two associated with re-
processing are already industry practice. Eleven of the required controls
are not cost-effective even by EPA's own values. Of these eleven non-
cost-effective controls, industry is already using 6 1/2, despite their
lack of cost-effectiveness.
There are 6 1/2 control measures which are not present industry
practice—two which EPA claims are cost-effective (and we dispute) and
A 1/2 which even EPA does not show are cost-effective—which would be
required by the proposal. The total annual cost of these 6 1/2 control
measures which are not now used by industry is (using EPA costs—corrected
to 1975 dollars)
Kr-85 removal * 1,400,000/reproc plant
33,000/gigawatt(e)
Ag Zeolite 225,000/reproc plant = 5,000/ "
2nd ba§ filter 1,500/conversion plant = 50/ "
HEPA Drying 1,500/mill = 300/ "
2nd bag filter 23,000/conversion plant = 850/ "
Evaporator (Detergent)* 50,000/reactor = 50,000/ "
Clean Steam to 150,000/reactor
Turbine Valves
* The 1/2 case.
150.OOP/ "
$ 240,000/gigawattCe)
Our preliminary analysis of the BWR cases listed on Figure 12 of
the DES (an analysis which will be detailed and extended in our Hearing
testimony) indicates that, for single BWR at a site, the gaseous require-
ments of the EPA proposal would appear to be compatible with Appendix I,
again so long as NRC did not adopt EPA organic iodine dose models. For
BWR liquid cases, the EPA and Appendix I requirements are closer together
than in the case of the PWR liquids. In fact, if EPA had not obscured
the terribly poor cost-effectiveness of evaporating detergent waste by com-
bining this step with the ion exchange treatment of the Low Purity Waste,
they would probably have come to the same conclusions as were arrived at
in the Appendix I Hearings. Our preliminary evaluation of the BWR liquid
control measures suggests the following.
Waste Stream Required By EPA Required by
(Figure 12, DES) Appendix I
High Purity
Low Purity
Chemical
Detergent
Ion Exchange Ion Exchange
Ion Exchange Ion Exchange
Evaporation Evaporation
Evaporation No Treatment
The additional cost which EPA indicates would be required for liquid
treating equipment would be about $50,000/year.
Overall then the non-cost-effective equipment called for by the EPA
proposal would cost about $185,000/year per reactor. For 100 reactors this
amounts to about 18 million dollars per year.
All of the comments to date are based on the EPA's own figures--both
cost and benefit. And we take strong exception to their calculations of
both costs and benefits (dose reduction).
19
18
A-161
-------
We do not have too much quarrel with EPA's basic cost estimates for
cases involving reactors. They seem to have started with costs developed
during the Appendix I hearing. We have made comparisons of the costs
presented by the Consolidated Utility Group in the Appendix I hearing with
EPA's costs and they compare reasonably well—much better than they do with
the AEC Staff costs in the Appendix 1 hearing. For the fuel supply and
fuel reprocessing! however, their costs have to be at least 40% low since
they all are in 1970 dollars. Furthermore the backup for most of these
costs are I960 references. The I960 dollars were converted to 1970 dollars
by multiplying by about 1.25--perhaps a bit low. The real question is whether
1960 estimations—many based on papers from Harvard—have any validity today.
A more fundamental objection to their cost treatment is that, although
they calculate doses for 130 years, they present worth costs at 7 1/2%
which in effect sums the annual costs for only 11.8 years. We do not believe
this is a valid approach, we believe that the total costs for the thirty
years of operation should be summed. Thus we believe that EPA understates
the costs by a factor of 2.5. Coupling this with a factor of 1.45 which
we used to convert 1970 dollars to 1975 dollars leads us to the conclusion
that all of their costs are low by a factor of almost four.
As we indicate in more detail in another section of these comments, we
also quarrel seriously with the EPA approach to the calculation of "benefit".
The population dose concept, measured in man-rein, is at best only a device
for aiding in the decision process as to the cut-off point for further
expenditures for control measures. If extended indefinitely in time and space,
it must inevitably approach the mathematical absurdity of multiplying an
infinite (population) be an infinitesimal (dose) resulting in a purely
indeterminate and meaningless product. The cost-benefit approach used by
NRC, which arbitrarily cuts off the population at 50 miles, and calculates
the dose based on the last operating year of the plant so as to maximize
the effect of buildup of long-lived emissions puts a rational limit on both
the population and on the dose to the least exposed member of the population
at risk. To this approach could reasonably be added a 50-year dose
commitment from internal emitters. The product of such a calculation may
have some validity for the decision making process. The product obtained by
EPA, when they use the population of the entire world and calculate the
dose over 130 years (the rationale for the cutoff at 130 years is not clear--
why not 15 trillion years when the sun is supposed to give out?) is completely
meaningless.
The absurdity of the EPA approach vis-a-vis that of NRC is well illus-
trated by comparing the cost-benefit calculations for Kr-85 removal at
reprocessing plants. EPA claims that Kr-85 can be removed at a cost of
about $75/man-rem. A cost-benefit calculation of this control measure using
the NRC approach leads to the following.
The annual discharge of fuel associated with 1 gigawatt(e) is
about 30 tonnes containing about 10,000 curies Kr-85 per tonne.
Therefore about an 85% removal of the Kr-85 would be required to
meet the proposed Kr-85 limit. There are no demonstrated processes
to do this on a commercial basis but there are processes which have
A-162
21
-------
been demonstrated on a pilot plant basis. Such a process is the
"Voloxidation Process"* under development at Oak Ridge. A
capital cost estimate for installing such a process at the West
Valley plant has been made (ORNL-TM-4409, "Fission Product Gas
Retention Study's North and Booth, August, 1973) and the suggested
capital cost for the Kr-85 portion of the system, which is
undoubtedly low, is $4,000,000. If this is annualIzed with a
fixed capital charge of 25% and a reasonable estimate of the annual
operating costs is made, a total annual cost of about $3,000,000
is obtained. (EPA on a comparable annualizing basis allows only
about $300,000/year, so their costs are about a factor of ten low.)
The West Valley SAR indicates that the whole-body dose
produced per curie of Kr-85 released is about 5E-07 man-rem/curie
and the total population dose is 4.3 man-rem/year. Thus the cost
benefit ratio for 85% removal of Kr-85 at West Valley would be
3E+06 = $800,000/man-rem.
4.3 x 0.85
This is just about a factor of 1000 higher than that claimed by
EPA. This anomalous result is the product of their understatement
of costs (by a factor of ten) and their vast overstatement of
"benefits" by playing numbers games with time and space. There is
no doubt that the man-rem can be vastly inflated by playing
numbers games. But by the time the NRC 50-mile radius has been
reached the individual whole-body dose has dropped to the order
*This process also is useful in removing iodines and tritium.
of 0.001 mrem/yr--a value equivalent to the increase in natural
background due to an increase in elevation of about 2 inches.
The numbers one can obtain by multiplying meaningless small
numbers by very large populations are themselves meaningless and
should not be used to justify saddling an industry with unnecessary
limits and the populace with unnecessary costs.
The cost benefit claims for 1-129 removal suffer from the same
deficiencies as the Kr-85 claims. Again calculations done for West Valley
indicate that the annual dose from the release of 1-129 (within 200 miles
in this case since over this distance essentially all of the iodine will have
deposited on the ground) is about 15-man-thyroid rem/curie (the whole-body
dose would be about 1% of this). The fuel from one gigawatt(e) will contain
just about one curie of 1-129 so its essential removal (to 5 millicuries)
will result in the elimination of about 15 MTR. There is little likelihood
that this can be done for less than say $100,000 so the cost per MTR is
over $6500--again a far cry from $75. Again the value of the operation can
be inflated by assuming the eventual exposure of more and more people as
the small amounts of 1-129 move through the environment; but the dose levels
must perforce be more trivial than was the case for Kr-85. And again the
numbers game produces a meaningless number.
Removal of Kr-85 and 1-129 are the two control measures of the six
mentioned earlier, which are not now industry practice, and which EPA claims
are cost-effective. We state flatly that they are both grossly cost-ineffective
and should be eliminated on that basis alone, quite apart from the fact that
the technology for the removal of either is a long way from being demonstrated.
23
A-163
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10
Annual
Dose (mrem
from
1000 MWe I2
BWR
Turbine
N-16
occupation)
BWR Turbine N-16 Dose vs Distance
d o from NRC Standard Review Plan 12. 4 I
a = poor shielding o = good shielding
}•_• A from Steyn, et al, TANS Vol. 18. Includes :
skyshine component only, excludes N-16 direct I
radiation
A and B from Hairr, et al, Environmental
Analysts study, HPS 18th Annual Meeting,
June, 1973.
A = minimum of measurements at four reactors =
> 1500 MWth
B = maximum of measurements at four reactors =
> 1500 MWth
Plotted values are normalized to 3450 MWth
(1000 MWe)
Table 1
EPA Required Cases for PWR (see Figure 12)
Control
1 HEPA
2 HEPA's(2)
3 Liquid Case PWR-2
4 Bag Filter
5 Iodine Scrub
6 Settling Ponds
7 Kr-85 Removal
8 Bag Filter
9 Ag Zeolite
10 Bag Filter(drying)
11 Settling Ponds
12 Holding Pond
13 Liquid Case PWR-3
14 Clay Cure Dam
15 2nd Bag Filter
16 Settling Tanks
17 15-Day Gas Holdup
*8 HEPA Drying
19 Bag Filter(crush)
20 2nd Bag Filter
21 Seepage Return
22 Iodine Case PG1E-3
Mills
Mills
Conv (HF)
Mills
Reactor
Industry
Practice
Fuel Fab
Reproc
Reactor
Conv (WS)
Reproc
Enrich
Reproc
Conv (HF)
Reproc
Mill
Conv (WS)
Conv (HF)
Reactor
Mills
Conv (WS)
Fab
Reactor
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
EPA Cost Cost Effective
Per Health Eff By EPA
($1000) Definition
1.1
1.1
3.0
7.3
11.5
24
42.5
47.5
54.4
52
67
280
2400/260
440
785
1235
960
1430
4000
5200
6700
800
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
600 800
Distance (m)
1000
1200
A-164
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Table 2
EPA Required Cases for BUR (see Figure 12)
1 HEPA
2 HEPA's (2)
3 Bag Filters
4 Iodine Scrubber
5 Settling Pond
6 Liquid Case BWR-2
7 Kr-85 Removal
8 Bag Filters
9 Ag Zeolite
10 Bag Filter (U3
11 Settling Pond
12 10-day Xe Charcoal
13 20-day Xe Charcoal
14 Holding Pond
15 Clay Core Dam
16 2nd Bag Filter
17 Settling Tanks
18 HEPA (drying)
19 Bag Filters (crush)
20 2nd Bag Filter
21 Seepage Return
22 Liquid Case BWR-3
Demin-Dirty
Evap-Laundry
23 Iodine Case BG1 E-2
jr
JR-2
»°8)
rcoal
rcoal
>
:rush)
i
JR-3
J
;i E-2
Fuel Fab
Reproc
Conv (WS)
Reproc
Enrich
Reactor
Reproc
Conv (HF)
Reproc
Mill
Conv (WS)
Reactor
Reactor
Reproc
Mill
Conv (WS)
Fuel FAB
Mill
Mill
Conv (HF)
Mill
Reactor
Reactor
Industry
Practice
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
yes
no
yes
no
yes
yes
no
no
F.PA Cos
per Healtl
Effect ($
1.1
1.1
7.3
11.5
24
31
42.5
47.5
54.4
52
67
100
irooo
280
440
785
1,235
1,430
4,000
5,200
6,700
2,850
3.6E+06
5 . 4E+06
Cost Effective
by EPA Definition
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
References
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission) Standard Review Plani Section 12.4,
"Dose Assessment," 1975.
Steyn, Julian J., R. Huang, and H. P. Yule, "Reactor Site N-16
Skyshine Dose Rate, "Transactions of the American Nuclear Society,
Volume 18, June, 1974.
Hairr, L. M., P.C. LeClare, T. W. Philbin, and J. R. Tuday, "The
Evaluation of Direct Radiation in the Vicinity of Nuclear Power
Stations," presented at the Health Physics Society annual meeting,
June, 1973.
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, "Final Environmental Statement Concerning
Proposed Rule Making Action, Numerical Guidelines for Design Objectives
and Limiting Conditions for Operation to Meet the Criterion 'As Low
as Practicable1 for Radioactive Material in Light-Water Cooled Nuclear
Power Reactor Effluents," WASH-1258, 1973.
Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc, Safety Analysis Report, Docket 50-201,
Table X-2-2.
Allied General Nuclear Services, Safety Analysis Report, Docket 50-332i
Table 2.1-4A, Appendix J.
loc cit Table X-2-1
loc cit Table 2.1-1, Appendix J
loc cit Table X-2-7
A-165
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B. COMMENTS ON EPA RISK ANALYSIS
The proposed regulation derives from an attempt to balance the cost of
control measures against the cost of health effects prevented by the control
measures. In relating anticipated health effects to doses, EPA uses the
results of the National Academy of Sciences BEIR (Biological Effects of
Ionizing Radiation) report of 1972( '. The BEIR report estimates health
risks from radiation exposure at low doses and dose rater, by linear
extrapolation of the only available empirical results which were obi.lined
at doses 2-3 orders of magnitude above doses of interest and dose rates
8-9 orders of magnitude higher than dose rates of interest.
The linear extrapolation has been used by authoritative bodies in the past
to derive conservative estimates of risk from radiation exposure to aid
(2 'i)
in establishing maximum permissible doses '' . The recognition that
a no-threshold hypothesis may accurately reflect the dose-response
relationship is the basis for these bodies' recommendations to keep doses
/o ^ \
as lo'.v as practicable, readily achievable, or reasonably achievable .
The BEIR Committee adoption of the linear hypothesis to quantify risk
from low level radiation exposure resulted from a perceived need for
quantitative analysis to determine the limits of practicability. The
Committee recognized that the calculated risks are subject to considerable
uncertainty and that risks associated with low level radiation exposure may
be zero. The fact that a proven alternate relationship does not exis! and
the fact that the linear relationship simplifies quantitative estimation of
risk were important in the Committee adoption are evident in the following
quote from BEIR:
"In view of the gaps in our understanding of radiation carcinogenesis
in man, and in view of its more conservative implications, the
linear, nonthreshold hypothesis warrants use in determining public
policy on radiation protection; however, explicit explanation and
qualification of the assumptions and procedures involved in such
risk estimates are called for to prevent their acceptance as
scientific dogma. Futhermorc [sic], the linear hypothesis is the
only one which permits the selection of the mean accumulated
tissue dose to characterize the radiation exposure of a group
under conditions of nonuniform exposure and exposure rate. The
mean accumulated tissue dose is the only practical quantity that
can be used to estimate the risk of cancer in such populations
until the influence of the many interacting variables can be better
specified. "
(It is worthwhile to note, at this point, that EPA documentation supporting
the proposed rule is sadly lacking in "explanation and qualification . . .
to prevent [risk estimate] acceptance as scientific dogma. ")
In a report published at about the same time as the BEIR report, UNSCEAR
(United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Ionizing Radiation)
presented results of analyses of individual and population dose commitments
from each of a variety of sources, and, for comparison, included the annual
dose to an individual from natural radiation' . The NCRP (National Council
on Radiation Protection and Measurements) has published a review of the
BEIR and UNSCEAR reports and identifies the reasons for UNSCEAR
rejection of the linear hypothesis for low level radiation exposure risk
estimation:
"Both Committees (BEIR and UNSCEAR) recognized that the neutron
RBE varies with dose in most biological systems, and they both
pointed out that it may well vary with dose in the Hiroshima and
Nagasaki A-bomb survivor data. However, the reports of these
Committees come to different decisions concerning the utilization
or disposition of this knowledge. This is an important difference
because data from the atomic bomb survivors in Hiroshima (where
neutron radiation was predominant) and in the smaller study
population in Nagasaki (where only gamma radiation was impor-
tant) form a major basis for carcinogenic risk estimates for
low-LET radiation.
"The BEIR committee assumed that the dose-effect relationships
for carcinogenesis among survivors of either or both of these two
cities may be linear. The BEIR Report compared the data from
the two cities by means of the simplifying assumption of a mean
neutron RBK of 1 or 5, independent of dose. The Report recognized
that this treatment of the data might seriously underestimate the
A-166
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neutron RBE and overestimate the gamma radiation risk at low
doses and dose rates, but that firm data enabling other approaches
were lacking. The UNSCEAR arbitrarily chose neutron RBE
values varying from 10 at low doses to 1 at high doses in the range
of observation.
"The limitations imposed by UNSCEAR in its approach to risk
estimation may be represented by the following excerpt from its
1972 Report (page 403, paragraph 6 of reference 4):
'Estimates of risk per unit dose derived from epidemic-
logical investigations are valid only for the doses at
which they have been estimated and they can be applied
to a range of doses only if there is a linear relationship
between dose and incidence since extrapolations beyond
that range may lead to gross errors. Particular care
should be exercised in estimating risks from data on
people exposed to mixed neutron and gamma radiation.
Radiobiological experiments indicate that the RBE of
neutrons varies with dose (see annex G) so that, if
these results are applicable to human beings, the incidence
of various effects cannot be proprotional [sic] to absorbed
dose for both gamma rays and neutrons and estimates of
risk in terms of incidence per unit dose need to be clearly
qualified.
"The UNSCEAR Report stressed the uncertainty of extrapolations
of available data to low radiation levels, does not attempt such
extrapolations, and indicates the need for consistency between
conclusions drawn from epidemiological data and established
general findings in radiobiology, making a special point in this
connection concerning the functional relationship between RBE
of high-LET radiation and dose and dose rate. The UNSCEAR
Report indicated that the data from Hiroshima, involving mixed
gamma and neutron radiations, and the uncertainty of the neutron
RBE at low radiation levels, constitutes a strong argument against
extrapolation from these data obtained at high doses and dose rates
to estimate even upper limits of risk-At low doses and dose rates,
especially for low-LET radiation."
In the DES supporting the proposed rule-making, EPA acknowledges a
double-edged responsibility:
"It would be irresponsible to set standards that impose unnecessary
health risks on the public (unnecessary in the sense that exposures
permitted by the standards can be avoided at a small or reasonable
cost to the industry), and it would be equally irresponsible to set
standards that impose unreasonable costs on the industry
(inreasonable in the sense that control costs imposed by the ^
standards provide little or no health benefit to the public). "
Previously noted criticisms of the use of the linear hypothesis indicate that
the health benefit to the public may be less than anticipated by EPA and may,
in fact, be zero. But even if one accepts the linear hypothesis, the EPA
balance of the value of anticipated cumulative health effects against costs
of control measures without consideration of relative risk (health effect
probability from radiation exposure relative to other causes) appears
questionable.
In the BEER report, NAS has suggested that relative risk is an important
consideration:
"The public must be protected from radiation but not to the extent
that the degree of protection provided results in the substitution
of a worse hazard for the radiation avoided. Additionally there
should not be attempted the reduction of small risks even further
at the cost of large sums of money tbat spent otherwise, would
clearly produce greater benefit. "
Similarly, the ICRP (International Commission on Radiological Protection),
in recommending the use of a cost-effectiveness approach similar to that
used by EPA, cautions against ignoring the consideration of relative risk:
"The concept of population dose (or collective dose) in man-rems
has been widely used as a measure of the total detriment either
to a whole population, or to a group of people, who may be workers
or members of the public. Its use in this way is valid only for a
linear, non-threshold dose-risk relationship, independent of dose
rate. Even granting these conditions, it requires some modification
in practice.
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The use of tne concept of population dose in the process of decision-
making should, therefore, be supplemented by consideration of the
dose to individuals. At low levels of individual dose, e.g. those
small by comparison with variations in local natural'background
the risk to the individual is so small that his health and welfare '
will not be significantly changed by the presence or absence of
the radiation dose. At levels of individual dose close to the relevant
dose limits, the need to avoid occasional excessive doses the
restrictions imposed by regulatory bodies and the desire to reduce
the radiation risk to individuals well below that to which they are
otherwise exposed, mean that more effort has to be applied'in
practice to dose reduction than ^ould be expected from consideration
of the collective dose alone. " { '
NCRP considers the risk estimates based on the linear hypothesis of
"marginal value" at best for purposes of realistic risk-benefit evaluation
and concludes that numerical risk benefit balance is not yet useful because
of the large uncertainties involved. NCRP also cautions against ignoring
relative risk:
"In risk-benefit analysis for purposes of decision-making, numerical
estimates of radiation-related risks, even when realistic, are of
little use in a vacuum, i.e. , without comparable numerical
estimates of associated benefits, and of risks and benefits for
alternative means to achieve the desired ends. When it becomes
possible to analyze, quantify and weigh in the balance numerically
the risks, benefits and costs of activities involving desirable or
undesirable radiation exposure, on the one hand, and alternative
means to desired ends on the other hand, the use of overestimates
of risk for one alternative, e.g. . one involving radiation exposure
unless counterbalanced by commensurate overestimates of risks '
from other alternatives, could deny benefits to society and could
conceivably incur greater risks in some circumstances.
"Before considering any further restriction of radiation protection
standards, it is important to attain realistic values for risks and
benefits, for weighing risks and benefits in decision-making, and
for the most effective application of the principle of 'lowest
practicable level' . This approach is important in order to avoid
the expenditure of large amounts of the limited resources of
society to reduce very small risks still further with possible
concomitant increase in risks of other hazard* pf consequent
lack of attention to existing greater risks. " ( '
Consideration of EPA results suggests that EPA is proposing to reduce
risks which are currently low and which may be expected to remain low
through the year 2000. Table 1 contains estimates of risks to an individual
in the year 2000 from Kr-85, 1-129, and long-lived transuranic alpha-
emitters discharged in the period 1970-2000. Risk estimates are based
upon EPA load projections, transport models, and risk coefficients
derived from BEIR. The cancer death risk from natural background
radiation is included for comparison. Risks from other sources are
given in Tables 2 and 3. It is apparent that risks from uranium 'fuel
cycle operations are orders of magnitude lower than most other risks.
A-168
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Table 1
Table 2
Risk to Individual in Year 2000 from Effluents
from Uranium Fuel Cycle from 1970-1999
and Natural Background Radiation^
Comparative Population Risks in the U. S.
(1)
Source
Risk per Year
(2 3)
Cancer Death from Krypton-85 '
(2 4)
Genetic Damage from Krypton-85 '
/r t*\
Thyroid Cancer from Iodine-129^ '
Lung Cancer from long-lived alpha
emitting isotopes of plutonium,
americium, and curium
1. 4x 10"
2.4 x 10"
1. 5 x 10"
1. 4x 10
.-10
1 in 710, 000, 000
1 in 420, 000, 000
1 in 70, 000,000
1 in 7,100,000,000
1 in 48, 000
Cancer from natural background 2. 1 x 10
radiation (assumed 100 mrem/yr)
' 'Based on EPA load projections, transport models, and risk coefficients
derived from BEER.
^
on no control of effluents. EPA proposes a seven-fold reduction.
^'
^
^ '
^
Annual total body dose of 0. 007 mrem
Effective annual gonad dose of 0. 008 mrem
Based on current practice containment factor of 10. EPA proposes
further reductions.
Annual thyroid dose of 0. 098 mrem
Annual lung dose commitment of 0. 003 mrem, based on containment factor
of 10 as expected by EPA
Sources
Risk of Death per Year
From all causes
Under 1 year
1 year old
10 years old
35 years old
55 years old
Average population
From 170 mrem/year
From natural disasters
2. 2x 10"2
1. 4x 10"3
2. 8x 10"4
2. 1 x 10"3
1, 2x 10"2
1. Ox 10"2
5(2)
5. Ox 10
1.0 x 10"6
1 in 46
1 in 735
1 in 3600
1 in 470
1 in 85
1 in 100
1 in 20, 000
1 in 1, 000,
(2)
000
From 1 mrem/year
2. 9 x 10
-7
(2)
1 in 3,400,000
(2)
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Table 3
Individual Risk of Acute Fatality by Various Causes(1)
Approximate
Individual Risk
Accident Type
Motor Vehicle
Falls
Fires and Hot Substance
Drowning
Poison
Firearms
Machinery (1968)
Water Transport
Air Travel
Falling Objects
Electrocution
Railway
Lightning
Tornadoes^ '
Hurricanes '
All Others
Nuclear Accidents
(100 reactors)
Acute Fatality, .
Probability/vr^ '
3 x ID'4
9x 10"5
4 x 10"5
3 x 10 ;5
2x 10"5
Ix 10"5
Ix 10"5
9x 10"6
9x 10"6
6xKT6
6x 10"6
4x 10"6
5x 10"7
4x 10"7
4 x 10"7
4 x 10~5
3 x 10"9
1 in 3,300
1 in 11,000
1 in 25,000
1 in 33,000
1 in 50, 000
1 in 100, 000
1 in 100, 000
1 in 110,000
1 in 110,000
1 in 170,000
1 in 170, 000
1 in 250, 000
1 in 2, 000, 000
1 in 2, 500, 000
1 in 2,500,000
1 in 25, 000
1 in 330, 000, 000^
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
From Table 6.3, WASH-1400
(8)
Based on total U. S. population and 1969 statistics, except as noted
1953-1971 average
1901-1972 average
'Based on approximately 15 million people located within 20 miles of
nuclear power plants. If the entire U. S. population of about 200 million
people were to be used, then the value would be 2 x 10"1T)
References
1. National Academy of Sciences, "The Effects on Populations of Exposure
to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation, " 1972.
2. National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, "Basic
Radiation Protection Criteria, " NCRP Report 39, 1971.
3. International Commission on Radiological Protection, 'Implications of
Commission Recommendations that Doses be Kept as Low as Readily
Achievable, " ICRP Publication 22, 1973.
4. United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation,
"ionizing Radiation: Levels and Effects, " Volumes 1 and 2, 1972.
5. National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, "Review
of the Current State of Radiation Protection Philosophy, NCRP Report 43
1975.
6. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Draft Environmental Statement
for a Proposed Rulemaking Action Concerning Environmental Radiation
Protection Requirements for Normal Operations of Activities in the
Uranium Fuel Cycle, " 1975.
7. Comar, C. L., "Presentation of the U. S. A. National Academy of
Sciences Report on the Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low
Levels of Ionizing Radiation, 1. General Review and Implications, "
Proceedings of the Third International Meeting of the International
Radiation Association, CONF. 730970-P1 and 2, 1974.
8. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, "Reactor Safety Study (Draft) "
WASH-1400, 1974.
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1-26
Encuth* wet PntUmt
Consumers
power
Company
General Offices: 319 West Michigan Avenue. Jackson. Michigan 4B2O1 . Area Code 517 788-188O
September 15, 1975
Director, Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
US Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, DC 2Ql*60
COMMENTS OF CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY ON
PROPOSED EPA STANDARDS ENTITLED "RADIATION
PROTECTION FOR NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIONS"
In response to the Agency's May 29, 1975 Federal Register notice concerning
proposed radiation protection standards, Consumers Power Company wishes to
make the following comments, which are in addition to comments being filed
by Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge on behalf of the utility group which
includes Consumers Power Company:
1. EPA has selected only two of the conclusions of the BEIR Report to Justify
the need for the proposed standards. Two other conclusions of the BEIR
Committee, not referenced by EPA, are also important:
(a) "The public must be protected from radiation but not to the extent
that the degree of protection provided results in the substitution
of a worse hazard for the radiation avoided. Additionally there
should not be attempted the reduction of small risks even further
at the cost of large sums of money that spent otherwise, would
clearly produce greater benefit."
(b) "Medical radiation exposure can and should be reduced considerably
by limiting its use to clinically indicated procedures utilizing
efficient exposure techniques and optional operation of radiation
equipment."
The Agency in its Draft Environmental Statement and in its proposed rule
has not considered radiation exposures from other sources and the cost-
effectiveness of reducing these exposures. Also the Agency has not con-
sidered the effect that the proposed standards may have on encouraging
the use of alternate methods of generating electrical power and the po-
tential health effects from these alternate methods, which full considera
tion of the first BEIR Report conclusion quoted above would require.
2. We also question the timing of the proposed regulations. Appendix I to
10 CFR Part 50 is now in effect for nuclear power plants. There is no
immediate prospect for the operation of reprocessing plants. The need
at this time for additional comprehensive regulations, as proposed by EPA,
is therefore questionable at best. There is time to develop a more sound
basis for the proposed regulations. Also, NCRP recently issued Report
No. 1*4, "Krypton-85 In the Atmosphere - Accumulation, Biological Signifi-
cance, and Control Technology". This Report presents the detailed analysis
that the EPA-DES is lacking and as such should be reviewed in detail by
EPA. Report No. 44 estimates that skin dose from world production and
dispersion of Kr-85 will average 2.0 mrem/yr by the year 2000, while whole
body dose is estimated to be 0.02 mrem/yr by the year 2000. NCRP estimates
are based on an installed world nuclear electric power capacity of 1*,500 GW
with fast breeder reactors accounting for 58.7 percent of the total. Fur-
ther, NCRP estimates that the United States will have only 20 percent of
the installed nuclear power capacity in the year 2000. Therefore, any
policy adopted by EPA would only reduce projected health effects by 20 per-
cent. NCRP concludes:
"The dose from Kr-85 for the next several years will
be of such a low order as to preclude the need for
installation of recovery systems. However, as such
systems become available for full-scale application,
their installation in fuel reprocessing plants should
be considered in relation to the costs of such in-
stallations and the benefits, if any, that would re-
sult ."
Based on NCRP's Report No. 1*4, EPA's proposed deadline, 1983, for Kr-85
control cannot be justified in terms of potential health effects to the US
population or the world population.
3. EPA uses exclusively the BEIR Committee's linear extrapolation of dose and
effect. This adaption of the linear hypothesis requires the extrapolation
of empirical linear dose-effect curves by a factor greater than 1000 in dose
and by factors from 100 million to one billion in dose rate. There are
several other authoritative reports dealing with assessment of the biologi-
cal effects of radiation which should have been utilized. Two of these re-
ports are the United Nations 1972 UNSCEAR Report and NCRP Report No. 1*3.
In Report No. 43 NCRP undertook the task of reviewing both the BEIR and
UNSCEAR Reports "for the purpose of identifying difference, their signifi-
cance, and especially how they relate to the NCRP's recommendations relative
to permissible exposures or dose limits for the public".
On linear extrapolation NCRP states:
"that risk, estimates for radiogenic cancers at low
doses and low dose rates derived on the basis of
linear (proportional) extrapolation from the rising
portions of the dose-incidence curves at high doses
A-171
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and high dose rates . . . cannot be expected to
provide realistic estimates of the actual risks
fron low level, low-LET radiations, and have such
a high probability of over-estimating the actual
risk as to be of only marginal value, if any, for
purposes of realistic risk-benefit evaluation".
Report No. 1*3 continues:
"The NCRP wishes to caution governmental policy-
making agencies of the unreasonableness of inter-
preting or assuming upper limit estimates of
carcinogenic risks at low radiation levels, de-
rived by linear extrapolation from data obtained
at high doses and dose rates, as actual risks,
and of basing unduly restrictive policies on such
an interpretation or assumption. The NCRP has al-
ways endeavored to insure public awareness of the
hazards of ionizing radiation, but it has been
equally determined to insure that such hazards are
not greatly overestimated.x Undue concern, as well
as carelessness with regard to radiation hazards
is considered detrimental to the public interest."
Apparently NCRP's caution was not heeded by EPA, as illustrated in the
Wall Street Journal's report on the proposed standards:
"The stricter standards would prevent 1000 cases
of cancer or serious genetic damage during the
next 25 years, Mr. Train said."
Table 10, page 82, of the EPA Draft Environmental Statement is misleading
in several aspects. First, while it is clear that the health effects are
attributable to releases from the U.S. nuclear industry, EPA does not clearly
point out that the projected health effects from long-lived materials, used
to justify the proposed rules, are global and not restricted to the U.S
population. In regard to shorter-lived materials, commercial reactors do
not nor have they ever approached the permissible dose levels of the Federal
Radiation Guides. Therefore the suggestion of an actual reduction of about
3SOOO potential health effects attributed to Appendix I is extremely mis-
leading.
The presentation of health impact in terms of absolute population risks,
that is the summation of annual doses to individuals over large popula-
tions and long time spans, is a dramatic way of impressing the general pub-
lic. But it obscures the fact that the postulated risks, relative to others
accepted by the population, are quite small.
It is suggested that EPA reevaluate its use of the linear, no-threshold
hypothesis and irrespective of its future acceptance or rejection of the
hypothesis compare the risks due to effluents from the U.S. nuclear industry
and risks due to other industrial pollutants.
k. The proposed rules refer to both "proposed Appendix I to 10CPR50" and
Appendix I to 10CFR50". Since Appendix I as finally adopted differs
significantly from the earlier proposed versions it is not clear which
version the EPA considers satisfactory for implementation of the proposed
environmental radiation standards. If the Agency does endorse Appendix I
as adopted, it would be appropriate to incorporate in Part 190 a state-
ment that compliance with Appendix I to 10CFR50 provides satisfactory im-
plementation of the Part 190 regulation insofar as light water power reactors
are concerned.
5- The proposed standard imposing a 25 mrem per year per site limit poses an
unnecessary obstacle to the nuclear energy park concept. The Appendix I
limit is 8 mrem per year per reactor. The proposed EPA standards would
effectively limit the number of reactors per site to three. The Draft
Environmental Statement contained tables estimating doses from power plants.
These estimates were in the range of 1 to 2 mrem, allowing EPA to assume
that the 25 mrem standard is practical for a number of reactors at a site.
Appendix I limits are based on extensive hearings and as such provide a
more realistic limit of what can be achieved by industry.
6. Two extremely important issues not considered by EPA are the implementation
of the proposed standards and the allocation of the curie limits among the
various fuel cycle facilities. EPA has made it clear that these two items
fall under the jurisdiction of the NRC. Therefore, until the NRC has formu-
lated its implementation and allocation plans it is impossible for industry
and the EPA to accurately assess the total impact of the proposed standards.
7- Cost estimates for implementation of the proposed standards are given by EPA
as less than $100,000 per potential health effect averted (less than $75 per
person rem) . Consumers Power does not believe EPA's cost estimate is cor-
rect. Figures 3 and k of the DES depict the cost effectiveness of the con-
trol measures examined by EPA. These figures suffer from several deficiencies,
including: (a) the lack of detailed backup for Figures 3 and k; (b) the
lumping together of a number of treatments in the case of liquid radwaste
systems; (c) assigning the "no control" case a cost of zero when actually
several million dollars have already been spent; (d) not indicating on either
Figure the break point between cost effectiveness and cost ineffectiveness;
and (e) not indicating that nearly ell "cost-effective systems" are standard
industry practice.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment, and trust that the proposed standards
will be scrutinized in depth in meaningful public hearings.
r
A-172
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1-27
Bechtel Power Corporation
Engineers—Constructors
Fifty Beale Street tHfc/
San Francisco, California
Mail Address: P.O. Box 3965, San Francisco, CA 94119
Comments
on EPA Proposed Standards, "Radiation
Protection for Nuclear Power Operations"
October 3, 1975
Director, Criteria and Standards
Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
United States Environmental
Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
SUBJECT:
Dear Sir:
Comments on EPA Proposed Standards
"Radiation Protection for Nuclear
Power Operations"
Enclosed are our comments on the EPA proposed standards "Radiation
Protection for Nuclear Power Operations" which we respectfully
submit for your consideration.
You will note that we are transmitting these comments under my
signature as Supervisor of the Radiation Management Group. The
comments represent a consensus of the thinking of my colleagues
in the radiation management area. However, it should be noted
that Bechtel Power Corporation is more concerned with the plant
design required to achieve specific radiation protection limits
than with the formulation of such limits. As such, my company
believes that establishing radiation protection limits is outside
its area of expertise and, therefore, the comments do not neces-
sarily represent the position of the Bechtel Power Corporation.
We trust that these comments will be useful in your development
of proper radiation protection standards.
Very truly yours,
JNV/aw
Attach.
Jene N. Vance
Supervisor, Radiation Management
I. Relationship to ALAP
We applaud the EPA's effort to develop comprehensive standards
to protect the public health and safety from radiation in the
environment from the uranium fuel cycle. However, the argu-
ments for promulgating these standards are not overwhelmingly
convincing without knowing the fate of the ALAP requirement
as established in 10CFR20. • If those portions of Part 20 which
pertain to releases to unrestricted areas (including the ALAP
requirement) are to be replaced with the EPA standards then
there is indeed a compelling argument for the standards as
proposed. We assume that Part 20 will be modified once the
EPA standards are issued to eliminate the conflict between the
two federal regulations. The effect then of the EPA rulemaking
hearing and standards would be to establish radiation limits
for the entire fuel cycle which are considered ALAP and should,
therefore, eliminate any future rulemaking hearings to deter-
mine ALAP in the fuel cycle. If, on the other hand, the EPA
standards are not intended to determine ALAP radiation limits
then the usefulness of the proposed standards is questionable
because the value determined in an ALAP proceeding would
become, in effect, a limit by way of its implementation and
enforcement.
II. Implementation
This raises three questions on the implementation of the pro-
posed standards. First it is stated that with minor modifica-
tions Appendix I could be issued to implement these standards.
We do not see how Appendix I could be used to implement the
EPA standards. The EPA standards as proposed contain no
directives or requirements regarding ALAP which Appendix I
-1-
A-173
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allegedly quantifies. In addition it appears that even though
the EPA and AEC have determined "limits" which each considered
as low as reasonably achievable, each concluded that a dif-
ferent value was appropriate. This isn't too surprising as
each derived the values using fundamentally different cost-
benefit approaches and dose models for their determinations.
After reviewing both, we believe that the approach used by the
EPA has greater merit in that the entire fuel cycle was con-
sidered and environmental impacts for the long-lived isotopes
were included. We believe that with further refinements (as
discussed later) in the source term, dose models and cost
analysis the EPA standards.could be implemented as the ALAP
values.
The second question on implementation concerns the source terms
and dose models to be used in predicting the environmental
doses in the design phase of the various fuel cycle facilities.
Throughout the Appendix I rulemaking hearing it was obvious
that the source terms and dose models were no less important
than the dose limits themselves and in fact they must be as
realistic as possible to validate the "as low as reasonably
achievable" requirement. We strongly urge that the EPA
provide clear direction to the NRC on the dose models and the
nuclide environmental transport properties to be used in deter-
mining the environmental doses. Also the NRC should be advised
to develop realistic source terms incuding pertinent chemical
and physical properties that are used in the dose assessments.
The third question is one of apportionment. The Agency does
not provide clear direction to the NRC on the method of
apportioning an individual's dose between the facilities in
the fuel cycle. It would seem that the apportionment of the
doses should bear some relationship to the cost-benefit analysis
performed to establish the standards. This guidance should be
provided to the NRC.
-2-
111• Approach to Setting Standards
In the draft Environmental Statement the EPA described a
methodology by which they examined population impacts to
establish the proposed limits. After reviewing this method-
ology we have some serious questions regarding the impact
on populations and the perspective that was adopted to
weigh this impact. In the following discussion we would like
to present a rationale for setting the standard based first
on individual impacts and second on population impacts. We
will argue that the individual impact is an increase in
mortality risk and that the limit should be established at a
level at which the increase in risk is "acceptable." The
judgement on the acceptability of the increase in risk should
be based on a comparison of risks from other societal activi-
ties which apparently have been found to be acceptable to the
public. We will argue that the population impact can be
examined by either determining the cost of a mortality and
comparing this cost to the cost of avoiding the mortality or
by doing a comparison of the cost-effectiveness of reducing
mortalities in this industry with other industries or societal
activities. In this manner it can be determined if the limits
established for protection of the individual should be further
reduced in the name of ALAP.
What Constitutes an Impact?
Before we discuss a methodology which could be used to establish
an acceptability level, it is important to identify with some
definitiveness what constitutes an impact on individuals, both
directly and in a collective sense. It should be realized
that impacts can only be experienced by individuals either
directly or by individuals when considered collectively. Even
though all impacts are experienced only by individuals, those
impacts which are direct are termed individual and those which
are considered collectively are termed population impacts.
We'll use these terms to distinguish between the two types of
-3-
A-174
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impacts. The distinction between the two is important since
the population impact is not "equivalent" to the individual
impact and, therefore, the standard-setting process should
focus on the proper weighting of the impacts.
An impact on an individual or population as a result of any
societal activity is ultimately a reduction in their potential
capability to achieve the goals that they deem appropriate.
Any society activity may have side effects such as deaths,
disease, disability, mental and physical degeneration, etc.
which are clearly seen to be impacts as they, in varying
degrees, reduce the potential capability of individuals and
populations to achieve their goals. The degree to which the
side effects reduce each capability must be examined to estab-
lish an acceptable level of protection.
For individual impacts it seems fairly self-evident that any
of the above mentioned side effects result in a direct reduc-
tion in the potential capability of an individual to achieve
his goals. The magnitude of the reduction, of course, varies
with the side effect from an ultimate reduction caused by death
to a slight reduction caused by a small disability. If the
side effects are known for a given society activity then
judgements can be made on the relative severity of the reduc-
tion (e.g. aversion factors). For populations, it is not
evident how the above side effects result in a reduction in
the potential capability of the population to achieve their
goals without first considering the factors which affect the
population's goal achievement capability. The following repre-
sent the obvious, and probably the most important, factors
which may limit a population from achieving a given goal:
a. replacement and expansion capability of the population
b. intelligence resources
c. manual skills resources
-4-
d. moral resources
e. natural resources and capital (in excess of that required
for fundmental life support).
With the exception of factors a. and e. it does not appear
to be possible to express these factors in any quantifiable
terms and, therefore, the magnitude of the reduction in these
factors from a given side effect cannot be determined. Never-
theless, it appears that qualitative' judgements can be and
must be made if population impacts are to be addressed in any
context other than in a- comparative exercise with other
industries.
Individual Impact
We have started with the premise that a govenmental agency
acting on behalf of the people it represents should regulate
the activities of the society for the adequate protection of
all the individuals in the society. An agency, acting with
the will of the people, should establish the levels of pro-
tection for the public at a point where the impact on individ-
uals is acceptably low. The determination of an acceptably
low level is, of course, the crux of any regulatory process.
It is assumed that the side effects from the nuclear power
industry are radiation induced health effects (primarily
cancer and genetic diseases). At the levels of radiation of
concern for the proposed standards, the individual impact, for
both current and future generations, is an increase in the
risk of experiencing some health effect. It is interesting to
note that even though it is likely that the individual impact
could end up being the basis for establishing standards, there
were no individual risks presented in the DES and, accordingly,
we believe this is a serious deficiency in the DES. The risks
should be presented as potential mortality risks per person
per unit time based on the appropriate age-specific risk
coefficients. The risks to future individuals from genetic
effects should be presented as a function dose to members of
-5-
A-175
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the reproductive population. If effects other than death
are to be included in the risks then some adjustment factor
should be included to account for the difference between
fatal and non-fatal effects.
Plots should then be developed of dose to a site boundary
individual as a function of cost for the radiation control
features for each typical facility in the fuel cycle. Where
an individual may receive a dose from more than one facility
(i.e. two reactors on a site or one reactor and fuel processing
plant, etc.) radiation control features to be added to the
facilities should be determined by treating them as a single
facility. The radiation control features should be added to
the facility(ies) in order of decreasing cost-effectiveness.
The source term used to calculate the facility site boundary
individual doses at the various dose levels should be used
to calculate the population exposures-for the projected growth
of the nuclear industry. The population exposures would be
used in the exercise aimed at determining the population im-
pact. The exposure rate (or annual dose) based on the long-
term buildup of the long-lived isotopes should be estimated
to determine the individual somatic risks for future genera-
tions .
Based on'the fundamental premise that all individuals are to
be protected, the individual at maximum risk (genetic or
somatic) should be the focus for the acceptability judgements.
It appears that the risk that an individual is willing to
accept when he participates in an activity depends on the
value of the activity to him. We believe it is not presently
possible to quantify the benefits of power generation and com-
pare them to the benefits of other societal activities and the
risks which they entail. However, we believe that from observa-
tions of activities (both voluntary and involuntary) in which
a large fraction of the population engage, judgements can be
made regarding the range of acceptable risks. The choice of
activities which are widespread in the population has the
effect of ensuring that the risk aversion characteristics
demonstrated are typical of the population and that the
benefits (although unknown) from the various activities are
probably relatively high and to some degree comparable. The
individual risk for the maximum exposed individual could then
be compared to the risks from other societal activities which
apparently have been found to be acceptable to the public.
The judgement on the acceptable individual risks for future
generations who do not directly receive the benefits of power
generation is somewhat difficult. However, it is likely that
for- future generations the first generation progeny of the
site boundary individuals will be at the highest risk. It
may be argued that in part the progeny will benefit directly
from the power generation and presumably the progeny is
expected to exhibit risk aversion characteristics similar to
the parents. For generations beyond the first generation it
is likely that the risks from genetic effects and long-lived
isotopes will be significantly lower than the risks which
current generations routinely accept and should not be an
onerous burden even though they are not the direct recipients
of the benefits.
Population Impact
After the individual impact has been examined at the proposed
limit then the population impact should be evaluated to deter-
mine if the limit should be further reduced for ALAP purposes.
The factors a. through e. discussed previously which serve as
a measure of the impact on a population should be examined. In
the DES we could not find a qualitative expression of the im-
pact on the population. Throughout the DES there are statements
that without the proposed standards the health effects "would
be large" (page 13) or "substantial" (page 14), etc. Yet there
-6-
-7-
A-176
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are not criteria provided on which this judgement is based
nor is there a comparison provided which indicates clearly
what the impact is in relation to anything. We believe that
an examination of the factors a. through d. and the number of
effects at the level of concern for standards will lead to
the conclusion that the population impact is probably insig-
nificant. Factor e., which is the economic cost consideration,
remains and should be evaluated. In effect this says that the
standard first considered the risks from an individual point
of view and now the economics, when considered collectively,
should be accounted for. This approach is, generally, that
approach used by the Agency in the DES, namely a comparison
of the dollars spent today to reduce health effects which
could give rise to a potential expenditure in the future.
In our opinion, however, the discussion of the derivation of
the value or worth of a health effect in the DES is seriously
deficient. Reference is made in the DES to authors in the
literature who derived values based on, in one case, the loss
of earning capacity for an individual and in another case on
the total annual U.S. health care budget. We believe that
these values should be carefully examined and that a rational
method should be developed which more closely relates the
societal cost with each potential effect being predicted.
The value should include an estimate of the actual health cost
associated with a specific effect and the life support costs
for the individual and dependents during periods of disability
or death. The life support costs should be determined real-
istically for the period of time in which real costs are actually
incurred for life support. This should be done according to age
and functional role in society. For example an individual 65
years old is likely to incur only health care costs as the life
support costs could be assumed to be taken care of by Social
Security. An example of the functional role is a married per-
son whose life support costs are already being borne by the other
marriage partner. The society costs associated with the loss
of a consumer in the consumer-producer cycle or a taxpayer in
the taxpayer-government expenditure cycle during an adjustment
to new cycles should be considered to determine if it is a
significant cost. We are not certain how costs incurred in
the future should be treated economically. It is obvious
that the effects which would occur well into the future will
have exceedingly small present worth factors associated with
the costs.
As an alternative to the above cost evaluation (or perhaps
in combination) a comparison should be performed of the
cost-effectiveness of reducing mortalities resulting from other
industrial or societal activities. Limited studies could be
performed to estimate the costs associated with methods to
reduce or prevent mortalities resulting from other societal
activities, such as health care, building construction,
transportation, etc. In the absence of quantifiable benefits
from power generation we believe that this comparison would
provide a basis against which the costs to reduce radiation
in the environment to ALAP levels r^uld be judged to be
practicable.
IV. Dose Assessment Period
We fully support the EPA's decision to limit the dose assess-
ment period to a period of time for which future uncertainties
do not make the predictions wholly unsuitable. For long-
range predictions there are major uncertainties; in population
growth and demographic patterns, in the environmental removal
factors, in medical advances for the successful treatment of
cancer, in future economics and even in the radiosensitivity
of humans. These uncertainties argue strongly for a limited
-9-
A-177
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dose assessment period in the range of 100 years as selected
by the EPA. Additionally, these uncertainties coupled with:
(1) an ever-declining exposure rate, (2) an extremely low
incremental risk and (3) indirect benefits passed on to future
generations tend to answer the problem of future generations
being exposed to risks for which they receive no direct
benefits.
V. Source Terms and Dose Models
Since the proposed standard requires that doses to individ-
uals not exceed 25 mrem per year and since this value is at
the levels which can be practically measured, the validity of
the dose and source term models used to establish the standard
and determine compliance are obviously of key importance. Use
of overly conservative models is not acceptable since it ad-
versely affects the cost-benefit analysis used to establish
the standard.
Review of the EPA dose models and comparison of these models
with the NRC models used in the rulemaking hearings for the
proposed Appendix I to 10CFR50 showed significant differences
and the use of many basic assumptions without substantial
documentation or apparent physical basis. We agree that
better data may not be available today and that additional
environmental studies may be required. However, it is
important that these differences be resolved and that as
realistic as possible models be developed prior to completing
the rulemaking process if the standards are to be accepted as
valid limits for the nuclear power cycle.
VI. Direct Radiation
In the DBS we could not find where the exposures from direct
radiation had been accounted for in the health effects nor
in the cost-benefit analysis. The cost-benefit analysis used
-10-
to develop the whole body exposure limit was based upon the
EPA report "Environmental Analysis of the Uranium Fuel Cycle."
That report does not address direct radiation exposure reduc-
tion. Because of the significant dissimilarities between the
direct radiation and effluent exposure pathways and in parti-
cular in the cost-effectiveness of reducing the environmental
impacts, it is important that the direct radiation exposure
pathway be explicitly accounted for in the analyses. If, on
the basis of a cost analysis including direct radiation, it
appears impractical or unreasonable to establish a single
limit to control both effluents and direct radiation, then
consideration should be given to establishing a separate
limit within the standards for the direct component.
VII. Dose Risk Conversion Factors
Dose-risk conversion factors were used in the EPA's
Environmental Analysis of the Uranium Fuel Cycle to evaluate
the number of health effects in the population from radiation.
The environmental analysis stated that the dose-risk conversion
factors were derived from ICRP No. 8 and the BEIR and UNSCEAR
Reports. Many conclusions drawn in the DBS were derived
directly from the environmental analyses of the health effects
caused by radiation using these dose-risk conversion factors.
These comments pertain to these conversion factors.
a. The EPA proposed a whole body limit of 25 mrem per year
based on a risk-benefit analysis and a cancer morbidity
dose-risk conversion factor of 700 cases of adverse health
effects per million man-rem. The EPA stated that the
corresponding average risk of thyroid cancer is 56 cases
per million man-rem, yet the EPA proposed a thyroid dose
limit of 75 mrem per year. If a risk-benefit analysis
is applied to the thyroid dose limit, which should be
valid since this approach is used to establish the whole
body limit, the resulting thyroid limit would be approxi-
-11-
A-178
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mately 12 times higher than the whole body limit or
300 mrem per year. The use of either a higher or lower
limit than justified by the cost-benefit analysis is not
consistent with the premise that a cost-benefit analysis
is the appropriate methodology in setting a detailed
justification for the use of the lower limit of 75 mrem
per year.
b. Of the 700 adverse health effects considered for whole
body doses, approximately 100 or more result in mortality.
According to the BEIR report, thyroid cancer rarely results
in death. The EPA standards for thyroid doses does not
reflect this difference in severity or consequence from
the applicable adverse health effect. We recommend that
the EPA consider this point when finalizing the standards.
c. Consistent dose-risk conversion factors were not used
throughout the report. For example, Part II which con-
cerns power reactors, used a thyroid cancer risk of 60
cases per million man-rem for persons over 20 whereas
Part III concerning fuel reprocessing used a risk of 5
cases per million man-rem.
2. Figure 3 on page 37 of the DES presents curves of risk
reduction as a function of cost incurred in the uranium
fuel cycle. We could not determine from the curve the
level of health effects associated with the proposed
standards. This would be very helpful in gaining per-
spective on the expected impact using the EPA standards.
As a corollary to this we are not clear on how this
figure was used to derive the limits contained in the
standards. Also it should be noted that although the
figure is titled "Risk Reduction . . ." we do not
believe that the values shown are risk values in the
sense of a potential hazard to a person over a given
unit of time.
3. We believe that greater perspective needs to be provided
in the DES by comparing the number of potential health
effects resulting from the nuclear industry to the number
of total health effects which are occurring over the same
time period from all other causes.
VIII. Miscellaneous Comments
1. Although we agree with the use of a linear dose-effect,
rate-independent relationship, we believe that the health
hazards or effects resulting from radiation exposure should
properly be qualified as "potential." As stated in the DES
the actual relationship is "beyond scientific resolution"
and, therefore, the BEIR report provides the best estimate
available of the potential effects of radiation exposure.
One loses this perspective of potentiality in reading the
DES and Environmental Analyses.
-12-
A-179
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1-28
POWER COMPANY
231 WEST MICHIGAN, MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN 53201
Mr. William D. Rowe
Deputy Assistant Administrator
Criteria and Standards Division
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
Mr. William D. Rowe - 2
We refr the EPA to the
March 4, 1976
study (Reference (3)
March 4, 1976
n
*" ttlose»«h
Dear Mr. Rowe:
References:
dose
"1th a 1ovrer *"• 0" the ,
PROPOSED STANDARDS 40 CFR 190
h° tH? Str1^'n9 conclusions of the Mancuso-Sanders
(1) EPA, Environmental Radiation Protection for Nucle-r Power Operations
Proposed Standards (40 CFR 190), Supplementary Information, jSj 5.
study there
l
|
and 2,755,200 mrem recorded for 3,444 females a total of 5
5a?1at;?n ^ograms, Draft Environmental Statement
Rulemakmg Act10n concerning Environmental Radiation
Operations °f Activities in the
(2)
(3)
a«onatPrf S ^e^ewed the proposed EPA regulations (40 CFR 190) and
associated documentation as presented in References (1) and (2) above
Sim! Grnnnr *"*" "V^ admini^^tive concerns are addre sed in'the
Utility Group conments; however, we wish to point out to you certain studies
of radiation effects in response to your implicit request for additional
contrary data in Supplement B to Reference (1) ammonal
Thomas F. Mancuso, M.D. , and Barkev S. Sanders, Ph.D., "Study of the
Lifetime Health and Mortality Experience of Employees of AEC Contractors'
Progress Report #10, Graduate School of Public Health, University of
I 1 SS'lS}?81'""9'1' PA> C°°-3428-5' APril 30« ™ 74. AlS Rejon
^
A-180
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Mr. William D. Rowe - 3
March 4, 1976
Mr. William D. Rowe - 4
March 4, 1976
thyroid irradiation. Since thyroid uptake studies with radioiodine result
in a thyroid dose on the order of 200 Rem or 2 x 10^ mrem, one would expect
that, on the average, about one out of every 85 patients undergoing this
thyroid diagnostic procedure should exhibit an undesirable health effect if
the EPA number is correct. While we doubt that an undesirable effect on 1/85
of all thyroid uptakes would go unnoticed, this area should be investigated
to either confirm or disprove the EPA assumption. The starting point for such
a study is reasonably accessible, i.e., hospital medical records.
Supplement B to Reference (1) decries the lack of non-linear
models proposed by critics. For such a model based solely on human data,
we refer you to the studies of Dr. Rowland at Argonne National Laboratory.
Dr. Rowland has been studying radiation effects on those with rather large
burdens of radium, principally those who had been radium dial painters.
Certain of Dr. Rowland's models fit a dose-squared function.
In Supplement B to Reference (1), it is stated that, "the Agency's
use of a linear nonthreshold model to estimate genetic risks ... was not
questioned". We feel that the statement should have more accurately read,
"... was not commented upon." Obviously far more research has been done on
somatic effects, making it the most fertile area on which to base comments.
On the other hand, far less work has been invested in genetic effects,
although sufficient evidence exists to support reversible chemical damage,
biological repair, and other theories which enable one to question the
applicability of the linear nonthreshold model even to genetic effects.
The Agency should not assume tacit approval by the scientific community
based merely on a lack of comments.
Finally, we were surprised to read the following paragraph quoted
from the last few pages of Supplement B of Reference (1):
"Some commentors expressed the view that numerical
estimates of radiation-related risks are of little use
if they are not compared with the risk from other environ-
mental pollutants. While the Agency accepts that such
comparisons, including a comparison with natural background
radiation, may place the radiation risk from man's activities
in a perspective useful to the public, the Agency does not
accept such comparisons as the primary basis for establishing
radiation protection standards, since at least it could only
result in equity between pollutants - not between costs and
benefits. Having made an assessment of potential health risks
the Agency believes it is more appropriate to select appro-
priate limits by means of a cost-effectiveness of health
risk reduction methodology, rather than via comparative risk
assessment".
Taken at face value, this paragraph would seem to be an admission
that selection of general areas for regulation and control is based on
Agency whim rather than on objective analysis. Undoubtedly the writer of
the quoted paragraph did not intend this direct interpretation of his
argument; however, certain conclusions are inescapable. Overall Agency
function must consider relative risks in order to rationally ensure environ-
mental quality. For example, if the average individual is subjected to a
risk of 10"^ health effects per year from one pollutant, it makes little sense
for the Agency to put forth a substantial effort to reduce another pollutant
which subjects the average individual to a risk of only 10"8 health effects
per year. We are not saying that risks from all pollutants should be equal,
but we are saying that control and regulation of minor risks must proceed in
proportion to their contribution to overall risk. The individual exposed
to an overall risk of 0.004002 is willing to pay far more to change the "4"
than he is to change the "2". Hence, cost-benefit must be done on both an
interpollutant and intrapollutant basis; and relative risk must be factored
into the interpollutant analysis.
We would appreciate your consideration of our comments, and we
look forward to some resolution of the difficulties addressed.
Very truly yours,
Sol Burstein
Executive Vice President
A-181
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*$v
?.&& *
f?fl
,'te"^*
s-i
of ii
utht<»
STATE OF MARYLAND
ENERGY POLICY OFFICE
5TH REGIMENT ARMORY 219 WEST HOFFMAN STREET BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
June 25, 1975
MARVIN MANDEL
Governor
S-2
John P. Hewitt
DCXXKK
Director
June 27, 1975
W. D. Rowe, Ph.D.
Deputy Assistant Administrator
for Radiation Programs
U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D. C. 20460
Subject: proposed Regulations for
Dear Dr. Rowe: Environmental Radiation Protection
Standards for Normal Operations of
Activities in the Uranium Fuel Cycle
In response to your recent letter, asking for the
State of Maine's response to proposed Environmental
Radiation Protection Requirements for Normal Operations of
Activities in the Uranium Fuel Cycle, please be advised that
I referred your environmental statement along with your
proposed environmental standards to the Division of Health
Engineering in the Department of Health and Welfare jjr
review and comment.
Division of Health Engineering's staff approves of
the lower annual whole body dose guides since many of the
existing nuclear power facilities have demonstrated their
abilities to more than adequately meet the proposed limits.
The Division was also pleased to see limits put on
the total quantity of Krypton-85 and Iodine-129 discharged
to the general environment.
Thank you for allowing us the opportunity to review
the proposed regulations.
Sincerely,
JBL/gwd
84
KJAMES B>-LON(?L.EY
Governor
Director, Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D. C. 20460
Dear Sir:
We have reviewed your "Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for
Nuclear Power Operations" along with the supporting Draft Environmental
Statement, and have several comments:
wv,-!Thldif!iCUlty °f enforcement of the proposed standards is underestimated.
While this buck is passed to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the type of
standards proposed by the EPA will make enforcement extremely difficult
in the case of fuel cycle operations in close proximity to each other, or for
the transportation of nuclear materials. If the trend continues to develop
nuclear complexes (possibly co-locating up to 40 nuclear reactors, as has
been suggested), regulation might be impossible, using the proposed approach
The answer may be to address that problem as the need arises, but such an
approach (similar to the manner in which air quality standards have been
promulgated) is inadequate because it does not provide the industry a sound
framework by which they can plan future operations.
2. In areas where the EPA professed insufficient information to propose
standards (e.g. , for the release of tritium or carbon 14), the attitude is
to wait and see. Careful consideration is promised in the event information
becomes available. It should be a foremost charge of the EPA to insure that
such information is developed as soon as possible. Furthermore, it is in-
teresting to note that a provision for variance is provided in order to exceed
standards, but no provision is made for inclusion of stricter standards or to
regulate radioactive materials not included in the proposed standards.
3. The matter of variances raises serious questions. All the best judge-
ments which were made to establish the initial standards can evaporate
overnight if variances are given freely in the name of "public welfare "
A-182
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S-3
Page 2
June 27, 1975
v Deportment of
Environmental Protection
Under the pressure for energy supply sure to develop in the years ahead,
variances could become the rule rather than the exception. Moreover,
such variances would not be subject to the careful balancing with which these
initial standards were developed. At the very least, the circumstances
under which variances will be issued should be laid out in detail. "Temporary
and unusual operating conditions" requiring variances should be precisely
defined, and the tradeoffs examined closely.
In general, we feel the risk-benefit approach to be a valid and superior
methodology for balancing public interests. Care should be taken in develop-
ing societally reasonable standards for all radiological threats; these standards
should not be allowed to erode by hastily contrived variances.
Sincerely,
,-',/ / / WC'V..
John P. Hewitt
Director
JPH:a
A-183
Pierre, South Dakota 57501
Phone (605) 224-3351
July 1, 1975
W. D. Rove
Deputy Assistant Administrator
for Radiation Programs
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
Dear Dr. Rowe:
in response to your letter of June 3,
to Governor
the distribution of toxic and radioactive wastes into the State
waterways. The purpose of the State's water quality standardTis to
me^f f^6*1'*1 and 8afet* °f th. public. ^T^Z^SSH Depart
ment of Environmental Protection intends to achieve this goal by
assuring that water quality standards should not be violate^ by the
consider^ °K rfloactlve efflu«* **» the environment at levSs
considered to be dangerous to any form of plant or animal life.
No plans for construction of nuclear power generating plants in
plants in the near future.
5,22- local
*»
: SSLS
— £2
Sincer
Depar
cc: Richard F. Kneip, Governor
State of South Dakota
C2/04
Equal Opportunity Employe*
-------
S-4
BOARD MEMBERS
Lachlan L. Hyatt, Chairman
William M. Wilson, Vice-Chairman
I. DeQuincey Newman, Secretary
W. A. Barnette, Jr.
Leonard W. Douglas, M.D.
J. Lorin Mason, Jr., M.D.
Caroline G. Newhall
S-5
SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL
E. KENNETH AYCOCK. M.D.. M.P.H.. COMMISSIONER
J. MARION SIMS BUILDING — 2600 BULL STREET
COLUMBIA. SOUTH CAROLINA 29201
July 8, 1975
Director, Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, DC 20460
Re: Draft Environmental Statement, "Environmental Radiation
Protection Requirements for Normal Operations of Activities
in the Uranium Fuel Cycle"
Dear Sir:
The Department of Health and Environmental Control of the State of
South Carolina is pleased to endorse the proposed regulations set
forth and discussed in the above referenced draft environmental
Statement. The review of the referenced document by staff members of
our Division of Radiological Health resulted in no adverse criticisms
or recommendations to improve the proposed rules. This state is
especially pleased to see the Environmental Protection Agency support
the installation of Kr-85 and 1-129 removal equipment. We believe
that the time delay afforded also provides a reasonable time within
which the technologies required can be refined, and at the same time
does not jeopardize the health and safety of our citizens. It is our
desire that your agency further the policy adopted by supporting its
adoption however possible by other nations entering into the "tail end"
of the nuclear fuel cycle. We additionally encourage the promulgation
of H-3 and C-14 control requirements when the technology becomes both
available and feasible.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment upon the draft environmental
impact statement.
Very truly yours,
Heyward G. Shealy, Director
Division of Radiological Health
SB: bo
cc: Mr. H. Richard Payne, Region IV, EPA
^
State of Kansas . . . ROBERT F. BENNETT. Governor
DWIGHT F. M
11 July 1975
W. D. Rowe, Ph.D.
Deputy Assistant Administrator
for Radiation Programs
U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
Dear Doctor Rowe:
Governor Robert F. Bennett has requested that we comment on the draft
environmental statement regarding proposed Environmental Radiation
Protection Requirements for Normal Operations of Activities in the Uranium
Fuel Cycle.
The comments provided are of a general nature since Kansas does not have,
at this time, any of the facilities which constitute the uranium fuel cycle.
1. The quote on page 13 from the BEIR report could benefit by a more
detailed explanation so that its relative value could be more clearly
understood. As it now stands, it seems possible to draw the con-
clusion that the Federal Radiation Protection Guides (FRPG) were
intended to establish a limit for exposure to the total population of
the United States from activities of the uranium fuel cycle. Although
the paragraphs following the quote do point out that the components of
the fuel cycle do not now approach this limit, it is not really clear that
the limit was intended to include a number of possible contributors.
2. Some indication of the total quantity of power (gigawatt years) now
being produced in this country by both conventional and nuclear power
and the anticipated quantity to be produced in the next 100 years would
also help develop some relative value points.
3. Page 8, last line, page 9, first line "The nuclear power industry is
projected to grow from its present proportion of approximately four
percent of total electric power capacity to over sixty percent by the
year 2000 (an absolute growth of about 20 gigawatts to 1200 gigawatts). "
A-184
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11 July 1975
Page 2
This is not a very clear statement. Does it mean that from 1975
to 2000 only 20 gigawatts of capacity is to be added and that addition
will bring the entire installed capacity to 1200 gigawatts or is it
intended to mean the growth from 1975 to 2000 will be from a
present capacity of 20 gigawatts to a capacity of 1200 gieawatts
in 2000.
It is hoped these general comments will be useful in your deliberations
and that if we can be of further assistance, you will not hesitate to contact
us.
Sincerely yours,
Melville W. Gray, P. E.
Director
Division of Environment
MWG:ht
S-6
THE SECRETARY FOR HUMAN RESOURCES
FRANKFORT 4O6OI
July 9, 1975
W. D. Rowe, Ph.D.
Deputy Assistand Administrator
for Radiation Programs (AW-558)
U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D. C. 20460
Dear Doctor Rowe:
Governor Carroll has asked that I respond to the draft environ-
mental statement regarding the Environmental Radiation Protection
Requirements for Normal Operations of Activities in the Uranium
Fuel Cycle as enclosed with your letter of June 3, 1975.
We concur with the basic philosophy that the present radiation
standards should be changed to consider the potential build-up
of long lived radionuclides in the environment from specific
systems such as the uranium fuel cycle. We believe that the pro-
posed standard is adequate in this regard for the radionuclides
specified. In regard to the lower radiation limits for the
exposure of any member of the public, this standard appears to be
adequate. We are under the impression that this standard relates
specifically to the uranium fuel cycle since industry can
apparently meet the standard with present technology.
We note that the standard sets an effective date for the limits on
Krypton-85 and Iodine-129 as January 1, 1983. This provides
several years for the industry to prepare for meeting the Krypton-
85 and Iodine-129 standards. It would appear appropriate that the
standard should address Tritium and Carbon-14 in a similar manner.
It is realized that the technology may not be as advanced for con-
trolling these radionuclides and that an even later date for
implementation of a Tritium and Carbon-14 standard may be necessary.
However, without a proposed standard for Tritium and Carbon-14
it would appear there is no incentive for the industry to begin
developing the technology to control the release of these two
nuclides.
We do not concur with the statement made on page 6 which states
"...the implications of the controls required by this rulemaking
for radioactive wastes and for decommissioning represent minor
perturbations on existing requirements for waste management for
the fuel cycle." Any standard which further limits the release
A-185
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W. D. Rowe, Ph.D.
July 9, 1975
Page Two
of radionuclides from the uranium cycle ultimately increases the
waste inventory. In light of this apparent impact on radioactive
waste disposal sites, it would appear that the EPA should consider
a standard specifying the manner in which the radioactive waste
should be packaged to assure no potential release into the environ-
ment from the ultimate disposal.
We do not concur with your statement on page 118 "...there are no
planned releases from existing radioactive waste disposal sites..."
The radioactive waste disposal facility in Kentucky is licensed for
the planned release of radioactive materials through the use of an
evaporator for volume reduction of onsite generated contaminated
waters.
We appreciate the opportunity to review and comment on the draft
environmental statement.
Sincerely,
C. Leslie Dawson
RAUL H. CASTRO
S-7
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
STATE HOUSE
PHOENIX. ARIZONA asoo?
July 15, 1975
William D. Rowe, Ph. D., Deputy Assistant
Administrator for Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Office of Radiation Programs (AW-558)
Room 611, Waterside Mall East
401 M. Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20460
Dear Dr. Rowe:
With reference to your correspondence, dated June 3, 1975, and the
attached copy of proposed Environmental Radiation Protection Require-
ments for Normal Operations of Activities in the Uranium Fuel Cycle,
please be advised we have reviewed the document and find no significant
objections.
However, we do note there might be some difficulty or confusion in
applying a component of the numerical standard to any one segment of
the cycle's activities.
Thank ^rou for this opportunity to comment.
Sincerely,
A/
Raul H. Castro
Governor
RHC:evp
A-186
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S-8
S-9
EXECUTIVE CHAMBERS
HONOLULU
July 15, 1975
8TATI OP NEVADA
GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF PLANNING COORDINATION
CAPITOL BUILDINQ
CAIIION CITY, HIV AD* 887O1
<7O») (85-4888
July 22, ]975
W. D. Rowe, Ph.D.
Deputy Assistant Administrator
for Radiation Programs (AW-558)
United States Environmental
Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
Dear Dr. Rowe:
Thank you for allowing us to review and comment on the Draft Environ-
mental Statement for a Proposed Rulemaking Action Concerning Environmental
Radiation Protection Requirements for Normal Operations of Activities in the
Uranium Fuel Cycle. Please be informed that we have no objections to the
proposed rulemaking action.
At this time, a nuclear power plant of the smallest commercial size
available (550-600 megawatts) could not be fit into the electrical distribution
system of Oahu before the year 2000. In addition, there is also the question
of licensing a nuclear plant in Hawaii from the standpoint of geology and
seismology. As a result, nuclear power plants as an alternative energy
source for Hawaii is not foreseen in the near future.
With warm personal regards, I remain,
Yours very truly,
W. D. Rowe
Deputy Assistant
Office of RAdiation Programs
US Environmental Protection
Washington, D. C. 20460
RE:
Radiation Protection Requirements for Normal Operations
SAI NV 75800040
Dear Mr. Rowe:
Thank you for the opportunity to review the above mentioned project.
The State Clearinghouse has processed the proposal and has no
comment. Based on the information contained therein and the responses of
interested parties, the proposed project is, as of this date, found not
to be in conflict with the State's plans, goals or objectives.
However, Comprehensive Health wishes to know whether the protection
requirements are minimal or maximal. Please answer this question directly
to Comprehensive Health with a carbon copy to this office.
Sincerely,
^
'*Z#*S&.
Bruce D. Arkell
State Planning Coordinator
BDA/tls
cc: Comprehensive Health
A-187
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STATE OF CONNECTICUT
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
S-10
STATE OFFICE BUILDING
HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06115
July 23, 1975
S-11
/o\
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency
Mr. W.D. Rowe
Deputy Assistant Administrator
for Radiation Programs
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, B.C. 20460
Dear Mr. Rowe:
Staff members of this department have reviewed the draft
Environmental Impact Study for the proposed Environmental
Radiation Protection Requirements for Normal Operations of
Activities in the Uranium Fuel Cycle. The standards which are
proposed in this document appear to be compatible with the
philosophy of keeping the radiation exposure to the public
as low as practicable. I believe that the proposed standa,
can be regarded as acceptable.
lards
CEQ, Washington
Bill Kraynak
JBG/eca
July 28, 1975
Director
Criteria & Standards
Office of Radiation Programs
U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D. C. 20460
Dear Sir:
Proposed New Part 190 to Title 40
Environmental Radiation Protection
Standards for Nuclear Power Operations
In §190.02(b) Uranium Fuel Cycle is defined by
naming functionally different operational facilities. Neither
high-level nor low-level radioactive waste management facilities
are specified as parts of the UFC. Such facilities can release
radioactive materials into the environment and, therefore,
should not be excluded from UFC. The same section excludes
the reuse of recovered non-uranium fissile products of the
cycle. When Plutonium Recycle is authorized by NRC, any
nuclear power plant using mixed oxide fuel and any facility that
is in any way involved with such fuels would not be subject to
new Part 190. The new Part 190 should unambiguously provide to
include all facilities the fabricate, use, or reprocess mixed
oxide fuels in order that the rule shall apply to such facilities.
In §190.10 (b) release limits for long half-live
radionuclides during normal operations are specified. The rule
reads "The total quantity of radioactive materials entering the
general environment from the entire uranium fuel cycle, per
gigawatt-year of electrical energy produced by the fuel cycle, shall
contain less than 50,000 curies of krypton-85, 5 millicuries
of iodine-129, and 0.5 millicuries combined of plutonium-239
and other alpha-emitting transuranic radionuclides with half-lifes
/sic/ greater than one year." It is not clear how these limits
A-188
1935 West County Road B2, Roseville, Minnesota 55113
Regional Offices • Duluth / Brainerd / Fergus Falls/ Marshall / Rochester / Roseville
Equal Opportunity Employer
-------
Letter to Director, Criteria & Standards, U.S. EPA
July 28, 1975
Page 2
are to be calculated. Are they to be computed on a periodical
basis using only the quantity released and the energy produced
during the period or on a cumulative basis wherein the total
cumulative release limits are tied to the total cumulative
energy produced or on some other basis. This point should be
clarified in the final rule. The release limit for iodine-129
is five times larger than the minimum expected industry performance
which has been cited to be about 1 millicurie per gigawatt-year.*
A five-fold allowance is overly generous in terms of the EPA
intent to propose standards that are not permissive with respect
to public exposures and long-term environmental releases. The
iodine-129 limit should be reduced by at least 3 millicuries
per gigawatt-year to 2 millicuries per gigawatt-year.
In §190.11,allows standards specified in §190.10
to be exceeded if the regulatory agency has granted a variance
based upon its determination that a temporary and unusual
operating condition exists and continued operations is necessary to
protect the overall societal interest with respect to delivery
of electrical power. What constitutes "unusual" is not defined.
No upper bound to annual radiological exposure doses or radio-
nuclide release limits for unusual operations is mentioned or
implied. What constitutes "temporary" is not defined. No
variance time limit is implied. No provision for plant
derating or shutdown exists in the event "temporary" is exceeded.
These deficiencis should be remedied in the final rule, because
societal interest includes public health and safety as well
as a right to electricity.
The foregoing constitu
Control Agency comments to the
the Minnesota Pollution
lirt 190 to Title 40 CFR.
Executive Director
State of Wisconsin \ DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES
July 29, 1975
S-12
DIVISION OF HEALTH
W. D. Rowe, Ph.D.
Deputy Assistant Administrator
for Radiation Programs (AW-558)
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
Dear Dr. Rowe:
The environment al statement mailed to Governor Lucey on June 3
relating to proposed Environmental Radiation Protection Require-
ments for Normal Operations of Activities in the Uranium Fuel
Cycle was referred to this agency for response. Attached are
our comments.
PLG/re
George H. Handy, M.D.
State Health Officer
GHH:dv
attachment
cc: Governor Patrick J. Lucey
Wilbur J. Schmidt
EPA-520/4-73-002 Environmental Radiation Dose Commitment:
An Application to the Nuclear Power Industry, Tables 1 and B.5.
A-189
-------
FORM AD-7S
DEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE
To George H. Handy, M.D.
State Health Officer
From Lawrence J. McDonnell. Chief
Section of Radiation Protection
Subject.
Date July 28. 1975
COMMENTS ON ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS
FOR NORMAL OPERATIONS OF ACTIVITIES IN THE URANIUM FUEL CYCLE
We recognize that the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency is responsible
for establishing environmental radiation standards and in general we are
not in a position to comment on the proposed numerical values selected by
EPA. However, one serious question does arise. If, as expressed by the
National AcadeTsy of Sciences, the current Radiation Protection Guide is
unnecessarily high the health risks involved must have been unnecessarily
high in applying the current guide. The thrust of the new proposed
radiation standards simply reinforces many fears already entertained by
people in that the government has not provided adequate guides in matters
of radiation protection. I feel that this point should be clarified if
the current guides are too high;what dangers, if any, have we in the
general population already been exposed?
The Wisconsin Division of Health has conducted environmental radiation
surveys in and around nuclear powar facilities located within the state
since 1966. We understand that the NEC has responsibility to implosror.t
the proposed standards at the specific facility; however the state continues
its interest outside the plant boundaries, and in this respect it is evident
that these surveys will necessarily be continued in order to verify that
individual sites are meeting the standards. The impact of the proposed
standards must be weighed by the state agency responsible for environmental
radioactivity surveillance. It is likely that new measuring procedures not
presently available to the states will be necessary to insure compliance
with the proposed standards when adopted. While it is recognized that
certain field measurements have been conducted and are included is the
Draft Environmental Statement, it is recommended that the Environmental
Protection Agency provide the state detailed procedures and necessary
laboratory control procedures to insure verification measurements in the
environment.
cc - Mr. H. E. Wirth, Director
Bureau of Environmental Health
S-13
Office of planning anb
JSxtctxK'at Department
Junes T. Mclntyre. Jr
Director
GEORGiA STATE C L E A R I_ N G H 0 U S E MEMORANDUM
Mr. W. D. Rowe, Ph.D.
Deputy Assistant Administrator
for Radiation Programs (AW-558)
United States Environmental Protection
Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
TO:
FROM-: Cnartes^H. Badger, Administrator
Georgia State Clearinghouse
Office of Planning and Budget
DATE: August 1, 1975
SUBJECT: RESULTS OF STATE-LEVEL REVIEW
Applicant: U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
Project: Draft Environmental Impact Statement (F.R. Doc. 74-24350)
State Clearinghouse Control Number: 75-06-26-13
to be consistent with tho social
programs with which the State is conceded
m* was PrePared f°* has been found
' ? * 8°alS' Policies' P^s, and
owing state agencies have been offered the opportunity to review and comment on this
Georgia Department of Natural Resources, inclusive
of historical and archaeological sections
Office of Planning and Budget, Executive Department
cc: Gary Midkiff, OPB
Ray Siewert, DNR
A-190
270 30a»rnnflton
Jfl. . Atlanta, (georgia 30334
SC-EIS-4
July 1975
-------
State of Ohio Environmental Protection Age Box 1049, 361 East Broad_Street, Columbus, 10 43216 (614) 466-8565 S-14
August 6, 1975
Office of Radiation Programs
August 6, 1975
Page 2
James A. Rhodes
Governor
Ned E. Williams, P.E.
Director
Re: Draft Environmental Statement, Environmental
Radiation Protection Standards for Normal
Operations of Activities in the Uranium Fuel
Cycle.
Office of Radiation Programs
Criteria and Standards Division
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
401 M Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20460
Gentlemen:
The Ohio Environmental Protection Agency has been charged,
by the Governor, with lead agency and review coordination
responsibilities for the State of Ohio on Federal Environmental
Impact Statements. The above mentioned Draft Environmental
Impact Statement has been reviewed by sections of this Agency,
and the Ohio Power Siting Commission.
The DEIS is generally very well done. However, there seems
to be an unresolved conflict between the ALAP criteria of the
(former) AEC and the present EPA rulemaking. The NRC usually
requires a 15 mrem fencepost dose per reactor. Even when the
dose is lower (usually in the neighborhood of 6-8 mrem per unit),
any multi-unit site or reprocessing plant would have difficulty
in meeting the 25 mrem dose required by the new rule-making.
Table 8 (page 66) has a seeming lack of consistency in that
doses of 25, 75 and 25 mrems are set down in section A irrespective
of unit size or electricity generated and then Section B sets
down standards based on units per gigawatt-year of electrical
energy generated. Application of the standards could cause
undue confusion in the field.
There is also a problem in controlling Krypton 85 releases. The
present state of technology seems to leave much to be desired,
especially in the area of controlling concentrated amounts of
Krypton 85.
The following minor points should be clarified:
1. Page 10 - first paragraph - The statement concerning
sensitivity on biota other than human should be
referenced, if at all possible. The reviewers are
not aware of any studies on radio sensitivity of
these lower forms of life.
2. Page 10 - second paragraph - The discussion of
health effects is crucial to the whole EIS and
should be expanded to explain why life-shortening
criteria are not used. It would be well to repeat
some of this on page 22, or to refer to this section
on page 10.
3. Page 11 - top - It should be made clear that the
limit discussed was 170 mrem above background.
4. Some of the terms in the graphs and Tables are not clear
(e.g. PGIE, BGIE). We suggest a glossary of terms
and abreviations in the Appendices.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this DEIS and hope
that our comments will aid in the preparation of the Final EIS.
Very
NEW/cp
31503.0
A-191
100% ftecyctod P«P«r
-------
S-15
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation
50 Wolf Road, Albany, New York 12233
August 12, 1975
Ogden Reid,
Commissioner
Director, Criteria and Standards
Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
Dear Sir:
The State of New York has reviewed the proposed 40CFR190 "Environ-
mental Radiation Protection Standards for Nuclear Power Operations"
and the associated Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Draft
Environmental Statement dated May 1975. The State of New York
supports the adoption of the EPA proposed standards since they will:
1. Limit radiation doses to the general public and quantities
of long-lived radioactive materials in the general environ-
ment, attributable to operations involving the uranium fuel
cycle for electrical power generation.
2. Help to expedite issuance by NRC of "as low as practicable"
guidelines for the non-reactor components of the uranium
fuel cycle, especially fuel reprocessing and fuel fabrica-
tion operations.
However, it is felt that EPA should propose standards not only for
those activities of the uranium' fuel cycle which relate to the
generation of electric power but for all other activities related
to the use of uranium, including military, educational, and medical
uses which would not be regulated by the presently proposed standards.
The State supports the concept of limits in curies per gigawatt year
for prevention of environmental buildup of long-lived radionuclides
(The Department of Environmental Conservation has previously identi-
fied a potential problem due to the release of iodine - 129 at the
Nuclear Fuel Services reprocessing plant at West Valley New York
The problem should be alleviated by the proposed standards ) The'
State also urges that a high priority be given to the development
of a standard for carbon-lM-.
- 2 -
The State supports the twenty-fold reduction in the maximum allowable
dose to an individual (25 mrem vs 500 mrem) for fuel reprocessing
and other phases of the fuel cycle but notes that for single re-
^t0rL°Pve,n^ing at a Site the EPA standards (25 mrem) are higher
than the NRC's Appendix I, 10CFRSO limits ("as low as practicable"
guides). For sites with three or more reactors, the EPA standard
may be the controlling standard.
A number of New York State agencies have commented on the draft
environmental statement and the proposed standards. These comments
have been collected by this Department and a summary of them is pro-
vided in the attachment. In addition, our Department's specific
comments about the impact statement are also included in the attached
These comments are all presented so as to assist EPA in preparation "
of the final environmental statement and subsequent rule-making.
I trust that even though these comments have been submitted past
your stated deadline, they will be given full consideration and
judged on their merits.
Sincerely,
Theodore L. Hullar
Deputy Commissioner for
Programs and Research
Attachment
A-192
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State of New York
Comments on The
"Draft Environmental Statement Concerning Environmental
Radiation Protection Requirements For
Normal Operations of Activities In The Uranium Fuel Cycle"
By The
U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
Office of Radiation Programs
Issued May 1975
1. General Comment - The statement should contain a detailed epidemiological
appraisal of radioactive discharges for normal operations of activities
in the uranium fuel cycle.
2. General Comment - The proposed standards are based upon potential health
effects vs cost. The statement should thoroughly discuss other environ-
mental standards such as effluent standards for 803, NOx, CO,Particulates,
etc.) and compare the health effects bases of these standards to that of
the proposed standards.
3. General Comment - The statement should contain a detailed cost-benefit
analysis covering the impacts of the proposed standard, otherwise one
may be left with the feeling that it may be of significantly greater
benefit to society as a whole for the nuclear industry to take the money
necessary to meet the proposed standards and donate it to cancer research,
etc., and allow operation under the old standards.
This view is reinforced by the BEIR report (p.8) which states "it is
becoming increasingly important that society not expend enormously
large resources to reduce very small risks still further, at the
expense of greater risks that go unattended."
Since the statement rightfully recognizes the unusual opportunity
mankind has in managing future growth in the use of nuclear energy
in a preventive rather than in a remedial context, a detailed cost
benefit approach is essential to providing sound precedent in the
area of preventive environmental contamination standards.
4. General Comment - If the dose standards in Part 190,iQa are to be
determined on a realistic assessment basis, the environmental state-
ment should explain why the more conservative and more readily
determined approach of applying the standards to a hypothetical man at
the site boundary ("fence-post-dose") is not a more practicable approach and limit.
5. General Comment - The Department "of Health noted that the reduction in
the individual dose limits in the proposed standards for normal operation
of the uranium fuel cycle is a desirable goal. This assumes that these
limits are attainable with current technology and at a cost commensurate
with the reduction of risk as indicated in the Draft Environmental
Statement.
6. General Comment - The Department of Health states that the proposed
limits for the long-lived radionuclides raise questions. For example,
have other environmental consequences such as a potential increase in
solid wastes been considered in attempting to attain the limits for
Kr-85, 1-129 and the transuranics? It is suggested that the final
environmental statement address itself to this problem.
A-193
-------
, General Comment - The Public Service Commission (PSC) noted that
the standard for Krypton-85 (i.e. 50,000 curies per gigawatt year)
proposed in these rules is more restrictive than the existing NFC
standard. It will require the reprocessing industry to construct
and operate Krypton recovery systems to limit emissions. These
new systems will of course add to the cost of reprocessing It
is suggested by PSC that EPA ought to provide a benefit/cost
analysis, perhaps expressed in dollars per man rem saved to
determine whether this particular standard is justified. The
International Commission on Radiological Protection Report 22
specifically Appendix III, and "Human Costs of Nuclear Power "
by Sagan, in Science, Vol. 177, pp. 487-493, should be useful in
the preparation of such an analysis.
General Comment - The Department of Commerce stated that Kr-85
removal and storage technology sufficient tp meet the proposed
standards is not currently available and hence it is not clear
that the cost estimated in the Draft Environmental Statement
accurately reflects the true monetary cost of implementing the
proposed standards. These monetary costs should also include
the costs necessary to protect the workers who will operate the
krypton removal equipment and the krypton storage facility. The
radiological risk to the public as well as the worker in the
baconsfdUnPlannCd releases from the storage facility should also
General Comment - The Department of Commerce stated that EPA proposes
a whole body dose limit of 25 mr/yr from a given site. The gamma
dose from the decay of N-16 in the turbines at the Nine Mile Point
power station in New York State is given in Table 5 of the Draft
Environmental Statement as 12 mr/yr based on 100 hours occupancy per
year in a boat at the point of nearest approach to the facility! It
is recommended by Commerce that EPA consider, in its estimation of
the monetary cost to society for implementing these standards, the
added cost (extra shielding, greater setback of turbine from river
etc.) necessary to insure that multiple plants on the same site do'
not exceed the proposed whole body limit of 25 mr/yr.
thsti-'n™16 DePartnent °f Commerce notes that according to
York * ™ nnn DePartfflent> the c""ent cancer rate in Upstate New
York is 30 000 cases per year (excluding skin cancer); in addition
io™ lie" year" k™"'",,'* ^^ "* l'l°° ^ "irtn Llforma-
estimat! f I ^" " tO be comPared with EPA's very conservative
estimate of a total nationwide reduction of 1,000 effects (cancer
ofttoToOO "riT rnfiC defCCtS) by the ye« 200°
-------
- 4 -
- 5 -
15. p 57 - Section V.B. - Table 6 shows that the bone exposure as a result
of the Humeca mill operation is 42 mrem/year. In response to this it
is stated on p 57, "The single instance of a projected dose significantly
exceeding 10 mrem/year is for a facility not projecting use of cost-
effective levels of particulate control."
The draft statement should discuss such facilities which are presently
not operating under the limits of the proposed standards and what
actions will be necessary to bring such facilities into compliance if
the proposed standards are adopted. Such a discussion should also
include EPA's views on whether a variance for such "grand father"
facilities is being considered.
16. p 68 - Section V.D. - EPA has stated on p 68 that it intends to "consider
the appropriateness of more stringent levels for maximum environmental
burdens of these persistent radionuclides" as experience is gained con-
cerning the ability of the industry to limit fuel cycle releases of
these materials to the environment. EPA should provide a thorough dis-
cussion of the technology for control of these long-lived radionuclides.
17. p 68 - Section V.D. - It is stated that "as knowledge becomes available
concerning the capability of technology to limit environmental releases
of tritium and carbon - 14, the appropriate levels of environmental
burdens of these radionuclides will be carefully considered by the
Agency." The environmental statement should provide an assessment of
the technology controling releases of tritium and carbon-14.
18. p 73 - Section VI - It is stated that "Since the proposed standards are
more restrictive than current standards, their environmental and public
health impacts will logically be positive and not adverse in nature."
It is felt that the assumption that these impacts will be positive and
not adverse in nature needs justification in view of the fact that
although the standards will result in lower radioactive releases to
the environs they may result in high doses to the workers at the uranium
fuel cycle facility or even to the general public in case of abnormal
releases due to leakage or accidents at storage facilities. It is felt
that a thorough cost-benefit analysis should be presented covering each
of the proposed standards and their alternatives and then covering the
entire standard in comparison to its alternatives.
19. p 82 - Table 10 - The environmental statement should contain a detailed
discussion of the linear non-threshold theory versus the threshold theory.
Such a discussion should include references to support each viewpoint
and fully explain why EPA has chosen the non-threshold theory in formulating
its radiation standards.
20. p 81 - Section VLB - This section should attempt to-place the potential
health effects attributable to operation of the nuclear fuel cycle in
perspective to other fuel cycles such as coal or oil.
21. The draft statement should discuss why non-ionizing radiation is not
being regulated to the extent of that of ionizing radiation.
22* p 87 - Section VI.C - The total, capital, operating, and fuel cycle
costs for all reactors and fuel cycle facilities planned, ordered,
under construction, and operating should be estimated. It is roughly
estimated that these total capital costs will exceed $1 billion for
LWR's within the next 10 years alone. It is important to note, as
the draft statement has done, that these increased costs for LWR's
would be required independently of the proposed EPA standards as a
result of Appendix I recently issued by NRC.
23. p 90 - Section VI.D - It is stated that Appendix I to 10 CFR 50 has
not yet been issued even though it was first proposed almost four
years ago. The reason for the delay in adoption of Appendix I and
its significance should be discussed.
24. p 93 - Section VI.E - The statement should discuss the impact the
proposed standards may have on proposals for disposal of low level
radwastes, in particular Tritium, via deep well injection.
25. p 94 - Section VI,E - It is stated that "It is simply assumed that
waste Management represents an improvement over disposal." Such a
"simple assumption" should be justified since this issue is basic
to the "dilute and disperse vs. concentrate and contain" arguments
in waste management/disposal.
26. p 96 - Section VI,E - This section should discuss the potential
influence the proposed standards may have on the mix between PWR,
BWR, and HTGR's.
27. p 111 - Figure 12 - The Department of Commerce notes that in the Draft
Environmental Statement EPA indicates the cost of electricity to the
consumer to be in the range of 30.00 to 30.25 mills/kilowatt-hour
(i.e., Figure 12). The source and the year to which these data apply
are not clear. The following data (Atomic Industrial Forum INFO,
dated June 1975) for the first quarter of 1975, which includes capital
amortization as well as fuel and other operating costs per kilowatt-
hour of nuclear and fossil fuel, show the cost of nuclear generated
electrical power to be substantially less than 30 mills/KWH. The
Department of Commerce feels these data also show the economic benefit
to society of nuclear over fossil fuel for electric energy production.
A-195
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- 6 -
Cost of Electricity - mills/KWH
S.°al OH Nuclear
CLAIRE T. DEDRICK
Consolidated Edison
Northeast Utilities
Rochester Gas & Electric
Virginia Electric & Power
20.60
22.65
35.40
30.80
24.42
13.58
9.63
9.40
11.61
EPA^s conclusions regarding the percent increase in cost to the consumer
of implementing the proposed standards appears to be based on a ^7
cost of approximately 30 mills/KWH. In view of the AIF data for 1975 it
appears that the percent increase in cost estimated by EPA in the Draft
Environmental Statement should be revised upward
EDMUND G. BROWN JR
S-16
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
RESOURCES BUILDING
Ul« NINTH STREET
958 U
(916) 445-5656
THE RESOURCES AGENCY OF CALIFORNIA
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA
AUG 1 51975
control via an emissions tax.
2''
LlK ' Sp!"ndtx ; " ls "»t clut how the propo«ed standard .111 b,
h™r™
Dr. W. D. Rowe
Deputy Assistant Administrator
for Radiation Programs
y. S. Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D. C. 20460
Dear Dr. Rowe:
This is in response to your letter dated June 3 1975 to
Governor £rown requesting review and comments on the draft
R^il?^nnprotf?teinef re^rdin6 Proposed "EnvLon^entaf
Activit?e, Tn fhh°n Re1ulrernents f°r Normal Operations of
activities in the Uranium Fuel Cycle .
Your draft environmental statement has been reviewed bv the
Departments of Health, Transportation, and Water Resources
the ££3? 2tiv?CeS C°nservation and'Development CoSmissfon,
th* S? TTbtf1\t,ies Commission; the Air Resources Board:
SntrS Boarl Mamgement 3oard^ and the State Water Resources
We have no comments on your statement.
tunity to review and comment.
Thank you for the oppor-
Sincerely,
CLAIRE T. DEDRICK
Secretary for Resources
Air Mail
A-196
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S-17
S-18
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
WILLIAM L.WALLER
WM. M. HEADRICK
DOLPH BRISCOE
GOVERNOR
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
DIVISION OF PLANNING COORDINATION
JAMES M. ROSE
DIRECTOR
STATE CLEARINGHOUSE FOR FEDERAL PROGRAMS
August 25, 1975
TO: Dr. W. D. Rowe
Deputy Assistant Administrator
for Radiation Programs (AW-558)
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 29460
State Clearinghouse Number
75062506
Date: 8/15/75
PROJECT DESCRIPTION: Draft Environmental Statement entitled "Environmental
Radiation Protection Requirements for Normal Operations of Activities in the
Uranium Fuel Cycle. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Office of Radiation
Programs).
Dr. William A. Mills
Director
Criteria and Standards Division (AW560)
Environmental Protection Agency
401 M Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20460
Dear Dr. Mills:
The draft environmental impact statement, (DEIS) titled "Environmental Radiation
Protection Requirements for Normal Operation of Activities in the Uranium Fuel
Cycle" has been reviewed by the Governor's Division of Planning Coordination
and by interested State agencies in accordance with the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969.
The review participants submitted the following comments which warrant your con-
sideration:
( x ) 1. The State Clearinghouse has received notification of intent to apply for Federal assistance as described
above.
(--) 2. The State Clearinghouse has reviewed the application(s) for Federal assistance described above.
( - - ) 3. After proper notification, no State agency has expressed an interest in conferring with the applicant(s)
or commenting on the proposed project.
( - - ) 4. The proposed project is: ( ) consistent ( ) inconsistent with an applicable State plan for Mississippi.
(x ) 5. Although there is no applicable State plan for Mississippi, the proposed project appears to be: ( x ) con-
sistent ( ) inconsistent with present State goals and policies.
COMMENTS: The Division of Radiological Health and the Office of Science and
Technology advise that, due to personnel assignments in other areas, they are
unable to review this EIS in depth and, therefore, have no comments to make
at this time.
This notice constitutes FINAL STATE CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW AND COMMENT. The
requirements of U.S. Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-95 have been met at
the State level.
cc: Glen Wood, Jr., Air & Water Pollution
Dr. P. Tal Bankston
Mr. Eddie S. Fuente
Clearinghouse Director
A-197
The Texas Department of Health Resources (TDHR) commended the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) for their effort in preparing the DEIS;
however, the TDHR expressed serious concern for what they believe to
be an insufficient consideration and assessment of the effects which
are potentially involved in active and abandoned uranium mines and in
the milling of uranium. They also expressed concern for the attempt
to quantify the cost of health effects. The TDHR suggested that because
of the crucial decision involved in setting this standard, an extensive
effort should be made to obtain expert advice and a sampling of opinion
from an informed public. In addition, the TDHR made several suggestions
for substantive editorial changes.
The Texas Department of Agriculture (TDA) expressed strong concern over
several important aspects of the DEIS. They stated that the exclusion
of the effects from uranium mines is a serious omission and if the new
radiation standards are to be effective, they must be applicable to
both active and abandoned mines. The TDA questioned the validity of
the risk-cost assessment and emphasized the need to include cost esti-
mates and projections from manufacturers and operators of nuclear power
equipment. The TDA also stated that the document introduces consider-
able bias by accentuating the possible adverse impacts of nuclear power
plants by quoting calculated limits rather than measured effects which
invariably have been found to be lower. The TDA urged that the DEIS be
revised to overcome the basis of their concerns.
P. O. BOX 12428, CAPITOL STATION, AUSTIN, TEXAS 78711
Phone 512/475-2427 Offices Located in Sam Houston State Office Building
-------
3.
The Texas Water Quality Board (TWQB) stated that the DEIS generally
covers the important items of concern to their agency. However they
advised that the discharge of radioactive pollutants into^tlte wSers
will require a permit from them and the discharge must comply with the
effluent limitations established for the stream segment involved
Dr . T. T. Sugihara, Director of the Cyclotron Institute at Texas ASM
straTSe Si*?-*"* ** ^^ •*"*** — "asonable a^d demon-
Fnff ^ Affective measures taken by the Atomic Energy Commission,
SS T and Devel°P«lent Administration and Nuclear Regulatory
Commission to control the routine release of radioactivity. However^
he expressed concern about setting standards for limiting the release of
in addit^ k7pt°n-85' based °n technology that is still under development
radiation0"' £ SUg9?^ed that in estimating the effect of this source of
of SSr Tf ^e/° S P°^lation' *™ should take into account that most
of those affected are non-Americans with widely varying life expectanciet?
JAMES E. PEAVY. M.D., M.P.H.
COMMISSIONER OF HEALTH
jftafc Jeparteitt of
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78756
July 18, 1975
ParkB
WUdlife
also
Sincerely,
JAMES M. ROSE
Director
JMR/eg
Enclosure
cc: Dr. Fratis L. Duff, TDHR
Mr. Hugh c. Yantis, Jr.y TWQB
Mr. Edmund L. Nichols, TDA
Mr. James M. Rose, Director
Division of Planning Coordination
Office of the Governor
Executive Office Building
411 West 13th Street
Austin, Texas 78701
Dear Mr. Rose:
Attn:
Wayne N. Brown, Chief
Intergovernmental
Coordination
1. The proposed standard is deficient i
the
of
who may visit abandoned underground
3.
" £aCilUi"' •»»" °°l "e considered af ve°y high
A-198
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Mr. James M. Rose, Director
July 18, 1975
Page - 2 -
the potential number of people so exposed is small, this is due
largely to the sparseness of mill site population, which can
change.
4. One philosophical judgement implied in the DES should be noted.
How much money one is willing to spend to avert a potential health
effect is another method of asking "how much is a human life worth?"
Ours is a technically oriented agency and we feel ill-at-ease in
trying to answer this question. The assumptions used in trying
to ascertain the numbers of health effects are questioned by some
experts, and some conclusions regarding how much money should be
spent to avoid health effects calculated using these assumptions
are implied in the DES. We believe that the issue has finally
been brought to a level where the question of what level of exposures
should be permitted can be resolved by considering the opinions of
large samples of the informed public. This could require an ex-
tensive effort in seeking advice on this one issue. As technical
people, we feel comfortable saying "Using certain assumptions, at
an exposure of X millirems there will be Y health effects." We feel
quite uncomfortable saying that "Industry should spend Z dollars
to reduce exposure to X millirems, giving Y health effects".
To summarize, we believe there are parts of the DES which are of great
value, and that it is obvious there has been considerable work expended
developing the draft. We must nonetheless conclude it is insufficient
in that a totally blind eye has been turned on the uranium mining in-
dustry and the milling industry has been examined only with foggy vision.
It is also our opinion that further comments should be sought concerning
the issue of money spent versus health effects saved. That seems to be
the crucial decision in setting this standard and it should not be
lightly considered.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this important work.
Sincerely,
•latftin C. Wukasch, P.E., Director
Division of Occupational Health
and Radiation Control
EDMUND L. NICHOLS
Assistant Commissioner
July 8, 1975
Mr. Wayne N. Brown, Chief
Intergovernmental Coordination
Division of Planning Coordination
Office of the Governor
Austin, Texas 78711
Dear Wayne:
This is in response to your letter of July 1, 1975, re-
questing comments on Draft Environmental Statement: hn-
vironmental Radiation Protection Requirements for Normal
Operations of Activities in the Uranium Fuel Cycle.
Our review of this document leads us to believe that it has
a significant number of omissions and inconsistenci.es, and
in addition, it appears to be somewhat biased.
The most obvious and probably most serious omission is that
it does not include uranium mining. This is the activity
with the greatest radiation exposure to individuals. Any
new radiation standards must be applicable to this activity
if they are to be effective.
This statement claims to balance risks and costs It
states " ..it would be irresponsible to set standards that
impose unreasonable costs on the industry..." However, the
costs used in determining the proposed standards come ex-
clusively from an AEC report. There are ru> references used
which include cost estimates or cost projections by either a
manufacturer or operator such as a utility of nuclear power
equipment and plants. In addition, the document gives all
costs in 1972 dollar values. These facts can only lead to
unbalanced risk-cost assessments. This inconsistency is in
great need of resolution. These lead to deception in the
ri sk-cost anaylsis.
The document has considerable bias in that the semantics are
chosen to accentuate the possible adverse impacts of nuclear
power plants. These are too numerous to tabulate, but in
general, the health effects of exposure to low 1 evel s °f
radiation quoted are calculated limits and not measur
A-199
.IUL
nt o( Agriculture, John C. While, Coir
, P.O. Box 12W7, Austin. Te
STATE PLANNING
11 & DEVELOPMENT
-------
Mr. Wayne N. Brown
July 8, 1975
page two
ejects. The latter have invariably been found to be lower
ELN/pcf
°PP°rtuni^ ^ review this en vi ron.enta 1
','^~^\
"\ i x"
Of / J JtL^M^,
Edmund M.V Nichols
TEXAS WATER QUALITY BOARD
M.K. KKOST
HAKRV P. BLK1.KKJH
July 23, 1975
General James M. Rose, Director
Re: Draft Environmental Statement
Environmental Radiation Pro- '
tection Requirements for
Activities in Uranium Fuel Cycle
Dear General Rose.-
•" --——
If
Verv truly yours,
Emory G. L
-------
CYCLOTRON INSTITUTE
Office of the Director
i EXAS A&M UNIVERSITY"
COLLEGE OF SCIENCE
COLLEGE STATION. TEXAS. 77843
July 22, 1975
JUL 23 915
RECEIVED
PHONE 51Z/451-5711
8520 SHOAL CREEK BOULEVARD
CHARLES R. BARDEN, P
EXECUTIVE D1RECf°R
Area Code 713
845-1411
Mr. Wayne N. Brown
Division of Planning Coordination
Office of the Governor
411 W. 13th St.
Autin, TX 78701
Subject: Draft Environmental Statement: Environmental Radiation
Protection Requirements for Normal Operations of Activities
in the Uranium Fuel Cycle
Dear Mr. Brown:
In general the standards proposed by the EPA for environmental radiation
protection in connection with the uranium fuel cycle seem reasonable.
The technical considerations on which the arguments are based come princi-
pally from the AEC and demonstrate clearly the effective measures taken
by the AEC, ERDA and NRC to control routine release of radioactivity.
The proposed standards would codify present practices.
While I have no expertise in the technology of limiting the release of
85Kr, it seems to me as a scientist that it may be premature to set
standards based on a technology that is still under development. One
wonders also whether in estimating the effect of 85Kr on the world's
population, the EPA took into account that most of those who would be
affected are non-Americans with widely varying life expectancies.
Sincerely,
T. T. Sugihara
Director
TTS:sd
JOHN L. BLAIR
Chairman
HERBERT W.WHITNEY, P.E.
V ice-Cha irman
AUSTIN, TEXAS - 78758
ALBERT W. HARTMAN, JR., M.D.
E.W. ROBINSON, P.E.
CHARLES R. JAYNES
JAMES D. ABRAMS, P.E.
FRED HARTMAN
WILLIE L. ULICH, Ph.D., P.E.
JOE C, BRIDGEFARMER, P.E.
July 14, 1975
Mr. Wayne N. Brown, Chief
Intergovernmental Coordination
Office of the Governor
Division of Planning Coordination
P. 0. Box 12428, Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78711
Dear Mr. Brown:
Our agency has reviewed the Draft Environmental Statement:
Environmental Radiation Protection Requirements for Normal
Operating of Activities in the Uranium Fuel Cycle. We have
no comments to make concerning this document.
Thank you for the review opportunity.
assistance, please contact me.
yours,
If we can be of further
.11 Stewart, P.E.
Director
Control and Prevention
A-201
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TE
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S-20
W. D. Rowe, Ph. D.
-2-
September 23, 1975
DAVID L BOREN
STATE OF OKLAHOMA
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
OKLAHOMA CITY
September 23, 1975
W. D. Rowe, Ph. D.
Deputy Assistant Administrator for
Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency (AW-558)
Room 611, Waterside Mall East
401 M Street, S. W.
Washington, D. C. 20460
Dear Dr. Rowe:
This is in response to your request for review and comments on
the environmental impact statement concerning the radiation protec-
tion requirements for normal operations of activities in the uranium
fuel cycle.
Members of the staff of the Occupational and Radiological Health
and their comments follow:
Our comments are related to the feasibility of the
proposed standards as displayed in Table 8. We cer-
tainly agree that limitations should be placed on
Radioactivity releases from facilities within the
'uranium fuel cycle such that the exposure of indivi-
duals and the general public are held to levels as
low as reasonably possible. However, our concern
is with the degree of difficulty which may be en-
countered in the determination, either on an abso-
lute or presumptive basis, of adherence to these
proposed standards by the regulated industries and/or
state health agencies charged with radiation protec-
tion responsibilities. The current state-of-the art
of determinations of environmental radioactivity, the
difficulties in detecting and separating the dose due
to natural radioactivity from that released from ur-
anium fuel-cycle facilities and the complex process
of accurately assessing the actual dose received by
an individual from the emissions of such facilities
are the basis for our concern. If our concern is
valid, then it follows that field studies and other
associated activities to show compliance with the
proposed standards may become quite costly - costs
to state government due to federally-mandated pro-
grams or requirements are receiving close scrutiny
at this time in Oklahoma - and thereby reduce the
cost-benefit ratio of the proposed standards.
In a related Dinner, the proposed limitation on the
dose to people is given for the entire uranium fuel
cycle which is composed of several separate and dis-
tinct types of operations which can be easily iden-
tified. Any attempt to impose limitations on an
individual facility will result in an extremely
cumbersome and unwieldy plan of action with respect
to the dose contribution from that facility and
will probably neglect at least some portion of the
dose contribution to those individuals from the
fuel cycle. Some guidelines as to how the limita-
tions will be imposed upon specific portions of the
fuel cycle (and perhaps upon individual facilities)
are mandatory.
It is hoped that these comments will be of assistance to you in
the further consideration of these proposed standards and the prepar-
ation of a final environmental impact statement.
A-203
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 374O1
July 25, 1975
F-1
Environmental Protection Agency
-2-
July 25, 1975
Director
Criteria and Standards Division (AW-560)
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, B.C. 20k60
Dear Sir:
m anoff^ th % fr™ ^6l CyCle'" We have reviewed
ments and offer the following comments for consideration.
General Comments
X' basis'^ ^Vi!-0mne^al Statement does not provide a sufficient
the nro o f P ^g. a regulation with the profound implications of
th!t hP ?fx atl°n standards- The breadth of the information
that should be considered, particularly in regard to uranium mills
and fuel reprocessing plants, can best be developed in a rule-
making hearing that permits a full record to be developed. This
fuSv exaTin 8"fficlent +tlme to Permit interested persons to care-
lully examine the assumptions, cost estimates, state-of-the-art
control technology, and dose models.
2. Insufficient consideration has been given to the costs of meeting
the proposed standards for uranium mills and reprocessing facil-
ities. Control of radioiodine at reprocessing plants (assumed
darl1* r^°Val Sfficienc^ is "itical tomeeting the stan-
gards, as is attainment of a decontamination factor of 1,000 for
Kr Yet the control technology for radioiodine and 8$Kr is only
in the laboratory or pilot plant stage. There is no certainty
that the anticipated decontamination factors will be attained in
a lull-sized reprocessing facility.
^:iromnental Statement (DBS) gives little attention to
the difficulties and costs in meeting the standards for uranium
Ti ^^fn tl0n facilities- Table 6 of the DBS indicates
that little information is being considered on the impacts of
,hese_ facilities. Full development of such information is essen-
tial in considering the adoption of such standards
a
a ^-
There is a possibility that reactor sites having multiple BWR units
may have difficulty meeting the EPA standard. 10^^!^
*. ^T""" t0tal ^ d°Se rate fronl the *vr*i*e* °f
BWR, plus a gaseous release from the plant of 5 mrem/yr/unit
y APPendlX J t0 10CFR5°' could result i* * failure to
f ^P°Sed m t0tal b0dy d°Se lifflits of 25 "^Vyr on a cal-
t In TiS " Df consistent w"h the statement from
(page 20, last line) which says that Appendix I "will pro-
eviroaPtTrla +and Satisfactory implementation of these proposed
environmental radiation standards for the uranium fuel cvcle with
respect to light-water-cooled nuclear reactors utmSn^uranlum
£r i^T ^ lustrates the i*P°rtance of determining the procedures
for implementation of these standards before they are promulgated.
+1 lS^0t °lear fr°m readin« the introductory material to 1*OCFR190
that the proposed EPA standard considers Appendix I 10CFR50 as
±Se^ rather than proposed. There are at least two instances
Sferrin6 T^ pr°?°^d is ™* ™ this introductory material in
rT^ ^ g- Appendix I. The EPA standard should take into considera-
tion the issued version of Appendix I and not the proposed version?
6' S*o6 l^ f^^11 embraces the entire uranium fuel cycle, it is not
clear how the NRC would apportion the curie releases of 8$Kr, 129l°
^ the alpha-emitting transuranics among the individual fuel cycle
HRrtn «flm-i • + feel that " WOUld be extremely difficult for the
DEC to administer or enforce such a standard. Again, we urge that
implementation procedures should be developed before the standard
is promulgated as a rule.
7. While it may be appropriate to use a linear, nonthreshold dose-risk
model for standards setting, the DES treats this hypothesis as if it
were real. The DES and the material supportive to the proposed
standard should emphasize that the BEIR model used is only a hypothesis.
8. Throughout the standard, the words "annual dose commitment" should
be used when referring to the internal exposure pathways.
Specific Comments on the Proposed Standard
1- TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS, page 9. second paragraph, third line-The
annual thyroid dose limit of 75 mrem does not clearly state whether
it applies to an adult or to the limiting case of a child.
2' TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS. page 1QT fM~t. „„,__.».- ^^ release lifflit
of 50kCi of KR-85 corresponds to almost a factor of 7 reduction in the
An Equal Opportunity Employer
A-204
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Environmental Protection Agency
-3-
July 25, 1975
F-2
United States Department of the Interior
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20240
source term of the assumed "typical" reprocessing plant as presented
in "Environmental Survey of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle" (AEC, November
19T2) when normalized to the same fuel cycle support basis of 1,000
MWe for a year. The reason for this difference in source terms
should be clearly explained.
3. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STANDARDS, page 19, lines 1-U—Regarding the
statement that "Once a given quantity...individual dose limitations."
We believe that this philosophy will lead to flexibility in the rate
of release of long-lived radioactivity from individual facilities.
However, it should be emphasized that each facility should maintain
releases as-low-as-readily-achievable consistent with maintaining a
reliable source of power. This would be particularly important
where several facilities are located in a complex at a single site.
1*. SUBPART B. §190.10(a), page 26—This paragraph should indicate in a
clearer manner that the standard includes sources of direct radia-
tion from the facility as well as radioactive effluent releases to
the air and water pathways. With the present wording, it is easy
to overlook this important fact.
5. TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS, page 17. the full paragraph—We agree that
"...the problems associated with radon emissions are sufficiently-
different from those of other radioactive materials associated with
the fuel cycle to warrant separate consideration...". TVA will look
forward to reviewing and commenting on EPA proposed standards regard-
ing management of radon and its daughter products after these pro-
posed standards have been developed.
6. SUBPART B, §190.12, page 26—TVA believes that a period in excess of
two years may be necessary to bring existing operating facilities
into compliance with the proposed regulation. Therefore, considera-
tion should be given to exempting operating facilities for a period
extending past the effective
PEP ER-75/552
AUG 8 1975
A-205
Dear Dr. Rowe:
Thank you for your letter of June 2, 1975, requesting our
comments on the Environmental Protection Agency1s_
draft environmental statement on the proposed Environmental
Radiation Protection Requirements for Normal Operations
of Activities in the Uranium Fuel Cycle.
We have reviewed the statement together with the proposed
rulemaking published in the Federal Register May 29, 1975.
Our comments are presented according to the format of the
statement or by subject.
Objectives of Standards
We concur in particular with the consideration given to the
long-term impact of the release of longlived radionuclides
to the environment. Continuing studies will be required to
determine whether additional radionuclides should be
specifically limited.
Groundwater
The need for further assessment of radon emissions is
discussed in the Federal Register notice on page 23U23.
Excessive radon occurs in some groundwaters; research on
this source should accompany the assessment of man-made
sources of radon emissions, if eventually meaningful
standards are to be set.
Rationale for Standards
We agree that the process of cost-effective health-risk
minimization seems to be the most logical and practicable
standards-setting method with the current status of knowledge
of effects and technology, assuming, as indicated, that all
standards are subjected to continuous scrutiny and reevaluation
as new information becomes available.
-------
-2-
General
health ^?f ^ Sh?Uld descrlbe whether or not cumulative
thai Jhf f ?S of,exP°sure increments from sources other
a?™ H V CyC^' esPecially natural sources, have
already been considered in setting the suggested standards
for maximum doses resulting from LposureSfo planneTdfs-
10^1"6 mate^alS' rad°n and i?s Daughters
enVlr°nment f— uranium fuel
We hope these comments will be helpful to you.
Sincerely yours,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Interior
W. D. Rowe, Ph.D.
Deputy Assistant Administrator
for Radiation Programs
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
August 29, 1975
Mr. William Rowe
Deputy Assistant Administrator
for Radiation Programs
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
401 M Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20460
Dear Mr. Rowe:
The draft Environmental Impact Statement for Environmental
Radiation Protection Requirements for Normal Operations of
Activities in the Uranium Fuel Cycle has been reviewed by
the Department of Commerce. The following comments are
offered for your consideration.
This draft statement discusses proposed rulemaking by the
Environmental Protection Agency to limit radiation doses to
the general public and quantities of long-lived radioactive
materials in the general environment due to planned operations
of all elements in the nuclear fuel cycle, including milling,
conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, light-water-cooled
reactors, fuel reprocessing, and transportation of radioactive
materials in connection with any of these operations.
Under the proposed new rule, the maximum annual radiation
doses to individual members of the public resulting from fuel
cycle operations would be limited to 25 millirems to the whole
body and all other organs except the thyroid, which would be
limited to 75 millirems.
The proposed rules would also limit release of certain long-
lived radioactive pollutants to the local, national and
global environment, specifically krypton 85, iodine-129, and
alpha-emitting transuronics. No rulemaking is proposed for
other long-lived radioactive effluents, tritium and carbon-14.
Variances from these proposed rules would be allowed, to be
granted by the licensor (presumably the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission or the Energy Research and Development Agency).
A-206
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- 2 -
The procedures for variances are written in extremely vague
language.
(1) Proposed general population standards
from nuclear fuel cycle.
Current Federal Radiation Protection Guides for maximum
annual dose to individual members of the public are 500 mil-
lirems to the whole body and 1500 millirems to the thyroid
from all sources of exposure except those due to medical use
and natural background. The proposed new rule would thus
reduce current allowed limits for individual exposure for one
specific source, the nuclear fuel cycle, by a factor of 20.
Medical uses of man-made radiation, which now constitutes the
majority of man-made exposure (90%) would remain unregulated.
All other sources of man-made radiation would retain the 20
times higher regulated limit of exposure to individuals of
the general public.
It should be noted that because the radiation sources involved
are localized, the actual reduction in allowed dose is much
greater than a factor of 20 for most members of the general
. public.
The principal argument of the EPA for adopting these proposed
new rules is that most operations in the nuclear fuel cycle
actually operate at present below these limits. All light-
water reactors are presently designed and operated under
Appendix I of 10 CFR 50 issued by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. Limits set by Appendix I are below those of the
proposed EPA rules. Some impact will exist for operation of
mills, conversion, and fuel fabrication facilities. While
the EPA draft statement claims that impact will be small for
fuel reprocessing facilities, this is not clear since no fuel
reprocessing facilities are presently in operation in the
United States and the information base is poor.
The draft statement does not speak at all to possible legal
conflicts which might exist due to claimed excessive radiation
exposure from different radiation sources, with legal protec-
tion limits which differ by a factor of 20.
- 3 -
The EPA approach to rulemaking is very dangerous. The risk
to an individual from radiation exposure is independent of the
radiation source for similar radiations. Universally applica-
ble rules which apply to one source of radiation and not to
others are thus illogical. This is different conceptually
from the limits imposed by Appendix I of 10 CFR 50, which is
a specific operating limit for a specific operation, light-
water power reactors. In any case, if the arguments made by
EPA in the draft statement are correct, the present system oper-
ates satisfactorily and new rules appear unnecessary. They
would, however, contribute to confusion and conflict between
federal regulatory agencies, and would involve additional
expenditure of federal and state funds for their enforcement.
(2) Proposed limits on release of certain
long-lived radioactive pollutants.
A much better case exists for new rules limiting the release
from the nuclear fuel cycle of long-lived radioactive pollu-
tants. These pollutants spread throughout the world (especially
krypton-85) in an irreversible manner and represent a radiation
dose commitment for the future. Two concerns exist regarding
these proposed rules. The first is the question of whether
technology exists and will be available to satisfy the new
rules. This is particularly a concern regarding krypton-85.
The draft statement recognizes this concern. It believes that
technology will exist, and proposes a possible reversal or
delay of the rule if technology is not available. For this
situation where no urgent, compelling need for new rules has
been demonstrated, this position is unacceptable, if for no
other reason than the public alarm which might be created by
such a precedure.
The second concern relates to the world-wide aspect of such
pollutants. A much better solution would be to work with the
International Atomic Energy Agency to develop international
rules for such pollutants. Since the concern here is a long
term one, not requiring immediate attention, adequate time
exists to attempt an international solution, and to develop
the appropriate control technology.
(3) Relation of proposed rules to
radiation protection guidelines.
A-207
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- 4 -
The justification for the proposed rulemaking is based in
large part upon a study by the National Academy of Sciences-
National Research Council's Advisory Committee on the Biologi-
cal Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR Committee). While
mention of other studies is made, no specific mention has been
made to the National Council on Radiation Protection and
Measurements (NCRP), Report No. 43, Review of the Current State
of Radiation Protection Philosophy. This report of the NCRP
the most authoritative body in the United States on radiation
protection questions, was issued in January 1975 and is
directed primarily to questions raised by the BEIR report
NCRP Report No. 43 with recent national and international
studies of these questions, including the BEIR report available
to it, was unable to find justification for reduction in pre-
sently accepted limits for general population exposure to
ionizing radiation.
Conclusions
The EPA justification for proposed new rules which would
lower the allowed limits to individual members of the general
public resulting from operations of the nuclear fuel cycle is
based upon the claim that most of the nuclear fuel cycle
operations are already operating below these limits. There
is some question as to whether this claim will be true when
new fuel reprocessing plants come into operation. Even if
the claim is true, there does not seem to be adequate justi-
fication to create an extremely illogical radiation protection
situation where the source of radiation determines the rule
rather than the risk to the public, especially when the exist-
ing NRC licensing rules are admitted by EPA to be adequately
controlling the situation.
Proposed rules limiting the release of long-lived radionuclides
would be desirable; however, the situation is not urgent.
Attempts should be made to develop internationally accepted
rules through the medium of International Atomic Energy Agency.
In any case, new rules should not be promulgated before an
assured technical fix is available when the public risk is
quite small and uncertain.
Thank you for giving us an opportunity to provide these com-
ments, which we hope will be of assistance to you. We
- 5 -
would appreciate receiving ten copies of the final state-
ment.
Sincerely,
/J«6,., ./
'sidney/R.
Deputy Ass'istant Secretary
for Environmental Affairs
A-208
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F-4
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D C. 20S55
Honorable Russell E. Train
- 2 -
SEP 1 5 1975
Honorable Russell E. Train
Administrator
U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
Dear Mr. Train:
This is in reply to the notice in the Federal Register, Volume 40
Number 104, May 29, 1975, wherein the Environmental Protection Agency
proposed Environmental Protection Standards for the Uranium Fuel Cycle
(40 CFR Part 190), and to the letter (Rowe to Muller, June 2, 1975)
requesting comments on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for
the rulemaking action.
The NRC strongly supports EPA's mission to develop generally applicable
environmental radiation standards. We believe the national interest and
our regulatory program would benefit by a numerical expression of safe
limits on radioactivity in the ambient environment within which radio-
active emissions from the facilities in the uranium fuel cycle could be
regulated. Such standards should be developed with full consideration
given to the balancing of resource expenditures for health protection
for the uranium fuel cycle versus similar expenditures for control of
other activities which affect the public health aspects of the environ-
ment.
Existing Federal regulations and current regulatory practices provide
assurance that for normal operation the uranium fuel cycle facilities will
be designed and operated in a manner which limits to as low as reasonably
achievable the levels of release of radioactive material and exposures
to radiation. In view of the demonstrated effectiveness of the existing
regulatory program, we do not believe there is a need for further
restrictions for these facilities at this time. Futhermore, any small
changes in radiation exposure which might be effected by the proposed
EPA standards do not justify the considerable costs associated with the
standards. The apparent lack of cost effectiveness should be examined
in perspective to reductions which might be afforded by expenditures for
control of more significant environmental problems. We believe that EPA's
broad responsibilities for pollution abatement and the diverse expertise
represented by the EPA staff would permit examination of these trade-offs.
We find that the EPA proposed standards are in reality a "fine tuning" of
-existing effluent regulations. To demonstrate why this is objectionable,
consider the relationship between the EPA proposed standard and the NRC
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I. The numerical guidelines in Appendix I
were derived from a thorough consideration of the costs and environmental
effects of radioactive effluents which were presented during a public
rulemaking hearing. EPA's proposed standards specify environmental
radiation levels for activities in the uranium fuel cycle. Yet, when
applied to only one kind of facility within the fuel cycle, light water
power reactors, the levels specified by EPA are in the same range as the
the guidelines of Appendix I. Furthermore, the EPA proposed standards
differ in specific details and are not consistent with Appendix I. The
EPA Notice of Proposed Rulemaking states that Appendix I "will provide an
appropriate and satisfactory implementation" of these standards for
light-water-cooled nuclear power reactors. The NRC staff does not agree
that compliance with Appendix I necessarily would provide compliance with
the EPA proposed standards. For instance, for a multiple reactor site
it would be possible for the emissions to be within the Appendix I levels
and in excess of the EPA proposed standards. The EPA proposed standards
also would require the scheduled application of technologies which have not
been demonstrated on a commercial scale for removing and retaining radio-
active iodine and krypton for long term decay and for stabilizing mill
tailing piles.
Implementation of the EPA proposed standards would require a substantive
effort to modify the NRC's regulations in order to remove these discrepan-
cies, and it would not change significantly the overall environmental
impact. Although the proposed standard would require a system for imple-
mentation which would be similar in concept to the existing NRC system
for regulating effluents, there would be significant differences in the
details of implementation which would impose a significant administrative
burden on the NRC. It would be particularly difficult to develop a
mechanism to demonstrate conformance with the emission limits stated in
curies pet unit of energy generated.
Thus, we believe that the proposed standard requires further work. The
NRC staff believes that EPA's generally applicable environmental radiation
standards should provide an upper limit for radiation exposures, predicated
upon restricting the potential health impact from all sources of radiation
exposure. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission would require its licensees
to operate within such limits and further restrict effluent releases
and radiation exposures in a cost-effective manner to be as low as
reasonably achievable. Several alternative approaches appear available to
the EPA. The limits could be raised to reflect the concerns expressed
above and in the NRC staff comments which are attached. Another possible
approach would be that the Federal Radiation Council (FRC) radiation
protection guides for doses to individuals be supplemented to limit doses
from the nuclear fuel cycle facilities to a larger fraction of the present
FRC limits than the factor of twenty reduction which is reflected in the
EPA proposed standard. The fractional limits should be chosen on the basis
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Honorable Russell E. Train
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of a broad and balanced approach to resource expenditures for health
protectxon. The NRC staff is prepared to initiate further work with your
staff to develop an appropriate and balanced standard which would allow
flexibility within which effluents could be regulated without undue
interruptions of electric power sources and with consideration of the
proper distribution of allowable discharges among the various types of
facilities in the fuel cycle.
Sincerely,
Executive Director for Operations
Enclosure: Staff Comments
COMMENTS OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION STAFF
ON THE
EPA PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION STANDARD
40 CFR PART 190
JULY 1975
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1. Suitability of the EPA Proposed Standards with Respect to
Statutory Authority
Under Reorganization Plan No. 3 the following functions, with respect
to radiation standards, were transferred to EPA:
"The functions of the Atomic Energy Commission under the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, as amended, ... to the extent that such functions of the Commission
consist of establishing generally applicable environmental standards
for the protection of the general environment from radioactive materials.
As used herein, standards mean limits on radiation exposures or levels,
or concentrations or quantities of radioactive material, in the environment
outside the boundaries of locations under the control of persons possessing
or using radioactive material."
In addition, a 1973 memorandum from the Director, OMB, to the Administrator
of the EPA and the Chairman of the AEC clarified the responsibilities of the
two Federal agencies by stating that:
"EPA should continue, under its current authority, to have responsibility
for setting standards for the total amount of radiation in the general
environment from all facilities combined in the uranium fuel cycle, i.e.,
an ambient standard which would have to reflect AEC's findings as to the
practicability of emission controls."
The regulatory responsibilities of the AEC were transferred to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974.
It is the view of the NRC staff that the portion of the EPA proposed
standard which defines the annual dose equivalent for any member of the
public is an appropriate "generally applicable standard" and within the
EPA area of responsibility. The actual values proposed in the EPA standard
do not adequately reflect NRC's findings as to practicability expressed
in Appendix I which was published in the Federal Register on May 5, 1975,
as discussed in Section 2, below.
The portion of the proposed standard which specifies limits on quantities
of long-lived materials entering the environment is not, in our opinion,
a generally applicable environmental standard. These limits which are
expressed in curies per gigawatt-year of electric energy generation are,
for all practical purposes, discharge limitations for spent fuel reprocessing
plants and, in our opinion, represent release limits for a specific type of
facility. The proposed approach provides no real limit on the concentrations
of these radionuclides in the environment. The use of environmental
concentrations would provide a "generally applicable standard" for such
long-lived radionuclides.
2. Comparison of the EPA Proposed Uranium Fuel Cycle Standard (40 CFR Part 190)
with Appendix I, 10 CFR Part 50
Appendix I of 10 CFR Part 50, which provides numerical guidelines for
design objectives and limiting conditions for operation to meet the criterion
"as low as reasonably achievable" for radioactive material in light-water-cooled
nuclear power reactor effluents, was issued as an NRC regulation on April 30,
1975, with notice in the Federal Register on May 5, 1975.
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In addition to satisfying the design objective guidelines, additional
radioactive waste treatment components are required by the regulation if the
annual costs of those components are justified by reductions of the dose to
the population within 50 miles of the reactor using the interim values of
$1,000 per person-rem or $1000 per person-thyroid-rem as the basis for judging
cost effectiveness.
The statement of considerations published in the Federal Register with
the EPA proposed standard 40 CFR Part 190 states in part:
"It is the view of the Agency (EPA) that this guidance for reactors
(Appendix I, 10 CFR Part 50) will provide an appropriate and satisfactory
implementation of these (40 CFR Part 190) proposed environmental
radiation standards for the uranium fuel cycle with respect to light-
water-cooled nuclear reactors utilizing uranium fuel."
The NRC staff does not agree that the provisions of Appendix I would
necessarily "provide an appropriate and satisfactory implementation" of the
proposed 40 CFR Part 190 for LWR power stations. The reasons are
several:
1. The design objective quantities of Appendix I and attendant doses for
the three release modes under some circumstances could be
additive.
2. The design objectives apply to each reactor on a site (not to the
entire site) and can be multiplied by the number of reactors on the site
for estimating the equivalent values for the site.
3. The flexibility provided in Appendix I for the limiting conditions
for operation (in recognition of the uncertainties in the source
- 4 -
term estimates and in anticipated operational occurrences) would
permit the design objective quantities to be exceeded under
certain conditions.
4. Appendix I applies only to effluents from LWR power stations and
does not apply to other radiation sources such as N-16 from the
turbines, storage of radioactive material, or interaction of radiation
from other nearby sites and radiation from other than LWRs on the
same site.
For these reasons, a nuclear power station with only three LWR units
designed and operated in accordance with Appendix I could result in the
doses presented in Table I.
TABLE I. POTENTIAL ANNUAL DOSE RATES TO AN INDIVIDUAL NEAR A THREE-UNIT
LWR STATION OPERATING WITHIN APPENDIX I, 10 CFR PART 50
Release Mode Whole Body (mrem)
Liquid Effluents 9
Gaseous Effluents 15
Iodine and Particulates - -
Doses at "design object ive"level 24
Proposed Standard (40 CFR Part 190) 25
Organ
30
15
45
90
75
25
(mrem)
(thyroid)
(other organs)
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The total dose from effluents is almost equal to the EPA whole-body dose
and could exceed the organ dose limits. The total dose could be higher
than that which could occur from exposure to effluents if consideration
is given to radiation from N-16 in the turbine of a BWR station, from
storage of radioactive materials onsite, from transportation of radioactive
material, from nuclear facilities other than LWR, or from other nuclear
sites in the near vicinity of the station site.
3. Conceptual Differences Between Appendix I and the EPA Proposed Standards
There are substantial conceptual differences between the "design
objective" and "limiting conditions for operations" features of the NRC
10 CFR Part 50 Appendix I and the standards presented in the EPA proposed
40 CFR Part 190. The design objectives of Appendix I are values which NRC
has selected with due consideration of technical feasibility and cost
effectiveness. Design objectives are values which the designers and the
operators of the facility are to use in selecting station features and
operating procedures. A substantial technical effort was undertaken by
NRC in order to provide a data base for defining design objective values.
Representative values were selected for each of the numerous parameters
which are required to be considered in order to estimate the quantities of
each radionuclide which might be released and the exposures and doses
which might occur as a result of the release.
NRC recognized that each parameter could have a range of values and
the selected value was believed to be "realistically" conservative but any
particular facility, depending on actual experience, might have greater
or lesser releases or impacts than predicted by analytical models used by
the NRC staff. NRC also recognized that any particular facility could
experience operating difficulties more severe than those assumed in develop-
ing the staff analytical models. In recognition of these difficulties in
predicting impact, the NRC Appendix I of 10 CFR Part 50 provides for
operating flexibility between the "design objectives" and the "limiting
conditions" which are reflected in the "technical specifications which
define plant operating limits. If the limting conditions are exceeded,
the station personnel must report the matter to the NRC, determine the
reasons for the higher releases, and determine a course of action which will
reduce the releases to the design objective levels. This may be viewed
as a graded scale of action rather than a limit.
In contrast, the values proposed by the EPA in 40 CFR Part 190 are
limits rather than design objectives, and if they are exceeded the facility
presumably would have to cease operations unless the NRC made a "variance"
finding that the release was unusual, of a temporary nature, and the
societal interests would be served best by continued operation.
4. Direct Radiatiln Exposure from Onsite Sources
The proposed EPA dose limits include dose contributions from direct
and scattered radiation arising from radioactive materials which are con-
fined within onsite structures. Appendix I defines as low as reasonably
achievable design objectives for radioactive materials in effluents and
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does not address direct radiation. Dose contributions from this source
would be additive to the doses arising from effluents. Neither the Draft
Environmental Statement nor the referenced technical documents provide
adequate bases for limiting the combined dose due to direct radiation and
radionuclide discharges to the proposed limits.
Studies of the direct dose due to N-16 in BWR turbines show that
the dose rate falls off rapidly with distance from the turbine building
and, therefore, does not represent major source of population exposure.
Individuals residing near the site boundary could receive whole-body dose
contributions from this source. The magnitude of this exposure is very
dependent upon plant design conditions (power level, turbine design and
shielding, equipment orientation, etc.), upon the geometric relationship
of the receptor to the source (distance, direction, and orientation to
the turbine axis), and upon the habits of the exposed individual such as
the type of residence (which determines shielding) and the amount of time
spent at that location (occupancy). Because of the multitude of factors
which can affect the exposure, it is difficult to specify the magnitude
of the individual dose contributed from this exposure pathway except for
specific sites and plants. Appendix A provides calculations which indi-
cate the potential magnitude of these doses. Although parametric studies
6,7
of turbine shielding have been performed, the costs of backfitting
shielding installations would be highly dependent upon individual plant
design characteristics. Because of the difficulty in formulating a general
model for estimating turbine shine, this source of exposure is addressed
by NRC on a case-by-case basis in its licensing actions.
5- Fuel Reprocessing Plants - Thyroid Dose Rates
In 1973 the AEC (now the NRC) staff initiated comprehensive engineering,
environmental, and cost studies to provide part of the data base
for establishing "as low as reasonably achievable" levels of radioactive
8
material in effluents from fuel reprocessing plants.
The initial step in the studies, which were performed at the Holifield
National Laboratory (formerly the ORNL), was to develop a model fuel
reprocessing plant typical of current design and operation using present
licensing limitations on the release of radioactive materials. The cost/
benefit of decreasing the release of radioactive wastes through the use of
increasingly effective radwaste systems was analyzed. Decontamination
factors and source terms were evaluated for each radwaste system. The
radwaste systems ranged from present practice to the foreseeable limits of
available technology and were analyzed with respect to normal operations.
The technology of several of the radwaste systems considered has not been
demonstrated on a production basis, and those systems, therefore, are not
available for immediate application. Thus, some of the radwaste systems
that were considered for purposes of a cost-benefit assessment might not
achieve projected removal efficiencies with demonstrated practicability.
Radiological impact on the environment depends upon effluent and site
characteristics, population distribution, and land and water uses. Two
site regimes, similar to sites previously approved by the AEC, were selected
for the study in order to assess the range of impacts from site-related
characteristics: a site on a plain in a rural southeastern coastal area
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adjacent to a continuously flowing stream which empties into an estuary;
and a site located on a plain in a rural midwestern environment adjacent
to a continuously flowing stream which empties into a large river. Human
activities and land and water uses for each site regime were hypothesized
and analyzed to determine potential radiation exposure pathways. Doses from
identified exposure pathways were calculated for individuals in the vicinity
of the plants and for the population within 55 miles of the plants. Hypo-
thetical doses to individuals, to the population, and to organisms near
fuel reprocessing plants were evaluated for interaction of radioactive
material in effluents from the plants with food and water and irradiation of
persons in the environs. Dose models and pathways used in the study to
assess exposures are consistent with those used in the licensing of
facilities to evaluate the environmental impact from proposed activities.
Average meteorologic data from representative midwestern and southeastern
coastal regions were used to calculate average atmospheric dispersion factors
for use in calculating doses to individuals and to the population. The dose
commitments calculated for these sites might be significantly higher than
those that are actually experienced owing to the conservatism introduced into
the calculation in lieu of definitive data from operating experience.
The results of these studies indicate that the maximum annual dose
commitment via the milk pathway to the thyroid of a child located at a
distance of 0.5 mile from the plant could approach 500 mrems per year during
equilibrium operations of a plant that reprocessed fuel cooled for 160 days.
A significant fraction of this estimated dose commitment is due to the
release of 1-129. Therefore, variation in cooling time beyond 160 days
would have very little effect on estimated dose rates. The ALAP studies
indicate that the dose could be reduced to about 190 mrem per year at a
8
total annual operating cost of approximately $35,000 (about $3.80 per
person-thyroid-rem on a population basis) using macroreticular resin rad-
waste treatment equipment. It should be noted that only preliminary
laboratory studies have been made of the performance of these macroreticular
resins. Development work would be needed to confirm the practicability of
the process, which is similar otherwise to conventional ion exchange
processes, and to establish suitable methods for resin regeneration and
handling of the resins and the spent regenerant. The elapsed time to
demonstrate the practicability of this process has been estimated to be
8
three years from project initiation.
The staff believes that this dose rate could be reduced to less than 30
mrem per year by modifying the processing to evolve iodine during disolution
and providing additional treatment equipment. This process is not complex,
and conventional equipment would be used in a commercial reprocessing
plant. The process has been successfully demonstrated on a laboratory
scale. However, engineering development and a demonstration of the process
with irradiated LWR fuel and dissolver solution are required. It is
estimated that the development and design engineering, equipment procurement
and installation, start up and testing, and integration into the overall
plant circuit could reasonably be accomplished in about 5 years from project
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initiation in view of the simplicity of the process and the use of
conventional equipment. Operation of this equipment could require an
8
annual operating cost of approximately $275,000 ($130 per person-thyroid-
rem on a population basis).
Recent public hearings have been conducted on the environmental
impact of the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant pursuant to the National Environ-
mental Protection Act of 1969 (NEPA). The staff has estimated that normal
operations of the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant could yield maximum iodine
thyroid dose rates to the thyroid of an infant via the milk and inhalation
9
pathways of 88 mrems per year. This dose rate has been estimated for a
location at a distance of 1.5 miles from the facility (i.e., the closest
uncontrolled distance from the plant).
On the basis of the above studies, and depending on the location of the
nearest "real" cow, it appears that compliance with the proposed EPA standard
of 75 millirems per year to an individual's thyroid may not be achievable,
with practicability a consideration, within the next 2 years as required by
the EPA standard. We note that the EPA report, which is stated to provide
the technical backup for the proposed standard, acknowledges that the
technology required to control iodine ^and krypton releases from spent fuel
reprocessing plants is "unproven." (EPA-520/9-73-003-D, Table B2, page B15).
However, it is likely that plants designed and approved after 1980 could
comply with the level of exposure proposed for 1980 in the standard, but
the plants then operating might require additional time to modify (backfit)
equipment.
6. Fuel Reprocessing Plants - Quantities of 1-129 Released
EPA proposes a standard of 5 mCi per gigawatt-year electrical for the
release of 1-129, with an effective implementation date of January 1, 1983.
Studies carried out at the Holifield National Laboratory include considera-
tion of the control of the long-lived radioiodine, 1-129 (half life =
7 8
1.6 x 10 years). The studies indicate that the use of treatment systems
incorporating macroreticular resins, could contain 1-129 releases' to
62 mCi per gigawatt-year electrical at an annual operating cost of
about $35,000 for a model plant. Further NRC staff analysis indicates
that this improvement can be reduced to practice in about 3 years from
project initiation. The addition of iodine evolution equipment to the
reprocessing system is believed to be capable of reducing 1-129 releases
to about 1.6 mCi per gigawatt-year electrical for a. model plant and is
estimated to require approximately $275,000 in annual operating costs.
Reduction of this advanced equipment to practice is expected to require
about 5 years from project initiation. Therefore implementation of the
proposed 5 mCi per GWe-year effluent limit for iodine-129 appears to be
achievable by 1983.
The improvements listed above have been discussed in relation to thyroid
doses of individuals from radioiodine. The EPA proposed standards also
address 1-129 releases per gigawatt-year electrical. We expect that the
installation of radwaste treatment systems to satisfy the proposed individual
thyroid dose rate standards also would satisfy the proposed standards
related to 1-129 release quantity.
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7. Uranium Mills - Organ Dose Rates
The function of uranium mills is to extract uranium in concentrated
form from naturally occurring ore deposits which generally contain three
to six Ibs. of U 0 per ton of ore (0.15 to 0.30% U 0 ). In addition to
38 38
uranium, the ores contain other radioactive constituents, such as
thorium-230, radium-226, radon-222, lead-210, etc., which are radioactive
decay products of uranium.
At the beginning of 1974, there were 15 operating mills in the
United States, plus one mill on a standby basis. Information regarding
these mills is provided in Table II. The nominal capacities of the
10
mills range from 400 to 7000 tons of ore per day.
TABLE II. URANIUM MILLS IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1974
State
New Mexico*
Wyoming
Colorado*
Washington*
Texas*
Utah
TOTAL
Utah
Status of Mill
Active
Act ive
Active
Act ive
Active
Act ive
Inact ive
''Nominal" Capacity
No. of Mills Short Tons of Ore Per Day
3 13,500
7 9,050
2 1,750
1 400
1 1,750
1 500
15 26,950
1 1,500
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After ore is received at a mill, it is first crushed and then
finely ground into a wet slurry. After the ore has reached a fine sand-
like consistency, it is contacted with chemicals which selectively
dissolve or leach the uranium from the finely ground solids. The barren
solids (tailings) are then separated from the pregnant solution and
pumped to waste storage areas (tailings ponds). The pregnant solution
is then chemically treated to extract and purify the uranium. The stripped
solution is then used as the pumping fluid to convey the solid waste
tailings to the tailings pond.
It is important to characterize the locale of uranium mills and the
type of radioactive materials that are released. Two primary sources
contribute radioactive materials to the atmospheric environment. These
are: (1) the release of effluents containing radon and particulates
carrying radioactive material from the discharge stacks following in-plant
dust collection and effluent treatment; and (2) the escape of radon gas
and the wind transport of particulates carrying radioactive material from
the tailings area.
Doses from radon are specifically excluded from the standards
proposed by EPA. Practicable means are not presently available to control
releases of radon from either mill discharge stacks or tailing areas.
The application of existing dust collection techniques will control
doses from the releases of airborne particulates from mill discharge
stacks to within the standards proposed by EPA.
*Agreement states
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The major dose contribution from uranium milling is from wind
transported particulates from tailings retention systems. The tailings
retention systems at uranium mills are constructed similarly to those
11
of other ore dressing and hydrometallurgical plants. In the usual
case an initial earth dam is constructed using native soils or mine
wastes. Tailings slurries are then discharged along the inner edges of
the embankments.
Tailings retention systems range in size from a few acres to hundreds
of acres containing millions of tons of tailings. During the construction
and operation of tailings retention systems, substantial areas of tailings
will form beaches due to evaporation, seepage, and drainage of the liquid
fraction of the waste slurry by gravity to lower elevations within the
overall waste retention system. Thus, as tailings become exposed by
beach formation within these waste retention systems, the finely ground
solid tailings, containing the radioactive descendants of uranium, become
subject to wind erosion. This erosion, along with the diffusion of radon
from tailings systems, results in the dispersal of radioactive materials
into the surroundings of uranium mills.
Environmental surveys in the environs of uranium mills have been
based on the collection and analyses of airborne samples collected by mill
licensees, an AEC program to determine airborne concentrations of radio-
12
active materials around tailings piles at closed mills, an AJEC-PHS
13
sponsored program to determine radon concentrations around such systems,
and an HEW evaluation of the potential effects of unstabilized inactive
14
piles on the Colorado River Basin. In addition, limited calculations
have been made pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act to
estimate potential exposures to individuals by inhalation only from milling
activities at three new mills commencing operations since 1970.
Engineering, cost, and environmental studies have also been initiated at
16
the Holifield National Laboratory under the direction of the NRC for the
purpose of providing information on "as low as reasonably achievable-
effluent releases from uranium mills.
12
The AEC measurements of airborne concentrations of radioactive
materials around tailings piles at inactive mills indicate that airborne
concentrations of thorium-230 at 1500 feet from a tailings pile, which
had only been inactive a few months and which contained significant mois-
ture, averaged 55% of applicable 10 CFR Part 20 limits. This corresponds
to a lung dose rate of about 825 mrem per year from inhalation of thorium-
230 alone to an individual continuously present in such an environment.
It is recognized that tailings at inactive mills are more prone to wind
erosion than those at active mills. The question of ALARA releases from
uranium mills is under active study by the NRC staff.
The "as low as reasonably achievable" studies performed by HNL estimate
the total maximum annual bone dose rate to a hypothetical individual at 0.5
miles from a theoretical model operating uranium mill and tailings area
in Wyoming to be 1060 mrem per year, assuming total occupancy at that
location and that 1002 of the food consumed is produced locally. It is
recognized that this dose rate overestimates reality because of the sparse
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population in the vicinity of most mills and the unlikely assumption that
an individual obtains all his food locally. However, the subject of real
doses to real people will require further study before firm conclusions
can be reached with regard to establishing the conformance to generally
applicable limits as they affect uranium mills.
15
Recent evaluations of environmental impacts from uranium mills
pursuant to NEPA resulted in the calculated dose rate equivalents presented
in Table III.
15
TABLE III. ESTIMATED OFFSITE DOSES FROM URANIUM MILL AIRBORNE EFFLUENTS
Mill
Petrotomics
Humeca
Highland
Shirley Basin
Dose (mrem/year)
Location Bone Lung
Outside Fence 38.6 38
Ranch 42 23
Ranch 3.4-12 1
Ranch 0.4 1.0
These calculated dose rates result from inhalation only. These are
a small fraction of the 3 rem bone and 1.5 rem lung limits of Part 20.
The boundary dose rates are hypothetical, since no individual resides at
the site boundaries. The dose rates include radionuclides from the mill and
mine ventilation systems, but do not include radionuclides that have become
airborne owing to wind erosion of tailings. Again, additional studies would
be required to identify the dose to a real individual.
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8. Removal of Noble Gases from Fuel Reprocessing Plant Effluents
The principal concern arising from the release of noble gases from
reprocessing plants (particularly Kr-85) is the dose commitment (man-rem)
delivered to populations. Over the period 1980-2000, the United States
would contribute approximately 25% of the Kr-85 dose commitment to the
world population. Thus, if the United States were the sole nation to
require noble gas removal from reprocessing plant effluents, the desired
consequences of control would be largely negated. Similarly, the costs
associated with reductions in dose commitments may be related to both the
United States population and that of the world. Estimates of these costs
are provided in Table IV.
TABLE IV. COST ESTIMATES PER MAN-REM REDUCTION OF KR-85 DOSE COMMITMENT
FROM U.S. LWR REPROCESSING PLANTS
Year
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
1
No. of Plants
0
0
2
4
8
11
CO!
U.S.
Holdup
29,800
19,900
20,400
19,700
2
it in Dollars Per Man-Rem Reduction
Population
3
Holdup and BF
36,500
26,500
25,000
23,500
World
Holdup
352
228
224
204
Population
3
Holdup and BF
393
277
249
222
1. In addition to NFS, AGNS, and MFRD plants.
2. In dollars of 1973.
3. Plants built prior to 1983 backfitted (BF) to recover 99% of the krypton
in the fuel received.
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- 20 -
As may be seen in Table IV, the costs per man-rem reduction in dose
to the population of the United States is about a factor of 90 greater than
that to the worldwide population. An interim value of $1,000 per man-rem
and $1,000 per man-thyroid-rem are specified in Appendix I for judging the
cost effectiveness of efforts to reduce population doses. Kr-85 removal
equipment installation and operation would not be cost-effective when con-
sidering the U.S. population dose from Kr-85. Only in terms of world popula-
tion can the installation of Kr-85 removal systems be argued as justifiable
in terms of cost effectiveness. Unilateral action on the part of the United
States to remove Kr-85 would have little effect on the dose delivered to
the entire world population. Foreign fuel processing will contribute about
3 times the Kr-85 dose contributed by processing in the United States if
Kr-85 is not collected by any country. Given these considerations, it is
the view of the staff that the self-imposition by 1983 of Kr-85 removal
systems upon United States fuel reprocessing plants should be deferred pending
resolution of developing standards now in progress under auspices of the
International Atomic Energy Agency.
A delay in imposing standards for Kr-85 release for the purpose of
establishing policy will impose virtually no added risk to any individual.
Estimated dose rates as a result of assumed releases from all worldwide
facilities of Kr-85 through the year 2000 are about 0.03 mrem whole body
17
per year or about 1/2500 that of natural background radiation. Skin dose
rates for such conditions are calculated to be about 3 mrem per year.
Prior to the imposition of release standards for Kr-85 with the
consequent investments in equipment and operations, the staff believes that
these costs should be examined in terms of societal risks and alternative
beneficial investments of the nation's resources. This view is in consonance
18
with a conclusion given in the BEIR report that states "... it is becoming
increasingly important that society not expend enormously large resources to
reduce very small risks still further, at the expense of greater risks that
go unattended; such unbalances may pass unnoticed unless a cost-benefit analy-
sis is attempted. If these matters are not explored, the decisions will
still be made and the complex issues resolved either arbitrarily or by
default since the setting and implementation of standards represent such
a resolution."
While the above considerations appear to be overriding, the development
of krypton removal equipment to practice in fuel reprocessing plants should
be fostered and continued, particularly in view of the possibility of inter-
national agreements to limit releases of Kr-85. The staff also notes that the
unilateral requirement of restricted Kr-85 release by the U.S. could also
adversely affect the competitive position of the U.S. in processing fuel
compared to that of foreign countries which do not have such a requirement.
It is expected that noble gas removal systems appropriate to the fuel
reprocessing industry could be operational in 1983 if appropriate research
8
and development efforts were to be initiated now. This date, when com-
pliance with the EPA Kr-85 release standards is proposed, may be optimistic.
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However, the EPA proposes that the development program on noble gas removal
be reviewed in the future to establish the practicability of removal
systems prior to 1983. At present, two noble gas removal systems appear to
have the greatest promise. These systems may be described as the selective
absorption and the cryogenic distillation systems. Description of these
systems and estimated schedules for their proof of practice certifications
are provided in References 17 through 26.
9. Utility of the EPA Proposed Standard
In 1971, the AEC amended 10 CFR Parts 20 and 50 to include the following
criteria:
10 CFR Part 20.1(c)
"... persons engaged in activities under licenses ... should, in addi-
tion to complying with the requirements set forth in AO CFR Part 2£7 •••
make every reasonable effort to maintain radiation exposures and releases
of radioactive material in effluents to unrestricted areas as
far below the limits specified in /To CFR Part 20j as practicable."
10 CFR Part 50.34a(a)
"... The applicant /for a permit to construct a nuclear power reactor/
shall ... identify the design objectives, and the means to be employed,
for keeping levels of radioactive material in effluents to unrestricted
areas as low as practicable."
The terminology "as low as practicable" is defined in 10 CFR Parts 20 and
50 to be:
"... as low as is practicably achievable taking into account the state
of technology and the economics of improvements in relation to the
benefits to the health and safety and in relation to the utilization
of atomic energy in the public interest."
In 1971 the AEC proposed numerical guidelines for radioactive material
in LWR effluents to meet the criterion "as low as practicable." An
evidentiary public hearing was held on the rulemaking action. About 4,200
pages of testimony, a three-volume environmental impact statement, and
thousands of pages of written testimony and exhibits were produced in this
rulemaking action. The public hearing was completed on December 6, 1973,
and the NRC published Appendix I as an amendment to 10 CFR Part 50 on
May 5, 1975- While the rulemaking action was time consuming and extensive,
it permitted participation by all interested parties and was responsible
for the development of a substantial data base upon which a sound rule
could be drawn. Further, the criterion "as low as practicable" which
exists in 10 CFR Parts 20 and 50 was applied in the licensing of reactors
in an effective manner during the four-year period that was required to
complete the rulemaking process.
Upon completion of the public hearing on Appendix I, an effort was
initiated to develop the generic technical and economic data base for
selection of numerical guides to meet the "as low as practicable"
criterion for uranium fuel cycle facilities other than LWR power stations.
While a substantial amount of data has been produced from this effort, the
generic effort has not been completed and the numerical guidelines for all
uranium fuel cycle facilities are specified on a case-by-case basis in the
licensing review.
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- 24 -
In view of the effective effort demonstrated by the NRC to restrict expo-
sures and releases of radioactive material from licensed nuclear facilities to
as low as reasonably achievable levels, it appears that the proposed EPA
40 CFR Part 190 would not significantly reduce the population exposure from
reactor and fuel cycle effluents, but it does have significant administrative
impacts in otner areas as described below.
10- Implementation of the EPA Proposed Standard
Among the alternatives to 40 CFR Part 190 considered by EPA was one
which would set lower values for the standard. This alternative was rejected
by EPA because, as stated in the EPA DBS, "... it would impose a large
administrative burden on NRC in order to insure compliance."
Should the proposed 40 CFR Part 190 become an effective rule, implementation
of that rule would impose a substantial administrative burden. The
following technically substantive administrative problems are representative
of those which would be presented to NRC if 40 CFR Part 190 were to become
a rule.
a. Revise 10 CFR Part 20 and the recently amended Part 50 (Appendix I)
to implement 40 CFR Part 190.
b. Revise Technical Specifications for all licensed LWR power stations
to reflect the requirements of 40 CFR Part 190.
c. Review all licensing actions to identify facilities which will require
additional radwaste treatment or other features which will permit com-
pliance with 40 CFR Part 190 and identify methods by which compliance
could be accomplished and demonstrated.
d. Decide, as a matter of policy, whether the facilities should be
designed for current land and water usage by persons in the near
vicinity of the station and require backfit or restrictions should
usage change, or design for potential land and water usage to avoid
the more costly backfitting, operating restrictions, and extensive
surveillance requirements.
e. Determine whether the quantities of Kr-85 and 1-129 which would be
permitted by 40 CFR Part 190 after January 1, 1983, refer to all uranium
fuel processed after that date or only to that fuel which was used to
generate electrical power after that date. A finding on this issue
could influence decisions on matters such as the schedule for processing
spent fuel and similar issues dealing with fuel and waste management.
f. Provide guidelines on what constitutes "a temporary and unusual operating
condition" for a nuclear facility for which the NRC may grant a "variance.
Guidelines also would have to be provided for judging the "necessity
to protect the overall societal interest with respect to the orderly
delivery of electrical power" should the need for a variance by NRC
be required for a uranium fuel cycle facility.
g. Review the analytical models currently used by NRC staff to estimate
potential doses and consider possible modifications or adjustments for
doses to "real people" as stated by the EPA in the DES. It is
actually impossible to determine accurately the actual doses to specific
individuals owing to the mulviple exposure modes, the levels which are
too low to measure, the mobility of individuals, unique characteristics
of individuals, and other factors.
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- 26 -
h. Perform studies to determine the relationships between releases of
radioactive material and the doses which might be received by indivi-
duals in a region where interactions of dispersion patterns from
multiple nuclear facilities overlap.
i. Determine what modifications on siting criteria for uranium fuel cycle
facilities might be required to comply with 40 CFR Part 190. In view
of the low dose 1imits specified in the EPA proposed standard, distance
requirements required to assure compliance for normal operations of
the facilities might be more restrictive than those required in con-
sideration of serious accident situations.
j. Devise a system for relating release quantities of Kr-85, 1-129, and
long-lived transuranic elements to the power generated by LWR power
stations and allocating permissible release quantities among uranium
fuel cycle facilities. Allocation of release quantities among newer
and older facilities would be complicated by factors such as possible
competitive advantages which might be realized by older stations,
which might not have features which will be included in new facilities,
should they be granted release allotments based on considerations
other than fuel burnup quantities. On the other hand, backfitting of
older facilities can be extremely expensive and place these facilities
at a competitive disadvantage if the backfitting is required.
If the contributions of the iodine-129 and alpha-emitting transuranics from
light-water-cooled nuclear reactors would have to be assessed in order to
comply with the proposed standards, then a considerable expenditure of effort
and money would be required to measure radionuclides which, in them
selves, contribute insignificantly to the radiation dose from nuclear
power reactors. If the reactor contribution could be omitted, then
the standards would represent effluent limitations solely for spent
fuel reprocessing plants.
Even if the contributions from the reactor facilities were omitted,
determination of a priori effluent limitations (such as the technical
specifications in NRC licensing conditions) would prove almost impossible.
Because these proposed limits are tied to energy production, knowledge
of the fuel burnup and the thermal efficiency of the reactor (to convert
thermal energy to electrical energy) would be required for each batch of
fuel reprocessed. Because of the variation in individual reactor designs,
power level, and fuel management practices, it would be nearly impossible
to specify, beforehand, the total equivalent energy generated by the
annual reprocessing plant throughput of spent fuel. The reprocessing
facility would have to keep a running account of the total activity
released to the environment and the total energy which had been generated
by the fuel. The ratio of these quantities would have to be computed
prior to initiation of processing for each batch of fuel in order to
determine whether that batch could be processed without exceeding the
EPA standard. Even if a given reprocessing plant were to remain in
compliance, the ratio of the total activity discharged and the total
equivalent energy production for all reprocessing facilities would have
to be calculated by NRC for every batch of fuel reprocessed to insure
that the overall totals were in compliance.
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U' PersPective of the Impact of the EPA Proposed Standard
The EPA Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DES)* states that imple-
mentation of the proposed 40 CFR Part 190 would avert an estimated 1030
"potential health effects" which would occur if current NRC regulatory
practices were to continue. The DES presents values for the potential
health effects attributable to operation of the nuclear fuel cycle through
the year 2000 at various environmental radiation protection levels.
Table 10 on page 82 of the DES contains columns which contain estimated
values based on existing "Federal Radiation Guides," "Current AEC Practice,
and "EPA Generally Applicable Standards." According to this table, there
would be a substantial difference between the values projected under FRC
guidance and AEC practice only for short-lived materials where Appendix I
has been recognized to restrict releases in effluents to levels below the
FRC guides. The values projected under FRC guidance and AEC practice are
identical for all other sources. The DES does not present sufficient
details to determine the bases for the estimates presented, but apparently
the estimates do not recognize that the nuclear facilities have not been
operated in a manner which would result in doses to individuals at levels
as high as those permitted by the FRC standards nor does it recognize the
existence of the "as low as reasonably achievable" criterion which the NRC
applies to all uranium fuel cycle facilities and which assures that the
dose levels are well below the FRC guides.
In addition, the potential health effects are estimated assuming a
linear nonthreshold relationship of somatic and genetic effects to radiation
dose at levels which approach zero and which are delivered at a very
low dose rate. The bulk of the health effects are postulated to occur as
a result of integrating the extremely low doses from long-lived materials
to the world's population over several decades.**
Without a perspective, the estimated 1030 health effects postulated to
occur over about 150 years might appear to be substantive. Placed in
perspective, the estimated 1030 health effects are small, a small number in
a statistical sense when compared to the billions of such health
effects which can be estimated to occur from other causes during the same
time period. Table V presents an estimate of the normal incidence of
cancer and serious genetic diseases of the types referred to as "health
effects."
Numerical estimates of "health effects" presented in the Draft
Environmental Impact Statement for the Uranium Fuel Cycle standard are
based upon the hypothesis of a linear, non-threshold, dose rate
independent relationship between biological effects and doses applied
at levels which approach natural backgsound. This is consistent with
the recommendations of scientific authorities in matters of radiation
protection. However, experimental data are inadequate to verify or to
*Table 10, page 82, DES
**Table 3, page 12, Environmental Analysis of the Uranium Fuel Cycle,
Part III, Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing, EPA-520/9-73-003D, Oct. 1973
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- 30 -
deny this hypothesis. An alternate hypothesis is that the probability
of biological effects are reduced when the doses are delivered at low
dose rates and that an effective threshold exists. If this alternate
hypothesis is correct, the probability of biological effects at very low
dose levels could be zero. More than 93% of the total-body dose commitment,
which represent essentially all of the calculated health effects, are
the result of summing doses far less than one mrem per year to the entire
population of the world over several decades. Thus, a fair statement
would be that the expected impact is likely to be within the range from
zero to 1030 health effects.
TABLE V. ESTIMATED NORMAL INCIDENCE OF "HEALTH EFFECTS" IN THE U.S.
AND IN THE WORLD
Period
I/
1970-2020
Population
W
U.S.
Cancer
7 3/
1.8x10 deaths
7 4/
3.7x10 cases
5/
1970-2120
1970-2020
1970-2120
U.S.
7/
8/
World
World
5.9x10 deaths
9
1.2x10 cases
Genetic
7 6/
5.0x10 cases
9 9/
3.0x10 cases
Total health effects (cancer + genetic) cases
7
U.S. 8.6x10 cases
9
World 4.2x10 cases
T/ A 50-year period was selected for evaluating cancer incidence to compare
~ with the EPA postulated number of somatic effects resulting from doses
from exposures to radiation originating in U-fuel cycle facilities during
the several decades.
2/ The population of the U.S. was based on Fig. D.I, p. D-9 of EPA-520/9-73-003D.
-3
3/ A cancer death rate of 1.29x10 per person year from the U.S. was selected
~ from World Health Statistics Annual 1966-67.
4/ The number of new cancer cases was assumed to be twice the number of cancer
~~ deaths per the NAS/NRC BEIR Report.
5/ A 150-year period was selected for evaluating genetic disease incidence to
~ correspond to the time period for the EPA genetic estimates.
6/ A value of 6% was selected for genetic disease incidence based on estimates
~ in the BEIR Report.
9
7/ The world population was assumed to be 3.5x10 in 1970 and to increase by
1.9% per year to be consistent with p D-15 of EPA-520/9-73-003D.
-3
8/ A calcer death rate of 1.22x10 per person year for the world was estimated
~ from data in the World Health Statistics Annual 1966-67.
9/ The U.S. genetic disease incidence (6%) was assumed to apply the world
population.
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- 32 -
Further, the United States will contribute only about one-quarter of
the Kr-85 worldwide inventory from uranium fuel cycle operations which will
be the source of these worldwide low-level doses. Neither national nor
international authorities in radiation protection have specifically addressed
the significance of worldwide low-level doses and the need for international
control of Kr-85 and similar radioactive sources.
While the values for normal incidence presented in Table VII are gross
estimates, it is clear that the estimated 1030 health effects which EPA
postulates to be averted by implementing the proposed 40 CFR Part 190, even
if correct, would cost about $100,000,000 to the United States and would
represent an increase of less than 0.0003% in the normal incidence of these
health effects.
1. Lowder, W. M. and Raft, P. D., "Environmental Gamma Radiation Exposure
Rates from Nitrogen-16 in the Turbines of a Large BWR Power Plant,"
Health and Safety Laboratory, USAEC, New York, October 1971.
2. Lowder, W. M., Raft, P. D., and Gogolak, C. V., "Environmental Gamma
Radiation from Nitrogen-16 Decay in the Turbines of a Large Boiling
Water Reactor," Health and Safety Laboratory, HASL TM 72-1, USAEC,
New York, February 1972.
3. Lowder, W. M., Raft, P. D., and Gogolak, C. V., "Environmental Gamma
Radiation from Nitrogen-16 Decay in the Turbines of a Large Boiling
Water Reactor," Health and Safety Laboratory, HASL-271, USAEC, New York,
January 1973.
4. Hairr, L. M., LeClare, P.C., Philbin, T.W., and Tuday, J.R., "The
Evaluation of Direct Radiation in the Vicinity of Nuclear Power Stations
Environmental Analysts, Inc., Garden City, N.Y., Publication No. 303
June 1973.
5. Memorandum to Participants in the April N-16 Radiation Surveys at the
Arnold and Cooper Nuclear Power Stations, W. M. Lowder, ERDA/HASL,
June 11, 1975 (and attachments).
6. Private Communication, James M. Smith, Jr., Nuclear Energy Division,
General Electric Company, San Jose, California, to William E. Kreger
USAEC, January 17, 1975.
7. Private Communication, E. A. Warman, Stone and Webster Engineering
Corporation, to J. Kastner, USAEC.
8. Blanco, R. E., et al, Correlation of Radioactive Waste Treatment Costs
and Environmental Impact of Waste Effluents in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
for Use in Establishing "As Low As Practicable" Guides - Nuclear Fuel
Reprocessing, ORNL-TM-4901, in press.
9. "Supplemental Testimony Regarding the Health Effect to the Local
Population from Normal Operations of the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant
(The Reprocessing Facility)," F. J. Congel and K. F. Eckerman,
Docket No. 50-332, undated.
10- Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
p 62, 1974.~
11. Merritt, Robert C., The Extractive Metallurgy of Uranium. Colorado
School of Mines Research Institute, 1971.
12. HASL Technical Memorandum, 64-14, July 31, 1964.
13. Evaluation of Radon-222 Near Uranium Tailing Piles, U.S. Public Health
Service, DER 69-1, March 1969.~~
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- 34 -
14. "Disposition and Control of Uranium Mill Tailings Piles in the
Colorado River Basin," Federal Water Pollution Control Administration,
Region VIII, U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
Denver, March 1966.
15. Environmental Statements for Highland Uranium Mill (Docket No. 40-
8102), the Shirley Basin Uranium Mill (Docket No. 40-6622), and
the Humeca Mill (Docket No. 40-8084) and the Environmental Impact
Appraisal for the Petrotomics Co. Uranium Mill (Docket No. 40-6659).
16. Blanco, R. E., et al, Correlation of Radioactive Waste Treatment Costs
and Environmental Impact of Waste Effluents in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
for Use in Establishing "As Low As Practicable" Guides - Uranium
Milling, ORNL-TM-4903, in press.
17. "The Potential Radiological Implications of Nuclear Facilities in the
Upper Mississippi River Basin in the Year 2000," USAEC, WASH-1209,
January 1973.
18. "The Effects on Population of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing
Radiation," Report of the Advisory Committee on the Biological Effects
of Ionizing Radiations, Division of Medical Sciences, National
Academy of Sciences National Research Council, Washington, D.C.,
November 1972.
19. Stephenson, M. J., et al, "Experimental Demonstration of the Selective
Absorption Process for Krypton-Xenon Removal," Proceedings of the 12th
Air Cleaning Conference Held in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, August 28-31,
1972, CONF-720823, Vol. 1, January 1973.
20, Hogg, R. M., "New Radwaste Retention System," Nuclear Engineering
International 1J, 98-99, 1972.
21. Nichols, J. P. and Binford, F. T., "Status of Noble Gas Removal and
Disposal," ORNL-TM-3515, August 1971.
22. Bendixsen, C. L. and Offutt, G. F., "Rare Gas Recovery Facility at the
Idaho Chemical Processing Plant," IN-1221, April 1969.
23. Bendixsen, C. L. and Rohde, K. L., "Operational Performance and Safety
of a Cryogenic System for Krypton Recovery," Trans. Am. Nucl. Soc.,
15(1), 96, 1972.
24. Davis, J. S. and Martin, J. R., "A Cryogenic Approach to Fuel
Reprocessing Gaseous Radwaste Treatment," Trans. Am. Nucl. Soc.,
]j>, 176-77, 1973.
25. Draft Environmental Statement, Limerick Generating Station, Dockets
50-352 and 50-353. ~~~~~~
26. Draft Environmental Statement, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station,
Dockets 50-387 and 50-388.~~~
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- 36 -
APPENDIX A
CALCULATED N TURBINE DOSES
TABLE A-l
EXTERNAL DOSE PARAMETERS DETERMINED FROM EXPERIMENTAL MEASUREMENTS
1-5
Measurements at several boiling water reactors1"5 have shown that the
dose rate from direct radiation falls off exponentially with distance
according to the formula:
-br
D(r) = Ae
where D(r) is the dose rate at distance r in mrem/year, r is the distance
from the turbine in meters, and A and b are parameters which are determined
by fitting the model to experimental data. These constants are highly
dependent upon the turbine building design and the reactor power level as
shown in Table A-l. At present, these variations are not well understood.
The parameters generally represent the dependence of the dose rate upon
distance in the direction of the highest measured dose. The dose rate is
also related to the direction with respect to the turbine axis so that the
doses calculated using those parameters represent upper bound estimates.
The exponential nature of the model indicates that the dose rates fall off
rapidly with distance.
Code
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Reactor Power Level
MWe
600
1840
1555
1000 (normalized)
1000 (normalized)
1000 (normalized)
1000 (normalized)
1250
716
543
108
125
858
2470
0.0132
0.0088
0.0091
0.011
0.0066
0.0099
0.0161
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- 38 -
In order to estimate the doses which may exist at typical reactor sites,
the site boundary (exclusion radius) distance and the distance to the
nearest residence were examined for 13 BWR reactors selected at random.
These distances were measured from the reactor building and not the turbine
axis, but they give approximate estimates of the distances which could
represent actual site conditions for real reactor installations. The range
of values is represented in Table A-2.
TABLE A-2
REPRESENTATIVE BWR SITE PARAMETERS
Site Boundary (meters)
Nearest Residence (meters)
limum
215
430
Maximum
1340
1560
Average
I S. E.
650 + 110
925 + 115
the site boundary doses at the smallest site might be 7 - 10 mrem/year.
These doses could be additive to the dose contribution from radioactive
materials in the facility effluents and could, thereby, result in total
doses in excess of the proposed standard of 25 mrem/year. Because the
turbine doses are highly dependent upon individual site and reactor
design parameters, the NRC staff believes that they can be more properly
addressed in individual licensing actions on a case-by-case basis, rather
than by a general standard.
These distances were used with the models in Table A-l to determine the
range of doses which might be expected to occur at real sites and distances.
The results of these calculations are shown in Table A-3. As can be
seen, the majority of the calculations yield doses which are considerably
below 1 mrem/year. However, for smaller sites the contributions to the
external dose rate could be appreciable fractions of the proposed EPA
standard. The site boundary doses assume continuous occupancy which would
not actually occur, but even with a 10% occupancy ( 880 hours per year)
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§ -
UNITED STATES
ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545
SEP 2 5 19/5
F-5
§ *
s §
o
v
NO
* pg
S §
Honorable Russell E. Train
Environmental Protection Agency
Dear Mr. Train:
We have reviewed the proposed EPA Regulation (40 CFR, Part 190) on
Environmental Radiation Protection for Nuclear Power Operations and
the supporting Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS). We find
that the proposed environmental radiation standards are not justified
on the basis of the estimates of health effects, costs, as derived in
the DEIS, and the risk benefit analysis presented in support of the
proposed standards. It is our concern that the proposed regulation
would establish environmental radiation limits for the entire uranium
fuel cycle, at levels which are a small fraction (as low as 5 percent)
of the established international, national, and Federal radiation
standards, without compelling evidence that the imposition of such
limitations on this Nation's nuclear power economy is technically and
economically justified, or cost-effective.
The health effects estimates, which are the basis for the proposed
regulations, are derived by linear extrapolation from effects at high
radiation doses and dose rates, i.e., the linear dose-effect assump-
tion. While such an assumption is of value in estimating the upper
limit of the potential for effects from low levels of exposure to
radiation, or other potentially harmful agents, it is widely recog-
nized that the assumption must be interpreted prudently and with appro-
priate qualifications since in all probability it overestimates the
actual risk. Both the International Commission on Radiological
Protection (ICRP) and the National Council on Radiation Protection and
Measurements (NCRP) warn against the use of this deliberately cautious
assumption in estimating actual effects in their respective reports on
this subject (ICRP Publication 22 and NCRP Report No. 43).
Use of the linear assumption also distorts the assessments of costs and
benefits by exaggerating the number of effects to which the costs are
ascribed and consequently the benefit derived from a reduction in dose.
The details and sources of the cost information presented in the DEIS
are not provided and, therefore, cannot be specifically evaluated,
though they do not appear to be realistic. This is particularly true
with respect to the cost of krypton removal, to be required in 1983.
Since the removal technology has not been developed, actual or realis-
tic estimates of cost are not possible at this time. The relative risks
A-230
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Honorable Russell E. Train
-2-
and costs of storing large quantities of krypton compared to the routine
release of low concentrations have not yet been evaluated. Valid cost-
benefit analysis of this aspect is not yet possible and should await
further development of the removal technology.
Careful deliberation of the justification for and implications of the
proposed changes in the approach to establishing environmental radiation
standards is warranted. In the meantime, implementation of NRC Regulation
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I, requiring installation of the best available
effluent control technology, will assure that public exposures due to
effluents from normal operation of the uranium fuel cycle will be controlled
to levels comparable to those in the proposed EPA regulation There is,
therefore, ample time for careful consideration of the justification for
and impact of any proposed changes in the environmental radiation standards.
Firm technical and economic justification in support of the proposed
fuel cycle standards is lacking. The enclosed staff comments re-emphasize
the uncertainties expressed in the estimates of health effects, in the
cost-benefit analysis, and in other significant technical areas offered
in support of the proposed regulation. The substantial economic impact
of these very stringent standards on the production of nuclear energy
in the United States demands that the justification for the proposed
action be thoroughly examined in detail to make certain it is soundly
justified. This agency will be happy to assist in any way we can in
this regard. Toward this end we will want to participate in the planned
public hearings on the proposed regulations.
James L. Liverman
Assistant Administrator
for Environment and Safety
Enclosure:
Staff Comments on Proposed
Regulation and DEIS
cc: Council on Environmental
Quality (5 copies)
DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
General
SC.c~.
(DEIS)
o£ effluent controls.
proposed ruiing
philosophy
proposing firm, enforceable
F
conclusion that the use of the
expected to provide realistic estimates of the actual ris* , y
'--'--
evaluations. "
tmplementation and enforcement of ^proposed ,andards jil^
technical and administratxve burdens *nd costs "Jich d ^ ^
in the proposed rule or .ujporting DEC «^ ^Mlbl. to accurately
evaluation of cost-effectiveness it n * public" at these
measure the potential exposure of "any member o the pu .ons
1« dose levels ^J^^il^^SSnrto determine compliance
in background. The difficulties raKUlatory controls imposed
would be complicated by the ^ Jhat^te ^ J a margln of safety
by NRC on individual facilities will nav applicable standards.
to assure -npUance with the proposed.enerally .pp ^ ^ ^.^
fini-S S*^ c2j{l2. with tL NRC regulatory controls.
A-231
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-2-
-3-
THE PROPOSED STANDARDS
1. Analysis of Cost Effecti
The proposed standards and their
Furthermore, it is becoming increasingly important
that society not expend enormously large resources
to reduce very small risks still further, at the
expense of greater risks that go unattended; such
imbalances may pass unnoticed unless a cost-benef
analysis is attempted."
efit
values has also been
"Before considering any further restriction of
radiation protection standards, it is important
to attain realistic values for risks and benefi
for weighing risks and benefits in decision-mak
and for the most effective application of the
principle of 'lowest practicable level.1 This
-r :
.
lack of attention to existing greater risks."
2. Health Effects Evaluation.
3. Det
ermination of Maximum Annual Dose.
The limitation on the maxi
um annual dose to "... any person in
The heavy emphasis
on the dose to the
ose to te
individua member of the public is also difficult to under
stand in light of the very low order (zero to 10-5) of
estimated risk to the individual receiving a few tens of
mrems per year from fuel cycle operations^ considering
.he statement by the ICRP in Publication 22, quoted above.
Adequacy of Current Standards.
reason to
revise established standards prior to completion of=
A-232
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-4-
-5-
adequate studies of cost-effectiveness. In addition, the proposed
standards, particularly the curie limits, may require substantial
facility modification as design and operating experience provide
information required for assessing the cost-effectiveness of
control technology alternatives now under development. Assuming
the technology is developed and proves successful in meeting the
proposed requirements within the next 3-5 years, it is doubtful
that a unit could be designed, installed, and brought to reliable
operating status before the required date. .Again, it is to be
noted that the Ash memorandum stated that EPA standards "would
have to reflect AEC's (now NRC's) findings as to the practicability
of emission controls," a condition that cannot be met until removal
technology is adequately demonstrated on an operating facility.
5. Application of Proposed Rulemaking.
With regard to 190.lOa, it is not clear whether or not these dose
standards are intended to be per gigawatt-year of electrical energy
produced by the fuel cycle. It is clearly stated that the curie
limits do apply per gigawatt-year of energy. If it is not applied
to the dose standards, some explanation is in order.
DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
1. Justification for the Proposed Course of Action:
It is stated categorically that the proposed standards are
estimated to reduce the potential health impact of the uranium
fuel cycle by greater than 1,000 cases of cancer, leukemia and
serious genetic defects. Presumably this value assumes maximum
exposure at both current and proposed exposure standards, and
is derived on the basis of relating source tetins, release rates,
environmental dispersion, dose equivalent determinations, dose-
response relationships and the calculation of benefit, cost and
risk. While the justification for, verification of, references
to and calculations relating to all of these variables are not
present, the final value is given. However, it is seen from
Table 10, page 82, that under the proposed regulations the
overwhelming cause of potential health effects is due to
tritium and to carbon-14 particularly. It is also seen from
this table that the proposed standards in no way apply to
either of these radioisotopes. The reason for this judgment
is given on pages 68, 81 and 93. Briefly stated, the lack of
standards for tritium and for 14C is justified on the basis
that "control technologies for these materials are not yet
commercially available" (page 91). Therefore, limits apparently
were chosen on the basis of what can readily be met by present
and proven technology. This feature is clear not only with
regard to carbon-14 and tritium, for which no standards are
set, since control technology is not adequate to meet any
particular standards, but also with regard to krypton-85
and iodine-129, where standards will become effective in
1983, at which time new control systems are expected to be-
come available. However, since tritium and carbon-14 contribute
by far the greatest part of the potential health effects, this
would seem to question whether the proposed standards are in
fact based upon some upper level of risk from which the public
must be shielded or whether the proposed standards are in fact
based upon "technologies commercially available."
2. Content and Format of the DEIS.
In several areas the DEIS does not comply with NEPA-CEQ guidelines
for content or organization outlined in 40 CFR Chapter 1, Part 6,
subpart C. It does not fully treat known responsible
opposing views, or all potential adverse effects; it omits relevant
alternative courses of action, a cost-benefit analysis, and dis-
cussion of short-term uses versus long-term productivity; and it
does not treat irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
resources.
A. Discussion of Opposing Views
Over the past several years there have been a number of
proposals to revise the present internationally accepted
radiation exposure standards by defining "as low as
practicable" exposures in quantitative terms, using the
linear dose-effect theory as a rationale. These proposals
have been highly controversial, but the PEIS does not discuss
them. The opinions and cautions of the KCRP are not acknowledged
or referred to. This has contributed to a continuing concern of
many professional radiation protection soecialists that the
EPA is seemingly indifferent to the evaluations and recommen-
dations of independent and recognized authoritative entities
in this field with whom the EPA might have differences of
opinion.
It is important to note that other countries have not seen
the need to take action similar to the proposed rulemaking.
The levels of specific control proposed apparently do not
take into account the inverse question or releases of
persistent nuclides which may take place in the future from
sources outside the U.S. (as nuclear powar grows worldwide)
and which (through long-term pathway processes) may there-
fore have a-n effect upon the eventual buildups experienced
in the U.S. and hence upon the releases to be permitted for
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-7-
shouJT Ut:"S.now- The views of the Department of State
should be solicited on the subject of unilateral U.S. action
drastically departing from accepted international standards
in view of the increased attention international organizations
are giving to the quality of the worldwide environment
B. Potential Adverse Effects
There are several ways in which the proposed action may have
an adverse environmental effect. One would be the disparage-
ment and reduction of the use of nuclear power, because of the
TM s COBX ? fy added C°ntr01 «1«*e«eit. ^d other factors
This could lead to the generation of power by alternative
ewe".'.'"11'* ^ HaVe increased detrimenta/environ^ental
Another possible adverse environmental effect could be che
placing of a disproportionate attention on environmental
radiation to the exclusion of attention to some other aspect
of safety and environmental protection. For example no
discussion is given of management of the SSRr and 129i
captured in the collection devices used to limit effluent
releases. If this collection is considered part of waste
Zn8^,^ K0' C°?sidered in <*is statement, the relation-
ship should be made clear. The environmental impact of
collecting the noble gases rather than releasing them at
the reprocessing plant (storage facility requirements
accident potential, etc.) and increased doses to fuel c>
workers (and resulting effects) should be addressed.
ftho"fhthe Pr°pOSed UmitS °n ™x™™ radiation exposures
to individuals are very probably attainable for single facility
sites, they may be difficult for multi-facility sites or nuclear
parks to meet. It is argued that because current plans do not
envisage energy parks in operation over the next decade, these
parks need not be considered. However, the proposed limits
may discourage plans for energy parks for the following decades.
!ndChM^henff§y ParkS ^ WeU °ffer reduced overa11 radiation
sH hH K-\ Y° the 8eneral PU5UC
-------
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-9-
equipment might be significantly less cost-effective than
EPA has assumed and some of the stated basic justification
for the proposed standards may thus disappear.
It is assumed that implementation and enforcement of the
proposed standards by the NRC will be readily achievable.
However, the lack of precedent for allocating to specific
fuel cycle activities, much less individual facilities,
and the inevitable legal procedures, both required and
potential, which will ensue might lead to years of regulatory
rulemaking and additional litigation. The socio-economic
impact of this possibility is not discussed in the DEIS.
3. Use of the Linear Dose-Effect Assumptions.
Statements are presented in the DEIS which, through lack of proper
qualification, can mislead the reader as to the theoretical nature
of the linear dose-effect hypothesis, which assesses the upper
limit of risk but is generally recognized as overestimating the
actual effects of radiation.
The linear theory as used in the DEIS is not in agreement with the
recommendations of the ICRP (Publication 22, page 13) in that:
"... the use of a linear relationship derived in this
way'(as in the DEIS) for assessing the social gain of
a dose reduction is less satisfactory, because the
linear relationship implies the same social gain from
a unit reduction in dose, independent of the level of
dose and dose rate.... The linear extrapolation from
high doses thus may overestimate the social gains of
dose reductions at these low levels of dose and dose
rate and may lead to an expenditure of effort not
balanced by corresponding social gains."
The NCRP considers the use of "upper limits" in establishing
policies to be unreasonable and cautions the use of person-rem
versus risk estimations in Report No. 43:
"The NCRP wishes to caution governmental policymaking
agencies of the unreasonableness of interpreting or
assuming 'upper limit1 estimates of carcinogenic risks
at low radiation levels, derived by linear extrapolation
from data obtained at high doses and dose rates, as
actual risks, and of basing unduly restrictive policies
on such an interpretation or assumption."
The philosophy and justification for applying the linear theory
to predict harmful effects is not limited to ionizing radiation,
as stated in NCRP Report No. 39, underscoring as in the original:
"... it is a concise summary of the intention /of the as low
as practicable provisionT to encourage protection practices
that are better than any prescribed minimal level, and this
is the basic criterion for all cases in which a non-threshold
dose-effect either exists or has to be assumed. A similar
admonition should be given for many potentially harmful
agents and radiation is in no way unique in this respect."
The DEIS does not include this aspect of the linear theory of
biological effects, nor does it discuss whether the linear theory
should be applied to any materials which might be emitted to the
environment by energy generation systems which are alternatives
to nuclear energy. The possibility is thus suggested that the
proposed rulemaking would apply the linear theory to the nuclear
industry in a discriminatory manner. Is there a consistent national
policy on, say, fossil fuel utilization, or the use of radiation and
radioisotopes in medical practice, or are we proceeding in an ad hoc
fashion by individual technology?
4. The Treatment of Health Effects.
The proposed standards are not given proper perspective in the DEIS
with respect to ICRP, NCRP, and FRC guidance particularly with regard
to their relative health effects. A seriousness of exposure at these
low levels is implied but is inconsistent with the ICRP in
Publication 22:
"At low levels of individual dose; e.g., those small by
comparison with variations in local natural background,
the risk to the individual is so small that his health
and welfare will not be significantly changed by the
presence or absence of the radiation dose."
and the NCRP, in Report No. 43:
"At such low radiation levels as are involved in the
radiation protection standards, identification and
quantification of both risks and benefits are so
highly uncertain and imprecise at this time that the
practice of balancing risks and benefits numerically
is not useful to pursue without far more thorough
and penetrating exploration."
These warnings to the reader are not reflected in the "health effects"
discussions. More importantly, it does not acknowledge that because
of the Unproven nature of the linear theory any "health effects"
estimation for these low dose rates must always involve a range. Since
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...=...,„«, .htl, „..£„! £or mklng „„„.«, o£ po«™«.i"=alth
l.p.ct ar« not coa,U.r«d to be so ..11-d.Ho.d .. to ,llow
reoSrlf "/O1>"lf tl°°s « »« .xpr....d dtr.ctly tn M™T
requiring their explicit use."
SLorini ^8nifiCance is the cau"°n included in the DEIS against
ignoring the environmental radiation exposures which are so small
becausee"thiS1Stln8UiS^ble fr°m nat"ral backS-un * radiation
radiation L " ? I"6" "• negleCtS "' the P°int tha' the
duf fn \ r T are avoidable ".an-made doses, not doses
the same bif ^^"ivity. " Since a rem, by definition, has
of thi^H? M 81 6ffeCt n° ma"er what lts source> ^e point
of this distinction is not clear. More important, however is
the fact that the DEIS fails to make clear to the reader that
natural background radiation is not a uniform quantity, but
TPta flmC a? P Ce' By data which EPA itself has published
a change of residence within the United States can involve an
annual incremental change in radiation exposure greater
than 125 mrem.
The importance and the significance of small exposures with regard
wh^hCk8rT been WeU Stated by the ICRP in Publication 22
Se D^dofr ^^ . «UOted earli«- The methodology used in
^ vrtl doesjno' rec°gn«e the philosophical bases for the ICRP
and NCRP standards. The DEJ.S does set a tone for objective and
balanced assessment of the industry's demonstrated ability and
record in environmental protection. This tone should be developed
as the rationale for the rulemaking. Instead, it is stated that
unless standards are adopted, "unnecessary exposure t! ! £ pub Uc
"; ??" ": lrreversible contamination of the environment could
result .and that ... "the principal impact of radioactive effluents
on the biosphere is the induction of deleterious effects in man »
b^.rV" ST"C 6ffeCtS include leukemias, thyroid, lung, '
oreast, bone and a variety of other cancers ...", Lid "The Jnetir
effecc. encompass virtually every aspect of man'^ physical Sd
"fee" "Wo n8;" iWith n° PersPecti- provided/the "health
ettect of an equivalent power economy based on some other- fuel
source cannot be determined.
5. Economic Costs of Implementation.
The basic implementation cost of the proposed standards appears
1 Percent of ^V° ?'10 mlUS/kWh (FigU" 3> °r much le" ^n
;«! i., tal POW6r C°StS indicated. Overall economic
cost would not therefore appear to be a significant factor (even
though the total health benefits are also relatively small) me
estimate of $100,000 cost per "effect" reduced (p. 85, line 13
tor example) appears compatible with some other costs society now
PT™ rif reduction- However, it should be noted that page^
control"I6 1Srm v° indiCate * ^^ C° de&1 Wlth an Droved
control level breakpoint at or below one-half million dollars per
slr^'n §e 7> l^eS U'13' als° places the UPP« li»it of
million iynCCCP,e Prevention-«"s at one-quarter to one-half
million dollars, and this may be high. Thus the basis for the
dollar value estimates should be included. In addition the
concept of basing standards on "best" performance that can be
extracted from a control technology appears contradictory to
the principle underlying EPA's basic approach in this document
(which is to develop the standards in a cost-effective manner
and to specify control levels compatible with expenditures that
society considers appropriate to reducing other types of risk).
6. Potential Health Effects and Table 10.
erfe'tsls'uc^'if1?,; ^^ Si*nificant contributor to health
eirects is ifC. If the data are correct and the presentation is
representative of reality, then a moderate reduction in MC releases
by the development of improved control systems would lead to reduction
of population exposures and potential health effects far more sub-
stantial than those suggested in the proposed rulemaking.
With regard to the table, it can be seen that if (1) one sums the
three columns, (2) recognizes (page 83) that EPA used 170 instead
of 500 mrem/yr as the allowable dose to an individual at the sit-
thTt AFP ?SrrItiplie8 the SUm °f C°1U!nn l by 3 C° 140'000 ""eats,
ror 1M nnm >u??pe|? ? rem°VeS °ver 90 percent of the "^fects"
(or 129,000) while EPA's further restrictions remove only 1,000 of
them.
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Varying the time period chosen for "effect" calculations (100 years)
has a large effect on the number of effects, especially from C-14.
Also, no credit was given for forthcoming NRC guides for reduced
doses at FRP's and other fuel cycle facilities. If this was done the
1,000 effects saved would be further reduced in number.
7. Apportionment of Permitted Dose
Apportionment of radiation guides to various industries, actions,
or processes is dismissed rather briefly by the EPA. A limit of
25 mrem per year is being set "on individual doses to members of the
public" with respect to short-lived nuclides and gamma radiation
from on-site sources. It is stated that this limit can be easily
met according to information available on effluent control systems,
from environmental impact statements, from operating experience,
and from present projections for growth and siting of nuclear
facilities. The issue of population definition and the mechanics
of dose apportionment is not addressed. Doses due to transportation
were not included.
It is concluded that the alternative of using apportionment, "could
not provide adequate environmental protection." As standards are
reduced and are applied to many parts of the nuclear industry, it
becomes difficult to set these standards for one part of the industry
without considering its effect on another part of the industry.
Apportionment therefore may be a very crucial part of the whole problem,
and should be addressed. If exposures from various industries are
to be reduced, the effects from these other uses compared to
those from nuclear power use should be compared. The concept of
risk-benefit calculations and the concept of as low as practicable
should apply to each of the industries and to their inter-relationships.
8. Availability of Backup Information
Supporting information or documentation in the DEIS is severely
limited. There is no way to trace calculations, step-by-step, from
source term to health effect. One is referred to reference 13
(EPA-520/9-73-003), but these documents do not provide sufficient
information in general and virtually no information on transuranics.
Health effects are derived from the BEIR report, but just how is
not explained.
The general dositnetry used in Parts I, II, and III of EPA-520/9-73-003
has been described only briefly and, in particular, the weaknesses
and strengths have not been discussed nor has its accuracy been
indicated. Some of the dosimetry depends on the adequacy of numbers
obtained from ICRP and NCRP documents, a number of which are now
under complete review especially with respect to concentration data.
-13-
An explanation for the use of a dose conversion factor in units
of mrem/yr per PCi/m3 should be included since it "not clear if
this is for a continuous intake situation in which the dose is
building up with time, or whether the factor is an average for
1 year, 100 years, or some other time unit.
9. An Expanding Data Base
The difficulty of establishing "as low as practicable" radiation
standards with an incomplete and changing data base is recognized.
The difficulties are perhaps demonstrated by the internal
inconsistencies (e.g., the treatment of 85Kr versus "C the
apparent use of a dose model but a disclaimer of the value of
such models) and the frequent resort to conjecture and unsupported
citation (e.g., page 14-paragraph 2, page 15-paragraph 2, page 20-
oaraeraph 2 page 56-paragraph 3, page 89-paragraph 1, and page
paragraph 2)! These difficulties are compounded by introducing
unexplained factors into the procedure for establishing population
dose criteria. For example, the basis for using 100 years, as
the time period for assessing impact is not evident yet the dose
imoact of any release (and presumably any health effect) is highly
dependent on"the time period selected. Where knowledge is -complete
and uncertainties are prevalent, perhaps an infinite time period
should be selected. It would appear appropriate "attempt such an
estimate in view of the long-lived radionuclldes. In addition, the
reason for the assignment of the same dose criterion tor the
whole body and for all organs of the body other than thyroid is not
clear. Since the ration of doses to different parts or the body
can be quite dependent on the physical form of release and the
subsequent pathways and modes of exposure, release criteria may .ave
no consistent relationship to relative organ doses, and criteria based
on releases rather than relative radiosensitivity may not be appropriate.
For example, the proposed regulations imply a limit of 25 mrem/yr
to the pulmonary ?ymph nodes, which are likely to receive relatively
high radiation doses compared with other tissues The impact of
rhis restriction on the lymph nodes is not considered, ana, while
Part I (Fuel Supply) of reference 13 states that the "radiation dose
to the ymph nodes ot the tracheobronchial region will not be used as
a criterion for setting environmental standards...," this qualification
is not stated in the Draft Statement.
10. Detailed Comments
1 Page 3 - Contamination from weapons testing fallout and that
' IW^atural and other artificial sources should be presented
for comparison with present and projected contributions from
the nuclear power industry.
2 Page 5 - The phrase "fuel cladding is destroyed" is not
Spelentative of the processes involved. The basis for this
phraseology should be stated.
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4.
Pa£|_| - Waste management and decommissioning are specifically
excluded from "uranium fuel cycle." This fact should be
made clear in the definition in 40 CFR 190.02b.
elsewhere - The reassignment of AEC functions to
botlt ERDA and NRC should be made clear.
• Page 10 - The first sentence implies that deleterious effects
on man of low-level radiation are proven. They are only postulated.
' ifbTI auesti^M611" " "non-sPecific Hfe shortening" appears
Int-n i-ho • lonaDle.one- Slnce the concept is not incorporated
«ndJ I analysis used to support the proposed standards,
and since its significance at the low dose levels under review
is questionable the term should be either deleted or defined
has been ?!fr ^ "^ ^ C° believe that son>ething threatening
nas been left unregulated.
!agf 13 ' The statement that "it has become increasingly clear
that the current...Guide for...exposure...is unnecessarily
high rests upon unsubstantiated concepts and concerns TMs
is not the sense of the original remark found in the BEIR
report as can be seen in the quote later in the same paragraph.
The categorical conclusion that present radiation standards
are unnecessarily, high," with the unstated, but implied
conclusion that the standards are set at a level dangerous to
the public health and welfare, is scientifically unsound
administrative unwise, and could become economically costly
Technological feasibility and thus the technological capability
of meeting scientifically sound standards criteria, and the " "
opposite situation where the standards themselves are unsound
and at threatening levels should be differentiated. In both
instances the standards are "unnecessarily high" but only in
the second case are they a threat to the public health.
PageJ^ - The first full paragraph is a weak basis for justifying
major expenditures to limit releases of long-lived nuclides
...may give rise to substantial long-term impacts..." needs
quantification.
Pages 14 and 15 - The ICRP, NCRP, and FRC have recommended
"m"ln?/adiati°n d°SeS t0 i^ividuals rather than limiting
the buildup of quantities of radionuclides. The EPA would
reverse this recommendation because the approach is not
specifically environmental." However, they state elsewhere
(page 10) that effects on man can be selected as the controllina
parameter - that no other species have a "sensitivity sufficiently
high to warrant a greater level of protection than that adequate
for man. Therefore, dose to man (or health effects) would
seem to be appropriate to assess environmental effects.
-15-
10. Pages 15 and 21 - Exposure is used when dose is intended
Throughout the report "exposure" is frequently used when'"dose"
is intended. (The words whole body should always be hyphenated
when used as an adjective, such as "whole-body dose.")
11. Pase 31 - Figure 2 does not include any reference to the number
of fuel reprocessing plants that will be in operation or needed.
12. Page 32 - The next to last sentence says that EPA will assess
dose commitment and health effects first, then decide on limits
for measurable quantities"...to provide the level of protection
indicated. The assessment in later sections of the report
does not meet this criterion. No comparison of health effect-/
benefit versus similar values for alternative power sources are
given According to Table 10 (page 82), "c may be the primary
nuclide of concern. The report does not adequately deal with
the wide range of effects shown in this table.
13. Pages 32-33 - Considering only individual dose and excluding
population dose for short-lived nuclide emission would appear
to eliminate consideration of nearby population densities
when siting power reactors.
Pafe 34 ' Table 2 is an uncomplete presentation of principal
critical organs per radionuclide. For example, the C-14 dose
to bone is 4 to 5 times the total body dose per unit intake
bone, liver, and lymph nodes can be considered principal
critical organs for plutonium as well as the lung, and skin of
the whole body for noble gases as well as whole body.
Pa8e.3? ' The criteria for selection of rad-waste systems used
in figure and for the order of addition of them to plants should
be outlined in some detail.
Pa§e 3.P " If reasonably conservative assumptions as to humiditv
and atmospheric dispersion are made, the maximum possible annual
dose from H 3 released to air is 1 mrem not 3 (i.e., 8xlO'3 kg HoO/
air, and SxlO'S sec/m3). Thyroid doses should include contribution
from H-3, C-14, external irradiation, etc. Transportation doses
could be included in this table.
17. Pages 42-43 - Too much confidence in unproved techniques
(especially for «3Kr) is applied in an effort to justify the
necessary expenditures. On what basis is the "volox" process
considered a means of tritium control?
18. Pages 46-47 - It can be questioned whether one can leave "aside
moral implication of assigning a monetary value..."; similarly
14.
15.
16.
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-17-
it can be questioned whether one "can draw upon (experience)
for what society has been willing to spend to prevent future
losses..." since it would be interesting to determine whether
or not society has ever made such a conscious judgment.
19. Page 49 - Alaska and Hawaii are significant geographical situations
and at least potential power-consuming regions that have not
been considered in environmental statements for nuclear power
facilities. This should be mentioned as such facilities would
provide significantly different source term locations for both
local and world-wide effects compared to locations in the contiguous
48 states.
20. Pages 50 and 51. Table 4 - Why are HTGR's listed in PWR table?
21. Page 54 - Delete midwest fuel reprocessing, also doses quoted
for Barnwell were challenged at hearings and conclusions about
how low they are (page 57) may not be valid'.
22. Page 68 - No standard is proposed for H-3 releases but doses could
be relatively significant compared to other nuclides if releases
from FRP's are not reduced.
23. Page 69 - Non-consideration of "unusual" conditions may be
ignoring the sourc'e of the majority of releases, both shorf
and long-lived, and consequently underestimate both short-
term dose and the long-term buildup of nuclides.
24. Pa^es 70 and 71 - It is simply not true that one of the objectives
of the year 2000 study was "to assist the EPA...." This was
purely an AEC study for AEC purposes. Also, site boundary doses
could be significantly higher than the "Centroid" averages
calculated in the year 2000 study.
25. page 78 - DF of 10 for I* is less than current practice. The
Barnwell hearings established a DF of 20 for 1-129.
26 Pages 81-85 and Table 10 - The contribution of each of the
"controllable long-lived materials" (B5Kr, L^l, TRU) to the
1040 health effects should be given, so a proper evaluation
of the necessary controls for each can be made. As already
noted, they all'appear relatively small compared to the 12,000
health effects quoted from 1-4C. Further, the technical bases
for these estimates should be presented.
EPA does not acknowledge in this table that these values are
maximum values as obtained from the BEIR report and that, in all
fairness, a "less-than or equal" sign should be placed before each
of these numbers. Furthermore, it is quite clear that many of
the qualifications in both the BEIR and UNSCEAR reports indicate
that many of these health effects could in fact be zero alt£ou8h
they have no evidence for it at the moment.(e.g., BtiK p. oo,.
27 Paee 83 - It is not clear that all these diseases are specifically
' genetic, they may have only genetically related components.
28 Page 85 - Although an average value is quoted for the cost of
avoiding health effects (H. E.) of $100,000/H. E., risk reduction
items are shown in Figure 3, page 37 (discussion on page 44)
that have a slope of approximately $500,000/H. E. The methodology
in arriving at $100,000/H. E. should be presented.
29 Page 88 - The third sentence in the full paragraph apparently should
' read "fabrication facility" rather than "reprocessing facility
since costs for reprocessing facilities were estimated in the
first sentence.
30. Page 90 - Appendix I to 10 CFR 50 was issued and published in the
Federal Register in May 1975.
31- Page 91 - ORNL (HNL) is not the only laboratory doing research on
removal of I.
32. Page 93 - There is no assurance the H-3 releases to water would
Ie2d to lower individual dose, but same world-wide doses. The
source of this statement should be referenced, or calculation
provided.
33 Page 94 - Maximum Permissible Concentrations (MFC's) have not
' been basic standards since the issuance of FRC Guide No. 1;
the concept of MFC has long been discarded in favor of
"Concentration Guides."
34 Page 95 - Occupational dose is not addressed in the first^two
' paragraphs as a consequence of "effluent control systems.
35 page 104 - Does the estimate of .3 person-rems include the
contribution of world-wide krypton and tritium?
36 Page 127 - The rationale for choosing the 75 mrem/year to the
' thyroid does not indicate any technical basis for analysis.
This rationale should be discussed in the DEIS.
37 Paee 131 - The $75 per person-rem derived from the $100,000/Per
' health effect is not discussed in the DEIS. Rationale for
its derivation should be presented.
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F-6
FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20461
OCT 2 4 1975
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR
costs provided in the statement, which reflect the
FEA 75-242
Dr. W. D. Rowe
Deputy Assistant Administrator
for Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
Dear Dr. Rowe:
necessary, should be assessed in the statement.
tS £L°o1
implement the proposed standards. However, in consideration
S Statement of 0inion of the NRC oHppendJx 1
'
supporting documentation to show that reliable safe and
for th^e'ra'dionCclides
to the potential
relate to the proposed ruleraaking.
and disposai
We recommend that EPA expand the statement to include the
X X
Sincerely,
Roger W. Sant
Assistant Administrator
Energy Conservation and Environment
to the range of estimated iodine control capital
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