B s
Thursday
June 20, 1996
Part III
Environmental
Protection Agency
40 CFR Part 68
Accidental Release Prevention
Requirements: Risk Management
Programs Under the Clean Air Act,
Section 112(r)(7); List of Regulated
Substances and Thresholds for
Accidental Release Prevention, Stay of
Effectiveness; and Accidental Release
Prevention Requirements: Risk
Management Programs Under Section
112(r)(7) of the Clean Air Act as
Amended, Guidelines; Final Rules and
Notice
31667
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31668 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY
4QCFRPart68
IFRL-SS16-5]
BIN 2050-AD26
Accidental Release Prevention
Requirements: Risk Management
Programs Under Clean Air Act Section
AGENCY: Environmental Protection
Agency.
ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY: The Clean Air Act requires
EPA to promulgate regulations to
prevent accidental releases of regulated
substances and reduce the severity of
those releases that do occur. EPA is
promulgating rules that apply to all
stationary sources with processes that
contain more than a threshold quantity
of a regulated substance. Processes will
be divided into three categories based
on: the potential for offsite
consequences associated with a worst-
case accidental release: accident history;
or compliance with the prevention
requirements under OSHA's Process
Safety Management Standard. Processes
that have no potential impact on the
public in the case of an accidental
release will have minimal requirements.
For other processes, sources will
implement a risk management program
that includes more detailed
requirements for hazard assessment,
prevention, and emergency response.
Processes in industry categories with a
history of accidental releases and
processes already complying with
OSHA's Process Safety Management
Standard will be subject to a prevention
program that is identical to parallel
elements of the OSHA Standard. All
other processes will be subject to
streamlined prevention requirements.
All sources must prepare a risk
management plan based on the risk
management programs established at the
source. The source must submit the plan
to a central point specified by EPA; the
plan will be available to state and local
governments and the public. These
regulations will encourage sources to
reduce the probability of accidental
releases of substances that have the
potential to cause immediate harm to
public health and the environment and
will stimulate the dialogue between
industry and the public to improve
accident prevention and emergency
response practices.
DATES: The rule is effective August 19,
1996.
ADDRESSES: Supporting material used in
developing the proposed rule,
supplemental notice, and final rule is
contained in Docket No. A-91-73. The
docket is available for public inspection
and copying between 8:00 a.m. and 5:30
p.m., Monday through Friday (except
government holidays) at Room 1500,
401 M St. SW, Washington, DC 20460.
A reasonable fee may charged for
copying.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Craig Matthiessen at (202) 260-8600,
Chemical Emergency Preparedness and
Prevention Office, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, 401 M St. SW,
Washington, DC 20460, or the
Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Hotline at 1-800-424-
9346 (in the Washington, DC,
metropolitan area, (703) 412-9810).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Judicial
Review, Accidental Release Prevention
Requirements: Risk Management
Programs Under Clean Air Act Section
112(r)(7) were proposed in the Federal
Register on October 20, 1993 (58 FR
54190). A supplemental notice was
issued on March 13, 1995 (60 FR
13526). This Federal Register action
announces the EPA's final decisions on
the rule. Under section 307(b)(l) of the
Act, judicial review of the Accidental
Release Prevention Requirements: Risk
Management Programs is available only
by the petition for review in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit within 60 days of
today's publication of this final rule.
Under section 307(b)(2) of the Act, the
requirements that are the subject of
today's notice may not be challenged
later in civil or criminal proceedings
brought by the EPA to enforce these
requirements.
Regulated Entities
Entities potentially regulated by this
action are those stationary sources that
have more than a threshold quantity of
a regulated substance in a process.
Regulated categories and entities
include:
Category
Examples of regulated entities
Chemical Manufacturers
Petrochemical
Other Manufacturing
Agriculture
Public Sources ..
Utilities „....
Others ................
Federal Sources
Industrial organics & inorganics, paints, Pharmaceuticals, adhesives, sealants, fibers
Refineries, industrial gases, plastics & resins, synthetic rubber
Electronics, semiconductors, paper, fabricated metals, industrial machinery, furniture,
textiles
Fertilzers, pesticides
Drinking and waste water treatment works
Electric and Gas Utilities
Food and cold storage, propane retail, warehousing and wholesalers
Military and energy installations
This table is not intended to be
exhaustive, but rather provides a guide
for readers regarding entities likely to be
regulated by this action. This table lists
the types of entities that EPA is now
aware could potentially b^e regulated by
tills action. Other types of entities not
listed in the table could also be
regulated. To determine whether a
stationary source is regulated by this
action, carefully examine the provisions
associated with the list of substances
and thresholds under §68.130 (59 FR
4478), the proposed modifications (61
FR 16598, April 15, 1996) and the stay
of implementation of the affected
provisions until the proposed
modifications are final published
elsewhere in today's Federal Register,
and the applicability criteria in §68.10
of today's rule. If you have questions
regarding the applicability of this action
to a particular entity, consult the person
listed in the preceding FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT section.
The following outline is provided to
aid in reading this preamble:
I. Introduction and Background
A. Statutory Authority
B. Background
II. Discussion of Final Rule
A. Applicability
B. Program Criteria and Requirements
C. Hazard Assessment
D. Prevention Programs
E. Emergency Response
F. Risk Management Plan (RMP)
G. Air Permitting
H. Other Issues
III. Discussion of Comments
A. Tiering
1. Rationale
2. Program 1 vs. Program 2 and Program 3
Criteria
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Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 31669
a. Potential for Offsite Impact
b. Accident History
c. Other
3. Program 2 vs. Program 3 Criteria
a. Number of Employees
b. SIC Code
c. Site-specific, Risk-based Criteria
d. Accident History
e. Other
4. Program 1 Requirements
a. Certification of No Environmental
Impact
b. Signs
c. Emergency Response Program
d. Other
5. Program 2 Requirements
a. Streamlined Program
b. Other Regulations
c. Emergency Response Program
B. Offsite Consequence Analysis
1. Worst-Case Release Scenario
2. Mitigation Systems
a. Worst-Case Release Scenario
b. Alternative Scenarios
3. Populations Affected
4. Number of Scenarios
5. Technical Guidance
6. Modeling Parameters
a. Endpoints
b. Meteorology
C. Consideration of Environmental Impact
1. Inclusion of Environmental Impacts
2. Environments to be Considered
3. Level of Analysis Required
D. Program 3 Consistency with OSHA PSM
Standard
1. Prevention Program
2. Enforcement
3. Exemptions
E. Relationship to Air Permits
1. General Relationship between the Part
68 and Part 70 programs
2. Impact of EPA's Proposal on Air
Permitting Programs
3. Part 68 as an "Applicable Requirement"
under Part 70
4. Role of the Air Permitting Authority
5. Air Permit Application Contents
6. Air Permit Contents
7. Completeness Review
8. Interaction of the Implementing Agency
and the Permitting Authority
9. Designated Agency
10. Reopening Air Permits to Incorporate
Section 112(r) Requirements
11. Use of Air Funds
12. Other Issues
F. General Definitions
1. Significant Accidental Release
2. Stationary Source
3. Process
4. Offsite
5. Other Definitions
G, Risk Management Plan (RMP)
1. Level of Detail
2. RMP Content
3. Submission
4. Other Issues
H. Prevention Program
I. Accident History
J. Emergency Response Program
K. Registration
L. Model Risk Management Programs
M. Implementing Agency Audits
N. Public Participation
O. Inherently Safer Technologies
P. Coverage by Other Regulations
1. General Issues
2. DOT Transportation Regulations
3. Other EPA Regulations
4. Other Federal Regulations
5. State and Local Regulations
Q. Industry-Specific Issues
1. Oil and Gas Facilities
2. Retail Facilities
a. Propane Retailers
b. Ammonia Retailers
3. Refrigeration Systems
4. Other Operations
R. Implementing Agency Delegation
S. Accident Reporting
T. Other Issues
l.OSHA VPP
2. Qualified Third Party
3. Documentation
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis of the Rule
V. Required Analyses
A. E.O. 12866
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
C. Unfunded Mandate Reform Act
D. Paperwork Reduction Act
E. Submission to Congress and the General
Accounting Office
I. Introduction and Background
A. Statutory Authority
This rule is promulgated under
sections 112(r), 301(a)(l), Title V of the
Clean Air Act (CAA) as amended (42
U.S.C. 7412(r), 7601 (a)(l), 7661-7661Q.
B. Background
The CAA Amendments of 1990
amend section 112 and add paragraph
(r). The intent of section 112(r) is to
prevent accidental releases to the air
and mitigate the consequences of such
releases by focusing prevention
measures on chemicals that pose the
greatest risk to the public and the
environment. Section 112(r)(3)
mandates that EPA promulgate a list of
regulated substances, with threshold
quantities; this list defines the
stationary sources that will be subject to
accident prevention regulations
mandated by section 112(r)(7). EPA
promulgated its list of substances on
January 31, 1994 (59 FR 4478) ("List
Rule").
As noted elsewhere in today's Federal
Register, EPA has stayed certain
provisions of part 68 that were
promulgated as part of the List Rule.
The stayed provisions are being
addressed in amendments to the List
Rule, which were proposed in 61 FR
16598 (April 15, 1996). Therefore, EPA
has not taken final action on provisions
of the Risk Management Program rule
that apply to regulated substances,
mixtures, and stationary sources
addressed by the stayed provisions.
Final action will be deferred until EPA
takes final action on the proposed
amendments to the List Rule.
Section 112(r)(7) mandates that EPA
promulgate regulations and develop
guidance to prevent, detect, and
respond to accidental releases.
Stationary sources covered by these
regulations must develop and
implement a risk management program
that includes a hazard assessment, a
prevention program, and an emergency
response program. The risk management
program must be described in a risk
management plan (RMP) that must be
registered with EPA, submitted to state
and local authorities, and made
available to the public. On October 20,
1993, EPA published a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) for the
section 112(r)(7) regulations (58 FR
54190). (For a summary of the statutory
requirements of section 112(r) and
related statutory provisions, see the
October 20, 1993, NPRM).
Following publication of the proposed
rule, EPA held four public hearings and
received approximately 770 written
comments. Because of these comments,
EPA issued a supplemental notice of
proposed rulemaking (SNPRM) on
March 13, 1995 (60 FR 13526) for
comment on: approaches for setting
different requirements for sources that
pose different levels of hazard (tiering);
worst-case releases and other hazard
assessment issues; accident information
reporting; public participation;
inherently safer approaches; and
implementation and integration of
section 112(r) with state programs,
particularly state air permitting
programs. EPA held a public hearing on
March 31, 1995, in Washington, DC, and
received more than 280 written
comments. Today's rule reflects EPA's
consideration of all comments; major
issues raised by commenters and EPA's
response are briefly discussed in
Section III of this preamble. A summary
of all comments submitted and EPA's
response to them is available in the
Docket (see ADDRESSES).
EPA has proposed to delist explosives
from §68.130. Consequently, explosives
are not addressed in this rule. EPA had
also requested at the time of the final
List Rule comments on whether
flammable substances, when used as
fuel, posed a lesser intrinsic hazard than
the same substance handled otherwise
(59 FR 4500, January 31, 1994). The
comments submitted lacked data that
would justify a lesser level of hazard
consideration for flammable fuels;
hence, the Agency will not adopt a fuel
use exemption for purposes of threshold
quantity determination.
With today's rule, EPA continues the
philosophy that the Agency embraced in
implementing the Emergency Planning
and Community Right-to-Know Act of
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31670 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations
1986 (BPCRA). Specifically. EPA
recognizes that regulatory requirements,
by themselves, will not guarantee safety.
Instead, EPA believes that information
about hazards in a community can and
should lead public officials and the
general public to work with industry to
prevent accidents. For example, today's
rule requires covered sources to provide
Information about possible worst-case
scenarios. EPA intends that officials and
the public use this information to
understand the chemical hazards in the
community and then engage in a
dialogue with industry to reduce risk. In
this way, accident prevention is focused
primarily at the local level where the
risk is found. Further, today's rule
builds on existing programs and
standards. For example, EPA has
coordinated with Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) and
the Department of Transportation (DOT)
in developing this regulation. To the
extent possible, covered sources will not
face inconsistent requirements under
these agencies* rules. EPA is
encouraging sources to use existing
emergency response programs, rather
than develop a separate and duplicative
program under this rule. In addition,
today's rule scales requirements based
on the potential risk posed by a source
and the steps needed to address the risk,
rather than Imposing identical
requirements on all sources.
To accommodate the concerns of
smalt businesses, EPA is providing
guidance with reference tables that
covered sources can use to model the
ofTsite consequences of a release. EPA is
providing a model RMP guidance for the
ammonia refrigeration industry, and
will develop similar guidance for
propane handlers and drinking water
systems. As today's rule is
implemented, EPA hopes that other
industry sectors will work with EPA to
develop model RMPs for other
processes, thereby reducing costs for
individual sources. Finally, today's rule
requires industry to submit RMPs
centrally in a format and method to be
determined by EPA. Working with
stakeholders, EPA will develop
mechanisms to allow industry to use
appropriate electronic technology to
register with EPA and submit RMPs. In
turn, all interested parties will be able
to access electronically the data in
RMPs. This method of submission and
access avoids a potentially significant
amount of paperwork for all involved
parties and promotes uniformity. Users
will be able to develop databases for
specific purposes and compare RMPs
for various sites across the country. In
turn, industries' use of the data will
promote continuous improvement, for
example, through new safety
technologies. As the method for
submitting RMPs is developed, EPA
invites the participation of all
stakeholders, including industry, state
and local governments, local emergency
planning committees, environmental
groups, and the general public.
II. Discussion of Final Rule
A. Applicability
The owner or operator of a stationary
source that has more than a threshold
quantity of a regulated substance in a
process must comply with these
requirements no later than June 21,
1999: three years after the date on which
a regulated substance is first listed
under § 68.130; or the date on which a
regulated substance is first present in
more than a threshold quantity in a
process, whichever is later.
B. Program Criteria and Requirements
Under today's rule, processes subject
to these requirements are divided into
three tiers, labeled Programs 1, 2, and 3.
TABLE 1—PROGRAM ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA
EPA has adopted the term "Program" to
replace the term "Tier" found in the
SNPRM to avoid confusion with Tier I
and Tier II forms submitted under
EPCRA, also known as Title III of the
Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA
Title III). Eligibility for any given
Program is based on process criteria so
that classification of one process in a
Program does not influence the
classification of other processes at the
source. For example, if a process meets
Program 1 criteria, the source need only
satisfy Program 1 requirements for that
process, even if other processes at the
source are subject to Program 2 or
Program 3. A source, therefore, could
have processes in one or more of the
three Programs.
Program 1 is available to any process
that has not had an accidental release
with offsite consequences in the five
years prior to the submission date of the
RMP and has no public receptors within
the distance to a specified toxic or
flammable endpoint associated with a
worst-case release scenario. Program 3
applies to processes in Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes
2611 (pulp mills), 2812 (chlor-alkali),
2819 (industrial inorganics). 2821
(plastics and resins), 2865 (cyclic
crudes), 2869 (industrial organics), 2873
(nitrogen fertilizers), 2879 (agricultural
chemicals), and 2911 (petroleum
refineries). Program 3 also applies to all
processes subject to the OSHA Process
Safety Management (PSM) standard (29
CFR 1910.119), unless the process is
eligible for Program 1. Owners or
operators will need to determine
individual SIC codes for each covered
process to determine whether Program 3
applies. All other covered processes
must satisfy Program 2 requirements.
Program requirements and differences
are illustrated on Tables 1 and 2:
Program 1
No offsita accident history
No public receptors In worst-case circle
Emergency response coordinated with local re-
s ponders
Program 2
The process is not eligible for Program 1 or 3
Program 3
Process is subject to OSHA PSM.
Process is in SIC code 2611, 2812, 2819,
2821, 2865, 2869, 2873, 2879, or 2911.
TABLE 2—COMPARISON OF PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS
Program 1
Hazard Assessment:
Worst'Cuse analysis . .
Management Program:
Program 2
Worst-case analysis
Alternative releases .. .
5-year accident history
Document manaaement svstem
Program 3
Worst-case analysis.
Alternative releases.
5-year accident history.
Document management system.
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Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 31671
TABLE 2—COMPARISON OF PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS—Continued
Program 1
Program 2
Program 3
Prevention Program:
Certify no additional steps needed
Emergency Response Program:
Coordinate with local responders .
Risk Management Plan Contents:
Executive Summary
Registration
Worst-case data
5-year accident history
Certification
Safety Information
Hazard Review
Operating Procedures
Training
Maintenance
Incident Investigation .,
Compliance Audit
Develop plan and program
Executive Summary
Regisfration
Worst-case data
Alternative release data
5-year accident history
Prevention program data ...
Emergency response data
Certification
Process Safety Information.
Process Hazard Analysis.
Operating Procedures.
Training.
Mechanical Integrity.
Incident Investigation.
Compliance Audit.
Management of Change.
Pre-startup Review.
Contractors.
Employee Participation.
Hot Work Permits.
Develop plan and program.
Executive Summary
Registration.
Worst-case data.
Alternative release data.
5-year accident history.
Prevention program data.
Emergency response data.
Certification.
The owner or operator of a covered
process must: (1) prepare and submit a
single risk management plan (RMP),
including registration that covers all
affected processes and chemicals; (2)
conduct a worst-case release scenario
analysis, review accident history, ensure
emergency response procedures are
coordinated with community response
organizations to determine eligibility for
Program 1 and, if eligible, document the
worst case and complete a Program 1
certification for the RMP; (3) conduct a
hazard assessment, document a
management system, implement a more
extensive, but still streamlined
prevention program, and implement an
emergency response program for
Program 2 processes; and (4) conduct a
hazard assessment, document a
management system, implement a
prevention program that is
fundamentally identical to the OSHA
PSM Standard, and implement an
emergency response program for
Program 3 processes.
Measures taken by sources to comply
with OSHA PSM for any process that
meets OSHA's PSM standard are
sufficient to comply with the prevention
program requirements of all three
Programs. EPA will retain" its authority
to enforce the prevention program
requirements and the general duty
requirements of CAA Section 112(r)(l).
EPA and OSHA are working closely to
coordinate interpretation and
enforcement of PSM and accident
prevention programs. EPA will also
work with state and local agencies to
coordinate oversight of worker and
public safety and environmental
protection programs.
C. Hazard Assessment
EPA has adopted the worst-case
definition proposed in the SNPRM. For
all substances, the worst-case release
scenario will be defined as the release
of the largest quantity of a regulated
substance from a vessel or process line
failure, including administrative
controls and passive mitigation that
limit the total quantity involved or the
release rate. For most gases, the worst-
case release scenario assumes that the
quantity is released in 10 minutes. For
liquids, the scenario assumes an
instantaneous spill; the release rate to
the air is the volatilization rate from a
pool 1 cm deep unless passive
mitigation systems contain the
substance in a smaller area. For
flammables, the worst case assumes an
instantaneous release and a vapor cloud
explosion.
For the final rule, EPA has adopted
the term "alternative release scenarios"
to replace the term "other more likely
scenarios" found in the NPRM and
SNPRM. The non-worst-case accidental
releases for the hazard assessment
portion of the risk management plan
were presumed "more likely to occur"
and "more realistic" than the worst
case. EPA believes sources should have
flexibility to select non-worst-case
scenarios that are the most useful for
communication with the public and first
responders and for emergency response
preparedness and planning.
Catastrophic accidental releases are
typically rare events; the words "more
likely" suggests certainty of occurrence.
Consequently, the scenarios other than
worst case provided in the hazard
assessment are called alternative release
scenarios. For alternative scenarios,
sources may consider the effects of both
. passive and active mitigation systems.
One worst-case release scenario will
be defined to represent all toxics, and
one worst-case release scenario will be
defined to represent all flammables held
above the threshold at the source.
Additional worst-case release
scenario(s) must be analyzed and
reported if such a release from another
covered process at the source
potentially affects public receptors that
would not be potentially affected by the
first scenario. EPA recognizes that this
approach may be problematic for some
sources such as batch processors and
warehouses where use of listed
substances or inventory may vary
considerably within an RMP reporting
period. EPA suggests that owners or
operators of such processes develop a
worst-case scenario for future chemical
use and inventory based on past
practices to minimize the need for
frequent revision of their worst-case
scenario. For alternative release
scenarios, one scenario is required for
each toxic substance and one to
represent all flammable substances held
in covered processes at the source.
An endpoint is needed for the offsite
consequence analysis. Appendix A of
today's rule lists the endpoints for toxic
substances that must be used in worst-
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31672 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations
case and alternative scenario
assessment. The endpoint for a toxic
substance is its Emergency Response
Planning Guideline level 2 (ERPG-2)
developed by the American Industrial
Hygiene Association (AIHA). If a
substance has no ERPG-2, then the
endpoint is the level of concern (LOG)
from the Technical Guidance for
Hazards Analysis, updated where
necessary to reflect new toxicity data.
EPA recognizes the limitations
associated with ERPG-2 and LOC values
and is working with other agencies to
develop Acute Exposure Guideline
Limits (AEGLs). When these values have
been developed and peer-reviewed, EPA
intends to adopt them through
rulemaking as the toxic endpoints for
this rule. For flammables, vapor cloud
explosion distances will be based on an
overpressure of 1 psi; for alternative
flammable releases, radiant heat
distances will be based on an exposure
of 5 kW/m2 for 40 seconds. For vapor
cloud fires and jet fires, the lower
flammabllity limit provided by the
National Fire Protection Association
(NFPA) or other sources shall be used.
EPA selected 1.5 meter per second
(m/s) wind speed and F atmospheric
stability class as the default worst-case
scenario meteorological conditions. If
the owner or operator has
meteorological data that show that
higher minimum wind speeds or less
stable atmospheric class conditions
existed at the source at all times in the
previous three years, then the higher
wind speed and different stability class
may be used. Alternative release
analyses may use site-specific, typical
meteorological conditions. If the owner
or operator has no data on typical
meteorological conditions, then
conditions used in the RMP Offsite
Consequence Analysis Guidance (3 m/s
and D stability), may be used. Although
EPA is providing technical guidance
and reference tables for worst-case and
alternative release scenario assessments,
owners or operators may use any
generally recognized, commercially or
publicly available air dispersion
modeling techniques, provided the
modeling parameters specified in the
rule are used.
For the hazard assessment and the
RMP, populations potentially affected
are defined as those within a circle that
has as its center the point'of release and
its radius the distance to the toxic or
flammable endpoint. Owners or
operators may use Census data to define
this population, and may update those
data if they are inaccurate. EPA suggests
that owners or operators use LandView,
an electronic publication of
environmental, geographic and
demographic information published by
EPA and the Bureau of Census. The
presence of schools, hospitals, other
institutions, public arenas, recreational
areas, and large commercial and
industrial developments that can be
identified on street maps within this
circle must be noted in the RMP, but the
number of people occupying them need
not be enumerated. The presence of
environmental receptors within this
circle must also be listed. EPA has
defined environmental receptors as
natural areas such as national or state
parks, forests, or monuments; officially
designated wildlife sanctuaries,
preserves, refuges, or areas; and Federal
wilderness areas, that can be exposed to
an accidental release. All of these can be
identified on local U.S. Geological
Survey maps or maps based on USGS
data.
The five-year accident history will
cover all accidents involving regulated
substances, but only from covered
processes at the source that resulted in
serious on site or certain known offsite
impacts in the five years prior to the
submission of each RMP. EPA has
replaced the definition of significant
accidental release with specific
definitions of the types of releases to be
covered under each of the specific
requirements previously associated with
this definition.
D. Prevention Programs
EPA has retained the management
system requirement proposed in the
NPRM, but only for Program 2 and 3
processes. EPA has moved the
management system requirement from
the prevention program section to the
general requirements section because it
should be designed to oversee the
implementation of all elements of the
risk management program. The owner or
operator must designate a qualified
person or position with overall
responsibility for the program and
specify the lines of authority if
responsibility for implementing
individual requirements is assigned to
other persons or positions.
In the SNPRM, EPA proposed a
Program 2 prevention program that
covered training, maintenance, safety
precautions, and monitoring, but did
not specify any particular actions. EPA
solicited comment on whether specific
prevention activities should be required
for Program 2 sources, such as any of
the specific activities initially proposed
in the NPRM. For today's rule, EPA has
developed seven specific elements for
the Program 2 prevention program:
safety information (§68.48), hazard
review (§68.50), operating procedures
(§68.52), training (§68.54), maintenance
(§ 68.56), compliance audits (§ 68.58),
and incident investigation (§ 68.60).
Most Program 2 processes are likely to
be relatively simple and located at
smaller businesses. EPA believes
owners or operators of Program 2
processes can successfully prevent
accidents without a program as detailed
as the OSHA PSM, which was primarily
designed for the chemical industry. EPA
combined and tailored elements
common to OSHA's PSM and EPA's
NPRM to generate Program 2
requirements and applied them to non-
petrochemical industry processes. EPA
is also developing model risk
management programs (and RMPs) for
several industry sectors that will have
Program 2 processes. These model
guidances will help sources comply by
providing standard elements that can be
adopted to a specific source. EPA
expects that many Program 2 processes
will already be in compliance with most
of the requirements through compliance
with other Federal regulations, state
laws, industry standards and codes, and
good engineering practices.
The Program 3 prevention program
includes the requirements of the OSHA
PSM standard, 29 CFR 1910.119 (c)
through (m) and (o), with minor
wording changes to address statutory
differences. This makes it clear that one
accident prevention program to protect
workers, the general public, and the
environment will satisfy both OSHA
and EPA. For elements that are in both
the EPA and OSHA rules, EPA has used
OSHA's language verbatim, with the
following changes: the replacement of
the terms "highly hazardous substance,"
"employer," "standard" and "facility"
with "regulated substance," "owner or
operator," "part or rule," and
"stationary source"; the deletion of
specific references to workplace impacts
or to "safety and health;" changes to
specific schedule dates; and changes to
references within the standard. The
"safety and health" and "workplace
impacts" references occur in OSHA's
PSM standard in process safety
information (29 CFR 1910.119 (d)(2)(E)).
process hazards analysis (29 CFR
1910.119(e)(3)(vii)), and incident
investigation (29 CFR 1910.119(rn)(l)).
These changes are designed to ensure
that OSHA retains its oversight of
actions designed to protect workers
while EPA retains its oversight of
actions to protect public health arid the
environment and to remove possible
interpretations that certain elements of
process safety management fail to
account for offsite impacts. Commeriters
were particularly concerned about the
phase-in of process hazard analyses
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Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 31673
(PHAs). Under the final rule, PHAs
conducted for OSHA are considered
adequate to meet EPA's requirements.
They will be updated on the OSHA
schedule (i.e., by the fifth anniversary of
their initial completion). This approach
will eliminate any need for duplicative
analyses. Documentation for the PHA
developed for OSHA will be sufficient
to meet EPA's purposes.
EPA anticipates that sources whose
processes are already in compliance
with OSHA PSM will not need to take
any additional steps or create any new
documentation to comply with EPA's
Program 3 prevention program. Any
PSM modifications necessary to account
for protection of public health and the
environment along with protection of
workers can be made when PSM
elements are updated under the OSHA
requirements. EPA has modified the
OSHA definition of catastrophic release,
which serves as the trigger for an
incident investigation, to include events
"that present imminent and substantial
endangerment to public health and the
environment." As a result, this rule
requires investigation of accidental
releases that pose a risk to the public or
the environment, whereas the OSHA
rule does not. EPA recognizes that
catastrophic accidental releases
primarily affect the workplace and that
this change will have little effect on
incident investigation programs already
established. However, EPA needs to
ensure that deviations that could have
had only an offsite impact are also
addressed.
E. Emergency Response
EPA has adopted the emergency
response requirements found in the
statute, without additional specific
planning requirements beyond those
necessary to implement the statute. This
action is consistent with the Agency's
effort to develop a single Federal
approach for emergency response
planning. The Presidential Review of
Federal release prevention, mitigation,
and response authorities (required
under section 112(r)(10) of the Clean Air
Act) found that there is seldom harmony
in the required formats or elements of
response plans prepared to meet various
Federal regulations. Accordingly, EPA
has committed not to specify new plan
elements and/or a specific plan format
in today's rule beyond those that are
statutorily required. EPA believes that
plans developed to comply with other
EPA contingency planning requirements
and the OSHA Hazardous Waste and
Emergency Operations (HAZWOPER)
rule (29 CFR 1910.120) will meet most
of the requirements for the emergency
response program. In addition, EPA and
other National Response Team agencies
have prepared Integrated Contingency
Plan Guidance ("one plan") (NRTJ May
1996). The NRT and the agencies
responsible for reviewing and approving
federal response plans to which the one
plan option applies agree that integrated
response plans prepared in the format
provided in this guidance will be
acceptable and be the federally
preferred method of response planning.
An emergency response plan that
includes the elements specified in this
guidance can be used to meet the
requirements in today's rule. The final
rule also provides relief for sources that
are too small to respond to releases with
their own employees: these sources will
not be required to develop emergency
response plans provided that
procedures for notifying non-employee
emergency responders have been
adopted and that appropriate responses
to their hazards have been addressed in
the community emergency response
plan developed under EPCRA (42 U.S.C.
11003) for toxics or coordinated with
the local fire department for
flammables.
F. Risk Management Plan (RMP)
Owners or operators must submit
their first RMP by the date specified in
§ 68.10. After the RMP is submitted,
changes at the source may require
updates to the RMP other than the
standard update every five years. If a
new substance or new process is added,
the RMP will need to be revised and
submitted by the date the substance is
first in the process above the threshold
quantity. If changes to processes require
revised hazard assessments or PHAs, or
if a process changes Program level, the
source must submit a revised RMP
within six months.
EPA intends that the RMP will be
submitted in a method and format to a
central point as specified by EPA.
States, local entities including local
emergency planning committees
(LEPCs), and the public will be able to
access all RMPs electronically. This
process will relieve states and local
entities of the burden of filing
documents and providing public access
to them without limiting these agencies'
or the public's access to the information.
The RMP is a multi-purpose
document. The CAA requires that the
RMP indicate compliance with the
regulations and also include the hazard
assessment, prevention program, and
emergency response program. EPA is
mandated to develop a program for
auditing RMPs and requiring revisions,
where appropriate. The RMP, therefore,
must include enough data to allow the
implementing agency to determine,
through review of the RMP, whether the
source is in compliance with the rule.
EPA, however, believes that the RMP
must serve another function; to provide
information to the public in a form that
will be understandable and will
encourage the public to use the
information to improve the dialogue
with sources on issues related to
prevention and preparedness.
To meet both of these purposes, the
RMP will consist of the source's
registration; an executive summary that
will provide a brief description of the
source's activities as they relate to
covered processes and program
elements; and data elements that
address compliance with each of the
rule elements. While the public and
implementing agencies could make use
of all sections of the RMP, the executive
summary will provide text descriptions
and give the source a chance to explain
its programs in a format that will be
easy for communities to read and
understand. The data elements will
provide the implementing agency with
the basic data it needs to assess
compliance without asking for detailed
documentation. The Agency is
considering development of an RMP
form where the data elements of the
form would provide the implementing
agency with the basic data it needs to
assess compliance without asking for
detailed documentation. All data
elements would be checkoff boxes, yes/
no answers, or numerical entries.
This approach will provide data that
anyone can download or search. States,
communities, trade associations, or
public interest groups may want to use
the data or a subset of the data to create
databases that allow them to compare
sources in the same industry or same
area. For example, a local entity will be
able to download data from all reporting
sources that are similar to ones in its
community to determine whether the
quantities stored and process controls
used are typical. The information will
provide the public with data that will
enhance their dialogue with sources. It
will also help sources and trade
associations to understand practices in
their industries and identify practices
that could be used to reduce risks. The
risk management program
documentation will remain at the source
and will be available for review by EPA
and the implementing agency.
G. Air Permitting
The SNPRM discussed the
relationship between section 112(r) and
CAA air permitting requirements for
sources subject to both provisions.
Under the CAA, air permitting
authorities must ensure that sources are
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31674 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations
in compliance with applicable
requirements to issue a permit. Because
section 112(r) is an applicable
requirement, EPA has identified in the
final rule the permit conditions and the
actions owners or operators and air
permitting authorities must take to
ensure compliance. The permit must
identify part 68 as an applicable
requirement and establish conditions
that require the owner or operator of the
source to submit either a compliance
schedule for meeting the requirements
of part 68 by the date specified in
§68.10(a) or, as part of the compliance
certification submitted under 40 CFR
70.6(c)(5), a certification statement that,
to the best of the owner or operator's
knowledge, the source is in compliance
with all requirements of this part,
Including the registration and
submission of the RMP. The owner or
operator must also submit any
additional relevant information
requested by the air permitting authority
or designated agency to ensure
compliance with the requirements of
this section. If a permit is already issued
that does not contain the provisions
described above, then, the owner or
operator or air permitting authority shall
Initiate permit revision or reopening
according to the procedures in 40 CFR
70.7 or 71.7 to incorporate the terms and
conditions as described above. KPA aLso
allows the state to assign the authority
to implement and enforce these
requirements to another agency or
agencies (the "designated agency") to
take advantage of resources or accident
prevention expertise that might be
available in these other agencies.
Finally, the air permitting authority or
designated agency must: (1) Verify that
the source owner or operator has
registered and submitted an RMP or a
revised plan when required; (2) verify
that the source owner or operator has
submitted the proper certification or
compliance schedule: (3) for some or all
sources, use one or more mechanisms
such as. but not limited to, a
completeness check, source audits,
record reviews or facility inspections to
ensure that permitted sources are in
compliance: and (4) initiate enforcement
action, based on the requirements of this
section, as appropriate.
H. Other Issues
In the SNPRM, EPA discussed three
other issues raised by commenters:
accident information reporting, public
participation, and inherently safer
technologies. EPA has decided not to
develop any requirements related to
these issues at this time. Although EPA
continues to believe that accident
reports that provide more detail on the
causes and impacts of accidents could
be useful, the Agency has decided to
limit such reporting required under this
rule to the five-year accident history
mandated by the CAA. When necessary,
EPA will use its authority to investigate
individual accidents and to seek
additional information to the extent
authorized by CAA section 114 (i.e., to
determine compliance with this rule
and CAA section 112(r) (1), to support
further rule development, and to assist
research on hazard assessment).
Secondly, the Agency encourages
sources, the public, and local entities to
work together on accident prevention
issues, but believes that the wide variety
and large number of sources subject to
this rule make any single mandatory
approach to public participation
inappropriate. RMP information should
be used as the basis for dialogue
between the community and sources on
accidental release prevention, risk
reduction and preparedness for
emergency response. Industry and the
public should continue to use the LEPC
as a mechanism for this dialogue.
Finally, EPA does not believe that a
requirement that owners or operators
conduct searches or analyses of
alternative process technologies for new
or existing processes will produce
significant additional benefits. Many
rommeiiters, including those who
sup[x>rt those analyses, indicated that
an ass«!SstiK>nt of inherently safer design
alternatives has the most benefit in the
development of new processes. Industry
generally examines new process
alternatives to avoid the addition of
more costly administrative or
engineering controls associated with a
design that may be more hazardous in
nature. Although some existing
processes may be judged to be
inherently less safe than others, EPA
believes most of these processes can be
safely operated through management
and control of the hazards without
spending resources searching for
unavailable or unaffordable new process
technologies. Application of good PHA
techniques often reveals opportunities
for continuous improvement of existing
processes and operations without a
separate analysis of alternatives. EPA
encourages owners or operators to
continue to examine and adopt viable
alternative processing technologies,
system safeguards, or process
modifications to make new and existing
processes and operations inherently
safer. Through the process and
prevention program information in the
RMP, sources can demonstrate, and
users of the RMP information can
observe and promote, progress toward
safer processes and operations.
EPA is considering the development
of incentives and awards to stimulate
inherently safer alternative research and
development, public outreach and
education, and risk communication
efforts. The Agency welcomes ideas and
participation in this effort.
III. Discussion of Comments
EPA received 1220 comments,
including 180 relevant comments
submitted for the List Rule, 757
comments on the NPRM, and 283
comments on the SNPRM. The
commenters represented 92 chemical
manufacturers, 81 other chemical users,
111 petroleum industry companies, 174
industry trade associations, 40 other
trade associations, 58 agricultural
supply retailers, 102 propane retailers,
132 explosives users, 29 water treatment
facilities, 26 utilities, 66 state agencies,
63 local governments, 8 other Federal
agencies, 52 academics and consultants,
61 environmental groups, 6 labor
unions, and 31 private citizens. The
remaining 88 letters were requests for
extensions of the comment period,
interim or duplicate sets of comments,
or had been sent to the incorrect docket.
The major issues raised by the
commenters are briefly addressed
below; a complete presentation of the
Agency's response to the comments
received on this rulemaking is available
in the Risk Management Program Rule:
Summary and Response to Comments in
the docket (see ADDRESSES).
Many commenters requested that
EPA's list be identical to OSHA's list of
highly hazardous substances and no
thresholds should be less than OSHA's.
These comments were addressed in the
final list rule (59 FR 4478; January 21,
1994) and background material related
to these issues is available in docket
number A-91-74 (see ADDRESSES).
A. Tiering
Commenters on the NPRM suggested
that EPA create different levels of
requirements for sources that pose
different risks. In the SNPRM, EPA
proposed three tiers: a low hazard tier
for sources whose worst-case release
would not affect any public or
environmental receptors of concern; a
medium hazard tier for sources that
were not eligible or covered by the; low
or high hazard tiers; and a high hazard
tier based on either industry sector
accident history and number of
employees or simply based on the
number of employees. Generally,
commenters were concerned that all
processes at a source would need to be
eligible for Program 1 before any process
could be. EPA has revised the rule to
clarify that eligibility for any tier
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Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 31675
(Program) is based on process criteria,
not source. If a process meets Program
1 criteria, the owners or operators need
only meet Program 1 requirements for
that process even if other processes at
the source are subject to Program 2 or
Program 3.
1. Rationale. Only 2 of the 57
commenters opposed tiering arguing
that the -CAA mandates that all covered
sources be required to complete a full
prevention program and that Congress
had considered and rejected
exemptions. One commenter argued that
EPA had already accounted for
"differences in size, operations,
processes, class and categories of
sources" in developing the list and
thresholds. Most commenters supported
tiering as an appropriate way to
recognize different levels of risks and to
allow sources and emergency
responders to focus on the highest risk
processes.
EPA disagrees that the CAA requires
all covered processes to comply with
the same detailed risk management
program. EPA listed regulated
substances because of their inherent
hazards, such as toxicity and volatility.
EPA did not consider, nor does the CAA
indicate that it may consider,
"differences in size, operations,
processes, class and categories of
sources" in selecting chemicals or
setting thresholds. In establishing
section 112(r)(7) requirements, however,
Congress clearly recognized that a "one-
size-fits-all" approach may not be
appropriate for these regulations and
directed EPA to consider these factors in
the development of the accident
prevention regulations. Furthermore,
EPA strongly disputes the assertion that
it has exempted any source from
regulation by creating different
programs for different sources. As noted
below, all covered processes will be
addressed in RMPs that contain hazard
assessment, prevention, and response
information, as required by statute.
2. Program 1 vs. Program 2 and
Program 3 Criteria. Commenters
generally supported Program 1 for low-
risk sources, but argued that few, if any,
sources would qualify because the
requirements were too stringent.
a. Potential for Offsite Impact.
Commenters generally agreed that
sources that can demonstrate no offsite
impact should be eligible for Program 1,
but only public health should be
considered, not environmental impacts.
Others stated that only sources posing a
threat of "considerable" impacts should
not be eligible for Program 1. One
commenter stated that EPA's worst-case
scenario is unrealistic and its use as a
Program 1 trigger is unreasonable. Other
commenters want EPA to allow site-
specific modeling for the offsite
consequence analysis, rather than look-
up tables.
In today's rule, EPA specifically
allows owners or operators to use site-
specific air dispersion modeling for
their offsite consequence analyses. EPA
disagrees that offsite impacts should be
limited to "considerable" impacts.
When offsite impacts are possible, it
may be reasonable to implement some
additional measures to reduce
accidental releases, especially when the
burden of measures such as additional
training or safety precautions is low.
Programs 2 and 3 provide flexibility to
allow source-specific consideration of
the appropriate level of effort. Program
1 requires no additional prevention
measures, which is only categorically
justifiable if such measures would not
reduce offsite impact. It is reasonable to
couple a no impact criterion with a
conservative worst-case scenario to
conclude categorically the public would
not benefit from additional prevention
measures. If no impact can be
demonstrated for a conservative worst-
case release, then no impact is likely to
occur for any other release event, and
the process could be judged to pose a
low threat to the surrounding area.
EPA has decided that potential impact
on environmental receptors resulting
from a worst-case scenario will not be
a criterion to determine eligibility for
Program 1. EPA agrees that very little,
if any, data exist on the potential acute
environmental impacts or
environmental endpoints associated
with listed chemicals upon accidental
release. In addition, the offsite
consequence distances estimated using
human acute toxicity or overpressure
effects may not be directly relevant to
environmental effects. However, owners
or operators will be required to
document in the RMP the presence of
such receptors within the distance
determined for the worst case. EPA
believes that natural resource agencies
and the public will be able to benefit
from the environmental receptors
information in the RMP in discussions
with the source.
b. Accident History for Program 1.
Many commenters objected to accident
history as a Program 1 criterion, arguing
that a process that had a significant
accidental release in the previous five
years may have been changed to reduce
or eliminate future events and public
impact. Several commenters suggested
that such processes that otherwise meet
Program 1 criteria should remain
eligible, but be required to justify and
document the changes. Some
commenters also objected to EPA's
proposed definition of significant
accidental release, arguing that many
companies and emergency responders
conservatively evacuate or shelter-in-
place during minor incidents. Under the
proposed definition, these actions
disqualify a process from Program 1
even if there were no offsite impacts.
Some commenters stated that the
accident history provision was
unnecessary because, by definition, a
Program 1 process is not capable of an
accidental release that could affect
public receptors.
EPA has decided to retain the
accident history criterion for Program 1
processes, excluding events with
evacuations and shelterings in place,
and to drop the definition of significant
accidental release. Program 1 eligibility
is not a one-time exercise; owners or
operators must certify in each RMP that
no qualifying releases have occurred
since the previous RMP submission and
provide current worst-case release data
indicating no offsite impacts are
anticipated in the future. Program 1
criteria and accident history provide
owners or operators an opportunity to
demonstrate to the community ongoing
excellence in accident prevention and
an incentive to search for and
implement ways, such as inventory
reduction, to reduce the potential for
offsite impacts associated with large
scale accidental releases. Further, the
unique circumstances surrounding past
accidents can provide a reality check on
the theoretical modeling and worst-case
scenario claims used for the offsite
consequence assessment and serve to
verify that administrative controls and
passive mitigation measures work as
intended. EPA decided to delete public
evacuations or shelterings-in-place as
criteria for Program 1 eligibility. EPA is
that inclusion of these criteria in
Program 1 eligibility may create a
perverse incentive not to report releases
and it may encourage sources and local
emergency officials to take more
chances during an event when there
may be potential exposures that do not
rise to the endpoint specified in this
rule but would otherwise be worthy of
precautionary actions by the source or
by local officials. If the evacuation or
sheltering takes place because of a
concern for public exposure to an
endpoint as specified in this rule, then
public receptors necessarily would be
under the worst case distance and the
process would not be eligible for
Program 1 under the criteria of the rule.
Owners or operators of processes that
meet Program 1 eligibility requirements
are required to report a 5 year accident
history for that process. If local
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31676 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations
emergency planners, first responders or
the public have concerns about
processes In Program 1 because of a past
evacuation orsheltering-in-place event,
then mechanisms under EPCRA could
be used to gather more information from
the source about its prevention program
(such as EPCRA sections 302(b)(2)
[designation of a facility if it does not
already handle extremely hazardous
substances listed under section 302] and
303(d)(3) (provision of information to
the emergency planning committee])
and Involve the source in emergency
planning. Sources and local first
responders should be discussing
evacuation and sheltering-in-place
criteria and decisions as part of
emergency response planning.
c. Other. Many commenters asked that
specific industries such as ammonia
refrigeration, retail fertilizer outlets, all
flammables, and all non-PSM sources be
assigned to Program 1. EPA disagrees
because each source has unique
surroundings that must be considered in
the worst-case assessment and each
source must demonstrate favorable
accident history. All ammonia
refrigeration units covered by this rule
are already subject to OSHA PSM; many
of these have had accidents that affected
the community and should be required
to complete the requirements of the
hazard assessment and emergency
response program and provide the
community with full RMP information.
According to the industry, a typical
ammonia fertilizer retailer handles 200
Jons of ammonia. Some retailers may be
very geographically isolated and can
qualify for Program 1, but EPA expects
that most will be subject to Program 2.
Given the large quantity of ammonia
involved. EPA considers it important
that the community have information on
ofCsUc consequences from these sources
and that the owner or operator takes the
necessary steps to address accidental
release prevention and emergency
response.
EPA expects that some sources
handling flammables will qualify for
Program 1 because the distance to a 1
psi overpressure is generally less than
distances to toxic endpoints.
Nonetheless, those sources handling
flammables in sufficient quantity to
generate a potential offsite impact
should provide the community with
information on hazards and address
prevention and response steps. Many
sources handling flammables are
already subject to PSM: the only
additional steps required under this rule
are completion of the hazard assessment
and emergency response programs and
submission of an RMP.
EPA does not agree that non-PSM
sources should be assigned to Program
1. Many of these sources could have an
accidental release that can affect the
community. OSHA exempted retailers
because they are covered by other
OSHA or state regulations that address
workplace safety, not because they are
incapable of having offsite impacts. All
retailers are in Program 2 unless they
can meet Program 1 criteria; thus, they
should be taking prevention steps and
will be providing the community with
information. Compliance with other
existing Federal and state programs may
satisfy many Program 2 prevention
requirements, thereby limiting the
burden. In addition, EPA expects to
develop model risk management
programs for these sectors. Public
sources in states without delegated
OSHA programs are not covered by
OSHA PSM because OSHA is barred by
law from regulating them. Nonetheless,
these sources may pose a threat to the
community. Today's rule places these
sources in Program 2.
3. Program 2 vs. Program 3 Criteria. In
the SNPRM, EPA's preferred approach
assigned sources to Program 3 based on
SIC code and number of employees;
sources in specified SIC codes with 100
or more full-time employees (FTE)
would have been subject to the full
program in 3 years; sources in a subset
of these SIC codes with 20 to 99 FTEs
would have been subject to the full
program in 8 years. The alternative was
to impose the full program on all
sources with more than 100 FTEs. Most
SNPRM commenters submitted
suggestions and arguments about this
approach.
a. Number of Employees. Only two
commenters supported using the
number of employees as the sole
criterion, arguing it would be the easiest
approach to implement with the greatest
amount of industry participation.
Commenters opposed it because the
number of employees proposed does not
reliably correlate with risk, hazard, or
quantity on site, and because it could
act as an incentive to reduce
employment. In addition, some
commenters stated that smaller sources
may have fewer resources to manage
hazards and, therefore, may pose a
greater risk to the public.
EPA agrees and has deleted the
number of employees as a Program 3
criterion. Although size of a source in
the manufacturing sectors may be
related to the quantities on site and
complexity of the processes, many other
sources may have similar characteristics
with fewer employees. Complexity is
more directly associated with the type
of industry (i.e., SIC code) than with
number of employees; a highly
automated process may involve fewer
employees and be more complex than a
more labor intensive process. Quantity,
ifrelevant, can be directly measured
rather than indirectly by number of
employees. In addition, EPA was
concerned that the data on which the
Agency based its proposed approach
may not be representative of all
accidental releases. These data, drawn
from reports to the National Response
Center and EPA regions, appear to
indicate that larger sources have more
and larger accidental releases than do
smaller sources. This finding, however,
may in part reflect different levels of
reporting, rather than different levels of
accidents. Both Federal and state
officials report that the number of
releases has risen in recent years as
more sources learn about their reporting
obligations. EPA has decided that,
because the processes within the SIC
codes basically handle the same
chemicals in the same way, smaller
sources should not be moved to a
different Program based on the number
of employees.
b. SlC Code. Fifty-seven commenters,
particularly those in the oil industry,
utilities, and public systems, supported
the use of SIC codes based on accident
history; 28 commenters opposed it.
Supporters argued that industry
accident records represented a
reasonable criterion for identifying high
risk sources. If an entire industry has a
long history without accidental release,
it may indicate that the materials
handled and handling conditions
generate a smaller potential for serious
releases or that the industry is
effectively controlled by government or
industry standards. Some commenters
argued that industry accident histories
reflect underlying risk better than
individual source accident histories
because accidents are rare events; a
source with no accidental releases over
the previous five years is not necessarily
safe.
Commenters opposing the use of SIC
codes stated that the approach is
arbitrary, that accidents with only onsite
effects should not be used, that sources
in other industry sectors handle similar
quantities and pose similar risks, and
that sources within an industry that
have successful risk management
practices are penalized by a few isolated
sources within the industry.
EPA has decided to retain the use of
SIC codes, adding SIC 2865 based on
further review of accident histories, and
to add coverage by the OSHA PSM
standard as a separate criterion for
Program 3. EPA selected the SIC codes
by analyzing accident data filed by
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Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 31677
sources in response to EPA's request for
information in the Accidental Release
Information Program (ARIP). ARIP
collects data from certain sources that
report releases under CERCLA section
103. EPA selected the SIC codes that
showed a high frequency of the most
serious accidents across a significant
percentage of all sources within the SIC
code to avoid mischaracterizing an
industry based on isolated, problematic
sources. Data on the selection criteria
were summarized in the SNPRM and
the docket at the time of the SNPRM.
The accident history of the cyclic crudes
industry (SIC code 2865) is similar to
that of the categories selected. EPA
disagrees that only offsite impacts
should be considered; accidental
releases that caused death,
hospitalizations, or injuries on site are
also of concern because they indicate
significant safety problems that could
lead to releases that cause impacts
offsite. The SIC codes selected by EPA
are basically the same ones OSH A
selected for its PSM program inspection
focus. EPA disagrees that sources are
"penalized" by this approach because
owners or operators of processes in
these SIC codes have an opportunity to
present their safety record, demonstrate
the success of their accident prevention
programs, and communicate with ihe
local community the basis for their risk
management practices. Sources thai
receive Merit or Star status in the OSI1A
Voluntary Protection Program will be
favorably distinguished from others in
the same industry when implementing
agencies are selecting sources for audits
(see section III.T.l below).
EPA agrees that serious accidents
occur infrequently even at sources with
poor safety practices and that industry-
wide accident records provide a better
mechanism than the accident history at
a single source for identifying those
sectors whose chemicals and processes
may lead to serious releases. A high
proportion of the sources in some SIC
codes reported releases; EPA's analysis
specifically took into account the
number of reports from individual
sources to avoid selecting an SIC code
because of a small number of sources
with serious safety problems.
The OSHA PSM already applies to
most covered processes in the selected
SIC codes. EPA expects that there will
be fewer than 400 additional processes
assigned to Program 3 that are not
already subject to the OSHA PSM
standard at the approximately 1,400
sources in these SIC codes and that all
of these sources will already have other
processes covered by OSHA PSM.
Consequently, fulfilling the RMP
requirements imposes little additional
burden.
EPA decided to include all covered
processes currently subject to the OSHA
PSM standard in Program 3 to eliminate
any confusion and inconsistency
between the prevention requirements
that the owners or operators of such
processes must meet. EPA's Program 3
prevention program is identical to the
OSHA PSM standard. Including OSHA
PSM processes in Program 3, therefore,
imposes no additional burden on these
processes; the only new requirements
for such processes are the hazard
assessment, emergency response
program, and the RMP, which are the
same under Programs 2 and 3.
c. Site-Specific, Risk-based Criteria.
Many commenters stated that Program
assignment should be based on site-
specific risk-based criteria. Accident
history is one such criterion and is
discussed separately in Section
IH.A.S.d. Other criteria suggested
include population density or
proximity, quantity on site, number of
substances held above the threshold,
process conditions, toxicity, volatility,
alternative release scenario results, or
combinations of these factors as a risk
index.
FPA agrees with commenters that
Program assignments should be risk-
based to the' extent possible; however, as
the variety of suggestions indicates, a
considerable number of variables would
nc>ed to be considered. EPA knows of no
standard approach or equation that is
used and generally accepted. The
variety of suggestions indicate the
likelihood that any proposed formula
would meet opposition. No commenter
provided a method to comprehensively
address these factors on a nation-wide
basis.
An important consideration for EPA
in developing the rule provisions for
Program assignment was to avoid undue
complexity, confusion, and resource
expenditure by sources and
implementing agencies implementing
the rule's criteria. To some extent, EPA
has incorporated risk factors, including
site-specific factors, in determining
which sources are eligible for which
Program. For example, Program 1
eligibility already considers the
potential for offsite impacts; any process
for which there are no public receptors
within the distance to an endpoint from
a worst-case release may be eligible for
Program 1, provided there have been no
releases with certain offsite
consequences within the previous five
years. Today's rule allows sources to
consider passive mitigation and
administrative controls in conducting
the worst-case release analysis. Such
site-specific considerations affect the
extent of potential exposure to a worst-
case release, and thus are reflected in
the Program 1 eligibility criteria.
Elements of risk such as process
complexity and accident history are also
reflected the design of Program 2 and
Program 3 requirements and the
assignment of processes to these
Programs. Program 2 sources generally
handle and store regulated substances,
but do not react or manufacture them.
EPA believes Program 2 sources can
take prevention steps that are less
detailed than those in the OSHA PSM
standard and still accomplish accident
prevention that is protective of any
population nearby. Program 3 is
reserved for processes already subject to
the OSHA PSM standard and processes
with high accidental release histories.
The SIC codes with an accident history
selected by EPA for Program 3 are
typically complex processes. The PSM
standard was designed for, and is
particularly appropriate for, these
processes.
EPA takes issue with the
appropriateness of some of the
suggested factors. Meteorological
conditions vary too much to be
considered in determining a risk level.
Chemical quantity alone does not
accurately relate to risk because the
location and handling conditions can
dramatically change the potential for
exposures.
In addition, EPA has implementation
concerns about a detailed, national,
multi-factor, risk-based approach, were
it to be feasible. States such as Delaware
have used a simple version of a risk-
based approach and found that it
created serious problems for the state
and the sources. Smaller sources and
those without technical staff have had
great difficulty in implementing the
approach and have had to rely on state
officials to determine applicability for
them. Delaware specifically
recommended that EPA not attempt
implementing a similar approach on a
national basis because of the burden it
imposes on the state and the confusion
and uncertainty it creates for sources.
Delaware has fewer than 100 sources;
nationally, EPA estimates that 66,000
sources will be subject to the rule,
approximately 62,000 of which are
outside of the chemical and refining
sectors. If implementing agencies had to
help most of these sources determine
the index score and Program for each
process, not only would the burden on
the agencies be extreme, but
implementation would also be delayed.
Furthermore, were EPA to simply
identify risk factors without an index
and leave the determination of Program
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31678 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday. June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations
approach than those reflected by a risk
index approach.
d. Accident History. Some
commenters argued that EPA should
assign sources to Program 3 based on
the accident history of the source. One
commenter suggested that any source
with no accidental release that exceeded
a reportable quantity (as defined in
CERCLA) for the previous five years
should be in Program 2. Others argued
that a source should be in Program 2 if
it had no significant accidental release
in the previous five years. Some
commenters said that a one-release
standard was too stringent and that two
or more significant accidental releases
should be allowed before a source was
assigned to Program 3. Another
commenter suggested that a source with
no significant accidental releases in the
past five years and with few potentially
impacted neighbors should be placed in
Program 2.
Other commenters opposed this
approach, arguing that, in many cases,
sources take steps to prevent
recurrences following a serious release.
In some cases, the offsite impacts from
releases are minor and would not justify
assigning a source to a particular
Program. Other commenters stated that
the absence of an accidental release can
be indicative of lower risk, but it can
also simply mean that a release has not
yet occurred. Several oommenters noted
that a five-year time period is
statistically insignificant because
accidental releases are infrequent
events.
EPA agrees that source-specific
accident history is not a reasonable
basis for assigning processes to
Programs 2 and 3. Given the relative
infrequency of serious accidents, a five
or even ten-year period without an
accident may not be indicative of safe
operations. In addition, the criteria
necessary to define the types of past
accidental release for the purposes of
program classification would need to bo
based on a wide variety of variables and
site-specific factors, which would lead
to confusion and unnecessary
complexity. Factors such as weather
conditions at the time of the release,
rather than the size of a source or its
management practices, often determine
whether a release has offsite
consequences. EPA believes that
accident history is appropriately used
on an industry-wide basis as described
above for selection of Program 3
sources. If accidental releases with
consequences appear to occur at a large
proportion of sources within an SIC
code, where similar processes,
equipment and chemicals are used, then
it is reasonable to conclude that
level to sources or Implementing
agencies, the process for such site-
specific determinations would be even
more complex and resource intensive
Tor sources and implementing agencies;
It would create disincentives for a state
to become involved and to take on the
role of an implementing agency. EPA
believes It is better to have sources and
agencies focus their resources on
prevention activities.
EPA considered, but decided against,
a less comprehensive risk-based
approach using proximity or population
density as criteria for distinguishing
between Program 2 and 3. EPA
recognizes that accidental releases from
sources near or in densely populated
areas may harm more individuals and
be perceived to pose a greater risk than
other sources. However, as stated above,
EPA believes that the type of process, its
complexity and accident history should
be considered for Program 2 or 3
assignment, regardless of the number of
people potentially exposed. In other
words, EPA does not believe the
streamlined Program 2 prevention
elements should apply to a complex
Program 3 process just because fewer
persons could be potentially exposed or
that the Program 3 prevention elements
should apply to a Program 2 process
because more people could be
potentially exposed. EPA believes that
populations offsite should be protected
from harm based on the type of process;
the Program 2 prevention elements,
properly applied to the expected types
of Program 2 processes, serves to protect
off-site populations, just as the Program
3 prevention elements for complex
processes serves to protect offsite
populations.
if Program assignments were based on
the alternative release scenario results,
sources would not have the flexibility
and latitude in today's rule for these
scenarios because more definite criteria
would need to be considered to ensure
the proper scenarios and results are
assessed. This places more emphasis
and burden for sources on the offsite
consequence assessment rather than on
accident prevention and communication
with the public and first responders.
Furthermore, because active mitigation^
includes process and control equipment
that may fail, considering such
equipment in evaluating risk would not
be appropriate without detailed review
by the source and oversight by the
implementing agency.
Some commenters suggested yet
another variation of a less
comprehensive, "risk"-based approach
that would have EPA use a site-specific
analysis oflikelihood of release to
assign Program levels. Many of the same
difficulties in developing a "risk index"
for determining Program assignments
would apply to an attempt to
incorporate likelihood in a more
sophisticated manner than EPA was
able to do in its analysis of accident
history by SIC code. In addition to the
substance-specific properties considered
as part of the chemical listing criteria,
the site-specific likelihood of a release
depends on a number of factors,
including the appropriateness of the
equipment in use, the maintenance of
that equipment, operator performance,
and safety systems and their
performance. Evaluating site-specific
likelihood of release requires data on
each of these items; such data rarely
exist especially for complex processes
where a variety of equipment must be
evaluated along with the performance of
multiple operators and maintenance
workers. Using surrogate data (e.g.,
manufacturer's failure rate data)
introduces error of an unknown
magnitude to the analysis. Such
analyses are very costly and produce
results that are, at best, questionable.
EPA also believes that assessing the
likelihood of a release at most sites for
site-specific individualized Program-
level determinations is neither
technically feasible nor cost-effective. In
most cases, the data do not exist to
conduct a meaningful analysis; where
they do exist, the cost of developing a
defensible analysis and overseeing it
could well exceed the cost of
compliance with the rule. Such an
approach would resemble a permit
program, which would be resource-
intensive for sources and implementing
agencies. EPA determined that the
simpler approach for assigning sources
to Program 1 would provide regulatory
relief for those sources that could not
affect the public while allowing other
sources to devote their resources to
prevention activities rather than to
analyses that would be subject to legal
challenges.
EPA notes that sources have the
flexibility to implement appropriate
accident prevention measures based on
the hazards and risks discovered in the
hazard review or process hazard
analysis. The structure of Programs 2
and 3, therefore, reflect site-specific risk
criteria. Further, the purpose of the risk
management program and RMP effort is
to prevent accidents and facilitate local
level dialogue about the risks,
prevention measures, and emergency
response effort in place at the source.
The local community and first
responders may have far different
concerns that should, and can be
addressed better through today's
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Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 31679
processes in that SIC code pose a greater
likelihood of a high hazard release than
others. This approach removes the need
for at least one accident to occur at
every source that EPA believes ought to
be assigned to a particular Program,
especially when such accidents are rare
events. EPA is also concerned that using
source-specific accident history as a
criterion would create an incentive for
sources to fail to report releases. Finally,
as EPA has stated, assignments to
Program 2 and 3 also consider the
appropriateness of the prevention steps
for the types of sources. EPA believes
that both Programs move sources to
greater accident prevention.
e. Other. Some commenters asked that
the implementing agency be given
discretion to move a source into a
different Program based on local
concerns and knowledge. EPA notes
that states have the authority, under the
CAA, to impose more, but not less,
stringent standards than EPA (see CAA
section 112(r)(ll)).
A few commenters suggested that
Program 2 be limited to sources for
which a model risk management
program had been developed. The
models would be designed to reflect
risks associated with categories of
sources that all use the same type of
equipment and handle the substances in
the same way (e.g., propane retailers
and users, ammonia retailers). EPA
considered this approach and decided
that the Program 2 prevention program
provides a better, generic prevention
approach for processes for which the
more detailed PSM program would be
inappropriate. Limiting Program 2 to
those industrial sectors where industry-
specific models are feasible would place
some manufacturing sources at a
disadvantage simply because their
chemical uses, processes, and
equipment were too varied to allow
development of a model or because
there are too few sources to justify use
of EPA or industry resources to develop
a model. In addition, if EPA were to
limit Program 2 to sources with model
programs, Program 2 regulations would
need sufficient specificity to enforce the
use of these models; otherwise, sources
would be able to ignore both PSM and
the models. EPA is also concerned that
codifying the model plans could stifle
innovation in safety practices. If
industry codes or other Federal
regulations on which parts of the
models may be based were updated,
EPA would have to revise its models;
given the time needed to propose and
adopt regulations, sources might have to
delay implementation of new systems
and, in some cases, might be caught
between complying with a revised EPA
or OSHA regulation or state law or
complying with the model.
Consequently, EPA decided it was better
to have models available as guidance,
but not require compliance with them.
Further, EPA believes that the key
elements of good accident prevention
practices are captured within the
requirements of the Program 2
prevention program. Model programs
and plans are likely to build on these
approaches, making it easier for sources
in Program 2 to use models that are later
developed by others.
EPA is working with industry to
develop model risk management
programs and RMPs for ammonia
refrigeration systems, propane
distributors and users, and water
treatment systems. EPA also expects to
develop models for ammonia retailers
and wastewater treatment systems. EPA
encourages other industrial sectors to
work together on additional model
development.
4. Program 1 Requirements.
Commenters were generally opposed to
posting signs, and certification of no
environmental impact.
a. Certification of No Environmental
Impact. Many commenters stated that it
would be "virtually impossible" to
certify "no potential for environmental
impacts," as required by the SNPRM.
Commenters said that the definition of
environmental impact was too vague,
that the list of environments suggested
in the SNPRM was too broad, and that
the language seemed to require a full
environmental consequence assessment,
making the requirement impossible.
One commenter noted that companies
would find it difficult to assert that
there could be "no environmental
impacts" even after an environmental
consequence assessment reveals
insignificant impacts. Two commenters
suggested that EPA substitute "low
potential for environmental impact" or
"no potential for long-term, adverse
environmental impact." Other
commenters requested that
environmental impact be dropped or
that the requirement be changed to
mirror the Program 1 eligibility criteria
with an indication in the RMP that no
environmental receptors of concern
were within the worst-case distance to
an endpoint.
As described above in section
HI.A.2.a. Potential for Offsite Impact,
EPA has decided not to make the
presence of environmental receptors a
part of the eligibility criteria for Program
1 and has deleted the certification
requirement. Instead, owners or
operators of all covered processes will
have to identify in the RMP any
environmental receptors that are within
the distance potentially affected by the
worst case.
b. Signs. Commenters generally
opposed the SNPRM requirement that
sources with Program 1 processes post
signs warning of the hazards on site if
the only regulated substances present at
the site above the threshold quantity
were listed for flammability.
Commenters stated that local and state
fire and safety codes often already
require such signs. In addition, sources
are already required under EPCRA
section 312 to file annual inventories
with the LEPC and fire department that
identify hazards on site. Signs would
have fulfilled the emergency response
program requirements for a source.
Because Program 1 eligibility will now
be determined on a by-process basis
rather than by source-wide criteria and
because EPA has revised the emergency
response program provisions as noted
below, EPA has dropped the
requirement for signs.
c. Emergency Response Program. In
the SNPRM, EPA asked whether
additional emergency response planning
and coordination should be required for
Program 1 processes. Some commenters
supported this requirement, while
others stated that most sources are
already covered by EPCRA and
participate in community response
planning. Commenters stated that
because the worst-case release could not
reach public receptors, such efforts were
not necessary.
In the final rule, EPA is requiring the
owner or operator of a Program 1
process to ensure that any necessary
response actions have been coordinated
with local response agencies. EPA
believes that local responders may
become involved in an incident, even if
the public is not threatened. No
additional CAA-related planning
activities are required, however.
d. Other. Many commenters stated
that, since Program 1 processes generate
no offsite impact, they should be
exempt from this rule. One commenter
objected to Program 1 because members
of the public, particularly first
responders and business visitors, could
still be hurt by a release. Other
commenters suggested that the annual
"EPCRA section 312 form could be
amended to indicate that a source was
covered by the rule, replacing the RMP
registration form.
The CAA requires that all sources
with more than a threshold quantity of
a listed substance register an RMP,
perform a hazard assessment, and
develop accidental release prevention
and emergency response programs.
Therefore, total exemption of processes
that meet Program 1 criteria is not
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31680 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations
possible. SeeS. Rep. No. 228,101st
Cong., 1st session, at 208 ("Senate
Report") (precursor of RMP provision
mandating hazard assessments for
sources that exceed threshold for listed
substance); 136 Congressional Record
S16927 (daily ed. October 27,1990)
(remarks of Sen. Durenburger, sources
with more than a threshold quantity are
subject to regulations); 136 Cong. Rec.
H12879 (daily ed. Oct. 26,
1990) (remarks of Rep. Barton)(all users
of hazardous chemicals are required to
plan for accidents). Moreover, even if an
exemption for processes that exceed a
threshold were permissible, the owner
or operator would need to take steps
that are equivalent to the hazard
assessment to establish eligibility for the
exemption. The offsite consequence
analysis is the most significant burden
for a Program 1 process under this rule.
The minimal additional actions required
in today's rule for Program 1 simply
establish a record of eligibility and a
response coordination mechanism.
EPA recognizes that emergency
responders and site visitors could be
hurt by an accidental release from any
process, but notes that responder safety
Is covered by OSHA and EPA under the
HAZWOPER regulations. It is the
owners' or operators' responsibility to
inform visitors about the hazards and
the appropriate steps to take in the
event of an accidental release from any
process subject to today's rule.
Finally, EPA has based the
registration information requirements in
today's rule on the EPCRA section 312
Tier II form. The CAA requires that the
RMP be registered with EPA. Because
the EPCRA form is not submitted to
EPA, it would not substitute for
registration with EPA either in its
present or amended form. Completion of
the registration portion of the RMP
should impose little additional burden
on owners or operators. However, EPA
recognizes the information overlap
between the Tier II form and the RMP
registration and is considering use of the
RMP registration for the Tier II reporting
requirement.
5. Program 2 Requirements.
Commenters were generally concerned
about the lack of specific requirements
for the Program 2 streamlined
prevention program and emergency
response requirements, and how
compliance with other regulations
would be incorporated.
a. Streamlined Program. Commenters
stated that the Program 2 prevention
program does not provide much, if any.
regulatory relief because sources would
need to address most of the ten elements
of the Program 3 prevention program.
Others said that the majority of the
sources affected by the rule are already
covered by OSHA PSM and chemical
industry standards, the Program 2
requirements do not satisfy the CAA
mandate, and that only a full process
hazard analysis would meet the hazard
assessment requirements under section
112(r). Another commenter argued that
EPA's statement that sources must
comply with the CAA's general duty
clause was inadequate because EPA has
not used, and has no policy about, the
clause.
EPA agrees that the preferred
approach in the SNPRM did not provide
sufficient detail on Program 2
prevention requirements to distinguish
it from Program 3. EPA solicited
comments on whether Program 2 should
require additional, specific prevention
steps. Today's rule provides specific
requirements as discussed in section I.D
above and in Section IV below. In the
RMP, the owner or operator will be
required to report on other Federal or
state regulations, industry codes, and
standards used to comply with
prevention elements as well as any
major hazards, process controls,
mitigation systems, monitoring and
detection systems examined in the
hazard review. This streamlined
prevention program addresses many of
the PSM elements as the basis for sound
prevention practices, but is tailored to
processes with less complex chemical
uses; this program provides
considerable regulatory relief by
substantially reducing the
documentation and recordkeeping
burden of PSM. In addition, EPA will
provide guidance and model risk
management programs to further assist
Program 2 processes in developing and
maintaining good prevention program
practices.
EPA disagrees that only a full PHA
would meet the requirements of the Act.
Section 112(r) does not contain detailed
requirements for the hazard assessment,
beyond the key components of
accidental release scenarios and a five-
year accident history. EPA believes that
a PHA is more appropriately considered
an element of a prevention program,
such as PSM. The statute does not
mandate detailed PHA engineering
analyses for all sources, whether as part
of the hazard assessment or the
prevention program. EPA believes PHAs
involve a more detailed engineering
analysis than is necessary to prevent
accidents at Program 2 sources. The
"hazard review" provisions of Program
2 should be sufficient to detect process
hazards at these simpler processes. EPA
recognizes that although hazard
assessments and PHAs or process
hazard reviews are discreet elements
that can be performed independently,
hazard assessment results can enhance
PHA or process hazards reviews and in
turn, the results of the PHA or review
can enhance the hazard assessment.
EPA encourages owners or operators to
make maximum use of the PHA or
review and hazard assessment
information to manage risks and prevent
accidents.
Finally, sources with Program 2
requirements, as well as sources with
Program 1 or 3 requirements, must
comply with the general duty clause of
CAA Section 112(r)(l). The general duty
clause provides that owners and
operators have a general duty to identify
hazards that may result from accidental
releases, design and maintain a safe
facility, and minimize the consequences
of any releases that occur. The genera)
duty clause is a self-executing statutory
requirement: it requires no regulations
or other EPA action to take effect. The
clause provides a separate statutory
mechanism that EPA will use in
appropriate circumstances to ensure the
protection of public health and the
environment. To date, EPA has
undertaken several inspections designed
in part to determine compliance with
Section 112(r)(l). As appropriate at a
future date, EPA may issue policies or
guidance on application of the general
duty clause.
b. Other Regulations. Commenters
generally agree that OSHA PSM,
HAZWOPER, the OSHA hazard
communication standard (29 CFR
1910.1200), and NFPA-58 are examples
of other regulations or voluntary
industry standards that could be cited to
meet the requirements of a Program 2
prevention program. Commenters
requested that EPA provide a matrix or
crosswalk that indicates which other
regulations, standards, and codes met
specific requirements. One commenter
opposed the use of other regulations or
referencing of voluntary industry
standards, stating that, other than OSHA
PSM, no other OSHA standard
addresses safety precautions or
maintenance. Another commenter
objected that this approach creates
another documentation burden without
any commensurate benefit.
EPA agrees that the SNPRM preferred
approach for Program 2 was not specific
enough and has provided more detailed
requirements in this rule as noted
above. EPA continues to believe that
many of the Program 2 prevention
requirements are already met through
industry compliance with existing
regulations and voluntary standards. For
example, ammonia retailers whose
processes are designed to meet the
OSHA ammonia handling rule (29 CFR
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Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 31681
1910.111) should be able to meet the
Program 2 requirement that the process
design meets good engineering
practices. This effectively allows
sources to cite compliance with these
other regulations and standards instead
of developing specific, duplicative
elements solely to comply with Program
2. EPA will also use these existing
regulations and standards as it develops
model programs.
c. Emergency Response Program.
Commenters supported considering
HAZWOPER programs as adequate to
meet the Program 2 emergency response
program. A few commenters said that
HAZWOPER is inadequate because it
does not consider offsite impacts or the
environment. Some commenters also
said that coverage of a source by an
EPCRA community emergency response
plan should be sufficient. Others said
that any contingency plan developed
under Federal or state law should be
considered sufficient because the
requirements under these programs are
generally consistent with EPA's
proposed emergency response program;
one commenter noted that, for
flammable processes, compliance with
29 CFR 1910.38 should be adequate
because the response is usually
evacuation of employees. Five
commenters opposed any requirement
that sources with Program 2 processes
conduct drills or exercises because they
represent lower hazards.
Consistent with its efforts to
consolidate Federal emergency planning
requirements, EPA has included
language in the final rule that will allow
any source in compliance with another
Federal emergency response program
that includes the elements specified in
this rule to use that program to meet
these requirements. In particular, this
applies to response plans prepared in
accordance with the National Response
Team's Integrated Contingency Plan
Guidance ("one plan") (NRT, May
1996). EPA believes that sources should
have a single response plan; creation of
multiple response plans to meet slightly
different Federal or state standards is
counterproductive, diverting resources
that could be used to develop better
response capabilities.
EPA recognizes that some sources will
only evacuate their employees in the
event of a release. For these sources,
EPA will not require the development of
emergency response plans, provided
that appropriate responses to their
hazards have been discussed in the
community emergency response plan
developed under 42 U.S.C. 11003 for
toxics or coordinated with the local fire
department for flammables.
B. Offsite Consequence Analysis
I. Worst-Case Release Scenario. EPA
proposed in the NPRM to define the
worst-case release as the "loss of all of
the regulated substance from the process
* * * that leads to the worst offsite
consequences" and that the scenario
should assume "instantaneous release."
Hundreds of commenters stated that
instantaneous loss of the total process
contents is not technically feasible for
complex systems and, therefore,
represents a non-credible worst case
that would provide no useful
information to the public or the source
for risk communication, accident
prevention, and emergency
preparedness. Many commenters also
argued that this approach differed from
the release modeling assumptions
contained in EPA's Technical Guidance
for Hazards Analysis, which has been
the basis for community emergency
planning activities under EPCRA.
Although some commenters were
generally opposed to the concept of
worst case, most of the commenters
were supportive of an approach similar
to that taken in the Technical Guidance.
In response to these comments, EPA
proposed in the SNPRM to redefine a
worst-case scenario as the release, over
a 10-minute period, of the largest
quantity of a regulated substance
resulting from a vessel or process piping
failure. The 10-minute release time is
drawn from the Technical Guidance for
Hazards Analysis. EPA believes this
duration is reasonable and accounts for
comments arguing that an
"instantaneous" release is unrealistic
for large-scale releases.
EPA has decided to adopt the SNPRM
approach for worst-case toxic vapor
releases in the final rule because most
of the SNPRM comments agreed that the
redefinition is generally more credible
and that the 10-minute time frame
particularly applies to vapor releases.
Although some commenters argued that
this approach still does not account for
all process-specific conditions, EPA
believes it is reasonable and
representative of accident history. EPA
notes that owners or operators may use
air dispersion modeling techniques that
better account for site-specific
conditions, provided modeling
parameters as specified in the rule are
applied. This release scenario will apply
to substances that are gases at ambient
conditions, including those liquefied
under pressure. Gases liquefied by
refrigeration only may be analyzed as
liquids if the spill would be contained
by passive mitigation systems to a depth
greater than 1 cm.
Under the SNPRM, worst-case liquid
spills were assumed to form a pool in
10 minutes, with the release rate to the
air determined by volatilization rate.
EPA recognized that this approach
differs from the use of an instantaneous
release in the Technical Guidance,
which EPA cited as an alternative to its
favored approach. The few comments
received were divided between support
of this approach and arguments that the
10-minute time frame was unrealistic
for liquid releases (particularly for
pipelines and connected equipment)
and thus did not properly account for
process-specific conditions.
EPA's approach for the liquid worst-
case scenario in the final rule is similar
to the Technical Guidance methodology,
in which the total quantity of liquid in
a vessel or pipeline is instantaneously
spilled upon failure, considering
administrative controls or passive
mitigation discussed below. The rate of .
release to the air is not instantaneous; it
is determined by the volatilization rate
of the spilled liquid, which depends on
the surface area of the pool formed after
the spill. The pool surface area is
determined by assuming the spilled
liquid rapidly spreads out and forms a
one-centimeter deep pool, unless
passive mitigation systems contain the
pool to a smaller area. EPA believes this
approach is reasonable because total
vessel or pipeline failure will generally
lead to immediate and rapid spillage
followed by pool volatilization. Further,
if the liquid were assumed to spill over
a particular time frame rather than
instantaneously, owners or operators
would need to calculate the amount of
vapor emitted to the air as the liquid is
spilled, in addition to the volatilization
rate as the pool spreads out and reaches
its maximum size. Computer-based
models are available for such
calculations, but they are complex and
require considerable data input to use.
EPA believes that liquid spillage from a
worst-case scenario is likely to be
extremely rapid such that the most
significant portion of the release rate is
given by pool volatilization;
consequently, liquid release time is not
necessary. Liquid spill rates and times
could be reflected in alternative
scenarios discussed below.
As proposed, the worst-case for
flammables assumes that the total
quantity of the substance in the vessel
or pipeline vaporizes, resulting in a
vapor cloud explosion. If the vapor
cloud explosion is modeled using a
TNT-equivalent methodology, then a 10
percent yield factor must be used.
EPA requested comment in the
SNPRM on whether the worst-case
scenario should include an additional
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31682 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations
greater distances to the endpoint than
the distance generated by the largest
vessel or pipeline scenario. Owners or
operators need to consider releases from
smaller vessels if those vessels contain
the substance at higher temperature or
pressures or if they are closer to public
receptors. In some cases, the largest
vessel will be a storage vessel where the
substance is held at ambient conditions.
A reactor vessel may hold a smaller
quantity, but at high pressures and
temperatures, generating a release that
could travel farther offsite to an
endpoint. Vessel location is important,
especially at large sources. A smaller
vessel located nearer to the stationary
source boundary may generate a greater
impact distance than a larger vessel
farther away. This difference may be
particularly important for flamrnables,
because impact distances for
flammables are generally shorter than
those for toxic releases.
2. Mitigation Systems
a. Worst-case scenario. In the NPRM
worst-case scenario, EPA indicated that
sources must assume that both active
and passive systems fail to mitigate the
release. Commenters were generally
split between those who wanted passive
(as well as certain redundant active)
mitigation systems to be included and
those who argued that historical
evidence from catastrophic releases
suggests that the worst case should
assume the failure of all such systems.
Those who supported mitigation argued
that inclusion provides a more credible
scenario for improved risk
communication, accident prevention,
and emergency planning.
EPA proposed in the SNPRM to
include passive mitigation systems in
the worst-case release scenario as long
as the system is capable of
withstanding, and continuing to
function as intended during and after a
destructive event, such as an
earthquake, storm, or explosion, which
causes a vessel or pipeline to fail.
Passive systems such as dikes, catch
basins, and drains for liquids, and
enclosures for both liquids and gases,
could be assumed to mitigate the
release. Some commenters opposed this
approach, arguing again that the worst
case should account for the possibility
of passive mitigation failure. The
majority supported this approach
because the assumption that passive
systems specifically designed and
installed as protection against a
potential catastrophe tail is unrealistic.
Furthermore, the approach recognizes
and encourages prevention through
additional passive mitigation and
supports more realistic emergency
amount of substance that could
potentially drain or flow from process
equipment interconnected with the
failed vessel or pipeline. Many
commenters opposed this option,
suggesting that it is technically
uncertain and would have little value in
terms of what they saw as EPA's
intended purpose for the worst-case
assessment. Cither commenters
requested that "interconnected
equipment" be defined and clarified.
Given the assumption of rapid release
associated with Initial equipment
failure, EPA agrees that determination of
the spill rate from connected piping and
equipment is likely to be technically
complex, very different from that of the
quantity in the vessel or failed pipeline,
and likely to extend the duration of
volatilization rather than affecting the
rate overall. Therefore, EPA has not
Included this requirement in the final
rule.
EPA also sought comment in the
SNPRM on options for the
determination of the relevant quantity of
regulated substance in a vessel or
process piping for a worst-case release
scenario: the maximum possible vessel
inventory (design capacity) at any time
without regard for operational practices
and administrative controls; the
maximum possible vessel inventory
unless there are internal administrative
controls (written procedural
restrictions) that limit inventories to less
than the maximum; or historic or
projected maximum operating
inventories without regard to
administrative controls. EPA preferred
that the maximum vessel inventory
including administrative controls that
might limit or raise the vessel quantity
to be used in the worst-case assessment
and reported in the worst-case release
analysis section of the RMP. If the
quantity used in the assessment were
exceeded (e.g., an administrative control
were ignored), then the source would be
in violation of the rule (i.e., failure to
perform a worst-case analysis) and RMP
reporting unless the administrative
control was revised, the worst-case
analysis updated to reflect any changes
in the analysis, and a revised RMP
submitted. This approach acknowledges
the efforts by sources to increase process
safety by Intentionally reducing the
inventory of regulated substances (e.g.,
vessels kept at half capacity to allow for
process upsets, emergency shutdowns,
and deinventorying or maintenance
turnarounds). EPA notes that at some
sources, as a result of inventory
reduction measures, the largest quantity
may be held in a transportation
container that is loaded or unloaded at
the source (See section P. 2).
A few commenters supported the
other options, noting that administrative
controls may fail, potentially generating
a larger scenario. However, the majority
of commenters supported EPA's
preferred approach based on the
historical reliability of such controls at
many sources and the role that such a
provision could play in encouraging
their use at additional locations. Other
commenters asked whether mechanical
controls, alone or in combination with
administrative controls, should be
incorporated into the proposal.
Although mechanical controls may also
serve to limit the quantity, EPA has
decided not to include them in the
quantity determination for the worst-
case release scenario because the
definition for administrative control as
"written procedural mechanisms used
for hazard control" provides a backup
for possible failure of mechanical
controls. For more discussion of
mechanical controls, see section
III(B)(2), mitigation systems, below.
In the SNPRM, EPA considered
providing the implementing agency
with the discretion to determine the
appropriate quantity for the worst-case
release scenario on a site-specific or
industry-specific basis. EPA noted in
the SNPRM, and most of the few
comments received on this issue agreed,
that implementing agency discretion
would result in increased administrative
burden on the implementing agency and
cross-jurisdictional differences in the
methodology used for the worst-case
analyses. EPA has decided not to
incorporate this approach in the final
rule. States, however, may impose more
stringent requirements, such as
additional modeling, under state
authority.
In the NPRM worst-case definition,
EPA did not specify what constitutes or
how to determine the worst offsite
consequences. Some commenters
indicated that without clear direction,
EPA's proposed worst case might not
actually capture the scenario that leads
to the most severe offsite impact. In the
SNPRM, EPA indicated that the worst-
case scenario should be the scenario
that generates the greatest distance to a
specified endpoint (i.e., the toxic vapor
cloud or blast wave from a vapor cloud
explosion that travels the farthest).
EPA recognizes that there may be
other release scenarios that could
generate a greater distance than the
release from the largest vessel or
pipeline. Consequently, EPA has added
paragraph (h) to §68.25 to require
owners or operators to consider other
scenarios if those scenarios generate
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Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 31683
planning. A few commenters also
suggested that active mitigation
measures that were unlikely to fail (e.g.,
redundant or backup systems) should be
considered, for similar reasons.
Historical data, however, indicate that
certain events compromise active
mitigation systems (e.g., explosions
have destroyed fire water piping
systems).
For the final rule, EPA has decided to
adopt the SNPRM approach. Passive
mitigation systems would be defined as
those systems that operate without
human, mechanical, or other energy
input and would include building
enclosures, dikes, and containment
walls. EPA also agrees that reservoirs or
vessels sufficiently buried underground
are passively mitigated or prevented
from failing catastrophically. In this
case, sources should evaluate the failure
of piping connected to underground
storage for the worst case or alternative
case scenarios. In addition to the
requirements outlined in §68.25, EPA
provides guidance on how passive
mitigation would affect release rate and
distance to endpoints in its RMP Offsite
Consequence Analysis Guidance.
b. Alternative scenarios. EPA initially
proposed that sources could include
passive mitigation systems in their
alternative scenario assessments, but
that active mitigation systems (e.g.,
excess flow valves, fail-safe and
automatic shutdown valves, scrubbers,
flares, deluge systems, and water
curtains) would be assumed to fail.
Some commenters generally opposed
inclusion of any mitigation systems in
the hazard assessment, while other
commenters noted that the alternative
release scenario should recognize and
encourage industry accident prevention
efforts, specifically the installation of
additional mitigation systems, and
support more realistic emergency
planning.
EPA proposed in the SNPRM to allow
sources to consider passive and active
mitigation measures in the alternative
release scenario assessment.
Commenters supported this approach
and EPA has decided to retain It in the
final rule. EPA agrees that the
assumption that both passive and active
mitigation measures fail when such
measures are specifically designed and
installed to mitigate catastrophic
releases is unrealistic for the alternative
scenarios. Although not required, EPA
notes that sources may choose to apply
passive and active mitigation measures
to a worst-case type scenario to
illustrate the capabilities of such
systems to reduce the potential impact
of a worst-case accidental release. In
addition to the requirements outlined in
§ 68.28, EPA provides guidance in its
RMP Offsite Consequence Analysis
Guidance on how passive and active
mitigation would affect release rate and
distance to endpoints.
3. Populations Affected. EPA
described in the NPRM preamble certain
locations (e.g., schools and hospitals)
where sensitive populations might be
present and proposed in the rule that
owners or operators identify potentially
exposed populations as part of the
offsite consequence assessment.
Commenters generally opposed
requirements for population surveys;
several commenters suggested that
Census data or other readily available
population information should be
sufficient, while other commenters
indicated that the LEPC or other local
planning entities were the appropriate
entity to prepare these data.
EPA believes owners or operators
need to be aware of the magnitude of
impact on populations associated with
the worst-case and alternative scenarios.
However, EPA learned that, although
much of this information is readily
available, identification of some
sensitive populations could require
considerable effort, especially if the
distance to an endpoint generated in the
offsite consequence assessment is large
or crosses several jurisdictions.
Consequently, EPA proposed in the
SNPRM that offsite populations be
defined using available Census data;
information on the number of children
and people over 65 could be considered
a proxy for sensitive populations,
thereby accomplishing the same
objective as the proposed rule. EPA also
indicated that it has developed a
geographic information system,
LandView, that will facilitate analysis of
resident populations. (LandView can be
ordered from the U.S. Bureau of the
Census customer service at (301) 457-
4100.) In general, commenters agreed
with the SNPRM approach. However,
some commenters questioned the
accuracy of potentially ten-year-old
Census data and requested additional
flexibility, or a greater role for local
government, in this analysis.
EPA has decided to adopt the
approach outlined in the SNPRM for the
final rule. Sources will be allowed to
use available Census data to estimate
populations potentially affected.
Sources may update these data if they
believe the data are inaccurate, but are
not required to do so. Populations shall
be reported to two significant digits.
Because Census data are limited to
residential populations, sources will
also have to note in the RMP whether
other, non-residential populations, such
as schools, hospitals, prisons, public
recreational areas or arenas, and major
commercial or industrial areas, are
within the distance to an endpoint.
These institutions and areas are those
that can generally be found on local
street maps. Sources will not be
required to estimate the number of
people who might be present at these
locations. EPA provides further
guidance on the identification of
affected populations in its RMP Offsite
Consequence Analysis Guidance.
4. Number of Scenarios In the NPRM.
EPA required a worst-case release
scenario for each regulated substance.
Commenters requested clarification,
because one substance could be present
in more than one process at the source
and sources would need to select the
"worst" worst case for substances in
multiple processes. In addition, one
process may have several, similar listed
substances and multiple worst-case
analyses of similar substances (e.g.,
flammables) would not provide
additional useful information to the
public.
EPA proposed in the SNPRM that
sources report in the RMP one worst-
case release scenario representative of
all toxic substances present at the
source and one worst-case release
scenario representative of all flammable
substances present at the source. Even
though additional screening analyses to
determine the appropriate worst-case
scenario might be necessary, this
approach reduces to a maximum of two
the number of worst-case analyses
reported in the RMP by a source. In
general, commenters favored this
approach, particularly for flammables,
which do not produce markedly
different adverse effects. A few
commenters argued that a single toxic
substance should not be considered
representative of all toxic substances at
a source, since there are considerable
differences in toxic endpoint and
adverse affect.
EPA has decided to adopt the
approach outlined in the SNPRM for the
final rule: report one worst-case release
scenario for all flammables and one
worst-case release scenario for all toxics
at the source. EPA notes that the worst-
case scenario is designed principally to
support a dialogue between the source
and the community on release
prevention, and not to serve as the sole
or primary basis for local emergency
planning. The "worst" worst-case
release scenario will inform the broadest
range of individuals that they may be
impacted by the source so that they may
participate in dialogue with the source
about prevention, preparedness, and
emergency response actions. Lesser
worst-case release scenarios would not
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31684 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20. 1996 / Rules and Regulations
inform any person not already within
the range of the "worst" worst case even
though the health effects may be
different: consequently, EPA believes
that only a single toxic worst case is
necessary. However, sources must also
analyze and report another worst-case
release scenario (for flammables or
toxics) if such a release from another
locatlon'at the source potentially affects
public receptors different from those
potentially affected by the first scenario
(e.g., if a large-sized source is located
between two communities and has a
covered process adjacent to each
community).
In the NPRM, EPA did not specify the
number of alternative scenarios to be
reported for each regulated substance.
EPA noted in the preamble that this
approach, while providing flexibility,
may also create uncertainty about what
EPA will consider to be an adequate
number of scenarios. While a few
commenters argued against scenarios
beyond the worst case, many
commenters supported a requirement
for a maximum of two: the worst case
plus one additional scenario; others
supported a maximum of three. Many of
the commenters noted that local entities
could request further information under
EPCRA section 303(d)(3) authority if
they desired. At the same time, a
number of commenters suggested that
this determination should be made by
the source based on their scenario
analysis, perhaps in coordination with a
local agency.
In the SNPRM, EPA proposed to
require one alternative release scenario
for all flammable substances at the
source and one alternative scenario for
each toxic substance at the source. As
discussed above, the listed flammable
substances behave similarly upon
release and have the same endpoint,
while each toxic substance has a
different endpoint and different
atmospheric behavior. EPA sought
comment on whether one toxic
substance alternative scenario could
represent all toxic substances at a source
or in a process. Although commenters
generally agreed with the approach for
flammables, only a few argued that a
single alternative scenario for all toxics
was also appropriate; most others
supported EPA^s proposal.
Upon review of the comments, EPA
has decided to adopt the approach
outlined in the SNPRM: an alternative
release scenario must be reported in the
RMP for each toxic held above the
threshold at the source, and one
alternative scenario must be reported
that represents all flammables held
above the threshold. As EPA noted in
the SNPRM preamble and commenters
echoed, the differences in the hazards
posed by individual toxic regulated
substances are significant and should be
reflected in the alternative scenarios.
This information has significant value
for emergency planning purposes and
could increase public interest in
prevention at the source.
5. Technical Guidance The proposed
rule required sources to evaluate the
consequences (vapor cloud dispersion,
blast wave, or radiant heat modeling
calculations) associated with the worst-
case and alternative release scenarios.
EPA did not specify a methodology or
models, expecting that sources would
have, contract for, or find the expertise
and modeling tools needed to perform
potentially complex modeling
calculations. Because of the potential
burden associated with this approach,
EPA began working on the development
of a set of simple, generic tools that
could provide useful results and become
part of the technical guidance for the
rule. Based on its experience in
developing the Technical Guidance for
Hazards Analysis and on advice from
commenters, EPA understands that a
generic methodology depends on
approximations to capture a wide
variety of situations, will likely ignore
site-specific conditions, and potentially
may generate overly conservative or less
realistic estimates of offsite impacts. In
spite of these limitations, EPA believes
that generic modeling tools are capable
of supporting greater understanding of
the hazards posed by substances and
emergency planning. Commenters
agreed this approach would reduce the
burden on smaller sources unfamiliar
with such activities as long as use of the
guidance was not mandatory, and the
guidance addressed specific industry
sectors or was used as part of a
screening process to focus resources on
significant problem areas. Many
commenters recommended that sources
be given the flexibility to use any
appropriate modeling techniques for the
offsite consequence analysis to take
advantage of expertise and to apply site-
specific'considerations to the hazard
assessment. Other commenters argued
that EPA should establish mandatory
guidelines or specify certain dispersion
modeling tools to make release scenario
results more comparable across sources.
Some commenters were concerned
about the development of modeling
tools by EPA outside of the rulemaking
process and requested the opportunity
to participate in their development.
In the SNPRM, EPA stated it would
develop a generic methodology and
reference tables in an offsite
consequence assessment guidance to
assist sources with the analyses required
by the rule. EPA believed that the
Technical Guidance could be revised,
expanded, and updated to address the
rule requirements. The methodologies
and tables would be subject to public
review prior to publication of the final
rule; once finalized, the tables would
replace the Technical Guidance. EPA
added that sources that wish to conduct
more sophisticated modeling could do
so, provided the techniques used
account for the modeling parameters
described in the rule. Alternatively, EPA
proposed that only Program 2 sources
use the guidance; Program 3 sources
would be required to conduct their own
dispersion modeling.
Most commenters supported the
SNPRM approach, especially if sources
were given the option to use their own
site-specific modeling. Some
commenters argued that the generic
methodology and reference tables and
the option for site-specific modeling
should be applied to processes in all
three Programs, while others suggested
that they be applied only to a specific
Program. In recognition of these
comments, EPA prepared draft
modeling methodologies and reference
tables, provided an opportunity for their
review (see 61 FR 3031, January 30,
1996), and has published them as the
RMP Offsite Consequence Analysis
Guidance. EPA intends to conduct peer
review of the RMP Offsite Consequence
Analysis Guidance and will revise it as
appropriate. For the final rule, EPA will
allow sources in all Programs to use the
guidance or conduct their own site-
specific modeling, provided the
modeling techniques used account for
the parameters described in the rule. For
example, EPA's Office of Air Quality
Planning and Standards has prepared a
publicly available modeling tool called
TScreen that can assist owners and
operators with consequence
assessments. EPA also encourages local
emergency planners, fire departments,
and others who use tools such as
CAMEO/ALOHA or other modeling
techniques to assist businesses in their
community who may need help in their
modeling efforts. EPA believes the final
rule approach takes advantage of the
broad range of expertise and modeling
tools already available and will provide
more useful results at the local level for
chemical emergency prevention,
preparedness, and response. This
approach will also stimulate accidental
release modeling research, new and
existing model development, and model
validation to generate new tools for
better understanding of hazards and the
behavior of substances in accidental
release situations.
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Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 31685
6. Modeling Parameters, a. Endpoints.
In the NPRM, EPA did not specify toxic
or flammable substance endpoints that
must be used in the offsite consequence
assessment modeling. Most commenters
recommended that EPA specify
endpoints to provide a consistent basis
for modeling; many favored the use of
existing standards or guidelines,
primarily the emergency response
planning guidelines (ERPGs) developed
by the American Industrial Hygiene
Association for toxic substances. For
flammables, commenters suggested
overpressure, heat radiation, and
explosion or flammability limits. In
addition to other specific standards, a
few commenters recommended a
hierarchy of values if certain levels for
some chemicals were not available.
In the SNPRM, EPA indicated that it
would select one endpoint for each
toxic substance for use in the offsite
consequence assessment methodology
and sought comment on whether it
should use a single endpoint to the
extent possible (e.g., the Immediately
Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH)
value developed by the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH), unless one does not
exist for a substance), or a hierarchy of
endpoints (e.g., ERPGs; if one does not
exist, then the IDLH; and finally toxicity
data if no other value is available). EPA
also asked whether overpressure or both
overpressure and radiant heat effects
should be used for flammable substance
endpoints. Some commenters supported
the use of ERPG values for the toxic
substance endpoint, or a hierarchy of
values beginning with the ERPG. Others
opposed IDLH or the IDLH divided by
10 for technical reasons.
EPA agrees with commenters that one
toxic endpoint should be set for each
substance. The endpoint for each listed
toxic, substance is provided in Appendix
A to the final rule. The endpoint,
applicable whether the source uses the
EPA guidance or conducts site-specific
modeling described below, is the AIHA
ERPG-2 or, if no ERPG-2 is available,
the level of concern (LOG) developed for
the Technical Guidance, corrected
where necessary to account for new
toxicity data. The LOCs that were based
on IDLHs have been updated only if the
IDLHs were revised between the original
LOG listing in 1987 and the 1995 IDLH
revisions. The most recent; IDLH
revisions were not used because they
are based on a methodology that EPA
has not reviewed; the previous IDLH
methodology was reviewed by EPA's
Science Advisory Board for use as
LOCs. EPA chose the ERPG-2 First
because ERPGs are subject to peer
review and are specifically developed
by a scientific committee for emergency
planning to protect the general public in
emergency situations. The ERPG-2
represents the maximum airborne
concentration below which the
committee judges that nearly all
individuals could be exposed for up to
an hour without experiencing or
developing irreversible or other serious
human health effects or symptoms that
could impair their ability to take
protective action. EPA rejected the
ERPG-3, which is a lethal exposure
level, because it is not protective
enough of the public in emergency
situations. About 30 listed toxic
substances have ERPGs. EPA chose to
use LOG levels for substances with no
ERPG because LOCs have been peer
reviewed by EPA's Science Advisory
Board, they are intended to be
protective of the general public for
exposure periods of up to an hour, they
are widely used by the emergency
response planning community, and, for
a majority of the listed toxic substances,
there are no acceptable alternatives.
EPA notes that, for substances with both
values, the LOC is comparable to, and
in some cases is identical to, the ERPG-
2.
EPA recognizes potential limitations
associated with the ERPG and LOC and
is working with other agencies to
develop Acute Exposure Guideline
Limits (AEGLs). See Establishment of a
National Advisory Committee for Acute
Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs) for
Hazardous Substances, (60 FR 55376;
October 31, 1995). When these values
have been developed and peer-
reviewed, EPA intends to adopt them,
through rulemaking, as the toxic
endpoint for substances under this rule.
As proposed, vapor cloud explosion
distances will be based on an
overpressure of 1 psi, and for analysis
of worst-case releases, a yield factor of
10 percent. Yield factors (the percentage
of the available energy released in the
explosion process) can vary
considerably. EPA selected 10 percent
to generate conservative worst-case
consequences. For flammables, EPA
selected a radiant heat exposure level of
5 kW/m2 for 40 seconds as
recommended by the commenters, and,
for vapor cloud fire and jet fire
dispersion analysis, the lower
flammability limit (LFL) as specified by
NFPA or other recognized sources.
b. Meteorology. In the NPRM, EPA
proposed that sources model the
downwind dispersion of the worst-case
release scenario using an F atmospheric
stability class and 1.5 m/s wind speed
and model the alternative release
scenarios using both the worst-case
conditions and the meteorological
conditions prevailing at the source. EPA
did not revise the meteorological
assumptions in the SNPRM.
Several commenters argued that the
worst-case meteorological conditions
were too conservative or not applicable
on a national basis and that site-specific
conditions should be used, while others
agreed that for worst case, minimum
wind speeds and the most stable
atmospheric conditions should be used.
In the final rule, EPA has decided that
sources must conduct worst-case
dispersion modeling using an F
atmospheric stability class and a 1.5
m/s wind speed. A higher wind speed
or less stable atmospheric stability class
may be used if the owner or operator
has local meteorological data applicable
to the source that show that the lowest
recorded wind speed was always greater
or the atmospheric stability class was
always less stable during the previous
three years.
In the final rule, EPA also requires
sources to conduct alternative release
scenario dispersion modeling using the
typical meteorological conditions
applicable to the source. If
meteorological data are not available,
typical conditions in the RMP Offsite ,
Consequence Analysis Guidance may be
used. EPA believes typical
meteorological conditions should be
used to generate realistic hazard
assessments for communication with
the public and first responders and for
emergency planning.
C. Consideration of Environmental
Impact
The issue of whether and how
environmental impacts should be
addressed in the hazard assessment and
the rule in general drew considerable
comment. The comments divide into
three questions: Should EPA consider
environmental impacts from accidental
releases? If so, which environments
should be identified? What constitutes
an environmental impact?
1. Inclusion of Environmental
Impacts. Environmental groups argued
that the CAA requires assessment of
potential impacts to the environment
and that the environmental receptors
listed in the SNPRM should be
broadened. One commenter stated that
since the CAA Amendments of 1990
strengthened limits of continuous air
toxic emissions, wildlife is now
threatened more by accidental releases.
However, the majority of commenters
on this issue, principally industry
groups, opposed consideration of the
environment because it is adequately
protected by other environmental
statutes, environmental protection in
section 112(r) relates only to emergency
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31686 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations
response, and Congress intended in
section 112(r) for the environment to be
addressed only to the extent that human
health is protected. Several commenters
argued that flammable substances were
unlikely to generate environmental
Impacts. Commenters also stated that
many industries have voluntarily
developed nature reserves around their
sources; often at the urging of
government agencies. Additional
regulations based on "environmental"
Impact consideration would "penalize"
these sources for their efforts. Finally,
two commenters noted that EPA's
cndpoints are based on acute human
effects; applying these to the
environment may not be valid.
EPA disagrees that section 112(r) was
not intended to protect the environment
as well as human health. Although
section 112(r)(5) links the threshold
quantity to human health, section
112(r)(3) requires EPA to select
substances that could impact human
health and the environment. EPA agrees
that the only time sections
1l2(r)(7)(B)(I) and (ii) mention
protection of the environment is in
conjunction with emergency response;
however, this is also true for protection
of human health. Congress did not
Intend to limit concern about either
Impact strictly to emergency response
procedures; Congress may not have
mentioned either impact relative to
prevention because the act of preventing
an accident eliminates the impact on
both. When accidents occur, human
health and the environment need
protection. By mentioning both impacts
In tlic response or post accident phase.
Congress was stressing its concern for
the environment as well as human
health. Given the integrated nature of
the RMP, it would be an inappropriately
narrow reading of CAA section
112(r)(7)(B) to say environmental
impacts must be ignored in hazard
assessments and in the design of the
prevention program, but must be
accounted for in emergency response. In
addition, section 112(r)(9) provides
authority for EPA to take emergency
action when an actual or threatened
accidental release of a regulated
substance may cause imminent and
substantial endangerment to human
health, welfare, or the environment.
Clearly, section 112(r)(9) allows EPA to
take action to prevent, as opposed to
simply respond to, accidental releases to
protect the environment. Because
section 112(r)(7) is intended to prevent
situations that could lead to emergency
orders under section 112(r)(9), it is
logical to conclude that Congress meant
EPA to develop regulations that would
prevent accidental releases that could
cause environmental damage. Although
the consequences may not be precisely
known, EPA believes that impacts could
occur at environmental receptors
located within the distance to a human
acute exposure endpoint associated
with a worst-case or alternative scenario
because wildlife may be more sensitive
or require less exposure to cause an
adverse effect than humans.
2. Environmental Receptors to Be
Considered. In the SNPRM, EPA
proposed that sources report in their
RMP which sensitive environments
listed by the National Oceanographic
and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) for the Clean Water Act are
within the distance determined by the
worst-case or alternative case scenario.
A few commenters argued that the list
should include state and local level
analogues to Federal entities (e.g., state
parks), all surface waters that are
fishable or swimmable or supply
drinking water, and ground water
recharge areas. Many commenters
opposed the NOAA list, arguing that the
list is extremely broad, covers millions
of acres in primarily rural areas, and
contains areas that are difficult for both
the regulated community and the
government to clearly identify (e.g.,
habitat used by proposed threatened or
endangered species, cultural resources,
and wetlands). They stated that the
NOAA list is not appropriate for this
rule because it represents guidance
applicable to offshore sources, and to a
limited number of very large onshore
sources, that could have catastrophic oil
spills. A few commenters suggested
limiting the list to Federal Class 1 areas
designated under the CAA prevention of
significant deterioration program, or
reducing the list of sensitive areas to
national parks and the designated
critical habitat for listed endangered
species, and limiting environmental
concern to those accidents that generate
a significant and long-term impact, such
as an actual "taking" of an endangered
species.
For the final rule, EPA has not used
the NOAA list. Instead EPA requires
owners or operators to indicate in the
RMP the environmental receptors
located within circles whose radii are
the distances to an endpoint for the
worst-case and alternative release
scenarios. EPA agrees with commenters
that the locations of certain natural
resources are difficult to identify.
Consequently, EPA has defined
environmental receptors as natural areas
such as national or state parks, forests,
or monuments; officially designated
wildlife sanctuaries, preserves, refuges,
or areas; and Federal wilderness areas,
that can be exposed to an accidental
release. All such receptors typically can
be found on local U.S. Geological
Survey (USGS) maps or maps based on
USGS data. Habitats of endangered or
threatened species are not included
because the locations of these habitats
are frequently not made public to
protect the species. Natural resource
agencies will have access to the RMP
information and can raise concerns with
local officials about potential harm to
these habitats, as necessary. Local
emergency planners and responders
may want to consult with
environmental management agencies as
part of emergency preparedness.
3. Level of Analysis Required. In the
SNPRM, EPA proposed that sources
only identify sensitive environments
within the area of the worst-case release.
rather than analyzing potential impacts.
A few commenters opposed this
approach, stating that the CAA requires
that sources analyze impacts. Most
commenters supported EPA's position
because extensive expertise at
considerable cost is required to
adequately assess all environmental
impacts associated with the
environments list EPA provided.
Commenters stated that this cost would
make fewer resources available for
prevention activities and providing no
benefit. Other commenters noted that
much of the data needed for such
analyses is not available.
EPA agrees that extensive
environmental analysis is not justified.
Irreversible adverse effect exposure
level data for the wide variety of
environmental species potentially
exposed in an accidental release event
are not available for most of the listed
substances. EPA believes that
identification of potentially affected
environmental receptors in the RMP is
sufficient for purposes of accident
prevention, preparedness, and response
by the source and at the local level.
D. Program 3 Consistency with OSHA
PSM Standard
1. Prevention Program. In EPA's
original proposal, the prevention
program requirements were based on
the elements of OSHA's PSM standard
(29 CFR 1910.119), and some
commenters supported this approach.
But EPA added a paragraph to each
OSHA prevention program element to
explain the purpose of the provision
and, in some instances, added
additional recordkeeping, reporting, or
substantive provisions to ensure that
statutory requirements were met.
Several commenters argued that these
additions cause confusion and appear to
require sources to create two separate
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prevention programs, which could
cause conflicting inspection and
enforcement actions and greater cost for
sources that must comply with both the
OSHA and EPA requirements. Many
commenters suggested that EPA simply
reference the OSHA requirements.
EPA agrees that the Program 3
prevention program requirements
should be identical to OSHA's PSM
standard to avoid confusion and
redundant requirements and to ensure
that sources develop one accidental
release prevention program that protects
workers, the general public, and the
environment. Therefore, EPA has moved
the Management System requirement
(see section I.D) supported by most
commenters to a section separate from
the Prevention Program and deleted the
introductory paragraphs and
modifications to the PSM language. The
Agency recognizes that many workplace
hazards also threaten public receptors
and that the majority of accident
prevention steps taken to protect
workers also protect the general public
and the environment; thus, a source
owner or operator responsible for a
process in compliance with the OSHA
PSM standard should already be in
compliance with the Program 3
prevention program requirements.
EPA did not cross-reference sections
of the PSM standard in today's rule
because, under Office of Federal
Register requirements at 1 CFR
21.21(c)(2), EPA cannot adopt OSHA's
requirements. EPA and OSHA have
separate legal authority to regulate
chemical process safety to prevent
accidental releases. Furthermore, cross-
referencing the OSHA standard would
be tantamount to a delegation of
authority to set standards in this area
from the Administrator of EPA to the
Secretary of Labor, because OSHA
would be able to modify the PSM
requirements without an EPA
rulemaking under CAA § 307(d). The
Senate explicitly considered and
rejected the possibility of the
Administrator delegating to OSHA
responsibility for hazard assessment.
Senate Report at 226. As that term was
used in the Senate bill, hazard
assessment included many of the
elements of PSM.
With the exception of some key terms
and phrases, the Program 3 prevention
program language in the final rule is
identical to the OSHA standard
language (the rulemaking docket
contains a side-by-side analysis of the
OSHA standard and EPA rule text with
word differences highlighted). Most of
the differences are terms based on
specific legislative authorities given to
OSHA or EPA that have essentially the
same meaning:
OSHA term
Highly hazardous substance
Employer
Facility
Standard
Regulated substance
Owner or operator
Stationary source
Rule or part
EPA term
EPA also agrees with commenters that sound process safety management systems ideally address chemical accident
prevention in a way that protects workers, the public, and the environment. Since OSHA's responsibility is to protect
workers, there are phrases in the OSHA standard that are designed to focus employer attention on accidents that
affect the workplace. It could be argued that these phrases inadvertently exclude consideration of offsite impacts. EPA
has deleted the phrases noted below to ensure that all sources implement process safety management in a way that
protects not only workers, but also the public and the environment:
OSHA PSM requirement
EPA program 3 requirement
1910.119(d)(2)(E) An evaluation of the consequences of deviations, in-
cluding those affecting the safety and health of employees.
1910.119(e)(3)(ii) The identification of any previous incident which had
a likely potential for catastrophic consequences in the workplace.
1910.119(e)(3)(vii) A qualitative evaluation of a range of the possible
safety and health effects of failure of controls on employees in the
workplace.
1910.119(m)(1) The employer shall investigate each incident which re-
sulted in, or could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release
of a highly hazardous chemical in the workplace.
68.65(c)(1 )(v) An evaluation of the consequences of deviations.
68.67(c)(2) The identification of any previous incident which had a like-
ly potential for catastrophic consequences.
68.67(c)(7) A qualitative evaluation of a range of the possible safety
and health effects of failure of controls.
68.81(a) The owner or operator shall investigate each incident which
resulted in, or could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic re-
lease of a regulated substance.
EPA also made changes to specific
schedule dates to coordinate with the
OSHA PSM requirements, made internal
references consistent, and added a
provision to the PHA section
specifically grandfathering all OSHA
PHAs and allowing sources to update
and revalidate these PHAs on their
OSHA schedule. EPA believes these
modifications do not cause source
owners or operators to make major
adjustments to their PSM systems
established under OSHA. These minor
modifications ultimately lead to the
development of one comprehensive
process safety management system
satisfying both OSHA and EPA that
works to prevent accidents affecting
workers, the public, and the
environment.
EPA also modified the OSHA
definition of catastrophic release, which
serves as a trigger for an accident
investigation, to include events "that
present imminent and substantial
endangerment to public health and the
environment." This modification, in
combination with the changes noted
above, ensure that sources covered by
both OSHA and EPA requirements must
investigate not only accidents that
threaten workers, but also those that
threaten the public or the environment.
EPA agrees with commenters and
recognizes that most catastrophic
accidental releases affect workers first.
However, the Agency also believes that
there are accidental release situations
where workers are protected but the
public and the environment are
threatened, e.g. vessel
overpressurizations that cause
emergency relief devices to work as
designed and vent hazardous
atmospheres away from the workplace
and into the air where they are carried
downwind. Although many sources
through the PHA process will have
recognized and addressed the potential
impact offsite associated with safety
measures that protect workers (e.g. an
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31688 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations
emergency vent scrubber system), EPA
believes that the requirements in today's
rule ensure that all sources routinely
consider such possibilities and integrate
the protection of workers, the public,
and the environment into one program.
2. Enforcement. Many commenters
expressed concern for conflicting audit
procedures, interpretations, and
enforcement actions when EPA and
OSHA auditors inspect the same
processes. EPA has no authority to
exempt a source covered under the PSM
standard and today's rule from any
prospect of an EPA enforcement action
for violations of section 112(r) and EPA
regulations issued under it. EPA and
OSHA are working closely to ensure
that enforcement actions are based on
consistent interpretations and
coordinated to avoid overlapping audits.
Such coordination in enforcement was
recognized as an appropriate method for
exercising the Administrator's duty to
coordinate the EPA program with OSHA
(Senate Report at 244).
3. Exemptions. Many commenters
suggested that the Agency exempt small
businesses or certain industry sectors
because the rule is too costly, some
industries are already subject to
substantial regulation by other Federal
or state agencies, OSHA exempts certain
industries from the PSM standard, and
some sources have effective self
policing regimes in place.
Regardless of whether the source is
covered under some other Federal, state.
or local program, EPA has no authority
to exempt a source that has more than
a threshold quantity of a regulated
substance from complying with the risk
management program rule (CAA section
112(r)(7)(B)(ii)). EPA established the
tiered approach to acknowledge that
different Industries pose different
potential risks to human health and the
environment and that elements of other
regulatory programs may serve to
prevent accidents. EPA believes that
owners or operators can indicate in their
Program and RMP how compliance with
other particular regulations and
standards satisfies Program or RMP
elements, thereby, avoid duplication.
Only those processes in certain SIC
codes or covered by OSHA's PSM
standard must implement the full PSM
program under Program 3. A source
owner or operator can demonstrate
compliance with the Program 2 or 3
prevention program under today's rule
for a covered process by showing that it
complies with the PSM standard. This
approach is consistent with the
authority to set different standards for
different types of sources under CAA
section 112(r)(7)(B)(I).
E. Relationship to Air Permitting
Several commenters on the NPRM
requested that EPA clarify the
relationship between the risk
management program and the air permit
program under Title V of the CAA for
sources subject to both requirements. In
the SNPRM, EPA indicated that in Title
V, section 502(b)(5)(A), Congress clearly
requires that permitting authorities must
have the authority to "assure
compliance by all sources required to
have a permit under this title with each
applicable standard, regulation or
requirement under this Act." EPA
further states in part 70.2 that
"Applicable Requirement means * * *
(4) Any standard or other requirement
under section 112 of the Act, including
any requirement concerning accident
prevention under section 112(r)(7) of the
Act; * * *" Consequently, EPA must
require that air permitting authorities
implementing Title V permit programs
be able to assure compliance with
section 112(r). In the SNPRM, EPA
attempted to identify the section 112(r)
"applicable requirements," clarify the
minimum content of part 70 permits
with respect to these requirements, and
to specify the role and responsibilities
of the part 70 permitting authority in
assuring compliance with these
requirements.
The sec-lions below address the major
Issue areas raised by commenters on the
SNPRM. More detail can be found in the
Risk Management Program Rule:
Summary and Response to Comments in
the Docket. The SNPRM also addressed
the role and responsibilities of the
implementing agency with respect to
section 112(r). This issue is addressed
separately in Section R below.
1. General relationship between the
part 68 and air permitting programs.
Some commenters agreed with EPA's
proposed role for the air permitting
authority with respect to section 112(r),
but encouraged EPA to avoid new,
confusing, and duplicative state and
source permitting requirements. A few
commenters suggested that all part 68
requirements should become permit
conditions, that it be fully enforced
through the part 70 permitting program,
and that anything less violates the CAA.
Most commenters (state air permitting
authorities and industry), opposed
EPA's proposal stating that Congress did
not intend, and legislative history does
not support, section 112(r) to be
implemented or enforced through the
Title V permit program.
EPA agrees that Congress did not
intend for section 112(r) to be
implemented and enforced primarily
through Title V and recognizes the
potential for confusion and burden on
sources and air permitting authorities
associated with section 112(r). EPA
believes that the requirements in today's
rule are flexible, impose minimal
burden, address the concerns raised by
commenters and satisfy the CAA
requirement for assurance of
compliance with section 112(r) as an
applicable requirement for permitting.
The requirements apply only to sources
subject to both part 68 and parts 70 or
71; there are no permitting requirements
on sources subject solely to part 68. EPA
agrees that ideally, one authority should
implement part 68 oversight; however,
air permitting authorities should not be
responsible for implementation just as
implementing agencies should not be
responsible for permitting (see
implementing agency discussion in
Section R, below). The air permitting
authority has the flexibility under
today's rule to obtain assistance,
expertise or resources from other
agencies in fulfilling its responsibilities
with respect to section 112(r). This will
foster interaction and coordination of air
pollution, pollution prevention, public
and worker safety and health and
environmental programs at the state and
local levels leading to more effective-
oversight.
2. Impact of EPA's proposal on air
permitting programs. Several
commenters stated thai EPA's proposal
places an unreasonable burden on air
permitting programs because states
would need to amend or develop new
legislative authority and implementing
regulations which diverts limited state
resources away from the development
and operation of more important routine
emissions permit programs.
EPA disagrees that today's rule places
an unreasonable burden on air
permitting programs. Part of the
approval process for a state air
permitting program is confirmation that
states have the authority to ensure that
sources are in compliance with air
toxics requirements under section 112
including section 112(r). The provisions
of section 68.215 are sufficient to meet
the obligations under part 70. Thus, for
state and local agencies that have
approved part 70 programs, states
would need to develop new legislative
authorities only if they seek delegation
to implement part 68 beyond the narrow
responsibilities provided in §68.215
(see Section R, below). State obligations
under §68.215, which should be
covered by permit fees (see section E.I 1,
below), should not impose a substantial
burden on state resources because the
rule streamlines the RMP requirements
and establishes centralized
recordkeeping for RMPs.
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Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 31689
3. Part 68 as an "applicable
requirement" under part 70. As
described above, the CAA requires that
air permitting authorities ensure that
sources are in compliance with
applicable requirements as a condition
of permitting. In the preamble of
previous rulemakings for part 70 (57 FR
32301), EPA indicated that the
definition of "applicable requirement"
under Title V includes "any
requirement under section 112(r) to
prepare and register a risk management
plan (RMP)." This explanatory
statement preceded development of part
68, which implements section 112(r)(7).
In the SNPRM, EPA proposed more
specific provisions to assure compliance
with applicable requirements for section
112(r) than the part 70 preamble so that
air permitting authority responsibility is
clear. EPA believed that all elements of
part 68 are applicable requirements;
however, compliance with applicable
requirements could be assured by
including generic terms in permits and
certain minimal oversight activities.
Together, these steps ensure that
permitted sources fulfill their accident
prevention and information sharing
responsibilities.
EPA proposed standard permit
conditions that would allow air
permitting authorities to verify
compliance with part 68. Commenters
stated that alteration of the part 70 rule
definition of the term 'applicable
requirement' under the part 68
rulemaking is inappropriate and that the
role of the air permitting authority with
respect to section 112(r) should be
defined in part 70 rulemakings rather
than in part 68.
EPA's action today does not alter the
definition of "applicable requirements"
under 40 CFR 70.2, which already
includes "any requirement concerning
accident prevention under section
112(r)(7)." Rather, EPA is establishing
very simple permit terms and flexible,
minimal oversight responsibilities that
will assure compliance with part 68.
EPA disagrees that part 68 cannot
establish more specific terms for permits
than those given in part 70 or 71 with
respect to section 112(r). As mentioned
in the SNPRM preamble, part 70 does
not preclude EPA from clarifying or
even expanding air permitting
responsibilities. Specific permit
requirements are useful to clearly
establish the minimum permit
conditions and state responsibilities
essential to ensuring compliance with
part 68 and to reduce uncertainties that
may lead to overly broad interpretations
of the requirements. However, air
permitting authorities still have the
flexibility to establish additional terms
for the permit if it so chooses.
4. Role of the air permitting authority.
In the SNPRM, EPA proposed certain air
permitting authority responsibilities
necessary to ensure that sources are in
compliance with part 68 for purposes of
permitting. Commenters stated that the
role of the Title V permitting authority
should be defined in part 70, not in part
68 and opposed EPA's proposal arguing
that it causes unnecessary confusion for
sources. Commenters also argued that
air permitting authorities do not have
the relevant expertise needed and that
states should have the flexibility to
implement risk management programs
in whichever agency they see fit. Other
commenters argued that air permitting
authorities, without section 112(1)
delegation, could not accept the
responsibilities assigned by the SNPRM
and that EPA was unlawfully attempting
to delegate the responsibility for
implementing section 112(r) to the state
permitting authorities. Several
commenters believed the permitting
authority should have no
responsibilities beyond those set forth
in EPA's April 13, 1993, policy
memorandum from John Seitz, Director
of the Office of Air and Quality
Planning and Standards (OAQPS), to
EPA Regional Air Division Directors,
available in the docket because states
invested significant resources and effort
into the development of their programs,
guided by this EPA memorandum.
However, a state permitting authority
stated that the EPA memorandum did
not account for many of the key program
elements, including the necessary
incorporation of standard permit
conditions. Many commenters also
opposed requiring extensive details or
all aspects of part 68 compliance in the
permit, finding this approach excessive
and overly burdensome on both state air
permitting authorities and sources and
contrary to the law and Congressional
intent in that it would have required
section 112(r)(7) to be fully
implemented by state permit programs.
Several commenters were concerned
that a single violation of part 68 could
potentially be enforced by both the
permitting authority and the
implementing agency. One commenter
suggested that the only case where a
violation of a part 68 requirement
should also be considered a violation of
part 70 would be the failure to register
an RMP on time under the requirements
of §68.12. Another commenter
requested that, at §68.58(b)(3), EPA
should allow the state the discretion to
determine whether a penalty should be
assessed. Several commenters, uncertain
how the Programs proposed by EPA in
the SNPRM would affect the role of the
permitting authority, suggested that EPA
develop a process to inform states of the
tiering approach and to exclude
Program 1 and 2 sources from additional
permitting requirements.
EPA believes that part 68 should more
clearly define the role of the air
permitting authority with respect to
section 112(r). Part 70 requirements
were established well before part 68 and
are therefore vague. Consequently, EPA
is using part 68 to clarify the applicable
requirements, to specify permit terms
and to establish the minimum permit
conditions and activities to avoid
misinterpretations and to ensure
compliance with part 68. EPA agrees
that air permitting authorities may not
have the expertise necessary with
respect to part 68; consequently, the
requirements in today's rule only
specify the actions the state must take
to assure that sources have met their
part 68 responsibilities while giving the
state flexibility to assign or designate by
agreement entities other than the
permitting authority to carry out these
activities. The elements in today's rule
are the minimal components of a
successful compliance program;
anything less falls short of the statutory
requirements of assuring compliance
with all applicable requirements. EPA
also disagrees that it is forcing
delegation on air permitting authorities
to implement section 112(r). As
described in the SNPRM and above, air
permitting authorities must ensure that
sources are in compliance with
applicable requirements for purposes of
permitting. This is not section 112(r)
implementation (see section R below).
EPA is merely specifying more clearly
the requirements already upon air
permitting authorities; without the
, specification given in today's rule, it
could be argued that air permitting
authorities are obligated to review and
evaluate the adequacy of RMP
submissions. EPA agrees that oversight
of the adequacy of part 68 compliance,
including RMPs, is not an appropriate
activity for the air permitting authority
and is more appropriately an
implementing agency duty, Delegation
of these implementing agency activities
can only be accomplished through a
delegation consistent with part 63,
subpart E.
EPA also maintains that the air
permitting authority role should be
more specifically defined than that
offered by the April 13, 1993,
memorandum. The April 1993 policy
was prepared prior to the NPRM and
SNPRM, it does not account for
implementation of the risk management
program by the source (as opposed to
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31690 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations
implementation of the plan), and there
is no mechanism, such as a review of
the RMP by the permitting authority, to
ensure that the plan contains the
elements required by part 68. These
deficiencies were previously indicated
by EPA in a June 24, 1994,
memorandum from John Seitz and Jim
Makris, Director of the Chemical
Emergency Preparedness and
Prevention Office (CEPPO) to EPA
Regional Division Directors, which
stated that "approval criteria in the
April 13 memorandum may not be
sufficient to ensure compliance with all
'applicable requirements' established"
in the risk management program rule.
EPA acknowledges that states may have
invested considerable resources and
effort in development of air permitting
programs based on the April 13,1993
policy. However, EPA also believes that
the minimum requirements and
flexibility offered by today's rule allow
air permitting authorities to fold these
activities into their programs with
minimal burden. EPA recognizes that
there may be multiple agency oversight
related to permitting and part 68. As
mentioned above, today's rule allows
the air permitting authority the
flexibility to use other agencies, such as
the implementing agency or a
designated agency (upon agreement), to
better coordinate at the state and local
level. In addition, EPA must note that
there is no 'approval' of either initial or
revised RMP submissions.
EPA agrees that requiring the permit
to contain extensive details of part 68
compliance goes well beyond the need
for part 70 permits to assure compliance
with applicable section i 12(r)
requirements and it would impose
considerable resource and expertise
burdens on the permitting authority.
EPA has maintained that it is not
appropriate to include risk management
program elements as permit conditions
since these elements will be highly
source=specific and subject to change as
the source develops and implements its
programs.
While enforcement would primarily
occur using part 68 authority, EPA
agrees that the permitting authority also
has the authority to pursue violations
under part 70 and sources could be
subject to multiple violations. This is no
different from any other standard
promulgated by EPA that becomes an
applicable requirement for permitting.
EPA agrees that the air permitting
authority has the discretion to
coordinate with the implementing
agency with respect to penalty
assessment associated with §68.58(b)(3)
in theSNPRM (§68.215(e)(4) under
today's rule).
Finally, the tiering (Program)
approach benefits sources as well as air
permitting authorities. EPA has
simplified the tiering,provisions so
sources and air permitting authorities
should be able to readily determine the
Program requirements each process
must satisfy, leading to more effective
oversight. EPA has also streamlined the
RMP reporting requirements and is
working on electronic submission of
RMP information which serve to reduce
the burden on air permitting authorities
and implementing agencies.
5. Title V permit application contents.
Many commenters stated that sources
regulated under parts 70 or 71 and part
68 should only be required to certify
whether they are subject to section
112(r) in their initial permit application
to allow timely processing. Although
EPA indicated that it did not want the
RMP included in permit applications or
in the permit, many commenters stated
their opposition because the additional
time required for RMP review could
delay permit grants and, in some states,
the RMP could be included in the
source's permit. Several commenters
suggested that the air permitting
authority should decide whether it
wants the RMP; one commenter stated
that sources would have a significant
incentive to comply with such a request,
given the permitting authority's ability
to withdraw an application shield.
Others stated that the permitting
authority should be prohibited from
asking for the RMP as part of the permit
application.
As EPA has indicated, the RMP
should not be submitted with the permit
application or made part of the permit.
EPA is working to streamline permit
application requirements and has
indicated that the minimum with
respect to section 112(r) is a "check
box" for the source to note whether it
is subject to section 112(r), and either
certification that the source is in
compliance with part 68 or has a plan
for achieving compliance. Any other
requirements are up to the air
permitting authority. All sources will be
required to submit their RMP to a
central point to be specified by EPA and
will be immediately available to local
responders and the state which may
elect to make it available to air
permitting authorities.
6. Air permit contents. EPA proposed
in the SNPRM that each permit contain
standard conditions that address key
compliance elements in part 68 and
mechanisms for compliance plans,
certifications and revisions. Although
EPA indicated it did not believe the
RMP should be part of the permit, two
commenters suggested that it should be
included while most others indicated
that it should not or that the air
permitting authority should decide.
Several commenters supported no more
than the four conditions proposed in the
SNPRM while others suggested
requirements including: prompt
development and updating of a
complete RMP; no conditions other than
an indication that a source is subject to
part 68; provisions stating the need to
register according to § 68.12; a condition
stating that the source will comply with
all part 68 requirements; and a standard
provision recognizing that the
implementing agency has the section
112(r) enforcement authority.
Except for the provisions of
§68.215(a), EPA does not believe that
the RMP or all or any portion of the
remainder of part 68 should become
permit conditions because the RMP and
part 68 elements will be highly source-
specific and subject to frequent change
introducing unnecessary complexity
and delaying permit implementation.
The provisions of §68.215 should allow
the air permitting authority to
implement the conditions in a
standardized way across many sources
with minimal burden. EPA has revised
§ 68.215 to require that all permits
contain a statement listing part 68 as an
applicable requirement and that
conditions shall be added that require
the source to submit a compliance
schedule for meeting the requirements
of part 68 or, as part of the compliance
certification all permitted sources must
submit under 40 CFR 70.6(c)(5), a
certification statement that, to the best
of the owner or operator's knowledge,
the source is in compliance with all
requirements of this part, including the
registration and submission of the RMP.
EPA had amended the authority citation
for part 68 to include CAA Title V
because EPA is promulgating permit
terms and oversight duties. Consistent
with parts 70 and 71, the permit shield
provisions of parts 70 and 71 would not
apply to the substantive requirements of
part 68 because the detailed substantive
requirements of part 68 are not
addressed in the Title V permit or
permit application. If a permit without
these conditions has already been
issued, then when the permit comes up
for renewal under part 70 or 71
requirements (40 CFR Part 70.7), the
owner or operator shall submit an
application for a revision to its permit
to incorporate these conditions. The
suggested alternative conditions, not
adopted, generally help assure
compliance only with portions of part
68, such as registration or the
preparation of the RMP, or omit critical
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Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 31691
information, such as whether the source
is subject to part 68 or what its
compliance status is. The implementing
agency's enforcement authority is
apparent on the face of the CAA.
7. Completeness review. As part of
ensuring compliance, EPA proposed in
the SNPRM that within a certain time-
frame the air permitting authority must
verify that an RMP containing the
required elements had been submitted
and indicated in the preamble that it
would assist air permitting authorities
by developing a checklist. EPA stated
that this review is independent of
completeness reviews required for
permit applications to avoid interfering
with the permit process. Further, air
permitting authorities could arrange for
other agencies, including the
implementing agency, to perform the
completeness review. EPA also
requested comment on whether the
permitting authority should be able to
require sources to make revisions to an
RMP.
Most commenters disagreed with this
proposal arguing that if a completeness
check is necessary, it should be
performed by the implementing agency
since most air permitting authorities
will not have the technical expertise
(e.g., chemical process safety) required
to adequately review RMPs for technical
completeness. Commenters also argued
that a completeness review would lx-
merely procedural, it duplicates effort
without creating any real benefit, it
consumes scarce resources, and it leads
to inconsistent RMP review without
ensuring the source is in compliance
with risk management program
requirements. Some commenters
suggested that the completeness review
could be better defined only as a review
of source self-certification that a
complete RMP was submitted rather
than a substantive review. Some
commenters generally agreed that
completeness checks should be
completed within sixty days. Finally,
most commenters argued that only the
implementing agency should be able to
require revisions to the RMP. Otherwise,
another revision review, appeal and
verification process would be necessary,
duplicating the process already
established for the implementing
agency.
Based on these comments, EPA has
decided not to require that air
permitting authorities perform a
completeness check as part of the
verification of compliance with part 68.
EPA has modified the rule requirements
so that the air permitting authority may
select for itself one or more appropriate
mechanisms (such as source audits,
record reviews, source inspections or
completeness checks) and time-frame in
conjunction with source certifications,
to ensure that permitted sources are in
compliance with the part 68
requirements. Without some kind of
oversight, source self-certification is not
a sufficient means of compliance
assurance, given that an RMP contains
information essential at the local level
for emergency prevention,
preparedness, and response and is not
subject to routine, case-by-case review
for quality. These oversight mechanisms
do not need to be used on each source
in order to be effective. EPA agrees that
the review for quality or adequacy of the
RMP is best accomplished by the
implementing agency on a frequency
and scope that may vary. EPA is willing
to work with air permitting authorities
on guidance, checklists or other tools to
assist in the development of compliance
mechanisms related to the RMP. In
addition, EPA is willing to assist air
permitting authorities in electronic
checks once the electronic system for
RMP submittal is developed. EPA
emphasizes that if an RMP
completeness check is used by the air
permitting authority, it should remain
independent of the completeness
determination for the permit
application. The RMP will most likely
bo submitted at a different time than a
permit application, since almost all
{K-rniil applications will have been
submitted well in advance of the risk
management program rule deadline. If
the completeness check determines that
an incomplete RMP has been submitted,
the permitting authority can request
additional information under
§ 68.215 (b) and should coordinate with
the implementing agency on necessary
RMP revisions. The completeness
checks are facial reviews of RMPs to
verify that there are no omissions. Such
checks could be performed on a select
basis and occasionally integrated with a
multi-purpose source inspection
conducted to ensure that the air source
is in compliance with its permit.
8. Interaction of the implementing
agency and the permitting authority. In
the SNPRM, EPA attempted to delineate
the specific requirements unique to the
air permitting authority and the
implementing agency. The role of the
state is described in more detail in E.4
while the implementing agency is
discussed in R. Commenters on the
SNPRM suggested that EPA should
require the implementing agency to
certify to permitting authorities whether
part 68 sources regulated under part 70
are in compliance with part 68
requirements. Such certification should
be deemed sufficient to "assure
compliance" with the applicable
requirement under part 70. Other
commenters suggested that the
permitting authority could simply
consult with the implementing agency
when it believes there is a problem
requiring attention or that the
implementing agency should notify the
permitting authority of any problems in
part 68 compliance, so that the
permitting authority may then expand
the permit conditions accordingly.
EPA does not believe it is necessary
to define the interaction between the
permitting authority and the
implementing agency. Ideally, this
coordination and interaction should
occur at the state or local level.
Coordination of other CAA programs
(Title V, SBAP, and other 112 programs)
with the 112(r) program will ensure that
the programs are more consistently
implemented and enforced, while
easing regulatory burden and providing
the public greater access to information.
However, when EPA is the
implementing agency, it stands ready to
work with air permitting authorities on
oversight associated with permitting
and enforcement of the part 68
requirements. Today's rule also
provides the state the flexibility to
assign some or all of its responsibilities
by prior cooperative agreements or
memoranda of understanding to the
implementing agency or another state,
local, or Federal "designated agency."
EPA recognizes that each state is
structured differently and will have
different impediments and
opportunities;therefore each state has
the flexibility to place the program in an
appropriate agency or department,
including the air permitting agency.
9. The "designated agency." In the
SNPRM, EPA proposed to define the
designated agency as the state or local
agency designated by the air permitting
authority as the agency responsible for
the review of an RMP for completeness.
This provision was designed to give the
air permitting authority the flexibility to
obtain expertise from other agencies to
fulfill its responsibilities. Several
commenters believed the SNPRM does
not clearly allow the permitting
authority to delegate tasks to a
designated agency and the permitting
authority should be able to delegate
more than the completeness review, e.g.,
enforcement. Some commenters
requested that EPA redefine the term to
allow permitting authorities to delegate
tasks to EPA or other Federal agencies;
while one commenter argued that EPA
should not allow the permitting
authority to designate EPA as the
designated agency.
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31692 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations
EPA agrees that the definition should
be revised to give the air permitting
authority more flexibility. EPA has
dropped the mandatory completeness
review, added broader implementation
and enforcement activities, and
Included Federal agencies in the
designated agency definition. Thus, a
"designated agency" may be any state,
local, orFederal agency designated by
the state as the agency to carry out the
provisions of §68.215, provided that
such designation is in writing and, in
the case of a Federal agency, consented
to by the agency. The parties to any
such designation should negotiate the
terms and details of any agreements.
10, Reopening part 70 permits to
incorporate section 112(r) requirements.
In the preamble to the SNPRM, EPA
indicated that part 68 requirements
should be incorporated into part 70 or
71 permits using the part 70
administrative amendment process
because of the timing difference
between part 68 and air permitting.
Most commenters agreed with this
approach or indicated that permits
should not be reopened at all; instead,
sources that submitted permit
applications prior to promulgation of
the final section 112(r) regulations
should not be subject to enforcement
action under Title V until after the first
renewal of the permit (i.e., after 5 years).
As discussed under section E.6, if a
permit without the necessary part 68
conditions has already been issued, then
the owner or operator or air permitting
authority shall initiate a permit revision
or reopening according to the
procedures detailed in 40 CFR 70.7 or
71,7 to incorporate the terms and
conditions under paragraph (a) of
§68.215. Although EPA has not
completed part 70 permit streamlining
efforts, the requirements for permit
revisions or reopenings should be
complete by the time sources will be
required to be in compliance with the
part 68 requirements. Under the most
recent part 70 proposal, the part 68
requirements would be classified as
"less environmentally significant" and
the associated procedures would be
followed. Sources with such permits
shall be subject to enforcement under
authorities other than Title V.
11. Use of Title V funds. In the
SNPRM, EPA indicated that activities
conducted by air permitting authorities
should be covered by fees collected
under part 70 since part 68 is an
"applicable requirement." EPA also
acknowledged that air permitting
authorities may not have planned for
section 112(r) activities and requested
input on alternative funding
mechanisms or whether resources
would need to be reduced in other
programs to allow completion of part 68
responsibilities.
Several commenters raised concerns
about the impact of the section 112(r)
requirements on state and local air
permitting authorities because funding
will be needed and it may not be
possible in the current political climate
for the permitting authorities to raise the
necessary fees through Title V. Some
commenters argued that funding
decisions should be left up to the air
permitting authorities.
EPA agrees that funding decisions
regarding the part 68 program should be
made at the discretion of the state and
local agencies. However, air permitting
authorities need to be aware that the
CAA requires states to impose permit
fees that are sufficient to cover the
direct and indirect costs of
implementing the permit program,
including part 68 activities and
activities conducted by state designated
agencies. EPA believes the straight-
forward and flexible requirements
established in today's rule impose
minimal additional burden on air
permitting authorities. Funding
associated with section 112(r)
implementation is addressed in section
R, below.
12. Other issues. In the SNPRM
preamble. EPA stated that it worked
closely with and directly involved
several state and local air program
officials and state emergency response
and prevention representatives in the
development of the preamble and
regulatory language to prepare the
approaches described. EPA stated that
the proposed approaches "best reflect
the concerns of the states about air
permit program implementation and the
needs for comprehensive participation
in chemical accident prevention,
preparedness, and response at the state
and local level." Two commenters
disagreed, arguing that in January 1995,
the National Governors Association
(NGA) and ECOS (organization of state
environmental officials) presented
numerous recommendations to EPA
Assistant Administrator Mary Nichols
for changes in several clean air
programs; regarding section 112(r),
NGA/ECOS recommended that Title V
permitting authorities be required only
to certify that an RMP has been
submitted. These commenters believe
that the SNPRM fails to adequately
address states' central concern;
requiring permitting authorities to
review RMPs will encumber an already
overtaxed system.
Although EPA disagrees that the
proposal fails to adequately address
states' concerns, EPA agreed that the air
permitting authority requirements could
be more sharply focused to minimize
the burden. EPA believes that today's
rule is the product of many hours of
hard work with state and local air
permitting authorities to recognize their
concerns and to develop a rule that is
effective, flexible and imposes the least
economic burden possible.
F. General Definitions
1. Significant Accidental Release. In
the NPRM, EPA proposed to define
significant accidental release as "any
release of a regulated substance that has
caused or has the potential to cause
offsite consequences such as death,
injury, or adverse effects to human
health or the environment or to cause
the public to shelter in place or be
evacuated to avoid such consequences."
This definition was key to the
applicability of a number of rule
requirements, including hazard
assessment, accident history, and
accident investigation. Only four of
more than 115 commenters supported
this proposal arguing that the definition
should be protective of the public and
should consider inconvenience to the
public and precautionary measures
taken. Other commenters argued that
Congress intended for the section 112(r)
rules to address catastrophic releases,
not those with minor impacts, and thai
this definition overly broadens the
scope of the rule diverting resources and
increasing cost for little additional
benefit. Many commenters stated that
"injury" and "adverse effects" are
undefined and could mean any health
impact from irreversible effects to minor
irritation requiring no medical
treatment. "Potential to cause" was also
considered too vague. As discussed in
Section III.C, many commenters
objected to consideration of
environmental impacts. Commenters
also opposed sheltering-in-place and
evacuation as criteria because these
actions are often precautionary and, in
many cases, are later viewed as
unnecessary and may discourage
owners or operators from making
recommendations to evacuate or shelter
in-place. Several commenters submitted
alternative definitions where injuries
were limited to those that require
hospitalization, adverse effects were
limited to serious effects, and
environmental effects were limited to
those that generate human deaths or
hospitalizations. Some suggested that all
environmental effects be dropped.
EPA agrees that the definition as
proposed was too vague and subject to
a wide variety of interpretations. In
addition, EPA decided that a single
definition does not adequately address
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Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 31693
the criteria needed for all affected
sections of the rule. For example, the
five-year accident history requirement
depends on the offsite impacts
generated by the accident while
endpoint criteria are used for the worst-
case and alternate scenario offsite
consequence assessments.
Consequently, EPA has decided to drop
the definition and instead identify the
criteria for the types of releases or
impacts that should be addressed by the
appropriate requirement. EPA has
considered the suggestions offered by
commenters and added definitions of
the terms "environmental receptor,"
"injury," "medical treatment," and
"public receptor" and adopted (with
modifications as described above) the
OSH A definition of catastrophic release.
EPA notes that sources should be aware
that within the definition of Injury,
direct consequences include effects
caused by shrapnel and debris set in
motion by a vapor cloud explosion. EPA
adopted its Medical Treatment
definition from one OSHA uses for
logging occupational injuries and
illness. Finally, under the
environmental and public receptor
definitions, sources should npte that
certain parks and recreational areas may
be both if the public could be exposed
as a result of an accidental release
2. Stationary Source. Commenters
requested that EPA state whether the
term stationary source covers the entire
"facility" or simply a single process and
provide guidance on which
requirements apply source-wide and
which are process-specific. EPA also
received comments regarding the
relationship or overlap between the
stationary source definition and DOT
regulations. These are discussed in
section III.P.2 below.
In the List and Thresholds rule, EPA
defined stationary source to include an
entire "facility." Sources will be
required to submit one RMP and one
registration as part of that RMP for all
processes at the source with more than
a threshold quantity of a regulated
substance. Although the management
system applies to all Program 2 and 3
processes, the prevention program
elements are process-specific. The
hazard assessment requirements apply
to the regulated substances, but only in
covered processes. As a practical matter,
the emergency response program will
probably apply to the entire source
although technically it applies only to
covered processes.
3. Process. Several commenters
argued that the definition of process was
susceptible to overly expansive •
interpretations and asked that certain
activities such as storage at sources or
distribution terminals be excluded.
Many commenters sought clarification
of "close proximity" and
"interconnected vessel." Commenters
also wanted the definition to be
consistent with OSHA.
EPA adopted OSHA's definition of
process in the original proposal and for
the final rule. This definition
specifically covers storage (as well as
handling and processing) of regulated
substances. EPA disagrees that storage-
only sources are adequately covered by
SPCC regulations since the regulations
under SPCC and OPA-90 cover oil
terminals and releases to water. This
rule is directed at accidental releases of
regulated substances (not including oil)
to the ambient air. Generally, OSHA
PSM also covers these chemical
terminals; consequently, the only
additional steps these sources will need
to take will be to conduct the hazard
assessment and submit the RMP, as
existing emergency response plans may
meet the emergency response program
requirements.
Since EPA's definition is identical to
OSHA's, EPA will coordinate
interpretations of the definition of
process with OSHA to ensure that the
rule is applied consistently. OSHA has
stated that processes are in "close
proximity" if a release from one could
lead to a release from the other. Owners
or operators must be able to demonstrate
that an "effective barrier" exists to
prevent a release from one process from
affecting another. OSHA has interpreted
"interconnected vessel" to mean vessels
connected by any means, such as
piping, valves or hoses, even if these are
occasionally disconnected. EPA will
also adhere to these interpretations.
4. Offsite. One commenter stated that
EPA's proposed definition of offsite
should be expanded to include the air
above and below the point of release to
cover exposure to the upper atmosphere
and groundwater. Another asked EPA to
limit the definition to areas frequented
by the public. Two commenters
opposed including areas on site where
the public has access because OSHA
already covers these areas.
In the final rule, EPA has retained a
definition of offsite as "areas beyond the
property boundary of the stationary
source or areas within the property
boundary to which the public has
routine and unrestricted access during
or outside business hours." OSHA's
jurisdiction includes visitors that may
be on the property of a facility who are
conducting business as employees of
other companies but does not
necessarily extend to casual visitors or
to areas within a facility boundary to
which the public has routine and
unrestricted access at any time.
5. Other Definitions. Commenters
raised questions about several other
definitions. Three commenters
suggested changes or clarifications to
the definition of accidental release.
EPA's definition is the statutory
definition. Commenters also proposed
modifications to the definition of
"analysis of offsite consequence." As
noted above, EPA has determined that
this definition is not needed and has
deleted it from the final rule.
Commenters sought clarification of
the definition of mitigation systems and
whether personnel should be
considered an active mitigation system.
Others asked for a list of passive
mitigation systems and provided
proposals. These commenters also
objected to limiting passive systems to
those that capture or control released
substances; they suggested that systems
that are designed to prevent releases or
control the volume or rate of a release,
such as vent/catch tanks, quench tanks,
blowdown tanks, elevated stacks and
high velocity stacks, adsorbents
including carbon beds, neutralization
tanks, double-walled vessels or
pipelines, chemical sewers, closed drain
header systems for flammables, vapor
liquid separators, fire barriers,
explosion-resistant walls, isolation
distances, barriers to prevent free access
of air flow after a release, containment
buildings, pre-charged water spray
systems, closed vent systems, and filters
should also be considered passive
mitigation. One commenter suggested
that active mitigation systems should be
defined as those that require manual
activation or an energy source (other
than gravitational attraction) to perform
their intended function.
For the final rule, EPA has decided to
define passive mitigation systems as
those systems that operate without
human, mechanical, or other energy
input and would include building
enclosures, dikes, and containment
walls but excludes active mitigation
systems such as excess flow valves, fail-
safe systems, scrubbers, flares, deluge
systems, and water curtains. In addition
to the requirements outlined in §§ 68.25
and 68.28, EPA provides further
guidance on the consideration of the
effect of passive mitigation in its RMP
Offsite Consequence Analysis Guidance.
EPA does not believe that all systems
designed to prevent releases or control
the volume or rate of a release should
be considered passive mitigation,
consistent with its intent to reflect the
potential for failure of any system that
requires human, mechanical, or other
energy inputs.
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31694 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations
C, Risk Management Plan (RMP)
In the NPRM, EPA proposed that
owners or operators of stationary
sources covered by the requirements
submit an RMP summarizing the key
elements of its risk management
program. In the NPRM preamble, EPA
indicated that summaries of the
information requested (e.g., hazard
assessment and emergency response
program) would provide the most useful
information to the public and local
agencies without overburdening them
with unneeded detailed information.
EPA further stated that the RMP should
serve to provide local and state agencies
and the public with sufficient
information to determine if additional
details are needed. These details would
be available, if needed, to implementing
agency officials conducting audits or
compliance inspections.
1. Level of Detail. Most commenters
agreed with EPA's proposal noting that
the public should be able to identify key
hazard and risk management
information from the RMP without
being overwhelmed by extraneous
documentation that is more
appropriately maintained on site. A
detailed submission would not be cost-
effective and could threaten plant
security; these commenters expressed
fears of terrorism, thieves, and
saboteurs.
Other commenters disagreed and
argued that summaries would not
provide enough information while "full
disclosure" would support an informed
public. Some commenters argued that
the public could be misled by a
summary derived from a "full" RMP
withheld from the public by the source.
Further, several commenters made the
general argument that right-to-know
provisions should be strengthened and
that the public should be given full
access to all risk management program
information including PHAs and actual
operating procedures. Individual
commenters also requested public
access to specific information regarding
such details as worst-case scenarios and
descriptions of chemical accidents.
Some commenters argued that an
Informed public and public scrutiny, in
general, can act as a powerful force in
reducing risk and preventing accidents
at stationary sources.
EPA agrees that an informed public is
a key element of sound chemical
emergency prevention, preparedness,
and response. However, EPA also
believes that it is essential for the public
to focus on the information essential at
the local level for prevention.
preparedness, and response and has
decided to maintain its proposed
requirement that the RMP provide
certain information about the risk
management programs at a source. EPA
notes that its previous use of the word
summary was not intended to imply
that the source prepares a "full" RMP
document from which a source extracts
summary information that is shared
with the public. Rather, the source is
obligated to develop certain information
about the hazards, prevention, and
emergency response programs from the
array of documentation at the source to
prepare an RMP. EPA believes it would
be impractical to require sources to
share all documentation used for the
safe operation of the processes at a
source. Not only is much of this
information likely to be confidential,
but significant technical expertise and
time are necessary to extract,
understand, and to make meaningful
judgments about the adequacy of the
information. The RMP will consist of an
executive summary and required data
elements addressing all elements of the
risk management program as described
below. Detailed supporting
documentation will be maintained on
site available to the implementing
agency for review.
2. RMP Contents. Most commenters
requested that EPA generally limit the
level of detail required, the number of
scenarios, or the number of pages in the
RMP. Other commenters recommended
EPA require submission of only
information specified in the CAA and
incorporate other detailed information
by reference. Commenters also noted
that documenting each action taken to
address a hazard, the date on which the
action started (or is scheduled to start),
and the actual or scheduled completion
date would prove impractical. EPA
received many comments stating that
the requirement that exact dates on
which training, emergency exercises, or
rescue drills, are conducted would be
impractical and unnecessary.
Commenters seeking more
comprehensive RMPs argued in favor of
requiring an index or bibliography of
detailed information or a catalog of all
available documents, an investigation
and analysis of all other credible release
scenarios, and submission of
assumptions, methodology, and
modeling methods used to determine
worst-case accidents.
As described above, EPA is
considering development of a reporting
mechanism and form to collect key data
elements. As discussed below, this
approach will foster electronic
submission and immediate availability
to Federal, state and local entities, and
the public. To make such submission
possible, EPA wants to collect data that
generally can be reported by numerical
information, yes/no answers, and check
boxes. For the offsite consequence
analyses, owners or operators will be
asked to provide distance to the
endpoint, populations and
environments affected, and enough of
the data used to determine these
distances so that local entities and the
public can check the distance against
the distance derived from EPA's
reference tables or a model identified in
the RMP. If EPA's guidance was not
used, sources will need to indicate
which models were used. Many of the
parameters for modeling are set in the
rule and do not need to be respecified
in the RMP. The rule requires only one
alternative release scenario per toxic
substance and one for all flammables;
owners or operators may submit
additional scenarios.
For prevention programs, owners or
operators must provide information
(primarily dates) that will allow the
implementing agency to assess whether
the source is in compliance with the
rule elements. For the PHA, owners or
operators must state which technique
was used for each covered process, the
general hazards associated with the
chemicals and process, the process
controls in use, mitigation and
monitoring or detection systems in use,
and changes instituted since the last
PHA (Program 3) or hazard review
(Program 2) update. Through lists and
checkoff boxes, EPA can collect a
significant amount of information on
current safety practices without
requiring sources to develop lengthy
documentation that would have proved
a burden to both the source and any
government or public data user and
reduced the potential for electronic
submission. EPA believes this approach
provides the Agency and others with a
mechanism for identifying industry
practices and controls from almost
70,000 sources that would not be
feasible otherwise. EPA notes that some
of the largest chemical sources and
refineries may be providing data on 30
or more processes. In the format
proposed in the NPRM, these sources
might have submitted several thousand
pages each; analyzing such submissions
would have been a daunting task for the
implementing agencies and probably
would have made it impossible for
public interest groups to review an
industry as a whole. With electronic
submission, such reviews will be easier.
The implementing agency or EPA can
seek additional details from individual
sources, as needed. EPA has eliminated
the requirement to provide dates of
training and emergency exercises or
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Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 31695
drills because the Agency agrees that
this amount of detail is unnecessary and
impractical.
3. Submission. In the NPRM
preamble, EPA proposed that computer
software be developed that would
provide sources with a standard format
for completing the information required
in the RMP; that local authorities be
allowed to designate the state as the
receiving entity; or that RMPs be
submitted only on request from the
state, or local entity.
Many commenters, particularly those
in the potentially regulated community,
supported submission of the RMP upon
request or mandatory submission to the
implementing agency with submission
by request to other organizations. Others
recommended submission to the LEPC
and public with submission by request
to the implementing agency, and SERC.
Most commenters favored reducing the
paperwork burden and electronic
submission because it would reduce
time and errors, provide more
consistency, and make information
more useful for the LEPC and regulatory
agencies. Only two commenters
opposed electronic filing because all
sources may not have the computer
capability.
Commenters also supported the
development of a standard RMP format
regardless of whether the RMP is
submitted electronically because
standardization would ensure
submissions were manageable and
useful and would ease burdens on both
regulated and reviewing entities.
EPA has decided to work toward
electronic submission of RMPs. The
Agency believes this will meet
numerous objectives of the program and
will address several issues. First,
electronic submission would reduce the
burden on regulated and receiving
entities. The Agency has noted that
information management of regulatory
documents is not a cost-free
requirement, and that duplication of
effort, including system development,
personnel resources, and storage and
maintenance efforts could be significant.
Electronic submissions would reduce
the paperwork burden on sources and
state and local governments and would
further serve to comply with the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995,
which supports the maximum feasible
use of electronic submission. Second,
EPA wishes to limit the information
management burden on local entities so
they can focus on the chemical safety
issues raised by this rule.
Third, electronic submissions would
benefit affected communities and the
general public. Besides having the RMP
provide the statutorily required
information on compliance with the
regulations to the implementing agency,
EPA believes the specific value of RMP
information is for the local community
to understand its community's risk from
chemical accidents and to help them
work with sources using these
chemicals to reduce such risks. The
Agency believes this objective would
not be served well with a centralized
paper information source and that using
an electronic medium would support
better access to information. With
electronic submission of RMPs to a
central point, states, local entities, and
the public will have access to all RMPs
electronically. RMP information may
also be made available on-line via
libraries and other institutions.
Electronic submissions further address
the issue of standardized RMPs. The
RMP data elements included in the
submission will be checkoff boxes, yes/
no answers, or numerical entries to ease
the burden of submission and reception
and will promote consistency and
uniformity. The Agency intends to
develop technical guidance for the
submission of the RMPs, which will
provide for submission and receipt of an
electronic formatted document
containing the data elements outlined in
§§ 68.160 through 68.180.
4. Other Issues. In the NPRM, EPA
proposed that RMPs be resubmitted
within six months of an information
change. Several commenters argued it
would generate a continual flow of
paperwork and recommended an update
frequency requirement of once a year.
EPA has retained the requirement that
the RMP be resubmitted within six
months of the elimination of a substance
in a process or at the source, a change
in Program status for a process, or if a
process change at the source requires a
revised hazard assessment or hazard
review/PHA. To be consistent with the
statutory requirements for compliance,
the RMP would also have to be updated
on the date an already regulated
substance becomes present in a process
above the threshold or within three
years of the date when EPA lists a new
substance. EPA believes that with a
standardized format and electronic
filing, updates can be rapidly and easily
made, and this information should be
promptly shared. EPA changed the
update schedule for hazard assessments
to make them consistent with the RMP
update. EPA also specified when offsite
consequence analyses require update;
the rule states that these analyses need
to be reviewed and changed if on-site
changes may be reasonably expected to
change the distance to an endpoint by
a factor of two or more. EPA notes that
this change is likely to reduce the
number of updates required. For PHAs,
only major changes to a process or
installation of new processes is likely to
trigger a revised PHA. EPA expects that
relatively few sources will need to
update either their offsite consequence
analyses or PHAs/hazard reviews more
frequently than once every five years
because the majority of sources have
simple processes that do not change
frequently. Chemical industry sources
may need to submit more updates if
processes are changing significantly.
The RMP should reflect such significant
changes.
EPA proposed that RMPs be
submitted to implementing agencies,
SERCs, and LEPCs, and be made
available to the public. Several
commenters recommended that
additional parties, local fire officials in
particular, also receive RMPs. One
commenter stated that EPCRA requires
various reports go to local fire
departments, and another commenter
noted that RMP information may be
better used by emergency management
agencies, fire departments, and
hazardous materials teams. Because
EPA plans to have RMPs submitted to
and available from a central point in
electronic format, any agency that wants
the information will be able to access it
directly on-line. The RMP will be
immediately available to local
responders and the state. Thus, this
manner of submission fulfills the
requirements of CAA section
112(r)(7)(B)(iii). Additional submission
requirements are, therefore,
unnecessary.
The Department of Defense (DOD)
commented concerning the lack of a
rule provision explicitly declaring that
information that is classified under
applicable laws and Executive Orders
(E.O.s) is not to be included in the RMP.
EPA is clarifying that such classified
information is protected from disclosure
by including a specific regulatory
exemption for such information.
Furthermore, EPA is clarifying that no
provision of part 68 requires the
disclosure of classified information in
violation of Federal law, regulations, or
E.O.s. Finally, EPA is also promulgating
a definition of "classified information"
that adopts the definition under the
Classified Information Procedures Act.
EPA has found no relevant statutory
language superseding or impliedly
repealing the Classified Information
Procedures Act or applicable E.O.s
regarding disclosure of classified
information, nor has EPA found any
legislative history indicating that
Congress intended to supersede or
repeal these provisions when it
established the requirement to prepare
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31696 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations
publicly-available RMPs. The provision
for exemptions from standards and
limitations established under CAA
section 112 narrowly addresses the
procedures for an exemption when "the
President determines that the
technology to implement such standard
Is not available and * * * it is in the
national security interests of the United
States to do so." CAA § 112(i)(4). The
focus of section 112(i)(4) is on the
technical capability to meet a limitation;
for example, the provision would apply
when an emission standard requires a
control device that precludes national
security-related equipment from
functioning. Section 112(i)(4) does not
consider or address the availability or
distribution of classified information to
the public, nor does the legislative
history demonstrate that such disclosure
was contemplated.
The requirement of section
112(r)(7)(B)(ill) to make RMPs publicly
available must read in congruence with
the provisions prohibiting disclosure of
classified information. "Classified
Information," as defined by the
Classified Information Procedures Act,
18 U.S.C. App. 3, section 1 (a), is "any
Information or material that has been
determined by the United States
Government pursuant to an Executive
order, statute, or regulation, to require
protection against unauthorized
disclosure for reasons of national
security. * * *" "National security
* * * means the national defense and
foreign relations of the United States"
18 U.S.C. App. 3, section 1 (b). Criminal
penalties exist for unauthorized
disclosure of classified information that
has been designated by the Department
of Defense or defense agencies for
limited or restricted dissemination or
distribution. 18 U.S.C. 793. It is not
reasonable to interpret the CAA to
require the disclosure of classified
information in violation of criminal law.
It has been EPA's long-standing policy
to interpret information disclosure
provisions in its statutes as being
consistent with national security law to
the maximum extent possible and to
require such information to be
maintained in accordance with the
originating agency's requirements.
Federal Facilities Compliance Strategy
(November 1988), at page V-6.
Therefore, EPA is promulgating
language in §68.150(d) to clarify its
intent with respect to the disclosure of
classified information in RMPs by
specifically exempting classified
Information from the RMP except by
means of a classified annex submitted to
appropriately cleared Federal or state
representatives with proper security
clearances. Furthermore, EPA is
promulgating §68.210(b) to clarify that
disclosure of classified information is
controlled by the Classified Information
Procedures Act, E.O.s 12958 and 12968,
and other laws, regulations, and E.O.s
applicable to classified information.
Finally, in §68.3, EPA is defining
classified information by promulgating
the definition under the Classified
Information Procedures Act.
H. Prevention Program
In the NPRM preamble, EPA noted
that the CAA requires the risk
management program to include a
prevention program that covers safety
precautions and maintenance,
monitoring, and employee training
measures. Because OSHA PSM covers
this same set of elements, EPA proposed
a prevention program that adopted and
built on OSHA PSM. The proposed
requirements for EPA's prevention
program included a management system
requirement and sections covering nine
elements: process hazard analysis,
process safety information, operating
procedures (SOPs), training,
maintenance, pre-startup review,
management of change, safety audits,
' and accident investigation.
To assist in describing its prevention
program, EPA included a section in its
preamble comparing its prevention
program to OSHA PSM standard. EPA
noted that with the exception of the
management system requirement, the
proposed prevention program covered
the same elements as OSHA's PSM and
generally used identical language except
where the statutory mandates of the two
agencies dictated differences. EPA
added introductory paragraphs to most
sections to provide additional
information. Further, in some of the
sections, EPA proposed additional
requirements and established different
deadlines. The majority of comments
EPA received concerned conflicts and
differences between EPA's proposed
requirements and OSHA PSM standard.
In the final rule, the Program 3
prevention program is the OSHA PSM
standard for parallel elements, with
minor wording changes to address
statutory differences. For elements that
are in both the EPA and OSHA rules,
EPA has used OSHA's language
verbatim, changing only certain
regulatory terms (e.g., highly hazardous
chemical to regulated substance and
employer to owner/operator) and dates.
The sections of the OSHA PSM standard
were not cross-referenced for the
reasons discussed in section III.D of this
preamble. Key issues under PSM are
discussed below; the remainder are
addressed in the Response to Comments
Document.
Management. In the NPRM preamble,
EPA stated the purpose of its proposed
management system is to ensure
integration of all prevention program
elements. EPA proposed that owners or
operators identify a single person or
position that has the overall
responsibility for the development,
implementation, and integration of the
risk management program requirements.
When responsibility for implementing
individual requirements of the risk
management program is assigned to
persons other than the person
designated, the names or positions of
these people shall be documented and
the lines of authority defined through an
organization chart or similar document.
Several commenters agreed with this
approach because it serves a useful
purpose and many PSM sources already
implement management systems. Many
commenters opposed the requirement
for submission of an organization chart
of their source because it would be of
no value to EPA and that continual
updating would waste company
resources.
EPA has decided to maintain its
management system requirements in the
final rule for sources with processes in
Program 2 and 3, but has moved it to
general requirements (§68.15) because it
is the entire risk management program
that should be managed, not just the
prevention program. EPA has also
revised the requirement to provide
flexibility in indicating lines of
authority; an organization chart is not
absolutely required and is not included
in the RMP.
Management of Change. Some
commenters objected to EPA's
definition of replacement in kind,
asking that EPA adopt the OSHA PSM
definition. Other commenters stated that
management of change procedures
should only be implemented when the
changes had the potential to increase
the risk (e.g., an increase in inventory,
an introduction of a new substance).
As part of its efforts to strengthen
coordination between the two programs,
EPA will use the OSHA definition for
"replacements in kind": "a replacement
which satisfies the design
specification." OSHA defined this term
to address a concern expressed by
commenters on its standard that failing
to define "replacements in kind" could
result in misunderstandings such as
employers believing that only a
replacement with the same brand and
model number could be characterized as
a "replacement in kind." OSHA
promulgated a definition in recognition
of these comments, and EPA
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understands it to reflect a concept
understood in industry.
Further, EPA does not agree that
management of change requirements
should exclude changes that reduce the
risk of an accidental release. The
Agency does not believe that only
changes to "critical systems" should be
subject to management of change
procedures. As EPA stated in the NPRM
preamble, most process changes
improve process safety or efficiency.
However, even these changes may result
in unintended effects when source
owners and operators fail to evaluate the
consequences of the change. Therefore,
the Agency continues to believe that a
change that reduces the risk of an
accidental chemical release may,
nonetheless, be an appropriate subject
for a management of change procedure.
Failure to subject such changes to a
management of change process could
inadvertently result in a change that was
believed to lower risk when such a
change, in fact, increases risk. Regarding
the comment about critical systems,
EPA notes that chemical processes are
integrated systems,-and that a change in
one part of the process can have
unintended effects in other parts of the
system—irrespective of whether the
system is "critical." Consequently, EPA
agrees with OSHA that source owners
and operators must establish and
implement written management of
change procedures for any change to a
regulated substance, process technology,
or equipment and any change to a
source that affects the covered process.
Other Provisions. Several commenters
stated that EPA should include in its
risk management program the OSHA
PSM provisions on contractors,
employee participation, and hot work
permits that EPA had not proposed in
its prevention program. The NPRM
solicited comment on whether to
include these provisions (58 FR 54205;
October 20, 1993). Commenters argued
that contractors have been responsible
for a number of accidents that have
affected the public and the
environment. Commenters presented
the same argument to support inclusion
of the hot work permit requirements. A
substantial number of commenters also
argued that employee participation is a
key factor in successful implementation
of PSM. A few commenters supported
EPA's initial position that'these
requirements were more properly OSHA
concerns.
In response to the former commenters'
arguments and to ensure consistency
between the elements of the two rules,
EPA has decided to add these sections
to its Program 3 prevention program.
EPA believes that each of these elements
is important to the implementation of an
effective prevention program. Worker
participation in PHAs and other
elements is critical to the success of
process safety because workers are
intimately familiar with the process and
equipment operation, possible failure
modes and consequences of deviations.
It also serves as a mechanism for greater
communication and understanding of
specific process hazards (as opposed to
the general chemical hazards) and the
importance of developing and following
proper procedures. Similarly, contract
employees have been involved in a
number of major accidents in recent
years; for example, the explosion in
Pasadena, Texas, in 1989, which killed
23 workers, has been attributed to
improper maintenance practices by
contractor employees. Oversight of
contractors, therefore, can be critical for
accident prevention. Finally, hot work
permits ensure that use of flame or
spark-producing equipment is carefully
controlled. Not only are many of the
listed substances highly flammable, but
fires in the vicinity of vessels or pipes
containing the toxic substances can lead
to releases of these substances.
I. Accident History
In the NPRM, EPA required sources to
document a five-year history of releases
that caused or had the potential to cause
offsite consequences for each regulated
substance handled at the source. EPA
specified that the accident history
should include the nature of any offsite
consequences, such as deaths, injuries,
hospitalizations, medical treatments,
evacuations, sheltering-in-place, and
major offsite environmental impacts
such as soil, groundwater, or drinking
water contamination, fish kills, and
vegetation damage.
A few commenters argued that
releases with only the potential for
offsite consequences should not be
included, while other commenters were
evenly divided on whether near-miss
events should be included in the
accident history. A number of
commenters indicated that releases with
on-site consequences should be added
to the accident history. Several
commenters requested that EPA clarify
that the accident history applies only to
covered processes.
In recognition of these comments, in
the final rule, only those accidents from
covered processes that resulted in
deaths, injuries, or significant property
damage on-site, or known offsite deaths,
injuries, evacuations, sheltering in
place, property damage, or
environmental damage need to be
included in the five-year accident
history. Near-miss accidents or
accidents with only the potential for
offsite consequences (that did not meet
any of the previous criteria) would not
need to be included. Because the
accident history is, by statute, an aspect
of the hazard assessment, and the
hazard assessment provisions apply
only to covered processes, EPA believes
that requiring the accident history to
address accidental releases from
processes not covered by this rule
would be inconsistent with the structure
of part 68. EPA notes that such releases
may be subject to reporting under other
statutes; the Agency may investigate
such releases to determine the need for
a response action under CERCLA and to
determine whether CAA section
112(r)(l) has been violated.
J. Emergency Response Program
In the proposed rule, EPA required
sources to develop an emergency
response plan that defines the steps the
source and each employee should take
during an accidental release of a
regulated substance. EPA noted that
most sources are already required to
have at least part of the emergency
response plan in place as a result of
other EPA (Spill Prevention, Control,
and Countermeasures and Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act) and
OSHA (emergency action plans and
HAZWOPER) regulations and requested
comment on how the proposed
requirements could best be integrated
with these existing programs to
minimize duplication. Many of the
commenters were particularly
concerned with the potential for
increased duplication of emergency
planning requirements at the state and
Federal levels that would require
expenditure of additional resources
without improving source emergency
response capabilities. Most of these
commenters suggested that EPA allow
compliance with other Federal
regulatory programs to meet the
mandate of the Clean Air Act for an
emergency response program, while
other commenters recommended that
EPA work with other agencies to
develop a format for a single,
comprehensive response plan for the
source. Some commenters addressed
related concerns with respect to state
program or voluntary initiatives.
EPA has decided to adopt the
emergency response requirements found
in the statute, without additional
specific planning requirements. This
action is consistent with the Agency's
effort to develop a single Federal
approach for emergency response
planning. The Review of Federal
Authorities for Hazardous Materials
Accident Safety, (required under section
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31698 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations
112(r)(10) of the Clean Air Act) reported
Httle harmony in the required formats or
elements of response plans prepared to
meet various Federal regulations.
Accordingly, EPA has committed not to
specify new plan elements or a specific
plan format In today's rule. EPA
believes that plans developed to comply
with other EPA contingency planning
requirements and the OSHA Hazardous
Waste and Emergency Operations
(HAZWOPER) rule (29 CFR 1910.120)
Will meet the requirements for the
emergency response program provided
that they address the elements in
section 68.95(a). EPA believes that
coordination of the emergency response
plan with the community emergency
response plan will help ensure that
oflslte response issues are addressed. In
addition, EPA and other National
Response Team agencies have prepared
Integrated Contingency Plan Guidance
("one plan") (NRT. May 1996). An
emergency response plan that includes
the elements specified in this guidance
can be used to meet the requirements in
today's rule. The final rule also provides
relief for sources that are too small to
respond to releases with their own
employees; these sources will not be
required to develop emergency response
plans provided that appropriate
responses to their hazards have been
discussed in the community emergency
response plan developed under EPCRA
(42 U.S.C. 11003) for toxics or
coordinated with the local fire
department for flammables.
K. Registration
In the NPRM, EPA proposed that
sources register with the EPA
Administrator by three years after the
publication date of the final rule, or
within three years of the date on which
a source becomes subject to the risk
management program requirements as
mandated by the CAA. While a number
of commenters agreed with this
proposal, a greater number requested
that EPA accelerate the registration to
between six months and two years of
promulgation of the rule so that
implementing agencies could better
determine resource allocation and
conduct more extensive outreach and
technical assistance to sources
developing risk management programs
and preparing RMPs.
EPA agrees that earlier registration
could aid outreach efforts and help
implementing agencies focus resources.
However, since the first RMP need not
be submitted until June 21, 1999, an
earlier, pre-registration would impose
an additional burden on sources. Some
sources may reduce inventories, make
process modifications or switch
chemicals prior to the first RMP due
date and, consequently, will not be
subject to the rule. If EPA required a
pre-registration, these sources would
have to deregister at that time. Further,
states and local agencies already have
information gathered under EPCRA
section 312 that could be used for early
identification and outreach to sources
covered by this rule. EPA is also
working with trade associations and
other representatives of affected
industries to ensure that sources are
aware of the rule. Instead, in today's
rule, the registration is included as part
of the RMP to limit the number of filings
made by sources.
EPA also proposed that sources
submit written registration information.
A number of commenters advocated
either the modification of existing forms
(e.g., the EPCRA Tier II form) or an
electronic filing system for the
submission of this information. Since
the RMP and the registration are
consolidated into one submission, this
issue is addressed generally in Section
III.G.
Under the proposed rule sources
would need to submit an amended
notice to the Administrator and the
implementing agency within 60 days if
information in the registration is no
longer accurate. Many commenters
argued that six months or a year is
needed to ensure compliance with the
certification requirements. EPA agrees
with commenters and in the final rule
has lengthened the time for submission
of an amended registration to six
months which should be enough time to
modify the information and to
electronically resubmit the registration
and RMP.
L. Model Risk Management Programs
Commenters supported the
development of model risk management
programs and RMPs, stating that the
models were needed by smaller
businesses and public systems that lack
the expertise to implement process
safety management. Commenters
specifically supported development of
models for industries with well-
understood processes and practices,
such as chlorination systems, propane
and ammonia retailers, and refrigeration
systems. A few commenters asked that
the models be made available for public
review. Others said the models should
be published as guidance, not
regulations.
EPA is working with industry groups
to develop model programs for ammonia
refrigeration, propane handling, and
water treatment. After having provided
the public with an opportunity to
review a draft of the ammonia model
program, EPA today is issuing a
guidance on a model program for this
industry (see Model Risk Management
Program for Ammonia Refrigeration).
EPA encourages other industry groups
to work with the Agency to develop
models for their sectors. EPA notes that
the models are particularly relevant to
sources with Program 2 processes.
Because EPA has adopted the OSHA
PSM standard, EPA has not provided an
EPA guidance on PSM compliance. EPA
will also publish general technical
guidance to help sources understand
and comply with the rule which will
include Program 2 prevention program
guidance. The RMP Offsite Consequence
Analysis Guidance contains reference
tables for the offsite consequence
analysis, which can be used instead of
site-specific modeling. EPA emphasizes
that the models are guidance, not
regulations; sources are not required to
use them.
M. Implementing Agency Audits
EPA originally proposed in §68.60
seven criteria an implementing agency
could use to determine whether to audit
a source's RMP. EPA also proposed that
the implementing agency have the
authority to determine whether an RMP
should be revised and to direct the
owner or operator to make revisions.
Many commenters suggested that the
Agency lacked statutory authority to
specify measures to correct risk
management program elements through
the RMP, and that RMP changes based
on implementing agency directives will
be costly.
EPA or other implementing agencies
have general inspection and
enforcement authority under CAA
sections 112(r)(7)(E), 113, and 114 to
compel source owners and operators to
correct deficiencies in the risk
management program. EPA intends to
use the audit process as a way to verify
the quality of the program summarized
in the RMP. When it is reasonable, EPA
will require modifications to the RMP
that may lead to quality improvements
in the underlying program.
EPA notes that many commenters
were uncertain of the distinction among
audits conducted under §68.220,
reviews by the permitting authority
under §68.215, and inspections. CAA
section 112(r)(7)(B)(iii) requires EPA to
develop, by regulation, a system for
auditing RMPs. These audits will review
the information submitted by sources to
determine whether the source is in
compliance with the rule elements. For
example, the implementing agency will
consider whether the dates for reviews
and revisions of various elements are
consistent with the steps sources are
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required to take. If a source reported a
major change on a date later than the
last date on which safety information
and operating procedures were
reviewed, the implementing agency
could seek further information about
why such reviews had not been
conducted and require updates if the
agency determined that the source
should have reviewed the documents.
Audits may be detailed paper reviews or
may be done at a source to confirm that
on-site documentation is consistent
with reported information.
In contrast, the air permitting
authority or its designated agency may
be reviewing the RMP for completeness,
rather that the quality of the RMP
contents. Inspections are generally more
extensive in scope than audits although
they may include a review of the
accuracy of the RMP information.
Inspections will consider whether the
source is in compliance with part 68 as
a whole, not just with the RMP
requirements, and may review both the
documentation kept at the source and
operating practices.
Regarding comments that making
changes to the RMP would be too costly,
EPA has endeavored to ameliorate the
cost burden of this rule by using a
tiering approach to make the risk
management program elements on
which the RMP rests appropriate for
sources of various sizes and complexity.
In addition, EPA is considering
development of a standard RMP
reporting format and data elements,
which should significantly reduce the
time and effort necessary to revise the
RMP. Any source owner or operator can
further limit the costs associated with
revising its RMP by submitting a timely,
complete, and valid plan in the first
instance.
N. Public Participation
In the SNPRM, EPA requested
comments on how public participation
in the risk management program process
might be encouraged. EPA's preferred
approach was to encourage the public
and sources to use existing groups,
primarily the LEPC, as a conduit for
communications between the source
and the public throughout the RMP
development process. A substantial
number of commenters supported this
approach, stating that the-LEPC was
well placed to interpret the RMP
information for the public. Commenters
said that LEPCs and their member
organizations have considerable
experience and have established rapport
in dealing with the community. Others
stated that this role is a logical
extension of current LEPC
responsibilities under EPCRA, although
funding for LEPCs was a concern.
A number of commenters opposed
this approach because some LEPCs are
not functional and that LEPCs are not a
substitute for public participation. A
few LEPCs also objected to assuming
any additional role. Commenters
suggested that EPA should require
public participation in the development
of the RMP and require all major
sources to have a public participation
strategy. Industry commenters generally
opposed any mandated public
participation requirements because
direct involvement in risk management
program development would delay the
process and would represent an
unwarranted and inappropriate
interference in management and site
control responsibilities. A few
commenters supported the SNPRM
suggestion that public participation be
limited to sources with Program 3
processes because these sources
represent the greatest risk. Other
commenters opposed this idea,
preferring the .decision to be left to local
authorities.
EPA has not adopted any specific
public participation requirements. EPA
plans to make the RMP immediately
available to any member of the public.
LEPCs and others will be able to
compare their sources with similar
sources in other areas to determine
whether quantities on sites, process
controls, mitigation systems, and
monitoring systems are significantly
different. This information will give the
public an opportunity to gain a better
understanding of local industries and
carry on a more informed dialogue with
sources on their prevention practices.
EPA continues to encourage sources to
work with the LEPCs and other
community groups to provide
information to the public and ensure an
on-going dialogue during and after RMP
development and submission. The
public is a valuable resource and a key
stakeholder in chemical accident
prevention, preparedness, and response
at the local level.
A number of commenters said that
EPA should prohibit the public from
triggering an audit through petitions
because this approach would open the
process to litigation; a petition process
would be expensive, time-consuming,
and increase the time needed to
complete the RMP. Some commenters
said it would impose an excessive
burden on the implementing agency.
Two commenters favored public
petitions to trigger audits. One said that
the audits should be conducted by
qualified third parties, subject to
community selection and supervision.
EPA has not included public petitions
as a mechanism for periodic audits of
sources under § 68.220. States, however,
are able to adopt more stringent
requirements.
O. Inherently Safer Technologies
In response to the NPRM, a number of
commenters stated that EPA should
require sources to conduct "technology
options analyses" to identify inherently
safer technologies. In the SNPRM, EPA
solicited comments on this issue, but
did not propose a requirement for such
analyses.
A number of commenters stated that
EPA should require analyses of
inherently safer technologies, at least for
sources with Program 3 processes or
new processes. Some commenters
argued that inherent safety is primary
prevention (directed at the source of the
hazard), while EPA's proposed
requirements are secondary prevention
(control of the hazard). One commenter
asked that sources be required to
provide full economic and technical
analyses of options. Commenters argued
that without a technology options
analysis requirement, industry will not
conduct these analyses because, unlike
its pollution prevention efforts, EPA has
provided no incentive for safer plants.
Other commenters strongly opposed
any requirement for these analyses
because PHA teams regularly suggest
viable, effective (and inherently safer)
alternatives for risk reduction, which
may include features such as inventory
reduction, material substitution, and
process control changes. These changes
are made as opportunities arise, without
regulation or adopting of completely
new and unproven process
technologies. Commenters said that
similar analyses are frequently
conducted during the design phase of a
process or source where there are
sufficient economic incentives to design
a process with as few costly additional
safety features as possible without new
EPA requirements. Commenters also
said that a requirement would prove
costly, without providing commensurate
benefits.
EPA has decided not to mandate
inherently safer technology analyses.
EPA does not believe that a requirement
that sources conduct searches or
analyses of alternative processing
technologies for new or existing
processes will produce additional
benefits beyond those accruing to the
rule already. As many commenters,
including those that support such
analyses, pointed out, an assessment of
inherently safer design alternatives has
the most benefit in the development of
new processes. Industry generally
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31700 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday. June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations
examines new process alternatives to
avoid the addition of more costly
administrative or engineering controls
to mitigate a design that may be more
hazardous in nature. Although some
existing processes may be superficially
judged to be inherently less safe than
other processes, EPA believes these
processes can be safely operated
through'management and control of the
hazards without spending resources
searching for unavailable or
unaffordable new process technologies.
Good PHA techniques often reveal
opportunities for continuous
improvement of existing processes and
operations. EPA encourages sources to
continue to examine and adopt viable
alternative processing technologies,
system safeguards, or process
modifications to make new and existing
processes and operations inherently
safer. EPA included questions related to
process modifications in the RMP so
that sources can demonstrate, and users
of the RMP Information can observe,
progress toward safer processes and
operations.
P, Coverage by Other Regulations
A large number of commenters
expressed concerns about duplication
between the risk management program
rule and other Federal and state
regulations. Issues related to overlap
between this rule and OSHA PSM are
discussed in Section III.D of this
preamble; issues related to overlap
between this rule and other emergency
response planning regulations are
discussed in Section IH.J of this
preamble.
1. General Issues. A substantial
number of comrnenters stated that EPA
had failed to consider other regulations
to which sources are subject that cover
some of the same requirements as this
rule. They noted that many sources are
covered by DOT rules, other EPA rules,
OSHA rules, and, in some cases, other
agency or state rules. Some commenters
argued that these other regulations
essentially prevent accidents and,
therefore, this rule is not needed.
Commenters stated that EPA should
define jurisdlctional and enforcement
boundaries so that sources subject to
multiple regulations are not subjected to
multiple enforcement actions for the
same violation. Other commenters said
that EPA should clearly identify which
similar requirements imposed by other
programs satisfy this rule and what
additional steps are needed. Some
commenters said that any source
covered by another, similar rule should
be excluded from this rule. Others
suggested that EPA explicitly cross-
reference other applicable rules. A few
commenters stated that EPCRA
reporting requirements provide ample
information to local entities and no
further reporting is needed.
EPA disagrees with some of these
comments. Except for the OSHA PSM
rule, no other rule cited by the
commenters addresses accidental
releases of regulated substances to the
extent that today's rule does. Some
Federal and state rules for certain
industries provide design standards;
compliance with these rules will satisfy
parts of today's rule. For example,
sources in compliance with 29 CFR
1910.111 for handling of anhydrous
ammonia may not need to take
additional steps to ensure the safe
design of the process. These other
standards generally do not cover
training, maintenance, hazards analysis,
and accident investigation, which are all
key elements in process safety
management. In addition, none of the
Federal rules require offsite
consequence analyses or reporting to the
public on the results of these analyses
and on prevention steps. Information
submitted under EPCRA, which consists
primarily of annual inventories, is not
equivalent to the RMP information.
Nevertheless, EPA agrees with
commenters that duplication should be
minimized, which is why the
emergency response and Program 2
prevention program steps recognize that
meeting other requirements will satisfy
elements of this rule. The model risk
management programs that EPA is
developing with industry will explicitly
cite other regulations, as well as codes
and standards, that satisfy specific
elements of this rule.
2. DOT Transportation Regulations.
Commenters concerned with overlap
with DOT regulations focused on two
issues: pipeline regulations, and
loading/unloading and storage
regulations. Commenters asked EPA to
exclude pipelines and transportation
containers connected for loading or
unloading since these are adequately
covered by DOT regulations. Some
commenters disagreed and wanted
loading and unloading of transportation
containers to be included because many
accidents occur during these
procedures.
In the final List Rule, EPA defined
stationary source to include
"transportation containers that are no
longer under active shipping orders and
transportation containers that are
connected to equipment at the
stationary source for the purposes of
temporary storage, loading, or
unloading." One commenter stated that
the 1993 oleum release in Richmond,
California, demonstrated that DOT
regulations do not adequately address
risk management of loading and
unloading. The other commenters,
however, said that loading and
unloading were covered by DOT
regulations and should not be subject to
this rule. They noted that DOT has
adopted regulations requiring training
for anyone who loads or unloads
hazardous materials. They further said
that at distribution centers, regulated
substances are not used or processed,
and, if in packages, the containers are
not opened.
Several commenters were concerned
that EPA regulation in this area could
create problems with DOT's preemption
of state rules. Under U.S. law, states
may not adopt regulations in certain
specified areas that are not substantively
the same as DOT rules or in other areas
that pose an obstacle to DOT goals
under Federal Hazardous Materials
Transportation Law. If state laws are
authorized by Federal law, however,
states could develop different
requirements than DOT imposes. In this
case, the commenter said, if EPA were
to regulate loading and unloading under
the CAA, the states would have the
authority under the CAA to impose
more stringent requirements on this
activity.
EPA disagrees with the commenters
concerning the scope of the Hazardous
Materials Transportation Act
preemption authority in this area. EPA's
definition of stationary source clearly
covers transportation containers only
when they are no longer in
transportation in commerce and was
addressed in the List Rule. EPA believes
commenters have overstated the extent
of any preemption problem. EPA's
interpretation today is consistent with
DOT's, as explained in "California and
Los Angeles County Requirements
Applicable to the On-Site Handling and
Transportation of Hazardous
Materials—Preemption Determination"
(60 FR 8774, 8776-78, February 15,
1995). EPA notes that in many cases
warehouses and wholesalers take
delivery of materials and resell them:
EPA considers this storage to be covered
by today's rule. EPA believes that DOT
standards for container integrity satisfy
process safety information
requirements. The same applies to DOT
standards for training requirements for
loading and unloading; that training
satisfies the training requirements of
this rule for loading and unloading.
Requirements for the PHA only apply to
connections to transportation containers
and for storage of containers.
3. Other EPA Regulations. Many
commenters stated that other EPA
regulations cover the same activities and
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Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 31701
should be deferred to or referenced to
prevent duplicative requirements and
enforcement. A number of commenters
said that regulations under the Clean
Water Act, specifically the Spill
Prevention, Control, and
Countermeasure (SPCC) and Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA-90) rules,
duplicate many of the provisions of this
rule. Other commenters argued the
Underground Storage Tank (UST) rules
require sources to comply with
requirements equivalent to many of the
notification, prevention, and emergency
response provisions. A few commenters
stated that EPCRA already covers the
right-to-know provisions; others stated
that the risk management program
regulations should support existing
EPCRA rules. Three commenters said
that EPA should exempt any source
covered by the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA) because the
rules under that act already impose
comprehensive risk management
requirements.
As discussed in Section III.J,
emergency response plans developed
under SPCC, OPA-90, or RCRA can be
used to meet the emergency response
requirements of this rule. EPA notes,
however, that SPCC, OPA-90, and UST
rules do not address storage, handling,
and release prevention for regulated
substances. SPCC and OPA-90 rules
apply to oil; UST rules apply to oil and
gasoline. The processes addressed by
these rules, therefore, do not overlap
with the processes covered by today's
rule.
RCRA requirements apply only to
certain activities undertaken at sources
that may be subject to the requirements
of today's final rule. As noted above,
EPA anticipates that emergency
response plans developed under RCRA
can be used to meet the emergency
response requirements of this rule. In
addition, certain training and other
release prevention activities required
under RCRA may satisfy certain of the
prevention program requirements for
Program 2 processes.
4. Other Federal Regulations. A
number of commenters stated that EPA
should not cover outer continental shelf
(OCS) sources because they are
adequately regulated under the Marine
Mineral Service, Pipeline Safety Act,
and OPA-90. The mining industry said
that they should not be covered because
their handling of explosives is regulated
in great detail by the Mine Safety and
Health Administration and the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. In
its proposed rule (61 FR 16598, April
15, 1996), EPA has proposed to delist
explosives and proposed a stay of the
affected list provisions; elsewhere in
today's Federal Register, EPA has
stayed implementation of the affected
provisions until these changes are
finalized. OCS sources are not subject to
part 68 because the connection between
this part and protection of ambient air
quality is too remote; therefore, CAA
section 328 proscribes EPA's
jurisdiction.
5. State and Local Regulations.
Commenters sought clarification of how
risk management programs
implemented under state laws in
Delaware, New Jersey, California, and
Nevada would be treated. Some
commenters said sources complying
with these state rules should be
grandfathered into EPA's rule for at least
five years. California commenters asked
that risk management prevention
programs (RMPPs) developed and
submitted under California's rule be
considered in lieu of the required RMP.
Some commenters asked that
documentation created to meet the state
requirements be considered adequate to
meet EPA's program so that additional
documentation need not be created just
to meet slightly different rules. A few
commenters suggested that EPA should
explicitly preempt any state risk
management program regulations that
are not submitted to and approved by
EPA. Other states said that EPA should
defer to state rules on hydrogen sulfide
and propane.
None of the four state risk
management program rules is identical
to EPA's or each other. The Delaware,
New Jersey, and Nevada programs
closely parallel the OSHA PSM rule; the
California program is less specific. EPA
expects that sources in compliance with
these state programs will have
completed most of the steps required
under EPA's rule. EPA notes that these
sources are generally also covered by
OSHA PSM and, therefore, should be in
compliance with a significant portion of
EPA's rule.
In relation to the request for
grandfathering, EPA does not have the
authority to grandfather compliance
with programs that the Agency has not
reviewed and approved. EPA expects
that these four states will seek
delegation of the 112(r) program under
CAA section 112(1). At that time, EPA
will review the state programs and
approve them if they are as stringent as
EPA's rule and meet other section 112(1)
requirements. If states are granted
delegation, they will have the authority
to grandfather previous compliance.
Because the CAA specifically grants
states the right to impose more stringent
regulations, EPA cannot preempt state
programs as one commenter requested.
EPA believes that substitution of the
RMPP for the RMP for California
sources is not feasible. The California
RMPPs are voluminous documents,
submitted per process, not per source.
These documents could not be
submitted electronically. Because EPA
is concentrating on submission of data
elements, EPA believes that its RMP
requirements can be met quickly by any
source that has completed an RMPP.
Completion of the RMP will not impose
a large burden on sources. If the RMPP
has summary sections, these may be
directly transferable for use as the
executive summary.
In regard to other state laws, states
may include them as part of their CAA
section 112(1) submission for EPA's
review and approval. These laws,
however, must be as stringent as EPA's;
that is, they must cover all elements of
the rule with requirements that at least
match EPA's. EPA notes that state
propane laws are generally based on
NFPA-58, which EPA is using to help
develop its model risk management
program for propane distributors and
users. Therefore, sources in compliance
with NFPA-58 requirements may meet
many of the requirements of Program 2,
as defined in the model.
Q. Industry-Specific Issues
A number of industries submitted
comments on issues that were particular
to them, in many cases seeking
exemption from the rule.
1. Oil and Gas Facilities. Industry
commenters argued that components of
the oil and gas industries should be
excluded from EPA's risk management
program; in particular, that EPA should
exempt the following operations and
facilities from RMP requirements:
• Atmospheric storage and transfer of
flammable liquids;
• Retail facilities;
• Marketing terminals and bulk
plants;
• Remote, low-risk petroleum
operations;
• Oil and gas exploration, production
and processing facilities;
• Crude oil separation, handling, and
storage operations;
• Subsurface hydrocarbon reservoirs;
• All transportation and facilities
incident to transportation; and
• Outer continental shelf facilities.
Commenters noted that these industries
and facilities pose a low risk to the
public for a number of reasons.
Significant accidental releases are
highly unlikely because these facilities
handle materials which, given site
conditions, have limited potential for
release to the air or offsite impacts.
Existing regulations reduce the potential
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31702 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations
for significant accidental releases.
Additionally, commenters argued that
the RMP provisions extend beyond
EPA's statutory authority and run
counter to the Domestic Natural Gas and
Oil Initiative established by President
Clinton.
Commenters stated that most of the
exploration and production facilities are
remotely located and argued that even
the tiering approach that EPA proposed
in the SNPRM did not provide adequate
relief for these sources, which pose
minimal risks. They noted that OSHA
specifically excludes remotely located
sources, retail facilities, DOT-regulated
sources, and atmospheric storage tanks.
A number of commenters said that EPA
had never included most of these
sources in its economic analysis,
implying that EPA did not intend to
cover them in these regulations; they
requested an explicit statement to that
effect. One commenter opposed an
exemption for oil and gas sources and
pipeline and other transportation
companies, arguing that these sources
have some of the most common or worst
accidents.
EPA does not agree that marketing
terminals or bulk plants should bo
excluded if there are regulated
substances present above their threshold
quantities. Although EPA did not
specifically exempt gasoline and
naturally occurring hydrocarbons (e.g..
crude oil), it did not intend to cover
regulated flammables in these mixtures.
In its proposed rule (61 FR 16598, April
15,1996), EPA has proposed to revise
the criteria for flammable mixtures and
to exclude naturally occurring
hydrocarbons prior to processing at a
gas processing plant or refinery.
Flammable mixtures would be covered
only if they met all of the NFPA-4
criteria. Gasoline and crude oil are
listed with NFPA 3 flammability ratings
in NFPA 325 M, Fire Hazard Properties
of Flammable Liquids, Gases, and
Volatile Solids, 1991. Elsewhere in
today's Federal Register, EPA has
stayed implementation of the risk
management program rule for
substances and processes that would be
affected by the proposed changes. As
EPA explained in the preamble to the
final list rule, the Agency has not
adopted OSHA's exemption for
atmospheric storage of flatnmables
because, unlike OSHA, EPA has listed
only flammable gases and highly
volatile flammable liquids. EPA
considers these substances to be
intrinsically hazardous, regardless of
Storage conditions and, therefore, does
not believe it Is appropriate to provide
an exemption for such tanks.
2. Retail Facilities. The rule is
expected to cover a substantial number
of retail facilities, specifically those
handling propane and ammonia as a
fertilizer. Approximately 100
commenters requested that EPA exempt
propane retailers from coverage under
the risk management program, primarily
due to the effectiveness of the existing
regulatory structure for the industry (in
particular, NFPA Standard 58). At the
same time, more than 50 commenters
requested that EPA exempt agricultural
chemical retailers (with inventories of
ammonia fertilizer) from coverage under
the risk management program because
of the existing state and Federal
regulation of these operations.
a. Propane Retailers. Commenters
argued that the primary thrust of the
proposed regulations is to preclude
unwarranted risk to the surrounding
community from an accidental failure of
a storage tank. They stated that the basic
purpose of NFPA 58, the Storage and
Handling of Liquefied Petroleum Gases,
is to prevent such releases through
design and engineering. This standard
requires fire safety analyses, distance
separation between the storage tank and
surrounding exposures, and approval of
plans for new or existing facilities by
local authorities. They noted that NFPA
58 has been adopted as state law in 48
of the 50 states and that the two
remaining states (California and Texas)
have similar rules. They said that
propane storage containers are
manufactured strictly to the
specifications of the American Society
of Mechanical Engineers. According to
commenters, emergency response
planning is already covered by NFPA-
58, OSHA, and DOT. Because of
compliance with this standard and state
law, commenters argued that the rule
would not provide any improvement in
safety. A number of commenters argued
that propane was a heating fuel, not a
chemical, and did not pose the same
level of risk as larger quantities of
propane held and used as a chemical
feedstock. One commenter noted that
OSHA had exempted retailers and
propane when used as a fuel.
In contrast, one state, which also
regulates propane under its state risk
management program law, argued that
propane is not sufficiently regulated. It
stated:
Fire authorities inspect each new
facility before propane is introduced.
They concentrate on adequate fire water
supply, electrical code compliance, and
distance separation requirements. Some
fire authorities are not technically
capable of determining if the facility
piping system complies with NFPA 58.
There are no follow-up inspections to
assure continuing compliance and no
requirements under NFPA 58 for
training distribution plant operators or
mechanics, written maintenance
programs, or procedures to control
change. During our inspections, we have
identified some facilities that were not
in conformance with NFPA 58.
EPA does not agree with commenters
who are seeking exemption of propane
retailers and users. In a supplemental
notice, EPA sought comment on
whether flammable substances, when
used as a fuel, posed a lesser intrinsic
hazard than the same substances
handled otherwise; no data were
submitted to EPA to justify this
position. Further, EPA has considerable
accident data for propane that illustrates
its potential to affect the public located
nearby. As a result, EPA continues to
believe that the hazard posed by
propane is inherent and does not vary
with its use. Because of a lack of data
justifying a different level of hazard for
flammables used as fuel, the Agency
will not adopt a fuel use exemption
similar to that provided by OSHA.
Furthermore, EPA notes that many
propane retailers are relatively close to
other commercial buildings and the
community. Should a fire or explosion
occur, the community could be
substantially impacted. EPA believes
the community and sources need to be
aware of the potential risk and
understand the steps the source is
taking to limit the potential for a release.
Because EPA recognizes that the full
PSM standard is not appropriate for
propane retailers, EPA has assigned
propane retailers and users to Program
2. Compliance with most aspects of
Program 2 should be simple. For
example, use of tanks that meet relevant
ASME standards and retention of the
material safety data sheets required by
OSHA will satisfy the safety information
requirements of § 68.48. Furthermore,
EPA is developing a model risk
management program to help sources
comply. This model is being based on
NFPA-58 standards, where they apply,
so that sources already in compliance
with NFPA-58 will be in substantial
compliance with Program 2. The model
will help sources comply with other
elements in a cost-effective mariner.
b. Ammonia Retailers. Ammonia is
sold as a fertilizer from agricultural
retailers, primarily in the Middle West,
Great Plains, and West. Commenters
stated that the retail fertilizer industry is
already governed by OSHA's Health and
Safety Standards, which are specifically
applicable to the storage and handling
of anhydrous ammonia. They noted that
this standard (29 CFR 1910.111) is based
on ANSI K61.1 and sets forth extensive
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Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 31703
requirements applicable to the design,
construction, location, installation, and
operation of anhydrous ammonia
facilities. Measures designed to
adequately provide for the prevention of
and response to accidental releases are
an integral part of this standard. Some
commenters said that if EPA did not
exempt retail sources, ammonia retailers
should be deemed to be in compliance
with the prevention program. In
addition, commenters said they are
regulated under state laws and are
subject to EPCRA reporting
requirements. Many commenters argued
that retail fertilizer sources have an
excellent safety record. They stated that
retail fertilizer facilities are limited in
size, do not involve complex processing
and manufacturing operations, and are
located in rural areas; consequently,
they present a low risk to the
surrounding communities. Commenters
objected to the regulations because they
would impose a substantial burden on
what are small operations. Some
commenters argued that, because
Congress had granted EPA the authority
to exempt ammonia when held by a
farmer for use as a fertilizer, EPA could
grant retail ammonia sources the same
exemption.
Although EPA recognizes that other
regulatory programs address safety for
agricultural retailers and that such
operations do not involve complex
processing or manufacturing, EPA
disagrees with the conclusions of these
commenters. According to the industry,
the typical ammonia retailer has 200
tons of ammonia on site at times. Even
in rural areas, release of even a fraction
of this quantity could affect the
community. Sources constructed and
operated consistent with the relevant
ANSI standard will meet the EPA rule
for subjects addressed by both. EPA
recognizes the OSHA standard for
anhydrous ammonia handling and
hopes to work with the ammonia
industry to develop a model risk
management program for ammonia
retailers. This model would be based on
the OSHA standard, where applicable.
The standard, however, does not
include some elements mandated by the
CAA as part of the prevention program,
specifically training and maintenance
programs. In addition, EPA believes that
there is a further need to convey
information on hazards and risk
management practices of these
operations to the public and local
entities. The model will provide
guidance to help sources comply with
these elements in a cost-effective
manner. Finally, EPA does not agree
that the Congressionally allowed
exemption of farmers can be extended to
non-farmers. See 136 Cong. Rec. S2284
(March 7, 1990) (colloquy between Sens.
Kerrey and Chafee).
3. Refrigeration Systems. A number of
commenters stated that ammonia used
in a refrigeration system should be
exempted from this rule because these
systems pose little risk to the public.
One commenter said that EPA should
exempt roof-mounted air handlers,
pipes, and components. Some
commenters said that the industry was
already overregulated and the
imposition of this rule would be a
burden.
The CAA requires EPA to impose this
rule on any source with more than a
threshold quantity of a regulated
substance. Therefore, EPA cannot
exempt ammonia refrigeration systems
that contain more than 10,000 pounds of
ammonia. In addition, ammonia
refrigeration plants have had a
substantial number of accidents where
the ammonia has migrated offsite,
indicating that these systems do pose a
risk to the public. At the same time, it
should be noted that all of these
refrigeration systems are already
covered by the OSHA PSM standard.
Consequently, the only additional steps
sources will have to take are to conduct
the hazard assessment, comply with the
emergency response requirements, and
file the RMP. EPA worked with the
International Institute of Ammonia
Refrigeration to develop a model risk
management program that will facilitate
compliance and reduce the burden on
sources (Model Risk Management
Program for Ammonia Refrigeration).
For most of these sources, which have
only one chemical, the RMP will be a
very brief document.
4. Other Operations. Comments were
submitted on a range of other industries.
The warehouse industry said that it
should be exempted where material is
received and shipped in packages that
are not opened; commenters noted that
they are covered by DOT packaging
regulations. EPA believes that
warehouses must be covered if they
have more than a threshold quantity of
a regulated substance. Under the OSHA
definition of process, which EPA has
adopted, packages of a substance stored
in the same room may be counted
toward the threshold quantity if the
packages could release their contents in
the same event. EPA notes that
warehouse fires have created major
incidents in the past 10 years, and the
Agency believes that warehouses should
take the steps necessary to prevent and
mitigate such incidents. EPA is
interested in working with the industry
to create a model risk management
program that would help sources
develop a hazard assessment process
that can account for potentially
changing contents of a warehouse.
Batch processors face related
problems with changing chemicals on
site. EPA is willing to work with
industry to develop a generic approach
to risk management programs. EPA
believes, however, that most batch
processors will already be covered by
OSHA PSM. The RMP Offsite
Consequence Analyses Guidance will
reduce the burden of developing
multiple release scenario analyses. To
minimize the need for continual
revision of their worst-case scenario to
accommodate periodic inventory
changes, sources such as warehouses
and batch processors may want to
analyze their expected chemical
inventory in developing a scenario that
represents the worst case for the
foreseeable future, even if the substance
is not currently in use at the source.
A number of commenters raised
questions about coverage of POTWs. A
specific concern was EPA's statement in
the NPRM that substances in waste
streams would not be covered by the
rule. This statement is based on the
belief that the regulated toxic substances
will not constitute more than one
percent of any waste stream received by
a POTW.. Consequently, they will not be
considered in calculations of threshold
quantities. No waste stream is likely to
meet EPA's flammability criteria.
POTWs are likely, however, to be
covered because of regulated substances
they use to treat wastes.
R. Implementing Agency Delegation
EPA received a number of comments
to the NPRM regarding the role and
potential burden on LEPCs, SERCs, and
other local agencies that may result from
implementation of the risk management
program. In the SNPRM preamble, EPA
indicated that EPA and the states share
the responsibility for protecting public
health and the environment and
encouraged state and local agencies to
seek delegation for this program because
their participation is essential to
successful chemical accident
prevention, preparedness and response
and recognized by the legislative history
and the CAA section 112(r)
requirements by requiring that RMPs be
submitted to states and local planning
entities. States are already involved in
chemical emergency preparedness and
planning through the requirements of
EPCRA.
Commenters on the SNPRM requested
that the final rule clearly state that EPA
is the implementing agency unless a
state or local agency is granted a
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31704 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations
delegation of authority under section
112(1). Several commenters indicated
that EPA should allow states the
flexibility to designate the most
appropriate implementing agency, such
as OSHA or the state agency that
administers and enforces the OSHA
PSM standard, rather than mandating
the air permitting authority or a SERC
agency in the final rule. A number of
commenters on the SNPRM and NPRM
suggested that existing local emergency
planning agencies (e.g., LEPCs, fire
departments) would be best suited to
serve as implementing agencies, in part
because they are closest to the
communities at risk. However, many
commenters (including LEPCs that
commented) argued that LEPCs would
be unprepared to take on such a burden
and that even a minimal role in
Implementing section 112(r), including
mere storage of RMPs, would
overwhelm their limited resources and
technical expertise. In addition,
commenters Indicated that LEPCs, as
mostly volunteer agencies, would not
and could not have the authority
necessary to implement and enforce the
RMP rule.
The Implementing agency is the state
or local agency that obtains delegation
of the section 112(r) program under
section 112Q). As stated in the
definition of Implementing Agency in
today's rule, until a state or local agency
is granted delegation of the risk
management program under CAA
section 112(1), EPA will serve as the
implementing agency. States may select
any state or local agency to implement
this program, Including an air
permitting authority or a state OSHA
program, provided the agency has the
expertise, legal authority and resources
to implement the program: the state
must also have the authority to enforce
the program. EPA realizes that, in most
cases, LEPCs will not have the authority
to be implementing agencies, but they
should be involved as much as possible
in the program.
Commenters on the SNPRM suggested
that EPA should avoid adding specific
implementation details to the final rule
so that states would have the flexibility
to develop or continue programs that
meet local needs. Other commenters,
however, suggested that EPA should
issue delegation guidance and to define
the elements of an adequate state
program to avoid inconsistent
interpretations and implementation of
llio rule. Commenters representing
companies that operate in several states
were particularly concerned about
maintaining uniform implementation.
EPA has not added specific state or
local Implementation requirements to
today's rule because the Agency already
promulgated sufficient provisions for
delegation of accident prevention
programs under section 112(r) to states
and local authorities under 40 CFR part
63, subpart E, which implements CAA
§ 112(1). As EPA discussed in the
SNPRM, implementing agencies will be
responsible for such tasks as reviewing
RMP information, auditing and
inspecting a percentage of sources
annually, requiring revisions to the RMP
as necessary, and assisting the
permitting authority in ensuring
compliance. States have the flexibility
to implement their own programs,
however the CAA requires that state or
local program requirements must be as
stringent as EPA's and must include
EPA regulated substances and
processes. This means that California,
Delaware, Nevada, and New Jersey will
need to revise their existing program
requirements, substance lists, and in
some cases, thresholds, to meet EPA's
requirements and to obtain section
112(r) delegation. EPA intends to issue
additional guidance that will help state
and local agencies obtain program
delegation. EPA must review delegation
requests submitted under 40 CFR part
63, subpart E to ensure that state and
local programs requirements are as
stringent as EPA's. With respect to
nationwide uniform implementation,
EPA notes that the CAA specifically
grants states the right to develop more
stringent requirements; consequently,
there may be state-to-state variations.
Many states, however, are prohibited
under their state laws from adopting
regulations that are more stringent than
Federal rules.
One commenter on the NPRM
indicated that EPA's estimation of the
costs of implementing the section 112(r)
program is extremely low, representing
demands that are 65 to 75 percent lower
than those experienced by states
implementing similar programs. LEPCs
and state governments were concerned
about the imposition of section 112(r)
requirements on state and local
governments as an unfunded mandate.
Several state agencies indicated that the
considerable financial burden imposed
by section 112(r) implementation would
prohibit them from seeking section
112(1) delegation. Commenters
encouraged EPA to develop guidance on
potential funding mechanisms,
including descriptions of the fee
systems used by existing state programs
for accidental release prevention.
Several commenters indicated that the
political climate at the state and local
level would make it impossible to levy
new, or raise existing, fees.
Since states are not required to seek
delegation of this program, it does not
constitute an unfunded mandate (see
also section V.C). Before EPA grants
delegation, state or local agencies must
show that they have the resources to
implement and enforce the risk
management program rules. EPA
recognizes that there is no Federal
funding associated with implementation
of section 112(r) but believes that the
tiered program levels and centralized
electronic submission of RMPs in
today's rule substantially reduces the
cost and resource demand for state and
local entities seeking delegation. State
and local agencies that fully implement
section 112(r) will be able to develop
and operate a program that best fits their
individual needs, resources, and
structures. As part of consideration of
the costs to implement section 112(r),
state and local agencies should also
weigh the benefits of integrating
accident prevention with pollution
prevention, environmental protection,
and worker and public health and safety
at the state level, and the benefits to
local industry associated with state,
rather than Federal, implementation of
this program. Many states and local
agencies have established a close
working relationship with the sources in
their jurisdiction. In addition, a number
of state and local publicly owned
sources are covered by this rule; state
implementation can serve to enhance
compliance that may otherwise require
increased coordination with EPA.
Although other states have successfully
"self-funded" their accident prevention
programs with various state authorized
fees, EPA recognizes that it may be
difficult for state or local agencies to
generate the resources necessary to fund
full section 112(r) implementation.
Several commenters on the SNPRM
requested guidance and training for
sources, local entities, and
implementing agencies on
understanding hazard assessments, arid
conducting program inspections,
reviews, and audits. EPA recognizes the
need for guidance and training for
implementing agencies and sources.
EPA plans to modify and to continue
offering its four-day Chemical Safety
Audit workshop to other federal agency
representatives, state and local
government officials, and industry
representatives as an introduction to
chemical process safety, current
industry chemical accident prevention
practices and understanding the
elements of the risk management
program. EPA is ready to assist state and
local agencies through its regional
offices to coordinate state and local
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Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 31705
programs and to help in obtaining
program delegation and development of
resources to fund state or local
programs. Region 4 in Atlanta, Georgia,
for example, has developed an
integrated section 112(r) work group of
state and local air pollution control,
SERC, and LEPC representatives who
participate in workshops, seminars, and
pilot studies designed to foster local
program implementation and to build a
support network. EPA also continues to
work with NOAA to enhance modeling
and information management tools
contained in the Computer Aided
Management of Emergency Operations
(CAMEO) and Areal Locations of
Hazardous Atmospheres (ALOHA)
software for local emergency planners
and responders.
Two commenters on the NPRM
requested that EPA address the issue of
tort liability in the event that an
accidental release occurs after an RMP
has been submitted to the implementing
agency. One other commenter believed
that the implementing agency must be
held accountable for RMP content while
another believed that EPA must ensure
that adequate limits to implementing
agency liability exist.
The primary responsibility for
accident prevention rests with the
• owners or operators of sources. Section
112(r) does not create a basis for
implementing agency tort liability under
federal law. CAA § 112(r)(l). When MPA
is the implementing agency, it is
immune from tort liability under state
law. States that are implementing
agencies generally will have protection
from liability under their state laws. If
a state has waived its sovereign
immunity, EPA cannot take steps to
alter that situation. EPA encourages
states concerned about this issue to
discuss the matter with their attorneys
general to determine whether state law
protects them from liability.
S. Accident Information Reporting
In the SNPRM, EPA discussed the
possibility of additional accident
reporting to support a variety of future
accident prevention activities. EPA
proposed that sources either submit an
OSHA PSM or Program 3 investigation
report for certain accidental releases or
a survey form that collects certain
accident data. Otherwise EPA could use
existing authorities to collect additional
accident data from existing information,
as needed.
Most commenters opposed EPA's
proposal for additional accident
reporting requirements, especially the
collection of accident investigations
prepared under Program 3 or OSHA
PSM, because it increases costs, it
would have no benefit, it generates
significant liability issues, and it would
divert limited resources away from
activities with greater public health
benefit. Commenters supported the use
of existing reports since this approach
should not generate an additional
burden, such reports are available
through EPA and OSHA under other
regulations and they should be adequate
for the objectives outlined by EPA.
EPA agrees with commenters and has
decided not to adopt any additional
accident reporting requirements. EPA
will rely on the five-year accident
history for the immediate future and,
based on that information, determine
whether additional information and
requirements are needed. EPA has the
authority under CAA section 114 to
investigate releases and seek additional
information as needed.
T. Other Issues
1. OSHA VPP. In the SNPRM, EPA
asked whether the OSHA Voluntary
Protection Program (VPP) protects
public health and the environment and
suggested that one approach to third
party review (discussed below) would
be to assign sources that participate in
VPP to Program 2. Many commenters
supported VPP participation as a
criterion for assigning a source to
Program 2. Several of these commenters
noted, however, that because VPP
sources are probably already covered by
OSHA PSM, assigning them to Program
2 would provide no reduction in burden
or regulatory relief. One commenter
suggested that EPA could allow VPP
sources the flexibility to determine,
with the LEPC, what the offsite
consequence analysis would cover.
Seven commenters opposed VPP
participation as a Program 2 criterion
because VPP does not address offsite
consequences, no evidence was
presented that PSM is being carried out
adequately at VPP sources, and this
approach would discriminate against
other voluntary programs.
After consideration of the comments,
EPA has decided not to use VPP
participation as a Program 2 criterion,
but has adopted language in the final
rule to exempt sources with a Star or
Merit ranking under OSHA's VPP from
selection for audits based on the criteria
in §68.220 (b)(2) and (b)(7); such a
source may be audited if it has an
accidental release that requires an
accident investigation under these
regulations. This decision recognizes
that such sources have active accident
prevention programs and should not be
regarded in the same way as other
sources within the same industry or as
other sources in general. In addition, it
thus provides a similar degree of benefit
with respect to EPA'auditing as it does
with respect to OSHA auditing. EPA
agrees that VPP sources would gain no
benefit by assignment to Program 2. EPA
does not believe it is appropriate to
adjust the hazard assessment
requirements for VPP sources; this
information is essential to local
emergency preparedness and response
and for public dialogue.
2. Qualified Third Party. In the
SNPRM, EPA sought comments on
whether sources should be allowed to
have qualified third parties assist them
in achieving and maintaining
compliance. Eight commenters
supported third party reviews as a way
to reduce implementing agency efforts.
One commenter stated that sources
should be required to hire a qualified
third party to assess their activities.
Most commenters, however, expressed
some reservations including greater cost
if sources were required to hire third
parties, when many sources already
have staff qualified to implement the
risk management program. Commenters
said that a third party review would be
particularly costly for retailers who will
have model programs and stated that
use of third parties would add another
layer of bureaucracy to the process. A
number of commenters said that EPA
should fund third parties. Commenters
also stated that use of third parties
might confuse the issue of who was
responsible for safety and for
enforcement; they said that EPA must
make it clear that the owner or operator
of the source remains responsible for
accidents and that the implementing
agency retains enforcement authority.
Finally, several commenters asked who
would determine the qualifications of a
qualified third party.
EPA is not requiring use of qualified
third parties in this rule. EPA, however,
endorses the concept of offering sources
the option of using third parties to assist
owner/operators in meeting their
obligations under the rule. Based on the
comments, EPA recognizes that any
third party proposal must:
• Not weaken the compliance
responsibilities of source owner/
operators;
• Offer cost savings and benefits to the
industry, community, and
implementing agencies that significantly
exceed the cost of implementing the
qualified third party approach;
• Lead to a net increase in process
safety, particularly for smaller, less
technically sophisticated sources; and
• Promote cost-effective agency
prioritization of implementing agency
oversight resources.
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31706 Federal Register / Vol. 61. No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations
Several key issues need further
discussion before the use of a qualified
third party may be offered as an option.
These include qualification criteria,
certification procedures, liability, and
other critical issues associated with the
use of a qualified third party. Therefore,
following promulgation of this rule,
EPA proposes to call a meeting to solicit
input from trade associations,
professional and technical societies,
states, and other interested parties to
address these issues and investigate the
need for developing a process and a
national exam to qualify third parties.
3. Documentation. Commenters
expressed a number of concerns about
the level of recordkeeping and the
availability of information. Some
commenters stated that records need to
be maintained for longer than five years;
commenters suggested 10 years, 20
years, and the life of the source. One
commenter suggested that records
should be kept for the life of the process
and then seven years thereafter to
ensure that records would be available
if a lawsuit was initiated. Industry
commenters said that only current
documents and data should be
maintained to prevent confusion from
having multiple versions of the same
document. One commenter stated that
policies and procedures should be kept
until they are superseded, then they
should be destroyed; retaining old,
superseded information is unsafe and
unacceptable and can result in
accidents.
One commenter said that sources
should be required to develop and
maintain a master index or catalogue of
documents relevant to the proposed rule
to support public access. Another
commenter stated that, in addition to
maintaining records supporting the
implementation of the risk management
program, the owner or operator should
submit the records to the implementing
agency. A third commenter said that the
rule should require that all records
supporting compliance with the rule be
organized and readily available through
the designated contact person at the
source to the implementing agency for
inspection.
Other commenters said the proposed
recordkeeping was excessive. One stated
that EPA is forcing industries towards
"defensive universal recordkeeping,"
retaining mountains of documents
because EPA has not specified what
records need to be kept. Another
commenter said that an examination of
the proposal indicated that no fewer
than about 22 separate written
documents are required to be
maintained on site or submitted to the
responsible regulatory agency and other
parties. One commenter noted that more
resources will be spent on filling out
paperwork than on actual spill
prevention.
In the final rule, EPA has adopted the
OSHA PSM language for Program 3
processes; therefore, documentation for
PSM elements is dictated by that rule.
For other elements of the risk
management program and for processes
in other tiers, EPA has set a period of
five years for the maintenance of
supporting documentation. EPA agrees
with commenters that only current
versions of documents and procedures
should be retained. On the issue of
records submitted to the implementing
agency, EPA believes that the provisions
outlined in the final rule (as described
in Subpart G to part 68) will limit the
volume of such documentation. The
TABLE 3.—DISTRIBUTION TABLE
implementing agency and EPA will
have access to all on-site documentation
when needed. Much of the on-site
documentation will be confidential and
protected under Section 114(c) of the
CAA. The burden on the implementing
agency will be substantially reduced
because it will not have to establish
protected trade secret files and
procedures.
Finally, EPA agrees with commenters
that level of recordkeeping should be
kept as low as possible consistent with
EPA's statutory mandate. EPA has
reduced the documentation
requirements for Program 2 processes
(particularly with respect to the
prevention program) because it believes
that for these sources, the benefit of the
records does not offset the cost of
creating and maintaining files.
IV. Sectlon-by-Section Analysis of the
Rule
This section discusses specific
changes to the rule that are not
otherwise described in this preamble.
The rule has been renumbered to
include new sections and subparts. The
hazard assessment requirements have
been divided into separate sections in
subpart B. The Program 2 prevention
program requirements are in subpart C;
Program 3 prevention program elements
are in Subpart D. Emergency response
requirements are in subpart E, RMP
requirements in subpart G. The
registration requirement, proposed
§ 68.12, has been moved to the RMP
subpart. Tables 3 and 4 present the
distribution of NPRM and SNPRM
sections and derivation of final rule
sections.
NPRM and SNPRM citations
Final rule citations
68 3 Definitions
68,10 Applicability
68.12 Registration
68,13 No Impact Sources (Tier 1)
68,14
68,15
68,20
68,22
68,24
68,26
68,28
68.30
68,32
68.34
68,36
68,38
Streamlined Risk Management Program (Tier 2)
Hazard Assessment
Prevention Program—Purpose
Prevention Program—Management System
Prevention Program—Process Hazard Analysis
Prevention Program—Process Safety
Prevention Program—Standard Operating Procedures
Prevention Program—Training
Prevention Program—Maintenance (mechanical integrity)
Prevention Program—Pre-Startup Review
Prevention Program—Management of Change
Prevention Program—Safety Audits
68,40 Prevention Program—Accident Investigation
68,45 Emergency Response Program
68.3 Definitions.
68.10 Applicability.
68.160 Registration.
68.10(b) Applicability.
68.12(b) General Requirements.
Subpart C Program 2 Prevention Program (68.48-68.60).
Subpart B Hazard Assessment (68.20-68.42).
Deleted.
68.15 Management.
68.67 Process Hazard Analysis.
68.65 Process Safety Information.
68.69 Operating Procedures.
68.71 Training.
68.73 Mechanical Integrity.
68.77 Pre-Startup Review.
68.75 Management of Change.
68.58 Compliance Audits.
68.79 Compliance Audits.
68.60 Incident Investigation.
68.81 Incident Investigation.
68.95 Emergency Response Program.
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Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 31707
TABLE 3.—DISTRIBUTION TABLE—Continued
NPRM and SNPRM citations
Final rule citations
68.50 Risk Management Plan
68.55 Recordkeeping Requirements
68.58 Permit Content and Air Permitting Authority Requirements
68.60 Audits
Subpart G Risk Management Plan (68.150-68.190).
68.200 Recordkeeping.
68.215 Permit Content and Air Permitting Authority or Designated
Agency Requirements.
68.220 Audits.
TABLE 4.—DERIVATION TABLE
Final rule citations
NPRM and SNPRM citations
68.3 Definitions
68.10 Applicability
68.12 General Requirements
68.15 Management
68.20 Applicability (Hazard Assessment)
68.22 Offsite Consequence Analysis Parameters (Hazard Assess-
ment).
68.25 Worst-Case Release Analysis (Hazard Assessment)
68.28 Alternative Release Analysis (Hazard Assessment)
68.30 Defining Offsite Impacts—Population (Hazard Assessment)
68.33 Defining Offsite Impacts—Environment (Hazard Assessment) ...
68.36 Review and Update (Hazard Assessment)
68.39 Documentation (Hazard Assessment)
68.42 Five-year Accident History (Hazard Assessment)
68.48 Safety Information (Program 2)
68.50 Hazard Review (Program 2)
68.52 Operating Procedures (Program 2)
68.54 Training (Program 2)
68.56 Maintenance (Program 2)
68.58
68.60
68.65
68.67
68.69
68.71
68.73
68.75
68.77
68.79
68.81
68.83
68.85
68.87
68.90
68.95
68.150
68.155
68.160
68.165
68.168
68.170
68.175
68.180
68.185
Compliance Audits (Program 2)
Incident Investigation (Program 2)
Process Safety Information (Program 3)
Process Hazard Analysis (Program 3)
Operating Procedures (Program 3)
Training (Program 3)
Mechanical Integrity (Program 3)
Management of Change (Program 3)
Pre-Startup Review (Program 3)
Compliance Audits (Program 3)
Accident Investigation (Program 3)
Employee Participation (Program 3)
Hot Work Permit (Program 3)
Contractors (Program 3)
Applicability (Emergency Response)
Emergency Response Program
Submission (Risk Management Plan)
Executive Summary (Risk Management Plan)
Registration (Risk Management Plan)
Offsite Consequence Analysis (Risk Management Plan) ..
Five-Year Accident History (Risk Management Plan)
Prevention Program/Program 2 (Risk Management Plan)
Prevention Program/Program 3 (Risk Management Plan)
Emergency Response Program (Risk Management Plan)
Certification (Risk Management Plan)
68.190 Updates (Risk Management Plan)
68.200 Recordkeeping
68.210 Availability of Information to the Public
68.215 Permit Content and' Air Permitting Authority or Designated
Agency Requirements.
68.220 Audits
Appendix A—Table of Toxic Endpoints
68.3 Definitions.
68.10 Applicability, SNPRM 68.13.
SNPRM 68.13, 68.14.
68.22 Prevention Program—Management.
68.10 Applicability.
68.15(e) Hazard Assessment.
68.15(c) Hazard Assessment.
68.15(d) Hazard Assessment.
68.15(e)(3) Hazard Assessment.
68.15(e)(4) Hazard Assessment.
68.15(g) Hazard Assessment.
68.15(h) Hazard Assessment.
68.15(f) Hazard Assessment.
68.14(b) Streamlined Risk Management Program (Tier 2); 68.26 Proc-
ess Safety Information.
68.14(b) Streamlined Risk Management Program (Tier 2); 68.24 PHA.
68.14(b) Streamlined Risk Management Program (Tier 2); 68.28 SOPs.
68.14(b) Streamlined Risk Management Program (Tier 2); 68.30 Train-
ing.
68.14(b) Streamlined Risk Management Program (Tier 2); 68.32 Main-
tenance.
68.38 Prevention Program—Safety Audits.
68.40 Prevention Program—Incident Investigation.
68.26 Prevention Program—Process Safety.
68.24 Prevention Program—Process Hazard Analysis.
68.28 Prevention Program—Standard Operating Procedures.
68.30 Prevention Program—Training.
68.32 Prevention Program—Maintenance (mechanical integrity).
68.36 Prevention Program—Management of Change.
68.34 Prevention Program—Pre-Startup Review.
68.38 Prevention Program—Safety Audits.
68.40 Prevention Program—Accident Investigation.
68.24(f) Process Hazard Analysis.
NPRM Preamble (58 FR 54205).
NPRM Preamble (58 FR 54205).
68.45(a) Emergency Response Program.
68.45(b)-(f) Emergency Response Program.
68.50(a) Risk Management Plan.
68.50(a) Risk Management Plan.
68.12 Registration.
68.50(c) Risk Management Plan.
68.15(f) Hazard Assessment.
68.14(b) Streamlined Risk Management Program (Tier 2); 68.50(g).
68.50(g) Risk Management Plan.
68.50(e) Risk Management Plan.
68.50(g) Risk Management Plan.
68.13(a) No Impact Sources.
68.50(h) Risk Management Plan.
68.55 Recordkeeping Requirements.
42 U.S.C. 7412.
68.58 Permit Content and Air Permitting Authority Requirements.
68.60 Audits.
68.15(h)(3)(iii) Hazard Assessment.
Section 68.3, Definitions, has been
revised to add or delete a number of
definitions. A definition of
administrative controls has been added
that is derived from the definition used
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31708 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations
by the Center for Chemical Process
Safely (CCPS).
The definition of analysis of offsite
consequences has been deleted.
A definition of catastrophic release
has been added that Is adapted from
OSHA's definition of catastrophic
release (29 CFR 1910.119); OSHA's
language on danger to employees in the
workplace has been changed to
imminent and substantial endangerment
to public health and the environment.
A definition of classified information
has been added. The definition is
adopted from the Classified Information
Procedures Act.
The proposed definition of covered
process Is unchanged.
The proposed definition of designated
agency has been revised to indicate that
the state, not the state air permitting
authority, shall select an agency to
conduct activities required by § 68.215.
As discussed above, a definition of
environmental receptor has been added
to list the receptors of concern.
The definition of full-time employee
has been deleted.
A definition of hot work has been
adopted verbatim from the OSHA PSM
standard.
The definition of implementing
agency Is adopted as proposed in the
SNPRM.
A definition of injury has been added.
A definition of major change has been
added to clarify the types of changes
that necessitate actions to manage
change. The definition will help sources
understand when they are required to
take steps to review their activities for
new hazards.
A definition of mechanical integrity
has been added to clarify the
requirements of maintenance sections.
A definition of medical treatment has
been added to clarify what constitutes
an injury. The definition is adapted
from an OSHA definition used by
sources in logging occupational injuries
and illnesses.
The proposed definition of mitigation
has been changed by adding a definition
of active mitigation.
A definition of offsite has been
changed to clarify that areas within the
source would be considered offsite if the
public has routine and unrestricted
access during or outside of business
hours. Areas within a source's
boundaries that may be considered
offslte are public roads that pass
through sections of the site and natural
areas owned by the source to which the
public has unrestricted access. For some
sites, parking lots within the boundary
may be offsite if the source cannot
restrict access.
A definition of population has been
added. Population is defined as the
public.
A definition of public has been added
to state that all persons except
employees and contractors at the
stationary source are members of the
public. A number of commenters stated
that employees at other facilities should
not be considered part of the public.
EPA disagrees because these employees
may not be trained in protective actions
or have protective equipment
appropriate for releases from covered
processes.
A definition of public receptor has
been added. Some commenters stated
that EPA should include public roads
within this definition. EPA decided that
inclusion of public roads was
unwarranted. EPA recognizes that
people on public roads may be exposed
during a release. In most cases,
however, vehicles on public roads will
be able to leave the area quickly and
further access can be blocked, especially
in isolated areas. If public roads were
included, almost no sources would be
eligible for Program 1 because there will
be public roads leading to the source. In
those cases where public roads are
heavily traveled, there will be other
public receptors near the source and,
therefore, the source's processes will not
qualify for Program 1.
OSHA's definition of replacement in
kind has been adopted.
The definition of significant
accidental release has been deleted.
A definition of typical meteorological
conditions has been added which means
the temperature, wind speed, cloud
cover, and atmospheric stability class
prevailing at the source. Data on the first
three of these are available from local
meteorological stations (e.g., airports).
Atmospheric stability class can be
derived from cloud cover data.
The definition of worst-case release
has been revised to clarify that the
release is the one that leads to the
greatest distance to the applicable
endpoint.
Section 68.10, Applicability, has been
revised to change the term "tier" to
"Program." The section now details the
eligibility criteria for all three programs.
Paragraph (a) has been revised to be
consistent with statutory language on
compliance dates. Sources must comply
with the requirements by June 21, 1999,
three years after EPA first lists a
substance, or the date on which a source
first becomes subject to this part,
whichever is latest. After June 21, 1999,
sources that begin using a regulated
substance that has been listed for at
least three years must be in compliance
with the requirements of part 68 on the
day they bring the substance on site
above a threshold quantity.
The Program 1 eligibility
requirements have been revised to
clarify that the criteria are applied to a
process, not the source as a whole, as
discussed above. EPA has deleted
requirements for explosives because the
Agency is proposing to delist
explosives. The types of accidents that
will disqualify a process from Program
1 are now specified in the rule as those
accidental releases of a regulated
substance that led to offsite exposure to
the substance, its reaction products,
overpressure generated by an explosion
involving the substance, or radiant heat
generated by a fire involving the
substance which resulted in offsite
death or injury (as defined by the rule),
or response or restoration activities at an
environmental receptor. These
accidental release criteria eliminate the
need for a definition of significant
accidental release, which has been
deleted. Offsite environmental response
or restoration would include such
activities as collection, treatment and
disposal of soil, shutoff of drinking
water, replacement of damaged
vegetation, or isolation of a natural areas
due to contamination associated with an
accidental release. The distance
calculation equation for flammables has
been dropped, and the worst-case
release endpoint for flammables is
specified which allows the source to use
the reference tables or their own
methodology to determine the distance
to the endpoint. The requirement that
the community have an EPCRA
emergency response plan has been
replaced by a requirement that the
source coordinate emergency response
procedures with local community
responders.
As discussed above, the eligibility
criteria for Program 2 and 3 have been
changed. Both apply to processes, not
sources.
Paragraph (e) states that if a process
no longer meets the eligibility criteria of
its Program level, the source must
comply with the requirements of the
new Program level and the update the
RMP according to §68.190. This
paragraph clarifies the responsibility of
the source when a process becomes
ineligible for a Program level (e.g.,
public receptors move within the
distance to an endpoint for a Program 1
process or OSHA changes the
applicability of its PSM standard).
Proposed §68.12, Registration, has
been dropped. Registration
requirements are now part of the RMP
requirements in subpart G, §68.160.
New §68.12, General Requirements,
has been added to provide a roadmap
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Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 31709
for sources to use to identify the
requirements that apply to processes in
each of the three tiers. The Program 1
requirements, in proposed § 68.13, have
been included in this section. Owners or
operators of Program 1 processes are
required to analyze and document in the
RMP the worst-case release to ensure
that they meet the eligibility criteria of
no public receptors within the distance
to the endpoint. As discussed above, the
requirement to post signs has been
dropped. The certification statement has
been revised to be consistent with the
eligibility requirements. If a source has
more than one Program 1 process, a
single certification may be submitted to
cover all such processes.
The Program 2 requirements specify
the sections of the rule that apply to
these processes.
The Program 3 requirements specify
the sections of the rule that apply to
these processes.
Proposed §68.22, Management, has
been moved from the prevention
program to §68.15 in subpart A-General.
The section has been adopted as
proposed except that the purpose
sentence in paragraph (a) has been
dropped and a phrase at the beginning
of paragraph (b) has been deleted as
unnecessary.
A new subpart B has been created to
cover the hazard assessment
requirements. The proposed §68.15 has
been divided into separate sections to
cover the parameters, the different types
of analyses, the identification of offsite
populations and environments,
documentation and updates, and the
five-year accident history. EPA believes
that limiting each section to a single
topic will make the rule easier to
understand.
Section 68.20 has been added to
specify which hazard assessment
requirements apply to Program 1, 2, and
3 processes. All sources are required to
complete a worst-case release analysis
for regulated substances in covered
processes, based on the requirements of
§ 68.25. Program 2 and 3 processes must
also perform alternative release analyses
required by § 68.28. All sources must
complete the five-year accident history
for all covered processes.
A new §68.22 has been added to list
the parameters to be used in the offsite
consequence analyses. Owners or
operators who choose to use their own
air dispersion modeling tools must use
the parameters specified in paragraphs
(a), (e), (f), and (g) of this section; they
must use the meteorological parameters
specified in paragraph (b) of this section
unless they can demonstrate that the
conditions do not exist at their site.
Paragraph (c) specifies the ambient
temperature and humidity for worst
case (highest daily maximum over the
previous three years and average
humidity); if a source uses the guidance,
it may use average temperature and
humidity (25° C and 50 percent) as
default values. EPA recognizes that
these values are less conservative than
the worst-case meteorological
conditions,' but determined that they
represent a reasonable average to be
used for developing tables. Providing
tables for a variety of temperatures and
humidity would have made the
guidance much more voluminous and
difficult to use. EPA is requiring sources
that use dispersion models instead of
the guidance to use actual temperature
and humidity data applicable to the site.
EPA believes this approach represents a
reasonable tradeoff. The guidance
generates conservative results even with
the less conservative assumptions about
temperature and humidity; air
dispersion modeling will generally
produce less conservative results and,
therefore, should be based on actual
data for these variables. Average data
applicable to the source may be used for
alternative scenarios. Paragraph (d)
requires that the release height for
worst-case be at ground level (zero feet).
Paragraph (e) specifies that urban or
rural topography be used as appropriate
in modeling. Paragraph (0 requires
sources to use models or tables
appropriate for the density of the
substance being released (e.g., dense
gases must be modeled using tables or
models that account for the behavior of
dense gases). Dense gases are typically
those that are heavier than air as well as
those that form aerosols and behave as
if they are heavier than air upon released
For worst-case releases, liquids (other
than gases liquefied by refrigeration
only) shall be considered to be released
at the highest daily maximum
temperature or at process temperature,
whichever is higher. For alternative
scenarios, substances may be considered
to be released at ambient or process
temperatures as appropriate. Owners or
operators may choose to use EPA's RMP
Offsite Consequence Analysis Guidance
for their offsite consequence analyses.
All of the parameters specified here are
reflected in this guidance.
A new § 68.25 has been added on the
worst-case release analysis. As
discussed above, the section requires
one worst-case release for toxics and
one for flammables. If additional
scenarios, for either class of substances,
would potentially expose receptors not
exposed by the worst-case release, the
additional scenario shall be analyzed
and reported. This provision is to take
into account the possibility that at large
sources, vessels at opposite ends of the
source may expose different
populations.
The section specifies how maximum
quantity in a vessel or pipe is to be
determined, the scenarios to be
considered for toxic gases, toxic gases
liquefied by refrigeration only, toxic
liquids, and flammables, the parameters
to be used, consideration of passive
mitigation, and factors to be considered
in selecting the worst-case scenario. The
section also specifies that sources may
use proprietary models if the source
provides the implementing agency
access to the model and explains
differences between the model and
publicly available models, if requested.
This approach will allow sources to use
the most appropriate models available,
while preserving the transparency of the
results.
A new §68.28 has been added on
alternative release scenario analysis. As
discussed above, the section requires
one alternative release analysis for all
flammables held above the threshold in
processes at the source and one
alternative release analysis for each
toxic held above the threshold in
processes. For each scenario, the owner
or operator shall select a scenario that
is more likely to occur than the worst
case; and that will reach an endpoint
offsite, unless no such scenario exists.
The section includes a list of scenarios
that owners/operators may want to
consider, but does not dictate a
particular scenario. EPA has provided
additional direction and suggestions for
defining these scenarios in the RMP
Offsite Consequence Analysis Guidance.
As noted above, the section references
the parameters to be used and allows
consideration of both passive and active
mitigation systems. The section
specifies factors to be considered in
selecting alternative scenarios;
specifically, sources shall consider
releases that have been documented in
the five-year accident history; or failure
scenarios identified through the PHA or
hazard review.
A new § 68.30 has been added on
defining offsite impacts—-population.
The section specifies that populations
are to be defined for a circle with a
radius that is the distance to the
endpoint. Owners or operators are
required only to estimate the residential
population within the circle to two
significant digits and may use Census
data to make these estimates. Owners or
operators are also required to note, in
the RMP, the presence of any major
institutions, such as schools, hospitals,
prisons, public recreational areas,
arenas, and major commercial and
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31710 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations
industrial developments, but they are
not required to estimate the number of
people present at such sites. These
additional locations are those that
would normally be shown on area street
maps.
A new §68.33 has been added on
defining oflsite impacts to the
environment. As discussed above, the
owners or operators are required only to
identify any environmental receptors
within the circle with a radius
determined by the distance to the
cndpoint. The owners or operators are
not required to assess the potential
types or degree of damage that might
occur from a release of the substance.
The environmental receptors are those
that can be identified on U.S. Geological
Survey local topographical maps or
maps based on U.S.G.S. data.
A new §68.36 has been added to list
the requirements for reviewing and
updating the offslte consequence
analysis. As proposed, if no changes
occur at the site, the analyses must be
reviewed and updated at least once
every five years. If changes at the site
occur that would reasonably be
expected either to increase or decrease
the distance to the endpoint by a factor
of two or more, owners/operators are
required to update the offsite
consequence analysis within six
months. The time for the reanalysis has
been changed to six months to make it
consistent with the update requirements
for the RMP. The proposed requirement
for reviewing the analyses based on
oflsile changes has been deleted. A
number of commenters objected to the
requirement because it would have
compelled them to track changes over
very large areas. Because the distance to
the endpolnts, especially for toxics, may
be as much as 40 km, the area affected
could easily exceed 1,000 square miles.
EPA agreed with commenters that there
was little benefit from requiring sources
to track offsite changes and redo
analyses because the public is aware of
the changes.
A new §68.39 has been added to list
the documentation related to the offsite
consequence analyses that must be
retained on site. For both types of
scenarios, the documentation shall
include a description of the scenarios
identified, assumptions and parameters
used, the rationale for the selection of
specific scenarios; assumptions shall
include use of mitigation and any
administrative controls that were
assumed to limit the quantity that could
be released. Documentation shall
include the effect of the mitigation and
controls on the release quantity. The
documentation shall also include the
estimated quantities released, release
rates, and durations of release. The
owners or operators shall also identify
the methodology used to determine
distance to endpoints (i.e., EPA's
guidance or an air dispersion model)
and the data used to estimate
population and environmental receptors
potentially affected. EPA has deleted the
proposed requirement for
documentation of endpoints because
these are now dictated by the rule. EPA
has also dropped the requirement for
documentation of distance calculations;
distances will either be determined from
EPA's reference tables or by an air
dispersion model.
A new § 68.42 has been added to
detail the requirements for the five-year
accident history. As discussed above,
the accident history is limited to
accidental releases of listed substances
from covered processes only. The only
accidental releases that must be
included in the history are those that
resulted in deaths, injuries, or
significant property damage on site, or
known offsite deaths, injuries,
evacuations, sheltering in place,
property damage, or environmental
damage. Although language related to
the types of environmental damage
listed in the proposed rule has been
dropped, EPA intends that
environmental damage not be limited to
environmental receptors; events where
any known environmental impact of any
kind (e.g., fish or animal kills, lawn,
shrub, or crop damage), should be
included in the history.
The data required on each accident
include date, time, and approximate
duration of the release; chemical (s)
released; estimated quantity in pounds;
the type of release event and its source;
weather conditions (if known); on-site
impacts and known offsite impacts; the
initiating event and contributing factors
(if known); whether offsite responders
were notified (if known); and
operational or process changes that
resulted from the release. Estimates may
be provided to two significant digits.
EPA expects that for accidents that
occur after the publication of this rule,
sources will be able to document
weather conditions, initiating events
and contributing factors, and
notification of offsite responders as
these items would be part of the
incident investigation. The Agency
recognizes, however, that for incidents
that occur before the rule is final,
sources may not have this information
unless OSHA PSM already would
require the source to gather such
information (e.g., initiating event and
contributing factors). EPA has dropped
the requirement that the concentration
of the released substance be reported.
Concentration at the point of release is
assumed to be 100 percent except for
substances in solution, where the
concentration at the point of release is
assumed to be the percentage of the
solution as held or processed. The data
provided will allow the source or the
public to estimate the concentration
offsite.
Because the five-year accident history
will initially cover releases that
occurred before this rule is
promulgated, EPA is requiring reports
on weather conditions only if the source
has a record. For future releases, EPA
encourages the owners or operators keep
a record of wind speed and temperature
if possible as these conditions have a
significant impact on the migration of a
release offsite. The rule specifies that
the source must document known
offsite impacts. The source is not
required to conduct research on this
subject,.but must report impacts of
which it is aware through direct
reporting to the source or claims filed,
or reasonably should have been aware of
from publicly available information.
The source is not required to verify the
accuracy of public or media reports.
A new subpart C has been created to
include the requirements of the
prevention program for Program 2
processes.
New §68.48 details the safety
information that sources will be
required to develop. The information is
a subset of the information required
under the OSHA rule and is limited to
those items that are likely to apply to
Program 2 processes: MSDSs, maximum
intended inventory, safe upper and
lower process parameters, equipment
specifications, and the codes and
standards used to design, build, and
operate the process. Because Program 2
processes are generally simple, EPA
determined that items such as process
chemistry, process flow diagrams,
detailed drawings on equipment, and
material and energy balances are not
necessary for these processes.
Evaluation of consequences of
deviations will be handled under the
process review and the offsite
consequence analysis.
Paragraph (b) of §68.48 requires
owners or operators to ensure that the
process is designed in compliance with
good engineering practices. The
paragraph states that compliance with
Federal or state regulations that address
industry-specific safe design or with
industry-specific design codes may be
used to demonstrate compliance.
NFPA-58 for propane handlers and
OSHA's rule for ammonia handling (29
CFR 1910.111) are examples of such
design codes.
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Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 31711
The final paragraph of §68.48
requires owners or operators to update
the safety information if a major change
makes it inaccurate.
New §68.50 sets the requirements for
a hazard review. The section lists the
hazards and safeguards that the owners
or operators must identify and review.
The section states that owners or
operators may use checklists, such as
those provided in model risk
management programs, to conduct the
review. For processes that are designed
to industry standards (e.g., NFPA-58) or
Federal/state design rules, owners or
operators need only check their
equipment closely to ensure that it has
been fabricated and installed according
to the standards or rules and is being
operated appropriately. In this case, the
standard or rule-setting body has, in
essence, conducted the hazard review
and designed the equipment to reduce
hazards. Like the PHA required under
PSM, the hazard review must be
documented and the findings resolved.
The review must be updated at least •
once every five years or when a major
change occurs. A streamlined version of
the PHA requirement, the review
recognizes that for simple processes
some of the OSHA requirements, such
as the requirement for a team and a
person trained in the technique, may
not be necessary. Most Program 2
processes will have model risk
management programs that will assist
owners or operators in conducting the
review.
New §68.52 covers operating
procedures. The section allows owners
or operators to use standardized
procedures developed by industry
groups or provided in model risk
management programs as a basis for the
SOPs. Owners or operators will need to
review standardized SOPs to ensure that
they are appropriate for their operations;
some may need to be tailored. The steps
covered in the SOP are adapted from the
OSHA PSM standard. Certain elements
of the PSM requirement (e.g., safety and
health consideration) were dropped
because they are generally covered in
training provided under the OSHA
hazard communication standard. Other
elements were not included because
they are covered by other OSHA rules
or may not apply to the kinds of sources
in Program 2. The section requires that
the SOPs be updated whenever
necessary.
New §68.54 covers training and is a
streamlined version of the OSHA PSM
requirement. The primary difference
with the OSHA PSM training element is
that the documentation requirements
have been dropped. EPA believes that
for Program 2 sources, which generally
will have simple processes and few
employees involved in the process, the
level of documentation required by
OSHA PSM is not needed. The section
specifically states that training
conducted to comply with other Federal
or state rules or industry codes may be
used to demonstrate compliance with
the section if the training covers the
SOPs for the process. Workers must be
retrained when SOPs change as a result
of a major change.
New § 68.56 covers maintenance and
requires owners or operators to prepare
and implement procedures for
maintenance and train workers in these
procedures. The owners or operators are
also required to inspect and test process
equipment consistent with good
engineering practices. The OSHA list of
equipment has been dropped because it
seemed too detailed for the simpler
Program 2 processes. Similarly, the
OSHA PSM requirements for
documentation, equipment deficiencies,
and quality assurance seem too
burdensome given the type of processes
in Program 2. EPA emphasizes that
sources should address equipment
deficiencies when they arise.
New §§68.58 and 68.60 on
compliance audits and accident
investigation are adopted directly from
the OSHA PSM standard. EPA believes
that these two elements are critical to
good prevention practices and that no
changes are needed from the OSHA
requirements. EPA has added a
provision to clearly indicate that audit
reports more than five-years old need
not be retained.
The Program 3 prevention program is
codified in new subpart D. As explained
above, the subpart adopts the OSHA
PSM standard with only minor editorial
changes necessitated by the different
statutory authorities of the two agencies.
Throughout the subpart, "employer"
has been changed to "owner or
operator," "facility" to "stationary
source," and "highly hazardous
chemical" to "regulated substance."
EPA has reordered the elements
somewhat so that the order reflects the
progression in which sources will
generally implement the program. For
example, process safety information,
which is needed for the PHA, now
precedes that section. Pre-startup
review, which is the last step of
management of change procedures, now
follows management of change. The
reordering does not reflect any change
in the content.
Section 68.65, process safety
information, is adopted directly from
OSHA. The only changes are the
following: references to other
requirements have been changed to
reflect the appropriate EPA section
numbers; the phrase "highly hazardous
chemical" has been changed to
"regulated substance"; the word
"standard" has been changed to "rule"
in paragraph (a); and the date when
material and energy balances are needed
for new processes has been changed to
June 21, 1999. The words "including
those affecting the safety and health of
employees" has been deleted from the
requirement for the evaluation of the
consequences of deviations (paragraph
(c)(l)(v)) because EPA has no authority
to regulate the workplace. Further, EPA
believes this change reflects EPA's
desire that sources implement one
prevention program that protects the
safety and health of workers, the public
and the environment and should have
no effect on sources already complying
with the OSHA PSM rule.
Section 68.67, process hazard
analysis, has been adopted from the
OSHA rule with a few changes. The
OSHA schedule for completion of PHAs
has been replaced with the compliance
date of this rule; a new sentence has
been added to state that PHAs
conducted to comply with OSHA PSM
are acceptable as the initial PHA under
this rule. These PHAs shall be updated
and revalidated based on their OSHA
completion date. This provision will
ensure that sources do not need to
duplicate PHAs already completed or
change their update schedule.
In paragraph (c)(2), the phrase "in the
workplace" has been deleted from the
requirement to identify previous
incidents with the potential for
catastrophic consequences because EPA
does not have the authority to regulate
the work place. EPA believes that this
change will have no effect on the rule;
any incident with the potential for
catastrophic consequences in the
workplace will also have had the
potential for catastrophic consequences
offsite. Similarly, the phrase "on
employees in the workplace" has been
deleted from paragraph (c)(7), which
requires a qualitative evaluation of a
range of the possible safety and health
effects of failure of controls. By deleting
the language, rather than changing it,
EPA is consistent with its authority
without imposing any new requirements
on sources. A new sentence has been
added to paragraph (f) to state that PHAs
updated and revalidated under the
OSHA rule are acceptable for EPA's
purposes. Throughout this section,
internal references have been changed.
To maintain consistency with OSHA
PSM, proposed paragraph (j), which
would have required the evaluation of
mitigation and detection systems, has
been dropped, as have proposed
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31712 Federal Register / Vol. 61. No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations
references to offslte consequences and
public health and the environment.
Evaluation of mitigation and detection
systems is normally part of the PHA
process and of management's decisions
on implementing recommendations and,
therefore, EPA decided that a separate
requirement was not needed. EPA will
collect information on monitoring,
detection, and mitigation systems used
in each Program 2 and 3 process as part
of the RMP. Proposed paragraph (a),
which was advisory, has been dropped.
Section 68.69, Operating Procedures.
has been adopted verbatim from OSHA
except for changing "employer" to
"owner or operator." Proposed
paragraph (a) has been deleted to ensure
consistency with OSHA.
Section 68.71, Training, has been
adopted verbatim from OSHA except for
changing "employer" to "owner or
operator" and changes in referenced
sections. Proposed paragraph (a) has
been deleted to ensure consistency with
OSHA, as has proposed paragraph (e).
Section 68.73, Mechanical Integrity
proposed as Maintenance, has been
adopted verbatim from OSHA except for
changing "employer" to "owner or
operator." Proposed paragraph (a) has
been deleted to ensure consistency with
OSHA. The proposed requirements to
develop a critical equipment list,
document training, and "maintain" as
well as inspect and test under paragraph
(d) have been dropped to ensure
consistency with OSHA.
Section 68.75, Management of
Change, has been adopted verbatim
from OSHA except for changing
"employer" to "owner or operator" and
changes to referenced sections.
Proposed paragraph (a) has been deleted
to ensure consistency with OSHA.
EPA's proposed paragraph (b), which
defined changes not covered by the
section, has also been dropped in favor
of OSHA's definition of "replacement in
kind."
Section 68.77, Pre-Startup Review,
has been adopted verbatim from OSHA
except for changing "employer" to
"owner or operator" and changes to
referenced sections. Proposed paragraph
(a) and the reference to emergency
response training in proposed paragraph
(c)(4) have been deleted to ensure
consistency with OSHA.
Section 68.79, Compliance Audits,
has been adopted verbatirn from OSHA
except for changing "employer" to
"owner or operator" and changes to
referenced sections. Proposed paragraph
(a) has been deleted to ensure
consistency with OSHA.
Section 68.81, Accident Investigation,
has been adopted verbatim from OSHA
except for changing "employer" to
"owner or operator" and "highly
hazardous chemical" to "regulated
substance" and changes to referenced
sections. Proposed paragraphs (a) and
(b), the latter of which would have
required written procedures, have been
deleted to ensure consistency with
OSHA. References to significant
accidental release have been dropped
because the phrase is no longer used.
Although EPA has adopted OSHA's
language, EPA has changed the
definition of catastrophic release.
Consequently, this section requires
owners or operators to investigate
accidents that resulted in or could
reasonably have resulted in a release
that presented serious danger to public
health or the environment. EPA does
not believe that, except in isolated
cases, the modification to this provision
will require sources to investigate
accidents that they would not
investigate under the OSHA rule.
Section 68.83, Employee
Participation, has been adopted
verbatim from OSHA except for
changing "employer" to "owner or
operator." Although EPA did not
propose adopting this section, the
Agency solicited comments on this
issue, and commenters convinced the
Agency that employee participation is
an important component of a complete
prevention program.
Section 68.85, Hot Work Permit, has
been adopted verbatim from OSHA
except for changing "employer" to
"owner or operator." Although EPA did
not propose adopting this section, the
Agency solicited comments on this
provision and decided that it was
valuable to maintain consistency with
the OSHA PSM elements and that the
hot work permit was important to good
prevention practices.
Section 68.87, Contractors, has been
adopted verbatim from OSHA except for
changing "employer" to "owner or
operator," changing to referenced
sections, and deleting OSHA's
paragraph 29 CFR 1910.119(h)(2)(vi).
Although EPA did not propose adopting
this section, the Agency solicited
comments on this issue. Commenters
argued that contractor practices are an
important component of a complete
prevention program. A number of major
accidents have resulted from contractor
mistakes. EPA agrees with the
commenters and has included the
provision in the final rule. EPA has,
however, deleted the requirement that
employers maintain an occupational
injury and illness log for contract
employees because the Agency does not
have the authority to impose this
requirement.
EPA has placed the emergency
response requirements in a new Subpart
E and divided the proposed emergency
response section into two separate
sections, an applicability section and a
section to cover the emergency response
program.
A new §68.90, Applicability, has
been added. Because many sources
covered by this rule may be too small
to handle emergency response
themselves, EPA has provided, in this
new section, the actions they must take
if they will not respond to releases.
Specifically, for sources with regulated
toxic substances, the source must be
addressed in the community emergency
response plan developed under EPCRA
section 303. Sources with regulated
flammable substances must coordinate
response actions with the local fire
department. These sources must also
establish a mechanism to contact local
emergency responders. Sources that do
not meet these requirements must
comply with EPA's emergency response
program requirements.
Section 68.95, Emergency Response
Program, is adopted from § 68.45 of the
proposed rule. The program has four
components: an emergency response
plan, procedures for use of response
equipment and its maintenance, training
for employees, and procedures to
update the plan after changes to the
source. The required elements of the
plan are those specified in CAA section
112(r)(7)(B)(ii): procedures for informing
the public and local response agencies;
documentation of emergency medical
treatment; and procedures and measures
for emergency response. As explained
above, EPA decided that, to avoid
inconsistency with other emergency
response planning regulations, the rule
would be limited to the statutory
requirements. Consequently, EPA has
deleted the following proposed
requirements: documentation of—
evacuation routes (which should be
covered under the emergency action
plans required by OSHA under 29 CFR
1910.38); descriptions of all response
and mitigation technologies available at
the source; documentation of the
maintenance and training programs;
emergency response drills and
exercises; revision of the plan based on
the findings of the drills and exercises;
and documentation of management's
response to findings and a schedule for
completion. EPA believes that these
requirements are addressed in other
Federal regulations and, therefore,
sources are already doing them. By not
including them, EPA, however, avoids
the possibility that slightly different
wording could lead to unnecessary
additional effort on the part of sources.
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Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 31713
EPA has added a paragraph (b) to this
section to state that compliance with
other Federal contingency plan
regulations or use of the National
Response Team's Integrated
Contingency Plan Guidance ("One
Plan") that results in a written plan that
addresses the elements in paragraph (a)
shall satisfy the requirements of the
rule, provided that the owner or
operator also complies with paragraph
(c) of this section.
Paragraph (c) is adopted from
proposed paragraph §68.45(g) and
requires coordination of the plan with
the local community emergency
response plan. References to the local
emergency planning committee (LEPC)
have been changed to 'local emergency
response officials' to recognize and
include other local groups that may be
in charge of coordinating emergency
planning. LEPCs would be included in
this category.
A new Subpart G has been created to
cover the Risk Management Plan. The
Risk Management Plan includes three
main sections, an executive summary,
the registration, and data elements that
provide information on the offsite
consequence analyses, the five-year
accident history, the prevention
program, and the emergency response
program. The subpart includes separate
section to address each of these, plus
sections on submission, certifications,
and updates.
New §68.150, Submission, has been
added. As discussed above, an owner or
operator shall submit a single RMP for
the source, regardless of the number of
covered processes or the tiers for which
they are eligible. All RMPs will be
submitted in a manner and method EPA
will specify by the compliance date to
a point designated by EPA; no other
submission will be required because
other agencies and the public will have
access to the submissions on-line. As
required by the CAA, the first RMP must
be submitted by June 21, 1999, three
years after EPA first lists a substance, or
the date on which a source first becomes
subject to this part, whichever is latest.
As discussed above under applicability,
after June 21, 1999, sources that begin
using a substance that has been listed
for at least three years will be required
to submit their RMPs on the date the
substance is first on site above the
threshold quantity. Sources that begin
using such a regulated substance prior
to June 21, 1999 will need to be in
compliance with the rule on June 21,
1999. The final paragraph states that,
except for a classified annex that would
not be publicly available, the RMP shall
exclude classified information.
New § 68.155 details the requirements
for the executive summary. The
summary shall include brief
descriptions of the following items: the
source's prevention and emergency
response approach; the stationary
source and regulated substances; worst-
case release scenario(s) and alternative
release scenario(s), including any
administrative controls applied to limit
the release quantity; the general
prevention program and chemical-
specific prevention steps; the five-year
accident history; the emergency
response program; and planned changes
to improve safety. EPA anticipates that
none of these items should require more
than a half page of text. Because this
information may be filed electronically,
EPA is not asking sources to submit
maps of the worst-case or alternative
release scenario circles. The data
submitted under each of these sections
will allow state or local agencies and the
public to map the circles.
Section 68.160, Registration, replaces
proposed § 68.12. The registration shall
include the following data: stationary
source name, street, city, county, state,
zip code, latitude, and longitude; the
stationary source and corporate Dun and
Bradstreet numbers; the name,
telephone number, and mailing address
of the owner/operator; the name and
title of the person responsible for
implementation of the risk management
program; the name, title, telephone
number, and 24-hour telephone number
of the emergency contact; the stationary
source EPA identifier; the number of
full-time employees at the stationary
source; whether the stationary source is
subject to 29 CFR 1910.119; whether the
stationary source is subject to 40 CFR
part 355; and the date on which the
stationary source last had a safety
inspection by a Federal, state, or local
government agency.
For each covered process, the source
must list the regulated substances
present above a threshold quantity
(name and CAS number), the maximum
quantity of each substance in the
process, the SIC code of the process, and
the Program level that applies to the
process. This process information
provides a simple method for describing
covered processes and identifying
Program levels.
The reporting of the quantity has been
changed; rather than have sources report
in ranges, the rule requires that the
quantity be reported to two significant
digits. EPA has found that the reporting
ranges are so broad (generally an order
of magnitude) that data analysis is
extremely difficult. By limiting the
reporting to two significant digits, EPA
will allow sources to estimate
quantities, but still provide more precise
data than are currently available. EPA
has added a requirement for reporting
full-time employees. These data are easy
for sources to provide and will enhance
the Agency's ability to assess the impact
of its rule on businesses of various sizes.
The EPA identifier will be the unique
number EPA will assign to each source
and will allow EPA to cross reference
other reporting to the Agency. Use of the
identifier also means that EPA may not
need to collect certain data on this form
because they will be available from the
identifier database; EPA may revise the
requirements when the identifier rule is
promulgated.
EPA has deleted the certification
statement proposed for the registration
because the RMP as a whole will have
a certification statement that will cover
all elements, including registration.
Corrections to the registration will be
treated as corrections to the RMP and
must be filed within six months of the
change, rather than the 60 days
proposed for registration changes.
The registration now requires the
owners or operators to check off the
agency that last conducted a safety
inspection at the source and provide the
date. The inspection does not need to
have been related to prevention
practices as defined in this rule, but
may instead cover fire safety, workplace
safety, etc.
New §68.165 covers the requirements
for reporting on the offsite consequence
analysis. As discussed in Section III.B,
the RMP shall include data on one worst
case release scenario for each Program 1
process; and, for Program 2 and 3
processes, one worst case release
scenario for toxics and one for
flammables (for sources with substances
in both hazard classes). If additional
worst-case release scenarios are required
under § 68.25 for either class, data on
that scenario must also be reported.
Sources with Program 2 and 3 processes
will also provide data on one alternative
release scenario to cover all flammables
in covered processes and an alternative
release scenario for each toxic substance
held in covered processes.
For each reported scenario, the
owners or operators shall provide the
following data: chemical name; physical
state (toxics only); basis of results and
model (if used); scenario: quantity
released in pounds; release rate;
duration; wind speed and stability
(toxics only); topography (toxics only);
distance to endpoint; public and
environmental receptors within the
distance; passive mitigation considered;
and active mitigation (alternative
releases only) considered. A number of
the data elements are not relevant to all
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31714 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations
flammable releases; for example, in the
worst-case release flammables are
assumed to be released and explode
almost instantly so that release rate,
duration, wind speed and stability, and
topography are not factors in
determining distances.
The purpose of requiring these data
elements, rather than the proposed
summary of the assessment, is to
provide the public with the essential
estimates of distance to the endpoints
and provide enough data on the release
scenario to allow agencies or the public
to confirm the distance estimate. With
the data provided, a public agency will
be able to use EPA's guidance to
determine the distance for a particular
chemical release and compare that
distance with the one reported by the
source. This ability will be particularly
important when a source has chosen to
use an air dispersion model rather than
the reference table. The proposed rule
approach, which required a summary of
the assessment, would have resulted in
considerable variation in the
information submitted, as happened in
the Kanawha Valley exercise. In that
case, each source decided on the level
of Information to provide; although each
provided maps, it was not possible, in
many cases, to determine how the
distances were estimated because much
of the underlying data was not reported.
EPA believes that these requirements
will impose a minimal burden on
sources, because they will already have
the data from completing the analyses,
will ensure that the same data are
reported by all sources, and will provide
enough data to evaluate the results
using publicly available documents and
models.
New §68.168 on the five-year
accident history simply references the
data elements listed in §68.42(a). The
data elements will be reported for each
accidental release covered by the
accident history requirement.
New §68.170, Prevention Program/
Program 2, requires owners or operators
with Program 2 processes to list the
name of chemical(s) in, and SIC code
for, the Program 2 process; to provide
the dates of the most recent revisions or
reviews of the prevention program
elements; to provide, based on the
hazard review, information on the major
hazards, process controls, mitigation
systems, monitoring or detection
systems, and changes since the last
hazard review; to list any state or federal
regulations of industry-specific design
codes or standards being used to
demonstrate compliance with
prevention program elements; to list the
type of training and competency testing
used: to provide the date of the most
recent change that triggered a review or
revision of prevention elements; and to
provide the date of the completion of
any changes resulting from hazard
reviews, audits, or incident
investigations. EPA recognizes that not
all recommendations resulting from
hazard reviews, audits, or incident
investigations result in changes; some or
all may be resolved without changes.
However, if any changes are made, the
owners or operators shall report in the
RMP the date when such changes are
complete or expected to be complete.
New §68.175, Prevention Program/
Program 3, requires owners or operators
with Program 3 processes to list the
name of chemical(s) in, and SIC code
for, the Program 3 process; to provide
the dates of the most recent revisions or
reviews of the prevention program
elements; to provide, based on the PHA,
information on the major hazards,
process controls, mitigation systems,
monitoring or detection systems, and
changes since the last PHA; to list the
type of training and competency testing
used; to provide the date of the most
recent change that triggered a review or
revision of prevention elements; and to
provide the date of the completion of
any changes resulting from PHAs,
audits, or incident investigations. As
above, EPA recognizes that not all
recommendations resulting from PHAs,
audits, or incident investigations result
in changes; some or all may be resolved
without changes. However, if any
changes are made, the owners or
operators shall report in the RMP the
date when such changes are complete or
expected to be complete.
New § 68.180, Emergency Response
Program, requires owners or operators to
answer questions about the required
content of the emergency response plan,
providing the date of the most recent
training of employees update of the
plan, indicate whether the source
emergency response plan has been
coordinated with the LEPC plan,
provide the name and telephone
number of the local agency with which
the plan has been coordinated, and list
other Federal or state emergency
planning requirements to which the
source is subject.
New §68.185, Certification, specifies
the certification requirements that
owners or operators must complete
when the RMP is submitted.
New §68.190 details the requirements
for updating the RMP. The plan must be
updated at least once every five years.
If a new substance is added to an
already covered process or a new
covered process is added, the RMP must
be updated on the date on which the
regulated substance is first present
above a threshold quantity. If EPA lists
a new substance that the source has
above a threshold quantity, the RMP
must be updated within three years of
the date of listing. If a change at the
source leads to a revised offsite
consequence analysis, process hazard
analysis or review, or a process changes
Program level, the RMP must be revised
and resubmitted within six months of
the change. Subsequent updates will be
required within five years of the update.
A new Subpart H, Other
Requirements, has been added.
New §68.200, Recordkeeping, simply
states that records will be maintained
for five years unless otherwise specified
in the Program 3 prevention program.
New §68.210, Availability of
information to the public, has been
added and a paragraph included to
provide that classified information is
protected under applicable laws,
regulations, and executive orders.
New §68.215, Permit content and air
permitting authority or designated
agency requirements, has been added to
define the requirements for including
part 68 in Part 70 and 71 permits, as
discussed above.
.Section 68.220, Audits, has been
revised to change references in
paragraph (a). A new paragraph (c) has
been added to specify the sources that
have achieved a star or merit rating
under OSHA's VPP program will be
exempt from audits if the audit program
is based on industry accident history or
on neutral random oversight and if the
source has not had an accidental release
that requires investigation under the
rule. Paragraph (h) has been revised to
clarify that the source must revise the
RMP 30 days after completion of the
actions detailed in the implementation
plan, not 30 days after the issuance of
the final determination.
Appendix A has been added to
provide the toxic endpoints.
V. Required Analyses
A. E.O. 12866
Under Executive Order (E.O.) 12866
(58 PR 51735; October 4, 1993), EPA
must determine whether a regulatory
action is "significant" and, therefore,
subject to OMB review and the
requirements of the E.O. The Order
defines "significant regulatory action"
as one that is likely to result in a rule
that may:
(1) Have an annual effect on the
economy of $100 million or more or
adversely affect in a material way the
economy, a sector of the economy,
productivity, competition, jobs, the
environment, public health or safety, or
state, local, or tribal government or
communities.
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Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 31715
(2) Create a serious inconsistency or
otherwise interfere with an action taken
or planned by another agency;
(3) Materially alter the budgetary
impact of entitlements, grants, user fees,
or loan programs or the rights and
obligations of recipients thereof; or
(4) Raise novel legal or policy issues
arising out of legal mandates, the
President's priorities, or the principles
set forth in the E.O.
Under terms of E.O. 12866, EPA has
determined that today's final
rulemaking is a "significant regulatory
action." EPA, therefore, has developed
an economic impact analysis for the
final rule, (Economic Analysis in
Support of Final Rule on Risk
Management Program Regulations for
Chemical Accidental Release
Prevention), which is available in the
docket.
In developing the final rule, EPA
notes that it has taken actions to
streamline requirements whenever
possible and has tailored the
requirements through the use of
Programs. This approach differed from
the proposed rule, which imposed what
are now Program 3 requirements on all
sources and processes. EPA has also
changed substantially the requirements
for two elements of the rule, the offsite
consequence analysis and the RMP. For
the offsite consequence analysis, EPA
decided to develop methodologies and
look-up tables so sources would not
need to spend resources obtaining air
dispersion models; EPA also reduced
the requirements to define offsite
populations by allowing sources to use
Census data and to identify only those
institutions and developments that
appear on local maps (as opposed to
identifying day care centers and nursing
homes). For the RMP, EPA has limited
the requirements for information to that
which can be reported as data elements.
In contrast, the rule as proposed would
have required sources to document for
each process all major hazards, the
consequences of each of these hazards,
the risk reduction steps taken to address
each hazard, and the consequences of
each risk reduction step. The result
would have been, for large, complex
sources, documents of a 1,000 pages or
more.
To analyze the cost impacts of the
various approaches, EPA considered
three possible options in the final EIA:
the final rule, an option that imposed
final rule Program 3 requirements on all
sources, and an option that imposed
proposed rule requirements on all
sources. The last of these options was
considered to evaluate the impact of
changing the requirements for the offsite
consequence analysis and RMP.
Based on the final list and thresholds,
EPA estimates that approximately
66,100 sources will be affected by the
rule. EPA expects that about 360 sources
and approximately 410 processes will
be eligible for Program 1. These sources
are primarily gas processors that,
because they are remote and unstaffed,
are not covered by OSHA PSM. EPA
also estimated that approximately 50
processes using toluene di-isocyanate
(TDI) may qualify for Program 1 based
on the relatively low volatility of TDI.
Program 2 is expected to include 40,200
sources and 47,700 processes; these
sources include all retailers, propane
users, public drinking water and
wastewater systems and public electric
utilities not subject to OSHA PSM,
wholesalers, processes at Federal
facility processes, and non-chemical
manufacturers. Program 3 is expected to
cover 25,500 sources and 43,800
processes. These sources include
manufacturers, electric utilities, POTWs
and drinking water sites covered by
OSHA PSM, wholesalers, ammonia
refrigeration systems, gas utilities, gas
processors, and Federal facilities. All of
these sources are already covered by
OSHA PSM for at least one regulated
substance; EPA estimates that about 370
non-OSHA Program 3 processes in the
specified SIC codes will be covered.
Sources that already have a high
quality PSM program would not need to
take any additional actions to satisfy
EPA's Program 3 prevention program,
but the analysis assumed that many
sources may still be in the process of
improving their PSM programs after
achieving initial compliance. The public
scrutiny expected to follow submission
of the RMP is likely to encourage
sources to ensure that their prevention
efforts are fully implemented and
effective. To account for these efforts,
the analysis assumed that sources
covered by OSHA would improve
training, maintenance, and management
oversight and, in some cases, institute
additional capital improvements.
The rule provides sources three years
to come into compliance with the rule.
The rule, however, will impose
continuing costs as sources implement
their risk management programs. Initial
compliance, therefore, covers the cost of
meeting the requirements of the rule by
the three-year compliance date. These
costs are presented as a single figure,
but are assumed to be incurred over a
three-year period. Total costs to
industry were estimated by multiplying
the estimated unit costs of compliance
with the risk management program
elements by the estimated number of
affected sources. Because many sources
already implement some of the risk
management requirements (e.g.,
training), cost estimates were adjusted
to account for the expected likelihood
that a source is already human health
(death or injury), responses to these
threats (evacuations, sheltering in place)
threats to the environment, and
economic damages (lost production,
property damages, and litigation).
Additional benefits may be provided by
making information available to the
public in the RMP. These benefits,
however, cannot be quantified.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
In accordance with the Regulatory
Flexibility Act of 1980, Federal agencies
must evaluate the impacts of rules on
small entities and consider less
burdensome regulatory alternatives. As
originally proposed in 1993, EPA
believes that the rule would have
created a severe, adverse impact on
small manufacturers. In February 1995,
EPA published a supplemental
proposal which introduced a tiering
approach for this regulation. By using
the tiering approach and streamlining
the Program 2 requirements, this final
rule significantly reduces the impact on
small businesses. The tiering approach
also significantly reduces the impact on
small communities.
EPA has developed a Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis for this final rule
evaluating the effects on small entities,
which is presented in Chapter 7 of the
EIA. The number of small
manufacturers was estimated to be 960
sources with fewer than 20 FTEs, and
2,000 sources with between 20 and 99
FTEs. The number of small non-
manufacturers is more difficult to
determine. Virtually all retailer and
wholesalers have fewer than 100 FTEs.
Industry estimates, however, indicate
that about 80 percent of the affected
retailers may be owned by larger
companies; the analysis assumed that
3,700 retailers were small businesses.
No information was available to
estimate the percentage of wholesalers
that might be owned by large
corporations. The analysis assumed that
all wholesalers were small. The total
number of small businesses, therefore,
was estimated to be 8,160.
Public drinking water and waste
water systems affected by the rule
generally serve a minimum of 10,000
people. Approximately 980 water
systems are estimated to serve between
10,000 and 25,000 people.
Approximately 500 water systems are
estimated to serve between 25,000 and
50,000 people. Consequently, 1,480
drinking water systems would be
considered small governmental entities.
The number of small POTWs was
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31716 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations
estimated to include all systems treating
less than 10 mgd and 59 percent of
those treating between 10 and 25 mgd
(based on the ratio of drinking water
systems in this category that serve
populations below 50,000).
Approximately 2,600 POTWs were
estimated to serve between 10,000 and
25,000 people and 180 to serve between
25,000 and 50,000, for a total of 2,800
POTWs. A total of approximately 4,300
small governmental entities would be
affected by this rule.
The total number of small entities
affected by this rule was estimated to be
12,500 or 19 percent of the affected
universe. No detailed analysis of the
impact on small entities was performed
because of the relatively low cost of the
rule for small entities. Initial costs are
considerably less than one percent of
sales for ail small manufacturers.
Subsequent year costs will be even
lower. Costs for non-manufacturers are
very low (less than $1,000 per year for
initial compliance). These sums do not
impose a serious adverse burden on
these sources. Only chemical
manufacturers with complex processes
and 20 to 99 FTEs have initial costs that
exceed $6,000 per year. The costs for
these sources, $28,000 to $30,000 per
year for the first three years, represent
less than 0.5 percent of sales. It should
be noted that all of the costs for small
manufacturers assume that the source-,
will take additional efforts, above their
actions to comply with the OSHA rule,
to Improve the quality of the risk
management programs. If they do not
take additional actions, their costs
would be substantially lower.
C, Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
Title 11 of the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA), Public
Law 104-4, establishes requirements for
Federal agencies to assess the effects of
their regulatory actions on state, local,
and tribal governments and the private
sector. Under section 202 of UMRA,
EPA must generally prepare a written
statement, Including a cost-benefit
analysis for proposed and final rules
with "Federal mandates" that may
result in expenditures to state, local,
and tribal governments, in the aggregate,
or to the private sector, of $100 million
or more in any one year. Before
promulgating an EPA rule for which a
written statement is needed, section 205
of UMRA generally requires EPA to
identify and consider a reasonable
number of regulatory alternatives and
adopt the least costly, most cost-
effective, or least burdensome
alternatives that achieves the objectives
of the rule. The provisions of section
205 do not apply when they are
inconsistent with applicable law.
Moreover, section 205 allows EPA to
adopt an alternative other than the least
costly, most cost-effective, or least
burdensome alternative if the
Administrator publishes with the final
rule an explanation of why the
alternative was not adopted. Before EPA
establishes any regulatory requirements
that significantly or uniquely affect
small governments, including tribal
governments, it must have developed
under section 203 of UMRA, a small
government agency plan. The plan must
provide for notifying potentially
affected small governments, enabling
officials of affected small governments
to have meaningful and timely input
into the development of the regulatory
proposals with significant Federal
intergovernmental mandates, and
informing, educating, and advising
small governments on compliance with
the regulatory requirements.
EPA has determined that this rule
contains a Federal mandate that may
result in expenditures of $100 million or
more for state, local, and tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or to the
private sector, in any one year.
Accordingly, EPA has prepared, under
section 202 of the UMRA, a written
statement which is summarized below.
EPA is required to promulgate this
rule under CAA section 112(r). In the
first and third year of initial
compliance, the cost of the rule to the
regulated community will exceed $100
million: in all subsequent years the
costs will be below $100 million. EPA
has developed an economic impact
analysis, discussed above, that evaluates
several regulatory alternatives. EPA has
adopted the least costly of these
alternatives. EPA estimates that
annualized costs for state and local
governments will be $13 million;
annualized costs for the private sector
are estimated to be $72 million.
Consistent with the intergovernmental
consultation provisions of section 204 of
the UMRA and Executive Order 12875
"Enhancing the Intergovernmental
Partnership," EPA has involved state,
local and business representatives in
focus groups to develop the rule. EPA
included representatives of state
government in the rulemaking
workgroup process, available to the
public under CAA section 114(c) and 40
CFR part 2; EPA does not believe that
any of the requested information will be
considered confidential.
The public reporting burden will
depend on the regulatory program into
which the 66,100 sources are placed.
The public reporting burden for rule
familiarization is estimated to range
from 4 to 68 hours per source for all
three program tiers. The public
reporting burden to prepare and submit
the registration and other RMP elements
is estimated to be 0.5 hours for sources
with only Program 1 processes, between
6.0 and 11.25 hours for Program 2
sources, and between 6.25 and 30.5
hours for Program 3 sources. The RMP
is submitted once, at the end of the
three year compliance period. The
public recordkeeping burden to
maintain on-site documentation is
estimated to range from 10 to 180 hours
for Program 2 sources and from 52 to
1,200 hours for Program 3 sources. On-
site documentation must be developed
and maintained on an ongoing basis,
which varies by rule element; based on
the statute of limitation for this rule,
documentation must generally be
maintained for five years. The total
annual public reporting burden for rule
familiarization, to complete the RMP,
and to maintain on-site documentation
is estimated to be about 3.36 million
hours over three years, or an annual
burden of 1.119 million hours. No
capital costs are expected to be incurred
to maintain or submit this
documentation.
Burden means the total time, effort, or
financial resources expended by persons
to generate, maintain, retain, or disclose
or provide information to or for a
Federal agency. This includes thq time
needed to review instructions; develop,
acquire, install, and use technology and
systems for the purposes of collecting,
validating, and verifying information,
processing and maintaining
information, and disclosing and
providing information; adjust the
existing ways to comply with any
previously applicable instructions and
requirements; train personnel to be able
to respond to a collection of
information; search data sources;
complete and review the collection of
information; and transmit or otherwise
disclose the information.
E. Submission to Congress and the
General Accounting Office.
Under section 801(a)(l)(A) of the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA) as
amended by the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of
1996, EPA submitted a report containing
this rule and other required information
to the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of
Representatives and the Comptroller
General of the General Accounting
Office prior to publication of the rule in
today's Federal Register. This rule is a
"major rule" as defined by section
804(2) of the APA as amended.
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Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 31717
List of Subjects in 40 CFR Part 68
Environmental protection, Chemicals,
Hazardous substances,
Intergovernmental relations.
Dated: May 24, 1996.
Carol M. Browner,
Administrator.
For the reasons set out in the
preamble, 40 CFR Part 68 is amended as
follows:
PART 68—[AMENDED]
1. The authority citation for part 68 is
revised to read as follows:
Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7412(r), 7601 (a)(l),
7661-7661f.
2. Part 68 is amended by
redesignating Subpart C (§§ 68.100—
68.130)asSubpartF.
Subpart A—[Amended]
4. Section 68.3 is amended to add the
following definitions:
§68.3 Definitions.
Act means the Clean Air Act as
amended (42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.)
*****
Administrative controls mean written
procedural mechanisms used for hazard
control.
AIChE/CCPS means the American
Institute of Chemical Engineers/Center
for Chemical Process Safety.
*****
API means the American Petroleum
Institute.
ASME means the American Society of
Mechanical Engineers.
Catastrophic release means a major
uncontrolled emission, fire, or
explosion, involving one or more
regulated substances that presents
imminent and substantial endangerment
to public health and the environment.
Classified information means
"classified information" as defined in
the Classified Information Procedures
Act, 18 U.S.C. App. 3, section l(a) as
"any information or material that has
been determined by the United States
Government pursuant to an executive
order, statute, or regulation, to require
protection against unauthorized
disclosure for reasons of national
security."
Covered process means a process that
has a regulated substance present in
more than a threshold quantity as
determined under §68.115.
Designated agency means the state,
local, or Federal agency designated by
the state under the provisions of
§ 68.215{d).
Environmental receptor means natural
areas such as national or state parks,
forests, or monuments; officially
designated wildlife sanctuaries,
preserves, refuges, or areas; and Federal
wilderness areas, that could be exposed
at any time to toxic concentrations,
radiant heat, or overpressure greater
than or equal to the endpoints provided
in §68.22(a) , as a result of an accidental
release and that can be identified on
local U. S. Geological Survey maps.
Hot work means work involving
electric or gas welding, cutting, brazing,
or similar flame or spark-producing
operations.
Implementing agency means the state
or local agency that obtains delegation
for an accidental release prevention
program under subpart E, 40 CFR part
63. The implementing agency may, but
is not required to, be the state or local
air permitting agency. If no state or local
agency is granted delegation, EPA will
be the implementing agency for that
state.
Injury means any effect on a human
that results either from direct exposure
to toxic concentrations; radiant heat; or
overpressures from accidental releases
or from the direct consequences of a
vapor cloud explosion (such as flying
glass, debris, and other projectiles) from
an accidental release and that requires
medical treatment or hospitalization.
Major change means introduction of a
new process, process equipment, or
regulated substance, an alteration of
process chemistry that results in any
change to safe operating limits, or other
alteration that introduces a new hazard.
Mechanical integrity means the
process of ensuring that process
equipment is fabricated from the proper
materials of construction and is
properly installed, maintained, and
replaced to prevent failures and
accidental releases.
Medical treatment means treatment,
other than first aid, administered by a
physician or registered professional
personnel under standing orders from a
physician.
Mitigation or mitigation system means
specific activities, technologies, or
equipment designed or deployed to
capture or control substances upon loss
of containment to minimize exposure of
the public or the environment. Passive
mitigation means equipment, devices, or
technologies that function without
human, mechanical, or other energy
input. Active mitigation means
equipment, devices, or technologies that
need human, mechanical, or other
energy input to function.
NFPA means the National Fire
Protection Association.
Offsite means areas beyond the
property boundary of the stationary
source, and areas within the property
boundary to which the public has
routine and unrestricted access during
or outside business hours.
OSHA means the U.S. Occupational
Safety and Health Administration.
Owner or operator means any person
who owns, leases, operates, controls, or
supervises a stationary source.
Population means the public.
*****
Public means any person except
employees or contractors at the
stationary source.
Public receptor means offsite
residences, institutions (e.g., schools,
hospitals), industrial, commercial, and
office buildings, parks, or recreational
areas inhabited or occupied by the
public at any time without restriction by
the stationary source where members of
the public could be exposed to toxic
concentrations, radiant heat, or
overpressure, as a result of an accidental
release.
*****
Replacement in kind means a
replacement that satisfies the design
specifications.
RMP means the risk management plan
required under subpart G of this part.
SIC means Standard Industrial
Classification.
*****
Typical meteorological conditions
means the temperature, wind speed,
cloud cover, and atmospheric stability
class, prevailing at the site based on
data gathered at or near the site or from
a local meteorological station.
*****
Worst-case release means the release
of the largest quantity of a regulated
substance from a vessel or process line
failure that results in the greatest
distance to an endpoint defined in
§68.22(a).
5. Section 68.10 is added to subpart
A to read as follows:
§68.10 Applicability.
(a) An owner or operator of a
stationary source that has more than a
threshold quantity of a regulated
substance in a process, as determined
under § 68.115, shall comply with the
requirements of this part no later than
the latest of the following dates:
(1) June 21, 1999;
(2) Three years after the date on
which a regulated substance is first
listed under §68.130; or
(3) The date on which a regulated
substance is first present above a
threshold quantity in a process.
(b) Program 1 eligibility requirements.
A covered process is eligible for
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31718 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations
Program 1 requirements as provided in
§68,12(b) if it meets all of the following
requirements:
(1) For the five years prior to the
submission of an RMP, the process has
not had an accidental release of a
regulated substance where exposure to
the substance, its reaction products,
overpressure generated by an explosion
involving the substance, or radiant heat
generated by a fire involving the
substance led to any of the following
oflsite:
(I) Death;
III) Injury, or
(III) Response or restoration activities
for an exposure of an environmental
receptor,
(2) The distance to a toxic or
flammable endpoint for a worst-case
release assessment conducted under
Subpart B and § 68.25 is less than the
distance to any public receptor, as
deHned In §68.30; and
(?) Emergency response procedures
have been coordinated between the
stationary source and local emergency
planning and response organizations.
(c) Program 2 eligibility requirements.
A covered process is subject to Program
2 requirements if it does not meet the
eligibility requirements of either
|>aragraph (b) or paragraph (d) of this
section.
(d) Program 3 eligibility requirements.
A covered process is subject to Program
3 If the process does not meet the
requirements of paragraph (b) of this
section, and if either of the following
conditions is met:
(I) The process is in SIC code 2611,
2812, 2819, 2821.2865, 2869, 2873,
2879. or 2911; or
(2) The process Is subject to the OSHA
process safety management standard, 29
CFR 1910.119.
(e) If at any time a covered process no
longer meets the eligibility criteria of its
Program level, the owner or operator
shall comply with the requirements of
the new Program level that applies to
the process and update the RMP as
provided In §68.190.
6. Section 68.12 is added to subpart
A to read as follows:
§68.12 General requirements.
(a) General requirements. The owner
or operator of a stationary source subject
to this part shall submit a single RMP,
as provided in §§68.150 to 68.185. The
RMP shall include a registration that
reflects all covered processes.
(b) Program 1 requirements. In
addition to meeting the requirements of
paragraph (a) of this section, the owner
or operator of a stationary source with
a process eligible for Program 1, as
provided In § 68.100}), shall:
(1) Analyze the worst-case release
scenario for the process(es), as provided
in §68.25; document that the nearest
public receptor is beyond the distance
to a toxic or flammable endpoint
defined in § 68.22(a); and submit in the
RMP the worst-case release scenario as
provided in §68.165;
(2) Complete the five-year accident
history for the process as provided in
§ 68.42 of this part and submit it in the
RMP as provided in §68.168;
(3) Ensure that response actions have
been coordinated with local emergency
planning and response agencies; and
(4) Certify in the RMP the following:
"Based on the criteria in 40 CFR 68.10,
the distance to the specified endpoint
for the worst-case accidental release
scenario for the following processes) is
less than the distance to the nearest
public receptor: [list process(es)].
Within the past five years, the
process(es) has (have) had no accidental
release that caused offsite impacts
provided in the risk management
program rule (40 CFR 68.10(b)(l)). No
additional measures are necessary to
prevent offsite impacts from accidental
releases. In the event of fire, explosion,
or a release of a regulated substance
from the process(es), entry within the
distance to the specified endpoints may
pose a danger to public emergency
responders. Therefore, public
emergency responders should not enter
this area except as arranged with the
emergency contact indicated in the
RMP. The undersigned certifies that, to
the best of my knowledge, information,
and belief, formed after reasonable
inquiry, the information submitted is
true, accurate, and complete. [Signature,
title, date signed]."
(c) Program 2 requirements. In
addition to meeting the requirements of
paragraph (a) of this section, the owner
or operator of a stationary source with
a process subject to Program 2, as
provided in § 68.10(c), shall:
(1) Develop and implement a
management system as provided in
§68.15;
(2) Conduct a hazard assessment as
provided in §§68.20 through 68.42;
(3) Implement the Program 2
prevention steps provided in §§ 68.48
through 68.60 or implement the
Program 3 prevention steps provided in
§§68.65 through 68.87;
(4) Develop and implement an
emergency response program as
provided in §§ 68.90 to 68.95; and
(5) Submit as part of the RMP the data
on prevention program elements for
Program 2 processes as provided in
§68.170.
(d) Program 3 requirements. In
addition to meeting the requirements of
paragraph (a) of this section, the owner
or operator of a stationary source with
a process subject to Program 3, as
provided in §68.10(d) shall:
(1) Develop and implement a
management system as provided in
§68.15;
(2) Conduct a hazard assessment as
provided in §§68.20 through 68.42;
(3) Implement the prevention
requirements of §§68.65 through 68.87;
(4) Develop and implement an
emergency response program as
provided in §§68.90 to 68.95 of this
part; and
(5) Submit as part of the RMP the data
on prevention program elements for
Program 3 processes as provided in
§68.175.
7. Section 68.15 is added to subpart
A to read as follows:
§68.15 Management
(a) The owner or operator of a
stationary source with processes subject
to Program 2 or Program 3 shall develop
a management system to oversee the
implementation of the risk management
program elements.
(b) The owner or operator shall assign
a qualified person or position that has
the overall responsibility for the
development, implementation, and
integration of the risk management
program elements.
(c) When responsibility for
implementing individual requirements
of this part is assigned to persons other
than the person identified under
paragraph (b) of this section, the names
or positions of these people shall be
documented and the lines of authority
defined through an organization chart or
similar document.
8. Subpart B—is added to read as
follows:
Subpart B—Hazard Assessment
Sec.
68.20 Applicability.
68.22 Offsite consequence analysis
parameters.
68.25 Worst-case release scenario analysis
68.28 Alternative release scenario analysis.
68.30 Defining offsite impacts —
population.
68.33 Defining offsite impacts —
environment.
68.36 Review and update.
68.39 Documentation.
68.42 Five-year accident history.
Subpart B—Hazard Assessment
§ 68.20 Applicability.
The owner or operator of a stationary
source subject to this part shall prepare
a worst-case release scenario analysis as
provided in § 68.25 of this part and
complete the five-year accident history
as provided in § 68.42. The owner or
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Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 31719
operator of a Program 2 and 3 process
must comply with all sections in this
subpart for these processes.
§68.22 Offsite consequence analysis
parameters.
(a) Endpoints. For analyses of offsite
consequences, the following endpoints
shall be used:
(1) Toxics. The toxic endpoints
provided in Appendix A of this part.
(2) Flammables. The endpoints for
flammables vary according to the
scenarios studied:
(i) Explosion. An overpressure of 1
psi.
(ii) Radiant heat/exposure time. A
radiant heat of 5 kw/m2 for 40 seconds.
(iii) Lower flammability limit. A
lower flammability limit as provided in
NFPA documents or other generally
recognized sources.
(b) Wind speed/atmospheric stability
class. For the worst-case release
analysis, the owner or operator shall use
a wind speed of 1.5 meters per second
and F atmospheric stability class. If the
owner or operator can demonstrate that
local meteorological data applicable to
the stationary source show a higher
minimum wind speed or less stable
atmosphere at all times during the
previous three years, these minimums
may be used. For analysis of alternative
scenarios, the owner or operator may
use the typical meteorological
conditions for the stationary source'.
(c) Ambient temperature/humidity.
For worst-case release analysis of a
regulated toxic substance, the owner or
operator shall use the highest daily
maximum temperature in the previous
three years and average humidity for the
site, based on temperature/humidity
data gathered at the stationary source or
at a local meteorological station; an
owner or operator using the RMP Offsite
Consequence Analysis Guidance may
use 25°C and 50 percent humidity as
values for these variables. For analysis
of alternative scenarios, the owner or
operator may use typical temperature/
humidity data gathered at the stationary
source or at a local meteorological
station.
(d) Height of release. The worst-case
release of a regulated toxic substance
shall be analyzed assuming a ground
level (0 feet) release. For an alternative
scenario analysis of a regulated toxic
substance, release height may be
determined by the release scenario.
(e) Surface roughness. The owner or
operator shall use either urban or rural
topography, as appropriate. Urban
means that there are many obstacles in
the immediate area; obstacles include
buildings or trees. Rural means there are
no buildings in the immediate area and
the terrain is generally flat and
unobstructed.
(f) Dense or neutrally buoyant gases.
The owner or operator shall ensure that
tables or models used for dispersion
analysis of regulated toxic substances
appropriately account for gas density.
(g) Temperature of released substance.
For worst case, liquids other than gases
liquified by refrigeration only shall be
considered to be released at the highest
daily maximum temperature, based on
data for the previous three years
appropriate for the stationary source, or
at process temperature, whichever is
higher. For alternative scenarios,
substances may be considered to be
released at a process or ambient
temperature that is appropriate for the
scenario.
§68.25 Worst-case release scenario
analysis.
(a) The owner or operator shall
analyze and report in the RMP:
(1) For Program 1 processes, one
worst-case release scenario for each
Program 1 process;
(2) For Program 2 and 3 processes:
(i) One worst-case release scenario
that is estimated to create the greatest
distance in any direction to an endpoint
provided in Appendix A of this part
resulting from an accidental release of
regulated toxic substances from covered
processes under worst-case conditions
donned in § 68.22;
(ii) One worst-case release scenario
that is estimated to create the greatest
distance in any direction to an endpoint
defined in §68.22(a) resulting from an
accidental release of regulated
flammable substances from covered
processes under worst-case conditions
defined in § 68.22; and
(iii) Additional worst-case release
scenarios for a hazard class if a worst-
case release from another covered
process at the stationary source
potentially affects public receptors
different from those potentially affected
by the worst-case release scenario
developed under paragraphs (a)(2)(i) or
(a)(2)(ii) of this section.
(b) Determination of worst-case
release quantity. The worst-case release
quantity shall be the greater of the
following:
(1) For substances in a vessel, the
greatest amount held in a single vessel,
taking into account administrative
controls that limit the maximum
quantity; or
(2) For substances in pipes, the
greatest amount in a pipe, taking into
account administrative controls that
limit the maximum quantity.
(c) Worst-case release scenario—toxic
gases.
(1) For regulated toxic substances that
are normally gases at ambient
temperature and handled as a gas or as
a liquid under pressure, the owner or
operator shall assume that the quantity
in the vessel or pipe, as determined
under paragraph (b) of this section, is
released as a gas over 10 minutes. The
release rate shall be assumed to be the
total quantity divided by 10 unless
passive mitigation systems are in place.
(2) For gases handled as refrigerated
liquids at ambient pressure:
(i) If the released substance is not
contained by passive mitigation systems
or if the contained pool would have a
depth of 1 cm or less, the owner or
operator shall assume that the substance
is released as a gas in 10 minutes;
(ii) If the released substance is
contained by passive mitigation systems
in a pool with a depth greater than 1 cm,
the owner or operator may assume that
the quantity in the vessel or pipe, as
determined under paragraph (b) of this
section, is spilled instantaneously to
form a liquid pool. The volatilization
rate (release rate) shall be calculated at
the boiling point of the substance and at
the conditions specified in paragraph
(d) of this section.
(d) Worst-case release scenario—toxic
liquids.
(1) For regulated toxic substances that
are normally liquids at ambient
temperature, the owner or operator shall
assume that the quantity in the vessel or
pipe, as determined under paragraph (b)
of this section, is spilled
instantaneously to form a liquid pool.
(i) The surface area of the pool shall
be determined by assuming that the
liquid spreads to 1 centimeter deep
unless passive mitigation systems are in
place that serve to contain the spill and
limit the surface area. Where passive
mitigation is in place, the surface area
of the contained liquid shall be used to
calculate the volatilization rate.
(ii) If the release would occur onto a
surface that is not paved or smooth, the
owner or operator may take into account
the actual surface characteristics.
(2) The volatilization rate shall
account for the highest daily maximum
temperature occurring in the past three
years, the temperature of the substance
in the vessel, and the concentration of
the substance if the liquid spilled is a
mixture or solution.
(3) The rate of release to air shall be
determined from the volatilization rate
of the liquid pool. The owner or
operator may use the methodology in
the RMP Offsite Consequence Analysis
Guidance or any other publicly
available techniques that account for the
modeling conditions and are recognized
by industry as applicable as part of
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31720 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations
current practices. Proprietary models
that account for the modeling
conditions may be used provided the
owner or operator allows the
implementing agency access to the
model and describes model features and
differences from publicly available
models to local emergency planners
upon request.
(e) Worst-case release scenario—
flammables. The owner or operator shall
assume that the quantity of the
substance, as determined under
paragraph (b) of this section, vaporizes
resulting in a vapor cloud explosion. A
yield factor of 10 percent of the
available energy released in the
explosion shall be used to determine the
distance to the explosion endpoint if the
model used is based on TNT-equivalent
methods.
(0 Parameters to be applied. The
owner or operator shall use the
parameters defined in §68.22 to
determine distance to the endpoints.
The owner or operator may use the
methodology provided in the RMP
Offsite Consequence Analysis Guidance
or any commercially or publicly
available air dispersion modeling
techniques, provided the techniques
account for the modeling conditions and
are recognized by industry as applicable
as part of current practices. Proprietary
models that account for the modeling
conditions may be used provided the
owner or operator allows the
implementing agency access to the
model and describes model features and
differences from publicly available
models to local emergency planners
upon request.
(g) Consideration of passive
mitigation. Passive mitigation systems
may be considered for the analysis of
worst case provided that the mitigation
system is capable of withstanding the
release event triggering the scenario and
would still function as intended.
(h) Factors In selecting a worst-case
scenario. Notwithstanding the
provisions of paragraph (b) of this
section, the owner or operator shall
select as the worst case for flammable
regulated substances or the worst case
for regulated toxic substances, a
scenario based on the following factors
if such a scenario would result in a
greater distance to an endpoint defined
in §68.22(a) beyond the stationary
source boundary than the scenario
provided under paragraph (b) of this
section:
(1) Smaller quantities handled at
higher process temperature or pressure;
and
(2) Proximity to the boundary of the
stationary source.
§ 68.28 Alternative release scenario
analysis.
(a) The number of scenarios. The
owner or operator shall identify and
analyze at least one alternative release
scenario for each regulated toxic
substance held in a covered process(es)
and at least one alternative release
scenario to represent all flammable
substances held in covered processes.
(b) Scenarios to consider. (1) For each
scenario required under paragraph (a) of
this section, the owner or operator shall
select a scenario:
(i) That is more likely to occur than
the worst-case release scenario under
§68.25; and
(ii) That will reach an endpoint
offsite, unless no such scenario exists.
(2) Release scenarios considered
should include, but are not limited to,
the following, where applicable:
(i) Transfer hose releases due to splits
or sudden hose uncoupling;
(ii) Process piping releases from
failures at flanges, joints, welds, valves
and valve seals, and drains or bleeds;
(iii) Process vessel or pump releases
due to cracks, seal failure, or drain,
bleed, or plug failure;
(iv) Vessel overfilling and spill, or
overpressurization and venting through
relief valves or rupture disks; and
(v) Shipping container mishandling
and breakage or puncturing leading to a
spill.
(c) Parameters to be applied. The
owner or operator shall use the
appropriate parameters defined in
§68.22 to determine distance to the
endpoints. Tiie owner or operator may
use either the methodology provided in
the RMP Offsite Consequence Analysis
Guidance or any commercially or
publicly available air dispersion
modeling techniques, provided the
techniques account for the specified
modeling conditions and are recognized
by industry as applicable as part of
current practices. Proprietary models
that account for the modeling
conditions may be used provided the
owner or operator allows the
implementing agency access to the
model and describes model features and
differences from publicly available
models to local emergency planners
upon request.
(d) Consideration of mitigation.
Active and passive mitigation systems
may be considered provided they are
capable of withstanding the event that
triggered the release and would still be
functional.
(e) Factors in selecting scenarios. The
owner or operator shall consider the
following in selecting alternative release
scenarios:
(1) The five-year accident history
provided in § 68.42; and
(2) Failure scenarios identified under
§§68.50 or 68.67.
§68.30 Defining offsite impacts—
population.
(a) The owner or operator shall
estimate in the RMP the population
within a circle with its center at the
point of the release and a radius
determined by the distance to the
endpoint defined in §68.22(a).
(b) Population to be defined.
Population shall include residential
population. The presence of institutions
(schools, hospitals, prisons), parks and
recreational areas, and major
commercial, office, and industrial
buildings shall be noted in the RMP.
(c) Data sources acceptable. The
owner or operator may use the most
recent Census data, or other updated
information, to estimate the population
potentially affected.
(d) Level of accuracy. Population shall
be estimated to two significant digits.
§68.33 Defining offsite impacts—
environment.
(a) The owner or operator shall list in
the RMP environmental receptors
within a circle with its center at the
point of the release and a radius
determined by the distance to the
endpoint defined in §68.22(a) of this
part.
(b) Data sources acceptable. The
owner or operator may rely on
information provided on local U.S.
Geological Survey maps or on any data
source containing U.S.G.S. data to
identify environmental receptors.
68.36 Review and update.
(a) The owner or operator shall review
and update the offsite consequence
analyses at least once every five years.
(b) If changes in processes, quantities
stored or handled, or any other aspect
of the stationary source might
reasonably be expected to increase or
decrease the distance to the endpoint by
a factor of two or more, the owner or
operator shall complete a revised
analysis within six months of the
change and submit a revised risk
management plan as provided in
§68.190.
§68.39 Documentation
The owner or operator shall maintain
the following records on the offsite
consequence analyses:
(a) For worst-case scenarios, a
description of the vessel or pipeline and
substance selected as worst case,
assumptions and parameters used, and
the rationale for selection; assumptions
shall include use of any administrative
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Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 31721
controls and any passive mitigation that
were assumed to limit the quantity that
could be released. Documentation shall
include the anticipated effect of the
controls and mitigation on the release
quantity and rate.
(b) For alternative release scenarios, a
description of the scenarios identified,
assumptions and parameters used, and
the rationale for the selection of specific
scenarios; assumptions shall include
use of any administrative controls and
any mitigation that were assumed to
limit the quantity that could be released.
Documentation shall include the effect
of the controls and mitigation on the
release quantity and rate.
(c) Documentation of estimated
quantity released, release rate, and
duration of release.
(d) Methodology used to determine
distance to endpoints.
(e) Data used to estimate population
and environmental receptors potentially
affected.
§ 68.42 Five-year accident history.
(a) The owner or operator shall
include in the five-year accident history
all accidental releases from covered
processes that resulted in deaths,
injuries, or significant property damage
on site, or known offsite deaths,
injuries, evacuations, sheltering in
place, property damage, or
environmental damage.
(b) Data required. For each accidental
release included, the owner or operator
shall report the following information:
(1) Date, time, and approximate
duration of the release;
(2) Chemical(s) released;
(3) Estimated quantity released in
pounds;
(4) The type of release event and its
source;
(5) Weather conditions, if known;
(6) On-site impacts;
(7) Known offsite impacts;
(8) Initiating event and contributing
factors if known;
(9) Whether offsite responders were
notified if known; and
(10) Operational or process changes
that resulted from investigation of the
release.
(c) Level of accuracy. Numerical
estimates may be provided to two
significant digits.
9. Subpart C is added to read as
follows:
Subpart C—Program 2 Prevention Program
Sees.
68,48 Safety information.
68.50 Hazard review.
68.52 Operating procedures.
68.54 Training.
68.56 Maintenance.
68.58 Compliance audits.
68.60 Incident investigation.
Subpart C—Program 2 Prevention
Program
§ 68.48 Safety information.
(a) The owner or operator shall
compile and maintain the following up-
to-date safety information related to the
regulated substances, processes, and
equipment:
(1) Material Safety Data Sheets that
meet the requirements of 29 CFR
1910.1200(g);
(2) Maximum intended inventory of
equipment in which the regulated
substances are stored or processed;
(3) Safe upper and lower
temperatures, pressures, flows, and
compositions;
(4) Equipment specifications; and
(5) Codes and standards used to
design, build, and operate the process.
(b) The owner or operator shall ensure
that the process is designed in
compliance with recognized and
generally accepted good engineering
practices. Compliance with Federal or
state regulations that address industry-
specific safe design or with industry-
specific design codes and standards may
be used to demonstrate compliance with
this paragraph.
(c) The owner or operator shall update
the safety information if a major change
occurs that makes the information
inaccurate.
§ 68.50 Hazard review.
(a) The owner or operator shall
conduct a review of the hazards
associated with the regulated
substances, process, and procedures.
The review shall identify the following:
(1) The hazards associated with the
process and regulated substances;
(2) Opportunities for equipment
malfunctions or human errors that could
cause an accidental release;
(3) The safeguards used or needed to
control the hazards or prevent
equipment malfunction or human error;
and
(4) Any steps used or needed to detect
or monitor releases.
(b) The owner or operator may use
checklists developed by persons or
organizations knowledgeable about the
process and equipment as a guide to
conducting the review. For processes
designed to meet industry standards or
Federal or state design rules, the hazard
review shall, by inspecting all
equipment, determine whether the
process is designed, fabricated, and
operated in accordance with the
applicable standards or rules.
(c) The owner or operator shall
document the results of the review and
ensure that problems identified are
resolved in a timely manner.
(d) The review shall be updated at
least once every five years. The owner
or operator shall also conduct reviews
whenever a major change in the process
occurs; all issues identified in the
review shall be resolved before startup
of the changed process.
§68.52 Operating procedures.
(a) The owner or operator shall
prepare written operating procedures
that provide clear instructions or steps
for safely conducting activities
associated with each covered process
consistent with the safety information
for that process. Operating procedures
or instructions provided by equipment
manufacturers or developed by persons
or organizations knowledgeable about
the process and equipment may be used
as a basis for a stationary source's
operating procedures.
(b) The procedures shall address the
following:
(1) Initial startup;
(2) Normal operations;
(3) Temporary operations;
(4) Emergency shutdown and
operations;
(5) Normal shutdown;
(6) Startup following a normal or
emergency shutdown or a major change
that requires a hazard review;
(7) Consequences of deviations and
steps required to correct or avoid
deviations; and
(8) Equipment inspections.
(c) The owner Or operator shall ensure
that the operating procedures are
updated, if necessary, whenever a major
change occurs and prior to startup of the
changed process.
§68.54 Training.
(a) The owner or operator shall ensure
that each employee presently operating
a process, and each employee newly
assigned to a covered process have been
trained or tested competent in the
operating procedures provided in
§ 68.52 that pertain to their duties. For
those employees already operating a
process on June 21, 1999, the owner or
operator may certify in writing that the
employee has the required knowledge,
skills, and abilities to safely carry out
the duties and responsibilities as
provided in the operating procedures.
(b) Refresher training. Refresher
training shall be provided at least every
three years, and more often if necessary,
to each employee operating a process to
ensure that the employee understands
and adheres to the current operating
procedures of the process. The owner or
operator, in consultation with the
employees operating the process, shall
determine the appropriate frequency of
refresher training.
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31722 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations
(c) The owner or operator may use
training conducted under Federal or
state regulations or under industry-
speclficstandards or codes or training
conducted by covered process
equipment vendors to demonstrate
compliance with this section to the
extent that the training meets the
requirements of this section.
(d) The owner or operator shall ensure
that operators are trained in any
updated or new procedures prior to
startup of a process after a major change.
§68.56 Maintenance.
(a) The owner or operator shall
prepare and implement procedures to
maintain the on-going mechanical
integrity of the process equipment. The
owner or operator may use procedures
or instructions provided by covered
process equipment vendors or
procedures in Federal or state
regulations or industry codes as the
basis for stationary source maintenance
procedures.
(b) The owner or operator shall train
or cause to be trained each employee
involved in maintaining the on-going
mechanical integrity of the process. To
ensure that the employee can perform
the job tasks in a safe manner, each such
employee shall be trained in the hazards
of the process, in how to avoid or
correct unsafe conditions, and in the
procedures applicable to the employee's
job tasks.
(c) Any maintenance contractor shall
ensure that each contract maintenance
employee is trained to perform the
maintenance procedures developed
under paragraph (a) of this section.
(d) The owner or operator shall
perform or cause to be performed
inspections and tests on process
equipment. Inspection and testing
procedures shall follow recognized and
generally accepted good engineering
practices. The frequency of inspections
and tests of process equipment shall be
consistent with applicable
manufacturers' recommendations,
industry standards or codes, good
engineering practices, and prior
operating experience.
§ 68.58 Compliance audits.
(a) The owner or operator shall certify
that they have evaluated compliance
with the provisions of this subpart at
least every three years to verify that the
procedures and practices developed
under the rule are adequate and are
being followed.
(b) The compliance audit shall be
conducted by at least one person
knowledgeable in the process.
(c) The owner or operator shall
develop a report of the audit findings.
(d) The owner or operator shall
promptly determine and document an
appropriate response to each of the
findings of the compliance audit and
document that deficiencies have been
corrected.
(e) The owner or operator shall retain
the two (2) most recent compliance
audit reports. This requirement does not
apply to any compliance audit report
that is more than five years old.
§68.60 Incident Investigation.
(a) The owner or operator shall
investigate each incident which resulted
in, or could reasonably have resulted in
a catastrophic release.
(b) An incident investigation shall be
initiated as promptly as possible, but
not later than 48 hours following the
incident.
(c) A summary shall be prepared at
the conclusion of the investigation
which includes at a minimum:
(1) Date of incident;
(2) Date investigation began;
(3) A description of the incident;
(4) The factors that contributed to the
incident; and,
(5) Any recommendations resulting
from the investigation.
(d) The owner or operator shall
promptly address and resolve the
investigation findings and
recommendations. Resolutions and
corrective actions shall be documented.
(e) The findings shall be reviewed
with all affected personnel whose job
tasks are affected by the findings.
(f) Investigation summaries shall be
retained for five years.
10. Subpart D is added to read as
follows:
Subpart D—Program 3 Prevention Program
Sec.
68.65 Process safety information.
68.67 Process hazard analysis.
68.69 Operating procedures.
68.71 Training.
68.73 Mechanical integrity.
68.75 Management of change.
68.77 Pre-startup review.
68.79 Compliance audits.
68.81 Incident investigation.
68.83 Employee participation.
68.85 Hot work permit.
68.87 Contractors.
Subpart D—Program 3 Prevention
Program
§ 68.65 Process safety information.
(a) In accordance with the schedule
set forth in § 68.67, the owner or
operator shall complete a compilation of
written process safety information
before conducting any process hazard
analysis required by the rule. The
compilation of written process safety
information is to enable the owner or
operator and the employees involved in
operating the process to identify and
understand the hazards posed by those
processes involving regulated
substances. This process safety
information shall include information
pertaining to the hazards of the
regulated substances used or produced
by the process, information pertaining
to the technology of the process, and
information pertaining to the equipment
in the process.
(b) Information pertaining to the
hazards of the regulated substances in
the process. This information shall
consist of at least the following:
(1) Toxicity information;
(2) Permissible exposure limits;
(3) Physical data;
(4) Reactivity data:
(5) Corrosivity data;
(6) Thermal and chemical stability
data; and
(7) Hazardous effects of inadvertent
mixing of different materials that could
foreseeably occur.
Note to paragraph (b): Material Safety Data
Sheets meeting the requirements of 29 CFR
1910.1200(g) may be used to comply with
this requirement to the extent they contain
the information required by this
subparagraph.
(c) Information pertaining to the
technology of the process.
(1) Information concerning the
technology of the process shall include
at least the following:
(i) A block flow diagram or simplified
process flow diagram;
(ii) Process chemistry;
(Hi) Maximum intended inventory;
(iv) Safe upper and lower limits for
such items as temperatures, pressures,
flows or compositions; and,
(v) An evaluation of the consequences
of deviations.
(2) Where the original technical
information no longer exists, such
information may be developed in
conjunction with the process hazard
analysis in sufficient detail to support
the analysis.
(d) Information pertaining to the
equipment in the process.
(1) Information pertaining to the
equipment in the process shall include:
(i) Materials of construction;
(ii) Piping and instrument diagrams
(P&ID's);
(iii) Electrical classification;
(iv) Relief system design and design
basis;
(v) Ventilation system design;
(vi) Design codes and standards
employed;
(vii) Material and energy balances for
processes built after June 21, 1999; and
(viii) Safety systems (e.g. interlocks,
detection or suppression systems).
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Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 31723
(2) The owner or operator shall
document that equipment complies
with recognized and generally accepted
good engineering practices.
(3) For existing equipment designed
and constructed in accordance with
codes, standards, or practices that are no
longer in general use, the owner or
operator shall determine and document
that the-equipment is designed,
maintained, inspected, tested, and
operating in a safe manner.
§ 68.67 Process hazard analysis.
(a) The owner or operator shall
perform an initial process hazard
analysis (hazard evaluation) on
processes covered by this part. The
process hazard analysis shall be
appropriate to the complexity of the
process and shall identify, evaluate, and
control the hazards involved in the
process. The owner or operator shall
determine and document the priority
order for conducting process hazard
analyses based on a rationale which
includes such considerations as extent
of the process hazards, number of
potentially affected employees, age of
the process, and operating history of the
process. The process hazard analysis
shall be conducted as soon as possible,
but not later than June 21, 1999. Process
hazards analyses completed to comply
with 29 CFR 1910.119(e) are acceptable
as initial process hazards analyses.
These process hazard analyses shall be
updated and revalidated, based on their
completion date.
(b) The owner or operator shall use
one or more of the following
methodologies that are appropriate to
determine and evaluate the hazards of
the process being analyzed.
(1) What-If;
(2) Checklist;
(3) What-lf/Checklist;
(4) Hazard and Operability Study
(HAZOP);
(5) Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
(FMEA);
(6) Fault Tree Analysis; or
(7) An appropriate equivalent
methodology.
(c) The process hazard analysis shall
address:
(1) The hazards of the process;
(2) The identification of any previous
incident which had a likely potential for
catastrophic consequences.
(3) Engineering and administrative
controls applicable to the-'hazards and
their interrelationships such as
appropriate application of detection
methodologies to provide early warning
of releases. (Acceptable detection
methods might include process
monitoring and control instrumentation
with alarms, and detection hardware
such as hydrocarbon sensors.);
(4) Consequences of failure of
engineering and administrative controls;
(5) Stationary source siting;
(6) Human factors; and
(7) A qualitative evaluation of a range
of the possible safety and health effects
of failure of controls.
(d) The process hazard analysis shall
be performed by a team with expertise
in engineering and process operations,
and the team shall include at least one
employee who has experience and
knowledge specific to the process being
evaluated. Also, one member of the
team must be knowledgeable in the
specific process hazard analysis
methodology being used.
(e) The owner or operator shall
establish a system to promptly address
the team's findings and
recommendations; assure that the
recommendations are resolved in a
timely manner and that the resolution is
documented; document what actions are
to be taken; complete actions as soon as
possible; develop a written schedule of
when these actions are to be completed;
communicate the actions to operating,
maintenance and other employees
whose work assignments are in the
process and who may be affected by the
recommendations or actions.
(f) At least every five (5) years after
the completion of the initial process
hazard analysis, the process hazard
analysis shall be updated and
revalidated by a team meeting the
requirements in paragraph (d) of this
section, to assure that the process
hazard analysis is consistent with the
current process. Updated and
revalidated process hazard analyses
completed to comply with 29 CFR
1910.119(e) are acceptable to meet the
requirements of this paragraph.
(g) The owner or operator shall retain
process hazards analyses and updates or
revalidations for each process covered
by this section, as well as the
documented resolution of
recommendations described in
paragraph (e) of this section for the life
of the process.
§68.69 Operating procedures.
(a) The owner or operator shall
develop and implement written
operating procedures that provide clear
instructions for safely conducting
activities involved in each covered
process consistent with the process
safety information and shall address at
least the following elements.
(1) Steps for each operating phase:
(i) Initial startup;
(ii) Normal operations;
(iii) Temporary operations;
(iv) Emergency shutdown including
the conditions under which emergency
shutdown is required, and the
assignment of shutdown responsibility
to qualified operators to ensure that
emergency shutdown is executed in a
safe and timely manner.
(v) Emergency operations;
(vi) Normal shutdown; and,
(vii) Startup following a turnaround,
or after an emergency shutdown.
(2) Operating limits:
(i) Consequences of deviation; and
(ii) Steps required to correct or avoid
deviation.
(3) Safety and health considerations:
(i) Properties of, and hazards
presented by, the chemicals used in the
process;
(ii) Precautions necessary to prevent
exposure, including engineering
controls, administrative controls, and
personal protective equipment;
(iii) Control measures to be taken if
physical contact or airborne exposure
occurs;
(iv) Quality control for raw materials
and control of hazardous chemical
inventory levels; and,
(v) Any special or unique hazards.
(4) Safety systems and their functions.
(b) Operating procedures shall be
readily accessible to employees who
work in or maintain a process.
(c) The operating procedures shall be
reviewed as often as necessary to assure
that they reflect current operating
practice, including changes that result
from changes in process chemicals,
technology, and equipment, and
changes to stationary sources. The
owner or operator shall certify annually
that these operating procedures are
current and accurate.
(d) The owner or operator shall
develop and implement safe work
practices to provide for the control of
hazards during operations such as
lockout/tagout; confined space entry;
opening process equipment or piping;
and control over entrance into a
stationary source by maintenance,
contractor, laboratory, or other support
personnel. These safe work practices
shall apply to employees and contractor
employees.
§68.71 Training.
(a) Initial training. (I) Each employee
presently involved in operating a
process, and each employee before
being involved in operating a newly
assigned process, shall be trained in an
overview of the process and in the
operating procedures as specified in
§ 68.69. The training shall include
emphasis on the specific safety and
health hazards, emergency operations
including shutdown, and safe work
practices applicable to the employee's
job tasks.
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31724 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations
(2) In lieu of initial training for those
employees already involved in
operating a process on June 21,1999 an
owner or operator may certify in writing
that the employee has the required
knowledge, skills, and abilities to safely
carry out the duties and responsibilities
as specified In the operating procedures.
(b) Refresher training. Refresher
training shall be provided at least every
three years, and more often if necessary,
to each employee involved in operating
a process to assure that the employee
understands and adheres to the current
operating procedures of the process. The
owner or operator, in consultation with
the employees involved in operating the
process, shall determine the appropriate
frequency of refresher training.
(c) Training documentation. The
owner or operator shall ascertain that
each employee involved in operating a
process has received and understood the
training required by this paragraph. The
owner or operator shall prepare a record
which contains the identity of the
employee, the date of training, and the
means used to verify that the employee
understood the training.
§68.73 Mechanical Integrity.
(a) Application. Paragraphs (b)
through (Q of this section apply to the
following process equipment:
(1) Pressure vessels and storage tanks;
(2) Piping systems (including piping
components such as valves);
(3) Relief and vent systems and
devices;
(4) Emergency shutdown systems;
(5) Controls (including monitoring
devices and sensors, alarms, and
interlocks) and,
(6) Pumps.
(b) Written procedures. The owner or
operator shall establish and implement
written procedures to maintain the on-
going Integrity of process equipment.
(c) Training for process maintenance
activities. The owner or operator shall
train each employee involved in
maintaining the on-going integrity of
process equipment in an overview of
that process and its hazards and in the
procedures applicable to the employee's
job tasks to assure that the employee can
perform the job tasks in a safe manner.
(d) Inspection and testing. (1)
Inspections and tests shall be performed
on process equipment.
(2) Inspection and testing procedures
shall follow recognized and generally
accepted good engineering practices.
(3) The frequency of inspections and
tests of process equipment shall be
consistent with applicable
manufacturers* recommendations and
good engineering practices, and more
frequently if determined to be necessary
by prior operating experience.
(4) The owner or operator shall
document each inspection and test that
has been performed on process
equipment. The documentation shall
identify the date of the inspection or
test, the name of the person who
performed the inspection or test, the
serial number or other identifier of the
equipment on which the inspection or
test was performed, a description of the
inspection or test performed, and the
results of the inspection or test.
(e) Equipment deficiencies. The
owner or operator shall correct
deficiencies in equipment that are
outside acceptable limits (defined by the
process safety information in § 68.65)
before further use or in a safe and timely
manner when necessary means are
taken to assure safe operation.
(f) Quality assurance. (1) In the
construction of new plants and
equipment, the owner or operator shall
assure that equipment as it is fabricated
is suitable for the process application
for which they will be used.
(2) Appropriate checks and
inspections shall be performed to assure
that equipment is installed properly and
consistent with design specifications
and the manufacturer's instructions.
(3) The owner or operator shall assure
that maintenance materials, spare parts
and equipment are suitable for the
process application for which they will
be used.
§ 68.75 Management of change.
(a) The owner or operator shall
establish and implement written
procedures to manage changes (except
for "replacements in kind") to process
chemicals, technology, equipment, and
procedures; and. changes to stationary
sources that affect a covered process.
(b) The procedures shall assure that
the following considerations are
addressed prior to any change:
(1) The technical basis for the
proposed change;
(2) Impact of change on safety and
health;
(3) Modifications to operating
procedures;
(4) Necessary time period for the
change; and,
(5) Authorization requirements for the
proposed change.
(c) Employees involved in operating a
process and maintenance and contract
employees whose job tasks will be
affected by a change in the process shall
be informed of, and trained in, the
change prior to start-up of the process
or affected part of the process.
(d) If a change covered by this
paragraph results in a change in the
process safety information required by
§ 68.65 of this part, such information
shall be updated accordingly.
(e) If a change covered by this
paragraph results in a change in the
operating procedures or practices
required by § 68.69, such procedures or
practices shall be updated accordingly.
§ 68.77 Pre-startup review.
(a) The owner or operator shall
perform a pre-startup safety review for
new stationary sources and for modified
stationary sources when the
modification is significant enough to
require a change in the process safety
information.
(b) The pre-startup safety review shall
confirm that prior to the introduction of
regulated substances to a process:
(1) Construction and equipment is in
accordance with design specifications;
(2) Safety, operating, maintenance,
and emergency procedures are in place
and are adequate;
(3) For new stationary sources, a
process hazard analysis has been
performed and recommendations have
been resolved or implemented before
startup; and modified stationary sources
meet the requirements contained in
management of change, §68.75.
(4) Training of each employee
involved in operating a process has been
completed.
§68.79 Compliance audits.
(a) The owner or operator shall certify
that they have evaluated compliance
with the provisions of this section at
least every three years to verify that the
procedures and practices developed
under the standard are adequate and arc
being followed.
(b) The compliance audit shall be
conducted by at least one person
knowledgeable in the process.
(c) A report of the findings of the;
audit shall be developed.
(d) The owner or operator shall
promptly determine and document an
appropriate response to each of the
findings of the compliance audit, and
document that deficiencies have been
corrected.
(e) The owner or operator shall retain
the two (2) most recent compliance
audit reports.
§68.81 Incident investigation.
(a) The owner or operator shall
investigate each incident which resulted
in, or could reasonably have resulted in
a catastrophic release of a regulated
substance.
(b) An incident investigation shall be
initiated as promptly as possible, but
not later than 48 hours following the
incident.
(c) An incident investigation team
shall be established and consist of at
least one person knowledgeable in the
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Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 31725
process involved, including a contract
employee if the incident involved work
of the contractor, and other persons
with appropriate knowledge and
experience to thoroughly investigate
and analyze the incident.
(d) A report shall be prepared at the
conclusion of the investigation which
includes at a minimum:
(1) Date of incident;
(2) Date investigation began;
(3) A description of the incident;
(4) The factors that contributed to the
incident; and,
(5) Any recommendations resulting
from the investigation.
(e) The owner or operator shall
establish a system to promptly address
and resolve the incident report findings
and recommendations. Resolutions and
corrective actions shall be documented.
(f) The report shall be reviewed with
all affected personnel whose job tasks
are relevant to the incident findings
including contract employees where
applicable.
(g) Incident investigation reports shall
be retained for five years.
§68.83 Employee participation.
(a) The owner or operator shall
develop a written plan of action
regarding the implementation of the
employee participation required by this
section.
(b) The owner or operator shall
consult with employees and their
representatives on the conduct and
development of process hazards
analyses and on the development of the
other elements of process safety
management in this rule.
(c) The owner or operator shall
provide to employees and their
representatives access to process hazard
analyses and to all other information
required to be developed under this
rule.
§ 68.85 Hot work permit.
(a) The owner or operator shall issue
a hot work permit for hot work
operations conducted on or near a
covered process.
(b) The permit shall document that
the fire prevention and protection
requirements in 29 CFR 1910.252(a)
have been implemented prior to
beginning the hot work operations; it
shall indicate the date(s) authorized for
hot work; and identify the' object on
which hot work is to be performed. The
permit shall be kept on file until
completion of the hot work operations.
§ 68.87 Contractors.
(a) Application. This section applies
to contractors performing maintenance
or repair, turnaround, major renovation,
or specialty work on or adjacent to a
covered process. It does not apply to
contractors providing incidental
services which do not influence process
safety, such as janitorial work, food and
drink services, laundry, delivery or
other supply services.
(b) Owner or operator responsibilities.
(1) The owner or operator, when
selecting a contractor, shall obtain and
evaluate information regarding the
contract owner or operator's safety
performance and programs.
(2) The owner or operator shall inform
contract owner or operator of the known
potential fire, explosion, or toxic release
hazards related to the contractor's work
and the process.
(3) The owner or operator shall
explain to the contract owner or
operator the applicable provisions of
subpart E of this part.
(4) The owner or operator shall
develop and implement safe work
practices consistent with §68.69(d), to
control the entrance, presence, and exit
of the contract owner or operator and
contract employees in covered process
areas.
(5) The owner or operator shall
periodically evaluate the performance of
the contract owner or operator in
fulfilling their obligations as specified
in paragraph (c) of this section.
(c) Contract owner or operator
responsibilities. (1) The contract owner
or operator shall assure that each
contract employee is trained in the work
practices necessary to safely perform
his/her job.
(2) The contract owner or operator
shall assure that each contract employee
is instructed in the known potential fire,
explosion, or toxic release hazards
related to his/her job and the process,
and the applicable provisions of the
emergency action plan.
(3) The contract owner or operator
shall document that each contract
employee has received and understood
the training required by this section.
The contract owner or operator shall
prepare a record which contains the
identity of the contract employee, the
date of training, and the means used to
verify that the employee understood the
training.
(4) The contract owner or operator
shall assure that each contract employee
follows the safety rules of the stationary
source including the safe work practices
required by § 68.69(d).
(5) The contract owner or operator
shall advise the owner or operator of
any unique hazards presented by the
contract owner or operator's work, or of
any hazards found by the contract
owner or operator's work.
11. Subpart E is added to read as
follows:
Subpart E—Emergency Response
Sec.
68.90 Applicability.
68.95 Emergency Response Program.
Subpart E—Emergency Response
§68.90 Applicability.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph
(b) of this section, the owner or operator
of a stationary source with Program 2
and Program 3 processes shall comply
with the requirements of § 68.95.
(b) The owner or operator of
stationary source whose employees will
not respond to accidental releases of
regulated substances need not comply
with §68.95 of this part provided that
they meet the following:
(1) For stationary sources with any
regulated toxic substance held in a
process above the threshold quantity,
the stationary source is included in the
community emergency response plan
developed under 42 U.S.C. 11003;
(2) For stationary sources with only
regulated flammable substances held in
a process above the threshold quantity,
the owner or operator has coordinated
response actions with the local fire
department; and
(3) Appropriate mechanisms are in
place to notify emergency responders
when there is a need for a response.
§68.95 Emergency response program.
(a) The owner or operator shall
develop and implement an emergency
response program for the purpose of
protecting public health and the
environment. Such program shall
include the following elements:
(1) An emergency response plan,
which shall be maintained at the
stationary source and contain at least
the following elements:
(i) Procedures for informing the
public and local emergency response
agencies about accidental releases;
(ii) Documentation of proper first-aid
and emergency medical treatment
necessary to treat accidental human
exposures; and
(iii) Procedures and measures for
emergency response after an accidental
release of a regulated substance;
(2) Procedures for the use of
emergency response equipment and for
its inspection, testing, and maintenance;
(3) Training for all employees in
relevant procedures; and
(4) Procedures to review and update,
as appropriate, the emergency response
plan to reflect changes at the stationary
source and ensure that employees are
informed of changes.
(b) A written plan that complies with
other Federal contingency plan
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31726 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations
regulations or Is consistent with the
approach in the National Response
Team's Integrated Contingency Plan
Guidance ("One Plan") and that, among
other matters, includes the elements
provided in paragraph (a) of this
section, shall satisfy the requirements of
this section if the owner or operator also
complies with paragraph (c) of this
section.
(c) The emergency response plan
developed under paragraph (a)(l) of this
section shall be coordinated with the
community emergency response plan
developed under 42 U.S.C. 11003. Upon
request of the local emergency planning
committee or emergency response
officials, the owner or operator shall
promptly provide to the local
emergency response officials
Information necessary for developing
and implementing the community
emergency response plan.
12. Subpart G is added to read as
follows:
Subpart G—Risk Management Plan
Sec,
68.150 Submission.
68 155 Executive summary.
G8.1GO Registration.
08,165 Offsite consequence analysis.
68,168 Five-year accident history.
68; 170 Prevention program/Program 2.
68,175 Prevention program/Program 3.
68,180 Emergency response program.
68,185 Certification,
68.100 Updates.
Subpart G—Risk Management Plan
§68.150 Submission.
(a) The owner or operator shall submit
a single RMP that includes the
information required by §§68.155
through 68.185 for all covered
processes. The RMP shall be submitted
in a method and format to a central
point as specified by EPA prior to June
21,1999.
(b) The owner or operator shall
submit the first RMP no later than the
latest of the following dates:
(1) June 21,1999:
(2) Three years after the date on
which a regulated substance is first
listed under §68.130; or
(3) The date on which a regulated
substance is first present above a
threshold quantity in a process.
(c) Subsequent submissions of RMPs
shall be in accordance with § 68.190.
(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of
§§ 68.155 to 68.190, the RMP sha 11
exclude classified information. Subject
to appropriate procedures to protect
such information from public
disclosure, classified data or
information excluded from the RMP
may be made available in a classified
annex to the RMP for review by Federal
and state representatives who have
received the appropriate security
clearances.
§ 68.155 Executive summary.
The owner or operator shall provide
in the RMP an executive summary that
includes a brief description of the
following elements:
(a) The accidental release prevention
and emergency response policies at the
stationary source;
(b) The stationary source and
regulated substances handled;
(c) The worst-case release scenario(s)
and the alternative release scenario(s),
including administrative controls and
mitigation measures to limit the
distances for each reported scenario;
(d) The general accidental release
prevention program and chemical-
specific prevention steps;
(e) The five-year accident history;
(f) The emergency response program;
and
(g) Planned changes to improve safety.
§ 68.160 Registration.
(a) The owner or operator shall
complete a single registration form and
include it in the RMP. The form shall
cover all regulated substances handled
in covered processes.
(b) The registration shall include the
following data:
(1) Stationary source name, street,
city, county, state, zip code, latitude,
and longitude;
(2) The stationary source Dun and
Bradstreet number;
(3) Name and Dun and Bradstreet
number of the corporate parent
company;
(4) The name, telephone number, and
mailing address of the owner or
operator;
(5) The name and title of the person
or position with overall responsibility
for RMP elements and implementation;
(6) The name, title, telephone number,
and 24-hour telephone number of the
emergency contact;
(7) For each covered process, the
name and CAS number of each
regulated substance held above the
threshold quantity in the process, the
maximum quantity of each regulated
substance or mixture in the process (in
pounds) to two significant digits, the
SIC code, and the Program level of the
process;
(8) The stationary source EPA
identifier;
(9) The number of full-time
employees at the stationary source;
(10) Whether the stationary source is
subject to 29 CFR 1910.119;
(11) Whether the stationary source is
subject to 40 CFR part 355;
(12) Whether the stationary source has
a CAA Title V operating permit; and
(13) The date of the last safety
inspection of the stationary source by a
Federal, state, or local government
agency and the identity of the
inspecting entity.
§ 68.165 Offsite consequence analysis.
(a) The owner or operator shall submit
in the RMP information:
(1) One worst-case release scenario for
each Program 1 process; and
(2) For Program 2 and 3 processes,
one worst-case release scenario to
represent all regulated toxic substances
held above the threshold quantity and
one worst-case release scenario to
represent all regulated flammable
substances held above the threshold
quantity. If additional worst-case
scenarios for toxics or fiammables are
required by §68.25(a)(2)(iii), the owner
or operator shall submit the same
information on the additional
scenario(s). The owner or operator of
Program 2 and 3 processes shall also
submit information on one alternative
release scenario for each regulated toxic
substance held above the threshold
quantity and one alternative release
scenario to represent all regulated
flammable substances held above the
threshold quantity.
(b) The owner or opnrator shall
submit the following data:
(1) Chemical name;
(2) Physical state (toxics only);
(3) Basis of results (give model name
if used);
(4) Scenario (explosion, fire, toxic gas
release, or liquid spill and
vaporization);
(5) Quantity released in pounds:
(6) Release rate;
(7) Release duration;
(8) Wind speed and atmospheric-
stability class (toxics only);
(9) Topography (toxics only);
(10) Distance to endpoint;
(11) Public and environmental
receptors within the distance;
(12) Passive mitigation considered;
and
(13) Active mitigation considered
(alternative releases only);
§ 68.168 Five-year accident history.
The owner or operator shall submit in
the RMP the information provided in
§68.42(b) on each accident covered by
§68.42(a).
§ 68.170 Prevention program/Program 2.
(a) For each Program 2 process, the
owner or operator shall provide in the
RMP the information indicated in
paragraphs (b) through (k) of this
section. If the same information applies
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Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 31727
to more than one covered process, the
owner or operator may provide the
information only once, but shall
indicate to which processes the
information applies.
(b) The SIC code for the process.
(c) The name(s) of the chemical(s)
covered.
(d) The date of the most recent review
or revision of the safety information and
a list of Federal or state regulations or
industry-specific design codes and
standards used to demonstrate
compliance with the safety information
requirement.
(e) The date of completion of the most
recent hazard review or update.
(1) The expected date of completion
of any changes resulting from the hazard
review;
(2) Major hazards identified;
(3) Process controls in use;
(4) Mitigation systems in use;
(5) Monitoring and detection systems
in use; and
(6) Changes since the last hazard
review.
(f) The date of the most recent review
or revision of operating procedures.
(g) The date of the most recent review
or revision of training programs;
(1) The type of training provided—
classroom, classroom plus on the job, on
the job; and
(2) The type of competency testing
used.
(h) The date of the most recent review
or revision of maintenance procedures
and the date of the most recent
equipment inspection or test and the
equipment inspected or tested.
(i) The date of the most recent
compliance audit and the expected date
of completion of any changes resulting
from the compliance audit.
(j) The date of the most recent
incident investigation and the expected
date of completion of any changes
resulting from the investigation.
(k) The date of the most recent change
that triggered a review or revision of
safety information, the hazard review,
operating or maintenance procedures, or
training.
§68.175 Prevention program/Program 3.
(a) For each Program 3 process, the
owner or operator shall provide the
information indicated in paragraphs (b)
through (p) of this section-. If the same
information applies to more than one
covered process, the owner or operator
may provide the information only once,
but shall indicate to which processes
the information applies.
(b) The SIC code for the process.
(c) The name(s) of the substance(s)
covered.
(d) The date on which the safety
information was last reviewed or
revised.
(e) The date of completion of the most
recent PHA or update and the technique
used.
(1) The expected date of completion
of any changes resulting from the PHA;
(2) Major hazards identified;
(3) Process controls in use;
(4) Mitigation systems in use;
(5) Monitoring and detection systems
in use; and
(6) Changes since the last PHA.
(f) The date of the most recent review
or revision of operating procedures.
(g) The date of the most recent review
or revision of training programs;
(1) The type of training provided—
classroom, classroom plus on the job, on
the job; and
(2) The type of competency testing
used.
(h) The date of the most recent review
or revision of maintenance procedures
and the date of the most recent
equipment inspection or test and the
equipment inspected or tested.
(i) The date of the most recent change
that triggered management of change
procedures and the date of the most
recent review or revision of
management of change procedures.
(j) The date of the most recent pre-
startup review.
(k) The date of the most recent
compliance audit and the expected date
of completion of any changes resulting
from the compliance audit;
(1) The date of the most recent
incident investigation and the expected
date of completion of any changes
resulting from the investigation;
(m) The date of the most recent
review or revision of employee
participation plans;
(n) The date of the most recent review
or revision of hot work permit
procedures;
(o) The date of the most recent review
or revision of contractor safety
procedures; and
(p) The date of the most recent
evaluation of contractor safety
performance.
§ 68.180 Emergency response program.
(a) The owner or operator shall
provide in the RMP the following
information:
(1) Do you have a written emergency
response plan?
(2) Does the plan include specific
actions to be taken in response to an
accidental releases of a regulated
substance?
(3) Does the plan include procedures
for informing the public and local
agencies responsible for responding to
accidental releases?
(4) Does the plan include information
on emergency health care?
(5) The date of the most recent review
or update of the emergency response
plan;
(6) The date of the most recent
emergency response training for
employees.
(b) The owner or operator shall
provide the name and telephone
number of the local agency with which
the plan is coordinated.
(c) The owner or operator shall list
other Federal or state emergency plan
requirements to which the stationary
source is subject.
§68.185 Certification.
(a) For Program 1 processes, the
owner or operator shall submit in the
RMP the certification statement
provided in §68.12(b)(4).
(b) For all other covered processes,
the owner or operator shall submit in
the RMP a single certification that, to
the best of the signer's knowledge,
information, and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry, the information
submitted is true, accurate, and
complete.
§68.190 Updates.
(a) The owner or operator shall review
and update the RMP as specified in
paragraph (b) of this section and submit
it in a method and format to a central
point specified by EPA prior to June 21,
1999.
(b) The owner or operator of a
stationary source shall revise and
update the RMP submitted under
§68.150 as follows:
(1) Within five years of its initial
submission or most recent update
required by paragraphs (b) (2) through
(b)(7) of this section, whichever is later.
(2) No later than three years after a
newly regulated substance is first listed
by EPA;
(3) No later than the date on which a
new regulated substance is first present
in an already covered process above a
threshold quantity;
(4) No later than the date on which a
regulated substance is first present
above a threshold quantity in a new
process;
(5) Within six months of a change that
requires a revised PHA or hazard
review;
(6) Within six months of a change that
requires a revised offsite consequence
analysis as provided in § 68.36; and
(7) Within six months of a change that
alters the Program level that applied to
any covered process.
(c) If a stationary source is no longer
subject to this part, the owner or
operator shall submit a revised
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31728 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations
registration to EPA within six months
indicating that the stationary source is
no longer covered.
13. Subpart H is added to read as
follows:
Subpart H—Other Requirements
Sec.
§68,200 Recordkeeping.
§68=210 Availability of information to the
public.
68,215 Permit content and air permitting
authority or designated agency
requirements.
68,220 Audits.
Subpart H—Other Requirements
§68.200 Recordkecplng.
The owner or operator shall maintain
records supporting the implementation
of this part for five years unless
otherwise provided in Subpart D of this
part.
§68.210 Availability of information to the
public.
(a) The RMP required under subpart
G of this part shall be available to the
public under 42 U.S.C. 7414(c).
(b) The disclosure of classified
information by the Department of
Defense or other Federal agencies or
contractors of such agencies shall be
controlled by applicable laws,
regulations, or executive orders
concerning the release of classified
information.
§ 68.215 Permit content and air permitting
authority or designated agency
requirements.
(a) These requirements apply to any
stationary source subject to this part 68
and parts 70 or 71 of this Chapter. The
40 CFR part 70 or part 71 permit for the
stationary source shall contain:
(1) A statement listing this part as an
applicable requirement:
(2) Conditions that require the source
owner or operator to submit:
(0 A compliance schedule for meeting
the requirements of this part by the date
provided in § 68.10(a) or;
(11) As part of the compliance
certification submitted under 40 CFR
70.6(c)C>), a certification statement that
the source Is in compliance with all
requirements of this part, including the
registration and submission of the RMP.
(b) The owner or operator shall
submit any additional relevant
Information requested by the air
permitting authority or designated
agency.
(c) For 40 CFR part 70 or part 71
permits issued prior to the deadline for
registering and submitting the RMP and
which do not contain permit conditions
described in paragraph (a) of this
section, the owner or operator or air
permitting authority shall initiate
permit revision or reopening according
to the procedures of 40 CFR 70.7 or 71.7
to incorporate the terms and conditions
consistent with paragraph (a) of this
section.
(d) The state may delegate the
authority to implement and enforce the
requirements of paragraph (e) of this
section to a state or local agency or
agencies other than the air permitting
authority. An up-to-date copy of any
delegation instrument shall be
maintained by the air permitting
authority. The state may enter a written
agreement with the Administrator under
which EPA will implement and enforce
the requirements of paragraph (e) of this
section.
(e) The air permitting authority or the
agency designated by delegation or
agreement under paragraph (d) of this
section shall, at a minimum:
(1) Verify that the source owner or
operator has registered and submitted
an RMP or a revised plan when required
by this part;
(2) Verify that the source owner or
operator has submitted a source
certification or in its absence has
submitted a compliance schedule
consistent with paragraph (a) (2) of this
section;
(3) For some or all of the sources
subject to this section, use one or more
mechanisms such as, but not limited to,
a completeness check, source audits,
record reviews, or facility inspections to
ensure that permitted sources are in
compliance with the requirements of
this part; and
(4) Initiate enforcement action based
on paragraphs (e)(l) and (e)(2) of this
section as appropriate.
§68.220 Audits.
(a) In addition to inspections for the
purpose of regulatory development and
enforcement of the Act, the
implementing agency shall periodically
audit RMPs submitted under subpart G
of this part to review the adequacy of
such RMPs and require revisions of
RMPs when necessary to ensure
compliance with subpart G of this part.
(b) The implementing agency shall
select stationary sources for audits
based on any of the following criteria:
(1) Accident history of the stationary
source;
(2) Accident history of other
stationary sources in the same industry;
(3) Quantity of regulated substances
present at the stationary source;
(4) Location of the stationary source
and its proximity to the public and
environmental receptors;
(5) The presence of specific regulated
substances;
(6) The hazards identified in the RMP;
and
(7) A plan providing for neutral,
random oversight.
(c) Exemption from audits. A
stationary source with a Star or Merit
ranking under OSHA's voluntary
protection program shall be exempt
from audits under paragraph (b)(2) and
(b) (7) of this section.
(d) The implementing agency shall
have access to the stationary source,
supporting documentation, and any area
where an accidental release could occur.
(e) Based on the audit, the
implementing agency may issue the
owner or operator of a stationary source
a written preliminary determination of
necessary revisions to the stationary
source's RMP to ensure that the RMP
meets the criteria of subpart G of this
part. The preliminary determination
shall include an explanation for the
basis for the revisions, reflecting
industry standards and guidelines (such
as AIChE/CCPS guidelines and ASME
and API standards) to the extent that
such standards and guidelines are
applicable, and shall include a timetable
for their implementation.
(f) Written response to a preliminary
determination.
(1) The owner or operator shall
respond in writing to a preliminary
determination made in accordance with
paragraph (e) of this section. The
response shall state the owner or
operator will implement the revisions
contained in the preliminary
determination in accordance with the
timetable included in the preliminary
determination or shall state that the
owner or operator rejects the revisions
in whole or in part. For each rejected
revision, the owner or operator shall
explain the basis for rejecting such
revision. Such explanation may include
substitute revisions.
(2) The written response under
paragraph (f)(l) of this section shall be
received by the implementing agency
within 90 days of the issue of the
preliminary determination or a shorter
period of time as the implementing
agency specifies in the preliminary
determination as necessary to protect
public health and the environment.
Prior to the written response being due
and upon written request from the
owner or operator, the implementing
agency may provide in writing
additional time for the response to be
received.
(g) After providing the owner or
operator an opportunity to respond
under paragraph (f) of this section, the
implementing agency may issue the
owner or operator a written final
determination of necessary revisions to
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Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 31729
the stationary source's RMP. The final
determination may adopt or modify the
revisions contained in the preliminary
determination under paragraph (e) of
this section or may adopt or modify the
substitute revisions provided in the
response under paragraph (f) of this
section. A final determination that
adopts a revision rejected by the owner
or operator shall include an explanation
of the basis for the revision. A final
determination that fails to adopt a
substitute revision provided under
paragraph (f) of this section shall
include an explanation of the basis for
finding such substitute revision
unreasonable.
(h) Thirty days after completion of the
actions detailed in the implementation
schedule set in the final determination
under paragraph (g) of this section, the
owner or operator shall be in violation
of subpart G of this part and this section
unless the owner or operator revises the
RMP prepared under subpart G of this
part as required by the final
determination, and submits the revised
RMP as required under §68.150.
(i) The public shall have access to the
preliminary determinations, responses,
and final determinations under this
section in a manner consistent with
§68.210.
(j) Nothing in this section shall
preclude, limit, or interfere in any way
with the authority of EPA or the state to
exercise its enforcement, investigatory,
and information gathering authorities
concerning this part under the Act.
14. Part 68 Appendix A is added to
read as follows:
APPENDIX A TO PART 68—TABLE OF Toxic ENDPOINTS
[As defined in §68.22 of this part]
CAS No.
1 07-02-8
1 07-1 3-1
814-68-6
1 07-1 8-6
107-11-9
7664-41-7
7664-41-7
7784-34-1
7784-42-1
10294-34-5
7637-07-2
353-42-4
7726-95-6
75_15_0
7782-50-5
1 0049-04-4
67 66 3
542-88-1
107-30-2
4170-30 3
1 23-73-9
506-77-4
108 91 8
1 9287—45—7
75—78 5
57 14 7
1 06—89—8
1 07 1 5—3
151 56-4
7*^—91— ft
7700 4i_4
50—00—0
1 1 ri— fin— Q
Qfjo_ni o
7RA7 O1 — O
74— QO— ft
7RA7— fi1— O
7697-37-2
Chemical name
Acrolein [2-Propenal]
Acrylonitrile [2-Propsnenitrile]
Acryly! chloride [2-Propenoyl chloride]
Allyl alcohol [2-Propen-1-ol]
Allylamine [2-Propen-1-amine] . .
Ammonia (anhydrous) .
Ammonia (cone 20% or greater) ..
Arsenous trichloride
Arsine
Boron trichloride [Borane trichloro-]
Boron trifluoride [Borane trifluoro-]
Boron trifluoride compound with methyl ether (1"1) [Boron trifluoro{oxybis[methane]]-, T-4
Bromine
Carbon disulfide
Chlorine
Chlorine dioxide [Chlorine oxide (CIO2)]
Chloroform [Methane trichloro-] . .
Chloromethyl ether [Methane oxybis[chloro-]
Chloromethyl methyl ether [Methane, chloromethoxy-]
Crotonaldehyde [2-Butenal]
Crotonaldehyde (E)- [2-Butenal (E)-]
Cyanogen chloride
Cyclohexylamine [Cyclohexanamine]
Diborane
Dimethyldichlorosilane [Silane dichlorodimethyl-]
1 1 -Dimethylhydrazine [Hydrazine 1 1-dimethyl-] .
Epichlorohydrin [Oxirane (Chloromethyl)-] .
Ethylenediamine [1 2-Ethanediamine] -
Ethyleneimine [Aziridine]
Ethylene oxide [Oxirane]
Formaldehyde (solution)
Furan •
Hydrochloric acid (cone 30% or greater)
Hydrocyanic acid
Hydrogen chloride (anhydrous) [Hydrochloric acid]
Hydrogen fluoride/Hydrofluoric acid (cone 50% or greater) [Hydrofluoric acid]
Hydrogen sulfide
Iron pentacarbonyl- [Iron carbonyl (Fe(CO)5) (TB— 5— 11)-]
Isobutyronitrile [Propanenitrile 2-methyl-]
Isopropyl chloroformate [Carbonochloride acid 1-methylethyl ester]
Methacrylonitrile [2-Propenenitrile 2-methyl-]
Methyl chloride [Methane chloro-]
Methyl chloroformate [Carbonochloridic acid methylester]
Methyl mercaptan [Methanethiol]
i Methyl thiocyanate [Thiocyanic acid methyl ester]
Methyltrichlorosilane [Silane trichloromethyl-] -
Nickel carbonyl
Nitric acid (cone 80% or greater)
Toxic
endpoint
(mg/L)
0.001 1
0.076
0 00090
0 036
00032
0 14
0 14
0.010
0.0019
0.010
0.028
0.023
0.0065
0.16
0.0087
0.0028
049
0.00025
0.0018
0.029
0.029
0.030
0.16
0.001 1
0.026
0.012
0.076
0.49
0.018
0.090
0.0039
0.012
0.0012
0.011
0.030
0.011
0.030
0.016
0.00066
0.042
0.00044
0.14
0.10
0.0027
0.82
0.0019
0.0094
0.0012
0.049
0.085
0.018
0.00067
0.026
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31730 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday. June 20. 1996 / Rules and Regulations
APPENDIX A TO PART 68—TABLE OF Toxic ENDPOINTS—Continued
[As defined in §68.22 of this part]
CAS No.
10102-43-9
8014-95-7
79-21-0 .,
594-42-3
75-44-5
7803-51-2
10025-87-3
7719-12-2
1 10-89-4 ,
107-12-0
109-61-5
75-55-8
75-55-9 „ .,
7446-09-5
7783-60-0
7446-11-9
75-74-1 .
509-14-8
7750-45-0
5g4_84-9
91-08-7
26471-62-5
75-77-4
108-05-4
Chemical name
Nitric oxide [Nitrogen oxide (NO)] . ...
Oleum (Fuming Sulfuric acid) [Sulfuric acid mixture with sulfur trioxide]
Peracetic acid [Ethaneperoxoic acid]
Perchloromethylmercaptan [Methanesulfenyl chloride trichloro-]
Phosgene [Carbonic dichloride]
Phosphine
Phosphorus oxychloride [Phosphoryl chloride]
Phosphorus trichloride [Phosphorous trichloride]
Piperldine
Propionitrile [Propanenitrile]
Propyl chloroformate [Carbonochloridic acid, propylester]
Propyleneimine [Aziridine, 2-methyl-]
Propylene oxide [Oxirane methyl-]
Sulfur dioxide (anhydrous)
Sulfur tetrafluoride [Sulfur fluoride (SF4) (T-4)-]
Sulfur trioxide
Tetramethyllead [Plumbane, tetramethyl-]
Tetranitromethane [Methane, tetranitro-]
Titanium tetrachloride [Titanium chloride (TiCI4) (T-4)-] . . .
Toluene 2,4-diisocyanate [Benzene 2 4-diisocyanato-l -methyl-]
Toluene 2,6-diisocyanate [Benzene 1 3-diisocyanato-2-methyl-]
Toluene diisocyanate (unspecified isomer) [Benzene, 1 ,3-diisocyanatomethyl-]
Trimethylchlorosilane [Silane, chlorotrimethyl-]
Vinyl acetate monomer [Acetic acid ethenyl ester]
Toxic
endpoint
(mg/L)
0031
0 010
0 0045
0 0076
0 00081
00035
00030
0028
0022
0 0037
0 010
0 12
0 59
00078
00092
0010
00040
00040
0020
00070
00070
00070
0.050
026
|FR Doc, 96-14597 Filed 6-19-96; 8:45 am]
DIU.WO CODE 8560-SO-M
40CFRPart68
[FRL-5516-6]
List of Regulated Substances and
Thresholds for Accidental Release
Prevention; Rnal Rule—Stay of
Effectiveness
AGENCY: Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA).
ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY: On April 15,1996, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
proposed several modifications to
provisions of the rule listing regulated
substances and establishing threshold
quantities under section 112(r) of the
Clean Air Act as amended (List Rule
Amendments). The proposed List Rule
Amendments, if promulgated in a final
rule, would clarify or establish that part
68 does not apply to several types of
processes and sources. In addition, EPA
proposed, pursuant to Clean Air Act
section 301 (a)(1), 42 U.S.C. 7601 (a)(l),
to stay the effectiveness of provisions
thai would be affected by the proposed
List Rule Amendments, for so long as
necessary to take final action on the
proposed List Rule Amendments. EPA
received no adverse public comment on
the short-term stay. Today EPA is
amending part 68 to promulgate the
stay, under which owners and operators
of processes and sources that EPA has
proposed not be subject to part 68
would not become subject to part 68
until EPA has determined whether to
proceed with the List Rule
Amendments. The effect of today's
action will be to give owners and
operators of sources affected by the
proposed List Rule Amendments the
same amount of time to achieve
compliance with the requirements of
part 68 as owners and operators of other
sources in the event that EPA does not
proceed with the List Rule Amendments
as proposed.
EFFECTIVE DATE: June 20, 1996.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Vanessa Rodriguez, Chemical Engineer,
Chemical Emergency Preparedness and
Prevention Office, Environmental
Protection Agency (5101), 401 M St.
SW., Washington, DC 20460, (202) 260-
7913.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background and Discussion
On April 15, 1996, EPA proposed
amendments to regulations in 40 CFR
part 68 that, inter alia, list regulated
substances and establish threshold
quantities for the accident prevention
provisions under Clean Air Act section
112(r). 61 FR 16598. Readers should
refer to that document for a complete
discussion of the background of the rule
affected. The amendments proposed in
that document ("List Rule
Amendments") would, if promulgated,
delete explosives from the list of
regulated substances, modify threshold
provisions to exclude flammable
substances in gasoline and in naturally
occurring hydrocarbon mixtures prior to
entry into a processing unit or plant,
modify the threshold provisions for
other flammable mixtures, and clarify
the definition of stationary source with
respect to transportation, storage
incident to transportation, and naturally
occurring hydrocarbon reservoirs.
On the same date, EPA proposed to
stay provisions of part 68 that were
affected by the proposed List Rule
Amendments until such time as EPA
takes final action on the proposed List
Rule Amendments. 61 FR 16606. EPA
proposed a stay of 18 months because it
believed such a period would be
sufficient to take final action on the List
Rule Amendments and believed that
owners and operators affected by the
List Rule Amendments should have the
same certainty about whether they are
subject to part 68 as owners and
operators of other sources have when
they begin their regulatory compliance
planning. In general, owners and
operators of sources subject to the "Risk
Management Program" final rule
promulgated elsewhere in today's
Federal Register, have three years from
today to achieve compliance with part
68.
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Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20. 1996 / Rules and Regulations 31731
EPA received seven comment letters
on the proposed stay; all generally
supported EPA's action. The Agency's
response to comments is contained
below. Three commenters suggested that
EPA should promulgate a stay for so
long as it takes the Agency to take final
action on the List Rule Amendments
rather than for a certain (18 month) time
period. The 18 month time period was
selected to be consistent with the time
period provided for final action on
amendments discussed in the settlement
of litigation concerning the List Rule.
EPA believes this time will be sufficient
to take any necessary action. Another
commenter expressed concern that the
stay would not affect statutory deadlines
for seeking judicial review of the final
Risk Management Program rule. EPA
has not taken final action on the Risk
Management Program rule's
applicability to stationary sources,
mixtures containing regulated
flammable substances, and regulated
explosive substances that are subject to
today's stay. In the event that the
Agency does not promulgate the List
Rule Amendments, the Agency intends
to take final action on applying the Risk
Management Program to the sources,
mixtures, and substances to be
regulated. In the absence of final action
on the Risk Management Program mic-
as it applies to these sources, mixtures,
and substances, a petition seeking
review of that rule would be premature.
Under the provisions of section
307(b)(l) of the Clean Air Act, a petition
for judicial review of this stay may only
be filed in the United States Court of
Appeals for District of Columbia Circuit
within 60 days of today's publication of
this action.
II. Required Analyses
A. E.O. 12866
Under Executive Order 12866 (58 FR
51735, October 4, 1993), the Agency
must judge whether the regulatory
action is "significant," and therefore
subject to Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) review and the
requirements of the Executive Order.
The Order defines a "significant
regulatory action" as one that is likely
to result in a rule that may:
(1) Have an annual effect on the
economy of $100 million or more or
adversely affect in a material way the
economy, a sector of the economy,
productivity, jobs, the environment,
public health or safety, or state, local, or
tribal government or communities',
(2) Create a serious inconsistency or
otherwise interfere with an action taken
or planned by another agency;
(3) Materially alter the budgetary
impact of entitlements, grants, user fees,
or loan programs or the rights and
obligations of recipients thereof; or
(4) Raise novel legal or policy issues
arising out of legal mandates, the
President's priorities, or the principles
set forth in the Executive Order.
It has been determined this final rule
is not a "significant regulatory action"
under the terms of Executive Order
12866 and therefore is not subject to
OMB review.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
In accordance with the Regulatory
Flexibility Act of 1980, Federal agencies
must evaluate the effects of this final
rule on small entities and examine
alternatives that may reduce these
effects. EPA has examined this final
rule's potential effects on small entities
as required by the Regulatory Flexibility
Act. It has determined that this rule will
have no adverse effect on small entities
because it defers the need for stationary
sources to comply with current rule
provisions that EPA has proposed to
amend; the amendments, if adopted,
likely would reduce the number of
stationary sources subject to the
accidental release prevention
requirements. Therefore, I certify that
today's final stay of effectiveness rule
will not have a significant economic
effect on a substantial number of small
entities.
C. Paperwork Reduction Act
This final rule does not include any
information collection requirements for
OMB to review under the provisions of
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980,
44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.
D. Unfunded Mandates
Under section 202 of the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995, signed
into law on March 22, 1995, EPA must
prepare a statement to accompany any
rule where the estimated costs to State,
local, or tribal governments in the
aggregate, or to the private sector, will
be $100 million or more in any one year.
Under section 205, EPA must select the
most cost-effective and least
burdensome alternative that achieves
the objective of the rule and is
consistent with statutory requirements.
Section 203 requires EPA to establish a
plan for informing and advising any
small governments that may be
significantly impacted by the rule.
EPA has estimated that this rule does
not include a Federal mandate that may
result in estimated costs of $100 million
or more to either State, local, or tribal
governments in the aggregate, or to the
private sector.
E. Submission to Congress and the
General Accounting Office
Under section 801 (a) (1) (A) of the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA) as
amended by the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of
1996, EPA submitted a report containing
this rule and other required information
to the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of
Representatives and the Comptroller
General of the General Accounting
Office prior to publication of the rule in
today's Federal Register. This rule is
not a "major rule" as defined by section
804(2) of the APA as amended.
List of Subjects in 40 CFR Part 68
Environmental protection, Chemicals,
Chemical accident prevention, Clean
Air Act, Extremely hazardous
substances, Intergovernmental relations,
Hazardous substances, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
Dated: May 24, 1996.
Carol M Browner,
Administrator.
For the reasons set out in the
preamble, Title 40, Chapter I,
Subchapter C, Part 68 of the Code of
Federal Regulations is amended to read
as follows:
PART 68—ACCIDENTAL RELEASE
PREVENTION PROVISIONS
1. The authority citation for Part 68
continues to read as follows:
Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7412(r), 7601.
2. In Subpart A, Sec. 68.2 is added to
read as follows:
§ 68.2 Stayed Provisions.
(a) Notwithstanding any other
provision of this part, the effectiveness
of the following provisions is stayed
from March 2, 1994 to December 22,
1997.
(1) In Sec. 68.3, the definition of
"stationary source," to the extent that
such definition includes naturally
occurring hydrocarbon reservoirs or
transportation subject to oversight or
regulation under a state natural gas or
hazardous liquid program for which the
state has in effect a certification to DOT
under 49 U.S.C. 60105;
(2) Section 68.115 (b) (2) of this part, to
the extent that such provision requires
an owner or operator to treat as a
regulated flammable substance:
(i) Gasoline, when in distribution or
related storage for use as fuel for
internal combustion engines;
(ii) Naturally occurring hydrocarbon
mixtures prior to entry into a petroleum
refining process unit or a natural gas
processing plant. Naturally occurring
hydrocarbon mixtures include any of
-------
31732 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Rules and Regulations
the following: condensate, crude oil,
field gas, and produced water, each as
defined in paragraph (b) of this section;
(111) Other mixtures that contain a
regulated flammable substance and that
do not have a National Fire Protection
Association flammability hazard rating
of 4, the definition of which is in the
NFPA 704, Standard System for the
Identification of the Fire Hazards of
Materials, National Fire Protection
Association, Quincy, MA, 1990,
available from the National Fire
Protection Association, 1 Batterymarch
Park. Quincy, MA 02269-9101; and
(3) Section 68.130(a).
(b) From March 2,1994 to December
22,1997, the following definitions shall
apply to the stayed provisions described
in paragraph (a) of this section:
Condensate means hydrocarbon
liquid separated from natural gas that
condenses because of changes in
temperature, pressure, or both, and
remains liquid at standard conditions.
Crude oil means any naturally
occurring, unrefined petroleum liquid.
Field gas means gas extracted from a
production well before the gas enters a
natural gas processing plant.
Natural gas processing plant means
any processing site engaged in the
extraction of natural gas liquids from
field gas, fractionation of natural gas
liquids to natural gas products, or both.
A separator, dehydration unit, heater
treater, sweetening unit, compressor, or
similar equipment shall not be
considered a "processing site" unless
such equipment is physically located
within a natural gas processing plant
(gas plant) site.
Petroleum refining process unit
means a process unit used in an
establishment primarily engaged in
petroleum refining as defined in the
Standard Industrial Classification code
for petroleum refining (2911) and used
for the following: Producing
transportation fuels (such as gasoline,
diesel fuels, and jet fuels), heating fuels
(such as kerosene, fuel gas distillate,
and fuel oils), or lubricants; separating
petroleum; or separating, cracking,
reacting, or reforming intermediate
petroleum streams. Examples of such
units include, but are not limited to,
petroleum based solvent units,
alkylation units, catalytic hydrotreating,
catalytic hydrorefining, catalytic
hydrocracking, catalytic reforming,
catalytic cracking, crude distillation,
lube oil processing, hydrogen
production, isomerization,
polymerization, thermal processes, and
blending, sweetening, and treating
processes. Petroleum refining process
units include sulfur plants..
Produced water means water
extracted from the earth from an oil or
natural gas production well, or that is
separated from oil or natural gas after
extraction.
[FR Doc. 96-14636 Filed 6-19-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560-50-P
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Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 120 / Thursday, June 20, 1996 / Notices
31733
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY
[FRL-5517-1]
Accidental Release Prevention
Requirements: Risk Management
Programs Under Section 112(r)(7) of
the Clean Air Act as Amended;
Guidances
AGENCY: Environmental Protection
Agency.
ACTION: Notice of availability.
SUMMARY: Section 112(r)(7) of the Clean
Air Act (CAA), as amended, requires the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
to develop guidance documents,
including model risk management
plans, to assist stationary sources in the
development of risk management
programs. EPA is issuing three guidance
documents that are available for review
in Docket No. A-91-73 Category VIII-A:
"RMP Offslte Consequence Analysis
Guidance"; "Model Risk Management
Program and Plan for Ammonia
Refrigeration" and "Risk Management
Plan Data Elements." The Agency views
the Guidances issued today as
"evergreen" documents and is
interested in continued dialogue on the
Guidances with interested members of
the public. The Agency anticipates it
will revise and update these Guidances
from time to time as stakeholders and
the Agency proceed in implementing
the Risk Management Program
regulations.
ADDRESSES:
Docket. These documents are in
Docket A-91-73 Category VIII-A and
available for public inspection and
copying between 8:00 a.m. and 5:30
p.m., Monday through Friday, including
all non-Governmental holidays, at EPA's
Air and Radiation Docket and
Information Center, room M1500, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency
(6102), 401 M Street S.W., Washington,
D.C. 20460.
Electronic Access. These documents
can be accessed in electronic format
through the Internet system and through
EPA's Technology Transfer Network
(TTN), a network of electronic bulletin
boards operated by the Office of Air
Quality Planning and Standards. The
Internet address of EPA's gopher server
is GOPHER.EPA.GOV. This information
is also available using File Transfer
Protocol (FTP) on FTP.EPA.GOV or
using World Wide Web (WWW) (http:/
7www.epa.gov/swercepp/). The TTN
service is free, except for the cost of .a
phone call. To access the TTN, dial
(919) 541-5742 for up to a 14,400 bits
per second (bps) modem. If more
information on TTN is needed, contact
the systems operator at (919) 541-5382.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
technical information on the "Model
Risk Management Program and Plan for
Ammonia Refrigeration" and "Risk
Management Plan Data Elements,"
contact Dr. Lyse Helsing, at (202) 260-
6128. For technical information on the
—"MP Offsite Consequence Analysis
Guidance," contact Craig Matthiessen,
at (202) 260-9781. To obtain copies of
these documents, please FAX requests
to the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Information
Hotline (Hotline) at (703) 412-3333. The
Hotline is also available to answer
questions at (800) 535-0202 or (703)
412-9877 when calling from local
Washington, D.C. area.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: EPA
announces the availability of Guidances
that will assist stationary sources in
complying with the provisions of the
regulations implementing CAA section
112(r)(7)(B), part 68, including the
requirement to prepare risk management
plans. The documents made available
today are guidances and do not create
any obligations on the part of entities
subject to part 68. These Guidances do
not substitute for EPA's regulations, nor
are they regulations themselves. The
Guidances do not impose legally
binding requirements on EPA, States, or
the regulated community, and may not
apply to a particular situation based
upon the circumstances. EPA may
change these Guidances in the future, as
appropriate.
Elsewhere in today's Federal Register,
EPA has promulgated Risk Management
Program regulations under part 68 in
order to implement CAA section
112(r)(7). For information on these
regulations, please see the above-
referenced notice. Furthermore, for
information on chemicals, sources, and
processes subject to part 68, please see
40 CFR part 68 and the notice
establishing these provisions (59 FR
4478, January 31, 1994). Finally, readers
should note that, elsewhere in today's
Federal Register, EPA has promulgated
a stay of certain provisions of part 68
promulgated in the January 1994
rulemaking.
The "RMP Offsite Consequence
Analysis Guidance" contains all the
methodologies and reference tables that
will be necessary to develop and
analyze the consequences of worst case
and alternative case scenarios for part
68. This Guidance is designed to help
those sources subject to part 68 comply
with the offsite consequence
requirements without specific expertise
or access to computer-based and more
sophisticated modeling tools. Sources
will be able to use the modeling results
contained in this Guidance or other
appropriate modeling results in
complying with part 68.
The "Model Risk Management
Program and Plan for Ammonia
Refrigeration" is a model program and
plan that will help owners and
operators of ammonia refrigeration
facilities comply with part 68. The
Guidance includes a section on hazard
assessment and on emergency response,
and four appendices: (A) selection of
scenarios; (B) background information
on ammonia modeling; (C) effect of
ammonia releases on structures; and (D)
information about accidental ammonia
releases.
EPA views both of the above-
mentioned Guidances to be "evergreen."
That is, while EPA is issuing these
Guidances today, EPA will continue to
seek public input and revise these
documents as appropriate.
Part 68 requires the submission of risk
management plans in a form and
manner to be specified by EPA. The
Risk Management Data Elements maps
out the kinds of information that would
be submitted by each source as its risk
management plan. The draft includes an
executive summary, registration, data on
worst case and alternative releases for
toxics and for flammables, five-year
accident history, prevention program,
and emergency response program. Like
the other Guidances today, EPA intends
to continue to seek public input on the
format of submittal of the data required
by part 68. In particular, EPA will study
new methods for information submittal
and public access to such information
when it develops the information
collection.
Dated: May 31, 1996.
Jim Makris,
Director, Chemical Emergency Preparedness
and Prevention Office.
[FR Doc. 96-14627 Filed 6-19-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560-50-P
-------
United States
Environmental Protection Agency
(5101)
Washington, DC 20460
Official Business
Penalty for Private Use
$300
------- |