&EPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Solid Waste and
Emergency Response
(5305W)
EPA530-K-95-010
December 1995
Planning for
Disaster Debris
Printed on paper that contains
at least 20% recycled fiber
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U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Office of Solid Waste
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This guide highlights the need for communities to plan for the
cleanup of debris after a major natural disaster. Based on lessons
learned from communities that have experienced such disasters, this
guide contains information to help communities prepare for and
recover more quickly from the increased solid waste generated by a
natural disaster.
The following individuals shared their knowledge and experiences of
recovery from natural disasters and provided input to this guide:
Joan Edwards, Ellyn Hae, and Kelly Ingalls
City of Los Angeles, California
David Paulson
Erie County, Ohio
Chris Doyle and Larry Latham
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Dale Berton, William Himes, and Wayne Rifer
Kauai County, Hawaii
Steve Etcher and Charles Friedrichs
Lincoln County, Missouri
Gary Saul
Mecklenburg County, North Carolina
Deborah Higer
Metro-Bade County, Florida
Robert Grubbs
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
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Hurricane debris 2
Earthquake debris 3
Tornado debris 3
Flood debris 4
Fire debris 4
Congress and the President 5
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 5
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USAGE) 5
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 6
State governments 7
Other government assistance 7
Make a long-term debris management plan 8
Consider mutual aid arrangements 8
Implement recycling programs 8
Update the community's solid waste management plan 8
Develop a communication strategy 9
Prepare for increased outreach and enforcement staffing needs 9
Obtain equipment and supplies 9
Select collection and storage sites 9
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Determine management options and goals 10
Segregate hazardous waste 10
Prepare contracts 10
Plan for FEMA and state reimbursement 10
Los Angeles, California—The Northridge Earthquake 11
Lincoln County, Missouri—The Midwest Floods 14
Metro-Dade County, Florida—Hurricane Andrew 16
Mecklenburg County, North Carolina—Hurricane Hugo 18
Kauai, Hawaii—Hurricane Iniki 20
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 22
EPA regional offices 22
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Hotline 23
RCRA Information Center 23
Magazine articles 23
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very year natural disasters, such as fires,
floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, and
tornadoes, challenge American commu-
nities. These natural disasters have generated
large amounts of debris, causing considerable
disposal challenges for local public officials. If
you answer yes to any of the following ques-
tions, your community could benefit from the
advice and information presented in this guide.
28 Is your community at risk of significant
damage from a natural disaster?
St Does your emergency plan ignore disaster
debris cleanup or rely on open burning or
unengineered burial of the debris?
255 Has your community updated its solid
waste management1 plans with recycling
policies that are not included in your emer-
gency response plan?
SI Does your emergency plan need updating to
reflect recent changes in the community's
solid waste management practices and facil-
ities (e.g., landfill closures, new recycling
programs, or regionalization of services)?
In the past, debris from disasters was simply
buried or burned in the community. As demon-
strated by recent disasters, burying or burning
debris as a means of waste management may
not be acceptable. Citizens do not want to
inhale the smoke from open burning. Munici-
palities do not want to risk contamination of
drinking water and soil from uncontrolled
burial of debris. Under normal circumstances,
much municipal solid waste is recycled. The
remainder is disposed of in sanitary landfills or
in sophisticated combustors, both of which are
equipped with devices to control pollutants.
Often, however, these standard waste disposal
options are not sufficient to handle the over-
whelming amount of debris left after a disaster.
Further adding to the disposal dilemma is the
fact that many municipalities are reluctant to
overburden or deplete their existing disposal
capacity with disaster debris.
Any community likely to be faced with
significant debris from a natural disaster
should develop a debris management plan. To
facilitate coordination, this plan could be a
specific task under the community's general
emergency plan. This guide, based on experi-
ences of other communities, suggests some
helpful planning considerations. It describes
steps a community can take to prepare for
dealing with the waste created by natural dis-
asters and to speed recovery after such disas-
ters. It also describes ways communities can
reduce the burden on their municipal solid
waste management systems in the event of a
natural disaster.
This guide does not provide all the tools a
planner will need to write a debris manage-
ment plan, however. The development of a dis-
aster debris management plan usually requires
input from neighboring communities, state
officials, local contractors, and a variety of
local agencies. This guide is intended to help a
planner begin the development process.
1 In this guide, the term "solid waste management" refers to all phases of nonhazardous solid waste removal and handling,
including collection, transportation, sorting, processing, recycling, reduction, combustion, and land-filling.
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Debris removal is a major component of
every disaster recovery operation. Much of the
debris generated from natural disasters is not
hazardous. Soil, building material, and green
waste, such as trees and shrubs, make up
most of the volume of disaster debris. Most
of this waste can be recycled into useful com-
modities. Debris from hurricanes, earthquakes,
tornadoes, floods, and fires falls into a few
major categories, as shown in the table on the
facing page.
U atural disasters strike with varying
degrees of severity and pose both
H short- and long-term challenges to
public service providers. The most severe
natural disasters generate debris in quantities
that can overwhelm existing solid waste man-
agement facilities or force communities to use
disposal options that otherwise would not be
acceptable. The table below gives examples of
how much debris was generated in a few
recent natural disasters.
Hurricanes generate high-velocity winds,
cause oceans to surge well above high tide
levels, and create waves in inland waters.
Hurricanes leave behind debris made up of
construction materials, damaged buildings,
sediments, green waste, and personal property.
Hurricane debris obstructs roads and disables
electrical power and communication systems
over wide areas.
Most of the damage and resulting debris is
in the area where the hurricane first hits land;
Disaster Debris Volume Examples
Metro-Dade County, FL Hurricane Andrew August 1992
Los Angeles, CA
Northridge Earthquake January 1994
43 million cubic yards of
disaster debris in Metro-Dade
County alone
7 million cubic yards of
disaster debris
Kami, HI
Hurricane Iniki
September 1992 5 million cubic yards of
disaster debris
Mecklenburg County, NC Hurricane Hugo
September 1989 2 million cubic yards of
green waste2
2 In this guide, the term "green waste" refers to all types of organic yard and landscaping waste, including shrubs, leaves,
grass, and tree materials. "Wood waste" refers to tree limbs that have been ground into mulch.
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however, the destruction also can extend many
miles inland. For example, in 1989, Hurricane
Hugo made landfall at Charleston, South
Carolina, and continued inland, causing great
damage as it cut across the state and into
North Carolina. The hurricane generated
400,000 tons of green waste in Mecklenburg
County, North Carolina, 200 miles from
Charleston. This amount of green waste would
have taken up two years of landfill capacity,
while only two and a half years of capacity was
available in the local landfill. The county con-
sidered burning the green waste, but rejected
the idea to protect the county's air quality.
Instead, all the debris was ground up into
mulch and given away to local citizens and
businesses for use.
Earthquakes generate shock waves and dis-
place the ground along fault lines. These seis-
mic forces can bring down buildings and
bridges in a localized area and damage build-
ings and other structures in a far wider area.
Secondary damage from fires, explosions, and
localized flooding from broken water pipes can
increase the amount of debris. Earthquake
debris includes building materials, personal
property, and sediment from landslides.
Los Angeles is still collecting and manag-
ing debris from the Northridge earthquake that
hit the city in January 1994. The amount of
debris reached 3 million tons at the end of July
1995. Three months into the debris removal
process, city officials decided to attempt to
recycle as much of the debris as possible to
conserve the remaining landfill capacity. Most
of the waste was construction and demolition
(C&D) debris, which could be processed by
local recycling businesses. City officials
worked with the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) and local busi-
nesses to expand existing recycling capacity
and approve permits, thereby enhancing the
ability of these businesses to meet the city's
waste management needs. The city developed
contracts with existing businesses, provided
them with clean source-separated materials,
and piloted a project to recycle mixed debris.
After one year, the city had created more than
10,000 tons of new, privately operated daily
processing capacity for mixed and source-
separated debris.
Damage from tornadoes is caused by high-
velocity rotating winds. The severity of the
damage depends on the size of the tornado fun-
nel and the length of time the funnel touches
the ground. Damage is generally confined to a
narrow path extending up to half a mile wide
and from a hundred yards to several miles long.
Tornado debris includes damaged and destroyed
structures, green waste, and personal property.
The city of Sandusky, Ohio, did not have
a plan for managing disaster debris when a
Major Categories of Disaster Debris
Hurricanes
Earthquakes
Tornadoes
Floods
Fires
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tornado hit in July 1992. Cleanup took about
two and a half months and involved approxi-
mately 600 tons of waste, most of which was
green waste. City officials found that the two
greatest obstacles to managing the debris were
communicating instructions to residents and
sorting the green waste to maximize chipping
and mulching efficiency.
Debris from floods is caused by structural
inundation and high-velocity water flow. As
soon as flood waters recede, people begin to
dispose of flood-damaged household items.
Mud, sediment, sandbags, and other reinforcing
materials also add to the volume of debris
needing management, as do materials from
demolished and dismantled houses.
After the Midwest flood in the summer of
1993, officials in Lincoln County, Missouri,
handled the flood debris through dropoff cen-
ters as well as county collection. The debris
included appliances, wood, shingles, insula-
tion, tires, materials containing asbestos, and
household hazardous waste. To comply with
state solid waste regulations and county recy-
cling goals, county staff and contractors segre-
gated the debris by waste type. Scrap dealers
picked up the appliances, and individuals sal-
vaged the wood. Tires were cut in half for dis-
posal in approved landfills or ground for
roadside use. After the flood, the state of
Missouri temporarily set aside its recycling
policy, which prohibited landfilling of com-
postable materials, so that communities could
landfill leaves and yard waste. A hazardous
waste contractor collected and disposed of
household hazardous waste.
While fires leave less debris than other
types of disasters, they still generate much
waste. For example, demolished houses con-
tribute noncombustible debris. Burned out
cars and other metal objects, as well as ash
and charred wood waste, also must be man-
aged. In addition, large-scale loss of plants serv-
ing as ground cover can lead to mud slides,
adding debris to the waste stream.
In Malibu, California, one of the com-
munities hit hardest in 1993 by coastal fires,
268 houses were destroyed; most of them
burned to their foundations. Malibu removed
fallen trees as well as dead trees that might
have fallen on roads or homes, and chipped
the trees for mulch. The city left other dead
trees standing to help prevent erosion. The
city gave property owners six weeks to
remove their own debris, then began removing
remaining household debris. In clearing the fire
debris from about 175 properties, the city
collected the same amount of solid waste nor-
mally collected in an entire year. The city
recycled some concrete and asphalt and lifted
daily landfill limits to accommodate the rest of
the debris.
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• f the President declares a community a
H natural disaster area, considerable federal
• assistance is available from FEMA. In
addition to FEMA, the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (USAGE) and the U.S. Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) can provide federal
assistance. Most natural disasters, however, do
not qualify for full federal assistance.
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act sets forth federal
disaster relief responsibilities and procedures.
Among many other activities, the Stafford Act
authorizes debris removal in "the public inter-
est ... from publicly and privately owned
lands and water." The President makes the
final decision to declare an area a natural disas-
ter and therefore eligible for federal assistance.
The Stafford Act authorizes FEMA to
respond to disasters and emergencies in order to
help save lives and protect public health, safety,
and property. FEMA operates under specific reg-
ulations, which are spelled out in Section
206.224 of Title 44 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR). The Stafford Act and the
CFR use the term debris removal in a broad
sense to encompass the entire process of remov-
ing, handling, recycling, and disposing of debris.
The CFR declares debris removal to be "in the
public interest," not only to protect "life, public
health, and safety" but also to "ensure econ-
omic recovery of the affected community."
Thus, the authorizing statements in the Stafford
Act and CFR are broad and inclusive.
For communities to qualify for FEMA
assistance, the effort needed to recover from
the disaster must be of such magnitude as to
be beyond the capabilities of the state or local
government. A local government must make a
declaration of natural disaster to the state
emergency management agency, and the state's
governor must request through FEMA that the
President declare the affected area a disaster.
Once the President concurs, the local govern-
ment becomes eligible for reimbursement of
some portion of its debris management expens-
es and other disaster recovery costs. FEMA also
opens a Regional Operations Center and a
Disaster Field Office in the affected area to co-
ordinate efforts with local and state authorities.
Once the declaration is made by the
President, FEMA negotiates the disaster relief
efforts with the state emergency management
agency. The state agency represents the local
communities during this discussion. FEMA
staff advise local government officials regard-
ing the activities eligible for reimbursement
specific to that community; FEMA also sets
reasonable cost standards for these activities.
Under the Stafford Act, FEMA is authorized to
pay for activities to handle debris posing an
immediate threat to the public, generally
including debris removal, transportation, vol-
ume reduction at staging areas, and ultimate
disposal. FEMA requires careful recordkeeping
regarding expenditures for communities to
obtain reimbursement. FEMA may fund recy-
cling of disaster debris if the local government
has in place prior to the natural disaster a
policy emphasizing recycling, or if the local
government can demonstrate that recycling is
a cost-effective debris management option.
FEMA does not respond alone to natural
disasters. Other federal agencies also have
substantial roles. In particular, two agencies
are involved in hazardous and nonhazardous
waste management.
The Department of Defense is responsible
for emergency support related to public works
and engineering, and has designated USAGE as
its operating agent. USAGE provides technical
advice and evaluations, engineering services,
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construction management and inspection,
emergency contracting, emergency repair of
wastewater and solid waste facilities, and real-
estate support.
USAGE assistance is arranged through
FEMA. In the Miami area after Hurricane
Andrew in 1992, USAGE removed debris in the
hardest hit areas by contracting with six large
general contractors.
EPA is the primary agency responsible for
emergency support related to hazardous mate-
rials. EPA responds to releases of hazardous
materials and provides technical assistance for
environmental monitoring needs. EPA regional
offices also can provide technical assistance on
municipal solid waste issues.
tate and local governments are commu-
"^•3= nities' first source of assistance in the
wake of a natural disaster and in plan-
ning for disaster debris management. Such
assistance is available to communities impact-
ed by disasters, regardless of whether they
receive a federal disaster declaration.
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The state emergency management agency
and state waste management agency have spe-
cific roles to play in cleaning up disaster debris.
The state emergency management agency
serves as the local government's liaison to
FEMA and can provide information for emer-
gency planning. This state agency also can help
represent the local government's interests to
FEMA during a disaster and cleanup. The state
waste management agency's role can be to make
special accommodations for the unusual waste
management needs resulting from a natural dis-
aster. For example, this agency could tempor-
arily lift permit requirements for solid waste
facilities. In addition, specialized assistance is
often available from other state agencies.
Both state and local governments may
enter into mutual aid agreements with other
state and local governments prior to any disas-
ter. Such an agreement could provide for either
binding commitments or nonbinding inten-
tions of support by state and local govern-
ments to assist one another in the event of a
disaster. Through these agreements, communi-
ties can loan equipment and personnel with
specific expertise or experience.
The Southern Regional Emergency
Management Assistance Compact is an example
of a mutual aid agreement originally signed by
17 states, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
The resolution supporting this pact now has
been offered to all states and includes model
legislation for state legislatures. The compact
also contains broad language and a legal frame-
work addressing authority, liability, licensing,
reimbursement, injury or death benefits, and
use of the National Guard. For more informa-
tion on the Southern Regional Emergency
Management Assistance Compact, contact:
The Southern Governors' Association
The Hall of the States
444 North Capitol Street, NW.
Washington, DC 20001
202 624-5897
IJJ^Iareparing a disaster debris management
H^Pplan in advance can pay off in the event
• of a natural disaster. Planning can help
a community identify its debris collection,
recycling, and disposal options. Although the
recovery process will take a long time, perhaps
even years, careful planning will prevent costly
mistakes, speed recovery, and avoid creation of
more waste. A plan also can save money by
identifying cost-effective debris management
options and sources of help, increasing control
over debris management in your community,
and improving administrative efficiency.
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following suggestions for disaster
•j debris planning are based on insights
• from community officials who recently
have experienced a major natural disaster.
Implementing a plan for recycling disaster
debris is much easier if a community already
has a recycling program in place. Permitting,
enforcement, collection, processing, and mar-
keting issues already will have been largely
resolved. After a disaster, the community will
be faced with expanding current recycling prac-
tices rather than designing and implementing
new practices. It is much easier to expand
existing capacities and markets than to start
these endeavors in the wake of a disaster.
Every community consulted suggested
increasing existing emergency planning to
include long-term debris management. Because
natural disasters can generate tremendous quan-
tities of debris, communities should plan for the
worst case. Any plan should include a detailed
strategy for debris collection, temporary storage
and staging areas, recycling, disposal, hazardous
waste identification and handling, administra-
tion, and dissemination of information to the
public. Distribute the plan and work with per-
sonnel from each agency to ensure that the plan
can be implemented quickly and smoothly.
Review the plan at least once a year, and revise
it as needed. For example, outdated forms, such
as time sheets and materials tracking forms,
may need to be replaced.
Mutual aid arrangements allow communi-
ties to quickly access specialized personnel or
equipment on a short-term basis. Usually the
host community pays the expenses for the per-
sonnel as well as any maintenance or repair
costs for equipment. These agreements can be
developed for a local geographic area or can
extend to communities in other states. The
agreements can be formal or informal.
It is important that a community's solid
waste management plan reflect current prac-
tices and policies, especially those that apply
in disaster situations. The plan is an official
document that often is filed with the state, and
when regional solid waste services or facilities
are involved, a copy often is provided to neigh-
boring communities as well. It also can be
beneficial to share the plan with private con-
tractors and other community agencies (e.g., fire
and police) that in the event of a disaster would
be involved with solid waste management
services. Should a disaster occur, supporting
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agencies would find the plan useful because it
describes established practices and policies, as
well as the types, locations, and capacities of
existing solid waste recycling and disposal facil-
ities. Reflecting current practices and policies,
the plan also would serve as a resource docu-
ment in negotiating technical and financial
assistance with FEMA and other agencies.
Prepare a communication strategy ahead of
time. Government officials will need to tell the
community when, where, and how trash collec-
tion will resume, as well as provide special
instructions for reporting and sorting disaster
debris. Many communities have prepared radio
announcements and flyers as part of the emer-
gency plan. Depending on the type and severity
of the natural disaster, however, a community
might lose electricity, telephone service, radio
broadcasting capability, or newspaper service.
Therefore, communities should prepare for
more than one method of communication.
Discuss with local media companies the use of
free advertising time and space to communicate
instructions in the event of a disaster.
In the aftermath of a natural disaster,
waste management staff must handle an
increased number of telephone calls and
requests concerning waste removal.
Communities need more staff to train and
monitor debris collection contractors, enforce
disposal restrictions, and help solve implemen-
tation problems. Identify sources of temporary
labor and, if your community is culturally
diverse, consider the use of a multilingual
telephone bank.
Identify in advance the types of equipment
and supplies that your crews will need to imple-
ment the plan. Plan for quick procurement of
these items through mutual aid agreements or
standing contracts, or consider stockpiling this
equipment. If stockpiling is too expensive for
one community alone, perhaps the state could
stockpile the equipment.
Types of equipment that a community
might need include chain saws, portable gener-
ators, cellular phones, flashlights, batteries,
vehicle repair equipment (flat tires occur more
often because of glass and metal debris in
roads), and extra work clothing. A local govern-
ment that routinely stores drinking water e.g.,
for its solid waste collection crews) might want
to make sure that water supplies are well-
stocked during the hurricane or flood season.
The most common suggestion from com-
munities that have experienced natural disas-
ters is to pre-select debris staging sites that will
be used for temporary storage and processing of
debris. Convenient local sites allow collection
crews to reduce travel time when transferring
debris to processing or disposal facilities and
result in faster street clearing. Site operators
can sort debris for recycling or disposal, as well
as answer questions from the public. These
sites can be used to store green waste before
transferring it to another facility, or they can be
used to chip and mulch green waste on site.
Communities also can use these sites to dis-
tribute free mulch or wood to the public.
Select the sites based on planned activities,
such as staging, collection, storage, sorting,
recycling, landfilling, and burning of debris.
Pre-selection of sites speeds the implementa-
tion of the debris management plan. Also con-
sider access to heavy equipment, lack of impact
on environmentally sensitive areas, and conven-
ience to collection routes. Investigate possible
impacts on adjacent housing, since the sites
could produce noise at levels deemed unaccept-
able by residents or attract rodents that may
carry disease. Evaluate and document the con-
dition of these sites prior to use. The govern-
ment agencies involved will be responsible for
returning these sites to their original condition.
Be sure to establish agreement on the schedule
for return of the property to the owners and the
degree of rehabilitation to the property.
If residents will be asked to bring disaster
debris to collection sites, your community
should include these locations in its disaster
communication strategy, so that information is
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immediately available to the public in the
event of a disaster. Schedules and staffing plans
for these sites should take into account that
the busiest times for residents dropping off
home-related debris are likely to be evenings
and weekends.
Any disaster debris management plan should
include a disposal strategy. Communities need
to set priorities for recycling wastes and deter-
mine the desired disposal options for the remain-
ing waste.
Determine what equipment and staff
resources your community needs in the event
of a disaster. Any assistance that will not be
provided by state and other local governments
must be obtained through contracts. If con-
tracted work seems likely at the state or com-
munity level, consider bidding an emergency
contract, as is commonly done for snow
removal. The request for proposals (RFP) may
include service for debris collection, storage,
sorting, processing, marketing, and disposal.
Investigate FEMA reimbursement policies and
ensure that the terms described in the RFP are
likely to meet FEMA and state requirements in
the event that your community qualifies for
federal or state reimbursement.
Be prepared to segregate hazardous from
nonhazardous disaster debris; otherwise your
community might be forced to dispose of the
combined waste as hazardous waste. Monitor
collected business waste to be certain it does
not meet the definition of hazardous waste.
Waste handlers must understand these require-
ments as well as have a plan for controlling
and diverting the hazardous waste from the
debris stream.
Consider staffing needs to meet the record-
keeping requirements for FEMA reimburse-
ment of disaster debris management costs.
Some states reimburse some costs even if the
disaster does not qualify for federal reimburse-
ment funds. Discuss recordkeeping require-
ments with your state emergency planning
agency. Your community, particularly if it is
small, might benefit from identifying in
advance people who have experience in obtain-
ing reimbursement.
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f course, every community hopes it never has to use its disaster debris manage -
• U merit plan, but when a disaster does hit, prepared communities can recover
more quickly than other communities. Below are disaster debris case studies
from an earthquake, a flood, and three hurricanes. These case studies include examples
of situations in which planning paid off, as well as circumstances in which the lack of
planning slowed recovery.
The Northridge Earthquake
city of Los Angeles relied heavily on
•j recycling to manage debris from its
• January 1994 earthquake. In response to
the earthquake, city staff negotiated with
FEMA to designate recycling as the preferred
method of debris management. The city devel-
oped contracts with existing businesses to
recycle clean source-separated materials and
worked with more than nine businesses to
develop processing capacity for mixed debris.
By midsummer, the city was able to recycle
about 50 percent of the earthquake debris col-
lected each week. By July 1995, the city was
recycling over 86 percent of the debris collect-
ed, totaling over \Vi million tons.
The city of Los Angeles did not have a plan
for debris management prior to the earthquake
but quickly developed debris management pro-
cedures after the disaster. The day after the
earthquake struck, the city instituted a curb-
side debris collection program, which did not
include recycling. C&D debris under normal
conditions makes up 10 to 15 percent of the
Los Angeles waste stream. Prior to the 1994
earthquake, one local company processed 150
tons of C&D waste per day. After the earth-
quake, the city picked up as much as 10,000
tons of C&D waste per day. City officials
updated an existing list of licensed, insured
debris removal contractors and asked them
to attend an orientation and to sign hastily
drafted contracts for debris removal.
At first, contracts for debris removal were
only two pages long and contracted for one
week of work. These early contracts allowed
the city to begin removing debris quickly, yet
did not include recycling or other requirements
such as subcontracting parameters. Contracts
ultimately grew to 22 pages. The city assigned
each contractor a grid of streets to clear. City
inspectors (pulled from other assignments)
monitored contractors and kept records to
determine whether debris in each area was col-
lected within seven days of being set out.
When contractors expended their total contract
amounts, city officials placed them at the bot-
tom of the list of approved contractors and
called them again when their turns came.
After two months of negotiation, FEMA
allowed the city to include recycling as a
debris removal method. This decision was
based primarily on the city's local policy sup-
porting recycling and a recycling pilot that
documented a potential 82 percent recycling
rate. Contractors began separate collections of
wood, metal, dirt, concrete and asphalt, and red
clay brick. The city required the contractors to
send any debris that could not be separated to
facilities that recycled at least 80 percent of the
mixed debris.
Most of the materials collected were recy-
clable. Recyclers crushed concrete and asphalt
(mixed with up to 15 percent dirt) and sold it
for use as sub-base in roads. They reused dirt as
landfill cover and soil amendment. They
ground and screened wood, selling fine pieces
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by the cubic yard for landscaping and coarse
pieces for cogeneration fuel or compost.
Recycling facilities either ground up brick for
use on baseball infields or chipped it for use in
landscaping. Scrap metal dealers recycled
metal waste.
By December 1995, four facilities were
capable of recycling mixed debris. Two of them
used an automated process that screened out
fine debris and sent the remainder along a con-
veyor belt where workers removed and sepa-
rated wood, brick, metal, and trash by hand. A
vibrating screen removed any dirt left in the
remaining stream. At the end of the process,
only clean concrete and asphalt were left.
City officials also ensured that debris
would be recycled by providing training and
incentives to haulers. For example, city offi-
cials required haulers to develop a recycling
plan that included scouting for recyclables
and dedicating trucks to a given type of
waste, so that debris separated at the curb did
not become mixed in the truck. The city also
created a contract performance incentive that
placed source-separated recycling higher than
mixed recycling. With these efforts, the city
expanded its C&D recycling capacity by a
minimum of 10,300 tons per day. Immediately
after the earthquake, all debris was disposed of
in three landfills. Just over a year later, the
city had added 18 recycling facilities and one
landfill. This expansion helped to meet a long-
term goal to increase recycling of routine
C&D waste.
By the end of the program, the city had
recycled almost 56 percent of all materials col-
lected since the day of the earthquake for less
than the cost of disposal. The city demon-
strated that when sufficient recycling facility
capacity exists, a recycling rate of over 86 per-
cent can be achieved. This total would have
been much higher, in fact, had the city imple-
mented recycling in the beginning of the
recovery effort. To prepare for the possibility
of future disasters, Los Angeles has issued an
RFP for a contingency contract for various
waste management activities, including the
use of sites in the event of a natural disaster.
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Soon after the earthquake, officials placed
news stories and advertisements to inform the
public that they could leave debris for pickup
on the street in a pile as wide as a parked car.
At first, the city allowed residents to leave
mixed debris at the curb. Later, city officials
asked residents to separate the following mate-
rials: concrete and asphalt (these could be
mixed), dirt, red clay brick, wood, and all other
material. Residents had been accustomed to
the relaxed requirements that allowed them
to set out mixed debris, however, so crews of
specially hired city workers distributed
doorhangers requesting residents to separate
their debris. Where residents still did not sepa-
rate debris into its recyclable components,
work crews preceded the debris haulers and
separated the debris. When residents placed
yard trimmings or other non-earthquake-
related debris on the curb, workers left
doorhangers explaining why these materials
had not been picked up and giving directions
on how to dispose of the materials. In the first
eight months after the earthquake, debris
haulers collected 122,000 truck loads of debris.
The city relied on both residents and city
staff to determine which locations needed
debris pickups. A telephone bank, staffed by
English-, Spanish-, and Korean-speaking opera-
tors, fielded requests for pickups from residents.
Staff entered the address of each caller into a
geographic information system database and
regularly produced maps showing areas needing
pickups. At the same time, city inspectors
supervising the debris management work
reported streets where debris had accumulated.
Los Angeles was largely self-sufficient in
managing its earthquake debris. If the quantity
of debris had been greater, the city would have
asked for assistance from USAGE (through
FEMA), the state of California, and other
states. Other agencies provided some assis-
tance. The California Office of Emergency
Services provided a liaison to FEMA and
issued emergency regulations expanding per-
mit hours for solid waste facilities.
FEMA funded the debris recycling pro-
gram, including paying recycling facility tip-
ping fees, as well as the costs associated with
hiring data entry staff and contracting with a
consultant to manage recycling efforts. For the
period of May 14, 1995, through July 15, 1995,
the average tipping fee to use the recycling
facilities was $21.55 per ton versus $24.92 per
ton for disposal facilities, resulting in an aver-
age savings of $3.37 per ton. In addition,
recycling saved the city transportation costs
since recycling facilities were closer to the
devastated areas and many had shorter lines.
California's Integrated Waste Management
Board helped Los Angeles obtain this funding
by writing a letter to FEMA stating that recy-
cling was state policy. Los Angeles, like every
community in California, has been required to
submit a plan for source reduction, recycling,
and composting under the state's Integrated
Waste Management and Litter Reduction Act.
FEMA determined that since Los Angeles had
a recycling policy prior to the earthquake, the
city did not need to demonstrate that recy-
cling would save money in order to obtain
FEMA funding.
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The Midwest Floods
Midwest floods in the summer of
•j 1993 inundated 75 towns and more than
• 20 million acres of land in nine states.
The flood damaged or destroyed an estimated
50,000 homes and ruined household belongings
in thousands of other homes that were flooded.
One rural county that borders the Mississippi
River, Lincoln County, Missouri, developed a
successful debris management program with a
significant recycling component.
Lincoln County initiated separate debris
cleanup programs for three types of debris:
Crews cleared mud and sand from roads
and moved it into roadside drainage
ditches. Later the ditches were cleared
of the dirt and sand to restore drainage.
Crews delivered the dirt to farmers, who
used it for topsoil.
were likely to encounter. Staff separated
about 25 percent of the debris, including
appliances, wood, shingles, insulation,
tires, materials containing asbestos, and
household hazardous waste. Scrap dealers
picked up the appliances; individuals sal-
vaged wood. Missouri's recycling policy
prohibiting landfilling of compostable
materials (leaves and yard waste) was
temporarily lifted after the flood.
Substantial household hazardous waste
accumulated at the collection sites. If
sorters were unsure whether particular
materials were hazardous (e.g., shingles
and insulation), they set them aside as spe-
cial debris. The waste hauler then deter-
mined whether these materials should be
taken to a hazardous or nonhazardous
waste landfill. The hauler placed leaking
hazardous waste containers into sealed
containers. No hazardous materials leaked
onto the ground, so no soil remediation
was needed at the collection sites.
Soon after the flood waters began receding,
county officials placed containers for
household flood debris at one site in each
of the county's four towns along the river.
The county contracted with a private
waste management firm to haul approxi-
mately 700 containers of debris, ranging in
capacity from 40 to 90 tons, to a landfill.
Initially, staff operated the collection sites
10 hours per day. Officials soon increased
operating time to 24 hours per day because
residents dropped off more debris at night
than during the day. County residents
brought household flood debris to the col-
lection sites and left it on the ground. The
county used a hi-lift, a tractor with a bucket
on the front, to lift heavy items into large
containers. Site staff were responsible for
sorting materials for recycling, as well as
separating out hazardous waste. The waste
management contractor provided guidance
on the types of hazardous waste sorters
Approximately 300 houses in Lincoln
County sustained damage amounting to
more than 50 percent of the value of the
house. Most of these homeowners chose to
sell their properties to the county in a buy-
out and demolition program. FEMA and the
state Community Development Block
Grant program, which is connected with a
Department of Housing and Urban
Development program, funded the program.
Once the county purchased the houses
slated for demolition, county crews worked
to remove and separate salvageable or non-
burnable items from the homes. Crews
removed vinyl siding, windows, asphalt
shingles, insulation, cabinets, appliances,
furniture, electrical cables, piping, rafters,
studs, and decks. The demolition contrac-
tor then had the option to sell or give away
as much of these materials as possible
before disposing of what remained. The
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contractor then could easily demolish the
shell of each house, which consisted
almost entirely of wood.
An air curtain burner combusted the demo-
lition debris and unsalvaged items from the
houses. Other debris was landfilled.
A mass mailing of over 1,000 letters was
sent to residents in the Lincoln County flood-
plain. Information also was distributed through
a local newspaper. The county's communica-
tion strategy differed for each of the three
types of debris generated.
Through phone calls and advertisements in
local newspapers, the county found farmers
interested in taking the soil debris piled by the
roadside. County crews removing soil from
ditches delivered some of the soil to their farms.
The county publicized the household debris
collection program through public meetings,
newspapers, and radio, but ultimately word of
mouth was the most effective communication
mechanism. Signs on the road identified each
collection site. The county informed residents 30
days prior to the closing of the collection sites.
A series of public meetings was held
throughout the county to inform residents of
the home buyout program. County staff respon-
sible for assessing flood damage to houses met
daily for breakfast from 6 to 7 a.m. at a centrally
located restaurant in the flood area and wel-
comed homeowners to meet with them and
learn about the buyout program. The county
also notified residents of the program with
posters at the same restaurant and at a resort
community at the northern end of the flood
area. As of July 1995, Lincoln County had com-
pleted over 250 buyouts, had demolished and
recycled over 200 homes, and was expecting to
purchase and remove an additional 150 homes
from the flood plain.
The Boonslick Regional Planning
Commission, a local government group,
recruited staff for the collection sites and the
pre-demolition salvage crews. U.S. Department
of Labor funds paid for these services through
the Jobs Training Partnership Act program.
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Hurricane Andrew
Hi m urricane Andrew, which struck the
Florida coast on August 24, 1992, left
• • an estimated 6 million tons of debris
in Metro-Dade County (Greater Miami). This
included downed trees and debris from 150,000
houses that were severely damaged or com-
pletely destroyed. Because of the extent of the
destruction, Miami received help in collecting
hurricane debris from USAGE through FEMA.
Since the hurricane, to streamline the
administration of hauling contracts in the event
of future disasters, Metro-Dade County has
issued an RFP for a contingency contract for
various waste management activities. The RFP
calls for two types of bids: one bid for a disposal
site plus waste hauling services and one bid for
a disposal site without waste hauling services.
Metro-Dade County instituted a hurricane
plan prior to the disaster and followed the plan's
emergency debris collection guidelines. In
accordance with the plan, the county initially
focused on both collection of garbage, because
garbage can pose the greatest health risk, and
clearing of the county's highways.
In the three weeks after the hurricane, the
amount of garbage set out by residents was
double the pre-disaster amount as people in
houses without electricity cleaned out spoiled
food from refrigerators and freezers. County
garbage collection crews worked seven days a
week, 18 hours per day to collect garbage and
clear debris from the streets.
A small number of county solid waste man-
agement employees initially could not report to
work because they needed to make emergency
repairs to their homes, obtain food for their fam-
ilies, or provide care to children or elderly depen-
dents. In these cases, other county employees
offered assistance, thereby reducing the amount
of time county employees were unable to per-
form their waste management duties.
Initially, the hurricane debris consisted
mostly of downed trees. As citizens began their
cleanup efforts, more household debris was col-
lected (e.g., rain-damaged furniture). And as
repairs began, the debris contained more C&D
wastes (e.g., drywall and roofing tiles).
The county asked residents to bring wood
and yard waste, appliances, and metal to any of
the county's 18 existing trash and recycling
dropoff centers. Wood and yard waste was
chipped for mulch. Scrap dealers took appli-
ances and metal. County officials asked resi-
dents to place other hurricane debris at the
curb and to separate nonburnable waste from
burnable waste.
Soon the trash and recycling centers were
overwhelmed with debris. The county then
opened neighborhood staging areas in parks
and similar locations where residents could
bring their wood waste. Approximately
500,000 tons of wood waste from the hurricane
were mulched and distributed to agricultural
areas, parks, and residential sites.
The county and USAGE hired debris
haulers to move debris from the curbs to stag-
ing areas. At each of the staging areas, person-
nel separated and inspected incoming loads and
removed any hazardous waste. In the northern
part of the county, the county government
established 16 zones and assigned county
resources to four zones, contracting out the
work in the remaining 12 zones to qualified
local contractors. The county divided up the
number of contracts equally to firms owned by
Whites, African Americans, and Hispanics.
USAGE contracted debris removal work in 13
zones to six out-of-state contractors. Metro-
Dade County contracted with a private firm to
haul debris from all of the staging areas to the
private firm's landfills.
The Florida Department of Environmental
Regulation allowed debris to be burned under an
emergency 30-day order. USAGE used air-curtain
burners that met all federal and state require-
ments. Some other local burn sites, however,
did not use state-of-the-art technology. Burning
at these sites led to many public complaints and
-------
protests by environmental activists. As a result,
county commissioners shut down all burning
three weeks after it began. The major problem
that arose during burning operations was com-
mingled debris that did not burn efficiently. At
USAGE burn sites, the resultant ash was tested
to determine if it was hazardous and disposed of
accordingly. After debris collection and staging
areas were cleared of all debris, the county con-
ducted soil and water testing for hazardous
waste contamination.
Metro-Dade County used different commu-
nications strategies for each stage of the debris
management effort. In the days following the
hurricane, city officials gave about 10 televi-
sion and radio interviews each day, in which
they asked residents to carry their garbage to
the nearest cleared street. Later, the county
used television, radio, and direct mail adver-
tisements. Newspaper advertisements were not
an option since the hurricane had temporarily
halted publication of Miami's daily newspaper.
Because most access into the hurricane zone
was by highway, the county also distributed
flyers at highway toll plazas. Through all of
these communication vehicles, the county told
residents and building contractors how to set
out debris, the status of debris collection in
each zone, and the sanctions against illegal
dumping. The county also added new tele-
phone lines and work stations and hired and
trained new staff to handle thousands of calls
each month about debris. Every call complain-
ing about debris piles or illegal dumping was
recorded, routed to the appropriate agency for
action, and mapped on a geographic informa-
tion system to help identify problem areas.
Metro-Dade County received extensive
assistance from USAGE in managing its hurri-
cane debris. Within three days, two general
contractors had been awarded debris removal
contracts for $3 million and had begun
removal efforts. USAGE took responsibility for
the harder hit southern half of the county,
while the county crews concentrated on the
northern half. USAGE debris removal work
went on for over two years and totaled over
$375 million.
*s?,-J?»f!
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Hurricane Hugo
H n September 1989, Hurricane Hugo created
• a solid waste crisis for Charlotte, North
• Carolina. In Mecklenburg County, North
Carolina, alone, the equivalent of 10 years'
worth of green waste was generated in just
over three hours.
The Charlotte/Mecklenburg Emergency
Management Office was well prepared to han-
dle the variety of medical, housing, and com-
munication needs presented by this disaster.
Mecklenburg County did not, however, have a
plan to deal with the enormous quantity of
debris generated by the storm. When Hugo hit,
the county was down to its last municipal solid
waste landfill, which had only IVi years of capac-
ity remaining. The county did not want to use
up its remaining landfill capacity. Because of
existing air pollution problems, burning was
not a viable option either. County officials
determined the best option would be to collect
and shred the green waste—by far the largest
category of waste—and distribute the resulting
product for use as mulch and boiler fuel.
The city of Charlotte and six other munici-
palities in Mecklenburg County were responsi-
ble for collecting the hurricane debris. Working
together, these communities spread collection
and storage locations throughout the county.
Eleven public properties were designated as
green-waste dropoff sites, including former,
present, and future landfill sites and a parcel of
land at the Charlotte airport. Private citizens
also volunteered land for collection sites.
More than 175,000 vehicle loads dumped a
total of 400,000 tons of green waste at the col-
lection sites over a 10-month period. Officials
feared that such a large quantity of green waste
would be accompanied by a high level of non-
organic contaminants. The contaminant level
was very low, however, due primarily to three
factors:
^ During the three weeks immediately fol-
lowing the storm, the county landfill
accepted all storm-related, non-green-waste
debris free of charge. This debris totaled
6,300 tons and consisted primarily of C&D
waste.
28 All entrances to green-waste sites were
staffed during operating hours, and staff
strictly enforced the prohibition of other
types of waste.
2K The city of Charlotte resumed weekly
curbside trash collection two days after the
storm, providing convenient disposal of
other types of waste for all residents.
While awaiting shredding, wood was piled
10 to 15 feet high over 100 acres of land. One
problem with storing this much wood was the
fire hazard.
Green-waste mulch also was piled 10 feet
high. When piled that high for more than a
-------
month, this mulch tends to heat up and can
spontaneously combust. One mulch fire at a
storage site took a week to extinguish.
The county initially hired a local contrac-
tor to shred the green waste into mulch using
high-speed shredding equipment. One month
after the hurricane, with four shredding sys-
tems working 12 hours per day, seven days a
week, the county decided to contract for more
grinders. Shredding was finally completed in
February 1991 (16 months after the storm) at a
cost of $7 million.
As the green-waste mulch was created, the
county had yet another challenge on its hands:
what to do with 400,000 tons of shredded
green waste.
In October 1989, the county launched its
"Take-a-Ton" mulch give-away program. The
media was very supportive in getting the word
out. The Charlotte newspaper published maps
of the give-away locations, and radio and tele-
vision stations ran announcements.
Initially, the product was too coarse to be
used as mulch. But once the county reduced
the shredder's screen size and provided loaders
on site, citizens took home the mulch as fast
as it could be produced. County officials also
granted permits to contractors to haul away as
much mulch as they could to sell to their cus-
tomers. One company hauled away thousands
of cubic yards to sell as boiler fuel to local
paper mills.
State and federal sources, including FEMA,
provided funding to Mecklenburg County.
FEMA required the county to maintain data on
all incoming debris and equipment operations.
Five full-time staff kept detailed records of the
county's recovery expenses. At the site, county
personnel recorded information on each vehi-
cle, including delivery date, time, truck type,
and user. The county hired temporary staff to
record similar information for contracted grind-
ing operations. As a result of its diligent record-
keeping efforts, the county was reimbursed
fully (75 percent from FEMA, 25 percent from
the state of North Carolina) for its debris man-
agement costs, totaling over $7 million. The
accounting also has proved helpful in planning
for future natural disasters in the region.
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Hurricane Iniki
•! H urricane Iniki struck the Hawaiian
island of Kauai in September 1992.
• • The storm generated more than 5 mil-
lion cubic yards of debris—seven years' worth
of Kauai's normal refuse—for a landfill with less
than four years of remaining capacity. Kauai
needed the four years to plan and design a new
landfill, and shipping the debris off the island
for disposal was not economically feasible.
Island officials therefore chose to develop an
efficient collection and recycling plan that saved
both money and the dwindling landfill space.
Within days of the storm, island officials,
with the cooperation of local landowners,
established five temporary hurricane debris
receiving sites. Officials trained temporary site
operators to separate recoverable materials on
site, but encountered many problems during
the early stages of the cleanup effort. Hauling
contracts had been written quickly and did not
include incentives to keep materials free of
contaminants. Consequently, some reusable
materials became unusable. Haulers mixed
clean loads of green waste with other trash and
combined hazardous materials with recyclable
debris. Stores and household refrigerators gen-
erated tons of food waste, which was mixed
with recyclable materials. In the absence of
instruction to do otherwise, residents began
creating spontaneous dumps and at some sites
burned or buried debris. In addition, the initial
collection contractors were construction crews
with little or no experience in handling and
recovering solid waste.
Because Kauai is an island, officials could
not easily spread the burden by transporting
hurricane debris to unaffected communities.
Without an adequate management plan, the
collection sites were overwhelmed until
December, when officials implemented a
debris management plan and contracted with
professional solid waste personnel to manage
the sites and the collection process.
The island's solid waste management plan
focused on recycling. From the beginning, local
and state officials made a firm commitment to
divert the massive amounts of debris from
Kauai's landfill. A response team that included
local, state, and federal government staff, con-
tractors, and the county's solid waste consul-
tants developed the plan. Team members
agreed that materials recovery was the most
environmentally sound and economical
method of managing the hurricane debris.
The plan aimed to divert debris in a cost-
effective manner by separating materials at the
point of generation. It also proposed methods
to maintain separation through the collection,
transportation, storage, and processing stages.
The plan required residents to separate materi-
als into five piles at the curb: green waste;
metals and appliances; wood debris; aggregate
materials, including toilets, tile roofing, and
concrete; and mixed debris. The plan also
banned the burning of debris and instituted
curbside collection across the island to accom-
modate those unable to haul the debris them-
selves. The plan ensured that processed debris
was usable and met market specifications.
Officials decided to hold off grinding any mate-
rials until a processing and end-use plan was
developed. While this delay increased stock-
piles of materials, it was essential to cost-
effective diversion.
All of the metals, appliances, tires, and
aggregate materials were reused. The aggregate
was used to make revetment walls to shore up
county shore-front property. A local company
processed more than half of the 100,000 tons of
green waste created by the storm into com-
post, thereby saving the county millions of dol-
lars and precious landfill space. As a result of
delays, the recycling plans for the remainder of
the green waste and mixed debris fell through,
and the waste was buried or landfilled.
Although the plan took three months to
prepare, it resulted in much higher debris
diversion rates, minimized environmental
impacts, reduced waste management costs,
-------
minimized threats to health and safety, and
significantly shortened the duration of the
cleanup effort. In addition, the plan instituted
specific controls at collection sites across the
island to monitor incoming debris, contain
odors, and minimize water runoff.
One of the first orders of business after the
storm was to inform residents about what to
do with hurricane debris scattered across their
property. With all communication systems
down for several weeks, however, it was nearly
impossible to reach all island residents to
instruct them on how to separate materials.
Kauai had only a fledgling recycling program,
and source separation was not a household
practice. As the communication systems
recovered, island officials posted signs, ran arti-
cles in the newspaper, and broadcast radio
announcements to inform citizens of upcom-
ing collection efforts. After several weeks of
intense outreach, the public caught on and
began separating materials before pickup or
dropoff. Discrete piles of green waste, metals,
wood, and mixed debris soon lined the streets
of Kauai. During this process, island officials
realized that mobilization for recovery would
have occurred more rapidly and effectively if
they had planned ahead. By developing a clearly
defined organizational structure and public
information materials in advance, officials
could have saved time and money and stream-
lined cleanup efforts in the chaotic aftermath
of the storm.
Most of the funding for the cleanup efforts
came from a FEMA grant. Shortly after the
storm, more than 2,000 military and National
Guard personnel arrived to help in the cleanup
effort, and the aid of 27 private contractors was
secured. Together with county and state road
crews, military units and contractors systemat-
ically swept the entire island to collect source-
separated debris placed curbside by residents.
With FEMA's assistance, officials are preparing
for future disasters by establishing a perma-
nent collection and storage site with proper
environmental controls.
-------
a he following references and contacts
can help your community plan for dis-
aster debris cleanup.
For more information about FEMA require-
ments, contact:
Infrastructure Support Division, Room 714
Response and Recovery Directorate
Federal Emergency Management Agency
500 C Street, SW.
Washington, DC 20472
Phone: 202 646-4240
EPA's local offices can help provide infor-
mation on solid waste management and regula-
tions. Contact the EPA office in your region:
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net
U.S. EPA
Mail Code: HER-CAN6
90 Canal Street
Boston, MA 02203
Phone: 617 573-9670
Fax: 617 573-9662
U.S. EPA
Mail Code: 4WD-OSW
345 Courtland Street, NE.
Atlanta, GA 30365
Phone: 404 347-2091 ext. 6425
Fax: 404 347-0076
U.S. EPA
Mail Code: 2AWM
290 Broadway
New York, NY 10007-1866
Phone: 212 637-4099
Fax: 212 637-4437
U.S. EPA
Mail Code: HRP-8J
77 West Jackson Boulevard
Chicago, IL 60604-3590
Phone:312886-0976
Fax:312353-4788
U.S. EPA
Mail Code: 3HW53
841 Chestnut Building
Philadelphia, PA 19107
Phone: 215 597-9636
Fax: 215 580-2013
U.S. EPA
Mail Code: 6H-H
1445 Ross Avenue
Dallas, TX 75202-2733
Phone: 214 665-6656
Fax: 214 665-6762
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7
U.S" EPA
Mail Code: STPG
726 Minnesota Avenue
Kansas City, KS 66101
Phone: 913 551-7666
Fax: 913 551-7947
U.S. EPA
Mail Code: 8HWM-WM
999 18th Street, Suite 500
Denver, CO 80202-2466
Phone:303293-1667
Fax:303293-1488
U.S. EPA
Mail Code: H-W-3
75 Hawthorne Street
San Francisco, CA 94105
Phone: 415 744-2106
Fax: 415 744-1044
U.S. EPA
Mail Code: HW107
1200 Sixth Avenue
Seattle, WA 98101
Phone: 206 553-2857
Fax: 206 553-8509
To order EPA publications on solid waste
management and regulations, write to:
RCRA Information Center (5305W)
U.S. EPA
401 M Street, SW.
Washington, DC 20460
Publications disaster debris planners might
find useful include:
Criteria for Solid Waste Disposal
Facilities: A Guide for Owners/Operators
(530/SW-91-089)
Environmental Fact Sheet: Yard Waste
Composting (530/SW-91-009)
Household Hazardous Waste Management:
A Manual for One-Day Community
Collection Programs (530-R-92-026)
Joining Forces on Solid Waste
Management: Regionalization Is Working
in Rural and Small Communities (530-K-
93-001)
Recycling Works/ State and Local Success
Stories (530/SW-89-014)
Safer Disposal for Solid Waste: The Federal
Regulation for Landfills (530/SW-91-092)
Summary of Markets for Compost
(530/SW-90-0736)
For general information on solid waste
management and regulations, contact the
RCRA Hotline Monday through Friday, 9 a.m.
to 6 p.m. EST, at:
—TDD (for hearing
impaired).
the Washington, DC,
metropolitan area.
TDD (for hearing
impaired in the Washington, DC,
metropolitan area).
Below are a few articles that served as
resources in writing this guide and might be of
use to disaster debris planners:
Brickner, R. 1994. How To Manage Disaster
Debris. C&D Debris Recycling. April, p. 8.
Friesen, G., J. Harder, and W. Rifer. 1994.
Closing the Loop After the Storm.
Resource Recycling. October, p. 37.
Sheehan, K., and C. Thoresen. 1993. Des
Moines, Iowa: A River Ran Through It,
and Over It. Waste Age. November, p. 39.
Steuteville, R. 1992. Recycling After the
Storm. BioCycle. October, p. 30.
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