United States
            Environmental Protection
               Office of Radiation
               and Indoor Air
EPA 402-S-98-001
  August 1998

Meeting Proceedings
               Sheraton City Centre Hotel, Washington, D.C.

                      vSeptember9- 11, 1998


                               OF THE

                           Washington, D.C. USA
                            9-11 September 1998
U.S. Enviro:
                             omental Protection Agency

                     Health am


            GENERAL CHAIR
            W. Craig Conklin

              Charles Blue

              Lisa Nanko

            Marcia Carpentier

              Bonnie Wyvill

              Miles Kahn

            Madeleine Nawar

            EXHIBITS CHAIR
              Rick Lyman


                                  (By Affiliation)

George Bickerton, U. S. Department of Agriculture
Charles Blue, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
Marcia Carpentier, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
Craig Conklin, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
Gregg Dempsey, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
Thomas Essig, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Jim Fairobent, U. S. Department of Energy
Ron Fraass, Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors
Gary Goldberg, U. S. Department of Energy
Nancy Goldstein, Federal Emergency Management Agency
Kent Gray, Centers for Disease Control, Health and Human Services
Jim Hardeman, Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors
Miles Kahn, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
Richard Katz, Federal Emergency Management Agency
Linda Lewis, U. S. Department of Agriculture
Rick Lyman, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
Thomas McKenna, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
R. Scott Moore, American Nuclear Society
Lisa Nanko, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
Madeleine Nawar, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
F.C. Oelrich, Federal Emergency Management Agency
Jack Patterson, Health Physics Society, Baltimore-Washington Chapter
Andrea Pepper, State of Illinois, Department of Nuclear Safety
Jim Rabb, Centers for Disease Control, Health and Human Services
Peter Stang, U. S. Department of Energy
Charles Willis, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission


                   International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

                                Table of Contents
Session A, Track 1
Monitoring, Measurement, and Modeling I
Wednesday, September 9, 1998
10:45 a.m. - 12:35 p.m.                                                              1
      Chair: Gregg Dempsey, United States Environmental Protection Agency

Simon Jerome, and Kenneth G.W. Inn                                                  2
      Workshop Summary: Rapid Radioactivity Measurements in
      Routine and Emergency Situations

John G. Griggs, David P. Garman, and Rhonda S. Cook                                  8
      EPA's Environmental Radiation Ambient Monitoring System (ERAMS)
      Role in Post-Emergency Response

Philippe Renaud, Henri Maubert, Karin Beaugelin, and Philippe Ledenvic                  12
      Combined Use of Modelling and Measurement Results
      in Post-Accidental Situation

7.5. Hamilton, E.A. Thompson, andJ.M.  Thompson                                      18
      Agricultural Impact Of Accidents Postulated For Missions Proposed
      for the US DOE Pantex Plant

Session A, Track 2
Lessons Learned from Chernobyl I
Wednesday, September 9,1998
10:45 a.m. - 12:35 p.m.                                                             23
      Chair: Thomas McKenna, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Ole Harbitz, Lavrans Skuterud and Per Strand                                         24
      Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident and Emergency Preparedness in Norway

Session B, Track 1
Lessons Learned from Actual Events
Wednesday, September 9, 1998
2:05 p.m.- 4:20 p.m.                                                               29
      Chair: Charles Willis, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

Marcos Cesar Ferreira Moreira                                                      30
       Experience Managing the Response to a Damaged Source at Goia"nia - Brazil

H. Alan Robitaille                                                                  35
       Operation Morning Light:
       Recovery of Debris from Cosmos 954

James F. Nicolosi, Gerard V. Policastro, and Richard McGinley                          40
       Post-Emergency Management Issues Following
       Inadvertent Melting of Radioactive Sources

A.R.Denman, P. Morgan, andS.Tomlinson                                             44
       The Response To Depleted Uranium Turnings Dumped In Northamptonshire

Paul A. Charp, presented by William E. Belanger                                       49
       Graded Decision Guidelines for Public Health Activities — Lansdowne, Pennsylvania

Session B, Track 2
Social and Humanitarian Issues Following a Radiological Accident
Wednesday, September 9,1998
2:05 p.m. - 4:20 p.m.                                                                55
       Chair: Marcia Carpentier, United States Environmental Protection Agency

Dr. Jean-Pierre Revel                                                              56
       Red Cross Programme Responding to Humanitarian Needs in Nuclear Disaster

Dr. Steven M. Becker                                                               60
       Constructing More Effective, Post-Emergency Responses:
       the Human Services Component

P.T.Allen                                                                          61
       Modelling Social Psychological Factors After an Accident

Brian W. Flynn                                                                    66
       Emergency Events Involving Radiation Exposure:
       Issues Impacting Mental Health Sequelae

Britt-Marie Drottz Sjoberg                                                           71
       Public Reactions Following the Chernobyl Accident: Implications
       for Emergency Procedures
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11,1998

                   International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference
Session C, Track 1
Lessons Learned from Exercises
Thursday, September 10,1998
8:00 a.m. - 9:50 a.m.
       Chair: Gary Goldberg, United States Department of Energy

William E. Belanger
       Lessons Learned from the 1997 Lost Source Exercise

Cheryl K. Rogers
       Nebraska's '97 Ingestion Exercise:
       Communication Through 2 Phases of Response

Michael J. Sharon
       Post-Emergency Planning and Exercises: Lessons Learned from CALVEX 97

Igor Linge, and Denys Rousseau
       The Russian French Collaboration in the Radiological
       Post-Accidental Area
Session C, Track 2
Outreach and Legal Issues
Thursday, September 10,1998
8:00 a.m. - 9:50 a.m.
       Chair: Lisa Nanko, United States Environmental Protection Agency

Caroline L. Herzenberg
       Uses of the Internet in Post-Emergency Response: Some Issues

Sokolov V.A., Khoptynskaya S.K., and Ivanov V.K.
       Five Years' Experience in Publishing the Bulletin "Radiation and Risk

James S. Reece, and Deborah A. Loeser
       Will the Nuclear Industry Become the Next Major Litigation Target?

Session D, Track 1
Agriculture, Forestry and Land Use Issues
Thursday, September 10, 1998
10:10a.m.- 12:40 p.m.
       Chair: Jack Patterson, United States Department of Agriculture
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

Alexakhin R.M., Fesenko S. V., and Sanzharova N.I.                                     114
       Problems of Agroindustrial Production on Contaminated Territories and
       Principles of Their Rehabilitation

Gerald Kirchner, Carol Salt, Herbert Lettner, Hanne Solheim Hansen, Seppo Rekolainen    119
       Integrated Long-term Management of Radioactively Contaminated Land:
       the Ceser Project           ;

Rafferty, B., Synnott, H., andDawsori, D.                                              124
       Remediation Options for Agricultural Land: Evaluation and Strategy Development

Maria Belli, Barbara Rafferty, Hugh Synnott, and Umberto Sansone                      130
       Countermeasures in Forest Ecosystems: a Preliminary Classification in
       Term of Dose Reduction and Ecological Quality

Rufus L. Chaney, Pamela Russell, and Minnie Malik                                    138
       Phytoextraction and Phytostabilization of Radionuclides in Contaminated Soils

Session D, Track  2
Public Health Issues I
Thursday, September 10,1998
10:10a.m.- 12:40 p.m.                                                             141
       Chair: Jim Rabb, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

Larry Luckett, Eric Daxon, and John Parker                                          142
       Operation Chernobyl Challenge: The Public Health Response by
       US Military Forces in Europe

Charles W. Miller, James M. Smith, and Robert C. Whitcomb, Jr.                         148
       Application of Environmental Dose Reconstruction to
       Post-Emergency Response Public Health Issues

Michael H. Momeni                                                                152
       A Discussion  of Public Health Issues From a Severe Nuclear Reactor Accident

V.M.Shestopalov, M.V. Naboka, L.Yu. andA.S. Halchinskiy                             157
       Separating of Radionuclides Component in Technogenous
       Ecological Influence on Health of the Population

A.F. Tsyb, EM. Parshkov, J. Barnes, V.V. Yarzutkin, N.V. Vorontsov, and V.I. Dedov       162
       Rehabilitation of a Chernobyl Affected Population Using a Detoxification Method
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11,1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

Session E, Track 1
Monitoring, Measurement, and Modeling II
Thursday, September 10,1998
2:15p.m. -4:40p.m.
       Chair: Peter Stang, United States Department of Energy
Oleg Voitsekhovich and Mark Zheleznyak                                             168
       Aquatic Countermeasures in the Chernobyl ZonerDecision Support Based on Field
       Studies and Mathematical Modelling

J. S. Ellis, T.J. Sullivan, andR.L. Baskett                                             173
       Dose Refinement: ARAC's Role

Joseph H. Shinn                                                                   179
       Post-Accident Inhalation Exposure And Experience with Plutonium

S.Y. Chen andB.M. Biwer                                                          184
       Post-Accident Cleanup Analysis for Transportation of Radioactive Materials

V. Poyarkov                                                                      191
       Using Chernobyl Experience to Develop Methods and Procedures
       of Post Accident Monitoring

SessionE, Track 2
Public Health Issues II
Thyroid Disorder as a Result of
Chernobyl and Other Health Issues
Thursday, September 10,1998
2:15p.m.-4:40 p.m.                                                               197
       Chair: Andrea Pepper, State of Illinois, Department of Nuclear Safety

E.M.Parshkov, A.F.Tsyb, V.A.Sokolov, andI.V.Chebotareva                             198
       A Model Explaining Thyroid Cancer Induction from Chernobyl Radioactivity

JanuszA. Nauman                                                                202
       Potassium Iodine Prophylaxis in Case of Nuclear Accident;
       Polish Experience

E.Buglova, and J.Kenigsberg                                                       207
       Emergency Response after the Chernobyl Accident in Belarus: Lessons Learned
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September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

Session F, Track 1
Clean-Up Levels
Friday, September 11, 1998
8:00 a.m. - 9:50 a.m.                                                               211
       Chair: Craig Conklin, United States Environmental Protection Agency

Charles B. Meinhold                                                               212
       Philosophical Challenges to the Establishment Of Reasonable Clean-up Levels

AndrewJ. Gross                                                                  217
       Beyond Academia; An Argument for Clean Up to Background Levels
       to Minimize Property Stigma and Devaluation

Vinod Mubayi and W. Trevor Pratt                                                  218
       Tradeoffs Between Post-Emergency Clean-up Levels and
       Costs Following a Severe Accident Release

Session F, Track 2
Lessons Learned from Chernobyl II
Friday, September 11, 1998
8:00 a.m. - 9:50 a.m.                                                               225
       Chair: Jim Fairobent, United States Department of Energy

Sldvik O., Mordvek J., Stubna M., and Vladar M.                                       226
       Cleanup Criteria and Technologies for a 137Cs-contaminated Site Recovery

V.M.Shestopalov, Yu.F.Rudenko, and A.S.Bohuslavskiy                                 231
       Lessons of the Chernobyl NPP Accident Regarding Potable Water Supply

I.P.Onyshchenko, V.M.Shestopalov, and N.I.Panasyuk                                  236
       Radio-hydrogeochemical Monitoring of Area Adjacent to the "Shelter" Object

Session G, Track 1
Public Health Issues ffl
Friday, September 11,1998
10:10 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.                                                             243
       Chair: Gary Goldberg, United States Department of Energy

Shirley A. Fry, Ronald E. Goans, Robert C. Ricks, and Richard E. Toohey                 244
       Public Health Issues: Considerations for Post-Emergency
       Response Panel Discussion
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September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

Ronald E. Goans,Richard E. Toohey, Shirley A. Fry, Robert C. Ricks                      247
       Medical Considerations for Post-Emergency Response of Radiation Accidents

Shirley A. Fry                                                                       253
       Post-emergency Response: Epidemiological Considerations

Richard E. Toohey                                                                  256
       Post-Emergency Response: Health Physics Considerations
Session G, Track 2
Protective Actions
Friday, September 11,  1998
10:10a.m.-12:00 p.m.
       Chair: Dorothy Meyerhof, Health Canada

H. Korn, S. Bittner, I. Strilek, and H. Zindler
       The German Guide for Selecting Protection Measures

A.S. Baweja, B.L. Tracy, B. Ahier and D.P. Meyerhof
       Protective Action Guidance For Nuclear Emergencies In Canada

Costa, E.M., Biagio, R., Leao, I, andAlves, R.N
       Integrated Analysis of Accident Scenarios, Radiological Dose Estimates and
       Protective Measures Efficacy Following a Radioactive Release

N. A. Higgins, T. W. Charnock, J. Brown, andM. Morrey
       Information Synthesis for Aiding Recovery Decisions
Please note: Papers not received by press time for the Conference Proceedings were not
included, however, EPA substituted the authors' abstracts for their missing papers when
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               Session A, Track 1:
  Monitoring, Measurement, and Modeling I
                 Wednesday, September 9,1998
                   10:45 a.m. - 12:35 p.m.
Chair: Gregg Dempsey, United States Environmental Protection Agency

                    International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference
               Workshop Summary: Rapid Radioactivity Measurements in
                           Routine and Emergency Situations

                            Simon Jerome1, Kenneth G.W. Inn2

                              1 National Physical Laboratory
                                    Teddington, UK
                      2 National Institute of Standards and Technology
                                Gaithersburg, MD 20899
While Europe is fascinated with the prospect of a rapid response to another Chernobyl-type
incident, North America is more focused on rapid radioassay methods for environmental
remediation and South America is concerned with the rapid determination of natural
radionuclides. The UK, along with many of the other European countries, has an accident
response plan. Planning for accident response will include three phases: a) <24 hour using a
preestablished early warning survey system; b) about 24 hours to assure appropriate decision
making for the quarantine of foods and water; and c) >24 hours for long-term implications.
Under an accident scenario, logistics will be very important to assure appropriate distribution of
samples, sufficient supplies for radiochemical analyses, data collation and interpretation.
Regardless of the underlying reasons for needing rapid radioassay methods, it was generally felt
by the Conference participants that the basic measurement tools were generally available.  The
natural growth of science will, of course, continue to evolve toward more rapid, simpler, less
expensive and less polluting radioassay methods.


Over the past decade, rapid radioanalyses have been called upon to provide initial evaluations of
emergency incidence, and for ongoing assessments for environmental remediation and
decontamination and decommissioning programs. It is  timely to reflect on the current state-of-
the-art and chart a course for a rational development of new investments in methods and
instruments to meet future needs.  The Conference on Rapid Radioactivity Measurements in
Emergency & Routine Situations was held at the National Physical Laboratory (UK), co-
sponsored by the International Atomic Energy Agency,  International Committee on Radionuclide
Metrology, and the Royal  Society of Chemistry - Radiochemical Methods Group, to: a) define
the state-of-the-art, b) document the results of the presentations and discussions, and c) develop
recommendations on what should be improved and developed, the rational for these
recommendations, and determine priorities (based on purpose, drivers, requirements). The
conference was attended by representatives from Austria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Finland, France, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway, Republic of China, Russia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States of America. Conference
proceedings will be published by Fall '98, and selected  papers will be published in
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

Radiochemistry and Radioactivity at the same time. Measurement issues included in the papers
and posters presented are listed in Table 1.


Programmatic Issues

Emergency response is a high visibility issue in Europe because of Chernobyl.  The major
objectives for rapid radioanalyses are to identify and quantify the radionuclides present in order
to assess the source term and potential doses to the most sensitive populations. Since the impact
to food and environment must be accessed quickly, less accuracy can be tolerated, and the cost of
the analysis is generally not an issue. In the EU, the regulatory limit for radioactive
contamination in food is <1 kBq per kg.

Since 1987, the IAEA responded to requests by member states to help set up laboratories with
rapid methods to monitor food supplies and the environment by providing a six-year Fellowship
Training program to improve the accuracy of measurements and teach the principles of the
measurement techniques.  The participants, however, had varying agenda, depending of their site
of origin (Emergency Response was the chief focus of EU participants, Remediation was the
focus of those from South America, and Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D) was the
focus of those from North America).
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

Table 1. Conference Issues




Sea Floor





(3H, 14C,
Gases, ^Sr,
134 Cs,

Air Filters













Detectors and





Monte Carlo

In the UK, LARMACC and RADMIL exemplify the local authority monitoring effort, while
RIMNET is supported by the national Department of Environment, Transport and Regions
(DETR) for international incidents.  Each nuclear establishment and authority has the
responsibility to have an emergency plan for preparedness that includes: a) radioanalytical
laboratories, b) means to handle data flux, c) sample distribution, d) data methodology and
evaluation, and e) means for interpretation of the data for the authorities. RIMNET consists of
ninety-two automatic gamma ray sensitive Geiger-Miiller detectors with associated data
collectors throughout the UK which are accredited by external bodies, intercompared on a regular
basis, and maintained on a regular basis. Resulting data are released into the public domain by
the DETR.

The UK universities may contribute to the LARMACC/RADMIL/RIMNET systems but are not
generally part of the decision process and are not generally set up for routine analyses. However,
some universities, such  as Southampton University, have begun to install rapid methods and set
up laboratories under contract with local authorities. The rapid measurement requirements are
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

generally not well defined (accuracy and minimum detectable activity, MDA), and will remain so
unless a customer driven issue creates investment resources for their development, and for
accreditation programs as well. Reporting of analytical results will be by the university
investigators rather than a local or national authority.

The UK hospitals (and, indeed, many other laboratories) can input supplementary analytical data
into the RIMNET database if approved to do so by DETR. However, it was suggested that these
institutions be part of an ongoing intercomparison system to establish their baseline and
demonstrate comparability.

It was also suggested that information is released from one central point to avoid confusion and
conflicting assessments and statements.

Remediation, D&D and effluent release programs, on the other hand, are more concerned with
determining the amount of radiation emitted and radionuclide content for regulatory compliance
(surveillance, process control, process assessment, long-term monitoring) to control waste
released from plant/site, and for environmental management. These programs are health
regulation driven and measurements of minimal cost are desired. Measurement accuracy must be
acceptable which is more important than analytical speed. High analytical throughput, however,
is desired because of the economic incentive of fast turnaround times, potential for higher profit,
ease of training analysts and robustness.

Investment of resources to develop and implement specific analytical methods are strongly
influenced by a country's priorities. In South America, the emphasis for radioanalytical methods
is primarily dictated by remediation and effluent release of natural radionuclides.  North America
focuses its radioanalytical methods on measurements on D&D and environmental remediation
from nuclear weapon production and nuclear power; Europe has emphasized monitoring effluent
release from nuclear reprocessing activities.

Derived Release/Emission Limits are estimated by: a) using the regulated dose limits for all
radionuclides through multiple pathways, b) identifying critical exposed groups, c) identifying
the most significant critical  group per radionuclide, d) reducing the derived release/emission limit
by a safety factor (100-1000), e) comparing the measured release to the reduced derived limit,
and f) reviewing the procedure and limits periodically since the critical group can change.
Population exposures to non-environmental sources are limited to 15-25 mRem per year per
person in the U.S., < IkSv per critical group per year in Canada, and < 0.4 Bq per gram in all
matrices in the UK.  In  some countries, the reduced limits are managed on a per year basis.  In
other countries, the safety factor is continually increased as experience demonstrates that the
increased safety factor is achievable and verified  by measurements. When ICRP 60 is  invoked,
the reduced limits are further constrained because of the possibility of exposure to multiple
sources.  ICRP 60 recommends a limit of 0.3 mSv total exposure for the critical personnel.

As technology progresses, radioanalytical methods will evolve toward more convenient, faster,
and cheaper techniques, and should be able to maintain measurement quality. Measurement
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 	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

 issues include: a) establish criteria for accuracy and precision, b) performance testing and
 accreditation programs to establish credibility, c) define required MDLs, d) policy for handling
 negative numbers, e) statement of uncertainty that is easily understood by customers, and f)
 investment resources to establish and verify measurement methods

 Selected Papers

 The conference presentations were outstanding and addressed critical rapid methods issues. A
 few issues, particularly, should be highlighted to indicate recent progress. The references noted
 here are to be incorporated in the conference proceedings.

 The Italians (De Felice et al. The Validation of a National Standard for Rapid Measurement of
 Strontium Isotopes in MilK) were the first to establish a national standard radiochemical
 procedure for the determination of 89Sr and 90Sr in milk for emergency situations. The paper
 describes the validation of the method through an intercomparison exercise, much like that used
 by the U.S. American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM). The method was validated to
 ±15 percent, and is sufficiently good for emergency situations.

 Croudace et al. (A Highly Efficient Technique for the Determination ofActinides, Particularly
 Plutonium and Uranium, in Soils Following a Borate Fusion). Uchida & Tagami (A Rapid
 Separation Method for Determination of"Tc in environmental Waters by ICP-MS, and Tagami
 and Uchida (Use of a Combustion Apparatus for Low-level "Tc Separation from Soil Samples')
 focused on utilizing mass spectrometry-based measurements for long-lived radionuclides such as
 uranium, thorium, plutonium and technetium.  It is anticipated that mass spectrometric
 measurements will demand the creation of new tracer Standard Reference Materials (SRMs) to
 meet their measurement needs.

 Bojanowski et al. (Sources of Bias in Rapid Methods for 89Sr and 90Sr Assay in Environmental
 Samples), and Warwick & Croudace (Review of Techniques for the Rapid Identification and
 Determination of pure B Emitters') recognized the importance of measuring long-lived pure P-
 emitting radionuclides. Bojanowski's paper summarized sources of bias for the generally
 miserable measurement of radiostrontium isotopes. Over a dozen papers focused on the
 determination of 89Sr and ^Sr. Although there are several very good laboratories in the world
 that can probably reliably measure ^Sr, there is a need to develop the capability to measure
 equally well many other pure p-emitter radionuclides.

 Radionuclide speciation issues (Beresford et al. The Comparative Importance of Bioavailabilitv:
An Assessment of Rapid Prediction Techniques to Determine the Bioavailabilitv of Important
Radionuclides for Transfer to Animal Derived Food Products Following a Contamination Event)
 was not a major focus of the Conference because it is generally thought of as a secondary
concern. However, this issue will become recognized for its utmost importance in understanding
the source term, fundamental influence on strategies to be used for radiochemical measurements,
 and the effects it will have on a radionuclide's transport through the environment and food web.
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

Additional flexibility in calibrating gamma-ray spectrometers by computational tools is
beginning to augment standards-based instrument calibrations (MacDonald et al. In-situ y-ray
Spectrometry, Likar et al. Monte Carlo Calculations with GEANTfor in-situ Measurements, and
Bronson ISOCS: a Laboratory Quality Ge y Spectroscope System That you can Take to the
Source for Immediate High Quality Results}. While the national standard laboratories can
develop benchmark reference sources, the community requires increasingly diverse calibrations
for their project/program-specific needs.  The measurement community's research efforts to
derive virtual calibrations must invest a focused effort to develop and validate its computational
skills with increasingly complex benchmark standards.


Radioanalytical issues that need to be carefully addressed include:

•      Communications between analysts and clients that include: planning, training, and
       establishing action levels.
•      Screening methods that are important for early decision making.
•      Routine measurements that balance turn-around-time, cost and quality. Under emergency
       situations, however, turn-around-time with as much quality possible overshadows the cost
       of the analysis.
•      Rapid radioassay methods that must be supported by as much verification/validation,
       traceability, and quality assurance/control as used for routine measurements.

Future research will need to assure that only known amounts of quality is sacrificed while
developing more rapid, simpler, less expensive and less polluting radioassay methods. If critical
steps in a radiochemical method are to be eliminated, their effect on measurement quality must
be quantified. As a result, additional efforts must be invested in the validation and verification of
any new method.

Although a critical high-priority call for new research and initiatives will probably not be
recommended to the International Atomic Energy Agency or International Committee for
Radionuclide Metrology, there will be a need for coordinated development of Reference
Materials for intercomparison studies and accreditation programs to validate and verify new and
standard protocol radioassay methods and processes. Furthermore, additional effort should be
placed on developing SRMs for screening measurements.
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                    International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference
              EPA's Environmental Radiation Ambient Monitoring System
                      (ERAMS) Role in Post-Emergency Response

                   John G. Griggs, David P. Garman, and Rhonda S. Cook

                   National Air and Radiation Environmental Laboratory
                USEPA/Office of Radiation and Indoor Air, Montgomery, AL


The U. S. Environmental Protection Agency is currently reconfiguring the Environmental
Radiation Ambient Monitoring System (ERAMS). ERAMS is a national monitoring program
which collects and performs radioanalysis on over 7,600  samples per year.  EPA launched the
ERAMS network in 1973 by consolidating a number of existing radiation monitoring networks.

These existing networks were mainly intended to monitor fallout.  The ERAMS mission
expanded to include monitoring radiation emergencies, following trends in environmental
radioactivity levels, and providing data for dose calculations. Currently, ERAMS is the nation's
only comprehensive radiation monitoring network, with over 300 sampling stations distributed
across all 50 states and the American Territories. These stations regularly sample the nation's air
particulates, precipitation, drinking water, surface water and milk, provide broad geographical
coverage, and cover many major population centers. During its twenty five years of operation,
ERAMS has been most successful in developing an environmental radiation database, providing
information about weapons testing, and reporting on significant releases of radioactivity into the
environment, such as the Chinese weapons tests of 1976  and 1977, and the Chernobyl incident in
1986. The overall responsibility for ERAMS falls under  the EPA's Office of Radiation and
Indoor Air (ORIA).  The system is operated by the ORIA's National Air and Radiation
Environmental Laboratory (NAREL) in Montgomery, Alabama.


Mission Statement

The mission statement developed for ERAMS as a result of the ORIA reconfiguration efforts
retains some of the elements in the original mission, but the primary focus is nuclear emergency
preparedness. This focus is especially significant in light of current global politics, aging nuclear
reactors in many parts of the world, and the potential threat of terrorist activities involving
nuclear material.

The reconfigured ERAMS has the following mission: To monitor environmental radioactivity in
the United States and its Territories in order to provide high quality data for assessing public
exposure and environmental impacts resulting from nuclear emergencies and to provide baseline
data during routine conditions.2  This mission will be achieved by addressing three main
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

objectives: (1) providing data for nuclear emergency response assessments; (2) providing data on
ambient levels of radiation in the environment for baseline and trend analysis, and (3) informing
the general public and public officials about levels of radiation in the environment.  Although the
primary objective of the proposed system is to provide data for the assessment of a national
nuclear emergency in the short and long term, the ambient monitoring component is essential to
maintain system readiness, competency, and high quality data. Both operational modes, energy
and ambient, will provide information to the public and public officials.

ERAMS Reconfiguration

Based upon the mission and objectives, all elements of ERAMS, from sample collection through
analysis, data reporting, and dissemination, were analyzed according to specific criteria. The
conclusions that were developed resulted in recommendations for system changes designed to
provide an optimized national radiation monitoring system.

Several factors guided the selection of media to be sampled in the proposed system. Paramount
among these were the objectives of the system and the intended uses of the data generated. The
following media selection criteria were developed: principal transport medium of radioactivity
during a nuclear incident or release, short and long term indicators of health and environmental
impacts, significant human pathway, Federal, State and Tribal interest in baseline data for
comparison to facility and site monitoring, and concern by the general public and public officials.
Based on these selection criteria, the following media were selected: air particulates,
precipitation, drinking water, and milk.  In addition, gamma monitors are proposed to provide
real-time measurement  capability to the  system.

Given the resource requirements of sample analysis, a major consideration in determining
sampling frequency is an approach that allows for minimal sampling frequency while ensuring
the system meets its objectives.  For air particulate sampling, the sampling equipment determines
the sampling frequency, which in most instances would be twice weekly. For other media, the
routine sampling frequency needed to maintain system readiness is judged to be  two collections
per year. In the event of a nuclear emergency, the sampling frequency would be increased to
daily collections, with the exception of precipitation, which would be increased to each
precipitation event.

The  overall strategy for locating ERAMS sampling sites is based on the system's fundamental
mission of supporting emergency and post emergency preparedness and response and developing
national baselines and trends of environmental levels of radiation.  This strategy, to the extent
possible, will utilize the existing set of sampling sites. Air particulate, drinking  water and
precipitation sampling sites will provide for maximum major population and geographical
coverage, and add U. S. border monitoring. Population coverage is further augmented by
sampling at several population centers near major nuclear sites.  Sampling sites for milk
collection will focus on the top 20 milk  producing states, which account for 85% of the milk
consumed in the U. S.  Real-time gamma monitors are proposed to be initially employed at each
of the ten EPA regional offices and at ten U. S. border locations. Another influence on sampling
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

site locations is the fact that all station operators are volunteers who have a limited range of
geographical mobility.

Emergency and Post-Emergency Response

la the event of a major nuclear incident, data from ERAMS will be used to determine the
immediate and long-term environmental and public health impacts.  Specifically, in terms of
public health, data from the monitoring system will be used for dose assessments. Depending on
the results of the dose assessments, this information could be used by the EPA, States, and Tribal
governments to protect public health by issuing warnings and protective action recommendations
to the public. Other Federal agencies may also utilize the data for their respective roles during a
nuclear emergency.  Given the public's perception of radiation, the data will be used extensively
to respond to public officials and the public. Since a major nuclear incident could potentially
affect the world community, data users may include the governments of other countries and
international organizations. EPA's role under the Federal Radiological Emergency Response
Plan is long-term monitoring in the vicinity of an incident following control of the actual
incident. ERAMS will assist in providing valuable data in support of this agency responsibility.

During a major nuclear incident, the EPA will place all or selected ERAMS stations on an
accelerated status. The number of stations activated will depend on the type, location, and scale
of the emergency. These stations will provide daily samples for analysis. The ERAMS stations
will continue to operate on an accelerated status until radiation levels return to baseline levels.
The data can then be compared to baseline data available in the ERAMS database and
Environmental Radiation Data (ERD) reports. The ERAMS database and ERD reports provide
valuable baseline and trend information used to determine elevated levels of radioactivity
released to the environment during a radiological emergency.

The analytical schemes in the reconfigured ERAMS employ cost-effective screening methods,
such as gross alpha and beta analysis, which are effective in measuring overall changes in the
levels of radioactivity in the environment and detecting action levels to trigger more resource
intensive radionuclide-specific analyses. For emergency and post emergency response, the
screening methods will still be employed, but the number of nuclide-specific  analyses will
increase significantly. The type of nuclide-specific analyses performed will be based on the
nature of the emergency, with priority given to radionuclides that are significant contributors to

Results of analyses are compiled, reported and distributed quarterly in the ERD reports by
NAREL. Sample composite analyses are performed and reported annually. An excerpt of an
ERD air paniculate composite report is provided in Table I.3 ERAMS data can also be accessed
on the Internet at: "www.epa.gov/narel/erdonline.html".
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

Table 1.  Plutonium and Uranium in Airborne Particulates, July-December 1994 Composites.
VA: Virginia
aCi/m3 ±2a
0.2 0.3
aCi/m3 ±20
0.3 0.3
0.1 0.2
aCi/m3 ±2a
131 10
13.9 1.4
aCi/m3 ±20
3.4 0.8
0.8 03
aCi/m3 ±20
10.6 1.5
12.7 1.3

The assessment of ERAMS has strongly affirmed the importance and need for a nationwide
ambient radiation monitoring network, especially in the event of a major nuclear incident. The
primary consideration in designing the proposed monitoring system is the assessment of public
health and environmental impacts resulting from national and international emergencies.  Since
emergency and post emergency response is contingent upon a system being in place and
operational at the time of an incident, significant design attention was paid to the routine
operations of the system. Under the reconfigured system, ERAMS stations can efficiently be
placed on an accelerated status, during an emergency. This will provide rapid sample collection
and analysis, the data from which can then be compared to baseline and trend analyses data
available in the ERAMS database and ERD reports. The reconfigured system also will provide
real-time gamma measurement capability, increase population coverage, minimize expense, and
make data evaluation results available electronically.


 1. U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), "Environmental Radiation Ambient
Monitoring System (ERAMS) Manual". (EPA 520/5-84-007,008,009), May, 1988.

2. U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), "Proposed Reconfiguration Design for the
Environmental Radiation Ambient Monitoring System (ERAMS)", November, 1997.

3. U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), "Environmental Radiation Data Report 80".
(EPA-402-R-97-003), February,  1997.
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                    International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference
                  Combined Use of Modelling and Measurement Results
                              in Post-Accidental Situation

             Philippe Renaud, Henri Maubert, Karin Beaugelin, Philippe Ledenvic

                        Institut de Protection et de Surete Nucleaire,
                           13108 Saint-Paul-lez-Durance, France

Immediately following an accidental deposit of radionuclides in the environment, modelling is
the only means of assessing the seriousness of the situation from a radiological viewpoint and
deciding on possible emergency measures for the protection of populations. The ASTRAL
software has been developed by the French Nuclear Protection and Safety Institute (IPSN) for
this purpose. ASTRAL is an acronym for « radioprotection in post accidental situation ». It
allows to assess rapidly the evolution of radionuclides concentrations in the environment and in
the food chain, derive from that the potential internal and external exposure of concerned
populations, forecast the evolution in time  of this exposure and propose different scenarios of
remediation actions in the contaminated zones. The starting point of the evaluations is the
deposited surfacic activity (Bq/m2) of radionuclides which can be previously estimated using an
atmospheric transfer model or air and rain water measurements. The results given by ASTRAL
are then compared to the admissible limits  and intervention levels. Different simulations of
management of contaminated zones, by implementation of countermeasures may be conducted.
So, the ASTRAL software constitutes an element of decision making as soon as  the
announcement of the accident is made (Maubert et al 97).

Fairly quickly after the deposits, measurements are made in the environment. ASTRAL can then
be used to establishes the correspondence between the deposited surfacic activity and the specific
activities of some selective representative products in order to draw a map of the mean surfacic

The purpose of this document is to present the method using these two means of investigation
applied in France for the characterisation of the deposit and the reconstruction of the doses
following the Chernobyl accident (Renaud  et al 97).


Description of the method and results

After the Chernobyl accident, the measurements  on French territory were made starting in May,
1986 by various national agencies responsible for the inspection of agricultural commodities and
livestock and for public health.  The Office for Protection against Ionising Radiation (OPRI) is in
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

charge of the control of radioactive levels of different samples among which soil, plants and cow
milk. Soil and plants measures are only representatives of local deposits and often vary on a wide
range. With such natural variability, a great number of measurements is needed to assess the
average surfacic activity of wide areas. Milk samples are of a greater interest. From spring to
winter a cow grazes a surface of several tens of square meters per day. The sampling protocol
used by OPRI specify that the milk is taken from district collection centers. Thus, these samples
are representatives of a wide area at the scale of a French district (4000 to 8000 km2).
The interception and the retention of radionuclides by plants during deposits depends of the
relative contribution of the wet (during rain) and dry deposits, as well as the amount of
precipitation during the passing of contaminated air masses. Therefore, these parameters
constitute the data to be supplied to the ASTRAL software before any estimate can be made.
After the Chernobyl accident, from the 1st to the 5th of May 1986, air and rain water samples
been measured. Derived from the that, the ratio between wet and dry deposits for 137Cs and 134Cs
at a few locations have been estimated. They usually rank between 2 and 7, which shows a clear
predominance of the wet deposit contribution : it corresponds to 66 to 88 % of the total deposit.
There are, of course, places where precipitation was very low and for which dry deposits
predominate (central France). It is eastern France, with precipitation in excess of 20 mm, which
was most affected by the fallout. Many towns or locations received wet deposits exceeding
2,000 Bq/m2 of 137Cs.  The central strip received deposits seven times smaller on the average,
resulting from an amount of rainfall under 10 mm. Western France, though having received more
rain, was even less affected because of the depletion of the air masses in radionuclides (washing
of the cloud).

With these data, ASTRAL can simulate the evolution of milk specific activities for different
values of the deposited surfacic activity.  As it has been shown in figure 1, it is then possible to
classify the milk measurement results and their originating districts.
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                     International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

n 10 •
pri A^TRAI iQ^nocmnnt AOOn Rn/m>*
_\ _ 	 _ A^TRAI fl^PQ^mpnt POOD Rn/mP

gV, 	 ASTRAL assessment 400 Bq/m2
*g\ n measures from 6 district of eastern France
• g V? B measures from 6 district of the center of France
• h A measures from 8 district of western France
B » \ D n D a
f\ B ;B \DD f • an no
\\ *'N.B \m an
\A\ B \ \ B D •
-. B \ B H B B D
A ^ • Dv \n ; :
AAA. . x|in \ • •
\ \ \
A v. \ \ n :.
1 \ :
\ \
Y\ \
t ^ 1 ^L 1 t 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
05- 05- 0%- 07- 08- .-09--"1-4Q---:l4— -^2- — -G-1 	 G2---63-- -04— --05-—. 0&-
86 86 86S 86 86 ! 86 86 86 86 87 87 87 87 87 !87

 Figure 1 : Evolution of the concentration of cesium 137 in milk in different french districts and
              simulations given by ASTRAL for different corresponding deposits

This figure clearly differentiates between districts contaminated to a level of 3,000 to 5,000
Bq/m2 (eastern France), those less affected, with values of 1,000 to 3,000 Bq/m2 (center of the
territory) and those with very low deposits. The scatter in milk measurements for a single district
is fairly low given the time  dependancy of the specific activity. These observed kinetics and
ASTRAL forecasts show a good agreement. It is characteristic of summer grazing, and winter
feeding using mainly spring hay. During the pasture period, the activity of the milk decreases
with that of the grass ; during winter, it increases and stabilises : the specific activity of hay
harvested in spring or in summer decreases only by radioactive decay. In the spring of 1987, the
return to pasture - with renewed grass - led to a final fall of the milk contamination, with 137Cs
concentrations sinking below detection thresholds.
A study of this type was conducted for all districts of France, which allowed to draw a map of
showing mean deposited surfacic activities of 137Cs (figure 2). As inferred from wet deposition
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                    International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference
determinations, there is a strong surfacic activity decrease from east to west in a result of plume
depletion. This map is in good agreement with the one established by OPRI on the basis of
results of "ground + plant" sample measurements.
Figure 2 : Average cesium 137 surfacic activities deposited on agricultural surfaces and meadows
                               after the Chernobyl accident
                                                                               Doc. IPSN
  Cesium 137 SCD
   • From 3 000 to 6 000 Bq/m2
   H From 1 500 to 3 000 Bo^m
   H From  750 to 1500 Boym
   H    < 750 Boym2
Maps of 134Cs and 131I have been drawn also. The well-known ratio 137Cs/134Cs of 2 is confirmed.
For iodine the mean surfacic activity of the eastern most severely contaminated part of France
range between 20,000 and 50,000 Bq/m2. In the least contaminated zone (western France)
activities of this radionuclide are lower than 5,000 Bq/m2.

Among others foodstuffs regularly sampled by the french ministry of Agriculture are the leafy
vegetables : salad, spinach...ASTRAL can be used to verify the coherence between these
measurements and milk ones for each district. Figure 3 shows the measurement results for leafy
vegetables sampled in the six districts of eastern France chosen in the figure 2. It appears that
specific activity of cesium 137 in leafy vegetables and milk are coherent.
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

Leafy vegetables present a greater variability of their specific activities due to their greater
sensitivity to local variations of the deposits. In eastern France, their specific activities is
sometimes representative of surfacic activities as high as 6,000 Bq/m2.

ASTRAL also allows to compensate for inadequacies affecting certain types of measurement or
certain time periods by assigning them theoretical values, validated by comparison between
measurements and calculations when this is possible. Thus this comparison has been done for
few cereals sampled punctually after the first three harvests in 1986,1987 and 1988, for hay
during the winter 1986-1987, for grass from 1986 to 1987 but only in  particular places, and for
beef and sheep meats. Usually, ASTRAL assessments and measurements results are in good
agreement with sometimes the need to adapt some parameters, mainly dates of harvest and
feeding practices for animals.
  Figure 3 : Evolution of the concentration of cesium 137 in leafy vegetables in different French .
        districts and simulations given by ASTRAL for different corresponding deposits
                              Measurement results of 6 districts of eastern France
                              ASTRAL assessment (2000 Bq/m2)
                              - ASTRAL assessement (6000 Bq/m2)
        1000 --
         100 -•
may 11     may 21     may 31    June 10    June 20
         June 30
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

At the end of this work we have got a complete set of validated data : maps of deposited surfacic
activities and foodstuff specific activities with their evolution in time during the firsts three year.
ASTRAL may then be used to assess the evolution of the daily human intake of activity. The
comparison of these assessments with anthropometric measurements is the last  level of
validation before dosimetric estimations. Whole body gamma counting and urine measurements
are usually made in France by OPRI and different nuclear operators for the health protection of
workers. The evolution of the intake of cesium for different time steps have been derived from
these measures. The discrepancy with ASTRAL assessments is about 20 to 50 % except during
the firsts three months where ASTRAL overestimate the cesium intake by a factor 2 to 3. This is
probably due to the use in ASTRAL of conservative values for the consumption rates of leafy
vegetables and milk.


The combined use of modelling and measurement results developed in this paper allows to
characterize radioactive deposits for a widespread contamination of the environment, with a
limited number of measurements. Using milk as pilot, the mean surfacic activity deposited over
few thousand square kilometers can be evaluated with less than a few tens of samples distributed
over three months. Some complementary measurements of grass or leafy vegetables enables
experts to valid these assessments and to study the heterogeneity of deposits. The advantage is to
keep the rest of the measurement capacity to locate the most affected areas in relation with
rainfall, altitude, orography or wooded surfaces.


1.     Maubert H, Renaud Ph, Bernie J. C. Metivier J. M. Fache Ph. ASTRAL : a software for
       the estimation of the consequences of accidental releases in the Environment.
       Radioprotection vol 32, n°3, pp 357-368. 1997. in French and in English.

2.     Renaud Ph, Beaugelin K, Maubert H, Ledenvic Ph. Radioecological and dosimetric
       consequences in France of the Chernobyl accident. Nuclear Protection and Safety
       Institute. Report IPSN 97-03. 1997.
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

       Agricultural Impact Of Accidents Postulated For Missions Proposed For The
                                 US DOE Pantex Plant

                     IS. Hamilton', E.A. Thompson2, J.M. Thompson2

                'Texas A&M University, Department of Nuclear Engineering,
                                  College Station, TX
                2Westinghouse Safety Management Solutions, Inc., Aiken, SC


Two new missions are currently under consideration for the USDOE Pantex Plant. The first
mission would involve conversion of the plutonium metal center of the warhead, referred to as a
"pit," into one of two forms.  The first option possible would be to convert a plutonium hemi-
shell into a solid metai "puck," of declassified shape. The second option would be to convert the
plutonium into plutonium dioxide (PuO2) powder.  The former outcome is the most acceptable
for storage of weapons-usable material. The latter outcome is a necessary precursor to MOX fuel
production. These processes would be performed in the disassembly/conversion facility (DCF)1.
The second mission would involve fabrication of mixed-oxide (MOX) reactor fuel. MOX fuel
fabrication would take place in the MOX fuel fabrication facility (MOXF)2.  To date, various
steps in the conversion process have been tested successfully  at the laboratory scale. MOX fuel
fabrication has been accomplished at production-scale for the past several decades in Europe.


An independent, scoping-level health-risk and environmental impact assessment of the proposed
missions was performed at the request of the Governor's Office of the State  of Texas. Four
groups of professionals were assembled by the Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium
(ANRCP), to perform the assessments: process identification, risk assessment, environmental
transport, and agriculture issues.  The primary goal of the study's initial phase was a comparative
societal risk assessment wherein the impact of proposed missions would be compared to that of
existing missions.

The preliminary risk assessment considered a wide range of accident scenarios.  Bounding
postulated accidents were chosen for further study, as this approach would give the citizens of
Texas a perspective on "worst case" impacts. As such, no fault tree analysis was performed.
Rather, the research team used environmental impact statements (EISs), environmental
assessments (EAs), safety analyses reports (S ARs) and a battery of source and reference
documents consistent with existing DOE analyses, due to the  comparative nature of the study1"5.
The "bounded" approach above had the advantage of allowing the assessment to go on without
the need to obtain fault trees possibly beyond the scope of the Freedom of Information Act.
Results were based on the best information deemed available in the professional judgement of
assessment team members. Site specific data were used where possible, e.g., meteorological data
and some accident probability frequencies4. Surrogate facility data were used in the absence of
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

site specific data, the emphasis being on DOE facilities that had handled PuO2 in powdered

During the risk assessment, it was noted that the usual endpoint in an environmental impact
statement was a collective or population dose. No account was taken of potential impacts on
local agriculture, impacts that may prove quite severe if the locale adjacent to the nuclear facility
is dependent upon some form of agribusiness. Therefore, in addition to the differential risk
assessment, computational models were used to determine the impact of postulated accidents on
agricultural areas surrounding the Pantex Plant.

Areas of land contaminated to different levels by an accident are a measure of agricultural
consequence.  Derived response levels (DRLs) were calculated, which correspond to
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guides (PAGs) for the intermediate
phase of an accident8. These values were used in conjunction with the HotSpot computer code to
determine the areal extent of land where calculated deposition levels for the various accident
scenarios, and various deposition pathways, exceed the DRLs corresponding to particular PAGs9.
Determinations of the areas affected were made for both DRLs based on the dose to bone
surfaces (generally the limiting case for plutonium) and DRLs based on the committed effective
dose equivalent.

A DRL is the level of a measured indicator that corresponds to a particular limit of interest. For
example, deposition of radioactive material on the ground can be correlated with dose to an
individual or group of individuals. This correlation allows protective action decisions to be made
based upon deposition measurements.

For this analysis, only a subset of the possible accident scenario exposure pathways was chosen.
These were: inhalation of resuspended material following deposition; ingestion of fruit,
vegetables, or grain directly contaminated by deposition; ingestion of beef from cattle grazing on
contaminated forage; ingestion of milk from cattle grazing on contaminated forage; and
ingestion of leafy vegetables grown in contaminated soil. Values for many parameters must be
determined or assumed in order to calculate DRLs for the various pathways.  Information for
these calculations came from publications  of the International Atomic  Energy Agency (IAEA),
International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), National Council on Radiation
Protection and Measurements (NCRP), U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

The HotSpot code uses a straight-line Gaussian dispersion and transport model9. The default
deposition velocity used in HotSpot for determining the rate of deposition of plutonium onto the
ground is 1.0-cm s"1 and was used for these calculations.  All calculations assumed a release
height above the ground of zero.  Meteorological data typical for the Pantex Plant was used in
the calculations: stability class D and a wind speed of 6 m s"1.  These meteorological conditions
corresponded to those used by DOE.
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

There are many variables that affect the extent of the area contaminated following an accident.
The calculations performed for this evaluation give estimates of the areas potentially involved,
but cannot be presumed to be exact predictions of the areas that would be contaminated in the
event an accident were to occur. Results are shown in Table 1. These are the areas for which
dose mitigation techniques would need to be implemented in order to keep the offsite dose below
the PAG level.  As can be seen, DRLs for ingestion of vegetables directly contaminated with
plutonium are more restrictive (by a factor of approximately 400) than the DRLs for vegetables
grown in contaminated soil, which become subsequently contaminated via root uptake (no wash-
off or rain-off was assumed).

Table 1. Acres affected for selected accident scenarios based on PAGs (typical meteorological
conditions: D Stability Class, 6-m s"1).
                      Acres affected
                     Based on bone surface doses (BSD)
                     (Based on committed effective doses (CEDE))

Value A* B C D E
Based on BSD
(Based on CEDE)
pCi m"" g Pu ha"'
0.6 0.04 - 7 30 60 110
(2.1) (0.15) (2) (6) (20) (20)
0.5 0.04 -- 8 30 80 130
(1.6) (0.12) (2) (8) (20) (30)
0.5 0.04 - 8 30 80 130
(1.7) (0.12) (2) (8) (20) (30)
0.8 0.06 - 5 20 40 80
(2.8) (0.20) (1) (5) (10) (20)
22 1.6 -- - 1 1 2
(43) (3.1) (0) (1) (1)
43 3.1 - .... i i
(160) (12) (0) (0)
180 13 - 	
(710) (52)
BEB** Cell fire - 0.64 g Pu * - is negligible dose




Fire on the loading dock — 9.0 g Pu **BEB is Beyond Evaluation Basis
Truck (diesel fire) - 30 g Pu ***A/C is Aircraft Crash
DCF oxyacetylene explosion — 64 g Pu
BEB (maximum credible) earthquake (DCF) - 100 g Pu
A/C*** into DCF - 200 g Pu
A/C into oxide storage - 2,000 g Pu


Modeling results indicate that material would be released beyond Pantex Plant boundaries under
certain accident scenarios, for certain assumed siting decisions. Areal deposition is possible
wherein EPA PAGs can be exceeded. Such deposition would require protective actions to be
taken; therefore, a study that features methodology such as this may prove useful as an
emergency response planning tool for personnel at Pantex Plant should the siting decision dictate
that either of the proposed material disposition activities be placed on Texas soil. In addition,
such a study would afford the State of Texas an informed input in the siting decision prior to
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_ International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

ground breaking. A similar study would provide results of similar nature for any disposition
option-siting candidate.


'Cremers, T.L., Bronson, M.C., Riley, D.C. Fissile material disposition program: pit
disassembly and conversion facility data call input. LA-UR-96-474.  Los Alamos, NM: U.S.
Department of Energy; 1996.

2New mixed oxide fuel fabrication facility data report for the fissile material disposition program
programmatic environmental impact statement. LA-UR-95-4442.  Los Alamos, NM: U.S.
Department of Energy; 1995.

3Coats, D.W.; Murray, R.C. Natural phenomena hazards modeling project:  seismic hazard
models for Department of Energy sites. Livermore, CA. Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, UCRL-53582, Rev. 1; 1984.

4U.S. Department of Energy. Final environmental impact statement for the continued operation
of the Pantex plant and the associated storage of nuclear weapon components. Albuquerque,
NM: U.S. Department of Energy, DOE/EIS-0225; 1996.

5U.S. Department of Energy. Storage and disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials final
programmatic environmental impact statement. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy,
DOE/EIS-0229; 1996.

^International Atomic Energy Agency. Probabilistic safety assessment INSAG-6. Safety Series
No. 75-INSAG-6.  Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency; 1992.

7U.S. Department of Energy; Resumption of thermal stabilization of plutonium oxide in building
707, Rocky Flats Plant, Golden, Colorado. Golden, CO. U.S. DOE Rocky Flats Office,
DOE/EA-887-1; 1994.

8U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Manual of protective action guides and protective
actions for nuclear incidents. Washington, DC: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
EPA/400-R-92-001; 1991.
        , S.G. HOTSPOT health physics codes for the PC.  UCRL-MA-106315. Livermore,
CA: U.S. Department of Energy; 1994.
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Washington, D.C.
September 9-11,1998

               Session A, Track 2:

      Lessons Learned from Chernobyl I

                Wednesday, September 9,1998
                   10:45 a.m. - 12:35 p.m.
Chair: Thomas McKenna, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

     Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident and Emergency Preparedness in Norway

                       Ole Harbitz, Lavrans Skuterud and Per Strand

                    Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, Norway


Heavy precipitation from the air masses during the critical days after the Chernobyl accident led
to wet deposition of considerable amounts of radioactive fallout in Norway. It was estimated
that 6% of the total released radioactive material was deposited in Norway (Backe et al. 1987).
Due to highly unusual meteorological conditions, these deposits concentrated in some sparsely
populated regions in southern and mid-Norway, while densely populated areas received less
fallout.  The mountainous and forest areas with large amounts of fallout (in spots, up to 600 kBq
m-2 of radiocesium) are important production areas for certain animal products.

The most severely contaminated foodstuffs were produced in semi-natural ecosystems. These
included meat from sheep, reindeer, game and cattle (to some extent), and milk from goats and
cattle. Radiocesium levels up to 150 kBq kg-1 in reindeer meat and 40 kBq kg-1 in sheep were
observed. Freshwater fish also showed high radioactivity levels (up to 35 kBq kg-1).


In June 1986, the Norwegian Directorate of Health imposed intervention radioactivity levels for
the nuclides 137Cs and 134Cs. The intervention levels were 370 Bq kg-1 for milk and baby food,
and 600 Bq kg-1 for all other foodstuffs. To maintain reindeer breeding in Norway and to reduce
the social effects for the Sami reindeer breeders, it was necessary to consider a higher
intervention level for reindeer meat. In November 1986, the intervention level for reindeer was
increased to 6000 Bq kg-1 and in July 1987, the level for wild freshwater fish and game was
also increased to 6000 Bq kg-1.

Dietary advice was given to  the parts of the population consuming high amounts of reindeer
meat or freshwater fish. This advice was published by the health authorities as a brochure in
1986, and gave guidance as to how often people could eat the most affected foodstuffs,
depending on their activity levels (kg of meat or fish per year and as meals per week).  The
brochure also included some examples regarding how to prepare food to reduce the radiocesium
content.  The main goal of the dietary advice was that nobody should have an intake of
radiocaesium exceeding 400 kBq the first year after the Chernobyl accident and exceeding 80
kBq y-1 during the subsequent years.

In 1986 about 35% of all lambs were contaminated at levels above the intervention level  at the
normal time of slaughter. Between 1986 and 1997 the proportion has varied between 30% and
5% of the total livestock.  In 1997 about 10% of all lamb and mutton, and 27% of reindeer had
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

activity levels above the intervention levels. Thus a persistent need for pre-slaughter
countermeasures is existing. After 1986, countermeasures have been very successful in reducing
the amount of meat declared as unfit for human consumption to a negligible fraction. Cesium
binders (Prussian Blue - AFCF) in salt lick, boli and mixed in concentrate, and special feeding of
lamb and sheep are the extensively used countermeasures. During the period 1986-1994 a total
of 1,566,000 lamb and sheep have been involved in special feeding programs; 320,000 of these
in 1986. Compensation paid to the farmers for their additional workload amounts to a total of 23
mill USD for the whole period.

The human population was subject to irradiation from three sources after the fallout; external
radiation from deposited radionuclides, inhalation of radionuclides from the air and ingestion of
radionuclides through foodstuffs. Figure 1 shows the monthly doses from intake of food together
with the monthly doses from external doses due to the fallout on the ground. The first few
months after the accident, the external exposure was the major contributor to dose. After this
period the exposure from contaminated foodstuffs was the major contributor. However, the
prognoses for the coming 50 years is that the external exposure again will be the major
contributor. The total individual dose over 50 years will in average be in the order of 2 mSv,
giving a collective  dose over 50 years to the Norwegian population (4 million people) in the
order of  8000 manSv. There are however groups of the population with special dietary
preferences receiving significantly higher doses than the average: The reindeer herding Samis,
but also persons with higher consumption of game than the average. Among these groups,
dietary advices have been very efficient in reducing doses. While the  average total dose received
during 50 years have been estimated to 20 mSv to these groups, it could have been 5-10 times
higher if no advices were given.
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September 9-11, 1998

                    International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference




             CO  0.010-
       	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

        Table 1. Cost of countermeasures in terms of man.Sv saved (Strand 1994).
                          USD man.Sv-1
 Interdiction of sheep

 Interdiction of reindeer

 Special feeding

 Change of slaughter time

 Giese salt (AFCF) concentrate

 Dietary advice, 1987





The cost effectiveness of different countermeasures varied considerably in Norway (Table 1).
However, this simple cost-benefit analysis does not show the total cost for society. The
economic losses for agriculture could have become considerable due to the population's
decisions to avoid contaminated food. Immediately after the accident the situation was not clear
due to insufficient knowledge of the fallout and its consequences. In Norway, as in several other
European countries, the health authorities introduced intervention levels at an early stage after
the accident.  There was little room for optimization in the situation. Later, after some
rationalization, a clearer radiological protection philosophy was introduced.

Ideally, a countermeasures contingency program should have been drawn up in preparation for
an accident so that correct decisions could have been made promptly and correctly. In the event,
the countermeasures applied were carefully monitored and a more or less  optimum situation was
achieved.  In retrospect, it was shown that most of the countermeasures employed were justified.
The maintenance of confidence in the foodstuffs on the market is extremely important when
considering the social costs to society. Thus, it is necessary to compare more than just the costs
of the countermeasures as such and the averted dose, when estimating the total societal costs.

A decrease in the sale of some agricultural produce represented a potential economic loss
considerably higher than the cost of the implemented countermeasures. Not all the
countermeasures would have had the desired effect in satisfying the consumers. The
implementation of intervention levels was of great importance in this respect. It resulted in an
active implementation of countermeasures in agriculture and only in some limited use of dietary
advice to critical groups.

The use of dietary advice alone instead of special feeding would perhaps have given the same
adverted dose at a lower direct monetary cost.  However, the special feeding program led to
activity levels in food below the intervention levels and no active involvement by the consumers
was called for.  The combination of the different countermeasures took this into consideration
and hopefully gave the maximum reduction of the total negative consequences. A decrease in
consumption of some of the most affected foodstuffs (e.g. lamb) occurred. The decrease in
consumption of lamb was about 5 to 10%  in the first years.  This represented a loss of about $8
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

to $15 million USD for the producers. On the other hand, if no countermeasures except
interdiction had been used, and intervention levels were maintained, the costs would have been
about $15 to 60 million USD each year. Without countermeasures, lost sales of lamb could have
been considerable.


From the discussion above one may conclude that the measures introduced to protect the
population from negative health consequences of the Chernobyl accident were relatively
extensive and resource demanding. Their main purpose was to reduce the physical health effects
by reducing radiation dose. The dose was reduced and the relationship between cost and reduced
dose was acceptable. Without the implementation of countermeasures the agricultural
community could probably have suffered much greater losses through an extensive decline in the
sales of the sensitive foodstuffs (e.g. lamb and reindeer meat).


Per Strand (1994): Radioactive fallout in Norway from the Chernobyl accident. Studies on the
behaviour of radiocaesium in the environment and possible health impacts. NRPA Report
1994:2, Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, 0steras, Norway.
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11,1998

               Session B, Track 1:
     Lessons Learned from Actual Events
                Wednesday, September 9, 1998
                   2:05 p.m. - 4:20 p.m.
Chair: Charles Willis, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

       Experience Managing the Response to a Damaged Source at Goiania - Brazil

                             Marcos Cesar Ferreira Moreira

                      Institute de Radioprotegao e Dosimetria (IRD),
                  Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear (CNEN) - Brazil


The radiological accident

Probably on September 13th, 1987, a strong radioactive 137Cs source (-51 TBq at the time of the
accident) was removed from an abandoned building in Goiania and ruptured by some individuals •
in a backyard. They aimed to sell the obtained lead from the shielding as scrap material. This
source was formerly used by a radiotherapy clinic in a teletherapy (137Cs) machine. After they
dismantled the machine and ruptured the source capsule, the material with commercial value
(lead and steel) was sold to a junkyard store. It was reported that they noticed a blue light in the
dark coming from the ruptured capsule source. This light caused fascination in several persons
that came to see it. Small parts of the source were given to friends and relatives, causing external
irradiation and internal and external contamination. Due to the constitution of the source (cesium
chloride salt), it was highly soluble and easily dispersible in the environment by resuspension of
the deposited material. The contamination was spread out over the city. This accident caused 4
casualties and at least 28 people injured with radiation burns. The symptoms of the injured
people were not initially recognized as radiation syndrome. A few days later, one person
established a relationship between the source and the symptoms presented by the people and took
the remaining material to the local health authorities. This action led to the discovery of the
accident. A local physicist was called and he assessed the scale of the accident, evacuating two
areas. The Brazilian Nuclear Energy National Commission - CNEN was informed and
dispatched a team to the city in the same day.


CNEN arrangements for emergency response

The response of CNEN to radiological emergencies in the non-nuclear power sector ensures that
there is a central person to contact, who is able to arrange the appropriate assistance. The head of
the Department of Nuclear Installations (DIN) was in charge of coordinating the response in
these events.

There was also an emergency plan for nuclear facilities. In this case, several groups were
involved and have their own structure to respond. At least, a few people of each group were kept
in standby to provide initial actions and activate the emergency response centers. During
emergency situations the decisions would be taken by a joint coordination committee formed by
major Government agencies such as CNEN, Federal, State and Local Authorities and from the
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

utility. CNEN has, in the plan, its executive group to coordinate all the actions of the response, a
technical group to assist in decision making, two groups for plant safety evaluation, the field
emergency monitoring and evaluation group of the Institute of Radiation Protection and
Dosimetry and the administrative and logistical support group.

The initial response

CNEN headquarter was contacted through the head of DIN on September 29th, 1987 at 18:00 in
Rio de Janeiro, soon after he arrived at Goi§nia with two more technicians from Sao Paulo. They
arrived at Goiania at 00:30 of September 30th. This team first went to the abandoned building
where the source was and after a survey, finding no radioactive source or trace of radioactivity,
they went to the local health authorities building and found the leftover of the source. The dose
rates at 1m from the source was 0.4 Sv.h-1 indicating that about 10% of the source was still

The CNEN team and the local physicist proceeded to the other identified sites and confirmed the
initial surveys. The dose rate value of 2.5 Sv.h-1 used to evacuate an area by the physicist and
local authorities was based on simple criterion of the occupational limits, knowing that for the
public the limit used to be ten times lower. The CNEN team, taking into account political
aspects, decided not to change this value.

At 03:00 the CNEN Coordinator evaluated the situation as critical and demanded additional
resources from CNEN headquarter. On that morning, the team dealt with the leftover source,
which was over a chair. The team decided to bury it in a sewer pipe filled with concrete. This
simple action reduced s significantly the dose  rate.

At 06:30, another team from CNEN arrived with one physician and two physicists and start
dealing with the contaminated or injured persons. A soccer stadium was designated as  a
temporary screening area where those persons were send. A physician from Tropical Diseases
Hospital - first to recognize the possibility of radiation overexposure - had been overnight at the
stadium. 22 persons were identified with symptoms of radiation exposure and sent to that
hospital. By the end of the day, the two physicians, with the support of the physicists, had
examined about 60 contaminated persons and took the first actions to decontaminate them.

The evolution of the response team

At 17:00 of September 29th, the Director of IRD was contacted and asked to prepare a team to
send to GoiSnia. Composed by the former IRD director, two physicians and health physicist
support staff, this team arrived at Goiania at 16:00 of September 30th. The former director acted
as deputy emergency coordinator. The team faced a crowd of people in the stadium, including
the press, which was looking for information,  wondering if they were or not contaminated as
they had been alarmed by the isolation of areas around the city.
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

The stadium was now designated as the place where people should go to be screened. In total, till
the end of response, 112 000 persons were monitored and 249 found with detectable

The CNEN team established a headquarters at the State Health Authority facility. One main goal
of this team was to conduct a well-documented survey of the contamination levels for planning
purposes. All the main foci of contamination were found and isolated.

In the following days, more technical staff arrived at Goiania. At this point, with the need for
record keeping and logistical support for the response team indicated the need of an
administrative staff.

The response team was divided into subgroups. Four of them to deal with cleanup of the most
contaminated areas (Junkyard I, n and ffl, the house where the  source was ruptured and others).
One team was involved in the screening of persons  at the stadium. There was also a specialized
team for chemical decontamination of small areas, vehicles, personal belongings and small
objects. The administrative staff was increased and subdivided in maintenance of equipment,
logistic (laundry, material, finance etc) and administrative issues.

At this time a great volume of radioactive waste started being generated and a group was created
to plan and develop the managing of that waste. This was one of the major logistical problems.
There were no suitable assembles in the market, Brazil did not have a disposal site and there
were only a few trained persons in this field.

The other resources

The need for ensuring that the control over the accident was gained, demanded additional aerial
and terrestrial monitoring to be performed. The aerial survey found another important site
contaminated in a sanitary waste deposit. The road network of the city was monitored with a
vehicle equipped with a large detector of Nal(Tl) and GM probes for low  and high dose rates.
This survey found several spots of contamination of minor importance. Teams for either physical
or chemical decontamination were settled for dealing with these small spots of contamination.

A whole body counter was designed and mounted at the State Hospital. A complete
infrastructure at the hospital was settled, including heath physicist staff and decontamination
room. An entire infirmary was reserved to the care of injured and contaminated internally or
externally persons.

An environmental assessment group designed and executed a monitoring  program performing
more than 1300 measurements of 137CS in soil, vegetables, water and air. A small radiometry
laboratory was built in GoiSnia with sample preparation support. This group was also responsible
for the decontamination of yards. The resuspension and dispersion of cesium was the major path
of contamination of the environment, Based on a critical group dose bellow 5mSv, several
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September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

remedial actions levels were derived, e.g., decontamination of property, restriction of home
grown produce and removal of contaminated soil.

The long term phase

Some of the activities enter in a steady state. Most of the groups were well organized. Three
medical care centers were working for different levels of radiation injury severity. Two of them
were in Goiania and the other, for the high severity injured people in Rio de Janeiro. Planning
and beginning of decontamination processes were being carried out by the groups   As might
been expected, adverse reactions to matters related to radiation arouse from the public, some
authorities and press. The choice of the site for the radioactive waste deposit was not only a
technical decision but also a political concern. There were legal aspects to be taken into
consideration. Finally the State Governor accepted a site 20-km away from the city.

As the deposit was crucial for the decontamination of the major foci, and the logistical and
political difficulties tended to increase, a decision from the President of CNEN was taken. He
decided to move his office to Goiania and lead directly the CNEN task  force and put large
amount of resources in managing the situation. This action not  only reduced the steps in decision
making processes but, as well, compromised the CNEN headquarters and its Institutes, providing
total support for logistic, analytical and dosimetry services as needed. The date of December 21st
was established for the end of the decontamination of the main areas. The construction of the
waste deposit was accelerated and, by mid of November, the removal and transport of waste
started. Before this, the decontamination actions were restricted to preparation and prevention
from deteriorating of the situation.

The total staff involved increasing up to 250 professional or technical staff plus 300 other staff
for supporting the decontamination, transport and disposal of the  waste, plus all the other
activities. The date of December 21st was achieved with an effort of a 12-hours working shift.


The lessons we should learn and practice

- Radiological accidents become worse as time of discovery elapses.
- Records of radioactive sealed sources should contain information on physical and chemical
-  A general public information system should be set up on radiation matters.
- A social and psychological support should be provided for either the persons affected by the
    accident and the response team.
-  International assistance depends on the local infrastructure. Emergency training and courses
    should be provided for this kind of accidents.
-  Mobile system of first aid by air should be available.
-  Equipment should be suitable for working in field adverse conditions.
-  Records of available personnel resources in each area of interest should be kept.
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 	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

 —  Temporary storage facility near the accident area is to be considered essential.
 -  Decision making and organization hierarchy should be well defined.
 —  Inspection programs are important and should be connected with an effective enforcement


 The Radiological Accident in Goizinia - International Atomic Energy Agency, 1988
 Health Physics vol. 60 n. 1,1990.

 The Loss of a Sealed Source - A Radiological Emergency; C.A. Nogueira de Oliveira, R. C.
 Falcao, M. C. F. Moreira, E. T. Silva and L. A. Vines; Seguridad Radiologica n.5, September
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11,1998

                    International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

                               Operation Morning Light:
                          Recovery of Debris from Cosmos 954

                                   H. Alan Robitaille
                                  Maple Bay, Canada

Cosmos 954 was launched on 18 September 1977, carrying an estimated 100 kilowatt (thermal)
nuclear reactor.  Such a high power level was necessitated by the fact that Soviet ocean-
reconnaissance satellites of the time employed active radar as the remote-sensing technology.
The satellite was estimated to have a mass of 4,000 kilograms, 50 kilograms of which was
attributed to the U235 core. The reactor was taken to criticality shortly thereafter, but the satellite
never functioned properly. Attempts were subsequently made to separate the satellite into three
modules; two of which were expected to burnup on re-entry to the earth's atmosphere, while the
core itself was to be boosted to a much higher orbit, allowing sufficient time for adequate
radioactive decay before subsequent re-entry. All such attempts ultimately proved futile.
Additionally, in early January 1998, attitude control of the satellite was lost and it began to
tumble uncontrollably, thus greatly shortening it's space-borne lifetime.

The projected impact date at that time was 23 January 1978, somewhere on the earth's surface
between 65° North latitude and 65° South latitude. The reactor core was anticipated to contain
some 100,000 Curies of activity, mostly due to the isotopes Cs137, Sr90, Ce144, Zr95 and Np239,
given its burnup history.  On 22 January  1978 various nuclear emergency assets in Canada and
the United States were put on a two-hour notice, through the NORAD agreement.

Actual re-entry occurred at 0353 (Pacific Standard Time) over Great Slave Lake, in Canada's
North West Territories.  Debris was expected on the ground along the satellite's final track from
Yellowknife to Baker Lake, a distance of some 500 nautical miles, in a direction of 062° True. A
few (mostly inebriated) eyewitnesses observed the re-entry visually from the city of Yellowknife.
Thus in the early morning of 24 January  1978, "Operation Morning Light" (a randomly-selected
code name) and the world's first (only?) predictable nuclear emergency began.


Operation Morning Light was, from its beginning, a joint operation between Canada and the
United States of America, including assets drawn from the Canadian Department of National
Defense, Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, the Atomic Energy Control Board and the
American Department of Energy. The Canadian Forces Base at Edmonton, Alberta was
activated to conduct the operation. A Canadian Nuclear Accident Support Team (22  personnel)
was deployed to Yellowknife and at 1630 PST two American C-141 Starlifters arrived from
Andrews Air Force Base, carrying the DOE's Nuclear Emergency Search Team and their
equipment. Approximately six hours later, at 0015 PST 25 January, the first search mission was
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September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiolosical Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

initiated; a Canadian C-130 Hercules aircraft carrying US radiation detection equipment. This
consisted of an array of twenty-eight 4" x 4" Sodium-Iodide scintillators.  Five gamma-ray
spectra were obtained per second as the aircraft flew at an altitude of 1000' above ground along
the satellite's estimated re-entry track (Figure 1).

Later that same day additional assets from both the USA and Canada arrived at Edmonton and an
additional search team was deployed to Baker Lake, at the terminus of the re-entry track. By the
end of the day a total of twelve aircraft were involved in the search (4 Hercules, 3 Twin Otters, 1
Convair (US) and 4 helicopters) carrying four Nal detector arrays (three American and one
Canadian, provided by the Geological Survey of Canada). Search missions conducted that day
involved three Hercules flying in formation C/2 mile apart) at 1000' along the satellite's re-entry
track, and on both sides of it.

The following day (26 January) at 1900 PST the first radioactive anomaly ("hit") was detected, at
the northeastern end of Great Slave Lake.  A ten-mile square grid at Vz mile spacing was then
established around this point and searched by a second aircraft. No additional hits were  detected,
but the original one was confirmed. Airborne infrared search missions were also flown over the
entire search area, being completed the following day, with no anomalies reported.

On 28 January a large piece of non-radioactive debris was found by chance by two of six
persons engaged in a fifteen-month dog-sled expedition across Canada's northern wilderness,
recreating the 1926/7 journey of an English explorer, John Hornsby.  The debris was found in the
Warden's Grove area within the Thelon Game Sanctuary. Additionally, that same day three
more radioactive anomalies were located in the McLoed Bay area, two of which were confirmed
to be satellite debris and one a natural outcropping of Thorium.

Around this time the search was becoming much better organized (Figure 2) with specific
responsibilities and lines of communication allocated to individual elements. In addition, the
search area itself was much more methodically defined and prioritized.  From theoretical
calculations of re-entry and atmospheric observations at the time, a wind-corrected debris track
was estimated.  Winds aloft blew from the North at the time of re-entry, thus it was expected that
smaller and lighter objects would be found widely dispersed south of Great Slave Lake, while
higher Beta (i.e., mass-to-drag ratio) objects would be found further down-range and closer to the
actual re-entry track.  (This was eventually confirmed.)  It was  also expected that some objects
with a Beta of up to 300 lbs/ft2 would be found closer to Baker Lake,  although as it eventually
transpired, none of that size was ever found.

However, objects of lower Beta were being found in the Thelon River area, near Warden's
Grove, and a decision was made to relocate the recovery team at Baker Lake to what eventually
became known (as it is to this day) as Cosmos Lake, in the Thelon Game Sanctuary. This
relocation commenced on 29 January 1978.

By the end of January many more fragments had been identified and located, most radioactively
but some not - these had been observed visually during airborne searches.  Also around this time
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

a concept of search operations began to evolve.  Instrumented C-130 aircraft, operating out of
Edmonton, systematically flew parallel track lines at 1000' AGL, in each search sector. Hit co-
ordinates were then passed to recovery teams based in Yellowknife and Cosmos Lake.  An
instrumented helicopter would then be flown to these co-ordinates to further localize the hit.
This flight would not land, for fear of contamination which might render the aircraft useless for
further operations.  Instead it would drop brightly-coloured markers to locate the hit. A second
helicopter mission would then be flown to extract the debris from the ice, since most melted into
it, and to assess the extent of the radiological hazard. If practicable, the debris would be
recovered at this time. If it were too bulky or too radioactive for standard shielding containers, a
special container would be fabricated at the University of Edmonton and then shipped to the field
on one of the daily re-supply flights. Another helicopter mission would then recover the object
for subsequent shipment to, and analysis at, the Whiteshell Nuclear Research Establishment, in
Manitoba.  A final, instrumented, helicopter mission would then be flown to the same site, to
ensure that the recovered fragment had not masked other debris of lesser activity.

On 1 February the most radioactive fragment found to date was located, measuring some 200
R/hr near contact. This was thought to be a structural element of the reactor core, with some
spent fuel condensed on its exterior.

Operations continued until the end of March 1998.  By that time a total of 608 airborne search
missions had been flown. Numerous large objects had been found  along the track between
Artillery Lake and Cosmos Lake, including six Beryllium cylinders (about 3" in diameter and 8"
long), all virtually intact, and many more Beryllium pencils of much smaller size.

Additionally, literally thousands of small particles of spent fuel were discovered from Great
Slave Lake south to the Alberta border. These were typically about 200 microns in diameter and
were dispersed unevenly over an area of some 20,000 square miles. Individual particles were
retrieved if they emitted in excess of 100 microR/hr at one metre, or if they were found in
populated areas (e.g., the towns of Snowdrift and Fort Reliance), since in Winter the local Innuit
melt surface snow as a source of potable water.

On 28 February a small piece of spent fuel was recovered, comprising about one cubic
centimetre, and emitting over 500 R/hr near contact - this constituted the most radioactive
fragment found during the entire search.


Approximately 100 objects were ultimately recovered, constituting some one percent of the
estimated radioactive inventory. The remainder was concluded to have been spent fuel which
had vaporized upon re-entry and eventually settled over a very large area surrounding the search
area, and perhaps worldwide.  There is a high level of confidence that all major pieces of debris
were located and retrieved, many of which consisted of Beryllium metal - thought to be part of
the reactor's combined reflector and criticality control system.
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September 9-11,1998

 	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference


 There were four major lessons learned from Operation Morning Light, two of which remain
 valid today and two of which have since been superceded by the intervening twenty years.

 Firstly, many Nal crystals were lost due to cracking in the extremely cold weather. These must
 be protected by sufficient insulation to limit their rate of thermal change to less than about 2°
 Celsius per hour.

 Secondly, in adverse environments such as Canada's North, it required three times as many
 personnel as would have been required in more moderate climates to do the same amount of
 work, due to fatigue and the loss of manual dexterity to bulky survival clothing.

 Thirdly, at the time a bottleneck developed in computational capability. It took four hours to
 analyze the data from one hour's worth of flight time, using the PDF 8/e's and PDF 11 's of the
 period. This should not be a problem today.

 Finally, navigational repeatability was a major problem early in the search, when trying to
 relocate debris which had been previously identified.  A microwave ranging system was
 deployed as a solution, but at considerable cost and inconvenience in relocating the beacons and
 changing their batteries daily.  Today, inexpensive ($100) hand-held GPS receivers would easily
 solve this problem, given their typical 10-metre precision.

 One other lesson was also learned, of particular relevance to Canadians. When operating in an
 environment where the daytime high sometimes reaches forty degrees below zero, be sure to
 bring along a heated toilet seat!
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

                    International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference
                           Figure 1: Cosmos 954 Search Area.
                               MORNING LIGHT
                           FIELD OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION





[ BASE 1




1 JO

S \





                           Figure 2: Search Team Organization
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11,1998

                    International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference
                     Post-Emergency Management Issues Following
                       Inadvertent Melting of Radioactive Sources

James F. Nicolosi, Director, Marketing and Sales, Gerard V. Policastro, Manager, Support Services, and Richard
                         McGinley, Senior Radiological Engineer

                 GTS Duratek - Radiological Engineering and Field Services


Steel manufacturers are encountering radioactive sealed sources in incoming scrap metal
inventories that are, on occasion, not detected, even though monitoring and. detection
instrumentation is being used. Unfortunately, they end up being melted in the mill's furnace,
resulting in the emissions control system and supporting facilities being contaminated with
radioactive materials.  This paper briefly describes a recent incident where a facility was
contaminated by such an event. The remediation and resulting facility recovery, though
successful, is often not the event that has the greatest impact on facility operations and financial
resources. It is the post-emergency activities that have a greater impact on the steel manufacturer
involved in such an event. It often results in facility alterations to operations because of the
generated radioactive wastes that remain onsite following completion of remedial activities. The
impact on operations and financial resources are described below.


In April of 1997, a steel manufacturer located in Kentucky experienced a radioactive source melt
event in which a radioactive cesium-137 (Cs137) source, in an unidentified form, was
inadvertently melted. The sources vaporized during the smelting process in the electric arc
furnace (EAF) which resulted in contamination of the emissions control system and EAF dust
handling equipment. The emission control system consists of the entire inside of the baghouse,
the EAF dust conveyor system including portions of the railcar filling area, the main ventilation
duct and associated components from the melt  shop. The event was discovered when a railcar
containing EAF dust was sent to an off site processing facility where it set off the facility's fixed
railcar radiation monitor.  Upon detection, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Department of
Health, was notified and all operations at the steel mill were ordered to be terminated. The
remediation contractor responded within 24 hours upon the steel mill's request to assess the
extent of contamination.  A contract was provided to the remediation contractor for
decontamination and survey work scope to return the mill to operational status.  The contractor
assessed the extent of the radioactive contamination, provided  onsite remediation support, and
developed the work plans for decontamination  of the facility. The remediation contractor used a
combination of decontamination techniques to  accomplish the  guidelines established by the
Commonwealth of Kentucky to remove  the radioactive contamination and return the facility to
unrestricted use.  The efforts of the contractor enabled the steel mill to commence operations
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

within 12 days after the incident. The contractor received a bonus payment from the customer's
insurance company for completing remediation ahead of schedule, allowing the company to
resume steel-making operations, and minimize the insurance company's liability. In addition, the
contractor enabled the company to comply with the guidelines for unconditional release of land
areas, slag, and EAF dust from the Cs137 contamination incident.  Currently the contractor is
conducting periodic sampling activities of the emissions (EAF dust) to insure compliance with
the requirements of the Commonwealth of Kentucky and Department for Public Health with
additional survey activity for metal scrap survey oversight.

After the remediation was completed and resumption of plant operations the company was left
with two new management variables that they previously did not have to deal with operationally
or financially.  The first was the establishment of a controlled area with restricted access for the
storage of the radioactively contaminated materials generated from the remediation. The second
is the financial burden of the management efforts and waste disposal costs incurred as part of the
incident. The company was left with a considerable quantity of mixed waste (radioactive and
hazardous materials) that require special handling. Instead of being able to send the EAF dust on
to a recycle center for recovery of certain useful metals, the steel mill is faced with disposal  at a
specially licensed burial site.  Other debris, which could generally go to unrestricted commercial
or industrial landfills, must also be disposed of at a licensed burial site. To further complicate
matters the radioactively contaminated EAF dust and other production residues are considered a
mixed waste because of the presence of the radioactive component and the presence of hazardous
component heavy metals. This escalates the cost of disposal because of the mixed waste
category for the dust and other debris.

For most companies, the final disposal of the waste often lags behind the remediation. There are
several reasons for this occurrence. First of all, companies are unfamiliar with the requirements
for restricted disposal options. There is a learning period during which company representatives
become acquainted with requirements which have not previously been dealt with, which are
different from the usual disposal environment with which they are familiar.  The second reason is
the complexity of disposal site criteria.  This usually includes characterization and waste
stabilization activities that companies are generally not knowledgeable concerning waste
preparation for disposal. Thirdly, companies are not set up for waste processing for stabilization
and shipment. They have neither the equipment, procedures or regulatory licenses/permits to
perform such activities.  This usually necessitates going to an outside service supplier to perform
these operations for the company which results in an added expense over and above the waste
disposal costs. Finally, waste disposal is usually delayed because of the expense of disposal
itself.  As a general rule, the cost of disposal for these generated wastes are higher than the cost
of remediating the facility equipment, systems and structures. In the cited case in this paper the
cost of the remediation was slightly greater than  $1 million while the cost of waste dispositioning
(stabilization, packaging and disposal) was higher.

The generation of radioactive wastes during remediation activities requires companies to set up
controlled, restricted areas for the purposes of radiation protection and contamination control.
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 	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

 This means giving up site space and/or facilities that may normally be dedicated to routine site
 operations. This may require re-engineering of site activities to accommodate the interim storage
 of the radioactive wastes. Depending on the planned time for onsite storage, regulatory
 authorities will require a company to obtain a radioactive  material license authorizing the
 possession and storage of the radioactive waste. This obviously adds a new administrative
 burden which the company has not encountered before.  The company must now expend
 resources for posting and maintaining a restricted area. This involves setting up an organization
 with designated duties and responsibilities, posting the area with "Caution-Radiation Area," and
 "Caution-Radioactive Material" signs, developing and conducting a training program for
 designated radiation workers, assigning personnel dosimetry, and implementing site access
 control and surveillance programs, in short, setting up a radiation protection program.

 The expense of waste disposal represents a financial challenge to the company if the unplanned
 funding must come from internal resources. Funding mechanisms need to be identified within
 the company if insurance coverage was not available at the time of the incident. It is interesting
 to note that some insurance companies have bulked at paying coverage claims in cases where a
 company incident is a second event of the same kind. One current client is experiencing such a
 response from its insurance carrier which subsequently has escalated into litigation.

 Returning the site to normal conditions requires the intervention of State regulators from both the
 Division of Solid Waste Management and the Division of Radiological Health.  This becomes
 costly to the company as a post emergency measure. These agencies require the company to
 show proof that the materials have been removed, or are properly containerized  for short or long
 term storage. Showing proof that the materials have been removed is a costly expense as it
 requires several types of surveys to be performed by a qualified vendor.  Typically, the regulators
 have specific criteria that the site must meet to be released for unrestricted use.  Storage of these
 materials includes compliance with the requirements for hazardous/radioactive container
 inspections. The Division of Solid Waste typically requires a weekly container inspection and
 the Division of Radiological  Health typically requires surveillance on a similar frequency.
 Additionally, both agencies require the responsible individuals to have appropriate initial
 training with refresher courses at some frequency.

 Once a company has completed all activities associated with an inadvertent melting of a
 radioactive sealed source, serious attention must be given  to minimize the recurrence of a
 subsequent event. The company should review its operations and install monitoring/surveillance
 systems at strategic points. The company must understand the strengths and weaknesses of any
 monitoring system including radiation detector sensitivity,  scan speeds, and therefore, vehicular
 speeds in monitoring incoming inventory.  The maintenance of the detection system is important
 since it is often operated in harsh environmental conditions. The investigation of a system alarm
 is important so that the operator(s) can become familiar with operational characteristics of their
 monitoring system, this being able to differentiate between positive indicators and false positive
 alarms. It is inherent that a company understand that even  under the best circumstances and ideal
 conditions, a radioactive source may go undetected.
Washington, D.C.
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                    International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

Steel manufacturers who have successfully remediated their facilities are faced with a greater
challenge in the post emergency phase because of the complexities of waste management
associated with facility remediation. Steel manufactures are typically not experienced in
handling radioactive waste and often do not have the financial resources to deal with the waste
management consequences.  It is recommended that a steel manufacturer consider preparing an
emergency plan that covers termination of operations in the event of a radioactive source melting
incident. It should contain points of contact for governing regulatory authorities as well as
describing area isolation instructions for the establishment of restricted areas, clean up
procedures and instructions and criteria for returning the facility to normal operations.  Waste
management and disposal issues should be generally described with available options.  The plan
should be periodically reviewed and updated for applicability and incorporate any regulatory
changes that will impact these activities. While it is not required, the steel manufacturer should
meet with the appropriate regulatory agencies to learn before hand the expectations of those
offices, should an event occur. This proactive posture by the steel manufacturer will help
minimize mistakes during any subsequent cleanup.
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

       The Response To Depleted Uranium Turnings Dumped In Northamptonshire

                      A-R.Denman1*, P. Morgan2, and S.Tomlinson1

                             1) Medical Physics Department,
                        Northampton General Hospital NHS Trust,
                                   Northampton, UK

                             2) Public Health Department,
                           Northamptonshire Health Authority,
                                   Northampton, UK.

       *Visiting Fellow in Medical Physics, Nene University College, Northampton, UK.


The discovery, by HM Inspectorate of Pollution (now part of the Environment Agency), of a
substantial quantity of depleted Uranium Swarf scattered about derelict land on a farm in East
Northamptonshire, UK, sparked a full scale emergency, where the National Arrangements for
Incidents Involving Radioactivity (NAIR) Scheme were invoked.

Major users of radioactivity are required by UK law to have appropriate emergency plans.1 The
NAIR Scheme, co-ordinated by the National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB), provides
advice to the Police on accidents involving radioactivity in cases where no emergency plan
applies, or if such a plan fails. The Scheme envisages two stages of response - an initial response
by local experts, usually from a hospital physics department; and a second stage, if the incident is
large or requires specialists, from companies in the Nuclear Industry.2  The Medical Physics
Department at Northampton General Hospital was the local NAIR I contact.3


The first stage was an inter-agency meeting on Friday, the 13th of January, 1995, to discuss the
discovery and its implications. The agencies present included the Police, Fire Service, Public
Health, Ambulance, Mr. Denman as NAIR Stage 1, County Council, HMIP, District Council
Environmental Health and a USAAF representative.

Discussion centred on whether, as the swarf was on private land, the farmer should be required
to clean up the site, or whether the material was a sufficient public health risk that NAIR should
be invoked. As the area had no gate, and was used as an adventure playground by children of
nearby USAAF residents, and was a general illegal dump, it was decided that there was a public
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

risk, and, as there was no other obvious emergency plan, NAIR was invoked. Without visiting
the site, NAIR Stage I decided that the clear-up was beyond their capabilities, and invoked Stage
n directly.

The most at risk group were the children in USAAF Accommodation 100 metres away, and it
became a priority to meet residents. Senior USAAF Staff were briefed at 15.00, and a residents
meeting called for 18.00. Press were briefed at the site at 16.00. The Health Help-line was
established by 18.00 with the twin aims of finding anyone who had been on the site and
reassuring other members of the public. NAIR Stage n, AEA Technology, Harwell, arrived at
17.30. At the Meetings with USAAF staff and residents, and at the Press Conference, Dr Morgan
and Mr Denman, together with the HMIP Inspector, Adrian Bush, provided expert comment.

The possibility of radioactive waste being on the farm had been raised when a consignment of
metal waste set off a radiation alarm in a Sheffield scrap-yard. The company had only fitted the
alarm recently in order to detect contaminated metal from sources such as Scandinavian steel
with raised Caesium content following Chernobyl. Subsequently, a paper in Health Physics noted
38 incidents of radioactivity in scrap, worldwide, in the period 1983 to 1994 4, and incidents
continue at the rate of 3 each year.5

The passage of the waste had been tracked back by HMIP, via another scrap-yard in
Northampton, to the farm. Originally suspected to contain Caesium, the material had, by the start
of the NAIR incident, been identified as depleted Uranium Swarf, - that is metal turnings, 0.25
by 1 inches of almost pure Uranium-238, an a-emitter with half-life of 4.5 * 109 years, decaying
to radioactive daughters emitting a and p-radiation.6 The Annual Limit of Intake is 0.5 MBq
orally and 50 kBq for inhalation (minimum dependent on form).7 It is pyrogenic, and should be
stored under oil; otherwise oxidises to  yellow\green oxide. It is also a chemical hazard with a
daily limit 2.5 mgm, and a threshold limit in air equivalent to an ALI of 10 MBq. The risks are
ingestion of oxide and inhalation of smoke if it bums. Additional information about depleted
Uranium was obtained during the incident from the NRPB, British Nuclear Fuels (BNFL) and
the NHS National Poisons Unit.

The swarf had been dumped in black unmarked drums; some had been opened and emptied and
others had been knocked over, spilling the contents, so that most of the swarf was exposed. The
initial assessment was that 50 kgm had been spilt.

AEA took several days to investigate the extent of the uranium and to plan the strategy to remove
it. The swarf was spread over a sizable area on the ground amongst brambles and on the concrete
roadway, pressed into the surface by vehicles. The estimate was revised upwards, and AEA
eventually removed almost 1000 kgm of swarf from the site. AEA were concerned that the metal
could catch fire when moved, and therefore proposed to make the piles safe with oil and transfer
these piles to large oil-filled drums. The latter was the most hazardous operation. This required
special protective suits and fire-fighting equipment.
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

This raised the possibility of a fire and radioactive plume, and consequent hazard to the public. A
series of inter-agency meetings were held over the weekend to consider the implications, and
Neil McColl, as NAIR Coordinator, ran computer simulations at NRPB to consider the risk from
a plume in view of the current wind direction. The calculation assumed that 1% of the uranium
would be sufficiently vaporised to be carried off-site. The projected radiation risk was low
compared to NRPB Sheltering Limits 8, but it was decided that the US AAF personnel should be
asked to stay away from their accommodation, or shelter in it throughout the 7 hour operation.

The Police set up road-blocks at convenient junctions half a mile away, and an ambulance, fire
tender, and Mr Denman were on stand-by near the scene throughout. The operation was carried
out safely, with the bulk of the uranium being removed that day. AEA took several months to
completely clear the site, including scrubbing the concrete roadway, and removing a substantial
amount of top-soil. This procedure was only completed in early 1996.

The Health Authority set up the telephone Help-line, 6 lines manned all week-end. Details were
taken from callers, and these were prioritised following the guidelines in Table 1. This process
was aided by a map of the site, initially cryptic, showing location of the swarf. Callers were
reassured that they would be contacted again, starting with those of highest priority. 73 calls
were received, and a further 21 were contacted as a result of these calls. The numbers of people
(callers, US AAF residents, and people contacted) in each category is also shown in Table 1.

 Table 1- Priorities used by Help-line


Took swarf away. Ate it
Handled Swarf on site
Definitely saw and trod on swarf
Walked all over site, including drum area
Walked on site, not near drums
Never visited site (includes drive past)
of People
Physics Visits
A surprising number of people had been on the site as shown in Table 2.
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

Table 2 - People who visited the site
American Children
Pigeon Shooters
Metal Sculptress
Old bottle collector
Farm Workers
American Resident jogging
Pheasant Shoot and Beaters
Aircraft memorabilia Group
Car scrap-dealer
Fly Tippers
Waste Regulators
Fox Hunt Followers
Apple Scrumpers
Some-one dumping car

It was concluded that any contamination would be on outdoor shoes, door-mats, ground floor
carpets, out-door clothing; and bike and car tyres, and so people were monitored in their own
homes. The USAAF residents were monitored first, with the rest of the monitoring starting on
Monday using three teams of two - one from the local Medical Physics Department, and two
from NRPB. In total 52 people were monitored, (see Table 1), and all found to be negative. Eight
people at greatest risk were offered whole body monitoring using the shielded germanium
detector system at NRPB. Two took up this offer and were both found to be negative. Those  not
visited were advised by letter of the negative results for those at greater risk.

The only radioactivity found off-site was a small amount in the bottom of a drum - one of those
used to transport the uranium. This had been removed from the site by a farm worker to a
housing estate in a large town and used as a garden incinerator. Fortunately the area around the
drum was clear, suggesting that the drum had been emptied before use.

From the quantity which was discovered on the site, it was surmised that a further empty drum
must have been taken from site. This was no doubt an unmarked black drum like the others, of
which there are many lying around the countryside. As the drum would be empty the risk to the
public would be very low. It was concluded that there should be no public appeal to locate the

The Police Press Office took charge of dealings with the Press. Their preference was to release
the news as early as possible, to prevent speculation.  This, of course, was prior to a full
examination of the site by Stage n. At that time, the risk to people going on to the site was
compared to a few chest X-Rays. The Press demanded pictures and hence access to the site, and
had to be tested for contamination afterwards which sidetracked staff from public monitoring.
The discussions about the fire risk to local communities did not excite the public greatly, even
though news leaked out that this was being considered. Further, the Press missed the potential
significance of the drum that was found off-site.
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September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

Public reaction to the incident was to a major extent determined by local, national and
international press coverage. Would the incident have had a higher profile without the on-going
story of public demonstrations over live export of calves? The national press aided by
spokesmen from pressure groups such as Friends of the Earth made much of the environmental
concerns with subsequent comment developing a political dimension - "how could it happen?" -
"could it happen again?" - rather than local health risks.

The Health Help-line number was carried by the national media, but given more prominence in
the local press in Northamptonshire. The incident occurred 1 mile from the county border, but no
one who lived outside Northamptonshire called the Help-line. Some callers were concerned that
rats on the site could have carried the uranium off site to contaminate workers in an industrial
complex half a mile away. Two ladies had scrumped apples, and made pies, and were concerned
that the apples were contaminated.

By contrast, the American Residents had greater knowledge of the risk from uranium, because of
health concerns  over Uranium Mining. The residents were anxious for their children, but the
concern dropped markedly once the site entrance and children's playground were found to be


1. Regulation 27 of The Ionising Radiations Regulations  1985, SI1333, (1985). HMSO

2. NAIR Handbook : Handbook on the National Arrangements for Incidents Involving
Radioactivity, 1995 Edition; NRPB.

3. Emergency Planning in the NHS: Health Services Arrangement for dealing with major
Incidents, Volume 2; Accidents involving Radioactivity, NHS Executive. 1996.

4. Radioactive Materials in Recycled Metals, J.O.Lubenau and J.G. Yusko, Health Physics, Vol
68, No 4 (April  1995), p440-451.

5. Radioactive Materials in Recycled Metals - An update , J.OJLubenau and J.G. Yusko, Health
Physics, Vol 74, No 3 (March 1998), p293-299.

6. Radioisotope Data, R.A.Allen, D.B.Smith, J.E.ffiscott. AERE Report R2938, 1961.

7. Limits for Intake of Workers, ICRP Publication 30, 1979.

8. Emergency Reference Levels; Criteria for limiting doses to the public in the event of
accidental exposure to radiation. NRPB Report ERL2 (1981).
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

                   International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference
   Graded Decision Guidelines for Public Health Activities ~ Lansdowne, Pennsylvania

     Paul A. Charp, Senior Health Physicist1, and William E. Belanger, Regional Radiation

                              1) ATSDR, Atlanta, Georgia
                      2) EPA Region IE, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.


In 1991, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Region ffi office requested that the
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) initiate preliminary public health
evaluations of radiologic hazards associated with several residential properties in Lansdowne,
Pennsylvania. Because of the presence of radium, radon, and asbestos in the house at 133 Austin
Avenue and an adjacent warehouse as reported by EPA, ATSDR determined an imminent public
health hazard existed and both agencies expressed concern about the potential for structural fires,
intrusion, or other unauthorized events.  Because of ATSDR activities, and with concurrence of
EPA, the site was included on the National Priorities List (NPL).

On June 13,1991, EPA Region HI contacted the EPA National Air and Radiation Environmental
Laboratory (NAREL) to help in the initial site evaluation at 133 Austin Avenue. This two-
family rental unit was believed to be contaminated with radium-226 (Ra-226) processed during
the early 1900s at the adjacent warehouse at 36 S. Union Street. EPA Region HI informed
ATSDR that the rental  house was occupied by two families, including a woman who was
approximately 6 months pregnant.  On the basis of limited sampling information, ATSDR
concurred with the EPA Region in recommendation that all residents in the house be relocated.
This relocation occurred during June 17 - 23. On June 19, NAREL collected radiologic data at
the site, including external gamma radiation readings, levels of fixed and removable
contamination, and radon levels in the house and adjacent warehouse.


NAREL released the results of this survey on June 28, 1991.  The reported levels of external
gamma radiation ranged from background levels  (15 microroentgens/hour; //R/h) to 1.2
milliroentgens/hour (mR/h) in the master bedroom on the first floor. The maximum removable
alpha contamination in the basement exceeded 30,000 disintegrations per minute (dpm). Radon
measurements indicated that the highest levels in living areas were greater than 20 picocuries per
liter (pCi/L), even with a relatively high rate of ventilation during the measurements. Because of
this high rate of ventilation, NAREL requested that charcoal canisters be placed in the house.
Results from the canister measurements showed that radon levels on the first floor ranged from
approximately 49 pCi/L to 63 pCi/L. On the second and third floors, levels ranged from
approximately 19 pCi/L to 29 pCi/L. NAREL also surveyed the warehouse and found elevated
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 	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

 levels of gamma radiation (190 //R/h to 1.2 mR/h) and radon (23 to 36 pCi/L); removable
 contamination on the first floor was 60 dpm.

 EPA performed expanded site investigations and identified 40 residential properties
 contaminated with radium and/or radon in excess of levels thought to be safe for human
 exposure. ATSDR and EPA Region IH collaborated to determine what, if any, actions should be
 taken to protect the public health of these residents. As a result of these guidelines, over 15
 persons were relocated.  The actions included a set of graded decision guidelines that would
 support actions ranging from no action to immediate relocation. The process used to develop
 these guidelines and the evaluation of standards as they existed in 1991 is discussed below.

 The Uranium Mill Tailings (UMT) standards (40 CFR 192)1 provided guidance for cleanup of
 properties contaminated with UMT. This established an action level at 4 pCi/L of radon and 20
 fjRJh gamma radiation above background in houses, which is similar to the situation at the
 Austin Avenue site. The UMT rule provided clear guidance for the decision to initiate  cleanup
 action; however, the rule does not address the problem of relocating the occupants of the
 property in the interim.

 For gamma radiation, several guidelines were available. In 1991, the Nuclear Regulatory
 Commission (NRC) allowed an exposure of 500 millirem  (mrem) per year to members of the
 public.2 The estimated annual cancer risk of such an exposure was about two extra cases in a
 population of 10,000 per year of exposure.  The International Council on Radiation Protection
 (ICRP) and the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) currently
 recommend an annual exposure limit of 100 mrem per year above background.3'4  The annual
 risk of 100 millirem is about 5 in 100,000. It is generally assumed that the limit of 100 mrem per
 year above background also is intended to apply to exposures that might be repeated for many
 years. The risks quoted above are calculated using an additive model that applies a
 linear-nonthreshold assumption and does not allow for the dependence of effects on dose rate.

 At the other extreme, the standard for nuclear workers is 5.0 rem per year2, but occupational
 exposures are kept as low as reasonably achievable (the ALARA principle). This level of risk is
 tolerable in an occupational exposure for which a commensurate benefit results from the
 exposure. A standard this high is inappropriate for an involuntary exposure to a member of the
 public, especially when no compensating benefit to society exists.

 The final, and perhaps most relevant guidance, was EPA's  Protective Action Guides (PAGs) for
 nuclear power plant accidents.5 These guidelines focus on the relocation of persons from their
 residents after a nuclear accident and discuss risks and social and economic costs of relocation.
 The guidance allows a maximum of 2 rem the first year and a maximum of 500 mrem any other
 year.  The 2 rem per year maximum in the first year is based on the typical radionuclide mix
 from a power plant accident and is intended to achieve 5 rem over 50 years because of decay.
 The 5 rem included the 2 rem in the first year and results in an average dose of 100 mrem per
 year over 50 years. Because radium has a 1,600 year half-life, it can be  treated as if it does not
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

decay, and the 2 rem maximum would therefore not apply. However, the 0.5 rem guide for any
other year is designed to protect against hazards accrued over only a few years.  Because the
contaminated houses were to be cleaned up within a few years, the longest that nonrelocated
persons will be exposed in the future is only a few years.  Thus, the 0.5 rem guide fits well. It
also should be noted that the PAGs do not consider past exposure. The guides are aimed
specifically at preventing the effects of future exposures which is better explained in the PAG
document. It also is intended that the relocation is based on exposures before cleanup measures
are applied.  Therefore, a person who is not relocated after a first-year dose of 1.9 rem would
probably receive only 0.5 rem after rudimentary cleanup is performed.

Using these guidelines, ATSDR reviewed and categorized the addresses encompassed by the
Austin Avenue site into three distinct categories: Category 1 - relocation if radiation exposure
exceeds the 500 mrem action level (seven addresses); Category 2 - ATSDR and EPA discuss
actions if radiation readings are greater than 200 mrem per year but below 500 mrem per year
(four addresses); and Category 3 — no actions necessary if expected annual exposures are less
than 200  mrem per year (10 addresses). Table 1 lists each of the addresses and information
regarding measurement levels, EPA actions, and categorization.

Radiation levels at addresses in Category 1 exceeded the ATSDR-recommended limits and
relocation was offered to residents.  Several elderly residents declined relocation despite elevated
gamma radiation exposure rates and the elevated radon levels in their homes.

Addresses in Category 2 contained residences at which the expected external gamma radiation
level was between 200 and 500 mrem per year. For each location, the demographic
characteristics of the residents and the potential for additional exposure were considered.
ATSDR met with EPA and discussed the four locations.  EPA determined the annual gamma
radiation exposure estimates after interviewing these residents. The estimates were time-
weighted averages based on the estimated time, over a year, that residents would spend in each
radioactively contaminated room. After reviewing the exposure estimates and the EPA rationale,
ATSDR concurred with EPA's decision not to offer relocation.

Category 3 contained locations at which the expected external gamma radiation level was less
than 200 mrem per year. As stated previously, when levels below 200 mrem were estimated,
ATSDR recommended no EPA action. For each location, the demographic characteristics of the
residents and the potential for additional exposure were considered. On the basis  of annual
gamma radiation exposure estimates, ATSDR concurred with EPA's decision not to offer
relocation, except to one person, a medical radiologist who resided at 237 N. Lansdowne. This
relocation was offered because of concern that the resident's cumulative occupational and
residential exposures could exceed 500 mrem annually.
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                    International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

 With the development of these graded decision guidelines, ATSDR and EPA were able to apply
 a uniform process to assist the on-scene coordinators and the remedial project managers in the
 performance of their duties. The guidelines also have been applied in Idaho (i.e., in conjunction
 with phosphate slag issues) and their use has been considered in Connecticut (i.e., in several
 contaminated buildings used previously in the watch manufacturing).
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

Table I. Location, estimated radiation levels, radon levels, and EPA actions

    Location         Category     Gamma Radiation     Radon          EPA Actions
25 Lexington Ave.
137 Lexington Ave.
25 Beverly
216 Wayne Ave.
218 Wayne Ave.
500 Harper Ave.
3723 Huev Ave.
617 Pine St.
619 Pine St.
623 Pine St.
126 Owen Ave.
237 N. Lansdowne
6 Plumstead Ave.
10 Plumstead Ave.
310 Shadeland Ave.
64 S. Clifton Ave.
621 Pine St.
346 Owen Ave.
151 Lexington Ave.
504 Harper Ave.
Not Determined
0.7 rem/year
0.3 rem/year
Relocation offered
but declined
Relocation offered
but declined
Relocation offered
Relocation offered
Relocation offered
Relocation offered
Relocation offered
No offer
No offer
No offer
No offer
No offer
One relocated,
occupational exposure
Radon reduction
system installed
No offer
No offer
Unoccupied at time
of measurement
Below action levels
Below action levels
Radon reduction
system installed
Below action levels
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference


1. Health and environmental protection standards for uranium and thorium mill tailings. 40
C.RR. 192.

2. Standards for protection against radiation.  10 C.F.R. 20.

3. International Commission on Radiological Protection (1991). 1990 recommendations of the
International Commission on Radiological Protection.  ICRP Publication 60. New York:
Pergamon Press.

4. National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (1993).  Limitation of exposure
to ionizing radiation.  Report 116. Bethesda, Maryland: National Council on Radiation
Protection and Measurements.

5. Environmental Protection Agency. Manual of protective actions for nuclear incidents.
Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC. EPA 520/1-75-001-A
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

               Session B, Track 2:
 Social and Humanitarian Issues Following a
             Radiological Accident
                Wednesday, September 9, 1998
                   2:05 p.m. - 4:20 p.m.
Chair: Marcia Carpentier, United States Environmental Protection Agency

                     International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference
       Red Cross Programme Responding to Humanitarian Needs in Nuclear Disaster

                                   Dr. Jean-Pierre Revel
                            Senior Officer, Relief Health Service
 Large scale nuclear disasters are fortunately very rare.  So far, international humanitarian
 assistance has been requested in only one case, following the explosion in reactor N 4 at the
 Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (CNPP) in Ukraine on the 26th April 1986. Apart from the
 immediate and better known emergency effects, the world took some time to discover the extent
 of the damages on the environment.  It took even longer to assess the consequences on affected
 populations.  Cross border effects, large number of population affected spread over three
 countries and limited information on the long term consequences are only but a few of the
 constraints faced by humanitarian organisations in the aftermath of that disaster.  The
 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (hereafter called the
 "Federation") has developed a unique programme aiming at meeting the humanitarian needs in
 affected communities. The following is a review of this programme, its background, its
 activities and the lessons learnt and to be shared with the entire humanitarian community.


 Historical Background

 Immediately after the Chernobyl disaster became known, the Red Cross National Societies (NSs)
 and the Government authorities of the three affected Soviet Republics of Ukraine, Belarus and
 Russia were involved in the provision of immediate relief to the affected population. This was
 carried out under the umbrella of the Alliance of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies of Soviet

 In 1990, following a request for additional international assistance, the Federation sent a needs
 assessment mission to look at possible humanitarian intervention. The mission reported that a
 lot of information was missing concerning the levels of radioactivity as well as on the possible
 health effects on people living in contaminated areas. The first programme was designed which
 included use of hand held dosimeters distributed to people in villages in the most contaminated

 In 1992, the Red Cross Chernobyl Humanitarian Assistance and Rehabilitation Programme
 (CHARP) second step was launched with the introduction of 6 Mobile Diagnostic Laboratory
 (MDL) vehicles, two for each affected republic. The aim was to collect information at the
 community level in the most remote villages and provide immediate feedback to people. Health
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

status of local populations was checked and levels of radioactivity were measured both in human
beings and in the environment. In most cases, results were found to be within acceptable limits
set by the governments. In 1994, ultrasonic scan for detection of thyroid gland cancer was added
to the programme's activities.

The "New" CHARP

In 1996, following the second evaluation of the programme, it was decided to adapt and reshape
CHARP to better meet the needs of affected populations. The following adaptations were

a) Measurement of radioactivity was restricted only to gamma radiation in most contaminated
areas. Measurements of alpha and beta radiation in the environment were discontinued since
four years of experience had not shown dramatic increase in the levels measured. Whole body
monitoring to assess the internal accumulated radioactivity in persons was discontinued. It was
relying on heavy and expensive equipment and this modification allowed use of lighter vehicles.
Monitoring of radioactivity in food items was also discontinued in the MDL's. It remained in a
few places only (Red Cross dispensaries) as an extraordinary service. The MDL's health
screening by medical doctors as well as blood and urine examinations were also continued.
Particular attention was paid to the teenagers and those who were children at the time of the

b) Prioritised detection of thyroid gland cancer through enhanced capacity in the MDL's: more
sophisticated equipment and better trained personnel. The reported increase in the number of
this type of cancer in children appeared to be the major health consequence of the disaster. (See
table for Belarus, next page). The target population was now focused on children and teenagers
(as the group most at risk consists of children who were between 0 and 2 years of age at the time
of the accident, in 1986) and screen 90,000 people per year, an increase of 50% from 60,000
previously. The health screening is still backed up with a full medical check up and blood and
urine laboratory tests.

c) Distribution of non contaminated food items (milk powder and vitamins plus micronutrients)
to specific target groups (children in institutions) continues. For most of these children, this food
supplement is the  only source of non contaminated  animal proteins and vitamins during the
winter and part of the spring each year.

d) The fourth recommendation was to develop a psycho-social rehabilitation programme so as to
meet the psychological needs of the affected population. At large, these needs were unmet (and
sometimes not even recognised), and required careful attention as they prevent effective
rehabilitation from taking place. The development of a pilot project in Belarus took place,
centred around the already existing network of Red Cross branches and MDL's.  Through
dissemination of simple, reliable and understandable information made by specially trained
volunteers and personnel, it is expected to reduce the anxiety of the targeted populations.
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

e) [To increase the sustainability in each national part of the programme was put forward
as essential.] It is currently addressed by the National Societies of the three affected republics,
now fully independent countries.

Collected data is computerised and shared with relevant authorities in the three countries, mainly
Ministries of Health. Even though it may appear to be a sophisticated programme, CHARP is a
humanitarian programme, aiming at improving quality of life in affected population, and neither
a scientific nor research exercise. Close co-operation with scientific and technical communities
as well as establishment of good relationship with International Organisations such as WHO,
UN/OCHA, IAEA and UNESCO, are important in order to establish and further develop the
programme's credibility.


Twelve years after the explosion in CNPP, the need to continue humanitarian assistance is more
obvious than ever. Despite that the only major health consequence detected so far is the
dramatic increase in the number of thyroid cancer cases, all health consequences remain yet to be
fully assessed.

The psychological impact of the disaster overtakes by far the physical consequences. The
Federation Programme is one among the very few that addresses those needs. It requires both a
careful and long term approach as there are great needs to be met, especially to restore
confidence in the affected populations.  During its seven years of activity, CHARP has gained
credibility and recognition amongst the affected communities and this made the acceptability of
the psycho-social rehabilitation pilot project much easier as people trust the Red Cross

The socio-political disturbances that followed the disintegration of the former Soviet Union
dramatically increased the negative health impact of the disaster as most health care services
became rudimentary, especially in remote areas. It left people in a bad position to deal with any
disease or ailment. The level of distrust developed against authorities is such that rehabilitation
will take decades. Programmes, such as the Federation one, helps to accelerate the process,
demonstrating the possibility for affected communities to regain self confidence and to decide on
their future.


The effects of technological disasters require careful exploration using new and innovative
approaches to detect, identify and manage health consequences. Characteristics such as cross
border effects and long term consequences are obvious today. For example, first reports about
thyroid gland cancer increase appeared more than 5 years after the disaster and when the most
suspected causative agent, radioactive iodine, had completely disappeared from the environment.
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For humanitarian organisations, the management of such type of disasters requires development
of new skills. Links with both scientific and technical communities have to be established and
further developed in order to provide the most appropriate response on the one hand and to
re-enforce the organisation's credibility, on the other hand.

The time frame is also different compared with other humanitarian activities. Long term
perspective is required and political as well as financial long term commitments are needed so as
to ensure adequate response during all the phases of the post-disaster period.

Given the potential for other disasters of the same type, it is critical that humanitarian
organisations draw lessons from past experiences and get prepared for both action and advocacy.
Since long term humanitarian needs are frequently overlooked in technological  disasters and
technical and economical aspects are given the priority, it is important that somebody highlights
the humanitarian needs during longer periods and what exactly is needed in the  affected
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                Constructing More Effective, Post-emergency Responses:
                            the Human Services Component

                                 Dr. Steven M. Becker

                         School of Social and Behavioral Sciences,
                        The University of Alabama at Birmingham
Recent studies and an accumulating body of experience have demonstrated that environmental
accidents can have both short-term and long-term effects on the social, psychological and
psychosocial well-being of people in affected communities.  It has, therefore, become evident
that there is a need for an expanded and more sophisticated human services component in post-
emergency response, several factors, however, are hindering the development of this human
services component. First, there is presently a lack of a formal role for human service
professionals in most emergency and post-emergency response mechanisms. In coming years it
will be important to better integrate human service professionals such as environmental
sociologists, community psychologists and social workers into post-emergency planning and
response bodies. Second, education and training related to environmental hazards has not yet
been included in most human services training programs. While several programs have recently
moved to incorporate material on environmental accidents into the curriculum, additional work
in this area will need to be undertaken. Third, the exchange of information on human service
assistance efforts after environmental emergencies has thus far been spotty. To facilitate
systematic improvements in the human service component of post-emergency response, a better
means for sharing experience and cumulating knowledge will need to be developed.
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                Modelling Social Psychological Factors After an Accident

                                        P.T. Allen

                     European Institute of Health and Medical Sciences
                            .  University of Surrey, Guildford


The situation obtaining in the long term post-emergency phase of a major nuclear accident is as
complex as any to be found in society. As time passes, the original event and its immediate
consequences set in train a long process of action and counter-action designed to improve the
situation.  Each action is capable of generating further change so that overall complexity
increases. Social and psychological factors appear as outcomes  and can interact with radiation
protection measures in ways which may reduce the effectiveness of those measures. For
example, expected dose reductions may be compromised and populations left distraught when
the intention was otherwise.

Studies conducted in the regions affected by the Chernobyl accident have demonstrated that
psychological factors can interact to affect behaviour and, consequently, to affect dose. Thus,
there is a need for social psychological factors to be taken into account in the planning and
execution of radiation protection policies. But how to do it? In an EC funded study on Social
Psychological Aspects of Radiation Protection after Accidents (SPARPA)1 the roles of the
various factors are being examined in the context of socio-cognitive structural models. The main
aim of these studies is to explicate the situation of people living in contaminated territories in
order that decisions about countermeasures may be based on a better understanding of the key
factors. Thus, one outcome of the research will be a decision aid for radiological protection.

This paper introduces socio-cognitive models, discusses how empirically based structural
behavioural models can predict behaviours and/or psychological distress in response to the
accident, or to countermeasures, and reviews the implications for decision aiding for radiological


Socio-cognitive models

Social cognitive models have been developed  by social psychologists to take account of the ways
in which people think and act in a given type of situation. In general, such models measure
beliefs, perceptions and attitudes in an attempt to predict intention to pursue specific behaviour2.
In the context of health related behaviour there have been several such theories applied in recent
years3, particularly in the examination of protective behaviours4. One synthesis of these attempts
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has characterised the main dimensions of such models as comprising two main phases5.
According to this approach, the first phase is concerned with motivation, which leads to the
formation of intention to act. It includes four components: self-efficacy expectations, outcome
expectancies, threat and intention. The second phase is concerned with the taking of action and
includes planning, behavioural and situational components.

It is instructive to examine these components in the context of the radiation situation obtaining in
the contaminated regions.  Self-efficacy expectations have emerged as very important elements
in the modelling of a wide range of health related behaviours.  They refer to the extent to which
people believe they are capable of taking the appropriate actions needed to provide protection
from a threat. Such expectations are not mere reflections of some individual self estimate of
strength of character or similar generalisation but may consist of very practical considerations or
judgements about the situation. For example, even if people know that they should eat
uncontaminated food, do they believe that such food is actually available?

There is then the matter of the efficacy of the specific response.  Simply put, this refers to the
extent to which people believe  that the available response will actually produce the  desired or
recommended outcome. For example, do people think that limiting their use of forest produce,
such as mushrooms, will have an effect on their dose? In general, if people believe that a given
action will reduce their dose, and believe that they are capable of taking that action, then they are
more likely to perform the behaviour.

Outcome expectancies also play a major role in the formation of intentions to act. Here both
specific and generalised outcome expectancies may play a part. Both refer to beliefs about the
likely outcomes of behaviours and answer for the individual a question like what will happen if I
do x. For example, people often do things because they expect a familiar outcome and, if there is
a risk associated with the behaviour which does not immediately challenge that assumption, then
changing that behaviour may be problematic. For example, where people habitually pick wild
mushrooms and expect to gain  from the activity, and cannot detect any problem with that
activity, merely telling them that there is a risk may not violate the expectation of reward.
Generalised outcome expectancy is a similar element in the explanation of behaviour but refers
to overall views of the consequences of action. It has not featured strongly in many of the
existing health behaviour models but there is evidence of its role6 and one measure based on this
concept has been found to be an important predictor of dose in Russia7.

Outcome expectancies may include costs and benefits associated with particular protective
behaviour. In the above example, the avoidance of wild mushrooms clearly involves a cost.  In
the context of a fairly poor rural economy this includes both a monetary loss of free food but also
a loss of non-monetary benefit, such as the enjoyment derived from the traditional foraging for
wild produce. Expectancies can also include the behaviour of family or friends. People often
rely on the guidance or example of others to help determine their own actions, either because
they are encouraged to pursue courses of action deemed good for them or because they fear
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disregard if they fail to comply. Similar arguments apply to the social acceptability of

Characterisation by individuals of the threat posed to themselves clearly constitutes a major
aspect of the approach.  There are two main elements to this characterisation: the perceived
vulnerability of the individual to the threat, in this case the perceived level of exposure to
contamination; and, the perceived severity of the threat, simply the subjective estimate of the
severity of the consequences of exposure.

This apparently simple formulation does not capture all that is known with respect to protective
behaviours. When people are faced with a threat, assuming that they have the information
necessary to estimate the danger to themselves, they do not necessarily choose the recommended
course of action. The process of evaluation itself may arouse fear or anxiety and this may then
become a problem for the individual. The person is confronted with an immediate problem, the
anxiety, and may resolve that problem in a way which prevents behaviour aimed at the primary
cause. For example, being afraid of the consequences of exposure to contamination may lead
people to deny the threat. Pursuit of such a coping strategy may involve the avoidance of
information about the threat so that radiological advice is actively ignored.

Structural behavioural models

Empirically based structural models take the main elements of social cognition theories and
hypothesise relations between them by positing causal pathways between measured variables.
Such measurements use conventional psychological scaling methods based on questionnaire
responses. [In the SPARPA approach settlements that have been surveyed and scales developed
from items in the questionnaire which represent concepts in the models.] Such scales combine a
number of items which have been developed to measure the same concept in  order to produce a
new variable representing this concept. By combining the responses to a number of items, a
more reliable estimate of the concept is obtained. The  internal consistency of the resulting scale
can be estimated by examination of the way in which all of the items correlate with one another.
An index of this internal reliability is available and hence some aspects of the quality of the
measurements may be estimated.

The structural behavioural models being developed in the project take the social cognition
theories as a starting point, but variation in the approach is necessitated by the specific
conditions obtaining in the contaminated areas.  For example, in most applications of social
cognition theories there is not usually a convenient measure of behaviour, or of a proxy outcome
for behaviour. In the case of the contaminated areas, however, there is the opportunity to
measure ingestion dose which will have derived from individual behaviours,  such as the
consumption of contaminated local food. Furthermore, most of the approaches have the
prediction of intention to act as their main focus. In the contaminated areas, however, there is
already a considerable history of actions and recommendations so that past and existing patterns
of behaviour have more significance.  In this case a behavioural measure, such as avoidance of
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 	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

 forest behaviour can be devised, based on self reports of avoidance of forest foods combined
 with reports of avoidance of visiting the forest.  Within a model a composite behavioural
 measure such as avoidance of forest behaviour can be used to predict dose, based on Whole
 Body Measurements taken from individuals completing questionnaires.

 The modelling process was begun with the specification of a generic model based on the logic of
 the social cognition theories. Empirical data were then collected and specific versions of this
 model were tested using a structural equation modelling technique8. Within this family of
 techniques, statistical procedures exist which permit the testing of hypothesised relationships.
 Because a great many models may be based on empirical data, a specific version may be tested
 against a base line model, where variables are assumed to be uncorrelated. In addition, measures
 of the predictive strength between variables are available as standardised path coefficients which
 can be evaluated to conventional confidence limits. The procedure is iterative so that a series of
 such models may be built on survey data and tested for fit.  Relationships that are shown to be
 weak by statistical tests may be dropped. Subsequent surveys may be designed to improve the


 Decision aiding

 The SPARPA project aims to characterise, using quantitative methods, the nature and
 psychological impact of countermeasures, and the influence of behaviour on dose, in order to
 help develop guidance on the implementation of countermeasures. One clear implication for
 decision aiding for the radiation protection community is that a reliable framework for making
 sense of the social psychological elements of a decision should emerge. The building of
 structural behavioural models is one technique that should feed conveniently into decision aiding
 procedures currently used, or being developed.  The conceptual structure is flexible and offers
 the opportunity for the diagnosis of failure in the implementation of what would otherwise
 appear to be effective protection measures.


 1. Work supported under EC Contract no.: F14C-CT96-0010

 2. Ajzen, 1. and Madden, T. J. Prediction of goal-directed behaviour: Attitudes, intentions, and
 perceived behavioural control, Journal of Experimental Social  Psychology, 22,453-74, (1986).

 3. Janz, N. K. and Becker, M. H.  The health belief model: a decade  later, Health Education
 Quarterly, 11(1)1-47(1984).

4. Wienstein, N. and Sandman, P.M. A model of the precaution adoption process: Evidence
from home radon testing, Health Psychology,  11,170-180, (1992).
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5. Schwarzer, R.  Self-efficacy in the adoption and maintenance of health behaviours:
Theoretical approaches and a new model. In R. Schwarzer (ed.) Self-efficacy: Thought Control
of action. Washington: Hemisphere (1992).

6. Scheier, M. F., & Carver, C. S. Optimism, coping, and health: Assessment and implications
of generalised outcome expectancies. Health Psychology, 4 219-247, (1985).

7. Allen, P. T., Rumyantseva, G. The Contribution of Social and Psychological Factors to
Relative Radiation Ingestion Dose in Two Russian Settlements Affected by The Chernobyl NPP
Accident. Risk Analysis and Management in a Global Economy, pp. 220-234, SRA Europe;
Proceedings of the 1995 Conference, Center of Technology Assessment in Baden-Wurttemburg,
Stuttgart (1997).

8. Hoyle, Rick H. Structural Equation Modeling: Concepts, Issues and Applications, Sage,
London, (1995).
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

                    Emergency Events Involving Radiation Exposure:
                        Issues Impacting Mental Health Sequelae

                              Brian W. Flynn, Ed.d., Director

                            Division of Program Development,
                              Special Populations and Projects
                             Center for Mental Health Services
                Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
                            United States Public Health Service

Statements contained in this paper are solely those of the author and do not express any official
opinion or endorsement by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration.


Understanding the psychological sequelae of disasters is rapidly increasing as a result of both
emerging research as well as real life experience. In the United States, the primary experience
base has been with natural disasters. There is much to be learned from experience with natural
disasters that is very applicable to planning for, and response to, radiation emergencies.

This paper will not focus on general principles of disaster mental health preparedness and
response. There are several good sources for this type of information1'2-3. This paper will
propose a number of special considerations, which may be significantly different than dealing
with natural disasters, for understanding human response to radiation emergencies. A number of
very concrete suggestions will be offered in response to these special characteristics.


Context of Understanding

To begin understanding the psychological consequences of radiation exposure, regardless of the
nature of the event, it is important to consider how most people view and understand radiation.
Perhaps more accurately, how people lack understanding of radiation—therein is the key to
understanding what we are up against in helping people cope with actual or perceived exposure.

Most people have very little understanding of what radiation is, how it works, and what it does to
living things. What people do perceive is that radiation is very powerful (especially in
destructive ways) and very mysterious. It is likely that most people, could not accurately
answers very basic questions regarding the nature and effects of radiation and exposure. In the
absence of accurate understanding, especially when coupled with often distorted beliefs and
intense fear, it is easy to see how both acute and chronic stress responses can result from even
suspected exposure.
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•   Public education regarding the nature of radiation and its effects on the body should be
    encouraged, both as part of general public education, as well as emergency and disaster
    preparedness efforts.

•   Education should include dispelling myth, assuring the validity of post exposure assessment,
    and educating about the nature and normalcy of stress reactions following perceived

Role of Blame

In responding to natural and other types of emergencies and disasters we have learned a great
deal about the centrality of blame following traumatic events which are outside the range of
usual human experience.  Since, in natural disasters, people find it culturally and religiously
unacceptable to blame God, people frequently turn their anger toward any individual or group
that they feel is responsible for, or could/should have prevented, the traumatic event. In events
where victims/survivors become focused on blame and the desire to seek retribution, stress and
depression appear to last longer and delay health integration and resolution of the experience.
When blame is not easily assigned, people tend to focus blame on a wide variety of authority
figures, regardless of their involvement in the incident. In the case of radiation exposure, there
will, in all likelihood, be fairly easy targets for blame.


•   In preparedness activities, help response official understand the normal nature of blame and
    provide specific training on how to deal with individual and group blame.

•   In any counseling interventions following an incident, help victim/survivors understand the
    normalcy of blame as well as its adverse psychological consequences.  Provide alternative
    coping mechanisms.

Impact of Unknown Health Consequences

In the best known nuclear power plant emergency in the United States, Three Mile Island, the
most significant long term health effect was anxiety and depression resulting from unknown long
term health consequences.4'5 Stress resulting from acute and chronic health and medical
conditions is significant and often not well treated. This situation is exacerbated if those
exposed  to radiation fear future illness (even into future generations).


•   Same as in next section.
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 Tracking and Follow-up with Those Exposed

 Because of the fear of (real or imagined) long term health effects it is critical that those exposed
 are tracked for extended periods of time for screening and intervention purposed. As a result of
 the long-term nature of some emergency and disaster related stress, as well as its biological
 manifestations, mental health screening and intervention where appropriate and necessary should
 be a component of any follow-up program.


 •   Include mental health screening as part of all follow-up programs.

 •   Have treatment interventions available for anyone who needs them.

 •   Provide ongoing accurate information to those exposed.

 Importance of the Message and the Messenger

 When faced with frightening and mysterious situations, people seek leadership and accurate
 information.  In the hours immediately following radiation exposure, there is a need to provide
 the general public and high risk populations with a great deal of information. The content,
 format, and presenter of the information are important in reducing psychological sequelae.


 •   Make every attempt to coordinate messages to reduce the potential of contradictory
    information. Few things will erode confidence more quickly than conflicting information
    from identified leaders and experts.

 •   Assure that the person(s) delivering the message has the highest credibility possible to
    reduce the potential of listeners discounting the message.  All spokespersons should be free
    of perceived vested interest in "spinning" information.

 •   Assure that all public information is available in various formats (e.g., radio, television,
    written) and reflects the culture of the recipients.

 •   Include information related to stress as part of all massages. Normalize the experience of
    stress, provide suggestions for coping, anticipate special situations (e.g.., the stress of
    families sheltering hi place for extended periods, availability of guns, alcohol, etc.), and
    provide information about where to get help.
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•   Repeat messages frequently. People under stress tend to retain information less will than
    when they are not stressed.

Screening for Exposure

In any large scale radiation incident, there will need to be extensive radiation exposure screening.
While this will typically place a significant burden on the existing health care system it provides
a unique opportunity to intervene in the mental health domain (if not labeled "mental health"). If
mental health or stress assessment is made part of general screening it provides a great
opportunity to assess stress, identify those most in need, establish a contact that can later be
capitalized upon for future interventions, provide educational materials about disaster related


•   Make mental health part of all radiation exposure screening and follow-up.

Impact of the View of Government

Most radiation incidents, with the exception of war, are the result of some type of accident or
error. Various parts of the Federal government will be involved in activities following the
incident even if not involved in the incident itself. There appears to be a significant, and perhaps
growing, negative feeling toward government in the United States.  This ranges from outright
hatred and the perception that government is the enemy of the people (this type of view
apparently resulted in the Oklahoma City bombing).  Others view the government as involved in
cynical  attempts to experiment on and manipulate people. Still others, while not viewing the
government as sinister, view the government as inept and incapable of adequately managing its
affairs and protecting the people.

Emergencies and disasters of all types do not occur in a vacuum. They exist in a context of
people's individual and collective experiences, beliefs, and perceptions.  The perception of «
government will play a significant factor in how people cognitively structure their experience of
radiation exposure.  That cognitive structure will be the major determinant in determining the
emotional impact of the exposure and behavior that follows.


•   Preparedness and response activities should include appreciation for, and training in, dealing
    with the sometimes hostile views of government. It is important for preparedness and
    response officials to understand that people's attitudes and behavior may have to  do with
    other perceptions that have little to do with radiation.
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 Impact of Competing Priorities

 The primacy of concerns about radiation exposure has varied considerably over time. Certainly,
 it reached its peak during the Cold War. It has always been in the forefront of the concerns for
 those who live and work in areas where there is ongoing concern for exposure. Even in light of
 this long standing concern, as noted at the start of is paper, most individuals remain
 extraordinarily naive and ill informed regarding radiation and its effects. Following the end of
 the cold war, attention to the potential of radiation exposure appeared to have waned as we
 adjusted to a world order that is different than what many had known.

 With the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings, the threat of terrorism on United
 States soil became a reality. It did not take long for concerns about radiation to reemerge in the
 context of the group of threats labeled Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Very shortly after
 that, radiation exposure, at least resulting from terrorist threats, seems to have lost the spotlight
 again, probably as a result of the enormous complexity of the threat from biological terrorist
 events.  There is a risk that the significant health and mental health consequences of radiation
 exposure will not receive the attention necessary to enable full preparation and response because
 of attention to other types of threats.


 •    There should be reinforcement of the perspective that all WMD threats represent complex
     preparedness and response challenges, that the types of threats are very different, and that
     preparing for one does not necessarily make us better prepared for all.


 1.     Gerrity E &, Flynn B. (1997) Mental health consequences of disasters. In Noji EK (ed)
       Public Health Consequences of Natural and Technological Disasters (2nd edition). New
       York, Oxford University Press.

 2.     Myers, D. (1994). Disaster response and recovery: A handbook for mental health
       professionals.  Rockville, MD: Center for Mental Health Services (DHHS Publication
       No. (SMA) 94-3010.

 3.     Saylor, C. F. (Ed.). (1993). Children and disasters. New York: Plenum Press.

 4.     Baum, A., Gatchel, R.J., & Schaeffer, M.A. (1983). Emotional, behavioral, and
       physiological effects of chronic stress at Three Mile Island. Journal of Consulting and
       Clinical Psychology. 51, 565-572.

 5.     Bromet, E.J., Parkinson, D.K., Schulberg, H.C., Dunn, L.O., & Gondek, P.C. (1982).
       Mental health of residents near the Three Mile Island reactor: A comparative study of
       selected groups. Journal of Preventive Psychiatry. 1, 225-274.
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           	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

                   Public Reactions Following the Chernobyl Accident
                        Implications for Emergency Procedures

                               Britt-Marie Drottz-Sjoberg

           Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Dept. of Psychology
                               N-7034 Trondheim, Norway

The paper briefly sketches a general background of the public reactions to the Chernobyl
accident in affected states of the former Soviet Union, Scandinavia and other parts of Europe.
Fear of health effects, and trustworthiness of information, played central roles at the time of the
event and in the development of the post-accidental situation. In the case of an accident, the
importance of immediate, reliable information from trusted sources accompanied with behavioral
recommendations is underlined. Furthermore, that various monitoring activities and
countermeasures are sufficiently explained, and quickly focused on affected or vulnerable groups
and areas. It should be noted that long-term physical and psychological effects will occur in the
most affected groups even after the society at large has found a way back to normal life.


General background

The Chernobyl accident is the largest nuclear accident which the entire world has recognized and
experienced. Some of the lessons learned from the accident, however, may be quite specific to
that time and situation. There have been other, large accidents involving radiation and severe
contamination, e.g. the Techa River pollution  (1947) and the "Kyshtym" accident (1957) in the
Soviet Union (1). These catastrophes were not known to the world, and not officially
acknowledged until 1989, when the Russian government declared the Chelyabinsk Oblast in the
southern Urals an ecological disaster zone (2). The Chernobyl accident occurred in 1986, in a
transitional political era, when the Soviet Union moved from silence to "Glasnost", even
regarding nuclear issues, and was moving towards a political and geographic breaking up of the
state. The explosion of the fourth reactor in Chernobyl, however, occurred within the "old mental
framework", where silence,  and remote, high level, decision making,  belonged to the golden
rules. The adapted policy affected information availability, relative to the immediately affected
populations, as well as neighboring  nations and the rest of the world.  Retrospectively the
accident has become associated with initial silence, no early warning  and thus unnecessary harm
to affected individuals, and a long heartbreaking and politically turbulent post-accidental
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Nobody was warned about the airborne releases of e.g. Iodine. Individuals living close to the
plant actually watched the burning reactor, and some of those living in Pripyat misunderstood the
clean-up activities of the city the following day as preparations for the first of May celebrations.
Even after the evacuation of the population of Pripyat, people in neighboring areas were
encouraged to participate in the first of May parades in the following week. This encouragement
was salient in the minds of a group of youth and children in Novozybkov in 1992 (3). Trust in
various information sources, e.g. authorities, scientists, journalists, was overall very low. This
state of affairs created a dilemma, since people were dependent on, and expected help from,
those instances which they did not trust. Thus, the conscious neglect of warnings, early
information and relevant recommendations came to affect both the medical situation (e.g. thyroid
problems), trust in subsequent information, and the anxiety attached to the event. People felt
unprotected, uncertain about information, and lacked personal control in a potentially dangerous

The first years' continuous measurement work, and the attached information, revealed more
contaminated territories. The period involved relocation of large population groups and late
introduction of countermeasures and e.g. massive health screenings. As time went by, the
subdued  fear and the personal experiences of helplessness developed sometimes into an
aggravated waiting for long-term health effects. Some people in affected areas and elsewhere
tried various ways to be classified as victims, to benefit from available compensation schemes. In
the first half of the 1990s there was a marked exhaustion and listlessness in the most affected
populations, and an increasing difference in reported well-being between those who still lived in
fear of health effects and others. However, people had learnt something about radiation and
radioactive contamination. Those living in more contaminated areas slowly returned to normal
life, including restrictions to daily life, if they lacked alternatives. Some may even have adopted
the optimistic attitude that they had become resistant to radiation. Others, and especially those
who had been relocated from their previous homes, often faced a rather hostile new environment
when they were to compete for jobs, various products and communal resources with those who
already lived in a depressed economic situation. The newcomers were not seldom stigmatized,
and their well-being often assessed as the lowest across investigated groups (4). People attributed
various health problems and misfortunes to the accident. In addition, in the first part of the
1990s, claims of financial compensation and health monitoring surfaced from those who (or
whose parents or grandparents) had been affected by the earlier nuclear accidents. Why should
the Chernobyl victims be so well cared for when others had been subjected to far more serious
conditions without any  notice at all?

Western  Europe was first puzzled by the indications of increased levels of radioactivity, and
highly puzzled by the lack of information. The accident had happened on the night to Saturday,
April 26th, but there was no official Soviet information about the accident until Monday
evening.  The morning had seen personnel at the Forsmark nuclear power plant on the east coast
of Sweden lining up outside the plant, awaiting individual monitoring and control of the plant.
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

These protective actions, and the searching for a source, were followed by the hour in the local
and national media (5). The excessive air distribution of radioactivity was surprising to experts,
and the uneven dispersion, due to winds and rainfall, quite hard to understand for the public. The
immediate, as well as the long-term, radiological situation therefore became both factually
complex and complicated to communicate. Experiences of worry were related to degree of
contamination and vulnerability (6). Local areas in Scandinavia measured a mean deposition of
Cesium 137 of about 80 kBq/m2, e.g. the Gavle area in Sweden (7). The sudden event with its
long lasting effects affected especially farmers and hunters regarding their daily life and general
well-being. The Sami population was, in addition, threatened with respect to cultural traditions
and self-identity (8).

The continuous reactions in Europe seemed to reflect the overall level of acquaintance with
nuclear issues. And although the public opinion rapidly grew somewhat or very negative
immediately after the accident, researchers could point to (9) a relationship between
pre-accidental public debate and reactions to the accident.  Public opinions reversed more quickly
to a pre-accidental situation in countries where the public was more familiar with nuclear power
issues. As measurements continued in the former Soviet Union, however, it became evident that
people who had believed themselves to be unaffected, lived on rather or very contaminated land,
e.g. in Belarus in 1987-88. Some villages were relocated, and others subjected to
countermeasures (10). In our joint CIS/CEC studies investigating the  social and psychological
effects of the accident (11), we encountered people still awaiting relocation from small villages
as late as 1992. Simultaneously did memories related to the Chernobyl accident fade in the rest
of the world. Some influential persons even subscribed to the expression of "radiation phobia",
which had spread in the former Soviet Union to stigmatize those still  living in fear of radiation
health effects (12). At the 10th anniversary of the accident it was concluded that social and
psychological effects were among the most prominent and lasting consequences. It was also
pointed out that these effects must be viewed in the overall context of the political, economic,
social and cultural situation of the time and geographic area.


Implications for emergency procedures

Individuals' reactions to radiation and radioactive fall-out is foremost related to risks of health
effects. People are especially concerned about children. Health effects certainly vary due to
several factors and circumstances, but until more specific information becomes available the
psychological reactions are linked to procedures connected with early warnings, information and
recommendations, including reflections on the mastery of the evolving situation and general
preparedness, e.g. availability of prophylaxes, etc. It should be noted that the first reaction to a
disaster, or a potentially dangerous situation, very well might be indifference, i.e. what
Quarantelli has termed "the normalcy bias" (13). The first reaction to the TMI accident has  been
described as unconcerned (14). People have to be convinced that there are good reasons to take
action before they act. The reactions when a warning is heeded, involve observing others'
 Washington, D.C.
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

behaviors and collecting and comparing information from several sources (15). As already noted
above, general preparedness and early warning and information are among the vital factors (16)
in the quality and development of public, and media, reactions. The handling of these factors
seems to influence the subsequent phases of the post-accidental development. Furthermore, it is
necessary always to provide sufficient explanations to issued countermeasures and
recommendations. Emergency procedures would also be facilitated by involving known, efficient
and trusted communicators. There are immensely important lessons to be learnt from Chernobyl,
but it may not be feasible to compare reactions of people accustomed to dictatorship with
populations used to totally different life styles. Neither should it be forgotten that the communist
system offered some options which may not be available in democratic societies, e.g. to evacuate
whole villages in a rather controlled and efficient manner, to implement far reaching decisions
quickly and without discussion, etc. Thus, political, cultural and sub-cultural values and
variations must, among other aspects, be seriously considered in the planning, as well as the
implementation phase, of an accident.


(1)  Medvedev, Z. A. (1991). Nuclear disaster in the Urals. London: Angus & Robertson.
(2)  Monroe, S. D. (1992). Chelyabinsk: The evolution of disaster. Post-Soviet Geography, 33,
(3)  Drottz-Sjoberg, B.-M., Rumyantseva,  G. M., Martyushov, A. N. (1993). Perceived risks
     and risk attitudes in southern Russia in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident. Rhizikon:
     Risk Research Report, No. 13. Stockholm: Center for Risk Research, Stockholm School of
(4)  Drottz-Sjoberg, B.-M. (1996). Social/psychological effects. IAEA-Bulletin, 38, No. 3,
(5)  Nohrstedt, S. A., & Lekare, K. (1987). Att rapportera det oforutsedda  {To report the
     unexpected}. Rapport No. 138. Stockholm: Styrelsen for Psykologiskt Forsvar.
(6)  Drottz-Sjoberg, B.-M., Sjoberg, L. (1990).  Risk perception and worries after the Chernobyl
     accident. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 10, 135-149.
(7)  Agren, G., Drottz-Sjoberg, B.-M., Enander, A., bergman, R., & Johansson, K.J. (1995).
     Transfer of radioactive Caesium to hunters and their families. FOA-R-00196-4.3--SE.
     Umea: National Defence Research Establishment.
(8)  Stephens, S. (1995). The "cultural fallout" of Chernobyl in Norwegian sami regions:
     Implications for children. In J. Kleiven (Ed.), Miljo/betinget livskvalitet {Environmentally
     related quality of life}. Oslo: Norwegian Research Council.
(9)  Hohenemser, C, & Renn, O. (1989). Chernobyl's other legacy: Shifting public perceptions
     of nuclear risk. CENTED Reprint No.  65. Worcester, Mass.: Clark University.
(10) See e.g. the Proceedings from the Minsk conference listed as (11) below.
(11) Rumyantseva, G. M., Drottz-Sjoberg, B.-M., Allen, P. T., Arkhangelskaya, H. V., Nyagu,
     A. I, Ageeva, L. A., & Prilipko, V. (1996). The influence of social and psychological
     factors in the management of contaminated territories. In: A. Karaoglou, G. Desmet, G. N.
     Kelly and H. G. Menzel, (eds.), (1996). The radiological consequences of the Chernobyl
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

     accident. Proceedings of the first international conference Minsk, Belarus, 18-22 March,
     1996. EUR 16544 EN. European Commission and the Belarus, Russian and Ukrainian
     Ministries on Chernobyl Affairs, Emergency Situations and Health. Luxembourg: Office
     for Official Publications of the European Communities.
(12) Drottz-Sjoberg, B.-M., & Persson, L. (1993). Public reaction to radiation: fear, anxiety, or
     phobia? Health Physics, 64, 223-231.
(13) Quarantelli, E. L. (1990). Radiation disasters: Similarities to and differences from other
     disasters. Preliminary paper No. 153. Delaware: University of Delaware, Disaster Research
(14) Behler, G. T. Jr. (1986). The nuclear accident at Three Mile Island: Its effect on a local
     community. Historical and Comparative Disaster Series, No. 7. Delaware: University of
     Delaware, Disaster Research Center.
(15) Drottz-Sjoberg, B.-M. (1993). Medical and psychological aspects of crisis management
     during a nuclear accident. In B. Stefenson, P. A. Landahl, & T. Ritchey (Eds.),
     International Conference on Nuclear Accidents and Crisis Management (pp. 33-48).
     Stockholm: Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademien.
(16) Sjoberg, L., & Drottz-Sjoberg, B.-M. (1994). Risk perception. In Radiation and society:
     Comprehending radiation risk Vol 1. (pp. 29-59). Vienna: International Atomic Energy
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Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

                Session C, Track 1:

        Lessons Learned from Exercises

                 Thursday, September 10, 1998
                    8:00 a.m. - 9:50 a.m.
Chair: Gary Goldberg, United States Department of Energy

                    International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

                  Lessons Learned from the 1997 Lost Source Exercise

                                  William E. Belanger

                                  U.S. EPA, Region m
During the mid to late 1990s, radiation detection systems have been installed in increasing
numbers at waste disposal and processing facilities, as well as scrap metal facilities. During this
time the States, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency have noticed a significant increase in the number of radiation alarms reported by these
facilities.  This increase most likely reflects an increase in the number of radiation detectors
present at waste disposal and scrap metal facilities rather than an increase in the amount of
uncontrolled radioactive material. Nonetheless, there is a significant potential for radioactive
sources to find their way into commerce, which NRC is working to reduce.  Examples of these
"lost sources" include the following.

In August of 1996, workers removed a radioactive gauge containing americium-241 from an
industrial process in Racine, Wisconsin. The Radiation Safety Officer did not discover the
unauthorized removal of the gauge until November of that year.  The source was never
recovered, and the licensee believes it was sent to a landfill.

In September 1997, a radiography camera was reported missing. The camera was located in a
pickup truck and the truck was stolen. The incident happened near Tulsa, Oklahoma. The
camera was subsequently recovered and was intact, but there had been the potential for it to enter
the waste stream or the scrap metal market. Loss of a source of this type is the basis for the data
used in the Lost Source Exercise.

In September of 1997, an americium-241 gauge was removed from an assembly line in
Allentown, Pennsylvania. In this incident, the gauge found its way to an automotive scrap metal
facility. Unlike the 1996 incident, the gauge went through the metal shredder and the container
was breached. This resulted in approximately 40 cubic yards of contaminated waste, as well as
the ruptured source, which the Department of Energy removed for disposal. This incident was
noteworthy because, in responding to the State request for assistance, Federal Agencies followed
the procedures described in this exercise.

In all, during 1996 (the latest year available at the time of this writing), NRC's Office for
Analysis of Operational Data3 reported 88 incidents where there was a loss of control of NRC
licensed material, and 76 similar incidents of agreement-State licensed material.  Lubenau and
Yusko1'2 have also described the occurrence of radioactive materials in recycled metals.
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

While the regulatory agencies may be able to reduce the number of incidents where there is a
loss of control over radioactive materials, there will always be a potential for radioactive
materials to enter the waste and scrap metal operations. It is not practical to reduce human error
to zero and there are also foreign sources where United States regulatory agencies have no

EPA, NRC and DOE share responsibility for supporting the States in radiological incidents in the
public domain and are natural partners in radiological response. The Federal Radiological
Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), dated May 8, 1996, designates a Lead Federal Agency
(LFA) for radiological responses to emergencies. For example, the EPA is the designated LFA
for responses to emergencies in which sources are of unknown, unlicensed, or foreign origin. By
contrast, the NRC is the designated LFA for responding to incidents involving materials
licensed by the NRC or an Agreement State. The DOE maintains an independent Radiological
Assistance Program which may respond to State requests for assistance independently or as part
of the FRERP.

The EPA also has the ability to respond pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), as amended, and the National
Contingency Plan (NCP) adopted under CERCLA authority. CERCLA and the NCP give EPA
broad funding and response authority to protect the health and welfare of the public and the
environment. This response may come as a part of the emergency response, or may be delivered
in the post-emergency phase, or both, as long as there continues to be a "threat of release."


The Lost Source Exercise, conducted in Coatesville, PA in September and October of 1997, was
an opportunity for the EPA and the NRC to coordinate their response efforts with those of DOE
and State and local officials to address a public domain incident using FRERP and NCP
authorities. This exercise examined the ways that Federal assistance can be provided to State
and Local officials by the EPA, NRC, and DOE pursuant to the FRERP and NCP during a public
domain, private sector incident. The exercise scenario involved an unshielded, 100 Curie
radiography  camera arriving at a municipal waste landfill in a trash truck.  This scenario
provided ample  technical as well as administrative  challenges to the participants, who were
drawn from all levels of government and from the private sector. The exercise was held in two
parts, representing the emergency phase and the post-emergency phase. For the purpose of this
paper, we define the emergency phase as the period when there is an imminent threat to public
health, and the post-emergency phase as that period when the immediate threat has been
controlled, but there may be substantial clean-up remaining. In this exercise, the post-emergency
phase began when the trash truck had been (simulated) relocated to a remote area where it posed
no immediate threat, but the source had not yet been recovered. The post-emergency exercise
consisted of the recovery of a dummy radiography source and camera from a load of simulated
municipal waste. The Federal response for both the emergency and post-emergency phases was
provided pursuant to the National Contingency Plan.
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

The EPA and the NRC conceived and conducted the Lost Source exercise to demonstrate the
capability to mount a regional multi-agency response to a radioactive material release in the
public domain, since such releases in the public domain pose a different set of problems than
those involving a fixed nuclear facility.  In the public domain, there is no advance knowledge of
where a release might occur, and the identity of the licensee or responsible party might not be
known or the licensee might not have the ability to maintain  financial responsibility. By
contrast, releases at a fixed facility usually originate from a point somewhere within the facility,
and the fixed facility has a known licensee or responsible party who can be held responsible for
cleanup activities.  Consequently, for releases in the public domain where the identity of the
licensee is unknown or where the material  is of foreign origin, the FRERP designates the EPA as

This exercise involved EPA Region ffl, NRC Region I, the DOE Brookhaven RAP team,
Pennsylvania DEP and PEMA (the cognizant State agencies  in this case) local officials and solid
waste industry representatives. Representatives from FEMA and the DOD Defense Nuclear
Weapons School observed the exercise and discussed the capabilities which could be provided
by their agencies. The response was conducted at the regional level for two reasons. First, the
EPA Region HL RERP was unique when the exercise was conducted because it included
radiological incident response under the NCP.  Second, the size and nature of the release were
chosen to require only a response on the regional level, a situation which is typical of most
releases in the public domain. The regional response reflected the provisions of the FRERP,
while also examining resources available through the NCP that may be appropriate with the EPA
as the designated LFA. Also,  the reader should note that, in playing the cognizant State
government, Pennsylvania represented the necessary interface between the Federal government
and any State involved in a given incident.

In addition to demonstrating multi-agency response capability, the Lost Source Exercise yielded
a number of ancillary benefits. For example, this exercise gave participants the opportunity to
review current incident response plans, which are geared to the FRERP, and to determine how
those plans may need to be better integrated with the NCP. In particular, this exercise examined
the process for determining LFA responsibilities and other agency support activities. This is
important, since the recent revisions to the FRERP have not otherwise been exercised under
simulated conditions involving a spill of radiological material of unknown ownership licensed
under the Atomic Energy Act  (AEA), with the EPA designated as LFA. In that capacity, the
EPA's primary intent is to coordinate Federal response and assistance activities from the scene.


As a result of the Lost Source Exercise, the participants learned the following lessons:

•   The EPA Superfund Program encompasses substantial capabilities and authorities, which
    can be mobilized in the event of a radiation emergency (whether or not the material is
    licensed under the AEA.)
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                    International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference
    Each responding entity has its own goals and priorities during a response.  These goals and
    priorities are dynamic and may evolve as the situation develops. For example, in this
    exercise, private industry wanted to minimize the impact on business operations, solid waste
    agencies wanted to ensure that the continuing stream of municipal waste had a place to go,
    county officials handled the immediate threat, State officials had the ultimate responsibility
    to protect public health from the radiation threat, and Federal officials provided technical
    support and had the capability to mobilize significant resources. While it was not apparent
    in this exercise, these dynamic priorities might be expected to conflict at times throughout a

    Federal notification procedures are well defined within each Federal agency, but an
    individual agency's internal procedures are not well known among the other agencies.
    Consequently, the Federal community needs to develop a standardized notification scheme
    that applies to the Federal response as a whole.  While the FRERP provides a standardized
    notification scheme among the agencies, internal procedures are not consistent from agency
    to agency. This can result in confusion as the Federal team is formed.

    The Unified Incident Command (UIC) concept was not familiar to all of the participants.
    This concept needs to be better explained in future exercises and training opportunities. By
    providing a practical scenario to apply the UIC concept, this exercise gave participants a
    valuable learning experience.  Many participants suggested in their comments that this
    experience should be shared with others.

    Notification thresholds need to be better defined for each agency and office. The NCP
    specifies required notification of the National Response Center of releases of all chemicals
    (including radioactive materials) exceeding certain reportable quantities specified in the
    NCP. The agencies responding to radiation incidents are generally unfamiliar with this legal
    requirement.  A courtesy notification at lower levels should also be  considered.

    Federal officials need to recognize that the States differ greatly in their capabilities and their
    needs.  This includes responsibilities associated with Agreement State status, different
    responding organizations within each State, and the roles of local government in emergency

    Early notification of the appropriate DOE RAP team should be routine. The RAP team
    needs to know of a developing situation, rather than simply being called in after the fact.

    Private sector capabilities and constraints are highly variable and will need to be considered
    on a case-by-case basis.  Industry groups should be consulted when government emergency
    response plans and procedures are formulated.
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

•   Local government may play a significant role in emergency response and must not be
    overlooked in either the planning or the response, in both the emergency phase and post-
    emergency phase.

•   Agency acronyms and jargon should be carefully avoided when multiple agencies are acting
    in concert. There are many conflicting acronyms between agencies. For example, "NRC"
    may stand for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the EPA's National Response
    Center. Such conflicts and unfamiliar jargon restrict effective communication.
•   The DOE and DOD possess a large body of expertise and resources, and the FRERP and
    NCP provide a means to access those resources. In addition, individual cooperative
    agreements between the various agencies can be used in addressing incidents. The Unified
    Incident Command gives a useful mechanism to employ these cooperative agreements.

•   Many participants also commented that the opportunity to witness recovery of a highly
    radioactive source very valuable, and that the experience should be provided to others.

Overall, the exercise demonstrated the role of the NCP in the response to a radiological incident.
This response need not be confined to the emergency phase. In fact, the resources available
through the NCP may be more  important in the post-emergency phase, as the cleanup effort
becomes the focus of the response.  This is especially true when EPA is the LFA under the
FRERP, since EPA is designated LFA mainly in circumstances where there is no licensee or
otherwise well defined responsible party who can conduct the cleanup.


1.  Lubenau and Yusko, Radioactive Materials in Recycled Metals - an Update, Health Physics
    74:293, March, 1998.

2.  Lubenau and Yusko, Radioactive Materials in Recycled Metals, Health Physics 68:440,
    April 1995.

3.  Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data - Annual
    Report, 1996, NUREG 1272, December, 1997.
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

                    International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference
                           Nebraska's '97 Ingestion Exercise:
                     Communication Through 2 Phases of Response

                     Cheryl K. Rogers, Emergency Response Manager

               Nebraska Health and Human Services Regulation & Licensure


The ingestion pathway exercise was demonstrated at Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station following a
standard plume phase exercise in June, 1997. Ft. Calhoun is located on the Missouri River.
Participants included the State representatives of Iowa and Nebraska from both the emergency
management and health departments, now Health and Human Services Regulation and
Licensure, HHS R&L, in Nebraska. There were no Federal participants or power plant
representatives. This was in contrast to the 1993 Federal Radiological Monitoring and
Assessment Center, FRMAC, which was conducted in June of 1993 with full Federal

HHS R&L provide technical advice and assistance to the Governor's Authorized Representative
from the Nebraska Emergency Management Agency, NEMA. The challenge in an ingestion
exercise is to communicate technical information concerning the first two phases of radiological
emergency response. The phases are Early or Plume Phase and the Intermediate Phase which is
when the source and releases are under control.  There are two components to the Intermediate
Phase regarding Protective Actions. One component restricts access to areas which  have
projected doses of 2 Rem or greater. The other  component restricts ingestion of contaminated
food and water. The protective actions may be developed simultaneously.


The initial plume phase resulted in activity deposited to the northwest of the plant and located in
Nebraska. Due to the fact that the wind shifted  during the release, the area to the south and east
of the plant out to 5 miles had also been evacuated as a precautionary measure. This area was not
considered to have ground deposition. We did have the results of the Department of Energy,
DOE, flyover, Figure 1, immediately following  the plume phase.

The first lesson concerned the best use of the field teams. Even though this was simulated
activity, we had to be very specific about where we wanted immediate information.  We assumed
that we had four field teams at our disposal. In  addition to Ion Chambers for accurate dose
readings, one field team was assumed to have the use of a portable multi-channel analyzer,
MCA, which was borrowed from Iowa. The team with the MCA obtained field data from the
area of ground deposition. By the following morning, we had identified and measured
concentrations of the major isotopes. This information confirmed that the isotopic mix was
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

                               International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference
Fort Calhoun Nuclear
Exercise Data

AMS Serpentine Flight

Grid represents a 1 0, 20,
30, 40, and 50 mile
concentric circle radius
from incident location

Radiation data is
simulated Aerial
Measuring System Survey

Survey line spacing: 2 miles

Survey Altitude: 1500 feet AGL

Levels are total exposure
at 1 meter AGL in mR/hr
    10-20 mR/hr

    1.0-10 mR/hr

    0.1-1.0 mR/hr

  I .01-0.1 mR/hr
3ffr Plant
• Town
— Road

Map Scale: Miles
                             FIGURE 1 - DOE Flyover Showing Ground Deposition

          uniform. We knew that the dose rate corresponding to 2 Rem/year for the restricted area was
          3.7 mrem.  Two other field teams conducted surveys along major roads and intersections to give
          us dose rates. These were used in conjunction with the gamma spectrometry information to
          identify the restricted zone. One field team was sent to confirm that there was no deposition in
          the clean area.

          The next lesson learned involved our communication of the restricted area to the Emergency
          Management Agency. Figure 2 shows the restricted area based on the field team results. The
          restricted access area covered a sector and a half out to a distance of 5 miles. Our first
          communications obstacle arose when the restricted area map developed by HHS R&L staff
          indicated that the part of the town of Blair, (south of Highway 75), could be released, but the
          north area would subject its inhabitants to  more than the recommended 2 Rem per year. Also, the
          Blair's water treatment system was located in the restricted area. The local authorities and
          Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

                    International Radiological Post-Emersency Response Issues Conference
                 FIGURE 2 - Restricted Area Based on Field Team Results

NEMA had developed a standard policy of not splitting a town in half for evacuation.  Therefore,
initially at least, it did not make sense to them to split the town in half for purposes of restricting
access. Their perspective, which carried over from the early phase, was that access to the entire
town of Blair should be restricted.

There were health physics issues associated with the restricted zone. The "re-entry" check-point
for those individuals with urgent business in the restricted zone required staffing in order to
provide TLDs and survey meters. We were requested to determine probable dose rates, how to
adequately monitor these individuals during their re-entry, and to provide training as individuals
re-entering would now be classified as occupational workers. We were asked what would the
dose limit be for these workers. The missing piece of information is how much time over the
course of a year would an individual need to spend in the area. A recommendation would be to
set some predetermined dose rates that would be acceptable. We utilized 2 Rem as our initial
working limit, but our State Emergency Plan has since been updated to the 5 Rem which is
recommended in EPA 400.
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

The final challenge or lesson concerned the timing and process of the ingestion pathway
sampling. HHS R&L began requesting information from NEMA when the plume phase ended.
Requests were generic and included: dairy, surface water, forage, produce, eggs and meat. In
retrospect, a standard list in order of priority could be developed as part of the planning process
and submitted to NEMA early in the intermediate phase. In addition, the USDA representatives
suggested including food processing plants. The protective action guidance for ingestion was
utilized during the exercise. The distances that were recommended extended out as far as 60
miles in areas that were not evacuated or restricted. There were separate recommendations for
each type of food or milk product and the restrictions varied from 30 to 60 miles out. Figure 3 is
a map showing the area restricted for milk ingestion. These new areas were initially discussed
looking at the same map which identified the restricted area, which did cause some confusion.
The area that had ingestion restrictions overlapped the restricted area  and the various ingestion
restrictions were not uniform. Considering public perception of risk, it seemed unlikely that
anyone would want to remain in an area known to have ground deposition, despite assurances
from government officials that it was safe. We considered and discussed how the local
population would react to the safety recommendations such as: do not eat anything grown in this
area, wash, scrub or peel all your home grown vegetables,  and only let your children play outside
a few hours per day. Options for presenting this information to the local population were
reviewed, and it was decided that small group discussions would be best. Concerns were raised
about whether any foodstuffs containing radioactivity would ever be released, regardless of the
protective action levels.  From our perspective, it was more likely that foodstuffs would be
condemned for human use,(with a suitable buffer zone), to assure that the other agricultural
products from the State would not be adversely impacted.  For this exercise, we did follow EPA
400 and advised the Governor's authorized representative to:

•   condemn milk and divert milk,

•   not introduce meat livestock into commerce,

•   condemn forage or divert to non-human use pathways,

•   shrink the stored feed area for lactating animals, and

•   condemn produce or divert to non-human food pathways.


In summary, our focus going into the exercise was primarily on the technical methods to be used
to arrive at our recommendations.  However, we should have utilized  different maps for the
restricted area and the  ingestion pathway restrictions. Communications would have been
improved by providing a clear introduction to the phase and component for recommendations
(i.e., these are for the restricted zones and these are the ingestion restrictions). The same maps
and forms for recommending protective actions may not fit the intermediate phase.  New
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

approaches may be needed to adequately frame the recommendations and to apprise the
emergency management agency and the local authorities. Additional table-top exercises would
help both the health and emergency management agencies understand the different phases and
steps involved in the intermediate phase. Finally, the local authorities should be more fully
involved in planning and response if they are to understand how to accomplish the needed
protective actions.


1. EPA 400-R-92-001, Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear
     Fort Cctlhoun Nuclear
     Exercise Data
     FRMAC Assessments

     Protective Action
     Guides for Milk
     Preventive PAG - Thyroid

  &V] Exceeds
     Emergency PAG - Thyroid
     * Plant
     • Town

     Map Scale:  Miles
                      FIGURE 3 - Ingestion Zone Restrictions for Milk
 Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

       Post-Emergency Planning and Exercises: Lessons Learned from CALVEX 97

                                   Michael J. Sharon

                      Chief, Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Division
                         Maryland Department of the Environment


In September and November 1997, the State of Maryland participated in a post-emergency
radiological exercise with the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (CALVEX 97).  The exercise
involved 13 local jurisdictions in Maryland, 3 local jurisdictions in Virginia, the District of
Columbia and numerous Maryland State agencies. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the U.S.
Department of Agriculture  (USDA) provided training assistance and participated as players
during the event.

Maryland is often referred to as "the United States in miniature" because of its unique
topography. This topography and diverse patterns of residential, agricultural and commercial
development within 50 miles of Calvert Cliffs present many challenges to radiological post-
emergency  planning and operations. The Calvert Cliffs ingestion planning zone includes 13
counties in  Maryland, the District of Columbia, two counties in Delaware, and 16 local
jurisdictions in Virginia. The terrain includes the Chesapeake Bay, rural areas in Southern
Delaware, Maryland's Eastern Shore, Virginia's Northern Neck and suburban areas around
Baltimore and Washington, D.C.  A wide variety of food and agricultural products are produced
in the region. Seafood harvesting and poultry production are major industries; numerous food
processing plants are also located throughout the area. The Chesapeake Bay and Eastern Shore
are well known hunting areas for deer and migratory birds.  The Eastern Shore is even home to
such exotic creatures as ostriches and emu, which are raised by commercial providers.
Aquaculture farms and honeybee apiaries are found throughout the area.


Maryland's last ingestion pathway exercise was held in 1990. However, very few  individuals
involved in the 1990 exercise were available to help plan and conduct the  1997 event. Many of
the "lessons learned" from  1990 were now lost to time. Exercise planners sought to increase
their knowledge by observing and participating in ingestion exercises in Delaware and Virginia
in 1996. These exercises provided a wealth of useful ideas and experiences that were
incorporated into the preparations for CALVEX 97. Delaware and Virginia emergency
management staff generously provided advice and assistance throughout the development of
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September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

In the course of planning and preparing for CALVEX 97, a number of issues were noted.  The
most significant of these included the use of Federal radiological assets for exercise planning and
training, the effective use of out-of sequence demonstrations, training for local ingestion pathway
jurisdictions and skills training for field sampling teams and other staff.

Use of Federal radiological assets

Maryland made great use of Federal radiological assistance while planning CALVEX 97 and
training exercise participants.  The USDA's emergency response staff conducted a basic
ingestion pathway seminar and DOE Region I staff trained ingestion sampling teams. The DOE
Washington Aerial Measurements Operations office assisted in scenario development and
provided simulated aerial measurement maps. Finally, the NRC held a workshop to provide an
overview of Federal response activities. This workshop also stimulated many thought-provoking
discussions regarding protective action decision making.

Federal assistance not only created excellent training opportunities, but also opened lines of
communication between State responders and their Federal counterparts. This enhanced
communication later proved to be a significant asset during the course of the exercise. It is
critical, however, to request Federal assistance early in the exercise planning and training
process—preferably at least a year prior to the date of the exercise.

Out-of-sequence demonstrations

Given the great complexity of an ingestion exercise, CALVEX planners decided to maximize the
use of out-of-sequence demonstrations. One of the chief complaints from local officials during
the 1990 ingestion exercise was that their emergency operations centers had no meaningful
involvement during the exercise.  It is extremely difficult to develop a scenario that
simultaneously impacts every jurisdiction within 50 miles of a nuclear power facility. Therefore,
the exercise planners exercised and evaluated local ingestion pathway jurisdictions two months
prior to the State-level ingestion exercise.

Local evaluations were conducted using a tabletop interview format, which allowed each
jurisdiction to be meaningfully evaluated. Federal evaluators visited each jurisdiction and
evaluated communications, ingestion pathway protective action implementation and emergency
public information activities. Local jurisdictions praised this approach, since it allowed them an
opportunity to learn as well as be objectively evaluated.

Laboratory and field sampling operations were also conducted out-of-sequence to save time and
not delay State-level sample planning and decision making activities. Field sampling, which
included water and milk samples, occurred the day prior to the laboratory demonstration.  These
samples were then used during the laboratory demonstration, so that laboratory staff could
realistically demonstrate the processing of samples.
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

Local jurisdictional training

Most of the local jurisdictions involved in CALVEX 97 had little or no ingestion pathway
experience. State and utility staff offered several ingestion pathway seminars for all
jurisdictions. Many jurisdictions were unable to attend these seminars due to other
commitments. Ultimately, State and utility staff visited most local jurisdictions to provide
individual training to emergency management, public information, agricultural and health
department staff members.

Local government training was made easier through the use of a standardized training package.
State and utility staff developed a computer-based presentation that was loaded on a laptop
computer and taken to each jurisdiction. This ensured consistent training among all
jurisdictions. The training package was continually refined and was later used in other ingestion
jurisdictions in Maryland.

Skills training

Since ingestion activities are usually evaluated only every six years, exercise planners noted that
participants needed practice on critical skills such as  sample collection and data plotting and
analysis. State and utility staff provided extensive training in the months before the exercise,
with generally positive results. For future exercises,  Maryland plans to train and internally
evaluate ingestion-specific activities every three years instead of every six years. This will
ensure a trained cadre of staff and will help maintain interest and enthusiasm for ingestion
response activities.

After months of intense training and local out-of-sequence evaluations, the State-level portion of
CALVEX 97 was held on November 18-20,1997. The exercise began on the  evening of
November 18 with "plume phase" response activities. The exercise continued on November 19
as the State Ingestion Pathway Coordinating Committee convened to consider deposition data
and develop protective actions for relocation, re-entry, ingestion and long-term recovery. Field
sampling activities were also demonstrated on November 19.  The State emergency operations
center demonstrated implementation of protective action decisions on November 20, and
laboratory operations were evaluated.

Although State officials had developed rather detailed procedures for post-accident activities,
many lessons were learned through exercise play. Some of these lessons were protective actions
for unconventional ingestion pathways, State and Federal interactions during protective action
decision making, development and dissemination of  ad hoc protective action areas and the
impact of a recent environmental crisis on the decision making process.
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

Unconventional ingestion pathways

As previously noted, the Calvert Cliffs ingestion pathway contains a wide variety of food and
agricultural activities.  Maryland's decision-makers were confronted with several unusual but
critical ingestion pathways. Marine life and migratory birds presented special challenges for
protective action decisions and implementation.

Maryland's seafood industry is a vital part of its economy. Protective action implementation is
complicated, however, by several factors. First, the Commonwealth of Virginia controls the
southernmost portions of the Chesapeake Bay.  Any protective action involving seafood will
require close coordination between the two states. Second, it is impossible to prevent the
movement of some types of marine life.  Potentially contaminated fish, for example, would be
difficult to conclusively sample and isolate. Crabs and oysters are more stationary and would be
far easier commodities to sample and control.

Maryland's Eastern Shore also relies on migratory bird hunting as a significant part of its local
economy. Migratory birds present interesting challenges.  Though it is possible that birds could
be directly contaminated by a radiological accident, it is more likely that these birds would ingest
contaminated forage or feed in local fields.  Officials then face the difficult task of sampling
birds and determining exactly where they may have ingested contaminated material.  If migratory
bird refuge areas are determined to be radiologically contaminated, it is imperative that States all
along the birds' flyway communicate the potential risk.  Ingestion of migratory birds can be
managed by notifying the public not to consume migratory bird meat until it has been determined
to be safe. These same challenges also apply to wild game such as deer.  Natural resources
officials  can more easily monitor potential ingestion of deer meat through existing deer checking

State and Federal interactions

During the exercise, staff from the NRC, EPA, USDA and DOE participated in the evaluation of
field data and the development of protective actions. This participation allowed all parties to
experience the challenges of integrating Federal assets into a State's post-accident response.
Although State and Federal personnel did not always agree in their assessments of data,  they
worked together effectively. This was largely due to the communication and working
relationships established while jointly planning and training for the exercise.

Development and dissemination of ad hoc protective action areas

When protective actions are determined for areas beyond the 10 mile "plume" planning  zone,
they must be defined using geographic features or other boundaries. Maryland officials  quickly
realized  that the most effective way to determine specific protective action areas was through a
coordinated effort of State and local agencies. Local officials would define specific protective
action areas using technical information and assistance provided by State agencies. This
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September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

increased communication between State and local agencies and gave local officials a direct
interest in the protective action decision process.

Dissemination of protective action areas proved to be a more daunting task. The Maryland
Department of the Environment (MDE), which hosts the Ingestion Pathway Coordinating
Committee, maintains a sophisticated geographic information system (GIS) which is a highly
effective tool for defining protective action areas. Ideally, MDE staff could develop GIS maps
that could then be transmitted electronically to emergency management customers. However,
State and local emergency managers are still in the early phases of using GIS and do not
generally possess compatible GIS hardware and software.  During the exercise, hard copy maps
were developed and delivered by courier to the State emergency operations center. Although this
method is not technologically sophisticated, it was effective due to the proximity of the State
emergency operations center to MDE. Maps will be transmitted electronically in future exercises
as GIS equipment becomes more widely available.

The impact of the pfiesteria crisis

In the summer of 1997, Maryland experienced a significant environmental crisis when the
microbe Pfiesteria piscicida caused a number of large fish kills in Chesapeake Bay tributaries.
Pfiesteria also caused symptoms such as skin lesions and short-term memory loss among some
humans who came  in contact with waters containing the microbe.  Pfiesteria soon dominated the
news in the Baltimore and Washington area during August and September 1997.

Seafood sales and water recreation, so vital to Maryland's economy, dramatically declined. State
agricultural officials estimate that losses by commercial fisheries, the charter boat industry,
recreational fishery and tourism totaled nearly $127 million, while seafood dealers suffered an
estimated $43 million loss (Baltimore Sun, June 10,1998). These losses even though none of
the individuals affected by pfiesteria came in contact with the microbe by consuming seafood.
State officials made every effort to reassure the public that Maryland seafood was safe, but with
only moderate success.

Maryland's key decision maker in a radiological emergency, the Secretary of the Environment,
was deeply involved in the pfiesteria crisis. This pfiesteria experience was referred to frequently
when discussing protective actions for foodstuffs.  The public's reaction to pfiesteria seemed to
serve as a clear indicator of how the public would react to the prospect of radiologically
contaminated food. In light of this experience, ingestion protective action decisions during
CALVEX 97 tended to focus solely on identification and embargo of contaminated food.  State
decision makers felt that few retailers or food processors would be willing to handle food that
had been even slightly contaminated.
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference


CALVEX 97 provided Maryland with an excellent opportunity to prepare for the many
challenges of post-emergency radiological response. Plans and procedures are now being
adjusted to reflect lessons learned before and during the exercise. The exercise left Maryland
with renewed confidence in its ability to manage long-term radiological emergency response and
helped solidify working relationships between the State and supporting Federal responders.
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

                  The Russian French Collaboration in the Radiological
                                 Post-Accidental Area

                              Igor Linge1, Denys Rousseau2

                                  1) Ibrae-ran, Moscow
                    2) Institut de Protection et de Surete Nucleaire, BP 6
                       92265 Fontenay-aux-Roses Cedex - FRANCE
                                Tel. : 00 33 1 46 54 77 58
                                Fax : 00 33 1 46 29 05 73
                             e.mail: denys.rousseau@ipsn.fr


In 1990, the Nuclear Safety Institute from the Russian Academy of Sciences (IBRAE-RAN) and
the French Institute for Nuclear Safety and Protection (IPSN) signed an agreement for promoting
common technical studies dealing with the management of abnormal, or post-accidental
radiological situations. Along a linked process, this Ministry EMERCOM of the Russian
Federation and the French Secretariat General of the Interministerial Committee of General
Nuclear Safety signed an umbrella agreement in 1993 dealing with the administrative specific
issues of such situations. In such a technical and administrative framework, the implementation
of large scale table top exercises has been made possible. The objectives of these exercises were
mainly to test decision making processes with the associated expertise. Field exercises on the
same subjects also have been organised.


The first exercise of the series took place in June 1993 in Saint Petersburg. Three one-day
periods have been simulated respectively one month, one year and five years after a release.

The contaminated region of Briansk was chosen as the concrete case to be dealt with. The local
public authorities were fully participating to the game with the common expertise of IBRAE and
IPSN. A dedicated satellite link with the IPSN Emergency Centre in Fontenay-aux-Roses near
Paris was operated. This exercise provided specifications on the necessary databases to be set up
for relevant expertise as well as the computer tools to be developed for providing relevant
answers to concrete questions coming from real situations.

The right way to simulate and to characterise radiological situations was clarified as well as their
sanitary impact. Particular computer tools such as "Paris" code are concrete, common
IBRAE/IPSN results coming from this exercise (see OECD workshop in Zurich, September
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

The second exercise was a bilateral contribution to the KOLA exercise organised by
EMERCOM in May and June 1995, under the auspices of the Department of Humanitarian
Affairs of the United Nations (UN/DHA). Three one-day periods have been also simulated
respectively three days, fifteen days and one month after a major release. The Russian public
authorities were again fully involved, both at the Federal level and at the blast level. A story
expertise was provided by IBRAE and IPSN, including the results coming from a team of thirty
experts working for the three days in the IPSN Emergency Centre. A common French Ministry
of Interior/IPSN team was airborne on the site with all the necessary communication links. At the
opportunity of this exercise, the lessons learned from the Saint Petersburg exercise were used
and strengthened.

A third exercise was played in October 1996 around the Saclay site located in the South of Paris.
This exercise lasted two full days. The emergency phase resulting from a simulated accident
occurred in the research reactor Osiris was played during the first day. The second day was
dedicated to the management of the accident consequences seven days after the releases. In this
exercise, IBRAE prepared the main part of the scenario regarding its environmental and sanitary
part. For this exercise also, a "generator" of simulated activity measurements was developed ; it
was named "Enveloppe". It aimed to be used by the field monitoring teams. It was highly
appreciated and showed clearly that the main problem of the radiological monitoring was not
only to make the measurements but also to define what to do with them.

Based on the current results of this close collaboration, and, for IPSN, the knowledge acquisition
related to the management of contaminated territories, a French process has been launched after
the Becquerel exercise.

This working process aims to define and to propose concrete and operational arrangements
which could be implemented during or after a nuclear accident with radiological consequences.

These arrangements are supposed to be complementary to the standard emergency
countermeasures, (i.e., sheltering, evacuation and iodine prophylasis) if decided and
implemented, which are not sufficient to deal with a recovery phase with taking into account all
the social, economic, environmental and sanitary impacts of such accidents.

This process is structured with regular meetings of four groups. The members of these groups are
mandated representatives of the different concerned ministries, of the main nuclear companies
and of expertise organisations. These four groups work on the following topics:

  1.   Radiological characterisation of a contaminated environment. This group reviewed the
      current French situation (means, organisation and practices). It made recommendations
      along different items such as radiological units to be used, measurements and sampling
      procedures establishing, results transfer means. A particular issue was pointed out, as
      already mentioned, about the necessity to foresee a clear planning for using the results of a
      radiological monitoring, with emphasis on the specific problem to correct a decision
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

     making results based only on a release prognosis with real data probably much different
     from the prognosis. This group has recommended a specific exercise to validate its work
     and its proposal, to be played in  1999.

 2.   Medical and sanitary policy. This group has based its work on the assessment of the
     dosimetric impact made with dedicated tools as ASTRAL (see again OECD meeting in
     Zurich, September 1995). It implements a classical risk analysis method from different
     typical scenarios. It made proposals concerning population typology establishing and
     arrangements for preparing a relevant sanitary policy based on epidemiological data to be
     gathered according a logical and pre-established procedure.

     One priority of this group is to study what we call "grey" situations where doses to the
     population are significant while  remaining below international recommended intervention

 3.   Compensation and civil liability. This group made progress establishing concrete
     procedures for emergency compensation and compensation during the recovery phase.
     Links have been foreseen between insurance company and the French public authorities to
     co-ordinate their respective roles in this area. A validating table top exercise is foreseen
     during the first part of 1999.

 4.   Contaminated environment recovery. This group is federating the work of the three other
     groups. During a first step, it established a data base of the. currently available technical
     intervention processes for decontamination. But it is not enough. Establishing the criteria
     for setting up a recovery strategy taking into account the contaminated scene data, the
     accident data and, mainly, the local decision making becomes the basic objective.
     Therefore, post-accidental preparedness and planning are no more the practical aim ; but
     this one would be to find the right method to suggest the active management of the
     situation by the local population, its representatives the local authorities.


In conclusion, it could be underlined that the Russian-French collaboration in the post-accidental
management area has learned, at least to the two involved countries, that the so called "recovery
phase" could have chances to be dealt with successfully by considering not only the
implementation of technical radiological countermeasures but also, and mainly, the definition
and the implementation by the different involved social bodies of a whole strategy aiming to
make the situation understandable then possibly acceptable.
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

                Session C, Track 2:

            Outreach and Legal Issues

                  Thursday, September 10,1998
                     8:00 a.m. - 9:50 a.m.
Chair: Lisa Nanko, United States Environmental Protection Agency

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

              Uses of the Internet in Post-Emergency Response: Some Issues

                                 Caroline L. Herzenberg

                               Argonne National Laboratory


Can the Internet be of value in post-emergency response? The answer is yes, to judge by its use
following the Kobe earthquake in Japan and the ice storms in the United States and Canada last
winter. This will not be a technical account of the Internet, but rather a quick look at some
advantages, disadvantages, promising applications, and issues that may arise in using the Internet
for post-emergency response.

The Internet and associated information technologies have already become valuable components
of emergency preparedness and disaster management. So far, the Internet has probably been
used most frequently hi networking on a daily basis, in communicating through e-mail, and in
making available general resources. Examples of these resources are the Emergency Information
Infrastructure Partnership (EH?) Website1; the Medical, Emergency, Rescue and Global
Information Network (MERGInet)2; and the Natural Hazards Center Website,3 to name a few.
Some states, such as Pennsylvania, have networks that connect their counties into the State
Emergency Operations Center.  The amount of structured information on emergency
management and disaster preparedness on the Internet is growing rapidly.  Applications of the
Internet in actual crisis situations have been limited, and experience with the Internet in actual
post-disaster operations is even more limited. Much more can be done to utilize the Internet and
related technologies, including geographic information systems and communications
technologies, in coping with disasters. As access to and familiarity with the Internet increase, we
anticipate that the uses of the Internet both in emergency preparedness and in dealing with actual
emergencies will burgeon.


The Internet has been used during and following several disasters, and I'll talk briefly about how
this experience has turned out in a few cases. Among the disasters in which appreciable Internet
usage occurred and was written about are the Kobe earthquake in Japan and the 1989 Loma
Prieta earthquake in California. In both cases, the Internet proved useful when other
communications methods broke down (the telephone system largely went down in Kobe, and
many of the radio and television stations went off the air in California during Loma Prieta).4 The
Kamsai Area Earthquake Information Web site, set up during the 1995 Kobe earthquake, is still
present on the Web.5  It provides an example of a Web site developed for use for a disaster; it
includes government announcements; links to pages listing the deceased and survivors; damage
information, including images; information on relief; mail services information; lists of out-of-
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

service and usable phone numbers; information on Internet connections in the area; information
on congregate care and relocation facilities; information from banks; railway service status;
arrangements for money donation; information for volunteering; arrangements for pet care;
information for blood donation; maps; local information; hospital information; and many other
topics, including a message board.

A more recent example of Internet use during a crisis situation occurred during the January 1998
four-day ice storm in the northeastern United States and in Canada, which affected some 600,000
people for up to 14 days in northern New York State alone.  With help from other State agencies,
the New York State Emergency Management Office developed a Web page to assist in the
disaster recovery, and the Internet also proved its worth in this disaster.6'7 During the severe ice
storm in the northeastern United States in January 1998, this Web page was posted with a range
of useful information, such as what roads were opening up and which colleges were open for
students. It also had information such as warnings about potential hazards of carbon monoxide
from use of portable electric generators during the power outages.  An interesting aspect of the
use of the Ice Storm '98 Web site was that in many cases emergency workers and residents would
go out during the day and struggle locally with the storm's effects,  and then in the evening they
would access the Web site and get the bigger picture of the status of the emergency.7

The Internet can provide such features as interactivity, two-way communications, and
multimedia information on demand. One of its advantages is that a great deal of information can
be made widely available. Access to these data can be either restricted (e.g., by password use) or
open to any Internet user. The potential for dispensing information is enormous. There is also
excellent potential for contacting other persons, either individually (as in e-mail) or in groups, for
on-line discussions. An important aspect of the Internet is that it can provide information one-
way, without permitting direct inquiries from those receiving the information.  This could be an
advantage for public information personnel and others responsible for information dissemination
during disasters, in that they could provide information without simultaneously having to deal
with a flood of direct inquiries from the media or the public.

On the other hand, the Internet does have some drawbacks.  A major drawback at present is
limited access.  This is more of a problem world-wide than it is in the United States at present;
by some estimates, about 30% of people in the United States have some form of Internet access,
and this percentage is rising rapidly. To communicate or receive communications on the Internet
requires literacy, knowledge of the language or languages in use, capability of using computers
and software, and access to both a computer and the Internet.  Also, relevant portions of the
Internet must be operational: both clients and servers need to be up and not overloaded. All the
communications systems that we use in emergency response, including networks, can be fragile
and technically vulnerable. To compare technical vulnerabilities of the Internet with those of
other communications systems, such as television, radio, telephone, cellular telephones,
facsimile machines, and so on, is well beyond the scope of this paper. In crisis situations, you
need redundancy; that can be accomplished by having access to many different communication
channels during and after an emergency.
 Washington, D.C.
September 9-11,1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

Another drawback of the Internet can be the presence of incorrect information. The quality of
information on the Internet varies a lot, and bizarre ideas and false information have spread on
the Internet in the past in other contexts. We must be prepared for this to occur during
emergencies, and we will likely need some sort of rumor control operation to address rumors
relating to emergencies.  More generally, it would be desirable to have means to assure the
integrity of information disseminated during emergencies and disasters.

While one-way electronic information dissemination may be an advantage for some applications,
as just mentioned, it may also be a  drawback for others. Users would have to explicitly request
information that may not have been provided; they might make such requests by e-mail.  (The
one-way aspect of information dissemination does have the advantage that the reply can be
delayed until accurate information  is available.)  Also, people in crisis sometimes need a direct,
interactive relationship with other individuals; this need can be addressed to a limited extent by
providing contact information along with the data.

The Internet has been a valuable asset in emergency management, and in the future we can
expect it to become even more valuable. We can expect an increased use of computer networks
during actual emergencies, for example, to support communication among emergency
organizations, police, medical services, the Red Cross, and other organizations, and we can
expect coordination and extension  of existing State and local networks.

During a disaster, we can look forward to increased transfer of information through the Internet
to and from the public and the press and among separated family, friends, and colleagues. Thus,
there may be concern about traffic jams on the Internet: network traffic load.  What capacity
might be needed during an emergency?  Could a restriction on the use of the Internet by the
public be required, or even be implemented?

What about security considerations?  It would appear that an increasing number of organizations
may become dependent on the Internet and demand secure and efficient communications even
during emergencies. Power outages can interfere with the use of computers, and Internet service
providers are sometimes  taken out  by disasters.

Many concerns need to be addressed during the post-emergency response phase of an accident or
disaster.8 There would appear to be a potential for use of the Internet in conjunction with a
significant number of the associated activities. Many command and control and surveillance
tasks could be supported by the Internet both during and after emergencies. After emergencies,
satellite communications, remote sensing images from space, and location data from global
positioning system satellites will become critical to the success of emergency organizations, and
these types of information can be integrated into Internet use. The global positioning system,
together with geographic information systems, can be used to track the location of vehicles,
ships, and other resources during emergencies and also to provide coordinates for sampling
operations so that the location from which a sample originated will be known accurately and in a
format suitable for use in databases.
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

In the post-emergency phase of a radiological emergency in which radioactive materials have
been dispersed over a wide area, the gathering of samples and sample analysis will be very
important. The Internet has turned out to be quite useful for communicating sample analysis
results (e.g., by FTP [file transfer protocol]).  In particular, if the number of samples is very large
and they are being sent for analysis to several different laboratories, communication of results on
the Internet and integration of results into databases will be highly important.

There are many other areas of potential Internet use. These range from communication and data
management to public information to economic and legal aspects, medical and social needs,
relocation needs, ingestion pathway considerations, and other areas.  For example, Internet
listings of evacuees or relocated persons and their locations could be helpful in reuniting
families. An Internet site with information on financial assistance and legal issues following a
particular disaster could provide accurate, detailed, and accessible information for individuals
and businesses affected by the event.


To summarize, the Internet has many potential uses in the post-emergency response phase
following a disaster, although various concerns are associated with this use, such as limited
access. This brief paper has just scratched the surface of what can be done now. It is clear that
we have not yet seen all of the potential uses of the Internet, and we can look forward to new
applications of what is already an extremely useful tool for emergency management.

This paper prepared under U.S. Department of Energy contract number W-31-109-ENG-38.


 1. Emergency Information Infrastructure Partnership (BOP), "EIIP Virtual Forum  Home Page"
 [URL http://www.emforum.org/index.html] (accessed May 27,  1998).

 2. Medical, Emergency, Rescue and Global Information Network, "MERGInet: Medical,
 Emergency, Rescue and Global Information Network" [URL
 http://www.merginet.com/main.htm] (accessed May 27, 1998).

 3. Natural Hazards Center at the University of Colorado, Boulder, "The Natural Hazards Center -
 Information on Human Adaptation to Disaster" [URL http://www.colorado.edu/hazards]
 (accessed May 27, 1998).

 4. Ivefors, Gunilla M., Linkopings University, 1995, "Emergency Information Management &
 Disaster Preparedness on the Internet" [URL http://www.hb.se/bhs/ith/gi.htm] (accessed May 27,

 5. SONY Corporation (volunteer), 1995, "Kansai Area Earthquake information"
 Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

[URL http://azumi.shinshu-u.ac.jp/quake/sony/index.html] (accessed May 27, 1998).

6. Simpson, Robert, New York State Emergency Management Office, private communication,
May 26,1998.

7. Simpson, Robert, New York State Emergency Management Office, 1998, "Ice Storm '98 and
State-wide Hooding" [URL http://www.nysemo.state.ny.us/IceStorai98/icestorm98.htm]
(accessed May 27,1998).

8. Herzenberg, C.L., L.M. Lewis, R. Haffenden, R.C. Hemphill, K. Lerner, S.A. Meleski, E.A.
Tanzman, and J.D. Adams, Recovery from a Chemical Weapons Accident or Incident: A Concept
Paper on Planning, Argonne National Laboratory Technical Memorandum, ANL/DIS/TM-14,
Argonne, EL (April  1994).
17 July 1998 draft, revised

This is a revision of interner.pap (29 May 1998 draft, revised) which has been revised to conform
with Argonne editing by J. Andrew as of 7/16/98.

This paper has been prepared by C. Herzenberg for presentation at the EPA International Post
Emergency Response Issues Conference, to be held in Washington DC, September 9-11 1998.
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

          Five Years' Experience in Publishing the Bulletin "Radiation and Risk"

                    Sokolov V.A., Khoptynskaya S.K., and Ivanov V.K.

       Medical Radiological Research Center of Russian Academy of Medical Sciences,
                                     Obninsk, Russia


Information related to radiological disasters and accidents, as well as other environmental
hazards, is widely dispersed over a large list of scientific journals and other sources of published
information1. As the consequences of such events involve different spheres of scientific,
political, and socio-economic knowledge, such a dispersion is natural. The publication of
technical information in specialized journals facilitates a scientist's access to developments at the
frontiers of his field of activity. Unfortunately, this specialization inhibits the dissemination of a
more general view of current and emerging problems between different specialties.

The importance of the 1986 Chernobyl accident in international affairs, as well as other
radiological events in the former Soviet Union, made it mandatory to make all information
widely available.  At first, the legacy of secrecy in the former USSR made this difficult.
Scientific knowledge of military significance was always excluded from the sphere of normal
scientific communications.  Even immediately following the Chernobyl accident, this knowledge
was not used in full measure. Only recently has it become open for analysis. Nevertheless, the
knowledge does not receive wide distribution, not due to official controls, but because of the
relatively few people in the West who fluently speak or read the Russian language. This has
hampered the dissemination of Russian research into the Western scientific communities.

It is well known that the health consequences of the large-scale radiological accidents are
followed, as a rule, by misinterpretations in mass-media and mistrust of official information
among the population.3  This leads to additional aggravation of real scientific and health
problems. In order to supply both researchers and journalists with a cohesive presentation of
Chernobyl related issues, the Bulletin "Radiation and Risk" was launched in 1992. This paper
discusses the resources provided by this publication.


The Chernobyl accident initiated a comprehensive and objective reevaluation of the radiological
situation in the whole territory of the former USSR. At the time of the accident, the contribution
of nuclear technologies into the defense, power generation, science, and industrial activities of
the country was vastly larger than had been discussed in open scientific literature and in the mass
media. Owing to the fact that the post-Chernobyl period coincided with the changes in the
economic, political, and social life of the country, the information on the radiological and
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

epidemiological situations in the different regions, on accidents in the nuclear industry, and on
the consequences of nuclear and thermonuclear weapon tests gradually became available. It has
become clear that the accumulated experience of the atomic epoch has been based not only on
intellectual advances, but also on tragic cases as well, where the life and health of people were
adversely affected by radiation.

In response to the accident, the Government of the Soviet Union established the National
Radiation and Epidemiological Registry as a functional element of the Medical Radiological
Research Center in Obninsk (near Moscow). The Registry was established in order to develop a
uniform State system for the registration of individuals in support of needs associated with
radio-epidemiology for both Chernobyl and other accidents involving radiation exposure. The
Registry was used to accumulate and correlate medical and dosimetric data on various
population groups, including present and former residents of the radioactively contaminated
territories, emergency and recovery workers ("liquidators") and the children of members of these
two populations. At present, the Registry contains personal data on more than 500,000 Russian
citizens. The Registry is arranged in such a way as to permit the rapid selection of persons by
cancer incidence, cause of death, thyroid pathology in persons who were children or adolescents
at the moment of the accident, leukemia incidence in liquidators, and persons where a disease or
death is directly linked to radiation exposure. The contents of the Registry are constantly
updated and expanded due to regular examination of the registered and control populations and
due to entries for people recently receiving medical  surveillance. The headquarters operation in
Obninsk organizes and oversees the activity of twenty regional centers of the Registry across
Russia, and it is here where the initial information is collected and distributed2. While the large
volume of data stored at the Registry does not permit transmittal in hardcopy form, interested
persons and organizations may obtain data in electronic form on diskettes.

The Bulletin "Radiation and Risk" is the official periodical of the Registry and is based on its
documentary data.  As the accumulation of the primary ("raw") medical and dosimetric
information is only the initial step of data gathering, it is prone to being misinterpreted in the
hands of unqualified or inexperienced persons. Therefore, published materials from the Registry
are supplemented with scientific papers and reviews discussing and substantiating the
methodologies of collection and the interpretations of the results of the monitoring of radiation
effects in the population. The Bulletin is intended for specialists in radiation medicine,
epidemiology, radiobiology, environmental protection, dosimetry, health physics, medical
statistics, and clinical practice.  It is edited by Academician A.Tzyb (Director, Medical
Radiological Research Center), with a distinguished Russian editorial board and a multi-national
advisory council whose diverse areas of expertise reflect the interdisciplinary aspects of the
Bulletin. Owing to the personal activity and support of Professor Richard Wilson from Harvard
University, an English version of the Bulletin appeared in 1995.  At this time, five English
language versions of "Radiation and Risk" have been published. At present, work is in progress
to make the Bulletin available through the Internet.
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

All regular and supplemental issues of "Radiation and Risk" are subject oriented.  Each regular
issue consists of several sections (Normative Documents, Materials of the Registry, News from
the All-Russia Scientific Commission on Radiation Protection, International Cooperation, and
Current Bibliography).  Following the first issue in 1992, "General Description of the Registry,"
the following subjects have been covered:

Liquidators, Persons Involved in Recovery Operations (1992)
Radioecology (1993)
Contamination of Russian Territories with Radionuclides 137Cs, ^Sr, 239Pu / 240Pu, 131I
Radiation Accident in Tomsk-7,
Health Effects of Low Doses (Kaluga Region) (1994)
The  Southern Urals (1995)
Radiation Doses for Emergency Workers (1995)
Radiogenic Thyroid Cancer (1995)
Radiation Oncoepidemiology (1996)
Exposures of the Population (1996)
Radiation Risks Assessments (1996)
Normative Documents  of the National Registry (1996)
Agricultural Radiology (1997)

One of the most important tasks of the Bulletin is to facilitate cooperation between the central
registry institution in Obninsk and the regional units of the Registry. Several operational issues
are involved: refining methods and means of data collecting and processing, managing complex
medical registration forms required by the heterogeneous registry population, balancing the need
for scientifically desirable data specificity and reliability against the educational and experience
level of the local examination staff, and providing procedures for standardization and quality

The most obvious reader interest was induced by publications on risk assessments and on
absorbed doses. Establishing a relationship between radiation dose and the health of the current
and  future generations  continues to be a key area of research and discussion.  Approaches to
radiation risk assessment, as well as the risks from other hazardous factors, engender keen
discussions.4 For a long time, radiation risk estimates for stochastic late effects in humans were
based largely on epidemiological studies of the Japanese A-bomb survivors, but such estimates
do not relate directly to Chernobyl, as its exposures were from relatively lower doses, at lower
dose rates, and with significant commitments of internal dose.  The Bulletin has published many
papers, and has devoted several issues, to this subject.  It has published extensive information on
the absorbed doses for  the populations of Russia, for Belarus, and for liquidators. The
conclusions of the authors sometimes differ, and there is great debate on the acceptable
methodologies to be used for dose reconstruction.  The editorial board tries to represent the
entire scope of views, being concerned only with the reliability of data, and attempts to refrain
from emotional or political arguments.
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September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

Issue V of the Bulletin should be of particular interest to researchers in the West.  In addition to
Chernobyl, significant radiological problems exist in the regions surrounding the Chelyabinsk
facility. This facility was involved in the development and production of special nuclear
materials for the nuclear arsenal of the USSR. The Bulletin's editorial staff pioneered the
publication in the open press of declassified papers dealing with the clinical picture and later
consequences of the radiological exposures from this facility. Although these works cover a
number of years (1959-1990), a wide range of specialists in the field of radiation pathology and
medicine are not aware of them. Specifically, a large body of information is available that deals
with the transfer and distribution of 239Pu in humans, including the mechanisms of its retention
and elimination, the peculiarities of the clinical picture of plutonium pneurnosclerosis, and the
late consequences of exposure (such as carcinoma of lung and the prognosis of its development
in persons involved in plutonium production). A large volume of declassified data is provided in
this issue, with current reviews on the consequences of occupational exposure among the staff of
plant "Majak" (a facility at Chelyabinsk), the levels of morbidity and mortality among children in
Ozersk (the population center in the region), and the health effects among the population living
in the contaminated territories along the River Techa. These published materials would be useful
both for specialists and for the general public.


Much more information, and more precise information, about Chernobyl is available than is
generally realized.  The radiological experiences of the former USSR are of significant interest to
the scientific community in the West. The Bulletin "Radiation and Risk" represents a new
resource for this community, as well as a source of peer-reviewed scientific discussions of the
issues raised by radiological accidents.


1. McCunney, R., .R.J., Boswell R., Harzbecker J. Environmental Health in the Journals.
   Environmental Research. 1992; 59: 114-124.

2. W. Morgenstem, V.K.Ivanov, A.I.Michalski, A.F.Tzyb, G.Shettler. Mathematical Modeling
   with Chernobyl Registry Data. Registry and Concept.  Eds. Springer-Verlag,
   Berlin-Heidelberg, 1995.

3. Kellerer, A.M. The New Panorama of Radioepidemiology - Problems and Possibilities that
   Emerge in a Changed Europe. Radiation Protection Dosimetry. 1994. 52, 1-4: 3-7.

4. Maciiwain C. US Panel Backs New Approach to Risk. Nature. 381,638: 13.
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

          	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

          Will the Nuclear Industry Become the Next Major Litigation Target?

                          James S. Reece and Deborah A. Loeser
                                 Zelle and Larson, LLP
We read almost weekly of a new lawsuit which threatens a large established corporation or even
an entire industry. There is often a pattern to the development of these lawsuits which can be
observed well in advance if one knows what to look for. There are also ways to avoid becoming
a major litigation target.

Today's sophisticated communications technology has created a tightly knit, international
society with many shared concerns. For example, the Internet contains abundant information
about exposure to ionizing radiation, including reports of many specific incidents.  The nuclear
industry has been sued in the past for claims of injury from radiation exposure, but it has not
been a major target.

This paper will address generally what factors lawyers might evaluate in deciding whether to
represent plaintiffs who claim injury from ionizing radiation and what a nuclear defendant can
do to minimize its litigation exposure.


What Lawyers Consider Before Pursuing an Injury Case

It normally takes a lot of lawyer time and expense to pursue a lawsuit. Major complex lawsuits
may involve a several year investment for a number of lawyers and hundreds of thousands of
dollars in out of pocket costs. Individuals who claim injury from a product or action of others
often either don't have the money necessary to finance a lawsuit or don't wish to take the risk
that they may end up owing their lawyers if they lose or recover just a small amount. As a result,
lawyers in the United States generally take such cases on a contingent fee basis, which means
that they only receive a fee out of any recovery they make.

To stay in business, a lawyer must accurately evaluate (1) the likelihood of proving that the
defendant injured his client; (2) the amount of recoverable damages (it doesn't help to obtain a
huge award against a defendant which can't pay); (3) the costs he will have to advance for filing
costs, deposition costs, travel, expert witnesses (court rules generally don't allow expert
witnesses to work on a contingent fee basis) and the like; (4) the time he and others will have to
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

This article reflects the views of the individual authors. It is not intended to reflect the views of
Zelle & Larson LLP.

invest; and (5) how quickly the case can get to trial (the ideal for the plaintiff is to get to trial
quickly - that keeps the plaintiff interested in the case and keeps pressure on the defendant, who
will soon be before a jury.)

You may wish to familiarize yourselves with how scientifically-based claims come to the
attention of plaintiffs' attorneys and end up being litigated.  A Civil Action by Jonathan Harr is a
very enjoyable book which describes the economic realities faced by a young lawyer who
represented a number of clients suffering from leukemia against two companies who were
alleged to have polluted the local water system. The book does a very credible and interesting
job of describing the interface between science and law.

How a Lawyer Might Apply These Principles to a Case Involving Claims of Injury From
Ionizing Radiation

To win at trial,  a lawyer must prove that his client was exposed to ionizing radiation. He will
also need to reliably estimate his client's dose since that impacts the type and severity of
biological injury. This exercise is obviously far more challenging than proving that a defendant
ran his car into  the plaintiffs car. The potential damages therefore must be substantially greater
than in the ordinary case to justify the added difficulty, because the added difficulty translates
into increased risk and costs for the lawyer.

In rare cases, a defendant admits it generated the exposure and agrees with the plaintiff about the
magnitude of his dose.  However, these issues are usually hotly contested because there are
innumerable variables, specific to each case. The way lawyers contest scientific issues is to hire
"experts" who review the facts and arrive at opinions.  An expert is someone who has unique
skill or background in a particular field; however, the talent and credentials of experts can differ
dramatically. It's very important to hire the best possible experts because you will likely get the
most accurate answers and most thoughtful insight.  Although the technical subject may be over
a layperson's (and therefore, jury's) head, we believe juries can usually sense the depth of an
expert's understanding and knowledge. Nevertheless, even with the brightest experts in the
world, it is important to work heavily on their communication skills. An expert whose opinion is
scientifically unsupported but who communicates extremely well will be a formidable foe inside
the courtroom for a premier scientist who doesn't. Lawyers, experts and their clients need to
continually remind themselves that juries are simply small random groups of "everyday" people
who are 18 years of age or older.

These types of cases involve the issues you would expect, but with judgments made by lay
people as opposed to your peers.  Examples include:
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

•  What was the exposure pathway and length of duration? (e.g. chronic radon overexposure
   over a number of years probably involves a more complex modeling process than modeling
   an acute release to workers inside a building).

•  How does the body handle the internally deposited radionuclides?

•  What are the risks associated with the external exposure?

•  What dose did they receive?

•  Are the particular plaintiffs more or less susceptible than the average person to potential
   radiation injury?

•  How long is the latency period for injuries potentially associated with these doses?

•  Is the plaintiffs response biologically plausible?

There has been a lot written in the last 5-10 years about "junk science."  In the litigation context,
this phrase refers to experts who espouse theories of exposure and injury which the general
medical or scientific community believes are baseless. Of course, this wouldn't be news unless
the junk scientists were exerting influence.  In fact, many articles over this time period have
focused on the ability of junk scientists to convince juries to award astronomical sums for
injuries which mainstream doctors and scientists believe are nonexistent.

Judges can keep experts from testifying at trial. In most courts, the opinions of experts are
supposed to be based upon generally accepted scientific methods or methods which can be
tested, have been subjected to peer review and about which the error rates are known. The
specific standard varies depending upon whether the case is in Federal or State court and which
state's law applies. Courts have applied these standards and kept experts from testifying in a
number of cases over the last five to ten years, but disqualifying an expert is still an exception.

With a case involving low dose, low LET radiation, a defendant's expert will likely point to
studies which "show" that there are no adverse health effects for this type of exposure. In the
absence of contrary studies, the plaintiffs attorney will likely try to dissect the defendant's
studies, with the goal of showing the court that there are no comprehensive reliable studies
which fit this specific fact situation and, therefore,  both side's experts ought to be heard.

 Once a court allows experts to testify in the courtroom, the proof is very different from what you
 are used to. "Proof is simply whatever the jury decides when asked simple lay questions such
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September 9-11, 1998

    	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

    Was the plaintiff exposed to radiation which came from the defendant's products or

    If so, was plaintiff injured by this exposure?


 •  If yes, what sum of money will fairly compensate the plaintiff for his injuries?


 A number of huge verdicts have resulted in part from a defendant not appreciating how scientific
 issues become refrained into such simple lay questions inside the courtroom.

 There is always a risk that a plaintiff will prevail on issues of exposure and dose if his experts are
 allowed to testify before a jury because of the simpler level of proof and the influence of so
 many factors other than science (e.g., quality of the lawyers and experts, the jury's bias against
 nuclear radiation, the jury's personal fear of cancer, etc.). On the other hand, it is extremely
 expensive for a lawyer to get a case to that point. Experts charge high hourly or daily rates, and
 in a complicated case they must do a lot of work to develop support for their opinions and help
 the plaintiffs lawyer understand and show the fallacies in the defendant's positions.  As a result,
 the potential damages must be large or no plaintiffs lawyer will reasonably go down that road
 absent some non-economic reason for pursuing the case (but even then, someone has to pay all
 of the costs referred to above or the case will go nowhere and will eventually be dismissed by the

 Absent a very straightforward accident with concededly excessive levels of radiation exposure,
 lawyers generally must represent a sizable number of plaintiffs to have potential damages which
justify the investment of time and money. The plaintiffs' lawyer's job is clearly easier if the
 plaintiffs have already developed symptoms of the type one would expect from exposure to  the
 nature and level of radiation claimed.  However, in many cases, the exposed plaintiffs may be
 asymptomatic when they sue. In these situations, plaintiffs  may try to seek damages for fear of
 injury, medical monitoring or increased risk of future injury. The courts in different states vary
 significantly regarding whether they will allow plaintiffs to  sue for these claims. However, since
 nearly everyone is afraid of radiation and cancer, the damages can be significant if a jury is
 allowed to make those awards. The nuclear defendant can and should do a great deal proactively
to reasonably limit such situations.
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

We have only talked about exposure to radiation and resulting injury. We haven't talked about
the conduct of the defendants responsible for the exposure.  Were they blameless, negligent,
reckless ...? While a plaintiff generally doesn't have to prove that the defendant did something
wrong which caused the radiation exposure, a plaintiff will often focus on the defendant's
conduct to  try to show recklessness or a willful indifference in order to seek extra damages
which are permitted in some states pursuant to a particular state's laws or to "punish" the
defendant and deter future bad conduct.

While a defendant may feel comfortable that it has done nothing wrong, one has to realize that
documents or testimony can be taken  out of context to portray a very different image. Therefore,
good conduct does become a major theme in defending these cases.  Of course, one can plan in
advance by considering what a plaintiff is likely to legitimately criticize and then proactively
develop procedures to assure the type of conduct you'd like to present in the courtroom.

What Can the Nuclear Industry Do to Lessen Its Litigation Risks?

The nuclear industry conducts numerous simulations of possible emergencies to assure the best
preparation and response.  They should also consider how they might become a major litigation
target and consciously plan how to prevent that from occurring. The industry can take a number
of steps to  lessen the likelihood of becoming a target. The following are some examples:

•   Have the appropriate instrumentation, procedures and controls in place. It's easier to defend
    when you have  the most accurate data on any releases, exposures and doses, as opposed to
    leaving lawyers and their experts  to argue about what they might have been or why these
    numbers are unavailable.

•   Fight the cases where science is absolutely solid, but be flexible and creative about resolving
    cases where liability is likely or possible under the best science. Cost effective resolution is
    achievable.  Some of the worst corporate and industry litigation disasters have resulted from
    an attitude that benefit accrues from fighting every case, even arguably legitimate ones.  That
    can work for a while if the plaintiffs have limited funds to pursue litigation and a defendant
    devotes considerable resources  to its defense, but eventually well funded, talented plaintiffs'
    lawyers will end up with good cases. If the claims are legitimate, plaintiffs will win and
    possibly win big if the company's or industry's records or testimony make it appear that they
    were hiding the "truth."

•   Communicate quickly and clearly to individuals who may have been exposed. Often people
    will not consult a lawyer if they feel they are being treated properly and being kept fully

•   If the plaintiffs already have a lawyer, don't immediately hunker down into a litigation mind
    set.  As this discussion indicates,  plaintiffs' lawyers are often looking for efficient,
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

    economical and fair ways to resolve legitimate cases and will often settle for many orders of
    magnitude less than they will likely ask a jury for if they are forced to trial.

•   If people need to be assessed medically, help arrange it. People will understand that you
    have their best interests in mind and will look to you for help. One of the strongest defense
    themes is that you made the welfare of those potentially exposed your top priority.

•   Consider how to handle a situation where different agencies are involved which have
    different regulations and guidelines for appropriate exposure. The plaintiffs lawyer will
    capitalize on these differences. The jury will likely gravitate toward the safest exposure or
    possibly a lower one, if effectively communicated by the plaintiffs expert who will say that
    he is bringing clarity to the "agencies' confusion."

•   Consider what people (and lawyers) will criticize you for if things don't go well.  Continue
    to diligently plan for emergency situations and update your responses as science develops. It
    is easier to defend if you remain flexible in an emergency and don't limit actions to what the
    minimum regulations call for, if more can be done.


A number of factors have to come together before a radiation case will appear attractive to a
plaintiffs lawyer. The nuclear industry can do a great deal now to protect itself from such cases
and from becoming a major litigation target in the future. This paper briefly discusses some of
the proactive steps which can and should be taken by both licensees and regulators within the
nuclear community.
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

               Session D9 Track 1:
  Agriculture, Forestry and Land Use Issues
                 Thursday, September 10, 1998
                   10:10a.m. -12:40 p.m.
Chair: Jack Patterson, United States Department of Agriculture

                     International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference
                 Problems of Agroindustrial Production on Contaminated
                    Territories and Principles of Their Rehabilitation

                       Alexakhin R.M., Fesenko S.V., Sanzharova N.I.

                 Russian Institute of Agricultural Radiology and Agroecology,
                              Russia, Kaluga Region, Obninsk


In radiation accidents that are accompanied by radioactive contamination of the environment, the
intake of radionuclides with farm products becomes a very important source of irradiation of the
population. Therefore, the implementation of a system of countermeasures on affected
agricultural lands is a vital element in mitigating consequences of accidents. Thus, following the
accident in the South Urals in 1957, the presence in the radionuclide mixture on the East Urals
radioactive trace of the long-lived p-emitter ^Sr (2.7% in the total composition of radionuclide
mixture) predetermined a long-term biological threat to humans because of the formation of the
internal irradiation source (of principal importance was the consumption of milk, vegetables and
bread).  In the Chernobyl accident in 1986, the presence in the mixture of 131I in the early stage
(intake through the milk chain "fodder-milk") has resulted in the development of thyroid cancer,
one of the major epidemiological consequences of the accident. A long-term hazard of the
Chernobyl accident is associated with the release of 137Cs, the main dose-forming radionuclide
(in relatively small area ^Sr was of great significance as well).  Analysis of the 12-year
radioecological studies in the ChNPP accidental zone has shown that in both acute (about one
year) and distant periods the ratio of internal and external doses is close to unity. For some
regions affected by this accident the contribution from internal irradiation to the overall dose
burden amounted to 70-90% [1-5]. In the Sellafield accident in the UK in 1957, an essential role
was played by 131I release and its associated transfer via the milk chain.

Following the nuclear weapons tests and their induced global biospheric contamination, the
importance of internal irradiation (i.e. consumption of radionuclide containing foodstuffs) has
considerably  increased.

It should be noted that limiting the overall dose burden from radioactive contamination of the
environment by means of reducing the internal irradiation component can be an economically
and ecologically more effective way than decreasing dose burdens from external irradiation. The
control of radionuclide flux in agricultural chains in the system soil-farm crops - farm animals -
human diet by means of applying special measures (countermeasures) reduces concentrations of
radionuclides in foodstuffs.

The type and scales of countermeasures in agroindustrial production depend on the  time elapsed
after the contamination.  In the early period (several weeks to one year) prohibitive
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

countermeasures prevail (a ban on the use of critical in terms of dose formation foodstuffs, on
animal pasturing, etc.)- In the medium and long terms after the accident, dominant are
countermeasures that restrict concentration of radionuclides in farm products and reduce the
collective dose of irradiation.


In the early period of an accidental contamination of the environment, a zonal principle of
agricultural production is realized. In this case countermeasures and farm specialization (meat,
milk, vegetable production) depend on the contamination density (for critical radionuclides). In
the medium and long-term periods, a zonal principle of agroindustrial production is replaced by
a dose one (according to ICRP and national recommendations this dose is currently 1 mSv/year).
This principle suggests that the dose above the background irradiation from all the sources (i.e.
internal and external) should not exceed 1 mSv/year.

The countermeasure effectiveness in agricultural production is assessed by a number of criteria:
radioecological (reduction factors of radionuclide content in foodstuffs after countermeasure
implementation), radiological (value of the averted dose due to countermeasure application,
man.Sv), radiologo-economic (cost of unit of collective dose saved as a result of countermeasure
application, cost of dose decrease per man. Sv, thousands US $).

The experience gained in liquidating the consequences of the South Urals (1957) and Chernobyl
NPP (1986) accidents testifies that the most effective countermeasures for restricting transfer of
the most important long-lived radionuclides via agricultural chains are as follows (in brackets
reduction factors of radionuclide transfer are indicated):

1. In restricting ^Sr transfer to foodstuffs:

    a) in plant production - liming of acid soils (2), application of mineral fertilisers (2-3), deep
    ploughing to remove the contaminated layer into lower horizons (1.5), selection of crop
    species and varieties with minimum accumulation of ^Sr (3-5), radical amelioration of
    meadows (by a factor of 3-4 for  milk);

    b) in animal production - Ca enrichment of animal rations deficient in this element (2),
    organization of a pre-slaughter feeding (2);

    c) in processing industries (processing milk to cheese and butter (2-5).

2.  In restricting 137Cs transfer to foodstuffs:

    a) in plant production - application of mineral fertilisers at increased K doses (2-2.5), liming
    of acid soils (1.5), deep ploughing to remove the contaminated layer into lower horizons
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

    (1.5), selection of species and varieties with minimum 137Cs accumulation (5-7), radical
    meadow amelioration (8-10);

    b) in animal production - use of 137Cs binders (for milk - 3-7, for meat 3-5), pre-slaughter

    c) in processing industry - processing milk to cheese and butter (3-6).


As stated above, the effectiveness of countermeasures for mitigating the consequences of
accidents in the agricultural sphere depends on a number of factors, among which are time after
radiation fallout, specific features of agricultural production and natural conditions (primarily
soil type). As an example let us consider results from the studies in one of the Chernobyl
affected regions of Russia where countermeasures have been applied [6]. Milk is a critical
foodstuff in dose formation.  Therefore, the effectiveness of countermeasures is assessed by this
product. Depending on soil properties, special features of agricultural production and
countermeasures dose from the consumption of milk containing 137Cs can vary by a factor of 50
and more (Table).  In this case, doses to the population from milk can be considerably (from
20% on heavy loamy and clay to 45% on peaty soils) reduced through the use of
countermeasures. For peaty soils, the contribution of milk to the overall dose even with
countermeasure application remains greater than that of external irradiation even for the staff
who a great deal of time are working outdoors.  For sandy soils, the contribution to the overall
dose from internal irradiation connected with milk consumption and external irradiation are
comparable and in the event of countermeasure application it does not exceed 50% of the dose of
external irradiation.

The cost of the  unit of saved dose in man.Sv for the region considered increases monotonically:
from 0.8 in 1987 with countermeasure application to U.S. $ 3,000 in 1997 with countermeasure
application; these values are U.S. $ 6 to 18,000 and  U.S. $ 24 to 80,000 for sandy and heavy
loamy soils, respectively (Figure).  A precise estimation of the "red line"of the warranted cost of
dose decrease per 1 man.-Sv (in particular in the existing economic situation) is an extremely
complicated task which is unlikely to have purely scientific substantiation. Therefore, the
figures suggested in the ICRP Publication 37 (U.S. $ 10 to 20,000) are used in assessments of
countermeasure justification.
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September 9-11, 1998

                      International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference
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                                87  88  89   90   91  92  93  94  95  96   97
                               1 -
                                              A- -A- -A


                                 87  88  89  90  91  92  93  94  95   96  97
Figure 1.  Dynamics of changes in the cost of dose decrease of 1 man. Sv as a result of radical improvement in
collective sector. Density of 137Cs fallout is 740 kBq rn2.
Soils: 1 - peaty; 2 - sandy and sandy loam; 3 - heavy loam and clay; 4 and 5 - costs of dose decrease of 1 man. Sv
for which countermeasure application was considered justified (10(4) and 20 (5) thousands US $).  A - collective
sector, B - private sector
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

Table 1. Individual effective doses from milk consumption received over the first 10-year
period after 137Cs fallout (ignoring the acute period) depending on the agricultural practice
details ((nSv/kBq nr2)
Private sector, without
Private sector, intensive
Collective sector, without
Collective sector, intensive
Real dynamics of counter-measure
Soil type
18.6 (0.77-
15.9 (0.66-
5.1 (0.21-
2.3 (0.10-
18.0 (0.75-
55.9 (2.3-
* In brackets is the ratio of internal and external irradiation


1. Fesenko S.V. Agricultural and Forest Ecosystems: Radioecological Consequences and
Effectiveness of Countermeasures Under Radioactive Contamination. Doctor Thesis, Obninsk,

2. Agricultural Radioecology /Ed. Alexakhin R.M., Korneyev N.A., M.: Ecology, 1992. 400p.

3. Guidebook on Radiation Situation and Exposure Doses in 1991 for the Population of the
Russian Federation in Regions Affected by the Chernobyl Accident. Ed. M.LBalonov. St.-
Petersburg, Publ. Ariadna - Arcadia, 1993, 147p.

4. Alexakhin R.M., Fesenko S.V., Sanzharova N.I. Serious Radiation Accidents and the
Radiological Impact on Agriculture. Radiat.  Prot. Dosim.  1996. V.64. N 1/2.  P.37-42.

5. R.M.Alexakhin. Countermeasures in Agricultural Production as an Effective Means of
Mitigating the Radiological Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident// Sci. Total Environ.,
1993. V.137. P.9-20.

6. Fesenko S.V., Alexakhin R.M., Lisyansky K.B., Sanzharova N.I. Analysis of Factors
Responsible for the Effectiveness of Countermeasures in Agriculture Under Radioactive
Contamination. Radiation Biology.  Radioecology. 1998. V.38, N.3 (in press).
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

                    International Radiolosical Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference
        Integrated Long-term Management of Radioactively Contaminated Land:
                                   the Ceser Project

Gerald Kirchner1, Carol Salt2, Herbert Lettner3, Hanne Solheim Hansen4, and Seppo Rekolainen5

                        1) University of Bremen, Bremen, Germany
       2) University of Stirling, Dept. of Environmental Sciences, Stirling FK9 4LA, UK
    3) University of Salzburg, Institute of Physics and Biophysics, A-5020 Salzburg, Austria
                4) Hogskolen i Nord-Trondelag, N-7700 Steinkjer, Norway
               5) Finnish Environmental Institute, FIN-00251 Helsinki, Finland


Accidents at nuclear installations can cause widespread long-term contamination of soils. On
land used for agriculture this may necessitate countermeasures to reduce the transfer of
radionuclides into the human food chain. A wide range of countermeasures have been evaluated
in European countries in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident.1 The main aim of this
evaluation has been to identify the most effective and practical techniques for reducing the
radiation dose to humans. In comparison, little attention has been paid to the potential long-term
impacts of these measures on the functioning of agro-ecosystems and their economic value. It is
conceivable that environmental and economic costs due to these impacts may equal or even
outweigh the benefits of dose reduction. Thus any changes in the economic and ecological values
of resources should be considered as part of a comprehensive remediation strategy. It is the
objective of the work presented here to develop and test an impact assessment methodology
which permits decision makers to choose an ecologically and economically balanced long-term
remediation strategy for severely contaminated areas. This research is part of an EU funded
project under the Nuclear Fission Safety Programme entitled: Countermeasures: Environmental
and Socio-Economic Responses (CESER) and involves partners in Austria, Finland, Germany,
Norway and the UK.

The approach shown in Fig. 1 is being adopted to assess ecological and economic impacts of
countermeasures. The various steps included in Fig. 1 are characterized in the following.



Initially a comprehensive list of potential countermeasures intended to reduce radiation doses
from radioactive cesium and strontium was compiled. Countermeasures reviewed include
interventions both at the soil-plant level and at the animal level. Criteria adopted for
countermeasure selection included radiological effectiveness, applicability, cost and acceptability
to farmers. Based on these criteria, deep ploughing to bury contamination, soil application of
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September 9-11, 1998

 	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

 fertilisers that compete with radionuclides in the soil solution, use of binding agents in soils or
 livestock, changes in livestock management or in land use (e.g. afforestation) were included in
 the study. For these countermeasures, a literature review identified potential impacts on the
 quality of soil, water and air; the health of plants, animals and humans; the quality and quantity
 of the products; and the diversity of landscapes and organisms. Examples are:
      Spatial Decision
      Support System
                                 Quantification &,
                  Non-Spatial decision
                    Support System
Fig. 1: Approach adopted for the integrated impact assessment of countermeasures.

At the soil-plant level, ploughing may enhance mineralisation of organic soils and increase
erosion. At the animal level, movement of animals to less contaminated areas result in a shift of
grazing pressure and may increase manure application which consequently may affect water
quality and increase the potential for eutrophication. Both positive effects (e.g. growth
stimulation of plants due to fertilizer application, higher milk yield) and negative effects (e.g.
lower food quality, reduced animal health) were included.

Emphasis was given to identifying the basic physical and chemical mechanisms of the selected
countermeasures and their potential non-radiological impacts, since their understanding is
essential for quantification of site-specific effects by modelling.

For some potentially important non-radiological impacts of selected countermeasures, however,
the information available in the literature was found to be inadequate for quantifying these
effects. Thus laboratory experiments were initiated: Soil column experiments have been set up to
study the environmental fate and identify potential degradation products of ammonium-
ferric(m)-hexacyanoferrate(II) (AFCF) which is used as a cesium binding agent in livestock
feeding. Diffusion experiments2 have been designed to investigate the potential of mobile
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

organic matter degradation products (fulvic acids) for transport of trace nutrients and toxic trace


The potential countermeasures identified were then prioritised for case study areas in Finland
and Scotland on the basis of four radioactive deposition scenarios and existing agricultural
production systems taking into account crop and animal production. The four radiological
scenarios included contamination levels ranging from depositions characteristic for greater
distances from a damaged nuclear plant to levels to be expected near to the accident location.

Quantification and Ranking

The impacts selected are either quantified through calculations and simulation modelling or
qualitatively assessed on the basis of expert knowledge. The models ICECREAM3, OPUS 4 and
PHREEQC 5 were chosen to simulate environmental changes due to countermeasures.
ICECREAM and  OPUS are used to simulate soil erosion and transport of water and solutes via
surface runoff and percolation in the soil column in a watershed taking into account a variety of
agricultural management  practices (e.g. ploughing, fertilisation, manure application). Since both
study areas include soils rich in organic matter, the OPUS code was modified to include a
recently proposed hydrological model based on the Vereecken 6J  pedo-transfer function which is
applicable for both mineral and organic soils. PHREEQC is applied to simulate effects of
changes  of fertiliser addition on soil chemistry and availability of major and trace nutrients and
of toxic trace substances taking into account a variety of chemical reactions (e.g. exchange
reactions, precipitation).

For the selected countermeasures, the simulations will provide matrices of erosion, nutrient
losses, changes in the availability of toxic trace substances and chemical changes in soil solution
for the most common soil types, climates, slopes, land use categories and land management
practices within the selected geographic areas. Within a geographical information system (GIS),
the model output matrices are linked to spatial data sets covering topography, soil types and land
uses. This enables the mapping of impacts for different countermeasures.


Environmental cost-benefit analysis is used to estimate off-site costs such as loss of fisheries or
amenity value and benefits such as reduced radiation risk arising from the application of
countermeasures. Costs will be derived by combining the environmental modelling results with
valuations from the literature. Selected impacts such as landscape changes are being valued
through  an original 'willingness to pay' survey. The direct monetary costs of countermeasures
will be included in the final analysis.
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September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

Decision Support Systems

Multicriteria Decision Making (MCDM) 8 has been chosen as the methodology for integrating
the assessments of impacts and costs resulting from countermeasures. This methodology will
provide the decision-maker with a set of countermeasure suitability rankings or suitability maps
based on the quantitative and qualitative impacts.

The MCDM approach will be embedded into two types of decision support system. The first will
be a non-spatial assessment for a single area, built as a piece of stand alone software using Visual
Basic. "Wizards" will take the user down a series of decision trees regarding the type of
agriculture and the deposition scenario. Based on this information the user is presented with a
selectable list of countermeasures. Once the user has made the selection, he/she is asked to
provide additional information on site properties which might limit the application of the
countermeasures. The impacts, costs and benefits of the countermeasures are then assessed
qualitatively and quantitatively using the MCDM methodology.

The second system will'be a more generic suitability assessment of a larger, heterogeneous area
using a GIS. A suitability assessment will be performed using spatial data within the GIS.
Thematic maps depicting site suitability for a single countermeasure or showing the overall
"most suitable" countermeasure can be created. By being custom built for this project, both
Decision Support Systems should prove to provide greater flexibility, specificity and user-
friendliness compared to commercially available software packages.


As final product, this methodology will provide decision-makers with a set of countermeasure
suitability rankings or suitability maps based on an integrated assessment of their quantitative
and qualitative radiological, ecological and economic impacts.
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September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference


Acknowledgments. Financial support of the CESER project by the Commission of the European
Communities in the framework of its Nuclear Fission Safety Programme under research contract
FI4P-CT95-0021 is gratefully acknowledged.

1) International Atomic Energy Agency (1994). Guidelines for Agricultural Countermeasures
Following an Accidental Release of Radionuclides. Technical Reports Series No. 363. IAEA,

2) Kirchner, G.; Baumgartner, D.; Delitzsch, V.; Schabl, G. and Wellner, R. (1993). Laboratory
studies on the sorption behavior of fallout radionuclides in agriculturally used soils. Model. Geo-
Biosphere Processes, 2, 115-127.

3) Rekolainen, S. and Posch, M. (1992). Adapting the CREAMS Model for Finnish conditions.
Nordic Hydrology, 24, 309-322.

4) Smith, R. E. (1992). OPUS, An Integrated Simulation Model for Transport ofNon-point-
Source Pollutants at the Field Scale. U. S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research
Service, Report ARS-98. Fort Collins.

5) Parkhurst, D. L. (1995). User's Guide to PHREEQC - a Computer Program for Speciation,
Reaction-Path, Advection-Transport and Inverse Geochemical Calculations. U. S. Geological
Survey, Water Resources Investigations Report 95-4227.

6) Vereecken, H.; Maes, J.; Feyen, J. and Darius, P. (1989). Estimating the soil moisture
retention characteristics from texture, bulk density and carbon content. Soil Science, 148, 389-

7) Vereecken, H.; Maes, J. and Feyen, J. (1990). Estimating unsaturated hydraulic conductivity
from easily measured soil properties. Soil Science, 149,1-12.

8) Voogd, H. (1983). Multicriteria Evaluation for Urban and Regional Planning. London: Pion.
 Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

    Remediation Options for Agricultural Land: Evaluation and Strategy Development

                          Rafferty, B., Synnott, H. and Dawson, D.

                         Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland
                         3 Clonskeagh Square, Dublin 14, Ireland.


Since the Chernobyl accident considerable research effort throughout Europe has focused on
understanding the behaviour of radionuclides in agricultural systems. The ultimate aim of this
work has been to identify strategies by which the radiological impact of large-scale accidents
like Chernobyl can be minimized.  Over the last 2 years the focus of research has shifted to one
of evaluation of past research findings and compilation of the information into practical, user-
friendly decision support systems for remediation of radioactively contaminated land. A number
of international projects are presently under way all with this basic objective.  These projects test
different approaches to aspects of decision making such as (a) the different end-users of the
system - whether it be  a farm adviser or a local authority; (b) the use of computer models to
predict effectiveness and impact; and (c) the geographical scale over which intervention is

This paper is based on a review of the available literature describing the current state of
European research into remediation strategies for agricultural land. Also presented are
preliminary observations on the difficulties of compiling this research into a meaningful and
practical tool for use in real-life, post-nuclear accident situations.

Table 1 lists the agricultural countermeasure options which are discussed in the literature. This
table is drawn from a 1994 IAEA publication1 in which guidelines,for agricultural
countermeasures are reviewed. In the few years since its publication, the list of available options
has not changed significantly but a few of the options have been found to be impractical due to
poor availability of equipment and raw materials.
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September 9-11, 1998

                      International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference
Table 1: Agricultural countermeasures as reviewed by IAEA
measure type
Soil Based -

Soil based -
Animal based
Specific Application
Normal ploughing
Deep ploughing
Skim and burial ploughing
Remove 5- 10cm top-soil
Soil stabilisation
Lime addition
Potassium addition •
Apply Sapropell
Apply Aluminosilicates
Apply organic
Apply soluble phosphate
Select lower- uptake varieties
Select similar but lower-
uptake crops
Select different, lower-uptake
Select crops from which
processing removes
Select non-food crops
Harvest crops for disposal
Replace sheep/goats with
Change from arable crops to
Change to forestry production
Provide uncontaminated feed
Grow forage with lower
uptake rate
Use land for non-dairy
animals or those not yet for
Raise cutting height of fodder
Delay slaughter time to period
of reduced uptake
Provide prussian blue (AFCF)
Add clays to diet
Increase Ca in diet
High with mouldboard ploughs
RF of at least 10
Removes up to 95% of radioactivity
Variable with material used
High on acid soils, RF up to 10 for yuSr, up
to 3 for 137Cs
High when soil soln K cone <20uM. RF
up to 5 for 137Cs
High, RF up to 6 for U7Cs, up to 5 for yuSr
Limited, RF up to 2 for 137Cs
High, RF up to 10 for yuSr
Variable but can achieve RF up to 5
Variable but can achieve RF up to 3
Variable but can achieve RF up to 8
Variable but can achieve RF of up to 10 in
final product
Not applicable
High, up to 80% removal
Variable, RF up to 5
Variable, RF of up to 100
Not applicable
High, up to 100%
Switch from grasses to cereals, tubers and
root-crops. RF5-10
Variable - reported RF of 3 for 137Cs and 9
Variable - 2 to 5 fold reduction in 137Cs
content of milk and meat
Variable - 5 fold reduction in in 137Cs
content of milk and meat is possible
Increase of 2-4 times Ca in diet reduces
90Sr in milk by factor of 1 .5-3.0
 "Effectiveness as described in IAEA (1994)
 b IAEA (1994) rating :  A, Widely applicable; B, Effective but resources might not be available; C,
 Technically effective but requiring specialised equipment that is not widely available; D, Not
 recommended (either inadequately tested or proven to be of little or no value).
 0 Reduction Factor = Radioactivity or dose before treatment/ Radioactivity or dose after treatment
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 	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference


 Strategy development

 In developing a strategy for managing radioactively contaminated agricultural land, the
 intervention must be justified, in the sense that the action taken should achieve more good than
 harm. The levels at which the intervention is introduced and at which it is later withdrawn
 should be optimized, so that the protective measures will produce maximum net benefit1. The
 conventional approach3'4 has been to compare the different actions in terms of reduction of dose
 to man and the associated cost factors according to the following relationship:

      Collective Averted Dose versus Costs (manpower + consumables + equipment costs)

 But in practical terms what does this really mean to the farmer? The aim of dose reduction
 dictates that if the radiation dose to man from the contaminated agricultural situation is
 unacceptably high then some restriction must be applied to the use of the land or produce.
 However, to minimize the cost of this intervention a parallel aim of the remediation strategy
 must be the restoration of the economic use of the land.  Except in the case of low-level
 contamination it is probably unrealistic to hope that the remediation will achieve complete
 restoration of the land to what it was prior to contamination.  It is more reasonable to aim to
 restore economic viability to the agricultural situation or to shorten the time interval over which
 the land use is restricted.   In this approach, the effectiveness of the action is compared only with
 limited economic factors.  Other authors1'5 have suggested that social and environmental factors
 also warrant consideration. Recent experience in evaluating remediation strategies confirms this
 suggestion and indicates several other, less obvious but equally important, factors as outlined in
 Table 2.

 Each of the factors listed in Table 2 will be considered at some stage in every countermeasure
 evaluation process, but depending on the option being considered each will take on greater or
 lesser importance. Lost production and lost product value refer to situations in which production
 is restricted or where the crop attains  a lower market value due to its contamination. In this case
 the farmer may expect compensation  for lost earnings and so this factor becomes a real cost of
 the remediation option.  Applicability involves factors such as the slope of the land and the
 stoniness of the soil, as well as the availability of equipment or raw materials. In the final
 analysis these factors may exclude even the most effective or most economical remediation
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

                    International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference
 Collective Averted Dose   vs
Direct monetary


Application costs (Manpower, Consumables,
Equipment, Waste disposal)
Lost production or lost product value
Suitability to for example, topography, soil,
production system etc.
to farmer, consumer, local residents
                            Secondary impacts   Environmental, Ecological, Social, Economic
Table 2:  Cost-benefit analysis parameters for agricultural remediation options

Acceptability to the farmer is related to applicability and production losses and may ultimately
depend on compensation arrangements. Acceptability to the consumer is a much more complex
factor; it would be unwise to assume that a food product that is grown on decontaminated land,
or produced using some method of dose reduction, will be acceptable to the consumer. This
factor greatly influences costs in an agricultural context and represents the greatest challenge to
the restoration of economic viability of agriculture after a nuclear accident.

Acceptability to local residents and secondary impacts refer to the fact that agricultural land is
not only a food production system but has many functions in the wider natural, social and
economic environment. For example, agricultural land is a feature of the landscape, a habitat for
wildlife and a source of raw materials for industry. The integrity of the natural landscape has
implications for the sense of well-being of the population.

These wider scale secondary impacts raise a very important question in the development of any
remediation strategy:  on what geographical scale should the evaluation be made? It is clear that
there will be economic consequences for those whose livelihood comes from farming
contaminated land.  In addition to these costs however, there will be knock-on effects  in for
example, the local sales of seed and fertilizer.  Evaluation on a regional level may require
consideration of the impact on food processing industries, transport companies and export trade.

It is essential therefore, that prior to developing a strategy for management of radioactively
contaminated land,  a decision is taken about the geographical level to which the assessment of
the remediation options will be made.

Scenario analysis

A comparative analysis of the remediation options for a given agricultural scenario requires that
the effectiveness and the value of each of the above cost factors is known and that the change in
these cost values due to the remediation can be predicted. The experience attained in  Europe is
that this is where the  greatest difficulties in restoration strategy development lie.
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 	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

 Evaluation of remediation effectiveness and costs as applied to real situations requires detailed
 knowledge of the environmental, economic and social parameters which influence these factors.
 Consider for example the site information needed to evaluate the application of potassium to
 agricultural soil as a countermeasure against radiocaesium transfer to vegetation. This
 countermeasure works by providing excess K ions which compete with and effectively dilute the
 available Cs ions.  The effectiveness of K as a countermeasure is strongly dependent on the
 level of exchangeable K in the soil.6 In order to evaluate the benefit of this countermeasure the
 decision maker requires knowledge of the K status of the soils to be treated. The K status of soil
 is a commonly measured parameter in normal agricultural practice but even so, our experience is
 that these data are not sufficiently available to facilitate a reliable evaluation of the effectiveness
 of this countermeasure on a wide geographical scale.

 In the case of liming as a countermeasure against strontium transfer to vegetation, the key
 effectiveness parameter is soil exchangeable calcium.  Ca is not a soil parameter which is '
 commonly recorded for agricultural soils in Europe, therefore compared to K, these data are very
 scarce. Other remediation options present similar difficulties of poor availability of data
 essential for prediction of effectiveness, applicability, acceptability, costs and secondary impacts.

 Many of these effectiveness parameters are spatially variable such that within even a single field,
 different areas will require different levels of treatment to achieve a uniform effectiveness of the
 countermeasure.  In many cases, much of the information required is available on a very local
 level.  Most farmers have a detailed knowledge of the peculiarities of their own land and how
 any change will affect the crop.  It is therefore a useful strategy to avail of this wealth of
 experience in the analysis of remediation options. It may seem impractical to gather such
 detailed information, but on the other hand, we must conclude that the larger the unit of land
 upon which the strategy is assessed the lower will be the reliability of the analysis.

 A practical approach may be to combine the local and the regional data and identify which stages
 in the decision-making process are best achieved at a local level and which can best be solved
 regionally.  In this way the process maximizes the use of available information at each stage. An
 example of this combined approach is presented in Figure 1.  Here the general, broad-scale
 applicability of countermeasure options can be assessed based on regional crop data, soil maps,
 topographical, demographic and climatic data etc. This step will eliminate all countermeasure
 options which are not applicable.  The resulting list of appropriate remediation options can be
 evaluated regionally with respect to application costs but local assessment is required to
 evaluate these options in terms of effectiveness, small scale applicability and production losses.
 The resulting short-list of remediation options will require further local-level assessment with
 respect to acceptability and secondary impacts before a final decision on the  best remediation
 strategy can be reached. If secondary environmental, economic and social impacts are to be
 evaluated on a wider scale then an additional step may  be required prior to reaching a final
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference


A wide range of potentially useful agricultural countermeasures are reported in the scientific
literature. The following points are indicated as being important to the development of a strategy
for remediation of agricultural land following a nuclear accident:

•   Cost-benefit analysis of remediation strategies should include consideration of production
    losses, applicability, acceptability and social and environmental costs
•   The geographical scale of strategy evaluation should be established
•   Consumer acceptability of products is a significant challenge to the restoration of economic
    viability to contaminated land

Extensive data are required to properly assess the costs and benefits of remediation. Experience
in Europe is that these data are not always available in central databases but may be obtained
directly from local farm personnel.

It is suggested that an approach to strategy evaluation which incorporates local assessment stages
will maximise the use of the available data.


'International Atomic Energy Agency (1994) Guidelines for agricultural countermeasures
following an accidental release of radionuclides. Technical Reports Series No. 353. IAEA

2Bertilsson, J., Andersson, I, Johanson, K.J. (1988). Feeding green-cut forage contaminated by
radioactive fallout to dairy cows.  Health Physics, 55: 855-862

3Jouve, A., Schulte, E., Bon, P. and Cardot, A.L., (1993). Mechanical and physical removing of
soil and plants as agricultural mitigation techniques. The Science of the Total Environment, 137:

4Brynildsen, L.I., Selnaes, T.D., Strand, P. and Hove, K., (1996). Cpuntermeasures for
radiocesium in animal products in Norway after the Chernobyl accident B techniques,
effectiveness and costs. Health Physics 70(5): 665-672

5Wilkins, B.T., Howard, B.J., Desmet, G.M., Alexakhin, R.M. and Maubert, H., (1993).
 Strategies for deployment of agricultural countermeasures. The Science of the Total
Environment, 137: 1-8.

6Nisbet, A.F., (1993).  Effect of soil-based countermeasures on solid-liquid equilibria in
 agricultural soils contaminated with radiocaesium and radiostrontium. The Science of the Total
 Environment, 137: 99-118.
 Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

 	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

    Counter-measures in Forest Ecosystems: a Preliminary Classification in Term of Dose
                            Reduction and Ecological Quality

             Maria Belli1, Barbara Rafferty2, Hugh Synnott2,and Umberto Sansone1

              1 - ANPA - National Environmental Protection Agency, Roma, Italy
           2 - RPn - The Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland, Dublin, Ireland


 Overall in Europe, forests account for about 28% of the total land area.1-2 It is interesting to note
 that in contrast to other parts of the world, recent trends in land use in Europe have shown a
 general decline in arable/cropland and an increase in forests.

 in the aftermath of the accident  at Chernobyl, it was difficult to define the contribution to the
 dose to man from forests and to adopt well-justified countermeasures, because there was very
 little information relating to the impact to man of radioactive fallout on forests. After the fallout
 from atmospheric nuclear weapons testing, in the 1960's, considerable attention was paid to the
 effect of fallout on agricultural products, drinking water, etc. but only the lichen-caribou-man
 and lichen-reindeer-man food chain was studied for natural and semi-natural environments.3'4
 The few observations in semi-natural environments in the 1960's and the studies carried out after
 the Kystym accident (in which mainly Sr-90 was released) showed that in these environments,
 radionuclides remain available for a longer time than in agricultural systems.5

 In the wake of the Chernobyl accident, it became apparent that forest ecosystems are very
 important sources of dose to man which demand careful management. Nine years after the
 Chernobyl event, the 137Cs concentrations in plants grown in forests and in meadows
 had not declined significantly.6 Meat and milk from animals grazing on clearings as well as
 mushrooms, wild berries  and game, contribute a significant dose to man.7 Restrictions in the use
 of food products coming from semi-natural ecosystems are still necessary in some heavily
 contaminated areas of Belarus.7  At present, the intake of radiocaesium and radiostrontium
 through food from semi-natural  systems is, in some areas, the greatest contribution to the dose to
 man. Additionally, external doses may be received by forestry workers and groups of population
 using timber for furniture or building material. Wood industries, like pulp mills, consuming large
 amounts of wood, concentrate radionuclides in their waste products. In highly contaminated
 areas these wastes can be a source of external dose to workers in wood industries. Furthermore,
 in the heavily contaminated areas of CIS countries, forests are a potential reservoir of secondary
 contamination and forest fires represent  a resuspension risk. In the long-term, the contribution to
 the dose to man from forests may be, for some groups of population, more important than that
 from agricultural and urban areas.7
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

Counter-measures aim to minimise the radiological impact to man of nuclear contamination of an
environment. Their effectiveness  is generally expressed in terms of dose reduction. The design
of a post-nuclear accident management strategy involves  appraisal of the benefits of dose
reduction versus the cost of implementation. The cost of implementation is generally
calculated as a function of manpower, equipment, consumables and in some cases  waste
disposal. Experience since the Chernobyl accident has demonstrated that  additional factors
relating to practicality and side effects must be considered during the evaluation of
countermeasure options.

The aim of this paper is to evaluate the state of knowledge in Europe with respect to
countermeasures in forest ecosystems and to suggest a preliminary classification in terms of dose
reduction and ecological quality.


A Preliminary Classification of Countermeasures in Forest

In the last 12 years, considerable research has been carried out in Europe aimed at devising
countermeasures for reducing the radiological impact of land contaminated by the Chernobyl
fallout. Table 1 presents a summary of the countermeasures evaluated so far which have
potential for use in forests. Little research has been targeted specifically at forest ecosystems.
The majority of the countermeasure research is related to agriculture and application to forests
has by and large not been tested. The research also focused mainly on the effectiveness of the
countermeasure whereas practicality of application and potential secondary impacts of the
countermeasures were seldom reported. Because of the lack of direct forest research in many
cases it was necessary to extrapolate conclusions based on agricultural systems to the forest

A first classification of the countermeasures reported in Table 1 has been carried out considering
their applicability, the timing of countermeasure application, the time period over which the
countermeasures is effective and their impact on ecological quality.                   *
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 	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference
 Table 1. Forest Countermeasures
  measure Type
Action taken/
Secondary Ecological Effects
    Soil Based
                  • Clay minerals
                  • Potassium
                  • Liming
                  Most effective on
                  organic soils
                  Application and
                  adequate mixing in
                  forest soils is
                  impractical due to
                  presence of roots and
                  understory vegetation
                         • Change in floral composition recorded on upland
                           organic pastures treated with bentonite and lime.
                         • May alter availability of fungi and forest fruits
                         • K may enhance understorey biomass but the effect will
                           be short lived
                         • K may limit bioavailability of micronutrients
                         • Excessive lime treatment may reduce the fine root
                           biomass of conifers
                         • Liming can reduce the bioavailability of essential
                           nutrients especially P
   Soil Based   . Ploughing
                  • Soil surface
                • Impractical due to
                  physical heterogeneity
                  of the forest floor and
                  poor equipment access.
                           Damage to roots and geophytic plants
                           Destruction of understorey vegetation
                           Ploughing displaces contamination to deeper in the  •
                           soil profile
                           Potential contamination of ground water
                           Erosion risk
                           Loss or dilution of nutrient pool in surface soil layers;
                           Organic soil removal generates 5-100t/ha of
                           contaminated waste
                           Each additional 1cm removal of mineral soil generates
                           100-150t/ha of contaminated waste
                           Loss of forest grazing                            t
                           Alternative fodder required                       ;
                           Loss of forest fruits and fungi                    :
                           Loss of game/hunting
                           Alternative foods required
                           Reduction of amenity value
                   Litter removal
                 Over a small area
                 (urban park) litter
                 removal may be done
                 To be effective, timing
                 is critical
                        • Damage to understorey vegetation
                        • Minor loss of nutrients
                        • Generation of contaminated waste
Washington, D.C.
                                           September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

Table 1. Forest Countermeasures (continued)
nf*!Kiiv*p TVTIP
Action taken/
  A nnli cation
                                  Practicality/Suitability   Secondary Ecological Effects
  Forest      • Restrict human
Management   access to forest
                                  • Difficult to enforce
                                  • Education required
                                  • Forest maintenance
                                    and fire prevention
                                    must be continued
                                         Loss of forest grazing
                                         Loss of forest fruits and fungi
                                         Loss of hunting
                                         Alternative foods required
                                         Reduced control over game population
                                         Loss of amenity value
                                         Loss of fire-wood
                                         Negative psychological impact	
                  • Restrict access
                   by grazing
                                 Difficult to enforce
                                 Education required
                                         No ecological effects
                                         Alternative fodder required
                                         Negative psychological impact
                   Restrict         • Difficult to enforce
                   consumption of  • Education required
                   forest foods
                                                         Loss of forest fruits and fungi
                                                         Loss of hunting
                                                         Alternative foods required
                                                         Reduced control over game population
                                                         Loss of amenity value
                                                         Negative psychological impact
• Change game
hunting season
• Delay forest
• Difficult to enforce
• Education required
• Forest maintenance
and fire prevention
must be continued
• Reduced game weights
• Game may be more difficult to locate
• Change in traditional practices
• Enhanced risk of timber loss through
disease and wind fall
• Possible loss of timber quality
• Loss of employment
• Prolonged amenity value
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                       International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference
    measure Type
  Action taken/
Practicality/Suitability   Secondary Ecological Effects
                  • Change to
                   Staff retraining
                    Market required
                           Disposal of clearfelled trees
                           Change of landscape
                           Change of forest ecology
                           Loss of understorey vegetation
                           Loss of forest fruits and fungi
                           Loss of hunting
                           Alternative foods required
                           Loss of amenity value
                           High fertilizer demand
                           Altered hydrology
                           Soil erosion risk
                           Possible contamination of water bodies
                           Migration of game to alternative habitats
                           Change in employment pattern
                           Loss of timber processing industry
                           Spread of contamination via saplings
   Tree Based

• Defoliation and
  removal of
  leaves/ needles
• Timing is critical
• More applicable to
  deciduous trees
Leaf loss will damage trees severely
Defoliant may have toxic effect on flora and fauna
Possible contamination of water bodies
Access by humans and domestic animals may be
Hunting and wild food collection may be suspended
Alternative foods and fodder required
Minor loss of nutrients
Generation of contaminated waste
Alteration of landscape
Negative psychological impact

The application of countermeasures can be optimised on the basis of knowledge about the effects
of soil type on transfer of radionuclides to forest biomass. Depending on soil characteristics
particular forests may require restrictions applicable to a more (or less) contaminated zone. For
example, forests on hydromorfic soils (with a well developed holorganic layer) have a high
transfer of contamination to wood so require restrictions applicable to a more contaminated zone
(one class more severe). Less strict limitations (one contamination class) are required on soils
with heavy texture (clay and loamy soils). Soil type may also be used to prioritise the application
of countermeasures.
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

Timing of Application

The evaluation of the benefit in terms of dose reduction by some countermeasures depends on
time elapsed from the deposition and on the characteristics of the forests. Litter removal for
example would be more effective for deciduous trees if contamination occurs just before autumn.
If the contamination occurs at other periods for deciduous trees and for coniferous trees in
general this method could be effective from six months to one year after the accident. In the case
of the Chernobyl accident, litter removal carried out in autumn 1986 could have removed
between 10 to 20% of the total radiocaesium deposit.8 Similarly, tree defoliation is only effective
while the canopy retains the contamination. Data from Chernobyl show that 80-90% of total
forest contamination could be removed by defoliation within the first 6 months of the accident.8
In the analysis of the cost computation of this remediation action it is necessary to consider the
cost of the transport and the treatment of a large volume of radioactive waste. The relatively slow
migration of radionuclides in the forest soil4 means that timing is not so critical for soil based or
forest management countermeasures.

Duration of Effect

Information on the persistence of radionuclides in the forest compartments and knowledge of the
dynamics of radionuclides in these ecosystems are required to determine the duration of effect of
the different countermeasures. The duration of effect is a major component of the calculation of
averted dose. Data collected in the wake of the Chernobyl accident have shown that tree wood
will become increasingly contaminated and the 137Cs concentration will reach a maximum
between the years 1998 and 2010.9 Data on mushrooms show that for some species there is no
significant decrease with time.8 These data indicate, therefore, that remediation measures taken
soon after contamination will have a long term dose saving effect.

Defoliation and litter removal have long term benefits in that they reduce the contamination
source in the forest - but the waste produced by these actions present long-term disposal

Restriction of access to forests and use of forest products results in an instantaneous dose
reduction but this action must be sustained over many years to be continually effective. These
measures require  the population to change traditional practices which involves the loss, for
extended periods, of foodstuffs traditionally collected in the forest. The economic effect may be
significant and the cultural change can cause a strong negative psychological impact on the

Ecological Effects

Secondary impacts on the  forest as a result of countermeasure application are important
considerations in  countermeasure evaluation because very often the direct economic costs
associated with the action  (for example, loss of timber value) are less important than the impact
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 	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

 on other forest functions. Forests have many functions in the environment (e.g., a production
 system for wood for industry and fuel, a habitat, a grazing place for domestic animals, a source
 of food, a territory for game, a recreation ground for man, a feature of the landscape). The forest
 gives stability to soil, intercepts precipitation and forms an attractive barrier to sound, unpleasant
 views and airborne contaminants. The more functions, either economic, social or environmental
 that a forest has, the greater its value and the more precious its ecology.

 A classification of forest countermeasures in terms of their impact on the forest ecology must
 consider both the severity of the secondary effects as well as the range of functions which will be
 put at risk by this secondary effect. Table 1 indicates the potential secondary impacts of the listed
 countermeasures. It is clear that some have more potential effects than others.

 The majority of research effort has targeted soil-based countermeasures which are most effective
 in agricultural situations. The important role of soil in the bio- and geo-sphere means that there is
 potentially a very wide range of secondary effects associated with any interference in soil. The
 radiological literature which propose soil based countermeasures do not do justice to the
 important role of soil in the environment.

 Table 1 lists both physical and chemical soil amendments as countermeasures and indicates that
 chemical applications to soil are less ecologically damaging than the physical. Any of the
 impacts listed will be magnified if a large forested area are to be treated. Changes to the forest
 soil will affect the availability of forest fruits and the use of the forest for grazing. In small
 forested areas such as in an urban parkland, these measures may be justified on the basis of the
 large social benefit to be derived from the preservation of a parkland.  In this case, any secondary
 effects of the countermeasure which risked the health of the forest would defeat the purpose of

 Chemical defoliation is a frequently suggested action but the loss of all leaves is a severe shock
 to the physiology of a tree, especially to coniferous trees. In addition to this effect, there are
 significant potential ecological hazards associated with the defoliant. The defoliant is likely to
 affect all of the forest flora with knock-on effects in the forest fauna. There is also a risk that the
 defoliant could spread to water bodies. As with the soil based countermeasures the potential
 secondary effects associated with defoliation may be acceptable for small area treatments where
 understorey vegetation has not got a food role.


 With forest management measures there are few direct losses of ecological quality. However, the
 restriction of forest use by the public reduces the value of the forest to the local community
 which in turn can negatively impact the public perception of the wider environment and of their
 quality of life. This indicates again the important role of public education programs in such forest
 management based countermeasures. Listed under forest management is the option to change
 forestry production to one of nursery production. This management option preserves commercial
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

activity but it is dependent on the availability of markets and it would require a shift in the labour
patterns. This action also has the most severe ecological consequences because it involves the
loss of the forest itself and every function which it performed in the community and the


1.  United Nations Environmental Programme Environmental  Data Report, 1991. Blackwell,

2.  The agricultural situation in the Community,  1991 Report.  Commission of the European
   Communities, 1992, Luxembourg.

3.  Bird, P.M.; 1968, Studies of Fallout 137Cs in the Canadian North; Archives of Environmental
   Health; 1968, 17,631638.

4.  Bird, P.M.; Radionuclides in Foods; The Canadian Medical Association Journal; 1966,94,

5. Alexakhin, R.M., Ginsburg, L.R., Mednik, I.G, Prokhorov V.M.;  1994, Model of 90Sr
   Cycling in a Forest Biogeocenosis; The Science of the Total Environment; 1994,157, 83-91.

6. Belli, M., Tikhomirov F.A, Kliashtorin, A., Shchlegov A., Rafferty, B., Shaw, G., Wirth, E.,
   Kammerer, L., Ruehm, W., Steiner, M., Delvaux, B., Maes, E., Kruyts, N., Bunzl,  K.,
   Dvomik, A.M. and Kuchma, N., 1996, Dynamics of radionuclides in forest environments,
   Proceedings of the First International Conference on the Radiological Consequences of the
   Chernobyl Accident. European Commission and the Belarus, Russian and Ukrainian
   Ministries on Chernobyl Affairs, Emergency Situations and Health, 69-80, EUR 16544 EN.

7. Strand, P., Balonov, M., Skuterud, L., Hove, K., Howard, B., Prister, B.S., Travnikova and
   Ratnikov, A.,  1996, Exposure from consumption of agricultural and semi-natural products,
   Proceedings of the First International Conference on the Radiological Consequences of the
   Chernobyl Accident. European Commission and the Belarus, Russian and Ukrainian
   Ministries on Chernobyl Affairs, Emergency Situations and Health, 261-269, EUR 16544

 8.  Belli,  M. & Tikhomirov F.A. editors;  1996, Behaviour of radionuclides in natural and
    semi-natural environments; Final Report of ECP-5 Project (1991-1996), EUR 16531.

 9.  Tikhomirov F.A., Shchlegov A. and Sidorov, V.P.; 1993, Forest and Forestry: radiation
    protection measures with special reference to the Chernobyl accident zone. Sci. Total
    Environ., 1993,  137 289- 305.
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September 9-11, 1998

 .	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

       Phytoextraction and Phytostabilization of Radionuclides in Contaminated Soils

                Rufus L. Chaney (1), Pamela Russell (2),  and Minnie Malik (3)

      (1) US Dept. of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, Environmental Chemistry
                                Laboratory, Beltsville, MD
 (2) US-Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Radiation and Indoor Air, Washington, DC
              (3) Dept. Plant Science, University of Maryland, College Park, MD

 Remediation of soils contaminated with radionuclides has historically been removal and
 replacement of the soil. New approaches to remediate the risk of soil radionuclides" by
 phytoremediation (phytoextraction or phytostabilization) are being developed.  In
 phytoextraction, plant species which accumulate unusually high concentrations (have very high
 bioconcentration factors) compared to crop plants are being grown as a "hay" crop. The hay is
 grown using management practices to maximize yield and accumulation of the contaminant,
 dried in the field, baled, and the biomass burned or pyrolyzed to produce a concentrated ash
 which is a significant part of the total soil contaminant in  a small mass. This reduces the cost of
 appropriate disposal of the contaminants, and retains soil fertility. During the remediation
 period, cropping limits wind or water erosion of the contaminated soil, and evapotranspiration
 reduces potential for leaching.


 Phytostabilization uses application of chemicals or soil amendments which reduce the
 bioavailability of the contaminant in soil. Plants may play a direct role by oxidation of
 xenobiotics, or by accumulating an element needed to inactivate a contaminant (such as
 accumulating phosphate which improves the rate of formation of chloropyromorphite, a
 crystalline Pb solid which has very low bioavailability). Application of adsorbents such as
 hydrous Fe and Mn oxides can increase adsorption or precipitation of a contaminant, or favor
 occlusion within the more crystalline solids formed over time. If bioavailability is persistently
 reduced such that environmental risk is reduced to required levels of protection,
 phytostabilization can be a practical remediation. Demonstration of the persistence of the
 reduction in bioavailability is a necessary to win acceptance of phytostabilization.

 Technologies are under development for phytoremediation/phytoextraction of the elements Zn,
 Cd, Ni, Co, and Se using hyperaccumulator plants, and for Hg and Se using phytovolatilization.
 Soil and crop management practices are being optimized to maximize annual removals.
 Evidence has been reported that some radionuclides (Cs, Sr, Co) can be effectively
 phytoextracted, and more radionuclides are being studied.  Addition of chelating agents can
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

increase uptake of some metals or radionuclides, but leaching would need to be controlled if this
approach were applied in the field.

Application of phytoextraction to specific radionuclides using specific plants. We have
completed a Critical Review of the literature on Phytoremediation of Soil Radionuclides to
identify both promising plant species for specific radionuclides, and appropriate methods for
evaluation of phytoextraction, and a Report is being prepared.

Response Criteria

Response Actions are limited reactions to releases of hazardous substances into the environment
to minimize hazard or dispersal.  Phytostabilization could be an Emergency Response wherein
cover crops which have reduced uptake of radionuclides of concern are grown on the site. An
effective vegetative cover can be achieved on nearly any site if soil analysis is conducted to
identify deficient nutrients or toxic elements, and existing pH and adsorption'ability of the soil.
Inexpensive locally available byproducts may provide needed changes in soil nutrients and toxic
element phytoavailability so that desired plants can be grown; plant species which exclude
radionuclides from food-chain plant tissues could be sown and maintained using conventional
agricultural practices.


Phytoextraction as a Response Technology?

Thus the Agency has begun to gather information about phytoremediation and its possible
application as a cleanup technology. Bioremediation and Phytoremediation have some
similarities in their application to contaminated soils, and present similar issues to On Scene
Coordinators considering use following a release event. We believe that research and
demonstration of radionuclide phytoextraction will show the ability of this technology to achieve
practical remediation of soil radionuclides, and provide the information needed for public
decisions on use of phytoextraction of contaminated sites.
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Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

                 Session D, Track 2:

               Public Health Issues I

                  Thursday, September 10, 1998
                     10:10a.m.-12:40 p.m.
Chair: Jim Rabb, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

                   International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference
                           Operation Chernobyl Challenge:
              The Public Health Response by US Military Forces in Europe

                       Larry Luckett1, Eric Daxon2 and John Parker3

                    US Army 7th Medical Command, Heidelberg, FRG

                  1) Current Address = Dames & Moore, Pearl River, NY
          2) Current Address = US Army Medical Command, Ft Sam Houston, TX
  3) Current Address = US Army Medical Research and Materiel Command, Ft Detrick, MD


News of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station accident and its widespread environmental
radioactive contamination became public knowledge on April 28, 1986. At that time, more than
500,000 US military members, US government civilian employees and their families were
working and living in Europe. For information on health threats and for guidance on precautions
to take, these American citizens looked to their own government, rather than the governments of
the countries in which they resided. To coordinate the public information and health response
actions, the United States European Command (USEUCOM) organized a Chernobyl Task Force
in the Office of the Command Surgeon.  Cooperating with US State Department and local host
nation authorities, the Chernobyl Task Force responded through a variety of actions to evaluate
the hazard and  to ensure the safety of US personnel.

The USEUCOM is the Department of Defense element exercising operational command of US
Forces in Europe. In 1986, the USEUCOM area of responsibility covered 13 million square
miles, from the North Cape of Norway through the Mediterranean, most of Africa and parts of
the Middle East.  Although planning for an NATO conflict was first priority at USEUCOM,
consideration also was given to contingency planning for humanitarian relief in the event of
natural disaster or terrorist activity. Tactical US military units in Europe with nuclear
monitoring capability were organized for wartime responsibilities with detection equipment
optimized for evaluating relatively intense radioactivity in a nuclear exchange environment. The
military medical units in Europe did have sufficient radiological evaluation equipment to support
their peacetime missions of medical treatment, occupational health and environmental hygiene.
However, military units did not have the mission of routine monitoring for environmental
radioactivity in a peacetime or garrison situation.

Following early reports of the accident, USEUCOM established a crisis management team to
address the situation as it developed. The initial team meeting on April 29, 1986 brought
together US Army medical staff consultants in public health, preventive medicine, radiological
hygiene, veterinary medicine/food sanitation, nuclear medicine, medical operations  and medical
logistics. In subsequent meetings the team was augmented with representatives from public
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

affairs and members representing Navy and Air Force Commands, and was designated as the
USEUCOM Chernobyl Task Force (CTF). Under the direction of an Army Medical Corps
physician, the CTF accumulated radiological data, evaluated information and planned public
health responses to minimize the radiological impact of the accident on US personnel in Europe.


Public Affairs

The main crisis management function of the CTF evolved to be information management:
obtaining information, interpreting data, developing guidance and disseminating public
instructions. In this context, environmental radioactivity data played the major role. Initially,
sources of radiological data were the newspapers, the US Embassy in Bonn, the Federal German
Interior Ministry Crisis Action Center in Bonn, the German Weather Service and German
military liaison officers with German State governments. Later, environmental monitoring data
by US military forces were routed to the task force to support their deliberations.

Although organized as a crisis management team and working from an emergency operations
center, the most significant determination by the Task Force was that the situation in Western
Europe was neither a "crisis" nor an "emergency."  The situation was certainly not normal, but
based on the operations and evaluations discussed below, the CTF concluded that individuals
taking reasonable precautions following public health directives need not be exposed to other
than a negligible individual risk. The CTF developed recommendations covering food, milk and
water, and precautions for children and pregnant women using existing Federal guidance
documents1'2 and distributed its guidance and information through several available information
channels. Environmental situation analyses were provided to military services for their use.
Military hospital commanders were encouraged to contact the CTF daily for updated
information. Public announcements were provided in press releases, published in English
language newspapers ("The Stars & Stripes") and broadcast on the US Armed Forces Network
radio and television stations. The CTF directed several operations by military personnel to
monitor radioactivity in people, milk, foodstuffs, equipment and the environment. These results
gave the CTF first-hand knowledge of conditions, lending credence to public announcements on
the environmental situation.3

Protocol for Screening Tourists

When the accident occurred at the Chernobyl power station, there happened to be two groups of
U.S. military personnel family members on commercial tours inside the USSR. The unknown
situation within the USSR following the accident led USEUCOM officials to concerns for
radiation exposures to the individual tour members and for contaminated items they might bring
back to the West. Planning for the reception of these groups built on operational procedures
used previously when USEUCOM medical units had received American hostages returning from
Middle East locations. However, in this situation several differences complicated the execution:
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

since the time of the accident was not certain, it was unclear whether the groups had departed
Kiev before or after the release of radioactivity from Chernobyl; the tour groups were arriving at
commercial rather than military airports; and the tour groups were traveling on commercial
airlines rather than military aircraft.

Army units met one tour group upon its arrival at Frankfurt, Germany, while Air Force units met
the other tour group in Luxembourg. Both screening operations included monitoring individuals
and their baggage for external contamination, obtaining individual itineraries and medical
histories, performing thyroid counts and obtaining bioassay samples to assess internal
contamination, and incorporating all analyses and interpretations into the individual's medical
record.  Radioactivity above background was not detected on any luggage nor in the thyroids,
nasal swabs or fingernail scrapings of the 88 group members.

Food Supply Monitoring

Fresh foods for consumption by US personnel were obtained from many outlets throughout the
European theater. Following the Chernobyl radioactivity release, health agencies in each nation
began monitoring food distribution points and enforced national Standards for radiologically
contaminated items. Food inspectors from USEUCOM veterinary service units traveled to
wholesale markets, bulk issue  points, and US commissary distribution warehouses to monitor the
food supplies destined for American tables in Europe. Inspectors also obtained representative
food and dairy product samples for analysis in the Army medical laboratory. Other samples were
sent to the US for analysis by the Food and Drug Administration. Information on this
surveillance and knowledge of these efforts reassured the American population in Europe of the
safely of their food supply.4

Monitoring Mission to Moscow

Following the news of the reactor accident, personnel at the American embassy in Moscow were
presented with a dilemma of unknown proportions.  While the Western press was reporting
widespread radioactive contamination and fallout in countries surrounding the USSR, the Soviet
government would not discuss the radiation situation inside the country.  At the request of the
US State Department, USEUCOM dispatched a Radiation Advisory Medical Team (RAMT) to
Moscow to advise the US Ambassador on the radiation status and to evaluate any hazards to the
community of Americans in the USSR.  The team of Army officers (three health physicists, a
food sanitation veterinarian, and a nuclear medicine physician) arrived in Moscow on
May 3,1986, only five days following the first public knowledge of radioactivity fallout.

While in the USSR, the RAMT surveyed the US embassy in Moscow, the US Consulate mission
in Leningrad, and the living quarters of US families in both cities. Without an opportunity to
interact with Soviet government officials, the Team established its own environmental
monitoring program to support the US Ambassador's need for information. The radiation
monitoring activities conducted at these locations included surveys of external radiation
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

exposure and surface fallout contamination, individual body scans and thyroid counts, daily air
samples for radioactive particulates and radioiodine, screening of foods, and sample collection
for definitive analysis in the USA. All monitoring results were discussed with Embassy staff and
were forwarded to the US Federal Chernobyl Interagency Task Force in Washington, D.C.,
providing a basis for the determination that there was not a radiological health risk in remaining
in Leningrad or Moscow.5 The RAMT departed Moscow for return to Germany on 13 May
1986, following the Soviet announcement that the reactor fire had been extinguished.

Environmental Radioactivity Monitoring

Local environmental radioactivity data was available to the CTF from US State Department and
host-nation authorities. However, the information was often delayed due to multiple
bureaucratic channels, sometimes confusing due to the radiological units reported, and even
unavailable for some geographic locations in which US populations were domiciled. Limited
environmental data from impromptu monitoring by military units was also available.

Health physicists at the US Army 10th Medical Laboratory, Landstuhl, Germany had begun
sampling on 29 April.  Landstuhl is in southwest Germany, adjacent to the major logistics
centers of the US Air Force base at Ramstein and the Army depots at Kaiserslautern, and it is
more than 1,600 km (1,000 miles) due west of Chernobyl. Around Landstuhl in the
Kaiserslautern vicinity lived and worked almost 60,000 Americans, at that time comprising the
largest American community outside the US. Environmental sampling included airborne
particulate radioactivity, airborne iodine/gaseous radioactivity and radioactivity in rainfall.
Preventive Medicine units of the US Air Force also collected air and soil samples from air bases
in eight countries throughout western Europe. Sufficient samples were collected and analyzed to
give a picture of the radioactivity situation as the fallout cloud passed through the area in early
May 1986. A spectrum of gamma energy from the May 1, 1986 air sample filter revealed gamma
rays characteristic of the presence of the fission products Ru-103,1-131,1-132, Te-132, Cs-134
and Cs-137.

On May 12, 1986 the CTF began a theater-wide^sampling program using Army 7th MEDCOM
Preventive Medicine personnel and equipment assets. Besides obtaining environmental data,  the
CTF intended the program be used to evaluate analytical system constraints and capabilities, and
to identify equipment needs for future use of the sampling program by other military services.
The program involved environmental monitoring at 18 sites, 15 locations in West Germany, and
individual sites in West Berlin, Belgium and Italy.  These sites coincided with or were adjacent
to communities and training sites with large populations of US personnel. Media sampled
included air particulates and air gases daily, while drinking water, surface soil and rain water
were sampled twice per week. Samples were sent daily to the Army Medical  Laboratory in
Landstuhl for analysis.

By May 30, 1986, after the collection and analysis of more than 350 samples, it was evident that
radioactivity levels had returned to baseline levels. On June 1, 1986 the monitoring intensity
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 	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

 was reduced to weekly air samples and monthly samples of soil and drinking water.  This
 monitoring level was continued for 11 months to allow baseline radiation characterization of the
 various US communities, while analyzing system constraints and procedures.  In early May
 1987, the environmental monitoring system moved into a maintenance mode of semiannual

 Evaluation of Hazards to Troop Exercises

 A remaining concern following the Soviet announcement that the accident situation had
 stabilized was whether the fallout in local areas would have any impacts on military training
 operations. As tanks and tactical vehicles maneuver in the training areas, significant amounts of
 surface dust become resuspended in the local atmosphere.  If significant fallout radioactivity
 were present in the soil, breathing this resuspended activity could present a health hazard to
 troops engaged in tactical exercises and training. In late May 1986 the CTF initiated an
 evaluation  of surface soil radioactivity at Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels Training Areas in
 Southern Germany that had reported higher levels of airborne radioactivity continuing into

 Surface soil samples, shallow soil plugs and deep soil core samples were collected adjacent to
 tank trails and samples of road dust were also collected from  the tank trail.  All samples were
 analyzed for total alpha and total  beta activity; surface dust samples were further analyzed for
 gamma activity. Abnormal levels of radioactivity were not observed in any of the soil samples,
 although sample-to-sample variations were noted. Soil core samples showed little variation in
 radioactivity from the surface down to a six-inch depth, showing that significant fallout had not
 accumulated on the ground surface. Gamma radiation spectroscopic analysis of the road dust
 samples indicated the radioactivity was consistent with naturally occurring radioactive Thorium,
 and the spectrum did not show the presence of reactor-produced gamma-emitting nuclides such
 as Cs-137.

 The absence of abnormal levels of environmental radioactivity in the soils at the Training Areas
 indicated that short or long term radiological health hazards from exposure to resuspended road
 dusts and surface soils were not present during training activities.  This finding confirmed that
 the Army training to support  the NATO mission could continue without distraction by undue
 health concerns.


 Through these diverse public health response activities following the Chernobyl Nuclear Power
 Station accident, the USEUCOM assured the safety of American military and family members in
 Europe. The operations directed by the USEUCOM Chernobyl Task Force provided data and
 evaluations to support an extensive public information effort to address the concerns of the
 community of Americans far from familiar information sources. The activities of the military
 forces' Chernobyl Task Force during and after the radioactivity release provided credible
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

information that dispelled public uncertainty and enabled continued military operations and
diplomatic functions.


1. Background for Protective Action Recommendations: Accidental Radioactive Contamination
   of Foods and Animal Feeds. Rockville, MD: US Department of Health and Human Services;
   HHS Pub No. FDA82-8196; 1982.

2. Preparedness and Response in Radiation Accidents. Rockville, MD: US Department of
   Health and Human Services; HHS Pub No. FDA83-8211; 1983.

3. J. Parker, "7th MEDCOM Task Force Monitors Contamination", MEDCOM Examiner, vol
    17, No 6, June 1986.

4. Letters, "Answering safety worries after Chernobyl," The Stars and Stripes, Aug 2, 1986,
   page 11.

5. L. Luckett, J. Bliss, M. Pacilio, J. Wempe and M. Strang, "Radiological Monitoring Mission:
   Moscow," presented to 31st Annual Meeting, Health Physics Society, Pittsburg, PA, July
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      '	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

                   Application of Environmental Dose Reconstruction to
                      Post-Emergency Response Public Health Issues

               Charles W. Miller, James M. Smith, and Robert C. Whitcomb, Jr.

                                 Radiation Studies Branch
                    Division of Environmental Hazards and Health Effects
                          National Center for Environmental Health
                         Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
                                     Atlanta, Georgia

 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is currently responsible for
 environmental dose-reconstruction activities at four different nuclear weapons production sites in
 the United States under a Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Energy
 and the Department of Health and Human Services. An environmental dose reconstruction is a
 comprehensive analysis of the exposure received by people living in the vicinity of facilities that
 have released contaminants into the environment.  One goal of a dose reconstruction is to
 estimate exposures and doses as realistically as possible for a given site.  The results of CDC-
 conducted dose reconstructions are being used as the basis for performing risk analyses and
 deciding what other public health activities should be undertaken around these sites.2 In
 addition, the results of dose reconstruction can be  used in other site-specific risk assessment
 activities, such as those associated with environmental restoration and radioactive waste

 During a post-emergency response following a major release of radionuclides to the
 envkonment, public health will be of utmost concern to persons affected by the event. While
 State and local officials have primary responsibility for the health and safety of their citizens,3 all
 people involved in the post-emergency response will be involved to some extent in providing
 information to the public on the possible health consequences resulting from their exposure to
 radionuclides. Providing this information will require knowledge of the radiological doses
 received during the event. Such doses will likely need to be  reconstructed from environmental
 and other types of measurements made during and after the emergency event.


 CDC is currently using a phased approach in conducting the  technical aspects of environmental
 dose reconstructions.3 These phases are summarized in Table 1. However, CDC has learned that
 there is more to a credible dose reconstruction project than technical work.  Public involvement
 is critical to this process.1 A meaningful public involvement program not only provides a forum
 to allow community members to voice their concerns so they can be considered by the project,
but it also builds credibility in the community for the technical work that is being done. Such a
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

program also ensures that the government agency responsible for the dose reconstruction is
accountable to the community. Indeed, the success of any dose reconstruction depends as much
on public involvement in the project as on the scientific and technical credibility of the methods
used to estimate doses and exposures.3

Table 1. Technical phases of an environmental dose reconstruction project.
         I          Locate and catalog all records applicable to the dose reconstruction

         n          Estimate a source term for the site (i.e., a listing of what toxicants were
                    released, what amounts of each were released, the point(s) on site where
                    they were released, how and when they were released, and the physical
                    and chemical form of the release)

         HI         Perform screening calculations to help determine which contaminants at a
                    site are of most or least concern to human or environmental health and
                    which environmental media and pathways of exposure or sections of the
                    site require additional study

         IV         Develop more detailed assessment models that use as much site-specific
                    data as available and incorporate a quantitative uncertainty analysis in  the
                    assessment results

         V         Using the models and data gathered in previous phases, perform as
	             realistic a dose and risk analysis as possible

Public involvement will be an important aspect of any post-emergency public health response,
too. One of the first steps that responders must take is to identify potential local stakeholders.
This will certainly include State and local elected and public health officials, but it will also
include members of the general public. It is not only important to assess the radiological dose
and risk to the public resulting from the emergency event, it is also critical to assess the public's
concern about the event.  This can only be done effectively by involving them directly in the
assessment process.

It is important that all phases of the radiological dose and risk assessment be conducted in as
open and public a manner as possible. For example, the compilation of all records related to the
emergency event must be an open process.  Copies of all records must be readily available for
public review even as they are being examined by scientists and engineers charged with
evaluating the event. Members of the public must be strongly encouraged to participate in the
record collection process, providing any information that they feel may be of importance,
including personal observations of activities that occurred during the emergency event.
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. However, this process must be sensitive to the need to protect personal identification data related
 to the information.

 As responders begin using the compiled records to reconstruct the source term for the event, care
 must be taken to insure that the public is involved in this process, too. Depending upon the exact
 nature of the radiological emergency, source term reconstruction can be very technical.
 However, responders must make the time and effort to help the public understand what is being
 done and why. This will require that the scientists and engineers doing the work interact with the
 public. CDC has learned through its dose reconstructions that scientists, not just public
 information specialists, must be available to answer questions from the public if those answers
 are going to have maximum credibility.  Also, any reconstructed source term will have some
 level of uncertainty associated with it. This uncertainty must be quantified and then discussed
 with the public in an open manner. The public knows that science is uncertain, and they
 appreciate it when scientists are open about it.

 Once the source term has been reconstructed, screening analyses can be performed to identify the
 most significant radionuclides and pathways of exposure for the event. Members of the public
 can be most helpful in performing this work. Are there any special or unusual populations in the
 exposed area? Are there any special or unusual pathways of exposure in the area? And just what
 is the area of concern for the event? From a purely technical point of view identifying the exact
 area around the event where exposures to people and/or ground contamination has occurred or
 could occur in the future is of utmost importance. For the public, however, clearly and
 convincingly delineating the area where exposures or contamination is NOT present may be of
 equal or greater importance.  The screening process is a way to begin judging community
 concerns and selecting programs, such as environmental monitoring and health education, to
 address those concerns.

 The results of the screening process can be used to select the necessary mathematical models and
 procedures to use in reconstructing the potential doses to people from the emergency event.
 Providing people with these doses is not the end of the public health process, however. The first
 thing people will ask is "but what does the dose estimate really mean to me; what is my risk from
 this event." These questions must be addressed with care and sensitivity by the responders. One
 aspect of the answer will be a program of health education both for members of the public and
 local  physicians.  CDC has found that members of the public consider their personal  physician a
 primary source for information of this nature. As a result, it is important that local physicians
 understand the dose and risk information associated with the emergency event. Another aspect
 of the response to people's concern will be the design and implementation of a highly visible and
 effective environmental monitoring program. This program should be designed to provide a high
level  of assurance to people that their health and safety is of utmost importance to responders.
As always, this program should have significant public involvement when it is being designed.
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference


There are no definitive guide books on how to implement an effective post-emergency response
public health program. All responses will, of necessity, be site-specific in nature. The key
consideration is that all responders must be flexible and be responsive to the needs and concerns
of the public. Again, the success of any post-emergency response will depend as much on public
involvement in the project as on the scientific and technical credibility of the methods used to
estimate doses and risks from the radiological release.


1. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry. Report on Workshop on Community, Tribal, and Labor Involvement in Public Health
Service Activities at Department of Energy Facilities. Atlanta, Georgia:  Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention. 1994 (DRAFT).

2. Devine, O.J., Qualters, J.R., Morrissey, J.L., and Wall, P. A. Estimation of the Impact of the
Former Feed Materials Production Center (FMPC) on Lung Cancer Mortality in the
Surrounding Community. Atlanta, Georgia: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 1998.

3. Miller, C.W., and Smith, J.M.  Why should we do environmental dose reconstructions?
Health Phys. 71:420-424; 1996.

4. Sakenas, C.A., McKenna, T.J., Miller, C.W., Hively, L.M., Sharpe, R.W., Giitter, J.G., and
Watkins, R.M. Pilot Program: NRC Severe Reactor Accident Incident Response Training
Manual; Response of Licensee and State and Local Officials. Report NUREG-1210, Vol. 3.
Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 1987.
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 	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

       A Discussion of Public Health Issues From a Severe Nuclear Reactor Accident

                                   Michael H. Momeni

                           Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety
                                Springfield, Illinois 62704


 Any strategy for implementation of protective actions for the general public following a nuclear
 power reactor accident must be based on justification and optimization of the imposed actions to
 produce a maximum benefit by reducing the total harm.  This paper discusses the influence of
 some of the factors affecting the analysis of risk and assignment of priorities in the creation of a
 rational and flexible strategy for post-emergency periods. The issues discussed include:
 radiation-induced risks, the impact of protective actions, and psychologically induced illnesses.


 Radiation-Induced Risks

 The risks induced by exposure to radiation have been catalogued, analyzed, and quantified by
 national and international agencies.1  Procedures for emergency preparedness for response to the
 emergency phase of a nuclear reactor accident have been fully documented.2  The levels of
 radiation-induced risk have been correlated with both rates and duration of exposure.3  The
 radiation risks during the post-emergency periods are principally from chronic irradiation due to
 inhalation of contaminated airborne radionuclides, ingestion of contaminated food and water,
 and external exposure to the contaminated ground. The principal radiation-induced effects are
 somatic late effects, which include stochastic effects such as leukemia, sarcoma, and carcinoma.
 Each one of these late effects has a period of latency, which is the time period between
 irradiation and manifestation of the cancers. The latency period may be from several years to
 decades long.

 A particular protective action may decrease the radiation dose, but the long-term decrease in
 somatic effects of the exposure may not be uniformly distributed for all age cohorts in the
 demographic distribution. This non-uniformity in protective effect is a consequence of a
 non-linear age-dose-response distribution. For example, for older adults whose remaining life
 span is less than the latency period for induction of a somatic effect, the effect of the
 radiation-induced risk may not be realized.3
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The Impact of Protective Actions

Among the most common emergency and intermediate protective actions are evacuation,
relocation, and restriction of the intake of contaminated food and water. All have associated
impacts and risks, as described below.

Some actions, such as evacuation and administration of potassium iodide (KI), could be
intrusive and may induce unintended harm. Evacuation under adverse climatological
conditions, such as a severe winter storm, could prove far riskier than the dose to be avoided.
Evacuation of medical facilities can pose high risks to the elderly or critically ill. Adverse
reactions to KI resulting from hypersensitivity to iodide, although uncommon, are not unknown.

Furthermore, while local emergency plans thoroughly address the use and implementation of
early protective actions like evacuation and sheltering, they commonly fail to address the
consequences of later actions; i.e., those involving potentially contaminated food, water,
animals, etc.  Evacuation decisions will likely be based on science (reactor stability, accident
sequences, dose assessments), while food chain decisions will more likely bow to public
perception. For example, following the Chernobyl accident, some foodstuffs grown in the
Ukraine were sampled, analyzed, and found to contain minimal amounts of radioactive
contamination, far below cut-off levels. Although science verified the safety of such products,
the public perception of risk was skewed, and these items were driven from the market. The
economic consequences were considerable.

Likewise, long-term actions for environmental cleanup can have drawbacks.  One long-term
protective action for a contaminated area is the option of "no action," permitting natural removal
of the radioactivity by surface runoff and by mechanical mixing of the contamination into deeper
soil matrices by wind and precipitation.4  Another option is surface stabilization using surface
active chemicals to reduce resuspension. This may also reduce relocation of the radioactivity by
surface wash off. Finally, deep tilling of the moist, agricultural land can be performed to reduce
resuspension of the radioactivity.  All of these options reduce availability of the land for an
extended period of time and would increase the potential for plant uptake and leaching of
radionuclides into the groundwater.

Psychologically Induced Illnesses

Psychologically induced illnesses  include both psychosomatic illnesses and the induction of
anxiety, depression, and helplessness.  Some  of the induced psychological effects are created by
overestimating the magnitude of the risks beyond the reality of the potential hazards. An
apprehension about risks of unknown events  and lack of control, fed by misinformation and poor
comprehension of reality, increases the anxiety and its consequences.

The psychological effects of major accidents, such as car, train,  and airplane crashes, or natural
disasters, such as floods, tornadoes, and earthquakes, have been studied and understood better
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than nuclear accidents. The public has become aware of the dangers and consequences of natural
disasters on the affected individuals and the environment; thus the public has developed a
reasonable comprehension of risks and realities. In contrast, our experience with nuclear reactor
accidents is embedded in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings.  The consequences of the
atomic bombs have created an unrealistic apprehension about non-military sources of radiation.
The horror of events in unscientific fiction and movies about monstrous genetic mutations are
etched into our memories. Radiation phobia (or radiophobia) is an expression for an
exaggerated perception of radiation risks. This phobia has been nurtured by decades of
misinformation while the real and significant risks in our daily life are downplayed. Although
we are all affected by any event that deviates from the daily routine—coping5 with evacuation or
food restrictions would be stressful enough~the prospect of additional actions such as whole
body counting and decontamination could induce even more anxiety and stress.

These psychological effects are physically real and are usually disproportionate to the magnitude
of the  radiation exposure.  These syndromes are classified as post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD)6 and chronic stress disorder (CSD). A major difference between these two disorders is
the duration of the stress itself. Whereas the duration of the stress may be brief for the onset of
PTSD, lasting up to several days, the stress would be chronic for CSD. In Chernobyl, the
continuity of the stress among the population created CSD, similar to that found among victims
of war and prolonged occupation. A review of the Three Mile Island7 (TMI) and Chernobyl8
accidents indicates that the PTSD and CSD contribution to  the total risk is significant. The
impact of induced psychological risks on the public health is difficult to analyze and quantify
using standard risk analysis techniques. Because these effects are hard to quantify, they often are
not included in the traditional methods of risk analysis. This is a serious omission.

A major objective following a severe nuclear reactor accident is allocation of regional and
national resources to reduce any potential public health risks. These allocations should be
cost-effective and based on realistic objectives for reduction of total harm. Unfortunately, this is
difficult in practice because of multiple factors affecting the decision process.

An optimum risk management structure would include elimination of interference among
several parallel imposed actions. Not all of the parameters for the evaluation are amenable to
digitalization (assignment of cost to a particular risk factor). In addition, some of the risk
parameters are subjective and many carry a large uncertainty in their value.9  These include biotic
uptake coefficients, resuspension coefficients, and the accuracy of measured radiation
concentrations in the environment.  Nevertheless, expert evaluation of these risks, including
some attempt at quantization, may permit the creation of scales for trade-off among several risks.
In contrast to the emergency and early post-emergency periods, a more systematic evaluation of
each of the input parameters could permit a more accurate estimation of the accident's
psychological, social, and economical impacts upon the society, and thus assist in the
development of longer-term strategies.
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

The trade-off among several risk factors has to be weighed against the long-term benefits and
cost-effectiveness of the actions to be taken. Assigning an economic weight to each risk
increment is fraught with difficulty, because it is non-linear in functional structure. For example,
the cost of the reduction of a particular risk from 50% to 10% may be economically worthwhile;
however, the corresponding cost of reductions from 10% to 1% may not be cost-effective.  Cost
analysis relative to the associated baselines (no protective action) for different risks may not be

Risks may also be shared unequally across a population. The psychological and economic
consequences of some protective actions may affect the members of older cohorts in the
population more than younger ones.  A uniform imposition of actions for all ages may be robust
and practicable; however, the consequences of the action may be non-uniform.  Segregation
based solely on age for any protective action would impose its own psychological effects,
adding anxiety and stress particularly to young families.

Any analysis of risks based solely on reduction of the radiation risks could easily underestimate
the total risk and cause more harm than good.  History bears this out: protective actions
following the Chernobyl accident were a brute exercise in relocation. The second wave of
evacuation, in 1990 and 1991, did reduce radiation exposure, while exacerbating and extending
the chronic environmental disorder.  What were the merits of the evacuation in terms of
reduction of total impacts on public health? In some cases, especially when the whole body
radiation doses were less than 10 rem, the psychological and social consequences of evacuation
on those older than 60 years of age may have exceeded the potential radiation-induced
biological effects. An evaluation of an optimum procedure for the management of risks must, by
necessity, be flexible and based on inputs from multiple disciplines: radiation protection,
agriculture,  conservation, economics, psychology, sociology, and political science. The analysis
should draw from each discipline using techniques such as multi-attribute utility analysis.10 The
perception of risk would be the dominant force affecting the process.


Finally, good public information and education are essential for effective risk reduction.
Systematic programs to educate the public through participation and interaction must be initiated
before any severe nuclear reactor accident.  Negative public reactions following an accident
 should be expected and planned for.  Emergency planners must integrate the effect of
psychological factors into the response planning and training in order to optimize the benefits of
public protective actions.


 I would like to express my deep appreciation to my colleagues Andrea Pepper, Michael
 Sinclair, and Sheryl Soderdahl for their review and comments on this paper.
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 1.  United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, Sources, Effects
    and Risks of Ionizing Radiation, United Nations, New York (1988).

 2.  Shleien, B., Preparedness and Response in Radiation Accidents, US Department of Health
    and Human Services, Rockville, Maryland (1983).

 3.  Momeni, M.H., Williams, R.J., and Rosenblatt, L.S., "Dose, Dose Rate and Age Parameters
    in Analysis of Risks from Bone Seeking Radionuclides: An Extrapolation to Low Levels."
    In International Atomic Energy Agency Symposium:  Biological Effects of Low-level
    Radiation Pertinent to Protection of Man and His Environment, v. E, IAEA, Vienna (1976).

 4.  Momeni, M.H., Yuan, Y., and Zielen, A.J., The Uranium Dispersion and Dosimetry (UDAD)
    Code, NUREG/CR-0553, ANL/ES-72, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1979).

 5.  Lazarus, R., Psychological Stress and the Coping Process, New York, McGraw-Hill (1966).

 6.  American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
    Washington, DC (1987).

 7.  Prince-Embury, S., and Rooney, J.F., "Psychological Symptoms of Residents in the
    Aftermath of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Accident and Restart", The Journal of Social
    Psychology, v. 128(6), pp. 779-790 (1988).

 8.  Renn, O., "Public Responses to the Chernobyl Accident", Journal of Environmental
    Psychology, v. 10, pp. 151-167 (1990).

 9.  Vesely, W.E., and Rasmuson, D.M., "Uncertainties in Nuclear Probabilistic Risk Analyses",
    Risk Analysis, v. 4, pp. 313-322 (1984).

 10. Merkhoffer, M.W, Conway, R., and Anderson, R.G., "Multiple Utility Analysis as a
    Framework for Public Participation in Siting a Hazardous Waste Management Facility",
    Environmental Management, v. 21, pp. 831-839 (1997).
Washington, D.C.
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

                Separating of Radionuclides Component in Technogenous
                     Ecological Influence on Health of the Population

                    V.M.Shestopalov, M.V. Naboka, L.Yu. Halchinskiy

              Radioecological Center, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine


It has become one of the lessons of the Chernobyl disaster that the small levels of radioactive
contamination which was treated as not dangerous for the population had imposed over the old
non-radiation contamination that led to outbreak of nonspecific morbidity. A new term
"Chernobyl syndrome" has appeared which consists of a lot of symptoms suffered by a
frequently sick child [1,2].  This is a new term, used for describing the state of children's health,
suffering from frequent diseases on the territory that was contaminated as a result of the
Chernobyl accident. "Chernobyl syndrome" is characterised most often by a high level of
respiratory diseases in spite of the lack of connection of these pathologies with the direct
radioactive influence.  It's worth mentioning that frequent respiratory diseases are characteristic
for the child population living in the territories with a high level of chemical contamination [3].
That is why this class of morbidity can be used as an indicator of unfavourable ecological

In present methodical documents the comparison with the morbidity in the analogous inhabited
territory or with the morbidity of the unexposed group of population is the decisive argument
about the dominating influence factor on the level of morbidity. It is supposed that all the other
conditions are equal. Unfortunately to collect such pairs for comparison is practically impossible
nowadays.  As an example, the choice of control territory of Chernobyl influence can be
illustrated by the choice of Poltava and Sumi regions where there is no radioactive
contamination. But as the continued research of the Institute of Geography demonstrated
conclusively, these regions were admitted with the  highest level of oncological morbidity in that
period in Ukraine [4]. The results of comparing oncological morbidity levels can be
underestimated greatly under these conditions.  In addition, analyzing the simultaneous influence
of several factors can be done in 2 ways: 1) sorting out of isolated factors or 2) with the help of
an estimating system.

Not to mention the little attention paid to the analysis of the territorial distribution of morbidity
and contamination at the investigated territory.


The development of natural particularities on contaminated territories to a great extent and its
landscape geochemical peculiarities for forming of  doses of irradiation became the other
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 important lesson of the Chernobyl emergency.  Under the same density of radiocesium
 contamination of soil (Kiev region for example), its contents in milk may differ as much as 2-10
 times [5]. This means that different natural geochemical conditions have levels and kinds of
 technological contamination (industrial wastes, transport of waste, radionuclides, pesticides,
 mineral fertilizers) from ecological unfavourable zones on Ukrainian territory which are
 characterized by the increasing of substances of natural and technological nature.

 Selection of ecologically unfavourable zones in the condition of combined pollution of
 radioactive and chemical substances of environment demands considerable time and finance
 which is not realistic for Ukraine nowadays.

 Taking into account that the modern human is under the influence of a great number of
 ecological agents and that is why it's sometimes almost impossible to discover the reason for
 changes in human health.  To pinpoint this or that factor, it's necessary to use a new methodical

 For this purpose, during 1991-1995, a group of specialists of different profiles and different
 institutions (NAS Ukraine, Russia and Belorussia, Ukraine State Committee of Geology and
 Agrochemical Service), under the leadership of Academician V. Shestopalov held the detailed
 polygon investigation of the northern part of the Kiev region,  attached to the zone of the
 Chernobyl accident, and also screening research of the territory of "west trace".

 The new-found information allowed scientists to formulate and publish "Methodical
 recommendations on radioecological assessment of territories by mapping", (all the participants
 were co-authors) in 1995 [6].  They include the following suggestions:

 •  Account and analysis of territorial distribution of all possible unfavourable ecological factors
    of population health, which is under state monitoring.

 •  The mathematical analysis of factor-dependent conditions and modeling of risk morbidity for
    definition of the contribution of each investigated factor;

 •  Zoning of territory in accordance with the risk from each studied factor.

 In these recommendations, our presentation of ecological risk was introduced as a combined
 criteria action of all pathological ecological factors including radioactivity as an integral part of
 common ecological risk.  "Ecological risk" means the quantity of the undesirable declining in the
 population's health which was calculated with the definite probability and the level for this
 territory, caused by the influence of investigated factors of morbidity per 10,000. The child
 population morbidity (from 0 to 14 years of age) is the most vulnerable under the influence of
 unfavourable factors [7] and that is why it was used as an indicator of the territory state. Because
 it has a sufficient number for receiving true statistical marks studied on the territory of the former
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USSR, using only one method for many years, it allows the comparison of different territories for
different periods, and they are available for each person.

Taking into account the detailed investigation, including the registration of morbidity on the
level of countryside, medical district (some inhabited districts) and an insufficient number of
children, who were living in these territories for receiving representative data in "Methodical
recommendations". We offer to hold analysis only on the base of indexes of general and
respiratory morbidity. In addition, it's necessary to analyze the level of medical care provided to
the district by doctors in the investigated territories.  This will permit analysis of the influence of
medical service among all the investigated factors. For example: the production of radioactive
factors contribution characterizes the radioecological risk.

The level of ecological risk and the contribution of each factor out of the investigated complex is
defined with a help of multi-factor regressive models.  The choice of models is created after the
analysis of outcome information, which reflects the real interrelation of "factors"  and "states" of
organisms in a concrete ecological system (in this case - contamination of the environment and
morbidity of children's population and morbidity of children's population living on this

We define a "state" as the numerical characteristics of the biological bodies peculiar to
anthropogenosis and biogeocenosis over a given area (in our case it is the local population
morbidity). We define "factors" as the numerical characteristics that show the contents of
artificial and natural components over a given area. We consider the spacial distribution of a risk
parameter marked on a basic map (administrative, landscape-geochemical, etc.) of correspondent
scale, as a ecological risk map.

Zones of high ecological risk (over the average for a given area) are shown by red and yellow
colors (the "traffic light principle"); green and blue are the colors for zones where the risk is
below the average. Let us consider, as an example, the research that has been carried out in the
territory of the Kiev region in Ukraine, bordering on the alienated Chernobyl zone in the North.
The research allowed estimations of the degree of influence of the complex environmental
factors of radioactive and non-radioactive nature on  somatic morbidity of the child population.

The investigation of the territorial distribution and the degree of influence of the complex
environmental factors of radiating and nonradiating nature on somatic morbidity  of the child
population have been carried out in the territory of the Kiev area in Ukraine, bordering on the
Chernobyl alienated zone in the North. The following factors of environmental contamination
were studied:  pollution of soil by radiocesium and by strontium - 90, of milk (from individual
farms), the annual summary of equivalent effective radiation dose, as cumulated pesticide load,
chloro-organic pesticide load and others, nitrogen, phosphoric and potassium fertilizer load,
loading in soil of heavy metals and microelements Pb, Ni, Cu, Cr, Cd, Co, Ba, Mn, Sn, Zn, Zr, V
for 1989-1994.  Twenty-seven factors were investigated and landscape-geochemical
characteristics on investigated territory.
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 The mathematical analysis has shown that influence of all investigated factors achieved 30-40%,
 variation in different zones of supervision. The influence of radioactive factors in the Northern
 part of Kiev test site is six times more than the risk caused by heavy metals and agrochemical
 pollution, taken together. The greatest influence of heavy metals was found in the centre of the
 Kiev region. The result of mapping analysis gave the evidence, that the zones of maximum
 influence of each investigated factors coincide in some cases.

 The zones of maximum radioecological risk were marked, which exceeds the average level for
 investigated territories as follows: 1) by 3-10 times, 2) by 3 times; and areas where the
 radioactive risk is on average 10 times less than the average. It was concluded that the
 mathematical probability of this influence was insufficient, which is why research was conducted
 towards improvement of the mathematical risk model.

 Taking into account the presence of trend and  nonlinearity, different nonlinear dependencies
 were investigated with the help of the software package STATISTICA for Windows.  The square
 law model turned out to be the most optimum  (on a criterion of multiple regression R=0.65
 against R=0.52), the most reliable (the significant majority of regression coefficients has a
 generally accepted confidence interval not less than 95%), and the most adequate, after the
 analysis of residual remainder. During the process of model construction, the procedure of
 reducing a nonlinear model in linear was used, due to which the implementation of the model
 has become possible, as above mentioned linear. It can be considered as one more lesson of the
 Chernobyl accident.


 Thus, it can be stated that as the lessons of the  Chernobyl accident that are necessary to be
 considered under other ecological accidents, we have:

 •  A splash of somatic morbidity of the child  population, particularly the respiratory diseases.
    That is why this class of morbidity can be used as an indicator of unfavourable ecological

 •  The considerable influence of natural particularities of contaminated territories, its landscape
    geochemical characteristics on the level of pollution entering into the human organism. That
    is why it's necessary to take them into account for assessment of accident consequences for

 •  The action of ecological factors in small doses on the contaminated territories displayed not
    only directly, but as interacting with other factors. Thus, in making analysis of ecological
    accident consequences it's necessary to take into account the complexity of environmental
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•  The method scheme for the assessment of ecological risk is recommended for a complex
   analysis of the factor influence and separating radioecological component in technogenic and
   ecological influence on population health [6].


1. Bobiliva O. A. Six-year estimations of medical consequences of Chernobyl accident on
   Ukraine.- The Reports of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 1:117-122, 1993.(Rus)

2. Stepanova E.I., Kolpakova I.E., Kurilo L.V., Davidenko O.A., Rosum V.M. An estimation
   and forecast of a condition of health of the children from unsuccessful on a radiating
   conditions of regions of Ukraine.  In book.: Problems radiating epidemiology of medical
   consequences of Chernobyl emergency / MATERIALS of a scientific conference on October
    19-20 1993., with international participation Kyiv-1993 USCRM Ministry of Heals and NAS

3. Shandala M.G., Svinyazkovsky Y.I. A role of the separate factors and their complexes in
   multifactors influence of an environment to a condition of health population.- In book: An
   environment and health. A science and practice. An international symposium of the
    scientists USSR - East Economic Community, Moscow 1991, p. 68-71.(Rus)

4.  Ukraine. Environment and human: Maps 1:6000000.- Kyiv : NAS of Ukraine Institut
    geografy, 1993.- 55p.(Ukr)

5.  Los IP., Shandala N.K., Gulko G.M., etc.  Radiocesium.  Maps pollution.- In book: Medical
    consequences of failure on Chernobyl atomic power station: information bulletin.- Kiev,
    USCRM MSA USSR, 1991, p.31-45. (Rus)

6.  The Methodical recommendations on radioechological assessment of territories by
    mapping).: Kiev, Ministry of health of Ukraine, 1995, 37 p. (Rus)

7.  Shestopalov V.M., Naboka M.V., Bayda L.K., Isakova T.I Use of parameters of medical
    statistics as of the indicator ecological trouble of polluted territories at construction of
    radioecological maps. - In book: Chernobyl - 94: IV an International technological
    conference Totals 8 years of work on liquidation of consequences of failure on Chernobyl
    atomic power station, Collection reports.- Chernobyl: Ministry of Chernobyl of Ukraine,
    1996. part 2, p. 249-260. (Rus)
 Washington, D.C.
September 9-11,1998

 	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

     Rehabilitation of a Chernobyl Affected Population Using a Detoxification Method

    A.F. Tsyb1, E.M. Parshkov', J. Barnes2, V.V. Yarzutkin3, N.V. Vorontsov3, V.I. Dedov 4

 1) Medical Radiological Research Center of Russian Academy of Medical Sciences;
    Obninsk, Russia
 2) Foundation for Advancements in Science and Education (FASE); Los Angeles, CA
 3) Kaluga Regional Detoxification Center; Russia
 4) International University of Nature, Society and Man "Dubna"; Moscow, Russia


 The Chernobyl disaster resulted not only in the acute exposure of hundreds of thousands of
 people to various radionuclides, but also in a situation where a significant part of the population
 now lives permanently in radioactively contaminated territories. Many residents of the areas
 suffer from chronic stress and radiophobia.1'2 The situation is exacerbated by relatively high
 levels of environmental chemical contamination. Despite this, the present health care in the
 affected areas is aimed mainly at the medical examination of persons and the diagnosis of
 diseases. Some programs dealing with specific aspects of the problem have been suggested and
 implemented, with inconclusive results.

 Recently, a treatment modality has been examined which appears to offer the broad-spectrum
 approach necessary to address the range of problems resulting from the Chernobyl incident. The
 use of the detoxification method developed by L. Ron Hubbard has been described in the
 literature as a safe and effective means for removal from the body of specific toxic substances
 accumulated in the process of work activity.  Detoxification procedures have been demonstrated
 to remove various xenobiotics, mainly with lipophilic properties,3'4 and to remove chlororganic
 compounds.5 A number of case histories6 exist where the detoxification method produced a
 remission of physical and mental complaints that attending physicians have associated with the
 relative high radiation doses received by individuals ("liquidators") involved in cleanup work at
 the Chernobyl site.

 In a cooperative effort between the Medical Radiological Research Center of the Russian
 Academy of Medical Sciences (MRRC RAMS) and Human Detoxification Services
 International (HDSI) of Great Britain, a group of twenty-four males aged 20 to 40 years old
 underwent detoxification using the Hubbard protocol.  Participants were long-term residents of
 contaminated areas. The purpose of this work was to perform a broad examination of the effects
 of the human detoxification program as it applies to the removal of toxic substances, xenobiotics,
 and radioactive Cesium-137 (Cs-137) from the human body. In addition, an assay of the effects
 of the method on the physical processes of the body was performed.
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference


The Hubbard detoxification program includes a daily regimen of one-half hour of moderate
physical exercise (jogging), followed by up to four and a half hours of intermittent thermal
procedures (i.e., moderate temperature sauna with periodic cool down). The detoxification
regimen includes specific criteria by which the optimum rate of progress of each individual can
be monitored and assured. Vitamin and mineral supplementation is administered based upon a
standardized dosage scale modified by daily medical supervision and patient reporting of
symptoms and perception of general health.

The use of psychodiagnostic testing and daily written debriefs enables the program administrator
to establish the rate of progress of the patient and to determine the endpoint of the program more
precisely. A typical course of treatment takes approximately two to three weeks.7

In this study, twenty-four males aged 20 to 40 years old from the Klimovsk District of the
Bryansk Region participated.  All of the participants were long-term residents of radioactively
contaminated areas. The participants were randomly selected from the registry database of
individuals with confirmed body burdens exceeding levels of 5,000 kilobecquerel (kBq) of
radioactive cesium. For better uniformity of the group, the individuals were selected from a
settlement with similar socio-economic levels.

Because of the requirements for relatively robust physical activity during the detoxification
procedure, participants received preliminary examinations to ensure that they did not have
physical or mental conditions that contraindicated participation  in the procedure (e.g.,
oncological diseases, acute infections, mental disorders, decompensated somatic diseases, etc.).
Three potential participants were excluded from the program, as they could not meet the above

In addition to standard physical examinations and clinical tests, special examinations were
conducted in order to determine various physical responses to the program (i.e., extended
biochemical blood tests; cellular and humoral immunity status evaluations, assay of thyroid
hormone levels, estimation of antioxidant activity in the blood serum, and evaluation of the
functional activity of neutrophils).  Diagnostic psychological evaluations (including both
objective and subjective evaluations of self-perception, activity, moods, and emotional reactions)
were also conducted. When indicated on an individual basis, the participants were provided
additionally with echocardiography, ultrasound, dopplerography, rheovasography, fibroscopy, x-
ray imaging, caprologic examination, etc. A series of tests reflecting a functional state of the
heart, liver, kidneys, and pancreas was conducted. In addition, lipid exchange and microelement
metabolism were monitored. In all, twenty-two biochemical parameters of the blood were
evaluated.  In most cases, the parameters observed varied within accepted normal ranges. The
most notable fluctuations were an increase of conjugated bilirubin in blood serum, the decrease
of glucose and triglycerides, and the reduction of glutamiltransaminase activity.
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 ,	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

 The functional status of each patient's immune system was estimated from the level of
 immunoglobulins in serum (normal antibodies to rat erythrocytes detected by hemaglutination
 reaction) and from the determination of the functional state of the thymus gland through the use
 of a proprietary immunodeficiency analyzer ("Helper"). During the course of detoxification,
 each patient displayed a pronounced elevation of the intensity of spontaneous
 chemoluminescence of polymorphonuclear lymphocytes of the blood and increased antioxidant
 activity in the blood serum.  These reactions are considered to be the response to elevated levels
 of toxins, free radicals, and peroxides in the blood. The most typical effects were such
 improvements as a decrease hi heterophylic antibody liters and the normalization of thymic
 function. In addition, the positive changes in the immune parameters in patients were confirmed
 to still be present one year after the rehabilitation treatment.

 No significant negative impacts on the immune system were noted. At the end of the
 detoxification program, the level of integral antioxidant activity returned to the initial activity in
 almost all the patients. A year after the completion of the program, the level of antioxidant -
 activity was found to have increased 2-3 fold over the pre-detoxification levels. This finding
 suggests that detoxification may have rehabilitated the immune system, and that these levels
 reflect the body's now more successful resistance to the chemically and radiologically
 contaminated environment.

 The thyroid system was studied on the basis of measurements of thyroid hormones (FT3, FT4,
 TSH). Starling from the initial days of the program, the thyroid system was shown to respond by
 the enhanced secretion of thyroid hormone hypophysis into the blood stream and, respectively,
 the decrease of free triiodothyronine level and, to a lesser degree, of thyronine. Two
 explanations of these observations exist. On the one hand, these results may be considered as the
 development of an acute phase of subclinical hypothyrosis in response to the physical challenges
 of the program (i.e., exercises, sauna, and high doses of vitamins) with the concurrent release of
 xenobiotics and other catabolic products into blood.  On the other hand, hypothyrosis may also
 be explained by the extensive "spending" of thyroid hormones in response to the above-
 mentioned factors.

 We believe that the thyroid gland responded adequately to  the systemic stresses induced by
 detoxification.  This view is supported by the fact that the thyroid function had re-normalized
 three weeks after the end of the program, and that long-term examinations performed nine and
 twelve months after the rehabilitation demonstrated that the level of thyroid hormones were
 within the limits of a normal physiological range.

 A series of in vivo measurements of radioactive Cesium-137 were performed on all participants
 prior to and during the program. Rates computed from these measurements were compared to
 elimination rates expected from routine physical processes. While Cesium-137 was reliably
 detected hi the sweat of all the patients, an evident acceleration of Cesium-137 elimination was
 not found. However, an earlier study involving a group of 14 children exposed as a result of
 Chernobyl did find significant acceleration of elimination.  We suspect that this discrepancy may
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September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

be attributable to metabolic differences between children and adults, especially with regard to the
metabolism of potassium (the pathway which cesium follows in the body.) This would be a
fruitful area for further research.

This consultation of the patient's feelings and observations about how he is progressing on the
program is a standard feature of the program. During this trial, additional objective testing
methods were also utilized. The results of the evaluation of the participant's psychosocial states
were particularly interesting.  Analysis of data reveals a significant (p<0.05) positive change in
the psychoemotional status of the program participants. Anxiety decreased from 23.48% to
9.09%, activity and "ability to work" increased from 40.9% to 46.96% and from 60.24% to
80.36%, respectively. This correlates with changes in individual status, levels, and ways of
adaptation according to SMIL tests and SOC method. Such conditions are interpreted as a
reduction of unproductive hypochondriac symptomatics, decrease of anxiety, increase of
spontaneity and activity, increased self-confidence, renewed motivation for achievement, an
increased "searching activity" and self-sufficiency.  Results of the diagnostics of self estimation
level showed that in most of the patients, positive changes occurred not only in the objective
characteristics of psychological adaptation, but also in the subjective sense estimation of the
individual as a person. No negative manifestations in mental status or organism comfort were
noted. No decompensated disorders of major regulatory and life maintaining systems were
revealed during the course of detoxification.

Follow-up examinations of the participants conducted at one and nine months after the
completion of the program indicated that chronic diseases present at the start of the
detoxification study were in lengthy remission, and an  improvement in resistance to acute
respiratory diseases was noted in a number of patients.


There is evidence suggesting that the program revitalizes the immune system and improves the
general physical condition of the participant. In spite of its robust regimen, there is an absence
of negative health effects. While out of normal range fluctuations of several key biochemical
parameters were noted during the process, the deviated parameters renormalized upon
completion of the course of treatment.

In addition, the detoxification program devised by Hubbard possesses a powerful
psychotherapeutic potential that has been associated with significant improvement in the general
health of the participant.  Increases in physical and mental endurance, activity level, and
resistance against stress can be expected.  The specific physical processes induced by the
detoxification method have not been fully examined at this time.  Further research into these
areas would be valuable. Nevertheless, it is our opinion that the detoxification method holds
great promise as a general treatment for a number of non-specific symptoms associated with
living in the contaminated areas of the Chernobyl disaster.
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September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference


1. Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident for Public Health: Report EUR/RC 45/9. Regional
World Health Organization Office for Europe. Copenhagen, 1995.

2. Surinov B.P., Parshkov E.M., Isaeva V.G., Karpova N.A.  Psychosocial Effects In
Radioecological Immune Studies. New Technologies in Industry. 1996. Vol 2-3; Pp. 69-74 (in

3. Root D.E., Lionelli G.T. Excretion of a Lipophilic Toxicant Through the Sebaceous Glands:
A  Case Report.  J. Toxocol.-Gut. & Ocular Toxicol.  1987. Vol. 6, No. 1.  Pp 13-17.

4.Tretjiak Z., Root D.E., Tretjak A., et al. Xenobiotic Reduction and Clinical Improvements in
Capacitor Workers: A Feasible Method. J. Environ. Sci. & Health. 1990. Vol. A25.  Pp. 731-

5. Schnare  D.W.  BenM.,  Shields M.G. Body Burden Reductions Of PCBs, PBBs And
Chlorinated Pesticides In Human Subjects. AMBIO: A  J. Human Environ. 1984. Vol. 13, No.
5-6. Pp. 378-380.

6. Unpublished Data. Human Detoxification Services International. East Grinstead, Sussex,
Great Britain.

7. Hubbard, Ron.  Clear Body - Clear Mind. Copenhagen: 1990. Bridge Publications.

8. Medical Rehabilitation of Persons Affected by Stress and Negative Ecological Factors.
Methodical Recommendations. Moscow: 1996. (in Russian)
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

               Session E9 Track 1:
 Monitoring, Measurement, and Modeling II
                Thursday, September 10, 1998
                   2:15p.m. -4:40 p.m.
Chair: Peter Stang, United States Department of Energy

 	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

                    Aquatic Countermeasures in the Chernobyl Zone:
           Decision Support Based on Field Studies and Mathematical Modelling

                        Oleg Voitsekhovich1 and Mark Zheleznyak2

         l)Ukrainian Research Institute on Hydrometeorology of the State Committee of
                            Prospect Nauki 105, Kiev, Ukraine

            2)Institute of Mathematical Machines and System Problems (IPMMS),
               Cybernetics Center of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine
                        Prospect Glushkova, 42, Kiev, 187, Ukraine


 The water protection is one of the significant direction of post-Chernobyl accident
 countermeasure activities in Ukraine. Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) stays near the bank
 of the Pripyat River at 30 km from its outflow to the Kiev Reservoir of the Dnieper River (Fig. 1).
 The floodplain territory near Chernobyl NPP and surrounding watersheds are heavily
 contaminated by 137Cs and ^Sr. The spots of 137Cs are in the upper Dnieper watershed in
 Russian and Belorussian territory and on the entire Pripyat watershed. The surface
 contamination leads to the permanent influx of 137Cs and ^Sr into the Kiev Reservoir (the
 capacity is 3.7 cub.km) that is an upper one in the cascade of six Dnieper reservoirs. The
 Dnieper River transports radionuclides through this cascade at 900 km to the Black sea. The
 aquatic pathway is considered in post-accidental period as a main one for the radionuclide
 dispersion from the Chernobyl zone after the early accidental phase [1,2].

 The main objective of water remedial activities that have been implemented since 1986 was to
 prevent significant secondary contamination of the surface water bodies that are hydraulically
 linked with the areas of heavy fallout and to mitigate expansion of expected ground water
 contamination. The choice and design of the countermeasures was supported by the modelling of
 radionuclide transport in the aquatic system and by the field and laboratory studies of these
 processes [3-6]. The presentation summarizes an experience of the research and developments to
 support the water protection countermeasures in the Chernobyl area.


 Field Studies

 During the initial accidental release period after April 26, 1986, the surface water bodies around
 the Chernobyl NPP (Fig.l) were directly contaminated by atmospheric fallout. Surface water
 contamination was characterized with a high level of radiation over a wide spectrum of
 short-lived radionuclides. The total beta-contamination of the open water bodies near the
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September 9-11,1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

Chernobyl NPP reached approximately 10"6 Ci/L (lCi=37 GBq, lLiter= 10'3 m3). The
beta-activity of the Pripyat River water downflow Chernobyl NPP in early May 1986 exceeded
10"8 Ci/L. The range of radioactivity in Dnieper River water near the main water intake of Kiev
City (at 130 km downflow from the Chernobyl NPP) was from 10'10 to 10"8 Ci/L in May and June
1986. The largest contribution to water contamination in first months after the acident was from
131I. Since 1987, the radionuclides  137Cs and ^Sr had the largest influence on the water
contamination. The special regular water sampling program was organised in the Chernobyl
Exclusion Zone to control the radionuclide dispersion from this territory via the Pripyat River.
The detailed studies of the watershed pollution demonstrates that the most contaminated areas
that could be flooded is the part of left-bank floodplain of the Pripyat River upstream the
Chernobyl NPP (Fig.l). It was estimated the deposition of at 8000 Ci of ^Sr on this rather small
territory at 10 km along the river channel. The parameters of the radionuclide washing out from
the floodplain soil was studied within the special laboratory experiments. The monitoring
program for studies of the radionuclide concentrations in the water, suspended sediments and
bottom deposition was implemented since 1986 for the whole Dnieper basin.

                                 Heavy contaminated part of the left-bank floodplain of
                                 the Pripvat River
          Pripyat River

            City of Pripyat
                   Chernobyl NPP

                           Cooling pond
                                                                  North-West part of
                                                                  the Kiev Reservoir
              Figure 1. Scheme of water bodies surrounding Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant

The main feature of the radionuclide release from the contaminated watersheds to the Kiev
reservoir within 12 years after the accident is the significant diminishing of the 137Cs influx to
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September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

the reservoir, however, 90Sr washing out to river net continued to be on a rather high level. Since
1992, the rate of ^Sr release to Pripyat River was reduced due to the water protection measures
(dike construction) on the floodplain near Chernobyl NPP.  Annual total influx of I37Cs and ^Sr
into the Kiev Reservoir from Pripyat River and Upper Dnieper changes  after the accident as
follows: 2620 Ci and 1030 Ci respectively in 1986; 365 Ci and 320 Ci in 1989;  130 Ci and 510
Ci in 1991,45 Ci and 90 Ci in 1997. The difference in the behavior of the radionuclides appears
also in the phenomenon that a large part of 137Cs, as well as some other radionuclides, are
associated in water with suspended particles. The experimental studies of the Chernobyl
radionuclide fate in water bodies were an important part of the background for the water
protection activities in the Chernobyl area.


The simulation of the efficiency of countermeasures was done based on a set of models,
describing radionuclide transport in rivers and reservoirs in different scales of resolution  [3-5].
Wide range of scales is achieved by combining the box model WATOX, describing radionuclide
concentration averaged over compartments (whole reservoir or its large  part), one-dimensional
river channel model RIVTOX (the variables are averaged over the channel cross-section),
two-dimensional lateral-longitudinal model COASTOX (the variables are averaged over the
flow depth), two-dimensional vertical model VERTOX (the variables are averaged over the flow
width), THREETOX- 3-D hydrodynamics and radionuclide transport model. Each model at its
specific level of resolution simulates the flow dynamics, suspended sediment transport,
radionuclide transport in dilute  and on suspended sediments, radionuclides fate in the bottom
deposition. The models developed by Y.Onishi in the Pacific Northwest National Laboratories
also were used for the simulations in the area [6 ]

The predictions of 137Cs and ^Sr concentration in the Dnieper reservoirs during spring flood
were prepared in February-March each year since the accident. The predictions also were
developed during the high rainstorm flood and other emergency events  at Pripyat River
watershed. The seasonal and short term predictions are in reasonable agreement with the
measured data for the spring floods, rainstorm floods, consequences of the radionuclide releases
from the Pripyat floodplain as results of the ice jams in winter 1991 and 1993 [ 4,5].

The models of radionuclide transport that were tuned and validated on the basis of the
monitoring data gave a tool to simulate the efficiency of the designed water protection measures
to diminish the radionuclide concentration in the water. This data was used to simulate
deminishing of the collective dose as the result of the countermeasure implementation [1,2].

Water Protection Measures

The specifics of radionuclide transport defines the strategies of aquatic countermeasures. A lot of
remedial strategies that have been  proposed and implemented in the Chernobyl area and may be
classified as follows:
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September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

       A.    Measures in drainage area
             a)     Removal of contaminated soil;
             b)     Alternations in the catchment area to minimize the run-off of
                    radionuclides from land to water, e.g., planting  of  trees, digging of
                    channels/ditches, or adding the chemicals to bind the radioisotopes
                    (e.g., lime, potash or dolomite);
             c)     Prevention of flooding most contaminated territories attached to a water
                    body (e.g., floodplain dikes);
             d)     Construction to prevent  radionuclide transport to surface water bodies
                    by ground water flow (e.g. contra-seepage wall in  soil).
       B.    Measures in water bodies
             a)     Constructions to increase the sedimentation of contaminated suspended
                    materials in rivers (e.g., a quarry - a bottom trap for contaminated
                    sediments, dams, ditches and spurs).
             b)     Construction to separate most contaminated parts of the water bodies
                    from a main stream (e.g., dikes and dams dividing the water bodies);
             c)     Dredging of contaminated deposits;
             d)     Change in mode  of the Dnieper reservoir management  to optimize it
                    on the minimum of the radionuclide concentration.
             e)     Change in drinking water intakes (e.g., recommendation to switch on
                    other water supply sources).

The computerized system was used to evaluate the efficiency of the countermeasures proposed to
diminish the radionuclide concentrations in the Dnieper reservoirs. The demonstration of low
efficiency of the large scale hydraulics projects for Kiev Reservoir, e.g.,  the construction of the
new dam through the reservoir and submerged dike near Hydropower Plant, was background to
stop these expensive projects. It was simulated and demonstrated low  efficiency of the bottom
traps designed for settling down of contaminated sediments in the Pripyat River channel.


The modelling results demonstrated the efficiency of the construction of the special dike around
the contaminated floodplain area on the left bank of the Pripyat river at the Chernobyl [3,4] that
was used as the background of the decision to construct the dam. The modeling predictions were
confirmed by the data measured during the flooding of this area due to  the ice jam in the Pripyat
River in January 1991 [5,6]. The dike was constructed in 1992 and it is estimated now as the
most efficient water protection measure in the Chernobyl zone. This dike prevented the
remobilization of radionuclides, especially ^Sr from the highly contaminated floodplain into the
river, thus lowering the collective dose by 600 to 700 menSv. The construction of a dike along
the right riverbank could further reduce the collective dose by 300 to 400 menSv.
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

Further action in the Chernobyl exclusive zone should be focused on the construction of the right
riverbank dike upstream the NPP and on the decontamination or rehabilitation of the bottom
sediment of the cooling pond after planned shutdown the Chernobyl NPP.


1.     Voitsekhovich, O., Prister, B., Nasvit, O., Los, L, Berkovski V. Present concept on
       current water protection and remediation activities for the areas contaminated by the 1986
       Chernobyl accident, Health Phys., 1996, .71 (1)  p. 19-29
2.     Voitsekhovitch  O., Sansone U., Zheleznyak M., Bugai D. Water quality management of
       contaminated areas and its effect on doses from aquatic pathways . In: Proc.First Intern.
       Conf. "The radiological consequences of Chernobyl accident". Minsk, Belarus 18-22
       March 1996. Eds. A.Karaoglou, G.Desmet, G.N.Kelly and H.G.Menzel,  European
       Commission. Luxembourg, 1996, p. 401-410
3.     Zheleznyak, M., Voitsekhovich O. Mathematical modelling of radionuclide dispersion in
       surface waters after the  Chernobyl accident to  evaluate the effectiveness of water
       protection measures. In.: Proc.Seminar on Comparative assessment of the Environmental
       Impact of Radionuclides Released during Three  Major Nuclear Accidents: Kyshtym,
       Windscale, Chernobyl. Luxembourg, 1-5 October 1990, vol.2- Commission of  the
       Europian  Communities, Radiation Protection-53, EUR 13574,1991, p.725-748.
4.     Zheleznyak M., et al.  Mathematical Modeling of Radionuclide Dispersion in the
       Pripyat-Dnieper Aquatic System After the Chernobyl Accident. The Sci.Total Env. ,1992,
5.     Zheleznyak M., Shepeleva T., Sizonenko V., Mezhueva I. Simulation of
       countermeasures to diminish radionuclide fluxes from Chernobyl zone via  aquatic
       pathways - Rad. Prot. Dosimetry, 1997, v.73, No.1-4, pp.181-186
6.     Bilyi I, Voitsekhovich O., Onishi Ya., Graves R., Modelling of Sr-90 wash-off from the
       River Pripyat floodplaine by four-year flood. - In; Proc. Symp.on Isotopes in Water
       Resources Management., IAEA, Vienna, 20-24 March 1995, Vienna, IAEA, 1996, v.l,
       p.l 17-126.
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

                    International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

                            Dose Refinement: ARAC's Role

                         J. S. Ellis, T.J. Sullivan, and R.L. Baskett

                         Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
                                 Livermore, California
The Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC), located at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, since the late 1970's has been involved in assessing consequences from
nuclear and other hazardous material releases into the atmosphere. ARAC's primary role has
been emergency response. However, after the emergency phase, there is still a significant role for
dispersion modeling. This work usually involves refining the source term and, hence, the dose to
the populations affected as additional information becomes available in the form of source term
estimates—release rates, mix of material, and release geometry—and any measurements from
passage of the plume and deposition on the ground.

Many of the ARAC responses have been documented elsewhere.1 Some of the more notable
radiological releases that ARAC has participated in the post-emergency phase have been the
1979 Three Mile Island nuclear power plant (NPP) accident outside Harrisburg, PA, the 1986
Chernobyl NPP accident in the Ukraine, and the 1996 Japan Tokai nuclear processing plant
explosion. ARAC has also done post-emergency phase analyses for the 1978 Russian satellite
COSMOS 954 reentry and subsequent partial burn up of its on board nuclear reactor depositing
radioactive materials on the ground in Canada, the 1986 uranium hexafluoride spill in Gore, OK,
the 1993 Russian Tomsk-7 nuclear waste tank explosion, and lesser releases of mostly tritium. In
addition, ARAC has performed a key role in the contingency planning for possible accidental
releases during the launch of spacecraft with radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) on
board (i.e. Galileo, Ulysses, Mars-Pathfinder, and Cassini), and routinely exercises with the
Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) in preparation for offsite
consequences of radiological releases from NPPs and nuclear weapon accidents or incidents.

Several accident post-emergency phase assessments are discussed in this paper in order to
illustrate ARAC's role in dose refinement. A brief description of the tools (the models) then and
now, is presented followed by a description of how these models have been applied during the
post-emergency phase to various events.
 Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

 	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference


 The ARAC Models

 The ARAC wind flow model is a combination of two codes: MEDIC2 interpolates
 meteorological observed winds to three-dimensional girded space; MATHEW2 mass adjusts the
 winds in the presence of terrain using atmospheric stability to affect this adjustment so that mass
 is conserved in the three-dimensional space. The dispersion model ADPIC3 is a Lagrangian
 particle model with random displacement diffusion and has the flexibility for specifying various
 source characteristics with full decay and ingrowth of daughter products during transport and
 after ground deposition. In addition to these models, ARAC has a computer code that matches
 radionuclide air and ground deposition measurements in time and space with the model-
 generated air concentrations and ground deposition concentrations.

 Over the past-four years, ARAC has been developing new models to replace the older ones.
 ADAPT4 is the interpolation and mass adjustment flow model and LODI5 is the dispersion
 model. Since these models are under development, the present versions have only limited
 capability and are not yet part of the ARAC production environment. Major improvements in the
 new models are continuous terrain representation rather than the block terrain of the older
 models, and variable and graded resolution in both the horizontal and vertical dimensions. Other
 attributes in these models will be horizontally varying turbulence and boundary layer depths.

 Post-accident Responses

 A FRMAC would most likely be formed for offsite consequences from a significant radiological
 release within or impacting the US and its territories. The FRMAC works with the State, local
 government and tribal authorities to determine the consequences and to mitigate the
 consequences to the extent possible  from a radiological release to the environment. ARAC works
 with the FRMAC both from the ARAC Center in Livermore and by deploying staff members to
 the field.

 Based  on both a real need and considerable experience, the ARAC program has developed a
 methodology to derive the amount of radioactivity released by a matching procedure applied to
 model  calculations and representative measurements. This is an iterative process of improving
 the source term estimate as more measurements are taken. The resulting refinement to the source
 term allows the dispersion model to  better define the deposition boundaries and greatly adds to
 defining the airborne plume concentrations, which most likely will not be measured well during
 most accidental releases particularly during the earliest phase. ARAC may then answer with
 greater confidence who was exposed and at what dose. As a part of FRMAC exercises, ARAC
 routinely uses simulated measurements of ground deposition to re-scale the source term, and
 hence the computer generated air concentrations and ground deposition concentrations.
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Chernobyl Accident

During the first few weeks following the 1986 Chernobyl accident, ARAC derived the first
estimates of the total inventory released into the atmosphere using measurements that were then
obtained from various European countries.6 Calculations of projected air movement and
radioactive air concentrations were matched with measurements from up to 20 sites throughout
the Northern Hemisphere. Through an iterative process involving adjusting the source term
geometry and release rates, ARAC was able to refine estimates of how the radioactivity released
varied with time and how the radioactivity was initially  distributed in the air. ARAC is  presently
working with Russian scientists (SPA Typhoon) to acquire additional meteorological data in the
region surrounding the reactor in order to calculate a refined reconstruction of the dispersion. The
refined plume may lead to improved dose reconstruction in the region. Since the Chernobyl
accident, the available meteorological data sets, and improved ARAC models and tools permit
better iterative plume and source term reconstructions.

General Chemical Accident

For several months after a 1993 major rail tank car spill of sulfur trioxide (oleum) in Richmond,
California, ARAC participated in an intensive effort to assess the source release rates and total
exposure to the population from the released sulfuric acid cloud.7 Even though this event was not
a radiological release, it did provide additional insight for plume reconstruction. Using just the
standard reporting meteorological station data that were available through the World
Meteorological Organization's global distribution system, the ARAC initial calculated plume did
not follow the path that staff meteorologists believed it should have. The staff meteorologists had
knowledge of non-reporting meteorological tower data in the vicinity of the plume. After
rerunning the ARAC models with this additional data, the plume was judged to be in the right
place. Later runs of a prognostic mesoscale forecast model8 confirmed this flow pattern.

Over the next several months, the quantity of material released from the rail tank car was
determined along with estimates of the release rates over a four-hour duration. ARAC and a
private firm both recalculated the plume based on this new source term. Apart from one sampler
that measured concentrations in the passing plume, the only source of information on exposure to
the population from the cloud was the plume calculation.  Litigation proceeded using plume
calculations. This event serves as an example for what could occur for an unmonitored remote
radiological release, particularly where the release is composed of mostly non-depositing noble
gases and short lived radioactive iodines.

Tokai Accident

In March of 1997, PNC-Tokai corporation of Japan, located on the JAERI facility, experienced a
fire and subsequent explosion in a fuels reprocessing facility. ARAC and JAERI were  (and still
 are) collaborating on the development and evaluation of a nuclear accident assessment
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 information Internet-based communication protocol, incorporating televideo, whiteboards and
 web pages.

 During the Tokai accident and shortly thereafter, ARAC and JAERI were able to view each
 system's model assessment plots, discuss differences, locate measurements sites and values,
 discuss differences due to differences/deficiencies in meteorological data and then recompare and
 discuss results when comparable data were used in both systems. The dialogue with whiteboard
 interaction proved highly effective in communicating mutual understanding as well as unique
 insights. Shortly after assuring that both had the same meteorological data, JAERI received
 preliminary radiological measurement data and rapidly, using the graphical web pages on
 whiteboard, identified the locations and preliminary readings at three locations.

 The shortfall of not having  full live video was evident but not-detrimental. The results
 accomplished over a two-week period in a cooperative response to an actual event would have
 been impossible to achieve using conventional exchanges via phone, e-mail and telefax. The
 combination of the web pages and the teleconferences yielded a collaborative effort which could
 only have been otherwise achieved by actual face-to-face meetings. In fact, this prototype system
 even provides an advantage over the face-to-face exchange, as each participant is acting from
 their own institutional environments, where all local data and even colleagues are readily
 accessible, whereas travelers must reduce their tools and information to fit in a suitcase.
                                                    RUNS -12 hr Avg Air Concentration
                                                                              ARACCcmputerSlmulatlcn Notes
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Since the ARAC and SPEEDI transport and dispersion models provided similar results including
estimates of the release magnitude within ±15% after using the same input data, both centers
judged the interactive refinement process to be useful for the estimation of source term coupling
with monitoring.

This work fits within the context of the Global Emergency Management Information Network
Infrastructure (GEMINI) and is an example of the benefits of exploiting cyber technology for
timely and enhanced accident assessment. We intend to offer this as a start toward an
international "mutual aid" structure.


Examples of post-emergency phase assessments by ARAC for three real hazardous releases to
the atmosphere were presented. The 20 years or more of ARAC experience in training for and
responding to emergency releases of hazardous materials into the atmosphere has demonstrated
the need for post-emergency assessment transport and dispersion model calculations for most
major events until the exposure to the population has been fully determined. This is an iterative
refinement process as source term estimates and air and surface concentrations measurements of
the released material become available.


This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory under contract No. W-7405-ENG-48.


1. Sullivan, T.J., J.S. Ellis, C.S. Foster, K.T. Foster., R.L. Baskett, J.S. Nasstrom and W.W.
Schalk ffl, 1993: Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability: Real-time Modeling of Airborne
Hazardous Materials, Bull. Amer. Meteor. Soc., 74, 2343-2361.

2. Sherman, C.A., 1978: A Mass-consistent Model  for Wind Fields Over Complex Terrain, J.
Appl. Meteor., 17, 312-319.

3. Lange, R.,  1978: A Three-dimensional Particle-in-cell Model for the Dispersal of Atmospheric
Pollutants and its Comparison to Regional Tracer Studies, J. Appl. Meteor., 17, 320-329.

4. Sugiyama, G. and S.T. Chan, 1998: A New Meteorological Data Assimilation Model for Real-
time Emergency Response, Proceedings of the Tenth Joint Conference on the Applications of Air
Pollution Meteorology with the A&WMA, Phoenix, AZ, 285-289.
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 5. Leone Jr., J.M., J Nasstrom, and D. Maddix, 1997: A First Look at the New ARAC Dispersion
 Model, Proc. of the ANS Sixth Topical Meeting on Emergency Preparedness and Emergency
 Response, San Francisco, CA, 383-386.

 6. Dickerson, M.H., 1987: ARAC: Modeling an 111 Wind, Energy and Technology Review,
 UCRL-52000-87-8, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, 6-13.

 7. Baskett, R.L., PJ. Vogt, W.W. Schalk m, and B.M. Pobanz, 1994: ARAC Dispersion
 Modeling of the July 26, 1993 Oleum Tank Car Spill in Richmond, California, UCRL-ID-
 116012-Rev. 1, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA.

 8. Lee, R.L., S. Soong, and S. Yin, 1994: Simulation of an Accidental Release Over an Urban
 Area with a Prognostic Emergency Response Model, Proceedings of the Fifth Topical Meeting
 on Emergency Preparedness and Response, Savannah, GA, 338-340.
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           Post-Accident Inhalation Exposure And Experience with Plutonium

                                  Joseph H. Shinn, PhD

                         Health and Ecological Assessment Division
                          Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory


This paper addresses the issue of inhalation exposure immediately afterward and for a long time
following a nuclear accident.  For the cases where either a nuclear weapon bums or explodes
prior to nuclear fission, or at locations  close to a nuclear reactor accident containing fission
products, a major concern is the inhalation of aerosolized plutonium (Pu) particles producing
alpha-radiation.  We have conducted field studies of Pu-contaminated real and simulated
accident sites at Bikini, Johnston Atoll, Tonopah (Nevada), Palomares (Spain), Chernobyl, and
Maralinga (Australia).


It has long been recognized that the most significant pathway for human exposure to Pu is the
inhalation of aerosolized-Pu attached to soil, and methods have been developed to estimate
human exposure by this pathway.1  From the perspective of health risk assessment there are two
physical processes that should be predicted: the first-order process that produces the "respirable"
Pu-concentration in air, and the second-order process that causes a Pu flux into the air (rate of
Pu-aerosol emissions) for subsequent redistribution. The term "respirable" is defined here as
particles having less than 10 /um aerodynamic diameter. Resuspended Pu particles normally have
a peak in the size-distribution at 2 to 5 fj.m, and are approximately log-normally distributed with
a geometric standard deviation from 3 to 5. The Pu is found as plutonium oxide aggregated in
soil particles.

Observations of normalized radionuclide concentrations in air following an accident show a
remarkable agreement, since  at all sites the concentrations decrease by 5 orders of magnitude in
the first 20 to  30 days. This should guide decisions on reentry into an accident site.  Our
hypothesis is that (1) this occurs because fallout particles initially adhere to any available surface,
but are transferred to sites of greater and greater adhesion with time and (2) the process is much
more rapid than migration into the soil.  But eventually, fallout radionuclides find their way to
the soil surface. Our time dependent empirical model is too conservative and overpredicts
Pu-concentrations in air1. There are several time-dependent models in current literature, and
none seem to  be completely accurate even though they are physically-based.  More work needs to
be done in this area.
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 A simple model for predicting the Pu concentration in air is the resuspension factor approach.  In
 this concept, the Pu concentration in air is integrated over a period of at least several days to
 eliminate the variations due to wind and weather conditions, and these Pu concentrations are
 normalized by dividing the observed concentrations in air (C, Bq/m3) by the local soil-Pu
 inventory from deposition (D, Bq/m2). This method has proven useful around the world because
 once Sf is estimated, then the concentration can be predicted from the deposition, D, that is, C =
 Sf D. The resuspension factor values, Sf, tend to a long-term limit between 10"10 m"1 and 10"9 m"1.

 Enhancement Factor and Effects of Disturbance

 This "steady-state" can be interrupted, however, by disturbances such as construction, traffic, etc.
 Another model, the mass loading approach, tries to deal with this problem by predicting the
 Pu-aerosol activity (A, Bq/g) and the total suspended paniculate mass loading (M, g/m3). The
 activity, A, would be predicted from an enhancement factor, Ef, and the average surface soil
 activity to a depth of 0.05 m,S0 (Bq/g),that is, A =Ef S0. In this model, the concentration can
 then be predicted by the product combination, C =Ef S0 M. Both S0 and M are easily measured.
 But both Ef and M can be expected to increase during disturbances, and in undisturbed soil, both
 have seasonal variations. That Ef would increase with disturbance indicates that the Pu bindings
 with soil aggregates are somewhat fragile.  In some cases M is predictable from dust emission
 factor models for various types of construction and agricultural activity. In studies performed
 over a wide number of sites, Shinn2 found that values of Ef were usually less than unity, typically
 0.7, for the non-fissioning types of accidents and at large distances from fission events (Bikini,
 Palomares, Tonopah, Maralinga). For disturbances such as traffic, bulldozer blading, wildfire,
 and freezing-thawing cycles, Shinn reported that Ef values temporarily increased to between 2.5
 and 6.5. In the case of a nuclear fission event at ground level, much of the soil Pu within a
 kilometer of the "ground zero" is found in small glass beads that are too large to be resuspended.
 So for nuclear fission accidents, these Ef values were found to be about 0.01 and the resuspension
 factors, Sf, decrease to a lower long-term limit between 10"13 m"1 and  10"11 m"1.

 Particle Emission Rates

 The second-order problem, predicting the Pu-aerosol emission rates, is determined by solving the
 flux equation F = K (dC/dz), where K is conventionally measured as the turbulent diffusivity for
 sensible heat, and the vertical gradient dC/dz is measured from vertically-spaced air samplers.
 We simplified this even further by the approximation dC/dz = p C/z where p is the power-law
 parameter determined as the constant slope from the log C versus log z measurements.1

 The parameter p is a measure of the surface conditions and for suspended particulate mass
 loading has typical values of -0.2 with a range between -0.05 and -0.6. The negative sign
 indicates that suspended mass is decreasing with height in the air above the soil. The values of p
 vary through the season and depend upon the degree of surface cover. The turbulent diffusivity
 K can be easily measured and varies directly with wind speed and height above ground. To
 determine the resuspension rate, R, the flux F (Bq/m2 sec) is divided by the local soil
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                    International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference
Pu-inventory from deposition (D, Bq/m2), that is R = F/D. This gives the fraction of the
contamination being resuspended per second. Typical values3 for R are 10"n s'1 to 10'12 s"1. But
in some cases soils have a higher R, i.e. more erodible, sandy soil or disturbed soils that have R
greater than 3 x 10"u s"1; then local redistribution of Pu is a problem4.

Considerations in Environmental Cleanup

Environmental cleanup decisions for Pu should be based on the potential risk to human health.
Since plutonium oxide is insoluble, doesn't transfer through the intestine, is not transferred into
food chains, and does not produce a significant external dose (barely detectable gamma
radiation), the decisions will be largely based on inhalation exposure estimates. It is important to
average soil measurements over an area, because at typical inhalation heights, the trajectories of
particles come from an upwind range characterized5 as 90% within a distance of 150 m.

A first consideration is the removal of fragments and radioactive debris.  This requires locating
and removing fragments that are visible, and a vacuum cleaner method worked well with a 60%
removal efficiency for each pass.4 Locating Pu fragments must be done with a special instrument
(high purity germanium crystal) optimized for detecting  a weak gamma emission from a daughter
radionuclide,241 Am.  At Johnston Atoll, a mining technique of sifting soil on a moving belt was
used successfully to remove the fragments but did not reduce the activity in the inhalation size
range.6 At Maralinga, residual Pu fragments were mapped after the contaminated surface soil
was scraped off, and the fragments were either removed by hand or by vacuum cleaning.

Consideration of potential land use, and cultural practices for habitation has led to different
cleanup criteria7 as appropriate. Experiences in cleanup at Enewetak Atoll, Maralinga, and
Tonopah led to slightly different cleanup criteria and averaging areas for integrating sampled soil
Pu; Table 1.  Cleanup criteria for Pu in these cases were between 1.5 and 15 Bq/g (40 to 400
pCi/g). For comparison purposes, the calculated Pu-concentrations in air using the upper limit
steady state resuspension factor of 10"9 m"1 could be estimated from the contamination depth of
0.05 m and a soil bulk density  of 1500 Kg m'3 to be between 112.5 and 1125
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 Table 1. Risk-Based Plutonium Cleanup Criteria for Cleaned Sites.
        Enewetak Atoll
      Maralinga, Australia
       Tonopah, Nevada
     residential island
    agricultural island
      food gathering

   hunting and gathering
      cattle grazing
  3.0 Bq/g over 0.5 Ha
  6.0 Bq/g over 0.5 Ha

       9-15 Bq/g
 (0.7-2.2-Bq/g 241 Am)

   7.4 Bq/g over 1 Ha

 Post-accident inhalation exposure is an important determinant entering decisions about re-entry
 and possible risk management schemes, because of the alpha contamination from Pu.  Our
 experience in field studies at Pu-contaminated sites provides some insights about risk estimation
 and risk management. Since Pu-concentrations decrease by 5 orders of magnitude in the first
 20-30 days, it would be advisable to postpone re-entry until after that time. Furthermore, because
 of the importance of inhalation exposure and the possible local effects on the enhancement factor
 (ratio of aerosol activity, Bq/g, to surface soil activity, Bq/g) it would be advisable to monitor the
 air concentration and the total suspended particulate mass loading and to predict future
 resuspension factors from these observations rather than to estimate them from empirical means.
 We expect nevertheless that when steady state is reached, the resuspension factor will have a
 long-term limit between 10'10 m"1 and 10'9 m'1. Typical risk-based cleanup criteria will be
 between 1.5 and 15 Bq/g in soil and this will result in Pu-concentrations  in air less than the range
 112.5 to 1125 /zBq/m3. The soils will have a resuspension rate of 10'11 s'1 to 10'12 s"1 unless they
 are highly credible and then redistribution of Pu is a problem if the rate exceeds 3 x  10"11 s"1.


 1. Anspaugh, L.R., J. H. Shinn, P. L. Phelps, and N. C. Kennedy, 1975, Resuspension and
 Redistribution of Plutonium in Soils, Health  Physics, 29: 571 - 582.

 2. Shinn, J. H., 1992, "Enhancement Factors  for Resuspended Aerosol Radioactivity: Effects of
 Topsoil Disturbance," in Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Precipitation
 Scavenging and Atmosphere-Surface Exchange Processes, 3:1183-1193,  S. E. Schwartz and W.
 G. N. Slinn, eds.,Hemisphere Publishing Corp., Washington and Philadelphia.

 3. Shinn, J. H., D. N. Homan,.and W. L. Robison, 1997, Resuspension Studies in the Marshall
 Islands, Health Physics, 73: 248-257.
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4. Shinn, J. EL, E. H. Essington, F. L. Miller, Jr., T. P. O'Farrell, J. A. Orcutt, E. M. Romney, J.
W. Shugart, and E. R. Sorom, 1989, "Results of a Cleanup and Treatment Test at the Nevada
Test Site: Evaluation of Vacuum Removal of Pu-Contaminated Soil", Health Phys., 57(5):

5. Shinn, J. H. and F. J. Gouveia,  1992, The Footprint Area Influencing a High Volume Air
Sampler, Technical Report UCRL-ID-112181, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
Livermore, CA, 94551.

6. Shinn, J. H., C. O. Fry, and J. S. Johnson, 1996, Monitored Plutonium Aerosols at a Soil
Cleanup Site on Johnston Atoll, Technical Report UCRL-ID-124059, Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, Livermore CA, 94551.

7. Church, B. W., 1998, Proceedings of the Conference on Waste Management 98, Tucson,
Arizon, March 1-5, 1998.
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       Post-Accident Cleanup Analysis for Transportation of Radioactive Materials*

                                S.Y. Chen and B.M. Biwer

                               Argonne National Laboratory
                            Environmental Assessment Division

 Approximately 5 to 10 million packages of radioactive material and wastes are shipped annually
 in the United States.1  Most of these shipments consist of small quantities of medical and
 research isotopes.  However, larger quantities of radioactive wastes are shipped by the
 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) via commercial truck or rail service. The number of
 shipments of radioactive waste is expected to increase over the next several years as efforts to
 dispose of waste stored and generated at DOE sites progress.2 The potential for a severe accident
 involving these anticipated waste shipments is small, but not insignificant.  The probability of a
 severe accident resulting in the largest credible release of material has been estimated to range
 from approximately 0.01 to 0.1 over the 20-year time period considered for permanent disposal
 of each of the low-level, transuranic, and high-level radioactive waste types (LLW, TRUW, and
 HLW).2 The potential radiological consequences of the most severe credible accident involving
 each of these waste types could adversely affect the community in which it occurred. These
 consequences are considered below. Accidents involving spent nuclear fuel (SNF) shipments are
 of concern to the public and are also considered.

 Exposure of individuals to radionuclides can occur through many exposure pathways if an
 accident results in a radioactive release to the environment. The Federal Radiological
 Emergency Response Plan establishes a coordinated response by Federal agencies when
 requested by State, tribal, or local government officials during a peacetime radiological
 emergency.1 In case of such an emergency, DOE has primary responsibility for providing
 assistance unless the radioactive source is unknown, unidentified, or from a foreign country, then
 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) becomes the primary  coordinating Federal
 agency. The EPA has issued a set of protective action guides3 (PAGs) to aid public officials in
 responding to an accident involving radioactive materials.  Under emergency conditions,
 maximum individual dose limits are suggested when practicable.  Limits are set for the early
 phase of an accident, lasting up to four days from the time of the initial radioactive release, and
 for the intermediate phase of an accident, taken to represent up to one year after the accident.
"Work supported by the U.S. Department of Energy, Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management, under
contract W-31-109-Eng-38.
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In this paper, a pathway analysis code, the RISKIND computer program,4 has been used as a
screening tool to help develop an example action plan for both the early and intermediate phases
of an accident involving the release of radioactive materials. RISKIND was developed for the
analysis of radiological consequences and health risks to individuals and the collective
population from exposures associated with the transport of SNF or other radioactive materials.
RISKIND was developed by Argonne National Laboratory under the support of the DOE Office
of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management.

Projection of individual doses at the start of the early phase following an accident is difficult
because quantitative data on contamination levels in the vicinity of a transportation accident are
not immediately available to response  officials. However, RISKIND can be used to estimate
potential doses to members of the public in specific locations downwind of the accident. The
following discussions illustrate the application of RISKIND to the most severe, credible
transportation accidents involving the different radioactive waste types.


Transportation Accidents

The primary regulatory approach used to ensure safety during transport of radioactive materials is
to specify standards for the proper packaging of such materials.  Primary regulatory authority is
provided by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), as set forth in 49 CFR Part 173
("Shippers — General Requirements for Shipments and Packaging"). Packaging for transporting
radioactive materials must be designed, constructed, and maintained to ensure that it will contain
and shield the contents during normal transportation.  Type A packaging provides such protection
for less radioactive material, such as low-level waste (LLW). Type B packaging is required for
more highly radioactive material, such as high-level waste (HLW), transuranic waste (TRUW),
and SNF.  Type B packaging is designed to contain and shield its contents in all but the most
severe accidents.

In general, accident severity is characterized by the potential release fraction of the shipment
contents. That is, for the same type of packaging, more severe events result in a larger quantity
of material released.5-6 The more severe cases, however, are associated with lower probabilities
of occurrence. In its recent programmatic environmental impact statements, DOE has evaluated
various options for managing its radioactive wastes and SNF. Because of the large number of
DOE shipments and total estimated mileage, transportation accidents leading to the highest
potential releases have been estimated to have overall probabilities that range from 1 in 10 to 1  in
100 for all waste types (i.e., HLW, LLW, and TRUW). Possible SNF accidents within this
probability range are not the most severe but could result in a potential release. In this study, only
three waste types are included (and the cases are so designated): LLW, TRUW, and SNF. No
analysis is performed for HLW because of the low release in its vitrified form. Because of the
large variability of accident release fractions, the study also includes a very improbable event, a
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second SNF case involving the highest potential release. Such accidents have a probability of
about 3 in 100,000 (case designated as SNF1).

Early Phase

Doses to individuals downwind during the early phase of an accident are primarily from
inhalation during the passing of the contaminated plume. In the case of a transportation accident,
protective actions such as sheltering or evacuation to mitigate exposure may not be feasible in
the near vicinity of the accident because there may be only a matter of minutes or less before the
plume arrives. Figure 1 shows the relative time-integrated ground-level air concentrations within
the first 1 km downwind of an accident as determined by RISKIND.  The results are based on a
ground-level release under neutral weather conditions. It can be seen that the ground-level air
concentrations are highest near the accident for this ground-level release.  Working downwind
from the area with the highest concentration, every second isopleth in Figure 1 represents a factor
of 10 decrease in concentration. In an accident involving fire, which can be modeled with
RISKIND, the highest concentrations would be at the downwind location where the buoyant
plume descends back to the ground.

If projected doses are expected to be near the PAG values, protective actions should be taken to
mitigate exposure, providing the risk involved in implementing the protective actions is not
comparable to or greater than the risk posed by the accidental release itself. Protective actions
include such measures as sheltering and evacuation in the early phase following an accident if the
projected dose is expected to exceed 1 rem. As estimated by using RISKIND, individual doses
could reach 6.6,32,1.9, or 2.1 rem from the LLW, TRUW, SNF, and SNF1 accidents,
respectively. If the release occurs over a short period (seconds), there may not be time for
protective actions. However, if the release occurs over a longer period (minutes or hours), such
as in a transportation accident involving a fire, there might be time to implement sheltering or
evacuation to mitigate dose.

RISKIND can be used to estimate the area that might require protective actions in the early phase
of an accident. Figure 2 shows the total area near the accident in which RISKIND projects the
1-rem PAG to be exceeded for each waste type accident. Although the accident conditions used
in the RISKIND calculations were the same for each waste type (except for the SNF1 accident,
which involves fire), areas of different sizes are affected because of the different radioactive
isotope mixes typically found in each waste type.

Intermediate Phase

For the intermediate phase of an accident, RISKIND can estimate both the need for protective
actions and the amount of cleanup necessary to achieve proposed dose limits. Intermediate-phase
exposures occur through inhalation of resuspended contamination and external exposure to
contaminated surfaces and resuspended contamination. RISKIND estimates contaminated
ground concentration isopleths  similar to those calculated for contaminant air concentrations.
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These contours match those for air concentrations under most conditions. The exposure time and
dose limit can be input independently. The doses estimated for this illustration take into account
the average daily indoor/outdoor activity patterns of people and the shielding normally afforded
by different types of structures.

The PAGs suggest relocation as a protective action if the first-year dose to a single individual
would exceed 2 rem.  Figure 2 shows the amount of contaminated area where this PAG is
projected by RISKIND to be exceeded. Without mitigation, a person might be expected to
receive a dose in the first year as high as 70,13,7, and 3.5 rem from accidents involving LLW,
TRUW, SNF, and SNF1, respectively.

For doses expected to be less than 2 rem, the PAGs suggest that surface contamination be
reduced to levels as low as reasonably achievable and recommend initial efforts to be
concentrated in areas where the projected doses are expected to exceed 0.5 rem in the first year.
Again, Figure 2 displays the amount of area in each case where this PAG would be exceeded.

Longer-Term Objectives

The stated objective of the PAGs regarding deposited radioactivity for the intermediate phase is
that doses to an individual in any single year after the first year not exceed 0.5 rem and that the
cumulative dose over 50 years (including the first and second years) not exceed 5 rem.
RISKIND shows (Figure 2) that in the case of the LLW, SNF, and SNF1 accidents, the 50-year
5-rem value is more limiting than the first-year guide of 2 rem. Without cleanup, an individual
might receive up to 416, 13, 71,  and 54 rem from a LLW, TRUW, SNF, or SNF1 accident,
respectively, over a 50-year period following the accident. (Note that the LLW, TRUW, and
SNF1 examples have different limiting PAG values, as shown in Figure 2).


RISKIND has been shown to be a useful emergency response planning tool for shipment of
radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. The code has been used to project individual and
population doses for the early and intermediate phases following an accident involving the
release of radioactive material. In the process, the decontamination factors for deposited
radioactivity to achieve a specific PAG, as input to RISKIND, were provided on an isopleth-by-
isopleth basis downwind of the accident. RISKIND can also be used to determine the most
restrictive PAG, in large part on the basis of the type of radioactive material released, as
demonstrated in the examples provided. However, the quantity of material involved can also be
a major factor.  For example, severe accidents involving LLW shipped in Type A packaging can
have consequences similar to or worse than those from TRUW, SNF, and HLW accidents
involving material shipped in Type B packaging, because more radioactive material is released.
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 1.   Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1998, Guidance for Developing State, Tribal, and
     Local Radiological Emergency Response Planning and Preparedness for Transportation
     Accidents, FEMA REP-5, Rev. 2, Draft 3, March 31.

 2.   U.S. Department of Energy, 1997, Final Waste Management Programmatic Environmental
     Impact Statement for Managing Treatment, Storage, and Disposal of Radioactive and
     Hazardous Waste, DOE/EIS-0200-F, Office of Environmental Management, Washington,
     D.C., May.

 3.   U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1992, Manual of Protective Action Guides and
     Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, EPA 400-R-92-001, Office of Radiation Programs,
     Washington, D.C., May.

 4.   Yuan, Y.C., S.Y. Chen, B.M. Biwer, and DJ. LePoire, 1995, RISKIND —A Computer
     Program for Calculating Radiological Consequences and Health Risks from Transportation
     of Spent Nuclear Fuel, ANL/EAD-1, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, 111., Nov.

 5.   U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1977, Final Environmental Impact Statement on the
     Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes, NUREG-0170, Office of
     Standards Development, Washington, D.C., Dec.

 6.   Fischer, L.E. et al., 1987, Shipping Container response to Severe Highway and Railway
     Accident Conditions, NUREG/CR-4829, UCID-20733, prepared by Lawrence Livermore
     National Laboratory, Livermore, Calif., for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office
     of Nuclear Regulatory Research, Division of Reactor System Safety, Washington, D.C., Feb.
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                     International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference
                                                                    ^7. ^-^ >MK^: .'s<*. S-. - rv"..?•-?-.??.; V v.^'w^^i^ <;
Figure 1. Isopleths of time-integrated air concentrations  following an accidental release of
radioactive material under neutral stability weather conditions (ground-level release, Pasquill
stability class D, 4 m/s windspeed).
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                    International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference
             Early Phase (1 rem)     1st Year (2 rem)      1st Year (0.5 rem)
                                         50 Years (5 rem)
     Figure 2. Amount of area affected by early-phase and intermediate-phase PAG values
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

                  Using Chernobyl Experience to Develop Methods and
                      Procedures of Post Accident Radiomonitoring

                                      V. Poyarkov

                   European Centre of Technogenic Safety, Kiev, Ukraine


The Three Mile Island, Goiania and Chernobyl accidents have resulted in the re-examination of
many emergency planning principles and practices.

A nuclear, or radiation emergency response planning is based on expected avertible doses for short
(4 hours,  2 days, 1 week) and long (50 or 70 years) periods  of time. Therefore, in emergency
planning one has to differentiate the following three periods in evaluating accident exposure: the
acute (at and 4-6 hours after a radioactive discharge), the short-term (duration of the acute period
plus 48 hours) and the long-term (50-70 years).

The primary task of radiation protection in the acute period is  to forecast the area distribution of
radionuclide contamination in order to prevent deterministic effects as the effective doses can exceed
ISv from the moment of release to the following 4-6 hours.  The principal protective measures are
evacuation, sheltering, and iodine prophylactics. The acute period evaluation is based on the state
of the reactor core and that of the area of 3-5 km around the NPP.

The main task of the short-time period evaluation is to forecast territories, where doses could exceed
1 Sv in the following month. The forecast is made on the basis of accident radiomonitoring with a
due account of protective measures undertaken.

The long-term evaluation is designed to forecast territories where doses for 50-70 years can exceed
permissible levels. The forecast is  made on  the basis of  comprehensive radiomonitoring, soil
characteristics, and expected soil-plant transfer coefficients,  as well as the economic possibilities to
carry out the corresponding  counter-measures and the analysis of socio-psychological situation.

To develop a comprehensive integrated system for emergency response, it is necessary to elaborate
on the methods and procedures for post-accident radiomonitoring, which would provide countries
with uniform techniques and procedures for accident radiation  measurement and appropriate dose
assessment, and could be integrated as a part of the decision support system.

International study and analysis of consequences of the Chernobyl accident set up a unique basis for
using the Chernobyl experience in the areas of environmental radiomonitoring techniques, dose
 assessment, and decision making. The contaminated area is the largest out-door laboratory for testing
developed methods and procedures.
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

The two stages in emergency response require techniques and procedures for accident radiation
measurement and appropriate dose assessment, i.e. the short-term and the long-term periods of
assessment. The main components of exposure, which need to be assessed during the short-term
period are external and internal exposures from the released radioactive cloud, external exposure
from the radioactive fallout, and internal exposure from the contaminated food and water.


In an emergency situation the contamination can cover large areas and have unpredictable spot
structure due to meteorological conditions and other factors. Since for most nuclear accident
scenarios the highest part of the dose is external exposure, the first priority is to have a measurement
of the external dose. In this case, the first step of the monitoring should be to use integrated methods,
like aerial monitoring, which have high productivity and provide opportunity to have a generic
structure of contamination on the large area during a short time. But this survey does not have a
sufficient accuracy for ambient-dose assessment and requires knowledge of the ground dose rate
measurement. This measurement details the contamination structure  but  does not provide
information on composition of the fallouts for evaluation of the avertible dose. Unfortunately, the
radionuclides composition  in the release and fallout can  significantly vary depending on the
processes in the reactor core and the mechanism of precipitation. The in-situ gamma-spectrometry
is commonly used for measurement of the radionuclides composition. It provides information about
radionuclides mixture  integrated for an area of about 30-50 sq.m The main problems of the accident
in-situ gamma-spectrometry are high dose and complicated spectrum. Currently existing devices and
techniques are completely acceptable in real reactor accident situations.

The information about radionuclides composition can be made more precise by soil sampling. The
local soil contamination varies significantly (up  to 3-5 times within a few sq.meters) due to a
complex mechanism of deposition. Fig. 1 presents an example of frequency distribution (FD) of the
activity soil samples  collected within 5 m  radius.  This FD in theory  follows  a  log  normal
distribution. The geometric mean of activities of as minimum as 10 samples collected within a few
square meters should be used as an estimator of the real density of the contamination.1

For internal exposure assessment, samples of air, water, vegetables, milk, and other ingestion stuff
are collected. The main goal of such  activity is to assess collective and individual doses for the
public. Thus, the  air  samples should be collected in the settlements near the accident source
immediately after the early warning signal about the accident occurs.

The water, vegetables, milk, and other ingestion stuff samples should be collected at the same time
as the soil samples. The activity of these samples also can vary significantly, and for assessment of
the real contamination one should use a geometric mean of activities on a minimum of 5 samples.
It is also necessary to take into account that for the emergency personal collection of the samples is
the most difficult and  expensive step  of the monitoring. Thus, you should have a guarantee that
collected amounts of samples are sufficient for real radiological assessment.
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

The Chernobyl experience has demonstrated that in case of a nuclear reactor accident only two
radionuclides  137Cs and 90Sr  have the highest contribution to the long-term exposure. These
radionuclides have half-lives  (~ 30 years) close to the human life, high ratio in the reactor core
inventory and release, as well as similar chemical characteristics to elements as potassium (for Cs)
and calcium (for Sr) with such importance for human beings.

More than 99% of the Chernobyl accident collective effective dose (CED) is due to I37Cs (90-95%)
and ^Sr (0.5±4%). The internal exposure produced about 70% of the total CED. The main part of
this dose (90-95%) was produced by 137Cs. The food stuff contributed the most (97-98%) to the
internal dose. In Ukraine 70-90% of the 137Cs intake is due to milk. The contamination of milk
depends on radionuclide migration within a chain soil-plant-milk.2

One of the main parameters used for radiological status forecast is the root-layer clearance half-time.
The 137Cs effective clearance half-time for the 0-10 cm soil layer, taking into account radioactive
decay, typically varies from 10 to 25 years. The soil layer clearance was slower in the upper layer
(24-27 years for the 0-5 cm layer) than in the deeper layer (10-17 years). Typically, the processes of
soil clearance of ^Sr are up to 3 times faster than those of 137Cs. The clearance half-time for 90Sr is
typically 7 to 12 years. Three years after the accident, a stabilisation of the transfer factor between
soil and plant has been observed. The variability in observed soil-plant transfer is due to the varying
chemical and physical properties of different soil types.

The level of contamination of agricultural products depends on several factors, including the level
of soil contamination, the soil properties, and the biological characteristics of the plants. The transfer
coefficients of radionuclides into the  plants growing on soddy-podzolic loamy soils are  1-3 times
lower than  the same coefficients for soddy-podzolic sandstone soils. Thus the treatment of
soddy-podzolic soils through the complex use of organic fertilizers, h'ming and high doses of
potassium and phosphorus fertilizers, makes it possible to  reduce the  137Cs contamination of
agricultural crops by up to 4 times when accompanied by water regime improvement, i.e. increased
irrigation and drainage by up to 10 times.3


As a result, for the  long-term period of the radiological assessment  of the consequences of an
accident, the  type of the soil of the contaminated area should be measured and the transfer
coefficient, be evaluated. Everybody hopes that we will never have to face another nuclear accident,
but the emergency response plans should be prepared, and all the details of the monitoring and
modeling procedures be taken into account and tested in a real contaminated area.
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 	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference


 1 V.A.Poiarkov,A.N.Nazarov,N.N.Kaletnik Post-Chernobyl Radiomonitoring of Ukrainian Forest
  Ecosystem, J.Environ.Radioactivity, 26 (1995), 259-271.

 2 Ten year after Chernosbyl accident, National report, Kiev, 1996.

 3 One decade after Chernobyl: Environmental impact and prospects for the future, IAEA/31 -CN-63,
  Vienna, Austria, 1996.
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                    International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference
                0.-5.   5.-10.  10.-15.  15.-20.  20.-25. 25.-30.  30.-35.  35.-40.  40.-45.  45.-50.
                                 DENSITY OFCONTAMINATION.CI/KM2
         '  10-
           25- '
                                     3._4.    4.-5.   5.-6.   6.-7.    7.-8.
                                 DENSITY OF CONTAMINATION, CI/KM2
                                                                         8.-9.   9.-10.
Figure 1. Frequency distribution of the soil sample activities collected within 5m radius
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Washington, D.C.
September 9-11,1998

               Session E, Track 2:
             Public Health Issues II
        Thyroid Disorder as a Result of
      Chernobyl and Other Health Issues
                Thursday, September 10, 1998
                   2:15p.m.-4:40 p.m.
Chair: Andrea Pepper, State of Illinois, Department of Nuclear Safety

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

       A Model Explaining Thyroid Cancer Induction from Chernobyl Radioactivity

                   E.M.Parshkov, A.F.Tsyb, V.A.Sokolov, LV.Chebotareva

                      Medical Radiological Research Center of Russian
                       Academy of Medical Sciences, Obninsk, Russia


The high level of the incidence of thyroid diseases in children and adolescents born from 1968 to
1986 is the most especially dramatic health consequence of the Chernobyl nuclear catastrophe1'4.
The number of thyroid cancers in the radioactively contaminated territories of the Russian
Federation, as well as in Belarus and Ukraine, has significantly exceeded the preliminary
prognostic estimates made by national and international experts.

At present, in the most heavily contaminated territories of the Russian Federation (the Bryansk,
Kaluga, Orel, and Tula regions), more than 250 cases of thyroid cancer in children and
adolescents have been registered. The ages of these patients, at the time of the accident, ranged
from newborn to 18 years. Based upon known ratios between Cesium-137 (137Cs) and lodine-
131 (131I) in fallout, no apparent correlation exists between the incidence of thyroid cancer and
the mean levels of radioactive contamination of 131I and 137Cs in the contaminated areas.

Based upon ten years experience with this problem, we propose a process model for the
development of thyroid pathology in the post-Chernobyl period.


In spite of numerous publications on the thyroid problem, many questions remain because of the
lack of factual material, or because of the absence of adequate explanations for the occurrence
and mechanism of causation for such an increased incidence. At this writing, the following
questions remain unresolved:

1.     The role of short-lived radioisotopes of iodine in the radiation exposure of the thyroid;
2.     The interdependencies among the exchange of stable and radioactive iodine, the
       physiological state of the thyroid itself, and differences of exposure dynamics as a
       dependency on the maturity or physiological condition of the individual (i.e., in utero,
       neonate, prepubertal and postpubertal, pregnant and lactating, menopausal, etc.);
3.     The dynamics and relationships between the intake and delivery of the internally
       absorbed dose;
4.     The epidemiology of thyroid disease for patients living in areas with iodine deficiency;
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

5.     The difference in disease latency periods in children affected by uptakes of radio-iodine
       into the thyroid and then afterwards either remaining in radioactively contaminated zones
       or living in clean territories of Russia following evacuation;
6.     The role of isotopic transport factors in active radionuclide transfer in the first hours and
       days after the accident and its contribution to thyroid exposure doses;
7.     The effect provided by life-style differences between urban and rural populations in the
       affected territories; and,
8.     Reactions of immune, endocrine and other systemic responses due to chronic exposures
       from low dose rates of external and internal irradiation.

As can be seen, the assessment of the aftermath of thyroid radiation exposure after the Chernobyl
accident reveals a very complex medical problem. After extensive study of post-Chernobyl
thyroid pathology, we believe that we have developed a model describing the mechanism of
induction of radiogenic thyroid cancer. This process model consists of the following features:

 1.     In Russia, a definite dependence between the cancer incidence and the proximity of
       children living near major roads and railways was discovered5. This fact is inconsistent
       with the commonly held assumption that all exposure resulted from an airborne plume of
       activity from the damaged reactor. We conclude that in the first hours and days after the
       accident, trains and automobiles served as passive transport pathways for significant
       quantities of short-lived iodine radionuclides. These radionuclides were inhaled and
       ingested by children living near transportation arteries. These intakes resulted in
       significant doses to the thyroid of these children.

 2.     The highest frequency of the thyroid cancer is registered in children who were between
       0-4 years of age at the moment of the accident.  This is of great significance for several
       reasons. First, thyroid gland function in infants and young children differs markedly from
       that in adults. In young children, one notes higher proliferation of thyreocites and
       elements of stroma, a non-competent immune system, etc. Second, in children under one
       year of age, the frequency of breathing is 2-2,5 times greater than in adults, and this, in
       turn, could enhance the intensity of radionuclide inhalation. Third, the mass of the
       thyroid, at these ages, is much smaller than that of an adult. Thus, it can be demonstrated
       that in terms of specific dose (i.e., mSv/gram), the exposure levels to the thyroid of small
       children results in a dose nearly 8 times that received by an adult for a similar intake of
       activity. Because of this higher specific dose, the effectiveness of the radiation is higher,
        and cancer incidence is more prevalent. These factors all combine to effectively
       concentrate the effect of iodine intake in very young children and multiply the potential
        damage of the resulting thyroid dose.

 3.     It has been established that among all thyroid cancers, the papillary morphological form
        comprises more than 95%.  Because of the high incidence of this specific type,  it can be
        safely assumed that this form is radiogenic in nature. It  was also shown that this papillary
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

       form of cancer results in early metastasis into the lymph collector in the neck, and owing
       to this, the radiation induced cancer is considered to be the most aggressive type. It is our
       view that children are particularly susceptible to this form of cancer. During the first 4
       years of life, there is an intense development of the follicular apparatus of the thyroid
       gland, accompanied with formation of the stroma, basal membranes, and capsula of the
       gland.  This developmental physiology opens the possibility for tumor growth in the form
       of endofit and subsequent transformation into papillary cancer. The existence of a rich
       network of lymphatic capillaries facilitates the fast transfer of cancer cells into
       neighboring lymph nodes and the subsequent development of early metastasis there. As a
       result, in young children (0-3 year old), the papillary form of cancer will be induced with
       early metastasis into lymph nodes.  The absence of formed capsula in the thyroid gland
       permits the easy exit of a tumor outside the gland. With the maturing of the organism and
       the completion of the thyroid gland formation, the one should anticipate a decreasing of
       the papillary form of the disease, and an increase of follicular form.

4.     We believe that hypothyrosis is the trigger in development of pathology. We are of the
       opinion that the development of thyroid cancer in children after the Chernobyl accident
       takes place against the background of non-oncological thyroid pathology - diffuse goiter,
       hypothyrosis, autoimmune thyroiditis. We initially adopted this position with great
       caution, but are finding it to be true with growing reliability. We theorize that a chronic
       deficiency of thyroid hormones induces a diffusion of local hyperplasia of thyroid tissue.
       Thyroglobulins are synthesized in excess, but are non-realized. These compounds enter
       into thyroid tissue and blood, which, in turn, stimulates the production of antibodies.  As
       a consequence, autoimmune thyroiditis occurs. The elevated level of TSH, in this case,
       might stimulate the accelerated growth of malignant tumors. This mechanism may have
       particular importance and prevalence in iodine endemic zones.

The above mentioned items are of importance not only to children affected by the Chernobyl
accident, but also to other cohorts of the affected population, particularly personnel involved in
the recovery of the Chernobyl plant ("liquidators"), pregnant women, and lactating women.

It is still too early to make final conclusions related to the nature of incidence, development,
treatment, rehabilitation and prophylaxis of thyroid pathology in the after-Chernobyl period.
Long-term, cross-disciplinary efforts for the continued collection and analysis of data are still
vitally needed.


The primary health effect of the Chernobyl disaster was the increased incidence of childhood
thyroid cancer.  After ten years of study of the problem, a process model is proposed that
explains the main contributors to the onset of this disease. The clustering of cases around
transportation arteries suggests that significant levels of radioactive contamination were carried
in by motorized vehicles leaving the Chernobyl region immediately after the accident.  The effect
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

of this contamination on children was heightened due to the developmental stages of the thyroid
in these children, which increased susceptibility to the induction of cancer from radiation
exposure.  In addition, the cancer appears to develop from a background of non-oncological
disease, and a pathway for this induction was proposed.

1.     Kazakov V.S., Demidchik E.P., Astakhova L.N. Thyroid Cancer after Chernobyl.
       Nature. 1992; 359:21.
2.     Ramzaev P.V., Kacevich A.I., Kacevich N.A., Kovalenko V.I., Komarov E.I.,
       Konstantinov Yu.O., Krivonosov S.P., Ramzaev V.P. Dynamics of Population Exposure
       and Public Health In The Bryansk Region after The Chernobyl Accident. Nagasaki
       Symposium: Radiation and Human Health.  1996:  Elsevier Science B.V. P. 15-28.
3.     Nikiforov Yu.E., Fagin J.A. Risk Factors for Thyroid Cancer. TEM 1997; 8:1; 20-25.
4.     Baverstock K. Chernobyl And Public Health. BMJ 1998; 316:7136; 952-953.
5.     Parskov E.M., Chebotareva I.V., Sokolov V. A., Dallas C.E. Additional  Thyroid Dose
       Factor from Transportation Sources in Russia after The Chernobyl Disaster. Environ
       Health Persp. 1997; 105:6; 1491-1496.
 Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

 	International Radiolosical Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

                Potassium Iodine Prophylaxis in Case of Nuclear Accident;
                                    Polish Experience

                                    Janusz A. Nauman

                         Department of Medicine & Endocrinology,
                         University Medical School of Warsaw and
                              Department of Endocrinology,
                  Medical Research Center of Polish Academy of Sciences,
                                     Warsaw, Poland


 It is now established that both external and internal  radiation can be tumorogenic for the thyroid
 [1,2]. Therefore, hi case of radioiodines contamination, thyroid dose, especially in risk groups
 (pregnant and lactating women, newborns and children), should be kept as low as possible. The
 accumulation of radioiodines by the thyroid gland can be effectively decreased by administration
 of pharmacological dose of stable iodine [3,4], although prior to the Chernobyl accident such
 action aimed to protect the thyroids of large population was not undertaken.  The aim of the
 present paper is to describe the objectives which led to the decision to implement potassium
 iodine (KI) prophylaxis in Poland in time of Chernobyl accident, and to present the model of
 prophylaxis and its effiacacy. The side effects of KI in different ages groups and the problems of
 cost-benefit of this protective measure will be also discussed. Part of these data presented were
 already published [5,6].

 Radiological contamination in Poland following the Chernobyl accident and objectives for
 decision to implement KI prophylaxis

 At the time of the accident, reliable information about its size and possible health consequences
 were not available from former Soviet Union authorities. In Poland increased air radioactivity
 and external radiation were first time identified on the night of April 27 and confirmed on April
 28 by all Polish monitoring stations. Because of environmental findings in the whole country
 showing radiological contamination a governmental commission was called in the morning hours
 of April 29 to assess damage potential and if necessary to protect public health. The commission
 made several decisions.  First, it accepted the scenario of the accident presented by members of
 the Center for Radiological Protection which stated  that the accident was very serious and would
 lead to a prolonged release of radionuclides including radioiodines. Second, it recommended the
 following intervention levels:

 (1)     Whole body committed dose should nor exceed 5mSv
 (2)     Thyroid committed dose should nor exceed 50 mSv in children and 500 mSv in adults
 (3)     Thyroid content in children at any moment should not exceed 5700 Bq
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

Third, the commission defined the population at risk as about 11 million children and adolescents
where thyroid uptakes of radioiodines might be higher due to relative iodine deficiency which
was suspected in Polish diet.

At 10 AM on April 29, monitoring stations were reporting continuing and growing radiological
contamination especially in eastern and central Poland. In the same time neck measurements
taken in children at different ages showed, that in some of them, the thyroid content of 131-1 was
quite high. It was then concluded that at least in 11 Voivodoships (Provinces) the thyroid
committed dose in children might  well exceed the 50 mSv limit. It was realized that although
some thyroid radioiodines uptake already occurred the gland should be protected against
continuing radioiodine contamination coming from damaged Chernobyl power station reactor. At
this moment Poland had no sufficient supply of KI tablets, however, the Central Pharmacy
Organization (CEFARM) had stores of KI in substance sufficient to prepare the KI solution
containing about 90 millions doses of 100 mg of KI each.

Potassium iodide prophylaxis in Poland

Evidence from literature [7] showed that mean effect of 70 mg of iodide is similar to that of 100
mg of iodide. The information about side effects of iodide, although they came from observation
of small group  of patients, suggested that intrathyroidal and extrathyroidal side effects might
depend on the final dose of iodide [ 3,4 ].  Those, who proposed the final model of prophylaxis
realized that total block of  radioiodines uptake in Poland is not possible on April 29. On the
other hand,  it was realized that final burden to the thyroid gland should be reduced to the level
which would be relatively safe in  terms of possible tumorogenic effects of internal radiation. It
was also expected that single dose of iodide would not lead to serious side effects. At noon hours
of April 29  the Minister of Health ordered to prepare and distribute KI solution in all hospitals,
public health care centers, drug stores, schools, kindergartens and so forth. The KI prophylaxis
was mandatory to all under 16 years old and voluntary to all others. Pregnant and lactating
women were advised to take prophylaxis. The following protocol was used: 15 mg of iodide for
newboms, 50 mg for children 5 years or under and 70 mg for all others. The prophylaxis was first
introduced in 11 eastern Voivodoships. On April 30 as the radiological situation further
 deteriorated, the prophylaxis was  ordered to be country-wide  It was also decided that a second
 dose of KI would be distributed if radiological contamination in air would continue to be high.
 Fortunately, by May 3 air contamination had decreased at least fourfold and in the next days
 further reduction of radioactivity  was observed therefore distribution of a second dose of KI was

 Thyroid committed doses in Poland, efficacy of KI prophylaxis and adverse reactions

 In December 1986 a research follow-up programme coded MZ-XVH was approved. This
 population studies had the following main objectives:
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

1.     To estimate thyroid 131-1 committed doses in children and adults living in different
       regions of Poland and to investigate possible effects of thyroid irradiation;
2.     To evaluate the degree of thyroid protection achieved by KI administration and by other
       protective measures and to obtain estimates of the incidence of intrathyroidal and
       extrathyroidal side effects of single dose of KI in newborns, children and adults;
3.     To evaluate thyroid function of newborns who were exposed to the radiation and KI
       administration while in utero or soon after delivery;
4.     To evaluate possible detrimental effects of single dose of KI on subjects with past  history
       of thyroid disorders.

The MZ-XVH programme (1987-1990) was described in detail elsewhere [ 5,6 ] Briefly 52,092
randomly selected persons were questioned and 34,391 completed medical and laboratory
investigations. The sample represented approximately 0.09% of the population of Poland and its
distribution (age, sex, living in towns and villages) was typical for the country as a whole. In
addition, in the middle of 1997 we started A second research programme coded PBZ-38-08 and
aimed to reexamine the same sample which had been studied under THE MZ-XVn programme.
Although the PBZ-38-08 programme will come to the end in 1999, the thyroid dose
reconstruction which  used the results of population study on iodine intake in diet was already
completed in eastern part of Poland.

As previously described in detail [5,6 ], thyroid burden was evaluated by both the direct method
and by an indirect method based on 5 compartmental models of iodine metabolism developed by
Johnson [ 8 ]. The maximal 131-1 thyroid committed doses (without KI prophylaxis)  in 12
highly contaminated provinces for children < 1 year old, < 2-5 years, < 6-10 years and adults
were 136.2 mSv, 69.4 mSv, 55.1mSv and 30.8 mSv, respectively. These preliminary data on
thyroid dose reconstruction suggests also that about 17% of children of all age groups who
reached maximal thyroid doses all exceeded 50 mSv limit without protective action. The thyroid
maximal doses in the remaining provinces of Poland where radioactive contamination was
estimated as average or mild in all age groups were below 50 mSv. However it should be added
that in all Poland there were a number of "hot spots" wherein the thyroid doses could have been
6-10 times-thai of the surrounding areas. More comprehensive results of thyroid committed dose
reconstruction will soon be available.

It has been estimated [ 5,6 ] that approximately 95.3% of Polish children (about 10.5 million)
and 23.2%  of adolescents (above 16 years old) and adults (7.5 million) took potassium iodide
dose. In 12 provinces where KI prophylaxis was ordered on April 29, the bulk of KI distribution
occurred during the next two days. In  areas bordering former Soviet Union almost 75% of
children were given KI within the first 24 hours of the prophylactics.  In the remaining provinces
where KI protective action was ordered on April 30, the bulk of children  received potassium
iodide on May 2. In Ostroleka province where the thyroid burden and the efficacy of single dose
of KI were investigated by direct method [ 5 ] the dose reduction in subjects who took
prophylaxis on April 29 was estimated to be 45% and in those who took KI on April 30 to be
41%. On the basis of indirect method it was assumed that KI dose given on April 29 reduced
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

thyroid burden by about 40% and KI given on April 25 by about 25%.  If there were prompt
warning from former Soviet Union and if KI prophylaxis were implemented in Poland on April
27 the thyroid radioiodines committed dose reduction would have been close to 67% [ 5  ].

The acute and transient intrathyroidal side effects of a single dose of KI were seen only in 0.37%
of newborns who received prophylaxis on the second day of life [5,6  ]. The mild increase of
serum TSH and decrease of serum FT4 disappeared after 10 days without treatment. This
transient Wolff-Chaikoff phenomenon was without effect on further development of these
children and on their thyroid status as examined in the 3rd year of life. Although re-examination
of these children in their 10th year of life is not yet completed the preliminary results suggest that
neither thyroid irradiation nor KI given on the second day of life affected the function of their
thyroid gland. The single dose of KI was without effect upon the course of thyroid diseases in
those with the history of thyroid pathology [ 5 ].

As previously described [5,6] the number of extrathyroidal side effects after the single dose of KI
were more common than could be expected. These reactions were identified in about 4.6% of
children and about 4.5% of adolescents and  adults. All of these adverse reactions were of
hypersensitivity type and all were mild and transient. As estimated [ 5,6 ], majority of these
reactions disappeared without medical assistance. In addition, acute respiratory distress
developed in two adults with chronic obstructive lung disease and well documented allergy to
iodides who regardless of this allergy decided to take KI dose. They were cured by
hydrocortisone administration.


At the time of the Chernobyl accident there  was no international agreement on early warning in
case of nuclear accident, such regulations, however, are now in place.  Therefore it should be
expected that if a severe nuclear accident happens, with a risk for public health, KI prophylaxis
would be if needed introduced very early. The present evidence [ 9,10 ] that even low thyroid
doses of radioiodines can lead to thyroid cancer in children, strongly support the need for such
protective action for pregnant and lactating women, and for children. It also suggests that
intervention levels for these risk groups should be lower than previously established. The Polish
experience showed that even  in the absence of KI tablets protective action (KI solution) can be
quite efficiently implemented. As KI tablets at present available have long shelf-time their
predistribution seems to be a crucial issue for most effective prophylaxis in case of nuclear
 accident. In conclusion, it is suggested that the decision to block the thyroid uptake or to reduce
 final committed thyroid dose of radioiodines depend on the evaluation of radiological
 contamination, size of population at risk, approved intervention levels and preparedness.

 We proved that even a single dose of KI can significantly reduce final thyroid burden and that a
 single dose of KI is a safe procedure.
 Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference


1.     Williams E.D., Pacini F, Pinchera A. Thyroid cancer following Chernobyl. J. Endocrinol.
       Invest. 1995; 18:144-146
2.     Lichtarev LA., Sobolev B.D., Kairo LA., Chepurny N.I. Thyroid cancer in Ukraine.
       Nature 1995; 375: 365
3.     Crocker D.G. Nuclear reactor accidents - the use of KI as a blocking agent against
       radioiodine uptake in the thyroid - a review. Health Physics 1984; 46: 1265-1279
4.     Becker D.V., Braverman L.E., Dunn J.T., Gaitan E.  et all The use of iodine as thyroidal
       blocking agent in the event of a reactor accident. J.A.M.A. 1984; 252: 659-661
5.     Nauman J., Wolff J. Iodide prophylaxis in Poland after the Chernobyl reactor accident;
       benefits and risks. Am. J. Medicine 1993; 94: 524-532
6.     Nauman J. (guest editor) Results of studies performed within MZ-XVn Programme (
       Chernobyl, iodide, thyroid) Pol. J. Endocrinol. 1991; 42:153-367
7.     Stemthal E., Lipworth L., Stanley B., Abreau C et all. Supression of thyroid radioiodine
       uptake by various doses of stable iodide. NJEngl. J. Med.  1980; 303: 1083-1088
8.     Johnson J.R. Radioiodine dosimetry. J. Radioanalitical Chem. 1981; 65: 223-231
9.     Nikiforov Y., Gnepp D.R. Pediatric thyroid cancer after the Chernobyl disaster. Cancer
       1994; 74: 748-751
10.    Ron E. et all Thyroid cancer after exposure to external radiation: a pooled analysis of
       seven studies. Rad. Res. 1995; 141: 259-277
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

      Emergency Response after the Chernobyl Accident in Belarus: Lessons Learned

                                 E.Buglova, J.Kenigsberg

           Research and Clinical Institute of Radiation Medicine and Endocrinology
                                     Minsk, Belarus
                                Phone: 375-172-26-66-22
                                 Fax: 375-172-26-93-60
                           E-mail: risk@rirme.belpak.minsk.by


The Chernobyl accident is one of the most dramatic reactor accidents that affected different
countries and millions of people. Belarus is one of the most contaminated countries due to this
accident. Twenty three percent of the entire area of Belarus was contaminated with the
long-lived radionuclides with different levels of contamination density.

During about 12 years of the post-accident period, radiation protection of the population of
Belarus has been one of the crucial problems aimed at reducing the exposure doses and risk of
radiation induced effects. Different protective actions with various levels of effectiveness have
been performed during all phases of the accident.


At the early phase of the accident, evacuation of about 24,700 people was performed. This
measure allows to prevent deterministic health effects among the Belarusian population. At the
intermediate and late phases of the accident, about  130,000 of people were relocated. At present,
average annual doses for the majority of the inhabitants of settlements located on the
contaminated territories do not exceed 5 mSv. Of 2,2 million of Belarusian inhabitants,  who were
exposed in 1986, less than 300,000 people now receive annual doses in the range of 1-5 mSv.
The maintenance of doses at such low levels has become possible due to conduction and
maintenance of a number of protective measures. To restrict the internal exposure, the following
protective actions were carried out: establishment of permissible levels for radioactive
contamination of foodstuffs, conduction of regular control of foodstuffs contamination and a
wide range of agricultural protective measures.

One of the most important experience that was obtained, based on the analysis of the
effectiveness for different types of the carried out intervention, is connected with the protection
of the thyroid gland. After the Chernobyl accident, the majority of Belarusian territory was
contaminated with 1-131. In five out of 6 regions of Belarus,  density of contamination with 1-131
ranged from 0.4 to 37 MBq/sq.m. The highest levels of contamination density were registered on
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September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

the territories closest to the NPP (southern part of Belarus). The contamination decreased with
the distance from the NPP.

Because of late warning of the population and incompleteness of measurements for thyroid
protection, significant doses were formed to the thyroid glands of Belarusian people. According
to the recent estimation, the collective thyroid dose for all population of Belarus is 510,000
person-Sv.m This estimation takes into account only doses from ingestion of 1-131 and does not
count short-lived isotopes of iodine, as well as inhalation of 1-131. Children up to 6 years old
who lived in the south part of Belarus, received highest thyroid doses. Exposure from 1-131
developed conditions for thyroid stochastic consequences among the exposed population.

The level of the thyroid cancer incidence in Belarus before the Chernobyl accident (1971-1985)
was low for children (0.04 per 100,000 children population annually) and relatively higher for
adults (0.3-2.5 per 100,000 population for men and  1.2-3.9 per 100,000 population for women).[2]

After the accident, the thyroid cancer incidence started to increase and since 1990, the significant
increase of the incidence rate among the exposed children was registered. Among children and
adolescents who were under 18 years of age in 1986, the incidence rate of thyroid cancer was:
1.15 per 100,000 in 1990; 2.7 per 100,000 in 1991; 3.17 per 100,000 in 1994; 5.0 per 100,000 in
1995; 4.63 per 100,000 in 1996.[3] Similar increase in the incidence was observed among the
exposed children of Ukraine and Russia.13-4-51

Specialists attribute the increased rate of thyroid cancer to the development of radiation-induced
excess cases. Nevertheless, there are some aspects that are still not well known now:
effectiveness of internal exposure of 1-131 in comparison with external gamma- and X-ray
exposure; role of short-lived isotopes of I and Te in the induction of thyroid cancer; role of non-
radiation factors in carcinogenesis (iodine deficiency, genetical predisposition, use of stable
iodine in 1986,  chemical environmental pollutants, endemic disorders of the thyroid that are
characteristic for some regions of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine).

The comparative analysis of dose levels for thyroid exposure of different cohorts shows that
absolute risk of radiation-induced thyroid cancer after external gamma- or X-ray exposure may
be close to the absolute risk of such cancer due to internal 1-131 exposure after the Chernobyl
accident (Table 1).
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

                    International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference
   Table 1. Absolute risk of excess thyroid cancer after external gamma- or X-ray exposure
               and due to internal 1-131 exposure after the Chernobyl accident
survivors [6'73
Tinea capitis [8]
Pooled analysis
of seven studies
children of
Belarus, Russia,
Ukraine [4]
children of
Belarus [3]l
Number of
Age of
all ages
thyroid dose
Absolute risk
per 104
Although the risk values are relatively close, these levels were obtained for cohorts of different
age groups. The data of the table shows that the question is under investigation, but because of
different uncertainties that still exist, the investigations have to be continued.

Recent studies conducted in Belarus try to find the influence of non-radiation factors on the
excess of thyroid cancer among the exposed persons. The comparison of iodine excretion level
with urine for the regions where the persons with thyroid cancer are living, does not allow to find
the relationship between the thyroid cancer and the level of iodine deficiency that is investigated
using this method. It is important to take into account that such investigation of iodine excretion
with urine was not performed before the Chernobyl accident. There are no consistent data to be
compared. Because of that, it is difficult to estimate the real role of iodine deficiency in the
increase of thyroid cancer incidence.

Estimation of thyroid doses brings a significant contribution to the uncertainty of risk
assessment. For  1.4 % of the Belarusian population of 0-18 years of age, the dose estimation is
based on the results of the direct measurements that were performed in 1986. For the rest of the
cohort of this age group (2,683,621 persons), the dose estimation is carried out using different
methods of dose reconstruction based on radioecological models with high level of uncertainty.
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September 9-11,1998

 	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

 Possibly, different thyroid disorders (goiter, hyperplasia, etc.) that existed before the accident,
 could also contribute to the total uncertainty of thyroid dose estimation. Dose models are based
 on biokinetic models and peculiarities of the exposure for normal thyroid tissues of a reference
 healthy man. There are no dose models for the thyroid that take into account the changes in
 thyroid volume, functional conditions, the presence of nodules, etc.
 After the Chernobyl accident, a significant increase in thyroid cancer among the exposed
 population and, in particular, among the exposed children was registered. The level of this
 increase is correlated with doses of exposure within some limits. However, for the correct risk
 assessment of radiation-induced thyroid cancer, the investigation should be continued.


 Radiation-induced thyroid cancer is one of the Chernobyl lessons that should be summarized and
 learned for the purpose of its effective use for protection of people in the case of potential future
 radiological emergencies.



Gavrilin, Y., Khrouch,V., Shinkarev, S., et al., Estimation of Thyroid Doses Received by
the Population of Belarus as a Result of the Chernobyl Accident / The radiological
consequences of the Chernobyl accident / Proc. of the conference, Minsk, Belarus, 1996.
- Karaoglou, A., Desmet, G., Kelly, G.N., Menzel, H.G., Ed., Minsk (1996) 1011-1020.
Okeanov, A.E., Demidchik, E.P., Ankudovich, M.A., Thyroid cancer incidence in the
Republic of Belarus. Radiation and Risk. Bulletin of the National Radiation and
Epidemiological Registry. 1995; 6: 236-239.
Buglova E., Demidchik E., Kenigsberg J., Golovneva A. Thyroid cancer in Belarus after
the Chernobyl accident: incidence, prognosis of progress, risk assessment. / Low Doses
of Ionizing Radiation: Biological Effects and Regulatory Control. / Proceeding of the
International Conference. - Spain, November 1997. - P. 280-284.
Jacob P., Goulko G., Heidenreich W., Likhtarev L, Kairo I., Tronko N., Bogdanova T.,
Kenigsberg J., Buglova E., Drozdovitch V., Golovneva A., Demidchik E., Balonov M.,
Zvonova I. Thyroid cancer risk to children calculated. // Nature. 1998; 392,  ? 5: 31-32.
Sobolev, B., Likhtarev, I., Kairo,  I., Tronko, N., et al., Radiation risk assessment of the
thyroid cancer in Ukrainian children exposed due to Chernobyl / The radiological
consequences of the Chernobyl accident / Proc. of the conference, Minsk, Belarus, 1996.
- Karaoglou, A., Desmet, G., Kelly, G.N., Menzel, H.G., Ed., Minsk (1996) 741-748.
Thomson D., Mabuchi K., Ron E., et al. Cancer incidence in atomic bomb survivors. Part
H: Solid tumors, 1958-1987 //Radiat.Res. 1994; 137:S17-S67.
Ron, E., Lubin, J., Shore, R., et al., Thyroid cancer after exposure to external radiation; a
pooled analysis of seven studies. Radiat. Res.  1995; 141: 259 - 277.
Ron E., Modan B., Preston D., et  al., Thyroid neoplasia following low-dose radiation in
childhood. Radiat. Res. 1989; 120: 516-531.
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

                 Session F, Track 1:

                   Clean-Up Levels

                   Friday, September 11,1998
                      8:00 a.m. - 9:50 a.m.
Chair: Craig Conklin, United States Environmental Protection Agency

                    International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

                      Philosophical Challenges to the Establishment
                             Of Reasonable Clean-up Levels

                              Charles B. Meinhold, President

                 National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements
                            7910 Woodmont Avenue, Suite 800
                                Bethesda, MD 20814-3095

Limitation of low-level radiation as applied to such issues as projected waste storage,
decontamination and decommissioning of nuclear facilities, and in many cases, with the cleanup
of contaminated land, can be considered to be properly within the classical system of dose
limitation recommended by the ICRP and the NCRP. In these cases, the exposure conies about
as the result of the deliberate introduction of a source of radiation with consequences which can
be reasonably expected. For example, the decision on waste storage is justified on the basis of
justifying the practice which led to the generation of the waste.  This is a decision which does not
rest with radiation protection issues alone. Clearly, society, commercial interests, and
government all participate in such decisions, either by legislative decree or by Federal and State
regulation. This is the first principle in the three-part system of dose limitation.

The second principle is related to reducing exposures to as low  as reasonably achievable
(ALARA), economic and social considerations included. This is a radiation protection issue, and
one which will be addressed.

The third element in the system of dose limitation is the system of establishing dose limits for
both individual workers and for members of the public. Perhaps the greatest driving force for
establishing limits is the need to insure that individuals  or groups of individuals are not placed in
the position of receiving an inordinately high exposure simply because the collective dose is low.
In addition, ALARA considerations may establish the acceptability of a given radiation source,
whereas the individual may be exposed to many such sources.


For emergencies, the situation is inherently different. Here the exposure is unplanned, and for
many scenarios, unexpected.  The exposure exists simply as a result of the event having taken
place, and the system of dose limitation cannot embody the classical justification step since the
exposure is already taking place. What then are the appropriate parts of the dose limitation
system that should be applied in the event of an accidental release of radioactive material?
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

The concepts inherent in the dose limitation system as it applies to introducing a practice are
somewhat reversed. The first order of business is to keep individual exposures below the
threshold of serious deterministic effects and prevent any unacceptably high risks of stochastic
effects in individuals. When exposures are at these levels, action to prevent individual exposures
will be obviously necessary. For example, whole-body absorbed dose rates in excess of a tenth
of a Gy (10 rads) per month fall into this category.  Since, as pointed out above, the justification
step doesn't make sense when dealing with an emergency, a simple objective is in order. For
exposures resulting from emergencies, simply do more good than harm. Sounds simple, but of
course it isn't. Let's look at one particularly formidable aspect of the detriment associated with
any exposure — anxiety.

"Anxiety" can be associated with a decision not to take an action to reduce exposure by virtue of
both reasonable  and unreasonable concerns about perceived risk. On the other hand, once the
decision maker decides to take an aggressive approach to reducing exposure, the affected public
will likewise respond with anxiety. For example, the anecdotal evidence from the former Soviet
Union indicates  severe psychological stress related to the Chernobyl accident when actions were
taken. The Three Mile Island experience suggests that among those for whom emergency actions
were not imposed there was also severe psychological stress.  Public anxiety over low-level
radiation is perhaps the most difficult issue which the decision-maker must address in trying to
establish an acceptable and workable approach to handing radiation exposure issues that must be
made in the event of a  radiological emergency. As a result, decisions are often made on the basis
of perceived risks rather than the actual risks related to exposure.

Returning to ALARA (optimization), the second element in the system of dose limitation, the
 application to an emergency situation is also somewhat different from that applied to introduction
 of a new practice.  Here, we must focus on insuring that each protective measure is evaluated to
 determine how far the  action should be taken based on balancing the cost of the action such that
 the net benefit from such action is maximized.

 The third element ~ establishment of a dose limit - is perhaps the most difficult in that the
 system of dose limitation for accidents brings us to the establishment of an action level, as
 mentioned above.  For the  emergency situation, the source of exposure already exists, and the
 derivation of an exposure limit must be related to the basic concept of deriving the level where
 the action will do more good than harm. Perhaps a review of the ICRP's thoughts related to
 intervention are in order here.

 From ICRP Publication 63,1  "Principles for Intervention for Protection of the Public in a
 Radiological Emergency," we find Figure 1.  We  assume that the accident or event has resulted
 in widespread contamination which will deliver the exposure as depicted in the smooth curve
 shown in the figure. The ICRP refers to this  dose as the projected dose. It is the dose  that would
 be received if no action is taken.  The objective in intervening is to intercede so as to eliminate a
 fraction of the projected dose.  That  is called the averted dose. It is also clear from this figure
 that the duration of the intervention is important.  However, the relative effectiveness of any
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September 9-11, 1998

 	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

 intervention decreases with time (i.e., with dose rate). One of the truisms in these decisions is
 that the cost of introducing some action is quite great, while continuing it is considerably less.
 Rather than to get into a detailed analysis of how intervention is determined, I would again refer
 you to ICRP's Publication 63.  Table 3 from that report, shown below, introduces some
 recommended intervention levels.
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September 9-11, 1998

                  International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference
	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

The table and the magnitude of the values in it, brings us to my main objective.  Fundamentally,
that position is that we cannot use the radiation levels like .15 mSv/y (15 mrem/y), or .25 mSv/y
(25 mrem/y), or even 1 mSv (100 mrem/y) as our basis for planning the response to radiation

The primary difficulty in establishing reasonable action levels is the extraordinary emphasis
placed on low dose effects. EPA and NRC are in open disagreement on a clean-up level of 15 or
25 mrem, respectively. This is, perhaps, appropriate when someone has clear responsibilities for
paying for remediation (i.e., you  degrade the environment, you pay).

Now let us suppose that there is widespread contamination of prime real estate resulting from
terrorist events. Let us further suppose that the individual dose will range between .1 mSv and 1
mSv (10 and 100 mrem) per year for seventy years. Using the concepts behind the EPA-
suggested 15 mrem, we find the maximumly exposed individual will receive 100 mrem x 70
years - 7 rem or 70 mSv. The individual^ fatal cancer risk will be approximately 7 rem x 5 x
lO^/rem or 3.5 x 10'3. Since this exceeds EPA guidance that the public should incur risks of no
more than 1  x 10"4 to 1 x 10'6 fatal cancer risk in a lifetime, it would seem that the residents of
our expensive real estate will have to abandon their homes. This would be accompanied with
widespread fear and concern by the people who will expect the regulators and the politicians to
correct his horrendous health effect.


But let us remember that the several million residents of Denver, Colorado, already have faced
the same risk from their exposure to an increment of natural background just about that much
greater than the exposure to natural background here in Washington. They even build nurseries
for little children in Denver. How crass; how careless.  Where are the regulators, the public
health officials, and the politicians?

My point is that we have created a conundrum of a problem not related to our assumption of
linearity but a perception that small risks resulting from radiation exposure are somehow
different dependent upon the origin at the exposure. My plea here is to emphasize that we
develop a system of action levels that reflect the important differences between emergency
response and regulating existing practices.

 1.  ICRP, 1992. "Principals for Intervention for Protection of the Public in a Radiological
    Emergency," ICRP Publication 63, Pergamon Press, New York.
 Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

          	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

          Beyond Academia; An Argument for Clean Up to Background Levels
                      to Minimize Property Stigma and Devaluation

                                    Andrew!. Gross

             Radiation Protection Services, LSU-LBTC, Baton Rouge, Louisiana

While the academic community focuses on a debate between regulated and risk-based analysis
for determination of clean up levels following a release or other contamination event, little
consideration is given to the long-term effects which may be equally injurious to the residents
and property owner; property stigma and devaluation.

The lowering of property values after a release or contamination of the property may be attributed
to several factors. These factors may include the requirement to disclose prior to sale any
"environmental hazards including but not limited to... nuclear sources" on the Property Condition
Disclosure Statement used by real estate agents and the stigma associated with property which
still contains levels above natural background.

Several real estate experts have also argued that stigma value damage continues after clean up.

In addition, more than one legal case has resulted in tax rebates for property owners due to
diminished value as a result of environmental damage. In the cases discussed, the property
owner filed for tax rebates to the local taxing authority claiming the property is severely devalued
due to the contaminants. Rulings in favor of the land owner may entitle the landowner to a
rebate of taxes paid since the date of the incident resulting in the contamination. This has been
successfully argued in asbestos contamination cases.  The result can be significant financial
losses and subsequent hardship for the taxing authority including county, State or local

Additionally, a fundamental constitutional argument regarding the lack of "due process" in
regulatory approval processes also results in loss of real property.

The EPA, in northern Florida was involved in an agreement to purchase homes located near a
contaminated site, although the properties were not directly affected by the contaminants.

This paper will provide an analysis of clean up levels as they affect property value and the local
real estate market. Using market analysis of communities affected by contaminants such as those
surrounding Superfund sites and areas of radioactive releases, the authors will discuss and argue
why clean up to natural background levels or purchase of properties may be reasonable
consideration in the regulatory process.
 Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

                 Tradeoffs Between Post-Emergency Clean-up Levels and
                       Costs Following a Severe Accident Release1

                            Vinod Mubayi and W. Trevor Pratt

                           Department of Advanced Technology
                    Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, New York


A severe accident at a nuclear power plant can potentially release a significant fraction of the
core inventory of radionuclides to the environment. Radiation exposure of the affected
population from this release can have both short-term consequences, such as radiation-induced
early injuries and fatalities, and long-term consequences, such as latent cancers, through various
exposure pathways. In the short-term, the important pathways are inhalation exposure due to
breathing contaminated air, cloudshine exposure from the passage of the radioactive plume, and
groundshine exposure from standing on ground contaminated by the deposition of radioactive
material. Longer-term consequences are mainly due to three exposure pathways: inhalation
exposure from the resuspension of deposited material, ingestion of contaminated food and water,
and groundshine exposure from living on residually contaminated land.

Emergency protective actions mandated by Part 50 Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
10 CFR 50.47(3),* are meant to prevent or reduce short-term consequences. These actions
include relocation or sheltering of the potentially exposed population downwind of the release.
Long-term consequences can be reduced by:  decontamination of land and buildings, banning the
consumption of contaminated milk and other foodstuffs, prohibiting the production of crops or
animal feed on contaminated farmland, or by permanently interdicting land that cannot be
decontaminated within a certain time period in a cost-effective manner.

Each of these actions will lead to costs that have to be borne by society. The Protective Action
Guidelines2 (PAGs) of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) can be utilized to limit short-
term plume exposures and ingestion exposures from contaminated food within a planning area
around each reactor site. However,  there are no specific guidelines for projected long-term doses
from groundshine or resuspension inhalation which are below the respective PAGs.  Long-term
health effects depend on the clean-up level, also called the "long term interdiction limit," i.e. the
allowable level of long-term exposure of a potentially affected population expressed in terms of
the projected dose to an individual over a certain time period from the long-term exposure
pathways. Relaxation of the long-term interdiction limit (i.e., allowing a higher dose over a
certain period of time) will lead to higher doses to the population and more latent cancers but
will decrease the offsite costs since  smaller amounts of property and food will have to be
'This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

condemned. Conversely, a more stringent long term interdiction limit (i.e., a lower level of dose
over the same time period) will lead to smaller health effects but increase the offsite costs.  Thus,
the two measures of offsite consequences—health effects and offsite costs—are inversely related
and a particular choice of an interdiction limit is, in effect, a trade-off between these two
consequence measures.

This paper evaluates the trade-off for five nuclear power plants studied in the NUREG-1150
program.3 Using the severe accident source terms at each plant, the MACCS4 probabilistic
consequence code was run to calculate the offsite (or clean-up) costs as a function of the clean-up
level (or, equivalently, the long-term projected dose limit) at each plant site.  If a monetary cost is
ascribed to the health effects, through the choice of a monetary value for a life saved or latent
cancer averted (generally called a statistical-value-of-life, SVOL), then the sum of the clean-up
costs and the health costs will be a minimum at  some clean-up level and this level can be
considered optimal from the standpoint of irnnimizing the total costs.  Such a minimum is
presented below for the five NUREG-1150 plants (Grand Gulf, Peach Bottom, Sequoyah, Surry,
and Zion) and its implications for post-emergency clean-up levels are discussed.


Bases of Calculations

Details of the calculations presented below have been described elsewhere5; the bases are
summarized below. (1) Accident source terms were taken from the individual plant studies in the
NUREG-1150 program. (2) Consequence calculations were performed using the MACCS code
(Version In performing the consequence calculations, the emergency response
assumptions were the same as those assumed in the NUREG-1150 study.  The long-term
protective assumption used in NUREG-1150 were to interdict land which could give a projected
dose to an individual via the groundshine and resuspension inhalation pathways of more than 4
rem in 5 years (2 rem in the first year and 0.5 rem per year for the next 4 years). Banning of
contaminated food and interdiction of agricultural land for crop growing was based on FDA
protective action guides for exposure from ingestion for the food groups and crops modeled in
the MACCS code (representative of an average U. S. diet). To estimate the effect of varying
long-term interdiction dose limits on  offsite costs, latent fatalities, and population doses, we
recalculated the consequences at each of the NUREG-1150 plants for the following limits: 3.5
rem in 5 years (0.7 rem or 700 millirem per year), 2.5 rem in 5 years (500 millirem per year) and
 1.5 rem in 5 years  (300 millirem per year). These calculations were performed for all of the
 source terms at each plant out to a distance of 50 miles.

For each source term, the MACCS code calculates distributions of the consequences based on
 Monte Carlo sampling from one year of site-specific hourly weather and wind direction data.
 Apart from the variability due to weather, there is a very large variation in the consequences
 arising from the different source terms at each plant due to differences in the release parameters
 such as magnitude (that is, fractions of the core inventory released), timing and energy. To
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September 9-11, 1998

 .	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

 obtain a single value of mean (averaged over weather) consequences which is representative of
 all of the source terms analyzed at each plant we constructed frequency-averaged mean
 consequences defined as follows.  For any mean consequence, C,, for a source term i, the
 frequency-averaged value C is
where X; is the frequency of source term i and N is the total number of source term groups.  C can
be understood as a frequency-averaged conditional mean consequence value, that is the mean
value (averaged over weather) of the consequence conditional on the occurrence of the accident
and weighted by the frequency of the accident.

Total Costs as a Function of Long-Term Interdiction Limit

The total cost of an accidental release can be expressed as the sum of the offsite protective action
costs, OC(r), and the health-related costs, HRC. The offsite costs are calculated by the
consequence code for each selected value of the long term interdiction limit, r (denoted in
mrem/year). To monetize  the health effects, early and latent fatalities, calculated by the
consequence code, the health-related costs are expressed as:

                                   HRC = EFC + LFC

where EFC = early fatality costs and LFC = latent fatality costs. The early fatality cost can be
simply written as:
                                   EFC = SVOL *EF
where EF is the number of early fatalities and SVOL ($) is the selected statistical value of life.
The latent fatalities are a function of the long term interdiction limit r and have to be discounted
to present value due to the latency period between the time of exposure and the induction of the
cancer.  Table 1 displays the risks and latency periods for various types of cancer due to radiation
exposure. We can then write the (discounted) latent fatality costs as the product of SVOL and
the number of latent cancers:
LFC(r) = SVOL *
Ljj(r) = number of latent fatalities due to cancer type/at the assumed interdiction limit r,
lj = latency period of thej'th type of cancer, (yrs)
d = discount rate, (%/yr)
N = number of cancer types, and
r = interdiction limit, (mrem/year)
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

                    International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference
The total cost, TC, of an accidental release can then be written as:

TC(r) = OC(r)  + SVOL * \EF +
                                                              ^ — -
With the exception of the statistical value of life, SVOL, all the other quantities in the above
equation are calculated by the consequence code. Estimates of the mean of SVOL from various
public exposure and hazardous occupation risk studies are approximately $10 million (1990 $).


The total costs to 50 miles as a function of the interdiction limit, r, have been calculated for
Grand Gulf, Peach Bottom, Sequoyah, Surry and Zion, respectively. Figure 1 shows the results
for the Zion plant; the results for the other plants are very similar. As the interdiction limit is
reduced, the offsite costs progressively increase while the population dose and latent cancers
decrease. Ultimately, a law of diminishing returns should set in as the interdiction limit is
reduced; the reduction in total dose (and thus the number of latent cancers) should get smaller as
progressively larger costs of condemning land and property are incurred.

The curve for total costs in Figure 1 assumed an SVOL of $10 million and a discount rate of 7%
per year.

For most of the plants, the minimum of the total cost curve for the chosen SVOL lies in the range
of 500 to 700 mrem per year.  In other words, for a SVOL of $10 million, which represents a
mean across many different public risk studies, an interdiction limit of 500-700 mrem per year
represents an optimum from the standpoint of minimizing the total costs. Lower values of
avoided dose limits, for example down to 200 mrem per year, will be associated with a
significantly higher value of SVOL, which would be out of line with risk allocation decisions in
many other areas.
 Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

                    International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference
             0.84  --
             0.83  -
             0.82  -
             0.81  -
                 300      400      500      600      700      800

                            Interdiction Level (mrem/yr)
                Figure 1 Total Cost at 50 Miles vs. Interdiction Level, Zion
1. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Code of Federal Regulations, "Domestic Licensing of
Production and Utilization Facilities," Part 50, Title 10, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996.

2. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective
Actions for Nuclear Incidents," EPA 400-R-92-001, May 1992.

3. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Severe Accident Risks: An Assessment for Five U.S.
Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-1150, Vol. 1, 1989.
Washington, D.C.
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

4.Chanin, D., et al, "MACCS Version A Maintenance Release of the Code," Sandia
National Laboratories, NUREG/CR-6059, SAND92-2146.

5. Mubayi, V., et al., "Cost-Benefit Considerations in Regulatory Analysis", NUREG/CR-6349,
BNL-NUREG-52466, October 1995.
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September 9-11, 1998

                   International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference
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Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

               Session F, Track 2:
     Lessons Learned from Chernobyl II
                 Friday, September 11, 1998
                    8:00 a.m. - 9:50 a.m.
Chair: Jim Fairobent, United States Department of Energy

 	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

         Cleanup Criteria and Technologies for a 137Cs-contaminated Site Recovery

                      Slavik O.1, Moravek J.1, Stubna M.1, Vladar M.2

         1) Nuclear Power Plants Research Institute, Okruna 5, 91864 Trnava, Slovakia
         2) Research Institute of Preventive Medicine, Limbova 5, Bratislava, Slovakia


 The 19 km long banks of the Bohunice NPP waste water recipient has been identified as
 contaminated by 137Cs as a result of two accidents on the CO2 cooled and heavy water moderated
 NPP-A1 unit in 1976 and 1977. Until 1992, NPP waste water had been derived through the 5
 km-long, concrete paved Manivier canal to the smaller rated Dudvah River (Qaverage=1.8 mVs
 which is conjucted with the Vah River (Qa=150 m3/s) after 13 km downstream at 90 km from
 Vah's mouth into the Danube River (see Fig.l). In the period between 1976 and  1978, when both
 accidents happened, construction of a flood control project on  Dudvah River had just been
 implemented in the length of 8 km upstream of its mouth. In the next upstream part of the River
 approximately a 5 km long river section which was affected by NPP, the flood control conditions
 are insufficient and have, hitherto, caused permanent public concern.

 The contamination of the banks and its significance was discovered in 1991 in connection with
 preparation of a flood control project implementation. As a result of the conducted radiological
 survey of the concerned banks, the flood control project implementation was stopped during its
 licensing. Soon after, proper restoration action was requested by the competent authority from
 the operator of the Bohunice NPP who has been considered responsible for the bank
 contamination. A preliminary cleanup level was given as well, being set up ad hoc by the
 authority on a low level of 1 Bq/g of I37Cs.

 The goal of this paper is to give a brief characterization of the site and to summarize the working
 efforts spent after discovery of the site contamination problems in line of the post-emergency
 response and planning for recovery of the site. Emphasis is put on the cleanup criteria
 development and the proposed characterization and remediation technologies for the 137Cs
 contaminated banks.


 Initial Response and Radiological Site Characterization

 In 1992, a bank restoration project including site characterization for the concerned part of the
 river was initiated by the NPP with a projected disposal capacity of 5,000 m3 of removed soil. It
 was assumed that the soil would be dumped into a subsurface concrete structure inside the NPP
 area, which is considered to be the most acceptable disposal site of the removed soil for the
Washington, D.C.
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

nearby public. Consequently, during the ongoing monitoring exercises, other parts of the affected
river banks were found to be contaminated as well. Therefore, a comprehensive post-emergency
survey was needed to be conducted on the overall potentially influenced banks and its nearby

First, a mobile ground based screening survey exercise was applied to the flood plain area of the
Dudvah (18 km) and Vah rivers (25 km) including the Kralova Reservoir to identify locations of
the contamination in the site. Gamma radiation readings and sliced bulk soil samples for
laboratory gamma-spectrometric and radiochemical analysis were taken at the surface of the
banks inside and outside of the built levees. These analyses determined that 137Cs is the dominant
contaminant in the site.

For the accessible places in the outer side of levees, scanning by a vehicle mounted mobile
gamma survey system (VMGS) was used.1  A contaminated land-field in a  spread of 2000 m2,
alongside the Dudvah bank and in a limited flood plain area of the Vah and the former Dudvah
River were discovered and evaluated this way, as well. Inside the levees, a hand-held gamma
survey meter was used for discrete measurements, mostly, with  about 20 m spacing within the
monitoring line established on the 18 km-long banks.

The detailed and comprehensive survey done between 1991 and 1994 shows that the top soil
contamination on the banks widely varies from background level to 20 Bq/g (3.8 MBq/m2) on the
Dudvah River and reaches 250 Bq/g of 137Cs for the spottily-contaminated section on the
Manivier canal banks. The contamination is spread over a 0.5 to 3m wide strip on the lower part
of the banks and the average level of 137Cs in the top 10 cm soil  layer reaches 6.3 Bq/g. The
overall contaminated area in the site with activity level exceeding 1 Bq/g of I37Cs has been
identified as to be about 67,000 m2 and the volume of soil which had to be  removed according to
this preliminary cleanup criterion exceeds 13,000 m3.

After finalization of the monitoring exercises, it was recognized that the applied 1 Bq 137Cs/g is
too low and inappropriate for use as a justified cleanup criteria.  The previous restoration project
demonstrated that it was necessary to reconsider with emphasis the complexity of the proposed
cleanup measures including alternative remedial technologies (fencing, clean covering,
trenching), the cost-analysis and development of justified cleanup criteria. Since 1993, VUJE
Research Institute has been involved in comprehensively addressing of the above mentioned
contamination problems.

A typical feature of these efforts, clear legislation in the field has been hitherto absent. This is
why a primary demand to develop some principles for evaluation of the justified scale of cleanup
measures including appropriate cleanup criteria development became the first priority in order to
achieve confidence and authorization of the final reconsidered environmental restoration plan. Of
course, this demand was realized in close cooperation with competent hygiene authorities and
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

 	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

 Dose Assessments and Cleanup Criteria Development

 The contaminated banks are accessible for 16,000 residents living in a 3.5 km wide strip
 alongside the river. Selected exposure pathway scenarios with authorized parameters (stay on
 the bank and land field residential use of the contaminated soil for housing) were applied for
 dose characterization assessments and development of the proper cleanup criteria for the
 proposed cleanup measures. Ingestion pathways using transfer factors for goat's milk, meat and
 loamy soil according to the reference2 was also part of the completed dose assessments.

 Moving a large amount of the contaminated soil from the river banks, and its release into the
 environment during and after a planned flood control project implementation poses the most
 serious potential risks for the nearby population.

 The contaminated soil from the banks is assumed to be relocated, and used as a landfill or fertile
 soil-around a resident's living house. This type of radiation risk, but with a smaller amounts of
 contaminated soil arising (e.g., even from some maintenance works on an arbitrarily
 contaminated bank section could be considered as the most critical  exposure pathway for the
 site). So, according to these conditions, the effective dose from a stay on a bank does not exceed
 0.35 mSv/a, although, the potential risk from the use of contaminated soil reaches higher levels
 of effective dose to up to about 2 to 3 mSv/a. The annual collective dose from the stay on the
 banks is low, maximally, on the level of about 100 - 200 man mSv, accordingly to  not
 too-intense use of the banks.

 Cleanup criteria for the contaminated banks were derived on the basis of authorized principles
 and the mentioned site specific soil use scenario dose factors3 (0.14 or 0.21 mSva=l/(Bq.g=l)).
 According to the recovery approach of the ICRP, accepted by the authority, both the actual dose
 and potential risk to critical individuals from the contaminated banks must not exceed  1 mSv/a.
 Average 137Cs activity concentration levels in the bank soil (top 10 cm) AL200=6.0 or 8.0 Bq/g
 over 300 or 80 m long sections, competently, correspond to the above dose constraint
 requirement.  In addition, 137Cs activity concentrations AL.3 =25 Bq/g for isolated small spots on
 the canal banks.

 The derived criteria are in good relation with the results of the volume distribution  of the activity
 concentration analysis carried out on the basis of detailed measurements for the bank soil. It was
 possible to demonstrate by this way that cleanup measures, even, for a small part of the identified
 contaminated area on the banks-namely clean soil cover or removing, only, of the mostly
 contaminated soil (i.e. the soil with contamination above 6-7 Bq.g-1) would lead to significant
 improvement in remediation of the contaminated banks in the site.
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

Technologies and Scale of Resulting Cleanup

Exceeding the developed cleanup criteria justifies implementation of more cost-consuming
restoration techniques, from which two remedies have been selected as the most appropriate for
the contaminated banks remediation:

a) dilution/fixation of contaminated top soil by clean cover on flat contaminated areas; and
b) removing/disposal of top soil layer for the steep banks.

The clean cover technique sufficiently reduces the anticipated radiation risk, however, its price is
about 10 times lower compared to the standard removing/disposal technique.

To be in compliance with these criteria, it is necessary to subject to cleanup measures about
11,000 m2 of contaminated area on the Dudvah River banks and 8,000 m2 on the Manivier canal
banks. As engineered flat terraces prevail on the Dudvah River banks, according to the
authorized principles, clean soil cover is sufficient to be applied over 9,500 m2 of contaminated
flat area.4 On the spotty contaminated Manivier canal section, only the isolated spots of
contamination are proposed to be removed. So, the resulting volume of soil to be removed from
the steep banks and safely buried in a disposal facility inside the Bohunice NPP area equals to
about 1,100m.3


Re-evaluation of a 137Cs contaminated bank restoration project has been conducted for NPP
Bohunice site on the basis of comprehensive and detailed site characterization technique
application. As there is no clear legislation in the subjected field, principles for contaminated
bank evaluation had been developed and approved by the competent authorities. Site-specific
cleanup criteria have been developed, which are 6 or 8 Bq 137Cs/g in soil depending on the size of
the contaminated area. Thanks to the application of consistent site characterization techniques
and planning of clean covering use as a justified cleanup measure, unnecessary waste soil
disposal is going to be avoided within the prepared new bank restoration project.


 1. Slavik, O., Moravek, J., Identification and Radiological Characterization of Contaminated
Sites in the  Slovak Republic, Proc. Planning for Environmental Restoration in Central in Eastern
Europe (Budapest, 4 -8 October 1993), IAEA-TEC-DOC- 865, Vol. 1,  1996

2. International Atomic Energy Agency, Handbook of parameter values for the prediction of
radionuclide transfer in temperate environment, Vienna, 1993
 Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

 	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

 3. Slavik, O., Moravek, J., Vlada'r, M., Principles and Criteria for Environmental Restoration of
 Contaminated Banks near NPP Bohunice, Proc.: ENS 2nd Reg. meeting: Nuclear Energy in
 Central Europe, Portoroz, Slovenia, 11-14.9.1995

 4. SlaVik, O., Moravek, J., Vlada'r, M., Technologies for Environmental Restoration in Slovakia,
 ibid [1], Vol.3, May 1996.
                Reservoir   Vah River
/ Waste water
                           Dudvah River
                    Canal (5 km)
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

    .	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

        Lessons of the Chernobyl NPP Accident Regarding Potable Water Supply

                    V.M.Shestopalov, Yu.F.Rudenko, A.S.Bohuslavskiy

              Radioecological Center, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine


The world's greatest radiation catastrophe at the Chernobyl NPP has reflected the faults in the
organization of water supply for the town populations and water resources monitoring in the
Ukraine. Prior to the accident, hi spite of known advantages of groundwater among available
sources for town water supply and the good state of groundwater prospecting, the preference was
paid mainly to river water.  (In Kiev, the Capital and the largest town of the Ukraine, with an
existing possibility  of all water being supplied by prospected groundwater of very good quality,
more than two thirds of the water supply is maintained from the rivers Dnieper and Desna).

For the organization of the centralized water supply of Kiev by groundwater, of the most
practical importance are the Cenomanian-Callovian (depths 100-150 m) and Middle Jurassic
(Bajocian, depths 250-300 m) aquifers,  which are protected by 2-3 regional aquitards with
filtration coefficients  of the order of lO'MO"4 m/day.  For these two aquifers the exploitational
resources are proven to exceed 700 thousand mVday (60% from Cenomanian-Callovian and 40%
from Bajocian).  Present water intake from these aquifers does not exceed 50% of this amount.

Initial composition  of the radioactive contamination found in the river water formed in May 1986
was represented by several dozens of nuclides, the majority of which by their input in exposition
dose for biocenoses are 141Ce, 144Ce, 103Ru,  140Ba, 1311,95Zr, 95Nb, 14La, 134Cs, 136Cs, and other
products of uranium decay. The input in total activity from each of these nuclides was different,
but starting from 1987, the dominating in dose formation became I37Cs and ^Sr.

It is worth emphasizing that the maximum  allowable concentration (MAC) of 137Cs in potable
water at that time was 37 Bq/liter (1 10"9 Ci/1). By May 3, 1986 the Dnieper water exceeded the
MAC for 137Cs by 35  times.


Systematic observations for the content of nuclides in surface and subsurface water and analysis
of their content in fish and other hydrobionts were started only in the beginning of 1987.  But
from May 1986, the works on surface water monitoring were performed by specialists of
different organizations of the former USSR (Scientific-Industrial Union "Taifoon", USSR State
Committee of Hydrometeorology, Institute of Radium, State Hydrological Institute, etc.) and
Ukrainian organizations (UkrNIGMI, Institute of Nuclear Studies, Institute of Geochemistry and
Physics of Minerals, Institute of Geology of Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, etc.).
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

Unfortunately, the majority of the observation results obtained by different monitoring groups
were secret or available only "for service use". For this reason the active coordination of
researches and data collection was impossible. The same reason was for the large amounts of
unconditional data which entered the database created in the Institute of Cybernetics of NASU
for systematization of monitoring information on the environment's state of radioactive

Based on the fact of fast radioactive contamination of water in the Dnieper, the decision was
made in May 1986 by the Government of Ukraine to drill over 80 wells to deep aquifers
(Cenomanian-Callovian and Bajocian) in Kiev City, and urgent construction of the water
pipeline for additional transport of water from the Desna River which was contaminated to a
much lesser extent than the Dnieper. The wells and pipeline were constructed over a period of
two months. During this time the tendency was set for surface water quality improvement. The
example is that the maximum concentration of ^Sr in May 1986 in the water of the Pripyat River
close to the Chernobyl NPP reached 15 Bq/1, and at the end of June the same year it dropped to

Within the Kiev region, contamination of groundwater with 137Cs and ^Sr during the whole
post-accidental period did not exceed several tens or a few hundreds of mBq/1. In spite of this
fact and the proved vulnerability of surface water sources, the decision was not made or
practically realized concerning the necessity of a preferable water supply on account of
groundwater. The wells drilled in May-June 1986 were conserved.

The research performed after the accident has shown that notwithstanding the relatively fast
penetration of initial portions of contamination into groundwater to the depth of 100-300 m
within the regions of operating water intakes, the water-bearing aquifers remain much more
protected than surface water.

Especially important in this research was the revealing of the pathways of nuclide penetration
into groundwater. Among such pathways, the technogenic and natural ones can be considered.
The technogenic are the pathways which originate in weak zones of round-wells space, cavities
or breaks in wells casing. Special experiments have been done at several exploitational wells,
which confirmed these suppositions. The quality of isolation of the wells from surface
contamination appeared to be low.

Natural migration pathways correspond to the vertical component of infiltration within regions of
groundwater recharge. The lateral flow from the Chernobyl accident epicenter is of no
importance because of the general character of groundwater exchange and small horizontal flow
velocities as relative to the area scale. Groundwater of the most contaminated 30-km exclusion
zone area discharges into the Pripyat Valley with no access to aquifers lying north from the lower
current of Uzh River.
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

Hence, observed contamination, besides technogenous pathways, might occur only by vertical
filtration through the bulk of rock being enhanced in the central part of the water intake
depression cone which provides significant pressure differences between the subsurface aquifers.
In order to confirm the validity of this supposition, observations were made in drainage tunnels
disposed at the Dnieper right bank slopes in Kiev, and during the Kiev  subway tunnels driving in
marls at depths of about 60 m.  The 137Cs was found in groundwater and rock samples at
concentrations of 10~3-10"2 Bq/1 and 2-20 Bq/kg respectively. So, the nuclides' migration by
natural pathways through the bulk of rocks is a matter of proven facts.  According to these data,
the vertical velocity of downward migration should be no less than 2.5  m/year, but sometimes
may reach 15-20 m/year and more.

Such significant velocities demonstrate the existence of fast vertical migration pathways through
the bulk of alternating water-bearing and semipermeable rocks reaching great depth. These
pathways  may be related primarily to the zones of present tectonic fracturing of mountain rocks
and disintegration of unconsolidated rocks. Also, of high importance are the facial variability,
mineralogical and granulometric inhomogeneity of deposits. The openness of these pathways is
registered only by rather toxic indicators such as radionuclides and pesticides.

To obtain the modeling assessment of geological rock medium contamination with 137Cs in the
Kiev industrial agglomeration, we performed the modeling of vertical convection/dispersion
transport for typical sections of this region with downing infiltration low of about 100 mm/year
rate, taking into account the equilibrium sorption process. Modeling parameters (dispersion
coefficient D and partition coefficient Kd) were calibrated according to observation data for the
contaminant content in liquid and solid phases at different depths.  Prognostic vertical
distributions until the year 2050 obtained for the concentration with its maximum values in
2005-2010 of 70-100 mBq/1 for most exploited Cenomanian-Callovian, and Bajocian aquifers.
So, the results of modelling confirmed that the possible groundwater contamination is
significantly lower than the MFC levels.

In spite of the reliability and sufficient degree of protection of groundwater and vulnerability of
surface waters, which were proven by the events during the post-accidental period and results of
special research, the authorities of the former USSR, as well as of the independent Ukraine, did
not perform practical measures on increasing of water supply of population by groundwater.  It
also is obvious that the measures are urgent but still not implemented on improvement of the
protection state of ground-wells space  and well casing from nuclide penetration by this way from
the surface.

The assessment should be done for the possibility of potable water supply of population by
groundwater during periods of surface water contamination in different accidental situations.
Essentially, for each town which is partially or wholly supplied by potable water from the surface
sources, the programs should be elaborated and realized of partial or entire water supply by
groundwater or from other well-protected sources.
 Washington, D.C.
September 9-11,1998

 	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

 The Chernobyl disaster has shown that the pre-accidental system of surface and groundwater
 monitoring was insufficient with respect to the amount of observation points, data types and
 condition, system of analysis and forecasting of water quality. During the pre-accident period,
 the permanent models were not created for sites and areas of dangerous technogenous objects
 (NPPs, Plants, etc) and town agglomerations, and the modeling scenarios were not simulated for
 the consequences of possible accidents and for taking optimal administrative decisions in such

 In spite of a relatively low present contamination of groundwater by nuclides, further
 improvement of the monitoring network for surface and subsurface hydrosphere is necessary.

 In particular, for substantiation of the groundwater monitoring system, the following research has
 been performed:

 •   Characterization of main origins of contamination and its  state for groundwater and its
    neighboring media;

 •   Studying of the observation wells state within the depression cone of Kiev water intakes and
    their correspondence to the criteria of the monitoring regime network;

 •   Characterization of specific natural and technogenic conditions of KIA;

 •   Characterization of studied factors in the monitoring system;

 •   Elaboration of criteria for assessment of the factors of geological environment changing.

 Many examples are known from groundwater exploitation practice that when operating water
 intake structures were fully excluded from the cycle of industrial-potable water supply because of
 groundwater quality deterioration first in recharging, and later in pumped aquifers.  So, it is very
 important to register in proper time the initial stages of contamination of the elements of the
 water exchange system and their dynamics. In this connection, the suggested scheme of the
 observation network is primarily based on construction of the gungs of regime wells for each of
 the storey aquifers, not only for exploited ones.

 Creation of a regime network should be performed gradually and should take into account the
 observation data during changing groundwater exploitation conditions and periodically refined
 information about hydrogeological conditions and technogenic loads.  Substantiation for
 construction of each gung or separate well should be proved by modelling on the existing and
 periodically refined permanent hydrogeological model.

Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

1. The world's largest technogenic radiation catastrophe at the Chernobyl NPP has reflected the
   faults in organization of water supply of population and monitoring of water resources in
   Ukraine. Notwithstanding the disaster which revealed the vulnerability of surface water
   sources, the conclusions about preferable water supply on account of groundwater have not
   been made, nor practically realized.

2. In spite of the revealed initial contamination of groundwater by radionuclides of Chernobyl
   origin, the confined aquifers remain the most reliable sources of water supply within the
   affected regions.

3. For conditions of accidental situations leading to partial or full contamination of surface
   water sources, the reserve system of water supply should be elaborated and introduced, based
   on maximum use of groundwater, spreading of surface water intakes over the area, creation
   of a system of water purification, and other reserve possibilities.

4. The priority among towns requiring the accidental water supply measures implemantation
   should be determined taking into account:

   •  existence in the neighborhood of potentially dangerous potable water contamination
       sources; and

    •  intensive use of surface water for water supply.

5.  The protection degree of groundwater water intakes should be assessed and checked with
    respect to technogenous pathways  of fast migration of contaminants;

6.  In order to perform reliable groundwater quality forecasting and, if needed, management of
    their state, it is necessary to create the monitoring system, which includes:

    •   periodic examination of exploitation and regime wells according to developed techniques
        accounting for  the wells conditions assessment;

    •   construction of regime test  sites embracing the storey system of aquifers, their interstitial
        semipermeable aquitards and aeration zone in different landscape-geochemical,
        hydrogeological and technogenic conditions;

    •   creation and improvement of permanent hydrogeological models of large water intakes,
        other water-economy objects, regime observation sites providing reliable forecasting and,
        if necessary, development of variants of managerial decisions for optimization of the
        ecological state of water resources and their environment;

    •   creation of the  system of independent controls for the cases of revealing of anomalous
        radionuclides concentrations with guarantee for results reliability.
 Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

 	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

       Radio-hydrogeochemical Monitoring of Area Adjacent to the "Shelter" Object

                 LP.Onyshchenko (1), V.M.Shestopalov (1), N.I.Panasyuk (2)

             (1) -Radioecological Center, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine
      (2) -Scientific-Technical Center "Shelter", National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine


 The accident at the Chernobyl NPP that happened in 1986 could be undoubtedly described as one
 of the greatest technogenous catastrophes of modern civilization. Into the epicenter of the
 accident there were involved large territories of Ukraine and Byelorus, which are now referred to
 as the Chernobyl exclusion zone. In its scale and diversity of the negative consequences, the
 Chernobyl accident turned out to be a national tragedy for the people of Ukraine, Byelorus and
 Russia. Its influence can be traced to this or that degree in many countries of Europe, Asia and all
 over the world.

 The Chernobyl exclusion zone area within the Ukraine borders equals 2044.4 km2. After
 evacuating people from the large territories, the excluded areas automatically extended
 approximately by 1800 km2. As a whole, this area exceeds the territory of such a European state
 as Luxemburg by 1.5 times.1

 As a result of the explosion, the active zone and the upper part of the reactor were completely
 destroyed. Barriers and safety systems for protecting the environment from radionuclides
 produced by irradiated fuel were also ruined. Therefore, immediately after the accident the most
 urgent problem was to build an available structure to protect the environment from further
 spreading of radionuclides out of the destroyed NPP 4th unit as well as working personnel from
 exposure to radiation.  It took only six months to construct a structure which had no analogues in
 world practice. This structure was called the "Shelter" object (SO).

 Having protected the area from direct radiation of the destroyed reactor, the SO did not provide
 complete reactor isolation from the environment and prevention of groundwater contamination
 by radionuclides. The  reality of groundwater contamination is substantiated by the large amount
 of nuclear fuel in the ruined reactor (about 200 ton)2 and radionuclide occurrence in internal SO
 water with activity of a few million Bq/1 for strontium and tens of millions of Bq/1 for cesium. At
 2-3 km from the SO, down the groundwater gradient, the Prypiat river is located. Thus, the
 urgent problem after the Chernobyl NPP accident was to accomplish geological environmental
 monitoring around the SO, involving groundwater as the most mobile and the least protected
 component of the environment.

 In the course of geological prospecting for Chernobyl NPP construction, appropriate
 geological-engineering and hydrogeological investigations were performed giving the principal
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

estimate of soils and groundwater over the study area. However, the creation of the
radiohydrogeochemical monitoring system was not intended to be the permanent control of the
groundwater levels, chemical composition and radionuclide concentration over the area close to
NPP power units. This omission was eliminated in the post-accidental period by spending large
financial, human and technical resources.


In 1991, creation of the modern system of radiohydrogeochemical monitoring was started,
involving the area around the SO.

According to the "Arial" program in 1991-1992, the first prospecting wells of 10m in depth were
installed near the northern barrier of the SO site, and were drilled with continuous core sampling
from the different soil layers. This provided for the pioneer geological-engineering examination
of the SO site in the post-accidental state.3 Determination of nuclear fuel and radionuclide
distribution in deep soil layers down to the groundwater table was performed based on dosimetric
and radionuclide core analysis. Experimentally, the amount of nuclear fuel within the operating
site was evaluated (about 600 kg).

In 1993, an international contest was held concerning the conversion of the SO into an ecology-
and radiation-safe system. As a result, Conversion Strategy was developed. One of its main items
was the SO state examination and environmental monitoring.

In 1994, the net of observation wells was completed within the SO site which provided for the
pioneer study of:

•   Radionuclide contamination and groundwater levels dynamics;

•   Recent geophysical and technogenous geolithological sections across the SO site and a more
    precise assessment of the fuel amount remaining after land surface deactivation.

There was also a determination concerning:  distribution of airflow temperature, moisture and
velocities; the principal water pathways inside the SO and major places of its accumulation; and
the dynamics of radionuclides and nuclear fuel accumulation in SO water.

While analyzing the obtained data, it was revealed that the radionuclide concentration in the
internal SO water abruptly increased (by 3 orders over 3 years).4 This fact allowed us to consider
the internal SO water as a new source of nuclear contamination for the geological environment.
The possible hydraulic connection between the internal SO water and Quaternary aquifer
initiated their parallel studying.

In 1995, it was determined that the main ways of water income to the SO premises was namely
by: atmospheric precipitation, moisture condensation and technological solutions. Inside the SO,
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water moves along the principal water pathways. Depending on weather conditions, its discharge
can vary in large ranges (up to 800 mVyear). After interaction with concrete, water takes on
alkaline carbonate composition and gains the capacity to dissolve cesium and uranium
compounds. Water flow washes out the fuel-containing mass and removes the fuel particles and
soluble radionuclides. Eventually, water is accumulated in the lower SO premises. In some cases,
the water level inside the SO is much higher than the groundwater table in the adjacent SO area
that can lead to water removal outside the SO, its inflow to groundwater, and then to the rivers.

The other source of groundwater contamination is the area around the SO containing, at the land
surface, 0.5% of nuclear fuel ejected from reactor and other active zone elements .

Deactivation works performed in 1986-1987 considerably improved the radiation situation
around the destroyed 4th unit of the Chernobyl NPP. Hence, by the moment of completion of the
SO construction the radiation level at the site equaled 0.3-1.2 R/hour (compared to 40-1000
R/hour as of 1 August 1986). However, there was a large  amount of fuel still remaining on the
operating site covered by the artificial bank composed of gravel-sand mixture, concrete and
asphalt coating. It was built as a special radiation-resistant layer to reduce the radiation level. The
remaining fuel mass is a real danger for the environment because the artificial bank can't provide
for safe isolation from physical-chemical influence of natural and technogenous factors.

The most dangerous factors for the geological environment are possibly water migration outside
the SO and radiocontaminated area of the SO site.

In the course of hydrogeological studies the thickness of the Quaternary aquifer was determined
to be  25-28m, the depth of the unsaturated zone is 3.5-7.4 m. The unsaturated zone is composed
of both technogenous soils (formed during the Chernobyl NPP construction and accident
consequences liquidation) and Quaternary deposits.

The Quaternary deposits within the unsaturated zone are represented by fine- and
medium-grained sands with sandy loam and loam interbeds. The conductivity of water-bearing
sands is 15-20 m/day (medium-grained); 2-4m/day (fine-grained); l-2m/day (powdered);
-O.lm/day (loam) and 0.5m/day (sandy loam).

The magnitude of the groundwater table fluctuations in 1996-1997 equaled 0.4-0.6 m. The
groundwater flow gradient was 0.001 m/m. In the summer period, groundwater temperature
varied from 10.4°C to 14.2°C.

Mineralization of groundwater sampled from wells located close to the SO site and down the
groundwater gradient from the SO was 503-962mg/l. This parameter for wells located up the
groundwater gradient from the SO was 174-256mg/l.
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According to the anion composition, groundwater is hydrocarbonate, hydrocarbonate-sulfate*,
and sometimes sulfate-hydrocarbonate. By cation composition it is sodium-calcium, rarely
sodium and calcium-sodium; pH varies from 4.2 to 9.8.

As a result of different chemical substances, penetration into the destroyed reactor (for stopping
the fire, decreasing the probability of chain reaction, deactivation, dust suppression, etc.), some
of them with time migrate into groundwater changing its natural composition by increase of
sulfate, chloride, phosphate and nitrate concentrations.

In the course of monitoring improvement, radioisotopes (T-tritium, 90Sr, 137Cs, 238Pu, 239+240Pu,
241 Am) in groundwater were also studied.

Concentration of radioisotopes in groundwater is as follows: 137Cs -444Bq/l, ^Sr -229Bq/l
(excluding well 3-g with all-time high concentration of ^Sr up to 3820Bq/l); 238Pu -3Bq/l;
239+240pu .5 6Bq/1; 241^ _g
Water concentration of ^Sr and 137Cs in the SO lower premises reaches 4,400,OOOBq/l and
98,000,OOOBq/l, respectively.

Tritium was chosen as an indicator for migration of the internal SO water to the Quaternary
aquifer. The groundwater sampled from wells located along the same flow streamline down the
groundwater flow from the SO are of higher concentration of tritium (to 4,037Bq/l) as compared
to its concentration in the other area (10-20Bq/l). Probably, it indicates the migration of the
internal SO water into the geological environment, because the tritium concentration in the
internal SO water achieves 20,OOOBq/l. At the same time the groundwater flow rate near the SO
is rather low (up to 50m/year). The time when the contamination front reached the Prypiat River
was evaluated at 150-200 years. This evaluation is conservative,  because it does not take into
account the broadening of the first part of the contamination front and sorption properties of
soils. To provide precise information of contact between the internal SO water and groundwater,
long-term observations are required.

The soils within the SO site were studied with radiochemical and radiometric methods by
analyzing core samples and wells gamma-logging. Uranium, plutonium and products of nuclear
fuel fission were identified by laboratory analysis of core samples.

The highest concentration of uranium (5. 1 lE-2**%) was detected in the northeastern part of the
SO site at the depth of 2.6-2.9 m (pre-accidental land surface). In the deeper soil samples, the
uranium concentration does not exceed 8E-4%. Within the zone of natural soils it equals nE-5%,
where "n" ranges from 1 to 10.

In sampled soils, plutonium concentration correlates with that of uranium. Its maximum value is
close to that of uranium and equals 1.6E+4 Bq/g. In the deeper soil samples, the plutonium
concentration does not exceed 1-13.4 Bq/g, within natural soils zone it is 0.01 Bq/g and less.
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At present short-living fission products (144Ce, 106Ru, 125Sb, 154Eu, 60Co) are identified only in the
sampled soils with high uranium concentration by gamma-spectrum at long exposition of
137Cs and ^Sr were found in all geological zones in different concentrations. Maximum
concentration of 137Cs was observed in well 4g (2.5E+4Bq/g) and 9-1 A (8,7E+4Bq/g) at the
depth of pre-accidental land surface. Minimum I37Cs concentrations (0 3-0.6Bq/g) were
observed in the natural soils zone.

^Sr concentration in post-accidental technogenous deposits varies from 0.2 to 2.5E+4Bq/g.
Maximum concentrations are associated with pre-accidental land surface. In the upper part of the
Quaternary aquifer ^Sr concentrations are 0.0 -0.2Bq/g.

Therefore, in the vertical cross-section of the study area, the most radiocontaminated are soils
near pre-accidental land surface.  The less contaminated are post-accidental technogenous
deposits. Water migration of radionuclides or their mechanical removal caused contamination of
pre-accidental soils (both technogenous and natural).


To the Chernobyl accident lessons, we can ascribe the necessity of preventive monitoring
accomplishment in NPP areas to control the soils and groundwater state during regular NPP
work and to evaluate the sources, scales and dynamics of radiocontamination of the geological
environment in the case of extraordinary situation.

The principal monitoring wells should be disposed in the direction of the lateral groundwater

It was revealed that the groundwater radionuclide concentration is non-uniform along the aquifer
thickness, being maximum in the upper part of the aquifer. Therefore, the long well filters
providing for only averaged sampling of the whole aquifer thickness are not suitable. Short filters
installed in the upper part of aquifer are preferable to long ones.

In the case of a multi-aquifer system a group of wells should be equipped for studying interaction
of these aquifers both in ordinary and extraordinary situations.


1.  Atlas of Chernobyl exclusion zone edited by V.M.Shestopalov. "Kartografiya" Kyiv, 1996.

2.  A.A.Borovoy, A.A.Klyuchnikov, V.N.Shcherbin, Problems of safety of the object "Shelter"/
    Object "Shelter" -10 years after. The main results of research studies", Chernobyl 1996,
    p.7-22. (in Russian)
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3. M.I.Pavlyuchenko, LP.Khorenko. Review of works on the study of the technological section
   and radionuclide contamination of soil water in construction site object "Shelter"/ Problems
   of Chernobyl exclusion zone, v.4, Kyiv, Naukova dumka 1996, p.58-65. (in Russian)

4. B.I.Gorbachev. Current events on research studies of the object "Shelter" /in collected articles
   "Object Shelter" -10 years after. The main results of research studies", Chernobyl 1996,
   p.23-28. (in Russian)
* by hydrocarbonate-sulfate water is meant the prevalent concentration of sulfate ions in
groundwater composition

** by 5.11E-2 is meant 5.11x10-2
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Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 1998

                Session G, Track 1:

              Public Health Issues III

                   Friday, September 11, 1998
                     10:10a.m.- 12:00 p.m.
Chair: Gary Goldberg, United States Department of Energy

 	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

                         Public Health Issues: Considerations for
                        Post-Emergency Response Panel Discussion

       Presented by the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS)

                 Shirley A. Fry, MB, BCh, MPH, Ronald E. Goans, PhD, MD,
                    Robert C. Ricks, PhD, Richard E. Toohey, PhD, CHP


 In 1895, Professor Conrad Reontgen published a report on the discovery of x-ray (Roentgen,
 W.C., 1898). Shortly thereafter, the first x-ray induced health effect was reported in scientific
 literature (Edison, T., et al, 1896). Over the next 45 years, radiation accidents were often
 unreported and associated medical data were archived in personal files of treating physicians. In
 the early 1940s, the development of nuclear weapons and their subsequent use in Hiroshima and
 Nagasaki resulted in the establishment of a medical/epidemiological database for follow-up on
 the Japanese atomic bomb survivors. With the advent of peacetime applications of nuclear
 energy for electrical power generation, as well as applications in industry, agriculture, medicine
 and consumer products, more and more radiation accidents were reported. Many of these
 accidents were studied and medical information archived in the accident registries as part of the
 programs of the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS).  (Lushbaugh,
 C.C., Fry, S.A., Ricks, R.C., 1980).  The majority of the reported serious worldwide radiation
 accidents involved not more than 10 persons.


 Prior to 1979, multi-casualty incidents involving radiation were limited to events in the Marshall
 Islands (1954); Palomares, Spain (1966); and Thule, Greenland (1968).  In March, 1979, the
 accident at Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant, although not a radiological disaster, caused
 considerable re-evaluation for post-emergency response capabilities to radiation accidents in the
 United States. It was quickly realized that the potential impact of multi-casualties on overall
 health care systems and population follow-up could be significant. More and more attention was
 therefore given to pre-planning, medical capabilities, and training for radiation accidents.
 Subsequent accidents in Chernobyl (1986) and Goiania, Brazil (1987) reinforced the need for
 continued planning and preparation for major multi-casualty radiation accidents.

 While accidents are by definition, unplanned, there exists today another potential for multi-
 casualties associated  with ionizing radiation. We live in a community at risk from terrorist acts
 involving weapons for mass destruction, including chemical, biological, and nuclear devices.
 Nuclear terrorism may involve crude or sophisticated nuclear weapons, radiation dispersal
 devices, sabotage of commercial nuclear power plants, or simple radiological devices such as
 stolen sources. As part of the'Nunn-Lugar Weapons of Mass Destruction legislation, training of
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

fire, police, technical, EMS and medical personnel for post-emergency response is being
conducted throughout the United States.  Two hundred cities are currently on the list of training

Over the past 22 years, the REAC/TS program has trained 4,373 physician, nurses, EMTs, health
physicists, and others in medical management for radiation accidents through courses sponsored
by the United States Department of Energy. Specific courses are offered for the emergency
department personnel, health physics support personnel, and physicians/nurses involved in post-
emergency care. Historically, course participants have come from areas of the country where the
use of nuclear energy for electrical power production, R&D employing ionizing radiation, or
military applications are concentrated.

An incident resulting in a number of persons having exposure to penetrating radiation sufficient
to result in the acute radiation syndrome (and possibly to serious localized injuries) will have
significant impact on the medical community and health care organizations, even after the early
problems of victim extrication, triage, trauma management, medical and radiological assessment,
decontamination, and supportive treatment are taken care of. Those with the acute radiation
syndrome may require transfer to facilities for long periods of costly hospitalization by highly
skilled staff, while those with less severe exposures will require frequent assessments and careful
follow-up by local practitioners and admission to hospitals when infections, bleeding, skin
injuries or other problems are manifest. Planning for emergency response and emergency care
have been published by Leonard & Ricks (1980) and Berger & Ricks (1992).

Decisions regarding administration of antiviral and antibacterial prophylactic agents, appropriate
growth factor therapy, the use of peripheral or cord blood stem cell transfusions, and assessment
and interpretation of dose information will require consultation with experts in radiation
medicine, hematology, immunology, radiobiology, and transplant therapy, while management of
localized injuries will require experts in radiation medicine, dermatology, vascular and
reconstructive surgery. If radioiodines are released in an incident, medical personnel will be
needed to assess thyroid function of involved persons.

In addition, during and after an incident, health care practitioners will be inundated with requests
for medical evaluation and treatment for conditions which may be psychosomatic in origin.


This panel discussion will address ways the medical community will  be impacted by a serious
radiological emergency, beginning with hospitalizations for the seriously ill, home/community
care for others, and the usual medical problems associated with evacuation of the population. In
addition, considerations for bioassays, whole-body counting, internal dose assessment, and
requirements for epidemiological information will be discussed.
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 	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference


 'Ueber eine neue Art von Strahlen,' Sitzugsberichte der Physikalisch-medizin Gesellschaft zu
 Whrzburg, p. 132, Roentgen, W.C., 1895.

 'The effect of X-rays upon the eyes,' "Nature," 53,421, Edison, T., Morton, W.J., Swinton,
 A.A.C., Stanton, E., 1896.

 "Total-body Irradiation: A Historical Review and Follow-up,' "The Medical Basis for Radiation
 Accident Preparedness," Lushbaugh, C.C., Fry, S.A., Hubner, K.F., Ricks, R.C., Published by
 Elsevier North Holland, Inc., 1980.

 "The United States Radiation Accident and Other Registries of the REAC/TS System: Their
 Function and Current Status' "The Medical Basis for Radiation Accident Preparedness,"
 Lushbaugh, C.C., Fry, S.A., Hhbner, K.F., Ricks, R.C., Published by Elsevier North Holland,
 Inc., 1980.

 'Emergency Department Radiation Accident Protocol,' "Concepts, Components, and
 Confirmations," Leonard, R.B., Ricks, R.C., Annals of Emergency Medicine. September, 1980.

 'Management of Emergency Care for Radiation Accident Victims,' Berger, ME, Ricks, RC, CRC
 Handbook of Management of Radiation Protection Programs. 2nd Edition, Miller, K.L., Editor,
 CRC Press, Inc., Boca Raton, FL, 1992.

 "The Radiological Accident in Goiania," International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 1988.
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                    International Radiological Post-Emersency Response Issues Conference
      Medical Considerations for Post-Emergency Response of Radiation Accidents

    Panel Discussion Presented by the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site

                               Ronald E. Goans, PhD, MD
                              Richard E. Toohey, PhD, CHP
                              Shirley A. Fry, MB, BCh, MPH
                         Robert C. Ricks, PhD; Director, REAC/TS


In the initial evaluation of a radiation accident, it is crucial to estimate the maximum credible
accident that has occurred since'reliable health physics data may take days to accumulate.
Radiation effects usually take hours to days to even weeks to manifest and there is always time to
formulate a plan of management and enlist the aid of appropriate medical and surgical sub-
specialists. However, because of the evolving nature of radiation-induced lesions, this means
that most of the definitive care takes place outside of the Emergency Department. Since
management of a radiation accident also can involve medical and surgical complications, it is
important to resolve these issues first.

It is important to evaluate population radiation dose in perspective in order to deal with radiation
accidents in an informed manner.  Average background radiation dose to the population is
approximately 0.36 cSv/year (1), dose from a PA and lateral chest film is approximately  0.006-
0.02 cSv, and dose from a pelvic or skull CT is 1.5-4.0 cSv/slice. This may be viewed in contrast
to the current occupational limit of 5 cSv/year. In contrast, the acute whole body dose for
lethality of 50% of a population (LD 50) is approximately 4 Gy, somewhat dependent on the state
of health of the patient, dose rate, and the availability and sophistication of medical resources.
For an exposed population, the dose for 5% mortality may differ from the dose for 95% mortality
by only 2-3 Gy.  Therefore, an increase in dose by only a factor of 2 may represent the difference
between total  survival of an individual and essentially total mortality.


It is possible to subdivide radiation accidents into four categories: (1) body surface contamination
with or without wounds;  (2) whole-body irradiation; (3) acute local injury; and (4) internal
contamination. The injured patient may exhibit only one or a combination of these effects.

Wound or Intact Skin Contamination

Decontamination of a minor wound or intact skin is relatively straightforward, is commonly
practiced and has been presented in detail elsewhere (2).  Generally,  decontamination procedures
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

Start with the mildest agents possible (soap and water) and progress to more aggressive
techniques as indicated. In decontamination of intact skin, it is important not to irritate the skin,
thereby disrupting the skin's normal protective barrier and possibly increasing transdermal
absorption of any deposited radionuclides. The most important consideration of decontamination
of wounds and lacerations is copious irrigation of the area under sterile conditions. Surgical
debridement of contaminated areas may also be of help in some cases.

Acute Effects of Whole-body Irradiation (Acute Radiation Syndrome)

It is instructive to look at early deterministic effects of whole-body irradiation:

(1) < 10 cGy, whole body - No detectable difference in exposed vs. non-exposed patients.

(2) ~ 20 cGy, whole body - Detectable  increase in chromosome  aberrations. No clinical signs
    or symptoms.

(3) - 20-100 cGy, whole body - Detectable bone marrow depression with minor lymphopenia,
    leukopenia and thrombocytopenia.

(4) - 100-800 cGy whole body - Bone marrow depression with dose-related depression of all
    blood elements.

The Acute Radiation Syndrome (ARS) is an acute illness, which follows a roughly predictable
course over a period of time ranging from a few hours to several weeks after exposure to ionizing
radiation. ARS has classically been subdivided into component syndromes as follows:

(1)    Hematopoietic	100  -  800 cGy
(2)    Gastrointestinal ...800 -SOOOcGy
       Cardiovascular/Central Nervous System... > 3000 cGy

The ARS is characterized by the development .of groups of signs and symptoms which are
manifestations of the reactions of various body systems to irradiation of the whole body or to a
significant portion of it. Prodromal signs and symptoms include anorexia, nausea, vomiting,
diarrhea, fever, conjunctivitis, and skin erythema. The latter is especially observed if there has
been a dose to a localized portion of the body. The higher the whole-body dose, the more
quickly one expects to see the prodromal symptoms of nausea and vomiting.

Most radiation accidents involve doses under 100 cGy and are therefore subclinical. However,
for higher doses,  the hematopoietic syndrome is the symptom complex most commonly seen.
The etiology of the hematopoietic component of the ARS basically arises from destruction of
radiosensitive bone marrow stem cells and a consequent decrease in circulating white cells and
platelets. Clinical stigmata of this syndrome include immunodysfunction, increased infectious
complications, hemorrhage, anemia, and impaired wound healing. Significant neutropenia can
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develop some 20-30 days post-exposure, depending on the magnitude of the whole-body dose.
The radiosensitivity of circulating lymphocytes has formed the medical basis for an improved
technique to estimate total body dose after a severe accident involving low LET radiation (3,4).

As in all accidents, medical management of a severe whole-body exposure includes a complete
history and physical examination. Besides the classical components of the medical history, it
should also include time of exposure if possible, time of onset and severity of prodromal
symptoms, as well as possible exposure to toxic chemicals.  A hematological profile (CBC with
differential) should be obtained every 2-4 hours following exposure to monitor any initial fall in
lymphocyte count. Cytogenetic dosimetry is also an important adjunct to retrospective accident
analysis and accident reconstruction involving time and motion studies.

Post-emergency management of the ARS includes treatment of infections (bacterial, viral, fungal,
CMV, HS V), trauma surgery as indicated for conventional trauma or thermal burns, and surgical
management of radiation-induced skin injuries.  Immediate treatment of ARS includes supportive
care, platelet transfusions as indicated, psychological support, infection control, and, most
importantly, stimulation of the hematopoietic system. The primary goal of radiation casualty
management involves therapy to correct radiation-induced bone marrow aplasia and infection
from opportunistic pathogens.

Hospital care of mild cases (< 2 Gy) involve triage by prodromal symptoms and by lymphocyte
depletion kinetics, evaluation of biological and physical dosimetry, emergency surgery if
indicated during an appropriate early time window, and close observation of the patient with
frequent hematologic profiles. It is also appropriate to consider management of residual skin
contamination and medical management of internal contamination, if present. For the more
severely injured patient (2-5 Gy), reverse isolation techniques are appropriate, GI tract
decontamination with antibiotics, growth factor therapy to reverse marrow aplasia, and viral
prophylaxis. If the patient exhibits a febrile neutropenia, then antibiotics and urine and blood
cultures are appropriate. For a patient with whole-body dose beyond the LD50, it is important to
utilize aggressive growth factor therapy with transfusion of peripheral blood progenitor cells
(PBPC) or cord/placenta blood progenitor cells  (CBPC). These cells are  transfused after
mobilization and ex vivo expansion by cytokines.  Examples of hemopoietic cytokines currently
either in use or in development are GM-CSF, G-CSF, IL-6,11, PIXY321, MGDF, and

Clinical cases involving the gastrointestinal syndrome (GIS; 800-3000 cGy) or the
cardiovascular/central nervous syndrome CV/CNS) are rare and effective treatment modalities do
not exist, especially for the CV/CNS syndrome. Effects resulting from the GIS include
malabsorption, Ileus, fluid and electrolyte shifts, dehydration, acute renal failure, cardiovascular
collapse, GI bleeding, and sepsis.  Typically the patient dies within 5-9 days post-exposure. The
Cerebrovascular / CNS Syndrome (CV/CNS; > 3000 cGy) generally exhibits vomiting and
diarrhea within minutes, confusion and disorientation; severe hypotension, hyperpyrexia,
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convulsions, and ultimately coma.  The literature contains very few of these cases, but they have
all been fatal within 24 to 48 hours.

Acute Local Injury

Acute local injury is seen reasonably frequently in industrial settings, typically after handling
high-level sources at small distances. Common sources inducing local radiation injury are 192Ir,
^Co, and ^Sr. Local injury was also seen in the weapons testing program from fission product
betas, and is seen currently in industrial radiography and in misuse of X-ray machines, X-ray
diffraction units and X-ray fluorescence units. Since these are deterministic effects, certain
approximate thresholds with common signs are observed:

(1)    300 cGy threshold - Epilation, beginning around day 17.
(2)    600 cGy threshold - Erythema; developing minutes to weeks post-exposure,
       depending on dose.
(3)    1,000 - 1,500 cGy - Dry desquamation.
(4)    2,000 - 5,000 cGy - Wet desquamation, 2-3 weeks post-exposure, depending upon dose.
(5)    »5,000 Gy - radionecrosis with deep ulceration.

Medical management of local injury generally involves history and physical exam, laboratory
tests as indicated, slit lamp ophthalmoscopy, and documentation of the evolution of the lesion(s)
with serial color photos.  One significant problem with the management of local radiation injury
is that the actual dose is rarely known when the patient is first seen. The radiation dose is
estimated after the lesion has run its course (usually over several weeks). Mock-up of the
accident from a retrospective scenario is quite often helpful and medical management often is
supervised by a plastic or reconstructive surgeon.

Internal Contamination

Exposure situations involving internal contamination are more common than accidents involving
acute whole-body irradiation. Potential workplace accidents involve stages of the nuclear fuel
cycle, fabrication of fuel elements, reactor operation and repair, decommissioning, reprocessing,
and waste disposal, and accidental intake with radioactive sources in the medical and industrial
sectors. Environmental uptake associated with accidental or intentional releases of radioactivity
(e.g., reactor accidents, terrorist activity) is also possible. Pathways of contamination include
inhalation (particularly likely with explosion or fire), absorption from wounds, and ingestion. In
inhalation incidents, the size of the aerosol particles determines the region of the respiratory tract
where most are deposited. The fate of inhaled particles is dependent on their physico-chemical
properties and highly insoluble particles can remain in the lung for long periods of time. As  in
all radiation accidents, it is important to attempt to determine the maximum credible accident.

Nasal swabs taken within a few minutes post-exposure can aid in nuclide identification and
estimation  of the maximum credible accident. Whole body counting is an important adjunct
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modality to estimate internal deposition for those nuclides that emit penetrating x or gamma rays.
It is also useful for nuclides, such as ^Sr, which emit energetic beta particles; these nuclides can
often be detected by the bremsstrahlung radiation given off as electrons slow down in soft tissue.
In internal contamination incidents, 24-hour urine and fecal bioassay is usually necessary to
estimate intake using various, well-accepted biokinetic models.


General principles of treatment of internal contamination include: minimizing intake, reducing
and/or inhibiting absorption, blocking target organ uptake, isotopic dilution, promotion of
excretion, altering the chemistry of the substance, displacing the isotope from receptors, or
utilizing chelation therapy.  It is important to remember that radioactive isotopes deposited
internally metabolize in the same manner as their stable counterparts. It is instructive to consider
some selected examples:

(1) Tritium - 3H; follows pathway of water in the body; penetrates skin, lungs, and GI tract, either
as tritiated water (HTO) or in the gaseous form. Single exposures are treated by forcing fluids.
This has the dual value of diluting the tritium and increasing excretion. Forcing fluids to
tolerance (3-4 L/d) will reduce the biological half-life to 1/3 to Vz of the normal value (10 days).

(2) Uranium- exists in various solubility classes; inhalation is the usual occupational exposure.
Overall biological half-life is 15 days and 85% of retained U resides in bone. Kidney toxicity is
the basis of occupational exposure limits. Oral doses or infusions of sodium bicarbonate are the
treatment of choice and should be administered in a dosing schedule to keep  the urine alkaline.

(3)  Radioiodine - The dominant internal exposure after a reactor accident, nuclear weapons test,
or any incident involving fresh fission products is likely to be 131I. The thyroid is the target
organ and medical management involves blocking the thyroid by stable iodine, either by KI
tablets or SSKI (Saturated Solution of Potassium Iodide).

(4) Radiocesium - 137Cs (physical half-life, 30 years; biological half-life 109 days) is the
dominant radioisotope in aged fission products. Cesium distributes in body fluids similarly to
potassium. The most effective means for removing radioactive cesium is the oral administration
of the ion-exchange resin, ferric ferrocyanate, commonly called Prussian blue.

(5) Actinides - Plutonium, Americium, Curium, and Californium (all have long biological half-
lives). Inhalation is approximately 75% of industrial exposures and these accidents are generally
seen in  the DOE complex or in universities supporting weapons research.  Ca-D TPA and Zn-
DTPA chelation therapy is the treatment of choice.

(6) Additional Chelating agents - Chelation has an active history in radiation medicine and much
research is still directed toward developing better chelating agents. For example, Dimercaprol
(B AL) forms stable chelates with mercury, lead, arsenic, gold, bismuth, chromium, and nickel.  It
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may therefore be used for the treatment of internal contamination with radioisotopes of these
elements.  Deferoxamine (DFOA) has been effective in treatment of iron storage disease and may
be used for chelation of 59Fe. Penicillamine chelates copper, iron, mercury, lead, and gold. It is
superior to BAL and Ca-EDTA for removal of copper (Wilson's Disease).


1. Health Effects of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation. BEIRV. National
   Research Council, National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 1990: pp 18-19.

2. NCRP Report No. 65. Management of Persons Accidentally Contaminated with
   Radionuclides. National Council on Radiation protection and Measurements, Bethesda, MD,

3. Andrews, G.A. Medical Management of Accidental Total-Body Irradiation.  In: Hhbner,
   K.F.; Fry, S.A., eds. The Medical Basis for Radiation Accident Preparedness. North
   Holland; Elsevier, 1980: pp 297-301.

4. Goans, R.E., Holloway, E.G., Berger, M.E., and Ricks, R.C. Early Dose Assessment
   Following Severe Radiation Accidents.  Health Phys. 72 (4): 513-518, 1997.
Washington, D.C.
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

                Post-emergency Response: Epidemiological Considerations

                            Shirley A. Fry, M.B., B.Ch, M.P.H.

                            Oak Ridge Associated Universities


During the three decades following the nuclear explosion in Japan, radiation accidents worldwide
generally were contained within secured and often remote environments, involved small numbers
of active participants, and with a few notable exceptions, had little or no impact on the public
health. More recently however, accidents such as those originating at the Three Mile Island and
Chernobyl nuclear power generating plants, at metal processing facilities in Juarez, Mexico and
in Taiwan, and at medical facilities in Goiania, Brazil and Indiana, Pennsylvania had, or were
perceived to have the potential to affect the health of members of the general public in addition to
those at the accident site. The potential for similar situations to occur in the future raises
questions  about the need or desirability to follow groups of individuals for epidemiological
purposes,  and how to prepare for such eventualities.  Such questions are likely to be relevant or
applicable in the case of non-radiological emergencies.


Reasons for implementing epidemiological follow-up of groups of persons 'at risk' after an
emergency event include:

1.     To identify adverse health effects in the 'at risk' group, and to determine if the risk of
       such effects is greater relative to some comparable 'non-exposed' group or population.

2.     To determine if increased risks that may be identified are associated with exposure to
       known agents (e.g., radioactive materials, released in the emergency).

3.     To determine if the increased risks observed are related to or influenced by other factors
       associated with or independent of the emergency.

4.     To add to the scientific basis for establishing or modifying protection standards for
       workers and the public.

Outcomes of the first three of these follow-up objectives potentially can benefit individuals in the
'at risk' group by:
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

1.    Identifying a need for medical awareness of verified or suspected exposure to potentially
       hazardous agents.

2.    Identifying the need to include 'at risk' persons in medical monitoring or screening
      programs that are known to be effective in early detection of diseases inducible by the
      agent involved in the emergency, so that interventions can be implemented to avoid or
      minimize future morbidity.

Implementation of actions to achieve these objectives are likely to reassure the individuals and
groups that: 1) something is being done; 2) they will know if they are or are not at increased risk
for developing exposure - related diseases in the future; and if so 3) appropriate actions to
prevent or minimize the effects of the increased risk can be implemented.

Although increasing the scientific basis for protection standards may not be of direct benefit to
the individuals in the 'at risk' groups, it may contribute to improved protections for others at risk
of similar exposures in the future.

Unfortunately, implementing such follow-up programs is not without its technical or scientific
difficulties and limitations, the first of which is 'who should be included?'  Other practical
considerations included:  1) whether or not the exposure is known to cause an unique disease; 2)
what 'measures of exposure' are available; how certain are they?; and 3) is there likely to be a
definitive answer in the short-term. Factors that can affect or influence the interpretation of the
results of epidemiological studies include: 1) whether the population or number of individuals
available for inclusion or the follow-up program, and the  exposure levels are sufficient to identify
an effect of the exposure of interest, if any exists. This is especially important when the outcome
is not uniquely caused by the exposure part as in the case of radiation and cancer.  In these cases,
attribution of the increased risk to the exposure must rely on statistically significant differences
between the risk of the outcome (disease) in the 'exposed' compared with a 'non-exposed' group.
Large populations generally are needed to achieve this objective. The interval between an
exposure and an exposure-related health outcome, such as cancer, especially is long, so that long
periods of follow-up may be necessary before a valid result is available. Also, human health is
inevitably affected by inherent genetic and life-style factors that must be considered in
interpretation of results. Such factors would include the stresses  of the emergency itself, such as
evacuation, loss of economic support, and the benefits that may accrue to the 'exposed'
population such as increased medical attention, or improved diets.


Proper consideration of issues relating to epidemiological follow-up is appropriately included in
the planning for radiation and other potential emergencies to the benefit of the public health.
Such planning should include capabilities to immediately and adequately document persons
impacted by the emergency so as to permit their follow-up directly by contact, or indirectly
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

through national records systems such as the Social Security Administration or State Drivers'
License Bureaus.

It is likely that there will be emergency or accident situations in which epidemiological follow-up
of the 'survivors' is not justifiable on scientific grounds but in which socio-economic and
political considerations necessitate implementation of a follow-up program. Being prepared to
act effectively in either situation is to the advantage of the responders and in the interests of the
public health.


1.    'The Medical Basis for Radiation-Accident Preparedness HI: The Psychological
      Perspective,' Proceedings of the Third International REAC/TS  Conference, Eds.: Ricks,
      RC; Berger, ME; O'Hara, FM, Oak Ridge, TN, 1990.

2.    'Planning for Human Health Effects in the Event of a Nuclear Accident,' Committee on
      Interagency Radiation Research and Policy Coordination, Science Panel Report No. 7,
      Office of Science and Technology Policy, Washington, DC 20506, 1990.
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 	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

                 Post-Emergency Response: Health Physics Considerations

                              Richard E. Toohey, Ph.D., CHP

           Radiation Emergency Assistance Center and Training Site, Oak Ridge, TN


 The health physics response to radiation accidents that involve only a few people are easily
 manageable; however, when many persons have been actually or potentially exposed, the
 majority of resources allocated to recovery operations may well be involved in one or another
 aspects of health physics.  The goal of health physics operations will be to determine and control
 the radiation exposure of affected persons, and the decisions made will be based on
 determination of: 1) the geographical extent and magnitude of radioactive contamination of the
 environment, 2) the resulting external radiation dose rates to resident or responding persons, and
 3) the external and internal contamination levels of exposed persons.  Each of these tasks will
 require numerous measurements, whose sophistication and interpretation will be greatly affected
 by the particular radioactive materials involved. During the early post-emergency phase, the
 measurement results may be used to determine the need for evacuation, sheltering in place,
 importation of uncontaminated food and drinking water, treatment for internal or external
 exposure, and radiological safety constraints for responders. Later in the post-emergency phase,
 the measurements may be used to determine the need for decontamination, and to verify that
 decontamination goals have been achieved. Finally, the measurements may be used to
 reconstruct radiation doses to the exposed populations, thereby providing the "dose" component
 of the dose-response function for epidemiologic studies, and no doubt the basis for compensation
 for real or perceived harm to the exposed populations.


 Well-established procedures exist for environmental monitoring of external (penetrating)
 radiation levels; the instrumentation is relatively simple, easy to operate, and provides instant
 read-out. Guidance on selecting instrumentation for post-emergency monitoring has been
 published, based on the experience gained in the Goiania accident (Becker et al., 1991.)  The
 main problem lies in compiling the data into a usable form for decision-makers.  Normally, dose
 rate or integrated dose contours are generated on standard regional maps. Measurements of
 radioactive contamination in or on environmental samples (air, water, soil, foliage, foodstuffs,
 exposed surfaces, etc.) are  also reasonably straight forward, but may be more-or-less complex
 depending on the exact radionuclide involved. Gamma-ray emitters such as Cs-137 or Co-60
 require minimal sample preparation; however, the detectors used may require extensive
 shielding, may need to be operated at liquid nitrogen temperature, and typically involve a
 computerized analysis of the data collected. Pure beta emitters, such as Sr-90, and especially
 low-energy beta emitters such as tritium (H-3), require careful sample preparation, usually
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

including chemical separation, and more complicated detection procedures, such as liquid
scintillation counting. Finally, alpha emitters such as Pu-239, are the most difficult to detect,
normally involving extensive wet chemistry and sophisticated alpha spectrometers to determine
their levels. In a reactor accident or weapon detonation, easily measured radionuclides such as
Cs-137 normally serve as markers for the entire inventory of radioactive materials released;
however, in dispersal of only one or a few radionuclides, such as a weapons accident with
detonation of the conventional explosives, but no nuclear yield, only limited "marker"
radionuclides are available (e.g., Am-241, which emits a low-energy (60 keV) gamma ray, may
be used as a marker for Pu-239.)

Environmental measurements are still rather simple compared to measurements of radioactivity
on or in exposed persons. External contamination monitoring requires about ten minutes to do a
thorough survey, or "frisk" of a single person by an experienced technician; as the numbers of
people to be surveyed mount, the time required quickly becomes unacceptably long. Every
person will want to be measured as soon as possible, because of the extensive fear of radiation
that permeates the general public. An initial triage of persons by likelihood of exposure is
required, but very often, security personnel  will be required to provide crowd control. As an
example, after the Goiania accident in Brazil, persons who lived adjacent to the accident scene
were told to report to the town's Olympic stadium for contamination monitoring, and 112,800
people presented. Of these, 129 were found to be contaminated on their clothes or shoes only,
and another 129 were found to be contaminated on their skin or internally.  Of the latter, 21
required hospitalization. (Rosenthal et. al.,  1991.) Fortunately, the radionuclide involved, Cs-
137, is easy to detect.

Determination of internally deposited radioactivity in exposed persons is the most complex set of
measurements to be performed in the post-emergency period. Although it can be argued that
persons who are found not to be contaminated externally are unlikely to be contaminated
internally,  such a triage method may or may not be acceptable to the population involved. In
addition, external contamination with tritium  is very difficult to detect with survey instruments,
and in such a case, there may be few ways to determine the likelihood of internal contamination
other than by place of residence or work versus environmental monitoring results. Again,
gamma-emitters are relatively easy to detect, and normally whole-body counters (mobile, unless
a fixed facility is nearby) are used for the measurements. In Goiania, more than 300 persons,
ranging in age from a few months to 72 years, received whole-body counts; some were so
contaminated that special arrangements to reduce analyzer dead time were required (Oliveira et
al., 1991.)  After the accident at Three Mile Island, 760 persons, both plant workers and local
residents, were counted with a single mobile whole-body counter over a period of eight days (ten
minutes per count, 24 hours per day), and the measurement program was terminated when no
radionuclides attributable to the accident were found in this population (Berger, 1981.)
Following the Chernobyl accident, a total of 119,306 children were measured for Cs-137 content
at five fixed facilities located in the Bryansk,  Kiev, Zhitomir, Gomel,  and Mogilev regions from
May 1991 to April 1996; Cs-137 was used  as a marker for the radioiodines released in the
accident, and the resulting dosimetry information was used to determine the risk factor for
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 	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

 thyroid cancer (Sharifov et al., 1997.)  Another series of whole-body counts was performed on
 residents of the Rovno oblast of the Ukraine, not so much to determine individual intakes and
 doses, but to validate a mathematical model for environmental exposures and intakes through the
 food chain, that would be widely applied to the exposed population.  (Likhtarev et al., 1996.)
 Other countries have prepared mobile whole-body counting facilities specifically for use in the
 post-emergency environment. For example, the French have prepared a railroad car with twenty
 whole-body counting stations, that can easily be deployed to the vicinity of an accident; no such
 capability exists in the United States.

 In an accident involving primarily alpha (e.g., Pu-239) or beta (e.g., tritium) emitters, whole-body
 counting is either inappropriate  or has inadequate sensitivity to be used, and measurements of
 radioactivity in excreta must be employed. Although the analytical methods used are essentially
 identical to those used for radioactivity in environmental media, the logistics of sample collection
 are much more complicated.  Urine samples are relatively easy to collect, and most people have
 had the experience of providing a urine sample as part of a physical examination; however, for
 accurate dose assessment, a twenty-four sample is preferred, and for low-levels of intake, a
 sizable sample (one liter or more) may be required.  Urinalysis is of course limited to soluble
 radionuclides that may be excreted in urine; in the case of inhalation or ingestion of insoluble
 compounds, such as the oxides of plutonium, fecal sample collection and analysis may be the
 only reliable means of detecting intakes. Most people are reluctant to provide fecal samples,
 although collection kits  are readily available from medical supply firms. The  logistical problems
 involved with urine samples, such as provision of containers, recovery of samples, and sample
 storage pending analysis are magnified in the case of fecal samples.

 Once the data have been collected, the dose assessment can be performed, either for individuals
 from bioassay measurements, or for populations from environmental measurements. Standard
 biokinetic models have been published by the International Commission on Radiation Protection
 (ICRP Publications 30 and 54) and by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NUREG/CR-
 4884) that can be used to relate the results of a bioassay measurement to the intake of a
 radionuclide, if the time between the intake and the excreta collection or whole-body count is
 known.  Similarly, standard models of environmental transport and pathway analysis are
 available to estimate population intakes based on the concentrations of radioactivity measured in
 environmental samples.  Once the intakes have been determined, dose coefficients published by
 the U.S.  Environmental  Protection Agency for adults (Federal Guidance Report 11), and by the
 International Atomic Energy Agency for all ages (Basic Safety Standards, Safety Series No. 115)
 may be applied to calculate the resulting radiation doses.  However, the estimation of the dose to
 a particular individual from environmental pathway analysis is particularly uncertain, and may be
 of little use for epidemiological  studies attempting to determine dose-response functions.


The final health physics consideration in the post-emergency situation may well be the
verification survey following decontamination efforts; that is, verifying that contamination levels
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

have in fact been reduced to whatever level has been determined to be the goal of those efforts.
Again, the logistical requirements for such efforts may be enormous; in Goiania, some fifty
houses were decontaminated after the accident (some by complete removal), and the top 1.5 cm
of soil were removed for distances of up to 100 m from the most contaminated sites (da Silva et
al.,  1991; Amaral et al., 1991), generating thousands of cubic meters of waste, all of which
required monitoring.


1.    Amaral ECS, Vianna MEC, Godoy JM et al.  Distribution of Cs-137 in Soils Due to the
      Goiania Accident and Decisions for Remedial Action During the Recovery Phase. Health

2.    Becker PHB, Matta LESC, Moreira AJC. Guidance for Selecting Nuclear Instrumentation
      Derived from Experience in the Goiania Accident.  Health Phys.  60,77; 1991.

3.    Berger, CD. The Effectiveness of a Whole Body Counter During and After an Accident
      Situation at Nuclear Facilities. Health Phys. 40, 685; 1981.

4.    DaSilva CJ, Delgado JU, Luiz MTB, Cunha PG, de Barros PD. Considerations Related to
      the Decontamination of Houses in Goiania: Limitations and Implications. Health Phys.
      60,91; 1991.

5.    Likhtarev I, Kovgan L, Gluvchinsky R, et al. Assessing Internal  Exposures and the
      Efficacy of Countermeasures from Whole Body Measurements.  In: The Radiological
      Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident (Karaoglou A, Desmet G, Kelly GN, Menzel
      HG, eds.) European Commission, 1996.

6.    Oliveira CAN, Lourenco MC, Dantas BM, Lucena EA. Design and Operation of a Whole-
      Body Monitoring System for the Goiania Radiation Accident. Health Phys.  60, 51; 1991.
7.    Rosenthal JJ, de Almeida CE, Mendonca AH. The Radiological Accident in Goiania:  the
      Initial Remedial Actions. Health Phys. 60,7; 1991.

8.    Sharifov VF, Koulikova NV, Voropai LV, et al.  Findings of the Chernobyl Sasakawa
      Health and Medical Cooperation Project: Cs-137 Concentration Among Children around
      Chernobyl.  In: Chernobyl  A Decade (Yamashita S., Shibata Y., eds.) Elsevier, 1997.
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                Session G, Track 2:

                 Protective Actions

                  Friday, September 11, 1998
                    10:10a.m. -12:00 p.m.
Chair: Dorothy Meyerhof, Health Canada

	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

                   The German Guide for Selecting Protection Measures

                       H. Kom1, S. Bittner2,1. Strilek1, and H. Zindler1

                           1) Bundesamt fur Strahlenschutz, Berlin
          2) Bundesministerium fur Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit, Bonn


After the accident in the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, many countries were first forced to
perform ad-hoc countermeasures as well as to impose criteria and reference values with regard to
the effects of the accident. Without detailed knowledge of the accident course, they had to
estimate the radiological situation, to recommend protection measures and to inform and reassure
the public. Different assessments of measured data resulted in considerable confusion,
contradictory recommendations on how to behave put the public in a state of unnecessary
uncertainty. Taking into account the experiences made and the recognized insufficiencies, the
emergency plannings were checked worldwide, with the objective to be better prepared for the
various types of radiological accidents - like accidents with contaminations over large areas, but
also transport and satellite accidents.

Finally, the basis was created for an improved co-operation in the case of an incident/accident
and the scientific and technical basis for a more efficient emergency planning and preparation
through the intensive efforts of the responsible organizations..


The experiences with the radiological effects of the Chernobyl accident triggered off a
corresponding evaluation also in the Federal Republic of Germany. Among other things, this led
to new legal regulations, in order to be able to act rapidly and appropriately in the case of an
event with considerable radiological effects. According to the Radiation Protection Ordinance
(Strahlenschutzverordnung, StrlSchV) [1], all necessary countermeasures have to be initiated in
the case of incidents/accidents so that hazards to life, health and material goods are reduced to
the minimum. According to the Precautionary Radiation Protection Act
(Strahlenschutzvorsorgegesetz, StrVG) [2], in order to protect the population, radioactivity in the
environment has to be monitored and, in the case of events with possible considerable
radiological effects, has to be kept as  low as possible, taking into account the state-of-the-art of
science and technology and all circumstances.

Considering these objectives, a strategy of measures has been developed for the implementation
of §§ 6,7, 8,9 StrVG which authorizes the Federal ministries - on the basis of the data compiled
according to §§ 2, 3 StrVG and summarized by the Integrated Measuring and Information System
(IMIS) for the monitoring of environmental radioactivity - to demand or, respectively,
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

recommend together with the competent highest Federal State authorities certain modes of
behaviour. As a guide for this strategy, the Catalogue of Countermeasures ("Survey of measures
designed to reduce the radiation exposure after events of considerable radiological
consequences") was elaborated.

In addition to the radiation protection precaution measures, the Catalogue of Countermeasures
contains disaster measures like evacuation, for which the Federal states are competent.
Intervention levels for precautionary measures are lower than those for disaster Countermeasures.

The Catalogue should be a guide for experts from competent governmental and State authorities
as well as persons belonging to the respective advisory and supporting panels, which have to
make the assessment and evaluation in the case of a nuclear event with radiological
consequences off-site.

The first version of the Catalogue was submitted in the summer of 1992 [3]. It is currently being
revised. A new and more synoptical version is expected and will probably be published by the
end of this year.

Content of the Catalogue of Countermeasures

The compilation of measures in the Catalogue is based on a literature analysis. The measures are
arranged regarding the time phases of an accident (pre-release, release and late phase). For each
measure, the effectiveness, the operational intervention level (OIL) and problems that may arise
during the application of the measure are mentioned.

When using the Catalogue, it must in principle be presumed that not all measures will apply to all
situations. Still, an attempt was made to provide a comprehensive overview as a basis for
possible argumentation if, for example, a specific measure should not be initiated on account of
its low effectiveness.

The main criterion for initiating and executing a protective measure is the radiation dose
expected to be received from each of the considered pathways (external radiation, internal
radiation after inhalation or ingestion). Since radiation dose is generally not measurable directly,
directly measurable quantities (the OIL's) like the time-integrated concentration in air, soil
contamination, etc. are used for decision-making.

To calculate OIL's, models must be used which include, (e. g., the circumstances of the release
due to the condition of the nuclear installation) the dispersion of radioactive substances in the
atmosphere, the radioecology as well as the incorporation-related metabolism of the radioactive

The following OIL's are used:
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

      released activity in Bq,
      time-integrated air concentration in Bq«h/m3,
      ground contamination in Bq/m2,
      surface contamination in Bq/m2,
      specific activity in Bq/kg or Bq/1,
      gamma dose rate in mSv/h.

Structure of the revised Catalogue

The revised Catalogue will consist of two parts. The first part, in form of diagrams and tables,
will allow for short-term decisions on initiating precautionary measures on the basis of available
data. It includes:


This section represents information required for the understanding of the objective and directions
of the Catalogue.

Chapter 1: Foundations and structure of the Catalogue

This chapter contains explanations for the used designations, the general conditions, the structure
and use of the Catalogue.

Chapter 2: Orientation diagrams and tables

The orientation diagrams in this chapter serve as a guide for the use of orientation tables,
including criteria for the selection of required measures. On the basis of actual available
information, (e.g. measured or prognosticated data on the time-integrated air concentration of
specific nuclides), the table of relevance for these data can be determined from this chapter and
identified from a model. For each countermeasure, the table refers to relevant additional
information and data contained in other chapters of the Catalogue.

Chapter 3: Nomograms

This chapter contains additional information about the radiological situation in the form of
nomograms for dose estimation. With the help of nomograms a quick dose estimation based on
the time-integrated concentration in air or the surface contamination is possible.

Chapters 4 to 6: Compilation of commentaries on all countermeasures

Based on each area where countermeasures apply, the compilation is divided into respective focal
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

      disaster measures (chapter 4),
      precautionary radiological protection measures (chapter 5),
      measures in the agricultural and feeding area (chapter 6).

The text and tables summarize important information on countermeasures, particularly
emphasizing on preconditions, feasibility, effectiveness, advantages, and disadvantages.

Chapter 7: Combination of data, information and documents

This chapter contains additional information which may be helpful for the work with the
Catalogue. Among others, it includes data on nuclear power plants in Europe, tables referring to
the nuclear inventory and the International Nuclear Event Scale.

Chapter 8: Example of use

The example serves to explain the work with the Catalogue in several time phases of an accident.

Appendix: Theoretical foundation

The appendix, the second part of the Catalogue, contains a summary of the theoretical principles
and the most important equations used for the calculation of OIL's in the Catalogue. It provides
the background for a more detailed familiarization with the Catalogue.

Limits of the Catalogue

In consequence of the manual-like character of the Catalogue, its universality is considerably
limited compared to computer programs:

      For pre-calculation, it is necessary to establish specific model parameters. Under certain
      circumstances, such model parameters must be changed, if this should result in a better
      estimation of the actual accident situation.

      By a computer program essential quantities like contamination and radiation exposure can
      be determined by one process for all involved sites and points of time. With a manual,
      however, these quantities can be determined for only one site at a time and one point of
      time. Therefore, it is essential to gain first an overview of the sites and points of time for
      which estimations are to be prepared from measurement results.

      A particularly important restriction applies to the intervention level (IL).  In the Catalogue,
      the dose corresponding with the IL is assumed to be fully exhausted by one exposure
      pathway.  In practice, however, it must be assumed that next to one pathway there may
      also be others that play a more or less important role. Accordingly, the OIL which
      corresponds with the respective IL is generally too high. Nevertheless, this approach seems
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

      to be justified by the fact that the OIL is calculated based on the lower IL of the ICRP
      bandwidth concept. In addition, the proportions of the various exposure pathways
      contributing to the total exposure by one single nuclide may be determined by prepared


[1]   Verordnung fiber den Schutz von Schaden durch ionisierende Strahlung
      (Strahlenschutzverordnung, StrSchV), 13.10.1976, Fassung vom 30.06.1989, zuletzt
      geSndert durch Medizinproduktegesetz vom 02.08.1994

[2]   Gesetz zum vorsorgenden Schutz der Bevolkerung gegen Strahlenbelastung
      (Strahlenschutzvorsorgegesetz, StrVG), 19.12.1986, zuletzt geandert durch
      Gesundheitseinrichtungen-Neuordnungs-Gesetz vom 24.06.1994

[3]   Karthein, R.; Schnadt, H.; Willrodt, C. Ubersicht fiber MaBnahmen zur Verringerung der
      Strahlenexposition nach Ereignissen mit nicht unerheblichen radiologischen
      Auswirkungen", TUV Rheinland, Koln, 30. Juni 1992 (uberarbeitet am 22.03.1993)
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	International Radiological Post-Emersencv Response Issues Conference

             Protective Action Guidance For Nuclear Emergencies In Canada

                    A.S. Baweja, B.L. Tracy, B. Ahier and D.P. Meyerhof

                Radiation Protection Bureau, Health Canada, Ottawa, Canada


In Canada, approximately 15% of the electricity generated is produced using nuclear reactors.
The process for dealing with nuclear emergencies is essentially similar to that in the United
States. The operators of nuclear generating stations, research reactors or other nuclear facilities
are responsible for on-site emergency planning, preparedness and response. The provincial
governments, like the states in the United States, have the primary responsibility for protecting
public health and safety, property and the environment within their borders. The role of the
Federal government is to develop, control  and regulate the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,
manage nuclear liability, and coordinate support to the provinces in their response to a nuclear
emergency. The Federal government is also responsible for liaison with the international

Health Canada is the lead Federal department for planning and execution of the Federal Nuclear
Emergency Plan1. This plan, recently revised, is intended to establish and organize a coordinated
response by the Federal departments and agencies during a nuclear emergency in Canada or
abroad. This Department also participates in a Joint Canada-United States Radiological
Emergency Response Plan.

The Protective Action Guides (PAGs), or Protective Action Levels (PALs), are pre-specified
levels of radiation dose that would justify the introduction of countermeasures to protect health
and safety, property and the environment. These include sheltering, iodine prophylaxis and
evacuation in the early phases of an accident, and relocation and food controls in later phases. All
three Canadian provinces with operating nuclear power plants have their own protective action
guides with specified radiation dose levels. However, there remains a need for a set of PAGs at
the Federal level in order to coordinate the response to radioactivity that may cross provincial or
national boundaries. Furthermore, it is recognized that countermeasures could also be introduced
in response to the status of a damaged nuclear facility, without reference to explicit dose criteria.


In order to establish Federal PAGs, it was decided to review the international guidance on the
 subject. The ICRP-40 (1984)2 recommended three basic tenets of radiation protection for
 planning purposes, viz., dose limitation, justification and optimization. This document also
 proposed projected upper and lower dose levels for different countermeasures as summarized in
 Table 1 which also contains doses from other agencies. The IAEA Safety Series No. 72 (1985)3
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 	  International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

 introduced the concept of Derived Intervention Levels (DLLs) (i.e., a dose rate or Becquerel
 concentration of activity that would correspond to a prescribed dose level for intervention). No
 numerical values for DILs were cited.

 The ICRP-63 (1993)4 supersedes the ICRP-40, and introduces the concept of dose averted (i.e., a
 dose that would be avoided by the introduction of countermeasures (Table 1)). At the time of an
 emergency, the actual intervention levels will be based on accident-specific parameters.  The
 IAEA Safety Series No. 109 (1994)5 was prepared as a revision of Safety Series No. 72. It
 incorporates the latest recommendations from ICRP-60 and ICRP-63. Safety Series No. 109
 abandons the concept of a range of doses between upper and lower limits, and instead
 recommends single numerical values, called generic intervention levels, for the various
 countermeasures. Each generic intervention level is based on an optimization procedure for a
 generic accident scenario. When details of a specific accident become available, it will then be
 possible to carry out a further optimization to obtain specific intervention levels. The generic
 intervention dose levels are summarized in Table 1.

 The protective action guidelines operative in the United States are most relevant to Canadian
 conditions because of the Canada-United States Joint Radiological Emergency Response Plan
 (1996).6 At the U.S. Federal level, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is responsible for
 technical advice and coordination among different levels of responsibility centres. The
 Environmental Protection Agency establishes Protective Action Guides at varied projected dose
 levels as enunciated in the Manual  of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for
 Nuclear Incidents (1992).7 As in ICRP-40 (1984), this Manual distinguishes between different
 phases of accidents as follows:

       Early Phase: This period refers to the beginning of a nuclear accident when immediate
       decisions for effective protective actions are required. This phase may last from hours to

       Intermediate Phase: The intermediate phase is the period beginning after the source and
       releases have been brought under control, and reliable environmental measurements are
       available for use as a basis for decisions on additional protective actions. This phase may
       overlap the early and late  phases, and may last from weeks to many months.

       Late (Recovery) Phase: This is the period beginning when recovery action designed to
       reduce radiation levels in the environment to acceptable levels for unrestricted use are
       commenced, and ending when all recovery actions have been completed. This period may
       extend from months to years.

pe protective actions recommended in the EPA manual are based on projected doses as shown
in Table 1.  Based on optimization,  dose rates may vary significantly depending upon weather
and personal conditions.
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

The food restrictions were developed by the UiS. Department of Health and Human Services, and
Food and Drug Administration in the event of a nuclear incident. The Protective Action Guides
for the consumption of contaminated foodstuff are set at an equivalent dose of 5 mSv (500
millirem) for the whole body and at 15 mSv (1.5 rems) to the thyroid; these guidelines are being
reviewed at the present time.

All three Canadian provinces with operating nuclear power plants - Ontario, Quebec and New
Brunswick - have their own protective action guides with specified radiation dose rates and/or
levels. They are essentially based on international guidance and consensus as developed by the

Health Canada has drafted guidelines for the restriction of radioactivity in food  in the event of a
nuclear emergency. Presently, these guidelines are being discussed with other Federal agencies
and the provinces for adoption. For drinking water, it has been decided that the existing
Guidelines for Canadian Drinking Water Quality (1996)8, meant for non-emergency conditions,
be adopted in order to sustain public confidence. These guidelines are based on a lifetime
exposure of 0.1 mSv/year; however, this exposure may be raised up to a level of 1 mSv/year
during a nuclear emergency, if the conditions warrant. Thus, it appears that the Federal guidelines
will be based on 1 mSv/year for each  of the three food groups, viz. fresh milk, other foods and
water. All the Federal guidelines and PAGs, existent or when developed, will become an integral
part of our Federal Nuclear Emergency Plan.

A simplified summary of the Protective Action Guides from all jurisdictions discussed above is
presented in Table 1. Some details (e.g., dose rates) have been omitted in order  to simplify the
comparison. With these considerations, it is remarkable to see the degree of consistency between
the PAGs of different agencies. For nearly every countermeasure, the dose levels overlap.

In developing Federal protective action guidance, review of the international literature, including
that of the United States, is essentially complete. We have also reviewed our provincial
protective action guides. In the near future, we hope to specify projected radiation dose levels for
different countermeasures. When completed, the PAGs will be discussed with our regulatory
agency, the Atomic Energy Control Board, the provinces and the U.S. Federal agencies before
adoption. Nonetheless, it is very likely that our protective action levels are likely to be in the
range of those accepted internationally and by our provinces.
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                    International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference
 Table 1. Summary of Protective Action Guides by various agencies. All entries are
 expressed in mSv to the whole body except for KI administration, which is expressed as
 mSv to the thyroid.
IAEA, SS 109
WHO, Codex
'Health Canada
New Bruns.



3 per 12 hr
KI Amins.
50 - 500
50 - 500


50 - 500
50 - 500


10 - 100
50 per 7 days
50 - 500
1000 lifetime
1000 lifetime

100-1000 life
Food Control
	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

[6]   Canada - U.S. (1996). Canada - United States Joint Radiological Emergency Response
      Plan, Ottawa-Washington, July 27, 1996.

[7]   EPA (1992). Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear
      Incidents. United States Environmental Protection Agency, EPA 400-R-92-001, May
      1992, Washington, DC 20460.

[8]   Health Canada (1996). Guidelines for Canadian Drinking Water Quality, 6th Edition.
      Prepared by the Federal-Provincial Subcommittee on Drinking Water of the Federal-
      Provincial Committee on Environmental and Occupational Health. Ministry of Health,
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  	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

   Integrated Analysis of Accident Scenarios, Radiological Dose Estimates and Protective
                    Measures Efficacy Following a Radioactive Release

                      Costa, E.M1., Biagio, R1., Leao, I1, and Alves, R.N2

                1 Comissao National de Energia Nuclear, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

                    2 Institute Militar de Engenharia, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

 A nuclear accident may result in radioactivity being directly released to the atmosphere, to rivers,
 to the sea and to the ground. The main threat to urban areas and their inhabitants is generally
 considered to be from releases to the atmosphere, which are then carried over and deposit their
 radioactivity on towns and villages. The radiological assessment of the consequences of an
 accidental release of pollutants is an important tool for an emergency decision-making process,
 especially during the early and intermediate phase of an accident in which radioactive materials
 escape from the installation into the environment. The development and evaluation of adequate
 protective measures are part of the decision-making process and have to be concerned with
 several components. Among them, the technical and scientific components, such as the
 knowledge of the source-term (features of the release), availability of meteorological data,
 modeling of atmospheric dispersion, modeling of deposition and modeling of exposure (and
 health effects, if required). However, the social and economical components are also very
 specific for each region and need to be carefully considered.

 Internationally, safety analysis studies ensuring that the public and the environment are
 adequately protected, are a requirement to obtain the permission for the operation of a nuclear
 power installation (operation license). More recently, a considerable amount of effort has gone
 into developing more realistic methods to fulfill the safety requirements. In addition to a huge
 amount of data gathered from studies during the pre-operational phase, up to the construction and
 operation of the power plant, there has also been a considerable development of environmental
 analysis techniques. These techniques demand an  integrated approach taking into account all the
 relevant information to provide a better knowledge of the potential environmental impact
 associated with hypothetical accident scenarios in those plants.

 All these developments have led to an increasing demand for greater levels of  geographical data
 analysis and mapping procedures in the planning and implementation of major decisions, and
 also for the monitoring and evaluation of the results of these decisions. Geographic information
 systems (GIS) is an efficient method for storing information about complex relationships and
 plays an important role to improve the user's ability to make decisions in research, planning and
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This study is concerned with the application 6f this integrated approach in the planning and
selection of protective measures to protect the public in the case of an accidental release of
radioactive material into the atmosphere. A very simple methodology was established taking the
Brazilian nuclear power plant site as a case-study. By selecting a hypothetical accident for a
generic pressurized water (PWR) to define the source-term, it is possible to estimate the radiation
dose to the public. This layer of information is integrated to other layers of information related to
specific environmental, demographic, social and economic features of the region where the plant
is located. The objective of this approach is the identification and a previous selection of areas
requiring a more detailed planning for the establishment of protective measures.



Dose Estimates

The first consequence analysis study of nuclear power plant operation was introduced in the
middle 70's: the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400).(1)  In this publication, nine
accidental-release categories and their respective source-term are described. After the accident in
Three-Mile Island, further studies presented a much lower fraction of radionuclides in the
source-term, indicating that a conservative approach had been adopted by the first study.
However, in spite of these studies, the categories described by the  WASH-1400 are still used as a
technical basis for decision-making procedures.

The category selected for the purpose of this study is classified as PWR-4, which is described by
a sequence of events leading to serious accident, including core melting and failure in the
containment building. According to Dolores(2), the description of the PWR-4 category  shows
many similarities to those defined as BEED (Best Estimate from Empirical Data). Presently, the
BEED category is considered the most reasonable one, as compared with empirical data
available. Once defined as the source-term, the radiation dose can  be estimated for different
distances from the source.

Local Factors

In addition to dose estimates and local environmental factors, the establishment of a set of
protective measures following a radioactive release, also depends on characteristics of population
including social and economical conditions. In general terms, these factors can be listed as

1)     Existence of groups of population
2)     Distance from the emission source
3)     Communication
4)     Means of transport
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                     International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference
 5)    Adequate roads or via of transport
 6)    Existence of appropriate shelters
 The existence or absence of population is an important factor in the evaluation of the area to
 receive the first basic protective measures. The number of people in the different villas or groups
 will influence in some way the application of different protective measures. The higher the
 population, the higher the resources required for the implementation of protective measures. In
 another way, a high number of people could cause for example, a traffic jam in the case of an
 evacuation measure.

 The distance of the emission source is an essential factor to be considered, since the
 accident-related dose is proportional to the distance. The application of certain protective
 measures is only required above a defined limit, below which no action is taken.

 Communication capacity is related not only to the possibility of communication, via equipment
 of radio, TV, etc, but also to the capacity of understanding the situation as an emergency.

 The existence of adequate roads and means of transport are especially important in the case of
 evacuation of people from the affected areas.

 The shelters in the areas should be considered under two aspects: 1) as a shelter against bad
 weather conditions, allowing people to wait for further transferring or additional information;
 2) as a radioactive shelter, reducing the radiation exposure and ingestion of radioactive material.


 A brief description of the study-site and population characteristics are presented in the next
 paragraphs, giving emphasis to some aspects of geography, meteorology and population.

 Local Characteristics

 The study-site is located at the southeastern coast of Brazil (23.0° S, 44.5° W) about halfway
 between Rio de Janeiro and Santos (state of Sao Paulo). It is a bowl-shaped area with hills on
 three sides and a bay on the fourth side. The highway Rio de Janeiro-Santos (BR101) is directly
 beside the northern and eastern fences of the nuclear power plant site (NPP). The curved
 shoreline is oriented NWW to SSE with the bay to the west. To the north of the NPP and the
 highway, there are bluffs rising up to 700 m and to the southeast of the NPP hills rise to less than
 300 m. Generally speaking, 50% of the area is occupied by hills and 50% by ocean. The hills are
 covered with a tropical forest of a dense canopy (Mata Atlantica). Local wind-systems and
 turbulence are complicated by the land-sea interface and high insolation due to low altitude.  The
region is also characterized by intense precipitation, low average wind speeds (about 1.5 m/s) and
 stable atmosphere (Pasquill class E). Agricultural and fishing activities are mainly of subsistence
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

nature. Spotty cattle are raised on small-scale. The industrial activity is basically non-existent.
Boating and swimming activities are practiced by the small population and by an increasing
number of tourists during certain periods of the year(3).


The site region is sparsely populated by small villages along the coast. According to a recent
local census, a population of 10,804 people live within the area of 5 km around the NPP. Three
categories can be used to describe the population:

Workers: all the individuals who work in the operation of the unit 1 and those involved in the
construction of the unit 2. They are considered a special group  of people who remain in the plant
site on a daily basis. Presently, there are about 4000 workers in the NPP.

Permanent inhabitants: all the individuals who live permanently in the area: They are mainly
concentrated in 3 areas: Residential Vila of Praia Brava (2102 inhabitants) fully occupied by
workers and their families, as well by local people running small businesses in the area; Frade
(2,354 inhabitants) and Cunhambebe (1,849 inhabitants).

Eventual inhabitants: mainly tourists, who spend the weekends and holidays in the region. Porto
Frade and Praia Vermelha are the most popular resorts.

Most of the local population (98%) within the 5km radius, has  some level of literacy, with only
2% illiteracy. In general terms, it can be said that the local population have a certain level of
participation and a reasonable understanding of the NPP activities. Educational and information
campaigns have been carried out by the plant operator. The installation of the plant in the region
has also been an important source of employment.


Table 1 presents the probability of occurrence of the accident category PWR-4 including periods
of time involved during the release of material and fraction of total inventory of fission products
released into the atmosphere. Having defined the accident category, the dose estimates can then
be evaluated using a proper code.
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

Table 1. Source-Term (PWR-4)
Probability and time
106Btu/h (7)
Fraction of the total inventory of fission products
released from the core
Cs, Rb
Ba, Sr
5 x 10°
3 x lO'3
4 x 10'4
(1) Time interval between the beginning of the accident and the release of radioactive material into the atmosphere.
(2) Total time spent to release most of the radioactive material into the atmosphere
(3) Time interval between the acknowledgment of the release (to make the decision to apply protective measures)
and the release of radioactive material into the atmosphere.

Scenario Analysis

Thyroid doses (4) were estimated for a range of distances up to 5 km from the source. The
maximum doses are found within the range of 1-2 km from the plant, due to the release of heat
energy in the considered accident category. Ground release, average wind speed of 1.5 m/s and
Pasquill atmospheric stability class E were selected as being representative of the average
conditions of the site. In addition, some other specific factors were established to identify those
areas which need a further detailed investigation. Table 2 presents the factors which are
considered in this integrated approach. Due to our limitation in terms of time, data availability
and resources, some simplifications were made. However, the methodology can be applied to a
wider range of scenarios or situations, taking advantage of more detailed information and
resources available.

Table 2. Factors and weights adopted for the integrated analysis with GIS






Means of


As a starting point, it was considered that the selected areas should have at least 100 inhabitants.
This limit was chosen due to the high number of very small localities scattered over the study
region. Areas with a population higher than 1000 inhabitants were given the higher weight (3),
since these areas would require a very well planned set of protective measures. The range of dose
values shown in Table 2 were adopted as a result of the calculated dose distribution within a 5
km radius from the nuclear plant. Accessibility to any type of communication, capacity of
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

understanding and existence of appropriate shelters were considered as being satisfactory (weight
= 1) in the whole region, as well as the roads and means of transportation.

The integration of all the factors by using a GIS(5) has provided the identification of several areas
falling into different categories. The areas showing the combination of the higher scores suggest
the need of a prioritization in the investigation of adequate protective measures in the case of an
accidental release of radioactive material into the atmosphere. The results could be summarized
showing areas classified as having higher, intermediate and lower priorities.  Figure  1 shows the
location of these areas.
                                                             ^—J     Selected areas
                                                                   (degrees of priority)

                                                                 O iow>r
                                                               population distribution
                                                                to 100
                                                               500 to 1000
                                                               000 to 5000
                                                               jimit of 5km around the NPP
Figure 1. Study-area showing the location of the selected areas according to the criteria adopted
by this study.


It was not the purpose of this work to exhaust all the possibilities of integration of information. A
more detailed study would require the inclusion of additional relevant factors, improvement of
dose estimates, meteorological data information, dispersion modeling, etc, would have to be
introduced. However, even a simple approach has shown to be of great help by identifying
critical areas in terms of planning of protective measures.
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 	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference


 (1)   Nuclear Regulatory Commission-NRC, "Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Risk in
      U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants", WASH-1400, (1975).

 (2)   Dorado, C. D., La Cruz , F. D., "Estrategias de Actuacion en Emergencias Radiologicas",
      Energia Nuclear Espana 28 (1984)

 (3)   Furnas Centrais Eletricas, Final Safety Analysis Report, Central Nuclear Almirante Alvaro
      Alberto Unidade I, Capitulo 2.3 Meteorology, Diretoria Tecnica, Volume 1-2, Revisao 27,

 (4)   Jow, H.N., J. L. Sprung, J. A. Rollstin, L. T. Ritchie, and D. I. Chanin, MELCOR
      Accident Consequence Code System (MACCS), Model Description, NUREG/CR-4691,
      SAND86-1562, Vol. 2, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM. (1990).

 (5)   CaliperTM, Caliper Maptitude User's Guide, version 3.0 for Windows, Caliper
      Corporation, (1995).
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                    International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

                  Information Synthesis for Aiding Recovery Decisions

                    N A Higgins, T W Charnock, J Brown and M Morrey

                          National Radiological Protection Board
                             Chilton, Didcot OX11 ORQ, UK
As part of NRPB's role to provide advice on appropriate actions to take after an accidental
release of radioactivity, tools are being developed and investigations are underway to enhance the
quality and scope of information provided to decision makers. Particular emphasis is placed on
information that helps in the consideration of potentially protracted countermeasures (i.e., food
restrictions, decontamination and access restrictions (including relocation)). The potential long
term social and monetary consequences of applying such countermeasures reduces the scope for
precautionary application and increases the need for confidence in the information to be acted on.
However, for both radiological protection and social considerations, there is likely to be pressure
for these decisions to be made as soon as possible. Thus, there is a need for tools that maximise
the information extracted from measurements and provide guidance on the likely consequences
and acceptability of countermeasures.

This paper describes three projects currently in progress at NRPB. They form part of a multilevel
approach towards providing decision making support. The final section reviews how the results
of these independent projects may link together, to provide a scheme that will provide more
nearly optimal guidance on the application of such countermeasures.


Characterising the Problem

A four-year research programme called SECTAR* (Statistical Estimation and Characterisation
Techniques for Accident Response), is investigating techniques for assessing the extent of
contamination from limited quantities of measurement data. Two complementary approaches are
being followed to provide data driven estimates of the extent of any contamination. In the first
case, measurements are used to adjust model estimates through a process of Bayesian updating.1
This process enables a gradual shift of emphasis from model estimates to estimates based almost
entirely on the measured values of contamination, as more measurements become available. The
alternative approach investigates how to use a range of established geostatistical techniques,
successful in a data rich environment, in the data poor environment occurring in the early stages
of an accident.
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

The two approaches, Bayesian updating and geostatistical techniques, naturally meld with an
increasing reliance on measurement data to correct and eventually supersede model estimates as
the accident evolves.

To test alternative geostatistical techniques, predictions using subsets of measurements are
compared with the reality represented by a more comprehensive data set. Rainfall and other
correlated information, possibly gathered from models, may also be used to support estimates of
the extent and amount of contamination where direct measurements are sparse. An objective is to
find out what sorts of inferences can legitimately be drawn for a given sample size.

An example of what may be achieved using a very simple geostatistical approach is shown in
Figure 1. This figure shows the result of applying ordinary kriging,2 to a few measurements from
the accident in 1992 at the Tomsk reprocessing factory in Russia.3 The figure shows that a few
points can give a good representation of the final contamination pattern. However, further work
is underway on the conditions under which this is likely and the range of errors 'associated with
estimates based on limited data. Ideally, what is sought is not only the best estimate for a given
amount and configuration of sampling, but an estimate of how reliable that estimate is likely to
be. A primary application of this information (combined with practicality considerations) will be
to decide if implementing a countermeasure is appropriate, based on what is known, or to delay
until more data are available.

A key aspect of these investigations is the collection of information on accidents from around the
world. The use of real data is an essential prerequisite, if the anticipated improvement over non-
adaptive modelling is to be demonstrated. Data from the accidents at Chernobyl, Tomsk and
Windscale are currently in use or preparation.

Options for Removing the Problem

NRPB has recently published advice on a framework for decisions on decontamination and
restricted access countermeasures ('recovery countermeasures').4 The advice promotes a
proportionate response and recognises the need to consider countermeasure strategies, rather than
treating each protective action independently. The emphasis is on considering the full impact of
the proposed strategy, in terms of resources, time, waste generation, environmental and social
impacts and the averted dose. Strategies that can be finished quickly with relatively low adverse
impacts, whilst also being radiologically effective, should always be considered (Category A).
More disruptive, less practical, but still effective procedures should be additionally considered if
the dose to a resident population is likely to exceed 10 mSv y"1 (Category B). Generally, options
that have low radiological benefit, but relatively high adverse consequences (Category C) should
only be considered if other measures are unable to reduce lifetime doses from the accident to
below 1 Sv, or for non-radiological reasons. The advice is summarised in Table 1 below.
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                    International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference
Table 1. Summary of NRPB advice on recovery countermeasures
To consider
Unlikely to be justified
 Any offsite contamination

 Dose > 10 mSv y"1

 Lifetime dose > 1 Sv
Category A

Category A, Category B"1"

Category B Category C*

Category C*

* Potentially justified in support of other measures.
+ Need to offset increasing resource requirements/disruption with increasing dose averted; in
  general relocation would not be justified at doses around 10 mSv y"1.
? Potentially justified in support of other measures, or if Category B measures impractical.

It is within this context that decisions on strategies involving decontamination will be taken in
the UK. A PC-based decision aid CONDO (CONsequences of Decontamination Options)* has
been developed to illustrate the practical consequences that follow from selecting alternative
decontamination procedures.

Use of CONDO requires the contaminated area to be specified as a series of regions defined by
contamination level and environment type (i.e., the relative proportion of different types of
surfaces). This information is combined with the results of a major UK review on the
effectiveness of decontamination techniques5 and precalculated dose consequences obtained from
modelling6, to provide the following endpoints: level of decontamination achieved; monetary
costs; resources required; timescale; waste arisings and level of activity; residual doses and doses
to clean-up workers. For perspective notional relocation costs are also provided.

Placing Countermeasures in a Social Context

There are complex problems of acceptability and compliance associated with the application of
recovery countermeasures. Whilst, there are only a few categories of countermeasure, the way
they are applied and supported can have large, and long term, consequences on their
effectiveness. A project on Social Psychological Aspects of Radiation Protection after Accidents
(SPARPA)* is investigating possible interactions between countermeasures, doses and some
social and psychological factors in the former republics of the Soviet Union affected by the
Chernobyl accident.

The aim of SPARPA is to develop a structural behavioural model that explains, to some extent,
how particular behaviours and hence doses arise. This knowledge will help in the development of
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference

decision models that aid the selection of countermeasures and the strategy adopted to implement
them. The work involves the use of focus groups, questionnaire surveys and individual dose
measurements, with greatest attention being given to the consumption of private milk and free
forest foods. Previous studies7 indicate that these are the dose pathways most likely to help
elucidate key properties in the relationship between the context in which countermeasures are
applied and their success in reducing doses. Additionally, the provision of compensation
payments and information campaigns are also under study. One particularly novel aspect of
SPARPA is the consideration of why particular population groups may comply with restrictions
and the distress this or its converse may cause.

Clearly, an ideal decision may be expected to minimise cost and distress while maximising the
dose averted. However, it is likely that tradeoffs will have to be made and the understanding
gained from SPARPA will provide guidance8 on how best to achieve this.


Synthesis - The Way Forward

The three example strands of NRPB research and development are key elements in a more
comprehensive approach to improving information for the decision maker. SECTAR aims to
provide optimum estimates of what can be known for a particular amount of sampling and
support information, together with an estimate of the range of results consistent with the data.
This improved understanding of the likely extent of contamination supports programs such as
CONDO that provide estimates of the consequences of applying countermeasures. Such
consequences are in turn supported by considerations of the influence of social psychological
factors in countermeasure decisions9. SPARPA provides methods to generalise the discussion on
the influence of social psychological factors that will result in a broader decision aiding
framework, that better understands the limitations of the data and the complexity of the options


We thank Drs Shershakov and Borodin for  the provision of data on Tomsk-7 and their advice on
details of the event and their subsequent analysis. We also thank Professor O'Hagan and Dr
Kennedy for applying their Bayesian techniques to our problems. Finally we thank Dr Daniels for
helping in the preparation of this manuscript.

*SECTAR is partially funded by the UK Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food, CONDO
was entirely funded by the UK Ministry of Defence and SPARPA is supported by the EC under
the auspices of its Nuclear Fission Safety Programme.
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	International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference


1     O'Hagan, A, Kennedy, M C, and Oakley, J E. Uncertainty Analysis and other Inference
      Tools for Complex Computer Codes. Bayesian Statistics 6 (J M Bernardo, J O Berger, A P
      David and A F M Smith (Eds.) Oxford University Press, (1998).

2     Charnock, T W, Daniels, W M, Higgins, N A. Geostatistical Estimation Techniques
      Applied to Radionuclide Deposition: An Accident Response Decision Aid geoENV98
      Nov. 18-20 Valencia (1998).

3     Shershakov, V M et al. Analysis and Prognosis of Radiation Exposure Following the
      Accident at the Siberian Chemical Combine Tomsk-7. Radiat. Prot. Dosim. 59(2) 93-126

4     NRPB. Intervention for recovery after accidents. Doc. NRPB 8( 1) 1 -20 (1997).

5     Brown, J, Cooper, J R, Jones, J A, Flaws, L, McGeary, R, and Spooner, J. Review of
      decontamination and clean-up techniques for use in the UK following accidental releases
      of radioactivity to the environment. Chilton, NRPB-R288 (DOE/RAS/96009) (1996)
      (London, SO).

6     Crick, M J, and Brown, J. EXPURT A Model for Evaluating Exposure from Radioactive
      Material Deposited in the Urban Environment. Chilton. NRPB-R235 (1990).

7     Skryabin, A M et al. Distribution of Doses received in Rural Areas affected by the
      Chernobyl Accident. Chilton NRPB-R277 (1995).

8     Higgins, N A, and Morrey, M. Social intervention and risk reduction - indirect
      countermeasures. Radiat. Prot. Dosim., 68(3/4), 213-17 (1996).

9     Higgins, N A, Jones, K A, and McLaren, F E. An examination of consequences and
      recovery actions applicable in the recovery phase of a nuclear accident. Chilton, NRPB (to
      be published).
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                   International Radiological Post-Emergency Response Issues Conference
                            (UEJ) aDuejsja
                                                            C in



Figure 1 A comparison of an Ordinary Kriging estimate of 106Ru contamination from the

Tomsk-7 accident using (700) measurements (left), a subset of 40 randomly selected

measurements (centre) and showing the difference between the two estimates (right).
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September 9-11, 1998