Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations

STATE: Environment Protection Agency (EPA)

ACTION: Final Policy Statement.

I. Explanation of Policy

The Environmental Protection Agency today issues its final policy to enhance protection of human health and the environment by encouraging regulated entities to voluntarily discover, disclose, correct and prevent violations of federal environmental law. Effective 30 days from today, where violations are found through voluntary environmental audits or efforts that reflect a regulated entity's due diligence, and are promptly disclosed and expeditiously corrected, EPA will not seek gravity-based (i.e., non-economic benefit) penalties and will generally not recommend criminal prosecution against the regulated entity. EPA will reduce gravity-based penalties by 75% for violations that are voluntarily discovered, and are promptly disclosed and corrected, even if not found through a formal audit or due diligence. Finally, the policy restates EPA's long-held policy and practice to refrain from routine requests for environmental audit reports. The policy includes important safeguards to deter irresponsible behavior and protect the public and environment. For example, in addition to prompt disclosure and expeditious correction, the policy requires companies to act to prevent recurrence of the violation and to remedy any environmental harm which may have occurred. Repeated violations or those which result in actual harm or may present imminent and substantial endangerment are not eligible for relief under this policy, and companies will not be allowed to gain an economic advantage over their competitors by delaying their investment in compliance. Corporations remain criminally liable for violations that result from conscious disregard of their obligations under the law, and individuals are liable for criminal misconduct.

The issuance of this policy concludes EPA's eighteen-month public evaluation of the optimum way to encourage voluntary self-policing while preserving fair and effective enforcement. The incentives, conditions and exceptions announced today reflect thoughtful suggestions from the Department of Justice, state attorneys general and local prosecutors, state environmental agencies, the regulated community, and public interest organizations. EPA believes that it has found a balanced and responsible approach, and will conduct a study within three years to determine the effectiveness of this policy.

B. Public Process

One of the Environmental Protection Agency's most important responsibilities is ensuring compliance with federal laws that protect public health and safeguard the environment. Effective deterrence requires inspecting, bringing penalty actions and securing compliance and remediation of harm. But EPA realizes that achieving compliance also requires the cooperation of thousands of businesses and other regulated entities subject to these requirements. Accordingly, in May of 1994, the Administrator asked the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (OECA) to determine whether additional incentives were needed to encourage voluntary disclosure and correction of violations uncovered during environmental audits.

EPA began its evaluation with a two-day public meeting in July of 1994, in Washington, D.C., followed
by a two-day meeting in San Francisco on January 19, 1995 with stakeholders from industry, trade groups, state environmental commissioners and attorneys general, district attorneys, public interest organizations and professional environmental auditors. The Agency also established and maintained a public docket of testimony presented at these meetings and all comment and correspondence submitted to EPA by outside parties on this issue. In addition to considering opinion and information from stakeholders, the Agency examined other federal and state policies related to self-policing, self-disclosure and correction. The Agency also considered relevant surveys on auditing practices in the private sector. EPA completed the first stage of this effort with the announcement of an interim policy on April 3 of this year, which defined conditions under which EPA would reduce civil penalties and not recommend criminal prosecution for companies that audited, disclosed, and corrected violations.

Interested parties were asked to submit comment on the interim policy by June 30 of this year (60 FR 16875), and EPA received over 300 responses from a wide variety of private and public organizations. (Comments on the interim audit policy are contained in the Auditing Policy Docket, hereinafter, "Docket"). Further, the American Bar Association SONREEL Subcommittee hosted five days of dialogue with representatives from the regulated industry, states and public interest organizations in June and September of this year, which identified options for strengthening the interim policy. The changes to the interim policy announced today reflect insight gained through comments submitted to EPA, the ABA dialogue, and the Agency's practical experience implementing the interim policy.

C. Purpose

This policy is designed to encourage greater compliance with laws and regulations that protect human health and the environment. It promotes a higher standard of self-policing by waiving gravity-based penalties for violations that are promptly disclosed and corrected, and which were discovered through voluntary audits or compliance management systems that demonstrate due diligence. To further promote compliance, the policy reduces gravity-based penalties by 75% for any violation voluntarily discovered and promptly disclosed and corrected, even if not found through an audit or compliance management system. EPA's enforcement program provides a strong incentive for responsible behavior by imposing stiff sanctions for noncompliance. Enforcement has contributed to the dramatic expansion of environmental auditing measured in numerous recent surveys. For example, more than 90% of corporate respondents to the 1995 Price-Waterhouse survey who conduct audits said that one of the reasons they did so was to find and correct violations before they were found by government inspectors. (A copy of the Price-Waterhouse survey is contained in the Docket as document VIII-A-76.)

At the same time, because government resources are limited, maximum compliance cannot be achieved without active efforts by the regulated community to police themselves. More than half of the respondents to the same 1995 Price-Waterhouse survey said that they would expand environmental auditing in exchange for reduced penalties for violations discovered and corrected. While many companies already audit or have compliance management programs, EPA believes that the incentives offered in this policy will improve the frequency and quality of these self-monitoring efforts.

D. Incentives for Self-Policing

Section C of EPA's policy identifies the major incentives that EPA will provide to encourage self-policing, self-disclosure, and prompt self-correction. These include not seeking gravity-based civil penalties or reducing them by 75%, declining to recommend criminal prosecution for regulated entities that self-police, and refraining from routine requests for audits. (As noted in Section C of the policy, EPA has refrained from making routine requests for audit reports since issuance of its 1986 policy on environmental auditing.)

1. Eliminating Gravity-Based Penalties

Under Section C(1) of the policy, EPA will not seek gravity-based penalties for violations found through auditing that are promptly disclosed and corrected. Gravity-based penalties will also be waived for violations found through any documented procedure for self-policing, where the company can show that it has a compliance management program that meets the criteria for due diligence in Section B of the policy.

Gravity-based penalties (defined in Section B of the policy) generally reflect the seriousness of the violator's behavior. EPA has elected to waive such penalties for violations discovered through due diligence or environmental audits, recognizing that these voluntary efforts play a critical role in protecting human health and the environment by identifying, correcting and ultimately preventing violations. All of the conditions set forth in Section D, which include prompt disclosure and expeditious correction, must be satisfied for gravity-based penalties to be waived.

As in the interim policy, EPA reserves the right to collect any economic benefit that may have been realized as a result of noncompliance, even where companies meet all other conditions of the policy. Economic benefit may be waived, however, where the Agency determines that it is insignificant.

After considering public comment, EPA has decided to retain the discretion to recover economic benefit for two reasons. First, it provides an incentive to comply on time. Taxpayers expect to pay interest or a penalty fee if their tax payments are late; the same principle should apply to corporations that have delayed their investment in compliance. Second, it is fair because it protects responsible companies from being undercut by their noncomplying competitors, thereby preserving a level playing field. The concept of recovering economic benefit was supported in public comments by many stakeholders, including industry representatives (see, e.g., Docket, II-F-39, II-F-28, and II-F-18).
2. 75% Reduction of Gravity

The policy appropriately limits the complete waiver of gravity-based civil penalties to companies that meet the higher standard of environmental auditing or systematic compliance management. However, to provide additional encouragement for the kind of self-policing that benefits the public, gravity-based penalties will be reduced by 75% for a violation that is voluntarily discovered, promptly discovered and expeditiously corrected, even if it was not found through an environmental audit and the company cannot document due diligence. EPA expects that this will encourage companies to come forward and work with the Agency to resolve environmental problems and begin to develop an effective compliance management program.

Gravity-based penalties will be reduced 75% only where the company meets all conditions in Section D(2) through D(9). EPA has eliminated language from the interim policy indicating that penalties may be reduced “up to” 75% where “most” conditions are met, because the Agency believes that all of the conditions in D(2) through D(9) are reasonable and essential to achieve compliance. This change also responds to request for greater clarity and predictability.

3. No Recommendations for Criminal Prosecution

EPA has never recommended criminal prosecution of a regulated entity based on voluntary disclosure of violations discovered through audits and disclosed to the government before an investigation was already under way. Thus, EPA will not recommend criminal prosecution for a regulated entity that uncovers violations through environmental audits or due diligence, promptly disclosures and expeditiously correct those violations, and meets all other conditions of Section D of the policy.

This policy is limited to good actors, and therefore has important limitations. It will not apply, for example, where corporate officials are consciously involved in or willfully blind to violations, or conceal or condone noncompliance. Since the regulated entity must satisfy all of the conditions of Section D of the policy, violations that caused serious harm or which may pose imminent and substantial endangerment to human health or the environment are not covered by this policy. Finally, EPA reserves the right to recommend prosecution for the criminal conduct of any culpable individual.

Even where all of the conditions of this policy are not met, however, it is important to remember that EPA may decline to recommend prosecution of a company or individual for many other reasons under other Agency enforcement policies. For example, the prosecution where there is no significant harm or culpability and the individual or corporate defendant has cooperated fully.

Where a company has met the conditions for avoiding a recommendation for criminal prosecution under this policy, it will not face any civil liability for gravity-based penalties. That is because the same conditions for discovery, disclosure, and correction apply in both cases. This represents a clarification of the interim policy, not a substantive change, objective, and periodic as defined in the 1986 audit policy, or (b) a documented, systematic procedure or practice which reflects regulated entity’s due diligence in preventing, detecting, and correcting violations. The interim policy provided full credit for any violation found through “voluntary self-evaluation,” even if the evaluation did not constitute an audit. In order to receive full credit under the final policy, any self-evaluation that is not an audit must be part of a “due diligence” program. Both “environmental audit” and “due diligence” are defined in Section B of the policy.

Where the violation is discovered through a “systematic procedure or practice” which is not an audit, the regulated entity will be asked to document how its program reflects the criteria for due diligence as defined in Section B of the policy. These criteria, which are adapted from existing codes of practice required by statute, regulation, permit, judicial or administrative order, or consent agreement. Section D(4) requires that disclosure of the violation be prompt and in writing. To avoid confusion and respond to state requests for greater clarity, disclosure under this policy should be made to EPA. The Agency will work closely with states in implementing the policy.

The requirement that discovery of the violations be voluntary is consistent with proposed federal and state bills which would reward those discoveries that the regulated entity can legitimately attribute to its own voluntary efforts.

The policy gives
three specific examples of discovery that would not be voluntary, and therefore would not be eligible for penalty mitigation: emissions violations detected through a required continuous emissions monitor, violations of NPDES discharge limits found through prescribed monitoring, and violations discovered through a

4. No Routine Requests for Audits

EPA is reaffirming its policy, in effect since 1986, to refrain from routine requests for audits. Eighteen months of public testimony and debate have produced no evidence that the Agency has deviated, or should deviate, from this policy.

If the Agency has independent evidence of a violation, it may seek information needed to establish the extent and nature of the problem and the degree of culpability. In general, however, an audit which results in prompt correction clearly will reduce liability, not expand it. Furthermore, a review of the criminal docket did not reveal a single criminal prosecution for violations discovered as a result of an audit self-disclosed to the government.

E. Conditions

Section D describes the nine conditions that a regulated entity must meet in order for the Agency not to seek (or to reduce) gravity-based penalties under the policy. As explained in the summary above, regulated entities that meet all nine conditions will not face gravity-based civil penalties, and will generally not have to fear criminal prosecution. Where the regulated meets all of the conditions except the first (D(1)), EPA will reduce gravity-based penalties by 75%.

1. Discovery of the Violation Through an Environmental Audit or Due Diligence

Under Section D(1), the violation must have been discovered through either (a) an environmental audit that is systematic, such as the 1991 Criminal Sentencing Guidelines, were fully discussed during the ABA dialogue. The criteria are flexible enough to accommodate different types and sizes of businesses. The Agency recognizes that a variety of compliance management programs may develop under the due diligence criteria, and will use its review under this policy to determine whether basic criteria have been met. Compliance management programs which train and motivate production staff to prevent, detect and correct violations on a daily basis are a valuable complement to periodic auditing. The policy is responsive to recommendations received during public comment and from the ABA dialogue to give compliance management efforts which meet the criteria for due diligence the same penalty reduction offered for environmental audits. (See e.g., II-F-39, II-E-18, and II-G-18 in the Docket.) EPA may require as a condition of penalty mitigation that a description of the regulated entity’s due diligence efforts be made publicly available. The Agency added this provision in response to suggestions from environmental groups, and believes that the availability of such information will allow the public to judge the adequacy of compliance management systems, lead to enhanced compliance, and foster greater public trust in the integrity of compliance management systems.

2. Voluntary Discovery and Prompt Disclosure

Under Section D(2) of the final policy, the violation must have been identified voluntarily, and not through a monitoring, sampling, or auditing procedure that is compliance audit required to be performed by the terms of a consent order or settlement agreement.

The final policy generally applies to any violation that is voluntarily discovered, regardless of whether the violation is required to be reported. This violation is required to be reported. This definition responds to comments pointing out that reporting requirements are extensive, and that excluding them from the policy’s scope would severely limit the incentive for self-policing (see, e.g. II-C-48 in the Docket).

The Agency wishes to emphasize that the integrity of federal environmental law depends upon timely and accurate reporting. The public relies on timely and accurate reports from the regulated community, not only to measure compliance but to evaluate health or
environmental risk and gauge progress in reducing pollutant loadings. EPA expects the policy to encourage the kind of vigorous self-policing that will serve these objectives, and not to provide an excuse for delayed reporting. Where violations of reporting requirements are voluntarily discovered, they must be promptly reported (as discussed below). Where a failure to report results in imminent and substantial endangerment or serious harm, that violation is not covered under this policy (see condition D(8)). The policy also requires the regulated entity to prevent recurrence of the violation, to ensure that noncompliance with reporting requirements is not repeated. EPA will closely scrutinize the effect of the policy in furthering the public interest in timely and accurate reports from the regulated community. Under Section D(4), disclosure of the violation should be made within 10 days of its discovery, and in writing to EPA. Where a statute or regulation requires reporting be made in less than 10 days, disclosure should be made within the time limit established by the law. Where reporting within 10 days is not practical because the violation is complex and compliance cannot be determined within that period, the Agency may accept later disclosures if the circumstances do not present a serious threat and the regulated entity meets its burden of showing that the additional time was needed to determine compliance status. This condition recognizes that it is critical for EPA to get timely reporting of violations in order that it might have clear notice of the violations and the opportunity to respond if necessary, as well as an accurate picture of a given facility’s compliance record. Prompt disclosure is also evidence of the regulated entity’s good faith in wanting to achieve or return to compliance as soon as possible.

In the final policy, the Agency has added the works, “or may have occurred”, to the sentence, “The regulated entity fully discloses that a specific violation has occurred or may have occurred ***.” This change, which was made in response to comments received, clarifies that where an entity has some doubt about the existence of a violation, the recommended course is for it to disclose and allow the regulatory authorities to make a definitive determination.

In general, the Freedom of Information Act will govern the Agency’s release of disclosures made pursuant to this policy. EPA will, independently of FOIA, make publicly available any compliance agreements reached under the policy (see Section H of the policy), as well as descriptions of due diligence programs submitted under Section D.1 of the Policy. Any material claimed to be Confidential Business Information will be treated in accordance with EPA regulations at 40 C.F.R. Part 2.

3. Discover and Disclosure Independent of Government or Third Party Plaintiff

Under Section D(3), in order to be “voluntary, the violation must be identified and disclosed by the regulated entity prior to: the commencement of a federal state or local agency inspection, investigation or information request; notice of a citizen suit; legal complaint by a third party; the reporting of the violation to EPA by a “whistleblower” employee; and imminent discovery of the violation by a regulatory agency.

This condition means that regulated entities must have taken the initiative to find violations and promptly report them, rather than reacting to knowledge of a pending enforcement action or third-party complaint. This concept was reflected in the interim policy and in federal and stated penalty immunity laws and did not prove controversial in the public comment process.

4. Correction and Remediation

Section D(5) ensures that, in order to receive the penalty mitigation benefits available under the policy, the regulated entity not only voluntarily discovers and promptly discloses a violation, but expeditiously corrects it, remedies any harm caused by that violation (including responding to any spill and carrying out any removal or remedial action required by law), and expeditiously certifies in writing to appropriate state, local and EPA authorities that violations have been corrected. It also enables EPA to ensure that the regulated entity will be publicly accountable for its commitments through.
binding written agreements, orders or consent decrees where necessary. The final policy requires the violation to be corrected within 60 days, or that the regulated entity provide written notice where violation may take longer to correct. EPA recognizes that some violations can and should be corrected immediately, while others (e.g. where capital expenditures are involved), may take longer than 60 days to correct. In all cases, the regulated entity will be expected to do its utmost to achieve or return to compliance as expeditiously as possible.

Where correction of the violation depends upon issuance of a permit which has been applied for but not issued by federal or state authorities, the Agency will, where appropriate, make reasonable efforts to secure timely review of the permit.

5. Prevent Recurrence

Under Section D(6), the regulated entity must agree to take steps to prevent a recurrence of the violation, including but not limited to improvements to its environmental auditing or due diligence efforts. The final policy makes clear that the preventive steps may include improvements to a regulated entity’s environmental auditing or due diligence efforts to prevent recurrence of the violation.

In the interim policy, the Agency required that the entity implement appropriate measures to prevent a recurrence of the violation, a requirement that operates prospectively.

However, a separate condition in the interim policy also required that the violation not indicate “a failure to take appropriate steps to avoid repeat or recurring violations”--a requirement that operates retrospectively. In the interest of both clarity and fairness, the Agency has decided for purposes of this condition to keep the focus prospective and thus to require only that steps be taken to prevent recurrence of the violation after it has been disclosed.

6. No Repeat Violations

In response to requests from commenters (see, e.g., II-F-39 and II-G-18 in the Docket), EPA has established “bright lines” to determine when previous violations will bar a regulated entity from obtaining relief under this policy. These will help protect the public and responsible companies by ensuring that penalties are not waived for repeat offenders. Under condition D(7), the same or closely-related violation must not have occurred previously within the past three years at the same facility, or be part of a pattern of violations on the regulated entity's part over the past five years. This provides companies with a continuing incentive to prevent violations, without being unfair to regulated entities responsible for managing hundreds of facilities. It would be unreasonable to provide unlimited amnesty for repeated violations of the same requirement.

The term “violation” includes any violation subject to a federal or state civil judicial or administrative order, consent agreement, conviction or plea agreement. Recognizing that minor violations are sometimes settled without a formal action in court, the term also covers any act or omission for which the regulated entity has received a penalty reduction in the past. Together, these conditions identify situations in which the regulated community has had clear notice of its noncompliance and an opportunity to correct.

7. Other Violations Excluded

Section D(8) makes clear that penalty reductions are not available under this policy for violations that resulted in serious actual harm or which may have presented an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health or the environment. Such events indicate a serious failure (or absence) of a self-policing program, which should be designed to prevent such risks, and it would seriously undermine deterrence to waive penalties for such violations. These exceptions are responsive to suggestions from public interest organizations, as well as other commenters. (See, e.g., II-F-39 and II-G-18 in the Docket.) The final policy also excludes penalty reductions for violations of the specific terms of any order, consent agreement, or plea agreement. (See, II-E-60 in the Docket.) Once a consent agreement has been negotiated, there is little incentive to comply if there are no sanctions for violating its specific requirements. The exclusion
in this section applies to violations of the terms of any response, removal or remedial action covered by a written agreement.

8. Cooperation

Under Section D(9), the regulated entity must cooperate as required by EPA and provide information necessary to determine the applicability of the policy. This condition is largely unchanged from the interim policy. In the final policy, however, the Agency has added that "cooperation" includes assistance in determining the facts of any related violations suggested by the disclosure, as well as of the disclosed violation itself. This was added to allow the agency to obtain information about any violations indicated by the disclosure, even where the violation is not initially identified by the regulated entity.

F. Opposition to Privilege

The Agency remains firmly opposed to the establishment of a statutory evidentiary privilege for environmental audits for the following reasons:

1. Privilege, by definition, invites secrecy, instead of the openness needed to build public trust in industry's ability to self-policing. American law reflects the high value that the public places on fair access to the facts. The Supreme Court, for example, has said of privileges that, "[w]hatever their origins, these exceptions to the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). Federal courts have unanimously refused to recognize a privilege for environmental audits in the context of government investigations. See, e.g., United States v. Dexter, 132 F.R.D. 8, 9-10 (D.Conn. 1990). (application of a privilege "would effectively impede [EPA's] ability to enforce the Clean Water Act, and would be contrary to stated public policy.")

2. Eighteen months have failed to produce any evidence that a privilege is needed. Public testimony on the interim policy confirmed that EPA rarely uses audit reports as evidence. Furthermore, surveys demonstrate that environmental auditing has expanded rapidly over the past decade without the stimulus of a privilege. Most recently, the 1995 Price Waterhouse survey found that those few large or mid-sized companies that do not audit generally do not perceive any need to; concern about confidentiality ranked as one of the least important factors in their decisions.

3. A privilege would invite defendants to claim as "audit" material almost any evidence the government needed to establish a violation or determine who was responsible. For example, most audit privilege bills under consideration in federal and state legislatures would arguably protect factual information--such as health studies or contaminated sediment data--and not just the conclusions of the auditors. While the government might have access to required monitoring data under the law, as some industry commenters have suggested, a privilege of that nature would cloak underlying facts needed to determine whether such data were accurate.

4. An audit privilege would breed litigation, as both parties struggled to determine what material fell within its scope. The problem is compounded by the lack of any clear national standard for audits. The "in camera" (i.e., non-public) proceedings used to resolve these disputes under some statutory schemes would result in a series of time-consuming, expensive mini-trials.

5. The Agency's policy eliminates the need for any privilege as against the government, by reducing civil penalties and criminal liability for those companies that audit, disclose and correct violations. The 1995 Price Waterhouse survey indicated that companies would expand their auditing programs in exchange for the kind of incentives that EPA provides in its policy.

6. Finally, audit privileges are strongly opposed by the law enforcement community, including the National District Attorneys Association, as well as by public interest groups. (See, e.g., Docket, II-C-21, II-C-28, II-C-52, IV-G-10, II-C-25, II-C-33, II-C-52, II-C-48, and II-G-13 through II-G-24.)

G. Effect on States

The final policy reflects EPA's desire to develop fair
and effective incentives for self-policing that will have practical value to states that share responsibility for enforcing federal environmental laws. To that end, the Agency has consulted closely with state officials in developing this policy, through a series of special meetings and conference calls in addition to the extensive opportunity for public comment. As a result, EPA believes its final policy is grounded in common-sense principles that should prove useful in the development of state programs and policies.

As always, states are encouraged to experiment with different approaches that do not jeopardize the fundamental national interest in assuring that violations of federal law do not threaten the public health or the environment, or make it profitable not to comply. The Agency remains opposed to state legislation that does not include these basic protections, and reserves its right to bring independent action against regulated entities for violations of federal law that threaten human health or the environment, reflect criminal conduct or repeated noncompliance, or allow one company to make a substantial profit at the expense of its law-abiding competitors. Where a state has obtained appropriate sanctions needed to deter such misconduct, there is no need for EPA action.

H. Scope of Policy

EPA has developed this document as a policy to guide settlement actions.

EPA employees will be expected to follow this policy, and the Agency will make public any compliance agreements reached under this policy, in order to provide the regulated community with fair notice of decisions and greater accountability to affected communities. Many in the regulated community recommended that the Agency convert the policy into a regulation because they felt it might ensure greater consistency and predictability. While EPA is taking steps to ensure consistency and predictability and believes that it will be successful, the Agency will consider this issue and will provide notice if it determines that a rulemaking is appropriate.

II. Statement of Policy: Incentives for Self-Policing

Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention

A. Purpose

This policy is designed to enhance protection of human health and the environment by encouraging regulated entities to voluntarily discover, disclose, correct and prevent violations of federal environmental requirements.

B. Definitions

For purposes of this policy, the following definitions apply: "Environmental Audit" has the definition given to it in EPA's 1986 audit policy on environmental auditing, i.e., "a systematic, documented, periodic and objective review by regulated entities of facility operations and practices related to meeting environmental requirements."

"Due Diligence" encompasses the regulated entity's systematic efforts, appropriate to the size and nature of its business, to prevent, detect and correct violations through all of the following:

(a) Compliance policies, standards and procedures that identify how employees and agents are to meet the requirements of laws, regulations, permits and other sources of authority for environmental requirements;
(b) Assignment of overall responsibility for overseeing compliance with policies, standards, and procedures, and assignment of specific responsibility for assuring compliance at each facility or operation;
(c) Mechanisms for systematically assuring that compliance policies, standards and procedures are being carried out, including monitoring and auditing systems reasonably designed to detect and correct violations, periodic evaluation of the overall performance of the compliance management system, and a means for employees or agents to report violations of environmental requirements without fear of retaliation;
(d) Efforts to communicate effectively the regulated entity's standards and procedures to all employees and other agents;
(e) Appropriate incentives to managers and employees to perform in accordance with the compliance policies, standards and procedures, including consistent enforcement through appropriate disciplinary mechanisms; and

(f) Procedures for the prompt and appropriate correction of any violations, and any necessary modifications to the regulated entity’s program to prevent future violations.

“Environmental audit report” means the analysis, conclusion, and recommendations resulting from an environmental audit, but does not include data obtained in, or testimonial evidence concerning, the environmental audit.

``Gravity-based penalties’’ are that portion of a penalty over and above the economic benefit, i.e., the punitive portion of the penalty, rather than that portion representing a defendant’s economic gain from non-compliance. (For further discussion of this concept, see "A Framework for Statute-Specific Approaches to Penalty Assessments", #GM-22, 1980, U.S. EPA General Enforcement Policy Compendium). “Regulated entity” means any entity, including a federal, state or municipal agency or facility, regulated under federal environmental laws.

C. Incentives for Self-Policing

1. No Gravity-Based Penalties

Where the regulated entity establishes that it satisfies all of the conditions of Section D of the policy, EPA will not seek gravity-based penalties for violations of federal environmental requirements.

2. Reduction of Gravity-Based Penalties by 75%

EPA will reduce gravity-based penalties for violations of federal environmental requirements by 75% so long as the regulated entity satisfies all of the conditions of Section D(2) through D(9) below.

3. No Criminal Recommendation

   (a) EPA will not recommend to the Department of Justice or other prosecuting authority that criminal charges be brought against a regulated entity where EPA determines that all of the conditions in Section D are satisfied, so long as the violation does not demonstrate or involve:

   (i) a prevalent management philosophy or practice that concealed or condoned environmental violations; or

   (ii) high-level corporate officials’ or managers’ conscious involvement in, or willful blindness to, the violations.

   (b) Whether or not EPA refers the regulated entity for criminal prosecution under this section, the Agency reserves the right to recommend prosecution for the criminal acts of individual managers or employees under existing policies guiding the exercise of enforcement discretion.

4. No Routine Request for Audits

   EPA will not request or use an environmental audit report to initiate a civil or criminal investigation of the entity. For example, EPA will not request an environmental audit report in routine inspections. If the Agency has independent reason to believe that a violation has occurred, however, EPA may seek any information relevant to identifying violations or determining liability or extent of harm.

D. Conditions

1. Systematic Discovery

   The violation was discovered through:

   (a) an environmental audit; or

   (b) an objective, documented, systematic procedure or practice reflecting the regulated entity’s due diligence in preventing, detecting, and correcting violations. The regulated entity must provide accurate and complete documentation to the Agency as to how it exercises due diligence to prevent, detect and correct violations according to the criteria for due diligence outlined in Section B. EPA may require as a condition of penalty mitigation that a description of the regulated entity’s due diligence efforts be made publicly available.

   (a) emissions violations detected through a continuous emissions monitor (or alternative monitor established in a permit) where any such monitoring is required;

   (b) violations of National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) discharge limits detected through required sampling or monitoring;

   (c) violations discovered through compliance audit required to be performed by the terms of a consent order or settlement agreement.

2. Voluntary Discovery

   The violation was identified voluntarily, and not through a legally mandated monitoring or sampling requirement prescribed by statute, regulation, permit, judicial or administrative order, or consent agreement. For example, the policy does not apply to:

   (a) offenses committed against the regulated entity by a third party; or

   (b) offenses discovered through an environmental audit report.

3. Prompt Disclosure

   The regulated entity fully discloses a specific violation within 10 days (or such shorter period provided by law) after it has discovered that the violation has occurred, or may have occurred, in writing to EPA;

4. Discovery and Disclosure

   Independent of Government or Third Party Plaintiff

   The violation must also be identified and disclosed by the regulated entity prior to:

   (a) the commencement of a federal, state or local agency inspection or investigation, or the issuance by such agency of an information request to the regulated entity;

   (b) notice of a citizen suit;

   (c) the filing of a complaint by a third party;

   (d) the reporting of the violation to EPA (or other government agency) by a ‘‘whistleblower’’ employee, rather than by one authorized to speak on behalf of the regulated entity; or

   (e) imminent discovery of the violation by a regulatory agency;

5. Correction and Remediation

   The regulated entity corrects the
violation within 60 days, certifies in writing that violations have been corrected, and takes appropriate measures as determined by EPA to remedy any environmental or human harm due to the violation. If more than 60 days will be needed to correct the violation(s), the regulated entity must so notify EPA in writing before the 60-day period has passed. Where appropriate, EPA may require that to satisfy conditions 5 and 6, a regulated entity enter into a publicly available written agreement, administrative consent order or judicial consent decree, particularly where compliance or remedial measures are complex or a lengthy schedule for attaining and maintaining compliance or remediating harm is required;

6. Prevent Recurrence

The regulated entity agrees in writing to take steps to prevent a recurrence of the violation, which may include improvements to its environmental auditing or due diligence efforts;

7. No Repeat Violations

The specific violation (or closely related violation) has not occurred previously within the past three years at the same facility, or is not part of a pattern of federal, state or local violations by the facility's parent organization (if any), which have occurred within the past five years. For the purposes of this section, a violation is:

(a) any violation of federal, state or local environmental law identified in a judicial or administrative order, consent agreement or order, complaint, or notice of violation, conviction or plea agreement; or
(b) any act or omission for which the regulated entity has previously received penalty mitigation from EPA or a state or local agency.

8. Other Violations Excluded

The violation is not one which (i) resulted in serious actual harm, or may have presented an imminent and substantial endangerment to, human health or the environment, or (ii) violates the specific terms of any judicial or administrative order, or consent agreement.

9. Cooperation

The regulated entity cooperates as requested by EPA and provides such information as is necessary and requested by EPA to determine applicability of this policy. Cooperation includes, at a minimum, providing all requested documents and access to employees and assistance in investigating the violation, any noncompliance problems related to the disclosure, and any environmental consequences related to the violations.

E. Economic Benefit

EPA will retain its full discretion to recover any economic benefit gained as a result of noncompliance to preserve a "level playing field" in which violators do not gain a competitive advantage over regulated entities that do comply. EPA may forgive the entire penalty for violations which meet conditions 1 through 9 in section D and, in the Agency's opinion, do not merit any penalty due to the insignificant amount of any economic benefit.

F. Effect on State Law, Regulation or Policy

EPA will work closely with states to encourage their adoption of policies that reflect the incentives and conditions outlined in this policy. EPA remains firmly opposed to statutory environmental audit privileges that shield evidence of environmental violations and undermine the public's right to know, as well as to blanket immunities for violations that reflect criminal conduct, present serious threats or actual harm to health and the environment, allow non complying companies to gain an economic advantage over their competitors, or reflect a repeated failure to comply with federal law. EPA will work with states to address any provisions of state audit privilege or immunity laws that are inconsistent with this policy, and which may prevent a timely and appropriate response to significant environmental violations. The Agency reserves its right to take necessary actions to protect public health or the environment by enforcing against any violations of federal law.

G. Applicability

(1) This policy applies to the assessment of penalties for any violations under all of the federal environmental statutes that EPA administers, and supersedes any inconsistent provisions in media-specific penalty or enforcement policies and EPA's 1986 Environmental Auditing Policy Statement.

(2) To the extent that existing EPA enforcement policies are not inconsistent, they will continue to apply in conjunction with this policy. However, a regulated entity that has received penalty mitigation for satisfying specific conditions under this policy may not receive additional penalty mitigation for satisfying the same or similar conditions under other policies for the same violation(s), nor will this policy apply to violations which have received penalty mitigation under other policies.

(3) This policy sets forth factors for consideration that will guide the Agency in the exercise of its prosecutorial discretion. It states the Agency's views as to the proper allocation of its enforcement resources. The policy is not final agency action, and is intended as guidance. It does not create any rights, duties, obligations, or defenses, implied or otherwise, in any third parties.

(4) This policy should be used whenever applicable in settlement negotiations for both administrative and civil judicial enforcement actions. It is not intended for use in pleading, at hearing or at trial. The policy may be applied at EPA's discretion to the settlement of administrative and judicial enforcement actions instituted prior to, but not yet resolved, as of the effective date of this policy.

H. Public Accountability

(1) Within 3 years of the effective date of this policy, EPA will complete a study of the effectiveness of the policy in encouraging:

(a) changes in compliance
behavior within the regulated community, including improved compliance rates;

(b) prompt disclosure and correction of violations, including timely and accurate compliance with reporting requirements;

(c) corporate compliance programs that are successful in preventing violations, improving environmental performance, and promoting public disclosure;

(d) consistency among state programs that provide incentives for voluntary compliance.

EPA will make the study available to the public.

. (2) EPA will make publicly available the terms and conditions of any compliance agreement reached under this policy, including the nature of the violation, the remedy, and the schedule for returning to compliance.

I. Effective Date

This policy is effective January 22, 1996.


Steven A. Herman, Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance Assurance. [FR Doc. 95-31146 Filed 12-21-95; 8:45 am]

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