United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Solid Waste and
Emergency Response
(5305W)
EPA530-R-99-O14
April 1999
www.epa.gov/osw
Report on Emergency Incidents
at Hazardous Waste Combustion
Facilities and Other Treatment,
Storage, and Disposal Facilities
(TSDFs)
Printed on paper that contains at least 30 percent postconsumer fiber
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Report on Emergency Incidents at Hazardous Waste Combustion Facilities
and Other Treatment, Storage and Disposal Facilities (TSDFs)
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Office of Solid Waste
Permits and Programs Division
Washington, D.C. 20460
April 1999
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This report was prepared for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency by ICF Incorporated, under
contract # 68-W2-0008. The EPA work assignment manager for this project was Karen Randolph.
Acknowledgments to the U.S. EPA Regional Waste Combustion permit writers and those State permit
writers who provided information for use in this report.
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Table of Contents
Executive Summary
Table 1
Number of Combustion Facilities and TSDFs with Reported Incidents by Region
Chart 1
Number of Incidents at Combustion Facilities and TSDFs, 1977 - 1998
Regional Summaries
Region I *
No facilities
Region n 2
Eastman Kodak Company
Bridgeport Rental and Oil Services (BROS)
Rollins Environmental Services, Inc.
Region m 4
Mill Service
Delaware Container Company
Region IV 6
ThermalKEM
Laidlaw Environmental Services (Thermal Oxidation Corporation)
U.S. Department of Energy
Diversified Scientific Services, Inc (DSSI)
LWD
Carolina Solite
Southeastern Chemicals
Laidlaw Environmental Services (GSX Laidlaw Landfill)
Safety-Kleen Lexington Recycling Center
IV
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Region 4 (continued)
Holnam/Safety-Kleen
CP Chemicals
Albright and Wilson
E.I. DuPont de Nemours
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. (CWM)
Fisher Industrial Services, Inc.
Region V
Dow Chemical Company
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. (CWM)
Ross Incineration Services, Inc.
Waste Technologies Industries (WTI)
Trade Waste Incineration (part of CWM)
3M
Region VI
Ensco
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. (CWM)
Rollins Deer Park
Region VII
International Paper
Monsanto Company
Lake City Army Ammunition Plant
Aptus
ICI Explosives Environmental Company
12
16
19
Region
United States Pollution Control Incorporated (U.S.P.C.I.)
Region IX
Johnston Atoll Chemical Agents Demilitarization System (JACADS)
Rhone Poulenc Basic Chemical Company
Statewide Environmental Services, Inc.
Oil and Solvent Process Company (OSCO)
Chem-Tech Systems
21
22
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Region X
Chemical Waste Management of the Northwest, Inc. (CWMNW)
Northwest EnviroService (NWE)
Sol-Pro
ChemPro
Phillips Environmental (formerly ChemPro)
Washington Chemical
Summary of Incidents at Combustion Facilities
and Other TSDF Facility Listings
27
31
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ATTACHMENTS
1. Eastman Kodak Company - Kodak Park, New Jersey
2. Bridgeport Rental and Oil Services (BROS) - Bridgeport, New Jersey
3. Rollins Environmental Services, Inc. - Logan Township, New Jersey
4. Summary of Region IV Facilities
5. Dow Chemical Company - Midland, Michigan
6. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. (CWM) - Chicago, Illinois
7. Trade Waste Incineration (part of CWM) - Sauget, Illinois
8. 3M - Cottage Grove, Minnesota
9. Chem Waste Management, Inc. (CWM) - Port Arthur, Texas
10. ICI Explosives Environmental Company - Joplin, Missouri
11. Johnston Atoll Chemical Agents Demilitarization System (JACADS) -
Johnston Island
12. Rhone Poulenc Basic Chemical Company - Martinez, California
13. Statewide Environmental Services, Inc. - Los Angeles, California
14. Oil and Solvent Process Company (OSCO) - Azusa, California
15. Chem-Tech Systems - Los Angeles, California
16. Chemical Waste Management of the Northwest, Inc. (CWMNW) -
Arlington, Oregon
17. Northwest EnviroService (NWE) -Seattle, Washington
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report provides a compilation of information on reported emergency incidents at hazardous
waste combustion facilities and other treatment, storage, and disposal facilities (TSDFs) regulated under
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). This report is limited to emergency incidents only
(such as fires, explosions, hazardous waste spills or unauthorized releases of hazardous waste)
Occurrences when emergency bypasses or thermal relief vents were used may be mentioned but such
events are not fully addressed in this report. This report represents a comprehensive compil'ation of
incidents from December 1977 through August 1995, with several incidents occurring prior to the
implementation of RCRA. This report also includes two additional incidents; one from 1997 and one from
1998 The addition of incidents from 1997 and 1998 does not account for all incidents during the time
period from September 1995 to present. As more information becomes available, this report will be
updated.
Information in this report was obtained from Regional and State waste combustion experts and
permit writers. In many cases, the state agencies had collected and maintained information regarding
emergency incidents at RCRA facilities. In cases where information was incomplete, memories of EPA
and state permit writers were relied upon. Although every attempt was made to include all incidents at
combustion faculties and other TSDFs regulated under RCRA, there may be incidents that EPA was
unable to identify. Therefore, this report may not be all inclusive.
• *u- EmerSency incidents at 24 hazardous waste combustion units and 26 other TSDFs are documented
in this report. Of the incidents that have occurred, 9 facilities experienced incidents that were directly
related to the actual combustion of hazardous waste. The remaining incidents involved were not
combustion related and consist of activities such as waste handling and storage. As indicated in the
individual facility wnte-ups, some of the incidents occurred before RCRA was instituted and full RCRA
safeguards were not in effect.
^ * u teginS ^ a summary toble listing the number of reported incidents (per facility type)
that have occurred ui each of the EPA Regions, and the number of combustion facilities with incidents^
resulted from the actual combustion of hazardous waste. On the next page is a chart showing the number
of incidents that occurred at combustion facilities and TSDFs from 1977-1998. The chart is followed bv a
Regional summary of each individual incident and the EPA or State contacts who provided the information
regarding the incident. |The report ends with a complete listing (by Region) of each facility Where
available, detailed incident reports are included as attachments.
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TABLE I. Number of Combustion Facilities and TSDFs with Reported Incidents by Region «
Hazardous Waste Combustion
Region
# Facilities Under
Interim Status with
Incidents
# Facilities Under
Permit Status with
Incidents
# Facilities with
Incidents due to
Actual Combustion
of Hazardous
Waste
# Facilities Under
Interim Status or
Not Permitted with
Incidents
# Facilities Under
Permit Status with
Incidents
See next page for footnote details.
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Footnotes
1. Some facilities listed in this table have had multiple incidents. Please see attached summaries for more information.
2. Some facilities have been accounted for twice: incidents occurring during a non-permitted or interim status, incidents occurring during a permitted
status, and/or incidents due to the actual combustion of hazardous waste. Please see attached summaries for more information.
3. Includes a permitted nonhazardous facility; Albright and Wilson.
4. Fires occurred on two separate occasions in the combustion unit of the ThermalKEM facility.
5. Incidents included a fire in the combustion units of DOW, CWM, and Ross.
6. Fires occurred in the furnace duct of the incinerator at Rollins Deer Park and in the kiln at CWM.
7. Incidents occurred in the incinerator at the Lake City Army Ammunition Plant after live rounds of ammunition were set off on the conveyer belt after
being treated, an explosion in the scrubber of the combustion unit at Aptus, and an explosion in the kiln at ICI.
m
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CHART 1. Number of Incidents at Combustion Facilities and TSDFs
1977-1998
30
1977-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991
•Incidents include: fires, explosions, spills, equipment failures, etc.
1992 1"3 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Years
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REGION I
Regional Summary
There has not been aay reported incidents at combustion facilities ar other TSDFs in Regioa'
•i* .' . ~
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REGION II
Regional Summary >
Incident were reported at two incinerators in Region II, One incident occurred at the
Eastman Kodak facility In Kodak Park, Mew York, The other incident occurred at tlte Bridgeport
Rental and Oil Services Superfund incinerator ia Bridgeport, New Jersey, ;
^ In 1977 a series of explosions and fires occurred at the Rollins Environmental Services tank
farm in Logan Township, New Jersey. The facility did act have a RCRA permit at the time. '
Eastman Kodak Company, Kodak Park, New York
Contact: John Brogard, EPA Region II (212) 637-4162
On July 12, 1990, an incident occurred at the RCRA-permitted Kodak Park chemical incinerator.
Approximately 75 gallons of recycled cooling water spilled when the cooling water system ruptured. Two
gallons of spilled water contacted the ground, while the remaining 73 gallons flowed into an industrial
sewer. The ruptured line was repaired within two hours and the facility was put back into operation. For
additional information, see Attachment 1.
Bridgeport Rental and Oil Services (BROS), Bridgeport, New Jersey
Contact: John Brogard, EPA Region II (212) 637-4162
An explosion occurred at the BROS facility on September 20, 1992. According to the Region II contact,
the explosion was caused by a rapid steam generation that resulted when a slag ring that formed in the kiln
fell into the water in the ash quench. He also noted that although the oxygen and CO concentrations were
normal prior to the event, the total hydrocarbon monitor readings were unusual for a large part of the day.
In addition, the waste feed had already stopped 50 minutes prior to the explosion. The explosion blew off
the hinged sides of the weigh belt used to meter the contaminated soil to the rotary kiln. There were
fugitive emissions associated with the explosion, but no injuries or natural resource damages were reported.
i
Another incident was reported at this facility on September 21, 1992. On that date, a large amount of ash
was released while workers were trying to attach the screw feeder after emptying the multi clone.
Particulate matter was released into the air for eight minutes and traveled across U.S. Route 130. EPA
was not aware of any health or environmental impacts from this release. Although this is a Superfund site,
the State of New Jersey had previously issued the facility a permit equivalent to a RCRA-permit. For
additional information, see Attachment 2.
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Rollins Environmental Services Inc., Logan Township, New Jersey
Contact: John Brogard, EPA Region II (212) 637-4162
On December 8, 1977, Rollins Environmental Services (RES) in Logan Township, N.J., experienced a
series of explosions and fires at their tank farm. The initial explosion occurred at approximately 2:15 p.m.,
and was followed by between two and five additional explosions. The ensuing fire lasted about 11A hours,'
during which time approximately 12 storage tanks and two tank trucks exploded and/or burned. The
incident claimed six lives and injured 12 on-site workers who were various contractors performing
specialized maintenance work. In addition, about 40 firemen were admitted to the local hospital for smoke
inhalation and released after treatment. At the time of the incident, the facility did not have a RCRA
permit.
Representatives from the NJ Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP), the NJ. Department of
Health (NJDOH), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), the U.S. Treasury Bomb Squad, and state and local police worked with local
public safety officers and Rollins personnel to minimize the immediate and longer-term damage from the
fire and explosions. Although state and federal authorities determined that evacuation of Bridgeport, the
nearby town, was not necessary, they warned all persons who were in direct contact with the explosion
scene to take precautionary measures with clothing and equipment because of possible toxic contamination.
Results of monitoring and surveillance studies indicated that the explosion and fire had not caused any off-
site contamination. After substantial review by the appropriate state and federal authorities, the RES
facility was permitted to reopen subject to certain conditions, including a consent order that stipulated the
incinerator operational temperature for toxic substances. For additional information on this facility, see
Attachments.
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REGION III
Regional Summary
There have not been any reported incidents at combustion facilities in Region lO
TwoIncidents have been reported'a| other commercial treatment and storage facilities in
Region m. One incident took place at Mill Service* located in Yykpn, Pennsylvania The second
incident occurred atthe Delaware Container Company i» Coatesville, Pennsylvania i
Mill Service, Yukon, Pennsylvania
Contact: Marcos Aquino, EPA Region III (215) 597-8187
Mil] Service treats hazardous waste sludges that exhibit toxic characteristics (TC) to render them
npnhazardous so that they may be disposed of as nonhazardous wastes in a Subtitle D landfill Two
different types of incidents were reported at this facility.
The first incident occurred on November 12, 1991. Between 5,000 and 20,000 gallons of partially treated
waste sludges were accidentally placed in a surface impoundment at the facility, which was operating under
interim status at the time. These wastes still exhibited the TC. The facility was closed by the State until
March 1992 when in-situ treatment was performed on the material. The facility was allowed to reopen in
April 1992.
Since the facility has reopened, it has had recurring problems with NOX fuming from waste pickle liquor
in particular, tank trucks used for transporting these wastes to the facility were not always cleaned out
properly. Whenever the dome of the truck was removed, a NOX puff resulted. This type of incident has
occurred approximately six times during the last ten years. No incidents have occurred since 1992 since
the facility installed NOX and H2S monitors. Trucks are now unloaded in a different manner to prevent
releases. In addition, air pollution control equipment has been installed in the truck unloading areas.
Delaware Container Company, Coatesville, Pennsylvania
Contact: Victoria loff, EPA Region III (215) 597-7237
On October 14, 1985, an incident was reported at the Delaware Container Company facility in Coatesville
Pennsylvania. Delaware Container treated hazardous and residual wastes in its waste solidification area '
During interim status the facility received a shipment of waste that contained an aluminum-based paint
This particular waste was not identified on the shipping manifest and was not detected by Delaware
Container's testing procedures. An exothermic reaction resulted from the mixture of aluminum waste and
cement kiln dust and a form of an unidentified gas was released. Residents of the surrounding community
reported a strange odor from the facility and contacted the state's emergency response personnel. The
exothermic reaction ended when response personnel removed the tarp that covered the waste and
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redistributed the mixture. Although the facility reported that approximately 32 community residents were
treated in a neighboring hospital for nose and throat irritations, the community claimed that the number of
those treated was closer to 100. No hospitalizations or deaths resulted from the incident. Delaware
Container was fined by the State of Pennsylvania for an air pollution violation.
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REGION IV
Regional Summary
There have been 15 documented incidents at combustion facilities In Region. !Y< TWO of
these events (ThermalKEM, July 10,1987 and December 8,1988) were related to the actual
combustion of hazardous waste; these incidents occurred before the unite were under RCRA
permits. The remaining events either occurred while the units were on auxiliary fuel, or were related
to ancillary equipment
There have been 22 documented incidents at TSDFs i« Region IV. These incidents include
fires, spills, an explosion* and a collapse of a landfill berm, - - ;
ThermalKEM, Rock Hill, South Carolina
Contacts: Brian Kaplan, EPA Region IV (404) 347-3433 and
Joan Hartley, S.C. Department of Health and Environmental Control (803) 734-5167
There have been five incidents at the ThermalKEM facility in Rock Hill. The first incident occurred on
July 10,1987. The incinerator was operating under interim status at the time. An explosion resulted from
a 10% nitroglycerine 90% lactose material that had been incorrectly identified by the generator as not heat
reactive and not explosive. Three explosions resulted from the introduction of this waste into the
incinerator. The first two explosions occurred within the incinerator kiln; the third occurred partially
outside the incinerator. There were no spills, fires, or hazardous waste releases, although two employees
did complain of ringing of the ears. Following the incident, more rigorous waste approval procedures were
instituted, including use of a Differential Scanning Calorimeter.
I
The second incident at ThermalKEM occurred on December 8, 1988. A drum caused a strong reaction
within the incinerator, and a large pressure surge caused the safety pressure relief door to open. A fuel line
was also ruptured. The explosion resulted from nitrocellulose that had been incorrectly identified by an
EPA contractor as a non-reactive F005 solvent. Following the incident, ThermalKEM instituted
procedures for on-site sampling and analysis of remedial wastes, as well as 100% inspection and testing of
drums upon receipt.
The third incident at ThermalKEM occurred on March 24, 1991. Low water pressure caused the boiler
tube to fail, which in turn caused the package boiler to explode. The explosion moved the boiler
approximately 50 feet, resulting in extensive damage to the boiler, the boiler house, and also severing of the
steam and fuel oil lines. The boiler was burning natural gas at the time of the explosion. Thirty (30)
gallons of diesel fuel combined with water were spilled but contained, and the thermal relief vent on the
incinerator was activated.
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The fourth incident occurred on April 25, 1993, and involved a fire around their Solid Drum Repackaging
System (SDKS). It was reported that hydraulic hoses and oil which are part of the SDRS system caught
fire. Company representatives reported that no wastes were being processed at the time of the fire. There
were also no reported injuries.
The fifth incident took place on January 14, 1995, when a fire occurred at 4:55 a.m. in the Drum
Repackaging Building in the Fiber Drum Storage Area. ThermalKEM implemented the contingency plan
and promptly notified off-site emergency response agencies. The fire was fought by ThermalKEM
employees and brought under control by 6:30 a.m. All fire water was captured in the secondary
containment system, and no off-site releases occurred in amounts above the reportable quantities. One
employee experienced a minor wrist bum, which was treated at the site. The facility concluded that no
explosions had occurred during the fire. ThermalKEM believes that the fire was caused by a nonhazardous
waste stream of molybdenum paste. After processing, the paste was grounded into a highly flammable and
reactive powder. This powder was then mixed with wood flour, which absorbed the organic constituents
and started the fire. To prevent recurrence, the facility took the following corrective measures: (1) the
waste analysis plan was revised to incorporate a test of each batch of fibers produced for reactivity; (2) the
storage area for fiber drums was limited to areas equipped with automatic foam suppression systems and
(3) the contingency plan was revised to create a new off-site Response Coordinator position and to add
additional persons to the contact list. See Attachment 4 for additional information.
Laidlaw Environmental Services (Thermal Oxidation Corporation), Roebuck, South Carolina
Contacts: Denise Housely, EPA Region IV (404) 347-3433 and
Shelly Sherritt, S.C. Department of Health and Environmental Control (803) 734-5203
Five releases have been reported at this interim status incinerator and related storage areas. The facility's
permit was issued in September 1988. The State and Federal portions of the permit were appealed, and the
State permit has not yet been settled. The Federal portion of the permit is effective and contains
requirements related to HSWA.
The first release occurred on March 17, 1982, when 3,000 gallons of various types of solvents were spilled
from the pipe that connects the blend tanks to the incinerator. The contaminated soil was removed
immediately. The release was detected during a routine inspection, when it was discovered that a small
section of the pipe had corroded, creating a hole which the solvents leaked out of.
The second incident at Laidlaw occurred on February 9, 1988, when 6,000 gallons of maleic anhydride
spilled from a storage tank. Again, the contaminated soil was quickly removed.
The third incident occurred on March 22, 1991, when the thermal relief vent (TRY) from the Laidlaw
incinerator vaporizer was blown off the unit and fell down to the direct burn containment pad. The exact
cause of this incident is not known, but may have occurred due to a faulty natural gas regulator. At the
time of the incident, the liquid injection unit was on natural gas. There were no injuries or known
hazardous waste releases. As a result of this incident, EPA and the facility entered into a consent
agreement that required Laidlaw to improve its reporting procedures and TRY controls.
On February 8, 1994, Laidlaw received a shipment of orthochlorophenol. During redrumming, the
orthochlorophenol emitted a vapor cloud which drifted off site. One person reported sinus problems
resulting from exposure to the vapor cloud while driving off site. The facility had no violations related to
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this emission, but did install a hood system in the outdoor container redrumming area to eliminate the
possibility of future instances.
The fifth incident occurred on September 19, 1994, when a small fire occurred as an out-of-service welder
dismantled a tank. The fire was contained and extinguished in approximately three minutes. The facility
did not have to evacuate the area and no injuries resulted from the incident. See Attachment 4 for any
additional information.
U,S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge, Tennessee
Contact: Beth Antley, EPA Region IV (404) 347-3433
On June 15, 1989, while completing a trial burn, an induced draft fan of the incinerator at the permitted
Oak Ridge facility failed. Although the exact cause of the failure is not known, an examination of the fan
revealed that severe cracks had been forming in the impeller. The failure breached the fan housing and
debris was found as far away as 370 feet. Flying debris damaged the stack. There were no injuries and no
detectable off-site releases of toxic material as a result of the incident. See Attachment 4 for additional
information.
Diversified Scientific Services, Inc. (DSSI), Kingston, Tennessee
Contact: Rick Gillian, EPA Region IV (404) 347-3433
On July 31, 1992, during preparation for a BIF compliance test burn, a brief electrical outage allowed
some unburned propane to go through the DSSI boiler. When the unbumed propane reached the charcoal
filters in the secondary pollution control system, the filters caught fire and burned for approximately four
minutes. The fire then spread to the HEPA filters, but was contained by DSSI's emergency response team.
There were no injuries or hazardous waste releases. The facility was operating under interim status at the
time. See Attachment 4 for additional information.
LWD, Clay, Kentucky
Contact: Beth Antley, EPA Region IV (404) 347-3433
On February 2, 1982, a direct-feed tank truck containing acetone exploded and caught fire at the interim
status LWD incinerator facility. Vapors in the truck were accidently ignited by the operator while he was
checking the waste level in the tanker. An oil/acetone mixture was released as a result of the explosion, and
a small stream of fire fighting water flowed into a drainage ditch and eventually a creek. Three other tank
trucks also caught fire, but no releases were reported. Hazardous wastes were released inside an earthen
dike where the tank trucks were located. The operator received extensive bums above the waist and a
compound fracture of the leg. The facility is now closed. See Attachment 4 for additional information.
Carolina Solite, Norwood, North Carolina
Contact: Hugh Hazen, EPA Region IV (404) 347-3433
On November 4, 1993, one of the waste blend tanks at this permitted facility burst a pipe and spilled
approximately 2,500 gallons of waste. Most of the waste remained in the secondary containment system,
but an estimated 50 to 100 gallons of waste escaped onto adjacent soils. The facility acted promptly and
the contamination was remediated effectively. The State of North Carolina issued a notice of violation on
September 26, 1994 for using a front-end loader for remediation that was made of carbon steel, which
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presented a flash hazard, and also for failing to decontaminate the same front-end loader before it left the
site. A similar spill occurred in January 1994.
Southeastern Chemicals, Sumter, South Carolina
Contact: Bill Carder, S.C. Department of Health & Environmental Control (803) 734-5166
There have been four fires at this permitted facility, none of which resulted in a major release. The fires
occurred on April 12, 1992, April 14, 1992, April 20, 1992, and June 6, 1992.
Laidlaw Environmental Services (GSX Laidlaw Landfill), Pinewood, South Carolina
Contact: Sean Barron, S.C. Department of Health & Environmental Control (803) 734-5160
This facility has experienced four fires, two of which occurred while the facility was operating under
interim status. In 1991, there was a fire at the drum shredder unit. No major release was reported. Also in
1991, the berm of the landfill collapsed during construction, but there were no hazardous materials
involved. In February 1992, there was a spill at the waste solidification unit. Information on the amount
or type of spill was not available, but the spill was remediated promptly by removing all affected soil.
On September 9, 1993, a fire occurred in the hazardous waste drum shredder unit. The fire involved two
55-gallon containerized drums of lithium manganese batteries, but it is unclear if the batteries actually
caused the fire. The fire was quickly extinguished and no injuries were reported.
The facility received a RCRA permit on March 23, 1994. On April 12, 1994, a fire involving alkaline
batteries began in the nonhazardous subcell IIA of the Laidlaw facility. The fire was extinguished and no
injuries were reported.
The fourth incident occurred when a bulk load that contained oil and grease was being managed in the
facility's treatment tanks. Facility workers observed smoke and small pockets of flames coming from the
load. The facility workers later found that the load also contained caustic manure and aluminum turning,
which was suspected as the cause of the fire.
Sqfety-Kleen Lexington Recycling Center, Lexington, South Carolina
Contact: Bill Carder, S.C. Department of Health & Environmental Control (803) 734-5166
Two spills have occurred at this permitted facility; however it is uncertain what substances they were. On
April 8, 1992, approximately 300 gallons were spilled while filling a tank. Forty gallons were spilled on
June 19, 1992, again while filling a tank.
Holnam/Safety-Kleen, Holly Hill, South Carolina
Contact: Sean Barron, S.C. Department of Health & Environmental Control (803) 734-5160
There have been two incidents at the Holnam/Safety-Kleen facility. The first occurred on October 23,
1987, when a 100,000-gallon fuel tank exploded. There is little information on this incident, as it was not a
regulated unit.
On August 13, 1992, there was a 638-gallon spill during a railcar transfer. The facility remediated the site.
The facility was permitted at the time of the incidents.
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CP Chemicals, Sutnter, South Carolina
Contact: Joan Hartley, S.C. Department of Health & Environmental Control (803) 734-5167
On November 29, 1985, there was a spill of approximately 2,200 gallons of ammonia and 2,000 gallons of
hydrochloric acid from two storage tanks. These releases resulted when the tank valves were left open.
Two employees were arrested two weeks later and charged with intentionally causing the releases.
The CP Chemicals facility was permitted in April 1990 and is subject to secondary containment and
inspection requirements that should minimize the impact of future releases.
Albright and Wilson, Charleston, South Carolina
Contact: Sean Barron, S.C. Department of Health & Environmental Control (803) 734-5160
Two incidents have occurred at this permitted facility. On June 17, 1991, there was an explosion and fire
in the Special Products Unit (SPU) which killed nine people. Water used to fight the fire was released into
a containment pond.
The second incident occurred on January 14, 1993, in the High Temperature Unit (HTU). A rupture in the
steam jacket and piping in the HTU resulted in a release of steam and byproducts.
Although the facility was permitted for treatment and storage when both of these incidents occurred, no
hazardous waste was involved.
E.I. DuPont de Nemours, Axis, Alabama
Contact: Steven Cobb, Alabama Department of Environmental Management (334) 271-7726
On June 9, 1994, approximately 3,800 gallons of sulfuric acid were released from a leaking transfer pipe at
this permitted DuPont commercial combustion facility. Approximately 2,500 gallons of the material were
recovered. An estimated 300 cubic yards of contaminated soil were removed and disposed of. This facility
was permitted at the time of the incident.
On June 10, 1994, one drum, containing approximately one gallon of hydrogen peroxide and twenty gallons
of ground corncobs, burst due to a buildup of pressure inside the drum.
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. (CWM), Emelle, Alabama
Contact: Steven Cobb, Alabama Department of Environmental Management (334) 271-7726
On November 10, 1992, Unit 700 started smoldering and eventually burst into flames while Oil Dry was
being added to a drum of waste epicholrohydrin. The automatic overhead sprinklers were immediately
activated and the fire brigade responded. The fire was contained within the tipping pan, and no personnel
injuries were reported. This facility was permitted at the time of the incident.
On December 5, 1992, approximately 170,000 gallons of water were pumped from the fire water tank to
the crusher dispersion unit. Subsequent sampling of the accumulated water revealed that it was
contaminated with D039 hazardous waste. Soil samples taken from the ditch through which the water
flowed were analyzed and found to be contaminated. The ditch was later excavated and the soil was
properly managed.
10
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On December 8, 1992, a fire occurred while stabilizing a vat of D004/D018 hazardous waste in Unit 1200.
The fire occurred after portland cement was added and was contained in the stabilization vat No injuries
were reported.
On January 9, 1993, an employee observed a reaction in the landfill which resembled a "roman candle" in
nature. The employee also observed a ball of fire rising a few feet above the active trench followed by a
puff of smoke and another ball of fire.
On February 26, 1993, during the processing of a load of waste in a vat in Unit 1200 a flash-ignition of
the reagent sulfur was observed as it was being mixed with the waste. The flash lasted no more than 1-2
seconds and there was no visible release of hazardous substances to the environment.
Fisher Industrial Services, Inc., Glencoe, Alabama
Contact: Steven Cobb, Alabama Department of Environmental Management (334) 271-7726
Various materials were placed into a roll-off box on August 13, 1993. The materials included hazardous
wastes P001, D004, D007, D008, F002, F003, and F005. A small fire was observed in the roll-off box on
August 14, 1993. The fire was restricted to the container where the reaction occurred This facility was
permitted at the time of the incident.
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REGION V
f f f <
Regional Summary '" ' \
Incidents at six RCRA incinerators have been reported. Incidents at three of these facilities,
Dow Chemical Company k Midland, Michigan; Chemical Waste Management ia Chicago, Hfiaois '
and Ross Incineration Services in Grafton, Ohio, consisted of erosions involving the eombustioB
of hazardous waste. Facilities that e?{penenced other incidents include; WH. in East liverpooJ,
Ohio; Trade Waste Incineration m Sauget; Illinois and the 3M facility in Cottage Grove, Minnesitta.
; j s f fSfSsffff f
' f I
There have been no reports m Incidents that have omtrred at other TSDFs i» Region V.
Dow Chemical Company, Midland, Michigan
Contact: Cheryl Howe, Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (517) 373-9881
On January 25, 1992, a natural gas explosion occurred next to one of Dow's two permitted incinerators.
While unplugging the incinerator feed line, the worker failed to block off the natural gas feed and turn off
the burner pilots. As a result, natural gas that was fed to the incinerator when the kiln cooled down leaked
into a room adjacent to the incinerator and ignited. This incident occurred during normal operations. One
worker sustained burns to the face and hands, while another worker complained of ringing in the ears.
There is no evidence that any hazardous waste was released, and there was no natural resource damage.
Following the incident, the facilities made improvements in their gas sensing equipment and interlock '
system, and also took steps to ensure adherence to proper procedures for unplugging feed lines.
On February 4, 1993, another explosion occurred in the 703 Building Rotary Kiln Incinerator. The
primary cause of the incident is attributed to an explosion of a five-gallon pail of Nitrobid(R) (a
pharmaceutical), or process wastes from the production of Nitrobid(R), being fed into the incinerator. The
explosion was relieved through both the explosion damper and the emergency vent stack. Some solid, non-
regulated rubbish was released through the explosion damper, and some visible flames and hot gases were
emitted from the emergency unit. The incident occurred during normal operations, and no injuries or
exposures to hazardous waste occurred as a result of this incident. All cleanup and repairs to the
incinerator were completed promptly and the unit was returned to service on February 7, 1993. Following
the incident, the facility made improvements to its contingency plan and agency notification requirements.
For more information, see Attachment 5.
Chemical Waste Management Inc. (CWM), Chicago, Illinois
Contact: JuanaRojo, EPA Region V(312) 886-0990
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On February 13, 1991, an explosion occurred in the rotary kiln of the interim status CWM Chicago
incinerator, 28 seconds after a 16-gallon drum containing two laboratory chemicals was fed into the kiln.
The drum contained a lab pack prepared by the generator. One of the chemicals, tetrazole (20 Kg), was
identified as the cause of the explosion. CWM identified the material but failed to recognize it as an
explosive. The explosion damaged the seals of the kiln and caused sections of the kiln's outer shell and end
plate to bulge. Although three employees experienced headaches and tinnitus (ringing in the ears), there
were no injuries as a result of the incident. There was also no indication of toxic releases into neighboring
areas. The Region required the plant to replace several parts of the unit before restarting operations.
Additional fire prevention and safety equipment were also required.
See Attachment 6 for additional information.
JRoss Incineration Services, Inc., Grafton, Ohio
Contact: Mike Galbraith, EPA Region V (312) 886-6182
An incident occurred on August 12, 1994, which involved the ignition of a waste drum that created a fire.
One employee was injured by the ignited vapors and liquid, and there was minor damage to the side door of
the incineration system. Operations at the Ross Incinerator were suspended overnight but resumed the next -
day. An investigative team determined that the accident was caused when a skid covered with acid residue
was improperly loaded with waste drums. (The acid residue was left in the bottom of the skid after waste
materials had been incinerated.) The skid was reloaded with waste drums by employees who failed to
follow instructions to incinerate the residue before loading the drums. When the drums were incinerated,
the acid residue on the skid heated one of the drums, causing it to become pressurized and release vapors'
and liquid. -The vapors and liquid ignited, consequently setting fire to the other three drums. Cyclohexane,
styrene, and mineral spirits were released into the air as a result of the fire.
A similar incident occurred on May 1, 1995, which involved an explosion in the secondary combustion
chamber (SCC) of the incinerator unit while drummed waste was being fed to the unit. The explosion
separated the exit door of the chamber and damaged the activation system of the bypass stack mechanism.
Most of the damage occurred in the interior of the secondary chamber refractory. Although no injuries
were reported, a portion of the chamber brick roof collapsed and was left opened to the environment. As a
result, fugitive emissions were released. Due to the damage to the secondary chamber door cooling system,
the induced draft fan did not function for 10 minutes after the incident, and the air pollution control device
system did not operate for one hour after the incident. Although Ross implemented their shut down
procedures using bypass fuel to slowly cool the unit, it took eight days to completely shut the unit down.
Ross has agreed not to feed waste through the side door of the secondary chamber until all information
related to this incident has been evaluated and written approval was obtained from EPA.
The facility reported that the vapor or liquid could have been ignited when it came into contact with the hot
skid, the hot residue material, or the metal wall of the incinerator. The facility also reported that there was
a remote chance that ignition was caused by heat coming from the entrance chamber of the side door.
The facility maintained that the incident would not have occurred if existing operating procedures had been
followed. The facility has implemented the following measures to prevent future accidents:
The side door operating procedures have been augmented to require additional cooling time
for skids and to move the drum preparation area further away from the incinerator. New
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procedures also require the incinerator foreman and shift team leader to oversee skids
through the incineration process.
• All incinerator operators and supervisors received additional training on the augmented
side door procedures, with emphasis placed on communications between operators and
employees on different shifts.
• Heat shields have been installed between waste handling areas and the exterior of the
incinerator.
• Procedures for drum opening have been modified to achieve greater safety.
Waste Technologies Industries (WTI), East Liverpool, Ohio
Contact: Gary Victorine, EPA Region V (312) 886-1479
\
On February 14, 1995, there was a small electrical fire in the control cabinet of the spray dryer penthouse.
It was immediately extinguished by plant personnel with a fire extinguisher. The spray dryer is controlled
both electrically and hydraulically, and some of the hydraulic piping which runs through the control cabinet
ruptured and spilled into the penthouse, on the floor grating, through the grating and through the grating
insulation. The oil was steam cleaned off of the grates on the following evening.
On February 15, 1995, bulk waste that was caught in the clamshell of the loading system caught fire.
Within 1 minute the sprinkler system activated and extinguished the fire. The fire was believed to be
caused by a "flashback" of powdery material that fell out of the clamshell bucket. Damage was reportedly
limited to the crane bucket wires, cables, and insulation in the immediate area.
On March 15, 1995, a repulsive odor was released from the facility which affected much of East Liverpool.
The odor originated from a tanker unloading waste containing mercaptan thiophenol. No release point was
ever identified with certainty, but reportedly only a few drops of this waste could have resulted in this kind
of problem. WTI stopped receiving shipments of this waste until it completed enclosure of the tanker truck
unloading pad and vented the enclosure to the vapor recovery system.
On July 3, 1995, the waste in one of the two bulk solid waste pits caught fire. The fire was quickly
extinguished by the automatic water deluge system. There were no reported injuries, and the only reported
damage was to the door of the pit. Since this enclosure is vented to the vapor recovery system, no
significant releases were suspected, but some smoke was reported as leaking out from under and around the
door. The ignition source was attributed to a burning piece of waste either traveling through the air from
the incinerator feed chute doors to the pit, or being carried from the chute doors to the pit via the clamshell
bucket.
Trade Waste Incineration (part ofCWM), Sauget, Illinois
Contact: JuanaRojo, EPA Region V(312) 886-0990
There have been three incidents at this permitted facility. The first incident occurred on January 16, 1990,
when the facility was evacuated due to vapor cloud emissions of hydrochloric acid (HC1) from a storage
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tank. The incident occurred when facility personnel failed to properly identify the corrosivity
characteristics of the contents of a tank truck received at the facility. When the tank truck contents were
transferred to the TWI storage tank, a large plume of chlorinated gas containing 196 pounds of HC1 was
emitted from the tank. The facility has since instituted additional confirmation of the blending samples, and
has also established better training procedures for its personnel regarding tank-to-tank transfers.
The second incident happened on January 26, 1991, when sodium azide, the explosive found in automobile
air bags, was incinerated. The ash from this waste was placed in the dumpster; a few hours later, the ash
exploded. The ash appeared to have been incompletely burned.
The third explosion occurred on February 5, 1991, which resulted when a worker used a pole to dislodge
molten slag that partly blocked the exit from an incinerator during operation. As the slag fell into the ash
pit below, contact with the water caused a steam explosion that severely burned the worker. Vaporized
hazardous waste was released. There were no reports of other injuries or environmental impacts from these
two incidents.
See Attachment 7 for additional information.
3M, Cottage Grove, Minnesota
Contact: FredJenness, Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (612) 297-8470
There have been two incinerator-related incidents at this 3M facility. The first incident occurred in the
early 1980's when hot slag came into contact with low-temperature ash quench water. The impact of the
hot slag on the quench water resulted in a thermal explosion. No injuries or releases to the environment
resulted from the incident. The facility was under interim status at the time; the facility received a RCRA
permit on March 29, 1989.
A similar incident occurred on September 18, 1992, after the facility received a RCRA permit. Molten
metal in the slag dropped into the ash quench, trapping some water and creating a steam explosion. The
resulting pressure blew off the pressure relief panels and ruptured the brick walls of the air seal and some
of the lightweight wall panels of the ash house. There were no injuries or releases of hazardous wastes to
the environment, with the exception of a brief release of smoke from burning fuel oil.
See Attachment 8 for additional information.
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REGION VI
Regional Summary
There have been reports of incidents feat have occurred as &ree KCRA-pennitted
mcinerators tn Region VI The Bnsco facility In Bt Dorado, Arkansas has had two incidents
involving its incinerator. Another incident occurred attiie Rollins facility in Deer Park, Texas
where a fire broke-oat ia the furnace duct. The Chemical Wasfc Management fcc&ty, located ki
Port Arthur, Texas, has had one incident that consisted of ak% fire during normal operation and
another that consisted of a leaking storage contained ,_ " •- '
Tnere have been no reported incidents at other TSDF's la
Ensco, El Dorado, Arkansas
Contact: Derik Warrick (501) 570-2893 and Rhonda E. Sharp (501) 682-0916
Arkansas Department of Pollution Control & Ecology '
On April 20 1989, an explosion occurred in the waste heat recovery unit due to equipment failure This
unit was fairly old and built up excessive pressure which caused structure failure. As a result the unit
exploded. The explosion occurred during normal operations, and no injuries or significant releases were
reported The incinerator unit did not sustain extensive damage. The waste heat recovery unit was shut
down, and the rest of the plant was back up and operating under normal conditions within one week.
Two injuries were reported following a trailer fire on August 16, 1990, that also resulted in the evacuation
of approximately 50 people in an adjacent neighborhood. A drum of nitrocellulose based film is believed to
nave spontaneously combusted and spread to 30 ten-gallon containers of the same material.
On March 27, 1991, an explosion occurred in the Komar drum shredder causing the pressure relief doors to
open and emit gases. One person was injured as a result of the incident. The explosion and fire followed a
teed of four drums containing acid sludge, water-based coatings and debris that included pater filters
plastic, absorbent cloth and personal protective equipment contaminated with solvents and petrojeum'oil.
On March 30, 1991, a fire broke out when a 30-gallon drum failed to drop from the automatic feed ram
into a kiln and instead was pushed into another drum by the feed ram. This caused liquids to be released
which created a fire and quickly spread to two more drums on the feed line. No injuries were reported.
On May 25, 1991, liquid leaking from a kiln shredder isolation gate caught fire in the catch pan No
injuries were reported. Feed of waste to the shredder and kiln had to be stopped to allow maintenance
below the catch pan.
Flames vented from the charging door of a shredder air lock on August 14, 1992. At approximately the
same time a light detonation occurred in the control enclosure located immediately below the air lock. The
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detonation caused the doors of the enclosure to fling open. The immediate cause of the fire was the
simultaneous opening of both air lock doors which allowed mixing of combustible gases with air.
A fire occurred in the kiln shredder auger machine on July 28, 1993, when dirt and debris contaminated
with an oxidizer were fed to the unit. After the fire, an inspection revealed that an 85-gallon drum of the
same waste stream had a five-gallon bucket packed inside of a 30-gallon drum containing dirt and debris.
Six drums which contained oxidizers were found in their waste stream.
On August 10, 1993, another incident occurred when a container being moved to an incinerator warehouse
autodegraded, causing a release. A worker left the cap off of a container that was filled with bromine and
chlorine. The contents of the container reacted with the air, causing a spontaneous reaction. The container
then combusted, which caused the fire. No injuries resulted from the combustion.
On December 12, 1994, an explosion occurred in the kiln shredder auger machine waste feed system when
a 2300 pound container of spent oxygen breathing apparatus canisters was dropped into the unit. The
waste had been mislabeied. Three injuries were reported as a result of the explosion and ensuing fire. The
entire feed system was a total loss and other structural damage was reported.
On March 25, 1995, a fire occurred in a kiln shredder building when vapors from a 250-pound box of non-
RCRA aerosol containers escaped and caused a flash of flames. The vapors escaped through a faulty
mechanical seal on the shredder slide gates and then to the containment chamber housing the shredder slide
gates. One employee was injured as a result of the incident.
On August 4, 1995, a fire occurred in the special handling facility when elemental phosphorous overheated
and splattered on combustible packaging. The fire spread within a small room to the wall and ceiling.
Material handlers unsuccessfully attempted to cover the phosphorous with dry sand. One injury was
reported as a result of the incident.
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. (CWM), Port Arthur, Texas
Contact: David Barker, Texas Natural Resources Conservation Commission (512) 239-2510
There have been two incidents at the permitted CWM facility in Port Arthur. One of the incidents
occurred in June 1992, and was described as a kiln fire that resulted from overheating during normal
operation.
The second incident occurred on December 24, 1992, when one gallon of Incinerator Air Pollution Control
Train (APC) waste leaked from a storage container in a truck staging area. Workers at CWM assumed the
release consisted of PCBs and immediately initiated a cleanup. CWM secured the area and cleaned up all
visible signs of the waste. In areas where the waste had penetrated cracks in the asphalt,
the asphalt and underlying soil was removed until no signs of the waste remained. Tests of the released
material indicated that the waste did not contain PCBs.
See Attachment 9 for additional information.
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Rollins Deer Park, Deer Park, Texas
Contact: David Barker, Texas Natural Resources Conservation Commission (512) 239-2510
An incident occurred at this permitted facility in November 1991, when a fire broke out in the furnace duct
of the combustion chamber. The plant shut down as many vents as possible and allowed the facility to cool
down for a few days. A new duct was installed and the unit was running again in about five days.
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REGION VII
Regional Summary
There have been reported incidents at four RCRA permitted incinerators in. Region VII
These facilities include: the Monsanto Company » Muscatme, Iowa, the Lake City Atmy
AroBHii«tfon Hani io Independence, Missouri, the Aptos facility i» Coffeyvilie, Kansas and ICC
Explosives BnvH-oomenta! Company in Joplb, Missouri These incidents included a fire and
.several explosions. Detail summaries are provided below, ,, "
reported at a TSBF (international Paper w J<$ia, Missouri) InT
Region V& It involved a release of water contaminated with wood preserving wastes, tie itcility
is now closed. A detailed summary is provided befow. " - "'
International Paper, Joplin, Missouri
Contact: Robert Morrison, Missouri Department of Natural Resources (314) 751-3191
International Paper is a closed TSDF. On October 1, 1992, water contaminated with wood treating wastes
was released during a transfer from one closed surface impoundment to another. The release occurred
when the hose used to transfer the water broke and water continued to pump into the environment for a
short period of time. It is estimated that, at most, 30,000 gallons of water was released to the environment
Ihe Agency does not have information on the concentration of the waste in the water that was released
The hose leak was corrected, and the facility has since made operational changes to make sure the pump is
under personnel surveillance at all times. .
Monsanto Company, Muscatine, Iowa
Contact: Ken Herstowski, EPA Region VII (913) 551-7058
In July 1992, the permitted incinerator at the Monsanto facility was shut down while the facility's process
unit was being repaired. When the incinerator was brought back on line there was a loss of quench water
flow which caused the temperature in the fiberglass scrubber to approach 2000 degrees Fahrenheit As a
result, the unit's scrubber caught fire. Although organics such as chlorobenzene and dichlorobenzene are
usually treated in the unit, only natural gas was in the incinerator at the time of the incident because the
unit was just being brought on line. There was no release of hazardous waste to the environment There
were also no injuries reported. Since the incident, the facility has updated its controls (e.g., valves and
sensors) to better identify losses of water pressure.
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Lake City Army Ammunition Plant, Independence, Missouri
Contact: John Smith, EPA Region VII (913) 551-7845
An incident occurred at the permitted Lake City Army Ammunition Plant incinerator on March 29, 1991.
Live rounds of ammunition had been put through the incinerator, but were not completely treated, 'when
the rounds came out of the back of the incinerator they fell off of the conveyer belt and were set off. The
incident occurred during the trial bum. There were no injuries recorded. The facility no longer processes
the type of bullets that were involved in this incident and as a result has imposed more strict controls of the
waste feed to the incinerator.
Aptus, Coffeyville, Kansas
Contact: John Smith, EPA Region VII (913) 551-7845
The incident at this permitted facility occurred in the fall of 1990 during normal operations. A waste drum
with an exceedingly high Btu mixture of PCB-contaminated paint waste was introduced to the incinerator.
Gas accumulated in the ionized wet scrubber and was set off by a spark. The explosion occurred in the
scrubber, not in the incinerator itself. The explosion was completely contained within the unit. The unit's
air pollution control devices were damaged internally, and the unit was out of operation for about one week.
No injuries or natural resource damages were reported. Since the material had gone through the entire
thermal combustion process, no hazardous waste was released. However, air emissions may have exceeded
particulate and HC1 emissions standards due to the damage to the pollution control device. Since this
incident, the facility has instituted tighter controls on its waste sampling and feed procedures, and no longer
accepts wastes with a high Btu content.
ICI Explosives Environmental Company, Joplin, Missouri
Contacts: John Smith, EPA Region VII (913) 551-7845 and Kyle Russell, Missouri Department of
Natural Resources (573) 751-3176
There have been three incidents involving explosions at this facility since it began operating in 1995. None
of the incidents resulted in releases to the environment.
I
The first incident occurred during start-up in 1995 when there was an unexplained explosion in the rotary
kiln. The incinerator was operating as interim status until the final permit was issued in March 1996.
The second incident also involves an unexplained explosion in the rotary kiln on April 3, 1997. It was
assumed that a round of ammunition was left in the kiln and that it exploded, causing ammonium nitrate to
react.
A third explosion occurred on August 26, 1998 in Ithe storage area of the feed handling building. The
explosion occurred when workers were removing detonator components from a container onto a flat table.
One person was killed and two others were injured as a result. No fire suppression was required for this
incident. There was no obvious cause for the explosion.
i
See attachment 10 for additional information.
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REGION VIII
Regional Summary
there haw bees no reported incidents at combustioa lactiitles k Region VOJ. '
There fcas been only one reported incident in Region Villa* a TSDF, This release
occurred at the United States Pollution Control Incorporated
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REGION IX
Regional Summary
There have been reported incidents at one combustion facility *n Region IX at the Johnston
AtoU Chemical Agent Demtfitarization System {JACADS) facility^ three of which involved & reksase
of hazardous substances; " ' -'"",',;
Reports at three eommerciaf TSDFs ta Region IX have also been reported* One accident
took pJace at Statewide Environmental Services, Inc., which is a transfer and storage facility. TJx?
second incident took place at a storage and recycling facility owned and operated by the Oil and
Solvent Processing Company, which was later acquired &y Chemical Waste Management. 'The
third incident occurred at Chem-Tech Systems, All three facilities are located in the l#$ Angeles
area, A fourth incident at the Rhone Poulenc BasicjChemicai Company industrial furnace faciliiy
in Martinez, California was also reported. , -
Johnston Atoll Chemical Agents Demilitarization System (JACADS), Johnston Island
Contacts: Larry Bowerman (415) 744-2051 and Ray Fox (415) 744-2053, EPA Region IX and Cathv
Massimlno, EPA Region X (206) 553-4153
The JACADS incinerator was permitted in 1985 and is designed to destroy the U.S. stockpile of Chemical
weapons being stored on Johnston Island. These weapons all contain nerve agents or blister agents. There
have been a number of incidents at the JACADS incinerator since December 1990. These incidents are as
follows:
• In December 1990, during shutdown of the Liquid Incinerator (LIC), agent GB (a nerve
agent) was sensed in the duct leading from the LIC pollution abatement system. The
source of the agent was a short-term leakage from the agent feed system after feed shut off.
The period of emissions was about 45 minutes, and emission levels from the stack were
about 25% of what is allowed in the state permit. Following the incident, the facility
implemented changes in its operating procedures.
• On March 11, 1991, smoke filled the Deactivation Furnace System (DPS) room and some
smoke escaped to the atmosphere through the stack. No agent was being processed at the
time. The incident was attributed to an instrumentation malfunction; the defective
instrument was replaced following the incident.
• On May 2, 1991, there was a small bearing cooling oil fire, caused by an overheated
bearing, in the DPS room. Agent was not being processed at the time, and there were no
reports of harmful releases.
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On June 26, 1991, the Dunnage Incinerator (DUN) was in start-up mode with
nonhazardous waste when a pressure transient occurred resulting in deformation of the
furnace chamber and building. The DUN underwent trial burn testing in January 1995
and is being prepared for full-scale operations.
On January 21, 1992, the DPS kiln stopped rotating while processing VX (a nerve agent)
rockets, and the system shut down. The incident was attributed to a hole found in the kiln
cylinder wall (apparently caused by detonation of rocket parts near the kiln wall). No
releases were reported. The unit is housed in a building where ventilation air is routed
through a carbon filter system. The Army installed a new kiln with thicker walls and
redesigned the flights to decrease the likelihood of rocket parts becoming lodged in the kiln.
On December 18, 1992, there was a wind storm which resulted in a spill onto coral near
Building 888 of 50 gallons of xylene, 1.6 gallons of hexane and 0.6 gallons of isopropanol.
The contingency plan was implemented and soil (coral) sampling was performed.
On December 27 and 28, 1992, power outages caused a loss of ventilation in the
Munitions Demilitarization Building (MDB) for four separate short periods. The facility
implemented the contingency plan, but no agent migration outside the MDB was noted.
On December 28, 1992, the Depot Air Monitoring System (DAMS) detected elevated
readings that were traced to a leaking GB rocket in Igloo No. 750. The report indicated
that the amount of leakage was small and presented no hazards to human health or the
environment outside the facility.
On January 2, 1993, a fire in the Explosion Containment Room (ECR) occurred. A
hazardous materials team extinguished the fire with CO2 and then water. Investigations
indicated that this incident did not involve any of the incinerators, but only a small part of
the rubber/fiberglass conveyor belt. As a result, operational verification testing (OVT) for
the Metal Parts Furnace (MPF) was delayed approximately 45 days. The facility also
made various changes, including the installation of a deluge system.
On May 31, 1993, there was a potential release of agent HD (mustard gas) of 0.012
mg/m3 outside the MPF building (the allowable stack concentration is 0.03 mg/m3). The
incident occurred when a tray containing the residue of waste material exited the building.
The Army was unable to determine whether the alarm was triggered by a low-level agent
release, products of incomplete combustion (PICs), or other interferents. The facility
temporarily suspended processing of projectiles and waste material in the MPF.
On December 9, 1993, a spill of about 500 pounds of agent GB occurred inside the
Munitions Demilitarization Building (MDB). There was no agent migration outside the
building and the contingency plan was not activated. The facility suspended processing of
munitions until investigation of the incident was satisfactorily completed.
On March 14, 1994, a small fire occurred in the ECR. The fire was caused by a migration
of hot gases up the DPS feed chute that resulted when the two feed gates jammed in the
open position. There was no migration of hazardous waste inside or
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outside the facility. The Army committed to take corrective measures to prevent
recurrence.
• On March 23, 1994, the automatic continuous air monitoring system (ACAMS) detected a
stack emission concentration of agent GB above the allowable concentration of 0.0003
mg/m3. The emissions exceeded the limit for about 25 minutes, with a maximum
concentration of .0315 mg/m3. The incident occurred after the LIC had been shut down
for maintenance and while the agent gun was being removed. All weapon processing was
suspended pending the outcome of the investigation. The investigation indicated that the
incident was caused by inadequate system design and operating procedures, combined with
equipment malfunction and operator error. The investigative team estimated that a total of
10 to 12 mg of agent GB had been emitted from the stack and that maximum ground-level
concentrations were below the General Population Limit (GPL). After this incident, the
Army instituted numerous additional safeguards to prevent future releases. Since then,
the JACADs facility has shown significant improvement.
See Attachment 11 additional information.
Rhone Poulenc Basic Chemical Company, Martinez, California
Contacts: Robert Bornstein (415) 744-2298 and Larry Bowerman, EPA Region IX (415) 744-2051
On June 22, 1992, this facility had an industrial accident and chemical fire/release. A release of corrosive
sulfonation acid sludge containing spent sulfuric acid and petroleum sludge resulted in an explosion sind
fire. Local fire agencies worked all day to control the chemical release and suppress the fire with fire
fighting and acid-suppressing foam.
Region IX reported that Rhone-Poulenc did not aggressively restrict access to the impacted area A Pacific
Gas and Electric worker was seriously injured when he unknowingly came in contact with, corrosive sludge
EPA demanded that Rhone Poulenc adhere to OSHA regulations.
Upon inspection of the damaged area, EPA detected elevated air concentration levels of hydrogen sulfide
and sulfur dioxide. The inspection team also found that a ruptured line was releasing acidic water into a
bermed area that was close to capacity. Rhone also had allowed several workers to work in the area
without respiratory protection. EPA recommended that a contractor immediately remove the acidic water
from the bermed area.
Rhone Poulenc's remediation plan called for analysis of the fire water runofFand sludge for pH, total
hydrocarbons, and flash point. After characterizing the materials, the facility used vacuum trucks to
transfer the runoff and sludge to a holding pond.
EPA reported that Rhone lacked organization and structure to adequately address the situation. It appeared
that the facility had-never practiced its emergency contingency plans.
NOTE: The facility produced commercial-grade sulfuric acid by burning spent sulfuric acid and sulfur in
an industrial furnace. It has never operated as a commercial TSDF under RCRA. Although the sulfur
containing compounds had characteristics of hazardous waste, they were specifically exempted from the
definition of a hazardous waste under State and Federal regulations. At the time of this product release the
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facility had an application in for a new RCRA incinerator permit that was being reviewed by EPA and the
State of California. The permit application was subsequently withdrawn on August 31, 1992.
See Attachment 12 for additional information.
Statewide Environmental Services, Inc., Los Angeles, California
Contact: Larry Bowerman, EPA Region IX (415) 744-2051
An incident occurred at this commercial transfer/storage facility on May 21, 1991, when solidified organic
peroxides were being transferred to a polyethylene drum for incineration. The consolidation of these
materials resulted in an unexpected reaction that caused a release of water vapor and carbon dioxide. In
addition, some solid material within the drum spilled into a containment area. Statewide Environmental
Services implemented its contingency plan and the spill was contained, cleaned up and placed in a 30-
gallon polyethylene drum for disposal. Four personnel from Nash Salvage, the company working at the
facility on the day of the incident, complained of health effects and were taken to a hospital and released the
same day. Since the incident, the facility no longer consolidates organic peroxides or any other materials
from lab packs.
See Attachment 13 for additional information.
Oil and Solvent Process Company (OSCO), Azusa, California
Contact: Larry Bowerman, EPA Region IX (415) 744-2051
On April 21, 1989, this recycling and storage facility had a 9,611 gallon spill of wastewater containing
1.28 percent solvents, most of which were acetone. The spill occurred when a hose detached from a
portable pump to which wastewater was being transferred. The spill spread to adjacent industrial land, and
approximately five gallons traveled onto a public road, where the spill was contained. The spilled
wastewater did not enter any drains or waterways, and 2,300 gallons were recovered by using on-site
vacuum trucks and absorbent. A consultant removed the contaminated soil, covered the area with Visqueen
(a commercial product), and tested the area to ensure that the contamination had been removed. OSCO
reviewed procedures and made modifications to prevent future occurrences. According to the facility, the
successful containment and on-site response action averted any threat to human health or the environment.
This facility is now owned by Chemical Waste Management, Inc.
See Attachment 14 for additional information.
Chem-Tech Systems, Los Angeles, California
Contact: Yolanda Garza, Department of Toxic Substances Control (818) 551-2955
On August 29, 1994, this permitted commercial TSDF had a release of nitrous oxide emissions from a
scrubber in the inorganic processing area. Acute emissions lasted between 20 minutes and one hour, and
appeared to be the result of the off-loading of a tanker containing water with chrome (pH 5) into Tank M-3,
which contained mixed acids. Solids in the tank were agitated during the unloading process, which caused '
a chemical reaction that led to the release.
25
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Upon detection of the emissions, the facility notified the fire department and evacuated all personnel. The
plant was shut down and only the scrubbers were left in operation. Once the cause of the release was
identified, the fire department's hazardous materials team entered the facility to monitor ambient air and
collect a laboratory sample.
Chem-Tech demonstrated to the satisfaction of the fire department that the mixture in Tank M-3 could be
neutralized and treated in the facility's treatment systems. Chem-Tech has reviewed its tank cleaning
schedule and has developed a new schedule for certain tanks, including Tank M-3.
See Attachment 15 for additional information.
26
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REGION X
Regional Summary "
There have been no reported incidents at combustion facilities in Region X.
, the incidents reported in Region X occurred at several commercial tSDFs, they include:
Chemical Waste Management in Arlington^ Oregon; Northwest BnviroService in Seattle,
Washington; Sol-Pro and. ChemPro both uiTacoma, Washington; PhlHips Btmronmenta>PIer 91
ia Port of Seatfle, Washington and Washington Chemical in. Sjx&ane, Washington., Incidents at
these facilities occurred as a re'suft of various activities sach as mixing incompatible hazardous
waste, processing oil -wastes, spills of hazardous waste arid oil mixtures, and welding activities.
Chemical Waste Management of the Northwest, Inc. (CWMNW), Arlington, Oregon
Contacts: Fredrick Moore and Mike Renz,
Oregon Department of Environmental Quality (503) 388-6146
On May 5, 1994, at 10:00 p.m., a Chemical Waste Management (CWMNW) security guard discovered a
fire inside Landfill L-13. The guard notified the Emergency Coordinator. The fire was contained and
extinguished in the landfill by 1:00 a.m. on May 6, 1994. CWMNW reported the incident to the Oregon
Department of Environmental Quality and EPA at 8:15 a.m. Disposal records indicated that wood debris
was placed in relative proximity to stabilized, heat-generating waste streams of which CWMNW claimed
are normally segregated. In its incident report, CWMNW stated that it would take the following actions to
prevent recurrence:
Supplement the Landfill L-13 operating procedures to clarify that heat-generating waste
was to be separated from combustible materials;
• Retrain the operations staff on operating procedures;
Study ways to identify heat-generating loads of waste by using an infrared thermometer
and thermocouple thermometer probe; and
• Conduct a fire brigade training session for all fire team personnel.
The facility was permitted at the time of the incident.
See Attachment 16 for additional information.
27
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Northwest EnviroService (NWE), Seattle, Washington
Contacts: Barb Smith (206) 649-7019 and Jeannie Summerhays (206) 649-7055,
Washington State Department of Ecology
Northwest EnviroService (NWE) is a commercial TSDF located 1.5 miles from the city of Seattle on
Highway 1-5. The facility has had four incidents since 1988, all of which occurred while the facility
operated under interim status. In 1988 a fire broke out at the facility when welding sparks ignited fumes
from a below-grade exempt cinder block pit covered by a wooden structure. This pit contained oily bilge
water from boats. No injuries or natural resource damage resulted from the incident, but the highway was
shut down until the fire was brought under control.
There was another incident at this facility in October 1989. It involved the processing of oil wastes from
the Exxon Valdez spill. Workers in a building across the street from the facility complained about fugitive
emissions, and several of the workers were hospitalized.
On March 28, 1992, facility personnel mixed incompatible waste in a stabilization unit. The mixing
generated heat, flames, and toxic fumes. The facility did not promptly report the incident and the State
issued a citation.
On February 14 and 15, 1994, 5,500 gallons of a hazardous waste and oil mixture spilled from a bulk
container at a transfer facility into a storm drain. The waste proceeded to migrate to the Duwamish River
via a nearby wetland. NWE claimed that the spill was an act of sabotage, because the accident could not
have occurred unless a seal, lock, and valve were all opened in succession. A NWE employee discovered
the spill at 7:50 a.m. on February 15, 1994, when he noticed a sheen on the parking lot. NWE put up
barriers to divert the spill around storm drains and notified the National Response Center, Washington
Department of Ecology, and the Seattle Fire Department all by 9:30 a.m. Initial response activities
involved boom and pad deployment in the wetland channel and a holding pond. Vacuum trucks removed
products from the holding pond and the wetlands, and a contractor conducted cleanups at the Duwamish
River. Although the location of the spill occurred under EPA jurisdiction, because EPA was not on the
scene, the U.S. Coast Guard served as the Federal Incident Commander. Response actions over the first
two days consisted of the following:
i
Stabilizing the site and containing ithe spill;
• Defining response strategies and priorities;
• Conducting a spill investigation;
• Notifying authorities and coordinating response activities;
Dye testing of the storm drain system from the NWE site to the wetlands;
• Spill documenting and sampling;
• Surveilling and tracking the spill; and
• Developing a long-term cleanup plan and planning cycle.
28
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NWE had provided only limited security in the tank area before this incident occurred. Since the incident,
NWE has proposed to put up a security fence, put in lighting in the tank area, and has hired a 24-hour
security guard until the fence can be installed. NWE also has proposed installing a valve at the storm drain
to prevent releases from migrating from the site. The Department of Ecology has assessed a penalty of
$91,000 against NWE.
According to State officials, the facility does not have a RCRA permit and will be ceasing all hazardous
waste management activities.
See Attachment 17 for additional information.
Sol-Pro, Tacoma, Washington
Contact: Dave Bartus, EPA Region X, (206) 553-2804
In approximately 1991, Sol-Pro removed a feed tank from a solvent recycling still in order to refurbish the
tank. The contractor performing the work, received explicit directions to abstain from any welding work on
the tank, but did not follow these instructions. The welding on the exterior of the tank ignited fumes inside
the tank, resulting in an explosion that damaged some equipment and caused a very small release of fugitive
emissions. The force of the explosion cut off an electricity transmission line and temporarily shut down
Sol-Pro and two neighboring facilities. Sol-Pro and a neighboring facility implemented their contingency
plans. No injuries were reported.
The State also cited the facility for fugitive emissions from solvent recyclers, evaporators, and process
vents containing acetone, toluene, and lacquer thinner, and from a hopper that contained empty chemical
drums. No physical or health related problems were reported. There was some documented data of
releases to surface water from leaking vats and/or containers. The facility has installed a flare to burn off
any emissions.
The facility was not permitted at the time of these incidents.
ChemPro, Tacoma, Washington
Contact: David Polivka, Washington State Department of Ecology, (206) 407-6345
In 1987, this interim status facility experienced a 10,000-gallon spill of chromic acid that leaked through a
loose valve. The facility is a treater of metal-bearing waste through solidification and precipitation. The
facility performed a soil cleanup and agreed to more rigorous inspections to prevent recurrence. The
facility is now under a corrective action order for past waste management practices, including storage of oil
in and operating unlined surface impoundment.
29
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Phillips Environmental - Pier 91, Port of Seattle, Washington
Contacts: Jack Boiler (206) 753-9428 and Jeannie Summerhays (206) 649-7055, EPA Region X
In 1990, when the facility was owned by ChemPro, welders working at an old Navy tank farm/waste oil
facility ignited fumes in an empty tank. One worker was killed and fugitive emissions were reportedly
released. The State investigated the incident. The facility was not permitted at the time of the incident
Washington Chemical, Spokane, Washington
Contact: Jack Boiler, EPA Region X, (206) 753-9428
In March/April of 1990, workers at the Washington Chemical facility mixed several incompatible
characteristic (reactive and/or ignitable) wastes and sealed them into a 55-gallon drum. An explosion
resulted, launching the drum into the air and across several hundred feet of the facility, spraying the waste
in all directions during its flight. The drum landed outside the facility in the middle of a street intersection
No injuries were reported, and only minor property damage occurred. The facility was permitted at lie
time of the incident.
The facility did not implement its contingency plan, nor did it report the release. The release was reported
by a neighboring business. Consequently, the Washington Department of Ecology investigated the incident
and assessed a $60,000 penalty against Washington Chemical. The state hearing board upheld Ecology's
fine, but the company has appealed the decision.
30
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Summary of Incidents at Combustion Facilities and Other TSDF Listings
Region I
No facilities
Region II
Eastman Kodak Company (Incinerator)
Kodak Park, New York
Bridgeport Rental and Oil Services (BROS) (Superfund Incinerator)
New Jersey
Rollins Environmental Services, Inc. (TSDF)
Logan Township, New Jersey
Region HI
Mill Service (TSDF)
Yukon, Pennsylvania
Delaware Container Company (TSDF)
Coatesville, Pennsylvania
Region IV
ThermalKEM (Incinerator)
Rock Hill, South Carolina
Laidlaw Environmental Services (Thermal Oxidation Corporation) (Incinerator)
Roebuck, South Carolina
U.S. Department of Energy (Incinerator)
Oak Ridge, Tennessee
Diversified Scientific Services, Inc. (DSSI) (BIF)
Kingston, Tennessee
LWD (Incinerator)
Clay, Kentucky
31
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Region IV (continued)
Carolina Solite (TSDF)
Norwood, North Carolina
Southeastern Chemicals (TSDF)
Sumter, South Carolina
Laidlaw Environmental Services (GSX Laidlaw Landfill) (TSDF)
Pinewood, South Carolina
Safety-Kleen Lexington Recycling Center (TSDF)
Lexington, South Carolina -
Holnam/Safety-Kleen (TSDF)
Holly Hill, South Carolina
CP Chemicals (TSDF)
Sumter, South Carolina
Albright and Wilson (TSDF)
Charleston, South Carolina
E.I. DuPont de Nemours (Incinerator)
Axis, Alabama
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. (CWM) (Commercial TSDF)
Emelle, Alabama
Fisher Industrial Services, Inc. (Commercial TSDF)
Glencoe, Alabama
Region V
Dow Chemical Company (Incinerator)
Midland, Michigan
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. (CWM) (Incinerator)
Chicago, Illinois
Ross Incineration Services, Inc. (Incinerator)
Grafton, Ohio
32
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Region V (continued!
Waste Technologies Industries (WTI) (Incinerator)
East Liverpool, Ohio
Trade Waste Incineration (part of CWM) (Incinerator)
Sauget, Illinois
3M (Incinerator)
Cottage Grove, Minnesota
Region VI
Ensco (Incinerator)
El Dorado, Arkansas
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. (CWM) (Incinerator)
Port Arthur, Texas
Rollins Deer Park (Incinerator)
Deer Park, Texas
Region VII
International Paper (TSDF)
Joplin, Missouri
Monsanto Company (Incinerator)
Muscatine, Iowa
Lake City Army Ammunition Plant (Incinerator)
Independence, Missouri
Aptus (Incinerator)
Coffeyville, Kansas
ICI Explosives Environmental Company (Incinerator)
Joplin, Missouri
33
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Region
United States Pollution Control Incorporated (U.S.P.C.I.) Grassy Mountain Landfill (TSDF)
Tooele County, Utah
Region IX
Johnston Atoll Chemical Agents Demilitarization System (JACADS) (Incinerator)
Johnston Island
Rhone Poulenc Basic Chemical Company (TSDF)
Martinez, California
Statewide Environmental Services, Inc. (TSDF)
Los Angeles, California
Oil and Solvent Process Company (OSCO) (TSDF)
Azusa, California
Chem-Tech Systems (TSDF)
Los Angeles, CA
Region X
Chemical Waste Management of the Northwest (CWMNW) (TSDF)
Arlington, Oregon
Northwest EnviroService (NWE) (TSDF)
Seattle, Washington
Sol-Pro (TSDF)
Tacoma, Washington
ChemPro (TSDF)
Tacoma, Washington
Phillips Environmental (formerly ChemPro) (TSDF)
Pier 91, Port of Seattle, Washington
Washington Chemical (TSDF)
Spokane, Washington
34
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ATTACHMENT 1
Eastman Kodak Company
Kodak Park, New York
-------
-------
July 27, 1990
Mr. Constantine Sidanon-Eristoff
Regional Administrator, Region II
United States Environmental Protection Agency
26 Federal Plaza
New fork, NY 10278
Mr. Bruce Fineter
New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation
6274 East Avon-Lima Road
Avon, NT I4A1A
Dear Sire:
Subject: Emission, Eastman Kodak Company, Kodak Bark, B-21.S,
July 12j 1990
The following is a summary of the events leading to and the £ allow-up of > the
incident which occurred on July 12, 1990 at the Kodak Park, B-218 chemical
incinerator. :
Ac approximately 12:00 PH, a water liae from the recycle cooling water system
ruptured, spilling approximately 75 gallon* of recycle cooling water. An
estimated 2 gallons of this amount impacted the ground surrounding the recycle
pump pad while the remaining 73 gallons entered the industrial cewer. The
area of visible contamination was immediately excavated and treated at B-218.
As a result of the recycle water line rupture and the rub sequent loss in
pressure, the automatic shutdown sequence for the facility began. The
emergency stack opened a* part of the automatic-shutdown mode to protect the
emission control equipment from high temperature. ThLe resulted in a visible
plume from the emrgeacy stack for approximately 7 miautes. (Tastes in the kiln
at the tine of the stack opening were empty containers of
l-chloro-2,«-diaitrabeB2eae and paper trays used in tiie process of drying
2-m«Uiylhydroquinone.
EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY- 3O STATE STREET - BOCHESTSJt. KEW VO*K T4BSO
-------
Mr. Congtantine Sidamon-Eristoff - 2
Mr. Bruce Fineter
July 27, 1990
The ruptured water line wa* repaired ead the facility was back in operation by
2r30 PH,. July 12, 1990. IE you have any questions regarding thl« incidenu,
please contact Mark Nicholson of nay staff at (716) 712-4721-
Sincerely -youre,
Bruce H- ELandennan, Ph.D., Director
Environmental Technical Services
Health and Environment Laboratories
BtlKtmto.
Kfiicholson
1113H
ccr: He. Richard Elliott
Monroe County Health Department
111 Hestfall Eoad
Rochester, RT 14620
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Bare: Uarcb 4, 1991
Time: 12 midnight - 2iH
Information included:
1. Chemical Incinerator Li fan* restarted and emergeasy
stack eloaad.
It 47
Fuel oil
Hazardous .waste feeds are Btasted, normal operations resumed, Kode 3
-------
Dates March 6, ±991
10 AK - 4 EH
Information Included:
1- JCiln Temperatnre Strip Chart
2. secondary Combustion Chamber Strip ch«rt
3. Kiln Draft strip Chart
4. -Smart Display - Logic Controller Printout
5. chemical Incinerator Liquid Handling log
Additional Informations
Prior Mode 3, Normal Operatum*
to
10:56
I
10:56 The instrumentation monitoring ti.e B-218 scrubber vmtcr flows
off, the.
to *top and tfc« otergency rtack to pp«n.
11:41 Sh» ID fans, were started and the emergency ^.ck elo««d.
1*56 Corseted repair, on tne «erahb«r water flow -cmitariag in«tr«tient«tion.
2s09 Fuel oil,,t«»d to warm up «ae kila..
2sSS Bazardoaa waste feed* are started, Kode 3
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ATTACHMENT!
Bridgeport Rental and Oil Services
(BROS)
Bridgeport, New Jersey
-------
-------
Bridgeport Rental and Oil services (BROS) - ,
Damage DU* to the Explosion and op.rftto.on Before and After
Donald tt. Wright, Environmental Scientist
Air and Water Section (2ES-MM)
Joel Columbek, Chief .«.,-, •_***%
New Jersey/Caribbean Compliance Section (2AWM-HWC)
Thru: Marcus E. Kantr, Chief
Air and Water Section (2ES-MM)
At your request, I visited the BROS super fund site cm September
23 to see the extent of damage to the incinerator and to look at
the operating conditions to as»e*» possible causes of the
explosion that occurred at 6:19 pa on Sunday September 20, 1992.
The explosion blew the hinged sides of the weigh belt "used to
».«r ?ne'contaminated sci! to the rotary kiln. «J«" h5vjj££
reinstalled, although they don't seal *• well as they did to*"*?
the explosion. There were fugitive missions associated with the
explosion.
The subcontractor's (ENSCO'n) thinking is that a J«rje piece of
slag ring that had formed in the kiln fell Into-the water in the
ash quench forming steam. Waste feed had been stopped 50 minutes
prior to the explosion. Th« incinerator operation was normal
prior to the event as indicated by the oxygen and CO WMital.
concentrations in the stack. The Total hydrocarbon »3J
pointed out the neid to explain the HC readings in this report.
From discussions with the prime contractor (EBASCO) and the COB,
there were 2 previous explosions, on* about 2 »onths ego end one
last winter. . .
on September 21, 1992-at approximately 7»30j?m there-was an
emission of partieulate matter that lasted for a »inutes end
travelled across U. 8. Route 130. EKSCO personnel had been
-------
<*<
working on the roulticlone (particulars removal device) to free a
jammed screw feeder used to remove ash from the aulticlone. .Phey
thought that tney had emptied the roulticlone and were reattaching
the screw feeder when ash tfcat had farmed a bridge in -the
multiclone broke causing the release of a large quantity of auth
from the separated flanges.
Based on these two events, the COE shut down all waste feed
operations pending a complete inspection and corrections of all
deficiencies found. The inspection by the COE cited many area*
of poor maintenance and tecs- housekeeping.
Although I did not specifically loo*, at the number of waste fmd
cutoffs, the number seems high, perhaps due to the attempt to .
feed too much waste for the amount of organic* present in the
waste. Waste feed rates are very variable. Although the screw
feeder and the kiln will tend to smooth the operation, ENSCO
should try to minimize feed variations.
If you have any questions, please call me at 908-321-6764.
I
cc: Donald Lynch
Mark Wheeler
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ATTACHMENT 3
Rollins Environmental Services, Inc.
Logan Township, New Jersey
-------
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ROLLINS
•*» «fc ENVTBOSMEVEU.iJEKV1CES f\J> 1ST.
P.O. Boi O37, BrideEpon. NJ 08014. fiW/«W100 Geaenl Offices. M9/4&T.3105 Sate OUfct
August 2, 1990
Mr. Thomas Sherman, Chief
Department of "Environmental Protection
Division of Hazardous waste Management
Bureau of Hazardous Waste Engineering
CN-020
Trenton, NJ 08625
Re: Incinerator Emissions £.t -Rollins Environican.te."' Se»-vi-es
Inc.
Dear Mr. Sherman: •
at approximately. 10:58 a.m. on July 27, 1990, Rollins Environmental
services (NJ) ine*: [RES (NJ}J experienced & drop in water flow to
the oiicinaration scrubber system at its facility in Logan Townsnip.
THIS drop in flow caused tae incinerator trip system to activate.
and resulted, in fugitive air emissions from the rotary kiln section
of the incinerator. The problem.ceased at aporoxinately ll:OO a.m.
The incident was reported to the Cepartaent Jsy calling 252-7172.
Analysis of the incident revealed that the cause of tha drop in
water flew ^o the scrubber Eystem w&s caused 3sv *. flutte^ in. the
water puicp. Corrective action taJcen included restartiac the fans
and reesrablisking. ths dlraft within th«. incinerator and
reestablishing the.flow of water to the scrubber.
I certify-under'penalty of. law that I have personally examined ana
am familiar with the information submitted in this document and all
S^fS?"^11?* aQd ^-V, b¥ed on ffir ^^"T of those individuals
immediately responsible for obtaining the- information, I believe
that the.information is true, accurate, and complete. I am aware
that, there' are significant, penalties for submitting, false
information, including the possibility cf fine snd imprisonment.
Sincerely, • • '
xx
Gerald E. Jordan '
?resid«m.t - ;
LRSrne" . . . . ;
cc: Carolyn Grasso,' Southern Field Of£ice-BHWH
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ROLLINS
•^ ^ ^TOONMEXTU. SERVICES (Ml DC.
P.O. Box SSZBnde.poct NJ 08014.6W/467-3HW <-«! Offc*. 609/467-3105 &faOffitt
August 24r is90
Mr. Thomas Sh.cnaan.r
Departanent of Environmental Protection
Divxsion of Hazarfloas- waste Management
Tren.ton"r
08S25
Re: incinerator Emissions at Rollins Environmental services (KJ)
Dear Mr. Snenaan-
in^atio,, s^ssf^sss^s 4s
Sincerely,
Gerald E. Jordan
President
ccr
Carolyn Grasso, Southern Field Office-DHHM
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ROLLINS
^*» ^ ENTilRDNTHe.-EU. SERVICES (Ml INT.
September 17, 1990
Mr. Thomas Sherman, Chief
Department of.Environmental Protection
Division_of Hazardous Waste Management
of Hazardous Waste Engineering
Trenton, NJ OS625
Re: incinerator Emissions at Rollins Snvironaental Services (NJ)
Dear Mr. snenaan:
"-
_
ceased at appSIlaiSlv 2 ?ic " -, J? « .incinerator. The pronlan
292 "ll^' """"t "« reports to the
Sincerely,
a-r- •" e~4 ^"W7"—'—-«*•«"-«=.• «3G. compiere.. I am aware
^" *^*ticajlt senaltiss for submitting false
, in^luaing tne possibiii^ of fln. _anjj 1^^^^
.Gerald E.. Jordan
Bresident
LRS/ne
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ROLLINS
«^» »*» ENVIRa«!EVIAL SERVICES l\Jl EX.:
KG. Box 337. Bridceport. M OWW. 6W/467.J1M Gtocral Offi« 609/4C7-3105 Sd= OHi«
September 20, 1590
Mr. Thomas Sherman, Ciiief
Department of • Snvircnnent-ai Protection
Division of Hazardous Waste Management
Bureau of Hazardous Waste Engineering
CN-028
Trenton, KTJ 08625
Re: Incinerator Emissions at Rollins Envirbmaenral
Services ~
Dear Mr. Sherman:
At approacinataly 6:10 P.m. on Augtast 29, 1990 , Roll-ns
Environmental Service (NJ) zac. [SEs (NJ>] -experienced a loss of
araf t wi-cnin tne incineration .system ar its facility
Township. Thxs loss, of draft rSulted in fugitfce ai?
from tne rotary kila sectiofi of the incinerator. The
^ ^^ ^ repor-,edto
incidsnt h» revealed taat the cause was tie result
^866 bY ^ 'electri<^ai storm. After power was
incineratcr scrubber system was restarted.
-stsM
reestablished
Ff Ia? **** I tave Personally examined and
anf oiaataon sut,mitted in this document and all
i>ased on ^ Inquiry of thos. individuals
hfo™6 .f°r cbt'£in^ the information, I believe
the. information is true, accurate, and complete. I am aware
. there . ;are significant ipenalti.s for submitting falTse
information, • inclufiina the possibility of fine andimprSInment
Sincerely, • . .
,Gerald E.. Jordan
r-'Prasideot.
LRS/na1 $J. . • .
cc: Carolyn Grasso, southern Field office-DHWM
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ROLLINS
^^ ^^EtfVIRONMEWttLSEEPEJSfvnjNr;
Bri*«P««. NJ MOM, 6Q9/46T-31*) Gcmnd «Be«. «B/4»^ifl5 SW« Offic
October 10r 1990
Mr. Thomas Sherman, Chief
Department of Environmental Protection
Division of Hazardous Waste Management
Bureau, of Hazardous Waste Engineering
CN-028
Trenton, HJ 08625
Re:
Incinerator Emissions at Rollins Environmental
Services (NJ) Inc. :
Dear Mr. Shenaan:
At approximately 9:23 a.m. on September 20, 1990, Rollins
Environmental Services (KT) inc. [RES (NJ)] experienced a loss of
draft: witnon the incineration. system at its facility in Logan
Township. This loss of draft resulted in fugitive air emissions
from the rotary kiln section of the incinerator. The problem
ceasea at approximately 9:33 a.m. The incident was reported to the
Department by ^-m -t-ng- 292-7172 ;
Analysis of the incident has revealed that the forced draft and
induced draft fans shut off because a plugged flow sensor in the
scrubber water supply line resulted, in a false low flow signal to
the control system. The system compensated by increasing the flow
SSNi-0i ^CZnSb*^ vater. Efeis flooded the scrubber system and
resulted in the fan shut down. Corrective action taken included
unplugging the sensor, reestablishing water flow to the scrubber
restarting the draft fans and restarting .the incinerator.
I certify under penalty of law. that I have personally *xaa±ssd and
am femn 1 iar with the information submitted in this document and all
?^S??^ amd ^t', based on my **<&*** <* taiose individuals
^di^Y,^!P°nsil*e for obtaining th* information, I believe
that the information is true, accurate and complete. I am aware
?** significant penalties for submitting false
including the possibility of fine and imprisonment..
Sia
•7»
Terrj7 A. Harmeson
President
IiES/cr
cc: Carolyn Grasso, Southern Field Office
- DEHH
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ROLLBVS
^*" ^ ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES fXI) INC.
RO.B«337tBridsq«ru>-J 08914. W9WWIOO G««l Office 60JKW7-3M5 S*5 Offi«
October 11, 1990
Mr. Thomas Sherman, Chief
£ Environmental Protection
of Hazardous Waste
Sazartto«
Trenton., KJ 08S25
Mr. Sherman:
S
lncte.rator and ™ *"* "ttUn
that
Sinceucely,
^>C ' /y «C6*^
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ROLLINS
^^ ^ EWIBONMESTU. SaVTCES i
EWIBONMESTU. SaVTCES i\n INC
P.O. Box 337, Bridgeport, NJ MOU, 609/467-3K* Gottttl Offices, fi09/4S7-
October 17/ 1990
Mr. Tnomas Sherman, Chief :
Department of Environmental Protection
Division of Hazardous waste Management
Bureau of Hazardous Waste Engineering
Trenton, NJ 08625
±£ •—
1 ** • 4 V 5* * r , -^
£!gi££!?3 f£{
OCT { 9 CT I'
r SmifiSicinfi at
Environmental services
Dear Mr. sherman:
-' Environmental
t
°£ J2i laeMttt has revealed that" the decrease in the
Sincerely,
Terry A. Earmeson
President
LRS/ne
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ROLLINS
^fc ^fc ENVJSONMESTM. SERVICES txn INC.
P.aflcr337.todeepon, N708M4.60SW67.3Me G-maOEQas. 609/^7^105 Sate Office
November 21, 1990
Mr. Tiiomas Sherman, Chief
Department of Bavironmeatal Protection
j£!iS0V* Stoardou. waste Management
Bureau of Harardous Waste Sngineering
Trenton, NJ 08625
fie:
Dear Mt. Snexman:
at
c EE "• 1990'
the Depart^St 1 292 " *«"«* was reported to
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November 21, 1990
Page 2
information,
Sincerely,
" //
. i-!s*
A. Earmeson
President
possibility cf
t=
and imprisonment
cct Carolyn Grasso, soutiem Fielfi Office-
DHWM
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ROLLINS
^*» ^»- ESVIIKXSUEVCU-XH&TECES i\ft CSf.
FXJ.Bar357.Brid»eport. XJCS0.4. 609/467-3100 baMf OfBcti. «9.'^3iOS Sate OfH,
:ce
November-21, 1990
Mr. Thomas Snerman, Chief
Department, of :En.viroamentsa Protection
Division of Hazardous Waste Management
Bureau of Hazardous Waste Eagineering
CJ^
Trenton, NJ 08S25
Re:
:-
L
Dear Mr. Shermaa: ' . • .
d-
Tarry A. . Harmeson
President
cc: Carolyn Qrasso, southern
Office-DHsnr
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ROLLINS
^^k ^^ ENVIRONMENTAL JvOEVjnES i\j> iv
RO. Box 337. Brtdetport. NJ OW14. UM6*3100 Ge.ni Offi-s. 609/467.3US «Ute Ofr«
February 20r 1991
Mr. Thomas Sherman, C2iief
Department of Environmental Protection
Division of Hazardous Waste Management
Bureau of Hazardous Waste Enginelring
Trenton, KJ Q8625 ' '
Dear Mr. shersan:
"• »"•
fluctuation tne pn^wSc^SaSJlSS: *• a result of
system shut off. aSi"S»?S? S^s^f Stack gas
caaMiwsr the loss ^dSS ^LS«Si 2^ *° eimt off
reestablishing the Sow^« ter ??^ U action taken included
and restarting the drift f«^. ° ±Jle Staclc ^« scrubbing system
basis only since
the
environment
compliance vith the
-------
February 20, 1931
that there
Siai£grely,
f //
5: . fiet
. Harmeson
President
.«: Carolyn
Southern. ,1-ieO.d
-------
ROLLINS
«^fc ^fc ENVIRONMENTAL SOIVJCES (Ml DA'.
RQ- Bet 33Z Briderpoci. XJ
-------
March. 27, 1991
Page TWO
that there ~
-' *»* «»«*«<». I
a
ISs/ne
oc: Carolyn' orasso, Southern Plaid
-------
ROLLINS
^^ ^^ EWTHCWMEXTaL SERVICES , °1?put:er *jl±ci
. Qorrective action taS^SttS^^lrtS^*11* 2aUse Of ,
in the area, "^^^ incj.ua.ea tigbtenxng- of several connections
— ttta^'^t^s^^^SS^^-gWtot. non-
a
immediately twRic^Sla *S? 2S ^ «««lzy of those individuals
.as
t1 Si
Haraneaon.
lent
ERS/ne "-•-.
.00, Wayne Kounta,. southern Field Office-DBS®
-------
-------
ROLLINS
^fc m EM1HBNM&-ZU. SERVICES «3> INC.
Rtt B«337. Brifeeport, NJ 08014. «»/4fi7-31oe Geon* Oto «9/467.3ttS Ste Offi,
2, 1991
Mr. Thomas Sherman, Chie*
of Environmental Protection
e
Hazardous Wast* Engineering
Trenton, KJ 08625
Bear Mr.
less of draft within
to the
outsid.
«P«lenad
in the
°f
basis
or the
-------
May 2, 1991
Pag*
IzSlOcJ _
Terry/A. Haraeson
•*•* A £. t» j
KcesiHent
ERS/ne
cc:
Hounts, Southern Field Off ice-DHWH
-------
ROLLINS
^^ ^ EJ«V«K3NMEXru.sEKVTCES CXI) JV.'.
* Chief '
Trenton, JET 08625
Dear Mr. Sneraan: .
fcLln section of the iiicSS?«^ fissions from
approximately -ds oe 'aST Th?S£K^- The Problem
by calling 292-7172?^ J«c^<^t was reported to the
«=: - Wayne Mounts, Soutner* Fieid
fc
1
HT2 J
™f? t »•»
•J99I
.-li
1^3
...
-------
^^^* ^B^i ^TVHSOfrtMEPfTA! qrguT/^ttrW-T* T»^—
£-514 8S9
May 16, 199!
Jjr. Thoaas. Sherman,
of Enviranmantal
KT 08625
Dear
•
Siuc«relv. • • ' . *
Southern
O'fflce-DHRM
-------
ATTACHMENT 4
Summary of Region IV Facilities
-------
-------
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGEMCV
REGION IV
345 COURTUAND »TKEET, U.K..
ATUANTA. GEORGIA 3O363
MEMDRAKDUM
DATES
OCT 05 1882
SUBJECTi Sunmary of Bmargeucy Events «t Hazardous
Waste Xncineratorw in Region IV
FROHi Beth Antley
Regional HaaardouH waste Combustion Expert
TO:
Bonya Sa«Bevillo, Chief
Alternative Technology Section (OS-343)
to response to an October 1, 19i2, telephone request from teily
h^ardoJfiaJS^^ «
July 10, 1987) vac related to
«» MwtiBln «»«it. either
to;
co» Bmily Green, ICF
Po.•»
:
•Ml ^BeMeMeeAf flhM>^^
-------
-------
nw«TrtM „_ OF EMERGENCY BVBHTS
REQION IV HAZARDOUS WASTE INCINERATION FACILITIES
Ocrtobar 5, 1992
- Rook
" sis;
c
-------
-2-
,
.
ass
Thermal Relief
••oond.ry
•nviroaaant^l
T«nn««ft»».
th* Bta8k-
«v
in
at
no
fan upon approval
-------
-3-
Pi versified Scientific
me. rpssii - Kingston
(This is a newly-regulated boiler under the BIF rule operating
under a Class 1 permit modification.) 9
On July 31, 1992, at approximately 1:35 p.m., DSSI was
preparing for a BIF Compliance Test Bum, which was scheduled
for the following week., The boiler was operating in a start-
up mode and propane fuel was being burned to preheat the
boiler. No hazardous waste was being fired. A bri«f
electrical outage allowed eome unburned propana to go through
the boiler, fiinoe the boiler is designed to bum low-level
radioactive waate, the unit hits a secondary pollution control
system consisting of roughing filtera, HBPA filters, and
«?~«?i SHJ*"* ,.,?h'2,,tn* «inburn«J propane reached the
charcoal filter*, the filtera caught fire and burned for
approximately 4 ninuten. The fire apread to the nearby HBPA
filtera, but waa contained at this point by DSSI 'a emergency
response team. Local fire department, worked with DSSI
P"1 ° C001 *** affected eguipmant and prevent any
wr" no ^«SL or haiardou. wao2
aurvey of the area was performed and
up*r '*diologioal controls were
DSSI has shut down the boiler until a detailed
^ *** aodif ioati— incorporated to
LHP - Clav.
^ *25?rAtin£ und*r -^terim status at the time of the
incident. The entire facility ia now closed.) ^^
tai
tank
a.m. , a direct-feed
oaught on fire. The tank truck
*0«to»»' •"* « oil/acetone mixture was reUased?
Three other tank trucks with heels of residues (approximately
'C al*° Oaught fir*' bttt no ^"-w i-rVreportedT
?aurTd ^~ «» operator manually .hut of?the
*d *nt ^t*^* *» «•• if the tank oar was empty.
bad 50°-l°eo 9«llons of acetone left/and
«~ vapor above the liquid. The operator
climbed on top of the tanker and somehow ignited the^apors
??ii; Decking the waste level in the taake/ (i.e. , cigaretf!
bu^i^bo^TST1 f}*8hli9ht' •to'» B« received «ctSSv:
burns above the waist find a compound fracture of the leg.
BaBardous wastes were rol.ased inside an earthen dike where
Sf 6 ^^f101"1 "*" ioo<*'*- m addition, TraaJLl tSeS"!
fire fighting water reached a drainage ditch andWventuaSv a
S^S^ tJiv111^^111' ** adsorbent and .oU tha? oVuS? 2to
contact with the waste was removed. The facility is now
closed pursuant to a RCRA olosnr*. *»~J.«y is now
-------
-------
ATTACHMENT 5
Dow Chemical Company
Midland, Michigan
-------
-------
i !•
-=r, •=—.- —
: ' •' ;•• Incident Report f! :
-- \\ '
February 4, 1993 Exploision
703 Building Rotary Kiln Incinerator
.';^^:r!-.-' JQcitoL
'- y. . -,•--••- - :-. . :- .-
:--••,-
T r.- . : •;.
"
-
-------
t ,
debris Place
was returned to service
the incinerator
February 7, -1993
'
the
turned to
Hygiene. Divisin
*
Waste
t
-------
;. f
Cause
RCRA> Act
as waste nitroilycerm based medication and process
wastes from the Nitrobid(R) formulation procts, Really cSL
1-0% mtroglycerin, 50% lacjose and the balan'ce 2S?i*^S*
bottles and packaging material. Shipments aboil. once a montTbf *is
"
Based on review with generator personnel and the unit's
sr'
sw by the «'» or
this waste streain however, ftis material makei ap a small portion of
Uus waste stream. The bulk of this waste stream is retarned g?ods.
Two possible scenarios could, describe the cause for
The tot scenario is that * pharmaceutical
ed n" « » an
exposed to high temperatures, tliereby isolating a quantity of
mtroglycenn from the lacto« matrix which slbseoTuendy exploded
.The second scenario is that the powdered form of the
X77
-------
Additional thermodynamic testing has been conducted to
^3U2T JOnoV^l Pn cy^* /s4* +T*«i * * • »**•• bv
-
-
1.
2.
3,
"' COIIect ** to an
Alternative packaging methods which could improve sife
' ' 1 -.
-------
ACTIOMS
z. ec««.ubi.
-
,«
• as- s
3-
-*
-------
CORRECTIVE JlCTlONS (Cont'd)
4. PoMibl* burner block change*
" ^^^5 **• f«<»*.to:ey use or a blind flange in th.
) cover
b. Con»td«c BOM type o£ intarloek to ...v»««i.-.«i.j.,i-y
ehut down th* burner block feed* «ban a »ozxl» la
e- xdwitiry the approprlat* nuabar of »p«r«
^See1^;;^^c>n ^ *• BW* rat •*«
-------
ATTACHMENT 6
Chemical Waste Management, Inc.
(CWM)
Chicago, Illinois
-------
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FACT SHSITT — CWM CHSHJCAL SERVICES
BACKGBOUNEJ
February of 1991, an explosion occurrea an "» *jl» of
Chemical services (CWM: incinerator in Chicago,
iB 6 wholly ovmec subsidiary cf Chemxcal
and Illinois At
General's
were
.d CWM to
and allowed CWM to
issued their approvals through a consent decree.
During the demonstration, CWK conducted a RCRA trial burn
Steneion te CWM to complete the demonstratron until the
trial burn data was approved.
in January 1992, CWK informed Region 5, IEPA and IAGO that
aS amployL allegedly relabelled drums of waste »«*
Remain uSder thrmaxiaum inventory ^pacity *«!«"£*. g
consent decree. Tim ZZPX and IAGO iamediately launched
investigations.
< March 10, 1992. Chemical Waste . Management
IBPA and IAGO that their reco-ds indicated that CWK had
exceeded the maxinum inventory capacity.
on March 19 , - 1992, CSieni'cal Waste Management
5. IEPA and "IAGO, that they plan to suspend operations at
CWM until they -receive a final RCRA Part B approval. No
explanation was provided for tfcis decision.
STATUS;
CWM has suspended op«xation& and is currently planning to
remove all vaste fr«rk the site and decontaminate F«*i»of
the storage areas. TPbey will also continue with several on-
going studies regarding their operations.
Region 5 will continue to :monitor activities at the site and
will proceed with plans to rewrite their TSCA permit.
CONTACT: John corinell, PCB Control section, (312) .8*6-6832
-------
-------
S5.S million. Scott Hamilton, editor of
Commercial Aviation Report. asys
that Riven JiarkAir's inevitabk k»»w on
developing new markea, "they would
have to do something to generate fresh
eaih." Ai for an IPO, "I certainly
wouldn't want to invest in the earner
thaf s going «P against the competition I
MarkAir w going agaiwrt." Thar now in-
cludes United Airline* and Delta.
Bergt argues to advantage is in
MarkAir's low costs. "Alaska Airlines te
an old dinosaur." be asvs. "They tot
their cot»Us run ainuk," MarkAir' a IMBIM
approach thoe« of supert fffcient South-
west Airline*, Bergt claim*, and Mark-
Air's strategy io the manor. "If you get
air transportation down cheap enough.
people will travel. If s a matter of run-
ning a thinner, leaner airline."
Berfft, 56, has spent two decades try-
ing to do just that Reared in Alaska, he
got his start flying propeller planes to
the state's rural villages for cargo air-
tine Alaska Inter-
national Air Inc.
Bergt took the ear-
ner private in .1979..
in a leveraged
buyout. Toe compa*
ny flourished by
transporting con-
struction matenabi
for oil exploration.
Bergt moved brief-
ly into the natiif*nal
aviation vpoUiKtu
in 1981 when he be-
came CEO at West-
era, but he left
within 17 months.
He returned to Alaska i«tnTj«i*»i»iiii
and began expandmjf into the more
promising passenger businecB, renaming
the farrier MarkAir. Initially, its chief
competition .was AJuaka Airlines. But in
1986, Bergt worked oat the marketing
agreements with Alaska Airlines that
made m-etata fare wan between ttaa two
a. rarity. MarkAir uho purchased a com-
muter airline, sending propeller planes
into 330 rural Alaska communities.
Relations between the two deteriorat*
ed last fall Bergt says Alaska Airlines
changed the tanas of agrofmenm. Veed
says Bergt never complained, But by
November, lawsuits were flying. Alaska
Airlines accused MarkAir of stealing
passenger*. MarkAir alleged antitrust
violation*.
lite rivalry shows no signs of cooling.
MarkAir is continuing ta tow fares
through the summer season. Alaska Air-
lines will likely match them. If a the kind
of deefeructivt price war Lorenao could
ten both carrier* all about
By Bo! BmUon in Anekongt, Xfocfce.
BoOvm** m -Wnr Yorte
TMIE UGLY MESS
AT WASTE MANAGEMENT
Its 'model' plant dearly wasn't, but that's about all that's dear
The folki at Waste Management
line, luted to love showing off their
Chicago incmerao; as a model for
safe, disposal of hazardous -waste. Oper-
ated by Will's Gheroica'. Waste Manage-
men', line, subsidiary, the nation's huvest
eamnwrdal taemaratcr was so tedux>-
kjpicaliv advanced tnat. it was then one
cl'only three facilities iu the U.S. per-
mitted to burn cancer-causing PCBs. Bus-
loads of anftJy»t«, cuatcimerg, and even
ucjioolchildren j«gubrlj tourtd the
plant, located just an hour away irom
vnn'e Oak Brook (DL> htiadquarten.
That pride now scrcns badly mis-
r-laeed. The ptfttfew years have brought.
t. dislurbing aeries of aUegatkau and
liocumcnted instances of management,
and woerker-ufetgr prob-
«i tW> Chicago indnerator (table);
In January, state officials launched an
investigation mta possiite cnmnm] mis-
«onduet there. And « state
grand jury has convened to
IIMT mvkianee of delkiemte
mi»lal)elmg of up to 100 bar-
rel* of hazardous waste by
t sujienrisor, according to
lawyers invohed in xli? case.
in late March, Cheunca]
WuBte Management ewin
said k -would suspend c^iera-
tions at the incinerator and
teud moat employc««ai L '
HcnUBck—who until s«v«n
montiis ago waft also thair-
Miw. of own—has biamad
win't rnanj' regulatcjy run-
ins on managers left
-------
nroWems wore not isolated modems.
foe company fe afco the target of an
oajoia? federal crimim! investigation
into alleged violation* of procurement
•ad tnviroomental regulation* at*. U.S.
Army Cwp« of Engin*«* lite. Now.
CWM'« ability to expand it* high-margin
incinerator bunineu will depend on
whether it can assure customers that it
wiD comply with eoTinmmental law&.
Concerns about the company's record
could detoy or block plans for new
projects. Already, the tone hai ilowed
WMi'i attempt to bufld a nudmr-waetc
dkpnml plant in Martmivflle. DL, whew
officials have demanded all of WMI'S b-
tornal memo* ou the Chicago problems.
And KB Indiana reriews cwifft applies-
tion to expand a hazardous*wute aite,
the aiate is Mr^y the exaeme vtep of
using ha Good Character Requirements
Act to make cwit list aD major civil and
admmittrative complaints, aa well K» any
criminal complaints, ovor the past five
yenri. Depending on what it finds, Ino>
ac* can deny the implication baaed on
CWK-6 "character." SJDCC may other
itataa bavt similar prorauont, this could
turn into » Mttksome ksue for WHL
There's Kttle doubt that the Chicago
moDcrator1* trouble* hate helped drmg
down profits at both CWM and ta 76*
owner, win. In 1991, OWK'a profits
plnngtd 42.6*. to »OO8 mfflian. It wa»
the finrt •arninga decline aince win ipon
h. of f to the public in 1966. The Chicago
THAT WfLl: RAr
SldpC3P, "MY ITANDS
STAR I H BUBBLING'
A TRAIL OF TROUBLE
AT AN INCINERATOR
jf*. -'I p wuvK'
CTRUARY, 1991
IJAKUARY, 1992
** sf :i*l*. l*i» HI* ic-Kilcr n? *u1». j t ' in-
• - I-.-N. i ;•
.•.11, . I ,-jf vll..Hi... .:! fp1 I'-."
- . , , .. -.-.utr.'-. l-.l'i V »"• V-!- tP
ittl.i il., -Ill" f- ,l-"i-1- -. i • • c nii-jc
I wi-*,it, I ' .lllll""'!!^ wn..rlijUUlll'1 ";
'' .*.•/.' '.- -.1, "I I !••>'•••/ ' 1''-"•.' -VH
tl I'., i • ii>«i •'•'• I"' •' f U' ' > '"' •"'»
pkat has generated no wvc«u« fine* a
major ezpiotion 18 months ag" • T '
t,;.f i *• ,t--U «l.'0 ••"' I" '"1" ' •••- r PA
Ii «i c l"lr
i MARCH, 1992 i
allegaton*, _
hu»r» ItKat poDution gaagtt
had btwa aimed off four
times In 188& and 1S87 and
that «teta» KM waste wu
fed into tbe kiln at bait
UOOK. 15ot titc company d/^
nted tiiat tbe action* were
ecad09«d by mazafftft.
ling to Home ex-employeee, t>>o
,__., to ptoduce profile was intense.
Earo one of the plants former wp nuu»-
«gen: "Tbe attitude was: '1 doo'i want
to know how you do h. Juat k«ep turn-
ing in the remits '" cwil's fast growth
throughout the IKBUs aad hs decentra}-
ned maziat^ment. structure, with each
facility operating ax its own profic cen-
ter, may have alao contributetl tn a cli-
mate where Kuch probWwiR could occur.
Thee wan: ao nmeh curnoTer »t the plant
and corporate level, for iniaince, that a
common jdk« among employe** went:
'If the bow calk, get bis name."
Saving money was paramount, aay e»-
employwi. San»time« they wew «v*n
forced to skimp on auch ltam» »* gktvtu
«ad Naptmtora. "It wu M money fao-
tor," *ayn GrmgnlinL "Corporate uid we
were wring too much equipment'' AkhQ
G. Desai a fonawr proceiMMintler techni-
cian at the plant aaye he suffered 6«-
vfire reactions while raking ehemicaMail-
en aludgtt: "All of a sudden, my hands
Htarted bubbling." Desai auyt he aui;-
gested wayi TO avoid contact with the
sludge, auch as abating it in a mechani-
cal hopper, but plant manafera rejected
ms idea* becaute.of coat Plnnkett aays
th* cowpany merer knowingly eompro-
mmd aafety &r profita or coat amvingn.
rauc IIIMH CWV tried to dean houue
in th« wake of Turanian's chargct,
bringing m new plant mamtgement aixi
•pending mflBow on Rafetj- feature* in
1968. It waau't enough. Junt after mid-
night on Feb. IS, 1991, an eiptowon
rocked the iwancnrtnr, relaaajng tmdc
fumw. Woriuns. nuture of what th«iy
w«r» handling, had fed a packet contaJin-
mg the exptosive tetraaote into the JdJin.
AlmoBt M ymr later, after agreeing to
tSJo mfliion m finea over the incident
wtthouc admitting any wnrngduiag, CWM
had more bad news: It reraaled that an
•mplojM had nlaoad phoay kiwla
mmmental kwa,
Dunn, eavir
uyx Matthew J.
control chief at the
,
Iffinmi Attorney Central'* office. He
•cds: "Well go as high M we am*1 to
pneecatt wrongdoen. For cwx and WMI
muafen, that ia only tto kttcat in a.
kug itrinff af »ery baa nrwa.
fiy Julie ftyn» in CMougo
-------
Incinerator
supervisor
is accused
.By Stevenson Swanson
lEmkonnMnt wrtor
' In the latest of a long string of
•woes at the cbcmicsj-wasie in-
cinerator on the Southeast Side
company officafc have accused a
supervisor of potting tabe labels
•oo cootamers of haxardons wute
to dodge safety regulations.
Dak Gtwlak, who was in charts
of overseeing the inventory of
waste awaiting incineration at the
Chemica] Waste Manage mnaL Inc.
,bunier, changed labels on about
100 cnruamtn so that they would
•be exempt from a limit on the
..amount of waste thai can be
stored at the incinerator site, the
plant manager said in a letter the
company ideated Monday.
uswhuc. who his been fired, s4*
jejedly toade the label switch Sept
28. but the modern did not come
to fight until Jan. 21, when an em-
ployee who atid she helped ban
witn the phony labels
nyofficiak
The phony labels made the
waste, which consisted of such
things as road sweepings at the
•ae and used iirotectrwdothmg!
appear to be less than 90 days oli'
A coon oider limits the amount
f^%StfX*2£rl&
^JSMSAfSS*
a data, one accurate and
Plant tnaitftfftr Kurt Frey ieoon»
ed the matter to the Ulmoii Envi-
ronmental Protecrion Aavncir and
te Uhnoit Attorney Oenenrs Ot
«oe in a Jmn. 28 ieSetSSBfa eoa>
Pjny umai%»tioa in wfakh a tmrt
B*twyet and an ex-employee cor-
raborated ^^
The U^. EPA, me mbois EPA
and the stase anoney aenenra of-
fice have bunched criminal »vat»
Ufations, said ^hpmHd Waste
«pofcir»m«D Watiun PhuketL fic-
cfu« state and ftdenl offioai woe
eksed Monday, to officials from
dioseaacaeks eoold be niched
Gsmlak's aoonty did not ntnm
'
-------
-------
JRN ? -52
P«0« 17 7«t
llano* C*t*irwMMmaf Protection Aytnev
B*
217/762*33
FOR IMMEDIATE RET BASE
#91-259
Contact: Dim Won
217/782-07(0
BQL IngicrfO'B
217/7g2«5544
» 1991 — • Settlement agreeaems totalling $43
have trm
SPRINGFIELD,
involving the only two commercial h&azdros waste iccineratoa in toe state. The agreement follow*
months of negotiation* between the Illinois Envin»ffiienial Pn«ction Afency OEPAX the Office of the
minois Aaotney General (OAG), and Cbamical Wane Maaagemam Inc., as die resulr of enfonzmeat
actions taken against the incmentoOv operated by the chemical flnn. One maneimor is located m
Chkago and tt» other In the Meco-Eas:
A consent otdcr i$ expected to be entered today in SL Oair County Gicott Court ccaocmingTiadc Waste
i, Sauget, imposing a $15 t&QUoa civil penalty lor violations of me Illinois Environmental
Protection Act and me federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). En addition, the
agreement orders the company to provide $1 million to. cash or aeivioes to support an East St Louis area
£i**mtri i^ityiMH. god mandates numerous tachnical improvements at the facility, including new tsiaL tHinUi
a $200,000computernetwotklmlc to the 1B?A fbreoatinuous Agency scratiny, and 4S2404XX>altewanee
for cue year of EPA oversight.
Another consent decre* is expected to be flkd witto we Cook County Circuit Court today concerning
Chemical Waste Management CWM Chemical Services iac.^ a hazardous waste and PCS incinerator at
11700 S. Stoncy Island Ave* Chicago, iaposmg a Si mUfion peiwhy, and requiring continued oversight
by contnctois as wett as EPA personnaL Tills iix&erator, cmreatly conrtufiting openbQity
demonstrations, win be required to continue testae; befoa pnxeediaj: to fun opexafloos on completion
and approval of Its trial bums. Tne faattqr has been sfassdownimee a Feb. 13.1991. explosion in the
totary kirn at the ate.
(MOKE)
-------
"Enforcement actions against these two facilities will esacii&the strictest operating Himin and assurance
programs for any hazardous waste incfc-rttrr fecfflty in Ulinots, if not the entire coumry," said EPA
Director Mazy A. Oade. "The sealtmtna require owtncrcw achnical improvements, provide continuous
EPA oversight, impoca resounding dvil penalties, und, mcst inaponamiy. provide for the protection of
th» puMic't health and safety as well as (be environment. An additional benefit of tbii enforcement is
theSl mmiondfiaia^jpiOfnBn whichaEptitleia^xiigzeattyneeded»enhanceKtop^iaUtyof M«
E. St. Louis area nsidatts," Oade takL
The xBdemems arc the results of months oa" woritby the staff of EPA, the Attorney OenerATs Office and
Waste Msnafemem. to achieve 'xctodcal ijohitious and lefal remedies fat the problem*.
XXX
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ATTACHMENT 7
Trade Waste Incineration
(CWM)
Sauget, Illinois
-------
-------
y[ S525 on a charge card. The iotaJ bill:
morr titan Si.000. (A spokeswoman says
the hospital normally asm tor the wbole
tee up front because UK sunery is consid-
suwrs ro pay by trypossint: tor surgenns
and ob:ainjng tetters frotr linuy doctors
and rth-umawlogttts mattM-v
Wuter fire rrnm angry ron*«. one mv
ho: safe. Critics cnarge tut me implants
can cause or trigger a variety of diseases.
ranging from muscle patn to chronic Im-
mune disorders.
Wo
ingv.
r*mc'.
ENVIRONMENT
Concerns Mount Over Operating Methods
Of Plants That Incinerate Toxic Waste
By JEW BAILBT
TI IT W ALL. Stmer JOCBMAI.
dumpstcr of seem-
explodes. hurtling its
contents 100 fen. Hazardous liquids boil
over uncontrolled for 6% hours, sending
dangerous fumes skyward. A worker sut-
lers second-degree buns iron a steam ex-
plosion.
. The work of some Oyby-ntfnt handler
! 01 hazardous materials? Hardly. These
; irjsnaps occurred at an tnemeratkm plant
sere. just across the Mississippi River
:rom downtown St. louts. owned by the
1 world s biggest wane company, wasu
Management Inc.
When state regulators discovered thesa
'. and other problems, they Drought civil
, charges against Waste Management's haz-
I ardous-wacte unit. Chemieai Waste Man-
| aj?ement Inc.. and last December levied a
S3.1 million penalty. The unit settled the
charges in a consent decree and pronused
to be more careful
The mishaps, though, rawe concerns
about what's going on at the nation's 18
government-licensed commercial incinera-
tion plants and about the potential tor ca
lamlty at them. Such Incinerators are in-
creasingly important because recent fed-
eral reguiaaont prohibit many manatees
•ram being .tuned ta haiardma-wMjrte
dumps. This "land ban" is channeling a
more diverse and potentially dangerous ar-
ray of waste to incinerator*.
The sites receive Intense scnitmy from
teaeriL sure and nmetimet local nlfi-
cials. Most af that attention, though,
M
off&ctftls
in
Is
In
have a cornputeriad link to this plant that
allows them to constantly n»mtor emit-
sions. and thta •ntorceroeat ease imaally
focused on air poUutton.
dOKl have & way to con-
sonUv montfor the n»re mundane aspect?
of thfe operation: movie? dbngerous sub-
stancs? between boots, barrels. tatJcs, in-
caieratari and dumpstcrs. The case here
grew to :nslude mich wan^-iuodhng con-
cerns. Regulators' worst ieii:. althouci
highly unlikely, ii that w Incinerator ex*
plosion ciuk: spread to tt
-------
I
Concerns Mount OverProcedures
OfPlants That Burn Toxic Waste
- A.
From Pafft.si
Main ogjtanon. .Uere ttscsax of calls
torn an out-of-late repuiatar and j
thai it made mm woiKlerr "?s tatttaU**^
*««« M»ai«emtti says n has teamed
nora ha mlua*afc'*^>'ve nn£ ^i^
thereactton. • cays Ray Smiley,
™«"nn>MtaJ muatv.
cwx* eooaeb fujnea
*w*e» eu return, it takes X
Piune to stop
wtat drtm
bum altered tv i
w rented famr
company UMii't adaUt te-ind
prablems we-r reported
. sad any amomttM
called ndium adde. TRW
coraptny
r a amated. But
stuff and teUsnzittfln
* tt*ltt te eta««' "
»*
tnm a hoat oo tte piame- but
oiate it. to inotJiae in Star a
'
'Wagner to Succeed
Baker in Top Posts
At Air Products
* l« !!•! I .
i ai«teal waate
SSJ*!"!? ?**ltaa » »^» tatte
* > m-i—?.'.• * J '
M
^ batrrtaBlt
«w«ltenie
-------
u jAwbMuuc *nui *« «f»uu*y tcnju
e-tree exeenttre soccemo juaa.
he Aflenttjwn, fa.., company aaid that
fire tad -a iatt yemi as
». Dexter p.
er win be soc-
bypresldtBt
A. Wagner,
.
Tturus 65 next
fa. wfatehis the
aaJ retire.
age for Air
ucis officers.
Mil remain on
mpuVsboud
of the
tttve commit-
to. Bator ajao
conilaae to
tuns tram & normal
two
rchemfcai
• "It was chofctnj the
i state inspector Mike Gnat. Mr. Garyde-
^*^*Wwu led too rapidly bat says
; —"-- —» ••»*: Chemical Waste some-
! ntoK ffoee to casttmers"! '
; coUeet, Iterate and
. uaai October, us
nan of the May*Tit' ^'•"r'ptlfln of
iacturen.
w. 66. k a &year veteran tf
IBS company. He has hopped
OB* executive post to another hi tt£
ud Europe, on toft tlie mti and
cal aides of the company, a< be
dhta way up tb» eaecttlive ladder at
'rodnets. The penpaiatte manager
ained president snd ehoel "renting
• just last July. Prior to that, he
M
^S^? IS'L*? etther «» ^ «»
wnw or ctfll does cactato pure dteta
cpoahtered the moc potent man-mad* car-
c^TMLltiMflt lenity be bonedTSJ.
gr. l»e ortitaal teats taot aooee th
Tin wfeen a
o
gr. l»e ortitaal teats taot
Tin wfeen pacunr oa watte. A
Inspector at Saufet aotec tte vial on aiS
port but daeast uatenttacJ to te£C
MM* ^ttettne another offcla! iv-ia.
was hi toe pacxaie, It has teen
at a glance.
lor lur IXlM- «M
0»»y St.00 prr v
So tiirycur»«i(. no
Bach of 3btse
1 l££ !^ly<>e.more w* SSStefarkms'
abom operating btdneratocs at too toira
| temperature, ———"— - -• "
nr the company^ f ases and
h«M»«. wftfck lolkwad & two-
tintas pntideni oJ Air Pxodueti En-
try and emit confiaued powth at
•lapaay nfardtess at the apt sad
.of the Ui eeonwriy..Mr. Warner
etotendi to faQov Mr. ]3akerltlBad
mothu: Air Pnaacts' tomgn bust-
l'iJ^S^;BS5r ^ **heta te
U»fft Zr% of sales woe wtth fortice
nm. Far the fiscal year ended but
nber. foraiin aaies totaled 40% of Air
cts'Siaa billion in sales. Air. Wafuer
Meat that (caeltu sates can too so%
latter naif of the dacade.
I m^KSlS0^ behre the ease was
; ^?;*L2S?leil,Wiatcortemlllltak>-
cw enYiroomeiiBj maaaptrs. soch as Mr
^»y. to report dfar^ to retfoail and
u*«o beaosmanen envtrcamenul
** of to total operadaf
attentkm"
ueaUfM «w«w much
tteytr* BOW," aays m».
. *tth 1230 million, or S4J5 a
ittiuealmo.
) Imljilny to cmhlon «he U£> icces*
tapaet to the fact iiuit a substantial
; of the company's easctunrETts are
tenn "take or pay" ittrtements
«at aflKted by qaaneiso-quarter
B fa industrial ootpat About two-
Jf the company1* sates are mm Its
"•taws, aad abcwt ane rcpohed the
FbraFRKEiM
1-212MC
FAX 1-212
FtiUiafaer
«f the
and cerate of In attflatti.
«» *"»» Uws betar
aharaa are behv oiSered bi
™
,
JOrnnarGrosp IDC, A iSathiaad?
---»
l m
the Ui. aad Can-
ttintejrtco.il actor a»iea<3
I
Don't it
Die
Nauiooalfe
the
fa therm
iHavethenexti?**!
-------
-------
ATTACHMENT 8
3M
Cottage Grove, Minnesota
-------
-------
EngJnMrfng
•nd Poltutien Central
PO Box 33331
SL Paul, MN 55133-3331
612778 4335
September 23, 1992
Subject: 3M Corporate Incinerator, Ash Quench Incident;
Permit #23-Al-89-0-6, EPA ID, MND006172969
fieri Ma
Darryl Weakley
Regulatory Compliance Section
Hazardous Waste Division
MFCA •
520 Lafayette Road
St. Paul, MN S5155
Bob Berg
Regulatory Compliance
Air Quality Division
MPCA
520 Lafayette Road
St. Paul, MN 55155
Dear Mr. Weakley and Mr. Berg:
On September 18, 1992, at 2:45- AM, a physical explosion
occurred in the incinerate:: ash guencn WHACU cau»«w uue
operation to be shutdown one week before the planned annual
maintenance. (See letter to Mr. G. Wegwart of August 24,
1992). The facility is scheduled to resume operation during
the week of October 19, 1992.
The incident appears to have been caused by molten metal in
the slag leaving the kiln, dropping into the ash quench,
trapping some water and creating a steam explosion. The
resulting pressure blew the pressure relief panels and
ruptured the brick walls of the air seal and some of the
light weight wall panels of the ash house. No structural
damage y«s cavsed tp the installation. The ash house is
always off limits to. personnel while waste is being burned
and the 'kiln is discharging slag to the ash quench.
All waste feeds had been discontinued by 1:00 AM, therefore
all wastes had been burned out and only fuel oil was burning
to maintain the kiln temperature at the normal 1850 F at the
time of the incident. The fuel oil was automatically cutoff.
With the loss of the air seal at the ash quench, some smoke
from the fuel oil and heat from the kiln backed up the feed
chute venting into the pakfeeder room and out the air intake
louvers. This caused the sprinkler adjacent to the feed
chute to activate automatically calling the Cottage Grove
Fire Department and the site Emergency Squad. Both parties
were dismissed upon arrival because there was no fire or
injury. Beyond the brief release of smoke from the fuel oil/
tnere was no other release to the environment.
-------
Mr. Weakley and Mr. Berg
Page 2
September 23, 1992
3M is conducting a through investigation of this incident.
AS a result of this investigation, steps will be implemented
to reduce the. risk of this type of explosion and to increase
the pressure relief area.
Please contact George Mills at 778-5058 with any questions
'
concerning this incident.
Sincerely/
&
G, P. Mills
Environmental Engineering .Specialist..
cc: Fred Jenness - Hazardous Waste
Peter Torkelaon - Air Quality
-------
ATTACHMENT 9
Chemical Waste Management
(CWM)
Port: Arthur, Texas
-------
-------
fOLLLTION CLEA.NLP -, [CF Incorporated:? 4/15
Chemical Waste Management, Inc.
P.O Sox 2563
Pol Arthur, TexiiS ??643-25£3
409/736 28?1
January 4, 1993
CERTIFIED MAIL
RETUHK RECEIPT
P-103 047 537
Mr. Jesus Garza
Executive Director
Texas Water Commission
1700 North Congress Avenue
Austin, Texas 78701
ATTN: Mr. David Barker, Emergency Response Unit
RE:
Chemical Waste Management, inc. - Port Arthur, Texas
Industrial Solid Waste Registration Number: 33905
Hazardous Material Accidental Discharge/Spill Report
Dear Mr. Garza:
Ma"a9en)fnt' *««• (CWM) - Port Arthur Facility is
this H^ardous Material Accidental Discharge/Spill
Report for a spill that occurred on December 24 1992 CWM
verbally reported this incident to the Tex^T Water ' Colissio™
SSS"? ^i? *2* left ? ttessage for David Neleigh, with
JS2«vi»S^J?^ ?*«« • Environ»ental Protection Agency, at
approximately 6:00 p.m. on Thursday, December 24, 1992 This
serves as written documentation of that verbal report
i.
the
Chemical Waste Management, Inc
P. O. Box 2563
Port Arthur, Texas 77643-2563
(409) 736-2821
2.
name, address, and telephone mimber nf
Chemical Waste Management, Inc.
P. O. Box 2563
Port Arthur, Texas 77643-2563
(409) 736-2821
-------
M*w> f • IU 1
: 1:1 arc ; POLLUTI ON CLEAMP - ICF I ncor por a:ed:* 5/15
A
Mr. Jesus Garza
January 4, 1993
Page -02-
date. time, and type of
spill, fi'
A leaking box containing Incinerator Air Pollution Control
Train (APC) waste was identified in the truck staging area
at approximately 9:45 a.m. on December 24, 1992. CWM
SSSS! ^ TOK teriai spilled contained PCBs and immediately
sampled the box and initiated a cleanup. Testing of the
TSS^VJl* Wat co?Pleted aft*r the cleanup, and it
indicated the waste did not contain PCBs
4* name and quantity of
f AP,C waste was Billed. The waste
codes («ee attachment) because of the
-from rule. The Texas waste code is 900550
5- the
of injuries, if
None.
6.
assessment of ^ctua], or- potential h
health or the environment f w\-\e>r
wastf* fc?n ?ra tod ciean«d UP a11 visible signs of
waste. in the area where the waste had penetrated
^1^ the aSphalt was taken u^andthf
th ^ ^ - > wa^ removed until ^ visible signs of
the waste regained. Hi-dry was used to remove the waits in
the areas where the asphalt was intact, and those areas
were then washed with a surfactant and watS
SP±11 Was
and cleaned
of
-------
ATTACHMENT 10
ICI Explosives Environmental Company
Joplin, Missouri
-------
-------
scales - jjje Jopun uiooe
tittp://www.jopiingioDe.com? iyv //apry /
Part of incinerator
shut down after
unexplained explosion
By Wally Kennedy
Globe Staff Writer
Part of the hazardous-waste incinerator operated by ICI Explosives Environmental
Co., east of Joplin, was shut down Tuesday night after an unexplained explosion in
the rotary kiln, a company official said Wednesday.
Dave Wallace, a company spokesman, said no employees were injured and that the
minor explosion posed no emergency outside of the plant.
"We are assessing the cause of the explosion and will adjust procedures to make
sure that it doesn't happen again," Wallace said.
The only other explosion to occur within the kiln happened in the incinerator's
start-up phase about two years ago.
An employee, who was outside of the building when the blast occurred, observed
the roof lift on the sheet-metal building. Wallace said the employee told him that no
smoke escaped from the building.
Wallace said the explosives being processed at the time of the detonation were
contained within the kiln and that all emissions were captured by the
air-pollution-control system. The roof and walls of the kiln building are designed to
relieve pressure in the event of a detonation, he said.
The blast damaged equipment that feeds wastes to the kiln. Other parts of the
incinerator remain operational.
The incinerator was burning a four-pound load of ammonium nitrate. The material
was manufactured at the ICI Explosives USA plant, also east of Joplin. Had other
four-pound loads of the material detonated at the same time, the damage could have
been much worse, he said.
Ammonium nitrate requires another explosive device to set it off. Wallace said it is
possible a round of ammunition was left in the kiln. If it exploded, it could have set
off the ammonium nitrate, he said.
Exploding ammunition is used to clear the kiln of deposits of glass and aluminum
that build up inside the walls of the kiln, he said.
Return to April 03. 1997 Directory
Last Updated: Thursday, April 03, 1997 2:12 PM
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Four States — The Joplin Globe
Page I of 2
ICI explosion kills 1
By \VaIly Kennedy
Gtobe Staff Writer
An explosion ripped ihroue-h the conveyor nxim at the ICI Kxplosives incinerator at
4:30 pin Wednesday, killing one man and injuring two others.
Donald Reynolds IT, 32,2923 Terri LaiW. Joplin, died at 5:22 p.m. at SL John's
Regional Medical Center, aaid Jasper County Coroner Ron Mosbaugh. The coroner
said Reynolds died of injuries inflicted by shrapnel.
The other injured men, who also were taken to St John's, were not identified by
authorities. One of them was in critical condition, a company spokesman said.
A fourth moa. with a history oFhcart problems, was taken to Freeman Hospital West
an hour after the blast He was treated and released. Doug Wene, manager of the
incinerator, said Ihc man was not in the building where QIC explosion occurred
Wene. who was consoling family members at the hospital Wednesday night, declined
to comment about the accident. He referred all questions to Clrvc WhiUxride, who
manages the ICI lixplusi vcs USA plant, formerty known as Atlas Powder Co.
The incinerator, managed by ICI Hxplosivts laivironmental Co.. operates in the
middle of the 2,000-acrc complex. About 35 people work there.
Whiicside said the explosion occurred in Ihe feed-handling building, which is
separated from the incinerator's rotary kiln by a blast wall The workers apparently
were breaking apart packages of detonators and placing diem on a conveyor that
carries them into the incinerator through a hole in the blast wall, he said.
The detonators, aboulthe same diameter and half the length of o ballpoint pen, are
used to set off explosives. Th«y arrive in bundles at die feed-handling room. Workers
break them into smaller bundles that are placed in containers and then on the
oonveyor.
The speed at which the containers are fed into the incinerator and the number of
detonators in each container are governed by a computer system. Usually, no more
than four hours' worth of feed material can be stored in Ihc kiln feed room at any one
time, according to the company's operating permit.
Whiicside said an investigation will determine whether the detonators blew up on the
conveyor bdt or within the area where the detonators were being prepared for
incineration. He said the Occupational Safely and Health Administrntion had been
notified.
Jim Mueller, a Joplin resident who organized opposition to the incinerator in 1991.
said the kirn feed zoom is one of the most dangerous areas within the incinerator plant.
"This is where the workers are physically handling the stuff," he said. 'If there is an
explosion, this is one of the places it would occur. The ineineiator itself is not going
to blow up."
Workers do not enter th» kiln room because of the heat from the incinerator.
ThrcepcoplK were killed in a similar accident Jan, 25. l971.attheMcAlcslcr
-------
Four Stales — The Joplin Globe
Page 2 of2
The explosion at McAlester happened while workers were loading munitions onto a.
conveyor that carried them 1'rom one building into a fortified structure that housed the
kiln. Workers •were handling highly explosive 20-millimeter rounds, instead of
smaller detonators. Authorities were unable lo determine what caused the blast
because so little evidence remained at the scene.
Mueller said: "This is n tragic accident. 1C1 has been really cautious. They have
attempted to run a very good operation oul there. This is the kind of thing that can
happen with any fypc of operation Like this.
"There is no reason to believe that 'this might have involved negligence on the part of
ICI. They have been running a pretty light ship."
Mueller said there is no risk lo the public when detonators of this type are incinerated.
Two unexplained explosions within the rotary kiln have been reported since it began
operating about three years agn. One of them occurred during the start-up phase. The
other occurred in April 1997. No workers were injured in cither explosion.
i
The Duenweg Volunteer Eire Dcpmtment sent two engines and a rescue truck to the
plant, five miles cast of Joplin. No fire suppression was needed. The injured were
taken to the hospital by Metro linwsrgency Transport System ambulances.
Rood:! leading to the plant were closed by the Jasper County Sheriffs Department
within minutes of the explosion.
Staff-writer J.L. Griffin contributed to thin report.
Black to Four States
Last Updated: Thursday, August 27,1998 2:09 AM
hUp-Jtoww.joplrnglobc.com/4state/lip 1 .html
R/27/98
-------
Four States — The Joplin Globe
Page I of 2
Explosion probe at ICI under way; two remain
in local hospital
By Wall)-Kennedy
Globe Staff Writer
Internal and federal investigations into Wednesdays explosion (hat killed one man and
injured two others at the ICT Explosives incinerator arc under way, a company
spokesman said Thursday.
'Hie investigations could lead to regulatory or legislative safety recommendations with
regard lo the operation of other explosive-waste operations nationwide — particularly
if federal investigators oon link factors in the ICI explosion to a similar accident thai
occurred in January at a plant in the state of Nevada, a federal official said Thursday.
But part of the federal probe nt'Uic ICI blasl will be limited because funding is not
available to launch a Hill-scale investigation.
"We arc gathering documentation together and talking to the people who have
information that might bear on Ihis," said Clive Whileside, manager of the 1CJ
Explosives USA plant, five miles cast of Joplin.
"A senior ICI safety, health and environment team has been colled in ta investigate, as
well us «n explosives expert," he said. *We received notification today lhal an OSHA
(Occupational Safety and Health AdminLstrotion) inspector would be arriving
sometime today.
The building has been locked down until our investigation is on."
Also planning to review the explosion is the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard
Investigation Board (CSB). The board is modeled after the National Transportation
Safety Board, which investigates aircrafl and other transportation accidents. The CSB.
which is responsible for finding ways to prevail or minimize chemical accidents, is
required by law to investigate an accident in which loss of life has occurred.
The CSB will rely on (he investigation by OSHA, a branch of the U.S. Department of
I-abor. OSHA will have up to six months to issue its report The CSB also will us*
information uncovered by me Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF).
But it will not he using its own investigators lo undertake a comprehensive probe.
"This is the fourth fatal incident mat has occurred in the past two weeks that the board
is forced to study in a very limited fashion through 'incident reviews' only," said Paul
Hill Jr., the board's executive officer. "Because the CSB is operating with limited
resources, a full investigation is not possible."
The CSB, since January of this year, has investigated or reviewed 16 incidents in 14
nates, exhausting die state's investigative resources;. The incidents resulted in 26
fatalities.
"We hope the assistance from OSHA and BATF-will help our experts independently
dctcnninc and report to the board the likuly cause or causes of the incident." Hill said.
"The board will determine: whether industry, regulatory or legislative safety
recommendations are appropriate."
Prelimmuiy facts about th« ICI explosion have raised technical issues meriting CSB
review:
hup:/Avww.joplinglobc.c
-------
I It/l It S ||
Four States .. The Joplin Globe
Page 2 of2
aThe ICl blast has factors which, based on initial reports, appear similar to a falal
incident in January of this year. The Sierra Chemical Co. explosion, near Sparks.
Nev., killed four and injured several others.
aPublished reports point to one or more possible "precursor" events at the 1CI
incinerator and at least one other similar facility,
Whiteside said any speculation would be premature about what might have caused the
blast that killed Donald Reynolds 11,32, Joplin, and injured two other men at 4:30
p.m. Wednesday.
i
"There is no obvious cause at this point," he said.
The names of the injured were not being released at the request of their families. One
of (he men remained in critical condition and the other was in stable medical condition
Thursday at St. John's Regional Medical Center.
"We have been asked by the families not to release any personal information,"
Whilcside said. "Thai is me message I have been giving to people."
David Wallace, spokesman for ICl Explosives iaiviroamental Co., which operates Ore
incinerator, said, "We have brought in an employee-assistance team to assist in
consoling our employees through this period."
The explosion occurred in the kiln feed room, which is separated from the
incinerator's rotary kiln by a blast wall Initial reports indicated that the workers might
have been disassembling packages of detonators and placing them on a conveyor that
carries them into the incinerator through a opening in the blast wall.
Wallace .said it now appears QIC workers might have been removing detonator
components from a container in UK: kite feed room. The blast did not occur on the
conveyor, but on a flat table around which the men were working. The components
were being prepared for placement, on the conveyor,
"There is nothing seen so far to indicate a lack of confidence in the machinery," he
said.
Asked when the findings of the investigations will be made public, Wallace said, "1
have no idea. They will go on until they are satisfied that they have reached a
conclusion."
What the incident could mean to the future of the incinerator, he said, is unclear.
Said Wallace: "The future of the incinerator will be the subject on an ongoing
discussion,"
Return to August 28. 1998 Directory
T.ast Updated: Friday. August 28,1998 1:31 AM
ht^://\vww.joplinglobe.com/1998/aug98/aug28A)82898n .fatal
8/31/98
TOTflL F'.05
-------
ATTACHMENT 11
Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Demilitarization System
(JACADS)
Johnston Island
-------
-------
JACADS
(Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System)
Status Report
Update May 1992
• Introduction • Pa9e
• Facility Operations •, - page 3
• RCRA Permitting Pa9e \J
• Trial Burns ........ .....-•... • page~
• Inspections ....... page 26
• Future Permitting Activity page 28
• Public Concern • • • Pa9® 29
c
Paget May 21,1992 '
-------
Introduction
JACADS is a facility designed, built and operated by the U.S. Army, to
demilitarize surplus chemical weapons. The facility is located on Johnston
Island situated in the Pacific Ocean, about 717 nautical miles west-southwest of I
Hawaii.
The weapons which were moved to Johnston Island from Okinawa in 1971 f
represent about 5.2 percent of the U.S. stockpile of unitary chemical agent. An
additional 1.4 percent of the U.S. stockpile was moved from Germany to
Johnston Island in November 1990. in addition, about 100 rounds of Work*
War II unserviceable projectiles filled with mustara gas were moveu to oo.iRSion
Island in June 1991.
Weapons stored on the island include rockets, projectiles, mines, bombs
and bulk containers, each containing one of two types of nerve agent (GB and
VX) or blister agent (mustarcl gas - HD). Demilitarization of weapons consists^
of disassembly followed by destruction or decontamination of the components in
four specialized incinerators.
Page 2 May 21.1992
-------
Facility Operations
• Permitted Facility
The major elements of the permitted facility are weapon disassembly and
shearing systems, agent draining and agent storage systems and the four
specialized incinerators as follows:
1. Liquid incinerator (LIC): for destruction of chemical agent.
2. Deactivation furnace system (DPS): for destruction of explosives and
propellants.
3. Metal parts furnace (HPF): for decontamination of metal parts.
4. Dunnage incinerator (DUN): for decontamination of miscellaneous
refuse that may have come in contact with chemical agent
The incinerators and their associated air pollution control systems are the
subject of most of the equipment-specific permit conditions, and have, to date,
been the focus of EPA's permit overview.
c
Page 3
May 21.1992
-------
Facility Operations (continued)
• Permitted Operational Phases
Overall sequence of operational phases for each incinerator, mandated by the
RCRA permit for the JACADS facility, is:
1.) Shakedown period of 720 hours - under limited operational conditions
specified in the permit.
2.) Trial burn
3.) Post trial burn - under limited operational conditions, while results of trial
bum are being evaluated.
4.) Normal operation - under permit conditions, unless modified as a result of
trial bum experience.
*
Note: Operation not involving hazardous wastes is not limited by the permit
during the shakedown periods.
Page 4
May 21,1992
-------
Facility Operations (continued)
• Operations to Date
LIC and DPS Systems
February 1990: Rockets (without agent) processed as part of the first TSCA
trial bum. Rockets specially obtained from the Tooele Army Depot for this
purpose.
July 1990: First agent-filled rockets (with GB) disassembled and processed.
Observed by EPA staff.
July 1990: First bulk agent (GB) incinerated.
December 1990: Trial burn on LiC conducted. Observed by EPA staff.
February 1991: DFS shut down to allow modifications to the heated discharge
conveyor, and to ready the system to handle rockets with VX.
April 1991: LIC shut down to allow replacement of some internal refractory.
PageS
May 21,1992
-------
Operations to Date (continued)
August 1991: DPS resumed processing with Tooele type rockets (no agent)
September 1991: Army imposed ban on all toxic and hazardous waste
operations pending completion of investigation of pipe welding.
October 1991: Army lifted ban.
November 1991: DPS began processing VX rockets and LIC began processing
VX.
January 1992: DPS shut down because of damage to kiln. LIC shut down
because of lack of VX to process,
February 1992: Resumed processing VX rockets in DPS and VX in LIC.
March 1992: Trial burns with VX rockets in DPS and VX in LIC completed.
March 1992: Processing of all rockets containing VX (including leakers) was
completed. DPS and LIC shut down for conversion to processing HD.
Page 6 May 21.1992
-------
Operations to Date (continued)
As of the end of March 1992, Army reported processing of 7,565 rockets
filled with GB, 13,889 rockets filled with VX and and about 638 simulant rockets
(without agent). The LIC had processed 77,171 pounds of agent GB and
134,983 pounds of agent VX. Army has estimated that there were originally
72,000 rockets (containing either GB or VX) on Johnston Island to be
destroyed.
tJiOf Qirctam
iwii • wj «*»**••• • •
MPF is in start up mode without the use of hazardous wastes. Shakedown with
HD is planned for June 1992.
DUN System
DUN was in start up mode without the use of hazardous waste when a
pressure transient occurred in June 1991 resulting in deformation of the furnace
chamber and building. Dun has been out of service since that time. Army
advises that only hazardous dunnage being produced consists of used DPE
suits which are being shipped off-island as hazardous waste.
Page 7
May 21.1992
-------
Operations to Date (continued)
Brine Reduction Area (BRA)
This system was in start up mode without the use of hazardous wastes j[
through November 1991 when the RCRA emissions test took place with j,
hazardous waste (brine). Emission testing indicated no emissions outside
limits, and the BRA continued operations with hazardous waste at half test
capacity, although it was out of service for periods of time because of various jj
mechanical problems. The major problem was the accumulation of moisture
and particulates in the outlet duct. In April 1992 EPA ordered the Army to
suspend processing of hazardous waste pending receipt and review of the q
emissions test report and review of mechanical problems being encountered. 3
PageB May 21.1992
-------
Facility Operations (continued)
• Operational Problems
JACADS Is a complex first-of-its-kind facility. Operational problems were to be
expected and have occurred. However the problems have been mainly
mechanical and have not been indicative of any defect in the overall system
concept or design. Some examples are noted below.
During early stages of incinerating Tooele rockets, problems were
encountered with jamming of DPS feed gates, which resulted in small fire
not involving agent. Redesign and replacement of some gates was
necessary prior to processing of rockets with agent in July 1990.
• Deterioration of LIC refractory had proceeded at an unacceptable rate.
Remedial measures, which were conipeted in jul^g |gg^f jn^|ucjed
replacement of some refractory with a different type. No further problems
have been reported.
Page 9
May 21,1992
-------
Operational Problems (continued)
Residue from the DPS had caused continuing problems for the heated
discharge conveyor (HOC) by jamming both the conveyor itself and also :,
the discharge gates. A revised design involving buckets (instead of a belt), |
additional heaters, new discharge gate configurations and operating logic, ,
and installation of a sealed enclosure around the residue container, was
installed in March and April 1991. Some M60 and M67 rockets (without . ,
agent) were successfully processed in May 1991 r but jamming problems jj
returned, and the HOC was dismantled again. Differential expansion of the
conveyor frame was suspected, and monitoring thermocouples were
installed. The discharge gate configuration was changed again in February r
1992 and jamming problems were reduced to an acceptable level until the >
end of the campaign in March 1992.
• In December 1990, during LIC shutdown, agent was sensed in the duct
|eacjjng frorn the LIC pollution abatement system, which in turn vents to the
stack. Source of the agent was found to be a short term leakage from the
agent feed system after feed shut off. Corrective actions (including changes
in operating procedures), were taken.
i about «f5«nmutf$. ,
about 1S% of Wfot IS aNowoUcf tp^nwQVn #>€ ***
-------
Operational Problems (continued)
On March 11,1991, while the DPS was under checkout using JP-5 fuel,
smoke filled the DPS room and some smoke escaped to the atmosphere
via the stack. No agent was being processed at the time. Subsequent
investigation revealed an instrumentation malfunction causing a blockage of
the off-gas system, which in turn caused the products of combustion of the
JP-5 fuel to back up into the DPS room. The defective instrument was
replaced and blinds installed in the off-gas duct to prevent backing up in
4t ttt
On May 2,1991 there was a small bearing cooling oil fire (due to an
overheated bearing) in the DPS room. Agent was not being processed at
the time, and there were no reports of harmful releases. The bearing was
repaired and furtherstudies were undertaken to develop prpcedures to
prevent a reoccurrence of this incident
On June 26,1991 the DUN was in start up mode, with non-hazardous
waste when a pressure transient occurred resulting in deformation of the
furnace chamber and building. The DUN is still out of service pending a
resolution of the problem.
Page 11
Mar 21.1992
-------
Operational Problems (continued)
• On January 21 r 1992 the DPS kiln stopped rotating while processing VX
filled rockets and the system shut down. No releases were reported. A
team of scientists and engineers from Army and EPA was sent to the
island to investigate the cause of the kiln damage. A 2 inch by 12 inch
hole was found in the kiln cylinder wall, apparently caused by the
detonation of a fuse which had become hung up on a flight support. The
kiln flight supports were modified, and the kiln repaired and tested for
mechanical and metallurgical integrity as prescribed by EPA. It was
returned to service in February 1992.
• Considerable problems have been experienced since start up with plugging
of the filter candles (with particulates) in the LIC, DPS and MPF Pollution
Abatement Systems (PAS). The problem seems most severe when
burning auxiliary fuel during warm up and standby.
The demister candles on the LIC PAS have been bypassed through an
empty vessel since August 1990 during operations not involving hazardous
waste. An actual bypass duct to achieve this purpose is being installed
during the current shutdown, along with appropriate interlocks to prevent
bypassing during operations with agent or SDS.
Page12 May 21,1992
-------
Operational Problems (continued)
*> . .
Prefilter candles were installed in the DPS PAS but were found to be
ineffective and were removed. A hot water filter candle washing system
was installed in February 1992, but this is reported to be ineffective also.
Other methods of filter candle washing are being investigated.
It is proposed to install a bypass duct on the MPF PAS similar to the LIC
PAS bypass duct during the current shutdown.
* Experience with the BRA since emission testing in November 1991
confirms that moisture and particulate is collecting in the horizontal outlet
duct. The moisture drips out of the duct and the weight of the wet
particulate endangers the structural integrity of the duct. It now seems
possible that the system did not reach e^^ test andthat
some of the particulates resulting from the spiked feed settled out in the
ducts and never reached the baghouse.
The problem appears to be related to an inablity to keep the off-gases
above dew-point until they exit the system.
Page 13
May 21,1992
-------
-------
09/26/54
08:54
EPR
003
UNITED STATJES EN^IRONMeNTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
December 17, 1992
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: JACADS UPDATE
FROM: Ray Fox (H-3-:
REQIONplX
Hawthorne Street
San Fnincisco, Oft. 04105-3901
TO:
cc:
Laura Yoshii
H-l-
Michael Feeleir (H-
Nahid Zouesht'Lagh/
Larry Bowenjnan (
Y.J. Kim (H-3--3)
Tiro Stott (H-;>-2)
Pierre Belangur (H
proce
Army continues to
agent HD) at a reduced
projectiles have
OVT in September
We received the 15-day
mber 14, 1992
b&en
1V92
; Mark Klaixnan (RC-3-1)
| Dave Schmidt (E-2)
; Carrie Johnston (H-l-l)
; Vicky Tsuhako (E-4) (FAX)
• \ Jim Michael (HQ 5303W)
•4-3 f | (FAX)
5nwi projectiles (containing
rate. Army reports that 7,663 105mm
roceased from the start of Phase iv
irou^h November 21, 1992.
at 12:21 a.m. on Ndrvemb ar
•epo:rt pf an incident which occurred
l^A ^ I "l H **V *"V ^»
JL992.
The incident was tile hekrin^r of a loud noise by the outside
MPF operator, the Aecttr: :eno » of an MPF high/high pressure
alarm and the occu^renc >
-------
08:55
EEPA
UNITED STATES; ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
REGION IX
76 tjtawthom* Stroot
SJan PraJicisco, CA M105-3901
March 25, 1993
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT:
S-ROMX
TO*
CO I
JACADS UPDATE - Wetjk of March 22, 1993
Ray Pox (H-3-3J)
i
Laura Yoshii (JH-l-l
)
Michael Feeley! (H-: )
Nahid Zoueshtijagh JH-3-3)
Larry Bowerman (H-3-:
V.J. Kim (H-3-!s)
Tim Stott (H-2-2)
Pierre Belangejr
j
Army advised of a small
Processing Building at C
extinguished with a| hanc
extension cord and one
damaged. There were no
Y.J. Kim is on Johnson
trial burn.
4-3)
Mark Klaiman (RC-3-1)
Dave Schmidt (E-2)
Vicky Simones (H-l-1)
Vicky Tsuhako (E-4) (FAX)
Jim Michael (HQ 5303W)
(FAX)
On 03/25/93 we apprjoved
request. This roodikiea
DPS kiln cylinder.1
i
i
Arroy advised that 3J8757
fire which occurred in the Munitions
031 hours on 03/20/93. The fire was
extinguisher. About one foot of an
heel of a portable ladder were
injuries and no migration of agent.
sland this week to observe the DUN
a class 3 permit modification
ioniallows the Army to replace the
105mm projectiles had been processed
as of 02/20/93.
A schedule of major! events at JACADS is attached.
Primed on Rccycttd PofKr
-------
06:56
UNITED STATE? ENVI
75
FT
ONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
REOJON IX
tawthpmeiStfMf
iclsccj, CA 94105-3001 ..
June 10, 1993
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: JACADS UPDATE
FROMt
TO!
cot
Ray Fox (H-3-
Laura Yoshii
- W
3) f
(H-l-
Michael Feelejy (H-
Larry Bowermah (K
Y.J. Kim (H-3k»)
Tim Stott (H-2-2)
Pierre Belangsr (
Army advised that Ln Oc
Johnston Island to) Kett
have had a level oje age
allows off-island.
been monitored pri
F)
material in the MPF has been
sitjuatijon jhas been investigated.
requests
cc nou;
f;or Class 1 modifications
rjred fully with one request but
e other! request.
at JJACADS is attached.
Printed on Rtfycled Paper
-------
09X26/54
08:55
EPfl
UNITED STATES ENV RONIMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Rl-OION IX
76
Hawilfioma 8tr*et
Ban Fnnciftcjo, CA M10&-3901
June 17, 1993
SUBJECTr JACADS UPDATE
FROM*
TO;
oot
Ray Fox (H-3-3)
Laura Yoshii
- W«ek of June 14, 1993
(B-l-fo)
Michael Feelekr (HH3)
Larry Bowarroah (H-J3-3)j
*r *v «J ^A.I_ ^ I ^ . I '
Y.J. Kim (H-3
Tim stott (H-
Pierre Belangir
Wa received four r
the weak and also
upcoming request f
-3)
-4-3)
Mark Klaiwan (RC-3-1)
Dave Schmidt (E^2)
Vicky Seraones (H-l-1)
Vicky Tsuhako (B-4) (PAX)
Jim Michael (HQ 5303W)
(FAX)
igueejts cor Class 1 modifications during
cojy of a study designed to support an
>r ari increased feedrate to the MPF.
We received the 15
(potential release!
week«« update).
uncertainty as to
level agent releasl
or by other int*rfjerantis.
report
day
of ejgent
port
re
rtiett
ox
er titie
by
_ of the 05/31/93 incident
HD at the MPF, described in last
indicates the Army's continuing
r-e alarm was triggered by a low
products of incomplete combustion
A schedule of majob events jat JACADS is attached.
Printed on Recycled Paper
-------
05x26/94
08:57
EPfi
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
REGION IX
Hawthorne Street
Son Fn
inclsco, Ca. 94105-3801
January 3,- 1994
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT': JACADS Update fojr December 1993
FROM: Ray FOX (H-3-3) |
TO: Laura Yoshii (H-1-JV)
cc:
Michael Feeley (HkS)
Larry Bowerman (E -3-3)
Y.J. Kim (H-3-3) T
Tim Stott (H-2-2) i
Laura Oentile (H-4-jl)
i
We concurred with two Class 1 pi
measurement system on 12^03/93.
Mark Klaiman (RC-3-1)
Jim Vreeland (E-2)
Vicky Semones (H-l-l)
Vicky Tsuhako (E-4) (FAX)
Jim Michael (HQ 5303W) (FAX)
srmit modifications relative io the agent GB
JACADS began processing; ton containers (containing agent GB) on 12/06/93.
On 12/13/93 we were advised of
inside the MDB on 12/09/913. Th
the contingency plan was n'ot act!
pending investigation of thl incid
We received a 15-day incident re:
ihc lower munitions corridor of tl
were recorded and the contfngenc
Ihe building was reported, j None
had a blood cholinasterase iievel d
level is 15% below ba$cline).
No member of the public aktcndec
Class 2 modification reque$t) whi
I spillj of about 500 Jb of agent GB which occurred
•re was no agent migration outside the building and
rated.. Processing of munitions was suspended
'ort of personnel "encountering" a ton container in
e MDB on 12/53/93. Concentrations of 375 TWA
f plan was activated. No migration of agent outside
of thp personnel involved in the above two incident*
bcrease greater than 9% below baseline (reporting
the Army Public Meeting (relative to the 11/17/93
>h was held in Honolulu on December 15t 3993.
' Primed on Recycled Paper
-------
09x26/94
08:
UNITED STATES
EPR
oie
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
REGI.ON IX
76iJHawtripma Street
San Hranclsipo, CA 94105
March 24, 1994
MEMORANDUM
Subject* JACADS Special tijpdate
From: Ray Fox. (H-3-3
Tos Laura Yoshii
cc:
Michael Feeley (H-fc)
Lester Kaufman (HJ3-2)
Larry Bowerman (H-3-3)
Y.J. Kim (H-3-3)
Tim Stolt (H-2-2)
Laura Gentile (H-4-ll)
1 received a phone call from LTC
incident at JACADS.
The incident consisted of a stack
limit of 1.0 ASC (0.0003 mg/m3)
(J.I, time) on March 23, 1994 and
highest concentration recorded by
Mark KJaiman (RC-3-1)
Jim Vreeland (E-2)
Vicky Semones (H-1,-1)
Vicky Tsuhako (E-4) (FAX)
Jim Michael (HQ 5303W) (PAX)
Carl Daly (R8)(FAX)
at about 8:00 am today relative to an
lissioh of agemjGB above the allowable concentration
The imissipas began to exceed the limit at about ll:00pm
continjied to exceed the limit for about 25 minutes. The
the AGAMS was 10.05 ASC
No casualties on J.I. have been reported.
The incident occurred after the LI: had
gun was being removed. The con:entrat[on ofjCrBiin the room air went high at about'thT
same time and the room air exhaust was switched from the LIC afterburner duct to the filters
Since no agent was being incinerated at foe link i* is speculated that me high concentration '
of room air m the duct was the cakise of khe high stack emissions
1 f
»n s^iut down for maintenance and while the agent
rtfl CrR iir> th* rftrttn &•*• tkJAM« u
-------
09/26/94
08:58
UNITED STATES BNVJR
J
75 H
April 4, 3994
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: JACADS Update for 1
FROM: Ray Pox (H-3-3)
TO: Laura Yoshii (H-l-W
ian Fraiicteco,
EPft
IMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
IX
torn* Street
CA 94105
011
994
cc:
Michael Feeley (H-3)
Lester Kaufman (H-3-2)
Larry Bowerman (H-3-3)
Y.J. Kim (H-3-3)
Tim Stott (H-2-2)
Laura Gentile (H-4-1)
Mark Klaiman (RC-3-1)
Jim VreeJand (E-2)
Vicky Semones (H-l-1)
Vicky Tsuhako (E~4) (FAX)
Jim Michael (HQ 3303W) (PAX)
CarJ Daly (R8) (FAX)
We received a 15 day report k>f an incident which occurred on March 14, 1994 The
incident consisted of a small jfire (14 Ib rocket propcHant) in the Explosive
Containment Room B. The fire wa| causisd by migration of hot gases up the DPS
feed chute which in turn was caused -by tte jamming of the two feed gales in the open
position. There was no migration of hazardous waste inside or outside the facility and
no damage to equipment. Ajjmy rdorts tliat it is taking corrective measures to
prevent recurrence of the inc
agent
Initial information on the reliiase of
1994 was provided in my special update <
In a telephone conversation on March 31,
dent.
T
Investigative team has
left
GB from the incinerator stack on March 23,
f March 24, 1994.
1994, Army advised as follows: -
and ^rill present findings to PMCD. Indications
are that incident was mused toy underlying system design and operating
procedures, together vdth eqjripmeil malfunction and operator error.
There were no abnormal re* lings
result of the incident. A
that a total of 10 to 31 mg ojf agerit
>f agent concentration at ground level as a
member of Ihe investigative team estimated
had been emitted from the stack during the
-------
05.-26/94
08:58
I
incident. DHHS also esti:
GPJL, which is below the I
GPL (General Population
8-hour worker exposure li
lated maximum ground Jevel concentration at 0.1
>wer ^[uantitation limit of the detection equipment.
Jmit) concentration is 0,000003 mg/m3, versus the
lit of 0.0001 mg/m3.
Any final authorization to Restart demilitarization operations will be made by
the Secretary of the: Army '
We received from the Army the
Noncompliances. The document
We received six requests fdr Clasj
A schedule of major events! at JA(
below: i
fACADS 1993 Annual Report ofRCRA
- about one half inch thick,
J permit modifications during the month.
iis of the date of mis memorandum is shown
JACADS -! SCHEDULE OF MAJOR EVENTS
DUN Trial Bum
RCRA Permit Expires
Postponed indefinitely
. . . . August 30. 1995
-------
ATTACHMENT 12
Rhone Poulenc Basic Chemical Company
Martinez, California
-------
-------
>
ELECTRONIC
MAIL
Date:
tr-om:
Dept:
Tel No
TO: see Below
Subject: P.OLREP 2 and FINAL/
„ E
^
• -- --
24-Jun-19J92 IQrPinm EDT
ROBERT BORNSTEIN
BORNSTEIN . ROBERT
(REG,09,HWMD) (E)
415-744-2298
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
POLLUTION REPORT
I - HEADING
DATE: June 23, 1992
FROM: Robert Bernstein, OSC, EPA Reaion TV rs,
Response Section H-8-3 Re9ion IX, Emergency
T0:
SUBJECT: Rhone Poulenc Basic chemical Release, Martine2, Ca
POLREP: Polrep 2 and Final
II- BACKGROUND
Site ID: N/A
Delivery Order NO: N/A
State Notification: OES
III. INCIDENT INFORMATION
Response Authority: CERCLA
NPL Status: N/A
Action Memo: N/A
A- Incident Category
industrial accident and chemical fire/release
B. Situation
«t the
all
The fire reignited shortly and
At approximately 18:00 hri .
by 13:3° hrs-
-------
EPA, USCG MSO, TAT and PST responded to the scene at 12:30
hrs. The federal response team assisted the Incident Commander,
Contra Costa County Fire Department, with air monitoring and site!
assessment information.
-------
IV. Current Actions
that trepa-rmen s£aS «"ill«» on site. At
approximately 8:30, TA^ar^ed onJSK""11^ tO "^"lize. At
when he
s^iously
At that time, OSC BornsteL ded th
Bernstein threatened to
' °SC
activftfes? den
fxre threat was diminishld and Sat Se
the facility. Rhone outlined their e
n ^eclared «»t the
shed control back to
J
^^
and TA?
°SC
PST
n
demanded that sanpiing planS and vork
review. Since it was the 'pinion
immediately reduce the amount of
80
comprehensive plan.
agencles that
The state EPA
devel°Psd for agency
resP°nse team to
to
-------
begin this task. However, action to remove this water wa^ « *-
undertaken until late afternoon. not
Overall, by late afternoon, OH Materials appeared to h*
begun an adequate response. Health and safety tone's were
well established and proper decontamination areas
It appeared throughout this crisis that Rhone offio-i^i
V. CASE STATUS
Distribution:
TO: Bornstein.R
TO: DOI-9
TO: ERD/OERR
TO: ERS/REG.IX
TO: ERT/EDISON
( BORNSTEIN.ROBERT )
( DOI-9 )
( ERD/OERR )
( ERS/REG.IX )
( ERT/EDISON )
Use the SH option to view the entire distribution list.
-------
ATTACHMENT 13
Statewide Environmental Services, Inc.
Los Angeles, California
-------
I
-------
JUN-30-1994 12:15 FROM TOXICS ftSSESSMENT GROUP
TO
18185512841 P.02/07
Statewide Environmental Services, Inc.
200 Oceangate, Suite 540, Long Beach, CA 90802
(213)437-2242 Pax (213)437-4562
June 25, 1991
Department of Health Services
Toxic Substances Control Program (Region 3)
1405 N. San Fernando Boulevard, Suite 300
Burbank, CA 91504
ATTN: Jerry Lile
RE: Incident Involving Hazardous Waste
Further to my letter of May 23, 1991, a copy of which is attached,
Statewide had contracted with Nash Salvage, Inc. to sort and
consolidate small containers of lab type chemicals into larger
drums which would then be shipped for incineration. Two chemists,
Val Brandt and Mary Halal were doing the work at the site on May
21st. They had previously done similar type of work for a largfe
number of companies and had previously experienced no problem
whatsoever in this type of work. A report from Nash Salvage dated
May 2lst, 1991 written by Val Brandt is attached.
A sample of the material in the drum was taken as noted about one
hour before the incident and no chemical reaction was noted either
at that time or since then in this sample. We have not been able
to pletermine what caused the reaction. The vermiculite used as the
inert agent for the consolidated container was taken from one of
the other containers of lab type chemicals and it is speculated
that there may have been some small amount of contaminate in that
vermiculite which after a period of time reacted with the oxidizer,
i.e., the organic peroxide. The Plant Supervisor and the Emergency
Coordinator, Stuart Brown, breathed ar.d smelled the "white smoke"
and said that it had little order and had no impact on his
breathing. The report of Stuart Brown in the operating record, is
attached.
Four people, we .understand, were taken to the local hospital by
ambulance after the Fire 'Depar-tment was informed and we understand
that they were sent home afterwards and no problems were indicated.
The information on the people is not available to Statewide but the
Emergency Data Management Service Phone number (213) 267-2475,
(Richard Salinas) informed me that he would be willing to give
information to the Department of Health Services if they called
him. The Fire Department (Number 41) reported the incident as No.
134967 as indicated to me by Captain Light. The phone number for
the Fire Department is (213) 564-6241.
•97%
SES Facility: P.O. Hex 61248 - 12618 Main Street, IMS Angeles, CA 90061 (213) 7S6-7896
S-r.
06-30-94 12:19PM P002 #23
916 753 531 8
-------
JLN-30-1934 12:16 FROM TOXICS ASSESSMENT GROUP
TO
18185512841 P.03/07
Department of Health Services - ATTN: Jerry Lile
Page 2
25, 1991
On June the 10th, we received a letter from a lav firm who said
they were representing Gloria McCune and Buford Harris of 140 E.
126th Street regarding an accident on Hay 28, 1991 and wanted the
name of our insurance company BO they could be in contact with
them. X passed on this information to our insurance broker,
Jardine Insurance Brokers, Elton Kunkle, phone number (714) 740-
1127. We are insured by Lloyds of London.
i
Since the incident, we have stopped the consolidation of organic
peroxides or any other materials from lab packs.
Very truly yours,
STATEWIDE ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, INC.
/ 1 /L
V
Matfthew P. Stewart
/ President
, MFS:ci
Attachments
R-97X
916 753 5318
06-30-94 12:19PM P003 «23
-------
IS... FROM
213 437
TO
S172+1 ; *
r.B2
Statewide Environmental Services, In,
NAY *3, 1991
Fax C213) 437-4562
Dopartwmt of Health a«rvice»
~w™
VIA PAX #Sl»-567-
3129
1M1> *
30
«- «»
incidont 1.
und«r lmr..tl»«tion.
*"•
M78/1V
-------
r
-------
Statewide Environmental Services, Inc.
200 Oceangate, Suite 540, Long Beach, CA 90802
(213)437-2242 Fax (213) 437-4562
June 25, 1991
Department of Health Services
Toxic Substances control Program (Region 3)
1405 N. San Fernando Boulevard, suite 300
Burbank, CA 91504
ATTN; Jerry Lile
RE: Incident Involving Hazardous Waste
Further to my letter of May 23, 1991, a copy of which is attached,
statewide had contracted with Nash Salvage, Inc. to sort and
consolidate snail containers of lab type chemicals into larger
drums which would then be shipped for incineration. Two chemists,
Val Brandt and Mary Halal were doing the work at the site on May
2lst. They had previously done similar type of work for a large
number of companies and had previously experienced no problem
whatsoever in this type of work. A report from Nash Salvage dated
May 2lst, 1991 written by val Brandt is attached.
A sample of the material in the drum was taken as noted about one
hour before the incident and no chemical reaction was noted either
at that time or since then in this sample. He have not been able
to determine what caused the reaction. The vermiculite used as the
inert agent for the consolidated container was taken from one of
.the other containers of lab type chemicals and it is speculated
that there may have b*en some small amount of contaminate in that
vermiculite which after a period of time reacted with the oxidizer.
i.e., the organic peroxide. The Plant Supervisor and the Emergenci
Coordinator, Stuart Brown, breathed and smelled the "white swoke"
and said that it had little ordor and had no impact on his
breathing. The report of Stuart Brown in the operating record is
attached»
Four people, we understand, were taken to the local hospital by
ambulance after the Fire Department was informed and we understand
that they were sent home afterwards and no problems were indicated.
The information on the people is not available to Statewide but the
Emergency Data Management Service Phone number (213) 267-2475
(Richard Salinas) informed me that he would be willing to give
information to the Department of Health Services if they called
?^;.Jrhe ^^ D*Part»ent (Number 41) reported the incident as No.
134967 as indicated to m« by Captain Light. Th« phone number for
the Fir« Department is (213) 564-6241.
SES Facility: P.O. Box 61248 • 12618 Main Street, Los AnBeles, CA 90061 (213) 756-7896
-------
IIL..OJ.O do i — .Ji
Department of Health Services
Pag* 2
June 25f 1991
- ATTN: Jerry Lile
On June the 10th, we received a letter fro» a law firm who said
they were representing Gloria Mccune and Buford Harris of 140 E.
126th Street regarding an accident on May 28, 1991 and wanted the
name of our insurance company st> they could be in contact with
thtrtu. I passed on this information to our insurance broker,
Jardine Insurance Brokers, Elton Kunkle, phone number (714) 740-
1127. We ar« insured by Lloyds of London.
Since the incident, we have stopped the consolidation of organic
peroxides or any other materials from lab packs.
Very truly yours,
STATEWIDE ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, INC.
Y\ AA $*- fr
Matthew F. Stewart
President
MPSsci
Attachments
-------
•IV.
*£•
f 91
— - — "t7 )A~fi. \A J~ i ,\f »-r .. - ' -.-.—— -^|/>vx
&/&f<»j
i
-------
-------
VACWM
*ou.— OFF
DRUM OtUSHNG
Nash Salvage Inc.
133S4 ,LA QU1NTA STREET
LA MIRADA, CA 90639
(213)
STATS tCTVSf0
SfftVtCt
21, 1991
To Whom it hay Concern:
a Sco. W<» B*B^
hazard cl«ses ef cheinicalW udiSrS^iT9 Bever*1
kiln °r9*niC Pe^iO«B to toe picked t£ ^ifUS*^!*? ' ENSCO
kiln. Preparation for direct feed I ?*f, ? direct feed into their
organic peroxides wit^ veritculite into *S 6olid^i«tion of
CUB^*rB the? g^rSe rela?!^ Pf^ d"»- "f have
paroxides which we handle in a t^ilar 9"8 A ie6 °f
ne
previously with no reaction with the °rganic
Val Brandt
-------
30 gallon poly drum
SEfi S-21-91
.ersini
b*nzoyl peroxide
smlofcyl peroxide
TBP
MEKP
dicuayl peroxide
x j> gra»«» solid
ixi ib. solid
1 x gallon liquid
1 Qt. liquid
3 Iba. solid
00321038
diohlorobenzoyl peroxid* 2 ibs. eolid
diehlorobuneoyl peroxide 26 x 10 -oz, patte
TBP 1 x 40 Ib, liquid
TBP 2 x Gal. liquid
MEKP 9 x pt. liquid
00130007
00130007
00221022
00221022
00520018
00130006
.00130000
00130006
TBP -
MEKP -
ethyl ketenft peroxide
-------
ATTACHMENT 14
Oil and Solvent Process Company
(OSCO)
Azusa, California
-------
-------
r
AP*
OIL ft SOLVENT PROCESS CO.
1704 West Pint Street. Azusa, CA 91702
618-334-5117 / 714-828-646O
April 26, 1989
John Lewis
Environmental Specialist
California Regional Water Quality Control Board
107 South Broadway Room 4027
Los Angeles, CA 90012
Dear Mr. Lewis:
At approximately 5;00 p.m. on 4-21-89 oil & Solvent Process
Company (osco) had a 9,611 gallon spill of wastewater containing
1.28% solvents with the majority being acetone.
The spill was caused by wastewater being discharged out of a tanX
from a hose that came off of an operating portable pump.
The spilled wastewater traveled south along OSCO's rail spur,
west by OSCO's southern property line, then spread on the west
side of OSCO-and NORAC's property. Approximately five gallons
traveled from NORAC's property onto Peckham Road where the spill
was contained* The wastewater did not enter any drains or
waterways. Approximately 2f300 gallons vere recovered via on-
site vacuum trucks arid absorbent was spread on_spi-ll areas. . The
successful containment and on-sifee response action averted any
immediate environmental threat. There was no danger to the
public because the spill was predominantly water. Ho services
from outside emergency response agencies were necessary.
The wastewater spill was reported to the national Response
canter, California Office of Emergency Services and the Air
Quality Management District within 24 hours. The California
Department of Health Services, Regional Water Quality Control
Board and the Region IX Environmental Protection Agency were also
notified. The Azusa Police Department and the Los Angeles County
Fire Department were at the scene at approximately 7:00 p.m. and
no action was required on their part. The Los Angeles county
Department of Health Services inspected the area the following
day.
A Oiwiim WMM Mmgi
M Company
-------
r
OSCO obtained the services of an independent environmental
consultant cervice the next day. The contaminated soil was
removed and covered with visquieen. The excavated area will be
further tested to insure the contamination has been removed. The
results will be forwarded to the appropriate agencies and the
area will be backfilled upon agency approval.
OSCO is currently reviewing procedures and modifications to
prevent future occurrences.
Yours truly.
stahl»cker
Environmental Manager
LS:kW
cc: MB. Heather Stona
Remedial Project Manager
Hazardous Waste Management Division
D.s. Environmental protection Agency
Region IX
215 Fremont street
San Fcancisco, CA 94106
Mr. Henry chui
California Department of Health service*
T«xic Substances control Division
1403 North 'San Fernando Boulevard
Suite 300 -
Burbank, CA 91504
Mr. Rod Milliken
f ?2Jh»?°?st A}r
9150 Flair Drive
El Mont a, CA 91731
Management District
Mr. Jamas Nishida
County of Los Angeles Department of Health Services
2615 South Grand Avenue 6th Floor #607
Los Angel**, CA 90OO7
Mr. Michael D. Douglass
Ett«rg«ncy Services Coordinator
City of Azusa
725 North Alameda Avenue
AZUsa, CA 91702
-------
ATTACHMENT 15
Chem-Tech Systems
Los Angeles, California
-------
_
-------
CHEM • TECH • SYSTEMS
fl commitment to a dean environment
p-TO;""1 r*r~;
•C-
•'( fi
September 2, 1994
Mr. James R. Wilcox, R.E.H.S.
Environmental Health Specialist
CITY OF VERNON
Environmental Health Department
4305 Santa Fe Avenue
Vemon, CA 90058
INCIDENT REPORT DATED AUGUST 30. 1994
Dear Mr. Wilcox:
Please excuse the delay in my response to your question of August 31, 1994, regardin? the
incident report filed on August 30, 1994. In answer to your question regarding whether the
emission was nitric acid or nitrous oxide-the response is that the emission was nitrous oxide.
Chem-Tech speculated that the reaction was probably caused by nitric acid in the tank. I
have attached copies of the waste disposition reports for the contents of Tank M-3 prior to
Monday, August 29, 1994, and a copy of the waste disposition report for the waste stream
unloaded on Monday, August, 29, 1994.
I have also attached samples of Chem-Tech's daily tank reports. Chem-Tech instituted the
tank cleaning log in January as part of its operational procedures. Prior to January, the tank
cleaning was noted in the maintenance logs. As you requested, Chem-Tech reviewed the
tank cleaning logs and the maintenance logs for the last year to determine the date that Tank
M-3 was cleaned. A record of the cleaning date was not found, however, that does not
necessarily imply that the tank has not been cleaned in the past year.
Chem-Tech reviewed its tank cleaning schedule and decided that a new schedule is required
for certain tanks, including Tank M-3. I am in the process of developing this schedule and
will provide you with a copy when it is complete. Currently, Chem-Tech is moving and
treating the material in Tank M-3. Once the aqueous solution is removed, Chem-Tech will
sample the sludge, and remove and treat it accordingly. A copy of the sample analysis of the
sludge will be sent to you.
3650 East 26th Street Los Angeles, California 90023
-------
Mr. James R. Wilcox, R.E.H.S.
CITY OF VERNON
September 2, 1994
Page 2
If you have questions or require additional information, please call me at (213) 268-5056.
Thank you for your time.
\
Sincerely yours,
CHEM-TECH SYSTEMS, INC.
-------
:lr:a:^l£fcxiV^^^
CHEM
M commitment to a dean ejtvtroiwt&it
WASTE DISPOSITION AND
EVALUATION LABORATORY REPORT
Generator/Customers . ^_ ~-~*-\Plf{A -ifaV*^
Manifest No.: ^
Transporter: A> a
Designated for? C
Waste Description
Storage/Transfer I
"^rSd PN Waste ID #:
'
'2-*^ o$!~Lty— O1^
Date: 4^2^
Volume: ^2-^70°
Lab No.: H=*~)-q-\.
1 Treatment Q Stabilization Q Storage/Transfer Profile Reviewed Bv: '
•
xi cation:
ANALYSIS
LsT)^^
Odor W
Sp. Gravity s-\0\
A
PH i!TA Norm
Oil ^ ^Z-\ %
Solids "^
Flash Point ^~
1\Cyanide (\
Halogens (Total)
Phenol
CTO
1 Before
Treatment
Cd -O
1 Cr l^$r
Cr+6 Y V
Cu LJ '
Pb flic'
Ni l ?T"2_
Aa Or"^
Zn '/?
Other
s" %
fv/ft °F
ppm
//) , ppm
|\/f\ ppm
ppm
ppm
After
Treatment
ppm
W ppm
pom
Dom
ft '~~1 ppm
/<"> - "-^ ppm
•-7 ppm
£•> ^ ppm
IV
\
I
\
ORGANIC WASTE
TREATMENT (100ml)
CaCI2
Alum
NaOH
ml
ml
ml
H2SO4 ml
SBS
DTC
ml
ml
Other:
Anionic Polymer
Cationic Polymer
H2O2
CTS Mixture
FeSO<
Other
ml
ml
ml
ml
ml
ml
Blending Factor:
Comments/Precautions:
H202
SBS *2--v!
NaOH
FeSO< CD
CaCI,
INORGANI
^- ml
^> ml
ml
O ml
ml
Other:
C WASTE ^
H2SO4 I ~-*
Lime /
DTC L S~
i — • —
CTS Mixture
Other fV \ t/Aa - 1 _ O
ml
ml
ml
ml
ml
Blending Factor:
Comments/Precaii
Compatibilities wit
tions: j]
fi Tank No.: Jv
/- -\
-5 ( Mt/W / fJDlW/rH'Uj
/
J*'T 7 A
AFTER TREATMENT OBSERVATION
Treatment Procedure(s):
Temp. Max 7 / °F
Final pH <\
Oil
Water
Total Sludge %\ /^
Disposition: T3
Off-Load To Tfreatm
Analyst: :o r£
Accountina: ^— --^
^ \ %
^O o^
^) Sludge Generated % '^-&
Comments: / -^
•'C^c'*
^ s^^^C?
fe^
/^
Accepted Q Rejected Bv: AA «s
ent Tank No.: -g^L. si
Compatibility: Tank No.: '' '""^
T Date: 5*r/£$7^n Approved bv: x^ Jr-'
r?n /if • t/)^ <^ •_ rv\
Date: /? 1 ^
3EV-11:020394:5M
White - Laooratc-v Coov Canary - Technical Service
\ D^9n/}/^QaiQ- xP ^^
Pink - Accouncnq
-L-^iS
^^m
-------
4^-tJlliiiliHH^^
i "O
rs,
!! 8
UNIFORM HAZARDOUS
WASTE MANIFEST
U Generator'. Name ond Mc-Cng Address
'l US EPA ID No.
niAIDlQ|0|8|4|7|4|L|3|2|3 |8 |5 |9
4. Qeoerotof't Phoo* ( Rig 8&2-2184
5. r.omporrer I Ccmpony Nome
The Patterson Group. Inc
7, Transporter 2 Compony Name
" 9. D*v,na«a Foa.rty Name and Site Address
$!§ 1SJ5 26th Straet
Los Angeles, CA 90023
„. US OPT
. .inc.uding Proper Shipp.ng Nome. Hazard Cla,,. end ID Nu.nber,
6. US EPA ID Number
C| A| P| 9| 8j_2L 3| 6! 9| 9| 9|3_|
8. US EPA ID Number
I I I I J I I I I 1
10. US EPA ID N'jmDer
ir.!AiTlQl8lOlOl3l3l6l8|_lJ
12. CmJuineri
RQ hazardous waste liquid, n.o.s. (contains
chrcr.iua), 9, NA 3082, PG III
T T
13. Total
Ouonrty
tu
< .
U.
15.
^*g?^^yyf^yityE"cpK^«5'Q«*««»j»^»"»^»"i
Spcoctl HondSng JrmnicSom ond AddHioool Wormaobn
wear gloves and goggles
nnrr-TTi-r r.™**^-. 818-336-7200
- - - • — ; __ , VK, and accurately deicribed above by proper shipping name ana are daw
^ * OPPiiCOble
-------
a commitment to a dean environment
WASTE DISPOSITION AND
EVALUATION LABORATORY REPORT
Generator/Custon
Manifest No.:
Transporter •;
Designated for: £
Waste Description
Storage/Transfer I
ier: -V^-A^H,
^ j#'*-j t— i/f,^'2—
P^Wa^fc^ Waste ID *• ~
7 f-f)g// —& fo
JxTfeatment^ Q Stabilisation Q Storage/Transfer Profile R
.ocXtion: P
ANALYSIS
Appearance ^/(
Odor (/
V^T^W-X-
U(Q>
Sp. Gravity // / C"
pH -<=. / Norm %
Oil -=. / ' o/o
Solids <*z. I %
Flash Point
<5i itfirtoc
Cyanide
Halogens (Total)
Phenol
CTO
Before
Treatment
Cd
Cr+6
Cu CT (
1 Mi 1
II
1 ^
LEbTLV
Other
k) ^ °F
^J 7^ ppm
LJ 1 ef ppm
7
r PPm
U {CY ppm
' ppm
After
Treatment
ppm
ppm
DD1T)
ppm
ppm
ppm
ppm
ppm
Date: <£ 1 7*9 /9^/-
Volume: 2? (2~C*r^ '
Lab No.: / ^-7 ^ <=;>„ y.
. _ — / -^ "* >' *•/ r
eviewed By: /
ORGANIC WASTE
TREATMENT (100ml)
CaCI2
Alum
NaOH
ml
ml
ml
HzSO^ ml
SBS
DTC
ml
ml
Other:
Anionic Polymer ml
Cationic Polymer ml
H2O2 ml
CTS Mixture ml
FeSO< ml
Other mi
Blending Factor:
Comments/Precautions:
H20a
SBS
NaOH !^~
INORGANI
ml
ml
ml
FeSOi ml
CaCI,
ml
Other: £L#-<£ AW1^
C WASTE
HzSO* ml
Lime -x ml
DTC 1 ' ° ml
CTS Mixture ml
Other ml
ja^y%^jl,^^rX ,.&£_ t
Blending Factor: A-^-_. ^y"*V /^ •
Comments/Precautions:
Compatibilities with Tank No.: /^
* f^T~^~i^
' O (M^H ) A£ /» $ 'rft-i
AFTER TREATMENT OBSERVATION
Treatment Procedure(s):
Temp. Max ^r ^
— & /•>
) C^ op
Final pH '
Total Sludge $\'**'
Disposition: \3
Off-Load To-Treatm
Analyst: ^u*-*-^
Accounting:
-------
Cofifornlo
olPn
crion Aoffrtcy
F»on AppnWd OMS No. 20SO-OOW (Expire! 9-3O-9.4)
K»ow $>on» ofc.
6. US EPA ID Number
C A 0
1 6 6
7. Transporter 2 Company Nome
8. US EPA ID Number
I I I I I I I I I I I
9. Designated Facility Name and Site Address
•-h^n-'scr. systos-s
3£E£ t. eSch 'ifcr-^r
10. US EPA ID Number
81 2
2. Pago 1
Information in th« shaded i
is not required by federal I
11. US DOT Description (including Proper Shipping Name, Hazard Class, and ID Number)
K. Handfing Codes for Wastes listed
15. Special Handling Instructions and Additional Information
i -en-*,
16. GENERATOR'S CERTIFICATION: I hereby declare that the contents of this consignment ore fully and accurately described above by proper shipping name and are classified.]
pocked, marked, ond labeled, and are in all respects in proper condition for transjjort by highway according to applicable international and national government regulations.
f K I am a large quantity generator. I certify mat I have a program in place to reduce the volume and toxkHy of waste generated to the degree I have determined to I
I economically practicable ond that I have selected the practicable method of treatment, storage, or disposal currently available to me which minimizes the present and ft-"--
thfecrt to human health and the environment: OR. if I am a small quantity generator. 1 have made a good faith effort to minimize my waste generation and select the
I waste management method that is available to me ond that I can afford.
Printed/Typed Name
t
Signature
Month
Day
17. Tromoorlef 1 Acknowledgement of Receipt of Materials
Pr!atoet/Tj
Name
18. Transporter 2 Acknowledgement of Receipt of Materials
Printed/Typed Name
7<~ /*,.*./ //
—
rature
Month Day
.- \*\l 1?
'
Month
1
Day
1
19. Discrepancy Indication Space
50 facility Owner or Operotor Certificotion of receipt of hozordous materials covered by this manifest except as noted in Hem 19
Pftnted/Typed Nome
Signature
Day
DO NOT WRITE BELOW THIS UNE.
i 3IJC
-------
a commitment to a clean environment
WASTE DISPOSITION AND
EVALUATION LABORATORY REPORT
Generator/Customer:
Manifest No.: <^T)^'2,
Transporter: ^"^rv^yp^
Designated for: T5J Treatment
Waste Description:
Storage/Transfer Location: _
ANALYSIS
Appearance.
Odor \
Sp. Gravity _
PH ^H Norm
Oil <1
Solids £A
Flash Point _
Sulfides
Cyanide
Halogens (Total) , r>
Phenol fvy
CTO
Cd
E
Waste ID
CaCI2
Alum _
NaOH
SBS
DTC
-------
.S!
o:
01
U
•lit
t/S
i
S
01
S
X' Gwertrtor't Nom« ot»d MoiEng Address
Rohr, rlnc. ^ 1V«
— «
•^
F
-2H-
1
15. Spt«iol Hondlna Inrtroelian. and Ado»oool hfarmotion
Eaergency Response'Inforaation
Rohr, Inc
':Wear"Pr«per Safety Equip«ent.
' wmt» monooetnent method mot b oToaoble to me end mot I con offord.
Printed/Typed Nome
17. Tromporter 1 Adcnowiedgement of Receipt of Mderiah
18. Trorapomr 2 Acfa»wie7?C— ??
White: TSDF SENDS THIS; CC?Y TO 3TSC WITHIN 30 I
; ' ^. "'P.O. Sox 20OO, Socramento. CA 95812""".,.';
-------
-------
I ; ',;•;
«|0
"SAMPLER:
LOCATION:"
DATE:
TIME:
OAM ()PM
SAMPLE NAME:
= ANALYSES COMPLETED BY:
§j PLANT CONTACTED BY: CONTACT IS:
COMMENTS:
TIME:
TIME:"
QAM ()PM
_<)AM()PM
CHECIC APPROPRIATE TESTi'S'i NEEDED:
\ GEN TSTS RESULTS |
..:_- 1
•71 . "
x ORGANICS RESULTS !
1 -•/--!• i
i '
i
i -x TC '• ^ •-.; '
'
,— - , , , :
x METALS RESULT
! Cadmium '' /} ~j
• r ^, ' ' ! i :' ""'
j C!:ro|r:!ur.i ••• >'-••' —
j . (Totr.i) L.^.
: •- ,,•„.- 4- ... :. •
3
Cihcr
TREATMENT
ORGANIC \\'AST:
(100 ML,
, .Alum
-------
VYEHX OF:
WEEKLY STATUS OF ORGANIC BLENDING/HOLDING TANK
-)t^ * i FT. = 2.000 GALS.
1 FT. = 800 GALS.
TA.HK N'O,
1C1
:C2
CAPAC.TT
(GALS.)
• WONDAY xj;
RECORDING/. •
~
16.900
16.SOO
12.500
-RECORDINO/gi
^WEDNESDAY :
I RECORDING/" ,"
:*J"OTACOA1_ .'—
THURsnAY JFHIDAV""
"''
RECORDING; I RE&; :."'.,'.
'TOTAL-OAL..
12.500
1S.5GO
28.500
16.SOO
12.500
+-
^ L (.'
15.COO
= rnn ^
15.CCO
zLd/.-r-
i t> C- <._
i6.=oo !. ;..;- .—
' *- ' -i „ *'..
1^ cnn !-'? *'
}> J ! > '- ,--V-—.
' -^ • -f c.. > ^
5"
V5C
'6.9GO ! £~^-'
.*."«--»
gg^rl
•(_.
(flrc
2^^--
^gZHso
1Pryt
-------
-------
PUG 33 "34 13:11
.CHEM-TECH s:
INCjbENT-Rfe
, me.
ADDRESS:
CHEM,TECH
3650E. 26:TH STREET -" ' '
LOS ANGELES, CA@0023^ '
(213) 268-5056
i
-FAOLITY NAME: SAME
DAXEQJF INCIDENT: Augusts?, 1994 J.^
TIME OF INCIDENT: Between 11: 30 I
Qn
•. • :NAMKUF MATERIAL .INVOLVED: i
, and
Receptionist -
moml Hospital On August 30 ti
REPORT;
I
|.
r-
i
i';.
i-J;
-------
ftUG 38 '94 13:11
.- '-Incjdeqt Report
: ;, f , - ."August29, 1994
i, * a « *'« ^ "• * ,* '
P. 3/5
; emergency alarm was sounded and all perso.nw$ vvjsis evacuated from the facility within-7 .•
minutes. ;The plant was shut down and.orUy.-^,s'c:rujbbji^. were left in operation. Two
transporters were on site -at the time of the eyacuajicfn; / Unated Pumping and The Patterson
Group: The transporters were evacuated with the <>4her:"«mpioyees and the vehicles left on site,
32:27 PM i . '/':''
. Th
-------
RUG 30 '94 13:12
P. 4/5'
:InddentK;eport : • '•;•''•"'..; ~ . ;
August 29; 1994 • ; •'; '.'.•.-.••';..•'••••
Page'3'. .' '' - -; ..• . [ • -: ' ' = •
A^ESSMENT OF mo»ENT? The rel W^eiig.tp be the result of the off-loading of a
tanker^water Wth chrome^H-5) into Tank.M-3, ivlM.contains mixed acids. Chem^hl
-fol)o.w^jtS:SOP for compatibility, testing befare/ofRiowOng the tanker. Solids in the tank were
agitated 4 tmng the unloading process aDd a .chemicaj.-r^ticn.occurred whereby ^ouJoST
^released through the air scrubber. The sy^m,,(^«ept.fotthe air scrubber?^shutTown'.
3d. Chern-Tech's laboratory staff' :
can be neutralized in the
to
satiation that the-.mixtum i
. .ans can e
ttpttnent>0ystems. This treatment will -take. place o^rtfaa next, few days.
ASSESSMENT OF
f T?65 Wer!n0t SpiUed t&the '^^iPmi^on was acute, lasted between '0
unute .and 1 hour and was dispersed^ a- gouthw«^i;wind: Since the prirnary actiS T
LOW-UP ACTIONS: Ch^n-Tech Systeina, to^agement staff win perf
bn
orm a
.^^
and ^implement new procedures. ^ preyefat ^re:inc5dents. Chem-Tech
Q2 m the- fankM-3 area, the results-,of these teflts^lbe lagged.
' '
dynD.-iForrest
i Technical Services Manager
.Y^landa Garza, AssociateiHazardaus iN^tot^'Sfc
:.Cajifornia Environmental- Protection ^genctyi. '•-''
.,Department.ofToxicSubsjtancosControl-'" • ,'-
Region3 ••• •: .-.
1'Q.H Grand view Avenue" .• .' , •'.
. .GJijndale, CA 91201 • '' -'V'
:FAX: (818)551-2874 .... .'•• -,:
• -,
-------
PUG 30 '94 13-'13
.- JncJ;4ent. Report
,'August 2$, 1994
! llPafe'4: '
>**"''"
P.5/5'
• i
'• • :.'f$ena Suzuki, Associate-Hazardous Materi
'• .California Environmental protection Agency \
,, ; Department of Toxic Substances Control-;'
, 10.i 1 North Graadview Avenue.
Glendale,CA 91201 ' :
Fax: (818) 551-2841
f James R, Wilcox, R,E;H.^.
• City of Vernon !
^uyironmental Health Departrrient
• 4305 Santa Pe Avenue
'.Vecnon,CA9005S
[Fax: (213)583-4451
_':: Sputh Coast Air Qqality Management. Dtis.ti:i'
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ATTACHMENT 16
Chemical Waste Management of the Northwest
(CWMNW)
Arlington, Oregon
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08:20
©503 388 8283
D E Q BE.ND
.'003
Chemical Waste Management of the Northwest, Inc.
17629 Cedar Borings Lane
Arlington, Oregon 97812
503/454-2643
May 20, 3 994
Mr. Brett McKnight
Manager
Oregon DEQ
Eastern Regional Office
2146 N.E. Fourth St.
Bend, Oregon 97701
[P 988 803 221]
Mr. Randall Smith
Director
US EPA
Hazardous Waste Division
1200 Sixth Avenue, HW-112
Seattle, Washington 98101
[P 988 803 222]
RE:
Chemical Waste Management of the Northwest, Inc. (CWMNW)
Part B permit ORD 089452353 (Permit)
May 5, 1994 Contingency Plan Implementation
Dear Mr. McKnight and Mr. Smith:
™ C°ndition ILH' «* Secti«n 9-0(A)(6) of the
CWMNW Contingency Plan, CWMNW is providing a written report of an incident which
required implementation of the CWMNW Contingency Plan. The incident involved a fire
made Landfill L-13, which was discovered by a security guard at approximately 10:00 P.M
PST on May 5, 1994. This incident was previously reported to Brett McKnight and Mike Renz
6 ^4Department md Bruce Lon§ of t*16 ASency * approximately 8:15 A.M. PST on May
Incident and Cause
The incident involved a fire in the noriheastern corner of the L-13 Landfill. The landfill
quadrants which were affected by the fire are highlighted on the grid coordinate system man
enclosed in Attachment 1 of this report. The fire was initially discovered by a security guST
who immediately notified the Emergency Coordinator (EC). The EC mobilized the necessary'
r^cV0 A * ^ Wd ** &e Was comPletely extinguished at approximately 1:00
A.M. PST on May 6, 1994. The area was reworked and monitored to ensure the fire did not
reoccur. The area was put back into service on May 10, 1994, after CWMNW notified Brett
McKnight that the area was again ready for service. Copies of CWMNW's incident reportine
rorms are enclosed in Attachment 2 of this report. .
CWMNW has performed a detailed investigation of the-incident, including an evaluation of all
rw^/T1^, W6r! ?laC^ m ** affected ^te™* ^ week before the incident.
CWMNW has determined that the most likely cause of the fire was stabilized waste(s) coming
into contact with combustible/burnable waste(s). The disposal records indicate that a large
amount of wood debris was placed in relative proximity to a number of stabilized waste
streams which may have been generating heat. CWMNW maintains separate disposal areas
for stabilized wastes or other wastes which generate heat and combustible/burnable waste
"'•t-rriir^i W; .-.
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00/23/94 08:21
©503 388 8283
D E Q BK.SU
©002/003
Mr. Brett McKnight and Mr. Randall Smith
May 20, 1994 !
Page Two
, i i ,
streams (e.g. wood debris); however, in this case, some waste from the combustible/'burnable
area was introduced into the hot load area.
i |
A table summarizing the waste steams and the corresponding waste profile summary sheets for
wastes in the incident area (including names *md quantities) are enclosed in Attachment 3 of
this report. This information was requested by Mike Renz of the Department and Bruce Long
of the Agency during the inspection on May (5, 1994.
.
There were no injuries sustained by any personnel during the actual incident or remediation
of the incident. The fire was contained and extinguished within the landfill. CWMNW
characterizes any actual or potential threat to human health or the environment as minor in
nature. '
1 ' !
Steps to Prevent Recurrence
CWMNW immediately began implementing the following actions to prevent the recurrence of
this type of incident:
• CWMNW supplemented the Landfill L-13 operating procedures (Standard Division
Practice) to clarify that waste streams which may be generating heat (e.g. stabilized
waste and potliner (K088)) must be kept separate from containers or burnable materials
(including debris).
• The operations staff was re-trained on existing and revised landfill operating procedures
regarding the segregation of waste streams which may generate heat and those which
are burnable. In addition, the incident and methods to prevent recurrence were
discussed with all CWMNW employees.
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• CWMNW has purchased a infrared thermometer gun and thermocouple thermometer
probe which will be used in a pilot study to investigate methods to identify loads of
waste which are generating heat. In addition, CWMNW will attempt to quantify the
surface and core temperatures of selected waste loads/streams utilizing the new
instruments. CWMNW will analyze the information from the pilot study to evaluate
the feasibility and need for the implementation of additional operational procedures.
The CWMNW material handlers and operations staff were trained on the use of the new
instruments today. The study will initisiily include loads of wastes which are stabilized
on or off-site, loads of potliner (KL088), loads which are observed to be steaming or
emitting vapors, and any loads which are warm to the touch through gloves or sample
containers. Copies of the instrument specification summaries are enclosed in
Attachment 4 of this report.
©
tacycwd P*M!
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S503 38S
D K Q BK.ND
Mr. Brett McKnight and Mr. Randall Smith
May 20, 1994
Page Three
CWMNW is conducting an intensive fire brigade training session for all personnel on
the CWMNW fire team during May 21 and 22. The fire brigade training will be
conducted by an accredited fire-training instructor.
If you have any questions regarding this report, or if I can be of anv assistance please call
at (503) 454-2643. * V
me
I certify under penalty of law that this document and all attachments were prepared under my
direction or supervision in accordance with a system designed to assure that qualified personnel
properly gather and evaluate the information submitted. Based on my inquiry of the person
or persons who manage the system, or those persons directly responsible for gathering the
information, the information submitted is, to be the best of my knowledge and belief, true
accurate and complete. I am aware that there are significant penalties for submitting false
information, including the possibility of fine and imprisonment for knowing violations.
Sincerely,
Chemical
:ement of the Northwest, Inc.
Andrew D.R. Nichols
Environmental Manager
ADN/mb
Attachments
cc: Bruce Long (EPA) [P 988 803 223]
Mike Renz (DEQ) [P 988 803 224]
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ATTACHMENT 17
Northwest EnviroService
(NWE)
Seattle, Washington
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ECCL3GY, NUIRC
Post-It" brand fax transmlttal memo 7671
March 21, 1994
PROM:
Paul O'Brien \<
spm,
BBfiEQHSE SUMMARY
Reporting Party:
Date of Response:
contaminant:
Quantity:
Site Location/County:
Site Name:
Ecology Case No.:
EPA I.D. No.:
Manifest No.:
Olympus Job No.:
Contractor:
Ecology Responders:
DOE Costs:
Other Response Agencies:
Destruct Order:
Jerry Bartlett
February 15, 1994
Oil/Hasardous Waste Mixture Fuel
5, ,500 gallons
B1.05 1st Ave South - King County
Northwest EnviroService
N1S094
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Paul O'Brien, Elin Abrainson, Dick
Storey, Hathor Woods
To be determined
eattle
Works Dept.,
NOAA' s
Police Departments
N/A
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09:28
ECOLOGY, NUJRC
O32
Environmental Assessment:To be determined through NKDA RDA
Property Ownership:
EnviroService
WDOT, City of Seattle, Northwest
On February 15/1994 at 9:3O a.m., we received a report from
Jerry Bartlett of Northwest EnviroService (NWE) that a s QQQ
gallon spill of hazardous waste had occurred at their 1st
IS2S? ^a5lon<, Hi8 initial reP°rt indicated tha? the
material^had spilled from a bulk container on their site
into a Storm drain system and from there went into a nearby
*lth°Wh *»t»il» were sketchy, NWE believed that
had purposely opened a valve on the tank, thereby
3£ spill SLanSp?ntS* NWE accepted ful1 responsibility*^
O'Brien and Abramson immediately responded to the spill
™»A n5;cessary internal and external notifications w«re
made. Upon arrival, we found NWZ, EPA's Technical
all SrSIt^T*"
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09:26
ECOLOGY, NURC
003
Tile
March 21,1994
Page 3
to the federal ?SSJ fund* et£* SaSfK?'* 2cti°ns' access
Transportation and Seattle ' EnoiAeer?^ n9 to« Department of
involved in the spill becauf* «? ™i?g DePart»ent were
t.«tin, of th. .tora
«pill documenting
response activities,
followup.
were handed off to the
determine
apiii situation
» =logy P«ti=ipat.a ln
r"1"9 was an 'ttrn
of events surrounding
placed on the
February 10
"*"
to th.
ana a "" «•
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09:2S
E-COLOGY, NURG
03-
File
March 21,1994
Page 4
February 11
February 14
February is
of the valves were still closed and the seal
was still intact. The tank was then loaded
on a truck and brought to the spill site.
- Once at the spill site samples were taken
through the top hatch and analyzed. The
analysis showed that after 24 hours the
sample settled to a 70/30 ratio of sludge to
liquid.
- Dale Leicks, NWE facility employee, did a
site walk just prior to leaving for the day.
The tank was still full of product at 1430
hours on February 14.
' ' '\.:. i
- The spill was discovered at 0750 hours by
Dale Leicks as he does his normal morning
site walk when he noticed a sheen on the
P&rking lot. He proceeded to run up the hill
and loc:ated the sourp* as the tank in
question. He closed the now open outside
valve and immediately called for help. He
called Bill DeNike, a NWE employee
responsible for the rail cars. Bill
responded to this site and determined through
the top hatch that the basically the entire
tank load had been lost. He estimated that
approximately 5KOO gallons of blended fuel
product had been lost.
- 0800: Leicks and DeNike immediately put
Out barriers to divert product around storm
drains. Dale begins to divert pump trucks to
the NWES site for use in spill recovery.
Bill Notified Tom summerfold that a spill had
occurred and Tom Summerfeld notified Jerry
Bartlett. Jerry notified the National
Response Center at 0900 and received case
number 221807, Jerry notified Ecology and
Steve Banchero. Jerry spoke with Christie
True of Metro, she indicted that she thought
none of the product would get off site. OSCG
was on scene at 0920 as they thought he
product might reach the Duwamish. They
recommend that Jerry notify the Seattle rire
Department, he did at 0930.
NWE indicated that they believe that the spill was caused by
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File
March 21,1994
Page 5
natSr^of tS'J ?alled ^ Dotage due to the
investigator to deterge ?£ iff J?1?™^ to hirla private
identify « suspaet? f there is enou9h evidence to
tampered
ss '
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