United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Solid Waste and
Emergency Response
(5305W)
EPA530-R-99-O14
April 1999
www.epa.gov/osw
Report on Emergency Incidents
at Hazardous Waste Combustion
Facilities and Other Treatment,
Storage, and Disposal Facilities
(TSDFs)
        Printed on paper that contains at least 30 percent postconsumer fiber

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Report on Emergency Incidents at Hazardous Waste Combustion Facilities
     and Other Treatment, Storage and Disposal Facilities (TSDFs)
               U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
                       Office of Solid Waste
                  Permits and Programs Division
                     Washington, D.C. 20460

                           April 1999

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This report was prepared for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency by ICF Incorporated, under
contract # 68-W2-0008.  The EPA work assignment manager for this project was Karen Randolph.
Acknowledgments to the U.S. EPA Regional Waste Combustion permit writers and those State permit
writers who provided information for use in this report.

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                      Table of Contents


  Executive Summary

  Table 1

  Number of Combustion Facilities and TSDFs with Reported Incidents by Region

  Chart 1

  Number of Incidents at Combustion Facilities and TSDFs, 1977 - 1998

  Regional Summaries

 Region I                                                      *

 No facilities

 Region n                                                     2

 Eastman Kodak Company
 Bridgeport Rental and Oil Services (BROS)
 Rollins Environmental Services, Inc.

 Region m                                                     4
 Mill Service
 Delaware Container Company

 Region IV                                                     6

 ThermalKEM
 Laidlaw Environmental Services (Thermal Oxidation Corporation)
 U.S. Department of Energy
 Diversified Scientific Services, Inc (DSSI)
 LWD
 Carolina Solite
 Southeastern Chemicals
Laidlaw Environmental Services (GSX Laidlaw Landfill)
Safety-Kleen Lexington Recycling Center
IV

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  Region 4 (continued)

  Holnam/Safety-Kleen
  CP Chemicals
  Albright and Wilson
  E.I. DuPont de Nemours
  Chemical Waste Management, Inc. (CWM)
  Fisher Industrial Services, Inc.

  Region V

  Dow Chemical Company
  Chemical Waste Management, Inc. (CWM)
  Ross Incineration Services, Inc.
  Waste Technologies Industries (WTI)
  Trade Waste Incineration (part of CWM)
  3M

  Region VI

 Ensco
 Chemical Waste Management, Inc. (CWM)
 Rollins Deer Park

 Region VII

 International Paper
 Monsanto Company
 Lake City Army Ammunition Plant
 Aptus
 ICI Explosives Environmental Company
 12
 16
 19
Region

United States Pollution Control Incorporated (U.S.P.C.I.)

Region IX

Johnston Atoll Chemical Agents Demilitarization System (JACADS)
Rhone Poulenc Basic Chemical Company
Statewide Environmental Services, Inc.
Oil and Solvent Process Company (OSCO)
Chem-Tech Systems
21
22

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Region X

Chemical Waste Management of the Northwest, Inc. (CWMNW)
Northwest EnviroService (NWE)
Sol-Pro
ChemPro
Phillips Environmental (formerly ChemPro)
Washington Chemical

Summary of Incidents at Combustion Facilities
and Other TSDF Facility Listings
27
31

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 ATTACHMENTS

 1.  Eastman Kodak Company - Kodak Park, New Jersey
 2.  Bridgeport Rental and Oil Services (BROS) - Bridgeport, New Jersey
 3.  Rollins Environmental Services, Inc. - Logan Township, New Jersey
 4.  Summary of Region IV Facilities
 5.  Dow Chemical Company - Midland, Michigan
 6.  Chemical Waste Management, Inc. (CWM) - Chicago, Illinois
 7.  Trade Waste Incineration (part of CWM) - Sauget, Illinois
 8.  3M - Cottage Grove, Minnesota
 9.  Chem Waste Management, Inc. (CWM) - Port Arthur, Texas
 10.  ICI Explosives Environmental Company - Joplin, Missouri
 11.  Johnston Atoll Chemical Agents Demilitarization System (JACADS) -
    Johnston Island
 12.  Rhone Poulenc Basic Chemical Company - Martinez, California
 13.  Statewide Environmental Services, Inc. - Los Angeles, California
 14.  Oil and Solvent Process Company (OSCO) - Azusa, California
 15.  Chem-Tech Systems - Los Angeles, California
 16.  Chemical Waste Management of the Northwest, Inc. (CWMNW) -
    Arlington, Oregon
17.  Northwest EnviroService (NWE) -Seattle,  Washington

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                               EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
         This report provides a compilation of information on reported emergency incidents at hazardous
  waste combustion facilities and other treatment, storage, and disposal facilities (TSDFs) regulated under
  the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).  This report is limited to emergency incidents only
  (such as fires, explosions, hazardous waste spills or unauthorized releases of hazardous waste)
  Occurrences when emergency bypasses or thermal relief vents were used may  be mentioned but such
  events are not fully addressed in this report. This report represents a comprehensive compil'ation of
  incidents from December 1977 through August 1995, with several incidents occurring prior to the
  implementation of RCRA.  This report also includes two additional incidents; one from 1997 and one from
  1998 The addition  of incidents from 1997 and 1998 does not account for all incidents during the time
  period from September 1995 to present.  As more information  becomes available, this report will be
  updated.

         Information  in this report was obtained from Regional and State waste combustion experts and
 permit writers. In many cases, the state agencies had collected and maintained information regarding
 emergency incidents  at RCRA facilities.  In cases where information was incomplete, memories of EPA
 and state permit writers were relied upon. Although every attempt was made to include all incidents at
 combustion faculties and other TSDFs regulated under RCRA, there may be incidents that EPA was
 unable to identify. Therefore, this report may not be all inclusive.

 •  *u-   EmerSency incidents at 24 hazardous waste combustion units and 26 other TSDFs are documented
 in this report. Of the incidents that have occurred, 9 facilities experienced incidents that were directly
 related to the actual combustion of hazardous waste. The remaining incidents involved were not
 combustion related and consist of activities such as waste handling and storage. As indicated in the
 individual facility wnte-ups, some of the incidents occurred before RCRA was instituted and full RCRA
 safeguards were not in effect.
^ * u             teginS ^ a summary toble listing the number of reported incidents (per facility type)
that have occurred ui each of the EPA Regions, and the number of combustion facilities with incidents^
resulted from the actual combustion of hazardous waste. On the next page is a chart showing the number
of incidents that occurred at combustion facilities and TSDFs from 1977-1998. The chart is followed bv a
Regional summary of each individual incident and the EPA or State contacts who provided the information
regarding the incident. |The report ends with a complete listing (by Region) of each facility  Where
available, detailed incident reports are included as attachments.

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                 TABLE I. Number of Combustion Facilities and TSDFs with Reported Incidents by Region «
                                  Hazardous Waste Combustion
               Region
 # Facilities Under
Interim Status with
    Incidents
# Facilities Under
Permit Status with
    Incidents
 # Facilities with
 Incidents due to
Actual Combustion
  of Hazardous
     Waste
                                                                                   # Facilities Under
                                                                                   Interim Status or
                                                                                  Not Permitted with
                                                                                      Incidents
# Facilities Under
Permit Status with
    Incidents
See next page for footnote details.
                                                                 111

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Footnotes

1. Some facilities listed in this table have had multiple incidents. Please see attached summaries for more information.

2. Some facilities have been accounted for twice: incidents occurring during a non-permitted or interim status, incidents occurring during a permitted
status, and/or incidents due to the actual combustion of hazardous waste. Please see attached summaries for more information.

3. Includes a permitted nonhazardous facility; Albright and Wilson.

4. Fires occurred on two separate occasions in the combustion unit of the ThermalKEM facility.

5. Incidents included a fire in the combustion units of DOW, CWM, and Ross.

6. Fires occurred in the furnace duct of the incinerator at Rollins Deer Park and in the kiln at CWM.

7. Incidents occurred in the incinerator at the Lake City Army Ammunition Plant after live rounds of ammunition were set off on the conveyer belt after
being treated, an explosion in the scrubber of the combustion unit at Aptus, and an explosion in the kiln at ICI.
                                                                    m

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           CHART 1.  Number of Incidents at Combustion Facilities and TSDFs
                                             1977-1998
    30
         1977-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990   1991

•Incidents include: fires, explosions, spills, equipment failures, etc.
1992    1"3    1994    1995     1996     1997    1998
      Years

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                           REGION I
                          Regional Summary


There has not been aay reported incidents at combustion facilities ar other TSDFs in Regioa'
•i*                                         .'        .               ~

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                                       REGION II
                                        Regional Summary                          >

            Incident were reported at two incinerators in Region II, One incident occurred at the
     Eastman Kodak facility In Kodak Park, Mew York, The other incident occurred at tlte Bridgeport
     Rental and Oil Services Superfund incinerator ia Bridgeport, New Jersey,               ;

         ^  In 1977 a series of explosions and fires occurred at the Rollins Environmental Services tank
     farm in Logan Township, New Jersey. The facility did act have a RCRA permit at the time.   '
 Eastman Kodak Company, Kodak Park, New York
 Contact: John Brogard, EPA Region II (212) 637-4162

 On July 12, 1990, an incident occurred at the RCRA-permitted Kodak Park chemical incinerator.
 Approximately 75 gallons of recycled cooling water spilled when the cooling water system ruptured. Two
 gallons of spilled water contacted the ground, while the remaining 73 gallons flowed into an industrial
 sewer.  The ruptured line was repaired within two hours and the facility was put back into operation.  For
 additional information, see Attachment 1.

 Bridgeport Rental and Oil Services (BROS), Bridgeport, New Jersey
 Contact: John Brogard, EPA Region II (212) 637-4162

 An explosion occurred at the BROS facility on September 20, 1992. According to the Region II contact,
 the explosion was caused by a rapid steam generation that resulted when a slag ring that formed in the kiln
 fell into the water in the ash quench.  He also noted that although the oxygen and CO concentrations were
 normal prior to the event, the total hydrocarbon monitor readings were unusual for a large part of the day.
 In addition, the waste feed had already stopped 50 minutes prior to the explosion. The explosion blew off
 the hinged sides of the weigh belt used to meter the contaminated soil to the rotary kiln. There were
 fugitive emissions associated with the explosion, but no injuries or natural resource damages were reported.
                                                                                    i
 Another incident was reported at this facility on September 21,  1992. On that date, a large amount of ash
 was released while workers were trying to attach the screw feeder after emptying the multi clone.
 Particulate matter was released into the air for eight minutes and traveled across U.S. Route 130.  EPA
 was not aware of any health or environmental impacts from this release. Although this is a Superfund site,
the State of New Jersey had  previously issued the facility a permit equivalent to a RCRA-permit. For
additional information, see Attachment 2.

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 Rollins Environmental Services Inc., Logan Township, New Jersey
 Contact: John Brogard, EPA Region II (212) 637-4162

 On December 8, 1977, Rollins Environmental Services (RES) in Logan Township, N.J., experienced a
 series of explosions and fires at their tank farm. The initial explosion occurred at approximately 2:15 p.m.,
 and was followed by between two and five additional explosions.  The ensuing fire lasted about 11A hours,'
 during which time approximately 12 storage tanks and two tank trucks exploded and/or burned.  The
 incident claimed six lives and injured 12 on-site workers who were various contractors performing
 specialized maintenance work.  In addition, about 40 firemen were admitted to the local hospital for smoke
 inhalation and released after treatment. At the time of the incident, the facility did not have a RCRA
 permit.

 Representatives from the NJ Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP),  the NJ. Department of
 Health (NJDOH), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Occupational Safety and Health
 Administration (OSHA), the U.S. Treasury Bomb Squad, and state and local police worked with local
 public safety officers and Rollins personnel to minimize the immediate and longer-term damage from the
 fire and explosions.  Although state and federal authorities determined that evacuation of Bridgeport, the
 nearby town, was not necessary, they warned all persons who were in direct contact with the explosion
 scene to take precautionary measures with clothing and equipment because of possible toxic contamination.
Results of monitoring and surveillance studies indicated that the explosion and fire had not caused any off-
site contamination. After substantial review by the appropriate state and federal authorities, the RES
facility was permitted to reopen subject to certain conditions, including a consent order that stipulated the
incinerator operational temperature for toxic substances.  For additional information on this facility, see
Attachments.

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                                          REGION III
                                         Regional Summary

             There have not been any reported incidents at combustion facilities in Region lO

             TwoIncidents have been reported'a| other commercial treatment and storage facilities in
     Region m.  One incident took place at Mill Service* located in Yykpn, Pennsylvania  The second
     incident occurred atthe Delaware Container Company i» Coatesville, Pennsylvania       i
 Mill Service, Yukon, Pennsylvania
 Contact: Marcos Aquino, EPA Region III (215) 597-8187

 Mil] Service treats hazardous waste sludges that exhibit toxic characteristics (TC) to render them
 npnhazardous so that they may be disposed of as nonhazardous wastes in a Subtitle D landfill  Two
 different types of incidents were reported at this facility.

 The first incident occurred on November 12, 1991. Between 5,000 and 20,000 gallons of partially treated
 waste sludges were accidentally placed in a surface impoundment at the facility, which was operating under
 interim status at the time. These wastes still exhibited the TC. The facility was closed by the State until
 March 1992 when in-situ treatment was performed on the material. The facility was allowed to reopen in
 April 1992.

 Since the facility has  reopened, it has had recurring problems with NOX fuming from waste pickle liquor
 in particular, tank trucks used for transporting these wastes to the facility were not always cleaned out
 properly. Whenever the dome of the truck was removed, a NOX puff resulted. This type of incident has
 occurred approximately six times during the last ten years. No incidents have occurred since 1992  since
 the facility installed NOX and H2S monitors.  Trucks are now unloaded in a different manner to prevent
 releases.  In addition,  air pollution control equipment has been installed in the truck unloading areas.

 Delaware Container  Company, Coatesville, Pennsylvania
 Contact: Victoria loff, EPA Region III (215) 597-7237

 On October 14, 1985, an  incident was reported at the Delaware Container Company facility in Coatesville
 Pennsylvania. Delaware Container treated hazardous and residual wastes in its waste solidification area  '
 During interim status the facility received a shipment of waste that contained an aluminum-based paint
This particular waste was not identified on the shipping manifest and was not detected by Delaware
 Container's testing procedures. An exothermic reaction resulted from the mixture of aluminum waste and
cement kiln dust and a form of an unidentified gas was  released. Residents of the surrounding community
reported a strange odor from the facility and contacted the state's emergency response personnel. The
exothermic reaction ended when response personnel removed the tarp that covered the waste and

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redistributed the mixture.  Although the facility reported that approximately 32 community residents were
treated in a neighboring hospital for nose and throat irritations, the community claimed that the number of
those treated was closer to 100. No hospitalizations or deaths resulted from the incident.  Delaware
Container was fined by the State of Pennsylvania for an air pollution violation.

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                                          REGION IV
                                          Regional Summary

             There have been 15 documented incidents at combustion facilities In Region. !Y< TWO of
     these events (ThermalKEM, July 10,1987 and December 8,1988) were related to the actual
     combustion of hazardous waste; these incidents occurred before the unite were under RCRA
     permits. The remaining events either occurred while the units were on auxiliary fuel, or were related
     to ancillary equipment

             There have been 22 documented incidents at TSDFs i« Region IV. These incidents include
     fires, spills, an explosion* and a collapse of a landfill berm,            - -              ;
 ThermalKEM, Rock Hill, South Carolina
 Contacts: Brian Kaplan, EPA Region IV (404) 347-3433 and
 Joan Hartley, S.C. Department of Health and Environmental Control (803) 734-5167

 There have been five incidents at the ThermalKEM facility in Rock Hill. The first incident occurred on
 July 10,1987. The incinerator was operating under interim status at the time. An explosion resulted from
 a 10% nitroglycerine 90% lactose material that had been incorrectly identified by the generator as not heat
 reactive and not explosive. Three explosions resulted from the introduction of this waste into the
 incinerator. The first two explosions occurred within the incinerator kiln; the third occurred partially
 outside the incinerator.  There were no spills, fires, or hazardous waste releases, although two employees
 did complain of ringing of the ears.  Following the incident, more rigorous waste approval procedures were
 instituted, including use of a Differential Scanning Calorimeter.
                                                                                      I
 The second incident at ThermalKEM occurred on December 8, 1988. A drum caused a strong reaction
 within the incinerator, and a large pressure surge caused the safety pressure relief door to open. A fuel  line
 was also ruptured. The explosion resulted from nitrocellulose that had been incorrectly identified by an
 EPA contractor as a non-reactive F005 solvent. Following the incident,  ThermalKEM instituted
 procedures for on-site sampling and analysis of remedial wastes, as well as 100% inspection and testing of
 drums upon receipt.

 The third incident at ThermalKEM occurred on March 24, 1991. Low water pressure caused the boiler
 tube to fail, which in turn caused the package boiler to explode. The explosion moved the boiler
 approximately 50 feet, resulting in extensive damage to the boiler, the boiler house, and also severing of the
 steam and fuel oil lines.  The boiler was burning natural gas at the time of the explosion. Thirty (30)
gallons of diesel fuel combined with water were spilled but contained, and the thermal relief vent on the
 incinerator was activated.

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  The fourth incident occurred on April 25, 1993, and involved a fire around their Solid Drum Repackaging
  System (SDKS).  It was reported that hydraulic hoses and oil which are part of the SDRS system caught
  fire. Company representatives reported that no wastes were being processed at the time of the fire. There
  were also no reported injuries.

  The fifth incident took place on January 14, 1995, when a fire occurred at 4:55 a.m. in the Drum
  Repackaging Building in the Fiber Drum Storage Area. ThermalKEM implemented the contingency plan
  and promptly notified off-site emergency response agencies.  The fire was fought by ThermalKEM
  employees and brought under control by 6:30 a.m. All fire water was captured in the secondary
  containment system, and no off-site releases occurred in amounts above the reportable quantities.  One
  employee experienced a minor wrist bum, which was treated at the site. The facility concluded that no
  explosions had occurred during the fire. ThermalKEM believes that the fire was caused by a nonhazardous
 waste stream of molybdenum paste. After processing, the paste was grounded into a highly flammable and
 reactive powder. This powder was then mixed with wood flour, which absorbed the organic constituents
 and started the fire. To prevent recurrence, the facility took the following corrective measures: (1) the
 waste analysis plan was revised to incorporate a test of each batch of fibers produced for reactivity; (2) the
 storage area for fiber drums was limited to areas equipped with automatic foam suppression systems and
 (3) the contingency plan was revised to create a new off-site Response Coordinator position and to add
 additional persons to the contact list.  See Attachment 4 for additional information.

 Laidlaw Environmental Services (Thermal Oxidation Corporation), Roebuck, South Carolina
 Contacts: Denise Housely, EPA Region IV (404) 347-3433 and
 Shelly Sherritt, S.C. Department of Health and Environmental Control (803) 734-5203

 Five releases have been reported at this interim status incinerator and related storage areas. The facility's
 permit was issued in September 1988.  The State and Federal portions of the permit were appealed, and the
 State permit has not yet been settled. The Federal portion of the permit is effective and contains
 requirements related to HSWA.

 The first release occurred on March 17, 1982, when 3,000 gallons of various types of solvents were spilled
 from the pipe that connects the blend tanks to the incinerator. The contaminated soil was removed
 immediately. The release was detected during a routine inspection, when it was discovered that a small
 section of the pipe had corroded, creating a hole which the solvents leaked out of.

 The second incident at Laidlaw occurred on February 9, 1988, when 6,000 gallons of maleic anhydride
 spilled from a storage tank. Again, the contaminated soil was quickly removed.

 The third incident occurred on March 22, 1991, when the thermal relief vent (TRY)  from the Laidlaw
 incinerator vaporizer was blown off the unit and fell down to the direct burn containment pad. The exact
 cause of this incident is not known, but may have occurred due to a faulty natural gas regulator.  At the
 time of the incident, the liquid injection unit was on natural gas. There were no injuries or known
 hazardous waste releases.  As a result of this incident, EPA and the facility entered into a consent
 agreement that required Laidlaw to improve its reporting procedures and TRY controls.

 On February 8, 1994,  Laidlaw received a shipment of orthochlorophenol.  During redrumming, the
orthochlorophenol emitted a vapor cloud which drifted off site. One person reported sinus problems
resulting from exposure to the vapor cloud while driving off site. The facility had no violations related to

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  this emission, but did install a hood system in the outdoor container redrumming area to eliminate the
  possibility of future instances.

  The fifth incident occurred on September 19, 1994, when a small  fire occurred as an out-of-service welder
  dismantled a tank.  The fire was contained and extinguished in approximately three minutes.  The facility
  did not have to evacuate the area and no injuries resulted from the incident.  See Attachment 4 for any
  additional information.

  U,S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge, Tennessee
  Contact: Beth Antley, EPA Region IV (404) 347-3433

  On June 15, 1989, while completing a trial burn, an induced draft fan of the incinerator at the permitted
  Oak Ridge facility failed. Although the exact cause of the failure is not known, an examination of the fan
  revealed that severe cracks had been forming in the impeller. The failure breached the fan housing and
  debris was found as far away as 370 feet. Flying debris damaged the stack. There were no injuries and no
 detectable off-site releases of toxic material as a result of the incident.  See Attachment 4 for additional
  information.

 Diversified Scientific Services, Inc. (DSSI), Kingston, Tennessee
 Contact: Rick Gillian, EPA Region IV (404) 347-3433

 On July 31, 1992, during preparation for a BIF compliance test burn, a brief electrical outage allowed
 some unburned propane to go through the DSSI boiler. When the unbumed propane reached the charcoal
 filters in the secondary pollution control system, the filters caught fire and burned for approximately four
 minutes. The fire then spread to the HEPA filters, but was contained by DSSI's emergency response team.
 There were no injuries or hazardous waste releases. The facility was operating under interim  status at the
 time.  See Attachment 4 for additional information.

 LWD, Clay, Kentucky
 Contact: Beth Antley, EPA Region IV (404) 347-3433

 On February 2, 1982, a direct-feed tank truck containing acetone exploded and caught fire at the interim
 status  LWD incinerator facility. Vapors in the truck were accidently ignited by the operator while he was
 checking the waste level in the tanker. An oil/acetone mixture was released as a result of the explosion, and
 a small stream of fire fighting water flowed into a drainage ditch and eventually a creek. Three other tank
 trucks also caught fire, but no releases were reported.  Hazardous wastes were released inside an earthen
 dike where the tank trucks were located. The operator received extensive bums above the waist and a
 compound fracture of the leg. The facility is now closed.  See Attachment 4 for additional information.

 Carolina Solite, Norwood, North Carolina
 Contact: Hugh Hazen, EPA Region IV (404) 347-3433

 On November 4, 1993, one of the waste blend tanks at this permitted facility burst a pipe and spilled
 approximately 2,500 gallons of waste. Most of the waste remained in the secondary containment system,
 but an  estimated 50 to 100 gallons of waste escaped onto adjacent soils.  The facility acted promptly and
the contamination was remediated effectively. The  State of North Carolina issued a notice of violation on
 September 26, 1994 for using a front-end loader for remediation that was made of carbon steel, which

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 presented a flash hazard, and also for failing to decontaminate the same front-end loader before it left the
 site. A similar spill occurred in January 1994.

 Southeastern Chemicals, Sumter, South Carolina
 Contact: Bill Carder, S.C. Department of Health & Environmental Control (803) 734-5166

 There have been four fires at this permitted facility, none of which resulted in a major release. The fires
 occurred on April 12, 1992, April 14, 1992, April 20, 1992, and June 6, 1992.

 Laidlaw Environmental Services (GSX Laidlaw Landfill), Pinewood, South Carolina
 Contact: Sean Barron, S.C. Department of Health & Environmental Control (803) 734-5160

 This facility has experienced four fires, two of which occurred while the facility was operating under
 interim status. In 1991, there was a fire at the drum shredder unit.  No major release was reported. Also in
 1991, the berm of the landfill collapsed during construction, but there were no hazardous materials
 involved. In February 1992, there was a spill at the waste solidification unit. Information on the amount
 or type of spill was not available, but the spill was remediated promptly by removing all affected soil.

 On September 9, 1993, a fire occurred in the hazardous waste drum shredder unit.  The fire involved two
 55-gallon containerized drums of lithium manganese batteries, but it is unclear if the batteries actually
 caused the fire. The fire was quickly extinguished and no injuries were reported.

 The facility received a RCRA permit on March 23, 1994.  On April 12, 1994,  a fire involving alkaline
 batteries began in the nonhazardous subcell IIA of the Laidlaw facility. The fire was extinguished and no
 injuries were reported.

 The fourth incident occurred when a bulk load that contained oil and grease was being managed in the
 facility's treatment tanks. Facility workers observed smoke and small pockets of flames coming from the
 load. The facility workers later found that the load also contained caustic manure and aluminum turning,
 which was suspected as the cause of the fire.

 Sqfety-Kleen Lexington Recycling Center, Lexington, South Carolina
 Contact:  Bill Carder, S.C. Department of Health & Environmental Control (803) 734-5166

 Two spills have occurred at this permitted facility; however it is uncertain what substances they were. On
 April 8, 1992,  approximately 300 gallons were spilled while filling a tank. Forty gallons were spilled on
 June 19, 1992, again while filling a tank.

Holnam/Safety-Kleen, Holly Hill, South Carolina
Contact: Sean Barron, S.C. Department of Health & Environmental Control (803) 734-5160

There have been two incidents at the Holnam/Safety-Kleen facility.  The first occurred on October 23,
 1987, when a 100,000-gallon fuel tank exploded.  There is little information on this incident, as it was not a
regulated unit.

On August 13, 1992, there was a 638-gallon spill during a railcar transfer. The facility remediated the site.
The facility was permitted at the time of the incidents.

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  CP Chemicals, Sutnter, South Carolina
  Contact: Joan Hartley, S.C. Department of Health & Environmental Control (803) 734-5167

  On November 29, 1985, there was a spill of approximately 2,200 gallons of ammonia and 2,000 gallons of
  hydrochloric acid from two storage tanks. These releases resulted when the tank valves were left open.
  Two employees were arrested two weeks later and charged with intentionally causing the releases.

  The CP Chemicals facility was permitted in April 1990 and is subject to secondary containment and
  inspection requirements that should minimize the impact of future releases.

 Albright and Wilson, Charleston, South Carolina
  Contact: Sean Barron, S.C. Department of Health & Environmental Control (803) 734-5160

 Two incidents have occurred at this permitted facility.  On June 17, 1991, there was an explosion and fire
 in the Special Products Unit (SPU) which killed nine people. Water used to fight the fire was released into
 a containment pond.

 The second incident occurred on January 14, 1993, in the High Temperature Unit (HTU). A rupture in the
 steam jacket and piping in the HTU resulted in a release of steam and byproducts.

 Although the facility was permitted for treatment and storage when both of these incidents occurred, no
 hazardous waste was involved.

 E.I. DuPont de Nemours, Axis, Alabama
 Contact: Steven Cobb, Alabama Department of Environmental Management (334) 271-7726

 On June 9, 1994, approximately 3,800 gallons of sulfuric acid were released from a leaking transfer pipe at
 this permitted DuPont commercial combustion facility.  Approximately 2,500 gallons of the material were
 recovered. An estimated 300 cubic yards of contaminated soil were removed and disposed of. This facility
 was permitted at the time of the incident.

 On June 10, 1994, one drum, containing approximately one gallon of hydrogen peroxide and twenty gallons
 of ground corncobs, burst due to a buildup of pressure inside the drum.

 Chemical Waste Management, Inc. (CWM), Emelle, Alabama
 Contact: Steven Cobb, Alabama Department of Environmental Management (334) 271-7726

 On November 10, 1992, Unit 700 started smoldering and eventually burst into flames while Oil Dry was
 being added to a drum of waste epicholrohydrin. The automatic overhead sprinklers were immediately
 activated and the fire brigade responded.  The fire was contained within the tipping pan, and no personnel
 injuries were reported. This facility was permitted at the time of the incident.

 On December 5, 1992, approximately 170,000 gallons of water were pumped from the fire water tank to
the crusher dispersion unit. Subsequent sampling of the accumulated water revealed that it was
contaminated with D039 hazardous waste. Soil samples taken from the ditch through which the water
flowed were analyzed and found to be contaminated. The ditch was later excavated and the soil was
properly managed.
                                              10

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 On December 8, 1992, a fire occurred while stabilizing a vat of D004/D018 hazardous waste in Unit 1200.
 The fire occurred after portland cement was added and was contained in the stabilization vat No injuries
 were reported.

 On January 9, 1993, an employee observed a reaction in the landfill which resembled a "roman candle" in
 nature. The employee also observed a ball of fire rising a few feet above the active trench followed by a
 puff of smoke and another ball of fire.

 On February 26, 1993, during the processing of a load of waste in a vat in Unit 1200 a flash-ignition of
 the reagent sulfur was observed as it was being mixed with the waste. The flash lasted no more than 1-2
 seconds and there was no visible release of hazardous substances to the environment.

 Fisher Industrial Services, Inc., Glencoe, Alabama
 Contact: Steven Cobb, Alabama Department of Environmental Management (334) 271-7726

 Various materials were placed into a roll-off box on August 13, 1993. The materials included hazardous
wastes P001, D004, D007, D008, F002, F003, and F005.  A small fire was observed in the roll-off box on
August 14, 1993.  The fire was restricted to the container where the reaction occurred  This facility was
permitted at the time of the incident.
                                             11

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                                         REGION V
                             f                                f f                       <
                                         Regional Summary  '"	           '        \

             Incidents at six RCRA incinerators have been reported. Incidents at three of these facilities,
     Dow Chemical Company k Midland, Michigan; Chemical Waste Management ia Chicago, Hfiaois '
     and Ross Incineration Services in Grafton, Ohio, consisted of erosions involving the eombustioB
     of hazardous waste. Facilities that e?{penenced other incidents include; WH. in East liverpooJ,
     Ohio; Trade Waste Incineration m Sauget; Illinois and the 3M facility in Cottage Grove, Minnesitta.
                                                              ; j s        f    fSfSsffff        f
                           '                                f                         I
            There have been no reports m Incidents that have omtrred at other TSDFs i» Region V.
 Dow Chemical Company, Midland, Michigan
 Contact: Cheryl Howe, Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (517) 373-9881

 On January 25, 1992, a natural gas explosion occurred next to one of Dow's two permitted incinerators.
 While unplugging the incinerator feed line, the worker failed to block off the natural gas feed and turn off
 the burner pilots. As a result, natural gas that was fed to the incinerator when the kiln cooled down leaked
 into a room adjacent to the incinerator and ignited.  This incident occurred during normal operations.  One
 worker sustained burns to  the face and hands, while another worker complained of ringing in the ears.
 There is no evidence that any hazardous waste was released, and there was no natural resource damage.
 Following the incident, the facilities made improvements in their gas sensing equipment and interlock  '
 system, and also took steps to ensure adherence to proper procedures for unplugging feed lines.

 On February 4, 1993, another explosion occurred in the 703 Building Rotary Kiln Incinerator. The
 primary cause of the incident is attributed to an explosion of a five-gallon pail of Nitrobid(R) (a
 pharmaceutical), or process wastes from the production of Nitrobid(R), being fed into the incinerator. The
 explosion was relieved through both the explosion damper and the emergency vent stack.  Some solid, non-
 regulated rubbish was released through the explosion damper, and some visible flames and hot gases were
 emitted from the emergency unit.  The incident occurred during normal operations, and no injuries or
 exposures to hazardous waste occurred as a result of this incident. All cleanup and repairs to the
 incinerator were completed promptly and the unit was returned to service on February 7, 1993.  Following
the incident, the facility made improvements to its contingency plan and agency notification requirements.
For more information, see Attachment 5.
Chemical Waste Management Inc. (CWM), Chicago, Illinois
Contact: JuanaRojo, EPA Region V(312) 886-0990
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  On February 13, 1991, an explosion occurred in the rotary kiln of the interim status CWM Chicago
  incinerator, 28 seconds after a 16-gallon drum containing two laboratory chemicals was fed into the kiln.
  The drum contained a lab pack prepared by the generator. One of the chemicals, tetrazole (20 Kg), was
  identified as the cause of the explosion. CWM identified the material but failed to recognize it as an
  explosive.  The explosion damaged the seals of the kiln and caused sections of the kiln's outer shell and end
  plate to bulge. Although three employees experienced headaches and tinnitus (ringing in the ears), there
  were no injuries as a result of the incident.  There was also no indication of toxic releases  into neighboring
  areas.  The Region required the plant to replace several parts of the unit before restarting operations.
  Additional fire prevention and safety equipment were also required.

  See Attachment 6 for additional information.

 JRoss Incineration Services, Inc., Grafton, Ohio
  Contact: Mike Galbraith, EPA Region V (312) 886-6182

 An incident occurred on August 12, 1994, which involved the ignition of a waste drum that created a fire.
 One employee was injured by the ignited vapors and liquid, and there was minor damage to the side door of
 the incineration system. Operations at the Ross Incinerator were suspended overnight but  resumed the next -
 day.  An investigative team determined that the accident was caused when a skid covered with acid residue
 was improperly loaded with waste drums. (The acid residue was left in the bottom of the skid after waste
 materials had been incinerated.) The skid was reloaded with waste drums by employees who failed to
 follow instructions to incinerate the residue before loading the drums. When the drums were incinerated,
 the acid residue on the skid heated one of the drums, causing it to become pressurized and release vapors'
 and liquid. -The vapors and liquid ignited, consequently setting fire to the other three drums.  Cyclohexane,
 styrene, and mineral spirits were released into the air as a result of the fire.

 A similar incident occurred on May 1, 1995, which involved an explosion in the secondary combustion
 chamber (SCC) of the incinerator unit while drummed waste was being fed to the unit. The explosion
 separated the exit door of the chamber and damaged the activation system of the bypass stack mechanism.
 Most of the damage occurred in the interior of the secondary chamber refractory.  Although no injuries
 were reported, a portion of the chamber brick roof collapsed and was left opened to the environment. As a
 result, fugitive emissions were released.  Due to the damage to the secondary chamber door cooling system,
 the induced draft fan did not function for 10 minutes after the  incident, and the air pollution control device
 system did not operate for one hour after the incident.  Although Ross implemented their shut down
 procedures using bypass fuel to slowly cool the unit, it took eight days to completely shut the unit down.
 Ross has agreed not to feed waste through the side door of the secondary chamber until all information
 related to this incident has been  evaluated and written approval was obtained from EPA.

 The facility reported that the vapor or liquid could have been ignited when it came into contact with the hot
 skid, the hot residue material, or the metal wall of the incinerator. The facility also reported that there was
 a remote chance that ignition was caused by heat coming from the entrance chamber of the  side door.

The facility maintained that the incident would not have occurred if existing operating procedures had been
followed.  The facility has  implemented the following measures to prevent future accidents:

               The side door operating procedures have been augmented to require  additional cooling time
               for skids and to move the drum preparation area further away from the incinerator. New
                                               13

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                 procedures also require the incinerator foreman and shift team leader to oversee skids
                 through the incineration process.

          •       All incinerator operators and supervisors received additional training on the augmented
                 side door procedures, with emphasis placed on communications between operators and
                 employees on different shifts.

          •       Heat shields have been installed between waste handling areas and the exterior of the
                 incinerator.

          •       Procedures for drum opening have been modified to achieve greater safety.


  Waste Technologies Industries (WTI), East Liverpool, Ohio
  Contact: Gary Victorine, EPA Region V (312) 886-1479
                                                                                       \
  On February 14, 1995, there was a small electrical fire in the control cabinet of the spray dryer penthouse.
  It was immediately extinguished by plant personnel with a fire extinguisher. The spray dryer is controlled
  both electrically and hydraulically, and some of the hydraulic piping which runs through the control cabinet
  ruptured and spilled into the penthouse, on the floor grating, through the grating and through the grating
  insulation. The oil  was steam cleaned off of the grates on the following evening.

  On February 15, 1995, bulk waste that was caught in the clamshell of the loading system caught fire.
 Within 1 minute the sprinkler system activated and extinguished the fire. The fire was believed to be
 caused by a "flashback" of powdery material that fell out of the clamshell bucket.  Damage was reportedly
 limited to the crane bucket wires, cables, and  insulation in the immediate area.

 On March 15,  1995, a repulsive odor was released from the facility which affected  much of East Liverpool.
 The odor originated from a tanker unloading waste containing mercaptan thiophenol. No release point was
 ever identified with certainty, but reportedly only a few drops of this waste could have resulted in this kind
 of problem.  WTI stopped receiving shipments of this waste until it completed enclosure of the tanker truck
 unloading pad and vented the enclosure to the vapor recovery system.

 On July 3, 1995, the waste in one of the two bulk solid waste pits caught fire. The fire was quickly
 extinguished by the automatic water deluge system.  There were no reported injuries, and the only reported
 damage was to the door of the pit.  Since this enclosure is vented to the vapor recovery system, no
 significant releases  were suspected, but some smoke was reported as leaking out from under and around the
 door. The ignition source was attributed to a burning piece of waste either traveling through the air from
 the incinerator feed chute doors to the pit, or being carried from the chute doors to the pit via the clamshell
 bucket.
Trade Waste Incineration (part ofCWM), Sauget, Illinois
Contact: JuanaRojo, EPA Region V(312) 886-0990

There have been three incidents at this permitted facility.  The first incident occurred on January 16, 1990,
when the facility was evacuated due to vapor cloud emissions of hydrochloric acid (HC1) from a storage
                                                14

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 tank. The incident occurred when facility personnel failed to properly identify the corrosivity
 characteristics of the contents of a tank truck received at the facility. When the tank truck contents were
 transferred to the TWI storage tank, a large plume of chlorinated gas containing 196 pounds of HC1 was
 emitted from the tank. The facility has since instituted additional confirmation  of the blending samples, and
 has also established better training procedures for its personnel regarding tank-to-tank transfers.

 The second incident happened on January 26, 1991, when sodium azide, the explosive found in automobile
 air bags, was incinerated. The ash from this waste was placed in the dumpster; a few hours later, the ash
 exploded.  The ash appeared to have been incompletely burned.

 The third explosion occurred on February 5, 1991, which resulted when a worker used a pole to dislodge
 molten slag that partly blocked the exit from an incinerator during operation. As the slag fell into the ash
 pit below, contact with the water caused a steam explosion that severely burned the worker. Vaporized
 hazardous waste was released. There were no reports of other injuries or environmental impacts from these
 two incidents.

 See Attachment 7 for additional information.
3M, Cottage Grove, Minnesota
Contact:  FredJenness, Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (612) 297-8470

There have been two incinerator-related incidents at this 3M facility. The first incident occurred in the
early 1980's when hot slag came into contact with low-temperature ash quench water.  The impact of the
hot slag on the quench water resulted in a thermal explosion. No injuries or releases to the environment
resulted from the incident.  The facility was under interim status at the time; the facility received a RCRA
permit on March 29, 1989.

A similar incident occurred on September 18, 1992, after the facility received a RCRA permit.  Molten
metal in the slag dropped into the ash quench, trapping some water and creating a steam explosion. The
resulting pressure blew off the pressure relief panels and ruptured the brick walls of the air seal and some
of the lightweight wall panels of the ash house.  There were no injuries or releases of hazardous wastes to
the environment, with the exception of a brief release of smoke from burning fuel oil.

See Attachment 8 for additional information.
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                                       REGION VI
                                         Regional Summary

             There have been reports of incidents feat have occurred as &ree KCRA-pennitted
      mcinerators tn Region VI The Bnsco facility In Bt Dorado, Arkansas has had two incidents
      involving its incinerator. Another incident occurred attiie Rollins facility in Deer Park, Texas
      where a fire broke-oat ia the furnace duct. The Chemical Wasfc Management fcc&ty, located ki
      Port Arthur, Texas, has had one incident that consisted of ak% fire during normal operation and
      another that consisted of a leaking storage contained     ,_                   "    •-  '
             Tnere have been no reported incidents at other TSDF's la
  Ensco, El Dorado, Arkansas
  Contact:  Derik Warrick (501) 570-2893 and Rhonda E. Sharp (501) 682-0916
  Arkansas Department of Pollution Control & Ecology                      '

  On April 20 1989, an explosion occurred in the waste heat recovery unit due to equipment failure  This
  unit was fairly old and built up excessive pressure which caused structure failure. As a result the unit
  exploded.  The explosion occurred during normal operations, and no injuries or significant releases were
  reported  The incinerator unit did not sustain extensive damage. The waste heat recovery unit was shut
 down, and the rest of the plant was back up and operating under normal conditions within one week.

 Two injuries were reported following a trailer fire on August 16, 1990, that also resulted in the evacuation
 of approximately 50 people in an adjacent neighborhood. A drum of nitrocellulose based film is believed to
 nave spontaneously combusted and spread to 30 ten-gallon containers of the same material.

 On March 27, 1991, an explosion occurred in the Komar drum shredder causing the pressure relief doors to
 open and emit gases. One person was injured as a result of the incident. The explosion and fire followed a
 teed of four drums containing acid sludge, water-based coatings and debris that included pater filters
 plastic, absorbent cloth and personal protective equipment contaminated with solvents and petrojeum'oil.

 On March 30, 1991, a fire broke out when a 30-gallon drum failed to drop from the automatic feed ram
 into a kiln and instead was pushed into another drum by the feed ram. This caused liquids to be released
 which created a fire and quickly spread to two more drums on the feed line. No injuries were reported.

 On May 25, 1991, liquid leaking from a kiln shredder isolation gate caught fire in the catch pan  No
 injuries were reported. Feed of waste to the shredder and kiln had to be stopped to allow maintenance
below the catch pan.
Flames vented from the charging door of a shredder air lock on August 14,  1992.  At approximately the
same time a light detonation occurred in the control enclosure located immediately below the air lock. The
                                              16

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 detonation caused the doors of the enclosure to fling open. The immediate cause of the fire was the
 simultaneous opening of both air lock doors which allowed mixing of combustible gases with air.

 A fire occurred in the kiln shredder auger machine on July 28,  1993, when dirt and debris contaminated
 with an oxidizer were fed to the unit. After the fire, an inspection revealed that an 85-gallon drum of the
 same waste stream had a five-gallon bucket packed inside of a 30-gallon drum containing dirt and debris.
 Six drums which contained oxidizers were found in their waste stream.

 On August 10, 1993, another incident occurred when a container being moved to an incinerator warehouse
 autodegraded, causing a release. A worker left the cap off of a container that was filled with bromine and
 chlorine.  The contents of the container reacted with the air, causing a spontaneous reaction. The container
 then combusted, which caused the fire. No injuries resulted from the combustion.

 On December 12, 1994, an explosion occurred in the kiln shredder auger machine waste feed system when
 a 2300 pound container of spent oxygen breathing apparatus canisters was dropped into the unit.  The
 waste had been mislabeied. Three injuries were reported as a result of the explosion and ensuing fire. The
 entire feed system was a total loss and other structural damage was reported.

 On March 25, 1995, a fire occurred in a kiln shredder building when vapors from a 250-pound box of non-
 RCRA aerosol containers escaped and caused a flash of flames. The vapors escaped through a faulty
 mechanical seal on the shredder slide gates and then to the containment chamber housing the shredder slide
 gates. One employee was injured as a result of the incident.

 On August 4, 1995, a fire occurred in the special handling facility when elemental phosphorous overheated
 and splattered on  combustible packaging.  The fire spread within a small room to the wall and ceiling.
 Material handlers unsuccessfully attempted to cover the phosphorous with dry sand. One injury was
 reported as a result of the incident.


 Chemical Waste Management, Inc. (CWM), Port Arthur, Texas
 Contact:  David Barker, Texas Natural Resources Conservation Commission (512) 239-2510

 There have been two incidents at the permitted CWM facility in Port Arthur.  One of the incidents
 occurred in June 1992, and was described as a kiln fire that resulted from overheating during normal
 operation.

 The second incident occurred on December 24, 1992, when one gallon of Incinerator Air Pollution Control
 Train (APC) waste leaked from a storage container in a truck staging area.  Workers at CWM assumed  the
 release consisted of PCBs and immediately initiated a cleanup.  CWM secured the area and cleaned up all
 visible signs of the waste. In areas where the waste had penetrated cracks in the asphalt,
the asphalt and underlying soil was removed until no signs of the waste remained. Tests of the released
material indicated that the waste did not contain PCBs.

See Attachment 9  for additional information.
                                               17

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Rollins Deer Park, Deer Park, Texas
Contact: David Barker, Texas Natural Resources Conservation Commission (512) 239-2510

An incident occurred at this permitted facility in November 1991, when a fire broke out in the furnace duct
of the combustion chamber. The plant shut down as many vents as possible and allowed the facility to cool
down for a few days.  A new duct was installed and the unit was running again in about five days.
                                            18

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                                        REGION VII
                                        Regional Summary

             There have been reported incidents at four RCRA permitted incinerators in. Region VII
     These facilities include: the Monsanto Company » Muscatme, Iowa, the Lake City Atmy
     AroBHii«tfon Hani io Independence, Missouri, the Aptos facility i» Coffeyvilie, Kansas and ICC
     Explosives BnvH-oomenta! Company in Joplb, Missouri These incidents included a fire and
     .several explosions. Detail summaries are provided below,                         ,,  "
                                     reported at a TSBF (international Paper w J<$ia, Missouri) InT
     Region V&  It involved a release of water contaminated with wood preserving wastes, tie itcility
     is now closed. A detailed summary is provided befow.             "       -          "'
 International Paper, Joplin, Missouri
 Contact: Robert Morrison, Missouri Department of Natural Resources (314) 751-3191

 International Paper is a closed TSDF.  On October 1, 1992, water contaminated with wood treating wastes
 was released during a transfer from one closed surface impoundment to another.  The release occurred
 when the hose used to transfer the water broke and water continued to pump into the environment for a
 short period of time.  It is estimated that, at most, 30,000 gallons of water was released to the environment
 Ihe Agency does not have information on the concentration of the waste in the water that was released
 The hose leak was corrected, and the facility has since made operational changes to make sure the pump is
 under personnel surveillance at all times.                                                  .


 Monsanto Company, Muscatine, Iowa
 Contact: Ken Herstowski, EPA Region VII (913) 551-7058

 In July 1992, the permitted incinerator at the Monsanto facility was shut down while the facility's process
 unit was being repaired. When the incinerator was brought back on line there was a loss of quench water
 flow which caused the temperature in the fiberglass scrubber to approach 2000 degrees Fahrenheit As a
 result, the unit's scrubber caught fire. Although organics such as chlorobenzene and dichlorobenzene are
 usually treated in the unit, only natural gas was in the incinerator at the time of the incident because the
 unit was just being brought on line. There was no release of hazardous waste to the environment  There
were also no injuries reported. Since the incident, the facility has updated its controls (e.g., valves and
sensors) to better identify losses of water pressure.
                                              19

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  Lake City Army Ammunition Plant, Independence, Missouri
  Contact: John Smith, EPA Region VII (913) 551-7845

  An incident occurred at the permitted Lake City Army Ammunition Plant incinerator on March 29, 1991.
  Live rounds of ammunition had been put through the incinerator, but were not completely treated, 'when
  the rounds came out of the back of the incinerator they fell off of the conveyer belt and were set off. The
  incident occurred during the trial bum.  There were no injuries recorded.  The facility no longer processes
  the type of bullets that were involved in this incident and as a result has imposed more strict controls of the
  waste feed to the incinerator.


 Aptus, Coffeyville, Kansas
  Contact:  John Smith, EPA Region VII (913)  551-7845

 The incident at this permitted facility occurred in the fall of 1990 during normal operations.  A waste drum
 with an exceedingly high Btu mixture of PCB-contaminated paint waste was introduced to the incinerator.
 Gas accumulated in the ionized wet scrubber and was set off by a spark. The explosion occurred in the
 scrubber, not in the incinerator itself. The explosion was completely contained within the unit. The unit's
 air pollution control devices were damaged internally, and the unit was out of operation for about one week.
 No injuries or natural resource damages were reported.  Since the material had gone through the entire
 thermal combustion process, no hazardous waste was released. However, air emissions may have exceeded
 particulate and HC1 emissions standards due to the damage to the pollution control device. Since this
 incident, the facility has instituted tighter controls on its waste sampling and feed procedures, and no longer
 accepts wastes with a high Btu content.


 ICI Explosives Environmental Company, Joplin, Missouri
 Contacts:  John Smith, EPA Region VII (913) 551-7845 and Kyle Russell, Missouri Department of
 Natural Resources (573)  751-3176

 There have been three incidents involving explosions at this facility since it began operating in 1995. None
 of the incidents resulted in releases to the environment.
                                                                                     I
 The first incident occurred during start-up in 1995 when there was an unexplained explosion in the rotary
 kiln. The incinerator was operating as interim status until the final permit was issued in March 1996.

 The second incident also involves an unexplained explosion in the rotary kiln on April 3, 1997.  It was
 assumed that a round of ammunition was left in the kiln and that it exploded, causing ammonium nitrate to
 react.

A third explosion occurred on August 26, 1998 in Ithe storage area of the feed handling building. The
explosion occurred when workers were removing detonator components from a container onto a flat table.
One person was killed and two others  were injured as a result. No fire suppression was required for this
incident.  There was no obvious cause for the explosion.
                                                                                     i
See attachment 10 for additional information.
                                               20

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                                      REGION VIII
                                        Regional Summary

            there haw bees no reported incidents at combustioa lactiitles k Region VOJ.  '

            There fcas been only one reported incident in Region Villa* a TSDF, This release
    occurred at the United States Pollution Control Incorporated 
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                                        REGION IX
                                       Regional Summary

            There have been reported incidents at one combustion facility *n Region IX at the Johnston
    AtoU Chemical Agent Demtfitarization System {JACADS) facility^ three of which involved & reksase
    of hazardous substances;          "            '             -'"",',;
           Reports at three eommerciaf TSDFs ta Region IX have also been reported* One accident
    took pJace at Statewide Environmental Services, Inc., which is a transfer and storage facility. TJx?
    second incident took place at a storage and recycling facility owned and operated by the Oil and
    Solvent Processing Company, which was later acquired &y Chemical Waste Management. 'The
    third incident occurred at Chem-Tech Systems, All three facilities are located in the l#$ Angeles
    area, A fourth incident at the Rhone Poulenc BasicjChemicai Company industrial furnace faciliiy
    in Martinez, California was also reported.                                    ,      -
Johnston Atoll Chemical Agents Demilitarization System (JACADS), Johnston Island
Contacts: Larry Bowerman (415) 744-2051 and Ray Fox (415) 744-2053, EPA Region IX and Cathv
Massimlno, EPA Region X (206) 553-4153

The JACADS incinerator was permitted in 1985 and is designed to destroy the U.S. stockpile of Chemical
weapons being stored on Johnston Island. These weapons all contain nerve agents or blister agents.  There
have been a number of incidents at the JACADS incinerator since December 1990. These incidents are as
follows:

        •      In December 1990, during shutdown of the Liquid Incinerator (LIC), agent GB (a nerve
              agent) was sensed in the duct leading from the LIC pollution abatement system. The
              source of the agent was a short-term leakage from the agent feed system after feed shut off.
              The period of emissions was about 45 minutes, and emission levels from the stack were
              about 25% of what is allowed in the state permit. Following the incident, the facility
              implemented changes in its operating procedures.

       •      On March 11, 1991, smoke filled the Deactivation Furnace System (DPS) room and some
              smoke escaped to the atmosphere through the stack. No agent was being processed at the
              time. The incident was attributed to an instrumentation malfunction; the defective
              instrument was replaced following the incident.

       •      On May 2, 1991, there was a small bearing cooling oil fire, caused by an overheated
              bearing, in the DPS room.  Agent was not being processed at the time, and there were no
              reports of harmful releases.
                                             22

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  On June 26, 1991, the Dunnage Incinerator (DUN) was in start-up mode with
  nonhazardous waste when a pressure transient occurred resulting in deformation of the
  furnace chamber and building. The DUN underwent trial burn testing in January 1995
  and is being prepared for full-scale operations.

  On January 21, 1992, the DPS kiln stopped rotating while processing VX (a nerve agent)
  rockets, and the system shut down. The incident was attributed to a hole found in the kiln
  cylinder wall (apparently caused by detonation of rocket parts near the kiln wall). No
  releases were reported. The unit is housed in a building where ventilation air is routed
  through a carbon filter system. The Army installed a new kiln with thicker walls and
  redesigned the flights to decrease the likelihood of rocket parts becoming lodged in the kiln.


  On December  18, 1992, there was a wind storm which resulted in a spill onto coral near
  Building 888 of 50 gallons of xylene, 1.6 gallons of hexane and 0.6 gallons of isopropanol.
  The contingency plan was implemented and soil (coral) sampling was performed.

  On December 27 and 28, 1992, power outages caused a loss of ventilation in the
 Munitions Demilitarization Building (MDB) for four separate short periods. The facility
 implemented the contingency plan, but no agent migration outside the MDB was noted.

 On December 28, 1992, the Depot Air Monitoring System (DAMS) detected elevated
 readings that were traced to a leaking GB rocket in Igloo No. 750. The report indicated
 that the amount of leakage was small  and presented no hazards to human health or the
 environment outside the facility.

 On January 2,  1993, a fire in the Explosion Containment Room (ECR) occurred. A
 hazardous materials team extinguished the fire with CO2 and then water.  Investigations
 indicated that this incident did not involve any of the incinerators, but only a small part of
 the rubber/fiberglass conveyor belt. As a result, operational verification testing (OVT) for
 the Metal Parts Furnace (MPF) was delayed approximately 45 days. The facility also
 made various changes, including the installation of a deluge system.

 On May 31, 1993, there was a potential release of agent HD (mustard gas) of 0.012
 mg/m3 outside the MPF building (the allowable stack concentration is 0.03 mg/m3). The
 incident occurred when a tray containing the residue of waste material exited the building.
 The Army was  unable to determine whether the alarm was triggered by a low-level agent
 release, products of incomplete combustion (PICs), or other interferents.  The facility
 temporarily suspended processing of projectiles and waste material in the MPF.

 On December 9, 1993, a spill of about 500 pounds of agent GB occurred inside the
 Munitions Demilitarization Building (MDB). There was no agent migration outside the
 building and the contingency plan was not activated. The facility suspended processing of
 munitions until  investigation of the incident was satisfactorily completed.

On March 14, 1994, a small fire occurred in the ECR.  The fire was caused by a migration
of hot gases up the DPS feed chute that resulted when the two feed gates jammed in the
open position. There was no migration of hazardous waste inside or
                                23

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                 outside the facility. The Army committed to take corrective measures to prevent
          recurrence.

          •      On March 23, 1994, the automatic continuous air monitoring system (ACAMS) detected a
                 stack emission concentration of agent GB above the allowable concentration of 0.0003
                 mg/m3. The emissions exceeded the limit for about 25 minutes, with a maximum
                 concentration of .0315 mg/m3. The incident occurred after the LIC had been shut down
                 for maintenance and while the agent gun was being removed. All weapon processing was
                 suspended pending the outcome of the investigation. The investigation indicated that the
                 incident was caused by inadequate system design and operating procedures, combined with
                 equipment malfunction and operator error. The investigative team estimated that a total of
                 10 to 12 mg of agent GB had been emitted from the stack and that maximum ground-level
                 concentrations were below the General Population Limit (GPL).  After this incident, the
                 Army instituted numerous additional safeguards to prevent future releases. Since then,
                 the JACADs facility has shown significant improvement.

  See Attachment 11 additional information.


 Rhone Poulenc Basic Chemical Company, Martinez, California
 Contacts: Robert Bornstein (415) 744-2298 and Larry Bowerman, EPA Region IX (415) 744-2051

 On June 22, 1992, this facility had an industrial accident and chemical fire/release.  A release of corrosive
 sulfonation acid sludge containing spent sulfuric acid and petroleum sludge resulted in an explosion sind
 fire. Local fire agencies worked all day to control the chemical release and suppress the fire with fire
 fighting and acid-suppressing foam.

 Region IX reported that Rhone-Poulenc did not aggressively restrict access to the impacted area  A Pacific
 Gas and Electric worker was seriously injured when he unknowingly came in contact with, corrosive sludge
 EPA demanded that Rhone Poulenc adhere to OSHA regulations.

 Upon inspection of the damaged area, EPA detected elevated air concentration levels of hydrogen sulfide
 and sulfur dioxide.  The inspection team also found that a ruptured line was releasing acidic water into a
 bermed area that was close to capacity. Rhone also had allowed several workers to work in the area
 without respiratory protection. EPA recommended that a contractor immediately remove the acidic water
 from the bermed area.

 Rhone Poulenc's remediation plan called for analysis of the fire water runofFand sludge for pH, total
 hydrocarbons, and flash point.  After characterizing the materials, the facility used vacuum trucks to
 transfer the runoff and sludge to a holding pond.

 EPA reported that Rhone lacked organization and structure to adequately address the situation.  It appeared
that the facility had-never practiced its emergency contingency plans.

NOTE: The facility produced commercial-grade sulfuric acid by burning spent sulfuric acid and sulfur in
an industrial furnace. It has never operated as a commercial TSDF under RCRA. Although the sulfur
containing compounds had characteristics of hazardous waste, they were specifically exempted from the
definition of a hazardous waste under State and Federal regulations. At the time of this product release the
                                               24

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  facility had an application in for a new RCRA incinerator permit that was being reviewed by EPA and the
  State of California. The permit application was subsequently withdrawn on August 31, 1992.

  See Attachment 12 for additional information.


  Statewide Environmental Services, Inc., Los Angeles, California
  Contact: Larry Bowerman, EPA Region IX (415) 744-2051

  An incident occurred at this commercial transfer/storage facility on May 21, 1991, when solidified organic
  peroxides were being transferred to a polyethylene drum for incineration. The consolidation of these
  materials resulted in an unexpected reaction that caused a release of water vapor and carbon dioxide. In
  addition, some solid material within the drum spilled into a containment area. Statewide Environmental
  Services implemented its contingency plan and the spill was contained, cleaned up and placed in a 30-
  gallon polyethylene drum for disposal. Four personnel from Nash Salvage, the company working at the
  facility on the day of the incident, complained of health effects and were taken to a hospital and released the
  same day. Since the incident, the facility no longer consolidates organic peroxides or any other materials
  from lab packs.

 See Attachment 13 for additional information.


 Oil and Solvent Process Company (OSCO), Azusa, California
 Contact: Larry Bowerman, EPA Region IX (415) 744-2051

 On April 21, 1989, this recycling and storage facility had a 9,611 gallon spill of wastewater containing
 1.28 percent solvents, most of which were acetone. The spill occurred when a hose detached from a
 portable pump  to which wastewater was  being transferred. The spill spread to adjacent industrial land, and
 approximately five gallons traveled onto  a public road, where the spill was contained. The spilled
 wastewater did not enter any drains or waterways, and 2,300 gallons were recovered by using on-site
 vacuum trucks  and absorbent.  A consultant removed the contaminated  soil, covered the area with Visqueen
 (a commercial product), and tested the area to ensure that the contamination had been removed. OSCO
 reviewed procedures and made modifications to prevent future occurrences. According to the facility, the
 successful containment and on-site response action averted any threat to human health or the environment.
 This facility is now owned by Chemical Waste Management, Inc.

 See Attachment 14 for additional information.


 Chem-Tech Systems, Los Angeles, California
 Contact: Yolanda Garza, Department of Toxic Substances Control (818) 551-2955

 On August 29,  1994, this permitted commercial TSDF had a release of nitrous oxide emissions from a
 scrubber in the inorganic processing area. Acute emissions lasted between 20 minutes and one hour, and
appeared to be the result of the off-loading of a tanker containing water with chrome (pH 5) into Tank M-3,
which contained mixed acids. Solids in the tank were agitated during the unloading process, which caused '
a chemical reaction that led to the release.
                                               25

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 Upon detection of the emissions, the facility notified the fire department and evacuated all personnel. The
 plant was shut down and only the scrubbers were left in operation.  Once the cause of the release was
 identified, the fire department's hazardous materials team entered the facility to monitor ambient air and
 collect a laboratory sample.

 Chem-Tech demonstrated to the satisfaction of the fire department that the mixture in Tank M-3 could be
neutralized and treated in the facility's treatment systems. Chem-Tech has reviewed its tank cleaning
schedule and has developed a new schedule for certain tanks, including Tank M-3.

See Attachment 15 for additional information.
                                              26

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                                        REGION X
                                        Regional Summary                         "

            There have been no reported incidents at combustion facilities in Region X.

        ,    the incidents reported in Region X occurred at several commercial tSDFs, they include:
     Chemical Waste Management in Arlington^ Oregon; Northwest BnviroService in Seattle,
     Washington; Sol-Pro and. ChemPro both uiTacoma, Washington; PhlHips Btmronmenta>PIer 91
     ia Port of Seatfle, Washington and Washington Chemical in. Sjx&ane, Washington., Incidents at
     these facilities occurred as a re'suft of various activities sach as mixing incompatible hazardous
     waste, processing oil -wastes, spills of hazardous waste arid oil mixtures, and welding activities.
 Chemical Waste Management of the Northwest, Inc. (CWMNW), Arlington, Oregon
 Contacts: Fredrick Moore and Mike Renz,
 Oregon Department of Environmental Quality (503) 388-6146

 On May 5, 1994, at 10:00 p.m., a Chemical Waste Management (CWMNW) security guard discovered a
 fire inside Landfill L-13.  The guard notified the Emergency Coordinator. The fire was contained and
 extinguished in the landfill by 1:00 a.m. on May 6, 1994.  CWMNW reported the incident to the Oregon
 Department of Environmental Quality and EPA at 8:15 a.m. Disposal records indicated that wood debris
 was placed in relative proximity to stabilized, heat-generating waste streams of which CWMNW claimed
 are normally segregated. In its incident report, CWMNW stated that it would take the following actions to
 prevent recurrence:

               Supplement the Landfill L-13 operating procedures to clarify that heat-generating waste
               was to be separated from combustible materials;

       •       Retrain the operations staff on operating procedures;

               Study ways to identify heat-generating loads of waste by using an infrared thermometer
               and thermocouple thermometer probe; and

       •       Conduct a fire brigade training session for all fire team personnel.

The facility was permitted at the time  of the incident.

See Attachment 16 for additional information.
                                              27

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  Northwest EnviroService (NWE), Seattle, Washington
  Contacts:  Barb Smith (206) 649-7019 and Jeannie Summerhays (206) 649-7055,
  Washington State Department of Ecology

  Northwest EnviroService (NWE) is a commercial TSDF located 1.5 miles from the city of Seattle on
  Highway 1-5. The facility has had four incidents since 1988, all of which occurred while the facility
  operated under interim status. In 1988 a fire broke out at the facility when welding sparks ignited fumes
  from a below-grade exempt cinder block pit covered by a wooden structure. This pit contained oily bilge
 water from boats. No injuries or natural resource damage resulted from the incident, but the highway was
 shut down until the fire was brought under control.

 There was another incident at this facility in October 1989. It involved the processing of oil wastes from
 the Exxon Valdez spill. Workers in a building across the street from the facility complained about fugitive
 emissions, and several of the workers were hospitalized.

 On March 28, 1992, facility personnel mixed incompatible waste in a stabilization unit.  The mixing
 generated heat, flames, and toxic fumes. The facility did not promptly report the incident and the State
 issued a citation.

 On February 14 and 15, 1994, 5,500 gallons of a hazardous waste and oil mixture spilled from a bulk
 container at a transfer facility into a storm drain.  The waste proceeded to migrate to the Duwamish River
 via a nearby wetland. NWE claimed that the spill was an act of sabotage, because the accident could not
 have occurred unless a seal, lock, and valve were all opened in succession. A NWE employee discovered
 the spill at 7:50 a.m. on February 15, 1994, when he noticed a sheen on the parking lot. NWE put up
 barriers to divert the spill around storm drains  and notified the National Response Center, Washington
 Department of Ecology, and the Seattle Fire Department all by 9:30 a.m. Initial response activities
 involved boom and pad deployment in the wetland channel  and a holding pond. Vacuum trucks removed
 products from the holding pond and the wetlands, and a contractor conducted cleanups at the Duwamish
 River.  Although the location of the spill occurred under EPA jurisdiction, because EPA was not on the
scene, the U.S. Coast Guard served as the Federal Incident Commander. Response actions over the first
two days consisted of the following:
                                                                                      i
               Stabilizing the site and containing ithe spill;

       •       Defining response strategies and priorities;

       •       Conducting a spill investigation;

       •      Notifying authorities and coordinating response activities;

              Dye testing of the storm drain system from the NWE site to the wetlands;

       •      Spill documenting and sampling;

       •      Surveilling and tracking the spill; and

       •       Developing a long-term cleanup plan and planning cycle.

                                               28

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 NWE had provided only limited security in the tank area before this incident occurred.  Since the incident,
 NWE has proposed to put up a security fence, put in lighting in the tank area, and has hired a 24-hour
 security guard until the fence can be installed. NWE also has proposed installing a valve at the storm drain
 to prevent releases from migrating from the site.  The Department of Ecology has assessed a penalty of
 $91,000 against NWE.

 According to State officials, the facility does not have a RCRA permit and will be ceasing all hazardous
 waste management activities.

 See Attachment 17 for additional information.
 Sol-Pro, Tacoma, Washington
 Contact: Dave Bartus, EPA Region X, (206) 553-2804

 In approximately  1991, Sol-Pro removed a feed tank from a solvent recycling still in order to refurbish the
 tank.  The contractor performing the work, received explicit directions to abstain from any welding work on
 the tank, but did not follow these instructions.  The welding on the exterior of the tank ignited fumes inside
 the tank, resulting in an explosion that damaged some equipment and caused a very small release of fugitive
 emissions. The force of the explosion cut off an electricity transmission line and temporarily shut down
 Sol-Pro and two neighboring facilities.  Sol-Pro and a neighboring facility implemented their contingency
 plans. No injuries were reported.

 The State also cited the facility for fugitive emissions from solvent recyclers, evaporators, and process
 vents containing acetone, toluene, and lacquer thinner, and from a hopper that contained empty chemical
 drums. No physical or health related problems were reported.  There was some documented data of
 releases to surface water from leaking vats and/or containers. The facility has installed a flare to burn off
 any emissions.

 The facility was not permitted at the time of these incidents.


 ChemPro, Tacoma, Washington
 Contact: David Polivka, Washington State Department of Ecology, (206) 407-6345

 In 1987, this interim status facility experienced a 10,000-gallon spill of chromic acid that leaked through a
 loose valve. The facility is a treater of metal-bearing waste through solidification and precipitation. The
facility performed a soil cleanup and agreed to more rigorous inspections to prevent recurrence.  The
facility is now under a corrective action order for past waste management practices, including storage of oil
in and operating unlined surface impoundment.
                                               29

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 Phillips Environmental - Pier 91, Port of Seattle, Washington
 Contacts: Jack Boiler (206) 753-9428 and Jeannie Summerhays (206) 649-7055, EPA Region X

 In 1990, when the facility was owned by ChemPro, welders working at an old Navy tank farm/waste oil
 facility ignited fumes in an empty tank. One worker was killed and fugitive emissions were reportedly
 released.  The State investigated the incident. The facility was not permitted at the time of the incident
 Washington Chemical, Spokane, Washington
 Contact: Jack Boiler, EPA Region X, (206) 753-9428

 In March/April of 1990, workers at the Washington Chemical facility mixed several incompatible
 characteristic (reactive and/or ignitable) wastes and sealed them into a 55-gallon drum. An explosion
 resulted, launching the drum into the air and across several hundred feet of the facility, spraying the waste
 in all directions during its flight.  The drum landed outside the facility in the middle of a street intersection
No injuries were reported, and only minor property damage occurred. The facility was permitted at lie
time of the incident.

The facility did not implement its contingency plan, nor did it report the release.  The release was reported
by a neighboring business. Consequently, the Washington Department of Ecology investigated the incident
and assessed a $60,000 penalty against Washington Chemical.  The state hearing board upheld Ecology's
fine, but the company has appealed the decision.
                                              30

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      Summary of Incidents at Combustion Facilities and Other TSDF Listings
 Region I

 No facilities


 Region II

 Eastman Kodak Company  (Incinerator)
 Kodak Park, New York

 Bridgeport Rental and Oil Services (BROS)  (Superfund Incinerator)
 New Jersey

 Rollins Environmental Services, Inc. (TSDF)
 Logan Township, New Jersey


 Region HI

 Mill Service (TSDF)
 Yukon, Pennsylvania

 Delaware Container Company  (TSDF)
 Coatesville, Pennsylvania


 Region IV

 ThermalKEM (Incinerator)
 Rock Hill, South Carolina

 Laidlaw Environmental Services (Thermal Oxidation Corporation) (Incinerator)
 Roebuck, South Carolina

 U.S. Department of Energy (Incinerator)
 Oak Ridge, Tennessee

Diversified Scientific Services, Inc. (DSSI) (BIF)
Kingston, Tennessee

LWD (Incinerator)
Clay, Kentucky
                                         31

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  Region IV (continued)

  Carolina Solite  (TSDF)
  Norwood, North Carolina

  Southeastern Chemicals (TSDF)
  Sumter, South Carolina

  Laidlaw Environmental Services (GSX Laidlaw Landfill)  (TSDF)
  Pinewood, South Carolina

  Safety-Kleen Lexington Recycling Center (TSDF)
  Lexington, South Carolina  -

  Holnam/Safety-Kleen  (TSDF)
  Holly Hill, South Carolina

  CP Chemicals (TSDF)
  Sumter, South Carolina

 Albright and Wilson (TSDF)
 Charleston, South Carolina

 E.I. DuPont de Nemours (Incinerator)
 Axis, Alabama

 Chemical Waste Management, Inc. (CWM) (Commercial TSDF)
 Emelle, Alabama

 Fisher Industrial Services, Inc. (Commercial TSDF)
 Glencoe, Alabama
Region V

Dow Chemical Company (Incinerator)
Midland, Michigan

Chemical Waste Management, Inc. (CWM) (Incinerator)
Chicago, Illinois

Ross Incineration Services, Inc. (Incinerator)
Grafton, Ohio
                                         32

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  Region V (continued!

  Waste Technologies Industries (WTI) (Incinerator)
  East Liverpool, Ohio

  Trade Waste Incineration (part of CWM) (Incinerator)
  Sauget, Illinois

  3M (Incinerator)
  Cottage Grove, Minnesota
 Region VI

 Ensco  (Incinerator)
 El Dorado, Arkansas

 Chemical Waste Management, Inc. (CWM) (Incinerator)
 Port Arthur, Texas

 Rollins Deer Park (Incinerator)
 Deer Park, Texas
 Region VII

 International Paper  (TSDF)
 Joplin, Missouri

 Monsanto Company (Incinerator)
 Muscatine, Iowa

 Lake City Army Ammunition Plant (Incinerator)
 Independence, Missouri

 Aptus (Incinerator)
 Coffeyville, Kansas

ICI Explosives Environmental Company (Incinerator)
Joplin, Missouri
                                          33

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  Region
  United States Pollution Control Incorporated (U.S.P.C.I.) Grassy Mountain Landfill (TSDF)
  Tooele County, Utah
  Region IX

  Johnston Atoll Chemical Agents Demilitarization System (JACADS)  (Incinerator)
  Johnston Island

  Rhone Poulenc Basic Chemical Company (TSDF)
  Martinez, California

  Statewide Environmental Services, Inc. (TSDF)
  Los Angeles, California

  Oil and Solvent Process Company (OSCO) (TSDF)
  Azusa, California

 Chem-Tech Systems (TSDF)
 Los Angeles, CA
 Region X

 Chemical Waste Management of the Northwest (CWMNW) (TSDF)
 Arlington, Oregon

 Northwest EnviroService (NWE)  (TSDF)
 Seattle, Washington

 Sol-Pro (TSDF)
 Tacoma, Washington

 ChemPro (TSDF)
 Tacoma, Washington

Phillips Environmental (formerly ChemPro)  (TSDF)
Pier 91, Port of Seattle, Washington

Washington Chemical  (TSDF)
Spokane, Washington
                                        34

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   ATTACHMENT 1

Eastman Kodak Company
 Kodak Park, New York

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 July 27, 1990
 Mr. Constantine Sidanon-Eristoff
 Regional Administrator, Region II
 United States Environmental Protection Agency
 26 Federal Plaza
 New fork, NY 10278

 Mr. Bruce Fineter
 New York State Department of
   Environmental Conservation
 6274 East Avon-Lima Road
 Avon,  NT I4A1A
Dear Sire:

Subject:  Emission,  Eastman  Kodak  Company,  Kodak Bark,  B-21.S,
          July  12j 1990

The following is a summary of  the  events  leading to and the £ allow-up of >  the
incident which  occurred on July  12,  1990  at the  Kodak Park, B-218 chemical
incinerator.                          :

Ac approximately 12:00  PH, a water liae from the recycle cooling water system
ruptured, spilling approximately 75  gallon* of recycle  cooling water. An
estimated 2 gallons  of  this  amount impacted the  ground  surrounding the recycle
pump pad while  the remaining  73 gallons  entered the industrial cewer. The
area of visible contamination  was  immediately excavated and treated at B-218.

As a result of  the recycle water line rupture and the rub sequent loss in
pressure, the automatic shutdown sequence for the facility began. The
emergency stack opened  a* part of  the automatic-shutdown mode to protect the
emission control equipment from  high temperature.  ThLe  resulted in a visible
plume from the  emrgeacy stack for approximately 7 miautes. (Tastes in the kiln
at the tine of  the stack opening were empty containers  of
l-chloro-2,«-diaitrabeB2eae and  paper trays used  in  tiie process of drying
2-m«Uiylhydroquinone.
     EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY- 3O STATE STREET - BOCHESTSJt. KEW VO*K T4BSO

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 Mr. Congtantine Sidamon-Eristoff - 2
 Mr. Bruce Fineter
 July 27, 1990
 The ruptured water line wa* repaired ead the facility was back in operation by
 2r30 PH,. July 12,  1990. IE you have any questions regarding thl« incidenu,
 please contact Mark Nicholson of  nay staff at (716) 712-4721-

                                        Sincerely -youre,
                                       Bruce H- ELandennan, Ph.D.,  Director
                                       Environmental Technical  Services
                                       Health and Environment Laboratories
BtlKtmto.
Kfiicholson
1113H

ccr: He. Richard Elliott
    Monroe County Health Department
    111 Hestfall Eoad
    Rochester, RT 14620

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 Bare: Uarcb 4, 1991

 Time:  12 midnight  - 2iH

 Information included:
        1.  Chemical Incinerator Li  fan* restarted  and emergeasy
       stack eloaad.
It 47
       Fuel oil

       Hazardous .waste feeds are Btasted, normal operations resumed, Kode 3

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  Dates March 6, ±991

         10 AK - 4 EH

  Information Included:
         1-   JCiln Temperatnre Strip Chart
         2.   secondary Combustion Chamber Strip ch«rt
         3.   Kiln Draft strip Chart
         4.   -Smart Display - Logic Controller Printout
         5.   chemical Incinerator Liquid Handling log

 Additional Informations

 Prior  Mode 3, Normal Operatum*
   to
 10:56
                                                                      I
 10:56  The instrumentation monitoring ti.e B-218  scrubber vmtcr flows
                                                                   off,  the.
                           to *top and tfc« otergency rtack to pp«n.

11:41  Sh» ID  fans, were started and the emergency ^.ck elo««d.

1*56   Corseted repair, on tne «erahb«r water flow -cmitariag in«tr«tient«tion.

2s09   Fuel oil,,t«»d to warm up «ae kila..

2sSS   Bazardoaa waste feed* are started, Kode 3

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       ATTACHMENT!

Bridgeport Rental and Oil Services
            (BROS)
     Bridgeport, New Jersey

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Bridgeport Rental and Oil services (BROS) -           ,
Damage DU* to the Explosion and op.rftto.on Before and After

Donald tt. Wright, Environmental Scientist
Air and Water Section (2ES-MM)

Joel Columbek, Chief                     .«.,-, •_***%
New Jersey/Caribbean Compliance Section  (2AWM-HWC)

Thru: Marcus E. Kantr, Chief
      Air and Water Section (2ES-MM)


At your request, I visited the BROS super fund site cm September
23 to see the extent of damage to the incinerator and to look at
the operating conditions to as»e*» possible causes of the
explosion that occurred at 6:19 pa on Sunday September 20, 1992.


The explosion blew the hinged sides of the weigh belt "used to
».«r ?ne'contaminated sci! to the rotary kiln.  «J«" h5vjj££
reinstalled, although they don't seal *• well as they did to*"*?
the explosion.  There were fugitive missions associated with the
explosion.

The subcontractor's  (ENSCO'n) thinking is that a J«rje piece of
slag ring that had formed in the kiln fell Into-the water in the
ash quench forming steam.  Waste feed had been stopped 50 minutes
prior to the explosion.  Th«  incinerator operation was normal
prior to the event as indicated by the oxygen and CO      WMital.
concentrations  in the  stack.  The Total hydrocarbon  »3J
pointed  out the neid to  explain the HC readings  in this report.
From discussions with the prime contractor  (EBASCO)  and the COB,
there were  2  previous explosions, on* about  2 »onths ego end one
last winter.             .                                   .

on September  21, 1992-at approximately  7»30j?m there-was an
emission of partieulate  matter that lasted for  a  »inutes end
travelled across U.  8. Route 130.   EKSCO personnel had been

-------
<*<
         working on the roulticlone  (particulars removal device) to free a
         jammed screw feeder used to remove ash from the aulticlone.  .Phey
         thought that tney had emptied the roulticlone and were reattaching
         the screw feeder when ash tfcat had farmed a bridge in -the
         multiclone broke causing the release of a large quantity of auth
         from the separated flanges.

         Based on these two events, the COE shut down all waste feed
         operations pending a complete inspection and corrections of all
         deficiencies found.  The inspection by the COE cited many area*
         of poor maintenance and tecs- housekeeping.

         Although I did not specifically loo*, at the number of waste fmd
         cutoffs,  the number seems high, perhaps due to the attempt to  .
         feed too much waste for the amount of organic* present in the
         waste.   Waste feed rates are very variable.  Although the screw
         feeder and the kiln will tend to smooth the operation, ENSCO
         should try to minimize feed variations.

         If you have any questions, please call me at 908-321-6764.
                                                                   I
         cc:  Donald Lynch
              Mark Wheeler

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        ATTACHMENT 3

Rollins Environmental Services, Inc.
   Logan Township, New Jersey

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                       ROLLINS
                       •*» «fc ENVTBOSMEVEU.iJEKV1CES f\J> 1ST.
             P.O. Boi O37, BrideEpon. NJ 08014. fiW/«W100 Geaenl Offices. M9/4&T.3105 Sate OUfct
 August 2,  1990
 Mr. Thomas Sherman, Chief
 Department of "Environmental Protection
 Division of Hazardous waste Management
 Bureau of Hazardous Waste Engineering
 CN-020
 Trenton, NJ  08625

 Re:  Incinerator Emissions £.t -Rollins Environican.te."'  Se»-vi-es
      Inc.

 Dear Mr. Sherman:               •

 at approximately. 10:58 a.m. on July 27, 1990, Rollins Environmental
 services (NJ) ine*: [RES (NJ}J experienced & drop in water flow to
 the oiicinaration scrubber system at its facility in Logan Townsnip.
 THIS drop in flow caused tae  incinerator trip system to  activate.
 and resulted, in fugitive air emissions from the rotary kiln section
 of the incinerator. The problem.ceased at aporoxinately  ll:OO a.m.
 The incident was reported to the Cepartaent Jsy calling  252-7172.

 Analysis of the incident revealed that  the cause of tha drop  in
 water flew ^o the scrubber Eystem w&s caused 3sv *. flutte^  in. the
 water puicp.   Corrective action taJcen included restartiac  the fans
 and  reesrablisking. ths   dlraft  within  th«.  incinerator   and
 reestablishing the.flow of  water to the  scrubber.

 I  certify-under'penalty of. law that I have personally examined ana
 am familiar with the information submitted in this document and all
 S^fS?"^11?*  aQd ^-V, b¥ed on ffir  ^^"T of  those individuals
 immediately  responsible for obtaining the- information,  I believe
 that the.information  is  true,  accurate,  and complete.   I  am aware
 that,  there'  are  significant,  penalties  for  submitting,  false
 information,  including  the  possibility cf fine snd imprisonment.

 Sincerely, • •                                    '

xx

 Gerald  E. Jordan                   '
 ?resid«m.t                -      ;

 LRSrne"  .     .         .       .  ;
 cc:  Carolyn  Grasso,' Southern Field Of£ice-BHWH

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                   ROLLINS
                   •^ ^ ^TOONMEXTU. SERVICES (Ml DC.
           P.O. Box SSZBnde.poct NJ 08014.6W/467-3HW <-«! Offc*. 609/467-3105 &faOffitt
  August 24r is90
  Mr. Thomas Sh.cnaan.r

  Departanent of Environmental Protection
  Divxsion of Hazarfloas- waste Management
  Tren.ton"r
            08S25
 Re:  incinerator Emissions at Rollins Environmental services (KJ)


 Dear Mr. Snenaan-
in^atio,, s^ssf^sss^s 4s
Sincerely,
Gerald E. Jordan
President
ccr
    Carolyn Grasso, Southern Field Office-DHHM

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                      ROLLINS
                      ^*» ^ ENTilRDNTHe.-EU. SERVICES (Ml INT.
  September 17,  1990


  Mr.  Thomas Sherman, Chief
  Department of.Environmental Protection
  Division_of Hazardous Waste Management
        of Hazardous Waste Engineering
  Trenton, NJ   OS625
  Re:  incinerator Emissions at Rollins Snvironaental Services (NJ)
  Dear Mr.  snenaan:
                                                        "-
                                         _

 ceased at appSIlaiSlv 2 ?ic " -,   J? « .incinerator.   The pronlan
                     292 "ll^'      """"t "« reports to the
 Sincerely,
             a-r- •" e~4 ^"W7"—'—-«*•«"-«=.• «3G. compiere..  I am aware
             ^"   *^*ticajlt  senaltiss   for  submitting  false
           ,  in^luaing tne possibiii^ of fln. _anjj 1^^^^
.Gerald E.. Jordan
Bresident
LRS/ne

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                        ROLLINS
                        «^» »*» ENVIRa«!EVIAL SERVICES l\Jl EX.:
              KG. Box 337. Bridceport. M OWW. 6W/467.J1M Gtocral Offi« 609/4C7-3105 Sd= OHi«
  September 20, 1590
  Mr. Thomas Sherman, Ciiief
  Department of • Snvircnnent-ai Protection
  Division of Hazardous Waste Management
  Bureau of Hazardous Waste Engineering
  CN-028
  Trenton, KTJ  08625

  Re:  Incinerator Emissions at Rollins Envirbmaenral
       Services 	  ~
Dear Mr. Sherman:

At  approacinataly  6:10  P.m.  on   Augtast   29,   1990 ,  Roll-ns
Environmental Service  (NJ) zac.  [SEs (NJ>] -experienced a loss of
araf t wi-cnin  tne incineration .system  ar its  facility
Township.  Thxs  loss, of draft rSulted in fugitfce ai?
from tne  rotary kila  sectiofi  of  the incinerator.   The
                                 ^ ^^ ^ repor-,edto


               incidsnt h» revealed taat the cause was tie result
                  ^866 bY ^ 'electri<^ai storm.  After power was
                  incineratcr  scrubber system was restarted.
 -stsM
 reestablished
                        Ff Ia? **** I tave Personally examined and
                      anf oiaataon sut,mitted in this document and all
                        i>ased  on  ^  Inquiry of thos.  individuals
       hfo™6 .f°r cbt'£in^  the  information, I believe
      the. information is true,  accurate, and complete.   I am aware
    .  there  . ;are  significant ipenalti.s   for  submitting  falTse
 information, • inclufiina the possibility of fine  andimprSInment

 Sincerely,        • .                         .
,Gerald E.. Jordan
r-'Prasideot.
 LRS/na1  $J. .   •     .

 cc:  Carolyn Grasso, southern Field office-DHWM

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                       ROLLINS
                       ^^ ^^EtfVIRONMEWttLSEEPEJSfvnjNr;
                   Bri*«P««. NJ MOM, 6Q9/46T-31*) Gcmnd «Be«. «B/4»^ifl5 SW« Offic
 October 10r 1990
 Mr. Thomas Sherman, Chief
 Department of Environmental Protection
 Division of Hazardous Waste Management
 Bureau, of Hazardous Waste Engineering
 CN-028
 Trenton, HJ 08625
 Re:
      Incinerator Emissions at Rollins Environmental
      Services (NJ) Inc.            :
 Dear Mr.  Shenaan:

 At  approximately   9:23  a.m.  on  September  20,  1990,  Rollins
 Environmental Services (KT) inc. [RES (NJ)] experienced a loss of
 draft: witnon  the  incineration. system at  its  facility  in  Logan
 Township.   This loss of draft resulted  in fugitive air emissions
 from the rotary kiln section of the incinerator.   The problem
 ceasea at approximately 9:33 a.m.  The incident was reported to the
 Department by ^-m -t-ng- 292-7172 ;
Analysis  of the incident has revealed that the forced draft  and
induced draft  fans shut off because a plugged flow sensor in  the
scrubber water supply line resulted, in a false low flow signal to
the control system.  The system compensated by increasing  the flow
SSNi-0i ^CZnSb*^  vater.   Efeis flooded  the scrubber system  and
resulted in the  fan shut down.   Corrective  action taken  included
unplugging the sensor, reestablishing water  flow to the scrubber
restarting the draft fans and restarting .the incinerator.

I certify under penalty of law. that I have personally  *xaa±ssd  and
am femn 1 iar with the information submitted in this document and  all
?^S??^ amd  ^t', based on my  **<&***  <* taiose individuals
^di^Y,^!P°nsil*e for  obtaining th* information,  I believe
that the information is true, accurate and complete.   I am  aware
             ?**  significant  penalties  for  submitting   false
             including the possibility of fine and imprisonment..
Sia
        •7»
Terrj7 A. Harmeson
President

IiES/cr

cc:  Carolyn Grasso, Southern Field Office
                                          - DEHH

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                     ROLLBVS
                     ^*" ^ ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES fXI) INC.
            RO.B«337tBridsq«ru>-J 08914. W9WWIOO G««l Office 60JKW7-3M5 S*5 Offi«
  October 11, 1990
  Mr. Thomas Sherman, Chief

             £ Environmental Protection
          of Hazardous Waste

           Sazartto«
  Trenton., KJ 08S25
      Mr.  Sherman:
                                                        S



 lncte.rator and                        ™  *"*  "ttUn

 that
Sinceucely,
        ^>C '  /y «C6*^
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       ROLLINS
       ^^ ^ EWIBONMESTU. SaVTCES i
                          EWIBONMESTU. SaVTCES i\n INC

            P.O. Box 337, Bridgeport, NJ MOU, 609/467-3K* Gottttl Offices, fi09/4S7-
  October 17/  1990
 Mr. Tnomas  Sherman,  Chief      :
 Department  of Environmental Protection
 Division of Hazardous waste Management
 Bureau of Hazardous  Waste Engineering

 Trenton, NJ 08625
                                                               ±£ •—
                                     1 ** •  4 V 5* * r ,    -^
                                     £!gi££!?3 f£{
                                                    OCT { 9 CT  I'
r SmifiSicinfi at
                                   Environmental services
 Dear Mr. sherman:
                                 -'            Environmental
                       t
         °£ J2i laeMttt has revealed that" the decrease in the

Sincerely,
Terry A. Earmeson
President
LRS/ne

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                     ROLLINS
                     ^fc ^fc ENVJSONMESTM. SERVICES txn INC.
           P.aflcr337.todeepon, N708M4.60SW67.3Me G-maOEQas. 609/^7^105 Sate Office
 November 21, 1990
 Mr. Tiiomas Sherman, Chief

 Department of Bavironmeatal Protection

 j£!iS0V* Stoardou. waste Management
 Bureau of Harardous Waste Sngineering


 Trenton, NJ  08625
fie:
Dear Mt.  Snexman:
                         at
                            c  EE         "•  1990'



the Depart^St       1    292 "        *«"«* was reported to


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 November 21, 1990
 Page 2
information,
Sincerely,
           "   //
           . i-!s*
      A. Earmeson
President

                            possibility cf
                                                     t=
                                               and imprisonment
cct  Carolyn Grasso, soutiem Fielfi Office-
                                           DHWM

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                       ROLLINS
                       ^*» ^»- ESVIIKXSUEVCU-XH&TECES i\ft CSf.
             FXJ.Bar357.Brid»eport. XJCS0.4. 609/467-3100 baMf OfBcti. «9.'^3iOS Sate OfH,
                                                      :ce
  November-21,  1990

  Mr.  Thomas Snerman, Chief
  Department, of :En.viroamentsa Protection
  Division of Hazardous Waste Management
  Bureau of Hazardous Waste Eagineering
  CJ^
  Trenton, NJ  08S25

  Re:
                                               :-
                                               L
 Dear Mr. Shermaa:       '       .    •  .









        d-


Tarry A. . Harmeson
President
cc:   Carolyn Qrasso, southern
                                  Office-DHsnr

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-------
                     ROLLINS
                     ^^k ^^ ENVIRONMENTAL JvOEVjnES i\j> iv
           RO. Box 337. Brtdetport. NJ OW14. UM6*3100 Ge.ni Offi-s. 609/467.3US «Ute Ofr«
  February 20r 1991

 Mr. Thomas Sherman, C2iief
 Department of Environmental Protection
 Division of Hazardous Waste Management
 Bureau of Hazardous Waste Enginelring

 Trenton, KJ  Q8625    '   '
 Dear Mr.  shersan:
                                            "•   »"•
 fluctuation tne pn^wSc^SaSJlSS: *•   a result of
 system shut off.  aSi"S»?S? S^s^f Stack gas
 caaMiwsr the  loss ^dSS   ^LS«Si    2^ *° eimt off
 reestablishing the Sow^« ter ??^ U  action taken included
 and restarting the drift f«^.   ° ±Jle Staclc ^« scrubbing system
basis only since
             the
environment
compliance vith the

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 February 20,  1931
that  there
 Siai£grely,
           f  //
          5: . fiet
        . Harmeson
President
.«:   Carolyn
                      Southern. ,1-ieO.d

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                   ROLLINS
                   «^fc ^fc ENVIRONMENTAL SOIVJCES (Ml DA'.
          RQ- Bet 33Z Briderpoci. XJ 
-------
 March. 27, 1991
 Page TWO
 that  there     ~
-' *»* «»«*«<».  I
                                                          a
ISs/ne

oc:  Carolyn' orasso, Southern Plaid

-------
                     ROLLINS
                     ^^ ^^ EWTHCWMEXTaL SERVICES , °1?put:er *jl±ci
. Qorrective action taS^SttS^^lrtS^*11* 2aUse Of           ,
 in the area,     "^^^ incj.ua.ea tigbtenxng- of several connections





 — ttta^'^t^s^^^SS^^-gWtot. non-



                                                         a
 immediately twRic^Sla *S? 2S ^ «««lzy  of those  individuals

.as

                     t1              Si
         Haraneaon.
      lent
ERS/ne  "-•-.


.00,  Wayne Kounta,. southern Field Office-DBS®

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                 ROLLINS
                 ^fc m EM1HBNM&-ZU. SERVICES «3> INC.
         Rtt B«337. Brifeeport, NJ 08014. «»/4fi7-31oe Geon* Oto «9/467.3ttS Ste Offi,
    2, 1991
Mr.  Thomas Sherman, Chie*

         of Environmental Protection
                             e
        Hazardous Wast* Engineering

Trenton, KJ  08625
Bear Mr.





less of draft within
     to the
          outsid.
                                           «P«lenad
                                            in the
                                                    °f
                                       basis
                                                or the

-------
 May 2,  1991
 Pag*

 IzSlOcJ _
Terry/A. Haraeson
•*•*	A £. t»	j
KcesiHent
ERS/ne
cc:
           Hounts, Southern Field Off ice-DHWH

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                    ROLLINS
                    ^^ ^ EJ«V«K3NMEXru.sEKVTCES CXI) JV.'.
            * Chief   '
  Trenton, JET  08625
  Dear Mr. Sneraan:                     .









  fcLln  section  of the  iiicSS?«^    fissions from

  approximately -ds oe 'aST Th?S£K^-    The Problem
  by calling 292-7172?^      J«c^<^t was reported to the

«=: - Wayne Mounts, Soutner* Fieid
fc
1

HT2 J
™f? t »•»
•J99I
.-li
1^3
...

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                          ^^^* ^B^i ^TVHSOfrtMEPfTA! qrguT/^ttrW-T* T»^—
   £-514  8S9
   May 16,  199!
   Jjr. Thoaas. Sherman,
               of Enviranmantal
            KT  08625
  Dear
                  •
Siuc«relv.   •       •                 '                         .       *
                     Southern
                                     O'fflce-DHRM

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      ATTACHMENT 4




Summary of Region IV Facilities

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               UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGEMCV

                                 REGION IV

                           345 COURTUAND »TKEET, U.K..
                            ATUANTA. GEORGIA 3O363
 MEMDRAKDUM
 DATES
           OCT 05 1882
 SUBJECTi  Sunmary of Bmargeucy Events «t Hazardous
           Waste Xncineratorw in Region IV

 FROHi     Beth  Antley
           Regional HaaardouH waste  Combustion Expert
 TO:
Bonya  Sa«Bevillo, Chief
Alternative Technology Section (OS-343)
 to response  to an October 1, 19i2,  telephone  request from teily

 h^ardoJfiaJS^^                                             «
                                      July  10,  1987) vac related to
                                         «» MwtiBln  «»«it. either
                                                                   to;
co»  Bmily Green, ICF
                            Po.•»
                                                                     :



                                                                •Ml ^BeMeMeeAf flhM>^^

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nw«TrtM „_         OF EMERGENCY BVBHTS
REQION IV HAZARDOUS WASTE INCINERATION FACILITIES
                Ocrtobar 5,  1992
   - Rook

                                  "      sis;
                      c


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-2-
                           ,
      .
            ass


Thermal Relief
     ••oond.ry
•nviroaaant^l
    T«nn««ft»».
              th*  Bta8k-
                       «v
                        in
                          at
                          no

             fan upon approval

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                                 -3-
Pi versified Scientific
                                  me.  rpssii - Kingston
  (This  is a newly-regulated  boiler under the BIF  rule operating
 under a  Class 1 permit modification.)                           9

      On  July 31,  1992,  at approximately  1:35 p.m., DSSI  was
      preparing for a BIF Compliance Test Bum, which was scheduled
      for the following week., The boiler was operating in a start-
      up  mode  and propane  fuel was being  burned to preheat  the
      boiler.   No  hazardous waste was  being  fired.    A  bri«f
      electrical outage allowed  eome unburned propana to go through
      the boiler,  fiinoe the  boiler is  designed  to  bum low-level
      radioactive waate,  the unit  hits a secondary pollution control
      system consisting  of  roughing  filtera, HBPA filters,  and
      «?~«?i  SHJ*"*  ,.,?h'2,,tn*  «inburn«J  propane reached  the
      charcoal filter*,  the  filtera  caught fire and burned  for
      approximately  4  ninuten.  The  fire apread to the nearby HBPA
      filtera,  but waa contained at  this point by DSSI 'a emergency
      response team.   Local fire  department, worked  with DSSI
      P"1  °  C001  ***  affected eguipmant  and prevent  any
                               wr" no ^«SL or haiardou.  wao2
                              aurvey  of the area was performed  and
                         up*r  '*diologioal  controls  were
                    DSSI  has shut  down the boiler  until  a detailed
                             ^ *** aodif ioati— incorporated to
LHP - Clav.
    ^      *25?rAtin£ und*r  -^terim  status at  the  time  of the
incident.  The entire facility ia now closed.)       ^^
   tai
   tank
                                              a.m. , a direct-feed
                               oaught on  fire.    The tank truck
               *0«to»»' •"* «  oil/acetone  mixture was reUased?
     Three other tank trucks with heels of residues (approximately
        'C    al*° Oaught  fir*' bttt no ^"-w i-rVreportedT
                  ?aurTd ^~ «» operator manually .hut of?the
                 *d *nt ^t*^* *» «•• if the tank oar was empty.
                        bad 50°-l°eo 9«llons of acetone left/and
     «~              vapor  above  the liquid.   The  operator
     climbed on top of the tanker and somehow ignited  the^apors
     ??ii; Decking  the waste  level in the taake/ (i.e. ,  cigaretf!
     bu^i^bo^TST1  f}*8hli9ht'  •to'»  B«  received  «ctSSv:
     burns above the  waist  find a compound  fracture of the  leg.
     BaBardous wastes were rol.ased inside an earthen dike where
     Sf 6 ^^f101"1 "*" ioo<*'*-  m addition, TraaJLl tSeS"!
     fire  fighting water reached a drainage ditch andWventuaSv a
     S^S^  tJiv111^^111'  ** adsorbent and .oU tha? oVuS?  2to
     contact  with the  waste was removed.   The  facility is  now
     closed pursuant to a RCRA olosnr*.           *»~J.«y is  now

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  ATTACHMENT 5

Dow Chemical Company
  Midland, Michigan

-------

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                                                               i !•
-=r, •=—.- —
                               :  '     •'   ;•• Incident  Report  f!  :
                                           --                    \\  '
                                     February 4,  1993  Exploision

                               703  Building  Rotary Kiln  Incinerator
.';^^:r!-.-'  JQcitoL
 '- y. . -,•--••- - :-. . :- .-
   :--••,-
     T r.- . : •;.
                                                                                    "


                                                                         -


-------
t ,
 debris        Place
 was  returned to service
                                                                    the  incinerator
February 7, -1993
                  '
                                                                the
                                                             turned to

             Hygiene. Divisin
                                              *


            Waste
                                                           t


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                           ;. f
  Cause

                             RCRA> Act
               as waste nitroilycerm based  medication  and process
 wastes  from the Nitrobid(R) formulation  procts, Really  cSL
 1-0% mtroglycerin, 50% lacjose  and  the  balan'ce 2S?i*^S*
 bottles and  packaging material. Shipments aboil. once a montTbf *is

                                                        "
 Based  on review with  generator personnel and the unit's
 sr'
   sw                           by the                   «'»   or
 this waste streain however,  ftis material makei ap a  small  portion of
 Uus waste stream. The bulk of this  waste  stream  is retarned g?ods.
Two possible scenarios could, describe  the cause for
The tot scenario is that *  pharmaceutical
ed                                       n"   «   » an
exposed  to  high temperatures, tliereby isolating a quantity of
mtroglycenn from  the  lacto« matrix  which slbseoTuendy exploded
.The  second  scenario  is that the  powdered form of the

         X77

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  Additional thermodynamic testing  has  been conducted to
  ^3U2T JOnoV^l Pn cy^*  /s4*  +T*«i      *    *            •        »**•• bv
                                               -


                                                                     -
 1.
2.
3,
     "'                 COIIect ** to an
     Alternative packaging methods which could  improve  sife








                                 '             '                 1 -.

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                           ACTIOMS
z.  ec««.ubi.
   -
             ,«
     •  as- s
3-

                          -*

-------
                CORRECTIVE JlCTlONS  (Cont'd)
4.  PoMibl* burner block change*

    "   ^^^5 **• f«<»*.to:ey use or a blind flange in  th.
                                ) cover
   b.  Con»td«c BOM type o£ intarloek to ...v»««i.-.«i.j.,i-y
       ehut down th* burner block feed* «ban a »ozxl» la
   e-  xdwitiry the approprlat* nuabar of »p«r«
       ^See1^;;^^c>n ^ *• BW* rat •*«

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       ATTACHMENT 6

Chemical Waste Management, Inc.
           (CWM)
        Chicago, Illinois

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              FACT SHSITT — CWM CHSHJCAL SERVICES
BACKGBOUNEJ
        February of 1991, an explosion occurrea an "» *jl» of
             Chemical services (CWM: incinerator in Chicago,
                    iB 6 wholly ovmec subsidiary cf Chemxcal
           and Illinois At
 General's
were
                                                  .d CWM to
                                                and allowed CWM to
      issued  their approvals  through a consent decree.

      During  the demonstration,  CWK conducted a RCRA trial burn
      Steneion te CWM to complete the demonstratron until the
      trial burn data was approved.

      in January 1992, CWK informed Region 5, IEPA and IAGO that
      aS amployL allegedly relabelled drums of waste »«*
      Remain uSder thrmaxiaum inventory ^pacity *«!«"£*. g
      consent decree.  Tim ZZPX and IAGO iamediately launched
      investigations.
      <   March  10,  1992. Chemical Waste . Management
      IBPA and  IAGO that their reco-ds indicated that  CWK had
      exceeded  the  maxinum inventory capacity.
      on March 19 , - 1992,  CSieni'cal Waste Management
      5. IEPA and "IAGO,  that they plan to suspend operations at
      CWM until they -receive a final RCRA Part B approval.   No
      explanation  was provided for tfcis decision.
  STATUS;
       CWM has suspended op«xation& and is currently planning to
       remove all vaste fr«rk the site and decontaminate F«*i»of
       the storage areas.  TPbey will also continue with several on-
       going studies regarding their operations.
       Region 5 will continue to :monitor activities at the site  and
       will proceed with plans to rewrite their TSCA permit.

  CONTACT:  John corinell, PCB Control section,  (312) .8*6-6832

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 S5.S million.  Scott Hamilton, editor of
 Commercial Aviation Report. asys
 that Riven JiarkAir's inevitabk k»»w on
 developing new  markea, "they would
 have to do something to generate fresh
 eaih."  Ai  for  an IPO, "I certainly
 wouldn't want to invest in  the  earner
 thaf s going «P against the  competition I
 MarkAir w going agaiwrt." Thar now in-
 cludes United Airline* and Delta.
   Bergt argues  to advantage  is in
 MarkAir's low costs. "Alaska Airlines te
 an old  dinosaur." be asvs.  "They tot
 their cot»Us run ainuk,"  MarkAir' a IMBIM
 approach thoe«  of supert fffcient South-
 west Airline*, Bergt claim*, and Mark-
 Air's strategy io the manor. "If you get
 air transportation down cheap enough.
 people will travel. If s a matter  of run-
 ning a thinner, leaner airline."
   Berfft, 56, has spent two decades try-
 ing to do just that Reared in Alaska, he
 got  his start flying propeller planes to
 the  state's rural villages for cargo air-
                   tine Alaska  Inter-
                   national Air Inc.
                   Bergt took the ear-
                   ner private  in .1979..
                   in   a  leveraged
                   buyout. Toe compa*
                   ny  flourished by
                   transporting  con-
                   struction matenabi
                   for oil  exploration.
                   Bergt moved brief-
                   ly into the natiif*nal
                   aviation vpoUiKtu
                   in 1981 when he be-
                   came CEO at West-
                   era, but  he left
 within 17 months.
   He returned  to Alaska i«tnTj«i*»i»iiii
 and began expandmjf  into the  more
 promising passenger businecB, renaming
 the farrier MarkAir. Initially, its chief
 competition .was AJuaka Airlines. But in
 1986, Bergt worked oat the marketing
 agreements with Alaska Airlines that
 made m-etata fare wan between ttaa two
 a. rarity. MarkAir uho purchased a com-
 muter airline, sending propeller planes
 into 330 rural Alaska communities.
   Relations between the two deteriorat*
 ed last fall Bergt says Alaska  Airlines
 changed the tanas of agrofmenm. Veed
 says Bergt never complained,  But  by
 November, lawsuits were flying. Alaska
 Airlines accused MarkAir  of  stealing
 passenger*.  MarkAir alleged antitrust
 violation*.
   lite rivalry shows no signs of cooling.
 MarkAir is continuing  ta tow  fares
 through the summer season. Alaska Air-
 lines will likely match them. If a the kind
 of deefeructivt price war Lorenao could
 ten both carrier* all about
   By Bo! BmUon in Anekongt, Xfocfce.
            BoOvm** m -Wnr Yorte
TMIE  UGLY MESS
AT WASTE MANAGEMENT
Its 'model' plant dearly wasn't, but that's about all that's dear
     The folki  at Waste  Management
     line, luted to love showing off their
     Chicago incmerao; as a model for
safe, disposal of hazardous -waste. Oper-
ated by Will's Gheroica'. Waste Manage-
men', line, subsidiary, the nation's huvest
eamnwrdal taemaratcr was so tedux>-
kjpicaliv advanced tnat. it was then one
cl'only three facilities iu the U.S. per-
mitted to burn cancer-causing PCBs. Bus-
loads  of anftJy»t«, cuatcimerg, and even
ucjioolchildren j«gubrlj tourtd the
plant, located just an hour away irom
vnn'e Oak Brook (DL> htiadquarten.
  That pride now scrcns badly mis-
r-laeed. The ptfttfew years have brought.
t. dislurbing aeries of aUegatkau and
liocumcnted  instances of  management,
              and woerker-ufetgr prob-
     «i tW>  Chicago indnerator (table);
In January,  state officials launched an
investigation mta possiite cnmnm] mis-
«onduet there. And « state
grand jury has convened to
IIMT mvkianee of delkiemte
mi»lal)elmg of up to 100 bar-
rel* of hazardous waste by
t sujienrisor, according  to
lawyers invohed in xli? case.
in  late  March, Cheunca]
WuBte Management  ewin
said k -would suspend c^iera-
tions  at the incinerator and
teud moat employc««ai L '
HcnUBck—who until s«v«n
montiis ago waft also thair-
Miw.  of  own—has  biamad
win't rnanj' regulatcjy run-
ins on managers left 
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  nroWems wore  not isolated  modems.
  foe company fe afco the  target of an
  oajoia? federal  crimim!  investigation
  into alleged violation* of procurement
  •ad tnviroomental regulation* at*. U.S.
  Army Cwp«  of  Engin*«* lite. Now.
  CWM'« ability  to expand it* high-margin
  incinerator bunineu  will depend on
  whether it can assure customers that it
  wiD comply with eoTinmmental law&.
    Concerns about the company's record
  could  detoy  or  block  plans  for  new
  projects. Already, the tone hai  ilowed
  WMi'i attempt to bufld a  nudmr-waetc
  dkpnml plant in Martmivflle. DL, whew
  officials have demanded all of WMI'S b-
  tornal memo* ou the Chicago problems.
  And KB  Indiana reriews cwifft applies-
  tion to expand a hazardous*wute aite,
  the aiate is Mr^y the exaeme vtep of
  using ha Good Character  Requirements
  Act to make cwit list aD major civil and
  admmittrative complaints, aa well K» any
  criminal complaints, ovor the  past five
  yenri. Depending on what it finds, Ino>
  ac* can deny the implication  baaed on
  CWK-6 "character." SJDCC may  other
  itataa bavt similar prorauont,  this could
  turn into » Mttksome ksue for WHL
    There's Kttle doubt that the Chicago
  moDcrator1*  trouble*  hate helped drmg
   down profits at both CWM and  ta 76*
  owner, win. In 1991, OWK'a  profits
  plnngtd 42.6*. to »OO8  mfflian. It wa»
   the finrt •arninga decline  aince win ipon
   h. of f to the  public in  1966. The Chicago
                          THAT WfLl: RAr

                          SldpC3P, "MY ITANDS

                          STAR I H  BUBBLING'
          A TRAIL OF TROUBLE
          AT AN INCINERATOR
 jf*. -'I p wuvK'
 CTRUARY, 1991



IJAKUARY, 1992

** sf :i*l*. l*i» HI* ic-Kilcr n? *u1». j t  ' in-

 • - I-.-N.  i         	    ;•


      .•.11, . I ,-jf vll..Hi... .:!  fp1 I'-."

  - .  , , .. -.-.utr.'-. l-.l'i V »"• V-!- tP

ittl.i il.,  -Ill"  f- ,l-"i-1- -. i •  • c nii-jc

I  wi-*,it, I ' .lllll""'!!^ wn..rlijUUlll'1 ";


 '' .*.•/.'  '.- -.1, "I I !••>'•••/  ' 1''-"•.' -VH

  tl I'.,  i • ii>«i •'•'• I"' •' f U' ' > '"' •"'»
                                       pkat has generated no wvc«u« fine* a
                                       major ezpiotion  18 months ag"	• T '

t,;.f i *• ,t--U «l.'0 ••"' I" '"1"  ' •••- r PA
                                         Ii «i c l"lr
i MARCH, 1992 i
allegaton*,	_
hu»r» ItKat poDution gaagtt
had  btwa aimed off four
times In 188& and 1S87 and
that «teta» KM waste wu
fed  into tbe kiln  at bait
UOOK. 15ot titc company d/^
nted tiiat tbe action* were
ecad09«d by mazafftft.
                                ling to Home ex-employeee, t>>o
                          ,__., to ptoduce profile was intense.
                         Earo one of the plants former wp nuu»-
                         «gen: "Tbe attitude was: '1 doo'i want
                         to know how you do h. Juat k«ep turn-
                         ing in the remits '" cwil's fast growth
                         throughout  the IKBUs  aad hs decentra}-
                         ned maziat^ment. structure, with each
                         facility operating ax its own profic cen-
                         ter, may have alao contributetl tn a cli-
                         mate where Kuch probWwiR could occur.
                         Thee wan: ao nmeh curnoTer »t the plant
                         and corporate level, for iniaince, that a
                         common jdk« among  employe**  went:
                         'If the bow calk, get bis name."
                           Saving money was paramount, aay e»-
                         employwi.  San»time« they wew «v*n
                         forced to skimp on auch ltam» »* gktvtu
                         «ad Naptmtora.  "It wu M money fao-
                         tor," *ayn GrmgnlinL "Corporate uid we
                         were wring too much equipment'' AkhQ
                         G. Desai a fonawr proceiMMintler techni-
                         cian at the plant aaye he suffered 6«-
                         vfire reactions while raking ehemicaMail-
                         en  aludgtt:  "All of a  sudden, my hands
                         Htarted bubbling." Desai  auyt  he aui;-
                         gested wayi  TO  avoid contact with the
                         sludge, auch as abating it in a mechani-
                         cal hopper, but plant manafera rejected
                         ms idea* becaute.of coat Plnnkett aays
                         th* cowpany merer knowingly eompro-
                         mmd aafety &r profita or coat amvingn.
                         rauc IIIMH CWV tried to dean houue
                          in  th« wake  of Turanian's  chargct,
                          bringing m new plant mamtgement aixi
                          •pending mflBow on  Rafetj- feature* in
                          1968. It waau't enough. Junt after mid-
                          night on  Feb.  IS, 1991, an eiptowon
                          rocked the iwancnrtnr,  relaaajng tmdc
                          fumw. Woriuns. nuture of what th«iy
                          w«r» handling, had fed a packet contaJin-
                          mg the exptosive tetraaote into the JdJin.
                          AlmoBt M  ymr  later, after agreeing to
                          tSJo mfliion  m  finea over  the incident
                          wtthouc admitting any wnrngduiag, CWM
                          had  more  bad news: It reraaled that an
                          •mplojM  had nlaoad phoay kiwla 
                                                                                 mmmental  kwa,
                                                                                Dunn, eavir
                                                                                 uyx  Matthew  J.
                                                                                 control chief at the
                                                                   ,
                                                              Iffinmi  Attorney  Central'* office. He
                                                              •cds: "Well go as high M we am*1 to
                                                              pneecatt wrongdoen. For cwx and WMI
                                                              muafen,  that ia only tto kttcat in a.
                                                              kug itrinff af »ery baa nrwa.
                                                                            fiy Julie ftyn» in CMougo

-------
 Incinerator



 supervisor


 is accused

 .By Stevenson Swanson
 lEmkonnMnt wrtor
 '  In the latest of a long string of
 •woes at the cbcmicsj-wasie in-
 cinerator on the Southeast Side
 company officafc have accused a
 supervisor of potting tabe labels
 •oo cootamers of haxardons wute
 to dodge safety regulations.
   Dak Gtwlak, who was in charts
 of overseeing the inventory of
 waste awaiting incineration at the
 Chemica] Waste Manage mnaL Inc.
 ,bunier, changed labels on about
 100 cnruamtn so that they would
 •be exempt from  a limit on the
 ..amount of waste thai  can be
 stored at the incinerator site, the
 plant manager said in a letter the
 company ideated Monday.
   uswhuc. who his been fired, s4*
 jejedly toade the label switch Sept
 28. but the modern did not come
 to fight until Jan. 21, when an em-
 ployee who atid she helped ban
 witn the phony labels
 nyofficiak

  The phony labels made the
 waste, which consisted of such
 things as  road sweepings at the
 •ae and used iirotectrwdothmg!
 appear to be less than 90 days oli'
 A coon oider limits the amount

 f^%StfX*2£rl&

 ^JSMSAfSS*
 	a data, one accurate and
  Plant tnaitftfftr Kurt Frey ieoon»
ed the matter to the Ulmoii Envi-
ronmental Protecrion Aavncir and
te Uhnoit Attorney Oenenrs Ot
«oe in a Jmn. 28 ieSetSSBfa eoa>
Pjny umai%»tioa in wfakh a tmrt
B*twyet and an ex-employee cor-
raborated         ^^
 The U^. EPA, me mbois EPA
and the stase anoney aenenra of-
fice have bunched criminal »vat»
Ufations, said ^hpmHd Waste
«pofcir»m«D Watiun PhuketL fic-
cfu« state and ftdenl offioai woe
eksed Monday, to officials from
dioseaacaeks eoold be niched
 Gsmlak's aoonty did not ntnm
                    '

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-------
JRN  ?  -52
P«0«   17 7«t
     llano* C*t*irwMMmaf Protection Aytnev
                                                                                              B*

                                                                                       217/762*33
    FOR IMMEDIATE RET BASE
    #91-259
                    Contact:      Dim Won
                                 217/782-07(0
                                 BQL IngicrfO'B
                                 217/7g2«5544

» 1991 — • Settlement agreeaems totalling $43
                                                    have trm
    SPRINGFIELD,
    involving the only two commercial h&azdros waste iccineratoa in toe state. The agreement follow*
    months of negotiation* between the Illinois Envin»ffiienial Pn«ction Afency OEPAX the Office of the
    minois Aaotney General (OAG), and Cbamical Wane Maaagemam Inc., as die resulr of enfonzmeat
    actions taken against the incmentoOv operated by the chemical flnn.  One maneimor is located m
    Chkago and tt» other In the Meco-Eas:
    A consent otdcr i$ expected to be entered today in SL Oair County Gicott Court ccaocmingTiadc Waste
             i, Sauget, imposing a $15 t&QUoa civil penalty lor violations of me Illinois Environmental
    Protection Act and me federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).  En addition, the
    agreement orders the company to provide $1 million to. cash or aeivioes to support an East St Louis area
    £i**mtri i^ityiMH. god mandates numerous tachnical improvements at the facility, including new tsiaL tHinUi
    a $200,000computernetwotklmlc to the 1B?A fbreoatinuous Agency scratiny, and 4S2404XX>altewanee
    for cue year of EPA oversight.

    Another consent decre* is expected to be flkd witto we Cook County Circuit Court today concerning
    Chemical Waste Management CWM Chemical Services iac.^ a hazardous waste and PCS incinerator at
    11700 S. Stoncy Island Ave* Chicago, iaposmg a Si mUfion peiwhy, and requiring continued oversight
    by contnctois as wett as  EPA personnaL   Tills iix&erator, cmreatly  conrtufiting openbQity
    demonstrations, win be required to continue testae; befoa pnxeediaj: to fun opexafloos on completion
    and approval of Its trial bums.  Tne faattqr has been sfassdownimee a Feb.  13.1991. explosion in the
    totary kirn at the ate.
                                            (MOKE)

-------
"Enforcement actions against these two facilities will esacii&the strictest operating Himin and assurance
programs for any hazardous waste incfc-rttrr fecfflty in Ulinots, if not the entire coumry," said EPA
Director Mazy A. Oade. "The sealtmtna require owtncrcw achnical improvements, provide continuous
EPA oversight, impoca resounding dvil penalties, und, mcst inaponamiy. provide for the protection of
th» puMic't health and safety as well as (be environment. An additional benefit of tbii enforcement is
theSl mmiondfiaia^jpiOfnBn whichaEptitleia^xiigzeattyneeded»enhanceKtop^iaUtyof M«
E. St. Louis area nsidatts," Oade takL

The xBdemems arc the results of months oa" woritby the staff of EPA, the Attorney OenerATs Office and
         Waste Msnafemem. to achieve 'xctodcal ijohitious and lefal remedies fat the problem*.
                                          XXX

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   ATTACHMENT 7

Trade Waste Incineration
        (CWM)
     Sauget, Illinois

-------

-------
 y[ S525 on a charge card. The iotaJ bill:
 morr  titan Si.000. (A spokeswoman says
 the hospital normally asm tor the wbole
 tee up front because UK sunery is consid-
              suwrs ro pay by trypossint: tor surgenns
              and ob:ainjng tetters frotr linuy doctors
              and rth-umawlogttts mattM-v
                Wuter fire rrnm angry ron*«. one mv
                                  ho: safe. Critics cnarge tut me implants
                                  can cause or trigger a variety of diseases.
                                  ranging from muscle patn to chronic Im-
                                  mune disorders.
  Wo
ingv.
r*mc'.
  ENVIRONMENT
 Concerns Mount Over Operating Methods

 Of Plants  That Incinerate Toxic  Waste
           By JEW BAILBT
             TI IT W ALL. Stmer JOCBMAI.
                 dumpstcr of seem-
                explodes. hurtling its
 contents 100 fen. Hazardous liquids boil
 over uncontrolled for 6% hours, sending
 dangerous fumes skyward. A worker sut-
 lers second-degree buns iron a steam ex-
 plosion.
.   The work of some Oyby-ntfnt handler
! 01  hazardous  materials? Hardly. These
; irjsnaps occurred at an tnemeratkm plant
 sere. just across the  Mississippi River
 :rom downtown St. louts. owned by the
1 world s biggest wane company, wasu
 Management Inc.
    When state regulators discovered thesa
'. and other problems,  they  Drought  civil
, charges against Waste Management's haz-
I ardous-wacte unit. Chemieai Waste Man-
| aj?ement Inc.. and last December levied a
 S3.1 million penalty. The unit settled the
 charges in a consent decree and pronused
 to be more careful
    The mishaps, though, rawe concerns
 about what's  going on at the nation's 18
 government-licensed commercial incinera-
 tion plants and about the potential tor ca
 lamlty at them.  Such Incinerators are in-
 creasingly important because recent fed-
 eral reguiaaont prohibit many manatees
 •ram being .tuned  ta haiardma-wMjrte
 dumps. This  "land ban" is channeling a
  more diverse and potentially dangerous ar-
  ray of waste to incinerator*.

    The sites receive Intense scnitmy from
  teaeriL sure and nmetimet local nlfi-
  cials. Most af that attention, though,
  M
off&ctftls
                            in
                                                                                    Is
                                                                                    In
  have a cornputeriad link to this plant that
  allows them to constantly n»mtor emit-
  sions. and thta •ntorceroeat ease imaally
  focused on air poUutton.
            dOKl have & way to con-
 sonUv montfor the n»re mundane aspect?
 of thfe operation: movie? dbngerous sub-
 stancs? between boots, barrels. tatJcs, in-
 caieratari and dumpstcrs. The case here
 grew to :nslude mich wan^-iuodhng con-
 cerns.  Regulators'  worst  ieii:. althouci
 highly unlikely,  ii that w  Incinerator ex*
 plosion ciuk: spread to tt
-------
               	I

    Concerns Mount OverProcedures

    OfPlants That Burn Toxic Waste
              -             A.	
      	From Pafft.si
Main ogjtanon. .Uere ttscsax of calls
torn an out-of-late repuiatar and j
thai it made mm woiKlerr "?s tatttaU**^
  *««« M»ai«emtti says n has teamed
nora ha mlua*afc'*^>'ve nn£ ^i^
                             thereactton. • cays Ray Smiley,
                             ™«"nn>MtaJ muatv.
                             cwx* eooaeb  fujnea
                             *w*e» eu return, it takes X
                               Piune to stop
      wtat drtm
        bum altered tv i
      w  rented famr
        company UMii't adaUt te-ind
        prablems we-r reported
             . sad any amomttM
                            called ndium adde. TRW

                 coraptny
                                       r a amated. But
                                      stuff and teUsnzittfln





                                *  tt*ltt te eta««'   "
               »*
        tnm a hoat oo tte piame- but
    oiate it. to inotJiae in Star a






      '
'Wagner to Succeed

Baker in Top Posts

At Air Products
                                        * l« !!•!   I	.

                          i              ai«teal waate
                          SSJ*!"!? ?**ltaa » »^» tatte
                         *        > m-i—?.'.• * J '
                            M
                                       ^  batrrtaBlt
                                       «w«ltenie

-------
   u jAwbMuuc *nui *« «f»uu*y tcnju
 e-tree exeenttre soccemo juaa.
 he Aflenttjwn, fa.., company aaid that
  fire tad -a iatt yemi as
 ».  Dexter p.
 er win be soc-
   bypresldtBt
   A. Wagner,
            .
 Tturus 65 next
 fa. wfatehis the
  aaJ  retire.
  age for  Air
ucis  officers.
Mil remain on

mpuVsboud
       of the
tttve  commit-
to. Bator ajao
conilaae to
                                                tuns tram & normal
                                                               two
                                        rchemfcai
                               •  "It was chofctnj the
                               i  state inspector Mike Gnat. Mr. Garyde-
                                 ^*^*Wwu led too rapidly bat says
                               ;   —"-- —»  ••»*: Chemical Waste some-
                               ! ntoK ffoee to casttmers"! '
                               ;  coUeet, Iterate and
.        	uaai October, us
nan of the May*Tit' ^'•"r'ptlfln of
iacturen.
     w. 66. k a &year veteran tf
      IBS company. He has hopped
OB* executive post  to another hi tt£
ud Europe, on toft tlie mti and
cal aides of the company, a< be
dhta way up tb» eaecttlive ladder at
'rodnets. The penpaiatte manager
ained president snd ehoel "renting
• just last July. Prior to that, he
                                  M
                                  ^S^? IS'L*? etther «» ^ «»
                                  wnw or ctfll does cactato pure  dteta
                                  cpoahtered the moc potent man-mad* car-
                                  c^TMLltiMflt lenity be bonedTSJ.
                                  gr. l»e ortitaal teats taot aooee th
                                  Tin wfeen a
                                                      o
                                gr. l»e ortitaal teats taot

                                Tin wfeen pacunr oa watte. A
                                Inspector at Saufet aotec tte vial on aiS
                                port but daeast uatenttacJ to te£C
                                MM* ^ttettne another offcla! iv-ia.
                                      was hi toe pacxaie, It has teen
                                                                         at a glance.
                                                                        lor lur IXlM- «M
                                                                         0»»y St.00 prr v
                                                                       So tiirycur»«i(. no
                                  Bach of 3btse	


                              1  l££ !^ly<>e.more w* SSStefarkms'
                                abom operating btdneratocs at too toira
                              |  temperature,   ———"—    -   -•   "
 nr the company^ f ases and
 h«M»«. wftfck lolkwad & two-
 tintas pntideni oJ Air Pxodueti En-

 try and emit confiaued powth at
 •lapaay nfardtess at the apt sad
 .of the Ui eeonwriy..Mr. Warner
 etotendi to faQov Mr. ]3akerltlBad
mothu: Air Pnaacts' tomgn bust-

l'iJ^S^;BS5r ^ **heta te
U»fft Zr% of sales woe wtth fortice
nm. Far the fiscal year ended but
nber. foraiin aaies totaled 40% of Air
cts'Siaa billion in sales. Air. Wafuer
 Meat that (caeltu sates can too so%
 latter naif of the dacade.
                              I m^KSlS0^ behre the ease was
                              ; ^?;*L2S?leil,Wiatcortemlllltak>-
                               cw enYiroomeiiBj maaaptrs. soch as Mr
                               ^»y. to report dfar^ to retfoail and
                               u*«o beaosmanen envtrcamenul
                                   ** of to total operadaf
                                     attentkm"
                                      ueaUfM «w«w much
                               tteytr* BOW," aays m».
 .    *tth 1230 million, or S4J5 a
 ittiuealmo.
 ) Imljilny to cmhlon «he U£> icces*
 tapaet to the fact iiuit a substantial
 ; of the company's easctunrETts are
 tenn "take or  pay" ittrtements
 «at aflKted by qaaneiso-quarter
 B fa industrial ootpat About two-
 Jf the company1* sates are mm Its
 "•taws, aad abcwt ane rcpohed the
                                                                     FbraFRKEiM
                                                                           1-212MC
                                                                        FAX 1-212

                                                                            FtiUiafaer
                                                         «f the
                                 and cerate of In attflatti.
                                  «» *"»» Uws betar
                                     aharaa are behv oiSered bi
                                              ™

                          ,
JOrnnarGrosp IDC, A iSathiaad?
                      ---»
                                              l             m
                                               the Ui. aad Can-
                                      ttintejrtco.il actor a»iea<3
                                                                 I	
                                                                       Don't it
                                                                                  Die
                                                                           Nauiooalfe
                                                                         the
                                                                           fa therm
                                                                 iHavethenexti?**!

-------

-------
   ATTACHMENT 8

          3M
Cottage Grove, Minnesota

-------

-------
             EngJnMrfng
 •nd Poltutien Central
 PO Box 33331
 SL Paul, MN 55133-3331
 612778 4335
 September 23, 1992
 Subject:  3M Corporate  Incinerator, Ash Quench  Incident;
           Permit #23-Al-89-0-6,  EPA ID, MND006172969
      fieri Ma
 Darryl Weakley
 Regulatory Compliance Section
 Hazardous Waste Division
 MFCA    •
 520 Lafayette Road
 St. Paul,  MN   S5155
Bob Berg
Regulatory Compliance
Air Quality Division
MPCA
520 Lafayette Road
St. Paul, MN   55155
 Dear Mr.  Weakley and Mr.  Berg:

 On September 18,  1992,  at 2:45- AM,  a physical explosion
 occurred  in the incinerate:: ash guencn WHACU cau»«w uue
 operation to be shutdown  one week before the planned annual
 maintenance.  (See letter  to Mr.  G.  Wegwart of August 24,
 1992).  The facility is scheduled to resume operation during
 the week  of October 19, 1992.

 The incident  appears to have been caused by molten metal in
 the slag  leaving the kiln,  dropping into the ash quench,
 trapping  some water and creating a  steam explosion.  The
 resulting pressure blew the pressure relief panels and
 ruptured  the  brick walls  of the  air seal and some of the
 light weight  wall panels  of the  ash house.   No structural
 damage y«s cavsed tp the  installation.   The ash house is
 always off limits to. personnel while waste is  being burned
 and the 'kiln  is discharging slag to the  ash quench.

 All  waste  feeds had been  discontinued by 1:00  AM,  therefore
 all  wastes  had  been burned  out and  only  fuel oil was burning
 to maintain the kiln temperature at  the  normal 1850 F at  the
 time of the incident.   The  fuel  oil  was  automatically cutoff.
With the loss of  the air  seal at the ash quench,  some smoke
 from the fuel oil  and  heat from the kiln backed up the  feed
 chute venting into  the  pakfeeder room and out  the air intake
 louvers.  This  caused the sprinkler  adjacent to the feed
 chute to activate automatically  calling  the  Cottage Grove
Fire Department and the site Emergency Squad.   Both parties
were dismissed  upon arrival because  there  was  no fire or
injury.  Beyond the brief release of  smoke from the fuel  oil/
tnere was no other  release  to the environment.

-------
 Mr.  Weakley and Mr.  Berg
 Page 2
 September  23,  1992

 3M is conducting a through  investigation of this  incident.
 AS a result  of this  investigation, steps will be  implemented
 to reduce  the. risk of this  type  of explosion and  to increase
 the  pressure relief  area.
Please contact George Mills at 778-5058 with any questions
                                 '
concerning this incident.
Sincerely/
&
G, P. Mills
Environmental Engineering .Specialist..

cc:  Fred Jenness - Hazardous Waste
     Peter Torkelaon - Air Quality

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     ATTACHMENT 9

Chemical Waste Management
         (CWM)
     Port: Arthur, Texas

-------

-------
                                     fOLLLTION CLEA.NLP -,   [CF Incorporated:? 4/15
    Chemical Waste Management, Inc.
    P.O Sox 2563
    Pol Arthur, TexiiS ??643-25£3
    409/736 28?1
 January 4, 1993
                                    CERTIFIED MAIL
                                    RETUHK RECEIPT
                                          P-103 047 537
 Mr. Jesus Garza
 Executive Director
 Texas Water Commission
 1700 North Congress Avenue
 Austin, Texas 78701

 ATTN:  Mr. David Barker, Emergency Response Unit
 RE:
Chemical Waste Management,  inc.  - Port Arthur, Texas
Industrial Solid Waste Registration Number:   33905
Hazardous Material Accidental  Discharge/Spill Report
 Dear Mr.  Garza:
                Ma"a9en)fnt' *««• (CWM) - Port Arthur Facility is
            this H^ardous Material  Accidental  Discharge/Spill
Report  for a  spill that  occurred on December  24  1992    CWM
verbally reported  this incident to the Tex^T Water ' Colissio™

SSS"? ^i?  *2*  left ?  ttessage for David  Neleigh,  with
JS2«vi»S^J?^  ?*««    •  Environ»ental  Protection  Agency,  at
approximately  6:00 p.m. on  Thursday, December 24,  1992    This
serves as written  documentation of that verbal report
i.
                                                  the
     Chemical Waste Management,  Inc
     P. O. Box 2563
     Port Arthur, Texas  77643-2563
     (409) 736-2821
2.
     name, address, and telephone mimber nf

     Chemical Waste Management,  Inc.
     P. O. Box 2563
     Port Arthur, Texas 77643-2563
     (409) 736-2821

-------
M*w> f • IU 1
                               :  1:1 arc ;   POLLUTI ON CLEAMP -    ICF I ncor por a:ed:* 5/15
    A
     Mr. Jesus Garza
     January 4, 1993
     Page -02-
          date. time,  and type of
                                               spill,  fi'
          A leaking box containing Incinerator Air Pollution Control
          Train (APC) waste was identified in the truck staging area
          at approximately 9:45  a.m.  on  December 24,  1992.    CWM
          SSSS! ^ TOK teriai  spilled contained PCBs and immediately
          sampled the box  and  initiated  a cleanup.  Testing of the
          TSS^VJl* Wat co?Pleted  aft*r  the  cleanup,  and  it
          indicated the waste did not contain PCBs
     4*    name and quantity of
                                 f AP,C waste was Billed.   The waste
                               codes  («ee attachment) because of  the
                 -from rule.   The Texas waste code is 900550
5-   the
                     of  injuries,  if
         None.
    6.
             assessment  of  ^ctua],  or- potential  h
         health or the  environment f  w\-\e>r
         wastf* fc?n ?ra  tod  ciean«d UP a11 visible signs  of
         waste.   in the area  where  the  waste had  penetrated

                     ^1^  the aSphalt  was  taken u^andthf
     th  ^ ^       -  > wa^  removed  until ^ visible signs  of
     the waste  regained.  Hi-dry was used to remove the waits  in
     the  areas where the  asphalt was  intact,  and those areas
     were then  washed with  a  surfactant and watS


                           SP±11 Was
                                                    and  cleaned
                                                     of

-------
         ATTACHMENT 10

ICI Explosives Environmental Company
          Joplin, Missouri

-------

-------
scales - jjje Jopun uiooe
                                                                  tittp://www.jopiingioDe.com? iyv //apry /
                           Part of incinerator

                           shut down after

                           unexplained explosion
                           By Wally Kennedy
                           Globe Staff Writer

                           Part of the hazardous-waste incinerator operated by ICI Explosives Environmental
                           Co., east of Joplin, was shut down Tuesday night after an unexplained explosion in
                           the rotary kiln, a company official said Wednesday.

                           Dave Wallace, a company spokesman, said no employees were injured and that the
                           minor explosion posed no emergency outside of the plant.

                           "We  are assessing the cause of the explosion and will adjust procedures to make
                           sure that it doesn't happen again," Wallace said.

                           The only other explosion to occur within the kiln happened in the incinerator's
                           start-up phase about two years ago.

                           An employee, who was outside of the building when the blast occurred, observed
                           the roof lift on the sheet-metal building. Wallace said the employee told him that no
                           smoke escaped from the building.

                           Wallace said the explosives being processed at the time of the detonation were
                           contained within the kiln and that all emissions were captured by the
                           air-pollution-control system. The roof and walls of the kiln building are designed to
                           relieve pressure in the event of a detonation, he said.

                           The blast damaged equipment that feeds wastes to the kiln. Other parts of the
                           incinerator remain operational.

                           The incinerator was burning a four-pound load of ammonium nitrate. The material
                          was manufactured at the ICI Explosives USA plant, also east of Joplin. Had other
                           four-pound loads of the material detonated at the same time, the damage could have
                           been much worse, he said.

                          Ammonium nitrate requires another explosive device to set it off. Wallace said it is
                          possible a round of ammunition was left in the kiln. If it exploded,  it could have set
                          off the ammonium nitrate, he said.

                          Exploding ammunition is used to clear the kiln of deposits of glass and aluminum
                          that build up inside the walls of the kiln, he said.
                                               Return to April 03. 1997 Directory
                                         Last Updated: Thursday, April 03, 1997 2:12 PM

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Four States — The Joplin Globe
                                                                                                       Page I of 2
                           ICI explosion kills 1

                           By \VaIly Kennedy
                           Gtobe Staff Writer
                           An explosion ripped ihroue-h the conveyor nxim at the ICI Kxplosives incinerator at
                           4:30 pin  Wednesday, killing one man and injuring two others.

                           Donald Reynolds IT, 32,2923 Terri LaiW. Joplin, died at 5:22 p.m. at SL John's
                           Regional Medical Center, aaid Jasper County Coroner Ron Mosbaugh. The coroner
                           said Reynolds died of injuries inflicted by shrapnel.

                           The other injured men, who also were taken to St John's, were not identified by
                            authorities. One of them was in critical condition, a company spokesman said.

                            A fourth moa. with a history oFhcart problems, was taken to Freeman Hospital West
                            an hour after the blast He was treated and released. Doug Wene, manager of the
                            incinerator, said Ihc man was not in the building where QIC explosion occurred

                            Wene. who was consoling family members at the hospital Wednesday night, declined
                            to comment about the accident. He referred all questions to Clrvc WhiUxride, who
                            manages the ICI lixplusi vcs USA plant, formerty known as Atlas Powder Co.

                            The incinerator, managed by ICI Hxplosivts laivironmental Co.. operates in the
                            middle of the 2,000-acrc  complex. About 35 people work there.

                            Whiicside said the explosion occurred in Ihe feed-handling building, which is
                            separated from the incinerator's rotary kiln by a blast wall The workers apparently
                            were breaking apart packages of detonators and placing diem on a conveyor that
                            carries them into the incinerator through a hole in the blast wall, he said.

                            The detonators, aboulthe same diameter and half the length of o ballpoint pen, are
                            used to set off explosives. Th«y arrive in bundles at die feed-handling room. Workers
                            break them into smaller bundles that are placed in containers and then on the
                            oonveyor.

                            The speed at which the containers are fed into the incinerator and the number of
                            detonators in each container are governed by a computer system. Usually, no more
                            than four hours' worth of feed material can be stored in Ihc kiln feed room at any one
                            time, according to the company's operating permit.

                             Whiicside said an investigation will determine whether the detonators blew up on the
                             conveyor bdt or within the area where the detonators were being prepared for
                             incineration. He said the Occupational Safely and Health Administrntion had been
                             notified.

                             Jim Mueller, a Joplin resident who organized opposition to the incinerator in 1991.
                             said the kirn feed zoom is one of the most dangerous areas within the incinerator plant.

                              "This is where the workers are physically handling the stuff," he said. 'If there is an
                              explosion, this is one of the places it would occur. The ineineiator itself is not going
                              to blow up."

                              Workers do not enter th» kiln room because of the heat from the incinerator.

                              ThrcepcoplK were killed in a similar accident Jan, 25. l971.attheMcAlcslcr
-------
Four Stales — The Joplin Globe
Page 2 of2
                            The explosion at McAlester happened while workers were loading munitions onto a.
                            conveyor that carried them 1'rom one building into a fortified structure that housed the
                            kiln. Workers •were handling highly explosive 20-millimeter rounds, instead of
                            smaller detonators. Authorities were unable lo determine what caused the blast
                            because so little evidence remained at the scene.

                            Mueller said: "This is n tragic accident. 1C1 has been really cautious. They have
                            attempted to run a very good operation oul there. This is the kind of thing that can
                            happen with any fypc of operation Like this.

                            "There is no reason to believe that 'this might have involved negligence on the part of
                            ICI. They have been running a pretty light ship."

                            Mueller said there is no risk lo the public when detonators of this type are incinerated.

                            Two unexplained explosions within the rotary kiln have been reported since it began
                            operating about three years agn. One of them occurred during the start-up phase. The
                            other occurred in April 1997. No workers were injured in cither explosion.
                                                                                                     i
                            The Duenweg Volunteer Eire Dcpmtment sent two engines and a rescue truck to the
                            plant, five miles cast of Joplin. No fire suppression was needed. The injured were
                            taken to the hospital by Metro linwsrgency Transport System ambulances.

                            Rood:! leading to the plant were closed by the Jasper County Sheriffs Department
                            within minutes of the explosion.

                            Staff-writer J.L. Griffin contributed to thin report.

                                                          Black to Four States
                                           Last Updated: Thursday, August 27,1998 2:09 AM
hUp-Jtoww.joplrnglobc.com/4state/lip 1 .html
    R/27/98

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Four States — The Joplin Globe
Page I of 2
                            Explosion probe at ICI under way; two  remain

                            in local hospital

                            By Wall)-Kennedy
                            Globe Staff Writer
                            Internal and federal investigations into Wednesdays explosion (hat killed one man and
                            injured two others at the ICT Explosives incinerator arc under way, a company
                            spokesman said Thursday.

                            'Hie investigations could lead to regulatory or legislative safety recommendations with
                            regard lo the operation of other explosive-waste operations nationwide — particularly
                            if federal investigators oon link factors in the ICI explosion to a similar accident thai
                            occurred in January at a plant in the state of Nevada, a federal official said Thursday.

                            But part of the federal probe nt'Uic ICI blasl will be limited because funding is not
                            available to launch a Hill-scale investigation.

                            "We arc gathering documentation together and talking to the people who have
                            information that might bear on Ihis," said Clive Whileside, manager of the 1CJ
                            Explosives USA plant, five miles cast of Joplin.

                            "A senior ICI safety, health and environment team has been colled in ta investigate, as
                            well us «n explosives expert," he said. *We received notification today lhal an OSHA
                            (Occupational Safety and Health AdminLstrotion) inspector would be arriving
                            sometime today.

                            The building has been locked down until our investigation is on."

                            Also planning to review the explosion is the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard
                            Investigation Board (CSB). The board is modeled after the National Transportation
                            Safety Board, which investigates aircrafl and other transportation accidents. The CSB.
                            which is responsible for finding ways to prevail or minimize chemical accidents, is
                            required by law to investigate an accident in which loss of life has occurred.

                            The CSB will rely on (he investigation by OSHA, a branch of the U.S. Department of
                            I-abor. OSHA will have up to six months to issue its report The CSB also will us*
                            information uncovered by me Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF).

                            But it will not he using its own investigators lo undertake a comprehensive probe.

                            "This is the fourth fatal incident mat has occurred in the past two weeks that the board
                            is forced to study in a very limited fashion through 'incident reviews' only," said Paul
                            Hill Jr., the board's executive officer. "Because the CSB is operating with limited
                            resources, a full investigation is not possible."

                            The CSB, since January of this year, has investigated or reviewed 16 incidents in 14
                            nates, exhausting die state's investigative resources;. The incidents resulted in 26
                            fatalities.

                            "We hope the assistance from OSHA and BATF-will help our experts independently
                            dctcnninc and report to the board the likuly cause or causes of the incident." Hill said.
                            "The board will determine: whether industry, regulatory or legislative safety
                            recommendations are appropriate."

                            Prelimmuiy facts about th« ICI explosion have raised technical issues meriting CSB
                            review:
hup:/Avww.joplinglobc.c
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                                      I It/l It S  ||
   Four States .. The Joplin Globe
                                                                                                           Page 2 of2
                              aThe ICl blast has factors which, based on initial reports, appear similar to a falal
                              incident in January of this year. The Sierra Chemical Co. explosion, near Sparks.
                              Nev., killed four and injured several others.

                              aPublished reports point to one or more possible "precursor" events at the 1CI
                              incinerator and at least one other similar facility,

                              Whiteside said any speculation would be premature about what might have caused the
                              blast that killed Donald Reynolds 11,32, Joplin, and injured two other men at 4:30
                              p.m. Wednesday.
                                                                                                   i
                              "There is no obvious cause at this point," he said.

                              The names of the injured were not being released at the request of their families. One
                              of (he men remained in critical condition and the other was in stable medical condition
                              Thursday at St. John's Regional Medical Center.

                              "We have been asked by the families not to release any personal information,"
                              Whilcside said. "Thai is me message I have been giving to people."

                              David Wallace, spokesman for ICl Explosives iaiviroamental Co., which operates Ore
                              incinerator, said, "We have brought in an employee-assistance team to assist in
                              consoling our employees through this period."

                              The explosion occurred in the kiln feed room, which is separated from the
                              incinerator's rotary kiln by a blast wall Initial reports indicated that the workers might
                             have been disassembling packages of detonators and placing them on a conveyor that
                             carries them into the incinerator through a opening in the blast wall.

                             Wallace .said it now appears QIC workers might have been removing detonator
                             components from a container in UK: kite feed room. The blast did not occur on the
                             conveyor, but on a flat table around which the men were working. The components
                             were being prepared for placement, on the conveyor,

                             "There is nothing seen so far to indicate a lack of confidence in the machinery," he
                             said.

                             Asked when the findings of the investigations will be made public, Wallace said, "1
                             have no idea. They will go on until they are satisfied that they have reached a
                             conclusion."

                             What the incident could mean to the future of the incinerator, he said, is unclear.

                             Said Wallace: "The future of the incinerator will be the subject on an ongoing
                             discussion,"
                                                   Return to August 28. 1998 Directory
                                             T.ast Updated: Friday. August 28,1998 1:31 AM
ht^://\vww.joplinglobe.com/1998/aug98/aug28A)82898n .fatal
                                                                                                             8/31/98

                                                                                                         TOTflL F'.05

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                ATTACHMENT 11

Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Demilitarization System
                    (JACADS)
                 Johnston Island

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                    JACADS
        (Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System)

                  Status Report

                 Update May 1992

•  Introduction	•	Pa9e
•  Facility Operations	•, -	page 3
•  RCRA Permitting	Pa9e \J
•  Trial Burns ........ .....-•... •	page~
•  Inspections 		....... page 26
•  Future Permitting Activity  		 page 28
•  Public Concern	• • •	Pa9® 29
                                                      c

                        Paget                   May 21,1992    '

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                            Introduction

    JACADS is a facility designed, built and operated by the U.S. Army, to
demilitarize surplus chemical weapons.  The facility is located on Johnston
Island situated in the Pacific Ocean, about 717 nautical miles west-southwest of       I
Hawaii.

    The weapons which were moved to Johnston Island from Okinawa in 1971 f
represent about 5.2 percent of the U.S. stockpile of unitary chemical agent. An
additional 1.4 percent of the U.S. stockpile was moved from Germany to
Johnston Island in November 1990. in  addition, about 100 rounds of Work*
War II unserviceable projectiles filled with mustara gas were moveu to oo.iRSion
Island in June 1991.

     Weapons stored on the island include rockets, projectiles, mines, bombs
and bulk containers, each containing one of two types of nerve agent (GB and
VX) or blister agent (mustarcl gas - HD).  Demilitarization of weapons consists^
of disassembly followed by destruction  or decontamination of the components in
four specialized incinerators.
                                   Page 2                           May 21.1992

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Facility Operations
•   Permitted Facility

    The major elements of the permitted facility are weapon disassembly and
shearing systems, agent draining and agent storage systems and the four
specialized incinerators as follows:

    1.   Liquid incinerator (LIC): for destruction of chemical agent.

    2.   Deactivation furnace system (DPS): for destruction of explosives and
        propellants.

    3.   Metal parts furnace (HPF): for decontamination of metal parts.

    4.   Dunnage incinerator (DUN): for decontamination of miscellaneous
        refuse that may have come in contact with chemical agent

    The incinerators and their associated air pollution control systems are the
 subject of most of the equipment-specific permit conditions, and have, to date,
 been the focus of EPA's permit overview.
                                                      c
           Page 3
                                                                May 21.1992

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Facility Operations (continued)

•   Permitted Operational Phases

Overall sequence of operational phases for each incinerator, mandated by the
RCRA permit for the JACADS facility, is:

1.)  Shakedown period of 720 hours - under limited operational conditions
    specified in the permit.

2.)  Trial burn

3.)  Post trial burn - under limited operational conditions, while results of trial
    bum are being evaluated.

4.)  Normal operation - under permit conditions, unless modified as a result of
    trial bum experience.
                                                  *
Note:   Operation not involving hazardous wastes is not limited by the permit
during the shakedown periods.
                                  Page 4
May 21,1992

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Facility Operations (continued)
•   Operations to Date
LIC and DPS Systems
February 1990:  Rockets (without agent) processed as part of the first TSCA
trial bum. Rockets specially obtained from the Tooele Army Depot for this
purpose.
July 1990: First agent-filled rockets (with GB) disassembled and processed.
Observed by EPA staff.
July 1990: First bulk agent (GB) incinerated.
December 1990: Trial burn on LiC conducted. Observed by EPA staff.
February 1991:  DFS  shut down to allow modifications to the heated discharge
conveyor, and to ready the system to handle rockets with VX.
April 1991: LIC shut down to allow replacement of some internal refractory.
                                  PageS
May 21,1992

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Operations to Date (continued)

August 1991: DPS resumed processing with Tooele type rockets (no agent)

September 1991:  Army imposed ban on all toxic and hazardous waste
operations pending completion of investigation of pipe welding.

October 1991:  Army lifted ban.

November 1991: DPS began processing VX rockets and LIC began processing
VX.

January 1992:  DPS shut down because of damage to kiln. LIC shut down
because of lack of VX to process,

February 1992: Resumed processing VX rockets in DPS and VX in LIC.

March 1992: Trial burns with VX rockets in DPS and VX in LIC completed.

 March 1992: Processing of all rockets containing VX (including leakers) was
completed.  DPS and LIC shut down for conversion to processing HD.

                                  Page 6                          May 21.1992

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Operations to Date (continued)

    As of the end of March 1992, Army reported processing of 7,565 rockets
filled with GB, 13,889 rockets filled with VX and and about 638 simulant rockets
(without agent). The LIC had processed 77,171  pounds of agent GB and
134,983 pounds of agent VX.  Army has estimated that there were originally
72,000 rockets (containing either GB or VX) on Johnston Island to be
destroyed.

tJiOf Qirctam
iwii • wj «*»**•••   •                  •

MPF is in start up mode without the use of hazardous wastes. Shakedown with
HD is planned for June 1992.

DUN System

DUN was in start up mode without the use of hazardous waste when a
pressure transient occurred in June 1991 resulting in deformation of the furnace
chamber and building.  Dun has been out of service since that time.  Army
advises that only hazardous dunnage being produced consists of used DPE
suits which are being shipped off-island as hazardous waste.
                                   Page 7
May 21.1992

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Operations to Date (continued)

Brine Reduction Area (BRA)

    This system was in start up mode without the use of hazardous wastes           j[
through November 1991 when the RCRA emissions test took place with               j,
hazardous waste (brine). Emission testing indicated no emissions outside
limits, and the BRA continued operations with hazardous waste at half test
capacity, although it was out of service for periods of time because of various          jj
mechanical problems.  The major problem was the accumulation of moisture
and particulates in the outlet duct. In April 1992 EPA ordered the Army to
suspend processing of hazardous waste pending receipt and review of the            q
emissions test report and review of mechanical problems being encountered.          3
                                  PageB                           May 21.1992

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Facility Operations (continued)

•   Operational Problems

JACADS Is a complex first-of-its-kind facility.  Operational problems were to be
expected and have occurred.  However the problems have been mainly
mechanical and have not been indicative of any defect in the overall system
concept or design. Some examples are noted below.

    During early stages of incinerating Tooele rockets, problems were
    encountered with jamming of DPS feed gates, which resulted in small fire
    not involving agent.  Redesign and replacement of some gates was
    necessary prior to processing of rockets with agent in July 1990.

•   Deterioration of LIC refractory  had proceeded at an  unacceptable rate.
    Remedial measures, which were conipeted in jul^g |gg^f jn^|ucjed
    replacement of some refractory with a different type. No further problems
    have been reported.
                                  Page 9
May 21,1992

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Operational Problems (continued)

    Residue from the DPS had caused continuing problems for the heated
    discharge conveyor (HOC) by jamming both the conveyor itself and also          :,
    the discharge gates.  A revised design involving buckets (instead of a belt),        |
    additional heaters, new discharge gate configurations and operating logic,         ,
    and installation of a sealed enclosure around the residue container, was
    installed in March and April 1991. Some M60 and M67 rockets (without    .      ,
    agent) were successfully processed in May 1991 r but jamming problems          jj
    returned, and the HOC was dismantled again.  Differential expansion of the
    conveyor frame was suspected, and monitoring thermocouples were
    installed. The discharge gate configuration was changed again in February        r
    1992 and jamming  problems were reduced to an acceptable level until the        >
    end of the campaign in March 1992.

•   In December 1990, during LIC shutdown, agent was sensed in the duct
    |eacjjng frorn the LIC pollution abatement system, which in turn vents to the
    stack.  Source of the agent was found to be a short term leakage from the
    agent feed system  after feed shut off.  Corrective actions (including changes
    in operating procedures), were taken.
             i about «f5«nmutf$.      ,                                        	
                  about 1S% of Wfot IS aNowoUcf tp^nwQVn #>€ ***
-------
Operational Problems (continued)

    On March 11,1991, while the DPS was under checkout using JP-5 fuel,
    smoke filled the DPS room and some smoke escaped to the atmosphere
    via the stack.  No agent was being processed at the time.  Subsequent
    investigation revealed an instrumentation malfunction causing a blockage of
    the off-gas system, which in turn caused the products of combustion of the
    JP-5 fuel to back up into the DPS  room. The defective instrument was
    replaced and blinds installed in the off-gas duct to prevent backing up in
       4t ttt
    On May 2,1991 there was a small bearing cooling oil fire (due to an
    overheated bearing) in the DPS room. Agent was not being processed at
    the time, and there were no  reports of harmful releases. The bearing was
    repaired and furtherstudies  were undertaken to develop prpcedures to
    prevent a reoccurrence of this incident

    On June 26,1991 the DUN  was in start up mode, with  non-hazardous
    waste when a pressure transient occurred resulting in deformation of the
    furnace chamber and building. The DUN is still out of service pending a
    resolution of the problem.
                                  Page 11
                                                                 Mar 21.1992

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Operational Problems (continued)

•   On January 21 r 1992 the DPS kiln stopped rotating while processing VX
    filled rockets and the system shut down.  No releases were reported. A
    team of scientists and engineers from Army and EPA was sent to the
    island to investigate the cause of the kiln damage. A 2 inch by  12 inch
    hole was found in the kiln cylinder wall, apparently caused by the
    detonation of a fuse which had become hung up on a flight support. The
    kiln flight supports were modified, and the kiln repaired and tested for
    mechanical and metallurgical integrity as prescribed by EPA. It was
    returned to service in February 1992.

 •   Considerable problems have been experienced since start up with plugging
    of the filter candles (with particulates) in the LIC, DPS and MPF Pollution
    Abatement Systems (PAS). The problem seems most severe when
    burning auxiliary fuel during warm up and standby.

    The demister candles on the LIC PAS have been bypassed through an
    empty vessel since August 1990 during  operations not involving hazardous
    waste.  An actual bypass duct to achieve this purpose is being  installed
    during the current shutdown, along with appropriate interlocks to prevent
     bypassing during operations with agent or SDS.
                                   Page12                            May 21,1992

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Operational Problems (continued)
                                            *>      . .
    Prefilter candles were installed in the DPS PAS but were found to be
    ineffective and were removed.  A hot water filter candle washing system
    was installed in February 1992, but this is reported to be ineffective also.
    Other methods of filter candle washing are being investigated.

    It is proposed to install a bypass duct on the MPF PAS similar to the LIC
    PAS bypass duct during the current shutdown.

*   Experience with the BRA since emission testing in November 1991
    confirms that moisture and particulate is collecting in the horizontal outlet
    duct.  The moisture drips out of the duct and the weight of the wet
    particulate endangers the structural integrity of the duct. It now seems
    possible that the system did not reach e^^                 test andthat
    some of the particulates resulting from the spiked feed settled out in the
    ducts and never reached the baghouse.

    The problem appears to be related to an inablity to keep the off-gases
    above dew-point until they exit the system.
                                  Page 13
May 21,1992

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           09/26/54
                     08:54
                                 EPR
                                                                003
                UNITED STATJES EN^IRONMeNTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
December 17,  1992


MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT:   JACADS UPDATE

FROM:      Ray  Fox (H-3-:
                                REQIONplX

                               Hawthorne Street
                         San Fnincisco, Oft. 04105-3901
TO:
cc:
          Laura  Yoshii
                         H-l-
          Michael  Feeleir (H-
          Nahid  Zouesht'Lagh/
            Larry  Bowenjnan (
          Y.J. Kim (H-3--3)
          Tiro Stott  (H-;>-2)
          Pierre Belangur (H
                        proce
     Army continues to
     agent HD) at a reduced
     projectiles have
     OVT in September
     We received the  15-day
                                        mber 14, 1992
                       b&en
                       1V92
                                ;     Mark Klaixnan (RC-3-1)
                                |     Dave Schmidt (E-2)
                                ;     Carrie Johnston  (H-l-l)
                                ;     Vicky Tsuhako (E-4)  (FAX)
                             •   \     Jim  Michael (HQ 5303W)
                         •4-3 f   |     (FAX)

                              5nwi projectiles  (containing
                         rate.   Army reports that 7,663 105mm
                         roceased from the start of Phase iv
                         irou^h November  21, 1992.
 at 12:21 a.m. on Ndrvemb ar
                             •epo:rt pf an incident which occurred
                             l^A  ^ I "l  H **V *"V ^»
                                    JL992.
     The incident was tile hekrin^r of a loud noise  by the outside
     MPF operator, the Aecttr: :eno » of an MPF high/high pressure
     alarm and the occu^renc >  
-------
                      08:55
                                  EEPA
               UNITED STATES; ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
                                REGION IX
                            76 tjtawthom* Stroot
                         SJan PraJicisco, CA M105-3901
March  25,  1993
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT:

S-ROMX

TO*

CO I
JACADS UPDATE - Wetjk of March 22, 1993

Ray Pox  (H-3-3J)
              i
Laura Yoshii  (JH-l-l
                          )

      Michael Feeley!  (H-: )
      Nahid Zoueshtijagh  JH-3-3)
      Larry Bowerman  (H-3-:
      V.J.  Kim (H-3-!s)
      Tim Stott (H-2-2)
     Pierre Belangejr
                    j
Army advised of a small
Processing  Building at C
extinguished with a| hanc
extension cord and one
damaged.  There were no

Y.J. Kim is on Johnson
trial burn.
                   4-3)
                                         Mark  Klaiman (RC-3-1)
                                         Dave  Schmidt (E-2)
                                         Vicky Simones (H-l-1)
                                         Vicky Tsuhako (E-4)  (FAX)
                                         Jim Michael  (HQ 5303W)
                                         (FAX)
     On 03/25/93 we apprjoved
     request.   This roodikiea
     DPS kiln cylinder.1
                        i
                        i
     Arroy advised that 3J8757
                   fire which occurred in the Munitions
                   031 hours  on 03/20/93.  The fire was
                    extinguisher.   About one foot of an
                   heel of a  portable ladder were
                   injuries and no  migration of agent.

                   sland this week  to observe the DUN


                   a class 3  permit modification
                   ioniallows the Army to replace the


                   105mm projectiles  had  been processed
    as of 02/20/93.

    A schedule of major! events at JACADS  is attached.
                                                        Primed on Rccycttd PofKr

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                     06:56
              UNITED STATE? ENVI
                           75
                           FT

                              ONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
                               REOJON IX
                              tawthpmeiStfMf
                              iclsccj, CA 94105-3001  ..

June  10,  1993
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT:  JACADS UPDATE
FROMt

TO!

cot
          Ray Fox  (H-3-

          Laura Yoshii
                         - W
                    3)  f

                    (H-l-
      Michael Feelejy  (H-
      Larry Bowermah  (K
      Y.J. Kim  (H-3k»)
      Tim Stott  (H-2-2)
      Pierre Belangsr  (


 Army advised that  Ln Oc
 Johnston Island to) Kett
 have had a level oje age
     allows off-island.
     been monitored pri
     F)
                              material in the MPF has  been
                         sitjuatijon jhas been investigated.
                        requests
                          cc nou;
                              f;or Class 1 modifications
                           rjred fully with one request but
                        e other! request.
                                at JJACADS is attached.
                                                      Printed on Rtfycled Paper

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           09X26/54
                     08:55
                                 EPfl
               UNITED STATES ENV RONIMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
                                Rl-OION IX
                            76
                    Hawilfioma 8tr*et
                         Ban Fnnciftcjo, CA M10&-3901
June  17,  1993
SUBJECTr   JACADS UPDATE
FROM*

TO;

oot
Ray Fox (H-3-3)
Laura  Yoshii
               - W«ek of June  14,  1993
(B-l-fo)
Michael Feelekr (HH3)
Larry Bowarroah (H-J3-3)j
*r *v  «J	  ^A.I_ ^ I ^ .   I    '
          Y.J. Kim (H-3
Tim stott  (H-
Pierre Belangir
     Wa received four r
     the weak and also
     upcoming request f
              -3)
                             -4-3)
                 Mark Klaiwan (RC-3-1)
                 Dave Schmidt (E^2)
                 Vicky Seraones (H-l-1)
                 Vicky Tsuhako (B-4) (PAX)
                 Jim Michael  (HQ 5303W)
                 (FAX)
              igueejts cor Class 1 modifications during
               cojy of a study designed to support an
              >r  ari increased feedrate to the MPF.
     We received the  15
     (potential release!
     week«« update).
     uncertainty as to
     level agent releasl
     or by other int*rfjerantis.
                   report
day
of ejgent
    port
                re
              rtiett
                ox
    er titie
     by
  _ of  the 05/31/93 incident
  HD at the MPF,  described in  last
  indicates the Army's continuing
r-e alarm was triggered by a low
products of incomplete combustion
    A schedule of majob events jat JACADS is attached.
                                                        Printed on Recycled Paper

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               05x26/94
                            08:57
                                           EPfi
                    UNITED  STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION  AGENCY
                                          REGION IX
                                        Hawthorne Street
                                Son Fn
                                  inclsco, Ca.  94105-3801
 January 3,- 1994
 MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT':   JACADS Update fojr December 1993

FROM:      Ray FOX (H-3-3)  |

TO:         Laura Yoshii (H-1-JV)
cc:
        Michael Feeley (HkS)
        Larry Bowerman (E -3-3)
        Y.J. Kim (H-3-3)   T
        Tim Stott (H-2-2)  i
        Laura Oentile (H-4-jl)
                          i
 We concurred with two Class  1 pi
 measurement system on 12^03/93.
                                                    Mark Klaiman (RC-3-1)
                                                    Jim Vreeland (E-2)
                                                    Vicky Semones (H-l-l)
                                                    Vicky Tsuhako (E-4) (FAX)
                                                    Jim Michael (HQ 5303W) (FAX)

                                     srmit modifications relative io the agent GB
      JACADS began processing; ton containers (containing agent GB) on 12/06/93.
 On 12/13/93 we were advised of
 inside the MDB on 12/09/913. Th
 the contingency plan was n'ot act!
 pending investigation of thl incid

 We received a 15-day incident re:
 ihc lower munitions corridor of tl
 were recorded and the contfngenc
 Ihe building was reported,  j None
 had a blood cholinasterase iievel d
 level is 15% below ba$cline).

No member of the public aktcndec
Class 2 modification reque$t) whi
                                    I spillj of about 500 Jb of agent GB which occurred
                                     •re was no agent migration outside the building and
                                     rated.. Processing of munitions was suspended


                                    'ort of personnel  "encountering" a ton container in
                                    e MDB on 12/53/93.  Concentrations of 375 TWA
                                    f plan was activated.  No migration of agent outside
                                    of thp personnel  involved in the above two incident*
                                    bcrease greater than 9% below baseline (reporting


                                     the Army Public Meeting (relative to the 11/17/93
                                    >h was held in Honolulu on December 15t 3993.
                                                                      ' Primed on Recycled Paper

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                09x26/94
                             08:
                   UNITED STATES
                                            EPR
                                                                                 oie
                                  ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
                                        REGI.ON IX
                                    76iJHawtripma Street
                                  San Hranclsipo, CA 94105
  March 24, 1994

  MEMORANDUM

  Subject*      JACADS  Special tijpdate

  From:        Ray Fox. (H-3-3

  Tos          Laura Yoshii
  cc:
              Michael Feeley (H-fc)
              Lester Kaufman (HJ3-2)
              Larry Bowerman (H-3-3)
              Y.J. Kim (H-3-3)
              Tim Stolt (H-2-2)
              Laura Gentile (H-4-ll)
 1 received a phone call from LTC
 incident at JACADS.
 The incident consisted of a stack
 limit of 1.0 ASC (0.0003 mg/m3)
 (J.I, time) on March 23, 1994 and
 highest concentration recorded by
                                                     Mark KJaiman (RC-3-1)
                                                     Jim Vreeland (E-2)
                                                     Vicky Semones (H-1,-1)
                                                     Vicky Tsuhako (E-4) (FAX)
                                                     Jim Michael (HQ 5303W) (PAX)
                                                     Carl Daly (R8)(FAX)
                                               at about 8:00 am today relative to an
                                 lissioh of agemjGB above the allowable concentration
                                 The imissipas began to exceed the limit at about ll:00pm
                                continjied to exceed the limit for about 25 minutes. The
                               the AGAMS was 10.05 ASC
No casualties on J.I. have been reported.

The incident occurred after the LI: had
gun was being removed. The con:entrat[on ofjCrBiin the room air went high at about'thT
same time and the room air exhaust was switched from the LIC afterburner duct to the filters
Since no agent was being incinerated at foe link i* is speculated that me high concentration '
of room air m the duct was the cakise of khe high stack emissions
                                         1   f
                                       »n s^iut down for maintenance and while the agent
                                        rtfl CrR iir> th* rftrttn &•*• tkJAM« u
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                09/26/94
                             08:58
                 UNITED STATES BNVJR
                                J
                                  75 H
April 4, 3994

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT:   JACADS Update for 1

FROM:      Ray Pox (H-3-3)

TO:          Laura Yoshii (H-l-W
                                 ian Fraiicteco,
                                            EPft
  IMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
        IX
    torn* Street
       CA 94105
                                                                                 011
                                       994
cc:
             Michael Feeley (H-3)
             Lester Kaufman (H-3-2)
             Larry Bowerman (H-3-3)
             Y.J. Kim (H-3-3)
             Tim Stott (H-2-2)
             Laura Gentile (H-4-1)
                                                   Mark Klaiman (RC-3-1)
                                                   Jim VreeJand (E-2)
                                                   Vicky Semones (H-l-1)
                                                   Vicky Tsuhako (E~4) (FAX)
                                                   Jim Michael (HQ 3303W) (PAX)
                                                   CarJ Daly (R8) (FAX)
      We received a 15 day report k>f an incident which occurred on March 14, 1994  The
      incident consisted of a small jfire (14 Ib rocket propcHant) in the Explosive
      Containment Room B.  The fire wa| causisd by migration of hot gases up the DPS
      feed chute which in turn was caused -by tte jamming of the two feed gales in the open
      position.  There was no migration of hazardous waste inside or outside the facility and
      no damage to equipment.  Ajjmy rdorts tliat  it is taking corrective measures to
      prevent recurrence of the inc
                                      agent
      Initial information on the reliiase of
      1994 was provided in my special update <

      In a telephone conversation on March 31,
                                dent.
                              T
            Investigative team has
                                left
     GB from the incinerator stack on March 23,
     f March 24, 1994.

     1994, Army advised as follows: -
and ^rill present findings to PMCD.  Indications
            are that incident was mused toy underlying system design and operating
            procedures, together vdth eqjripmeil malfunction and operator error.
            There were no abnormal re* lings
            result of the incident.  A
            that a total of 10 to 31 mg ojf agerit
                                          >f agent concentration at ground level as a
                                         member of Ihe investigative team estimated
                                            had been emitted from the stack during the

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        05.-26/94
                    08:58
                         I
        incident. DHHS also esti:
        GPJL, which is below the I
        GPL (General Population
        8-hour worker exposure li
 lated maximum ground Jevel concentration at 0.1
 >wer ^[uantitation limit of the detection equipment.
 Jmit)  concentration is 0,000003 mg/m3, versus the
 lit of 0.0001 mg/m3.
       Any final authorization to Restart demilitarization operations will be made by
       the Secretary of the: Army                                           '
 We received from the Army the
 Noncompliances.  The document

 We received six requests fdr Clasj

 A schedule of major events! at JA(
 below:                  i
fACADS 1993 Annual Report ofRCRA
- about one half inch thick,

 J permit modifications during the month.

      iis of the date of mis memorandum is shown
              JACADS -! SCHEDULE OF MAJOR EVENTS
DUN Trial Bum
RCRA Permit Expires
                          Postponed indefinitely

                         .  . . .  August 30. 1995

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         ATTACHMENT 12

Rhone Poulenc Basic Chemical Company
         Martinez, California

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          >
                       ELECTRONIC
                                      MAIL
                                 Date:
                                 tr-om:

                                 Dept:
                                 Tel No
TO: see Below

Subject: P.OLREP 2 and  FINAL/
                                                       „ E

                                                              ^
                                                            •   -- --
                                                   24-Jun-19J92 IQrPinm EDT
                                                   ROBERT BORNSTEIN
                                                   BORNSTEIN . ROBERT
                                                   (REG,09,HWMD)  (E)
                                                   415-744-2298
                    UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
                                  POLLUTION REPORT
          I -  HEADING

               DATE: June 23, 1992

               FROM: Robert Bernstein,  OSC,  EPA  Reaion TV  rs,
                     Response Section H-8-3       Re9ion IX,  Emergency

                T0:
           SUBJECT: Rhone Poulenc Basic chemical Release,  Martine2,  Ca

            POLREP: Polrep 2 and Final

         II-  BACKGROUND
                     Site ID: N/A
           Delivery Order NO: N/A
          State Notification: OES

         III.  INCIDENT INFORMATION
                                  Response Authority:  CERCLA
                                           NPL Status:  N/A
                                         Action  Memo:  N/A
              A-  Incident Category
                 industrial accident and chemical fire/release
              B.  Situation
                                                                     «t the
                                                                        all
The fire reignited shortly and
At approximately 18:00 hri .
                                                             by 13:3° hrs-

-------
     EPA, USCG MSO, TAT and PST responded to the scene at 12:30
hrs.  The federal response team assisted the Incident Commander,
Contra Costa County Fire Department, with air monitoring and site!
assessment information.

-------
   IV. Current Actions
   that trepa-rmen    s£aS «"ill«» on site.   At

   approximately 8:30,  TA^ar^ed onJSK""11^ tO "^"lize.  At
          when he
                                                            s^iously
  At that time, OSC BornsteL ded   th
  Bernstein threatened to
                                                             '  °SC
  activftfes?                       den

  fxre  threat was  diminishld and Sat Se
  the facility.  Rhone outlined their  e
                                                  n  ^eclared «»t the
                                                 shed  control back to
                                                       J

                                     ^^
 and TA?
                                                °SC
                                                               PST
                        n
demanded that sanpiing planS and vork
review.  Since it was the 'pinion
immediately reduce the amount of


       80
comprehensive plan.
                                                 agencles that
                                                     The state EPA
                                               devel°Psd for agency
                                                 resP°nse team to
                                                                 to

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            begin this task.  However, action to remove this water wa^ « *-
            undertaken until late afternoon.                           not

                 Overall,  by late afternoon, OH Materials appeared to h*
            begun an adequate response.   Health and safety tone's were
            well  established and proper decontamination areas
                It  appeared throughout this crisis that Rhone offio-i^i








           V.  CASE STATUS
Distribution:

TO: Bornstein.R
TO: DOI-9
TO: ERD/OERR
TO: ERS/REG.IX
TO: ERT/EDISON
( BORNSTEIN.ROBERT )
( DOI-9 )
( ERD/OERR )
( ERS/REG.IX )
( ERT/EDISON )
Use the SH option to view the entire  distribution  list.

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        ATTACHMENT 13

Statewide Environmental Services, Inc.
       Los Angeles, California

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I

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    JUN-30-1994  12:15  FROM  TOXICS ftSSESSMENT GROUP
                                         TO
                                                          18185512841  P.02/07
                Statewide Environmental Services, Inc.
                    200 Oceangate, Suite 540, Long Beach, CA 90802
                (213)437-2242                    Pax (213)437-4562
    June 25,  1991
    Department of Health Services
    Toxic  Substances Control Program (Region 3)
    1405 N.  San Fernando Boulevard, Suite 300
    Burbank,  CA   91504

    ATTN:  Jerry Lile

    RE:  Incident Involving Hazardous Waste

    Further to my letter of May 23, 1991, a copy of which is attached,
    Statewide had  contracted with Nash Salvage,  Inc.  to  sort and
    consolidate small  containers of lab type chemicals  into larger
    drums  which would then be shipped for incineration. Two chemists,
    Val Brandt and Mary Halal were doing the  work  at the site on May
    21st.  They had previously done similar type of  work for a largfe
    number of  companies and  had  previously  experienced  no problem
    whatsoever in this type of work.  A report from Nash Salvage dated
    May 2lst,  1991 written by Val Brandt is attached.

    A sample  of the material  in  the drum was taken as noted about one
    hour before the incident and  no chemical reaction was noted either
    at that time or since then in this sample.  We have not been able
    to pletermine what caused the reaction.   The vermiculite  used as the
    inert  agent for the consolidated container was taken from one of
    the other containers of  lab  type chemicals and  it is speculated
    that there may have been  some small amount of  contaminate in that
    vermiculite which after a period of time reacted with the oxidizer,
    i.e., the organic peroxide. The Plant Supervisor and the Emergency
    Coordinator,  Stuart Brown, breathed ar.d smelled the "white smoke"
    and  said  that  it  had little order  and had  no  impact on his
    breathing.   The report of Stuart  Brown  in the  operating record, is
    attached.

    Four people, we .understand,   were  taken to the local  hospital by
    ambulance  after the Fire 'Depar-tment was informed and we understand
    that they were sent home afterwards and no problems were indicated.
    The information on the people is not available to Statewide but the
    Emergency  Data  Management Service Phone  number   (213)  267-2475,
    (Richard  Salinas)   informed me that he would  be  willing  to  give
    information to the  Department of  Health Services  if  they called
    him.  The  Fire Department  (Number 41) reported the incident as No.
    134967 as  indicated to me by  Captain  Light.  The  phone number for
    the Fire  Department is (213)  564-6241.
•97%
SES Facility: P.O. Hex 61248 - 12618 Main Street, IMS Angeles, CA 90061 (213) 7S6-7896

                                                                    S-r.

                                                 06-30-94 12:19PM  P002 #23
                                       916  753  531 8

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      JLN-30-1934  12:16  FROM  TOXICS ASSESSMENT GROUP
             TO
                                                           18185512841  P.03/07
       Department of Health  Services - ATTN:   Jerry Lile
       Page 2
            25, 1991
       On June the 10th,  we received  a  letter from a lav  firm who said
       they were representing  Gloria McCune and Buford  Harris of 140 E.
       126th Street regarding  an  accident on Hay 28,  1991 and wanted the
       name of our insurance  company  BO they  could  be  in  contact with
       them.   X passed on  this  information  to  our insurance  broker,
       Jardine Insurance Brokers, Elton Kunkle, phone number (714)  740-
       1127.  We are insured by Lloyds of London.
                                                                    i

       Since the incident, we  have stopped the  consolidation of organic
       peroxides or any other  materials  from lab packs.
       Very truly yours,

       STATEWIDE ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, INC.
      /  1 /L
	V
       Matfthew P. Stewart
     / President

     , MFS:ci

       Attachments
R-97X
                                         916  753 5318
                                                          06-30-94  12:19PM  P003 «23

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           IS...   FROM
                                  213 437


                                      TO
S172+1 ; *



    r.B2
              Statewide Environmental Services, In,
    NAY *3, 1991
                                        Fax C213) 437-4562
   Dopartwmt of Health a«rvice»
                            ~w™
                                        VIA PAX #Sl»-567-
                                                            3129
                                         1M1> *
                                                             30
                                                       «-  «»

incidont 1.
                     und«r lmr..tl»«tion.
               *"•
M78/1V

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r

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             Statewide Environmental Services, Inc.

                 200 Oceangate, Suite 540, Long Beach, CA 90802
             (213)437-2242                    Fax (213) 437-4562
  June 25, 1991
  Department of Health Services
  Toxic Substances control Program (Region 3)
  1405 N.  San Fernando Boulevard, suite 300
  Burbank,  CA   91504

  ATTN;  Jerry Lile

  RE:   Incident Involving Hazardous Waste

  Further to  my letter of May 23, 1991, a copy of which is attached,
  statewide  had  contracted with  Nash Salvage,  Inc.  to sort  and
  consolidate snail  containers  of lab type  chemicals  into  larger
  drums which would then  be shipped for incineration.  Two chemists,
  Val  Brandt  and Mary Halal were doing the work at the  site  on May
  2lst.  They had previously done similar type of work  for  a large
  number of  companies  and  had  previously experienced no  problem
  whatsoever  in this type of work.  A report from Nash Salvage dated
  May 2lst, 1991 written by val Brandt  is attached.

  A sample of the material  in the drum was taken as noted  about  one
 hour before the incident and no chemical reaction was noted  either
 at that time or since then in this sample.  He have  not  been able
 to determine what caused the reaction.  The vermiculite used as  the
 inert agent for the consolidated container  was taken from  one of
.the other containers  of lab type chemicals and  it is speculated
 that there may have b*en some small amount of contaminate in that
 vermiculite which after a period of time  reacted with the  oxidizer.
 i.e., the organic  peroxide.  The Plant Supervisor and the  Emergenci
 Coordinator, Stuart Brown, breathed and smelled the "white  swoke"
 and  said  that  it had  little  ordor  and had no  impact  on  his
 breathing.   The report of Stuart Brown in the operating record is
 attached»

 Four  people, we understand, were taken  to the  local hospital  by
 ambulance after the Fire Department was informed and we understand
 that  they were sent home afterwards and no problems were indicated.
 The information on the people is not available to Statewide but the
 Emergency  Data Management Service Phone  number (213)  267-2475
 (Richard  Salinas)  informed me  that he would  be willing to give
 information  to the Department  of Health Services if  they  called
 ?^;.Jrhe ^^ D*Part»ent  (Number 41) reported the incident as No.
 134967 as indicated to m« by Captain  Light.  Th« phone number for
 the Fir« Department is  (213) 564-6241.
   SES Facility: P.O. Box 61248 • 12618 Main Street, Los AnBeles, CA 90061 (213) 756-7896

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                                        IIL..OJ.O do i — .Ji
  Department of Health Services
  Pag* 2
  June 25f  1991
- ATTN:  Jerry Lile
 On  June the 10th, we received a  letter fro» a law firm  who said
 they were  representing  Gloria Mccune and Buford Harris of  140  E.
 126th Street regarding  an accident  on May  28,  1991  and wanted the
 name of our insurance  company  st> they could  be in contact with
 thtrtu.   I  passed on  this  information  to our insurance broker,
 Jardine Insurance Brokers,  Elton  Kunkle,  phone number  (714)  740-
 1127.  We ar« insured by Lloyds of  London.

 Since the incident, we  have stopped the  consolidation  of organic
 peroxides or any  other  materials from lab packs.
 Very truly yours,

 STATEWIDE ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, INC.

Y\ AA $*-	fr
 Matthew F. Stewart
 President

 MPSsci

 Attachments

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•IV.

*£•
                                               f 91
         — -  — "t7 )A~fi. \A J~ i ,\f  »-r .. -  '   -.-.—— -^|/>vx



                              &/&f<»j
                                                               i

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VACWM
*ou.— OFF
DRUM OtUSHNG
Nash Salvage  Inc.
      133S4 ,LA QU1NTA STREET
       LA MIRADA, CA 90639
          (213)
STATS tCTVSf0

    SfftVtCt
        21, 1991


    To Whom it hay Concern:
                 a    Sco.   W<»       B*B^
    hazard  cl«ses ef cheinicalW      udiSrS^iT9  Bever*1

    kiln   °r9*niC Pe^iO«B to toe picked t£ ^ifUS*^!*? '    ENSCO
    kiln.   Preparation  for  direct feed I  ?*f, ? direct feed into their
    organic peroxides  wit^ veritculite into    *S  6olid^i«tion of
           CUB^*rB  the? g^rSe  rela?!^ Pf^ d"»-   "f have
           paroxides which we  handle in a t^ilar     9"8  A  ie6 °f
                                                    ne











   previously  with no reaction  with the        °rganic
  Val  Brandt

-------
  30 gallon poly drum
                                                    SEfi S-21-91
                        .ersini
       b*nzoyl peroxide
       smlofcyl peroxide
       TBP
       MEKP
       dicuayl peroxide
  x  j>  gra»«» solid
ixi  ib. solid
1 x gallon liquid
1 Qt. liquid
3 Iba.  solid
 00321038
      diohlorobenzoyl peroxid* 2 ibs. eolid
      diehlorobuneoyl peroxide 26 x 10 -oz, patte
      TBP                      1 x 40 Ib, liquid
      TBP                      2 x Gal. liquid
      MEKP                     9 x pt.  liquid
 00130007
 00130007
 00221022
 00221022
 00520018
 00130006
.00130000
00130006
TBP -
MEKP -
               ethyl ketenft peroxide

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      ATTACHMENT 14

Oil and Solvent Process Company
           (OSCO)
       Azusa, California

-------

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                                              r
                     AP*
                     OIL ft SOLVENT PROCESS CO.
                  1704 West Pint Street. Azusa, CA 91702
                     618-334-5117 / 714-828-646O
April 26, 1989
John Lewis
Environmental Specialist
California Regional Water Quality Control Board
107 South Broadway Room 4027
Los Angeles, CA  90012

Dear Mr. Lewis:

At  approximately  5;00  p.m.  on  4-21-89 oil  &  Solvent  Process
Company  (osco) had a 9,611 gallon spill of wastewater containing
1.28% solvents with the majority being acetone.

The spill was caused by wastewater being discharged out of a tanX
from a hose that came off of an operating portable pump.

The  spilled wastewater  traveled south  along OSCO's rail  spur,
west  by OSCO's southern  property line, then  spread on the west
side  of OSCO-and  NORAC's property.   Approximately  five  gallons
traveled  from  NORAC's property onto Peckham Road  where the spill
was  contained*    The wastewater  did  not enter  any drains  or
waterways.   Approximately  2f300  gallons vere recovered  via on-
site  vacuum trucks arid absorbent was spread on_spi-ll areas. . The
successful  containment and on-sifee response  action averted any
immediate  environmental  threat.    There  was no  danger  to the
public  because the  spill  was predominantly water.   Ho services
from  outside emergency response agencies were  necessary.

The  wastewater  spill  was reported  to  the  national  Response
canter,  California  Office  of Emergency  Services  and  the Air
Quality Management  District  within 24 hours.     The  California
Department  of Health Services,  Regional Water  Quality  Control
Board and the Region IX Environmental  Protection Agency were also
notified.   The Azusa Police Department and the Los Angeles County
Fire  Department  were at the scene at approximately 7:00 p.m. and
no  action was required on their part.   The Los Angeles county
Department  of Health Services inspected  the area the following
day.
                      A Oiwiim WMM Mmgi
M Company

-------
r
           OSCO  obtained  the  services  of  an  independent  environmental
           consultant  cervice the  next  day.    The  contaminated soil  was
           removed and covered with visquieen.   The excavated  area  will be
           further tested to insure the contamination has been removed.  The
           results will be  forwarded  to the  appropriate agencies  and  the
           area will be backfilled upon agency approval.

           OSCO  is  currently reviewing  procedures  and  modifications  to
           prevent future occurrences.

           Yours truly.
               stahl»cker
           Environmental Manager

           LS:kW

           cc:   MB.  Heather  Stona
                Remedial Project Manager
                Hazardous Waste  Management Division
                D.s. Environmental protection Agency
                Region IX
                215  Fremont  street
                San  Fcancisco, CA  94106

                Mr. Henry chui
                California Department of Health service*
                T«xic Substances control Division
                1403 North 'San Fernando Boulevard
                Suite 300                          -
                Burbank, CA  91504
Mr. Rod Milliken

f ?2Jh»?°?st A}r
9150 Flair Drive
El Mont a, CA  91731
                                       Management District
               Mr. Jamas Nishida
               County of Los Angeles Department of Health Services
               2615 South Grand Avenue  6th Floor #607
               Los Angel**, CA  90OO7

               Mr. Michael D. Douglass
               Ett«rg«ncy Services Coordinator
               City of Azusa
               725 North Alameda Avenue
               AZUsa,  CA  91702

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  ATTACHMENT 15

  Chem-Tech Systems
Los Angeles, California

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_

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                CHEM • TECH • SYSTEMS
                      fl commitment to a dean environment
p-TO;""1  r*r~;
                                                                                    •C-
                                                                      •'(  fi
  September 2, 1994
 Mr. James R. Wilcox, R.E.H.S.
 Environmental Health Specialist
 CITY OF VERNON
 Environmental Health Department
 4305 Santa Fe Avenue
 Vemon, CA  90058
      INCIDENT REPORT DATED AUGUST 30. 1994
 Dear Mr.  Wilcox:

 Please excuse the delay in my response to your question of August 31, 1994, regardin? the
 incident report filed on August 30, 1994. In answer to your question regarding whether the
 emission was nitric acid or nitrous oxide-the response is that the emission was nitrous oxide.
 Chem-Tech speculated that the reaction was probably caused by nitric acid in the tank.  I
 have attached copies of the waste disposition reports for the contents of Tank M-3 prior to
 Monday, August  29, 1994,  and a copy of the waste disposition report for the  waste stream
 unloaded on Monday, August, 29, 1994.

 I have also attached samples of Chem-Tech's daily tank reports. Chem-Tech instituted the
 tank cleaning log in January as part of its operational procedures.  Prior to January, the tank
 cleaning was noted in  the maintenance logs.  As you requested,  Chem-Tech reviewed the
 tank cleaning logs and the maintenance logs for the last year to determine the date that Tank
 M-3 was cleaned.  A record of the cleaning date was not found, however, that does not
 necessarily imply that the tank has not been cleaned in the past year.

 Chem-Tech reviewed its tank cleaning schedule and decided that a new schedule is required
for certain tanks,  including Tank M-3.  I am in the process of developing this schedule and
 will provide you with a copy when it is  complete. Currently, Chem-Tech is  moving and
 treating the material in Tank M-3.  Once the aqueous solution is removed,  Chem-Tech will
 sample the sludge, and remove and treat it accordingly. A copy of the sample analysis of the
 sludge will be sent to you.
                 3650 East 26th Street Los Angeles, California 90023

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 Mr. James R. Wilcox, R.E.H.S.
 CITY OF VERNON
 September 2, 1994
 Page 2
 If you have questions or require additional information, please call me at (213) 268-5056.
 Thank you for your time.
                                                                         \
 Sincerely yours,

 CHEM-TECH SYSTEMS, INC.

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      :lr:a:^l£fcxiV^^^
CHEM
  M commitment to a dean ejtvtroiwt&it
     WASTE DISPOSITION AND
EVALUATION LABORATORY REPORT
Generator/Customers . ^_ ~-~*-\Plf{A -ifaV*^
Manifest No.: ^
Transporter: A> a
Designated for? C
Waste Description
Storage/Transfer I

"^rSd PN Waste ID #:
	 '
'2-*^ o$!~Lty— O1^
Date: 4^2^
Volume: ^2-^70°
Lab No.: H=*~)-q-\.
1 Treatment Q Stabilization Q Storage/Transfer Profile Reviewed Bv: '
•
xi cation:
ANALYSIS
	

LsT)^^
Odor W
Sp. Gravity s-\0\
A
PH i!TA Norm
Oil ^ ^Z-\ %
Solids "^
Flash Point ^~
1\Cyanide (\
Halogens (Total)
Phenol
CTO
1 Before
Treatment
Cd -O
1 Cr l^$r
Cr+6 Y V
Cu LJ '
Pb flic'
Ni l ?T"2_
Aa Or"^
Zn '/?
Other

s" %
fv/ft °F
ppm
//) , ppm
|\/f\ ppm
ppm
ppm
After
Treatment
ppm
W ppm
pom
Dom
ft '~~1 ppm
/<"> - "-^ ppm
•-7 ppm
£•> ^ ppm






IV

\
I
\

ORGANIC WASTE
TREATMENT (100ml)
CaCI2
Alum
NaOH
ml
ml
ml
H2SO4 ml
SBS
DTC
ml
ml
Other:
Anionic Polymer
Cationic Polymer
H2O2
CTS Mixture
FeSO<
Other
ml
ml
ml
ml
ml
ml

Blending Factor:
Comments/Precautions:

H202
SBS *2--v!
NaOH
FeSO< CD
CaCI,

INORGANI
^- ml
^> ml
ml
O ml
ml
Other:

C WASTE ^
H2SO4 I ~-*
Lime /
DTC L S~
i — 	 • —
CTS Mixture
Other fV \ t/Aa - 1 _ O


ml
ml
ml
ml
ml

Blending Factor:
Comments/Precaii
Compatibilities wit
tions: j]
fi Tank No.: Jv
/- 	 -\
-5 ( Mt/W / fJDlW/rH'Uj
/
J*'T 7 A
AFTER TREATMENT OBSERVATION
Treatment Procedure(s):







Temp. Max 7 / °F
Final pH <\
Oil
Water
Total Sludge %\ /^
Disposition: T3
Off-Load To Tfreatm
Analyst: :o r£
Accountina: ^— --^
^ \ %
^O o^
^) Sludge Generated % '^-&

Comments: / -^
•'C^c'*
^ s^^^C?
fe^
/^
Accepted Q Rejected Bv: AA «s
ent Tank No.: -g^L. si
Compatibility: Tank No.: '' '""^
T Date: 5*r/£$7^n Approved bv: x^ Jr-'
r?n /if • t/)^ <^ •_ rv\
Date: /? 1 ^
3EV-11:020394:5M
White - Laooratc-v Coov Canary - Technical Service
\ D^9n/}/^QaiQ- xP ^^

Pink - Accouncnq
-L-^iS





^^m

-------
4^-tJlliiiliHH^^
i  "O
  rs,

!!  8
          UNIFORM  HAZARDOUS
              WASTE  MANIFEST
        U Generator'. Name ond Mc-Cng Address
                                                  'l US EPA ID No.

                                         niAIDlQ|0|8|4|7|4|L|3|2|3  |8  |5   |9
       4. Qeoerotof't Phoo* ( Rig  8&2-2184
       5. r.omporrer I Ccmpony Nome

        The Patterson  Group. Inc
       7, Transporter 2 Compony Name
      " 9. D*v,na«a Foa.rty Name and Site Address

         $!§ 1SJ5 26th Straet
         Los  Angeles,  CA 90023
       „. US OPT
                       . .inc.uding Proper Shipp.ng Nome. Hazard Cla,,. end ID Nu.nber,
 6. US EPA ID Number

 C| A|  P| 9| 8j_2L 3| 6!  9| 9| 9|3_|
 8. US EPA ID Number

  I  I   I  I J  I   I  I   I  1
10. US EPA ID N'jmDer
                                                     ir.!AiTlQl8lOlOl3l3l6l8|_lJ
                                                                                12. CmJuineri
              RQ  hazardous waste liquid,  n.o.s.  (contains
              chrcr.iua),  9,  NA  3082,  PG  III
                                                                                     T  T
                                                                                              13. Total
                                                                                              Ouonrty
tu
  < .
  U.
         15.
          ^*g?^^yyf^yityE"cpK^«5'Q«*««»j»^»"»^»"i
          Spcoctl HondSng JrmnicSom ond AddHioool Wormaobn

        wear  gloves and  goggles
                                                                   nnrr-TTi-r  r.™**^-.   818-336-7200
                                            - - - • — ; __    , VK, and accurately deicribed above by proper shipping name ana are daw

                                                                            ^    * OPPiiCOble 
-------



a commitment to a dean environment
     WASTE DISPOSITION AND
EVALUATION LABORATORY REPORT
Generator/Custon
Manifest No.:
Transporter •;
Designated for: £
Waste Description
Storage/Transfer I
ier: -V^-A^H,
^ j#'*-j t— i/f,^'2—
P^Wa^fc^ Waste ID *• ~


7 f-f)g// —& fo
JxTfeatment^ Q Stabilisation Q Storage/Transfer Profile R
.ocXtion: P
ANALYSIS
Appearance ^/(
Odor (/
V^T^W-X-
U(Q>
Sp. Gravity // / C"
pH -<=. / Norm %
Oil -=. / ' o/o
Solids <*z. I %
Flash Point
<5i itfirtoc
Cyanide
Halogens (Total)
Phenol
CTO
Before
Treatment
Cd
Cr+6
Cu CT (
1 Mi 1
II
1 ^
LEbTLV
Other

k) ^ °F
^J 7^ ppm
LJ 1 ef ppm
7
r PPm
U {CY ppm
' ppm
After
Treatment
ppm
ppm
DD1T)
ppm
ppm
ppm
ppm
ppm





Date: <£ 1 7*9 /9^/-
Volume: 2? (2~C*r^ '
Lab No.: / ^-7 ^ <=;>„ y.
. _ — / -^ "* >' *•/ r 	
eviewed By: /


ORGANIC WASTE
TREATMENT (100ml)
CaCI2
Alum
NaOH
ml
ml
ml
HzSO^ ml
SBS
DTC
ml
ml
Other:
Anionic Polymer ml
Cationic Polymer ml
H2O2 ml
CTS Mixture ml
FeSO< ml
Other mi

Blending Factor:
Comments/Precautions:

H20a
SBS
NaOH !^~

INORGANI
ml
ml
ml
FeSOi ml
CaCI,
ml
Other: £L#-<£ AW1^

C WASTE
HzSO* ml
Lime -x ml
DTC 1 ' ° ml
CTS Mixture ml
Other ml
ja^y%^jl,^^rX ,.&£_ t
Blending Factor: A-^-_. ^y"*V /^ •
Comments/Precautions:
Compatibilities with Tank No.: /^
* f^T~^~i^
' O (M^H ) A£ /» $ 'rft-i
AFTER TREATMENT OBSERVATION
Treatment Procedure(s):






Temp. Max ^r ^
— & /•>
) C^ op
Final pH '
Total Sludge $\'**'
Disposition: \3
Off-Load To-Treatm
Analyst: ^u*-*-^
Accounting: 
-------
           Cofifornlo
                             olPn
                                   crion Aoffrtcy
    F»on AppnWd OMS No. 20SO-OOW (Expire! 9-3O-9.4)
    K»ow $>on» ofc.
                                                                    6. US EPA ID Number
                                                          C A  0
                                             1  6  6
            7. Transporter 2 Company Nome
                                                           8. US EPA ID Number


                                                            I   I    I   I   I    I   I   I    I   I   I
   9. Designated Facility Name and Site Address
   •-h^n-'scr.  systos-s
   3£E£   t.  eSch  'ifcr-^r
                                                          10. US EPA ID Number
                                                                                                    81  2
                                                                                                                       2. Pago 1
                                                                                                                          Information in th« shaded i
                                                                                                                          is not required by federal I
            11. US DOT Description (including Proper Shipping Name, Hazard Class, and ID Number)
                                                                                                          K. Handfing Codes for Wastes listed
           15. Special Handling Instructions and Additional Information
i   -en-*,

  16. GENERATOR'S CERTIFICATION: I hereby declare that the contents of this consignment ore fully and accurately described above by proper shipping name and are classified.]
     pocked, marked, ond labeled, and are in all respects in proper condition for transjjort by highway according to applicable international and national government regulations.

f     K I am a large quantity generator. I certify mat I have a program in place to reduce the volume and toxkHy of waste generated to the degree I  have determined to I
I     economically practicable ond that I  have selected the practicable method of treatment, storage, or disposal currently available to me which minimizes the present and ft-"--
     thfecrt to human health and the environment: OR.  if I am a small quantity generator. 1 have made a good faith effort to minimize my waste generation and select the
I     waste management method that is available to me  ond that I can afford.
  Printed/Typed Name
         t
                                                                       Signature
                                                                                                                                       Month
                                                                                                                                                  Day
           17. Tromoorlef 1  Acknowledgement of Receipt of Materials
          Pr!atoet/Tj
                       Name
           18. Transporter 2 Acknowledgement of Receipt of Materials
          Printed/Typed Name
7<~ /*,.*./ //
—
rature
Month Day
.- \*\l 1?
'
Month
1
Day
1
          19. Discrepancy Indication Space
          50  facility Owner or Operotor Certificotion of receipt of hozordous materials covered by this manifest except as noted in Hem  19
          Pftnted/Typed Nome
                                                                       Signature
                                                                                                                                                 Day
                                                              DO NOT  WRITE  BELOW THIS  UNE.
i  3IJC

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                    a commitment to a clean environment
                                                 WASTE  DISPOSITION AND
                                          EVALUATION LABORATORY REPORT
 Generator/Customer:	
 Manifest No.:      <^T)^'2,
 Transporter:   ^"^rv^yp^
 Designated for: T5J Treatment
 Waste Description: 	
 Storage/Transfer Location: _

           ANALYSIS
Appearance.
Odor 	\
Sp. Gravity _
PH    ^H    Norm
Oil      <1
Solids	£A
Flash Point _
Sulfides	
Cyanide	
Halogens (Total) , r>
  Phenol      fvy
  CTO
 Cd
                               E
                                   Waste ID
                                 CaCI2
                                 Alum _
                                 NaOH
                                 SBS
                                 DTC
	 
-------
.S!
    o:
    01
   U
   •lit
   t/S
   i
   S
   01
   S
            X' Gwertrtor't Nom« ot»d MoiEng Address
            Rohr,  rlnc. ^  1V«
— «
•^
F


-2H-
                                                                                                            1
           15. Spt«iol Hondlna Inrtroelian. and Ado»oool hfarmotion

           Eaergency Response'Inforaation
           Rohr,  Inc
                                                              ':Wear"Pr«per Safety Equip«ent.

  ' wmt» monooetnent method mot b oToaoble to me end mot I con offord.	
Printed/Typed Nome
           17. Tromporter 1 Adcnowiedgement of Receipt of Mderiah
18. Trorapomr 2 Acfa»wie7?C— ??
                                                                                 White:   TSDF SENDS THIS; CC?Y TO 3TSC WITHIN 30 I
                                                                                 ; ' ^. "'P.O. Sox 20OO, Socramento. CA  95812""".,.';

-------

-------
I	 ; ',;•;
 «|0
 "SAMPLER:
   LOCATION:"
DATE:
TIME:
                                                           OAM ()PM
   SAMPLE NAME:	
=   ANALYSES COMPLETED BY:	
§j   PLANT CONTACTED BY:	CONTACT IS:
   COMMENTS:     	
                  TIME:
                  TIME:"
                                                              QAM ()PM
                                                             _<)AM()PM
  CHECIC APPROPRIATE TESTi'S'i NEEDED:
\ GEN TSTS RESULTS |
..:_- 1
•71 . "


x ORGANICS RESULTS !
1 -•/--!• i
i '
i
i -x TC '• ^ •-.; '
'
,— - , , , :
x METALS RESULT
! Cadmium '' 	 /} ~j
• r ^, ' ' ! i :' 	 ""'
j C!:ro|r:!ur.i ••• >'-••' —
j . (Totr.i) L.^.
: •- ,,•„.- 4- ... :. •
3
                                                                    	Cihcr
                                    TREATMENT
                                   ORGANIC \\'AST:
                                      (100 ML,
                                 , .Alum

-------
 VYEHX OF:
         WEEKLY STATUS OF ORGANIC BLENDING/HOLDING TANK

         -)t^                                              * i FT. = 2.000 GALS.
                                                       	1 FT. =  800 GALS.
TA.HK N'O,
  1C1
  :C2
CAPAC.TT
(GALS.)
• WONDAY   xj;
 RECORDING/. •
          ~
              16.900
              16.SOO
              12.500
-RECORDINO/gi
^WEDNESDAY :
I RECORDING/" ,"
:*J"OTACOA1_ .'—
                                                                THURsnAY    JFHIDAV""
                                                                                    "''
                                                                RECORDING;    I RE&;  :."'.,'.
                                                               'TOTAL-OAL..
              12.500
             1S.5GO
             28.500
             16.SOO
             12.500
                           +-
                          ^ L (.'
             15.COO
             = rnn  ^
            15.CCO
                                 zLd/.-r-
                                   i  t> C- <._
            i6.=oo !. ;..;- .—
                  ' *- '  -i „  *'..
            1^ cnn  !-'?  *'
            }>	J !   > '- ,--V-—.
                 	'	-^  • -f c.. >	^
                        5"
               V5C
            '6.9GO ! £~^-'
                     .*."«--»
                        gg^rl
                                        •(_.
                                  (flrc
                                  2^^--
                                ^gZHso
                                1Pryt
-------

-------
    PUG 33 "34 13:11
                           .CHEM-TECH s:
                               INCjbENT-Rfe
                          , me.
    ADDRESS:
                    CHEM,TECH
3650E. 26:TH STREET -"  ' '
LOS ANGELES, CA@0023^ '
                    (213) 268-5056
      i

   -FAOLITY NAME: SAME
    DAXEQJF INCIDENT:    Augusts?, 1994 J.^

    TIME OF INCIDENT:    Between 11: 30    I
                                                Qn
•. •  :NAMKUF MATERIAL .INVOLVED:   i
     , and
                                                         Receptionist     -

                                              moml Hospital On August 30 ti
                    REPORT;

                                                                            I
                                                                            |.
                                                                                 r-
                                                                                i
                                                                               i';.
                                                                               i-J;

-------
ftUG 38  '94  13:11
      .-   '-Incjdeqt Report
:  ;, f  , -  ."August29, 1994
i,   *   a  «  *'«  ^ "•  * ,* '
                                                                                          P. 3/5
    ; emergency alarm was sounded and all perso.nw$ vvjsis evacuated from the facility within-7 .•
 minutes. ;The plant was shut down and.orUy.-^,s'c:rujbbji^. were left in operation. Two
 transporters were on site -at the time of the eyacuajicfn; / Unated Pumping and The Patterson
 Group: The transporters were evacuated with the <>4her:"«mpioyees and the vehicles left on site,

 32:27 PM                       i   .    '/':''

. Th
-------
 RUG 30 '94 13:12
                                                                                P. 4/5'
:InddentK;eport                :    •        '•;•''•"'..;  ~                         .   ;
August 29; 1994               •    ;      •';  '.'.•.-.••';..•'••••
Page'3'. .'                        ''     - -; ..• . [ •    -: ' ' = •



A^ESSMENT OF mo»ENT?   The rel W^eiig.tp be the result of the off-loading of a
tanker^water Wth chrome^H-5) into Tank.M-3, ivlM.contains mixed acids. Chem^hl
-fol)o.w^jtS:SOP for compatibility, testing befare/ofRiowOng the tanker.  Solids in the tank were
agitated 4 tmng the unloading process aDd a .chemicaj.-r^ticn.occurred whereby ^ouJoST
  ^released through the air scrubber. The sy^m,,(^«ept.fotthe air scrubber?^shutTown'.
                                                     3d. Chern-Tech's laboratory staff' :
                                                          can be neutralized in the
           to
                        satiation that the-.mixtum i
                                         .             .ans can  e
 ttpttnent>0ystems.  This treatment will -take. place o^rtfaa next, few days.
 ASSESSMENT OF

       f  T?65 Wer!n0t SpiUed t&the '^^iPmi^on was acute, lasted between '0
  unute .and 1 hour and was dispersed^ a- gouthw«^i;wind: Since the prirnary actiS  T
  LOW-UP ACTIONS: Ch^n-Tech Systeina, to^agement staff win perf
bn
                                                                          orm a
                                         .^^
            and ^implement new procedures. ^ preyefat ^re:inc5dents.  Chem-Tech
  Q2 m the- fankM-3 area, the results-,of these teflts^lbe lagged.
                                            '            '
     dynD.-iForrest
i Technical Services Manager
       .Y^landa Garza, AssociateiHazardaus iN^tot^'Sfc
      :.Cajifornia Environmental- Protection ^genctyi.  '•-''
      .,Department.ofToxicSubsjtancosControl-'" •  ,'-
       Region3                          ••• •: .-.
       1'Q.H Grand view Avenue"        .• .'  , •'.
      . .GJijndale, CA 91201      •          '' -'V'
      :FAX: (818)551-2874        ....   .'•• -,:
                                                                                                • -,

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   PUG 30 '94 13-'13
.-  JncJ;4ent. Report
   ,'August 2$, 1994
!   llPafe'4: '
>**"''"
                                                                                  P.5/5'
•  i
       '• •  :.'f$ena Suzuki, Associate-Hazardous Materi
       '•   .California Environmental protection Agency \
       ,,   ; Department of Toxic Substances Control-;'
, 10.i 1 North Graadview Avenue.
 Glendale,CA 91201        '  :
 Fax:  (818) 551-2841

f James R, Wilcox, R,E;H.^.
• City of Vernon              !
 ^uyironmental Health Departrrient
• 4305 Santa Pe Avenue
'.Vecnon,CA9005S
[Fax:  (213)583-4451
      _'::    Sputh Coast Air Qqality Management. Dtis.ti:i'

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           ATTACHMENT 16

Chemical Waste Management of the Northwest
              (CWMNW)
            Arlington, Oregon

-------

-------
     •4
          08:20
           ©503 388 8283
                                            D E  Q   BE.ND
                                                                                          .'003
     Chemical Waste Management of the Northwest, Inc.
     17629 Cedar Borings Lane
     Arlington, Oregon 97812
     503/454-2643
  May 20, 3 994
  Mr. Brett McKnight
  Manager
  Oregon DEQ
  Eastern Regional Office
  2146 N.E. Fourth St.
  Bend, Oregon 97701
  [P 988 803 221]
                                        Mr. Randall Smith
                                        Director
                                        US EPA
                                        Hazardous Waste Division
                                        1200 Sixth Avenue, HW-112
                                        Seattle, Washington 98101
                                        [P 988 803 222]
  RE:
Chemical Waste Management of the Northwest, Inc. (CWMNW)
Part B permit ORD 089452353 (Permit)
May 5, 1994 Contingency Plan Implementation
 Dear Mr. McKnight and Mr.  Smith:
 ™                                        C°ndition ILH'  «* Secti«n 9-0(A)(6) of the
 CWMNW Contingency  Plan, CWMNW is providing a written report of an incident which
 required  implementation  of the CWMNW Contingency Plan.  The incident involved a fire
 made Landfill L-13, which was discovered by a security guard at approximately 10:00  P.M
 PST on May 5, 1994. This incident was previously reported to Brett McKnight and Mike Renz
 6  ^4Department md Bruce Lon§ of t*16 ASency * approximately 8:15 A.M. PST on May
 Incident and Cause

 The incident involved a fire in the noriheastern  corner of the L-13 Landfill.   The landfill
 quadrants which were affected by the fire are highlighted on the grid coordinate system man
 enclosed in Attachment  1 of this report. The fire was initially discovered by a security guST
 who immediately notified the Emergency Coordinator (EC). The EC mobilized the necessary'
 r^cV0 A   *  ^ Wd ** &e Was comPletely extinguished at approximately 1:00
 A.M. PST on May 6, 1994.  The area was reworked and monitored to ensure the fire did not
 reoccur.  The area was put back into service on May  10, 1994,  after CWMNW notified Brett
 McKnight that the area was again ready for service. Copies of CWMNW's incident reportine
 rorms are enclosed in Attachment 2 of this report.    .

 CWMNW has performed a detailed investigation of the-incident, including an evaluation of all
rw^/T1^,   W6r!  ?laC^  m **  affected  ^te™*  ^ week before the incident.
CWMNW has determined that the most likely cause of the fire was stabilized waste(s) coming
into contact with  combustible/burnable waste(s).  The disposal records indicate that a large
amount  of wood  debris was placed in relative proximity  to a number of stabilized  waste
streams  which may have been generating heat.  CWMNW  maintains separate disposal areas
for stabilized wastes or other wastes which generate heat and combustible/burnable  waste
               "'•t-rriir^i W; .-.

-------
00/23/94    08:21
©503 388  8283
                                               D E Q   BK.SU
©002/003
    Mr. Brett McKnight and Mr. Randall Smith
    May 20, 1994                                                              !
    Page Two
                                                              ,   i               i       ,
    streams (e.g. wood debris); however, in this case, some waste from the combustible/'burnable
    area was introduced into the hot load area.
                                                                 i               |
    A table summarizing the waste steams and the corresponding waste profile summary sheets for
    wastes in the incident area (including names *md quantities)  are enclosed in Attachment 3 of
    this report.  This information was requested  by Mike Renz of the Department and Bruce Long
    of the  Agency during the inspection on May (5,  1994.
                                                                 .
    There  were no injuries sustained by any personnel during  the actual incident  or remediation
    of the incident.  The fire was  contained and extinguished  within the  landfill.  CWMNW
    characterizes any actual or potential threat  to human health  or the environment as minor in
    nature.                                                                      '
                           1 '                                                     !
    Steps to Prevent Recurrence

    CWMNW immediately began implementing  the following actions to prevent the recurrence of
    this type of incident:

    •       CWMNW supplemented the Landfill L-13 operating procedures  (Standard Division
           Practice) to  clarify  that waste streams which may be generating  heat (e.g. stabilized
           waste and potliner (K088)) must be kept separate from containers or burnable materials
           (including debris).

    •       The operations staff was re-trained on existing and revised landfill operating procedures
           regarding the segregation of waste streams which may generate heat and those which
           are  burnable.   In addition, the incident and  methods  to prevent recurrence  were
           discussed with all CWMNW employees.
                                                                 i     ,     '     i
                                                                 i               i
    •       CWMNW has purchased a infrared thermometer  gun and thermocouple thermometer
           probe which will be used in a pilot  study to investigate methods  to identify loads of
           waste which are generating heat.  In addition, CWMNW will attempt to quantify the
           surface  and core temperatures  of  selected  waste  loads/streams  utilizing  the new
           instruments.   CWMNW will analyze the  information from the pilot study to evaluate
           the feasibility  and need for the implementation of additional operational procedures.
           The CWMNW material handlers and  operations staff were trained on the use of the new
           instruments today.   The study will initisiily include loads of wastes which are stabilized
           on or off-site, loads of potliner (KL088), loads which  are observed to be steaming or
           emitting vapors, and any loads which are warm to the touch through gloves or sample
           containers.    Copies of the instrument  specification  summaries are  enclosed  in
           Attachment 4 of this report.
                                                                                      ©
                                                                         tacycwd P*M!

-------
                  S503  38S
                                            D  K Q  BK.ND
  Mr. Brett McKnight and Mr. Randall Smith
  May 20, 1994
  Page Three
        CWMNW is conducting an intensive fire brigade training session for all personnel on
        the CWMNW fire team during May 21 and 22.  The fire brigade training will be
        conducted by an accredited fire-training instructor.
 If you have any questions regarding this report, or if I can be of anv assistance please call
 at (503) 454-2643.                                            *           V
                                                              me
 I certify under penalty of law that this document and all attachments were prepared under my
 direction or supervision in accordance with a system designed to assure that qualified personnel
 properly  gather and evaluate the information submitted. Based on my inquiry of the person
 or  persons who manage the system, or those persons directly responsible for gathering the
 information,  the information submitted is, to be the best of my knowledge and belief, true
 accurate and complete.  I am  aware that there  are  significant penalties for submitting false
 information,  including the possibility of fine and imprisonment for knowing violations.
 Sincerely,
 Chemical
:ement of the Northwest,  Inc.
Andrew D.R. Nichols
Environmental  Manager
ADN/mb
Attachments
cc:     Bruce Long (EPA) [P 988 803 223]
       Mike Renz (DEQ) [P 988 803 224]

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-------
  ATTACHMENT 17

Northwest EnviroService
        (NWE)
  Seattle, Washington

-------

-------
                                 ECCL3GY, NUIRC
                                Post-It" brand fax transmlttal memo 7671
   March  21,  1994
PROM:
            Paul  O'Brien \<
                                                         spm,
                        BBfiEQHSE SUMMARY
  Reporting Party:
  Date of Response:
  contaminant:
  Quantity:
  Site Location/County:
  Site Name:
  Ecology Case No.:
 EPA I.D. No.:
 Manifest No.:
 Olympus Job No.:
 Contractor:
 Ecology Responders:
 DOE Costs:
 Other Response Agencies:

Destruct Order:
                         Jerry Bartlett
                         February 15,  1994
                         Oil/Hasardous Waste Mixture Fuel
                        5, ,500 gallons
                        B1.05 1st Ave South - King County
                        Northwest EnviroService
                        N1S094
                        N/A
                        N/A
                        N/A
                        N/A
                        Paul O'Brien,  Elin Abrainson, Dick
                        Storey, Hathor  Woods
                        To  be determined
                              eattle
                                             Works Dept.,
                                      NOAA'  s
                           Police Departments
                         N/A

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                   09:28
                               ECOLOGY, NUJRC
                                                            O32
  Environmental Assessment:To be determined through NKDA RDA
  Property Ownership:

  EnviroService
WDOT, City of Seattle, Northwest
  On  February  15/1994 at 9:3O a.m.,  we received a report from

  Jerry Bartlett  of  Northwest EnviroService (NWE)  that a s QQQ

  gallon spill  of hazardous  waste had occurred at their 1st

  IS2S? ^a5lon<,  Hi8 initial reP°rt indicated tha? the
  material^had  spilled from  a bulk container on their site

  into a Storm  drain system  and from  there  went into a nearby

           *lth°Wh *»t»il» were sketchy,  NWE believed that
         had purposely opened a  valve on the tank,  thereby


  3£ spill SLanSp?ntS*   NWE accepted ful1 responsibility*^



  O'Brien and Abramson  immediately  responded to the  spill

  ™»A   n5;cessary  internal and external notifications  w«re
  made.  Upon arrival,  we  found NWZ, EPA's  Technical


  all SrSIt^T*"  
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                  09:26
                              ECOLOGY, NURC
                                                           003
 Tile
 March 21,1994
 Page 3












to the federal ?SSJ fund* et£*  SaSfK?'* 2cti°ns' access
Transportation and Seattle ' EnoiAeer?^ n9 to« Department of
involved in the spill becauf* «? ™i?g DePart»ent were
t.«tin, of th. .tora
«pill documenting
                                response activities,
        followup.
                                    were handed off to the
  determine
   apiii situation
                                 » =logy P«ti=ipat.a ln
                                   r"1"9 was  an 'ttrn
                                   of events surrounding
placed on the

February 10
                                "*"
                                                 to th.

                                            ana a "" «•

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                   09:2S
                               E-COLOGY, NURG
                                                            03-
  File
  March 21,1994
  Page 4
  February 11
  February 14
 February  is
  of  the valves were  still  closed  and  the seal
  was still  intact.   The tank  was  then loaded
  on  a truck and brought to the  spill  site.

  - Once at the spill site  samples were taken
  through the top hatch  and analyzed.   The
  analysis showed that after 24  hours  the
  sample settled to a 70/30 ratio  of sludge to
  liquid.

  - Dale Leicks, NWE  facility  employee,  did a
  site walk just prior to leaving  for the  day.
  The tank was still  full of product at  1430
 hours on February 14.
                  '    '     '\.:.         i
  - The spill was discovered at 0750 hours by
 Dale Leicks as he does his normal morning
 site walk when he noticed a sheen on the
 P&rking lot.   He proceeded to run up the hill
 and loc:ated the sourp* as the tank in
 question.  He closed the now open outside
 valve and immediately called for help.  He
 called  Bill DeNike,  a NWE employee
 responsible for the rail cars.   Bill
 responded  to  this site and determined  through
 the  top hatch that  the  basically the  entire
 tank load  had been  lost.  He estimated that
 approximately 5KOO  gallons of blended fuel
 product had been  lost.

 - 0800:  Leicks and  DeNike immediately put
 Out  barriers  to divert  product  around storm
 drains.  Dale begins to divert  pump trucks to
 the  NWES site for use in spill  recovery.
 Bill Notified Tom summerfold  that a spill had
 occurred and Tom Summerfeld notified  Jerry
 Bartlett.  Jerry notified  the National
 Response Center at 0900  and received  case
 number 221807, Jerry notified Ecology  and
 Steve Banchero.  Jerry spoke  with Christie
 True of Metro, she indicted that  she thought
 none of the product  would  get off site.  OSCG
was on scene at 0920 as they  thought he
product might reach  the Duwamish.  They
recommend that Jerry notify the Seattle rire
Department, he did at 0930.
NWE indicated that they believe that the spill was caused  by

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   File

   March 21,1994
   Page 5
            natSr^of tS'J  ?alled ^ Dotage due to  the







  investigator to deterge ?£ iff J?1?™^  to hirla private
  identify « suspaet?        f there  is  enou9h evidence to

tampered
ss '


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