40 CFR Part 191
Environmental Standards for the
Management and Disposal of Spent
Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and
Transuranic Radioactive Wastes
EPA 520/1-85-024-1
RESPONSE TO COMMENTS
FINAL RULE FOR HIGH-LEVEL AND TRANSURANIC RADIOACTIVE WASTES
Volume I—Public Comments
August 1985
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Office of Radiation Programs
Washington, D.C., 20460
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CONTENTS
Page
1. INTRODUCTION 1-1
2. DEFINITIONS 2-1
2.1 Subpart A 2-1
2.2 Subpart B 2-4
3. GENERAL 3-1
3.1 Authorities and Implementation 3-1
3.2 Transportation 3-2
3.3 Subpart A 3-2
3.4 Ambiguous Language and Clarification 3-4
3.5 Technical Information 3-5
3.6 Application of Standards 3-7
3.7 Intrusion 3-9
3.8 Miscellaneous 3-11
4. ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS 4-1
4.1 General 4-1
4.2 Prompt Disposal Requirement 4-2
4.3 ALARA Requirement 4-2
4.4 Multiple Barrier Requirement 4-3
4.5 Active Institutional Controls Requirement 4-4
4.6 Permanent Markers Requirement 4-5
4.7 Resource Conflict Requirement 4-6
4.8 Retrievability Requirement 4-8
4.9 Long-Term Monitoring Requirement 4-9
5. CONTAINMENT REQUIREMENTS 5-1
5.1 Time Period 5-1
5.2 Definitions 5-2
5.3 Release Probabilities 5-2
6. ACCESSIBLE ENVIRONMENT 6-1
7. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS 7-1
8. STANDARDS 8-1
8.1 Individual Dose Standards 8-1
8.2 Release Limits (Population Dose Approach) 8-2
8.3 General 8-3
9. REGULATORY (COST) IMPACT ANALYSIS 9-1
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CONTENTS (continued)
10. MODELS AND MODELING
11. LEVEL OF RISK
11.1 Comparison to Other Risks
11.2 General
12. SITING
12.1 Water Resources
12.2 General
12.3 Geology
Appendices
A — List of Commenters
Page
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11-1
11-1
11-2
12-1
12-1
12-1
12-2
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the responsi-
bility of developing and issuing environmental standards, guidelines, and
criteria to ensure adequate protection of the public and the environment
from potential radiation impacts.
This document addresses the comments received on the proposed rule-
making for "Environmental Standards for the Management and Disposal of
Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes," (40
CFR Part 191), published in the Federal Register on December 29, 1982
(47 FR 58196-58206)
During the rulemaking, there were two public comment periods based
on the proposed rule. During the first comment period, lasting until May
2, 1983, comments were sought on all aspects of the proposed standards.
The Agency received replies from a broad spectrum of private citizens,
public interest groups, members of the scientific community, representa-
tives of industry, and State and Federal agencies. Two public hearings,
held May 12-14, 1983, in Washington, D.C., and May 19-21, 1983, in
Denver, Colorado (48 FR 13444) concentrated on seven topics that gen-
erated a range of questions. Copies of these questions were also sent to
all those who responded to the initial request for comment, and the
availability of these questions was announced in the Federal Register
(48 FR 21666). A second comment period was then held open until June 20,
1983, to receive responses to these additional questions. The Agency
continued to accept comments for docketing until the final rulemaking.
The seven issues were:
(1) A definition of high-level waste.
(a) Should EPA define "sufficient concentrations" in the
high-level waste definition?
(b) Should EPA prohibit dilution?
(2) Need for the assurance and procedural requirements.
(a) Retained or deleted.
(b) Kept in standards or issued as Federal guidance.
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(3) Should a long-term monitoring requirement be included?
(4) Definition of accessible environment.
(5) Should applicability of standards be extended beyond 10,000
years?
(6) Should there be some limit on individual exposures in the
standard?
(7) Is there a need for quantitative definitions of release proba-
bilities?
Copies of the written comments and transcripts of the hearings are
available for inspection and copying at EPA's Central Docket Section,
West Tower Lobby, Gallery One, Waterside Mall, 401 M Street, S.W., Wash-
ington, D.C. 20460. The docket number is R-82-3. (A fee may be charged
for copying.)
The Agency has made every effort to consider all comments submitted.
However, because of the time constraint, it is possible that those com-
ments submitted during those months previous to the final rulemaking and
after the final comment period closed may not be included in this docu-
ment.
This document summarizes major concerns and issues arising from
written and oral comments on the proposed rulemaking, as well as EPA's
response to these. Each commenter is identified by a letter and number
after the comment. The response to the comment then follows. In the
interest of clarity and economy, some comments are paraphrased, and some
closely related comments are combined. A list of the commenters and
their identification numbers is given in Appendix A.
In the responses to comments sections of this document, no distinc-
tion is made between comments on the proposed standard and special com-
ments concerning the seven issues.
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Chapter 2: DEFINITIONS
2.1 Subpart A
Comment 2.1.1; Define "site." (D-58)
Response: The term "site" has been defined in 191.02(n).
Comment 2.1.2a; EPA should adopt the NWPA definition for high-level
radioactive waste (HLW). (D-46, D-47, D-48, D-49, D-52, D-62, D-67,
D-68, D-71, D-72, D-74, D-76, D-80, D-83, D-91, D-92, F-7-iii, F-7-ix,
F-8-ii, F-8-v, H-l, H-4, H-14, K-4, K-5, K-6, K-8, K-9, K-ll, K-13, K-14,
K-16, K-17, K-20, K-21, K-22, K-24, L-6)
Comment 2.1.2b; EPA should allow NRC to define HLW or use its existing
definition. (D-46, D-65, D-70)
Comment 2.1.2c; Definition for HLW should be all inclusive and not allow
anything to slip through the cracks. (D-63, D-66)
Comment•2.1.2d; Define HLW in terms of its heat-generating capacity.
(D-93)
Comment 2.1.2e; Define HLW in terms of potential hazard to biological
systems. (D-77)
Comment 2.1.2f; HLW definition should be reserved for uniquely concen-
trated primary-raffinate stream rather than be predetermined by Table 1
concentrations. (D-16)
Comment 2.1.2g; Supports the EPA proposed definition of HLW. (D-14,
D-42, D-57, D-78, D-90, H-12, H-28, K-7, L-3, L-10)
Comment 2.1.2h: Suggests a HLW classification system based on level of
protection necessary. (K-3)
Comment 2.1.2i; Supports definition proposed by DOE. (K-2, K-15, L-l)
Comment 2.1.2j: Supports definition proposed by the Edison Electric
Institute. (K-18, K-19)
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Comment 2.1.2k; Suggest addition of an intermediate-level waste category
to the EPA/NWPA HLW definition. (D-84, K-l, K-ll)
Response (Comments 2.1.2a through k); The EPA definition of high-level
radioactive waste was revised to be identical with the definition in the
NWPA. This was done to prevent varying definitions and will allow EPA to
follow the NRG rulemakings in determining a more specific definition for
other highly-radioactive material. The Agency will follow-up in deter-
mining what appropriate elaborations of the NWPA definition will be
incorporated into 40 CFR Part 191.
Comment 2.1.3a; Should use the NWPA definition for HLW, but include
spent fuel. (K-12)
Comment 2.1.3b; Spent fuel should not be considered in HLW definition or
included for disposal. (D-36, D-59)
Response (Comments 2.1.3a and b); The term "spent fuel" was removed from
the HLW definition and defined separately. However, "spent nuclear fuel"
was kept under the coverage of the final disposal standards.
Comment 2.1.4a: The background section for Table 1 requires more explan-
ation and documentation. (D-7, D-25, D-84, D-85, F-8-iv)
Comment 2.1.4b; Consideration should be given to the quantity of waste
over which concentration limits may be averaged. (D-16)
Comment 2.1.4c; Americium-241 should be given a specific entry with a
lower concentration limit in Table 1. (H-21)
Comment 2.1.4d: EPA should retain Table 1 (concentrations) and define
the NWPA term "sufficient concentrations." (K-4, K-5, K-6, K-7, K-8,
K-12, K-13, K-14, K-16, K-17, K-20, K-21, K-24, L-3, L-6)
Comment 2.1.4e; "Sufficient concentrations" definition (in NWPA) should
be defined by the NWPA implementor. (K-2, K-15, L-l, K-18)
Comment 2.1. 4f; EPA should not define "sufficient concentrations" for
the NWPA HLW definition. (K-9)
Comment 2.1.4g; Should broaden definition to include all radioactive
wastes greater than Table 1 concentrations and require geological dis-
posal.
(D-23, D-46, D-8, D-86, H-10)
Comment 2.1.4h; EPA should include a provision to specifically prohibit
dilution of wastes to avoid the concentration limits in Table 1. (D-12,
D-66, K-4, K-6, K-7, K-8, K-9, K-13, K-17, K-20, L-3, L-6)
Comment 2.1.4i; EPA should not prohibit dilution of wastes. (K-15,
K-18, L-l, K-2, L-4)
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Comment 2.1.4j: EPA should allow dilution if there is a net health and
environmental benefit or cost benefit. (K-14, L-4)
Response (Comments 2.1.4a through j); EPA has incorporated the NWPA
definition for HLW without further elaboration of the phrase "sufficient
concentrations" and deleted its proposed definition and Table 1 concen-
trations; thus the subject of waste dilution will be a matter for the
implementing agency.
Comment 2.1.5a: The TRU waste definition needs to be clarified in rela-
tionship to that for HLW. (D-79)
Comment 2.1.5b: A discrepancy was noted in EPA's definition of TRU
wastes. Were they to be considered based on a one-year or 20-year half-
life? (D-7, D-25, D-46, D-57, D-59, D-78, D-85, D-86, D-90, H-6, H-10,
H-12) '
Comment 2.1.5c: EPA's definition of TRD should be the same as NRC's
definition in 10 CFR Part 60 and 10 CFR Part 61 or reconciled. (D-7,
D-25, D-57, D-65, D-90, F-8-vi)
Response (Comments 2.1.5a through c); The one-year half-life reference
was a typographical error. EPA's definition of TRU wastes is applicable
to TRU radionuclides with a half-life greater than 20 years. NRC's TRU
waste definition in the proposed 10 CFR Part 60 rule was deleted in the
final rule, while their definition in the 10 CFR Part 61 rule defines TRU
wastes with half-lives greater than 5 years, EPA feels its definition is
appropriate for those wastes to be disposed of in a deep geological
repository, while NRC's definition is appropriate for shallow land burial
considerations.
Comment 2.1.6; Suggest EPA set a de minimis level for very small quanti-
ties of HLW. (D-47)
Response: As EPA is evaluating the possibility of a Below Regulatory
Concern standard along with its standards for the disposal of low-level
radioactive wastes (48 FR 39563), it is not appropriate to evaluate such
a level in the HLW standards rulemaking.
Comment 2.1.7; EPA should use an environmental bubble approach over the
nuclear industry for disposal of nuclear wastes. (D-12)
Response; The environmental bubble would not be an appropriate approach
for the disposal of radioactive wastes because of the wide variety of
types and radioactivity ranges of the wastes. It is our opinion that the
various wastes, high-level, mill tailings, low-level, etc., must be eval-
uated on their own basis and appropriate standards developed'for applica-
tion to that type of waste.
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2.2 Subpart B
Comment 2.2.1; "Disposal" should be defined as it is in the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act. (D-58)
Response; The EPA disposal definition (located in Subpart A of the final
rulemaking) follows the NWPA definition very closely. The minor differ-
ences are related to EPA's standard and the terminology used in the
standard.
Comment 2.2.2; Suggest disposal system definition be in terms of physi-
cal boundaries during operation and post-closure. (D-48, D-49)
Response; Rather than define the physical boundaries of the disposal
system, EPA chose to define the controlled area [in Section 191.12(g)] as
it relates to the EPA environmental standard. The definition EPA chose
was considered to be the most appropriate within the context of this
rule.
Comment 2.2.3; The definition of "heavy metals" is inconsistent with
that now legally accepted. (D-75)
Response; The EPA definition is the common definition in use today both
in the U.S. and internationally.
Comment 2.2.4; In the "barriers" definition, replace "substantially"
with an effectiveness time estimate. (D-75)
Response; The implementing agency will determine whether the barriers
are effective to meet the EPA standard.
Comment 2.2.5; The "barriers" definition should add the phrase, "from
their original location in the disposal system." (D-47)
Response; The combined definition of barriers and disposal system pro-
vides the same meaning.
Comment 2.2.6; What are the "expected processes" in the "reasonably
foreseeable" definition? (D-46)
Response; This definition has been deleted in the final rule and permis-
sible probabilities incorporated in the containment requirements. It
will be up to the implementing agency to evaluate the significant pro-
cesses and events that may affect the disposal system. In addition, EPA
has added a "Guidance for Implementation of Subpart B" appendix to the
final rule.
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Comment 2.2.7; "Disturbed zone" should be defined as in 10 CFR Part 60.
(D-46)
Response; EPA does not use the term in its standard.
Comment 2.2.8; "Ground water" should be the same as "significant amounts
of ground water". (D-46)
Response; Each term refers to a significant definition. Both are needed.
Some ground water may not be in an aquifer that is a primary source for a
community water system.
Comment 2.2.9a; Define "health effects." (D-46)
Comment 2.2.9b; "Health effects" should include morbidity and genetic
effects on humans, flora, and fauna. (D-35).
Comment 2.2.9c; More emphasis should be placed on ionizing radiation
damage through alpha and beta emitters to the biota. (D-51)
Response (Comments 2.2.9a through c); The term "health effects" is not
used in this standard. The term, where used in the preamble and support
documents, is intended to mean fatal cancers for humans only. Agency
policy states that when environmental contaminants are radioactive mate-
rials and ionizing radiation, the most important impacts are those af-
fecting human health. This policy assumes that, for the same dose,
potential radiation effects to other receptors, such as flora and fauna,
will be no greater and that such receptors are no more radiosensitive
than humans.
Comment 2.2.10; The definition of "active institutional controls" should
include monitoring in the list of activities. (D-58)
Response; This was added to the definition in the final rule.
Comment 2.2.11; The "performance assessment" should require all identi-
fied events to be evaluated by accountable means rather than dismissed by
a "reasonable expectation" since the sentence that contains the term
"reasonable expectation" implies that some evaluation needs to be per-
formed to reach that conclusion. (D-58, D-75)
Response; The term "reasonable expectation" is not included in the
performance assessment definition in the final rule. The performance
assessment is further detailed in the preamble, the containment require-
ments (Section 191.13), and the appendix on "Guidance for Implementation
of Subpart B."
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Chapter 3: GENERAL
3.1 Authorities and Implementation
Comment 3.1.la; EPA may have exceeded its legislative authority by
delving into implementation issues. (D-7, D-85)
Comment 3.1.Ib; EPA has incorrectly delegated certain standard setting
and environmental protection requirements to other Federal agencies
through the use of the National Environmental Policy Act. (D-55)
Response (Comments 3.1.la and b)t EPA has not exceeded its legislative
authority. The rule is a generally applicable environmental standard
issued under the authorities of Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, and
the Atomic Energy Act.
Comment 3.1.2; More specific information is needed on which agency
implements which activities. (D-46, D-47, D-509 H-25)
Response; This has been done, both in the preamble and in the standard
itself. For Subparts A and B, NRC will be the implementing agency for
licensed facilities, whereas DOE will be the implementing agency for ac-
tivities at non-licensed disposal facilities. Other DOE facilities will
be covered under the Clean Air Act radionuclide emission regulations (40
CFR Part 61). .
Comment 3.1.3; EPA should include the NWPA as part of their authority.
(D-48, D-49)
Response; The NWPA (P.L. 97-425) does not give EPA any additional author-
ity. It only directs EPA, under its pre-existing authorities, to promul-
gate generally applicable standards for protection of the general environ-
ment, i
Comment 3.1.4a: Structure standards so that conservatism by EPA, DOE,
and NRC on the same item can be avoided. (F-7-ii, F-7-iii)
Comment 3.1.4b; Set standards to allow implementing agencies some flexi-
bility. (K-ll)
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Comment 3.I.Ac; Due to uncertainties, allow more flexibility in reaching
licensing decisions. (D-7, D-25)
Response (Comments 3.1.4a through c): In the final rule, the EPA Admin-
istrator may allow alternative standards and provisions for both subparts
through rulemaking.
Comment 3.1.5; EPA should address its responsibilities under Section 106
of the National Historic Preservation Act and 36 CFR 800. (D-3)
Response; We believe that application of the criteria of the National
Historic Preservation Act are appropriate relative to specific site
evaluations, but are not appropriate for the promulgation of generally
applicable environmental standards under the Atomic Energy Act.
3.2 Transportation
Comment 3.2.la; EPA should develop and include transportation standards
in 40 CFR Part 191. (D-20, D-50, D-70, F-8-iii, H-3, H-19, H-27)
Comment 3.2.1b; Why was transportation not included in the proposed
rule? (D-2)
Comment 3.2.Ic; Include a transportation assurance requirement. (H-14)
Response (Comments 3.2.la through c); Transportation is not included in
these standards for two reasons. First, the Agency believes the regula-
tions promulgated by DOT and NRG are doing a very good job in limiting
impacts from both normal transportation and the number and consequences
of accidents. Second, as a consequence of the apparently adequate DOT
and NRC regulations and budget and time constraints, the Agency has
concentrated its efforts on projects of higher priority such as low-level
waste standards and standards under the authority of the Clean Air Act.
3.3 Subpart A
Comment 3.3.la; Variance section for Subpart A is not within EPA's
authority. (H-7)
Comment 3.3.Ib; Variance section is too vague. (D-15)
Comment 3.3.1c; Variance procedures need greater State involvement.
(D-50, D-58, D-86, H-2)
Comment 3.3.Id; Delete variance section or leave to implementing agency.
(H-ll)
Comment 3.3.le; Require a stringent environmental review with variance.
(D-22)
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Response (Comments 3.3.la through e); The variance section in the pro-
posed rule was deleted in the final rule. In place of the variance
section, an "Alternative Standards" provision has been included in the
final rule. The provision allows the EPA Administrator, upon review of
an application, to issue alternative standards for waste management and
storage operations at particular DOE disposal facilities that are not
regulated by NRG.
Comment 3.3.2a: The dose limits are not consistent in Subparts A and B.
(D-7, D-25, L-16)
Comment 3.3.2b; The three different dose limits in 40 CFR Part 190 and
40 CFR 191 should correspond to the same level of risk. (D-7)
Comment 3.3.2c; The dose limits should be based on the effective dose
equivalent. (D-25)
Comment 3.3.2d; Subpart A dose limits should be no higher than those
proposed in the CAA. (D-78)
Comment 3.3.2e; The dose limit approach is not a satisfactory basis for
Subpart A standards. (D-47)
Comment 3.3.2f; Subpart A should specifically apply to DOE waste facil-
ities. (F-7-ix, H-38)
Response (Comments 3.3.2a through f): The dose limits set in 40 CFR Part
191 have been arrived at for the specific case of high-level and trans-
uranic radioactive waste disposal. The analyses included consideration
of achievability and costs unique to these circumstances. Where the
analyses showed it was practicable, we have used limits consistent with
other EPA standards in order to simplify implementation. For this same
reason, we have expressed the individual exposure limits in units con-
sistent with current EPA radiation standards. The proposed Subpart A
limits were based on the outdated "critical organ" approach, while the
Subpart B limits used the ICRP's "effective dose equivalent" approach.
In the final rule, Subpart A has been divided between NRC-licensed and
non-NRC-licensed facilities. The NRC-licensed facilities are considered
to be an extension of the uranium fuel cycle and, therefore, fall under
40 CFR Part 190 where dose limits are based on the older method; for
consistency purposes, these have been extended to Subpart A. For non-
NRC-licensed facilities, the Subpart A dose limits are consistent with
the EPA's Clean Air Act standards, which are based on the newer method.
The Subpart B dose limits remain based on the newer method. In the
future, EPA will consider revising Part 190 and Subpart A of Part 191 to
incorporate the effective dose-equivalent concept.
In the final rule, Subpart A standards apply to all NRC-licensed
waste management and storage facilities and to the management and storage
operations at any non-NRC-licensed disposal facility. For other DOE
waste management and storage operations, which are usually conducted on
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large reservations with many other potential sources of radionuclide
emissions, the Agency believes that coverage under the broader scope of
EPA's Clean Air Act Standards, 40 CFR Part 61, is the most effective and
practical regulatory approach.
Comment 3.3.3a; The ICRP 500 mrern, annual-committed effective dose
equivalent should be an acceptable level. (D-16, D-73)
Comment 3.3.3b; ICRP principles cannot be applied directly to waste
disposal. (D-19)
Comment 3.3.3c; Curie release limits for specific radionuclides should
also be set for Subpart A, consistent with 40 CFR Part 190. (D-7, D-25)
Comment 3.3.3d; The Subpart A dose limits should correspond to the ICRP
and NCRP recommendations of 500 mrem per year. (D-46)
Response (Comments 3.3.3a through d); Upon surveying the expected per-
formance of the technologies planned for the management, storage, and
preparation of these wastes for disposal, the Agency found that the
likely exposures to members of the public would generally be very small.
Therefore, compatibility with related radiation protection standards
(40 CFR Part 190) became a more important perspective for Subpart A. In
addition, individual curie release standards, as in 40 CFR Part 190, were
not necessary because of the already minimal release and exposure of
radionuclides from these activities.
Comment 3.3.4; Guidance should be offered on how technical, social, and
economic considerations are factored into the operations planning in
order to strive for lower levels of exposure. (D-58)
Response; Such guidance should come from the implementing agencies. The
rule does include guidance on the Agency's view of how calculations
should be used in determining compliance with the standard.
Comment 3.3.5; The retrieval of waste from storage operations should be
addressed. (D-57, D-58, D-74, H-12)
Response; The Agency believes that any radioactive releases from opera-
tions such as described would be covered under the existing 40 CFR Part 61
and 40 CFR Part 191 standards. Occupational exposure relating to reposi-
tory retrievability would be covered by NRC standards.
3.4 Ambiguous Language and Clarification
Comment 3.4.1; The standard contains numerous ambiguities, terms, and
definitions which are vague, and many subjective and qualitative words
are used. (D-7, D-42, D-85, D-93, L-7)
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Response; EPA believes that the final standard has eliminated those
terms, definitions, and phrases thought to be vague and ambiguous.
Comment 3.4.2; The preamble (47 FR 58198) and the DEIS gives the impres-
sion that a repository could give perfect containment. This is not
credible; clarify. (D-46, D-50)
Response; We agree and have reworded to more accurately reflect the
projected situations.
3.5 Technical Information
Comment 3.5.1; State number of reactors which currently generate 2000
metric tons per year of spent fuel (47 FR 58196). (D-7)
Response; This number is an average based on the amount of spent fuel
generated by all reactors each year over a number of years. Refer to the
section on spent nuclear fuel in the Background Information Document.
Comment 3.5.2; EPA should revise its waste inventory to include all
wastes and associated radioactivity rather than just those wastes with
radionuclide half-lives greater than 20 years. (D-48, D-49)
Response; EPA includes these data in the Background Information Document
section on Quantities, Sources, and Characteristics of Spent Nuclear
Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes. It is the long
half-life elements that will be of concern over the 10,000-year contain-
ment requirement. The shorter half-life nuclides will probably be decayed
to innocuous levels by the time any amount could travel into the general
environment.
Comment 3.5.3; What difference does inclusion of defense or commercial
fuel with different burnups and defense wastes have on repository inven-
tory and releases? (D-46, K-3)
Response; The final rule has detailed notes on the application of the
release limits table and adjustments for reactor fuels with different
burnups or fractionated high-level radioactive waste streams. DOE will
calculate an equivalent burnup value (MWd/MTHM) for its defense wastes.
Comment 3.5.4; The repository capacity choice of 100,000 MTHM should be
further explained since actual repository capacity may vary; also, a fur-
ther explanation of the number of reactors producing spent fuel is need-
ed. (D-7, D-31, D-50)
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Response: The choice of 100,000 MTHM is a reference base only. It is
not meant to define the actual repository, but as a calculational tool to
allow one to estimate the releases based on a quantity of waste in the
repository. Data on reactor spent fuel generation rates may be found in
the Background Information Document.
Comment 3.5.5; Remove all reference to a 500-mrem-per-year dose limit as
being acceptable today. (D-66)
Response; This is not possible since the value is an acceptable dose
limit under certain circumstances until it is changed by the Federal
regulatory agencies.
Comment 3.5.6; More data are necessary to select a site and write stan-
dards. (D-86)
Response; The Agency believes it has utilized all available data to
prepare the final standards. If further information becomes available in
the future that would change the standards, EPA will review such data and
make an appropriate judgment as to whether changes are needed. The need
to collect more data to select a site is under the authority of the DOE
and NRG.
Comment 3.5.7; The standards should insist on "best available technolo-
gy." (D-50)
Response; In general, the Agency developed the various parts of this
rule by balancing several perspectives. One set of considerations was
the expected capabilities of the waste management and disposal technolo-
gies to reduce both short- and long-term risks to public health and the
environment. These capabilities were examined through a number of per-
formance assessments. A second consideration, where applicable, was
consistency with related environmental standards for radiation exposure.
A third factor was evaluation of various benchmarks to assess the accept-
ability of the residual risks that might be allowed by the rule. This
was particularly important for the disposal standards, where there were
few precedents to guide the Agency's judgments. Finally, the Agency
placed considerable emphasis on the public concerns expressed during the
various phases of this rulemaking, particularly where these concerns
involved addressing the substantial uncertainties inherent in the un-
precedented time periods of interest.
Because there were other factors to be considered, the Agency be-
lieved that the final rule should reflect a blend of all these perspec-
tives, and no single factor, such as a "best" available technology,
should predominate to produce a standard.
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Comment 3.5.8; Inability to accurately project the future does not allow
for reliable results. (D-19)
Response; The Agency has always acknowledged that there is considerable
uncertainty in making such long-term predictions. This is a major reason
we believe the Assurance Requirements are necessary in the regulatory
structure.
Comment 3.5.9; Set an upper limit on the amount of wastes per repository.
(D-7)
Response; The NWPA (42 USC 10134) has already set an upper limit on
amount of wastes for the first repository until such time as a secondary
repository is in operation. In addition, the Agency believes that a
proliferation of small repositories is contrary to the policy of best
possible protection offered by selecting a small number of well
characterized and carefully chosen sites.
3.6 Application of Standards
Comment 3.6.1; There is concern that there is a potential for applying
the standards more broadly, or taking them out of context for use in
other radiation areas rather than just for the disposal of these partic-
ular types of radioactive wastes. (D-42, D-65, F-7-vi)
Response; EPA has emphasized in the preamble to the rule that this stan-
dard is for this specific class of wastes and for a given set of condi-
tions. It is EPA's intent that these standards not be used to judge
other wastes under other conditions of disposal.
Comment 3.6.2; The special emphasis on high-level radioactive waste
management and disposal, causes an inconsistency between other waste
management standards and gives the impression that high-level waste
disposal presents substantial risks. (H-3, L-9)
Response; The Agency believes that one set of standards is not neces-
sarily appropriate for all classes of wastes. Different wastes may
present different levels of risk.
Comment 3.6.3a; Indicate whether DOE's Waste Isolation Pilot Plant or
any other test and evaluation disposal facility have to conform to EPA's
standards. (D-49, D-50, F-8, K-13, K-25, L-15)
Comment 3.6.3b; Standards should apply to all DOE disposal sites for
high-level wastes. (H-14, K-25, L-15)
Response Comments (3.6.3a and b); EPA's disposal and normal operations
standard apply to any NRC-licensed or non-NRC-licensed repository where
spent nuclear fuel, high-level or transuranic radioactive wastes will be
placed for disposal. Test and evaluation facilities are not covered
3-7
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unless they become a permanent disposal facility in which case they would
then have to conform to EPA's standards. However, if a test and evalua-
tion facility is associated with a repository, it too will be covered by
the normal operations portion (Subpart A) of EPA's standards.
Comment 3.6.4; EPA should exclude transuranic wastes from standards
until NRG and EPA can agree on the degree of control necessary. (K-ll)
Response; The Agency believes the standard is appropriate considering
the control technology available and that NRC or DOE should be able to
implement the standard.
Comment 3.6.5a; Standards should be limited to geologic disposal since
that was the basis of the supporting analysis for the rule. (D-66, D-69)
Comment 3.6.5b; EPA has not given proper consideration to seabed dis-
posal as a viable option and is presenting a bias to deep geological
disposal. (D-24, D-35, D-69, K-l)
Response (Comments 3.6.5a and b); EPA has specifically excluded ocean or
ocean sediment disposal from these standards because ocean dumping of
high-level radioactive waste is presently prohibited by both the U.S.
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (P.L. 92-532)
and the multinational treaty covered by the London Convention of 1972 on
the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter.
In the event ocean disposal were to become a viable alternative, EPA
would, if appropriate, prepare standards and regulations under its P.L.
92-532 authority.
EPA's standard is intended to be a generally applicable environmen-
tal standard for the disposal, by any method other than the ocean, of
high-level wastes, spent nuclear fuel, and specified transuranic wastes.
In developing the standards, EPA concentrated on geologic reposito-
ries because more information is available on this approach than on other
disposal methods and the U.S. national program is focusing on this meth-
od. Also, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (P.L. 97-425) has directed the
Department of Energy to proceed with developing a permanent deep geologi-
cal repository for disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent
nuclear fuel.
Comment 3.6.6: Why the 12-month delay in the effective date of Subpart A
of the proposed standard? (D-86)
Response; In the final rule the effective date for both Subparts A and B
will be 60 days after publication in the Federal Register.
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Comment 3.6.7; The preamble indicates Subpart B to take effect when the
mine is backfilled and sealed, whereas Section 191.16 states Subpart B to
be effective immediately upon promulgation. (D-85)
Response; The preamble is referring to the releases and release limits.
The time involved with the releases is to begin upon sealing the reposi-
tory; whereas, the necessary means to implement the containment and
assurance requirements should begin soon after promulgation and during
the design and construction phases.
Comment 3.6.8; EPA should delay the final rule until the National Acade-
my of Sciences releases its final report on the isolation system for
geologic disposal. (D-79)
Response; The NAS report was released in April 1983 and made available
to EPA's Science Advisory Board's.High-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal
Subcommittee prior to their report to EPA and prior to EPA's final rule.
Comment 3.6.9; Let DOE and NRC set acceptable practices to meet EPA's
standards. (K-2)
Response; It is intended that NRC and DOE will set acceptable practices
to meet EPA's 40 CFR Part 191 through appropriate modification and ap-
plication of their regulations and guidelines, 10 CFR Part 60 and 10 CFR
Part 960, respectively.
Comment 3.6.10; Allow case-by-case risk-benefit analysis for disposing
of certain defense wastes in—situ. (D—46)
Response: The Agency does not now have sufficient information and analy-
sis to formulate and propose provisions for subcategories or subclasses
of wastes. However, it may turn out that the disposal requirements of
Subpart B are not completely appropriate for all classes of wastes.
Therefore, a Section (191.17) has been added to the final rule which, sets
forth procedures to be followed if further rulemaking is needed to modify
Subpart B for such situations when more information becomes available.
Comment 3.6.11; Provide funding and expertise for intervenor groups and
require compensation and consent of local populace. (L—7)
Response; EPA's authority only extends to providing generally applicable
environmental standards.
3.7 Intrusion
Comment 3.7.la; The human intrusion scenario taking place after 100
years is too conservative. (D-7)
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Comment 3.7.Ib; EPA should include human error in its analysis. (D-50)
Comment 3.7.1c; Quantitative demonstration of compliance for the human
intrusion scenario and other human activities should be restricted to no
greater than 100 meters, whereas deeper human intrusions should be dis-
couraged by the assurance requirements. (D-19)
Comment 3.7.Id; It seems inconsistent that water well drilling is con-
sidered a likely source of intrusion, while estimates of waste migration
in groundwater assume that there is an openly flowing stream at the
surface only 1600 meters from the repository site. (D-36)
Response (Comments 3.7.la through d); The most potential disruptions of
a mined geologic repository are those that are hardest to predict and
associated with inadvertent human intrusion. Some types of intrusion
would have virtually no effect on a repository's containment of waste.
On the other hand, it is possible to conceive of intrusions that could
result in major disruptions that no reasonable repository selection or
design precautions could alleviate. The Agency believes that the most
productive consideration of inadvertent intrusion concerns those realistic
possibilities that may be usefully mitigated by repository design, site
selection, or use of passive controls (although passive institutional
controls should not be assumed to completely rule out the possibility of
intrusion). Therefore, inadvertent and intermittent intrusion by explora-
tory drilling for resources should be the most severe intrusion scenario
considered by the implementing agencies. For further details, see Appen-
dix B of the final rule, "Guidance for Implementation of Subpart B." The
Agency interprets inadvertent to mean any unplanned and unintended intru-
sion.
The implementing agencies should consider the effects of each par-
ticular disposal system's site, design, and passive institutional con-
trols in judging the likelihood and consequences of such inadvertent
exploratory drilling. Furthermore, the Agency assumed that the conse-
quences of such inadvertent drilling need not be assumed to be more
severe than: 1) direct release to the land surface of all the ground
water in the repository horizon that would promptly flow through the
newly-created borehole to the surface due to natural lithostatic pres-
sure—or (if pumping would be required to raise water to the surface)
release of 200 cubic meters of ground water pumped to the surface if that
much water is readily available to be pumped; and 2) creation of a ground
water flow path with a permeability typical of a borehole filled by the
soil or gravel that would normally settle into an open hole over time—
not the permeability of a carefully-sealed borehole.
The Agency assumes that, as long as such passive institutional
controls endure and are understood, they: 1) can be effective to cause
societal action to deter systematic or persistent exploitation of these
disposal sites; and 2) can reduce the likelihood of inadvertent, intermit-
tent human intrusion to a degree to be determined by the implementing
agency. However, the Agency believes that passive institutional controls
can never be assumed to eliminate the chance of inadvertent and intermit-
tent human intrusion into these disposal sites.
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3.8 Miscellaneous
Comment 3.8.1; EPA should select an advisory board of technical experts
to review the comments and response documents. (D-62, F-7-ix)
Response; The Agency did convene a group of internal experts to review
the comments and responses. This was not considered an appropriate task
for a group outside the Agency since the EPA Administrator must be re-
sponsible for the decisions.
Comment 3.8.2; EPA's interpretation that the National Academy of Science
study supports EPA's standards as an effective rulemaking is question-
able. (D-7, D-25)
Response; EPA's statement in the proposed rule was not meant to imply
that EPA believed the NAS study supported EPA's standards. The NAS study
on the compliance aspects assisted EPA in concluding that our standard
could be implemented.
Comment 3.8.3; EPA should allow for several decades of dry storage of
solidified wastes to reduce the thermal output. (D-93)
Response; The assurance requirement calling for prompt disposal has been
deleted; there is now nothing in the final rules which prohibits DOE from
cooling the waste over some time period to reduce the thermal load.
Comment 3.8.4; A variance section should be included for Subpart B.
(D-7, F-7-iii)
Response; An "Alternative Provisions for Disposal" section (191.17) has
been included in the final rule establishing minimum procedural require-
ments that the EPA Administrator must follow if additional information
indicates that it might be appropriate to consider modifying the disposal
standards (Subpart B).
Comment 3.8.5; The standard should state that 1000 health effects over
10,000 years from 100,000 metric tons of waste is the basis of Table 2.
(H-10)
Response; We do not see the need to include that information in the
standard, as its inclusion in the Preamble and the Background Information
Document is sufficient to properly inform the public of the table's
basis.
Comment 3.8.6a; When and where will nonradiological impacts, such as
socioeconomics, land use, and air quality, be analyzed? (D-70)
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Comment 3.8.6b; EPA should consider and include nonradiological risks.
(D-25, D-75, D-56, D-86, H-10)
Response (Comments 3.8.6a and b); These subjects will be addressed in
the environmental impact statements issued by the Department of Energy in
the course of its site selection and repository licensing programs. This
rulemaking establishes generally applicable environmental standards only
for radiation exposure. The standard being promulgated by EPA does not
take nonradiological impacts or risks into consideration because they
were outside the scope of the standard.
Comment 3.8.7; The DEIS does not consider other HLW such as demineral-
ized resins. (H-13)
Response: The final rule has used the NWPA definition for high-level
radioactive waste which allows the NRC to further define other highly-
radioactive material that requires permanent isolation.
Comment 3.8.8: Why are extraterrestrial and transmutation discussed in
the DEIS as viable disposal alternatives? (D-69)
Response; The DEIS section discussed extraterrestrial disposal and
transmutation in the context of describing various waste management
operations for various disposal options and not necessarily as viable
disposal options. See Section 4.6 of the BID for further information on
alternative disposal methods.
Comment 3.8.9a; Vaults created by underground nuclear weapons tests
should be used for the storage of radioactive wastes until they can be
recycled into safe by-products. (H-24)
Comment 3.8^9b: Consider use of salt domes for storing liquid radio-
active wastes. (F-84)
Response (Comments 3.8.9a and b); It is the Department of Energy's re-
sponsibility to determine storage policy for high-level radioactive
wastes.
Comment 3.8.10; The Agency should include a general discussion of the
relative chemical toxicity of HLW and consider it in the standard. (D-7,
D-25, D-50, D-59, F-7-vii, H-2, K-3, K-9)
Response; The standards being promulgated by EPA do not take into con-
sideration the chemical toxicity of the HLW. For high-level radioactive
wastes and spent nuclear fuel, it is felt that the radiation concern is
greater than the problem of chemical toxicity.
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Comment 3.8.11: The Agency should consider and/or require a 1000-year
canister. (D-50, F-7-vii, F-7-viii).
Response; It is within NRC's authority to designate the technical criteria
for the disposal of high-level radioactive wastes (10 CFR Part 60), e.g.,
a specific type of engineering control, of which canisters would be a
part.
Comment 3.8.12; EPA should set rules to discourage further reprocessing
and encourage disposal of all existing and spent fuel in unaltered form.
(D-54, L-9)
Response; EPA can discern no basis for such a rule. Our basic concern
is to assure that the development of all energy sources be accomplished
in a manner compatible with generally acceptable public health and environ-
mental quality goals.
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Chapter 4: ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
4.1 General
Comment 4.1. la; The assurance requirement's should be retained in the
rule. (D-50, D-66, D-80, D-81, F-7-iv, F-7-v, F-7-vii, F-7-viii, F-7-ix,
F-8-iv, F-8-v, H-6, H-37, H-38, K-l, K-4, K-5, K-6, K-7, K-8, K-9, K-10,
K-12, K-13, K-16, K-17, K-20, K-21, K-24, K-25, L-3, L-6, L-8, L-10,
L-ll, L-12, L-13, L-14, L-15)
Comment 4.1. Ib; Retain assurance requirements, especially for facilities
not subject to NRC licensing. (K-13)
Comment 4.1.1c; Changes should be made and additional requirements
included to describe uncertainties, state assumptions, and document
models. (D-7, D-36, D-41, D-53, D-55, D-57, K-5, K-24)
Comment 4.1.Id: The assurance requirements should be deleted from the
rule. (D-46, D-47, D-79, F-7-ii, F-7-iii, F-ll. H-7, H-ll, H-33, K-2,
K-15, K-18, K-19, L-l)
Comment 4.1.le; Should require the implementing agencies to issue as-
surance requirements. (K-18)
Comment 4.1.If: NRC only should be allowed to waive the assurance re-
quirements if a particular site meets the performance standard. (K-13)
Comment 4.1.Ig; The assurance requirements should be retained and issued
as Federal Radiation Protection Guidance. (D-65, D-84, D-90, F-7-vi,
K-2, K-14, K-15, K-19)
Response (Comments 4.1.la through g); EPA believes that an important
complement to the disposal containment requirements is the assurance
requirements and that they are needed to provide adequate confidence that
the long-term release limits will be met. The Agency believes that the
assurance requirements are an important part of the generally applicable
standards because of the major uncertainties involved. The NRC has
agreed to modify 10 CFR Part 60 where necessary to incorporate the intent
of the assurance requirements, rather than have them included in 40 CFR
Part 191 for NRC-licensed disposal facilities. In the final rule, the
assurance requirements are retained for non-NRC-licensed disposal facili-
ties only.
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Comment 4.1.2: What enforcement measures are in place to ensure compli-
ance by DOE and NRG? (K-9)
Response! The DOE's 10 CFR Part 960 incorporates the standards the
Agency is promulgating as the overall siting requirements for a geologic
repository. See response to Comment 4.1.la through g for NRC's
compliance with the standards.
4.2 Prompt Disposal Requirement
Comment 4.2.la; Quantify the time before disposal. (D-50, B-53, D-75,
D-81, H-6, L-7)
Comment 4.2.1b; Define prompt disposal in terms of inventory or radioac-
tivity, and how it applies to storage or test facilities. (D-50, D-75,
D-84, K-9)
Comment 4.2.1c; Preclude reprocessing. (D-54)
Comment 4.2.Id; Requirement too vague and not germane to purpose of
assurance requirements. (D-7, D-25, D-46, D-47, D-65, F-7-iii, F-ll)
Comment 4.2.1e; The requirement should be deleted. (D-46, D-65, D-90,
F-7-iii, F-ll, H-14, K-7)
Comment 4.2.If; Retain the prompt disposal requirement. (D-50, K-9,
L-9)
Response (Comments 4.2.la through f); The assurance requirement discuss-
ing prompt disposal was deleted from the final rulemaking. There is a
requirement in the NWPA for DOE to assess the advantages of long-term
storage for ease of computation, lesser disturbance of the geologic
environment, etc. The prompt disposal requirement in the proposed stan-
dards, therefore, appears to be inconsistent with these considerations.
With the NWPA in force clarifying the nation's commitment to develop
disposal facilities, while allowing for some temporary storage, the
Agency believes the requirement calling for prompt disposal is no longer
necessary.
4.3 ALARA Requirement
Comment 4.3.la; Include the ALARA. requirement. (D-50, D-52, D-60, D-70,
D-80, D-81, D-90, F-7-viii, H-38, K-7, L-7)
Comment 4.3.1b; Include the ALARA. requirement as appropriate to site
selection process. (D-53, D-62, D-66, F-7-viii, F-7-ix, H-12)
Comment 4.3.1c; ALARA not appropriate for repositories or repository
siting. (D-93, F-7-ii, F-7-vi, H-3, K-19)
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Comment 4.3.Id; The ALARA concept should be applied in new ways or that
alternative concepts might be preferable. (D-7, D-19, D-25, D-58, H-6)
Comment 4.3.1e; The ALARA requirement should be deleted. (D-46, D-47,
D-56, D-59, D-84, D-90)
Response (Comments 4.3.la through e); The ALARA assurance requirement
was deleted from the final rulemaking because of two aspects of the
related rules subsequently promulgated by the NRG and DOE for disposal of
spent fuel and high-level wastes. First, NRC's 10 CFR Part 60 implemented
the multiple barrier principle by requiring very good performance from
two types of engineered components: a 300- to 1000-year lifetime for
waste packages during which there would be essentially no expected release
of waste, and a long-term release rate from the waste form of no more
than one part in 100,000 per year. The Agency fully endorses this ap-
proach. Second, the DOE has included a provision in its site selection
guidelines (10 CFR Part 960) that calls for significant emphasis to be
placed on selecting sites that demonstrate the lowest releases over
100,000 years compared with the other alternatives available. Particu-
larly because of the longer time frame involved in this comparison, the
Agency believes that this provides adequate encouragement to choose sites
that provide the best isolation capabilities available. Therefore, the
concept of keeping long-term releases as small as reasonably achievable
has been embodied by other agencies' regulations for both the engineered
and natural components of disposal systems.
4.4 Multiple Barrier Requirement
Comment 4.4.la; Keep the assurance requirement concerning use of multiple
barriers.
K-12)
(D-7, D-22, D-24, D-50, F-7-ix, F-8-v, H-4, H-36, K-7, K-9,
Comment 4.4.Ib: The multiple barrier assurance requirement should be
deleted. (D-46, D-47, D-84)
Response (Comments 4.4.la and b); Because of the inherent uncertainties
associated with these long time periods, the Agency believes that the
principles embodied in this assurance requirement are essential com-
plements to the containment requirements to ensure that the level of
protection desired is likely to be achieved. Designing disposal systems
to include multiple types of barriers, both engineered and natural,
reduces the risks if one type of barrier performs more poorly than current
knowledge indicates.
Comment 4.4.2a; Quantify barrier performance requirements. (D-58, D-85,
L-7)
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Comment 4.4.2b; Clarify the multiple barrier concept, define types of
barriers, and define "substantial isolation". (D-69, D-75, D-84, D-85,
F-8-iv, H-4, L-7)
Comment 4.4.2c; Do not use limited resources in constructing barriers.
Comment 4.4.2d; Rely on total system performance. (D-24, D-47)
Response (Comments 4.4.2a through d) : The multiple barrier assurance
requirement in the final standard was modified from that in the proposed
standard. Barriers are defined and examples given in the definitions
section of Subpart B [Section 191.12(d)]. EPA does not believe that it
is necessary to quantify or define system performance because of the two
related rules by NRC and DOE.
See Response to Comments 4. 3. la through e.
Comment 4.4.3; The multiple barrier assurance requirement might need to
be different for TRU waste. (D-47, F-8-iv, L-16)
Response: The assurance requirement calling for both engineered barriers
and natural barriers in the final rule does no.t distinguish between
high-level and transuranic radioactive wastes. Although the wording of
the assurance requirement has changed from the proposed rule, the Agency
does not believe the requirement has been significantly changed. EPA
believes that the definition is broad enough that it is not necessary to
differentiate between HLW and. TRU wastes.
4.5 Active Institutional Controls Requirement
Comment 4. 5. la; Agree with EPA's philosophy of active institutional
controls, but believe the authority belongs to NRC. (D-46, D-47, D-90)
Comment 4.5.1b; The primary consideration for any control requirements
at a specific site should be need. (D-90)
Response (Comments 4. 5. la and b) ; See response to Comments 4.1. la through
g-
Comment 4.5.2a; Need either a specific time period or a limit of 0 to
100 years after closure. (D-12, D-48, D-49, D-50, D-52, D-53, D-61,
D-62, D-67, D-68, D-71, D-72, D-769 D-79, D-80, D-81, D-83, D-92, H-l,
K-21, L-7)
Comment 4.5.2b; Need several hundred years if the implementing agency
could give assurance that they can maintain control beyond the 100 years.
(K-7)
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Comment 4.5.2c; Limiting active institutional controls is unrealistic.
(D-19)
Comment 4.5.2d; Need a longer period and a monitoring program. (F-8-iii)
Response (Comments 4.5.2a through d); In the final rule, a time period
of 100 years was decided to be the maximum time that repository performance
assessments could assume for relying on any active institutional controls
to isolate the wastes, although it is stated that the controls should be
maintained for as long a period of time as is reasonable after disposal
[191.14(a)]. Also, a monitoring assurance requirement [191.14(b)] was
included in the final rule and included in the definition of active
institutional controls. See also response to Comments 4.1.la through g.
The phrase "several hundred years" lacks the specificity necessary
upon which to base assessments with confidence and may be unrealistically
long, whereas less than 100 years is deemed to be unrealistically con-
servative.
Comment 4.5.3; Under no circumstances should active institutional con-
trols be used as a reason to relax the requirement regarding siting near
resources. (D-63)
Response; The resource assurance requirement was revised so that it now
permits compensating factors to be considered rather than automatically
ruling out a site because of the proximity of potential resources.
However, this change was not prompted by any changes in the length of the
active institutional control period; in fact, rather than lengthening the
active institutional control period, it has been reduced from "several
hundred years" to 100 years.
4.6 Permanent Markers Requirement
Comment 4.6.1; This requirement is better addressed by NRC and DOE and
should be deleted from EPA standards. (D-47)
Response; This requirement has been retained. See response to Comments
4.1.la through g.
Comment 4.6.2a; Feasibility of permanent marking systems has not been
shown beyond a relatively short time. (D-50, F-7-viii)
Comment 4.6.2b; Passive controls should not be tied to a particular
government structure. (D-65)
Comment 4.6.2c; Passive controls in perpetuity are unrealistic without
Congressional action to prohibit drilling. (L-7)
Comment 4.6.2d: Passive controls might increase the probability of
future intrusions. (D-48, D-49, D-50, D-55)
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Response (Comments 4.6.2a through d); While long-term markers of modern
design have not shown their durability over long periods of time, we
believe that some method of warning future generations is better than not
attempting to communicate the dangers involved. Prior to this rulemaking
(in the public hearings held in 1977-1978), the question was raised as to
whether it would be wiser to mark the site or to essentially "hide" the
site. Public comments led us to the conclusion that marking the site
would likely be the safer of the two alternatives since markings give a
notion of the dangers; whereas, given the natural curiosity of people,
they would probably find a "hidden" site anyway and then have no idea of
what was there, with potentially very dangerous results.
Comment 4.6.3; There needs to be continued maintenance of the markers to
counteract effects of erosion, vandalism, and vegetative growth. (D-57)
Response; While this suggestion would be the ideal and needs to be con-
sidered very seriously by designers, the stated position of nonreliance
on active institutional controls prevents us from requiring long-term
maintenance. Requiring "the most permanent markers, records and other
passive institutional controls practicable" is as far as we can reasonably
go toward the stated ideal.
Comment 4.6.4; EPA needs to be more specific concerning the legal and
physical requirements, such as "a massive stone pyramid cap," for records
and markers (D-50, D-77, D-81, D-84).
Response; This is the role of NRG and DOE.
Comment 4.6.5; Reliance on passive institutional controls should not
allow selection of a site which would otherwise be more vulnerable to
human intrusion. (F-7-ix)
Response; Permitting reliance on passive institutional controls is not
intended to be used as a trade off in selecting sites with an increased
likelihood of human intrusion.
4.7 Resource Conflict Requirement
Comment 4.7.la; Keep this assurance requirement. (D-12, D-16, D-22,
D-36, D-53, D-70, D-78, D-81, D-93, H-2, H-10, H-12, L-4)
Comment 4.7.1b; Delete this assurance requirement. (D-46, D-47, D-65,
D-90)
Comment 4.7.1c; Replace this requirement with its counterpart in NRC's
10 CFR Part 60. (D-65)
Comment 4.7.Id; Many terms are ambiguous. (D-7, D-14)
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Response (Comments 4.7.la through d); The requirement was maintained,
but modified in the final rule [191.14(c)] to identify resource potential
as a disincentive but not as an outright prohibition for site selection,
because other attributes of the site might overcome the relative disadvan-
tages presented by resource potential. The new wording implies a qualita-
tive comparison rather than quantitative formulas to provide adequate
comparisons. The Agency intends that the sites with resources should
only be used if it is reasonably certain that they would provide better
overall protection than the practical alternatives that are available.
See response to Comments 4.1.la through g.
Comment 4.7.2; Change the word "easily" to "potentially" or "perceived"
which would allow the requirement to account for improved resource
extraction technology and the changing economics of resources and their
extraction. (D-48, D-49, D-61, D-62, D-67, D-68, D-71, D-72, D-76, D-80,
D-92, L-7)
Response; The word "easily" has been retained because it expresses what
is intended. "Easily" is a relative term and its interpretation could
change depending on the circumstances but is still exclusive; whereas,
"potentially" or "perceived" could be interpreted to mean any material
anywhere without regard to where it is located and/or the difficulty of
reaching it. .
Comment 4.7.3; Requirement is too strict in that resource potential
should be considered unfavorable but not prohibitive, depending on suffi-
cient compensatory factors. (D-l, D-41, D-42, D-47, D-57, D-78, D-79
D-84, D-85, F-8-v, H-4)
Response; The Agency believes that potential resources should not auto-
matically eliminate a site and that any favorable characteristics for
such a site must compensate for their greater likelihood of being dis-
turbed in the future.
Comment 4.7.4; Include a prohibition against salt domes. (D-32, D-66)
Response; It is DOE's responsibility to select the disposal media.
However, any media or method chosen will have to meet EPA standards.
Comment 4.7.5; Include groundwater as a potential resource. (D-48,
D-49, D-50, D-58, D-62, D-70, D-74, D-80, D-91, L-7)
Response; In the final rule, resources to be considered included ground
waters that are irreplaceable either because there is no reasonable al-
ternative source of drinking water available for substantial populations
or that they are vital to the preservation of unique and sensitive eco-
systems.
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Comment 4.7.6; Spent nuclear fuel is a potential resource and, there-
fore, the standard is inconsistent within itself. (D-36)
Response; Spent nuclear fuel is a waste once it has been disposed of
with no intent to retrieve it in a routine manner. See NWPA. The EPA
rule is not internally inconsistent.
Comment 4.7.7; Include a prohibition against an area with major tectonic
activity within the past 100 years. (D-86)
Response; Tectonic activity is factored into the siting process during
the performance assessment phase. Here the probability of activity is
estimated along with the potential enhancement of the radionuclide re-
lease rate. These outcomes are then factored into the other scenarios
for comparison with 40 CFR Part 191. In addition, tectonic activity is a
major consideration in the DOE siting guidelines, 10 CFR Part 960.4-2-7.
4.8 Retrievability Requirement
Comment 4.8.la; Supports the retrievability assurance requirement.
(D-12, D-14, D-15, D-16, D-50, D-53, D-57, D-78, D-85, H-2, H-4, H-6,
K-5, K-7, K-24, F-8-v)'
Comment 4.8.Ib; The retrievability assurance requirement is inappropri-
ate and should be deleted. (D-46, D-47, D-71, D-87, D-92, F-7-x)
Response (Comments 4.8.la and b); This requirement has been retained
[191.14(f)]. See response to Comments 4.1.la through g.
Comment 4.8.2; The retrievability assurance requirement appears to be
inconsistent with the definition of disposal where there is no intent to
recover. (D-7, D-16, D-23, D-25, D-58, D-62, D-77, D-80, D-83, D-86,
D-93)
Response; This assurance requirement would permit corrective action if
development of technical and scientific knowledge should indicate that a
disposal system poses much greater risks than had originally been expect-
ed. Future generations may find it necessary or desirable to recover the
wastes in order to better dispose of them (not because they are a resource)
and change the disposal site or methodology in light of new knowledge.
This would be possible using the other assurance requirements of institu-
tional controls. This is not intended to be a required concept of
retrievable storage; this criterion merely requires that the option of
retrievability be left open to our successors. Also, it will prevent
methods of irreversible disposal such as deep-hole placement. In addi-
tion, the NWPA has specified an appropriate period of retrievability for
disposal of spent nuclear fuel (42 USC 10142).
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Comment 4.8.3a; Should specify a period of time for retrievability
option. (D-36, D-50, D-52, D-62, D-65, D-67, D-68, D-71, D-76, D-79,
D-80, D-81, D-91, F-7-vi, F-7-vii, F-7-ix)
Comment 4.8.3b: Clarify meaning of retrievability. (D-42, D-50, K-9)
Comment 4.8.3c: Include additional restraints to the retrievability
(D-54, H-10, H-12, H-28, H-31, L-4, L-7, F-7-vii)
requirement,
Response (Comments 4.8.3a through c); The requirement in the final rule
is the same as that in the proposed rule. The Agency does not believe
that a specified time or additional restraints would provide added as-
surance. Other requirements or further restraints may be added by the
implementing agencies at any time. For further discussion on this re-
quirement, refer to the proposed rule preamble (47 FR 58201) and the
Draft Environmental Impact Statement for 40 CFR 191 (EPA-520/1-82-025).
4.9 Long-Term Monitoring Requirement
Comment 4.9.la: Should require long-term monitoring as long as active
institutional controls are in place or as long as possible. (D-6, D-15,
D-58, D-81, K-7, K-12, K-14, K-16, K-20, L-5, L-6)
Comment 4.9.1b; Keep a long-term monitoring assurance requirement.
(K-8, K-13, K-17, K-21, K-22, L-3)
Comment 4.9.1c; Establish an institution for long-term monitoring in
perpetuity. (D-77)
Comment 4.9.Id; Make long-term monitoring a siting factor. (D-5)
Comment 4.9.1e; Do not support a long-term monitoring program because of
possible technical problems and uncertainties such as additional escape
pathways, and increased costs. (K-2, K-10, K-15, K-18, K-19)
Comment 4.9.If: Such a program should be left to implementing agencies.
(L—1)
Response (Comments 4.9.la through f); The proposed rule did not include
a long-term monitoring requirement; however, from the comments received
and further study of the issue, the Agency decided to include long-term
monitoring as an assurance requirement [191.14(b)] while taking into
consideration the comments against the proposal. The assurance require-
ment stipulates that monitoring techniques be used which could not create
escape pathways for the radionuclides. This stipulation together with
the requirement to detect "substantial and detrimental deviations from
expected performance" negates the need for the more expensive "close-in"
monitoring systems and allows reliance on less expensive and more reli-
able systems to monitor only large-scale parameters such as ground up-
lift, groundwater flow, and seismicity. The Agency further understands
that the technology exists and is available at reasonable cost to fulfill
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this requirement and, therefore, concludes that this requirement is a
prudent addition to the rule. The details of the monitoring are left up
to the implementing agencies.
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Chapter 5: CONTAINMENT REQUIREMENTS
5.1 Time Period
Comment 5.1.la; Retain the 10,000-year time period for containment
requirements. (D-90, F-7-iii, F-7-vii, F-8-vi, F-ll, K-7, K-9, K-12,
K-15, K-18, K-19, K-21, L-l, L-3)
Comment 5.1.Ib: Adopt a time period of 1000 years for containment require-
ments. (D-14, D-44, H-16, K-2)
Comment 5.1.1c; Adopt a time period greater than 10,000 years for contain-
ment requirements. (D-6, D-19, D-35, D-41, D-52, D-55, D-62, D-66, D-70,
D-71, D-72, D-75, D-76, D-77, D-78, D-80, D-83, D-87, D-91, D-92, F-7-iv,
F-7-viii, F-7, F-7-x, K-20, K-24, F-8-ii, F-8-iii, F-8-v, H-10, H-14,
H-28, L-5, K-5, K-6, K-8, K-10, K-13, K-14, K-16, K-17)
Comment 5.1.Id; Need further comparison or additional qualitative state-
ment for containment requirements beyond 10,000 years. (D-47, D-62,
D-66, F-7-iii, F-7-ix, F-8-vi, F-ll, K-6, K-7, K-9, K-12, K-13, K-15,
K-20, K-21, L-l, L-3, L-6)
Comment S.l.le; Explain basis for 10,000 years in greater detail. (D-6,
D-7, D-16S D-25, D-50, F-8-v)
Response (Comments 5.1.la through e); To develop the containment require-
ments, it was assumed that some aspects of the future can be predicted
well enough to guide the selection and development of disposal systems
for these wastes. A period of 10,000 years was considered because that
appears to be long enough to distinguish geologic repositories with
relatively good capabilities to isolate wastes from those with relatively
poor capabilities. On the other hand, this period is short enough so
that major geologic changes are unlikely and repository performance might
be reasonably projected.
In the proposed rule, the Agency indicated that 10,000 years was
chosen, in part, because compliance with quantitative standards for a
substantially longer period would have entailed considerably more uncer-
tain calculations. There was no intention to indicate that times beyond
10,000 years were unimportant, but the Agency felt that a disposal system
5-1
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capable of meeting the proposed containment requirements for 10,000 years
would continue to protect people and the environment well beyond 10,000
years. The SAB Subcommittee reviewed and supported these technical
arguments for limiting the containment requirements to a 10,000-year
period.
Many of the commenters and the SAB Subcommittee suggested that more
qualitative or comparative assessments beyond 10,000 years might be
appropriate. The Agency agreed with these comments and worked with the
DOE to formulate comparative assessment provisions that have been incor-
porated into the final version of the Department's site selection guide-
lines (10 CFR Part 960). These provisions call for comparisons of the
projected releases from undisturbed performance of alternative repository
sites over 100,000 years to be a significant consideration in site selec-
tion. Since natural barriers are expected to provide the primary pro-
tection for such long time frames, this provision should allow for appro-
priate consideration of longer time periods without requiring the abso-
lute values of these very uncertain calculations to meet a specific
quantitative test. With the inclusion of this comparative test in
10 CFR Part 960, the Agency believes that no modification is needed in
40 CFR Part 191.
5.2 Definitions
Comment 5.2.1; Define the term "reasonable expectation." (D-7, D-58,
L-16)
Response: This phrase reflects the fact that unequivocal numerical proof
of compliance is neither necessary nor likely to be obtained. It should
not be associated with a level of confidence that may not be appropriate
for the very long-term analytical projections that are called for. The
use of this test of judgment is meant to acknowledge the unique consider-
ations likely to be encountered upon implementation.
Comment 5.2.2a; The definitions of "reasonably foreseeable" and "very
unlikely" seem excessively conservative. (D-7)
Comment 5.2.2b; Explain difference between "normal" and "accidental"
occurrences. (H-6)
Comment 5.2.2c; Change definition of "very unlikely releases" to "less
than one chance of 100" of occurring in 10,000 years. (D-86)
Response (Comments 5.2.2a through c); These terms are not used in the
final rule; therefore, the comments are no longer applicable.
5.3 Release Probabilities
Comment 5.3.la; Should have only one set of release probabilities.
(D-7, K-2, K-15, K-17, K-18)
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Comment 5.3.Ib; Should have only the lowest of the two proposed proba-
bilities. (K-13)
Comment 5.3.1c; Should have two sets of release probabilities. (H-31,
K-6, K-8, K-9, K-12, K-20, L-l)
Comment 5.3.Id;. Increase the "very unlikely" release probability by a
factor of 100. (D-65)
Comment 5.3.1e; The release probabilities should be stated quantita-
tively. (F-8-iv, F-8-v, K-4, K-5, K-6, K-9, K-10, K-13, K-14, K-16,
K-17, K-20, K-22, K-24, L-3)
Comment 5.3.If; The release probabilities should be stated quantita-
tively with uncertainty limits or high uncertainty noted. (K-7, K-12,
K-21)
Comment 5.3.1g; The release probabilities should be stated qualitatively
with some numerical guidance. (K-2, K-15, K-18, K-19, L-l, L-6)
Comment 5.3.Ih; Qualitative relative probabilities should be set through
an adjudicatory hearing using expert witnesses after EPA sets a list of
possible events to examine. (F-7-ix)
Comment 5.3.1i; The probability classes discussion in the Preamble is
not consistent with their definitions and the standard. (H-10)
Comment 5.3.Ij; Use terms such as Category A and Category B for prob-
ability classes to preclude connotative misinterpretation. (D-36, H-12)
Comment 5.3.1k; Release definitions are unworkable; release categories
should be stated qualitatively. (H-7)
Comment 5.3.11; Prefer subjective definitions of release probability
classes. (D-7, D-25, D-47)
Comment 5.3.1m: Delete numerical probability definitions from rule in
favor of qualitative descriptions. (D-19)
Response (Comments 5.3.la through m); The containment requirement in the
proposed rule applied to two categories of potential releases ("rea-
sonably foreseeable" and "very unlikely") based upon their projected
probabilities of occurrence over the first 10,000 years after disposal.
The Agency has revised the structure of the containment requirements in
several ways that will retain quantitative objectives for long-term
containment while allowing the implementing agencies enough flexibility
to make qualitative judgments when necessary.
First, the final rule does not use the terms "reasonably foresee-
able" and "very unlikely" releases. Instead, the permissible probabil-
ities for two different levels of cumulative releases (over 10,000 years
after disposal) are now incorporated directly into the containment re-
quirements.
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Second, the numerical probabilities associated with the two release
categories have been increased by an order of magnitude to reflect fur-
ther assessments of the uncertainties associated with projecting the
probabilities of geologic events such as fault movement.
Third, the final rule clearly indicates that comprehensive per-
formance assessments, including estimates of the probabilities of various
potential releases whenever meaningful estimates are practicable, are
needed to determine compliance with the containment requirements.
Fourth, a paragraph has been added to the final containment require-
ments to emphasize that unequivocal proof of compliance is neither ex-
pected nor required because of the substantial uncertainties inherent in
such long-term projections. Instead, the appropriate test is a reason-
able expectation of compliance based upon practically obtainable informa-
tion and analysis.
Finally, a "Guidance for Implementation of Subpart B" appendix has
been added. This part of the rule describes the Agency's intentions
regarding performance assessments and uncertainties and should discourage
overly restrictive or inappropriate implementation of the containment
requirements.
The Agency believes that these revisions to the proposed rule pre-
serve an objective framework for application of the containment require-
ments that requires very stringent isolation, while allowing the imple-
menting agencies adequate flexibility to handle specific uncertainties
that may be encountered.
Comment 5.3.2: Some release
are not
"events"
but are continuous
physical processes, in which case one should attempt to bracket uncer-
tainties in process rates and not predict yes/no probabilities. (D-7)
Response: The Agency agrees. The final rule makes it clear that perform-
ance assessments must address both "processes" and "events", including
uncertainties in the rates of processes.
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Chapter 6: ACCESSIBLE ENVIRONMENT
Comment 6.1; Change the general definition. (D-19, D-59, D-62, D-71,
D-78, F-7-ix, H-3, K-2, K-5, K-7, K-8, K-12, K-15, K-16, K-18, K-19,
K-20, K-24, L-3, L-6)
Comment 6.2; Provide for long-term monitoring in the definition. (K-5,
H-38)
Comment 6.3; The distance to the accessible environment should be less
than 10 kilometers. (D-48, D-49, D-52, D-53, D-67, D-71, D-75, D-83,
F-8-ii, F-8-iii, F-8-vi, H-38, K-4, K-6, K-10, K-13, K-14, K-22, L-7)
Comment 6.4; There should be no exclusion zone. (D-58, K-9)
Comment 6.5; Exclude or distinguish unusable water. (D-46, D-48, D-49,
D-58, D-70, D-79, K-14, L-l)
Comment 6.6; Define accessible environment to be site-specific. (D-7,
D-25, F-7-ii, H-6)
Comment 6.7; Delete accessible environment concept. (D-55, F-7-v)
Comment 6.8; Provide protection for all ^urface or ground water within
the accessible environment area (D-7, D-48, D-49, D-50, D-52, D-58, D-65,
D-66, D-74, D-76, D-91, F-8-ii, F-8-v, H-2, H-3, H-4, K-6, K-10, K-13,
K-17, K-21)
Comment 6.9; Define qualitative terms or allow NEC and DOE to define
using EPA guidance. (D-90, K-6, K-12, K-13, K-15, K-18, K-20)
Comment 6.10; Use NRC's accessible environment and controlled area
definitions. (D-19, D-62, D-65, D-71, F-7-ix)
Comment 6.11; Explain the change from 1 mile to 10 kilometers. (K-3,
L-3)
Response (Comments 6.1 through 6.11); In the proposed rule, ground water
within 10 kilometers of a disposal system was excluded from the defini-
tion of accessible environment. This definition was intended to reflect
the concept that the geologic media surrounding a mined repository are
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part of the long-term containment system, with disposal sites being
selected so that the surrounding media prevent or retard transport of
radionuclides through ground water.
Such surrounding media would be dedicated for this purpose, with the
assumption that steps will be taken to prohibit any incompatible activities
(either those that might disrupt the disposal system or those that could
cause significant radiation exposures) in perpetuity. Applying standards
to ground water in the immediate vicinity of the site within the defini-
tion of "accessible environment" would ignore the role of this natural
barrier, and it could remove the incentive to search for sites with
properties that would enhance long-term containment of these wastes. The
Agency also recognizes that the institutional controls designed to re-
serve this area around a disposal system cannot be considered infallible.
The Agency made several changes in the definition of the "accessible
environment". First, the concept of a "controlled area" has been adopted
from NEC's 10 CFR Part 60. This establishes an area around a disposal
system that is to be identified by markers, records, and other passive
institutional controls intended to prohibit incompatible activities from
the area. Consistent with the proposed 40 CFR Part 191, the current NRC
definition of "controlled area" limits its distance from the edge of a
repository to no more than 10 kilometers. The final 40 CFR Part 191
defines "accessible environment" to include: 1) the atmosphere, land
surfaces, surface waters, and the oceans, wherever•they are located; and
2) portions of the lithosphere—and the ground water within it—that are
beyond the controlled area.
Second, the Agency has made the definition of the "controlled area"
more restrictive than that currently incorporated in 10 CFR Part 60.
This revised definition limits the controlled area to a distance no
greater than 5 kilometers from the original emplacement of wastes in a
disposal system, rather than 10 kilometers. Furthermore, the revised
definition limits the area encompassed by the controlled area to no more
than 100 square kilometers, which is approximately the area that would be
encompassed by a controlled area at a distance of 3 kilometers from all
sides of a typical repository configuration. This revised definition
substantially reduces the area of the lithosphere that would have been
removed from the "accessible environment" defined in the proposed rule,
and it somewhat reduces the distance used in the proposed rule. The
5-kilometer distance was chosen to retain reasonable compatibility with
the NRC's requirement for a preemplacement ground water travel time of
1,000 years to the accessible environment while still providing for
greater isolation than called for by the proposed rule. This definition
of the accessible environment will allow a controlled area to be estab-
lished asymmetrically around a repository based upon the particular
characteristics of a site.
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Chapter 7: PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
Comment 7.1; Define various terms and phrases. (D-7, D-19, D-50, L-7)
Comment 7.2; Probabilistic analyses are NRC's responsibility and should
be deleted from the rule. (D-90, H-7, H-ll)
Comment 7.3; Concept of procedural requirements is fine, but standards
should be health-based, not performance-assessment-based. (F-ll)
Comment 7.4; Screening models should be used for evaluations. (D-7,
Comment 7.5; Require use of nominal values for parameters. (D-65)
Comment 7.6; EPA should set minimal assessment criteria and not leave
performance assessment criteria to discretion of implementing agencies.
(D—83)
Response (Comments 7.1 through 7.6); The procedural requirements as
presented in the proposed rule have been deleted from the final rule. In
their place is a new definition of "performance assessment" and a "Gui-
dance for Implementation of Subpart B" appendix, which although not an
integral part of the standard, will be included in the Code of Federal
Regulations.
The appendix to the final rule is based upon the analytical assump-
tions that the Agency made in developing the technical basis used for
formulating the numerical disposal standards. In particular, the appen-
dix discusses: 1) the consideration of all barriers of a disposal system
in performance assessments; 2) reasonable limitations on the scope of
performance assessments; 3) the use of average or "mean" values in ex-
pressing the results of performance assessments; 4) the types of assump-
tions regarding the effectiveness of institutional controls; and 5) our
limiting assumptions regarding the frequency and severity of inadvertent
human intrusion into geologic repositories.
The implementing agencies are responsible for selecting the specific
information to be used in these and other aspects of performance assess-
ments to determine compliance with 40 CFR Part 191. However, the Agency
believes it is important that the underlying reasoning and approach used
7-1
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by the implementing agencies are compatible with those used by EPA in
developing this rule. Otherwise, implementation of the disposal standards
may have effects quite different than those anticipated by EPA. Although
the other agencies are not bound to follow this guidance, EPA recommends
that it be carefully considered in planning for the application of 40 CFR
Part 191. The Agency will monitor implementation of the disposal standards
as it develops over the next several years to determine whether any
changes to the rule are called for to meet the Agency's objectives for
these standards.
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Chapter 8: STANDARDS
8.1 Individual Dose Standards
Comment 8.1.la; There is a need for some form of individual protection
criteria. (D-24, D-41, D-50, D-70, D-78, D-79, D-91, D-93, F-7-iv,
F-7-v, F-7-vii, F-7-ix, F-8-ii, F-8-iii, K-l, K-2, K-6, K-9, K-10, K-12,
K-13, K-14, K-16, K-17, K-20, K-21, H-2, H-28, L-3, L-6, L-8)
Comment 8.1.Ib; There is no need for individual protection requirements.
(K-4, K-7, K-8, K-15, K-18, K-19, K-22, L-l)
Comment S.l.lc; Individual protection limits should apply to ground
water in the vicinity of a disposal site. (D-19, D-24, D-41, D-71, K-6,
K-10, K-12, K-13, K-14, K-20)
Comment 8.1.Id: Individual protection limits are not needed for ground
waters in vicinity of a disposal site. (K-2, K-15, K-17, K-18)
Comment S.l.le; Individual dose limits should apply to all ground waters
in the area. (K-6, K-12, K-14, K-17, K-20)
Comment 8.1.If; Individual dose limits should apply to ground waters
only in the accessible environment. (K-9, K-15, K-18, L-6)
Comment S.l.lg; Use ALARA to keep individual doses low. (L-l)
Comment 8.1.Ih; Qualitative requirements such as ALARA are not needed or
too vague. (K-13, K-14, K-15, K-17, K-18, K-20)
Comment 8.1.11; Qualitative requirements would need quantitative augmenta-
tion. (K-6, K-9, K-12, K-13, K-20)
Comment 8.1.1j; Use the individual protection approach of B. Ross (comment
letter II-D-19, available in EPA's Public Docket Room). (D-19, K-2, K-9,
K-13, K-17)
Comment 8.1.1k; Reject the proposed B. Ross approach to individual
protection. (K-6, K-15, K-18)
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Comment 8.1.11; Existing standards, either 10 CFR Part 20 or 40 CFR Part 141,
are adequate for individual dose standards. (K-2, K-5, K-9, K-12, K-15,
K-18, K-17, K-24)
Comment 8.1.1m; Existing standards, either 10 CFR Part 20 or 40 CFR
Part 141, are not adequate for individual dose standards. (K-6)
Response (Comments 8.1.la through m); The Agency believes that the
containment requirements in Section 191.13 will ensure that the overall
population risks to future generations from disposal of these wastes will
be acceptably small. However, the situation with regard to potential
individual doses is more complicated. Even with good engineering con-
trols, some waste may eventually (i.e., several hundreds or thousands of
years after disposal) be released into any ground water that might be in
the immediate vicinity of a geologic repository. Since ground water
generally provides relatively little dilution, anyone using such contam-
inated ground water in the future may receive a substantial radiation
exposure. This possibility is inherent in the decision to isolate a very
large amount of radioactivity in a small area.
On the other hand, analyses of repository systems with good engi-
neering controls show that they should be able to prevent significant
doses from ground water use for several hundred to a thousand years after
disposal. Such protection would be compatible with both containment and
assurance requirements.
After considering all the available information, the Agency has de-
cided to include two new sections in the final rule. The first (Section
191.15) limits annual exposures in the first 1000 years to members of the
public from all pathways after disposal, while the second (Section 191.16)
limits concentrations in water withdrawn from certain important sources
of ground water after disposal during the same time period.
Comment 8.1.2; Should require zero accessibility of radioactivity to
ground water. (D-92)
Response; Considering the long time spans involved (10,000 years) and
the limited technical and financial capabilities available, it was not
feasible to require an absolute zero accessibility of radioactivity to
ground water.
8.2 Release Limits (Population Dose Approach)
Comment 8.2.la; Keep EPA release limit approach (proposed rule -
Table 2).(5^7, D-62, D-65, D-68, D-71, D-76, D-77, D-78, D-80, D-85,
D-92, F-7-vi, F-8-iv, F-8-v, H-4, H-7, H-12)
Comment 8.2.1b; Use a release rate standard, too. (D-86, F-7-vi)
Comment 8.2.1c; Release limits are too stringent; more flexibility is
needed.(D-36, D-44, D-47, D-90, D-93, F-7-ii, F-7-iii, F-7-vi, K-3)
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Comment 8.2.Id; Release limits not conservative enough. (D-31, D-48,
D-49, D-91, F-7-iv, F-7-viii)
Comment 8.2.let Basis for release limits has. technical shortcomings.
(D-6, D-41, D-44, D-46, D-75, D-78, F-7-v, F-7-ix)
Comment 8.2.If; Release rates for the TRU wastes too high. (H-4,
F-8-iv)
Response (Comments 8.2.la through f); The Agency and its Science Ad-
visory Board both reviewed the release limit concept and its basis and
concurred that this was the best way to influence the design of high-
level radioactive waste repositories. The final standards augment the
release limits with individual protection requirements that establish
annual limits for individual exposures. The issue of the stringency of
the release limits was thoroughly evaluated by the Agency management and
determined to be appropriate for this specific circumstance.
8.3 General
Comment 8.3.1; Provide individual standards for construction, operation,
and closure. (F-8-iii)
Response; This is accomplished by the Subpart A portion of the final
rule.
Comment 8.3.2; Standard should not be proportioned to amount of waste in
respository. (D-86, L-4, F-8-vi)
Response; To have made the release limits independent of the amount of
waste in the repository, i.e., only related to releases from a site,
could have provided impetus to have more sites. The Agency believed that
it was desirable to concentrate the waste in a minimum number of reposi-
tories.
Comment 8.3.3; What about people living in the area of a repository who
already have, or are exposed to, radiation from other sources including
fallout or weapons testing? (D-60, F-8-iii)
Response; Other sources of radiation exposure were taken into considera-
tion in Subpart A of the standards. This subpart limits the combined
exposure from the repository's operational phase and other NRC-licensed
fuel cycle facilities. It also limits the combined exposure from DOE
high-level waste management and storage operations and other DOE activi-
ties through application of the Clean Air Act Radionuclide Standards.
Protection from background radiation, including fallout, is not part of
this standard.
8-3
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Comment 8.3.4a; EPA should not use the linear dose hypothesis. (D-44)
Comment 8.3.4b; EPA should use a geometric relationship between radia-
tion and cancer incidence. (F-8-iii)
Response (Comments 8.3.4a and b); The Agency and its Science Advisory
Board both reviewed the basis for the radiation dose vs. effects assump-
tions. It was determined that the most prudent relationship to use was
the linear. However, the Background Information Document does discuss
the differences resulting from other dose-effect relationships.
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Chapter 9: REGULATORY (COST) IMPACT ANALYSIS
Comment 9.1; Clarify the assumptions used in the Draft Regulatory Impact
Analysis (RIA) document that pertain to delay-induced costs. (F-ll)
Response;
costs.
Neither the Draft RIA nor the Final RIA considers delay-induced
Comment 9.2; Life cycle cost should be considered for implementing the
standards and state the range of cost for a single year. (F-ll)
Response; The Final RIA demonstrates that the standards are not expected
to cause significant additional costs for most of the repository sites
being considered by DOE. Only for one site would there be additional
costs of 6 to 12 million dollars per year, and only if the requirements
of 10 CFR Part 60 were relaxed.
Comment 9.3; Include cost impacts on defense waste disposal programs
(both high-level and transuranic radioactive wastes) and from Subpart A.
(D-47, F-ll)
Response; The Agency does not have enough information on the plans and
engineering designs for the disposal of defense high-level and transuranic
radioactive wastes to perform meaningful estimates of possible cost
impacts of Subpart B. With regards to Subpart A, studies performed in
support of the proposed rule indicate that Subpart A should not have any
cost impacts (see Item 8, Section 1.5 in the BID) since the estimated
radionuclide releases during normal operations of typical facilities and
the resulting radiation doses are less than the limits in the proposed
rule.
Comment 9.4; Clarify what operations (i.e., siting, construction, opera-
tion, decommissioning, monitoring) are covered in the cost estimates.
(D-50, D-59, L-16)
Response; The cost estimates for waste disposal in the Final RIA include
transportation; encapsulation; the waste form; siting, design, construction,
operation, and decommissioning of the repository; research and development
9-1
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needed for the various components of the disposal system (including site
evaluations); and miscellaneous government overhead. Monitoring of the
disposal system would be included within these costs. However, unlike
the Draft RIA, waste storage before transportation to the disposal site
is not included in the Final RIA.
Comment 9.5: Repository costs should be borne by nuclear power plant
customers only. (D-50)
Response; The NWPA accomplishes this by setting up a fund to pay for
repository costs that is financed through a fee levied on electricity
generated by nuclear power plants.
Comment 9.6; EPA should also consider costs of additional containment
beyond 10,000 years. (F-7-iv)
Response; Disposal systems that meet the 10,000-year containment require-
ments will almost certainly provide substantial containment for much
longer periods of time. Furthermore, enhancing the very long term
containment capability appears to be best addressed by picking sites
which provide good isolation (which does not necessarily cost more) than
by using more expensive engineering controls.
Comment 9.7a; The standards may result in greater costs with no added
benefits. (D-47, F-ll)
Comment 9.7b; Overconservatism could make licensing difficult and in-
crease costs. (F-7-iii, F-7-vi)
Comment 9.7c; Costs should not be in conflict with finding a suitable
disposal site. (D-50)
Comment 9.7d; Demonstrable safety increases should be the only reason
for cost increases. (D-36)
Response (Comments 9.7a through d); The Final RIA indicates that the
levels of protection sought by the final rule generally do not appear to
cause cost increases over the costs already anticipated for mined
geologic repositories. Section 191.13(b) and Appendix B of the final
rule have been added to ensure that unwarranted difficulties or conserva-
tisms do not hamper licensing of adequate disposal systems.
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Chapter 10: MODELS AND MODELING
Comment 10.1; Too many model uncertainties exist over the long time
spans simulated. (D-7, D-25, D-36, D-50, D-86, F-7-iii, F-7-viii, H-6,
L-7)
Comment 10.2; The generic site data are too uncertain. (D-70, F-7-ii,
F-8-iii)
Comment 10.3; Models are not conservative enough. (D-55, D-66, F-7-v,
F-8-iii, H-6, H-15, L-7)
Comment 10.4; Models are too conservative. (D-7, D-36, F-ll, H-4)
Comment 10.5; More adequate input data and more detail concerning assump-
tions and how calculations were made are needed. (D-31, D-46, D-50,
D-70, F-8-vi, H-2)
Comment 10.6; Should include new or additional modeling considerations
for climate changes, repository thermal effects, atmospheric transport,
and other environmental effects. (D-50, D-56, D-60, D-69, F-8-v)
Response (Comments 10.1 through 10.6); The Agency recognizes that there
are great uncertainties in models that attempt to estimate risks over
these very long time periods, in the Preamble to 40 CFR Part 191, there
is a footnote that specifically points out that this is "a speculative
calculation that is primarily intended as a tool for comparing risk
levels; it should not be considered a reliable projecton of the 'real1
number of health effects resulting from compliance with the disposal
standards." Also in the supporting Regulatory Impact Analysis for the
standard, the Agency has presented its estimates of cost effectiveness as
ranges, rather than points, to illustrate the uncertainty involved.
Even with the realization of uncertainty, it was necessary to make
some modeling estimates of risks to establish a perspective for making
decisions. It was this context that justified the type of modeling used.
Since we never intended to typify specific sites, and since our standards
must be generally applicable, we used generic single-dimension models.
10-1
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The many assumptions and input factors that were used in developing
the proposed standard were reviewed by the Agency's Science Advisory
Board. Numerous changes were made on the basis of this review and com-
ments received.
Comment 10.7; The ground water transport and radionuclide sorption
portions of the transport model has a built-in bias against salt; con-
sider differences among rock types. (D-42)
Response; The Agency could not discern that its transport models had
"built-in bias" relative to any specific geology. Rather, the model
seemed to adequately differentiate among geological media.
Comment 10.8; Modeling should include rapid dissolution of salt bodies
or ground water flow directly into a major river. (D-75)
Response; Even with reasonable siting criteria, the Agency did not be-
lieve that rapid dissolution of salt or ground water flow directly into a
major river was sufficiently probable to predominate the risk assessment.
Comment 10.9; Need model verification. (D-3)
Response; The models used predict releases over thousands of years.
Although various subelements have been checked against available data,
there is no way to "validate" the totality of such long-term predictions.
It is because of these inherent uncertainties that the Agency believes
the assurance requirements are a necessary part of the standards.
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Chapter 11: LEVEL OF RISK
11.1 Comparison to Other Risks
Comment 11.1.la; Risks posed by mined uranium ore bodies are not necessar-
ily acceptable. (D-55, D-75, F-7-v, F-8-vii, K-10)
Comment 11.1. Ib: Differences between a uranium ore body and a repository
are too great for a basis of comparison. (D-31, D-55, D-75, D-86, F-7-v,
F-8-iii)
Comment ll.l.lc; Supports the uranium ore body comparison as an approach
to a long-term acceptable risk. (D-16, D-61, D-62, D-63, D-67, D-68,
D-76, D-77, D-78, D-80, D-81, D-86, D-92, F-7-vii, H-2, H-6, H-15, L-4)
Response (Comments 11.1.la through c); In developing the disposal stan-
dards, the Agency has carefully evaluated the capabilities of mined geo-
logic repositories to isolate the high-level radioactive wastes from the
environment, because it is believed that these repositories are capable
of providing exceptionally good protection to current and future genera-
tions for at least 10,000 years after disposal. EPA's analyses indicate
that the residual risks allowed by the disposal standards would be compa-
rable to the risks to which future generations would have been exposed if
the uranium ore used to produce the high-level wastes had not been mined
to begin with.
Specifically, the Agency estimates that compliance with the disposal
standards would allow no more than 1,000 premature deaths from cancer in
the first 10,000 years after disposal of the high-level radioactive
wastes from 100,000 metric tons of reactor fuel: an average of no more
than one premature death every ten years. This residual risk level is a
speculative calculation that is primarily intended as a tool for compar-
ing risk levels; it should not be considered a reliable projection of the
"real" number of health effects resulting from compliance with the dis-
posal standards.
The Agency also evaluated the health risks to which future genera-
tions would be exposed from the amount of uranium ore needed to produce
100,000 metric tons of reactor fuel, if this ore had not been mined to
begin with. Population risks ranging between 10 and 100,000 premature
cancer deaths over 10,000 years were associated with this much unmined
uranium ore, depending upon the analytical assumptions made.
11-1
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These analyses, which have been updated from those prepared for the
proposed standards, reinforce the Agency's conclusion that limiting
radionuclide releases to levels associated with no more than 1,000 pre-
mature cancer deaths over 10,000 years from disposal of the wastes from
100,000 metric tons of reactor fuel satisfies two important objectives.
First, it provides an objective that appears readily achievable by the
various options being considered within the national program. Second, it
limits risks from disposal to no more than the midpoint of the range of
estimated risks that future generations would have been exposed to if the
uranium ore used to create the wastes had never been mined. The Agency
believes that such a limitation is adequately small and has decided to
establish containment requirements that meet these two objectives.
We have never stated that the risks from a uranium ore body are
necessarily acceptable. The level of risk was chosen based upon the
projected performances of generic repositories in various geologic media
not upon the range of projected risks from ore bodies. The ore body risk
levels were compared to the chosen risk level because of the many simi-
larities between an ore body and a repository.
Comment 11.1.2; Use natural background as a basis for risk comparison.
(D-36, D-59, D-65, D-75, F-7-ii, F-7-iii, F-7-vi, F-8-ii, F-ll, K-19)
Response; In the draft EIS, the uranium ore body was only one of four
bases for comparisons given; there were also nuclear power generation,
nuclear weapons fallout, and natural background radiation. However, in
the Preamble to the proposed rule, only the uranium ore body was men-
tioned. It was not our intention to stress the ore body comparison in
favor of the other bases. Therefore, while we will continue to refer to
the uranium ore body analysis because we believe it provides a usable,
if not perfect, long-term risk reference point, we will also refer to
natural background radiation exposure risks because it provides a long-
term risk reference as well.
Comment 11.1.3; Should consider radiation risks from medical applica-
tions in assessment of comparative levels. (D-36)
Response; The perspectives of medical exposure are quite different from
exposure from environmental sources. In medical exposure, the physician
must weigh the potential hazards of increased radiation exposure against
the risk of improper diagnosis or treatment.
11.2 General
Comment 11.2.la; Level of risk is lower than necessary or too conserva-
tive. (D-44, D-46, D-47, D-79, D-85, D-90, H-12, H-35, K-19)
Comment 11.2.1b; Risk level is too high. (D-52, D-66, D-72, H-34)
11-2
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Comment 11.2.1c; Include all the fuel cycle activity risks in setting a
level or making comparison. (D-7, D-75, L-9)
Comment 11.2.Id; Oppose any long-term risk, incremental or otherwise.
(D-52, D-59, D-72, D-87, D-90, D-91, F-8-ii)
Comment 11.2.1e; Supports the standards' long-term acceptable risk ap-
proach. (D-7, D-25, D-50, D-57, D-59, D-65, D-78, D-85, H-4)
Response (Comment 11.2.la through e); Intergenerational risks are an
issue because the consequence of the fundamental decisions to have nuclear
power and nuclear weapons is the production of radioactive wastes, some
of which will exist for generations. It now becomes necessary to isolate,
as long as possible, these wastes from people and the environment in the
safest and most economically reasonable method possible. The Congress
assumed, in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), that deep geo-
logic disposal would be the method used for high-level waste disposal in
the foreseeable future. Prior to passage of NWPA, EPA had decided to
center its studies to develop high-level waste standards on deep geologic
disposal since it was the most advanced disposal technology then, and
still is now. Using current technology, it is neither economically, nor
technically possible, to reduce releases to zero for the lifetime of all
the nuclides in the wastes. Therefore, given those constraints, a level
of risk somewhere between zero and several million potential cancer
fatalities must be found and judged acceptable.
In the proposed rule, the containment requirements for disposal
systems limited the residual risks to no more than an estimated 1,000
premature cancer deaths over the first 10,000 years after disposal of the
wastes from 100,000 metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) used as fuel in a
nuclear reactor, or its equivalent. The Agency pointed out that a variety
of mined repository designs using different combinations of geologic
media and engineered controls were expected to readily meet these require-
ments. It was also estimated that the residual risks to future generations
appeared to be no greater than if the uranium ore used to create the
wastes had not been mined.
The Agency has retained the proposed level of protection as the
basis for the long-term containment requirements in the final rule, even
though it is true that long-term assessments of repository performance
will encounter substantial uncertainties, as the SAB Subcommittee pointed
out. Three reasons support this decision.
First, revising the performance assessments in accordance with many
of the technical recommendations of the SAB has reinforced the Agency's
conclusion that the proposed level of protection can readily be achieved
by a variety of combinations of repository sites and designs, and EPA's
Regulatory Impact Analyses indicate that this level of protection can be
achieved without significant effects on the cost of disposing of these
wastes.
11-3
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Second, comparing this level of protection with the same type risks
from equivalent amounts of unmined uranium ore lends perspective that the
standard does not allow a significant increase in the risk to future
generations. Therefore, the Agency believes that this level of protec-
tion represents a reasonable basis for these disposal standards.
Third, rather than relax the level of protection, the Agency has
chosen to address the uncertainties that concerned the SAB Subcommittee
by providing a more detailed "Guidance for Implementation" of Subpart B
appendix to replace the proposed "Procedural Requirements." For example,
this guidance points out that the entire range of possible projections of
releases need not meet the containment requirements. Rather, compliance
should be based upon the projections that the implementing agencies
believe are more realistic. Furthermore, this guidance acknowledges that
the quantitative calculations needed may have to be supplemented by
reasonable qualitative judgments in order to appropriately determine
compliance with the disposal standards.
In retaining the proposed level of protection, the Agency emphasizes
that it is making a decision applicable only to the circumstances involv-
ing disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level and transuranic radio-
active wastes. This rule cannot be used to establish precedents such as
"no incremental risk to future generations" for extrapolation to other
disposal problems.
Comment 11.2.2; Defer setting a U.S. standard on long-term risks until
an international consensus has been agreed upon. (D-93)
Response; The Agency's consideration of the appropriate risk level
included several factors, such as the capabilities of geological disposal
systems, the risks from unmined uranium ore, and the need for public
acceptance. The time period within which the standards were required did
not accommodate an international consensus.
11-4
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Chapter 12: SITING
12.1 Water Resources
Comment 12.1.la; Repository sites should avoid surface water resources.
(D-52)
Comment 12.1.1b; Disqualify site if a waterway is a major water supply
within a set distance from the repository. (F-8-iii)
Comment 12.1.1c; Sites with limited quantities of water should be
avoided. (F-8-v)
Response (Comments 12.1.la through c); In considering all nearby water
resources, the Agency concluded that its primary role was the protection
of public health and that protection of potable water should be required
in that context (Section 191.16). In addition, Individual Protection
Requirements (Section 191.15) were included to protect the public in the
accessible environment.
12.2 General
Comment 12.2.1; Evaluate site location considering both short-term and
long-term problems; however, the long-term problems should be more judi-
ciously considered. (D-63)
Response: The Agency's containment requirements (Section 191.13) serve
as the primary protection aspect of the standard in its influence of de-
sign of a repository. This provision does consider the potential releas-
es over a 10,000-year period. The provisions for Individual Protection
and Ground Water Protection (Sections 191.15 and 191.16) consider the
shorter term problems for a 1,000-year period.
Comment 12.2.2; Site repository away from other nuclear areas for dis-
bursal of risk for health and safety. (F-8-ii)
Response; Rather than establish any siting requirements with specific
relation to other nuclear facilities, the Agency has prescribed its
Subpart A requirements so that the combined exposure from NRC-licensed
repositories and other fuel-cycle facilities are limited.
12-1
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Comment 12.2.3; Cultural resources, such as archaeological areas should
be considered as mitigating measures for not siting a repository nearby.
(H-19)
Response; The Department of Energy guidelines, 10 CFR Part 960, provide
for such considerations as other land uses.
Comment 12.2.4; Opposed to disposal of materials in agriculture-producing
areas. (H-20)
Response; The Agency's risk assessment and the assessment necessary to
show compliance with the EPA standards both consider contamination of
agricultural products to the extent that the commenter's intent was to
protect the consumer of agricultural products.
12.3 Geology
Comment 12.3.la; Risk of intrusion into salt domes should be a factor in
siting. (F-7-iii)
Comment 12.3.1b; Risk of intrusion into salt domes should be a factor in
siting, but not rule out salt domes. (D-37, D-47, L-5)
Comment 12.3.1c; Resource potential of salt domes should be considered
in site selection. (F-ll)
Comment 12.3.Id; EPA did not adequately consider many factors concerning
salt domes, e.g., salt tectonism, dome dissolution processes, dome uplift
and movement, past geologic history of salt areas, and potential for gas
exploration. (F-8-v, H-13, H-17, H-30)
Response (Comments 12.3.la through d); Assurance Requirement 191.14(e)
provides that resource potential and intrusion probability will be taken
into consideration in the site selection process. The site-specific
aspects of a salt dome will be considered in the site assessment and
selection process. A further discussion of intrusion is included in the
response to comments 3.7.la through d.
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF COMMENTERS
A-l
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF COMMENTERS
A.I Introduction
The following is a list of the commenters whose comments were
responded to in this document. The identification number used in this
document is the same number used by the EPA Docket Section (except that
the number II is deleted from each number). Where there are missing
sequential numbers, it means that the document material was not a letter
of comment but some other reference material.
A.2 Commenter Listing
Section D
Date
docketed
D-l Linda K. McClain, Westerville, Ohio. 1/12/83
D-2 The U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C.,
signed by Joseph Canny, Deputy Director for Environment
and Policy Review. 2/24/83
D-3 The State of Montana Historical Society signed by
Marcella Sherfy, Deputy SHPO of the Historic Preser-
vation Office. 2/28/83
D-7 Package of comments, letters, and memos from David C.
Kocher, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge,
Tennessee. 3/8/83
D-10 D.G. Andrews, Professor of Nuclear Engineering,
University of Toronto (Canada). 3/16/83
D-ll The State of Kansas, signed by Lynn Muchmore, Director
of the Budget, Division of the Budget, Department of
Administration. 3/16/83
D-12 John Bergamini, Windham, New York. 3/17/83
D-14 Dennis R. Arter, Kennewick, Washington. 3/23/83
D-15 The Suffolk Nuclear Study Group, Mastic, New York,
signed by Bill Hafner. 3/25/83
D-16 The British Embassy, Washington, D.C., on behalf of the
United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority. 3/25/83
A-2
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D-19 Benjamin Ross of GeoTrans, Inc. of Reston, VA, but
submitted as a private citizen. 4/15/83
D-20 The State of Oklahoma Grant-in-Aid Clearinghouse
signed by Don N. Strain, Director. 4/15/83
D-22 The South Carolina Department of Health and
Environmental Control, signed by Heyward G. Shealy,
Chief, Bureau of Radiological Health. 4/20/83
D-23 Dr. Charles Forsberg, Kingston, Tennessee. 4/20/83
D-24 John M. Matuszek of the State of New York Radiolo-
gical Sciences Laboratory. 4/26/83
D-25 David C. Kocher, Oak Ridge, Tennessee. 4/21/83
D-28 D.E. Wood of Rockwell International, Richland,
Washington. 4/26/83
D-29 Steve Irishman of the Texas Energy and Natural
Resources Advisory Council. 4/26/83
D-30 Copy of testimony given by Bill Vincent, southern
coordinator of Citizen Alert, at a DOE public
hearing in Las Vegas, Nevada on March 30, 1983. 4/22/83
D—31 John. L. Geesman, Executive Director of the State of
California Energy Commission, to Gordon F. Snow,
Assistant Secretary of the California Resources Agency. 4/22/83
D-32 Theodore M. Edison, West Orange, NJ. 4/26/83
D-34 Packerland Packing Company, Inc., Green Bay,
Wisconsin, signed by Norval Dvorak, Vice-President
of Market Growth & Development. 4/27/83
D-35 Douglas E. Denninger, Somerville, MA. 4/27/83
D-36 San Diego Gas & Electric, San Diego, California,
signed by L. Bernath, Manager, Nuclear Department. 4/27/83
D-41 John M. Matuszek of the State of New York
Radiological Sciences Laboratory. 4/29/83
D-42 RE/SPEC Inc. of Rapid City, South Dakota, signed
by William C. McClain, Executive Vice President. 4/29/83
D-44 Memo from Kay Wilcox, State of Oregon A-95 Coordinator,
forwarding a comment memo from Dr. Max Bader, Oregon
Health Division. 4/29/83
A-3
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D-46 The Atomic Industrial Forum, Bethesda, Maryland,
signed by Carl Walske. 4/29/83
D-47 The U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.,
signed by William A0 Vaughn, Assistant Secretary
for Environmental Protection, Safety, and Emergency
Preparedness. 5/2/83
D-48 Serious Texans Against Nuclear Dumping, Tulia, Texas,
signed by Don Hancock, a consultant for that group. 5/2/83
D-49 The Southwest Research and Information Center,
Albuquerque, New Mexico, signed by Don Hancock,
Information Coordinator. 5/2/83
D-50 The Wisconsin Radioactive Waste Review Board signed
by Patrick J. Walsh, Executive Director. 5/2/83
D-51 Louis G. Williams, Ph.D., Northport, Alabama. 5/2/83
D-52 The Yakima Indian Nation, Toppenish, Washington,
signed by Melvin R. Sampson, Chairman of the Legis-
lative Committee. 5/2/83
D-53 The Sierra Club signed by Brooks B. Yeager,
Washington Representative. 5/2/83
D-54 Paul Leventhal, President of the Nuclear Control
Institute (Washington, D.C.), Ted Harris, President
of the Energy Research Foundation (Columbia, South
Carolina), and John Buell, staff member of Nuclear
Control Institute. 5/2/83
D-55 The Environmental Policy Institute, Washington, D.C.,
signed by David M. Berick, Director of the Nuclear
Waste Project. 5/2/83
D-56 Sandra Edwards, Champaign, Illinois. 5/3/83
D-57 The Tennessee Valley Authority, signed by Alvan Bruch
for Dr. Mohamed T. E].-Ashry, Director of Environmental
Quality, Rnoxville, Tennessee. 5/3/83
D-58 The State of Texas Energy and Natural Resources
Advisory Council, Austin, Texas, signed by Bill Carter,
Acting Executive Director. 5/3/83
D-59 GA Technologies, San Diego, California, signed by
R.A. Dean, Vice President, Power Reactors Program. 5/3/83
D-60 Citizen Alert, Las Vegas, Nevada, signed by Abby
Johnson, Program Director. 5/3/83
A-4
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D-61 Upper Valley Energy Coalition, Lebanon, New
Hampshire, signed by Dr. Douglas V. Smith. 5/3/83
D-62 The Nuclear Information and Resource Service,
Washington, D.C., signed by Laura Worby. 5/3/83
D-63 Angela ladavaia-Cox, New York, New York. 5/3/83
D-65 The Edison Electric Institute, Washington, D.C.,
signed by John J. Kearney, Senior Vice President. 5/3/83
D-66 The Natural Resources Defense Council, Washington,
D.C., signed by Thomas B. Cochran. 5/3/83
D-67 Katherine P. Kitchell, Logan, Utah. 5/3/83
D-68 Groundwater Alliance, Ketchum, Idaho, signed by
Elizabeth Paul. 5/3/83
D-69 The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C., signed
by Joyce M. Wood, Chief, Ecology and Conservation
Division. 5/3/83
D-70 The U.S. Department of the Interior, Washington,
D.C., signed by Tom Loomis for Bruce Blanchard,
Director, Environmental Project Review. 5/3/83
D-71 Joseph H. Gross, El Paso, Texas. 5/3/83
D-72 Carolinians for Safe Energy, Asheville, North
Carolina, signed by Rubin Falk, President. 5/3/83
D-73 Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corporation, Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma, signed by W.J. Shelley, Vice-President,
Nuclear Licensing & Regulation. 5/3/83
D-74 The State of Nevada Department of Energy, signed
by James I. Barnes, Director. 5/4/83
D-75 The State of Utah signed by Randy Moon, State
Science Advisor. 5/4/83
D-76 The Redwood Alliance, Arcata, California, signed
by James S. Adams. 5/4/83
D-77 The Natural Rights Center, Summertown, Tennessee,
signed by Albert Bates, Director. 5/4/83
A-5
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D-78 The New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation, signed by Louis M. Concra, Jr.,
Director, Division of Regulatory Affairs. 5/4/83
D-79 The American Nuclear Society, LaGrange Park, Illinois,
signed by L. Manning Huntzing. 5/4/83
D-80 The Minnesota Project, Minneapolis, Minnesota, signed
by Barbara J. Johnson, Radioactive Waste Project. 5/5/83
D-81 The U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, signed
by John C. Villforth, Director, National Center for
Devices and Radiological Health. 5/5/83
D-82 Deborah Wilkinson, Bayfield, Wisconsin. 5/5/83
D-83 The Hanford Oversight Committee, Richland, Washington,
signed by Larry L. Caldwell. 5/5/83
D-84 Middle South Services, Inc., New Orleans, Louisiana,
signed by Joel D. Patterson. 5/5/83
D-85 Marshall S. Little, Santa Fe, New Mexico. 5/5/83
D-86 The Michigan Department of Public Health, signed by
Gloria R. Smith. 5/5/83
D-87 R. Eileen Buller, Kennewick, Washington. 5/5/83
D-88 The California Resources Agency, signed by Gordon F.
Snow, Assistant Secretary for Resources. 5/5/83
D-89 Gayle Houston, Alta, Utah. 5/6/83
D-90 The American Institute of Chemical Engineers signed
by J.A. Buckham, Chairman, Nuclear Waste Task Force,
Government Programs Steering Committee. 5/6/83
D-91 Hovis, Cockrill, Weaver, & Bjur, Yakima, Washington,
signed by James B. Hovis, Attorney for the Yakima
Indian Nation. 5/9/83
D-92 Roscoe and Evelyn Churchill, Ladysmith, Wisconsin. 5/9/83
D-93 The United Kingdom's Department of the Environment,
signed by F.S. Feates, Director, Nuclear Waste
Management. 5/9/83
A-6
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Section F
Date
docketed
F-7 TRANSCRIPT FOM THE MAY 12-14, 1983 PUBLIC HEARING
HELD IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 5/24/83
F-7-ii Michael J. Lawrence, Director, Office of Storage and
and Acting Director, Nuclear Waste Policy Act project
F-7-iii Office. U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.
F-7-iv David M. Berick, Director, Nuclear Waste Project,
and Environmental Policy Institute, Washington, D.C.
F-7-v
F-7-vi Russell E.L. Stanford, Program Director, Utility
Nuclear Waste Management Group, Representing the Edison
Electric Institute and the Utility Nuclear Waste
Management Group, Washington, D.C.
F-7-vli Duwayne F. Gebken, Chief, Environmental Analysis
Section and Chairman, Radioactive Waste Review Board
Technical Advisory Council, Department of Natural
Resources, State of Wisconsin.
F-7-viii Brooks B. Yeager, Washington Representative, Sierra
Club, Washington, D.C.
F-7-ix Laura Worby, Nuclear Waste Specialist, Nuclear
Information and Resource Service, Washington, D.C.
F-7-x Louis G. Williams, Aquatic ecologist and Emeritus
professor, University of Alabama, Northport, Alabama.
F-8 TRANSCRIPT FROM THE MAY 20, 1983, PUBLIC HEARING HELD
IN DENVER, COLORADO. 5/31/83
F-8-ii Mr. Melvin Sampson, Yakima Indian Nation, Toppenish,
Washington.
F-8-iii Dr. Randy G. Moon, State of Utah.
F-8-iv Dr. James K. Channell, Environmental Evaluation Group,
State of Mexico.
F-8-v Mr. Steve Frishman, Energy and Natural Resources
Advisory Council, State of Texas.
F-8-vi William Jacobi, Department of Health, State of Colorado.
A-7
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F-ll Letter from the U.S. Department of Energy, signed by the
John 0. McElroy for Michael J. Lawrence, Acting Direc-
tor, Nuclear Waste Policy Act Project Office, forward-
Ing a package entitled "Responce to Questions Raised
by EPA during M. Lawrence's Testimony, May 12, 1983." 7/19/83
Date
Section H docketed
H-l Pacific Gas and Electric Company, San Francisco,
California, signed by Philip A. Crane. 5/4/83
H-2 The Texas Department of Health, signed by David M.
Cochran, Associate Commissioner for Environmental
and Consumer Health Protection. 5/6/83
H-3 Numerous Mississippi State Offices, forwarded by the
Mississippi Department of Energy & Transportation and
signed by Ronald J. Forsythe, Manager, Nuclear Energy/
Nuclear Waste. 5/6/83
H-4 The New Mexico Environmental Evaluation Group. 5/6/83
H-5 Raymond S. Burton, Executive Councilor, District
One, State of New Hampshire. 5/9/83
H-6 The State of Minnesota, signed by Michael O'Donnell,
Executive Secretary of the Cabinet, Office of the
Governor. 5/9/83
H-7 The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, signed by
Donald S. Mausshardt for John G. Davis, Office of
Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards. 5/10/83
H-8 Pacific Gas and Electric Company, San Francisco,
California, signed by Philip A. Crane. 5/11/83
H-10 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Envir-
onmental Resources, signed by Nicholas DeBenedictis,
Secretary, Department of Environmental Resources. 5/13/83
H-ll The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, signed by
Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. 5/16/83
H-12 Georgia Power Company, Atlanta, Georgia, signed by
L.T. Gucwa, Chief Nuclear Engineer, Power Generation
Department. 5/17/83
H-13 The Manhattan Group (Oil and Gas Consultants),
Natchez, Mississippi, signed by Donald F.X. Finn,
Managing Director. 5/13/83
A-8
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H-14 The Birmingham Audubon Society, Birmingham, Alabama,
signed by John Northrop, Member, Conservation Committee. 5/18/83
H-15 The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection,
signed by George J. Tyler, Assistant'Commissioner. 5/18/83
H-16 The Virginia Council on the Environment, signed for
Sheila M. Prindiville. 5/18/83
H-18 The Mississippi State Clearinghouse and Ronald J.
Forsythe, Mississippi Department of Energy &
Transportation referring their comments to the
Mississippi Nuclear Waste Technical Review Committee. 5/31/83
H-19 The New Mexico State Clearinghouse and various New
Mexico State Agencies. 5/31/83
H-20 Position statements from the Texas Corn Growers
Association and the High Plains Gas Users Association. 3/31/83
H-21 The Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Bethlehem,
Pennsylvania, signed by A.E. Moffitt, Jr., Manager
of Environmental Health. 6/03/83
H-24 Richard Packey, Oakdale, New York. 6/14/83
H-25 The Maryland State Clearinghouse, signed by Guy W.
Hager, Director. 6/14/83
H-26 The Manhattan Group, Natchez, Mississippi, signed
by Donald F.X. Finn, Managing Director. 6/15/83
H-27 Gary Tannahill, Houston, Texas. 6/16/83
H-28 The New York State Department of Health, signed by
David Axelrod, Commissioner of Health. 6/20/83
H-30 The Manhattan Group, signed by Donald F.X. Finn. 7/19/83
H-31 The National Radiological Protection Board. 7/19/83
H-33 Thomas M. Roberts, Acting Chairman, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. 8/10/84
H-34 William Thompson, M.D., Hattiesburg, Mississippi. 8/10/84
H-35 David Okrent, University of California at Los Angeles. 5/22/85
H-37 Robert H. Neill,, Director, New Mexico Environmental
Evaluation Group. 5/22/85
A-9
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H-38 Russell Jim, Manager, Nuclear Waste Program, Yakima
Indian Nation, Toppenish, Washington. 6/4/85
Date
Section K docketed
K-l Louis G. Williams, Ph.D., Northport, Alabama. 6/3/83
K-2 San Diego Gas & Electric, San Diego, California,
signed by L. Bernath, Manager, Nuclear Department. 6/7/83
K-3 The Georgia Department of Natural Resources signed by
James C. Hardeman, Manager, Environmental Radiation
Program. 6/14/83
K-4 The Suffolk Nuclear Study Group, Mastic, New York,
signed by Bill Hafner, Director. 6/15/83
K-5 The Washington State Department of Ecology, signed by
Donald W. Moos, Director, Department of Ecology, and
Susan E. Gould, Chair, Nuclear Waste Policy and Review
Board, and Chair, Nuclear Waste Advisory Council. 6/20/83
K-6 Harmon & Weiss, Washington, D.C., signed by Dean R.
Tousley on behalf of the Yakima Indian Nation. 6/20/83
K—7 The New Mexico Environmental Evaluation Group, signed
by Robert H. Neill, Director. 6/20/83
K-8 Joseph H. Gross, El Paso, Texas. 6/20/83
K-9 The Wisconsin Radioactive Waste Review Board, signed
by DuWayne R. Gebken for Patrick J. Walsh, Executive
Director. 6/20/83
K-10 The Environmental Policy Institute, Washington, D.C.,
signed by David Berick, Director, Nuclear Waste Project. 6/20/83
K-ll Kerr-McGee Corporation, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, signed
by W.J. Shelley, Vice-President, Nuclear Licensing and
Regulation. 6/20/83
K-12 The Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
Washington, D.C., signed by Thomas B. Cochran,
Senior Staff Scientist, and Barbara A. Finamore,
Project Attorney. 6/21/83
K-13 The Southwest Research and Information Center,
Albuquerque, New Mexico, signed by Don Hancock,
Information Coordinator. 6/21/83
A-10
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K-14 The Colorado Department of Health, signed for Albert
J. Hazle, Director, Radiation Control Division. 6/21/83
K-15 The American Institute of Chemical Engineers, signed
by J.A. Buckham, Chairman, Nuclear Waste Task Force,
Government Programs Steering Committee. 6/21/83
K-16 The Groundwater Alliance, Ketchum, Idaho, signed
by Elizabeth Paul. 6/21/83
K-17 Mary Green, Hattiesburg, Mississippi. 6/21/83
K-18 The Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc., Bethesda,
Maryland, signed by Carl Walske. 6/21/83
K-19 The Edison Electric Institute, Washington, D.C.,
signed by John J. Kearney, Senior Vice-President. 6/22/83
K-20 The Minnesota Project, Minneapolis, Minnesota, signed
by Barbara J. Johnson, Coordinator, Radioactive Waste
Project. 6/23/83
K-21 The Nuclear Information and Resource Service,
Washington, D.C., signed by Laura Worby, Nuclear
Waste Specialist. 6/23/83
K-22 The Nevada Department of Energy, signed by James I.
Barnes, Director. 6/28/83
K-23 The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, signed by
Robert E. Browning, Acting Director, Division of
Waste Management. 7/14/83
K-24 The Washington State Department of Ecology, signed by
Donald M. Moos, Director, and Susan E. Gould, Chair,
Nuclear Waste Policy and Review Board, and Chair,
Nuclear Waste Advisory Council. 7/15/83
K-25 The Governor of New Mexico. 9/8/83
Date
Section L docketed
L-l The U.S. Department of Energy, signed by William A.
Vaughan, Assistant Secretary, Environmental Protection,
Safety, and Emergency Preparedness. 6/22/83
L-3 The Michigan Department of Health, signed by James
Harmon for Gloria R. Smith, Director. 7/5/83
L-4 The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection,
signed by George J. Tyler, Assistant Commissioner. 7/14/83
A-ll
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L-5 The Texas Governor's Office, signed by Steve Frishman,
Director, Nuclear Waste Programs Office. 7/18/83
L-6 The U.S. Department of the Interior, signed by Bruce
Blanchard, Director, Environmental Project Review. 7/22/83
L-7 The Sierra Club National Energy Committee, signed by
Marvin Resnikoff. 8/16/83
L-8 Governor Earl of Wisconsin. 9/2/83
L-9 William D. Wiley, Phoenix, Arizona. 10/18/83
L-10 Governor Bryan of Nevada. 2/10/84
L-ll Thomas Kalitowski, Chairman of the Minnesota Governor's
High-Level Radioactive Waste Task Force. 2/10/84
L-12 David C. Treen, Governor of Louisiana. 2/10/84
L-13 Mark White, Governor of Texas. 3/12/84
L-14 Thomas F. Hartnett, Congressman from South Carolina. 4/26/84
L-15 Joseph Goldberg, New Mexico Secretary for Health
& Environment. 5/25/84
L-16 Tom Kalitowski, Chairman, Minnesota Governor's Task
Force on High-Level Radioactive Waste. 5/29/84
A-12
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