&EPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Office of Radiation
and Indoor Air
EPA 402-SrOO-002
July 2000
INTERNATIONAL RADIOLOGICAL
POST-EMERGENCY RESPONSE
ISSUES CONFERENCE
Executive Summary
Sheraton City Centre Hotel, Washington, D.C.
September 9- 11, 1998
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
OF THE
1998
INTERNATIONAL RADIOLOGICAL POST-
EMERGENCY RESPONSE ISSUES CONFERENCE
Washington, D.C. USA
9-11 September 1998
Sponsor;
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Co-sponsors:
American Nuclear Society
Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors
Defense Special Weapons Agency, Department of Defense
Department of Energy
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Health and Human Services, Center for Disease Control
Health Physics Sdciety, Baltimore-Washington Chapter
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
United States Department of Agriculture
Organized in Cooperation with the
International Atomic Energy Agency
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\
U)
o
UNITED STATES ENVSRONMEMTAL PROTECTION AGEMCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460
OFFICE OF
AiR AND RADIATION
July 31,2000
Dear Participant,
Thank you for making the International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues
Conference a success. Your participation in the conference was invaluable in that you helped us
to achieve our primary goal - to initiate a dialogue among the Federal, State, local, and
international communities that focuses on post-emergency response issues.
More than 260 participants from seven countries attended the conference, including
several prominent Eastern European experts on the Chernobyl accident. These experts and the
wide-range of disciplines and response experience of all conference attendees created a setting
that allowed for a successful dialogue on post-emergency response issues. During the
conference, participants worked diligently to identify, discuss, and search for solutions to many
issues.
EPA's Office of Radiation and Indoor Air has prepared an Executive Summary of the
proceedings to provide a record of the first International Radiological Post-Emergency Response
Issues Conference. The Executive Summary, which immediately follows this letter, summarizes
the outcome of the conference, including accomplishments and highlights from each conference
session. The Executive Summary also includes, as appendices, copies of papers that were not
included in the Conference Proceedings (published in August of 1998), a list of conference
attendees, and errata to the Conference Proceedings.
The conference allowed participants to exchange and share valuable information that can
be applied to future post-emergency response efforts. We encourage you and your colleagues to
continue discussing post-emergency response issues and to share your experiences and insights
regarding the longer-term response issues that result from nuclear accidents.
Sincerely,
tU. <^
W. Craig Cor
Conference Chairman
Hecyeled/Hecystebls
Primed with Soy/Canoia Ink on papsr that
contains a* least 50% recyciaci fiber
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary 1
Introduction 1
Accomplishments .1
Reasons for Continuing the Dialogue 2
Conference Proceedings 2
Conference Sessions 2
Keynote Address Summary 3
Keynote Address Paper #1, International Perspective 5
Keynote Address Paper #2, National Perspective 12
Keynote Address Paper #3, State Perspective 18
Conference Summary 23
Track 1 Sessions 24
Track 2 Sessions 48
Appendices
A. Papers Not Included in the Conference Proceedings 69
B. List of Participants 125
C. Errata to the Conference Proceedings 155
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Executive Summary
Introduction
On September 9-11, 1998 the first International Radiological Post-Emergency Response
Issues Conference was held in Washington, D.C. The primary goal of the conference was to
initiate a dialogue between the international community and Federal, State, and local agencies on
post-emergency response issues resulting from a nuclear accident. An anticipated outcome of the
conference was to identify post-emergency response issues that the international community
might face in the event of a major nuclear accident.
The conference was sponsored by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
Office of Radiation and Indoor Air (ORIA), in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA). The following Federal agencies and professional societies were co-sponsors:
Defense Special Weapons Agency, Department of Energy (DOE); Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA); Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Department of
Health and Human Services; Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); United States Department
of Agriculture (USDA); American Nuclear Society; Health Physics Society, Baltimore-
Washington Chapter; and the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors, Inc.
Accomplishments
EPA is pleased to report that the conference was well-attended and was considered a
success by both participants and conference planners. More than 260 participants from seven
countries attended the conference1 and included several prominent Eastern European experts on
the Chernobyl accident; representatives from Federal, State, and local response programs from
the United States; and emergency response professionals from Europe, South America, Canada,
and Asia. The number of participants, combined with a wide-range of disciplines and experience
(e.g., researchers, decision- and policy makers, scientists, and engineers), created a setting that
allowed for a successful dialogue on post-emergency response issues.
Many participants said, through verbal and written comments, that the conference was
timely and that the subject matter covered was appropriate and useful. In addition, participants
commented that the conference enabled them to gather and initiate discussions about the post-
emergency response phase of a nuclear accident and to network in-person with their colleagues.
Conference participants included representatives from the United States, Russia, Eastern Europe, Europe,
South America, Canada, and Asia. Participants from the United States included representatives from EPA, DOE,
FEMA, NRC, Department of Defense, Department of State, USDA, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
Massachusetts, Louisiana, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Kansas, Arkansas, Georgia, Minnesota,
Illinois, Missouri, New York, and Nebraska.
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Through this conference, EPA identified post-emergency response issues that the
international community might encounter in the event of a nuclear disaster. These issues involve
all aspects of post-emergency response that affect the government, communities, and the
environment. EPA recognizes that the discussion on potential solutions to these issues has only
just begun.
Reasons for Continuing the Dialogue
Discussions with conference participants and the written responses to post-conference
questionnaires revealed that the participants considered the conference valuable and would like
to continue the dialogue. Participants indicated that the conference successfully provided a
forum for discussing and identifying post-emergency response issues. Participants also stated
that a future conference dedicated to continuing post-emergency response discussion,
information exchange, and networking would be beneficial.
Conference Proceedings
EPA's Office of Radiation and Indoor Air prepared and distributed at the conference a
Proceedings of the International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference
(EPA 402-S-98-001, August 1998). The Proceedings list the conference co-sponsors, identify
the executive committee and technical program committee members, and include most of the
papers that were presented at the conference. In addition, Appendix A of this report provides
errata to the conference proceedings. Appendix B includes papers not contained-in the
conference proceedings and Appendices C and D list conference participants and speakers,
respectively.
Conference Sessions
A summary of each conference session is provided beginning on the next page. The
summaries list speakers, identify the papers that each speaker presented during the session, and
provide highlights of the presentations, including questions and answers. The summaries begin
with the Keynote session, which also presents the papers submitted by each Keynote speaker.
The papers submitted by the other conference speakers are contained in the Proceedings of the
International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference (EPA 402-S-98-001,
August 1998) or in Appendix B of this report.
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Keynote Address Summary
Speakers:
1. Malcolm J. Crick, International Atomic Energy Agency, "International framework for
emergency response preparedness."
2. Frank J. Congel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Long-term Response Issues
Following a Severe Nuclear Accident."
3. James C. Hardeman, Jr., Manager, Environmental Radiation Program, Georgia
Department of Natural Resources & Chair, Emergency Response Planning Committee,
Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors, Inc., "State Government Perspective
on Post-Emergency Response Issues."
Three speakers representing the international, national, and State levels of emergency
response opened discussions at the conference. Key points from these three presentations are
summarized below.
Highlights
> Expecting the unexpected is the most important element an effective response to a serious
nuclear accident.
*• More attention must be focused on post-emergency issues, specifically the intermediate
and late phases of emergency response.
> Post-emergency response preparations must include consideration of longer-lived
contaminants (e.g., cesium).
> Many factors influence the severity and complexity of nuclear contamination and post-
emergency response actions (e.g., source term, release conditions, and atmospheric
transport).
> The effects of a major radiological incident are unlikely to be limited to the confines of
one State or one country.
>• Most States do not have the resources and capabilities to deal with the broad range of
issues resulting from a major radiological accident.
> State and Federal response agencies need to work together using a regional approach to
plan and prepare for a radiological incident.
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>• To ensure that a regional approach works, States need to establish mutual aid agreements,
and regionally-based exercises involving multiple States and Federal agencies should be
established to develop capabilities.
>• An international framework for emergency response preparedness that clearly sets out
preparedness activities and responsibilities needs to be established.
*• New challenges to radiological response, such as those from terrorism and illicit
trafficking of radioactive sources, are becoming apparent and need to be addressed.
Each Keynote address is presented on the following page, followed by questions and answers.
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Keynote Address Paper # 1 - International Perspective
International framework for emergency response preparedness
Malcolm J. Crick
International Atomic Energy Agency
Since the beginning of nuclear power production on a large scale, a small number of accidents
have been reported in which nuclear facilities have been damaged. During one such accident, at
Chernobyl in 1986, significant amounts of radioactive materials were released into the
atmosphere and caused contamination of the environment both locally and in other countries.
The extent and effects of the potential contamination due to a major accident at a nuclear facility
are still matters of public concern. Much progress has been made over the last decade or so in
the field of emergency planning and preparedness, including the development of guidance,
criteria, training programmes, regulations and comprehensive plans in the support of nuclear
facilities. Together with the experience from other accidents, such as that at Goiania in Brazil
involving contamination of a town with Cs-137 from a breached spent source, and that of
rehabilitating former weapons test sites are reinforcing the need to recognize that the post-
emergency phase of a possible accident needs to be adequately addressed within the framework
of advance emergency preparedness. New challenges are also becoming apparent, including
illicit trafficking of sources and the threat of terrorism which require some creative thinking to
anticipate possible response needs.
During this conference we shall hear about the various components of post-emergency response
to such accidents, ranging from technical aspects to psycho-social and economic ones. All
participants will surely agree that such situations can be and usually are extremely complex.
There is a need to try to synthesize the various elements of response and their interactions in
order to produce an overall picture of post-emergency response, and to identify root causes or
driving forces that determine a 'good' or 'bad' response. To stimulate initial discussion on this, I
have formulated Figure 1, which is based on the conclusions of the 1996 EC/IAEA/WHO
conference: "One Decade after Chernobyl: summing up the consequences"1'2. I invite you to
share your experience in trying to refine this diagram during the Conference.
It is important to recognize that the interrelationships between the various elements are often
extremely non-linear. For example, Figure 2 illustrates the cost of conservatism in applying a
given countermeasure, say, for example, in the resettlement of a population from a contaminated
environment. Simply because of the typical dispersion patterns of material released to
atmosphere, choosing to reduce the criteria for resettlement by a factor of ten will typically
increase the number of people to be resettled by a factor of twenty, but will typically only reduce
the residual collective dose (and the associated radiation-induced health effects) by only about a
factor of two. It is clear that conservatism rapidly gets expensive.
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Another conclusion to draw from Figure 1 is the crucial importance of re-establishing lack of
trust in public authorities, by having an effective early response. The total cost of accidents
involving long-lived nuclides are dominated by the long-term costs, not the short term ones, and
yet the way the accident is managed early on can strongly influence the need for long term
actions. In many situations, a little over reaction early on can save effects and costs in the long
run, because of the crucial importance of re-establishing trust in the local authorities.
On further examination of this figure and other similar ones we can list some of the key root
causes of the long-term impact of the Chernobyl accident. For example in Figure 1, we can
identify the following factors:
that the accident happened !
hotspots discovered late
public information not pro-active
lack of international endorsement of
actions taken
lack of international standards
lack of operational quantities
inconsistencies in protective measures
taken along borders of countries
poor appreciation of costs
poor food controls early on
no stable iodine prophylaxis
lack of trustworthy information,
including good dosimetry and medical
records management, monitoring results,
effects of radiation and public
information
no effective psycho-social support
mechanisms
breakup of the USSR
and this Conference will surely identify and debate others. Some of these factors we can
influence with good planning. Others can only be left to fate.
The international community reflected through the international and multinational organizations
has been and is pursuing work in many areas to help improve emergency response preparedness.
Table I lists emergency preparedness activities of these various organizations and agencies with
emphasis on the post-emergency phase.
To facilitate many of the functions required under the two International Conventions related
specifically to emergency response, an Inter-Agency committee meets annually to co-ordinate
preparedness related to nuclear accidents and radiological emergencies. Its terms of reference are
to ensure exchange of information among agencies concerning their respective activities and to
the extent possible harmonization of these activities; to review progress in joint activities; to
identify new areas for inter-agency co-operation and to plan joint actions.
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It presently is composed of representatives from the following organizations:
• Economic Commission for Europe;
• European Commission;
Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations;
• International Atomic Energy Agency;
International Labour Office;
• International Maritime Organisation;
• Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD);
UN Education, Scientific & Cultural Organisation;
• UN Environment Programme;
• UN Industrial Development Organisation;
• Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN);
• United Nations Office at Vienna, Office of Outer Space Affairs;
• World Health Organisation; and the
• World Meteorological Organisation.
The IAEA provides the Secretariat. In the past this has been a relatively informal grouping,
comprising mainly UN Agencies. In the past year, the European Commission and the Nuclear
Energy Agency were invited as observers, and negotiations are taking place now to invite NATO
to join. Moreover, with the general aim of integrating emergency planning between the different
agencies, there is now amove towards formalizing the committee, its membership and terms of
reference. The IAEA currently maintains the ENATOM (Emergency Notification and Assistance
Technical Operations Manual) which describes the existing arrangements and interagency
agreements established under the legal auspices of the two Conventions. However it is
recognized that there are many activities that the various organizations will perform in an
emergency response that do not fall directly or explicitly under the Conventions. In this regard
there is a move towards the idea of developing an integrated and formal 'International Nuclear
Emergency Response Plan', which would cover more than the legal obligations but also the
statutory responsibilities of the various partners to that plan. Moreover it is conceived that the
plan would also clearly set out preparedness activities and responsibilities so that future activities
would be better harmonized and lead to less duplication and inconsistency.
Also in this regard the IAEA, WHO, NEA and FAO are planning to co-sponsor Requirements for
Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Preparedness and Response, which would be issued as an
IAEA Safety Standard. This document will set out the basic infrastructure, functional and
response requirements that a Member State will need to meet to ensure an adequate emergency
response capability. The document will be harmonized with the 'International Nuclear
Emergency Response Plan' so that again there is an integrated approach.
It is intended that this formalization of an 'International Nuclear Emergency Response Plan'
linked with International Requirements and co-sponsored technical documents will lead to a
better use of international resources, targeted to those aspects that need development in a
consistent and coherent way under the existing international legal framework. These
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international efforts should aim to provide real and needed support to national preparedness
activities and to prepare for responding efficiently and in a timely manner to Member States'
requests in the event of any future accident. The results of this conference will help orient this
process to their real needs.
REFERENCES
1. CRICK, M.J., EC/IAEA/WHO 1996 Conference: One Decade after Chernobyl;
Implications for Post-Emergency Response, paper at this conference.
2. EC/IAEA/WHO, Proc. Int. Conf. "One Decade after Chernobyl - summing up the
consequences of the accident", Vienna, Austria, 8-12 April 1996, IAEA, Vienna (1996).
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TABLE I ACTIVITIES CURRENTLY PERFORMED BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
RESPONSE FUNCTIONS
Responsibilities under International Conventions:
• on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident
• on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency
Response teams
Independent assessments of radiological situations on request
IAEA
IAEA/WHO/
OCHA/NATO
IAEA/WHO
GUIDANCE FOR MEMBER STATES
Safety Standards: Requirements for Nuclear and Radiological Emergency
Preparedness and Response
Detailed technical guidance on accident assessment, monitoring and on developing
emergency response preparedness
Physical security to reduce radiological threats from illicit trafficking
Criteria for intervention and for rehabilitation of contaminated land
Information exchange and the use of new technologies for decision support
Agricultural countermeasures
Guideline levels for foodstuffs moving in international trade
Public communication: Internationa] Nuclear Event Scale (INES)
Manual on public health response
Research on countermeasure effectiveness
Operational intervention levels
Cross-border emergency planning agreements
Monitoring strategies for and practical procedures
Technical information on Iodine Prophylaxis
IAEA/WHO/NEA/FAO
IAEA
IAEA/INTERPOL
ICRP/IAEA
EC/NEA
FAO/EC
FAO/WHO
NBA/IAEA
WHO
EC
IAEA
IAEA
NBA/IAEA
WHO/IAEA
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
International Emergency Exercises
Training Courses
NEA/NATO
EC/WHO/IAEA
NATO/PAHO
EC: European Commission
FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEA: Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OCHA: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations
PAHO: Pan-American Health Organization
WHO: World Health Organization
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Figure 1 Factors influencing Chernobyl post-emergency response
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Multiplier on consequence
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Keynote Address Paper # 2 - National Perspective
LONG-TERM RESPONSE ISSUES FOLLOWING A
SEVERE NUCLEAR ACCIDENT
Frank J. Congel, Thomas J. McKenna, Aby S. Mohseni, and Charles A. Willis
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
INTRODUCTION
Concern about the possible consequences of a major radiological accident dates back at least to
1929 when 125 people were killed in the "Cleveland Disaster," an event so serious that it moved
the League of Nations to investigate radiation safety. The concern was well established by the
time the U.S. nuclear program got underway in 1942; after the first reactors, reliance was placed
on remote siting until 1948 when containment was introduced. Consequence mitigation was an
integral part of reactor design by the time the "atoms for peace" program was initiated and the
"Geneva conferences" were held. Emergency preparedness (EP) was required for the first U.S.
commercial nuclear power plants and there was a constant effort to improve EP as accidents and
events made severe accidents seem ever more probable .''2 A major milestone in the
advancement of EP was the accident at Three Mile Island-2 (TMI-2). This accident was
followed by numerous advances, including attention to non-reactor facilities .3"13 Regulatory
response14 and instrumentation15"17 received particular attention. At every step, some mention
was made of the recovery phase of accident management, but emphasis was always placed on the
early "plume" phase. Now, after Chernobyl, we are taking a harder look at the recovery phase.
DISCUSSION
Probability, Expectation and Reality
The most important element in the effective response to a serious nuclear accident is to be
prepared to expect the unexpected. To meet regulatory requirements it has been necessary to
develop models, practices, and scenarios that tend to bias our expectations in various ways.
While these biases tend to prepare us well for the severe accidents that are considered most
probable, they may well leave us unprepared for, or at least surprised at, the eventualities of a
real accident.
Source Term
For a nuclear accident to be considered severe, a substantial quantity of radioactivity must be
released to the environment. Accident experiences have shaped more our expectations of
consequences than any other factor. The change in expectations is exemplified by our experience
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with nuclear power plants. By the time the U.S. embarked upon the development of civilian
nuclear power, we had a decade of experience with nuclear reactors, with reactor accidents, and
with fission product release experiments. The volatility of the noble gases and the halogens was
well known. In the early accident analyses, however, as described in Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC) reports and in papers presented at the Geneva Conferences, the radioiodines
were not treated with any particular importance. This changed dramatically with the Windscale
accident in 1957; radioiodines were going to be a more important radionuclide in the release
spectrum.
The radioiodines were not particularly important in subsequent accidents such as the SL-1
destructive excursion, the SRE fuel melt, and the Fermi-1 core damage accident and, most
dramatically, the TMI-2 accident. The dominance of radioiodine in our thinking, however, did
not decline. This was true, in part at least, because the radioiodines were found to be excellent
surrogates for the non-noble gas fission products, and were built into our regulatory system.18
The results of fission product release experiments, destructive tests and accidents leave no doubt
that the nuclide composition of the source term depend on a host of factors including the course
of the accident, the degree of burnup, the environment of the fuel elements (oxidizing conditions,
steam blanketing, or atmospheric inerting). Still, we proceed as though the only real threats were
from the radioiodines and the noble gases. In accidents where this expectation is met, recovery
phase activities are relatively simple because of the short half lives of the radioiodines and the
non-reactive nature of the noble gases. If, on the other hand, the release also includes large
fractions of long-lived particulates such as cesium, the environmental problems would be much
more complex.
It is vital that our preparations include the consideration of longer-lived contaminants and that we
base our decisions on what is observed and measured at the time, rather that pre-accident
expectations."
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Release Conditions
Radioactive materials can be released in a variety of ways; fast, slow, intermittent, as a buoyant
aerosol or as a ground-hugging fog; there may be sub-micron aerosols or large particle that are
individually capable of delivering devastating doses. The possibilities are virtually endless. For
obvious reasons, it is not convenient to deal with all of the possibilities in our emergency
planning drills. Consequently, our mind-set is to expect conditions that were found convenient in
our accident scenarios. In a real accident, it is vital that our monitoring program be implemented
so as to detect activity at great distances from the release point but also to find those dangerous
large particles which may or may not be deposited close to the release point.
Atmospheric Transport
Atmospheric transport is a complex science. The uncertainties associated with modeling
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atmospheric transport increase non-linearly with time and distance. This is an area where U.S.
emergency planning drills and practices tend to be most misleading. For our models and
scenarios, we use unchanging or slowly-varying meteorological conditions. This sort of
atmospheric behavior is highly improbable in any real accident. Furthermore, our meteorological
monitoring provisions at the accident site are minimal at best and non-existent at worst. This is
dangerous in the early phases of an accident but it can be as bad in the recovery phase if the
responsible people actually believe that the location of the contamination can be foretold. It is
vital that everyone with emergency response responsibilities and authority be familiarized with
actual meteorological observations such as the tetroon observations made in the aerospace
nuclear safety program and the fallout patterns from real releases such as that from Chernobyl.
Again, it is vital that actions be based on real observations made at the time.
Deposition
The deposition of radioactive material on surfaces is a complex phenomenon, one that we tend to
simplify in our exercises. Deposition rates are affected by factors such as surface roughness,
surface materials, ground-level atmospheric turbulence and surface chemistry. The deposition of
one chemical may or may not correspond to the deposition of another chemical. That is, the
iodine may be one place and the cesium another. This phenomenon must be reflected in the
monitoring practices. Environmental monitoring must be conducted to find out the variability in
concentration as a function of time, distance and nuclide.
Land Use
Proper emergency/recovery response requires accurate knowledge of the area of interest. Nuclear
power plant licensees are required to conduct land use censuses annually. Other licensees have
no such requirement. In either case, the available information may be inappropriate, inaccurate,
or inadequate. The most obvious source of inadequacy is the distance limitation. Chernobyl and
other events have shown that areas of concern may be more than 50 miles from the plant. No
accidental release has matched the 1953 weapons test in Nevada which produced 100 mR/hr
radiation levels from fallout in Troy, NY, some 2000 miles away. That case showed that the
atmosphere can provide impressive and unexpected transport. Consequently, the recovery phase
of accident management may entail the need for land use knowledge about areas remote from the
accident site.
Post-Accident Environmental Monitoring
In the event of a large release of radioactive material, there will be a need a for considerable
number of qualified personnel, equipment, and laboratories. Generally, pos.t^-accident
environmental monitoring should be conducted in stages, starting with a broad scale survey and
proceeding to detailed investigation of areas of interest. Two vital considerations in
environmental monitoring are breadth of coverage and quality of the results. Proper recovery and
reentry require accurate knowledge of what radionuclides are there and where they are located.
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Actual magnitudes of the contamination levels are less important than the nuclide identification.
The characteristics of the surfaces also may be critical information because nuclides that tend to
bind tightly to some surfaces such as clay are readily removable from other materials such as
sand or sandy soil. It is also important to know whether the contamination has been retained on
the vegetation or whether it is virtually all on the ground.
Shelter/Decontamination/Medical
Shelter, decontamination, and medical considerations are quite different in the recovery phase
from what they were in the emergency phase. Shelter issues are expected to be resolved for
displaced people but concerns will center on the use of potentially contaminated dwellings by
people who are reentering the evacuated areas; it is important that monitoring be quite thorough
before people return. At the same time, considerable pressure to facilitate return is to be
expected.
Decontamination of land areas and facilities may require a substantial work force. Chernobyl
experience has demonstrated that a major portion of the contamination resulting from a major
radiological accident can be removed but that decontamination is manpower-intensive.
After the initial emergency has passed, medical concerns are expected to be dominated by efforts
to return medical facilities to service. In a worst case scenario, which is least likely, large
numbers of people could require medical attention. It is likely, however, that extensive effort
will be made to obtain, as much as practicable, medical information about affected people for use
in the expected future legal actions.
Reentry Control
Reentry control is expected to be a principal activity and is expected to occupy the time and
energy of much of the state and local emergency personnel. The extent of this effort, of course,
will depend on the specifics of the accident and of local conditions. It is vital that this work be
performed by local people who are familiar with local conditions. Also, it is essentially that
these people be adequately supported by people with the appropriate radiological and safety
expertise. The experience of the TMI-2 accident provides assurance that the needed expertise
will be available from a variety of sources, including the National Laboratories.
Interdiction/Replacement of Contaminated Foodstuffs/Water
The Chernobyl experience suggests that control of foodstuff may be the most important element
in limiting the radiological consequences of a nuclear accident, especially if evacuation is
affected in a timely manner, so that large doses from the plume are avoided. American
conditions vary sufficiently with locale. Where foodstuffs are consumed directly by producers,
i.e. family farms, there is concern about local hot spot contamination. More commonly,
foodstuffs collected from uncontaminated areas could be inadvertently combined with
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contaminated foodstuffs. In the U.S., replacement foodstuffs are readily available so the
confiscation of foodstuffs from a considerable area is expected to impose only an economic
hardship, which could be compensated.
Livestock/Animal Protection
Under some circumstances, treatment of animals may be a major concern. Generally,
domesticated animals cannot safely be left unattended for very long nor can they readily be
evacuated with the people. Thus they will provide a strong motivating force for hastening
reentry. This need could place a special burden on the monitoring teams. Detailed information
about conditions is needed to support a decision to allow people to return to work with their
stock, including providing recommendations as to what should and should not, be done.
Dosimetry
To the extent practicable, the actual radiation doses received by the people affected should be
determined. A knowledge of the doses, supported by explanations of the significance of dose,
may go a long way toward alleviating the stress that is a normal part of living through such an
event. The stress factor was the dominant detriment in the TMI-2 accident, and, according to the
statistical analyses of severe accidents, would dominate in some 90 percent (or more) of the
serious nuclear accidents in the U.S.. Furthermore, reliable dose information will be important in
the legal actions that invariably will follow any serious nuclear accident.
Tort Actions
Law suits are an integral part of American life. If one cannot win the lottery, there is always the
hope of striking it rich in the courts. Two decades after the accident, the legal books are not
closed on TMI-2. Thus, it is incumbent on anyone involved in the recovery from a serious
accident to take every reasonable precaution against legal actions. Thus, to the extent
practicable, procedures should be established for handling the situations that may arise. During
the event it is important to follow the "book" unless there is a compelling reason to do otherwise.
Of course, everyone should document every step taken.
CONCLUSION
In the U.S., considerable attention has been paid to the management of nuclear accidents.
Almost all the attention has been directed to the early phases of the accident. This is reasonable
because prompt and proper action at this time may be necessary to avert a catastrophe. The
recovery phase, which tends to be less dramatic, generally is mentioned in the key documents but
has received scant attention. The need for more attention to the "back end" of a nuclear accident
is becoming manifest.
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REFERENCES
1. Willis, C. A., "Developments in Emergency Preparedness," J. Korean Nuclear Society, 7,
1, pp 49-50, March 1975.
2. "Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological
Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-
0396 and EPA 520/1-78-016, December 1978
3. "Emergency Planning for Fuel Cycle Facilities and Plants Licensed Under 10 CFR Parts
50 and 70," NRC Regulatory Guide 3.42, Rev.l, 1979.
4. Grimes, B., et al., "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation Of Radiological Emergency
Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-0654
and FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, October 1980.
5. "Emergency Planning for Research and Test Reactors," NRC Regulatory Guide 2.6, Rev.
1, 1983.
6. "Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP)," Federal Register 50, 46542,
November 8, 1985.
7. Senseney, R., "International Cooperation During Radiological Emergencies," NUREG-
1160, April 1986.
8. Carriker, W. A., et al., "Guidance for Developing State and Local Radiological
Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness for Transportation Accidents, FEMA REP
5, August 1988.
9. "Standard Format and Content for Emergency Plans for Fuel-Cycle and Materials
Facilities," NUREG-0762, Rev. 1, November 1987.
10. McGuire, S. A., "A Regulatory Analysis on Emergency Preparedness for Fuel Cycle and
Other Radioactive Material Licensees," NUREG-1140, January 1988.
11. "Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power Reactors," NRC Regulatory
Guide 1.101, Rev. 3, 1992.
12. "Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Accidents,"
EPA400-R-92-001,Rev. 1, 1991.
13. "Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities,"
Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, Federal Register 61, 30132, June 14, 1996.
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Keynote Address Paper # 3 - State Perspective
State Government Perspective on Post-Emergency Response Issues
James C. Hardeman, Jr.
Manager, Environmental Radiation Program
Georgia Department of Natural Resources
and
Chair, Emergency Response Planning Committee (E-6)
Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors, Inc.
Good morning. It's a pleasure for me to be here, and to speak with you for just a few minutes on the
views of state governments, particularly state radiation control programs, regarding response to a
major radiological incident. I'd like to take just a minute, if you don't mind, to give you a thumbnail
sketch of the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors, or CRCPD — who we are, and
what we do — before getting into the meat of my presentation.
CRCPD is a non-profit professional organization whose members are predominantly individuals in
state and local governments who have responsibilities for regulating the use of radiation or
radioactive materials. CRCPD members are responsible for regulating a wide range of radiation uses
—industrial, medical and educational uses of radioactive materials and machine-produced radiation,
naturally-occurring radioactive materials, non-ionizing radiation, defense facilities — the "broad
spectrum" of uses, if you will. CRCPD was formed in 1968 in order to foster communication
between governmental radiation control programs, and to promote uniform radiation protection
regulations and activities. Most of CRCPD's work comes from working groups or committees, and
I have the pleasure of having chaired the Emergency Response Planning Committee since January
1997. There are four other members on this committee — three of which are here this morning, and
I would like for them to stand and be recognized — Ms. Andrea Pepper from Illinois — Mr. Ron
Fraass from Kansas — and Mr. Nick DePierro from New Jersey. We will be here for the entire
conference if you would like to speak with us.
The Emergency Response Planning Committee has the responsibility of working with various federal
agencies in reviewing and commenting on proposed activities related to radiological emergency
preparedness, and fairly representing the varying opinion's of the CRCPD member states — a
situation not unlike herding cats. With more than 50 separate organizations represented in CRCPD,
it's no wonder that we represent a broad range of views on any particular subject. In the area that we
are discussing this morning, however, there has been a great deal of consensus from the states.
As you just heard from Frank Congel, federal, state and local governments have paid considerable
attention to radiological emergency preparedness — almost all of it geared towards response actions
during what is traditionally referred to as "the early phase". Little attention has been paid to what
we in this country refer to as the "intermediate phase" and "late phase". During my sixteen (16)
years with the state of Georgia, I have participated in over two dozen evaluated radiological exercises
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— only three of those were considered "full scale post-emergency" exercises. The last one that we
had, at Plant Hatch this May, was far and away the best exercise that I have ever participated in, but
even so, it was a mere shadow of what the actual event would be like. How do I know this? Because
I had the pleasure of overseeing the cleanup of what, from a public standpoint, was a minor
radiological incident in Decatur, Georgia about 10 years ago. That incident, which involved a
leaking cesium canister used at an irradiation facility, took nearly four years and $45 million to
remediate.
As you heard previously, the effects of a major radiological incident are unlikely to be limited to the
confines of one state, or for that matter, one country. We all can tell stories of the responses in our
own jurisdiction to the Chernobyl incident. Yet we have very little practice working together —
federal agencies working with state agencies, or perhaps more importantly — several states working
with each other. Several federal agencies have committed to participate in state post-emergency
exercises at some level — some are small scale as our exercise this year at Hatch — others are
larger scale, as was the federal government's participation in the Salem exercise in New Jersey.
Recognizing that these federal agencies have budget pressures not unlike our own, we can't
reasonably expect full federal participation in a dozen or so post-emergency exercises each year;
which leaves us with the question — how can we maximize our ability to work together in a "real
event" while at the same time "living within our means"?
The answer, we feel, is to adopt a regional approach to radiological emergency preparedness. For
the past year and a half, we have been working with the Federal Emergency -Management Agency
(FEMA) in its Strategic Review of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) program. One
of the areas looked at in this review covered alternative means of demonstrating "reasonable
assurance" that state and local governments can and will take actions to protect the public in the
event of a radiological incident. "Alternative means" here describes an alternative to the current
state-by-state evaluation of capabilities through review and approval of radiological emergency plans
and the evaluation of REP exercises. In our comments back to FEMA, we noted several issues.
Among these is our opinion that no state has within its own resources the capability to deal with the
broad range of issues resulting from a major radiological incident. We also noted that merely filling
in all the slots in the organization chart of a post-emergency response organization will oVerextend
all but the largest state radiation control programs.
In order for a regional approach to work, there are several components which would need to be in
place. The first of these components is the establishment of mutual aid agreements between states
to allow them to assist each other during emergencies. In the southern United States, we have an
agreement known as the Southern Mutual Radiological Assistance Plan, or SMRAP, which is exactly
this sort of mutual aid agreement I'm speaking of. Unfortunately (or fortunately, depending on how
you look at it), we have never truly exercised this plan, thus we don't really know for certain how we
will work together under the pressure of an actual incident. Another vehicle for inter-state
cooperation is the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, or EMAC — a broader mutual aid
agreement than SMRAP in that it deals with all emergencies and disasters, not just radiological
emergencies.
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The second component needed for the regional approach to work is a change in the manner in which
radiological exercises are conducted and evaluated. Currently, each state which has a nuclear power
plant within or near its borders is required to demonstrate several post-emergency objectives, once
every six (6) years. I'm not going to take a position one way or the other as to the frequency of this
evaluation, but the aspect that is the most troublesome is that the evaluation presumes that each state
will be dealing with all aspects "on its own". All states rely heavily on federal resources, such as the
Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center, or FRMAC, and the Aerial Monitoring
System, or AMS, for dealing with both short-term and long-term issues following a major
radiological incident, and we contend that evaluation of state and local governments without realistic
involvement from these assets is misleading and inappropriate. The regional approach would allow
for realistic interaction between states and the federal government, and would be designed to provide
a "real capability" for "real incidents" % not just a capability that we "demonstrate" for exercise'
evaluation purposes.
The regional approach that we propose would involve multiple states and federal agencies in
regionally-based exercises designed primarily to develop those capabilities required to effectively
deal with post-emergency issues. Particularly critical here is the ability for representatives of various
government and private entities to work together towards a common goal.
Although these exercises may to a large extent deal with the "radiological" issues of post-accident
environmental monitoring and protective action decision-making, they should also deal with the
"human needs" issues that will be discussed here. The model for these exercises is somewhere
between a Federal Field Exercise, or FFE—which mostly have involved federal agencies interacting
with a single state — and the HANDSHAKE series of FRMAC exercises, which have involved
several states bringing their personnel and equipment to a single site, such as Nevada Test Site or
Savannah River Site, and exercising the main functional areas of the FRMAC. We envision no more
than one such regional exercise per year, with rotation of the exercises between regions although I
haven't given much thought to whether those should be EPA regions — NRC regions — DOE
regions — or FEMA regions.
Participation in such regional exercises should be voluntary, but there should be some "incentive"
involved to motivate states to participate. The incentive that we propose is that participation in
regional exercises be deemed adequate to demonstrate "reasonable assurance" at least for
post-emergency issues.
What are the benefits to this approach? First, and perhaps foremost, is that regional exercises will
allow each state to participate in a radiological exercise with its neighboring states and the "federal
family" within a reasonable period of time. And — we'll get to work with the federal family
side-by-side, as colleagues, instead of merely being "evaluated" by them. Second, this approach
holds the promise of resulting in a truly enhanced national response capability for radiological
incidents. This has the added side benefit of allowing FEMA to make a much more definitive
statement regarding "reasonable assurance". Third, the enhanced interaction between federal and
state governments will allow us to finally answer the question "just what do the states want"? — and
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allow us to identify those assets and capabilities that, regardless of budget pressures, cannot be
allowed to erode. Last, but certainly not least, is that we estimate that the total cost to federal, state
and local governments and utilities will be less to conduct one regional exercise per year than to
conduct several individual state exercises.
I want to leave you with one last thought on post-emergency issues... and it's something that Frank
has already said once this morning. "Expect the unexpected". Each incident will take on a "life of
it's own" % its own unique identity. Andrea Pepper and I know that some issues that may be
extremely important in Illinois might be inconsequential in Georgia — and vice versa. And
regardless of how well we plan — it's always going to be more complicated than we think, take more
effort than we think, and require more resources — time and money — than we think.
Thank you for your time this morning. I hope that all of you have an enjoyable meeting.
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Questions and Answers
The questions and answers listed below were presented at the end of the Keynote session.
They pertain only to the Keynote paper presented by James C. Hardeman, Jr., State Government
Perspective on Post-Emergency Response Issues.
Q: The interaction between the State and Federal governments in implementing a regional
approach to radiological emergency preparedness was discussed. What about interaction
with local authorities?
A: The role of local agencies needs to be included in a regional approach to emergency
preparedness. However, the question is how to implement a regional approach that
includes local agencies.
Q: The State of North Carolina has participated with the State of South Carolina in the
Oconee exercise. I commend this approach because it was very helpful to us to work
with them in an actual power plant exercise. How far has the idea of a regional approach
gotten and has the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors finalized a plan?
A: If the States think this is a good approach, then the States need to say something about it.
The States need to respond within the next 45 days, because the Strategic Review of the
Radiological Emergency Preparedness paper was issued in the Federal Register today
(September 9, 1998).
Q: When the plume phase was discussed, sheltering and evacuation were the only protective
measures that were mentioned. With Chernobyl, there was a five or six day plan. Would
you recommend us to shelter for five or six days, or do you find this impractical? Also,
you avoided use of iodine prophylaxis. This was used in Chernobyl. Can you comment
on this?
A: The plan we follow here in the United States is primarily based on evacuation to get
people out of the exposure pathways.
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Conference Summary
The presentations, and the question and answer sessions, covered a wide variety of topics
and issues that are likely to be encountered during the post-emergency response phase of a
nuclear accident. The following topics were discussed at the conference sessions:
lessons learned from Chernobyl;
lessons learned from actual events;
clean-up levels;
monitoring, measurement, and modeling;
social and humanitarian issues;
lessons learned from exercises and actual events other than Chernobyl;
agriculture, forestry, and land issues;
protective actions;
public health issues; and
outreach and legal issues.
Common themes that surfaced throughout the conference include the need to focus on social and
psychological effects, and the importance of public participation and public .outreach.
A summary of each conference session, including questions and answers, is provided
beginning on the next page.
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Track 1 Sessions
A summary is provided for each session in this Track. The summaries list speakers,
identify the papers that each speaker presented during the session, and provide highlights of the
presentations, including questions and answers.
Session A, Track 1: Monitoring, Measurement, and Modeling I
This topic was presented in two conference sessions. A summary of Monitoring,
Measurement, and Modeling n, presented in Track 1, Session E, is provided in on page 37.
Speakers:
1. Kenneth G.W. Inn, NIST, and Simon Jerome, National Physical Laboratory, "Summary
of 15-17 October 1997 Workshop: Rapid Radioactivity Measurements in Routing and
Emergency Situations."
2. David Garman, John Griggs, Rhonda Cook, EPA/ORIA/NAREL, "EPA's
Environmental Radiation Ambient Monitoring System (ERAMS) Role in Post-
Emergency Response."
3. Philippe Renaud, Henri Maubert, Karin Beaugelin, Philippe Ledenvic, The Nuclear
Protection and Safety Institute, "Combined Use of Modeling and Measurement Results in
Post-Accidental Situations."
4. Presented by Kenneth V. Krieger, written by Dr. Ian S. Hamilton, E.A. Thompson, J.M.
Thompson, Texas A&M University, Dept. of Nuclear Engineering, "Agricultural Impact
of Accidents Postulated for Missions Proposed for the US DOE Pantex Plant.
The discussion at this session focused on how to effectively identify, quantify, and
monitor radionuclides to assess health and environmental impacts resulting from national and
international emergencies. The speakers stressed the importance of having methods and
protocols in place for conducting radioanalyses during an emergency and conducting assessments
for remediation, decontamination, and decommissioning programs.
Highlights
*- Modeling is essential — through modeling, the extent of an accidental radiological release
on health and the environment can be assessed and potential emergency measures to
protect populations can be planned and implemented.
»• State-of-the-art methods for measurement and monitoring should be utilized.
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> Investing in the development of new methods and instruments to meet future needs is
essential.
>• Several methods are available for determining the potential impact of a radiological
accident on agriculture (e.g., calculation of derived response levels for possible exposure
pathways, and the HotSpot computer code).
>• EPA is reconfiguring the Environmental Radiation Ambient Monitoring System
(ERAMS) to focus on nuclear emergency preparedness. ERAMS' enhanced mission will
include providing data for nuclear emergency response assessments; providing data on
ambient levels of radiation in the environment for baseline and trend analysis; and
informing the general public and public officials about levels of radiation in the
environment.
Questions and Answers
Q: Is there going to be a summary report that puts forth recommended procedures (e.g.,
scenario dependent procedures for sampling various media following a nuclear reactor
accident, or a terrorist use of an improvised nuclear device)?
A: No, we did not discuss specific scenarios. We talked more about analytical procedures
and what kind of information would be needed to create a good analytical procedure. We
also talked about what new methodologies have been developed over the last year or two.
Q: Data quality objectives (DQOs) were mentioned and that they need to be tied in with the
labs very early on. What I am sensing from your discussion is that the lab and field
people have not yet gotten together on this.
A: It is probably more like the policy-makers, the regulatory people, and the lab people to be
exact. I do not think they have gotten together on this, and they have said that this is what
is needed and wanted.
Q. Presumably, a lot of analyses will be required at the site area. Will the enhanced ERAMS
use up the available laboratory time?
A: It should not under emergency conditions. The National Air and Radiation
Environmental Laboratory (NAREL) will be placed on an accelerated status and will
work around-the-clock. We also have mobile laboratories that will be sent out into the
field to do gross alpha, beta, and gamma analyses. Some of the actinide analysis may
take a little longer due to the inherent nature of the chemical separation, but since daily
turnaround on practically all of the analyses will occur, there should not be any problem.
For example, we went through this situation during Chernobyl.
Q: What is the annual price tag of this system? Are you indicating that you have a one-day
turnaround time on your sample analyses? What is the statistical coverage that this
system provides based on the locations of all nuclear utilities and all major cities that
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would be a potential location for a nuclear incident or accident? Exactly what is the
efficacy of only three hundred monitoring stations in covering the total CONUS
(Continental United States) area?
A: In response to the first question, finances play an important part in reconfiguring
ERAMS. ERAMS has been in business since 1973. Under the reconfiguration, there is
not going to be a significant change in the number of stations. The location of the
stations will change to more efficiently cover the population (e.g., major metropolitan
areas) to provide broad-based geographical coverage. Our sampling frequencies will be
reduced to improve the cost-effectiveness and we are going from monthly analyses down
to twice-yearly on many different samples to provide better cost-effectiveness. As far as
the second question, for a gamma analysis, we can get a sample in and perform the
analysis in one day and have the data generated and available to go out the next day. As
mentioned previously, the actinide analysis may take a little longer due to the inherent
nature of chemical separation but, under emergency conditions, the analysis could be
ready in three to four days.
Q: How do you ensure quality of the measurements?
A: We have a very extensive quality assurance program at NAREL and we are working
under the reconfigured ERAMS — we are following the DQO approach. We also are
following all Occupational Safety and Health Administration health and safety
procedures. Our data is verified, re-verified, and double-checked before it is sent out.
Q: What about the use of the HotSpot computer code? I had talked to someone at Lawrence
Livermore a year ago and he indicated to me that the code had not been benchmarked or
validated. Has the code been benchmarked?
A: I think that they are working on that right now. We are doing some work at Texas A&M
on HotSpot to incorporate specific parameters. For example, there is a default value that
we are working on to better quantify the particle size and wind direction.
Q: Was the dose analyzed by direct inhalation by people who might be in the plume versus
dose from ingestion of contaminated foodstuffs?
A: I think direct inhalation was performed. However, the numbers indicate that it was not as
great of a dose as if the material was ingested.
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Session B, Track 1: Lessons Learned from Actual Events (Non-Chernobyl)
Speakers:
1. Marcos C. Ferreira Moreira, Commissao National de Energia Nuclear, "Experience of
Managing the Response to a Damaged Source in Gioania, Brazil."
2. Presented by Dorothy Meyerhof, Health Canada, Radiation Protection Bureau (written
by Alan H. Robitaille, Maple Bay, Canada), "Operation Morning Light: Recovery of
Debris from Cosmos 954."
3. A.R. Denman, P. Morgan, S. Tomlinson, Northampton General Hospital Trust, "The
Response to Deleted Uranium Turnings Dumped in Northamptonshire."
4. James F. Nicolosi, Gerard Policastro, Richard McGinley, Safety and Ecology Corp.,
"Post Emergency Management Issues Following Inadvertent Melting of Radioactive
Sealed Sources."
5. William Belanger (written by Paul Charp), EPA Region HI, "Graded Decision
Guidelines for Public Health Activities ~ Lansdowne, Pennsylvania."
Speakers at this session shared their experience in responding to a variety of actual
radiological contamination events. These events involved the improper removal of radioactive
material from an abandoned building in Brazil, recovery of debris from the Cosmos 954 satellite,
contamination of steel plants by radioactive scrap metal, contamination of land by depleted
uranium, and contamination of homes from radium and radon.
Highlights
> Lessons learned from the actual events were considered applicable to future radiological
accidents, even though the circumstances of each incident were unique in terms of the
cause and effect of the radiological contamination (e.g., number of people affected, effect
on the environment, and actual threat posed by the contamination).
> Experience with wide-spread cesium contamination demonstrated that radiological
accidents become worse as the time of discovery elapses. Records of radioactive sealed
sources should contain information on physical and chemical properties.
*• A general public information system should be established to inform citizens of radiation
matters, and social and psychological support should be provided for the response team
and persons affected by the accident.
> Far more response personnel are required in adverse environments (e.g., North Canada)
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than are needed in more moderate climates.
> Response decision guidelines should be established to provide a uniform process for
response personnel to apply in the performance of their duties.
* Steel manufacturers typically are not experienced in handling radioactive waste and often
do not have the financial resources to handle the consequences of accidentally melting
radioactive sources.
»• Steel manufacturers should prepare emergency plans that cover termination of operations
in the event of a radioactive source melting incident. These plans should include points
of contact for governing regulatory authorities, waste management and disposal options,
and cleanup procedures and instructions.
Questions and Answers
Q: Heavy winter conditions existed at the time the Cosmos 954 debris was recovered. Were
there any weather-related problems or cold problems with the survey instruments?
A: The sodium iodide crystals cracked. I think the Geological Survey equipment was
protected, but some of the crystals in the American equipment cracked.
Q: Other than the standard reports of debris from the lake area, have you ever had any other
pieces of the Cosmos 954 satellite appear?
A: No, I do not believe any debris was found after the search was concluded. A very
organized search was conducted, which included an aerial survey. When the fixed wing
aircraft detected something, a helicopter would be sent in to pinpoint the find. Then, a
marker would be dropped and another helicopter would go in and pick up the debris and
take it out. I understand that they flew a very methodical grid over the entire area.
Q: Where did the farmer get the depleted uranium? Was there a control system that was
avoided?
A: The answer is yes, but I had hoped that I would be able to come here with a definitive
answer as to where it had come from. It has been discovered who dumped the material
and they are in the process of being taken to court. I had hoped that the case would have
gone to court a couple of weeks ago, and I would be able to say who dumped the
radioactive material.
Q: What was the magnitude of the cesium source that was melted at the steel- plant?
A: Some back calculations were performed, I believe it was estimated to be 200 millicurie.
Q: That seems to be a very small amount for which to shut down a production plant. I know
steel mills regularly melt 5 to 10 millicurie of cobalt in their ware lining and I was
wondering what the cutoff for a situation like that is?
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A: The decision goes by release criteria — whatever a particular State's release criteria are
and whatever the corporate folks want to deal with. It is sometimes difficult to back
calculate these things. I would say that for most of these sources these are level gate
instances anywhere from 200 millicurie to up to a curie of cesium-137.
Q: Did any of the EPA off-site monitoring sites detect this release or this meltdown?
A: No, it volatilizes and it is in the dust at the bag house. In one sense, it is contained
somewhat to the local site. It is interesting that cesium partitions out of itself. Not in
steel apparently, which is different than cobalt 60 — I think which does go into steel. It is
localized. It is easily detected by incoming monitors, because sometimes these are
measured in the 10 micro-r per hour range. So, it is a low concentration.
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Session C, Track 1: Lessons Learned from Exercises
Speakers:
1. William Belanger, EPA Region m, "Lessons Learned from the 1997 Lost Source
Exercise."
2. Cheryl Rogers, Nebraska Health & Human Services - Regulation and Licensure,
'"Nebraska's '97 Ingestion Exercise: Communication through Two Phases of Response."
3. Michael Sharon, Maryland Department of the Environment, Nuclear Power Plant
Emergency Division, "Post-Emergency Planning and Exercises: Lessons Learned from
CALVEX 97."
4. Denys Rousseau, Institut de Protection et de Surete Nucleaire, "The Russian-French
Collaboration in the Radiological Post-Accidental Area."
5. Malcolm Crick, IAEA, "International Guidance on Emergency Response Preparedness."
The speakers at this conference session demonstrated that valuable experience can be
gained from conducting response exercises and that the experience gained in simulated situations
can be applied to actual radiological accidents. One of the response exercises involved the loss
of contaminated material and was conducted by EPA's Region m and State and local response
agencies. Another exercise involved an ingestion pathway event demonstrated by the State of
Nebraska at Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station. The State of Maryland also conducted an ingestion
pathway exercise, which involved the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Plant. Additionally, a series of
exercises conducted by Russia and France that focused on a variety of response parameters were
described. The response parameters included database specifications, measurement and
sampling procedures, communications, technical intervention processes for decontamination, and
management of post-emergency accident consequences.
Highlights
*• Overall, it was recognized that the opportunity to participate in a response exercise is
valuable and that after an exercise, it is important to incorporate the lessons learned in the
existing response plans and procedures.
> Confidence in the ability to manage a radiological emergency response can be renewed
and strengthened, and working relationships between emergency responders can be
solidified and improved by conducting exercises.
>• Responding entities (e.g., private industry, and local governments) may have their own
goals and priorities during a response, and these goals and priorities are dynamic and may
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evolve as the situation develops.
* Federal officials need to recognize that the States differ greatly in their capabilities and
their needs.
*• Local governments may play a significant role in emergency response and must not be
overlooked during planning or response activities.
i
*• Private sector capabilities and constraints are highly variable and will need to be
considered on a case-by-case basis.
Questions and Answers
Q: The unified command was discussed. It was mentioned that the unified command would
be in charge and that the local and State governments would have no control except to
replace the commander. Who has control of the unified command and who would make
an authoritative decision?
A: I think you have a mistaken impression. The misimpression is that the unified command
would usurp State authority. That is incorrect. The unified command includes the State.
The State's responsibility, even under the National Contingency Plan (NCP), is protecting
the public. The unified command would never get involved unless the State requested
assistance. The NCP is a mechanism under which we can render assistance from the
Federal government in an unified manner. Concerning usurping authority, what the
unified command does is prevent the political influences, both at the State and Federal
level, from interfering with the response. This occurs because the NCP has force of law
and it specifically designates the on-scene commander as the person who makes the
decisions. The on-scene commander at the Federal level would be either the Coast Guard
or EPA. It is pre-designated, that person is not going to usurp State authority. The
Federal on-scene commander will ask the State for its opinion and what it wants to do.
The Federal on-scene commander has the legal authority to implement the State's
recommendations under force of law. With the unified command concept, the State is an
integral part of the unified command.
Q: In your exercise, why did you not request the higher spatial and spectral resolution Aerial
Measurements Operations assets? For example, we have helicopters that can give you
spectral information. This asset can give you spatial resolution on the order of tens of
feet. We also have germanium detection systems, ground-based systems, systems
mounted to vehicles.
A: Basically, the plume phase was over. We had the fly-over and we had one evening to
collect information so that the next day the decisionmakers could switch gears and go into
the intermediate phase. I think we would have many fly-overs. That would be just the
start of it.
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Q: I have the impression that everything was good with the Federal and the State relationship
in the ingestion pathway exercise. What was different in Nebraska versus Maryland?
A: There were discussions about the significance of the technical data. Overall, the
interactions were excellent and there was opportunity for us to work out our differences.
I thought that the interactions went well; however, we were unsure about how we might
work out some differences in opinion between Federal agencies and State agencies. The
point was that at all times, the Federal agencies supported the State. There was no sense
that anybody was coming in and trying to take over.
Q: The focus this morning was mostly on ingestion pathway exercises and the need to
establish exactly what dose rates and contamination levels exist after the plume traverses
a given region. The issue seems to be what and how isotope-specific aerial deposition
measurements are acquired as soon as possible post-accident. Then, rapidly gathering the
intelligence on land, use that to feed into some type of pathway model such as RESRAD
to assess doses upon which you implement PAGs. After these exercises, are there general
recommendations made on what organic assets are required in the field — radio-analytical
measurements, in-situ gamma spectrometry? Is there an on-call chain to the necessary
assets to respond to a large-scale reactor accident or improvised nuclear device where the
organic assets local to the incident may be destroyed or put out of commission due to the
accident? Does the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP) address
bringing DoD assets to these types of scenarios and accidents?
A#l: You saw day one of our exercise. Four field teams, twenty sample points, and a fly-over.
That was to do the basic cut to decide where we needed to keep working. We do that for
the next sixty days. The asset that I wanted right away was a fly-over. I needed to find
out quickly what I thought was clean versus dirty. Also, I wanted that gamma
spectrometry instrument because I needed some ground truth. I have found that a fly-over
does not provide enough information, so instrumentation on the ground is vital. The
gamma spectrometry identifies what the isotopes are and the isotopes must be identified
to make the translation of what the dose rate is that will equal the two rem per year. Once
I knew the dose rate, 3.7 mr per hour at a uniform deposition, then a regular portable
survey meter can be used and the gamma spectrometry for the whole area is not needed.
The gamma spectrometry is initially needed at enough points to build some assurance that
the contamination was uniform or not uniform. If contamination was not uniform, then a
different strategy would have been taken. The problem is to manage not only the assets,
but the information flow.
A#2: One of the things about an ingestion exercise is that very few samples get taken to a lab.
There is very seldom any demonstration of large-scale laboratory capability. There is a
presumption that there will be capabilities out there that the States can draw on, including
our Federal agencies and perhaps the DoD assets. The Chernobyl accident is teaching us
that it is extremely important to get a handle on the iodines very early on, especially if
you have a very rapid pathway from the farm to the consumer. We, in the Federal
government, tend to think in terms of "we established a dose and if the foodstuff has a
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low enough concentration that you won't exceed that dose, that people might actually eat
it." This is where the difference is. The State takes a somewhat different stand on this
that if it is contaminated and you can measure it, even if it is going to be below these
PAGs, people are probably not going to eat it.
Q: Was the extent and scope of Federal participation imbedded into the exercise? For
example, how they were going to interact with the State? Did you learn something that
you are going to incorporate in your plans in terms of long-term Federal and State
interface regarding ingestion issues?
A: Federal participation was in the plan for our decisionmakers. We had a technical
advisory group which did the number crunching, and we had significant Federal
interaction as well as an ingestion pathway coordinating committee. We found that we
are going to need more State people. Our plan, even with the small amount of Federal
participation, could not conceive of the amount of assets that are going to be available
and that we will need to interact with, as well as the amount of information that we are
going to have to process.
Q: I have noticed that your modeling included a great deal of information from air pathways
and then deposition. I was wondering if the material is down on the ground, do you
consider it being transported via waterways? Is it considered a part of the plan? If it is,
what is your physical plan for diverting or stopping it?
A: I am not sure what is written in the plan, but we do pull water from the Missouri River for
the city of Omaha, so definitely we would be collecting samples to see if there was
anything. Yes, there will be some runoff into the river no matter what you do when you
have that much deposition. It would need to be sampled and it would take a lot of work.
Q: There is some Federal guidance on the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment
Center (FRMAC) which consists of several bright yellow manuals that contain everything
from forms to template procedures. Our organization has been attempting to get in step
with that, we are not there yet. Are you currently using some of that guidance? It is
apparently meant to help all of us to be speaking from the same sheet of music when the
Federal government comes in and all these assets are made available to us. Are you using
any of that FRMAC guidance for your own programs and exercises?
A: We have not had the manpower to do all that. As far as the ingestion calculations, I
believe we did use the methodology to determine the dose rate line, because there was a
slight difference between EPA 400 and how they did it in the FRMAC. When we did it
the FRMAC way we encountered some problems in doing it that way. I think you need to
know what the Federal government is doing, so you can understand when those
differences come up. For example, we found that out in the 1993 exercise that the
Federal government wanted to reject our data because it was not on their forms.
Q: Did any of the exercises that you conducted involve a weekend? The reason is quite
simple. In 1986, the first information on the Chernobyl accident became known in
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Europe on a Wednesday and the next day, a Thursday, was a holiday. This was the main
reason why it was so difficult to react to the accident, because many of the scientists and
all of the response authorities were on an extended weekend. They came back to the
office the following Monday. Only a few had decided to come back earlier. Since that
time, I am absolutely convinced that being prepared for an accident has to consider such
complications. It is only of limited use to make exercises on a Monday and Tuesday
when everyone is at the office and knows in advance that there will be an exercise. I am
convinced that real life is much more difficult.
A#l: While we did not run our exercise on a weekend, the closest we came to simulating some
of those conditions is that the first day of the exercise occurred in the evening and then
we turned around early the next day and started up again. So, many of the
decisionmakers had been out until one or two in the morning and came back in under
conditions of less than optimal amounts of sleep. They were operating in a tired state and
the exercise stretched on for a couple of days. We were able to simulate some of the
fatigue that would come in a protracted incident of this nature.
A#2: There was a real incident that happened three weeks before our lost source exercise was
scheduled. It was so close to our lost source scenario, some people were calling me and
saying that they thought the exercise was in three weeks. This was an americium source
that found its way into an automotive scrapyard and the source was comprised. It was
about a hundred millicurie, so there was substantial contamination of the facility. We had
a unified command team. This was on a Friday afternoon. That Friday, I had just come
home from the hospital from minor surgery, so I was home. The head of the
Pennsylvania agency was out on his sailboat on the Potomac. We had a guy from the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission whose son was in the hospital for an operation, so he
was standing by in the waiting room. We had a unified command over the telephone.
The fellow on the boat in the Chesapeake was hooked up by his cell phone, I was on the
telephone from my home, another guy on the telephone from the hospital. A few other
people were in their offices and that was the way we did it. This was as close to a
weekend situation that you can get. You can do it, but it requires some flexibility in
communications.
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Session D, Track 1: Agriculture, Forestry, and Land Use Issues
Speakers:
1. Rudolf M. Alexakhin, S.V. Fesenko, N.I. Sanzharova, Russian Institute of Agricultural
Radiology and Agroecology, Radiation Biology and Medicine Section, "Problems of
Agroindustrial Production on Contaminated Territories and Principles of their
Rehabilitation."
2. Dr. Gerald Kirchner, Carol Salt, Herbert Lettner, Hanne Solheim Hansen, and Seppo
Rekolainen, University of Bremen, Dept. of Physics, "Integrated Long-Term Management
of Radioactively Contaminated Land: The Ceser Project."
3. Dr. Barbara Rafferty, H. Synnott, D. Dawson, Radiological Protection Institute of
Ireland, "Remediation Options for Agricultural Land: Evaluation and Strategy
Development."
4. Dr. Maria Belli, Barbara Rafferty, Hugh Synnott, Umberto Sansone, Italian
Environmental Protection Agency, "Countermeasures in Forest Ecosystems: A
Preliminary Classification in Term of Dose Reduction and Ecological Quality."
5. Pamela Russell, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Radiation and Indoor
Air and Minnie Malik, U.S. Department of Agriculture, "Overview of Phytoremediation
as a Remediation Technology for Soils/ Next Steps for Phytoremediation: A Response
Technology."
Several interesting topics were discussed at the Agriculture, Forestry, and Land Use
Issues session, including the use of countermeasures in agroindustrial production,
countermeasures to soil contamination and forest ecosystems, and remediation strategies for
agricultural land.
Highlights
> The control of radionuclide flux in agricultural chains (e.g., soil-farm, crops-farm, and
animals-human diet) reduces concentrations of radionuclides in foodstuffs.
> The effectiveness of countermeasures for mitigating contamination in agriculture depends
on several factors including the elapsed time after radiation fallout, specific features of
agriculture production, and natural conditions (e.g., primarily soil type).
>• New approaches to remediating soils contaminated with radionuclides are being
developed. For example, phytoremediation (phytoextraction or phytostabilization)
currently is being tested and used.
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*• Countermeasures used to mitigate contaminated soil benefit both human health (through
dose reduction) and the functioning and economic value of agro-ecosystems.
>• The benefits of remediation to agriculture (e.g., economic value) may equal or outweigh
the benefits to human health.
»• A wide range of potentially useful agricultural countermeasures exist (e.g., soil-based
additives and production management).
»• Strategies to remediate agricultural land should include a cost-benefit analysis that
considers production losses, applicability, acceptability, and social and environmental
costs.
*• Forest ecosystems are sources of radiation exposure and require careful management.
Nine years after the Chernobyl event, radiocesium concentrations in plants grown in
forests and in meadows have not declined significantly. Meat and milk from animals
grazing on clearings, mushrooms, wild berries, and game contribute to radioactive
exposure to man.
>• Very little research has been targeted specifically at forest ecosystems. The application of
agricultural countermeasures to forests has not been tested for the most part.
Questions and Answers
Q: Because clay minerals are notorious for trapping contaminants, how does the percentage
of clay in soil affect the effectiveness of phytoremediation?
A: It is one of the things that we intend to look at. We are still working on the first phase
where we are trying to determine which plants would take up which radionuclides. In the
next phase we want to start working in greenhouses and in the field and to see which
would be the appropriate soils or inappropriate soils. I think that we will have some
clues. I work with a colleague who is an expert on kds and we will work with him to help
us with some predictions.
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Session E, Track 1: Monitoring, Measurement, and Modeling II
This topic was presented in two conference sessions. A summary of Monitoring,
Measurement, and Modeling I, presented in Session A, Track 1, is provided in on page 24.
Speakers:
1. Dr. Oleg V. Voitsekhovitch and Dr. M. Zheleznyak, Ukrainian Hydrometeorological
Institute, "Aquatic Countermeasures in the Chernobyl Zone: Decision Support Based on
Field Studies and Mathematical Modelling."
2. Dr. James S. Ellis, T.J. Sullivan, R.L. Baskett, Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, "Dose Refinement: ARAC's Role."
3. Presented by Dr. Terry Hamilton, written by Dr. Joseph H. Shinn, Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, "Post-Accident Inhalation Exposure and Experience with
Plutonium."
4. Presented by Dr. Bruce Biwer, Argonne National Laboratory, Environmental
Assessment Division, written by Dr. S. Y. Chen and Dr. Bruce Biwer, Argonne National
Laboratory, Environmental Assessment Division), "Post-Accident Clean-Up Analysis for
Transportation of Radioactive Materials."
5. Victor Poyarkov, European Centre of Technogenic Safety, "Using Chernobyl
Experience to Develop Methods and Procedures of Post Accident Monitoring."
6. Dr. Marvin Goldman, Department of Surgical and Radiological Sciences, University of
California, Davis, "Mitigation of Radioactive Contamination Impacts through Cloud
Seeding."
Speakers at this session discussed a wide-range of topics including aquatic
countermeasures undertaken at Chernobyl, dose refinement, post-accident inhalation exposure
and experience with plutonium, and post-accident cleanup for transportation of radioactive
materials.
Highlights
*• Modeling was key in simulating the effectiveness of potential aquatic countermeasures at
Chernobyl.
*• The main objectives of the water remedial activities that have been implemented at the
Chernobyl area since 1986 are to prevent significant secondary contamination of the
surface water bodies that are hydraulically linked with the areas of heavy fallout and to
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mitigate expansion of expected ground water contamination.
> Many remedial strategies have been proposed and used in the Chernobyl area (e.g:, dikes
and dams to divide water bodies, dredging of contaminated deposits, and alternative
water supplies).
*• The Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC) has considerable, proven
experience in dispersion modeling.
>• Environmental cleanup decisions for plutonium should be based on the potential risk to
human health. Removal of fragments and radioactive debris and potential land use need
to be considered to determine effective cleanup criteria.
>• Since plutonium concentrations decrease by 5 orders of magnitude in the first 20-30 days
following an accident, it is advised to postpone re-entry into the contaminated area until
after that time.
*• The contaminated areas from the Chernobyl accident provide the largest "laboratory" for
testing developed methods and procedures and should be used for developing post-
accident radiomonitoring methods and procedures.
> The computer modeling program RISKIND has shown to be a useful emergency response
planning tool for shipment .of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel.
Questions and Answers
Q: You mentioned the re-suspension factors and they ranged over a very short range of
numbers. Is that based on the particle size or something else? Have you looked at any
data relating re-suspension factor to particle size?
A: We typically do impact sampling as well, so we do have information on the plutonium
concentrations in different particle size ranges. The re-suspension factor is based on the
bulk particle in the air and does not take into account different particle size information.
Q: In the last graph you had sensible heat in units, I believe, of meters squared per second,
along with flux and re-suspension. What is the role of the sensible heat units?
A: This data was derived from temperature and heat fluxes at different heights. There was
some measurement made from collections of vertical arrays that were made at two meters
and down to the ground level. On the basis of that, we were able to calculate fluxes.
Now the data that you saw, it was intriguing to us that we saw coupling between the
energy that is there and the concentrations of air particulates.
Q: I know of a study that looked at agricultural accidents involving grain dust. One of the
interesting things that they found in their study was that certain sized particles in a
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contaminated environment reduced the exposure of the individual to the contaminant.
The researchers found that the contaminant was attracted to the particle and the particle
was of a size just large enough that it would not be inhaled. I suggest that research be
conducted to find a substance that would attract radioactive contaminants and that this
approach could help reduce the dose.
A: That might be helpful in situations where you want to reduce the potential for re-
suspension. The respirable fraction between 1-10 microns is really important. For most
cases this is of no use whatsoever, but for the few where it might be, it would be very
useful to have it pre-packaged and on the shelf. The technology is very simple if this ever
got put together and somebody researched it. If the benefit is only a twenty percent
reduction, we should say that and then it is finished, but I have a feeling that the result
might be better than a twenty percent reduction.
Q: Are non-radiological risks included in your accident impact assessment code? The reason
for my question is that I recently learned that non-enriched uranium is being transported
as uranium hexafluoride in Type A packages. The simple Type A packages, after serious
accidents, may react with air moisture or water to form hydrochloric acid which in the
acute phase may pose a major chemical risk, although the radiological risk of the uranium
is more or less absent.
A: Hydrochloric acid is a big concern. Argonne National Lab has just finished the draft
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for DOE. It has got about 50,000 twenty ton
cylinders of uranium hexafluoride sitting at Paducah and Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion
plants. A greater concern is the shipment of the hexaflouride. One of the options we
were looking at is the oxidation of the uranium hexafluoride into a stable oxide for
disposal or use. There is an immediate area around a cylinder that can be breached. It
has happened once. A uranium cylinder cracked when it was being moved at one of the
sites and it fell into the snow. No one was injured because the wind was blowing the
other way. The other accident happened in a closed area where the container split and
came in contact with water. A plume killed someone about fifty feet away due to the
inhalation of the hydrochloric acid. Generally, when there is a breach, the uranium
hexafluoride reacts and forms an oxide on the crust so in the end there is not a lot of
hexafluoride released. There is a small amount, but then the breach will crust over with
the stable oxide and there will be no more formation of the hexafluoride. Even if it falls
in the water, a stable crust will form quickly, although within a couple of minutes in the
immediate area there might be a problem with hexafluoride. Beyond that, it will crust
over and most of it will be protected by its oxide coating.
Q: I did some studies with a contractor on UF6 releases and I'm not sure what you are
referring to, but if UF6 is released, it reacts with moisture. It forms U2F2 which is very
soluble.
A: Right, but the reaction continues. It will continue to a stable oxide coating, at least that is
what I have been told. That is in a water environment. Even in the air, there are old
cylinders sitting at Oak Ridge right now that have corroded through and they have formed
an oxide chloride coating.
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Session F, Track 1: Clean-Up Levels and Session F, Track 2: Lessons Learned
from Chernobyl II
These two sessions were combined at the conference. Speakers for each topic are noted
below, followed by highlights of the discussion. Questions and answers for both topics follow
the highlights. The topic Lessons Learned from Chernobyl was presented in two sessions at the
conference. A summary of Lessons Learned from Chernobyl I, presented in Session A, Track 2
is presented on page 48.
Speakers for Session F, Track 1: Clean-Up Levels
1. Charles Meinhold, National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements,
"Philosophical Challenges to the Establishment of Reasonable Clean-Up Levels."
2. Dr. Vinod Mubayi and W. Trevor Pratt, Brookhaven National Laboratory, "Tradeoffs
between Post-Emergency Clean-Up Levels and Costs Following a Severe Accident
Release."
Philosophical challenges to establishing clean-up levels and tradeoffs between post-
emergency clean-up levels and costs were the focus of discussion at this conference session.
Highlights
*• The total cost of an accidental release can be expressed as the sum of the offsite
protective action costs and the health-related costs.
>• Health effects and offsite costs are inversely related, and the choice of an interdiction
limit is a trade-off between these two factors.
> During an accidental release of radioactive material, the first course of action will be to
keep individual exposures below the threshold of serious deterministic effects and
prevent any unacceptably high risks of stochastic effects in individuals.
Speakers for Session F, Track 2, Lessons Learned from Chernobyl II
1. Presented by Dr. A.S. Bohuslavsky, written by IP. Onyshchenko, V.M. Shestopalov,
and N.I. Panasyuk, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Radioecological Center
and Scientific-Technical Center, "Radio-Hydrogeochemical Monitoring of Area Adjacent
to the "Shelter" Object."
2. Dr. Ondrej Slavik, J. Moravek, M. Stubfia, M. Vladar, Nuclear Power Plant Research
Institute Trnava Ltd. in Slovakia, "Clean-Up Criteria and Technologies for a 137Cs-
contaminated Site Recovery."
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3. Presented by Dr. A.S. Bohuslavsky, written by V.M. Shestopalov, Yu.F. Rudenko, and
A.S. Bohuslavskyy, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Radioecological Center,
"Lessons of the Chernobyl NPP Accident Regarding Potable Water Supply."
The two speakers at this session focused their presentations on cleanup criteria and
technologies for a 137Cs-contaminated site recovery, lessons learned regarding providing a
potable water supply, and radio-hydrogeochemical monitoring.
Highlights
* Successful remedies for 137Cs-contamination of river banks include dilution/fixation of
contaminated top soil by clean cover on flat contaminated areas and removal/disposal of
top soil for steep banks.
* The clean cover technique sufficiently reduces the anticipated radiation risk and its price
is about 10 times lower compared to the standard removing/disposal technique.
>• Methods for monitoring surface and groundwater contamination need to be improved. At
Chernobyl, the pre-accidental system of surface and groundwater monitoring was
insufficient with respect to the amount of observation points, data types and condition,
system of analysis, and forecasting of water quality.
»• The Chernobyl accident has demonstrated that a system of radiohydrogeochemical
monitoring is needed to monitor groundwater contamination.
Questions and Answers for Session F, Tracks 1 and 2
Q: There were several cleanup levels that I saw posted, and I am not sure which one was
finally agreed to. Was it 1 Bq/g or 6 Bq/g, depending on the size of the area?
A: The cleanup level was 6 Bq/g on continuously contaminated banks. This activity
concentration is equal to 1 mSV potential risks from the loose soil scenario.
Q: The Health Physics Society's position for evacuation is under 10 rem. If you were
somewhere in between the 10 and 100 and something was not done, a knowledgeable
citizen might come back to you and say "you did not evacuate me. You did not do
something. I was possibly in an area where certain changes could have been noted in my
body."
A: I want you to realize that this is where it is always justified. You notice that what we are
talking about here is a range of values. In fact, that is a time where you should not have
to think about any of these issues, you do it. You are going to be thinking about them in
most cases.
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Q: There are only a few doctors at this conference, but it seems to me that we have totally
different point-of-views on the statistical value of life. If I talked to the parents, wives,
husbands or others about the statistical value of life, I think I would be punished and that
would be the last day I worked. I would think that we could reach a compromise. I am
concerned when you discuss sheltering, for instance. If we were sheltering people for
seven days, if I calculated the statistical value of sheltering for a day, it would be
enormous. I say that you have to contact and stay in touch with medical doctors from
time to time.
A: When you are a medical doctor, you are talking about individuals and you are talking
about making a decision for a particular individual. Of course, when we are talking about
a specific person and how we are going to treat them, we have to display all of the
compassion and resources to try and save them. Every human life is priceless. As
decisionmakers, we have to think about how these dollars that have been given to us by
the taxpayers (who expect to be saved to an infinite extent whenever anything happens),
but who are not willing to give another ten dollars to avoid a risk of 10~5. I am talking
about very, very small risks out here. The only thing I was trying to show was the
tradeoff that we are faced with making resource allocation decisions. In society, we make
these decisions all the time in designing safer roads, for example. How much should we
spend on erecting a guardrail? How much should we spend on surfacing? We spend a
number of dollars and we reach this decision through this risk management procedure, so
I am just applying the risk management procedure in a hypothetical situation.
Q: What was the early observable effect at Three Mile Island?
A: Psychological distress.
Q: What is the cost of curing one individual who has been damaged psychologically for a
long time? It far exceeds the cost of cancer.
A: Thank you for that very insightful point. My calculation was reported in terms of what is
currently used as a code for calculating these costs. New codes should include these
psychological effects. New codes need to include these effects, but unfortunately, so far,
the codes have focused more on measurable type of effects, which can be quantified in a
reasonable way. The codes do not include a medical type of psychological treatment
process.
Q: The fact is whenever the Office of Management and Budget looks at a regulation they
look at the willingness to pay issue. That is how the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) got to its two thousand dollars. No one asks what is this person's life worth.
They ask what are people willing to pay to reduce the risk of dying — from traffic
accidents, pesticides in food, it is all of the things which Federal regulations deal with.
Looking at those, the highest one was about four million dollars. It is that people are
willing to pay no more on average than four million dollars to prevent people from dying
from automobile accidents or the reason why they do not pay for scanning for prostate
cancer. If we really were serious, then everyone would have a colon cancer examination
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every year, but we are not serious about it and the fact that the amount of money spent in
terms of risk benefit is absurd for that. Radon in the house is a perfect example where we
know the risk is much greater than anything we are talking about for this and yet, no one
wants to deal with that issue except EPA and the National Council on Radiation
Protection and Measurement (NCRP).
A: Some of the EPA decisions, you will find it in the report that I referenced, imply a value
of life in excess of one hundred million dollars. The decision-making in this area is
hardly consistent. There are things that have not been done which would be five hundred
or two hundred and fifty dollars for a life saved and other actions that cost one hundred
million. That difference reflects politics and perceptions to some extent.
Q: One of the things that we seem not to have addressed at this conference is the holistic
nature of risk -- that there are a large number of other contributors. For instance, a risk
level of 10~3 was given for living in Denver. I would like to point out that the risk of
driving a car is roughly 10~2; the risk of smoking cigarettes, one pack a day is roughly
10"1; and the risk of just living in your house is around 10"3 from household accidents. If
you want to get down to 10"6 risk, you are talking about getting struck by lightning as an
appropriate analogy. When you confront people with this, you find some interesting
reactions because people react differently when you are talking about a large population
than they react when you are talking personally about them. I have had some experience
with interviewing people who had been living for ten to twenty years in houses with
radon in the thousands of picocuries per liter. These people were significantly at risk for
lung cancer and their question was what can I do about it now? The answer is, do you
smoke? If you stop smoking now, you can greatly reduce your risk of lung cancer. To
those individuals that was a very disappointing and unsatisfying answer. They wanted
someone else to do it for them. The dichotomy seems to be, especially with the radon in
houses, when we ask an individual, "what are you going to do to help yourself?," then,
the dollar value of life gets very low. When you ask an individual well, "what do you
want the government to do to save your life?," the dollar value of life gets very, very high
and that is a dichotomy that you are going to find throughout any risk assessment if you
start looking at it holistically. At this conference, we are looking at these really low risks
where if we want to be realistic with ourselves, once you get down below a one rem
exposure, we do not know what the risk is and we make assumptions, but we are dealing
with total unknowns. We are trying to quantify these things and there are other things out
there that we do know and could quantify.
A: No response was provided.
Q: We can debate whose life is significant and who's not, but the problem that concerns me
right now is the mixed message we are getting from the Federal government. During this
week, we have heard a lot about relaxing some of the requirements, but we have the NRC
and FEMA telling us that we have to alert and notify people outside of the ten mile EPZs
even though the PAGs are not exceeded. Of course, we also have that iodine issue, that
the NRC is giving the States the opportunity to excel. What I challenge the Federal
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A:
government to do is come up with a unified way that we are going to do business. Are we
going to relax what we are doing for the general public, or are we going to let everybody
know that they have a cloud coming over them, but tell them, "don't worry, you can go
back and eat your tomatoes" and stuff like that. We are the users of Federal government
resources and right now, I am getting mixed messages.
No response was provided.
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Session G, Track 1: Public Health Issues III
This topic was presented in three sessions at the conference. A summary of Public Health
Issues I, presented in Session D, Track 2, is provided on page 57. A summary of Public Health
Issues II, presented in Session E, Track 2, is provided on page 60.
Speakers:
1. Dr. Robert C. Ricks, ORISE, Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site
(REAC/TS), "Public Health Issues: Considerations for Post-Emergency Response."
2. Dr. Richard E. Toohey, REAC/TS, "Post-Emergency Response: Health Physics
Considerations."
3. Dr. Ronald E. Goans, Richard E. Toohey, Shirley A. Fry, Robert C. Ricks, REAC/TS,
"Medical Considerations for Post-Emergency Response of Radiation Accidents."
4. Shirley A. Fry, Oak Ridge Associated Universities, "Post-Emergency Response:
Epidemiological Considerations."
During this session, a panel of experts discussed a variety of post-emergency response
issues such as medical, epidemiological, and health physics considerations. A summary of the
panel discussion is provided below.
Highlights
*• A nuclear accident resulting in persons exhibiting acute radiation syndrome will have a
significant impact on the medical community and health care organizations — even after
the early problems of victim extrication, triage, trauma management, medical and
radiological assessment, decontamination, and supportive treatment are concluded.
*• The general principles of treatment will vary depending on whether an injured person
exhibits one or more effects from exposure to radionuclides (i.e., body surface
contamination with or without wounds, whole-body irradiation, acute local injury, and
internal contamination).
»• When many people are actually or potentially exposed, the majority of resources allocated
to recovery operations may well be involved in one or more aspects of health physics and
the logistical requirements of implementing the response can be enormous.
> Epidemiological follow-up of groups of persons "at risk" after an emergency event may
result in beneficial public health information that can be applied in future nuclear
accidents.
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Questions and Answers
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Are you concerned about the recent emphasis on the human radiobiological experiments?
It seems from the DOE study that the sin was not in irradiating people, but in making
measurements about it. Do you feel threatened by this in terms of an epidemiologist's
concern?
No, I do not feel threatened from that point of view, I would like to make a comment
about the radiation experiments. Essentially nothing new was found as a result of
spending $40 million on it. Nothing was discovered that was not already in the literature,
with exception of the identification of people involved (of which I have some problems
with from the people's point of view). No, I do not have problems with conducting
epidemiological studies provided the proper preparation has gone on before and if the
studies require consent from individuals, that consent has been obtained.
It was mentioned that health physicists are not the persons to provide information to the
public. I think they are the only appropriate ones in emergency situations. And, the
point is, don't you think that health physicists should give information the
decisionmakers need? How can we transform our knowledge into two simple words —
safe or unsafe? How can we do that? People want to know that.
I agree with you completely. The requirement is to provide binary information ~ safe or
unsafe. Unfortunately, I think the health physics community has become its own worst
enemy in this position by worrying about risk levels of 10"4 and 10"6. Once we define a
number, public acceptance says "O.K., anything above that number is unsafe." So, we
have sort of shot ourselves in the foot. The people who have to interpret and present
health physics data to decisionmakers or to the general public need specialized training in
communication that is normally not a part of our professional curriculum.
You mentioned 30 rad through the use of cytogenetics and the dycentric chromosomes.
Is there a practical minimum exposure that you can detect below that?
Fifteen is about our minimum detectable.
And what happens to the chromosomes? Do they repair themselves? If they disappear,
are they replaced?
The types of damage that showed the dycentrics, those are unstable and they will not be
replicated. There are other markers, translocations, for example, which will continue,
and, in fact, are still detectable in the A-bomb survivors today.
So you would have to make measurements fairly soon then.
Well, it is advisable to get them as early as possible. But you can still get dose estimates
based on the stable changes after many years, but as soon as you can get the sample and
do the test, the better.
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Q: What are some of the latest developments on treatment of cutaneous radiation injury?
A: There are growth factors in that area that are being used also. Most of the cuteanous
injury has been conservative management. There was an international conference last
week in Rotterdam and I think the best way to answer your question is that I did not
discover anything at that conference that would lead me to believe that there are any
significant advances in the approach to therapies to this type of injury, although, it is very
much needed since this is the most common type of radiation injury that is seen
worldwide.
Q: It is not the health physics community alone that needs communications skills, there are a
few other professions that do not do as well as they could. The challenge is for both
communities — the emergency management professionals and the social work community
-- to use their skills to bring professionals together and to communicate amongst each
other.
A: I agree with you completely. There recently has been an effort on the part of the Office of
Foreign Disaster Assistance to get individuals, like REAC/TS staff, involved in that kind
of process. It is very early, but your comments are right on the mark. And, secondly, one
of the advantages that we have over the years, I am talking over 25 years, is that we have
had a lot of experience in going from location to location providing training — medical-
based training, primarily. We have been on that firing line in every one of those cases,
particularly in regard to issues associated with the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)
project. We have been shot down a lot of times because we did not approach it the right
way. You change and you modify and you hope the next time that you do not get shot at
quite so hard. We are still learning.
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Track 2 Sessions
A summary is provided for each session in this Track. The summaries list speakers,
identify the papers that each speaker presented during the session, and provide highlights of the
presentations, including questions and answers.
Session A, Track 2: Lessons Learned from Chernobyl I
This topic was discussed in two sessions. A summary of Lessons Learned from
Chernobyl H, which was presented in Track 1, is located on page 40.
Speakers:
1. Volodymyr I. Kholosha, The Ministry of Ukraine of Emergencies and Affairs of
Population Protection from the Consequences of Chernobyl Catastrophe, "Managing the
Intermediate and Long Term Response to the Chernobyl Accident - Problems and
Perspectives."
2. Malcolm Crick, IAEA, "Summary of the Results of the 1996 IAEA/WHO/EC
Conference - One Decade after Chernobyl."
3. Spartak T. Belyaev, Russian Research Centre "Kurchatov Institute," "Development of
the Radiological Situation Following the Chernobyl Accident and Political and Social
Response to it - Implications for Emergency Preparedness."
4. Ole Harbitz, Lavrans Skuterud, Per Strand, Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority,
"Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident and Emergency Preparedness in Norway."
A wide range of topics pertaining to the Chernobyl accident were discussed at this
session. Representatives from Russia, Ukraine, and Norway spoke about their experience with
managing the intermediate and long-term response to the Chernobyl accident. Also discussed
were the results of the 1996 IAEA/WHO/EC Conference, the political and social response to the
Chernobyl event, and the effect of the Chernobyl accident on Norway.
Highlights
*• The most effective countermeasures at Chernobyl have proven to be evacuation, the
removal of children during the first year after the incident, clean-up of schools, and the
substitution of local food products with "clean" foods.
»• Twelve years after the Chernobyl incident, significant resources are being spent for long-
term protective measures such as monitoring of food products, restricting access to the
most contaminated regions, and implementing countermeasures in agricultural production.
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Some food products derived from animals that graze in semi-natural pastures, forests, and
mountain areas, and on wild foods (e.g., game, berries, mushrooms) are likely to be major
sources of internal doses in the future.
The attitude of the general population toward products from contaminated areas makes it
difficult for produce to be sold or exported, leading to reductions in local incomes.
Chernobyl was not only a large-scale radiological disaster, but also a social and
psychological one of even greater scale.
Social protection and social rehabilitation issues, in addition to radiological protection
concerns, need to be addressed in the event of a nuclear disaster. Social impacts from
Chernobyl include long-term distress for affected communities, community fragmentation
and division, and stigma and discrimination. Evacuation and resettlement have created
serious social problems such as difficulties adjusting to new living conditions, and a
negative attitude of the general population toward products originating from areas thought
to be contaminated.
Demographic indicators in regions contaminated from the Chernobyl accident have
worsened (e.g., the birth rate has decreased, and the work force is migrating from
contaminated to uncontaminated areas, creating shortages of labor and professional
staff).
An increased incident of thyroid cancer has been noticed among individuals who were
children at the time of the Chernobyl accident.
No consistent attributable increase has been confirmed either in the rate of leukemia or in
the incidence of any malignancies other than thyroid carcinomas resulting from the
Chernobyl accident.
Countermeasures to reduce external exposures at Chernobyl were relatively inefficient
while countermeasures to reduce the uptake of radioactive material into foodstuffs were
relatively efficient.
Mountainous and forest areas within Norway that are important production areas for
certain animal products received large amounts of radioactive fallout from Chernobyl.
Severely contaminated foodstuffs include meat from sheep, reindeer, game, and cattle,
and milk from goats and cattle. Freshwater fish also showed high radioactivity levels.
The human population within contaminated areas of Norway was subject to irradiation
from three sources after the fallout: external radiation from deposited radionuclides,
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inhalation of radionuclides from the air, and ingestion of radionuclides through
foodstuffs.
>• Measures introduced to protect the population in Norway from negative health
consequences were relatively extensive and resource demanding (e.g., interdiction of
food, use of cesium binders in animals, changing diet, and changing the slaughtering time
for reindeer and sheep).
Questions and Answers
Q: Immediately after the accident, there were many reports that attempts were made to
scavenge the plume cloud and wash radioactivity out before it reached population centers.
I have heard reports that yes, it did happen, and I have heard reports that no, it never
happened. Could either of you clarify that situation? Was cloud seeding used?
A: No attempt was made.
Q: You mentioned that there were 14 people who have died since the Chernobyl accident. Is
this is a subset of the 237 that were hospitalized or the 134 that were afflicted with acute
radiation syndrome?
A: I believe the 14 are a subset of the 134.
Q: What is the significance of that particular group? What sort of information are we
looking for from the group of 134 and from the 237 that would not be found in a larger
group of liquidators?
A#l: I am not a medical specialist. If you look at the epidemiology for 200,000 liquidators,
these are the ones that received the highest doses in 1986 and 1987. Typically, they
received greater than 100 m/SV. If you are trying to find statistical differences, a
reasonably large population and reasonably large doses are needed. In this size group, it
is not expected to detect hereditary disorders nor cancers that can be statistically
substantiated. With leukemia, there's a 20-25 percent increase in leukemia deaths
expected, but in the first ten years because of the latency period of radiation-induced
leukemia, this sort of increase should be found. To my knowledge, this has not been
substantiated.
A#2: It was decided that most of those 14 deaths were not radiation-related. I think the
question of whether there is or is not an increase in leukemia in either the children or the
liquidator populations is still one that needs to be decided. Some reports say that there
has been an increase in leukemia and other reports say no, there has not been an increase.
It is surprising that given the population size and the doses for those people living in the
thirty kilometer area that some increase has not been seen.
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Session B, Track 2: Social and Humanitarian Issues Following a Radiological
Accident
Speakers:
1. Dr. Jean-Pierre Revel, IFRC, "Red Cross Programme Responding to Humanitarian
Needs in Nuclear Disaster."
2. Dr. Steven M. Becker, University of Alabama at Birmingham, School of Social and
Behavioral Sciences, "Constructing More Effective Post-Emergency Responses: The
Human Services Component."
3. Peter T. Allen, European Institute of Health and Medical Sciences, University of Surrey,
"Modelling Social Psychological Factors After an Accident."
4. Presented by Robert DeMartino, U. S. Public Health Service, written by Brian Flynn,
U.S. Public Health Service, Center for Mental Health Services,."Emergency Events
Involving Radiation Exposure: Issues Impacting Mental Health Sequelae."
5. Dr. Britt-Marie Drottz-Sjoberg, Norwegian University of Science & Technology,
Department of Psychology, "Public Reactions Following the Chernobyl Accident -
Implications for Emergency Procedures."
Representatives from the International Federation Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies,
the Universities of Alabama and Surrey, the U. S. Public Health Service, and the Norwegian
University of Science and Technology spoke about the human services component of responding
to a nuclear accident. Also discussed was modeling social psychological factors after an
accident.
Highlights
> Considerable time has been required to discover the extent of damages caused by the
Chernobyl accident on the environment and even longer to assess the consequences of
affected populations, including cross-border effects on populations and the environment
(such as in Norway).
*- Twelve years after the explosion in Chernobyl, the need to continue humanitarian
assistance is more obvious than ever. The psychological impact of the disaster by far
overtakes the physical consequences.
> Despite the growing recognition of the importance of psychosocial factors following a
nuclear accident such as Chernobyl, only modest progress has been made in developing
the infrastructure needed for an improved response in this area.
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>• Research on post-emergency services and service-related issues (e.g., evaluation studies,
and case studies of interventions) is needed. Also needed is more international
information exchange, more education, and more training.
»• Studies conducted in the regions affected by Chernobyl have shown that psychological
factors can interact and affect behavior; therefore, social psychological factors should be
taken into account in the planning and execution of radiation protection policies.
Questions and Answers
Q: How do you measure psycho-social effects? Can you explain how they are manifested in
the population?
A: That is a complicated question and the answer is even more complicated. Psycho-social
impacts can be manifested in very broad ways. Such manifestations range from
depression, psychosomatic illness, and post-traumatic stress to things which take place at
a more social or community level (e.g., a breakup of community, loss of community
cohesion, and community conflict). The ways that psycho-social impacts can manifest
themselves are many and varied. There is substantial literature that documents these
impacts ranging from sociological literature that looks principally at communities, to
social-psychological literature, to clinical psychological and psychiatric literature.
Although different instruments or different approaches are used for looking at the
impacts, it is quite clear that the impacts on individuals, families, and communities are
quite profound and, in some cases, very long-lasting. Unfortunately, some of the effects
may be intractable as well.
Q: One of the things we do in our training courses is give examples of the way people deal
with contaminated food early on in an accident and we compare the British BSE problem
where there was considerable denial of risk. It is important during emergency planning to
determine whether a blanket withdrawal of foodstuff will occur or no action will be taken
until products have been checked. The approach to handling contaminated foodstuffs
significantly impacts emergency planning. Can you comment on this?
A: It is complicated. Those of us from Europe know that countries widely differ in their
basic cultural and economic set-up and their habits with respect to food. You see the
difference with the BSE. Response personnel must understand the cultural and economic
situation.
Q: When considering the stresses that you noted in people as a result of radiation exposure,
the thought occurs to me that I have seen more of this sort of thing from some folks that
live next to a facility where there are low level releases that have occurred for twenty or
thirty years as part of normal operations. When cancer or other types of diseases are
diagnosed in a community, residents become convinced that the illnesses are from illegal
activities (e.g., exposures in the middle of the night).
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A: One of the issues that keeps surfacing and not only in these kinds of instances, but in all
of the work that I am doing with chemical and biological weapons, is that the issue of risk
perception is enormous. There are very good social-psychological models for risk
perception and some of them are completely relevant for exactly the scenario you are
describing. One of the outcomes, the most interesting outcomes of these kinds of
theories, is that a small event, in which there is a large release of radiation and only a few
people are killed, will have much less widespread effect than an event where very little is
released, but over a wide area. This again has to do with people's risk perception. Where
does the risk perception come from? It often comes from where they get information.
For example, the media may attempt to present all sides in an equal, equitable, and fair
manner, but often, they focus on things that hurt and harm.
Q: I did not understand what you said about injuries after the Three Mile Island (TMI)
accident. Were you talking about stress-related problems? There were no doses reported
over 100 mr.
A: The most significant long-term health effect from TMI was anxiety and depression
resulting from unknown health consequences.
Q: You had mentioned that the newspapers, not the scientists and the technical personnel are
the ones that are talking with the community after the initial crisis. How are the
newspaper people getting information? Who are they talking to? Are they just
freelancing it?
A: The journalists conduct interviews with experts. Usually, the experts say, "Oh, they
didn't understand me right." I think the important thing is to have good communication
with the journalists who are knowledgeable and reporting in that area. There should be
personal communications and a communications network to ensure that there is a mutual
trust between experts and journalists.
Q: Is it possible though, that what I have witnessed during a crisis is that the newspapers and
the press are interested in selling air time and ads, so they tend to sensationalize or they
tend to bring out the bad portions of the accident? What is the angle that they are using?
Is it a positive or negative angle that would continue to cause distress to the people who
are reading and hearing the news? I know that you said that the press are the ones that are
talking to the people through the newspapers and the television and that they are talking
to the scientists, but somehow, there's a disconnect. Is that what you are saying?
A: I think one should differentiate between headlines and content. I think headlines you can
not do much about, but content, the text in the articles could be influenced so that the
journalists understand the importance of giving self-help in some way, telling people why
we recommend this, and the reason for it and then how they should act. For example, if
they should stay home because of an iodine situation, it must be explained why. The only
way to do a good job is to work together with journalists and the experts. The experts
and the journalists have to work that out together.
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Q: I am not involved much in public relations, but what I hear in our agencies, and our State,
is that from the very beginning information must be very carefully worded and must be
consistent throughout when communicating facts to the media. What about the
emergency workers' psychological side, not only the population's? Any comments on
that?
A#l: I was in Goiania last year and there was talk about the specific psychological effects of
the emergency workers who were involved in the response and then, follow-up
mitigations. So, how about the reaction of the emergency workers themselves, following
the accident, following their response? Have there been studies done?
A#2: Maybe I can answer for the relief worker in general. At the time of Chernobyl, we had no
such program. Now, we are developing in the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement
psychological support for the victims and the relief workers. It is something that
appeared very clearly at the beginning in the 1990s when we had teams of relief workers
who can back from their mission really depressed and negatively affected by the accident.
We had at that time, a program for psychological support to victims and we created a new
target group for our work program. It is not fully implemented. I think at the time of
Chernobyl, there is one point that has not been mentioned — the high motivation of all
people working at the power plant and in the cleaning process. These people have done
an outstanding job. If such a disaster occurred now, I do not know if the result would be
the same today as it was in the former Soviet Union.
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Session C, Track 2: Outreach and Legal Issues
Speakers:
1. Dr. Caroline L. Herzenberg, Argonne National Laboratory, "Uses of the Internet in
Post-Emergency Response: Some Issues."
2. Dr. Victor A. Sokolov, S.K. Khoptynskaya, V.K. Ivanov, Medical Radiological Research
Center, Russian Academy of Medical Sciences, "Five-Years Experience in Publishing the
Bulletin 'Radiation and Risk'."
3. James Reece and Deborah Loeser, Zelle & Larson LLP, "Will the Nuclear Industry
Become the Next Major Litigation Target?"
4. Rick Jones, ANI, Insurance Issues
Topics covered during this session included how the Internet can be used during a post-
emergency response, how publishing information on radiological accidents can be valuable, and
how the nuclear industry should be prepared for potential future litigation resulting from a
radiological release.
Highlights
*• The Internet has been a valuable asset in emergency management as was demonstrated
with the Kobe earthquake in Japan and the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake in California. In
these cases, the Internet was used to provide information to the public on the extent of the
damage, to publish government announcements, to list deceased and survivors, and to
communicate other types of useful information.
*• Publication of radiological information, in a bulletin such as "Radiation and Risk", has
demonstrated that a publication dedicated to reporting Chernobyl'data and information on
related issues is a valuable tool for informing researchers, journalists, and others about
radiation and radiological accidents.
> The nuclear industry has not been a major target of litigation for damages caused by a
radiological disaster; however, this could change. The nuclear industry needs to be
prepared for likelihood of litigation.
Questions and Answers
Q: One of the problems we have during the emergency phase is a difference between what
the utility recommends and what the State recommends to the local governments for
evacuation. There have been many questions in our exercises about who is responsible
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for damage claims. For example, if a chicken house in an area was lost and the NRC
comes in and says "well, what the utility did was right and the State was too
conservative." Are we covered in anything that we do in response?
A: Let me clarify something because I want to make sure that this gets across. The State and
local governments are covered under our policy under the definition of the named
insured. What does that mean? It means that if the State and local government is sued
for its actions by a member of the general public for nuclear bodily injury or nuclear
property damage, you are covered. Yes, we will pay on your behalf for what you are
found to be liable.
Q: Along the same lines, how do you perceive the Tribal governments with regard to the
same question of indemnification?
A: The only exception to the indemnification in terms of the activities would be the Federal
government or any of its agencies. I am not an expert, but I believe Tribal governments
are independent of the Federal and State governments. So, if a Tribal government is
involved in the operation of a plant for some reason, the Tribal government would fall
under the omnibus definition of insured.
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Session D, Track 2: Public Health Issues I
This topic was presented in three sessions at the conference. A summary of Public Health
Issues n, presented in Session E, Track 2, is provided on page 60. A summary of Public Health
Issues IE, presented in Session G, Track 1, is provided on page 45.
Speakers:
1. Larry W. Luckett, Eric Daxon, John Parker, Dames & Moore, "Operation Chernobyl
Challenge: The Public Health Response by US Military Forces in Europe."
2. Dr. Charles Miller, James Smith, Robert Whitcomb Jr., CDC, Radiation Studies Branch,
"Application of Environmental Dose Reconstruction to Post-Emergency Response Public
Health Issues."
3. Dr. Michael Momeni, State of Illinois, Department of Nuclear Safety, "A Discussion of
Public Health Issues From a Severe Nuclear Reactor Accident."
4. Presented by Dr. A.S. Bohuslavsky, written by V.M. Shestopalov, M.V. Naboka, and L.
Yu. Halchinskiy, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Radioecological Center,
"Separating of Radionuclides Component in Technogenous Ecological Influence on
Health of the Population."
5. James G. Barnes, A.F. Tsyb, E.M. Parshkov, V.V. Yarzutkin, N.V. Voronsov, V.I.
Dedov, Foundation for Advancement in Science and Education, "Rehabilitation of a
Chernobyl Affected Population Using a Detoxification Method."
6. Dr. A.B. Bigaliev, Research Scientific Institute for Applied Ecology, Kazakh State
University, "Genetic Affects of Radiation and Prognosis of the Inherited Pathology of the
Population of the Regions Adjoining to the Former Semipalatinsk Nuclear Testing Site."
Topics discussed at this session include public health responses by U.S. military forces in
Europe, the application of dose reconstruction to post-emergency response, protective action
strategies for the general public, and the effect of unfavorable ecological factors other than
radionuclides.
Highlights
> American citizens turned to their own government, rather than the governments in the
countries in which they were residing, for information on health threats and guidance on
precautions that should be taken in response to Chernobyl.
*• A crisis management team to inform and provide guidance to citizens during and after a
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nuclear accident needs to be developed by governments with citizens overseas.
>• There is more to a credible dose reconstruction project than technical work, as has been
learned by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) which is currently
using a phased approach for conducting the technical aspects of environmental dose
reconstruction. The CDC has learned that public involvement is critical.
*• Community members must be given an opportunity to voice their concerns. This ensures
that the government agency responsible for the dose reconstruction is credible and
accountable to the community.
*• The success of any dose reconstruction depends as much on public involvement in the
project as on the scientific and technical credibility of the methods used to estimate doses
and exposures.
>• Any strategy for implementing protective actions for the general public following a
nuclear accident must consider the: 1) long-term radiation-induced risks to the populace;
2) impact and risk of protective actions such as evacuation, relocation, and restriction of
the intake of contaminated food and water; and 3) the development of psychologically
induced illnesses including anxiety, depression, and helplessness.
»• Good public information and education are essential for effective risk reduction and that
systematic programs to educate the public through participation and interaction must be
initiated before any severe nuclear reactor accident.
Questions and Answers
Q: Could you comment briefly on what kind of sensitivity analysis and air propagation is
typically used in your dose reconstructions? How does that affect the risk communication
that is done with your results?
A: First of all, we do a very detailed uncertainty analysis on all of our calculations. We do
the very best that we can to propagate the uncertainty through the whole process. An
uncertainty analysis where you are giving a range of numbers and where you are telling
people that the true, but unknown risks, lie somewhere between here and here, certainly
complicates the issue. What we have found is if you work with the public all along and
educate them, they understand the limitations of what you are doing and they give you
some credibility.
Q: Have you considered using a sub-lipid analysis to estimate dose, as well as the other
methods that you have mentioned?
A: We have looked at that and we are continuing to look at that. For the most part, the doses
that we are dealing with are environmental levels that have occurred over a long period of
time and to the best of our knowledge, they are not high enough to result in that kind of
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monitoring. We have at the National Center for Environmental Health, a laboratory that
is keeping up with those issues and advising us.
Q: Some references were made with respect to the sovereignty of Indian nations. Is the DoD
policy implementing the President's Executive Order regarding this issue finalized?
A: I do not know. For example, I believe Hanford involves nine Native American tribal
areas and we deal with them on a sovereign nation basis. We treat them and work with
them in that way. I have never seen a written policy, but we feel that we are there to help
them and that is the way we work with them.
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Session E, Track 2: Public Health Issues II - Thyroid Disorders as a Result of
Chernobyl and other Health Issues
This topic was presented in three sessions at the conference. A summary of Public Health
Issues I, Session D, Track 2, is presented on page 57. A summary of Public Health Issues m,
Session G, Track 1, is presented on page 45.
Speakers:
1. Mikhail I. Balonov, Institute of Radiation Hygiene, "Radiation Doses to the Population
Following the Chernobyl Accident - the Pattern of Contamination and Effectiveness of
Decontamination Measures."
2. Dr. Janusz A. Nauman, Department of Medicine & Endocrinology, University Medical
School of Warsaw, "Potassium Iodine Prophylaxis in Case of Nuclear Accident; Polish
Experience."
3. Dr. Elena Buglova and J. Kenigsberg, Research and Clinical Institute of Radiation
Medicine and Endocrinology, "Emergency Response after the Chernobyl Accident in
Belarus: Lessons Learned."
4. Dr. Victor A. Sokolov, E.M. Parshkov, A.F. Tsyb, IV. Chebotareva, Medical
Radiological Research Center, Russian Academy of Medical Sciences, "A Model
Explaining Thyroid Cancer Induction from Chernobyl Radioactivity."
5. Dr. A. Tsyb, V.Ivanov, V. Shakhtarin, Medical Radiological Research Center, Russian
Academy of Medical Sciences, "Thyroid Cancer - The Most Obvious and Pronounced
Effect of the Chernobyl Accident on the Health Status of the General Public."
The focus of discussion at this session was the incidence of thyroid cancer that resulted
from the Chernobyl accident.
Highlights
> The high level of thyroid diseases in children and adolescents born from 1968 to 1986 is
the most dramatic health consequence of the Chernobyl nuclear catastrophe.
> Many questions remain about the onset of thyroid cancer that resulted from the Chernobyl
accident. The clustering of cases around transportation arteries suggests that significant
levels of radioactive contamination were carried in by motorized vehicles leaving the
Chernobyl region immediately after the accident.
»• Administering potassium iodine very early after a nuclear accident to protect the thyroid
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is critical. Even low thyroid doses of radioiodines can lead to thyroid cancer in children,
strongly supporting the need for protective action for pregnant and lactating women, and
children.
>• The effect of the radiological exposure on children was heightened due to the
developmental stages of the thyroid in the children, which increased susceptibility to the
induction of cancer. The highest frequency of thyroid cancer is registered in children who
were between 0 and 4 years of age at the moment of the Chernobyl accident.
> The papillary morphological form of thyroid cancer comprises more that 95% of the
thyroid cases connected with the Chernobyl accident.
Questions and Answers
Q: Please comment on the effectiveness of the inhalation pathway under the conditions that
you described — that wet deposition might have caused most of the deposition that you
showed in your first chart versus dry deposition. What percent of an internal dose could
have potentially come from inhalation versus ingestion?
A: In our estimation for the lower dose, it was several percent, not more and the whole body
internal dose from cesium radionuclides is zero. It is low because it is accumulated over
many years and the contribution of the first hours is nothing.
Q: Would you then be able to address the countermeasures, like the effectiveness of stable
iodine in terms of inhalation percent?
A: It was characterized in Pripyat, because the main intake of iodine in the Pripyat
population was mainly inhalation, so it is excluded from the general rule that I mentioned.
According to the estimates of our Ukranian colleagues the effectiveness of stable iodine
implementation was about three, so the decrease of the primary dose was by a factor of
three approximately. They took some people without stable iodine and some with
indirect measurements.
Q: As you indicated, the administration of iodine reduced the thyroid dose by about 40
percent. My question is by what percentage in your assessment was the dose reduced by
food control?
A: I think that we immediately reduced the dose in children up to three years old by
approximately 30 percent by replacing the fresh milk with powdered milk. We believe,
depending on the day potassium iodine was administered, the dose reduction was 40
percent.
Q: In your dose reconstruction, have you considered those people who have taken iodine? I
understand that it was not very clear who received iodine and when. So, with your dose
reconstruction and the assumption that no iodine was given, how do you do this?
A: We are now sending the questionnaires to the people with direct measurements. Based
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on this, we will re-evaluate the doses. The question is what they will answer in 12 years
after the accident. I do not believe that they will remember.
Data from Hiroshima and Nagasaki indicate that leukemia is the earliest broad anomaly
as it appears in the population. The latency is less than five years. Looking at the data for
Chernobyl, this has not been indicated. Can you show why we are seeing thyroid cancer,
but we are not seeing leukemia cancer? Are you able to provide any information?
We also were surprised that we did not see leukemia. We have to consider differences
between the release after Chernobyl and the situation in Hiroshima/Nagasaki, and
differences between our total populations.
The collective dose is made up of a large number of individual doses, which in this case
appear to be very non-uniform. Is there any statement that can be made about the effect
of very low doses on the risk of contracting cancer?
This is an important issue. In Prezenow, where the case control study was carried out, we
are performing dosi-medical and dosi-metric investigations. We can say something about
those cases when we have direct measurement of dose rate to the thyroid gland. It was
made in children and adults of the Kaluga region. Children of the Kaluga region have
lower thyroid doses and the dose is about 20 to 22 centigray. In the Bryansk region, the
doses are 1.2 or 2 times higher than in the Kaluga region, but a small number of children
with thyroid cancer have direct measurements of dose and the answer is about half the
children with thyroid cancer had low thyroid doses. To make clear the development of
thyroid cancer among children with dose 10 or 15 centigray to the thyroid gland, we
should establish a dose limit of 10 centigray through the thyroid gland. This should be
discussed.
I also have a question about the latency period.. Is there any evidence that it is dose-
dependent? That is to say in the pool, whatever smaller thyroid doses in the latency
period, is different than the pool where there are higher thyroid doses? Is the latency
period affected by the total dose or by the dose rate?
We based our assumptions in our studies that there are no differences for age, sex and
dose levels because in different contamination zones, it is very difficult to distinguish any
differences. Integral figures also separately conclude boys and girls.
This data seems to suggest a consistency of the latency period peak at a certain point,
which is independent of sex and is independent of the age at the time of exposure. Does
the latency period vary with the total dose to the individual?
We can not answer that question because we do not have the exact individual doses.
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Session F, Track 2: Lessons Learned from Chernobyl II
This session was combined with Session F, Track 1: Clean-Up Levels. For a summary of
the discussion and questions and answers for Lessons Learned from Chernobyl n, see page 40 of
this report.
Session G, Track 2: Protective Actions
Speakers:
1. Dr. Hans Korn, S. Bittner, I. Strilek, H. Zindler, Bundesamt fur Strahlenschutz, "The
German Guide for Selecting Protective Measures."
2. Dr. Anar S. Baweja, B.L. Tracy, B. Ahier, D.P. Meyerhof, Health Canada, Radiation
Protection Bureau, "Protective Action Guidance for Nuclear Emergencies in Canada."
3. Dr. Rosa Biagio, Eduardo M. Costa, I. Leao, R.N. Alves, National Nuclear Energy
Commission in Brazil, "Integrated Analysis of Accident Scenarios, Radiological Dose
Estimates, and Protective Measures Efficacy following a Radioactive Release."
4. Dr. Neil Higgins, T.W. Charnock, J. Brown, M. Morrey, National Radiological
Protection Board, "Information Synthesis for Aiding Recovery Decisions."
This session provided an overview of protective actions in Germany, Canada, Brazil, and
the United States. The topics discussed at this session ranged from selecting protective measures
in the event of an accident to collecting data to help make informed decisions. Two speakers
discussed the German and Canadian guides for selecting protective measures in the case of a
nuclear accident. The other two presentations addressed the importance of collecting and sharing
data to make informed response decisions.
Highlights
*• In Germany, the Chernobyl accident has resulted in new regulations that established
national requirements for responding to a nuclear accident.
*• Canada's Protective Action Guides (PAGs) provide pre-specified levels of radiation dose
" that would justify the use of countermeasures to protect health and safety, property, and
the environment. The PAGs include sheltering, iodine prophylaxis, and evacuation in the
early phases of an accident, and relocation and food controls in later phases.
>• It is important to have a set of PAGs at the Federal level to coordinate responses to
radioactivity that may cross provincial or national boundaries.
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>• All three Canadian provinces with operating nuclear power plants have their own PAGs
with specified radiation dose levels.
*• The technical and scientific components of analysis (e.g. features of the release,
meteorological data, and modeling of atmospheric dispersion) need to be integrated with
social and economic considerations.
*• The demand for greater levels of geographical data analysis and mapping procedures in
the planning and implementation of major response decisions is increasing.
>• The National Radiological Protection Board is developing tools and conducting
investigations to improve the quality and scope of information provided to
decisionmakers. Emphasis is being placed on information that helps to make decisions
on long-term countermeasures such as food restrictions, decontamination, access
restrictions, and relocation.
Questions and Answers
Q: I have a question about a very interesting graph that you showed regarding the effects of
the relocation of the populations of Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia. Is the difference in the
stress levels, for instance in the Russian population, between the ones that were relocated
and the ones that remained behind in contaminated areas statistically significant? And, in
the case of the Belarusian and Ukrainian populations, if the difference between the
individuals who remained in clean areas and the ones who were relocated to clean areas if
those stress level differences (which looked dramatic to me), are statistically significant?
A: The difference between the Russian data and the Ukrainian and the Belarusian data was
statistically significant between the relocated populations and the two communities. So, I
think the answer to your question is yes.
Q: So within the Russian population the difference between the ones who were in clean areas
and the ones I am looking at the major differences... in the Belarusian population and
the Ukrainian population, the big difference was between the people who were in clean
areas all along and, of course, not relocated.
Yes.
A:
Q:
A:
Do any of the speakers from Belarus and the Ukraine or Russia have an insight as to what
that big difference was?
Since I have similar data showing the same thing, one of the major differences was how
people volunteered to relocate. For people in Russia, after the independent states were
created, there were different policies in different states and Russia adopted a policy
saying that people had more freedom, and if they wanted to relocate, how they did it.
I think that is what you see here as the major difference.
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Q: I have a question about the emergency planning around the plant. I guess what really
interested me is given the problem of precipitation and land slides. Take a worst case
scenario of some sort of accident where people are sheltered and yet they have to be
moved out of a contaminated zone and the roads are out. Have arrangements been with,
for example the military, to get people out by air or by sea? Because this applies to the
worst type of event, even a security question, where someone has to get in and yet you
have mountains and sea covers. Could you address this please?
A: Yes, obviously something has been done to repair the roads, but if something happened
today, for example, yes, we would have a problem. Then we would move the population
through the sea, that is a possibility now.
Q: The factors for the social/psychological stress, are you contemplating to moving them
into units or into a system by which you could commensurate with other factors that we
could quantify more easily, like land, or something like that, so that we can have some
idea of what the trade-offs are when we take all of the factors into account? And what
would be the basis of any such conversion or quantification?
A: Social psychology is not my subject, but my understanding is that there is a large body of
work that does provide give baselines on methods measuring these sorts of values. The
difficulty with the Soviet Union, was that there was no baseline information. That
complicates the initial analysis and, therefore, the progression of the methodology. If the
accident had'happened in the west, there would be a larger basis, a larger body of work to
draw on and maybe there would be a more standard method of analysis which could be
applied.
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Appendix A:
Papers Not Included in the
Conference Proceedings
(Published in August 1998)
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Appendix A: Papers Not Included in the Conference Proceedings
Papers Missing from Session E, Track 1: Monitoring, Measurement and Modeling II
Mitigation of Radioactive Contamination Impacts through Cloud Seeding
Marvin Goldman, Ph.D.
Davis, California
Emergency response following a large, toxic effluent producing accident, (e.g. nuclear
power plant release), can include cloud seeding as a means of reducing local contamination
runoff into potable waters as well as reducing exposure of rescue and cleanup personnel.
Properly and promptly used, significant cloud scavenging can result in rain extraction upwind of
the damaged facility site and it's downwind trajectory. To date, almost no quantitative data base
exists as to what parameters are significant, what resources and factors are necessary and what
criteria of success are appropriate. The probability of another Chernobyl-type accidental release
of a significant radioactive source term supports the need to develop the scientific data base to
best predict the most beneficial outcome for the procedure. The experience derived from the
Chernobyl accident show promising potential for cloud seeding.
Following the violent disassembly of the Chernobyl Reactor Number 4, in April of 1986,
questions were raised as to whether there was any action that might be taken to reduce the
potential radiation hazard of the accident. One suggestion was to implement local weather
control. In theory, this could be effective in two ways. The first would be to force local
precipitation over the plume issuing from the burning reactor. The resultant rain would, by wet
scavenging, wash out significant amounts of airborne radioactivity and thus diminish the
resultant fallout dose to down-wind populations, particularly if the washout area is sparsely
populated and the plume were heading toward highly populated areas. The potential reduction in
collective dose would proportionally reduce the collective short and long term radiation risk.
The main limitation to this option is the fact that action must be very prompt to be at all
effective. This is almost never possible; action is needed within hours of the accident. The
assessment in terms of population, terrain, and current weather of the areas to be contaminated by
the rainout and the areas to be spared must be known with minimal error. The limitations of the
local current weather pattern, i.e. whether there are usable clouds locally available, is a limiting
factor. All these data must be available in accurate and rapid fashion and usable form to allow
emergency responders to determine the likelihood of success. We know that although the concept
was known at the time of the accident and a limited experience data base was available, too many
significant uncertainties remained to be able to mount an effective effort in time to be of use.
A second option is to actually attempt to significantly reduce local rainfall over heavily
contaminated land, thus reducing the potential runoff into streams, rivers and reservoirs used by
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people for drinking and for crop irrigation. Immediately after the accident, experts from
Gidromet convened and planned strategies to exploit the potential of cloud seeding in order to
keep the most contaminated areas near the accident site dry.
The need for precipitation reduction in a specific area arose in connection with the April
26,1986 Chernobyl NFS Accident and the resulting radioactive contamination of a large area
around the station. Washout of the contaminated soil drainage during the massive spring rains
could have led to radionuclide pollution of the Pripiat River, the Kiev water basin (reservoir) and
subsequently, the Dnieper River. In response to this potential exacerbation of the Chernobyl
disaster, the Government Commission on the Accident Impact Mitigation took measures to
prevent radionuclide washout into the Pripiat river. In addition to building dikes, the USSR
Goskomgidromet was specifically asked to implement rainfall reduction through cloud
dissipation. This work was assigned to CAO and UkrNIGMI (Ukraine Meteorology Institute) and
required justification for the various approaches to and options for precipitation reduction and
cloud dissipation.
It should be noted that by the beginning of the 1980s, two experimental test sets in the
field of active weather modification had been completed. They indicated that there was a
possibility of practical precipitation redistribution in a specific given area. The first set dealt with
development suppression or convective clouds dissipation. The second set created the theoretical
background for redistribution of precipitation from frontal cloud systems by seeding clouds with
ice crystals and ice-forming aerosols.
The current theoretical basis for developing almost all weather modification techniques is
the unstable state of atmospheric processes. Of the various types of instability, those with the
greatest potential for local modification of precipitation and cloud formation processes are the
stage of cloud water (existence of supercooled liquid-drop moisture) and the convective (vertical)
instability of the atmosphere. In the first case, it is possible to stimulate nucleation of the
supercooled part of the cloud which, in turn, substantially alters the kinetics of the precipitation-
forming processes. In the second case, in order to dissipate convective clouds, the same energy of
atmospheric instability which caused their development can be used. It is necessary only to direct
this energy backwards by creating a downdraft in the cloud.
In planning for the cloud seeding, the first and main approach is to suppress the
development of cumulus congestus (cu con) and cumulonimbus (cb) clouds using coarse
powders. The method involves artificially initiating downdrafts in convective clouds by releasing
powdered agents into their tops. As was shown in the CAO experiment, this method is about 90
percent successful when treating single-cell, isolated air-mass clouds and 60-65 percent
successful when treating clouds of frontal origin. For the Chernobyl project, the approach
adapted was to disperse cu con and cb, thus reducing the cloud amount in the target area.
The second approach is to dissipate stratiform clouds or reduce precipitation from them
over the target area. Studies have shown that, in certain conditions, stratiform cloud seeding with
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ice-forming agents leads either to their dispersal or to more intense precipitation from them over
a certain period, followed by a relative reduction in rainfall intensity and cloud amount. Thus, by
causing a relative increase in precipitation at an appropriate distance to windward, a rain shadow
can be produced over the target area.
The third approach is to seed the rain-producing cloud systems with above-normal
quantities of the ice-forming agent at a specified distance upwind of the target zone. This
overseeding involves creating a concentration of ice nuclei in the clouds far exceeding that which
is formed naturally. Given the invariable water content of the rain-producing cloud layer and i
constant water-vapor influx, a sharp increase in the amount of simultaneously growing
precipitation particles leads to a substantial slowing down of their growth process and of their
falling, which in turn causes a marked reduction in the precipitation falling from the treated cloud
layer over a given time interval.
Overseeding is the generally preferred method for reducing precipitation in a specific
area, first because it results in a substantial reduction in precipitation, and second because the
rapid effect makes it easier to steer the area of lower precipitation towards the target area; this is
important in conditions of a complex and varying wind field. In calculating the impact of
overseeding, the selected distance of the seeding lines from the edge of the target area is
approximately equal to that of the half-hourly displacement of the rain-producing cloud, and is
several times less than the distance necessary for creating a rain shadow [1].
In the post Chernobyl efforts the Aircraft laboratories An- 12, An-30, Yak-40 were used.
The technique of treating clouds with coarse powders was as follows. Aircraft An 12 flights were
planned for the days when the development of cumulonimbus clouds was expected over the
target area (see fig.). The target objectives were the growing tops in cumulonimbus cloud
systems and powerful cumulus clouds showing a high probability of growing into cumulonimbus
clouds. The clouds were located immediately above the target or in the close vicinity (within 20
km). During the flight, 30 kg cement doses were released at 100 m above or below the tower.
The dose of the agent was determined by the number of tops in the cloud and the geometric
dimensions of each top. Doses varied from 30 to 300 kg per cloud.
The powerful cumulus clouds were treated using Aircraft An-30 and Yak-40. These
clouds were dosed when they were situated at a distance of a 2-hour displacement from the
nearest target edge in the counter displacement direction, thus allowing for precipitation and
dissipation of the cloud before it reached the target area. Dosing was from 1 to 10 kg of solid
carbon dioxide or from 1 to 10 cartridges of PV-26 (40 g) pyrotechnic flares.
In treating frontal stratiform clouds, doses of 3-5 kg of solid carbon dioxide per 1 km of
aircraft flight or one cartridge PV-50 per 1 km were, used maintaining a separation distance of 1
km between the seeding lines. In order to achieve this intensity of seeding, it is necessary for
several aircraft to be working simultaneously. They should be positioned near the calculated
seeding line in echelons of every 300 m and perform seeding in circles with a 10 km radius. The
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circles' centers for each aircraft should be at a distance of 10 km from each other along the line
of seeding. However, due to a number of reasons both organizational and technical, it was not
possible to meet all these criterion. Only one or two aircraft took part in the work simultaneously.
The aircraft operated from the airports Borispol (aircraft An-12 and Ilyushin-18) and
Zhulyany (An-30 and Yak-40). Headquarters were established at the airports to direct and
coordinate the work of research. Meteorological support for the work (including the information
about clouds in the target area from the radar MRL-2) was provided by AMSG (airport
meteorological service) in the airports. Aircraft Ilyushin-18 was sent to the target area for
reconnaissance before the beginning of treatment. Later this plane served as the base for
supervising the aircraft performing the seeding. The coordinates for seeding were determined
with the help of both land and on board navigation systems.
The 1986 Chernobyl cloud seeding was done from May 18 to June 8 and from September
17 to December 30. During the summer period, the treatment of cumulonimbus clouds with
coarse powders and of powerful cumulus clouds with ice-forming agents was performed. During
the autumn-winter period, frontal clouds and powerful cumulus clouds were treated with ice-
forming agents.
Treatment with coarse powders continued for 17 days during the summer period; 131
clouds were treated and nine tons of cement were used. Treatment with ice-forming agents
continued for 15 days and on a number of days it was done simultaneously with powder
treatment. 1.1 tons of solid carbon dioxide and 594 cartridges PV-26 were used.
During the autumn-winter period, the treatment continued for 43 days; 57 tons of solid
carbon dioxide, 1100 cartridges PV-26 and 2140 cartridges PV-50 were used.
Control of the treatment and assessment of the efficiency of the effort was extremely
difficult. Due to the emergency situation, it was not possible to deploy any permanent means of
treatment control (dense precipitation measuring network, radar systems of precipitation
measurement). Furthermore, randomization of the treatment for the sake of obtaining control data
was impossible. Because of the radioactive contamination of the territory, deployment of any
control devices in the target area was out of the question. Finally, neither approved methods of
artificial precipitation reduction nor methods of assessing their efficiency existed.
Under these circumstances the following on board and land control means and methods
were used: visual observation and parametric measurements characterizing cloud evolution after
treatment (velocity of growth and descent of cloud tops and their dissipation and precipitation);
observation of the treated clouds' radar echo evolution with the help of the on board MRL;
information from the radar MRL-2 stationed at the Borispol airport and precipitation
measurements done at meteorological stations in and around the target area.
Furthermore, it should be noted that it was not possible to observe the evolution of every
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treated cloud as the objective was to treat as many clouds as possible. The data obtained showed
that, as a rule, after treatment convective clouds dissipated. Observation showed that after
treatment with powders, the tops descended and dissipated and, after treatment with ice-forming
agents the tops stopped growing, clouds crystallized, and precipitation occurred.
The possibility for visual observation of stratiform cloud seeding during the autumn-
winter period was even more limited. However, it was possible to observe the behavior of these
clouds with the help of the on board MRL. These data verified the efficiency of the treatment.
For instance, analysis of the vertical radar slices of the stratinimbus clouds which were seeded
with PV-50 cartridges on November 25, 1986 showed that before seeding the reflection field was
solid (i.e., precipitation reached the ground everywhere), but 30 minutes after seeding the
reflection field lost its solid structure, precipitation lessened and did not reach the ground
everywhere.
Due to the irregular character of observations of cloud evolution it was impossible to
derive the quantitative efficiency of the project. The only data which could be analyzed came
from the network precipitation measurements.
Within the territory shown in the figure, there are 14 meteorological stations and posts,
including 2 stations on the target. This network is not dense enough to measure the precipitation
from every treated cloud, so precipitation measurement data can only summarize the total
efficiency of the treatment methods used. An attempt was made to analyze the daily precipitation
maps. However, due to the considerable variability of the
total daily precipitation and to the insufficient density of the meteorological network (i.e.,
sometimes the precipitation from the treated clouds fell between the stations), it was not possible
to discern any unique pattern in the precipitation distribution connected with the treatment. The
general assessment was restricted to analysis of the regular precipitation map for the period of the
project.
The figure presents the isolines of multi-annual precipitation sum totals for the period of
work, calculated on the basis of the data from the USSR Climate Directory and de-facto total
precipitation for the same period. The main characteristics of the precipitation field during the
work period were increased precipitation in areas to the left and to the right of the target, and an
area of lower precipitation in the target region. In the reduced rainfall area the precipitation level
was 2.5-3 times lower than in the maximum area to the west of the region. The eastern part of the
region has a blurry increased precipitation background with local maximums in the area of Kiev
and Chernigov. From the figure it can be seen that the cloud seeding time period was dryer than
the historic mean rainfall.
The precipitation minimum in the target area is also found on the annual map. However,
in the latter case the extreme precipitation differences on the map do not exceed 15-20%, while
during the period of the work, 2.5-3 fold differences were observed.
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To characterize the program's effectiveness throughout the region, the actual measured
precipitation levels were normalized and extrapolated using the historical regional precipitation
map. The differences between precipitation fields observed during the project and the historical
data made the comparison possible. On the figure it is seen that the cloud seeding effect outlined
by the 20mm isoline area was maximum at about 30-40%. In the eastern part of the region the
difference is 20-30% and in the western about 10-20% or less. Thus in the target area and near it,
the quantity of precipitation during the project period shows the greatest difference from the
historical, multi-annual values. This minimum precipitation value clearly coincides with the
location of the Chernobyl target (dotted outline) which led to the conclusion that the treatment
decreased precipitation on the target area.
The autumn-winter work period also provided interesting but less conclusive data.
Minimum precipitation was observed on the target area, when derived from the historic map of
total precipitation; this minimum is similar to the minimum shown on the figure. However, on
the precipitation map for the time period of the project, this minimum was not found. On the
other hand, it does appear on the total precipitation map of the whole halfday of treatment. The
estimated difference in precipitation level on the target area is about, 10-15mm. compared to the
precipitation east and west of the region. A similar minimum precipitation is also observed in the
south-west part of the region.
With these data limitations, it is not possible to make accurate quantitative treatment
efficiency assessments. One can only assume that the minimum precipitation noted in the target
area was partially caused by the treatment.
In conclusion, it should be noted that during the autumn-winter period, treatment was
performed using a technique which had never been tried or checked before. There were no prior
experiments using this technique [2].
As far as is known, this was the very first time that a program of precipitation reduction in
a specified area was carried out. Later, the main concepts which were formulated during the
Chernobyl program were further elaborated and developed for precipitation redistribution in
metropolitan areas in order to create favorable weather conditions for large sport, social or
special events.
In response to the Chernobyl accident, Academician Yuri Izreal asked Gosgidromet if
they could "keep the site dry", i.e., lessen the moisture content. The experts discussed the options
for 10-12 days before ordering any actions. No attempt was made to scavenge the radioactive
cloud emitted from the burning reactor during the first week after the accident, despite some
press reports to the contrary.
Their early experience with scavenging cumulous clouds had shown that it was necessary
to have cumulo-nimbus instability in order to modify moisture content. The conditions had to be
right in order for the technique to work. A local updraft of heated air is needed, as well as time to
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reestablish instability, and instability is stimulated through cloud acceleration in velocity and
volume. Aircraft coming in from the bottom have a draft uplift effect. Seeding with powder
initiates a downdraft and, if instability is high, causes an increase in velocity and volume, e.g.
100 kg of powder into a cloud top destroys a cell of about 5 sq. km. Following the use of
hydrophilic concrete powder, it appears that liquid nitrogen is better than concrete.
The Ukrainian Gosgidromet used silver iodine and carbon dioxide to initiate precipitation
upwind from Chernobyl. Although they succeeded in reducing the intensity of the rain, they did
not stop it. If the clouds had been cumulo-nimbus, they might have had better success.
Much of the Russian experience comes from attempts at fog dispersal. The Russians
found that the use of heat pumps providing heated and dehumidified air was more effective than
using burners and ventilators, especially at airports. They have also experimented with the use of
electrostatic precipitators for local clearing of fogged highways.
In conclusion, it appears that the Russian experience with these techniques has shown
only about 20 percent efficiency in removing moisture, and then only when the instability
conditions were favorable. This technology has not previously been used to mitigate adverse
environmental conditions. Based on the limited success under stress conditions, the findings
strongly suggest that it may be useful to investigate whether planned experiments might develop
data to optimize cloud seeding technology and result in improved efficiency.
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References:
1 . Al Bedritsky and AA Chernikov, 1996, Cloud Seeding to Protect Moscow form Rain on 9
May 1995, World Meteorologic Organization Bulletin 45(1) Jan. 1996, 60-64.
2. GP Beryuliev, LP 2atsepina, LB Zontov, BN Sergeev, YA Seregin, AA Chernikov, EE
Kornienko, VS Maksimov and SV Khusid, 1990, Experience in Artificial Regulation of
Precipitation Aimed at Mitigating the Impact of the Chernobyl Disaster, Trudy Vses. Konf. po
aktivnym vozd., Leningrad, Gidrometeoizdat, 233-238.
Precipitation level (mm) for the time period from May 18 to June 8, 1986 (1 solid lines), and
average multiannual (historical) precipitation level for the same time period (2 dashed lines). The
dotted line shows the outline of the Chernobyl target area. [2]
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Papers Missing from Session A, Track 2: Lessons Learned from Chernobyl I
EC/IAEA/WHO 1996 CONFERENCE
ONE DECADE AFTER CHERNOBYL
Implications for Post-Emergency Response
Malcolm J. Crick
International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria
From 8-12 April 1996, ten years after the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, more than
1000 scientists and technical experts participated in the Joint EC/IAEA/WHO International
Conference: One Decade after Chernobyl: Summing up the Consequences of the Accident, held in
Vienna. The aim of that conference was to summarize and synthesize the results often years' work
on assessing and managing the consequences of that accident, and to clarify fact from much
uninformed speculation circulating at that time. This paper revisits the conclusions of that conference1
and draws the main lessons for post-emergency response grouped by three main sets of
consequences: health impact (both radiation-induced and other); environmental (in the broadest
interpretation); and socio-economic impacts.
HEALTH IMPACT
'Liquidators'
About 200,000 'liquidators' worked in the region of Chernobyl during the period 1986-1987, and
received average doses of the order of 100 mSv. Around 10% of them received doses of the order of
250 mSv; a few per cent received doses greater than 500 mSv. They were among some 600,000 to
800,000 persons who were registered as helping to alleviate the consequences of the accident, and
who generally received low doses. Apart from anything else, there are considerable logistic problems
inaccurately monitoring and tracking the radiation doses and medical follow-ups of this large
number of people.
Of the occupationally exposed individuals 237 were initially admitted to hospital. Acute radiation
syndrome (ARS) was diagnosed in 134 cases. Of these, 28 died from radiation injuries, all within the
first three months. Two more persons died from injuries unrelated to radiation (and one additional
death was due to a coronary thrombosis). Since that time and up to 1996, an additional 14 of the
hospitalized patients died; however, their deaths are not necessarily, and in some cases are certainly
not, directly attributable to radiation exposure.
The therapy of bone marrow transplantation recommended at the time was of little benefit. With
today's knowledge, this is readily understandable in view of the inherent immunological risks of the
procedure, the heterogeneous exposure characteristics and the other complicating injuries due to
radiation, such as unmanageable gastrointestinal damage or skin lesions. Bone marrow damage can
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best be managed in future by the prompt administration of haemopoietic growth factors. For other
radiation damage, new diagnostic tools have become available which may contribute to a more
accurate prognosis and effective treatment.
At present, the more severely affected patients suffer from multiple ailments, including effects of
mental stress, and are in need of up-to-date treatment and preventive measures against secondary
effects. It is clear that health care will have to be provided and their health monitored for several
decades. It is important though to distinguish between effects attributable to radiation exposure and
those due to confounding factors.
Thyroid cancer among children
The radioiodines released delivered radiation doses up to several sieverts to the thyroid gland. A
highly significant increase in the incidence of thyroid cancer among those persons in the affected
areas who were children in 1986 is the only really clear evidence to date of a public health impact of
the radiation exposure. The number of reported cases up to the end of 1995 was about 800 in children
under 15 years old at the time of diagnosis. The increase was observed in children born before or
within six months of the accident; the incidence of thyroid cancer in children bom more than six
months after the accident drops dramatically to the low levels expected in unexposed populations.
The extent of the future incidence of thyroid cancers is very difficult to predict. It appears that very
young children were at the greatest risk, and that the increase in the incidence of thyroid cancer in this
group may persist. The prevalence of thyroid cancer in the affected group could yet increase in the
future, requiring adequate resources for dealing with it.
These post-Chernobyl papillary thyroid cancers in children are aggressive but appear to respond
favorably to standard therapeutic procedures. There is a need for complete and continuing follow-up
of any affected children in order to establish the optimal therapy. Life-long administration ofLr
thyroxine to children is mandatory after thyroidectomy.
For future accidents, recognized measures should be taken under strictly defined conditions to protect
populations at risk from exposure of the thyroid to radioiodine, such as prevention of the
consumption of contaminated food and stable iodine prophylaxis.
Other health effects
The 116,000 people who were evacuated from the exclusion zone in 1986 had already been exposed
to radiation. Fewer than 10% had received doses of more than 50 mSv and fewer than 5% had
received doses of more than 100 mSv. The highest European regional average committed dose
outside the former USSR over the 70 years to 2056 was estimated to be 1.2 mSv.
Apart from the confirmed increase in the incidence of thyroid cancer in young people, there have been
some reports of increases in the incidence of specific malignancies in some populations living in
contaminated territories and in liquidators as well as reported increases in the frequency of a number
of non-specific detrimental health effects other than cancer. These reports were not consistent,
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however, and the reported increases could reflect differences in the follow-up of exposed populations
and increased ascertainment following the Chernobyl accident; they may require further investigation.
Any such increases, if real, might also reflect effects of stress and anxiety.
No consistent attributable increase has been confirmed either in the rate of leukaemia or in the
incidence of any malignancies other than thyroid carcinomas. Future increases over the natural
incidence of all cancers, except for thyroid cancer, among the public would be difficult to discern,
even with large and well designed long term epidemiological studies.
It is clear that existing population based cancer and mortality registries need to be improved and set
up during the post-emergency phase. Moreover specific studies will be needed to investigate reported
increases. This should be done using carefully designed protocols applied uniformly to analyze, and
possibly to distinguish the effects of, confounding factors.
There are significant psychological health disorders and symptoms among the populations affected by
the Chernobyl accident, such as anxiety, depression and various psychosomatic disorders attributable
to mental distress. These resulted from the lack of public information, particularly immediately after
the accident, the stress and trauma of relocation, the breaking of social ties, and the fear that any
radiation exposure is damaging and could damage people's health and their children's health. It is
understandable that people who were not told the truth for several years after the accident continue to
be skeptical of official statements and to believe that illnesses of all kinds that now seem more
prevalent must be due to radiation. The effects are being prolonged by the protracted debate over
radiation risks, countermeasures and general social policy, and also by the occurrence of thyroid
cancers attributed to the early exposures. The distress caused by the misperception of radiation risks is
extremely harmful to people. Past experience of accidents unrelated to radiation has shown that the
psychological impact may persist for a long period. In fact, ten years after the Chernobyl accident,
the evolution of symptoms had not ended. It can however be expected that the importance of this
effect will decrease with time. ,
In any future accident, it is important to respond to the very real threat of widespread and long-term
distress and anxiety brought on by fear of the 'unknown' consequences of radiation exposure.
Accurate and consistent public information, social support structures and effective management of
the emergency phase to avoid visible health effects are needed to minimize this impact.
ENVIRONMENT
The current estimate of activity of the accident source term is higher than that estimated in 1986 by
the former USSR, which was made on the basis of summing the activity of the material deposited
within the countries of the former USSR. Accurate estimates of the source term early enough for
protective action decision making are unlikely to be available.
It was measurable over practically the entire northern hemisphere. Every country has an interest in
following the dispersion of material from an accident. Most of the material was deposited in the
region around the plant site, with wide variations in deposition density. Having a monitoring and
79
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protective action strategy to address such wide local variations in deposition is important.
Lethal radiation doses were reached in some radiosensitive local ecosystems, notably for coniferous
trees and for some small mammals within 10 km of the reactor site, in the first few weeks after the
accident. By 1989 the natural environment in these localities had begun to recover. No sustained
severe impacts on populations or ecosystems have been observed.
The main pathways now are by external irradiation from radioactive material deposited on the ground
and by internal irradiation due to the contamination of foodstuffs. In the first few weeks, radioiodines
were of greatest radiological importance. Since 1987, most of the radiation dose received has been
due to 134Cs and 137Cs, with a minor contribution from ^Sr, while 239Pu has made a minimal
contribution to dose.
Countermeasures are relatively inefficient in reducing external exposures but can be very efficient in
reducing the uptake of radioactive material into foostuffs. In the long term, the appropriate
application of agricultural countermeasures can effectively reduce the uptake of caesium into food. In
selecting a strategy for such countermeasures, local conditions such as soil type can be very
important.
Some food products derived from animals that graze in seminatural pastures, forests and mountain
areas and wild foods (such as game, berries and mushrooms) are likely to be a major source of
internal doses in the future.
Local dose rates due to radioactive material buried at the Chernobyl site can be considerable.
Furthermore, for orderly management of the provisional depositories of radioactive residues from the
accident, the potential contamination of the local groundwater in the long term should be considered.
The management of enormous volumes of waste under emergency conditions is a major challenge.
SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT
From 27 April to mid-August 1986, about 116,000 people were evacuated from their homes in the
region around the Chernobyl plant, the intention being to protect them against radiation exposure.
The exclusion zone covers in total 4300 km2. Between 1990 and the end of 1995, decisions were
taken to resettle a further 210,000 people, despite this leading to very little reduction in radiation
exposure. Evacuation and resettlement have created serious social problems, linked to the difficulties
of adjusting to new living conditions.
Demographic indicators in 'contaminated' regions have worsened: the birth rate has decreased, and
the work force is migrating from 'contaminated' areas to 'uncontaminated' areas, creating shortages
of labour and professional staff. The control measures imposed in 'contaminated' territories have
limited industrial and agricultural activities. Restrictions on people's customary activities make
everyday life difficult and distressing. Moreover, the attitude of the general population towards
products from 'contaminated' areas makes it difficult for produce to be sold or exported, leading to
reductions in local incomes. The social and economic conditions of people living and working in
'contaminated' territories are heavily dependent on public subsidies.
80
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Given the relatively low radiological risk, it is important to develop a strategy that takes into account
both the real radiological risk and the economic, social and psychological penalties in order to yield
the greatest net benefit in human terms.
CONCLUSIONS
The Chernobyl accident has raised many problems that were before thought only to be theoretical.
The experience gained from addressing these problems has in many cases not been fully incorporated
into strategies for managing future accidents. However the importance of managing the short term
response well in order that matters can return to normal as soon as possible is a crucial factor.
REFERENCES
1. European Commission, International Atomic Energy Agency, World Health Organization,
One Decade after Chernobyl - summing up the consequences of the accident, Proc. Int. Conf.,
Vienna, 8 - 12 April 1996 (IAEA, Vienna, 1996)
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Papers Missing from Session A, Track 2: Lessons Learned from Chernobyl I
Development of the Radiological Situation Following the Chernobyl
Accident and Political and Social Response to it
Spartak T.Belyaev,
Russian Research Center (Kurchatov Institute)
Washington, Sept. 9-11,1998
Chernobyl turned out to be not only a large scale radiological disaster, but also social and
psychological one of even the larger scale. The scale of social agitation after Chernobyl was
enormous. Was it possible not to reach such a situation? What was wrong in decision making,
planning and execution of countermeasures? What kind of lessons should be learned for the
radiological post-emergency response? The scale of Chernobyl accident and extraordinary unstable
political situation in the country were important reasons for not optimal and even erroneous
performance. Nevertheless, some more general lessons follow from the experience collected.
Outline of events
26 April 1986-accident on unit IV of Chernobyl NPP.
• The next day-evacuation of 50,000 residents from the town Pripyat (4 km from the Chernobyl
NPP) and then from other settlements in the vicinity of the Chernobyl NPP.
• 30 April-drawing out a map of radiation conditions near the Chernobyl NPP and the
adjoining regions of the Ukraine and Byelorussia with isolines from 5 mR/h and up.
• 5 May-the first map of ground contamination. 10 May-the more detailed map of gamma-field
with isolines from 0.5 mR/h and up. On the basis of this map and established dose limit 10
rem for the first year, the following zone scheme were suggested by the Ministry of Health
(MOH) and the State Committee for Hydrometeorology (Hydromet):
** an exclusion zone (above 20 mR/h; about 400 sq.km) where even temporal stay of people is
prohibited;
** a relocation zone (above 5 mR/h; 1100 sq.km), where the stay of shift personnel engaged in
eliminating the consequences of the accident is only authorized;
** a controlled zone (3 to 5 mR/h; about 3000 sq.km) with temporal relocation of children and
expectant mothers, strict radiological survey and exclusion practically the consumption of local food
products.
At the beginning of May the isotopic composition of radioactive fallout was determined for three
directions of air-mass transport. This allowed to estimate (by NCRP methods) the first-year and 50-
year external doses for the population of the main contaminated regions.
July-August: Hydromet submitted detailed maps of contamination by Cs-137, Sr-90 and Pu-239,240.
These maps became the basis for decision on additional relocation of residents from some settlements
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(from 29 settlements in Byelorussia, 4 in Russia and one in Ukraine).
November-completion of (Sarcophagus) construction.
In 1986 there were relocated 116,000 people from 188 settlements (including the town.of Pripyat).
Effectiveness of the measures implemented (as was seen at that time)
By the end of 1986 the situation had seemed to be fully under the control:
• the necessary relocations were made;
• the territories affected by the accident were zoned;
• the continuous monitoring of radiation situation and the control of food supply were arranged;
• the delivery of clean foodstuff was organized to the regions where consumption of local food
products was restricted;
• mass decontamination of settlements was under way;
• measures on improvement of the medical servicing of the population have been taken.
Specialists are convinced that the established dose limits (10 rem for the first year, 3.5 rem for the
second year and 2.5 rem for each of the third and fourth years) will not be reached in non-relocated
settlements.
In 1988 MOH worked up propositions on a (35-rem concept of safe living) to be introduced since
1990.
All decision making and measures implementation were promptly coordinated by the governmental
commission with an operational group working in Chernobyl.
Oversights and errors
The scope and efficiency of the works performed were unprecedented. However, reviewing today in
retrospection that early post-accident period some omissions and mistakes should be noted. Later they
gave cause for sharp aggravation of the social situation around Chernobyl. First, iodine prophylaxis
for the first weeks of the accident was organized unsatisfactorily and on quite insufficient scales. This
led to mass overexposure to the thyroid, particularly among children. Second, the relocations did not
turn out to be well-grounded everywhere. It was possible not to relocate some settlements, some
other, on the contrary, it was necessary to include into the relocation list. (In 1988 based on the ( 35-
rem concept) MOH suggested to relocate additionally about 12,000 residents from 63 settlements).
Finally, information of the public was insufficient and one-sided which promoted the spreading of
rumors and gave rise to distrustful attitude to the statements of specialists and administration.
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The situation goes out of control
Everything began to change drastically in 1989 - the year of the first free election, elimination of the
censorship. Chernobyl data were declassified, the central press published the detailed maps of
contaminated regions, data on received and projected doses and possible health effects.
la election campaign with violent political activity the speculations on the Chernobyl tragedy became
customary. The opinions of specialists, marked as "lobbyist of interested departments," were simply
ignored and non-professionals became "recognized experts." The preliminary, unconfirmed and often
mistaken or improperly interpreted data (particularly, those concerned with public health) were
speeded by mass media. A "35-rem per life" criterion suggested by NCRP and MOH as a criterion of
safe living became the target of acute criticism, was named "anti-human" and "socially criminal."
Counter-measures under political pressure
Realizing the necessity to have a legitimated "safe living concept" in order to elaborate a program for
additional measures, the USSR government suggested that the USSR Academy of Sciences would
discuss both the
"35-rem" concept and all alternative proposals, and to work out a variant acceptable for all interested
republics and organizations.
The government made also some steps towards the more open analysis of the situation: The groups
of experts from WHO (June 1989) and from Red Cross Society (in early 1990) visited the
contaminated areas. They noted the growing indices of medical statistics even for diseases never
associated with radiation. (They suggested several possible explanation: better screening, change in diet,
psychological anxieties and stresses, unreliable diagnoses).
Appeal to IAEA (October 1989) for help to conduct of "international experts' assessment of the
concept which the USSR has evolved to enable the population to live safely in areas affected by
radioactive contamination."
Unprecedental international project stated in 1990. It took about a year to carry out the project. Its
findings were reported at the conference in Vienna in May 1991. The conclusions of the International
Chernobyl Project are known. The main of them is: no differences are observed between the health of
the populations living in the contaminated and control areas.
But the USSR government did not wait for the results of the International Chernobyl Project. (In fact*
results of ICP were never officially presented in the USSR (or CIS), i.e. country which requested the
Project. But loud critics and discrimination were organized against results of ICP (in mass media and
even in Supreme Soviets of the USSR and Republics). In order to calm the population in the areas
affected by Chernobyl a Decree was issued for payment of benefits and compensations in accordance
with the zone of living (5-15 or 15-40 Ci/sq.km).
In April 1990 the Supreme Soviet adopted a two-year program for urgent measures (for 1990-1992).
Initially the program implied to relocate 73,000 people, but then after the negotiation with the
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republics this figure was increased up to 210,000. The Supreme Soviet charged also the government
with the preparation of a long-term program "based on the scientifically justifiable concept of safe
living."
April 1991 - the USSR Cabinet of Ministers approved the prepared conception. The USSR Supreme
Soviet passed the Law on social protection of people affected by the accident. The analogous, though
different in some terms, laws were passed earlier in all three republics. They are still acting today.
Main provisions of the Law acting in the Russian Federation
The Law is intrinsically contradictory. On the one hand, it establishes intervention levels based on
doses (average annual effective doses less than 1 mSv are permissible and require no intervention.-
from I to 5 mSv - countermeasures without relocation are required.-above 5 mSv - mandatory
relocation). On the other hand, several zones of special-regime are established depending on the
contamination level (Ci/sq.km of Csl37):
• exclusion zone where permanent residence, economic activities and use of natural resources
are prohibited (the area evacuated in 1986);
relocation zone - with contamination above 15 Ci/sq.km. Where it is higher than 40 Ci/sq.km,
relocation is mandatory, otherwise - voluntary; (206 settlements with a total population of
82,000 exclusively in the Bryansk Region).
• inhabitable zone with the right for relocation - 5 to 15 Ci/sq.km; (489 settlements with a total
population of 211,000 in four regions).
• inhabitable area with a preferential socio-economic status - from I to 5 Ci/sq.km. (3,5 88
settlements -with population 2,323,000 in 12 regions (including the Leningrad Region).
Contradiction : In this greatest area the average annual doses do not exceed, as a rule, I mSv
and, according to the Law, are quite permissible and need no intervention.
Thus, during 1988-1991, as a result of the socio-political pressure, the post-accident realities were fully
revised. The scale of territories and population "affected by Chernobyl" as well as the volume and
cost of the countermeasures taken and planned were extremely increased. On the other hand, the
extension of the measures being taken led in turn to the socio-psychological agitation of increasingly -
wider groups of the population.
Some lessons learned from Chernobyl
Implications for Emergency preparedness
Ineffective management in acute post-accident period, uncertain strategy and absence of dialog with
public may increase social excitation that, in its own turn, will prevent optimal management in the
next long-term period.
Even scientifically optimal countermeasures need social understanding and support. It is crucial to
persuade the public for correct measure but not to sacrifice it for political speculations. It may lead in
the future to more serious complications.
85
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Countermeasures with the highest averted doses may result in psychological stresses with higher risk
for health then averted radiological risk. A minimization of risk to health becomes more rational
index then averted dose. And, besides the radiological protection and rehabilitation, there appears a
problem of social protection and social rehabilitation. Everywhere, if possible, mandatory
administrative measures and restrictions must be rejected in favor of voluntary ones, which are
consciously accepted by the population or individuals. In "classical" radiological framework
excessive countermeasure may be expensive but not harmful. (Sometimes they say of "conservative
levels"). In real human background such policy may be very dangerous and Chernobyl has given a lot
of examples. For radiological countermeasures both their insufficiency and their excessive
redundancy are equally dangerous. In the latter case a suspicion of more serious consequences of the
accident than those officially announced could be aroused. This can create a panic, a non-confidence
to specialists and demands to take additional protective measures.
This is also true for measures of social protection. Here is also important not to overstep the limit of
reasonable sufficiency. This rule was neglected in post-Chernobyl management. Vast territories
populated by millions were officially (by law) given status "affected by Chernobyl" with
corresponding payment of benefits and compensations. In fact, it promoted social and economic
degradation. Now almost everyone consider the situation as unsound. Restoration of normal life and
vital activity is needed.
Transition from post-accident era to normal period is complicated in any case due to the difficulty for
residents to accept residual effects (contamination of land and additional though small doses remain).
A special legislation and strategy is needed for this transition period. (This is one of the most
important problems for post-Chernobyl management today.)
Chernobyl was and still is a disastrous event for my country and today we should admit that the scale
of this event was to large extend created by the mistakes and omissions in decision making. Let's
hope that the lessons of Chernobyl will be learned by the world community (my country included).
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Papers Missing from Session D, Track 2: Public Health Issues I
GENETIC EFFECTS OF RADIATION AND PROGNOSIS OF THE INHERITED
PATHOLOGY OF THE POPULATION OF THE REGIONS ADJOINING TO THE
FORMER SEMIPALATINSK NUCLEAR TESTING SITE
Bigaliev A.B. - Director of the Research Scientific Institute for Applied Ecology,
Kazakh State University, Professor
Epidemiological analysis of morbidity and mortality of populations arises from not only theoretical
interest in the genetics of human populations, but also from the need to correctly plan for medical and
social help to patients and their families, including preventive measures. The estimation of the
projected consequences of the impact of small doses of radiation on public health among regions
adjacent to the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site is of special public interest.
The Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site is located in the extreme northeast of the Republic of Kazakstan.
It was the location at which the Soviet Union conducted numerous underground, surface, and altitude
testing of nuclear weapons. Radioactivity was spread by the open testing, and activity from the
underground testing has now migrated into the biosphere. This contamination has caused a
significant rise of oncological diseases and blood diseases in several generations of victims.
Considering the fact that open air testing was terminated only in the mid-1970s', these consequences
of surface and air nuclear and hydrogen weapons tests will be reflected in the next century
For economy, data of the medical institutions was used which allows the investigation of the
situations regarding the dynamics and frequency of morbidity, mortality, congenital defects of
development (CDD), spontaneous abortions and other diseases. Following review of this archival
material, more direct forms of epidemiological registration could be utilized.
This paper will examine several aspects of the health effects of the testing. Studies were centered in
the Karaganda Oblast2. The Enindibulak and Karakaralinsk Raions3 were heavily affected by the
testing. The Nurin Raion was essentially unaffected, and serves as a control on the study. Except as
noted, overall ranges of effect are presented.
Perinatal Morbitity / Spontaneous Abortions
Analysis of perinatal mortality was conducted for the 1985-1992 time periods. Indices of perinatal
mortality in Enindibulak Raion constituted 17.9 - 22.4 per 1,000 newborn; in Karkaralinsk-17.4-20.2;
in Nurin -14.0-18.0, in the Oblast overall - 15.7-17.8. Frequency of spontaneous abortions in
Egindibulak Raion (9.99%) exceeds the Oblast's average indices and the indices of other raions.
In general, 40-45% of the spontaneous abortions are determined by chromosomal and genome
2
A region or area. Roughly equivalent to a state or county in the United States.
3 A section of a city. Region.
87
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mutations. If part of gene lethal mutations will be added to this, we can presume that, in total, not
less than 50% of these spontaneous abortions are conditioned by genetic causes. Genetic factors
contribute considerably in perinatal mortality, which constitutes 30% of the total number.
The distribution of these effects is presented in Table 1.
Table 1
Frequency of Spontaneous Abortions in Oblast and Raions Over 1980-1992
Years
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
Birth Defects
Total
egnanci
68793
65440
67124
65262
66612
65933
66598
72233
64732
63706
Total
'eliveries
23461
24888
24967
24535
26604
26839
27485
27982
26338
25704
-
-
-
Total
> Abortions
39912
35151
36673
35675
34961
34.36
33580
38649
33215
32318
-
-
-
Spontaneous
5420
5401
5484
5052
5047
5058
5533
5602
5179
5102
-
-
-
Percentage in
Oblast
7.88
8.25
8.17
7.74
7.58
7.67
8.31
7.76
7.89
7.89
-
-
-
E
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
9.88
8.78
9.99
9.44
K N
-
-
-
-
-
-
•
-
-
7.3 5.3
6.52 6.14
4.16 8.91
4.16 8.91
E- Egindibulak Raion, K- Karkaralinsk Raion, N- Nurin Raion (Control)
The frequency of births of children with congenital defects was determined from the journals of
registration of newborns over the 1980-1992 time period. In the Karaganda.Oblast, the frequency of
spontaneous abortions was compiled over the 1980-1989 time periods, while in the territory of the
raions, the determinations were made over the 1989-1992 periods. The records were obtained from
the archived materials of the respective Boards Of Public Health and from consultations with women
residents of the regions. By using annual precise data of population size of raions, standard statistical
studies were performed.
Data of frequency of congenital defects of development (CCD) are presented in Table 2. From the
literature, the frequency of CDD varies in wide limits (5.9).
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Table 2
Indices of Birth and Congenital Defects of
Development in Raions
Raion
E
K
4 'N^
E
K
• N N ^
E
K
"H *
E
K
^•*L -r
^ IN C
E
K
- N ;
E
K
:*N .-
Birth
Defects per
1,000 of
population
34.9
27.3
;h*32&T*
31.6
27.6
** ^, M -^
* >-£j •&
30.9
26.9
,,/2?.9 '
26.8
25.7
°25,2~I C
26.7
27.2
'- 124.1**,
-
-
r *** j
Number of
newborn /
Number of
CDD
541/25
707/26
-« 4146/7" "
528/12
919/27
\i257yis-"
599/43
1371/143
'; loiW
515/46
1310/138
*• ?^\^f:?2/i? r f
i\JC*o/v
467/14
1392/113
908/15,:
458
1370
.-" 9S5.V •
Incidence of
CDD per
1,000 of
population
1.6
1
' * !0.2 :
0.7
0.8
^ " rO,4^ >
2.2
2.8
0:1 /
2.4
2.7
1 m , -l ^
0.8
2.2
~^~ 0M % '
2.2
2.7
v «•) v
Year
1986
i ^ " o^ *,
1988
/ " -
1989
* y
1990
*
1991
V /
1992
v -,*•"
E-Egindibulak Raion, K- Karkaralinsk Raion,
N- Nurin Raion (Control)
Over the period of research, high frequency of CDD among children was observed in Egindibulak
Raion (0.7-2.4), and in Karkaralinsk Raion (1.0-2.8). Both exceed indices in Nurin Raion (0.1-0.4 per
1,000 persons). Among children, a doubling of oncological diseases was revealed when compared to
the Nurin Raion (0.06-0.08 per 1,000). In Egindibulak Raion is the oncological incidence was 0.1-
0.5, and in Karkaralinsk Raion 0.05-0.5 per 1,000 persons.
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Neurological Disorders
Over the period of research, diseases of the neural system and sensitive organs per 1,000 adults
constituted 52.1 - 105.7 in Egindibulak Raion; and 36.0 - 58.3 in Karkaralinsk Raion; compared to
22.5 - 51.1 in Nurin Raion. Respectively, per 1,000 children, 49.6 - 55.0; 50.8 - 58.2; vs. 14.1 - 34.9.
Over all the raions, neurological morbidity from inherited diseases is 5.2 per cent, and 3.64 per 1,000
of population in Egindibulak and Karkaralinsk Raions (according to Yakunin, U.A. on 1000 of
population, 1988).
The specific breakdown of these diseases is as follows:
Progressive Muscular Dystrophy Erba
Neural Amytrophy Sharko-Mary
Cerebellum Ataksia
Family Spastic Paraplegia
Myastenia
Thomson's Myotonia
Hepatocerebral dystrophy
Hentington Chorea
Other diseases
34%
27%
2%
9%
8%
5%
8%
4%
3%
Mortality
The highest mortality rate per 10,000 people was revealed in Egindibulak Raion (505.8 - 730.3). This
rate is 2 - 3 times higher than the indices of the Nurin Raion (283.5-337.1), which was not affected by
the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site. Children morbidity per 10,000 people continues to increase in
the Egindibulak and Karkaralinnsk Raions (respectively 497.0 - 784.2 and 442.7 - 693.8), which is
significantly elevated when compared to the Nurin Raion (332.. 1 - 419.0 per 10,000 children).
Chromosomal Effects
Regarding the contribution of inherited factors in human pathology, the literature reports the
following average numbers of inherited components:
For spontaneous abortions, 50-70% (not less than 50% due to new mutations),
For CDD 50% (not less than 25% - new mutations),
For perinatal mortality - 30% (about 15% - new mutations)
For Down's disease - 100 % (nearly all are new mutations).
The degradation of genetic structures of somatic cells can affect human health. This is not only
limited to the fatal degeneration of cell physiology in the individual, but also the origin of non-lethal
dysfunctional changes of cells and tissues in connection with mutation.
Within a human population, there are individuals with different resistance to mutagenic factors. In
connection with this, special attention should be paid to those of them where genome instability is
expressed. However, until the present time, there was no method which allowed one to estimate a
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genetic effect over large numbers of people, to choose people predisposed to genome instability, nor
to choose special groups with genetic risk.
Micronuclear testing was evaluated as a convenient method of screening for substances. Patients with
inherited diseases and congenital anomalies from ecologically unfavourable raions situated near
Semipalatinsk were examined. Micronuclei analysis was conducted among patients with inherited
diseases of the neural system, inherited degenerative diseases, and chromosome diseases. 25 patients
with hepatocerebral dystrophy, 25 patients with inborn defects of development, 25 patients with
different inherited diseases of the neural system, 10 patients with Downs Syndrome, and 25 patients
with perinatal pathology of the neural system were compared to a control group of 50 persons; 25 of
whom were patients with hepato-vascular pathology and the others were healthy people aged 20-35
years.
These tests revealed that the number of revealed micronuclei is higher among patients with hepato-
cerebral dystrophy, inborn defects of development, Downs Syndrome, and those with other inherited
degenerative diseases of the neural system, as compared with the control group. In addition, patients
with a high rate of the number of micronuclei in erythrocytes were examined after one month, and a
constant increased number of micronuclei in erythrocytes of peripheral blood was revealed.
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Results are summarized in Table 3:
Table 3
Number of Erytrocytes with Micronuclei in the Blood of Examined People.
Group of examined
1. Central group
*Healthy
*With Hepatovascular
Pathology
2. Patients with Perinatal
Pathology
3. Patients with
Hepatocerebral Dystrophy
4. Children with Inborn
Defects of Development
5. Patients with Inherited
Degenerative Diseases
6. Children with Down's
Disease
Number of
Analyzed
Erythrocytes
(per thousands)
241.2
214.8
212.6
259.6
258.8
249.1
98.1
Number of Erythrocytes with
Micronuclei
Absolute
Number
103
148
300
991
774
902
422
In Promille
0.427 (0.01)
0.689 (0.07)
1.411 (0.07)
3.82 (0.1)
2.99 (0.1)
3.68 (0.15)
4.3 (0.1)
The data demonstrates a negative impact of long-termed chronic exposure to radiation in relatively
small dose-rates upon the genetic apparatus and upon the health of those who live in the ecologically
unfavorable regions. It appears that the formation of micronuclei is tightly connected with
cytogenetical diseases found in the affected populations. The data also suggests that persons with
high rises in micronuclei have a considerable instability of the genome. The data also gives us
information about the significant increase of the number of inborn deflexions seen in the children over
the period 1956 - 1980. During the years the number of such deflexions doubled.
Medical genetic estimation of the inborn defects of the children began approximately 1956. Since
that time, the systematic obtaining of data has allowed researchers to follow the dynamics of this
category of genetic burden. Between 1956,4% of children were registered among the population
having inborn defects; in 1962-1966 - 5%; in 1974 - 9.4%; and in 1977 -1980 - 10,5%.
The presence of the mutagenic burden has not fully expressed itself openly. Because mutations of
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dominant genes results in an expression of disease, these expressed genes tend not to be passed on to
future generations (due to the debility created b,y the disease). The hereditary expression'of a mutated
gene in future generations appears from the individuals who have recessive mutated genes, and who
do not express any physical indication of the genetic effect. Thus the genetic stability of a human
population in based on the fact that each following generation appears mainly from phenotypically
normal people. In this situation, it would not be unexpected to see an increase of expression of
genetic disease in subsequent populations, and this is being expressed at the Semipalatinks region.
Conclusion
In general, the appearance of the people with genetic defects is a critical social problem. Their
numbers comprise from 1/10 to 1/20 of the total number of newborns. A number of these affected
newborns die in infancy, and, of those that do not die in infancy, a significant number of them are
affected by severe genetic disease. While more accurate determinations must be made, the initial
evidence is that these genetic defects will take approximately 30 years to be removed from the
population gene pools, and that these effects will affect hundreds of millions of people over this
period.
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Papers Missing from Session E, Track 2: Public Health Issues II - Thyroid Disorders as a Result of
Chernobyl and other Health Issues
STRATEGY FOR POPULATION PROTECTION AND AREA REHABILITATION IN
RUSSIA IN THE REMOTE PERIOD AFTER THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT
Balonov MX, Anisimova L.I. and Perminova G.S.
Abstract
The report presents the history of development of criteria for radiation and social protection of
Russian population residing in the areas contaminated with radionuclides after the Chernobyl
accident, in the remote time periods after the accident. The tendencies for reduction of standards with
time are shown, and their causes are analyzed. It is noted that the optimization principle was not
applied in the explicit form for population protection. The modem radiation situation in the
contaminated areas of Russia is described, and the future one is forecasted. Main pathways of external
and internal population exposure are described. Modem possibilities for reduction of the population
exposure dose are discussed. The authors propose promising criteria and methods for population
protection and rehabilitation of contaminated areas in Russia.
Introduction
Soon after the Chernobyl accident in 1986 and in conformity with its specific features, to provide
radiation safety of population, the Ministry of Health of the USSR established and regularly renewed
temporary dose limits for population exposure, temporary permissible levels for radionuclides content
in food products and drinking water, and in the products of agriculture, forestry and construction
industry etc. [1]. In 1988, the NCRP of the USSR developed, and the USSR Government approved
the Concept of safe residing for population in the areas contaminated with radionuclides as a result of
the Chernobyl accident ("the Concept of 35 rem"). In 1990, the Law of the USSR on social protection
of citizens that suffered of the Chernobyl disaster was adopted. The laws and standards in the
republics of the USSR copied, as a rule, the Ail-Union documents. After disintegration of the USSR
in 1991, the Laws and standards in newly independent states developed more independently, with
consideration for modern recommendations of international science [2, 3].
In the present paper, we consider the criteria that were put in the basis of radiation and social
protection of population in Russia after 1991, and proposals on their development as applied to the
problems of rehabilitation of the areas contaminated with long-lived radionuclides.
1. Criteria of population protection in Russia in 1991-1998
In 1991, five years after the accident, the official constant criterion for protection of population from
exposure to radiation from man-made sources was the limit of the annual dose equivalent for a
limited part of the population, equal to 5 mSv, according to the NRS76/87 [4]. The indicated dose
limit was substantiated as the level of permissible annual exposure to population, under which no
medical consequences detectable within modem methods arise during the life time. Although this
substantiation is somewhat different from the international one presented in Publication 26 of the
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ICRP [5], numeric values for the dose limit for the USSR population and the one recommended by
the ICRP are the same. This dose was assessed as the average dose of exposure in the whole body of
persons from the critical population group. For comparison with the dose limit, annual doses of
external and internal exposure to population were assessed by calculations on the basis of monitoring
of the environment and food products, and were validated with the results of individual measurements
by means of thermoluminescent dosemeters (TLD) and whole body counters (WBC) in the zone of
the Chernobyl accident. '
As applied to the consequences of the Chernobyl accident, a settlement was chosen as a spatial unit
for dose assessment and decision making on population protection. The reason for such a choice was
spotty character of radioactive contamination, especially in the areas of wet depositions of
radionuclides. Systematic measurements and official data of State Committee for Hydrometeorology
also refer to settlements of the contaminated areas, the contamination being usually relatively
homogeneous within a settlement and its vicinity.
Since 1988, the above-mentioned "Concept of 35 rem" was realized. According to the Concept, the
inhabitants of the settlements, in which the calculated average dose expected during 70 years
exceeded 35 rem (350 mSv), were liable to resettlement to non-contaminated areas. On the contrary,
in the settlements, where the expected dose was below 350 mSv, the countermeasures were proposed
to be cancelled to avoid stresses among population. Formally, this criterion, based on a simple
calculation (350 mSv = 5 mSv/year * 70 years) agrees with the documents adopted earlier in the
USSR and by the ICRP [4, 5].
Limitation of the internal exposure of population from Cs-137 and Sr-90 radionuclides was based on
the system of temporary permissible levels (TPL's) of their content in food products [6, 7]. It is
known that the problem of calculation of standards for food products has no unambiguous solution.
When calculating the numeric values of TPL's for different products, as it was in the practice of
introducing norms in the EU during the same period [8], observation of the dose limit of 5 mS-v was
sought, and later of I mSv, with consideration for contribution of food products in the food ration of
the population of Russia. Also, actual possibilities for limitation of radionuclides content in separate
agricultural and natural food products were taken into account. The TPL's for the main food products
presented in Table I were decreased with time both in connection with more strict dose standards in
the nineties, and with actual decrease of contamination of agricultural food products according to
natural reasons and due to countermeasures.
Since 1991, the Law on social protection of citizens [9] acts in this country. This Law is based on
separation of the area in zones according to the density of soil contamination with long-lived
radionuclides. Depending on this parameter that is indirectly connected with the level of human
exposure, the measures of social protection were set, up to resettlement to non-contaminated areas at
the cost of the state, and privileges and financial compensations. In particular, according to this Law,
inhabitants of those settlements are liable to obligatory resettlement, where the average annual
effective dose (AAED) exceeds 5 mSv, or the density of soil contamination with cesium-137 is above
40 Ci/km2 (1.4 MBq/m2). To realize this Law, the technique was developed for- assessment of the
AAED [10], which was determined as the average dose of external and internal exposure of adult
inhabitants of a settlement for conditions "without active radiation countermeasures", i.e., without
consideration for dose reduction due to decontamination in the settlement, delivery of radiation-clean
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products to population etc. However, to make socially significant decision about obligatory
resettlement of inhabitants, the actual AAED in conditions of countermeasures should be determined
with the results of individual dosimetry of inhabitants with TLD and WBC measurements.
In 1995, the Russian NCRP developed 'The Concept of radiation, medical, and social protection and
rehabilitation of population that suffered of radiation accidents" [11]. This Concept introduced
separation of the areas contaminated with long-lived radionuclides in zones exclusively according to
the current AAED, but not according to the level of the area contamination with radionuclides. In the
settlements where the dose does not reach 1 mSv, the conditions of life of people are not restricted. In
the settlements where the AAED exceeds 1 mSv, but does not reach 5 mSv (the zone of radiation
control) it is directed to monitor the population exposure and implement countermeasures on the basis
of the optimization principle. In the zone of limited residence, where the AAED is within the range
from 5 to 20 mSv, the countermeasures and monitoring are also performed, and assistance is given to
people which voluntarily wish to resettle according to motives of increased radiation risk. There are
no settlements in Russia where the AAED exceeds 20 mSv.
In the modem international standards, the annual limit of 1 mSv is applied to the controlled man-
made sources of radiation, but not to consequences of radiation accidents. However, in the remote
terms after the large-scale accidents, the population of the suffered areas reasonably demands
application to it of the same criteria of radiation protection as to the rest of the population. Taking into
consideration impossibility of observation of the annual dose of 1 mSv everywhere, the dose
boundaries of the zones should be considered as action levels with respect to application of
countermeasures [3]. This approach is actually adopted in Concept-95 [11 ].
The interpretation of the AAED in the Concept-95 is similar to that applied in the Law of 1991, and
assumes the assessment of the annual dose of accidental exposure in inhabitants at their normal mode
of life, without consideration for countermeasures. If for the normal mode of life the annual exposure
dose in population exceeds the level of 1 mSv that is assumed safe for the entire population of this
country (see below) and of the world on the whole [2, 3], it is expedient to apply optimized radiation
countermeasures. Such intervention inevitably limits the way of life and activity of population
(keeping cattle, using "gifts of nature" etc.) and should be compensated by measures of social
protection. The measures of social protection (investments, economic privileges, compensations etc.)
should be applied, in the first turn, to the areas and population that got actual economic damage from
the Chernobyl accident: contamination of production, decelerated economic development etc. The
most vulnerable to radioactive contamination is production of agriculture, forestry and fuel and
construction industry, which became non-competitive for many years.
The Law on radiation safety adopted in 1995 [12] and more detailed Standards of radiation safety
NRB-96 [13] in their parts relevant to population protection in the remote terms after radioactive
contamination of an area reproduce the provisions of the Concept-95. In these documents, the annual
effective dose of I mSv was adopted in Russia as the main limit of the exposure dose of population
from man-made sources, following the ICRP [2] and IAEA [3].
Thus, among the tendencies we may note the decrease of the standards with time. This decrease is
attributed, on the one hand, to reduction of the international dose limits after 1990 [2, 3], and, on the
other hand, to the actual improvement of radiation situation, which permits to apply reduced criteria
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without ruining expenses for countermeasures. It should be also noted that in the USSR, and later in
Russia, the optimization principle, an important principle of the modem radiation protection, was not
applied in planning countermeasures. Among the reasons for this we may indicate slow introduction
of the concepts of risks and weighted costs and benefits in the legislation and standards, the absence
of the corresponding methodical basis, the centralized character of the management system and
intrinsic contradictoriness of the economic systems during both the period of socialism and in the
current transition period. One may anticipate and welcome more active introduction of the
optimization principle with formation of market economy in Russia.
2. Current and future exposure of population due to the Chernobyl accident
In the remote period after the Chernobyl accident, the population of the number of districts in the
Bryansk, Tula, Kaluga and Orel regions of Russia is under continuing external and internal exposure
from long-lived radionuclides of cesium-137, strontium-90 and transuranium elements (plutonium-
238,-239,-240, americium-241 etc.). The external exposure of inhabitants is mainly attributed to
gamma radiation of cesium-137 deposited on soil, and internal one - to intake of cesium-137 and to
lesser extent, strontium-90, with local food products and to inhalation of transuranium elements with
aerosol particles of soil [14,15].
In the areas with light sandy soils in the Bryansk and Kaluga regions, internal exposure makes the
contribution in the annual dose close to that of the external exposure, and the internal exposure
prevails in the districts of the Bryansk region with peat soils. On the contrary, in the black-earth
districts of the Tula, Orel and other regions, CS-137 is bound with soil particles, and weakly migrates
along the food chain. Therefore, the external exposure forms 90 % and more of the dose, see Fig. 1.
At present, intake of long-lived cesium-137 with forest mushrooms and berries makes considerable
contribution (from 10 to 70 %) in the internal exposure of inhabitants. These food products have by
10 to 100 times higher contamination than local milk, meat and other agricultural products. Due to
economic difficulties, consumption of forest products during the last 3-5 years increased, being
accompanied by increase of the internal exposure, by 1.1 to 1.5 times on the average.
The dose rate in the air of settlements in the Bryansk region in 1995-97 did not exceed 3 //Sv/hour in
the villages of the Krasnogorsk rayon, and 0.5 yuSv/hour in town Novozybkov. Cesium-137
concentration in milk in 1995-97 was usually within the limits from 37 to 370 Bq/1, and in the
majority of samples did not exceed VDU-93. The average content of cesium-137 in the body of
inhabitants was between 4 kBq in Novozybkov and 40 kBq in some villages, The average actual
(according to the data -of WBC measurements) annual effective dose in 1996 in inhabitants of
Novozybkov due to the Chernobyl accident was about 0.8 mSv, and in the villages of the controlled
area - from 1 to 6 mSv.
In settlements of the Kaluga, Tula and Orel regions, the dose rate in the air in 1995-97 did not exceed
1 //Sv/hour. Concentration of cesium-137 in milk, but for rare exclusions (some villages of the
Kaluga region), did not reach VDU-93, and in the Tula and Orel regions was within 4 to 40 Bq/1. The
average content of cesium-137 in the body of inhabitants was below 4 kBq in the Tula and Orel
regions and up to 7 kBq in some villages of the Kaluga region. The average annual dose in inhabitants
of villages of the indicated regions did not exceed 1 mSv.
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In the districts of the Belgorod, Voronezh, Kursk, Leningrad, Lipetsk, Pensa, Ryazan, Smolensk,
Tambov, and Ulyanovsk regions and the Republic of Mordoviya, the dose rate in the air of
settlements in 1995-97 did not exceed 0.3 //Sv/hour. Concentration of cesium-137 in milk did not
reach VDU-93 and was predominantly within the interval from 0.4 to 40 Bq/1. The average annual
dose in inhabitants of settlements did not reach
1 mSv.
During the period after 1997, we expect decelerated decrease of the dose rate in the air (Fig. 2) and of
cesium-137 concentration in milk by 4 to 8 % per year. The Cs-137 concentration in forest food
products (mushrooms, berries, game) decreases slower, and in a number of products is attributed to
radioactive decay by 2 % per year only, see Fig. 3. According to the available dosimetric models,
during 1986-95 the population of the contaminated areas have already got about 60 % of the external
dose from all deposited radionuclides. The rest 40 % of the dose will be attributed to gamma radiation
of Cs-137 and are expected during the subsequent 60 years, i.e., up to 2056. The internal exposure to
inhabitants of the Bryansk region that do not consume forest food products (mushrooms, berries etc.)
in 1998-2056 is expected close to the value of the external dose, and to the rest of inhabitants - by 1.5
-3 times higher than the external dose.
Among countermeasures in the remote period after the Chernobyl accident, one should distinguish the
measures for reduction of the external and internal exposure, and resettlement of inhabitants to non-
contaminated areas. The last wide-scale campaign on decontamination of settlements in the Bryansk
region was performed by the troops of the Civil defense of the USSR in 1989. During the considered
period, beginning from 1991, only separate objects of frequent staying of inhabitants (kindergartens,
schools, hospitals etc.) were decontaminated in the planned order [ 16 ].
The measures for limitation of internal exposure to population include inspection of contaminated and
delivery of non-contaminated food products (in the first turn, of meat and dairy ones), melioration of
agricultural lands and other measures for reduction of transfer of cesium and strontium radionuclides
from soil to plants, countermeasures in cattle-breeding and meat and dairy production. Already in
1986, the state compulsorily purchased meat and dairy cattle from the inhabitants of over one hundred
settlements of the most contaminated south-west districts of the Bryansk region. This undoubtedly
promoted fast decrease of internal exposure. The most effective current measure for reduction of Cs-
137 concentration in milk and meat by 5 to 10 times is application of food additives that contain
ferracine (Prussian Blue) compounds. Persistent propaganda among population of limitations in
consumption of natural products and application of culinary processing that favors removal of
cesium- 137 is expedient. In 1991-1997, the mentioned measures were applied mostly in the Bryansk
region and gave reduction of the internal dose to inhabitants by 1.5 -5 times [14, 15,16].
Resettlement of inhabitants of contaminates areas of the Bryansk region to "clean" areas was
performed mainly in 1988-1992 as a countermeasure in accordance with the abovementioned
"Concept of 35 rem." la all, about 50 thousands of inhabitants moved from the contaminated areas
according to plans or voluntarily. After 1992, the planned resettlement based on radiation level was
terminated [16].
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3. The proposed criteria for population protection and area rehabilitation
Rehabilitation of the areas of Russia subjected to considerable radioactive contamination after the
Chernobyl accident, i.e., the set of measures on reconstruction of economic activity, and of way and
level of life of the population should be performed in combination with continuing measures on
population protection from the radiological consequences of the accident. The tasks of the set of
countermeasures on the population protection and area rehabilitation are:
1) Long-term radiation and social protection of population;
2) Special medical service to the population;
3) Restoration of economic activity of the population and priority social development of the region;
4) Restoration of economic and ecological value of the environment.
Below we propose and briefly substantiate the criteria and main ways for solution of the formulated
four tasks:
Task 1: Long-term radiation and social protection of population
Population categories:
• Population residing within the contaminated areas;
• Population returning to contaminated areas for constant residence;
• Persons working in the contaminated areas.
Protection criteria:
• Application of optimized measures of radiation protection in settlements where the average
annual effective dose in inhabitants due to the accidental exposure exceeds 1 mSv;
• Return of population to contaminated areas under the condition that the average annual effective
dose in inhabitants of the settlement due to the accidental exposure is below 1 mSv;
• Limitation of professional exposure to workers, on the basis of dose limits for the personnel;
• Optimization of countermeasures with respect to costs and benefits with consideration for social
and psychological aspects.
Substantiation of the criteria:
The action level equal to 1 mSv of the average annual effective exposure dose for constant inhabitants
of settlements is chosen similarly to the dose limit for the population at normal exploitation of
sources. In remote terms after the accident, the same criteria of radiation protection should be applied
to the population that suffered after the accident as to the rest of the population. We take into account
that no other sources of considerable man-made exposure to population are present in the regions of
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Russia contaminated with radionuclides after the Chernobyl accident. Intervention with the aim of
radiation protection that causes limitation of economic activity or way of life of the population should
be compensated by the measures of social protection.
With regard of return of people to settlements of the contaminated areas, there is a possibility of
controlling of this process. This process causing increase of the exposure level can be considered as
the analogue of practical activity. Correspondingly, it is expedient to apply the limit of the annual
dose of 1 mSv in this situation.
Radiation protection of persons working in the contaminated areas is regulated by the standards of
NRB-96. The annual effective dose of 5 mSv is permitted due to their professional activity as for the
personnel of the group B, which does not work directly with the sources of ionizing radiation , but
which are in the sphere of their action because of the working conditions, and 20 mSv for the
personnel of group A working with radiation sources [13].
Methods of protection:
• Standardization and control of radioactive contamination in food products;
• Application of ferracine compounds and other countermeasures in the meat and dairy production;
• Choice of species of natural food products (forest mushrooms and berries, lake fish and game)
and methods of their culinary processing;
• Decontamination of separate objects in settlements (kindergartens and schools, yards, production
areas etc.);
• Compensations to inhabitants of settlements, where countermeasures limit activity of population.
Task 2: Special medical service to population
Criteria for selection:
• Persons that suffered from radiation , i.e., those who became ill because of accidental exposure;
• Persons that were exposed as a result of the radiation accident, i.e., those who received the
effective dose of acute exposure above 50 mSv or the dose of chronic exposure above 70 mSv.
Methods:
• Regular clinical examinations of health;
• Free specialized medical service;
• State insurance of life and health;
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• Registration and participation in epidemiological investigations.
Task 3: Restoration of economic activity of population and priority social development of the region
Criteria for choice of the areas:
• Areas and settlements where economic activity of enterprises and population was limited due to
the Chernobyl accident, and where presently or in the nearest future production is possible that
meets hygienic requirements.
Methods for restoration and development:
• State investments and preferential credits for economic development and construction;
• Decrease of taxes for production;
• Priority development of infrastructure (roads, communications, power and thermal supply etc.)
and construction of health institutions.
Task 4: Restoration of economic and ecological value of the environment
Criteria:
• Application of optimized measures for restoration of forests, meadows, lakes etc, if the annual
exposure doses of their visitors exceed 1 mSv per year;
Content of radionuclides in natural food, raw materials and timber production should meet
hygienic requirements.
Methods:
• Decontamination of separate plots in the natural environment with long-term staying of
population and of production areas;
• Introduction of technologies in the forestry, raw materials production and agriculture that
provide observation of hygienic requirements;
• Control of external and internal exposure to population and persons working in natural
environment.
Conclusions
Thus, in the remote period after the Chernobyl accident, 10-12 years after it, the annual effective
doses of external and internal exposure to population decreased by 10-20 times as compared with the
first year after the accident. This decrease was caused mainly by natural processes, and also because
of application of wide-scale countermeasures. Further decrease of the dose is anticipated with the rate
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of 4 to 8 % per year, in dependence on natural conditions. In the areas with black-earth soils (the Tula,
Orel and other regions) the external exposure to population by gamma radiation from cesium-137
prevails. In the areas with turfpodzol sandy and sandy-loam soils (the Bryansk, Kaluga an other
regions) the internal exposure gives the contribution in the dose comparable to that from the external
exposure due to intake of Cs-137 and Sr-90 with food products, and in the areas with peat soils the
contribution of the internal exposure exceeds that of the external exposure. Note that the contribution
of Cs-137 intake with meat and dairy products in the internal dose decreases with time, and the
contribution of natural products increases up to 30-70 %.
In connection with the reduction and stabilization of exposure levels to population, the situation
became favorable for transition to long-term measures of population protection and area
rehabilitation. This requires solution of four tasks: long-term radiation and social protection of
population; special medical service to population; restoration of economic activity of population and
priority social development of the region; restoration of economic and ecological value of the
environment. Section 3 of the paper proposes the most expedient modern methods for population
protection and rehabilitation of contaminated areas in Russia
and criteria for judgement about reaching these tasks.
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References
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
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Buldakov L.A., Avetisov G.M., Balonov M.I. and Konstantinov Yu.O. (1989) Theory and practice
of establishing radiation standards before and after the Chernobyl accident. In: Medical aspects of
the Chernobyl accident. In: Proceedings of the Conference in Kiev, 1988. IAEA-Tecdoc-516,
IAEA, Vienna, pp.81-90.
ICRP. Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. ICRP
Publication 60. Annals of the ICRP, 1990, 21 (1-3).
International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for Safety of
Radiation Sources, IAEA, Vienna, 1996.
Norms of Radiation Safety NRS-76/87. Moscow, Energoatomizdat, 1988.
Radiation Protection. ICRP Publication 26. Pergamon Press, 1978.
Temporary permissble levels of content of caesium radionuclides and strontium-90 in food
products and drinking water (TPL-91). USSR Ministry of Health, Moscow, 1991.
Temporary permissble levels of content of caesium- 134 and - 137 and stroritium-90 in food
products (TPL-93). Hygienic standard GS 2.6.005-93. State Committee of Russia for Sanitary
Inspection, Moscow, 1993.
European Commission. Council Regulation (EEC) No 737/90 of 22 March 1990.
Law of the RSFSR «On social protection of citizens affected by radiation due to catastrophy at
the Chernobyl NPP)>of 15 May 1991.
Determination of the average annual effective dose of exposure to inhabitants of settlements of the
Russian Federation subjected to radioactive contamination due to the Chernobyl accident.
Methodical recommendations of the State Committee for Sanitary and Epidemiological Inspection
of the Russian Federation N MU 2.7.7.001 -93 of 12.03.97.
Concept of radiation, medical and social protection and rehabilitation of population of the Russian
Federation subjected to accidental exposure. RNCRP, 1995.
Law of the Russian Federation "On radiation safety of population" of 9 January 1996.
Standards of radiation safety NRB-96. Hygienic norms GN 2.6.1.054-96. The State Committee for
Sanitary and Epidemiological Inspection of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 126 pp.
Handbook on radiation situation and doses of exposure in 1991 to population of the areas of the
Russian Federation subjected to radioactive contamination due to the Chernobyl accident. Ed.:
MJ.Balonov, StPetersburg, 1993, 147 pp.
Balonov M.I., Bruk G., Golikov V., Erkin V.G., Zvonova LA., Parkhomenko V.I. and Shutov V.N.
(1995) Long term exposure of the population of the Russian Federation as a consequence of the
accident at the Chernobyl power plant. In: Environmental Impact of Radioactive Releases. IAEA,
Vienna, pp.397-411.
Ten years of the Chernobyl disaster. Results and problems of overcoming its consequences in
Russia. Russian national report. Ed.: Vladimirov V.A., Moscow, 1996, 33 pp.
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Contribution {%) of exposure pathways and food product groups
in the mean annual dose to rural population:
Bryansk region,
-------
1,4
I 1.2
C
I 1.0
-g 6.8
I 0,6
en
g 0.4
"53
2 °-2
0.0
D > 1000 km
0.01
0,1 1.0 10
Time after deposition (y)
100
Time dependence of the dose rate due to migration
of Cs-137 in undisturbed soil at large distances
Figure 2
105
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i- i ,m 1- 1. 1 a 1 • - • ••«
e.ei -
1986
IS'SS
99©
Time
fig.(L Cs-137transfer:iactor fiiomseal toiipc(^) a^!iki^c>biris (boletus
luteis, b ) in Bryansk region as a ftatetioii of tte'after the Qiernobyl
acdcfent
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Papers Missing from Session E, Track 2: Public Health Issues II - Thyroid Disorders as a Result of
Chernobyl and other Health Issues
THYROID CANCER - THE MOST OBVIOUS AND PRONOUNCED EFFECT OF THE
CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT ON THE HEALTH STATUS OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC
A. Tsyb, V. Ilvanov, V. Shakhtarin
Medical Radiological Research Center of RAMS, Obninsk, Russia
According to the results of studies performed in Russia, the Ukraine and Belarus after the
Chernobyl accident essential increase in thyroid cancer incidence in the contaminated with
radionuclides areas has occurred. One of potential causes of the growth is the exposure of thyroid to
incorporated iodine-131 (13II). This problem is particularly urgent for those residents of the
contaminated areas who were children and adolescents during the exposure, as the risk of developing
cancer (as well as dose) is strongly dependent on the age at the exposure.
Reconstructed 131I depositions in the territory of Russia is available.1 As of today, reconstruction
of dose to the thyroid has been performed to the population of Bryansk region only.
Therefore the population of Russia as a whole was identified as a control (zero-dose) in analysis
of the incidence in the territories of the above mentioned regions. One of the major limitations of the
used approach is a possible bias in the derived values of radiation risk due to changing intensity of
screening of thyroid cancers in the post-Chernobyl period and in identification of "controls". For this
reason, the work places particular emphasis to these matters. At the same time, an advantage of the
approach is taking into account all detected cases of thyroid cancer (it is very essential point for that
rare disease thyroid cancer) in the four most contaminated regions of Russia to estimate indicators of
incidence in different age groups prior to the
Chernobyl accident and after it.
The purpose of the present work is to analyse the dynamics of thyroid cancer incidence in four
regions of Russia with the population of 4330 thousand people at the age of 0-60 years (the number of
children and adolescents is 1217 thousand persons) in 1982-1996.
The primary source of demographic information was data of federal state statistic bodies and
regional statistic committees.
Reported thyroid cancer cases (among the population of 0-60 years of age) are official data of
oncological dispensaries in Bryansk, Kaluga, Tula and Orel regions in charge of registration of cancer
patients in accordance with regulations of Ministry of Health of Russia. A total of 3082 cases were
detected from 1982 to 1996. Among them 2618 cases are among females (50 cases among girls of 0-
17 years of age) and 464 cases among males (28 cases among boys of 0-17 years of age), There were
178 cases among persons born in 1969-1986, who were children and adolescents at the time of
exposure (46 boys and 132 girls).
Among the children born after the accident from 1987 to 1996 2 cases of thyroid cancer was
reported (the beginning of the period is chosen to include foetal exposure).
The dynamics of thyroid cancer incidence in the study regions in comparison with Russia is
presented in Figure 1. Figure 1 presents a standardised incidence ratio (SIR) with 96% confidence
intervals (SIR = observed number of cases/expected number of cases) for all four regions altogether.
The confidence levels are calculated according to2 the dynamics of SIR in 1982-1996 in the four
107
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regions reveals an interesting feature. Indeed, in 1982-1986 the thyroid cancer incidence, both in males
and females, was lower than in Russia (Russia as a whole is taken as control). In 1982-1986 SIR is less
than 1. In the second period 1987-1991 SIR, on the average, is more than 1 (1.6 times higher), i.e. the
incidence in the four regions becomes higher than in Russia as a whole. As the period 1987-1991 is a
latent period in radiation induction of thyroid cancer, the growth of incidence in this period can be
attributed to introduction of a specialised examination system in these regions (the screening effect).
After 1991 a certain growth of thyroid cancer incidence in the four regions of Russia under the study is
observed.
4,6
4,0
3,5
3,0
tfM
35 2,0
1,5
1,0
0,5
0,0
O Female (0-60 years of nge)
• M ale (0-60 years of
.1,
1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992
Calendar Years
1994 1996
Fig. 1. Dynamics of standardised thyroid cancer incidence ratio in the four regions under
consideration together (control - Russia).
The risks of development of radiation-induced cancer at the same thyroid dose is known to
depend on age at exposure.3 For malignant neoplasms of most sites, the decrease in age at exposure
leads to an increase in the risk of cancer. This equally applies to radiation-induced thyroid cancer.4"5
So, induction of radiation-related cancers should be maximum for those who were children and
adolescents at exposure time.
To prove this statement two -time intervals were considered: the first period from 1982 to 1990
included a pre-accident time period from 1982 to 1986 and the latent period of 5 years from 1986 to
1990 inclusive. This was assumed to be the period of spontaneous cancers. The second (postlatent)
108
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period covered from 1991 to 1996 when radiation-induced thyroid cancer could be developed. The
correctness of dividing into the above time intervals is confirmed by the dynamics of SIR of thyroid
cancer in the regions under study as compared to Russia (Figure 1).
Let us consider the ratio of observed (over 4 regions) and expected (in Russia in general)
incidence in the considered time intervals among individuals of age 1 at the beginning of each time
interval:
cu+k
= observed; =
expectedj
k=0,l,...,m for the first examination, k=0,l,...n for the second examination, and (i+k) is age at
diagnosis;
q i+k - number of cases among individuals at the age of i by the early of considered time interval, in k
years, at the age of i+k;
£A, i+k k - thyroid cancer incidence rate in Russia as a whole. The second index k takes into account
changes of the rate with time;
n; i+k - number of individuals been at the age of i by the early of considered time interval, in k years, at
the age of i+k.
The quantity of RR; for individuals of age i in 1986 is an estimate of relative risk of development of
radiation-induced cancer and age at exposure.
The 95% confidence intervals have been calculated according to2. To compare the distribution
of RR for children and adolescents with that for adults over considered time intervals and to eliminate
possible screening effect, the distributions have been normalised as average weighted RR for adults.
The size of age groups has been taken into account.
To estimate dose to the thyroid from incorporated 13II the results of individual radiometry of the
thyroid of 1864 residents of 96 settlements of Bryansk region were used. For calculation of doses due
to internal exposure we used the model6, paths of intake of 13II via inhalation and feeding were taken
into account in the model. Using linkage procedure the thyroid dose was estimated for residents of the
Bryansk region. Age ratio of the population has been taken into account. The estimated collective dose
to the thyroid is 34200 person Gy, average dose is 23 mGy. Thyroid dose to the exposed children and
adolescents is 56 mGy.
Model for absolute risk was used for calculation of coefficients of relationship between the dose
and Incidence rate:
A(u,D,a) = A0(u) + EAR(u,a) x D(a),
AQ is rate of baseline incidence at the age u;
D - dose to the thyroid;
a - age at exposure.
For calculation of model parameters we used the method of maximal likelihood with suggestion
that Poisson distribution of cases with time exists.
Figure 2(a, b) presents results of calculating risk of radiation-related thyroid cancer in children
and adolescents with respect to adults with 95% confidence intervals. It can be seen that the relations
for girls in the period of spontaneous cancers are close to unity and differ significantly from unity in
109
-------
the assumed period of development of radiation-induced cancers (1991-1996) for children and
adolescents.
8 ft
3 f«
tJ
5 ta
JS ta
73
I
3;
IF
Mala
O
t~
a)
fJ
2tf
IS
14
1S
1 *
9 4
£
DOW
-'"•<££.
, i? v »*... •••t^......«*«.. ,;.;_„;, ix,;,,;,,,;,!,,,-,;,,;,,,-;^,,,.,^,. y*T ^ y.
*«4 5** f*vf41-»*;t'tzs.i:42»iiE»s'a»a*SiB'.i5fS4i9.'4*f«.^»ftr-f
-------
The points on the plot are shifted to reveal the bias in the values. As is seen from Figure 2, the
relative risk of development of radiation-induced cancer among children and adolescents is higher than
the risk for adults in the considered period 1991-1996. In the age group of 0-4 years at exposure
relative risk is 14 and 13 times higher for girls and boys respectively, in the group of 5-9 years of age it
is 5 and 3.5 times higher in girls and boys respectively. On the average, the risk coefficient in children
and adolescents at the time of exposure is about 2.3 timer, higher that in adults. In3'6 the relation of
thyroid dose D and unit activity of incorporated 13II has been derived as a function of age at the time of
the Chernobyl accident. It has been shown that the difference in absorbed doses to the younger age
groups can occur earlier than at the age of 20-24 years at exposure. The distribution of dose D is also
shown in Figure 2, The dose is normalised to unity at age at exposure 20-24 years. The shape of the
curve of relative risk in post latent period is in good agreement with the thyroid dose to girls first.
Reconstruction of doses to the thyroid in Bryansk region allowed us to estimate relationship between
dose and radiation risk for the disease of concern.
Figure 3 shows relationship between incidence rate of thyroid cancer among boys and girls
exposed to radiation at the age of 0-17 years and the thyroid dose. 48 and 26 cases diagnosed in girls
and boys respectively over 1991-1996 were analysed. All doses were divided into 8 and 3 dose
intervals (girls and boys respectively), the width of the interval was chosen by criteria of homogenous
distribution of number of persons and cases. Median interval dose is calculated with the account for
the weight of the size of age group of the population laying in a dose interval.
0,0
f _
CIS; »
0,0
<*o*e to tfcw Yltyroftf gfamf
in
-------
to
•Bern* «IO*M» to *«*«
Fig. 3. Relationship between dose and thyroid cancer incidence rate among children and
adolescents at the age of exposure (females) over the period of observation 1991 to!996:
a - males; b - females.
From the Figure it is seen that dose-effect curve is close to line. It fits up-to-date ideas on
existence of relationship between dose and thyroid cancer. Excess absolute risk EAR (angular
coefficient of the relationship) for girls is 2.21 (95% CI: 0.74, 3.68) per 104 PYGy. Relative risk (ratio
of EAR to the incidence rate at zero dose) is 7.3 (95% CI: 2.4, 12.1), The obtained value of EAR
within confidence limits corresponds to the value of risk for children and adolescents (girls) due to
exposure to incorporated I31I given in7 -2.5x(4/3)x(l/3)=l.l [lO^PYGy]'1. EAR is 1.62 (95% CI: -
0.04, 3.23) per 104PYGy for boys, however it is not statistically significant, may be, because of less
number of thyroid cancer cases.
We have considered the relationship between excess number of thyroid cancer cases and thyroid
dose. However, we assume that there are other factors which can cause the development of thyroid
cancer and modify radiation risks.
It is known that almost all the most affected territories of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine are zones
of goitre endemy4. Until middle sixties iodine prophylactics was conducted there. Therefore
association of thyroid abnormalities with radiation due to the Chernobyl accident should be examined
with consideration for existing iodine deficiency.
In Russia the most affected territories are in the following 7 south-western rajons of Bryansk
region: Gordeevsky, Klintsovsky, Zlynkovsky, Kilmovsky, Krasnogorsky, Novozybkovsky and
Starodubsky. The level of soil contamination with 137Cs ranges from 1 to more then 40 Ci/km2. The
size of population of the most affected areas is about 500 thousand persons.
112
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Nonuniform contamination of limited territory with radionuclides, the large size of the affected
population as well as existence of goitre endemy are the basis for the study of combined effect of
radiation and iodine deficiency on development of thyroid abnormalities.
The map of iodine provision in Bryansk region was made up on the basis of 3070 measurements
(of concentration of iodine in urine (Fig 4). Areas in which renal iodine excretion is >10 mg/dl, 10.0-
7.5 mg/dl, 7.5-5.0 mg/dl and less than 5.0 mg/dl are marked. In order to obtain more detailed data, the
territory of slight degree of iodine deficiency was divided Into two zones: 10.0-7.5 mg/dl and 7.5 -5.0
mg/dl. In Table 1 data on renal excretion of iodine within bounders of marked territories are given
Table 1. Iodine concentration in urine of residents of south-western areas of Bryansk region
Iodine deficiency Number Number Mean value Standard deviation Median
(ug/dl) of the examined of settlements Og/dl) G^g/dl) C"g/dl)
<5
5.0 - 7.5
7.5-10
>10
TOTAL
441
920
862
847
3070
8
26
23
18
75
3.51
6.41
8.56
12.88
1.02
0.90
0.85
2.53
3.64
6.42
8.72
12.94
Variations of the level of iodine in urine between the data attributed to each zone are confident,
p<0.001. The results show that slight iodine deficiency (renal excretion of iodine 10.0-5.0 mg/dl) is in
the major part of the studied territory, in the less area the iodine deficiency is moderate (<5.0 mg/dl) or
iodine provision is normal (>10 mg/dl). However, town of Klimova and large settlement Gordeevka
are in the zone of moderate iodine deficiency, and towns of Surazh, Mglin, Unecha are in the zone of
normal iodine provision.
In May 1986 the size of population born 1968-1986 been living in territories of moderate (<5.0
mg/dl), slight (5.0-7.5 mg/dl; 7.5-10.0 mg/dl) and normal (>10.0 mg/dl) level of iodine deficiency was
8 325, 60 442, 18 178 and 32 840 persons respectively.
In Figure 5 the map of iodine deficiency and radiation dose to the thyroid of adults is presented.
Various combinations of thyroid dose and iodine deficiency occur. In children the relationship of two
factors (radiation and concentration of iodine in urine) is more complicated because thyroid dose
depends on the age at the time of exposure. Thyroid dose from radioiodines to children and
adolescents residing in the studied areas fluctuates from several to 240 cGy, the mean dose is 76 cGy.
In the areas in which iodine deficiency has been studied for 12 years 34 thyroid cancer cases
were diagnosed (Table 2). 3 cases were detected in areas with iodine deficiency less than 5mg/dl; 24
cases were in territories with iodine deficiency of 5.0-7,6 mg/dl. 4 cases were in territories with iodine
deficiency of 7.5-10.0 mg/dl and 3 cases were in territories with iodine deficiency above 10.0 mg/dl. In
figure 5 relationship between excess relative risk (ERR) of thyroid cancer among children and
adolescents and iodine deficiency is presented. ERR is normalized to dose of IGy. The magnitude of
ERR is seen to be confident. It considerably depends on the level of iodine provision in the area under
the study. So, ERR of thyroid cancer in patients with mean thyroid dose of 1 Gy residing in territory of
normal level of iodine deficiency (>10mg/dl) is 15, and the ERR for those living under high iodine
deficiency (<2.0 mg/dl) is 24.0.
113
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Table 2. Number of observed and expected thyroid cancer within 12 years after the Chernobyl
accident in persons, birth years 1968-1986, living in the area with different iodine deficiency and their
collective organ dose at the expense of 131I
Renal Iodine Number Collective Observed number Expected number
excretion in the of persons, birth thyroid dose, of cancer of cancer
area of residence years 1968-1986 GY
abs. for 100,000 abs. for 100,00
<5
5.0-7.5
7.5-10
>10
8325
60442
18178
32840
2043
21889
3617
1903
3
24
4
3
36.0
38.1
22.0
9.1
0.43
3.15
0.95
1.71
5.21
5.21
5.21
5.21
TOTAL
119785
29452
34 28.4
6.24
5.21
26
24
22
20
18
16
14
y»27,071-1,164*X
Correlation: RMJ.9595 p
-------
development of thyroid cancer.
• iodine deficiency leads to increase in excess relative risk of thyroid cancer among children
• the results obtained allow one to suggest that minimization of iodine deficiency in territories
affected due to the Chernobyl accident can contribute to mitigation of radiation effect on the
thyroid.
References
1. Pitkevitch VA, Duba W, Ivanov VK et al. Reconstruction of the composition of the Chernobyl
radionuclide fallout and external radiation absorbed doses to the population in areas of Russia,
Radiat Prot Dosimetry 1996; 64: 69-92.
2. Breslow NE and Day N, Statistical methods in cancer epidemiology. Vol. 11 - The design and
analysis of cohort studies. Lyon: International agency for research on cancer, 1987; 82: 69-75.
3. Age dependent doses to members of the public from intake of radionuclides. ICRP publication
1989; 56: 45-51.
4. Shore RE. Issues and epidemiological evidence regarding radiation-induced thyroid cancer.
Radiation Research 1992; 131: 98-117.
5. Ron E, Lubin JY, Shore RE, Mabucbi K, Modan B, Pottern LM, Shneider A, Tucker M and Bolce
JD. Thyroid cancer after exposure to external radiation: a pooled analysis of seven studies-
Radiation Research 1995; 141: 259-277.
6. Zvonova LA, Balonov MI. Radioiodine dosimetry and prediction of consequences of the thyroid
exposure of the Russian population following the Chernobyl accident. In: The Chernobyl papers,
ed. Mervin SE and Balonov MI, Washington: REPS, 1993: 71-126.
7. Health effects on populations of exposure to low levels of ionizing radiation. National Academy of
Sciences Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation. BEIR V Reports. Washington
DC: US National Academy of Sciences 1990
8. Endemic goitre. Geneva: WHO, 1963. Ed. by F.U. Klemens, De Merious.
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Contributed Papers to the International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference
NUCLEAR EMERGENCY PLANNING AND RESPONSE
IN
THE NETHERLANDS
Drs. Bart H. Dal The Hague, September '98
Crisis Management Director of the Ministry of
Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment
Dr. Ronald C.G.M. Smetsers
Head of the Laboratory of Radiation Research
National Institute of Public Health and the Environment
SUMMARY
The Chernobyl disaster, in 1986, was reason for the Dutch Government to implement a national
organization for nuclear emergency planning and response, and to improve the technical infrastructure
for the collection and presentation of radiological data. This paper gives an overview of the developments
that took place, and identifies the main problems that were encountered during emergency exercises and
the handling of (minor) radiological incidents. The paper concludes with tentative solutions to refine the
efficiency of the organization.
HISTORY
The Dutch approach to nuclear emergencies was and still is determined to a large extent by international
obligations. In 1957, the Netherlands and other EC states signed the Euratom Treaty in Rome establishing
the European Atomic Energy Community. This required signatories to make provisions for emergencies at
nuclear power stations. The intention was to provide an adequate response in the event of an accident. The
treaty formed the basis for the legal framework for nuclear safety in the Netherlands, the Nuclear Energy
Act of 1963 and the Nuclear Accidents Decree. From 1973 this Decree gave the basis for nuclear alarm
regulations for power stations in the Netherlands and close to the border. As was the case in the
neighboring countries, these early emergency preparedness plans tended to be of a rather local nature.
The 1986 Chernobyl disaster - which showed that nuclear accidents may have a major international impact -
tested our powers of improvisation to the limit. It became clear that local provisions for emergency response
would certainly be of limited use when such a catastrophe would take place in or nearby the Netherlands.
Obviously, the existing alarm provisions would have to be extended to deal with consequences of a nuclear
disaster on a national and international scale. Given the complexity of the subject, it was decided to develop
new measures for dealing with nuclear accidents under the auspices of a nationwide project. This project
resulted in February 1989 in the National Plan for Nuclear Emergency Response, or NPK.
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THE DUTCH NATIONAL PLAN FOR NUCLEAR EMERGENCY RESPONSE
The NPK covers all nuclear sites and activities, which could affect the Netherlands. Depending on the scale
of the possible radiological consequences of nuclear accidents, and criteria like the scale of measures to be
taken, public anxiety, international aspects, etc., the nuclear facilities and activities have been divided into
two categories, A and B. This classification indicates whether the overall coordination of accident response
is left to the municipal or the national level.
In the event of an accident at a nuclear site a national disaster organization involving all tiers of government
- central, provincial and municipal - is activated. Decisions on necessary protective measures will be taken
by a team of staff assembled at the National Coordination Center based at the Ministry for Internal Affairs.
Local authorities are responsible for implementing the measures. Public information will also be
coordinated centrally by a National Public Information Center. This body will issue statements and advice to
the public, the media and other authorities.
In parallel with this administrative and information organization, a national organization is set up to collect
and evaluate technical information. This technical information organization is mainly made up by services
and institutes that in their normal day-to-day work are engaged in monitoring the environment, surface
waters or consumer products. The involved institutes are called Support Centers. One of these Centers, the
National Institute of Public Health and the Environment is responsible for the central collection and
processing of technical data from all over the country.
Coordination of all the technical aspects of the organization rests with a Technical Information Group
(TIG), which would advise the Policy Team at the National Coordination Center on appropriate measures
(Fig.1).
Policy Team
advice for counter-measures
partial
information
Tl G
S partial information
H
general overview
digital data
Support Centers
1 f 1
monitoring data
1
Measuring
squads
Information Center
RIVM
Support Center
monitoring data
1
Pilot Flame
Institutes
H 1
[, digital data
Support Centers
-, 1
monitor
ng data
Measuring
squads
Figure 1
Simplified scheme of the technical information structure in the Netherlands
117
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The NPK also covers other important points:
• The accident classification system that the IAEA has introduced to provide a rapid assessment of the likely
consequences of an accident at a nuclear power station should be mentioned here. This system also details
the organization necessary to respond. One advantage of the classification system is that accident reports
are internationally consistent.
• The levels of radiation at which measures must be taken - known as intervention levels - have been
defined to provide guidelines for implementing radiation control measures. These measures must be
prepared in detail, and in advance, for specified zones around nuclear power stations, so that they can be
implemented rapidly if there is any danger of the intervention level being exceeded.
• On recommendation of the International Atomic Energy Agency, emergency planning zones were installed
around nuclear power stations in the Netherlands and the border areas.
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
The Chernobyl accident did certainly lead to better international coordination. In September 1986 two IAEA
conventions were signed in Vienna: one on the early notification of nuclear accidents and one on mutual
assistance. The conventions were both signed by the EC Member States.
These conventions have been further strengthened by the European Parliament, in particular by its decision in
late 1987 on Community arrangements for the rapid exchange of information in the event of radiological
emergencies, known as ECURIE. These arrangements go much further than the Vienna conventions, and also
apply to the provision of information concerning accidents and counter-measures, irrespective of whether an
accident has consequences for other Member States or not.
The European Commission is currently encouraging neighboring Member States to conclude bilateral
agreements among themselves - agreements that should go further than ECURIE. The Netherlands has signed
memoranda of understanding on coordination with Germany and Belgium. Wide-ranging agreement has also
been reached with both countries on a strategy for the combined response to nuclear accidents, especially in
the border areas. These agreements cover the notification of accidents and the exchange of operational and
most specifically "technical information".
FACILITIES FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION
In line with the National Plan for Nuclear Emergency Response itself, several facilities to support the
collection and management of technical information in the Netherlands were developed and implemented
in the years after Chernobyl. Amongst those should be mentioned the Information and Documentation
Center for Nuclear Emergency Response (IDC) and the National Radioactivity Monitoring Network
(NMR), both managed by the National Institute of Ptiblic Health and the Environment (RIVM). Both
facilities came into operation in 1990 and in the past eight years extensive experience was gained in
emergency exercises, training sessions and demonstrations. Furthermore, the IDC was used in a number of
occasions where international pre-alerts were received regarding accidents that actually led or could lead
to releases, such as the recent accidental release of Cs-137 in Alge?iras, Spain (Fig. 2).
Information and Documentation Center for Nuclear Emergency Response (IDC)
The IDC is the total of systems, applications and databases enabling a rapid prognosis and diagnosis of
the radiological situation during a nuclear event. Models for short- and long-distance air dispersion and
deposition are available in the IDC, and can be applied using on line diagnostic and prognostic meteo-
fields obtained from the Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute (KNMI). Consequences of the
environmental contamination for food products and radiation doses received by the population can be
evaluated. The IDC-database is designed as a national facility that contains all relevant radiological data
obtained from various support centers (Fig. 1) during an accident. Radiological data can be compared and
combined with modeled results. The IDC database also contains standard information on nuclear power
plants (locations, reactor-types, power, nuclear inventory etc.), potential source terms (e.g. in relation to
118
-------
reactor types and accident categories) and radionuclides (decay constants, dose conversion coefficients,
dispersion characteristics). :;
The present first-generation IDC is a dedicated system based on information technology of the late
eighties. Due to the rapid IT-developments that took place in the past eight years, the performance of the
system is now becoming obsolete. To mention one shortcoming, its present 'stand-alone' character requires
growing efforts for maintenance and control, and the training of (new) employees who may have to use
the IDC under great stress. As a result, it was recently decided to renew the system, using the eight years
of experience obtained during training sessions, national exercises and participation in international
validation studies such as ETEX (European Tracer Exercise) and RTMOD (Real-Time Modeling).
The key requirements for the IDC did not change essentially in the mean time, but the following
additional demands were laid on the second-generation system:
(1) instead of being a stand-alone system, the 2nd generation IDC aims to be an integrated part of the total
of hardware, applications, networks and (geographical) information systems used for regular activities in
the field of risk analysis, making it a 'living' system; (2) in contrast to the graphical work stations of the 1st
generation IDC, the user-end of the new system will be a general PC running under Windows NT,
diminishing the demands for training and enhancing the group of potential users; (3) the new system aims
to be more flexible in the presentation and communication of its results, with more emphasis on
(inter)national data-communication using various standards; (4) more emphasis will be given to the use of
measurements to validate or refine previous forecasts; (5) and finely, it is intended to integrate the IDC
with a similar system for emergency support in the case of accidents with hazardous (i.e. chemical)
materials. This second-generation IDC is expected to come into operation next year.
Cs-137 deposition
1E2 Bq/m2
1E1 Bq/m2
1EO Bq/m2
1E-1 Bq/m2
1E-2 Bq/m2
1E-3 Bq/m2
Figure 2 Calculated deposition of a supposed release of 10 TBq Cs-137 from AlgecJras,
on May 29th, 1998 (12:00u). Model results agree well with measured data.
119
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The National Radioactivity Monitoring Network (NMR)
The primary assignment of the NRM was to provide early warnings against major nuclear accidents, in
particular accidents with foreign nuclear power plants. Secondly, the network was considered to be the
main facility to obtain actual data of the distribution of radioactivity in the first phase of an accident.
NMR data support the calculation of actual radiation doses received by the population via the direct
pathways of 'external irradiation' and 'inhalation'. All NRM sites (initially 58, corresponding with a mesh-
width of typically 25 km) are equipped with ambient dose-equivalent rate meters. At 14 sites (mesh-width
50 km), airborne activity monitors measure the natural gross-a- and artificial gross-b-activity
concentration in air. However, to convert air activity concentrations to inhalation doses, information about
the actual mix of radionuclides is necessary. To fulfill this requirement, nuclide-specific measurements
(e.g. 131I) are carried out continuously at the RIVM site. During an event, the number of nuclide-specific
measuring sites can be extended by dispatching monitoring vans, with facilities to carry out a large
number of (nuclide-specific) radioactivity measurements 'on-the-spot', and by alerting eight so-called
Pilot-Flame institutes to conduct a standardized emergency measurement program.
Early 1996, the number of sites for ambient dose rate measurements was largely increased to cover the
needs of local authorities. In addition, double monitoring circles were implemented around nuclear power
plants in and nearby the Netherlands, avoiding the necessity to send measurement crews into (heavily)
contaminated zones. The large number of sites made it possible to use more sophisticated methods for
automatic validation of warning signals, based on trends in neighboring measuring sites. When the 1st
generation network was operating, duty officers were (falsely) alarmed typically 20 times a year, mainly
due to malfunction of equipment, but also due to extraordinary natural phenomena (e.g. unusual levels of
rainout of radon progeny during thunderstorms) or local human activities (e.g. radiography) nearby an
NRM site. Since 1996, however, the number of warnings has significantly reduced.
At present, large parts of the network have to be renewed, however, other priorities resulted in serious
budget cuts, and it was decided to reduce the number of dose-rate sites to approximately 175 (mesh-width
15 km on average). The present higher site density will be maintained along the border, in heavily
populated areas and in the vicinity of nuclear power plants. A study determining the probability of
detecting a severe nuclear accident based on measurements of airborne radioactivity, as a function of
mesh-width, led to the conclusion that the present number of 14 sites for the recording of radioactivity in
air should not be decreased.
EXPERIENCES
The NPK brings together the separate legislation covering nuclear accidents and other kinds of disaster. This
integration means that the normal disaster services available nationally would implement countermeasures in
the event of a nuclear accident. In other words, there is no separate organization to deal with a nuclear
emergency. This is regarded as a very important factor in view of the fact that the appointed NPK
organization was "luckily" never tested in operational circumstances.
Events in the Netherlands, such as the disaster at the chemical plant in Uithoorn and the accident involving
the Boeing 747 above the Bijlmermeer have shown that you can never absolutely rule out an accident. The
floodings in 1995 showed that organized rapid evacuation of 200.000 people is a feasible option when
needed, even in a densely populated country such as the Netherlands. The current tendency in Holland is not
to have full-scaled nuclear exercises, but to train people on aspects and measures that have or may have to do
with all kinds of emergencies. In fact nuclear accidents are considered only unique in the sense that they
might threaten a very large area and that they demand specialized expertise. Several years ago the Dutch
Ministry for Internal Affairs started a project on crisis-management on a national level. The organization that
was decided upon by the Dutch Parliament was based on the learning's of the realization of the Dutch NPK
and the many tryouts and exercises that were being conducted in the last ten years.
The evaluation of these exercises shows in particular a problem in the field of information management.
120
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Certainly in the case of emergencies that cover a large geographical area it is important that the same
information is as soon as possible made available to all the involved governmental organizations. Also the
information should be correct and understandable for people who lack radiological knowledge.
The exercises that are being conducted under the EC-directive ECUEJE and the bilateral exercise with
Belgium and Germany show similar information exchange problems. In order to improve this, Germany and
Holland recently started, for instance, an exchange of monitoring data on a regular basis. Of course,
information management covers more than technical information alone. All the steps in the process, i.e. data
collection, data processing, advising on countermeasures, deciding etc. are being evaluated and if possible
improved. Improvement is certainly possible in the means of communication. A lot of effort is being put into
projects, within the country as well as in European context, that deal with geographical information exchange
since this would diminish the data flow and improve understandability. Also the number of people involved
in the emergency organization is limited in order to speed up decision-making processes.
CONCLUSIONS
The organization for Nuclear Emergency Response in the Netherlands, implemented in the years after
Chernobyl and in force since 1989-1990, regulates the complete spectrum of emergency management.
This includes all national, provincial and municipal administrative levels, the technical and scientific
involvement of the various (governmental) research institutes, as well as the communication with foreign
bodies, the press and the .general public. The advantage of having all possible participants united in one
National Plan appears to be a disadvantage at the same time, since the involvement of so many people
makes the decision making process slow and puts extremely high demands on the handling of information.
It is clear that simple solutions for this paradox do not exist, however, experiences obtained from
exercises and (minor) incidents show that there is a definite need for improvement. Two possible ways are
presently investigated. Firstly, plans are being developed to size down the number of involved bodies and
participants depending on the type of event and the accident response phase. For instance, to facilitate the
decision making process in the first hours of a severe accident - when reliable information is limited - a
small and well trained group of generalists may serve this purpose better instead of involving a much
larger group of specialists at this stage. And secondly, the rapid developments in information technology
should be exploited to make the handling of information more efficient. The largest challenge here is to
harmonize the means and protocols for the exchange of information, both nationally and internationally,
in a situation were most of the participants are already bounded to their own systems and conventions.
Time will learn if these purposed improvements will be feasible and satisfactory in the end.
Overview of related papers:
Dal A.H., J.F.A. van Hienen and D. van Lith. Nuclear emergency planning and monitoring
strategies in the Netherlands. In: Proc. Int. Symp. on environmental contamination
following a major nuclear incident, Vienna, IAEA-SM-306/45, pp.319-334 (1990).
Lith D. van, R.C.G.M. Smetsers and H. Slaper. Environmental monitoring and the application of
predictive models for nuclear emergencies in the Netherlands. In: Proc, Second REM
Workshop on "Real time radioactivity monitoring and its interface with predictive
atmospheric transport models", Ispra, Italy, 5-6 December 1989. Ispra I, CEC-JRC Report
EUR 12290 EN, pp. 59-74 (1990).
Pruppers M.J.M., J.E.T. Moen and R.C.G.M. Smetsers. The role of RIVM in the management of
nuclear emergency response. In: Annual Scientific Report 1990. National Institute of
Public Health and Environmental Protection, Bilthoven, NL pp.144-146 (1991).
Smetsers R.C.G.M. and A.P.P. A. van Lunenburg. Evaluation of the Dutch radioactivity monitoring
121
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network for nuclear emergencies over the period 1990-1993. Radiat. Prot. Dosim. 55(3),
165-172 (1994).
Smetsers, R.C.G.M. and R.O. Blaauboer. Time-resolved monitoring of outdoor radiation levels in
the Netherlands. Radiat Prot. Dosim. 55(3), 173-181 (1994).
Smetsers, R.C.G.M., M.J.M. Pruppers and J.F. van Sonderen. Nuclear emergency planning and
response in the Netherlands: experiences obtained from large-scale exercises. In: Proc. Int.
Workshop "Scientific Bases for Decision Making after a Radioactive Contamination of an
Urban Environment", Rio de Janeiro / Goiania, 29 Aug - 2 Sep 1994.
Smetsers, R.C.G.M. An automated gross alpha/beta activity monitor applied to time-resolved
quantitative measurements of 222Rn progeny in air. Health Phys. 68(4), 546-552 (1995).
Moen, J.E.T., J.F. van Sonderen, F.J. Aldenkamp, A.H. Dal, W. Molhoek and A.M.M. van Leest.
Nuclear Emergency Prepardness in the Netherlands. In: Proc. 9th IRPA Conference,
Vienna, April 1996.
Smetsers, R.C.G.M. and R.O. Blaauboer. Variations in Outdoor Radiation Levels in The
Netherlands. Thesis Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, ISBN 90-367-0621-1, 1996, Also
available as RTVM report 610064002 (1996).
Aldenkamp F.J., P.A.M. Uijt de Haag and S.T. van Tuinen. Evaluation of Information
Management in the Netherlands during the Early Phase of an Accident. Radiat. Prot.
Dosim., Vol. 73, Nos 1-4, pp. 107-110 (1997).
Blaauboer, R.O. and R.C.G.M Smetsers. Outdoor Concentrations of the Equilibrium-Equivalent
Decay Products of 222Rn in the Netherlands and the Effect of Meteorological Variables.
Radiat. Prot. Dosim.., Vol. 69(1), pp. 7-18 (1997).
Smetsers, R.C.G.M. and R.O. Blaauboer. A Dynamic Compensation Method for Natural
Ambient Dose Rate Based on 6 Years Data from the Dutch Radioactivity Monitoring
Network. Radiat. Prot. Dosim., Vol. 69(1), pp. 19-31 (1997).
Smetsers, R.C.G.M. and R.O. Blaauboer. Source-Dependent Probability Densities Explaining
Frequency Distributions of Ambient Dose Rate in the Netherlands. Radiat. Prot. Dosim.,
Vol. 69(1), pp. 33-42 (1997).
Smetsers, R.C.G.M. and R.O. Blaauboer. Tracing Anomalous Events in a Large and Varying
Natural Background of Ionising Radiation RIVM Annual Scientific Report 1996, pp.
21-23 (1997).
Sonderen, JF van. Monitoring Strategy in support of Radiological Emergency Management.
Radiat. Prot. Dosim., Vol. 73, Nos 1-4, pp. 115-118 (1997).
122
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Appendix B:
List of Attendees
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124
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Appendix B: List of Participants
Mr. Robert L. Acerno
FEMA Region in
26 Federal Plaza
Room 1323
New York, NY 10278
Tel: (212) 225-7733
Fax: (212) 225-7026
E-mail: Robert.Acerno@fema.gov
Dr. E. John Ainsworth
National Council on Radiation Protection and
Measurements
11354 Empire Lane
N. Bethesda MD 20252
Tel: (301) 468-6652
E-mail: cjainsworth@juno.com
Dr. R.M. Alexakhin
Russian Institute of Agricultural Radiology
and Agroecology
Radiation Biology & Medicine Section
Kaluga Region, Obninsk
249020 RUSSIA
Tel: +007 08439 6-48-02
Fax: +007 095 2552225
E-mail: kruglov@obninsk.com
Mr. Peter T.Allen
European Institute of Health and Medical
Sciences
University of Surrey
Guildford
Surrey GU2 5XH
ENGLAND
Tel: +44 (0) 1483 259219
Fax:+44(0) 1483503517
E-mail: P.Allen@surrev.ac.uk
Mr. John Anderson (Exhibitor)
Atlantic Nuclear Corporation
1020 Turnpike St.
Canton, MA 02021
Tel: (781) 828-9118
Fax:(781)828-1319
E-mail: anc@att.net
Ms. Robin Anderson
U.S. EPA
401 M Street, SW
Mail Code 5202 (G)
Washington, D.C. 20460
Tel: (703) 603-8747
Fax: (703) 603-9133
E-mail: Anderson.Robin@epamail.epa.gov
Mr. Don Anthony
U.S. EPA, Region IX
75 Hawthorne St.
SFD-1-3
San Francisco, CA 94105
Tel: (415) 744-2208
Fax: (415) 744-1796
E-mail: DLAwriter@ aol.com
Ms. Cindy Arnone (Exhibitor)
Rados Technology, Inc.
6460-E Dobbin Road
Columbia, MD 21045
Tel: (410) 740-1440
Fax: (410) 740-4676
E-mail: cparnone@rados.com
125
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Mr. J.P. Auclair
Health Canada
Radiation Protection Bureau
775 Brookfield Road
Address Locator 6302D1
Ottawa, Ontario
CANADA K1A 1C1
Tel: (613) 954-6676
Fax: (613) 957-1089
E-mail: J P Auclair@hc-sc.gc.ca
Mr. Mikail Balonov
Institute of Radiation Hygiene
Mira str. 8
197101 St. Petersburg
RUSSIA
Tel:+007 812 233 4843
Fax:+007 812 230 6319
E-mail: ira@protection.spb.su
Mr. James C. Baranski
New York State Disaster Preparedness
Commission
State Emergency Management Office
1220 Washington Avenue
Building 22, Suite 101
Albany, NY 12226-2251
Tel: (518) 457-8916
Fax:(518)457-9930
Mr. James G. Barnes (Exhibitor)
Foundation for Advancements in Science and
Education
5917 Chula Vista Way #10
Los Angeles, CA 90068
Tel: (818) 586-5766
Fax: (818) 586-6142
E-mail: maill5077@pop.net
Ms. Loletta Barrett
Orange County Sheriff-Coroner
Department/Emergency Management
2644 Santiago Cyn Road
Silverado, CA 92676
Tel: (714) 628-7059
Fax:(714)628-7154
E-mail: lbarrett@occomm.oc.orange.ca.us
Mr. Keith F. Baverstock
World Health Organization
Cia F. Crispi, 10
00187 Rome
ITALY
Tel: +0039 6 4877548/40
Fax: +0039 6 4877599
E-mail: KBA@who.it
Dr. Anar S. Baweja
Health Canada
Radiation Protection Bureau
775 Brookfield Road
Address Locator 6302D1
Ottawa, Ontario
CANADA K1A 1C1
Tel: (613) 941-2355
Fax: (613) 957-1089
E-mail: Anar Baweja@hc-sc.gc.ca
Dr. Steven M. Becker
University of Alabama at Birmingham
School of Social and Behavioral Sciences
339 Ullman Building, 1212 University Blvd.
Birmingham, AL 35294-3350
Tel: (205) 934-8417
Fax: (205) 934-9896
E-mail: smbecker@ uab.edu
126
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Mr. Bill Belanger
UiS. EPA, Region m
841 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19107
Tel: (215) 566-2082
E-mail: belanger.bill@epamail.epa.gov
Ms. Deborah S. Bell
FEMA
467 J.W. McCormack POCH
Boston, MA 02109
Tel: (617) 223-4444
Fax: (617) 223-9574
E-mail: liftsinsts @ aol.com
Ms. Yvette Bellamy
FEMA, Region HI
105 S. 7th Street, 2nd Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Tel: (215) 931-5584
Fax:(215)931-5539
E-mail: Yvette.Bellamy@fema.gov
Dr. Maria Belli
ANPA
Via Vitaliano Brancati, 48
Rome 00144
ITALY
Tel: +39 06 50072952/2924
Fax: +39 06 50072856/2916
E-mail: belli@anpa.it
Mr. S. Belyaev
Russian Research Centre "Kurchatov
Institute"
Kurchatov Square 1
Moscow RU-123182'
RUSSIA
Tel: +007 095 196 6639
Fax: +007 095 943 0074
E-mail: bst@polvn.kiae.su
Mr. Mohandas Bhat
U.S. DOE
Office of International Health Programs,
EH-63
19901 Germantown Road, 270CC
Germantown, MD 20874-1290
Tel: (301) 903-1719
Fax: (301) 903-1413
E-mail: mohandas.bhat@eh.doe.gov
Mr. Ram Bhat
U.S. Army Missile Command
Fort Belvoir, VA
Dr. Rosa Biagio
Commissao National de Energia Nuclear
Rua General Severiano, 90
Rio de Janeiro, RJ 22294-010
BRAZE,
Tel: +55 21 5462368
Fax: +55 21 5462270
E-mail: biagio@ibm.net
Prof. Aithazha Bigaliev
c/o Dr. Bakhyt Ospanova
57 Auezov Street
Room 127
Almaty 480008
REPUBLIC OF KAZAKSTAN
Tel: +8 3272 42 23 90
.Mr. Bruce M. Biwer
Argonne National Laboratory
9700 South Cass Ave., EAD/900
Argonne, IL 60439
Tel: (630) 252-5761
Fax: (630) 252-4624
E-mail: bmbiwer@ anl. gov
127
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Mr. Charles Blue
U.S. EPA
401 M Street, SW
Mail Code 6602J
Washington, D.C. 20460
Tel: (202) 564-9488
Fax: (202) 565-2037
E-mail: blue.charles@epamail.epa.gov
Mr. Bryan Boardman (Exhibitor)
Aware Electronics Corp.
P.O. Box 4299
Wilmington, DE 19807
Tel: (302) 655-3800
Fax: same as above
E-mail: boardmanb@aw-el.com
Dr. Alexander S. Bohuslavsky
Radioecological Center of National Academy
of Sciences of Ukraine
55b, Gonchar St.
Kyiv 252054
UKRAINE
Tel: +38 044 216 8272
Fax:+38044216-1417
E-mail: hydroec @ geuk.apc.org
Ms. Linda Bomberg
Orange County Sheriff-Coroner
Department/Emergency Management
2644 Santiago Cyn Road
Silverado, CA 92676
Tel: (714) 628-7018
Fax: (714) 628-7154
E-mail: lbomberg@occomm.co.orange.ca.us
Ms. Marilyn Boots
FEMA, Region VI
SOON. Loop 288
Denton,TX 76201-3690
Tel: (940) 898-5122
Fax: (940) 898-5263
E-mail: marilvn.boots@fema.gov
Mr. Robert J. Bores
U.S. NRC, Region I
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406
Tel: (610) 337-5213
Fax: (610) 337-5067
E-mail: RJB@nrc.gov
Dr. Cari Borras
Pan American Health Organization
WHO Regional Office for the Americas
525 23rd Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20037
Tel: (202) 974-3222
Fax: (202) 974-3610
Mr. Dick R. Boyer
Westinghouse Electric Corp./WIPP
P.O. Box 2078
Carlsbad, NM 88220
Tel: (505) 234-7531
Fax: (505) 234-7004
E-mail: boyerd@wipp.carlsbad.nm.as
Ms. Diane Brown-Couture
Massachusetts Emergency Management
Agency
400 Worcester Road
P.O. Box 1496
Framingham, MA 01701-0317
Tel: (508) 820-2040
Fax: (508) 820-2049
E-mail: Diane.Brown-Couture@state.ma.us
Ms. Jennifer Browne (Exhibitor)
U.S. EPA
Chemical Emergency Preparedness and
Prevention Office
401 M Street, SW
Mail Code 5104
Washington, D.C. 20460
Tel: (202) 260-7945
Fax: (202) 260-1686
E-mail: browne.iennifer@epa.gov
128
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Dr. Elena Buglova
Research Clinical Institute of Radiation
Medicine and Endocrinology
Masherova Ave. 23
Minsk220600
BELARUS
Tel:+00 375 172 231512
Fax: +00 375 172 269 480
E-mail: risk@rcirme.belpak.minsk.by
Mr. Richard Button
U.S. EPA, Region IV
61 Forsyth St.
Atlanta, GA 30303
Tel: (404) 562-9135
Fax: (404) 562-9095
E-mail: button.rick@ epa. gov
Mr. John Cadwallader
Eagle Enterprises
2025 Limewood Dr.
Baton Rouge, LA 70816
Tel: (504) 751-1121
Fax: (504) 755-7753
Ms. Marcia Carpentier
U.S. EPA
401 M Street, SW
Mail Code 6602J
Washington, D.C. 20460
Tel: (202) 564-9711
Fax: (202) 565-2037
E-mail: carpentier.niarcia@epamail.epa.gov
Mr. Sanjib Chaki
U.S. EPA
401M Street, SW
Mail Code 6602J
Washington, D.C. 20460
Tel: (202) 564-9215
Fax:(202)565-2065
E-mail: chaki.saniib @ epa. gov
Mr. Chang-Chyuan Chen
National Nuclear Emergency Management
Committee
25, Pao-Ching Road
Taipei, Taiwan
ROC
Tel: +886 2 237 547 41
Fax: +886 2 375 47 42
Mr. Ching-Chung Chen
National Nuclear Emergency Management
Committee
25, Pao-Ching Road
Taipei, Taiwan
ROC
Tel:+886-2-23887915
Fax: +886-2-23754742
Mr. S.Y.Chen
Argonne National Laboratory
9700 South Cass Avenue
Argonne, IL 60439
Tel: (630) 252-7695
Fax:(630)252-4611
E-mail: sychen @ anl-gov
Dr. Anis Chowdhury
George Washington University
2300 Eye Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20037
Tel: (202) 994-2630
Fax: (202) 728-4056
E-mail: anis@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu
Mr. Prosanta Chowdhury
Louisiana State Department of Environmental
Quality
Radiation Protection Division
P.O. Box 82135
Baton Rouge, LA 70884-2135
Tel: (504) 765-0139
Fax: (504) 926-1903
E-mail: prosanta® deq .state.la.us
129
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Dr. Kurt Christensen
Sophus Banditz VEJ 16
8230 Aabyhoj
DENMARK
Tel: +45 86752155
Fax: +45 86752185
Dr. Mary E. Clark
U.S. EPA
Office of Radiation and Indoor Air
401 M Street, SW
Mail Code 6601J
Washington, D.C. 20460
Tel: (202) 564-9348
Fax: (202) 565-2043
E-mail: clark.marye@epa.gov
Captain Julie L. Coleman
U.S. Air Force
AFMOA/SGOR
110 Luke Ave., Room 405
Boiling AEBJD.C. 20332-7050
Tel: (202) 767-4306
Fax: (202) 767-5302
E-mail: julie.coleman@usafsg.bolling.af.mil
Mr. Frank Congel
U.S. NRC
Two White Flint North
11545 Rockville Pike
Mail Stop 4D18
Rockville, MD 20852-2738
Tel: (301) 415-7476
Mr. W. Craig Conklin
U.S. EPA
Office of Radiation and Indoor Air
401 M Street, SW
Mail Code 6602J
Washington, D.C. 20460
Tel: (202) 564-9222
Fax: (202) 565-2037
E-mail: conklin.craig@epa.gov
Mr. Robert J. Conley
USDA
8814BridlewoodDr.
Springfield, VA 22152
Tel: (202) 418-8910
Fax:(202)418-8825
E-mail: bob.conlev® asda.gov
Mr. Bernard Crabol
IPSN
Centre d'etudes de Fontenay-aux-Roses
BP6
Fontenay-aux-Roses 92260
FRANCE
Tel: +33 (1) 46 54 74 16
Fax:+33 (1)42 53 91 28
E-mail: bernard.crabol@ipsn.fr
Mr. Malcolm Crick
International Atomic Energy Agency
Wagramerstrasse 5
P.O. Box 100
A-1400 Vienna
AUSTRIA
Tel: +0043 1 2060 22729
Fax: +0043 1 2060 7
E-mail: M.Crick@iaea.org
Mr. Richard Cunningham
1200 North Nash Street, #555
Arlington, VA 22209
Tel: (703) 524-5024
Fax: same as above
Mr. John Cunnington
SSI Services, Inc.
Harrisburg, PA
130
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Mr. Bart Dal
Ministry of Housing, Spacial Planning and
the Environment
8, Rijinstraat
P.O. Box 30945
2500 GX The Hague
THE NETHERLANDS
Tel:+3170 3394628
Fax:+3170 3394589
Ms. Joyce P. Davis
2639 Fort Scott Drive
Arlington, VA 22202
Tel: (202) 208-6650
E-mail: joycepdavis@prodigy.net
Mr. Richard DeCaire
MDS Nordion, Inc.
447 March Road
Kanata, Ontario
CANADA K2K 1X8
Tel: (613) 592-3400 ext. 2054
Fax: (613) 592-2006
E-mail: rdecaire@mds.nordion.com
Mr. Robert DeMartino
U.S. Public Health Service
Center for Mental Health Services
5600 Fishers Lane
Room 16C-26
Rockville, MD 20857
Tel: (301) 443-2940
Fax:(301)443-8040
Mr. Gregg D. Dempsey
U.S. EPA
Office of Radiation & Indoor Air
P.O. Box 98517
Las Vegas, NM 89193-8517
Tel: (702) 798-2461
Fax: (702) 798-2465
E-mail: dempsev. gregg@ epa.gov
Mr. A.R. Denman
Nene University College Northampton
Northampton General Hospital
Medical Physics Department
Cliftonville, Northampton NNI5BD
ENGLAND
Tel: +01604 545450
Fax: +01604 544612
E-mail: ardenman @ medphysngh.u-net.com
Mr. Nick DePierro
New Jersey Bureau of Nuclear Engineering
CN 415
Trenton, NJ 08625
Tel: (609) 984-7442
Fax:(609)984-7513
E-mail: ndepierro@dep.state.nj.us
Dr. Britt-Marie Drottz-Sjoberg
Norwegian University of Science and
Technology
Department of Psychology
Trondheim N-7034
NORWAY
Tel: +00 47 73 59 7485
Fax: +00 47 73 59 1920
E-mail: brittds @ sv.ntnu.no
Mr. Bernard D. Dusenbury, Jr.
North Carolina Division of Radiation
Protection
3825 Barrett Drive
Raleigh, NC 27609-7221
Tel: (919) 571-4141
Fax:(919)571-4148
E-mail:dale dusenbury @ mail.enr.state.nc.us
Mr. Seth Duston
North Atlantic Energy Services Co.
P.O. Box 300
Mail Code 04-39
Seabrook,NH 03874
Tel: (603) 474-9521 ext. 7639
Fax:(603)773-7292
E-mail: dustosb @naesco.com
131
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Mr. Randolph Easton
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Protection
Rachel Carson State Office Building
400 Market Street
P.O. Box 8469
Harrisburg, PA 17105-8469
Tel: (717) 783-6003
Fax: (717) 783-8965
Mr. O.W. Eaton
Westinghouse Electric
P.O. Box 2078
Carlsbad, NM 88220
Tel: (505) 234-7629
Fax: (505) 234-7004
E-mail: eatono @wipp.carlsbad.nm.us
Mr. James S. Ellis
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
7000 East Avenue
P.O. Box 808, L-103
Livermore, CA 94551
Tel: (510) 422-1808
Fax: (510) 423-5167
E-mail: ellis6@llnl.gov
Mr. John E. Esterl
Defense Special Weapons Agency
FCDSWA/FCRSE
1680 Texas Street SE
Kirtland AFB, NM 87117-5669
Tel: (505) 846-5422
Fax: (505) 853-1793
E-mail: esterlj @fc.dswa.mil
Mr. James Fairobent
U.S. DOE
Planning and Preparedness Division
1000 Independence Ave. SW
Washington, D.C. 20585
Tel: (202) 586-8759
Fax:(202)586-3859
E-mail: fairoben@oem.doe.gov
Mr. Scott Faller
U.S. EPA
Office of Radiation and Indoor Air
P.O. Box 98517
Las Vegas, NV 89193-8517
Tel: (702) 798-2323
Fax: (702) 798-2465
E-mail: Faller.Scott@ epa. gov
Mr. Robert Fernandez (Exhibitor)
Research Planning, Inc.
6400 Arlington Blvd., Ste. 1100
Falls Church, VA 22042
Tel: (703) 237-8061
Fax: (703) 237-8085
E-mail: rfernand@rpihq.com
Mr. Lou Ferrante, Jr.
R.I.E.M.A.
645 New London Avenue
Cranston, RI 02920-3003
Tel: (401) 946-9996
Fax: (401) 944-1891
Mr. Marcos C. Ferreira Moreira
Commissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear
Av. Salvador Allende s/n Recreio
Rio de Janeiro, RJ CEP 22780-160
BRAZIL
Tel: +00 55 21 4422 530
Fax: +00 55 21 4422 530
E-mail: marcos @ird.gov.br
Mr. Matt Fertig
Center for Energy Studies
17410 N. 15th Street Apt. #1146
Phoenix, AZ 85022
Tel: (602) 494-1309
E-mail: fertig@proton.sdsu.edu
132
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Ms. Cindy Folkers
Nuclear Information and Resource Service
1424 16th Street, NW, #404
Washington, D.C. 20036
Tel: (202) 328-0002
Fax: (202) 462-2183
E-mail: cindyf@igc.apc.org
Ms. Debra Foutch
Westinghouse Savannah River Co.
706-8C, Emergency Services Dept.
Aiken, SC 29803
Tel: (803) 557-9252
Fax: (803) 557-9250
E-mail: debra.foutch@srs.gov
Mr. Ronald G. Fraass
Kansas Department of Health and
Environment
Radiation Control Program
Forbes Field, Building 283
Topeka,KS 66620-0001
Tel: (785) 296-1569
Fax:- (785) 296- 0984
E-mail: Rfraass @aol.com
Ms. Shirley A. Fry
REAC/TS
Oak Ridge Institute for Science and
Education
P.O. Box 117
Oak Ridge, TN 37831-0117
Tel: (423) 576-1725
Fax: (423) 576-9522
Mr. Thomas Gahan
University Hygienic Laboratory
University of Iowa, Oakdale Campus
102 Oakdale Campus, H101 OH
Iowa City, IA 52242-5002
Tel: (319) 335-4500
Fax: (319) 335-4555
E-mail: thomas-gahan @ uiowa.edu
Mr. David Gaiman (Exhibitor)
Human Detoxfication Services International
Vitality House, 2-3 Imberhorne Way
East Grinstead, West Sussex RH19 1RL
ENGLAND
Tel:+44(0) 1342312811
Fax:+44(0) 1342317770
E-mail: DavidGaiman @ compuserve.com
Ms. Sheila Gaiman (Exhibitor)
Human Detoxification Services International
Vitality House, 2-3 Imberhorne Way
East Grinstead, West Sussex RH19 1RL
ENGLAND
Tel:+44 (0)1342 312811
Fax:+44 (0)1342 317770
Mr. Richard Gale
P.O. Box 55
Kresgeville, PA 18333
Tel: (610) 681-5949
Fax: (610) 681-5954
Mr. Mark Gallagher
FEMA
J.W. McCormack POCH
Boston, MA 02109
Tel: (617) 223-9552
E-mail: mark, gallagher@ fema. gov
Mr. Richard A. Garcia
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
P.O. Box 4198
San Clemente, CA 92674
Tel: (949) 308-8845
Fax:(949)368-1165
E-mail: garciara® songs.sce.com
133
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Mr. David Garman
U.S. EPA
Office of Radiation and Indoor Air
NAREL
540 South Morris Ave.
Montgomery, AL 36117
Tel: (334) 270-7063
Fax: (334) 270-3454
E-mail: garman.david@epa.gov
Ms. Melody Geer
KL Travis & Associates
135 Sherman Street
Richland,WA 99352
Tel: (509) 375-3447
Fax: (509) 375-7599
E-mail: hpmelody@hotmail.com
Ms. Soumaya Ghosn
Louisiana State Department of
Environmental Quality
Radiation Protection Division
P.O. Box 82135
Baton Rouge, LA 70884-2135
Tel: (504) 765-0139
Fax: (504) 926-1903
E-mail: soumayag@deq.state.la.us
Mr. Ronald E. Goans
REAC/TS
Oak Ridge Institute for Science and
Education
P.O. Box 117
Oak Ridge, TN 37831-0117
Tel: (423) 576-4049
Fax: (423) 576-9522
E-mail: goanssr@orau.gov
Gary Goldberg
U.S. DOE
Department of Emergency Management
1000 Independence Ave, SW
Washington, D.C. 20585
Tel: (202) 586-8162
E-mail: goldberg@ oem.doe. gov
Dr. Marvin Goldman
University of California - Davis
Dept. Surg. and Radiological Sciences
1122 Pine Lane
Davis, CA 95616-1729
Tel: (530) 752-1341
Fax: (530) 752-7107
E-mail: mgoldman@ucdavis.edu
Ms. Nancy Goldstein
FEMA
500 C Street, SW
Washington, D.C. 20472
Tel: (202) 646-4285
Fax: (202) 646-3508
E-mail: nancy, goldstein @fema. gov
Mr. Richard Graham
U.S. EPA, Region Vm
999 18th Street
Suite 500, MS:OPRA
Denver, CO 80202
Tel: (303) 312-7080
Fax:(303)312-6044
E-mail: graham.richard@epamail.epa.gov
Mr. Bob Graves
GMW Communications, Inc.
9719 Lincoln Village
Suite 500
Sacramento, CA 95827
Tel: (916) 363-5000
Fax:(916)363-5197
E-mail: bgraves @ govtech.net
Mr. Don Greene
Arkansas Department of Health
Division of Radiation Control
4815 West Markham, Slot # 30
Little Rock, AR 72205
Tel: (501) 661-2301
Fax: (501) 661-2468
E-mail: dgreen@mail.doh.state.ar.us
134
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Mr. N. Anthony Greenhouse
Occupational and Environmental Health
Analysts
788 McKinley Ave.
Oakland, CA 94610-3833
Tel: (510) 465-4258
Fax: same as above
E-mail: ag-oeha@pacbell.net
Mr. Jose Gutierrez
CIEMAT (Ministerio Industria y Energia)
Avda. Complutense, 22
Madrid 28040
SPAIN
Tel: +34 91 346 6555
Fax:+34 91 346 6121
Dr. Terry Hamilton
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
P.O. Box 808, L-453
Livermore, CA 94551-0808
Tel: (925) 422-6621
Fax: (925) 422-6619
E-mail: hamiltonlS ©llnl.gov
Mr. Ole Harbitz
Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority
P.O. Box 55
Ostcras N-1345
NORWAY
Tel: +47 67162500
Fax: +47 67147407
E-mail: ole.harbitz @nrpa.no
Mr. James C. Hardeman, Jr.
Georgia Department of Natural Resources
Environmental Radiation Program
4244 International Parkway, Ste. 114
Atlanta, GA 30354
Tel: (404) 362-2675
Fax: (404) 362-2653
E-mail:Jim Hardeman@mail.dnr.state.ga.us
Mr. Al Henryson
FEMA, Region JU
105 S. 7th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Tel: (215) 931-5548
Fax:(215)931-5539
E-mail: Al.Henryson @ fema. gov
Ms. Caroline L. Herzenberg
Argonne National Laboratory
DIS Division, Building 900
Argonne, IL 60439
Tel: (630) 252-3026
Fax: (630) 252-3379
E-mail: herzenbc@anl.gov
Dr. Neil A. Higgins
National Radiation Protection Board
Chilton, Didcot,
Oxfordshire OX14 5PF
UNITED KINGDOM
Tel: +44 1235 822764
Fax: +44 1235 833891
E-mail: neil.higgins@nrpb.org.uk
Mr. Steve Hill
Orange County Agricultural
Commissioner's Office
Orange County, CA
Mr. Lloyd R. Hillier
MDS Nordion Inc.
447 March Road
Kanata, Ontario
CANADA K2K 1X8
Tel: (613) 592- 2790
Fax: (613) 592-2006
E-mail: Ihillier® mds.nordion.com
135
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Mr. Robert Hinten
U.S. EPA, Region I
OSRR Division
90 Canal Street
Boston, MA 02114
Tel: (617) 573-5728
Fax: (617) 573-9662
Mr. Robert Holden
NCAI
1301 Connecticut Ave, 2nd Floor W
Washington, D.C. 20036
Tel: (202) 466-7767
Fax: (202) 466-7797
E-mail: Robert Holden@ncai.org
Ms. LaShunda Holloway
U.S. EPA
401 M Street, SW
Mail Code
Washington, D.C. 20460
Tel: (202) 564-9219
Lt. Col. Roman N. Hrycaj
Department of State
Office of International Security and
Peacekeeping
Bureau of Political Military Affairs
PM/ISP, Rm 2422
Washington, D.C. 20520
Tel: (202) 647-8215
Fax: (202) 647-4055
E-mail: PMISP@aol.com
Mr. Earl Hughes
U.S. DOE
1000 Independence Ave SW
EH-33
Washington, D.C. 20585-0119
Tel: (202) 586-0065
Fax: (202) 585-7330
E-mail: earl.hughes@eh.doe.gov
Mr. Kenneth G.W. Inn
NIST
245/C114
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
Tel: (301) 975-5541
Fax: (301) 869-7682
E-mail: kenneth.inn@nist.gov
Mr. Rich Janati
Pennsylvania Department of Environment
Division of Nuclear Safety
400 Market Street
P.O. Box 8468
Hamsburg, PA 17105
Tel: (717) 787-2163
Fax:(717)783-8965
E-mail: janati.rich @al .dep.state.pa.us
Ms. Janice Johnson
Human Detoxification Services International
3 Birchwood Road
Mahtomedi, MN 55115-1824 •
Tel: (651) 429-8661
Fax:(651)407-9551
E-mail: dalealfred@yahoo.com
Mr. Terry A. Johnson
George Washington University
2300 Eye St., NW
RmB-32
Washington, D.C. 20037
Tel: (202) 994-2630
Fax: (202) 728-4056
E-mail: tjchp@ibm.net
Ms. Linda Johnson-Ladd
Northern States Power Company
414 Nicollet Mall (RSQ-8)
Minneapolis, MN 55401
Tel: (612) 337-2245
Fax: (612) 330-7888
E-mail: Linda.K.Johnson-Ladd@NSPL.co
136
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Mr. Carey Johnston (Exhibitor)
U.S. EPA
Radiation Protection Division
401 M Street, SW
MailCode 66023
Washington, D.C. 20460
Tel: (202) 564-9341
Fax: (202) 565-2042
E-mail: johnston.carey@epa.gov
Mr. Rick Jones
ANI
29 South Main Street
West Hartford, CT 06107-2430
Tel: (860) 561-3433 ext. 233
E-mail: riones42@home.net
Mr. Greg Kahles
Armed Forces Radiobiology Research
Institute
Safety and Health Department
8901 Wisconsin Avenue, Building 42
Bethesda, MD 20889
Tel: (301) 295-9150
Fax: (301) 295-6567
E-mail: kahles@mx.afrri.usuhs.mil
Miles Kahn
U.S. EPA
401 M Street, SW
Mail Code 6602J
Washington, D.C. 20460
Tel: (202) 564-9384
Fax:(202)565-2042
E-mail: kahn.miles @ epa. gov
Mr. Falk Kantor
U.S. NRC
Mail Stop 09H15
Washington, D.C. 20555
Tel: (301) 415-2907
Fax: (301) 415-2968
E-mail: fxk@nrc.gov
Mr. Gary Karnofski
HAMMER/Volpentest Training and
Education Center
2890 Horn Rapids Road
Richland, WA 99352
Tel: (509) 373-6068
Fax: (509) 373-6070
E-mail: gary c karnofski@rl.gov
Mr. Anthony Katarsky
Michigan State Police
Emergency Management Division
4000 Collins Road
P.O. Box 30636
Lansing, MI 48909-8136
Tel: (517) 333-5024
Fax: (517) 333-4987
E-mail: katarskt® state.mi.us
Dr. Eric Kearsley
National Council on Radiation Protection and
Measurements
7910 Woodmont Ave.
Suite 800
Bethesda, MD 20814
Tel: (301) 657- 2652
Fax: (301) 907-8768
E-mail: kearsley@ mnsinc.com
Ms. Veronika Kegel
Association for Better Living and Education
Moscow, RUSSIA
Mr. Kelvin J. Kelkenberg
U.S. DOE
Office of Transportation and Emergency
Management
Cloverleaf, EM-76
19901 Germantown Road
Germantown, MD 20874-1290
Tel: (301) 903-8113
Fax: (301) 903-7613
E-mail: KeIvin.Kelkenberg@em.doe.gov
137
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Mr. H.E.V. Kholosha
Ministry of Emergency Affairs of Population
Protected from Consequences of Chernobyl
O. Gonchara Str. 55
Kiev 22
252022 UKRAINE
Tel: +00 380 44 226 3437 or
+00 380 44 247 3033
Fax: +00 380 44 226 3437
E-mail: yap@ mipk.kiev.ua
Ms. Regina Kight
Battelle
505 King Ave
Columbus, OH 43201
Tel: (614) 424-5061
Fax: (614) 424-3682
E-mail: kight@battelle.org
Dr. Gerald Kirchner
University of Bremen
Department of Physics, FB 1
Postfach 330440
D-28334 Bremen
GERMANY
Tel:+49 421 218 3266
Fax: +49 421 218 3601
E-mail: kirchner@physik.uni-bremen.de
Mr. Paul Knapp
U.S. NRC
NRC Technical Training Center
5746 Marlin Rd.
Osborne Bldg. Ste. 200
Chattanooga, TN 37411
Tel: (423) 855-6639
Fax: (423) 855-6546
E-mail: pek@nrc.gov
Mr. Hans Korn
Btindesamt fur Strahlenschutz
Aubenstelle Berlin
Kopenicker Allee 120-130
10318Berlin
GERMANY
Tel: +49 305 922-704
Fax:+49305922-712
E-mail: Hkorn@BfS.DE
Mr. Kenneth V. Krieger
Texas A+M University
Department of Nuclear Engineering
129 Zachery Building
College Station, TX 77843
Tel: (409) 845-7084
E-mail: Kkrieger@trinity.tamu.edu
Ms. Zdena Kusovska
Nuclear Power Plants Research Institute
Trnava Inc.
Okruzna 5
918 64 Trnava
SLOVAK REPUBLIC
Tel: + 00 421 805 569 205
Fax: same as above
E-mail: Kusovska@vuje.sk
Mr. Milton Lammering
U.S. EPA, Region VHI
999 18th Street
Suite 500, MS: 8P-AR
Denver, CO 80202
Tel: (303) 312-7080
Fax:(303)312-6044
E-mail: lammering.milton @epamail.epa.gov
Mr. Randy Lanari
State of Minnesota
DEM Room B-5
St. Paul, MN 55115
Tel: (612) 296-0471
Fax: (612) 296-0459
138
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Mr. Anh-Tuan Le
FIT Systems & Sciences, Corp.
2560 Huntington Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22303
Tel: (703) 329-7342
Fax: (703) 329-7395
E-mail: anh-tuan.le@ssc.de.ittind.com
Mr. Don Lentzen
U.S. DOE
19901 Germantown Road
EH-61
Germantown, MD 20874
Tel: (301) 903-9845
Fax: (301) 903-5072
E-mail: donald.lentzen @eh.doe.gov
Ms. Linda Lewis
USDA
West End Court
Washington, D.C. 20250
Tel: (202) 418-8910
Fax: (202) 418-8800
E-mail: linda.lewis @ usda.gov
Mr. Paul Lin
U.S. DOE
1000 Independence Ave., SW
Washington, D.C. 20585
Tel: (202) 586-4408
Fax: (202) 586-0955
E-mail: paul.lin @eh.doe. gov
Ms. Deborah Loeser
3M
3M Center, Building 220-3W-06
P.O. Box 33283
St. Paul, MN 55133
Tel: (612) 733-3199
Fax: (612) 736-2285
E-mail: daloeser@ mmm.com
Mr. Li Longde
U.S. NRC
T6F33(F25)
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
Tel: (301) 415-6280
Fax: (301) 415-3986
E-mail: Idl8@yahoo.com or
Idl2@hotmail.com
Mr. Larry W. Luckett
Dames & Moore
One Blue Hill Plaza
Suite 530
Pearl River, NY 10965
Tel: (914) 735-1200
Fax: (914) 623-8797
E-mail: lluckett@ix.netcom.coni
Ritchey Lyman
U.S. EPA
401 M Street, SW
Mail Code 6602J
Washington, D.C. 20460
Tel: (202) 564-9363
Fax: (202) 565-2037
E-mail: lyman.ritchey@epa.gov
Ms. Laura Lynch (Exhibitor)
Rados Technology, Inc.
6460-E Dobbin Road
Columbia, MD 21045
Tel: (410) 740-1440
Fax: (410) 740-4676
E-mail: lhallen@rados.com
Mr. John Lyon (Exhibitor)
Research Planning Inc.
6400 Arlington Blvd
Suite 1100
Falls Church, VA 22042
Tel: (703) 237-8061, ext. 3184
Fax: (703) 237-8085 or 8089
139
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Mr. Don MacKenzie
U.S. DOE
Office of Environmental Restoration, EM-44
19901 Germantown Rd.
Cloverleaf Bldg, Rm. 2122
Germantown, MD 20874
Tel: (301) 903-7426
Fax: (301) 903-3675
E-mail: donald.mackenzie@em.doe.gov
Mr. Jose R. Maisonet
U.S. DOE
Office of Emergency Response
19901 Germantown Road
Germantown, MD 20874
Tel: (301) 903-6593
E-mail: j ose.maisonet@dp.doe. gov
Ms. Minnie Malik
USDA
Environmental Chemistry Lab
Bldg. 007, BARC-WEST
Beltsville, MD 20705
Tel: (301) 504-6550
Fax: (301) 504-5048
E-mail: mmalik@asrr.arsusda.gov
Ms. Willie Malone
FEMA, Region VI
SOON. Loop 288
Denton, TX 76201
Tel: (940) 898-5126
Fax: (940) 898-5263
E-mail: willie.malone @ fema. gov
Mrs. Ann Mansfield
U.S. Army Reserve
AMEDD - Nurse Corps
170 Kimberly Drive
Paducah, KY 42001-5636
Mr. Jerome Mansfield
Lockheed Martin Utility Services, Inc.
Emergency Management Group
P.O. Box 1410
Paducah, KY 42002-1410
Tel: (502) 441-6464
Fax: (502) 441-6093
E-mail: j man @ Imus .com
Mr. James A. Martin, Jr.
Jupiter Corporation
2730 University Blvd West
Suite 900, Wheaton Plaza North
Wheaton, MD 20902
Tel: (301) 946-8088
Fax: (301) 946-6539
E-mail: martin@iupitercorp.com
Mr. Ben Martinez
Defense Special Weapons Agency
1680 Texas Street, SE
Kirtland AFB, NM 87117
Tel: (505) 846-8696
Fax: (505) 853-1793
E-mail: martinez @fc.dswa.mil
Mr. Bradford C. Mason
FEMA
26 Federal Plaza, Rm 1337
New York, NY 10278
Tel: (212) 225-7227
Fax: (212) 225-7733
E-mail: bradford.mason @ fema. gov
Mr. Tom McKenna
U.S. NRC
19137 Dowden Circle
Poolsville, MD 20837
Tel: (301) 415-6073
Fax: (301) 415-5392
E-mail: tim2@nrc.gov
140
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Mr. Gary McNutt
Missouri Department of Health
930 Wildwood
P.O. Box 570
Jefferson City, MO 65102-0570
Tel: (573) 751-6111
Fax: (573) 526-6946
E-mail: mcnutg@mail.health.state.mo.us
Mr. William McNutt
FEMA
500 C Street, SW
Room 518
Washington, D.C. 20472
Tel: (202) 646-2857
Fax: (202) 646-3508
E-mail: William.McNutt@fema.gov
Mr. Charles B. Meinhold
National Council on Radiation Protection and
Measurements
7910 Woodmont Ave, Suite 800
Bethesda,MD 20814-3095
Tel: (301) 657-2652
Fax: (301) 907-8768
E-mail: cbm@bnl.gov or ncrp@ncrp.com
Mr. Jim Menge (Exhibitor)
Rados Technology, Inc.
6460-E Dobbin Road
Columbia, MD 21045
Tel: (410) 740-1440
Fax: (410) 740-4676
E-mail: custservice @rado.com
Mr. Tim Mengers, CHP
NIST
Bldg 235, Room A132 - Reactor Health
Physics
Gaithersburg, MD 20871
Tel: (301) 975-5810
Fax: (301) 921-9847
E-mail: Timothv.Mengers@nist.gov
Mr. George C. Meyer, Sr.
426 Center Street
Frederick, MD 21701-6376
Tel: (301) 663-3568
E-mail: meyfred@erols.com
Ms. Dorothy Meyerhof
Health Canada
Radiation Protection Bureau
775 Brookfield Rd.
Address Locator 6302D1
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 1C1
CANADA
Tel: (613) 954-6672
Fax: (613) 957-1089
E-mail: Dorothy P Meyerhof@hc-sc.gc.ca
Dr. Charles L. Miller
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20878
Tel: (301) 415-1086
Fax: (301) 415-2968
E-mail: clml@nrc.gov
Dr. Charles W. Miller
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
4770 Buford Highway, NE
Mailstop F35
Atlanta, GA 30341-3724
Tel: (770) 488-7046
Fax: (770) 488-7044
E-mail: cym3@cdc.gov
Mr. Keith Miller
Foundation for Advancements in Science and
Education
4801WilshireBlvd
Suite 215
Los Angeles, CA 90027
Tel: (213) 937-9911
Fax: (213) 937-7440
E-mail: kwm@aol.com
141
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Mr. Stephen W. Miller
MGP Instruments/ INDEF
14847 Lee Highway
P.O. Box 89
Amissville, VA 20106-0089
Tel: (540) 937-7327
Fax: (540) 937-7328
E-mail: indefsteve @ msn.com
Mr. Joe Milone
Missouri Department of Health
930 Wildwood
P.O. Box 570
Jefferson City, MO 65102-0570
Tel: (573) 751-6111
Fax:(573)526-6946
E-mail: milonj @mail.health.state.mo.us
Dr. Tin Mo
U.S. NRC
Mail Stop T-9-C-24
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
Tel: (301) 415-8151
E-mail: txm@nrc.gov
Dr. Michael Mohar
Bechtel Nevada, Inc.
Tel: (301) 817-3366
Fax: (301)-817-3401
E-mail: moharmf@nv.doe.gov
Dr. Michael Momeni
Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety
1035 Outer Park Drive
Springfield, IL 62704
Tel: (217) 785-9925
Fax: (217) 524-0026
E-mail: mhmomeni @heartland.bradlev.edu
Dr. Jozef Moravek
Nuclear Power Plant Research Institute
Okruzna 5
Trnava 91864
SLOVAKIA
Tel: +00 420805-569459
Fax:+00420805-91217
E-mail: moravek@vuje.sk
Mr. Ron Morgan
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Operational Health Physics (ESH-1)
MS E-503
Los Alamos, NM 87544
Tel: (505) 665-7843
Fax: (505) 667-1009
E-mail: rgmorgan @ lanl. gov
Ms. Brenda J. Mosley
FEMA, Region VI
800 N. Loop 288
Denton, TX 76201
Tel: (940) 898-5344
Fax: (940) 898-5263
E-mail: brenda.mosley @ fema. gov
Dr. Vinod Mubayi
Brookhaven National Laboratory
Safety and Environmental Risk Division
32 Lewis Road, Building 130
Upton, NY 11973
Tel: (516) 344-2056
Fax: (516) 344-5730
Mr. Paul Mushovic
U.S. EPA, Region VIH
900 18th St., Suite 500
(Denver Place)
Denver, CO 80234
Tel: (303) 312-6662
Fax:(303)312-6067
142
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Ms. Lisa Nanko
U.S. EPA
Office of Radiation and Indoor Air
401 M Street, SW
Mail Code 6602J
Washington, D.C. 20460
Tel: (202) 564-9448
Fax: (202) 565-2037
E-mail: nanko.lisa@epa.gov
Dr. Janusz Nauman
Chair & Department of Medicine and
Endocrinology
University Medical School
BanachaStr. la
Warsaw 02-097
POLAND
Tel:+48 22-39-1328
Fax:+48-22-659-7562
E-mail: janu@amwaw.edu.pl
Ms. Madeleine Nawar
U.S. EPA
Office of Radiation and Indoor Air
401 M Street,;SW
Mail Code 6602J
Washington, D.C. 20460
Tel: (202) 564-9229
Fax: (202) 565-2042
E-mail: nawaf.madeleine@epa.gov
i
Mr. Alan Nelson
Nuclear Energy Institute
1776 I Street, Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006-3708
Tel: (202) 739-8110
Fax: (202) 785-1898
E-mail: apn@nei.org
Mr. James F. Nicolosi
Safety and Ecology Corp.
12620 Broken Saddle Road
Knoxville,TN 37922-1326
Tel: (423) 966-2207
Mr. Delmar Noyes
U.S. DOE
P.O. Box 928
Golden, CO 80402-0928
Tel: (303) 966-3001
Fax: (303) 966-4763
E-mail: Delmar.Noyes @rfets. gov
Mr. Tom O'Malley (Exhibitor)
Nuclear Research Corporation
125 Titus Avenue
Warrington, PA 18976
Tel: (215) 343-5900, ext. 216
Fax: (215) 343-4670
E-mail: mktg@nuc.com
Mr. William M. O'Neal
Sandia National Labs
WSRC
Building 730-2B, Room 3020
Aiken, SC
Tel: (803) 952-6364
Fax: (803) 952-8294
E-mail: william.oneal@ srs.gov
Dr. Fritz Oelrich
FEMA
500 C Street, SW
Room 601
Washington, D.C. 20472
Tel: (202) 646-3583
E-mail: frederick.oelrich@fema. gov
Mr. Larry Olson
Minnesota Division of Emergency
Management
B-5 State Capitol
75 Constitution Avenue
St. Paul, MN 55155
Tel: (612) 282-2461
Fax: (612) 296-0459
E-mail: Larrv.J.Olson@state.mn.us
143
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Ms. Mary Olson
Nuclear Information and Resource Service
1424 16th Street, NW, #404
Washington, D.C. 20036
Tel: (202) 328-0002
Fax:(202)462-2183
E-mail: maryo@ipc.apc.org
Dr. Bakhyt Ospanova
Detoxification of Kazakstan
57 Auezov Street
Room 127
Almaty 480008
Republic of Kazakstan
Tel:+8 3272 42 23 90
Ms. Sandra Paice
Nebraska Emergency Management Agency
1300 Military Road
Lincoln, NE 68508-1090
Tel: (402) 471-7408
Fax:(402)471-7433
E-mail: sandra.paice@nema.state.ne.us
Dr. Nikola] I. Panasyuk
National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine
Scientific-Technical Center "Shelter"
36 Kirov Street
Chernobyl 255620
UKRAINE
Tel: +38 293 520-83
Fax: +38 293 514-34
Dr. E.M. Parshkov
Medical Radiological Research Center
Russian Academy of Medical Sciences
Koroleva str., 4
Obninsk, Kaluga Reg. 249020
RUSSIA
Tel: ++7 08439 39259
E-mail: roum@obninsk.ru
Mr. Robert J. Patterson
SSI Services, Inc.
2040 Linglestown Road
Suite 301
Harrisburg, PA 17110
Tel: (717) 541-8630
Fax: (717) 541-8649
E-mail: Rpatterson @ ssi.paonline.com
Mr. Jack F. Patterson, CHP.
USDA
4700 River Road, Unit 91
Riverdale,MD 20737
Tel: (301) 734-4948
Fax: (301) 734-5050
E-mail: jack.patterson@usda.gov
Ms. Andrea J. Pepper
Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety
1035 Outer Park Drive
Springfield, IL 62704
Tel: (217) 524-7507
Fax: (217) 524-0026
E-mail: pepper@idns.state.il.us
Mr. Frank R. Petkevicius
Ray K. Robinson, Inc.
200 Hillview Drive, Suite 100
Richland,WA 99352
Tel: (509) 627-6135
Fax:(509)783-0371-
E-mail: leefrp@aol.com
Ms. Colleen Petullo
U.S. EPA
ORIA - R & IE
P.O. Box 98517
Las Vegas, NV 89193-8517
Tel: (702) 798-2446
Fax: (702) 798-2465
E-mail: petullo.colleen@epa.gov
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Mr. Mark Phillips
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
4800 Oak Grove Drive, MS-301-472
Pasadena, CA 91109
Tel: (818) 354-1181
Fax:(818) 393-6734
E-mail: j .mark.phillips @ jpl.nasa. gov
Mr. Victor Poyarkov
European Centre of Technogenic Safety
Vasil'kivs'ka Str., 36
Kiev 252022
UKRAINE
Tel: +38 044 263 03 24
Fax: +38 044 263 20 92
E-mail: vap@mipk.kiev.ua
Mr. Jim Price (Exhibitor)
Fluor Daniel Hanford
HAMMER Volpentest Training & Education
Center
2890 Horn Rapids Rd
Richland,WA 99352
Tel: (509) 373-3846
Fax: (509) 373-6070
E-mail: james e jim price@rl.gov
Mr. John Price
FEMA
105 South 7th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Tel: (215) 931-5570
Fax:(215)931-5539
E-mail: john.price @fema. gov
Ms. Patricia A. Pringle
Baltimore Gas and Electric
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
1650 Calvert Cliffs Parkway
Lusby,MD 20657
Tel: (410) 495-4496
Fax: (410) 495-6622
E-mail: Patricia.A.Pringle@bge.com
Mr. Jim Rabb
Centers for Disease Control
4770 Buford Highway, F-38
Atlanta, GA 30341
Tel: (770) 488-7100
Fax:(770)488-7107
E-mail: jar5@cdc.gov
Dr. Barbara Rafferty
Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland
Radioecology Branch
3 Clonskeagh Square
Clonskeagh Road
Dublin 14
IRELAND
Tel: +353 1 6041353
Fax: +353 1 6680187
E-mail: barbara@rpii.ie
Ms. Linnea P. Raine
CSIS
1800 K Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20006
Tel: (202) 775-3239
Fax: (202) 785-1688
E-mail: lpr@csis.org
Mr. James S. Reece
Zelle and Larson
33 So. 6th Street
4400 City Center
Minneapolis, MN 55402
Tel: (612) 339-2020
Fax: (612) 336-9100
E-mail: jreece @ zel le.com
Mr. Glen I. Reeves
Armed Forces Radiobiology Research
Institute
8901 Wisconsin Avenue
Bethesda, MD 20889-5603
Tel: (301) 295-0377
Fax: (301) 295-4967
E-mail: reeves@mx.afrri.usuhs.mil
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Mr. Philippe Renaud
IPSN
Centre d'etude de Cadarache BP 1
13108 Saint-Paul-Lez-Durance
Cedex
FRANCE
Tel:+33(0)442 25 29 20
Fax:+33 (0)4 42 25 63 73
Dr. Jean-Pierre Revel
International Federation of Red Cross and
Red Crescent Societies
Tel:+(41) 22 730 44 38
E-mail: revel@ifrc.org
Mr. Ricardo Reyes
USACHPPM
5466 Bluecoat Lane
Columbia, MD 21045
Tel: (410) 436-2670
Fax:(410)436-5411
E-mail: ricardo reyes@chppm-
ccmail.apgea.army.mil
Mr. Robert C. Ricks
ORISE
REAC/TS
P.O. Box 117
Oak Ridge, TN 37831-0117
Tel: (423) 576-3131
Fax: (423) 576-9522
E-mail: cooleyp @orau.gov
Mr. Ray Robinson
Ray K. Robinson, Inc.
200 Hillview Drive, Suite 100
Richland,WA 99352
Tel: (509) 627-6135
Fax: (509) 627-6141
E-mail: rav@rkri.com
Ms. Cheryl Rogers
Nebraska Health & Human Services
Regulation and Licensure
301 Centennial Mall South
P.O. Box 95007
Lincoln, NE 68509
Tel: (402) 471-6430
Fax:(402)471-0169
E-mail: crogers@hhs.state.ne.us
Dr. Denys Rousseau
Institut Protection et Surete Nucleaire
77-83 Avenue du General De GaulleBP 6
Clamart 92140
FRANCE
Tel: +33 (1) 46 54 77 58
Fax: +33 (1) 46 29 05 73
E-mail: denys.rousseau @ ipsn.fr
Mr. Rob Roy
Northern States Power
514 Nicollet Mall
Minneapolis, MN 55401
Tel: (612) 330-7903
Fax: (612) 330-7888
E-mail: Robert.L.Rov@NSPco.com
Ms. Pamela Russell
U.S. EPA
Office of Radiation and Indoor Air
401 M Street, SW
Mail Code 6603J
Washington, D.C. 20460
Tel: (202) 564-9434
Fax: (202) 565-2042
E-mail: russell.pamela@epa.gov
Ms. Adela Salame-Alfie
New York State Dept. of Health
Center for Environmental Health
2 University Place, Room 380
Albany, NY 12203-3399
Tel: (518) 458-6451
Fax:(518)458-6434
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Mr. Tim Sanders
Gila River Indian Community
P.O. Box 1490
Sacaton, AZ 85247
Tel: (520) 562-3321, ext. 1227
Fax: (520) 562-3564
E-mail: TSanders54@aol.com
Mr. Jonathan F. Schwarz
Nebraska Emergency Management Agency
1300 Military Road
Lincoln, NE 68508-1090
Tel: (402) 471-7420
Fax:(402)471-7433
E-mail: ion.schwarz@nema.state.ne.us
Dr. Umberto Sansone
ANPA
Via V. Brancati, 48
Roma00144
ITALY
Tel: +39 6 5007 2869/2924
Fax: +39 6 5007 2856/2916
E-mail: sansone@anpa.it
Mr. David Schauer
USN
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
Portsmouth, NH 03804-5000
Tel: (207) 438-2588
Fax: (207) 438-1798
E-mail: das cl05@ports.navy.mil
Mr. Gregory J. Schmidt
US ACOM
JTASC - JT4
116 Lakeview Pkwy, Suite 100
Suffolk, VA 23703
Tel: (757) 686-7446
Fax: (757) 686-7253
E-mail: schmidt @ acorn.mil
Ms. Julia Schmidt
Nebraska Health and Human Services
Regulation and Licensure
HHS R&L, PHA, X-ray
301 Centennial Mall South
P.O. Box 95007
Lincoln, NE .68509-5007
Tel: (402) 471-0563
Fax:(402)471-0169
E-mail: ischmit@hhs.state.ne.us
Dr. Natalya Seleva
Medical Radiological Research Center
Russian Academy of Medical Sciences
Korolev Street 4
Obninsk, Kaluga Region 249020
Tel: +7 095-956-1440
Fax: +7 095-956-1440
E-mail: mrrc @obninsk.ru
Mr. Michael Sharon
Maryland Department of the Environment
Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Division
2500 Broening Highway
Baltimore, MD 21224
Tel: (410) 631-3868
Fax:(410)631-7056
E-mail: msharon@erols.com
Mr. Michael Shuler
PECO Nuclear
175 N. Cain Road
Coatesville, PA 19320
Tel: (610) 380-2684
Fax: (610) 380-2598
E-mail: mshuler@pecoenergy.com
Mr. Ken Silverstone
Business Publishers, Inc.
Mr. Steve Skinner (Exhibitor)
S.E. International, Inc.
P.O. Box 39
Summertown, TN 38483
Tel: (931)964-3561
Fax:(931)964-3564
E-mail: sciinc@usit.net
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Dr. Ondrej Slavik
Nuclear Power Plant Research Institute
TrnavaLtd.
Okruzna 5
Trnava 918 64
SLOVAK REPUBLIC
Tel: ++421 805 569 461 or 460
Fax: +4421 805 912 17
E-mail: slavik@vuje.sk
Dr. Ronald Smetsers
RIVM/LSO
Postbus 1
Bilthoven 3720 BA
The Netherlands
Tel:++3130 274 2796
Fax:+4-31302744428
E-mail: ronaId.smetsers@RIVM.NL
Mr. Dave Snellings
Arkansas Department of Health
Division of Radiation Control and
Emergency Management
4815 West Markham, Slot # 30
Little Rock, AR 72205
Tel: (501) 661-2301
Fax: (501) 661-2468
Dr. V.A. Sokolov
Medical Radiological Research Center
Russian Academy of Medical Sciences
Koroleva str., 4
Obninsk, Kaluga Reg. 249020
RUSSIA
Tel: ++7 08439 39259
E-mail: roum@obninsk.ru
Ms. Eugenia Soukhareva
Human Detoxification Services International
Moscow, RUSSIA
Mr. Peter C. Stang
U.S. DOE
19901 Germantown Road, DP-23
Germantown, MD 20874
Tel: 301-903-5292
Fax: 301-903-8628
E-mail: Peter.Stang@dp.doe.gov
Mr. Marlow J. Stangler
409 Wolftrap Road, SE
Vienna, VA 22180-4941
Tel: (703) 938-2325
Mr. Stephen F. Stasolla
428 E. Magnolia Dr.
Morrisville, PA 19067
Tel: 215-428-1017
E-mail: stasolla@erols.com
Mr. Dwane Stevens (Exhibitor)
Ludlum Measurements, Inc.
501 Oak Street
P.O. Box 810
Sweetwater, TX 79556
Tel: (915) 235-5494
Fax:(915)235-4672
E-mail: dstevens @ camalott.com
Ms. Sylvia Stewart
CO Dept. of Public Health and Environment
Emergency Management Program
SlOOLowryBlvd.
Denver, CO 80220
Tel: (303) 692-3018
Fax: (303) 692-3683
E-mail: tommv.stewart@state.co.us
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Mr. Tommy C. Stewart
Colorado Department of Public Health &
Environment
Emergency Management Program
SlOOLowryBlvd.
Denver, CO 80220
Tel: (303) 692-3018
Fax: (303) 782-4969
E-mail: tommy.stewart@state.co.us
Mr. R L Sullivan
U.S. NRC
MS012H2
Washington, D.C. 20555
Tel: (301) 415-1123
Fax: (301) 415-2968 . :
E-mail: RLS3@nrc.gov
Dr. Erik Svenson
4252NorthlakeBlvd
Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410
Mr. Dan Sythe (Exhibitor)
International Medcom
7497 Kennedy Rd
Sebastopol, CA 95472
Tel: (707) 823-0336
Fax: (707) 823-7207
E-mail: dan@medcom.com
Mr. Earnest E. Tate
Minnesota Department of Health
121 East Seventh Place -..'.-,.
St. Paul, MN 55164
Tel: (651)215-0944
Fax:(651)215-0979
E-mail: earnest.tate@health.state.mn.us
Mr. Timothy D. Taulbee
Lockheed Martin
P.O. Box 628
Piketon, OH 45661
Tel: (740) 897-2399
Fax:(740)897-2125
E-mail: taulbeetd @lmus.com
Mr. Richard E. Toohey
RIDIC
Oak Ridge Institute for Science and
Education
P.O. Box 117
Oak Ridge, TN 37831-0117
Tel: (423) 576-4778
Fax: (423) 576-9522
E-mail: tooheyr@orau.gov
Mr. Daniel Trokey
Missouri State Emergency Management
Agency :
P.O. Box 116
Jefferson City, MO 65102
Tel: (573) 526-9134
Fax:(573)634-7966
E-mail: dtrokey@mail.state.mo.us
Dr. Thomas Tseng
TECRO
Science Division
4201 Wisconsin Ave., NW
Washington, D.C. 20016
Tel: (202) 895-1932
Fax:(202)895-1939
Dr. Anatoli Tsyb . :
Medical Radiological Research Center
Russian Academy of Medical Sciences
Koroleva Str., 4
Obninsk, Kaluga Region 249020 •-•
RUSSIA
Tel: ++7 08439 39259
E-mail: roum@obninsk.ru...
Mr. William Turnbull
New Brunswick Power Corporation
Point Lepreau Nuclear Generating Station
P.O. Box 10
Lepreau, New Brunswick EOG 2YO
CANADA ...•:.
Tel: (506) 659-6224
Fax: (506) 659-6507
E-mail: bturnbull @ nbpower.com
149
290 Broadway
New York, NY 10007
Tel: (212) 637-4002
Fax:(212)637-4942
E-mail: winslow.mark@epamail.epa.gov
E-mail: ssy@nrc.gov
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Ms. Christine E. Turner
San Diego County Dept. of Agriculture
County Operations Center
5555 Overland Ave. #3
San Diego, CA 92123
Tel: (619) 694-2745
Fax: (619) 565-7046
E-mail: cturnerag@san-diego.ca.us
Dr. Oleg V. Voitsekhovitch
Ukrainian Research Institute of
Hydrometeorology of State
Committee of Hydrometeorology
Prospect Nauki, 105
Kiev 252028
UKRAINE
Tel: +380-44-265-1050
Dr. V.V Yarsutkin
Medical Radiological Research Center
Russian Academy of Medical Sciences
Koroleva str., 4
Obninsk, Kaluga Reg. 249020
RUSSIA
Tel: ++7 08439 39259
E-mail: roum@obninsk.ru
Dr. Lionel S. Zuckier
Albert Einstein College of Medicine
Department of Nuclear Medicine
1300 Morris Park Ave.
Bronx,NY 10461
Tel: (718) 918-4895
Fax: (718) 918-7465
E-mail: zuckier@aecom.vu.edu
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Appendix C:
Errata to the Conference
Proceedings
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154
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Appendix C: Errata to the Conference Proceedings
The following excerpts are from papers included in the Conference Proceedings that contain errors
in the text. The corrections are included in these excerpts in bold.
Operation Morning Light: Recovery of Debris from Cosmos 954
By H. Alan Robitaille from Maple Bay, Canada
The first sentence in the first paragraph in the introduction should read as follows: "Cosmos 954
was launched on 18 September 1977, carrying an estimated 100 kilowatt (thermal) nuclear reactor."
The last sentence in the third paragraph in the introduction should read as follows: "Thus in the
early morning of 24 January 1987, "Operation Morning Light" (a randomly-selected code name)
and the world's first (only!)predictable nuclear emergency began."
Uses of the Internet in Post-Emergency Response: Some Issues
By Caroline L. Herzenberg from Argonne National Laboratory, Illinois
The sixth sentence in the second paragraph in the introduction should read as follows:
"Applications of the Internet in actual crisis situations have been limited, and experience with the
Internet in actual post-disaster operations is even more limited."
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