-------
TABLE 1. (continued)
Area
Response Technology
Alternative
Description
Rationale for Rejection/Acceptance
NCP
Reference
II
continued)
Disposal of PCB-contaniinated oil and
aludge sediments at a Class I
landfill
• A successful French drain system
is operating for similar problem
at a GE site in Pittsfield, HA
(7) Ground water
Monitoring
(Accepted)
Monitoring of ground water that has
been recovered and treated
State and Federal regulations
require that fluids that are
discharged into a surface water
body must be monitored
III
(8) Containment without
Extraction
(Rejected)
(9) Hell pumping system
for Extraction
(Rejected)
(1) Surface Grading
and Runoff Controls
(Accepted)
Employ physical barriers such as
surface sealing, a bentonlte slurry
trench cutoff wall around the area
and chemical grouting beneath the
contaminated zone to immobilize
the free oil by restriction of
ground water movement through contam-
inated zones
There would be no extraction of fluid
phase
Installation of wells to recover
oil
Grading and construction of berras
where necessary; growth of
vegetative cover
No way of ensuring the integrity
of a chemical grout curtain, there-
fore there is high risk that
contaminated oil and oily ground
water would move downward through
breaks in grout curtain
• Subsurface materials are hetero-
genous; oil zone configura-
tion not precisely defined thus
would not be efficient; French
drain much more flexible
Large number of wells would have
been necessary due to large
plume size; even if geologic condi-
tions were uniform the number of
wells required would have greatly
increased operational costs
300.70 (b)(l)(iii)(A)
ground water controls-
impermeable barriers
300.70 (bUOUHHC)
ground water controls-
ground water pumping
Only grading (vs. grading and
surface sealing) deemed necessary
due to insignificant levels of
PCBs present in area
Constructing runoff control struc-
tures such as berms was undertaken
in response to request by state that
GE control storm water drainage
from this area
300.70 (b)(l)(ii)(c)
grading
300.70 (b)(l)(ii)(B);
(O,(2),(5),(6)
surface water
diversions
(continued)
-------
^ABLE 1. (continued)
Area
Response Technology
Alternative
Description
Rationale for Rejection/Acceptance
HGP
Reference
I
NJ
I, II
& III
(1)
Surface Runoff
Monitoring and
Discharge
(Accepted)
Three separate drainage systems all
of trtiich eventually discharge through
one main outlet
(1) Drainage from bentonite soil seal
areas
(2) Drainage from building roofs
(3) Drainage from paved areas
Fluids passing through each drainage
system monitored separately and then
discharged
Provides flexibility of system
isolation if monitoring results
ever indicate high contamination
levels
Establishes effectiveness of
selected response technologies
-------
with those corrective measures considered for Area 1. As
previously described, the problem in Area I involved
surface soil PCB contamination to a maximum depth of 5
feet. Consequently the alternative remedial techniques
confined to this zone of contamination.
The overall contamination in Area II was much more
widespread than in Area I. The surface soil contamination
levels were higher and contamination extended further
below the ground surface. In addition, free oil con-
taining high concentrations of PCBs occurred in sand
lenses Due to the more extensive contamination problem,
the corrective measures considered for Area II involved a
higher degree of complexity, than those considered for
Area I. Table 1 continues with detailed descriptions of
the remedial alternatives assessed for Area II.
The Phase II field investigation activities conducted
in Area III revealed insignificant PCB concentration
levels in both soil and ground water samples. On the
basis of the low contamination levels it was decided that
the necessary response in this area would involve the
grading of the area, as opposed to grading and surface
seeding for other areas. In addition, the state required
that the facility management provide storm water control
in this area.
Extent of Site Response
The ultimate extent of the site response has not yet
been established, as of January 1983. The site response
that has already been carried out, and is described above
is the immediate correction plan; a long term remedy has
not yet been initiated, but is required by the state, and
is now being developed by GE. The goal and scope of the
long term plan, as well as the extent of the immediate
correction plan is considered below.
The "Long Term Mitigation Plan: as described in the
1980 CAO should "remove and/or treat contaminated soil and
ground water to acceptable levels." The research for this
plan, occurring at GE's Schenectady, New York research and
development laboratories includes , as previously
mentioned, three areas of study:
1. Microbial degradation of the waste in-situ or in
combination with other methods such as solvent
extraction or chemical pretreatment .
300.68OO
initial screen-
ing of
alternatives
300.70(b)(iii)
microbiological
degradation
9-30
-------
2. Treatment of the soil with a liquid detergent to
"wash" the oil out of the soil pores and flush it
into the French drain.
3. Chemical destruction with a potassium hydroxide
and polyethylene glycol combination similar to
the sodium polyethylene glycol (NaPEG) system
developed by the Franklin Institute.
The implementation of a "Long Term Mitigation Measure" is
anticipated in 1987 after completion of a research and
pilot scale program.
The extent of the immediate site response was deter-
mined primarily by two decisions:
1. Selection of the French drain instead of another
alternative such as excavation and removal, is
discussed in detail above in the "Selection of
Site Response" section, and only in general terms
in this section.
2. The level of treatment for the collected waste-
water had to be established for removal of PCB
laden oil and grease. This decision on the level
of treatment for the water was an implicit result
of choosing the French drain. This system
collects PCB oil and slightly contaminated water,
which must be decontaminated to some allowable
PCB concentration before discharging to the East
Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD). EBMUD
held a meeting with GE in April 1981, regarding
the proposed discharge at which time GE indicated
that discharge to the storm drainage system was
not very viable, perhaps due to required level of
treatment.
The selection of the French drain largely determined
the extent of the site response for the immediate correc-
tion plan. In general, the French drain was accepted by
the state based on their understanding with GE that a long
term mitigation plan would be developed and implemented.
In addition, the state believed that some immediate con-
tainment and runoff control was needed, but concurred with
GE and its consultant that immediate excavation and
removal would be excessively risky and costly. However,
because the state law required that PCBs be safely
disposed of, as discussed in the "Initiation of Site
Response" section above, the long term mitigation plan is
considered a necessary element of the site response.
300.70(b)(iii)
(E)(l)
solution mining
300.70(b)(ii)(B)
chemical methods
300.68(j)
extent of remedy
9-31
-------
The decision to limit the concentration of the
effluent from the treatment system to an average PCS
concentration of 50 ppb and a maximum of 150 ppb was based
primarily on estimated quality of the effluent which could
be produced from the FRAM unit. It was determined that
these average and maximum concentrations would not disrupt
the EBMUD's treatment process or violate NPDES permit
compliance conditions. When the EBMUD was asked by GE to
set a standard for PCBs in a revised discharge permit for
waste going into the EBMUD system, they referred to their
wastewater control ordinance, which has no ^specific PCB
standard, but requires them to prohibit anything that will
cause harm tc District facilities. After determining that
PCBs would not harm the system, the EDMUD considered the
limits set forth in the NPDES permit, which also has no
specific PCB standard, but only a limit on the amount of
Total Identifiable Chlorinated Hydrocarbon (TICH)^. ^ By
calculating the PCB influent as an additional identifiable
chlorinated hydrocarbon to be considered among the TICK
effluent, the EBMUD set the PCB levels given above,
assuming that PCBs are not removed at all and pass
directly through the plant (Aroclor 1260 is generally
considered to be very refractory). The EBMUD's TICK
effluent was approximately doubled by the addition of the
GE waste to about 0.2 ppb, which is still significantly
below their NPDES permit level. This level was set by the
RWQCB to meet federal regulations (40 CFR, Sections
129.105(4)) which states that "The ambient water quality
criteria for PCBs in navigable water is 0.001 ppb. Since
Aroclor 1260, has a solubility of 3 ppb in water, the
saturated oil-free FRAM effluent has a PCB level at or
below 3 ppb before dilution. Subsequently, a new
discharge permit was issued to GE based on monitoring of
the effluent from this facility at a point nearer to its
discharge into the sanitary sewer after the FRAM oil
removal unit wastewater has comingled with other plant
wastes.
DESIGN AND INSTALLATION OF RESPONSE TECHNOLOGIES
The response actions finally selected for use at the
site, were designed to provide containment and control of
(1) 'the oil-contaminated zone and (2) surface runoff.
The oil plume control system operates to remove oil from
subsurface soils and controls the water table gradients in
the oil plume area to preclude any movement of ground
water or other fluids vertically downward into deeper for-
mations and therefore provides containment of contaminants
in the oil plume area. The established surface runoff
controls prohibit the movement of PCB-contaminated soils
into surface runoff and greatly reduces infiltration of
9-32
300.70(b)(l)
[(1) & (2)]
ground water
controls -
ground water
pumping
-------
rainfall through the soils to the ground water. In
reducing infiltration, the runoff controls also act to
enhance the ability of the oil plume control system to
control ground water gradients.
The plans and specifications for implementation of
the response measures at the GE site were completed in
June 1981. The successful bidder for the project was
selected in August 1981. Construction began in August
1981 and was completed in December 1981. The response
program included the following facilities:
• A surface sealing system of bentonite and soil
overlaid with a permeable gravel layer; and
asphalt paving
• Surface runoff controls including curb and gut-
ters, catch basins, drainage piping, drainage
channels and a monitoring station
• A three-trench French drain system with a central
collection sump and mechanical extraction system
• Disposal of recovered PCB-oil and sediments at a
Class I landfill
• A ground water treatment system and storage
facilities for treated ground water, sediment and
PCB-contaminated oil
• Modification of the existing tank farm for
approved temporary bulk storage of PCS fluids and
drummed storage of sediments.
Surface _S_ea_l_ing and^ Runoff Control System
The design for the surface sealing and runoff control
system at the GE facility consists of two soil sealing
techniques, various types of drainage controls and three
separately, structured drainage systems. The two types of
soil sealing techniques utilized are (1*) a soil-bentonite
mixture covered with a gravel blanket and (2) asphalt
paving and base rock coated with a surface sealant. The
soil-bentonite seal was used over those site areas where
(1) there were high concentrations of PCBs, (2) where
automotive traffic was, and currently is, prohibited and
(3) those areas where no facility expansion plans existed.
A schematic representation of the soil-bentonite seal
and a typical drainage channel is shown in Figure 9.
Prior to applying bentonite to designated areas, grading
was often necessary to provide uniform slopes for surface
9-33
300.70(b)(l)
(ii)(A,B,C & D)
surface water
controls
-------
^c
I
-P-
EXISTING
PLANT PAVED
SURFACES
SURFACE SEAL ON
CONTAMINATED
SOILS
DRAINAGE
CHANNEL
<
SURFACE SEAL ON
CONTAMINATFD
SOILS
CATCH
BASIN
CULVERT
BCNTON1TE /SOIL IMPERMEABLE LAYER
GRAVEL
Figure 9 Typical Surface Seal and Drainage Channel
(From: Immediate Correction Plan Report, G.E. , Co., CA, January 20, 1981)
-------
runoff control. Following the grading process, dry
bentonite was applied over the contaminated area using a
truck designed with a rear spreader through which the dry
bentonite was applied. The bentonite supply was kept in a
hopper located on top of the truck. The rate of bentonite
application depended on the rate at which the truck was
traveling. On the average, the truck would spread 150
tons, (136 Mt) of bentonite over 7 acres every 2 days.
About 4 pounds (2 kg) of bentonite was used per square
foot (.093 m ). Following behind the truck was a plow-
type vehicle which served to churn up the bentonite and
soil, mixing the two together. The mixture was then
compacted with a diesel driven roller. The permeability
of the final seal, when compacted to 80 percent at optimum
moisture content, is approximately 1 x 10 cm/sec.
Following application of the soil-bentonite mixture to an
area, a six inch blanket of gravel was constructed over
the impermeable layer, and sufficient curbs and channels
were provided to control runoff. Bentonite and gravel
were applied over a total area of 156,000 ft (14,492 m ).
All drainage from the soil-bentonite areas is
conveyed to concrete drainage channels which collect the
runoff for discharge through a single outlet. The drain-
age system constructed for the soil-bentonite sealed areas
is one of the three systems previously mentioned. The two
other drainage systems that are being utilized control
runoff from (1) building roofs and (2) the site's paved
areas. The effluents from the three systems are passed
through monitoring systems before being combined and
discharged through a single outlet. This main outlet is
located in the southwest corner of the site and empties
into a channel which eventually empties into San Francisco
Bay. Making use of three structurally separate systems
provides flexibility of system isolation if monitoring
results ever indicate high PCB concentration levels in the
combined discharge. The construction of the three systems
involved the reconstruction of the sewer system around the
plant. These construction activities were ongoing
throughout the site response program.
The asphalt paving technique was only utilized over
the area inside the manufacturing plant where there is
known heavy vehicular traffic. A total area of 135,000
ft (12,542 m ) was sealed with asphalt during the site
response program. In preparation for setting the asphalt
seal, the soil was compacted using the diesel driven
roller and then a gravel layer was laid down. Once these
preparations were complete an oil slurry seal was applied
at a r,ate of 0.101 gallons per square yard (0.38 1 per
0.84 m ). This seal was applied over both existing and
newly paved areas to seal any existing fissures.
9-35
-------
Surface sealing was deemed unnecessary for Area III
due to the low levels of PCBs present. The state,
however, requested that GE provide some degree of storm
water control in this area. The facility management
consented to the request by grading the area, constructing
berms where they were necessary to control runoff and
establishing a vegetative cover over the area. A total
area of 154,000 ft (14,307 m ) was revegetated. With the
use of these techniques, runoff drainage from Area III is
controlled and directed to the main discharge outlet in
the southwest corner of the property.
The areas of the site which were already paved with
asphalt required little or no modification. Where modifi-
cations were necessary, construction involved bounding the
areas with runoff diversion features such as curbs and
gutters. This construction was undertaken to prevent
runoff movement onto unpaved areas and to direct it to
appropriate catch basins.
Drainage from building roofs is collected and con-
veyed to either catch basins or buried drain lines, or
permitted to drain across paved areas to installed catch
basins.
In general, drainage across the site is from east to
west, and north to south. The parking lot along the east
side of the site, and the curb and gutter structure along
East 14th Street eliminate storm water runoff from enter-
ing the site from the north. Storm water is prevented
from entering the site from the east by a drainage channel
along the property's south perimeter that was constructed
as part of the site response program. Along all other
portions of the site perimeter, concrete curbs have been
constructed.
Much of the construction that took place involved
excavation of contaminated soil. This soil was never
removed from the facility property and disposed of else-
where. All excavated soils were used on site for the
construction of the various runoff control structures.
French Drain Extraction System and Ground Water Treatment
The system selected to contain and gradually elimin-
ate the PCB contamination problem in Area II consists of
three French drains, a central collection sump and two
pumps. An oil-water interface is created within the sump
which enables one pump to remove the oil while the other
pumps ground water to the surface. A plan view and cross
300.70(b)(l)(ii)
(c)
grad ing
300.70(b)(l)(ii)
(D)
revegetation
300.70(b)(l)(ii)
(B)
surface water
diversion and
collection
systems
300.70(b)(l)(ii)
(B).[(2) & (3)]
surface water
diversion and
collection
systems
9-36
-------
section of this unit are given in Figure 10. As previ-
ously described in the "Selection of Response
Technologies" section, the overall success of the site
response systems at GE depends upon the oil and ground
water extraction processes and their ability to control
subsurface flow and eliminate the potential for offsite
contaminant migration. A schematic diagram of the French
drain and oil collection facility is shown in Figure 11.
Extending from the extraction sump are three French
drains each of which consists of three 6-inch (15 cm)
diameter perforated pipes. The three pipes within each
arm are vertically separated from one another by about 3
feet (1m). The three level design provides flexibility in
the collection of oil and ground water. The bottom pipes
in each arm are between 25 and 30 feet (8-9 m) below the
surface; the top pipes are about 20 feet (6m) below the
surface. The piping is surrounded by drain rock which
extends within about 1 foot (.3m) of the ground surface.
The drain rock is overlaid by compacted fill and then by a
surface seal so as not to permit surface infiltration into
the French drains. The lengths of the arms are 60, 70,
and 80 feet (18, 21, and 24m). In the design of the
system, the lengths of the arms were not considered
critical to the success of the extraction process. The
important design feature for the success of the system was
the 3 level drain arm. With 3 levels the oil-water
interface could be intersected at various points due to
the existence of a cone of depression. The difference in
arm lengths reflects decisions made during installation.
There are two main differences between the as-built and
the originally designed French drain system. One of these
differences involves arm pipe placement. Where buildings
were present in the vicinity of the installation site,
drain arm lengths were modified. It was for this reason
that the final arm lengths varied. The second deviation
from the original design was the absence of valves along
the ins ides of the pipes, which would have regulated the
fluid flow. It was discovered during the installation of
the system, that there was not enough flow to warrent the
use of valves and therefore they were eliminated.
The location of the collection sump with respect to
the oil plume is shown on Figure 12, along with the soil
borings used to define the plume and the observation wells
that are maintained to monitor any changes in the config-
uration and size of the oil plume.
300.70(b)(2)
UiiXcMU)
(2)]
ground water
controls —
ground water
pumping
9-37
-------
TRENCH (TYPICAL)
6" PERFORATED LINE
GRAVEL
8"PERFORATED
PIPE (TYPICAL)
Figure 10. Plan View and Cross Section of French Drain
and Extraction Sump
(Source: Paper by B.E. Bracken and H.M. Theisen, Brown and Caldwell,
CA, 1982)
9-38
-------
FRENCH OflAIN
TO GSOUND*ATER
TREATMENT SVSTEW '
* \ \ \ \ \ \
*r \ COMPACTED ^u x
\ \ \
Figure 11. French Drain and Extraction System
(Source: Volume I, Preliminary Phase Report, G.E.,Co., 1-20-81)
9-39
-------
LCGCNO
O S604 SOIL BORING
• W30 MONITOR WELL
PROPERTY LINE
SCALE
1 IN ^40 FT
Figure 12. French Drain Location
(Source: Immediate Correction Plan Report, G.E.,Co.s 1-20-81)
9-40
-------
Oil and sludge sediments recovered by the extraction
system are stored on-site in 55-gallon (208 1) drums for a
period of 90 days after which they are disposed of at a
I landfill. The oily ground water treatment system which
was supplied by FRAM Industrial Filter Corporation is
shown schematically in Figure 13. Oil is collected
through a surface skimmer directly to a storage tank.
Oily ground water is extracted and pumped to the oil-water
separator. The separator consists of a rectangular steel
box made up of a series of vertical and horizontal
coalescing, hydrophobic and oilophobic plates. The
fabricated steel box is 20 feet (6m) long, 6 feet (2m)
wide and 6 feet (2m) high. The plates within the
separator box cause any fine oil droplets to coalesce into
larger oil globules. The larger globules more readily
float to the surface where they are easily collected via a
static skimming pipe. Any solids present settle to the
bottom of the separator and then drop into sludge hoppers
for collection by periodic pumping. Treated effluent
flows by gravity through a monitoring station and then
into the East Bay Municipal Utility District's sanitary
sewer collection system. Effluent that is in need of
further testing is pumped to a storage tank prior to
discharge, until additional tests for PCB-concentration
levels are conducted.
As part of the design phase of the French drain
system and the treatment system, detailed analyses of
their expected efficiencies were made. The analysis of
the efficiency of the French drain system involved
simulation of the drawdown and inflow effects due to
extraction. Simulated effects were calculated using
standard ground water flow equations. The objectives of
this simulation were to determine (1) the inflow rate to
the drain, (2) the change in the inflow rate with time and
(3) to predict the drawdown produced by the operation of
the extraction system. With the results from the simula-
tion, the size of the pump needed to produce optimum
extraction of oil and water was calculated. The simula-
tion results also provided conceptual verification that
sufficient drawdown would occur to reverse the shallow
ground water gradients.
The expected performance of the treatment system was
evaluated by the pilot testing of a small scale version of
a specialized package plant coalescer. The system was
tested at the GE facility using small scale equipment
rented from FRAM Industrial Filter Corporation and
influents similar to those expected during initial opera-
tion of the extraction system. On-site pilot testing of
the treatment system showed oil removal efficiencies in
300.70(b)(2)(ii)
direct waste
treatment Class
methods
9-41
-------
the range of 95.7 to 99.7 percent. The full scale system
was expected to yield similar results.
It was during the preliminary stages of the French
drain system installation that the tank farm was modified
to provide temporary bulk storage of PCS fluids and
drummed sediments. All stored sediments were eventually
used for the construction of embankments as part of the
overall site drainage system. At no time were contami-
nated sediments moved off-site.
Due to the fact that the tank farm was identified as
a contributor to the subsurface oil plume as well as being
the primary contributor to the ground water mound which
had the potential to cause increased mobility of the oil
plume, it was decided that the tank farm would be decom-
missioned and partially removed. This process entailed
breaking down the boundary dike system surrounding the
tank area, removing all but 4 tanks and constructing a
building to shelter the modified storage area. A general
layout of the drainage system and the surface sealing at
the GE site is shown in Figure 14.
The construction activities undergone at the GE site
were performed by several different construction crews.
One crew was responsible for all excavation work; another
crew oversaw the pile driving process; a third crew was
responsible for all the piping and installation work;
another group was soley responsible for reconstructing the
sewer system and a fifth crew was in charge of con-
structing the buildings to shelter the modified storage
tank area. Construction equipment utilized over the
course of the program are listed in Table 2.
The site response program at the GE site was com-
pleted within a 5-month period. The response program
began in August 1981 and was completed in December 1981.
The firm Brown and Ca Id we 11 acted as the preparer of all
contract documents and provided engineering services
throughout the duration of the project. Probably the
single most important feature of the construction program
implemented at the GE site was the assignment of a full-
time on-site project manager by General Electric. This
individual had a thorough understanding of the site's
history and was granted complete authority to execute
contract change orders and make field decisions for G.E.
As with many construction projects, there were
unanticipated delays. The most critical delays and their
causes associated with the GE project are discussed in the
following.
9-42
-------
OILY
GROUNOWATER
PROM
EXTH ACTION
SUMf
TO
SANITARY
SEWER
Figure 13. Groundwater Treatment System
TREATED
EFFLUENT
TO EBMUO
TREATMENT
AND STORAGE
BUILDING
TO
STORM
WATER
SEWER
OPEN DRAINAGE CHANNEL-^XTRACT)ONDRAIN
eijup PIPE
^^ OUTLET
PERMEABLE ROCK
8ENTONITE/SOILSEAL
PERMEABLE ROCK/
BENTONITE/SOiL SEAL
^^^^^^^f
DRAINAGE CHANNEL
Figure 14. Surface Sealing and Drainage System
(Source: Paper by B.D. Bracken and H.M. Theisen, Brown &«.Caldwell, CA, 1982)
9-43
-------
TABLE 2. EQUIPMENT TYPES AND USES
Type of Equipment
Deep Backhoe
Pile Driver
(A) pneumatic
(fi) diesel driven
Bulldozer
Crane
Grader
Diesel Driven Roller
Bentonite Spreading
Vehicle
Quantity
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
Purpose
Trenching for French drain
installation
Soil stabilization during trench
excavations
Grading; earth moving
Placement of pipes; moving oil/water
separator
Grading
Soil compaction
Bentonite seal construction
9-44
-------
In preparation for the excavation for the extraction
sump and French drains, the contractor attempted to drive
sheet piling through the site soils to prevent soil cave-
in and ground water encroachment into the excavation.
Initially, a pneumatic pile driver was used, however, time
and time again the piles would shift and the ends would
buckle due to the presence of a hard clay layer below. It
was then decided to use a diesel driven pile driver but
there were still technical difficulties. It is believed
that the use of newer and thicker piles would have proven
more successful. Eventually two different techniques were
utilized to drive the piles using the diesel driver. For
the excavation of the area for the extraction sump, a
24-inch diameter (0.61 m) auger was used to drill several
deep holes in the sump, permitting the piles to be driven.
The French drain trenches, which were approximately 25
feet deep were excavated in sections with the use of a
backhoe with sheet piling added later rather than
attempting to drive them into the ground during excava-
tion. The reason the French drain trenches were excavated
to a depth of 25 feet (8 m) as opposed to the depth to
which oil contamination had been found i.e., 32 feet (10
m), is because a major oil-containing sand lense exists at
25 feet (8 m). It was decided that this lense would serve
as the main extractable soil unit. Underlying this unit
are primarily clays and discontinuous lenses.
Soil control was an important aspect of the excava-
tion process. As soil was removed from the trench and
sump excavations, it was piled according to contamination
level. It was later replaced to its original excavation
area and depth. Contamination levels were determined and
logged during the field investigations. Excavation during
this stage of the project required a much longer period of
time than anticipated which resulted in higher costs and
overall project delays.
Additional time delays occurred during the response
activities at the GE site due to contract specifications
requiring that all construction equipment leaving the site
first be inspected and cleared. Inspection activities
included what is known as a wipe test. The wipe test
consisted of wiping one square foot of a piece of con-
struction equipment with a swab doused in acetone and then
analyzing the swab for PCBs. Wipe test analyses had to
show less than 100 micrograms per square foot of PCBs
before the piece of equipment could leave the site. When
equipment did not pass inspection clearing the equipment
to meet the specifications proved time consuming and
expensive for the contractor.
9-45
-------
The monitoring wells that are present on-site, of
which there are 76, produced some problems during con-
struction activities. Close to one third of the wells
were damaged by impact with construction equipment. The
wells did not extend far enough above the ground surface
to be easily seen by equipment operators.
Another problem encountered involved underground
piping and utility lines. As-built drawings of the
facility were not available and it was therefore necessary
to spend a good deal of time locating piping and utility
lines prior to actual construction.
The original time schedule planned by GE for the
completion of construction activities at the Oakland site
comprised 120 calender days, with the contractor required
to be finished by November 1, 1981. Neither of these
deadlines were met. The project was not completed until
December 1981, due to the problems described previously.
COST AND FUNDING
Source of Fund ing
General Electric Company paid for all project costs
which amounted to a total of $1,583,300. The state did
not assess any fines on GE to compensate for the
monitoring costs.
Selec^tion _jaf_^ Con t r ac to r
No information is available on the contractor
selection process.
Project Cost
The total construction costs for surface sealing and
drainage, and the oil recovery system was about $1.6
million (see Tables 3, 4 and 5). This cost does not
include preliminary study and design work by Brown and
Caldwell. No cost information is available for the cost
of this work, which included monitoring well installation,
sampling and analysis, and repair, as well as design and
planning. The following cost information is based on
verbal discussion with a General Electric engineer; no
invoices were available.
9-46
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Surface Sealing and Drainage
The sum cost of $734,000 for surface sealing and
drainage includes the expenditures listed in Table 3 and
highlighted in Table 5. The $42,000 cost of grading is
split between asphalt and clay capping costs for the
purpose of calculating unit costs. At a cost of $155-000,
the unit cost for the 135,000 square feet (12,542 m ) of
asphalt pavement was $1.15/square foot ($12.36/m ). At a
cost of $177,000, the unit cost for the 156,000 square
feet (14,493 m ) of bentonite capping with a gravel cover
was $1.13/square foot ($12.21/m ). The unit cost for
constructing 4,150 feet (1,265 m) of curbs and gutters was
calculated by dividing the total cost of $132,800 by 4,150
feet (1,265 m), which results in a unit cost of $32/foot
($105/m).
300.70
UXbXiiXA)
surface sealing
Oil Recovery and Treatment System
The sum cost of $337,000 for the installation of the
French drain system is based on drain arm lengths of 60,
70 and 80 feet (18,21 and 24 m). The unit cost of con-
structing a total of 210 feet (63m) of 20-25 feet (6-8m)
deep trenches was about $1,605/linear foot ($5,264/m).
This cost excludes expenditures for the sump and other
related costs given in Table 4.
The operation and maintenance (0. & M.) cost for
treating between 1,000 and 1,500 gallons (3,785-5,678 1)
per month excludes equipment amortization and about two
hours/week of the plant manager's time to perform batch
treatments. At a total 0. & M. cost of about $50,00/year,
the unit cost for this initial rate of treatment is
$2.70-4.16/gallon ($0.73-1.10/1).
300.70(l)(b)
(iiO(dXl)
subsurface
drains
300.70(b)(2)(ii)
direct waste
treatment
methods
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The monitoring plan developed to evaluate the
effectiveness of the French drain system and the surface
cover at the GE site involves the measurement of static
ground water levels and the analyses of monitor well and
surface runoff samples. Through this type of measurements
and analysis, the following four conditions are monitored:
(1) ground water, (2) recovered and treated ground water,
(3) recovered sediment and oil, and (4) stormwater runoff.
The monitoring program at the GE facility has, thus, been
four-fold. A new and revised monitoring plan has recently
been designed, however, the details of this plan are not
yet available. The parameter descriptions, the monitoring
and sampling frequencies discussed below originate from
the initial monitoring plan implemented at the site.
9-47
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TABLE 3. SURFACE SEALING AMD DRAINAGE COST-GE, OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA
Surface Sealing and Drainage
• Equipment mobilization
• Equipment demobilization
( includes cleaning)
• Paving
• Perimeter fencing
• Drainage system pipe
• Curb and gutter
• Manholes
• Monitoring equipment at
end of manhole for surface sealing
• Supervision (on-site
contractor and consultant oversight)
• Soil removal
• Grading
• Claying sealing; top rock
subtotal
$ 26,000
$ 3,600
$134,000
$ 6,000 ($10/foot, $33/m)*
$150,000 ($18/foot, $59/m)
$132,800 ($32/foot, $105/m)
$ 4,700 ($280 each)
$ 12,000
$ 20,000
$ 47,000 ($23/cubic yard, $30/m3)
$ 42,000
$156,000
$734,100
*Unit costs are as-built
9-48
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TABLE 4. OIL RECOVERY SYSTEM COST - GE, OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA
Oil Recovery System
• Equipment mobilization
• Demobilization
• Sump, including sheet pilling
• Treatment system
• Plumbing modifications on existing tank
farm to receive material before treatment
to test for treatment need
• Tank farm building
• Sanitary sewer system modifications
to discharge treated effluent to EBMUD
* Electrical and instrumental
oil recovery system
• Monitoring equipment for EBMUD
• Project management for EBMUD
modifications
• French drain system
• Prepurchased equipment
(oil/water separator,
pumps, water handling)
• Operation and maintenance (excluding
about 2 hours/week plant manager's time)
$ 41,000
$ 14,000
$ 85,000
$ 49,200
$ 8,000
$ 50,000
$ 33,000
$117,000
$ 12,000
$ 20,000
$337,000
$ 80,000
subtotal $846,200
$ 50,000/year
9-49
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TABLE 5. SUMMARY OF PROJECT COSTS-GENERAL ELECTRIC, OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA
I
Ln
O
Task
:3BBKSRaDBSBB=i:xBe!=ia±dQEtVEfl:AK=;:
A. Surface Sealing
and Drainage (a)
1. Asphalt paving
2.Betonite cap
with gravel
3. Curbs and
gutters
B. Oil Recovery System(c)
1. French Draln(d)
2. Operation and
Maintenance of
treatment system
TOTAL Project Cost
Quantity
135,000 sq.ft.
(12542 m2)
156,000 sq.ft.
(14,493 n2)
4,125 feet
(1,265 m)
length:210ft.(63m)
doptli:22.5ft.(7m)
1,000-1,500 gallons
(3,785-5,678 I)/
month
—
Actual Expenditure
Subtotal:$734,100
<$155,000)(b)
($177,000)(b)
($132,800)
Subtotal:$846L200
($337,000)
$50,000/year
$1,580,300
Unit Cost
= =S3S=3:a±±:343E±±9aisnM •«•!••=
$1.15/sq.ft.
($12.36/m2)
$1.13/sq.ft.
(12.21/m2)
$32/foot
($105/m)
$l,605/foot
($5,264/m)
$2.70-4.16/gallon
($0,73-1.10/1)
—
Period of
Perfornumqc
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1982
1981
(a) Subtotal also Includes other costs
given in Table 4.
(c) Subtotal also includes other costs
given in Table 5.
(b) Cost Includes half of $42,000 cost
for grading.
(d) Excluding sump cost.
-------
Ground Water
Ground water monitoring is performed to identify PCBs
in the ground water and to determine changes in the
ground water surface elevation. The parameters analyzed
are static water levels, filtered and unfiltered PCBs, and
oil and grease. Water level measurements have been taken
monthly from all 76 on-site monitoring wells. All wells
are monitored within the same 24-hour period. Samples for
laboratory analysis are collected from 19 selected on-site
monitor wells on a semiannual schedule.
The water levels measured are compared to previous
readings to confirm whether or not the operation of the
French drain continues to result in a drawdown of the
ground water mound level and in a reversal of the shallow
ground water flow direction. The result of the reversal
in shallow ground water flow in the vicinity of the ground
water mound, has been that ground water flow is in the
direction towards and into the French drain system.
Figure 15A shows ground water levels prior to the con-
struction of the French drain while Figure 15B shows the
same area and its ground water levels 8 months after the
start-up of the system. It can be seen by the difference
in the configuration of the ground water contours and the
ground water flow direction that the extraction system has
produced a reversal in the shallow ground water flow
regime.
Recovered, Treated Ground Water
The treated effluent from the oil-water separator
process is monitored to evaluate the treatment process and
to ensure that the discharge to the district sewer system
meets EBMUD requirements. The parameters analyzed
includeflow rate, PCBs, total identifiable chlorinated
hydrocarbons (TICK), oil and grease and total suspended
solids (TSS). Parameter measurement and analysis is
currently performed monthly on grab samples. Average
weekly values for these parameters during the first 8
months of system operation are given in Table 6.
Recovered _Sediment_and, Oij.
The sediment sludge and oil recovered by the treat-
ment process is sampled and analyzed to determine PCB
concentration levels of the wastes removed by the treat-
ment process. Parameters analyzed are PCBs for the sludge
and oil; and fluid level in the oil storage containers.
Sediments are usually stored on-site in 55-gallon (208 1)
drums and samples of the sludge material are collected
9-51
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I INSTALLED
NOVEMBER 19811
LEGEND 0 20 40
— LINE OF EQUAL WATER
LEVEL ELEVATION IN FEET
— SHALLOW GROUNDWATER
FLOW DIRECTION
Figure 15-A. Groundwater Contour Map - September 1981
(Source: Paper by B.D. Bracken & Theisen, Brown & Caldwell,
CA, 1982)
9-52
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LINE OF EQUAL WATER
LEVEL ELEVATION IN FEET
— SHALLOW GROUNDWATER
FLOW DIRECTION
Figure 15-B. Groundwater Contour Map - August 1982
(Source: Paper by B.D. Bracken & H.M. Theisen, Brown & Caldwell,
CA, 1982)
9-53
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TABLE 6. RECOVERED, TREATED GROUND WATER MONITORING RESULTS
FOR FIRST EIGHT MONTHS OF OPERATION
Parameter
Flow, gpd
PCBsa, ppb
Oil and grease, ppm
Total suspended
solids, ppm
Average value
Influent
-
6.5
9.2
5.8
Effluent
1,100
0.1
7.1
5.8
aActually total identifiable chlorinated
hydrocarbons.
Note: For first 8 months of operation.
(From: Paper by B.D. Bracken and H.M. Theisen,
Brown and Caldwell, CA, 1981)
9-54
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from each drum prior to it being sealed. Oil samples are
collected and analyzed on a monthly basis.
Stormwater Runoff
Stormwater runoff is monitored such that an evalua-
tion can be made of the effectiveness of the bentonite and
asphalt surface sealing systems across the site. Param-
eters analyzed are PCB and TSS content of surface runoff.
Sample collection for surface runoff is automatic. The
sample collection system in this case, was installed
during the construction of the drainage system. It con-
sists of a portable automatic vacuum compressor sampler, a
sampler actuator and sample enclosure. The automatic
sampler is set to collect approximately 4 liters over 24
hours of operation or 160 milliliters per hour. Samples
are also removed from the sampler after every storm event
or at least once every 48 hours for long-duration storms.
In addition to the seemingly complex monitoring
system described above, during the first 6 months of the
system's operation representatives from the Department of
Health Services observed operating procedures and
inspected site conditions bi-monthly. Currently, site
inspections are infrequent and unplanned.
In general, the combined systems at the GE site are
per forming as ant ic ipated. However, there are always
differences between predicted and actual performance effi-
ciencies. At this site, differences were noted between
predicted and actual efficiencies the extraction system.
As shown in Figures 15A and 15B, the operation of the
French drain system has resulted in sufficient drawdown to
control shallow ground water flow and reverse flow direc-
tions towards the French drain system. However, the
quantity of oil and ground water removed is much lower
than anticipated. The system was designed to recover
14,000-15,000 gallons of total fluids per month.
Currently between 1,000 and 1,500 gallons of water per
month are pumped and treated through the extraction-
treatment system; and approximately 1 gallon (3.7 1) of
oil is recovered per month. The overall consensus
regarding these low recovery rates seems to be that the
system is overdesigned for the existing hydrogeological
conditions. As it turns out, ground water flow rates in
the area are much lower than originally estimated. The
system was designed for a ground water flow rate of 150
gpm. The flow rate on-site is only 15 gpm. In other
words the design is more conservative than necessary for
the existing hydrological conditions.
9-55
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It was explained earlier in the discussion on Che
site's hydrogeological conditions, that the ground water
flow system was defined as a single homogeneous unit for
the purpose of calculating average permeabilities and
ground water flow rates. As evidenced by comparison of
the calculated values for flow rates and permeabilities,
and actual recovery rates, it is apparent that it is very
difficult to estimate average values for these parameters
for strata that consist of discontinuous clay, sand and
gravel units. The result of such an attempt, in this
case, is a system designed for much higher ground water
flow rates. It is for this reason that there is such a
discrepancy between predicted and actual recovery rates.
The combined systems at the GE site have successfully
controlled contaminant movement through the use of both
surface and subsurface techniques. The surface seal and
drainage systems together serve to (1) reduce infiltration
of precipitation into the ground water system thus
enhancing the ability of the oil control system to control
ground water gradients and (2) to direct and control the
movement of surface runoff such that all runoff is
monitored and eventually discharged according to State
regulations. The subsurface French drain system has
worked to reverse shallow ground water flow directions and
diminish ground water gradients, thus preventing any
further movement of the oil plume. The treatment system
performs adequately, discharging an effluent with con-
stituents that are within the state and district1s
concentration level standards.
In general terms the response actions taken at the GE
facility have proved successful. The extraction system
does not recover materials at the rate which was
originally estimated, but the effect produced has been
that which was predicted. The primary concern during the
design of the system was not oil removal, but rather the
immediate reversal of ground water flow and the lowering
of the shallow ground water table. The primary concern
and goal was to prevent any further movement of the
existing oil plume. The removal of oil was a secondary
concern. In this light, the fact that the system recovers
only 1 gallon of oil per month is not as critical an issue
as it might be otherwise. The effect that the operation
of the system has had upon the shallow ground water regime
is that which was anticipated.
Surface sealing is applicable in any situation where
there is a need to control surface infiltration. The need
to diminish or eliminate infiltration will arise from
problems associated with a particular area's ground water
regime. Surface sealing is most frequently used in
9-56
-------
conjunction with some other contaminant control measure,
such as ground water pumping or a French drain system as
in the case of the GE site. A surface seal is most often
used as an ancillary measure with another technique,
serving as an aid for the successful operation of more
primary contaminant controls. It is seldom a technique
that can be utilized alone to remedy a ground water
pollution problem.
Ground water treatment systems are utilized in situa-
tions where ground water will be pumped to the surface and
ultimately discharged into some surface water system or
back into the ground water system. The type of treatment
system selected will depend upon the contaminants to be
removed and pretreatment standards needed for the local
Publicly Owned Treatment Works (POTW) to meet water
quality regulations. This technique can either be used in
conjunction with other measures, or soley on its own,
depending on site specific conditions.
The French drain system is relatively new to the
realm of site response actions and there are still many
questions concerning its applicability. There are, how-
ever, some general guidelines that can be used during the
response technique selection process.
The primary alternative to a French drain for extrac-
tion purposes is the use of a well pumping system. There
are situations, however, in which a well pumping system is
not the most efficient means to recover subsurface fluids.
There are four types of conditions that influence the
applicability of a French drain system in a particular
situation and these are: (1) the movement of extractable
fluid relative to ground water; (2) the permeability of
the subsurface material; (3) the plume configuration and
depth to plume and; (4) the viscosity and density of the
plume fluid.
The initial consideration involved in the selection
of a French drain system is whether or not the fluid to be
extracted flows in the same direction as ground water in
the area* In order for a French drain to operate properly
the extrable fluid must be moving with the ground water so
that it can be collected in a central sump.
The permeability of the subsurface materials affects
the ease with which fluids can be extracted. In a situa-
tion where the materials have a very low permeability, if
a well pumping system were to be employed, a large number
of wells would probably be warranted due to the need for
close spacing of the wells. The more wells and pumping
time necessary, the more costly the operation. In a case
9-57
-------
such as this, if all other conditions permit, a French
drain may very well be more cost effective. A French
drain system relies on gravity for much of the fluid
movement. The fluid is then collected in a central sump
area from which only one or two pumps are necessary for
final extraction. The French drain system is also
applicable in situations where the subsurface material is
heterogenous in nature, e.g. the GE site. Where geologic
units are discontinuous, it may be difficult to precisely
define the configuration of the contamination zone. In
such a case, the French drain system provides greater
flexibility in terms of the amount of area it is capable
of extracting from. In a situation where the geologic
conditions are discontinuous due to impermeable strata
such as clay, the system would not be able to operate and
therefore would not be considered applicable.
The configuration of the contamination zone and the
depth to the zone and also important considerations. A
French drain system is applicable where contamination
exists over a large area, because the system is capable of
creating a large zone of influence. In the case where a
large contamination zone exists, such as a plume with a
100-foot radius, if a well pumping system was selected,
the conditions would demand that a large number of wells
be used and, as previously mentioned, this results in a
very costly operation. In a case such as this, the French
drain should be viewed as a viable alternative.
The depth to the plume surface can also play a large
part in the decision-making process. The deeper the drain
trenches will have to be excavated, the greater the cost
of construction.
The last factors to be considered are the viscosity
and density of the fluid to be extracted. The French
drain system is most applicable in the case where the
fluid floats on the water, i.e., its density is less than
water; and where the fluid has a low viscosity. Where the
contaminated fluid is naturally separated from the exis t-
ing water, with the use of a French drain system, the two
fluids can be extracted separately. This would not be
possible with a well pumping system. The viscosity of the
fluid is considered because a highly viscous material may
cause clogging within the drains. The French drain
system, therefore, is more suitable for recovery of low
viscosity fluids.
9-58
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bracken, Brian D., December 1982 and January 1983. Personal communications.
Brown and Caldwell, Walnut Creek, California.
Bracken, Brian D. and Theisen, Hilary M., of Brown and Caldwell. Cleanup
and Containment of PCB's—A Success Story. Presented at: 3rd National
Conference and Exhibition on Management of Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste
Sites. November 29 - December 1, 1982. Washington, D.C.
California Regional Water Quality Control Board, San Francisco Bay Region.
Letters of correspondence to and from General Electric Company.
Condit, Richard. December 1982. Personal communication. California Regional
Water Quality Control Board, Oakland, California.
General Electric. General Electric Company Oakland Plant Site: Volume I,
Preliminary Phase I Report, Problem Definition and Proposed Correction
Program. June 1980.
General Electic. General Electric Company Oakland Plant Site: Volume I,
Preliminary Phase I Report; Problem Definition and Proposed Correction
Program. September 1980.
General Electric. General Electric Company Oakland Plant Site: Phase II,
Problem Definition Work Plan. January 10, 1981.
General Electric. General Electric Company Oakland Plant Site: Immediate
Correction Plan. January 20, 1981.
General Electric. General Electric Company Oakland Plant Site: Final Phase
II Report, Problem Definition. June 1981.
Hatayama, H. December 1982. Personal communications. State of California,
Department of Health Services, Hazardous Waste Management Branch,
Berkley, California.
Mah-hing, G. December 1982. Personal communications. Underground
Construction, Co., Inc., Oakland, California.
Rhodes, John. February 1983. Personal communications. General Electric
Company, Pittsfield, Massachusetts.
9-59
-------
Thayer, J.H., December 1982 and January 1983. Personal communications.
General Electric Company, Pittsfield, Massachusetts.
Thompson, A. December 1982. Personal communication. East Bay Municipal
Utility District No. 2, Oakland, California.
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Soil Survey, Alameda Area, California.
March 1966.
9-60
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GALLUP SITE
PLAINFIELD, CONNECTICUT
INTRODUCTION
During 1977-1978, approximately 1,400 barrels and
an unknown quantity of free liquids were dumped into
three gravel pits located on a parcel of land in
Plainfield, Connecticut. Chemical wastes identified on
the site included chlorinated and unchlorinated
solvents, flammable sludges, organic chemicals, and
acidic and caustic materials. The wastes contaminated
ground water below the site that discharges into Mill
Brook. Although contamination of Mill Brook had not
occurred, the state intitiated remedial action on the
site because of the threat of pollution of Mill Brook
and nearby wells. Levels of contamination in the ground
water under the site exceeded drinking water standards
for copper, nickel, iron, zinc, cadmium, dissolved
solids, chlorides, and various solvents.
Background
Hazardous waste dumping on a 29 acre (11.74 ha)
site in Plainfield, Connecticut began in 1977 when
Stanton Gallup, the property owner, agreed to receive
shipments of hazardous waste from the Dick Trayner
Trucking Company. Trayner made arrangements for
Chemical Waste Removal, located in Bridgeport,
Connecticut, to transport free liquids and barrels of
hazardous waste to Gallup's property in Plainfield.
While Chemical Waste Removal was licensed by the
Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection to
transport hazardous wastes to licensed disposers,
neither Gallup nor Traynor had permits to dispose of
these wastes.
The site was discovered in January 1978 when
hunters on the property witnessed drums being thrown out
of a box trailer into the gravel pit. The hunters
photographed the incident and later gave the pictures to
the Conncecticut State Police (CSP) and Connecticut
NCP
References
300.63(a)(4)
incidental
observation
by public
10-1
-------
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), which
immediately began investigating the site. Trayner and 300.64
Chemical Waste Recovery were linked to the disposal preliminary
operations by the photographs, which showed the license assessment
number of a trailer that was leased to Chemical Waste
Recovery. Chemical Waste Recovery acted as a
transporter for hazardous wastes between generators and
disposers. During the course of police investigation,
Chemical Waste Recovery was linked with illegal dumping
operations in Coventry, Rhode Island. State officials
believe that when this site caught fire in 1977, an
arrangement was made with Gallup to provide needed
disposal capacity.
In February 1978, after approximately one month of
police surveillance, simultaneous raids were made on
Gallup's property in Plainfield and Canterbury,
Connecticut and on Chemical Waste Recovery in
Bridgeport, Connecticut. Gallup, Trayner, and the owner
of Chemical Waste Recovery were arrested and charged
with violation of Connecticut law prohibiting the
discharge of substances or materials into the waters of
the state without a state permit. Gallup pleaded nolo
contendre to these charges and agreed to pay the state
the sum of $15,000 for the costs of immediate protection
and control of the s ite. Gallup also agreed to
reimburse the state for its clean-up costs up to the sum
of $750,000. Further, the state fined him $25,000.
Synopsis of Site Response
The Connecticut Department of Environmental
Protection conducted a two phase site response. The
first phase consisted of a hydrogeological assessment of
the site and was conducted from June to August 1978 by
Fuss and O'Neill Consultants under contract to DEP. The
second phase, which ran from June through August 1978,
consisted of excavation and removal operations. Chem-
trol Pollution Services Inc, a subsidiary of SCA
Disposal Services, conducted all phase 2 operations
under contract to DEP. Remedial work included excava-
tion of waste pits and lagoons and excavation and
removal of approximately 1,400 barrels of waste. Chem-
trol transported the excavated wastes and heavily
contaminated soil to its Model City Landfill in New
York, 580 miles (928 km) away. Slightly contaminated
soil was transported 1.5 miles (2.4 km) to a nearby
landfill in Canterbury, Connecticut. Clean-up
operations took two months with crews working 12-14
hours a day, seven days a week.
Treatment of the ground water was not undertaken as
part of the site response because the hydrogeological
10-2
-------
assessment suggested that the geology of the area would
cause a natural attenuation of the plume and dilution of
contaminants to the point where they would no longer be
a threat. Thus, the state's clean-up goal was only to
remove the source of contamination, not treat the ground
water.
SITE DESCRIPTION
Surface Characteristics
The Gallup site is located on a 29 acre (11.7 ha)
tract of land in Plainfield, Connecticut (see Figure
1). This vacant property is bounded on the west by
railroad tracks for about 2,400 feet (731.5 m), on the
north by a power transmission line crossing the property
at an oblique angle, on the south by Tarbox Road, and on
the east by Connecticut Route 12 and several rural
residential tracts. Mill Brook meanders from east to
west across the northern portion of the Gallup property
and passes under the railroad tracks. A large wetland
area is associated with the brook. Before the dumping
incident, DEP designated Mill Brook as a "class A"
stream, meaning that it was considered to be pristine
and a potential future drinking water supply and that no
treated industrial discharges were allowed into it. (As
of^January 1983, it has been redesignated "class B/A,"
which means that it has been polluted but that DEP's
goal to bring it back to class A status). The Gallup
parcel was once used for a gravel mining operation and
its generally flat surface has many excavation pits and
overgrown stockpiles, but no significant vegetation
overall.
Continental glaciation during the Pleistocene
period significantly affected the soils and topography
of the site, as it did the entire New England region.
Glacial ice advanced through the area, eroding soil and
upper bedrock, then retreated, depositing a lodgement
(or lower till) consisting of a wide range of materials
having various textures, colors and thicknesses, and an
ablation till (or upper till) made of a friable mixture
of sediments that ranged from silt and clay to large
cobbles and boulders.
From June 6 to October 30,1978, Fuss & O'Neill
conducted a geologic assessment of the Gallup site using
22 borings and 18 test pits. The bedrock underlying the
site was a metamorphic rock, gneiss, believed to be part
of the Putnam gneiss. Its surface was not weathered,
apparently because the weathered zone had been removed
by glacial scour. This rock was extensively fractured,
with a predominant fracture dip of 47 degrees that was
10-3
-------
Figure 1. Location Map of Gallup Hazardous Waste Site,
Plainfield, Connecticut
10-4
-------
believed to dip in a northerly direction. Below the
bedrock's surface were found numerous vertical weathered
cavities or fractures that were similar to solution
cavities in limestone. Larger cavities were filled with
a gray silt that probably came from overlying soils.
Fuss & O'Neill believed that these vertical cavities or
fractures were associated with a vertical fault with
relative horizontal motion that was located near some of
the borings. A bedrock contour map in Figure 2 shows
that the bedrock surface rises beneath a hill in the
east-central part of the property and slopes northward
beneath the disposal areas to form the southern flank of
a buried rock valley that contains Mill Brook and its
sediments.
An almost continuous layer of glacial till overlies
the bedrock. A dense to friable gray silt and fine sand
and soil mixture that contains clumps of medium to
coarse sand, gravel, cobbles and boulders, this glacial
till varies from 2-22 feet (0.6-6.7 m) thick. The till
was thickest on the hill at the east-central part of the
property and thinned to the north and northwest.
For most of this tract of land, a layer of
interbedded sands and gravels, with isolated units of
silt, overlies the glacial till. This layer is 3-40
feet (0.9-12.2 m) thick, and Fuss & O'Neill believed it
to be deposition from glacial outwash along the Mill
Brook valley. Above the sand and gravel layer lies a
fine grained sediment unit originating from glacial Lake
Quinebaug deposit. This unit was found to be 2-18.5
feet (0.6-5.6 m) thick.
These upper layers of soils have various
distortions in depth and area due, according to Fuss &
O'Neill, to erosion and accumulation of stream alluvium
and swamp deposition since glacial time.
Hydrogeology
Fuss & O'Neill used 22 monitoring wells placed in 300.68(e)(2)
borings and 13 wells placed in test pits on-site plus 12 (i) (D)
surface water reference points, which were believed to hydrogeological
reflect the ground water system, to determine the factors
hydrogeology of the Gallup site. Wells had polyvinyl
chloride (PVC) screens that were placed at various zones
below the water table and connected by solid PVG riser
pipes to the ground surface. The wells were developed
by pumping so that they could yield water for sampling
and react freely to local changes in head. Some wells
were sunk into the saturated bedrock by inserting the
solid riser piper into core holes in the bedrock and
10-5
-------
Figure 2. Bedrock Contour Map, Gallup Site
Source: Fuss & O'Neill, January 1979
10-6
-------
sealing them to the rock with rubber gaskets and a
bentonite seal.
Fuss & O'Neill periodically monitored water levels
in these wells to develop the water table contours and
define horizontal ground water flow. To determine
vertical flow, pairs of wells were installed at certain
locations with differing depths. This enabled the
engineers to compare the differences in ground water
heads. The ground water contours shown in Figure 3
suggest that the shape and slope of the water table is
"significantly influenced by the local geologic
materials and demonstrates a continuous relationship
between flow in the fractured bedrock and the saturated,
unconsolidated materials," according to Fuss & O'Neill.
Generally speaking, ground water flows radially
from the hill located at the east-central portion of
Gallup's property. From the west side of the hill,
ground water moves westerly to northerly and discharges
into Mill Brook and its wetlands. From the north side
of the hill, ground water moves northerly to Mill Brook
and its wetland located east of the railroad. This flow
has a significant downward vertical component of flow
caused by a recharge mound found near wells SWI, 2D, 2S,
3D, 3S and 16, as shown in Figure 3.
Several local features of the ground water system
west and northwest of the main hill were noted. Near
wells SW 10 and 11, the water table is within the
fractured bedrock and moves northwesterly with a
gradient of 0.05 ft./ft. (1.5cm/30.48 cm). Around well
SW 12, the flow is in the upper fractured bedrock and
bottom 5 feet (1.5 m) of glacial till and moves in a
northerly direction with a gradient of 0,02 ft./ft (0.6
cm/30.48 cm). Fuss & O'Neill state that the smaller
gradient in this area "reflects the increasing system
transmissivity in the downgradient direction." Along
the flow path near wells SW 14, SW 18 and SWR, the flow
is in the fine-grained stratified drift sediments that
overlie the till and bedrock. The flow is northerly
with a gradient of 0.01 ft./ft. (0.3 cm/30.48 cm). At
wells SW 15 and SW 1*71, the water table gradient
flattens further to 0.0025 ft./ft. (0.08 cm./30.48 cm),
which is believed to reflect "the increased saturated
thickness and material permeability in this direction."
Using its monitoring well data, along with some
assumptions about relative quantities of recharge rates
in the till compared to the stratified drift areas, and
about the saturated thickness of the bedrock system,
Fuss & O'Neill calculated order of magnitude values for
10-7
-------
o
I
00
CO
o
/F MEW HAVEN TRAP ROCK CO
N TRAP ROCK CO
N/F
ATLAS WEATHER
MASTER, INC. (
MONITOR WELL COMPLETED IN BOBWG WITH
lOENTincarioN CODE AND WATER LEVEL FOD
7-iS-78 SHOWN
MONITOR WELL COMPLETED IN TEST PIT WITH
IDENTIFICATION CODE AND WATER LEVEL FOR
-78
TEST PIT LOCATION
GROUNOVMTEH CONTOURS FOR 7-ZS-78
SURFACE WATER REFERENCE LOCATION
DOMESTIC WELL IN THE VICINITY OF THE
PROJECT
SURFACE WATER SAMPLING LOCATION
OAOUNDWATER SPRING
-------
material permeability, flow rates and flow volumes (see
Table 1). The firm's report stated that "although there
is an increase of more than two orders of magnitude in
the system permeability, there is only a one-half order
of magnitude increase in the flow volume and velocity.
That is a direct result of increasing system
transmissivity and material porosity."
Fuss & O'Neill stated that the ground water flow-
pattern, described above with respect to flows westerly
and northwesterly from the main hill, was similar to
that found northerly from that hill. The latter flow
was presented graphically by two cross sections (see
Figures 4 and 5; the locations of the cross sections are
shown in Figure 3). These cross sections show soil and
rock materials, ground water heads and flows paths.
Several local features of this northerly flow
pattern were discovered. Ground water flow near wells
SW 6 and SW 8 is within the glacial till and moves
northerly. North of these wells, the flow is found
mainly within the stratified drift sediments at wells SW
1- SW 5 and SW 16. These sediments were thought to be
from the Mill Brook outwash, discussed above. Overlying
this outwash are fine-grained Lake Quinebaug deposits
that restrict the upper portion of ground water flow.
These fine-grained materials, combined with locally high
recharge rates caused by overlying coarse-grained
sediments, have created a ground water mound 3 feet (0.9
m) high. This mound causes a downward ground water
flow, as shown in Figure 4.
Apparently, the water table in this portion of the
property fluctuates with the seasons. During dry summer
months, the ground water discharges into Mill Brook and
its wetlands through a deep flow path. During winter
months, the water table is higher and a second path of
discharge exists through the coarse materials that
overlie the fine-grained Lake Quinebaug deposits (see
Figure 4). According to Fuss & O'Neill, "a seasonal
water table rise of 2 feet (0.6 m) or more would cause
flow rates to increase by more than one order of
magnitude along the upper portion of the water table due
to the increased material permeability."
Beavers have modified ground water flows beneath
the northern portion Gallup property recently. A beaver
colony built a dam across Mill Brook where it passes
under the railroad, creating a small impoundment across
the stream channel and raising the elevation of the
surrounding wetlands. This seems to have changed the
radial flow system discussed above to a flow through
system, whereby the pond recharges the ground water
10-9
-------
TABLE 1. ESTIMATE OF HYBROGEOLOGIC PARAMETERS,
GALLUP SITE
0) r*
01 >
(- 1U
m "J "O
^ -C X
Z LJ CO
10
Q £
Saturated
Thickness
-— ffl
0 T)
o x*
Q) jj
> t.
Ul
o
o
Q.
-meability
Ft. /day)
OJ ^
a
Average
charge
w Path
„
5 01
li
O LL
i
-— I!
LL Q
CM
CD
Tj
JZ •
5 o
- OJ
O
O
en
•
o
in
w
*
0)
CD
a
£
e
CO
OJ
m
Ol
o
o
•
d) LJJ_
-- ^ p
£ Q £
O "a 5
? £ tf
« o 5
3 i =
Q 0) LL
Stmrce
& O'Neill, January 1979
10-10
-------
Figure 4. Cross-Section A-A, North-South, Gallup Site
MILL BROOK
TRIBUTARY MILL BROOK
MONITOR WELL 3W2D w 5 /£
TEST PITS/ »
— MONITOR WELL SWI
MONITOR WELL SW6
ELEVATION US.G.S.
Source: Fuss & O'Neill, January 1979
10-11
-------
Figure 5. Cross-Section B-B, East-West, Gallup Site
WELL SW 5
03
i
03
Ul
CO
CO
CO
o
tr
CJ
WELL SWI6
WELL SW7D
WELL SWI3
WELL 5WIS
ELEVATION U5.G.S.
Source: Fuss & O'Neill, January 1979
10-12
-------
system along the northern and eastern wetland-terrace
border and the ground water flows westerly through the
terrace to the railroad. However, ultimate discharge
still is into Mill Brook. The changed flow patterns are
shown in Figures 5 and 6 (in Figure 5, the beaver-
altered flow pattern is referred to as "Flow Path in
December").
WASTE DISPOSAL HISTORY
Disposal operations took place at three locations
on the Gallup property: a seepage bed, a primary barrel
pit and chemical lagoon, and a secondary barrel pit and
liquid burial area (see Figure 7). The disposal took
place sometime during 1977.
Seepage Bed
The seepage bed was an area approximately 50' x 40'
(15.24 x 12.19 m) that had been excavated down to the
glacial till and partially backfilled with crushed
stone. Some of the layer of crushed stone was covered
by an inverted dump truck body, which in turn was
covered with soil. A metal pipe connected the dump body'
to the surface. Liquids were pumped through the pipe
into the dump body and then seeped through the crushed
stone into the surrounding soils. An unknown quantity
of liquids were disposed of in this manner.
Primary Barrel Pit and Chemical Lagoon
This was a pit about 0.4 acres (0.16 ha) in area
and about 10-15 feet (3-4.6 m) deep. Approximately
1,200 barrels of wastes were dumped into the southern
portion of the pit, while the northern portion was used
as a lagoon for an unknown quantity of free liquids.
Secondary Barrel Pit and Liquid Burial Area
This area was located about 100 feet (30.48 m) west
of the Primary Barrel Pit and near the railroad. It
covered 0.67 acres (0.27 ha) and was about 7-10 feet (2-
3 m) deep. The Secondary Barrel Pit contained about 200
drums of wastes and an unknown quantity of free liquids
apparently had been dumped into it and covered. At
least two layers consisting of crushed drums, liquids
and soil were discovered here.
DESCRIPTION OF CONTAMINATION
Fuss & O'Neill conducted a field investigation at
the site consisting of ground water, surface water and
soil samples. Ground water samples were taken from
10-13
-------
o
I
d
3
• i«i.l» MONITOR WELL IN BORING WITH li'7-78 WAT Eft
LEVEL INDICATED.
X n> tt MONITOR WELL IN TEST PIT WITH IZ-7'T8 WATER
LEVEL INDICATED,
* SURFACE WATER REFERENCE LOCATION WITH
WATER LEVEL INDICATED.
-^150
'-.ROUNOWATER CONTOURS FOR 12-7-78
I, BASE MAPPING 1953 DOT PLANNING MAP
2. PROPERTY LINES ARE APPROXIMATE
TAR BOX ROAD^SITE
CHEMICAL WASTE DISPOSAL ARE
WATER TABLE MAP
PLAIUFIELO . CONNECTICUT
OROUNOWATER FLOW PATH
3 CONTOURS MAY BE CHANGES DUE To
EXCAVATION
hrj
H-
OQ
c
H
fD
ft
(D
M
H
S-
O
h-1
h4
c
-------
O
I
d-
w
o
a
n>
Hr
M
vo
SECONDARY BARREL PIT S
LIQUID BUR./'.L AREA
APPROXIMATE LIMIT OF CONTAMINATED
SOIL AT GROUND SURFACE
[SEEPAGE SEP
LIMIT OF GROUNDWATER 8, SOIL
CONTAMINATION BASED ON
HYDROGEOLOGIC 8 CHEMICAL
ANALYSIS CONSIDERATIONS
CHEMICAL WASTELA600NJ
PRIMARY BARREL DISPOSAL PIT
MONITOR WELL COMPLETED IN BOSING
MONITOR WELL COMPLETED IN TEST PIT
CORE CONTAMINATION DURING JULY SAMPLING
S'J""T'$.AU-P_PL1' "ELL PROXIMATE TO AREA
OF INVESTIGATION
SURFACE WATER SIMPLE LOCATION
THICKNESS OF LACUSTRINE SILT UNIT
H-
OQ
C
fD
-^t
I
p»
o
rt
IT*
s?
T3
O
c/a
H-
-------
monitoring wells that had been placed in area borings
and test pits in and around the apparent disposal areas,
as well as from nearby domestic water wells. Surface
water samples were taken at points that had been
selected based on their relation to the disposal areas
and current knowledge of the geology and hydrogeology of
the site. As the samples were analyzed, the new data
were used to expand the network of monitoring wells.
Water extracted from the wells was initially
analyzed for three field parameters: specific con-
ductance, pH and in-situ temperature. In addition to
these parameters, samples taken in July 1978 were
analyzed by gas chroma tography for the presence and
relative concentration of metallic ions. When chemical
species were identified, they were verified by more
detailed gas chromotography and atomic absorption. Gas
chromotographic methods used included flame ionization
detection for aromatics, hydrocarbons, esters and
ketones; electron capture for chloro compounds; and
ultra violet for phenols. These methods had the
following detection limits:
Ultra Violet
Electron Capture
Flame Ionization
Lower Detection Limit
1 ppm
1 ppm
1 ppm
Accuracy
± 0.05 ppm
+, 10 ppm
+ 10%
Source: Fuss & O'Neill, January 29, 1979.
A second set of ground water samples was taken in
October 1978 and analyzed for indicator parameters,
hydrocarbon constituents and metallic ions, with the
latter being evaluated directly by atomic absorption. A
third set of samples was taken in December 1978 and
similarly analyzed.
The results of the sampling and analysis program
are discussed below with respect to each disposal area.
Seepage Bed
Prior to installing the monitor wells for this
area, Fuss & O'Neill obtained some contamination
information from the clean-up contractor. During
excavation of the inverted dump truck body, the
equipment operator and observing geologist encountered a
vapor irritant that caused a burning sensation in their
300.68(e)(2)
(D(B)
amount and form
of substances
present
10-16
-------
eyes and mouths. They left the pit open for some time
to allow the vapors to subside, then the clean-up
contractor sampled and analyzed the soil moisture and
ponded surface water that resulted from a rainfall.
Results indicated a PH of less than 2 and a specific
conductance o£ contact water exceeding 10,000 ohms,
suggesting that a low pH liquid had been dumped here.
The contractor then took soil samples from the test pit
walls and performed an extraction analysis for metallic
ions. Metals found included:
Iron as Fe
Manganese as Mn
Copper as Cu
Zinc as Zn
Nickel as Ni
Chromium as Cr
Cadmium as Cd
Cobalt as Co
Free Acid as B^SO^
Equivalent Acid as H,
25 -
2.7 -
1.5 -
0.2 -
0.2 -
0.3 -
0.1 -
0.24
0-1
1.5 -
6100
98
7.9
9,7
5.8
4.2
4.0
- 0.33
.3%
• 3.0%
mg/1
mg/1
mg/1
mg/1
mg/1
mg/1
mg/1
mg/1
Source: Fuss & O'Neill, January 29, 1979.
Fuss & O'Neill believed that these data were
characteristic of an industrial pickling liquor.
Based on this information about soil contamination,
Fuss & O'Neill installed monitoring wells SW 10, 11 and
12 within the fractured bedrock system and located in
and around the Seepage Bed (see Figure 7). Significant
levels of contamination were found in the July and
October samples; indicator chemical analysis showed
elevated total dissolved solids, total acidity, and very
low pH. Various solvents were found in wells SW 11 and
12, including acetone, methyl ethyl ketone (MEK>, and
methatvol. Analysis also detected a nonvolatile salt,
possibly a high molecular weight nitrogenous compound
believed to be an industrial dye. This *»bs'f1" h*d*
concentration of about 100 ppm at well SW 11 (it also
was found at wells SW 73, 7D, 9, 10 and 12). The
analysis for metallic ion concentration found
significant quantities of dissolved copper, nickel,
iron, zinc, and aluminum, plus trace levels of titanium,
chromium, silver, and cadmium.
10-17
-------
Downgradient from the Seepage Bed, lesser
contamination levels were observed in wells SW 9 14 15
and R, as shown in Figure 7, although each well showed
elevated dissolved solids concentration and a low pH
Trace levels of hydrocarbon compounds were found in
wells SW 9 and 14, but wells SW 18 and R had very high
concentrations of ethanol, methanol, isopropanol, ethyl
acetate, plus trace levels of trichloroethylene and
tnchloroethane, which suggested to Fuss & O'Neill that
dumping activities other than what occurred at the
Seepage Bed were responsible. Metallic ion con-
centrations in all downgradient wells showed significant
levels of iron and nickel in wells SW 9, 14 and 18, and
trace levels of copper, nickel, zinc, titanium and
cadmium.
Primary Barrel Pit and Chemical Lagoon
Most of the dumping occurred at this area
including about 1,200 barrels and an unknown quantity of
free liquids. Barrels were dumped in the southern part
of the pit and liquids were found in a pond in the
northern part, as shown in Figure 7. Wells SW 1, 6, 16,
J and K were placed in and around this area, as shown in
Figure 7. Underlying soils were found to determine
significantly the direction and extent of contamination;
the Primary Barrel Pit was located in free-draining
soils under which lay or almost continuous silt unit,
the Lake Quinebaug deposits.
Fuss & O'Neill observed that during the period
between cessation of dumping activities in mid-winter of
1978 and the first series of samples in July 1978,
contaminated ground water in the saturated section above
the silt unit flowed radially west, north and east and
discharged into the wetlands northeast and east of the
pit. Although contamination also was found within and
above the silt unit, wells SW 1, 4, 5, 25, 2D, 3S and 3D
showed littled impact. However, the October samples
from well SW 1 showed a significant increase in hydro-
carbon constituents (indicator parameters showed a 12-
fold increase in chemical oxygen demand value and a 6-
fold increase in total organic carbon/total carbon
values) below the silt unit, indicating that con-
tamination had broken through the silt unit between July
and October. Metallic ion concentrations for copper and
nickel also increased during this period.
East of the Primary Barrel Pit, wells SW 4 and 5
remained unaffected by the dumping throughout the period
of investigation. Fuss & O'Neill stated that although
normally the radial ground water flow at the site would
have carried contaminants to these wells, the changed
10-18
-------
flow patterns resulting from the beaver 'dam, which
caused water to flow from the area of the wells toward
the pit, prevented contamination of the wells.
South of the pit, wells SW 6 and 8 were relatively
unaffected by disposal activities. The engineers
reported that SW 6, located close to the pit and its
nearby temporary barrel storage area, had trace levels
of TCE and trichloethane, possible resulting from
migration of these volatile chemicals laterally from the
pit area through unsaturated soils.
Although breakthrough of contaminants did not occur
in the wells to the east and south of the Primary Barrel
Pit, breakthrough seemed to have occurred in wells SW K
and 16, located near each other within the pit (see
Figure 7). Well SW K was screened in the saturated
material in and above the silt unit, while SW 16 was
screened in the Mill Brook outwash sediments immediately
below the silt unit. Significant contamination was
found at each well with individual parameters more
concentrated at SW K, above the silt unit, than "at SW
16. Hydrocarbon solvent concentrations at both wells
had similar compositions and were at the 20 ppm level.
Low level metallic ion contamination was significantly
higher at SW K than at SW 16, suggesting again that the
silt unit retarded migration.
Secondary Barrel Pit and Liquid Burial Area
This disposal site was a linear trench adjacent and
parallel to the railroad in the northeast corner of
Gallup*s property. About 200 barrels of wastes were
buried here along with an unknown quantity of free
liquids. Wells SW 7S and 7D were placed close together
next to the Secondary Barrel Pit, wells SW 13, 0, P, Q,
17S and 17D were located northwest and downgradient from
the pit, and wells SW 15, 18 and R were situated more
distant from the pit and to the west (see Figure 7).
Indicator parameters at wells SW 7S and 7D showed a
sharp decline in contaminant levels from July to October
but some increases from October to December, resulting
in a relatively lesser decline as measured between July
and December. At well SW 7S, chemical oxygen demand
went from 8,050 mg/1 in July down to 3,900 mg/1 in
October but back up to 4,900 mg/1 in December. A
similar pattern was observed for dissolved solids, while
chlorides and organic carbon concentrations increased
throughout the study period. Well SW 7S had some of the
highest levels of contamination by metallic ions of any
wells tested, with very high concentrations of copper,
aluminum, nickel, iron, manganese, magnesium, zin'*
10-19
-------
chromium, cadmium and boron. These levels decreased
from July to October but returned to about the initial
levels in December. Even at their lowest point in
October, some levels were still extremely excessive: for
example, copper went from 1,185 mg/1 in July to 625 mg/1
in October, but Connecticut's drinking water standard
for copper is 0.5 mg/1, and most accepted standards for
adverse impact to sensitive fresh water fish are below
1.0 mg/1. The results from wells SW 7D were similar to
SW 7S - significant levels of copper, nickel, iron,
zinc, chromium and cadmium.
Downgradient from the Secondary Barrel Pit, con-
centrations of indicator parameters increased
significantly over the observation period, with hydro-
carbon concentrations (solvents) following the down-and-
up pattern exhibited by wells SW 7S and 7D. Fuss &
O'Neill concluded that "the results suggest that we are
observing a dynamic chemical wave migrating and changing
over time and distance. Concentrations in the central
core of the wave are decreasing due to dilution,
dispersion and downgradient migration. Downgradient
wells are exhibiting a concentration which has yet to
pass those ground water observation points."
The samples indicated that the ground water had
numerous contaminants, the diversity and concentration
of which decreased over time. For example, Well SW 7S
in July had a total solvent concentration of 100-200 ppm
with at least 10 distinct chemical species identified.
In October, concentration was about 60 ppm with
distinctly fewer chemical species. But in December,
total solvent concentration was in the 85-130 ppm range
with 6 major species constituting most of the con-
tamination. Generally speaking, the long term trend
seems to be decreasing concentration and diversity.
Consistent with the chemical wave hypothesis, down-
gradient well SW 13 showed a slight increase in total
solvent concentration between July and October, with
major chemical species shifting from xylene and toluene
in the first samples to acetone, isopropanol, methanol,
and various aromatics (including xylene and toluene) in
the second. Then from October to December, the
diversity and concentration of solvent contaminants
decreased by about 50 percent, with acetone and MEK as
the main constituents. On the whole, at well SW 13 all
indicator parameters in December were significantly more
concentrated than in July, but chemical oxygen demand,
dissolved solids and chloride parameters were more con-
centrated in October than in December. Significant and
increasing levels of metallic ions were detected at SW
13, including copper, nickel, iron, zinc, chromium and
10-20
-------
cadmium.
Wells SW 17S, 17D, 0, P and Q were located further
downgradient than well SW 13 and their samples
fluctuated unpredictably over the investigation
period. Some anomalies also occurred. For example,
well SW 15, which was west of the Secondary Barrel Pit
and out of the predicted ground water flow from the pit
area, changed from parts per billion levels in July to
parts per million levels of hydrocarbon concentration in
October and December, plus had increases in the
indicated parameters. Well SW 15 also had increased
concentrations of copper, zinc, nickel, iron and cadmium
over the period of investigation. Another anomoly was
that wells SW R and 18, thought to be out of the ground
water plume, had very high solvent concentrations and
high indicator parameters such as dissolved solids and
chemical oxygen demand.
Fuss & O'Neill offered several hypotheses for the
aberrant data: hydrocarbons might migrate in ways
significantly different from ground water flow; there
may have been distict disposal stages, with hydrocarbons
being deposited first and hence migrating at the leading
edge of the contaminant plume; or the existence of
undetected disposal areas around the Gallup property.
None of these hypotheses were tested during the period
of investigation, although Fuss & O'Neill noted some
evidence that tended to weigh against the hypotheses
about unique hydrocarbon migration and additional
disposal areas at this site.
Fuss & O'Neill drew several conclusions from the
sample data regarding the contaminant plume emanating
from the Secondary Barrel Pit:
(1) ground water contamination had existed at the
pit area for 1.5 years and had just begun to be
removed from the system by discharge into Mill
Brook;
(2) the core of contamination had migrated less
than 140 feet (42.7 m) during that period, and
it would take at least 2 more years before the
core began discharging into Mill Brook;
(3) contaminant concentrations at the core of the
plume had not abated significantly over the
one-half year investigation period;
10-21
-------
(4) assuming that the decline in concentration at
the point of discharge would occur at the same
rate as the observed concentration increase, a
minimum of 8 years of contamination would be
predicted;
(5) high levels of residual soil contamination
would add to the time required for
concentrations to decrease, with the extra time
computed to be as high as one order of
magnitude (4-44 years).
These conclusions were also believed to apply reasonably
well to the Primary Barrel Pit and the Seepage Bed.
Off-site Water Supply Wells
Fuss & O'Neill sampled domestic supply wells on
neighboring properties and detected no hydrocarbon con-
tamination. Analysis for metallic ions revealed only
low levels that were believed to reflect the general
background quality of the area's ground water and not be
attributable to disposal activities at the Gallup
Site. A 525 gpm (1,987 1/m) public water supply well,
owned by the Gallup Water Company and located about
4,000 feet (1,219 m) north of the disposal areas,
apparently was not tested for contamination. However,
Fuss & O'Neill concluded after an analysis of the well s
location and specifications (525 gpm, 1,987 1pm; 756,000
gpd, 2,861,771 Ipd) that any interaction between con-
taminated ground water at the disposal areas and the
area of well influence would be unlikely.
Mill Brook
Surface water samples were taken along Mill Brook
and its tributaries in September, October and November
1978. Samples were taken at the following locations
(see Figure 7):
Sample Point Location
£51 Mill Brook at Route 12
32 Wetland impoundment 350 feet
northwest of SW 15
S3
Mill Brook at railroad bridge
10-22
-------
S4
Mill Brook above confluence with
Fry Brook
S5
86
S7
Fry Brook above confluence with
Mill Brook
Plainfield Sewage Treatment
Plant overflow to Fry Brook
Mill Brook below Packer Pond
Source: Fuss & O'Neill, January 29, 1979.
September samples were taken when Mill Brook was at
1.4 times the annual low flow, i.e., at 75 percent flow
duration. Water quality in Mill Brook was fairly
uniform. The Fry Brook sample had noticeably more
copper, nickel, zinc and lead, which were attributed to
discharges from the sewage treatment plant upstream from
the sample point. All samples from Mill brook and Fry
Brook had trace levels of trichloroethylene and
trichloroethane. The Mill Brook sample from point S3,
at the railroad bridge, contained a C-7 or C-8 hydro-
carbon in the low ppm range; however, since no such
chemical was found in the ground water at the Gallup
site, Fuss & O'Neill did not attribute it to the
disposal activities.
A second series of samples taken later in September
again showed fairly uniform content for indicator
parameters and metallic ions in Mill Brook, but sample
points S3 and S4 (at Mill Brook above the confluence
with Fry Brook) showed increased hydrocarbon diversity
and concentrations. These levels were in the ppb range,
but Fuss & O'Neill thought they might reflect some con-
tamination from the Gallup site. November samples,
taken when Mill Brook was approaching annual low flow,
further supported this hypothesis because hydrocarbon
content at S4 increased dramatically.
Trichloroethylene, methylene, chloride and
trichloroethane levels were detected at 20-70 ppb.
Moreover, these constituents were also present in the
ground water downgradient from the disposal areas.
Since the ground water samples had levels of these
chemicals that weren't concentrated enough to account
for the surface water levels, Fuss & O'Neill postulated
that higher concentrations might have passed the monitor
well areas prior to ground water sampling, or that the
beaver impoundment might have modified ground water flow
in ways that increased these concentrations.
To supplement its surface water sampling program,
Fuss & O'Neill attempted to estimate the total impact of
300.68(e)(2)
(ii) extent
of substance
migration
10-23
-------
contaminated ground water on Mill Brook. It predicted
that outflow from the three major disposal sites into
Mill brook was 10,300 gallons/day (38,989.7 1/d). The
flow of Mill Brook was estimated to be 867,000 gallons/-
day (3,281,932 l/d> at the 90 percent flow duration. To
compute the contaminant impact, the engineers took the
concentrations observed in the October 1978 samples from
individual wells and weighted them based on estimated
transmissivity at each well over total transmissivity at
all wells. They then converted the results into pounds
per day loading and a maximum concentration increase at
the stream (see Table 2).
Fuss & O'Neill concluded that copper and iron had
the greatest potential for concentration, followed by
methanol, nickel and zinc. Copper was considered to
pose the greatest ecological threat to the stream.
Eventually, such toxic and possibly carcinogenic
substances as trichloroethylene, toluene, xylene and
chloroform are expected to enter the stream from the
site.
The engineering firm pointed out in its final
report that metallic ions seemed to be migrating toward
Mill Brook at slower rates than the hydrocarbon con-
stituents or indicator parameters such as the chloride
ion. If so, this might lower the concentrations of
metallic ions predicted in Table 2, but it also would
lengthen the critical period of impact to Mill Brook.
PLANNING THE SITE RESPONSE
Initiation of Response
The Connecticut Department of Environmental
Protection (DEP) learned of the site's existence in
January 1978, seized it in February, and began
investigating the nature and extent of contamination.
The DEP hired Fuss & O'Neill to conduct a hydro-
geological assessment of the site, which it performed
from June to December 1978. Fuss & O'Neill found that
the ground water was contaminated by a wide range of
metallic ions and hydrocarbon solvents and that it was
moving north and northwesterly from the Gallup property
toward ultimate discharge into Mill Brook, which was
then a "Class A" recreational stream but not a drinking
water source. The DEP concluded that an immediate
response action was necessary because, although Mill
Brook appeared fairly uncontaminated and nearby private
drinking water wells were not contaminated, the con-
tinued loading of contaminants from the disposal areas
into this ground water system eventually could result in
300.68(e)(2)
(iv)
environment al
effects and
welfare
concerns
300.68(f)
remedial
investigation
10-24
-------
TABLE 2. ESTIMATED IMPACT ON MILL BROOK
Parameters
Methanol
Acetone
Higher Acetates
Chlorinated Propane
Isopropanol
MEK
MIBK
Propyl Acetate
Toluene
Xylene
Aroma tics
Ethylene
Copper
Nickel
Iron
Zinc
Titanium
Chromium
Silver
Cadmium
Pounds/Day
0.291
0.1
0.117
O.01
0.162
0.069
0.217
0.155
0.004
0.003
O.031
0.013
1.877
0.231
1 .49
O.336
0.006
0.008
0.011
MUligrams/L-iter
.04
.01
.016
.001
.022
.009
.029
.021
ppb
ppb
.004
.001
.26
.031
.203
.046
ppb
.001
ppb
.001
10-25
-------
a significant plume of pollutants threatening the stream
and possibly the wells.
Selection of Response Technologies
DEP officials stated that the choice of clean-up
measures was based on the nature of the contamination
and the hydrogeology at the site, not on cost con-
siderations. DEP chose to remove contaminated soil,
drums and free liquids from the site in order to prevent
further ground water contamination. Pumping and
treatment of the ground water was rejected because DEP
believed that the hydrogeological system would dilute
the plume of contaminated ground water to levels con-
sidered acceptable for discharge into Mill Brook.
Extent of Response
The DEP's clean-up goal was to eliminate the source
of contamination by removing all contaminated soil,
drums and free liquids from the disposal areas. This
goal was apparently accomplished at two of the disposal
areas, the Primary and Secondary Barrel Pits, where ex-
cavation was done down to soil containing only a
residual amount of contamination. Composite soil
analyses were performed and soil was divided into highly
contaminated, lightly contaminated, and residually con-
taminated classes. The goal did not appear to be met
with respect to the Seepage Bed, however. During ex-
cavation at this area, which tests had shown to contain
solvents, both the equipment operator and an observing
geologist encountered irritating vapors. The excavation
pit as left open for some time until the vapors
subsided. When excavation resumed, it became clear that
there was extensive soil contamination that would re-
quire removing a very large volume, which was considered
economically prohibitive. Since the soil was highly
acidic, the state's computations indicated that a
neutralizing dose of lime would bring the pH into an
acceptable range. State officials decided to apply a
massive dose of lime (approximately 30 tons, 27.2 Mt) to
neutralize the contaminants in situ, then cover the pit
with local soil. Thus, economic considerations seemed
to play a critical role in determining the extent of
response at the Seepage Bed, but not at the Primary and
Secondary Barrel Pits.
Officials from DEP stated that settlement of the
department's law suit against Gallup, whereby Gallup
agreed to pay for clean-up costs up to $750,000, did not
affect the extent to which the state sought to remedy
the problem. The $750,000 figure represented DEP's
estimate of the total clean-up cost for the site. The
300.68(e)(2)
source control
remedial
action
300.68(h)
initiaJ.
screening of
alternatives
300.680)
cost
effectiveness
10-26
-------
officials acknowledged some contraints from this
settlement figure: since state funds would have to be
used for all costs above $750,000, the state tried to
monitor clean-up costs closely to insure that the
operation came in under this amount which, in effect,
was a self-imposed budget. DEP officals stated that if
unforeseen problems had arisen, the state was prepared
to pay any necessary additional costs. Regarding the
clean-up of the Seepage Bed, it appears that the extent
of response was determined by a decision that excavation
of contaminated soil was unnecessary or too costly.
DESIGN AND EXECUTION OF SITE RESPONSE
Upon learning of the probable nature and extent of
contamination, DEP decided to remove the contaminated
soil, drums and free liquids from the three main
disposal areas. Chem-Trol, Inc., a subsidiary of SCA,
Inc., was the clean-up contractor and performed the
excavation, transportation and disposal work. The
techniques used varied according to the characteristics
of each disposal area.
Seepage Bed
This area had significant amounts of metallic ions
and hyrocarbon solvents. First Chem-Trol removed the
soil surrounding the inverted dump truck bed. The soil
had very little contamination. Then the dump truck bed
was removed. When the field crew attempted to remove
the highly contaminated trap rock below the truck bed,
the equipment operator and an observing geologist
encountered irritating vapors that forced them to cease
work and leave the pit open until the vapors subsided.
Removal of rock and soil resumed, but it became clear
that contamination was extensive and would entail
removal of a large soil volume. State officials decided
that removal was too expensive, and sought to neutralize
the contaminants in situ with about 30 tons (27.2 Mt) of
lime. The pit was then filled and covered with fresh
local soil. No subsequent field testing was performed
to determine the effect of this treatment, other than
continued sampling of the surrounding monitoring wells.
Primary Barrel Pit and Chemical Lagoon
Response action in this area had two phases.
First, the free liquids ia the lagoon, which were
primarily solvents, were pumped out. Mud at the bottom
of the lagoon was removed with excavation equipment and
stockpiled on-site in depression zones to minimize run-
off. It subsequently was mixed with drier heavily
contaminated soil to lower the average moisture content
and facilitate handling and disposal. The second phase
300.70(b)(2)
in situ
treatment ;
neutralization
300.70(c)(2)
contaminated
soil removal
10-27
-------
involved removing drums and contaminated soil. A clear
area adjacent to the disposal site was excavated to a
depth of between 15 and 18 feet (4.6 - 5.5 m) and
constructed with an access ramp. From there lateral
excavation of the contaminated materials took place.
The technique employed for exposing the drums was to
slightly undercut the lower soils, allowing the
overlying layered soil to slough by gravity and expose
the drums. As the drums were exposed they were
selectively and carefully removed without damage using
barrel hooks. Drums and contaminated soil were removed
down to recognizably clean soil.
Secondary Barrel Pit and Liquid Burial Area
Excavation of this area was similar to the Primary 300.70(c)(2)
Barrel Pit. An area next to the pit was cleared and contaminated
excavated to a depth of 12-15 feet (3.6 - 4.6 m), then SDl1 removal
work proceeded laterally into the burial area. Layers
of drums and contaminated soil were removed using the
techniques employed in the Primary Barrel Pit. Excava-
tion continued down to recognizably clean soil.
On-Site Storage of Contaminated Materials
Heavily and lightly contaminated soils were
separated upon excavation and placed into different
piles located in depression areas on-site. This was
done to minimize surface run-off. Separation of soils
was done by visual examination and smell: heavily con-
taminated soil was noticeably colored and had a very
strong odor, while lightly contaminated soil was less
stained and had less odor. Free liquids pumped from the
Primary Barrel Pit were placed in a recently constructed
100 x 40 foot (30.5 x 12.2 m) bermed containment area
having a hypalon liner.
Drums were also stored on-site prior to transport
to a disposal landfill. The contents of each drum were
analyzed, using a mobile laboratory equipped with a gas
chromatograph and recorder, flash point tester, pH and
conductivity meters, and various other laboratory
supplies and sampling equipment. An inventory and
description of the composites of the drum contents was
made and included the following classes:
« Aqueous Subclass of Acids
Number of drums, pH range, percent free acid as
sulfuric acid, percent equivalent acid, total
inorganic carbon, and total organic carbon.
• Aqueous Subclass of Alkaline Wastes
Number of drums, pH range, percent free
10-28
-------
alkalinity as sodium hydroxide, percent
equivalent alkalinity as sodium hydroxide,
percent equivalent alkalinity, total inorganic
carbon, and total organic carbon.
Aqueous Class of High Total Organic Carbon
Number of drums, pH range, total inorganic
carbon and total organic carbon.
Solvent Class of Nonchlorinated Solvents
Number of drums, BTU1s per pound, BTU' s
gallon, and percent chlorine.
per
• Chlorinated Solvents
Analyzed only for specific gravity. The
limited testing on the chlorinated solvents was
based on the fact that attempts to make a
composite sample for analysis caused
polymerization and precluded further analysis.
Classification of Substances for Disposal
The contaminated materials stored on-site were
classified into 4 groups for disposal: (1) an aqueous
class subcategorized into acids, bases and high total
organic carbons; (2) a solvent class subcategorized into
chlorinated and nonchlorinated solvents; (3) a
contaminated soils class subcategorized into highly
contaminated and slightly contaminated soils; and (4)
flammable sludges.
Transportation and Disposal
Chem-Trol handled the transportation and disposal
work. Drums and heavily contaminated soil were
transported in 20 ton (18 Mt) sealed dump trucks to the
licensed SCA facility in Model City, N.Y., a distance of
580 miles (928 km). Free liquids were transported to
the Model City facility in one tanker that had a 4,000 -
5,000 gallon (15,141.6 - 18,927 1) capacity. Lightly
contaminated soil was taken in 20 ton (18 Mt) sealed
dump trucks a distance of 1.5 miles (2.4 km) to the
Yaworski, Landfill in Canterbury, Conn.
COST AND FUNDING
Source of Funding
All costs of response at the site were paid by the
state which, in turn, was reimbursed in full by Mr.
Gallup. Following its discovery of the disposal
activities in. January 1979 and seizure of the property
in February, DEP filed a civil suit against Gallup on
10-29
300.70(c)
off-site
transport
for secure
disposition
-------
May 17, 1978, charging him with violation of Connecticut 300.68(c)
law prohibiting the discharge of substances or materials judicial
into state waters without a permit. While this suit was process
pending, Gallup asked DEP to estimate the total costs of
cleaning up the site so that he could attempt to settle
the suit. During July, DEP worked with Fuss & O'Neill
to determine the extent of the problem and the required
response actions, and concluded it would cost about
$750,000. On September 13, 1978, Gallup pleaded nolo
contendre to the charges against him, was assessed a
$25,000 fine by the court, and agreed to reimburse the
state $15,000 for the costs of immediate protection and
control of the site, plus up to $750,000 for response
costs, payable in $100,000 installments.
Selection of Contractors
DEP hired Fuss & O'Neill Consulting Engineers, of
Manchester, Conn., to perform the hydrogeological
assessment of the site. Fuss & O'Neill was selected by
direct procurement based on past experience, and a lump
sum contract with a ceiling of $90,000 was used. Work
was completed on time, although a no-cost 3 month
extension was required for the firm to complete its
final report, and for almost $30,000 below the
ceiling. DEP hired Chem-Trol Pollution Services, Inc.,
a subsidiary of SCA Chemical Services, Inc., of Model
City, N.Y., to perform all excavation, transportation
and disposal work. Chem-Trol was hired under a time and
materials contract with a $640,000 ceiling and with
payment to be made monthly on the basis of itemized
vouchers. The firm was selected based on past ex-
perience. Chem-Trol subcontracted the disposal of the
lightly contaminated soil to Yaworski, Inc., of
Cantebury, Conn, because of its proximity to the site;
the remaining materials were disposed of at SCA1 s
licensed facility in Model City.
Project Costs
Response costs totalled $610,445.35, well under the
settlement figure of $750,000, and are summarized in
Table 3. Approximately 7,020 tons (6,368 Mt) of soil
and drums were excavated, transported and disposed of,
consisting of 4,020 tons (3,647 Mt) of drums and heavily
contaminated soil and 3,000 tons (2,721 Mt) of lightly
contaminated soil. This amounted to 201 dump truck
loads of drums and heavily contaminated soil and 150
loads of lightly contaminated soil, with an average load
of 20 tons (18 Mt). The quantity of material excavated
was assumed to be the sum of the quantitites of soil and
drums transported and disposed of. Approximately 5,114
10-30
-------
TABLE 3. SUMMARY OF COST INFORMATION-GALLUP SITE, PLAINFIELD, CONN.
o
i
LO
Task
Excavation
Transportation
A. drums & heavily contaminated
soil
B. lightly contaminated soil
C. bulk liquids
Subtotal- transportation
iDi-sposal
A. drums & heavily contaminated
soil
B. lightly contaiminated soil
C. bulk liquids
Subtotj'l-disgosal
Engineering & hydrogeologic studies
State Health Lab-analysis fees
Equipment & Consumables
TOTAL
-^Hiyyi&y-E-^lL-
7,020 tons
(6.368 Ht )
201 loads
(4,020 tons;
3,647 Mt )
150 loads
(3,000 tons;
2,721 Mt )
1 load
5,114 gal.
(19,359 1)
201 loads
(4,020 tons;
3,647 Mt >
150 loads
(3,047.4 tons;
2,764.5 Mt )
1 load
5,114 gal
(19,359 1)
Expenditure
i fc *± = K=t= =; = = = E i==±±
$89,285.47
$269,742.00
$2,534.60(c)
$1,342.00
$273,61B.60
$160,800.00
$21,331. 80(c)
$1,789.90
«Sifi3AS2i. 2Q_
$60,324.78
$1,009.46
$2,285.33
$610,445.34
__Unit_Q£St
$12.72/ton
($U.02/Mt )
$l,342/load(b)
($67.10/ton;
(73.96/Mt )
$16.90/load(b)
($0.84/ton;
$0.93/Mt )
$l,342.00/load(b)
$800/load(b)
($40/ton;
44.t)q/Mt ^
$142.21/load (b)
($7 ton; $7.72/Mt)
$l,789/load (b)
_Fund ing^ _Sou r ce
Gallup
Gallup
Gallup
Gallup
Gallup
Gallup
Gallup
Gallup
Gallup
Gallup
Gallup
Period of
Performance
11/78-12/78
11/78-12/78
11/78-12/78
11/78-12/78
11/78-12/78
11/78-12/78
11/78-12/78
6/78-10/78
6/78-12/78
(a) 1 load of soil - 20 tons, 18.14 Mt .
1 load of bulk liquids= 4-5,000 eal
(15,142-18,927 1)
(b) from contract between Chem-Trol (SCA) and DEP
(c) based on invoices
-------
gallons (19,359 1) of free (bulk) liquids were
transported in one tanker with a 4,000 - 5,000 gallon
(15,141.6 - 18,927 1) capacity.
Fuss & O'Neill was paid a sum of $60,324.78 for the
hydrogeological study. The State Health Lab charged
$1,009.46 for some chemical analyses performed on water
samples. Equipment and consumables relating to the
response action were also charged as costs.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
DEP's decision to remove the source of contamina-
tion but not to pump and treat the ground water was
based on the available data regarding probable dilution
of the plume of contaminated ground water and the fact
that no sources of drinking water were threatened. The
data upon which DEP made its decision seem sound, but
the decision is open to criticism on the ground that it
reflects only short term health concerns and doesn't
sufficiently consider longer term public health and
environmental concerns. The Fuss & O'Neill study showed
clearly that numerous species of metallic ions and
hydrocarbon solvents would continue to discharge into
Mill Brook for at least 8 and possibly as long as 44
years. Although these contaminants can be expected to
be diluted by the ground water system and by the waters
of Mill Brook itself, the extent of dilution and the
total amount of contaminant discharge are unknown.
Given the hazardous substances present at the site, this
decision could commmit the stream to a substantial
degree of pollution. The planning process lacked the
necessary consideration of contaminant sources, fate and
transport, sensitive receptors or a clear planning
horizon to mitigate this pollution cost effectively or
to understand it.
Justification of the state's goal of only removing
the source of contamination is undermined by the fact
that one of the three sources of contamination, the
Seepage Bed, was not excavated to recognizably clean
soil. Further, no test of the effectiveness of the in
situ lime treatment was made, other than continuing the
normal sampling program. While the lime might
neutralize some of the acids in the soil, it is not
likely to immobilize other contaminants such as volatile
organic compounds (VOCs) and metallic ions. Metallic
ions may be substantially immobilized, but not
completely and not permanently, which is important since
they may be elemental and hence will not biodegrade into
begin metabolitis. The effectiveness of lime or VOC s
is evnr less substantial, but many VOCs will eventually
biodegrade, even in a capped anaerobic environment.
Although the large amount of contamination at this area
10-32
-------
might have been very expensive in the short run to
remove, the extent of contamination would seem to argue
strongly for a response that more effectively mitigates
and minimizes the long term threat to public health and
welfare and the environment.
10-33
-------
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bowe, Steve. SCA Chemical Waste Services, Inc. June 18, 1982,
January 24, 1983. Personal communications with Environmental
Law Institute.
Burton, Donald, Jr., Chief Field Inspector, Oil and Chemical Spill
Section, Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection. June -
July 1982 and May 24, 1983. Personal communications with
Environmental Law Institute.
Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection. Undated.
"Clean-up Cost: Plainfield Dump Site (Gallup Property)."
Connecticut v. C. Stanton Gallup, No. 7750, Superior Court, Windham
County, May 12, 1978.
Fuss & O'Neill, January 29, 1979. "Evaluation of a Chemical Waste
Disposal Area, Tarbox Road Site, Plainfield, Connecticut".
Jacobson, Milton L. Brown, Jacobson, Jewett and Laudone, P.C.
September 13, 1978. Letter to Allan M. Kosloff, Assistant
Attorney General, Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection.
Kulinowski Kenneth, SCA Chemical Waste Services, Inc. January 24, 1983.
Personal communication with Environmental Law Institute.
Marple, David V. Chem-Trol Pollution Services, Inc. Undated. Letter
to Robert B. Taylor, Connecticut Department of Environmental
Protection.
SCA Chemical Waste Services, Inc. Invoices to Connecticut Department
of Environmental Protection, June 23 - August 30, 1978.
Taylor,Robert B. Director of Water Compliance and Hazardous Substances,
Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection. June 7, 1978.
Letter to David Marple, Chem-Trol Pollution Services, Inc.
Yaworski, Inc. Invoice, August 11, 1978.
10-34
-------
GOOSE FARM
PLUMSTED, N.J.
INTRODUCTION
The Goose Farm abandoned hazardous waste dump is
located in a rural area in Plumsted Township,
Ocean County, New Jersey (see Figure 1). Originally, the
site was a pit in which drums and bulk liquid chemical
wastes, includ ing solvents, chlorinated solvents, and
polychiorinated biphenyls (PCB's), were dumped. At the
time the site was discovered, ground water near the pit
was contaminated and seepage containing organic chemicals
was discharging into a stream on the site that drains into
the Delaware River.
Background
From 1945 to 1969, a manufacturer of rocket propel-
lants, ammunition, and specialty chemicals dumped and
buried various hazardous wastes in a pit 300 feet by 100
feet by 15 feet deep (91 by 30 by 4.6 m) on a piece of
property called Goose Farm, under contract with the owner
of the land. Wastes disposed on the site included solids
and liquids in bulk, 55-gallon (208 liter) drums, 5-gallon
(19 1) pails, and lab packs. The site is located approxi-
mately 20 miles (32 km) southeast of Trenton, N.J., in a
2-acre (0.8 ha) clearing surrounded by woods, farms, cran-
berry bogs, and scattered homes. The closest residence is
about 400 feet (122 m) from the site, and about 30 other
homes are within one-quarter to one-half mile (0.4-0.8 km)
of the site. Site location is shown in Figure 1.
In the course of a New Jersey Department of Environ-
mental Protection (DEP) investigation of possible pesti-
cide contamination of local drinking water wells in Jan-
uary 1980, the Plumsted Township Sheriff's office informed
DEP of the existence of the Goose Farm site and several
other sites in the area. Over the next 6 months, DEP
resistivity studies and ground water monitoring indicated
that a plume of contaminated ground water extended from
the pit. In addition, tests of a small stream running
past the site indicated surface water contamination.
NCP Reference
300.68 (f)
investigation
11-1
-------
Figure 1. Index Map for Location of the Goose Farm Site
-------
Metal detectors indicated a large quantity of buried metal
on the property.
Synopsis of Site Response
In July 1980, DEP decided that the site posed an
immediate threat to human health and in August 1980, hired
O.K. Materials, Inc. (OHM) to conduct preliminary environ-
mental testing to determine the extent of contamination.
In September 1980, OHM began an emergency clean-up of the
site using money from the New Jersey Spill Fund. From
September 1980 to March 1981, OHM installed and operated a
ground water recovery and treatment system to contain the
plume, prevent contaminants from entering the stream, and
flush contaminants from the soil. in addition, OHM exca-
vated contaminated soil and over 4,800 drums and pails
from the pit during the autumn of 1980. Over 9,000
gallons (34,000 1) of liquid were bulked and transported
off-site for disposal, although soil, drummed solids and
treatment system wastes remained. In March 1981, the
ground water recovery system was dismantled and all oper-
ations at the site except security ceased. From October
1980 through March 1981 the clean-up was funded almost
entirely by the Revolving Fund under section 311(k) of the
Clean Water Act, and by the Superfund Emergency Response
Fund. The remaining necessary funds were provided by the
state.
There was a seven-month period between March 1981 and
autumn 1981, when clean-up operations came to a halt.
This interlude occurred due to a lack of available State
and Federal funds.
In autumn of 1981, additional funds were provided and
operations resumed when DEP hired OHM and CECOS Inter-
national to bulk and transport the remaining wastes and
heavily contaminated soil to a CECOS landfill in Niagra
Falls, N.Y. The site was graded and additional ground
water monitoring wells were installed. In September 1982,
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) authorized
Superfund funding for an investigation to determine the
extent of contamination remaining at the site.
SITE DESCRIPTION
jSurface Characteristics
The Goose Farm site is located in a unique ecological
area known as the Pinelands. The New Jersey Pinelands is
characterized by acidic sandy soils and low lying forests
predominantly of pine with a lesser population of oak.
11-3
-------
The local climate is continental, experiencing sig-
nificant seasonal, daily, and day-to-day temperature
fluctuations. The average winter temperature is 33* F
(0.6° C) with the average daily minimum temperature
reaching 24° F (-4.4° C). The lowest recorded winter
temperature in this area was -14* F (-26* F) recorded in
Toms River in February, 1961. Average summer temperature
is 72* F (22° C) with an average daily maximum of 83° F
(28° C). The highest temperature recorded in the county
was 103° F (40* C) on July 4, 1966.
Precipitation averages between 42 to 46 inches (107 -
117 cm) per year with a range of 25 to 67 inches (64 -
170 cm) per year. The period of highest rainfall has been
found to be between July and August while January, Febru-
ary, and October tend to be the driest months. Precipita-
tion is distributed relatively evenly throughout the year;
however, droughts and heavy rains have occurred (highest
1-day rainfall was 4.9 inches - 12.4 cm). Thunderstorms
occur about 25 days per year predominantly in summer. The
average seasonal snowfall is 17 inches (43 cm) with the
highest recorded snow depth for any 1 time being 13 inches
(33 cm).
Relative humidity averages about 56 percent in mid-
afternoon with higher values at night, averaging 81 per-
cent at dawn. The percentage of average daily sunshine is
45 in winter and 60 in summer.
Winds are predominately southerly from April through
October, changing to northwest during winter months. The
highest average windspeed is 12 miles (19 km) per hour in
March.
The site is located in a gently sloping well-drained
area adjacent to a small stream to the north. Slopes are
typically from 0 to 5 percent. The surrounding soil has
been classified as the Kvesboro sand, a sandy soil of high
permeability, low water capacity, and low organic content
and fertility. Unless limed, the soil is acidic. Eves-
boro sand possesses severe wind erosion characteristics.
Goose Farm is located in a relatively sparsely popu-
lated area about 2 miles (3.8 km) northeast of New Egypt,
a small town with a population of 1,769. The site is
about 1 mile (1.6 km) southeast of the lesser town of
Hornerstown. There are a number of residences in the area
with private wells.
The site is located about 400 to 600 feet (122 -
152 m) south of a small stream flowing northward. The
stream is a tributary of Lahaway Creek, which drains
11-4
300.68(e)(2)
(i)(E) climate
300.68(e)(2)
(i)(A) popula-
titon at risk
-------
into the Delaware River. Latiaway Creek is designated by
the State of New Jersey as "FW-1 Non-trout; suitable for
potable water supply". A number of cranberry bogs are
located from 1/2 mile (0.8 km) to 1 mile (1.6 km) east to
southeast of the site.
Hydrogeology
The Goose Farm site is situated in the Coastal Plain 300.68(e)(2)
(consisting of tertiary and cretaceous sedimentary forma- (i)(D) hydrogeo-
tions of sands, clay silts, shell beds, and glauconite. logical factors
Strata which are exposed within a mile" of the site include
the Red Bank, Hornerstown, Vincetown, Kirkwood, and Cohan-
sey formations. Figure 2 is a geologic map of the Goose
Farm area. Although the regional survey shows the site is
located within the outcrop of the Vincetown formation,
local test well drilling has indicated that a thin veneer
of the Kirkwood formation underlies the site. Figure 3
shows a geologic cross section of the regional formations
relative to the Goose Farm site. A brief description of
each formation is presented below:
Cohansey Formation (Teh)—
The Cohansey is a light gray to yellow-brown to red,
medium to coarse quartz sand with visible amounts of
ilmenite present. It may contain clay lenses varying from
an inch to more than 2 feet (0.6 m). The Cohansey is the
single most important aquifer in the State and is the
water table aquifer for much of South Jersey. However, as
can be seen from Figures 2 and 3, the recharge zone for
the Cohansey is well outside the perimeter of the site and
outcrops at a higher elevation than the Goose Farm area.
Kirkwood Formation (Tkw)—
The Kirkwood is the uppermost formation underlying the
Goose Farm site, and ranges from 0 to 15 feet (0-4.6 m)
thick in this area. It consists of two distinct units, an
upper unit of fine to very fine slightly clayey quartzy
sand and a lower unit of dark brown fine to very fine,
peaty or lignitic quartz sand and silt. The Kirkwood
serves as a recharge zone in the Goose Farm area for both
the Kirkwood and the lower Vincetown Aquifer.
Manasquan Formation (Kmg)—
The Manasquan is an aquitard composed of two substrata.
The upper member is a greenish gray to tan clayey silt.
The lower unit is a dark greenish gray clayey quartz-
glauconite sand. The Manasquan ranges from a depth 15 to
23 feet (4.6-7.0 m) thick with the upper regions pinching
out into Kirkwood.
11-5
-------
Figure 2. Geologic Map of the Goose Farm Site Area
(O.H. Material Co., 1981)
11-6
-------
Goose
Farm Sice
r20O
1T200
SCALE
Vertical 1"- 1001
Horizontal 1"- 20001
Figure 3. Subsurface Cross Section of the Goose Farm Area
11-7
-------
Vincetown Formation (Tvt)—
The Vincetown is an aquifer composed of two units. The
upper member ranges from a greenish gray clayey,
micaceous, glauconitic, calcareous fine-to-medium grained
sand to a sandy, clayey coquina. The clays are calcitic
originating from decomposed shell fragments. Occasional
indurated sandstone or limestone beds occur. The
Vincetown is 30 to 50 feet (9.1-15 m) thick beneath Goose
Farm and is the drinking water source for 6 of the 96
local wells.
Hornerstown, Red Bank and Navesink Formations (Kht; Krb;
Kns) —
The Hornerstown, Red Bank, and Navesink formations are
aquicludes separating the Vincetown from the underlying
Mt. Laurel-Wenonah aquifer. The uppermost of these
aquicludes is the Hornerstown, composed of 99 percent
glauconite clayey sand with a thickness ranging from 30 to
35 feet (9.1-11 m). The Red Bank consists of a dark
clayey, very micaceous glauconite sand in the Goose Farm
area at a minimum thickness of 10 feet (3.0 m). Most of
the Navesink consists of a massive dark green to grayish
black, medium to coarse grained glauconite sand with
varying amounts of sand and clay at a thickness of 35 feet
(11 m). Shell layers are present in the lower regions
with a massive shell bed separating the Navesink from the
Mt. Laurel-Wenonah formation.
Mt. Laurel-Wenonah Formation (Kmw) —
This formation is a major aquifer ,in Ocean County with
about 1 million gallons (3.8 X 10 1) of water pumped
daily. It is used by other counties as well. The Mt.
Laurel-Wenonah is the source aquifer for 76 percent or 73
of the 96 local wells. The Mt. Laurel begins with a
massive shell bed in the upper layer but is primarily
composed of a glauconitic clayey to fine to very coarse
pebbly sand. The lower Wenonah formation consists of a
silt to medium grained yellow uniform micaceous sand. The
Mt. Laurel-Wenonah is about 90 feet (27 m) thick and
occurs at a depth of about 150 feet (46 m) in the Goose
Farm area.
The uppermost water table (Kirkwood) follows the
general topography, i.e. ground water flow direction is 5°
to 10° east of north toward the stream. The rate of flow
had been calculated to be about 0.5 feet (0.15 m) per day
horizontally and about 0.6 feet (0.2 m) per day verti-
cally. Estimated permeabil_i±y of the underlying Manasquan
formation is about 2 X 10~ feet (6 X 10 m) per day,
which suggests it is a leaky aquitard. A second flow
regime exists in the underlying Vincetown formation, which
dips to the Southeast. Gross permeability of the Vince-
11-8
-------
town foundation has been measured by pumping tests to be 1
to 3 feet (0.3-0.9 m) per day. The two nearest drinking
water wells tapping the Vincetown aquifer are located more
than one mile (1.6 km) south of the site. Most wells on
the area are located in the isolated Mt. Laure 1-Wenonah
foundations.
WASTE DISPOSAL HISTORY
The Goose Farm site was used as a hazardous waste
disposal site between 1945 and 1965 by a manufacturer
of solid rocket propeHants, ammunition, miscellaneous
plastics, synthetic rubber and organic fibers. The
wastes were dumped at the Goose Farm site under contract
with the then owner of the property. Data suggest that
dumping may have continued until sometime in the mid-
1970's.
The dump site was a pit dug into the fine sand,
approximately 100 feet (30 m) by 300 feet (91 m) and from
10 to 15 feet (3.0-4.6 m) deep. Fifty-five gallon (208 1)
drums containing liquids and solids, 5 gallon (19 1) lab
packs, and bulk liquids were dumped into the pit. Clean-
up efforts indicated that over 4,800 drums and containers
of miscellaneous chemicals were disposed at the site.
Over 9000 gallons (34,000 1) of bulk chemicals have been
removed from the site. Since many drums and containers
had deteriorated and the dumping of bulk chemicals was
also involved, the estimation of exact quantities disposed
at the site is not possible.
^Samples from the upper ground water and surface seep-
age indicate that a large variety of organic and inorganic
chemicals may have been dumped at the site, including
chlorinated compounds, solvents, and pesticides. During
drum excavation, numerous drums containing PCBs were
found. Specific chemical substances identified at the
site are listed below:
Toluene
Ethylbenzene
Xylenes
Styrene
Pentachlorophenol
Endrin
BHC (lindane)
Ant imony
Arsenic
Beryllium
Mercury
Zinc
Adipic acid
PhenoIs
Naphthalene
Pyrene
Methylene chloride
Vinylidene chloride
(1,1-dichloroethane)
Ethylene dichloride
(1,2-dichloroethane)
Trichloroethane
300.68(e)(2)
(i)(B) amount
and form of sub-
stances present
11-9
-------
Chloroform
Trichloroethylene
Benzene
1,1,2-trichloroethane
1,1,1-trichloroethane
Chromium
DESCRIPTION OF CONTAMINATION
In January 1980, the Plumsted township sheriff's
office informed the NJ Department of Environmental Protec-
tion (DEP) of the existence of the Goose Farm site. This
information was provided as input to a DEP investigation
of possible pesticides in drinking wells in the Plumsted
area. During the next six months, DEP conducted hydro-
geological assessment activities including sampling the
nearby stream, installing and logging 17 ground water
wells, conducting a metal detector and resistivity survey,
and reviewing regional geology and well drillers logs from
existing local wells.
The results from the metal detector survey identified
the location of two separate drum disposal pits. Also the
data from the test well cores were used to construct the
following lithology beneath the site.
A surface resistivity survey was performed to approx-
imate the extent of ground water contamination from the
site. By varying the spacing of electrodes, different
depths in the subsurface can be tested. The resistance of
the subsurface media is measured at various depths to
provide an indication of changes in strata or evidence of
ground water contamination. Profiles of a certain depth
across a horizontal distance can also be obtained to indi-
cate strata variations or contamination. The resistivity
profiles conducted by DEP indicated a contaminant plume
200 feet (61 m) wide originating from the drum pit and
moving to the stream north of the site. The resistivity
soundings suggested potential contamination of up to 60
feet (18 m) in depth beneath the site, with the majority
of contamination occurring within a depth of 40 feet
(12 m).
Stream sampling data has also indicated that polluted
ground water was leaching into the stream causing contami-
nation of surface water. Resistivity sounding data on the
other side of the stream indicated that contaminant migra-
tion was halted by the hydrologic barrier created by the
300.63(a)(2)
investigation
300.64(a)
preliminary
assessment
11-10
-------
TABLE 1
GENERALIZED GEOLOGIC SECTION OF SITE
Depth Below Site (feet)
0-13
13-15
15-23
23-60
60-62
meters
0-4
4-4.6
4.6-7
7-18
18-19
Formation
Kirkwood (upper)
Kirkwood (lower)
Lower Kirkwood
and Manasquan
Vincetown
Homers town
stream. ^ DEP also concluded that the contamination
extended into the Vincetown aquifer and possibly down to
the Vincetown-Hornerstown interface, but did not affect
any^local wells. However, a potential for future contami-
nation of wells in the Vincetown aquifer did exist if the
problem was not corrected.
In August 1980, O.K. Materials Company (OHM), Find-
lay, Ohio, initiated additional ground water monitoring
and prepared to implement site clean-up through an exist-
ing state contract. O.H. Materials Company installed 34
additional wells to further define the contaminant plume,
took soil samples and developed data to support the design
of a ground water recovery system. The OHM data from mon-
itoring wells indicated that the plume was less than 140
feet (43 m) wide. O.H. Materials Company also concluded
that the plume had not reached below a depth of 36 feet
(11 m), which corresponds to a cemented sand seam encoun-
tered in the Vincetown formation. A review of monitoring
data indicates that contamination data at depths greater
than 36 feet (11 m) were available from only three of the
monitoring wells, one of which was outside the boundaries
of the shallow plume. The hydrologic data developed from
the resistivity survey and well sampling was adequate for
assessing the shallow ground water and surface water
contamination. However, resistivity data is qualitative
below 40 feet (12 m) at this site due to the complex
geology. Therefore, because only three wells were used to
define the lower limit of plume depth, complete definition
of the plume at depths below 40 feet (12 m) was not
developed.
11-11
-------
Initial levels of contaminants in ground water were
highest for methylene chloride, benzene, and toluene at
134, 106, and 88 parts per million (mg/1), respectively.
Total organic carbon in shallow ground water depths ranged
from 1600 to 17,000 ppm (mg/1). Metals values were in the
parts per billion (ug/1) range and not considered a prob-
lem. Soil samples were also taken which also gave very
high TOG readings.
PLANNING THE SITE RESPONSE
Initiation of Response
Based on data from DEP tests of surface and ground
water that indicated the presence of a number of contami-
nants, including benzene, toluene, and methylene chloride,
DEP concluded in July 1980 that the Goose Farm site posed
a threat to human health. Ground water testing indicated
contamination of a shallow aquifer below the pit. Tests
of a deeper aquifer, which provides drinking water to
nearby residents, were inconclusive. However, local
geological characteristics, the downward vector of ground
water movement, and the long period of time that wastes
had been at the site suggested that the lower aquifer
might soon become contaminated. In addition, an uncon-
trolled discharge to surface water, which justified fund-
ing under 311 (k) of the Clean Water Act, prompted DEP1 s
response. Although tests of nearby drinking water wells
during the summer of 1980 showed no contamination above
background levels, DEP believed that the threat to drink-
ing water was additional incentive to justify immediate
action. Another factor prompting DEP's response was the
fact that the site was causing an apparent uncontrolled
discharge into the adjacent stream system and thus was
potentially eligible for section 31l(k) funding.
Selection of Response Technologies
The selection of response activities and technologies
at the Goose Farm site occurred before definite protocol
was available from the presently emerging (CERCLA) Super-
fund program such as the procedures outlined in the
National Contingency Plan. Also, selection of specific
technologies and the decision to clean-up the site seems
to have been carried out under a climate of urgency
prompted by the executive management of DEP and the poten-
tial availability of 311(k) funds. As mentioned earlier,
the N.J. Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) con-
ducted the preliminary site investigation during January
through June, 1980. They then utilized OHM in August 1980
300.68(e)(2)
(i)(C) hazard-
ous properties
300.68(e)(2)
(i)(D) hydrogeo-
logical factors
300.65(a)(2)
threat to
drinking water
11-12
-------
through an existing time and materials contract basis to
accomplish the following objectives:
• Accumulate data that indicated there was an uncon-
trolled release of hazardous substances into the
tributaries of Crosswick Creek and determine if
this release was originating from Goose Farm site
• Obtain sampling data to show the extent of the
ground water contamination to a degree sufficient
to enable assessment with respect to the elimi-
nation of the discharge to the Creek
• Contain the discharge by a three-phased approach
which included:
- a peripheral ground water treatment system
(referenced as System A in the literature),
- excavation of the drums and the most grossly
contaminated soil on site,
- possible further ground water control at the
heavily contaminated area, if needed.
• Improve or protect ground water quality at and
adjacent to the site sufficient to assure that
further significant surface water discharges would
not occur.
The DEP directed OHM to proceed with clean-up efforts
using ground water pumping and treatment to remove the
contaminants from the ground water. In addition, OHM pro-
posed (with DEP approval) to use their patented system to
collect contaminated ground water directly under the drum
burial site, treat the collected water, and spray irrigate
and pressure inject treated water over the site to flush
contaminants from the underlying soil with time. O.H.
Materials Company also proposed to use biological degrada-
tion with mutant microorganisms to complete the soil
clean-up process.
Several alternative remediation techniques were con-
sidered by DEP, including:
• Installing an open or gravel filled trench between 300.68(g)
the site and the stream to intercept contaminated development of
ground water with treatment prior to discharge alternatives
• Pumping and treatment to contain the plume rather
than to collect it
11-13
-------
• Installing a slurry wall with ground water pumping
or a french drain upgradient of the wall
• Capping the site
The first two measures were temporary containment
measures that could have been implemented to stop the
immediate ground water discharge to the stream. The major
benefit of utilizing the trench or pumping methods would
have been to provide DEP with temporary stabilization of
conditions at the site while a more detailed assessment
could be conducted to determine optimal long term remedia-
tion. These measures would have involved lower quantities
of collected ground water requiring treatment. Thus, low-
er treatment costs would have resulted over thex short
term.
The installation of a slurry wall to a 60-foot (18 m)
depth (beginning of Hornerstown aquiclude) with pumping of
the upper aquifers may have been a technically and econom-
ically viable long-term alternative, given a more detailed
hydrogeological and engineering assessment. The slurry
wall may have prevented migration of the contaminated
ground water into the stream, and further into the
aquifer. The Hornerstown, Red Bank, and Navesink forma-
tions consist of 75 to 80 feet (23-24 m) of relatively
impermeable strata. The thought behind considering a
slurry wall is that it would have cut off a portion of the
aquifer (or the entire aquifer depending on design) so
that a minimum of clean ground water would be pumped
during pumping of the contaminant plume. This would have
substantially reduced pumping and treatment costs,
especially given the high permeability of the subsurface
at the Goose Farm site. The slurry wall alternative at
this time, however, wasn1t considered by state and Federal
decision-makers to be a reliable technology and there were
doubts concerning this technology's effectiveness in the
situation at hand.
Extent of Response
The DEP's goals in the Goose Farm clean-up were to
eliminate the discharge of contaminants to surface water
and to mitigate the threat to ground water. The DEP
issued itself a permit which established an effluent
criterion for the treatment system, requiring that water
discharged from the system contain less than 100 rag/1
total organic carbon (TOG). By December 1980, NJDEP had
established a ground water clean-up goal of 100 mg/1 TOG.
The pumping and treatment response was terminated in March
1981 when NSDEP had determined ground water contamination
to be below 100 mg/1.
11-14
300.68(e)(l)
initial measures
300.68(j)
extent of remedy
-------
Another factor that determined the extent to which
the site was cleaned up was the amount of available funds.
While DEP had intended, after the ground water treatment
system was dismantled, to attempt a relatively complete
decontamination of the soil and ground water using
biological treatment, no state funds were then available,
and the section 311(k) and Superfund funds were only
available for emergency responses. By March 1981, the
situation at Goose Farm was not considered an emergency.
The DEP removed the excavated wastes in November 1981,
when additional state funds became available.
DESIGN AND EXECUTION OF SITE RESPONSE
The following sections describe the design, construc-
tion, and operation conducted at the Goose Farm site from
August 1980 to January 1982.
Remedial actions conducted at Goose Farm consisted of
the following activities:
• The installation of a wellpoint collection/spray
irrigation system to contain and thereby prevent
contaminated ground water from entering the creek
(System A)
• The installation of a wellpoint collection and
recharge system to flush contaminants from the
soil and collect contaminated ground water
directly beneath the drum disposal area (System B)
• Treatment of contaminated ground water
• Drum removal, segregation and treatment
• Temporary storage of drums and bulked wastes
• Final disposal of drums and bulked wastes.
The above remedial actions are discussed in the fol-
lowing sections:
Wellpoint/Spray Irrigation (System A)
Wellpoint system A was installed in September 1980
between the drum pit on the Goose Farm Site and the
nearby stream to prevent further contamination of the
surface water by contaminated ground water seepage. The
The wellpoint system composite cone of depression
acted as hydrologic barrier to the migration of the
contaminant plume to the stream. The wellpoint system
11-15
300.70(b)(D-
ground water
pumping ; plume
containment
-------
consisted of about 400 feet (122 m) of 6-inch (15 cm)
exposed aluminum header pipe with 52 wellpoints spaced
about every 7.5 feet (2.3 m). The wellpoints were com-
prised of 3-foot long (0.9 m) long jettable recovery
points screened with 200 mesh dutch weaved stainless steel
screens. The wellpoints were joined with 1 1/2 inch (3.8
cm) diameter metal pipe, and installed by water jetting to
a depth of approximately 22 feet (6.7 m), which corre-
sponds to the beginning of the Manasquan aquitard. (The
configuration of wellpoint system A is shown in Figure
4.) The wellpoint system was pumped at a rate of about
50,000 to 75,000 gallons (189, 271 - 283, 906) per day to
contain the migration of contaminants. Following treat-
ment to remove contaminants (which will be discussed later
in this section) the collected ground water was spray
irrigated via 6-inch (15 cm) aluminum headers. Two spray
irrigation systems were initially installed to handle the
flow from the system A wellpoints. The primary spray
irrigation system was located behind the main battery of
wellpoints, so that the mound created by infiltrating
water would form a second positive hydraulic barrier in
addition to the negative hydraulic barrier created by the
wellpoints1 composite cone of depression. A secondary
spray irrigation system was located northwest of the
collection area to handle the remaining flow. The primary
spray system was dismantled after a time and used as a
recharge system for wellpoint system B in the drum pit
area.
A vacuum receiver (himulator) was used to effect
ground water recovery in the wellpoint system. A second
vacuum system had to be added to achieve the required flow
rate for creating an adequate cone of depression.
Certain operational requirements were addressed
during site clean-up with respect to wellpoint system A.
Winterization of the wellpoint system had to be carried
out to protect system elements from freezing temperatures.
This was accomplished by constructing wooden housings
(snake barns) around the piping. Wooden housings were
also constructed around vacuum system elements. Adjust-
ments to the wellpoint system were made throughout pump-
ing. Initially the system was adjusted to give uniform
flow. Later adjustments to the system involved turning
off wellpoints in which relatively clean water was being
pumped. This action allowed greater pumping of wellpoints
located in pockets of higher contamination.
During the course of pumping, OHM decided to extend a
section of wellpoints 60 feet (18 m) to the southeast, to
offer greater containment of the contaminant plume.
11-16
-------
Temporary Drum
Storage Cells
System A
^^^ Recovery Header
——- Primary Irrigation System
Secondary Discharge System
System B
— • — Recovery Header
—.. Wellpoint Injection System
Grossly
Contaminated
Soil, Crushed
Drums, Waste
Carbon
Stream
Former
Drum Pit
To Rt. 539
(300 yds.)
NOTE; System A Primary Irrigation Piping Dismantled and
Remade into System B Piping for Weilpoint Injection
Figure 4. Ground water Pumping and Treatment System at Goose Farm.
Plumstead, New Jersey
11-17
-------
During the winter operation of the spray irrigation
system it was noticed that spray nozzles were freezing and
clogging. The spray nozzles were removed and the system
continued to be operated without any significant perfor-
mance impact. At one point during the pumping/treatment/
irrigation operation, runoff from the secondary spray
irrigation system was severely eroding a channel to the
stream. The eroded area was filled with gravel to control
future erosion problems.
System A was operated from September 1980 to February
1981, when it was determined that the drawdown from
system B was enough to contain the plume.
Wellpoint Collection/Spray Irrigation/Pressure Injection
(System B)
Wellpoint collection/injection system B (also shown
in Figure 4) was installed during December 1980 in the
drum burial area to remove contaminants in the unsaturated
zone and the ground water directly beneath the site.
The first phase of operation consisted of installing
wellpoints to a shallow depth, i.e. in the unsaturated
zone above the water table, which occurred at depths of
around 7 to 13 feet (2-4 m), under the site. Ground water
collection and injection at this depth would flush contam-
inants from the unsaturated zone. Later, the wellpoints
were lowered into the water table to collect the contami-
nated ground water plume. Collected water underwent
treatment, as did the water from System A. Initially,
treated water was spray irrigated onto the drum disposal
area to flush contamination from soils in the unsaturated
zone. Eventually treated water was pressure injected via
a separate wellpoint system directly into substrata in the
drum disposal area in order to accelerate flow movement
along surfaces of less permeable layers. As with system
A, wellpoints were constructed of 3-foot (0.9 m) Dutch
weave stainless steel screens joined with 1.5 inch (3.8
cm) metal pipe on centers of 7.5 feet. Approximately 100
wellpoints were connected to about 900 feet of 6-inch (15
cm) aluminum header pipe. Again, a vacuum system was used
to recover the ground water.
Prior to soil flushing, observations in test pits
(dug by a backhoe) indicated that contamination was pres-
ent as a black ooze above a clay layer, which was 3 to 4
feet (0.9-1.2 m) deep. Analysis of the clays indicated
that a high level of organics (30 mg/g TOG) was seeping
slowly through the clay layer. To facilitate flushing of
the contaminants from the low permeability clay layer, the
300.70(b)(2)-
(iii)(E)(l)
in situ treat-
ment: solu-
tion mining
11-18
-------
pressure injection system was operated with varying pres-
sures by using on/off relays in order to create a pressure
pulse.
Initially, bench scale leaching tests indicated that
10 complete soil rinses, or a total of 11,000,000 gallons
(4.2 X 10 1) of water would be required for complete soil
flushing to acceptable levels. When OHM was asked to
terminate operations, the total amount of water processed
was approximately 7.8 million gallons (2.9 X 10' 1) for
systems A and B. Soil TOG values in the drum pit area at
the termination of soil flushing operations averaged about
3,300 mg/1. The above criteria suggest that decontami-
nation of soils may have been incomplete. System B
operations were terminated in March 1981.
As with system A, snake barns were constructed around
piping to protect against freezing during winter opera-
tion.
Contaminated Ground Water Treatment
The 250,000 gallon (950,000 1) per day capacity
treatment systems at the Goose Farm site received contami-
nated ground water collected by wellpoint system A and B.
It consisted of an activated carbon fume scrubbers to
remove volatilized organics, a clarifier, a four-cascade
aqueous carbon treatment system, aeration to strip organ-
ics not treated by the aqueous carbon treatment system,
and an effluent storage tank. The configuration of the
treatment system is shown in Figure 5.
Contaminated ground water flowed through each of the
two wellpoint systems to two vacuum receivers, one for
each system, which developed the necessary suction for the
collection systems. The vacuum in these units enhanced
volatilization of organics from the aqueous to the vapor
phase. Organic loading in the influent stream averaged
about 157 mg/1 Total Organic Carbon (TOG). Volatilization
occurring at the vacuum receiver removed about 13 percent
of the TOG present in the aqueous stream. Vapor phase
carbon treatment systems (fume scrubbers) were then used
to remove organic contaminants from the resultant vapor
stream. The carbon fume scrubbers reduced organics in the
vapor phase from about 800 ppm to below 100 ppm.
The carbon adsorption units off the vacuum receiver
were vessels with a bed surface area of approximately 38.5
square feet (3.57 m ). Air flow (generated by the vacuum
receiver) could reach up to 300 cubic feet (8,500 1) per
minute. Each vessel was charged with up to 4,500 pounds
(2,041 kg) of carbon for treating the organic vapors.
300.70(2)(ii)
direct waste
treatment
methods
300.70(b)(2)
carbon
adsorption
11-19
-------
Sample Locations
1. Vacuum receiver influent
2. Vacuum receiver influent
3. Clarifier
4. Absorber unit 'A*
Absorber unit 'B'
Absorber unit *C*
Holding tank
Holding tank
NaOH
10.
Fume scrubber effluent
(air)
Water storage container
I
t-o
O
typical
r~7<5Ji 1 f
> i i ;,.J-
A/' F
-A^
Ground Water
X"*^ Containment
/ • System
Drum Pit
-*^* Recovery System
f/J J.
Discharge to Primary or
Secondary Spray System
Recovery and Treatment Equipment
A. Vacuum receiver (Himulator)
Portable clarifier
Liquid transfer station
Multi-stage carbon absorption units
Storage and sampling tanks
Vapor phase fume scrubber
G. Water storage container
Figure 5. Schematic View of Treatment System at the
Goose Farm Site (O.K. Material? Co., 1981)
-------
The aqueous effluent from the two vacuum receivers
flowed into a clarifier to reduce suspended solids and
heavy metals prior to treatment with carbon. The pH of
the stream was adjusted with sodium hydroxide to about 6.0
to enhance clarification. Polymer flocculants were tried
but found to be only marginally effective. The clarifier
was a portable unit of 12,000 gallon (45,000 1) capacity
with a mixing chamber, a sludge collector and decant
system, and a skimming apparatus. Detention time in the
clarifier was about 200 minutes. Organic loading in the
clarifier influent stream averaged about 136 mg/1. About
9 percent of TOG in the influent stream was removed by the
clarifier. Effluent from clarifier flowed to a transfer
station, where flow equalization occurred. Multi-stage
pumps provided a flow rate range of from 25 to 150 gallons
(95 -568 1) per minute to the carbon adsorption system.
Carbon adsorption of the aqueous stream consisted of
three 2-cell adsorbers, in which any two would be con-
nected in series during operation, while the remaining
unit was being recharged with fresh carbon. Influent to
the carbon adsorption system averaged 125 mg/1. The
carbon adsorption system removed about 62 percent of the
remaining TOC. Final effluent TOG after carbon adsorption
was about 54 mg/1, which demonstrates an overall removal
efficiency of 66 percent. Spent carbon was stored on-site
for six months prior to off-site disposal.
A 100,000 gallon (3.8 X 105 1) storage tank was
installed as a modification to the existing system to col-
lect effluent overnight prior to discharge. This elimi-
nated the additional cost of night-time sampling and also
provided a safeguard against releasing water that was
above the effluent discharge limit of 100 rag/1 TOC.
TOC was the main parameter used to monitor treatment
plant operation. Analyses for additional chemical com-
pounds were conducted only during the 21-day treatment
plant study period in February 1981. It was during this
time that methylene chloride was observed to be breaking
through the carbon system, i.e. it was not being
adequately removed and causing abnormally high effluent
concentrations.
The methylene chloride problem was solved by install-
ing an aeration system within the 100,000 gallon (380,000
1) storage tank. The aeration system consisted of a
series of 3-inch (7.6 cm) PVC headers installed about 3
feet (1 m) over the liquid surface. Stored water was
recycled through the spray aeration system until the water
met the discharge limits.
300.70(b)(2)
(ii)-(C)(l)
air stripping
11-21
-------
During winter operation the spray irrigation system
was observed to be sagging due to the weight of the ice on
the headers; however, no corrective action was required.
The treatment system was operational from September 1980
to March 1981, during which a total of 7,800,000 million
gallons (2.9 X 10 1) of contaminated ground water was
treated and discharged.
Waste Removal^
Waste removal operations at the Goose Farm site were
carried out from September to October of 1980. During a
45-day period, over 4,880 drums and containers were
excavated, analyzed, secured, and segregated. Table 2
gives an inventory of drums and containers recovered from
the burial area.
300.70(c)(2)(i)
excavation
TABLE 2
Inventory of Recovered Drums and Containers
Drummed Solids
Drummed Liquids
Overpacked Solids
Overpacked Liquids
Lab Packs
5 gallon (19 1) drums (full)
5 gallon (19 1) drums (empty)
55 gallon (208 1) drums (empty)
55 gallon (208 1) drums (crushed
or fragmented)
TOTAL
containers
1,201
402
23
278
92
2,037
512
288
54
4,887
Excavation operations proceeded as follows: The
boundaries and the depth of drum burial were defined. A
bench was then excavated near one end of the burial pit to
11-22
-------
the drum pit floor level. This allowed "above-ground"
access to the buried waste materials. Excavation of
drums, containers and contaminated soil proceeded from one
end of the pit to the other.
A backhoe/front end loader and two QHM-designed drum
grapplers were used to complete removal operations. The
backhoe was used to excavate to the surface of the drums.
The drum grapplers were used to grasp the drums and
transfer them from the excavation area to the front end
loader. The loader was used to transport drums to the
operations area and to the staging area. Drums that could
be overpacked were overpacked. Other drums containing
solids were secured on site while badly degraded drums
containing liquids were tested for compatibility and
emptied into separate concrete tanks according to whether
they were acid, base, or neutral materials. Bulked
liquids totalling 9,077 gallons (34,000 1) were disposed
of via Chem Clear, an aqueous waste pretreatment facility
in Chester, PA.
About 3,500 tons (3,200 Mt) of highly contaminated
soil and about 20,000 tons (18,000 Mt) of moderately
contaminated soil were excavated from the drum burial area
and segregated into two separate piles on site. The
severely contaminated soil was analyzed and found to con-
tain less than 50 mg/kg PCS.
Temporary Storage of Drums and Bulked Wastes
By December 1980, drums and bulked wastes were staged
on-site in anticipation of final disposal. Provisions for
temporary storage were made. Contaminated soils and PCB
contaminated carbon were stockpiled on-site. A 6-ml black
plastic liner was placed as a foundation for the waste
piles while a plastic liner was also used to cover the
piles. Wood from dismantling the snake barns was used to
weigh down the plastic top liner. Stored drums were
underlain and covered with a clear plastic liner.
The wastes remained on site for several months await-
ing funding for final disposal. In July 1981, a site
visit revealed general deterioration of provisions for
temporary storage. Wind conditions had partially torn
plastic top liners from the drum storage area and waste
piles. Drums were observed bursting from the excessive
heat caused by a "greenhouse" effect resulting from using
clear plastic to cover the drums. The clear plastic
lining was degrading due to contact with the organic
vapors and citizens in the area were complaining about
health problems they felt were caused by noxious fumes
from the site. Heavy rains had eroded some of the waste
11-23
-------
from Che storage piles. Several of the drums were in
danger of falling into the drum pit, because of erosion.
Final Disposal
In November 1981 final disposal of the stored mate-
rials was initiated. O.K. Materials Company used a dozer
and a front end loader to empty and crush the drums, and
loaded the bulked wastes for transport. About 4,320 tons
(3,930 Mt) of wastes, including the 3,500 tons (3,200 Mt)
of highly contaminated soil, were transported in 205 truck
loads to the CECOS International disposal site in Niagara
Falls, New York. In addition, 12 drums of PCB waste were
transported to Rollins Environmental Services, Bridgeport,
NJ for disposal.
300.70(c)
off-site trans-
port for stor-
age, treatment,
destruction, or
secure dis-
position
COST AND FUNDING
Source of Funding
Before initiating a response, state officials
attempted to enlist the cooperation of the party
responsible for dumping the wastes. The state was not
able to negotiate an acceptable settlement with the
dumper. The DEP began work on the site on August 25, 1980
using money from the New Jersey Spill Compensation Fund.
By October 19, 1980, costs for the clean-up averaged
$25,000 per day, and the state had spent $1.1 million.
As the state neared the limit of available Spill Fund
monies, DEP made a request through U.S. EPA to the U.S.
Coast Guard for funds under the Clean Water Act section
(311k) Revolving Fund. Since the site was contaminating
surface water that flowed into the Delaware River, a
navigable water of the U.S., the clean-up was eligible for
emergency funds under section 311(k). The request was
approved as state funds ran out.
Accordingly the Coast Guard approved section 311(k)
funding for the site and set an initial spending ceiling
of $500,000. An on-scene coordinator for the site was
appointed from the Emergency Response and Hazardous
Materials Inspection Branch in the Region II office of
EPA. Federal funding for the clean-up began on October
20, 1980. The DEP's Division of Hazard Management
continued as the managing authority at the site, while EPA
reviewed invoices and forwarded them to the Coast Guard,
which then reimbursed the state. The DEP stayed in charge
throughout the clean-up, choosing the contractors, tech-
nologies, and the clean-up criteria in coordination and
with concurrence of the Federal government.
300.68(c)
responsible
party
300.68(b)
state RA
11-24
-------
There was no formal cooperative agreement between New
Jersey and either EPA or the Coast Guard concerning the
specific uses of the federal funds. The state had a mem-
orandum of understanding from the Coast Guard stating that
the Coast Guard would reimburse the state only for expend-
itures approved by the EPA on-scene coordinator. The
Coast Guard placed an important restriction on spending at
the outset of EPA involvement, namely that section 311(k)
funds could not be used for waste disposal. The Coast
Guard believed that New Jersey Spill Fund money should be
used to pay for disposal.
As work on the site progressed, EPA made requests to
the Coast Guard every 2 to 4 weeks to raise the spending
ceiling at the site, usually in increments of $500,000 or
$1 million. In December 1980 the Coast Guard began
authorizing smaller increases, ranging from $30,000 to
$200,000 because the 311K money was nearly depleted. In
February 1981 part of the ground water recovery system was
dismantled and most of the clean-up personnel and equip-
ment were removed from the site. These actions were
intended to reduce clean-up costs at the site to $5,000
per day.
The Emergency Response Division (ERD) of the EPA
Office of Emergency and Remedial Response assumed
authority over section 311(k) funding for Goose Farm in 300.68(k)
March 1981. ERD reviewed the status of Goose Farm and balancing
concluded that the site did not present an emergency and
should be given a low priority in view of the limited
funds available to ERD and the more immediate problems at
other sites. Accordingly, the ERD terminated federal
funding for the Goose Farm clean-up in March 1981, with a
final total authorization of $2.75 million. According to
both EPA and DEP, the site no longer posed an immediate
threat to human health when operations ceased.
In November 1981, additional state funds became
available for Goose Farm. The DEP spent approximately
$600,000 from the Spill Fund to remove and dispose of the
wastes that had been excavated the previous year.
Selection of Contractors
In August 1980, DEP chose O.H. Materials, Inc. (OHM)
of Findlay, Ohio to install and operate a ground water
recovery and treatment system and to excavate wastes. The
state signed a sole-source contract with OHM on a time-
and-materials basis, using the New Jersey "X-83" contrac-
ting system. The X-83 system was a mechanism wherein the
state accepted price sheets for time and materials from a
number of contractors, then chose contractors as the need
11-25
-------
arose, basing the selection primarily on qualifications
and availability of the firm and secondarily on prices.
At the time of the site response DEP believed that
OHM was the only contractor offering the ground water
treatment technology that was selected. O.H. Materials
billed the state weekly for labor and equipment used in
the clean-up. No limit was set on total expenditures for
the job. The DEP kept an official on the site throughout
the clean-up to oversee the work and review invoices
submitted to the state.
The second major contractor chosen for the clean-up
was CECOS International of Niagara Falls, New York, which
was also prequalified and had received an X-83 contract.
The DEP cho se CECOS in November 1981 to t r anspor t and
dispose of 4,320 tons (3,930 Mg) of waste excavated from
the site. CECOS was chosen through an informal compet-
itive bidding arrangement because the firm offered the
lowest price for transportation and disposal.
Pr_o_j_e_ct C_o_s_t_s_
The cost of the Goose Farm clean-up operations from
August 1980 to January 1982 was $5.1 million. Of this
amount, $2.35 million came from the New Jersey Spill Fund
and $2.75 million from federal sources. Because the
project was ongoing when CERCLA was enacted in December
1980, the federal funds came from both the section 31l(k)
Revolving Fund ($1.75 million) under the Clean Water Act
and the Superfund Emergency Response Fund ($1 million).
Table 3 provides a summary of cost information.
Precise cost breakdown of each of the clean-up
elements is not possible for two major reasons. First,
the New Jersey DEP did not provide detailed information on
costs, as well as on other aspects of the clean-up,
because release of such information might have been detri-
mental to the state's litigation against the responsible
party. A cost summary was made available, but did not give
a detailed breakdown of expenditures. Second, the more
detailed cost information that EPA provided on the section
311(k)-funded portion of the clean-up did not differen-
tiate between the various tasks that OHM performed concur-
rently at the site because bills were submitted to DEP on
a time-and-materials basis. While invoices specified
hourly rates for labor and daily rental charges for equip-
ment, they did not state the tasks for which the labor and
equipment were used. Given these limitations, only a
general analysis of expenditures is possible.
300.6l(c)
CERCLA-f inane ed
response
11-26
-------
TABLE 3. SUMMARY OF COST INFORMATION - GOOSE FARM, PLUMSTED TOWNSHIP, N.J.
Task
Mobilization,
excavation and
demobilization
jfoundwater
recovery and
treatment
operation
cost only
Bulking and
.oading wastes
'or disposal
iisposal of
soil and drums
at CECOS
Transportation
of wastes to
Niagra Falls, N.Y
440 ml (708 km)
Off-site sample
analysis
'CB transporta-
tion and disposal
at Rollins,
Bridgeport, N.J.
)rilling
monitoring wells
Site security
guards
Electric power
iscellaneous
Quantity
7,817,480 gal
(29.5 million 1)
4320 tons
(3900 Mg)
4320 tons
(3900 Mg)
4320 tons
(3900 Hg)
(205 loads)
12 drums
Estimated
Expenditure
$380,000(a)
$1,258, 000 (a)
Transporta-
tion and
disposal
$15, 000 (a)
Actual
Expenditure
$3,104,845
$1,120,000
$193,834
$171,272
$246,000
$150,000
$4,100
$24,127
$58,371
$19,260
$12,123
Variance
-$186,166
(-51%)
-$840,728
(-67%)
-10,900
(-72%)
Unit Cost
14^/gal.
(3.7^/1)
(25-40^/gal.
including
set-up)
$45/ton
($50/Hg)
$40/ton
<$44/Mg)
$1200/load or
$57/ton or
12.9^/ton/mi.
(8.84/Mg/km)
$34 I/ drum
Funding Source
N.J. Spill Fund
311(k)/Superfund
N.J. Spill Fund
311(k)/Superfund
N.J. Spill Fund
N.J. Spill Fund
N -J. Spill Fund
N.J. Spill Fund
311(k)/Superfund
N.J. Spill Fund
N.J. Spill Fund
311(k)/Superfuml
N.J. Spill Fund
311(k)/Superfund
N.J. Spill Fund
311(k)/Supcrfund
N.J. Spill Fund
Period of
Performance
8/80-4/81
9/80-3/81
11/81-12/81
H/81-1/82
11/81-1/82
7/81-1/82
1/82
7/80-12-81
4/81-1/82
4/81-1/82
7/80-1/82
I
ho
Total
$5,000,000 (b) $5,103,932
(a) NJDEP estimate - May, 1981
(not a binding contractual estimate)
+103,932
(+2%)
(b) NJDEP estimate - October, 1980
(not a binding contractual estimate)
-------
Ground Water Recovery and Treatment—
Installation, operation1 and dismantling of the ground
water recovery and treatment system cost between $2 mil-
lion and $3 million, paid for from both state and federal
funds. Of the $2 to 3 million, DEP estimated that the
cost of operating the system, including chemical analyses,
was $1.12 million. Counting operation costs alone, the
treatment cost for 7,817,480 gallons (2.96 x 107 1) of
recovered ground water was $0.14 per gallon (3.8£ per
liter) based on the DEP estimated operating cost. How-
ever, if installation and dismantling costs are included,
the cost probably ranged between $0.26 and $0.40 per
gallon (6.8 - 10.l£ per liter). Unit cost of operation
varied, depending on the quantity of water processed. For
example, during the last week of November 1980, when only
the A system was operating and no other work was ongoing
at the site, the unit cost for recovery and treatment was
$0.27 per gallon (7.l£ per liter). The unit cost of
treatment can also be expressed as a function of TOG
removal. During a 21-day efficiency study of the treat-
ment system in February 1981, when both the A and B
systems were operating, the system removed an average of
31 pounds (14 kg) of TOG per day. Unit removal cost
ranged from $343 to $1,300 per pound ($156 - $591 per kg)
of TOC removed.
Waste Removal and Disposal—
The cost of excavating and staging 4,887 drums and
30,000 cubic yards (22,800 m ) of contaminated soil was
between $1 million and $2 million, all federally funded.
Again, an exact figure is unavailable because of the lack
of a cost breakdown.
Final removal and disposal of 4,320 tons (3,900 Mt)
of drums and soil and 12 drums of PCBs cost the state
$615,000. Of that amount, $194,000 was paid to O.H.
Materials for emptying and crushing drums and loading the
waste on to trucks, and $417,000 to CECOS Internat ional
for transporting and disposing of the waste in its Niagara
Falls landfill. Transportation cost $246,000 for 205
truckloads or $1,200 per load. The distance transported
aas approximately 440 miles (708 km). Disposal costs were
$171,000, or $40 per ton ($44/Mt). Based on these fig-
ures, the unit costs of the removal action were $45 per
ton ($50/Mt) for bulking and loading; $57 per ton ($63/Mt)
for transportation or 17.8 i per toa per mile (10.1 il
*t/km), and $40 per ton ($44/Mt) for disposal. Total
per-ton cost for removal and disposal was $142 per ton
($156/Mt). Transportation and disposal of 12 drums of
PCBs by Rollins Environmental Services in Bridgeport, N.J.
:ost $4,100, or $341 per drum.
11-28
-------
Sampling and Analysis--
Chemical analysis of samples performed off-site cost
$150,000. The cost of drilling 51 monitoring wells was
$24,127. No costs are available for resistivity testing.
Other Expenses—
The DEP hired security guards from the Plumsted Town-
ship Police Department to guard the site full-time from
April 1981' through January 1982. Security cost about
$1,500 per week, totalling $58,371.
The electric power cost for both the initial clean-up
activities from August 1980 to April 1981, and the waste
removal activities from November 1981 to January 1982,
totalled $19,260. Miscellaneous expenses totalled
$12,123.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
It is evident from the preceding case history that
thorough planning is essential to the successful technical
and financial conduct of response actions at hazardous
waste sites. Protocol for planning site response has been
made available through the development of the National
Contingency Plan. At the time of the Goose Farm clean-up,
no such protocol existed and guidance from past experience
was minimal. These facts must be considered in a just
evaluation of the response at the Goose Farm site.
The initial intent of the clean-up, as*mentioned in
the section on Selection of Site Response, was to elim-
inate the discharge of contaminated ground water to the
stream and also to provide additional treatment of ground
water as required. No monitoring data was available to
ascertain whether the discharge to the stream .has been
eliminated. The other major objective of the site
clean-up was to achieve some level of ground water quality
at and adjacent to the site. The established criterion
required that the average ground water- TOC level be less
than 100 mg/1. Again, no monitoring data were available
to determine whether this criterion had been met.
Additionally, it appears that there may have been
some degree of uncertainty concerning the extent of ground
water contamination at the site, due to the limited
monitoring well data. There also seemed to be a climate
of urgency related to the site clean-up resulting from
public concern in the area, and due to these emergency
response requirements and availability of funds, design of
the wellpoint system was based on the limited data
available at the time.
11-29
-------
It should also be pointed out that available ground
water remediation technology at the time of the Goose Farm
clean-up was not broadly used or developed, thus adding to
the difficulty of site clean-up efforts.
As mentioned earlier, preliminary data from resis-
tivity studies suggested that the contaminant plume may
have reached a depth of 60 feet (18 m) . From limited
monitoring well data, OHM concluded that ground water
contamination was limited to 36 feet (11 m) . They
designed their weilpoints (System A) for plume containment
with a screen depth of approximately 17 to 22 feet (5.2 -
6.7 m) to key into an aquitard. There is some suggestion
in the OHM literature that the weilpoints were supposed to
be lowered at a later date to take care of deeper contam-
ination, presumably to 36 feet (11 m) . However, the
System A wellpoint network was shut down in February 1981
during the operation of System B. The System A wellpoints
were never lowered to a greater depth to collect deeper
ground water contamination (the reason for not lowering
System A wellpoints is not known). In any case, it is
evident from the documentation that ground water treatment
objectives were initially not well defined and were being
modified as the clean-up proceeded.
Another occurrence at the Goose Farm site was that
ground water pumping, treatment, and recharge operations
were carried out during the winter. Winter operations
required that piping systems be insulated by wooden snake
barns and that process buildings be constructed around
treatment plant unit operations. The construction of
shelters for these components resulted in significant time
delays and additional costs. Also, winter operation
caused operational problems that were described in the
previous section. The expense of winter operation should
be considered in the future in the design and planning of
responses for uncontrolled hazardous waste sites.
Proper planning relative to the timely removal of
waste materials staged on-site is also an important aspect
of site response. At the Goose Farm site, a delay in
transporting staged wastes off-site caused a degradation
of temporary containment provisions, and may have resulted
in recontamination of previously cleaned soils.
At present, the documentation suggests that contam-
ination of the lower ground water regions has not been
thoroughly removed and may still pose a significant threat
to drinking water wells. Remediation relative to this
problem may be necessary. A report has been prepared by
Weston Consultants (Weston), West Chester, Pennsylvania
detailing additional sampling and analytical requirements
11-30
-------
for adequately defining the lower aquifer contamination at
the Goose Farm site. These include the installation of
multi-level cluster wells, a piezometric survey, monitor-
ing wells for EPA priority pollutants, pumping tests on a
minimum of two wells on-site, contaminated soil analysis
and detailed mapping of the extent of contamination.
Also, in the report, a number of alternatives for cleaning
up the remaining ground water contamination are assessed
in terms of technical feasibility and costs, including the
installation of a slurry trench, french drains, radial
wells, deep well ground water pumping, and alternate
aqueous treatment scenarios. Weston concluded that the
best clean-up option would be one similar to the OHM
system, but would be designed using more detailed data on
contamination.
Temporary measures to control site discharges can be
implemented at uncontrolled hazardous waste sites to allow
time for proper program planning prior to initiation of
extensive site clean-up activities. Thus, more efficient
and effective remediation techniques can be identified and
implemented. An alternative response which may have given
greater flexibility at the Goose Farm site would have been
to install one of the temporary containment actions
described in the section of this case study entitled
Selection of Site Response. Thus, a cut-off drain or
pumping just to contain the plume could have been used on
a temporary basis, while a detailed engineering report
could be prepared which would provide an adequate assess-
ment of existing data, further monitoring requirements,
and a detailed analysis of long-term remedial action
alternatives.
11-31
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Chapin, Richard W., November 11, 1980 to April 23, 1980. "Weekly Summaries of
Events for "311 Action at Goose Farm." TAT II, Princeton Aqua Science, Inc.,
New Brunswick, N.J.
Chapin, Richard W. , October 20, 1980 to April 16, 1981. "Daily Log of 311
Action at Goose Farm Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Site." TAT II, Princeton
Aqua Science, Inc., New Brunswick, N.J.
Chapin, Richard W., August 18, 1981. "A Preliminary Assessment of the Hazards
Associated with the Goose Farm Hazardous Waste Site, Plumsted Township, N.J."
TAT II, Princeton Aqua Science, New Brunswick, N.J.
Cook, Michael B., September 1981. "Continuation of Removal Activities Beyond
$1 million at the Goose Farm Hazardous Waste Site in Plurasted, N. J."
Memorandum to Christopher J. Capper, Acting Assistant Administrator for Solid
Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Washington, D.C.
Dalton, Richard, July 1982. Personal communications, N.J. Department of
Environmental Protection, Bureau of Groundwater Management, Trenton, N.J.
Dewling, Richard, T., Acting Regional Administrator, US EPA Region II, Letter
of February 2, 1982 regarding Weston report on Goose Farm, to John D. Dingell,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy
and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.
Giardina, Paul A., February 8, 1982. "Goose Farm Status Review," Memorandum
to George Tyler, Assistant Commissioner, N.J. Department of Environmental
Protection, Trenton, N.J.
Giardina, Paul A., Assistant to the Assistant Commissioner, June 1982.
Personal Communications. N.J. Department of Environmental Protection,
Trenton, N.J.
Humphrey, Allen, July, 1982. Personal communications. Emergency Response
Division, Office of Emergency and Remedial Response, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Washington, D.C.
Jaffe, Herb, January 21, 1982. "Toxic Cleanup Practices Blasted in Memo to
DEP," Newark Star-Ledger, Newark, N.J.
Lavache, Lt. Mark, June 1982. Personal communications. U.S. Coast Guard,
Third district, Governors Island, N.Y.
Moore, Richard, June 1982. Personal communication. U.S. Coast Guard, Third
District, Governor's Island, N.Y.
11-32
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BIBLIOGRAPHY (Continued)
N.J. Department of Environmental Protection, May 11, 1981. "Final
Remediation: Goose Farm, Plurasted Township. Trenton, N.J.
O.H. Materials, Inc., November 17, 1980. "Sampling and Analysis Protocol,
Goose Farm Suite." O.H. Materials Inc., Findlay, Ohio.
O.H. Materials, Inc., January 3, 1981. "Summary Report, Goose Farm Site."
O.H. Materials Inc., Findlay, Ohio.
Ohneck, Robert J., Letter of March 22, 1982. to Fred Rubel, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Region II, Edison, N.J., responding to Weston Report on
Goose Farm. O.H. Materials Co., Findlay, Ohio.
Panning, Robert, July 1982. Personal communications. O.H. Materials Co.,
Findlay, Ohio.
Pine lands Commission, June 1980. N.J. Pine lands: Draft Comprehensive
Management Plan. State of New Jersey. Pinelands Commission, New Lisbon, N.J.
Polito, Michael V., June, July 1982. Personal communications. Emergency
Response and Hazardous Materials Inspection Branch, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Edison, N.J.
Reger, David, June 1982. Personal communication. N.J. Deputy Attorney
General's Office, Trenton, N.J.
Rubel, Fred N., Chief, Emergency Response and Hazardous Materials Inspection
Branch USEPA Region II, February 19, 1981. "Use of Section 311(k) Revolving
Fund for Chemical incidents, Goose Farm." Memorandum to Michael B. Cook,
Deputy Assistant Administrator for Office of Hazardous Emergency Response,
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C.
Soil Conservation Service. April, 1980. Soil Survey of Ocean County, New
Jersey. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. July 16, 1982. National Oil and
Hazardous Substances Contingency Plan. Federal Register, Vol. 47, No. 137,
Washington, D.C.
Weston, Inc., December 1981. "A Cost-Effectiveness Study of Water and Soil
Decontamination at the Goose Farm Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Site, Plumsted
Township, Ocean County, N.J. Prepared for U.S. Coast Guard, Governor's
Island, N.Y.
11-33
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H & M DRUM COMPANY
DARTMOUTH, MASSACHUSETTS
INTRODUCTION
Hazardous wastes were stored and disposed at a former
gravel raining site in North Dartmouth, Massachusetts
between iate 1978 and early 1979. Contamination of
ground water and surface waters resulted from corroding
drums buried in a backfilled disposal pit that had been
excavated below the water table during previous mining
operations. A municipal well located approximately 1,400
feet (427 ra) downgradient from the drum disposal pit was
closed under state order due to the likelihood that con-
taminated ground water from the disposal pit would migrate
towards the well. 1,1,1 trichloroethane trichloroethylene
and other volatile, chlorinated organics were detected in
an observation well located 700 feet (213 ra) from the
municipal well. The concentration of 1,1,1 trichloro-
ethane exceeded 1 mg/1.
Background
The H & M Drum site is situated on a 150-acre (61 ha)
tract of land immediately south of Route 6 in Dartmouth,
Massachusetts. The property had been previously used for
gravel mining operations before being leased to Harold
Mathews, president and owner of H & M Drum Company, for
use as a refuse yard. in 1978, Mathews began storing
drums of hazardous waste in a warehouse located on the
property. Discovery of this site resulted from a local
police investigation into hazardous waste disposal by
H & M Drum in the nearby town of Freetown, Massachusetts
in April 1979. Investigation of the Freetown incident led
the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Quality
Engineering (DEQE) to investigate the Dartmouth site
shortly thereafter.
At the time of discovery by DEQE, the Dartmouth prop-
erty contained a warehouse with approximately 1,000 drums
of waste, a trailer with 100 drums, and four earthen-
covered disposal pits used for disposal of drums. The
primary disposal pit contained approximately 300 corroding
and leaking drums of waste mixed with metal debris and
NCP Reference
300.63(a)(4)
discovery
300.64(a)(2)
preliminary
assessment
12-1
-------
tires. Direct discharge of contaminants into the ground-
water occurred because rusting and Leaking drums of waste
burined in the pit lay partially submerged in the ground-
water. The other three pits contained fewer than 20 drums
in total. Figure 1 presents a layout of the site.
Synopsis' of Site Response
Following site discovery, DEQE sampled a small number
of drums from the warehouse and found them to contain a
wide range of organics. Based on their preliminary
assessment of the site conditions and the contents of the
drums, DEQE directed the town of Dartmouth to close the
downgradient municipal well because of the potential
threat to public health. The town has had to purchase
additional water from New Bedford in order to meet their
needs. A limited hydrogeologic investigation was subse-
quently initiated. The results indicated that there were
high levels of volatile organics in the shallow ground
water in the area of the main disposal pit and that the
contaminants were migrating towards the Route 6 well.
Response action to clean up the site was carried out
in two phases due to a time lapse in funding from the
state legislature. The first appropriation of $223,000
for the-Dartmouth site paid for the majority of the clean-
up, undertaken from November 11, 1979 to February 19,
1980. This initial clean-up effort included excavation
and removal of 320 tons (290 Mt) of heavily contaminated
soil mixed with crushed drums, use of sorbents to remove
non-miscible organics from ground water, construction of
an interceptor trench, and aeration of slightly contami-
nated soils. Because of the funding constraints, DEQE
focused on preventing further contamination of the ground
water by removing the source of pollution and did not seek
to decontaminate the ground water.
Phase II of the cleanup began upon receipt of addi-
t iona 1 fund ing from the legislature a year and a ha 1 f
later and occurred from September 23 through October 9,
1981. A private firm under contract to DEQE removed the
remaining 738 segregated drums and 50 tons (45 Mt) of
contaminated soil. Stockpiled tires and metal scraps
excavated from the disposal pit were not removed, and the
ground water remains contaminated.
In the Spring of 1982, the town of Dartmouth funded
a detailed hydrogeologic study to determine the extent
of contamination and potential remedial measures for
300.65(a)(2)
contamination of
drinking water
supply
300.65(b)(2)
alternative
water supplies
300.65(b)
immediate
removal
300.68(f)
sampling and
monitoring
12-2
-------
:OP.TH
DISPOSAL VREA
ro -;ELL
1«
ayout of the H&M Drum Site, Dartmouth, Massachusetts
(not to scale)
12-3
-------
restoring the well or identifying alternative water sup-
plies. As of November 1982, this study had not yet
started.
300.68(d)(l)
scope of
emedial actions
SITE DESCRIPTION
Surface Characteristics
The H & M Drum Disposal site, is located in Dart-
mouth, Massachusetts in the southern part of Bristol
County. The site is situated just south of Route 6,
approximately 1500 feet (500 m) east of the intersection
of Route 6 and Reed Road. This is an area of mixed com-
mercial, light industrial and residential use but the area
immediately surrounding the site is sparsely populated.
The major concern with regards to the location of the
H & M Drum site is the presence of the Route 6 municipal
well approximately 1400 feet (427 m) south of the site.
This well has a capacity of 0.5 MGD, sufficient to serve
about 65 percent of Dartmouth's population. Figure 2
shows the location of the H & M Drum site.
The local climate of Bristol County is continental,
experiencing significant seasonal, daily and day-to-day
fluctuations. The average winter temperature is 31 °F
(-0.6°C) and the average daily minimum temperature is
23°F (-5°C). In summer, the average temperature is 70°F
(21°C) and the average daily maximum temperature is 80°F
(27°C). Total annual precipitation in the area is 42
inches (107 cm). Of this, 21 inches (53 cm) or 50 percent
usually falls in April through September. In 2 years out
of 10, the rainfall during this period is only 16 inches
(41 cm). Average seasonal snowfall is 36 inches (91 cm).
The prevailing wind is from the southwest. Average wind-
speed is highest, 12 miles per hour (19 km/hr) in March.
The natural topography in the vicinity of the dis-
posal site was formed when sand and gravel from glacial
outwash were deposited along the edges of a retreating ice
mass. These delta kames, as they are called, were left
behind as flat topped hills which are often exploited as
sand and gravel pits. Such was the case in the immediate
area of the H & M Drum site. Depth of excavation varied
but the water table is at or near the surface in most of
the area immediately surrounding the site. There are also
outcrops of bedrock in the immediate area, as a result of
the excavation of gravel pits. Infiltration in the area
is high and runoff is low. Lack of soil material makes
the area unsuitable for most uses.
300.68(e)(2)(i)
(A)
population at
risk
300.68(e)(2)(i)
(E)
climate
300.68(e)(2)(i)-
(D)
hydrogeological
factors
12-4
-------
N
1 INCH = 2100 FT
Figure 2. Location of the H&M Drum Site,
Dartmouth, Massachusetts
12-5
-------
The Route 6 welL lies on the west bank of a swamp
adjacent to the abandoned sand and gravel pits. The area
is level, and consists of deep, very poorly drained soil.
The soil is classified as Swansea muck and was formed in
highly decomposed organic material underlain by sand and
gravel. The soil has a high water table at or near the
surface most of the year. Permeability is moderate or
moderately rapid in the organic material and very rapid in
the substratum. The area is mainly woodland and the high
water makes it poorly suited for most other uses.
Hydrogeology
No detailed studies have been published on the sub-
surface geology in the area of the H & M Disposal site and
the Route 6 well. However, limited geological mapping was
performed during installation of the Route 6 well in 1962.
Figure 3 shows the geological cross section in the area of
the well. Medium to coarse sand with some coarse gravel
was encountered at depths of about 17 to 35 feet (5-11 tn)
below the surface. Such sand and gravel deposits of the
outwash plains are typically an excellent source of large
supplies of water. Pumping tests have shown that the
Route 6 well can sustain a safe yield of about 350 gallons
(1325 1) per minute or 0.5 x 10 gallons (1.9 x 10 L) per
day. At a depth of 35 feet (10.7 m) a strata of uniform
fine sand was encountered and refusal was encountered at
37 feet (11.3 m).
The natural ground water flow in the area follows the
general topography, flowing in a north to northwest direc-
tion. However, the Route 6 well, during its operation
from 1976 through April 1979, created a drawdown which
caused ground water beneath the site to flow south towards
the well. This has been verified by sampling of observa-
tion wells located 700 and 250 feet (213 and 76 m) from
the well which showed movement of the contaminant plume
from the H & M Drum site towards the well. The ground
water sampling will be discussed further below.
300.68(e)(2)(i)-
(D)
hydrogeological
factors
WASTE DISPOSAL HISTORY
On April 8, 1979, the Freetown, Massachusetts police,
acting on a complaint, encountered two individuals at an
old sand and gravel pit in Freetown. The individuals
admitted to emptying the contents of the drums taken from
a truck marked H & M Drum Company Incorporated. The truck
registration was subsequently traced to Harold Mathews,
the owner and operator of H & M Drum Company. The EPA
300.63(a)
discovery of
release
12-6
-------
85-
•II //. /,. t
&eat
Clau and
i->ardpan
Fine Sand,
Sorne C/au,
,-£w 3ou/aery
_. <- . ,
u3G,'se Srave,'
Coarse 5ar,d
f^^f
Si^^f-
f"^m fa t^fsd. Sand
i-i'9f-i OGi~c.G->too&
*' *''"•*
> i
*
>*•
CM
I
i
on
'
r
»
;
1
t
c
;
»
L
«
i
*
.
i
-
;'
<.
.
t^.
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\
•
*
.
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t=a
- tj
"ffen
Jr. S fc f
+ '
/
k.
/""
/
/
5
| '*w
^O
(0;^
; in
(N.
t^ /
X^
Top of/e'Casinq Stev. 54.5*
Pipes for Gravel
of Concre/e Sea/
Co"Annular Space pocked
ff3 Cape Mau Gravel
3O~Outer Sieei Casing
Boiiom of3O~ Cos/no
S/ev, 59.S
Too of Screen Elev. 56-5
s art referred ~fo
U. 5.5.5. ,V/-i7/T Sea Level Da/urn
,:ocalion cfSrove/ Wa-'t
\see P/an AJo. C-/
,-So/rb/n of Wei' Siev. 46.5
?'•- Concrete Guide Block
Figure 3. Geological Cross-Section and Details of the Route 6 Well
(Source: Fay, Spofford and Thorndike, 1962)
12-7
-------
Regional Office in Lexington (Regional) and the DEQE were
informed of the incident. Mr. Mathews was subsequently
questioned regarding his disposal practices. He agreed to
accompany DEQE to his leased warehouse off Route 6 in
Dartmouth. Approximately 1000 drums were estimated to be
stored at the site.
It was learned from limited drum sampling which fol-
lowed, and from an investigation of Mathew1s disposal
practices, that many of the drums contained still bottoms,
paint sludges and other organic residues. Specific com-
pounds which were identified from drums included toluene,
ethyl benzene, trichloroethylene, methyl ethyl ketone and
xylene. In addition to drums in the warehouse, drums were
found in a trailer, in an abandoned gravel pit and in
three smaller disposal areas in the rear of the warehouse.
Disposal in the abandoned gravel pit raised the greatest
concern because the pit had been excavated down to the
level of ground water during previous gravel mining
activities and the drums were backfilled haphazardly along
with metal debris and tires, causing the drums to rust and
rupture.
It was these investigations and inquiries that led to
the State ordered closure of the Route 6 well on April 20
and the eventual cleanup of the North Dartmouth site.
However, storage of drums at the Route 6 warehouse was
known to EPA prior to April 1979 but apparently was not
considered hazardous. An investigation of the warehouse
by the Region I EPA, Hazardous Waste Section in July,
1978, revealed the presence of 300 to 400 drums. New
England Testing Laboratory conducted air sampling for
volatile organics in the warehouse in early October.
Sample analyses were made using a gas chromatograph with a
thermal conductivity detector and a gas chromatograph with
a flame ionization detector. None of the 4 samples taken
revealed concentrations in excess of 50 ppm. An odor was
reported by the testing laboratory but was attributed to
the former use of the facility as a cheese warehouse.
Apparently no further action was taken at the site until
the April 1979 investigation.
Ledge Incorporated was the owner of the property off
Route 6, which was rented to H & M Drum Company or Harold
Mathews. Neither Ledge, Incorporated, nor Cecil Smith,
president of Ledge had applied for or received a license
to operate a hazardous waste storage or disposal site.
Mr. Mathews and H & M Drum Company were licensed in 1978
to transport hazardous waste but they had never been
licensed to store or dispose of hazardous wastes in the
State. Independent of its knowledge of H & M1 s illegal
disposal operations, the DEQE had revoked Harold Mathews
300.64(a)(l)
preliminary
assessment
300.68(c)(2)(i)-
(B)
amount and form
of substance
present
12-8
-------
license in March 1979, for noncorapliance with administra-
tive regulations regarding State hazardous waste trans-
port at ion report ing requirements.
The State currently has a lawsuit against the
property owner to recover the costs of cleaning up the
site. The Massachusetts Attorney General's Office is
handling this case, which has not been tried as of
September 1982. In April 1979, the state sued Harold
Mathews, the d isposer, for violations of Massachusetts
criminal statutes pertaining to hazardous waste. After a
trial in September 1979, Mathews was convicted of four
counts of illegal transportation and storage of hazardous
waste. He received an 18 month sentence, served 12 months
and was re leased, and declared bankruptcy. No fines were
imposed and no money recovered to reimburse the state for
its clean-up costs.
DESCRIPTION OF CONTAMINATION
On April 19, 1979, approximately one week after site
d iscovery, DEQE procured samples from three drums stored
in the warehouse. These samples were analyzed for vola-
tile organics by EPA*s Regional Laboratory in Lexington,
Massachusetts. Identified chemicals included 2-ethyl
hexanal, toluene, ethyl benzene, methyl isobutyl ketone,
trlchloroethylene, xylene and raethylene chloride. The
following day DEQE inspected the primary disposal pit area
and col lee ted waste samples. Based on visual observations
of contamination, DEQE gave a verbal directive to the
Dartmouth Department of Public Works to close down the
Route 6 municipal well.
On April 25, 1979, DEQE and Coastal Service, from
East Boston, MA, the sole source contractor hired by the
State to respond to waste emergencies, conducted a limited
hydrogeologic investigation. Sha How test pits, which
ranged in depth from less than 1 foot to 7 feet (0.3-2.
1m) , were excavated us ing a backhoe and hand shovels. A
Century Organic Vapor Analyzer was used to determine the
levels of volatile organics at various depths in the pits.
Figure 4 shows the locations of the test pits and the
levels of volatile organics. The concentration of vola-
tile organics were generally found to be 500-1000 ppm at a
depth of 5 feet (1.5 m) in the major disposal pit.
In August 1980, nearly 16 months after closure of the
we 11, and 6 months after the Phase I cleanup effort had
been completed, DEQE collected and analyzed groundwater
samples from observation wells located 700 feet (213 m)
and 250 feet (76 m) from the Route 6 raunic ipal we 11.
300.65(a)(2)
contamination of
drinking water
300.65(b)(5)
measuring and
sampling
300.68(f)
sampling and
monitoring
12-9
-------
4'(2)
5' (01
3'CO)
7T(2)
2'C1SO) • 6'(800)
5'C400)
GU L'(1000)1
5'(0) •
GW 0.5' (1000)
• 5' (5)
GW 3' (I)
| DISPOSAL AREA 2J
05'(1000)
• Location of sampling pts,
( ) Concentrations (ppra)
X* Depth at which samples were
taken
NORTH
DISPOSAL
I,DISPOSAL AREA- --4
0'( 10)
I
O'(O)
5'(Q)
O'(5001
1'CO)
(0)
TO WELL
i
Figure 4. Results of April 25,1979 Sampling of Shallow Test Pits
(Not to Scale)
12-10
-------
Samples were analyzed for a number of volatile organics.
The results are summarized in Table 1. As the results
indicate, dichloroethane, tetrachloroethylene and tri-
chloroethylene were present in the ppb range in the
observation well located 700 feet (210 ra) from the munici-
pal well and the concentration of 1,1,1 trichloroethane
exceeded 1 ppm. These results confirmed the suspicion
that the contaminants had migrated towards the well.
Further migration towards the well was likely to occur if
pumping was re-established and the City of Dartmouth
ordered that the well remain closed.
Dartmouth Departments of Public Health and Public
Works have decided to keep the well closed until further
study of the extent of ground water contamination can be
made. In the spring of 1982, the Board of Selectmen
designated $40,000 of the town's annual budget to fund a
detailed hydro logic study of the site to be performed by
Fay, Spofford and Thorndike engineers from Boston, Mass.
As of November 1982, the study had not yet started due to
difficulty in obtaining easement. The study will include
installation of monitoring wells to determine extent of
contamination, aquifer characteristics (such as storage
coefficients and flow velocities), extent of contaminant
migration, the effect of the Route 6 well pumping on
contaminant transport, and an evaluation of potential
treatment and remedial alternatives. The town has stated
that it will reopen the well only if the results of the
study show that no public health threat would be created
by putting the well on line again.
300.68(e)(2)(ii)
extent of
raigrat ion of
substances
300.68(f)
sampling and
monitoring
SITE RESPONSE
Initiation of Response
The site response at H & M Drum was triggered by the
April 1979 discovery of contaminated ground water and
soil within 1400 feet (427 m) of the Route 6 municipal
well. Due to the nature of the threat to the municipal
well, immediate cleanup was needed. However, funding was
not available until September 13, 1979, when the State
made a supplemental appropriation to DEQE to pay for the
cleanup.
Selection of Response Technologies
Following site discovery in the spring of 1979, DEQE
planned clean-up measures for the site based on the pre-
liminary site investigation conducted by DEQE and Coastal
300.65(a)(2)
contamination of
drinking water
300.65
immed iate
removal
12-11
-------
TABLE 1. TEST RESULTS FOR ORGANIC CHEMICAL SOLVENTS
Intermediate Monitoring Wells
Route #6 Well - Dartmouth, Massachusetts
Conducted July 28, 1980
Chemical
Compound
Methylene Chloride
Dichloroe thane
Trichloroethylene
Chloroform
Trichloroethane
Carbon Tetrachloride
Trichloroethylene
Dibromoe thane
Bromoform
Tetrachloroethylene
Total Organic Carbon
Test
Parts
250'*
N.D.
N.D.
N.D.
N.D.
3.5
N.D.
2.1
N.D.
N.D.
1.7
500
Results in
Per Billion
700'*
N.D.
66.5
0.9
N.D.
1250
N.D.
540
N.D.
N.D.
140
700
*Distance of Test Well from Town Well
N.D. = Not Detectable
12-12
-------
Services. DEQE's proposed site clean-up had originally
consisted of the following measures:
1. Site preparation for removal and offsite disposal
of contaminated soil;
2. Excavation, aeration, and treatment of slightly
contaminated soils;
3. Transport and disposal of contaminated wastes and
soils at an approved disposal facility;
4. Analysis, segregation, bulking, crushing, and
disposal of drums.
Pumping of contaminated ground water; sampling;
and installation of monitoring wells; and
Activated carbon treatment of contaminated
ground water.
5.
6.
approximately $1.246
cost of cleaning up
for requesting $2.5
However, as stated
for both sites, and
The estimated cost of these measures,
million, combined with the estimated
the Freetown site, was DEQE1s basis
million from the State legislature.
earlier, DEQE received only $500,000
approximately $223,000 for the Dartmouth site alone.
Thus, due to this fund ing constraint from the legislature,
DEQE was forced to reconsider clean-up options. With
about $223,000 to address the contamination problem, DEQE
abandoned its original plan, which included groundwater
decontamination (activities 5 and 6) and targeted the
majority of the funds to reduc ing the source of con-
tamination and the likelihood of further ground water
contamination. Accordingly, the remedial measures
selected for the site were primarily drum removal and soil
excavation and removal (activities 1-4, above).
Extent of Response
Given the constraint of limited funding, DEQE sought
primarily to remove the source of contamination and not
to decontaminate the ground water. This goal appears to
have been achieved. All drums have been removed from the
site. Approximately 370 tons (336 Mt) of heavily con-
taminated soil were removed, and slightly contaminated
soil was aerated to lower the level of contamination to
1-5 ppm. Treatment of contaminated ground water was
limited to application of sorbents to remove non miscible
contaminants. The extent of remaining ground water con-
tamination cannot be precisely described in the absence of
hydrogeological data on the site. The shutdown of the
300.66
evaluation and
determination of
appropriate
response
300.65(c)
completion of
immediate
removal
12-13
-------
municipal welL in April of 1979 caused Che town to lose a
major portion of its water supply. Replacement water has
since been purchased from the nearby town of New Bedford,
but the town of Dartmouth would like to resume use of the
municipal well and has authorized a $40,000 hydrogeo-
logical assessment of the site in order to determine the
feasibility of future remedial work to decontaminate the
ground water. DEQE does not plan further work, on the site
because of the competition for limited state funding posed
by more immediate public health threats caused by other
sites in the State.
300.65(b)(2)
providing alter-
nate water
supplies
300.68(k)
balancing
DESIGN AND EXECUTION OF SITE RESPONSE
The response actions at the H & M Drum site were con-
ducted in two phases. Phase I consisted mainly of con-
struction of an interceptor trench along the toe of the
main disposal pit, use of sorbents to remove non-miscible
organics in ground water, excavation and segregation of
debris , wastes and contaminated soils, aeration of
slightly contaminated soils and segregation of drums in
the warehouse with removal of most of the liquid wastes.
At that time funds ran out and the rest of the drums had
to be stored in the warehouse for about a year and a half
until additional funds became available. Phase II con-
sisted of the removal of the remaining drums and con-
taminated soils.
Phase I
Excavation of Disposal Areas
The excavation operation was primarily focused on the
main disposal pit where about 300 drums, metal debris and
tires had been backfilled. The surface area of the dis-
posal pit measured approximately 160 feet by 90 feet (49 m
by 27 m) and was about 15 feet (5 m) deep (See Figure 1).
In order to minimize the impact of the cleanup operation
on the ground water quality, an interceptor trench was dug
along the toe of the disposal pit. The trench measured
approximately 60 to 80 feet (18-24 m) long and about 4
feet (1.2 m) deep. It extended between 0.5 to 2.5 feet
(0.2-0.8 m) into the ground water. Several time-s through-
out the cleanup operation, sorbent pi Hows were used to
remove a non-raiscible organic layer. The objective was to
prevent this non-miscible layer from moving downgradient
and towards the well.
Excavation of the disposal area was a slow and selec-
tive process. The drums had been haphazardly disposed of
along with metal debris and tires and the soils had been
300.65(b)(4)
controlling the
source of
release
300.65(b)(6)
removing hazard-
ous substances
12-14
-------
compacted. Because of these disposal practices, many of
the drums were badly damaged or void of contents. Equip-
ment used in the excavation included a backhoe, a front
end loader and a bobcat. Slings and other attachments
were used with the backhoe for lifting drums. Some drums
ruptured during the excavation operation and pumps were
used to clean up the spilled material. The front end
loader was also used as a temporary receptacle for leaking
drum contents. Approximately 300 drums along with debris
and contaminated soils were segregated over a 23 day
period. The slow rate of progress was attributed to the
haphazard disposal, the poor condition of the drums and
the cold weather.
Because of the large quantities of contaminated soils
and the limited funds available for disposal, a decision
was made to segregate heavily contaminated and slightly
contaminated soils. Heavily contaminated soils were those
with an organic vapor concentration in excess of 500 ppm,
the concentration at which the soils were considered
saturated. These soils, along with empty, crushed drums,
were stockpiled in an 18 inch (46 cm) high bermed area
with a polyethylene liner and diamtomaceous earth used to
absorb seepage. Approximately 320 tons (290 Mt) of the
heavily contaminated soils were stockpiled and later
transported to CECOS's secure landfill in Niagara Falls,
New York towards the end of Phase I.
Slightly contaminated soils, defined as having an
organic vapor concentration of 1-500 ppra, were landspread
and treated on site by aeration. The contaminated soils
were spread across the sandy, native soils in 6 inch
(15 cm) lifts and aerated using a rototiller. The soils
were aerated several times over a two week period until
monitoring detected an organic vapor concentration of only
1-5 ppra. Continued passes across the soil allowed semi-
liquid ocganics and solids to be pulled up to the surface.
This material was then raked up and stockpiled with
heavily contaminated soils for removal to CECOS.
Air pollution from the landspreading operation was
not a major concern. There were no residences in the
immediate area and exposure of field personnel was minimal
since the operation was performed in December and January
when cold temperatures kept the vapor pressures low.
The piles of metal debris and tires which were exca-
vated from the disposal pit were not considered hazardous
by DEQE and the town of Dartmouth was directed to remove
them. However, the Department of Pub Iic Works felt that
these materials would contaminate the local municipal
sanitary land fill. Furthermore, the town did not want to
12-15
-------
spend public money to remove the solid wastes from the
private property and the town instructed the property
owner to remove the wastes. To date no action has been
taken.
Drum Segregation
Under Phase I, drums in the warehouse and the trailer
were identified and segregated, leaky drums were repacked
and most of the liquid wastes were pumped into vacuum
trucks and hauled off site for incineration.
Many of the drums were badly rusted and the source of
the wastes could not be identified. It was determined,
however, that most of the wastes were solvent recovery
still bottoms, paint sludges and other organic residues.
Testing criteria were developed which could segregate
the wastes for final disposal. Based on test procedures
which included viscosity, water solubility, specific
gravity and pH, the drums were segregated into the follow-
ing categories:
17 Acids
302 Water Insoluble Flammabies
120 Water Soluble Flammabies
121 Flaramables with Resins/Sludges
358 Sludges, Organic Paint
82 Chlorinated Fuels
54 Oils - Soluble and Insoluble
36 Miscellaneous
1090 TOTAL
Approximately 19,250 gallons (72,860 1) of highly
flammable liquids were pumped from drums and transported
to Recycling Industries, Inc., of Braintree, Mass., for
incineration. The miscellaneous drummed wastes including
16 drums containing acids, 15 containing gels and 5 con-
taining ammonia were also transported to Recycling
Industries. 1250 gallons (4730 I) of chlorinated oils
were pumped and transported to Rollins Environmental
Services in New Jersey because Recycling's incinerator did
not have the capability to incinerate chlorinated
solvents.
Most of the remaining drums contained sludges of
various consistencies. Sawdust was mixed into the drums
until the consistency was considered suitable for
acceptance by a landfill. When Phase I was terminated,
738 solidified drums remained in the warehouse.
300.65(b)(6)
removing
hazardous
substances
12-16
-------
Demobilization
Equipment used during Phase I was decontaminated on
site using hot rinse water which was collected for
disposal. The disposal areas were regraded to their
original topographical contours. There was no follow up
monitoring done at the site.
Phase II
In September 1981, approximately a year and a half
after completion of Phase I, additional funds were appro-
priated to complete the cleanup of the Dartmouth site.
The Phase II effort was completed over a 6-week period and
consisted of removal of 738 drums and 50 tons (45 Mt) of
contaminated soils and debris.
Most of the Phase II effort was devoted to further
sampling and segregation of the drummed wastes to prepare
them for acceptance in the SCA Chemical Services secure
landfill in Model City, New York. During the interim
between Phase I and Phase II, RCRA regulations had been
promulgated requiring that additional sampling and record-
ing be undertaken prior to transport and disposal. An
initial random sampling of 5 percent of the drums was
undertaken to establish waste disposal codes and cate-
gories. Based on the results of the random sampling, the
following 5 categories were assigned by Model City to the
project wastes.
Disposal Category Type
Chlorinated Organic Residues Drums
General Organic Residues Drums
Low Flash Organic Residues Drums
Empty Crushed Drums and Contaminated Soils Bulk
Contaminated Sand, Soil and Sawdust Bulk
Flash point (using the closed cup tester) and organic
chlorine/sulfite testing were done on all samples. Compo-
sites from 25 drums were prepared and shipped off-site for
PCB analysis. The Model City secure landfill could not
accept drums of residue having a flashpoint of -Less than
70 F (21*C). The flashpoint was raised, when necessary,
by adding reclaimed freon TMC, a flashpoint suppressant.
Liquid comprised only 2-5% of the contents of most of the
12-17
-------
drums. It apparently rose to the top as the absorbent
added during Phase I settled. Additional absorbent was
added to solidify the drums.
Ten loads of drums were labelled and shipped in box
trailers to Model City. Front end loaders were used to
load dump trailers with contaminated soils, sawdust and
crushed drums. Contaminated soils around the drum loading
dock were excavated and removed along with the bulk loads.
Decontamination of the warehouse proceeded throughout
the project. Consolidated floor sweepings were drummed
and removed under the appropriate code. The warehouse
floor and the equipment used for cleanup were rinsed at
completion of the project.
COST AND FUNDING
Source of Funding
Upon determining that ground water and soil were
contaminated, the DEQE requested funding from the State
legislature for cleaning up both the Dartmouth and
Freetown sites because the department lacked funds .
Private funding was unavailable and the state planned to
bring criminal actions against Harold Mathews. Due to the
nature of the threat to the municipal well, immediate
clean-up was needed. DEQE requested $2.5 million, which
would have funded actions at both sites that included
establishing a well point system, dewatering, ground water
treatment, treatment of contaminated soils, drum removal,
and soil excavation.
On September 13, 1979, the state legislature made a 300.62U)
supplemental appropriation for DEQE to pay for cleaning up State funded
both the Dartmouth and Freetown sites. Although the DEQE response
had requested $2.5 million, the legislature appropriated
only $500,000, to be divided between the Dartmouth and
Freetown sites. Dartmouth's allocation was $223,000.
The remedial action was conducted in two phases due
to a time lapse in funding. The first phase of clean up
began on November 11, 1979 and ended February 19, 1980.
The majority of remedial work conducted on the site was
undertaken during Phase I. However, the supplemental
funding provided by the legislature ran out before work
was completed, so DEQE had to go back to the legislature
with a request for additional funding. It took over a
year to obtain this second appropriation, which was made
in September 1981. Over the course of the next year and a
half, DEQE and the town of Dartmouth actively sought to
12-18
-------
persuade the State Legislature to allocate funds to
complete the site cleanup. On August 27, 1981, DEQE was
notified that additional funding for completion of the
Dartmouth site had been secured from the legislature.
Phase II of the project cost $105,234.
Selection of Contractors
Four separate contractors conducted work on the H & M
site. These contractors, in chronological order of work
performed were: Coastal Services (initial site assess-
ment), Black Gold Industries/Jetline (Phase I clean-up),
A.D. Little Management Consulting (management of Phase
II), and Recycling Industries (Phase II clean-up).
Coastal Services performed the initial site assess-
ment in cooperation with DEQE from the date of site dis-
covery on April 11, 1979 through June 30, 1979. Coastal
Services was selected by DEQE to perform the initial site
assessment because the firm was under contract with DEQE
at the time. The contractual arrangement was made accord-
ing to the State Water Pollution Revolving Fund, which
requires DEQE to designate a private firm every two years
as the sole source contractor to respond to waste
emergenc ies.
When Coastal Service's contract expired on July 1,
1979, Black Gold Industries/Jetline from Stoughton,
Massachusetts, was hired as the State emergency response
contractor for the next two years. When funding for
clean-up was appropriated by the legislature on September
13, 1979, Black Gold Industries/Jetline was in the
position to respond immediately to the Dartmouth and
Freetown sites. Subsequently, DEQE amended the Black
Go Id/Jet line contract to include clean-up responsibility
for Dartmouth and Freetown. DEQE opted for an amendment
to the existing State-wide emergency response contract
with Black Gold/Jetline rather than requesting proposals
in a competitive bidding process because of the urgency of
the clean-up situation and the fact that securing State
funding had already taken six months.
Black Gold subcontracted with Recycling Industries, a
subsidiary of SCA, of Braintree, Massachusetts for assist-
ance in the work performed on the site and for use of the
latter's incinerator for liquid waste disposal. Black
Gold/Jetline also entered into an agreement with Chemical
and Environmental Conservation Systems (CECOS) of Niagara
Falls, New York for use of its approved secure landfill
for waste disposal and with Rollins Environmental Services
in Logan Township, New Jersey for incineration of
chlorinated oils.
12-19
-------
Black Gold/Jetline began cLean-up operations on
November 11, 1979. Work continued through February 19,
1980, when funding was exhausted. Funding from the State
legislature to complete the clean-up was not secured by
DEQE until a year and a half later. During this time DEQE
was in the process of hiring a management consulting firm
to provide assistance in managing the clean-up of
hazardous waste sites throughout the state. This involved
a time consuming selection process based on competitive
bidding. Ultimately, on June 5, 1981, A.D. Little, Inc.
(ADL) Cambridge, MA, was awarded the management contract
with DEQE. ADL's period of performance extended from June
6, 1981 through October 29, 1982, with a ceiling of
$467,108. When DEQE secured additional legislative fund-
ing to complete the H & M clean-up, ADL managed the con-
tractor selection process for Phase II of the clean-up.
On August 14, 1981, Recycling Industries, Inc., was
selected to complete the H & M clean-up. Recycling
Industries had been a subcontractor to Black Gold/Jetline
under the first phase of clean-up. Selection of Recycling
was based on a competitive bidding process. Four firms
submitted bids for the H & M clean-up; however, only two
firms, Recycling and another firm, were judged by ADL to
have the technical capability to complete the work. Black
Gold/Jetline, although still under contract with DEQE as
emergency response contractor when bid proposals were
taken for phase II, did not submit a bid because DEQE
believed that awarding another contract to that firm would
be considered favoritism. The choice of Recycling rather
than the other firm was based on DEQE's evaluation that
Recycling had superior technical capabilities and a better
contingency plan. Estimated costs of work to be performed
were not a major factor of selection because there was not
a large variance between bids in terms of total costs.
Recycling's contract with DEQE was based on time and
materials with a ceiling of $162,000. Work on the site
began on September 11, 1981, and was completed under
budget three weeks later on October 9, 1981.
Pro j ect Co s t^
Although the remedial action conducted at the Dart-
mouth site was a rather straightforward excavation and
removal operation, it was, in effect, two separate
operations due to the funding problem.
The summary of cost information shown in Table 2
reflects the difference between the two phases as far as
can be determined from available information. The Phase I
expenditure was in one lump sum of $148,000, excluding
12-20
-------
TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF COST INFORMATION FOR H&M Drum - DARTMOUTH, MASSACHUSETTS
NJ
I
tsj
T.i*k
rh4.e i
Start-up 10 11 and
l)Upo»l
Transportation
480 ajllci
(771 kn)
Hhai* 1 tubtotal
Fhase II
Star I -up*- labor,
equipment.
n.ilcrlatilb)
ni.p.,.1
Trannportatlon
teif.JI.iubtatil...
TOTAL
Ouanlltt
o 120 ton* -bull
cruvhrd drum
•nd null
o 20,500 f,\
(77.600 1)
1 Iquled watte
fro* 1)0 druBi
Stmv •* above
17 load* or
(110 tons/ 190 Ht)
o 7)8 drum
sol] 4 cnntnmln.itc
debrlt
o 7]fl drmm
o JO tons (4) Ht)
)l,3*6,oqn
(c)
Actual
*1 41,000
$ 2 ; , ooo
25,000
$51.000
$11,000
$111.000
$50.852
$17.859
$15.929
.HSi.tiS
$117.640
NA
($4.16/1)
$l,15)/1i..id or
($/9/Hl)
{SO.IO/Hl/Ki*)
HA
NA
NA
St.ite n(
State of
State of
H.isiarhuaet t*
Stair of
State of
St.ite of
11/11/79-
2/11/BO
11/11/79-
11/11/79-
1/19/RO
ll/79-l/BO
9/11/81-
9/1J/81-
10/9/Bl
a/ai.jnfgj
ll/H/79-
10/9/B1
HA : Not Applicable
(•) Alto Include* drui* ie|re|atlon,
•etJtton ind land*pte.idlng ol
• Ultlitlr conca»Inat*d soil.
Th* timt and ii.ilrrl.it Invoice*
*ade the irparatIon nf the
coat* of the conponrnti
lupofglblc.
(h) There mill cilut pflci of
wct.il drbrli .ind tltc» en-
cauntcd fro* the prln.iry
dltpn*nl pit.
(c) EKtlm.)te IncluJei cosU of
ground ujtrr drcontamlnltlon.
-------
transportation and disposal of liquid waste from the ware-
house and contaminated soil from the disposal pit. The
lump sum included: start-up costs, segregation and
repacking of drums in the warehouse, pumping out the
flammable liquids, soil and drum excavation from the dis-
posal pit and land spreading of the slightly contaminated
soil. Another $75,000 was spent on the disposal and
transportation of the materials. Liquid wastes were
incinerated at Recycling Industries and Rollins Environ-
mental Services at an average cost of $1.22 per gallon
($4.62/1) and the bulk waste was transported to CECOS at
$72/ton ($79/Mt). The Phase I operation was terminated
for lack of funding after 320 tons (290 Mt) and 20,500 gal
(77,600 1) of liquid wastes were removed. There remained
783 drums, mostly containing solid wastes, and 50 tons
(45 Mt) of excavated contaminated soil.
From the standpoint of cost, Phase II was conducted
more cautiously than Phase I. Phase II employed a written
request for bids, an evaluation of bids and a system that
tracked the progress of the remedial action. The Phase II
effort was completed at a cost of $104,640 which was
$57,360 lower than expected.
The costs incurred during Phase II included $15,929
for transportation and $37,859 for disposal of drums and
contaminated soils at the SCA secure landfill in Model
City, New York.
Another aspect of the cost of the response action is
the alternative supply of water which the town of Dart-
mouth had to obtain when its municipal well was closed.
Before its shutdown, the well supplied 15% of the town's
water and had the potential for serving up to 65% of the
population. To replace the lost water, the town had to
increase its share of water purchased from the nearby town
of New Bedford. Total cost of the water from 1979 to
March 1982 was $98,262. Operation costs saved from the
well shutdown were $27,812, producing a net cost of
$70,450 to the town. Since the well probably will remain
closed for some time, the net cost of alternative water
supplies will increase at this rate.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The effectiveness of the overall response activities
at the H & M Drum site must be evaluated in terms of the
constraints of limited funding. While originally the goal
planned by DEQE was for both removal of the source of
pollution and decontamination of ground water, lack of
adequate funding forced DEQE to redefine its cleanup
12-22
-------
goals. DEQE eventually sought only to reduce the source
of contamination to the extent possible with the limited
funding. The emergency cleanup activities appear to have
been successful insofar as the drums and the bulk of
contaminated soils were removed from the site, an
alternate source of water supply was made available to
residents formerly supplied by the Route 6 well and the
immediate public health threat was eliminated.
However, due to insufficient funds, there has been no
follow-up monitoring to determine the effectiveness of the
cleanup or the extent of ground water contamination.
Efforts taken to date have not been effective in restoring
the high yield municipal well. This has forced the town
of Dartmouth to incur expenses in excess of $70,000 for
buying replacement water since the well closed in April
1979.
The possibility of future remedial work on the ground
water is speculative from both a cost and technical
perspective. Dartmouth's position is that a detailed
hydrogeological assessment is needed before they can
assess the cost and feasibility of restoring the well.
The town has funded this assessment which was expected to
begin late in 1982.
12-23
-------
REFERENCES
Al-Momen, M., Arthur D. Little Program Systems Management Company, Cambridge,
MA.. October 13, 1981, and October 20, 1981. Written Communication to
William Simmons, DEQE.
Anderson, P. T. DEQE, Lakeville, MA. April 27, 1979. Written Communication
to M. Branco, Dartmouth Department of Public Works, April 27, 1979.
Branco, Manuel, Department of Public Works. March 28, 1980. Written
Communication to Lawrence Cameron, Board of Selectmen, South Dartmouth,
MA.
Branco, Manuel, Department of Public Works. October 15, 1980. Written
Communication to H. Kaltenthaler, MA Legislative Commission on Water
Supply.
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 1980. "Commonwealth of Massachusetts vs.
Ledge Inc., Cecil Smith, H&M Drum Co. and Harold Mathews." Superior
Court, Department of the Trial Court Civil Action.
Carson, D., Recycling Industries, Inc., Braintree, MA. September 13, 1981,
September 25, 1981, September 29, 1981, October 7, 1981, October 14,
1981. "Memoranda to Project File."
Connelly, J. DEQE, Lakesville, MA. July 28, 1980. "Report of Analytical
Results from Observation Wells."
Correia, J. DEQE. May 14, 1979. Memorandum to J. Gould.
Correia, J. DEQE, November 6, 1979 - April 15, 1980. Memorandum to W.
Marhoffer, DEQE.
Correia, J., DEQE, Stoughton, MA. Personal Communication, November 3, 1982.
Davey, John, Jetline, Stoughton, MA. Personal Communication, May 20 and
November 2, 1982.
Fay, Spofford and Thorndike, Inc. 1962. "Pump Test of Gravel - Wall Well at
Route 6 Site."
Fay, Spofford and Thorndike, Inc. Boston, MA. October 22, 1981. Written
Communication to Manuel Branco, Dartmouth Department of Public Works.
12-24
-------
Gidley, Philip T., Gidley Laboratories, Inc., Fairhaven, MA. May 21, 1979.
Written Communication to Manuel Branco, Dartmouth Department of Public
Works.
Gidley, Philip T., Gidley Laboratories, Inc., Fairhaven, MA. July 30, 1979.
Written Communication to Charles D. W. Thornton, Office of Environmental
Affairs, Boston, MA.
Gilbert, Edgar A., Arthur D. Little Program Systems Management Company,
Cambridge, MA. October 6, 1981. Written Communication to William
Simmons, DEQE.
Mansfield, Clifford S., Fay, Spofford & Thorndike, Inc., Engineers, Boston
MA. October 22, 1981. Written Communication to M. Branco, Dartmouth
Department of Public Works.
Mansfield, Clifford S., Fay, Spofford & Thorndike Inc., Boston, MA. Personal
Communication, October 18, 1982.
McMahon, Thomas C., Water Resources Commission, Boston, MA. March 18, 1980.
Written Communication to Dartmouth Board of Selectmen, South Dartmouth
MA.
McMahon, Thomas C., Water Resources Commission, Boston, MA. April 30, 1979.
Written Communication to Thomas McLoughlin, Acting Commissioner.
O'Brien, L. New England Analytical Testing Laboratory, Natick, MA. October
2, 1978. "Report of Analysis" to Attorney John Hountin. Boston, MA.
O'Brien, John J. DEQE, Boston, MA. August 17, 1981. Memorandum to William
Simmons, DEQE.
Purington, J.H., Recycling Industries, Inc., Braintree, MA. November 30,
1981. Written Communication to W. Simmons, DEQE, Boston, MA.
Soil Conservation Service. 1979. "Soil Survey of Bristol County
Massachusetts, Southern Part." United States Department of Agriculture,
and Massachusetts Agricultural Experiment Station.
12-25
-------
-------
HOUSTON CHEMICAL COMPANY
HOUSTON, MISSOURI
INTRODUCTION
The Houston Chemical Company plant is located in a
rural area in southern Missouri. On June 14, 1979, a
storage tank at the site collapsed and spilled 15,000
gallons (56,800 1) of diesel oil containing 5% penta-
chlorophenol (PGP) down a hillside and into a farm pond,
kill ing aquat ic 1 if e in the pond. The pond threatened to
overflow into a tributary of the Big Piney River, a
valuable wildlife and aquatic life habitat. When it
became apparent that the plant owner was not taking action
to remove the oil, the caretaker of the pond property
informed the Missouri Department of Conservation about the
spill. After inspecting the site and noting a total fish
kill in the pond, the Department of Conservation informed
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Region VII office
(EPA) in Kansas City, Kansas of the spill.
ISackground
The Houston Chemical Company plant (also known as
Cairo Wood Treatment) is located in Texas County,
Missouri, about three miles south of the small town of
Houston, in a lightly populated area of farms and woods.
At the time of the spill in June 1979, the plant was in
the business of mixing 95% diesel oil and 5% PGP for use
as a wood preservative. PCP is considered toxic to humans
and animal life.
On June 14, 1979 a 21,000 gallon (79,500 1) steel
storage tank at the plant buckled, sheared off a valve,
and spilled approximately 15,000 gallons (56,800 1) of
oil/PCP mixture. There was not a dike around the tank for
spill containment. The oil/PCP mixture flowed approx-
imately 300 yards (274 m) down a hillside, along a
roadside drainage ditch, through culverts under two roads,
and after pooling in a dry depression, flowed underground
for 100 feet (30 m) into a 0.7 acre (2,835 m2) farm pond.
The oil/PCP covered the pond surface in a layer 1/4 inch
to 1 inch (0.64 to 2.54 cm) thick (see Figure 1).
NCP Reference
300.63(a)(4)
discovery
13-1
-------
Hwy. 63
. —
A | Chemical Plant
'
Subsurface Flow
79-7020
Church Well
truck tank traier
Storage Tanks
Ruptured Tank
F!ow °* ^il
Haney Trailer Park Well
Figure 1. Houston Chemical Co. Spill Site and Sampling Locations
13-2
-------
An intermittent stream linked the pond with Hog
Creek, a tributary of the Big Piney River, which flows
into the Gasconade River and then into the Missouri River.
Hog Creek at the intermittent stream and the Big Piney at
the mouth of Hog Creek are officially designated by
Missouri for protection of livestock, wildlife, and aqua-
tic life. In addition, the Big Piney is a navigable water
of the United States. At the time of the spill, the pond
surface was a few inches below its spillway, and the oil
did not travel beyond the pond.
Synopsis of Site Response
On June 19, 1979 the EPA on-scene coordinator (OSC),
acting under section 311(k) of the Clean Water Act,
engaged 0,H. Materials Co. (OHM), of Findlay, Ohio to
undertake an emergency cleanup of the pond and pill path.
Over the next six weeks, OHM removed approximately 10,000
gallons (37,900 1) of oil/PCP from the pond and spill path
using skimmers and a vacuum pump; drained the pond and
filtered the water with a mobile carbon filtration unit;
flushed the spill path surface with water; and excavated
contaminated soil from the spill path, pond banks, and
pond bottom. O.K. Materials returned the recovered oil/
PCP to a secure tank in the Houston Chemical Co. plant and
transported 2,636 cubic yards (2,015 m ) of contaminated
soil to a licensed hazardous waste landfill in Wright
City, Missouri.
During the final two weeks of the cleanup, OHM intro-
duced nutrients and freeze-dried cultured bacteria into
the refilled pond in an attempt to biologically degrade
the remaining PCP. O.H. Materials ended work at the site
on August 6, 1979, at which time sample analysis indicated
that the PCP level in the pond was below the target level
of 10 ug/1.
Over the next two months, PCP levels in the pond rose
to 200 ug/1 as small amounts of oil/PCP continued to seep
from underground into the pond. In October 1979, the OSC
purchased nutrients and freeze-dried cultured bacteria,
introduced them into the pond, and aerated the pond.
Final sampling of the pond in November 1979, after all
cleanup activity ceased, indicated approximately 400 ug/1
of PCP. In December 1979, eight barrels of absorbent pads
were removed from the site and taken to a landfill. This
was the last work done at the site. According to the
Missouri Department of Conservation, in the three years
since the spill the pond has returned to a healthy condi-
tion, based on visual inspection. Aquatic life has
returned and effects of the spill are not apparent.
13-3
-------
Litigation is ongoing against
Chemical Co. to recover federal
cleanup.
the owners of
funds spent
Houston
in the
SITE DESCRIPTION
The Houston PCP oil spill site is located near a
saddle at S 1/2, NW 1/4, Section 30, Township 30 north,
Range 9 west, south of the town of Houston, Missouri.
Figure 2 shows the spill site's location on a portion of
the Houston topographic quadrangle. Numerous dwe 11 ings
exist near the site, the closest being a church approx-
imately 250 ft. (76 ra) north of the site, and a trailer
park approximately 900 ft. (274 ra) southwest of site.
The plant site itself consists of a mixing plant
building with attached block penta vat, two cylindrical
storage tanks for the PCP/oi 1 mixture, a holding pond to
contain spills from the plant, a truck tank trailer, and
an area for solid, block penta storage.
Surf ace Cjiatract eristics
The local climate of the area, as well as the State
of Missouri, is classified as continental. Large sea-
sonal and daily temperature fluctuations are not uncommon.
The average annual temperature at the site is approx-
imately 59°F (15°C). Daily maximum and minimum temper-
atures during July are 90*F (32°C) and 68°F (20°O,
respectively; while during January the daily maximum and
ininLmum temperatures are 45°F (7°C) and 24°F C-4°C) ,
respectively. Temperature extremes recorded in the state
are 115°F (46°C> and -22°F (-30°C).
Average annual precipitation for the spill site is
42 inches (107 cm), with approximately 42 percent of the
precipitation occurring during the period of May to
August, inclusive. The period of highest rainfall occurs
from March to June and the period of lowest rainfall
occurs from November to February. Mean annual snowfalL
for the area is approximately 14 inches (36 cm), with the
average annual number of days with snow cover being about
35 days.
Annual prevailing winds are from the south at about
10 mph (16 kra/hr) . Prevailing wind direction and speed
throughout the year does not vary significantly from the
annual values. Wind speeds as high as 66 mph (106 km/hr)
have been recorded nearby and these were associated with
winds from the west.
300.68(e)(2)(i)
(A)
population at
risk
300.68(e)(2)(i)
(E)
climate
13-4
-------
Figure 2. Location of Houston Chemical Co. Site
13-5
-------
Soils in the area surrounding the site are classi-
fied as ClarksvilLe Gravelly Loams. These soils were
formed from the weathering of cherty to moderately cherty
limestones. In character, these soils vary from gravelly
to moderately gravelly soils, gray to brown in color, and
from friable red clay through gravelly and stoney clays to
hardpan subsoils. The content of chert gravel varies form
almost zero to seventy-five percent, and usually increases
with depth. Perraeabilites vary from high to low depending
upon the stone content of the soil. These soils are
naturally low in nitrogen and phosphorus. Vegetation sup-
ported by the soils locally are pasture land and forests.
Drainage from the plant site is westward towards a
spring fed farm pond (Figure 1). Discharge from the
0.7-acre (2835 ra2) farm pond extension eaters an unnamed
intermittent tributary to Hog Creek. Hog Creek flows
northwest to Big Piney River. Average annual runoff for
the spill area is approximately 14 inches (36 cm).
The use of surface water in the area is varied. The
farm pond is stocked with numerous species of game fish
(e.g. , bass) . Local streams are known for their recrea-
tional use including fishing, boating, and swimming.
Stream water is also utilized for watering livestock.
WiIdlife are also dependent on local streams as watering
sources.
Hyd rogeology
The Houston spiII site is located in the Salem
Plateau sub-province of the Ozarks physiography province.
Physiographically, the Ozarks are an enlongated dome that
extends across Missouri from the Mississippi River to
northeastern Oklahoma and northern Arkansas. The
surficial geology is largely Cambrian and Ordovician
Rocks, although some later Paleozoic age rock remain.
Drainage patterns are more or less radial. Streams have
destroyed much of the Salem Plateau and developed valleys
many hundreds of feet deep.
The geology of the spill
rocks from the Canadian Series
The major formations present
site consists mainly of
of the Ordovician System.
are the Jefferson City
Formation and the Roubidoux Formation. A thin layer of
Pennsylvania Sandstone is also present as a cap rock at
the site (i.e., as described by the State Geologist) . A
brief description of the major formations are presented
below (Howe, 1961):
Jefferson City format ion. - The
Jefferson City formation is composed
300.68(e)(2)(i)
(D)
hydrogeologic
factors
13-6
-------
principally of light brown to brown,
medium to finely crystalline dolomite
and argillaceous dolomite. Tbe thick-
ness of the Jefferson City ranges from
125 to 350 feet (38 to 107 m); its
average thickness is 200 feet (61 m).
Roubidoux formation. - The Roubidoux
formation consists of sandstone,
do lornit ic sandstone, and cherty
dolomite. The thickness of the
Roubidoux ranges from 100 to 250 feet
(20 to 76 m) . The formation's
greatest thickness is at the south-
western part of the Ozarks, and its
least thickness is along the north-
eastern part of the area.
Gasconade formation. - The Gasconade
is predominantly a light brownish-
gray, cherty dolomite. The formation
contains a persistent sandstone unit
in its lowermost part that is
designated the Gunter member. In the
central Ozark region, the average
thickness of the Gasconade is 300 feet
(92 m). Data from wells in south-
eastern Missouri indicate a maximum
thickness of 700 feet (214 m) for the
Gasconade in that area.
The Ozark area of Missouri is the most extensively
developed, fresh ground water supply source in the state.
The ground water reservoir in this area consists of a
section of more than 2,000 feet (610 m) of Cambrian and
Ordovician dolomite and sandstone, overlain in the eastern
sections by Mississippian limestone. Because of the wide-
spread development of the Ozarks and the great depth of
weathering that has occurred, pollutants can migrate to
considerable depth. In order to safeguard water supplies
from pollutants, wells are locally cased to a dense
stratum below the surface and cemented. Considerable
casing depth is sometimes required because the depth of
weathering is great. For example, at West Plains, Howell
County (next County, south of site), 1,000 feet (305 m) of
casing is set, at Springfield 250 to 400 feet (76 - 122 m)
is set, and Rolla about 400 feet (122 ra) of casing is
required.
The five principal fresh-water aquifers in the Ozarks
that are likely to yield dependable ground water supplies
are the Laraotte Sandstone, Potosi Dolomite, Gunter Member
13-7
-------
of the Gasonade Dolomite, Roubidoux Formation, and the St.
Peter Sandstone. The aquifers present at the spill site
area are the Jefferson City Formation, Roubidoux Forma-
tion, and the Gasconade Formation of greater depths.
Specific capacities of wells in this area range from
approximately 2 to 10 gallons per minute per foot at down-
drawn (25 to 125 liter per minute per meter of drawdown).
Ground water usage in the area surround ing the spi 11
site is high because of the remoteness of the Location to
pub lie supplies. Approx imately 30 wells are Located in
the vicinity of the spill site and these are either
utilized for domestic supplies or livestock water. Of
most concern were three we L Ls located in the iramed iate
vicinity of the spill site; one on the plant site, one
northeast of the site at a church, and one southwest of
the site used as a water supply source for a trailer park
(refer to Figure 1 for Locations). Most wells are drilled
to depths of 200 to 250 feet (61 to 76 m). However, some
of these wells are cased only in the upper 40 feet (12 m)
which could make them susceptible to contaminants. The
aquifer utiL ized by these wells is probabLy the Roubidoux
Formation (based on State Geologist description).
Numerous springs occur in the area surrounding the
spill site. Of most importance are the springs that fed
the farm pond located west of the site (refer to
Figure 1). These springs are located below the surface
water level of the pond. Ground water discharged by
springs in the area appears to originate at or slightly
below the Jefferson City - Roubidoux Formation contact.
WASTE DISPOSAL HISTORY
The case study differs from other studies presented
in this document in that the response actions performed
were in response to an emergency spill situation, rather
than a waste disposal problem. Therefore, a detailed
waste disposal history at the site is not warranted.
The Houston Chemical Company mixes solid penta- 300.68(c)(2)(i)(B)
chlorophenol with oil for use as a wood preservative. amount and form of
Solid PCP is stored at the site in containers. Mixing substance present
operations occur in the plant and the 5% pentachloro-
phenol/oi1 mixture (PCP/oiI) is normally stored in one of
two storage tanks located behind the plant. These two
cylindrical storage tanks can hold a total of 36,000
gallons (136,300 1) of PCP/oil; i.e., 15,000 and 21,000
gallons (56,800 - 79,500 1).
13-8
-------
PCP has been used as a wood preservative since the
1940's when it was introduced as an alternative to the
more commonly used creosote. Other applications of PCP
are as fungicides, biocides and herbicides. During the
production of PCP numerous toxic impurities can be
introduced which are more toxic than the PCP itself. For
example, the elevated temperatures required during the
latter stages of chlorination favors the formation of
polychlorinated dibenzo-p-dioxins (PCDD) and polychlor-
inated dibenzofurans (PCDF). A chemical analysis of
different grades of pentachlorophenol is given in Table 1.
Analyses performed on various brands and samples of PCP
showed that the hexachlorodioxin and octachlorodioxin
concentrations can vary greatly; i.e., hexachlorodioxin
<2 ppm to 21 ppm, octachlorodioxin <1 ppm to 3600 ppra.
These contaminants in PCP are considerably more toxic
than the PCP itself. The toxicity of PCP to terrestrial
mammals and aquatic biota is shown in Table 2. The
effect of PCP on humans is not well documented, but the
reported oral lowest lethal dose is 29 mg/kg, and the oral
lowest toxic dose is 196 mg/kg (i.e., affected the central
nervous system). Toxicologists point out that these
results may not be fully attributable to the PCP but in
part to its contaminants (i.e., dioxins).
300.65(a)(l)
exposure to
acutely toxic
substances
DESCRIPTION OF CONTAMINATION
On the night of 14 June 1979, an above ground,
21,000 gallon (79,500 1), steel, horizontal storage tank
collapsed, shearing-off the drain control valve and
piping. This action allowed the contents of the tank to
spill onto the ground. An estimated 15,000 gallons
(56,800 1) and a 5% solution of PCP in diesel oil was
released. The probable reasons for the tank failure as
described by a Technical Assistance Team member on site
are:
300.64(a)(2)
source and nature
of release
• Saddle support blocks were not sufficient to sup-
port the weight of the tank and its contents; both
in spacing and number
• Tank was weakened by heavy corrosion and past
abuse
• Saddle support blocks were not engineered to fit
the curvature of the tank
• Drain pipe and valve should not have been
installed at the underside of the tank where they
are subject to damage in the event of a tank
collapse.
13-9
-------
TABLE 1. CHEMICAL ANALYSIS OF PENTACHLOROPHENOL
(Excerpted from Jones, 1981)
Compound
Pen tachloro phenol
Tetrachloro phenol
ttexachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin
Heptachlororadibenzo-£-dioxin
Actachlorod ibenzo-p_-dioxin
Tetrachlorodibenzofuran
Pentachlorodibenzofuran
Hexachlorodibenzofuran
Heptachlorod ibenzofuran
Actachlorodibenzofuran
Technical
84.6%
3%
8 ppm
520 ppm
1,380 ppm
<4 ppm
40 ppm
90 ppm
400 ppm
260 ppm
Concentration
Commercial3
88.4%
4.4%
<0.1%
<6.2%
2,500 ppm
125 ppm
4 ppm
80 ppm
80 ppm
30 ppm
Improved
89.8%
10.1%
<0.1%
-
15.0 ppm
6.5 ppm
1.0 ppm
<1 ppm
1 . 8 ppm
<1 ppm
a Dowicide 7
Dowicide EC-7
13-10
-------
TABLE 2. TOXICITY OF PENTACHLOROPHENOL REPORTED IN THE LITERATURE
Species
Rat
Mice
Rabbit
Guinea pig
Dog
Sheep
CaLf
BluegUl
Goldfish
Catfish (fingerling)
Fathead minnow
Crayfish
Sheepshead minnow
Rainbow trout
Shrimp
Reported Toxicity Range
LD50
(mg/kg-bw)
27-330
120-140
100
150-200
120
140
LD
(mg/kg-bw)
40-350
LC5Q
(ppm)
0.02- 0.05
0.05- 0.27
0.12- 0.14
0.06- 8.00
9.00-53.00
0.22- 0.44
0.13
3.3
13-11
-------
The spilled PCP/oil mixture was not adequately con-
tained on the Houston Chemical Company property because
suitable dikes had not been constructed around the
storage tanks. Approximately 5% of PCP/oil mixture was
contained on-site in an overflow pit adjacent to the plant
(Figure 1). The remaining 95% of the PCP/oil mixture
bypassed the overflow pit and flowed in a southwesterly
direction for 75 yards (69 m) into a roadside ditch. The
PCP/oil flowed in a southerly direction in this ditch for
approximately 125 yards (114 ra) to a road culvert under
old U.S. Highway 63 (i.e., service road). The PCP/oil
continued flowing in a westerly direction overland to a
culvert located under new U.S. Highway 63. From this
point the PCP/oil flowed into a manmade catch basin where
it was temporarily detained. Eventually the mixture
infiItrated through the basin1s bottom and reappeared
approximately 125 feet (58 m) below the basin. From there
the PCP/oil flowed into a 0.7-acre (2835 m ) farm pond.
The farm pond acted as a retention structure to prevent
further spreading of the PCP/oil.
A spill report was not received by EPA until 18 June
1979, four days after the spill occurred. The initial
report by plant personnel was that approximately 10,000
gallons (37,900 1) of PGP and P-9 oil mixture had spilled,
and that it was contained in a dike and being removed by
vacuum truck. Emergency spill response actions were not
initiated at the time because EPA was assured that
problems did not exist in the cleanup effort and that
local waterways were not threatened by the PCP/oil.
A subsequent visit to the site on 18 June 1979 by a
Conservation Officer with the Missouri Department of Con-
servation revealed that approximately 95% of the spilled
material had escaped and now covered a 0.7-acre farm pond
(1835 m2); approximately 1.5 x 10 gallons (5.7 x 10
liters); with a 1-inch (2.5 era) layer of PCP/oil. The
Conservation Officer also reported that a total fish kill
had occurred at the pond which included more than 82 game
fish (e.g., bass, catfish).
Although the PGP/oil was temporarily detained in the
farm pond, the situation was deemed serious because near
overflow conditions existed in the pond. If rainfall
occurred, PCP/oil would likely have been discharged over
the spillway into a tributary to Hog Creek.
Samples of soil, water, and oil and water were taken
to aid in characterizing the site. Figure I shows the
location of these samples and Table 3 gives the results
of the EPA laboratory analysis. The concentrations of PGP
in the drainageways above the farm pond's spillway were
300.64(a)(l)
evaluation of
magnitude of
hazard
300.65(a)(l)
exposure to
acutely toxic
substances
300.65(a)(5)
measuring and
sampling
13-12
-------
TABLE 3. PENTACHLOROPHENOL SAMPLE ANALYSIS, 19 JUNE 1979
Sample Identification
Number
EG 0301
EG 0304
79-7017
79-7018
79-7019
79-7020
79-7021
79-7022
Sample
Type
Water
Water
Oil
Oil
Soil
Oil
Oil & Water
Oil & Water
Pentachlorophenol
Concentration
0.30 ug/1
3.0 mg/1
38,000 mg/1
36,000 mg/1
2,928 ppma
36,000 mg/1
43,000 mg/1
34,000 mg/1
ppm in this case indicates mg/g of soil
13-13
-------
extremely high aod would be considered toxic to most
organisms. PGP concentrations below the farm pond were
Low (0.30 ug/1) and probably would not be considered
toxic. Concentrations of PCP in the well located at the
plant site were elevated (3.0 mg/1) and would be con-
sidered toxic.
An analysis of one of the soil samples (79-7022) was
also performed to determine the level of dioxin (2,3,7,8-
tetrachlorodibenzodioxin) in the PCP. Analysis by multi-
ple ion detection GC/MS indicated that if 2,3,7,8-TCDD was
present, its concentration was less than 20 ug/1 in the
PGP/oil (22 ng/g on a weight basis) . The choice of
analyzing for 2,3,7,8,-TCDD was made because this was
thought to provide the best indicator of dioxin contam-
ination since this isoraer of dioxin is usually present in
highest concentrations.
PLANNING THE SITE RESPONSE
Initiation of Site Response
On June 19, 1979, the On-Scene Coordinator (OSC)
decided that the oil/PCP spill constituted an immediate
threat to navigable waters of the U.S. Further, the OSC
decided that a cleanup should begin immediately. These
decisions were based on the toxic nature of PCP, and on
the likelihood of contaminaton spreading if was not con-
tained and removed at once. While the spill had not yet
travelled beyond the farm pond, a heavy rain would have
been sufficient to cause the pond to overflow and carry
oil/PCP into Hog Creek.
An additional concern of the OSC and of officials at
the Missouri Division of Health was the possibility of
contamination of drinking water wells in the area. There
were 30 such wells within a 1 mile (1.6 km) radius of the
site.
Selection of Response Technologies
Because the PGP/oil spill posed an imminent threat of
discharge of a hazardous substance and oil into United
States waters, and the spiller was not able to mitigate
the situation, a Regional Response Team (RRT) meeting was
convened in Houston, Missouri, on June 19, 1979. Atten-
dees of the RRT meeting included representatives from U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Department of Trans-
portation, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Food and Drug Adminis-
tration, Occupational Safety and Health Administration,
300.65UX1)
exposure to
acutely toxic
substances
300.68(e)(l)
(vii)
weather
300.65(a)(2)
contamination of
a drinking water
supply
13-14
-------
U.S. Corps of Engineers, Missouri Departments of Natural
Resources, Health Conservation, and Highways, Ecology and
Environment Inc., O.H. Materials Inc., U.S. Senator's
Office, and Houston Chemical Company. The purpose of the
meeting was to assess the problem at the spill site,
clarify clean-up resources, and implement clean-up
actions.
The initial clean-up actions determined necessary at
the RRT meeting were to:
• Skim floating PCP/oil from the pond's surface and
removed it with a vacuum truck
• Remove PCP/oil from the catch basin above the farm
pond with a vacuum truck
• Excavate and remove contaminated soils from around
the plant and along the spill path to the pond
• Recirculate pond water through a carbon filtration
system until PCP concentrations are below 10 ug/1
and then release filtered water to receiving
stream
• Construct diversions around the pond so
rainfall would not enter and overtop pond.
that
O.H. Materials of Findlay, Ohio was contracted to perform
all clean-up activities. The clean-up was done under
contract to the U.S. Coast Guard and monitoring of activ-
ities were performed by an EPA Region VII OSC with the
assistance of the U.S. Coast Guard Gulf Strike Team.
After initial clean-up operations were undertaken, it
became evident that further activities were necessary to
adequately clean up the spill site. These activities
were:
• Excavating contaminated pond sediments
• Sealing the well on the plant site to deter ground
water contamination
• Flushing of drainageways to aid in removing and
leaching of PCP/oil
300.65(b)(6)
moving hazardous
substances off-
site
300.65(b)(7)
physical
barriers
300.65(b)(6)
moving hazardous
substances
off-site
13-15
-------
• Inoculating the refilled pond with microorganisms
to maintain PCP levels below 10 ug/1 because of
leaching contaminants.
The selection of the clean-up activities were per-
formed on site based primarily on best engineering judge-
ments to quickly and effectively eliminate the hazard
posed at the spill site.
Extent of Response
On July 19, 1979 the Missouri Department of Conser-
vation conducted bio-assays on bluegill for PCP, and
reviewed U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service data on PCP
effects on fish, in order to determine a clean-up target
level. According to the studies, all test bluegill died
in less than 30 minutes at a PCP concentration of 2.5
rag/1. In pond water containing 32 ug/1 PCP, 50% of the
test bluegill died within 96 hours. Water samples from
the pond at Houston contained 59 rag/1 PCP. The Department
of Conservation concluded on July 19 that 10 ug/1 PCP
would be a safe level, and the Regional Response Team
agreed to set that level as the cleanup target.
When OHM completed introduction of bacteria on August
6 pond samples contained less than 10 ug/1 PCP. However,
the Coast Guard continued funding for a small amount of
additional work on the site until the end of October.
During that period, an aerator remained operating on the
pond to facilitate bacterial action. Also, EPA periodi-
cally took water, samples, and a local contractor occa-
sionally replaced sorbent pads on seeps of oil/PCP at the
site .
When EPA and the Coast Guard ended funding for work
at the site on October 30, pond samples averaged 200 ug/1
PCP, substantially higher than the target level of 10
ug/1. The aerator was removed because it did not appear
to be controlling the contamination, since the PCP level
in the pond had been rising since raid-August. By December
1979, while some oil/PCP seepage continued and pond
samples contained 400 ug/1 PCP, the Coast Guard concluded
that there was nothing further that could be done at the
site. Based on the Missouri Department of Conservation's
report that the pond has since returned to normal and is
supporting aquatic life, it appears that the final remedy
occurred through natural dissipation of the remaining PCP.
300.68(b)(5)
measuring and
sampling
300.65(c)
completion of
immediate removal
actions
13-16
-------
DESIGN AND EXECUTION OF SITE RESPONSE
The following section describes the different clean-
up actions taken at the Houston oil spill site. Actual
clean-up operations at the site started on 20 June 1979
and lasted through October 30, 1979. The main clean-up
operations performed at the site were:
• Skimming and vacuuming floating PCP/oil from the
catch basin and pond
• Excavating and removing contaminated soil from the
PCP/oil spill path and from the farm pond bottom
• Recirculating and treat ing farm pond water with a
carbon adsorption unit
• Constructing surface water diversions around the
farm pond
• Sealing of the well at plant site
• Inoculating the refilled farm pond with micro-
organisms in order to degrade PCP/oil.
Location of equipment set-up at the site by O.K. Materials
is shown in Figure 3.
Skimming and Vacuuming jJperations^
Concentrated PCP/oil was removed from the catch
basin (leaking pond) and farm pond using skimmers and a
vacuum truck. The catch basin contained nearly pure PGP/
oil, while the farm pond had an approximately 1-inch
(2.54 cm) layer of floating PCP/oil. PCP/oil was vacuumed
directly from the catch basin, and was skimmed and
vacuumed from the pond surface. Approximately 10,000
gallons (37,900 1) of PCP/oil was recovered during the
vacuum operations. Recovered PCP/oil was trucked to the
wood treating plant and stored in an inside storage tank
that was deemed safe. The skimming and vacuuming opera-
tions started on June 20, 1979 and continued until June
21, 1979.
Excavation Qperat ions
The soil excavation operations were carried out in
two phases: spill path excavation and pond bottom excava-
tion. Excavation of the spill path was initiated first
using backhoes , Contaminated soils were excavated from
around the plant site initially and then proceeded
westerly along the spill path to Highway 63. Excavated
13-17
300.65(b)(6)
moving hazardous
substances off-
site
-------
Hwy. 63
Spillway
r
. I Chemical Plant
•* • /
® Church Well
truck tank traiar
cartoon flttratton
on-arta lab
command poat
kttchwi
Storage Tanks
Ruptured Tank
Main Row of Oil
Haney Trailer Park Well
Figure 3. Houston Chemical Co. Response Actions
13-18
-------
soils were loaded and trucked to Bob's Home Service, Inc.,
(closest approved hazardous waste landfill) located in
Wright City, Missouri, approximately 170 (272 km) miles
away Trucks used for hauling of the contaminated soil were
lined with plastic to avoid leakage-during transport.
Approximately 942 cubic yards (720 m ) of contaminated
soils were removed along the spill path and transported to
the landfill.
As soil excavation proceeded along the spill path,
on-scene personnel determined that some PCP/oil still
remained in the soil and was leaching out. To abate this
problem, the drainageways were flushed with water. Three
8-inch (20 cm) plastic pipes were placed through Highway
63 to divert flushing water into a carbon filter box
before it entered the pond. Flushing water was obtained
from the well on-site or was carried from Hog Creek using
a vacuum truck.
Excavation of the farm pond bottom started as soon as
the pond's water level was lowered sufficiently to allow
equipment access. Approximately 4 to 6 inches (10 -
15 cm) of the pond's bottom sediments were removed. Saw-
dust had to be mixed with the sediments to control it's
consistency and satisfy the state's landfill regulations.
Excavation operations eventually outpaced hauling opera-
tions, requiring brief storage of contaminated sediments
on higher ground within the pond. Stockpiled sediments
were placed on plastic to prevent the recontamination of
underlying soils. Approximatley 1,694 cubic yards (1296
m ) of the pond sediments (some mixed with sawdust) were
hauled to the Wright City landfill.
During the pond excavation operations, numerous wet
weather springs or seeps were noticed in the floor of the
pond. These springs were found to be heavily contaminated
with PCP/oil (3100 ug/1 of PGP). In order to remedy this
problem, sorbent pads were placed around the springs.
When flow could not be contained by the sorbent pads, the
contaminated water was vacuumed and pumped through a
carbon filtration system.
After the excavation operations were completed, the
drainage ways and pond area were regraded and restored
(includes reseeding and landscaping). Contaminated
vegetative material and sorbent pads were hauled to the
landfill for disposal. A total of 2,635.9 cubic yards
(2016 mq) of contaminated soil were excavated and disposed
of from the spill site. Excavation operations started on
June 20, 1979 near the plant area and ended on July 20,
1979 with the removal of the last loads of pond sediments.
13-19
-------
Treatment of Pond Water
While the skimming and vacuuming operations were
occurring at the farm pond to remove the floating PGP/oil,
the contaminated pond water was being circulated through a
carbon filtration system. The filtration system consisted
of a mix-media prefilter (pea gravel/limestone) and a
three-stage carbon filter. Total charge of carbon was
2400 pounds (10,896 kg). Two pumps were utilized with the
unit, a 3-inch (7.6 cm) electric pump and a 4-inch (10.2
cm) diesel trash pump. The intake pipe was floated in the
pond in a boomed-off area with the actual intake 2 to 4
feet (0.6 to 1.2 m) below the surface. This prevented
highly concentrated PGP/oil from entering the system. The
carbon filtration unit was operated 24-hours per day until
the water in the pond was completely removed.
The initial plan was to recirculate the pond water
back to the pond after filtration until the PCP level was
less than 10 ug/1. This plan was changed to filtering the
pond water and releasing it to Hog Creek when the PCP
concentrations were reduced to below 10 ug/1. At the
onset of filtering the pond water, it was recirculated
back to the pond because OHM did not have their on-site
laboratory operational and the contaminant level could not
be checked. Carbon filtration and recycling started on
June 20, 1979 and lasted until June 25, 1979 when on-site
laboratory was made operational. After this date,
filtered pond water was released to a tributary of Hog
Creek. Complete filtration and removal of original pond
water was completed on July 8, 1979. Approximately
700,000 gallons (2.6 x 106 1) of water had been released
to drain the pond completely. The total amount of water
filtered by the carbon filtration system was nearly 2 x
106 gallons (7.6 x 106 O because the water had to be
recycled for the first six days until an on-site lab was
operational, allowing OHM to determine that treated water
was below 10 ug/1. During the treating and draining of
the farm pond, the carbon filtration unit was recharged
once. Spent carbon was disposed of in the Wright City
landfill.
The carbon filtration unit was reactivated on July 9,
1979 because a local rainfall partially refilled the pond,
and operated intermittent ly for the next ten days.
Filtering and releasing the water from the rainfall and
wet weather springs in the pond was accomplished by July
18, 1979. The carbon filtration unit was deactivated on
this date. Carbon filtration units were completely
removed from site on August 2, 1979.
13-20
-------
Diversion Construction
Because the level of water in the pond was near
overflow, a trench and sandbag diversion was constructed
at the site to divert surface runoff around the pond.
Location of the trench and sandbags is shown in Figure 3.
Construction of the runoff diversions began on June 20,
1979 and was completed on June 21, 1979. The diversion
structures remained in place until July 18, 1979 when they
were removed. During the time the structures were in
place the pond did not overflow the spillway and release
water.
Sealing of Plant Well
An investigation was performed at the plant site to
determine if the plant well was acting as a route for
aquifer contamination. Initial investigations made by
obtaining a water sample at an outside tap showed that an
oily film was present in the water, probably PCP/oil.
Sampling revealed that the concentration of PGP in the
well was 3 rag/1. Further investigations showed that an
old buried water line that was not sealed was the cause of
the PCP/oil intrusion. To prevent contamination of the
underlying aquifers, the plant well was purged until
contamination was not observed. Samples taken at this
time showed PGP levels to be less than 0.50 ug/1. The OSC
determined at the time that the plant well should be
sealed to prevent any further contamination of the local
aquifers. This was deemed necessary because the plant
well was improperly cased and the potential for contam-
ination was great. On June 27, 1979 the components of the
plant well were removed and the well sealed by pouring
cement throughout its drilled length.
Bioreclamation of Refilled Pond
Because of the potentially long term leaching of
PCP/oil into the pond from bottom seeps and the large
amount of soil that would need to be excavated to elim-
inate the leaching, the OSC decided to allow the farm
pond to refill and then introduce more organisms to
degrade any newly leached PCP. The type of organisms
chosen were pseudomonas bacteria (Bio-Pac Sybron culture
DC 1007 pp) originally developed for degradation of
phenols. PCP is more difficult to degrade than phenols
but it was believed that 80% degradation could be
accomplished. Microorganisms were shipped freeze-dried to
the site where they were acclimated in a holding pool with
300.65(b)(7)
physical
barriers to
deter spread
300.70(b)(l)
(ii)-(B)(l)
dikes and berms
13-21
-------
controlled nutrient, temperature, and oxygen levels. Once
acclimated, the organisms were added to the pond. Self-
contained electric aerators were floated on the pond to
help maintain oxygen levels above 2 mg/1.
The first batch of organisms were added to the pond
on July 28, 1979 and successive batches were added until
August 4, 1979. A total of approximately 100 pounds (220
kg) of organisms were added to the pond during this
period. Microorganism concentrations in the pond for part
of this time period are shown in Table 4. Bioreclamation
operations were discontinued after October 30, 1979 when
the aerator was removed and the spill clean-up terminated.
Two problems arose during the bioreclamation opera-
tions: excessive die-off of organisms and overtopping of
the spillway caused by heavy rain. The excessive die-off
of organism in the pond was apparently caused by the
property caretaker turning off the aerators in the pond.
Once this was discovered the problem ended.
During the bioreclamation operation heavy rains
occurred twice causing the pond to discharge contaminated
water through the spillway. Carbon filter dams (primary
and secondary) had been built on the spillway to minimize
contaminant releases. Despite the damage incurred to the
dams during the second overflow, a fish kill or extensive
damage did not occur in local receiving waters.
In early October, the OSC attempted to reintroduce a
bacteria population in to the pond and ordered 100 pounds
(45 kg) of freeze-dried bacteria from Sybron, Inc. The
OSC was not optimistic that the attempt would succeed, but
believed that the relatively small investment of $1,000
for the bacteria and nutrients was justified by the chance
that they might work. Subsequent sampling of the pond
indicated that the new batch of bacteria had no apparent
effect. The aerator was turned off on October 30. In
November, the last pond sample taken contained about 400
ppb PGP.
300.70(b)(2)(ii)
(A)(2)
aerated lagoon
COST AND FUNDING
Source of Funding
On June 19, 1979 EPA and Coast Guard officials sought
an agreement from representatives of Houston Chemical Co.
to pay for the clean-up. When the effort failed, the
only other available source of funds was the section
311(k) Revolving Fund. The OSC obtained an initial spend-
ing authorization of $50,000 from the 2nd Coast District
300.68(c)
responsible
party
13-22
-------
TABLE 4. MICRO-ORGANISM CONCENTRATIONS
Date
(1979)
30 July
31 July
1 August
2 August
Micro-organism Count (organism/ml)
Incubation Batch
1.3 x 106
1.2 x 107
Pool Sample
1.1 x 107
4.8 x 106
6.0 x 10*j
1.1 x 106
Upper Pond
5.2 x 105
8.0 x 104
4.0 x 104
1.5 x 104
Lower Pond
4 x 103
8.4 x 104
1.9 x 10^
1.7 x 10
1.5 x 10^
1.4 x 10
13-23
-------
office in St. Louis, Missouri. The Coast Guard periodi-
cally raised the spending authorization during the cleanup
as the OSC requested more funds. The OSC initially esti-
mated that the cleanup would take 30 days to complete and
would cost about $500,000.
Selection of Contractors
On June 19, the OSC contacted O.H. Materials, Inc. of
Findlay, Ohio, and engaged the firm to begin cleanup
operations as soon as possible. The first OHM personnel
arrived at the site that afternoon. According to the OSC,
OHM was chosen to do the work because, at that time, they
were one of only two firms in the U.S. qualified to
respond quickly and effectively to chemical spills. O.H.
Materials was chosen over the other firm because EPA
Region VII recently had used the other firm in a different
clean-up and believed it was equitable to use OHM for the
spill at Houston. The OSC, acting as agent for the Coast
Guard, contracted with OHM on a time-and-materials basis,
using an OHM price list for labor and equipment that EPA
already had on file. The contract did not specify the
tasks that OHM was to perform, leaving the OSC broad
discretion to define the nature and scope of work.
At the request of the OSC, on June 20 the EPA Region
VII office contracted with a dispoal facility in Wright
City, Missouri, approximatley 170 miles (274 km) from the
site, and made arrangements for disposal of contaminated
soil that was removed during the cleanup. The facility, a
landfill called Bob's Home Service, Inc. was chosen
because it was the closest facility available that was
licensed to accept hazardous wastes. Initial plans had
called for removal of both contaminated soil and recovered
oil/PCP. However, the OSC decided that the oil could be
transferred safely to a secure tank inside a building at
the Houston Chemical Co. plant, saving the expense of
transporting and disposing of the oil. Houston Chemical
Co. officials consented to the OSC's decision. EPA's
initial estimate of the quantity of soil to be disposed of
was 800 cubic yards (612 m ). The actual amount of soil
taken to Bob's Home Service was 2,636 cubic yards
(2015 m3).
Project Costs
The total cost of the Houston Chemical Co. cleanup,
from June 18, 1979 to December 29, 1979, was $709,427.
All monies came from the section 311 (k) Revolving Fund.
Most of the expenditures occurred during the 49 days from
June 19 to August 6 when the initial cleanup, soil dis-
posal , and biological treatment took place. The total
13-24
-------
spent during this period was about $704,000. The
remainder of the expenditures occurred from August 7 to
December 29 for a small amount of follow-up work. A total
of $3,370 was spent on grading and reseeding to restore
the site, and for replacing the sorbent pads placed over
oil seeps on a weekly basis for six weeks. Another $1,111
was spent on freeze-dried bacteria and nutrients in the
attempt to reintroduce a bacteria culture in the pond
during October 1979.
The EPA's original estimate of the cleanup cost, made
two weeks after work at the site began, was approximately
$500,000 for the whole job. The cleanup cost $209,000
more than anticipated for three reasons. First, EPA had
not expected to have to excavate and remove contaminated
soil from the pond bottom. When the pond bottom was found
to be contaminated, the amount of soil that had to be
removed and disposed of tripled the original estimate of
800 cubic yards (612 mj). Second, heavy rains in early
July delayed excavation work and necessitated reactivation
of the carbon filtration system. Third, EPA initially had
not intended to employ biological treatment, which added
about $60,000 to the total clean-up cost. Table 5 summa-
rizes the cost breakdown by operations.
Soil Excavation, Vacuuming, and Carbon Filtration
The bulk of expenditures, approximately $459,000,
occurred during the initial 32 days of the cleanup, from
June 19 to July 20. During this period, OHM built
surface water diversion structures; excavated all contam-
inated soil from the spill path and pond; vacuumed 10,000
gallons (561,800 1) of oil/PCP; and began restoration of
the carbon site. Because many of the tasks were performed
concurrently, and because OHM billing for time-and-
materials did not break down charges on a task-by-task
basis, it is not possible to calculate accurate costs for
each task performed. However, average daily costs for
different phases of the cleanup give some indication of
the relative costs of various tasks.
Daily costs were highest for the first 11 days of
work, averaging about $20,000. During this period, 17-20
workers were on site, setting up and beginning operation
of the carbon filtration system, mobile and analytical
lab, and vacuum truck, and excavating the spill path.
Skimming and vacuuming were completed during this period.
Daily costs from the 12th day to the 32nd day averaged
$12,000. Costs during this period were lower because
containment, set-up and vacuuming were already complete.
Twelve to 15 workers were on site during this period,
300.65(b)(6)
moving hazardous
substances off-
site
13-25
-------
TABLE 5. SUMMARY OF COST INFORMATION-HOUSTON CHEMICAL CO.. HOUSTON, MO.
I
ro
Li-id
V.ituniiiin'j "II /
I'M1
Carbon fl Itni-
t Urn Of pond
ioil i-xt.iv.i-
tlm
Soil Uii|'0$al-
UiiJIJll
Sull lrai)',portii
Uoii-UU mi
l!»7J km)
iiloluijicdl
IlCiltlM'tlt
l.l'ft (UT-iomiel
,111(1 tliiVI.'l
Cu.ist liuaril
iVriottiiel
.111(1 tl'ilVCl
HL'slQi'jUon and
fu11ow-u|)
word
MUc«l laiK-uus
Ox^i-TlJi lui'es
lotal
Estimated
quantity
lawi cu.y.l^.
612 cu. ra, )
IUM) cu.ytls.
161? cu. m.)
l«)i) cu.yds.
(612 cu.n)
Actual
Oujritlty
1(1,000 t|Al.
161.775 1)
2 mil Him f].il.
7W6 million 1)
?,(,V.> eu.yiW.
;2ni5 cu. >n. )
J.dK tu.yd'J.
(illl5 cu. ffl.)
Z.&J'j cy.ytls.
(?015 cu.m)
-til) douri
HGO linurs
Estimated
Exjinmlituro
$3.1.600 (?]
ji6,nnn (zi
t?o.ooo
jwjo.noo (3)
Actual
txpoixllture
H5H,'tM(U
(110,70(1
ir.2,646
Kil.Ui!
* ?,2I'»
ti(>.n?6
t 3.3M
t t,r.?j
$704,471
Variance
i;/,ioB
(.??'j,:|
$36.646
(i??9?)
it-Id, 1111
(*2iisr.i
1*201,4?;
1.41/1
Unit Cn*t
J1^/cu. yd.
(I1lj/cu.in)
$?n/cu.yil. or
ll.7
-------
completing soil excavation and removal, carbon filtration,
site restoration, and equipment breakdown.
Biological Treatment
The second phase of the cleanup, introduction of
bacteria and nutrients to the pond, lasted 13 days, from
July 25 to August 6, and cost $61,181. Daily costs were
biological about $4,700. Two to four OHM personnel were
on site during this period. The original OHM cost esti-
mate for the biological treatment was $20,000, or one-
third of the actual cost.
Transportation and Disposal
A total of 2,636 cubic yards (2,015 m ) of contam-
inated soil, vegetation, absorbent pads and spent filter
carbon were disposed of at Bob's Home Service, Inc., a
licensed hazardous waste landfill in Wright City,
Missouri. The disposal cost for all materials was $42 per
cubic yard ($48/m ), or a total of $110,708. The material
was transported in 130 truckloads at $355 per load. An
OHM subcontractor carried 122 of the loads, which added
15% to the cost per load. Eight loads were contracted for
directly by the Coast Guard. The total cost of trans-
portation was $52,610, or $19.96 per cubic yard ($26 per
cubic meter) of soil or 11.7 cents per cubic yard per mile
(15.3 cents/in /km).
Administrative Costs
Costs to EPA for salaries, transportation, and per
diems associated with the cleanup totalled $7,218. Seven
different EPA personnel were on site at various times
during the clean-up working a total of 440 hours. Wages,
including overtime, totalled $5,305. Transportation and
per diems totalled $1,913. These amounts do not include
sample analysis and administrative work performed at the
EPA Region VII offices.
Costs to the Coast Guard for salaries, per diems, and
transportation totalled $10,825. Three Coast Guard per-
sonnel worked a total of 860 hours on clean-up related
duties, at a cost of $4,524 in salaries. Per diems cost
$5,759, and transportation cost $542.
Miscellaneous Expenditures
Miscellaneous expenditures totalled $4,523. Included
in this figure are $1,211 for telephone service, $1,111
for additional bacteria, and a number of smaller expendi-
tures on such items as chartered airplanes to send samples
13-27
-------
to Kansas City, film, and rental of a motel room for use
as a command post.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
An assessment of the performance of the types of
clean-up actions taken at the Houston Company spill site
must consider the nature of response. This clean-up
effort was performed at an emergency spill response, not
as a planned remedial action. The actions taken at the
site were done to prevent the spread of PGP and cleanup
the site as quickly as possible. The decisions made were
often based on insufficient data and time constraints did
not allow for the development of extensive studies to
determine the "best" or the most cost effective clean-up
action.
The intent of the clean-up effort was to eliminate
the hazard posed by the PCP/oil spilled at the site. As
part of this, a target level of less than 10 ug/1 of PCP
in the local surface waters was to be attained to prevent
potential toxic effects to the ecosystems. The only
standard to determine if the clean-up actions taken at the
site were effective in eliminating the PCP hazard is the
water quality monitoring data.
Ground water quality data available for the site is
shown in Table 6. These data indicate that the local
ground water had not been significantly affected as of
June 26, 1979. The high concentration of PCP found in the
plant well on June 19, 1979 was caused by contaminants
that leaked into the water lines that carried water to the
plant building. Sealing of the well was an appropriate
action because the possibility for contamination was
great. Extensive monitoring of wells in the area did not
indicate that the PCP/oil had migrated into the deep
underlying aquifers. Depending upon the permeability and
velocity of these aquifers, the contaminants may have not
traveled far enough to be detected by the end of opera-
tions in December.
Surface water quality data for the site is shown in
Table 7. At the end of operations on October 30, 1979 the
farm pond had a PCP concentration ranging from 250 ug/1 to
400 ug/1, a concentration greater than ten times the
target level. Based upon data, it is evident that the
clean-up operations at the site did not completely accom-
plish their goals for reduction in surface water contam-
ination. The main reason for this is that the bulk of the
clean-up operations at site (i.e., soil excavation, carbon
filtration, and skimming and vacuuming) were designed to
13-28
-------
TABLE 6. GROUND WATER SAMPLES
Date
(1979)
June 19
June 24
June 26
Sample No.
EG 0304
EG 0322
EG 0323
EG 0324
EG 0325
EG 0326
EA 0405
EA 0406
EA 0407
EA 0408
Description
Well at plant
Well at church
Well at plant
Well at Haney trailer park
Well at Jaus farm
Well at Fisher junkyard
Well at plant
Well at plant
Well at trailer park
Well at trailer park
Concentration
3.0 rag/1
<0.1 ug/1
1.2 ug/1
0.7 ug/1
<0.1 ug/1
<0.1 ug/1
0.20 ug/1
<0.05 ug/1
<0.05 ug/1
<0.05 ug/1
13-29
-------
TABLE 7. SURFACE WATER SAMPLES
Date
June 19
June 24
June 25
June 26
June 29
July 8
July 9
July 16
July 28
July 30
July 31
Aug 1
Aug 2
Aug 5
Aug 6
Sample No.
79-7017
79-7018
79-7020
79-7021
79-7022
EG 0315
EG 0316
EG 0317
EG 0318
EA 0402
EA 0403
EA 0404
Description
Along spill path near plant - oil
Along spill path east of Hwy 63 - oil
Catch basin above farm pond - oil
East end of farm pond - oil/water
Near spillway of farm pond
Tributary to Hog Creek below farm pond
Tributary to Hog Creek above 400 yds
before confluence
Confluence at Hog Creek
On Hog Creek about 25 yards above
confluence
Tributary to Hog Creek below farm pond
Tributary to Hog Creek above confluence
Hog Creek below confluence
Pond water
Pond water
Pond pumped dry
Pond water (after rainfall)
Springs into pond
•
Bioreclamat ion started
Pond spillway water (after heavy
rain)
Hog Creek
Pond water (composite)
Pond spillway
Pond spillway
Batch tank (pOOl)
Pond water
Pond water
Concentration
38,000 mg/1
36,000 mg/1
36,000 mg/1
43,000 mg/1
34,000 mg/1
0.74 ug/1
0.40 ug/1
0.17 ug/1
0.27 ug/1
0.7 ug/1
0.2 ug/1
0.4 ug/1
20,600 ug/1
16,500 ug/1
1,167 ug/1
3,100 ug/1
1,440 ug/1
3 ug/1
20 ug/1
<10 ug/1
<10 ug/1
<10 ug/1
<10 ug/1
<10 ug/1
(continued)
13-30
-------
TABLE 7. (continued)
Date
Aug 14
Aug 20
Aug 29
Sept 7
Oct 5
Oct 30
Nov 2
Nov 6
Dec 11
Sample No.
Description
Pond water
Pond water
Pond water
Pond water
Pond water
All operation stopped
Pond water (4 samples)
low
mean
high
Pond water
Pond water
Concentration
<10 ug/1
153 ug/1
60 ug/1
80-90 ug/1
>100 ug/l
250 ug/1
>300 ug/1
400 ug/1
200 ug/1
400 ug/1
13-31
-------
eliminate known "visible" contamination (e.g., floating
PGP/oil, contaminated soils, contaminated pond water) not
PCP/oil which seeped into the shallow aquifers.
An unknown amount o f PGP/ oil had in f i 11 rated be low
the depth of soil excavation and possibly into the shallow
ground water table. This is evidenced by the high concen-
tration of PCP in the springs found in the pond's bottom
(3100 ug/1) after complete water removal. The method
chosen to control the PCP seeps was bioreclamation of the
pond water after the pond refilled. Early indications
were that the bioreclamation was performing as expected
because the PCP concentrations were reduced below 10 ug/1
between August 1, 1979 and August 14, 1979. However,
after this date the PCP concentrations approached 400
ug/1, after clean-up operation termination.
A factor that may have contributed to the failure of
the bioreclamation efforts at the site was that the
property caretaker was turning off the aeration pumps.
However, other uncontrollable factors such as weather
conditions, water chemistry, and natural nutrient loading
could have also had an effect on the bioreclamation
effort. Based on information provided by the bioreclama-
tion manufacturer, the oxygen concentrations in the pond
needed to be maintained above 2 mg/1 to ensure viability
of the organisms. Oxygen levels less than this would
cause excess die-off of organisms. However, hard data is
not available to conclusively show what caused the failure
of the bioreclamation operations at the site.
In retrospect, it appears that the clean-up opera-
tions at the site were performed in an appropriate manner
to minimize the hazard posed. The reason for not obtain-
ing the goal of less than 10 ug/1 of PCP in the surface
water was the inadequacy of the plan to deal with the
heavily contaminated springs in the pond bottom. Whether
or not the bioreclamation procedures would have been
completely successful in eliminating this problem is
unknown because sufficient data were not available.
13-32
-------
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Barnett, Dewey A. June 29, 1979. "Trip Report: Oil Pollution Project No.
190030 in Houston, Mo.". Second Coast Guard District, St. Louis,
Missouri.
Bob's Home Service, Inc. July 31, 1979. Invoice to U.S. Coast Guard Re:
contract DOT-CG02-3132-21902815. Wright City, Missouri.
Buchanan, Jim. June 19, 1979. "Regional Response Team Meeting Summary". TAT
VII, Ecology and Environment, Inc., Kansas City, Kansas.
Buchanan, Jim. undated. "Summary, TAT Response, Houston Chemical Company,
Houston, Missouri". TAT VII, Ecology and Environment, Inc., Kansas City,
Kansas.
Burris, James A., P.E. September, 1982. Personal communication. Missouri
Department of Natural Resources, Poplar Bluff, Missouri.
Duley, William. June 25, 1979. "Engineering Geologic Report on Houston
Chemical Spill, Texas County, Missouri". Missouri Geology and Land
Survey, Columbia, Missouri.
F&S Trucking Co. July 24, 1979. Invoice 5091 to U.S. Coast Guard. F&S
Trucking Co., Blue Springs, Missouri.
Gilmer, Harry. July 9, 1979. "Houston, Missouri, Pentachlorophenol Fact
Sheet, Draft". U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Kansas City,
Kansas.
Harrington, Richard. June 25, 1979. "Report on Causation of Tank Failure,
Region VII". TAT VII, Ecology and Environment Inc., Kansas City, Kansas.
Hoopes, Lt. Patrick T. September, 1982. Personal communication. U.S. Coast
Guard, Gulf Strike Team, Bay St. Louis, Mississippi.
Hoopes, Lt. Patrick T. December 11, 1979. Record of telephone call to Gary
Snodgrass, OSC, re: Houston Chemical Co. Spill. U.S. Coast Guard, Gulf
Strike Team, Bay St. Louis, Mississippi.
Hoopes, Lt. Patrick T. July 19, 1979. "Trip Report," re: Houston Chemical
Co. Spill. U.S. Coast Guard, Gulf Strike Team, Bay St. Louis,
Mississippi.
13-33
-------
Keffer, William J. et al. June 19, 1979 to October 10, 1979. "Spill Report:
Houston Chemical Company". U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Kansas
City, Kansas.
Leyland, Daniel. July 26, 1979. "Report of Investigation of Pentachloro-
phenol/Oil Spill, Houston, Missouri". Missouri Department of Natural
Resources, Poplar Bluff, Missouri.
O.K. Materials Inc. June 28, 1979 to August 28, 1979. Invoices to U.S. Coast
Guard re: contract DOT-CG02-3130-21902695. O.H. Materials, Inc.,
Findlay, Ohio.
Panning, Robert. September, 1982. Personal communication. O.H. Materials
Co., Findlay, Ohio.
Reese Excavating Co. August 4, 1979 to December 29, 1979. Invoices to USEPA,
Kansas City, Kansas. Reese Excavating Co., Houston, Missouri.
Reynolds, Jeffrey. June 23, 1979. Inspection Report, case file R5949-150100,
O.H. Materials Co., Houston, Missouri. U.S. Occupational Safety and
Health Administration, St. Louis, Missouri.
Snodgrass, Gary B. August, September, 1982. Personal communications. U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Kansas City, Kansas.
Snodgrass, Gary B. October 10, 1979. Memorandum re: status of Houston spill
site to Billy J. Fairless, Deputy Director, SVAN. U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Kansas City, Kansas.
U.S. Coast Guard. June 21, 1979 to October 9, 1979. "Pollution Reports,
Number One through 20". St. Louis, Missouri.
U.S. Coast Guard. January 13, 1981. "Billing for Sale of Material or
Services to Warren Wise, Inc.". St. Louis, Missouri.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, undated report. "Houston, Missouri
Oil-Pentachlorophenol Spill Incident". Emergency Response Section,
Technical Services Branch, Surveillance and Analysis Division. U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency Laboratory, Kansas City, Kansas.
Wickland, John C. January 6, 1981. Letter to Commander, Second Coast Guard
District, Re: Administrative Costs of Houston Cleanup. Management
Division, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Kansas City, Missouri.
13-34
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HOWE, INC.
BROOKLYN CENTER, MINNESOTA
INTRODUCTION
Howe, Inc., formulates and stores agricultural
chemicals at a small facility in Brooklyn Center,
Minnesota, a residential suburb of Minneapolis. In
January 1979, a warehouse at the site, containing a
variety of pesticides, fertilizers, and explosives, was
consumed by fire. Water used to extinguish the fire
carried pesticides into a nearby stream bed and infil-
trated into the soil. Sampling by state officials
revealed hazardous levels of pesticides on the ground
surface, in soil, and in ground water.
Background
Howe, Inc. occupied five buildings on a 5.3 acre (2.1
ha) parcel in Brooklyn Center, immediately west of the
Minneapolis city limits (see Figure 1 ) . The site is
located in a smal1 area of industrial buildings in an
otherwise residential neighborhood of detached single-
family homes. At the time of the fire, Howe's north
building contained about 100 different pesticides,
totalling 80 tons (73 Mt) of active ingredients. The
predominant active ingredients were two organic herbi-
cides: atrazine, known commercially as Aatrex 4L, and
alachlor, known commercially as Lasso.
Fire broke out in the north building on January 6,
1979 (see Figure 2). In the course of the six-hour effort
to extinguish the fire, the Brooklyn Center Fire Depart-
meigt sprayed more than a half-million gallons (1.9 x
10 1) of water on the building. Some of the water
collected in shallow ponds on the Howe property, but most
of the water flowed through a culvert and emptied into the
dry bed of a small intermittent stream named Ryan Creek,
which runs immediately south and east of the site and
drains into the Mississippi River, about two miles
(3.2 km) to the east. The pesticide-laden water flooded
an area of the stream bed about 900 feet long by 15 feet
wide (275 x 5 m). The flooded area lay within the City of
Minneapolis on property owned by the Soo Line Railroad.
NCP Reference
300.68(e)(2)
amount and form
of substances
14-1
-------
Figure 1. Howe, Inc. Location
(Barr Engineering, 1980)
mr*
HOWE, INC. SITE fT^t-.
14-2
-------
Figure 2. Howe, Inc. Site Map
(Barr Engineering, 1980)
HOWE, INC.
PROPERTY 0 i
LIMITS B '
Location of soil boring only
Location of monitoring well and
soil boring
'CB Catch Basin
-------
Synopsis of Site Response
This case study describes the actions carried out in
response to contamination left in the aftermath of the
fire, and does not include the actual firef ighting
efforts. A number of government agencies participated in
the Howe clean-up, including the Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency (MPCA), the Minnesota Department of Agri-
culture (MDA), the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH),
and the cities of Minneapolis and Brooklyn Center. The
major elements of the clean-up were: emergency response
actions; provision of alternative water supplies, removal
of contaminated ice, snow, and soil; removal of building
and other fire debris; a hydrogeological investigation;
and ground water recovery. Most of the clean-up occurred
from January 1979 to November 1979.
The response began on January 6, 1978, the day of
the fire, when the City of Minneapolis built two temporary
sand dams on Ryan Creek, east of the Soo Line Access
Road, to contain the contaminated water. During the
following seven days, after most of the water had been
absorbed into the stream bed and the water remaining on
the surface had frozen, a contractor hired by MPCA con-
structed a diked, plastic-lined containment area on the
Soo Line property and placed the contaminated ice and snow
from the stream bed and the Howe property in the initial
containment area. The City of Minneapolis erected a fence
around the containment area.
Meanwhile, state and Minneapolis officials were con-
cerned that air emissions from the fire might have contam-
inated snow down-wind of the site. Although sampling did
not detect significant snow contamination, Minneapolis
officials closed a nearby area to sledding and posted
signs around the industrial area east of the site which
read "Hazardous Materials, Keep Out."
Ten days after the fire, the MDH ordered 11 nearby
residents to discontinue use of their drinking water
wells. The City of Brooklyn Center subsequently con-
nected these houses to the municipal water system. On
the same date, the MDH contracted with Barr Engineering
Co., an engineering consulting firm, to investigate the
level and extent of soil and ground water contamination
and to evaluate remedial alternatives.
State officials spent one month seeking a means of
disposing of the contaminated ice and soil, encountering
strong citizen opposition as each proposed disposal
alternative was made public. In early March 1979, a
contractor hired by MPCA excavated 1,000 cubic yards
300.65(b)(7)
physical
barriers to
deter spread of
release
300.70(b)(l)
dikes and berms
300.65(b)(3)
security
300.70(d)(2)
provision of
alternative
water supply
300.68(f)
remedial
inve s t igation
300.68(e)(2)
source control
removal
14-4
-------
(765 cu. m) of contaminated soil from Ryan Creek and lined
the stream bed with sand and plastic to prevent spring
runoff from carrying the remaining contaminants downstream
or deeper into the soil. The excavated soil and 1,600
cubic yards (1,220 cu. m) of ice and snow were trucked to
a farm in Martin County, Minnesota, 140 miles (225 km)
from Brooklyn Center. The ice and snow were placed in a
plastic-lined pit and the soil was piled nearby. Two
months later, the melted ice and snow was sprayed over
74 acres (30 ha) and planted with corn. In September
1979, the contaminated soil was spread over 2.5 acres
(1 ha) and mixed with manure to enhance microbial break-
down of the pesticides.
During the spring of 1979, Howe, Inc. and owners of
some of the stored pesticides removed the remaining
chemicals and fire debris.
In June 1979, Barr Engineering installed four 35
foot deep (10.6 m) ground water recovery wells along a
1,200-foot (366 m) section of Ryan Creek. Over the next
five months, almost 90 million gallons (340 x 10 1) of
water were pumped from the wells into the Minneapolis
sanitary sewer system. The ground water recovery system
was shut down for the winter in November 1979. In August
1980, after reviewing ground water sampling data, the MDH
concluded that it was not necessary to resume pumping.
Currently, the State of Minnesota is suing Howe,
Inc., to recover clean-up costs.
300.70(b)(l)
(ii)(A)
surface seals
300.70(b)(l)
ground water
pumping
SITE DESCRIPTION
The Howe, Inc. site occupies 5.3 acres (2.1 ha) in
the southern portion of Brooklyn Center, Minnesota, imme-
diately west and north of the city limits of Minneapolis
and Robbinsdale, respectively. Figure 1 shows the site's
location and prominent surface features in the site
vicinity. The following discussions of regional and site
surface characteristics and hydrogeology are based upon
information presented in a report by Barr Engineer ine
(1980). 6
Surface Characteristics
The most prominent natural feature within a one-half
mile (0.8 km) radius of the site is Ryan Lake to the
south; Crystal Lake to the south, Twin Lakes to the west
and the Mississippi River to the east are within two miles
(3.2 km) of the site. Other nearby water bodies include
Ryan Creek to the east which flows into County Ditch No.
14-5
-------
13 and thence to the Mississippi River. In general, with
the exception of the Howe site itself and adjacent Soo
Line Railroad properties, the dominant land use in the
area is residential, including both single and multiple
family dwellings. The most prominent man-made features of
this area, though, are Brooklyn Boulevard, a four-lane
state highway, the Soo Line Railroad tracks south of the
site, and the Soo Line Railroad's Humboldt Yard east of
Brooklyn Boulevard. The area of greatest potential
contamination immediately surrounding the fire site
consisted of about 60 acres (24 ha) encompassing all of
the Howe property as well as some Soo Line Railroad
property, and crossed by the Soo Line tracks, Brooklyn
Boulevard and Ryan Creek (see Figure 2). Brooklyn
Boulevard conveniently divides this area into eastern and
western sections for purposes of further discussion.
As Figure 2 shows, the western portion of the area of
most concern includes the Howe property, containing two
large fertilizer manufacturing buildings, the pesticide
storage building and an office building. The pesticide
storage building (north building), a one-story wood-framed
structure, was the building destroyed by the fire. The
ground near these buildings slopes gradually from north to
south with a maximum relief of about four to six feet (1.2
to 1.8m). The lowest spots on this western section are
three storm water catch basins eventually draining nearly
all runoff north of the railroad tracks, south of 49th
Avenue North and west of Brooklyn Boulevard (see Figure
2). The southeast and southwest catch basins, in turn,
are hydraulically connected with an underground concrete
culvert installed to divert overflow from Ryan Lake under
the Soo Line tracks, Brooklyn Boulevard, and Soo Line
access road to Ryan Creek. The western catch basin does
not seem to have an outlet. As Figure 2 indicates,
asphalt covers a limited area around the Howe buildings;
the asphalt extends only to the western catch basin.
The eastern section of the area of most concern is
dominated by Ryan Creek, a stream flowing infrequently and
only during heavy rainfall or runoff. Ryan Creek flows
northeastward from the underground culvert outlet on the
east side of the Soo Line access road to 49th Avenue North
and Russell Avenue. At this intersection, the stream
flows back into another culvert paralleling 49th Avenue
North and reemerges at Oliver Avenue and flows eventually
into County Ditch No. 13. Otherwise the eastern portion
of the area in the immediate vicinity of the site is
generally featureless, being flat, undeveloped, and
covered with grasses and small brush.
14-6
-------
Hydrogeology
Surficial Geology
The surficial geology of the Twin Cities area is
characterized mainly by glacial deposits of Pleistocene
age, in particular by those resulting from the Superior
and Des Moines ice lobes which covered the area during the
late Wisconsin phase of glaciation. Both ice lobes
advanced from the northwest, the Superior first depositing
a sandy non-calcareous till and the Des Moines later
covering and modifying the Superior with a silty and
clayey calcareous drift. Sand-laden meltwater from the
retreating Des Moines later formed a series of coalescing
outwash plains called the Anoka Sand Plain. After retreat
of theses Moines lobe, the Mississippi River cut through
the drift deposits, forming the present river valley and
leaving the Mississippi Valley Outwash deposits. As a
result of these events, the metropolitan area is covered
by a surficial sand and gravel aquifer, and soils are
generally sandy and well drained. The underlying uncon-
solidated glacial deposits are an average 40 to 70 feet
(12 to 21 m) thick.
Information from soil borings taken during site
clean-up confirm the site is covered by a surficial sand
and gravel aquifer resulting from the Mississippi River
Outwash and possibly the Anoka Sand Plain. Below the
surface of the western portion of the area, the sand and
gravel outwash generally overlies a number of dis-
continuous fine organic swamp and lacustrine deposits of
varying or unknown, but generally significant, thick-
nesses. The uppermost layers are topsoil and miscella-
neous fill, including primarily silty sand, as well as
silty loam, debris, and trace organics and gravel. East
of Brooklyn Boulevard, the surficial geology is dominated
by deposits consisting of clean, well-sorted medium to
coarse sand, and some gravel. One isolated deposit of
clayey silt was discovered midway along 49th Avenue North.
Bedrock Geology
The bedrock geology of the Twin Cities area is
dominated by a sequence of Ordovician-age sandstone and
dolomite formations. The St. Peter Sandstone, directly
underlying the drift deposits, averages 150 feet (45.7 m)
but varies greatly in thickness due to erosion by inter-
glacial and post-glacial streams. Some of these ancient
streams cut valleys up to 150 feet (45.7 m) deep through
the St. Peter Sandstone and into the Prairie-du-Chien
dolomites and sandstones below. In general, the thick-
nesses and elevations of all of the major surficial and
bedrock units in the area vary greatly. Logs of two wells
within two and three miles (3.2 to 4.8 km) and northeast
14-7
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and east of the Howe site, respectively, show thickness
variations of 20, 85, and 135 feet (6.1, 25.9 and 4.1. m)
for the glacial sediments, St. Peter Sandstone and
Prairie-du-Chien Group, respectively.
Borings taken in the immediate vicinity of the Howe
site unfortunately were not sufficiently deep to confirm
the presence of these bedrock units.
Ground Water Hydrology
The regional ground water table in the surficial
aquifer moves on a gradient of 0.38% in an easterly
direction, originating at Twin Lakes and discharging into
the Mississippi River. Wells near the Howe site confirm
the easterly direction of flow, but on a gradient of less
than 0.25%. The depth of the ground water table ranges
from 12 to 18 feet (3.7 to 5.5 m) west of Brooklyn
Boulevard and from 5 to 14 feet (1.5 to 4.3 m) east of
Brooklyn Boulevard near the site.
Generally shallow (less than 25 feet, or 7.6 m, deep)
soil borings prevented confirmation of the presence of
till underneath the Howe site. Literature reports of
borings taken near the site are also inconclusive; there-
fore, the degree to which the till limits vertical ground
water flow cannot be ascertained. In addition, none of
the clay seams discovered in wells near Ryan Creek have
been found to be continuous and thus are not effective
barriers to vertical ground water movement. If till were
present, its 70 foot_ (21 m) thickness and hydraulic
conductivity of 3 x 10 cm/sec would make it a relatively
effective barrier. Even if the till were absent and the
surficial aquifer was hydrologically connected to the St.
Peter Sandstone, the majority of ground water would
probably flow horizontally through the more permeable
outwash deposits.
WASTE DISPOSAL HISTORY
No hazardous waste disposal, as such, occurred at the
Howe, Inc. site. Rather, fire debris and the water used
to put the fire out became contaminated by the chemicals
stored in the building and, in turn, became potential
sources of surface water, ground water, and soil
contamination.
The fire started at the east end of Howe's north
building on the morning of January 6, 1979, following a
small explosion due to a faulty acetylene torch being used
in the building's machine shop. An inventory of the
14-8
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building's contents taken four days prior to the fire
indicated storage of approximately 100 different pesticide
products and six different fertilizer products containing
80 tons (72.5 Mt) of active ingredients (see Table 1).
One-half of the active ingredients consisted of a commer-
cial product called Aatrex 4L, containing the organic
herbicide atrazine; another 22 percent could be accounted
for by another commercial pesticide, Lasso, containing the
organic herbicide alachlor. Other pesticide products
stored in the north building included Furadan, Thimet,
Lorsban, and Dyfonate. These substances are toxic to
humans and to certain plants and animals in varying
degrees, but all are potentially damaging to humans as
well as plants and animals.
While area fire departments were able to confine the
fire to the north building and extinguish it within a,few
hours, an estimated minimum 500,000 gallons (1.9 x 10 1)
of water was applied to the blaze at a rate of 2,000
gallons (7,500 1) per minute. This fire water mixed with
the various pesticide chemicals stored inside the build-
ing, and flowed over the asphalt and frozen soils around
the building toward the three catch basins at the site's
periphery (see Figure 2). From the southeast and south-
west catch basins, the contaminated fire water flowed via
the underground concrete culvert to Ryan Creek, which was
dry at the time. The fire water ponded at the western
catch basin. To prevent additional runoff from flowing
any further along the creek, officials constructed an
earthen dike across Ryan Creek about 80-100 feet (24 -
30 m) downstream of the culvert outlet. To prevent
flooding of the Soo Line access road behind this dike, a
second dike was built further downstream and the first
dike was intentionally breached. At day's end, the ponded
fire water was up to two feet (0.6 m) deep along the creek
bed, although it never actually reached the second dike,
and up to three feet (1 m) deep near the southeast and
southwest catch basins. On the next day, January 7, offi-
cials observed that 90 percent of the water previously
ponded in the creek and near the three catch basins had
infiltrated through the soil, leaving 10 percent frozen on
the surface.
DESCRIPTION OF CONTAMINATION
As a result of the fire and the manner in which it
was extinguished, a great variety of sources and avenues
of contamination by hazardous substances was created.
These are discussed in the following in order of most to
least imminent threat posed to human health and the
environment.
14-9
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TABLE 1. KQWE, CHEMICAL CO. FIRE PARTIAL INVENTORY
(Barr Engineering, 1980)
Conpany
CIBA-GEIGY
MonHanto
Dow
FHC
Dow
PMC
CIBA-GEIGT
CtBA-GBIGT
PPC
Dow
U. Carbide
Shell
American
Cyananld
Btauffer
Elanco
Dow
Stauffer
Product
Aatrex 4L
Laaao
Dow DMA-4
Fur ad an 100
Loreban 15G
Thlodan EM-2
Diaxinon
Dual
Chloro 1PC
Bexton
Bevin SON
Bladex
Thlawt 130
Dyfonate 4B
200
Treflen EC
Dow Pon H
Bradlcane 6.7E
Type
herbicide
herbicide
herbicide
inaecticide
tniecticide
inaecticide
inaecticide
herbicide
herbicide
herbicide
inaecticide
herbicide
inaecticide
inaecticide
herbicide
herbicide
herbicide
Active
Ingredient
atraxine
alachlor
2.4D
carbofuran
chlorpyrlfoa
endoaulfan
diaclnon
M to lac hi or
chloroprophan
propachlor
carbaryl
cyanaxine
phorate
fonofoe
frlflurelln
dalapon
EPIC
Amount of
Product
20,000
8,610 gal.
2,600 gal.
60,400 Iba.
24,350 Iba.
1,764 gal.
800 Iba.
227 gal.
1.500 Iba.
315 gal.
400 gal.
2,000 gal.
240 gal.
1.640 Iba.
30 Iba.
330 Iba.
210 gal.
7,000 Ib.
1,250 lb.
180 gal.
197 gal.
1,930 Iba.
115 gal.
Total Iba.
of Active
Ingredient
80,000
34,440
10,000
8,040
3,652
3,528
1,770
1,890
1,600
1,360
1,312
1,104
1,050
970
788
772
770
Fonwlatlon
liquid (EC)
liquid (EC)
liquid (Anlne
Salt)
granular
granular
liquid (EC)
granular.
WP, liquid
liquid (EC)
liquid (EC)
granular
liquid (EC)
HP
WP, liquid
(EC)
granular
granular
granular
liquid (EC)
liquid (EC)
liquid (Salt)
EC
Active
Ingredient
Acute Oral
LD50 (rata)
3,080
1,800
370
U
163
100
300
2.780
3,800
fio
500
334
3
10
10,000
970
2,000
< Source: Barr Engineering Co. draft report, Auguat 1980)
I
I—1
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Air Pollution/Direct Exposure.
The fire itself involved the combustion of pesticide
vehicle compounds, many of which were organic solvents,
producing a dense smoke containing volatilized pesticides.
Pigeons flying through the smoke plume were observed to
fall dead immediately, and a great number of pigeons were
discovered dead on the Howe site the day after the fire.
In addition, bystanders reported intense respiratory
irritation, and 11 fire fighters became ill and a news
reporter was hospitalized due to smoke inhalation.
Fortunately, the smoke plume moved over a predominantly
industrial area at a relatively high altitude. However,
some concern was voiced over the possibility that fallout
from the smoke plume had contaminated snow covering the
off-site areas in the plume's path, and that children
sledding in these areas would thus be directly exposed to
the pesticide contaminants. Analysis of snow samples
taken from these areas, however, did not indicate
dangerous levels of pesticides.
Also of concern were the odoriferous and irritating
vapors that could be detected emanating from the building
debris, pesticide residues and ice removal operations from
blocks away for several days after the fire. Clean-up
workers were not experiencing symptoms at that time,
however, and only the pesticides Endosulfan I and II could
be detected in the air samples analyzed.
At a later point during the ice removal operations,
however, several clean-up crew members complained of a
burning sensation on their hands, faces and upper respi-
ratory tracts. These symptoms were treated successfully
with skin cream and respirators, respectively. In addi-
tion , the ice removal crew foreman collapsed on the job
and was hospitalized for one day. The reason for his
collapse could not be ascertained.
Contaminated Building Debris
The building and other fire debris on the Howe site
was categorized into three classes: (1) high level wastes
consisting of ruptured pesticide containers or pieces of
burnt or frozen pesticides material; (2) heavy iron such
as burned trucks; and (3) low level wastes such as
building rubble. Only the "high level" waste category
above was considered a high priority disposal issue by the
state. Table 2 contains a post-fire inventory of
chemicals recovered and removed from the site.
As a result of the contamination and runoff of fire
water, the state had to remove a total of 1,600 cubic
14-11
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TABLE 2
HOWE, INC. FIRE
CHEMICALS RECOVERED AND REMOVED FROM SITE
Company
Stauffer
Stauffer
Stauffer
CIBA-GIEGY
CIBA-GIEGY
CIBA-GIEGY
Dow
Monsanto
Product
Dyfonate 10G & 20G
Eptara, Sutan, Eradicane
Thimet 10G
Aatrex 4L
Dual 6E
Diazinon 50W
Telone II
Telone C-17
Lasso
Amount of
Product Recovered
12,225 Ibs.
105 gals.
750 Ibs.
3,425 gals.
540 gals.
900 Ibs.
4,150 gals.
700 gals.
2,520 gals.
Comments
amounts of each not
discernable
approximate
(Source: Department of Agronomy Services memorandum, Feburary 23, 1979)
14-12
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yards (1,223 cu. m) of ice and snow containing 270 pounds
(123 kg) of atrazine and 280 pounds (127 kg) of alachlor,
and 1,000 cubic yards (765 cu. m) of surface soil con-
taining 300 pounds (136 kg) of atrazine and 700 pounds
(318 kg) of alachlor.
Ground Water and Subsurface Soil Contamination
Barr Engineering conducted a study of ground water
and soil contamination at the Howe site from January 300.65(b)(5)
through April, 1979. Ten soil borings were completed in sampling
January and February, 1979, along Ryan Creek and on the
Howe property in areas where ponding and/or infiltration
of contaminated runoff was known or suspected to have
occurred (see Figure 2). Eighteen ground water monitoring
wells and one pumping well were installed in the same
areas in two separate phases (see Figure 2). In order to
assess the relative significance of each pesticide in a
sample and to compare the relative degree of contamination
from one sample to another, an artificial parameter called
a "control ratio" was created. For a given sample and
pesticide, the control ratio was the ratio of the concen-
tration measured in the sample to the standard set for
that parameter by the Minnesota Department of Health
(MDH). A control ratio of less than one, then, indicates
that the parameter does not exceed the MDH standard.
Barr Engineering (1980) made the following obser-
vations with respect to the soil test values:
• "Soil samples from the borings along Ryan Creek
(B-l, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7) show significantly higher
concentrations of nearly all pesticides under
analysis than from the borings near the Howe, Inc.
property (B-6, 7, 8, 9 and 10).
• "With few exceptions, Thimet and Bladex concen-
trations govern the control ratio in Ryan Creek
borings, although levels of Atrazine, Lasso,
Ramrod, Endo I, Endo II and Diazanon exceed MDH
standards in many samples.
• "Bladex tends to govern the control ratio in
borings near Howe, Inc. property with levels of
Atrazine, Thimet and Diazanon exceeding MDH
standards in a few samples.
• "The highest levels of contamination, as measured
by control ratio, are from borings B-4 and B-5
which are located along Ryan Creek and downstream
from the culvert outlet. Thimet and Bladex
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governs the control ratio and results in the
control ratio increasing with depth.
• "In borings along Ryan Creek where Bladex tends to
govern control ratios (B-l, 2, 7) the control
ratio shows the tendency to decrease with depth.
• "Control ratios in borings near Howe, Inc.
property generally appear to decrease with depth.
Below a depth of 2 to 4 feet (0.6 to 1.2 m) in
borings B-8 and B-9, and 10 to 12 feet (3.0 to 3.7
m) to borings B-6 and B-1Q, control ratios are
less than unity.
• "No obvious correlations appeared to exist between
soil texture and levels of concentration of any of
the pesticides under analysis. There is some
tendency, however, for the finer grained soils
encountered near ground surface on the Howe, Inc.
property to contain higher pesticide concentra-
tions than the coarser subsoils."
Barr Engineering made these additional observations
with respect to ground water test values through April,
1979:
• "Monitoring wells on the Howe, Inc. site (P-6, 8,
10 and 23) shows significantly lower concentra-
tions of nearly all parameters analyzed in com-
parison to wells along the hanks of Ryan Creek
(P-l, 5, 15, 16 and 17). The only exception to
this condition was for Atrazine, which exceeds MDH
standards in wells P-8 and 10, but in no other
monitoring wells within the study area.
• "Monitoring wells nearest the culvert outlet to
Ryan Creek (P-l, 16, 17, and W-l) show the highest
control ratios encountered in the study area.
Bladex, Lasso, Ramrod and Thimet . concentrations
exceeded MDH standards in most of these wells,
with Bladex generally governing the control ratio.
The concentration of Bladex, Ramrod and Lasso
decreases by more than an order of magnitude
within the first 20 feet (6.1 m) of water table.
• "Further downstream of the culvert outlet, at well
P-5, Bladex, Ramrod and Thimet concentrations
exceed MDH standards. However, the control ratio
in P-5 was about one-half of the control ratio for
P-l or P-16. At P-15, which is down gradient of
P-5, only Bladex concentrations exceeded MDH
standards.
14-14
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• "The monitoring wells south of Ryan Creek (P-20
and 21) were generally clean except for the Bladex
concentrations in P-21 which slightly exceeded MDH
standards.
• "The monitoring wells along 49th Avenue North
(P-ll through 14) and north of Ryan Creek (P-18
and 19) were also generally clean except for the
Thimet concentrations in P-12 which exceeded MDH
standards.
• "The rate and direction of the movement of contam-
inants or changes in concentrations with time
could not be strictly established with the data
available through April , 1979."
PLANNING THE SITE RESPONSE
of Response
Alternative Water Supply
On January 15, 1979, the MDH ordered that use of all
drinking water wells within a three-block radius of the
site be discontinued . All houses in Minneapolis east of
the site were already connected to municipal water, as
were most houses in Brooklyn Center , north of the site .
Consequently, it was only necessary to connect 11 houses
in Brooklyn Center to municipal water to ensure that
residents were not exposed to contaminated drinking water.
As ground water monitoring had not yet begun, the MDH's
order was based on very limited data on the extent of
contamination. The only sampling data available at the
time of the order was for ice, which was found to contain
as much as 5,200 mg/1 of atrazine. The MDH concluded
that in light of the larger volume of contaminated water
that had been absorbed into the highly permeable soil, it
was prudent to err on the side of caution and close nearby
wells. Later, monitoring revealed that ground water
contamination was limited to the area along Ryan Creek,
and that the closed wells were hydrogeologically
upgradient from the contamination.
Ice , Snow, and Soil Removal
The MPCA believed it was necessary to remove contam-
inated ice and soil from the site as soon as possible to
prevent contamination from spreading. If temperatures had
risen, the ice would have melted and possibly leaked from
its temporary containment structure. Runoff into Ryan
Creek would have carried pesticides from the most highly
contaminated layer of soil near the' surface downstream or
deeper into the ground water. Further, officials of the
300.65(b)(2)
alternative
water supplies
300.65(a)(2)
contamination
of drinking
water supply
300.68(e)(2)
source control:
removal
14-15
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City of Minneapolis and of the Soo Line Railroad insisted
that the State move quickly to remove the materials from
the Soo Line property.
Ground Water Recovery
In late March, 1979, the MDH decided to install a
ground water recovery system along Ryan Creek in order to
reduce the potential for exposure of nearby residents to
hazardous levels of pesticides. Although exposure through
drinking water was not a concern since all homes near the
site were by this time connected to municipal water, there
was a possibility that spring runoff would flood basements
along 49th Avenue North and carry pesticides into homes.
The MDH had no means of assessing the health risk to
residents if such an event were to occur and, thus, might
have been forced to evacuate any homes that flooded. The
MDH viewed ground water pumping as a means of avoiding
this problem.
A secondary reason for pumping ground water was that
some nearby residents used wells for irrigating lawns,
which posed a potential for direct contact exposure to
pesticides. Finally, there was a slim possibility that
contaminants could have migrated to municipal drinking
water wells miles away from the site.
Selection of Response Technologies
The following subsections describe the identification
and evaluation of alternative response technologies for
the Howe site. These descriptions are based upon informa-
tion presented in a comprehensive review of events at the
site, particularly of decisions made by the state,
contained in an MPCA file document (undated).
Fire Debris Removal and Disposal
As described earlier, there were three categories of
building and miscellaneous debris resulting from the Howe
fire. No alternatives to the disposal methods outlined
below were seriously considered by the state. The "high
level waste" containing ruptured pesticide containers and
frozen or burnt pieces of pesticide material was separated
into identifiable and unidentifiable pesticide products.
Several pesticide manufacturers sent representatives to
the site to identify their products so that they could be
transported out of state for recovery or disposal. The
unidentifiable, usually mixed pesticide residues, were
trucked to a hazardous waste disposal facility in
Illinois, because no such facilities existed in Minnesota
and the RCRA regulations prohibited its disposal in a
sanitary landfill. The heavy iron portion of the fire
debris was magnetically separated on-site from the rest
300.70(b)(l)
(iiiXO
ground water
pumping
300.68(g)
development of
alternatives
14-16
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and then trucked to a nearby foundry where it was cut up
and reclaimed as scrap iron. The remaining "low level
waste", mainly wood timbers and paper sacks, was
determined nonhazardous and therefore was disposed of in a
nearby sanitary landfill.
Ice, Snow and Surface Soil Disposal
A great number of alternatives were proposed and
evaluated for removal and disposal of the contaminated
ice, snow and surface soils. These are described below in
approximate order of their consideration.
1. Land Spreading - Elk River Farm Site. This
option involved trucking the contaminated ice,
snow and soil to a farm site near Elk River,
Minnesota where it could be applied safely to
agricultural land like any other agricultural
chemicals. The site was selected above others
due to its higher soil organic content, greater
distance from surface water bodies, and lower
slope. A number of technical problems were
raised - and some resolved - with this proposal.
In any event, a Commissioner of Anoka County, the
county in which the Elk River site was located,
threatened to seek an injunction if the waste was
brought to the county, thereby effectively
killing the entire plan.
2. Special Area in a Sanitary Landfill. This option
involved placement of the contaminated materials
in a specially designated area of a sanitary
landfill with a sealed bottom. This plan was
rejected because: (1) the $60,000 cost of
preparing the special area was not deemed afford-
able; and (2) the MPCA was unwilling to approve
the idea given that hazardous waste regulations
they were about to promulgate specifically
prohibit such a practice.
3. Sugarbeet Plant. A sugarbeet plant offered to
mix the contaminated ice and soil with their
plant waste which was degraded in a series of
ponds and then sprayed on grass or alfalfa
fields. Calculations indicated the dilution of
the ice and soil in the system would be so large
that no environmental or health impact would
result. Local opposition, however, killed the
plan.
4. Gasohol. A farmer in Webster, Minnesota offered
to apply the ice and soil to 280 acres (111 ha)
of corn fields used solely for the production of
14-17
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alcohol. While the approval of the Rice County
Commissioners was carefully sought and obtained
prior to public knowledge of the plan, the
farmer's neighbors heard of it and strongly
objected. The farmer withdrew his offer.
Incineration at 3M Company. 3M Company offered
to incincerate the contaminated ice and soil at
their Twin Cities area facility which is used to
burn organic wastes. Although the incinerator
had an operating temperature greater than the
1,800°F (982°C) needed to break down pesticides,
the system's 0.1 second retention time was
determined insufficient for complete waste
decomposition.
Incineration at the King Plant. Northern States
Power Company (NSP) offered to incinerate the
waste at their Allen S. King plant on the St.
Croix River. The plant boiler's operating
temperature of 2,800°F (1,538°C) and two seconds
of re tent ion t ime were more than adequate to
break down the pesticides. A scheme was devised
involving mixing of contaminated ice and snow
with coal in a 1:99 ratio such that 10 days would
be required to burn all of the waste. In addi-
tion, certain potential plant worker health
problems related to ventilation were able to be
resolved in advance. However, before waste
already transported to the plant could be incin-
erated, the citizens of the local community, Oak
Park Heights, learned of the plan through the
news media and forced a special meeting of the
City Council. The Council passed a resolution
forcing NSP to withdraw its offer to incincerate
the waste.
Out-of-State Disposal. Failing all of the above
disposal alternatives, state officials devised a
plan to truck the wastes to a permitted hazardous
waste disposal facility in Illinois. The plan
would have involved two trips by a convoy of 40
end dump trucks. An emergency disposal permit
application for the waste to be trucked was sub-
mitted to the Illinois EPA. Before the appli-
cation could be reviewed, however, Illinois EPA
officials decided not to grant the emergency
permit, preferring instead to hold public hear-
ings as in the course of a normal permit applica-
tion process in Illinois. The minimum advance
publ ic no t ic e of 21 days for such hear ings,
however, was felt by Minnesota officials to pose
14-18
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too great a risk of melting and leakage from the
stockpiles of contaminated ice and soil.
8. Land Spreading - Robertson Farm Site. As a last
resort, the state's new Commissioner of Agricul-
ture convinced a neighhoring farmer to allow the
waste to be applied to his land in the spring
after the ice melted. The Commissioner was also
able to win the approval of local citizens.
Ground Water and Subsurface Soil Decontamination
To address its several concerns over potential ground
water contamination, the state hired Barr Engineering to
conduct hydrogeologic studies of the Howe fire site, to
evaluate alternative methods to mitigate contamination,
and to recommend and implement the most promising such
plan. Barr assumed that contaminants in the subsurface
soils would eventually degrade or be washed down to the
water table where they could be controlled or removed. As
a result, further evaluation of mitigative measures
focused on the ground water problem. Of the many
mitigative methods evaluated, barrier wells, impervious
barriers, chemical treatment by injection, and a single,
large-diameter, deep well proved to be too costly,
ineffective or too slow. Three methods were selected as
being potentially most effective, including: (1) open
pumping from ditches or sumps; (2) a shallow, low-capacity
well point system; and (3) a deep, high capacity, gravel-
packed well system.
Barr Engineering (1980) provided the following
description of the basic design, operation, advantages,
disadvantages and conclusions regarding the three selected
mitigative methods:
1) "Open ditches and sumps — continuous rock or
gravel-lined excavations parallel to Ryan Creek
with 2 to 1 (horizontal to vertical) side slopes
and cut approximately 10 feet into the water
table. This scheme was found to be relatively
impractical for several reasons:
• Limited depth of intercept ing ground water
• High excavation costs
• Possibility of accidents from open excavation
• Exposure of contaminated waters to environment
• Extensive areas scarred by excavation
14-19
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• Increased pumping during periods of rainfall
and runoff.
2) "Shallow well points — multiple (5 to 10), small
diameter (or 5.1 to 10.1 cm) (2 to 4 inches),
well points placed several feet into the water
table and located parallel and perpendicular to
Ryan Creek. This scheme was found to be less
expensive and more pratical than open-pumping,
but still had several problems. These were:
• Would not intercept ground water at depths
below about 10 to 15 feet (3.0 to 4.6 m)
• Difficult to control and monitor individual
well performances if not using individual well
pumps
• Time required to cleanse area of contaminants
could be long if wells are of low capacity
• Discharge piping becomes expensive
• High maintenance costs.
3) "Deep wells — 3 to 5 screened and gravel-packed
wells, 6 or 8 inches (15 or 20 cm) in diameter,
individually controlled and installed to some
depth below the water table (20 to 30 feet [or
6.1 to 9.1 m]) along Ryan Creek. This scheme was
found to be the most practical. Major advantages
were:
• Less expensive than ditches or sumps — easy
installation
* Safer than ditches or sumps
• Greater control over system operation, cost
and duration of pumping
• More flexibility in varying vertical and
lateral extent of interception, discharge
rates, local gradient, and drawdown
• The ability to use the wells for field tests
to determine aquifer characteristics
• More easily and cheaply protected than
numerous well points."
14-20
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As a result of these evaluations, Barr Engineering
recommended the deep-well pump-out system for the recovery
of contaminated ground water near Ryan Creek.
Extent of Response
Soil Removal
The MPCA's contractor excavated 1000 cubic yards (765 300.68(j)
cu.m) of contaminated soil at a depth of one to two feet extent of remedy
(30-60 cm) from a 900 foot by 15 foot (275 x 5m) area of
Ryan Creek extending east from Brooklyn Boulevard. The
MPCA based the extent of excavation on sampling data
available at the time indicating that the stream bed was
the most contaminated area, and that soil contamination
was concentrated in the top one to two feet (30-60 cm) of
soil, tapering off rapidly with increasing depth. Soil
borings showed that the Howe property, which was mostly
paved, was not heavily contaminated. The MPCA believed
that spring recharge would wash the remaining deeper soil
contamination down to the water table where it would be
removed by ground water pumping expected to begin later
that spring.
Ground Water Recovery
Barr Engineering used a hydrogeological computer
model to determine the most efficient size and design of
the ground water recovery system. Barr analyzed the soil
permeability and ground water gradient to predict the
number and spacing of wells and the pumping rate that
would create sufficient water table drawdown to encompass
the zone of significant ground water contamination.
The MDH determined the goal of ground water pumping
by establishing "levels of concern" for each of the pesti-
cides found in the ground water, intending to continue
pumping until monitoring indicated that the contamination
was below the levels of concern. The acceptable levels of
pesticides in ground water were se't based on information
from three primary sources: (1) "suggested no adverse-
effect levels in drinking water" developed by the National
Academy of Sciences; (2) "allowable daily intakes" set by
the World Health Organization; and (3) extrapolation from
crop tolerance levels established by the Environmental
Protection Agency. The National Academy of Sciences no-
adverse-effect level in drinking water for a particular
contaminant is derived by combining the maximum no-
observed-adverse-effect level from animal studies with an
uncertainty factor to calculate an acceptable daily intake
(ADI) for humans. The ADI is then adjusted by a factor to
account for a portion of exposure anticipated from drink-
ing water. For atrazine and alachlor, the predominant
contaminants, the uncertainty factor is 1,000. The
14-21
-------
relatively high uncertainty factor for these two chemicals
reflects the paucity of toxicological data on which to
base the ADI.
Because there were no established acceptable levels
of pesticides in soil, it was necessary to calculate soil
levels based on acceptable ground water levels. In order
to make this calculation, several assumptions were made.
First, it was assumed that the moisture content of the
soil in question was approximately 15 percent. Second, it
was assumed that the pesticides in the soil would be
completely and rapidly leached into the ground water with
the spring infiltration. Finally, it was assumed that the
pesticides in the water component of the soil cannot be
above the acceptable levels in ground water. Then by
multiplying the moisture content by the acceptable ground
water level for each pesticide, an acceptable soil level
was obtained. It should be noted that these levels are
given in micrograms per liter of soil and should be
corrected for the difference in the density of soil and
water if comparisons are made with measured values (see
Table 3).
Ground water pumping began on June 7, 1979. The MDH
had hoped to complete pumping by the end of that month;
however, contaminant levels had not been reduced signif-
icantly by that time, so pumping continued until November
14, 1979. When pumping stopped in November, the levels of
most contaminants in most of the wells were lower, but
were not all below the MDH levels of concern. The MDH
stopped pumping because of the difficulties of operating
the system during winter, intending to sample ground water
the following spring and evaluate the need to resume
pumping.
The final ground water samples were taken in June
1980. Contaminant levels had dropped further in some
wells, but had risen in some of the easternmost wells,
which were hydrogeologically down-gradient. This
suggested that the contamination was migrating with the
flow of ground water, and that some contaminants had
probably passed beyond the effective zone of influence of
the ground water recovery system. In August 1980, the MDH
decided not to resume pumping, concluding that, since the
ground water in the Ryan Creek area was not used for
drinking water, the levels of contamination present did
not pose a health threat. Further, there was some doubt
about whether the reductions in contamination that had
been recorded were even primarily attributable to the
ground water recovery system, or were instead a result of
dilution caused by spring recharge of the contaminated
aquifer.
14-22
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TABLE 3. MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH LEVELS
OF CONCERN FOR PESTICIDES AT HOWE, INC.
Common and or
Trade Name
Ethoprop or Mocap
Phorate or Thimet
Diazinon
Malathion
Alachlor or Lasso
Endosulfan I and II
or Thiodan I and II
Cyanazine or Bladex
Propachlor or Ramrod
Chloropyrlfos or
Lorsban
Terbufos or Counter
Atrazine or Aatrex 4L
Chemical Name
0-ethyl S,S-dipropyl
phosphorodithioate
0,0-diethyl S-
C(ethylthio)methyl)
phosphorodithioate
0,0-diethyl 0-(2-
isopropyl-6-methyly-
4-pyrimidinyly)
phosphor othioate
diethyl mercaptosuccinate
S-ester with 0,0-
dimethyl phosphorodithioate
2-chloro-2", 6 '-diethyl-N-
( methoxymethy 1 )
acetanilide
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 10-
hexachloro-1 , 5, 5a
6, 9, 9a-hexahydro-6,9-
methane-2, 4, 3-benzodiox-
thiepin 3-oxide
2-( (4-chloro-6-(ethylamino)-
s-triazin-2-yl)amino)-2-
methylpropionitrile
2-chloro-N-
isopropylacetanilide
0,0-diethyl 0-(3, 5, 6-
trichloro-2-pyridyl)
phosophor othioate
S-(tert-butylthio)methyl)
0,0-diethyl
phosphorodithioate
2-chloro-4-ethylamino-6-
isopropylamino-s-triazine
Acceptable
Ground Water
Levels, ug/1
1.0
0.7
14.0
160.0
700.0
50.0
2.0
700.0
11.0
2.0
150.0
Acceptable
Soil Levels,
ug/1 of Soil
0.15
0.11
2.1
24.0
105.0
7.5
0.3
105.0
1.7
0.3
22.5
(Source: Minnesota Department of Health, 1979)
14-23
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DESIGN AND EXECUTION OF SITE RESPONSE
The two major elements of the Howe site response are
covered in this section; they are: (1) the removal and
disposal by land spreading of the contaminated ice, snow
and surface soils; and (2) the decontamination of ground
water by a ground water pump-out system.
Land Spreading of Contaminated Ice^ Sjiqw and Surface Soils
The following description of the design and execution
of land spreading the Howe site's contaminated ice, snow
and surface soils is based primarily on a January 1981 MDA
summary of these activities.
A number of potential technical problems were iden-
tified and some resolved prior to land spreading the
contaminated materials. First, a special and unpre-
dictably adverse runoff situation might occur if the
contaminated materials were applied over a field covered
by two feet (0.6 m) of snow. Second, the inhomogeneity of
the contaminated ice and snow could produce a situation in
which pesticide concentrations exceed acceptable levels in
small localized areas even though, on average, calcula-
tions showed a safe application rate. Third, the
inhomogeneity of the contaminated ice and show applied
would also make it impossible to accurately measure the
crops harvested for their suitability for human consump-
tion. All three of these potential problems were resolved
simply by storing the contaminated materials in a holding
pit until both the snow covering the fields and the
contaminated ice and snow in the pit melted. After the
contaminated ice and snow melted, the resulting contami-
nated water could be mixed to achieve homogeneity. One
problem that was not addressed was that the contaminated
materials contained up to 60 compounds in an unknown
mixture, and that the persistence of mixtures of
pesticides in the enviornment is known to be far greater
than that of indiv idual pestic ide compounds.
On the Jim Robertson farm, therefore, a contractor
for MPCA constructed a 200 foot long, 20 foot wide and 5
foot (61.0 x 6.1 x 1.5 m) deep holding pit with bermed
sides and a bottom lined with two layers of PVC. In late
March, the contaminated ice and snow from the fire site
was transported and placed in the pit along with several
tanker loads of contaminated liquid collected at the fire
site. The contaminated soil was also transported to the
farm and piled in the holding area along the side of the
pit.
14-24
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In April of 1979, the impounded ice and snow had
begun to melt, and samples were taken and analyzed to
determine pesticide concentrations. After analysis, the
contaminated liquid was applied to a field on the farm
which had been planted with corn. The contaminated water
was spread on the fields on seven separate days within a
30-day period during May and June, 1979. A liquid manure
spreader with a 2,200 gallon (8,330 1) capacity and 20
foot (6.1 m) wide spread pattern was used to apply the
liquid. This equipment was necessary since the pesticide
mixture was so dilute as to require the application of a
relatively large volume - approximately 2,500 gallons per
acre (23,900 1/ha) in order to reach pesticide label
application rates. In all, 73.5 loads or 161,700 gallons
(612,000 1) of liquid containing an estimated 162 pounds
(73.5 kg) of alachlor and 16 pounds (7.3 kg) of atrazine
were applied over 74 acres (29.3 ha). This resulted in a
pesticide application rate of 0.22 pounds (0.1 kg) of
atrazine and 2.2 pounds (1,0 kg) of alachlor per acre.
Soil samples from this acreage were taken and analyzed
before and after application of the contaminated liquid.
The soil stockpiled in the hold ing area was also
sampled and analyzed for pesticide contaminants. In
September, 1979, after analysis, the soil and lime (from
the fire site containment berms) were spread out and mixed
over the entire 2.5 acres (1.0 ha) of the holding area,
and large rocks and other debris were removed by hand. To
promote biodegradation of the pesticide compounds, this
soil was frequently cultivated and liquid hog manure was
applied as a source of organic matter. Additional soil
samples were taken and analyzed to monitor the breakdown
of the pesticide compounds.
During crop growth, corn plants were visually
monitored for symptoms of chemical injury. No symptoms
were observed; the seedlings grew and developed at a
normal rate. Good weed control and higher yields were
observed in the treated areas. Leaf and ear tissue
analyses for pesticides were negative.
At this writing, the 74 acre (29.3 ha) liquid
spreading area is being cultivated and produces normal,
marketable corn. The 2.5 acre (1.0 ha) soil spreading
area, however, is still being cultivated with manure and
is not used for crop production.
Ground Water Recovery System
The deep-well pump-out system's purpose was to remove
contaminated ground water in the vicinity of Ryan Creek.
Thus, the planned zone of capture included 49th Avenue
14-25
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North between Xerxes and Russell Avenues, and extended to
the Soo Line Railroad Yard south of the creek. The
assumed maximum depth of contamination to include in the
capture zone was 25 to 30 feet (7.6 to 9.1 m). Optimal
well locations and discharge rates for the planned zone of
capture were determined by computer modeling. Several
different well configurations and discharge rates were
evaluated, and conservative drawdowns were predicted along
49th Avenue North and the Soo Line Railroad Yard. Of the
various well network designs analyzed, the one that proved
most effective consisted of four wells placed along the
north bank of Ryan Creek about 300 feet (91.4 m) apart and
pumping 100 gpm (378 1/min) if the permeability of the
screened strata is 0.025 cm/sec or 200 gpm (757 1/min) if
permeability is 0.050 cm/sec (see Figure 3). State and
Minneapolis officials agreed contamination levels of the
pumped ground water would allow direct discharge to the
sanitary sewer system, thereby avoiding the cost of
on-site treatment.
Barr Engineering obtained a temporary permit from the
MDNR to dewater the area for the purpose of removing
contaminants. The permit extended from May 7 through June
30, 1979, and was later extented to June 30, 1980. The
MDH obtained approval from the Metropolitan Waste Control
Commission (MWCC) to discharge contaminated water to the
Minneapolis sanitary sewer system, which outlets at the
MWCC Metro Plant in Pig's Eye, Minnesota, for treatment.
The maximum permitted pumping rate was 800 gallons per
minute (3,000 1/min) for ,all four wells or 1.15 x 10
gallons per day (4.35 x 10 I/day).
The pumped ground water was collected via a six-inch
(15.2 cm) PVC pipe and discharged via a eight-inch (20.3
cm) PVC pipe to a catch basin at the intersection of 49th
Avenue North and Upton Avenue North, accessing the
combined storm and sanitary sewer underlying 49th Avenue
North (see Figure 3).
The four wells were installed in May, 1979. Each
well was placed with a bottom screen 25 feet (7.6 m) below
the water table. Pumping began in June, 1979, and
extended five months to November 1979. The combined
discharge rate of the four wells, as calculated from well
flow meter readings, averaged 390 gpm (1,480 1/min), and
for the five months, of operation totalled nearly 990 x 10
gallons (3.75 x 10 1). Occasionally the wells were shut
down for repairs due to overheating or sediment build-up
inside casings, pumps and meters.
Ground water was sampled at two- to four-week inter-
vals from the four pump-out wells as well as the smaller
14-26
-------
In April of 1979, the impounded ice and snow had
begun to melt, and samples were taken and analyzed to
determine pesticide concentrations. After analysis, the
contaminated liquid was applied to a field on the farm
which had been planted with corn. The contaminated water
was spread on the fields on seven separate days within a
30-day period during May and June, 1979. A liquid manure
spreader with a 2,200 gallon (8,330 1) capacity and 20
foot (6.1 m) wide spread pattern was used to apply the
liquid. This equipment was necessary since the pesticide
mixture was so dilute as to require the application of a
relatively large volume - approximately 2,500 gallons per
acre (23,900 1/ha) in order to reach pesticide label
application rates. In all, 73.5 loads or 161,700 gallons
(612,000 1) of liquid containing an estimated 162 pounds
(73.5 kg) of alachlor and 16 pounds (7.3 kg) of atrazine
were applied over 74 acres (29.3 ha). This resulted in a
pesticide application rate of 0.22 pounds (0.1 kg) of
atrazine and 2.2 pounds (1.0 kg) of alachlor per acre.
Soil samples from this acreage were taken and analyzed
before and after application of the contaminated liquid.
The soil stockpiled in the holding area was also
sampled and analyzed for pesticide contaminants. In
September, 1979, after analysis, the soil and lime (from
the fire site containment berms) were spread out and mixed
over the entire 2.5 acres (1.0 ha) of the holding area,
and large rocks and other debris were removed by hand. To
promote biodegradation of the pesticide compounds, this
soil was frequently cultivated and liquid hog manure was
applied as a source of organic matter. Additional soil
samples were taken and analyzed to monitor the breakdown
of the pesticide compounds.
During crop growth, corn plants were visually
monitored for symptoms of chemical injury. No symptoms
were observed; the seedlings grew and developed at a
normal rate. Good weed control and higher yields were
observed in the treated areas. Leaf and ear tissue
analyses for pesticides were negative.
At this writing, the 74 acre (29,3 ha) liquid
spreading area is being cultivated and produces normal,
marketable corn. The 2.5 acre (1.0 ha) soil spreading
area, however, is still being cultivated with manure and
is not used for crop production.
Ground Water Recovery System
The deep-well pump-out system's purpose was to remove
contaminated ground water in the vicinity of Ryan Creek.
Thus, the planned zone of capture included 49th Avenue
14-25
-------
North between Xerxes and Russell Avenues, and extended to
the Soo Line Railroad Yard south of the creek. The
assumed maximum depth of contamination to include in the
capture zone was 25 to 30 feet (7.6 to 9.1 m). Optimal
well locations and discharge rates for the planned zone of
capture were determined by computer modeling. Several
different well configurations and discharge rates were
evaluated, and conservative drawdowns were predicted along
49th Avenue North and the Soo Line Railroad Yard. Of the
various well network designs analyzed, the one that proved
most effective consisted of four wells placed along the
north bank of Ryan Creek about 300 feet (91.4 m) apart and
pumping 100 gpm (378 1/min) if the permeability of the
screened strata is 0.025 cm/sec or 200 gpm (757 1/min) if
permeability is 0.050 cm/sec (see Figure 3). State and
Minneapolis officials agreed contamination levels of the
pumped ground water would allow direct discharge to the
sanitary sewer system, thereby avoiding the cost of
on-site treatment.
Barr Engineering obtained a temporary permit from the
MDNR to dewater the area for the purpose of removing
contaminants. The permit extended from May 7 through June
30, 1979, and was later extented to June 30, 1980. The
MDH obtained approval from the Metropolitan Waste Control
Commission (MWCC) to discharge contaminated water to the
Minneapolis sanitary sewer system, which outlets at the
MWCC Metro Plant in Pig's Eye, Minnesota, for treatment.
The maximum permitted pumping rate was 800 gallons per
minute (3,000 1/min) for all four wells or 1.15 x 10
gallons per day (4.35 x 10 I/day).
The pumped ground water was collected via a six-inch
(15.2 cm) PVC pipe and discharged via a eight-inch (20.3
cm) PVC pipe to a catch basin at the intersection of 49th
Avenue North and Upton Avenue North, accessing the
combined storm and sanitary sewer underlying 49th Avenue
North (see Figure 3).
The four wells were installed in May, 1979. Each
well was placed with a bottom screen 25 feet (7.6 m) below
the water table. Pumping began in June, 1979, and
extended five months to November 1979. The combined
discharge rate of the four wells, as calculated from well
flow meter readings, averaged 390 gpm (1,480 1/min), and
for the five months, of operation totalled nearly 990 x 10
gallons (3.75 x 10 1). Occasionally the wells were shut
down for repairs due to overheating or sediment build-up
inside casings, pumps and meters.
Ground water was sampled at two- to four-week inter-
vals from the four pump-out wells as well as the smaller
14-26
-------
Figure 3. Pumping Well, Discharge Line and Sanitary/Storm Sewer Locations
(Barr Engineering, 1980)
-------
diameter monitoring wells. Water levels inside the well
casings and selected well points in the area were also
monitored periodically to ensure that drawdowns were not
excessive.
Pumping was discontinued in November until spring as
freezing weather approached and contamination levels began
to decline. Low contamination in further samples taken in
April ^ and June of 1980 led the MDH to suspend pumping
indefinitely.
COST AND FUNDING
Source of Funding
Funding for the Howe, tnc. c lean-up came from a
number of sources, including:
State of Minnesota (contracting) $335,564
(internal) $ 59,294
City of Minneapolis $ 53 575
City of Brooklyn Center $ 12,000
Howe, Inc. $ 10 000
Total $470,* 434
Of the state funds, the largest part was a $152,321 300.62(a)
emergency appropriation from the Governor's Executive state role
Council, made twelve days after the fire, after initial
containment measures were complete. The balance of state
expenditures came from the operating budgets of the MPCA,
the MDH and the MDA. A summary of the cost and funding
for activities conducted at the Howe Site is eiven in
Table 4.
Of the City of Minneapolis expenditures, most were
sewer charges for accepting recovered ground water into
the municipal sanitary sewer treatment system. There were
miscellaneous additional expenditures totalling $2,121.
The City of Brooklyn Center expenditure represents the
cost of connecting eleven houses to the municipal water
system.
The Howe, Inc, expenditure is a partial reimbursement
to the MPCA for initial containment work at the site.
Howe did not contribute further to remedial work outside
the firm's property, although the company did spend
$215,802 to remove fire debris from the company premises.
This work is not included in the figure for the total
remedial expenditures.
14-28
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TABLE 4 . SUMMARY OF COST INFORMATION-HOWE, INC., BROOKLYN CENTER, MINNESOTA
Task
Initial response
Alternative water supply
Soil excavation
Transportation of Ice 4 soil
(140 mi) (225 km)
Disposal of Ice and soil
Surface water removal
Ground water investigation
HUH sample analysis
Ground water recovery
Ground w.itor treatment
(POTW)
Ground water recovery
system data analysis
Administration
Miscellaneous
TOTAL
Quantity
N/A
11 houses
1,000 cu.yd
(765 cu.m)
2,600 cu.yd
(1,988 cu.m)
2,600 cu.yd.
(1,988 cu.m)
2.1 million
gal Ions
(7.9 million 1)
N/A
N/A
90 mil lion gal.
(340 million 1)
90 million j»al,
(340 million 1)
N/A
4,225 hours
N/A
Expenditure
525,290
S 12, 000
$13,881
$74,273
$49,273
$29,479
$50,000
$12,536
$62,329
$50,169
$24,719
$46,758
$19,727
$470,43'.
Unit Cost
N/A
$l,09l/house
$8/cu.yd.
($10/cu.m)
$28.56/cu.yd
20rf/ru. yd/ml.
($37.36/cu.m)
(16.6^/cu.m/km)
$7. 41-18. 95/
cu. vd.
($9. 69-24. 78/
cu.m)
.014(f/gal
(.0037(1)
N/A
N/A
.00069^/gal.
(.00015(1/1)
,00056^/gal.
(.00015//1)
N/A
$11.06/hr
N/A
Funding Source
State of Minnesota
Minneapolis , Howe
Brooklyn Center
Stale of
Minnesota
State of
Minnesota
State' of
Minnesota
State of Minnesota,
Minneapol is
State of
Minnesota
State of
Minnesota
State of
Minnesota
Minneapolis
State of
Minnesota ,
State of
Minnesota
State of Minnesota
Period of
Performance
1/6/79-
1/13/79
1/79
3/8-3/16/79
3/8-3/16/79
2/79-9/79
2/27-4/20/79
1/79-5/79
1/79-6/80
7/7-11/14/79
6/7-11/14/79
12/2/79-
ftMO/RO
1/79-5/81
1/79-4/79
1/79-5/81
-c-
I
K3
-------
Selection of Contractors
The first contractor hired for the response at Howe,
Inc. was Fuel Recovery Company at St. Paul, Minnesota, a
firm experienced in emergency oil and chemical spill
clean-ups. Fuel Recovery was first contacted by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, and began work on con-
taining ice and snow the day after the fire, before it was
clear who would pay for the work. The MPCA, which had a
standing emergency response contract with Fuel Recovery,
agreed on the same day to pay for the work, and elicited
an agreement from Howe, Inc. to pay for $10,000 of the
expenditures.
All firms that the state subsequently hired for the
Howe clean-up were contracted on an emergency basis,
bypassing normal state procurement requirements, under
authority granted to the involved agencies by the
Executive Council. All contracts were for time and
materials.
On January 15, 1979, the MDH retained Barr
Engineering Company of Minneapolis to begin an investi-
gation of soil and ground water contamination at the site.
The investigation was estimated to cost $50,000, and it
was understood that further expenditures might be required
if the study found that remedial work was necessary.
C.S. McCrossan, Inc. of Osseo, Minnesota, was an
excavation contractor originally subcontracted by Fuel
Recovery to excavate ice and build the containment
structure, during the initial site response. Five weeks
later, the MPCA contracted directly with McCrossan to
excavate contaminated soil from the bed of Ryan Creek,
line the stream bed with sand and plastic, and load the
ice and soil for transport. The contract was limited to
$15,000.
In late January 1979, the MPCA hired Scrap Haulers,
of Riverdale, Illinois, to secure an Illinois disposal
permit and to haul the ice and soil to an Illinois hazard-
ous waste landfill. This disposal option was rejected a
few weeks later in favor of land spread ing, but the state
paid Scrap Haulers for some administrative and testing
expenditures.
In February 1978, the MPCA contracted with James F.
Robertson, the owner of a hog farm in Martin County near
Huntley, Minnesota, for the use of approximately 77 acres
(31 ha) for landspreading contaminated ice and composting
contaminated soil. The state agreed to pay Robertson $100
per acre ($247/ha) for landspreading, and $300 for the
14-30
-------
area occupied by a containment basin and contaminated
soil. The state further promised that the materials would
not pose a health hazard, that the pesticides in the
melted ice would be spread at normal agricultural rates,
that the state would pruchase Robertson's corn if it was
found to be contaminated, and that the crop of the
following year would not be adversely affected. Robertson
agreed to spread the water when it melted, and to culti-
vate the contaminated soil with liquid manure from his hog
farming operation.
The MPCA contracted with Robertson after exploring a
number of other disposal options, each of which was
rejected because of high cost or local citizen opposition.
The MPCA located Robertson through his neighbor, who was
the Minnesota Commissioner of Agriculture, and who helped
to allay local concerns about the waste materials.
The MPCA hired G&T Trucking Co. of Elko, Minnesota to
transport the ice and soil from the Howe site to the
Robertson farm, a distance of 140 miles (225 km). G&T was
hired on the basis of the competitive rates they charged,
and because the firm was a licensed hazardous materials
transporter.
In late February 1979, the MPCA hired W. Hodgman and
Sons, Inc., an excavation contractor in Fairmont,
Minnesota, to construct a containment basin for ice and
snow at the farm. Hodgman was selected because the firm
was located near the farm, reducing the cost of transport-
ing equipment and personnel. The MPCA hired H.R. Loveall
Construction, Inc., of Winnebago, Minnesota, to backfill
the the containment basin after it was emptied and to
spread the contaminated soil for composting. Again,
Loveall was selected because the firm was located near the
farm, reducing transportation costs.
Project Costs
The total cost of the Howe, Inc. clean-up was
$470,434. Of this amount, the two largest components
were: removal and disposal of contaminated materials,
accounting for 35% of expenditures, and ground water
investigation and recovery, accounting for 42%.
Initial Response
The initial response work at the site lasted eight
days, from January 6 to January 13, 1979, and cost
$25,290. Most of this amount, $23,159, was for work by
Fuel Recovery, the MPCA's emergency response contractor.
This work included constructing a plastic-lined contain-
ment area and excavating and moving 1,600 cubic yards
14-31
-------
(1,223 cu. m) of contaminated ice and snow. Fuel
Recovery's labor charge for 312 hours was $8,679, averag-
ing $27.81 per hour. Excavation contractors cost $7,786;
lime and sand for lining the containment area cost $5,612,
delivered; miscellaneous costs totalled $1,089.
The City of Minneapolis spent $2,121 in the initial
response, including $1,291 for a fence around the contain-
ment area, $401 for a police bomb squad to remove dynamite
from the burned building, $279 of warning signs, and $150
for surveying Ryan Creek.
Alternative Water Supply
The City of Brooklyn Center spent $12,000 to connect
eleven houses to the city water system, or $1,091 per
house.
Removal and Disposal of Contaminated Materials
The total cost of excavating, transporting, and
disposing of the contaminated ice, soil, and run-off water
was $166,905. This amount is broken down by contractor
expenditures as follows:
City of Minneapolis
C.S. McCrossan
James F. Roberston
W. Hodgman & Sons
Brock-White
G&T Trucking
Loveal1 Cons true t ion
Town of Center Creek
Total
$ 1,286
$ 13,881
$ 8,235
$ 31,602
$ 6,376
$102,465
$ 2,644
$ 416
$166,905
Excavation—C.S. McCrossan excavated 1,00 cubic yards
(765 cu. m) of soil from a 900 foot by 15 foot (275 x 5 m)
area of Ryan Creek, stripping off the top one to two feet
(30 - 60 cm) of soil. McCrossan loaded the soil and the
stockpiled ice into trucks for transport off-site. After
excavating, McCrossan covered the stream bed with a layer
of sand, placed a 20,000 square foot (1,858 sq. m), 10 mil
polyethylene liner over the sand, and covered the liner
with another layer of sand. Of the $13,881 paid to
McCrossan, $6,688 was for equipment rental, $3,539 was for
labor, $2,595 was for 865 cubic yards (661 cu. m) of sand,
$790 was for the polyethylene liner, and $290 was for
protective clothing.
The available data are insufficient to enable calcu-
lation of an exact unit cost for soil excavation and
loading, since McCrossan performed a few tasks simultane-
ously. However, a resaonable estimate is that soil
300.70(c)(2)(i)
offsite
transport:
excavation
14-32
-------
excavation and loading cost about $8 per cubic yard
($10.97 cu. ra).
Transportation—The state paid G&T Trucking $102,465
for transporting contaminated materials. From March 8 to
March 16, 1979, G&T transported 1,600 cubic yards (1,223
cu. m) of ice and snow and 1,000 cubic yards (765 cu m) of
soil 140 miles (225 km) to the Robertson farm in 232
loads, averaging 11.2 cubic yards (8.6 cu. m) per load.
G&T charged $296 per load, plus a $410 premium for ten
loads transported on a Sunday, totalling $69,082. G&T
charged an additional $559 for lining trucks with plastic,
and $4,632 for demurrage when the contaminated materials
froze in the truck beds and delayed operations. The total
cost of transporting the ice and soil was $74,273, or
$28,56 per cubic yard, or 20 cents per cubic yard per mile
($37.36/cu. m or 16.6 Hcu. m/km).
The state paid G&T $28,193 for removing melt-water
runoff from the Howe site. From February 27 to April 20,
1979, G&T removed about 2.1 million gallons (340 x 10 1)
of surface water from the site, pumping most of it
directly into the Minneapolis sanitary sewers, and
transporting some of it in tank trucks to the St. Paul
sanitary sewer system. The City of Minneapolis incurred
$1,286 in treatment costs for the water. The total unit
cost of removing and treating surface water was about
0.014 cents per gallon (0.0037 il\)
Disposal—The total cost of disposal of the contami-
nated ice and soil by landspreading was $49,273. The
largest component of the cost, $31,602, was paid to
W. Hodgraan and Sons for constructing a containment basin
at the farm and for unloading trucks. This work took 21
days, from February 27 to March 19, 1979. The state paid
James Robertson, the owner of the farm, $8,235 for rental
of approximately 77 acres (31 ha) of land, spreading the
melted ice, and applying manure to the contaminated soil.
H.R. Loveall Construction received $2,644 for restoring
the basin site after it was emptied and for spreading the
contaminated soil over 2.5 acres (1 ha). The state paid
Brock-White Company $6,376 for a 20 mil 45 foot by 280
foot (14 x 85 m) PVC liner, including $5,040 for the liner
itself and $1,336 for shipping and installation assis-
tance. The state reimbursed the Town of Center Creek $416
for regraveling a road leading to the farm.
Based on all costs incurred in the landspreading
operation, the unit cost of disposal of 2,600 cubic yards
(1,988 cu. m) of contaminated ice and soil was $18.95 per
cubic yard ($24.78/cu. m). However, this figure is not an
accurate representation of the cost of landspreading
300.70(c)
offsite transport
300.70(b)(2)
microbiological
degradation
14-33
-------
itself, since the bulk of expenditures, about 60%, was for
constructing, lining, and later removing the containment
basin. If the operation had not taken placed during
winter, the contaminated materials could have been spread
immediately, eliminating the need for a storage structure.
The cost of the basin can only be approximated, given the
available data, but was probably about $30,000. If this
cost is not included in the disposal cost calculation, the
unit cost of disposal would be about $7.41 per cubic yard
($9.69/cu. m), most of which was for unloading the ice and
soil, rental of the land, spreading water, and treating
the soil with applied compost.
Ground Water Investigation and Site Dewatering
The ground water investigation took place from
January to May 1979. Barr Engineering installed the
dewatering system in late May and early June 1979, and
operated it from June 7 to November 14, 1979, a total of
160 days, recovering almost 90 million gallons (340 x
10 1) from the Ryan Creek area. Over the following nine
months, Barr did some addtional sampling, analyzed data,
and produced a final report.
The total cost of the ground water investigation,
removal, and treatment was $199,753. The state paid Barr
Engineering $137,048, including $50,000 for the ground
water investigation and initial design of the dewatering
system, $62,329 for final design, installation and opera-
tion of the system, and $24,719 for analyzing data after
dewatering ceased. The unit cost of installing and oper-
ating the system, not including investigation, was 0.69
thousandths of a cent per gallon (0.00018 ^/l). In
interpreting the unit cost, it is important to note that
over 90% of the installation and operation cost was for
final design work and installation, and of the remaining
operation cost, the majority was for data analysis. Con-
sequently, the unit cost of ground water recovery was
primarily a function of the total quantity of water
removed, rather than the cost of operating the system.
The City of Minneapolis paid $50,169 for treatment of
90 million gallons (340 x 10 1) of water discharged to
the municipal treatment works. The unit cost of treatment
was 0.56 thousandths of a cent per gallons (0.00015^/1).
The MDH spent $12,536 analyzing soil and ground water
samples taken during the site investigation, the dewater-
ing operations, and after dewatering ceased.
Administrative Costs
The state's administrative costs for overseeing the
response at Howe, Inc. totalled $46,758. This figure does
not include sample analysis, or the costs of cost-recovery
14-34
-------
litigation, which is ongoing. The MDH incurred costs of
$27,953 for 2,625 hours of labor, averaging $10.65 per
hour. The MPCA incurred costs of $13,709 for 1,200 hours
averaging $11.42 per hour. The MDH incurred costs of
$5,096 for 400 hours, averaging $12.74 per hour.
Miscellaneous Expenses
Miscellaneous expenses totalled $19,727. The state
paid Scrap Haulers $8,702 for the administrative costs of
obtaining an Illinois disposal permit, a disposal option
that was ultimately rejected.
In late January 1979, the state paid G&T Trucking
$2,015 for loading and transporting four loads of ice 40
miles (64 km) to the Northern States plant in Stillwater,
Minnesota, for an incineration test, and then for taking
the loads back to the Howe site after public opposition
prevented the test from taking place.
In late April 1979, the state paid G&T $6,528 in
loading and trucking costs and $2,482 in disposal fees to
remove the emptied ice containment structure at the Howe
site. G&T loaded and transported 73 truck loads, or about
900 cubic yards (688 cu. m) of sand and lime to a sanitary
landfill about 30 miles (48 km) from the site. The unit
cost of loading and transportation was $7.25 per cubic
yard ($9.48/cu. m); the unit cost of disposal was $2.75
per cubic yard ($3.60/cu. m).
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Delays in Ultimate Disposal of Contaminated Ice, Snow and
Surface Soils
For the most part, state officials responded to the
Howe emergency clean-up efficiently and effectively. The
various agencies involved quickly organized a task force,
which was on the scene to make critical decisions at all
the right times, and continued to coordinate smoothly
among themselves throughout the clean-up period. However,
two related factors, neither fully within the state's
control, caused substantial delays in identifying a means
and place for ultimate disposal of the contaminated ice,
snow and surface soils removed from the Howe site.
First, Minnesota had no commercial facility for dis-
posing of hazardous wastes. Pronounced public opposition
had blocked proposals for siting new hazardous waste
management facilities as far back as 1974. An inadequate
plan for involving the public prior to the location deci-
sion has been cited by many as one of the chief causes for
14-35
-------
the failed proposal. Second, of the first seven disposal
alternatives considered and rejected by the state, only
one failed for technical reasons. The other six plans,
including one to dispose of the wastes in a permitted
landfill in Illinois, were killed by public opposiition.
In at least some of these cases, it would be fair to say
that the degree of public concern over the nearby disposal
of hazardous wastes from an uncontrolled site clean-up was
underestimated by the state. While decisions had to be
made in an atmosphere of some urgency, it is clear that
more planning to involve the public, especially to inform
and educate them in advance of any disposal decisions,
would have assisted in expediting safe ultimate disposal
of the clean-up wastes.
Effectiveness of the Ground Water Recovery System
Minnesota officials deserve recognition for having
established acceptable levels of pesticide contaminants
for both ground water and soil in advance of ground water
decontamination operations. However, a number of ques-
tions arise relating directly or indirectly to these
standards:
1. To what extent were ground water contaminant
levels reduced further downstream in the
direction of flow?
2. To what extent were contaminant levels in the
soil reduced?
3. To what extent were the standards actually used
in deciding when to stop pumping?
4. To what extent was the recovery system responsi-
ble for the observed reductions in ground water
contaminant levels?
These questions are discussed in turn below.
First, at the conclusion of their work, Barr
Engineering (1980) pointed out that increases at the time
in the levels of some parameters in the site's eastern
most wells correlated with the predicted direction and
rate of ground water flow at the site. In the 18 months
since the fire, the leachate plume very likely could have
migrated from the area of highest initial ground water
contamination, i.e., where the fire water ponded at the
culvert outlet on the western end of the Soo Line
property, to these easternmost wells. Barr, therefore,
recommended that additional monitoring wells be installed
to the east of those wells most easterly at the time (W-4,
14-36
-------
P-15), and that these be monitored until no further threat
to public health existed. This recommendation was never
implemented, and therefore, it is difficult to determine
whether ground water contamination eventually migrated
downstream away from the site and toward nearby
residential areas.
Second, Barr Engineering (1980) recommended that
additional 'soil borings be taken in areas where MDH soil
contamination standards were exceeded initially. The
original assumption that pesticides in the soil would
degrade or be washed down to the water table was never
tested .by taking more borings during the course of Barr's
study. Since this recommendation was also not followed,
it is difficult to determine to what degree ground water
quality at the site continues to be threatened by signifi-
cant concentrations of contaminants in the soil column.
Third , as discussed earlier, increases in some
contaminants were observed in the easternmost wells when
samples were taken in June 1980. In addition, many wells
still showed contaminant levels above MDH standards.
Nevertheless, the MDH decided not to resume pumping, con-
cluding that the contamination levels present posed no
threat to public health, since ground water in the Ryan
Creek area was not used for drinking water. This decision
raises the question of how seriously the MDH's levels of
concern were taken as decision-making criteria.
Finally, since there was some evidence of leachate
plume migration at the site, it is difficult to determine
to what extent the ground water recovery system was
responsible for the observed reductionos in contaminant
levels in many wells. In addition to migration of the
leachate plume, dilution due to the spring recharge of the
contaminated aquifer could have accounted for some of the
reduction.
14-37
-------
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Barr Engineering Co. August 1980. Howe, Inc. Fire, Ground water and Soil
Contamination Investigations, Report to Minnesota Department of Health.
Minneapolis, Minn.
Barr Engineering Co. January 1979 to April 1979. Notes of meetings with
Minnesota Department of Health concerning Howe, Inc. investigation.
Minneapolis, Minn.
Breimhurst, Louis J., Executive Director, Minnesota Pollution Control Agency.
May 14, 1981. Affidavit in Court File #767822. Fourth Judical District
Court, Hennepin County, Minn.
Felt, Russell, Head of Major Facilities Unit, Enforcement Section, Division of
Water Quality. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency. April 12, 1981.
Affadavit in Court File #767822. Fourth Judicial District Court,
Hennepin County, Minn.
Felt, Russell. December, 1982. Personal communications with Environmental
Law Institute. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency. Roseville, Minn.
Gray, David, Head, Health Risk Assessment, Environmental Health Division,
Minnesota Department of Health. May 7, 1981. Affidavit in Court File
#767822. Fourth Judicial District Court, Hennepin County, Minn.
Gray, David. January, 1983. Personal communication with Environmental Law
Institute. Minnesota Department of Health. Minneapolis, Minn.
Kable, Richard, Head, Emergency Response Unit, Division of Water Quality,
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency. May 18, 1981. Affidavit in Court
File #767822. Fourth Judicial District Court, Hennepin County, Minn.
Kalinoski, Stan P., Compliance and Enforcement Section, Division of Water
Quality, Minnesota Pollution Control Agency. April 29, 1981. Affidavit
in Court File #767822. Fourth Judicial District Court, Hennepin County,
Minn.
Kalinoski, Stan P. February 12, 1979. Letter to Ross Grotbeck, Minnesota
Department of Agriculture, re: sampling at Howe, Inc. Minnesota
Pollution Control Agency. Roseville, Minn.
Kiecker, Glenn D. November 19, 1979. Letter to Rollin Dennistoun, Deputy
Commissioner, Minnesota Department of Agriculture, re: City of
Minneapolis costs of Howe, Inc. response. Pollution Control Division,
City of Minneapolis, Minn.
14-38
-------
Mitchell, Alan R. Special Assistant Attorney General, Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency. April 15, 1980. Complaint in Court File #767822.
Fourth Judicial District Court, Hennepin County, Minn.
Mitchell, Alan R. May 18, 1981. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of its
Motion for Summary Judgement, Court File #767822. Fourth Judicial
District Court, Hennepin County, Minn.
Mitchell, Alan R. December, 1982. Personal communications with Environmental
Law Institute. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency. Roseville, Minn.
Minnesota Department of Agriculture. January, 1981. Land Application of
Snow, Ice, and Soil Containing Pesticides Residues from the Howe, Inc.
Fire of January 6, 1979: A Summary of Monitoring Activities. St. Paul,
Minn.
Minnesota Division of Procurement. January, 1979. Contract for excavation of
soil and loading of soil and ice from Howe, Inc. fire site. Department
of Agriculture, APID #30001-19-10. Roseville, Minn.
Minnesota Division of Procurement. January, 1979. Purchase order for
construction of a basin and handling of ice, snow, and soil containing
pesticides from Howe, Inc. fire site. Department of Argiculture, APID
#30001-19-10. Roseville, Minn.
Pettersen, George R. Commissioner, Minnesota Department of Health. May 14,
1981. Affidavit in Court File #767822. Fourth Judicial District Court,
Hennepin County, Minn.
Rogosheske, Steven E. Pesticide Specialist, Minnesota Department of
Agriculture. Affidavit in Court File #767822. Fourth Judicial District
Court, Hennepin County, Minn.
Russell, James H. May 7, 1980. Letter to Alan R. Mitchell, Office of the
Attorney General, Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, re: Howe, Inc.
expenditures in fire clean-up. Russell, Russell, & McLeod, attorneys.
Golden Valley, Minn.
Seetin, Mark W., Commissioner, Minnesota Department of Agriculture. May 8,
1981. Affidavit in Court File #767822. Fourth Judicial District Court,
Hennepin County, Minn.
Seetin, Mark, W., et al. January 17, 1979. Memorandum to Executive Council
re: Request for Emergency Funds Pursuant to Minn. State. 1974 Sec. 9.061
Subd. 3 and 5. Minnesota Department of Agriculture. St. Paul, Minn.
14-39
-------
-------
MARTY'S CMC,
KINGSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
INTRODUCTION
NCP
References
About 470 drums and buckets of paint sludges, still
bottoms, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and various
other organics and contaminated soil were illegally
dumped on and buried in a hillside behind an auto
dealership named Marty's CMC. The site is located near
Kingston, Massachusetts, a small rural town of
approximately 7,400 people about 40 miles (25 km)
southeast of Boston on Plymouth Bay (see Figure 1). The
neighboring auto dealer who was concerned about his on-
site Drinking water well, reported the dumping,
prompting much concern from the town, which was con-
structing a new drinking water well field near the
site. Analysis of the liquid wastes showed that some of
them were highly flammable. Slightly less than 1 mg/1
dichloromethane (methylene chloride) was detected in the
ground water in July 1981.
Background
From January to April 1980, about 470 drums and
buckets of hazardous waste and contaminated soil were
dumped on the hill behind Marty's CMC (see Figure 2).
The wastes included paint sludges, filter paper residue,
still bottoms, waste oil and solvents, and were among
demolition debris and other material dumped there. The
site was discovered when the neighboring auto dealer
reported midnight dumping to police who reported it to
the Massachusetts Attorney General's (AG) office, who
reported it to the Massachusetts Department of
Environmental Quality Engineering (DEQE) in April
1980. On April 5, 1980 State Police assigned to the AG,
AG staff, additional State Police, DEQE personnel and
technicians from Black Gold Services, Inc. "raided" the
site as the state termed it, to inspect and sample the
chemicals present. At this time, gas chromatograph/mass
spectrometry (GC/MS) testing revealed a variety of
chemicals in the drums and soil, including chlorinated
300.63(a)(4)
discovery
300.6500(1)
evidentiary
sampling
15-1
-------
Figure 1. Location Map of Marty's CMC Hazardous Waste
Site, Kingston, Massachusetts
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15-2
-------
MARTY'S-KINGSTON. MA
SITE VIEW* 19HU. BEFORE JULY 1981 REMEDIATION
H-
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•CONSTRUCTS PIOH SECTIONS IN MAT I !>H 1 RHP ANll NAI'S I'UflH JNH 1,81
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-------
and flammable organic solvents. Some drums contained
solids covered by very alkaline water, while others
contained flammable liquids.
Both Mr. Hamilton, who had a private drinking water
well downgradient on the adjacent property, and the town
of Kingston, which was planning to construct a well
field about 1/2 mile (0.8 km) upgradient, were very
concerned about the possible effect of the hazardous
waste on the ground water. In addition, the Kingston
water tower is located about 1000 feet (300 m) from
Marty's. Although the water for this storage tank is
drawn from another source several miles away, its
proximity to the site prompted some of the town's
concern. At the time Mr, Hamilton's well had only very
low concentrations of chloroform, which were thought to
be an equipment artifact, but it was directly in the
apparent path of ground water flow, downgradient from
Marty's CMC. In July 1981 DEQE found that methylene
chloride was the major contaminant in the ground water
(735, 432 and 134 ug/1 at 48, 78 and 93 feet (14.63,
23.67 and 28.35 m), respectively.
Synopsis of Site Response
From April 1980 to May 1981, the state's standby
spill response contractor, Black Gold Services, crushed,
secured or wrapped about 150 empty drums in plastic, and
removed another 99 drums for examination and disposal,
during the spring and summer of 1980. Through the
winter and up to the remedial action in July 1981, Black
Gold personnel returned to the site several times to re-
cover the drums with polyethylene.
In April 1981, the state's hydrogeological
consultant, Goldberg Zoino Associates (GZA), began to
study the nature and extent of the groundwater con-
tamination. It maintained and sampled the wells through
July 1981, when the remedial action occurred.
In July 1981 Oil and Hazardous Materials, Inc.
(OHM) of Findlay, Ohio excavated and removed
approximately 470 drums and buckets, and 475 tons (427.5
Mt) of contaminated soil. Soil with low levels of con-
tamination (less than 10 ug/g PCBs) was capped and
reseeded on-site after being aerated by spreading. The
remediated site now lies open, with the only restriction
on it being a prohibition against growing crops.
300.64(a)(2)
preliminary
assessment
300.65(b)(4)
immediate
removal
source control
300.66(c)(2)
(ill)
assessing
migration
potential
15-4
-------
SITE DESCRIPTION
Surface Characteristics
Eastern Massachusetts, where Marty's is located, is
situated near the edge of the general geomorphological
region known as the New England province. This area of
the province is relatively flat, and is covered with
temperate deciduous second growth forest and marshes.
The site is about 1 mile (1.6 km) from the center of the
Town of Kingston (population 7,400).
The surface water lying closest to the site (1,000
feet 1300 ml northwest) is Smelt Brook, which drains
Smelt Pond (3,200 feet (960 m) southwest), and
ultimately flows out to Kingston Bay (7,000 feet 2,100
m northeast) through the Jones River (see Figure 1).
At its closest approach, Smelt Brook has been altered to
support an area of cranberry bogs. The Massachusetts
state stream use classification for Smelt Brook is Class
B. According to the State Water Laws "Waters assigned
to this class are designated for the uses of protection
and propagation of fish, other aquatic life and wild-
life; and for primary and secondary contact recrea-
tion." The influence of Smelt Brook on the ground water
was found to be localized. The dominant influence on
the ground water flow below the site is the ocean.
Precipitation in the area averages 41.7 inches (106
cm) per year, distributed evenly throughout the year.
Average summer and winter temperatures are 74° and 22°F
(23 -6 C), respectively. Winds are predominantly
southerly from April to October, changing to north-
westerly during the winter months.
Hydrogeology
The Marty's GMC site is located in an area of loose
sandy glacial till (see Figures 3 & 4) of the Monk's
Hill moraine, which was deposited by a pause in the
retreat of a glacier about 8,000 years ago, consisting
of a relatively thick 90-150 foot (27-45 m) sequence of
stratified sands, gravels and silts overlying a thin
discontinuous glacial till of course gravel and un-
consolidated sediment. No bedrock outcroppings are
present within about 1/2 mile (0.8 km) of the site. The
glacial till is underlain by Dedham Grandiorite, which
is a crystalline rock underlying much of southeastern
Massachusetts. This bedrock was encountered at varying
depths in the area. At the site itself, the bedrock was
approximately 105 feet (31.5 m) deep.
15-5
-------
Figure 3- Location of Test Wells and Borings
15-6
-------
Figure 4. Subsurface Profiles
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15-7
-------
The ground water table (Figure 4) is located about
10-15 feet (3-4.5 m) deep at the site. This ground
water is considered to be in an upper aquifer composed
of sand and gravel extending from the surface to the
fine sand and silt layer below, which acts as an
aquitard allowing only minimal ground water flow. The
lower aquifer is composed of medium to course sand and
gravel below the fine sand and silt layer. This lower
aquifer is 7 feet (2.1 m) thick at the M-l well on-site,
and is pinched-out by the thickening sand and silt
aquitard to the northeast. The general ground water
flow at the site is about 20° to the northeast.
WASTE DISPOSAL HISTORY
About 470 drums and buckets of hazardous wastes,
and approximately 500 tons (454 Mt) of contaminated soil
was dumped on a hill behind Marty's CMC (see Figure 2),
from about January to April 1980. The actual amount
dumped is unclear since the case was still in litigation
as of October 1982. State officials believe that the
dumpers initially mixed the wastes with soil at a lot
down the street and then scooped up the soil/waste
mixture to dump behind Marty's. This dumping was part
of the operation known as the "Plymouth Ring," which
dumped hazardous wastes at several sites in the area.
The site owner, Marty Alexandis, had a wetlands fill
permit, which allowed him to add clean fill to the back
of his lot on the hill. Mr. Alexandis claimed that he
thought that the drums were empty.
DESCRIPTION OF CONTAMINATION
On April 5, 1980 state officials performed the 300.65 (b)(1)
first inspection and sampling of the site, to gather evidentiary
evidence for litigation and to assess the contamina- sampling
tion. Gas chromatograph and mass spectrometry (GC/MS)
analysis of the drum contents and soil revealed a
variety of wastes including chlorinated organics and
flammable solvents. Some of the drums contained solids
covered with very alkaline water or low flash point
supernatants. Among the wastes found at the time using
GC/MS were: dichloromethane (methylene chloride),
chlorobenzene, toluene, xylene, n-propanol, benzene,
ethyl toluene, trimethyl benzene, 2-methyl propanol,
methyl isopropylbenzene, ethyl xylene, naphthalene,
tetramethyl benzene, propanol. Only a few drums were
initially visible; more were discovered as test pits
were dug. Solid waste such as reinforcing rods and bed
springs were also found in the fill material.
Between the' April 1980 raid and May 1981, the
source of contamination was estimated by test trenches
and sampling by Black Gold and DEQE, and during the
15-8
-------
hydrogeological study by GZA. Based on data from two
test trenches and metal detector surveys by Black Gold,
DEQE estimated that there were between 400-800 drums
buried on-site, and about 300-400 cubic yards (228-304
m ) of contaminated soil. Volatile organics were the
most predominant contaminant in the soil, but during the
remedial work, PCBs were also found in soil at about 50
ug/g. The highest level of PCS contamination was 62
ug/g, found in otherwise slightly contaminated soil
during the remedial work. The depth of the soil con-
tamination at the toe of the slope where liquid waste
had pooled was found to be about one foot (0.3 m), based
on an ft foot (2.5 m) deep soil bore (A-5) next to the
multilevel well (M-l).
Hydrogeological Study - Goldberg Zoino Associates
A hydrogeological study was performed by Goldberg
Zoino Associates (GZA) of Newton Upper Falls,
Massachussets from April-July 1981. To assess the
present and future impact of the hazardous waste at
Marty's GMC, GZA studied lithologic and water quality
data from previous well logs in the area (Figure 3) as
well as data from 5 new observation wells constructed
near Marty's GMC. In addition, GZA advised DEQE on the
predicted impact of the contamination on the nearby
public and private wells. Subcontractors were used by
GZA for the laboratory analysis of volatile organics and
fecal colifonas, and to prepare site maps.
After studying the data from the well logs of the
previous 14 borings in the area, GZA constructed 5 new
observation wells near Marty's GMC. The location and
depth of these wells (M-L, A-l, A-2, A-3, A-4) is shown
in Figure 3 and Table 1, respectively. Note that the
multilevel well, M-l, was constructed at the toe of the
dump slope. This most often sampled well had an
observation well sampler at 36 feet (10.8 m), and had 3
BarCad gas drive samplers at 47.5, 76.9 and 93.0 feet
(14.25, 23.07 and 27.9 m) below land surface. These 5
newly installed wells, as well as the 14 previously
existing wells, were monitored to establish ground water
flow directions and determine water quality.
The water quality data in the final August 1981
report by GZA was based on a total of 21 ground water
samples collected and analyzed by GZA on April 21 and 29
and June 12 and 26, 1981, from new and previously
existing wells. Using gas chromatograph analysis (GC),
methylene chloride was found to be the most significant
contaminant in these samples. This contaminant was
found only in the multilevel well located on site.
Other contaminants were found at less than 50 ug/1 in
15-9
-------
TABLE 1. WELL INVENTORY
Well #
A-l
A-2
A-3
A-4
M-l
B-l
B-2
B-3
B-4
B-5
B-6
B-7
B-9
B-12
B-14
B-16
B-18
32-73
36-74A
TW-1
TW-2
Installed By
Con-Tec for GZA 1
ti
11
ii
it
— — —
John J. Boyle for BSC
ii
M
it
it
ii
ti
M
ir
M
ii
M
F.G. Sullivan for W&H3
ii
F.G. Sullivan for BSC3
»
Depth Below Land Surface (feet)
77
35
33
25
36*
_
16
16
32
33
30
57.5
62
42
26
16
26.5
72,5
80
95
95
91
" " — — — -
Note: * Multilevel sampling installation. Depth of
observation well sampler given.
1. Wells constructed for MA DEQE near
Marty's CMC
2. Wells constructed for planned shopping
mall
3. Wells constructed for Kingston town
drinking water well
Source: Goldberg Zoino Associates final report 8/81
15-10
-------
this well, which was considered the reliable detection
limit. Volatile organics were analyzed because they
were believed to be the most mobile of the potential
contaminants. The last ground water sample from the
area was taken from the multi-level well on July 15,
1981 by GZA, and analyzed by OHM Findlay, Ohio labs
using GC and mass spectrometry (MS). This final
sampling corroborated the earlier finding of methylene
chloride contamination only in the on-site multilevel
well. Methylene chloride levels were found to be
slightly higher in the OHM samples - 735, 432 and 134
ug/1 at 48, 78 and 93 feet (14,4, 23.4 and 27.9 m)
respectively. Test well 36-74A (Figure 3), located next
to the new Kingston water supply well, was sampled and
found to have no detectable volatile organics.
The boring cores from the test wells were also
analyzed. This data primarily helped to clarify the
underlying hydrogeology, but also suggested that soil
contamination was only present at the M-l well on-
site. This finding of volatile organic contamination
on-site in surface samples from M-l prompted a shallow
(8 feet (2.4 m) deep) test boring (A-5) on-site near M-l
with "continuous soil sampling... to assess the vertical
extent of organic contamination at the location of the
most highly degraded surficial soils" (GZA, 1981). An
organic vapor analyzer (OVA) measurement of the soil
from A-5 showed that the soil contamination there was
the result of localized ponding of contaminated runoff
water and was not expected to to present a significant
source of ground water contamination. As in the ground
water, methylene chloride was the most significant
contaminant but vinyl chloride, which was found in water
samples at M-l, was not found in the soil samples.
PLANNING THE SITE RESPONSE
Clean-up work at this site consisted of an
emergency response action and a remedial action. These
actions are discussed separately below.
Emergency Response
Initiation o& Response
The Massachusetts Department of Environmental
Quality Engineering (DEQE) first became involved in
Marty's CMC when the Attorney General's Office (AG)
asked it for technical support in the raid on the site
on April 5, 1980 to stop the dumping and to gather 300.65 (b) (1)
evidence. Most of the information produced from the evidentiary
raid was intended for use by the AG in its case. The sampling
following information was useful to DEQE in assessing
15-11
-------
the physical threat posed by the site:
1. A significant, but undetermined amount of
contaminated soil and drummed wastes was buried
in the hillside;
2. A significant amount of waste lay exposed in 55
gallon drums and contaminated soil; and
3. Gas chromatograph/mass spectrometry (GC/MS)
testing and drum labels indicated that some of
the wastes were very flammable and toxic.
Based on this information, DEQE had Black Gold return to
the site a few weeks later to secure the surface drums
because of the threat of fire from the drums of
flammable wastes, and to dig test trenches to assess the
need for future work.
alternatives
Selection of Response Technologies
The general emergency response
available to DEQE at Marty's were:
1. Clean-up work;
2. Site assessment; or
3. No action.
The DEQE's decision to combine the action alternatives 1
and 2 was based on the need to mitigate the fire hazard
and to assess the potential ground water threat The
DEQE knew that the available Spill Fund money $100,000
was not enough to fully remediate the site; hence some
combination of clean-up work and site assessment to
estimate future work was needed. The specific mix of
surface drum clean-up and site assessment was largely
based on limitations of funding and availability of
information.
The clean-up work was limited to surface drums
because that was all that the available funding would
allow and still leave money for the needed site
assessment. The surface drum work reduced the threat ot
fire but not the threat of ground water contamination.
The state official in charge of the Emergency Response
Branch stated that this level of clean-up was based more
on the amount of money that was available, rather than a
need to mitigate a specific hazard to a specific degree.
The site assessment primarily involved digging test
trenches to estimate the extent of the dumping, because
that «. needed to estimate adequately the extent of the
final remedial work needed, and also allow for the
300.65(9)(3)
risk of fire
300.65(b)(4)
immediate
removal
source control
300.68(k)
fund
balancing
15-12
-------
maximum amount of immediate clean-up work. The use of
the $100,000 exclusively for site assessment work would
have meant that no action would be taken regarding the
immediate mitigation of the threat of fire and,
therefore, was excluded. A limited amount of metal
detector investigation was undertaken to locate the
buried drums on-site. Test trenches were specifically
chosen because they were relatively cheap and adequate
to estimate the extent of soil work needed. This also
reserved resources for the clean-up. In addition, any
of the other possible site assessment alternatives,such
as ground-penetrating radar, resistivity studies,
extensive test well construction and monitoring,were
excluded as being unwarranted, given the information
available from the AG's investigation, which indicated
that only a short period of recent dumping during the
middle of winter had occurred on the site.
Extent of Response
The emergency response ended because the money ran
out and the general response goal of surface clean-up
and site assessment had been achieved. As a result, all
of the exposed empty drums were not removed from the
site. Most of these drums were placed on plastic sheets
pending completion of the rest of the response work.
300.65(c)
immediate
removal
completion
Remedial Action
Initiation of Response
Because of delays in getting funds, further work at
Marty's did not occur until 7 months after completion of
the emergency response, when Goldberg Zoino Associates
(GZA) was hired in February 1981 to construct and
monitor 3 test wells. As with the initiation of all of
the remedial action contracts (hydrogeological study,
management consultant, clean-up contractor), the timing
of the decision was based on balancing the desire of
DEQE and local interests to have the site cleaned up as
soon as possible, and the state legislature's desire to
carefully control the expenditure of state funds. Local
citizen concern had grown condsiderably from the time of
the raid in April 1980 until the site clean-up was
completed in July 1981. However, the delay through 1980
due to deliberations about the procedure for using the
Capital Outlays Acts limited DEQE's ability to take any
remedial action, because of lack of alternative funding.
When approval to use $5 million from the
Massachusetts Capital Outlay Act was granted in January
1981, DEQE decided to hire a hydrogeological consultant,
Goldberg Zoino Associates (GZA), to assess the impact,
if any, of the hazardous waste at Marty's on the ground
15-13
-------
water. This possibility of contamination was of
particular concern because the town of Kingston had
already sunk one drinking water well 1,500 feet (450 m)
from the site, and was planning to construct more
wells. Although this well field was known to be
upgradient from the site, the hydrogeologist verified
this fact and then determined the potential threat to
private wells downgradient. Local concern may have also
been heightened by the proximity of the town water tank
1,000 feet (300 m) from the site. The hydrogeologist
provided information that served to allay these
concerns.
DEQE was not prepared at that time to hire a
clean-up contractor because they had agreed with the
state legislature to contract a management consultant
first to assist and train DEQE personnel in overseeing
the clean-up of Marty's and other sites around the
state, all of which were to be cleaned up with funding
from the Capital Outlay Act. This agreement was reached
between the state Senate and House Ways and Means
Committees and DEQE during the scheduling of funds from
the Capital Outlay Act. The contracts for the
management consultant and the subsequent clean-up
contrac tor were expec ted to be larger and more
complicated than the hydrogeological consultant's and
therefore could not be executed as quickly.
A request for proposals for a management consultant
was issued in February 1981, and Arthur D. Little, Inc.
(ADL) was selected in March 1981. The management con-
sultant was hired for Marty's to improve on the
efficiency of the clean-up supervised by the DEQE at
Silresim, in Lowell, where a site cleanup went over
budget and past schedule. On May 1, 1981, DEQE issued a
request for proposals for the clean-up of Marty's CMC,
which had been developed in conjunction with ADL. This
action directly initiated the final remedial work that
had been deemed necessary in the spring of 1980 to
eliminate the ground water contamination source, but
which had been delayed due to the lack of funding. In
July 1981, O.H. Materials Inc. (OHM) was hired.
Selection of Response Technologies
The DEQE directed its contractor, OHM to combine
excavation and disposal with aeration and capping in
order to minimize disposal costs. Only material that
could not be treated (aerated or biodegraded) was to be
disposed of at an approved site. DEQE decided to
excavate because the aquifer under Kingston is a sole
source aquifer for the town. It is the largest aquifer
of drinking water quality in the state and has the
15-14
300.68(f)
remedial
investigation
-------
highest flow rate in the state. Exclusive use of other
technologies - ground water withdrawal and treatment, in
situ treatment, encapsulation, and complete excavation
and disposal, was rejected because the technologies were
considered unwarranted or unfeasible, or they were not
believed to offer the same level of cost-effective
ground water protection that the excavation-aeration
option provided. The specific mix of disposal,
treatment and capping resulted from decisions made on-
site based on what was found during excavation and
testing. In practical terms, the amount to be disposed
was minimized by separating the excavated material into
a high contaminated soil pile (HOP) and a low con-
taminated soil pile (LCP). This soil pile separation
will be discussed below, along with the decision to
dispose of the particular section of PCB contaminated
soil, and the bulking method that was used.
Defining the LCP vs. HOP—The DEQE decided to 300.68(h)(l)
aerate part of the "low contamination soil pile" (LCP) screening;
and leave it on-site because officials believed that it cost
was not a significant threat, and sought to minimize
disposal costs. The separation of the LCP from the high
contamination soil pile (HCP) began during the emergency
test trench excavation, when Black Gold created the 2
distinct piles based on visual evidence of contamination
(containing solid or wet hazardous wastes). This
initial separation was part of DEQE's overall plan to
minimize the amount of material requiring disposal.
During the remedial phase, the basis for separating
the LCP from the HCP, which was disposed of at an
approved landfill, was the organic vapor level emitted
from the soil. O.K. Materials used a photoionization
detector (PID) calibrated for organic contamination with
uncalibrated response for all volatile hydrocarbons. If
a PID reading of 20 ug/g or greater was found at ground
level when soil was excavated, then that soil would go
to the HCP for subsequent disposal. The resulting piles
were assessed later for total organic carbon (TOG). The
TOG level of the HCP was about 8,200 ug/g; the LCP was
between 1,900-6,400 ug/g (most soil on the hillside was
from 2,400-4,400 ug/g). By comparison, the TOG control
of clean, dry sand at the site was about 500-520 ug/g.
The DEQE's decision to leave the LCP on-site, which
was later amended because of the PCB discovery, was made
without a specific regulatory framework because of the
"emergency" nature of the work. Although the RCRA tests
of ignitability, reactivity and (EP) toxicity were
performed and considered in the decision, according to
the DEQE's General Counsel and the on scene coordinator,
the decision was based on "professional judgement" under
15-15
-------
the state law governing emergency operations, which
gives DEQE authority to clean up hazardous waste sites
using any environmentally safe means. The site was
cleaned up by the Emergency Response Branch because it
was the only unit of DEQE that had sufficient
contracting expertise. The Site Management Branch,
which now deals with long term clean-ups, was not
effectively operational at the time. The use of the
term "remedial response" is used in this report for the
July 1981 work to distinguish it from the 1980 emergency
work.
The cost basis for the decision on whether to
dispose of the LCP off-site was very clear. In a Budget
Variance Report for the period from July 10 - 16, 1981
OHM informed DEQE that disposal of the entire 750 cubic
yards (573 m ; 950 tons; 864.5 Mt) of LCP would cost
$220,000 (transportation + disposal + 15%), and would
put the project over budget. In addition, O.K.
Materials proposed the alternative of biodegrading the
contaminants out of the LCP at a cost of $96,000.
Neither plan was used. As will be discussed below, PCB
contamination of the LCP ultimately determined the
extent of disposal of the LCP. The DEQE decided to
aerate the LCP, which was only part of the proposed
biodegradation plan, because it believed this would be in Sltu SO11
adequate to reduce the volatile organics to the desired treatment
extent. The DEQE obtained "background" levels of
volatile organics in the LCP.
PCBs in the LCP—A relatively more complicated
process was involved in the decision to leave on-site
the part of the LCP that contained 7 ug/g or less of
PCBs. Black Gold's testing during the emergency work
did not detect any PCBs on the site. However, on July
15, during the first week of operation, OHM performed
PCB screens along with pH testing (for compatibility) of
all of the excavated material, and found low levels of
PCBs in the LCP but none in the HCP. This prompted the
DEQE to request a test to be run on the material at
OHM's Findlay-based lab of a composite of 6 samples from
the LCP. This test confirmed the presence of PCBs at 19
ug/g. The possibility of hot spots of PCBs prompted
DEQE to have OHM split the LCP into 8 sections, and take
8 samples (4 sections on either side of a long, split
oval) from each section. These samples were split and
tested by OHM and ADL. Both labs found PCBs at about 50
ug/g in 3 of the 8 sections (OHM/ADL: 61/51, 62/24/42
ug/g) DEQE had these 3 sections, which were in one area,
removed for disposal and ordered that an extensive
sampling program be carried out throughout the site to
make sure that no other PCB hot spots had been missed.
Samples were taken from 26 locations throughout the site
15-16
-------
on July 29th after the 3 moderately contaminated sec-
tions had been removed from the site. While the results
from these 26 samples were awaited from the Findlay
labs, the soil was aerated by spreading it over the
hillside for 4 days using a front loader. The last
sample results were called in to DEQE on Sunday, August
2, when it was reported that no PCPs over 7 ug/g had
been found. On Monday the LCP, which had been spread
thinly on a 60 x 50 foot (18 x 15 m) area, was capped
with 2-3 feet (0.6-0.9 m) of soil, followed by a 6 inch
(0.15 m) cap that was applied to the whole site.
^Mixing liquids into the HOP—When the drums con-
taining liquid hazardous wastes were excavated out of
the hillside, they were emptied onto and mixed with the
HCP, as OHM had recommended. DEQE agreed to the
recommended action because it was feasible from the
standpoint of liquids compatibility, and it was cheaper
than bulking the liquids and transporting them
separately in DOT-specified containers. The HOP was
already slated for disposal in a Class I landfill, so it
was considered economical to combine the 18 drums of
liquid with the soil and avoid additional disposal
expenses. In a weekly report from OHM to DEQE, dated
July 23, 1981, the site manager for OHM noted that the
18 drums of liquids would not provide for significant
economies of scale to warrant using a bulk tanker. He
concluded "since there were not enough liquids to bulk
together, that it would be more cost effective to mix
the liquids into the highly contaminated soil pile for
disposal."
After the contents of the drums were poured out,
the drums were crushed with the front loader and
disposed of in separate trucks. The full 5 gallon
buckets were not emptied and separated. Instead they
were simply dumped onto the HCP and mixed in, because
unlike the 55-gallon drums they would not interfere with
the mixing and loading for the disposal process.
Extent of Response
The DEQE ended the remedial operations because the
planned excavation and partial disposal had been
accomplished and, based on the best professional
judgement of its officials, the site no longer presented
a threat to public health or the environment. The
specific decisions regarding the extent of disposal and
the amount of material left on-site and capped are
discussed above in the "Selection of Site Response"
section. Generally, the plan to excavate the hillside
and dispose of the drums, and all of the contaminated
soil that could not be decontaminated adequately on-
300.70(b)(2)
in situ soil
treatment
300.68(j)
extent of
remedy
15-17
-------
site, was carried out to completion.
The level of volatile organic contamination in the
LCP left on site was reduced to the "background
level." The LCP was aerated for four days by spreading
and respreading it using a front-loader, while awaiting
the results from the extensive PCS sampling. The only
major surprise, which altered the planned completion
date, was the discovery of PCBs. As discussed above, by
disposing of the soil having about 50 ug/g PCB, only
soil with a PCB concentration of 7ug/g or less was left
on-site. This PCB problem extended the completion of
the clean-up about a week, but did not significantly
alter the planned clean-up.
DESIGN AND EXECUTION OF SITE RESPONSE
The following technologies were employed at the
Marty's CMC clean-up.
1. Emergency Response (site stabilization and
assessment)
2. Excavation
3. Bulking (drum opening and mixing contents with
contaminated soil)
4. Soil Aeration
5. Laboratory Analytical Work
6. Capping
7. Safety Procedures
These technologies will be discussed in turn below.
As noted in the section above, the clean-up work at
Marty's was separated into two distinct operations:
emergency response, which occurred in April 1980, and
remedial action, which occurred from July-August 1981.
These opertions will be discussed separately in this
section. The emergency response will be considered
briefly because of the relatively small scale of the
operation and because of the lack of documentation
available. The remedial response will be discussed in
sections according to the technology applied.
15-18
-------
Emergency Response
The state's spill contractor, Black Gold Services,
Inc. of Stoughton, Massachusetts, performed emergency
mitigation work and assessed the site in preparation for
future work. It became involved in the Marty's CMC
cleanup when DEQE asked it for backhoes and technicians
to assist in the April 5, 1980 raid. On that day Black
Gold personnel sampled and removed an undetermined
number of drums to provide the Attorney General's Office
(AG) with direct evidence of hazardous waste dumping on-
site. A backhoe was used to prove that there was buried
hazardous waste on-site. The drums that were removed by
Black Gold were placed in storage at Recycling
Industries of Braintree, Massachusetts as evidence in
litigation. Ten of the exposed drums were removed
immediately because of the threat of fire posed by their
flammable contents, while 89 other full or partly full
drums were removed shortly thereafter. This initial 9
work-days of emergency work ended on June 3, when the
exposed drums had either been removed from the site for
evidence or, because of high flammability, had been
covered with polyethylene (Figure 2).
On July 22, Black Gold returned to the site to dig
test holes and secure the excavated soil and drums that
came from these holes. Using 22.6 tons (20.16 Mt) of
clay, a staging area was created away from the toe of
the slope by spreading the clay and building a 2 /2
foot (0.15 m) berm around the downgrade side. This clay
platform and dike was then covered with polyethylene. A
month and a half later, on September 4-5, 18 drums were
removed from the site and stored prior to disposal. A
total of 150 empty, but waste-contaminated drums were
s tored in this area until the remedial action began in
July 1981, when they were removed and disposed of at a
landfill. Black Gold returned to the site on 6 more
days between September 30, 1980 and May 19, 1981 to
maintain the secured soil and drum pile by replacing the
polythylene plastic when it deteriorated or blew off.
The site preparation and assessment work occurred
in the spring and summer of 1981. Black Gold cleared a
work area for the planned remedial action by cutting
down all small trees in the future operating area and
consolidating all of the uncontaminated tree stumps and
demolition debris in a pile at the west side of the toe
of the slope.
An organic vapor analyzer, borrowed from U.S. EPA
Region I, was used to determine the level of contamina-
tion of soil as it was excavated. Black Gold used its
metal detector to determine the location and extent of
300.65(b)(l)
evidentiary
sampling
300.65(b)(7)
physical
barriers
15-19
-------
buried drums for estimating future work. Through these
estimates, the depth of the contaminated fill and the
location of the buried drums were determined, as shown
in Figure 2. From Black Gold's work, the DEQE estimated
that 400-800 drums, about half of which were empty, and
300-400 cubic yards (228-304 m ) of contaminated soil
were on-site.
300.66(c)(2)
(ii) assessing
hazardous
substances
jSxcavation
Preliminary excavation work for the remedial phase
began on Tuesday, July 14, 1981, one week after the OHM
contract was signed and the same day that the site owner
signed an authorization for the removal. A Case 580
backhoe was used to move to clean fill above the dumped
material to prevent contamination of the soil. This
fill was stockpiled in a clean area for future use as
cover. A Caterpillar (Cat) 955 front-end loader was
used to consolidate the contaminated soil and crushed
drums in one area away from the toe of the slope where
excavation would occur. This Cat 955 was also used to
c rush the emp ty drums and 1 oad them and the h igh ly
contaminated soil separately for disposal.
The three-day excavation operation into the hill-
side began on the next day, July 15, 1981, when the Cat
955 front loader, the Case 580 C backhoe and the Cat 215
backhoe, with a grappler attachment, were used to dig
out the northeast half the staging area (See Figure
2). The excavation of soil of the slope nearest the
drums was completed on Friday, July 17, 1980. A total
of 1,058 cubic yards (809 m ) of contaminated soil was
excavated. Air monitoring that was performed throughout
the excavation is discussed in the "Chemical Analysis"
section below.
As discussed in the "Extent of Site Response"
section above, material was excavated until it showed no
visual evidence of contamination or PID readings of
greater than 10 ug/g. Excavated soil was separated into
2 piles (high and low contamination) based on PID
readings of above or below 20 ug/g. The piles of con-
taminated soil were placed on polyethylene sheets
depending on whether PID readings of less than or
greater than 20 ug/g were measured at ground level above
the source of the excavated material.
The drums were removed from the hillside excavation
using the grappler attachment to a Cat 215 backhoe,
which is a large, long armed, caterpillar-treaded
vehicle. The grappler attachment to the arm was a claw-
like device that rotated 180 degress and was especially
designed for manipulating 55 gallon drums. The drums
300.70(c)(2)
(i)
excavation
15-20
-------
were staged on polyethylene liners for compatibility
testing prior to bulking and disposal.
Bulking
Of the 151 drums excavated from the hillside
(excluding the 144 full buckets), 59 drums were "full",
41 of which contained solids such as filter paper
residue, and 18 of which contained liquids. Of the 92
remaining drums, some were stored off-site as evidence,
and some were empty and were crushed and disposed of
with the other wastes. As the drums were excavated from
the hillside, they were sampled for compatibility tests
using a non-sparking brass punch on the Case 580-C
backhoe to open the drums. On Friday and Saturday, July
17, and 18, the following three tests were performed on
the contents to determine their compatibility for
bulking:
1. pH testing was performed on the contents from
the 18 liquid-filled drums to ensure that no
violent exothermic reactions would occur from
mixing them together;
2. PCB testing was performed to ensure that non-
PCB contaminated material was not mixed with
PCB-contaminated material, which requires
special regulatory considerations for disposal;
and
3. Cyanide testing was performed to prevent
cyanide cross contamination. Cyanide is
acutely toxic and may produce hydrogen cyanide
gas when mixed with acid.
All wastes were found to be compatible and could
therefore be bulked. Testing procedures and results are
discussed in the "Chemical Analysis" section below.
Since the 18 drums of liquid were not believed to
constitute a large enough volume to be cost-effectively
bulked as a liquid, they were poured onto and mixed into
the high contamination soil pile (HCP). A 10,000 gallon
(38,000 1) mobile compatibility chamber was brought to
the site but not used. Instead, the grappler equipped
Cat 215 was used to pour the contents of the full drums
onto the HCP.
The Case 580C backhoe was used to mix the liquids
and solids from the 59 full drums and the 144 five-
gallon buckets into the HCP for disposal.
15-21
-------
Chemical Analysis
The chemical analysis program that was carried out
by OHM involved an on-site laboratory trailer and base
(Findlay, Ohio) laboratory work. This sampling and
analysis program occurred from the first day of site
response to the last day of demobilization.
At the clean-up site, testing was performed by hand
held equipment and in the on-site mobile trailer
laboratory. Upon arriving at the site and before
beginning the excavation operation, an air scan was
performed with 4 personal air sampling pumps with Tenax
and Ambersorb XE-347 adsorbant material. These samples
were taken around the site and sent to the Findlay lab
for analysis. Three mobile infrared gas analyzers
(MIRANS) were used during the excavation and bulking.
These MIRANS were calibrated for chlorobenzene and
toluene, based on the personal air sampler results.
This MIRANS monitoring showed that chlorobenzene and
toluene were present in the air only during bulking at
maximums of 0.2 and 0.5 ppm, respectively. They were
not detected during the excavation. A photoionization
detector (PID) was used throughout the excavation and
bulking to identify contaminated soil. This PID was
calibrated for aromatic hydrocarbons, with an un-
calibrated response for volatile hydrocarbons. A Drager
portable air sampler was used on site with specific
sampling tubes for phenol, benzene, cyanide, toluene and
methylene chloride. Only benzene was detectable.
The mobile analytical trailer was used on site for
storing and maintaining this field equipment, as well as
performing additional analytical work. A gas
chromatograph (GC) was used to screen the soil for PCBs,
until a breakdown forced the PCS testing to be done in
the Findlay lab during the last week. Total organic
carbon (TOG) was also analyzed in the mobile lab to
corroborate the findings of the PID identification. The
low contamination soil pile (LCP) was also tested for
the reactivity and ignitability for RCRA characteriza-
tion (the EP toxicity testing was done in the Findlay
lab). Ignitability testing was performed with a Pensky-
Marten close-up analyzer to identify the flashpoint.
The Findlay lab provided additional testing
facilities for air, water and soil samples. A total of
6 air samples (including 2 controls) were analyzed for
volatile organics using gas chromatograph and mass
spectrometry (GC/MS). The water samples from all 4
levels of the M-l well on-site were analyzed using
GC/MS. The results of this testing showed 735, 432 and
134 ug/1 methylene chloride present at 48, 78 and 93
feet (14.4, 23.4 and 27.9 m) deep, respectively.
15-22
-------
The Findlay lab tested both the extract and
volatiles present in the LCP soil. A standard EP
toxicity extract was tested using atomic absorbtion
spectrophotometry for arsenic, selenium and mercury.
This extract was also tested for chlorinated pesticides
and chlorinated phenoxy acid herbicides using GC with an
electron capture detector followed by GC/MS. The soil
was also tested for volatile organics by heating it and
running the air through GC/MS. In addition, a GC screen
was done on the LCP soil to screen the soil for PCB's.
This GC gas elutrient was then split to a flame
ionization detector and an electron capture detector.
Soil Aeration
After the highly contaminated soil and drums were 300.70 (b)(2)
removed for disposal, the remaining low contamination (iii)(E)
soil pile (LCP) was spread at the toe of the slope to in situ
enhance the evaporation of the volatile organic con- treatment
taminants. As discussed in the "Extent of Site
Response" section above, the finding of low levels of
PCBs in the LCP caused a hiatus of several days in the
project while additional samples were taken and
analyzed. While awaiting the results of the analysis
and a decision on the LCP disposal, the Cat 955 front
loader was used to turn and spread each of the 8
sections. This aeration process occurred for 4 days
during this waiting period, in an effort to minimize the
standby time of the front loader and operator, who
remained onsite. As indicated by PID readings, volatile
organics were at background levels at the end of the
aeration.
Transportation .and Disposal
A total of 28 truckloads of contaminated soil and 300.70(c)
drums were hauled 520 miles (825 km) to the Class I off-site
landfill at CECOS in Niagra Falls, New York. Crushed disposal
drums (3 truckloads) and contaminated soil (21 truck-
loads) were transported and disposed of separately from
the PCB-contaminated soil (4 truckloads) which was
disposed of in a double secure cell at CECOS.
The average net weight of the loads was about 17
tons (15.3 Mt) instead of the 22 (19.8 Mt) ton rated
truck capacity because the contaminated soil was too
bulky to put 22 tons in one truckload. A 22 ton load
would have occupied about 16.9 cubic yards (12.94 m ),
which would have overfilled the 13 cubic yard (9.94 m )
capacity trucks. A conversion of 1.3 tons/cubic yard
(1.54 Mt/m3) was used by OHM, according to a company
official. A full 13 cubic yard load of contaminated
soil (9.94 m3) weighed about 16.9 tons (18.6 Mt) (470
15-23
-------
tons/28 truckloads). Crushed drums were transported
separately in two truckloads on July 18, 1981.
Safety Procedures
Upon arrival at the site, the contaminated area was
separated from the neighboring auto dealer's property by
a rope fence, with colored ribbon surveyor's tape and
"dangerous" placards. Support trailers and equipment
were located in the designated clean area on this
neighboring property. The entire area of visually
apparent dumping was roped off from the rest of Marty's
property a few days later. A portable decontamination
building was located along the northern "contamination
zone boundary" (see Figure 5.)
Al1 personne1 entering the s ite donned se1f-
contained breathing apparatus and "moon suits" before
entering until portable sampler and P.I.D. readings
showed no detectable air contamination. All personnel
entering the contaminated zone were required to have
prior authorization from the DEQK and sign a site visit
authorization and release form. Suits, tanks and other
personnel equipment were decontaminated daily by OHM
technicians. O.H. Materials also provided night
security.
Cleaning and sealing of trucks coming from the site
was done to avoid contamination of public areas enroute
from the dump site to the secure landfill. All trucks,
backhoes and equipment leaving the site were de-
contaminated using a high pressure water laser. Heavier
contamination on the buckets, drum punch and grappler
was removed using a sand blasting attachment to the
water laser. Trucks containing contaminated material
were sealed using a chemical sealing unit, including
lining and covering of the load with polyethylene.
Capping
After the low contamination soil (LCP) pile was
aerated and the three sections containing moderate
levels of PCB contamination were removed, the remaining
soil with low levels (less than 7 ug/g) of PCBs was
spread and capped before an additional cap was placed on
the entire site. The LCP was spread on the hillside
onto on a 60 x 50 foot (18.29 x 15.24 m) area and
covered with 2-3 feet (0.61 x 0.91 m) of soil. The
entire site was then capped with 6 inches (21.24 cm) of
native sandy loam soil throughout the area that had
experienced contaminated fill dumping. Grass seed and
fertilizer were then spread on the entire site, followed
by straw to prevent intervening erosion.
300.71
worker health
and safety
300.70(b)(l)
surface
seals
15-24
-------
Figure 5. Contaminated Zone Schematic
O.H. MATERIALS CO
PROJECT NO. 436
WARTY S CMC KINGSTON. MAE
INITIAL SITE MAP
Source: 0.5 H.Material
final report, g/SI
15-25
-------
COST AND FUNDING
Source of Funding
Funding for the emergency response came from the
Massachusetts Spill Fund because it was the only funding
immediately available. (The Spill Fund was a $300,000
revolving fund that was originally designed for quick
responses to oil spills). The other sources of funding
that could have been considered (CERCLA had not yet been
passed), and the reasons that they were excluded are as
follows:
1. Governor's Emergency Account - This fund is
only used when all other options have been
pursued. The director of DEQE's Emergency
Response Unit said that if the Spill Fund
turned out to be inadequate for the desired
level of emergency response, this fund might
have been used. The Spill Fund was adequate,
so it was not used.
2. Special appropriation from the state
legislature - This funding method had been used
previously for cleaning up hazardous waste
sites by obtaining a site-specific appropria-
tion. This source was not considered viable
for Marty's because of political problems
between DEQE and the state legislators.
The amount of $100,000 for emergency action at
Marty's provided by the Spill Fund was established as a
compromise between taking some emergency action at that
site and the imminent need for taking emergency action
at 2-3 other sites around the state. DEQE expected that
1/3 of the $300,000 fund would acheive a reasonable
level of surface clean-up and site assessment. It is
unclear if there was a conscious attempt to evenly
distribute the Spill Fund among 3 sites.
The Capital Outlay Act (Acts of 1979, Chapter 798,
Section 2, Item 2240-8801) was used to fund the remedial
action at Marty's GMC because it was easier than using
the only other potentially viable alternative-a special
appropriation from the state legislature. Although
funds from the Capital Outlay Act were not availbale
until January 1981, the Act was designed specifically
for the type of clean-up needed at Marty's. CERCLA had
not yet become a viable alternative and the dumpers were
virtually bankrupt. Lawsuits for cost recovery would
have taken too much time regardless of their potential
for success. The Capital Outlay Act was passed by the
state legislature in November 1979 in an attempt to
300.62(a)
state-funded
response
300.68(k)
fund
balancing
15-26
-------
overcome some of the problems attendent with depending
on special appropriations and other funding sources. It
created a $5 million Fund for hazardous waste site
clean-ups that was allocated according to a schedule
worked out by the state House and Senate Way and Means
Committees.
Selection of Contractors
DEQE chose Black Gold Services, Inc. to perform the
emergency response work because the firm was DEQE's
emergency spill contractor on stand-by at the time.
Black Gold had been placed on retainer for a standard
two year period beginning on July 1, 1979. DEQE hired
Black Gold on a sole source basis for approximately
$100,000 worth of time and materials. Black Gold was
asked to provide a backhoe and technicans for the April
5 raid to sample drums and to prove that drums were
buried. In addition, it subsequently removed or secured
the surface drums to mitigate the fire threat, and dug
test trenches to assess the extent of the buried drums.
The DEQE hired 3 firms in the course of the
remedial work at Marty's:
1. Goldberg Zoino Associates (GZA) was hired on a
sole source basis in February 1981 to install
and sample 5 observation wells as part of the
hydrogeological study of the area, and model
the impact of possible ground water contamina-
tion. GZA's work began in March 1981 and its
first draft report was submitted in June
1981. GZA was chosen on the basis of the
professional judgement of DEQE water pollution
specialists, who believed that GZA was the best
hydrogeological firm in the area.
2. Arthur D. Little (ADL) was hired by DEQE to
help them manage hazardous waste site clean-up
projects covered by the Capital Outlay Act
scheduling. The management consultant contract
was let through an RFP process in February -
March 1981. Proposals were reviewed by a
standing committee and ADL was selected in
March. In June 1981, a contract was executed
with ADL that included plans for evaluating the
clean-up contractors1 proposals, monitoring the
clean-up progress and costs, and training DEQE
personnel to take over these tasks in the
future. In October 1982, ADL's role had
shifted largely to training DEQE personnel.
15-27
-------
3. O.K. Materials (OHM) was hired in July 1981 as
the primary clean-up contractor "to remove,
transport, treat, and dispose of hazardous
wastes" at Marty's CMC, according to the RFP,
which was released in May 1981. From a field
of four proposers, OHM was chosen on the basis
of a multi-criteria bid evaluation procedure
developed by ADL. The DEQE heeded the
recommendation of ADL, who considered such
factors as qualifications, technical approach,
project management and cost as well as "other
subjective factors such as reputation for
quality work and DEQE's desire to use different
contractors in order to broaden their base of
experience," according to a draft Report of Bid
Evaluation and Contractor Selection by ADL in
June 1981.
The OHM contract was let on a time and materials
basis because DEQE believed that a fixed price would
lead to over-bidding by contractors trying to cover
contingencies for unknown costs. Since the extent of
the clean-up work needed was only roughly known, state
officials believed that a fixed price would lock them
into a bid that covered the higher end of the possible
cost range. Based on the test trench estimates from
Black Gold's work in Spring 1980, the RFP estimated that
there were from 400-800 drums on-site, about half of
which were empty, and 300-400 cubic yards (228-304 m )
of contaminated soil.
The proposal submitted by OHM estimated the total
clean-up costs based on an actual amount of work at the
mean of DEQE's estimate and a detailed cost breakdown
chart. The daily invoices from OHM were audited by ADL.
Pro j e_c_t_ Cos t s
The Massachusetts Department of Environmental
Quality Engineering (DEQE) was charged a total of
$562,031 (see Table 2.) on the Marty's CMC clean-up and
directly related activities from April 5, 1980 to August
10,1981. The amount DEQE actually paid was $551,049
because of a $10,982 discount for rapid payment of
invoices for the remedial work. This total cost
excludes administrative costs within the agency, which
were estimated at about $400,000, but were not
documented. Massachusetts paid for the work through its
Emergency Spill Fund and the Capital Outlay Act of 1979,
as itemized in Table 2. About three-quarters of the
expense ($409,000) was incurred during the month of July
1981 for the excavation and disposal of 470 tons (426.5
Mt) of contaminated soil and 453 crushed drums and
15-28
-------
TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF COST INFORMATION-MARTY'S CMC, KINGSTON, MA
i
ro
Tank
EMtKGtNa RKSl'ONSE
[jifmr
Equipment
Stor.iE..'
Di
S95,750(,l)
(-19!!)
Unit Cost
S19/m,-in hr.
nee cost text
enlry-$20/drum
Sl.OO/drum/
week
$70/drum
NA
NA
$47/<;u.yd.
(61 /ml)
NA
NA
$2300 truck-
load )
(S228/Ht)
Estimated
Future1 Togt
NA
NA
$50,000
NA
NA
ft
6
*
0
i-mi-rncnty
tl-Xt
rundinR
Smircu
Statu Spill
V,,m\
State Kplll
lunJ
State Spill
State Capita
Outlays Ait
COA
St. lit COA
Mt.itii COA
State COA
State COA
Si, Hi! CIIA
sum- COA
SlilLr COA
Period of
Pl'rfr.lln.niLl'
4/5/80-
5/I9/R1
4/5/RO-
i/n/Hi
4/5/80-
5/19/81
4/5/811-
5/19/81
1981
I9B1
7/14-
c!/(./K1
7/8-
B/d/81
7/11-
8/5/81
7/1B-
7/24/81
7/1H-
2/24 /fil
It •)()-
7/ll/H!
7/8-
B/5/81
(a) ADL report for period 7/31 - 8/4/81
(b) Includes 15% added cost for
sub-contractor handling
(c) Actual subtotal paid after discount
was $408,268. Variance=$106,732
(-21%)
(d) Actual total paid after discount was
$551,049.
-------
buckets. The budgeted ceiling of $515,000 for the
remedial response was not reached primarily because the
amount of contaminated material found on site was lower
than expected. The discovery of PCBs, however, raised
the costs. The emergency work cost $44,468; the hydro-
geological study cost $25,000; and the management
consultant cost $80,000.
Labor
For both the emergency and the remedial response
work, for which separate costs are available, labor
costs accounted for about 1/3 and 1/4, respectively, of
the total project phase costs (See Table 2). The
difference in the proportion of the costs devoted to
labor reflects the greater transportation and disposal
costs during the remedial response. The labor costs
given in Table 2 include only primary contractor
personnel, i.e., Black Gold Services, and O.H.
Materials. Since these labor costs do not include
subcontractors or administrative personnel, the unit
costs discussed below in the text may be more
valuable. The comparison of actual and projected labor
usage was tracked by charts such as Figure 6.
Approximately 3,503 hours of labor was used during the
remedial work by OHM. This was less than the expected
4,100 hours because of the lower amount of material
found. The labor cost was $94,941, which was $36,771
(29%) less than the $128,712 expected.
Excavation - Remedial Phase
The total costs of excavation activities, which
occurred on July 14-17, 1981, were not invoiced separately,
but can be estimated only by correlating the time of the
operation with the billings for the same period. On this
basis, the total cost of the 4-day excavation activity,
excluding subsequent transportation and disposal costs, was
about $49,850 (3/7 x $86,912 - July 10-16 weekly invoice
total), + $12,602 (July 17 daily invoice total), including
all costs for the period (labor, equipment, per diem,
analytical work and miscellaneous costs). The cost for
mobilization, demobilization and mixing liquids with the HCP
is not included in this amount. The cost of simultaneous
sampling and support is included.
The volume of drums and contaminated soil excavated can
be approximated by adding the 750 cubic yards (573 m )
estimated to be in the LCP, to the 308 cubic yards (235 m )
of non-PCB material (non-LCP) disposed of from the HCP.
Hence, the unit cost for excavating3 contaminated soil and
drums was about $47/cubic yard ($61/m ).
15-30
-------
Figure 6. Estimated and Actual Labor Hours in Remedial Phase
5000
4000
3000
c£
til -
2000
1000
4100 (approx)
503
TOTAL ESTIMATED MA1IHOURS
Reporting Period:
July 3 chru August 4, 1981
Source: Arthur D. Little weekly project report to MA DEQE
8/4/81
15-31
-------
Transportation - Remedial Phase
The DEQE spent a total of $60,000 for transportation
during the remedial work. This cost was $37,854 (39%) below
what was expected because the lower than expected amount of
contaminated soil on site required fewer truckloads. The
disposal hauling of about 520 miles (825 km) was done by
Tonawanda Trucking and Relco Systems. A 15% service charge
was added to the subcontractor rate by O.K. Materials
resulting in a rate of $2,300 per 13 cubic yard (9.94 m )
truckload, which held about 16.9 tons (15.3 Mt), according
to an OHM official. The unit cost charged to DEQE was
26 /cubic yard/mile (18 /Mt/km).
Disposal - Emergency and Remedial Phases
The DEQE spent a total of $63,675 on disposal during
the emergency and the remedial responses. All disposal was
carried out at the Chemical and Environmental Conservation
Systems, Inc. (CECOS) facility in Niagra Falls, New York.
Of the 101 full and partially full drums removed from the
site during the emergency response, 89 remained in storage
as of October 1982 at Recycling Industries, in Braintree,
phase. Massachussetts, pending completion of the criminal
litigation, for which they serve as evidence. The estimated
future cost of $50,000 for storing and disposing of these 89
drums is based on a verbal estimate by a DEQE official that
the total emergency operation will ultimately total
$100,000, minus the costs accounted for in the invoices.
The disposal costs charged by O.K. Materials includes a 15%
service charge added to the unit costs.
Hydrogeological Study
The DEQE spent $25,000 for the hydrogeological study by
Goldberg Zoino Associates (GZA). Results of this study are
discussed above in the "Description of Contamination"
section." Three subcontractors were used by GZA: Con-Tec,
Inc. (Concord, New Hampshire), for drilling the 5 test
wells; Energy Resources, Inc. (Cambridge, Massachusetts) for
laboratory analysis of the voltile organics in the soil and
water samples and GHR Engineering (New Bedford,
Massachusetts) for fecal coliform analysis of the ground
water.
Management Consultant
Arthur D. Little, Inc., of Cambridge, Massachusetts
(ADL) provided management consulting services to DEQE for
the remedial phase of the Marty's CMC project as part of a
contract with a ceiling of $467,108 that extended from June
6, 1981 to October 29, 1982. The $80,000 share of this work
that related to the Marty's GMC clean-up, given in Table 2,
15-32
-------
is based on an estimate given by a DEQE official. This
estimate was noted to include significant one-time start-up
costs. For comparison, if the $467,108 were spread out
evenly over the 16-month contract period at
$29,194.25/month, the 2i/4-month work related to Marty's
CMC, the billing would have been $65,687 ($467,108 x 2,25).
Two subcontractors were retained by ADL, with DEQE's
approval. Coopers and Lybrand of Boston, Massachusetts
performed invoice auditing. Haley and Aldrich of Cambridge,
Massachusetts provided independent hydrogeological advice,
such as assisting in the ground water sensitivity survey of
the area with DEQE and a Kingston town official.
The issue of the assistance versus the training
function of ADL became important during the Marty's GMC
phase of ADL's DEQE contract. The plan for using a
management consultant involved having ADL train DEQE
personnel to manage hazardous waste site clean-ups on their
own. By September 1982, ADL was almost completely phased
out because DEQE staff were able to perform the same work
themselves. A DEQE official was concerned, however, that
his newly trained engineers and managers would move to jobs
in the private sector.
Officials in DEQE believed that the use of the
management consultant was cost-effective for two reasons.
First, the auditing of on-site work and invoices allowed
DEQE to take full advantage of the potential economies of
the time-and-materials clean-up contract. Since the exact
amount of contaminated material at Marty's GMC was found to
be lower than expected, the careful scrutiny by the on-scene
coordinator ensured that a commensurately lower charge was
billed. A DEQE official said that experienced engineers
were needed to perform this on-site scrutiny. In addition,
cost tracking was enhanced by comparing expected and actual
costs against 8 specific milestones for the operation.
Second, the cost for the primary contractor was also
reduced by payment within the discount period. Previous
state contracts did not include a provision for a discount,
since payment was usually delayed. A discount of 5% was
offered if the bill was paid within 15 days, and 2% if paid
within 20 days. The invoices were paid on a weekly basis.
The discount rate was extrapolated for the day paid between
15-20 days after billing. Discounts were achieved for all
invoices on an average of 2.62% and a total savings of
$10,983. A DEQE official believed that the agency would not
have obtained the discount without the greater accounting
resources provided through the ADL contract.
An official with the contractor for the clean-up work,
O.H. Materials, believed that additional savings were
15-33
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realized from the use of the management consultant because
he believed that they were able to cut through the red tape
at DEQE and communicate more effectively with the agency
since the ADL had the credibility of an independent
consultant.
Equipment - Remedial Phase
During the remedial phase, the DEQE spent a total of
$138,442 on contractor equipment rental, excluding sub-
contractor equipment. During the week of July 17 - 23,
1981, for which detailed invoices are available, sub-
contractor equipment accounted for about 1/10
($3925/$40,023) the amount charged for equipment by OHM,
including mobile analytical equipment and facilities, which
accounted for about 20% of its equipment charges.
The unit costs charged by the different contractors for
similar pieces of equipment were roughly similar. One
contractor sometimes charged more for one piece, but less
for another. For example, OHM charged $56/hour for a 955
CAT front-loader; whereas Black Gold, Inc. charged $65/hour
for a 955 CAT. However, an OHM subcontractor, CMC, Inc.
charged $25/hour for a Case 580 C backhoe, whereas Black
Gold charged $15/hour for a Case 680 C backhoe. The hourly
charge for OHM's 30-foot CAT 215 backhoe reflects the
substantially larger size of the CAT 215 over the Case 580 C
backhoe. This large, treaded backhoe, and the drum grappler
attachment ($225/day) were primary pieces of equipment used
for the clean-up that were not readily available elsewhere
at the time. The cost for the compatibility chamber
($500/day), which was brought to the site but not used, as
mentioned above in "Technology: Bulking," was not charged.
The cost for the mobile analytical laboratory ($550/day) did
not include the costs of hand held or large lab equipment,
or field measurement equipment (PID, TOC, GC).
Safety Procedure Costs
Of the 2 elements of the cost of safety procedures used
during the emergency and remedial actions - labor and
equipment - only the equipment cost during the remedial
action can be distinguished from the other costs. During
the emergency response, no specific safety procedure
information is availble for site surveillance, which was not
provided by the contractor. From April 1980 - May 1981, the
deputy fire chief who served as the acting hazardous waste
coordinator for Kingston, and the police chief of Kingston
regularly drove by the site to ensure that the polyethylene
cover had not been removed. Although no schedule or
billings were prepared for this site security provided by
the town, a DEQE official estimated that this service would
have cost the state an extra $1,000 per month, if the state
15-34
-------
had paid for it.
During the week of July 17-23, 1981, for which detailed
invoices are available, and during which the final excava-
tion, bulking and loading occurred, the safety procedures
were the most extensive of the entire remedial operation.
For this week, the total cost of equipment devoted to safety
procedures was an average of 33% (range 16-49%; standard
deviation (SD) 11.2) of the overall equipment costs for the
week; it was an average of 42% (range 20-63%; SD-0.15.) of
the non-analytical equipment costs for the week. Since the
total equipment costs were about 41% of the weekly invoice
total (excluding the discount $40,023/$97,245), the cost of
safety procedures accounted for about 14% of the weekly
invoice total (33% x 41% or $13,428/97,245). Among the
standard safety equipment included in these total safety
equipment costs are the following: decontamination and
equipment trailer ($350/day); high pressure water laser
($400/day); chemical sealing unit ($130/day); self-contained
breathing apparatus ($150/day); regulated manifold air
supply system ($105/day); protective clothing set
($100/day); portable pool ($75/day); emergency escape pack
($43/day).
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Through the project, the DEQE sought to acheive a cost-
effective site response at Marty's CMC. The Massachusetts
DEQE's technical and financial expertise with hazardous
waste were important in thier apparent success at meeting
this goal. The department's experience with earlier clean-
ups had also suggested the need for greater cost control
assistance, such as that provided by ADL at Marty's. The
segregation of work into immediate and planned response
phases provided a contructive means of allocating the
state's limited resources between competing sites and
balancing those needs with the remaining funds.
Another cost effectiveness control was achieved through
the use of the time and materials type of contract.
However, since the exact volume of material was the only
major unknown in the RFP, a unit price contract might have
been cheaper. Savings could have also been acheived by
eliminating charges during analysis delays. But the
contract change orders due to the discovery of PCBs might
have eliminated these savings.
The work performed during the emergency phase
effectively mitigated the threat of fire, which was the
immediate concern. The site assessment during the emergency
period was efficient and practical since it provided
adequate information for future work and used available on-
site equipment. Monitoring and maintenance of the
15-35
-------
temporarily secured drums ensured that the threat of fire
did not arise again.
The work performed during the remedial phase was
apparently effective in removing the source of
contamination. The bulking of liquids and highly
contaminated soil was a practical means of increasing the
efficiency of this operation. An assessment of the
environmental consequences of leaving the PCS contaminated
soil (under 7 ug/g) must await future analysis and review.
Planning for follow-up monitoring of the site was pending as
of November 1982.
Future work at the site should primarily involve
monitoring the capped area of PCB contaminated soil and
ensuring that any contaminated ground water does not
threaten public health or the environment. Generally, the
PCB contaminated soil should be monitored to ensure the
ability of the cap to prevent erosion and its effect on
plants growing on the area. Since PCB is highly insoluble
(Arochlor 1260 - 3 ug/1 in water), the threat of downward
migration into the aquifer is probably insignificant. The
ground water which flows toward Kingston and Plymouth Bays
should be monitored to determine the extent and route of
contamination, if any. Construction of new water supply
wells downgradient should be done very cautiously, if at
all, to prevent public health problems. Although the
commercial cranberry bogs are not hydrologically down-
gradient from the site, the proximity of these bogs and the
potential for bioaccumulation suggests that they should be
monitored in the future.
15-36
-------
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Arthur D. Little, Inc., (ADL) April, 1981. Kingston Bid
Evaluation Package.
ADL. May 1981. "Report of bid evaluation and contractor
selection" to DEQE.
ADL, "Weekly Progress Reports" to DEQE: July 24-July 30,
1981; July 31-August 4, 1981.
ADL. July 1981. "PCS in LCP soil analysis."
Amiro, Joe. DEQE Accountant. October, 1982. Personal
communication with Environmental Law Institute.
Attorney General of Massachusetts. Complaint against alleged
dumpers as amended April 23, 1981.
Black Gold Services, Inc. Invoice # 403, 412, 415, 425, 437,
444, 460, 477, 480 and 502 to DEQE.
Bronson, Peter. DEQE Attorney General Counsel's Office.
October 1982. Personal communication with Environmental
Law Institute.
Conally, Joseph. DEQE Southeast Regional Ofice. October
1982. Personnal communication with Environmental Law
Institute.
Coopers and Lybrand, Inc. July 29, 1981. Invoice audit.
Cortese, Antony D, Commissioner, DEQE, September 27, 1981.
Letter to Kingston Board of Selectmen.
Feldman, Larry. Goldberg Zoino Assc., Inc. October 1982.
Personal communication with Environmental Law Institute.
Goldberg Zoino Associates, Inc. August 1981. Kingston
Hydrogeological Study.
Gould, Jeff, on-scene coordinator DEQE, September 10, 1981.
Memo to William Marhoffer.
Huniwell, Dodi. Water Pbllution Control, DEQE. October 1982.
Personal communication with Environmental Law Institute.
15-37
-------
Ikalalenen, Barbara. U.S. EPA Region I, Boston, MA.
September 1982. Personal communication with
Environmental Law Institute.
Kelly, Richard, former Assistant Attorney General, Criminal
September 1982. Personal communication.
Kirk, Joseph, Vice President O.K. Materials, Findlay, Ohio.
October 1982. Personal communication with Environmental
Law Institute.
Marhoffer, William, project manager, DEQE. October 1982.
Personal communication with Environmental Law Institute.
McShane, Tohomas, Legislative Liason, DEQE. October 1982.
Personal communication with Environmental Law Institute.
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Quality Engineering,
(MA DEQE) form AF-4 for ADL services.
MA DEQE RFP, dated May 1, 1981.
MA DEQE, contract with O.K. Materials, signed June 26, 1981.
O'Brien, John. July 2, 1981. "Response to press inquiries
by DEQE."
O.K. Materials. May 1981. Proposal to DEQE.
O.H. Materials. August 1981. Invoices.
O.K. Materials, Weekly Progress Reports to DEQE:
July 8 - July 16, 1981
July 17 - July 23, 1981
July 24 - July 30, 1981
July 31 - August 4, 1981
O.H. Materials, Budget Variance Reports to DEQE:
July 8 - July 16, 1981
July 24 - July 30, 1981
O.H. Materials, Weekly Analytical Reports to DEQE:
July 8 - July 16, 1981
July 17 - Jyly 23, 1981
O.H. Materials. July 1981. "Sampling procedure for PCB's
in LCP".
O.H. Materials. August 1981. Final Report, by Robert
Panning.
O'Purier, J.J., DEQE, Memo to William Simmons on final site
disposition recommendation. August 1981.
15-38
-------
Panning, Robert, Vice president, O.K. Materials. October
1982. Personal communication with Environmental Law
Institute.
Pittman, Malcolm, former Assistant Attorney General, Civil
Division. September 1982. Personal communication.
Rappaport, Ann, Deputy Director, DEQE. September 1982.
Personal communication with Environmental Law Institute.
Simmons, William, Emergency Response Unit Director, DEQE.
August 1982. Personal communication with Environmental
Law Institute.
Shotwell, JoAnn, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division,
Environmental Protection. September 1982. Personal
communication with Environmental Law Institute.
Spittler, Tom, U.S. EPA, Region I, Boston, MA.. Laboratory and
Technical Services. October 1982. Personal
communication with Environmental Law Institute.
15-39
-------
-------
N.W. MAUTHE, INC.
APPLETON, WISCONSIN
INTRODUCTION
N.W. Mauthe, Inc. is a former chrome plating shop
located in Appleton, Wisconsin. In March, 1982, the
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (WDNR) dis-
covered puddles of yellow chromium contaminated water
along railroad tracks immediately south of the plating
shop. Subsequent investigation revealed hexavalent
chromium contamination of soil, surface water, and shallow
ground water beneath and south of the shop. Contaminated
water was seeping into a nearby residential basement, and
threatened to enter the Fox River via storm sewers.
Background
From 1966 to 1976, Norbert W. Mauthe operated a
chrome plating facility at 725 South Outagamie Street in
Appleton, Wisconsin under the name of the Wisconsin
Chromium Corporation. In 1976, Mauthe sold the name and
chrome plating customer list to another company but
continued to do cadmium and zinc plating at the Outagamie
Street facility for some time thereafter. At the time of
site discovery in March 1982, Mauthe remained the sole
owner of the property at Outagamie Street.
An anonymous phone call to the WDNR led to site dis-
covery. Yellow puddles were reported along the railroad
tracks behind the chrome plating plant and in an adjacent
ditch leading to a storm sewer which discharged to the Fox
River. Investigation by WDNR revealed that chromium
contaminated water was being pumped from a sump pump at a
residence 150 feet (46 m) from the plant. WDNR responded
with a quick sampling effort to determine the extent of
contamination and discovered a high level of chromium
contamination and low levels of cyanide, zinc, copper,
cadmium and othe metals. Figure 1 presents a layout of
the site and the primary areas of contamination.
NCP References
300.63(a)94)
discovery
16-1
-------
Storm Sewer Pipe
R
WISCONSIN CHROMIUM CORP
Figure 1. Location and Extent of Surface Chrome Contamination at the Mauthe Site
-------
Synopsis of Site Response
The WDNR determined that snowmelt and rainwater were
leaching chrome out of the soil near the plating building
and transporting it laterally along the permeable railroad
beds and to the nearby resident's sump pump. The immedi-
ate concern was to contain the contaminated surface water
and remove it from the area to reduce possible exposure of
nearby residents and to prevent the contaminated water
from migrating into the Fox River via the storm sewers.
The WDNR made an arrangement with a local contractor,
Rocket Sewer Handling, to pump and dispose of the contami-
nated surface water from the puddles surrounding the site,
from the drainage ditch adjacent to the railroad tracks,
and from the nearby storm sewer. Beginning in April 1982,
Rocket Sewer Hauling pumped and transported the contami-
nated Liquid to the nearby City of DePere Sewage Treatment
Plant. This effort was combined with the construction of
a small dam across the drainage ditch to reduce the flow
of contaminated water into the storm sewer, and applica-
tion of Loads of sand to contain the spill. Over the
following six weeks, Rocket Sewer Hauling periodically
returned to the site to remove puddles of contaminated
water from melting snow and rainfall.
Between May 18-20, 1982, Commercial Pumping and
Incineration (CPI), under contract with WDNR, installed a
more permanent collection system. The system included
shallow subsurface drains which collected the contaminated
surface water and shallow ground water and routed it to
collection sumps where they were pumped into a holding
tank. Contaminated soils were removed from the north side
of the tracks in the process of installing the collection
sump there. CPI also installed a drain pipe to collect
clean rainfall runoff and divert it away from the sub-
surface drains so as to minimize the quantity of water
which is collected, pumped and hauled off site.
Rocket Sewer Hauling continues to haul the collected
contaminated liquids to DePere Sewage Treatment Pland and
as of December 1982, 273,000 gallons (1.03 x 10° 1) of
contaminated liquid have been pumped.
In October 1982, Mauthe drilled through the concrete
floor of the plating building, excavated a trench and
installed a sump pump to pump contaminated liquid into the
holding tank.
300.65(b)(6)
moving hazardous
substances
off-site
300.65(b)(7)
physical
barriers to
deter spread of
release
300.70(b)(l)
(iii)
ground water
controls
300.70(b)(l)(ii)
(b)
surface water
diversion and
collection
300.70(c)(2)(i)
excavation of
contaminated
soils
16-3
-------
SITE DESCRIPTION
The Mauthe site is located in Appleton, in east
central Wisconsin. The site is bounded by South Outagamie
Street s 2nd Street and Melvin Street. The source of the
contamination was the Wisconsin Chromium Corporation,
formerly located at 725 Outagamie Street adjacent to the
Chicago and Northwest Railroad tracks. This area is mixed
industrial and residential. Private residences are
located within 150 feet (46 m) of the source of contam-
ination. There are 6 primary and secondary schools
within one mile (1.6 Km) of the site, one of which is
located just 1 1/2 blocks from the site. Figure 2 shows
the location of the Mauthe site.
Surface Characteristics
The climate of Outagamie County is mild with long
cold and snowy winters and warm summers. There is a
considerable temperature range from season to season and
from year to year. The maximum average daily temperature
in Appleton ranges from a low of 26.1°F (-3.3°C) in
January to 82.6°F (28.1°C) in July. The average daily
minimum temperature ranges from a low of 9.8°F (-12.3°C)
in January to a high of 61.9°F (16.6°C) in July.
The average yearly precipitation in Appleton is 25.5
inches (64.8 cm) and 55 percent of the precipitation falls
between May and September. Snowfall and sleet average
about 43.4 inches (110.3 cm), but vary greatly from year
to year. The last freezing temperature occurs later than
April 30th in 6 out of 10 years. Prevailing winds are
from the northwest in winter and from the southwest in
summer.
The city of Appleton and most of Outagamie County
lie in the Fox River drainage basin. The river, which
is about 0.5 miles (0.8 Km) south of the Mauthe site,
flows in a southwesterly direction through Appleton and
discharges into Lake Winnebago.
The topographic relief of Outagaraie County was formed
by recent glaciation. The soil are well drained, nearly
level to gently sloping, and were formed in clayey glacial
till. The upper soils are principally brown and red clays
and silty clays. The permeability of these soils is slow
to moderately slow. In the immediate area of the Mauthe
site, much of the native soils have been covered with fill
consisting of cinders, sand and gravel. This fill layer
is discontinuous but is 1 to 2 feet (0.3-0.6 m) thick in
some areas. A perched water table is present in the fill
material.
300.68(e)(2)(i)
(A)
population at
risk
300.68(e)(2)
(i)(E)
climate
300.68(e)(2)
hydrogeological
factors
16-4
-------
Figure 2. Location of Che Mauthe Site - Appleton, Wisconsin
16-5
-------
Hydrogeology
The surface geology of Outagamie County is charac-
terized by a thick layer of glacial drift deposited during
the Wisconsin stage of glaciation. These deposits are
underlain by sandstone and dolomite of the Cambrian and
Ordovician age. The geology in the area of the Mauthe
site is outlined more specifically in the geologic cross-
section shown in Figure 3 and in Table 1 which summarizes
driller's well logs for two wells located within 0.5 miles
(0.8 km) of the site.
The glacial drift which is mainly till containing
sand, clay, silt and gravel varies widely in thickness in
the area of Appleton and is reported to be about 60 feet
(18 m) thick beneath the Mauthe site.
The upper 10 to 20 feet (3-6 m) of the glacial till
has been characterized by borings which were taken during
the site investigation efforts at the Mauthe site in May
1982. The drift was chiefly brown and red clays and silty
clays with discontinuous sand and gravel seams. Thin
sand and gravel seams of 1-2 inches (2.5-5 cm) were found
in most borings and thicker sand seams of 1 to 5 feet (0.3
- 1.5 m) occured in several borings at depths below 5 feet
(1.5 m). Water flowed freely where these highly permeable
sand or gravel strata were encountered. The surrounding
clay soils were generally saturated.
As indicated in Figure 3 and in the drillers logs
(Table 1), the glacial till is underlain by a dolomite
unit, ranging in thickness from about 20 to 80 feet (6 -
24 m) . Vertical fracturing and numerous sandy and silty
zones are characteristic of this formation. In some areas
there is 15 to 20 feet (4.5-6 m) of fine to medium
sandstone near the base of this unit.
As Figure 3 illustrates, the dolomite formation is
underlain by a sandstone unit (St. Peter sandstone) which
is characterized by fine to coarse grained sandstone
containing some chert. This unit is discontinuous but is
shown to be 70 feet (21 m) thick in the area of well No.
280.
The fractured dolomite or the sandstone, where found,
is in turn underlain by an older, denser dolomite
formation. This dolomite contains numerous shaly and
sandy zones and layers of chert. It is over 100 feet
(30 M) thick beneath the site.
Finally this dense dolomite formation is underlain by
about 150 feet (50 ra) of sandstone of the late Cambrian
16-6
-------
Northwest
APPl I I UN
Southeast
Ditum it ntftn IH /•¥*/
Figure 3. Geological Cross Section of Area Around the Mauthe Site
Source: LeRoux, 1957
16-7
-------
TABLE 1. WELL LOGS FROM TWO WELLS WITHIN 0.5 MILES OF THE MAUTHE SITE
. u. T. a s.. a. n x.
(ft.)
Depth
- (ft.)
3*04. iat. mv-nofc. •maaii—
TJC, pat 4otonuac_
3:wi. ana. i
TIT. nipt T*ui>iur*r
Giteia doiwniic nod FUiMvul* (ornucao;
Unooiu. UtOi-nmTr soaw ittot Wu*«tmT.-
sina*t*j*. swuom-io rtni 1111 mi iicu-Enr. dolooune..!!! I
sc
jiumon*. tta»-« mdua-cnBHii. nrr mat W»T
COOR. H»T. 3UU[-CJtT
jh"**. no: cam. mvB-fnr. onJc..
n_ 2*?- S?7i -r«U»"'«»r. o™I«-_™T titoi (tmy, aaar. ^>«. ew. oottdiu
Opptr OmbrajB OWIB:
^aonoDo. TCTT armttaio. TVT 11«M mr. dn
M. T- a N_ a. 17 x.
OaioaiM, Mu-cnT ud cnr
Do. 'mm. lirat-fny'
fln^tmnd. pfni. dntomdc ___ _ ________
poki-niB;. nndT. Trt. tntt. tauamtie __________ ________
aaiaiam. aa*»rtin«c. niT. n«a. aevimme. (Unconioe _____ IIII. ~ **"
iiBdJerac. la» a BMlOB-oamwuwO. ll«nl-fT»r.
Source: LeRoux, 1957
-------
Age. It is a fine to coarse grained sandstone which is
shaly and dolotnitic in some places.
Ground water occurs under both water table and
artesian conditions in the Appleton area. Water table
conditions prevail locally in bodies of clean sand and
gravel and in the dolomite where water moves freely
through cracks and solution channels. Artesian water
occurs locally, confined by layers of silt and clay in the
glacial drift. It also occurs throughout the bedrock
formations wherever it is confined by relatively imperme-
able dolomite and shale.
The sandstones of the upper Cambrian series and the
St. Peter's sandstone, where it is sufficiently thick, are
the most important aquifers in Outagarnie County. The
dolomite formations also supply some water to domestic and
industrial wells in the county but yields from these wells
are generally low. Yields from wells drilled in the
glacial till are good where the permeable layers are
sufficiently thick. Piezometric maps indicate that the
ground water flow is in a southeastern direction. This is
a result of natural discharge into the Fox River, recharge
from areas west of Appleton, industrial pumping along the
Fox River and the eastward dip of the bedrock.
The city of Appleton is served by a municipal water
supply and WDNR has indicated that there is only one
domestic well in the "immediate" area. This well is not
supplied by the glacial drift and is not contaminated.
There are several industrial wells in Appleton and the
sandstone and, to a lesser extent, the dolomite formations
supply these wells.
300.68(e)(2)
population at
risk
WASTE DISPOSAL HISTORY
Norbert Mauthe purchased the property at 725
Outagamie Street in 1966. He operated the Wisconsin
Chromium Corporation, a facility involved in chrome
plating and other types of electroplating, until March 26,
1976, when he sold the name and the chrome plating
customer list to Southern Plating located in another part
of the State. Mr. Mauthe retained the Outagamie Street
facility where he has continued to do cadmium and zinc
plating.
As the name implies, Wisconsin Chromium Corporation
was chiefly involved in chromplating. The process
involved immersion of the metal into an acidic solu-
tion of chromic acid or chromium salts so that some of
the base metal was converted to one of the components of
300.68
amount and form
of substance
present
16-9
-------
the film by reaction with the aqueous solution. Chromium
plating solutions contain chromic acid at concentrations
of 400 g/1 and small amounts of sulfuric acid or a mixture
of sulfuric and fluoro-silicate or fluoride ions.
Chromate conversions can be produced on a number of metals
including zinc, cadmium, copper and aluminum and low
concentrations of these dissolved metals can be found in
the chromating bath.
During operation of the Wisconsin Chromium Corpo-
ration at South Outagamie Street, there were two possible
sources of contamination. One was a blower vent located
along the southern face of the facility which discharged
chromium laden mist to the outside. The second source
apparently resulted from leakage of chromium plating
wastewater through cracks in the concrete floor. The
chromating tanks were located along the south wall of the
facility. A trough had run adjacent to tanks in order to
catch the drippings and to conduct them to the sanitary
sewer. Cracks in the trough and in the concrete flooring
resulted in seepage of chromium bearing waste water into
the underlying soil.
On March 31, 1982, the WDNR, responding to an
anonymous complaint, discovered puddles of yellow water in
the vicinity of the Outagamie Street plating facility and
in a ditch which ran adjacent to the railroad tracks, as
illustrated in Figure 1. Apparently the upward movement
of the water table resulting from snowmelt and rain had
caused the surface expression of the contamination.
WDNR's subsequent investigation and sampling at the site
verified the presence of high concentrations of hexavalent
chromium and low concentrations of other metals and
cyanide. Because of these findings, WDNR initiated both
an emergency response and a planned remedial response.
DESCRIPTION OF CONTAMINATION
In the course of developing both an emergency
response and a planned remedial response, WDNR has con-
ducted several sampling and monitoring efforts to deter-
mine the extent and severity of the contamination problem.
On April 1 and again on April 21, after emergency
efforts had been undertaken to pump contaminated water
from puddles and from the drainage ditches WDNR took a
number of samples from shallow 18 to 36 inch (46-91cm)
hand-dug, auger holes, from surface puddles, and from the
sump pump of a residence located less than 150 feet
(50 m) from the site. The samples were analysed for
hexavalent chromium, cyanide and for a number of other
300.68(f)
remedial
investigation
300.65(b)(l)
collecting and
analyzing
samples
16-10
-------
metals. The location of the sampling points and the
results of those sampling efforts are summarized in Figure
4 and Tables 2 and 3. The results clearly indicate the
following:
• Hexavalent chromium was the major contaminant
although cyanide, zinc and other metals were
also detected.
• The highest chromium concent rat ions were found at
or near the surface in the area west of a concrete
slab (see Figure 4, samples 3 and E), along the
southern wall of the facility and adjacent to the
blower discharge vent which was used for exhaust-
ing chromium laden mist.
• The contaminated water had entered a drainage
ditch which ran adjacent to the south side of the
railroad tracks and discharged into the Fox River
via a storm sewer.
• The permeable railway bed and the topography were
causing the contaminated groundwater to move in a
northeastern direction.
• The contaminated water was also moving in a south-
easterly direction, as was evident from the high
concentrations of chromium in samples taken from a
nearby basement sump pump (Sample 9, Figure 4).
• Contaminant migrated to a lesser extent north and
west of the site was minimal.
On May 6 and 7, 1982, two weeks prior to the instal-
lation of a surface water collection and diversion
system, Soil Testing Services of Green Bay, Wisconsin
conducted a subsurface exploration.
Nine borings were drilled at the locations shown on
Figure 5 using a trailer mounted hollow flight, split
spoon sampler in accordance with ASTM specification
D1586-67. Six, 20-foot (6 m) and three, 10-foot (3 m)
borings were made and samples were taken at 2.5 foot
(0.8 m) intervals. The boring logs which resulted from
this effort were described under "hydrogeology." Table 4
summarizes the levels of total chromium found in the
borings at various depths. Levels of 30 mg/kg or less are
considered to be background levels. The results indicated
Chat chromium had migrated vertically to a maximum of 13
feet (4 m) and further confirmed that the direction of
migration was in a northeast and southeast direction. The
300.68)(e)(2)
amount and form
of substance
present
300.68(e)(l)(v)
highly contami-
nated soil at or
near the surface
300.68(f)
sampling and
monitoring
300.68(e)(2)(ii)
extent of migra-
tion of
substance
16-11
-------
TABLE 2. RESULTS OF APRIL 1, 1982 SAMPLING AT MAUTHE SITE
Sample
lumber
SA-1
SA-3
SA-6
SA-7
SA-8
SA-9
As
mg/l
<1
<1
<1
<1
<1
<1
Ba
mg/l
<0.4
<0.4
<0.4
5
<0.4
<0.4
Cd
mg/l
<0.02
<0.02
0.04
<0.02
<0.02
i ' i
<0,02
Cu
mg/l
<0.05
<0.05
0.08
<0.05
<0.05
<0,1
• i • •^•^—
Fe
mg/l
1.4
0.8
1.0
5.1
2.4
8.5
Pb
mg/l
<0.1
<0.1
0.1
<0.1
<0.1
<0.1
i i "
-
Se
mg/l
<1
<1
<1
<1
<1
<1
*• 1 '*' 1"
Ag
mg/l
<0.05
<0,05
<0.05
<0.05
<0.05
<0.05
Zn
mg/l
0.150
0.080
0.580
0.100
0.280
0.170
Cr+6
rag/1
1.3
340
8.5
0.520
22
96
i I'
Cr-Tot.
mg/l
.
1.3
400
13
<0.1
21
no
GN
mg/l
<.01
.02
.21
— **..
<.01
I
I—'
NJ
All samples except SA-7 were properly filtered and Preflerved. All samples were from
shallow (18-36 inches) augerholea except SA-9 which is a aump pump sample.
-------
TABLE 3. RESULTS OF APRIL 21, 1982 SAMPLING AT MAUTHE SITE
I
»—•
LJ
Sample
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
I
K
As
rag/1
-------
OLD WISCONSIN CHROMIUM CORP
I
April 1 Sampling Points
April 21 Sampling Points
Figure 4. Location of April 1 and April 21, 1982 Sampling Points
-------
I
(->
Oi
Oil) WISCONSIN CHROMIUM CORP
I
Borings
Wells
Figure 5. Location of Borings and Wells Drilled and Installed on May 6 & 7,1982
-------
TABLE 4 RESULTS OF MAY 1982 SOIL BORINGS - TOTAL CHROMIUM (nig/kg)
(NITRIC ACID EXTRACTION) OF^OIL SAMPLES ON AND ADJACENT
TO THE N.W.-_MAUTHE COMPANY. • " .
. — . —
Deptl
(ft)
3
6
8
11
13
16
18
21
i Boring
1
80
61
30
27
30
-
30
21
20
2
4300
1300
420
720
810
1500
30
20
30
.^ aw**^— "-B^-^
3
i ' '
390
770
160
220 .
. ' ' *~
140
^•^— ^— ^— ^— ^
4
^m^^—*^^^^^^^
200
390
62
110
120
5
t^ ^^^B^N^fc^^
150
110
82
210
150
20
6
-^-•^•PI • "
79
310
51
44
16
72
•••— ^ i
•• i •
7
750
280
55
41
23
20
21
20
26
•.i -^— ^
••— _^ .^B^— ^^^— 1
8
910
120
120
110
25
25
28
~- — -^ — — •
9
••••••••••••••••••»•
32
34
29
23
24
22
21
16
19
Soil sample immediately under plating buildings slab: 33,000 mg/kg
total Cr —
1Blanks indicate that sample was not taken
All depths are+_ foot. ^
16-16
-------
high chromium levels detected in boring #5 were thought to
be attributable to a small spi11 from the chrome plating
facility. A grab sample of soil from underneath the
building slab was also taken and had an extremely high
chromium concentration of 33,000 mg/kg. This high
chromium concentrations led WDNR to suspect that the
blower vent was not the only source. WDNR subsequently
invest igated the buiIding and found evidence of leaky
collection troughs and cracks in the concrete flooring
thorugh which the chromium had seeped.
In two of the 20 foot (6 m) borings, PVC observation
wells were also installed. Figure 5 shows the locations
of these we 11s. The wells were protected with steel
protector pipes and locks. One well, B-7, was screened
from 15 to 20 feet (4.5 -6m) and the other, B-8, was
screened from 10 to 15 feet (3-4.5 m).
A second round of borings and monitoring wells were
completed by Twin City Testing of Appleton in December
1982. Five borings made inside the plating building to a
depth of 15 to 20 feet (4.5-6 m). Seven borings were made
to a depth of 15 to 20 feet (4.5-6 m) at various locations
in the area of south Outagaraie and Second Street and
twelve, 2-inch diameter schedule 160 PVC piezometers were
installed. Drill ing and sampling procedures were similar
to those used during the May 6 and 7 hydrogeologic
investigation. Boring and well locations, boring logs and
sampling results were not available as of January 1, 1983.
PLANNING THE SITE RESPONSE
InJLt_i.at^iqn of Response
On March 31, 1982, the WDNR was alerted to the
chromium spill at 725 Sout Outagamie Street by an
anonymous phone call reporting yellow and green water
pumping out of the ground around the site of Norbert
Mauthe's chrome plating plant. The WDNR responded with
an initial investigation to determine the type of con-
tamination and immediately hired Rocket Sewer Hauling to
begin pumping the contaminated liquid from puddles and
from the drainage ditch next to the railroad tracks. The
WDNR1s initial sampling determined the contamination to be
primarily hexavalent chromium in the soil and ground
water. The immediate threat involved three factors:
(1) the danger posed by human or animal exposure by
direct contact to puddles of hexavalent chromium contami-
nated water, (2) the threat of human exposure by direct
contact through seepage of contaminated water into local
300.64(a)(2)
identificat ion
of the source
and nature of
the release
300.65(a)(l)
exposure to
toxic substances
16-17
-------
resident's basements, and (3) the possibility of contam-
inated water migrating to the Fox River about 0.5 miles
(.8 km) south of the site.
^election of Site Response
The emergency activities at the Mauthe site, which
included periodic pumping of chromium contaminated water
from the drainage ditch and from puddles, were viewed by
WDNR to be interim control measures to provide them with
the time they needed to determine the extent of contamina-
tion and to develop a planned response. Based on early
sampling results and WDNR's inspection of the site, they
proposed a response plan which included the following
elements:
• Control and dispose of surface water in order to
reduce potential health effects and to prevent
contamination from entering the Fox River via the
storm sewers (Phase l)
Identify the horizontal and vertical extent of
contamination and the transport mechanisms (Phase
II
Design and implement a contamination containment
or removal plan (Phase III + IV).
Although WDNR could have continued to pump water from
the puddles and drainage ditch, this approach was expen-
sive and inefficient as a long-term solution. A lot of
contamination was escaping these collection efforts and
the WDNR was incurring a large expense because of the need
to pump the puddles and ditch after every rain storm. In
addition, unnecessary expenses were incurred from pumping
large amounts of clean rainwater running on to the site.
Therefore WDNR considered alternatives for controlling the
surface water.
They decided that a drainage system should be
installed to reduce the high costs and staff time
involved with pumping from the ditch and the puddles.
WDNR briefly considered alternatives to a drainage system
but dismissed them. Dewatering wells would not have been
effective because the soils were too clayey and the perme-
ability too low.
The District WDNR staff decided that, due to a short-
age of manpower and lack of staff engineering experience,
300.70(b)(l)(ii)
and (iii)
surface water
and ground water
controls
300.68(f)
sampling
and monitoring
300.70(b)(iii)
ground water
controls
300.68(g) and
(h)
development and
screening of
alternatives
16-18
-------
the design and installation of the collection system
should be performed by an outside contractor. WDNR
contacted several potential contractors and on April 14
they received four proposals which included the remedial
actions proposed in Table 5.
Table 5. PROPOSED REMEDIAL RESPONSE FOR PHASE I
Proposed Remedial Response
Collection lines with meter sprinkler
system to leach chromium from the soil
Trench system with pretreatment prior
to discharge to sanitary sewer
Groundwater depression pump with
collection and treatment
Trench system with collection and off-
site treatment of contaminated water;
removal of highly contaminated soils;
diversion of clean surface water
WDNR's Rationale for Selection
or Rejection
Rejected: high cost and soils
too impermeable for leaching
Rejected: high cost of pretreat-
ment
Rejected: soils too clayey to
pump
Selected: on basis of cost and
effectiveness
WDNR accepted the proposal submitted by CPI. Due to a
delay in funding, the work was not begun until May 18th.
However most of the construction was completed by May
20th.
Phase III or the design of the remedial response
activities is still ongoing at this time. As of January
1983, WDNR had just received the first round of monitoring
data from the wells which were completed in December 1982,
but the results will not be available until WDNR has
reviewed and analyzed the data.
Extent of Response
During Phase I the WDNR sought primarily to contain
the immediate threat of the chromium contamination by
minimizing migration of the contaminated ground and sur-
face water from the site. Consequently the selection of
the length and depth of the drainage system and the amount
of soil excavated was based upon WDNR's evaluation of what
was necessary to remove the immediate threat. The
response activity thus far can be termed an emergency
300.65(c)
immediate
removal is
complete
300.68(j)
extent of remedy
16-19
-------
response and an interim control measure. The WDNR is in
the process of analyzing the most recent hydrogeological
data and planning a more extensive response to the site in
order to prevent further horizontal and vertical migration
of the contaminated water.
300.66(a)
assessment for
further action
DESIGN AND EXECUTION OF THE SITE RESPONSE
As indicated previously, the remedial response
activities at the Mauthe site have involved an emergency
response, the planned, Phase I interim response for more
efficient control and collection of surface water and the
planned Phase IV response for containing or removing
remaining contaminated ground water.
Emergency Response
Within hours after WDNR was notified by the chromium
contamination problem, they reviewed their list of quali-
fied contractors and Rocket Sewer Hauling Company from
Appleton was contacted and requested to begin pumping
operations. Over a 5 day period from March 31 to April 4,
Rocket Sewer Hauling, collected 6000-7000 gallons (11,400-
26,5001) of contaminated liquid from the drainage ditch
running adjacent to the railroad tracks, from pools on the
ground surface and from a nearby storm sewer. The snow-
melt and heavy rains which occurred over the first several
days of the emergency response were causing the drainage
ditch running parallel to the railroad tracks to fill up
rapidly and were also resulting in the surface expression
of chromium contaminated water in puddles throughout the
area. The drainage ditch emptied into the storm sewer
system via a corrugated drain pipe at south Outagamie
Street and the storm water was eventually discharged into
the Fox River. Therefore, WDNR was very concerned with
minimizing discharge from the ditch into the storm sewer.
On April 2, with the threat of heavy rains, WDNR con-
structed a small coffer dam across the drainage ditch to
minimize discharge of contaminated water into the storm
sewer. They also used sandbags to isolate the highly
contaminated area and to prevent the chromium contam-
inated water from gravitating back into the residents
yards. However, these efforts were not very successful.
The rain was very heavy and the water flooded over the
drainage ditch and into the backyards of the residents
threatening to flood their basements. It was necessary to
break the dam and release some of the water into the storm
sewer.
300.65(b)(6)
moving hazardous
substances of f-
site
300.65(a)(7)
use of barrier
to deter spread
of releases
16-20
-------
The Department of Public Works then brought in two
loads of sand which were used to isolate the most heavily
contaminated area in an area of about 50 feet by 50 feet
(15m by 15m) and to divert the uncontaminated runoff from
the Miller Electric Co. parking lot just west of the site.
After the water which had flooded over the ditch water had
receded, sand bags were again placed in the ditch near the
storm sewer pipe. These measures, together with periodic
pumping from puddles and the drainage ditch, were effec-
tive in minimizing the quantity of contaminated water
discharged into the storm sewer.
In addition to pumping and diking, WDNR and the city
of Appleton took a number of other measures to reduce
public health hazard. The Department of Public Works put
up several hundred feet of snow fence to isolated the
heavily contaminated area from the adjacent residence.
The sump pump hose from a nearby house which was discharg-
ing into Second Street was rerouted into the area of heavy
contamination.
300.65(b)(3)
security
fencing
Phase I: Collection and Control of Surface Water
With the immediate emergency abated, WDNR began
further investigation of the site to determine the extent
of contamination and to plan for a more effective and
efficient surface water control system.
On April 15, WDNR selected CPI to install a surface
water and shallow ground water collection system, divert
clean water away from the site and to haul away highly
contaminated soils. However, due to problems in funding,
installation of the system was not begun until May 18,
1982. By this time Soil Testing Service had completed the
first series of borings and monitoring wells (drilled on
May 6 and 7, 1982). Although this information indicated
that chromium had migrated to a depth of 13 feet (3.9 m)
in the area of highest contamination, the results were not
available in time to be used in designing the collection
system and this information is being considered for Phase
II.
Through April and early May, prior to the construc-
tion of the collection system, Rocket Sewer Hauling con-
tinued to pump the chrome contaminated liquid and to haul
it to the DePere Sewage Treatment Plant. By April 14
about 10,000 gallons (38,000 1) had been hauled and, by
May 4, the volume had reached about 20,000 gallons
(75,700 1) DePere had only agreed to accept 15,000 gallons
(56,800 1) and it was necessary for WDNR to negotiate a
long term contract with DePere. The city of DePere Sewage
16-21
-------
Treatment Plant was the logical choice for treating the
contaminated water for the following reasons:
• The plant ran very efficiently whereas the
Appleton STP, the only other reasonably close
plant, had operational problems and occassionally
had to bypass due to overload
• Treatment thus far had not caused any operational
problems at the DePere STP
• Sludge was incinerated and the ash disposed of in
a licensed landfill, whereas Appleton1s sludge was
landspread.
The major elements of the collection system are shown
in Figure 6. The system includes 3 parallel subsurface
drains which are about 3 feet (1m) deep and have the fol-
lowing lengths:
• Drain to the north of main track - 325 feet (99 m)
• Drain to the south of main track - 275 feet (84 m)
• Drain to the south of switching track - 150 feet
(46 m)
The drains were installed by excavating a trench
about 2 feet (0,6 m) wide and 3 feet (1 m) deep us ing a
track type backhoe. The trenches were sloped at one per-
cent grade to two collection points as shown in Figure 6.
Four inch (10cm), perforated schedule 40 PVC pipe was laid
in the trench and surrounded with about 2 inches (5cm) of
gravel. The trenches were then backfilled with native
soils. Sumps were installed at each of the two collection
points. The sumps were connected to each other by about
25 feet (7.6 m) of PVC pipe so that water collected in the
sump south of the tracks could be pumped into a larger
sump north of tracks. The sump on the south side of the
tracks is a 4 foot diameter (1.2 m by 1.2 m) perforated
concrete cylinder which was installed about 4 feet (1.2 m)
below the grade of the railroad tracks. The sump on the
north side of the tracks, located in the area of highest
chromium contamination consists of two of these concrete
cylinders, one on top of the other, and was installed 6
feet (1.8 m) below railroad track grade. This sump is
equipped with a pump which empties the contents into a
10,000 gallon (38,000 1) steel tank.
During installation of the sump on north side of the
tracks, CPI encountered layers and streaks of yellow and
green (chromium) stained soil. The contaminated area
16-22
300.70(b)(l)(ii)
(B)
surface water
diversion and
collection
-------
contain or remove contaminated ground water. The extent
of the Phase IV activities will be largely determined by
the results of a detailed hydrogeologic investigation
controls which is currently underway. This investigation
includes soil sampling and ground water monitoring from
borings and wells which were completed by Twin City
Testing in December 1982. As of January 19, 1983, WDNR
had received the first set of ground water monitoring data
from the newly installed wells, but the data had not been
analyzed.
Potential remedial measures which WDNR is considering
include the installation of deeper subsurface drains to
collect contaminated groud water, removal of additional
contaminated soils with the possibility of razing the old
chroraeplating building to remove any contaminated soils
beneath it.
COST AND FUNDING
Source of Funding
The WDNR was able to procure funding for the site
clean-up through the state's Emergency Spill Fund,
authorized by the Wisconsin Hazardous Waste Management Act
of 1978. However, the State of Wisconsin has brought suit
against Norbert W. Mauthe in Circuit Court for reimburse-
ment of the expenses incurred in the site clean-up for
which he is charged with statutory responsibility. A
complaint was filed in Circuit Court by the Wisconsin 300.68(c)
Department of Justice on October 4, 1982, and a trial is responsible
expected. If these expenses are collected from Mauthe, the party
money will be returned to the Emergency Spill Fund.
Selection of Contractors
The WDNR staff performed some of the initial site
investigation and then contracted with Soil Testing
Services in Green Bay, Wisconsin to perform a hydro-
geologic investigation which was conducted on May 6 and 7,
1982. Rocket Sewer Hauling in Appleton was contracted for
regular pumping and transportation of the accumulated
chromium water to DePere Sewage Treatment Plant. These
two contractors were selected by the WDNR on an informal
basis during the emergency phase. After the initial
emergency, WDNR formally sought bids from waste haulers to
haul the chromium contaminated water to DePere. Rocket
Sewer Hauling was again selected because they had the
lowest bid. The DePere Sewage Treatment Plant was the
logical choice because the Appleton Sewage Treatment Plant
was not equipped to accept the chromium contaminated
16-25
-------
water. SST and Twin City Testing of Appleton responded to
WDNR's August 31, 1982 quotation request for additional
soil borings and of these two firms, Twin City Testing was
selected to provide the additional subsurface exploration.
After deciding to install a more permanent collection
system, the WDNR invited nine contractors to submit
proposals for its design and installation by April 14,
1982. The WDNR provided prospective contractors with the
opportunity to visit the site and four of the potential
contractors subsequently submitted proposals. Two of
these four proposals were rejected on the bases of cost.
A third proposal was rejected because it proposed ground
water pumping which WDNR felt would be ineffective in the
low permeability soils. WDNR judged the proposal
submitted by CPI to be the most cost effective and they
were awarded the contract.
Project Costs
A breakdown of the project costs by category of
activities is shown in Table 6. This cost information was
derived from purchase orders from the WDNR as of mid-
December 1982 and therefore may reflect in some cases
planned purchases rather than actual services received.
The total amount spent on the emergency response and
surface water collection system as of mid-December 1982 is
$72,229. Since the Appleton site has only been tempor-
arily contained and more complete actions are planned,
this is not a total cost. The WDNR is in the planning
stages of Phase IV of the site clean-up and reimbursement
is being sought for the costs of the emergency response
and Phase I from Norbert Mauthe, the owner of the chrome
plating facility. Rocket Sewer Hauling continues to
transport contaminated water to the DePere Sewage Treat-
ment Plant, and thus the total expenditure continues to
increase with time. Transporting this contaminated water
has been the largest portion of the clean-up expense,
comprising over 51% of the total.
Site Investigation—
The total of $7,643 shown for soil testing is the sum
of two figures: $1,643 paid to Soil Testing Services for
the initial drilling, sampling and monitoring, and $6,000
to Twin City Testing of Appleton, WI for additional
drilling, monitoring and sampling. WDNR had just received
the first round of monitoring data from Twin City Testing
at the time of this writing (January 1983) and the data
were in the process of being analyzed by the WDNR as part
of the planning and design (Phase III) for the Phase IV
remedial action.
16-26
-------
Pumping and Transportation—
As of mid-December 1982, $41,000 was authorized for
the Emergency Spill Fund to Rocket Sewer Hauling for
pumping and transportation of contaminated water. As of
mid-December 1982, $38,180 had actually been paid to
Rocker Sewer. This sum includes some initial start-up
costs for pumping puddles of water which were charged to
WDNR on an hourly basis. Therefore, unit costs are not
obtained by dividing $38,180 by the number of gallons
transported. Rather, the unit cost figures shown in Table
7 were taken from Rocker Sewers standard charge of $210
per $3,000 gallon (11,400 1) load. The pumping and
transportation costs for the contaminated water at $210
per 3,000 gallon (11,400 1) load, transported a distance
of 50 miles (81 km) to DePere Sewage Treatment Plant
resulted in a unit cost of 0.14 cents/gallon/mile
(0.02 cents/1/km).
Collection System and Soil Removal—
CPI was paid a total of $13,975 for the construction
and installation of the subsurface drains, the sump pumps,
and the clean water collection and diversion system. CPI
also received a total of $7,564 for soil excavation and
removal. Transportation and disposal costs for the
contaminated soil were $6,100 or $61/cubic yard ($80/m ).
Excavation and loading costs for the soil were $1,464 or
$14.60/cubic yard ($19/m ).
Water Treatment and Disposal—
A total of $2,275 had been paid to DePere STP as of
mid-December 1982 for the treatment and disposal of con-
taminated water. The unit cost is $25 per 3,000 gallon
(11,400 1) load or less than 0.08 cents per gallon (0.22
cents/1). The total volume of water treated and disposed
of was 273,000 gallons (1.03 x 10 1) as of mid-December.
16-27
-------
TABLE 6. SUMMARY OF COST INFORMATION-N.W. MAUTHE.INC., APPLETON, WISCONSIN
Task
Soil Testing, Sampling
Monitoring
Pumping and Transporta-
tion of contaminated
water
Treatment and disposal
of contaminated water
Construction of sump
pumps, drainpipe,
collection system
Transportation &
disposal of soil
Excavation & loading
of soil
Miscellaneous (incl.
steel tank at sewage
treatment plant)
TOTAL
Quantity
N/A
273,000 gallon
(1.03 x 106 J)
273,000 Rallon
(1.03 x 10^ 1)
N/A
100 cu.yds
(76.5m3)
100 cu.yds.
(76.5m3)
N/A
Expenditure
§7,643
$38,180
$2,275
$13,975
$6,100
$1,464
$2,592
$72,229
Unit Cost
N/A
. 14((/gallon/mile
(.02d/l/km)
.8^/gallon
(.2(1/1)
N/A
$61/cubic yd.
($80 per m3)
$14.60/cu.yd
($19/m3)
N/A
Funding Source
Wisconsin Emergency
Spill Fund
Wisconsin Emergency
Spill Fund
Wisconsin Emergency
Spill Fund
Wisconsin Emergency
Spill Fund
Wisconsin Emergency
Spill Fund
Wisconsin Emergency
Spill Fund
Wisconsin Emergency
-SgHl_Fund=i==_=
Wisconsin Emergency
Spill Fund
Period of
Performance
April 1982-Jnn. 1983
Continuous since
April 1982
Continuous since
April 1982
May 1982
October 1982
October 1982
April 1982 -
January 1983
PO
CO
N/A: Not Applicable
-------
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
There is only limited data available from which to
evaluate the performance of the collection system at the
Mauthe site. Delivery logs recording the volume of con-
taminated liquid hauled to the DePere Sewage 6Treatment
Plant indicate that 273,000 gallons (1.03 x 10 1) were
collected and treated from April through December 1982.
As Table 7 indicates, the concentration of hexavalent
chromium in the collection tank has ranged from 230 to 430
mg/1. Assuming an average concentration of 300 mg/1, an
estimated 683 pounds (310 kg) of hexavalent chromium was
collected during this 8-month period. The surface water
collection system has apparently been effective in
minimizing off-site migration of chromium. However, the
limited monitoring data summarized in Table 7 does not
permit any more quantitative evaluation of performance.
In evaluating performance of the collection system
installed at the Mauthe Site, it is important to keep in
mind that the system was intended to collect surface water
and shallow ground water and was not intended to remove or
contain the contaminated groundwater which had migrated
outside the influence of the collection system. As
mentioned previously, a more complete response is planned
in Phase IV.
16-29
-------
TABLE 7. SUMMARY OF MONITORING RESULTS AT MAUTHE SITES1
Location
Well #7
Well #8
Small Crock
Collection Tank
Residence Sump Pump
April 1
Cr+6
(mg
~
—
—
96
Cr Total
1)
—
—
—
110
May 24
Cr+6
(rag
--
~
230
—
Cr Total
/I)
—
~
—
—
June 2
Cr+6
(rag
—
—
250
—
Cr Total
/)
—
--
—
—
1 .
July 7
cr*6
(mg
0,020
73
67
260
70
Cr Total
/I)
0.024
73
'
71
—
74
August 19
Cr*6
(ra
0.020
120
76
430
100
Cr Total
5/U
0.024
110
i — ^-^ .__ ___
78
440
100
I
u»
o
analysis was done
-------
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Arens, A.H. April 5, 1982. "Toxic Chemical Spill of 31 March 82." Outagamie
County, Emergency Government. Appleton, Wisconsin.
Botz, J.J. May 3, 1982. "Subsurface Exploration for the N.W. Mauthe Company
in Appleton, Wisconsin." STS Consultants Ltd. Green Bay, Wisconsin.
Catlin, M. Catlin Law Office, Appleton, WI. October 4, 1982. Written
Communication to Mr. George Kraft, Wisconsin Department of Natural
Resources. Re: File No. 4430.
DePere Wastewater Treatment Plant. September 1982. "Special Liquid Waste
Delivery Log." DePere, WI.
Eggleson, S. October 4, 1982. "State of Wisconsin vs. Norbert W. Mauthe:
Complaint." Wisconsin Department of Justice Curcuit Court, Outagamie
County, Wisconsin.
Eggleson, S. Wisconsin Department of Justice. February 1983. Personal
communication.
Kraft, G.J. Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, Green Bay, Wisconsin.
May 4, 1982. Written Correspondence to Mr. Dave Benner, City of DePere.
Kraft, G.J. June 7, 1982. Memo to Perry Manor. "Re: Mauthe Alternatives"
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, Wisconsin.
Kraft, G.J. June 15, 1982. "N.W. Mauthe Summary." Wisconsin Department of
Natural Resources, Green Bay, Wisconsin.
Kraft, G.J. August 13, 1982. Memo to Files. Mauthe Plating; "June 2, 1983,
Tank Sample" Department of Natural Resources, Green Bay, Wisconsin.
Kraft, G.J. August 19, 1982. Memo to Files: N.W. Mauthe Company. "July 7
Sampling" Department of Natural Resources, Green Bay, Wisconsin.
Kraft, G.J. September 7, 1982. memo to Files: "Mauthe Plating, May 6 & &
Soil Sampling." Department of Natural Resources, Green Bay, Wisconsin.
Kraft, G.J. October 19, 1982. Memo to Files: "N.W. Mauthe Company August
19, 1982 Sampling." Department of Natural Resources, Green Bay,
Wisconsin.
16-31
-------
Kraft, G.J. Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources November 1982 and
February 1983. Personal Communications.
LeRoux E.F. 1957. Geology and Groundwater Resources of Outagamie County,
Wisconsin Geological Survey Water Supply Paper 1421. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C.
Manor P. May 11, 1982. Memo to Spill Files: "Early Happenings and Stages
in the Appleton Chromium Spill." Department of Natural Resources, Green
Bay, Wisconsin.
Pagels, J. May 21, 1982. "Chromium Spill-Mauthe Plating, Appleton.11
Department of Natural Resources, Green Bay, Wisconsin.
Soil Conservation Service. 1978. Soil Survey of Outagamie County, Wisconsin.
United States Department of Agriculture and University of Wisconsin.
Wade K. and K. Stensby. 1982. Memo to File of N.W. Mauthe Company,
'"Chromium Contamination, Appleton, WI." Department of Natural Resources,
Green Bay, Wisconsin.
16-32
-------
OCCIDENTIAL CHEMICAL COMPANY
LATHROP, CALIFORNIA
INTRODUCTION
The Occidential Chemical Agricultural Products
Company1s Lathrop, California facility is located in the
San Joaquin River Valley in a rural agricultural area
about 60 miles (95 km) east of San Francisco, 55 miles (90
km) south of Sacramento and 1.0 mile (1.6 km) east of the
San Joaquin River. Storage and evaporation of rinse water
from the fertilizer and pesticide operation in unlined
surface impoundments, and burial of waste pesticides,
caused groundwater contamination near the plant. The
primary ground water contaminants were dibromochloro-
propane (DBCP) (1-1200 ug/1) and sulfate (500-7,000 mg/1).
Other ground water contaminants included EDB, sulfolane
lindane, alpha-BHC, delta-BHC, Dimethoate, and Disyston.
Background
At various times during the operation of the Lathrop
plant since it opened in 1953, Occidential Chemical
Company (OCC) and/or its predecessor, Best Fertilizer,
disposed of process wastes into several unlined surface
impoundments, and buried sol id pesticide wastes in an
area known as the "boneyard." These wastes resulted from
the production of fertilizers and related chemicals, and
the synthesis and formulation (blending of concentrates
with inert ingredients) of about 150-200 different
pesticides for retail and wholesale trade. Pesticide
formulation began at the Lathrop plant in 1957. Among the
wastes disposed of on-site were DBCP, gypsum (calcium
sulfate), lindane and other isoraers of BHC; ethylene
dibroraide (EDB); heptachlor; ammonia and waste heavy metal
catalysts. Because of its persistence, lipophilicity,
mutagenicity, carcinogenic ity and volume of use, DBCP was
the main contaminant of concern in the ground water
throughout the remedial work.
The problems at the site were initially suggested in
a December 1978 meeting between Occidental and the Cali-
fornia Regional Water Quality Control Board (WQCB), where
OCC informed the WQCB that documents would be released
17-1
NCP References
300.63(a)(3)
notification by
federal or state
permit holder
-------
soon in ongoing litigation showing that organic and
inorganic chemical concentrations had increased in the
ground water near the plant. No specifics were provided.
On January 2, 1979 the WQCB received a letter from the US
EPA Region IX office noting that the above-mentioned
documents, disclosed in an Ohio court case, specifically
alleged that pesticide disposal on-site has caused ground
water contamination around the Lathrop facility. Follow-
ing an immediate discussion with the plant operators on
Monday, January 5, 1979, an inspector from the WQCB took
samples from the gypsum ponds on January 6 indicating that
surface sulfate levels had risen from 26 mg/1 in 1962 to
1700 mg/1 in 1979. Pesticide wastes were also found on
site, resulting in another site inspection and testing
of local drinking and irrigation water wells. On
February 8, 1979 the Libby-Owens-Ford (LOF) well on the
property adjacent to the Occidential site was sampled, by
the WQCB along with the well of a nearby dairy farmer.
Both of these wells were found to be contaminated with
DBCP at about 13 ug/1, and the owners were immediately
advised to stop using them. A consultant for Occidental
later found 58 ug/1 of DBCP in the neighboring dairy
farmers well in February 1979. (David Keith Todd Inc.
Oct. 1979). The state1s advice to the neighbors was
based on the assumption that any level of DBCP was harm-
ful, which in turn was based on the facts that the state
has had an action level of 1 ug/1 for DBCP and laboratory
animal tests showed that it caused stomach cancer at 3
mg/1 as well as the fact that the U.S. FDA action level
was 1.5 mg/1 in milk fat (55 ug/1 in whole milk) (3/19/79
letter from Vaughn, Stockton sanitary engineer to
Robertson, Executive Director of the WQCB).
Synopsis of Site Response
The remedial action was carried out under the general
provisions set forth in a Consent Decree lodged on
February 6, 1981, and were worked out in detail through
the US EPA's National Enforcement Investigations Center
(NEIC) and the state WQCB and DoHS. The "boneyard" of
pesticide wastes, as well as the contaminated sediments in
the gypsum ponds were excavated by the end of February
1981. A ground water extraction/treatment/reinjection
system was approved in January 1982 by the US EPA and
State of California, and went on-line in July 1982. The
system extracts contaminated ground water from five wells,
treats it in a reverse pulse granular activated carbon
systems, and then reinjects it into an unusable briny
aquifer through an injection well about 500 feet (90 m)
deep. The carbon system is intended to reduce the DBCP
concentration, which was agreed upon as the surrogate
criterion for all other contaminants, from about 2000 ppb
300.64
preliminary
assessment
300.64UX1)
evaluation of
the magnitude of
the hazard
300.65(b)(2)
providing alter-
nate water
supplies
300.64(b)
collection
or review of
literature
300.68(c)
responsible
party clean-up
300.68(e)(2)
source control
300.70(c)(2)(i)
excavation.
300.70(b)(2)(ii)
carbon
absorption
17-2
-------
to an effluent concentration of 1 ug/1. As of December
1982 the effluent DBCP concentrations being injected into
the deep unusable aquifer were initially between 4-6 ug/1.
The use of an additional carbon contractor column was
expected to enable the system to achieve the agreed upon
level of decontamination.
SITE DESCRIPTION
The surface characteristics and hydrogeology of the
Occidental Chemical Company site are discussed separately
below.
Surface Characteristics
The OCC site occupies approximately 130 acres on the
northern edge of the San Joquin Valley (Figure 1). The
site is bounded on the north by Louise Avenue and by resi-
dential areas and schools on the outskirts of Lathrop. To
the east, west and south of the site are large areas of
farmland that are typical of the San Joquin Valley.
Southern-Pacific, Inc. railroad tracks and Rowland Road
bisect the eastern portion of the site and a Libby-Owens
Ford, Inc. glass factory occupies an area immediately west
of the northern portion of the OCC site. Besides the
Libby-Owens Ford company, other entities in the area
include an Army depot and an Air Products, Inc. plant.
All of the land in the area slopes gently north
toward the San Francisco delta (about 2 feet per mile or
0.38 m/km) and lies about 10 feet (3 m) above mean sea
level. This flat area is about 35 miles (56.3 km) wide,
bounded on the east by the Sierra-Nevada range and on the
west by the Diablo range. Rainfall in this area of the
valley averages about 11.45 inches (29 cm) per year with
80 percent of this falling between November and March.
The annual evaporation rate is five times greater than the
annual rainfall necessitating a considerable need for
agricultural irrigation water.
Hydrogeology
The first 230-foot (70 m) depth of alluvial plain, on
which the OCC site is situated, is composed of great
thicknesses of interbedded sands, silts, clays, and
gravels. Several water-bearing units, located in the semi-
continuous layers of sand and gravel in this layer,
combine to form the large aquifer system which lies within
13 to 26 feet (3.9 to 7.8 m) of the surface and supplies
the primary source of domestic, agricultural, and
300.68(e)(2)(i)
(A)population at
risk
300.68(e)(2)(i)
(E)
climate
300.68(e)(2)(i)
(D)
hydrogeologic
factors
17-3
-------
Figure 1. Location of Occidental Chemical Company Site
Approximate boundries of the
• Occidental Chemical Company
17-4
-------
industrial water for the area. The horizontal perme-
—A *•
abilities in this aquifer system vary between 10 cm/sec
and 10 cm/sec.- Vertical permeabilities are lower,
ranging between 10 and 10 cm/sec. The overall aquifer
has a transmissivity of 21,000 gallons per day per foot
and a storage coefficient of 7 x 10
Lying beneath the aquifer is an approximate 90-foot
(27.5 m) thickness of blue and yellow clay which extends
horizontally for several miles in all directions. This
layer is believed to be part of the massive Corcoran clay
deposit which formed when the entire area was flooded by a
large body of water. Several bore holes and test wells
have confirmed the continuity of this clay layer and have
uncovered permeable zones beneath this layer which extend
downward from about 310 feet (94.5 m) below the surface.
The waters in these lower zones are high in dissolved
solids and chloride indicating a possible connection with
the San Francisco Bay Delta.
The nearest permanent surface water in the site area
is the San Joquin River which is about 1 mile (1.6 km) to
the west. Due to the arid climate, flat topography, and
permeable soils, there are no well-defined natural drain-
age channels connecting the OCC site area and the river.
WASTE DISPOSAL HISTORY
The present site was first developed in 1953 by the
Best Fertilizer Company which constructed several lagoons
to receive fertilizer wastes. In 1964, Occidental
Chemical Company purchased the site and began manu-
facturing several fertilizers such as phosphoric acid,
aqua anroonia, and ammonium sulfate. In addition to these
product lines, the OCC plant began formulating between 150
and 200 different pesticides. Until 1976, all liquid
wastes from the pesticide operations (about 5 tons per
year) were placed into a 5-acre pond, labelled 1 in Figure
2. (There are also undocumented reports of pesticide
dumping in a well which is located south of the pesticide-
formulation area and has since been capped.) In addition
to the liquid pesticide wastes, this pond received
contaminated cool ing water from the 4.5-acre phosphoric
acid concentrator pond (Pond 2 in Figure 2). This cooling
water travelled in a 700-foot long ditch connecting the
two ponds. Since 1976, all liquid pesticide wastes have
been collected in tanks prior to transport to an off-site
hazardous waste landfill.
17-5
-------
Figure 2. Aerial Photograph of the Occidental Chemical
Company, Lathrop, California
17-6
-------
Between 1964 and 1970 solid wastes from the plant
were buried in the unpermitted "boneyard". These wastes
included:
• Off-specification pesticides
• Pesticide containers
• Burned solid wastes
• Spent catalysts (Va, Ni, Cu, and Zn)
• Off-specification fertilizer
• Spent activated carbon
• Construction debris.
After 1970, burial of wastes in the "boneyard" was
discontinued and, by 1979, the solid pesticide wastes and
the spent catalysts were being sent to a California Class
I landfill. The other wastes are presumably sent to other
t ype s o f 1and fills.
Gypsum slurry produced during the manufacture of
phosphoric acid, has been deposited in a number of unlined
settling ponds around the site since 1953 (the most recent
of these are identified as ponds 3 through 8 in Figure 2).
The OCC facility has since converted to a dry phosphoric
acid production process thereby eliminating the need for
these ponds.
The only other documented disposal of hazardous waste
at the OCC site involved a pond which received cooling
water from the phosphoric acid concentrator. This pond
was filled in and used as a building site in 1968.
DESCRIPTION OF CONTAMINATION
The possibility of ground water contamination at the
OCC site was brought to the attention of the Regional
Water Quality Control Board in 1978. The Board did some
preliminary testing of the lagoons and the ground water at
the site and confirmed a suspected violation of OCC1s pre-
viously set discharge standards which expressly prohibited
any ground water or surface water contamination at the OCC
site.
In March and July 1979, further testing of the
lagoons, burial ditches, and ground water revealed the
following contaminants:
300.63(a)(3)
notification by
a federal or
state permit
holder
300.64
preliminary
assessment
17-7
-------
Lagoons and burial ditches
DBCP Disulfoton
Malathion Dursban
Me thoxychlor DEF
Dibrom Ethion
Chlordane EDB
Endosulfan DDT
Ethyl Parathion
ground vater^
EDB
alpha-BHC
delta-BHC
DBCP
ETDB
Benzene Hexachloride (BHC)
Ethyl Parathion
DNBP
Lindane (gamma BHC).
The concentrations of these substances reached 90
ug/1 in some of the test wells and 2,000 ug/1 in portions
of the ditches and lagoons. Some pesticides, primarily
DBCP, were also detected in some private well water
supplies in the vicinity. In addition, high radiation
levels (up to 113 p Cu/1) were detected in nearby public
wells. The source of these high levels were thought to
come from the unlined gypsum ponds since the gypsum there
was high in uranium; but naturally high background levels
have not been rulled out.
As a result of the above investigations, the State of
California and the U.S. EPA filed a lawsuit against the
Occidental Petroleum Company (the parent company to OCC)
requiring OCC to initiate a multi-phased remedial strategy
beginning with a comprehensive study of the site (Phase
I). OCC then contracted with an outside firm to conduct
the Phase I study. The Phase I study was completed in
December of 1980 and included:
• A complete hydrogeological assessment of the
entire area
300.68(f)
remedial
investigation
17-8
-------
• A thorough sampling and analysis plan to include
all quality control/quality assurance measures
• A complete assessment of the type, concentrations
and extent of chemicals buried around the site
• The establishment of a permanent ground water
monitoring system including new wells constructed
on the site as we11 as ex i s t ing on-site and
off-site wells.
This study included the development of 42 monitoring
wells at 14 locations (3 wells per location) at the site.
These three wells at each location were designed to
penetrate three zones with respect to the plume of
contaminated ground water: 1) the zone of greatest
contamination; 2) the zone in the middle of the plume; and
3) the zone just below the plume. Sulfate was chosen as
the contaminant for indicating the desired drilling depths
because a large amount of sulfate had seeped from the OCC
site into the ground water, sulfate was as mobile as any
other constituent in the contaminated plume, and it could
be monitored rapidly and inexpensively. To locate the
three zones at each location, three representatives bore
holes were drilled using a dual tube reverse air rotary
rig. This drilling method allowed an almost instantaneous
and continuous review of the cuttings by an expert
geologist and ground water sampling at 10-foot (3 m)
intervals for inorganic constituents (SO, , NO-, pH, NH,,) .
Once the desired depth for each well was achieved,
permanent wells were constructed by drilling 12-inch (30
cm) diameter bore holes with a conventional rotary rig and
installing 6-inch (15 era) steel casing with 5-foot (1.5 m)
diameter stainless steel screens.
Samples from the monitoring wells were analysed for
29 organic pesticides, several inorganics, and radiologi-
cal assays. The neraatocide DBCP was found in the majority
of these wells and six other chemicals (EDB, lindane,
delta-BHC, alpha-BHC, Demethoate, and Disyston) were found
in over 10 percent of the wells. Most of the other 22
organic chemicals that were found were at or near their
detection limits. Sulfate was the major inorganic
pollutant found in the wells—exceeding 500 mg/1 at all
but one test well site. All of the contaminants in the
test wells exhibited decreasing concentrations with depth.
The downward gradient that caused the deeper contamination
(despite relatively low vertical perraab ilities) was
created by several deep-pumping irrigation wells around
the site. The total area of ground water contamination
was estimated to occupy 1 square mile and reach a depth of
200 (61 m) feet below the surface. Figures 3 through 8
17-9
-------
* •-*%. N*. :i-
i* *S.i
^^r-^^fi
Louras *•• • • £1
.
NOTE: CONCEHTRATIOKS PRESENTED AS ;;-
MG/L SULFATE 9 DEfTH ;j
* INDICATES OHPEST OR SHAUOWEST ;j
OBSERVATION AT THIS SITE
Figure 3. Averaged Observed Sulfate Concentrations in
Shallow Monitoring Wells
(Source: Camp. Dresser, and McKee July, 1981)
17-10
-------
• -;^ \-_ ::.
tj.&Vtf*- -
7^-iM.in ^ -v ",|T3i --
5?=*-^ ^;-<:_
: CONCENTRATIONS PRESENTED AS
MG/L SULFATE 9 DEPTH
VINDICATES DEEPEST OR SHALLOWEST
OBSERVATION AT THIS SITE
!f>l<; V^-s. =, -
Figure 4. Average Observed Sulfate Concentrations in Intermediate
Depth Moni tori ng We 11s
(Source: Camp, Dresser, and McKee, July, 1981)
17-11
-------
: CQHCSmiATIQNS PRESENTED AS
MG/L SULFATE 9
^INDICATES DEEPEST OR SHALLOWEST ^
OBSERVATION AT THIS SITE
Figure 5. Average Observed Sulfate Concentrations in Deep Monitoring
Wells
(Source: Camp, Dresser, and McKee, July, 1981).
17-12
-------
CONCENTRATIONS PRESENTED AS
ufi/L DBCP 9 DEPTH
INDICATES DEEPEST OR SHALLOWEST
OBSERVATION AT THIS SITE
(Source:
Average Observed DBCP Concentrations in Shallow Monitoring
We 11 s
Camp, Dresser, and McKee, July 1981)
17-13
-------
• ~*— pi^asSis NJS
-^m^iim^ i
^s=5^r^:s -v^_^,
V —- 5i
CONCENTRATIONS PRESENTED AS **
uS/L OBCP 9 DEPTW -.:
INDICATES DEEPEST OR SHALLOWEST ;j
OBSERVATION AT THIS SITE
(Source:
Average Observed DBCP Concentrations in Intermediate Depth
Monitoring Veils
Camp, Dresser, and McKee, July, 1981)
17-14
-------
*• a nRes«r/oirs 11
S C !l
: CONCENTRATIONS PRESENTED AS
wG/L D8CP 9 DEPTH ;
INDICATES DEEPEST OR SHALLOWEST :
OBSERVATION AT THIS SITE___ 3
Figure 8. Average Observed DBCP Concentrations in Deep Monitoring We11s
(Source: Camp, Dresser, and McKee, July, 1981)
17-15
-------
provide concentrations of DBCP and sulfate at various
depths and locations throughout and OCC site.
The Phase I study also included the excavation of 16
exploratory trenches and the drilling of 17 soil borings.
Several shallow test pits were also excavated. These
activities revealed the presence of 4 hazardous waste
disposal trenches and pits within the "boneyard" area
containing thousands of small (1/2 to 1 pint or 0.25 to
0.5 1) glass pesticide bottles located above and below the
water table (see Figure 2). These bottles contained 29
types of pesticides formulated at to OCC plant. In
addition, a large area of pesticide-contaminated soil was
found in the southern portion of Pond 1 (see Figure 2).
PLANNING THE SITE RESPONSE
Initiation of Site Response
On March 23, 1979, the WQCB issued a cease and desist
order directing an immediate end to the discharges on the
site and compliance with a site assessment and clean-up
schedule because of the public health threat from DBCP
contaminated ground water. On November 19, 1980, a "Stip-
ulation and Judgement Approving settlement" was filed to
settle a December 18, 1979 complaint against Occidental,
and was lodged on February 6, 1981. This consent decree
provided the framework for the remedial action eventually
carried out at the site. The formalization of the
remedial action was delayed from early 1979 to late 1980
for several reasons, including the following:
1. Occidental asked the state to review the cease
and desist order because they contended that the
compliance schedule would require shutting down
the plant. A revised cease and desist order was
issued on April 27, 1979 that provided for an
extended compliance schedule.
2. Negotiations on a consent decree failed in
December 1979, resulting in the filling of the
above-mentioned complaint.
During the period between the filling of the compaint
in December 1979, and the settling of the consent decree
in February 1981, the state, US EPA and Occidental worked
together to study the site and develop remedial action
alternatives. When the suit was settled on February 6,
1981, the company and the US EPA state had already
established a rather detailed remedial plan and the
excavation of contaminated material had already begun.
17-16
300.68(c)
judicial process
-------
The excavation and removal work was completed within a
couple of weeks, by February 25, 1981, in compliance with
the March 1 deadline imposed by the settlement.
Following the immediate removal of the source of
contamination, the long terra remedial plan was developed
during 1981 and placed on-line in July 1982. Details of
the ground water extraction/treatment/injection plan were
worked out between the U.S. EPA NEIC, the state WQCB and
DoHS, and Occidential. The last significant approval was
given by NEIC on January 28, 1982, when it indicated sat-
isfaction that studies performed for Occidental has estab-
lished (l) that the briny unusable aquifer into which the
treated effluent would be injected was isolated from any
other usable aquifer; and (2) that the extraction system
was adequate to contain, collect and treat the contami-
nated groundwater. When this last approval was given,
Occidental began implementing the long term remedial plan.
Selection of Response Technologies
The preliminary selection of remedial actions for the
OCC site was made in the recommendations section of the
final Phase I report and involved several proposed
alternatives. The criteria used to select among the
various mitigation alternatives were:
• The chemical constituents present
• The hydrogeologic conditions
• The regulatory requirements
• Assessment of long-term risks
• The size of each mitigative area
• Economics
• Availability of the technology.
The U.S. EPA and the State reviewed and approved of the
alternatives that were proposed in the Phase I study.
However, there were numerous negotiations on and revisions
to the original remediation plans prior to final approval
of all parties involved.
The recommended remedial measures for the contami-
nated soils at the OCC site were proposed after considera-
tion of the following alternatives:
• No action
• Excavation and disposal of contaminated soils off-
site at a licensed facility
300.68(c)
state or federal
evaluation of
clean-up
proposals
300.68(h)
initial
screening of
alternatives
17-17
-------
• In situ containment using:
— Containment barriers
— Fixation
— Groundwater gradient modification
• On-site treatment.
Of these, the excavation and off-site disposal of
contaminated soils became the method of choice because it
was shown to provide the most certainty that further
ground water contamination would be prevented. After this
selection was made, further selections were necessary to
determine the proper method of closing the excavated areas
and to prevent seepage of any remaining chemical residues.
Several types of capping material were considered
including:
• Mixing on-site soils with cement
• Hauling in clay from off-site
• Asphalt
• Cement
• Several types of synthetic liner including
Hypalon, PVC and rubber.
The option of hauling in clay from off-site was chosen
because it was the most cost-effective measure.
The suggested approach to ground water remediation
was counterpumping coupled with treatment and disposal of
the extracted water. Counterpumping was selected as a
result of a comprehensive ' ground water modeling effort
under Phase 11 of the overall plan. The modeling effort
used parameters and constants developed during the exten-
sive ground water testing efforts of Phase I and data from
additional test wells which were drilled during Phase II
of the project.
The modeling effort revealed that counterpumping was
the only feasible method to arrest the northwesterly flow
of contaminants. The model was then used to determine the
number of extraction wells, their placement, depth, pump-
ing rates, and the seasonal effects of other pumping wells
in the immediate area.
17-18
-------
Several treatment and disposal options for the
extracted ground water were evaluated as part of the
Interim Phase II study. Treatment options included:
• Air stripping
• Carbon adsorption
• Ultraviolet oxidation
• Peroxide oxidation.
Of these, carbon adsorption and ultraviolet oxidation
were selected for bench scale and pilot plant testing.
These tests resulted in the selection of carbon adsorption
as the method of choice. Ultraviolet oxidation was
rejected due to lower performance, scaling problems, and
the formation of manganese oxide precipitants.
Disposal options considered for the treated effluent
included:
• Reuse in the OCC process
• Spray irrigation
• Reuse in cooling towers
• Solar stills
• Deep well injections.
The reuse of treated water as process water in the
OCC plant was rejected due to high dissolved solids which
would ruin plant equipment. A further negative aspect of
this option was that the supply of treated water at the
proposed pumping rates would far exceed the plant's normal
requirements.
The discharge of treated water to cooling towers,
spray irrigation equipment, and/or evaporation ponds was
rejected because the levels of dissolved solids in the
treated water would exceed state standards, thereby
necessitating unreasonable expenditures for lining the
ponds that would be needed for each of these alternatives.
Solar stills were eliminated from further considera-
tion because of possible vaporization of organics to the
air coupled with the need to treat still bottoms having
high dissolved solids.
Deep well injection into a confined, unusable
aquifer, located over 300 feet beneath the ground surface,
was chosen as the best disposal method for the treated
17-19
-------
effluent after extensive testing showed that this method
was both feasible and environmentally acceptable.
Extent of Site Response
The February 6, 1981 settlement did not specify any
numerical clean-up standards, but required that the
excavation and remedial plan be carried out "in a manner
consistent with the goals and standards stated in
paragraph IV E of (the) Stipulation," which were general
public health goals. As with other aspects of the
remedial action, the extent of the excavation and ground
water treatment were agreed upon by the U.S. EPA NEIC, the
state WQCB and DoHS, and Occidental. Generally, both the
excavation and the ground water treatment levels were
based on a combination of available standards, contaminant
and site characteristics, and best professional judgement.
During the excavation operation in February 1981, the
decisions concerning whether particular material would be
disposed in a Class I facility, a Class II-l facility, or
into the same trench were largely made on-site. The
pesticide bottles and the visually obvious contamination,
referred to by a WQCB official as type "C" material, were
automatically disposed of at a Class I landfill with a
minimum of testing to confirm the contamination.
Similarly, the backfilled soil that had been placed over
the wastes, referred to as type "A" material, was
temporarily placed nearby to be tested before reusing as
backfill after it had been found to be clean.
As noted in the "Design and Execution of Site
Response" section, some of the contaminated soil was
excavated using the "mud wave" technique. During this
process, when the bulldozer was consolidating the
contaminated material by driving through the saturated
layer. The strip of soil behind the dozer blaze was
visually monotired by the on-site coordinator. This strip
of soil had to be inspected quickly before the water being
pushed by the bulldozer could flow around the bulldozer
blade and cover the soil again. The excavation was
stopped when the on-site coordinator determined that the
strip of soil behind the bulldozer blade was not contami-
nated. Thousands of gallons of contaminated water were
pumped from the excavations and bulked with the company's
other process waste water for landfilling off-site. After
a backhoe had removed the accumulated solid material and
placed it on polyethylene sheets, composite samples of 5
or 6 samples per pile were flown back to the Raltech labs
via Federal Express for analysis. The analytical results
were returned within 2-4 weeks, and provided the WQCB
on-scene coordinator (OSC) with the necessary information
17-20
-------
for making the disposal decision. Using this analytical
data, the state and federal officials on-site considered
the following factors in deciding the fate of the
material: mobility, based on solubility and soil adhesion
characteristics of the contaminants; water quality
standards, if any, for the particular contaminant;
persistence; and the soil type.
The use of this procedure may be illustrated by
considering two primary decisions made based on chemical
and physical characteristics. First, the chemical
characteristics were the overriding factor in deciding how
to manage the DBCP contaminated material. Whether DBCP
was within the range of confidence of the analysis
technique (50 ug/1), dictated whether the material would
go to a Class I landfill. This was the primary contami-
nant found in the type B material. Physical character-
istics were used to decide on the disposal of pellets of
catalyst waste. Any waste having the unique pellet
texture, was put into overpack drums and diposed of at a
Class I facility.
The performance standard of the treatment system was
decided upon through a somewhat more institutionalized
process. Although the treated effluent from the carbon
filter system was to be injected into an unusable aquifer,
the State of California and the US EPA required that a
decontamination standard be met just in case the unusable
deep aquifer was found to commune iate with the upper
usable aquifer, and also in case the injection well leaked
into the surrounding upper aquifer through which it was
injected. The decontaminated effluent level was set at 1
ug/1 DBCP because it was concluded that DBCP served as an
adequate surrogate criterion and 1 ug/1 was the existing
"action level" set by the state and supported by the
federal government. This use of DBCP as a surrogate
criteria for other contaminants was estalished through
results from the pilot scale testing of the system. These
results indicated that when DBCP was removed, all other
organic contaminants were removed to below detectable
levels except sulfolane. The state concurred with an OCC
study that determined sulfolane presented an insignificant
risk at the residual levels resulting from the DBCP
removal to 1 ug/1 and considering the aquifer where the
treated water was injected. The 1 ug/1 action level (the
level at which some remedial action such as provision of
alternative water sources and source clean-up would be
undertaken) had recently been established by the state to
manage a variety of DBCP contamination problems that had
recently been discovered in the San Joaquin Valley. The
action figure was set at this level because, even through
the toxicologists and epidemiologist with the DoHS
17-21
-------
believed that 0.5 ug/1 might have been safer, they were
not confident enough about the existance of an additional
risk reduction to recommend this level which would have
required closing the number of wells that would be
required, rather than the 1.0 ug/1 standard, which would
require closing only 10% of the wells.
DESIGN AND EXECUTION OF SITE RESPONSE
The remedial actions carried out at the OCC site were
designed to:
• Prevent further leaching of contaminants from past
disposal areas to ground water
• Extract and decontaminate ground water beneath the
site to preclude offsite migration.
The fulfillment of the first goal was accomplished by
excavation of contaminated soils within the site bound-
aries and capping the site. The second goal was achieved
by installing a ground water extraction, treatment and
reinjection system. The equipment and procedures used to
implement these actions are discussed separately below.
Excavation and Capping
The initial activity began in the spring of 1980 and
continued through the summer of 1980 during the Phase I
investigations. The Phase I contractor excavated 16
exploratory trenches, drilled 17 test borings and dug
several test pits. This work was keyed to the area of the
site which contains pond number 1 and the "boneyard"
because this is where OCC records indicated the majority
of liquid and solid pesticides were deposited (see Figure
1). The exploratory excavation work led to the identifi-
cation of several localized areas of contamination (Figure
9).
The trench excavations required a variety of
equipment and procedures depending on whether the waste
was above or below the water table. The following
procedures were used:
Above water table:
• Removal of clean overburden
• Excavation of waste materials
• Placement of excavated materials on 20-foot (6.1m)
wide strips of 4 to 8-mil thick, polyethylene for
17-22
-------
I
NJ
U>
Approximate Units
of Pond II
•MM MM •!• MKBVtl
fi) IK Ull III II iOUIMM • UUll lilt HI MNH M M,
~ IMMWina MM mni»itMtl *ua*
I MMC< MM INI* MHIM*. Ill) l«j
ftWK* MM
i*f ItlMIMB « IWCt IMMCI HM.
' t ' fI (IUHIII* to«i taiiHuM nincm
•~~1 N
Figure 9. Location of Exploratory
Trenches and Surface Seals
(From Cannonie Environmental
Services Corp., July 1981)
-------
temporary storage. Other strips of polyethylene
were placed over the wastes during non-working
hours
• Selective removal of waste chemical-containing
containers from the excavated material for
placement into overpacks then into Class I
dumpsters (specially sealed) prior to off-site
transport and disposal
• Selective removal of empty containers from the
excavated materials and placement into Class II
sealed dumpsters prior to off-site transport and
disposal.
Below water table:
• Backhoe was used to dig a trench into groundwater,
creating a mud slurry from ground water and
existing soil.
• Bulldozer was then used to push a wedge of dry
soil down a ramp at one end of the trench to
create a wave of mud slurry primed with
contaminated ground water which was continuously
removed by the backhoe and a portable pump
• The trench was gradually filled in as the process
continued and eventually all the mud slurry and
contaminated ground water were removed
• The excavated material was handled in the same
manner as that used on the material from trenches
above the water table and the contaminated ground
water was stored in tanks prior to transport to a
licensed disposal site.
After all of the exploratory trenching under Phase I
was completed, a decision was made that, under Phase II,
some additional contaminated soils would be removed and
that all excavations would be sealed to prevent any
possible future contamination. Figure 9 shows all areas
within pond number 1 and the "boneyard" which were
excavated and capped and Table 1 shows the type and amount
of wastes removed from these areas, their method of
disposal, and the phase of the study in which they were
excavated. Table 1 and Figure 9 show that although twice
as much material was excavated under Phase II, not all of
the contaminated soils were removed and/or capped, because
all soils were not contaminated with hazardous wastes.
Therefore, some of the darkened exploratory trenches shown
in Figure 7 contained only non-hazardous wastes.
17-24
-------
TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF MATERIALS EXCAVATED AND REMOVED FROM
THE OCC SITE
Location
T ranch 1,5.4
PT 3
Trench 9, 10, 11
Traoch 1
PT 2 and Adjacent
ATM
PT 3 and PT 4
Tr«nch 9
Overflow Ditch
Overflow Ditch
Wastewater Pond
Material fro*
Pil«a II and X
Excavated fro* B
lay«r Tr«nch 1 & 5
Material Quantity
PHA
1,230 cu. yds.
30 cu. yda.
100 cu. yda.
160 cu. yda.
100 cu. yd*.
120 cu. yda.
PHA
80 cu, yds.
210 cu. yda.
1,265 cu. yda.
992 cu. yda.
366 cu. yda.
Type of Disposal
SE I
Clasa I
Class I
Class II-l
Claas II-i
Class II-l
Claaa II-l
SE II
Claas II-l
Claaa I
Claaa II-l
Claas II-l
Claaa II-l
Type of Material
Bottles, crushed
drums, Soil
Drums, Debris,
Bottles, Soil
Vanadium pellets
and crushed drums
Sand & Vanadium
pellets
Sand & Vanadium
pellets
Vanadium soil mix
Vanadium soil mix
top 2' of soil
Soil from 2'
to 8'
Soil
SoU
(From Cannonie Environmental Services Corp., 1981)
17-25
-------
The excavations under Phase II were conducted in a
similar manner to those conducted under Phase I, therefore
these methods will not be repeated. The capping of the
contaminated areas shown in Figure 9 was accomplished by:
• Filling in the excavations (or stripping areas not
previously excavated) to within 3 feet (0.9 m) of
grade.
• Spreading clay from off-site borrow areas evenly
in the 3-foot (0.9 m) depressions and compacting
to a minimum thickness of 1 foot and a
permeability of 10 cm/sec or less.
Spreading a 2-foot (0.6 m)
over the clay to protect
cracking.
layer of clean fill
it from drying and
The spreading of soils and clay was done using bull-
dozers and the compaction of the clay was accomplished
with four to eight passes of a tamping foot compactor. A
nuclear density gauge was used to monitor the density of
the compaction and the water content of the compacted clay
was monitored using a Speedy Moisture instrument. The
total sealed area was about 129,000 ft (11,984 m ), using
approximately 5,200 cubic yards (4,000 m) of fill
material.
After the caps and cap overfill materials were in
place, the entire area was graded to prevent surface
ponding of rain water.
Ground Water Extraction, Tr^eatment and Reinjection
Ground water remediation at the OCC site consists of
five extraction wells coupled to an activated carbon
treatment plant and 2 injection wells (Figure 10). These
components are described separately below.
The five extraction wells were drilled and screened
according to the specifications in Figure 11. All
extraction wells were initially constructed with a 6-inch
(15 cm) I.D. test well. The first 50 feet (15 m) of each
finished well is a 30-inch (7.6 cm) diameter reamed bore
hole with a 22-inch (56 cm) I.D. by 114 inch (290 cm)
thick single plate conductor casing. The remaining
portion of each well consists of a 20 inch (51 cm)
diameter reamed bore hole cased with 12 inch (30.5 cm)
I.D. by 3/16 inch (0.5 cm) thick copper/steel louvered
casing in the upper portion and with 8 inch (20 cm) I.D,
by 3/16 inch (0.5 cm) thick copper/steel plain casing in
the lower 5 feet (1.5 m). Extraction wells numbers 1 and
17-26
300.70(b)(l)(ii)
(C)
grading
-------
Figure 10. Location of the 5 Extraction Wells (EW), the Carbon Treatment
Plant, and One of the Injection Wells (IW) at the OCC Site
(From Black and Veatch Consulting Engineers, November, 1981)
17-27
-------
Figure 11. Design Specifications of the 5 Extraction Wells
at the OCC Site (From Black and Veatch Consulting
Engineers, November, 1981}.
17-28
-------
2 were fitted with 3-stage vertical turbine pumps capable
of pumping at a rate of 300 gallons (1,136 1) per minute.
The prescribed pumping rates of these wells are 150
gallons (568 1) per minute each in the summer and 100
gallons (379 1) per minute each in the winter. Extraction
well number 3 has a 2-stage vertical turbine pump capable
of 400 gallons (1,514 1) per minute although its pumping
rate is only 200 gallons (757 1) per minute in summer and
150 gallons (568 1) per minute in winter. Extraction
wells number 4 and 5 are fitted with 2-stage vertical
turbine pumps capable of 150 gallons (568 1) per minute
each. The present rate of pumpage from these wells is 75
gallons (284 1) per minute each in the winter and zero in
the summer. The higher rates of pumpage in the northern
wells during the summer were established to offset heavy
pumpage from nearby irrigation wells located northwest of
the site.
The carbon absorpt ion treatment plant is joined to
the extraction wells by 4, 6, and 8-inch (10, 15, and 20
cm) diameter, PVC pipes rated at 125 psi and with a
combined capacity equal to the sum of all five extraction
well capacities. The treatment unit consists of 2 upflow
pulsed bed contactors, 2 blow cases, and a storage tank
for spent carbon (Figure 12). The plant is arranged in a
total redundant design such that only one carbon contactor
is operational at a time with the other contactor on
standby in case of failure. Each contactor has 20-foot
(6 m) vertical sidewalls and a 10-foot (3 m) inside
diameter capable of holding 40,000 dry pounds (18,144 kg)
of carbon. The contactors are constructed of carbon steel
with an interior coating of coal tar epoxy. The spent
carbon tank, is also carbon steel with a coal tar epoxy
liner. It has 10-foot (3 m) vertical sidewalls and a
10-foot (3 m) inside diameter and holds 20,000 pounds
(9,072 kg) of dry carbon. The carbon blow cases are 6
feet (1.8 m) high and 4 feet (1.2 m) wide and are
constructed of unlined carbon steel. Carbon is used at a
rate of about 5,400 to 11,000 pounds (2,449 to 4,989 kg)
per month.
The 2 injection wells are connected to the treatment
plant by 12 inch (31 cm) diameter, PVC pipe rated at 200
psi. Only one of these wells has been in operation since
the remedial action began in the summer of 1982. The
other well is on standby in case the primary well becomes
clogged or more injection capacity is needed. Both wells
were completed to depths of about 500 feet (152 m) using
reverse rotary drilling techniques. In the first 290 feet
(88 m) of each well, there is a 24 inch (61 cm) diameter
bore hole cased with a 16 inch (41 cm) inside diameter by
1/4 inch (0.6 cm) thick high carbon steel pipe. The
17-29
-------
i
UJ
o
CONTACTOB
I SPENT FRESH
BLOWCA5Q BLOWCASE '
= - • txj-
I
•Cxh
INJECT
WELLS
FRATION
LIQUID PROCESS
GAG PIPING
Figure 12.
Schematic Diagram of the Granular Activated
Carbon (GAG) Treatment Plant at the OGC
Site (From Black and Veatch consulting
Engineers, November, 1981) . _
-------
remaining 210 feet (64 m) of these wells consists of a
15-inch (38 cm) bore hole cased with 8-5/8 inch (22 cm) OD
by 3/16 inch (0.5 cm) thick stainless steel with louvered
screens at the following intervals:
• 320' to 328' (97.5 to 100 m)
• 354' to 380' (108 m to 116 m)
• 404' to 414' (123 m to 126 m)
• 4281 to 436' (130.5 m to 133 m)
• 482' to 492' (147 m to 150 m).
Figure 13 provides detailed specifications of the
injection wells and the well head assemblies.
COST AND FUNDING
Source of Funding
The entire remedial action was funded by the
Occidental Chemical Company (OCC), including alternative
water supply hookups to 28 Lathrop area residents whose
ground water wells were either contaminated or threatened
with contamination. Occidental is making regular payments
to the Department of Health Services and the Regional
Water Quality Control Boards for their costs for sampling
and testing as specified in the consent decree.
Occidental also reimbursed the State and the Environmental
Protection Agency for the costs of investigation prior to
the settlement. Also, Occidental makes regular contribu-
tions to California universities for environmental
research.
Under the provisions of the February 1981 Consent
Decree, OCC will maintain the ground water treatment
system until the year 2001. As part of the divestiture
following its recent acquisition of Cities Services, Inc.,
OCC sold the Lathrop facility to the Simplot Company.
However, the remedial obligations of the Consent Decree
including the cost of the ground water treatment system
will continue to be met by Occidental. Occidental will
retain ownership of the system, related equipment and the
analytical laboratory located on-site. The individuals
operating the system and laboratory will be retained by
Occidental. The sales agreement provides permanent access
for OCC to Simplot's property, to allow for system
maintenance.
300.70(d)(2)
provision of
alternative
water supply
17-31
-------
1
' .81
hlMMon W«l COMlfudlon PHI*!
A-.V-.-t
ff ^^fl^ r
H. J»l ^r
Figure 13. Detailed Design Specificatoins for the Injection Wells at the OCC Site (From Lundorff
and Scalmanini, December, 1981).
-------
Selection of Contractors
Contractors were generally chosen on both sole source
and competitive bidding bases, but specific information on
all major contracts was not available. The drilling
contractor was chosen because his familarity ^ with the
local geology through direct experience was considered the
most important factor. The contract for constructing the
carbon system was let on an informal competitive bidding
process between two bidders. This contract was let
separately from the design and construction of the pilot
carbon system. Contracts for each phase of the study and
remedial work were also let separately, because the
Occidental manager in charge of the project believed that
no single contractor could offer the variety of services
needed, but each had a useful specialty.
Project Costs
The cost information in this section (See Table 2) is
based on verbal communications with involved parties, not
on invoices.
Testing, Planning and Design Costs
The cost of the ground water modelling by Camp,
Dresser and McKee (COM) used to plan the ground water
extraction well placement and prepare for the ground water
restoration project, was about §175,000. The cost of the
soil and ground water sampling and analyses was about
$1.25 million. Most of the work was done by Raltech, Inc.
Over half of the expense involved analysis costs. The
analyses are now performed on-site by the OCC lab, which
includes three specially-calibrated gas chromatographs.
Part of the total ground water treatment system costs was
devoted to design, development and construction of the
system with bench scale and pilot scale systems.
Excavation
The cost of excavation of the 4655 cubic yards
(6088 m ) of contaminated material described in "Design
and Execution of Site Response" above and listed in
Table 2, was about $678,000. The primary equipment used
for the excavation was a Case 450 bulldozer, a Caterpillar
977, and an Case 780 backhoe with a three foot bucket.
Transportation and Disposal
The costs of transportation and disposal were charged
together on a per-cubic-yard rate based on the type of
material and the location. Since the site was located
directly along a highway 1-5, these tipping rates were
relatively low because of the low amount of wear and tear
expected on the trucks, compared to what would be expected
17-33
300.70(c)(2)(i)
Excavation
-------
TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF COST INFORMATION-OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL CO., LATHROP, CA.
Task
Site Investigation
A. Excnv.it Ion
B. Contamination
Transportation and
disposal
I. Class I
1) Extremely
Hazardous
2. Class II-l
Total Removal Cost
C. Groundwater
Restoration
1. Model ling .planning
2. Treatment aystera(b)
Total Capital Cost
D. Operation and
Maintenance
1) Carbon
11) Electricity
ill) Maintenance
Total water treated
Quantity
--
4655 cu.yds. (3, 559m3)
Total:
4655 cu.yds. (3, 559«3)
140 miles (225 km)
735 cu. yds. (562 m^)
15 miles (24 km)
3185 cu.yds (2435 m3)
——
5,400-11,000 Ibs
(11,880-24,200 kg/
month
1749-2000 kwh
—
1.5-2.6 x lOBgallons
(6.8-9.8 x 10B 1)
year
Actual
Expenditure
$1.25 million
$678,000
$247t450
($80,850)
($114,475)
$925.450
$175,000
$1.56 million
$3.91 million
958,320-125, 400/year
$35, 000-40, 000/year
$40,000/year
OiH:$m,320-370-800/
year
Unit Coat
—
$146/cu.yd.
($191/M')
$110/cu.yd.
$144/m3)
$35/cu.yd
($46. »3)
—
90-95^/lb
(1.98-2.09/fcg
4.9 if /kwh
—
0.05-0. 1U
gallon
(0.013-0.029*1)
Funding
Source
OCC (a)
OCC (a)
OCC
OCC
occ
occ
occ
occ
occ
occ
occ
Period of
1979-81
July 1980-
Fcb. 1981
July 1980-
Feb. 1981
July 1980-
Feb. 1981
1980-19C.
1980-1981
1979-1981
'
1980-1981
1980
1980
1980
I
La
-P-
(a) Occidental Chemical Company
(b) Design, Development and construction
-------
if the site required driving along poorer quality roads.
The thirty cubic (23 m ) yard capacity trucks were filled
to between 15-20 yards (11-15 m ) because of weight
limitations set by California state law. About 274 truck-
loads of material were hauled off-site for disposal. The
transportation distance to the Class I landfill in
Coalinga, California was 140 miles (255 km). The Forward
Class II-l landfill in Stockton, California was 15 miles
(24 km) from the site. The separation of material into
Class I and II-l disposal categories was based on DoHS
criteria and best professional judgement of the regulatory
personnel and OCC. Generally, technical grade pesticides
were Class I and contaminated soil was Class II-l .
Containers of pure pesticides, including concentrated
vanadium pentoxide, were further segregated for disposal
as Class I "extremely hazardous."
The total cost for transportation and disposal of the
4655 cubic yards (6088 m ) of excavated waste pesticide
and contaminated soil was $247,450. This estimate is
based on the following unit costs given verbally by OCC,
and an even distribution of class I materials, noted by a
DoHS engineer (See Tables 1,2). At $110~per cubic yard
($144/m ), the 735 cubic yards (562 m ) of Class I
"extremely hazardous" material transportation and disposal
cost was $80,850. Aj $75 per cubic yard ($98/m ), the 735
cubic yards (562 m ) of Class I "hazardous" material
transportation and disposal cost was $55,125. At $35
dollars jjer cubic yard ($46/m ), the 3185 cubic yards
(2435 m ) of Class II-l material transportation and
disposal cost was $114,475.
Ground Water Treatment
The cost for designing, developing and constructing
the ground water treatment system was about $1.56 million.
The $175,000 cost for CDM's ground water planning study
should be included in the restoration project costs. The
annual operation and maintenance (O.&M.) costs are still
unclear, but some estimates were offered, and some can be
constructed from engineering data. Based on a carbon
usage rate of between 5,400 and 11,000 pounds
(11,880-24,300 kg) per month and a carbon cost of 90-95^
per pound ($1.98 - $2.09/kg) the annual cost for carbon
replacement will be about $58,320 - $125,400 per year.
This is based on the use of a single contactor which will
be changed to two contactors, and shipping the carbon to
New York for replacement and regeneration. The minimum
electricity costs for operating three 7.5 horsepower pumps
in the extraction wells, which draw at least 49,090
kwh/year to maintain a cone of depression, is about
$2,454. The estimate of present electricity cost is about
$35,000 - $40,000/year for the entire system. The annual
300.70(b)(2)(ii)
direct waste
treatment
methods-carbon
absorption
17-35
-------
maintenance cost has been estimated at about $40,000.
Hence, the total operation and maintenance for treating
1.65 - 2.6 x 10 gallons (6.8 - 9.8 x 10 1) of water a
year (300-500 gallons (1135 - 1893 1) per minute) is about
$133,320 - $165,400 per year. This is a unit cost of
0.05^ to 0.11^/gallon (0.013 - 0.029
This O.&M. cost estimate is very tentative since the
system was still being modified at the time of this
writing (January 1983). The cost for carbon regeneration
could increase in the short term when the second contactor
comes on line. However, in the long run this cost should
decrease as the concentration of the contaminants in the
ground water decreases. The replacement of the carbon
system with a biodegradation process, which is now in a
pilot scale stage of development, may also decrease the
treatment cost although the effectiveness of such a
process at reducing DBCP concentrations to below 1 ug/1
was uncertain as of January 1983. Finally, analytical
costs for maintaining and calibrating the system should
decrease as the procedure becomes more streamlined through
experience.
Alternative Water Supply Cost
The entire cost as well as the contracting responsi-
bility for the alternative water supply system near the
site is being borne by OCC. Aside from the construction
costs, OCC is paying for legal fees, right of way acqui-
sition, engineering, state and local permit fees, and the
district connection fee for each resident who desires a
connection. After completion and inspection, OCC will
turn over ownership to the Lathrop County Water District.
The District will assume future maintenance responsi-
bility.
The construction costs are expected to total between
$200,000 and $300,000 when completed in February 1983.
This cost includes water main lines, services, fire
hydrants, and appurtenences for two streets. An eight
inch (20 cm) water main will be installed along Louise
Avenue from 7th Street west, and north on Harlan Road. A
twelve inch (30 cm) water main will be installed on Louise
Avenue from 7th Street east to McKinely, and an eight inch
(20 cm) main along McKinely Street south of Louise Avenue.
A total of 28 residences will be connected.
300.68(i)(2)(B)
Distribution of
costs over time
300.70(d)(2)
provision of
alternative
water supply
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
There were two types of remedial actions at the OCC
site: (1) excavation and capping of contaminated soils,
and (2) ground water extraction, treatment, and
17-36
-------
reinfection. The performances of these remedial measures
are discussed separately below.
Soil Excavation and Capping
The excavation and capping of contaminated soils at
the OCC site was done according to specifications which
were preapproved by U.S. EPA and the State of California.
Since the time this work was completed, frequent visual
inspections have shown no ponding, cracking, or other
evidences of failure in the capped areas.
Groundwater Extraction, Treatment, and Reinfection
The effectiveness of the ground water remediation at
the OCC site is evaluated continuously through daily
monitoring of all organic constituents shown in Table 3 in
the influent and effluent to the carbon absorption
treatment plant. DBCP concentration was selected as the
key performance indicator after bench scale and pilot
plant testing showed it to be the most difficult pesticide
to remove. A maximum level of 1 ug/1 DBCP was set as the
performance standard for the treatment system since the
California Department of Health services had previously
established this concentration as an "action limit" for
area drinking water. This performance standard was
difficult to maintain when the ground water treatment
began in July, 1982.
When the system first began operating, the average
concentration of DBCP in the treated effluent was about 7
ug/1 with about a 5 ug/1 fluctuation about the mean. This
was greater than a 99 percent reduction over the influent
concentrations which usually lies in range between 1000
and 4000 ug/1. However, recently with the debrigging go
the system completed, US EPA has indicated compliance
with the consent-degree mandated 1 ug/1 DBCP limit.
Further, the OCC facility operator is now examining the
possibility of connecting the two carbon contactors to
double the carbon contact time and thereby expects to
reduce the effluent DBCP concentration below the 1 ug/1
performance level.
The performance of the injection wells is evaluated
continuously by monitoring the piezometric response of the
injection zone. This monitoring is done through 3 wells
that were drilled into the injection zone.
In addition to evaluating the performance of the
carbon treatment system and the injection wells, OCC is
required to monitor the ground water at over 60 monitoring
17-37
-------
TABLE 3. MONITORING PARAMETERS FOR WELL SAMPLES COLLECTED AT THE
OCC SITE.
Major Organic Constituents*
Alpha BHC
Beta BHC
Delta BHC
Gamma BHC
Minor Organic Constituents**
Aldrin
Chlorodane
DDE
DDT
DBF
Delnav
Dieldrin
Dimetholate
Major Inogranic Const!tuents*
Chloride
Conductivity
Nitrate
Minor Inogranic Constituents**
Gross Alpha
Gross Beta
DBCP
EDB
Sulfolane
Heptachlor
Methyl Parathion
Ethyl Parathion
Sevin
Toxaphene
Disyston
2,4-D
2,4,5-T
pH
Sulfate
Uranium
Radium 226
*Found in significant quantities and/or in a significant number of wells
**Found in detectible concentrations in one or more monitoring wells
17-38
-------
wells around the plant. Table 2 presents a list of
parameters prescribed by the monitoring program. The
major organics and inorganics shown in this table are
monitored 3 time per year and the minor constituents are
monitored only once a year. The purpose of the monitoring
plan is to confirm the outputs of the ground water model
on which the remedial extraction efforts are based. The
model has been used to predict the effects of different
extraction well pumpage rates and locations on the
movement of contaminated ground water plume. By
continuing to monitor the wells, the OCC facility operator
and the regulatory authorities can determine whether the
contaminated ground water is being contained and removed
according to the chosen configuration and pumpage rates of
the extraction wells (Figures 14 through 16) . If
descrepancies are found between the predicted and observed
concentrations of ground water contaminants, either the
model, the remedial design, or both will have to be
adjusted depending on the nature of the descrepancy. Thus
far, there is no indication of a problem with the present
ground water extraction program.
17-39
-------
Figure 14. Predicted Depth Averaged
(DBCP) After 5 Years of
Mitigative Pumping
5>
Reservoir w$$
(From Camp. Dresser, and McKee,
July. 1981).
17-40
-------
^
Figure 15. Predicted, Depth Averaged
(DBCP) After 10 Years of
Mitigative Pumping
(From Camp, Dresser, and McKee,
July, 1981).
FEET
17-41
-------
" .'/•X- • -^ •*' -WE
4k OB *BJ -
-55" *=M20
16. Predicted, Depth Averaged
(DBCP) After 20 years of
Mitigative Pumping
(From Camp, Dresser, and McKee,
July, 1981).
17-42
-------
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alpert, Norman, Hooker Chemical Company. December 1982. Personal
communcation with J. Werner, Environmental Law Institute.
Babich, H. and D.L. Davis [98], "DBCP: A Review." The Science of the total
Environment. Vol 17. pp 207-221.
Barr Engineering Company. "Assessment of Environmental Problems and
Associated Cleanup Costs." Submitted to Occidental Chemical Company,
Lathrop, California, February, 1979.
Black and Veatch Consulting Engineers. "Design Memorandum for Project 9970."
Submitted to the Occidental Chemical Company, Lathrop, California,
November, 1981.
Camp, Dresser, and McKee. "Mathematical Modeling of Ground Water Flow and
Chemical Transport in the Vicinity of Occidental Chemical Company,
Lathrop, California." Submitted to the Occidental Chemical Company,
Lathrop, California, July, 1981.
Canonie Environmental Services Corporation. "Development of Treatment
Measures for Ground Water Restoration." Submitted to the Occidental
Chemical Company, Lathrop, California, July, 1981.
Canonie Environmental Services Corporation. "Ground Water and Soil Analysis
Program Near Lathrop, California: Phase I Study." Submitted to the
Occidental Chemical Company, Lathrop, California, December, 1980.
Canonie Environmental Services Corporation. "Soil Mitigation Measures Western
Storage Area." Submitted to the Occidental Chemical Company, Lathrop,
California, July, 1981.
Caspeel, Roy, Lathrop County Water District. January 1983. Personal
communication. J. Werner, Environmental Law Institute.
Dahl, Thomas 0. "A Hazardous Waste Disposal Problem vs A Systematic Approach
for Imposing Order Into Chaos." In Proceedings of the National
Conference on Management of Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites,
Co-Sponsored by the U.S. EPA and the Hazardous Materials Control Research
Institute, October 28-30, 1981, Washington, D.C.
Dahl, Thomas 0., U.S. EPA, NEIC, Denver, CO. December 1983. Personal
communication with M. Evans, JRB Associates.
17-43
-------
Dahl, Thomas 0., U.S. EPA, NEIC, Denver, CA. January 1983. Personal
communication with J. Werner, Environmental Law Institute.
David Keith Todd Consulting Engineers. "Ground Water Quality in the Vicinity
of Occidental Chemical Company." Submitted to Occidental Chemical
Company, Lathrop, California, September, 1979.
David Keith Todd Consulting Engineers. "Ground Water Quality in the Vicinity
of Occidental Chemical Company: Supplemental Report on Organic
Compounds." Submitted to Occidental Chemical Company, Lathrop,
California, October, 1979.
Harris, John A. Occidental Chemical Company. Lathrop, California. November,
1982. Personal communication with M. Evans, JRB Associates. 30
Harris, John, Occidential Chemical Company, Lathrop, CA. September, 1982.
Personal communication with J. Werner, Environmental Law Institute.
Hatayama, Howard. California Department of Health Service. September,
December 1982. Personal communications with J. Werner, Environmental Law
Institute.
Luhdorff and Scalmanini Consulting Engineers. "Feasibility of Ground Water
Injection for Disposal for Treated Effluent." Submitted to the
Occidental Chemical Company, Lathrop, California, December, 1981.
Merkley, John, Chemical Waste Mangement, Inc., Coalinga, CA January 1983.
Personel communication with J. Werner, Environmental Law Institute.
Pinkos, Tom. California Regional Water Quality Control Board, September
December 1982. Personal communication with J. Werner, Environmental Law
Institute.
Pacific Gas & Electric rate schedule, August 23, 1982.
Schamber, Arnold, R.W. Siegried & Associates. Stockton, CA., personal
communication with J. Werner, Environmental Law Institute.
Van de Pol, Ron California Regional Water Quality Control Board, December,
1982. Personal communication with J. Werner, Environmental Law
Institute.
Wheeler, John. U.S. EPA December, 1982. Personal communication with J.
Werner Environmental Law Institute.
17-44
-------
STROUDSBURG
PENNSYLVANIA
A. INTRODUCTION NCP Reference
The Stroudsburg site is located in the Borough of
Stroudsburg, Monroe County, Pennsylvania at the site of a
historical coal gasification plant (Figure 1-A). Over a
60-year period EPA officials estimated that approximately
1-2 million gallons of coal tar residuals from a coal
gasification plant were injected into nine well adjacent
to a small trout stream known as Brodhead Creek. Over
time, the coal tar seeped from the wells into the
underlying gravel stratum of the streambed. Erosion of
the streambed eventually resulted in the migration of the
coal tar into the surface waters of the creek.
In addition to Brodhead Creek being widely used for
trout fishing, it is also a tributary of the Delaware
River which serves as the main water supply to Eastern,
Pennsylvania and as a recreational area. Due to the broad
usage of both the Delaware River and Brodhead Creek,
migration of coal tar into the creek posed a serious
potential health hazard and environmental threat.
Background
From 1880 to 1940, Stroudsburg Gas Co. operated a
coal gasification plant near the shores of Brodhead Creek.
Coal tar residuals from the gasification process were
injected into a well on the property down into a porous
gravel stratum that occurs approximately 20 feet below the
land surface. In the early 1900's the plant also supplied
electricity to area residents via electrical generators
located on the plant property.
In 1917, Pennsylvania Power and Light Company (PP&L)
purchased the electrical section of the Stroudsburg Gas
plant, and acquired four or five additional parcels of
land over the next 30-year period. Most of this land was
situated along the streambed of Brodhead Creek.
18-1
-------
Figure 1-A. Stroudsburs Site Area and Location Map
18-2
-------
In 1955, Hurricane Diane caused major flooding along
the shores of Brodhead Creek, including land owned by
PP&L. In 1960 the Corps of Engineers instituted a flood
control program which involved straightening of the creek
channel and construction of dikes approximately 50 feet
high along either side of the creek.
During routine maintenance of the dike in the Spring
of 1980, the State discovered that the s treambed has
eroded 6 feet. This was attributed to a change in stream
flow as a result of earlier dike construction. To remedy
this problem, the State began erosion control work along
the streambed, placing the existing riprap deeper than it
had been for the original dike construction. During low
water conditions in October of 1980, black tarry globules
(later identified as coal tar) were observed emanating
from the base of the dike at an elevation of about 375
feet. The observed seepage was in the approximate loca-
tion of the old coal-gas plant. The flow of the coal tar
into the stream was nonuniform, noncontinuous, and non-
homogeneous , issuing from the stratum at several points
along the side of the stream, similar to springs (Figure
1-B).
Syr]opsis of Si t e _R_esponse
In response to the discovery of the coal tar seepage,
the State began investigations to determine the extent of
contamination and the level of respon&r required to alle-
viate the problem. Six months later, in April of 1981,
the State and EPA Region II responded to the problem under
the authority of Section 311 of the Clean Water Act. This
action concentrated on oil removal technologies including
installation of filter fences and the construction of
inverted dams.
In September 1981 the State presented its findings on
the problem in a report entitled the "Extent of Contamina-
tion at Brodhead Creek." The report recommended the con-
struction of a slurry trench cut-off wall to effectively
contain the coal tar and prevent further migration into
the streambed. EPA began construction of the slurry wall
upon the State's recommendation. The slurry wall was
completed in January 1982.
Concurrent with actions taken by the State and EPA,
PP&L conducted extensive on-site geological and water
quality studies in April of 1981. The purpose of the
studies was to answer questions concerning the extent of
contamination and the type of technology necessary for
removal, not just containment, of the coal tar. The
300.63(a)(4)
discovery
300.68(f)
field
investigation
300.65(b)(7)
physical
barriers to
deter spread
of release
18-3
-------
CO
I
-o
Figure 1-B. General Stroudsburg Site Area
-------
studies identified a large accumulation of recoverable
coal tar in an underground stratigraphic depression
located near the flood control dike. Based on this
information, PP&L decided that the most effective means of
removing the coal tar was to reclaim it as a resource.
PP&L determined that the optimum technology for accom-
plishing this task would be a recovery well system. In
the fall of 1981 PP&L began and completed installation of
the system.
SITE DESCRIPTION
The Stroudsburg site plant is located at latitude
40°58'50" and longitude 75°llf10", near the urban area of
Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania, between the bridges of Route
209 and Route 1-80.
Surface Characteristics
The Stroudsburg site and surrounding Monroe County
are located in the Pocono Mountains of eastern
Pennsylvania. The terrain consists of predominantly
forested, rolling mountains dotted with numerous lakes,
swamps, and streams.
The Stroudsburg site is located along one of the
lower-most reaches of Brodbead Creek, in a relatively wide
valley. Approximately 200 feet (61 m) from the coal tar
site, Erodhead joins McMichael's Creek which flows in a
southeasterly and then in an easterly direction for
approximately 4 miles, (6.4 km) eventually emptying into
the Delaware River.
The drainage area of Brodhead Creek is approximately
142 square miles (368 km ) above the mouth of McMichael's
Creek. The topography of the watershed is characterized
by moderate to considerable relief.
The average flow of Brodhead Creek, based upon flow
records for the past 28 years, is 2.2 cubic feet (.06 m )
per second per square mile at a point near the
Interborough bridge, upstream of the site area, the flow
of Brodhead Creek was i&easured and was found to be 294
cubic feet (8.2 m ) per second. The creek is
characterized by frequent, yet brief, flooding events
during the 7-month period, November through May. The
highest degree of flooding, however, has been caused by
hurricane-force storms that have occurred during the late
summer months. A maximum peak of 266 cubic feet (7.5 m )
per second per square mile was recorded on August 19,
1955. Normal minimum flows occur in August, September and
18-5
-------
October and are generally between 5 percent and 10 percent
of the average flow.-3 The ininiinum flow recorded was 0.11
cubic feet (.003 m ) per second per square mile and
occurred on September 27, 1964.
The soils in the site area are members of the
Holly 300.68(e)(2)(i)(D) series and are characterized by a
fine loamy texture. The hydrogeology Holly soils are
typically deep (60 inches (.02 m) in factors depth) and
poorly drained. These soils were formed in alluvium that
was derived from acid sandstone and shale, and occur on
flood plains along major streams. Slopes range from 0 to
3 percent. Due to its fine-silty texture, poor drainage
and the fact that they are usually located in flood prone
areas, construction activities may be restricted in areas
consisting of Holly soils. Excavations can be problematic
due to the high moisture content of the soils and the
area's high flood hazard potential. The construction of
embankments, dikes, and levees with these soils requires
addressing the problems that can be caused by piping
(subsurface erosion). The erosion potential of these
soils is low.
The local climate is characterized as being humid 300.68(e)(2)(E)
continental. The average annual daily maximum and minimum climate
temperatures are approximately 57 °F (13.9°C) and 36 F
(2.22°C), respectively (3). The average daily minimum
temperatures during the months of November, December, and
January are 29.3°F (-1.67'C), 18.0°F (-7.78°C) and 14.5°F
(-10.0°C) respectively (4). During the winter months,
prevailing winds blow from a west-northwest direction.
During the summer months, the winds shift to a more west-
southwesterly origination. Wind speeds average 8 mph
(13 kmph).
Annual precipitation ranges between 40 and 60 inches
(>.51 and 1.5 m), with an average of 45 inches (1.1 m) per
year. Average snowfall is approximately 40 inches (.51 m)
per year. During the month of November, there is an
average of 3 days that have snow cover. December has, on
the average, 13 days with snow on the ground and both
January and February average 18 days each.
The Stroudsburg site is situated between the Borough
of Stroudsburg to the west and the Borough of East
Stroudsburg to the east. Combining these two areas, there
is a total population of approximately 15,000 within a 1.5
(2.5 km) mile radius of the site, which increases
substantially during the tourist season.
18-6
-------
Hydrogeology
The Stroudsburg area is situated at the foothills of 300.68(e)(2)
the Appalachians, in the Pocono Mountains and is charac- (i)(D) hydro-
terized by gently rolling terrain, underlain by unconsoli- geological
dated valley-fill glacial deposits. The geology of the factors
area consists of at least 60 feet (1.5 ra) of unconsoli-
dated sediment overlying undifferentiated Devonian or
Silurian calcareous bedrock. The unconsolidated material
is generally composed of four different lithelogics. A
typical geologic cross section consists of the following
units listed from the top to the base of the stratigraphic
column; (1) swamp deposits and artificial fill, (2) coarse
gravel alluvium, (3) fine sands and clayey silt, (4)
ground moraine or till, and (5) calcareous bedrock (See
Figure 2). This section is locally quite variable and has
altered extensively during the flood control project.
The material present nearest the surface is a highly
variable fill, consisting of swamp deposits, controlled
fill from construction of the dike and assorted "dumped"
materials. These components occur noncontinuously over
the site area and, in some locations, are completely
absent. Where fill material is absent, the surface layer
consists of the alluvium material.
The coarse alluvium underlying the artificial fill
consists of several sand and gravel beds of varying ages.
For the purposes of this report, however, the alluvium
beds will be treated as one unit. The thickness of the
gravel bed is relatively consistent throughout most of the
site area. There is one apparent pinch-out or thinning of
the bed occurring in a southerly direction.
Underlying the coarse alluvium 'are sediments that
range from medium grained sands to fine clayey silt. It
is suspected that this material is a lake deposit. Test
borings have revealed gravel lenses within this unit. The
lens matrix, however, is fine grained.
The material directly underlying the coarse alluvium
and overlying the calcareous bedrock in the site area, is
a dense gray ground moraine or till. It occurs as a
compact conglomeration of boulders, gravel, sand, silt,
and clay.
The ground water regime in the area is controlled by
both the configuration of glacial deposits and surface
topography. Most of the ground water that flows through
the glacial material is moving to the southeast, which is
the same general direction as surface runoff. The median
groundwater level is typically 10 ft (3 m) below the
18-7
-------
60 ft
(18 m)
Varied Fill - swamp deposits,
assorted dumped materials, and
controlled fill from dike
construction
Gravel - coarse gravel alluvium
Sand - medium grained sands to
fine clayey silt with gravel
lenses
Till - dense, grey conglomeration
of boulders, gravel, sand silt and
clay
Calcareous bedrock
Figure 2. Typical Geologic Cross Section of the Stroudsburg
Site Area
18-8
-------
natural Land surface and the median saturated thickness is
approximately 65 ft (20 m) in the region. With this
information and the fact that the overburden in the site
area is approximately 60 ft (18 m) in depth, one can
expect that most of the unconsolidated material overlying
the bedrock at the Stroudsburg site is water saturated.
It should be noted, however, that the term 'aquifer,' as
used in this report, is meant to describe only the gravel
alluvium. Water table contours for ground water levels at
the site indicate that ground water migration is in a
southeast direction toward Brodhead Creek, with an average
hydraulic gradient of 0.015. Ground water contours are
based on ground water level observations that were
recorded in June, 1981. The ground water flow rate from
the site to the creek has been calculated using Darcy's
equation and is estimated to be 28 gpra. The overall
velocity of ground water movement is approximately 2 ft
(.61 m) per day.
WASTE DISPOSAL HISTORY
The Stroudsburg coal gasification plant was
constructed near the shores of Brodhead Creek in the
middle 1800's. The plant furnished coal gas as fuel for
heat, power and light to residents of Stroudsburg and East
Stroudsburg. Stroudsburg Gas Co. acquired the plant in
the early 1880's and continued the operation until it was
terminated in approximately 1940.
The coal gasification process at this site involved
the destructive distillation of coal which left coal tar
as a by-product.
Several disposal methods were utilized in the time
span of plant operation. During the plant's early
operation, coal tar, removed from the reaction vessels,
was placed in a trench along the eastern edge of the
property, adjacent to Brodhead Creek. The waste products
that accumulated in the holding tanks were occasionally
"blown down" to the ground.
During the late 1800's and early 1900's, technology
developed to the extent that it became possible to remove
commercially valuable material from the coal tar waste.
The residue from the recovery operation was disposed of
through an injection well, Located in the northwestern
quadrant of the plant property where the facility's boiler
house previously stood. The well was constructed such
that residuals were injected into the gravel alluvium
stratum that underlies the plant area and is delineated
approximately 20 ft (6.1 m) below the land surface. This
18-9
-------
disposal method represented a state-of-the-art technology
and was an accepted practice during that time period.
Waste injection was practiced at the Stroudsburg plant
until its closing soon after World War IT.
The total quantity of coal tar residue in the contam-
inated groundwater plume present at the Stroudsburg site,
is, currently estimated at 1.8 million gallons (6.8 x
10 1) and is generally confined to the gravel stratum.
An underlying fine sand layer provides an effective
barrier to further downward migration. Investigative
studies have shown the contamination to be spread over an
area approximately 8 acres. The largest concentration of
coal tar has been located on the inside of the west bank
levee, in a stratigraphic depression formed by the
confining layer of fine silty sand.
The coal tar residue at Stroudsburg consists of a
light fraction that floats on water and a heavy fraction
that sinks. However, when slightly agitated in the
presence of water, the tar breaks up into three phases;
the light and heavy phases and a third phase of near
neutral buoyancy, that remains dispersed in the water
column. When strongly agitated, all the tar constituents
dissolve to a degree to form an emulsion which is very
slow to separate.
The chemical constituents of coal tar residue will
vary depending upon the coal from which it is produced and
the production process utilized. Coal tar is a mixture of
many chemical compounds, of which, polynuclear aromatic
hydrocarbons (PAHs), cyanides and ammonia, often exist in
significant concentrations. These compounds have both
acute and chronic health effects, some of them known and
suspected carcinogens. Table 1 describes the partial
analysis of a coal tar residue sample taken from the
Stroud&burg site.
300.68(e)(2)
(i)(B) amount
and form of
substances
present
DESCRIPTION OF CONTAMINATION
As a result of the severe flood damage caused by
Hurricane Diane in 1955, a flood control program was
initiated by the State in 1958. The program was insti-
tuted by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers under the
State's supervision and consisted of rechanneling Brodhead
and McMichael fs Creek slightly to the west of their
original course and placing the channel within a floodway
lined with stabilized levees. The levees which stand
approximately 50 feet (15 m) in height were constructed
along the east and west banks of Brodhead Creek and along
the north and south banks of McMichael's Creek. The con-
18-10
-------
TABLE 1. PARTIAL ANALYSIS OF THE STROUDSBURG COAL TAR
PARAMETER
Naphthalene
Fluoranthene
Phenanthrene
Anthracene
Dimethyl Naphthalenes
Trimethyl Naphthalenes
Methyl Phenanthrenes
Trimethyl Benzene
Fluorene
Acenaphthylene
Acenaphthene
Pyrene
Benzo( a) anthracene
Chrysene
Benze(a)pyrene
Other
Acidity
PH
Free Carbon (.Carbon I)
Ash
Total Carbon
Total Hydrogen
Total Nitrogen
Sulfur
Chloride
Ammonia
Cyanide
Iron
Copper
Manganese
Zinc
Nickel
Cadmium
Lead
Arsenic
Aluminum
Vanadium
Barium
VALUE
3.60
3.20
2.30
2.30
2.15
1.78
1.50
1.30
0.98
0.74
0.72
0.56
0.31
0.31
0.10
7.84
TOTAL 29.69
0.62
4.6
<0.01
0.00
90.77
8.12
0.17
0.65
50.
0.26
0.18
50.3
2.48
2.11
0.13
0.19
0.01
0.5
12.7
22.4
1.6
0.5
UNITS
7.
fa
"L
to
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
rag KOH
standard
%
%
%
%
%
%
ppra
ppra
ppm
ppm
ppm
ppra
ppm
ppra
ppm
ppm
ppm
ppra
ppm
ppm
Source: Villaune, J.F., Lowe, P.C. and Unites, D.F., Recovery of
Coal Gasification Wastes: An Innovative Approach, Presented at:
The Third National Symposium and Exposition on Aquifer Restoration
and Ground Water Monitoring, May 25-27, 1983, Columbus, Ohio
18-11
-------
struction was completed in 1960. The levee construction
along the shores of Brodhead Creek had a major effect upon
the stream's morphological processes and that was to con-
strict its lateral migration and prohibit the development
of meanders. This resulted in rapid downcutting of the
stream channel, lowering the channel 6 ft (18 m) over the
next 20 years and endangering the integrity of the levee
by undercutting the rip-rap placed along the toe of the
levee. By 1980 the creek had downcut below the level of
the rip-rap, and action was taken by the Pennsylvania
Department of General Services (DCS) in cooperation with
the municipalities and the Corps of Engineers, to extend
the rip-rap downward an additional 10 feet (3 m). Con-
struction began in October 1980 and involved the excava-
tion of a trench along the toe of the levee on the western
shore of Brodhead Creek. During a low water condition, a
black substance, later identified as coal tar residue, was
observed emanating from the base of the dike at an eleva-
tion of 375 feet (114 m) . The flow of the coal tar into
the creek was nonuniform, noncontinuous, and nonhomogenous
and entered the water from several points along the stream
channel (Figure 3).
DCS completed the restoration and reported the
incident to the State Department of Environmental
Resources (DEP), Bureau of Water Quality and the Fish
Commission.
In response to the coal tar discovery, the State
began investigations to determine the extent of contamina-
tion and the level of response necessary to alleviate the
problem. An initial preliminary assessment of the situa-
tion was made in March of 1981. At this time, it, was
estimated that 3 to 8 million gallons (11 to 30 x 10 1)
of, co^l tar was underlying an area of 11 acres (4.5 x
10 m ) along Brodhead Creek and within a year there would
be significant leaching into the creek. Based on these
conclusions, it was recommended that a more detailed
hydrogeologic investigation be conducted to ascertain the
extent of pollution.
In March-April, 1981, DER requested the assistance of
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in the
further investigation of the problem. It was also at this
time that PP&L and other affected property owners were
informed of the situation and ordered by EPA to undertake
an investigation of the extent of contamination. Only
PP&L complied.
The investigative field studies that followed
involved three major areas; (1) the hydrogeology of the
site area, (2) the impact of the coal tar on stream
18-12
300.68(f)
investigation
-------
Figure 3. Extent of Contamination at the Stroudsburg Site
18-13
-------
quality and its biological community and (3) the erosional
behavior of the stream.
The hydrogeologic field work conducted at tbe
Stroudsburg site involved several phases; (1) test pit
excavation, (2) a contamination survey including test
borings and additional test pits and (3) a groundwater
monitoring program.
A total of 23 test pits were excavated during the
second and third week of April, under State supervision
with assistance from the EPA Technical Assistance Team
(TAT). The excavations were made using a tractor mounted
backhoe and a tractor mounted shovel. Coal tar was dis-
covered in nine of those pits. The tar appeared to be
confined to the gravel and cobble layer and was particu-
larly concentrated on top of the fine sand bed that
underlies the gravel stratum.
As a result of the test pit findings, an extensive
contamination survey was undertaken by the State and EPA
in May, 1981, to determine the extent of contamination
present and the geological conditions affecting the move-
ment of the contaminants and their entry into Brodhead
Creek. This survey was conducted by PP&L and their geo-
logic consultant TRC. The subsurface investigation that
followed involved additional test pits, test borings, and
an electrical resistivity survey. Results indicated that
the contamination extended over an 8-acre (3.3 x 10 in )
area. Tbe largest concentration_of coal tar_ an estimated
50,000-100,000 gallons (1.2 x 10 - 3.8 x 10 1) was found
on the inside of the west bank levee in a stratigraphic
depression underlain by a confining layer of fine sand
(see Figure 3).
The depression is located near the old injection
well. Movement of the contaminants through the porous
gravel appears to be primarily controlled by the hydro-
static gradient and the configuration of the sand bed.
Movement is generally in the same direction as groundwater
flow which is to the southeast, however, groundwater flow
is not the predominant force behind tbe coal tar's migra-
tion pattern. If this were the case, a much larger tar
concentration would be found downstream and to the south-
east. Thus the specific gravity of tbe coal tar seems to
have had a greater effect on its movement than did the
groundwater flow direction.
A total of 17 test borings were drilled to determine
the extent of contamination. At critical depths, continu-
ous spoon samples were taken. In general, the holes
extended at least 10 ft (3 m) beyond the last noticeable
18-14
-------
phenolic odor in the sand. There were several borings
that required an extra 20 ft (6 m) of drilling beyond the
sand-gravel interface. Eight additional test pits were
also excavated.
With the data collected from the test pits and test
borings, the extent of contamination was estimated. One
of the most noticeable differences between the preliminary
assessment and the estimates made following the completion
of the field investigation was the much smaller size of
the depression behind the west bank levee, which conse-
quently lowered estimates of the coal tar volume.
The calculated volume of coal tar in the main sub-
surface reservoir of coal tar using the most recent boring
data, is^etween 26,000 and 103,000 gallons (9.8 x 10^ and
3.8 x 10 1) as opposed to the earler estimate of 100,000
to 150,000 gallons (3.8 x 10* and 5.75 1). The coal tar
existing outside this reservoir is not concentrated in
large depressions. The coal tar found outside the main
reservoir either migrated over the depression lip or it
was disposed of over the entire site area and found its
way into subsurface strata. No conclusive evidence has
been found to support either one of these possibilities.
The contaminated areas and volumes of coal tar
present have been estimated and are given in Table 2.
The groundwater sampling and analysis program
instituted at the site revealed that polynuclear
aromatics, benzene, toluene and ethylbenzene were present
in the shallow groundwater at either the part-per-billion
level or within the range of known solubilities of the
individual chemical species. The principal inorganic
contaminants, ie, iron, aluminum, manganese and cyanide
were detected at levels as high as 460, 218, 25.5 and 0.30
mg/l. These contaminants are responsible for the high
conductivity readings taken from the water samples
collected at the site.
The conclusion drawn from the sampling program is
that there is a contaminated groundwater ring surrounding
the coal tar deposits. The studies conducted to date,
indicate that the extent of this contamination is not much
beyond the main primary contamination plume due to the
absence of drinking water wells in the site area, it was
felt that the only potential impact of contaminated
groundwater would be on the stream, and because ground-
water flow in the area is only about I/5,000th of the
stream flow, the potential hazard of the contamination
appears negligible.
300.68(e)(2)
(iv) environ-
mental effects
and welfare
concerns
18-15
-------
TABLE 2. A REAL AND VOLUMETRIC ESTIMATES OF
CONTAMINATION AT THE STROUDSBURG SITE
Subareas
Area inside the dike
( includes area under
the dike)
Area outside the
dike
Island Area
TOTAL
Known Contaminated
Area, in Sq. Ft.
(m2)
210,000
(19,900)
90,000
(8,400)
35,000
(32,000)
335,000
(or 7.7 acres)
(3ha)
Estimated
Thickness
in Ft.
(m)
2 to 15
(0.61 to 4.6)
1
(.31)
1
(.31)
Contaminat ion
Volume
in Cu. Ft.
(m3)
1,642,000
(47,000)
90,000
(2,600)
35,000
(10,000)
1,767,000
(or 130,889 tons
assuming 1 ton =
1/2 ydJ)
(30,400)
Source
Concurrent with the extent of contamination surveys,
an additional series of studies was conducted to assess
the environmental impact of the coal tar on the aquatic
community and water quality of Brodhead Creek. The
performance of the studies was undertaken by the
Pennsylvania Fish Commission (PFC), PP&L, and PA DER.
During the period from April-August, 1981, these groups,
individually and in conjunction with one another, con-
ducted various sampling and analyses efforts to determine
the effects, if any, of the contaminant plume on stream
quality.
From the results of the various studies and surveys
conducted on Brodhead Creek it was concluded that the
stream's water quality and biological community had not
been adversely affected. However the presence of the coal
tar on-site, a highly toxic substance, was a potential
hazard to the stream1s integrity in the future. The
potential for detrimental long term effects from coal tar
seepage remained and the possibility of a catastrophic
release of tar directly into the stream1s waters was a
primary concern.
The third study conducted at the Stroudsburg site
investigated the morphological processes of Brodhead
300.68(e)(3)(i)
water pollution
problem
18-16
-------
Creek, with particular interest in determining the reasons
for the rapid downcutting that has occurred over the last
20 years. Knowledge of the mechanisms involved and the
resulting changes in the stream's morphology was of major
importance because the one greatest potential hazard posed
by the coal tar is its sudden release in large volumes,
caused by down-cutting of the stream bed. To evaluate the
situation, PP&L contracted its consultants to report on
the present day processes that are determining Brodhead
Creek* s evolution.
The investigation concluded that most of the channel
down-cutting has occurred as a result of the rechanneliza-
tion project. Brodhead Creek has a wide channel and a
relatively shallow cross-section with alternate bars
occurring throughout its natural and man-made reaches.
These bars are what produce the low amplitude, long
wavelength meanders characteristic of Brodhead Creek.
Straightening of the stream channel produced an increase
in stream gradient which has been documented to cause
significant channel downcutting. The rip-rap that was
placed along the levees, then perpetuated the channel
downcutting process by prohibiting the channel to move
laterally and form meanders.
It is the opinion of those involved in the investiga-
tion that the channel morphology is close to reaching
equilibrium, although the channel gradient may still be
too great. It is, however, difficult to determine
present-day rates of downcutting because of the lack of
historical and current data on stream bed configuration.
Two recommendations for monitoring and limiting channel
instability that were made are listed below:
• The channel should not be re-aligned, for this
would result in renewed downcutting
• Channel cross-sect ions should be measured and
monitored to determine if downcutting is con-
tinuing at high rates.
PLANNING THE SITE RESPONSE
jjiitiation of Response
Once preliminary assessment revealed that 3 to 8
million gallons of coal tar were underlying Brodhead Creek
and the threat of continued coal tar seepage into the
creek existed, DER requested funding from EPA and the
Coast Guard under Section 311 of the Clean Water Act, to
18-17
-------
intercept the discharge. Funds were granted because navi-
gable water was threatened by the release. The immediate
measures consisted of filter fences and sorbent booms to
intercept the coal tar moving from the back channel area
into the stream. Additional studies, confirmed by the
Pennsylvania Fish Commiss ion, DER and PP&L, determined
that the coal tar plume is toxic and potentially hazardous
to the ecological integrity of the stream. Consequently,
all parties agreed on the need to develop a long-term
remedial response program. The result of the program was
the construction of a slurry trench cut-off wall and the
installation of a recovery well system.
Selection of Response Technologies
The selection of remedial techniques at the Strouds- 300.68(g)
burg site proceeded under the influence of complex development
interagency decision-making, monetary and political of alternatives
limitations and the incertitude of the problem at hand.
Results from the numerous surveys and studies conducted at
the site were not easily compared due to varying degrees
of control and the use of differing study methods. Thus,
the difficulty in forming a single opinion as to the
nature and extent of the problem, was complicated by the
fact that there were data discrepancies between the
studies upon which decisions were to be based. The
remedial actions taken reflect a technically complex
situation in which there was a continually rising sense of
urgency due to (1) the possibility of a sudden release of
coal tar into the stream and (2) the time and financial
constraints involved in selecting response technologies.
The following section describes the rationale that lay
behind the selection of remedial techniques at
Stroudsburg, Pa.
Remedial actions at the Stroudsburg site consisted of
the following:
(1) Placement of filter fences and sorbent booms to
intercept backchannel discharge into stream
(2) Inverted dams installed in sequence with filter
fences
(3) Excavation of numerous recovery trenches and
installation of recovery wells
(4) Storage and disposal of drummed contaminated
materials
(5) Installation of a slurry trench cut-off wall
along the bench of the west bank levee
18-18
-------
(6) Installation of a recovery well system in the
area of the coal tar reservoir.
The first action taken in an attempt to control the
contamination problem at Stroudsburg was by EPA in April,
1981, under Section 311 of the Clean Water Act (Public Law
92-500). The emergency action taken was initiated as a
Federal removal activity and involved the installation of
filter fences, sorbent booms, and an inverted dam in the
backwater channel to intercept the discharge of coal tar
and contaminated water into Brodhead Creek. The filter
fence measure proved inadequate when light rains caused
the sheen to flow around the fence. At this point it was
dec ided to include an add it iona1 measure and instal1 an
inverted dam. Thus the backwater channel was further
excavated and a filter fence and inverted dam were
installed in such a way as to allow only water to be
released, preventing the flow into the stream of the oil
sheen on the surface and the insoluble coal tar on the
bottom (Figure 4-A). When one of these inverted dam/
filter fence combinations proved only partially effective,
three additional filter fences were placed downstream in
the backwater channel and another inverted dam and two
filter fences were installed within the flood gate channel
(Figure 4-B). The pipes within each dam, through which
clear water flowed, were emplaced such that the submerged
ends were downstream. This containment technique was a
success until heavy rains caused the complete flushing of
the backwater channel, destroying the dams and filter
fences alike.
It became apparent from the occurrences just
described, that more permanent measures would have to be
taken to prevent contaminant release. With results from
the hydrogeological studies, it also became apparent that
the contamination at Stroudsburg could not be cleaned-up
in a relatively short period of time, as, for example, an
oil spill could be. The coal tar problem at Stroudsburg
warranted years of containment and capture. Funds for
remedial actions at Stroudsburg were passed from Section
311 to CERCLA (Superfund). Beginning on November 9, 1981,
funds were appropriated under Superfund, establishing
Stroudsburg as the first site to recieve Emergency
Superfund monies.
Concurrent with activities involving the inverted
dam/filter fence installations and as part of the "extent
of contamination" studies, a recovery trench was construc-
ted on the west bank of Brodhead Creek to intercept coal
tar that was thought to be migrating into the stream.
During construction of this trench no significant
300.68(e)(l)
initial
remedial
measure
300.70(b)(l)(ii)
surface water
control
300.70(b)
drainage
ditches
18-19
-------
OILY SUF.RN
OO
I
to
O
WATER LEVE!
INSOLUBLE COAL TAR
Figure 4-A. Schematic Diagram of the Filter Fence/Inverted Dam Combination
Used at the Stroudsburg Site
-------
Oo
I
N)
(Inset from Figure 1-B.)
Figure 4-B. Schematic Diagram of Filter Fence/Inverted Dam Installations
at the Stroudsburg Site
-------
accumulations of coaL tar were discovered, though the
ground water did have a phenolic odor. A 4-hour pump test
of the recovery trench was conducted during which pumping
rates varied between 53 gallons (200 1) per minute (gpm)
and 157 gpra. The water level was drawn down near the
trench bottom. No significant accumulations of coal tar
were observed flowing into the trench. Throughout this
phase approximately 20 test pits were excavated in various
locations along Brodhead Creek to intercept coal tar
migration into the stream.
In conjunction with the excavation of test pits,
recovery wells (RW's) were installed to determine where
recoverable quantities of the coal tar were located.
PP&L's geotechnical consultants, TRC, explored the area
south of the recovery trench on the bench just above the
backwater channel. Since coal tar was emanating into the
backwater channel, it was thought that a recovery well
might prove successful in intercepting any contaminant
that was reaching the channel. Small amounts of coal tar
were observed during drilling and installation of the
well, however, recoverable quantities of coal tar were not
encountered.
A second well was then drilled on the west side
(interior) of the west bank dike in the area where the
stratigraphic depression was thought to exist. During the
drilling process, increasing quantities of coal tar were
encountered until the surface of the sand layer was
intersected. Below the sand layer, coal tar was not
encountered. Data from the second recovery well (RW2)
confirmed that a subsurface depression exists at this
location and contains a relatively large coal tar
reservoir. The reservoir thickness at RW2 was estimated
to be 10 feet (3 m).
Different methods of pumping from RW2 were tested and
evaluated to determine the feasibility of recovering large
quantities of coal tar from the reservoir at a sustained
rate. It was determined that it was possible to recover
relatively pure coal tar «1% HO), however, the physical
characteristics of the coal tar and the fact that it is in
contact with groundwater limited the usefulness of many of
the pump configurations tested. The heavy fraction of the
coal tar is slightly denser than water and although it
separates from water and will settle at the well bottom, a
minimal disturbance will cause a mixing of the coal tar
and the water, which produces an emulsion that is highly
300.70(b)(l)
(iUXO
ground water
pumping
18-22
-------
viscous and resembles a brown-orange paste. Several of
the pump configurations tested are described below.
• Diaphragm suction pump - satisfied minimum dis-
turbance conditions and low shear at pump intake
but maximum operating heads were only 20 feet
(6 m).
• Peristaltic pump - effect ive in satisfying low-
shear conditions and increased operating heads,
however, attainable pump rate <.25 gpm was
considered insufficlent for recovery purposes.
• Gas-powered suction pump - use of high speed
impe Her caused disturbance at intake and
perpetuated mixing and horaogenization through
pump. Also flow rates of this type of pump
difficult to regulate.
• Submersible pump - feasible for recovery if
provided with automatic shutoff to keep tar/water
interface above intake.
The recovery well "system" installed at the Stroudsburg
site was initially powered by a submersible pump as
described above, however, due to problems that will be
discussed in the next section, it was replaced by a
nonsubmersible centrifugal electric pump.
The debris and contaminated materials generated
during the Section 311 activities at the Stroudsburg site,
were contained in drums and stored on site through the
month of November, 1981, pending final disposal. The
greatest number of drums stored at one time was approxi-
mately 200. These included steel drums that contained
liquid coal tar and fiber and steel drums that held solid
waste materials. Initially the drums were stored on the
ground, in the open, with no labels or other identifying
markings. Eventually they were placed on pallets, covered
with plast ic sheet ing and stored in a fenced-in area.
The materials generated during the Section 311 300.70(c)(l)
activities were disposed of at SCA, Model City, NY, off-site
beginning in November, 1981. Contaminated soils produced transport
during slurry wall installation were sent to the SCA land-
fill in Niagara Falls, NY, and material generated during
the excavation of the backwater channel during slurry wall
construction was disposed of at GROWS, in Morrisville, PA.
18-23
-------
On November 9, 1981, remediation funds were appropri-
ated to the Stroudsburg site under Superfund. The coal
tar could no longer be considered oil for clean-up
purposes. Remediation of the situation required more time
and money than what was available under Section 311. The
following day, on November 10, 1981, EPA awarded a con-
tract to the construction firm, ICOS, to install a slurry
trench cut-off wall at the site. The filter fences how-
ever, continued to be maintained by the contractors,
Environmental Cleaning Specialists, and Section 311 con-
tinued to fund disposal activities.
The decision on the type of containment system to be
used resulted from a thorough investigation of numerous
alternatives. Table 3 describes the most prominent of
these alternatives, in addition to the final measures
taken to stabilize the situation.
Extent of Response
The cleanup response at Stroudsburg consisted of two
steps. First, coal tar seepage into the creek was inter-
cepted to protect "navigable water" from contamination.
The filter fence, sorbent boom, and inverted dam set in
the stream adequately achieved this goal.
Second, the response officials' long-term primary
goal was to contain the coal tar plume such that further
seepage into the stream was prevented. The purpose of
constructing the slurry wall was to achieve this goal by
creating a barrier between the coal tar reservoir and the
stream. The barrier wall essentially cut across the
gravel stratum which serves as the pathway for the
contaminants. Other than the minor excavation of con-
taminated soil in the back channel, once the barrier wall
was complete, the goal of the response action was
achieved. Continued migration of coal tar into the stream
has been arrested. The effectiveness of the barrier wall
is discussed in the Performance Evaluation Section.
Through the operation of the recovery well system, it is
anticipated that 50% (approximately 37,000 gallons) of the
coal tar present within the subsurface reservoir will be
recovered. To this date about 7,500 gallons have been
recovered. As such, the recovery operation will continue.
300.68(e)(l)
initial
remedial
measures
DESIGN AND EXECUTION OF SITE RESPONSE
Slurry Trench Cut-off Wall
The completed slurry trench cut-off wall is 648 ft in
length, 1 ft wide and 17 ft (5 m) deep (Figure 5). The
18-24
300.70(b)(l)
-------
TABLE 3. ALTERNATIVE RESPONSE TECHNOLOGIES FOR THE COAL TAR PROBLEM
AT STROUDSBURG, PENNSYLVANIA
Response Technology
Alternative
Description
Rational* for Rejection/Acceptance
NCP
Reference
Filter Fence/Recovery
Hell System
(Rejected)
Consisted or filter fences placed at seepage
point* along stream) recovery well system
Installed In coal tar reservoir area to ulti-
mately remove all coal tar] at tine of proposal
filter fences already on site and several
recovery wells already installed) in terms of
cost, this system would have required compar-
atively little additional funding.
Required that PPtL resume responsibility
and Maintenance of filter tencesj PPsL
opposed proposal based on filter fence
failure to adequately and consistently
contain contaminants]
Complete removal of coal tar could not
be accomplished within 6 months specified
by Superfund policy.
300,70(b)(1)(11)
surface water
control and
300.70(b)(1)(lli)(c)
ground water pumping
Treatment Plant System
(Rejected)
O5
I
Locate treatment plant on site at one end of
backwater-drained recovery trench) coal tar
and contaminated water would be pumped and fed
to treatment system
• Remedlatlons performed under Supecfund
must be complete within 6 months and
within a 1 million dollar budget treat-
ment of contaminant could not be
completed within 6 months]
• Proposed location foe treatment plant l
a bank that Is covered with water 6
months out of year
• Very costly.
300.TO(b)(2)(11)
direct treatment
methods
Sheet Piling Barrier
(Rejected)
Interlocking steel sheet piling to be
installed along eastern and southern
boundaries of site and on west side of dike
to mln. of 15 ft. below surface gradient
Piles driven to mln of 15 ft. below surface
gradient or 5 ft below sand/gravel Interface
Linked to concrete sluiceway on downstream
side and retaining wall on upstream side
Area between sheet piling and rip rap toe
reinforced within concrete cap
Minimum of 4 monitoring operations to be
located between sheet piling wall and dike
Time required for Implementation is
2 months) well within specified program
restrictions
Hot compatible with site geology) glacial
till consists of very coarse gravel type
material) problems Inevitably would arise
due to presence of boulder-siie material
Pounding Involved In Installation was
cause for concern) could change structure
of aggregation In flood control leveea
and disruption could result
300.70fb) (1)
plume
containment
(Source: JRB Associates)
(continued)
-------
TABLE 3. (continued)
Response Technology
Alternative
Description
Rationale for Rejection/Acceptance
NCP
Reference
Steel Piling Barrier
(continued)
Total cost fot job less than
$1,000,QOOt within program
specifications
Recommended that a contaminant removal
program be instituted In conjunction with
barrier
Building Up and Capping
Stream Banks
(Rejected)
Build stream banks up and out into stream
bed
Ensure Impermeability by then capping the
banks with clay material
Temporary in nature) length of time that
situation would be stabilized not
predictable
Very costly
300.70(b)
(D(ilHA)
surface seals
CO
I
ro
Slurry Trench Cut-off
(Accepted)
Cement-bentonite slurry wall (S.H.)
installed by EPA
Installation along bench on outer face of
west bank levee
Downstream end keyed horizontally into
pressure grouted curtain and upstream end
keyed into existing sheet piling wall below
concrete flood wall
Slurry wall la 648 feet long, 1 foot wide
and 12 feet deep) it is keyed 2 feet into
sand stratum underlying the coal tar bearing
gravel at elevation of 365 feet
Top elevation of wall Is 380 feet along
entire length except at one location where
the top elevation of the gravel layer is
higher
Completion of Installation possible
within Superfund policy restrictions
(6 months and one million dollars)
Time was crucial since Superfund money
was being used, a decision had to be made
and construction begun
Cement-bentonite used based on (1)
compatibility test results) (2)
insufficient room onsite for mixing
soil and bentonite and (3) unavailability
of fines on site for a soil-bentonite
mixture
300.70(b)(1)
(iii)W(D
slurry walls
(continued)
-------
TABLE 3. (continued)
Response Technology
Alternative
Description
Rationale for Rejection/Acceptance
NCP
Reference
Cement-Benton ite
Grout Cuetain
(Accepted)
Recovery Hell System
(Accepted)
CO
I
N)
• Forms the final downstream segment
of the slurry wall} serves as a
continuation of th« wall to the dike
• Keyed into clay core of the dike at one
end and the Blurry wall at the other
• Approximately 50 ft in length
• Constructed using cement-bentonite grout
and the Method of pressure grouting
through a series of vertical holes in
the ground and through the dike
• Recovery project a separate action fron
S.M. installation
• Four well clusters each containing one
control well and three surrounding wells
• Located behind west bank levee to remove
coal tar from atratigraphlc depression
• Wells contain comparative probes to sone
tar-water interface, sending signal to
controller which turns pump on or off
Excavation of a trench in close
proximity to the dike could have
Impaired dike integcityi decision
therefore made to continue wall to
dike by another means besides a slurry
trench wallj grouting was the most
technically and economically feasible
alternative
PPdL wanted to clean up the site, not
stabilize itj (EPA was charged by
law to stabilize the situation, not
clean it up)
Realized that any containment barrier
would be complemented by a removal
system
300.70(b)
Uii)(A)(2)
grout curtains
300.70(b)
ground water
pumping
Excavation of
Backwater Channel
(Accepted)
• Complete excavation of backwater channel
• Excavated area 350 feet long, 10 feet
widei 7 feet deep
• Contaminated materials drummed and disposed
of G.R.O.W.S. Landfill, Morrisvllle, Pa.
• Channel then developed and fitted with
uncontamlnated clay soil and a stone
rip-rap
Backwater channel was one of the most
highly toxic areas at the site
300.70(c)
(2)(1)
excavation
(continued)
-------
TABLE 3. (continued)
Response Technology
Alternative
Disposal of Contaminated
Materials
(Accepted)
Polyethylene Liner
(Rejected)
Monitoring Hell*
(Accepted)
Description
• Initially, contaminated materials (solid
and liquid) drummed and e toted on site
• Fiber and steel drums utilized
• Drums stored on pallet and covered with
plastic sheets
• Three landfills used Cor final disposal
{1J BCA Model City, NY
(2) SCA, Hiagra Falls, NY
<3) G.R.O.M.8., Mocclsvllle, PA
• To be placed In slurry wall trench during
construction for added wall strength
• Bight monitoring wells | four located on
either side of wall
• For purpose of monitoring 8.H. performance
and groundwater sampling
Rationale for Rejection/ Acceptance
• Three different disposal facilities used
because of difficulty In locating sites
that (a) would accept the wastes and
(b) would pass Pa. DBR standards and
(c) were within activity financial limits
• Unable to properly place in trench due to
its great length sod weight
• Necessary to determine effectiveness
of wall
—
NCP
Reference
300. 70 (c) (1)
oCf-site
transport
for secure
disposition
300.70(b)(1)
IliiMDlOt
liners
00
t
NJ
00
-------
Groundwater
level
Figure 5. Cross-Section — Brodhead Creek
Source: ELI report (1982)
18-29
-------
slurry wall extends down through the gravel stratum that
bears the coal tar and is keyed 2 ft (-6 m) into the
underlying sand layer. It was not necessary to key the
wall into an impervious aquiclude, due to the floating
nature of the coal tar contaminants on the sand layer.
The overall surface elevation of the wall is approximately
380 ft (132 m) above sea level. The upstream end of the
wall is keyed into a sheet piling gate that is part of the
existing flood dike. The downstream end of the slurry
wall is horizontally keyed into an impermeable ceraent-
bontonite grout curtain. The curtain was constructed to
form the final downstream segment of the barrier wall
because it was believed that trench excavation in close
proximity to the dike would have impaired the dike's
integrity. The grout curtain was installed by pressure
grouting through a series of vertical holes in the ground.
The curtain is approximately 50 feet long.
Pre-excavation for the slurry wall installation began
on November 16, 1981 and actual wall construction commen-
ced 9 days later. A ramp was constructed as an access
road for heavy equipment used during project operations.
During trench excavation earth was removed with a backhoe
and the contaminated material was separated, and hauled by
a track-mounted bucket loader to a small storage basin
on-site. The stored material was periodically loaded onto
a sealed truck and transported to SCA Disposal Services in
Niagara Falls, NY.
In excavating the slurry trench, a calculated risk
was taken regarding containment of the coal tar plume.
The plume configuration was such that there were several
areas extending out under the stream bed. Initially, EPA
suggested excavation of the areas, but the PA Fish
Commission opposed, claiming that excavation would be more
detrimental than taking no action. It was decided that
instead of excavating, the 'lost1 plume areas were capped
and rip-rapped. (See Figure 6).
Under EPA supervision, compatibility testing was
conducted to determine the most appropriate slurry wall
composition. The decision to use a cement-bentonite mix-
ture was based upon three factors; (1) the compatibility
test results, (2) the lack of area for on-site mixing of a
soil-bentonite backfill and (3) the unavailability of
local clays for use in a soil-bentonite backfill. The
cement-bentonite slurry mixture, used both as the slurry
to keep the trench open during excavation and as the
cut-off wall materials itself, was prepared using four
standard sized bags of bentonite and 11 bags of cement per
3 cubic yards. The selected mixture has a design permea-
bility of 1 x 10 cm/ sec and is considered sufficient to
slurry walls
300.70(b)
(iii)(A)(2)
grout curtains
300.68(i)(2)(E)
adverse effects
18-30
-------
Lost Plume Areas
Figure 6. Lost Plume Areas After Slurry Wall
Installation at the Stroudsburg Site
18-31
-------
contain the coal tar. This judgement, is based on the
assumption that the contaminant moves slowly through the
gravel stratum, and the gravel material has a much higher
permeability than the cement-bentonite. The original wall
design included the use of a polyethylene liner along the
wall's interior for added impermeability. The length and
weight of the material, however, caused problems during
attempted installations and as a result the material was
never utilized.
The cement-bentonite slurry trench cut-off wall was
installed in sections. Construction initially began
downstream (see Figure 7) near the drainage way, however,
problems arose due to the narrow bench from which the
trench was being excavated and the cohesionless nature of
the random fill that had been used to cover the levee
core. Instability on the upslope side of the trench
caused several sections to collapse repeatedly. The
decision was made to continue upstream as far as the ramp
and when the ramp was reached, construction activity then
began at the downstream end once again, but this time the
bench was widened and relocated farther from the control
levee to minimize the possibility of collapse. Following
wall completion at this end, construction began at the
upstream end near the retaining wall and moved downstream
towards the ramp. The section containing a gas line was
excavated by hand. The final section to be completed was
that which contained the access ramp.
Over the course of construction, cold weather
conditions including rain and ice storms, periodically
hampered operations but never entirely halted construction
activities.
The slurry wall was completed on December 15, 1981,
at which time drilling for the grout curtain, installation
at the downstream end of the wall had been completed and
grout injection had begun. The cement-bentonite grout
curtain was completed within 7 days.
The wall design that was finally chosen for con-
struction at the Stroudsburg site had a surface elevation
of 380 feet (116 m). This design dimension caused some
disagreement. The viewpoint held by the State at the
time, was that the wall surface elevation should have been
lower (approximately 378 ft) (115 m) to allow groundwater
to flow over the wall. The rationale was that by not
allowing flow over the wall and impounding the ground
water behind the barrier, there was the possibility that
the coal tar would build up and eventually discharge in
the swamp area behind the levee, forming a small lake
which could then drain through the floodgate tributary and
18-32
-------
tf 3SO-0
CteeX.
EI36GO
a
i'
-------
into Brodhead Creek. In support of the lower elevation
design, there was no evidence provided by the stream
quality studies that there had been stream degradation
caused by contaminated groundwater. It was therefore felt
that ground water flow over the wall and into the stream
was not a potential hazard to stream integrity. The
State's primary concern was to contain the coal tar which
existed at the lower portion of the groundwater column.
EPA representatives, on the other hand, were
concerned about the contaminated groundwater issue and
recommended a wall with a surface elevation of 380 ft
(116 m), to prevent groundwater flow over the wall. This
design was eventually implemented.
The surface elevation is 380 ft (116 ra) over the
wall's length except for a 100 ft (30 m) section in the
northern area of the site (see Figure 7). The gravel
stratum elevation along this segment is higher than any-
where else and therefore the wall surface was constructed
at 382 ft (116 m). The wall bottom elevation is 365 ft
(111 m) everywhere except along a section that is approxi-
mately 170 ft (52 m) long, where the gravel stratum is
extended to a greater depth. This wall section is
adjacent to the stratigraphic depression behind the levee
to the west.
The following task involved restoration of the levee
bench in order to permit the installation of monitoring
wells. Once this was completed, eight monitoring wells
were installed in support of a state supervised ground-
water sampling program to determine groundwater quality in
the vicinity of the wall. Four wells are located on the
stream side of the wall, three wells are situated on the
inland side of the wall, between the wall and the levee,
and one well is located behind the levee and behind PP&L1s
retaining wall.
Excavation
The next phase in the Stroudsburg operation was the
excavation of contaminated materials from the backwater
channel. The excavated area was 350 feet (107 m) long, 10
feet (3 m) wide and 7 feet (2 m) deep. Approximately 280
cubic yards of contaminated material were removed, drummed
and disposed of at a secure landfill in Morrisville, PA,
The excavated channel was then dewatered and backfilled
with approximately 600 cubic yards of uncontaminated clay
capping soil. In addition, about 300 cubic yards of access
ramp material were then placed over the clay capping
which, in turn, was overlain by stone rip-rap. In
concurrence with the channel excavation/backfilling
300.70(c)(2)(i)
excavation
18-34
-------
process, several other restoration activities were
underway and these included the following:
• Restoration of the flood control dike
• Hydroseeding of dike and other areas disturbed by
site activities
• Asphalting the private road (Union Gas property)
used by site activities.
By the end of January, 1982, demobilization and
general clean up had been completed at the Stroudsburg
site.
Recovery Well System
The recovery well installation project at the
Stroudsburg site was initiated and completed privately by
PP&L. This part of the response program did not fall
under Super fund funding due to restrictions inherent
within the Immediate Removal Program. Actions under this
program are implemented to stabilize or control problems
but not necessarily solve them. Stabilization of a
problem must be accomplished with less than $1,000,000 and
within a 6-raonth period, and operation and maintenance may
not be provided after the end of the 6 months. The coal
tar recovery system clearly did not fall within these
specifications. PP&L felt however, that any amount of
contaminant that was feasibly recoverable should be
removed and thus installed a recovery well system. It
should be noted here that neither the slurry wall nor the
recovery well system could have properly solved the
problem alone. The wall stabilized the situation but was
not installed with the intention that it would eliminate
the source of the problem. The recovery wells, on the
other hand, were installed to remove coal tar from only
one location, leaving other contaminated areas without
remediation. These points and others will be further
discussed in the next section, "Performance Evaluation".
The recovery well system consists of four well
clusters located throughout the stratigraphic depression
that contains the reservoir of coal tar (Figure 8). Each
well cluster has been installed in a 30-inch (91-cra) hole
and consists of four 6-inch (15 cm) gravel packed, slotted
PVC pipes for recovery, centered around one 4-inch slotted
PVC pipe used for monitoring (Figure 9). The pump con-
figuration originally selected to power the recovery well
system was a submersible pump with an automatic shutoff.
This choice, however, did not prove to be suitable because
the coal tar rapidly destroyed the pump and several
300.70(b)(2)
UiiXc)
groundwater
pumping
18-35
-------
00
I
Slimy Wall
8ILTY SAND
Figure 8. General Cross Section Through the Stroudsburg Coal Tar Site
(Source: Paper by J.F. Villaume 1982)
-------
00
I
U)
Monitoring Control Well
Recovery Well (4 Total).
Pump Control Sensors
SII.TY SAND
Figure 9. Generalized Cross-Section Through A Typical Coal Tar Recovery Well Cluster
(Source: Papers by James F. Villaume (PP&L) 1982 & 1983)
-------
replacement pumps. It was then decided that a nonsub-
mersible centrifugal pump be used. The pump is provided
with automatic level control features. Two pump control
sensors are located in the central monitoring well to
sense the tar-water interface. A signal is sent from the
sensors to the control device on the pump. The pump turns
on when the interface reaches the upper sensor and it
turns off when the interface drops to the lower one. In
this way, the tar-water interface can be maintained above
the well intake point and virtually pure coal tar «11%
H00) can be recovered. The recovered coal tar is then
stored on-site in a 10,000 gallon (37,000 1) holding tank.
PP&L had originally planned to use the coal tar as fuel in
their own facility, but due to public opposition they
sought other alternatives. Allied Chemical of Detroit,
Michigan signed an agreement with PP&L to purchase the
coal tar for use in their plants. Allied presently pays
for the transport of the coal tar plus 40 cents per
gallon.
There are differences between the original design and
the "as-built" recovery system. Charges were made to
increase the efficiency of the system. As mentioned
earlier, the type of pump used to power the system was
changed due to the corrosive nature of the coal tar.
Originally it was anticipated that all four clusters would
be operating. Presently, however, only RWl is recovering
coal tar. When the system's operation began, the movement
of the coal tar water interface was not induced to enhance
recovery rates. The interface level was allowed to
recover at its own rate. About 6 months after the
recovery operation began, PP&L decided that perhaps
pumping ground water in the vicinity of the recovery well
would increase the rate of coal tar recovery and
initiated a ground water pumping test program using RW2,
to determine the effect of ground water pumping on the
coal tar recovery rate. Pumping tests did, in fact, show
that recovery rates could be enhanced. Due to the density
difference between the water and the coal tar, as water is
removed from a designated area, the coal tar surface
actually rises in that area. This produces stress on the
system and causes the coal tar to flow toward the pumping
point or well at an increased rate. Testing continued
over the next 3-month period until the system was shut
down for the winter in November 1982.
In the spring of 1983 the system resumed operation
and ground water is being pumped through one of the four
wells in RWl, as coal tar is recovered through another one
of the four wells in RWl as shown in Figure 9. Two pumps
are being used, one for coal tar recovery and the other
18-38
-------
for ground water pumping. The water pump is a nonsub-
mersible centrifugal pump and is operated continuously.
Ground water is being removed at a rate of about 5 gpm.
This has resulted in a 10-15 times improvement in the coal
tar recovery rate. The coal tar pump being used is the
same nonsubraersible centrifugal described earlier. The
ground water is discharged to a leach field located about
65 feet upgradient of RW1, near the old coal tar injection
pit. The field is an excavated pit, approximately 6 ft x
12 ft x 6 ft (1.8 ra x 3.6 m x 1.8 m) backfilled with
gravel.
COST AND FUNDING
Source of Funding
To date, the total cost of the site response actions
taken by all parties at the Stroudsburg site comes to
approximately $594,500. EPA and the owner of the site,
Pennsylvania Power and Light, have spent the bulk of this
amount (see Table 4).
The removal of coal tar which had seeped into
Brodhead Creek was funded by EPA and the Coast Guard under
Section 311 of the Clean Water Act. The slurry wall and
grout curtain, a more permanent response, were funded by
the Super fund Immediate Removal Program. PP&L installed
the recovery wells on its own initiative. The entire coal
tar recovery operation is expected to cost $190,000.
The available cost information allows discussion of
the costs of only the slurry trench cut-off wall and the
recovery well system. Costs of other activities are shown
in Table 4.
Selection of Contractors
The selection of contractors in an emergency response
situation such as the Stroudsburg case, is made by the on
scene coordinator (OSC) , who consults the EPA list of
available contractors and makes a choice based on "best
judgement." In this case the OSC talked with several
firms and solicited bids. ECS was selected for the
emergency removal operation and for the construction of
the slurry wall. The inherent uncertainty and the
emergency nature of this type of operation were cited by
the OSC as the reasons the final cost of the slurry wall
increased to $326,000 which exceeded planned costs by
$88,000. The project was completed in 45 days, well
within the specified period of performance of 60 days.
PP&L contracted with TRC, Inc. in compliance with EPA1 s
18-39
-------
TABLE 4. SUMMARY OF COST INFORMATION-STROUDSBURG, PENNSYLVANIA
1-Utfk
Slurry
Wall
Recovery
Well System
1- liter
Tern' us
So r bunt
Booms
Inverted
flack Channel
Excavation,
Transporta-
tion and
Restoration
(c)
Total
Actual
Quantity
648 x 17 x ft:
11,016 ft3
(198 x 5 x 0.3m:
308 m3)
7,500 gal.
28,291 I.
280 cu.yd.
(215 m3)
Estimated
S 238,000
—
Actual
Expenditure
$326,000(a)
Held study:
$130,800
instill Imunt :
$110,000
additional:
$40.000
$43,500
$60,QOO
$15,000
$725,300
Variance
$88,000
(+372)
.
-._
—
Unit Cost
$29.59/ft3
$214/cu.yd.
(219/m^)
—
Funding
Source
Superfund
Removal
PP&L (b)
FUl'OA
Section 311
Superfund
Removal
Superfund
Removal
Performance
ll/fll-1/82
11/81-ongoing
4/81-7/81
1/82-3/82
4/82-5/82
00
I
(a) Includes excavating tlie trench,
transporting and disposing con-
taminated sail
(b) Pennsylvania Power and Light
(c) clean fill, grading and seeding
-------
request, to perform the investigative studies on the site
in April of 1981. A direct procurement contract was
signed between the two parties. The original estimated
cost for the studies was $125,000, which was exceeded by
$5,000, bringing the total cost of the studies to
$130,000.
Project Cost
Slurry Wall
The total cost of the slurry wall was $326,000. This
corresponds to a unit cost of $29.60 per installed cubic
foot. The allocation of the total expenditures for the
slurry wall operation is uncertain. The material cost of
the wall was between $5.00 and $8.30 per cubic foot. The
remaining costs were associated with the excavation,
transportation and disposal of the trenching waste, with
the latter two estimated at $105.00 per cubic yard
($136.50 per cu tn) . Included in the total cost is the
$20,000 spent on grouting at the downstream end of the
trench. The entire slurry wall operation was funded by
the Super fund Immediate Removal Program. It seems the
excavation of the trench incurred a large portion of the
total cost due to the difficulties of trenching in wet
contaminated soi1.
Recovery Well
Total expenditures to date by PP&L for the recovery
well system including investigative studies and well
installation, are $240,000. It is estimated that an
additional $40,000 will be spent before the system is
fully operational. Of the $240,000, $130,000 was spent on
investigative studies and, $110,000 on well installation.
In the fall of 1981, PP&L signed a direct procurement
contract with EMTEK out of Amherst, New Hampshire to
install the well system. A procurement contract was used
as opposed to open-bidding because PP&L had procured
EMTEK1s services in the past with effective results.
Original estimates for total cost of the system were
$150,000.
The est imated cost for the development of a
demonstration well and its operation was $7,500. However,
due to unanticipated problems an additional $10,000
expense occurred. Thus the total cost for phase one was
$17,500. The second phase which involved the installation
of the final four wells and an enhancement program to
insure maximum coal tar recovery, has cost $92,500 to
date. Installation has been completed but the system is
not yet fully operational. Inclement weather over the
past 3 months has prevented the continuation of work on
18-41
-------
the wells. PP&L plans to develop and institute an
enhancement program. The estimated expenditure for the
final part of the second phase is $40,000.
The installation of the recovery well system was
undertaken in two phases. In the first phase, a single
test well was installed in order to determine its
effectiveness. Several problems arose due to three of the
four pipes becoming clogged with silt and preventing the
well from operating. Once this problem was corrected the
second phase began which entailed the installation of the
four wells proposed in the system design.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The slurry trench cut-off wall at Stroudsburg was
installed to stabilize a situation in which coal tar was
entering a biologically active and healthy surface water
body. Data collected from the eight wells used to monitor
ground water conditions on either side of the slurry wall,
indicate that the wall has been successful in preventing
further horizontal contaminant migration into Brodhead
Creek. The values for ground water levels on the outside
of the wall (i.e., the stream-side) have been consistently
lower than those for ground water on the inside of the
wall (see Table 5). This suggests that the wall is indeed
acting as a barrier to horizontal ground water movement
and, consequently, coal tar movement towards the stream.
Visual inspections have been routinely made along the
stream bed to ensure that the coal tar seepage has been
successfully eliminated. Surface water sampling analyses
also show positive results regarding stream water quality.
Thus, it appears from f o 1 lowup inve s t igat ions that the
slurry wall has been effective in preventing coal tar
contaminants from entering the creek. There is, however,
some apprehension on the part of both the State and EPA,
regarding the seemingly complete stoppage of contaminant
migration. (Note: the term 'contaminants' is used here
with reference to coal tar constituents within the ground
water as well as the coal tar itself.) It seems
reasonable to assume that the coal tar, itself, has been
contained behind the wall for there are no further signs
of seepage along the stream bed and it was demonstrated
during the 'extent of contamination1 studies that the tar
does not penetrate the underlying sand to any significant
degree. The issue that has sparked concern is possible
vertical migration of contaminated groundwater. There has
been regular groundwater level monitoring in the vicinity
of the wall and regular surface water sampling, but there
18-42
-------
TABLE 5.
MONITORING WELL GROUND WATER ELEVATIONS ON EITHER SIDE OF WALL
WELL
No.
I
2
o
3
I
4.
»
5
o
6
o
I
0
DATE
Hell To* (tx» of
st«ti cap) Elm-
tie* in (.) E Ft.
(119.01)
390.01
(118.46)
387.70
(118.46)
383.68
(117.82)
388.50
(117.86)
386.56
(117.92)
386.89
(118.06)
387.34
(117.85)
386.85
1-28-82
2-4-82
2-17-82
3-10-82
4-20-82
5-27-82
Ground Water Elevations in Feet (m)
-
:u5.i2)
377.70
1115.56)
379.16
(115.58)
379.20
(115.08)
377.56
(114.92)
377.04
(115.41)
378.64
(114.60)
376.26
(115.85)
380.15
(115.55)
379.10
(115.86)
380.12
(115.87)
380. 16
(115.52)
379.01
(115.42)
378.69
(115.74)
3 79.74
(115.21)
378.00
(115.69)
379.55
(115.24)
378.10
(115.68)
379.53
(115.70)
379.60
(115.19)
377.91
(115.06)
377.49
(115.59)
379.24
(114.87)
376.86
-
(115.15)
377.30
(115.35)
378.45
(115.67)
379.50
(115.11)
377.66
(114.92)
377.04
(115.58)
379.19
(114.81)
376.66
;il5.84)
380.05
;il5.3U
378.30
:i!5,76)
379.78
;il5.34)
380.05
;il5.28)
378.21
;il5.12)
377.69
115.73)
379.69
114.90)
376.96
(115.69)
379.55
(115.12)
377.70
.(115.61)
379.29
(115.65)
379.42
(115.10)
377.62
(114.90)
376.96
(115,55)
379.09
(114.70)
376.32
6-2-82
(115.84)
380.05
(115.44)
378.75
(115.63)
379.38
(115.64)
379.40
(115.39)
378.56
(115.23)
378.05
(115.81)
379.94
(114.81)
376.66 :
o - Scream-side or oucside of Slurry wall; -
I - Inside or in land of slurry wall
Source: Department of Environmental Services
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania
Locaced behind PP&L's retaining
wall
18-43
-------
has never been a follow-up groundwater sampling and
analysis program implemented, which is a major concern to
the leading agencies involved. The question has become
whether the only discharge point for the ground water in
the site area is Brodhead Creek or whether there is
vertical movement down through the underlying sand strata.
If there is vertical ground water movement, soluble
constituents of the coal tar, such as polyaroraatic hydro-
carbons, benzene, cyanide, and naphthalene (PAHs), will
not be confined to the sand layer and the possibility of
deeper aquifer contamination exists. If this were the
case, an area such as East Stroudsburg might be affected.
The water for this area is drawn from an aquifer that is
700 feet below the ground surface.
In response to their own concerns, EPA has decided to
conduct an additional hydrogeologic investigation to
supplement the information that is already available. The
primary objective of the study will be to sample the
groundwater that exists within the sand strata. In autumn
of 1982, four to six additional monitoring wells were
installed and used to sample the ground water present
within the sand unit. When data collection is complete
EPA will be able to make a complete and final assessment
of the current situation at the Stroudsburg site.
The coal tar recovery rate originally anticipated for
the recovery well system at Stroudsburg, was approximately
100 gallons (378 1) per day. This rate, however, has not
been maintained due to the fact that only one of the four
wells in one of the four clusters, (cluster #1) (Figure
8), has been in operation, recovering coal tar at a rate
of 20-25 gallons (76-95 1) per day. The reason the other
wells are not operational is because the level of pumpable
coal tar does not extend to them as originally thought
based on split-spoon samples. The coal tar in the
vicinity of the other wells is associated with a consider-
able amount of free water, preventing the recovery of a
nearly pure product. Initially during the operation of
the wells, problems arose due to silt clogging several of
the pipes and preventing their operation. However, even
following the correction of this problem, coal tar
recovery was only possible using one of the clusters. It
was soon realized by PP&L, that the amount of "pure" coal
tar available for recovery was much less than had been
originally calculated, and this was the reason only one
well could be utilized. The remaining three well clusters
could only recover a tar-water mixture, due to the fact
that there wasn't recoverable coal tar in these locations.
Despite the use of only one well in one cluster, the
original 67 feet (20 m) of "pure" coal tar in the
18-44
-------
reservoir has been greatly diminished to a thickness of 4
feet (I m) , after approximately 8 months of well opera-
tion. A total of 7,500 gallons (2.8 x 10 I) of coal tar
has been recovered to date.
Al though the dec is ion-making processes were not
always well-coordinated between the agencies and indi-
viduals involved with the Stroudsburg case, the final
remedial actions taken have complemented each other in a
very advantageous manner. The slurry cut-off wall was
emplaced to block further coal tar migration into Brodhead
Creek and accomplished just that. The intention behind
the wall installation was to stabilize a potentially
hazardous situation. The predominant fear at the outset
of the site investigations was that a severe storm might
cause the rapid downcutting of the stream bed, releasing a
large quantity of coal tar directly into the stream. The
slurry wall was installed to prevent further seepage of
the coal tar to areas close to the stream bed where the
potential for release was greatest. This remedial
technique, however, did not eliminate the subsurface
reservoir of coal tar and this was the issue that PP&L
sought to address. PP&L felt that to solve the problem
permanently, some action had to be taken to remove the
coal tar from the underlying reservoir. They, then,
designed and installed the recovery well system and
although the system has not operated at the level that was
initially anticipated, it has operated sufficiently and
coal tar has been recovered at a steady rate.
One technique, the slurry wall, was utilized to
alleviate the immediate problem, that of coal tar seepage
into the stream, while the other remedial technique, the
recovery well system, was installed to ensure that no
future problems would arise due to coal tar movement. The
two actions, taken under different authorities, have
created what would seem to be the ideal conditions at a
remediated site; amendment of the present and immediate
problem coupled with continued elimination of the source
of the problem.
The applicability of any remedial technique at a site
depends upon the summation of surface, subsurface, and
waste type conditions and for this reason it is difficult
to make any type of judgement concerning general applica-
bility. There are, however, some guidelines that can be
offered which are briefly discussed below.
A recovery well system is most applicable in
situations where a large enough quantity of material
exists such that it is mechanically feasible to recover.
The recovered materials must often be marketable in order
18-45
-------
that the system be economically feasible. Recovery of
material from beneath the surface is a costly process and
it must usually continue over a period of several years.
The cement-bentonite slurry wall has a much more
diverse applicability than the recovery well system and
for this reason it is being used more often at other
sites. A slurry wall can be placed downgradient of the
contaminant source as it was in the Stroudsburg case. It
can be placed upgradient of the contaminant source to
divert flow of groundwater away from or around the
contaminant source or a wall can be installed around the
contaminant source, for complete containment. In most
cases, there must be an impervious layer or aquiclude into
which the wall is keyed. This is an important criteria
unless the wastes to be barred are floating or their
vertical migration is prohibited, as they were by the sand
strata at the Stroudsburg site. A cement-bentonite wall
is used in situations where either (l) the wastes/
leachates present are not compatible with a soil-bentonite
backfill or (2) there is insufficient room on site to
perform the mixing of soil-bentonite backfill.
The nature of the wastes and leachates and whether or
not they will be in direct contact with the wall are major
factors in (1) the decision to apply the wall technique
and (2) the decision between use of a soil-bentonite or
cement-bentonite mixture for the final wall composition.
Site-specific compatibility testing must be conducted
prior to making any decision to install a slurry wall.
These are simply general guidelines concerning the
use of recovery well systems and slurry trench cut-off
walls, and prior to making any decision concerning their
applicability at another site, thorough investigations
must be conducted to determine the surface, subsurface,
and waste type conditions at the particular location.
18-46
-------
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Barry, Barrett. Personal communications. 1982. Pennsylvania Dept. of
Environmental Resources, Bureau of Water Quality Management,
WiIkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.
Clements, Robert. Personal communications. 1982. U.S. EPA Headquarters,
Washington, D.C.
Environmental Law Institute: 1982. Draft Interim Report on Case Studies and
Cost Analysis of Remedial Actions at Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites,
Environmental Law Institute, Washington, D.C.
Lehman, Jerry. 1982. Pennsylvania Dept. of Environmental Resources, Bureau
of Water Quality Management, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.
Massey, Thomas. 1982. Personal communications and file information. U.S.
EPA, Region III, Philadephia, Pennsylvania.
McGill, Kenneth. 1982. Personal communications. U.S. EPA, Region III,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources. 1981. Brodhead Extent of
Contamination Report, September 11, 1981. Department of Environmental
Resources, Wilkes Earre, Pennsylvania.
Pennyslvania Power and Light Company. 1982. Laboratory and Aquatic Survey
Results - Stroudsburg Coal Tar Site, CCN 773097/001. Pennsylvania Power
and Light Co., Environmental Management Division, Allentown,
Pennsylvania.
Ratzel, Lyn. Personal communications. 1982. Pennsylvania Power and Light
Co., Environmental Management Divisiion, Allentown, Pennsylvania.
Schwartz, F.W., J.A. Cherry and J.R. Roberts. 1982. A Case Study of a
Chemical Spill and Polychlorinated Biphenys (PCBs) . 2. Hydrogeological
Conditions and Contaminant Migration. Water Resources Research, Vol. 18
No. 3. June 1982.
Soil Conservation Service. 1980. Soil Survey of Monroe County, Pennsylvania.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C.
TRC Environmental Consultants, Inc. 1981. Phase II-Pennsylvania Power and
Light Stoudsburg Contamination Study. TRC Environmental Consultants,
Inc., East Harford, Connecticut.
Villaume, James, F and P.C. Lowe. 1983. Coal Tar Recovery from a Gravel
Aquifer: Stroudsburg, PA. Conference on the Disposal of Solid and
Liquid Wastes. April 28-29, 1983.
18-47
-------
BIBLIOGRAPHY (Continued)
Villaume, James, F. Personal communications 1982. Pennsylvania Power and
Light Co., Environmental Management Division, Allentown, Pennsylvania.
Villaume, James, F. 1982. The U.S.A.'s First Emergency Superfund Site. In
Proceedings of the Fourteenth Mid-Atlantic Conference on Industrial
Waste, 1982.
18-48
-------
QUANTA RESOURCES
QUEENS, NEW YORK
INTRODUCTION
The Quanta waste oil processing facility occupies
about 1.8 acres (0.74 ha) in an old inudstrial area in
Queens about 450 feet (137 m) from the Newtown Creek,
which leads into the East River (see Figure 1). About
500,000 gallons (1.89 x 10° 1) of wastes were stored on
site in tanks (see Figure 2) awaiting re-refining when
the company abandoned the site in late 1981. The wastes
on-site included PCS contaminated waste oil, cyanides,
heavy metals and low flash point (82°F, 28 C) chlori-
nated organic solvents such as methylene chloride and
trichloroethylene. The City and State of New York
believed that there was a great potential for a major
release of hazardous air pollutants such as dioxin from
a fire.
Background
The waste oil recovery facility at 37-80 Review
Avenue in an old industrial area of Long Island City in
Queens, New York City (NYC) was originally built in the
early 1900*s. It was owned and operated by a variety of
companies and individuals who processed and sold waste
oil. No clear records were kept on the types of wastes
processed and stored on-site, but a site survey in June
1982 revealed about 500,000 gallons (1.89 x 10 1) of
wastes including PCB contaminated oil, cyanides, heavy
metals and chlorinated solvents. The potential threat
to public health from fire and toxic fumes became
imminent when the owner, Quanta Resources Corporation,
which had bought the site in July 1980, filed for bank-
ruptcy on October 6, 1981, and abandoned the site on
November 21, 1981. At this time, the immediate issue of
site security to prevent arson or vandalism, which could
cause toxic air and water emissions from fire or
leakage, became very important. While hazardous wastes
remained on-site, the city and state believed that the
extent of the threat was indirectly related to the level
of site security.
NCP
Refererences
300.65(a)
(3) Fire
and/or
explosion
300.65(b)
(3) Security
19-1
-------
Figure 1. Quanta Resources, Queens, New York, NY
19-2
-------
Figure 2. Quanta Resources Site Plan
19-3
-------
The site discovery process underwent several steps
involving different state and city agencies with
different levels of information. On April 25, 1980,
investigators from the New York State Department of
Health (NYSDOH) and the NYSDEC inspected the site and
reported health complaints from workers in adjacent
facilities, and noted that they suspected on-site
disposal of hazardous wastes. They also noted leakage
from a tank of what they were told was lubricating
oil. On July 30, 1981, NYSDEC sampled 19 tanks and
found PCB contaminated oil, estimated at 65,639 gallons
(248,443 1). The U.S. EPA subsequently tested another
tank and labeled it after finding that its contents were
PCB contaminated. The state and the site owner settled
on a consent decree with a compliance schedule for
repairing leaks and for general permitting
requirements. In 1981, the U.S. Attorney in the
Southern District Court of New York indicted the Quanta
plant manager for conspiring to illegally dispose of
hazardous wastes, including cyanides and contaminated
oil, into local sanitary landfills. With this knowledge
of the site hazards, NYSDEC and the NYCDEP were very
concerned about the potential for fire and pollution
when they were informed on Friday May 7, 1982 that the
trustee for the bankrupt corporation planned to remove
site security from the property. Because of city and
state objections, the trustee maintained a guard on-site
until June 8, 1982, when the U.S. Bankruptcy Court of
New Jersey granted the trustee's motion to remove all
security from the site due to lack of funds. Security
was provided by NYSDEC guards and NYC police patrols
until the city contracted with a guard service following
a declaration of a site emergency by the NYCDEP
Commissioner on June 16, 1982. The discovery of the
exact problem on-site was further made during a survey
by the NYCDEP and NYSDEC in June 1982. This survey
identified and quantified low flash point (82 F, 28 C)
liquids and PCB contaminated oil in leaking tanks, which
provided the impetus for the subsequent clean-up work.
Synopsis of Site Response
The site response had three main phases - two site
surveys and a surface waste removal operation. With
assistance from NYSDEC, the NYCDEP took 142 samples from
92 tanks between June 15-25, 1982. A NYCDEP contractor,
0. H. Materials (OHM), took 378 samples from 106 tanks
between August 13-20, 1982. These surveys found
approximately 150,000 gallons (567,750 1) of PCB
contaminated oil and sludge, 266,000 gallons (1.007 x
10 1) of contaminated water and 121,000 gallons
(458,000 1) of uncontaminated oil.
300.63
Discovery
300.65(b)(3)
security
300.64(a)
preliminary
assessment
300.65(b)(5)
sampling
19-4
-------
The wastes were removed from the site by OHM under
contract with NYCDEP between September and December
1982. Liquids were pumped into tank trucks and trains,
and sludges were solidified with lime and transported by
truck for disposal. All wastes were disposed of at
licensed hazardous waste facilities. Following the
removal, the tanks were cleaned with water followed by a
diesel fuel rinse and aeration. A subsurface
investigation is pending as of January 1983.
SITE DESCRIPTION
Surface Characteristics
The Quanta Resources waste oil processing facility
(see Figure 2) consisted of four buildings and about 100
storage tanks, which contained about 640,000 gallons
(2.4 x 10 1) of waste oil, sludge, chlorinated solvents
and cyanide. One of the buildings encloses a cracking
tower for re-refining waste oil in a 4 story corrugated
steel section, located near the main gate at the
northeast corner of the property. A one story warehouse
containing pits and tanks is located at the southeast
corner of the property. Two small boiler houses that
were between these buildings were removed during the
1982 clean-up. Most of the 100 storage tanks were large
above ground steel structures between 10 -45 feet (3-14
m) tall, with capacities between 5,000 - 51,000 gallons
(18,925-193,035 1). Some of the tanks were converted
railroad tank cars. The largest tanks, labeled "K" in
Figure 2, are surrounded by a matrix of 4 foot (1.5 m)
concrete dikes. There were also two buried tanks and
three recessed effluent sumps. The ground is paved
asphalt near the front and compacted oily dirt near the
rear.
The 1.84 acre (0.74 ha) facility slopes down
slightly from its 204 foot (62 m) long fenced frontage
on Review Avenue. The Calvary Cemetary is located
directly across Review Avenue. On the east side, the
site is separated from the Guiness Harp beer
distribution warehouse by a 392 foot (119 m) steel
fence. The original 4 foot (1.5 m) fence on this side
was replaced by a 10 foot fence in 1982 by NYCDEP, A
Long Island Railroad (LIRR) line runs along the fence
near of the site, which is about 450 feet from the
Newtown Creek. The Nanco (construction) Equipment
Company is located on the west side of the property,
separated by a 10 foot barbed-wire fence. The closest
residences are located about 500 yards south, across the
Newtown Creek in Brooklyn, and about 800 yards west
along 45th St.
300.65(b)(6)
removal
300.65(e)(2)
(i)(A)
population
at risk
19-5
-------
The Quanta site is located in an old industrial
area of Long Island City section of Queens in the
approximate center of New York City at 73 56' 15"
longitude and 40° 45' 6" latitude. The gently sloping
surface was formed by a combination of the retreat of
the Wisconsonian Glacier about 10,000 years ago, and the
relatively recent use of artificial fill, during the
19th century. (see Figure 3) The average annual
temperature is 54.3 °F (12.4°C), and the average daily
minimum and maximum temperatures are 47.4 F. (8.5 C.)
and 61.1°F. (16.2°C.), respectively. Average January
and July temperatures, which are the extremes of the
monthly averages, are 32.1°F (0.05°5) and 76.7 F
(24.8°C), respectively. The average annual
precipitation is 41.61 inches (105.7 cm). Winds are
usually out of the west northwest, at an average speed
of 12.2 miles (19.6 km) per hour.
Newtown Creek, which lies 450 feet (137 m) south of
the site, and the East River, into which it flows, are
both classified as "SD" in the New York State usage
designation. Class SD waters are defined as: "All
waters not primarily for recreational purposes,
shellfish culture or the development of fish life and
because of natural or man-made conditions cannot meet
the requirements of these uses."
Hydrogeology
The information in this section was drawn primarily
from a paper published in 1971 by the U.S. Geological
Survey (USGS). No hydrogeological study had been
completed on the site as of January 1983; the NYCDEP is
preparing to let a contract for a study. Relevant
information is summarized and extrapolated from this
paper and geological maps of Queens County.
In the area of Queens where the site is located
there are three aquifers consisting of sand and gravel
from the Later Cretaceous and Pleistocene, overlying
Precambrian bedrock (see Figure 4). The uppermost,
Pleistocene aquifer is presently water-bearing and an
additional aquifer lies nearby. The two Cretaceous
aquifers have receded from the site area. The site
rests on shallow artificial fill over ^ Pleistocene
glacial drift from the Wisconsinian glaciation. Within
this Upper Glacial Aquifer, water table conditions
(unconfined aquifer) exist at about 20 feet (6 m)
deep. This layer of primarily undifferentlated
Pleistocene deposits extends to about 50 feet (15 m)
deep. A section of the Jameco Aquifer lies nearby the
site directly beneath the Upper Glacial Aquifer. This
lower Pleistocene Unit occurs occasionally throughout
300.68(e)(2)
(i)(E)
climate
300.68(e)(2)
hydrogeological
factors
19-6
-------
Figure 3. Queens Surficial Deposit and Section Locator - Quanta Site
QUANTA
LOCATION
Artificial Mi
o Public supply well in use (1961)
0 Public supply or other high
capacity well in use after 1961
o Industrial, institutional or
observation well
—
-------
Figure 4. Geohydrologic Sections, Queens County, New York
00
APPROXIMATE LOCATION
QUANTA RESOURCES SITE
Vertical Exaggeration X20
5 miles
SCALE
i u
M «
t »*
M
Su
Ul aeonsin
Glaclatlon
(undlfferentlated)
Gardinera Clay
Jaaieco
Gravel
Hagothy Formation
Hatawan Group
8 Clay Member
Lloyd Sand
member
Bedrock
Qu
Qc
QJ
Kim
Krc
Krl
Approximate poaitton of the
40 mg/1 chloride line —
Water Table —
-------
the county in buried valleys. The Magothy is the second
aquifer underlying the site. It occurs directly beneath
the glacial drift layer in the Magothy Formation -
Matawan group. This layer was deposited during the
upper Cretaceous, and extends to about 175 feet (53
m), The hydrologic communication between the uppermost
aquifers is very good. The first of two members of the
Raritan group is a clay member extending from about 175
feet (53 m) to 350 feet (106 m). The second member is
the Lloyd sand member, which extends from about 350 feet
to 450 feet (106-137 m). Precambrian bedrock underlies
the site at a depth of about 450 feet (137 m).
Upper Glacial Aquifer
This aquifer is presently the only actual water
bearing unit under the site. It consists of some
glacial outwash sand and gravel deposits, but mainly of
ground moraine deposits at the site, which is north of
the terminal moraine. This aquifer has a porosity of
about 40%, and a coefficient of permeability (rate of
flow water, in gallons per day, through one square foot
under a gradient of 100 %) of about 1,000 gallons/-
day/square foot (40,743 I/day/m ).
Jaraeco Aquifer
The Jameco Aquifer is a lower Pleistocene buried
valley consisting of coarse sand and gravel- with small
amounts of silt and clay. It extends primarily north-
south, but a section of it underlies an area near the
site. Since this is a relatively shallow water-bearing
unit, its proximity may be relevant to the ground water
quality. In addition, this aquifer has the highest
permeability in the county, with coefficients as 2,000
gallons/day/ per square foot (81,485 1/day/m ).
Magothy Aquifer
The cloaest extent of the Magothy aquifer in 1968
was about 1 /2 miles (2.4 km) to the southeast of the
site. Subsequent to the last USGS study, the aquifer
has receded further to some extent. This Magothy
formation is in the Matawan Group and consists mainly of
intercollated beds and lenses of clay, clayey and silty
sand, fine to course sand, and gravelly sand. There is
a basal unit of sand in the aquifer, about 50 - 100 feet
(15-30 m) thick. This variety reflects the fact that it
was deeply eroded prior to the deposition of the
Pleistocene units. The porosity and permeability of the
formation vary widely, and are as yet unclear at the
site location. The unit's coefficient of permeability
varies from aboout 500 - 1,450 gallons/day/ square foot
19-9
-------
(20,371-59,077 I/day/ m2) and a porosity of about 30%.
Lloyd Aquifer
The closest extent of the Lloyd aquifer in 1968 was
about !1/2 miles (2.4 km) to the southeast of the
site. Reduced infiltration and increased pumping have
decreased the extent since the 1968 USGS study. This
aquifer consists of the Upper Cretaceous Lloyd Sand
Member of the Raritan Formation, and is the lowermost
major aquifer unit in Queens County. It is confined
between the underlying bedrock and the overlying poorly
permeable Raritan Clay member. The Lloyd aquifer
consists of beds of sand and gravel intercollated with
beds of clay and silt. The sand and gravel beds
commonly contain varying amounts of interstitial clay
and silt. The average permeability of the aquifer is
about 500 gallons/ day/square foot (20,371 I/day/ m ).
WAST?: DISPOSAL HISTORY
The date of the first processing of hazardous
wastes at the Quanta site is unclear, but the age of the
facility suggests that it paralleled the use of
petroleum products through the 20th century. The NYCDEP
estimates that the Quanta facility was built in the
early 1900's. The Newtown Creek area is the oldest oil
refining center in the country. Whale oil was
previously refined by early plants in the area during
the 18th and 19th centuries. -The last wastes were
brought on-site before November 1981, when Quanta
Resources abandoned the property.
DESCRIPTION OF CONTAMINATION
Of the three sampling programs carried out at
Quanta, the Phase I site survey program carried out by
0. H. Materials (OHM) in August 1982 was the most
extensive. Air, solids and liquid wastes were sampled,
but liquid waste analysis was the primary task. This
survey included 378 samples taken from 107 tanks,
separators, basins and drums and was largely verified by
a quality assurance program conducted by ClUM Hill, as
well as frequent spill samples analyzed by NYCDEP. The
results of the sampling program are summarized in Table
1, and the methodology is described in "Design and
Execution of the Site Response." The waste stream cate-
gories listed reflect the minimum regulatory ^ disposal
requirements of the wastes. Most tanks contained only
one waste stream each. But uncontaminated material that
could not be segregated from an adjacent layer is
included in the total for the contaminated waste stream
category. The survey determined the location, contents
and condition of each tank on site.
300.64(b)
data review
300.65(b)(5)
sampling
19-10
-------
TABLE 1. TYPES AND AMOUNTS OF WASTES AT QUANTA (August 1982)
Non-Contaminated oil
Oil contaminated with chlorinated
solvents
Oil contaminated with PCS*
(less than 500 mg/1)
PCB oil (greater than 500 ug/1)
Non-contaminated water
Water contaminated with
heavy metals
Water contaminated with
volatile organics
Water contaminated with PCB
Caustic
Non-contaminated sludge
Sludge — flammable
PCB contaminated sludge
Solids — non-contaminated
Solids — toxic
121,150
75,267
97,742
22,502
3,072
200
211,412
24,570
29,881
32,391
162
9,722
49
31,283
161
18
5
gallons (458,553 1)
gallons (284,886 1)
gallons (397,953 1)
gallons (85,107 1)
gallons (11,628 1)
gallons (757 1)
gallons (800,194 1)
gallons (92,997 1)
gallons (113,100 1)
gallons (122,600 1)
cubic yards (124 m )
gallons (36,798 U
cubic yards (37 m )
gallons (118,406 1)
cubic yards (123 m )
3
cubic yards (14 m )
3
cubic yards (4m)
* Includes some (9%) non-contaminated oil and sludge
that could not be separated cost-effectively from the
contaminated layer during transfer.
Source: Compiled from reports by NYCDEP, OHM and
CH2M Hill.
19-11
-------
Each category included an aggregation of more
specifically analyzed components. The non-contaminated
oil and sludge were found to be RCRA non-hazardous
according to their constituents and properties. The oil
and water contaminated with chlorinated organic solvents
primarily contained methylene chloride,
trichloroethylene, (TCE), benzene, xylene, 1,1,1-
trichloroethane and tetrachloroethylene (PCE). The
vapors from these contaminants caused the low flash
points, which were as low as 82°F (28°C). Oil
contaminated with PCS was defined as having PCS
concentrations between 50 - 500 mg/1, while PCB oil had
concentrations over 500 mg/1. Non-contaminated water
met pretreatment standards for the city sewage system
but was later pretreated with other aqueous waste before
disposal. The primary heavy metals were zinc, mercury,
chromium, lead and barium. A radiological survey,
performed by a NYCDEP contractor, Radiac, found no
measurable radioactivity onsite.
During the OHM survey, spillage occurred from two
above ground tanks and a sump tank. Tank JSEP 3, a
final oil separator basin at the lower southwest end of
the site, was brimming with oil water. Stains around
JSEP 3 suggested that it had overflowed previously onto
the LIRR tracks. Tanks J10 and J44 were found to be
slowly leaking oil from pipe fittings onto the ground
below them. Also, 15 full drums were found near
building A. A six inch (15 cm) barge loading pipe
leading from the site to the Newtown Creek had one
leak. Another 6 inch (15 cm) sewer line led under the
LIRR tracks to the Creek. No detectable off-site
organic air emis s ions were measured, us ing mob ile
infrared analyzers (MIRANS) and photoionization
detections (PID) . Detection limits were set for TCE and
PCE at 4 mg/m . No air contamination was measured in
the established "clean area", except inside and near the
laboratory because of reagents. Explosimeter
measurement showed combustible gases only at the lid of
chlorinated solvent/oil tanks.
PLANNING THE SITE RESPONSE
Initiation of Response
Generally, responses were initiated at Quanta to
prevent fire, which would have produced toxic air
pollutants. The NYCDEP and NYSDEC agreed that the
threat of fire required mitigation. But, the response
was not initiated until after the NYCDEP took
responsibility for the site clean-up.
There were two primary decision periods for the
initiation of work at Quanta to prevent fire and toxic
19-12
-------
air and water emissions. The first response actions
were taken by the city following the declaration of
emergency on June 16, 1982 when the Department of
General Services (DCS) contracted for site security and
the NYCDEP began a site survey and sampling program.
The second response was initiated in later July when the
NYCDEP released a request for proposals (RFP) and
contracted with OHM to perform another more extensive
site survey and sampling program, which subsequently led
to the clean-up actions in September- December 1982.
Throughout the decision making process, there was
extensive media coverage of the site by all major New
York newspapers, magazines, radio and television
stations, which created added pressure on government
decision makers to begin a clean-up.
The NYC Department of General Services contracted 300.65(b)(3)
with a security service for site security on June 16, security
1982 to prevent arson or vandalism that would result in
toxic air emissions from a fire or off-site surface
water releases. The city, rather than the state,
initiated this action because the NYSDEC believed that
it did not have the necessary resources to provide
continuing guard services. The NYSDEC had provided
guards following the bankruptcy court's granting of the
trustee's motion to remove its guards due to lack of
funds.
The NYCDEP initiated a site survey and sampling 300.65(b)(5)
program on June 15, 1982 to provide a more accurate sampling
assessment of the site hazards than that provided by the
July 1981 NYSDEC survey. The NYCDEP was attempting to
obtain federal or state assistence for a site clean-up,
and intended to use the results of a site survey to make
its request for assistance more specific. The NYCDEP
initiated the site survey instead of the NYSDEC or the
U.S. EPA because the other agencies believed that they
did not have the necessary resources to perform the
survey.
This site survey clarified the physical threat
posed by the site, which provided the impetus for a
clean-up. The NYCDEP identified the primary threat as
the potential for fire from wastes with flash points as
low a 82°F (28 °C). The combination of these low
flashpoint wastes, with the presence of large volumes of
PCS contaminated wastes in leaking tanks, created a
potential for hazardous air emissions. This threat of
fire was further heightened by the use of oxy-acetylene
welding torches by an adjoining equipment company about
20 feet (6.1 m) from the Quanta tanks. Two of the
buildings en-site were old and were highly flammable
with the waste oil stored inside. The city and state
19-13
-------
believed that low temperature combustion of PCBs
produces dioxin emissions and were very concerned about
this public health threat.
The NYCDEP continued to try to compel the U.S. EPA
or the NYSDEC to provide assistance for the site survey
and clean-up. The NYCDEP was continuing to request
funding or assistance from the U.S. EPA and the NYSDEC
through administrative channels when, on July 16, I982y
a representative of the Mayor of New York City directed
the NYCDEP to initiate a clean-up of the site. This
directive followed a request by the New York State
Select Committee on Crime dated July 14, 1982, for the
mayor "to convene a task force to address immediately
the Review Avenue situation." On July 20, 1982, the
NYCDEP held a meeting to draw up a request for proposals
(RFP), which was released on July 22, 1982. The
commissioner of the NYCDEP made the last requests for
federal or state assistance, prior to initiating city
clean-up actions, to the Regional Administrator for the
U.S. EPA and the NYSDEC Commissioner on July 30 and 26,
1982, respectively. The U.S. EPA did not provide any
CERCLA funding for the site.
Selection of Response Technologies
The NYCDEP removed above ground wastes because this
was the level of response necessary to eliminate the
threat of fire and toxic air emissions. The only other
alternative considered was the use of a new PCB oil
decontamination system using sodium and catalysts to
precipitate and filter out the PCB from the oil. This
alternative was not chosen because the NYCDEP on-scene
coordinator (OSC) was not confident of its proven
practicality for decontaminating oil in a thorough and
legal manner. A subsurface clean-up was not included in
the site response because it was beyond the necessary
action to mitigate the immediate threat of fire. Also,
a subsurface clean-up would have required a hydro-
geological study and design, which would have increased
the time of the potential for fire.
In addition, NYCDEP made three decisions regarding
more specific response technologies. First, the NYCDEP
decided to use lime dust to solidifiy the waste sludge
because it was more cost effective and more dependably
available than the alternatives of cement kiln dust or
fly ash. The exact ratio was based on on-site testing
performed by OHM chemists.
The NYCDEP's selection of on-site waste water
pretreatment was the second specific technology
300.65(b)(6)
removal
300.70(b)(2)
(ii)(B) chemical
treatment
methods
choice.
The alternative of off-site commercial
19-14
-------
pretreatment was not selected because the on-site system
was adequate for, most wastes and was less expensive.
Cyanide wastes were commercially treated because NYCDEP
and OHM believed the on-site system was inadequate to
treat them.
Third, NYCDEP decided, as an overall site policy,
to dispose of all wastes, hazardous and non-hazardous,
at permitted hazardous waste disposal facilities because
it was concerned about public reaction to disposal of
any waste from this well publicized hazardous waste
site. The alternative of sanitary landfilling of
solidified non-hazardous sludge at no charge at city
owned landfills was not chosen because of the potential
public reaction in the wake of recently publicized cases
of illegal hazardous waste dumping in city sanitary
landfills. Similarly, the NYCDEP was concerned about
reaction to standard boiler incineration of non-
hazardous oil because of recent publicity about toxic
emissions from the use of contaminated oil in city
apartment buildings.
Extent of Response
Generally, there were two dec is ion areas for
determining the extent of the response: extent of
material removed and waste water treatment levels. The
focus of the removal was on the liquid wastes and not on
the potentially heavily contaminated soil because the
hazard that initiated the response was the threat of
fire and toxic emissions, not ground water contamination
or soil erosion (e.g, runoff or contaminated dust). The
clean-up action entailed removal of all wastes stored
on-site, in addition to the low flashpoint wastes,
because of the significant economies of undertaking the
full removal at the same time since all wastes had been
characterized. The tanks were emptied and
decontaminated until they were "squeegee clean", and
inspected for Gas-Free certification. The disposal of
the uncontaminated sludge was at a standard above
regulatory requirements because city officials were
concerned about public anxiety over disposal of waste
from a site known to contain contaminated materials.
The levels of contaminants permitted in the
wastewater before disposal into the sewage system are
shown in Table 2. These levels for pretreatment were
300.65(b)(6)
removal
300.65(c)
completion
of immediate
removal
300.67(a)(l)
substantial
cost savings
300.70(b)(2)
conventional
wastewater
treatment
19-15
-------
TABLE 2. NYC INDUSTRIAL DISCHARGE CRITERIA
Parameter
PCS
Cadmium
Chromium (hexavalent)
Copper
Cyanide
Nickel
Zinc
Bromine, Iodine, Chlorine
Discharge Criteria
less than 10
less than 5
less than 5
less than 5
less than 2
less than 3
less than 5
less than 100
ug/1
mg/1
mg/1
mg/1
mg/1
mg/1
mg/1
tog/1
Source: NYCDEP, 1982.
set by the NYC Sewer Authority for two reasons. First,
they have been determined to have no detrimental effect
on the system's biological sewage treatment process.
Second, these levels ensure that, with dilution, the
system's final discharge will comply with its NPDES
permit standards.
DESIGN AND EXECUTION OF SITE RESPONSE
The NYCDEP managed three general site responses at
Quanta: initial site survey and protection, OHM site
survey, and removal.
Initial NYCDEP Site Survey and Protection
On June 15, 1982 following verbal notification of
the NYCDEP Commisioner's Declaration of Emergency, the
NYCDEP Bureau of Science and Technology's (BST) Field
Investigation unit had the NYC Fire Department cut the
lock on the front gate. The three BST employees
immediately began sampling and recording the size and
condition of the tanks. On June 22, 1982, two NYSDEC
employees assisted the BST workers on-site with the
sampling. They also assisted on June 24 and 25, when
the sampling was completed. A total of 142 samples were
taken from 61 tanks and analyzed by the NYCDEP lab.
The NYSDEC and NYS Department of Health labs
analyzed 23 duplicate samples. On July 16, 1982, a
NYCDEP contractor, CECOS International, collected
samples from tanks that were inaccessible because of
300.64(a)
preliminary
assessment
19-16
-------
shaky catwalks or bolted lids. A leak in non-hazardous
tank 10 was plugged by the NYC Fire Department's
Chemical Response Unit. The NYCDEP and the NYC Fire
Department also spread sorbent material around leaky
tanks.
When the site emergency was declared on June 15,
1982, the NYCDEP also requested that the NYC Department
of General Services contract for security guards and
fence repair. Two 24 hour, armed commercial security
guards were hired on June 16, 1982. Additional security
was provided by regular NYC Police patrols. A 10 foot
(3 ra) galvanized steel fence with razor barbed wire was
erected around the entire site. Existing lengths of 10
foot (3 m) fence on the north and south sides were
repaired and barbed.
On July 12, 1982, the NYCDEP sampled air on-site
with an organic vapor analyzer (OVA) and a H-NU meter.
Levels above background were found only inside the
laboratory building.
Phase I - OHM Site Survey
Following the signing of a Letter of Intent with
NYCDEP on August 11, 1982, OHM moved a mobile analytical
laboratory, decontamination unit, backhoe, office
trailer, crew/galley trailer and a vacuum skid unit to
Quanta, and set up on August 12, 1982. Local hospitals
were contacted to identify the nearest burn and poison
treatment centers. Adjacent facilities and the local
fire department were briefed about the project.
Laboratory instruments were warmed and calibrated. To
soak up recent run-off from tank JSEP3 and prevent
runoff flows, OHM immediately spread 30 bags of sorbent
material around the separator and along the LIRR tracks,
and pumped its contents into tank J17, The oil was
found to be uncontarainated.
The primary task of OHM's survey was liquid waste
sampling. But air samples were also taken daily to
ensure safe ambient levels in the "clean" on-site areas
and off-site, and several soil samples were analyzed.
To optimize the use of mobilized equipment and
personnel, OHM sampled 12 hours/day, seven days/week
from August 12 - 25, 1982. A "hot (contaminated) zone"
was delineated with luminescent engineering tape on
August 13, and air and tank sampling began. All
personnel passing into this area south of the lab
trailer (see Figure 2) wore a minimum of a hardhat with
face shield, respirator with R-563 filter cartrige,
tyvek suits, Rabor boots, and rubber gloves. Personnel
who were opening tanks for sampling wore self-contained
300.65(b)(7)
physical
barriers
300.65(b)(3)
security
300.65(b)(5)
sampling
300.71
worker
safety
19-17
-------
breathing apparatus (SCBA), and Saran coated tyvek suits
with hoods. On August 14, electrical power (triple
phase 440 volt, single phase 220 and 110 volt) was
established on-site.
A mobile infrared air analyzer (MIRAN) and a
photoionization detector (PID) were used to sample
ambient air daily. The two PIDs used were calibrated
for benzene, but were sensitive to most organic
vapors. A PID monitoring grid was established on August
13, consisting of 13 spray painted spots in the clean
zone and 21 in the hot zone, and are shown as solid dots
with letter/number codes in Figure 2. Throughout the
survey air sampling was performed on these spots at
least once daily. Other areas that were regularly
sampled as wind and work activity conditions changed
were: the portajohn area near the south end of the
decontamination trailer; the SCBA bottle filling area
near the north side of the decontamination trailer, the
area in the building A filter room, and the inside of
the lab trailer. Sample crews sampled air inside each
tank upon opening it. Since the MIRAN's were mounted on
carts, only about half of the grid points were
accessible for simultaneous sampling with the PID.
Two MIRAN1 s with chart recorders were used for
qualitative ambient air scans and for specific vapor
analysis. One was calibrated for trichloroethylene
(TCE) and the other for tetrachloroethylene (PCE). Both
were capable of a lowest detection limit of 4 mg/m .
The maximum allowable exposure for TCE and PCE set by
OSHA is 100 mg/m . Two explosimeters were used to
measure combustible gases inside tanks.
Upon initiating the liquids sampling on August 13,
OHM performed an inventory and inspection of the
tanks. A magnetometer (metal detector) was used to
locate buried tanks. Because of metal structures and
appurtenances, excavation was necessary to check metal
detector readings. This survey revealed tank H-220,
which was found under the south end of building H.
A total of 378 samples were taken from 106 tanks
and two diked areas at an average rate of 12 tanks/-
day. Samples were split for NYCDEP and CH2M Hill
verification. Volumes were estimated by measuring
tanks, and liquid layer depths were measured and sampled
with a bacon bomb sampler. Brass tools were used when
necessary for opening tanks without sparking. Sludge
was sampled with an aluminum hatched scoop on extension
poles. Sampling equipment was decontaminated between
samples by scrubbing with reagent hexane and rinsing
with acetone. Sampling of tanks without product
19-18
-------
layering was performed by lowering an open quart glass
jar with a nylon string. Duplicate one quart (0.95 1)
aqueous samples were obtained for PCB and RCRA metal
extraction procedure (EP) testing, as well as split 40
ml/amber vial samples for volatiles analysis.
On-site sample analysis work began on August 15
following connection of electrical power to the OHM
analytical laboratory trailer by NYCDEP. The analytical
methods used by OHM at Quanta were generally the minimum
testing necessary to accurately classify the three waste
types—oil, aqueous and sludge—into regulated waste
stream categories. This scheme provided the background
for an efficient removal and disposal operation. For
example, PCB oil and sludge required different removal
methods. The waste stream categorization decision
matrix is summarized by the following outline:
I. Oil
A. PCB oil (over 500 mg/1)
B. PCB contaminated oil (under 50-500 mg/1)
C. Non-PCB contaminated oil (under 50 mg/1)
1. Chlorinated solvent contaminated oil
(over 1% chlorination)
2. Non-contaminated oil (under 1%
chlorination)
a. high sulfur saleable fuel oil
b. low sulfur saleable fuel oil
II. Water
A. PCB contaminated (at or over 10 ug/1)
B. Non-PCB contaminated (under 10 ug/1)
1. Contaminated with volatile organics
(at or over 1 mg/1)
2. Non-contaminated with volatile
organics (under 1 mg/1)
a. contaminated with heavy metals
(at or over 5 mg/1)
b. uncontaminated water (under 5
mg/1)
III. Sludge
A. PCB contaminated (at or over 50 mg/1)
B. Non-PCB contaminated (under 50 mg/1)
1. Flammable (flash point at or under
60°C)
2. Non Flammable sludge (flash point
over 60°C)
a. Toxic (EP toxicity for RCRA
metals-positive)
b. Non-toxic (EP toxicity for RCRA
metals-negative)
19-19
-------
All analytical protocols followed appropriate U.S.
EPA, American Society for the Testing of Materials or
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
procedures. A Tracor 560 gas chromatograph was used for
PCS and volatile organics analysis. Flash points were
determined with a Seta-flash flash point detector.
Metals analysis was performed with an IL single beam
atomic absorption spectrophometer. Blanks or standards
were used for all analyses. Instruments were calibrated
at the change of each shift or analyst.
Split samples taken by NYCDEP were passed on to its
consultant, CH-M Hill (Hill), for the quantity assurance
(QA) program. The Hill engineer chose samples randomly
for analysis by Hill's Montgomery, Alabama- laboratory,
amounting to about 15% of the total. Four spiked
samples were also submitted to OHM and Hill's labs by
NYCDEP. No significant differences in analytical
results were found between OHM and Hill's labs. Aqueous
results varied slightly because of OHM1s re-filtering
of samples.
Phase II - Removal
The actual removal and clean-up operation (see
Table 3: "Quanta Waste Removal Summary") began on 300.65(b)(6)
September 2, 1982. Following the end of the survey on removal
August 25, OHM compiled a survey report, and moved
clean-up equipment to Quanta in preparation for the
Phase II operation, for which it was negotiating a
contract with NYCDEP. The four main activities of the
removal operation were: (1) waste consolidation, (2)
waste removal and transport, (3) on-site waste treatment
and off-site disposal, and (4) tank, dike, separator,
piping, and building decontamination and certifica-
tion. Other tasks performed by OHM included
recommendation of available disposal facilities,
sampling and analysis of wastes and treated water, and
manifest preparation.
Consulting services were provided to NYCDEP by CH^M
Hill during Phase II. The Hill engineer maintained the
site diary and verified the amount of wastes treated and
removed, as well as OHM's time and materials charges.
Every third discharge to the sewer was verified by Hill
analysis. Disposal sites were inspected as necessary by
Hill field offices to verify materials arrival or check
site compliance prior to transport.
On-Site Waste Consolidation and Transfer
To facilitate efficient truck and train loading, as
well as to allow for tank decontamination, wastes were
consolidated according to waste stream category in the
19-20
-------
tanks and separators shown in Figure 5 and listed in
Table 4. The equipment used for transferring each waste
stream category is listed in Table 4. Since non-aqueous
wastes filled about 25% of the 1.5 million gallon (5.7
million 1) tank capacity, well over half of the tanks
could be emptied and cleaned before off-site disposal
began. The need for this capacity will be discussed
briefly in "Transportation and Disposal".
Since non-pumpable sludge was disposed of at a
permitted hazardous waste landfill, RCRA regulations
required solidification. Lime dust was chosen as the
solidification material based on on-site tests by OHM
chemists. A lime: sludge ratio of 1:1 by weight was
based on OHM on-site testing to meet RCRA landfill
requirements. Sludge was mixed with a total of 893 tons
(810 Mt) of lime dust in the KF mixing area, (see Figure
5) and consolidated on and covered by polyethylene
sheets.
Transportation and Disposal
Waste removal began on September 12 and ended on
December 1, 1982. A total of 424,993 gallons of waste
was transported off-site as listed by category,
transport vehicle volume, date shipped and disposal
facility in Table 3. Wastes were loaded using the same
methods noted in Table 4 in "consolidation".
Contamination of exterior vehicle surfaces was generally
avoided, but spillage was wiped off before departure.
After filling, all closed valves and hatches were sealed
with evidence bands. Variations from the plan are
discussed in "Project Costs" to the extent that they
affected costs.
Decontamination and Certification
Following waste removal, all tanks were
decontaminated using methods corresponding to whether or
not they were PCB contaminated. Non-PCB tanks were
cleaned according to American Petroleum Institute
practices, using a Butterworth System. A Butterworth is
a stainless steel unit that sprays water at high
pressure in all directions by spinning on two
perpendicular axes. The unit is lowered and raised in
the tank until the walls are "squeegee" clean. The
tanks were then vented with an electric blower; most
tanks were further ventilated bv cutting holes in the
side about 10 square feet (10.9 m ) in area.
19-21
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I
NJ
to
LEGEND
ig Tank and Site Identification Number
• Air Monitoring Stations
Figure 5. Major Waste Transfer/Storage Stations
SOURCE: O.H. Miterl.li
-------
TABLE 3. QUANTA WASTE REMOVAL SUMMARY
Material
Category
Oil contaminated
with PCB (a)
PCB Oil (b)
Waste Oil with
Chlorinated
over 10,000 ppm
Non-contaminated
Waste Oil
Flammable Sludge
Pumpable Sludge
Contaminated with
PCB
Transport
Vehicle
Rail
Truck
Rail
Rail
Truck
Rail
Non-pumpable Truck
Sludge Contaminated
with PCB
Cyanide Solution
Non-pumpable PCB
Sludge over
500 ppm
Contaminated
De c on t ami na t i on
Liquid (Diesel
Fuel)
Nonhazardous
Sludge
Truck
Truck
Truck
Truck
Volume
Removed
38,716 gal
(146,540 1)
1,163 gal
(4,402 1)
78,920 gal
(2987 1)
119,830 gal
(453,557 1)
5,000 gal
(18925 1)
57,000 gal
(215,745 1)
430 tons
(390 Mt)
9,425 gal
(35674 1)
13 drums
(1,705 gal)
(6,453 1)
1,100 gal
(4,164 1)
886 tons
(804 Mt)
Dates
Shipped
10/21/82
10/22/82
09/29/82-
10/05/82
09/21/82-
10/05/82
10/13/82
10/15/82
11/09/82
11/10/82
12/01/82
12/01/82
11/13/82-
11/16/82
Disposal
Facility
Rollins, TX
Rollins, TX
SCA, ILL
SCA, ILL
Rollins, TX
ENS CO, AK
SCA, NY
SCA, NJ
Rollins, TX
Sea-Bright, KY
SCA, NY and
BFI, MD
(a) PCB between 50-500 mg/1
(b) PCB over 500 mg/1
Source: CH2M Hill Report 1983
19-23
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TABLE 4. PUMPABLE AND MECHANICAL WASTE TRANSFER AND REMOVAL EQUIPMENT
TRANSFER/REMOVAL EQUIPMENT
1500 gallon Vacuum Skid-Unit
Caterpillar 215 Backhoe
3000 gallon Vacuum Truck
Caterpillar 955 Front
End Loader
Diaphram Pumps
Bobcat Front End Loader
Submersible Pumps
Case 580 C Backhoe
Hydraulically Operated
Centrifugal Pump
WASTE TYPE
Aqueous
X
X
X
X
X
Oil
X
X
X
X
X
Pumpab le
Sludge
X
X
X
Non-pumbable
Sludge
X
X
X
X
X
Source: CH2 M Hill Report 1983.
19-24
-------
Diesel fuel was used to decontaminate PCB-oil tanks
X 2X and X3X, by triple rinsing. Using a 1,500 gallon
(5,678 1) vacuum skid unit, about 1,000 gallons (3,785
1) were used to rinse these two tanks. Following the
diesel fuel rinse, a fire hose was used to rinse the
tanks with city water.
Piping and appurtenances were decontaminated with a
high pressure water laser. Four crews wore hard hats,
saranex suits with hoods, splash suits, full-face
respirators, protective gloves and over boots, to clean
contaminated piping after cutting it into workable
lengths. The cracker tower building and the warehouse
building were cleaned manually in a similar manner.
All tanks were certified "clean and gas free" by a
licensed marine chemist from Marine Chemists Inc. of
Hoboken, N.J. An explosimeter and visual inspection
provided this certification on the first attempt for all
tanks.
On-site Waste Treatment
The 166,469 gallons (630,085 1) of contaminated and
non-contaminated water, which was in tanks, dikes,
separators and building basements, was treated on-site
before discharge into the NYC sewer system. This on-
site pretreatment reduced costs by avoiding high priced
disposal or off-site pretreatment. Some treated waste
waters were used for tank rinsing in the decontamination
operation and retreated. The water was treated
according to NYC discharge guidelines, which are
discussed in the "Extent of Site Response" section. All
treated effluent as tested by the OHM lab for discharge
approval by the NYCDEP OSC. Every third water sample
was split with CH2M Hill for verification. The results
were not significantly different between the two labs.
The aqueous treatment sytem was a two step process:
oil/water separation, and physical clarification and
filtration. The system was set up on August 31 and
September 1 before other removal activities began and
consisted of five 10,000 gallons (37,850 1) pools, two
chemical mixing tanks, a clarifier, a pressure sand
filter, two carbon contact units, and several types of
pumps (see Figure 6 for layout and location). The first
5,200 gallon (19,682 1) batch of water was treated on
September 3> 1981 at a rate of about 20 gallons/minute
(76 I/minute).
The following process flow description describes
the system at Quanta. Oily water from tanks,
separators, and containment dikes was pumped into pool 1
300.71
worker
safety
300.70(b)(2)
(ii)(B)
chemical
treatment
19-25
-------
LEGEND
MM Tank §nct Sit* Idintlflcttlon Number
C/« Air Monitoring Stitlcmi
SOURCE: O.H. Mittrlih
Figure 6. Onsite Waste Water Treatment Facility
-------
Co allow the free oil to separate from the waste
water. The waste water from pool I was pumped to pool
II where it was acidified to about pH 4 to break any oil
emulsion and allow the oil to separate from the water.
Waste water from either pool I or II was pumped to
Chemical Mix Tank I (CMT I) and treated with caustic to
raise the pH to 11-12. A polymer was also added to aid
in the agglomeration of flocculant formed in alkaline
solution. After pumping this alkaline waste water to
Chemical Mix Tank II (CMT II) from CMT I, it is
acidified to pH 6-9 to be compatible with the storage in
pools III, IV and V and the sewer system. A clarifier
tank was then used to allow the solids, heavy metals and
PCB to precipitate and settle. Finally, a sand filter,
filled with uniformly graded sand, was used to filter
out any flocculant solids or other particulate matter
that did not settle out in the clarifier. The carbon
contact units were not used because adequate PCB and
volatile organics removal was achieved in the preceding
physical/chemical treatment.
COST AND FUNDING
Source of Funding
All project costs were borne by the NYCDEP, except
site security, which was paid by the NYC Department of
General Services Real Property Division. On December
29, 1982, the NYC Corporate Counsel petitioned the State
Supreme Court to set aside the NYSDEC's denial of state
Superfund money, and to direct the state to reimburse
the city for expenditures of about $2.5 million for the
Quanta response. The city has alleged, inter alia, that
the state violated its mandated responsibilities under
the state Environmental Conservation Law (ECL) and that
the state's denial of the city's State Superfund request
was "erroneous, arbitrary and capricious". The state
contends that Quanta does not qualify as an inactive
hazardous waste site under the state Superfund Law; and
the NYSDEC lacked the resources to respond to Quanta
under the ECL. The case is pending as of February 1983.
Selection of Contractors
Major contractors were selected by a competitive
bidding process. Time and material contracts with price
ceilings were used. This section only discusses the
selection of the main survey and removal contractor.
On July 22, 1982, following the Mayor' s July 16
directive, the NYCDEP released a request for proposals
(RFP), "to furnish all labor, equipment and skills
necessary to accomplish the removal and disposal of PCB
19-27
-------
contaminated oil, solvents, chemicals, water and other
materials uncharacteristic of waste oil products which
are a hazard to the public and the environment located
at the Quanta... Long Island City." Six proposals were
submitted by the July 29, 1982 deadline.
The proposals were evaluated by NYCDEP and its man-
agement consultant, CH2M Hill, of Reston Va. On July 29,
1982 the NYCDEP released a "Special Report" on proposed
criteria for evaluating proposals. A description of
each criterion was given, and the relative weight of
each criterion was itemized (see Table 5). All six
proposals were evaluated by NYCDEP BST, and on August 2
a report was sent to the Deputy Commissioner. The
report considered 14 aspects of the OHM and the first
runner-up proposal, including financial, management, and
technical approach. Other proposals received decreasing
scrunity proportional to their non-responsiveness. If
the proposals were believed by NYCDEP to contain
excessive "boiler plate" and inadequate specific site
considerations, they were considered non-responsive.
The OHM proposal was specifically believed by NYCDEP to
show OHM to be "uniquely qualified" based on technical
and operational abilities, program management, and
transportation and disposal proposals. Recommendations
on details like permits verification were also made in
the NYCDEP proposal evaluation.
On August 9, 1982, CH2M Hill submitted their
proposal evaluation to NYCDEP. Two proposal evaluation
teams independently reviewed proposals. Two of the 6
proposals were considered non-responsive and were given
detailed scrutiny by only one team. Scores between 1-10
were given to each proposal for 43 different criteria.
The general criteria categories and weighting were:
general responsiveness to RFP (5%, 3 criteria), ex-
perience and qualifications (20%, 9 criteria), technical
approach (50%, 23 criteria), financial considerations
(25%, 8 criteria). These criteria were established
through discussions with NYCDEP about its projects
needs. Both evaluation teams picked OHM for recommenda-
tion, with no significant differences in the total
scores.
Project Costs
The total cost of $2,398,959 for the Quanta
Resources clean-up includes tasks listed in Table 6.
This total exceeded the initial rough estimate of $1.5
million made in July 1982, partly because of delays and
price increases during the transportation and disposal
phase. This phase was the largest single cost item of
the project.
19-28
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TABLE 5. NYCDEP BST PROPOSAL EVALUATION CRITERIA FOR QUANTA - July 29, 1982
Criteria" 100% Weight
Part One
General Program and Plan 20%
a. Outline of project and objectives
b. Problem areas
Detailed Technical Approach 60%
a. Timetable 10%
b. Public safety, monitoring and
site security 10%
c. Testing and quality assurance 10%
d. Legal removal, transportation and
disposal 20%
e. Equipment and decontamination 10%
Company experience and Qualifications 20%
a. Qualifications 12%
b. Past performance 8%
Part Two
Financial Details 100%
a. Overall cost estimate 30%
b. Time and Material costs 40%
c. Company's resources (bonds, sureties, insurance) 30%
Source: NYCDEP BST bid proposal evaluation special report
19-29
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TABLE 6. SUMMARY OF PROJECT COSTS - QUANTA, QUEENS, NEW YORK
A, Clean-up Contractor
1. Site Survey $ 217,395
2. Transportation and
Disposal (Table 5) $ 645,728
3. Tank Decontamination, Water
Treatment, etc. $1,236,877
(Subtotal $2,100,008)
B. Management Consultant $ 176,015
(Proposal Evaluation, On-Site
Monitoring, Analysis, Quality
Assurance)
C. Site Security $ 73,920
D. Electricity $ 13,600
E. Emergency Medical Service $ 20,000
F. Miscellaneous $ 15,424
Total $2,256,377
19-30
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Transportation and Disposal
The costs of transportation and disposal are
summarized in Table 7- The total cost listed in Table 6
includes an additional $64,149 for miscellaneous
transportation related costs, such as facility
inspection and delivery monitoring. Also, the costs
listed include a 15% subcontractor handling fee. Both
trains and trucks were used for transportation. Train
tankers held about 20,000 gallons (75,700 1). Tank
trucks for liquids held 3,000 - 5,000 gallons while
slide-off dumpsters for solidified sludge hauled 12 - 14
cubic yards each.
Four problems occurred during the transportation
and disposal phase that increased costs. First, an
additional transportation cost of'$4,313 was incurred in
September 1982 for double handling of non-hazardous
oil. This extra handling cost occurred when on
September 9, 1982 two tanker trucks, which had been
loaded and inspected for shipment, were unloaded
following a phone call from NYSDEC to NYCDEP. The
NYSDEC halted the planned 100 mile (161 km) shipment to
a rotary kiln in Marion, NY, south of Albany, becuase
the faci 1 ity' s permit might have been revoked in the
future. The transportation and disposal of the oil to
the hazardous waste incinerator in Chicago (818 miles,
1316 km) also added some marginal cost compared to the
Marion option. The second problem that occurred during
transportation was leakage from two train tankers.
While on route to the incinerator in Arkansas, a
pressure valve on one tank car carrying PCS contaminated
oil allowed the substance to splash on the sides of the
tanker. On another car, substances splashed from an
unplugged air vent valve and an ungasketed man-way. A
third car arrived intact and sealed. The volume of
spillage was unclear, because substances had expanded
due to temperature changes. The NYCDEP's consultant,
CIUM Hill, travelled to the facility to inspect the
cars, as well as renegotiate the incineration price, due
to the unexpectedly high heavy metal content of the oil.
The third extra cost was incurred for extra
handling of non-hazardous sludge when it could not be
received by the Rollins facility in Bridgeport, NJ for
technical reasons. On October 13, 1982, about 7,800
gallons (29,523 1) of non-hazardous sludge was pumped
into two tank trucks, but upon arrival in Bridgeport
they could not be pumped out by the facility's pumps.
One Canker was emptied with difficulty but the other
truck was returned and unloaded to pool 6 and tank J42
because Rollins believed that the sludge would clog the
incinerator screens and appurtenances. This sludge was
recategorized an non-pumpable.
19-31
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TABLE 7. SUMMARY OF 1982 TRANSPORTATION AND DISPOSAL (a) COSTS
QUANTA RESOURCES, LONG ISLAND CITY, NEW YORK
Material
PCB contaminated (l>)
oil
PCB oil (over 500 mg/1)
Oil with over 10,000mg/l
ilorinated organius
Non-contaminated oil
.ammable Sludge
Pumpable PCB contain!-
gated sliuhu- (10
Non-pumpable PCB
Contaminated Sludge
Cyanide Solution
Non-pumpable 1*08 Sludge
Contaminated diesel
fuel (from decontamina-
tion)
Nun-liaiiardmifi Slud^<;
II sen Itanium's
Total
Quantity
38,716 gallons(146,540 ].)
1,740 miles (2,800 km)
1,163 gallons (4,402 1)
1.740 miles (2,800 km)
78,920 gallons(298,712 1)
818 miles (1316 km)
119,830 gallons(853,557 1)
818 miles (1316 km)
5,000 gallons (18,925 1)
100 miles (161 km)
57,000 gallons(215,745 1)
1,420 miles (2,285 km)
430 cubic yards (329 m3)
400 miles (644 km)
9,425 gallons(35,674 1)
100 miles (161 km)
1,705 gallons(6,453 1)
1740 miles (2,800 km)
1,100 gallons(4,164 1)
1340 miles (2160 km)
838 tons (760 Mt)
48 tons (44 Mt)
185 miles (295 km)
NA
Actual Expenditure Combined
(Transportation/Disposal)
$83,330
($42,678/$40,652)
$7,607
(S6.386/S1.221)
$36,466
($29,837/$6,629)
$45,254
($39,262/$5,992)
$8,105
($2,960/$5,145)
$113,521
($57.661/$55,860)
$86,410
$15,495
($2,771/$12,724)
$22,885
$4,416 (3)
$149, 7 30
(SQ1 .070/S58.6601
$8,280
($5,640/$2,640)
$64,229
UNIT COST
Transportation (d)
0.06d/gallon/mile
(O.OU/l/kra)R
.32# gallon/mile
(0.05<
-------
The fourth extra transportation cost was incurred
during the transportation of non-hazardous sludge to
landfills in Maryland (Browning Ferris Industries) and
Niagra Falls, N.Y (SCA). Initially, NYCDEP had planned
to dispose of solidified non-hazardous sludge in city-
owned sanitary landfills. But because of long-term
public concern about illegal hazardous material disposal
in city-owned landfills, as well as illegal hazardous
material incineration in apartment building boilers,
NYCDEP decided that the Quanta disposal policy would be
to dispose of all material, RCRA hazardous and non-
hazardous, at permitted hazardous waste facilities. On
November 3, 1983, 8 trucks transported solidified non-
hazardous sludge to the BFI facility near Baltimore.
After one truck was unloaded, the State of Maryland
contended that the material was hazardous because of a
low flash point, and halted unloading the other 7
trucks. The waste was recharacterized by OHM and CH M
Hill, with the latter, an independent consultant,
providing results showing it to be non-hazardous on
November 9, 1982. Both used chromatograph mass
spectrometry to identify the volatile organics. On the
same date, the State of Maryland sent a letter to
NYSDEC, noting that a gas chromatograph/mass
spectrometry characterization would be needed. On
November 16, 1982 the State of Maryland concurred with
NYCDEP's analysis, and allowed disposal. In the
intervening weeks, 838 tons (924 Mt) of non-hazardous
sludge was sent 400 miles (295 km) to Niagra Falls to a
permitted hazardous waste landfill at a cost of $1,000
transportation per truckload and $70/ton ($77/Mt) for
disposal, compared with $700 transportation per truck
load and $55/ton ($61/Mt) disposal for the 185 miles
(298 km) to BFI. The NYCDEP's consultant, ClUM Hill,
concluded that, "After a thorough review of the
circumstances related to the disposal problems at BFI,
it is apparent that the rejection of Quanta non-
hazardous sludge had less to do with the waste
characterization data discrepancies as with inter-state
regulatory political factors."
Management Consulting
The sum cost of $176,015 for management consulting
by CH-M Hill included assistance for proposal
evaluation, contract negotiations, inventory assistance
and on-site engineering. The $10,000 cost of the
proposal evaluation work is the only cost that can be
segregated from the other tasks.
Services performed by various city agencies cannot
be precisely tallied, but some estimates on the level of
effort were made. The Department of General Services
19-33
-------
paid for electricity, which was estimated at $8,100 for
90 days at $30/day, and $5,500 for the installation.
The Department of Health and Hospitals paid for
emergency medical services. This sum includes a
specially equipped mobile first-aid station and
supervisor, special transportation arrangements and the
maintenance of medical profiles. About $20,000 was
spent on equipment, and 2,140 hours of personnel time
(54% overtime) and 246 hours of overhead were
estimated. The NYC police provided about 2,000 hours of
site surveillance.
Two 24 hour/day armed security guards, each with
trained attack dogs, cost about $73,000. The site was
guarded for about 22 weeks by a security service hired
by the NYC Department of General Services from about
June 16 - December 1, 1982. The unit cost for this
level of security was $3,360/week or about $10/guard/
hour. The services provided by NYCDEP BST can not be
accurately accounted for, but level of effort by hours
can be estimated. A total of about 4,000 hours was
spent by the NYCDEP personnel on the preliminary
assessment (1,100 hours) and survey/removal contract
monitoring (3,000 hours). Over half (53%) of the
contract monitoring was done on overtime. Miscellaneous
NYCDEP expenditures totalled $15,424 including fence
repair, flashpoint analysis equipment, preliminary tank
sampling, safety coveralls, electrical supplies, waste
drums and cans, rain coats, portable toilets,
radiological survey and lab coats.
Future Cost
The future costs of work at Quanta are unquantified
as of January 1983, but involve two primary tasks. The
first is a hydrogeological study to determine the extent
of subsurface contamination and remedial needs. The
second potential cost is the implementation of a
subsurface clean-up.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The NYCDEP site response accomplished what it
intended to accomplish—prevent a fire and toxic air
emissions and remove hazardous wastes from the site.
After its initiation in July 1982, the clean-up
operation was performed effectively and rapidly with
only a couple of relatively brief delays. Primarily,
NYCDEP's meticulous and assertive oversight, and 0. H.
Materials' technical expertise and equipment, served to
expedite this removal operation in a highly professional
manner. The NYCDEP1s management consultant, CH2M Hill,
helped resolve delays by providing an independent view
of problems and solutions.
19-34
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Three relatively minor technical changes could have
improved the efficiency of the removal operation.
First, the off-loading pumps at the disposal site to be
used for non-hazardous sludge were less capable of
pumping the sludge than the contractor's on-site sludge
pumps. If the contractor had anticipated this problem,
the cost of returning and off-loading the wastes could
have been avoided. Second, the expansion of waste oil
in the tank car traveling to Arkansas caused spillage
through vents that could have affected sensitive
populations en route. Extra head space to anticipate
the spillage might have prevented this occurrence.
The third, and somewhat more general, technical
improvement could have been made by undertaking a level
of anlaysis that matched the selected disposal
alternative. Since the policy decision was made,
because of public concerns, to dispose of all wastes,
hazardous and non-hazardous, at licensed hazardous waste
facilities, the precise characterization at 13 distinct
waste streams for disposal was unnecessary. A lower
level of waste characterization, sufficient to analyze
PCS, non-PCB and cyanide wastes, and segregate pumpable
and flammable wastes would have been more cost-
effective. The preliminary site survey, which cost
NYCDEP about $2,000 and 1,000 hours of staff time, may
have been adequate for this purpose . with some
supplemental testing. The OHM survey, which cost about
$217,000 and created an extensive categorization of
specific waste streams, was beyond the needs of general
manifest requirements and PCS vs. non-PCB waste
categorization. The specific analysis necessary for
disposal cost determination could have been left for the
disposal site operator to perform, with independently
analyzed split samples.
The general problem of determining response
authority and responsibility, which will be settled in
court through the pending law suits, is largely beyond
the scope of this technical evaluation, but it
significantly affected the public health risk. During
the several months when the various parties discussed
their site response obligations, the public health
threat at the site remained imminent. The need for
parties to have clearly delineated authorities and
responsibilities is as important in protecting public
health as the technical innovation and expertise
employed at the site.
In sum, however, the site response was successful
in removing the imminent public health threat. Future
work at the site will involve assessing and possibly
mitigating surface, subsurface and ground water
19-35
-------
contamination. Also, the on-site structures will
probably be removed for the site to be used in the
future.
19-36
-------
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bureau of National Affairs. 1982. State Water Laws.
CECOS International. October 5, 1982. Correspondence to NYCDEP.
CH2M Hill. December 1982. "Draft Engineering Services Report/
Quanta Resources Site Clean-up." Reston, Va.
CHjM Hill. 1982. Correspondence, Reston Va.
Chojnowski, Kathy. 1983. Personal communication with Environmental
Law Institute. U.S. EPA. New York, N.Y.
Kuntz, Glen. 1983. Personal communications with Environmental
Law Institute. U. S. EPA Office of Toxic Substances,
Washington, D.C.
Long Island Railroad. September 20, 1982. Correspondence to
0. H. Material about hauling prices. Long Island City, N.Y.
National Weather Service, 1981. Local Climatological Data,
Annual Summary With Comparative Data - LaGuardia Field.
New York, N.Y.
New York City Fire Department. June 1982. Correspondence.
New York, N.Y.
New York Magazine. July 19, 1982. "Hazardous Waste Abandoned in
Long Island City."
New York City Law Department. 1982. Memoranda and correspondence,
New York, N.Y.
New York City Department of Environmental Protection 1982, 1983.
Memoranda, correspondence, special reports, field notebook,
manifests, mailgrams, invoices, requests for proposals.
New York, N.Y.
New York Times. Business Day Section. April 1982. "Toxic Waste
Entrepreneur."
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC)
"Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites in New York State, Volume 1,
June 1980" Albany, N.Y.
19-37
-------
NYSDEC 1980 - 1982. Memoranda and correspondence. New York, N.Y.
0. H. Materials. 1982-1983. Site Survey Report, proposal,
correspondence. Findlay, Ohio.
Ott, Gary. 1982. Personal communication with Environmental
Law Institute. NYCDEP, New York, N.Y.
Soren, Julian. 1971. "Ground Water and Geohydrologic Conditions
in Queens County, Long Island, New York; U.S. Geological
Survey Water Paper 2001-A." U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington,D.C.
Sprague, Bruce. October 26, 1982. Pollution Report.
U.S. EPA, Edison, New Jersey.
Starks, Thomas. January 1983. Personal communication with
Environmental Law Institute. Rollins Environmental Services,
Deer Park, Texas.
Stearns, Nancy. 1983. Personal communication. N.Y. State Attorney
General's Office New York, N.Y.
Supreme Court of the State of New York. December 29, 1982.
"Petition 1996S/82- The City of New York v. Robert F. Flacke,
Commisioner, NYSDEC.
U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York 1982.
Indictment U.S. Kenneth Mansfield New York, N.Y.
Vickers, Amy. 1983. Personel communication with Environmental
Law Institute. NYCDEP, New York, N.Y.
McEnroe, W.F., 1982, Correspondence with Nolan, Bell & Moore, Esq.,
Newark, N.Y.
Weiss, Carey. 1982. Personal communication with Environmental Law
institute. NYCDEP, New York, N.Y.
19-38
-------
RICHMOND SANITARY SERVICE
RICHMOND, CALIFORNIA
INTRODUCTION
Richmond Sanitary Service (RSS) is a commercially
operated 350-acre (142 ha) landfill in Richmond,
California. A 15-acre (6 ha) area of the site is used for
disposal of Class I (hazardous) wastes, while the
remainder of the landfill is used for Class II (non-
hazardous) waste disposal. In 1975, the California
Regional Water Quality Control Board (RWQCB) and the
California Department of Health (DoH) found that the Class
I area did not meet new state regulations regarding
hazardous waste facility design and operation, and that
the site posed a threat to surface waters, landfill
employees, and air quality,
Background
The RSS site is Located on San Pablo Bay at the
outlet of San Pablo Creek. The State-designated
beneficial uses of the bay and the creek area are:
recreation, aquatic, waterfowl, and migratory bird
habitat, industrial water supply, and navigation.
Richmond Sanitary Service began accepting municipal and
industrial wastes in 1952. In 1973, the RWQCB ordered RSS
to designate separate areas for Class I and Class II
wastes. The designated Class I section, consisting of a
six-acre (2.4 ha) drum burial area and a nine-acre (3.5
ha) liquid waste evaporation pond, was situated on top of
an older layer of municipal solid waste.
Throughout the early to raid-1970's, state agencies
cited RSS for numerous health, safety, and air pollution
problems at the site. Drums of solid and liquid chemical
waste often ruptured while being dumped from trucks, and
were not segregated according to compatibility.
Volatile liquids were dumped in the evaporation pond,
causing nearby residents to complain of chemical odors.
In 1975, the RWQCB ordered RSS to make a number of
operational and design improvements in both the Class I
and Class II areas. Richmond Sanitary Service responded
with an engineering master plan for the site proposing a
20-1
NCP reference
300.68(e)(2)(iv)
environmental
effects
-------
much expanded Class I area enclosed by a relatively
impermeable bay mud subsurface barrier. In March 1976,
the RWQCB rejected the Class I expansion plan but ordered
RSS to construct a subsurface barrier, a two-foot high
dike around the existing Class I area, and a basin to
catch rainfall runoff and liquid waste overflow from the
Class I area. Also in 1976, the DoH ordered RSS to
improve waste handling and burial practices.
Synopsis of Site Response
On September 14, 1976, RSS began construction of the
subsurface barrier, the dike, and the retention basin
using RSS' own earth-moving equipment and operators.
The work was inspected by the engineering firm that
designed the improvements. The five-foot (1.5 m) wide
barrier ranged from 5 to 30 feet (1.5 -9.1 m) deep, and
was 2,765 feet (843 m) long. The new barrier was con-
nected to 2,100 feet (640 m) of a pre-existing barrier to
completely enclose a 25-acre (10.1 ha) area containing the
Class I pond, drum burial area, and retention basin. The
construction took 28 days over a seven-week period,
including 16 days for the barrier and 12 days for the dike
and retention basin. Six months later, ten monitoring
wells were installed in the barrier.
300.70(b)(l)
impermeable
barriers
300.70(b)(l)(ii)
(B)(l)
dikes and berms
SITE DESCRIPTION
The Richmond Sanitary Service site is an active land-
fill which is permitted to accept solid municipal wastes
(Class II) and hazardous wastes (Class l) from the San
Francisco Bay Area. Class I wastes are currently limited
to contaminated solids in the barrel storage area and acid
and caustic rinse water in the holding pond.
Surface Charaj^teristics
The site occupies approximately 350 acres (142 ha) of
former marshland and tidelands adjacent to San Pablo Bay,
in southwestern Contra Costa County. More specifically,
it is situated at the foot of Parr Boulevard in the City
of Richmond and is bounded on the west and southwest by
the Bay and on the north by San Pablo Creek. The San
Pablo Sewage Treatment Plant is located just west of the
site. The area is highly industrialized. A large
refinery is located less than 1.5 miles- (2.4 Km) from the
site boundaries.
Figures 1 and 2 show the location of the site.
Figure 2 also shows the relative location of the Class I
and Class II areas. The Class I area comprises only about
300.68(e)(2)(i)
(A)
population at
risk
20-2
-------
Figure 1. Location of the Richmond Sanitary Service Site
Richmond, California
20-3
-------
I RICHMOND SITE]
Figure 2.
Location of the Richmond Sanitary Services Class I and
Class II Disposal Areas in Richmond, California
20-4
-------
25 acres (10.1 ha)
(142 ha) Landfill.
or about 7 percent of the 350 acre
Because the site is situated in former tideLands and
marshlands of San Pablo Bay, potential for flooding has
been a concern. However, as Figure 2 illustrates, the
Class I area is buffered from tidal action by the Class
II area and by a perimeter dike. However, it should also
be noted that lower San Pablo Creek closely parallels both
the Class I and Class II areas along the northerly bound-
ary of the site before emptying into San Pablo Bay. The
magnitude of flood flow that reaches the Class I area is
limited mainly by the channel capacity of San Pablo Creek
and to a much lesser extent of Wildcat Creek.
The San Pablo Bay area has cool, dry summers and
mild, moist winters. The mean annual temperature is
58.2 F (14.6°C). The mean monthly temperature ranges
from a low of 50.2°F (10.TO in January to 65°F (18.3°C)
in September.
The average annual precipitation in Richmond is 22
inches (56 cm). The winters are moist and over 90 percent
of the precipitation falls between November and May. Late
in spring and summer coastal fog is common in the bay and
usually clears by late morning. In winter, the relative
humidity averages about 90 percent at night and 70 percent
in the afternoon.
Hydrogeology
The RSS site lies in an alluvial valley which is
covered with Reyes silty organic clay soils which are
nearly level, very poorly drained, highly compressible,
and nearly impermeable. These soils are commonly called
Bay Muds. The water table is at or near the ground
surface.
Figure 3 shows the general geology in the area of San
Pablo Bay. As shown, the alluvial valley in which the
Richmond Site is located is separated from the bedrock
formations to the northeast by the Hayward fault. The San
Pedro - San Pablo fault separates the valley from the
bedrock formation to the southwest.
The Hayward fault, located approximately 1.3 miles
(2.1 Km) east of the site is seismically active and is one
of the great earthquake faults in this part of California.
The San Pedro - San Pablo fault is not considered to be
seismically active. The San Andreas fault, although 16
miles (26 Km) southeast of the site, is considered to pose
a greater threat than the Hayward Fault.
300.68(e)(2)(i)
(D)
hydrogeologic
factors
300.68(e)(2)(i)
(E)
climate
300.68(e)(2)(i)
(D)
hydrogeologic
factors
20-5
-------
N>
O
I
tot
Orlnda Formation
non-marine conglomerate,
sandstone and clay
RICHMOND SITE
and marsh deposits
Valley fill alluvium
sand,silt, clay and gravel
Kjf
Franciscan Formation
marine sandstone and shale
Figure 3. Surface Geology in the Area of the Richmond Sanitary Service Site
-------
A combination of driller's water well logs, founda-
tion borings, water Level records, and etc. were used by
Nevin and Ellis (1971) to construct a hydrogeologic
cross-section of the area as shown in Figure 4. The
alluvial valley is underlain by a considerable thickness
of unconsoLidated sediments consisting of silty clay with
interbedded layers of sand, shells, and peat. These bay
muds, as they are called, occur to a depth of at least 50
feet (15m) along the eastern boundary of the site and to
at least 150 feet (46ra) along the western boundary as
shown in Figure 4. Lenses of sand found within the bay
mud occur erratically and discontinuously. The bay mud is
generally underlain by a sand unit deposited by stream
channels which once traversed the area enroute to the Bay.
These sand and gravel layers are sparse, highly variable
in occurrence and generally only a few feet thick. These
pervious layers are found mostly at depths below 100 feet
(30ra) where they constitute what is referred to in Figure
4 as the "deep aquifer zone". The zone constitutes the
only productive aquifer in the area. It is encountered at
depths of 80 to 100 feet (24 to 30m) several miles east of
the study area but deepens to below 180 feet (55m) in the
vicinty of the site.
This sand layer in turn overlies an older bay deposit
which consists of stiff, silty clay. Bedrock is estimated
to underlie the site at depths of about 300 feet (91ra).
As shown in Figure 4 most of the aquifer material is
overlain by thick, tight clay zones which serve as aqui-
cludes to confine these aquifers under artesian pressure.
The groundwater in the area is replenished mainly from
percolation of streamflow in high areas considerably east
of the project area where aquifers are not capped by
impermeable clays and can receive surface water infil-
tration. The groundwater flows from these recharge areas
towards the Bay. At the RSS site, groundwater flow is in
a westerly direction towards the Bay but the hydraulic
gradient is nearly flat and the rate of groundwater
movement is very slow. Also, the highly impermeable bay
mud and deeper clay deposits inhibit or greatly minimize
lateral groundwater migration.
The capacity of the "deep aquifer zone" and the
shallower sand lenses is rather limited since the zones
are generally only a few feet thick and are discontinuous.
Although well yields of 300 to 350 gallons (1136 - 1325
liters) per minute have been reported, the majority pump
much less. Some wells which penetrate the most productive
aquifer zone have a maximum yield of less than 50 gallons
(189 liters) per minute.
20-7
-------
N)
O
I
CO
Figure 4. Geological Cross-Section of the Area around the Richmond Sanitary
Services Site
-------
Water levels in both shallow and deep wells are
generally quite shallow where not influenced by pumping.
However, pumping records show drastic drawdowns in many
cases and specific capacities are commonly only 1 to 2 gpm
of yield per foot (1.2 - 2.3 liter per minute of yield per
meter) of drawdown.
Groundwater usage within the entire groundwater basin
is very limited. There are no existing drinking water
wells in the entire basin. In the locality of the site,
aquifer zones Located at depths of 50 to 100 feet (15 -
30ra) are known to be brackish and unsuitable for most
uses.
300.68(e)(2)(i)
(A)
population at
risk
WASTE DISPOSAL HISTORY
The disposal practices at the Richmond site evolved
over a 20 to 25 year period from haphazard, unregulated,
dumping to carefully regulated and monitored disposal.
This evolution paralleled the evolution of the State, and
to a lesser extent , the Federal hazardous waste
regulations.
Richmond Sanitary Service began acquiring the land
currently used as a Class I and Class II disposal site in
the early 1950's. In December of 1952, RSS was granted a
land use permit by Contra Costa County for operation of a
sanitary landfill. This permit, and a subsequent permit
issued in 1960, placed minimal operational conditions for
the handling of solid wastes, and handling of hazardous
wastes was not addressed at all. As a result, throughout
the 50's and most of the 60's RSS indiscriminately
accepted hazardous wastes and took little or no pre-
cautions to protect public health, safety of the workers
or the environment. Drums of wastes were often broken
open, exposing workers and the public to flammable and
toxic wastes. Incompatible wastes were not separated and
volatile, toxic liquids were dumped indiscriminately. One
of the few measures taken at the site during the 1950' s
was to construct a perimeter dike around much of the site.
In 1964, the Regional Water Pollution Control Board
(predecessor of the present Regional Water Quality Control
Board) issued a resolution requiring that disposal of
solid municipal wastes and industrial wastes be done in a
manner that is not detrimental to the state's waters. The
Board established a self-monitoring program for RSS and
ordered that they construct a dike to prevent wastes from
leaching into the Bay. However, the resolution did not
establish any operational requirement for handling
hazardous materials.
300.68(e)(2)(i)
(c)
hazardous
properties
300.70(B)(ii)(B)
(i)
dikes and berras
20-9
-------
The 1970* s marked the beginning of an increased
awareness by the County and State of the problems at the
Richmond Site. During 1970 about 1 x 10 gallons
(3.8 x 10 1) of hazardous wastes and approximately
120,000 tons (109,000 MX) of non-hazardous wastes were
discharged at the site. In 1971, the RWQCB was granted
authority to establish specifications for solid waste
disposal sites, including design and construction of
any measures needed to protect state waters. The RWQCB
ordered that the suitability of areas used for disposal
of Class I wastes be determined based on soil
engineering, hydrologic and hydrogeologic studies.
Richmond Sanitary Service's consultants, Cooper-Clark and
Associates, conducted these studies and made several
recommendations for upgrading the site. In 1973, the
RWQCB issued an order to RSS which incorporated Cooper-
Clark's recommended site improvements and identified a
Class I area for disposal of hazardous wastes and a Class
II area for solid municipal wastes. Because RSS encoun-
tered unanticipated problems in meeting the requirements
of various governmental agencies, the Class I facility was
not upgraded at that time.
The RWQCB was, however, investigating the site on a
routine basis at this time. Several violations of the
Board's order were documented. The most frequent viola-
tion was the deposition of hazardous wastes in the Class
II area.
The state Department of Health (DoH) also investi-
gated the site during the early 1970's and expressed con-
cern over lack of precautions taken to ensure protection
of workers and the public. Drums were still being dis-
posed of haphazardly, incompatible wastes were not sepa-
rated and volatile liquids were dumped indiscriminately.
However until the passage of the California Industrial
Waste Act of 1972, neither the RWQCB or the Department of
Health had the authority to control operational aspects
needed to protect public health and the environment. The
Industrial Waste Act required the Department of Health to
develop a hazardous waste control program by 1974.
In 1975, RSS submitted an engineering master plan for
the site which proposed a much expanded Class I area
enclosed by a bay mud subsurface barier. During 1975, the
Department of Health, the RWQCB and the RSS site operators
and their consultants, Cooper-Clark and Associates, met
on several occasions to discuss needed improvements at the
site. Although there was general agreement among the
involved parties regarding the need for design and
operational improvements, RWQCB rejected the expansion
300.68(e)(2)(i)
(B)
amount and form
of substances
present
300.68(f)
remedial
investigation
300.68 (g)
development of
alternatives
300.68(e)(2)(i)
(0
hazardous
properties
20-10
-------
plan. They ordered RSS to construct the subsurface
barrier, perimeter dike and retention basin. The Class I
disposal area was upgraded between 1975 and 1978 to meet
the requirements set forth by the RWQCB and the DoH.
DESCRIPTION OF SITE INVESTIGATION
As part of the RWQCB1s requirements that Richmond
Sanitary Service institute a self-monitoring program to
determine the acceptability of the site for handling Class
I wastes, Cooper-Clark and Associates, under contract to
RSS, conducted detailed soil engineering and hydro-
geologic investigations of the site during 1971 and 1974.
These investigations included the following activities:
• Exploration of soil and ground water conditions in
the existing and proposed Class I areas to depths
that could potentially be affected by wastes
• Evaluation of physical characteristics of soil by
laboratory testing
• Determination of potential reaction of wastes with
bay mud.
Soil borings were drilled at 100 foot (30 m) centers
to depths ranging from 3 to 60 feet (1 - 18m) using truck
mounted, 5 inch (12.7 cm) diameter rotary-wash equipment.
Undisturbed soil samples were taken using split-tube
barrel samplers for visual inspections and laboratory
testing.
Borings taken around the perimeter of the existing
Class I pond encountered about 3 to 13 feet (0.9 - 4.0 m)
of loose, permeable refuse. In one area 5.5 feet (1.7m)
of chemical waste was encountered. The fills were
directly underlain by bay mud containing varying amounts
of sand lenses and peat. In contrast, very little refuse
was encountered around what is now the barrel storage
area, and the bay mud was relatively free of sand deposits
at shallow depths. Groundwater was encountered within or
above the fill in the existing filled area and near the
ground surface in areas which remained unfilled.
Next, a series of soil engineering tests were
performed on the bay mud and on the sand lenses. Testing
included:
o Permeability of natural bay mud deposits and com-
pacted bay mud materials. Natural bay mud was
found to have a coefficient of permeability of
20-11
300.68(c)
state or federal
evaluation of
clean-up
proposals
300.68(f)
remedial
investigations
-------
10~^ to 10 cm/sec. Bay mud compacted to 80
percent of maximum compaccion at proper moisture
content consistently had a permeability of
10 cm/sec.
• Determination of strength characteristics of bay
mud using a portable Torvane Torsional Vane Shear
test at natural moisture content. To aid in
correlating the engineering properties of soil,
moisture content and dry density tests were
performed on all undisturbed samples.
• Grain size distribution tests on selected sandy
soils.
Based on the results of field exploration and labora-
tory testing Cooper-Clark concluded that the bay mud was
sufficiently impermeable to prevent leaching into the
underlying ground water but that lateral seepage through
the existing fill and sand lenses was a possiblity.
Although the permeability of the bay mud was
extremely low, there was some concern over the potential
for changes in permeability due to reactions with highly
acidic or basic Class I wastes. The results of laboratory
tests on bay mud samples saturated with a pH solution of 2
and 10 showed no changes in consolidation or permeability
characteristics. No such laboratory tests were conducted
to determine changes in consolidation or permeability
characteristics as a result of exposure to organics.
However, samples of bay mud from the existing Class I area
which had been in contact with various waste types were
tested, and showed no apparent change in permeability.
PLANNING THE SITE RESPONSE
Initiation _of_ Response
In March 1976, the RWQCB ordered RSS to implement the
site improvements in order to bring the facility into
compliance with new hazardous waste disposal regulations.
While no single incident triggered the order, the RWQCB
concluded that the site posed a threat to state waters
based on observations by state officials over the previous
five years of numerous problems with the RSS facility
design and operations. The order came after six months of
negotiations between the RWQCB and RSS, during which RSS
submitted proposals to greatly expand the Class I area
pinto adjacent marshland and to construct a bay mud
barrier enclosing the new Class I area.
20-12
-------
The RWQCB rejected the expansion plans because RSS
and^the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers were then engaged in
a dispute over the legitimacy of RSS1 claim to title over
the marshland. The RWQCB instead ordered RSS to construct
the proposed barrier only around the existing 15-acre (6
ha) Class I area and an adjacent 5 acres (2 ha), which was
to concain a retention basin for rainfall runoff from the
Class I area and overflow from the Class I pond in the
event of a dike failure. Figure 5 shows the layout of the
Class I area. The order to build the barrier was part of
a larger effort from 1975 to 1978 by the RWQCB and the DoH
to improve the design and operation of both the Class I
and Class II areas at the RSS site.
Selection of Response Technologies
Based on detailed hydrologic, hydrogeologic, and
soil engineering studies performed by Cooper-Clark and
Associates it became apparent that, although the low
permeability of bay mud prevented vertical migration
into underlying ground water, there was a potential for
lateral migration into surface waters through existing
refuse or sand lenses. These studies also indicated the
potential for releases of hazardous chemicals in the event
of flooding or seismic activity. Based on these studies
and subsequent discussions with Cooper-Clark and
Associates, the RWQCB ordered RSS to implement the
following improvements:
• Construction of an underground, impermeable
barrier which was to be keyed into the impermeable
bay mud
• Construction of a perimeter dike surrounding the
Class I area to prevent flooding
• Construction and maintenance of a retention basin
with adequate capacity to contain maximum runoff
plus maximum volume of liquid which would escape
the Class I pond in event of a dike failure
• Installation of monitoring wells
• Raising the interior dike around the Class I pond
to provide sufficient elevation and slope to
ensure stability in the event of seismic activity.
Inspections made by the Air Pollution Control
District and the DoH throughout• the early and mid-1970's
and complaints from area residents of odors indicated that
severe potential hazards still existed at the site. These
included disposal of extremely hazardous chemicals, mixing
20-13
-------
to
O
LIQUID WASTE
CLASS I DISPOSAL AREA
J ijttiJLJ *• «j **-*-«•— ' ' ^-
RICHMOND SANITARY SERVICE
^l^jfll'ivnf «<*••*- --
RICHMOND, CALIFORNIA
Subsurface barrier
and dike .
,,
Monitoring wells . . . •
Settlement markers . . ."L-l1
Figure 5. Layout of the Class I Disposal Area
-------
of incompatible wastes, haphazard disposal of drums such
that drums ruptured and leaked and lack of adequate safety
precautions in handling wastes.
In November 1976, after the DoH1s 1975 recommendation
for operational improvements had not been implemented, the
Department threatened issuance of a cease and desist order
unless RSS made certain operational improvements.
Richmond Sanitary Service initiated these improvements
shortly thereafter, including separation of incompatible
wastes in the barrel storage area and safer handling of
drums and liquid wastes.
Extent of Response
The RWQCB specified in its order to RSS that the sub-
surface barrier be at least 5 feet (1.5 m)_wide and have a
permeability of not greater than 1 x 10 cm/sec. The
depth of the trench excavated for the barrier was to
extend at least two feet (0.6 ra) into the underlying layer
of bay mud. The order further required that the 2-foot
(0.6 m) high dike surrounding the Class I area be com-
pacted sufficiently to meet the 1 x 10~8 cm/sec perme-
ability standard, that the retention basin be of a
sufficient volume to contain any liquid waste release in
the event of a failure in the Class I pond dike, and that
ten monitoring wells be installed at equal intervals in
the barrier. The RWQCB based the design criteria on
facility standards set forth in State hazardous waste
facility regulations. Since the site rested on a 50 to
150 foot (15 to _46 m) thick layer of bay mud with a
permeability of 10 cm/sec., forming an effective aqui-
clude between the Class I wastes and the nearest useable
ground water, State officials believed that the barrier
would sufficiently mitigate the threat to State waters.
The order listed other operational improvements,
requiring that two feet (0.6 ra) of freeboard be maintained
in the liquid waste pond, that each layer of buried drums
be covered with at least 1 foot (.3 ra) of compacted soil,
that the height of the drum burial area not exceed 43 feet
(13 m) feet above sea level, and that the retention basin
not be used for waste disposal.
300.68U)
extent of remedy
300.68(e)(2)
(v)
state approach
to similar
situations
DESIGN AND EXECUTION OF SITE RESPONSE
The response activities designed to prevent surface
water contamination and to minimize the risk to public
health and worker safety were implemented between 1976 and
1978. The activities were conducted and funded by RSS
20-15
-------
under the supervision of the RWQCB and the Department of
Health.
Construction of Impermeable Barrier, Perimeter Dike and
Retention Basin
In order to protect adjacent surface waters from
pollution caused by lateral or vertical seepage, an
impermeable, underground barrier was constructed around
the perimeter of the Class I area, and the area was
enclosed with a dike to protect against flooding and
ensure containment of runoff. Both the underground
barrier and the perimeter dike were constructed using bay
mud excavated from the site. The inherently low
permeability and ready availability made the bay mud an
excellent choice for the barrier material.
RSS began construction of the site improvements on
September 14, 1976 and completed most of the work by
October 30, 1976 in accordance with plans and specifi-
cations developed by the RWQCB and Cooper-Clark and
Associates. The specifications required that the under-
ground impervious key was to be a minimum of 5 feet
(1.5 m) wide and extend a minimum of 2 feet (0.6 m) below
the refuse material where it was keyed into the underlying
bay mud. Where sand lenses were encountered within 5 feet
(1.5 m) of the bottom of the fill, the trench was to be
excavated through the sand and 2 to 3 feet (0.6 - 1 ^m)
into the underlying mud. The newly constructed barrier
was also to be keyed into those portions of the barrier
which had been constructed during previous years. The
"old" barrier had been constructed along the northeast and
south boundaries of the Class I Pond and along the western
perimeter of what was later to be the retention basin.
The new barrier was 2,765 feet (843 m) long, and the old
barrier was 2,100 feet (640 m) long.
The trench was excavated using a hopto, which is a
large, track-mounted backhoe. Although the trench was
required to be only 5 feet (1.5 m) wide, it sometimes
reached 8 to 10 feet (2.4 - 3.0 m) wide in areas of
heterogeneous refuse fill. During excavation, the backhoe
encountered a considerable amount of refuse as well as
demolition debris, chemical waste and drums. These
materials were removed from the trench and disposed of in
the Class II area. At one point during trench excavation,
flammable liquids were encountered and the trench caught
on fire. No safety equipment was worn by field personnel
despite the fact that hazardous materials were encoun-
tered. Because of the considerable thickness of refuse
and sand lenses encountered, it was necessary to excavate
the trench to depths of 20 to 30 feet (6 - 9 m) in some
(300.70(b)(l)
(iii)U)
impermeable
barriers
300.71
worker health
and safety
20-16
-------
areas. The backhoe had a reach of only about 20 feet
(6.1 m). Consequently, it was sometimes necessary to use
a track-type dozer to excavate about 10 feet (3.0 m) below
grade adjacent to the trench to serve as a temporary
working area for the backhoe so it could excavate to the
required depths.
Inflow of water into the trenches was another problem
encountered during excavation. Inflow was particularly
rapid in areas of more permeable refuse fill, and in the
area of the Class I pond due to seepage of liquid wastes.
However, the need for dewatering was eliminated by
excavating and backfilling in about 30 linear foot (9 m)
segments, avoiding long lengths of unsupported open
trench.
A dragline was used to excavate the bay mud used for
backfill from an area southeast of the retention basin.
In some areas sand lenses were encountered and this
material, unsuitable for backfilling, was discarded. The
bay mud was dumped into trucks from the dragline and
hauled to the work area where it was dumped into the
trench. Dozers were also occasionally used to push the
mud into the trench.
It was necessary to closely coordinate the rate of
trench excavation and backfilling. If the excavation
proceeded too far ahead of backfilling there was likely to
be considerable inflow of water into the trench and
dewatering would be needed. if, on the other hand,
hauling of the bay mud for backfilling proceeded too far
ahead of excavation, the material would be unsuitable for
backfilling because it was required that it be dumped at
its natural moisture content without letting it dry.
As requested by RWQCB, Cooper-Clark took undisturbed
samples from the completed barrier at less than 500 foot
(150 m) intervals for permeability testing. Both the
"new" and existing barriers had permeabilities on the
order of 10 cm/sec in compliance with the RWQCB1s order.
Following completion of the key, RSS began construe- 300.70(b)(l)(B)
tion of the above ground perimeter dike. The perimeter (B)(l)
dike was constructed to a height of about 2 feet (0.6 m) dikes and berms
above ground level which was considered adequate to pre-
vent Class I area runoff from entering the Class II area.
The completed dike area was 4,900 feet (1494 m) long.
Again, bay mud was hauled in trucks from the area
southeast of the retention basin. Large track-type bull-
dozers were used to roughly shape the slopes of the dikes.
Smaller bulldozers, equipped with extra wide tracks, were
20-17
-------
used for polishing and finishing the slopes. The reten-
tion basin was also graded and finished using mainly
the larger bulldozers for shaping and grading and a
smaller bulldozer for final polishing. The dike was
compacted to at least 80 percent of maximum density in
order to attain the required permeability of 10 cm/sec.
In order to ensure the adequacy of the dikes, laboratory
permeability tests were performed on samples taken at less
than 500 foot (150 m) intervals. Permeabilities on the
order of 10~8 cm/sec were achieved consistently. Field
density tests were performed at intervals of less than
500 feet (150 m) according to ASTM Test Procedure D1557-70
to ensure that the bay mud was compacted to the required
80 percent.
Installation of Monitoring Wells
In July 1977, Cooper-Clark installed ten monitoring
wells at equal distances within the containment structure
enclosing the Class I areas. The wells were drilled with
a truck-mounted 7 inch (17.8cm) diameter, rotary wash
drill rig approximately along the centerline of the
containment structure. The wells extended through the
existing bay mud key and at least 1 foot (0.3m) into the
natural bay mud. The depth of the wells ranged from 10 to
13.5 feet (3.0 - 4.1m). It was essential for Cooper-Clark
to install the wells within the barrier so that wastes
which had been disposed of outside of the barrier limits
during the 1960's and early 1970's would not be detected
during monitoring.
After drilling each well, a 4 inch (10.2cm) diameter,
perforated PVC pipe surrounded by at least 1 inch (2.5cm)
of filter material consisting of 1 inch (2.5cm) maximum
size pea gravel was installed. A cap was provided for
each pipe, and the top 2 feet (0.6m) of backfill around
the pipe consisted of impermeable bay mud to prevent
surface water infiltration into the well. These wells are
monitored quarterly by EMCON Associates and the data is
submitted to the RWQCB.
Class I Pond
During late 1976 and early 1977, the 9 acre (3.6
hectare) Class I liquid pond came under critical examina-
tion by the RWQCB, the DoH and the Air Pollution Control
District. The pond was filling up and the 2 foot (0.6 m)
freeboard limit placed on it by the RWQCB was exceeded.
On January 4, 1977, the RWQCB ordered RSS to stop placing
waste in the pond.
20-18
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The reason the pond exceeded it's freeboard limit was
apparent. Prior to installation of the underground
barrier, the pond acted as an infiltration basin, allowing
the liquid wastes to seep into the old underlying refuse.
Construction of the barrier in October 1976 severely
restricted further infiltration. Also a persistent layer
of 2 to 5 inches (5-13 cm) of oil on the pond prevented
the liquid from evaporating.
In order to meet the requirements for a minimum of
2 feet (0.6m) of freeboard, it was necessary to raise the
crest of the perimeter dike to an elevation of 21 feet
(6.4m). The RWQCB granted permission to raise the
elevation provided the following stipulations were met:
o The permeability of the dike was not to exceed
10 cm/sec
o The crest width was to be at least 5 feet (1.5 m)
o Inboard and outboard slopes could not be steeper
than 3:1 (horizontal to vertical) to assure slope
stability in the event of seismic activity.
The crest of the dike surrounding the pond was ele-
vated using procedures similar to those used for con-
structing the perimeter dike. The same types of large and
small bulldozers were again used to shape, compact, and
polish the dike.
Following completion of the dike, the RWQCB required
that permanent settlement bench marks and liquid gauges be
installed at equidistant intervals around the perimeter of
the pond. The settlement bench marks consisted of nine
capped steel pipes driven into the top of the dike at 200
foot (61 m) intervals. The liquid gauges consisted of
four welded steel staff gauges which were installed at 400
foot (120 m) intervals. The top of the gauges were set
at elevation 21 feet (6.0 m) to allow a direct reading of
the pond freeboard relative to the top of the dike.
Loading Rate Determinations
Elevating the crest of the dikes to 21 feet (6.4 m)
was not sufficient justification for reopening the Class I
pond. The RWQCB required that RSS conduct an evaporation
rate study in order to determine the liquid loading rate
which could safely be accepted. They also required
documentation that the retention basin located south of
the barrel storage area had sufficient storage capacity to
contain runoff and any conceivable discharge from the pond
in the event of a failure of the perimeter dike.
20-19
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Initially the engineering firm of Kister, Savio and
Rei, Inc. submitted an evaporation study in which they
estimated that 730,000 gallons (2.8 x 106 D of liquid per
month evaporated from the pond. However, _the RWQCB
considered this loading rate to be very optimistic. It
assumed that the evaporation rate from the pond would be
equivalent to pure water. This assumption was not true
since, as the salt concentrations increased within the
pond, surface tension increased and evaporation decreased.
Also the industrial discharge to the pond typically
contained substantial amounts of floatable oils which
effectively prevented evaporation from the surface.
The RWQCB therefore recommended that the actual
evaporation rates be monitored. Gal Recovery System Inc.
made actual measurements of the evaporation rates between
December 1977 and May 1978. Based on these studies they
concluded that an acceptable loading rate was 500,000
gallons (1.9 x 10 1) per month, provided that the pond
was cleaned periodically and that the rate be adjusted to
reflect any unusual conditions such as very heavy rains or
excessive oil and debris. This loading rate met with the
approval of the RWQCB provided the 2 foot (0.6m) minimum
freeboard was maintained.
The next task was to determine the adequacy of the
retention basin tocontain Class I liquids in the even of a
dike failure around the Class I pond. To answer this
question, it was necessary to define a conceivable dike
failure. Due to the configuration of the adjacent ground
surface, Cooper-Clark determined that there was no possi-
bility of failure to the north, west, and most of the east
of the perimeter dike. However, in the event of the
maximum credible earthquake along the San Andreas Fault,
there was the possibility of lateral movement along the
southern perimeter of the pond but not complete dike
failure.
Cooper-Clark determined the stability of these slopes
in the event of seismic activity using the "SHAKE 2"
computer model made available through the University of
California at Berkeley and was later confirmed using the
results of the more complete "LUSH" program.
Assuming the most severe set of circumstances; that
is a maximum lateral movement of the southern perimeter
dike and maximum runoff resulting from a 100-year storm of
24 hour duration, Cooper-Clark determined that the
retention basin would be filled only 61 percent of its
capacity or 3.6 x 106 gallons (13.6 x 106 1) . Therefore,
the capacity of the retention basin was considered
adequate.
20-20
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Implementation of Waste Management Practices for the Class
I Evaporation Pond and Retention Basin
Following completion of these remedial measures and
studies for the Class I Pond, the pond was reopened. The
RWQCB stipulated that RSS could accept up to 500,000
gallons (1.9 x 10 1) per month (provided a minimum 2 foot
freeboard was maintained) of Class I liquid wastes with
the exception of pesticides, paint sludges, solvents,
tetraethyl lead sludge and oil, which cannot be accepted.
The pH of the pond is now maintained near neutrality due
to a balance of caustic and acid wastes.
In order to insure a minimum freeboard of two feet
and to optimize evaporation, the pond is periodically
skimmed to remove oils and animal fats which rise to the
surface as a result of their disposal in the 1950's and
1960's. Skimming is only required infrequently when about
20% of the pond is covered with oil. The oil is pumped
into a small adjacent pond and is later sold for fuel.
Finally the liquid level in the retention basin must
be maintained such that sufficient capacity exists to
store liquids from the Class I pond in the event of a dike
failure. In order to ensure this capacity, rainwater is
periodically pumped from the retention basin directly to
the San Pablo Sewage Treatment Plant for treatment .
Richmond Sanitary Service has an agreement with the treat-
ment plant whereby the landfill accepts secondary sewerage
sludge from the treatment plant in exchange for free
treatment of the retention basin effluent. The effluent
from the retention basin can be discharged directly into
the bay if it meets minimum discharge requirements.
Implementation of Remedial Measures and Waste Management
Practices for the Barrel Storage Area
In 1976, both the RWQCB and the DoH issued require-
ments for upgrading the barrel storage area. The RWQCB
required that RSS submit a slope stability analysis for
analysis for the slopes around the barrel storage area
specifying the maximum slope and height of fill which
could be developed without exceeding 80 percent of the
shear strength of the underlying material. Slope
stability was determined using the previously mentioned
SHAKE 2" and "LUSH" methods of analysis and assuming the
maximum credible earthquake along adjacent portions of the
San Andreas Fault. Based upon this analysis Cooper-Clark
concluded that the maximum allowable slope should be 8:1
except for the easterly slope adjacent to the Class I
pond, which should not be steeper than 4:1. The RWQCB
also required that the barrel storage area not have an
20-21
-------
elevation greater than 43 feet (13m) above mean sea level
to further assure slope stability.
During the later months of 1976 and early 1977, RSS
instituted numerous operational improvements for the
barrel storage area as required by the DoH. Bay mud and
other clays were used to construct four separate barrel
disposal cells for each of the following categories of
waste:
• Acids
• Alkalies and cyanides
• Strong oxidizers
• Pesticides, solvents and organic chemicals.
The cells were separated with a minimum of 5 feet (1.6m)
of clay or bay mud.
Special equipment was purchased so that drums could
be unloaded and disposed of without damage. Equipment
operators were required to wear respirators and safety
shields were installed on the front of drum unloaders.
In February 1980, DOH ordered implementation of
additional measures to upgrade the barrel storage area.
These measures included:
• Bury the containers with a volume of soil
sufficient to absorb the total volume of liquid in
the drum.
• Completely cover the drums with earth at the end
of the day
• provide a minimum of 1 foot (0.3m) of compacted
soil prior to starting the next layer.
Rather than meet these requirements, RSS stopped accepting
drums containing more than 10 percent liquids. .They are
currently accepting bulk or containerized contaminated
soils or solids. A closure plan has been developed for
the barrel storage area.
COST AND FUNDING
Source of _Fujid_iLng_
Richmond Sanitary Service paid for construction of
the site improvements out of its operating budget.
20-22
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Selection of Contractors
Since RSS used its own equipment, operators, and 300.68(c)
materials to implement the site improvements, no con- responsible
tractor selection process occurred. Richmond Sanitary party
Service hired Cooper-Clark and Associates, a foundation
engineering firm, to design the site improvements and
oversee their construction. Richmond Sanitary Service
based its selection on Cooper-Clark's longstanding
business relationship with RSS and their familiarity with
the site.
Project Costs
While RSS made a number of site improvements from
1976 to 1978, this cost analysis focuses only on the major
actions: the barrier, the perimeter dike, and the
retention basin. Because RSS primarily used its own
workers and equipment for the project, invoices were not
available with which to calculate the precise cost of the
work. Operators and earth-moving equipment were borrowed
as needed from the daily landfill operations. Conse-
quently, an estimate of the cost of implementing the site
improvements was based on standard rates for contracting
similar labor and equipment multiplied by the number of
days and hours spent on the project. Since all of the bay
mud used for the site improvements was taken from other
areas of the landfill, the only material costs were for
monitoring wells.
While the work occurred in 1976, 1983 rates were used
to estimate the cost of the project, in order to make the
costs more current. It is important to note that the
estimated costs were based on limited data, and may vary
from the actual cost by as much as 30%. The rates used
were taken from Mean's Building Construction Cost Data
1983. Most °f the costs were calculated from bare cost
rates for daily equipment rental, hourly operating cost,
and hourly labor, without including overhead and profit.
However, since RSS hired trucks from outside to haul mud,
the hauling estimate includes overhead and profit, and was
calculated on a per-cubic-yard basis. A summary of the
cost is provided in Table 1.
The total cost of constructing the 2,765-foot (843 ra)
long subsurface barrier, the 4,900-foot (1,494 m) long,
two-foot (0.6 m) high compacted mud dike, and the 5-acre
(2 ha) retention basin was about $111,000, in 1983
dollars. The bulk of the cost, about $77,000, was for
excavation and earth moving. The remaining $34,000 was
for Cooper-Clark's engineering services.
20-23
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TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF COST INFORMATION-RICHMOND SANITARY SERVICE, RICHMOND, CALIFORNIA
ro
o
i
Task
Constructing
subsurface
barrier
Constructing
dike, basin
Site investigation
and design
Installing
monitoring wells
Inspection
Oversight of
Construction
Total Cost
Quantity
7,313
cu.yds. „
(5,592m )
10 wells
30 days
Expenditure
(1983 dollars)
$56,118
$20,718
$15,000
$15,000
$4,200
$111,036
Unit Cost
$7.67/
cu. yd.
($10.03 m )
$1,5007
well
$140/day
Period of
Performance
9/14/76-
10/13/76
10/18/76-
11/9/76
1976
6/28/77-
7/7/77
9/14/76-
11/9/76
_
-------
Subsurface Barrier
The total cost of buiLding the 2,765-foot (843 m)
long barrier, excluding engineering, was $56,118, or
$20.29 per linear foot ($66.56/m). Since the depth of the
trench varied from 5 to 30 feet (1.5-9.1 m) , a more
meaningful unit measurement of the cost is that 7,313
cubic yards (5,592 m3) of trench fill were replaced with
an equal amount of bay mud, at a cost of $7.67 per cubic
yard ($10.03/ ra ) of replaced soil. Excavation of the
trench cost $18,895 for rental and operation of a track-
mounted, diesel, hydraulic backhoe and a large D-8 dozer.
Excavation of bay mud from a borrow area elsewhere in the
landfill cost $11,043 for operation of a dragline. Haul-
ing bay mud in dump trucks to the trench, and hauling
trench spoils to the Class II area cost $26,180. The cost
of backfilling the trench is included in the hauling
figure since most of the mud was dumped directly into the
trench from trucks.
Dike and Retention Basin
The total cost of building the 4,900-foot (1,494 ra)
long, two-foot (0.6 m) high dike around the Class I area,
and of building the 5-acre (2 ha) retention basin, was
$20,718. Dragline excavation of bay mud cost $2,734,
hauling cost $3,241, and basin excavation, grading, dike
construction and compaction cost $14,743, using small
dozers (D-6's and a JD-350) and a loader.
Engineering
The total cost of Cooper and Clark's engineering
services was $34,000, including $15,000 for site inves-
tigation and design of the site improvements, $15,000 for
installing ten monitoring wells in the barrier, and $4,200
for inspection and oversight during construciton.
Cost Components
The construction costs listed above are based on the
following rates for rental and operation, and on the
indicated amount of time each piece of equipment was used.
(1) Backhoe, diesel hydraulic, crawler mounted, 1.5
cubic yard (1.14 m3) capacity; 17 days, 116
hours; $10,883. ($400/day rental, $15.80/hour
operating cost, $19.40/hour labor.)
(2) D-6 Caterpillar dozer, 140 h.p.; 20 days, 160
hours: $11,062, ($295/day rental, $13.30/hour
operating cost, $18.90/hour labor.)
(3) D-8 Caterpillar dozer, 300 h.p.; 9 days, 48
hours: $8,012. ($655/day rental, $25.20/hour
operating cost, $18.90/hour labor.)
20-25
-------
(4) Dragline, 1.5 cubic yard (1.14 m ) capacity;
9,124 cubic yards (6,916 in ) : $13,777.
($1.51/cubic yard, $1.97/ m )
Q
(5) Hauling, 12-cubic yard (9.17 m ) dump trucks and
1-mile (J..6 km) round Crips; 9,124 cubic yards
(6,976 m3) bay mud, 7,313 cubic yards (4,592 raJ)
trench spoils: $29,421. ($1.79/cubic yard
$2.34/m ), including overhead and profit.)
(6) JD-350 dozer, 75 h.p.; 3 days, 234 hours: $994.
($128/day rental, $6.50/hour operating cost,
$18.90/hour labor.)
(7) Loader, tractor, wheeled, 130 h.p.; 5 days, 40
hours; $2,697. ($255/day rental, $16.65/hr
operating cost, $18.90/hour labor.)
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Based on all indications, the response activities
undertaken at Richmond Sanitary Service have been effec-
tive in controlling migration of contaminants and in
protecting public health and worker safety. By installing
a system of dikes and an underground barrier composed of
bay mud, RSS was able to take advantage of the low perme-
ability of the natural silty clays found beneath the site
to effectively control the source of contamination at a
relatively low cost. The bay mud barrier and dikes were
such logical choices for the response technology that no
other technologies received serious consideration.
Available monitoring data verifies the performance of
the barrier. As of August 1982, the results of ground-
water monitoring have not detected any leakage of contami-
nants through the underground barrier. Another indication
of the effectiveness of the barrier is the fact that the
Class I liquid waste pond began to fill up rapidly after
the barrier wall was completed. Prior to construction of
the barrier, the Class I pond was acting as an infiltra-
tion basin allowing liquid wastes to seep into the under-
lying landfill. The barrier has restricted further
infiltration.
Also, the dikes surrounding the Class I area have
generally been effective in controlling runoff and flood
waters. However, in February of 1980, there was a failure
of the dike surrounding the retention basin during an
intense rainstorm. This dike was redesigned and recon-
structed and no further problems have been reported.
20-26
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There is no information on the volume or type of
contaminants which may have been dumped outside of the
underground barrier prior to its construction and the
extent to which these contaminants may be migrating into
San Pablo Bay. However, the potential for migration into
the Bay has been greatly minimized by construction of a
second barrier around the entire perimeter of the 350 acre
(142 ha) site. This barrier was required to have a
maximum permeability of a 10 era/sec, as compared to 10
era/sec for the Class I barrier.
20-27
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-------
White, Charles A. September, 1982. Personal communications. California
Department of Health Service, Hazardous Waste Management Branch, Berkeley,
California.
20-31
-------
-------
TRAMMELL CROW COMPANY
DALLAS, TEXAS
INTRODUCTION MriJ ,
NCP reference
The Trammell Crow Company bought a 133 acre (53.2 ha)
tract of land in western Dallas for development as an
industrial park. The site had been used by the Texaco Oil
Company as a petroleum refinery and tank farm from 1915 to
1945 but had been vacant since then. Oil sludge and coke
cinders were stored on-site in five open ponds and
totalled approximately 5,000,000 gallons (1.9 x 10 1) of
sludge and 10,000 cubic yards (7,600 m ) of cinders.
Trammell Crow obtained an Urban Development Action Grant
from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
and a grant from the City of Dallas to finance part of the
infrastructure of its industrial park, which included
remedial action concerning the waste ponds. Waste kiln
dust and fresh kiln dust were used to solidify the oil
sludge and cinders and the resulting mixture was land-
filled on-site. This innovative and economical technique
was used in this instance for non-hazardous substances,
but has possible applications on EPA defined hazardous
wastes as wel1.
_Background_
The^Texaco Oil Company operated a petroleum refinery
on what is now the Trammell Crow site from 1915 to 1945.
During that period, oil sludge from tank bottoms and coke
cinders from the refinery's petroleum processing were put
into five open ponds located on the premises. After
closing the refinery in 1945, Texaco sold the property to
Rogers and Wright, a Tulsa scrap metal firm that bought
the property to salvage the tankage, piping and metal in
the refinery. After reclaiming the metal, Rogers and
Wright sold the land in 1959 to the Zale Corporation who
held the land until 1980, when Trammell Crow purchased it.
Trammell Crow knew of the oil ponds when it bought
the land. It planned to develop the site in two stages,
with the second stage involving the acreage that contained
the ponds. The Albert H. Halff Associates (Halff), a firm
of consulting engineers and scientists, was hired to
21-1
-------
design roads, water mains, sewers and surface water drain-
age for the entire 133 acre (53.2 ha) site. Halff also
was responsible for analyzing and supervising cLean-up
work. Halff took samples of the wastes and hired South-
western Laboratories, a geotechnical testing firm, to
drill soil borings and run standard soil tests. Results
of the soil tests showed that the site was underlain by a
layer of low permeability clay, a thick shale formation,
and below that a deep aquifer. Thus, the oil sludge ponds
posed a relatively minor threat to ground water. No
measured surface water pollution occurred, because the
ponds were banked and rainfall in that area was slight.
Moreover, the waste materials had weathered for over 35
years, resulting in heavy sludges with thick crusts.
Volatile substances had disappeared long ago. Extraction
Procedure (EP) toxicity tests were negative.
Synopsis of Site Response
Halff surveys showed that the open ponds contained an
estimated 5,000,000 gallons (1.9 x 10 1) of oil sludge
and 10,000 cubic yards (7,600 m ) of coke cinders, far
more than Trammell Crow's prepurchase estimates. Halff
selected what it considered to be the most effective and
economical technology: solidification and disposal in an
on-site landfill. They then planned and supervised the
entire remedial action. Acting as owner's representative,
Halff solicited bids for the work and selected H.B.
Zachry, Inc. (Zachry) as low bidder. Trammell Crow then
awarded the contract to Zachry.
Work began on April 21, 1981 with the excavation of
the landfill adjacent to a cluster of three ponds. Oil
sludge and coke cinders from four ponds were mixed with
waste cement kiln dust in the landfill, pulverized, dried
and compacted to specification. Oil sludge from the
largest pond was mixed with fresh cement kiln dust in the
pond, then transported several thousand feet to the
landfill, where the steps for mixing, pulverizing, drying
and compacting were repeated. After solidification of all
five ponds, the landfill was capped, graded and seeded.
Work was completed on September 1, 1981 and required
approximately 75 working days. The rest of the site was
then graded and a drainage system built in preparation for
construction of a large warehouse distribution facility.
SITE DESCRIPTION
The Trammell Crow site is located in the western
sector of the City of Dallas, Dallas County, Texas,
approximately 1 mile (1.6 km) southwest of the junction
21-2
-------
where the West Fork and Elm Fork become the Trinity River.
The site is situated on a 133 acre (53.2 ha) embankment
area bordered by Interstate 30 to the south and the Texas
and Pacific Railroad to the north. A stream which flows
north into the Old West Fork Channel (the channel diverted
from West Fork running parallel to the Trinity River) cuts
through the site and along the waste ponds.
The site and area surrounding it are zoned for
industrial use. To the north of the site is a Texaco
gasoline storage facility while a General Portland Cement,
Inc. plant is located to the south. East of the site are
warehouse/distribution buildings and the Texas Industries,
Inc. concrete pipe plant is to the west. A residential
area is located approximately 2,000 feet (609.6 m)
northeast of the sludge pit areas.
Surface Characteristics
Dallas County has a mild climate due to its location 300.68(e)(2)
at the northern edge of a humid subtropical belt which (i)(E)
extends into Texas from the Gulf of Mexico. There are no climate
pronounced topographic features to influence the climate,
so temperatures, precipitation, and snowfall are the
results of the combined effects of warm moist air off the
Pacific Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico and cold dry air from
Canada.
Winter temperatures average 48°F (8.9°C), and the
average daily minimum temperature is 38°F (3.3°C). The
lowest recorded temperature in the City of Dallas was 7°F
(-13.9°C) on February 1, 1971. Summer temperatures
average 84°F (28.9°C), and the average daily maximum
temperature is 94°F (34.4'C). The highest recorded
temperature for Dallas County was 111°F (43.8°C) on July
25, 1954. y
The prevailing winds are from the south producing
generally clear skies. Frequently, from the fall through
the spring, strong winds from the north rapidly sweep a
cold air mass into the area, lowering temperatures by as
much as 30°F (-1.1 °C) in 2 or 3 hours. The strongest
winds are during April, when the average wind speed is
13 miles (20.8 km) per hour.
Total annual precipitation in Dallas County is
36 inches (90 cm). The period of greatest precipitation
is April through September when 20 inches (50 cm) or
57 percent of the total falls. On the average, thunder-
storms occur 40 days per year, mostly in the spring. The
heaviest recorded rainfall for one storm was 6.01 inches
(15 cm) at Dallas on October 1, 1969. The average
21-3
-------
seasonal snowfall is 2 inches (5 cm), and the heaviest
snowfall recorded accumulated 7 inches (17.5 cm).
Relative huiridity averages about 55 percent in mid-
afternoon. It is higher at night and at dawn it averages
about 79 percent. Average daily sunshine is 75 percent in
summer and 55 percent in winter.
The surface characteristics of the site are illus-
trated in the topographic map section in Figure 1. The
site is located on a relatively flat area adjacent to a
small stream that follows the waste ponds along their
eastern and northern edges. The soil has been classified
as the Trinity-Urban land complex, which is composed of
deep, nearly level, poorly drained, dark clayey soils and
areas of urban land or flood plains. Soil borings by
Southwestern Laboratories were taken at the site in the
locations shown in Figure 2. These borings confirmed that
the surface soil is a Trinity Clay with a slope of less
than 1 percent. Trinity Clay is a moderately alkaline
soil of slow permeability (less than 0.06 inches [0.15 cm]
per hour) and high water capacity. It is frequently
flooded, has slow runoff capabilities, and a slight
erosion hazard. The clay is fine-grained and over 97 per-
cent will pass through a No. 200 sieve.
Hydrogeology
Southwestern Laboratories' geotechnical test results
revealed that the Trinity Clay extends 20 to 45 feet
(6.1-13.7 m) below the surface of the earth. Below this
is Eagle Ford shale, a predominantly dark, blue-gray
marine shale reaching a depth of approximately 400 feet
(122 m) with an average thickness of 475 feet (145 m) .
The Eagle Ford formation contains minor beds of calcareous
shale, shaley limestone, and numerous thin beds of
bentonite. Below the shale formation lies the Woodbine
Aquifer, one of the principal water-bearing beds in Dallas
County. The transition between the Eagle Ford shale and
Woodbine Aquifer is gradual; the sands of the Woodbine are
overlaid first by sandy clays and then Eagle Ford clays.
The Trinity Clay and Eagle Ford Shale formations form an
impermeable barrier between the surface and the Woodbine
Aquifer, so there is a negligible threat of ground water
contamination at the Trammell Crow site.
300.68(e)(2)(i)
(D)
hydrogeological
factors
300.68(e)(3)(ii)
extent of
present or
expected
migration
WASTE DISPOSAL HISTORY
The Trammell Crow site was originally owned and
operated by Texaco Oil Company from 1915 to 1945 as a
petroleum refinery and tank farm. When the refinery
21-4
-------
Figure 1. Toposraphic Map Section of Trammell Crow Site Location
(Source: USGS, 1973)
21-5
-------
Figure 2. Location of Soil Borings at Trammell Grow Site
(Source: Albert H. Halff Associates, Inc., April 1981.)
21-6
-------
ceased operations, the five major waste areas remained.
From 1945 to 1959 the property was owned by a firm that
had purchased the property for the purpose of reclaiming
any valuable scrap metal from the site. In 1959 after the
available metal was reclaimed, the site was sold to
Zale Corporation. Trammel1 Crow Company purchased it in
1980. At that time, Trammell Crow Company hired Halff
Associates to perform the initial site design which
included designing a method of cleaning up the five waste
ponds.
No records were available to detail what processes
were used by Texaco at the refinery or what wastes were
generated and buried in the ponds. Therefore, Halff
Associates supervised a series of field surveys, sound-
ings, and sampling and analysis procedures to determine
the size, contents, and characteristics of the waste
ponds. The five waste ponds, labeled A, B, C, D, and E,
are shown in Figure 3.
300.68(f)
remedial
investigation;
sampling and
monitoring
DESCRIPTION OF CONTAMINATION
Pond A, as Figure 3 shows, was the largest of the
five ponds, measuring 420 feet by 150 feet (128 x 46 m)
with an average depth of 9 feet (2.7 TB) . The bottom
and sides were clay, and the low permeability soil
prevented much seepage into the subsurface Trinity Clay.
The pond contained approximately 3,500-000 gallons (1.3 x
10 1) or 16,600 cubic yards (12,616 m ) of waste.
The material contained in Pond A appeared to be tank
bottoms, the residues that settle to the bottom of crude
oil tanks. As the tanks at the Texaco refinery were
cleaned, the residues were most likely placed in Pond A.
The sludge in Pond A consisted of approximately 50 percent
carbonaceous material, 35 percent water, and 15 percent
ash. A 2-inch (5 cm) crust had developed over a semi-
liquid oil/water emulsion which became thicker as it
became deeper because the density of the oil was greater
than that of the water. The carbonaceous portion of the
sludge was made up of equal proportions of asphaltenes and
paraffins. Complete chemical analyses of the oil sludge
sediments and water content from Pond A are presented in
Tables 1, 2, and 3. As Table 1 shows, the sludge was
tested using the Extraction Procedure (EP) toxicity test
to determine whether or not it was a hazardous waste by
definition under RCRA. The results show that the sludge
was below the maximum allowable concentrations as-defined
by RCRA.
300.68(e)(2)
amount and form
of substances
present
21-7
-------
Oo
Figure 3. Location of Sludge Pits at Trammell Crow Site
(Source: Albert H. Halff Associates, Inc. , 1981)
rent: TRAMMEl CKOW COMPANY, OAU*$
-------
TABLE 1. CHEMICAL ANALYSIS OF OIL SLUDGE SEDIMENT FROM POND A
Test
Moisture, %/wt.
Gross Heat of Combustion,
BTU/lb
Flash Point, TOC, °F
Total Sulfur, %/wt.
Vanadium, ppm
Ash, %/wt.
Contaminant
Arsenic
Cadmium
Chromium
Lead
Mercury
Selenium
Silver
Barium
Sediment sample (composite from three locations)
As received Dry basis
34.3
3,802
301
0.63
51
19.9
5,787
301
.96
77
30.3
EP Toxicity Tests per 40 CFR 260.0 & 260.21
Test results Maximum allowable concentrations
mg/1 of extractant mg/1 of extractant
0.42
*0.01
0.1
*0.05
*0.002
*0.01
*0.01
0.9
5.0
1.0
5.0
5.0
0.2
1.0 "I
5.0
100.0
*less than
Source: Morgan, D.S. Albert H. Halff Associates, Inc., 1982.
21-9
-------
TABLE 2. CHEMICAL ANALYSIS OF OIL SLUDGE FROM POND A
Test Pond A North End Pond A South End
Moisture content, %/wt.
Loss of heating, %/wt.
Ash content, %/wt.
Oil content, %/wt.
Gross heat of combustion,
BTU/lb
Viscosity, SFS
Asphaltene
30
35
10.5
56.0
8,316
*
26.67%
37
40
8.3
50.1
7,057
*
24.62%
*There was insufficient sample to perform the analysis
Source: Morgan, D.S. Albert H. Halff Associates, 1982.
21-10
-------
TABLE 3. WATER ANALYSIS FROM POND A
Identification: Water from south pond
pH 8.2
Conductivity 2200
mg/1
Silica
Iron
Aluminum
Calcium
Magnesium
Sodium
Potassium
Carbonate
Bicarbonate
I Sulfate
Chloride
Fluoride
Nitrate
Phosphate
Hydroxide
P-alkalinity (as CaCO?)
Total hardness (as CaCO,.)
Arsenic
Cadmium
Chromium
Lead
Zinc
Silver
Mercurv
Nickel
Boron
77.3
3.05
1.16
324
15
340
13.3
0
964
43
205
0.6
1.9 — 1
1.2
0
0
/y(j
870
0.15
* 0.01
* 0.1
* 0.05
0.07
* 0 . 0 1
* 0.01
* 0.002
0.09
* 0.1
*less than
Source: Morgan, D.S. Albert H. Halff Associates, Inc., 1982.
21-11
-------
Directly north of Pond A was Pond E. It measured 550
feet by 200 feet (152 x 61 m) with an average depth of 2.5
feet (0.76 m) . Pond B contained approximately 10,000
cubic yards (7,600 m ) of waste material.
The waste material in Pond B was a hard coke/slag
material believed to be coke cinders from the refinery
cracking process. This "clinker pit" was characterized by
a soil boring and trenching of the surface. The findings
showed that the coke material was approximately 4 feet
(1.2m) deep in the northern portion of the pit and varied
from a few inches along the edge to approximately 5 feet
(1.5m) in the center.
Ponds C, D, and E were located next to one another
along the northern edge of the Trammell Crow property.
Although they were not all the same size, each pond was
approximately 300 feet (91m) in length. Pond E was the
largest with a width of 150 feet (46 m), while Ponds C and
D were each approximately 50 feet (15 m) wide. They had
bee-n excavated almost 6 feet (1.8 m) below natural
gradient. About 1,500,000 gallons (5.7 x 10 1) of sludge
were found in Ponds C, D, and E combined.
The wastes in the three northern ponds (C, D, E) were
believed to be sedimentation pond or oxidation pond
residues. These oily sludges were approximately 4 feet
(1.2 tn) deep and were covered by a 6 to 7 inch (15 - 18
cm) layer of clean silt.
Although no significant contamination was evident at
the Trammell Crow site, the sludge from these ponds had to
be treated, removed, or both before construction at the
site could begin in order to ensure maximum and safe
development according to Texas state law.
PLANNING THE SITE RESPONSE
Initiation of Response
When the Trammell Crow Company bought this 133 acre
(53.2 ha) tract in western Dallas, it believed that only a
shallow pond of waste oil existed at the site and that it
would be easy to remove. As discussed above, subsequent
tests revealed that the shallow pond was really an oil
sludge pit about 9 feet (2.7 m) dee* that contained an
estimated 3,500,000 gallons (1.3 x 10 1). Three smaller
ponds on the property had layers of water and silt on
their surface, but underneath were found to contain about
4 feet (1.2 m) of cdl sludge, for an estimated 1,500,000
gallons (5.7 x 10 1). A fifth pond containing an
21-12
-------
estimated 10,000 cubic yards (7,600 m3) of coke cinders
was also discovered on the property.
Upon learning of the extent of wastes present on the
site and the initial estimates of the development cost,
Trammell Crow concluded that it would be economically
unfeasible to develop the site at that time. It notified
the City of Dallas of the situation and requested that the
city obtain an Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) from
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
The Dallas City Council refused in 1980, but in 1981 it
reconsidered Trammell Crow's request and decided to apply
for the UDAG. The grant was made that year. Trammell
Crow received $4,000,000 under the UDAG plus a $1,000,000
grant from the city to finance part of the construction of
the infrastructure at the site, which included remedial
action on the five ponds. The company financed the
remaining construction costs itself.
Selection of Response Technologies
Halff Associates took several criteria into consider-
consideration before selecting a remedial action. These
included cost, feasibility, environmental factors, time,
and legal implications. Before cement kiln dust solidi-
fication was chosen, 19 alternatives, including on-site
and off-site disposal methods, were investigated (see
Table 4) . Each alternative was evaluated and given a
preliminary cost estimate.
The first alternative to be investigated seriously
was oil recovery. It seemed logical that some of the
costs incurred for clean-up would be able to be recovered.
To determine whether or not the sludge had recoverable
oil, sludge samples were sent to various oil and wax
refineries. Analyses showed that the oil, bound in a
tight emulsion, would be difficult to recover using
standard techniques. Unconventional recovery techniques,
such as filtration through diatomaceous earth, produced a
maximum of 5 to 10 percent oil by weight at a cost of
$30 per barrel, a little above the current market price
for a barrel. Halff Associates concluded that the expense
of oil recovery was not worth the limited amount of oil
that could be recovered.
Next, Halff Associates compared off-site and on-site
disposal alternatives. The on-site solidification tech-
nique was found to be the most feasible, because the
sludge was classified as a Class II industrial waste under
Texas State law and therefore could not be placed in a
municipal landfill. The closest industrial waste landfill
was located on the Texas Gulf Coast, and the cost for
300.68(h)
screening
300.68(g)
development of
alternatives
21-13
-------
TABLE 4. DISPOSAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE TRAMMELL CROW SITE
Off-site disposal methods
Industrial waste landfill
Municipal landfill
Fuel in asphalt plant
Mixture in asphalt
Require Texaco to dispose of waste
Use as road oil
Oil in grass-seed mix
Sell oil to refinery
Off-site land farm
Transportation of waste to
wax recovery plant
On-site disposal methods
Open pit burn
Incineration (mobile unit)
Storage facility
On-site land farm
Landfill on-site*
Solidification*
Biological treatment plant
Incineration at permanent site
Recovery of oil and landfill
on-site*
*Alternatives that were further investigated
Source: Morgan, D.S. Albert H. Halff Associates, Inc., 1982,
21-14
-------
transporting the waste would have been $60 per cubic yard
C$45.60/m ) or $1,500,000. The on-site solidification
technique was estimated to cost $500,000 and thus was
selected as the most cost-effective procedure for
correcting the problem.
Extent of Response
Work began on May 21, 1981 and ended on September 1,
1981, for a total of about 75 working days. Clean-up
work was stopped when all of the oil sludge and coke
cinders had been solidified and landfilled and the site
graded, capped, and seeded. All work was supervised by
Halff and performed according to specifications once the
landfill closure plan submitted by Halff Associates was
approved by the Texas Department of Water Resources.
300.68(j)
extent of
remedy
DESIGN AND EXECUTION OF SITE RESPONSE
The design and implementation of the sludge solidifi-
cation technique involved extensive laboratory tests to
determine what materials in what quantities would pro-
duce the most stable compound when mixed with the sludge.
Several factors had to be taken into account before Che
solidification materials and remedial design were chosen.
These included mixing, solidification, and compaction
characteristics; availability; cost, knowledge of percent
moisture to avoid leaching; compatibility with Trinity
Clay; and distance maintained from utility lines.
With these criteria in mind, Halff Associates began
solidification testing using various local materials.
These materials included on-site clay, sulfurs, cements,
fly ash, fresh cement kiln dust, stale cement kiln dust*
quick lime, waste quick lime, limestone screenings, sand^
and various combinations of these materials. As Table 5
shows, the least expensive solidification additives were
waste cement kiln dust at $4.50 per ton ($4.08/Mt.) and
cement kiln dust at $6.75 per ton ($6.12/Mt.) (these costs
include transportation). The waste cement kiln dust is
known as stale dust because it has been stockpiled in
cement manufacturers' quarries and exposed to the ele-
ments, so it has retained moisture. As Table 5 shows, the
stale dust is in abundant supply because it was believed
that the moisture content would hinder its effectiveness
as a solidifying agent. Therefore, initial testing by
Halff Associates did not include testing the stale kiln
dust. Fresh kiln dust could only be obtained in limited
supplies, because it had become a commonly used solidi-
fying agent. Demand for this material had increased to
such a great extent that rights to the fresh dust had been
300.68(h)(3)(i)
detailed
analysis of
alternatives
21-15
-------
TABLE 5. COST AND AVAILABILITY OF SOLIDIFICATION ADDITIVES
Product
On-site clay
Sul fur
Cement
rly ash
Cement kiln dust
Waste cement kiln dust
(38% moisture)
Quick lime
iJaste quick lime
(41% moisture)
Limestone screenings
Tons per
cu . yd
1.28
-
1.27
1.0
0.54
0.75
0.34
0.55
Cost
per ton*
$ 0**
70.00
($63.50/Mt.)
69.00
($62.60/Mt.)
16.79
($15.23/Mt.)
6.75
($6.12/Mt.)
4.50
($4.08/Mt.)
65.00
($58.97/Mt.)
12.50
($11.34/Mt.)
7.92
($7.18/Mt.)
Availability
Abundant
Delivery problems
Abundant
Abundant
Limited supply
Abundant
Abundant
Abundant
Abundant
*Delivered to site
**Exclusive of drying and grinding that would not have been cost-effective
Source: Morgan, D.S. Albert H. Halff Associates, Inc., 1982.
21-16
-------
claimed prior to its production. Even though supplies of
fresh dust were limited, initial tests included it as a
viable solidifying agent.
Preliminary testing conducted by Halff Associates
included a procedure to measure the compressive strength
of various mixtures of sludge and solidifying agents. The
compressive strength test was as follows:
1. Twenty-five grams of sludge were mixed with a
predetermined amount of drying agent.
2. Combinations of drying compound and oil sludge by
weight were tested in the following ratios:
0.5:1.0, 1.0:1.0, 1.5:1.0, 2.0:1.0, and 2.5:1.0.
3. The drying compound and oil sludge mixtures were
each stirred until thoroughly mixed and lightly
compacted to eliminate large voids.
4. The samples were each compacted 1 hour later by
pressing the blunt end of a soil test pocket
penetrometer into the mixture 10 times.
5. The soil test pocket penetrometer was then
pressed into the mixture and the unconfined
compressive strength was measured in tons per
cubic foot.
6. The sample was loosened and the test was repeated
24 hours later and again 1 week later.
The results of these preliminary tests, presented in
Table 6, show that several of the materials solidified the
oil sludge effectively while others were less effective.
On-site clay, while most readily available, was not
effective when wet. It was an effective solidifying agent
when dried and pulverized. The strength tests on the dry
clay after one hour were moderately strong. The wet soil,
on the other hand, did not solidify to a satisfactory
strength. Therefore, the moisture content of the soil
appeared to be an important factor.
Neither crushed limestone nor sand proved to be good
solidifying agents, as shown in Table 6. Both materials
are_very large grained and did not solidify because the
grains became coated with oil.
Mixtures of cement with dry sand and wet sand were
both tested as solidifying agents. The cement and dry
sand showed poor compaction, dryness, and lack of
21-17
-------
TABLE 6. SOLIDIFICATION TEST RESULTS PERFORMED BY
ALBERT H. HALFF ASSOCIATES, INC.
Nl
i—*
I
i—'
00
Cost
>er
ton
($)
8.50
17.00
25.50
34.00
42.50
3.53
6.75
9.53
Compound
Fly ash*
Fly ash
Fly ash
Fly ash
Fly ash
Kiln dust
Kiln dust
Kiln dust
Ratio
CHPDjoil
0.5:1
1.0:1
1.5:1
2.0:1
2.5:1
0.5:1
1.0:1
1.5:1
Strength (tons/ft3)
1 hr. 24 hr. 1 «eek
_
1.75
2.6 2.45
2.85 2.50
2.00 2.50
2.15 2.40
1.50 3.00*
1.40 2.25 2.70
Description
Conditions af"ter approximately 1 week
Too wet; never tested; thrown out
very black; moist; compacts well; stays
tight
Black; moist; compacts; scrapes easily
dark brown; slightly moist; compacts;
scrapes easily
Brown; very slightly moist; compacts;
falls apart
Black; moist; compacts well; very
cohesive
brown; slightly moist; compacts;
slightly cohesive
Light brown; very slightly moist;
compact; not cohesive
(continued)
.
**Sr,i! w-ia dried and pulverized before raixin* with emuUion.
-------
TABLE 6. (continued)
N3
I—"
I
Cost
per
ton
<$>
13.50
19.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
3.96
7.92
Compound
Kiln dust
Kiln dust
Soil*,**
Soil**
Soil**
Soil**
Soil**
Crushed
limestone
Crushed
limestone
Ratio
CMPD;oiL
2.0:1
2.5:1
0.5:1
1.0:1
1.5:1
2.0:1
2.5:1
0.5:1
1.0:1
•i
Strength (tons/ft )
1 hr. 24 hr. 1 week
2.20
-
-
0.75
2.20
2.65
3.30
-
-
2.10
-
-
1.85
3.20
3.35
3.60
-
-
1.5
-
-
2.40
3.40
3.35
3.4
-
-
Description
Conditions after approximately 1 week
Light brown; relatively dry; does not
compact
Too powdery
Too wet; never tested; thrown out
Black; moist; compacts well; cohesive
Dark brown; not moist; compacts;
slight cohesion
Brown; not moist; compacts;
crumbles easily
Light brown; dry; compacts;
crumbles very easily
Too wet; never tested; thrown out
Too wet; never tested; thrown out
*Hot enough sample for accurate strength test.
**Soil was dried and pulverized before mixing with emulsion.
(continued)
-------
TABLE 6. (continued^
|SJ
K-
I
o
Cost
per
ton
(?)
11.88
15.84
19.80
5.75
11.50
17.25
23.00
28.75
Compound
Crushed
limestone
Crushed
1 imeatone
Crushed
limestone
Kiln dust ,
fly ash
Kiln dust ,*
fly ash
Kiln dust ,
fly ash
Kiln dust,
fty ash
Kiln dust ,
fly ash
Ratio
CHPO;oil
1.5:1
2.0:1
2.5:1
0.5:1
1.0:1
1.5:1
2.0:1
2.5:1
Strength (tons/ft3)
1 hr.
-
-
-
-
-
2.1
2.45
3,20
24 hr. 1 week
-
-
1.30
-
1.25
2.65
4^0
3.75
-
3.25
3.35
1.75
3.2
2.5
2.15
2.25
Description
Conditions after approximately 1 week
Too wet; never tested; thrown out
Black; slight raoist; compact;
slightly; cohesion
Black; slight moist; compact
slightly set but does crumble
Black; very moist; compacts well;
very cohesive
Black; moist; compacts well;
cohesive
Brown; slight moist; will compact;
slight cohesion
Light brown;dry; tough to compact;
crumbles
Light brown; powdery; tough to compact;
crumbles
.
*Hot enough sample for accurate strength test.
(continued)
-------
TABLE 6. (continued)
to
I
ro
Cost
per
ton
($)
74.00
108.50
177.50
74.00
108.50
177.50
53.10
Compound
Dry sand,
cement
Dry sand,
cement
Dry sand,
cement
Wet sand,**
cement
Wet sand ,
cement
Wet sand,**
cement
Sand, sulfur
Ratio
CMPD;oil
5:0.5:1
5:1.0:1
5:2.0:1
5:0.5:1
5:1.0:1
5:2.0:1
5:0.5:1
Strength (tons/ft3)
1 hr. 24 hr. 1 week
1.20
1.85
2.25
1.5
1.75
2.6
1.2
1.25
1.75
2.95
4.50
4.50
4.50
1.5
1.25
1.70
1.70
4.5
4.5
4.5
1.7
Description
Conditions after approximately 1 week
5:0.5:1 Black; dry; does not compact
well; crumbles
5:1:1 Brown; dry; poor compaction;
does not hold
5:2:1 Light brown; dry; poor compaction;
not cohesive
5:0.5:1 Black; dry; set; crumbly
5:1:1 Dark brown; dry; set; difficult to
break
5:2:1 Gray; dry; set; crumbles easily
5:0.5:1 Black; moist; compacts; cohesive
(continued)
*Sand vaa dried before it was added to the mixture.
Wet sand mixtures with cement set so the sample was not broken and re-compacted for the 24-hour and week
tests.
-------
TABLE 6. (continued)
ro
I
NJ
Cost
per
ton
($)
311.50
583.50
108.50
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
3.45
6.90
Compound
Sand, sulfur
Sand, sulfur
Sand, water,
cement
Wet soil
Wet soil
Wet soil
Wet soil
Wet soil
Cement
Cement
Ratio
CMPD;oil
5:1.0:1
5:2.0:1
5:0.5:1:1
0.5:1
1.0:1
1.5:1
2.0:1
2.5:1
0.05:1
0.1:1
Strength (tons/ ft3)
1 hr. 24 hr. 1 week
1.75
2.25
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1.95
2.65
4.5
-
-
0.5
0.5
1.55
-
-
2.2
2.5
4.5
3.1
3.25
3.55
3.0
4.0
-
0.6
Description
Conditions after approximately 1 week
5:1:1 Black; slight moist; compacts;
crumbles
5:2.1 Brown; slight moist; compacts;
slight cohesion
Black; oily; solid; very strong; rigid
Black; moist; compacts; cohesive
Black; slightly moist ; compacts;
cohesive
Black; slightly moist; compact; slightly
cohesive
Black; slightly moist; compact; crumble
Dark brown; dry; compact; crumble
Black; moist; not compacted well;
paste- like
Black; moist; compact; very cohesive
(continued)
-------
TABLE 6. (continued)
Cost
per
ton
($>
13.60
13.60
27.20
54.40
16.60
6.45
6.68
3.00
3.68
7.36
14.72
Compound
Cement
Sulfur
Sulfur
Sulfur
Sulfur,
kiln dust
Cement ,
kiln dust
Lime,
kiln dust
Kiln dust
Lime
Lime
Line
Ratio
CMPDjoil
0.2:1
0.05:1
0.10:1
0.20:1
0.05:0.5:1
0.05:0.5:1
0.05:0.5:1
0.5:1
0.05:1
0.10:1
0.20:1
Strength ( tons/ ft )
1 hr. 24 hr. 1 week
-
-
-
-
-
0.60
1.65
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1.0
3.25
3.10
0.90
-
-
.70
2.3
-
-
-
2.4
-
-
2.55
0.70
1.60
-
Description
Conditions after approximately 1 week
Black; slightly moist; compact; cohesive
Black; very thick fluid
Black; very thick fluid
Black; paste-like
Black; slightly moiat; compact; slight
cohesion
Black; slightly moist; compact; cohesive
Black; slightly moist; compacts;
cohesive
Black; slightly moist ; compacts well;
cohesive
Black; moist; compact; cohesive
Black; moist; compact; very cohesive
Black; slight moist; compact; cohesive
(continued)
Source: Morgan, D.S. Albert H. HaIff Associates, Inc., 1982.
-------
cohesion. Mixed together, cement and wet sand formed a
strong, concrete material that solidified quickly. One
disadvantage of this mixture was that it could not to be
broken up and re-compacted.
Other mixtures which were tested included lime,
sulfur, and cement. These were combined in small ratios of
each material to sludge ranging from 0.05, 0.1, and 0.2
parts of lime, sulfur, or cement to 1.0 part oil sludge.
Although these compounds formed cohesive mixtures, they
did not solidify well. They were paste-like, moist, and
remained soft for 2 days.
Kiln dust and fly ash were the most effective
solidifying agents, as they solidified at low mixing
ratios and could be broken up and re-compacted. A 50:50
mixture of kiln dust and fly ash was also tested. This
compound solidified the sludge well at lower ratios of
kiln dust and fly ash to oil. At higher ratios of kiln
dust and fly ash to oil, such as 2.0:1.0 and 2.5:1.0, the
mixtures became powdery, easily crumbled, and were
difficult to compact.
Halff Associates analyzed the results of these tests
and determined that cement kiln dust and dried clay were
the most feasible materials to use for the solidification
process. Once this determination was made, these
compounds had to be tested more extensively. Halff
Associates directed Southwestern Laboratories to conduct
further testing of various mixtures of clay, soil, kiln
dust, and oil. At the same time, Halff Associates began a
search for large supplies of cement kiln dust.
The results of Southwestern Laboratories' solidi-
fication tests are shown in Table 7. The compounds that
were tested using clay as a solidifying agent demonstrated
very high linear shrinkage. For an 8.0:1.0 ratio of clay
to sludge, the linear shrinkage was 13 percent. Insta-
bility of solidified sludge in a large mass, such as at
the Tramraell Crow Site, would not be acceptable.
Cement kiln dust was mixed with the sludge at a
3.0:1.0 ratio. As Table 7 shows, Southwestern Labora-
tories tested this cement kiln dust/sludge mixture twice.
The first mixture yielded a compressive strength of
2,210 psf and showed no linear shrinkage. The second test
shewed a compressive strength of 3,030 psf (3.01 x
10 Pa) . Therefore, it can be assumed that cement kiln
dust mixed, with sludge at a 3.0:1.0 ratio will produce a
strong, stable compound. As the results in Table 8 are
examined more closely, it is apparent that the kiln dust
showed little to no linear shrinkage and a low to zero
21-24
300.68(i)(2)(C)
constructibility
-------
TABLE 7. PRELIMINARY SOLIDIFICATION TESTS BY SOUTHWESTERN LABORATORIES
I
Ni
Ul
Dry
Mixture Moisture density
description content (pcf )
Clay
Clay, sludge
(8:1)
Kiln dust , sludge
(3:1)
Clay, kiln dust, sludge
(5:4:2)
Clay, ktln dust, sludge
(6:2:3)
Clay, hyd rated lime,
sludge (13:1:3)
Kiln dust, sludge
(3:1)
Clay, kiln dust, sludge
(3:3:2)
Kiln dust, clinker
(1:3)
Clay, quick line,
Kiln dust, sludge
(10:1:33)
Clay, quick lime, sludge
(13:1:3)
Clay, sludge
(1 C.Y.:60 gal)
(field test)
Clay, kiln duat, sludge
(3:3:2)(Field test)
20
17
21
22
18
16
20
23
11
23
17
29
19
93
92
81
93
93
92
82
86
65
61
87
SI
81
Atterberg Limits
LL PL PI
55
46
41
43
40
27
-
48
51
45
45
53
45
23
21
40
41
39
28
-
47
48
40
46
38
35
32
25
1
2
1
-
-
1
3
5
-
15
10
Linear
shrinkage
I
14
13
0
0
0
0
-
1
2
3
0
10
4
Corapressive
strength
(paf)
4,650
3,810
2,210
4,980
1,345
2,670
3,030
3,220
3,930
4,730
5,820
4,070
5,030
Source: Morgan, D.S. Albert H. Halff Associates, Inc., 1982
(continued)
-------
TABLE 8. CHEMICAL COMPOSITION OF FRESH CEMENT KILN DUST
Compound
CaO
Si°2
A12°3
Fe2°3
MgO
Na2°
K2°
so3
Miscellaneous
Percent by weight
53.8
17.2
5.5
2.4
0.9
2.2
3.1
4.4
10.5
Source: Morgan, D.S. Albert H. Halff Associates, Inc., 1982.
21-26
-------
plasticity index. The kiln dust combined readily with the
sludge so that a mixture of fair strength could be tested
within 1 hour. The kiln dust/sludge mixture increased in
strength as the material cured, and did not crumble after
being submerged in water for 24 hours. At ratios other
than 3.0:1.0, linear shrinkage was observed and
compressive strength decreased.
Quick lime (calcium oxide or CaO) and hydra ted lime
(calcium hydroxide or Ca(OH).), were tested by South-
western Laboratories as solidifying agents with various
combinations of clay, kiln dust, and sludge. The quick
lime reacted with the water in the sludge to instantly
combine with and dry the sludge. The roost desirable ratio
of quick lime to oil is 0.15 to 0.3 parts of quick lime to
1.0 part of oil. Quick lime, however, is expensive
($65.00 per ton or $58.97/Mt.) and would only be econom-
ical if used in smaller amounts to decrease the moisture
content and linear shrinkage of a soil/sludge mixture.
Hydrated lime was mixed with clay, sludge, and kiln
dust so that the ratio of clay to hydrated lime to sludge
to kiln dust was 10:1:3:3. The compound formed had a
compressive strength of 4,870 psf (4.84 x 10 Pa) and
showed no linear shrinkage. This reduction in the linear
shrinkage combined with a reduction in the plasticity
index are factors that make hydrated lime a better solidi-
fying agent than cement kiln dust. The hydrated lime
however, was at least as expensive or more so than the
quick lime, and would most likely be added to a cement
kiln dust/sludge mixture in small amounts to improve the
shrink-swell characteristics of the solidified mixture.
Once these preliminary tests were conducted, Halff 300.68(j)
Associates determined that the most cost-effective and cost-
technically feasible solidification agent was the cement effectiveness
kiln dust. Because of a large demand for fresh kiln dust,
the supply was limited. Therefore, Halff Associates
decided to have Southwestern Laboratories perform the same
solidification tests using waste cement kiln dust and
waste quick lime. These materials were both stockpiled in
cement manufacturers' quarries and had been exposed to
atmospheric conditions. Once water from the atmosphere
came into contact with the waste kiln dust, the powdery
waste cement kiln dust turned into a crumbly limestone
(CaO or quick lime) and the CaO reacted with water to form
Ca(OH) or hydrated lime. Southwestern Laboratories had
tested fresh hydrated lime and quick lime and found them
to be worthwhile as solidifying agents, but restrictive in
cost.
21-27
-------
Waste quick lime was tested to determine the percent-
age of avai lable CaO, because the CaO reacts with water
and produces steam and Ca(OH)2. The chemical reaction is
written as:
CaO + HO—- »-Ca(OH) + heat.
This chemical reac tion quickly dried the oil sludge.
Therefore, the previous tests by Southwestern Laboratories
confirmed this using fresh cement kiln dust and quick
lime. The fresh cement kiln dust contained approximately
50 percent CaO, while the quick 1 ime contained approxi-
mately 85 percent CaO. Although these non-waste materials
had produced excellent solidifying results, they were
expensive. Therefore, Halff Associates decided to test
the waste cement kiln dust and waste quick lime to
determine how effective they would be.
The waste quick 1 ime contained approximately 50 per-
cent CaO. When mixed with the sludge, the waste quick
lime had excellent adsorption characteristics, was water
repellant, was eas ily compacted, and produced a stable
fill. The waste quick lime was available for $12.50 per
ton ($11.34/Mt.)
The waste cement ki In dust was also sampled and
tested by Southwestern Laboratories. The sample which was
used contained 41 percent moisture prior to mixing. When
the sludge was mixed with the waste cement kiln dust
sample, the resulting compound contained 55 percent mois-
ture. The mixture after 24 hours was 45 percent moisture
and maintained a compressive strength of 5,200 psf (5.16 x
10 Pa) . The waste cement kiln dust showed excellent
stabilization and solidification characteristics. The
cost of the waste cement kiln dust at the time of testing
was $4.50 per ton ($4.08/Mt.) and the local supply was
abundant.
Southwestern Laboratories' tests confirmed that the
best solidifying agents for the oil/sludge mixture at the
Tramrae 11 Crow site were either cement kiln dust, quick
lime, hydrated lime, waste cement kiln dust, waste quick
lime, or a combinat ion of some or all of these agents.
The final determination of the solidifying agents best
suited for this site was made based on cost and avail-
ability of materials.
The most inexpensive materials were the waste cement
kiln dust ($4.50 per ton or $4.08/Mt.) and the fresh
cement kiln dust ($6.75 per ton or $6.12/Mt). The fresh
cement kiln dust produced the best results using small
ratios of dust to oil at 1.0:1.0 or 1.5:1.0 parts dust to
21-28
-------
oil, while the waste cement kiln dust produced a suitable
fill material when mixed with the oil at a 2.0:1.0 or
3.0:1.0 dust to oil ratio. Although the fresh cement kiln
dust was difficult to obtain in large quantities, some was
available locally. Gifford-Hill, Inc. owns a large cement
manufacturing plant, in Midlothian, Texas approximately 30
miles (48 km) southwest of Dallas. The Gifford-Hill plant
had some fresh cement kiln dust available and a large
stockpile of stale kiln dust that they were willing to
se,ll. Gifford-Hill could only supply 138 cubic yards (105
m ) or 33 tons (30 Mt.) of fresh kiln dust per day (an
average of three 25 ton (23 Mt.) cement transport trucks
full). Because of the limited supply of fresh kiln dust
and large supply of stale kiln dust available, Halff Asso-
ciates decided to use a combination of fresh dust and
stale dust.
Conservative estimates for the total quantity of dust
needed were based on a ratio of 3 parts dust to 1 part
oil, assuming that the majority of the bulking agents
would be stale dust and that the best solidification once
in the field would require a 3.0:1.0 ratio of dust to oil.
By using this ratio of stale and fresh dust, enough dust
would be available from Gifford-Hill on an as-needed
basis.
The total amount of sludge to be solidified was
estimated at 5,000,000 gallons (1.9 x 107 _1) of oil, the
equivalent of 25,000 cubic yards (19,000 m3) of sludge at
a density of approximately 1 ton per cubic yard. At the
3:1 dust to oil ratio, the estimated amount of kiln dust
needed for solidification was 75,000 tons (68,039 Mt.).
The projected cost for the kiln dust alone was $300,000.
In addition, an on-site landfill for the solidification
process and resulting solidified sludge was designed to be
5.5 acres (2.2 ha) on the surface and 12 feet (3.7 m)
deep. Labor costs for the solidification and excavation
were estimated at $200,000 or $500,000 for the entire job.
Once Halff Associates had determined that the oil
sludge solidification by cement kiln dust was a viable
solution and the Trammell Crow Company accepted this
alternative, a closure plan was filed with the Texas
Department of Water Resources. The closure plan outlined
the solidification process and the proposed on-site
landfill for disposal of the solidified sludge. The 5.5
acre (2.2 ha) landfill was to be located in the area con-
taining sludge ponds C, D, and E (see Figure 3) to avoid
odor problems related to the moving and mixing of the
sludge. No odor problems were discovered. There were
standing orders left with Halff Associates by the City of
Dallas to shut down the project if high winds were present
300.68(j)
cost effective-
ness
300.68(i)(2)(B)
detailed cost
estimation
300.68(i)(2)(E)
analysis and
mitigation of
adverse
environmental
impacts
21-29
-------
that might disperse the kiln dust. High winds did not
occur, so the project did not have to be halted at any
time.
After the closure plan was accepted by the State of
Texas, Halff Associates acted as design engineer and
construction supervisor on behalf of Trammell Crow Company
for the implementation of the solidification and disposal
process. With Trammell Crow Company's approval, Halff
Associates combined the solidification and disposal
process with the overall site grading and drainage that
was necessary for the entire Traramell Crow development
project. Halff Associates held a preconstruction meeting
for prospective contractors to explain the sludge
solidification process. The combined contract was awarded
to the low bidder, H.B. Zachry Company of San Antonio,
Texas.
The Zachry Company carried out the oil sludge
solidification process on the smaller ponds before
proceeding to Pond A. Figure 4 illustrates the sludge
solidification and disposal method in engineering drawings
prepared by Halff Associates. These drawings were used to
describe the process to prospective contractors. The
first step was to excavate the southern portion of the
sludge disposal pit adjacent to Pond C to a depth of 12
feet (3.7 m) . As the sludge was excavated from the pond
in small portions, the pit was filled in with stale kiln
dust and the mixture compacted. By testing a small
portion at first, the field engineers could determine how
the process was working under actual conditions and the
equipment operators could get an idea of what quantities
of sludge and dust their equipment was capable of handling
most readily. Hence, the exact ratios of kiln dust to oil
that had been determined in the laboratory were not
necessarily valid in the field. As long as the solidi-
fication process and compaction yielded appropriate
results the exact ratios were not necessary nor were they
able to be determined as both fresh and stale dust were
used together. Therefore, an overall ratio of 1.5 parts
kiln dust to 1.0 parts oil was determined for the entire
project. The solidification process, which began on
May 21, 1981, is described in the following steps:
1. The sludge disposal pit was excavated up to the
edge of Pond C.
2. Stale cement ki In dust was delivered to the
bottom of the excavated pit in 25 ton (23 Mt.)
truckloads.
3. The kiln dust was leveled by a bulldozer into a 6
to 12 inch (15 - 30 cm) layer.
21-30
300.70(b)(2)-
(iiO(C)
solidification
-------
TM( IW4TE dl SIUP<5E IN PONP*
•»••£'*ND 'P- MUST 0G S0LIP1NED
*NP STOCKPILE P TO ALLOW THE
PKTOSAL PIT TO BE
' MTMENT FO
FOIf ITEM • 9
•UNCLASSIFIED ore* fXCA
SLUPOE DISPOSAL.' WILL BE BASED
ON me CEos9-HAT<:nEp ABBA
TYPICAL SECTION
DESIGNATED SLUDGE DISPOSAL AREA
AT THE ENP or EtCH wotrcwti PAT.
THE coHifAcicK WIIL ee HELP
ec«raM*iBLe rot MI DtcnAKQt
or OIL OK eoNUMiMATeo i»»rei»
INTO NAIUK41 Xtief COVIKt*
I. 5L(IP6t WILL PC MIXEP IVIIft K'LM Pl>5T IN THE RATIO
Of J «MBT5 KILN DUST TO 1 «HT SLUMt BT WEIOHT
r. me OPTIMUM wowruee CONTENT OP THE MI* H«* BECM
FOUND TO BE 46% BY MUTI-tHE^TEKN LABS, WITH A «TANP
PPOCTOR PFM4HY UF 62 (b/fu Ft ( OS* ION9/tf )
]. TElAL MIXES OF }:l KILN PU$T/«LUEtiE *MOW » MOI$TUKE
CONTENT IMMEDIATELY AFTE* MMINa Of **'/'.
* KEOweeo FIELP COMPACTION WrLl. BE 96 K OF STANPARP
PB(JCTOR PENtlTY . BBOUieEP UNCONriNCP COMPBE«lve
^TffENQTH iv I LI BE 50OO lB/*d FT
5 TMC MIXEP 5LUPOE I* TO BC *PEBAP AMP IMPACTED AT
OEf'liMATED flEEA IK 6-If CH LITTS . PROOF KOLLIN<3
WILL BE BtaurlteP AFTER EVEKY 2FEET OF FILL.
PISPOSAL ABBA
Figure 4. Proposed Sludge Disposal Method
Source: Albert H. Halff Associates, Inc., 1981.
-------
4. The oil sludge was removed from the ponds by a
backhoe and placed on top of the kiln dust in the
disposal pit.
5. The kiln dust and sludge in the disposal pit was
mixed by a bulldozer into 1 foot (0.30 m) layers.
6. A pulverizing mixer was then driven over each 1
foot (0.30 m) layer to completely homogenize the
mixture.
7. Each layer of dust/sludge mixture air dried for
approximately one day.
8. Each layer was compacted to a specified density
and field tested to ensure proper compaction.
This procedure was foliowed until all of the oil
sludge from the waste ponds C, D, and E had been emptied
and solidified in the on-site landfill. The old ponds
were engulfed by the landfill.
For the largest sludge pit, Pond A, the solidifi-
cation process was modified, since the sludge was more
liquefied and the pond itself was several thousand feet
from the on-site landfill. Because of its more liquefied
nature, the sludge was solidified using both fresh and
stale kiln dust. The procedure for solidifying the sludge
from Pond A incorporated the same layering process used
for the three smaller ponds, however, the sludge was
treated prior to placement in the on-site landfill. The
procedure used for solidifying the sludge from Pond A was
as follows:
1. Fresh cetnent kiln dust was blown into sludge Pond
A.
2. The fresh dust was mixed into the sludge by a
backhoe (this semi-solidified the sludge).
3. The semi-solidified sLudge was loaded into a -40
cubic yard (3,040 m ) belly dump truck and
transported to the on-site landfill.
4. The semi-solidified sludge was dumped into the
landfill and onto a bed of stale kiln dust.
5. The semi-solidified sludge was mixed in the same
manner as outlined for the three smaller Ponds C,
D, and E.
21-32
-------
As each side of Pond A was excavated the pond was
backfilled with clean soil until all of the sludge had
been removed and solidified in the on-site landfill. The
coke/slag material was removed from Pond B and mixed in
with the sludge in the on-site landfill. Pond B was then
backfilled with soil.
In order to ensure the quality of compaction, density
tests were performed daily during the solidification
process. The results of some of these tests are listed in
Table 9. Proctor density tests were run in a laboratory
and the results indicated that the 3.0:1.0 kiln dust to
oil mixture would have a Proctor density of 73.9 pounds
per cubic foot (1,182 kg/m ) with an optimum moisture
content of 33.8 percent. Based on the Proctor density
tests, a compaction density of approximately 64 pounds per
cubic foot (1,024 kg/m ) was considered to be the minimum
acceptable density. As Table 9 shows, the actual
densities of the compacted layers were -.between 70 and 80
pounds per cubic foot (1,120-1,280 kg/m ); well above the
acceptable minimum of 64 pounds per cubic foot (1 024
, / -* \ i r \)
kg/m ).
The solidification process was completed by September
1, 1981 c^: within 75 working days. Five million gallons
(1.9 x 10 1) of sludge were disposed of at an average of
66,700 gallons (252,487 1) per day using approximately
41,000 tons (37,195 Mt.) of cement kiln dust. This was
much less than the 75,000 tons (68,039 Mt.) of kiln dust
originally projected because the dust solidified with the
sludge better in the field than in the laboratory. There-
fore, the project cost only $377,527.10 as opposed to the
estimated $500,000. This is much less than the off-site
disposal alternative which would have cost $1,500,000.
Once the solidification process was completed a layer
of soil from 3^to 5 feet (0.9 - 1.5 m) was placed over the
on-site landfill to ensure adequate capping. The entire
site was then completely graded and seeded with grass.
Unfortunately, the grass seed was planted too late in the
year and did not grow. However, the site was naturally
seeded and is now covered with wildflowers and weeds.
Presently, the site is adequate for building and is await-
ing future development within the Trammell Crow industrial
park.
300.70(b)(l)(ii)
(A)
surface seal
300.70(b)(l)(ii)
grading;
revegetation
21-33
-------
TABLE 9. SOLIDIFIED OIL SLUDGE KILN DUST FIELD DENSITY TESTS
Date
5/22/81
5/22/81
5/22/81
5/22/81
6/11/81
6/11/81
6/11/81
6/23/81
6/23/81
6/23/81
7/10/81
7/10/81
7/10/81
8/21/81
8/21/81
8/21/81
Field
moisture
(%)
36.5
37.5
35.2
35.4
35.2
40.4
41.4
30.7
28.7
34.4
36.0
35.8
34.2
33.3
37.2
36.2
Field
density
Clbs/cu.ft.)
79.0
78.2
81.6
81.2
75.2
71.2
74.7
77.9
74.3
74.9
72.3
73.3
73.4
74.9
74.1
74.4
Optimum
moisture
(%)
33.8
33.8
33.8
33.8
33.8
33.8
33.8
33.8
33.8
33.8
33.8
33.8
33.8
33.8
33.8
33.8
Proctor
density
(Ibs/cu.ft.)
73.9
73.9
73.9
73.9
73.9
73.9
73.9
73.9
73.9
73.9
73.9
73.9
73.9
73.9
73.9
73.9
Percent
density
106.9
105.8
110.4
109.9
102.2
96.2
101.1
105.4
100.5
101.4
97.8
99.2
99.3
101.4
100.3
100.7
Source: Morgan, D.S. Albert H. Halff Associates, Inc., 1982.
21-34
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COST AND FUNDING
Source of Funding
The solidification and landfilling costs were paid
in part by Traramell Crow and in part by the HUD and
Dallas grants. However, the amounts that these sources
contributed toward disposal costs cannot be given, because
the grants subsidized the total infrastructure cost.
Selection of Contractors
Albert H. Halff Associates
Trammell Crow hired Albert H. Halff Associates of
Dallas, Texas to design roads, sewers and surface water
drainage for the entire 133 acre (53.2 ha) site. Halff
also was responsible for analyzing disposal alternatives,
designing the remedial action plan, submitting government
applications, monitoring the site, and supervising the
clean-up work. Trammell Crow hired Halff based on prior
work and reputation.
H.B. Zachry Company
To save time and reduce costs, Halff recommended to
Trammell Crow that the oil sludge solidification and
disposal work be included in the grading and drainage
contract for the site. Traramell Crow agreed. Acting as
owner's representative, Halff solicited bids for the work
and held a preconstruction meeting to inform potential
bidders about the solidification procedures. H.B. Zachry
Company, of San Antonio, Texas was selected as low bidder.
Although it had considerable experience with road and
building construction, Zachry had never done this type of
waste disposal. One reason contributing to Zachry's low
bid ^ was the fact that it had most of the required heavy
equipment available nearby.
Project Costs
Engineering Feasibility Study-Solidification and Disposal
Halff' s fee was based on a percentage of the con-
struction costs. The total fee cannot be determined
because construction is still in progress at the site and
the^percentage used was not disclosed. However, the firm
estimated that the portion of its fee attributable to its
engineering feasibility study regarding solidification and
disposal was $50,000. The available construction cost
information relates directly to solidification and
disposal of the sludge (see Table 10). Included are the
costs for loading the kiln dust, transporting it to the
site, excavating, capping and grading the landfill, and
manpower and equipment used to process the mixture of
21-35
300.68(c)
responsible
party
-------
TABLE 10. SUMMARY OF COST INFORMATION- TRAMMELL CROW COMPANY, DALLAS, TX.
Task
Loading
waste klLn
dust
Transport Ing
w.iate kiln
dust
Transporting
fresh kiln
dust
Excavation
of disposal
landfill,
capping and
L.ibor and
C'(|U Ipmi'lU CO
process
Subtotal
Engineering
feas. D!I ty
study so . Id-
Hlcatlun &
disposal
TOTAL
Estimated
Quantity
75,000 tons
(68,039 Ht.)
Actual
Quant Itv
29,435 tons
(26, 703 Ml.)
29,407 tons
(26,678 Ht.)
11,532 tons
(10,461 Ht.)
64,740 cu.yds
(49,500 cu.m.)
40,939 tons
(37,139 ML.)
Estimated
Expenditure
$500.000(o)
Actual
Expenditure
$14,717.50
$104,394.85
$69,192.00
$97,110.00
$92,112.75
$377,527.lO(d)
$50,000(e)
$427,527 .10(d)
Variance
$122, 472. 9C
Unit Coat
$0.50/ton
(S0.55/ Mt.)
53.55/ton
($3.91/Mc.)
$6. 00. ton
($6.61/Mt.)
$1.50/cu.yd.
($1.96/cu.m)
$2.25/ton
($2. US/Ml.)
Funding
Source (a)
Trammcll
Crow
Trammcll
Crow
Trammell
Crow
Trammell
Crow
Trammell
Crow
Trammell
Crow
Trammell
Crow
Period of
I'erform.ince
4/21/81-
9/1/81
r-j
i—'
I
(a) portion of funds provided by UDAC
and City of Dallas grant
(b) coat Is for kiln duat aa delivered
to site, which Includes coat of
purchasing kiln dust.
(c) does not Include engineering fee paid
to Albert II. 1'nlff Associates, Inc.
(d) does not include bonua of $34,061.00 paid
to H.B. Zachry Co.
(e) estimate by Albert H. Halff Associates, Inc.
SOURCE: Morgan, D.S. Albert H. Halff Associates, Inc.,ilo82
-------
sludge and dust. Halff Associates calculated both total
and unit costs for each activity as part of its planning
and supervisory work.
The key to controlling costs for this remedial action
was the amount of kiln dust required. With the exception
of excavation of the landfill, the cost of each remedial
activity was directly affected by the tonnage of kiln dust
involved. Consequently, the costs of these activities
could be controlled by limiting the amount of kiln dust
used. Halff took advantage of this situation by inserting
an interesting provision in the contract with Zachry: the
contractor was paid a bonus of $1 per ton ($0.907/Mt.) for
each ton of dust not used in the solidification process.
This reversed the economic incentives for Zachry, from
using as much kiln dust as possible to maximize loading,
transportation and processing charges to using as little
as possible to cut its costs and earn the bonus. Regard-
less of the amount used, the solidification process had to
conform to Halff's workplan and the results had to meet
Halff's specifications for mixture and compaction.
Because the solidification technique worked better in
the field than the laboratory, only 40,939 tons (37,139
Mt.) of kiln dust were used, only 55% of the original
estimate of 75,000 tons (68,039 Mt). This is about a
1.5:1.0 ratio of dust to sludge, rather than the 3.0:1.0
ratio originally estimated. Reduced tonnage resulted in a
total cost of $377,527.10, compared to an estimated cost
of $500,000. Zachry received a bonus of $34,061, while
Trammell Crow had the job done for $88,411.90 less than
estimated. Even when the bonus is figured as part of the
cost of solidification, this only totals $411,588.10,
which is less than one-third of the cost of off-site
disposal, which was estimated to be $1,500,000.
Capping, Grading and Seeding; General Drainage Work
The contract with Zachry included within the same
category the tasks of excavating the disposal landfill,
capping it and grading it, as well as general site
preparation such as construction of the building pads and
drainage channel. Zachry bid the entire category of work
at $1.50 per cubic yard ($1.15/mJ). The cost of seeding
was not included in Zachry's bid and no data on this item
are available.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The remedial action that was taken at the Traramell
Crow site entailed detailed and innovative design and
implementation. These observations are made after
21-37
-------
visiting the site, viewing a videotape of the actual
solidification process, and discussing the remedial action
with representatives of Halff Associates, TrammeLl Crow
Company, and the Texas Department of Water Resources. Not
only did Halff Assoc iates devise a method to correct the
problem of the sludge ponds on the property, but also they
implemented a plan which recovered the land for further
use in a cost-effective, timely, and novel manner.
Because this remedial action was a voluntary planned
response with no strict time constraints, Halff Associates
was able to thoroughly investigate all of the alternatives
which were available for remediation. Halff Associates
recommended the corrective action for this particular site
only after carefully evaluating all of the options avail-
able, keeping in mind the interests of their client and
government regulations. Once preliminary tests showed
solidification to be a viable alternative, Halff Asso-
ciates performed extensive tests to determine the best
solidification materials based on technical stability,
cost, and supply. Halff Associates then took this one
step further when determinations found that the best
sol id ification material, fresh cement kiln dust, was in
short supply. They tested to see whether or not a
material such as waste kiln dust, originally believed to
be ineffective, would indeed be effective. The results
show that this was indeed worthwhile.
The Trammell Crow Company and Halff Associates showed
responsibility and cooperation in this remedial action.
Care was taken to ensure that the appropriate Federal,
state, and local officials were contacted and that the
work performed at the site was acceptable at each level.
Once it was determined that the waste oil was not EP toxic
and did not fail within the limits of RCRA, Halff
Associates maintained close communications with the Texas
Department of Water Resources and the City of Dallas
Health Department to ensure that the Class II wastes were
handled correctly and that the solidification process
posed no threat to human health or the environment. Prior
to the sol id i f ic a t i on and remova 1 o f the was te oil from
the sludge ponds, numerous carcasses of dead waterfowl
were found along the banks of the sludge. With the
removal of these ponds, this threat to local and migrating
waterfowl is no longer present.
From a technical perspective, the site is stable and
ready to be developed. The solidification technique
worked better in the field than in the laboratory. It is
impossible to tell by looking at the site that the solidi-
fied on-site disposal area contains oil sludge material
21-38
-------
and that the capped area, formerly Pond A, contained oil
sludge.
One area of potential concern is the long-term
stability of the solidified sludge. It is not possible to
determine whether or not the kiln dust and sludge will
indeed remain intact. Perhaps some type of monitoring or
sampling could be conducted periodically to determine
whether or not there is any actual leaching from the
on-site landfill.
Another area of potential concern is the former Pond
A, now a capped site. The site is graded over and the
soil cover rises above ground level approximately 6 inches
(15 cm). On top of the cap was quite a bit of water which
had remained after a heavy -rain. The water did not
evaporate quickly, nor did it drain readily. Upon closer
examination, it was concluded that there was no need to go
to the expense of further drainage of this area because
there is no apparent threat to percolation of contaminants
reaching the Woodbine aquifer, as the clay layers are
impermeable. Secondly, the site will have to be graded
and drained prior to construction, at which time any
puddles of water will be removed.
If these puddles do persist for long periods of time
between rainfall, and construction is not imminent, then
improvement of the site drainage would be prudent. Other-
wise, the solidification and capping at the site are
effective.
The Trammell Crow site is an example of a remedial
action in which careful planning and investigation of
numerous alternatives led to a successful clean-up. This
action not only corrected a problem waste site, but turned
it into one with potential for an economic return.
The scientists and engineers at Halff Associates are
convinced that the technique used at the Trammell Crow
site is applicable to many oil sludge sites where the
waste is hazardous by definition under RCRA. Addition-
ally, the concept that a substance not yet proven (stale
kiln dust in this case) may be worth trying on a proven
process is one that should be considered more often by
industry. Therefore, it is important for decision makers
to realize that the techniques now known for remedying
hazardous waste sites are by no means the only techniques
that will prove successful.
21-39
-------
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Albert H. HaLff Associates, Inc. August 9, 1982. Case Study Site Visit Made
to Albert H. Halff Associates, Inc., and Trammell Crow Site. Personal
visit with Dr. Albert H. Halff, Mr. Patrick Jolly, and Mr. Jim Pritchard of
Albert H. Halff Associates, Inc., Dallas, TX.
Albert H. Halff Associates, Inc. April 1981. Contract Documents, Specifica-
tions and General Conditions of Agreement for Site Grading, Street, Channel
Excavation, and Oil Sludge Solidification in Turnpike Distribution Center,
Phase II, Dallas Texas Trammell Crow Company No. 60. Albert H. Halff
Associates, Inc., Dallas, TX.
Albert H. Halff Associates, Inc. 1981. Assorted Engineering and Site
Diagrams of Turnpike Distribution Center for Trammell Crow Company,
Dallas, TX.
Dallas Geological Society. December 1965. The Geology of Dallas County.
Symposium on Surface and Subsurface Geology, Gravity, Physiography,
Underground Water Supply, Economic Geology and Engineering Geology of
Dallas County, Dallas, TX.
Eubanks, Don. September 27, 1982. Personal Communication. Texas Department
of Water Resources, Austin, TX.
Morgan, David S. September 1982-January 1983. Personal Communication.
Albert H. Halff Associates, Inc., Dallas, TX.
Morgan, David S., Jose I. Novoa, and Albert H. Halff. August 1982. Solidifi-
cation of Oil Sludge Surface Impoundments with Cement Kiln Dust (draft
pending publication). Albert H. Halff Associates, Inc., Dallas, TX.
Morgan, David S. April 1982. Surface Impoundment Cleanup. Waste Age.
13:99-102.
Myers, J. Marc. August 9, 1982. Case Study Site Visit to Trammell Crow
Company, Dallas, TX.
Soil Conservation Service. February 1980. Soil Survey of Dallas County, TX.
U.S. Department of Agriculture in Cooperation with Texas Agricultural
Exper iraent Stat ion.
21-40
-------
UNIVERSITY OF IDAHO
MOSCOW, IDAHO
INTRODUCTION NCP
References
A chemical waste disposal site located on
University of Idaho (Ul) property in Moscow, Idaho (see
Figure 1) was used from 1972 to 1979 for disposal of
various chemical wastes from the university campus.
Concern over the site was prompted by the City of
Moscow's proposal to sink a new municipal well about 800
feet (244 m) away from the site. When the City applied
to the state Department of Health and Welfare (DHW) for
a permit to sink the well, DHW denied the permit because
of the lack of information about the possible threat of
ground water contamination from the hazardous
chemicals. DHW further stated that the proximity of the
hazardous waste dump to the university1s existing wells
located approximately 300 feet (91 m) from the site
jeopardized the approval status of the university's
water system. The disposal site (shown in Figures 1-3)
consisted of 11 trenches located on a small hillside.
At the time of site closure in 1979, the site contained
approximately 10 to 15 tons (9-14 Mt) of pesticides,
acids, mixed solvents, and miscellaneous laboratory
wastes.
Background
In 1975, the Environmental Protection Agency
approved a chemical waste dump constructed by the
University of Idaho for disposal of miscellaneous wastes
from campus laboratories and physical plant opera-
tions. About 10-15 tons (9-14 Mt) of wastes were dumped
into 11 backhoe-dug trenches in an 80 by 40 foot (24 by
12 m) fenced in area (Figure 3). The disposal site was
located on campus agricultural land adjacent to a nearby
shopping center (Figure 2).
22-1
-------
Figure 1. "Former Disposal Site Location, University of Idaho,
Moscow
FORMER DISPOSAL
SITE LOCATION
»i •..•t_==.-=j' m- v \
J. lt^^-; •^V>^
mSiitf^r^ -
22-2
-------
Figure 2. Former Disposal Site and Supply Well Locations
ORMER DISPOSAL SITE
of I
SUPPLY WELL
U of \E
WELL
PROPOSED CITY
WELL
—=^
PALOUSE EMPIRE MALL
SEWAGE
PLANT
22-3
-------
Figure 3. Monitoring Wells and Trench Location
#7
Fence
#11
*
#10
#12
\
N
Trench
area
#9
Gat'e
#2
#1
22-4
-------
The City of Moscow had planned to locate a new city
water well some 800 feet (244 m) away from the site, but
was denied approval by DHW based on the lack of informa-
tion about possible ground water contamination from the
dump site. Furthermore, because two university wells
were also located approximately 300 feet (91 m) from the
site, DHW determined that the approval status of the
university's water system was in jeopardy. In order to
clarify approval status of the university's well and to
secure approval for the municipal well, DHW requested a
study to address the geology and ground water conditions
at the dump site and surrounding vicinity.
^ynopsis of Site Response
A testing program was entered into jointly by the
university and the city in response to DHW's request for
a hydrogeological study. Environmental Emergency
Services Inc. (EES) was hired to drill test wells and
report the soil conditions, including the probability of
migration beyond the site. EES reported a very limited
and minor migration (discussed in "Description of
Contamination" section), but recommended that the
chemicals be removed before drilling a new well. The
University of Idaho decided to proceed with excavation
of the buried chemicals and contracted with EES for the
excavation and removal of chemicals and contaminated
soil. EES excavated a total of 817 cubic yards (625
m ). The contaminated material was taken to an approved
disposal facility at a site near Arlington, Oregon,
owned by the State of Oregon and operated by Chem
Security Systems, Inc. The land was back-filled with
clean fill by the University of Idaho, and was
cultivated with an alfalfa crop.
Surface Characteristics
Moscow, Idaho (population 16,513) is situated west
of the Bitteroot Mountains in northwestern Idaho
bordering with Washington, 75 miles (120 km) southeast
of Spokane, Washington. Moscow is at an elevation of
2,550 to 2,650 feet (777 to 808 m). The average
temperature ranges from a high of 83.4 degrees F (28.5
C) in July to a low of 22.1 F (-5.5C) in January. On
the average there are 11 days per year with temperatures
reaching 90 F (32.2°C) or higher and only 3 days when
the temperature falls to 0 F (-17.8 C) or below.
Relative humidity is highest in the winter months
ranging from 65 to 80%. The humidity is lowest in the
summer months ranging from 25 to 75% with afternoon
values 25 to 40%. Damaging winds are infrequent but do
occasionally occur with thunderstorms during the winter
months. Winds usually range 12 miles (19 km) per hour
300.65(a)(4)
discovery
300.68(f)
remedial
investigation
300.68(f)
assessing the
use of source
control remedial
action
300.68(e)(2)
(i)(E)
climate
22-5
-------
or less. The greatest frequency of fog, low visibility
and low clouds is during November through February.
Average snowfall each season is 53.2 inches (135 cm)
most of which occurs in the winter and spring. Average
annual precipitation is 22.21 inches (56.4 cm). The
disposal site itself is situated at a slight slope on a
50 foot (15 m) hilltop at an elevation of approximately
2600 feet.
Hydrogeology
The following description is drawn from a report
made by a consulting geologist to the City of Moscow.
The area in the vicinity of the disposal site is 300.68(e) C2)
underlain by a large thickness of mostly basalt (i)(P)
overlying a granitic basement rock. The basalt and hydrogeological
intercollated sediments form the primary aquifers for factors
the cities of Moscow and Pullman. Wind blown silt or
loess overlies the basalt, resulting in a low
permeability of the soil, since loess has a uniformly
low hydraulic conductivity. The driller's log from the
university well describes the geologic material some 300
feet (91 m) from the disposal site. This data indicates
that basalt was first intercepted 11 feet (3.4 m) below
land surface. Given that the basalt level is fairly
even in the immediate vicinity of the disposal site, the
depth to basalt at the disposal site would thus be about
60 feet (18.3 m). The elevation at the top of the
university well is about 2560 feet (780 m); at the top
of the hill, 2610 feet (796 m). The University well is
drilled to a depth of 747 feet, deriving water from
depths greater than 600 feet (183 m) with a static depth
to water greater than 200 feet (61 m). Thus the depth
to water below the disposal site is 600 feet (183 m) .
WASTE DISPOSAL HISTORY
The University of Idaho chemical waste dump was
used for the disposal of chemicals from 1972 to 1979.
Approximately 10 to 15 tons (9-14 Mt.) of chemical
wastes were disposed of into 13 foot (4 m) deep
trenches, which were dug with a backhoe. The disposal
site consist of 11 trenches contained within a 80 by 40
foot fence (24 by 12 m). UI records indicated that
large volumes of organic solvents, herbicides,
insecticides, pesticides, and inorganic chemicals had
been indiscriminately deposited within the cells. The
trenches were unlined, and many of the containers in
which chemicals were stored had ruptured and leaked
contaminants in the trenches. In addition it is highly
probable that the mixing of chemicals within the
trenches altered the compounds to substances other than
22-6
-------
those recorded on the UI disposal sheets. A complete
inventory of the waste was kept by the Safety Control
Officer and turned over to the state of Idaho.
In 1979 the site was closed, and an alternate
disposal method was arranged for at an off-site approved
facility. The City of Moscow had been denied approval
by DHW for a proposed well to be located some 800 feet
(244 m) from the site. The DHW further determined that
the proximity of the site to UI' s water system
jeopardized the university's approval status of and
requested a complete hydrogeological study of the
problem by the university.
DESCRIPTION OF CONTAMINATION
EES carried out a testing program from May 27 - 30,
1981 to determine the extent of migration of chemicals
that were buried at the site. As shown in Figure 3,
thirteen test wells were drilled at various locations in
the area of the site, and soil samples were analyzed
using a uniform testing system. The results of all
tests performed were below detectable limits for each
contaminant with the exception of copper and arsenic.
The unusual elevation for these two elements was
attributed to the lubricant used on the drill itself.
The lubricant was shown to have been made of a copper
material with an arsenic component.
Table 1 shows the results of EES's soil test
analysis for each of the four groups used to screen for
persistent compounds. Thirteen multi-level monitoring
wells were drilled with screen ranges of 6 feet (1.8 m)
to 38 feet (11.6 m) . The four groups of contaminants
tested for were divided as follows.
Group 1. Organic phosphorous pesticides—This group
includes Class A poisons; compounds which
are extremely toxic but relatively short
lived. Detectable level, less than 1
ug/g-
Group 2. Heavy metals—This group includes lead,
copper, mercury, and arsenic. These
materials do not degrade and can be
expected to migrate through water.
Detectable level, less than 1 ug/Kg.
Group 3. Chlorinated pesticides—In addition to
pesticides, this group includes
phenoxyherbicides and PCBs. Detectable
limits, 1 ug/kg.
300.68(f)
sampling and
monitoring
22-7
-------
TABLE 1. RESULTS OF SOIL SAMPLES TAKEN PRIOR TO EXCAVATION
Sample #
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Group 1
bdl
bdl
bdl
bdl
bdl
bdl
bdl
bdl
bdl
bdl
bdl
bdl
bdl
Group 2 (mg/kg)
Hg Cu Pb As
bdl 9.7 bdl .9
bdl 7.4 bdl .9
bdl 6.6 bdl .6
bdl 6.8 bdl .9
bdl 7.7 bdl .9
bdl 6.4 bdl .8
bdl 5.6 bdl .6
bdl 4.7 bdl .7
bdl 6.0 bdl .9
bdl 6.7 bdl .9
bdl 8.6 bdl 1.0
bdl 5.4 bdl .8
bdl 6.3 bdl .5
Group 3
bdl
bdl
bdl
bdl
bdl
bdl
bdl
bdl
bdl
bdl
bdl
bdl
bdl
Group 4
bdl
bdl
bdl
bdl
bdl
bdl
bdl
bdl
bdl
bdl
bdl
bdl
bdl
Key: bdl- below detectable limits
Hg- Mercury
Cu- Copper
Pb- Lead
As- Arsenic
Source: Environmental Emergency Services, "Report on
Site Investigation at the Old UI Chemical Waste
Deposit Site," June 3, 1981.
22-8
-------
Group 4. Solvents—This group contains carbon
tetrachloride and benzene, in addition to
other suspected solvents. Phenols were
also added to this group at the request of
the State of Idaho. Detectable limits,
less than 1 ug/Kg.
With the exception of copper and arsenic
contamination, which was determined to be an artifact of
the lubricant used on the drill, all contaminants were
shown to be below detectable limits. In addition,
although data on contaminant levels was presented in
terms of detectable limits and not drinking water
standards, the EES report indicated that chemical
concentrations were also below safe drinking standards,
with the exception of copper and arsenic for the same
reason as previously mentioned. In order to remove any
possible future threat of migration of chemicals, EES
recommended that the hazardous waste be excavated and
removed from the site.
PLANNING THE SITE RESPONSE
Initiation of Response
Concern over the site was prompted when the City of
Moscow was denied approval by DHW to sink a new city
water well some 800 feet (244 m) from the site. In a
letter of April 17, 1981, DHW requested the University
of Idaho to arrange a study to "address the geology,
soil characteristics, topography, and ground water flow
at the dump site and surrounding vicinity." This
information would then be used to determine the safety
of both the university wells and the proposed city
well. The University responded by soliciting proposals
from EES and two other firms for soil testing and clean-
up. Time considerations were given a high priority in
order to minimize further delay in sinking the new
municipal well.
Selection of Response Technologies
The response alternatives considered by UI were:
(1) complete removal of contaminated soil, and (2)
encapsulation of the site. Encapsulation of the site
would involve installing an impervious cap over the site
with layers of sand, PVC liners and crushed rock. This
option would have been only a temporary measure which
would only postpone ultimate removal of the soil. The
University of Idaho determined that complete waste
removal was in the best overall interests of all the
parties concerned. Although DHW was prepared to accept
some alternative plan for waste containment, UI made a
300.68(e)(2)
source control
remedial
action
300.68(g)
development
of alternatives
22-9
-------
decision for complete removal based on several
factors: the possible threat of future migration of
chemicals to the water supply, the detrimental future
impact that the buried materials might have on the
development of the property by the university, and the
cost of continued monitoring that would be necessary
without complete removal.
Given UI' s goal of complete waste removal, the
appropriate remedial technology was excavation,
transportation, and disposal of chemicals and
contaminated soils. On June 8, 1981, UI signed an
"Hazardous Substance Excavation and Removal Agreement"
with Environmental Emergency Services, The parties
contracted to:
• remove the soil at the site to a depth of 13 feet
from the original grade (estimated 600 to 900
cubic yards (459 to 688 nT);
• to transport all excavated soil to Chem Security
Systems in Arlington, Oregon for disposal; and
• to take soil samples from the bottom and sides of
the excavation as are necessary to determine that
the hazardous waste materials do not remain.
Extent of Response
From July 18 to 25, 1981, approximately 817 cubic
yards of chemicals waste, contaminated soils, and debris
were excavated from the UI site. The site was excavated
to an undetermined depth, exceeding 13 ft (4 m), and 25
cubic yard (19 m ) dump trucks were used to transport
the contaminated material to an approved dump site in
Arlington, Oregon operated by Chem Security Systems and
owned by the state of Oregon. The resultant pit was
divided into grids from which soil samples were taken.
When the digging was stopped, the soil concentration of
each hazardous substance was less than 10 ug/g, which
was the interim drinking water standard for 2,4 - D at
the time. The EES report to UI made on August 21, 1981
provided the following conclusion: "Although evidence of
contamination still exists, the levels are relatively
minor and represent no danger to nearby water sources.
The concentrations of contaminants found represent an
insignificant volume of material which will most likely
remain bound in the soil until it ultimately degrades."
Table 2 shows the results of soil samples taken
following the excavation as reported by EES to UI on
August 21, 1981. The City of Moscow built the water
well, and the disposal site is now covered with an
300.68(h)
initial
screening of
•alternatives
300.68(j)
extent of
remedy
22-10
-------
TABLE 2. RESULTS OF SOIL TAKEN FOLLOWING EXCAVATION
(ug/g)
Ident.
#1
#2
#3
#4
#5
#6
#7
#8
#9
#10
#11
Cu
5.0
5.5
5.1
6.0
5.4
5.1
5.1
9,6
5.7
6.7
9.8
As
1.0
1.1
1.0
1.6
1.7
1.5
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.9
Hg
ND*
ND
ND
ND
ND
ND
0.24
0.62
0.26
1.2
1.5
Pb
ND*
ND
ND
ND
ND
ND
ND
ND
ND
0.5
0.4
Chlorinated
Ionic
ND*
ND
ND
2.0(2,4-D)
ND
ND
ND
0.4(2,4-0)
ND*
ND
0.1(2,4-0)
Pesticides
Chlorinated
Non- ionic
ND*
ND
ND
5.8 (DDT)
0.2 (dieldrin)
0.8 (aldrin)
5.1 (dieldrin)
ND
0.8 (DDT)
ND
ND
2.0 (dieldrin)
1.1 (DDT)
0-P (b)
ND*
ND
ND
(trace)
(a)
ND
ND
ND
ND
ND
ND
ND
Cu = Copper
As * Arsenic
Hg = Mercury
Pb - Lead
(a) Disyston found to be present
but could not be quatititated.
* Minimum detectable limit =0.1 mg/kg
except lead =0.2 mg/kg
ND= None Detected
(b) organophosphate pesticides
22-11
-------
alfalfa crop which 3 harvests a year which are used for
cattle feed. Although the Idaho Department of Health
and Welfare had informed the university there is no need
for^ futher monitoring of any of the test wells, the
monitoring wells are still maintained and are available
for field lab experience by hydrology classes on
campus. Students can gain experience in testing in
ground water contamination, and at the same time provide
frequent inexpensive monitoring.
DESIGN AND EXECUTION OF SITE RESPONSE
The basic components of the remedial action are
listed and described in the following sections. The
response action at this site was straight forward and
without complication.
Sampling, Testing, and Analysis
The first part or Phase I of the remedial action
involved drilling a series of 13 test holes and taking
soil samples at various depths. The samples were
analyzed by a certified laboratory using EPA approved
procedures. Soil samples were taken from depths ranging
from 6 feet to 38 feet (1.8 - 11.6 m) and at locations
agreed upon by EES and UI. The drilling took place from
May 27 to May 30, 1981. Samples were analyzed to
determine the occurrence of any gross migration of
chemicals or possibility of such migration which might
affect the drilling of the proposed water well on UI
property. The samples were analyzed specifically for
the hazardous materials listed by the University of
Idaho in the request for proposal. The tests were not
designed to test for the presence of naturally occurring
elemental materials inherent in the soils. The
suspected chemicals were divided into four groups to
screen for long lived toxic compounds associated with
hydrophopic and hydrophilic leachate materials. Results
of these tests are given in the "Description of
Contamination" section. All four groups were shown to
be below detectable limits with the exception of copper
and arsenic in the heavy metals group. The elevated
levels for copper and arsenic were determined to be
erroneous due to contamination from the lubricant used
on the drill itself. Gross migration of chemicals
beyond the boundaries of the site was not found.
Excavation, ^Transportation, Disposal
In accordance with the Excavation and Removal
Agreement, EES excavated 817 cubic yards (625 m ) of
chemicals and contaminated soils from July 18 to 25,
1981. Soil removal was accomplished with a Caterpillar
300.70(b)(l)
(ii)(D)
revegetation
300.68(f)
remedial
investigation
300.70(c)(2)
(i) removal
of contaminated
soils
22-12
-------
30 ft (9 m) arm backhoe with a 2 cubic yard (1.5 m^)
bucket. The contaminated soil was placed in 25 cubic
yard (19 m ) dump trucks that had been lined and made
water tight. The trucks were then covered and sealed
after loading. The contaminated materials were then
transported to Chem Security Systems in Arlington,
Oregon for disposal. This is an approved facility owned
by the State of Oregon. The contract provided that all
work be done in accordance with federal and state
regulations.
Post-Excavation Soil Analysis
Following the excavation, 11 soil samples were
taken from predetermined locations within the resulting
pit. The results of these tests are presented in the
"Extent of Response" section, showing relatively minor
levels of remaining contamination. This follow-up soil
analysis was done in accordance with the contract signed
between EES and UI.
The pit was backfilled by the university with clean
fill taken from a construction site on campus. The site
is now covered with an alfalfa crop.
COST AND FUNDING
Source of Funding
The total cost of Phase I of the remedial action—
the initial sampling testing, and analysis—was shared
equally by the University of Idaho and the City of
Moscow, providing $9119 each for a total of $18,237.
Phase II cost $156,660 and was paid for entirely by UI
out of the facilities capital improvement fund.
Selection of Contractors
On May 14, 1981, UI formally requested proposals
from three companies for site clean-up and testing of
soil in the vicinity of the site. The request for
proposal specified that costs for excavation, loading,
transport, and disposal shall be quoted on a cubic yard
(ra ) basis, and costs for the initial report on soil
conditions be quoted on a lump sum basis. Environmental
Emergency Services of Portland, Oregon was chosen
because it had both the lowest estimate and technical
qualifications. EES estimated the excavation would
involve removing 600 to 900 cubic yards (459 to 688 m )
and quoted a price of $192 per cubic yard ($147/nr).
The Phase I estimate was originally $13,435 but was
increased to $18,237 to accommodate UI requests to
increase test hole depth, take additional soil samples,
300.70(c)
off-site
transport
for secure
disposition
300.62(a)
state role
in response
22-13
-------
and perform additional contaminant testing. The
contract for Phase I was signed on May 28, 1981. The
contract for Phase II was signed on July 8, 1981.
Project Costs
The total cost of the Moscow clean-up was
$174,897. Precise cost breakdown of each of the clean-
up elements is not possible because of the lump sum and
cubic yard (m ) basis on which costs were estimated and
billed to the university. The $192 per cubic yard
($147/m ) included the entire volume of activities in
Phase II, totalling $156,660. Table 3 summarizes the
cost information for Phase I and II. One invoice was
submitted for each phase simply providing totals for the
work completed.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The streamlining of this particular clean-up
benefited from the cooperation between federal, state,
and university officials. The full range of response to
the site was accomplished in 3 /2 months, from April
17, 1981 when DHW denied a permit to the City of Moscow
for a new well to August 3, 1981 when DHW pronounced the
area safe for future activity. The work done by
Environmental Emergency Services was accomplished within
the contractual time frames and was highly regarded.
Delays in the response action were avoided due to the
willingness of the University of Idaho to pay for the
clean-up. The City of Moscow proceeded with construc-
tion of the new water well.
22-14
-------
TABLE 3. SUMMARY OF COST INFORMATION FOR MOSCOW, IDAHO
Task
Test In)1,,
Drilling, ami
sampl 1 t\K of
contaminated
soil (l'h.is« I)
Excavation,
Transportation,
and disposal
Total
quantity
—
817 cu.
yards
(625 m3)
Mst i ma led
Expenditure
$18,237
3192/c.u.yd
($251/m3)
Actual
Expend I turi'
$18,237
$156,660
$174,897
Variance
0
0
Unit Cost
—
$192/cii. yd.
Kundlnt; Source
City of Musrow:
Univ. of Idaho:
Univ. of l.l.ilio
Perl oil of
Performance
May 27-
.Inne 3.1981
t'xcav.i t Ion ,
t ran^porta-
l Ion disposal
July 1H-23,
1'JHl
Tina) soil
submit 1 od
AUR. 21.19H1
ho
ro
I
— ; Not Applicable
-------
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Environmental Emergency Services Company, Portland, Oregon.
"Proposal for Removal and Disposal of Hazardous Materials Located
on the Campus of the University of Idaho," sumbitted to to Don A.
Amos, University of Idaho.
Foch, Daryl F. June 2, 1981. State of Idaho Department of Health
and Welfare, Boise, Idaho. Letter to Arnie Bromberg, University
of Idaho.
Grupp, Carol. May 14, 1981 University of Idaho Office of Financial
Affairs. Letter to Ted L. Terrel, Morrisen - Knudsen Company,
Boise, Idaho.
Grupp, Carol. November 12, 1982. University of Idaho Office
of Financial Affairs. Letter to James Werner, Environmental Law
Institute.
Grupp, Carol. August 20, 1981. University of Idaho Office of
Financial Affairs. Memorandum to Record, "EES Chem-Site Waste
Haul Manifest Audit."
"Hazardous Substance Excavation and Removal Agreement,"
July 8, 1981. Signed by Enviromental Emergency Services and
University of Idaho.
Hopkins, John G.L. June 8, 1981. Environmental Emergency
Services Co., Portland, Oregon. Letter to Carol Grupp,
University of Idaho Office of Financial Affairs.
Koch, Daryl. August 3, 1981. State of Idaho Department of Health
Welfare, Boise, Idaho. Letter to Carol Grupp, University of
Idaho Office of Financial Affairs.
Ralston, Dale. May 20, 1981. Consultant in Hydrology, Moscow,
Idaho. Memorandum #8 to Gary Presol, City of Moscow and Carol
Grupp, University Idaho.
Roberts, Keith C. August 6, 1981, August 21, 1981. Environmental
Emergency Services. Letter to Carol Grupp, University of Idaho
Office of Financial Affairs. Co., Portland, Oregon
22-16
-------
Roberts, Keith C. May 18, 1981. Environmental Emergency Services
Co., Portand Oregon. Letter to Don A. Amos, University of Idaho.
Roberts, Keith C. May 20, 1981, June 3, 1981. Environmental
Emergency Services, Portland, Oregon. Letter to Carol Grupp,
University of Idaho Office of Financial Affairs.
Stawski, John, April 17, 1981. State of Idaho Department of
Health and Welfare, Lewiston, Idaho. Memorandum to Carol Grupp
and Arnie Broberg, University of Idaho Office of Financial
Affairs.
"Testing Agreement #1 for Hazardous Substance Determination,"
May 28, 1981, signed by Environmental Emergency Services and
University of Idaho.
22-17
-------
-------
VERTAC CHEMICAL CORPORATION
JACKSONVILLE, ARKANSAS
INTRODUCTION
The Vertac Chemical Corporation owns and operates an
herbicide manufacturing plant in Jacksonville, Arkansas.
On-site disposal of chemical wastes and^ discharges of
process wastewater over a thirty year period resulted in
contamination of soils, ground water and surface waters by
several substances, most notably dioxin, in excess _of
Federal and state levels. Administrative and judicial
orders have required the company to undertake five dis-
tinct remedial actions to date, and have required Vertac
to submit studies of on-site and off-site contamination
which may necessitate further remedial action. Although
remedial action at this site may not be complete, and some
cost and engineering details are not available regarding
this private clean-up, a large portion of the work has
been done and sufficient information is available for this
case study.
Background^
The Reasor-Hill Company purchased the site in ques-
tion from the U.S. Government in 1948. The Government had
used it for a munitions factory in the 1930's. Reasor-
Hill owned it from 1948-1961 and built a plant to formu-
late the insecticides DDT, aldrin, dieldrin and toxaphene.
During the 1950's, it also began producing the herbicides
2,4-ot 2,4-5-T; and 2,4,5-TP ("Silvex"). The Hercules
Chemical Corporation purchased the plant site in 1961 and
continued manufacturing the same products. In 19b7-iyb8,
Hercules produced "Agent Orange," a 2,4,5- T/2,4-D mix-
ture, for the Government. From 1971 to 1976, Hercules
leased the plant to the Transvaal Corporation, a
subsidiary of Vertac, Inc. Transvaal resumed production of
2,4-D and intermittently produced 2,4,5-T. Transvaal
purchased the property from Hercules in 1976. In 19/8,
Vertac, Inc. underwent a Chapter XI bankruptcy reorganiza-
tion and ownership of the site was transferred from
Transvaal to the new company, Vertac Chemical Corporation,
which is the present owner. Contamination of soil,
surface water and ground water has resulted from the
23-1
NCP Reference
-------
storage and disposal of process chemical wastes at this
site between 1948 and 1979.
Synopsis of Site Response
Remedial actions have been completed at five major
areas on the Vertac site to date. The Reasor-Hill land-
fill area was capped with clay, covered with soil, and
seeded. Clay barrier walls were installed on three sides,
leaving the downgradient side open. The Hercules-
Transvaal landfill was also capped with clay, covered with
soil and seeded, but had no barrier walls at the time of
this study. The former above-ground storage area was
capped, covered with soil and seeded; the old drums were
repacked and placed along with new drums in a roofed
storage warehouse. Two-thirds of the blow-out area, where
spills from reactor vessels had occurred was paved with
asphalt while the remaining portion was capped with clay,
covered with soil and seeded. Extensive remedial work was
performed on the equalization basin, which pre-treated the
plant's^process wastewater. Vertac dewatered the basin,
solidified its sludge with lime, installed clay barrier
walls around it, a French drain downgradient from it, and
placed a clay cap, topsoil, and seed over it. The company
then constructed an above-ground treatment system to
replace it. Before and throughout the site response,
extensive monitoring of soil, ground water and surface
water has taken place, including 15 test pits, 42 test
borings, 39 piezometers, and 19 ground water monitoring
wells. In addition, numerous samples were taken from
surface soil, surface water and sediments on and off the
site. Further, Vertac was directed by a Consent Decree to
have an independent consultant conduct studies of both
on-site and off-site contamination and report on the
effectiveness of the completed remedial actions.
SITE DESCRIPTION
The Vertac site is located in northwest Jacksonville,
Arkansas, approximately 20 miles (32 km) northeast of
Little Rock. The facility is about 93 acres (37 ha) in
size. As Figures 1 and 2 show, the site is bounded to the
east by Marshall Road and the Missouri-Pacific Railroad to
the west. The northern boundary is an old artillery
booster line. Adjacent to the site to the south is a
housing development. Rocky Branch Creek flows along the
western edge of the site and the East Branch is located to
the east of the site. A cooling pond, formed by construc-
tion of an earthen dam across Rocky Branch, is located
along the western edge of the site. Rocky Branch flows
into Bayou Meto approximately 2 miles (3.2 km) south of
23-2
-------
V Lake Dupree
\. I .•
Figure 1. Topographic Section of Vertac Site Location
Source: USGS, 1975.
23-3
-------
l/l T]
O H-
C 0
fit ft
H1 •-(
pt rt
O (U
3 O
oo
to
C/l
p.
ft
ro
OJ
I
-------
the Vertac site. The entire site is fenced in with the
main gate facing Marshall Road.
Surface Characteristics
The Vertac site is located in Pulaski County,
Arkansas. The topography of Pulaski County (see Figure 1) 300.68(e)(2)
does not have a major influence upon the climate. Cli- (i)(E)
matic conditions are caused by exposure to all of the climate
North American air mass types. Air which moves downslope
from the higher elevations may be slightly warmer at lower
elevations. Because of the lifting effect transmitted to
moist air by local ridges and mountains, there is slightly
more rainfall at higher elevations.
Winters are basically mild and relatively free of
severe cold. The daily winter temperature averages at
41 °F (5°C). January is the coldest month and a low of
10 °F (-12°C) occurs frequently. The lowest temperature
ever recorded in Pulaski County was -13°F (-25°C) in
February 1899. Annual snowfall averages 5.7 inches (14.3
cm) per year, however almost half of this snowfall occurs
during the month of January. The greatest monthly snowfall
ever recorded was 12 inches (25 cm) in January 1966.
Summers in Pulaski County are hot with large periods
of high humidity. The daily summer temperature averages
at 82°F (28°C). The hottest months are July and August
when a high temperature of over 100°F (38 °C) occurs
frequently. The highest temperature ever recorded in
Pulaski County was 110°F (43°C) in August 1936.
Precipitation is fairly well distributed throughout
the year, however May is normally the wettest month. The
average annual precipitation is approximately 48 inches
(120 cm). During March, April, and May approximately 15
inches (38 cm) or almost 31 percent of the annual total
precipitation falls. The driest months are August,
September, and October when approximately 3 inches (8 cm)
of rain falls.
The soil has been classified as the Leadvale-Urban
land complex with a 1 to 3 percent slope. The Leadvale
series are composed of moderately well-drained, nearly
level and gently sloping soils in valleys. They are
formed mainly in loamy sediment washed from uplands con-
sisting of weathered sandstone and shale and in some areas
from material weathered from silts tone. The native
vegetation is mixed hardwoods and pines. Leadvale soils
show moderately slow permeability and maintain a medium
level of available water capacity. The Leadvale-Urban
land complex are areas of Leadvale soils that have been
23-5
-------
modified by urban development. The Level of runoff from
the Leadvale-Urban land complex is medium, while the
erosion hazard is moderate if the soils are not protected
by vegetation. Additionally, these soils maintain a
seasonal perched water table, slow percolation rate, and
moderate bearing capacity.
Hydrogeology
Pulaski County is an area that is composed of two 300.68(e)(2)
physiographic regions: the Interior Highlands and the (i)(D)
Coastal Plain. The Interior Highlands are hilly and hydrogeological
underlain by unconsolidated sediments which dip slightly factors
in a southeasterly direction. The consolidated rock of
the Interior Highlands underlies the unconsolidated sedi-
ments of the Coastal Plain. Above the lowest level of the
water table, the consolidated rock of the Interior High-
lands has been subject to weathering. This has formed
soil and "rotten rock", which have a total maximum
thickness of approximately 20 feet (6.1m). This weathered
area is more permeable and porous than the original
unweathered rock. Water is present in the intergranular
voids of the "rotten rock" and soil while water is also
present in secondary openings, such as joints and
fractures in the unweathered rock.
The relationship of the Interior Highlands to the
Coastal Plain is shown in Figure 3. The relationship of
the rocks of the Coastal Plain to those of the Interior
Highlands is shown in Figure 4. The Coastal Plain
sediments, which make up Units 3 to 9, vary from high
plasticity clays to sands and gravels. Additionally,
permeabilities vary quite a bit between units. Units 3,
7, and 9 are major water sources in some areas throughout
Pulaski County. Unit 3 is made up of beds of claystone,
calcareous sandstone, sandy limestone, marl and conglomer-
ate. Its thickness varies from 7 to 60 feet (2.1-18.3m).
Unit 7 is composed of fine to medium sand with some inter-
bedded clay lenses. Its total thickness is approximately
320 feet (98m). Unit 9 is composed of terrace deposits
and alluvium. The terrace deposits are formed of sand
while the alluvium, which is deposited by both the
Arkansas and Mississippi Rivers, is made of a fine-grained
top stratum which becomes coarser with depth. Unit 9
reaches a thickness of 120 feet (36.6m)near the Arkansas
River and is much thinner at other locations. Units 4, 5,
6, and 8 are primarily fine-grained materials which,
unlike 3, 7, and 9, do not yield much water.
The Vertac site is situated very near or possibly on
the fall line of the Interior Highlands and Coastal Plain.
Although geologic maps show that the Vertac site is
23-6
-------
C0astal Plaln
23-7
-------
Figure
Source:
Relationship of ^surface Characteristics^o^the
to the Subsurface Characteristics
Walton, 1982.
23-i
-------
slightly to the west of the fall line, which would
indicate that it is in the Interior Highlands, there is
evidence which indicates that it is also in the Coastal
Plain, or perhaps in a zone of transition between the two.
The subsoils are part of the Atoka Formation which is
found in the Interior Highlands, however clays of the
Midway Group, which are present in the Coastal Plain, are
known to exist in the northern part of the site. Addi-
tionally, a surficial geologic inspection made by
Developers International Services Corporation (DISC), a
consultant to Vertac, indicates that the surface soils
near the eastern portion of the site are sedimentary,
which further supports the theory that a portion of the
site is in the Coastal Plain. Regardless, at relatively
shallow depths, the Vertac site is underlain by the
consolidated rock of the Atoka Formation which surfaces in
the Interior Highlands and underlies the sediments of the
Coastal Plain.
The Vertac plant is located on the south flank of a
westward plunging syncline. The axis of the syncline is
approximately 5 miles (8 km) north of the plant and has a
strike between N 75°W and N 60°W. The bedrock is alter-
nating gray to black shales and sandstones of the Atoka
Formation which dips to the NE at a rate of almost 30°.
Because the site is so close to the fall line, there are
many discrepancies regarding the strike and dip of the
rock strata at the Vertac site. Overlying the unweathered
bedrock in ascending order is weathered bedrock approxi-
mately 5 feet (1.5m) thick, clays, and alluvium.
Drainage patterns at the Vertac site are predomi-
nately westerly and easterly as shown in Figure 5. The
western 55 acres (22 ha) drain directly to Rocky Branch.
Rocky Branch enters the Vertac site at the northwest
boundary and flows into a man-made pooling pond. Approxi-
mately 700,000 gallons (2.7 x 10 1) per day of plant
process wastewater enter the cooling pond. Flow from the
cooling pond is by way of a concrete outlet structure at
the southwest extremity of the pond. Additionally, a
central ditch (see Figure 2) which acts as a surface
drainage channel from the plant production area, flows
into the cooling pond. The combined flow of surface
runoff and process water enters Rocky Branch and flows
south to Bayou Meto.
The eastern 38 acres (15.2 ha) of the Vertac site
drain to the east into numerous small ditches. These are
natural erosion channels with only a few man-made ditches
along roads and driveways. Several catch basins located
in the eastern portion of the site drain into a storm
sewer which empties into an open ditch near the main plant
23-9
-------
' • • • • DRAINAGE DIVIDE
*^^_ DRAINAGE & DIRECTION
Figure 5. Surface Drainage at the Vertac Site
Source: .- Walton, 1982.
23-10
-------
entrance. AIL surface runoff east of the drainage divide
eventually flows into the East Branch of Rocky Branch.
Most of this runoff is carried by the "East Ditch" (see
Figure 5) to the East Branch. The East Branch eventually
links with Rocky Branch south of the Vertac site.
Additionally, it is important to note that during
heavy spring rains it is not uncommon for Rocky Branch to
flood the area south of the Vertac site. This is signifi-
cant because, as shown on Figure 1, there is a man-made
body of water, Lake Dupree, located about 1.3 miles (2.1
km) south of the Vertac site. Lake Dupree is approxi-
mately 15 acres (6 ha) in size and has been used for
recreational purposes. It is likely that flooding has
contributed to contaminant transport from the Vertac site
to Lake Dupree because contaminants discharged into Rocky
Branch from the site subsequently may be removed and
deposited in Lake Dupree during flooding.
300.68(e)(l)
(vii)
weather; sub-
stance migration
WASTE DISPOSAL HISTORY
The Vertac site was originally developed by the
United States Government in the 1930's and was used as an
ordnance plant during World War II. In 1948 it was pur-
chased by the Reasor-Hill Company and converted into a
chemical manufacturing facility.
The Reasor-Hill Company operated the facility from
1948 to 1961. At first, Reasor-Hill manufactured the
insecticides DDT, aldrin, dieldrin and toxaphene. During
the 1950's Reasor-Hill began production of the herbicides
2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid; 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxy-
acetic acid; and 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyproprionic acid
(Silvex). Drums of organic waste were stacked in an open
field immediately southwest of the production area and
untreated wastewater was discharged from the west end of
the plant and was channeled into Rocky Branch Creek.
Rocky Branch drains into Bayou Meto a few miles from
the site. Bayou Meto is classified as a warm water
fishery according to the September 1975 Arkansas Water
Quality Standards. It is categorized as being suitable
for desirable species of fish, wildlife, and other aquatic
and semi-aquatic life, and as a raw water source for
public water supplies.
Pollution problems associated with Bayou Meto and its
tributaries, including Rocky Branch Creek, date back at
least as far as 1955 when a fish kill occurred in the
Bayou near Jacksonville. At that time the Water Pollution
Control Commission and the Game and Fish Commission per-
23-11
300.68(e)(2)(i)
amount and form
of substances
-------
formed an investigation. They determined that the cause
of the kill was oxygen depletion resulting from the efflu-
ent of the Jacksonville sewage treatment plant. However,
other pollution sources were found further upstream along
the creek, including the Reasor-Hill chemical plant and
the Arkansas Highway Department shops. A strong chemical
odor was noted at the Reasor-Hill plant's discharge into
Rocky Branch. Other complaints of a "medicinal" taste and
odor in fish caught in the Bayou were registered with and
investigated by the Game and Fish Commission. They
determined that the cause of the problem was the Reasor-
Hill effluent. Complaints continued through June of 1958
at which time the Water Pollution Control Commission
began a survey of the area. Chemical and bioassay tests
on the Reasor-Hill effluent found it to be extremely
toxic. The survey continued intermittently through the
summer of 1959 when a taste test found no problem with
fish from Bayou Meto. However, a biological report
(quoted in a summary report found in U.S. EPA Region VI
files) stated that "the bottom of the Bayou is devoid of
life" and noted that "the stream will become barren unless
the situation is corrected."
At this time, it became evident that the City of
Jacksonvilie's sewage treatment plant was overloaded
because of the increased growth of the city and the Little
Rock Air Force Base. It was not until April of 1960 that
a meeting was held with representatives of the Air Force
and the Water Pollution Control Commission to discuss
improvements for the sewage treatment plant. In 1961,
following a study of the sewage treatment requirements for
the area and a renegotiation of the city's contract with
the Air Force, the city improved the sewage treatment
plant. At this time, Reasor-Hill began discharging some
of its wastewater into the city's sewage treatment plant.
The plant site was purchased by Hercules Chemical
Corporation in 1961. Hercules continued to manufacture
the same products as Reasor-Hill. The waste drums that
were stacked near the plant were buried in the same area.
This became known as the "Reasor-Hill landfill" (see
Figure 2). Hercules continued to discharge some process
wastewater into Rocky Branch Creek and some into the
Jacksonville sewage treatment plant. A few months after
Hercules gained ownership, the company informed the Water
Pollution Control Commission that it intended to pretreat
its wastewater to reduce the load on the Jacksonville
sewage treatment plant.
300.68(e)(3)(i)
contribution to
water pollution
problem
23-12
-------
Complaints about taste and odor in fish caught in
Bayou Meto continued and on February 19, 1963, a massive
fish kill occurred in the Bayou approximately 45 miles
(72 km) downstream from Jacksonville, near Stuttgart. The
Water Pollution Control Commission determined that this
was caused by a slug of toxic chemicals from the Hercules
plant. By May 20, 1963, Hercules was ordered to shut down
operations at the plant and submit plans within 165 days
for a pretreatment facility. Hercules complied and a
neutralization and equalization pretreatment system was
completed in August 1964. As of September 30, 1964, the
plant's entire wastewater effluent was being discharged
into the Jacksonville sewage treatment plant.
Bayou Meto and Rocky Branch Creek were sampled in the
summer of 1965 and again in January 1966. Continued
improvements in stream ecology, fish, and bottom organisms
were found. However, complaints of disagreeable fish
taste and odor continued. Another fish kill occurred in
Bayou Meto in December of 1965 between Jacksonville and
Lonoke which was caused by oxygen depletion in the
Jacksonville sewage treatment plant effluent. The Water
Pollution Control Commission determined that the sewage
treatment plant was overloaded and recommended that the
city install a new sewage treatment plant. With joint
participation from Hercules, the City of Jacksonville, and
a grant from the Federal Government, the new sewage treat-
ment plant was completed in 1969. It was specifically
designed to handle Jacksonville municipal wastes and the
chemical waste generated by the Hercules facility. Once
the new sewage treatment plant went into operation,
complaints of the taste and odor in fish decreased.
At^ approximately this same time, Hercules began to
treat its wastewater via a solvent process. This new
process separated out several by-products of the waste and
produced toluene still bottoms. When hot, the still
bottoms were liquid; however, they solidified when pumped
into drums and allowed to cool. These drums of solid
waste were then buried in an area north of the plant
operations area, known as the Hercules-Transvaal landfill
(see Figure 2).
From 1967 to 1968, Hercules was ordered to manufac-
ture the herbicide Agent Orange, a 2,4,5-T/2,4-D mixture,
for the United States Government. Agent Orange was used
as a defoliant in the jungles of Vietnam. A finding of
the possible teratogenic effects of Agent Orange by the
National Cancer Institute caused a ban on Agent Orange use
in the Vietnam War. Soon after the ban, other additional
uses of 2,4,5-T were discontinued. Hercules then
discontinued operations at the Jacksonville site.
300.68(e)(3)(i)
contribution to
water pollution
problem
23-13
-------
From 1971 to 1976, Hercules leased the plant site to
Transvaal, Inc., a predecessor company of Vertac.
Transvaal resumed production of 2,4-D and intermittent
production of 2,4,5-T. Toluene still bottom wastes from
Transvaal's manufacturing processes were also buried in
drums at the Hercules-Transvaal landfill area. In 1974
Transvaal ceased still bottom burial and began storing the
drums above ground for ultimate recycling or off-site dis
posal.
In 1976, Transvaal purchased the Jacksonville plant
from Hercules. That same year, an EPA inspection of the
Jacksonville site did not indicate the presence of dioxin
on the plant site. By 1978, Transvaal and three Vertac
companies were involved in bankruptcy proceedings.
At that time, the rising concern over the health
risks posed by Agent Orange and its dioxin by-product,
caused Senator Mark Hatfield to institute a nationwide
survey of potential dioxin sites. Vertac participated in ft,fflw4)
this survey and in April 1978 Vertac officials reported to 300.63UX4)
the U S EPA and the Arkansas Department of Pollution Con- discovery
trol and Ecology that the toluene still bottoms located on
Che Jacksonville site contained 37 ppm of dioxin C2»3>^'8_
tetrachlorodibenzodioxin also known as TCDD). Subse
quently U S. EPA officials visited the site and took
samples'to verify Vertac's findings. The U.S. EPA samples
did not show any evidence of dioxin in the still bottoms.
Vertac scientists then requested verification of the^EPA
results to clarify the discrepancy between their findings
and those of EPA. Meanwhile, in November of 1978,
Transvaal and the other Vertac companies were brought_out
of bankruptcy by new owners to form Vertac Chemical
Corporation.
In May 1979, using an improved analytical technique,
EPA confirmed Vertac's orginal report that there was
indeed 37 ppra of dioxin present in the toluene still
bottoms at the Vertac site. Subsequently, EPA found trace
quantities of dioxin, usually in the parts per trillion
(ppt) level, at other locations at the Vertac site.
A final area of waste contamination at the Vertac
site is referred to as the "blow-out area". This is an
area onto which some of the materials from the trichioro
phenol reactor (used by Hercules and Transvaal) were
expelled during valve rupture blow-outs experienced by
Hercules and Transvaal prior to 1976 (see Figure 2). In
1976 Vertac installed a catch basin into which the
expelled contents of the reactor would be discharged
during future blow-outs.
23-14
-------
In summary, the waste disposal history of the Vertac
site includes the following five major waste disposal
areas of contamination:
• Reasor-Hill landfill area (drums of organic waste)
• Untreated wastewater discharge to Rocky Branch
Creek and ultimately Bayou Meto
• Hercules-Transvaal landfill area (drums of toluene
still bottoms)
• Above-ground storage area (drums of toluene still
bottoms)
• Blow-out area.
DESCRIPTION OF CONTAMINATION
Historically, it is difficult to determine exactly
when much of the contamination at the Vertac site
occurred. it is evident that pollutants from herbicide
manufacture were detected by 1955 when the previously
mentioned fish kill occurred in Bayou Meto near
Jacksonville; however, it may be possible that chemical
contaminants might have been seeping into the ground, as
well as into Rocky Branch Creek, from as far back as 1948
when Reasor-Hill first manufactured insecticides and
stacked drums of waste in an open field. These drums
consisted of various insecticide wastes and are believed
to have contained such compounds as DDT, aldrin, and
dieldrin. Still further, depending upon the waste
disposal methods used at the time, some contaminants might
have been building up in the soil, ground water, and/or
Rocky Branch Creek from the 1930's when the Vertac site
was originally operated as an ordnance plant by the U.S.
Government. Dioxin could not have been present prior to
the manufacture of 2,4,5-T in the 1950's. However, it was
not known that dioxin contamination was present at the
Vertac site until Vertac had discovered dioxin at 37 ppm
concentration at the site in 1978, while responding to the
previously mentioned nationwide survey of potential dioxin
contaminated sites. Furthermore, it was not until May
1979 that EPA positively confirmed Vertac's findings.
Therefore, the extent of the dioxin contamination was not
even determined until after May 1979, at which time
studies were sponsored and conducted by the Arkansas
Department of Pollution Control and Ecology (ADPCE), EPA,
and by contractors hired by Vertac.
23-15
-------
Sampling and Monitoring History .
Once EPA had confirmed Vertac's findings that dioxin 300.
did exist at the Vertac site in concentrations of 37 ppm, remedial _
a series of ground water monitoring wells were installed, investigation
samples were taken, and analyses were performed by several
contractors as well as EPA and ADPCE personnel and
laboratories.
During May and June of 1979, McClelland Engineers
installed 15 test pits and made one log boring to deter-
mine subsurface conditions at the site. In October 1979,
Southwestern Laboratories installed 8 more test borings at
EPA's request. From May through October 1980 the ADPCE
performed analyses of the monitoring well samples, while
EPA performed analyses from May 1980 through March 1981.
These test borings and test pits installed by McClelland
Engineers and Southwestern Laboratories are shown in
Figure 6. Additional samples were taken from the cooling
pond and Rocky Branch Creek themselves.
In April 1982, Developers, International Services
Corporation (DISC) made 41 auger borings at the Vertac
site. DISC was hired by Vertac to help determine the
extent of contamination, review remedial actions taken
thus far, and make recommendations for further remedial
work. The location of each of these 41 borings is shown
on Figure 7. The data obtained from these borings was
combined with the data obtained from the previously
installed test pits and test borings to determine subsur-
face geologic conditions. DISC mapped these results in
cross-sectional views of different segments of the site as
Figure 8 shows. This example of a cross-section shows^the
subsurface geologic conditions determined by auger borings
#119, #111, and #136.
Thirty-nine of the 41 auger borings made by DISC in
April were subsequently used to install 39 piezometers to
determine the characteristics of ground water flow.
Hence, the location of each of the 39 piezometers is also
shown in Figure 7; however, as noted, piezometers were not
installed in borings #110 and #119.
By July 1982, DISC had begun a complete geotechnical
investigation to describe the engineering properties of
the soil and rock strata encountered. This was accom-
plished through conducting 11 test borings at the site.
Once these 11 borings were completed, they were used as
ground water monitoring wells. An additional 8 wells were
installed, hence a total of 19 ground water monitoring
wells were installed and sampled during July 1982. The 11
test borings which became ground water monitoring wells
23-16
-------
• TEST BORINGS
o TEST PITS
Figure 6. Location of Test Borings and Test Pits Made in 1979
Source: Walton, 19S2.
23-17
-------
Figure 7. Location of Auger Borings and Piezometers
Source: Walton, 1982
23-18
-------
LO
I
I I I I
I I I I
I I
fffff
Figure 8. Cross Sectional View of Subsurface Strata From Auger Borings
# 119, # 111, and // 136.
Source: Walton, 1982.
Jar
-fc.-
Atfi
.
-------
and the additional 8 ground water monitoring wells were
located at the Vertac site as shown in Figure 9.
During July and August of 1982, DISC also performed
sampling and analysis of surface soil, surface water, and
sediments at the Vertac site. The surface soil at the
Vertac site was analyzed for measurable concentrations of
2,3,7,8- TCDD at the areas shown in Figure 10.
Surface waters at the Vertac site were sampled by
DISC at the Locations depicted in Figure 11. These
samples were measured for concentrations of chlorinated
phenols, benzenes, anisoles, toluene, and phenoxy acids.
Finally, in August 1982, DISC sampled and analyzed
sediments for concentrations of chlorinated phenols,
chlorinated benzenes, toluene, and TCDD. These samples
were drawn from the areas shown in Figure 12.
In total, the ADPCE, EPA, and Vertac investigations
determined that the contamination of both the Vertac site
and areas off-site, as well as Che potential threat of
contamination to other areas off-site, included the
following (see Figures 1 and 2):
• Dioxin detected at the ppt level in certain
sediment samples and species of aquatic life in
Rocky Branch Creek and Bayou Meto. Contaminants
were found as far as 45 miles (72 km) downstream
in Stuttgart discovered by a massive fish kill
that occurred in February 1963. These are
probably from process waste discharges made by
Reasor-Hill Company during herbicide production
(1950's to 1961) and by Hercules Chemical Company
from 1961 until May 20, 1963, when Hercules was
shut down and ordered to build a pretreatment
system
• Surface erosion, percolation, and seeps on top of,
through, and attributed to the Reasor-Hill land-
fill and former above-ground drum storage areas.
The estimated total volume of contaminated
materials (which include chlorinated phenols,
benzene, and toluene) lying within the Reasor-Hill
landfill is 30,000 cubic yards (22,800 m3) . This
may have also contributed to contaminant flow into
Rocky Branch Creek
• The equalization basin that was installed as a
process wastewater pretreatment system in 1964
contains contaminated st i11 bottoms. Approxi-
mately 20,000 cubic yards (15,200 m ) of material
300.68(e)(2)(ii)
extent of migra-
tion of sub-
stances
300.68(e)(2)
Civ)
environmental
effects and
welfare concerns
23-20
-------
• WELL LOCATIONS
Figure 9. Location of 19 Ground Water Monitoring Wells
Source: Walton, 1982.
23-21
-------
Sample Area Number
Sample Area rioundary
Figure 10. Location of Surface Soil Samples
Source: Walton, 1982.
23-22
-------
Cooling
Pond -v /
Center
Cooling Pond
North End
Coolin
Pond
South
East Ditch
Central Ditch
Rocky Branch @ Eq Basi
A Sample Location
Figure 11
Source:
Location of Surface Water Samples
Walton, 1982.
23-23
-------
Cooling
Pond NE
Cooling
Pond NW
Cooling
Pond
Cooling Pond SE
^-Central Ditch
Rocky
Branch
A Sample Location
Sample Area Boundary
Figure 12. Location of Sediment Samples
Source: Walton, 1982.
23-24
-------
is presently contained within the equalization
basin. The basin was closed out in 1981 as part
of Vertac's remedial response. This amount of
material includes the clay cover which was placed
on the basin at closure
• Leachate from the equalization basin was detected
along the western portion of the property adjacent
to the basin. This could have also contributed to
the contaminant flow into adjacent Rocky Branch
Creek
• 2,4-D, 2,45-T, and 2(2,4,5-T)P were detected in
ground water monitoring welIs down gradient
from the Hercules-Transvaal landfill area. There
is also a likelihood of co-solubilization of TCDD
with the detected 2,4,5-T in the ground water
adjacent to the Hercules-Transvaal landfill. The
estimated total volume of materials lying within
the Hercules-Transvaal landfill area is 100,000
cubic yards (76,000m )
• Contaminants from Hercules-Transvaal landfill
migrated to the process cooling pond where dioxin
was found
• Contaminants from the central drainage ditch and
surface runoff at the Vertac site contributed to
concentrations of dioxins in the cooling pond
• Cooling pond is in the Rocky Branch stream course;
therefore, contaminants that leaked into the
cooling pond and/or settled there probably flowed
into Rocky Branch as well
• Blow-out area, which contained materials from
valve ruptures of trichlorophenol reactor (used by
Hercules and Transvaal), could be cause of dioxin
percolation underground and/or surface runoff to
the east. Drainage from this area is towards the
east where coittaminated sediments were discovered
in East Branch
• Contaminants from spills that may have occurred
during normal plant operations, exclusive of the
blow-out area catch basin, may have entered East
Branch following heavy rains
• At various points to the east of the site (other
than East Branch), evidence of dioxin, which
migrated from the blow-out area or perhaps from
23-25
-------
spills that occurred during normal plant opera-
tions, was found due to the downgradient movement
of contaminated surface runoff as well as movement
of subsurface contaminants. In particular, 1 ppb
of dioxin contamination was detected along the
creek bed adjacent to private residences located
east of the Vertac site
Dioxin contamination was found in fish and sedi-
ments of Lake Dupree, a 15 acre (6 ha) recrea-
tional lake approximately 1.25 miles (2 km) south
of the Vertac site. The contamination is believed
to have resulted from flooding of Rocky Branch
during heavy spring rains which carried dioxin
from Rocky Branch and into Lake Dupree
Further contamination could have occurred during
remedial action implementation, particularly at
the equalization basin where movement of equipment
noticeably disturbed the soil near a former inter-
ceptor ditch.
Another issue at the Vertac site is that of cross-
contamination. In the Spring of 1979, Vertac halted
2,4,5-T production because EPA had banned most uses of
2,4,5-T at that time. In September of that year, Vertac
switched to 2,4-D production. Since October of 1979,
Vertac had been accumulating solid wastes from 2,4-D
production. However, these wastes may have been cross-
contaminated with dioxin by using the same equipment to
produce 2,4-D as was used to produce 2,4,5-T. The extent
of contamination at the Vertac site that may have resulted
from this cross-contamination is not really known.
Vertac, however, has been aware of the cross-contamination
problem and has been setting aside the 2,4-D waste in
drums since 1979. Since July 1982, Vertac has been
recycling 2,4-D waste liquids and has eliminated the
potential for cross-contamination through the use of new
equipment.
It is .important to note that at the present time,
surface soils at the site show no measurable (detection
limit of 50-100 ppt) concentrations of TCDD (dioxin)
except in the area near the Reasor-Hill landfill.
Additionally, no existing domestic or industrial water
wells were located in the areas that are immediately
downgradient from the site.
23-26
-------
PLANNING THE SITE RESPONSE
Initiation of Response
The first major remedial actions at the Vertac site
occurred in accordance with a June 15, 1979 Administrative
Order issued by the Arkansas Department of Pollution
Control and Ecology (ADPCE). Vertac had participated
in a nat ionwide survey of potential dioxin sites in 1978,
and in April 1978 had reported to U.S. EPA and the ADPCE
that its toluene still bottoms contained 37 pptn of dioxin.
Further testing and analysis was performed and EPA
confirmed Vertac's findings in May 1979. This led to more
ground water monitoring and subsurface test ing at the
site, performed by EPA, ADPCE, Vertac and its contractors.
Negotiations among Vertac and the two agencies led to
entry of the Administrative Order.
The ADPCE Order referred generally to chemical wastes
and by-products stored above ground or buried in the
ground at the site, but specifically mentioned only
d ioxin. The basic thrust of this Order was to compel
Vertac to undertake certain interim containment measures
re lat ing to the above ground storage of wastes and to the
wastes buried in the ground. It spec ifically required
Vertac to immediately install a clay cap over the Reasor-
Hi11 and fill area. With respect to longer term contain-
ment measures, the Order directed Vertac to submit engi-
neering reports regard ing barrier dikes and interceptor
ditches at the two on-site land fills and a detailed report
on alternatives to the equalization basin. Subsurface
samp1 ing and development of a ground water monitoring plan
also were required.
While the Administrat ive Order directed Vertac to
recontainerize any leaking drums stored above ground and
place them in a newly built roofed storage area, it did
not prohibit off-site disposal of drums. However, in
early 1980, EPA issued a TSCA section 6 ruling directing
Vertac to hold drums on-site containing 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T
still bottoms and not dispose of them in landfills. This
ruling was prompted by Vertac's finding of 0.7 ppb of
dioxin in its 2,4-D still bottoms that were generated in
late 1979 (the 2,4,5-T still bottoms were already known to
contain dioxin). Apparently the 2,4-D wastes had become
contaminated inadvertently through the manufacCuring
process. The EPA ruling provided that after May 12, 1980,
Vertac could dispose of the still bottoms in an approved
PCB landfill if their analysis showed only trace amounts
of dioxin. A Vertac official reported, however, that by
that time no PCB landfi11 would accept the drums because
of the presence of dioxin. This situation led Vertac to
300.68(c)
administrative
process; private
clean-up
300.68(e)(l)(iv)
above ground
hazardous
substances
300.70(c)
off-site trans-
port for secure
d ispos it ion
23-27
-------
develop a process for recycling the 2 ,4-D still bottoms,
thus eliminating the dioxin as a waste. Vertac is also
investigating, with EPA, the possibility of incineration.
The second major series of remedial actions at the
Vertac site was also initiated by a legal order. While
Vertac had completed or was implementing some of the tasks
spec ified in the Administrative Order, it had not
completed all of the work. On March 4, 1980, EPA and
ADPCE sued Vertac and Hercules Chemical Corporation in
Federal District Court under the "imminent threat" provi-
sions of RCRA and Arkansas statutes. The agencies then
obtained a Preliminary Injunction on May 12, 1980 that
directed Vertac to undertake numerous specific actions.
The Injunction required Vertac to repair the cap on the
Reasor-Hill landfill (which was capped under the Adminis-
trative Order but had eroded) and install containment
walls around it. Vertac also had to cap and cover several
other areas at the site: the Hercules-Transvaal landfill,
the old above-ground drum storage area, and the blow-out
area. The Injunction stated that Vertac was to submit
detailed engineering plans for an alternative to the
equalization basin, as had been required by the Adminis-
trative Order but had not been done. Finally, the Injunc-
tion imposed on-site sampling requirements similar to
those in the Administrative Order, but went further than
the Order by directing Vertac to begin off-site sampling,
i.e., sampling from the waters and sediments of Rocky
Branch Creek. Thus, the May 12, 1980 Injunction was
consistent with 1979 Administrative Order, continuing some
work, requiring remedial work to be performed that
previously had been studied, and directing new and
complementary work.
The next substantial remedial action was initiated on
September 26, 1980, when the court ordered Vertac to
proceed with its plans for replacing the equalization
basin with an alternative system and remediating the basin
area. Vertac submitted its plans to EPA and the ADPCE
pursuant to the Injunction1s requirements. The ADPCE
approved them but EPA did not. Following a hearing, the
court ordered Vertac to proceed with its plans, which the
company did.
During 1981, Vertac, Hercules, EPA and the ADPCE
negotiated extensively, seeking to resolve their disputes.
This led to the entry of a Consent Decree on January 9,
1982 in the suit that the agencies had filed in 1980.
Like the Preliminary Injunction before it, the Consent
Decree was consistent with the previously required work
and added certain complementary tasks. Since most, if not
all, of the required remedial actions had been completed,
300.68(c)
judicial pro-
cess; private
clean-up
300.68(c)
judicial pro-
cess; private
clean-up
300.68(c)
judicial pro-
cess; private
clean-up
23-28
-------
the Consent Decree was concerned with assessing the
effectiveness of those actions; the parties named an
independent consultant, Developers, International Services
Corporation (DISC) , to do this study. The Decree also
stated broad goals for protecting public health and the
environment, and provided that Vertac would submit plans
for additional on-site remedial work needed to meet those
goals. In addition, Vertac was to submit plans for the
study of certain areas of off-site contamination, such as
Rocky Branch Creek, Bayou Meto and Lake Dupree. The
Decree imposed various other tasks upon Vertac, including
submission of a plan for managing accumulated stored
wastes, exercise of best efforts to reduce the volume of
wastes stored on-site, and submission of interim discharge
limitations for Vertac's discharges into the Jacksonville
STP. It appears that the Consent Decree generally seeks
to ascertain the effectiveness of past remedial actions,
study on-site and off-site conditions to determine the
need for future actions, and manage and reduce the wastes
stored on-site or discharged into the STP.
Selection of Response Technologies
The remedial actions that were chosen at the Vertac
site were actions that did not come about through a simple
examination of the problem, analysis of alternatives, and
selection of the best remedial technologies available.
Instead, the remedial actions which have been completed as
well as those which are still on-going, were the result of
the aforementioned administrative and court orders which
took into account recommendations of EPA personnel,
Arkansas Department of Pollution Control and Ecology per-
sonnel, Vertac officials, as well as those recommendations
made by independent consultants that were used throughout
the legal proceedings.
The remedial actions first implemented at the Vertac
site were the direct result of the June 15, 1979, Adminis-
trative Order issued to Vertac by the ADPCE. Vertac had
consented to the order once EPA had verified the presence
of dioxin at the site in May 1979. As negotiations
between Vertac, the ADPCE, and EPA took place prior to
entry of the Administrative Order of June 15, 1979, Vertac
had hired Shreeve Engineering of Little Rock, Arkansas, to
conduct an objective study of the site and make recommen-
dations for remedial actions. The recommendations made in
the Shreeve Engineering Report, as well as recommendations
made by EPA and ADPCE personnel, were the criteria on
which the Administrative Order requirements were based.
23-29
-------
The Administrative Order required Vertac to Cake the
following actions (where not specified; compliance was
required prior to October 1, 1979):
Above-ground Storage Area
• Inspect and inventory all wastes stored above
ground in containers, and recontainerize any which
were leaking
• Prepare secure on-site storage area(s) to be of
adequate size to store all above-ground container-
ized wastes Located at Vertac
• Conduct weekly visual inspections of each drum in
storage
• Conduct daily visual inspection of tanks in which
wastes are stored
• Containers must be located on sealed concrete or
other sound, sealed, impermeable material
• Storage area(s) must be completely curbed to
contain any spills or leaks from containers; must
be capable of containing at least twice the volume
of the largest container in storage; and all
material including rainwater, contained within the
curbed area must be analyzed for contamination.
Any such contaminated material must be handled and
stored as a waste material and disposed of as
approved by the ADPCE
• Drum storage areas must be covered by August 15,
1979 by fixed roof structures of reinforced
fiberglass or materials of greater strength to
withstand forces such as wind and snow
• Storage areas must be well ventilated to prevent
accumulation of toxic fumes and must be secure
from unauthorized entry
• Drums in above-ground storage area must be recon-
tainerized by July 9, 1979
• All other deteriorated drums must be recontainer-
ized and relocated by October 1, 1979
• Maps must be drawn up immediately, delineating:
outside boundaries of above-ground drum storage
areas; portions of above-ground storage areas
300.68(e)(l)(iv)
above surface
hazardous sub-
stances—direct
threat
300.70(b)(l)U)
air emissions
control
23-30
-------
which overlie underground burial areas; all
contaminated surface areas and recontainerization
operations
• Locate and construct dikes to intercept and direct
all surface drainage away from the above-ground
container storage site
• No excavation will be permitted in areas mapped
for above-ground storage or that are delineated as
contaminated areas
• Install impermeable cover to prevent precipitation
and surface runoff from coming in contact with
areas mapped for above-ground storage or are
delineated as contaminated areas
» Store and isolate discarded containers and other
debris from surface runoff and precipitation
• Once wastes are relocated to secure area, contam-
inated wastewater within sumps and catchment basin
downgradient of existing storage area must be
removed and placed in secure containers pending
final disposal
• Existing sumps and catchment basins must^ be
leveled, filled, and covered to prevent contamina-
tion of surface runoff and ground water
• Treat dioxin contaminated ground surfaces to pre-
vent contamination from becoming airborne
• Sampling and analysis activities must be continued
by Vertac within 30 days of receipt of EPA-
approved analytical procedures, which are needed
to report qualitative and quantitative character-
istics of all surface flows of leachate, storm
water, cooling water, and process wastewater to
the ADPCE
Reasor-Hill/Hercules-Transvaal Areas
• Vertac must submit an engineering report no later
than July 9, 1979 for construction of barriers and
interceptor ditches necessary to prevent movement
of subsequent waters through the waste materials
buried at the Reasor-Hill site and to collect and
contain subsurface waters flowing from the Reasor-
Hill area for treatment as necessary. This will
300.70(b)(l)(U)
(B)
surface water
diversion
3QQ.7Q(b)(l)(ii)
(A)
surface seals
300.68(e)(2)
source, control
remedial actions
300.70(b)(l)(ii)
(A)
surface seal
3Q0.70(b)(2)(i)
gaseous
emissions
treatment
300.66(c)(2)
(iii)
assessing poten-
tial for
migration
23-31
-------
include soil borings, soil classification and
stratigraphic logs for each boring, permeability
or transmissivity of significant strata, and
subsurface flows
Vertac shall submit an engineering report no later
than August 9, 1979 for construction of barriers
and interceptor ditches necessary to prevent move-
ment of subsurface waters through the waste
materials buried at the Hercules-Transvaal site
and to collect and contain subsurface waters
flowing from Hercules-Transvaal area for treatment
as necessary. The same boring data as described
above are pertinent to the Hercules-Transvaal area
as we 11
• Vertac shall submit a plan for development and
implementation of ground water monitoring program
prior to August 9, 1979
• Locate and map all underground waste burial areas
including areas known to be or expected to be
contaminated by surface or underground flow
• No exploratory drilling, coring, or excavation
shall be conducted in burial areas or contaminated
areas, without the express written consent and
approval of the State of Arkansas
• Wastes from any exposed containers shall be placed
in new containers and transported to an above-
ground storage area. Any voids produced by the
removal oE exposed containers shall be backfilled
Limned iately
• Once boundaries of disposal areas have been
defined and mapped, Vertac shall clearly mark the
limits of each site
• Dikes (approved in writing by the State of
Arkansas prior to construction) shall be located
and constructed to intercept and direct all sur-
face drainage away from underground waste burial
sites
300.70(b)(l)(ii)
(B)(l)
dikes and berras
• Impermeable cover shall be installed to prevent
infiltration and surface runoff from coming in
contact with the surface of the underground waste
burial sites
300.70(b)U)(ii)
(A)
surface seal
23-32
-------
• Immediately proceed with application of clay cap
at Reasor-Hill area as recommended by Shreeve
Engineering Report of June 7, 1979
Equalization Basin
• Within 45 days of the Administrative Order, Vertac
shall submit a detailed report to the ADPCE
describing alternatives to the continued use of
the equalization basin.
As a result of this Administrative Order, Vertac
hired McClelland Engineers of Little Rock to perform the
geotechnical testing required. At EPA's request, Vertac
hired Southwestern Laboratories to perform the analyses of
the soil borings taken by McClelland Engineers.
One engineering report recommended that the ground
atop the Hercules-Transvaal burial area be recapped.
Vertac, although not required to do so by the Administra-
tive Order, recapped the Hercules-Transvaal landfill area.
Under "substantial threat" provisions of RCRA and
Arkansas state law, the EPA and ADPCE sued Vertac in March
of 1980. On May 12, 1980, the EPA and ADPCE obtained a
temporary injunction ordering Vertac to do the following:
Reasor-Hill Landfill Area
• Restore and repair the clay cap placed over the
Reasor-Hill landfill area, pursuant to June 15,
1979, Administrative Order, because it had eroded
• Once restored, cover clay cap at Reasor-Hill land-
fill area with topsoii and seed
• Within six months, construct clay cut-off or con-
tainment walls around the north and east portions
of Reasor-Hill landfill area to prevent movement
of ground water through the dump area into Rocky
Creek J
Equalization Basin
• Submit detailed engineering plans and specifica-
tions within 60 days to the ADPCE and EPA for the
development and installation of a wastewater
treatment system as an alternative to the equali-
zation basin
Hercules-Transvaal Landfill Area
• Proceed to cover the Hercules-Transvaal burial
area and former above-ground barrel storage area
with an impermeable clay cover within 90 days to
300.70(b)(l)(ii)
(A)
surface seal
300.70(b)(l)(ii)
(A)
surface seal
300.70(b)(l)(ii)
(A)
surface seal
300.70(b)(l)(ii)
(D)
revegetation
300.70(b)(l)
impermeable
barriers Branch
300.70(b)(2)(ii)
wastewater
treatment
300.70(b)(l)(ii)
(A)
surface seal
23-33
-------
prevent the penetration of underground areas by
surface waters
• Cover clay cap at HercuLes-Transvaal burial area
and former above-ground barrel storage area with
topsoi1 and seed
Blow-out Area
• Proceed to cover "blow-out" area to a distance not
less than 200 feet (61m) east, north, and west of
the trichlorophenol reactor vessels within 120
days; cover should be of impermeable clay material
to prevent infiltration by surface waters
• Cover blow-out area, cap with topsoil and seed
unless (in opinion of Vertac personnel) area will
not support vegetation; otherwise cover with
asphalt or other similarly permanent material
• Collect, label, and keep separate samples from
each of the monitoring wells presently on the
property and from the water and sediment of Rocky
Branch Creek at the south fence line on a monthly
basis. These samples should be delivered to the
ADPCE and EPA for analysis.
300.70(b)(l)(ii)
(D)
revegetation
300.70(b)(l)(ii)
(A)
surface seal
300.70(b)(l)(ii)
(D)
revegetation
Vertac submitted its plan to take the equalization
basin, which was part of the process water treatment
system built by Hercules in 1965, out of service.
Vertac's plan was to install a new above-ground waste-
water treatment system. The equalization basin was to be
dewatered and the remaining sludge was to be mixed with
lime to form an extremely hard phenoxy compound. The
entire area was to be capped and sealed and the basin area
was to be protected by an impervious barrier wall. This
plan was approved by the ADPCE but was not approved by the
EPA. After a hearing on September 26, 1980, the court
ordered Vertac to proceed with its plan.
During 1981, negotiations took place between Vertac,
Hercules, the ADPCE, and EPA to settle the EPA/ADPCE suit
of March 1980. A Consent Decree was entered on January 9,
1982. It required to Vertac to do the following:
Effectiveness/Compliance
• Retain DISC as an independent consultant to con-
duct a study on the effectiveness of the remedial
action at the Vertac facility and for contami-
nation that has migrated from the facility to be
completed within 150 days
300.70(b)(2)(ii)
direct waste
treatment
methods
300.70(b)(l)(ii)
(A)
surface seal
300.70(b)(l)
(iii)CA)
impermeable
barrier
23-34
-------
• Submit a proposal to EPA, ADPCE, and Hercules
within 60 days of receipt of DISC study to meet
the goals of the Consent Decree with regard to
ground water, surface water runoff, cooling water
pond, and surface conditions at Vertac site
• Vertac shall implement any plans approved by EPA,
ADPCE, or the court
Rocky Branch Creek/Bayou Keto
• Within 60 days, Vertac shall submit for EPA and
ADPCE approval a plan and implementation schedule
for a study of Rocky Branch Creek, the drainage
ditch which runs from east side of plant site to
Rocky Branch Creek, and Bayou Meto, which will be
based in part on a three-year sampling and
analysis program to be performed by the State
• Upon approval by EPA and ADPCE of the plan and
schedule for the proposed study, Vertac shall
complete the study
• Vertac shall pay the State $15,000 in three annual
installments to help defray costs for sampling and
analysis
• Vertac shall submit preliminary report to EPA and
ADPCE for review within six months which summa-
rizes data gathered in 1979, 1980, and 1981, and
submit to EPA and ADPCE a complete study no later
than 6 months after completion of sampling and
analysis program
Lake Dupree
• Within 60 days, Vertac shall submit for EPA and
ADPCE approval a plan and implementation schedule
for Lake Dupree, including decontamination, remov-
al, permanent sterilization, or containment of
contaminated water and sediment
• Upon EPA, ADPCE or court approval of the above
plan and schedule, Vertac shall make certain that
the plan is performed and completed
On-Site Maintenance
* Within 90 days, Vertac shall submit for SPA and
ADPCE approval, a plan and implementation schedule
for the management of accumulated chemical wastes
stored at the Vertac site including an inventory
of on-site was tes and conta Lnerization or
recontainerization of wastes presently on-site and
to be generated in the future
23-35
300.64
preliminary
assessment
3QQ.68(c)
evaluation of
clean-up pro-
posals
-------
• Upon approval of the plan by EPA and ADPCE, Vertac
shall cause the plan to be performed and completed
• Vertac shall exercise best efforts to reduce the
volume of chemical wastes stored at the site in an
orderly and exped itious manner. Using a list
(that EPA will provide Vertac within 180 days) of
names, addresses, and management methods of waste
transportation; treatment; storage; or disposal
facilities, Vertac will submit a report to EPA and
ADPCE every 180 days describing Vertac's efforts
to enter into negotiations with any facility for
transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal of
chemical wastes at the site
• Within 60 days, Vertac shall sample, analyze, and
submit to EPA and ADPCE a report characterizing
the nature, volume, and const ituents of the waste-
water discharge from existing system by Vertac to
the JacksonviHe sewage treatment plant
• Within 30 days after submission of above report,
Vertac shall submit to EPA and ADPCE a set of
interim discharge limitations for wastewater
designed to prevent increases in pollutant levels
in receiving st reams over previously detected
levels
• Vertac shall comply with interim discharge
standards set unless modified by agreement with
EPA, ADPCE or the court
• Vertac shall provide for the continuation and
maintenance of effectiveness of all monitoring and
remedial actions taken or to be taken at the site
from the present time to a period of 30 years
after closure of the manufacturing fac ility
• Vertac shall create a segregated trust fund of
$60,000 for post closure maintenance.
Extent of Response
In addition to specifying what remedial actions were
to be performed with respect to the Vertac site, the
Administrative Order, Preliminary Injunction, and Consent
Decree largely determined the extent of response. Remedi-
al actions relating to the Reasor-Hill and Hercules-
Transvaal landfill areas, the old above-ground storage
area, the blow-out area, and the equalization basin were
terminated once the legally required work was completed.
Because the legal orders came one after another, they
23-36
-------
ensured that all required work was done. For example, the
ADPCE Administrative Order required Vertac to submit an
engineering report on alternatives to the equalization
basin; this had not been done by the time of the Prelimi-
nary Injunction, so it was included as one of the
Injunction's tasks. The various ongoing tasks, such as
monitoring and conducting studies of off-site contamina-
tion, are continuing in expanded form in accordance with
the Consent Decree. The Decree requires that Vertac
undertake any future on-site or off-site remedial action
indicated by these studies and ordered by the agencies or
the court.
DESIGN AND EXECUTION OF SITE RESPONSE
Presently, the remedial actions at the Vertac site
are ongoing. As of the time this case study was prepared,
remedial actions at five major areas of contamination had
been completed. These areas include the:
• Reasor-Hill landfill area
• Hercules-Transvaal landfill area
• Former above-ground storage area
• Blow-out area
• Equalization basin.
The remedial actions taken at each of these areas is
described below. In all cases, Vertac acted as a general
contractor and supervisor for the design and installation
of remedial actions. In addition, a recycling technology,
an alternative technology, and future remedial actions are
discussed.
Reasor-Hill Landfill Area
The Reasor-Hill landfill area was originally capped
in the latter portion of 1979 as required under the June
15, 1979 Administrative Order. The area was recapped
following the May 12, 1980 injunction because there was
evidence which indicated that the original cap had eroded.
The Reasor-Hill landfill, shown in Figure 13 con-
tains 30,000 cubic yards (22,800 m3) of hazardous
material. The landfill was recapped with on-site clay
taken from a clay pit in the northeast area of the Vertac
property (see Figure 2). One foot (0.3m) of clay was used
to cap the Reasor-Hill area. Trucks, backhoes, graders,
and a sheepsfoot roller were used to distribute and
compact the clay from the pit to the landfill area
300.70(b)(ii)
surface water
controls
300.70(b)(l)(ii)
(A)
surface seal
23-37
-------
ro
UJ
I
U)
oo
OCVCU1KM MTEHHATIOHM. UHVICCI COU
• *^«« DISC •n~n^t
mi in • WMim
FNVIMNMENUI. AMCUMCNT
Figure 13. Details of Reasor-Hill Waste Burial Area and Barrier Walls
Soruce: Walton, 1982.
-------
Similarly, the same equipment was used to place a 6 inch
(15 cm) soil cover over the clay cap. The soil cover
was seeded over and is now covered with grass. Vertac
hired an excavation contractor, Helena Construction
Company (Helena), to place the clay cap and soil cover on
the Reasor-Hill area.
In addition to the clay cap, the Reasor-Hill landfill
area is surrounded on three sides by clay barrier walls
extending from bedrock to one or two feet (0.3-0.6m) above
ground level, (as seen in Figures 13 and 2) while the
downgradient side was left open. This design is intended
to prevent run-on of surface rainfall into the landfill to
keep it free from contact with any other materials,
particularly liquids. The downgradient side was left open
because the area is not susceptible to flooding.
The barrier walls were also constructed by Helena.
They were trenched to rock at a depth between 8 and 10
feet (2.4-3.0 m) and were then filled in and compacted
using on-site clay. They are approximately 2 feet (0.6m)
in width (the width of a backhoe bucket) and in combina-
tion with the clay cap, have served to contain the
Reasor-Hill site area.
Hercules-Transvaal Landfill Area
Vertac voluntarily recapped the Hercules-Transvaal
area in response to a recommendation made from a 1979
Shreeve Engineering Report. The procedure followed at the
Hercules-Transvaal landfill area was very much like that
at the Reasor-Hill area. The recapping was completed by
January 1980.
The Hercules-Transvaal landfill has a waste volume of
approximately 100,000 cubic yards (76,000 m3)- An outside
contractor was hired to excavate on-site clay and soil to
be placed over the area for capping and soil cover,
respectively. The clay cap is one foot (0.3m) deep and a
6 inch (15 cm) soil cover is maintained. The Hercules-
Transvaal site is seeded over and appears to be stabi-
lized. No barrier walls were constructed there. Figures
14a, b and c collectively show details of the Hercules-
Transvaal landfill area.
Former Above-Ground Storage Area
As a result of the June 15, 1979, Administrative
Order, Vertac was required to address the problem of an
estimated 3,000 drums of 2,4,5-T still bottoms which were
being stored in an area known as the former above-ground
storage area. A severe contamination problem was found in
this 300 foot by 200 foot (91 x 61m) area because many of
these drums were leaking.
300.70(b)(l)(ii)
(D)
revegetation
300.70(b)(l)(ii)
(A)
surface seal
300.70(b)(l)(ii)
surface water
controls
300.70(b)(l)(ii)
(D)
revegetation
23-39
-------
© - *
H*rcul««-Truuv«al Landfill
Figure 14a. Details o£ Hercules-Transval1 Landfill
Source: Walton, 1982.
23-40
-------
lt*tt /*.J,* J**tt
'\
r~\
-©•
Figuie I4b. Details of Hercules-Transvaal Landfill
Source: Walton, 1982.
23-41
-------
1' - 0"
6" Topsoil
Existing
Ground
Line
Burial Area Limits
Natural
£ Ground
. -
I
•p-
fo
Typical Section of Clay Cover
Not to Scale
Figure 14c. Details of Hercules-Transvaal Landfill Area
Source; Walton, 1982.
-------
Vertac was required to build a secure on-site storage
warehouse for these drums, as well as to repack those
which were badly cracked and/or leaking. Additionally,
any contaminated topsoil resulting from the leaking drums,
had to be removed and safely secured. Therefore, Vertac
containerized Che contaminated topsoil along with the
the drums of 2,4,5-T still bottoms that had to be
repacked. Out of 3,000 drums stored in this area, approx-
imately 2,000 were repacked. Vertac personnel repacked
the drums in standard 85-galIon (323 1) overpack drums.
While the special storage warehouse was being constructed
during the fall of 1979, the drums and contaminated
topsoil were repacked together and kept outside until the
warehouse was completed in late 1979. The former above-
ground storage area was filled and capped as part of the
Hercules-Transvaal landfill in early 1980.
The special storage warehouse, located on the site as
shown at the top of Figure 2, was built by an outside con-
tractor at a cost of approximately $71,000. The warehouse
measures 100 feet by 200 feet (30 x 61ra) and consists of a
concrete pad with dikes along each side and a roof of
steel. Once the warehouse was completed, the repacked
drums and those original drums that were intact, were
moved by truck and placed in the warehouse.
At the present time these drums are still being
stored in the special warehouse and inspected weekly to
detect any leaks. Vertac is examining several alter-
natives as to the ultimate disposal of these drums. These
include various types of incineration methods.
Blow-out Area
Vertac was required to cover and secure the blow-out
area with asphalt or clay to prevent penetration by sur-
face waters under the May 12, 1980 Temporary Injunction.
Vertac hired outside contractors to conduct the remedial
work at the blow-out area. The remedial action taken was
to cover this 1.5 acre (0.6 ha) area with asphalt and
clay. The asphalt was placed in a semicircle with a
radius of 200 feet (61m) around the former process area.
Two-thirds of the entire surface area is now covered with
asphalt while one-third" is covered with clay. The clay-
covered portion is the outlying area that was contaminated
from valve rupture blow-outs during trichlorophenol pro-
duction. The capping of the blow-out area took six weeks
and was completed by the fall of 1980.
Equalization Basin
Following a September 26, 1980, court decision,
Vertac went ahead with its original design for closing out
the equalization basin. The equalization basin had been
300.70(c)(2)
removal of
contaminated
soils
300.70(b)(l)(ii)
(A)
surface seal
300.70(b)(l)(ii)
(A)
surface seal
23-43
-------
used to neutralize process wastewater prior to discharge
to the Jacksonville sewage treatment plant. Vertac's
design was to first construct a new wastewater treatment
system and have that operating before closing out the
equalization basin. Vertac acted as a general contractor
for the work at the equalization basin using outside
equipment and an outside operator for the equipment.
The location of the new wastewater treatment system
in relation to the closed out equalization basin can be
seen in Figure 15a. Figures 15b and c show the profile of
the equalization basin in detail. The new system is an
aboveground pH stabilization system whereby highly acidic
2,4-D process wastewater (pH of 1.0) is neutralized to a
pH between 6 and 7 by a lime dosing apparatus. This pro-
cess takes place in a monitoring house through the addi-
tion of ground lime into an effluent mixing basin. Once
the wastewater has been neutralized it runs through an
outfall and into the Jacksonville sewage treatment plant.
Once the new wastewater treatment system was on-line
in January 1981, Vertac started its procedure for closing
out the equalization basin. The remedial action for the
equalization basin included the following steps:
• Dewatering of the basin
• Solidification of the sludge
• Installation of barrier walls and French drain
• Capping of the entire area.
The equalization basin was approximately 150 feet by
100 feet (46 x 30m) with a depth of 2 feet (0.6m).
Approximately 225,000 gallons (851,718 1) of water had to
removed and filtered before the remaining process sludges
could be solidified. A dewatering system was devised by a
Vertac engineer using equipment available at the Vertac
site. Quite simply, the water from the basin was pumped
through a crushed limestone filter and then a sand filter
that were each enclosed in tanks that had been located at
the Vertac site. The filtered water was then sent to the
Jacksonville sewage treatment plant. A schmematic diagram
of the dewatering system is shown in Figure 16. The
dewatering process, which began in February 1981, was not
completed until early May 1981.
As the dewatering progressed, Vertac began the solid-
ification process. The sludges left in the equalization
basin were very high concentrations of chlorophenols,
300.70(b)(2)(ii)
neutralization;
equalization
300.70(b)(2)(ii)
direct waste
treatment
methods
300.70(b)(2)
(iii)(C)
solidification
23-44
-------
ro
uj
I
Figure 15a. Details of Closed Out Equalization Basin
Source: Walton, 1982.
-------
UJ
I
140*0* fit i
a fa
Profile of Equalization Basin
Scale: 1" = 20MIORZ As of Date: (llov, 1968)
1" = 5' VERT
Figure 15b. Details of Closed Out Equalization Basin
Source: Walton, 1982.
-------
ft*
Lo
I
-P-
JOS
SS4
Figure 15c. Details of Closed Out Equalization Basin
Source: Walton, 1982.
-------
KJ
OJ
I
4>
00
Figure 16. Schematic Drawing of Dewatering System
Source: U.S. EPA, 1982.
-------
phenoxy acids, and other process wastes from 2,4~D produc-
tion. These were solidified through the addition of Lime
during May 1981.
As the equalization basin was being closed out, two
clay barrier walls and a French drain system were
installed around the equalization basin. The barrier
walls were built along the north and east sides of the
closed out equalization basin. These can be seen in
Figures 15 and 2. The French drain, located on the Rocky
Branch Creek side of the site, was installed to collect
subsurface runoff. It replaced the interceptor ditch and
barrier ditches built in 1964 when the original equaliza-
tion basin was installed. The French drain, designed by
Vertac, discharges into a 10,000 gallon (37,854 1) storage
tank. As subsurface liquid is intercepted by the drain,
it is is pumped into the storage tank where it is
accumulated. At the present time, an estimated 1,000
gallons (3,800 1) of leachate has been collected in the
tank. The drain is approximately 40 feet (12.2m) long and
is made of 6 inch (15 cm) clay pipe (It should be noted
that a true French drain does not contain a pipe, however
for purposes of consistency with the information gathered
for this case study, this term has been retained).
The entire equalization basin was backfilled and
capped by June 18, 1981. The volume of the backfilled
equalization basin is estimated to be 20,000 cubic yards
(15,200 m ) including the clay cover. The clay cover is
approximately 2 feet (0.6m) deep. During construction, it
was found that the French drain and barrier walls were
being placed^over weathered rock. Construction personnel
packed clay into any fissures which were present along the
trench as a precaution against vertical migration of
leachate at the trench.
Recycling
Another remedial action that has been taken at the
Vertac site is one that has been implemented to relieve
the previously mentioned cross-contamination problem.
Since October 1979, Vertac has been accumulating drums of
2,4-D process wastes but has not been allowed to dispose
of them because they may have been cross-contaminated with
2,4,5-T process wastes during a changeover from 2,4,5-T
production to 2,4-D production because the process equip-
ment was not changed. A special TSCA Section 6 ruling
prohibited Vertac from removing any of these wastes
generated prior to May 12, 1980. In response to this,
Vertac developed a recovery process to separate and reuse
2,4-D still bottoms. This process has been used since
July 1982 and appears to be working well. The 2,4-D
wastes generated prior to May 12, 1980, have been used as
300.70(b)(l)
impermeable
barriers;
leachate control
300.70(b)(l)(ii)
(A)
surface seal
23-49
-------
raw materials for further 2,4-D production with EPA
approval. Any 2,4-D production-related trash is disposed
of in an approved PCB landfill. The potential for further
cross-contamination has been eliminated by Vertac through
the use of new process equipment.
Alternative Technology
Late in 1979, Vertac wanted to start up 2,4,5-T
produc tion again using a chemical destruct ion technology
which they had patented. The idea was to manufacture
2,4,5-T from the toluene still bottoms at the site and
then chemically destroy any waste that would be generated.
Vertac applied for a research and development grant from
EPA to pi lot this technology; however, EPA had reserva-
tions about produc ing any more dioxin at this site which
might cause further hazard, therefore the grant was not
approved.
Future Reraed ial Actions
At the present time, Vertac is under court order to
proceed with clean-up activities at the cooling pond and
Lake Dupree as well as continual monitoring, inspection,
and development of a hazardous waste management plan.
Because these issues are ongoing and involve many legal
aspects, the remed ial actions being considered cannot be
disc losed at this time.
300.70(c)
off-site trans-
port for secure
disposit ion
COST AND FUNDING
Source of Funding
Vertac has provided most of the funds for reraed ial
action, monitoring, and analysis at the plant site. A
Vertac official estimates that the total cost as of August
1982 was approximately $1,946,000. Hercules has agreed to
pay for up to $75,000 for remedial work at the Reasor-Hi11
landf i 11 area and up to $40,000 for the environmental
study required by the Consent Decree. Vertac has paid for
the remaining costs, which are over 94 percent of the
est imated total costs as of August 1982. Negotiat ions
between the companies over cost sharing are continuing.
Selection of Contractors
Vertac served as its own general contractor, using
its personnel, machinery and materials to implement the
remedial ac tion plans. This work included; redrumming
3,000 drums containing 2,4,5-T still bottoms; maintaining
drums containing 2,4-D wastes for eventual recyc1 ing;
developing a recyc1 ing process; developing an alternative
300.68(c)
private clean-up
23-50
-------
process wastewater treatment system; developing a solidi-
fication process for the equalization basin; and
monitoring, sampling, and laboratory analyses.
Vertac contracted with McClelland Engineers of Little
Rock, Arkansas on a cost plus fixed fee basis to work with
the State in conducting the initial subsurface investiga-
tion at the site. McClelland was selected for this work
based on its reputation. Southwestern Engineers, of
Little Rock, was hired by EPA to do a second subsurface
investigation at the Vertac site. Subsequently, Vertac
hired the firm to conduct permeability and compaction
tests on the landfill caps. Vertac hired Shreeve
Engineers, which is based in Little Rock, to prepare an
engineering report for capping and containing the Reasor-
Hill and Hercules-Transvaal landfills. Shreeve was
selected because it previously had done work for Vertac at
the Jacksonville plant, and was hired on a cost plus fixed
fee basis.
Helena Construction Company based in West Helena
Arkansas, was selected by Vertac to excavate, transport[
place, and compact clay for the landfill caps, according
to specifications in the Shreeve report. Vertac selected
Helena because it was the low bidder, and used a lump sum
contract.
As required by the Consent Decree, Vertac hired
Developers, International Services Corporation (DISC), of
Memphis, Tennessee to review on-site conditions. DISC was
selected based on its bid and good reputation and was
hired under a cost plus fixed fee contract. Also as
required in the Consent Decree, Vertac selected
Environmental and Toxicological Consultants (ETC) to study
and report on off-site conditions. ETC was chosen based
on bid and reputation. A lump sum contract was used.
Vertac hired Environmental Protection Systems (EPS), of
Pensacola, Florida and Jackson, Mississippi, pursuant to
the Consent Decree to do sampling and analysis on process
wastewater and the cooling pond for phenol, chlorophenol,
chlorobenzene, and phenoxy acids. This firm was selected
because of its bid and reputation and a lump sum contract
was used. Specialized Assay (SA) of Nashville, Tennessee,
was hired by Vertac in accordance with the Consent Decree
to perform sampling and analysis relating only to dioxin.
Selected by bid and reputation, SA worked under a lump sum
contract.
Project Costs
Analysis of costs for this remedial action depends on
the nature and extent of data made available by Vertac
23-51
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Chemical Corporation, because this is a privately fLnanced
clean-up and Vertac did much of the work itself. A Vertac
representative provided summary information regarding
spec if ic reined ial act ions, such as for the Reasor-Hi 11
Landfi 11 or the equalization basin, which he then broke
down into the costs for outside contractors and Vertac' s
own costs. It should be noted that the latter figures
include Vertac's overhead but that the proportion of
overhead to total cost was not given. The task of cost
analysis is further complicated by the fact that for a
period of time (from June 15, 1979, the date of the
Administrat ive Order, to September 22, 1979) Vertac
stopped all produc tion at the plant and shifted all
suitable manpower to complying with the Order. The
Federal District Court noted that this resulted in a loss
to Vertac of $1 million for 1979 based on gross sales of
$8 million. While it might be argued that the $1 million
represents the opportunity cost of the remedial work, this
does not aid the analysis of actual costs. In addition,
some details re 1at ing to costs are not available, such as
the number of man-days worked, types of equipment used,
and amounts of materials used. Consequently, in some
instances it is impossible to compute meaningful unit
costs,
Nevertheless, the available data allow a general
discussion of costs. These data are presented in Table 1.
Cost figures supplied by a Vertac representative regarding
several specific remed ial actions taken at the plant total
$2,016,000. Broken down according to the major areas of
remedial work discussed in this study, the costs are as
follows:
* Reasor-Hill landfill area ($159,500)
• Hercules-Transvaal landfill and above-ground drum
storage areas ($135,000)
• Blow-out area ($37,000)
• Equalization basin ($143,000)
• 2,4,5-T waste management ($370,000)
• 2,4-D waste management ($931,000).
These cost items are discussed in more detail below.
Landfills and Above-Ground Drum Storage Area
A Vertac official estimates that a total of $295,000
was spent for chemical analysis, engineering studies and
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TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF COST INFORMATION - VERTAC CHEMICAL CORPORATION, JACKSONVILLE, ARK
ho
LO
Task
I.
Reasor-Hlll Landfill
A. Engineering studies and
chemical analysis
B. Capping and barrier walla
Subtotal
II. Hercules-Transvaal Landfill
& old drum storage area
A. Engineering studies and
chemical analysis
B. Capping
Subtotal
III. Blow-out area
A. Engineering Study
B. Clay and asphalt capping
Subtotal
IV. Equalization basin
A. Engineering study and
chemical analysis
B. Lime for solidification
C. Capping .barrier walls
and French Drain
0. Construction of above ground
replacement system
Subtotal
Quantity
Actual .
Expenditure ^a'
$63, 500 (b)
$96,000
$159,500
$62, 500 (b)
$73,000
5135,500
$15,000
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TABLE 1. (continued)
LO
I
-P-
Task
V. 2,4,5-T Waste Management
A. Engineering studies and
chemical analysis
B. Re-drummlng(materlal and
labor)
C. Construction of drum
Su'-l-tal
VI. 2,4,-D Waste Management
A. Engineering studies and
chemical analysis
11, Ru-drummlug (material and
labor)
•;. Construction of new
Subtotal
'11. Misc. Studies
t. Effectiveness of Remedial
Actions
1. Engineering studies and
chemical analysis
t. Sampling and Analysis
1. Process waste water
2. Coo Ling pond
3. Reimbursement of
state's costs
Subtotal
TOTAL
Quantity
3,000 drums(c)
10,000 drums(c)
Actual
Expenditure
$30,000(b)
$269,000 (b)
$71,000 (b)
$370,000
$75,000 (b)
$156,000 (b)
$700,000 (b)
$931,000
$200,000 (b)
$15,000 (b)
$10,000 (b)
$15,000 (d)
$240,000
Unit Cost
$67/drum (c)
$67/drum(c)
Funding Source
Vertac
Vertac
Vertac
Vertac
Vertac
Vertac
Vertac
Vertac
Vertac
Vertac
~* — j — f "r^^~"
Performance
1/9/82*
8/10/82
1/9/82-preaent
n n
$2.016.000 6/i3//*-preaeni
(a) all data supplied by Vertac
(b) includes in-house and outside work
(c) estimate by Vertac Official
-------
plans, and remedial work on the Reasor-Hill and Hercules-
Transvaal landfills and the former above-ground storage
area. Of this amount, approximately $41,000 was paid to
both McClelland Engineers for the subsurface investigation
and Shreeve Engineers for the engineering study and plan.
Vertac broke the $41,000 figure into $21,000 and $20,000
for work at the Reasor-Hill and Hercules-Transvaal areas,
respectively (the company treated the drum storage area as
part of the Hercules-Transvaal area cost for purposes) .
About $5,000 was paid to Southwestern Engineers for
permeability and compaction tests on the landfill caps
(since this was not broken down further, it will be
assumed that the cost was divided equally between the two
landfills). Vertac also estimated its in-house costs for
monitoring, chemical analysis and supervision, as well as
provision of an undetermined amount of labor, materials
and equipment, to total $80,000, divided evenly between
the landfills. Thus, the total estimated engineering and
analytical costs were $63,500 for Reasor-Hill and $62,500
for Hercules-Transvaal.
There was no expenditure for the clay used to cap
these areas because the clay was taken from another loca-
tion on-site. Consequently, the remaining item of expense
for the landfill remediation was the contract with Helena
Construction Company for moving and compacting the clay
caps and constructing the clay barrier walls at the
Reasor-Hill landfill. The Hercules-Transvaal cap cost
$73,000, while the Reasor-Hill cap and barrier walls cost
$96,000. A Vertac official stated that the unit cost for
this construction work was $2.85 per cubic yard
($2.18/m ); while no figure was given for the amount of
clay used, this can be computed to be approximately 25,614
cubic yards (19,584.5 m3) fr>r Hercules-Transvaal and
33,684 cubic yards (25,754.9 m ) for Reasor-Hill.
Equalization Basin
Vertac designed and supervised the work on the
equalization basin. The company hired outside operators
and equipment on an hourly basis to do the construction,
but Vertac officials could not give the names of the
people or types of equipment used, nor the hourly rates
charged. Total cost was estimated to be $93,000 which a
Vertac official broke down as follows:
• Monitoring, chemical analysis, development of a
solidification process for basin sludges, and
development of an above-ground alternative
treatment systera-$45,000
• Lime for solidification of sludges-$10,000 for an
undisclosed amount
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• Capping the area with clay, topsoil and grass seed
and instal1 ing the French drain and clay barrier
walls-$38,000.
The total figure of $93,000 does not include the cost of
buiId ing the above-ground treatment system, although a
company official estimated that this cost about $56,000.
Blow-out Area
Vertac was the general contractor for remedial work
on the blow-out area and hired outs ide personnel and
equipment to construct the asphalt and clay cap. Vertac
stated that the total remedial action cost was $37,000,
which included: sampling and chemical analysis at $15,000
and capping with asphalt and clay at $22,000. No data are
available regarding the portion of capping costs allocable
to asphalt as opposed to clay capping.
Monitoring, Sampling and Analysis
Vertac has spent a substantial amount of money pursu-
ant to administrative or court orders to determine the
nature and extent of both on-site and off-site pollution.
In add it ion to the monitoring and chemical analysis done
specifically for the two landfill areas discussed previ-
ously, Vertac had additional work done on other areas.
DISC performed a $125,000 study of on-site conditions such
as geology, ground water, surface water runoff, surface
soils, and the cooling water pond. A Vertac official
estimated that Vertac spent an additional $75,000 for its
own in-house sampling and analytical work related to the
DISC study. Thus, a total of $200,000 was spent to study
on-s ite cond it ions.
Environmental and Toxicological Consultants performed
off-site monitoring and analytical work on Rocky Branch
Creek, a drainage ditch running from the eastern side of
the plant to Rocky Branch Creek, and Bayou Meto. This
work cost $20,000. Vertac has not spec ified any in-house
costs relating to this study.
The Consent Decree also required Vertac to have
chemical analyses for dioxin performed on both cooling
pond and off-site samples. This work went to Specialized
Assay at a cost of $13,000. Vertac was ordered to reim-
burse the State of Arkansas for the costs of certain
analytical work regarding dioxin, which amounted to
$15,000 to be paid over 3 years. The total cost for
dioxin analysis, then, was $28,000. Vertac specified no
in-house costs associated with these studies.
In addition to the dioxin analysis, Vertac was
required by the Consent Decree to analyze samples from the
23-56
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cooling pond, process wastewater, and off-site samples.
Analytical work was to be performed for chlorinated
phenols, chlorinated benzenes, chlorinated anisoles,
toluene 2,4-D, 2,4,5-T and 2,4,5-TP. Environmental
Protection Systems did this work for $15,000, which a
Vertac official broke down to costs of $5,000 and $10,000
for work relating to process wastewater and the cooling
pond, respectively. Vertac also identified $10,000 of
in-house costs relating to analytical work on the process
wastewater. In sum, the chemical analysis for the sub-
stances listed above came to $15,000 for process waste-
water and $10,000 for the cooling pond.
Waste Management for 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T
The Consent Decree required Vertac to develop a waste
management plan for its 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T wastes,
including sampling, chemical analysis, and redrumming.
Furthermore, Vertac was required to "exercise best
efforts" to reduce the volume of chemical wastes stored
on-site. Vertac did all of the redrumming work itself.
An official estimated that about $269,000 was spent
redrumming 2,4,5-T wastes and $156,000 redrumming 2,4-D
wastes. These figures included materials and labor.
Vertac stated that repacking drums cost about $67 each.
An official estimated that it took about 2 1/2 hours per
drum to do the repacking. A Vertac official estimated
that the company spent $105,000 for sampling and analyzing
wastes, broken down to $30,000 for 2,4,5-T wastes and
$75,000 for 2,4-D wastes. The latter sum included costs
of developing a process to reuse the 2,4-D wastes. Vertac
reported that it also spent money to construct new facili-
ties at its plant as well as to modify the manufacturing
process in order to reduce the amount of new chemical
wastes. Approximately $71,000 was spent for work
associated with 2,4,5-T wastes and $700,000 for 2,4-D
wastes. The former amount represents the cost of building
a drum storage warehouse and the latter figure represents
the cost of modifying the 2,4-D formulating process.
Total figures for the various costs of managing both types
of wastes are as follows:
• Sampling, analysis and development of recycling
process for 2 ,4-D-$105,000
• Redrumming - $425,000
• Construction of new facilities or modification of
process - $771,000.
Looking at these costs across waste types, it appears that
managing 2,4-D wastes cost $931,000 and managing 2,4,5-T
23-57
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wastes cost $370,000. Total waste management cost was
$1,301,000 as of August 1982.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
At the present time it is difficult to determine the
effectiveness of the remedial action at the Vertac site,
primarily because the contamination present was the result
of several factors (combined in many instances), all of
which have not been remedied. Furthermore, indicators of
contamination off-site in locations such as Rocky Branch
and Lake Dupree have yet to be cleaned up. Once they are
totally cleaned up, continued monitoring will indicate
whether leaching and seepage are still occurring. A
proposal has recently been made to; (1) clean up Lake
Dupree, (2) discontinue use of the cooling pond, (3) clean
up the cooling pond, (4) establish a strict plant house-
keeping plan, (5) cap the surface of the central ditch,
and (6) establish a new east drainage ditch while filling
in the existing ditch. The proposal also includes
stipulations concerning monitoring that will be conducted
at the east drainage ditch, the west branch of Rocky
Branch Creek and the confluence of the branches of Rocky
Branch Creek as control points to determine whether DISC's
groundwater mass low balance is correct. DISC calculated
that for the entire site, one pound per year of soluble
pollutants would leak or flow. Therefore, an overall
evaluation is difficult to make at this time. Hence, each
remedial action is evaluated independently below.
Reasor-Hill Landfi11 Area
The clay cap and barrier walls at the Reasor-Hill
landfill area have apparently reduced the infiltration of
surface precipitation and are probably catching a good
amount of leachate in the area; preventing it from infil-
trating into or out of the Reasor-Hill site. The
effectiveness of these remedial actions in mitigating
vertical migration of contaminants is presently being
monitored with 3 newly installed monitoring wells (#' s 9,
15 & 16), in addition to original monitoring wells 1, 2
and 3 which are nested together to monitor vertical flow.
Al though insitu permeability tests conducted by DISC
indicate that permeability decreases with depth, there is
still no monitoring data available with which a conclusion
can be drawn concerning further contamination of ground
water.
Hercules-Transvaal Landfill Area
The same conclusions reached concerning the effec-
tiveness of the remedial action at the Reasor-Hill area
23-58
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are applicable to the remedial action at the Hercules-
Transvaal area. The clay cap prevents surface infiltra-
tion; however, there is no monitoring data available with
which a determination can be made concerning further
vertical contaminant migration. It should also be noted
that despite what monitoring results are inside this area,
no barrier walls have been installed, hence the potential
for both lateral and vertical movement outside the
confines of the area exists.
Former Above-Ground Storage Area
The removal and repacking of the approximately 3,000
drums of 2,4,5-T still bottoms, as well as the container-
ization of contaminated soil into a specially built above-
ground warehouse, appears satisfactory. Vertac is now
choosing the ultimate disposal method for these drums.
New regulations proposed on April 4, 1983 will make
disposal of the 2,4,5-T still bottoms possilbe once the
regulations are finalized.
The capping of the area as part of the Hercules-
Transvaal landfill area was a practical remedy; however,
the effectiveness of this action cannot be determined
totally for the reasons mentioned above.
Blow-out Area
The objective of the remedial action at the blow-out
area was to prevent the infiltration of surface precipita-
tion which would in turn prevent runoff of contaminants to
the east. The asphalt cap placed over the former process
area should prove satisfactory as long as it is checked
periodically for cracks. Although the asphalt is suscept-
ible to deterioration and corrosion should any chemical
spills occur at or near this area, it was selected and
applied due to the heavy traffic occurring in the area.
If clay were the only cap it would be much too easily worn
away. The clay capped portion, on the other hand, may not
be as susceptible to cracking. Furthermore, if any
chemical contamination were to occur, the clay may not
deteriorate as completely as the asphalt. The clay could
easily be removed and replaced with on-site clays if
contamination occurred, whereas replacing the asphalt
would not be as readily achieved.
Equalization Basin
The equalization basin that was installed has proven
to be effective as a wastewater treatment system.
Constant monitoring is in progress to ensure that the pH
of the wastewater is between 6 and 7 prior to discharge to
the Jacksonville sewage treatment plant.
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The closure procedure Vertac implemented appears to
be effective as far as preventing the infiltration of
surface water through the closed out area. The French
drain system and barrier walls appear to be containing
leachate seeps laterally; however, as stated earlier,
monitoring data has not been available with which a
determination can be made concerning further vertical
migration of contaminants. Further, the barrier walls and
the French drain were constructed over weathered rock.
Although any fissures which were present under the trench
were packed with clay, the effectiveness of this method
over time may be questionable.
Recycling
The procedure of separating and reusing 2,4-D still
bottoms for 2,4-D production has been very effective in
prevent ing the generat ion of add it ional waste at the
Vertac site. The problem of crosscontamination has been
alleviated through the use of new equipment. Vertac now
d isposes of any wastes generated from 2,4-D production in
an approved PCS landfill.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Guild, Dennis. August 10, 1982. Case Study Personal Interview Conducted at
U.S. EPA Region VI office with Mr. Dennis Guild, Environmental Engineer
in U.S. EPA Region VI Superfund Branch, Dallas, TX.
Hughes, Doice. August 11, 1982. Case Study Site Visit Made to Vertac Site,
Jacksonville, AR. Personal Interview Conducted With Mr. Doice Hughes of
Arkansas Department of Pollution Control and Ecology, Little Rock, AR.
Karkkainen, Richard D. August 11, 1982. Case Study Site Visit Made to Vertac
Site, Jacksonville, AR. Personal Interview Conducted With Mr. Richard
Karkkainen, Director, Environment and Safety, Vertac Chemical Corpora-
tion, Memphis, TN.
Karkkainen, Richard D. June 1982 - January 1983. Personal Communication.
Vertac Chemical Corporation, Memphis, TN.
Sekelyhidi, Irare J. 11 August 1982. Case Study Site Visit Made to Vertac
Site, Jacksonville, AR. Personal Interview Conducted With Mr. Imre
Sekelyhidi, Field Investigator for U.S. EPA Region VI from Ecology and
Environment, Inc., Dallas, TX.
Sekelyhidi, Imre J. June 1982 - November 1982. Personal Communication.
Ecology and Environment, Inc., Dallas, TX.
Shreeve, Kent. November 15, 1982. Personal Communication. Shreeve
Engineers, Little Rock, AR.
Soil Conservation Service. September 1975. Soil Survey of Pulaski County,
Arkansas. U.S. Department of Agriculture in Cooperation with Arkansas
Agricultural Experiment Station.
U.S. EPA Region VI Superfund Branch Files. August 10, 1982. Case Study
File Review. Conducted at U.S. EPA Region VI with the Assistance of
Mr. Dennis Guild, U.S. EPA Region VI Superfund Branch, Dallas, TX.
Walton, John L. Sr., and Rohn F. Droye, Jr. October 1982. Final Report for
Environmental Assessment Study, Vertac Chemical Corporation Site,
Jacksonville, AR. Developer's International Services Corporation,
Memphis, TN.
*USGPO: 1984-759-102-890
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