vvEPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Office of Water &
Waste Management
Washington D.C. 20460
SW809
Solid Waste
November 1979
&?kS 000809
Siting of Hazardous Waste
Management Facilities
and Public Opposition
V';
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r
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SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT
FACILITIES AND PUBLIC OPPOSITION
Final Report
This report (SW-809) was prepared under
contract for the Office of Solid Waste
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
1979
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This report was prepared by Centaur Associates, Inc., Washington, D.C., under
contract number 68-01-5012.
Publication does not signify that the contents reflect the views and policies of
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency but are solely the responsibility of the
contractor. It is also noted that inclusion of specific sites or facilities does
not represent endorsement by either the contractor or U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency of those establishments or the technologies employed. Mention of commercial
products does not constitute endorsement by the U.S. Government.
An environmental protection publication (SW-809) in the solid waste management
series.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Each siting attempt or operating facility described in this project was
included with the approval of the appropriate facility sponsor or
operator. Thus special thanks are due to the industry and public agency
officials responsible for these siting attempts or facilities who agreed
to participate in this project. Scores of state and federal regulators,
state and local elected and appointed officials, representatives of
local organizations and private citizens provided valuable information
for the case studies, and their cooperation is particularly appreciated.
In addition, a large number of EPA regional, state regulatory, and
industry officials were contacted in the process of identifying and
selecting a sample of cases. These officials provided a significant
amount of general information and insights into siting and more general
hazardous waste problems.
Clark-McGlennon Associates assisted in the development of the framework
for collecting data and played a particularly useful role in outlining
issues to be addressed and considered.
Finally, the helpful assistance of the EPA project office is gratefully
acknowledged.
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CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 4
III. PUBLIC RESPONSE . 9
IV. ATTEMPTS TO SECURE SUPPORT... 16
V. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 22
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 27
APPENDIX A: CASE STUDIES •
MONSANTO INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS COMPANY:
BRIDGEPORT, NEW JERSEY.. i... ......... 35
FRONTIER CHEMICAL WASTE PROCESSORS, INCORPORATED:
NIAGARA FALLS, NEW YORK 46
GULF COAST WASTE DISPOSAL AUTHORITY:
TEXAS CITY, TEXAS 54
CHEMICAL RESOURCES, INC.: TULSA, OKLAHOMA. 88
MASSACHUSETTS BUREAU OF SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL: '
STURBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS. 98
3M/CHEMOLITE: COTTAGE GROVE, MINNESOTA..... 110
KANSAS INDUSTRIAL ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES:
FURLEY, KANSAS . 120
BOB' S HOME SERVICE: WRIGHT CITY, MISSOURI. I34
WES-CON, INCORPORATED:
GRAND VIEW AND BRUNEAU, IDAHO. -.-.. 144
I.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont.)
Page
SCA/EARTHLINE: BORDENTOWN, NEW JERSEY 157
ALLIED CHEMICAL: ROSSVILLE, MARYLAND. 176
STATE OF MINNESOTA 190
STARR INDUSTRIAL SERVICES:
STARR COUNTY, TEXAS 207
INDUSTRIAL ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES:
KIRKSVILLE, MISSOURI 220
IT CORPORATION: BRENTWOOD, CALIFORNIA. 233
PADRE JUAN: VENTURA, CALIFORNIA. 245
SCA CHEMICAL WASTE SERVICES, INCORPORATED:
MODEL CITY, NEW YORK 256
ENSCO ENERGY SYSTEMS COMPANY:
EL DORADO, ARKANSAS , 280
CALABASAS, LOS ANGELES COUNTY SANITATION .DISTRICTS:
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA ..... 292
SCA/EARTHLINE,' INCORPORATED:
WILSONVILLE, ILLINOIS 303
RESOURCE RECOVERY CORPORATION:
PASCO, WASHINGTON. 317
APPENDIX B: NEW ENGLAND REGIONAL COMISSION REPORT. 332
APPENDIX C: INFORMATION ON STATE REGULATORY AGENCIES.. 352
II.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The major conclusion of this study is that public opposition to the
siting of hazardous waste management facilities, particularly landfills,
is a critical problem. It is the most critical problem in developing
new facilities, in the opinion of most government and industry officials
interviewed for this project. Once a facility is sited, problems with
public opposition are not over. Local communities can and have forced
operating facilities to close.
Opposition is rooted in fears of major and long-term risks posed by
facilities to the health and welfare of the surrounding community. It
reflects a loss of faith by local residents in the ability of government
and private industry to solve environmental problems and at the same
time to consider and protect local interests.
If problems with public opposition cannot be solved, the implications
may be enormous. The implementation of RCRA will lead to the closing
of facilities now receiving hazardous waste and to much greater demand
for proper disposal sites. Recent efforts to clean up abandoned sites,
including the superfund proposal, will produce even more hazardous waste
that must be disposed of properly. If public opposition continues to
frustrate siting attempts, there may be no place to put all this :
hazardous waste, and the national effort to regulate hazardous waste may
collapse.
The sensitivity of the problem was demonstrated early in this project.
It was decided that each site visit would be made only with the approval
of industry and key regulatory officials. While over 80 sites appeared
to be suitable for the study, only 21 sites were visited. Many industry
and some regulatory officials thought interviews with opponents would
only increase opposition to sites and that participating in this project
presented risks to sites and did not offer corresponding benefits. They
thought public opposition needed to be studied, but were opposed,
sometimes strongly, to having facilities they operated or regulated
studied. These officials preferred to "let sleeping dogs lie."
Public opposition involves a wide range of people, often amassing
considerable resources. Those who have raised concerns or .voiced
opposition in cases studied for this project have included grandmothers
and U.S. Congressmen, factory workers and university scientists, those
who never graduated from high school and those with doctorates in
ecology and physical sciences. What unites these people is their
concern and opposition to facilities in their communities. Opponents
have sometimes shown remarkable skill in political organizing (sometimes
drawing on the public opposition experiences of the anti-Viet Nam war
movement) and have often acquired technical expertise to support their
positions.
/ .
The controversies surrounding particular sites or facilities have
reached levels of stridency impossible to convey in reports such as this
III.
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one. In one case studied, an.angry mob was prepared to blow up a
facility, but was convinced not to. There were two reports, impossible
to confirm, of threats of death or physical harm to key individuals or
their families. In one case the threat was reportedly made to a
facility sponsor, in the other to a local official who opposed a
facility.
Based on the experience studied for this project, public opposition
often arises as soon as the community learns of a. proposed facility.
Excluding hazardous waste generator-owned facilities, the facility
sponsor is either unknown to the local community or, if known, may be
associated with problems at other facilities. The community envisions
few benefits from the proposed facility — a few jobs and perhaps some
tax revenues. Risks are often seen as overwhelming — a ''Love Canal" in
their community, polluted water supplies threatening the entire
community, decades of uncertainty, hundreds of trucks carrying thousands
of drums of hazardous waste on local roads. The industries that produce
these wastes may be hundreds of miles away. Because local communities
perceive the risks to be great, they demand that the probability of
something going wrong be low or, more often, non-existent.
The facility sponsors are often surprised by the vehemence of public
concern and opposition. Their technical studies present arcane data to
show that the proposed facility meets all regulations. Yet opponents
are often able to hire experts who can refute the facility's sponsors
claims. As opposition continues, the facility sponsor may offer to
change the proposal to suit the community. From the community's
perspective, these offers are too little, too late. Opponents question
the fairness of having their town bear such a large share of the
environmental costs of modern industry. Facility sponsors rarely, if
ever, address this question of equity. (Throughout this process the
community talks in terms of risks and fears, the facility sponsor in
terms of regulations and technology. The terms of one are often not
understood by the other.)
The state regulatory agency often is caught in the middle. The agency
seeks to protect the environment by encouraging proper disposal
facilities. Opponents may accuse the agency of destroying the
environment and endangering the public health by granting the facility
sponsor a permit. If the agency preempts local controls, it may further
incur the wrath of a community that feels powerless to control its own
development. Thus state regulatory officials are subjected to the same
suspicion and hostility as the facility sponsors.
Should present approaches to siting facilities continue, the data of
this project indicate that the prospects for successful sitings in most
regions of the country are dubious at best, and grim at worst. National
publicity concerning abandoned sites has made citizens and local
officials increasingly aware of hazardous waste problems. They are also
likely to be increasingly aware of actions taken by others to stop
sitings. Opposition will, in all likelihood, become more widespread
IV.
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and sophisticated. Even if not ultimately successful, opponents may
increasingly turn to the courts and delay sitings for months or years
with costly law suits.
Overcoming this opposition will require diligence and imagination.,
States will have to play the lead role in siting. States must be
perceived as the arbiters in the siting process. They must strike a
delicate balance between the need to protect the public health through
environmentally sound disposal, and the economic viability of industry.
Industry must be sensitive to and anticipate the broad range of public
concerns. Unless circumstances change dramatically, EPA has no direct
role in siting. EPA, however, should support continued research to
develop hazardous waste management technologies to be used by states and
industry and develop guidance to the states on the management and
regulation of facilities. EPA should also join with the states to
provide more public information. That information must demonstrate that
there are positive solutions to what has unquestionably been defined by
EPA, the media and others, as a major environmental problem.
V.
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I.
PROJECT OVERVIEW
Project Purpose
The purpose of this project was to provide insights into those factors
which give rise to public opposition to the siting and operation of
hazardous waste management facilities, and to identify the actions 'taken
to try to reduce or to overcome that opposition. The project was to
address cases where no opposition occurred, where opposition was
overcome, and where opposition led to either an abandoned siting attempt
or the closing of a facility.
Methodology
Because no centralized data existed on public opposition to siting
attempts or operating facilities, it was necessary to identify a sample
of cases suitable for the project. Specifically, 30 cases conforming to
the following range of situations were to be studied.
• Situation 1. No public opposition; new facility,
successfully sited; six cases.
• Situation 2. Public opposition; facility siting attempt
successful; six cases.
• Situation 3. Public opposition; facility siting attempt
unsuccessful; six cases.
• Situation 4. Public opposition; operating facility :..:
continues to operate; four cases.
• Situation 5. Public opposition; operating facility forced
to cease operations; four cases.
• Situation 6. Public opposition to planned or actual :
expansion of a facility; four cases. . .
In addition to the conditions specified by the situations, individual
cases were identified according to the following criteria -- disposal ':
method, ownership, location by EPA Region, wastes handled, urban versus
rural location, and adjacent land use. The use of these criteria was1,
based on the assumptions that the criteria were linked to public
opposition and that with more detailed initial descriptions a sample
which allowed for diversity within situations and comparability between
situations could be identified. •
Data used to identify a sample were gathered through telephone .
interviews of EPA regional office staffs, state regulators, and (in a
few instances) local regulatory officials. All EPA regional offices and
39 state regulatory agencies were contacted and eventually 90 cases were
identified that could be tentatively classified by the six situations.
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After identifying potential cases, a sample of 30 cases and six
alternate cases were selected. (The alternates were to be used, if
needed, to replace recommended cases.) Several factors influenced the
selection of this sample: the desire to have a sample that was diverse
yet which allowed for analysis of comparable facilities in different
situations; the desire to have a sample that reflected national
patterns, (for example, regional distributions as reflected in earlier
facility inventories); and the recommendations of EPA regional office
and state regulatory agency staffs familiar with local controversies.
The final step in determining which cases were to be studied was the
acquisition of approval from key parties. It was originally decided
that no site visit would be conducted without the approval of the
facility sponsor.1 This approval was made with the understanding that
those involved in the opposition to particular facilities would be
interviewed. Facility sponsors were often reluctant to grant needed
approvals. Some were vehemently opposed to the very idea of the
project. One facility sponsor threatened to sue both EPA and Centaur if
his facility was included in the sample. Another suggested that if a
site visit was conducted the local sheriff should accompany Centaur
staff to his facility. Without doubt this proved to be the most
difficult problem in developing a final sample.
This problem has substantially affected the overall project and is
illustrative of the sensitivity of the public opposition issue and of
hazardous waste problems in general. In practice five approvals — from
the facility sponsor, EPA headquarters, EPA regions, state regulatory
agencies, and Centaur — had to be obtained before a case was included
in the sample. For one-third of those identified cases, facility
sponsors declined to participate in the project. For another
one-quarter of the cases it was determined that because of substantial
regulatory violations or ongoing state investigations of possible
violations, those cases should be excluded. Pending permit reviews and
other factors led regulators to disapproval of additional cases.
Primarily because of case approval problems, the final sample was
reduced to 21 cases, Situation 6 cases were eliminated, and a report on
the New England Regional Commission's hazardous waste program was
prepared.
The final sample, then, is necesarily skewed,, This has overall
implications for the project. Of the largest national waste service
companies, only one (SCA Services, Inc.) is represented in the sample.
Thus there is probably an underrepresentation of problems that may be
associated with larger companies that operate and/or are attempting to
site several facilites. It is also possible that more controversial
For the sake of clarity, "facility" is used to refer to hazardous
waste mangement facility and "sponsor" refers to a company or agency
that has sponsored a siting attempt or is operating a facility.
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sitings or facilities were excluded. , If this is true then this report
underestimates the extent of public opposition. Conversely, some
actions that,have been effective in reducing opposition may not have
been identified. A large number of cases where opposition had
dissipated were excluded, because facility sponsors feared that
opposition might resurface if local leaders were interviewed by Centaur.
In spite of these possibilities, there is every evidence that the•final
sample is representative of current problems. Factors that gave rise to
opposition and the issues raised by opponents tended to be common to
most cases. Furthermore, actions in response to public opposition
showed many similarities between cases.
Interviews and reports, newspaper articles and other secondary sources
were used to prepare case studies. Local officials and representatives
of local civic and special interest groups provided most information on
public concerns and opposition issues. In some cases where no
opposition arose it was necessary to restrict interviews to selected
local officials in order to gain the facility sponsor's agreement to
participate in the project.
Report Organization
The report is composed of six sections and three appendices. Section II
presents background information on the 21 cases. Sections III and IV
discuss public response and attempts to secure support, respectively.
Findings and conclusions are delineated in Section V, and in Section VI
the implications of these data on the future siting of hazardous waste
management facilities are discussed.
In Appendix A are the 21 case studies. For a more complete under-
standing of siting problems, the reader is encouraged to refer to these
case studies. Each case study provides background information on the
specific site, facility, and local .community. The history of facility
development and public response is presented chronologically. Based on
those data the attempts to secure support are identified and analyzed,
the major issues are summarized, and the factors leading to public
support and/or acceptance are listed. Finally, various views of those
interviewed are presented, including retrospective views of the
particular case and more general views on hazardous waste management
problems. While the focus of these latter views varies widely, they are
included because they have been generated by the specific case history
and they elucidate what are perceived to be major problems related to
siting facilities and solving hazardous waste problems. Appendix B is a
report on the New England Regional Commission's hazardous waste program.
This was included in the project to illustrate new governmental
approaches to siting. Appendix C presents, for states in the sample,
basic data on state regulatory agencies and programs and regulatory
officials' views on siting and governmental involvement in siting.
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II.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Various data were collected for each proposed or operating facility
studied. These data are presented in a table, at the end of this
section. The location of each case studied is shown in the accompanying
The sample of cases studied was national in scope and included
facilities using four distinct technologies — land disposal, treatment,
incineration, and deep well injection. The sample was intended to be
representative, not random. As indicated below, the locational
distribution is generally not inconsistent with the national
distribution of operating facilities. The clear exceptions are an
underrepresentation in the sample of EPA Region V, which data indicate
has the largest number of facilities, and an overrepresentation in EPA
Regions VI and VII. In terms of the technologies used at or proposed
for facilities in the sample, the sample is heavily weighted in favor of
land disposal and under represents treatment and incineration
technologies. Each of those technologies is represented in the sample.
as shown in the table on the following page.
Locational Distribution of Sample and
National Distributions of Facilities
(in percent)
EPA Region
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
DC
X
Snell Report1 Straus Report2 'Centaur Sample
6%
16
8
6
25
9
7
1
17
5
4%
14
10
4
31
11
10
0
12
4
5%
19
5
0
14
19
14
0
14
10
Foster D. Snell, Inc., "Potential for Capacity Creation in the
Hazardous Waste Management Service Industry," National Technical
Information Service, August, 1976.
Matthew A. Straus, "Hazardous Waste Management Facilities in the
United States—1977," U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
January, 1977.
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Technologies Utilized in Sample and
in Operating Facilities*
(in percent)
Technology
Land disposal-*
Treatment/processing
Incineration
Injection well
Other4
Straus Report'
53%
58
28 ,
5
4
Centaur Sample
86%
19
5
5
0
When generator-owned facilities are excluded, only one facility in the
sample does not intend to accept a broad range of hazardous wastes. For
most facilities it was easier to define wastes not accepted (e.g., no
facility studied accepted radioactive waste) than to define the wastes a
given facility would accept. For the general public the most signific-
ant wastes that a facility can accept are what have been termed "politi-
cal wastes" such as PCBs, 2,4,5T, Kepone and Dioxin. These are wastes
that have achieved public notoriety and some facility sponsors have
indicated they will not accept such waste solely because of that
notoriety.
The cases in the sample are located in a full range of settings from
urban industrial areas to remote underdeveloped areas. A similar
diversity is shown in site size and site life. Landfills ranged in size
from five to 260 acres and from one to 60 years in projected life.
Market areas for facilities (excluding those designed to serve a
specific waste generator) also showed wide diversity in geographic size
and were related to facility ownership. The smallest market areas were
composed of the waste generators in one urban area. All facilities with
local markets were publicly owned. Conversely, all multi-state market
areas are associated with private commercial facilities. Some of those
interviewed for this study explained that to be economically feasible a
commercial facility must serve a multi-state area. In addition, the
Because one facility may encompass more than one technology
(e.g., landfill and incineration) columns add to more than 100 per-
cent.
Straus, see .previous table.
Includes landfills, landfarms, lagoons and pits.
Includes ocean disposal and storage.
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size of the market area for a substantial number of commercial
facilities appears to indicate two things. One is that the commercial
service industry is becoming increasingly centralized. The other is
that a permitted operating facility fills a dire need for such
facilities and can expect to receive a large volume of business from
generators hundreds and even thousands of miles away.
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Background Information on Cases Studied
Situ.- EPA Facility
Case tlon Region Type
Monsanto
Bridgeport, HJ
Frontier Chemical
Watte Processor. ,
Niagara Falls, NT
Gulf Coast Waste
Disposal Authority
Texas City, IX
Chemical Processors
Tulsa, OK
BSUD
Sturbrldge, HA
3H/Chemollt«
Cottage Grove, KN
KIES
Furley, KS
Bob1 8 Home Service
Bright City, HO
WES CON
Bruneau, ID
SCA/Earthllne.
Bordentown, HJ
Allied Chemical
Ros.vllle. MD
MPCA/EPA
State of Minnesota
Starr Industrial
Starr County, TX
IES
Klrfctvllle, HO
IT Corp.
Oil Well, CA
Fadre Juan
Ventura, CA
SCA Chemical
Wastes Services
Hodel City, ta
ENSCO
El Dorado, AR
•Calabasaa
Los Angeles, CA
SCA/Earthllne
Wllsonvllla, II.
Resource Recovery Corp.
Fasco, WA
1 11 Landfill
1 II . Treatment
1 VI Landfill
Landfam
1 VI Injection
Well
2 I Landfill
2 V Landfill
2 VII Landfill
Treatment
2 VII Landfill
2 I Landfill
3 II Landfill
3 III Landfill
3 V Landfill
Treatment
3 VI Landfill
3 VII Landfill
3 IX Landfill
3 IX Landfill
4 II Landfill
Treatment
4 VI ' Incinerator
4 IX Landfill
5 v Landfill
%
S X Landfill
Hastes
Accepted
Generator1*
Wastes Only
Broad Range
Liquids Only
Broad Range
Broad Range
Liquid. Only
Selected
Range
Generator* a
Hasten Only
Broad Range
Broad Range
Broad Range
Broad Range
Generator's
Vastes Only
Broad Range
Broad Range .
Broad Range
Broad Range
Broad Range
Less Hazardous
Broad Range
Broad Range
Location
Rural
Urban
Urban
Urban
Suburban
Suburban
Rural
Rural
Rural
Urban
Urban
Suburban
t Rural
Rural
Rural
Rural
Suburban
Suburban
. Urban
Broad Range , Surburban
Less Hazardous
Broad Range
Broad Range
Rural
Rural
Adjacent Site Size
Land Use (Acres)
Industrial
Induatrial
Industrial
Industrial
Residential
Undeveloped
Industrial
Agricultural
Residential
Undeveloped
School
Industrial
Residential
Varied
Agricultural
Agricultural
Agricultural
Agricultural
Residential
Industrial
Undeveloped
Industrial
Residential
Undeveloped '
Residential
Agricultural
Agricultural
6
8
200
4
105
S
80
15
20
S .
38
200
40
192
160
28-135
200
45
260
130
250
Site Life
(Years)
5
H.A.2
30
500+
6+
1
18
5-10
10
1-2
12
5
3-4
18-20
40-60
1-254
20-25
H.A.*
3-40
20
SO
Ownerahip
Private,
Generator
Private,
CoBoercial
Public
Private,
Commercial
Public
Private,
Generator .
Private,
Commercial
Private,
Coomercial
Private,
Commercial
Private,
. Commercial
Private,
Generator
Public
Private,
Commercial
Private,
Coanerclal
Private,
commercial
Public
Private,
Commercial
Private,
Commercial
Public
Private,
Commercial
Private,
Conmerclal
Market
Area
H.A.I
Multi-
State
Local
Multi-
State
State
R.A.I
Multi-
State
Multi-
State
Multi-
State
State
N.A.1
State
state
Multi-
State
State
Local
Multi-
State
Multi-
State
Local
Multi-
State
. Multl-
Stete
1 Because this facility is owied by and serves only the generator, a*rket area does not apply.
* Facility treats hazardous waste and theoretically haa an infinite life.
3 facility 1. a «... I I-mdflll U d«lBnatlon U.cd In California). Wile «... I landfill, can accept .11 hazardous «.«.. this facility
restrict* waitca to thooc of a less hazardous nature.
* Facility la «n Incinerator and theoretically haa an infinite 111*.
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Location of Cases Studied
00
LEGEND
• Landfill
DTreatment, processing facility
• Incinerator
O Injection Well
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III. PUBLIC RESPONSE ,
The siting and/or operation of nearly all the hazardous waste management
facilities visited has given rise to at least some public concern or
opposition.1 Only a few received some support from the public, tacit
or otherwise, and in most cases this public support was due to actions
taken by the sponsor. These actions and their results are described
below in Section III, "Attempts to Secure Support". Only if this
support was due to pre-existing conditions or coincidental but unrelated
events is it described in this section. Therefore this section is
primarily concerned with opposition to facilities.
Factors Which Have Given Rise to Public Opposition
Public opposition to the siting/operation of hazardous waste1management
facilities is so widespread that it might be thought to be unavoidable.
To what extent this might be true, it is also clear from the case •
studies that the extent and ultimately the effectiveness of public
opposition is influenced by identifiable factors. These factors include
actions taken (or not taken) by the sponsor, pre-existing conditions,
and coincidental but unrelated events. To the extent that these factors
are beyond the control of the facility sponsor they might be thought of
as expected risks. It must be noted that few if any of these factors
are necessarily,important for all sites, and that in each situation the
sponsor will have to face a different set of problems.
Public relations— Actions taken or not taken by the sponsor which give
rise to public opposition center around public relations. One factor in
particular which has been blamed for the demise of a number of sites and
potential sites is the failure to inform local residents and elected
officials of development plans, so that they are presented with a fait
accompli in terms of site location and facility plans. Another is
informing the local public of these plans in such a way that the lack of
local input is readily apparent. An egregious example of this sort of
approach is found in the Minnesota case study. Local residents were not
informed of the siting process until the number, of potential sites had
been reduced to four, and then only by the local press. The ensuing
uproar has been cited as the major reason for the failure of this siting
attempt. Early discussions of disposal problems and plans with local
elected officials has on the other hand led to public support (3M).2
The only site which faced no discernible public concern or
opposition was Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Authority in Texas City,
Texas.
Case studies named parenthetically throughout.this and following
sections illustrate the points raised. However, examples can
usually be found in other case studies. For more detailed
information, refer to the cited case study(ies) in Appendix A.
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A public relations campaign which stresses primarily the danger
associated with hazardous wastes (Minnesota) can also lead to public
opposition, as can unfortunate statements by employees of the sponsor.
In one case (SCA/Wilsonville), the site owner was quoted in the local
press as saying that although they were not at that time disposing of
nerve gas, they could if they wanted to. A positive public relations
effort can, conversely, lead to public support or at least vitiate
public opposition (3M). However, such an effort can backfire if it is
based on untruths. The Wilsonville facility was first announced as a
mine reclamation/resource recovery center, and the local public felt
betrayed when they found it was actually a hazardous waste landfill.
On the other hand, in certain circumstances a low-profile approach, with
no public relations or public information effort, has worked very well.
Both Chemical Resources and Gulf Coast, whose sites were located in
heavy industrial areas, adopted this strategy.
Public information — Another related factor is technical or other
information supplied to the public by outside parties, some of whom may
be opposed to the site or who wish to conceal its existence (Padre
Juan). This problem can be exacerbated if the sponsor fails to provide
the public and local elected officials with available information which
is favorable to the site (IT Corp.). Equally, there may be difficulties
if the sponsor is unable to respond satisfactorily to public concerns
(Allied).
Technical studies supporting proposed or extant sites and facilities can
contribute to public support if they are produced by a neutral body
recognized by the public as such, for example, a local technical
official (Monsanto) or state or federal regulatory agencies (Ensco).
Conversely, such third party reports can fail to have any effect on
opposition (SCA/Model City).
Credibility of sponsors and regulatory agencies — The credibility of
the sponsor is a major factor in the forming of public attitudes toward
the site. Credibility is a function of public perceptions of the past
history of the facility sponsors. If the developer is perceived to have
a questionable history, and especially if this involves the operation of
similar sites, then the public is unlikely to accept his assurances that
this particular operation will be properly conducted. Ensco's previous
problems with its Shakopee, Minnesota facility accounted for the
opposition to its operation in Arkansas. SCA Services has faced
credibility problems since its Wilsonville facility was shut down by the
courts. On the other hand, a firm such as Monsanto, well known and
respected in the local community, was able to make use of this good will
in gaining public support for a facility. Evidence that the sponsor is
willing to negotiate in good faith with the community to allay local
concerns can have the same effect (Monsanto, BSWD).
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Credibility is also an function of the successes of previous siting
attempts. If other communities have been unwilling to accept the
facility, this will not be perceived as a recommendation for it. The
Ventura ^Regional County Sanitation District's attempt to site a facility
in Padre Juan Canyon was defeated due, among other things, to the
failure of previous attempts to site the facility elsewhere on account
of adamant public opposition. State regulatory agencies' perceived lack
of credibility may also have a similar result (SCA/Model City). Agency
credibility can, however, have the opposite effect (BSWD).
National publicity given hazardous waste — The,timing of national
publicity given hazardous waste in general and sites such as Love Canal
in particular is an important coincidental but unrelated factor behind
public opposition to facilities. It can be an influential factor in
setting the tone of public response. Although this was specifically
mentioned as a factor behind public opposition at only two sites
(SCA/Model City, IBS), it seems.very likely that the increasing public
awareness of the hazards associated with hazardous waste — a factor
underlying a large part of public opposition — is due to this
publicity. ,
Political wastes— Another factor which has often given rise to
opposition to a particular facility is the acceptance of "political
wastes" (Ensco, Resource Recovery Corp., SCA/Wilsonville). "Political
wastes" are substances such as PCBs and Kepone which have achieved
particular notoriety in the public mind, generally due to publicity in
the national media.
Public attitudes — Local public attitudes toward hazardous waste vary
considerably across the country. For instance, the population in the
vicinity of the Wes-Con facility in Idaho has a history of public trust
in government. They have also taken the position that one should be
able to do what one wants on one's own land. ,
Facility operations — Especially if a facility is already operating,
potential or actual operational problems may give rise to concern.
These problems include odors (KIES), fires (SCA/Model City), and spills
and subsequent damage to flora and fauna (Resource Recovery Corp.). If
the site itself is perceived as being obviously unsuited for hazardous
waste disposal, such as Padre Juan Canyon overlooking the Pacific, this
may also be a factor behind public opposition.
Local political organization — One pre-existing condition of particular
importance is the political sophistication of the population in the
vicinity of the proposed or operating site. If the area has a history
of political activism (Allied) or previous experience opposing a
facility siting attempt (SCA/Bordentown), then it is likely that
organized opposition to the siting attempt will appear that much sooner.
As discussed below, the organization of liaison committees by the
sponsor has sometimes had the same effect (BSWD).
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Issues And Concerns Raised During The Course Of Opposition
After public opposition to a hazardous management facility has arisen,
certain issues and concerns are often seized upon in an attempt to stqp
either the siting or the continued operation of the facility in -.
question. These issues may reflect public concern and thus are often
the result of the public education that often accompanies opposition.
Alternatively, however, they may be chosen solely on the basis of their
potential usefulness in stopping the facility siting or operation. Some
of the issues described below tend to overlap with factors described in
the previous subsection. Indeed, many factors that give rise to
opposition become issues that sustain opposition and are focal points of
debate during opposition. On a general level, the distinction between
factors and issues cannot always be clearly drawn. In specific cases,
however, it is usually possible to identify those conditions or events
that have sparked and galvanized opposition (defined for this report as
factors) and those arguments and concerns that are used by opponents to
support their position (defined for this report as issues). These
issues fall into several groups or categories, described below.
Site and facility characteristics — Issues which have been raised
include particular aspects of site suitability, such as soil
permeability (SCA/Wilsonville) and seismic stability (Padre Juan);
problems associated with site operations, such as odors or fires, and
the existence of contingency plans (IT Corp.); the possibility of
environmental pollution, especially groundwater contamination (3M); more
appropriate or higher uses for the site (Starr); and provisions for
long-term maintenance (SCA/Model City).
Siting process — There were also concerns with the siting process
itself, including the 'possibility that other, superior sites had not
been considered (BSWD) and that subjective siting criteria were used
(Minnesota). The lack of substantive public input in the siting process
has been mentioned as an issue in many cases (KIES, Minnesota), as has
inadequate public information and the failure to notify the public of
either the process or of their potential role in it (SCA/Wilsonville).
Sponsor and regulatory agency credibility — If the credibility of the
sponsor does not initially give rise to public opposition, it is often
raised subsequently during the course of public debate (IBS,
SCA/Bordentown, Ensco).
Transportation — Possible problems associated with the transportation
of hazardous wastes to the facility have often been cited, including the
possibility of waste spills (Chemical Resources) and damage to highways
and property caused by heavy trucks (Calabasas).
Wastes to be disposed of at the proposed facility — The types of
wastes to be accepted at the facility are also likely to be a matter of
public concern. This includes "political wastes", which, as noted
above, are often a factor in the rise of public opposition, and if not,
will almost invariably be raised as an issue during the opposition (Wes-
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COB.). Hovrever, h.azardou.8 waste in general is also of concern. This has
been blamed on the national publicity accorded Love Canal and other
cases of improper disposal of hazardous waste.
Local residents also seem to perceive that their community's image will
suffer if it becomes known as a "dumping ground" for such wastes
(SCA/Model City). Furthermore, in some cases the possibility has been
raised that the community will then be unable to keep out other such
facilities if one is permitted (3M).
Local publics have of ten questioned whether there is really a need for a
hazardous waste management facility at all in their region (Minnesota). ,
This belief, which is generally incorrect from any sort of objective
point of view, can sometimes be traced to public misinformation on the
extent of the hazardous waste disposal problem. More typically, this,is
believed because local industries do not themselves produce large
amounts of hazardous wastes or because the public is under the
impression that alternative technologies, such as resource recovery,
could be relied upon to perform the same function (Padre Juan).
In addition, if hazardous wastes to be disposed of are not locally
generated, the public often manifests opposition to the disposal of
wastes from other areas, especially if the wastes are from out of state
(Resource Recovery Corp., SCA/Wilsonville). Residents of rural areas
have expressed opposition to accepting wastes generated by urban
industries (Minnesota, Starr). Their objections are based on the
likelihood that they would.be bearing risks associated with these wastes
while others receive the benefits.
Effect of the facility on the surrounding area— Another category of
issues raised concerns the area surrounding the proposed or operating
site. These include the contention that the area is too populated
(KIES), that property values will suffer (Allied, SCA/ Wilsonville), or
that the aesthetics of and quality of life in the area would be
adversely impacted (Calabasas).
Economic issues — Another major.category of issues involves economic
concerns — economic disbenefits or lack of economic benefits. In the
case of government—owned sites, the issue of loss of property taxes has
been raised (Minnesota). Hazardous waste facilities generally provide
few if any jobs for the local community, although in isolated cases jobs
reportedly were promised (Starr, SCA/Wilsonville). Actual or expected
losses to local.agriculture supposedly attributable to facility
operations can become an issue in rural areas (Resource Recovery Corp.).
Finally, the lack of compensation for the nuisances and risks which are
perceived to accompany such facilities may be a concern (Minnesbta). In
other cases, a direct tie between the proposed facility and jobs can
give rise to local public support (Monsanto, 3M), although if these jobs
are not located in the immediate area the effect is considerably less
significant (Allied).
Local control — Local control of land use (Allied, IT Corp.) and
hazardous waste management (IES) has occasionally been raised as an
issue.
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Site-specific issues — In addition, site-specific issues have also been
raised by those opposed to a particular site or facility. For example,
the impact of a facility on Shell Oil Company's oil and gas producing
operations also located on the site was an issue in the IT Corporation
case. .
Tactics Used by Facility Opponents
The most common tactics used by local residents and elected officials in
opposing hazardous waste management facilities are testimony at public
hearings, initiating or threatening to initiate lawsuits against the
facility sponsor to have the site closed, and hiring outside experts to
testify or develop a technical case against the facility.
The effectiveness of the public hearing as an opposition technique
usually depends upon the ability of the public or of local officials to
use hearings as a vehicle for demonstrating the extent of their
political influence. Technical experts hired by opponents have at best
been able to stalemate the situation. Most lawsuits initiated by
opponents to'date have been unsuccessful in the courts, but have been
moderately successful as a delaying tactic. They have also added
substantially to the sponsor's cost. Other more or less prevalent
tactics include letters to the media and regulatory agencies (SCA/Model
City), editorials in the local media (Ensco), and petitions (IBS).
Local elected officials have almost always been involved in the
opposition, either of their own accord or in response to pressure from
local residents. In addition to taking part in the above-mentioned
activities, such officials have also passed resolutions against the
facility (IES, SCA/Bordentown), promulgated a local ban on the
acceptance of PCBs (Ensco), ordered a facility to close down (Resource
Recovery Corp.), and — supposedly to resolve a drainage problem —
have had a ditch dug across the entrance to a facility (Wilsonville).
Local officials have considerably more power to influence the course of
events in states where permits from local (including county)
jurisdictions are required to site and/or operate a facility (e.g.,
California). In these cases, officials can deny a permit or impose
stringent conditions before one is issued (3M).
In only one case (Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Authority) did a local
elected official take active steps to support a siting attempt. This
official acted to benefit a local industry which formed the economic
basis of the community. This official acted in the absence of any
public response, either for or against the siting attempt.
Ad hoc groups are also quite frequently found to have been involved in
opposition to a given facility. Besides organizing the opposition and
originating or participating in some of the actions previously
mentioned, ad hoc groups have sponsored public debates on facility
siting between themselves and the sponsor (SCA/Bordentown).
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The final category of opposition tactics reported includes civil
disobedience (SCA/Wilsonville) and other actions which violate the law.
Threats of violence have been made, both against the facility itself
(SCA/Wilsonville) and against state personnel sent out to prospective
sites (Minnesota).
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IV.
ATTEMPTS TO SECURE SUPPORT
In the cases studied for this project diverse responses have been made
to the concerns and issues raised by the public. While the ideal goal
of these responses is to secure support for the given site and/or
facility, the practical goal in almost every case is much more modest.
At a minimum it is generally hoped that concern and opposition can be
reduced to a manageable level (defined as that level which does not
block siting or close the facility). This minimal level is generally
not exceeded. In a minority of cases, responses to public issues and
concerns were able to elicit a significant level of public acceptance.
Attempts to respond to public concerns and opposition can be subdivided
into two groups. One includes efforts to secure support or reduce
opposition to specific sites and/or hazardous waste management
facilities. The other includes efforts to secure support for hazardous
waste regulatory programs and procedures. Support for regulatory
programs and procedures in most cases leads directly or indirectly to
support for specific sites and/or facilities. In this section, the
actors who make these attempts, the tactics they use, and the issues
raised in support of facilities are discussed.
Actors Involved in Public Support
Seemingly everyone agrees that hazardous waste disposal is a major
problem that must be solved. However, when a specific solution (i.e.,
facility) is proposed the consensus collapses. Based on the experiences
studied during this project, the facility sponsor usually has the active
support of few if any parties. Those who have actively supported
facility sponsors are described below.
Private facility sponsors — The majority (15 of 21) of planned or
operating facilities surveyed in this project were initiated by private
industry. For obvious reasons these private facility sponsors were the
most active parties in soliciting support for their own facilities. Of
these private facilities, 12 were commercial facilities and three were
on-site facilities owned by and for the exclusive use of hazardous waste
generators. For the commercial facilities, the primary motive for
development was profit. For captive facilities, the motives for
development included solving the generator's own disposal problems,
reducing costs by not using commercial facilities, and responding to
state and/or federal regulations.
Government planning and management agencies — In six of the cases
studied, government agencies were to be the owners and/or operators of
the facility. Three of these were state agencies and three were county
or multi-county agencies. These agencies played the same role as
private facility sponsors. However, these governmental agencies were
significantly more susceptible and sensitive to political pressures and
were significantly more responsive to the concerns of the public.
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Governmental agencies became involved in hazardous waste management
primarily in response to the need of generators within their
jurisdictional bounds. Their involvement was an extension of their
roles as providers of environmental services and was not perceived as a
revenue-generating activity.
The one major exception to this general description was the case" of the
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA), which sponsored an EPA-funded
facility siting attempt. Unlike the other governmental facility
sponsors, MPCA is also responsible for regulating hazardous waste
management. Thus MPCA was the only governmental agency which could have
been in the position of regulating its own facility.
State regulatory agencies — In theory, state regulatory agencies are
neutral parties in siting attempts. In practice, these agencies often
are perceived by the public to be proponents of specific sites and/or
facilities. When public knowledge of, siting occurs only after
substantial review by state agencies (e.g., KIES, Monsanto), agencies
may have already decided to issue the required permit. By defending
their permit review (i.e., trying to secure support for hazardous waste
regulatory procedures), these agencies are, either directly or indirectly
acting as proponents and attempting to overcome opposition to the
proposed facilities.
Once a facility becomes operational, the regulatory agency position
becomes more clearly one of supporting or seeking support for the
facilities. The regulator's goal becomes that of ensuring that the
facility operator continues to operate within permit conditions. When
operational problems arise, regulators are often in the position of
working with operators to seek solutions while opponents demand facility
closure (SCA/Model City, Resource Recovery Corp.).
Hazardous waste generators — In only one case studied in this project
(SCA/Wilsonville) did generators take active steps to generate support
for a commercial facility. As the primary beneficiaries of disposal
facilities, generators have a clear self—interest in their development
and operation. They are thus conspicuous by their absence as facility
proponents.
Tactics to Secure Support
The actors described above have used a wide variety of tactics to gain
support or to reduce opposition. Most tactics have, been employed by
facility sponsors and have had mixed results. The most significant
tactics follow.
Presentations at public meetings and hearings — With rare exceptions,.
public meetings or hearings were held during each of siting attempts
studied, either as a standard procedure in the state permit application
review or in response to public concern and opposition.
" 17
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Thus presentations at these meetings by facility sponsors and state
regulators were the most common attempt to explain or to defend the
facility and the application and thereby directly or indirectly to
reduce opposition. In addition to presentations, comments and questions
from those in attendance were made at these meetings. It should be
noted that these public meetings and hearings provided for only the most
limited substantive discussion and primarily served as forums for
expounding positions for or against proposed of operating facilities.
Discussions between regulators, facility sponsors and local leaders —
These meetings were the second most frequently used tactic to
communicate with key individuals at the local level. Because these
meetings usually involved smaller numbers of individuals they were
significantly more likely to generate substantive discussions between
facility opponents, regulators and proponents than were public meetings.
Public relations campaigns — In a minority of cases facility sponsors
developed public relations campaigns to provide additional information
to local communities. In one case (Minnesota) this information stressed
the negative aspects of improper disposal while in most cases (3M,
SCA/Model City, Ensco) the ability of the facility sponsor to dispose of
waste in a safe manner and the economic value of hazardous waste
generators or of materials recycled and reclaimed at the facilities was
stressed. Most such campaigns were surprisingly ineffective. In cases
where information on types of waste to be accepted and the use of land
disposal technology was downplayed (SCA/Wilsonville), the campaigns were
later seen by opponents as outright deceit. Effectiveness appears to be
based on an ability to discuss hazardous waste management positively and
to capitalize on the credibility of the facility sponsor's past history,
and the facility's potential economic contribution to the community
(3M).
Debates with opponents — In two instances (IES, SCA/Bordentown),
facility sponsors debated opponents during siting attempts to try to
provide more information to the public and to refute the claims of
opponents. These particular debates were either unable to sway
opponents or added to opposition by raising issues involving still more
potential risks or unanswerable questions.
Siting strategies — Several strategies were used either to avoid or to
preempt public opposition. Most facility sponsors avoided publicity at
least in the earliest stages of land acquisition and application
preparation. The most extreme low-profile approach (Gulf Coast Waste
Disposal Authority) eschewed involving the general public throughout the
siting attempt. Similarly, a few sites in industrial areas (Gulf Coast.
Waste Disposal Authority, Frontier Chemical Waste Processors, Chemical
Resources) or at existing landfills (SCA/Bordentown) were consciously
chosen on the assumption that these sites were more acceptable to the
public. When the public is unaware of a siting attempt, they are
unlikely to oppose it. Except for the cases cited immediately above,
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the general public eventually learned of the siting attempt. The choice
of sites in industrial areas in most cases appeared to avoid or reduce
opposition. The choice of other types of sites—at existing landfills
or in remote areas—did not in general avoid the public opposition.
Involving government in siting—Several facility sponsors (Gulf Coast
Waste Disposal Authority, IT Corp.) sought to involve local government
directly in developing proposals. These actions were designed to
respond to local concerns and to enlist local support. Similarly, a
number of facility sponsors (KIES, Bob's Home Service) worked in close
cooperation with state regulatory agencies for generally the same
purpose. A related action taken by a regulatory agency was having local
elected officials review and approve a permit (SCA/Model City). This
tactic was often successful in gaining the additional support of the
state agencies or local officials, but rarely had an effect on public
opposition.
Amending proposals/operations — In a significant minority of cases
proposals or operations were amended to address public concerns.
Specific examples include revising siting criteria (Minnesota), changing
access to facilities (Padre Juan), reducing hours of operation (Allied),
upgrading operations to reduce odors (KIES), and generally cleaning up
sites (SCA/Model City). In almost every case these efforts failed to
reduce opposition because they were seen as too little and too late by
the public. Indeed, most revisions were made only after sustained
opposition had developed.
Direct Incentives to local communities — Various inducements have .been
discussed or offered during siting attempts — amenities such as
developing parks (Allied) or providing fire equipment (Wes-Con) and
•financial compensation to host communities (BSWD, SCA/Bordentown, SCA/
Wilsonville). Similarly, facility operators have paid local costs
involved in monitoring activities (SCA/Model City, 3M). For the same
reasons that revisions to proposals were not always well received, these
incentives were sometimes ineffective.
Exceptional regulatory actions — Regulatory agencies have taken some
exceptional actions to demonstrate their credibility and to assuage
opposition. These include publicizing the restrictiveness of permits
(KIES), and promises by U.Si EPA to take action if regulations are
violated (SCA/Model City). When agencies followed through on their
promises of tough regulation (KIES), public concern was reduced. When
they did not follow through or when the public felt they did not
(SCA/Model City), opposition intensified because government was seen as
contributing to the local community's problem.
Establishing or utilizing local task forces — Public facility sponsors
have in two instances (Padre Juan, BSWD) set up special task forces to
serve as contacts between local communities and facility sponsors during
siting processes. For operating facilities, one state regulator
(SCA/Model City) has helped to form such a group to try to reduce
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communications problems. Similarly, one facility operator (Monsanto)
has worked with an existing Ipcal environmental commission to address
local complaints, most of which related to odors. In cases of operating
facilities these task forces appear to be helpful in reducing public
concerns and/or demonstrating a willingness on the part of regulators or
facility operators to address concerns. When established during the
siting process, task forces have helped to improve communications but
have also served to organize local opposition.
Use of technical experts — In addition to using consultants in the
preparation of permit applications, facility sponsors (SCA/Model City,
Allied) have also used technical experts to buttress their proposals and
to refute claims of opponents. Opponents, however, have not normally
been persuaded by such technical arguments and can usually find experts
with the opposite view.
Enlist support of hazardous waste generators — Facility sponsors have
sought to gain the active support of those industries that would use
their facilities both during siting (Minnesota, IT Corp.) and after
operations began (Earthline). Generators have not been eager-to defend
or to publicly support siting attempts. When they have, they have not
tried to address the local community directly,
Appeal to governor — In one case (Allied), a facility sponsor appealed
to the state governor to intervene on its behalf in a siting
controversy. The governor's support was won, but opposition continued.
Legal tactics— In one case (Bob's Home Service) a facility sponsor
entered into an out-of-court settlement to reach a compromise with a
facility opponent which effectively reduced that opponent's concerns.
Good neighbor policy — Several facility operators have taken a wide
variety of steps designed to demonstrate a willingness to help the local
community. Some of these steps include free disposal service for
selected groups (Wes-Con, Bob's Home Service), contributions to local
civic and charitable organizations (Wes-Con, SCA/Model City), the
preferential use of local businesses for goods and services (KIES), the
opening of the facility for tours (Wes-Con, SCA/Model City). This is
only a partial list. Some facility operators have shown substantial
imagination in demonstrating their desire to be "good neighbors." The
effectiveness of these efforts is dependent on the level of controversy
surrounding a facility. When there are major substantive unresolved
issues, they overshadow these public relations efforts.. When issues are
largely resolved, these efforts can significantly improve the operator's
standing in the community. , .
Issues Raised in Support of Facilities
While facility proponents have used numerous tactics to gain public
support, they have raised only a few major issues in support of
facilities. These issues necessarily focus on the need as opposed
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to the desirability of facilities and the reduction of risk as opposed
to the possibility of benefit.
Need for hazardous waste disposal facilities — The primary issue raised
by facility proponents has been the need for safe disposal sites.
Hazardous waste generators who sponsor facilities (Allied, Monsanto, 3M)
have been the most vocal in expressing their needs for their specific
sites and in linking their needs directly to the industrial facilities
they operate. Commercial and public facility sponsors have also argued
the need for sites; however, they are necessarily less able to link this
need to specific local industries. State regulators have also
consistently raised the issue of the need for disposal sites.
Regulators generally focus on the needs of the jurisidiction they serve
(i.e., state, region, nation) and the need for the jurisdiction to be
responsible for its own disposal problems.
Viability of specific sites or technologies — Facility sponsors have
often gone to great lengths to substantiate the viability of their
sites. Most efforts focused on the impermeability of soils and the
protection of water supplies. These arguments are also directly tied to
land disposal technology. Where treatment and processing technologies
are to be employed, the environmental safety and desirability of these
technologies have been stressed. Occasionally, the economic benefits
from reclaiming or recycling material have also been presented.
Economic and other benefits — Hazardous waste generators who sponsor
facilities have argued that without disposal options their industrial
plants might close and thus jobs in local communities would be lost.
This same argument has not been uniformly made by other facility
sponsors primarily because links between generators' jobs and local
communities are more tenuous or non-existent. Some commercial facility,
sponsors (Starr, SCA/Model City, SCA/Wilsonville) have argued that the
facility itself will provide jobs to the local community.
In two cases (SCA/Model City, Frontier) the development of facilities
was considered a boost to an area's industry base either by expanding or
diversifying it. (It should be noted that one of these facilities is a
treatment facility; the other was generally perceived by the public as a
treatment facility.) The fact that industries that produce hazardous
waste provide all of us with benefits and that disposal facilities are
the necessary consequence of those benefits has occasionally been raised
by facility proponents.
Illegal and improper disposal — Various facility proponents have
contrasted proposed or operating disposal facilities with "midnight
dumping." These proponents argue that facilities such as those surveyed
for this study are not only the necessary alternative to dumping but are
essential if such dumping is to be eliminated.
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V.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Introduction/General Conclusions *
The promulgation of hazardous waste management regulations under RCRA is
imminent. It is anticipated that these regulations will exacerbate the
problem of hazardous waste disposal site availability both because they
will dramatically increase the demand for proper disposal sites and
because they will result in the closing of a number of marginal sites.
This problem may well be compounded, since facility sponsors are finding
it increasingly difficult to site and operate hazardous waste management
facilities. The principal reason for this is increased public
opposition. This increase in public opposition can in turn be traced to
the national publicity given environmental problems, particularly to the
hazardous waste problem. This publicity has focused almost exclusively
on the disastrous results of improper management of hazardous wastes.
The public is thereby unable or unwilling to distinguish between
patently improper sites for hazardous waste disposal such as Love Canal,
and properly managed disposal sites.
Understanding the problem in this case does not suggest an answer. It
is unlikely, even if it were possible, that countervailing publicity
alone would succeed in reassuring the public. It is obvious that public
opposition is a difficult problem to solve and one that will become more
so in the future, especially as efforts are made to identify and correct
the problems of abandoned sites.
The case studies suggest that certain actions or situations will
certainly give rise to public opposition. For instance, if a facility
sponsor has a bad previous history as a facility operator, or if he
decides to dispose of what are locally perceived as political wastes, he
will almost invariably face intense public opposition. However, there
is no corresponding certain or simple solution to the problem of public
opposition to facilities, either to avoid public opposition or to
mitigate it once it has arisen. Below are indicated, based on the
findings of the case studies, partial solutions to the problem in terms
of what should and should not be done during siting and operation. As
has frequently been stated elsewhere in this report, no single action or
set of actions could be recommended for all siting situations.
Public Opposition During Siting
The problems faced by a facility sponsor during a siting attempt are
somewhat different from those faced during operation. An obvious
Conclusions with regard to government roles are addressed below
in Section VI.
22.
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example of this diffefence is the likelihood that perceived operational
problems such as spills or the lack of them will probably be the
principal determinant of whether .the site faces public opposition once
operations have begun. In addition, a different set of problems is ;
faced by commercial sites than by generator-owned sites. On-site
facilities in particular are less likely to face credibility problems
because the generator is known and respected, and they carry a built-in
economic rationale because of the jobs the generator provides* Based on
the case study findings, overcoming public,opposition requires taking
specific actions or negotiating certain conditions and thereby
convincing the community that: ,
•" Complete.information is available about the operation of
the site and proposed waste streams,
• The public and local officials will be substantively
. involved in the siting process,
• The'operator is a person or organization of lasting integ-
rity,
• The risks of catastrophic or insidious dangers are slight,
• There are significant benefits to the local area to, offset
the risks,,
• The site and its operation are not in conflict with other
enterprises or existing activities in the area, nor are
there any better and more feasible higher land uses for the
site, ' , , ,i,-..-
• The government has sufficient resources and expertise to
judge independently the merits of site design and oper-
ation,
• There a,re sufficient government regulations, and resources
to guarantee safe operations,
• There are sufficient resources and government regulations
to ensure that the facility will be properly maintained
' . after closure, and
* The technical merits of the selected site and facilrty are
unquestioned. ,
All of these conditions have not been met in any of the cases .studied.
It is much more likely that only a minority are met in.the average
siting attempt. '
Probably the most important single factor in addressing public .„'
opposition to siting is coordination and communication with the public \
and local officials. This includes informing the public and
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local officials of the siting attempt and the nature of the'proposed
facility before a final decision is made on a specific site. , It also
includes responding to local concerns, in particular those about
possible hazards associated with the facility.
In the case of commercial facilities, industries which will use the
facility are potentially a very significant public by virtue of their
economic and political influence. For whatever reason, in these case
studies they are conspicuous by their absence as facility proponents.
Under certain circumstances, such as when the site.is in a heavy
industrial area and not in the public view, a low-profile approach may
be warranted. There is at least some evidence that opposition will not
arise in these cases, so that there is no need to alert the public and
thereby create a potential for opposition. , . .
The question of operator credibility will probably have been settled for
better or worse if the operator is a generator planning an on-site
facility or has operated hazardous waste facilities elsewhere.
Otherwise, little can be done to convince the local public of the
operator's credibility other than to conduct the siting attempt in an
open and receptive manner.
It is also unlikely that the public can be convinced, that the dangers of
a hazardous waste facility are slight, given national publicity.on the
subject.
Furthermore, hazardous waste management facilities are often perceived,
as bringing with them economic disbenefits, and do not, except for
on-site facilities, necessarily provide local economic benefits.
However, providing such benefits for purely public relations reasons has
often mitigated public opposition, although this is;not always perceived
as sufficient compensation for the risks and nuisances which are
expected to accompany such a facility. Examples of such.benefits
include the payment of a tipping fee to the local government and
providing jobs and/or services to the local population.
Sites which do not conflict with surrounding land uses include those
located in clearly defined industrial areas and those in truly isolated
areas. However, many sites which appear to facility sponsors to.be
remote or not in conflict with adjacent land uses are not perceived in
the same way by local residents. Most of the sites visitied which were
located in rural areas faced opposition for this very reason. The four
sites visited which faced little or no opposition were all located in >
industrial areas. Other sites in industrial areas did face opposition,
however because local residents perceived more favorable uses for the
land. . ; •
Local reaction to the siting attempt will to some degree depend on the,
local perception of the state regulatory agency and the attitude the
agency takes. Although state regulatory officials are ostensibly
neutral during the siting process, in several cases studied in this
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project state officials were active proponents of the siting attempt.
Active support for siting attempts is not at all inconsistent with •
stringent regulation. -On the contrary, in some cases testimony by state
officials that the proposed facility has been subject to a stringent
review process was quite successful in mitigating public opposition.
However, if the credibility of the state regulatory agency is questioned
by the public, its support may compromise the project.
Currently, hazardous waste management site and facility regulations vary
from state to state. However, it is anticipated that many of these
differences will be eliminated when RCRA establishes minimum regulatory
requirements. Local perceptions of the way these regulations are
enforced will likely continue to differ. In states which now give local
government a significant role in permitting sites, this too is not
likely to change. While the perception of substantial local control
over hazardous waste facilities will ease public opposition, based on
this issue in particular, such control is likely to be exercised to veto
any proposed facilities. Siting a new facility in such areas may well
be considerably more difficult. '„•'"-'
The focus of this study has been on perceived technical viability of
sites as opposed to any objective attempt to determine that viability.
Experience has shown, however, that in cases where facilities face
sustained public opposition, the local public almost without fail has
been able to seize upon technical faults in the proposal and to use them
either before the state regulatory agency or in the courts to defeat the
siting attempt. While technical perfection is obviously an unattainable
goal, egregious technical faults have been and are likely to be the
basis of successful opposition to siting attempts, particularly if the
credibility of a state regulatory agency is questioned.
Public Opposition During Operation
Many of the conclusions reached by this study with regard to facility
siting also carry through to facility operation. In particular, if a
problem is not resolved or addressed during siting, it will very likely
come up during operation.
Experience shows that it is much more difficult for public opposition to
shut down an operating facility than to prevent a facility siting. A
major reason for this is that, unless the facility is violating state
regulations in its operations, the state regulatory agency will probably
feel obliged to defend its regulatory process and thus the site. This
implies that public opposition during operation, to be successful, must
have considerably more political and technical resources than would be
necessary to defeat a siting attempt. Only if a locally granted permit
must be periodically renewed is this not necessarily true.
Facility operators contacted during this study also noted, however, that
these operations always proceed against a background of public distrust,
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and that very small problems during operations could have very large
public relations ramifications. This is true even with no history of
operational problems or opposition during siting.
Two primary concerns in avoiding public opposition during site operation
are maintaining communication with local officials and the public, and
avoiding operational problems that are apparent to the public. A
practical way to maintain communications is to set up a grievance
procedure, so that residents and/or officials with a complaint about the
facility will be able to make this known to facility personnel and, if
possible, have it resolved. In this way potential public relations
problems can be avoided. Operational problems such as spills and odors
will, if not infrequent, be perceived as indications that the facility
is not properly run.
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VI.
GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN SITING FACILITIES
Based on the data collected during this project, a wide range of actions
that government has taken or might take to solve the hazardous waste
disposal problem can be defined. Government involvement can be at the
local, state, multi-state, and federal levels, and can range from review
of proposals to owning and operating sites. Thus, at one extreme, local
governments are given no controls over siting and states review and
approve permit applications developed by private industry, which is
totally responsible for siting and developing facilities. At the other
extreme, the federal government sites, constructs, owns and operates
facilities.
To date, this project has placed only secondary emphasis on what roles
government might play. The data developed by this project, however,
suggest that states will have to play the pivotal government role in
siting. There are three definite reasons for this:
• States now play the pivotal governmental role and intend to
continue to do so.
• EPA intends for states to implement RCRA and has shown no
desire to become directly involved in siting.
* States are the most logical level of government to play the
lead role because federal agencies are in general too far
removed from local problems to be able to respond
effectively to them, and because local governments are
unlikely to voluntarily accept facilities.
Given that states should play the leading governmental role in siting,
the results of this study indicate that they should become arbiters of
the siting process. State regulatory agencies should be seen as
knowledgeable neutral parties which can carefully and independently
judge the merits of facility proposals. Because so many siting attempts
have become entangled in disputes, states may also have to serve as
negotiators between parties (i.e., facility sponsors and opponents) with
widely divergent interests. States cannot ignore public concerns, but
must be able to respond to the range of issues raised by local
communities. Scrutinizing proposed facilities clearly contributes to
better hazardous waste disposal practices. Responding to public
concerns will not necessarily win public acceptance but can win public -
respect for the siting process. Without this public respect the siting
process can become mired in political and legal battles over sites.
These can cost hundreds of thousands of dollars, delay siting for years,
and exacerbate already strained relationships between local residents,
the facility sponsor, and state regulators.
While the significance of the role of states in siting is certain, this
project can only tentatively discuss the variety of roles that states
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and other levels of government might assume. An optional second phase
to this study would examine in detail these potential roles.
Government, particularly at the state level, is rapidly evolving new
conceptions of its responsibility and authority in developing new
hazardous waste disposal capacity. The notoriety of abandoned sites and
the attendant widespread publicity has helped to spur major new
initiatives by both state legislatures and state agencies. The demand
for capacity is the major impetus behind these initiatives, but state
actions also reflect a clear concern with public opposition to siting :
and a desire to resolve problems that opposition causes. A better
understanding of these governmental initiatives is needed and government
agencies would greatly benefit from more knowledge of the actions of
other agencies. The second phase of this project could be a significant
step in examining these recent developments.
The following discussion highlights the major options that appear to be
available to government at the state, multi-state, federal, and local
levels. This discussion should serve as a starting point for a much
more thorough examination of government involvement in siting.
Options for States
States are the level of government most deeply involved in the siting of
hazardous waste facilities. This will continue to be true into the
foreseeable future. The implementation of RCRA will provide continuity
in state programs. However, individual states have taken and will
continue to take different approaches to siting because the urgency of
hazardous wastes problems varies substantially from state to state. In
the future any national hazardous waste program must recognize these
variations and must be able to respond accordingly.
Public participation in the development of facilities (e.g., in the
state review of permit applications) is largely the responsibility of
states. The question of how to involve the public exists regardless of
the state's siting approach. In addition, the public often demands that
it have a voice in the decision to develop a facility.
As defined by the states, public participation appears to have three
discrete functions. One, it can serve to inform the public of
government actions. Two, it can allow for technical input by the public
into government decision-making. Three, it can allow the public to
provide substantive input to technical and non-technical aspects of
government decision-making. For almost all cases studied in this
project public participation involved the first two functions only. The
third function, a substantive public role, was not common.
The question of what role public participation should play in siting
hazardous waste facilities is not easily answered. Even if a state has
clearly defined the function of public participation, facility opponents
may demand greater involvement than the state has assumed the public
will have. If opponents feel sufficiently frustrated by their lack of
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involvement, they may turn to political leaders or to the courts. On .
the other hand, if given too large a substantive role, opponents.will
probably block all siting attempts. If major local roles in siting were
to become widespread, this would very probably be disastrous for siting.
There appear to be five major options for states with respect to siting
facilities. The two major variables which,define these options are the
degree of state involvement in siting and the role of private industry.
All of these options are currently being employed by states. . The five
options are: , , .. ".•.-•, .
• State review of private siting attempts using data provided
by private industry. •'•',.• ? ,
• State evaluation of private siting attempts based on data
generated by themselves or independent third parties.
* State involvement in hazardous waste management planning.
• Joint state-private sector involvement in facility ,
ownership and operation. ,,-".-
• Total state control of facility ownership and.operation.
The majority of ;the states, visited in this project limited their
involvement in siting to reviewing permit applications prepared by • ..', ,
facility sponsors. For many of these states all data used to determine
the viability of the site and the proposed facility were provided by the
facility sponsor. The state decision to rely on.those data was usually
a matter ,of practicality. State resources were limited and demands
placed on the state were great. For facility opponents, state reliance
on the facility sponsor's data was a major problem. Opponents were
.suspicious of the reliability of the data and ,of facility sponsor
willingness to present objectively data that would weaken the permit
application. Thus-this option for state involvement in siting •
inherently tended to engender public opposition. , „
Other states developed their own data:when .evaluating permit ,, :
applications. For exap.ple, some states conducted soil tests to,
determine permeability. In another case state officials toured a ; . -
facility operated .in another state by the facility sponsor. These
actions allowed them to judge independently the soundness of.permit
applications. By demonstrating an ability to critically.evaluate the ;
proposal, state regulatory agencies enhanced their credibility in the
eyes of the public. ,.;
A third state approach to. siting is a logical extension of independent
development of data. .A few states visited were directly involved in
planning for .facilities either on a site-specific basis or on a more
general basis. Typically, a state regulatory agency would work closely
with a facility sponsor throughout the planning process in areas .such as
determining the most suitable sites, developing engineering plans, and
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establishing monitoring requirements. Such actions tended to ensure
that the proposed facility met all genera:! and specific requirements set
by the state regulators. They also served tp demonstrate to the public
the effectiveness of the agency and thus reduce public concerns. A
related state role involved negotiating conflicts between facility
sponsors and opponents over specific site and facility plans and
attempting to reach compromises acceptable to both parties. On a more
general level, state planning efforts have included statewide surveys to
determine the most hydrogeologically suitable areas for facilities.
More comprehensive planning efforts by states have included making
specific estimates of their needs for facilities, locating centers of
hazardous waste generation, developing siting criteria, and planning for
other aspects of hazardous waste management. Such planning has
substantially improved the state's understanding of its problems and
served to enhance the credibility of state regulatory agencies.
A few states visited had joined with private industry to develop
facilities, either by acquiring sites or by proposing to operate
facilities. The two major reasons for this joint public-private
development were: 1) an extension of other waste disposal activities
(e.g., industrial waste water treatment) conducted by the state; and 2)
a determination by the state that facility development by private
industry faced substantial, possibly insurmountable, obstacles. In some
cases, state agencies had two particular advantages (not enjoyed by
private industry) in acquiring sites. One was the preemption of local
zoning and the other was the power of eminent domain. By becoming
directly involved in developing facilities, states faced essentially the.
same opposition as did private industry. However, opponents appeared to
see state agencies as more credible than private facility sponsors,
because these agencies were perceived as being .concerned primarily with
environmental problems rather than with commercial interests.
Finally, a few states have decided to assume total control over facility
development, ownership, and operation. This decision has apparently
been spurred by the absence of private facilities or the conviction that
private industry faced insurmountable obstacles in developing
facilities. Another rationale for total state control is that the state
will exist longer than any individual private company. Thus in the
event of post-closure problems, the state will be in a position to
respond quickly. (This rationale has also been used to support state
ownership of facilities which are operated by private industry.) As
this project has shown, total state control in no way avoids public
opposition. It is not at all certain that states would have appreciably
more success in siting than private industry.
While the above options are presented as relatively discrete, in
practice most states combine aspects of the first three options (i.e.,
relying on facility sponsor's data, generating independent data, and
becoming involved in planning activities). However, many state
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regulatory officials felt that direct state involvement in facility
development was probable or inevitable. Whether states will in fact
play a major direct role in facility development will in all likelihood
depend on whether the states perceive hazardous waste problems as
critical.
Options for Local Jurisdictions
Based on the findings of this project, there are two major options for
local government:
• Zoning and other regulatory controls.
• Facility development.
Local jurisdictions exercise regulatory control primarily through
zoning, but they may also have responsibilities for local solid waste
planning. If these controls can hold veto power over site development,
then the primary role of local jurisdictions will be to block siting
attempts. Even when local controls are minimal, local governments have
substantially delayed siting attempts or frustrated facility operations.
Conversely, local governments have also developed facilities. Except
for the fact that several California counties own and operate
facilities, the prospects for local government playing any significant
role in promoting sites would appear to be minute.
Options for Regional Government
At least three multi-state regional agencies have recently developed
hazardous waste programs. One of these programs, "sponsored by the New
England Regional Commission, was examined for this project. Based on
quite limited information on these regional agency efforts, there appear
to be three roles that the agencies could play:
• Support to states. ,
• Public education and information programs.
• Facility development.
Support to states can parallel state planning efforts in developing
information on facility needs, siting strategies, and other areas of
hazardous waste management. Support can also encompass coordinating
individual state efforts in order to minimize interstate problems and to
maximize the efforts of individual states.
Regional agencies can also play a significant role in disseminating'
information and educating the public. To .the extent that this can
See Appendix B of this report.
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contribute to public confidence in facilities as a solution to hazardous
waste disposal problems, regional agencies can help reduce opposition to
siting. ,
While regional agencies have contemplated site acquisition or facility
ownership and operation, this would not appear to be a likely
possibility. Based on the limited experience of the NERCOM program,
states appear quite reluctant to relinquish their own authority and
responsibilities to regional agencies.
Options for U.S. EPA
Based on EPA's current activities and the views of regulatory officials
and others interviewed during this project, there are five major roles
EPA can play which can influence the siting of facilities.
o Public information and education.
o Research and development.
o State program funding.
o Liability funding.
o Facility development. '
According to many regulatory officials, public information released by
EPA has clearly demonstrated that hazardous waste disposal is a problem
that must be solved. Thus the public is generally aware of the dangers
of improper disposal. What is not generally understood or believed is
that there are any reliable solutions to this problem. Thus EPA can"
significantly reduce general public anxiety by developing information
that shows that the problem can be solved.
Directly related to this need for positive information is the perceived
need for research on more effective hazardous waste management
technologies. Facility proponents and opponents stressed the
desirability of technologies that eliminated the burial of hazardous
waste. Many felt that more research would lead to better technical
solutions to disposal problems. In addition there are a large number of
non-technical issues (e.g., institutional arrangements and market
structure) surrounding hazardous waste management which need to be
addressed.
RCRA provides substantial funds for state hazardous waste programs.
This EPA funding fills a clear need in many states for additional
resources with which to regulate and monitor facilities and plan for
future state needs.
A specific role that EPA could assume is funding for long-term liability
of facilities. State regulators considered long-term liability for
closed facilities a critically important issue. Because liability costs
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could be substantial and problems could arise long after facility
operators had closed sites, some state regulators thought that
government must eventually assume liability for closed facilities.
Because state resources are limited, EPA was seen as a logical source of
liability funding. This raises the difficult question of who should
ultimately pay for this liability funding.
Finally, a minority of those interviewed during this project felt EPA
should site, own, and operate facilities. While most holding this view
were local officials and residents distrustful of state regulatory
agencies, some state regulatory officials felt that siting problems and
public opposition might grow so large that they would overwhelm state
agencies. In that event, these state regulators saw federal facilities
as a last resort solution.
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APPENDIX A
CASE STUDIES
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MONSANTO INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS COMPANY
BRIDGEPORT, NEW JERSEY
I.
INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 1978 Monsanto Industrial Chemicals Company began
operation of a secure landfill at its Delaware River Plant outside of
Bridgeport, New Jersey. The facility -only accepts wastes generated at
that plant. Operations began after almost three years of planning and
development for the facility by Monsanto, including lengthy negotiations
with New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP)
officials.
The facility was formally endorsed by local officials and the;local
environmental commission. Although it did meet with some opposition and
raised concerns in the local community, this opposition was relatively
minor and was overshadowed by local endorsements. Local acceptance was
based on an acknowledgement of Monsanto's disposal needs and Monsanto's
local image as a trustworthy and responsible company.
The most visible attempts to secure support for the facility were those
required by the state permit procedures, primarily the public hearing.
These were augmented by ongoing relationships which Monsanto had
established with local environmentalists and the community in general.
Conscious attempts to secure support for the landill only partially
explain local acceptance which developed prior to the public hearing.
II.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The Monsanto facility occupies six acres within the bounds of the
Delaware River Plant. , The; plant is bounded by the Delaware River, U.S.
130, and undeveloped land. It, is relatively isolated, only a few
residents are nearby, and the facility is not visible from U.S. 130,
which passes by the plant. The landfill site is 150 feet from the river
and 1,000 feet from'Birch Creek, which drains into the Delaware River.
The soil underlying the site has a permeability, according to Monsanto,
of 2 X 10~7 cm/sec. Site life is projected to be five years; this
estimate is subject to variation according to the amount of dewatering
that occurs to sludges disposed of at the facility.
The facility itself is a secure landfill with two clay liners (18" top
liner, 12" bottom liner) separated by a layer of sand. The facility ^
accepts sludges from the plant's pollution control facilities and solids
which are by-products of manufacturing processes and of pollution
control equipment such as insoluble pitch, rocks from lime .slaker
operations, and contaminated filters. Sludges are dewatered; solids are
buried; all wastes are generated on-site. A collection system above the
top liner allows any leachate to be reprocessed by Monsanto's waste-
water treatment plant. Between the liners is a leak detection system
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which checks for failure of the top liner,. In addition, there are five
monitoring wells on the plant grounds. Samples are analyzed by an
independent lab.
Monsanto's closure and post-closure provisions for the landfill conform
to proposed state regulations, which call for quarterly monitoring of
the site over a three-year period, at the end of which the state reviews
monitoring records and may reduce the frequency of monitoring to once a
year if site records indicate that such an action would be justified.
Primary responsibility for perpetual maintenance rests with Monsanto.
All state regulations concerning funding mechanisms after site closure
are unwritten pending U.S. EPA action in this area.
The secure landfill is operated as an adjunct to Monsanto's chemical
manufacturing plant, located two miles from,Bridgeport. The plant was
established in 1961 and currently employs about 180 workers, including
the senior environmental engineer responsible for waste disposal. It is
one of 200 plants and laboratories operated worldwide by the Monsanto
Company. Monsanto is one of the largest U.S. chemical companies, with
1977 sales of $4.6 billion and assets of $4.3 billion, according to the
1978 Fortune 500 directory.
Bridgeport (1978 estimated population: 900) is an unincorporated town
within Logan Township. The town is in a relatively sparsely populated
section of southern New Jersey, approximately 30 miles south of
Philadelphia. Major employers in the area are chemical and petroleum
companies with a number of facilities along the Delaware River. ;
Bridgeport is also the site of a Rollins Environmental Services
hazardous waste disposal facility that has met with strong local
opposition.
Ill- HISTORY OF FACILITY DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC RESPONSE
The State of New Jersey preempts local zoning controls over special
waste faciliti.es. As a result, there are no local permits or
regulations applicable to these sites. In developing its facility,
Monsanto needed only a permit from NJDEP's Solid Waste Administration
(SWA), which takes the responsibility for having permits reviewed by
appropriate environmental (e.g., air and water quality) and other state
agencies.
Monsanto first began planning for its current secure landfill in late
1975 and early 1976. The impetus for this planning came from several
sources. The first was an existing landfill at the Delaware River Plant
was reaching capacity and was not designed to meet all of the plant's
disposal needs, particularly for sludge disposal. At the time, sludge
was being stored at the plant's wastewater treatment facility.
Secondly, off-site disposal facilities were not an effective means of
solving disposal problems. There were no facilities in New Jersey for
sludge disposal. The use of these facilities was also considered too
costly. Finally, without a long-term solution to its disposal problem,
Monsanto would have to reduce maufacturing operations at the plant.
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Thus the decision to develop an on-site facility met Monsanto1s primary
need for a sludge disposal facility and ensured continued plant
operations as well. Monsanto would have added control over its waste
stream and would reduce disposal costs. Risk involved in the
transporting of wastes off-site would be eliminated. The decision to
develop a secure landfill allowing for the dewatering of sludge and the
burial of solids was dictated by the nature of the plant's wastes and
influenced by Monsanto's experience with various technologies employed
at both on-and off-site facilities.
Monsanto sought information from New Jersey's DEP relatively early in
the development stage. During preliminary planning Monsanto had general
discussions with DEP to learn what state requirements and regulations
would apply to the facility and to inform DEP of Monsanto's needs for
such a facility. Discussions and negotiations between Monsanto and'DEP
continued throughout the development period, including the period of
permit application review.
In the fall of 1976 Monsanto submittted a permit application to SWA for
an 18-acre secure landfill to be located at its Delaware River Plant.,
It appears that this application encompassed the major objectives and
design concepts of the facility eventually developed by Monsanto.1 In
December of 1976, the consulting engineer retained by Logan Township
reported to the township on the application. His report indicated an
agreement with the concept proposed by Monsanto-and recommended that the
township be kept abreast of the application's progress.
SWA denied Monsanto's request for a permit in the winter or spring of
1977. The 18-acre landfill would have had an expected life of 15 to 18
years. In SWA's judgment this was too long a site life for a special
waste facility, and for that reason it denied the application.
In response, Monsanto reworked its application, reducing the site size
to six acres, thereby reducing site life to about five years. This
revised permit was submitted to SWA in July of 1977.
Following standard procedures, SWA notified local agencies and officials
in nearby jurisdications of the permit application within days of
receiving it. Those notified included the mayor of Bridgeport, the
Logan Township health officer, the Logan Township Environmental
Committee, and the Gloucester County planning agency.
After this notificaton Monsanto discussed plans for the landfill with
local officials including the Logan Township Environmental Commitee.
These discussions led to the committee's endorsement of the application.
At Monsanto's request, the commission contacted SWA and'asked that the
permit be'reviewed as expeditiously as possible.
The transfer of Monsanto personnel involved with this application
and the passage of time limited data availability for the original
permit. •
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In the months that followed the submission of the application, SWA and
Monsanto entered into what in effect were negotiations over the landfill
design. In reviewing the application, SWA's major concern was over the
impermeability of the landfill's lining. Monsanto originally proposed a
single clay liner. According to Monsanto's senior environmental
engineer, the thickness of the soil underneath the landfill site more
than compensated for the fact that it was twice as permeable as the
state requirement of 1 X ICT^cm/sec. xhe state requested a double
liner system and Monsanto responded with a proposal for two 12-inch
liners. SWA then asked that the top liner be an artificial (Dupont
hypalon) liner. Monsanto disagreed with this request on the grounds
that clay has better long-term characteristics than plastic liners and
that general quality control is better with clay liners. The state :
agreed with Monsanto on the condition that the top liner thickness be
increased to 18 inches. Monsanto agreed and the final design
incorporated an 18-inch top liner and a 12-inch bottom liner.
In December of 1977 the Logan Township engineer reported to the township
on the second Monsanto application. The engineer's report indicated
that the only major change from the original application was the reduced
size of the landfill. For the second time, the engineer's report
indicated general agreement with the preliminary design of Monsanto's
landfill. Monsanto's proposed liner material, however, did not conform
with the engineer's understanding of SWA's requirements of other
landifll facilities. Accordingly, he wrote SWA asking for a
clarification of their requirements.
In January of 1978, SWA staff met with local elected officials to
discuss the permit application. The meeting was intended as a
preparation for the upcoming public hearing and was held as a part of
SWA's standard procedures in reviewing permits. The same month SWA
responded to the township engineer's request for information on state
requirements for liner materials. That letter from SWA stated in turn
that SWA did not accept clay as landfill liner material, that individual
cases determined the acceptability of clay, that clay was acceptable for
most municipal and some industrial waste facilities, and finally that
clay was generally not acceptable for hazardous waste landfills. ;
The public hearing on Monsanto's permit application was held in ,
Bridgeport in February of 1978. SWA conducted the hearing and stated in
opening remarks that it was not an adversary proceeding and, as a
result, would not involve questions and answers between the public and
the applicant. Monsanto,.however, was free to respond to public comment
if it so desired. A Monsanto engineering specialist in pollution
control, who along with the plant manager represented the company,
explained that the landfill was needed if manufacturing were to continue
and that off-site disposal facilities were not available in the area.
He also described the site, wastes to be handled, facility design and
operation, and provisions for handling leachate.
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Public comments followed from local officials and private citizens.
Those making comments expressed positions ranging from total opposition
to full support. In general, most comments appeared to 'indicate at
least general support for Monsanto and/or the proposed landfill. Most
questioners sought additional information about the facility, particu-
larly contingency plans in the case of accidents and post-closure
provisions. Monsanto provided responses to all comments either
providing additional information about the facility or indicating
Monsanto1s existing and future commitments to the Bridgeport plans and
to Logan Township in general. The comments made during the public
hearing included those from three representatives of public bodies.
The Logan Township Environmental Committee (now Commission) had earlier
formally endorsed Monsanto's application and this endorsement was
restated during the public hearing. The Commission is an agency of the
township, chartered by the township. The seven commission members are
appointed by township elected officials and provided with a small annual
budget. The commission reviews matters of consequence to the environ-
ment and advises the township on these matters. Informal procedures
have also been established with area industries whereby a commission
member investigates environmental complaints (e.g., odors). It was
formed in 1974 partly as an outgrowth of an earlier private group of
area environmentalists. Although commission members had some major '
concerns about the facility (e.g., proximity to the river, contamination
of water supplies, operating hours), six of the seven members voted in
support of the facility. The quality of facility design and provisions
for; monitoring and leachate collection were the most immediate reasons
for this decision. Equally important, according to a commission member,
was the impression that Monsanto, had anticipated many concerns and dealt
with them responsibly. She indicated that commission members employed
at area petrochemical plants were also sympathetic to Monsanto's needs
for a disposal facility. . ,
The township engineer stated at the hearing that the township was not
opposed to Monsanto1s application. He referred to the two reports
previously prepared for the township which had agreed in concept with
the facility design. His only question was in reference to SWA's
position on clay as a liner material and the contradictory explanation
SWA had given the township in January of 1978. At the public hearing
SWA agreed that the earlier explanation was confusing and that a
clarification would be made. As of this writing, the town engineer had
heard nothing.
The only substantial opposition to the Monsanto permit voiced at, the
public hearing came from the Gloucester County Environmental Health
Coordinator. She opposed the facility on the following grounds: 1) its
proximity to the Delaware River (150 feet) and to Birch Creek (1,000
feet); 2) the subsidence potential of the marsh and made land of the "
area potentially leading to ruptured liners and to water supply
contamination; 3) the high water table at the site as indicated by test
bores; and 4) the fact that Monsanto's existing landfill was listed as a
3S
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pollutant by the area's Section 208 water quality management plan. In
addition, she asked what action would be taken if one or both liners
ruptured and what monitoring provisions were established. Monsanto
responded with an explanation of how ruptures in the liner would be
repaired and procedures for quarterly monitoring with testing by
independent labs. Monsanto also indicated that data on which she had
based some concerns was of dubious value as Monsanto's data refuted her
contentions on the depth of the water table. Monsanto also suggested
that the 208 plan had been based in part on older data.1
The February, 1978 public hearing was the last major instance of public
response to the permit application. The major subsequent actions
involved state review of the permit and Monsanto's construction of the
facility. By May, SWA had completed most of its work on the application
and told Monsanto formal approval would be given in June. According to
SWA this allowed Monsanto to begin site preparations and reduce the pos-
sibility tha plant operations would be disrupted by lack of the facil-
ity. In June, SWA formally approved the facility and construction con-
tinued throughout the summer. In October, 1978 Monsanto began disposal
operations at the facility.
Since operations began in October local residents have made periodic
complaints about odors from the facility. These complaints have usually
been made to the Logan Township Environmental Commission which has es-
tablished grievance procedures with Monsanto as well as other area
industries. One commission member has been responsible for contacting
Monsanto and inspecting the landfill to determine whether the odors
originated there. She indicated that odors have been and will continue
to be a concern. However, her inspections have shown that complaints
about Monsanto are not always justified and odors can be traced to
several other plants in the area.
Monsanto's landfill should reach capacity by 1983. Site life will
depend in part on the extent to which sludge is dewatered. When
capacity is reached, the facility will be covered and post-closure
monitoring will begin as described earlier in this report.
IV. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
Late 1975, early 1976 — Monsanto begins planning for HWMF.
Fall 1976 — Monsanto submits application to NJDEP for 18-acre secure
landfill.
When interviewed by Centaur, an SWA official said that older
landfills such as the Monsanto landfill cited by the 208 plan were
assumed to have leachate plumes. These landfills predate the
creation of SWA and the implementation of state landfill regulations
in 1971.
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December, 1976 — Logan Township engineer's report favorably reviews
permit application for Township.
Winter, spring, 1977 — NJDEP denies Monsanto permit on grounds that
facility life projection too long.
July, 1977 — Monsanto submits permit application for six-acre secure
landfill with reduced site life. NJDEP, following
standard procedures, notifies local officials and agencies
of permit application.
Summer 1977 — Monsanto discusses proposal with local officials and
agencies, receives endorsement of Logan Township
Environmental Committee.
Summer and fall 1977 — NJDEP and Monsanto negotiate site design and
engineering.
December, 1977 — Logan Township engineer's report again favorably
reviews permit application, questions clay as liner
material.
January, 1978 — NJDEP responds to Township on clay liners and,
following standard procedures, meets with local
officials prior to pubic hearing.
February, 1978 — NJDEP holds public hearing in Bridgeport. Monsanto
and NJDEP make presentations and respond to questions,
concerns, and some opposition from those in
attendance.
May, 1978 — NJDEP informs Monsanto that permit will be approved and
that site preparation may begin.
June, 1978 — NJDEP approves permit.
October, 1978 — Monsanto begins operations at secure landfill.
1983— Projected closure of facility when capacity reached; Monsanto
begins quarterly monitoring.
1986 -— NJDEP and Monsanto review monitoring data, possibly reduce
frequency of monitoring.
V.
ATTEMPTS TO SECURE SUPPORT
Direct attempts to secure support for Monsanto's landfill were few. The
major efforts were:
o Early discussions between Monsanto and interested officials
and agencies in Logan Township.
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VI.
o The public hearing held in Bridgeport by SWA in February,
1978. ;
o The establishment of procedures to allow the Logan Township
Environmental Commission to investigate complaints con-
cerning facility operations.
SUMMARY EVALUATION
The efforts outlined above were almost certainly necessary but not suf-
ficient for achieving public acceptance of Monsanto's landfill.
Monsanto's discussions with local leaders clearly led to either
statements of support or of non-opposition. The company was able to
convince key individuals both of the need for the facility and the :
adequacy of its design. Monsanto's ability to work with local
environmentalists and establish procedures to deal with complaints
reinforced the company's position as a responsible corporate citizen of
Logan Township. These two efforts indicated that the company and the
community could work together. This cooperative attitude reflects the
more basic condition that Monsanto was known and respected by local
leaders prior to submitting the application.
The public hearing had little if any impact on public acceptance. Both
the township and the environmental committee had earlier decided to
support Monsanto's plan. The public hearing then became a forum for
pre-determined positions. It had extremely limited objectives with
respect to either substantively examining the permit application or
addressing any issues raised. It is noteworthy that while Monsanto
willingly responded to questions and comments, the company did so at its
pleasure. SWA specifically stated that this was not required. In
effect the public hearing was an administrative ritual.
A number of issues and concerns were raised by the public during the
siting process. These are outlined below. Excluded are specific issues
raised by SWA in reviewing Monsanto's permit application because these
were not part of the public response. Issues raised by the public
generally encompassed those raised by SWA.
Site Suitability — The proximity of the site to Birch Creek and the
Delaware River and the instability of the area's soil were considered to
be major disadvantages of the site. Both raised concerns over
contamination of water supplies by leachate from the site.
Facility Operations — Odors from the facility have been a continuing
concern. Linked to this are concerns over the facility's operating
schedule (i.e., 24 hours daily).
Contingency Plans — Because any ruptures of the clay liners could
result in contamination of water supplies, Monsanto's procedures for
detecting leaks in liners and for repairing the liner were of concern.
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Long-Teria Maintenance —- Concerns over long-term maintenance focused On
the specifics of site monitoring for leachate as well as on Monsanto's
general commitment to be responsible for any problems that might arise
after the facility was closed.
The.concerns raised by local public officials and private citizens never
became major points of contention between those persons and Monsanto.
No major organized opposition arose to Monsanto's plans for the
landfill.5 The consensus among those interviewed was that Monsanto's
stature in the community obviated the development of opposition.
Monsanto has been in Bridgeport almost 20 years, provides a substantial
number of jobs, has the confidence of community leaders, and was
responsive to community concerns. Monsanto makes chemicals and southern
New Jersey is replete with chemical and similar manufacturing plants.
These industries are economically important to the area and area
residents are familiar with and sympathetic to these industries. These
conditions were the most significant reasons for the successful siting
of Monsanto's landfill. Equally important, Monsanto's stature in the
community appears to have been established well before the permit
application was submitted to SWA. ..;/
Because of Monsanto's credibility,'SWA's role in the siting process ap—
.pears to have had little impact ,from the point of view of local of-
ficials. SWA's most visible role was conducting the public hearing
which allowed comments to be entered into the public record. Because
most if not all local parties had determined their positions by the time
of this hearing, its value in generating public acceptance was quite
limited. SWA's negotiations with Monsanto over facility design
contributed-to the perception that Monsanto had anticipated public con-
cerns and designed the facility accordingly. • SWA's role in these nego-
tiations, however, was generally not acknowledged by local officials.
VII. FACTORS LEADING TO PUBLIC OPPOSITION/ACCEPTANCE '•'• ' : -
Concerns over Monsanto's proposal for the secure landfill developed as a
result of the following. •'..-.*•'
o Early notification by SWA of local officials and agencies
of the permit application and early discussions between
Monsanto and local agencies provided preliminary informa-
tion on the proposed facility. •"'•-• •---.''
o Reviews of that information raised concerns among some
• local agencies as to the environmental damage which might ,
result'from the facility. ,
The general public acceptance of the proposed landfill can be attributed
to the following factors. :
o Monsanto's credibility in the eyes of the community and the
effective rapport between them prior to Monsanto's
submitting the permit application.
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o Early discussions between Monsanto and local leaders, many
of whom became convinced of Monsanto's need for the facil-
ity and of the care taken in the design and operation of
the facility to protect against damage to the environment.
o The reports by the township engineer who found no essential
reason for the township to oppose the facility.
o The limited impact, if any, of the facility in terms of
visibility, traffic, and (at least from Monsanto's perspec-
tive) the generation of new odors in the area.
o The fact that.the facility serves Monsanto's needs and is
not a commercial facility, which means that wastes are
known and unchanging in terms of types and volumes.
o The clearly perceived link between hazardous waste disposal
and jobs provided by a hazardous waste generator.
VIII. RETROSPECTIVE VIEWS
In retrospect, only one criticism of the siting process for Monsanto's
landfill was raised. From the local perspective there was no guarantee
that any local party, public or private, could have a substantive impact
on the siting process. Because the state preempts local controls, the
community has no meaningful voice. As indicated earlier, the public
hearing requirement places no demands on either the state or the
applicant to respond to issues. Because of this, it has the potential
of underscoring the powerlessness of the local community thereby de-
creasing, not increasing, public acceptance.
Lack of a meaningful local role did not become an issue because Monsanto
was seen as responsive and responsible. Indeed, Monsanto feels that to
meet local concerns it has in some respects overdesigned its land-
fill.
IX.
GENERAL COMMENTS
Local of.f:L<".Lais also commented on siting issues in more general terms.
The need for meaningful local input into siting decisions was
emphasized. Monetary compensation to host communities as an inducement
drew mixed reactions; it was seen as a "payoff" in the pejorative sense
but also as a strong incentive for public acceptance if enough money was
given to a community. The added costs of compensation for industry were
seen as potentially driving industry out of an area requiring
compensation. The feasibility of using arbitration, negotiation, or
mediation to settle siting disputes was considered questionable because
of the lack of informed and disinterested parties. The use of panels of
experts (e.g., in the areas of law, medicine, chemistry) was seen as an
alternative to individual dispute settlers,, Comments on governmental
44
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roles focused on the need for unannounced independent monitoring of
sites "to keep industry honest." State resources to do this were seen
as extremely limited,.... „ •
A representative of Monsanto also stressed the need of the state or EPA
to monitor sites. Government should also provide the public with more
information on hazardous wastes and disposal risks to reduce misinfor-
mation and allay unfounded fears. Compensation was seen as a
conceivable inducement to some community members but not to those
totally opposed to disposal sites. Arbitration and other techniques to
resolve conflicts were seen as effective in the case of technical
conflicts (e.g., between industry and regulators). When strong
opposition arose to a site such techniques could, however, alter site
design and operation in a way that reduced the total integrity of the
facility. States views on siting and potential governmental involvement
are discussed under state program descriptions elsewhere in this report.
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FRONTIER CHEMICAL WASTE PROCESSORS, INC.
NIAGARA FALLS, NEW YORK
I.
INTRODUCTION
Since the fall of 1974 Frontier Chemical Waste Processors has operated a
hazardous waste treatment facility in Niagara Falls, New York. This
facility replaced another Frontier facility located in Pendleton, New
York, ten miles east of the Niagara Falls.site. The Pendleton site
began operations, in 1958 and by late 1974 had stopped accepting almost
all hazardous wastes. Both facilities were designed to process liquid
waste but the Niagara Falls site, unlike its predecessor, has no on-site
disposal capacity. Treated liquid effluents are discharged into the
city's sewer system while solid residues are buried at area hazardous ;
waste landfills.
The Pendleton site was closed following a substantial amount of public
opposition arising from concerns over facility operations. The move to
Niagara Falls, however, led to no opposition and attracted little public
attention. What little attention the new facility did attract appears
to have been favorable. Frontier has refrained from publicizing its
Niagara Falls facility.
(Although the original Frontier facilty was not intended to be the
subject of this case study, some discussion of that facility is
included. Problems with that original facility caused Frontier to seek
its current site. The contrast between the public response to the
facilities sheds some additional light on the reasons why Frontier has,
subsequently been able to. avoid similar problems.)
II.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Frontier's facility is located in an industrial area of Niagara Falls.
The seven-acre site was formerly occupied by a chemical manufacturing
commpany which maintains ownership of the land and leases the site.to
Frontier. A Union Carbide chemical plant is adjacent to the site on two
sides and undeveloped land surrounds the other two sides. The closest
non-industrial development is a residential area about one-quarter mile
west of the facility.
The site has a number of locational advantages. An interchange of 1-190
is one-half mile away and the route to that interchange passes almost
entirely through industrial development. The site is served by a rail
spur. It also is served by the Niagara Falls sewer system as well as
other major utiJLities.
The majority of materials handled by Frontier are aqueous wastes
contaminated with organics. Treatment involves pH adjustment,
oxidation, the precipitation of solids, and other procedures. The
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effluent from this process is discharged into the city sewer system.
Frontier monitors all liquid effluent to ensure that it stays within the
limits prescribed by Frontier's discharge permit. In addition to the
treatment of aqueous waste, Frontier recovers and reclaims materials
such as waste oils and solvents; it also serves as a broker for wastes
that it cannot handle at its facility. Storage of liquid wastes is
limited by site size and available facilities. No long-term storage
capacity exists and treatment procedures have been specifically designed
to expedite processing and minimize storage needs. No landfilling
occurs on-site; all solid residues are contracted out to hazardous waste
landfills permitted by the New York Department of Environmental
Conservation (DEC). Frontier generates an estimated 50 tons of solid
residual monthly.
Frontier was incorporated in the 1950s by two buffalo area lawyers and
an individual who described himself as a practical chemist. A 1960
Buffalo Courier Express article described the company founders as being
motivated by general concern with improper or inappropriate disposal of
industrial wastes and a conviction that the procedures that they had
developed represented a major innovation in disposal of liquid wastes.
In its 20 years of operation Frontier has concentrated on upgrading its
treatment procedures. It has also branched out into hauling. Total
employment is approximately 70 workers. Although it owns the Pendleton
site, the Niagara Falls facility is Frontier's only operating facility.
Frontier has always concentrated on providing services to generators in
western New York and these firms constitute the bulk of the firm's
market area today. As indicated, Frontier handles only liquid wastes,
the majority of which are aqueous wastes. While a relatively broad
range of such wastes is accepted, the following are excluded:
radioactive wastes, explosives, carcinogens, highly toxic pesticides and
herbicides, and PCBs.
Niagara Falls is located within Niagara County (1967 estimated
population 240,000) and within 15 miles of. Buffalo. While Niagara Falls,
has been linked historically to the beauty of American and Horseshoe
Falls and to the attendant tourist industry, the city is a major
manufacturing center'of chemicals, electrical machinery, and paper
products. Together with Buffalo, the entire metropolitan area is the
second largest in New York state. It is the major trade, service,
financial, cultural and transportation center for western New York and
southeastern Ontario.
In recent years Niagara Falls has received national attention because of
events surrounding Love Canal and other dumping sites once used by the
Hooker Chemical Company. On a regional level opposition has arisen to
two operating hazardous waste landfills, both of which are permitted by
DEC. Opposition has also arisen to a storage facility in Niagara County
which contains the world's largest concentration of radium and which is
reported to be leaking radiation. In March of 1979 DEC released a draft
report listing 36 dumping sites (one active, 35 inactive) in Erie and
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Niagara Counties with substantial amounts of hazardous wastes and an
additional 116 sites (47 active, 69 inactive) which might have
significant amounts of hazardous wastes. In the past three years,
hundreds of articles on specific area sites and hazardous waste problems
in general have appeared in area papers. More than any other area of
the country, Niagara Falls has had problems of and issues surrounding
hazardous waste disposal emblazoned on the public consciousness.
III. HISTORY OF FACILITY DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC RESPONSE
When Frontier began operations at its Niagara Falls facility, the two ap-
plicable regulatory requirements were local zoning and a state sewer
discharge permit. The site was already zoned industrial and Frontier
inherited the SPDES (state pollution discharge elimination system)
permit of the chemical plant which had been operating at the site. In
1977 revisions to state solid waste regulations required Frontier to
submit an application to DEC for an operating permit by February of
1979. That application was submitted to DEC, which had 90 days to review
it and make a decision. A public hearing on the application is not
required, but at DEC's discretion one may be held if public response is
significant. A DEC official indicated that Frontier's application had
attracted no attention and would likely not be the subject of a public
hearing. He also indicated that, barring the unlikely possibility that
data submitted by Frontier are inaccurate, DEC will issue the operating
permit.
Frontier's first facility began operations in 1958 in the town of Pen-
dleton, New York. Operations included treatment of liquid wastes to
reduce their hazardousness and incineration of flammable wastes. The
site included a former clay quarry covering 20 acres which Frontier used
as a lagoon for the storage of treated effluents. The surrounding area
is rural in character but did include scattered residences.
From relatively early in its operating history this facility generated
some local opposition because of smoke coming from the incinerator.
Concerns over smoke, noise, truck traffic, and odors sustained local
dissatisfaction with Frontier throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. In
June of 1973 seven drums of waste exploded a few hours after being
delivered to the site. As a result about 100 residents were evacuated
from an area surrounding the site for a period of 45 minutes. While no
one was harmed by the explosion and the company delivering the waste to
Frontier was reportedly at fault, the explosion did little to assuage
local concern over the facility.
In the summer of 1973, Frontier decided to expand its operations and
attempted to acquire additional land adjacent to the Pendelton site.
According to Frontier's president, the original local zoning for the
site had been changed in 1963 from industrial to non-conforming :
residential use. Frontier belatedly learned of the zoning change in
1973 when planning of the expansion began. As a result of the zoning
change any expansion would have required a variance from the town zoning
regulations. , Accordingly, Frontier went to several town board meetings,
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but was unsuccessful in persuading town officials to grant the needed
variance. Subsequent efforts to get the variance from the zoning board
of appeals were similarly unsuccessful. Frontier considered but
rejected legal actions to acquire the variance on the grounds that such
actions would produce more harm than good. By August, 1973 the town's
opposition had escalated from concern over expansion to attempts to
restrict the operation of the existing facility. As reported by the
Niagara Falls Gazette, the town attorney advised Frontier that not only
would expansion not be allowed but that Frontier would have to close
lagoons it was then using.
Faced with few prospects of favorably influencing the decisions of lor.al
officials, Frontier in early 1974 attempted to improve the operating
facility in lieu of expanding. It was hoped that by upgrading equipment
and procedures the company could increase handling capacity but continue
to operate within the bounds of the original site. Not entirely
convinced that their efforts would be successful, Frontier also began to
consider acquiring a new site outside of the Pendleton area.
In the spring of 1974 Frontier began to investigate other sites. It
first looked at the Niagara Falls site in April or May. The site
offered a number of advantages. Because it had been operating as a
chemical plant, many of the site's existing structures and equipment
could be adapted for waste treatment and processing. The site provided
a discharge into the city sewer system. Because the city's sewage plant
would provide physical-chemical treatment, Frontier's discharge permit
did not need to meet the more stringent requirements of discharging into
a biological treatment system or directly into a water body. The site
had been used for manufacturing chemicals for 60 years and was in an
industrial area; Frontier's operations would then conform to adjacent
uses, be relatively inconspicuous and be consistent with previous
activities at the site. Similarly, the site was zoned for industrial
use and no zoning changes were required before Frontier could operate.
While not considered essential, the proximity of the Niagara Falls site
to the Pendleton facility eased the move to the new site and had little
impact on the market served by Frontier. The only major disadvantage of
the site was the lack of storage capacity and the inability to dispose
of treated residuals on-site.
The site met Frontier's needs and the company sought to purchase it from
the chemical company. A sale could not be consummated and Frontier
arranged to lease the site. .The move to the new site began in September
of 1974 and by late fall operations began.
The transition to the Niagara Falls site did not bring a complete end
either to operations at the Pendleton site or attempts by officials to
restrict those operations. By December of 1974, DEC and the Niagara
County Health Department (NCHD) ordered a stop to all discharges into
Frontier's lagoon at Pendleton. The only exception would be for
colorless and odorless liquids; all handling of materials at the site :
stopped in 1977. Frontier's major concern since that date has been to
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maintain the integrity of the lagoon as a storage facility so that
leakages are prevented.
The start-up of operations at the Niagara Falls facility did not . .
stimulate any vocal response from area residents or the general public.
Frontier's operation was within the bounds of then applicable permits
and regulations. There was no need to apply for changes in regulations
and thereby involve local officials and possibly the general public in
the siting process. One indication of the reception that Frontier was
given was an editorial in a February 1975 edition of the Niagara
Gazette. Entitled "Welcome Frontier" the editorial greeted Frontier's
arrival in the city because as a small firm it added diversity to a
local economy dominated by large firms. It specifically praised
Frontier's reprocessing of industrial waste, noting, that such treatment
had a "...bright future in an economy where pollution and waste of
resources are not tolerated as they once were." Although the editorial
also expressed some reservations because of odor complaints made against
the Pendleton facility, overall it was favorable to the new facility. A
county health officer responsible for monitoring Frontier noted during
the site visit that the nature of Frontier's operations obviated public
opposition. As a treatment facility Frontier does not require
large-scale land disposal of wastes. The relatively small volumes of
solid residuals are land disposed by other firms. Thus, in the health
officer's opinion, Frontier has not used the disposal technique most
objectionable to the public.
Since the start of operations Frontier has constantly upgraded its
treatment procedures. This continues the firm's long-standing practice
of developing improved techniques. A major incentive for these
improvements is the fact that Frontier's SPDES permit places inflexible
limits on specific pollutants it may discharge. Consequently, an
increase in volume of wastes processed must be balanced by reductions in
pollutants per unit of discharge. Frontier has also studiously avoided
publicizing its operation or in other ways providing information to the
public.
In response to revised state regulations, Frontier submitted to DEC an
application to operate its facility. The application was submitted in
February, 1979, and according to Frontier's president will subsume all
applicable regulatory permits other than zoning. DEC has 90 days to re-
view the permit, to approve or deny it, and may at its discretion hold
public meetings on the application. A DEC official indicated that
Frontier's application was virtually certain to gain approval.
IV.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
1958 -- Frontier begins operations at Pendleton site.
1960 through 1975 — Opposition to site develops and continues as a
result of operational problems.
June, 1973 — Explosion at Pendleton site causes 45-minute evacuation.of
surrounding area.
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Summer, 1973 — Frontier unsuccessfully seeks local approval for:ex- :
panslon of site to enlarge facility operations. ,
August, 1973•'•*•- Town of Pendleton announces its intention to .close
"* ' lagoons at the site. , • ,
Early 1974 Frontier attempts to upgrade existing operations at Pen-
dleton site. , ;
Spring/Summer, 1974 —Frontier seeks replacement sites, determines that
Niagara Falls site meets needs, and arranges
lease of that site.
Fall, 1974 — Frontier moves to Niagara Falls site and begins oper- . '
ations. -'.'• ''
December, 1974 — DEC and NCHD prohibit Frontier from accepting all '
wastes, except for odorless and colorless wastes, at
Pendleton site.
February, 1975 — Generally favorable Niagara Gazette editorial
, , welcomes Frontier,to Niagara Falls.
1977— All acceptance of wastes at Pendleton site stopped.
February, 1979 — Frontier submits application for operational ;permit
for Niagara Falls facility to DEC. 'V
May, 1979 — Deadline for DEC action on Frontier permit application. ..-'
V. ATTEMPTS TO SECURE SUPPORT -..:;.-' ' •-' ,
Frontier made no attempts to provide public information about its
Niagara Falls facility to potentially interested parties nor was there
ever any need or occasion to respond to publicly raised issues or con-
cerns . ' .. ,
VI. SUMMARY EVALUATION . •'. , .:
Frontier was able to site its Niagara Falls facility without generating'
public concern. This experience, however, should not suggest that such
non-concern was inevitable. The pubic reaction to Frontier's Pendleton
site is ample witness to the possibility that a hazardous waste
treatment facility is not inherently innocuous. On the other hand, the
above-cited editorial and comments from state, county, and Frontier
officials indicate that the treatment of hazardous waste, as opposed to
burial, is publicly perceived as an acceptable and desirable technology.
The public apparently perceives Frontier's Niagara Falls facility as
generating not only lower environmental risks but also economic benefit
by virtue, of its capacity to reclaim and recover valuable materials.
This perception is in marked contrast to public perceptions, of hazardous
waste landfills visited during this project. . . ; . •
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The characteristics of the two Frontier facilities differ greatly,
contrast as do the operations of the facilities at those sites. Those
contrasts suggest causes for the non-response to Frontier's Niagara
Falls facility. The Pendleton facility is at odds with its immediate
environment. Frontier operated an industrial facility in a semi-rural,
historically non-industrial area. The Niagara Falls site is in an
urban, industrial area and the site had been used for decades as a
chemical plant. Frontier's move to the site did not inject an alien use
into that environment, but in a real sense served to perpetuate its
historic use. Because Frontier's Niagara Falls site, unlike its
Pendleton site, precludes the use of large holding lagoons, it is
literally and figuratively less visible to the public. Finally,
Frontier's use of other firms' landfills for its non-liquid residuals
can be seen as an exportation of potential public concerns.
It should not be assumed that Frontier's experience is so anomalous that
it has no bearing on future sitings. Sites within industrial areas and
unused but adaptable industrial facilities are not unusual. The ap-
parent lack of significant public interest in Frontier's Niagara Falls
operation suggests its neutral image both as a site and a facility.
There have been no public concerns or issues raised with respect to the
Niagara Falls site.
VII. FACTORS LEADING TO PUBLIC OPPOSITION/ACCEPTANCE
Acceptance is a less accurate term in this situation than public
non-opposition. The factors contributing to this "non-opposition"
follow.
o Frontier's adaptive re-use of a former chemical plant which
had access to the city sewer system.
o The lack of need to receive new regulatory approval to be-
gin operations, thereby minimizing contacts between
Frontier and public officials or the general public.
o Public comment which saw Frontier's benefits substantially
outweighing risks.
o Frontier's "low-profile" approach to public relations.
VIII. RETROSPECTIVE VIEWS /
Regulatory officials and Frontier's president agreed that the siting of
the Niagara Falls facility proceeded smoothly and in retrospect no
changes in that process would be warranted. Should the siting be re-
peated today Frontier would have to apply for a DEC permit. Based on
the response to Frontier's February, 1979 permit application, however, a
DEC official felt that no public concerns would be raised. This, he ex-
plained, was consistent with similar facilities which require SPDES
permits. With some minor exceptions, there has been no public
opposition to the granting of these permits.
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Frontier's president cautioned that the company's experience did not
translate into public acceptance of hazardous waste treatment
facilities. He felt, in direct contrast to the view held by the DEC
Official, that public concern and opposition to the land disposal of
hazardous wastes could easily be aimed at Frontier's Niagara Falls
facility. The public, being only marginally informed, cannot make
distinctions between technologies or reputable and disreputable firms.
The tarnished public image of current hazardous waste management is a
critical problem with serious implications. The most serious
implication is siting, and.if the public is given the power to the final
decision, he felt no sites could be obtained. Bad publicity has also
made lending institutions leery of the industry and exacerbated capital
formation problems. Frontier's president felt that industry attempts to
improve this image have been and will be only counter-productJ.ve.
IX.
GENERAL COMMENTS
Frontier's president saw a need for an increased governmental role in
siting and an increase in the sophistication of regulatory agencies.
Because hazardous waste facilities are so unpopular, local elected
officials who support them do so at the risk of their public careers.
It is difficult for these officials to play a constructive role in
siting. Thus the state needs the power (i.e., preemption of local
zoning or eminent domain) to override local opposition in such a way
that local legal recourses are minimized; Such recourses could delay
siting for years, and companies willing and able to spend three years to
secure a "site are few. Regulatory agencies also need to be conscious of
the implications of their regulations on the industry, particularly in
terms of the amount of time required for the impacts of regulations to
take full effect. Frontier's president was doubtful that regulatory
agency staffs had the requisite knowledge of and experience with the
hazardous waste management industry to make informed and reasoned
decisions.
State agency comments are presented in the state program write-up
elsewhere in this report. ; ••_..•
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GULF COAST WASTE DISPOSAL AUTHORITY
TEXAS CITY, TEXAS" '
I.
INTRODUCTION
The Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Authority.- was granted a permit by the
State of Texas to operate a hazardous waste landfill and landfarming
operation in Texas City. The Authority is a public corporation
established by the state in 1969 to operate industrial wastewater and
solid waste disposal facilities for three counties in the Houston-
Galveston area. The permit for the 200-acre site was granted in early
1978 by the Texas Water Quality Board. This marked the successful
completion of nearly two years of site selection and planning by the
Authority. The Authority hopes to start disposal operations in early
1980.
The site, which was suggested by the local political establishment, is
located in a highly industrial area. Although the site is within view
of a weekend recreational community, it did not arouse any public
opposition prior to, during, or after public hearings.
A major element of the Authority's successful plan to site its facility
has been an effort to assume a low public profile. Staff has argued
against extensive public relations and education campaigns in favor of
dealings with local politicians. Had significant public opposition
developed over this site, the Authority has indicated that it would have
withdrawn its plans for the facility. . • • ,
II.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The site of the proposed 200-acre landfill and landfarming operation is
in the incorporated limits of Texas City, Texas. The existing city
sanitary landfill and the Authority's industrial wastewater treatment
plant are located to the north of the site; Swan Lake, a shrimp and crab
nursery for the Bay, is located to the east; a commercial deep-well
injection disposal site is located,to the southeast, along with an
industrial disposal pit; and a railroad and highway are located to the
west. Across the highway and about one mile to the west is a new
private recreational community of custom weekend waterfront homes. Many
of these homes literally face the site as well as other petrochemical
industry facilities. Also to the west is an abandoned hazardous waste
disposal pit that the state is trying to have cleaned up. Texas City,
which contains all of the waste generating plants that will use the ,
disposal site, is located less than five miles to the north of the site.
La Marque is a bedroom community adjoining Texas City to the northwest
of the site. The land is currently being used for livestock grazing.
It was owned by the University of Texas before it was purchased by the
Authority for the disposal site.
The state permit makes provisions to compensate for. any deficiencies in
the site's hydrogeology. Accordingly, all landfill trenches must be
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lined either with four feet of existing soil with a permeability of at
least 10"' cm/sec or with liners of three feet of compacted soils with
permeability of at least 10~7 cm/sec if existing soil cannot meet the
permeability criterion. Any groundwater-bearing sediments encountered
during excavation must be dewatered prior to installing liners.
The 200-acre landfill and landfarming area will be divided into
individual sites, the first of which will be eight acres in area,
providing a four-year waste disposal capacity. The total capacity of
the area is expected to be approximately 30 years. The permit has been
approved for the entire 200-acre site, although the Texas Water Quality
Board will be approving each individual disposal site as it is opened
for operation.
The landfill portion of the site will accommodate scrap materi.als, coke,
carbbn, metals and catalysts. The landfarming portions will accept :
water oil tank bottoms and sludges. A separate set of trenches, will
accept fluoride solutions, acid solutions and caustic solutions. The
proposed landfill and landfarm areas will be built in increments as they
are needed. This procedure is desirable because the amount of rainfall
runoff which Will have to be treated is thus minimized. Each section is
completely self-contained and when exhausted will be closed to further
waste disposal. After new soil borings are taken and their analysis
completed, the next site will be selected and constructed in the same
manner as the previous site. All equipment will be moved to the next
site and the closed site will be seeded for vegetation. A new site
within the permitted area will then be chosen after consultation with
the Texas Water Quality Board.
Scrap materials, coke, carbon, metals and catalysts require no
pre-treatment for disposal other than mixing of liquids with soil• All
such wastes will be collected and dumped into trenches. Deposited
wastes will be covered with soil once a week. Dust and fine powder
materials may require more frequent coverage. Water and sludge wastes
will be suitable for disposal through landfarming operations. Waste
sludges and liquids will be spread over the landfarm site using two
methods. The preferred method will be the direct application by the
truck that delivers the wastes to the site*; An alternative will be used
during wet weather. The wastes will be delivered to an earthen tank and
stored until the farm is dry. Then the wastes will be pumped, onto the
farm through distribution pipes.
The landfarm treatment works by absorption and biological decay. To '
assist this process, the site will be cultivated, mixing residues with
the soil and thereby allowing continuation of the bibdegradation
process, while at the same time exposing fresh soil to receive new < "-
wastes. •- •
Runoff water from the landfarm will be collected and pumped to the
adjoining Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Authority wastewater treatment
plant. The fluoride, acid and caustic solution wastes will require
special handling. Some of these wastes require special treatment to
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neutralize the pH prior to placement in the trenches. This group of
wastes will be divided into compatible sub-groups: fluoride solutions,
acid solutions and centrifuge filter cake. Each sub-group will be
deposited in a separate disposal area and covered daily with earth.
Liquids will be mixed with soil.
The facility design incorporates a number of other safeguards. A series
of ditches will divert surface runoff from active disposal areas.
Monitoring wells will be constructed for approximately every 20 acres
and samples will be analyzed monthly for the first year, quarterly
thereafter. Dikes will surround disposal sites to protect against major
floods and the entire site will be fenced.
As described above, the facility will accept a broad range of wastes.
The wastes will be in solid, semi-solid, and liquid states. All wastes
to be accepted are those generated within the jurisdictional area of the
Authority, primarily from petrochemical industries in Texas City.
The Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Authority is a quasi-governmental
authority which operates four treatment plants for industrial clients.
In addition, the Authority provides assistance to area municipalities,
helping to solve their waste treatment problems.
Texas City (1978 population: 45,000).is located on Galveston Bay, ten
miles from Galveston and 30 miles from Houston. The economy of the
Texas City area is strongly based on the petroleum and petrochemical
industry. Area residents and officials have a long history of both
depending on these industries economically and cooperating with them to
solve industry-related problems.
III. HISTORY OF FACILITY DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC RESPONSE
Under Texas law, commercial-industrial waste sites not owned and
operated by and located within 50 miles of the waste generator must
receive a permit from the Texas Water Quality Board. The law also
requires public hearings on such commercial-industrial waste disposal
permits. The discharge permit issued by the Board is the only state
permit required in developing a commercial landfill. No local permits
are required, and land use controls are generally non-existent
throughout Texas and do not apply to the site.
The Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Authority was created in 1969 to own and
operate industrial wastewater treatment facilities. The authority was
created as a public corporation by the State of Texas with the power to
issue tax-exempt bonds to finance its disposal operations in three
counties in the Houstori-Galveston area.
It was modeled after the regional water pollution agency in the Ruhr
Valley of Germany and was to be a special-purpose district covering
seven counties in the Houston-Galveston area with regulatory and
operating authority. Local elected officials opposed this type of
authority because it diminished their existing landfill and wastewater
-------
responsibilities. Some industries, especially those that had mounted
effective water pollution control programs of their own, opposed the
Authority and the possibility of further government regulations. The
general public also expressed some opposition to the taxing authority
proposed for the Authority.
The final state legislation created a smaller (three-county) Authority
and provided seed funds to start its operation. The final legislation
also limited the Authority to waste disposal operational responsibili-
ties. Regulatory responsibilitj.es were left to other state and federal
agencies. (The enabling legislation can be found in Appendix 1.)
Since the creation of the Authority, its public profile has faded to the
point where most citizens are probably not aware of its existence. At
the height of public opposition to its creation, however, the Authority
was accused of acting solely to benefit industry by using its power to
issue tax-exempt bonds for the construction of industrial wastewater
treatment facilities. No counter campaign was mounted by the Authority
even though local environmental groups were quite vocal on this issue.
Since 1970, other issues have occupied local citizen groups. '
Furthermore, the subsequent increase in Gulf shrimp and oyster catches
in nearby waters has reduced any potential environmental concerns over
wastewater pollution controls.
Since the Authority began operations, the General Manager has countered
public opposition with the effective and respected operation of the -.
Authority. There have been no campaigns to secure support for the
Authority. His rationale for a low-profile strategy came from his years
of experience as a city manager involved in many forms of public
opposition.
In 1976, the Authority sought the advice of the mayor of Texas City and
a local county commissioner on potential sites for a new venture into
industrial hazardous waste disposal. Based on their review of other
siting attempts in Texas, the Authority decided first to contact local
elected officials. Members of the Authority had attended public
hearings in other parts of the state to learn what the siting problems
were and how to fight them. As a result of this review, the Authority
concluded that the site had to be located in an industrial area with the
help of local politicians and that no amount of public education would
make the public willingly accept a hazardous waste site. In other
words, they felt that, "to know a hazardous waste site is not to love
it." The Authority was convinced that educating the public on hazardous
waste disposal techniques and site suitability was not useful and
probably counterproductive since it gave the proposal an unnecessarily
high profile. They felt that siting was a purely political problem that
should be left to local politicians.
The decision to focus on political problems of siting was made possible
because much of the area under the Authority's jurisdiction is or can be
made technically suitable for hazardous waste disposal. Sites not : ,
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already technically suitable can be made so with engineering
modifications such as dikes or clay liners, which Would change only the
cost of operation.
The mayor of Texas City suggested a suitable site in the spring of 1977,
and an application for a permit for this site was prepared and submitted
to the Texas Water Quality Board in the autumn of that year. Public
hearings were held shortly thereafter in Houston and Austin as a
standard part of the permit process. Required notice of these hearings
was given; however, in keeping with the Authority's low-profile ,
approach, no steps beyond the legal requirements were taken to inform
the public of the hearings. No opposition whatsoever was voiced at
these hearings. Only the state and members of the Authority were
present at these hearings. The Texas City mayor had been scheduled as a
witness in support of the proposal, since all of the wastes were to be
generated by plants in the Texas City area, but his testimony was not
required. Although advised of the meeting through newspaper notices, no
local residents appeared at the hearing or gave any other indication of
being opposed to the facility. Following the public hearings, the Texas
Water Quality Board issued the Authority a permit for the site in
February of 1978.
During the two-year period leading up to the issuance of the permit, no
public opposition was voiced. The Authority indicated that had there
been significant opposition, the site plans would have been dropped.
The Authority is expected to begin disposal operations early in 1980.
IV.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
1969 — Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Authority is created.
1976 — The Authority seeks the advice of local officials on potential
sites for a hazardous waste disposal facility.
Spring, 1977 — The mayor of Texas City suggests a suitable site.
Autumn, 1977 — The Authority submits an application for a permit for
the site to the Texas Water Quality Board. Public
hearings on the application are held in Houston and Aus-
tin. There is no indication of any opposition to the
facility.
February, 1978 — The Texas Water Quality Board issues a permit for the
site.
Spring, 1980 — Expected date on which disposal operations will begin
at the site.
V.
ATTEMPTS TO SECURE SUPPORT
Actions taken by the Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Authority to secure sup-
port for this facility include the following:
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VI.
o They solicited the advice of local Apolitical officials and
allowed them ..to choose the-site.
SUMMARY EVALUATION .-.'",
There are four reasonsrwhy the Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Authority was
able to si,te a hazardous waste disposal facility without public
opposition: 1) they kept a low public profile; 2) the site is in a
heavily, industrial area; "3) :,they had local ...political support; and 4) the
wastes to be disposed of there are generated locally. Each of these is
discussed below. It does not seem that the Authority's being a ,
state-created public corporation affected the site approval process.
Their success is in, sharp contrast to many other siting attempts in
Texas which have been intensely opposed by the public. '
Industrial Area — The perceived .impact of a hazardous waste facility on
the environment and/or quality of life in an area is likely to be
greater where similar operations do not already exist. There have been
waste disposal operations in the Texas City-La Marque area for many
years. A municipal landfill, an industrial disposal pit, a wastewater
treatment plant and a commercial deep-well injection site adjoin the
proposed hazardous waste site. There is also an abandoned hazardous
waste pit in the area which has received some sporadic public attention
but has not created any sustained concern about hazardous wastes.
Therefore, although the site' is in plain view of a recreational
community — weekend waterfront homes --there was no public outcry.
Local Wastes - In addition to having learned to live with waste disposal
in an industrial area, the local public is also clearly aware of the
fact that the area's prosperity is due to the petrochemical industry.
The Mayor of Texas City said that fourteen years ago a series of
meetings was held between industry and the public to explore the
undesirable side-effects of the industry and ways to minimize their
pfoblems. Since t-hat time the citizens have lived harmoniously with
industry. The local residents appreciate the fact that these industries
must dispose of wastes and that a disposal site in their area is just
one more fact of life.
Political Support - Although having a waste disposal facility in the
area did not arouse any opposition, it was still necessary to involve
local politicians in the selection of a particular site. The Authority
left this decision entirely up to the local political leadership. The
mayor of Texas City had previously been involved in siting a municipal
landfill and based on this experience he recommended that the hazardous
waste disposal facility be sited,in an adjoining,area. The, entire
region is endowed with low-permeability clay formations making the
difference between specific locations a matter of proper site
engineering. Therefore, the site most politically acceptable was also
technically acceptable. This minimized the possibility of local
political opposition. It was felt,by the Authority that the mayor's
decision reflected the public,1 s preference. :
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Low Profile — Having reviewed the experiences of other agencies and
corporations trying to site hazardous waste facilities in Texas, the
Authority felt that trying to educate the general public on hazardous
waste disposal issues in support of site selection was unnecessary.
They argued that a public education and awareness program was not useful
because the public could not be expected to willingly accept such a site
simply because it understood the problem. Furthermore, they felt that
such a program might be counterproductive, since it might create opposi-
tion where none would exist otherwise. The Authority did provide all
the necessary public announcements, hearings, and media coverage of its
intent to site and operate a disposal facility. However, they did not
conduct a public relations campaign to secure support for the site.
VII. FACTORS LEADING TO PUBLIC OPPOSITION/ACCEPTANCE
In summary, the major factors contributing to the successful siting
were:
o The area has a heavy concentration of petrochemical plants
that generate the wastes to be disposed.
o The inhabitants of surrounding areas both within and
adjoining Texas City are dependent, on the continuing tax
base and employment opportunities represented by the
petrochemical plants.
o The site was suggested and strongly supported by the local
political leaderships.
o Other municipal, commercial and industrial waste disposal
facilities have been in operation in the area for many
years.
o The Authority maintains a low profile with regard to its
waste disposal activities to avoid generating public op-
position.
o The Authority has established a good reputation in
wastewater disposal enterprises over the past nine years.
VIII. RETROSPECTIVE VIEWS
For officials of the Authority the successful siting of a hazardous
waste disposal facility has confirmed their original strategy of
maintaining a low public profile and selecting an industrial area with
the help of local political leaders. They have indicated that they have
no cause to regret this strategy and intend to repeat it in future waste
disposal facility plans.
The Mayor of.Texas City, who actively participated in the site selection
process, also felt that everything done in the siting of this facility
represented a proper and effective course of action. If given a chance
to participate in a similar site selection process, he has said that he
would do it the same way.
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APPENDIX:
ENABLING LEGISLATION FOR THE .
* "' " •
GULF COAST WASTE DISPOSAL AUTHORITY
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Chapter 409, Acts of the 61st Legislature of the
State of Texas, Regular Session, 1969
As Amended By
Chapter 202, Acts of the 62nd Legislature of the
State of Texas, Regular Session, 1971; Chapters 258
and 466, Acts of the 63rd Legislature of the
State of Texas, Regular Session, 1973; and
Chapter 443, Acts of the 64th Legislature of the
State of Texas, Regular Session, 1975
(Originally Codified as
Article 7621d-2, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes)
THE GULF COAST WASTE DISPOSAL AUTHORITY
Compiled July 1, 197'
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Subchapter 1. Goner.=i I'H -visions : I
Section 1.01 -i'i:rpo>o .;. . - - - - - 1
Section 1.02 - l-'i-uhna- and declaration of policy : 1
Section 1.03" Dolini'.u.n.s . J
Subchapter 2. Adinii-istrative Provisions 2
Section 2.01 - (.'ration of Authority . . ,....-......., 2
Section 2.02 - l)< Sv.ription 3
Section 2.03 - B .ard .,..,...'. - . .-.. . 3
Section 2.04 - Q-iaHI'ication of directors 3
Section 2.05 - TVr:n> of directors and appointment procedures . ., 3
Section 2.06 - Qualification by directors ........... , . - 4
Section 2.07 - Meetings and action.^ of the board 4
Section 2.08 -Organization of board - 4
Section 2.09 - Interest in contract 5
Section 2.10 - Director's compensation 5
Section 2.1 1 - Genera! Manager ..'..' ............ 5
Section 2.12 - Directors' and employees' bonds ......... 5
Section 2.13'- Principal officer .- . 5
Section 2.14- Records ....... '. . '. . 6
Section 2.15- Seal , • ;• • • - 6
Section 2.16-Suit ... .... - - - - . . - 6
Subchapter 3. Powers and Duties ..".. 6
Section 3.0! - General powers and duties 6
Section 3.02 - Authority rules .•'.. 7
Section 3.03 - Inspections and investigations ',_ '7
Section 3.04 - Hearings 7
Section 3,05 - Penalties .... ...... , 7
Section 3.0ft - Court review 8
Section 3.07 - Authority of local governments ...... 8
Section 3.08 - Water quality standards and criteria 8
Section 3.09 - Enforcement of state water standards :........ 9
Section 3.10 - Master plan 9
Section 3.11- Regulation of solid waste disposal .10
Section 3.1 2 - Septic tanks 10
Section 3.! 3 - Disposal of waste from watercraft ; ,11
Section 3.14 - Acquisition, con.struction, and operation of disposal systems 11
Section 3.15- Waste disposal contracts 11
Section 3.16- Sale of water and. by-products 12
Section 3.17 - Permits from Texas water ri«hts commission . 12
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Section 3.18- Eminent domain 12
Section 3.1^ - Rilo.-ai.ion of facilities • - • '2
Section 3.20 - iSc of public easc-inents • 12
Section 3.21 - Acq-.u-ition and disposition of property 12
Section 3.22 - Facilities - 13
Section 3.23 - Contracis generally - -13
Section 3.24 - Cooperative agreements - - H
Subchapter 4. General Fiscal Provisions 14
Section 4.01 - Disbursement of funds . . , 14
Section 4.02 - I'e-.-s and charges 15
Section 4.03 - loans and grants 15
Section 4.04 - fiscal year and audit by state auditor 15
Section 4.05 - Slate auditor's report 15
Section 4.06 -Cost of state auditor's audit 15
Section 4.07 - Independent audit .-.. - 15
Section 4.OS - Depository banks • '1.6
Subchapter 5. Bond and Tax Provisions :.. . . 16
Section 5.01 - Bonds , 16
Section 5.02 - Refunding bonds ...........' 17
Section 5.03 - Approval and registration of bonds 1,8
Section 5.04 - Bund election ....... 18
Section 5.05 - Maintenance tax 18
Section 5.06 - Election - - - IS'
Section 5.07 - Rendition, assessment, equalization, levying, and collection of taxes . I1)
Section 5.08 - Tax limit -'. 19
Section 5.09 - Bonds authorized investments ..20
Subchapter 6. Pollution Control Districts 20
Section 6.01 - Pollution control districts 20
Section 6.02 - Establishment of districts 20
Section 6.03 - Boundaries and addition of territory 22
Section 6.04 - Taxation • 23
Section 6.05 - Bonded indebtedness 23
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SL'BCH-UMt.R I. GHNHRAL PROVISION'S
Purpose ' ,
Scv.t:oi] ''.'!!. I: ie purpose.of this Act is to establish an instrumentality for
developing and el'f-.vM.ir.'i: tor Chambers. GaKeston. and Harris Counties a regional water
quality management progiim including provision of Waste disposal systems and regulation
of disposal of w..i-us.
i-'indings and declaration of policy
Sec. l.'i'. It is hereby found and declared that the quality of waters in
Chambers. Cialwstou. ;.nd Harris Counties is materially affected by the disposal of wastes
throughout those ..-.unities: thai regional approaches to studying water pollution in these
counties, to planmnsi corrective and preventive measures, to providing coordinated facilities
for wa^le disposal, .ird Jo rcgi.-ating waste disposal would be far more effective than efforts
on a county-wide. «.:ty-\vk!e. i>r smaller scale: that solid wastes, as well as other kinds
of waste, may imp.i-r water quality by seepage, drainage, and otherwise:.that creation
of the diilf Coast Waste Disposal Authority would advance the established policy of the.
state to maintain the q u;!i:y of the w.tters in the .state consistent with the public health
and public enjoyment then of. the propagation and protection of terrestrial and aquatic
life, the opcraticn of c\Kti:i;j industiies, and the economic development of .the state: and
that impending short.ipe of water in the district for beneficial uses requires that all
reasonable 'measures u> be taken to prevent and abate water .pollution, .and to reclaim
polluted water for buK-ficial uses.
Definitions
this Act.
Sec. 1.0.'. (a) in this Act. unless the context requires a different definition,
•(!-) "Authority" means the Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Authority created by
(2)
"Board" mvans the board of directors of the authority.
(?) "Director" means a member of the board.
(4) "District" means the territory included in the authority.
(5) "I'erson" means .my individual, public or private corporation, political
subdivision, governmental agency, municipality, copartnership, association, firm, trust,
estate or any other entity whatsoever.
{<•>) "Oualifs board" means the "I exas Water Quality Board created by Chapter
313. AUs of the <>Uth I.cuM.itiire. Regular Session. 1S)67 (Article 762 Id- 1 . Vernon's Texas
Civil Statutes), tir its succvssr.rs.
(7) "Rule" includes regulation.
('S> "Water" means grbundwater. percolating or otherwise; lakes, bays, ponds,
impounding reservoirs, springs.. rivers, streams, creed.s. estuaries, marshes, inlets, canals, the
dull' of Mexico within the district, and all other bodies of surface water, natural or artificial,
inland or coastal, fresh or salt, navigable or non-navigable, that are wholly or pariiaily
svithin the district. .
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(;» 'W.t.-i-i" means sewage,. uuhistiial waste, municipal waste, recreational
waste. agri.'ulS'.ira1 \a-i.-.cr other waste, as defined in this section. ,
(i()i 'St\\.ir\" means waterborne human or animal waste.
(11) "Muc- > pal waste" means \\aterborne liquid. gaseous, m; solid substances
that ro.\ i-isjharge lY-nn a publicly owned sewer s\ stem, tivainsent facility.,
or disposal sy-ti ir..
( 11 > " K .-..eational waste" means watcihorne liquid. gaseous, or solid
substances tli.i' cm.sMaK trom any public or private park, beach., or recreational area.
(1.?) " Agricultural waste" means waierborne liquid. g.iseous. or solid
substances that u"ise from any type of agricultural activity, including \\atcrborne poisons
and insecticides US.M i:i agricultural activities.
(1.4 J ' Industrial waste" means waterboine liquid, gaseous, or solid substances
that result from any process of industry, manufacturing, trade, or business.
(15 I 'Other \\.iste" means garbage, refuse, decayed wood, sawdust, shavings.
bark. vmd. li:n.%. . ihders. ashes, offal, oil. tar. dyestuffs. acids, chemicals, salt water, or
any other subst.m. >.. other than sewage, industrial \\.iste. municipal waste, recreational
waste, or agriculti-r: ! waste, that may cause-iinp:iirmenr of the qualit> of the water in
the state.
(Ifi) "Solid waste" means any putrescibL- or non-putrescible discarded
material, including but not .limited to garbage and reiuse.
(17) "\\;iter pollution"' means the alteration of the physical, chemical, or
biological quality of. or the contamination of. water that renders the water harmful.
detrinHMH.il or iniur; HIS to humans, animal life, vegetation or property or to public health.
safety, or welfare, or impairs the usefulness or the public enjoyment of the. water for
any lawful or u-asoiuible purpose.
(18) "Sewer s\stem" means pipelines, conduits, canals, pumping stations.
force mains, and all other constructions, devices, and appurtenant applicances used to
transport waste. •
(I1)) "Treatment facility" means any plant, disposal field, lagoon, incinerator,
area devoted to sanitary landfills, or other facility inst-.Uied for the purpose of treating.
neutrali/ing, or stabilizing waste.
(.20) "Disposal system" means any system for disposing of waste, including
sewer systems and treatment facilitic.s.
(21) "Local government" means an incorporated city, a county, a river
authority, or a water district or authority acting under Article III, Section 52. or Article
XVI. Section 59. of the Texas Constitution.
(22) 'Outside the district" means the area contained in counties adjacent
to the district.
Sl'BCHAPTFR 2. ADMiNISTRATIVh PROVISIONS
Creation of authority.
Section 2.01. There is hereby created, pursuant to Article XVI. Section 51'..
of the Texas Constitution, a conservation and reclamation district to ho known as the
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Gulf Coast W:sjo,i! Authority, which slutil be a governmental agency and body
politic aivd ci.-rpor '•'••• '•• :ii-.'-State of f'exus. A •c.iit'inn.ition election .shall not be necessary.
Description
Sev. 1.1)2 1 he authority's ierritoix. consists oi i:,e area inside the h'-.tiularie--
of ("li.imbers.Ci i!vvM'>; . hul Harris Counties. The le'r^Ltiure'd.vl:!rv'-> That a!! riie-area
included in the district 'will be benefited, by -the exercise oi the.powers conferred h% this
Act. ': -.' - .. ' - •--•.. ' / ••• '• '
Board • ; ' "
Sec 203. (a) The authority's powers, rights, duties, and functions are
exercised by a bo.srd of directors.
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each munici|-aiitic u •>:,.• ih-pM-.a! Council shall meet at :i :ime and. place designated by
its tempor.ir. .-ii.iJM'.a i .rio-- notice o! the time and place D! that meet mi: has been mailed
by the temporary i- iirn .in to i-.iv.-h member of the council at least 4x luutrs prior to
the time fixed f. .- : ... :. i-. ctiiu:. A; that me-Mini:. the council shall elect a chairman.
vice-chairman. :ni K.CI.-I i: c. and -h.i!! adopt Mich bylaws ivl.itin.u to ihe conduct of it*
alTairs as the v-i.-u.-ii --hil: determine to be necessary.
(d) \V.h_--: ; director's term expiies. his successor shall be appointed by the
same source a;u! n.- ;l!e - :me manner as was the director whoso term expired.
(e) Ui.ei; a doctor's olfice becomes vac.mt' by death, resignation, or
removal, the une.\:vrvd term sluli be filled by the same source and in the same-manner
as was the direct.•! whose oifice IMS become vacant.
Qualification by directors
Stc .!.')6. To (i»a!ilV for office, each director must
(1) t ko the oath of office prescribed by Article !(•>. Revised Civil Statutes
of Tcxat, 1925:
(2) s^ocutc a bond in the amount of 55.000 with a corporate surety
authorized to do business in this state conditioned on the faithful per.forma.nco of his
duties; and
(3) file a copy of his bond with the secretary of state, and with the
commissioners court of the count}, from which he is appointed.
Meetings and actions of the board
Sec. 2.07. (a) The board shall meet at least once each month, and may
meet at any other time provided in its bylaws.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this Act. the vote of a majority of
directors is required for board action.
(c) The hoard slus!! adopt bylaws at its tiiM meetinu or as soon thereafter
as possible.
Organization of board
Sec. 2.08. (a) The board shall elect from its members a chairman.
vice-chairman, secretary, and other officers it deems necessary. A person who, is elected
to a hoard office shall servo for two years in that capacity or until he ceases to be a
director, if this event occurs within two years. Officeis1 terms shall commence on
September I.
(b) At its September meetini: each year, the board shall elect officers for
the offices to be filled.
(c) If a vacancy occurs in a board office, ihe directors at the next monthly
meeting shall elect a person to serve until the next September meeting of the board.
(d) The board's bylaws shall prescribe llse powers, duties, and procedures
for removal from board office of officers that it elects.
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Interest in contract
Sec. T-O-'i A director v.ho is financially interested in a contract to he executed
bv the authoritv '.;•>.. ;;-j f-.ucluise ui properly --r the constructionof f.ic'ili'.ies shall disclose
thru fact to lii • >'aj ,1,rectors a"d may not \o!c on liie acceptance ol.the contract.
Director's compensation :,
Se>.. 2.10. (a) -\ director is entitled to re.ceive ail allowance of S25 a day
and reimburseme-;! tor actual and necessary expenses incurred
(1) ;'or each dav he spends attendir.i! meetings of the board: and
(2) 'or each day he spends attending to the business of the authority which
is authorized I\v a resolution ui tlu- hoard. '
(bi X director is. not ciuiiled to receive a per diem allowance for more
than 12(1 days h; >:-.\ one calendar \ear.
General mannijer'
Sec.-2.1 i. (aV.The board shall employ a general manager for a term and
salary set by the boatJ, • . • .
(bi The general mai:ager is the chief executive officer of the authority.
Under policies established by the board." lie is responsible to the board for
(1) administering the directives of the board:
(2) keeping the authority's records, including minutes of the -board's-;
meetings:
(3) coordinating with state, federal, and local agencies:
(4) .developing plans and programs for the board's approval:
(5) hiring, supervising, training, and discharging the authority's employees:
(6) contracting for or retaining technical, scientific, legal, fiscal, and other
professional services: and •
(7) performing auy other duties assigned to him by the hoard.
(c) The board may discharge the genera! manager upon a majority \ote
of all the qualified directors.
Directors" and employees* bonds ,
Sec. 2.12. (a) The general manager and each employee of the authority
charged with the collection, custody. or payment of auy'money .of the authorit\ shall
execute a fidelity bond. The board, shall approve the form, amount, and .surety of the
bond, , • <
(b) The authority shall pay the premiums on the employees' bonds under
this .section and the directors' bonds under Section 2.0o (2) of this Act.
Principal office , j ;
Sec. 2.13. The authority shall maintain its principal office inside the district.
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Records
Se«. ' I 4, ;i:! Tii-.- authority Mi.-!l keep complete and accurate, -accounts of,
it's business Ins !••:. i •> •> 11 a'-cord-iiice with generally accepted methods of accounting.
l:>- "I iv : :!'i'>rit\ sh.il! keep complete and accurate minutes Mi" its meetings.
(-•' "I ic :• ! l.ority sit si! keep its accounts. ciKiM'.tcts. documents, minutes.
and other ree«r economics uf operation of industries.
(e) 1 xc-'pt ,i {••!•• i\ idod in Subsection (d) of t'ni.s section, the authority shall
permit reasonahv i-uhii-: ii-spection of its records during regular business hours.
Seal
S.-c. _'. .•». "Hi.- authority shall adopt a soul.'the form of which it may alter
from rime to tstr-e
Suit
• . "
S-v. 2.1 i'-.. The authority may sue and be sued in its corporate name.
SM5OIAITI.R 3. POWKRS AND DUT1HS .
Genera! powers and duties
Sec. .1.01. (a) The authority sh-all administer and enforce the terms of this
Act and shall use its fa.-ilities and powers to accomplish the purpose of this Act.
(bj '1 he authority shall conduct studies and research for the control of water
pollution and waste dipsosal within the district. It shall cooperate with the Gaheston
Bay Study of the quality board and utilize the results of that study.
(c) The regulatory powers of the authority under this Act extend to every
person, .is that term is defined in this Act. ' -. .
(d) Kxcept as expressly limited by this Act. the authority shall ha\e all
powers, rights, .iiul privileges necessary and convenient ior accomplishing the purposes
ot this Act conferred by genera! law upon any conservation aiid reclamation district created
pursuant to Article X\'I. Section 5l>. of the Texa< Constitution. •
("e) SuHect only to the authority vested by general law., and particularly
the Texas Water Quality Act (Article 7o21d-l. -Vernon's Texas (i\i! Suti.uesi. ;IS MOW
or hereatter amended, in the-qualiiy board and the state agencies repivsented on the quality
board, the authority is empowered to control .water pollution and waste diposal within
the district. . . •-.•••,-
(f) The powers granted to the authoirty in this Act are cumulative of all
powers granted by other laws, now or hereafter existing, which are In their ternis applicable
to the authority.
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. AuthoriU rules
Se«.. i.'l. . ( t.' The authority shall adopt and enforce rules reasonably required
to effectuate t!-e p'vv:-.io|.> ot tin-. Act. including rules governing procedure and practice
before the b<'^-\. •
(hi In .-d-v.'iing rule-., the bo.trd shall compix. as appropriate, with the
requirements t-l •.'I'.ip'c 274. Acts of the 57th Legislature. Regular Session. 1U(>1, as
amended (Artic;c '>j:52' Lv V'ernon's Texas Civil Statutes).
(o . H;e noard .'shall print its- rules and turnish copies to any person on
his written reiujs...:.
Inspections and investigations
Se>.. 3 (.'3. (a) Under the same provisions and restrictions applicable to the
quality hoaro or it-- successor, the authority ma\ enter public or private property for
the purpose ol i-is-.n cling and investigating .conditions relating to water quality and waste
disposal in the liNniet. • ..'••'.
(h) The authority >hall transmit the results of its inspections and
investigations to the mu'ity board. •
*
Hearings
Sec. .:.('4 The board may
(1) imld hearings, receive pertinent tind relevant proof from any party in
interest who appears before the board, compel the attendance of witnesses, make findings'
of fact and determinations with respect to administering the .provisions of thU Act or
of any orders or rules of the authority: and
(2) delegate to one or more of its members or to one or imore of its
employees, the authority to take testimony in any hearing called by the authority, or
authorized by the authority to be held, with power to administer oaths, but all orders
entered shall be m.:de by and in the name of the authority after its official action and
attested to by the proper members of the board of dhectors.
Penalties
Sec. 3.05. (a) A person who violates a rule, permit, or order of the authority
is subject to a civil penally of not less than $50 nor more than S1.000 for each day
of violation. The authority ma> sue to recover the penalty in a distric; court in the
county where the violation occurred. Penalties shall be paid to the authority.
, (b) The authority may sue for injunctive relief-in a district court in the
county where a violation of its rule, permit, or order occurred or is threatened. In any
such suit, the court sliall have.jurisdiction to grant to the authoritv. \\itliout bond or
other undertaking, sue!', prohibitory and mandatory injunctions as the facts may warrant.
including temporary restraining orders, after notice and hearing, temporary ".injunctions,
or permanent injunctions.
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proceeding.
suction.
(c) ~1 h.* :!Jt;u»rify may sue l<-.r injnnctivc relief and penalties in the same
(ih !.') -\ person who is adversely affected by a rule. act. or order
of the authority'may sue t'u- authority in a district court to set aside the rule. act. or
order. The suit s'l.dl he hU-d within 60- days after the day on which the rule, act, or
order took effei?.
(hi Venue for suits under Subsection (a) of this section is in any county
in the district.
Authority of local, governments
Sec. 307. (a) Under the same provisions and restrictions as are applicable
to the authority, a lo.'.il government may go in and on public and private property to
make inspections to i let ermine, compliance with the rules, permits, or orders of the
authority. A local government shall transmit the results of its inspections to the authority.
(b) \ local government, upon formal resolution of its governing bcxly. may
sue to enforce the provisions of Section 3.05 of this Act and for the penalties and injunctive
relief provided theiei-i. The authority is a necessary party to a suit under this subsection.
Penalties recoveied in such actions shall lie paid to the authority.
Water quality standards and criteria
Sec. 3.08. (a) After public hearing, the authority shall prescribe standards
and criteria for the waters in the district.
(b) After the authority has prescribed standards and criteria, it shall forward
a copy of the standards and criteria to the quality board for approval.
(c) The quality board shall consider, the standards and criteria.
(d) If the quality board objects to the standards and criteria in any respect.
it shall -.o notify the authority in writing within <;() days after receiving the proposed
standards and criteria, stating the objections and the reasons therefor. '1 he authority shall
amend its standards and criteria in light of the quality board's timely objections. When
the authority has amended the standards and criteria in light of the quality board's
objections, the quality board shall promptly evidence its approval of the amended standards
and criteria in writing.
(o) If the quality board does not notify the authority that it objects to
the standards and criteria within ^0 days after receiving thorn, they are operative at the
end of the 90-day period. If the quality board notifies-the authority within the- C)0-day
period that it objects to the standards and criteria. tho> are operative from the date the
quality board approves them.
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hnlm cement ol state water standards
Sec >.' l) I "pi The authority shall prepare a master plan encompassing plans
for the maxiinu'! i abatement and prevention of water pollution, plans for the control
of waste • disposa"; m.I'plans and methods for the treatment and control of waste water
that would other .v.se c.iuse pollution. The master plan shall show at least: (1 ) the nature
and location of existing w.iste disposal systems in the district: and (2) the nature and
location of proposed waste disposal systems which will be needed in the district within
stated periods of time to maintain desired water quality. The master plan shall be a
guide for devcU-p'iu-n't of such systems by the authority and by other persons.
(b) Tie master plan shall be filed with the quality board, for its re vie w
and approval. If the quality board shall -not notify the authority "" writing of its disapproval
of the plan in any respect within LSD days of filing, its app< shall not be required.
Any objection^ to the plan by the quality board shall be sui-......ed in writing to the
authority, and when the objections'are met to the satisfaction of the quality board, it
shall promptly evidence its approval in writing.
.(c) The master plats so approved shall be available for'inspection by the
public at the authority's principal office.
(d> "I he master plan may be amended or supplemented by the authority.
provided that a copy of such amendment or supplement to the master plan shall be filed
and approved in accordance with Subsection (b) of this section.
(e) The first master plan, as amended or supplemented, shall be effective
for a period of 10 years. Upon the expiration of each 10-year period, the authority
shall revise its master plan and a copy of said revised plan shall be filed and approved
in accordance with Subsection (b) of this-section.
(f) Prior to the adoption of a master plan, or any amendment, supplement,
or revision effecting any substantial change, the authority shall give notice to the public
that it proposes to adopt such master plan, amendment, supplement, or revision, by causing
a notice describing its general nature to be published once in a newspaper of general
circulation in each county in the district. In addition to such publication, a copy of
such notice shall be transmitted by mail to the county judge of each county Within the
district, to the mayor of each incorporated municipality within the district, and to the
manager or presiding director of every water district within the district which has registered
with the Texas Water Rights Commission under Chapter 62. Acts of the 54th Legislature.
Regular Session. 1955, as amended (Article X280--7. Yernon's Texas 'Civil Statutes), such
notice to be mailed not less than 20 days before the regular meeting at which the .master
plan, amendment, supplement, or revision is to be considered for the first time. Failure
in delivery of notice does not invalidate the action taken.
(g) Such master plan, amendment, supplement, or revision may be
considered and approved at the regular meeting of the hoard next following the last date
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of publication or \v:t'i«-ii? fi'inlier notice, at any regular meeting thereafter. However,
any amemhM-.-nt. -urp .• u til. or revision to a duly approved and liled master plan \vhich
is made cftcc.tr. ' ">> I.A\ >i by original action of tire qualiu hoard sluil not be subject
to the notice ret; li e:>u n ;• of Subsection (f) of this section.
(h) 1:;-. :i I •!-native vote of at least a majority or" .ill the directors is required
for the approv.,1 o; ;!><. -luster plan, amendment, supplement, or. revision.
(i) At:cr t.ie master plan has been tiled \vitit and 'approved by the quality
board, a copyo. siv p':.n of any waste disposal system or water pollution abatement
proposal, or o! ';:ii.' ivqiu-sr tor permit or authority submitted to the quality board, to
be operative wi'iun the district, not now or hereafter exempted by law from the
requirement for .1.o. i.ri.'ig .1 permit, shall be submitted in such form as the authority
shall require to -h* ai'.thortty at its principal office by the party making the proposal
or request. In c t^ • the proposed plan or request is one b> law requiring action by the
quality board, til-1 . i.tliority shall have the right to present its viesvs and recommendations
to the quaht\ h->:rt and receive notice of any hearings conducted by it in the matter.
Should the propt-s <.! plan or request he one not requiring by law action by the quality
board, then the ..u hori'ty shall hold a hearing at which the proponents of the proposed
plan or request in i\ pivsent their evidence and recommendations.
Ij") ri:e authority' -.hall approve such proposal requiring only its action, if
it finds such proposal Compatible with the authority's master plan: final approval or
disapproval slut!! issue from the authority within °0 days after receipt of a cop> of such
proposal or request.
(k) If approved. Mich proposal or request shall be incorporated into the
master plan.
Regulation of solid waste disposal
See. 3.11. (a) The authority shall establish minimum standards-of operation
for all aspects of solid waste h.indling, including but not limited to storage, collection,
incineration, sanitary landfill, or composting. Before establishing such standards, the
authority shall:
(1) hold public hearings after having given public notice in the time and
manner prescribed by the rules of the board; .
(2) consult with the quality board, the Texas Air Control Board, and the.
Texas State Department of Health to insure that the standards are not inconsistent with
established criteria: and
(3) find that the standards are reasonably necessary for protection of public
health or welfare from water pollution or other environmental harm.
(b) To amend standards, the authority shall follow the same procedures
required for establishing standards.
(c) The authority may make rules reasonably necessary to 'implement solid
waste disposal standards. These rules may include issuance and revocation of permits
for operation of solid waste disposal sites and other aspects of solid waste handling.
Septic tanks
Sec. 3.12. (a) If it finds that because of the nature of the soil or drainage
in the area it is neccessary to prevent water pollution that ma> directly or indirectly
injure the public health, the authority by rule may
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(1) provide limits on the-number and kind of septic tanks In any area
defined in the rule;
(2) forbid the use of septic tanks in the area; or -
(3) forbid the installation of new septic tanks in the area.
(b) The board shall consult with the- Texas State Department of Health
and the quality board prior to the adoption of a'rule under Subsection (a) of this section.
(c) The board may provide in the order for a gradual and systematic
reduction of the number or kind, of septic tanks in-the area and may by rule provide
for a system of licensing and issuing permits for the installation of new septic 'tanks in
the area affected, in which event no person may install septic tanks in the area without
a license or permit from the board. ,
(d) The board may not issue a rule under Subsection (a) of this section
without first holding a public, hearing in the area to be affected by the rule.
Disposal of waste from \vatercraft :
Sec. 3.13. (a) The authority may enforce within the district the rules of
any agency of the State of Texas concerning the disposal of waste from v/atercraft.
(b) It also may make and enforce- its own rules concerning the disposal
of waste from watercraft. after public hearing and finding that such rules are reasonably
necessary to'minimize water pollution.
Acquisition, construction, and operation of disposal systems
Sec. 3.14. (a) The authority «
(1) may acquire and provide by purchase, gift or lease any disposal systems
within or outside the district; i •
(2.) may;"' construct and provide disposal systems \vithin or outside the
district; ; ,'''"•,'.'" •
(3) 'may' operate and sell any disposal systems "that it constructs or acquires;
.(4) may contract with any person to operate and maintain any disposal
system belonging to the'person;'and
(5) may contract with any person to train or supervise employees of a
disposal system. ,.
Waste disposal-contracts
Sec. 3.15. (a) The authority may contract to receive and treat or dispose
of wastes from any person in the district.
(b) In contracts under Subsection (a) of this section, the authority shall
set fees on the basis of ' .
(1) the quality of the .waste; ''••'.-"''
(2) the quantity of the waste;
(3) the difficulty encountered in treating or disposing of the waste;
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(4)
operation. and inaii-1 -innn. .•
any oilu i^ reason, •! I
e%p:nses and debt retirement services: and
Sale of ua;er nnO by-products
Sec. 3.1(i. 'I Ji.; authority n .iv store .uul >•!!. water that it collects under Section
3.15 of this Act! and ni.:\ furni-.li \\ iler ot a specified quality. It aisv may store and
sell any hy-prodiiet from iN -operation..
Permits from Texas wnu-r rights commission
Sec. 3.17. (a) Io: the pnrpo->c of . maintaining establishes water quality
standards in the hays and esman-.s v.it'.'n 'he district, .the. authority may apply to 'the
Texas Water Rights Commission for v.:rs.V . ij-pn. pi ialion permits.
(h) The authority :n.i\ i\ | 'j. K>: water storage or use petniits from the
Texas Water Rights Commission, to stoiV snJ ^-il \\ater under the proviMons of Section
3.16 of this Act. "
Hninent domain
Sec. 3. IS. The authorii\ trj; acquire property of any kind within or outside
the district, appropriate for the exercise <>!' its function^ through the exercise of tiie power
of eminent domain under the pnnKions c!' Title 52, Revised Civil Statutes of Texas. \l>25,
as now or later amended.
Relocation of fncilitie.%
• ,
Sec. 3.19. In the event that the authority, in the exercise of the power
of eminent domain or power oi relocation, or any oilier power, makes necessary the
relocation, raising, rerouting or changing the grade of or altering the construction of any
highway, railroad, electric tran>mission line, telephone or te'euraph properties and facilities.
or pipelines, all such necessary relocation, raising, rerouting, change in grade or alteration
of construction, slul! be accomplice. I at lii.' -sole c\;vi-.e of the authority. The term
"sole expense" shall mean the actual cost of such relocation, raising. lerouting. char.ge
in grade ur alteration of grade or construction in providing comparable replacement without
any enhancement of siuh. facilities, .at-cr deducting therefrom the net salvage value derived.
from the old facility. .
Use nf public .easements
Sec. 3. JO. The -authority shall Have tl'.e rigiit, power, and authority to use
any and all public roadways, sire. t.s. alless. or public easements within or outside the
district in the accomplishment of ii-. purposes, without the necessity of securing a franchise.
Acquisition and disposition of property
Sec. 3.21. ia) 'Ihe authority may purchase, lease, acquire by gift, maintain.
use. and operate property of any kind appropriate for the exercise ot irs functions.
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(h) S:.k-s of property not authbri/ed by any other provision of this Act
are hereby authuri/.cd. subject to the following limitations: (1) 1 he board, by affirmative
vote of seven din. cu-rs. Shall determine that the property is not needed by the authority:
(2) sales shall iv :>\ .•ompetitive bidding if ihe value of the property as appra>ed by.-
the board exceed-. SHUK.'O. (3) notice of the propoed sale sliAH be published once each
week for three (.oi.^t'-.i!i\c weeks in a newspaper having general circulation in t'ne county
or counties in winch t!u- property is situated if the value of the property as appraised
by the board exceed-* S2.000: (4") the specific terms of the sale--.shall be approved by
the board, an affirmative vote of seven directors being required for this purpose/unless
the value of the property as appraised by the board is $2.000 or less, in'which; event
the board by iit'l n utive vote of seven directors may authori/e the general manager to
sell on such tern^ .is he deems advisable.
Facilities
Sec. .i.r.2. The authority may acquire in any lawful manner, construct, extend.
improve, maintain, reconstruct, .use, and operate any facilities necessary or convenient to
the exercise of its po\\ers. riglu*. duties, and functions.
Contracts generally •-•...-
Sec. 3.23. (a) The authority may make contracts and execute instruments
that are necessary or convenient to the exercise of its powers, rights, duties, and functions.
A contract may.be for any term not to exceed 50 years.
(b'l Any construction or repair contract, or contract for the purchase of
material, equipment or supplies, or any contract for services (other than technical, scientific:"
legal, fiscal or other professional services) shall be awarded to the lowest and best bidder
therefor, after publication of a notice to bidders once each week for three,consecutive
weeks before the dale set for awarding the contract, if the contract will require an estimated
expenditure of more than ,510.000, or if the contract is for a term of more than two
years. In the event of an emergency, the authority may let such contracts as are necessary
to protect and preserve the public health and welfare or the properties of the authority.
without such bidding procedures:
(c) The notice is sufficient if it states the time and place, when and where
the bids will be opened, the general nature of the work to be done, or the"-material,
equipment, or supplies to be purchased, or the nonprofessional services to be;rendered.
and states the terms upon which copies of the plans, specifications, or other pertinent
information may be obtained. •
(d) • Publication of the notice shall be in a newspaper having general
circulation in the county or counties in which..the contract is uThe performed. In addition
to publishing notice in a newspaper 'having general circulation, the notice may aNu be
published in any other appropriate publication. ,
(e) Anyone desiring to bid on the construction of any work advertised as
herein provided, shall, upon written application to the board, be furnished with a copy
of the plans and specifications or other engineering and architectural documents showing
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the work to bo done, and all the details thereof, providing that a charge may be made
therefor to cover the cost of making such copy. All bids to do any such work: shall
be in writing, and sealed and delivered to the board, and shall be accompanied by a certified
check upon sonic responsible bank in the State of Texas or a bid bond from a company
approved by the board, for at least one percent of the total amount bid, and"the amount
of said check or bond shall be forfeited to the authority in the'event such successful
bidder shall fail or refuse to enter into a proper contract therefor, or shall fail or refuse
to furnish bond therefor as required by law. Any or all bids may be rejected by the
board.
(0 Bids shall be opened at the place specified in the published notice and
shall be announced by the board. The place where the bids are opened and announced
shall always be open to the public. .• . I
(g) The contract price of all construction contracts of the authority may
be made in partial payment as the work progresses, but such payments shall not exceed
90 percent of the amount due at the time of such payment as shown by the report
of the general manager of the district. The board shall at all times during the progress
of the work, inspect the same or cause the same to be inspected by the general manager
or his assistants, and upon the completion of any contract in accordance with such terms,
they shall pay the balance due thereon.
(h) The person, firm* or corporation to whom such contract is let shall
provide such performance "and payment bonds'as are required by law. •
(i) The, provisions of this section do not prohibit the authority from
purchasing surplus property from the United States by negotiated contract and without
necessity for advertising bids. . •
(j) An officer, agent, or employee of the authority who is-financially
interested in a contract of the types enumerated in Subsection (b) of this section shall
disclose that fact to the board before the board votes on the acceptance of the contract.
(k) Notwithstanding any provision of any charter of any city or town,
contracts between the authority and any city or town need not be submitted to the
electorate.
Cooperative agreements
Sec. 3.24. The authority may enter into cooperative agreements with other
local governments, state agencies, or agencies of the United States of America
(1) to perform water quality and waste disposal management, inspection,
and enforcement functions and give technical aid and education services to any entity
that is a party to the agreement: and
• (2) to transfer money or property to any entity that is a party to the
cooperative agreement for the purpose of water quality and waste disposal, management,
inspection, enforcement, and technical aid and education.
Hearings Concerning Groundwnter Withdrawal
Sec. 3.25. (a) The authority is hereby authorized to work in cooperation
with and lend assistance to. any permanent standing committee or interim study committee
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authorized by the Legislature of the Stats of Texas, or the Coastal and Marine Affairs
Covmc\i. and to expend any money specifically appropriated by the legislature to the
authority, or money appropriated specifically to the Texas Water Quality Board or any
other state agency for a contractual arrangement between such state agency and the
authority, for the first phase of a subsidence control program for Harris and Galveston,
Counties. Such program is intended to develop regional information relating to water
demand, present and future, surface water supply sources, present and future, and
groundwater pumping zones, and to prepare methods to redistribute water in the future.
The authority is specifically authorized to cooperate with and contract with the United;-
States Geological. Survey and any other federal or state agencies concerning the results
of such program. It is specifically provided that the authority shall not be required to
expend any of its funds fur the purpose specified in this section unless such funds are
specifically appropriated by the legislature or specifically designated for such purpose from
contractual arrangements. .
SUBCHAPTER 4. GENERAL FISCAL PROVISIONS
* , - • • "
Disbursement of funds
Section 4.01. The authority's money is disbursable only by check, draft,
order, or other instrument, signed by the person or persons authorized to do so in the
board's bylaws, or by resolution of the board.
Fees and charges
Sec. 4.02. The authority shall establish fees and charges which may not be
higher than necessary to fulfill the obligations imposed on it by this Act.
Loans,and grants
Sec. 4.03. (a) The authority may borrow money for its corporate purposes.
.(b) The authority may borrow money and accept grants from private
sources, the United States of America, the state, and local governments. The authority
may enter into any agreement in connection with the loan or grant which is not in conflict
with the constitution and laws of this state.
(c) The sources of any funds accepted by the authority shall be public
information, both as to amount and any restrictions placed by the donor on their
expenditure. '• •
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Fiscal year and audit by state auditor
i ,
Sec. 4.04. (a) The authority's fiscal year shall be established by the board.
(b) The board shall keep separate books and accounts of all money received
from the State of Texas, and the state auditor shall audit annually such books and accounts
in a manner enabling him to report to the Legislature the manner and purpose of the
expenditure of the .authority's money received from the state during each fiscal year.
State auditor's report
Sec. 4.05. (a) The state auditor shall make a report of his audit promptly.
(b) The state auditor shall file a copy of the report with the governor,
the quality board, the commissioners court of each county in the district, and as may
otherwise be provided by law.
Cost of state auditor's audit
Sec. 4.06. (a) After completing the report required by Section 4.05 of this
Act, the state auditor shall prepare a detailed statement showing the actual cost of the
audit and certify the statement to the authority for payment.
(b) Upon receipt of the statement, the authority shall pay the state treasurer
the cost of the audit.
(c) The state treasurer shall credit the payment to the general revenue fund.
Independent audit
Sec. 4.07. (a) The authority shall keep a complete system of accounts and
an audit of its affairs (except as provided in Section 4.04(b) above) for each year shall
be prepared by an independent certified public accountant, or a firm of independent
certified public accountants, of recognized integrity and ability selected by the board.
The cost of said audit shall be paid by the authority. ,
(b) The authority shall file copies of the independent audit with the
Governor of the State of Texas, the quality board, and the commissioners court of each
county in the district; and the board shall keep at least one copy of such audit at the
office of the district open to inspection by any interested person during normal office
hours.
Depository banks
Sec. 4.0N. (a) The board shall designate one or more banks within the district
to serve as depository for the funds of the authority. All funds uf the authority shall
be deposited in such depository bank or banks except that bond proceeds and funds pledged
to pay bonds may, to the extent provided in a trust indenture, be deposited with the
trustee bank named in the tru->t indenture, and except that funds shall be remitted to
the bank of payment for the payment of principal of and mtere.st on bonds. To the
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t'l) frind- ^ccured by ad valorem taxes:
(2) bos d-. .secured'.by a pledge of all or part of the revenues accruing to
the authority, in--U ,!-ng without limitation those received from- sale of water or other
products, :reru!itu n i f si rvice, tolls, charges, and from all other sources other than ac!
valorem luxe*:
(.} • horn's •••ecured by a combination pledge of all or part of the revenues
described in $;..! UIVM >; (2) of this subsection, and t.txe.-..
(b) ' Sin.ii i-onds shall be authori/.cd by resolution of the board and shall
be issued in tin name of the authority, signed by the chairman or \ice-chairman, attested
by the secretary a ul shall bear tiie .seal of the authority. It is provided, however, that
the signatures i'I: he chairman, the vice-chairman or of the secretary or of both may
be printed, or Iiiii (graphed on the bonds if authori/ed by the board, and that the seal
of the authont> ,ni\ be impressed on the bonds or may be printed or lithographed thereon.
The bonds shall be in such form as shall be prescribed b> the board, shall be in such
denomination or. denominations, shall mature serially or.otherwise in not to exceed 50
years from .tru-ii -Lie. shall bear such interest, and may be sold at a price and under
terms determined bv the board to be the most advantageous reasonably obtainable, and
within the discretion of the board, may be made callable, prior to maturity at such times
and prices as may be preseribed.in the bonds, and may be made registrable as to principal
or a-; to hot!; princip.il and interest. Such bonds may be further secured by an indenture
of trust with a corporate trustee. : - -
(c) Ho ids may be issued in more than one series, and from time to time.
as required for carr>irg out the purposes of this Act. Any pledge of revenues may reserve
the right, under conditions therein specified, to issue additional bonds which will be on
a parity with. <>r be secured by a lien senior to or subordinate to the bonds then being
issued, • ' -.-"'•
(d) The resolution authorizing the bonds or the trust indenture further
securing such bonds ma\ specify additional provisions which shall constitute a contract
between the authority and its bondholders. The board shall have full discretion in providing
for such additional provisions including the authority to provide for a corporate tru>iee
or receiver to take possession of facilities of the authority in the'event of default on
the part of the authority in fulfilling the covenants rheiein made.
Refunding bunds
Sec. 5.02. The authority is authorized to issue refunding bonds for the purpose
of refur.ding any outstanding bonds authori/.ed by this Act and interest thereon. Such
refunding bonds max be issued to refund one or more series of outstanding bonds and
combine the pledges for the outstanding bonds for the security of the refunding bonds.
and may be secured by other or additional revenues. The provisions of this law with
reference to the issuance by the authority of other bonds, their security* and their approval
by the attorney general and the remedies of the holders shall be applicable to refunding
bonds. Refunding bonds shall he registered by tiie comptroller upon surrender and
cancellation of the bonds to be refunded, but in lieu thereof, the resolution authori/ing
their issuance may provide that they shall be sold and the proceeds thereof deposited
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in the bank wh-%r.' the original- bonds are payable, in which, case tiie refunding bonds
may be issued in :-r- a.n>'ii:u suilicienl to pav the princip.il i»i" and the interest on the
original bonds to !H.'ir ro-ion date or maMriU date, and tlk comptroller siiall' register
them without ton i-ru- -i surrender and'cancellation of the original bonds.
\pprovai nnd registration of bonds
Set.-xO.v .vl'tcr any bonds (including rcl'uiKling bonds) are authori/ed by
the authority. %iu'h ho-id-. .ind the record relating to their issuance shall be submitted
to the attorney :e:ieral tor his examination as to the validity thereof. If Mich bonds
recite that thev :r.- se -ured by a pledge of the proceeds of a contract theretofore nude
between the, authority und ::«iy city or other governmental agency, authority or district.
a copy of such vntract and the proceedings of the city or other governmental agency,
authority or dis-n.-t aullu-n/ing such contract shall also be submitted to the attorney
general. If he rind- that such bonds have been authon/ed and such contracts have been
made in accordant. v\ith the Constitution and laws of the State of Texas, he shall approve
the bonds and si.ch contracts and the bonds then .shall be registered by the comptroller
of public account-. Thereafter the bonds, and the contracts, if any. shall be valid and
binding and shall be incontestable for any cause.
Bond election
Sec. 5.04. \o bonds payable wholly or partially from ad valorem taxes (except
refunding bonds) -h.ill.be issued unless authori/.cd by an election at which only the qualified
property tax-paying voters of the district may vote and unless a majority of the votes
cast in such election is in favor of the issuance of the bonds. Refunding bonds and
bonds not pit\able wholly or partially from ad valorem taxes may be issued \\ithoutan
election. Such elections shall be held in accordance with the provisions hereinafter set
forth governing ad valorem tax elections.
Maintenance tax
Sec. 5.05. The board shall have the powei to levy and collect ad valorem
taxes for the maintenance of the authority and its improvements, in such amounts as
are voted in accordance with the procedure hereinafter set forth; provided that the
maintenance tax shall not exceed the maximum rate voted, and said rate shall remain
in effect until or unless changed by subsequent vote, and that in no event shall the tax
rate exceed the limit specified in Section 5.0s of this Act.
Election
Sec. 5.0'). No such maintenance tax shall he levied or collected and no bonds
payable \vhol!y or partially from ad valorem taxes shall be issued unless an election is
held in the district and any such taxes or bonds are duly and favorably voted by a majority
of the qualified property taxpaying voters of the district, voting at the election, t'ach
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polling' pi. icev i:u
election shall. 'i. ;!)
in a newspaper of
with ihc ;int,T\ il
such election ->!;:il! he c.iMvd h\ i ebullition of the board. The election resolution shall
set '.forth lljie d.iK- . rf i -v .-'s-vlion. !he proposition to be submitted and voted o,n. the
t> < t;u-i matters deemed a.Msahlc by the board. Notice of said
:? b. :% fl-Mslim;: a substantial copy of the resolution calling the election
r'.-i i! •-. i .-nl.iti.in m the district not lev. than twice in such news-paper,
' .v. .. i v.u-h pu!>ii-vJio.ns, to be at least one week, and with the first
of each of said p. i' !>,:—> MS to 'be nt ieas't <>0 days prior to the date set for the' election.
To the .extent ;u t iiv.i-r-i-i-.-nt \\itii the provisions hereof, the elections. Herein provided
for shall be held PI :;,o>:d.!nee 'with the provisions of the Texas Election Code.
Rendition, assessment, equalisation. levying, and collection of taxes •
Sec. i-(-1- The rendition and assessment of property for taxation, the
equalisation o! -?.i!.us. and the collection of taxes for the benefit of the authority shall
be in accord:! IK „• \vi!l- the I iw. applicable to counties, insofar as such law can be rriade
applicable, and cx.x.n a.s IK rcinafter specifically provided. The board may act as the
board of equali/af ••».- for the authority, or may appoint a separate board of equalization
to consist of fi\e :oMikm. qualified \pters who own taxable property in the district. In
either case, the bond of cquali/ation. shall ha\e the powers. -functions, and duties of the
commissioners yourU •-)!' ciHinfi.es»in equa!i/.ing property values in accordance with law
applicable to counties. ns.>i':iras such laws can be made applicable. .It is provided, however.-"
that renditions -hail be nntdc to t!ie county tax assessor and collector of the county in
which the proper! > r located and the tax assessor and collector of each, .county,
respectively, shall :» -i j^ t've tax assessor and collector for the authority for property located
in such count}. It. -.lull be the duty of the tax assessor and - 'collector in, each county
to cause to be pkued on. ihe county tax rolls, such additional column or columns as are
needed to show Hu' taxes levied by the authority and the amount thereof, based on the
value of sii.eh.pi-op.-r.ty as .i.ppnned finally by the authority's board, of equalization. .The .'
fee of eacli count \ tax assessor and collector for assessing and co,ile'ctinsi taxes shall Ibe
one percent of the t.ixes collected. snchTee to be paid over and disbursed in each county
as are other fees i-f ;)fflce. All o!' the laws for the /enforcement of , state and county
taxes_ .shiill be avail ll-:o to the authority. The authority shall have the right to cause
the office! < of each lountx to enforce and collect. the taxes due to ' tho1 authority, in that
county, .!-. provided m the law for the •.enforcement of state and county taxes. Taxes
assessed a:ul levied ' Mr the benefit of the authority shall be payable and shall become
delinqiier:t at the vinie time. in. the same manner, and subject to the same discount for ;.-..
advance paynvnt as taxes levied by and I'or the benefit of the county in which the property
is taxable 'Ihe fee for cullectini:. delinquent taxes throuyh prosecution of suit shall be
I> percent ot the- taxes collected by such suit, such fee to be paid over and disbursed
in each county as arc other fees ot oiYice. Concurrently "'with' the levy of county taxes
by the commissioners courts, the board shall levy the tax on all taxable property in the
district which i> .subix-ct to such taxation and shall immediately certify such tax rate to
the tax assessor and collector of the counties comprising the authority/ /
Tax limit
Sec. 5.()x. HH; maximum rate of .tax which may be levied by the board
in any fiscal year for all purposes, oilier than taxes levied pursuant to Section 0.05, shall
not exceed ten cents (lUc) on each SI 00 of assessed; valuation of taxable property.
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Bonds authorized investments
Sec. v')1'' Al! bonds and refunding "bonds of the authorilv shall be and are
hereby declared '«• lc 1-gil. eligible and authori/cd investments for banks: savings and
loan associations 'n^iunce companies; fiduciaries; trustee*: the sinking hinds oi cities.
towns, villages. CIH iilie-. •>• boo! districts, or an> other political corporations or stibdnisions
of the State of -lex.iN ;:u! for all public funds of tlu- State of Texas or its agencies.
including the St'ife Permanent School Fund. Such bond.-, and refunding bonds shall be
eligible to secure the deposit of any and all public funds of the State of Texas, cities,
towns, villages, .visnties, school districts, or other political corporations or subdiviMons.
of the State of Texas: and such bonds shall be lav/ful and sufficient security for said
deposits to the e>Unt of their face value, when accompanied by all unmatured coupons
appurtenant thereto.
SUBCHAPTER 6 - POLLUTION CONTROL DISTRICTS
Section KOI. The authority may establish one or more "Pollution Control
Districts" for the purpose of accomplishing any of the powers, purposes, rights, privileges
or authority vested in the authority. .
Establishment of districts
Sec. M52. (a) Pollution Control Districts may be established by the procedures
contained in this Section.
(I.) The board may adopt a resolution calling for the creation of a Pollution
Control District, definiti" the boundaries thereof, estimating the principal amount of and
stating the purpose of bonds proposed to be issued by the authority on behalf of the
proposed Pollution Control District, declaring that taxes for the payment of the proposed
bonded l.iclebtcJ.-.css shall be levied-exclusively upon the taxable property within the
proposed Pollution Control District, and fixing a time and place for a public hearing on
the matters set out in the resolution; or
(2) The board may adopt a resolution calling for the creation of a Pollution
Control District, defining the boundaries thereof, declaring that taxes for the maintenance,
of the authority and its improvements shall be levied upon the taxable property within
the proposed Pollution Control District, and fixing'a time and place for a public hearing
on the matters set out in the resolution.
(b) The resolutions authorized by Section 6.02(a) may be adopted
simultaneously and simultaneous hearings on proposed bond and maintenance taxes may
be held. " ,
fc) The public hearing may be conducted by a quorum of the board of
directors, or one or more directors, or one or more employees who may be designated
by the board. If someone other than a quorum of the board -conducts the hearing, he
shall have posver to accept evidence and make recommendations upon Which the board
may act. The board may alter, modify or change any pro\ision of the resolution calling
for the creation of the proposed Pollution Control District subsetiucrst to the public hearing:
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provided, however, t;i;.t the boundaries of the Pollution Control District may not be
enlarged or expand-.1*; without further notice .is hereinafter provided.
(d) . Ncticc of the public hearing shall be published in a newspaper of general
circulation-within fie proposed I'oilution Control District once not less than fifteen (IS)
nor more than th-ny ( »0-.' days prior to the public hearing. To the extent not inconsistent
with the provisit-a-. lu :\ .it. notice of the public hearing shall also comply with Article
6252-17. VernonV 'ie\a> Civil Statutes, as amended.
fe.) ;AI1 public hearings on creation of a Pollution Control District shall be
held within the boundaries cif the propo.iecl Pollution Control District, and may be held'
concurrently, or in connection with any other public hearing, meeting or proceeding
conducted by tin ncard.
(F) Any interested person, including persons residing or owning property
within the authority, may appear at the public hearing and,present evidence relevant to
the matters set tor!h in the resolution calling for the creation of the proposed Pollution
Control District \!1 persons residing within or owning property within the proposed
Pollution Control Di-trict shall have the right to appear at the public hearing and .present
evidence with regard to whether they will receive benefits from the proposed improvements
or taxation. Failure to appear at the public hearing shall constitute a waiver of all
objections which the .absent part-y might hau- had to all matters set forth in the resolution
calling for the creation ol -the proposed Pollution Control District.
(g) 1 he board shall reuew .the findings and recommendations resulting from
the public hearing, and may adopt a resolution creating the Pollution Control District,
stating the purposes for which the Pollution Control District has been created, designating'
the boundaries ot the Pollution-Control District, declaring that the indebtedness to be
incurred or the cost of services to be rendered by the authority for the benefit of the
Pollution Control District shall be payable from taxes le\ led upon property within the
Pollution Control District, finding thai the property within the Pollution Control District
will benefit from "the indebtedness proposed to be incurred or the services proposed to
be rendered by the authority on us behalf, and. calling'for an election within the. Pollution
Control District to authorize said indebtedness and/or said maintenance tax. Said resolution
shall further state the date of the election, the proposition or propositions to be voted
on, the location of the polling places, and the names ,of the officers of the election. Said
election may be held in'Conjunction with a general election, or any special election other
than a primary election. The provisioiis of the Texas- Llection Code shall govern the
election unless contrary to any provision of this Act.
(h) The resolution of the board creating a Pollution Control District shall
be final and conclusive, and shall not be subject to -'review by any court except upon
the basis of whether the resolution is supported by substantial evidence. Said resolution
shall be filed in the deed records of the county or .-counties wherein the territory within
the Pollution Control District is situated. Any action or proceeding wherein the validity
of the board's resolution creating a Pollution Control District or of the proceedings relative
thereto is contested, questioned or denied, shall be commenced within thiny (30) days
from the effective date of the resolution: otherwise, said resolution and all proceedings
relative thereto, including the creation of the Pollution Control District, shall be held
to be valid and in every respect legal and incontestable.
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Boundaries and addition of territory
Sec. ••> );. '':••) The boundaries •>! a Pollution Control District may include
any territory within ti-c authority.-whether or not the u-rritoi-y contains non-contiguous
parcels of land. a:rd xvhiti-.cr or not the terriiorv is located within the boundaries of any
incorporated vs!/. town, village, or any other governmental entity or political subdivision
of the State of T.exas. it any portion of the territory i.f a proposed Pollution Control^
District falls \\iil\ni the boundaries 01 within the exclusive .extraterritorial jurisdiction of
an incorporated uiv. town or village, the board shall not create said Pollution Control
District until it has obtained the consent of said city, town or village. Said consent may
contain such co'un.ion-; as may be mutually agreed upon by the authority and said c;iy.
town or village, .n.d shall be evidenced by a duly enacted ordinance of the governing,
body of said cit>. town or village.
(b) Proceedings for the annexation of territory to an existing Pollution
Control District h.:y be initiated by a resolution of the board, or by a petition signed
by the owners of ^0"' or more of the value of the land subject to tho proceedings, or
by a petition signvd by a majority of the residents of the land to be annexed. The-,
petition shall, insotar as is practicable, set forth substantially those mailers, set forth in
a resolution calling for the creation of a Pollution Control District, and shall request, a
public hearing..by the board on the matters set out in the petition. The public hearing
shall be held in substantial compliance with the provisions set forth herein for a-public;
hearing on creation of a Pollution Control District. If the board determines that the
annexation should be accomplished, it may adopt a resolution catling separate elections
on the matter of annexation to be held within the existing Pollution Control District
and within the land to be annexed. The annexation shall not become final until approved
by a majority of the qualified voters within the existing Pollution Control District: and
until a majority of the qualified voters within the boundaries of the land to be annexed'
approve said annexation and elect to allow the land to be annexed to be taxed for
maintenance purposes and/or to assume its pro rata share of indebtedness- theretofore
authorized and/or tuxes necessar\ to support the voted but unissued tax or tax-revenue
bonds of the authority which are to be issued on behalf of the existing Pollution Control
District, and authori/.e the board to levy a tax on the ptoperty therein for payment for
such unissued bonds, when issued. Said elections shall conform to the Texas 'election
Code, insofar as said Code is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. The board's.
resolution canvassing the return.- of such elections shall redefine the boundaries of the
Pollution Control District and shall be recorded in the deed records of the county within
which the annexed territory lies. .
fc) Proceedings for the addition of territory to an existing Pollution Control
District on which kss than three (3) qualified voters reside mav be initiated by a "petition
signed by the owner or owners thereof praying that die land described therein he added
thereto and become a part thereof. The petition shall, insofar as applicable set forth
substantially those matters set forth in a resolution calling for the creation of a Pollution
Control District and shall request a public hearing bv the board on the matters set out
tn tho petition. The public hearing .shall be held in subsiasitia! compliance with provisions
set forth herein for a public hearing on "creation of a Pollution Control District. . If tho
board determines that the addition should be accomplished, it may adopt a resolution
adding such land. If taxes or bonds have been aulhori/ed within the Pollution Control
District prior to the addition of said land, said resolution adding the land shall be temporary
and the addition shall not become final until approved by a majority of the qualified
voters within tho Pollution Control Di.strict as it exists after said addition. Such election-
shall be held as soon as practicable after said addition cm the proposition of approving
said addition, unifying tin- unissued tax or lax-re-.cm:e bonds of tho authority which are
to hi- !<>.-i.«.l
K.-
f:>..,.,.t iv,
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levy a tax on the property .within-the. Pollution Control District as enlarged for payment
of said unissued bonds when issued and/or for the maintenance of the authority. Such
election shall conform to the Texas Election Code so far as such Code is not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act. The board's resolution canvassing the returns of such
election or adding the territory shall redefine the boundaries of the Pollution Control
District and shall be recorded in the deed records of the county within, which the added
territory lies. . , , ; ....
Taxation ,
' Sec. 6.04. fa) If the qualified voters in the elections called pursuant to Section
6.02 and/or Section 6.03 authorize the authority to incur indebtedness for the benefit
of a Pollution Control District, the board shall have authority to. Issue bonds as'provided
in Subchapter 5 of this Act; provided, however, that taxes levied for the purpose of making
payments of the interest on or principal of said bonds shall be levied only on taxable
property within the Pollution Control District.
(b) Notwithstanding, any provision of this Act to the contrary, if the
qualified voters in the elections called pursuant to Section 6.02 or Section 6.03 authorize
the authority to levy and collect ad valorem taxes for the maintenance of the authority
and its improvements, the board shall have authority to levy, assess and collect said
maintenance tax as provided in Subchapter 5 of this Act; provided, however, that said
maintenance tax shall be levied only on taxable property within the Pollution Control
District. . - '; '•...;.- r ,
Bonded -indebtedness
Sec. 6.05. The board may incur all such indebtedness as may be necessary
to provide all improvements, and the maintenance thereof, requisite to the achievement
of the purposes for which any Pollution Control District is organized, and the authority
is authorized to levy and collect all such taxes as may be necessary for the payment
of the interest thereon and the creation of a sinking fund for the payment thereof, and
such taxes shall be a lien upon the property assessed for the payment thereof. .
Annexation by Municipalities . -
Sec. 6.06. If any city, town or village which has consented to the'-creatton
and boundaries of a Pollution Control District as provided in Section 6.03(a) of this Act
thereafter annexes any part or portion, of the territory within such Pollution Control
District, the agreement referred to in said Section 6.03fa)".shall be deemed to provide
and include the provisions of Chapter 128, Acts of the 50th Legislature, 1947, as amended
(Article 1182c-l, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes), or Chapter 228, Acts ol the :>6tn
Legislature, 1959, as amended (Article 1182c-5, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes), as may
be applicable to the specific-district, and. any such annexing city, town or village shall
assume all or the proportionate part of physio:.! assets, properties, facilities, intangible
assets, bonded indebtedness. li-.liHities. obligations and any oilier debts of the 1 ollutioa
Control District aft'octetl by such annexation.
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CHEMICAL RESOURCES, INC.
TULSA, OKLAHOMA
I. INTRODUCTION
Chemical Resources, Inc., was incorporated in January of 1979. It had
been operating as a commercial injection well for hazardous wastes under
the name of Lamberton Acid Well Disposal since 1973.
Since its opening, the site has experienced no organized public opposi-
tion to its hazardous waste disposal operation. There are thousands of
similar waste brine injection wells in Oklahoma and three other indus-
trial, waste-generator owned disposal wells in the Tulsa area. Local
residents have expressed no significant concern over the Lamberton well
apart from a few isolated complaints about odors. The nearby oil re-
fineries are generally blamed for most odors in the area. Public
opposition did surface briefly during the off-loading of an out-of-state
barge loaded with pesticide wastes en route to the Lamberton well.
However, the opposition was directed primarily at the barge and at the
possibility of accidental spills in the river if more such out-of-state
barges came to off-load their wastes in Tulsa. Because of the lack of
public concern or opposition towards the Lamberton well there has been
no need to take specific steps to secure public support.
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The injection well is situated on a four-acre site within a 265-acre
parcel owned by the operator. The entire area is zoned heavy indus-
trial. The well site was formerly cattle grazing land. Horses and
cattle are still periodically allowed to graze the area to keep the
grass down. •
The site is situated at the edge of an industrial area containing a
major railroad yard, two large oil refineries, several steel galvanizing
plants, a chemical plant, and a pipeline tank farm. The immediate
neighbors of the well site are a commercial stable owned by the
Lamberton family, a chemical products firm making ink, and a steel
galvanizing plant. One side of the well site is undeveloped land owned
by the operator and used for grazing and horseback riding. On this side
is also a series of hills which separate the site from the nearest
residential area about one mile away. The site is across the Arkansas
River and about three miles from downtown Tulsa.
The geology of the area is very suitable to injection well disposal.
The site overlies the Arbuckle formation, a limestone aquifer that
covers almost three quarters of Oklahoma and is approximately a quarter
of a mile thick. At the site of the well the aquifer is approximately
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2,100 feet below the surface and extends to 3,300 feet, at which point
the bedrock formation begins. This aquifer is well below the fresh
water bearing formations which are generally tapped for drinking water
at 20 to 60 feet below the surface. The operator remembers that back in
the 1930s the Arbuckle formation in this area was tapped for salt water
from which commercial salts were manufactured. However, those opera-
tions were soon stopped when it was learned that the salt water was
naturally radioactive.
The site itself contains an injection well, a pump, and three storage
tanks to temporarily hold wastes while balancing the volume of incoming
waste streams with the injection rate. Also on the site is a mobile
trailer office. The entire area is surrounded by a chain link fence.
.The site appears relatively clean and neat. The adjacent undeveloped
land contibutes to the favorable appearance of the site. The operator
estimates the life of the site to be at least 500 years. Private-
injection wells in the Tulsa area using the same limestone aquifer have
been operating at much higher injection rates for over 20 years with no
noticeable decline in capacity.
The waste disposal operation at the facility is one of deep-well injec-
tion. The wastes are piped in directly from local steel plants in the
neighboring industrial area. In addition, the facility receives wastes
by tanker trucks, rail tank ears and barges. The-x>perator owns a short
rail spur several hundred yards from the site which is connected by
pipeline directly to the well. He also owns an off-loading fatcility at
the nearby Port of Catoosa. His own small fleet of tanker trucks serves
the barge off-loading facility and several local industri.es in the Tulsa
area. With the exception of the piped-in wastes and those delivered by
his own trucks, all wastes arrive by commercial haulers or are trans-
ported by the waste generator.
The wastes are sometimes stored temporarily when the volume of the
arriving waste stream exceeds the injection rate of the well or the
wastes need to be segregated before injection. The well normally opera-
tes at a rate of 3 barrels per minute (126 gallons per minute) and under
an injection pressure of 360 pounds per square inch (psi). The pressure
can be increased with the addition of another pump, thereby increasing
the injection rate. The well has been operated under a pressure of 500
psi, which resulted in an injection rate of 2,000 gallons per minute.
This higher rate is used when a large shipment is accepted,which exceeds
the storage capacity of the tanks..
The wellfis constructed of a five-inch steel casing within which is a
three-inch fiberglass pipe. The bottom of the fiberglass pipe is open
to the 2,100-foot level in the Arbuckle limestone formation. The
annular space between the fiberglass pipe and steel casing is sealed at
the top and bottom and filled with oil under a higher pressure than the
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expected waste stream injection pressure. By monitoring the oil pres-
sure, leaks can be detected either in the fiberglass in the inner pipe
or the steel casing. Furthermore, the higher pressure of the oil will
prevent hazardous wastes from escaping the fiberglass in the event of a
leak. The steel casing is also surrounded by cement from top to bottom.
Some of the wastes are blended before injection to reduce the corrosive-
ness of a particular waste stream and thereby protect the piping. The
limestone aquifer further neutralizes the wastes. Since the operation
began there has never been a positive pressure in the aquifer after
waste injection has ceased, indicating no buildup of pressure in the
aquifer. There are three private injection wells in the area, all using
the same Arbuckle formation, with much higher injection volumes and with
similar histories of no pressure buildups. The other three wells han-
dled approximately 400 million gallons in 1979, compared to Lamberton's
well which processed about 12 million gallons.
The site will soon operate twenty-four hours per day with three two-
person shifts. Currently, the site operates only sixteen hours per day.
Contingency and post-closure provisions follow state regulations. The
owner has a $10,000 bond and $500,000 worth of liability insurance. The
insurance amount meets state standards. However, the bonding limit to
cover closure and post-closure monitoring has yet to be determined by
the state.
The facility accepts a relatively broad range of wastes from a large
market area. Out-of-state wastes come fromm Texas, New Jersey,
Louisiana, Ohio, Colorado, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Arkansas. These
wastes include sulfuric acid solutions from plating operations, waste
oil, and pesticide rinse waters. The operator does not handle highly
corrosive wastes which would damage the piping and storage tanks. He
also does not accept chlorinated hydrocarbons which contaminate the
piping and storage tanks for subsequent use of these facilities for
waste oils that are shipped to the refinery for reprocessing. The
facility handles an average of 1.5 million gallons per month. During a
one-month period in 1978, 4.5 million gallons were received and disposed
of.
The owner of the well is a petroleum engineer with drilling experience
dating back to 1926 when his family purchased some oil wells that are
still in operation near the site. He is a third-generation oil man.
His experiences have also included deep-well injection of brines from
oil well operations. He claims that there are over 10,000 such injec-
tion wells in the state. The injection well is the only hazardous waste
disposal facility focused on in this study which was owned by the opera-
tor. Although Tulsa is no longer the "oil capital of the world," its
primary industry still is oil and associated petrochemical industries.
The site is near one of the oldest parts of town, where the oil boom in
this area first started in the early 1900s. The neighborhood is now
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predominantly a lower middle class blue-collar area viewed by one of its
inhabitants as the "wrong side of the tracks" from the rest of Tulsa.
The site is within Tulsa County and the Tulsa SMSA, which has approxi-
mately 425,000 people. Tulsa is the major trade and service center for
eastern Oklahoma.
III. HISTORY OF FACILITY DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC RESPONSE
When the operation started in 1972, there were no specific regulations
covering hazardous waste injection. The state had passed a Solid Waste
Management Act in 1970 which covered hazardous waste disposal in land-
fills but not in deep-well injection facilities. At that time the State
Corporation Commission granted all well drilling permits for oil, gas
and waste injection wells, and the Water Resources Board granted waste
injection permits. In 1976, however, the state adopted the Oklahoma
Controlled Industrial Waste Act, which specifically covered deep-well
injection of hazardous wastes. The Act provided guidelines for both the
construction and operation of such wells, including a provision for
public hearings if one is requested. The statute also prohibited the
importation of wastes from any state that was not willing to accept
hazardous wastes from Oklahoma. In July of 1977, rules and regulations
were promulgated for the Act and the authority over deep-well injection
of hazardous waste was transferred from the Water Resources Board to the
state Health Department. Under an informal grandfather clause, .existing
operators were permitted to continue operations while their operating
conditions were evaluated for new Health Department permits based on the
rules and regulations of the 1976 Act. The portion of the Act dealing
with the reciprocity agreements between states over wastes shipments was
later struck down by a. federal court.
In 1978, the state passed an amendment to the Act tightening some of the
provisions of the 1976 Act. Revised rules and regulations are now being
drafted and are expected to be promulgated in the summer of 1979.
The state, under contractual arrangements with the City/County Health De-
partment, has delegated the responsibility of inspecting the injection _
well disposal facilities to the county. The county reports its findings
to the state and the state has the authority and responsibility to
enforce compliance with the regulations.
The federal government under the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 has
also developed proposed regulations covering underground injection of *
wastes and the protection of underground sources of drinking water.
However, these regulations will presumably allow states such as Oklahoma
with their own legal authorities to have primary enforcement responsibi-
lities for an underground injection control program if it meets or
exceeds federal standards.
The history of events that led to the hazardous waste disposal opera-
tions of Chemical Resources, Inc., formerly the Lamberton Acid Well
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Disposal, started in 1957 when the operator had his land holdings in
West Tulsa rezoned from agricultural to heavy industrial. The operator
had lived in the area since 1918 and operated oil wells on this property
since 1916. However, the primary use of the land was cattle grazing.
Since 1957 several pieces of land were sold, including one piece to a
steel galvanizing operation. Cattle grazing continued during this
period and the operator noticed some harmful effects on the cattle from
the acid wastes which were being disposed of by the galvanizing opera-
tion in evaporation ponds. These wastes occasionally escaped the ponds
and contaminated a local creek used by the cattle. This situation led '
to the idea of an acid waste injection well to serve the steel industry
in the area.
In 1972 the operator made arrangements with the area's steel plants to
accept their acid wastes for disposal in an injection well. The
arrangement included having the wastes piped directly to a four-acre
site where the well would be drilled, several hundred yards from the
steel plants. In 1973 the operator received a State Corporation
Commission permit and the well was drilled. At that time the operator
owned 265 acres of primarily undeveloped land around the well site.
In 1973 the State Water Resources Board granted the operator a permit to
inject acid wastes into the Arbuckle limestone formation. Waste dis-
posal operation began in 1973 and for two years the site-continued to
handle only the acid wastes from the nearby steel plants. During this
time another commercial waste injection well operated in the area and
the Lamberton operation received frequent requests to handle its i
oversupply of wastes. Therefore, in 1975 Lamberton decided to expand
the operation by accepting non-local waste shipments in addition to the
direct, piped acid wastes. Waste shipments were received by tank truck,
rail and barge from as far away as New Jersey.
Up to this time the facility was operated under a permit granted by the
Water Resources Board. In 1976 Oklahoma passed the Controlled
Industrial Waste Disposal Act which specifically addressed deep-well
injection of hazardous wastes. Rules and regulations under this Act
became effective in 1977 and the authority for underground hazardous
waste disposal shifted to the State Health Department. Technically, the
Water Resources Board permit was no longer valid and a new Health
Department permit was required. However, under an informal grandfather
clause, the facility continued to operate while certain housekeeping and
operating activities were-changed to meet the new regulations. There is
no established schedule to meet these requirements, and as soon as the
state is satisfied with the improvements, a new permit will be issued.
Some improvements have already been made, such as diking around the well
and installation of an impermeable liner under the off-loading area.
Other improvements (e.g., barbed wire strands above the existing
chainlink fence) have not yet been made. . :
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At the end of 1977, the operator filed suit against the Health Depart- .
ment over one provision in the new Act. This provision prohibited.the .
importation of hazardous wastes from any state that was unwilling to
accept Oklahoma's hazardous wastes. This.legislation was the direct
result of a hazardous waste landfill operation in southern Oklahoma
which was receiving over 60 percent of its wastes from outside the
state. There was a growing fear that the state would "fill up" with
toxic wastes from other states. The operator argued that a sweeping ban
on importation of wastes where no reciprocity agreement existed should
not apply to disposal technologies which have virtually unlimited
capacities such as deep-well injection, incineration, distillation, and
neutralization. When these metho'ds are employed there is little chance
of "filling up" the state. Furthermore, the/ operator argued that only a
small portion of the total hazardous wastes disposed in Oklahoma were
imported. In the case of the Tulsa area injection wells only about 5 .
million out of 400 million gallons disposed of in one year were from ,
outside sources. In September of 1978, the federal .court agreed with
the operator and a temporary injunction was granted preventing the state
from enforcing the reciprocity agreement. Both the operator and the
state expect that the court will issue ,a permanent injunction shortly.
A short while after the litigation over the reciprocity issue, an inci-
dent occurred which aroused the first local public attention to
hazardous waste disposal. In October of 1978 a barge loaded with pesti-
cide rinse water from Mississippi attempted to unload at the Port of
Catoosa serving the Tulsa area. The wastes were destined for the
Lamberton injection well. Under the new Act, the state required .that •
all shipments of hazardous wastes be covered by a disposal plan which .
was to be filled out by the waste generator. There is some confusion
over why this plan was not submitted. According to the state, some of
this confusion may have been the result of the lengthy litigation with
the operator and a misunderstanding over whether this requirement was,
still in effect. At any rate, at the last minute the operator requested
permission from the state to off-load the wastes* The state quickly
asked the county to inspect the situation and to advise the state on the
safety of the off-loading operation. The county's involvement then trig-
gered the news media and according to one county official the situation
became an instant media event. For several days, while the barge
awaited state approval to off-load, the local Tulsa papers and televi-,. .,
sion carried news about the barge, the possibility of polluting the
Verdigris River (which leads to the Arkansas river), and the realization
that Tulsa was becoming a "dumping ground" for out-of-state wastes. The
officials and townspeople of two towns with water supply intakes
downstream from the Port of Catoosa became alarmed at the possibility of
having their water,supply contaminated by an off-loading accident. They
also felt threatened by continued use of the port for similar hazardous ,
waste shipments.
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The state finally granted approval for the shipment to be off-loaded
onto tanker trucks and transported to the Lamberton well. The off-
loading took place without incident. Almost all of the news cov-
erage during this three to four week period was aimed at the barge and
the prospects of further shipments of hazardous wastes into the Tulsa
area. Only one article was found which dealt specifically with the
Lamerton injection well and what this technology meant to the area. The
article praised injection wells as a disposal technology. Indeed, it
began with a quotation attributed to an EPA official saying "Except for
shooting the stuff to the moon, injection wells are the next best
thing."A
With the exception of this incident there had been virtually no public
opposition to the injection well operation. Both the state and the
county had received a few phone calls voicing concern over the.operation
and a couple of calls complaining about odors. There is no odor ordi-
nance in Tulsa but the county did check on the complaints and was unable
to verify the allegations. The operation was never charged with creat-
ing a nuisance.
Conversations with two long-time residents in the nearby residential
area indicated that most people were aware of the hazardous waste dis-
posal operation but were not concerned about it. They were more con-
concerned about stopping industrial development in the vicinity of the
well to protect a series of scenic hills that separate the well from the
nearest residential area. When asked about possible odors from the op-
eration, 'they said that local odors were primarily the result of two
large refineries in the area. One of the residents who was on the prev-
ious mayor's planning commission for Project 2000 (a future development
plan for Tulsa) felt that under the current administration there was
very little input for public paticipation in the affairs of this
neighborhood, where the injection well was situated. She felt that this
predominantly blue-collar area was treated as though they were on the
"wrong side of the tracks" and frequently not given all the information
about developments in the area including information about the injection
well. Both residents agreed that the public is generally apathetic
towards the waste disposal operation.
In January of 1979 the Lamberton operation, which had been operating as
an individual proprietorship, was incorported as Chemical Resources,
Inc. Steps are still being taken to comply with all the new operating
requirements imposed by the Controlled Industrial Waste Disposal Act.
IV.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
1957 — Lamberton property is zoned for heavy industrial use.
It should be noted that the EPA'official's statement was meant to
underscore the viability of injection wells, not to seriously propose
disposing of hazardous waste in space.
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1972 — Negotiations undertaken with local steel plants to accept acid
was tes.
1973 — Corporation Commission approval granted and well is
drilled.
1973 — Water Resources Board grants acid waste disposal permit.
1973 — Operation begins accepting acid wastes from local steel plants.
July, 1975 — Operation is expanded by accepting non-local wastes by
truck, rail and barge from Oklahoma and out of state.
1976 — State passes the Oklahoma controlled Industrial Waste Disposal .
Act.
July, 1977 — New rules and regulations under the Act become effective.
Authority over underground hazardous waste disposal trans-
ferred from Water Resources Board to Department of Health.
More stringent operating procedures automatically apply to
the Lamberton well and must be met before Health De-
partment operating permit is granted.
December, 1977 -- Operator files suit against state to overturn statute
requiring reciprocity agreements with other states
over hazardous waste shipments.
September, 1978 — Federal court grants temporary injunction prohibiting
state enforcement of reciprocity agreements over
hazardous waste shipments.
October, 1978 -<- Major news event occurs when state refuses to allow a
barge loaded with pesticide wastes to be off,-loaded and
transported to the Lamberton well.
January, 1979 — Operator incorporates the business under the name of
Chemical Resources, Inc.
April, 1979 — All operating procedures under the new regulations had
not been meet and operating permit still pending full
compliance.
V.
ATTEMPTS TO SECURE SUPPORT
Because there has never been significant opposition to the injection
well, there has been no need to address public concerns or issues.
There were also no specific attempts to secure support for the injection
well.
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VI.
SUMMARY EVALUATION
At the time the operation began, there was no public opposition to the
project and very little awareness of its existence. Since that time
there have been a few isolated complaints over odors from the site but
no organized or persistent opposition. . No attempts were made to respond
to the public interest and the media coverage that developed over the
barge incident, largely because the interest was not directed specific-
ally at the Lamberton operation. The only steps now being taken by the
operator, which might prevent future public opposition, are those
housekeeping and operational procedures required by the 1976 Act. These
include surrounding the area with dikes to prevent accidental runoff
lining the unloading area with an impervious material, and adding barbed
wire to the fence. Finally, no attempts were made by the operator to
publicize the fact that the injection well is probably a much safer way
to dispose of locally generated hazardous wastes than the previous use
of evaporation ponds. During the barge incident, one lengthy news arti-
cle did appear in the Tulsa paper, written by a medical reporter, that
objectively covered the known pros and cons of injection wells and de-
scribed the Lamberton operation.
The Lamberton deep-well injection facility has operated successfully for
the past six years primarily for the following reasons:
Accepted Technology — The operator estimates that there are at
least 10,000 injection wells in Oklahoma disposing of oil dril-
ling waste brines. His facility is nothing new to the area and
is accepted as a simple offshoot to Oklahoma's oil and
petrochemical industry.
Site Location — The site is situated in an industrial area con-
taining oil refineries steel and chemical plants and a railroad
yard. By comparison, the relatively clean appearance of the
small four-acre site is hardly recognized as a hazardous indus-
trial waste disposal area. The family-owned riding stable and
horseback riding trails immediately adjacent to the well con-
tribute to the favorable appearance of the site.
Public Apathy — The neighborhood closest to the site is made up,
of blue-collar workers heavily dependent on the petrochemical
industry. The existence of the well and the waste disposal oper-
ation are treated as a way of life for these people and have not
aroused their special interest. They are aware of the operation
but not concerned about it.
Media Interest — Everyone interviewed agreed that the flurry of
media interest in the barge incident was -over an isolated event
and did not reflect long standing or deeply felt public views on
hazardous waste disposal. It is difficult to say what triggered
the' media interest other than it was a newsworthy event in the
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light of national publicity over hazardous wastes. However,
public interest has been awakened and although the public has not
shown its opposition to the Lamberton operation it has strongly
opposed a proposal to construct a similar injection operation
near Tulsa. - '
VII. FACTORS LEDING TO PUBLIC OPPOSITION/ACCEPTANCE
The following factors contributed to public acceptance, or rather, to
the lack of public opposition:
o The site is located in an area dominated by many larger and
more obvious industrial faciltie's.
o The site is buffered from residential areas by a large
parcel of undeveloped land. : ,
o Waste injection wells are common in Oklahoma.
o The site is small and relatively clean, indicating no ob-
:•.-' vipus nuisance. • . ; v
o Nearby residents are either not aware of or unconcerned by
yet another industrial activity in the area.
o Occasional odors from the site are easily mistaken for the
more frequent odors of the local.refineries.
VIII. RETROSPECTIVE VIEWS ,
There were no specific retrospective views on the part of the operator
or the government officials. One of the nearby residents, however, felt
that more information regarding the operation should have been made
available for neighborhood planning efforts.
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MASSACHUSETTS BUREAU OF
SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL
STURBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The Massachusetts Bureau of Solid Waste Disposal (BSWD) is currently
investigating the feasibility of developing a secure landfill for
hazardous waste near the town of Sturbridge, Massachusetts. Preliminary
engineering reports have indicated that the Sturbridge site appears to
be technically suitable for the disposal of metal finishing (hydroxide)
sludges and oil spill debris, wastes of the most immediate concern to
BSWD and other state agencies. A decision on whether to develop the
Sturbridge site was originally expected to be made by the fall of 1979.
That decision has been postponed at least until the spring of 1980.
Although the siting process is in an interim stage, public concern and
opposition to the possible development of the site have been voiced by
residents and officials in the Sturbridge area. Concerns have been
raised not only about the site's qualifications and facility development
plans but also about potential impacts of a facility on the area's
tourist industry.
In December 1978, at the suggestion of BSWD, the town appointed a task
force of local officials and residents. The task force has acted to
keep residents informed, to communicate with BSWD and other state
agencies, and to marshall resources which may be used to assure local
input into the siting process. BSWD and other state agencies have made
a concerted effort to inform the community of the progress of the
project and to respond to community questions and concerns. The town,
however, continues to express concern and opposition.
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The site being investigated by BSWD occupies 105 acres near the
intersection of the Massachusetts Turnpike (Interstate 90) and
Interstate 86, about 45 miles west of Boston and two miles northeast of
the town of Sturbridge. The land is privately owned and undeveloped,
although it had recently been considered as a site for a waste-to-energy
facility and/or regional sanitary landfill project. There are a few
small business establishments in close proximity to the site. To the
north of the site is a development of relatively expensive homes which
surround Walker Pond and which depend on private wells for water.
The geology of the Sturbridge site has required a preliminary design
meeting the intent of proposed RCRA regulations where it has not been
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possible to adhere strictly to those regulations.1 The site's soils,
(primarily gravels and tills) due to their permeability, are not " r
suitable for liner material. These soils in depths of 20 to 45 feet
overlie a fractured bedrock which transmits groundwater. Groundwater
appears to discharge into Hobbs Brook which flows through the western
portion of the site. The wetland area of the East Marsh section of the
site flows into Walker Pond, just north of the site, and Walker Pond in
turn flows into Hobbs Creek.
These factors have directly impacted site design. The central portion
of the site could be developed using the existing soil as liner material
if a Hypalon (i.e., synthetic) liner is also used. Development of the
East Marsh would require the excavation of saturated soils down to the
level of the underlying tills. Surface water runoff would be diverted
away from the site to adjacent water bodies. Development of the East
Marsh section of the landfill would also incorporate a Hypalon liner.
The entire developed area would be served by a leachate collection sys-
tem which would capture leachate within the secured impoundments.
If developed as a secure landfill the central portion site would have a
minimum life of about six years. Additional development of the site as
a landfill could increase gross capacity by 80 percent. Net increases
to capacity would depend on specific engineering plans (e.g., whether a
number of smaller fill areas would be planned, allowing for greater
segregation of wastes but decreasing capacity). ,
The preliminary design report included needed appurtenances and es- .
timated capital costs. Appurtenances included buildings, fencing, and
two monitoring wells downgradient from each impoundment. Construction
and capital costs were estimated at $1.8 million for development of the
central portion only and at $2.7 million for development of the central
and East Marsh portions.
The preliminary plan also addressed site operations. Recommendations
for ongoing operations included daily covering of wastes, handling of
Assessments of the Sturbridge site employed proposed RCRA
regulations (Section 300'4, dated March 24, 1978) as design criteria.
The most immediate requirements were those pertaining to sites
located over usable aquifers. Those regulations called for a
five-foot thick liner of a permeability less than10-? cm/sec.
Because of the shallowness of groundwater and permeability of in situ
soils, the site would not meet the letter of the draft regulations/
(Based on regulatory definitions almost all of New England would be
classified as a usable aquifer because"of shallow groundwater
conditions.) Other design criteria relate to: 1) the containment and
removal of leachate; 2) the thickness and permeability of liner
materials; 3) the quality and characteristics of soil liners; and 4)
the protection of those liners.
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leachate, a manifest system to maintain accurate records on wastes
accepted and random sampling of those wastes. Monitoring of groundwater
was recommended at monthly intervals. The importance of monitoring the
site after closure was stressed although most specific provisions were
left to the state to develop. Annual operating costs were estimated at.
$280,000; site closure capital costs were estimated at $330,000 to
$590,000, depending upon whether the East Marsh area were developed.
The landfill was designed with the assumption that it would accept
primarily plating wastes (metal hydroxide sludges), but it would also
accept oily solids resulting from oil spills and other Solids and
sludges if space were available. The landfill was developed to help ,
solve Massachusetts' waste problem. While no final determination has
been made on accepting out-of-state wastes, BSWD can restrict the
facility to serving only Massachusetts.
The site would be developed by BSWD which is a state agency within the
Department of Environmental Management. BSWD is a planning and
management agency concerned with a range of solid and hazardous waste
problems in Massachusetts and works with private industry to solve .those
problems. It has no regulatory power and is subject to the regulatory
authorities of other state agencies. BSWD does have power of eminent
domain and, unlike private industry, does not need local regulatory
approval to develop sites. Operation of the facility would probably be
by a private firm under contract to BSWD; however, final arrangements
have not been determined.
The town of Sturbridge has a population of 5,550 (1976 U.S. Census) and
is located in the central part of Massachusetts. It is the home of Old
Sturbridge Village, a not-for-profit institution which is, after Cape
Cod, the most popular tourist attraction in the state. While some
smaller industries operate in and around Sturbridge, it is also a ;
bedroom community for persons working in Worcester and other larger
urban areas. Sturbridge residents were characterized by local officials
as being in middle to upper middle income brackets.
III. HISTORY OF FACILITY DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC RESPONSE
As of May, 1979, state regulation of hazardous waste facilities was
shared by two divisions of the State's Department of Environmental
Quality Engineering (DEQE), with one division primarily concerned with
the transportation of such waste, the other with its disposal. Under
new state legislation expected to take effect by 1980, a new division
will be created within DEQE with sole regulatory authority for hazardous
waste management. This new division will acquire the powers currently
within DEQE and add to those the power to regulate generators. Local
communities exercise substantial power in siting by virtue of their
power to grant local assignments for privately developed hazardous waste
facilities. Without such local approval a private company may not
develop a facility. BSWD, however, is exempt from this local control
and needs only to comply with state regulations.
too
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The impetus for investigating Sturbridge as a HWMF site emerged from a
series of unrelated but coincidental events. By late 1977, all major
disposal sites used for hazardous waste originating in Massachusetts
were closed. These sites were located as far away as western New York
and southern New Jersey, some of which have since reopened. With normal
disposal options unavailable, state agencies including BSWD and the
Division of Water Pollution Control (DWPC) decided it was imperative to
find suitable sites in Massachusetts. The need for sites was
underscored by a recent estimate cited by BSWD's assistant director that
60 to 75 percent of hazardous wastes produced in Massachusetts are being
dumped "indiscriminantly".
To find potential sites, DWPC examined sites in the state that had
previously been proposed for waste disposal facilities. Because the
sites had previously been proposed for facilities, some data describing
the sites were available. Based on these data, DWPC's chose ten sites
for more thorough study. In February of 1978 DWPC.hired Camp Dresser
and McKee, Inc. (COM) to develop siting criteria and to evaluate the
proposed sites using those criteria. The objective of CDM's evaluation
was to recommend three sites which would be investigated more
extensively. , • . ,•
Because of the perceived crisis in hazardous waste disposal, BSWD
entered into a separate contract with COM to assess the feasibility of
implementing a hazardous landfill at Sturbridge as soon as possible.
(Sturbridge was one of the original ten sites which DWPC asked COM to
evaluate. When BSWD accelerated the investigation of Sturbridge, DWPC
replaced it with an eleventh site.) The major reason for selecting
Sturbridge for accelerated study was that based on the data then
available, the Sturbridge site appeared to have the most suitable
hydrogeology. Thus it appeared to be the most promising of,the ten
sites and the one that could be developed most quickly.
The contract between BSWD and,COM was signed in late February. In March
BSWD officials met with and first notified Sturbridge elected officials
of the hazardous waste siting project. BSWD's director indicated that
the Sturbridge site was being investigated for the disposal of,special
wastes, that it site would be state owned and privately operated, that
the tonnage of wastes to be disposed could not be estimated, and that
there would be ample time to keep officials informed prior to any
decision. Those officials expressed opposition and, according to a
local newspaper, were shocked at the possibility that a regional
industrial sludge landfill might be developed in the area. Local,media
indicated that the potential site had been considered for the
development of an energy, recovery facility and sanitary landfill. This
project had been reviewed by local officials and, despite some concern
and opposition, had been given local regulatory approval. Acceptance of
the energy recovery plant (the town had signed a contract with the
developer in February of 1977) was based partially on anticipated
revenues from the facility. Thus, the energy plant was seen as a..more
desirable use of the site. ,.
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While the first contact between BSWD and Sturbridge officials generated
a few articles in local newspapers, the siting investigation attracted
little attention until the late summer of 1978. In August BSWD again
contacted local officals to inform them of the investigation's general
progress. At that time BSWD told officials that the agency had the
power of eminent domain and in addition would not require local
regulatory approval (specifically, an assignment by the local board of
health). Within a month of this contact a petition opposing the site
had been circulated locally by area residents and several hundred
signatures had been collected. In September copies of the petition were
forwarded to the Governor and the Department of Environmental
Management, BSWD's parent agency.
In the fall of 1978 a number of events made it apparent that BSWD was
seriously considering Sturbridge as a site. The state informed the
Sturbridge Board of Selectmen (i.e., the elected officials of the town)
that an environmental impact report would have to be prepared by the
state before a facility could be developed. A DWPC official was cited
by the local press as stating that Sturbridge was one of two sites
chosen for a disposal facility. While the DWPC official's statement
indicated that a facility would be developed, the same article repeated
BSWD's policy that no final decision had been made on the Sturbridge•
site. According to a press report, DWPC would offer $.50 to $1.00 to
towns for each ton of hazardous waste disposed. BSWD, during the site
visit, indicated that such compensation could in fact be provided to the
town.
During this time, opposition to the facility began to build and the :
outlines of issues emerged. Local officials consistently expressed
"surprise" or "shock" at announcements concerning the site. Issues were
generally framed in environmental/public health or economic terms. The
site's proximity to water recharge areas and floodplains, with the
attendant potential for contamination of water supplies was the primary
environmental issue. The impact on Sturbridge's tourist industry
which brings $50 million into the local economy and tax structure were
described as primary economic issues. In addition, it was indicated
that the development of the energy recovery facility should be the top
priority for the site. By early 1978, however, that project had been
abandoned for reasons unrelated to BSWD's site investigation.
CDM, by December 1978, completed its preliminary design investigation.
The major conclusion of this report was that the central portion of the
site was "immediately amenable to development of a hazardous waste
landfill, if consideration of artificial liner systems was included."
Within a few days, BSWD provided the Board of Selectmen with copies of
CDM's report and suggested that a task force be appointed to work with
the agency. This suggestion was also made by the area's state
representative and a local resident. In late December the selectmen
appointed a six-member task force representing the Board of Selectmen,
town agencies, environmental and public interest organizations, and
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private citizens. The task force was charged with collecting and
disseminating relevant information, assuring coordinated and
constructive public input into decisions, and leading any discussions
and negotiations with state agencies. Since its creation, the task
force has spearheaded public concern with and opposition to the siting
process.
i -•'•'. .• . . . . •
In early January of 1979 the task force issued a report based on its
review of CDM's study. That report reiterated issues that had been
developing publicly in the fall and criticized inadequacies in the CDM
report. A prime concern was the potential of a significant threat to
groundwater supplies, not only in the Sturbridge area but also
downstream in areas served by the Quinebaug River after which is fed by
Hobbs Creek. Provisions for site monitoring during operations and after
the facility was closed were considered inadequate, and CDM's
recommendation of Hypalon liners over a superior but more costly liner
was sharply criticized. The task force generally concluded that CDM's
report left too many unknowns with respect to impacts on the
environment. The report noted that the task force would seek state
funds to conduct an independent assessment of the site.
Soon after the task force issued its report, the local League of Women
Voters sponsored a public meeting in Sturbridge to discuss the siting
project. Staff from EPA Region I and several state agencies were
invited and made presentations. The federal and state regulatory
officials discussed RCRA, the general problem of hazardous waste from
generation to disposal, and the development of a state plan for
hazardous waste management, including the need for cooperative public
participation. BSWD's assistant director discussed the Sturbridge
siting study and its relationship to the state plan. A question-
and-answer period followed the presentations.
While BSWD and the other agencies received generally positive comments
from the community for the presentation, the community remained,
skeptical of the siting process and opposed to the development of the
facility. Task force members indicated that BSWD had provided an honest
review of progress to date and an accurate picture of the site's
potential for development. At the same time the information available
was considered incomplete by task force members and other area residents
and, at least in the area of impacts on Sturbridge's tourist industry,
completely inadequate. A major impression of the presentation (as
stated in a local editorial the following day) was that "...like it or
not, if the state decides to locate an industrial waste landfill in
Sturbridge, there is little the town can do." This impression of
potential inevitability was coupled with the perception that Sturbridge
was at the top of the list for development in spite of the state's
assurances that no final decision would be made until after further
study.
By late January of 1979, the task force was trying to determine what
resources, particularly financial, could be made available,to it to
pursue its objectives and what avenues of protest were available. BSWD
indicated that state funds might be available for an independent review
of the site. The task force also approached the area's U.S. congressman
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to see if federal funds could be found for the same purpose. No funds
had yet been made available and it was uncertain if funds would be
available. The Sturbridge Conservation Commission had been petitioned!.
by the task force to see if the state's Wetlands Act provisions applied
to the site. Considered but dismissed by local officials were local
controls over the transportation of hazardous waste over local roads.
Local zoning's potential for blocking the site had been investigated.
In January, the area state representative had filed a bill banning
hazardous waste landfills within a set distance of any well. The
representative felt that any final legislation would be different from
his proposed bill, but that the bill served as a starting point for
negotiating within the state legislature.
The task force had also solicited support from various agencies and
organizations. Several local agencies (e.g., the town water and sewer
commission, the conservation commission) had formally protested
development of the site primarily because of potential water pollution.
The Army Corps of Engineers, which has jurisdiction over nearby water
basins, had been approached, as had various environmental organizations.
None had responded as of January, 1979.
The task force, as the official representative of Sturbridge, began to
mount a determined effort to block development of the site. While
acknowledging the severity of the hazardous waste disposal problem and:
the consequent need for sites, it viewed the Sturbridge site as
involving unacceptable risks to the local environment and economy. If,
utilization of the site was inevitable, however, the task force was
prepared to negotiate. Only the BSWD and state regulatory agencies had
taken a position in favor of the site. The area's state representative
was in a potential position to act as a negotiator between BSWD and the
town. By January he had taken no official position vis-a-vis the site.
BSWD indicated to local leaders that a number of issues raised by the
community (e.g., site access, operating hours, monitoring provisions)
were negotiable.
The next important action was the public announcement of potential sites
recommended by DWPC for development as hazardous waste disposal
facilities. The town was eager to compare Sturbridge to those sites to
determine its relative merits. '
The Centaur site visit was conducted in late January; in late May
Centaur again contacted BSWD to determine the status of the siting
attempt. In the intervening four months the state's approach to siting
had become more comprehensive. One result of this development was a
reduction in the sense of urgency with respect to the Sturbridge site.
In February, DWPC announced the results of the COM survey of ten sites
in the state. CDM had recommended that two sites be further studied for
the development of hazardous waste facilities. Two towns—Taunton and
Amesbury—then joined Sturbridge as prospective "sites. According to
BSWD, subsequent discussions by state agencies led to a decision to drop
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Amesbury as a potential hazardous waste site in favor of pursuing its
feasibility as an interim and back-up landfill for a resource recovery
facility. Dartmouth, one of the ten sites evaluated by CDM, was then
designated as a backup hazardous waste site. Public opposition has
developed in Tauton and Dartmouth as a result of these actions.
According to BSWD the announcement of these additional sites has had
some impact on opponents to- the Sturbridge site. Those opponents have
now had the. opportunity to compare its characteristics with other sites.
The site is no longer the "number one" prospect, according to BSWD, but
is at the same stage of development as the other announced sites. While
these developments have addressed'some of the issues raised by
Sturbridge residents, opposition has not diminished. To some extent
opposition has reportedly shifted to the potential economic impact of
developing a facility on tourism generated by Old Sturbridge Village.
The state's approach to siting has evolved substantially, which may have
much greater implications for Sturbridge than the DWPC announcement. A
second survey of sites has been initiated and will be completed by late
1979 or early 1980. BSWD has been investigating potential sites on
federal and state land. In addition, private landowners have been asked
to recommend sites and those sites are also being investigated. BSWD
expects to have a pool of prospect sites as a result of this survey and
it is 'at least possible that these sites may be more suitable than
Sturbridge or other currently identified sites. •
BSWD is also developing a state hazardous waste plan which should be
completed by early 1980. According to BSWD's assistant director, recent
agency experience has indicated a need for greater state involvement, at
least insofar as BSWD must be more knowledgeable about non-technical,
non site-specific issues. Accordingly the state plan will discuss,
among other things, the need and justification for a state role in
hazardous waste management, general siting criteria, institutional and
management policies, and regional and industrial concentrations with
respect to hazardous waste generation. The plan may also classify
specific wastes by degree of hazard, by susceptibility to treatment
and/or processing and by their compatibility for disposal with other
hazardous waste. ,
Had the state's original schedule been followed, a decision to proceed
with one of the announced sites would have been made by late April or
early May. An environmental"assessment would have then been initiated
and completed by late summer or early fall of 1979. Necessary permits
would then have been applied for.
With the development of the new site survey and the state plan, that
schedule has been abandoned. The state plan and related pool of poten-
tial sites will be completed in early 1980. An environmental impact re-
port (EIR) on those sites will then be prepared. If, as is possible, 20
to 25 potential sites are identified, then preparing the EIR may be a
protracted process. After the EIR is completed site acquisition(s)
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will be made and necessary permits applied for. Thus any final decision
on the Sturbridge site has been substantially delayed.
IV.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
Late 1977 —
Crisis in hazardous waste disposal leads state
agencies to decision to investigate potential
disposal sites in Massachusetts.
February, 1978 *— DWPC contracts with CDM to investigate ten
sites; BSWD contracts with CDM to investigate
suitability of Sturbridge site.
March, 1978 — BSWD notifies Sturbridge officials that site is
being investigated; some opposition surfaces and media
cover age appears.
August, 1978 — BSWD informs Sturbridge of investigation progress.
September, 1978 — Local petition opposing site is circulated and
sent to governor and state agencies.
Fall of 1978 — Sturbridge informed that EIR must be prepared. DWPC
reportedly delcares that Sturbridge has been chosen as
disposal site; BSWD denies making a final decision.
Local opposition increases.
December, 1978 — CDM completes report on Sturbridge; BSWD
provides local officials with a copy of CDM re-
port. Local task force to respond to investiga-
tion is established.
January, 1979 ~ Task force issues report critical of CDM report;
opponents seek political and financial support for
their fight against proposal. League of Women Voters
holds informational meet ing attended by EPA, DWPC,
BSWD, and local resi dents.
February, 1979 — DWPC announces that Amesbury and Taunton are
also prospective sites for hazardous waste
facilities.
Spring of 1979 — BSWD begins second site survey and state plan,
postpones any immediate action on pursuing
Sturbridge or other announced sites.
Early 1980 — Expected completion date of state plan and second
site survey. Possible starting date of EIR on
potential sites.
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V.
ATTEMPTS TO SECURE , SUPPORT
Attempts have been made to secure support both for BSWD's siting process
and the general need for facilities. -Major actions include:
o BSWD's early and continued notification of local officials
of the site investigation and its progress. An important
part of this notification process has been the conscious
attempt by BSWD to be both open and responsive.
,o The informational meeting sponsored by the League of Women
Voters in January 1979 and the agency presentations made
, , at that meeting.
o The statement by a DWPC official that compensation is
available to communities with disposal facilities.
VI.
SUMMARY EVALUATION
Conflict which has arisen over the Sturbridge site has not been resolved
to date. There are several major reasons for this: 1) BSWD has not made
a final decision on the site's feasibility; 2) additional work will be
done by BSWD before a decision is reached; and 3) BSWD's decision and
additional data will significantly contribute to the final disposition
of issues raised by the Sturbridge community. Thus no resolution has
been achieved, nor is there any reason why issues should be resolved at
this time.
As indicated above, BSWD and other agenices have met with the Sturbridge
community to provide information and to respond to local concerns.
These dealings with officials and citizens in Sturbridge.have met with
mixed results. BSWD has established credibility with local officials;
task force members feel that BSWD has been honest and above board with
them. This has helped communicate the need for dispoal sites to local
officials and private citizens. Consequently this need has been
recognized and acknowledged even by those most opposed to a facility ,in
Sturbridge. EPA's regional office and Masachusetts regulatory agencies
have contributed to this recognition.
In spite of this, Sturbridge opposes any development of a facility at
the site. The COM report commissioned by BSWD is considered generally
inadequate by task force members. To meet technical issues, raised by
the community, BSWD has indicated that state funds may be available for
Sturbridge to commission its own investigation. This would clearly meet
with local approval as the task force has actively sought such funds.
Whether such a report would overcome locally expressed concerns is un-
certain. Even if such a report reaffirmed CDM's conclusions, a task
force member felt that a considerable "selling job" would be required to
convince locals of the site's suitability. Among other concerns, the
task force wanted to compare Sturbridge to other potential disposal
sites in Masachusetts. •
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BSWD has also indicated that aspects of site design (e.g., access,
screening) and operation (e.g., monitoring, working hours) are nego-
tiable. If site development is inevitable, task force members have
indicated a desire to negotiate with BSWD to ensure that the safest and
most responsible plan for site development is prepared. The area's
state representative feels he is a potential negotiator for Sturbidge.
In discussing possible negotiations he reiterated the major issues
outlined by the task force and by BSWD. He also indicated that the
state might provide some compensation to Sturbridge by funding projects
to support the area's tourist industry.
A range of issues has been raised by local officials and citizens.
These generally relate to the viability of the site, the plan for facil-
ity development, the potential economic impact on the area, and the site
investigation of Sturbridge compared to other potential sites in Mas-
sachusetts.
Site viability — The proximity of the site to a marsh, a pond, and a
creek which might be contaminated by leakages from a facility is a major
concern. There are private wells in the area and sites that might in
the future be developed as public wells. The area is an aquifer .which
must meet stringent requirements to avoid contamination of drinking
water supplies. BSWD acknowledges these facts but does point out that
almost all, if not all, of New England would be classified as an aquifer
under existing regulations.
Facility development plan — The task force has criticized CDM's report
for not addressing a number of issues in sufficient detail, from the '.
specific wastes to be accepted to provisions for post-closure moni-
toring. Primary among these criticisms is that engineering will not
compensate for hydrogeological flaws of the site. BSWD has responded by
indicating that additional engineering and an environmental review have
yet to be prepared and that these will address many of the issues
raised. In addition, if site development occurs, both sides have
indicated a desire to negotiate the details of site design and facility
operation.
Economic impacts — Community representatives feel that the development
of a hazardous waste landfill is inherently incompatible with the area's
tourism. Regardless of other risks associated with a facility, they
feel its very presence could adversely affect tourist business. (Ac-
cording to task force members interviewed, tourists spend $50 million
annually in the Sturbridge area and that the area is second only to Cape
Cod as a Massachusetts tourist attraction.)
Sturbridge versus other potential sites — Community representatives
want to compare this site to others being investigated in the state.
They feel Sturbridge is the front runner because of its central location
and accessibility. Without data on other sites they are extremely
skeptical of statements and evidence which describe the site as suit-
able for hazardous waste disposal. By the spring of 1979 these data
were available.
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VII. FACTORS LEADING TO PUBLIC OPPOSITION/ACCEPTANCE ,
Opposition and concern arose to consideration of Sturbridge as a hazard-
ous waste disposal site almost as soon as BSWD informed local officials
of its site investigation. In the one-year period since officials were
first informed of the investigtion, opposition, has grown and issues have
become more clearly defined. The factors contributing to opposition
include the following.
o BSWD's decision to push the investigation of Sturbridge
ahead of DWPC's survey of other potential sites in the
state.
o The sense among local residents that Sturbridge was the
front runner among sites in the state despite BSWD's
statement that no final decision has been made.
o The perceived incompatibility of a hazardous waste"disposal
facility with area development, particularly the tourist
industry.
In spite of the opposition, there appeared to be some opportunity to ar-
rive at a negotiated agreement on the site. This potential could erode
over time; however, a number of factors contribute to the potential for
development of areas of agreement between BSWD and local concerns.
o The state's power of eminent domain which preempts local
regulation.
o BSWD's credibility in the eyes of .local leaders, resulting
from BSWD's openness and responsiveness. ,
o Two local options for negotiators—the task force which
is so charged and the area's state representative.
o BSWD's willingness to negotiate issues and the local
perception that negotiation is desirable if the facility
is inevitable.
VIII. RETROSPECTIVE VIEWS
The Sturbridge case is an example of an ongoing siting process; hence,
retrospective views would amount to pre-judging an incomplete process
and are therefore not included as part of this case study.
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3M/CHEMOLITE
COTTAGE GROVE, MINNESOTA
I.
INTRODUCTION
In early 1978, the Chemolite Division of the 3M Company joined with
local residents to successfully oppose an attempt by state and regional
agencies to site a hazardous waste landfill on their property. Little
more than a month later, Chemolite was informed that it could not
continue co-disposing of certain hazardous wastes in a nearby landfill,
and was obliged to attempt to site a hazardous waste facility of its
own.
Chemolite immediately contacted local .officials on learning that it
would have to make new arrangements to dispose of these wastes and
conducted a relatively effective but largely low-key public relations
campaign. They were successful in obtaining local support for a
temporary hazardous waste landfill on their property. In the long run,
however, they expect to have to ship their hazardous wastes to an
out-of-state landfill. Given local attitudes toward hazardous waste at
that time, their success in gaining approval even for a temporary
landfill was noteworthy.
II.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The 3M Company's Chemolite landfill is located on land adjacent to its
Chemolite complex in Cottage Grove, Minnesota. The site occupies
approximately five acres of the 820-acre 3M property, and is surrounded
on all sides by this property. Of the other 815 acres, 385 are
developed, 250 are non-buildable and 280 are reserved for future
expansion. (Portions of the undeveloped area are used for outdoor
weather testing of products and as a recreational areas, and the
remainder is leased on a yearly basis for agricultural uses.) The land
is presently zoned for general industry. The soils of the area are
silty and sandy surface soils underlain by sand. These are moderately
to highly permeable. Groundwater flow in the area is toward the
Mississippi River, which borders the 3M property on the north.
In order to ensure that the groundwater is not contaminated, the
landfill and the surrounding berm are lined with bentonite clay. This
also allows the collection of leachate for analysis. Lysimeters are
located adjacent to the disposal area to collect any percolating water
to determine whether any substances are being leached into the
groundwater. Finally, samples of groundwater from the Chemolite Plant
Well No. 4, the closest well to the site, are periodically analyzed for
contamination. The landfill accepts wastes only from the Chemolite
facility — wastewater sludge (including incinerator scrubber sludge)
and boiler ash. The 3M Company operates a rotary kiln incinerator at
the Chemolite plant which burns hazardous wastes (e.g. oily rags and
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sludges). Both the incinerator scrubber sludge and incinerator ash are
hazardous, (particularly because of their heavy metal content) and must
be landfilled. Incinerator ash was previously disposed of in the 3M
landfill, but is now hauled to a hazardous waste facility in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin. The remaining wastes are mixed prior to burial in the
landfill. The MPCA is of the opinion that the resulting mixture is
sufficiently alkaline that leachate is not a problem. 'Each year, the
Chemolite facility produces about 14-15,000 cubic yards of wastewater
sludge, (of when 30% is incinerator scrubber sludge), less than 1,000
cubic yards of incinerator ash, and about 6,500 cubic yards of boiler
ash. Approximately 1.5 acres of the landfill have not yet been filled,
so that the maximum remaining life of the landfill, at current rates of
disposal, is .about two years.
The 3M Company is a major chemical producer with over 90 plants located
around the country. Its chemicals are used in the production of various
coated materials (from adhesive tape to recording tape) which 3M
produces. With fiscal year 1978 sales revenues of over $4.6 billion, 3M,
was ranked fiftieth in the 1979 Fortune 500 listing of U.S. industrial
corporations. 3M does operate waste disposal facilities, at some plants.
However, the Cottage Grove facility is the only one designed to take
hazardous wastes.
Cottage Grove is located in Washington County, Minnesota, part of the
Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area (1976 population: 2.0 million).
The town has a population of about 18,000, the majority of whom'are
white-collar workers employed elsewhere in the region, and has one of
the highest per-capita incomes in the region. The only major industries
in the town are the Ghemolite plant and a Whirlpool appliance assembly
plant. The prevailing land use in the surrounding county is
agricultural.
III. HISTORY OF FACILITY DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC RESPONSE
Any solid waste disposal site for hazardous or other wastes in Minnesota
is required to have a Solid Waste Disposal Permit issued by the
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA). Initially, they recommend
that the prospective permittee discuss the scope and nature of the
project with MPCA staff. A preliminary application must then ,be
submitted to the MPCA. This application must include data on the
proposed site, facility design and engineering, access, clientele, type
of wastes, and some estimate on the environmental impacts of site
development and operation. The MPCA then responds to the preliminary
application and suggests changes which are incorporated into the final
application. In addition to receiving MPCA approval, the final
application must also be approved by the Metropolitan Council-'- if the
proposed facility is in the seven-county Mihneapolis-St. Paul region,
arid must be reviewed by the Minnesota Environmental Quality Board to
The Metropolitan Council is the regional planning agency for the
seven-county Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan region.
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determine whether an Environmental Impact Statement is required. If the
application is approved, the MPCA must give public notice, and can hold
a public hearing if one is requested. The permit if granted is for the
development and operation of the facility for the life of the site,
given that monitoring and reporting requirements are met. (Once the
site has been developed, a statement is required from a registered
professional engineer that the site has been developed according to the
permit).
No other state agency requires permits for the development and operation
of hazardous waste facilities. However, a number of counties and towns
in Minnesota do. Washington County and the City of Cottage Grove are
among these. Washington County has an ordinance which regulates the
development and operation of landfills, and requires that they receive a
permit to generate. The City of Cottage Grove requires that a hazardous
waste facility must have met MPCA standards and received an MPCA permit.
Within the state of Minnesota, local zoning generally cannot be
preempted to site hazardous waste facilities. Within the seven-county
metropolitan area, the Metropolitan Waste Control Commission (MWCC) can
preempt local zoning to site its own. hazardous waste facilities.1
Elsewhere in the state, the counties have this power. However, they
cannot preempt zoning for sites owned by other government agencies or by
private industry.
From June of 1975 through March of 1978, the MPCA with the aid of a U.S.
EPA grant, attempted to site a hazardous waste landfill in Minnesota.
This attempt was ultimately unsuccessful.* One of the final four
sites considered was located on land owned by the 3M Company in Cottage
Grove, although not on the same land on which the 3M site was to be
located. Two public meetings were held in Cottage Grove (in November
1977 and February 1978) to receive public comment on this proposed site.
Public opposition to the proposed site was intense. About 1,900 people
came to the November meeting to voice this opposition. Although fewer
people came to the February meeting, they were of the same opinion about
the proposed facility. At this February meeting, 3M spokesmen gave a
presentation detailing the company's opposition to the proposed site.
The reasons for their opposition were: 1) concern that if contaminants
leaked from the facility this would taint water in company wells and
disrupt production; and 2) that the construction of the facility would
deny the company the option of future expansion at that location.
Specialized production operations at the Chemolite facilty demand large
quantities of consistently pure water. Since the groundwater flow in
the area of the proposed site was toward Chemolite wells, any leakage
from the proposed facility would have jeopardized these operations.
Of the 820 acres owned by 3M, 385 were already developed and 255 were
non-buildable, leaving 180 acres for possible future expansion. The
entire 180 acres would have been included in the proposed MPCA site.
See the Minnesota case study elsewhere in Appendix A.
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Until March 15, 1978, the Chemolite facility disposed of sludge from its
wastewater treatment plant and ash from its incinerater at the Pine Bend
landfill in Dakota County. (Boiler ash was buried on-site.) However,
on that day the MPCA informed the landfill owner/operator that from then
on wastes from Chemolite would have to be buried separately from the
municipal solid wastes which comprised the greater part of the wastes
handled at this landfill. MPCA was of the opinion that acids produced
by decomposing organic materials in municipal waste could leach heavy
metals out of the Chemolite waste and into the groundwater. The
Chemolite waste alone is sufficiently alkaline that there would be
virtually no danger of this happening if the wastes were not mixed.
Dakota County officials then informed the owner/operator that such a
change in operating procedures would require an amendment to their '
existing landfill permit. The owner/operator in turn decided to resolve
this problem by not accepting any more wastes from Chemolite, and so
informed the company. Chemolite has been storing sludge and ash wastes
on its Cottage Grove property since March 24, 1978.
Chemolite's decision to store these wastes on their property —albeit
in the absence of any immediately available alternatives — immediately
put them in technical violation of city, county and state law.
In late March, 3M officials consulted with Cottage Grove officials about
their hazardous waste storage problem, and in early May the company
applied for a city permit to establish a temporary hazardous waste
landfill on the Chemolite site. There was not public discussion of the
proposal until late June, when the proposal was discussed at a Cottage-
Grove City Council meeting. In the meantime, 3M had also applied to the
MPCA for a permit to -store hazardous waste on its property.
In July the 3M Corporate Secretary and the Manager of Environmental
Affairs gave a presentation to the Cottage Grove Planing and Zoning
Commission in support of their permit application. They reiterated
their opposition to the MPCA/MWCC siting attempt and noted several
significant differences between the two proposals. ' In particular, they
pointed out that their site was not located in the area proposed for
future expansion; that it would cover five rather than 200 acres; that
they had complete control over the wastes buried in the landfill; and
that the wastes they were disposing of would not pose a threat to their
own operations. ,
Also during July, the Metropolitan Council staff tentatively approved
3M's proposal to temporarily store hazardous wastes at the Chemolite
facility, and 3M signed a stipulation agreement by which they promised
to come into compliance with MPCA regulations (i.e., either to obtain an
MPCA permit or dispose of these wastes elsewhere) within one year.
There was little immediate reaction to the proposal from the public or
local officials. The response of the Cottage Grove City Council is said
to have been concern about the possible hazards, posed by the facility,
but not outright opposition. The reasons for this concern were two-
fold. First, the public information campaign during the MPCA/MWCC
siting attempt had emphasized the hazards of improperly disposed
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hazardous waste. By virtue of this program, the public was made acutely
aware of the problems associated with hazardous waste but not with
possible solutions. Second, 3M had previously operated a landfill site
in a neighboring community. Some material dumped at this site had
leached into the water table and into private wells. 3M had had to put
in two wells to pump out the contaminated groundwater and this operation
is still continuing. The landfill was closed, and 3M received heavy
criticism from residents and public officials. After this landfill was
closed 3M installed the rotary kiln incinerator. Local residents were
also said to be afraid that if 3M were given permission to open a
hazardous waste landfill, the town would be unable to keep out other
such facilities.
Notwithstanding 3M's previous landfill experience, there was no outright
opposition to the facility due to the town's economic dependency on 3M,
and to 3M's reputation in the community as a competent and responsible
firm which would be there long after the site is filled.
The only significant criticism of the 3M proposal came from, state and
regional officials, some of who had been involved with the MPCA/MWCC
siting attempt. An official of the Minnesota Geological Survey stated
that he opposed the facility because the site is over a Jordan1 sandstone
formation that contains a major water supply. A member of the MPCA
board questioned what he saw as the double standard being applied to
3M's application. He felt that the 3M proposal was being evaluated ,
against less strict standards than had been the MPCA/MACC proposal be-
cause of 3M's local political and economic connections.
On August 22, the Cottage Grove City Planning Commission voted to recom-
mend that the City Council consider levying a fine against 3M for stor-,
ing manufacturing wastes on its property without a permit. Concerns
expressed by the Planning Commission included the inherent conflict of a
landfill with the proposed uses of the Mississippi River Critical
Area* inappropriate soil type and bedrock conditions. The following
week, however, the Planning Commission seemingly reversed itself and
voted to recommend that City Council grant 3M a temporary permit to
store hazardous wastes through December of 1978. The Commission also
called for periodic testing for leachate from the landfill.
The Cottage Grove City Council voted in September of 1978 to give
preliminary approval to 3M's application to store hazardous wastes until
December, 1979. The conditions of the permit were that the wastes
eventually be removed from the site; and that if testing showed seepage
from the landfill, the wastes must be removed immediately. The final
resolution to grant the city permit was approved on October 4. The
The Mississippi River Critical Area is a cooridor along both
sides of the river for which certain strict development controls ap-
ply. The recommended uses for this land are recreation and open
space, but existing uses and related development are allowed under
certain conditions. :
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stipulation was added that 3M must pay for periodic studies to determine
whether any wastes were leaching into the groundwater. Accordingly, 3M
developed the landfill. To resolve permanently its waste disposal -
problem, 3M has a number of options, not all of which include an on-site
landfill. The principal options are: •
o To dispose of all their ash and sludge wastes in an on-site
landfill;
o To ship all these wastes to an out-of-state hazardous waste
facility;
o To split this waste stream into hazardous and non-
hazardous wastes, ship the hazardous wastes out-of-state,
and dispose of non-hazardous wastes in their own landfill
or at the local municipal waste landfill.
o To site a facility elsewhere in Minnesota, either on their
own property or in an area seeking industrial development.
Currently, 3M is planning to adopt the third option. All incinerator
ash is already being hauled to a hazardous waste facility in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin. The MPCA has told 3M that if incinerator scrubber sludge is
separated from the rest of the wastewater sludge, the wastewater sludge
will then be non-hazardous and could be disposed of, separately, in any
sanitary landfill which would accept it. The incinerator scrubber
sludge would then also be hauled to the Milwaukee landfill.
Furthermore, if 3M can reduce the levels of contaminants in leachate
from this sludge to within an order of magnitude of levels specified in
the U.S. Public Health Service drinking water standards, they would be
allowed to co-dispose of the sludge with municipal wastes in the Pine
Bend landfill. Levels of contaminants in leachage could be reduced by
mixing boiler ash and lime with the wastewater sludge to increase its
alkalinity. 3M plans to adopt this option and to cease disposing of
wastes on-site as of December, 1979. From 3M's point of view, the least
costly option would have been to establish a permanent on-site disposal
facility. According to an official of the MPCA, local opposition to a
permanent facility is to blame for 3M's not being able to do so.
IV.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
January 19, 1978 —3M announces its opposition to the location of a
proposed chemical waste landfill on land at its
Chemolite complex in Cottage Grove.
March 15, 1978 — MPCA tells Pine Bend landfill to no longer mix Chemo-
lite wastes with municipal solid wastes. The landfill
owner/operator informs 3M that no more Chemolite
wastes will be accepted.
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June 20, 1978,— 3M announces that it is considering a plan to build
a chemical waste landfill on its Chemolite site.
June 27, 1978 — Official of the Minnesota Geological Survey says he is
opposed to the 3M plan; that the proposed site lies
over a Jordan sandstone formation that contains a major
water supply.
July 18, 1978 —
July 24, 1978 —
Metropolitan Council staff tentatively approves 3M
proposal to store chemical wastes.
3M officials make a presentation to Cottage Grove Plan-
ning and Zoning Commission in support of their permit
application.
August 22, 1978 — Cottage Grove Planning Commission recommends that the
City Council consider levying a fine against 3M for
storing manufacturing wastes on its Chemolite
property without a permit.
August 29, 1978 — Cottage Grove Planning Commission votes to recommend
that the City Council grant 3M a temporary permit to
store hazardous wastes through December, 1978; calls
for periodic testing for leachate from these wastes.
September, 1978 — Cottage Grove City Council votes to give preliminary
approval to allow 3M to store hazardous wastes until
Decemer, 1979, with the proviso that these wastes
eventually be removed, and if testing shows seepage,
that they be removed immediately.
October 4, 1978 — City Council approves final resolution to allow 3M to
store wastes. 3M agrees to pay for periodic studies
to determine whether wastes are leaching into the
groundwater.
February 9, 1979 — 3M announces that the future of the Chemolite plant
depends upon their finding an acceptable way to
dispose of hazardous wastes.
December, 1979 — Expected closing date of 3M landfill.
V. ATTEMPTS TO SECURE SUPPORT
There were few attempts made to secure support for the facility. These
included:
o Discussions about 3M's hazardous waste disposal problem be-
tween 3M and Cottage Grove officials soon after the closing
of the Pine Bend landfill to 3M and prior to any public
disclosure of the problem.
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VI.
o The presentation given by the 3M Corporate Secretary and
Manager of Environmental Affairs to the Cottage Grove Plan-
ning and Zoning Commission.
o The slide show and talk -.- which stressed 3M's economic
value to the community and its competence in safely
disposing of its own wastes — which was given
before all involved government bodies.
SUMMARY EVALUATION
This siting attempt is noteworthy because it so closely followed an
unsuccessful siting attempt and because it was successful, albeit only
temporarily. The major factors in 3M's being able to site a hazardous
waste landfill on virtually the same site where a public agency had been
unable to only a few months previously are the firm's credibility and
economic leverage, the small size of the proposed facility, and 3M's
ability to control the .wastes being dumped there., Local officials and
residents seem to feel that 3M is competent, responsible and committed
to the welfare of the community, notwithstanding the previous
3M/Chemolite landfill experience. Furthermore, the Chemolite facility
employs about 1,100 people, roughly 40 percent of whom live in Cottage
Grove, and pays approximately $700,000 per year in property taxes, about
40 percent of the county's industrial tax base.
These advantages notwithstanding, the 3M Company mounted a considerably
more effective public relations effort had the MPCA and MWCC. The
effort was low key but nonetheless reasonably successful. In
particular, local public officials were consulted shortly after the
siting attempt was begun, and public information stressed 3M's
competence in dealing with these wastes. This contrasts sharply with
the earlier attempt, wherein local officials were not apprised of the
progress of the siting attempt until after the first set of sites had
been selected, and wherein public information stressed the dangers of
improperly disposed chemical wastes. While ,it is presumably true that
3M learned from the earlier attempt, it is also true that their task was
made more difficult by extensive public knowledge of the hazards
associated with chemical wastes. A 3M official noted that during their
testimony in opposition to the MPCA/MWCC project they should have made
it clear that they were soon going to face a similar situation. He
further stated that their major problem was timing: that they needed to
site a facility so soon after a previously unsuccesful attempt. Not
•only did their effort suffer because of the public information program
mounted during the earlier attempt, but local officials had already
taken positions opposing any hazardous waste facilities, and it would
have been counterproductive to bring in the MPCA to testify on their
behalf before local officials which otherwise could have been done to
help gain local support. If the MPCA and MWCC had conducted a
well-designed public relations effort, he felt, the 3M facility could
have been permanently sited.
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Only a few issues and concerns were raised by the public and local of-
ficials during the siting attempt, although these few were strongly
felt. These included:
Site Suitability — The 3M property had previously been rejected a un- ,
suitable for a hzardous waste landfill, in particular due to the
permeability of the soil in the area.
Chemical Wastes — Due in large part to the public information campaign
mounted in the previous siting effort, residents were acutely aware of
the many hazards associated with improper storage and/or disposal of
chemical wastes.
VII. FACTORS LEADING TO PUBLIC OPPOSITION/ACCEPTANCE
Public opposition developed as the result of the following.
o Public awareness of the hazards associated with chemical
wastes, which was largely due to the public relations ef-
fort mounted during the previous (MPCA/MWCC) siting at-
tempt.
o Local public opposition to siting hazardous waste
facilities following the state attempt to site
a facility in Cottage Grove.
o Local public feeling that if this facility were sited,
others would be able to come in.
This opposition was blunted and partially overcome due to the following
factors.
o 3M's credibility in the eyes of the community.
o The economic ties between 3M and the community: in
particular, employment and taxes.
o Early discussions between 3M and Cottage Grove officials
about their problem and plans immediately following 3M's ex
clusion from the Pine Bend landfill.
o 3M's public relations campaign, which stressed their compet
ence and willingness to deal with their hazardous waste
problem.
VIII. RETROSPECTIVE VIEWS
It was noted by an official of the MPCA that, while the 3M siting
attempt is instructive, it does not point the way to the future of
hazardous waste facility siting in Minnesota. Most firms which produce
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chemical wastes do not produce enough to warrant maintaining on-site
disposal facilities, nor would the MPCA1 be amenable to such a
decentralized approach because of the difficulty of enforcing
regulations which this would imply. Furthermore, most firms have
neither the credibility nor the economic leverage that 3M has. Local
officials were generally sympathetic to 3Mfs problems and had no
criticisms to make of the way in which 3M handled the siting process,
but indicated that it would have been politically impossible for them to
accept a permanent site so soon after rejecting the state attempt. They
did feel that since these wastes were being generated in their town and,
in part, to their benefit, there was no rational argument to be made for
letting someone else bear the risk of their disposal.
IX.
GENERAL COMMENTS
A representative of 3M stressed that people who live in the immediate
vicinity of any proposed site should be contacted individually before a
public .announcement of the site is made. If their particular concerns
can be determined, some might be ameliorated (e.g. concerns about
traffic associated with the site). This would also help determine the
suitability of the location. The next step is to contact local elected
representatives. Only then should the public announcement be made.
He noted as well that public participation in decision making can be
either good or bad, depending upon the procedure followed; that if local
"opinion leaders" can be brought into the process early on, public
hearings can be conducted on a rational basis.
3M also does not view long-distance hauling as a permanent solution to
its hazardous waste problem, and is cooperatng wth MPCA in their'
attempts to site a statewide facility.
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KANSAS INDUSTRIAL ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
FURLEY, KANSAS
I.
INTRODUCTION
In February of 1977 Kansas Industrial. Environmental Services (KIES)
received a permit from the Kansas Department of Health and Environment
(KDHE) to operate a hazardous waste disposal facility. This event
capped a one-year siting and development process which was marked by
close cooperation and coordination between KIES and KDHE. By the time
of the Centaur site visit, KIES had modified its original land burial
and treatment lagoon operations and was adding new treatment
capabilities at the site.
The successful siting attempt was not accomplished without public
opposition. Area residents organized within days of the first public
announcement of the proposed facility. They raised concerns about
potential ground and surface water contamination and other issues.
While these concerns led to the filing of a suit to enjoin the issuance
of the permit, no sustained effort to block the siting developed. Since
KIES began operations, residents have complained about odors from the
facility and have sought additional state requirements to reduce
potential problems with the facility.
KDHE was the major party which effectively reduced the public
opposition. By developing stringent permit regulations with the advice
of state legislators and citizens, KDHE was able to address major
concerns and, for the most part, convince opponents that effective
regulation of the site would occur. While KDHE received almost all of
the public credit for allaying concerns, the head of KDHE's solid waste
section attributed much of the success to the cooperation the state
received from KIES. KIES officials attempts to address opponents'
issues met with much less success during the siting process. KIES has,
however, gained some credibility with area residents through
conscientious efforts to resolve operating problems and a more general
"good neighbor" policy.
II.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The KIES facility occupies an 80-acre tract of land in northeastern
Sedgwick County about 15 miles from Wichita. An additional 80-acre
tract adjacent to the site has recently been purchased for future
expansion but to date has not been developed. The land was previously
used as'grazing land, and adjacent land is used primarily for
agricultural purposes or as small homesteads. No zoning regulations
apply to that area of the county. Though close to Wichita, the site
itself is relatively remote and the only resident who could see the KIES
building sold her land to KIES. Access to the site is by county roads.
The Kansas Turnpike (1-35) passes within ten miles of the site.
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The site lies within a band of Wellington Clay Shale, which is
particularly impermeable. Within the bounds of the site, clay depths
range between 80 and 109 feet from ground level to a permeable limestone
stratum beneath the site. Clay depths from the bottom of disposal
trenches to the limestone are about 65 feet. The clay has a
permeability in the range of 10~9 to 10"^ cm/sec and a plasticity
index greater than 45. There is a perched aquifer within the clay
stratum in one area of the site, but this has been specifically excluded
from development as a disposal area.
As first developed, the facility design encompassed burial of drummed
waste and evaporation of liquid wastes. A total of 30 acres was
engineered for burial with the assumption that this would provide 30
years of capacity. Four small treatment ponds for acid neutralization,
chrome waste stabilization, oxidation and other treatment were
originally developed. Two large (400 by 200 feet) evaporation ponds
were also a part of the original design. ,
Based on its operating experience, KIES has changed and expanded its
operational capabilities. Wastes 'are now buried in small trenches
designed to accommodate a specific waste stream. These can be closed
fairly quickly and used year-round. (The large "bath tub" originally
used for burial was restricted to about six months of operation and
involved periodic pumping to eliminate standing water). KIES has added
63,000 gallons of liquid storage capacity for wastes which it sends to
reclaimers or incinerators. Treatment capability for cyanide and
hexavalent chromium waste was being developed during the Centaur site
visit. ..•..-
The entire site is ringed by a 200-foot buffer strip of unused land.
Catchment ponds are designed to receive all on-site drainage and can
hold the equivalent of two 100-year storms in a two-day period (about 12
inches of rain in 24 hours). Ponds are monitored quarterly. Off-site
runoff is diverted from the site. Monitoring wells are tested.monthly.
All tests are done by an independent lab approved by KDHE.
KIES's permit requires a complete post-closure plan one year prior to
closure. KIES has already submitted this plan to the state but expects
to upgrade it in response to new state regulations developed in response
to RCRA.
KIES was established in 1976 specifically for the purpose of developing
this facility. While KIES had no prior experience with hazardous waste
management, its two principals combined operating experience with
wastewater treatment facilties and a long-standing commitment to
environmentally sound land use practices. Key administrative people
with laboratory research, pollution control, and hazardous waste
management and planning experience were recruited from Vulcan Chemicals
Company and a consulting engineering firm. KIES employs about ten
operational staff at the facility. A separate division of KIES provides
hazardous waste hauling services and employs an additional 12 to, 15
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persons. KIES owns a fleet of a dozen trucks in a range of sizes to
handle any specific hauling need. Hauling is regulated by the Kansas
Corporation Commission and applicable federal regulations. In addition
the KDHE permit specifies a manifest system to track all wastes hauled
and disposed of by KIES. While most KIES monitoring tests are performed
by an independent laboratory as a condition of the permit, KIES has its
own on-site lab. At the time of the site visit, KIES was planning to
redevelop its lab facilities.
KIES accepts a broad range of hazardous waste including acids,
alkalines, solvents, small amounts of pesticides, and some
PCB-contaminated material (e.g., electrical transformers). Specifically
excluded are radioactive waste, bulk pesticides, and large volumes of
PCBs. Some wastes which are accepted by KIES are not disposed there but
are hauled to other facilities. Typically these are wastes that should
be incinerated or that can be reclaimed using technologies that KIES has
not developed.
KIES1 most immediate market area is Wichita and nearby areas of
Oklahoma. In its short operating history, however, it has dramatically
expanded its effective market. KIES had disposed of wastes from as far
away as Minnesota, Tennessee, Colorado and Texas. Some,of these market
areas are ones which KIES hopes to serve with future facilities.
KIES has initiated a rather ambitious campaign to develop new sites.
Work on an Oklahoma site has been underway since 1977 and a final permit
application was expected to be submitted in March, 1979. By the end of
1979, KIES hopes to submit plans for facilities in Missouri and Iowa.
Additional sites in two other states are contemplated.
KIES is located a few miles from Furley, Kansas, a town with a
population of about 50. The northeastern corner of Sedgwick County is
largely devoted to farming, small-scale oil production, and small
homesteads for those working in the Wichita area. Wichita (1977
estimated population, 263,000) is the largest city in Kansas and a major
center for small aircraft manufacturing. With a broad range of goods
and services available, the Wichita-Sedgwick County metropolitan area is
a major trade and service center for south central and southwestern
Kansas.
III. HISTORY OF FACILITY DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC REPSONSE
To operate a hazardous waste landfill in Kansas a facility must have a
permit from KDHE. The need for a local permit depends upon whether the
site is subject to local zoning. The area of Sedgwick County where KIES
is located does not have zoning. (The majority of Kansas counties do
not have county-wide zoning.) As a result, KIES required only the KDHE
permit in order to operate.
KDHE permit procedures involve a two-stage process. When an application
has been fully prepared through the stage of engineering design, KDHE
authorizes facility construction by letter. When construction is
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completed and meets state requirements, a permit is issued and
operations may begin. According to the chief of KDHE's solid waste'
section, only pennittable facilities will reach the stage of
construction authorization. . Emphasis is placed on extensive involvement
by the state in the development of the application from site selection
through construction. In this manner, KDHE can be assured that the
final application for a permit meets all requirements and is approvable.
Once a permit is issued, operational changes and facility expansions
need only KDHE approval rather than a new permit application. In
addition to granting a permit to operate, KDHE must approve each
hazardous waste by source before it may be accepted by a facility.
Planning for the KIES facility began in early 1976. The principals of
KIES had determined that a" market for industrial waste disposal existed
in the state. Consulting engineers experienced in the design of •
hazardous waste facilities in Oklahoma were retained and KIES approached
KDHE in April to determine what state requirements and regulations.would
apply to the proposed facility.
At that time Kansas had no regulations specifically applicable to
hazardous waste landfills. The only existing state regulations were
those for sanitary landfills. The development of the KIES facility thus
provided the initial impetus for the development of state hazardous
waste disposal regulations. (Continuing local concern 'with KIES and the
passage of RCRA have ensured the continued upgrading and expansion of
the state's regulations.) The need to develop these regulations
contributed to the close working relationship between KDHE and KIES
during the development of the permit application.
KIES1 siting process (as described by KIES1 general manager and KDHE's
solid waste section chief) began with preliminary surveys of state
geology. With state concurrence, this survey narrowed the area of
potential sites to a band of Wellington Clay Shale, which has particu-
larly low preineability characteristics. Within that clay band, areas
with unsuitable hydrogeology (e.g., presence of aquifers subject to
vertical percolation) and topography (e.g., floodplains) were excluded.
Aerial surveys were conducted to judge transportation access, population
density, and topography. By that process ten sites were selected for
soil tests by a private soils engineer. In the spring of 1976, tests
run on the sites included assessments of the proportion of clay to other
soils the presence of perched and major aquifers and, by laboratory
analyses, the clay's permeability, plasticity, shrinkage potential, and
reactivity to specific chemicals. Following these analyses five sites
were selected as qualified for development.
The final site selection rested on several additional considerations.
The Furley site is not subject to local zoning. The site, though not on
the market at that time, could be purchased from the previous owner.
The site was purchased quietly, with no publicity.
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In late May, KIES submitted an application to KDHE for approval to
establish and operate an industrial waste landfill. The application was
accompanied by preliminary plans for site design and facility operation.
Also submitted to KDHE in late May and early June were; soil reports,
monitoring well design, and drainage plans. All were prepared by KIES
consultants.
In late June of 1976, KDHE notified local officials that it would hold
an informational meeting on the KIES facility. This was the first
knowledge officials and residents of the Furley area had of plans for
the disposal site. Although work on site testing and engineering design
was not complete, KDHE indicated that a permit would probably be granted
to KIES.
The notification, given about a week before the meeting, produced a
quick and vocal response by area residents. An article in the Wichita
Eagle reported that about 150 residents were "fighting mad" and would
take any legal steps necessary to stop KIES. Concerned residents met
two days before the meeting, organized a committee, and hired attorneys.
Prior to the meeting, residents expressed concerns about potential
environmental and economic impacts, the site location and opportunities
for local participation in decision-making. They foresaw the potential
for air and water pollution and felt KIES could not predict what
pollution would occur. Drainage from the site was feared. One resident
noted that local regulations had banned runoff from feedlots into the
area's streams and that the impacts of chemicals would be far more
serious than those of manure. Several residents predicted that land
prices would fall. Residents felt the site was in too populous an area,
which in 20 years would likely become part of Wichita. Residents did
not like the thought of being known as "the dumping ground of Kansas" or
"a guinea pig for the rest of the state". Finally, the fact that only a
few days' notice of the meeting was given left the impression that
facility development was being rushed along without the local
community's knowledge. .
The informational meeting was held in Witchita on June 30, 1976. It was
conducted by KDHE's director of the Division of Environment and attended
by about 200 local residents. KIES' engineering consultant was also in
attendance. KDHE made a presentation and KIES' consultant responded to
concerns voiced by attendants. Opponents doubted the validity of
research prepared for KIES, specifically soil tests indicating low
permeability. Although KIES' consultant responded to these concerns, he
was unable to convince opponents that there would be no detrimental
impact on the environment. Indeed, some in attendance felt that neither
KDHE nor KIES' consultant could satisfactorily answer any of the
questions raised by residents. An attorney for the opponents declared
that the public had not had sufficient time to consider the proposal and
demanded more time. KDHE agreed to a second public meeting. The
meeting did little to allay public concerns. Opponents' earlier threats
to sue in order to stop the proposal were repeated at the end of the
meeting.
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Subsequent to the first public meeting, KIES .submitted additional soil
test results to KDHE. By early August, KDHE was satisfied that all .data
requirements had been fulfilled and work proceeded on a draft of the
permit for the KIES facility. By mid-October, 1976, KDHE was close to a
final version of the permit and scheduled a second public meeting.
On October 14, the second public meeting was held in the Wichita area.
KDHE's Division of Environment director again conducted the meeting and
outlined the regulations which would be applied" to KIES. The permit was
developed by KDHE with recommendations from a study group established
after the second public meeting by the Kansas legislature and a
citizens' group. The permit restrictions were considered extremely
stringent by state elected and appointed officials and were described by
EPA Region VII staff as among the tightest in the nation. Comments by
proponents and opponents, both at the time of meeting and during
Centaur's site visit, indicated that the permit, had a substantial impact
on reducing opponents' concerns. In addition to imposing stiff controls
on KIES, KDHE also strongly supported the development of the facility.
KIES had also come prepared, and presented a complete flowchart of
proposed facility operations, the manifest system to be used, quality
controls over facility construction and operation, and fire fighting
safeguards. KDHE told those at the meeting that KIES had .not only
submitted all required information, but also exhausted all data
possibilities in preparing the application.
The major conditions of that permit included the following: approval by
KDHE of all wastes accepted; approval by KDHE of all transportation
routes; maintenance of records of wastes received and analyses of those
wastes; payment of an annual fee for KDHE on-site inspection- costs; cost
and security bonds; liability insurance; and criminal and civil
penalities to insure compliance. Although not developed at the time of
the meeting, a post-closure plan would be required before the final
permit was issued. The permit was issued subject to,annual review and
approval and to amendment at any time based on the development of. new
regulations and requirements. The permit did allow KIES to expand the
facility or change procedures subject to KDHE approval.
In mid-November, KIES agreed to all conditions;of the permit and KDHE
authorized facility construction in accordance with approved, plans and
specifications. Construction began, and with some additional
modifications required by KDHE was completed in late January of 1977,
On February 1, KDHE issued the permit allowing KIES to begin operations.
While the second public meeting substantially reduced public concerns,
it did not eliminate them altogether. After that meeting the area's
state representative said she and othe'r legislators would seek to delay
permit issuance until after the legislative session began in January of
1977. In late January, a group of local opponents sought a temporary
restraining order on the permit issuance. The suit was based primarily
the fact that some KIES engineering work had been signed by an engineer
registered in Oklahoma, but not in Kansas.
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According to a KDHE official, opponents resorted to this technicality
because they could find no substantive dispute with the permit. The
matter was settled out of court and no permanent injunction blocking
permit issuance was ever obtained.
In March of 1977 KIES accepted its first load:;four five-gallon cans of
pesticide. Since that inauspicious start, the volume of wastes handled
has increased substantially, to the point where the original site life
of 30 years has been reduced by as much as 40 to 50 percent. KDHE
estimates about 70 percent of this waste is from out-of-state
generators. KIES' general manager explained that more than fifty
percent of the present volume would be diverted to new sites KIES hopes
to develop in the future.
Facility operations have been changed since operations began. Small
trenches have been added for burial of individual waste streams and
allow for greater control than did large disposal trenches. Storage :
capacity of 63,000 gallons for liquid wastes has been added. At the
time of the site visit KIES was developing waste treatment capabilities
for cyanide and chrome wastes.
Since operations began, the most frequently cited complaint by local
residents has been odors. On several occasions the treatment of wastes
has generated obnoxious odors, in one case for a period of about two
days. According to area residents, these have been a continuing source
of irritation. KIES has responded in two ways. First, it has improved
its operating procedures to minimize any odors. Secondly, it has
sometimes helped state health officials find the source of odors, not
all of which have come from its site. According to KIES, odors have
been tracked to old gas wells, ruptured pipelines, manufacturing plants,
feedlots, and in one case, the barnyard of the resident who had lodged
the complaint against KIES. In spite of this, residents appear to blame
KIES for most odors in the area.
In addition to attempting to respond conscientiously to odor complaints,
KIES has pursued a "good neighbor" policy in small ways. KIES helps to
maintain local roads in winter by plowing snow with it own equipment and
has helped pull residents' cars out ,pf snow drifts. It has provided
free earth moving service to a local farmer. To the extent possible,
KIES uses area businesses for needed parts and fuel oil. A KIES
employee lives on-site and local residents have shown little reluctance
to contact him with concerns or complaints.
According to the former chairman of the opponents' organization, KIES
has gained a certain respect locally. He indicated that KIES has been
able to reduce odor problems. On the other hand, he felt that some
promises made by KIES and KDHE at the public meetings had not been kept.
He cited the case of runoff after a particularly bad rain, and mentioned
the KIES statement that this would not happen. (According to KDHE, the
rain was the equivalent of a 500-year storm, which overtaxed the site's
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safeguards designed for two 100-year storms in two days. KDHE also
stated that no adverse impacts resulted from the runoff.) He also
referred to KIES1 projection of a 30-year site life versus the current
projections and the KIES purchase of an additional 80 acres for
expansion. He also felt the state had not inspected KIES weekly as
promised and nor had it seemed sufficiently concerned about its
regulatory responsibilities. A major problem, he felt, was reliable
information which could conceivably show that local concerns were
unwarranted.
The ex-chairman and KIES general manager both indicated that, while lo-
cal concerns had been reduced, major opposition could easily revive.
This uneasy relationship has been reflected in the local media's cov-
erage of KIES. In January of 1978, the Wichita Eagle ran a full-page
article on the site. The article described of the KIES facility in the
context of state and national efforts to upgrade hazardous waste
disposal. While making some reference to past opposition, the article
described KDHE's support for KIES and was generally favorable. In
October, 1978 several articles appeared following some discussion of
constructing an incinerator at KIES. The incinerator proposal was not
pursued. However, residents interviewed at the time repeated issues and
complaints that had been raised since June of 1976. Although the
articles reiterated support for KIES on the part of state and local
health and environmental officials, the overall impression was one of
local hostility. After those articles were published, KIES played the
major role in cleaning up a nitric acid spill at a titan missile silo.
According to KIES1 general manager, local media generally praised KIES
for its activities.
KIES' current status with local residents appears to be one of cautious
and concerned co-existence. The day Centaur spoke with the ex-chairman
of the opponents' organization, another ex-leader of the opponents was
in Topeka to discuss developing new legislation with the area's state
representative. The bill, if proposed, would be aimed at reducing odor
problems at KIES. These discussions underscored the feeling that res-
idents did not want to close KIES but did want to make sure that every
precaution would be taken to safeguard operations.
IV.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
Early 1976 —KIES begins planning for facility, hires consultants.
April, 1976
Late May,
Early
June, 1976 —
Late
June, 1976 --
KIES and. KDHE hold initial discussions over facility de-
velopment.
KIES submits preliminary plans for approval by KDHE and
submits supporting test results.
KDHE announces proposal publicly, holds first information
meeting, and promises second meeting.
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August, 1976 — KDHE informs KIES that all data requirements to date -
have been met.
October, 1976 — Second public meeting held, concerns are substantially
reduced by KDHE permit restrictions.
November, 1976 — KDHE authorizes facility construction.
January, 1977 — Citizens suit to enjoin permit issuance is filed but
resolved without injunction. Construction of facility
is completed.
February, 1977 — KIES permit to operate is granted by KDHE.
March, 1977 — First wastes are accepted.
1977 — Problems with handling oil refinery waste lead to citizen com-
plaints of odor. Periodic odor compliants,continue to
recur, although at a reduced rate.
January, 1978 — Wichita paper writes long and generally positive
article on KIES and general topic of hazardous waste
management.
October, 1978 — Possibility of constructing an incinerator at KIES
generates media attention to residents' concerns and
complaints about KIES.
1979 — KIES handling of nitric acid spill in titan missle silo attracts
favorable media attention.
Spring of 1979 — KIES develops new treatment capabilities for cyanide
and chromium waste.
V.
ATTEMPTS TO SECURE SUPPORT
The following are the major efforts to inform the public of KIES and ad-
dress public concerns.
o The June, 1976 public meeting where KDHE and the primary
consultant for KIES first explained the proposed facility
and state regulations and responded to opponents' concerns.
o The October, 1976 public meeting where KDHE outlined the
permit restrictions which would apply to the facility.
o Efforts by KIES staff to reduce odor problems and to help
identify sources of odors.
o A range of efforts and actions by KIES which amount to a
"good neighbor" policy.
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VI i
SUMMARY EVALUATION
The cumulative effect of the attempts to generate support has been to
reduce what was initial total opposition to the development of the
facility. Currently there appears to be a cautious willingness on the
part of nearby residents to let KIES operate. This by no means trans-
lates into local support for KIES, but more nearly reflects the attitude
of a "good loser," as one resident termed it.
The major factor in effectively overcoming public opposition was KDHE's
ability to demonstrate tight controls over facility design and oper-
ation. As described earlier, KDHE's performance at the second public
meeting met with general expressions of satisfation from those who had
opposed the facility. Just as important as KDHE's response to public
concerns was its steadfast support for the KIES proposal as a desired
solution to hazardous waste disposal problems. Commendations for KDHE's
role have been made by a range of parties from KIES officials to local
opponents whose individual'interests were divergent and sometimes
completely opposed. KDHE's solid waste section chief suggested that the
agency's general credibility with citizens was a significant factor in
allaying, specific concerns about KIES. KDHE was in this case able to'
perform the delicate balancing act of safeguarding the public health and
at the same time encouraging and supporting environmentally sound
hazardous waste management.
The ability to allay public concerns is more significant in light of the
earlier public meetings and post-operational attempts to secure support.
That the .first public meeting was unsuccessful (one regulatory official
called it a disaster) in reducing concerns is evidenced by the fact that
a second public meeting was held. Various regulatory officials
indicated that the failure of the meeting was attributable to poor
preparation. Despite the fact that the bulk of site investigation and a
significant amount of site engineering had been completed, KIES was
unable to persuade the public that the proposal was credible. The
failing then was not primarily defined in terms of information, but
rather in terms of communications and public relations. Newspaper
articles prior to the meeting citing KDHE's almost certain approval of
the proposal undoubtedly added to area residents' concerns.
Since operations have begun, KIES has worked in many ways to gain the
trust and respect of area residents. Based on limited contacts with
former opponents, it appears that KIES has had some success. However,
residents* deeply rooted concerns (e.g., eventual water contamination)
have changed little* This experience suggests that even the operator of
the best managed facility has very real limits placed on its ability to
reduce public concerns. More simply, the local community may never
accept and never completely trust the facility operator.
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Facility opponents raised a number of issues. The major issues follow:
Contamination of water and other media — Opponents felt that the site,
its design and regulations did not adequately protect surface and
ground-water from potential contamination from chemical wastes disposed
of at KIES. Less well defined were concerns that the soil and air
would also be polluted. They also felt that KIES could not predict the
facility's environmental impacts.
Site location — Opponents felt that the site was not sufficiently
isolated. While that section of the county is not densely populated,
opponents stressed its proximity to Wichita (about 15 miles) and the
potential in the future for urban development to envelop the area.
Economic disbenefits — Residents feared that nearby land values would
fall if the facility were developed.
Equity issues and local image — There were general concerns about the
equity of choosing the Furley area as a site. Opponents did not want to
gain the notoriety of being the industrial dumping ground of Kansas.
Similarly, they did not want to become the "guinea pig" for developing
appropriate hazardous waste disposal practices. This latter concern
reflected a more general concern over the reliability of these
practices.
Public participation opportunities — The outcry prior to and during the
first public meeting was compounded by the complaint that local
residents were not being adequately informed and were not given any
meaningful role in the decision-making process.
Since KIES has begun operation two issues have evolved: odors, and site
monitoring.
Odors — These are the most salient impact of operation and have
generated the bulk of the complaints. These complaints have diminished
because of KIES efforts to control odor problems and (perhaps) because
of odor surveys which have shown barnyards, pipelines, and other sources
of odors in the area. ;
Site monitoring — There appears to be some concern over whether the
state is adequately performing its monitoring and inspection functions.
KDHE states that monitoring is performed weekly, but opponents seem to
doubt this. They also feel uninformed about the results of on-site
monitoring.
VII. FACTORS LEADING TO PUBLIC OPPOSITION/ACCEPTANCE
The following were major steps leading to public opposition.
KDHE's announcement of the first public meeting to acquaint
the public with the KIES proposal. '
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o Statements by KDHE officials reported by the press prior to
. the first meeting that nothing in the proposal would
disqualify the site on technical grounds.
o The inability of KIES and KDHE to convince opponents of the
soundness of the proposal and of state controls over the
facility in the course of the first public meeting.
The reduction of public concern and opposition was attributable to the
following.
o KDHE's demonstration at the second public meeting of strong
regulatory controls over KIES.
o The ability of KDHE to include state legislator and
citizen concerns in the development process for the KIES
permit.
o The close cooperation between KDHE and KIES throughout the
siting process, particularly in regard to the
development of KDHE's regulatory program for hazardous
waste management.
o A final important factor may have been the lack of major
national publicity of hazardous waste problems during the
siting. Love Canal and other hazardous waste disasters be-
•'- came general public 'knowledge subsequent to the issuance of
the KIES permit.
VIII. RESTROSPECTIVE VIEWS
Comments on the siting process by area residents have focused on two re-
lated issues: ongoing provisions to ensure safe operations and the
public availabilty of reliable information pertaining to those opera-
tions. At the close of the second public meeting residents indicated a
need to be reassured that adverse impacts would be eliminated or re-
duced. During the site visit a former opposition leader reiterated this
concern and stated that the lack of information on site monitoring
prevented citizens from knowing what impacts had occurred. Locals did
not know the state of affairs and might have no cause to worry. He felt
that a small citizens' committee with the resources to independently
analyze water samples from monitoring wells would provide a means to
reliably inform residents on facility operations.
IX.
GENERAL COMMENTS
The KIES general manager (who had previous hazardous waste experience as
a consultant and state official) made a number of comments regarding
state and industry roles in siting. As in the KIES siting process, he
felt states should play a strong role but were constrained by a shortage
of well-qualified staff in hazardous waste offices and a lack of oper-
ational experience with facilities. By consulting with other state
131
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agencies, hazardous waste offices could substantially increase available
expertise. This pooled talent could help states scrutinize permit ap-
plications and focus on permit deficiencies.
While a strong state review of permits was critical, the ,KIES official
felt this should not slow down the permit process. Three to six months
should be allowed for permit review, with definite time limits placed on
other state agency and public comments. Lengthy review periods would
substantially increase industry costs and begin to drive out smaller
companies with limited capital.
Public participation was seen by KIES as a state function. State
agencies should take the lead in conducting public meetings and not '.
place the burden on industry to provide all information on facilities
and safeguards. From industry's point of view, public input should help
point out problem areas which industry and the state can then address
and correct. The KIES general manager cited the format employed in
Oklahoma as a possible model for public input. In that state, public
commenters may only address technical issues and only under oath;
cross-examination is allowed.
A final public agency role is the development, and dissemination of
reliable public information. Distinctions between Love Canal and sound
disposal practices need to be publicly understood. The desirablity of
incineration and other techniques over the burial of any hazardous waste
should be publicized. The KIES official felt that the public, the
media, and even some regulatory officials are not sufficiently
knowledgeable about current management practices and as a result impeded
the development of sound hazardous waste management.
One role which KIES felt to be inappropriate for government was site
ownership. The inevitable increase in administration would not result
in any greater public acceptance of sites. Financial and institutional
arrangements would be chaotic. This approach might also lead to
increased centralization in industry (because larger companies could
demonstrate greater experience) without any guarantee that this would
result in better disposal practices.
From KIES' perspective, this siting experience has provided two particu-
lar lessons for future siting. Given the need for a strong state role,
the disposal industry should help pay state costs. By providing the
state a. share of gross revenues (KIES provides about 5 percent),
industry can defray part of the costs of monitoring sites and
administering regulations. Industry also needs to amass as much
information as possible when developing new sites. In many cases this
will require significantly more data than minimally required by states.
To date, EPA Region VII has played a minor role in siting. It has not
reviewed any permit applications nor has it asked to do so. Instead it
has provided quiet support for sites which states have determined to be
good. In rare instances, Region VII staff have discussed general
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problems of hazardous waste management and the need for sound disposal
sites with opponents of specific sites.
According to regional staff the implementation of RCRA could drastically
change the EPA role, impede siting, and change the status of disposal in
the region. It was considered possible that some Region VII states
would ask EPA to implement RCRA. Yet only one-third of the estimated
personnel needed by the office to implement RCRA has been budgeted.
Recently issued regulations for public particiption could add six months
to two years to the siting process. This could drive public
participation costs to a level equal to the rest of siting costs. If
these estimates are at all accurate, siting costs will mushroom and a
number of potential facility sponsors will drop out. This would clearly
result in a slower rise in regional disposal capacity. That disposal
capacity could drop drastically when RCRA is implemented, as the office
expects only two sites in the region to meet the new regulations.
The regional office sees the major siting issues as follows: Do sites
meet, or preferably exceed, minimum technical standards for safety? Are
funds for all post-closure costs and eventualities available
perpetually? Are facility sponsors and operators qualified and
trustworthy? Can site proponents communicate clearly and effectively
with local officals and concerned citizens?
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BOB'S HOME SERVICE
WRIGHT CITY, MISSOURI
I.
INTRODUCTION
Bob's Home Service (BHS) is a hazardous waste landfill which began
limited operations in 1976 and received a permit for full operation in
May, 1977. That permit was issued by Missouri's Department of Natural
Resources (DNR) which played an active role in the development of the
facility's transformation from a sanitary landfill to a hazardous waste
landfill.
Opposition developed prior to the issuance of the DNR permit and con-
tinued for several months. Two different groups expressed opposition:
a homeowner's association representing a second home development
adjacent to the site and permanent residents of Wright City. While much
opposition was based on general objections to the development of any
hazardous waste disposal facility, the potential contamination of
surface and groundwater were specific issues. ,
Several attempts were made by BHS and DNR to address general concerns
and specific issues. These included specific operational procedures
taken by BHS to monitor and analyze runoff from the site. It appeared
that these actions were largely successful in reducing expressed con-
cerns. It was indicated, however, that this partial success by no means
suggested public acceptance of the facility.
II.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The BHS site is located approximately five miles south-southwest of
Wright City. The facility is within the bounds of a 150-acre farm owned
by BBS's owner/operator who is also at the site. Inter-city access, is
via 1-70; the route to BHS goes directly through Wright City.1 The
site is surrounded by forest, which lowers the its visibility. There is
a small number of year-round homes along the half-mile road which gives
direct access to the site. Immediately south of the site is a develop-
ment of vacation homes built around a lake.
The hydrogeology of the site was described by DNR and by Reitz and Jens
(engineering consultants to BHS) as being particularly suited to
BHS representatives indicated that an alternative route to the
site which involved passing by fewer residences is available. This
route, however, is longer and because DNR does not regulate routes
is not used by trucks coming to BHS.
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hazardous waste disposal. The uppermost geological stratum is glacial
till with a rated permeability in the range of 10-8 to io-9 cm/sec.
According to Reitz and Jens, this till is not subject to shrinkage as is
clay. Beneath the till is a shale and limestone formation approximately
160 feet thick. This formation reportedly has a low permeability and
carries little groundwater. A stream bed which has an intermittent flow
crosses the site and eventually empties into the lake around which the
vacation home development has been built.
The facility operates as a landfill for sludges and solids. The
original design called for two large trenches (20 x 30 x 200 feet), each
of which would accept drummed and bulk wastes. One trench was for
acidic wastes; the other for alkaline waste. At DNR's direction this
design was changed to four trenches to allow for the segregation of
drummed and bulk wastes. Currently the use of trenches has been
abandoned in of favor small holes (3 feet in diameter, 27 feet in depth)
which can accommodate eight drums. The use of holes has eliminated the
need for pumping standing water from trenches. This water would have
had to be held in ponds, analyzed, and land applied^ This new disposal
procedure also allows for greater isolation of individual waste streams,,
surer cataloging of buried wastes, and involves fewer problems with
operating equipment. There are only minor changes in the site's
capacity.
A broad range of hazardous waste is accepted including acids, bases,
organics, and flammables; specifically excluded is radioactive waste.
Virtually no liquid waste is accepted except in extremely small
quantities. While the St. Louis area is the primary market area for
BHS, out—of—state waste has been accepted from as far away as Georgia.
The facility encompases 15 acres and the life expectancy was estimated
at five to ten years. BHS's original intent was to develop the entire
150-acre site. This was reduced 90 percent because of DNR's requests
for monitoring wells at 100-foot intervals around the perimeter of the
site. BHS considered this too costly. The final plan includes 16
monitoring wells. . ,
Post-closure provisions will, at a minimum, adhere to state require-
ments. As proposed, state regulations specify operational procedures
for facility closure and the development of a post-closure fund to cover
contingencies when the facility operator cannot be held legally liable.
BHS is a privately owned company. Prior to the development of the
hazardous wast landfill, BUS operated a sanitary landfill at the same
site. In addition to the landfill, BHS also hauls wastes. For the
first year of its operation, BHS hired Chem-Dyne to manage daily
operations. Since then BHS has hired its own operations staff. The•
Wright City facility is the only BHS disposal operation.
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Wright City (1976 population: 1,170) is located in Warren County (1976
population: 12,430) about 50 miles west of St. Louis. Until the late
1960's the County was solely a farming area. Since then there has been,
an increase in the number of residents who live in the county and
commute to the St. Louis metropolitan area. Due in part to the lack of ,
county zoning, the area has been particularly attractive to the
development of small homesteads.
III. HISTORY OF FACILITY DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC RESPONSE
In Missouri, primary regulatory responsibility for hazardous waste
facilities rests with DNR. DNR regulations do not override local
zoning; however, Warren County has no zoning. The county does license
landfills, but this licensing cannot, in the opinion of Missouri's
attorney-general, apply to hazardous waste landfills. Thus, in the case
of BHS, the state permit was the only applicable regulation.
In the summer of 1976 DNR had only rudimentary regulations covering the
disposal of special wastes (i.e., those "requiring handling other than
that normally used for municipal wastes," as defined by then existing
state law). According to DNR, the permitting, of BHS as a disposal site
was based on the professional judgment of DNR staff who determined what
restrictions would apply to,a given site on a case-by-case basis.
The origin of BHS's facility was tied to the need of a St. Louis
Monsanto facility to dispose of sludge generated in a silicone purifi^
cation process. According to DNR, Monsanto had been disposing of that
sludge at a landfill about 15 miles from the BHS site. Because of the
marginal geology at that site, the state stopped Monsanto from taking
its sludge there in 1976. Their major problem then was to find a
suitable site. One option was for Monsanto to dispose on-site. Ac-
cording to BHS, Monsanto had a temporary permit to do that but only
under the condition that the company eventually exhume the wastes.
Another option was to landfill the sludge at BHS.
In the summer of 1976 arrangements were made between BHS, Monsanto, and
DNR for disposing of Monsanto1s sludge. According to BHS, Monsanto con-
tacted the company about using its site and BHS in turn contacted DNR.
A DNR official said that the department was aware that the geology of
the BHS site was good and wanted to discontinue Monsanto's use of the
other site.
BHS then hired engineering consultants who began to investigate the
site's potential for hazardous waste disposal. According to Reitz and
Jens, the results of soil tests conducted in August of that year con-
vinced DNR of the site's suitability. DNR then encouraged BHS to close
down the sanitary landfill operations and develop the site as a haz-
ardous waste facility. Accordingly, a trench was developed to accept
Monsanto's sludge. BHS first accepted sludge in August of 1976.
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For the first month, BHS accepted the sludge under the state's "good
graces."* In the latter part of September DNR issued a temporary
permit allowing BHS to accept the Monsanto sludge for 90 days. This
permit was subsequently extended until May of 1977, when a permanent
permit was issued. In encouraging BHS to develop a hazardous waste
facility, DNR stipulated that a detailed engineering plan be developed
by BHS and approved by DNR before a permanent permit wo.uld be issued-.
As described earlier, BBS's original plan for two trenches was changed
to four trenches at DNR's request. The original plan for engineering
the entire 150 acres was reduced to 15 acres because of the state's
demand for monitoring wells and the cost of those wells. The final
agreement on providing safeguards against the migration of chemicals
also included the excavation of any sand lenses uncovered during the
excavation of the trenches. ' ,
Following standard operating procedures, DNR did not provide for public
participation during the review of the permit application. On May 24,
1977, DNR notified state and local elected officials that approval had
been given to BHS. The following day the permit was formally issued.
The same day that the permit was issued (i.e., May 25), the attorney for
the second home developments adjacent to the site filed suit to close
the facility. The petition filed with the court argued that the ,
facility was a nuisance and that it was accepting toxic wastes. The
petition reportedly listed those materials which BHS was allowed to
accept under, the DNR permit. The petition also claimed that the wastes
were flowing toward the plaintiffs' property. The judge issued a
restraining order which temporarily closed the facility. The order also
called for BHS to show why the operation should not be closed perma-
nently. A hearing was set for June 24 to allow for further arguments
with respect to the injunction.
About two weeks later the director of DNR publicly announced the permit
approval during an industrial waste exchange conference in St. Louis.
Local electronic and print media publicized the directors's June 6 an-
nouncement. This media attention provided the broad public knowledge of
the facility and began to raise some concerns among local residents in
Wright City.
On June 22, two days before a scheduled hearing on the temporary injunc-
tion against BHS, an out-of-court settlement between BHS and the de-
velopments was announced. In that settlement BHS agreed to post a
$75,000 bond guaranteeing that no pollutants would leach out of the
As explained by a DNR official, BHS began operations with DNR's
full knowledge but without a formal state permit. Because DNR was
convinced of the BHS site's suitability, it had confidence that the
permit would be issued shortly, and thus DNR allowed operations under
its "good graces."
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site. BHS also agreed to monitor the inlet where the creek passing
through the site emptied into the lake. For the first year BHS would
analyze water samples monthly; thereafter samples would be analyzed
quarterly. In exchange for these provisions the developments' attorney
agreed to drop the suit against
While the problems BHS had had with the developments had been amelio-
rated by late June, other problems with permanent residents of Wright
City still existed. In the latter part of June, DNR agreed to attend a
public meeting in response to concerns raised by area residents. The
meeting was arranged by the University of Missouri Extension Service and
held in Warrenton, the Warren County seat. The meeting was attended by
several DNR officials, BHS's engineering consultant and over 100 area
residents. DNR, with the help of the consultant for BHS, made a
presentation on the facility, its operation, and provisions to guard
against pollution. The presentation was followed by a question-and-
answer period that allowed residents to express their concerns. Ac-
cording to a local official the major issue raised by area residents was
the potential for the contamination of water supplies. During this
meeting a resident asked DNR not to convince residents that the site was
good but to explain how to get rid of it. A DNR official who had gone
to the meeting with the assumption that rational explanations would
persuade opponents felt that this segment was the most telling comment
made. The request convinced the DNR official that area residents would
never accept the facility.
Several weeks after this meeting DNR was contacted by one of the Warren
County judges. The judge asked DNR to explain the BHS facility to .
the county court (i.e., to all the county judges) and DNR agreed. Prior
to this meeting a local pilot flew over the BHS site. According to BHS,
the pilot, seeing a bluish substance on the ground and assuming it to be
Monsanto sludge, complained to DNR that BHS was operating improperly.
DNR closed BHS pending an analysis of the material. That analysis de-
termined that the material was clay which BHS had excavated from the
site. Although DNR reportedly attempted to assuage those who had been
concerned, BHS indicated that the incident raised significantly the
level of general opposition to the facility.
The meeting requested by the county judge was held in August. DNR ex-
pected to brief the county court; however, the meeting had attracted
over 100 officials and residents including the area's state elected of-
ficials. The meeting became quite heated and most if not all elected
Although that suit was never pressed, BHS contended that it would
not have been successful. The major weakness was that the petition
had listed all wastes from the permit and claimed that they were
buried at the site. According to BHS, only Monsanto sludge had been
accepted when the petition was filed.
In Missouri, .county judges are the chief elected officials of
counties; they are not judicial officials.
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officials spoke against the facility. .The area's state representative,
who was minority leader of the state house, argued that local officials
should sue BHS on the grounds that there should be county control over
the facility. He indicated that he would ask the state Attorney-
General for an opinion on the question of what legal controls the county
could exercise. According to DNR, the local prosecuting attorney
indicated at the meeting that there was little likelihood that such a
suit would be successful. (At the time of this meeting the regulation
of hazardous waste facilities was based on 1975 state solid waste law
and regulations. A new state hazardous waste law had been passed by the
state legislature. That law, however, would not take effect until
September 28, 1977.)
On October 6, 1977 the Attorney-General of Missouri issued an opinion
letter in response to the state representative's request. That opinion
held that counties were authorized to regulate in substantial fashion
solid waste management systems under the 1975 solid waste law. The new-
ly enacted hazardous waste management law, however, subsumed the earlier,
law as it pertained to hazardous waste. Thus for hazardous waste
facilities regulation, authority rested with state government and local
governments could not regulate facilities which had been granted state
permits.
The Attorney-General's opinion marked the end of.major local efforts to
restrict or to close BHS. Since that time there have been some requests
for state inspections for the facility and DNR has responded to these
requests. The relative quiet has not indicated a lack of concern or op-
position to BHS. During the Centaur site visit in March 1979, a DNR of-
ficial said he had recently been contacted by the attorney for the
second home developments adjacent to BHS., The attorney, described as a
former aide to a Missouri governor, had asked how severe a violation of
state regulations would have to occur in order to close BHS. y
BHS has made some operational changes since opening. As indicated in
Section II, trenches have been replaced with much smaller holes for
burying wastes. BHS has severed its contract with Chem-Dyne and now has
its own operating staff. BHS has maintained a relatively low profile
and refrained from any active public relations. The firm does, however,
maintain the county road leading to the site and provides free waste
disposal for residents along the road. These residents, according to
BHS and others interviewed, have never given any support to local cit-
izens trying to close the facility.
IV.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
1976 — Monsanto precluded from using landfill, resulting in need for
alternative disposal site.
June/July 1976— Monsanto contacts BHS, BHS contacts DNR, initial
arrangements for disposal of Monsanto sludge at BHS
made. BHS hires engineering consultants.
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August, 1976 — BHS accepts first sludge for disposal under "good
graces" of DNR; soil tests and engineering for facility
proceed.
September, 1976
DNR grants temporary permit for disposal of Monsanto
sludge.
Late 1976/
early 1977
BHS and DNR negotiate over design of facility
May, 1977 — DNR notifies selected officials of permit approval; DNR ap-
proves permit. Attorney for second home developments sues
BHS; court temporarily closes BHS as a result.
June, 1977 — DNR director announces permit approval publicly. Out-of-
court settlement reached between BHS and attorney for
second home developments, allowing BHS to reopen. DNR and
BHS consultant attend public meeting to explain facility
to area residents.
July, 1977 — BHS temporarily closed by DNR, following charge of
improper operations.
August, 1977 — Second public meeting over BHS; area's state represen-
tative argues for suit against BHS based on local con-
trols over hazardous waste management.
September, 1977 — State hazardous waste law enacted.
October, 1977 — Attorney-General of Missouri renders opinion that state
law precludes local regulation of hazardous waste man-
agement. :
1979 — Attorney for second home developments"contacts DNR requesting
information on conditions required to close BHS.
V.
ATTEMPTS TO SECURE SUPPORT
The following steps were taken to secure support and/or address con-
cerns.
o The out-of-court settlement resulting in the BHS posting of
a $75,000 bond and increasing monitoring of facility oper-^
ations. , .,
o Responses made by DNR and BHS officials during the two
public meetings.
o BHS provides solid waste disposal and other services to re-
sidents along the county road leading to the site.
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VI.
SUMMARY EVALUATION
The various attempts to secure support for the BHS operation have been
moderately successful in reducing concerns, but probably not successful
in gaining any substantial support for the facility. The out-of-court
settlement appears to have been the most clear-cut case of BHS being
able to offer services (i.e., defined safeguards) in return for the
plaintiffs' acceptance of the facility. That an out-of-court settlement
was reached suggests that both parties were interested in resolving
differences. BHS's interests for this are self-evident. It was
suggested that the plaintiffs as well had definable reasons for arriving
at a compromise as well. The actual property owners are not permanent
residents and had left the questions of objecting to BHS to the
developer. The developer, not wanting to endanger property values by
undue publicity, sought an effective, expedient solution that would
increase safety provisions.
Direct attempts to reduce the concerns of permanent residents appeared
to have largely failed. Much more significant in overcoming this
opposition was the absence of any legal means by which the county could
control the facility. DNR did not significantly allay any concerns but
the law strongly suggested that continuation of BHS operations was
inevitable as long as BHS adhered to state regulations.
Finally, BHS does appear to have at least gained acceptance from its
closest permanent abutters. Because BHS's owner lives at the site,
these abutters are also his long-time neighbors. BHS's conscious
attempts at a "good neighbor" policy have largely succeeded. These
abutters, however, constitute only a small number of persons.
Overall, the successful siting of BHS is probably significantly linked
to the lack of widespread public knowledge of the facility until after
the permit was granted. Once the permit was granted opponents had few
means of effectively fighting the facility. Over time, opposition has
waned; however,-there is little to suggest that this lack of opposition
means acceptance. There is some evidence that opposition would arise in
the future if opponents felt they had a reasonable chance of restricting
or closing facility operations.
There were only a few issues raised during the controversy. They in-
clude the following. :
Potential water contamination — A major concern was that runoff from
the site would flow into and pollute the lake near the site. Less
clearly defined was the concern of contamination to groundwater by
chemicals migrating through the soil.
Improper operation — Opponents charged BHS with lax operational proce-
dures after a pilot spotted bluish material lying about the site. DNR
later refuted the charges of mismanagement.
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The exlstense of BHS — For some opponents the mere existence of a.
hazardous waste management facility such as BHS was the most majorc
issue. )
VII. FACTORS LEADING TO PUBLIC OPPOSITION/ACCEPTANCE
The following factors led to public opposition.
o The existence of the facility.
o DNR's announcement of the permit approval.
o The evidence (later refuted) that BHS was improperly
dumping Monsanto's sludge.
The following factors led either to acceptance or a waning of
opposition.
o The willingness of the plaintiffs in the court suit to
compromise.
o The overriding of local hazardous waste regulation by state
law.
VIII. RETROSPECTIVE VIEWS
In looking at future hazardous waste facility siting, BHS saw a need for
better provisions for communicating with the public. In particular,
local leaders should be educated both through small meetings with
leaders and tours of facilities or sites. The major thrust would be to
demonstrate credibility to these leaders prior to public meetings or
other events that are more conducive than public meetings to reasoned
discussions. BHS perceived state agencies as being strictly neutral
parties in siting attempts. EPA was seen as having no major role in
siting attempts.
IX.
GENERAL COMMENTS
Representatives of BHS also had more general comments on hazardous waste
management. Publicity about improper disposal generated by EPA could
possibly create backlash against good facilities, making it more diffi-
cult for the private sector to secure future sites. EPA regulations
should address the degree of hazard in wastes so that the need for
facilities could also be geared to the degree of hazard. This could
reduce the demand for facilities capable of handling extremely hazardous
wastes. Finally, if an operator has followed all regulations but some
spill or other accident occurs, the operator should not be held liable.
Instead, the government should establish a fund with payments from
hazardous waste generators to cover liability costs.
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To date, EPA Region VII has a minor role in siting. It has not reviewed
any permit applications and has not been asked to do so. Instead, it
has provided quiet support for sites which states have been determined
to be sound. In rare instances, Region VII staff have discussed general
problems of hazardous waste management and the need for sound disposal
sites with opponents of specific sites.
According to regional staff, the implementation of RCRA could
drastically change their role and the status of disposal in the region.
Only one-third of the estimated personnel needed by the office to
implement RCRA have been budgeted. Recently issued regulations for
public participation could add six months to two years to the siting
process. This could drive public participation costs up to a level
equal to the rest of siting costs. If these estimates are at all
accurate, siting, costs will mushroom and a number of potential facility
sponsors will drop out. This would clearly result in a slower rise in •
regional disposal capacity. That disposal capacity could drop
drastically when RCRA is implemented, as the office only expects two
sites in the region to meet the new regulations.
The regional office sees the major siting issues as follows: Do sites
meet, or preferably exceed, minimum technical standards for safety? Are
funds for all post-closure costs and eventualities available
perpertually? Are facility sponsors and operators qualified and
trustworthy? Can site proponents communicate clearly and effectively
with local officials and concerned citizens?
State agency comments are described in the state program write-up
elsewhere in this report.
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WES-CON, INC.
GRAND VIEW AND BRUNEAU, IDAHO
I.
INTRODUCTION
Both the Grand View and Bruneau facilities of Wes-Con, Inc., are
discussed in this report because their histories are so closely
intertwined. The sites are located in the same county, only 40 miles
apart. Many of the same residents and local elected officials sat in on
public hearings and county commission decisions for both sites. The
sites are identical abandoned Titan missile silo facilities and many of
the state's operational disposal guidelines developed for the Grand View
facility were later improved and adopted for the proposed Bruneau
facility. In addition, the County Commissioners viewed the permission
to operate at Bruneau as a simple extension of their previous approval
at Grand View.
Public opposition to both sites was very mild. There were a few
complaints about odors which were checked by the state, but absolute
verifications of the odors were never made. Neither the state or the
county has an odor ordinance. However, several operational changes were
made to minimize the potential odor nuisance. Following the national
publicity on Kepones and the announced possibility of their being
disposed of in Grand View, a few citizens voiced alarm. In response to
this opposition and as part of the state's re-evaluation of the permit
conditions, a public hearing was held over the Grand View operation.
Although some opposition was voiced, the state felt that it was minimal
and easily assuaged by certain operational changes and stricter controls
on the disposal operations.
Approximately a year and a half later a public hearing was also held for
the proposed Bruneau site. No significant opposition developed at this
hearing. Wes-Con received a similar conditional use permit and signed a
consent decree for the Bruneau operation.
Public support for both facilities came primarily from local elected
officials and civic leaders. They assumed a traditional attitude in
this area that if one owned the land, they were entitled to do with it
what they wanted to. The public also assumed that state and federal
organizations such as EPA and the State Department of Health and Welfare
would supervise and enforce the safe operation of the sites. Wes-Con
undertook several public relations initiatives to become good neighbors
and earn the continuing trust of the community. The Cattlemen's
Association is the only organized interest group in the area and they
supported the proposed activities of Wes-Con because they saw no
conflict with the agricultural and ranching economy of the area.
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II.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION1
Both sites are located in remote areas of Owyhee County. The Grand View
site is 10 miles from the town of Grand View (population: 260)^ The
Bruneau site is 20 miles from the town of Bruneau (population: 100).
The nearest rancher is two miles away at the Grand View site and 20
miles away at the Bruneau site. The remaining abutting land on both
sites is BLM grazing land. There are no zoning ordinances in effect in
Owyhee county.
The hydrogeology of both sites is particularly well suited to hazardous
waste disposal. The well log at the Grand View site revealed numerous
thick layers of blue clay underlying the missile silos. Since clay is
highly impermeable, especially at the reported depths and pressures, the
chance of groundwater contamination in the event of leachate escape is
almost non-existent. The site well logs report that first water was
encountered at approximately 3,000 feet. Although it was not documented
by a well log, a shallow water table reportedly existed in the general
Grand View area at 300 to 400 feet. However, it was determined that the
water table was not a flowing aquifer and was not present in all
locations in the Grand View area.
The hydrogeologic characteristics of the Bruneau site are similar to
those of Grand View but rendered somewhat more complicated by a
shallower water table, approximately 2,000 feet below the silos, and
intervening layers of volcanic rock instead of clay. However, the lack
of vertical fractures, the relatively impermeable deep formations, and
the high pressure of the deep artesian aquifer indicate that under
normal circumstances the deep aquifer would not be contaminated by
hazardous wastes.
Both the Grand View and Bruneau sites are identical in terms of the
silos and underground vault complexes. Each site has a number of silos
and two large underground vaults that can be used for temporary storage,
long-term warehousing or final disposal of wastes. Each site consists
of an approximately 20-acre fenced portion and an additionnal 100-acre
buffer zone. The underground structures were designed to withstand a
ground-zero atomic blast and to contain an internal explosion and fire
Most of this background information is derived from a technical
evaluation of Wes-Con which was provided to Centaur by Wes-Con. • This
evaluation has allowed for a much more detailed description of -
background and information than has been generally possible for case
studies in the project. The evaluation was conducted by TRW, Inc.
under contract to U.S. EPA. See Case Study No. 4 in Study of ,
Selected Landfills Designed as Pesticide Disposal Sites, TRW Systems
Group, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1976, published as PB
250-717 by the National Technical Information Service, Springfield,
Virginia, 22161.
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in the event.of an accidental ignition of the missile propellant. The
walls and floors are steel reinforced concrete treated to withstand,
complete water immersion. The silos are approximately 50 feet wide-and
160 feet deep with up to 6-foot thick walls and 13-foot thick floors.
The silos and vault areas are interconnected by tunnels which are sealed
with bomb-proof doors. Each silo has a 100-ton reinforced concrete
cover door which will be sealed when the silo is completely filled with
wastes. Preparation of the silos and vaults consisted of salvage
operations to recover metal structures and to collapse floating floors.
The Grand View site is completely prepared and operational. The Bruneau
site is still under preparation.
Wes-Con is also operating a landfill trench at the Grand View site which
allows them to segregate some of the more volatile wastes and thereby
reduce the risk of fire and extend the life of the silos.
The walls and floors at both sites were poured within a gunite form
which was constructed by excavating the original earth then recompacting
and finally "shooting" with a 6- to 12-inch thick gunite pad. The
excavation and recompaction of the entire area would also disrupt any
natural geological strata which might be evident in the upper sand and
clay layers and would thereby eliminate the possibility of underground
infiltration of surface water into the disposal area. To even further
minimize the chance of groundwater contamination, Wes-Con was required
to incorporate a clay soil mixture in the silos with each waste load in
order to eliminate any free-standing liquids in the silos. Both sites
are also protected from surface water problems by being situated on
knolls and in an area with an average precipitation of 10 inches and
evaporation of 72 inches.
Initially the silos were to be filled simply by dropping drums of wastes
into the opening at the top of the silo. This practice was later
replaced by a crane lowering the loads to help prevent sparking caused
by the impact of free-falling drums. In addition to the drums of waste,
bentonite clay is added in equal proportions to the waste volumes to
suppress odors and to make a "mud-mix" from the liquid wastes that leak
out of the ruptured drums. Every fifty feet or so a complete clay lid
is placed over the wastes to absorb further liquid wastes and to help
eliminate odors and prevent fires.
Both water and clay are available at the lip of the silo opening to be
bulldozed into the silo in case of fire. A fire truck is also available
on-site for additional water and foam pumping capacity. Other safety
features include protective clothing for the operators, showers in the
event of bodily contact with waste materials, and periodic physical
checkups with complete blood and urinalysis tests. Employees are
protected by regular monthly blood tests they are required to undergo at
a poison control center in Boise. Also, the final paycheck of a
terminating employee is withheld until they have arranged for a complete
physical. Access to the site is encouraged but limited to appointments
only in order to prevent an authorized entry which could be dangerous.
-------
Wes-Con does not own or operate its own waste hauling trucks. Under
agreements with some of the major clients, however, hauling of the
wastes is Wes-Con's responsibility. Wes-Con hires commercial waste
haulers for hauling in wastes from these clients. Only licensed
commercial waste haulers are admitted to the disposal site. Currently,
Wes-Con does not have on-site laboratory facilities for waste analysis
and the customers are required to identify the contents of their
shipments. In most cases, major waste producers send a technical
representative along with the waste shipment to assure that the waste
load reaches its intended destination and that the waste is disposed of
properly. The customers are usually consulted and their recommendations
on proper waste handling methods and pretreatment procedures are
solicited. Wastes received at the site are disposed of immediately.
The capacity of each site is approximately 1.5 million cubic feet. At
the projected rate of use the anticipated life of each site is
approximately 10 years. At the Grand View site, Wes-Con has recently
started a landfill trench adjacent to the silos in order to increase the
capacity of the operation. They are also considering incineration and
some form of resource recovery operation in the future to concen-
trate the hazardous wastes and recover some valuable products.
Implementation of these plans will extend the life of the site.
However, no. estimates are available at this time as to the total life of
the operation. At the moment there are no site closure plans short of
sealing the silo doors and reseeding the areas., The state has no rules
regarding bonding or other forms of financial responsibility during or
after the operation of a site. ,
The Wes-Con sites have been approved by the state as a pesticide waste
disposal facility and have a "blanket" permit for accepting pesticide
wastes. Disposal of hazardous wastes other than pesticides, however,
requires specific state approval which is granted on a case-by-case
basis. As a matter of policy, however, Wes-Con keeps a record of all
pesticide and non-pesticide wastes which it handles and the records are
available to the state for review upon request.
Wes-Con accepts a broad range of wastes in addition to pesticides. The
other wastes are miscellaneous hazardous wastes, including PCBs,
laboratory wastes, electroplating sludges, etc. Some hazardous wastes
are not accepted: Kepones, radioactive materials, military poison gas
and pressurized gas.
Through agreements with major power companies and the Bonneville Power
Administration, Wes-Con is currently handling most of the PCBs generated
within the Pacific Northwest. Some of the wastes come from as fair away
as Hawaii and negotiations have been conducted with,an Australian firm.
Most of the wastes handled at Grand View and projected for Bruneau will
be from out of state.
The name Wes-Con stands for Western Containment.
emphasize the positive aspects of the operation.
It was selected to
The company
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intentionally stayed away from such names as refuse disposal, hazardous
waste disposal, and indusrial waste disposal, which were considered to
be psychologically less appealing to the public than the name Wes-Con.
Wes-Con is an Idaho Corporation composed of the following three major
stockholders: the president (a former associate professor at the
University of Idaho); a Twin Falls owner of a chemical supply company;(
and an attorney. When all start-up activities are completed they will
employ six people at the Grand View site and plan to employ two persons
at Bruneau. Although the sites are very similar the additional trench
disposal at Grand View and greater mechanization at Bruneau account for
the difference in employment. At the moment Wes-Con owns only the Grand
View and Bruneau disposal sites. However, they are looking ahead to
recycling and resource recovery operations as an adjunct to the disposal
activities.
Owyhee County is a ranching and agricultural area with a population of
approximately 7,600 persons and an area of approximately 7,000 square
miles. Thus it is sparsely populated, with approximately one person per
square mile. The people in the county are poor, with the poorest sector
being the large number of senior citizens. Some of the land has been
purchased by outside interests, mainly California investors, but they
take little or no interest in local activities such as the waste
disposal sites. The region used to be much better off economically.
There was a major silver mining operation in the nearby Owyhee Mountains
and many Basques used to have large sheep herding operations there.
However, now the area exists on sugar beets, potatoes, alfalfa, hay and
livestock.
III. HISTORY OF FACILITY DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC RESPONSE
As of March, 1979 there were no state laws in Idaho specifically
pertaining to hazardous waste disposal in Idaho. There was, however,
proposed legislation which was modeled after RCRA, with the exception
that Idaho might classify wastes by degree of hazard. There were no
local permits or regulations which applied to either of the Wes-Con
facilities.
Prior to the Wes-Con facility development, the state had no experience
in hazardous waste disposal issues and none since the siting of these
two operations. In issuing the conditional use permit, the state relied
on its solid waste disposal laws and on the proposed federal hazardous
waste regulations. They anticipate all future issues concerning
hazardous wastes to be covered by federal regulations. The state also
has no requirements for public hearings, leaving it up to the county
commissioners to conduct local hearings and grant permission on waste
disposal.
The concept of using abandoned missile silos for hazardous waste storage
evolved in 1973. Wes-Con's president had had extensive experience in
selling chemical products and as a university professor and an
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agricultural extension agent familiar with pesticide uses and handling
procedures. He implemented his idea with the creation of Wes-Con. He
purchased the Grand View site in 1973 and prepared an environmental
assessment as part of an application to the state.
Although it was not required under any applicable regulations, at the
very beginning, Wes-Con discussed its waste disposal plan with the
Owyhee County Commissioners and solicited and received their approval.
According to Wes-Con, county approval reflected a strong local tradition
of allowing one the freedom to do with one's land what one wanted to.
In June of 1973 Wes-Con was granted a Conditional Use Permit for the
Grand View site by the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare.' The
permit was fashioned out of existing solid waste management regulations
and proposed federal hazardous waste regulations. Commercial operations
started in November of 1973.
Wes-Con1s management staff have been well known locals in the area for
many years, and from the start of their operation they undertook an
aggressive public relations campaign. Wes-Con donated steel stairs,
valves, pipes and other materials salvaged from the site to local
schools, farmers and private citizens. The company replaced a "no
admittance" sign with "visitors welcomed" sign and invited local
citizenry and representatives from universities, industry and
governmental agencies to see the site and its operation. To avoid
adverse publicity, Wes-Con intentionally stayed clear of nuclear wastes
and nerve gases, even though the site was considered to be most suitable
for the containment of such wastes. The .company's public relations
activities included hiring employees locally, accepting pesticides and
other hazardous waste from area ranchers and local public facilities
free of charge, providing free diaposal services for emergency
situations, allowing area ranchers to use free of charge Wes-Con's heavy
equipment, supporting local charities, and providing first aid classes
,to neighbors.
As a result of its public relations program, Wes-Con's Grand View
facility did not receive public opposition or major complaints from
local citizenry, with the exception of the nearest neighbor to the Grand
View facility. In this instance a woman residing about two miles from
the site complained about odors and the inherent dangers associated with
handling hazardous chemical wastes that had devalued her property. The
State made a routine check of the odor complaints, but was unable to
verify .them. In tj.me the woman sold the property to a ranch developer
who improved the property and resold it. The property is now being
ranched and no further complaints have arisen from this abutting
neighbor. The sale, improvement, and resale of the property indicate
that the nearby hazardous waste disposal facility has not adversely
affected the value of the property. . . /. •
In June of 1976, EPA, which had formed a special task force to
coordinate Kepone disposal, recommended that the Wes-Con facility be
used for those Kepone-contaminated materials that could not be
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incinerated. Allied Chemical approached Wes-Con with a request to
dispose of some of their Kepone wastes. Allied Chemical also contacted
the state, which had to give its permission before Kepone could be added
to Wes-Con's waste stream. The State Department of Health and Welfare
recommended in favor of the Kepone disposal on environmental grounds;
however, they conceded that it was a politically sensitive issue that
should be decided by the governor.
A flurry of media attention was given to the Wes-Con facility over the
possibility of Kepone disposal in Idaho. Much of this publicity focused
on the fact that the governor had publicly campaigned against the
disposal in Idaho of radioactive waste and nerve gas which would be
brought from other states. Finally, in November of 1976, the governor
issued a statement that he had asked Wes-Con not to accept the Kepone
wastes, suggesting that there were numerous disposal sites closer to
Baltimore (the source of the Kepone) which can encapsulate hazardous
materials, thereby avoiding the danger and cost of shipping the wastes
to Idaho. Wes-Con's refusal to accept the Kepone wastes saved the
governor from an obvious political dilemma. Because most of the waste
Wes-Con handled was from out-of-state he could not insist that only
Idaho wastes be buried at Grand View nor could he argue against .EPA's
recommendation at the same time the people of Idaho were voicing strong
opposition to the Kepone issue.
In the same statement over Kepones, the governor said that the state was
conducting a technical re-evaluation of the integrity of the Grand View
site and its operation but there was no evidence to suggest that the
operation of the site needed to be changed drastically. This
re-evaluation was instigated by several fires that had occurred in
October at the Grand View site. In November public hearings were called
in Owyhee County to investigate the operation of the site. It was
theorized that the dropping of barrels into the 160-foot silo caused
sparking and the possibility of fires. The revised conditional use
permit issued in March of 1977 that resulted from this hearing ordered
Wes-Con to lower the barrels by crane and to have on hand additional
fire fighting equipment. The fire truck purchased to meet state
requirements became an important public relations-symbol since it was
the only such truck available to local ranchers and farmers. Another
important outcome of the re—evaluation was the requirement for Wes—Con
to sign a consent decree. This consent decree meant that Wes-Con would
cease operations and have its permit automatically revoked in the event
of another fire,-without any legal or administrative action on the part
of the state. Similar consent decrees had been used by the state in air
pollution control situations.
In the spring of 1977 Wes-Con decided to expand its operation by
purchasing the Bruneau facility. This was an identical titan missile
silo complex, although its geology was somewhat less favorable than that
of the Grand View site. However, a consulting engineering and geology
firm with over 30 years of local USGS experience was hired to
investigate the possibility of hazardous wastes leaching into the
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groundwaters. In the summer of 1977, Wes-Con submitted to the state an
environmental assessment of the Bruneau site. Wes-Con again met with
and secured the approval of the County Commissioners and civic leaders,
who saw this as a simple extension to the Grand View operation, and
applied to the state for a permit with another environmental assessment.
In July of 1978 public hearings were held in Bruneau prior to granting
Wes-Con a permit. The hearings produced no local public opposition.
There was some opposition from an outsider (Boise) but locals were
willing to allow the site on the premise that state and federal laws
would guarantee its safety. Thus, the state granted a conditional use
permit. This permit adopted all the improved operating features of the
Grand View site. Wes-Con also signed a consent decree covering the
Bruneau site. In December Wes-Con applied for and received permission
from EPA and the state to dispose of PCBs in the Grand View silos.
Permission is still forthcoming from EPA and the state for a request to
dispose of PCBs in trenches alongside the Grand View silos.
The Grand View site has been operating successfully with no public op-
position since , the Keppne incident and no opposition has surfaced re-
garding the proposed Bruneau site which will go into operation in the
summer of 1979. However, Wes-Con feels that this lack of opposition
could change suddenly if an accident occurred such as a truck accident
spilling hazardous wastes along the highway. All of Wes-Con1s good will
built up over the years could easily be erased by such an incident, re-
gardless of whether such a truck was leased to Wes-Con or belonged to a
waste generator.
IV.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
1973 —An associate professor at the University of Idaho working as an
agricultural extension agent conceives the idea of Western Con-
tainment (Wes-Con), Inc. His plan is to operate a hazardous
waste management company using abandoned missile silos for the
containment of agricultural and industrial wastes.
1973 — A 17-acre missile silo and underground vault complex with a 100-
acre buffer zone near Grand View is purchased.
April, 1973 — Wes-Con prepares an environmental assessment and applies
to the State Department of Health and Welfare for permis-
sion to operate a pesticide and hazardous waste disposal
facility at the Grand View site.
1973 — Wes-Con receives approval from the Owyhee County Commissioners
to operate a waste disposal site.
June, 1973 -- Wes-Con receives a state conditional use permit to use the
missile silos for the disposal of pesticide wastes, elec-
troplating sludges, and laboratory wastes.
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November, 1973 — Formal commercial operation begins at the Grand View
site.
1974/1975 — Abutter complains of odors and loss of property value. Her
property is sold to ranch developer and complaints cease.
June, 1976 —At EPA's suggestion Allied Chemical approaches Wes-Con on
the disposal of Kepone wastes at the Grand View site.
October, 1976 — Several fires prompt the state to re-evaluate the oper-
ation of the Grand View site.
November, 1976 — Local and national news media cover the-possibility
of "ultimate" Kepone disposal in abandoned missile
silos in Idaho. Governor asks Wes-Con not to accept
Kepone wastes. The state holds a public hearing on
the operation of the Grand View site.
March, 1977
Wes-Con receives a revised state conditional use permit
and signs a consent decree agreeing to cease operation in
the event of another fire at the Grand View site.
Spring of 1977 — Initial payment on the purchase of approximately 100
acres of land including abandoned missile silos and
underground vault complex near Bruneau, Idaho.
July, 1977 — Wes-Con submits an environmental assessment of the
proposed operation at the Bruneau facility.
Summer of 1977 — Meetings with civic leaders in the Bruneau area to ex-
plain the future operation of the hazardous waste dis-
posal site. Wes-Con extends invitation to the general
public to visit the facility.
July, 1977 — Final payment is made on the land and missile silo
complex, and application to the Idaho Department of Health
and Welfare for permission to operate the Bruneau site is
made.
April, 1978 -
July, 1978 —
- State approves the silo disposal of PCBs at Grand View
site.
EPA approves the disposal of PCBs in missile silos at
Grand View. State holds public hearings in Bruneau to
solicit public comment on proposed Bruneau site. Wes-Con
receives conditional use permit from the state Department
of Health and Welfare. Permit also includes a consent de-
cree similar to the one 'signed by Wes-Con for the Grand
View site. ;
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December, 1978 — Wes-Con applies to EPA and state for a permit to dis-
pose of PCBs in clay-lined trenches adjoining the mis-
sile silos at Grand View.
March, 1979 — State and EPA approvals expected on PCB disposal in
trenches at the Grand View site.
Summer of 1979 — Start of Bruneau operation.
V. ATTEMPTS TO SECURE SUPPORT
The first step in securing public support for the disposal operation was
the elimination of nerve gas and radioactive materials from the proposed
waste streams to be handled. These materials would have generated
strong public opposition and the governor was campaigning to rid the
state of these wastes. The wisdom of this decision was later proven
when public opposition erupted over the arrangements to dispose of
Allied Chemical's Kepone wastes. Cancelling the arrangement with Al-
lied Chemical neutralized local public opposition and gained the support
of the state government. The state government was in a difficult
political dilemma over public opposition to the importation of Kepone
wastes after EPA had recommended their disposal at the Grand View site.
Other attempts to secure public support were a series of public re-
lations actions including:
o Replacing a "no admittance" sign at the entrance of the
facility with a "visitors welcomed" sign.
o Hiring local employees and asking them to bring their rel-
atives and friends to.the site for tours.
o Accepting for disposal free of charge the spent pesticide
containers from local ranchers and farmers.
o Providing free disposal services for local hazardous wastes
from hospitals, county facilities, and educational
facilities.
o Providing free disposal under emergency conditions for
materials within Idaho, including highway wrecks and flood
disasters.
o Providing access to the facility for state and federal ex-
perimental studies, demonstrations and training.
o Volunteering the use of bulldozer and other heavy equipment
to local residents.
o Supporting local firefighting efforts with personnel and
equipment.
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VI.
o Contributing to local fund-raising campaigns to help out
residents in time of sickness and other personal disasters.
o Paying the way for the children of local residents to
visit 4-H camps and the 4-H Congress.
o Organizing a local corporation with native and long-time
residents in ownership positions.
o Making no secret about the type of wastes to be disposed or
their local and out of state origins.
o Training local doctors on nature of hazardous waste and
providing first aid classes for local residents.
o Donating an ancient Indian cave to the university for
archeological studies. Will also pay to publish the
findings and donate them to a local museum.
o Guaranteeing the bills incurred by workmen in local com-
mercial establishments in the event that they skip town.
(This was a prevalent problem during the construction of
the missile silos.)
SUMMARY EVALUATION
The most effective step in securing public support for both sites was
the neutralization of public opposition that would have arisen over the
handling of radioactive materials and nerve gas disposal and later the
cancellation of the Kepone arrangements with Allied Chemical. The
operator was aware of the political liability associated with these
wastes, especially since the governor had campaigned to rid the state of
such wastes. By anticipating the governor's dilemma over these wastes,
the operator gained valuable political support on a statewide basis.
It is impossible to separately evaluate the remaining public relations
actions of the operator in gaining the support of the community. How-
ever, it is safe to say that none of the extensive public relations
activities hurt and taken together they all helped smooth the way
through public hearings, permit re-evaluation and the issuance of
conditional use permits.
There were five major factors which characterized the overall success of
this operation:
Technical Adequacy — The sites are obviously of superior structural
design and physical surroundings. Built to extraordinary military
specifications, the sites are more than suitable to contain hazardous
wastes. The hydrogeology of the sites is excellent with water tables at
approximately 2,000 and 3,000 feet below the silos. The 10 inches of
precipitation versus 72 inches of evaporation are also ideal conditions
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to minimize surface runoff. Finally, the sites are extremely remote
from population centers in a county that has a population density of
only one person per square mile.
Local Attitudes — The people in the area have a traditional "live and
let live" attitude. They respect the fact that if you owned the land
you should be allowed to do with it what you wanted to — even if it is
to operate a hazardous waste disposal site.
Public Trust— Local residents .trust that the state or federal
government or both will supervise and enforce the, safe operation of the
sites. This trust is reinforced by the governor's pressure to cancel
the controversial Kepone disposal and the state's re-evaluation of
permit conditions after the fires at the Grand View site. Public trust
is also enhanced by EPA's endorsement of the operating Grand View site.
Demographic Characteristics — This is.a poor agricultural area with
simple lifestyles. The hazardous waste disposal site is not perceived
as a real and present danger. Most of the wastes at the sites are
pesticide residues which local farmers have been handling long before it
became fashionable to call them hazardous or persistent wastes.
Public Relations — An extensive public relations campaign in a general-
ly poor community helped to sell the operation of the sites. This
campaign also served to guarantee the "good neighbor" image of the oper-
ator.
VII. FACTORS LEADING TO PUBLIC OPPOSITION/ACCEPTANCE
Both the Grand View and Bruneau sites have been accepted by the local
public. The Grand View site is in full operation, having passed a
public hearing and complete re-evaluation of its operation following a
few fires as well as a minor flurry of publicity over the possiblity of
•Kepone disposal. The Bruneau site is now being readied for operation,
having passed a public hearing for a conditional use permit. The
factors that led to public acceptance are: ,
o A traditional attitude in the area that if you owned the
. land you were entitled to do with it what you wanted to.
o An existing history of public acceptance of an outside
activity that posed a threat to the area —namely, the
missiles themselves. Also, many of the local citizens
worked on the sites during their construction and were ..''.
aware of their extreme structural integrity.
o An extensive public relations campaign by the operator to
become a good neighbor and to win the continuing trust of
the community.
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A pair of sites that had unquestionably good hydrogeologic
and surface water characteristics as well as excellent
structural features.
An operator who was a long-time resident of the area and
intimately aware of the • pesticide wastes generated in the
area that are part of the operation's waste stream.
An operator who was politically astute and had a good work-
ing relationship with the state government. This political
sensitivity lead to initial rejection of radioactive and
nerve gas wastes and later to the rejection of Kepone
wastes.
o An operator who used his years of experience as a chemical
products salesman to "sell" the public on his waste
disposal operation.
o Local public trust in the supervision of state and federal
agencies which have endorsed the site.
o An opportunity to rid pesticide wastes (e.g., spent con-.
tainers) from the community's sanitary landfill.
VIII. RETROSPECTIVE VIEWS
With the exception of having been denied the opportunity to dispose of
Kepone wastes, the Grand View and Bruneau sites are an operational suc-
cess. The only thing the operator would have done differently is to put
more emphasis on. the use of a public relations firm. He would have used
such a firm earlier in the planning process to anticipate problems
rather than having to react to them. This was .especially true for the
Kepone incident, the intensity of which caught the operator unprepared.
The operator would also have liked to have the federal government assume
a stronger and more dominant role in hazardous waste issues, especially
in siting facilities. He feels that state governments and certainly
county governments are too easily intimidated by local political
interests.
IX.
GENERAL COMMENTS
The operator thinks that his sites are competitive in spite of their
remoteness. However, he feels that there is insufficient federal or
state enforcement on waste generators because of a lack of suitable
sites, thus reducing the demand for existing sites or the incentive to
create new sites.
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SCA/EARTHLINE
BORDENTOWN, NEW JERSEY
I.
INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 1978 Earthline, a subsidiary of SCA Services, submitted
an application to the Solid Waste Administration (SWA) of the New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection. That application sought a
permit to operate a small commercial landfill for the disposal of
hazardous waste. In March of 1979 SWA denied that application.
Earthline1s application sparked local concerns which in time evolved
into strident opposition voiced by a broad range of public officials and
private citizens. Of particular concern to the opponents were the
site's proximity to a major aquifer and a high school; the credibility
of Earthline, SCA and SWA; and numerous attendant potential social,
economic, and cultural impacts.
Attempts to provide public information, to elicit public response,
and/or to address concerns and issues were made by SWA and Earthline.
The most salient of these was a two-day public meeting held by SWA;
others included smaller informational meetings and debates. Ultimately
these failed to make any significant impact on the opposition to the
Earthline application.
II.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The Earthline proposal called for the development of a five-acre secure
landfill within the bounds of an existing operating 100-acre sanitary
landfill. The site is located within Bordentown township to the west of
U.S. 130. The site is across a local street .from Bordentown Regional
High School. That local street provides access to the existing sanitary
landfill and would have also provided access to the hazardous waste
landfill.
The sanitary landfill is within a larger area known ,as the Church Brick
Clay Pit. That area is immediately underlain by four geologic
formations — the Pensauken formation, the.Woodbury Clay, the
Merchantville formation, and the Magothy-Raritan formation. According
to reports prepared during the siting attempt, the Pensauken formation
is uppermost of these and has been largely excavated as a result of
historic 'site use. Where present, it is typcially three to twelve feet
thick and does contain perched water tables. The second stratum, the
Woodbury Clay, which is zero to 40 feet thick and has a lab-tested
permeability of 1.3 x 10~^ cm/sec." The third stratum is the
Merchantville formation with an average thickness of 39 feet and a
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lab-tested permeability of 1.8 x 10~6 cm/sec.1 Beneath these three
formations is the Magothy-Raritan formation (actually two interconnected
formations) which is 330 feet thick. The Magothy-Raritan is a major
aquifer used by industry and the public. In 1976 this aquifer provided
80 percent of the groundwater pumped in Burlington County.
As proposed by Earthline, five acres of the 100-acre sanitary landfill
would have been developed as a secure landfill. The design called for
five cells within the five acres to separate different types of indus-
trial waste. Cells would have been separated by a clay berm minimally
ten feet thick. Beneath the cells would be two feet of compacted clay,
a 40-mil Hypalon liner, six inches of sand, and a minimum of ten feet of
clay beneath the sand. The five-acre secure landfill would have been
surrounded by a ten-foot-thick clay berm incorporated into the Woodbury
Clay. Four monitoring wells on each side of the secure landfill were
proposed. Provisions for long-term care were to be in comformance with
state regulations. Those regulations are being revised to conform with
anticipated RCRA requirements.
The secured landfill, as originally envisioned by Earthline, would have
disposed of residuals from an Earthline hazardous waste treatment and
The 39-foot figure was .provided by the New Jersey Geological
services. Earthline's application, based on data developed by
Wehran Engineering for the 1976 application for the sanitary
landfill, described the Merchantville formation as being 60 feet
thick. The permeability figure is from the same 1976 application.
In a 1976 letter to Wehran, SWA questioned the usefulness of the 1.8
x 10 cm/sec figure as the test was on a sample taken from the top
of the formation and state geologists indicated the possibility of
greater permeability at the bottom of the Merchantville formation.
State reviews of geological data also cited evidence that when the
Woodbury Clay was exposed to normal operations at the landfill the
clay would dry out and porosity would increase. This would have
potential, but uncertain, negative impacts on the integrity of the
clay as a liner. Furthermore, reviews of the Earthline application
by opponents' engineering consultants stated that permeability rates
were based on the flow of water, not leachate. Citing the
undefined nature of leachatefs effect on these clays, the question
was raised as to whether the lab-tested permeability rates had any
significance in defining the site's ability to prevent groundwater
contamination.
The point of this footnote is to illustrate part of one facet of
the technical dispute that arose during this siting attempt and the
lack of consensus on those data most easily quantified. As will be
discussed in Section III the technical dispute was but one of many
that arose.
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processing facility in Newark. According to an attorney retained by
Earthline, SWA had asked that other hazardous wastes generated in. New
Jersey be disposed of at the proposed facility. (Earthline agreed on
the condition that those wastes be tested at the Newark facility to
determine whether they were suitable for burial at the Bordentown site.)
In any event the Bordentown facilty was primarily designed to serve the
New Jersey market area.
Earthline is a subsidiary of SCA Services which has hazardous waste
management facilities in Illinois, New Jersey, New York, and South
Carolina. SCA Services is one of the largest waste services companies
in the nation. In fiscal year 1978, the company reported total revenues
of over $180 million. The majority of SCA operations are in the
municipal and commercial waste management field.
The Bordentown area is located about ten miles south of Trenton in
central New Jersey. Bordentown city has a population of about 5,000
and, according to the mayor, has a racial and economic profile
reflecting the state as a whole. Bordentown township, which surrounds
the 'city, has a population of about 8,000, almost totally white with
somewhat higher incomes than those for the city. Both the city and
township are within Burlington County (estimated 1977 population:
361,300). The employment base of the Bordentown area is broadly
dispersed among economic sectors within the greater Trenton metropolitan
area.
HI. HISTORY OF FACILITY DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC RESPONSE
The state of New Jersey preempts local zoning controls over special
waste facilities. As a result there are no local permits or regulations
applicable to these facilities. In planning for the hazardous waste
landfill Earthline needed only a permit from the Solid Waste
Administration (SWA). During the course of the approval process, SWA
has other appropriate state agencies (e.g., air and water pollution
control agencies) review the application. ,
The controversy surrounding the Earthline permit application has been
connected to events surrounding two other facilities in the area: the
municipal landfill owned and operated by Interstate Waste Removal ,and a
chemical tank farm proposed by Dow Chemical. (Nationally publicized
hazardous waste sites also have had an impact and will be discussed
subsequently.) The siting and operation of the municipal landfill
introduced SCA to Bordentown leaders and generated concerns among those
leaders as to the integrity of the company. The Dow proposal was a
major impetus for area residents to organize politically.
In mid-1977 Interstate Waste Removal began operating a 100-acre.
municipal landfill at a site across the street from Bordentown Regional
High School. Area leaders had expressed some concerns during this
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landfill's siting process and local jurisdictions sued the state on
jurisdictional grounds. The suit argued that local jurisdictions should
have control over solid waste management decisions. The courts ruled
that SWA had authority in this area and could preempt local controls
(i.e., zoning). The development of the sanitary landfill was deemed
important because of the limited number of sanitary landfills in the
area. Local leaders indicated that, in keeping with this reasoning,
Interstate had promised the facility would always be used for municipal
waste. A July, 1977 article in the Trenton Times claimed that the
landfill would give SCA subsidiaries a significent advantage in bidding
for municipal waste collection contracts in the Trenton area.
Interstate also has had the contract to collect municipal waste in
Bordentown city. In recent years the city and Interstate have been in
court a number of times in connection with the contract. Interstate has
sued to prevent the city from awarding the collection contract to firms
submitting lower bids than Interstate's on the grounds that those bids
were unresponsive. City officials claimed that Interstate has been
guilty of mismanagement and poor service.
In discussing the city's problems with Interstate, the mayor of
Bordentown city referred to articles on the New Jersey garbage industry
in the Trenton Times. These articles described the city's legal fights
with Interstate. They generally characterized that industry as
increasingly centralized to the point of being monopolized in some
regions of the state and as being dominated statewide by eight SCA
subsidiaries. The garbage industry pursued "hard-nosed business
practices" using "high-powered lawyers". Interstate, however, was
specifically excluded from any links to the most strident charges.
Although the articles referred to "reports of mob-style incidents," it
did state that no indictments had been made in connection with these
incidents. State regulatory agencies through ineptness and scarce
resources were characterized in the articles as generally ineffectual in
regulating garbage firms.
The significance of the articles was that they reflected the views of
some local leaders. Prior to the Earthline permit application, an SCA
subsidiary had generated anger and resentment in the Bordentown area.
Local leaders perceived SCA as a high-powered, politically powerful firm
that warranted little trust. The state was considered incapable of
providing independent control and enforcing existing regulations.
In mid-1977, Dow Chemical announced plans for a chemical tank farm to be
located on the Delaware River in Bordentown Township. Area residents
opposed to the project organized Help Our Polluted Environment (HOPE)
which currently claims a membership of 300 area residents. Supported by
voluntary donations, HOPE spearheaded citizen opposition to the Dow
proposal. A protracted debate ensued and opposition grew in size and
sophistication. By June of 1978, HOPE held a non-binding referendum on
the Dow proposal. According to HOPE almost 1,500 Bordentown residents
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voted two-to-one against the Dow proposal. In August Dow sought a re-
view of the proposed 52-acre facility by Bordentown Township to obtain a
conditional use permit for the site. Within ten days the township pas-
sed an ordinance banning the facility. Newspaper reports at the time
suggested that Dow considered suing the township to force acceptance of
the facility. Dow, however, filed no suit and in December, 1978, re-
portedly elected not to renew an option on the proposed site.
By mid-1978 the Bordentown area had acquired a particular sensitivity to
environmental issues. Furthermore, local citizens, including lawyers
and scientists, had developed an organization (i.e., HOPE) that had
acquired local political clout and a successful track record in
mobilizing resources. Added to this was an established skepticism of
the credibility of SCA. It was within this context that Earthline sub-
mitted its application to SWA for the secure landfill. -,
Earthline1s planning for the secure landfill in Bordentown began in 1977
and is directy linked to an Earthline facility in Newark and the absence
of commercial off-site landfills for hazardous waste in New Jersey.1
Earthline's siting of the Bordentown landfill has been managed by an at-
torney retained by SCA. This attorney was instrumental in developing
New Jersey's hazardous waste regulations when he was with the state at-
torney general's office and has had extensive experience with solid and
hazardous waste management in New Jersey.
Earthline's Newark facility began operations in 1977. The facility is
designed to process liquid chemical wastes and produces two residual
products: a liquid effluent and solid and sludge residuals. The ef-
fluent is discharged into the sewage system after being tested by Earth-
line and approved for discharge by the company and regulatory officials.
The solid and sludge residuals must be landfilled. Earthline has hauled
these residuals some 450 miles to an SCA facility in Model City, New
York. The desire for a more accessible facility was the impetus for de-
veloping a secure landfill in Bordentown.
In selecting a site Earthline surveyed existing municipal landfills.
(An SWA official indicated about 30 sites in New Jersey had been
investigated by Earthline.) Earthline felt that an existing municipal
In 1976, NJDEP closed the 220-acre Kin-Buc landfill in Middlesex
County because of extensive violations of state regulations. A small
portion of the site had been used as a chemical waste landfill. In
February of 1979, the U.S. EPA and U.S. Department of Justice filed
suit against Kin-Buc, Inc., and seven other firms for operating an
illegal disposal site. It was the first enforcement action under
RCRA. With the closing of Kin-Buc, the state had no operating off-
site landfills for hazardous waste.
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landfill would imply initial public acceptance of waste disposal,
thereby reducing potential public opposition. The major concern was the
geology of potential sites, particulary sub-surface clay deposits. The
lack of clay as a natural liner eliminated a large number of sites
surveyed and the underlying clay formations were the primary advantage
of the Bordentown site. That site had several other advantages
including access to the New Jersey Turnpike and 1-295, a location in the
central area of the state, and an operating municipal landfill in place.
Because the Interstate landfill had recently been sited, a substantial
amount of data existed on the site's hydrogeology and an environmental
impact statement had been prepared on the municipal landfill. In
addition, Interstate is a subsidiary of SCA.
The Bordentown site then met Earthline's' criteria for a secure landfill
and was selected as the site. Earthline's lawyer stressed that the
decision to develop a portion of the Bordentown site as a hazardous ;
waste facility was independent of the original decision to develop the
municipal landfill. If that had not been true he suggested that a much
larger amount of land would have been purchased originally and that the
municipal landfill would have been designed differently.
Earthline submitted its permit application to SWA on June 2, 1978.
Materials (including the engineering report and EIS) that had been
prepared for the Interstate landfill permit were upgraded and submitted
as a part of the application.
Following standard procedures, SWA notified local officals and agencies
of the application in a letter dated June 30. The letter indicated that
t,he recipients would be allowed to make comments during a 30-day period.
The letter, although the first formal notification to the community, did
not necessarily represent the community's first knowledge of the
proposed facility. HOPE's president stated that at least two months
prior to the application's submittal HOPE had learned informally that
Earthline wanted to develop a hazardous waste landfill at the Interstate
landfill site.
Within two weeks the first request by a local official for an extension
of the comment period was sent to the SWA director. .The Burlington
County Health Department in a July 13 letter requested a 90-day
extension. SWA granted a 30-day extension. Subsequent to that request
the Planning Board of Bordentown Township and the director of the
Burlington County Board of Freeholders also asked SWA for a 90-day
extension. In late July the state senator for the eighth district,
which includes the Bordentown area, wrote the commissioner of NJDEP
requesting a 90-day extension. In response to these requests, SWA
extended the comment period for 90 days, through October 3. As a
standard preparation for a public hearing on the permit applicaton SWA
also scheduled a meeting with local officials, for September 29.
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In early August the mayo.r of Bordentown City requested a 120-day .
extension of the comment period. At that time Betz Converse Murdoch
Inc. (BCM), consulting engineers for the city, was studying the city's
water system. The mayor's request sought time to have BCM assess the
impacts of the proposed landfill on the city's water supply. SWA denied
the request. As a result, the city sued SWA to stop the permit
application review process until BCM completed the water system study.
In an out-of-court settlement SWA agreed to receive comments on the
application until December 15, 1978. This necessarily postponed any '
final SWA decision on the application until after December 15.
Also in August the New Jersey Turnpike Authority formally opposed the
proposed facility. Because the site would be within close proximity of
the turnpike, the turnpike authority felt the smoke from fires at the
site could dangerously reduce visibility on the turnpike. Other
concerns were that fire equipment would not be able to respond quickly
to any fires, that SWA had insufficient staff to monitor on-site
operations properly, and that truck traffic from the site would
interfere with turnpike ramp traffic.
In the summer of 1978 the Earthline application had generated
substantial concern among local officials whose major response was to
seek additional time. Other events took place that summer which had no
relation to Earthline's actions but which would subsequently have
substantial impact on the opposition. As described above, local
officials' actions in August effectively quashed Dow's plans for a
chemical tank farm; these actions lent credibility not only to those
officials' powers but also to HOPE which had played a lead role in •
opposing Dow. Also in August the trial concerning the Earthline
hazardous waste landfill in Wilsonville, Illinois ended and the local
judge ordered that landfill closed and its contents exhumed. .While the
exhumation order was subsequently stayed during the appeal of that
judgement, the closing of the site was perceived as a major victory for
the citizens of Wilsonville. Earlier in the summer the New York State
Department of Health declared a health emergency in the area around Love
Canal in Niagara Falls, New York. The publicity surrounding Love Canal
has been nationwide and has dramatized the problems of improper
hazardous, waste disposal. •
On September 18 one of Bordentown's state assemblymen introduced a bill
into the state legislature. The bill called for a ban against the
The disputes over Love Canal and Wilsonville are markedly
different. Wilsonville has operated with a state permit from the
Illinois EPA and has been supported by U.S. EPA, industry, and trade
associations. Love Canal was closed in the early 1950's, 20 years
before any state hazardous waste laws were enacted, it lacks
most if not all of the precautions now considered necessary for the
burial of hazardous wastes.
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development of a hazardous waste landfill within 1,000 feet of a school.
As written, the bill would have prohibited the development of the
Earthline facility. Over the next four months, that bill would be
substantially amended as it made its way through ,the state legislature.,
On September 28 HOPE held an informational meeting attended by about 150
persons. HOPE's purpose in holding the meeting was to warn residents of
the risks involved in Earthline's proposal. Speakers at the meeting
included: 1) the assistant attorney general of Illinois who was in
charge of Illinois' case against the Wilsonville facility; 2) the
special attorney for Wilsonville residents in the same .case; 3) members
of the Love Canal Home Owners Association; and 4) local officials from
Lewiston, New York who were opposing an operating SCA hazardous waste.
facility in Model City, New York. As reported in the Trenton Times the
various speakers described the disabling health effects linked to Love
Canal and campaigns against other operating SCA facilities. The
assistant Illinois attorney general claimed that the Bordentown proposal
was similar to the Wilsonville facility except that the Bordentown
facility would overlay a water supply. The possibility of endangering a
water supply was, he claimed, "insane."
In early October SWA asked EPA's Region II office to review the
Earthline application. EPA agreed and arranged for Battelle Memorial
Institute to perform the review. In subsequent interviews SWA and EPA
officials stressed that EPA's review did not imply that EPA would play a
major role in the decision to approve or deny the permit. According to
the head of Region II's solid waste branch, that office's policy was
that SWA was the permitting agency and therefore was responsible for the
final decision.
On October 6, the Stevens Institute of Technology submitted its report
on the Earthline application to Bordentown township and Burlington
County, both of which had retained the institute. The report questioned
the benefits to New Jersey of developing a small secure landfill and
noted the inconsistency of the five-acre site size listed in the
application's supporting documents and the 100-acre size found in the
application itself. A large number of deficiencies in the application
were discussed, including descriptions of existing conditions and vague
or meaningless data on operating procedures, wastes accepted, liners,
and monitoring provisions. Noting the proposed location .over an
aquifer, the report found an absence of soil tests and leachate
generation estimates. The report recommended the development of an EIS,
the correction of data inadequacies, and reconsideration of siting such
a facility near an important aquifer.
About a week later, two Bordentown state assemblymen announced that they
had petitioned New Jersey's governor to deny the application. They
declared that "the tragedy of Love Canal cannot be permitted to repeat
itself in New Jersey." They based their appeal on the potential risks
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to the water supply of nearly one million people and deficiencies in the
application cited in the Stevens Institute of Technology report. ''','•
Beginning in October, local jurisdictions and organizations began to
communicate their formal opposition to the proposed facility. Based
largely on the Stevens Institute, Bordentown township and Burlington
County passed a joint resolution against the application. The
resolution cited the proximity to the high school, the population
density of the area, economic disbenefits, and a fear of Bordentown .
becoming the dumping ground for the state as well as other states. That
resolution also sought local control over such sitings. The Board of
Education of the high school also opposed the proposal. In addition to
issues raised by the township-county resolution, the board of education
cited "grievous" public health problems at other SCA facilities and the
lack of guarantees by Earthline, the state, or any financially
responsible party of the site's safe operation.
On October 23, SWA met with local officials as a standard procedure
preparatory to a public meeting on the application. This meeting had
been originally scheduled for late September but had been delayed
because of the suit by, Bordentown City against SWA. The meeting
provided an opportnity for SWA officials to explain the application and
regulatory procedures to local leaders. The next day, SWA wrote to
Earthline seeking more data for the application. (A second SWA request
for more data was sent to Earthline in mid-November. By January of
1979, Earthline had responded to the first request, in part by providing
more data, in part by reaffirming previously submitted data. According
to an SWA official, Earthline had not responded to the second request.)
Earthline also tried to deal directly with local leaders. According to
the attorney for Earthline, his offer to meet with local leaders was
deferred several times and never agreed to. An offer by Earthline to
provide some compensation to Bordentown in return for development of the
facility was flatly rejected by local officials, according to an SWA
official. Earthline1s attorney also went on local radio and television
shows to "debate" opponents of the facility. According to opponents
these debates did little to change anyone's mind. _
In November, opposition began to solidify and opponents escalated their
tactics. The city, township, and county began to discuss openly the
prospect of suing SWA claiming: 1) that the secure landfill fell within
the jurisdiction of local solid waste management planning and was
therefore subject to local controls; and 2) that SWA should not process
applications until regulations required by RCRA were issued. Eventually
a suit based on the jurisdictional dispute was filed, but the court's
decision reaffirmed SWA's sole authority over hazardous waste facility
siting.
In anticipation of the SWA-sponsored public hearing, HOPE organized a ••
week of "anti-Earthline", "pro-people" events. On Sunday, November 12
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HOPE organized a parade and rally complete with floats, banners, and a
car caravan. It was reported to have lasted three hours. On the 14th
and 15th, a film crew from ABC's "Close Up" news program filmed some of
HOPE's activities against the Earthline proposal.* The following night
(November 16) the local NBC affiliate also filmed local citizens'
efforts to stop the facility. HOPE's other actions during the fall
included a petition drive and the placement of ads in local papers.
Every available source strongly indicates that by the time of the
hearing, area residents were intent on stopping Earthline. As the
Trenton Times reported the morning of the first day of the hearing,
"suddenly, almost everyone here (i.e., in the Bordentown area) has
become an environmentalist." The article quoted a fairly broad spectrum
of local residents, including student leaders at the high school, as
being opposed to the facility and referred to a petition against the
facility signed by almost 80 percent of the high school student body.
On November 17 and 18, SWA held the public hearing on the Earthline
application at the Bordentown Regional High School. Over the two-day
hearing approximately 50 persons in addition to SWA and Earthline
representatives spoke. The hearings took a total of 13 hours, and the
hearing record ran to 600 pages.
The hearings began with presentations by SWA and Earthline
representatives. Earthline officials specifically declared that
adequate provisions (i.e., the clay base and liners) had been made to
prevent leaching into groundwater. What followed was a series
of statements and presentations by a broad spectrum of public leaders
and citizens from within and outside the Bordentown area. Speakers
included the area's state legislators, local elected officials, HOPE's
president, and members of the legal and engineering staffs of the
Illinois attorney-general's office, some of whom had spoken at HOPE's
September 29 meeting. All previously voiced issues were repeated during
the hearing. The Illinois officials charged Earthline officials with
mismanagement and misleading the public in connection with the
Wilsonville facility. Pleas were made to SWA by state and local elected
officials and private citizens to deny the permit. On the grounds that
no relevant federal or state regulations were in place, HOPE's president
claimed that industry was determining the nature of hazardous waste
management practices. Consequently, he stated, SWA's decision on
the application and the public hearing had no credibility. One state
legislator announced he would seek a one-year ban on chemical landfill
applications until state guidelines for application review had been
established.
The Bordentown siting controversy was included in a "Close Up"
report on hazardous waste problems. That program was aired on March
29, 1979.
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Outside the hearing, Earthline's attorney reportedly characterized much
of, the public testimony as emotional and fear-ridden because of
distortions of real issues. He claimed that the technical design for
the proposed facility was sound and that SCA would develop a perpetual
care fund for post-closure maintenance. >
Within two days of the public hearing, the New Jersey Senate passed by
voice vote a resolution banning chemical waste dumps in locations where
they endangered public water supplies. Specifically referencing the
Bordentown proposal, the resolution termed the site "unacceptable".
While the resolution.had no legal standing, its sponsor hoped it would
sway SWA's thinking. The same day, the commissioner of the Department
of Environmental Protection, SWA's parent agency, announced that no
decisions on any chemical waste landfill would be made until state '
hazardous waste regulations were issued. The commissioner indicated
late January 1979 as the earliest possible decision date on the
Earthline application.
Formal opposition to the Earthline proposal also continued to mount
during November. The Burlington Township Environmental Commission and,
Wrightstown, a city in Burlington County about ten miles southeast of
Bordentown, passed resolutions against the proposal. The Wrightstown
resolution asked the governor to intervene in the decision, and argued
that the profits that would accrue to Earthline could never compensate
for the risks to the health and welfare of hundreds of thousands of .
people.
On November 30 BCM submitted its report on potential groundwater impacts
to Bordentown city. The major conclusion of that report was that :
"unless it can be shown that leachate from the proposed landfill can
never escape and contaminate the underlying aquifers, then it is our
opinion that this in itself should be sufficient cause to reject the
permit application." This conclusion overrode the BCM finding that -the
secure landfill would have little impact on the existing water supply
and distribution system. The report covered much of the same ground and
reached conclusions similar to that of the earlier Stevens Institute
report. It also, however, analyzed more carefully the use of a hypalon
liner and pointed out the potential for certain compounds to attack the
liner material and seriously degrade the liner's integrity. From
Earthline's application, BCM found that these compounds were within
classes of wastes proposed for burial at the site. . ----- Y
In mid-December SWA responded to various officials who had communicated
concerns to the state. In a letter to a local jurisdiction SWA .
explained the state's need for safe disposal facilities to accommodate
the large volume of hazardous wastes generated by the state. SWA also
explained the status of the application review to one of New Jersey's
U.S. Senators who had been contacted by the Bordentown Regional Teachers
Association. On December 15 the comment period for the Earthline
application closed.
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On January 12, 1979, SWA held hearings on proposed hazardous waste
regulation. Representatives of HOPE and others active in the Bordentown
siting controversy spoke at those hearings. Following state procedures,
those regulations would be officially promulgated approximately two
months after the hearings. Given the earlier statements of state
regulatory officials, the date for a decision on the Earthline
application was mid-March at the earliest.
By late January the state legislature had acted on the bill originally
designed to ban hazardous waste landfills within 1,000 feet of a school.
In the four months since its filing, the bill had changed substantially.
In its final form, it placed a moratorium on state consideration of
applications for hazardous waste landfills pending a state-developed
comprehensive plan for siting such facilities. Such a plan would far
exceed the scope of then proposed state regulations. In that form the
bill was unanimously passed by both houses of the state legislature.
SWA had lobbied the governor not to sign the bill.
Also in January EPA's Region II office released Battelle's review of the
Earthline permit. That review, requested by SWA in October, was
generally favorable and specifically commended the site's geological
qualities and the use of liners to protect groundwater. The review did
call for additional monitoring and safety provisions as well as an
expanded EIS. SWA said they would add the report to the thousands of
pages of technical and public comments received to date in making their
final decision.
Field interviews were held in January, 1979. At that time no final SWA
decision had been reached and the various parties were weighing options
for the future. Earthline's attorney was confident that SWA would grant
the permit; he dismissed most of the opponents' issues as emotional or
specious. The feeling that SWA would grant the permit was shared by
HOPE's president and at least some local officials. If SWA granted the
permit, the mayor of Bordentown city said local jurisdictions would
appeal. He indicated a willingness to spend up to $250,000 for legal
talent, to hire the "F. Lee Bailey of environmental law," that is, the
best lawyer available. SWA would make no comment on how the decision
would be made.
On March 23, SWA denied Earthline's application. In its five-page
administrative order, SWA cited the following major reasons for the
denial.
o The secure landfill would reduce needed space already
committed to use as a sanitary landfill.
o The proposed facility would be inconsistent with and
disruptive to the area's solid waste management planning.
o No compelling need to bring hazardous wastes to the
Bordentown site had been established.
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o Hazardous wastes, if disposed of at the site, would
potentially threaten air and water quality and diminish
future productive use of the site.
o The application failed to delineate specific wastes to be
disposed of, thereby raising serious uncertainties as to
proposed site design and operations.
o The application failed to supply adequate analysis of man-
agerial and operational procedures, and of social, ec-
oiiomic,, and cultural impacts.
o The ability of Earthline to operate the facility
properly had not been demonstrated.
In .discussing these reasons SWA cited the 1977 application for the
sanitary landfill, specifically the "convincing evidence" presented
therein to substantiate a "compelling public need" for a sanitary
landfill. SWA stated that the site's proximity to the Bordentown Re-
gional High School presented a "needless and unwarranted burden upon and
risk to" the high school's students. In questioning the management and
operations reliability of Earthline, SWA specifically referenced the
trial judge's decision in the Wilsonville case. While SWA acknowledged
New Jersey's need for environmentally sound hazardous waste disposal -
facilities, it declared the risks associated with the Earthline proposal
outweighed any potential benefits.
Following SWA's announcement, Earthline's attorney indicated that the
company would consider an appeal to the courts of the application's de-
nial.
By late March the legislation calling for a moratorium on SWA review of
permit applications until the development of a state comprehensive
facility siting plan had not been signed by the governor. Bordentown
residents reportedly speculated that a political deal had been struck.
By taking no action to sign the bill, the governor would in effect veto
the bill and the entire process of developing hazardous waste disposal
facilities would not be derailed. In return, the Earthline application
which gave rise to the bill would be denied.
IV.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
The following chronology of events applies only to those stemming from
Earthline's permit application. Other indirectly related events de-
scribed in the previous section are excluded for the sake of clarity.
1977 — Planning for Earthline facility begins.
February, 1978 — HOPE first learns of Earthline's interest in de-
veloping a HWMF in Bordentown.
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June, 1978 — Earthline submits permit application to SWA. SWA informs
local agencies of permit application and of 30-day comment
period for those agencies.
July, 1978 — The area's State Senator, the Burlington County Health De-
partment and Planning Board of Bordentown Township, acting
individually, seek 90-day extension of comment period.
SWA grants 30-day extenstion.
August, 1978 — The Director of the Burlington County Board of
Freeholders seeks a 90-day extension; the Mayor of the
City of Bordentown seeks a 120-day extension so an on-
going city water study can assess impacts of proposed
landfill. New Jersey Turnpike Authority formally op-
poses proposed facility. City of Bordentown files suit
until city water study completed; out-of-court set-
tlement extends comment period until December 15, 1978.
September, 1978 — Meeting between SWA and local officials scheduled and
then postponed. HOPE holds public meeting in Borden-
town to inform citizens of permit application. State
legislation filed to ban HWMFs within 1000 feet of
schools. .
October, 1978 — EPA Region II submits permit application to Battelle
for review. Stevens Institute Report submitted to SWA.
Board of education of Bordentown Regional High School
formally opposes facility, as does Bordentown Township.
SWA meets with local officials prior to public hearing.
SWA requests more data on permit application from
Earthline. Area legislators ask Governor to deny
permit.
November, - 1978 — HOPE stages a week of events to highlight opposition
to proposal. SWA holds two-day public hearing in
Bordentown. SWA requests more data from Earthline.
State Senate passes resolution against facility.
Burlington Township Environmental Commission and
Wrightstown formally oppose facility. SWA delays de-
cision until state regulations are issued. BCM report
to Bordentown city submitted.
December, 1978 — City, township, and county sue SWA claiming local
authority over hazardous waste management. SWA writes
to local jurisdiction explaining need for HWMFs in New
Jersey and to U.S. Senator explaining status of permit
review. Comment period closes.
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January, 1979 State legislation to stop all permit reviews by SWA un-
til full state hazardous waste plan developed sent to
governor for his signature. Public hearing on state
hazardous waste regulations held. EPA/Battelle favor-
able review of permit submitted to SWA. Local suit
challenging SWA jurisdiction over solid waste man-
agement dismissed by court.
March, 1979 — SWA denies Earthline's application for a permit.
V. ATTEMPTS TO SECURE SUPPORT
A clear distinction should be made between SWA's actions designed to in-
form the public about permit review procedures and general hazardous
waste needs and Earthline actions intended to generate support or soften
opposition to the specific proposed facility. Actions by both
organizations are listed below. •
o SWA notification of local officials of the receipt of the
Earthline permit application.
o SWA's meeting with local officials preparatory to the
public hearing.
o Earthline's unsuccessful attempts to meet with local,
officials.
o Debates between Earthline and opposition representatives
aired by local radio and television stations.
o The presentations by SWA and Earthline at the public
hearing.
o Communications by SWA to various officials either
explaining the course of events or the general need in New
Jersey for disposal facilities.
VI.
SUMMARY EVALUATION
The March, 1979 decision by SWA is essentially irrelevant to the
question of whether attempts to secure support for the Earthline
proposal could in any way be termed successful. Even without that
decision it was clear that there was no support for the facility locally
nor was there any evidence of neutral parties.1 An approval by SWA would
have been met with continued opposition. ;
It is certainly possible to suggest that the entire experience,
including SWA's actions and perhaps even Earthline's, increased local
support for environmentally sound solutions to hazardous waste disposal
problems. Opposition leaders, however, clearly distinguished between
their support for such solutions and the Earthline proposal. The role
which the
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attempts outlined in Section V played in this process is most likely
minor compared with other actions which provided Bbrdentown area
residents with information on hazardous waste problems and solutions.
Attempts to address issues raised by local opponents were relatively
few. They were certainly made after opposition had solidified. The
majority of Earthline's efforts focused on preparation and defense of
its application and the provision of some additional data requested by
SWA. These SWA-Earthline exchanges were quite distinct from the public
response to the proposal and any attempts to react to that response.
A number of issues were raised by opponents and the major issues are
summerized below. Among these issues some were clearly important and
less susceptible to ambiguity in terms of strengthening the opposition
and impacting SWA's decision. These issues can be characterized as
pertaining to credibility, political sensibilities, and institutional
factors. These issues, in combination with the broad-based political
resources amassed by opponents, appear to have been decisive.
Credibility of Earthline and SCA ;— Opponents claimed that Earthline and
SCA could not prove that reliable development and operation of the
facility would be guaranteed. This was largely based on company claims
made during the development of the Interstate sanitary landfill and on
the Wilsonville case.
Site location — Location above an aquifer and proximity of the site to
the Bordentown Regional High School were considered unacceptable risks.
Credibility of SWA — Opponents doubted SWA's ability to make an
independent, reasoned judgement on the application. This was based
largely on assumptions that SWA was predisposed to approve the
application (or at least be more concerned about waste disposal than
public health), that SWA had no guidelines (particularly siting
criteria) by which to judge the application, and that SWA's limited
qualifications and resources prevented a thorough, independent review.
Technical suitability — Opponents considered engineering and geological
safeguards for the proposed facility insufficient to eliminate adverse
impacts, particularly the contamination of the Magothy-Raritan aquifer.
Technical studies by consultants to opponents supported this view while
those prepared for Earthline and EPA's Region II office came to
essentially the opposite conclusions.
Other impacts on the community — Opponents did hot want Bordentown to
become the hazardous waste "dumping ground" for the state. They also
feared that the site's development alone would create general economic
disbenefits to the area.
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Legal jurisdiction over solid and hazardous waste management -- Local
officials claimed authority for waste management planning and therefore
claimed a legal role in facility siting. This argument was dismissed by
the court.
VII. FACTORS LEADING TO PUBLIC OPPOSITION/ACCEPTANCE
The following are the major factors which led to the development and
coalescing of opposition to the Earthline proposal.
o A predisposition on the part of at least some local leaders
to mistrust solid waste companies in general, and SCA sub-
sidiaries in particular, based on prior experiences with
these firms. , ,
o A history of local leaders and the general public opposing
the siting of facilities considered to be objectionable.
o Ultimately successful efforts to block the siting of the
Dow tank farm, thus creating a successful track record and
a loosely working coalition between local environmentalists
and elected officials.
o SWA's notificaton of local officials and agencies of the
permit application.
o National publicity surrounding Love Canal.
p Numerous requests to SWA and a law suit by Bordentown City
to extend the comment period.
o The decision in the Wilsonville, Illinois case.
o Actions by state elected officials to introduce legislation
against the facility and to appeal to the governor.
o HOPE's informational meeting in September.
o The Stevens Institute report submitted to the township and
the county.
It is probably impossible to determine when opposition reached a stage
where maintenance of that opposition was at least as important as
further growth. By late October, however, it would appear that most
parties were irrevocably opposed to the proposal even if formal
positions had not been taken. The following actions can then be said to
serve as demonstrations of opposition and hence as sustainers of
opposition.
o HOPE's activities in the week prior to the public hearing.
o The public hearing.
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o The Senate resolution against the facility.
o The BCM report to Bordentown city.
o The city-township-county suit against SWA on jurisdictional
grounds.
o The bill sent to the governor banning permit reviews until
the development of a state facility siting plan.
VIII. GENERAL COMMENTS .....,,.
The siting experience in Bordentown provided key participants with a
wide range of insights and views on siting and other hazardous waste
problems. These are described below.
One local elected official felt that the onus for disposal should be
placed on hazardous waste generators. He had no faith in state or
federal bureaucrats playing major roles because they lacked competence.
Commercial disposal firms could either not be trusted or lacked
financial resources commensurate with risks entailed. This left .larger
generators as the responsible implementors; these firms had sufficient
assets to guarantee that any problems could be paid for. To pay for
disposal, costs should be included in product prices. Finally, disposal
techniques should stress rendering wastes harmless and avoid land burial
of hazardous waste altogether.
A state elected official differed sharply on governmental roles. While
questioning the usefulness of an expanded state role, he saw potential
for major changes in federal and/or multi-state agency roles. One
action would be for EPA to survey the state to determine if any areas
are suitable for disposal sites. While his ideas were less fixed on
ownership/ operation arrangements, he considered complete federal and/or
regional agency control, or federal or regional agency ownership coupled
with private operation as the two most viable options.
HOPE'S president made both specific and general comments. Echoing the
complaints of other opposition leaders, he felt that the costs to local
governments and organizations for technical studies of the Earthline
application were unfair. A mechanism needs to be developed to redress
the imbalances in resources available to state agencies and private
industry and those available to communities which are asked to live with
the consequences of state agency/private industry decisions. Public
input, he felt, was critical to siting because such scrutiny would more
thoroughly test the viability of proposed facilities. To ensure that
reasoned decisions are made, the state should develop siting criteria
before analyzing any permit application. In the event of technical
disputes by presumed experts, a scientific panel or "court" would be the
best way to settle such conflicts. Site ownership should be in state
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hands because states are more likely to make environmentally sound
decisions on site selection than industry. States could then contract
out operations to private firms. The .federal government should promote
"cradle to grave" monitoring of waste. Finally, the most critical need
is for perpetual maintenance and monitoring of sites after site closure.
Earthline's attorney considered existing siting procedures to be
satisfactory for the most part. He did feel that EPA should work to
improve the integrity of state regulatory agencies so that the public
will be more trusting of those agencies. On the other hand, he saw New
Jersey's disposal problems as particularly severe because there, are .no
commercial hazardous waste landfills and state and federal policies have
increased the demand for these facilities. Thus new secure landfills
must be found. He considered the Earthline application a demonstration
project not only of a facility but of the state's ability to develop
disposal capacity. During Centaur's interview he said that if the
Earthline permit were denied, the state would demonstrate its inability
to solve its hazardous waste problems.
State comments are included in the state program write-up elsewhere in
this report.
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ALLIED CHEMICAL
ROSSVILLE, MARYLAND
I.
INTRODUCTION
Since 1974, the Allied Chemical Corporation has unsuccessfully attempted
to establish its own private landfill in Rossville, Maryland. The
proposed landfill would be owned by Allied but operated by the Maryland
Environmental Service (MES), an agency within the Maryland Department of
Natural Resources. The site would be used for exclusive disposal of
chrome ore wastes generated at Allied!s chrome plant in nearby
Baltimore. Allied was forced to seek out the site when the Maryland
Port Administration (MPA) announced early termination of its 40-year
disposal agreement with Allied. Allied has been unable to develop the
Rossville site to date because the county has denied Allied a special
zoning exemption. Opposition to the landfill developed soon after the
first public knowledge of Allied's intention. Opposition has centered
on technical, operational, and political issues and has become
deeply-rooted and strongly emotional. The opponents' fight against the
facility has involved all major political leaders in the area as well as
the governor and lieutenant governor.
Allied and MES have made concerted efforts to address publicly raised
issues and/or to refute opponents' changes. While Allied has been
credited with being open and forthright in dealing with opponents, these
efforts have had little discernible effect on the opposition.
II.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The proposed landfill site is located at the intersection of
Philadelphia Road and Route 40, about five miles east of Baltimore. The
land is currently zoned for light manufacturing and owned by the Arundel
Corporation which operates a brick manufacturing plant on the location.
All clay needed for the brick manufacturing operation is excavated from
two large pits on the 60-acre property. The property is actually part
of a several-hundred acre Arundel-owned plot which includes an
immediately adjacent industrial park development. The site is bordered
by several private homes. A hospital and community college are located
within a mile of the brickyard.
The site has particular advantages for Allied. It is less than ten
miles from Allied's chrome processing plant in Baltimore and is well
served by highways and a rail line. The site had already been excavated
for clay used in brickmaking thereby providing a 38-acre repository with
at least 12 years dumping capacity (given Allied's yearly chrome
production rates). Study showed that the clay lining and iron stone
underlayers made the pits impervious to water. According to Allied's
engineering consultants, the site is located on the Arundel Clay
formation composed of two clay strata which would,contain any leachate
for a period of 335 years.
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According to Allied's engineering plans, total waste confinement was to
be achieved by complete encapsulation of each day's deposit of chrome
ore refuse within an impermeable clay envelope. The bottom and sides of
the pits provided at least five feet of clay lining and ten feet of
rock. This would protect underlying groundwater from leachate
contamination. Each day, the waste would be covered with clay to
prevent saturation of the refuse and/or surface runoff. The waste
material itself has a built-in safety shield, that is, an ability to
hold considerable amounts of water without leaching. Finally, Allied
proposed to install observation wells for monitoring leachate and
holding ponds to capture any possible surface runoff caused by
precipitation. Runoff would be confined there, tested for hexavalent
chromium content and treated if necessary. Allied agreed to give WRA
access to all monitoring and testing information. Allied also agreed to
comply with the state's evolving hazardous waste management regulations
regarding maintenance and closure. Included among these is a proposed
$100,000 a .year permit fee for each year of operation. The fee would
provide a contingency fund to help compensate for possible damages after
the facility closed. .
Allied Chemical is one of the nation's largest chemical maufacturers: in
fiscal year 1978 it reported total sales of over $3.2 billion. The
company has a fairly extensive program to provide for its own waste
disposal needs; however, not all plants have their own facilities.,
Allied operates one of the three chrome processing plants in the
country. The chromium chemicals produced at Allied1s Baltimore plant
are used in a wide variety of industrial applications including metal
finishing, leather tanning, pigment manufacture and oil well drilling.
In most cases, chromium applications are considered vital and : , .
irreplaceable where used. ,
Rossville itself is a largely working class community of industrial
parks, shopping centers and scattered homes about four miles east of
Baltimore. The area has traditionally attracted manufacturing and
processing operations otherwise unattractive to the. metropolitan area.
Recently, however, Rossville has experienced an increase in moderate to
middle income housing development due to the area's affordable home and
land prices. This growing trend is expected to continue accompanied by
a local policy encouraging compatible industrial growth. ,
There are no incorporated cities or townships in Baltimore County (1977
population, 644,000). Rossville, therefore, simply refers to a small
neighborhood or concentration of development under the direct
jurisdiction of the county government. The county government consists
of a locally elected council and an executive administrator.
III.
HISTORY OF FACILITY DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC RESPONSE
During the development of its plans Allied had to obtain regulatory
approval from the state and from Baltimore County. State permits from
the Water Resources Administration (WRA) included a groundwater
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discharge permit and a facility permit. In addition to state permits,
Allied also needed local zoning approval before it could operate the
landfill. The Arundel property was zoned for light manufacturing. A
special zoning exemption for heavy manufacturing was required for waste
disposal. Baltimore County regulations for landfills also require sign
offs by the fire department, the highway department, and the local
health department once zoning has been approved. Finally, some local
parties contend that a zoning change to heavy manufacturing would
constitute a change in the county's solid waste master plan. This, in
turn, would require formal review and approval by the County Council.
A by—product of chromium processing is an odorless, non-combustible
refuse.^ Allied's Baltimore plant produces approximately 93,000 cubic
yards of this refuse per year. Its disposal is essential to the plant's
operation. For years, Allied disposed of its chrome ore waste at an
85-acre landfill adjacent to the Maryland Port Administration's (MPA)
Dundalk Marine Terminal. In 1967, Allied sold the parcel to MPA with
the agreement that Allied would continue dumping up to 6 million cubic
yards of refuse on the property. The agreement included financial
penalties for Allied's failure to use the MPA landfill. MPA intended to
use the filled land for expansion of Dundalk.
Disposal continued at Dundalk until mid-1974. At that time, MPA
notified Allied it would no longer accept waste after January, 1975 due
to curtailment of its marine terminal expansion plans. Allied,
recognizing that someday it might need a contingency landfill site, had
already negotiated with a private sanitary landfill in case of emergency
disposal needs. Allied proceeded to use that landfill exclusively until
MPA, under a remaining 32-year obligation to Allied, provided an
alternate site at Hawkins Point in Baltimore City. The Hawkins Point
site, however, only had two years remaining capacity. Allied was once
again forced to consider alternative disposal arrangements.
Allied began to look for environmentally sound sites suitable for
long-term waste disposal as early as 1970. The search began in earnest
in late 1974. Siting criteria included proximity to the
Chrome ore waste has the consistency of a moist, heavy sand
and contains about 20 percent water by volume. The material is
principally a mixture of iron oxides, calcium, magnesium and
aluminum. The waste material, however, also contains about 0.2
percent water soluble and 1.3 percent acid soluble hexavalent
chromium. In its solid, damp state, the waste causes no problem.
However, hexavalent chromium concentrations greater than 0.05
milligrams per litre render water unacceptable for drinking;
concentrations greater than 0.1 milligrams per litre are harmful to
aquatic life. The chromium ion therefore is considered a hazardous
waste requiring special handling (i.e., prevention of leachate) in
disposal. "
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Baltimore plant, transportation access and cost of site preparation.
The most important criteria were proper soil type and amount for waste
containment, adequate size to hold at least ten years of Allied refuse
and overall availability for use. Of 60 sites considered, two appeared
promising. One was eliminated because it required massive clearing and
excavation and because the zoning department of the county in which it
was located clearly opposed use of the land for waste disposal. The
second site was Rossville.
Since Allied had recently suffered from $20 million fines and bad
publicity associated with Kepone contamination in Hopewell, Virginiaj
the company was particularly wary of any disposal method or site that
demonstrated risk of environmental pollution. The decision to dispose
of the chrome ore wastes in carefully constructed cells of impervious
clay was made only after a thorough investigation by Allied and WRA of
alternate means for handling and disposal. A number of methods to
reduce the hexavalent chromium content of the waste through additional
chemical treatment proved incomplete. , Such processing resulted in new
and significant amounts of chlorides which still needed.land disposal.
Ways of recycling the hexavalent chromium into alternate, commercially
useful materials also proved infeasible. By June 1975, WRA agreed with
Allied that landfilling the chromium waste was the most viable disposal
method at least until another alternative became known.
This research underscored the importance of identifying the Rossville
site for development as a landfill. Favorable technical reports by
Allied's engineering consultants boosted Allied's interest and
confidence in the site. Allied envisioned grading the site once filled
then putting the land to higher use, possibly as an extension of the
neighboring industrial park. By mid-1975, Allied had reached a purchase
agreement (which to date has not been consummated) with the Arundel
Corporation. The Arundel Corporation would retain an access strip from
the road to the brickyard which it would continue to operate for some
time. Allied, in turn, would receive rights to use the access roads to
the highway, rail line and other area roads.
In July 1975, Allied sought a state discharge permit for the landfill.
Typically, the Maryland State Health Department approves all landfill
applications, but because the Health Department code does not
specifically address hazardous waste disposal, Allied was referred to
WRA.
WRA, a department within the Maryland Department of Natural Resources,
is responsible for issuing NPDES (surface water) and state discharge
permits to all point sources. WRA recognized Allied's need for a
landfill site. It also recognized a state responsibility to assist
Allied since another state agency (i.e., MPA) was partly responsible for
the company's dilemma. WRA reviewed Allied's plans and determined that
although certain technical problems still remained, the site appeared
eligible for a groundwater discharge permit and a hazardous waste
permit. WRA also suggested that Allied request the assistance of
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the Maryland Environmental Services (MES) in developing a landfill at
Rossville. WRA believed that MES's participation in the project would
help ensure the technical quality of the operation and greater local
acceptance of the landfill.
MES was established as a corporate utility agency of the state in 1970.
The agency operates as a non-profit enterprise to assist local
governments, industries and other state agencies in matters of waste
management and water supply. Its purpose is to serve both public and
private interests by supporting efforts to achieve environmental
quality. MES recovers its costs through contract arrangements with its
clients. MES has no regulatory functions or police powers and must
conform to all regulations and decisions of other state agencies.
After several meetings in the summer of 1976, Allied formally invited
MES to submit a proposal to assist Allied in developing a landfill. MES
responded in September, 1976, thus becoming a partner in the venture.
MES agreed to help Allied through the regulatory process, to supply
technical review and advice where possible, and to operate the landfill
facility once it was established.
A preliminary assessment by Allied and MES indicated no insurmountable
problems in securing necessary permits and approval. Allied anticipated
that its first request for a zoning change would be denied but that a
special exemption eventually would be granted because the plans met all
federal regulations and county requirements. The only major problem
anticipated was securi.ng county approval. regarding the planned.
landfill's compatibility with the county solid waste master plan. On
this point, Allied planned to contest a negative decision on grounds
that the county plan did not provide for waste disposal beyond ten
years.
Public response to Allied1s proposed facility was strong and
well-organized early in the regulatory approval process. Although
rooted in emotional objections to the presence of a HWMF in their
neighborhood, -community opponents challenged the plans on the grounds of
technical issues related to specific site characteristics. The
opposition drew strength from unity among local community improvement
groups and political clubs as well as the backing of local elected
officials.
The public first became aware of Allied1s landfill plans shortly after
MES became involved in the project. MES encouraged Allied to meet with
state and county officials early, both as a courtesy to them and to
avoid announcing the landfill plans amidst the anxiety of a public
hearing atmosphere. Alli.ed took MES's suggestion and invited the state
representative, senator and county councilman representing the Rossville
area to discuss the plans with Allied. The officials seemed interested
in the proposed landfill, especially since it offered eventual
improvement of the unsightly brickyard pits and possible industrial/
commercial development for Baltimore County. The state senator
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suggested that a public meeting be held to present the plans to the
greater public. The Greater Rosedale Community Council, an umbrella
group representing 17 local groups, was contacted to notify other
interested publics of the upcoming meeting.1
The informational meeting was held in November, 1976. Approximately 80
people including local officials and representatives of community groups
attended. MES introduced the agenda, discussed state involvement in the
project, and outlined the project's lifespan and general operations.
With the help of its consultants, Allied explained the nature of the
facility (e.g., material to be disposed, safeguards, plans for future
use) and the company's need for disposal. Throughout the discussion,
Allied spoke candidly about potential problems and risks in operating
the proposed landfill. The public was invited to ask questions to which
MES, Allied and Allied's engineering consultants responded.
The impact of the meeting was somewhat greater than Allied or MES
probably expected. Both parties anticipated some negative response,
especially in view of the history of public reaction to hazardous waste
management facilities, Allied's recent Kepone publicity and the presence
of organized community groups. But by the end of the meeting, the
audience had developed what the newspapers referred to as a "polite, yet
antagonistic attitude toward representatives from the chemical company
and an engineer from their consulting firm". The local county
councilman who before the meeting indicated support for restoration of
the Rossville site, spoke out in strong opposition to the landfill at
the end of the evening. The councilman spoke of his desire to uplift
the area rather than further degrading it with a "poison pit". The,
Greater Rosedale „Community Council strongly supported the councilman's.
position in a membership vote taken immediately after the meeting. The
state senator, although reserving comment until Allied answered
technical issues raised, also showed some displeasure with the proposal.
His displeasure would grow within a short time into adamant opposition
to Allied's plans.
A number of technical concerns were raised by members of the attending
audience. Primary concerns focused on risk of groundwater contamina-
tion, surface water runoff from precipitation, nuisance (e.g. , dust,
noise, traffic congestion) and safety factors associated with hauling
seven days a week, and indefinite safeguards for future site
.development.
Although the area is not heavily populated, a number of local
political and neighborhood improvement groups have been; organized in
and around Rossville. These groups have lobbied successfully in the
past for tax relief, road repair and other community concerns. In
some cases, individual neighborhood groups have rallied under the
umbrella organization to add focus and strength to their common
efforts. The proposed landfill siting was the area's first
experience with a controversial environmental issue, of such
magnitude.
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Allied and its consultants offered assurances that the pits' clay lining
would prevent leachate, that the holding ponds and monitoring provisions
would deter surface runoff, that hauling hours would be adjusted to
avoid disturbing neighboring residents, that tarp covers on trucks would
eliminate blowing dust and that WRA's participation would ensure proper
oversight of the landfill after closure. Despite these answers, the
public felt Allied was speaking in generalities, unprepared to address
some of the issues raised and unable to offer adequate reassurances to
balance risks.
The audience drew parallels between Rossville and Norris Farms and Hart
Miller Islands, two other landfills with serious leachate problems.
Spokesmen for the Greater Rosedale Community Council complained of
burdening Rossville with wastes generated in other communities just for
the convenience of Allied. A number of people noted they were tired of
getting everyone else's waste. Because of past and ongoing court
situations depicting Allied as a "polluter", many residents simply did
not want to take a chance with a landfill.
Following the meeting, the local press carried a number of articles and
editorials highlighting the "hazardous" nature of Allied's wastes and
the extent of public opposition to the landfill. The councilman and
state senator petitioned the County Executive not to bring Allied's
special zoning exception request to the council in hopes of frustrating
Allied*s siting attempts. The senator also petitioned the governor's
office to oppose Allied's siting attempt. In January, 1977, the
lieutenant governor issued a response noting that "the governor thought
the entire undertaking should be abandoned". By that time, it was clear
to the director of MES that although Allied's proposal was technically
sound, the facility would never get off the ground unless the adjoining
neighborhoods withdrew their objections.
Also, in January, the Greater Rosedale Community Council invited a
representative from MES to speak about the landfill at a monthly
meeting. The president of the Council made it known that although the
organization was firmly opposed to the facility, it was willing to hear
all sides. The MES representative's presentation was received better
than Allied's presentation at the informational meeting, but was still
incapable of swaying the public's position.
A month later the County Zoning Commission denied Allied's zoning
petition on the basis of what it called "a contradiction of terms"
arising from the stated water imperviousness of the clay and the need
for the soil to pass a percolation test for establishing sewers. (Since
more than four persons would be employed at the site, Allied was obliged
to install sewer lines.) The denial of the zoning request was not
unexpected. Indeed, Allied's attorneys, expecting such a decision,
deliberately withheld expert testimony and special witnesses until the
appeals process so that all testimony would be recorded and so that
Allied could protect its position from premature "attack. The Greater
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Rpsedale Community Council established a "Landfill Defense Fund" to
fight. Allied in.its zoning appeals. The state senator became attorney
for the group and the county directed the people's counsel to further
assist the Rosedale group.
The area's state senator introduced legislation in February that would
have prohibited the development of the Allied landfill. That
legislation called for no hazardous waste landfills to be sited within
1,500 feet of a residence in Baltimore County. Within,two months that
legislation had passed both houses and was sent to the governor for his
signature. .'-...... ,
Allied appealed the zoning commission's decision and again tried to
assuage public concerns. In March, Allied sponsored a second public
information meeting regarding its zoning appeal. Stiff local opposition
arose at this time. Neighboring residents testified that they witnessed
water soaking into the soil at the site thereby challenging Allied's
claim that the soil is impervious. A local pastor spoke about declining
property values due to the landfill and lack of community control over
the land. A local hospital spokesman voiced concern over possible
health effects from chromium ore dust in hauling. The County Planning
Board and the Industrial Development Commission also took stands against
Allied's proposal for fear of contamination of nearby streams.
In April, Allied requested a special audience with the governor
regarding approval of the senator's bill restricting hazardous waste
management facilities near residences in Baltimore County. Calling to
the governor's attention the employment and income effects that could
result from closing the Baltimore plant, Allied urged the governor to
veto the bill. The governor apparently reconsidered his position and
did indeed veto the bill. The county executive was also opposed to the
bill because of its possible effects on the county solid waste plan.
The executive viewed the bill as a tool to phase out all landfills in
the county.
Also in April Allied applied to WRA for a facility permit. A complete
plan for the development and operation of the facility was submitted
with this application. At Allied's request, WRA considered this
application a continuation of the discharge permit application submitted
in July, 1975.
The zoning appeals hearing began in September, 1977. At the. first ...
hearing the local communities' challenged the validity oif Aliped's
technical reports. Allied's engineers again restated proposed measures
to assure protection of the groundwater. Allied also announced plans to
fill eight acres in the northwest corner of the site during the first
three to five years of operation. This area then would be developed as
a park for community use. Allied reminded the audience that its
Baltimore-plant employed 350 people and that no suitable alternative to
disposal by landfill had been found for chrome ore waste. The company's
presentation did little to reduce public opposition.
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The pattern established in the first appeals hearing continued through
four subsequent hearings. Each time, the community (through the Greater
Rosedale Community Council, individual spokesmen or elected officials)
continued to challenge Allied on the basis of potentially harmful
community effects. The Greater Rosedale Community Council hired its own
consultants who claimed that although the clay at Rossville might prove
adequate to prevent leachate, the site was actually spotted with sand
lenses which permit seepage through the clay. In response, Allied hired
another consultant—this time from the local university—who again
supported their engineer's report favoring soil characteristics at the
Rossville site. Another real estate broker was brought in to refute
claims that local property values would decline. Allied also tried to
appease the public by giving a greater role to public agencies in
managing the landfill. At the third appeals hearing, Allied announced
that MES would operate the landfill for five years after its closure.
After that time, WRA would assume control over the facility thereby
placing the site under public control.
All of Allied1s retorts did little to sway public opinion. In March,
1978 by the end of the fifth appeals hearing, the Zoning Commission was
no closer to approving the site. The County Planning Board and Board of
Health began bringing in reports of visible chromium leachate from the
Hawkins Point site on the Chesapeake Bay. This aroused greater public
ire due to concern over regenerating the bay.
The same month that the appeals hearings ended, MPA announced, as a
result of compromise legislation, that it would allow Allied to dispose
of its chrome ore waste at Hawkins Point until July, 1979. Local papers
reported that the MPA, WRA, and the area's state senator had reached
this compromise so that disposal would not become a major constraint for
Allied's processing plant.
•The site visit occurred in January, 1979; at that time a decision on
Allied's zoning appeal was expected in March, 1979. Although Allied
continued to petition the appeals boards, a reversal of the Zoning
Commission's original decision was considered highly unlikely. Allied
has not produced conclusive data to refute the opponents' technical
criticisms nor has it offered appropriate incentives to win the support
of the public. Furthermore, local opposition has been too deeply rooted
in emotional issues at this time to be appealed to through reason.
Although it has supported Allied's proposed landfill the state has not
been in a position to reverse the local ruling since the state does not
have authority to preempt local zoning decisions. Allied and MES will
continue the appeal to settle a number of lingering legal issues (e.g. ,
does an industrial waste landfill have to be consistent with the county
solid waste master plan) and to pave the way for other landfill sites in
Maryland. Allied and MES have learned valuable lessons through this
experience.
Compatibility of the proposed landfill with the County solid waste
master plan was also still in dispute. Allied claimed that the facility
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should be approved since the county plan did not adequately address
industrial waste disposal — a critical problem in the greater Baltimore
area. The WRA notified Allied that permitting procedures would be sus-
pended until the solid waste master plan question was settled. The
question was moot however, until zoning was approved.
In the meantime, Allied continued to use a private landfill site. Dis-
posal costs have tripled over the past year and the state estimated only
three to five years of remaining disposal capacity in Baltimore County.
MES, with the support of WRA, was still working with Allied to find a
suitable landfill site. Since a negative or at least too tardy decision
was expected on the Rossville zoning decision, Allied was proceeding
with another survey of alternate landfill locations. Allied will pre-
sent its development plans to selected candidate communities after MES
conducts a technical review of the sites and makes its own recom-
mendations regarding preferred suitability. Allied will then make a
final site decision. Allied will solicit the public's assistance in de-
veloping site selection criteria and in making the final choice. The
legislature is expected to be keenly interested in the activities, es-
pecially since highly developed areas will be considered. Ownership and
operation arrangements had not been decided.
In April, 1979, the appeals board granted Allied the needed special ex-
emption. This decision was appealed to the circuit court by the
people's counsel. As of late May, 1979, the circuit court was expected
to receive the complete files of the appeals board. When that was ac-
complished the court would begin to decide on hearing dates.
IV.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
1974 — MPA informs Allied that disposal at Dundalk must stop in Janu-
ary, 1975. Allied switches to private landfill until MPA ,
provides for disposal at Hawkins Point. Allied begins concerted
effort for disposal site.
June, 1975 — Allied and WRA agree on rejecting non-landfilling options
for chrome waste. Allied reaches purchase agreement on
Rossville site.
July, 1975 —• Allied seeks state discharge permit from WRA which refers
Allied to MES.
September, 1976 --After a series of meetings, MES formally agrees to
assist Allied.
November, 1976 — Allied and MES attend local informational meeting.
January, 1977 —MES attends Greater Rosedale Community Council board
meeting. Lieutenant governor indicates that he and
governor oppose facility.
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February, 1977 — County zoning commission rejects zoning change; Allied
appeals to county board of appeals. Area's state
senator introduces anti-facility legislation.
March, 1977 — Allied attends second informational meeting.
April, 1977 — Allied applies for state facility and apppeals to
governor for meeting prior to his action on senator's
bill.
May, 1977 — Governor vetoes senator's bill.
September, 1977 — Hearings before county board of appeals begin.
March, 1978 — Hearings end. MPA agrees to Allied's disposal at Hawkins
Point until July, 1979.
April, 1979 — County board of appeals granted special exemption.
May, 1979 — People's counsel appeals decision to circuit court.
V. ATTEMPTS TO SECURE SUPPORT
The following.major actions were taken by Allied and/or MES.
6 The November, 1976 informational meeting arranged by the
area's state senator.
o The MES presentation to the board of the Greater Rosedale
Community Council.
o The March, 1977 informational meeting sponsored by Allied.
o Allied's appeal to the governor.
o Amenities and technical data offered by Allied during the
zoning appeals process.
VI.
SUMMARY EVALUATION
The various actions taken by Allied and MES have failed to reduce public
opposition. Indeed, that opposition has escalated during the
controversy and for large numbers of area residents and officials
appears to have become deep-rooted and unalterable.
Allied's piecemeal attempts to respond to public concerns put the
company in a suspicious light. For example, no mention was made of
covering trucks with tarp to prevent spreading chrome ore dust until the
local opposition raised the issue. Similarly, truck scheduling at the
site was not adjusted to hours agreeable to local residents until
neighboring residents complained of anticipated traffic.congestion,
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noise and general nuisance. This approach made Allied appear
unresponsive to community concerns. While MES1 presentation to the
Greater Rosedale Community Council was considered to be better (i.e.,
more informative), that agency was no more successful in changing local
views than Allied. :
Allied1s legal strategy on presentation of data during the zoning
approval process seems to have backfired. Allied's legal counsel
advised the company to withhold detailed presentations until the hearing
process when proceedings would be recorded. Unfortunately, this put
Allied in a defensive position. The company did not anticipate, a
well-informed public armed with specific technical criticisms of the
site.
This inability to sway opinions may be explained by the fact that in the
final analysis, Allied's general approach demonstrated overall
insensitivity to the community's self-image and priorities. For'
example, the community appeared to be developing into a bedroom
community. As such, jobs in the community itself may not have been as
important as would seem at first glance. Development would be
particularly undesirable if new jobs brought in unsightly or dangerous;
industries. The community was trying to change its self-image away from
the "dumping grounds of Baltimore County". Even though Allied promised
to restore the brickyard to original grades, the intermediate steps to
fill the land (i.e., trucking in hazardous material) did not complement
the community's improvement plans. Nor did the promise of a park since
new homes in the area have adequate land for backyards and since clean
fill could be brought in to fill the clay pits at less risk. Allied's
overall inability to determine community priorities made it impossible
for them to determine local motivations and appropriately corresponding
incentives.
Finally, Allied failed to fully capitalize on its support from the
state. A more active role by the Water Resources Administration may
have helped allay public fears about groundwater contamination and
damage liability after site closure. As an impartial regulatory agency,
WRA could have helped settled conflicting technical reports about site
suitability.
Allied was not totally without success. It would appear that the
company's appeal to the governor contributed to a complete reversal of
the governor's position on the landfill. Gaining the support of the
governor, however, had no discernible impact on local sentiment.
The unexpected decision by the appeals board to grant Allied the special
exemption has given the siting attempt new life. Regardless of the
outcome of the appeal to the courts, the overwhelming evidence suggested
that opposition will not be overcome. Should the landfill be developed,
it will be developed without community support or approval. The
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Rossville case illustrates the strength and stamina of public opposition
once it has formed. Community groups and their leaders have been able
to mobilize a sizeable number of political, financial, and technical
resource when local interests have been threatened. While the technical
issues raised by citizens can be said to be merely tactics to support
emotionally-based concerns, they cannot be easily resolved or refuted.
The protracted opposition has centered around a number of major issues
that are summarized below.
Allied's credibility — National publicity regarding Kepone poisoning at
Hopewell, Virginia had surfaced shortly before Allied's first local
meeting in Rossville. Fear of a similar disaster in Rossville was
therefore a primary public concern. Despite Allied's direct statements
to the contrary, the public suspected Allied might secretly haul in
Kepone from Virginia. Furthermore, even if Kepone was not imported,
chromium ore still bore the label "hazardous waste." As such, chrome
wastes were assumed to have the same possible effects on the public as
Kepone no matter how Allied proposed to handle the waste.
Site suitability — Allied engineers seemed unable to refute
contradicting technical reports prepared by the opposition's engineers.
The latter reports referred to sand lenses throughout the site's clay
formation as well as stress patterns which might disrupt the sealed
encapsulation effect. The reports therefore supplied ample fuel for the
opposition's position and grounds for denying the zoning permit. The
basic fear has been that groundwater would be contaminated.
Operational procedures and provisions— Traffic in and out of the site
has been seen not only as a nuisance but also a safety hazard because of
traffic congestion and the potential for spilling chrome ore waters.
Procedures for preventing surface water contamination for runoff were
seen as unreliable. Allied was able to respond some of these concerns.
Post-closure provisions — The facility was thought to present long-term
problems which would render the site unsuitable for industrial
development. This conflicted with an expressed commmunity goal of
developing employment opportunities.
Community image — The landf ij.1 was seen as one of a series of
objectionable facilities being sited in an area with more than its fair
share of such projects. Residents did not want to see the area further
degraded to suit Allied's disposal needs. Moreover, the community has
recently experienced more residential development, thus making the
landfill increasingly in non-conforinance with area development trends;
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VII. FACTORS LEADING TO PUBLIC OPPOSITION/ACCEPTANCE
The following contributed to and sustained opposition.
o A local history of political organization and activism
particularly with regard to projects perceived as unac-
ceptable.
o Allied1s severely tarnished environmental reputation fol-
lowing the Kepone controversy.
o Allied's first notification to local leaders of the
proposed facility after the company was committed to, the ;
site.
o The inability of Allied or MES to respond effectively to an
exhaustive number of questions and concerns raised at the
informational meetings.
VIII. RETROSPECTIVE VIEWS
Local leaders and officials were pleased with the course of events up
through the time of the site visit. They felt the community and its
political representatives had done an effective job of raising concerns
and organizing to fight the landfill. Local leaders expressed a desire
for continued local control over siting in the future.
Allied and.MES have learned valuable lessons through this experience.
The company still needs a disposal area for its chrome ore wastes. ,In
developing an alternate site, Allied planned to consult with local com-
mittees earlier in the process to iron out problems before the plans
reach the public hearing stage. Allied advocated more state control in
siting hazardous waste facilities so as to introduce a regional perspec-
tive in the regulatory process. In the absence of this change, however,
Allied plans to work closely with MES and WRA in selecting and de- ,
veloping a new site. ,
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STATE OF MINNESOTA
I.
INTRODUCTION
In 1974 EPA requested proposals for the development of a chemical waste
landfill as a demonstration of the best available technology for land
disposal of hazardous wastes. The grant was awarded to the Minnesota
Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) in 1975, but the facility was never
sited, and the grant was terminated by mutual agreement in 1978.
The proposed facility never received the support of the public, local
officials or industry. This was primarily due to the press coverage the
project received before any of these groups had been involved in the
siting process, and before the public information program had begun.
Subsequent attempts to secure the support of these groups were
unsuccessful, largely because the agencies involved with the project and
the siting process itself had little credibility after the initial
announcement.
II.
HISTORY OF FACILITY DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC RESPONSE
All solid waste disposal sites in Minnesota are required to have a Solid
Waste Disposal Permit which is issued by the MPCA. Initially, it is
recommended that the prospective permittee discuss the scope and nature
of the project with MPCA staff. Next a preliminary application must be
submitted to the MPCA. This must include data on the proposed site,
facility design and engineering, access, clientele, type of.wastes, and
some estimate of the environmental impacts of site development and
operation. The MPCA then responds to the preliminary application and
suggests changes which are incorporated into the final application. In
addition to the MPCA, the final application must be approved by the
Metropolitan Council if the proposed facility is in the seven-county
Minneapolis-St. Paul region, and the Minnesota Environmental Quality
Board must review it to determine whether an Environmental Impact
Statement is required. If the application is approved by all parties,
the MPCA must give public notice, and can hold a public hearing at its
discretion if one is requested. A permit authorizes the development and
operation of a facility for the life of the site, given that monitoring
and reporting requirements are met. Once the site has been developed, a
statement is required from a registered professional engineer that the
site has been developed according to the permit.
No other state agencies require permits for hazardous waste management
facilities, but a number of counties and towns in Minnesota do so, es-
pecially those in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area. Within
the seven-county metropolitan area, the MWCC can preempt city and county
zoning in siting hazardous waste facilities. Elsewhere in the state,
counties can preempt local zoning for this purpose.
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In 1974, the Office of Solid Waste of U.S. EPA requested proposals to
develop a demonstration chemical waste landfill. The request was
limited to state, regional and local authorities. Of the 24 initial re-
sponses, eight were selected to present detailed final proposals. The
grant was ultimately awarded to the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency.
The bases for this award were: the State of Minnesota had in existence
laws governing the storage, transportation and disposal of hazardous •
industrial wastes; the Minneapplis-St. Paul area had a good cross-
section of industry and thus of industrial wastes; and the grantee had
available the required 25 percent matching funds.
The objectives of U.S. EPA in sponsoring this demonstration project, as
noted in the "Chemical Waste Landfill Facility Plan" (Henningsoh, Durham
and Richardson), included the demonstration and evaluation of siting
criteria and the siting process; of site development; and of site oper-
ation, including technical procedures, economics, and other impacts. It
was intended that the site be operative before U.S. EPA would begin de-
veloping its own regulations covering the storage, transportation and
disposal of hazardous industrial wastes. The facility was to provide
information to be used by EPA in the development of programs for the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act. , :
Certain constraints were put on the project. These included that the
site should be a chemical waste landfill, that it be in a metropolitan
area, and that it would require technical upgrading to meet standards
(i.e., that the site not necessarily be geologically ideal).
The grant was awarded, in June, 1975. The Minnesota Pollution Control •
Agency (MPCA) was the grantee. However, since the MPCA is a regulatory
agency, it was obligated to subcontract with another (operating) public
body or agency to do the work. Initially, this public body was to be
Hennepin County, one of the several counties which make up the
Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area. However, about this time the
Minnesota state legislature transferred the power to site hazardous
waste landfills in the metropolitan area from county government to the •
Metropolitan Waste Control.Commission (MWCC). The MWCC then became the
subcontractor for the MPCA for this grant, and agreed to acquire and be
responsible for the operation of the proposed facility. -The MWCC in
turn contracted with a local consulting engineering firm to develop the
criteria for siting the landfill and to select several sites. The MPCA
remained, responsible for project administration and the public . ••
information program. •
The MPCA was interested in developing regulatory expertise. However, it
was largely concerned with state needs. The MWCC wanted a hazardous
waste landfill that would serve as a disposal site for wastes which
because of industrial pretreatment standards could no longer be disposed
of in sewers. They were primarily interested in the, capability of the
facility to meet the needs* of the metropolitan area. .
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The first siting attempt began in June, 1975. The siting procedure was
the same in all three attempts.1 Site criteria and the data base were
developed first. Then, a number of "search areas" were identified in
the region. These are areas with conditions generally favorable for the
siting of hazardous waste landfills. The Minnesota Land Management
Information System (MLMIS), a computerized land use data base which
contains information on each 40 acres of land in the Minneapolis-St.
Paul metropolitan area, was used in this part of the analysis.
Next, the search areas were subject to an in-depth analysis and
candidate sites were selected. The number of candidate sites was then
narrowed down to three or four on the basis of site visits. The final
site was selected based on further analysis, in particular, of site
geology and access.
Site selection criteria used to develop search areas in the first siting
attempt were limited to information available for the MLMIS system.
These included: 1) land use, 2) hydrology, 3) topography, and 4)
geology.
Based on these criteria, 45 search areas were identified in the region.
Twelve candidate sites were identified in these search areas by applying
the following additional criteria: 1) accessibility, 2) land
availability, 3) availability of utilities, 4) air quality and
climatology (wind direction and area dispersion characteristics),
5) natural ecosystems, and 6) site-specific topography, soils, geology,
topography and land use. Four of these sites were located in each of
Scott and Carver Counties, two in Dakota County, and one in each of
Hennepin and Washington Counties, for a total of 12.
Each of the twelve candidate sites was visited, and additional data
gathered. Four sites were selected for further investigation. All were
located in agricultural areas. These sites were:
o Bongards
Section 29, Benton Township
Carver County
o Dahlgren
Section 17, Dahlgren Township
Carver County
While no locally acceptable sites were found during the
demonstration project, eight individual sites were proposed at one
time or another. In all, there were three attempts to select a site
and two sets of selection criteria. The second set of criteria was
used with some modification for the third as well as the second
attempt.
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o Button Lake
Section 26, Sand Creek Township
Scott County
o Castle Rock
Sections 23 and 24, Eureka Township
Sections 18 and 19, Castle Rock Townships
Dakota County
On December 16, 1976, thefour candidate sites selected for further
on-site analysis were presented by the engineering firm to a joint staff
meeting of the MWCC and the MPCA. The meeting was open to the public
and there were members of the local press in attendance. The next day,
December 17, local newspapers provided residents of the metropolitan
area with their first information of any kind about the demonstration
project and the siting process. Local reaction to the project and the
process was uniformly negative, and this was especially true in areas in
the vicinity of the proposed sites. Local residents and officials were
outraged that they had not been contacted prior to the release of this
information to the press and that such a dangerous facility should be
located in their vicinity.
The public participation program for the siting process did not begin
until late 1976. A public relations consultant had been hired by the
MPCA in early December, 1976. However, the consultant withdrew from the
project shortly after the unexpected press release. A slide show and
brochure explaining Minnesota's hazardous wastes program and the siting
process were developed by MPCA, but these were not released until
September, 1977.
In January, 1977, in reaction to severe criticism in the press and from
local officials, the MPCA held three public meetings in the vicinity of
the four candidate sites. These meetings served only to allow local
residents to express their opposition to the proposed sites, and did not
succeed in ameliorating public opposition. In addition, the Carver
County Board passed a resolution opposing siting a chemical waste
landifill on prime farmland and criticizing the siting process, and the
Scott County Board passed a resolution opposing siting the landfill in
their county. Furthermore, the Metropolitan Council1 and the
Metropolitan Inter-County Council2 demanded greater involvement in the
project and in the reevaluation of the site selection process.
The Metropolitan Council is the regional planning agency for the
Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area.
The Metropolitan Inter-County Council is comprised of the
commissioners of the seven counties which make up the Minneapolis-St.
Paul metropolitan area.
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In early February, the MWCC announced that it had decided to postpone •
indefinitely its planned inspections of the four candidate-sites until
the counties and the Metropolitan Council were able to review the site
selection process and recommend new criteria. Officials of the. three
counties concerned had told the MWCC that attempts to gain access to the
sites would be met by landowner resistance. . . -
The main objections to the initial criteria were: 1) they .did not take
cognizance of Metropolitan Council development policies; 2) they did-not
necessarily take into account local land use plans; and 3) not, enough
emphasis was placed upon siting the facility away from commercial
agricultural areas.* There was also strong objection to the lack of
public and local official input to the siting process. Development of •
agricultural land is a particularly strong political issue in rural -
areas of Minnesota, especially development which is perceived as .being
largely for the benefit of urban residents. ,
A second site selection process was developed to take into account
issues raised in previous public hearings and the development policies
of the Metropolitan Council. In response to an MWCC request, the staff
of the Metropolitan Council prepared a memorandum outlining a site
selection procedure based on their policies.
During March and April, 1977, public meetings were held in each of the
seven counties to gather local public input on siting process and
criteria. Using these suggestions, a new set of criteria was developed
with which to define the "search areas". These criteria defined areas
in which the hazardous wastes landfill could, not be located, as
follows: 1) floodplain, 2) wetlands, 3) water courses and water bodies,
4) groundwater recharge areas, 5) erodible slopes, 6) commercial
agricultural region, 7) land with soil suitable for cropland,
8) regional parks and open space (existing and proposed), 9) existing ,
and authorized state lands, and 10) 1975 metropolitan highway system. . .
The main difference between the two sets of selection criteria was the
extent of their reliance on existing state and regional regulations. .In
the absence of any state hazardous waste siting regulations, the first
set of criteria was based solely on technological and physical
considerations. The second set of criteria, developed in response to
the critical public and official reaction which greeted sites selected
according to the first criteria, took cognizance of state and regional
regulations and policies. These regulations and,policies included in
particular regional and local land use and development plans, rather
than hazardous waste regulations per se.
The Metropolitan Council's Development Policies are designed to,
among other things, protect the region's rural areas from development
pressures. The Commercial Agricultural Region is that part of the
Metropolitan Region where development is discouraged.
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Potential.search areas were identified based on these criteria.
However, when local planning constraints were also taken into account,
the entire metropolitan area was found to be unsuitable for landfill
development.
The criteria were then reviewed to determine if any criteria could be
eliminated. Since the groundwater recharge map was not considered
accurate, this constraint was removed as a search area criterion, and
groundwater recharge applicability was instead evaluated on a site-by-
site basis.
In the meantime, at a joint meeting held on February 25, 1977, MWCC
board members had blamed the MPCA for the premature announcement of the
selected sites. The MPCA had in return faulted the MWCC for not using
Metropolitan Council site selection procedures and criteria. Mutual
recriminations continued throughout the life of the project.
In early May, 1977, the MPCA staff asked its board to approve transfer
of total project responsibility to the MWCC. However, the MWCC board
felt strongly that the MPCA should stay on the project. The MPCA board
voted to continue administering the project but to hand over public
relations responsibilities to the MWCC. At the same time, a joint ad
hoc committee was set up, comprised of three members from each of the
boards of the MPCA, MWCC and Metropolitan Council. This committee was
to mediate between the three agencies and to exercise overall control
over the landfill project..
The MWCC assumed responsibility for public education and involvement
programs in August, 1977. The demonstration project was publicized with
a brochure previously developed by the MPCA, in articles in the MWCC
newsletter and in periodic informational letters to elected arid
administrative officials and other interested persons. A talk and slide
show explaining the hazardous waste problem was given throughout the
region during September and October, 1977.
During the summer, EPA had announced that it was considering withdrawing
its support from the project because of the delays in the site selection
process. In September, however, EPA announced that it had decided to
continue supporting the landfill project. In agreeing to continue the
funding, U.S. EPA required the MPCA and MWCC to follow a firm timetable
—three or more sites were to be identified by December 15, 1977; the
final site proposed by April, 1978; and operations begun by October,
1978.
Based on the revised set of criteria, six new search areas were
identified by early October, 1977. Two of these, the Chanhassen/Eden, ,
Prairie and Pine Bend/Cottage Grove search areas, were supposedly
recommended because an industrially oriented area would constitute a
more compatible land use rather than a rural, less populated area.
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However, the major factor in their selection was that they were the only
areas outside the Commercial Agricultural Region.! Public and media
reaction to this attempt to find a site was no less favorable than to
the previous one. For example, a newspaper article about the selection
of the six search areas was headlined "Landfill Site for Poisons
Sought." Major factors underlying the opposition included the
perception by rural parts of the metropolitan area that their land was
being used as a dumping ground for wastes generated in urban areas; the
belief that since this was a "federal demonatration project".it would be
experimental and would have to accept wastes .from all, over :the country;
and the fact that siting criteria had been changed midway through the
project. Other issues which were raised included the lack of provisions
for compensation for loss of tax revenues and for services demanded by
the facility; and the fact that the state had only a general idea of, the
quantities and types of wastes produced in the region.
On November 10, 1977 it was announced that the search areas had been
narrowed down to two—Chanhassen/Eden Prairie and Pine Bend/Cottage
Grove, which had been recommended in the previous report. Three public
hearings were held in these areas. Again, reaction from the public and
local officials was uniformly unfavorable. They continued to express
the same concerns. At the Cottage Grove meeting on November 15,
approximately 1,900 people came to voice opposition to any site in their
vicinity. The strong public reaction again prompted officials to
consider further delay in siting the landfill. The ad hoc committee
decided to seek the advice of the state legislature. . It w,as recognized
that this further delay might have prompted U.S. EPA to pull,out of the
project. , . - .
A meeting of the ad hoc committee with a committee of state legislators,
held on December 21, succeeded in gaining the support of urban
legislators—whose constituents included hazardous waste generators—but
not of rural legislators in whose districts the facility might be sited.
The legislative committee as a whole advised the ad hoc committee to
continue the search for a site. The ad hoc committee decided to delay
the choice of the final group of sites past the December 15 deadline.
The final four candidate sites were announced on January 19, 1978. The-
se were located in the towns of Rosemount, Roseport, Cottage Grove, and
Eden Prairie. On February 13, 1978 the ad hoc committee, members of the
staffs of MPCA, MWCC and the Metropolitan Council, consultants, members
of the news media and other interested persons;were taken on a bus tour
of these sites. They were met by protesters at each site.
The Metropolitan Council's Development Policies are designed to,
among other things, protect the region's rural areas from development
pressures. The Commercial Agricultural Region is that part of the
Metropolitan Region where development is discouraged. Use of this
criterion forced the proposed site to be less than geologically
optimal. Preferred geological areas were all located in the
Commercial Agricultural Region.
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Public meetings were held in each town in late February and early March.
Public reaction was again negative, based on the same concerns as be-
fore. At the Rosemount meeting, the Director of the Minnesota Geologi-
cal Survey stated that none of the proposed sites were geologically
suitable. The 3M company, which owned the land on which the proposed
Cottage Grove site would have been located, threatened to take legal ac-
tion to, prevent the siting if necessary.
The Metropolitan Council decided' on March 10, 1978 that all four sites
were inadequate, and .that the search for a landfill site should not re- •
sume until the state adopted regulations for hazardous waste management.
Responses cited by the Council in announcing their decision included the
inappropriate geological characteristics of the sites, the proximity of
all four sites to national parks or wildlife refuges, and the likelihood
that urban growth would reach all four in 20 years. The ad hoc com-
mittee, on siting the landfill agreed to abandon the search on March 13,
and on March 28, the staff of the MPCA recommended that the agency ter-
minate the U.S. EPA grant. The U.S. EPA concurred with this action. A
final report, Chemical Waste Landfill Facility Plan, which describes -in
detail the siting process and the proposed facility, was prepared by the
consulting engineers and issued in September, 1978.
III.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
No single site was ever decided upon during this project. This section-
therefore briefly describes the four final candidate sites that were
most seriously proposed, and the proposed facility. Although no
facility was constructed during the demonstration project, the U.S. EPA
grant called for a hazardous waste landfill which was to be designed to
handle the following wastes:
o
o
o
o
o
Cyanide Wastes .
Acid Wastes
Alkaline Wastes
Heavy Metal Wastes
Miscellaneous and Unidentified*
13,600 gal/month
26,400 gal/month
47,600 gal/month
31,700 gal/month
85,000 gal/month
The five-year life of the landfill was stipulated in the grant. Other
stipulations of the grant were that the facility not compete with
existing chemical waste management operations and that the waste stream
be pretested before landfilling.
The area of the proposed site was to be approximately 200 acres. This
would have included a landfill area of 90 acres and a 73-acre, 300-foot
wide buffer zone. The remaining acreage was to have been used for
processing facilities and landfarming of wastes. There would be three
Mostly paint and other sludges.
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buildings on the site—for the laboratory and administration, for
receiving and storage, and for pretreatment processing. Proposed
treatment processes included the following: (1) equalization,
(2) neutralization, (3) ozone/ultraviolet process, (4) chemical
precipitation and clarification, (5) sulfide process. Provision would
also have been made for the treatment of wastes for these processes.
A landfill capacity of 30 acre-feet was estimated to be sufficient for
the five-year period of the demonstration grant. The landfill would be
underlain by a double liner and a leachate collection system. The
capital cost of the facility (1975) was estimated at $3.75 million; the
annual operating, maintenance and capital cost was estimated at $0.8
million. The facility would have been operated by the Metropolitan
Waste Control Commission (MWCC). :
Closure and long-term care procedures were not specifically defined,
except that they would be in accordance with MPCA and/or EPA
regulations. Currently, proposed MPCA regulations would require that as
part of the permit procedure the facility owner/operator must provide a
plan for closure and long-term care. The latter is not necessary if the
state decides to assume liability.
A large number of sites were considered for the facility during the
siting attempt. Before the siting attempt was abandoned a final group
of four sites had been proposed. These are described in Table 1.
The Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Region is comprised of seven
counties—Anoka, Carver, Dakota, Hennepin, Ramsey, Scott and
Washington—and has an area of approximately 3000 square miles. Nearly
45 per cent of the land is in agricultural use, another 20 percent
residential and commerical, and the remainder is open space, forest, or
water. The population in 1976 was 1,993,245 and the 1980 population is
projected to be 2,031,400. The region's industrial base is quite
diverse, such that the largest industry employs three percent of the
labor force.
IV.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
1974 — Office of Solid Waste, U.S. EPA, requests proposal to develop a
demonstration chemical waste landfill.
H
June, 1975 — Grant is awarded to MPCA, which subcontracts with MWCC to
perform the work (with the exception of public relations).
The MWCC in turn hires an engineering consulting firm to
develop siting criteria and select three or four candidate
sites.
December, 1976 — Public relations consultant hired by MPCA.
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Table 1
LOCATION AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FINAL FOUR CANDIDATE SITES,
COTTAGE GROVE - .' ,
Eastern portion of. Section.27,. T.27N, R.21W., north of Chic,ago, -
Milwaukee,- St. Paul arid Pacific R.R., east of Chemolite Road, and south
of U.S. Highways 10'and 61, Washington County. -.
Pros — . Highway access is good.
. The site is well buffered on three sides. . .
. The topography is good for landfill development.
. Erosion potential is minimal.
The site is adjacent to the 3M Chemolite plant and is zoned
industrial. , .
. There are no homes on site or in the immediate,area.
The depth to ground water is probably greater than, 50-,feet.
Cons - . The area is underlaid by sand and gravel.
. The site is south of a regional park.
The land is classified as good agricultural land by Cottage
Grove. . • ,
. Pumping from the 3M Chemolite Plant may affect ground water
movement. .,--.--
. The southern ^half of the site is in the Mississippi River
Corridor Critical Areas and has been designated a Rural
Open Space District.
EDEN PRAIRIE
Southwest 1/4 of Section 28, T.116N., R. 22W., north of U.S. Highways 169
and 212, south and west of Flying Cloud Airport, Hennepin County
Pros -
Cons
Highway access is good.
Depth to ground water could be over 50 feet.
A 120 foot thick clay layer is located approximately 75
feet below the surface.
The area is not cultivated. ,
The site is adjacent to the Flying Cloud Airport.
The site is well buffered.
The property was for sale.
Highway congestion could be a problem.
The site is just north of a National Wildlife Area.
The site is underlain by sand and gravel.
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Table 1 (Continued)
ROSEMOUNT
Eastern portions of Section 19 and western portions of Section 20,
T.115N., R. 18.W., north of County Road 38 and southwest of Minnesota
Highway 55, Dakota County.
Pros - . Highway acess is good.
The site is adjacent to the Rosemount Treatment Plant.
. The topography is good for landfill development.
The site is adjacent to the North Star Chemical Company and
is partly zoned industrial.
. The site is not cultivated.
The population density in the surroundings area is low.
The property is for sale.
Cons - . The site is underlain by sand and gravel.
The ground water flow could be affected by irrigiation well
pumpage found in the area.
The site is one-half mile from Spring Lake Park.
. The area is planned by Rosemouunt as a "Neighborhood
Center".
ROSEPORT
Western portion of Section 13 and Eastern portion of Section 14,
T.115N., R. 19.W., east of Rich Valley Blvd., west of the Chicago and
North Western R.R., and south of the Rosemount village boundary, Dakota
County.
Pros - . The site is adjacent to Koch Refining.
Depth to bedrock is nearly 200 feet.
Depth to ground water is probably greater than 50 feet.
The residential density is low. ,
Cons - . The area is underlain by sand and gravel.
. The ground water system is probably the most complex of
the four sites.
The site would be visible to local residents.
Three pipelines cross .the site.
. The site is zoned agricultural.
. There is one house on the site.
Source: Henningson, Durham and Richardson, Chemical Waste Landfill
Facility Plan, v.7, p. 433-434
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December 16, 1976 —Four candidate sites are presented to joint staff
meeting of MPCA and MWCC. Press is in attendance.
December 17, 1976 — Newspapers provide region with first news of sit-
ing process. Local reaction is uniformly negative.
January, 1977 — Three public meetings are held in the vicinity of the
four candidate sites. These have no positive impact on
local reaction.
February, 1977 — MWCC announces it has decided to postpone indefinitely
its planned inspections of the four candidate sites
until the counties and the Metropolitan Council review
the site selection process and recommend new criteria.
March/April, 1977 — Public meetings are held in each of the seven coun-
ties in the Metropolitan Region to gather local
public input to the siting process and criteria.
May, 1977 — MPCA board approves the transfer of public relations re-
sponsibilities to the MWCC. First site selection attempt
based on new criteria fails to find any suitable areas in
the Metropolitian Area.
June 1, 1977 — Ad Hoc Committee on the landifll, comprised of three
members of the MPCA, MWCC and the Metropolitan Council,
hold first meeting. Committee is formed to alleviate
management problems due to large number of parties
involved in all decisions. First decision is to relax
groundwater constraint and try again to find a site.
September 7, 1977 — U.S. EPA, which had considered withdrawing from the
project because of the delays, announces it has de-
cided to continue supporting it. However, U.S. EPA
requires the MPCA and MWCC to follow a firm
timetable—three or more sites must be identified
by December 15; the final site proposed by April,
1978; and operations begun by October, 1978.
October 13, 1977 —Six new search areas are named.
November 10, 1977— Two search areas - Chanhaseen/Eden^Prairie and Pine
Bend/Cottage Grove - are selected for further
study.
November 14, 1977
through
November 17, 1977
Three public meetings are held in the two search
areas. Public reaction is no less unfavorable
— 1,900 people show up at the meeting in Cottage
Grove to oppose any site in that area.
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December 1, 1977 — Ad Hoc Committee votes to postpone selection of can-
didate sites past U.S. EPA deadline due to public
opposition.
December 12, 1977— Ad Hoc Committee meets with legislative committee
to seek advice; are told to proceed with landfill
siting.
January 19, 1978 — Final four candiate sites are announced.
February 13, 1978 — Ad Hoc Committee, staff of MPCA, MWCC and
Metropolitian Council, consultants, news media,
etc., tour four candidates sites, and are met by
protesters at each site.
February 20, 1978
through March 6, 1978 — Public meetings are held in the vicinity of
each site. Public response is still very un-
favorable. At the Rosemqunt meeting, the
Director of the Minnesota Geological Survey
states that none of the proposed sites are
geologically suitable.
March 10, 1978 — The Metropolitian Council decides that all four can-
didate sites are inadequate, and that the search for
sites should not resume until the state adopts plans
and regulations for hazardous waste management.
March 13, 1978 — The Ad Hoc Committee agrees to abandon the search for
the site.
March 28, 1978 — MPCA agrees to terminate U.S. EPA grant, and U.S. EPA
concurs.
V.
ATTEMPTS TO SECURE SUPPORT
Prior to the appearance of'newspaper accounts of the siting process and
the four candidate site (December 17, 1976), virtually no attempt had
been made to secure support for the proposed facility. The subsequent
adverse response from elected officials and the public did result in ef-
forts to secure such support. However, this task was made that much
more difficult by the initial adverse publicity. Attempts to secure
support included:
o Public meetings
— to discuss the first four candidate sites;
— in each county in the metropolitan area to get public
input to the siting process and criteria;
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VI.
to discuss the Chanhassen/Eden Prairie and Pine
Bend/Cottage Grove search areas;
to discuss the final four candidate sites
o Meetings with county environmental officers and re-
presentatives of the Metropolitan Inter-County Council to
inform them of the second set of site selection criteria.
o Efforts to involve industries which generate chemical waste
in the process. ,
o A talk and slide show on the hazardous waste problem in
Minnesota and the siting process given thrpughout the
metropolitan area.
o A brochure explaining the problem and the siting process.
o Articles in the MWCC newsletter, letters and press .releases
on the siting process and its progress..
o A meeting of the ad hoc committee with members of the state
legislature succeeded in gaining the support of urban
legislators, but not of their rural counterparts.
SUMMARY 'EVALUATION '
It is clear that actions taken by the MPCA and MWCC to regain public
support after the initial publicity given the siting effort were not
always well-advised. However, it is questionable whether any sequence
of actions after this publicity would have succeeded in regaining public
confidence in the siting attempt.
Public meetings seem to have had little if any impact on public at-
titudes toward the sites. Efforts to involve county officials in the
development of new site selection critieria were successful, but it was
not possible, given the preceedlng events, to obtain their support for
the facility itself. Local industries, mindful of the bad publicity the
siting attempt was receiving, were reluctant to become involved. Urban
legislators whose constituents included industries which generate chemi-
cal wastes and in whose districts the facility was not likely to be
sited gave it their support. However, rural legislators, who perceived
the facility as being primarily for the benefit of urban residents, and
in whose districts it might well have been sited, remained opposed to
the facility.
In the opinion of the agencies involved, however, there were other
problems inherent in this project. One in particular was that U.S. EPA,
MPCA and MWCC each seem to have had different reasons for pursuring the
project and therefore different expectations regarding it. The U.S.
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EPA's objective in funding this project was to demonstrate site selec-
tion, development and operating procedures; and to analyze economic and
other social/institutional aspects of hazardous waste management. They
therefore imposed a number of constraints on the process which made the
siting somewhat more difficult. The MPCA-like the EPA was inter-
ested in developing regulatory expertise. However, they were largely
concerned with state, rather than national problems, and were interested
in meeting the statewide need for such a facility. The MWCC wanted a
hazardous waste landfill so that they could enforce their pretreatment
regulations and clean up the sewers, which were then the primary means
of disposal of solid wastes. Therefore, they were primarily interested
in the capability of the facility to meet the needs of the metropolitan
area.
Finally, the project was hampered because:
o there were no applicable state regulations;
o there was no state plan fpr hazardous wastes management;
o state and regional agencies had only a very general idea
of quantities and types of wastes produced in the
region.
Local officials and the public raised a number of other issues and con-
cerns during the siting process. These included:
Need for the facility — In part because the public information program
began so late in the siting process, and in part because this was a
"federal demonstration" project, the public was never convinced of the
need for the facility.
Site suitability — Due to the constraints imposed first by U.S. EPA as
part of the grant conditions, and then by the Metropolitan Council, the
agencies concerned were never able to tell the public that they had
chosen the "best" site.
Development of agricultural land — Use of agricultural land for other
purposes has become a political issue in'Minnesota, particularly de-
velopment which is perceived as being largely for the benefit of urban
residents (e.g. high-voltage power lines). Rural residents were opposed
not only to the facility itself, but also to the industrial development
which it might have attracted.
Facility operations and long-term maintenance — Concerns were
frequently expressed over the possibility of environmental pollution
either as a result of facility operations or after closure.
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VII. FACTORS LEADING TO PUBLIC OPPOSITION/ACCEPTANCE
Public opposition to this siting attempt seems to have developed as the
result of the .following:
o Underestimation, by all parties involved in the siting
— , attempt, of public concern about chemical wastes and
chemical waste disposal sites. ... . , / -
o -
o
The fact that this was a federal demonstration project.
The fact that the agencies involved were not expecting
public input until their process called for it; and that
the initial siting criteria did not recognize the
political nature of the siting process.
No information was provided to the public about the siting
process or proposed sites until the first four candidate
sites were "announced" in the local press.
Lack of accurate public information. The information
"vacuum" led to press accounts which stressed local res-
idents' emotional response, and general acceptance by the
public of incorrect information.
Siting criteria were no longer perceived as objective when
it became apparent that political pressure could change
them, and thus the location of the facility.
MPCA/MWCC were not experienced in public relations. When
public information efforts began, they educated the public
primarily about the negative aspect of hazardous wastes.
The public was never convinced even of the need for such a
facility, and this siting attempt was perceived as an ad
hoc effort.
U.S. EPA's need for a less than perfect site was never ful-
ly explained to the public. The public expected the state
to come up with the best possible site. The informed
public—a vocal minority—favored geologically suitable
sites over those which had to be engineered up to standard
and treatment/recovery over landfillirig.
Perception by rural parts of the metropolitan area that
their land was being used as a dumping ground for
urban-generated wastes. Urban development of
agricultural land is a sensitive political issue in
Minnesota, and it was felt that the proposed facility would
attract industry.
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o The fact that no provision was made for compensation of
local residents for loss of tax revenues and for services
demand (e.g. roads, fire protection) by the facility.
VIII. RETROSPECTIVE VIEWS
In retrospect, officals of the 3M Company (on whose land was located one
of the four final sites) and the Metropolitan Council cautioned that it
would be short sighted to regard the project as an utter failure merely
because a site was not found. They felt that one possible result of any
siting process, especially when geographical, time and other constraints
are imposed, should be that there is no suitable site.
A new, long-term effort to site a hazardous waste management facility is
currently underway in Minnesota. In many ways this attempt reflects
what the agencies involved in the previous effort — particularly the
MPCA — feel are the lessons to be learned from the experience. State
comments and these revised plans are discussed in the state program
report elsewhere in this study.
IX.
GENERAL COMMENTS
The agencies involved in the siting process and local officials stressed
the need for some sort of compensation for communities in which such
facilities are located and a provision of such compensation may be
included in the planned siting process. Types of compensation proposed
included payments in lieu of taxes, direct payment for services demanded
(e.g., roads, fire protection), and fees per unit volume of waste
processed.
Without exception, the parties involved in the siting attempt indicated
that they think U.S. EPA should confine its involvement in the siting of
industrial hazardous waste management facilities to giving technical
assistance. It was felt that the states, with or without private
industry, are capable of carrying out the other aspects of siting. An
offical of the MPCA did suggest that the siting process would be made
easier if RCRA regulations distinquished different degrees of hazardous
waste. In that case, he suggested, there might be a need for a few EPA-
managed regional sites for very hazardous waste (and perhaps also
"political wastes" such as PCBs).
Both the MPCA and the Metropolitan Council perceived a need for
national, regional (multi-state) and state planning before hazardous
waste management facilities are sited. The EPA would be involved in
planning for national facility needs, but regional and state
coordination could be accomplished by the states themselves.
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STARR INDUSTRIAL SERVICES
STARR COUNTY, TEXAS
I.
INTRODUCTION
Starr Industrial Services, a private disposal company, is currently
seeking state approval of a proposed hazardous waste landfill in Starr
County, southern Texas. The Texas Water Quality Board denied Starr,
Industrial's initial permit request primarily on the.basis of local >
public opposition to the facility. After the Texas District Court
struck down public opposition as insufficient grounds for permit denial,
Starr Industrial resubmitted its,application. Starr County has appealed
the lower court's decision in an effort to sustain the Board's original
ruling against the site. The Board's second decision will be issued,
pending the appeals court decision, which is expected to be handed down
in summer, 1979.
Starr Industrial approached political and business leaders of the' com-
munity before the permit hearing took place. Company representatives ex-
plained the nature of the facility, reasons why the area was selected
and employment benefits that would accrue to the community. Although
the community leaders were initially open to the proposed hazardous .
waste facility, unified opposition materialized just before and at the
time of the hearing. Opposition focused on possible contamination of
the Rio Grande River (the area's major water supply), explosions ,or
fires at the landfill site and political issues such as further de-
gradation of the area and discrimination against Mexican-Americans.
Athough the state approved the site on technical criteria, local op-
position was strong .enough to pressure denial of the initial permit re-
quest. Despite additional attempts by Starr Industrial to gain local
support, opponents working through the county are still hoping to defeat
the landfill in an appeal to overturn a lower court ruling in favor of
the permit. Because the technical merits of the site are so strong and
because Starr Industrial is determined to establish the facility, it
appears that the landfill indeed may be developed despite opposition.
II. : BACKGROUND INFORMATION , > . '
The site for the proposed landfill is a 40-acre parcel rented by Starr
Industrial from a local rancher. It is part of a larger 800-acre parcel
which the company hopes to develop in stages. Land surrounding the site
is undeveloped and is used as grazing land. The closest'town is El Sauz
(population 85), two miles to .the north; Rio Grande City is eight miles
to the south. Access to the site is by state highways. The proposed
site has ideal geological formations, reportedly found nowhere else in
the state. It has soft sedimentary rock with clay minerals extending
800 feet below the surface. Such rocks containing large amounts of clay
minerals not only have low permeability but they have the added
advantage of being flexible or plastic enough not to be permanently
cracked, fissured or faulted by minor deforming forces. Even if
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earthquakes, land flextures, compaction and settling, or any other minor
deforming force changed the shape of the soft clay-rich sedimentary rock
body, its permeability would remain low.
The particular clay at the Starr County site is montmorillonite, which
has adsorptive and swelling properties especially favorable for
hazardous waste containment. Whenever water and/or many other polar
liquids come in contact with montmorillonite, the liquid is attracted to
the mineral surfaces, causing the flat plate-like crystals to be
separated or pushed apart. Any small amount of pore space originally
contained in the rock is reduced by this swelling. The permeability of
the soil is thereby further reduced, sometimes to the point of zero
permeability.
The proposed landfill is removed from groundwater sources and major,
wells. Groundwater in the area is only sufficient to support the
sparse population and grazing cattle. Rainfall is low (i.e., about 18
inches per year) while the evaporation rate far exceeds precipitation
(approximately 102 inches). The area's topography is dominated by
gently rolling surfaces sloping from southwest to northeast, away from
the Rio Grande River. The grade minimizes water infiltration while
avoiding excessive erosion. The site is located outside of the flood-
prone area of the Rio Grande and the closest arroyo. There have been no
recorded earthquakes in Starr County. Indeed, many geologists consider
the county the most seismically stable region in North America.
Starr Industrial proposes to landfill drummed and bulk Class I wastes.
According to state waste classifications, Class I includes all com-
mercial and industrial wastes including PCBs. Most of the waste Starr
Industrial expects to treat and dispose will come from petrochemical
manufacturers and oil drilling operations, primarily in the Houston
area.
The proposed disposal method consists of mixing wastes with soil in a
5:1 ratio then burying the waste in cells covered with more of the
impervious native clays. Those wastes which might become odiferous, ex-
plode or self-ignite when exposed to the atmosphere will be buried in
55-gallon drums. Each drum will be placed in a separate trench with
sufficient clay encapsulation to achieve the same 5:1 soil-to-waste
ratio if and when the drum corrodes or otherwise releases its contents.
Waste oils and oil sludges will be received in a tank from which
gravity-separated oils can be reclaimed. Sludges, cleaning/processing
water and inorganics will be moved to a slurry tank where they will be
blended with oil and buried. Incompatible wastes will be deposited in
separate cells. All solvents and volatile hydrocarbons will be tested
for compatibility with the clay liner prior to burial.
Rainfall in potentially contaminated areas will be captured within
levees and drained to the slurry mix tanks from which it will be
landfilled in the manner of bulk liquid wastes. A three-foot high berm
and drainage ditch will serve to control surface runoff from the site.
Facility design allows all-weather entrance and exit by way of gravel
roads. A six-foot fence will surround the site to prevent stray entry
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of children, animals, etc. The gate entrance will be supervised and
shipping tickets will be received from incoming trucks for recordkeeping
purposes. Site supervisors will be responsible for overall safety.
The topography of the area is such that surface waters originating out-
side the site can easily be controlled by diversion ditches and berms.
Drainage will be to an unnamed creek adjacent to the site, thence into
Los Almos Creek, thence into the Rio Grande River.
For safety precautions, Starr Industrial proposed six monitoring wells
and eight lysimeter wells for monthly pH and total organic carbon con-
tent checks. The presence of pH changes or hydrocarbons indicates
leachate movement from the filled cells into the surrounding soils. If
such leachate movement is detected and determined to constitute a
significant threat to the environment, Starr Industrial proposed to
either discontinue use of the cell, excavate the cell and move the con-
tents to a second cell or install a wellpoint system for capture and
subsequent treatment or disposal by other means. Starr Industrial also
proposed periodic on-site testing of wastes, rainfall runoff content,
etc., to ensure proper handling and burial.
The proposed landfill has a projected life of three to . four years—
the time estimated to reach disposal capacity of 13 million gallons of
liquid waste. Upon closure of the facility, Starr Industrial has
offered to fertilize, seed and irrigate the site and to return it to a
state visually compatible with the surrounding land. The area would be
fenced and marked off to prevent unauthorized trespassing and possible
site disturbance and/or contamination.
Original impetus for a Starr County landfill came from the Alice
Specialty Company which has been involved, in hazardous waste handling
for a number of years. During this time, the company became concerned
with illegal dumping practices of truckers and waste disposal companies.
These practices not only damaged the environment but also hurt the
ethical trucking companies' competitive position. "Outlaw" firms merely
poured wastes indiscriminately or hauled them to illegal sites. This
allowed these dealers to charge lower rates for waste removal.
Companies like Alice Specialty had to charge more (or at least incurred
greater expenses) because of the care they took in handling wastes and
in selecting well-managed disposal facilities. Inspired by corporate
self-interest and environmental awareness, associates of Alice Specialty
created an independent disposal company: Starr Industrial Services.
Major stock holdings were retained by the owner of Alice Specialty.1 The
new company's purpose was to establish an environmentally sound landfill
for safe hazardous waste disposal.
The city closest to the proposed landfill is Rio Grande City (population
, the largest community in Starr County. Starr County occupies
1
Population estimates from the 1973 Texas Almanac.
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a 1,211-square mile area with a total population of 19,600. The
population is predominantly low-income Mexican-Americans whose principal
source of employment is low-yield farming and ranching. Population
density in the area is among the lowest in the state. This is due to
the scarcity of water and the very low agricultural productivity of the
land. With the exception of Rio Grande city there are only two
communities with more than 1,000 people in the County. These are -
located miles away, from the site on the Rio Grande.
III. HISTORY OF FACILITY DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC RESPONSE ', ,
Under Texas law, commercial-industrial waste sites, if not owned and
operated by and located within 50 miles of the waste generator, must
receive a permit from the Texas Water Quality Board. The law also
requires public hearings on such commercial-industrial waste disposal
permits. The discharge permit issued by the Board is the only state
permit required in developing a commercial landfill. No local permi.ts
or approvals are required, because Starr County does not have zoning
regulations.
Starr Industrial began its siting efforts in mid-1975 with a costly
statewide search for the most technically and demographically
appropriate landfill location. Studies were conducted by Starr
Industrial's engineering consultants from Houston and a geologist from
the University of Texas. The search was guided by siting criteria
proposed by the Texas Water Quality Board. The criteria call for a site
with impervious soil, little or deep groundwater sources, low rainfall,
high evaporation, low population concentration, and low or non-existent
flood or earthquake risks. Such a site was found in Starr County.
In late 1975 and early 1976, approximately six months prior to the Starr
Industrial Services' application for an industrial waste disposal permit
from the Texas Water Quality Board, active steps were taken to explain
the facility to local public and private groups. Meetings were held
with city, county, Chamber of Commerce, and council of government
officials both in the county where the site was to be located and
downstream from the site in adjacent counties along the Rio Grande River
Valley. The company's consultants presented technical descriptions of
the waste facility and the extraordinary environmental suitability of
the local area. Although the proposed site would handle wastes from the
Houston area,; several hundred miles away, Starr Industrial
representatives explained that a thorough environmental analysis of
environmental criteria had resulted in the selection of the Starr County
site. Furthermore, the majority stockholder in Starr Industrial was a
waste materials hauler who assured the county safe and reputable
transportation services.
During these early meetings discussion centered on the technical oper-
ation of the site and the suitability of the physical surroundings^
Little mention was made of benefits to the area and its inhabitants^ from
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the operation of:the hazardous waste facility. There was little evi-
dence of public opposition at this time. The general attitude of the
public, as represented by the local officials, was one of wait and see.
Starr Industrial submitted a permit application for a 40-acre facility
to the Texas Water Quality Board in June, 1976. The Starr Industrial
permit application was reviewed by the Board's technical staff and a
review committee made up of other state agencies.. The Board staff -
conducted an on-site inspection in July. The proposed landfill met with
the staff's overall approval on technical acceptability and site
suitability. The staff introduced .several concerns that were later
included as special provisions in the draft permit. These provisions
included maintenance of a bond or other financial assurance (not less
than $40,000) for proper and adequate closing of the facility and a
$15,000 trust fund for surveillance, repairs and monitoring: during the
proposed 36-month closure period. Other provisions referred to specific
waste handling and monitoring details. The staff report to the
directors of the Texas Water Quality Board suggested that if Starr
Industrial adhered to its proposed plan of activities and to the special
provisions in the draft permit, no environmental damage would result
from the landfill's operation.
The technical staff of the Board indicated that the permit application
was one of the best received to date. The credentials of the geologic
consultant, a professor of geology from the University of Texas, were
considered impeccable. Furthermore, the major stockholder o£ Starr
Industrial, an industrial waste hauler, had a good reputation among
state agencies for proposing a manifest system for disposing of
hazardous wastes and in helping to make the state aware of haulers who
clandestinely dump their hazardous wastes along highways, drainage
ditches and other unauthorized places. The result of the Board's
technical staff review and the state agencies review committee was a
proposed permit which was presented in a public hearing in Starr County
in September. .
Opposition to the site surfaced after the permit application. There was
considerable confusion among local officials and residents over exactly
when the opposition was started and by whom. The opposition seems to
have been spearheaded by the County Judge and the Court of County
Commissioners. (The Judge is the elected executive of the county,
serving a four year term along with four district commissioners. The
County Court of Commissioners is the executive and administrative head
of the county.) The County Judge is one of a very small handfull of
medical doctors in the area, highly respected by the local inhabitants
and by his peers, who in 1977 gave him a nationwide AMA-sponsored
Bicentennial Award for public service. His opinions on the matter of
hazardous waste are widely respected because of his medical training and
because he is one of the few doctors serving the mostly poor
Mexican-American community. Regardless of the origin of the opposition,
the county commissioners announced opposition to the facility in a
letter sent to the Texas Water Quality Board in August.
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During the summer, opposition was also voiced by the Chamber of
Commerce, Industrial Foundation, Rotary, Kiwanis and a local women's
study group. The thrust of the opposition was the emotional issue of
hazardous wastes from outside the county being disposed of in their
"back yard". Starr County, in the minds of its inhabitants, has the
image of being a community of poor, second class citizens that is
generally being "dumped-on". Local officials said that this image is
'reinforced by the bad publicity the county receives over the reputed
drug traffic across the Mexican border, and cited a national magazine,
which recently rated Rio Grande City as one of its choices for the "ten
meanest towns in America." The public hearing record referred to a 1975
EPA report on the "Quality of Life Indicators" which ranked the
surrounding area between Laredo and McAllen as having the lowest
economic and political qualities of 95 SMSAs under 200,000 in
population. Starr County inhabitants have an average per capita income
that is approximately one third of the state and national average. The
elected officials as well as those trying to increase the economic
prosperity of the area saw the introduction of a hazardous waste
facility as contributing to this bad image and as a further sign of
being "dumped-on". These groups were opposed to the image of a waste
dump as well as the inevitable risks in transporting, disposing and
final site closure associated with hazardous wastes. They were also
opposed to the fact that their county would be used as a dumping site
for Houston's wastes. The Chamber of Commerce and Industrial Foundation
were eager to have the community's economic base grow in conjunction
with the increasing prosperity of their neighbors in Mexico. The
hazardous waste site, however, would be inconsistent with these plans.
Opposition from organizations and agencies in Rio Grande City and Starr
County was manifest by the end of August. In early September, the Texas
Water Quality Board published notices of a public hearing on the permit
application. The hearing, a standard part of the Board's permit review
process, was scheduled for late September.
Opposition to the proposed landfill expanded. The opposition was not
restricted to Starr County. Letters were received in response to the
public hearing notice from neighboring counties, towns and citizen
organizations that felt threatened by the site and its potential hazard
to agriculture in the Rio Grande River Valley and their water supplies.
The concerns expressed in these letters were over the impact on drinking
water supplies, funding to pay for possible damage, more technical
information as to the dangerous mixing of chemical substances, and more
information on long-term soil stability. One of the letters,
representing several women's groups summed up this opposition: "We are
aware that this group (Starr Industrial) is a group of responsible
people well-versed in safety procedures for the handling and disposing
of the wastes produced by their businesses; but we do not want these
wastes transported to, much less disposed of, in Starr County... We know
that safety procedures are set up to operate in every instance when they
are needed, but we do not want to live with that potential hazard in our
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area. Our soil may be impermeable, and the chances of waste products
escaping into our underground water may be slight, but we do not want
this hazard here, however slim this hazard may be described.",
By the time of the public hearing, there were no letters or other
documents favoring the site other than the original application for a
permit.
The public hearing held in Rio Grande City was attended by 81 opponents,
30 observers, 12 proponents and 10 members ;of the Board. Starr
Industrial alleged that the majority of those attending were local,
county, city and school district employees. Of those in favor of the
application, all had direct Starr Industrial connections.
Representatives of Starr Industrial presented a technical description of
the site and its operation. During the expert testimony of Starr
Industrial's consulting geologist it was pointed out that "based on the
factors earlier set out regarding geology and rainfall, and based on the
fact that other suitable sites are surrounded by more densely populated
areas, the proposed site is the best in the State." In connection'With a
question as to whether the applicant had adequately informed the local
citizenry, it was pointed out that of the abutting landowners one was
agreeable to selling a right-of-way easement, one wanted to develop a
similar facility, one would not sell (but indicated no objection to the
facility) and one would sell a piece of property to Starr Industrial.
The applicant also testified that several meetings had been held with
the Chamber of Commerce and the Rotary Club. Both a citizen and a local
geologist pointed out that these limited meetings were inadequate from
the point of view of informing the public at large and furthermore,
there was still a question as to why this site was chosen over other
suitable geologic sites that exist in the state.
Several other witnesses appeared at the hearing, either in a represent-
ative or individual capacity, to testify against the site. One adjunct
landowner opposed the site proposal based on his fear of fires,
explosions and possible spills or migrating wastes which could ruin
water wells or kill crops. During the hearing it was pointed out that a
flood protection and recreational reservoir in the area of the proposed
disposal site had been in the planning stages for some time. Although
it was felt that this would be a higher valued use of the land, no
specific decisions had been reached, or for that matter were pending, on
the construction of the dam.
The County Commissioners made the statement that they should have been
made officially aware of the Starr Industrial proposal much earlier in
the planning process. In addition the Commissioners stated that they
did not believe that this type of industry would encourage other
industrial growth which would employ more people in the area, and that
there would be present and long-term problems from fireSj traffic
mishaps or flooding. The commissioners felt that although there was
good technical preparation for this hearing and that the applicant was a
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reputable businessman, the problem with the proposed site was mainly a
"people issue". Since much of the wastes to be disposed of come from
the petrochemical industry around Houston they should be disposed of
there and not in Starr County, hundreds of miles away.
Following the public hearing opposition to the proposed facility
continued to be registered. In October the county commissioners passed
a resolution opposing the facility and a state senator from a district
adjacent to Starr County stated his opposition. The senator based his
opposition on the questionable reliability of data on long-term soil
characteristics, the impacts of buried wastes on those soils, inadequate
bonding provisions, and the potentially limited liability of Starr
Industrial. He was also generally concerned about long-term impacts on
agriculture in the area.
In December, a summary of the September public hearing was released by
the Board. In that summary, the hearing the Hearing Commissioner found
that the proposed site met all the technical and legal requirements of
the Texas Water Code, Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act and the rules and
procedures of the Texas Water Quality Board. However, the Hearing
Commissioner questioned whether, if an applicant wants to use his land
in a legal and safe manner and is ready to proceed, the Board should
deny such use based on some speculated future use of land and water in
the area; and whether the Board should deny the proposal because the
wastes proposed for disposal would not be generated in the area but
would have to be hauled several hundred miles to the site.
Because of these remaining policy questions, the Hearing Commissioner
did not make a recommendation to the Board on the proposed site.
However, in an addendum to his report, the Hearing Commissioner pointed
out to the Board that the Board had previously denied a permit in a
similar situation on the basis that the inhabitants of the county, some
of whom lived in the general area of the site, believed that the future
development of their county was incompatible with having in their county
a major industrial solid waste disposal site, especially one where the
wastes were derived from activities remote from the county.
In January, 1977, as a result of the hearing report and the later
addendum, the Board denied the permit. The denial was based primarily
on their finding that "the adamant local opposition to the application
for a proposed industrial solid waste management site (is to the effect
that) the granting of a permit would be contrary to the welfare of the
people in the area."
In March, 1977 following the Board's denial, Starr Industrial attempted
to gain the county commissioners' approval and thus pave the way for a
rehearing with the Board. They presented petitions of citizens in favor
of the site, more evidence and physical demonstrations of the disposal
practices as well as the economic benefits of the site. The benefits
would be four jobs on site plus "many" opportunities for entry into the
waste hauling business through owner-operated trucks in conjunction with
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the site. The County Commissioners again voted a resolution against the
proposal.
Starr Industrial then appealed the rejection of their application to the
Texas District Court arguing that the permit denial was based not on the
facts but on a not-so-similar site in another part of Texas which had
received over 6,000 letters opposing it. In January of 1978, the court
ruled in favor of Starr Industrial stating that adamant local opposition
to the permit application does not constitute a proper legal basis for
the Board order denying the permit. There were several other minor
technical points regarding the proposed site to which the Board had
objected and these were also dismissed by the Court.
The Board dropped out of the case after its findings were overruled.
However the County Commissioners have taken up an appeal to the court
order. They are still opposed to the site. Several new Commissioners
have recently been elected, including a new County Judge. Although the
County Judge campaigned on the basis of opposing the site, he has stated
that he will keep an open mind on the proposal till shown its risks and
benefits. In March 1979, however, the new County Judge flatly refused
to reconsider the county's appeal of the court decision. This reaf-
firmation was prompted by yet another appeal to the county court by
Starr Industrial. The retired County Judge has reiterated his position
that no benefits can be worth the risks posed by the proposed site.
Starr Industrial is continuing its effort to obtain a permit for this
site to protect its investments to date as well as to set a precedent
for future sites that will otherwise face similar obstacles.
The current procedural and legal status of the proposed hazardous waste
•facility is in limbo. Having been overruled by the State District Court
in its denial of a permit on the basis of adverse public opinion, the
Texas Water Quality Board has withdrawn from the case. Presumably the
Board can now issue the permit, although it has chosen not to act at
this time pending the County's appeal to the court ruling. The County
•Commissioners have taken up the appeal to the Judge's ruling hoping to
reinstate the Board's original denial of the permit. Starr Industrial
on the other hand is planning to oppose the county commissioners in an
attempt> to defend against the upcoming appeal and thus have the permit
granted. Starr Industrial is also trying to persuade the County Com-
missioners, outside of court, from proceeding on the appeal and let the
Judge's ruling stand.
The court's decision on the county commissioners' appeal which had been
expected in February, 1979 was later postponed until the summer of 1979.
Thus the'earliest conceivable date for granting Starr Industrial a
permit would also be summer^ 1979, approximately four years after it be-
gan the siting process.
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IV.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
1975 — Starr Industrial Services is founded and the statewide search
for a technically and demographically appropriate hazardous
waste landfill site is begun.
Winter, 1975 — Starr Industrial meets with public officials and
businessmen from towns downstream from Rio Grande City
to discuss the proposed facility.
February, 1976 — Starr Industrial makes a presentation describing the
proposed facility to the Rio Grande City Chamber of
Commerce.
June, 1976 — Starr Industrial files an application for a permit for an
industrial waste landfill with the Texas Water Quality
Board.
August, 1976 — The Texas Water Quality Board receives letters from the
Starr County Judge, County Commisisoners and the Rio
Grande City Chamber of Commerce stating their oppositon
to the propsed facility.
September, 1976 — Board receives letters from downstream city and coun-
ty leaders opposing the facility. Board holds public
hearing on permit application in Rio Grande City.
Local residents without exception express opposition
to the facility.
October, 1976 —
December, 1976 -
Starr County commissioners pass a resolution opposing
the facility. State senator opposes facility.
- Hearing Commission's report is published. Starr
Industrial becomes aware that decision on permit may
be made on other than technical grounds; unsuc-
cessfully attempts to gather political support.
January, 1977 — The Texas Water Quality Board denies the permit.
March, 1977 —' Starr Industrial attempts to get support of the Starr
County commissioners for a rehearing. When this fails,
they initiate legal action against the Board.
January, 1978 — Court rules in favor of Starr Industrial, stating that
adamant local opposition to the permit applications
does not constitute a proper legal basis for denying
the permit. The Board drops out of the case. However,
the Starr County commissioners appeal the court order.
Summer, 1979 — Expected date of appeals court ruling on the Starr Coun-
ty appeal.
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V.
ATTEMPTS TO SECURE SUPPORT
The only attempts to secure support for the Starr Industrial facility
were made by the Company and its consultants and the technical staff of
the Texas. Water Quality Board. These include the following:
o The Company held meetings with local elected officials and
community leaders prior to submitting their permit ap-
plication to the state. At these meetings the unique en-
vironmental suitability of the site was presented as well
as the technical operations of the facility. Attempts
were also made to indicate the potential employment op-
portunities connected with the site.
o Following the Texas Water Quality Board's denial of a
permit, Starr Industrial again sought the support of local
elected officials with additional technical presentations
and demonstrations in the hopes of getting a rehearing with
the Board.
o Support from the Board staff was primarily in terms of
their favorable technical review of the permit application.
VI.
SUMMARY EVALUATION
Attempts to secure support have been successful on some points but
overall have failed to secure any significant support from local leaders
for the proposed facility. At least some opponents have acknowledged
that Starr Industrial is a responsible and reputable company. Moreover,
some major technical aspects of the proposal have not been disputed.
Yet, opposition to the facility has not waned.
Starr Industrial expects that their permit application will ultimately
be approved. They feel that they have a technically, financially and
legally superior proposal. Furthermore, they believe that something has
to give in the growing dilemma between waste disposal siting and citizen
opposition. They feel that the constantly increasing amounts of
industrial wastes generated and the need for a reputable and responsible
hazardous waste operator will tip the scales in their favor.
Furthermore, Starr Industrial feels that hazardous waste disposal is a
good business and worth waiting for. They pointed out that many waste-
generating industries in the Houston area are warehousing their wastes
until such time as disposal provisions can be made.
The County Commissioners, on the other hand, have indicated their wil-
lingness to continue the fight against the proposed site. They see en-
vironmental and public risks as well as the continuing deterioration of
the county's image if the site is developed. They also fail to see any
real benefits to the community. The Chamber of Commerce, the leading
organization looking out for the business interests of Rio Grande City,
is backing the Commissioners in this fight.
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The conflict over the proposed Starr Industrial hazardous waste site is
not yet over. The final court appeal has yet to be heard and the final
decision by the Texas Water Quality Board as to the permit has yet to be
handed down. However, to date very little has been done to resolve lo-
cal conflicts, especially those over technical misunderstandings, the
lack of community benefits to offset risks, and the risk to the
community's self image posed by the hazardous waste site. Both Starr
Industrial and the state's technical staff tried to let the proposed
site sell itself to the local officials and Texas Water Quality Board on
the basis of its technical merit. Very little was done to deal with the
intense local political pressure that developed over dumping Houston's
hazardous wastes in Starr County.
There were no mediation efforts by respected neutrals on the scene. It
appears as though the protagonists for the site, members of Starr
Industrial, and antagonists, the county commissioners and business
leaders, are at a stalemate with no indication of possible compromise.
Furthermore, the stalemate can probably be broken only by direct order
of the courts or an entirely new approach by Starr Industrial to provide
Starr County with data about direct or indirect benefits to offset the
negative image and minor risks of the site.
There are four broad areas of conflict over the proposed siting of the
Starr Industrial Services hazardous waste site. First, there is the
inevitable controversy over -technical issues with "expert" witnesses on
either side of the question. Second, there is concern over appearances
and the self-image of the county, the disposal site and the operator.
Third, there is the question of whether the site would provide suffi-
cient local benefits to offset the risks. Fourth, there is confusion
over the legal standing of public opposition in the denial of a permit.
Highlights of each of these areas of conflict are listed below:
Technical — Site selection appears to have been carried out in a
thorough and straightforward manner. The site met all of the en-
vironmental and safety criteria established by the Texas Water Quality
Board. However, in spite of scientific evidence presented by Starr
Industrial and the Board, expert witnesses for the county have
questioned the environmental and public safety of the site.
Local Image— County elected officials and businessmen believe that the
proposed facility would have a negative impact on the area's image.
These spokesmen describe the community as ,the unwilling recipient of
Houston's industrial wastes. Starr Industrial, on the other hand, sees
the waste disposal facility as a good business opportunity for both
themselves and community residents.
Benefits vs. Risks — Local residents feel that the risks associated
with the facility far outweigh any benefits. . In fact, very few benefits
would be provided by the facility. Technical evidence was presented
which verified the environmental and public safety of the site.
However, the public seems to be demanding that the site be built only if
there is absolutely no risk, a condition which cannot be met.
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Legal Status of Local Opposition — Opponents claim that the proposed
facility is not in the interest of local residents and that this is a
legally valid ground for denying Starr Industrial's permit. The Texas
Water Quality Board, in denying the permit, clearly gave substantial
consideration to this contention. The court just as clearly found this
arbitrary and capricious. The current" appeal of the court's decision
hinges in substantial part on this issue.
VII. FACTORS LEADING TO PUBLIC OPPOSITION " '
The following were the major factors leading to the continuing op-
position.
o Initial information on .the proposal provided by Starr
Industrial to public and private agencies.
o Expert witnesses with conflicting testimony on both sides
of the issues.
o Abundant technical misinformation on site characteristics
and facility operations.
o Inability on the part of the company to convince locals of
site benefits to offset risks. ,
o Image of a hazardous waste site unnecessarily contributed
to an already poor community self-image held by local
business leaders.
o Administrative misinformation on correspondence dates,
origin of petition lists, and meeting attendees added to
confusion and site opposition.
o Short-term permit required by the state for the first of
many proposed tracts contributed to site operators'
hit-and-run image.
VIII. RETROSPECTIVE VIEWS
The major participants in the Starr Industrial proposal to site a
hazardous waste management facility were asked what if anything they
would do differently if given the chance. The local business leaders
and local elected officials said that their opposition has been
steadfast throughout the conflict. They see no way of having conducted
their opposition differently within the confines of their authority over
siting issues.
The position of the technical staff of the Texas Water Quality Board is
similar to that of the local officials. They have steadfastly approved
the site on technical considerations but had no authority to consider
the issue of public opposition.
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INDUSTRIAL ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
KIRKSVILLE, MISSOURI
I.
INTRODUCTION
In late February, 1979, Industrial Environmental Services (IBS) withdrew
a permit application for a hazardous waste disposal site. The with-
drawal was made after a particularly long and heated public meeting held
in Kirksville. By that action, IES scuttled work to develop the site
that had been in progress for over 18 months.
Opposition arose from many major groups within the area and was based on
a broad range of issues. County officials, faculty and students at
Northeastern Missouri State University (NMSU), state elected officials,
and abutters were among those that expressed outright opposition or
major concerns about the proposed facility. These concerns covered the
site, its design, and facility operations as well as the credibility of
Missouri's Department of Natural Resources (DNR), which regulates
hazardous waste management and the hazardous waste management industry.
IES and, to a lesser extent, DNR attempted to generate support and to
allay public concerns by providing more information to the community.
While these attempts did address some concerns, they did not produce any
significant change in the public response. On the contrary, most of
those interviewed, on both sides of the dispute, felt that these
attempts only increased problems with public opposition.
II.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The IES proposed site was about three.miles north of Kirksville,
Missouri just off U.S. 63. The total land area under IES control was
682 acres, of which 33 acres were designed for a muncipal landfill and
192 acres were designed as a secure landfill for hazardous waste. The
secure landfill was bounded on some or all of three sides by a one-half
mile strip of undeveloped land owned by lES's president or by the
municipal landfill. Surrounding land use is primarily agricultural.
The soil directly underlying the site is Kansas till which IES bores
indicated was over 150 feet thick. Tests showed the till's permeability
to be in the 10~^ 10~^ cm/sec range. The Missouri Geologic Survey
indicated no usable groundwater within Adair County, although the
possibility of small perched aquifers beneath the site existed. lES's
consulting engineers concluded that the site was "well suited for its
proposed use" and any anomalies at the site could be corrected by
engineering.
The facility plan called for a three-stage development. In the first
phase, 20 disposal trenches would be developed with a net capacity of 24
million cubic feet and a projected life of approximately six years.
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A service road, a 2,640-square foot building, and holding lagoons would
also be constructed. The building would include laboratory facilities
for spot checks of incoming wastes. Eight monitoring wells would also
be installed. The entire area would be fenced. The second phase would
involve the development of an additional 13 trenches and four monitoring
wells. This would extend site life by six to seven years. In the third
phase an additional 11 trenches and five monitoring wells would be
developed and site life would increase by about five years. Total site
life was estimated at 18 to 20 years and total capacity at 2.5 million
cubic yards of hazardous waste. The development plan stated that
post-closure monitoring and maintenance would be done "in accordance
with governing rules and regulations."
Personnel for the site included a site manager, a chemist responsible
for on-site analysis of wastes, and a minimum of five additional staff
for site operations and administration. A consulting engineer would be
retained. Oil-site records would include generator and hauler
descriptions of wastes accepted, receipt logs, and locations of wastes
buried on-site.
IES, the facility sponsor, was incorporated for the specific purpose of
developing this facility and as a corporation has had no other
experience in hazardous waste management. IES is an independent
corporation not connected with other firms. lES's president, however,
owns and operates Missouri Dispose-All, a solid waste collection and
hauling company in Kirksville, and had formerly operated a sanitary
•landfill in the Kirksville area. IES intended in addition to offering
disposal services to act as a broker for hazardous wastes which could be
reclaimed or recycled, to haul hazardous waste, and to develop in the
future some treatment capacity on-site. The anticipated market area for
the site was Northeastern Missouri, the St. Louis area, and possibly the
Kansas City area.
The city of Kirksville has a current estimated population of 19,000, and
serves as a trade center for a multi-county area in Northeastern
Missouri. Kirksville is about 220 miles north of St. Louis and 165
miles northeast of Kansas City. The area is predominantly agricultural,
although several industries in Kirksville employ almost 2,000 persons.
Kirksville is the home of NMSU and the Kirksville College of Osteopathic
Medicine. Because of the presence of these institutions, and because of
the town's role as a regional service center, the city has a
disproportionately high number of professional and technical workers.
III. HISTORY OF FACILITY DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC RESPONSE
In the state of Missouri, a HWMF requires a permit from DNR before it
may operate. Under the 1973 Solid Waste Management Law, a HWMF must be
issued a special operating permit which is based on case-by-case
negotiations between DNR and applicants. As of March 1979, new
hazardous waste regulations were in draft form and final promulgation
-------
was scheduled for October, 1979. DNR's regulations and authority do not
overrule local zoning. Adair County, however, has no zoning.
required only the DNR permit to operate.
Thus, IBS
Two major incentives gave rise to this project: first, IBS had
determined that a market existed for a HWMF in the Kirksville area;
second, the development of a municipal landfill at the site would
complement Missouri Dispose-All's collections and hauling business and
reduce problems related to the city-owned municipal landfill. While
these facilities would be two distinct operations, revenues from the
HWMF were expected to subsidize the operation of the municipal landfill.
Without the HWMF, ZES's president felt that the sanitary landfill would
not be economically feasible.
Planning for the project began in July, 1977. The first ten months were
spent in selecting the site, acquiring options on the site, and seeking
preliminary approval of DNR. The site was selected on the basis of
accessibility to U.S. 63, proximity to Kirksville, and the geology of
the level. Other sites were not considered. By May, 1978, options had
been acquired on the 682-acre site. At that time, IBS applied to DNR
for preliminary approval of the site.
Preliminary approval entailed an initial site investigation by DNR.
Using secondary materials and some field work (e.g. test bores) DNR
staff analyzed the site's geology and accessibility. These analyses
indicated no geological conditions which would exclude further
consideration of the site as either a solid .or hazardous waste disposal
facility. With preliminary approval given in August 1978, DNR indicated
that IBS must make a formal application complete with a detailed
engineering plan.
In June 1978, in anticipation of DNR's preliminary approval, IBS
retained Environmental Engineering, Inc., to prepare the detailed
engineering plan. Environmental Engineering had previous experience in
both solid and hazardous waste engineering including the engineering
design of the Earthline facility in Wilsonville, Illinois.1 Field
work began that same month with additional test bores at the site. Work
continued through the fall and by December the permit application was
ready for submission. On December 12, 1978, the permit application was
made and a four-part engineering report (development plan, operating
plan, geology and hydrology, and municipal landfill plan) with
appendices was submitted. DNR received that application and requested
additional data which Environmental Engineering forwarded to DNR on
January 22, 1979.
In December 1978, IBS approached the city of Kirksville to discuss the
proposed facility. IBS and the city focused on the proposed municipal
See the case study for Earthline/Wilsonville, Illinois elsewhere
in this appendix.
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landfill. Relatively little attention was given to the HWMF although
IBS told the city that revenues from the HWMF were needed in order to
make the municipal landfill economically feasible. The city was quite
receptive to the proposed municipal landfill. The city manager
explained that although the city-owned landfill could be expanded at its
current site, the city would be happy to get out of the landfill
business. The landfill, which serves a multi-county area, is a costly
operation to the city and a continuing source of management problems
including problems with meeting DNR regulations. An IBS municipal
landfill would receive a majority of the city's refuse, thus reducing
the need for and justification of the city^-owned facility. The proposed
IES facility would have been a major benefit to the city. IBS asked
city officials to hold these discussions in confidence until DNR's
public notice was issued. The city agreed to this request; however,
soine local leaders had already learned of the proposed municipal
landfill through informal channels.
On January 3, 1979, DNR publicly announced that the permit application
had been received, and invited citizens to comment on the proposed
facility. Comments were to be accepted until January 26. ^e
notification listed wastes which would be,accepted at the, "industrial
waste disposal site" as "wastewater treatment plant sludges, industrial
sludges, industrial liquids and other potentially hazardous wastes".
The announcement briefly,described existing state regulations and the
fact that DNR approval was required for each type of industrial waste
accepted by the HWMF. It also stated that if requested or considered
necessary, DNR would hold a public meeting in Kirksville before making a
final decision on the permit.
DNR's announcement was the first public knowledge of the proposed,
facility, and it generated an immediate response from area residents.
In January, DNR received eight, letters of concern and opposition, many
from owners of land near the proposed site. On January 25, DNR
responded to those individuals and announced that a meeting would be
held February 22 at NMSU. The meeting would allow for public comment,
and representatives of DNR, the applicant, and the applicant's engineer
would be present to answer questions about state regulations, facility
design and facility operations. The letter also stated that DNR had
investigated concerns that disposal operations had already begun at the
site. No operations had in fact begun. DNR publicly announced the
meeting on February 3.
DNR's public announcements touched off a general, increasingly heated
discussion of the proposal in the Kirksville area. The first major
public forum was a local radio station's morning "talk show which asked
listeners to phone in with comments and concerns. The proposed site
sparked heated discussions. People spoke of their concerns and fears,
and solicited the support of others to fight the site. According to
some of those interviewed, information disseminated by the show inflamed
area residents, particularly the possibility of nuclear and radioactive
- wastes being accepted by the facility. During one show, a resident
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suggested that a petition against the facility be circulated, and
volunteered to be responsible for the petition. By the time of the
public meeting (about one month later), over 3,000 signatures had been
collected.
In early February, the pace of events quickened and opposition began to
solidify. Within a week of the announcement of the public meeting, the
Adair County Court (i.e., the elected officials of the county) passed a
resolution formally opposing the HWMF, although the court did indicate
its support for the municipal landfill. Faculty and students at NMSU
began to review the permit application and other materials pertaining to
hazardous waste disposal. (Because of public pressure, DNR made a copy
of the permit application available to the public at its Macon office,
about 35 miles south of Kirksville. When interviewed, some local
residents charged that the application could not in fact be photocopied,
and that only handwritten notes could be made of its contents.)
Research by opponents included discussions with farmers familiar with
the area's land and older residents who had worked in shaft mines in the
county in the 1930s. Two county-level special purpose government
agencies in the area—a water district and a soil conservation
service—went on record against the facility primarily because of fears
of water supply and soil contamination from leachate. The city of
Kirksville never took a formal position, although like the county court,
it supported the proposed municipal landfill.
On February 13, the Community Betterment Council held a meeting at the
city hall to present issues surrounding the proposed facility. The
council is one of a number of such councils set up across Missouri. Its
city-appointed members review a broad range of community concerns, seek
to inform the public of these issues and advise elected officials. In
pursuit of its goal of public education, the council invited lES's
president and a representative of the opposition to speak at the
meeting. At the meeting, lES's president acknowledged the public
concerns that had been raised and stated that residents should be
concerned because of the nature of wastes to be handled. He also stated
that he felt community support was necessary for the project and that
without such support he would not pursue his plans. He qualified his
statement by saying that he did not want to give up the project because
of emotional objections which were not based on substantive issues. At
the meeting he explained the project and its safeguards, state
regulations including the required DNR approval for each hazardous waste
accepted, his intention to serve the northeastern Missouri market, and
another IES project. (That project is a planned waste-to-energy
facility that would produce steam for a local customer.) The project
opponent expressed concerns about the facility including the fear that
buried drums would leak and potentially threaten water supplies.
After this meeting, a local radio station invited lES's president and
two NMSU professors opposed to the facility to speak on a local radio
program. All three accepted the invitation and discussed the project
and responded to listeners' questions phoned in during the show. The
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meeting and the radio show were the two major opportunities for IBS and
opponents to discuss and debate issues prior to the public meeting.
While those interviewed felt that these discussions led to,some positive
response (e.g., the option of illegal dumping was raised in general
support of the IES proposal), the general consensus was that the more
people heard, the more they objected. As more information became
available, more questions were asked and more information was requested.
Information made available was considered too vague, too incomplete, and
unreassuring.
On February 18, the Kirksville Daily Express, in continuing its coverage
of the proposed site, ran an article entitled "Proposed Waste Disposal
Site Becomes Heated Controversy." The article served to describe the
sense of the community prior to the public meeting. The manager of the
local Chamber of Commerce indicated initial support for the project as a
local business. During the site visit the manager explained that the
position reflected the Chamber of Commerce's general support for local
business development. He did indicate that the statement was made
conditioned on an assessment of the environmental impact of the facility
and that the Chamber had taken no formal position on the matter. Most
local and state elected officals, while expressing concern over
environmental impacts, adopted a "wait and see" posture which deferred
to the public response at the upcoming public meeting. The presiding
county judge (i.e., the most senior county elected official) was
concerned-over the lack of letters the county judges had received. The
judges wanted documentation of residents' feelings about the facility
and had received only five letters by that time. The article mentioned
that the presiding county judge had contacted state elected officials to
determine what legal resource citizens could use to stop the site.
On February 22, DNR held the public meeting at the NMSU student union.
DNR officals from the solid waste program, a state geologist, lES's
president, and representatives of lES's consulting engineers attended,
as did a representative of EPA's Region VII office. (EPA had no offical
involvement in the permit or the meeting and was present as an observer
at the invitation of the area's state representative.) Also in
attendance was a standing-room-only crowd of several hundred local
residents and officals.
The public meeting provided the most visible evidence of public
opposition. Given lES's publicly professed desire for local support,
the meeting marked the facility's demise. DNR officals explained both
the permit application procedures and the technical qualifications of
the site. The state geologist explained that any new geological data
presented at the meeting would be considered before a final decision was
made. The public response involved four hours of prepared statements
followed by several more hours of "questions and answers."
It would appear that every issue of concern to local residents was
raised and that these covered every conceivable issue that could be
raised. They ranged from those questioning the legitimacy of the site's
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geology to those attacking the integrity of DNR and IBS. Opponents
pointed to experiences at an area mine and a quarry which suggested the
existence of substantial underground water supplies. The permeability
of soils was questioned based on the area's history of leaky ponds.
NMSU faculty members critized the permit application for being
incomplete, vague and too open-ended, particularly in terms of wastes
(i.e., application listed in effect all organic and inorganic materials
as being acceptable). Because many opponents felt that DNR had endorsed
the IBS application even though no formal DNR decision had been made,
the very vagueness of the application was considered a clear sign of
DNR's inability to understand hazardous waste management and the,
implications of this particular proposal. (During the site visit, an
official of the Community Betterment Council indicated that DNR had a
tarnished record with some local leaders who felt DNR had not been an
effective environmental agency. She indicated that this perception
compounded DNR's credibility problems during this siting attempt.)
Local officials charged that wastes would leach into public water
supplies and demanded 100 percent assurance that this would not happen.
They felt that the monitoring provisions proposed for the facility were
inadequate. Added to these and other technical concerns were fears of
property devaluation and the notoriety of being known as the "dumping
ground" of the Midwest. Opponents' reviews of the permit application
led to the belief that nothing would prevent out-of-state wastes from
being brought in. They felt the site's large capacity would guarantee a
multi-state market area. Comments were not confined to technical,
political, or economic issues but also personally attacked lES's
president and state officials.
While those interviewed differed dramatically in their views on how well
the meeting was handled by DNR, all agreed that the meeting produced a
fierce and emotional opposition to the project. The response was
heightened by a sense of powerlessness on the part of local officials
and residents. They felt, according to some of those interviewed, that
DNR would make a decision regardless of local response and "ram it down
the throats" of local residents. Over 3,000 of those residents had
signed a petition against the facility, and by the time of the public
meeting 215 local residents had written the county judges opposing the
facility. At one point a vote was taken, and virtually all opposed the
facility. None supported it. During the meeting, DNR announced that it
would accept public comment on the permit application until March 6.
The day following the public meetings, IBS announced that the ap-
plication would be withdrawn. The opposition at the public meeting con-
vinced IBS's president that there was no public support. He also an-
nounced that the land for the proposed site would be sold. During the
site visit IBS's president said that if DNR had approved the applica-
tion, public opposition would have probably continued and increased. He
would have anticipated legal action to close the facility and ongoing
harassment by opponents.
The withdrawal of IBS's application stopped the siting process. DNR
took no further action. Several public and private agencies (e.g., the
city and Chamber of Commerce) which had not taken a formal position for
or against the facility were relieved of the need to do so.
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Representatives of those agencies, however, felt that they almost
'certainly would have passed resolutions against the proposed facility.
One long-'term impact of this experience may be countywide zoning which
the county judges are considering as a means of increasing local control
over development in the county.
IV. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
July, 1977— IES begins facility planning and site acquisition
procedures.
May, 1978 Options acquired on site; IES seeks preliminary approval
for facility from DNR.
June, 1978 -<- Field work by IBS's consulting engineers begins.
August, 1978 ~ DNR gives preliminary approval and go-ahead for formal
application. -
December, 1978 -•— IES submits formal permit application with detailed en-
gineering plan. IES discusses facility with city of-
ficials.
January, 1979 — DNR announces receipt of permit application and public
.comment period and receives additional engineering data
for application. Opposition voiced during local radio
talk show and by some local officials.
February, 1979'-- The attempts to discuss publicly the issues for and
against the facility add to the already growing op-
position. DNR holds public meeting, in which over-
whelming public opposition is displayed. IES
, withdraws permit application. The siting attempt is
,. stopped.
-V.
ATTEMPTS TO SECURE SUPPORT
The following are the major attempts to secure support for the proposed
facility:
o lES's discussions with Kirksville city officials stressing
the advantages to the city of the proposed municipal
landfill and the economic necessity of the HWMF.
o The Community Betterment Council's meeting, where IES and
opponents presented arguments and explanations for and
• against the facility.
o The radio talk show debate during which IES argued in
favor of the facility and against claims of opponents.
,o DNR's making the permit application available in its
regional office following public demands for information.
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VI.
o The public meeting at NMSU designed to provide DNR with
technical data previously overlooked.
SUMMARY EVALUATION
The attempts to generate support for lES's permit application failed
completely. Indeed, the argument can be made that most of these
attempts only added to the opposition. The more IES or DNR tried to
anticipate concerns or to respond to questions, the more they became
mired in the increasingly widespread and vehement opposition. The one
major exception to this is the favorable response city and county
officials gave to the proposed municipal landfill. The issues
surrounding the HWMF, however, overwhelmed any advantages that the
municipal landfill may have lent the overall project.
The failure of these efforts is undoubtedly the result of numerous
interrelated causes and conditions. A number of these, however, stand
out. Opposition began and quickly developed prior to any major attempts
by IES or DNR to discuss or explain in detail the proposal and state reg-
ulations. Opposition then began on the basis of limited information,
and appears to have mushroomed because of unanswered fears. Some ac-
cusations (e.g., that nuclear waste would be accepted by IES) were
completely unfounded, but nevertheless had the apparent effect of
solidifying a deep-rooted opposition. IES and DNR were then in the
position of defending (as opposed to explaining) the proposal by the
time they responded publicly. Although lES's president went to some
lengths to explain the restrictions that DNR would place on the site's
design and operation, opponents were not satisfied. They either raised
questions unanswered by those regulations or placed different
interpretations on them than those made by IES or DNR. The fact that
DNR's regulations were pending and that the same was true of U.S. EPA
regulations intensified public unease. From the local perspective,
information that was made available was belated, unwillingly shared, and
most importantly, incomplete. In spite of this information, too many
"what if's" remained unanswered.
The public response and attempts to address issues were made in an
atmosphere lacking in dialogue and compromise. A reconciliation of
divergent viewpoints appears never to have been seriously considered by
all the interested parties. Coupled with this was the absence of a
trusted and knowledgeable party with no direct interest in the result of
the conflict. For the most part, each party was seen as having its own
ulterior motive.
A great many issues were raised by opponents. Those described in
Section III were not exhaustive as they excluded the most stridently
expressed. These emotional objections were not instructive because they
did not specifically pertain to the siting and operation of the proposed
facility. They did, however, reflect the general hostility that
(regardless of justification) people felt toward the facility sponsor
22S
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and regulatory agencies. That hostility became a concrete factor in the
controversy which chararcterized the siting process.
The major issues raised by opponents were the following: •
Suitability of the site — Opponents questioned ,the soil's ability to
contain wastes and the claims that there was no significant underground
water supply beneath the site. They feared contamination of public and
private water supplies and of the soil itself.
Operational risks — Opponents objected to the range of wastes that IBS
wanted to handle and to the importation of wastes from outside the
northeastern Missouri Region. They feared that containerized wastes
would leak from containers and pollute soil and water. They felt that
monitoring of the facility was insufficient.
Impact on local image and land values —Opponents did not want
Kirksville to be known as the Midwest's hazardous waste dump and felt
that the proposed size of the facility guaranteed this.result. They
felt land values, particularly those of land adjacent to the site, would
fall.
Credibility of the hazardous waste management industry -— The notoriety
of Love Canal and the publicity associated with Wilsonviile, Illinois,
as well as other information, contributed to a local image of the
hazardous waste management industry as irresponsible. Locals also saw
public information as vague and euphemistic and thus they saw the
industry as being secretive and evasive.
Credibility of regulators •— For some residents, DNR was seen as a
previously ineffectual agency which would not do its-job of regulating
IES properly. While not all felt that DNR had a bad track record, many
saw DNR's performance with respect to the IES application as inept, and
indicative of a staff without sufficient qualifications to judge the
applications or the resources to do a thorough job regardless of
qualifications. DNR's information was seen as being just as vague and
unreassuring as that provided by IES.
Status of regulations and research — Coupled with the previous issue
was the fact that neither DNR or EPA hazardous waste regulations were
promulgated. This gave rise to a sense that DNR had no basis for
permitting or regulating IES and, for some, a feeling that there would
be no controls over the facility. Opponents also questioned the
state-of-the-art of hazardous waste disposal technology which they saw
as environmentally unsound. Present knowledge about the nature of
hazardous waste (e.g., the degree of hazard and length of time.specific
wastes would be hazardous) was considered uncertain and therefore
unreassuring.
Local powerlessness — The lack of any local regulatory power angered
some local officials and residents.
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VII. FACTORS LEADING TO PUBLIC OPPOSITION /ACCEPTANCE
Opposition arose primarily because of the following factors, listed in
essentially chronological order.
o DNR's announcement that the application had been made
provided the first public information and basis for
opposition.
o A local radio talk show provided a public forum for
opponents to discuss their concerns and enlist general
support.
o Early information, some of which was completely incorrect,
generated fears before IBS or DNR responded publicly.
o Two forums to "discuss" the proposal increased the amount
of information available. This only provided opponents
with more issues of potential concern.
o The strong emotional and political reaction brought
together traditional political rivals (e.g. the city, the
county, NMSU).
o To this force, the intellectual and technical credibility
of NMSU faculty was added. Some residents felt the respect
accorded these professors was the critical factor in the
opposition.
o The public meeting provided an opportunity for opponents to
mobilize at once their considerable political and technical
resources against the proposal.
VIII. RETROSPECTIVE VIEWS
Comments from those interviewed concerning the siting process were
primarily concerned with information made publicly available. Local of-
ficials and leaders invariably felt that more information should have
been available earlier in the process. This would have helped to reduce
concerns that the public was not being fully informed and that suf-
ficient time was not available to study the proposal carefully. Had
this been available, some felt that there might have been greater op-
portunity to discuss the IES proposal in a reasonable non-adversarial
manner. -
The public meeting was the most dramatic event in the siting process.
It was praised by opponents because it allowed all opponents to express
their concerns and because it was conducted reasonably well given the
highly emotional atmosphere. On the other hand, it was criticized by
the city and IES for its lack of a sense of order and reason (i.e., it
was felt that the meeting was allowed to get out of control).
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Kirksville's city manager felt that the meeting's purpose was never made
clear and that the issues to be discussed should have been clarified
before public comments were made. The timing of the meeting was also
criticized. Opponents felt that not enough time elapsed between the
announcement of the meeting and the meeting itself. lES's president
felt the meeting should have been held much earlier in the process, at
the time of DNR's preliminary approval, so that any information on
anomalies of site hydrogeology would have been available prior to
developing detailed engineering plans.
IX.
GENERAL COMMENTS
Comments also touched on more general siting issues. A number of
opponents of the IES proposal felt that if sites served local needs they
would be more acceptable to the public. This line of reasoning
contemplated more smaller sites and a rationale emphasizing an area's
responsibility for solving its own problems. The fact that available
land may not be the most suitable land for disposal was seen as a major
flaw in current siting procedures. Most interviewees felt that sites
should be in extremely remote settings where potential impacts, on people
would be minimized.
Views differed widely on the question of appropriate roles for EPA, the
state, or the private sector in this process. A minority of
interviewees (e.g., IES, the Chamber of Commerce) felt that hazardous
waste management should remain largely a private business with no
increase in governmental involvement. According to this view, the
private sector should initiate public relations which "sell" a site by
demonstrating safety and potential benefits. More local officials and
leaders, however, envisioned greater governmental involvement,
particularly for EPA, because hazardous waste is a national problem and
because EPA has more expertise than state agencies. In this view, the
potential for federal disposal sites and for EPA management of RCRA was
stressed.
A major role contemplated for EPA by an NMSU faculty member was to,
advance the state-of-the-art in hazardous waste management and to
publicize these advances. EPA was seen as creating problems by defining
hazardous waste problems, but failing to define and/or to demonstrate
that there were solutions to those problems (e.g., environmentally safe
disposal sites). A number of local leaders felt that further research
would reduce problems in several ways: first, by changing manufacturing
processes in ways designed to reduce the volume of hazardous wastes;
second, by developing new treatment procedures, whereby hazardous wastes
could be rendered less hazardous or non-hazardous; third, by defining
degree of hazard, whereby EPA could help the general public define risks
associated with hazardous waste disposal and thereby better judge new
sites such as IES. •
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State comments focused on the public's perception of DNR's role and the
outcome of the siting attempt had IBS not withdrawn the permit. A DNR
official felt that opponents had wanted DNR to criticize IES during the
meeting, whereas DNR saw the meeting as a means of getting public input
of a technical nature. Had IES not withdrawn its application, this
official speculated that pressure might have been placed on the governor
to delay any decision until state regulations were issued.
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IT CORPORATION
BRENTWOOD, CALIFORNIA
I.
INTRODUCTION
The IT Corporation in 1973 and 1974 attempted to site a hazardous waste
management facility near Brentwood, California. The attempt was
unsuccessful, due to opposition from the local public and officials and
from the Shell Oil Company.
Local opposition to the facility was based on IT Corp.'s image among
local residents as an irresponsible and technically inept organization.
This image was due to IT Corp.'s operations at a facility in Antioch,
California, five miles north of Brentwood. It should be noted that
state and EPA Regional officials believe IT Corp. to be one of the best
qualified hazardous waste management firms in California. Shell Oil
Company's opposition was based on their contention that the proposed
facility would have been incompatible with the company's high-pressure
gas producing operations. Shell has operations that are within the
bounds of the proposed IT Corp. site.
The facility was supported by local industry—in particular by hazardous
wastes generators including the Shell Oil Refinery in Martinez—and
labor unions. Other than presentations which were made to community
organizations, the corporation made no attempt to inform or involve the
local public outside of the required public hearing process.
II.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The IT Corp. "Oil Well" facility, as it came to be known, would have
been located on a 160-acre site two and one-half miles west of
Brentwood, California. The northeastern half of the site is a plain
bisected by Sand Creek; the southwestern half, two parallel ridges and
the valley that separates them. In the area proposed for waste disposal
use, slopes ranged up to 20 percent. The southwestern part of the
property—in which disposal operations would have been located—is
underlain by beds of claystone and does not contain any good groundwater
supply* The northwestern part of the property is underlain by clayrock
bedrock, which is eroded and overlain by alluvial sediments. These
alluvial sediments might comprise important groundwater sources in some
places,* and therefore would not be suitable for hazardous waste
disposal. A study conducted for IT Corp. by an engineering consulting
firm indicated that the Tertiary Deposits in the southwestern section
would meet all Class I requirements of the Regional Water Quality
Control Board.
Communication from Professor Irwin Reiason of Stanford University
to the Contra Costa County Planning Department, March 21, 1974.
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The site had been used as low-order grazing land and to grow feed
grains, but at the time of the proposal there were no surface uses.
However, it contained seven oil and gas wells and was under lease to
Shell Oil Company for subsurface oil production; an underground Pacific
Gas and Electric natural gas pipeline across the southwest corner of the
site; and Contra Costa powerlines across the northeast corner of the
.site. Although oil wells were located on the adjacent properties to the
north and east, the predominant use of these properties was as
agricultural land (rowcrops and orchards). Northwest of and contiguous
to the site was the Brentwood yard of the Shell Oil Company, which
served as the center of that company's small oil-production activity in
the area. Adjoining land on the south and west was in its natural
grassland state and was sometimes used for grazing.
The site was zoned A-3, Heavy Agricultural, by the Contra Costa County
zoning ordinance. The A-3 district restricts uses to agricultural and
related activities. Access to the proposed site could be gained from
California Route 4 between Brentwood and Antioch. Direct access was
along Sand Creek Road. The latter was a minor, two-lane rural road.
Development .plans for the proposed Oil Well site included areas for ,
chemical processing, solar evaporation, biodegradation, and trench
burial. Initial operations would have included development of the
burial and biodegradation areas, a small laboratory and an evaporation
pond. Later phases would have included closed reaction tanks with
associated equipment, tanks, and covered storage areas. Interconnecting
pipes would have made it possible to transfer wastes from one area or
process to another. The phasing of site development would have depended
upon how rapidly the firm's Antioch site was phased out.
It is estimated that the proposed facility would have handled
approximately 30,000 barrels of liquid wastes per month (bbl/mo). Of
this, approximately 4000 bbl/mo would have been biodegradable
materials; 4500 bbl/mo, oil and water; 15,000 bbl/mo, acid waste
solutions; 5000 bbl/mo, waste basic solutions; and 1500 bbl/mo, other
materials. The latter would include approximately 100 drums of
containerized liquids. The site would not have handled pesticides,
radioactive wastes or "political" wastes (i.e. , controversial wastes
such as PCBs). In addition, Bay Area Air Pollution Control District
regulations would have effectively prevented the acceptance of such
wastes as solvents, concentrated acids, and light hydrocarbons.
At the time of the siting attempt there were no regulations, state or
otherwise, governing closure or long-term maintenance. Currently,
however, State Department of Health Services regulations state that the
operator is liable for proper closure and long-term maintenance. No
specific provision is made for funding liability.
The projected life span of the facility would have been 50 years, plus
or minus ten years. The long life of the site is due to the fact that
chemical processing, evaporation and biodegradation, which were planned
to be the primary methods for dealing with hazardous wastes in this
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facility, do not require as much land as conventional landfilling. Only
sludges from treatment processes require landfill disposal. Drum burial
would have only been a very minor part of operations (about 100 drums
per month).
The proposed facility would have served only industries located
primarily in Contra Costa County. The county is the heavy industrial
center of northern California. Major industries include petrochemicals
and primary metals (e.g., steel fabricators). Although employment in
these industries has declined over the last two decades,1 the heavy
industrial sector is still among the largest in the county's economy.
Most of the industries served would have been located within 20 miles of
the proposed facility, and all within the nine-county San Francisco Bay
Area.
In addition to its hazardous waste processing and disposal operations,
IT Corporation is active in the transportation of solid and liquid
products and wastes and in heavy-duty cleaning of industrial tanks and
related facilities. IT Environmental, a subsidiary of IT Corporation,
operates hazardous waste management facilities in Martinez and Benicia,
California (complementary facilities) and a hazardous waste collection
and transfer station near San Jose. They are presently attempting to
site a hazardous waste management facility near Saugus (in Los Angeles
County). As noted above, IT Environmental's hazardous waste operations
are thought—by Federal and state officials—to be among the best in the
state, both in terms of the relatively sophisticated technology used and
the competence with which these activities are undertaken.
The proposed project site was located in the pastern portion of Contra
Costa County, in an area whose primary type of land use is agricultural.
The surrounding communities of Oakley, Brentwood, and Byron were small
farm communities with developing residential areas extending into the
farmlands. The population of the City of Brentwood in 1975 was only
3,662;2 median annual household income was $9,778 in 1975, as compared
to the Contra Costa County median of $15,026.3 xhe East County
Planning Area in which the facility would have been located contained
approximately 40 percent of the County's agricultural land. During
recent years however, there has been a reduction in the acreage
1
One-factor underlying this decline has been the difficulty in
siting such industries in the county in recent years. For instance,
an attempt, by Dow Chemical to site a major petrochemical facility
near Pittsburgh in Contra Costa County was abandoned after extensive
public debate and considerable difficulty in obtaining necessary
permits. ,
Contra Costa County Planning Department, Contra Costa County - A
Profile, October, 1977.
Ibid.
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devoted to agriculture in the area—farmland has been turned to
residential and recreational uses. This trend is continuing.
III. HISTORY OF FACILITY DEVELOPMENT AMD PUBLIC RESPONSE
In order to develop and operate a hazardous waste management facility in
California, at least three permits are needed. These are: 1) land use
permit-, 2) Regional Water Quality Control Board Waste Discharge
Requirements (permit), and 3) Department of Health Services permit. The
land use permit, which is issued by the local city or, in unincorporated
areas, county plannning board, certifies that development and operation
of the proposed facility would not conflict with existing land use or
land use plans. In practice, it indicates that the facility has local
political support. A significant factor in gaining this support is
facility compatibility with local land use. This permit is a
precondition for the granting of the other two permits. The decision of
the local planning board can be appealed to the local board of
supervisors.
The Regional Water Quality Control Board Waste Discharge Requirements
specify what kinds of wastes the facility may receive and what measures
must be taken to prevent groundwater pollution. These requirements are
in effect a permit since they will not be issued if the geology and/or
hydrology of the site are inappropriate. The Department of Health
Services permit is for the most part based on the existence of proper
procedures for above-ground handling of chemical wastes. These
procedures must include a contingency plan in case of "an accident or
ace idental di scharge."*
In addition, two other permits are often required, depending on the
particular types of storage, processing or disposal of chemical wastes
that are proposed. If hazardous wastes are to be disposed of with
municipal solid wastes, then the state Solid Waste Management Board must
grant a permit for the facility. This permit regulates the disposal of
residential and commercial refuse so that nuisances are not created.
The power to grant this permit can be granted by the Solid Waste
Management Board to local political entities, such as the local city or
county government.
If some sort of evaporation, neutralization or incineration process (or
any other process which will produce a significant amount of atmosphere
emissions) is proposed, a permit will be required from the Regional Air
Pollution Control District. Evaporation ponds, for instance, are
treated as emission points. Depending on existing air quality in the
region, this permit can be very restrictive as to types of processes
California Department of Health Services, Hazardous Waste
Regulations, Chapter 2, Article 4, "Hazardous Waste Permit".
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and/or wastes accepted. Permits may also be required from agencies such
as the Coast Regional Commissions if the proposed site is located in any
of the areas which are under their purview.
The proposed IT Corp. facility at Oil Well required a land use permit
and permits from the Regional Water Quality Control Board, the
Department of Health Services and the Regional Air Pollution Control
District. In this case, permits from the state Solid Waste Management
Board arid the Coast Regional Commission were not required.
In the late 1960's the zoning of property adjacent to IT Corp's, Antioch,
California facility was changed from heavy industrial to residential
despite IT Corp's opposition. Subsequent to this change, housing
developments were built fairly close to the facility. Public opposition
to the facility began, and increased as residential areas encroached
upon the site. In 1970 the Antioch City Manager contacted IT Corp. and
requested that they consider moving to another site in order to avoid a
conflict with these developments. Public opposition continued to mount
with the support of the local media.
During the early 1970's, then, IT Corp. began looking for a new site for
a hazardous waste management facility. In June, 1971, they became
involved in an unsuccessful attempt to site a facility on a 480-acre
parcel of land in Ginochio, California. This proposal — which involved
disposal of municipal as well as industrial wastes —; was ultimately
unsuccessful because it became entangled in a long series of hearings
and studies about the garbage disposal needs of eastern Contra Costa
County.
Renewed attempts to identify a new site to replace the Antioch site were
begun in late 1972/early 1973. A number of possible sites in eastern
Contra Costa County were evaluated. Parameters in this evaluation
included geology, access, site development and zoning, adjacent land
use, and distance to markets. Six sites were thus selected for further
study.
On April 5, 1973, IT Corp. officials and members of the Contra Costa
County Planning Department staff toured these sites. The planning
department, in a letter dated April 25, 1973,. identified two of these
sites as the "least objectionable". One of these two was being held in
trust and was not available for development. The other, the "Oil Well"
site, was ultimately leased by IT Corp. for the purpose of developing an
industrial waste disposal facility. This lease was contingent upon IT's
obtaining the necessary permits for this facility. An application for a
land use permit for the proposed facility was submitted by ,IT Corp. to
the Contra Costa County Planning Department on October 1, 1973. More
than 25 letters from area industry — including one from the local Shell
Oil refinery — in support of this application were received by the
planning department during the next few months.
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IT Corp. submitted a preliminary Environmental Impact Report (SIR) on
the site to the planning department at the same time as the land use
permit application. The planning department decided, however, that in
order to obtain an impartial evaluation of the environmental impacts of
the proposed facility it would be necessary to hire an outside con-
sulting firm to prepare the full EIR. A consultant was hired by the de-
partment in January, 1974. (The consultant's fee was paid by IT Corp.)
Also during January, a full-scale geologic investigation and report on
the site was completed by a consultant hired by IT; and IT filed for
Waste Discharge Requirements with the Regional Water Quality Control
Board in Sacramento.
In March 1974, the Regional Water Quality Control Board announced that
dumping of Group 1 liquid industrial wastes * at the IT Corp. Antioch
facility would be prohibited after October 1, 1974. This of course
increased the pressure on IT Corp. to find a new site. The Board also
issued tentative discharge requirements for the Oil Well site. Final
discharge requirements could not be issued until IT Corp. received a
land use permit from the county. However, the issuance of tentative re-
quirements was tantamount to the granting of Board approval of the site.
During the Spring of 1974, officials of IT Corp. gave presentations to
community associations such as Rotary in the Brentwobd area, stressing
the need for such facilities and IT's competence in operating them.
The EIR was completed in July, 1974. It identified 21 adverse impacts
which it predicted would be associated with the development and oper-
ation of the proposed facility. Major possible impacts included the
"eventual contamination of the groundwater in Lone Tree Valley and the
alluvial plain to the east", odors emanating from evaporation ponds and
biodegradation impacts, and "corrosion and crop damage from acidic
vapors from evaporation ponds". The EIR also concluded that the oper-
ation of the proposed facility "will demand a level of capability in the
fire protection service that is probably beyond the resources of the
Brentwood (volunteer) Fire Department."
Group 1 wastes are defined to include those wastes which consist
of or contain toxic substances. Group 2 wastes consist of or contain
chemically or biologically decomposable material which does not
include toxic substances or those capable of significantly impair-
ing the quality of useful waters and includes municipal solid waste.
Group 3 wastes consist entirely of non-water soluble, nondecomposable
inert solids (California State Water Resources Control Board). A
Class 1 landfill can accept wastes in Groups 1, 2, and 3, a Class 2
landfill Groups 2 and 3, and so on.
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IT Corp. officials subsequently responded to the EIR. They noted that a
highly impenetrable layer of material underlay the site and that this
layer would severely limit if not eliminate the potential for ground-
water pollution; that plans for the site included berms around the
storage tank area and the placement of a positive hydraulic barrier
around the levees to detect and retain any sub-surface migration of
wastes;.and that the company would work with the local fire department
in developing an adequate system of men and equipment for fire •
prevention and response. ' -'" ~
In late July, the IT Corp. Martinez facility was named by the Bay Area
Air Pollution Control District as the source of foul odors which had
intermittently plagued northern Contra Costa County. IT Corp. officials
were quoted as blaming a mechanical breakdown for the problem. This
received extensive coverage in the local media, in particular in the
vicinity of the proposed site.
On August 23, 1974, the Planning Commission of the City of Brentwood
adopted a resolution opposing the proposed facility. This was the first
of many such resolutions adopted by boards, commissions and
organizations in the Brentwood-Antioch vicinity. The Brentwood City
Council, for instance, passed a resolution declaring its opposition on
September 10. The resolutions cited the issues raised by the EIR and
preemption of local land use planning as reasons for the opposition. *•
The planning department staff recommended to the planning commission on
September 13 that approval of the land use permit, would be "premature",
and' that the application should be deferred until after the East County
Review Committee had made its report. This committee, which was made up
of local residents and officials, was at that time studying the general
land use plan of the eastern par.t of Contra Costa County. If this
option were not pursued, the staff then recommended that the application
should be denied.
The first public hearing on the project was held five days later before
the Contra Costa County Planning Commission. The purpose of this
hearing was to consider both the EIR and IT Corp.'s land use permit
application.
Approximately 250 people attended the hearing. Speakers in favor of
granting the permit included representatives of local unions and
industry. Residents from the Brentwood-Antioch area spoke against
granting the permit. The planning commission decided to hold a second
public meeting on October 1 to allow for further debate on the issue.
On September 27 the Regional Water Quality Board, in response to the
delay in the land use permit application decision, granted IT Corp. a
Although the proposed site was outside the Brentwood city limits,
it was within the area covered by Brentwood's proposed general land
use plan. The proposed future land use for the site was residential.
239
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90-day delay in the closing of its Antioch facility. However, it also
required that that site no longer accept any odor-producing wastes or
any acids greater than 15 percent concentration.
The second hearing on October 1 again focused on the EIR and the land
use permit. Conflicting testimony was presented by experts for the two
sides. The one important change was that the production division of
Shell Oil Company, who owned and operated a number of oil and gas wells
on the site (see above, Section II), indicated that they might be op-
posed to such a facility in close proximity to these wells, but that
they had not yet made a determination. The EIR hearing was closed at
this meeting to give the planning commission staff 60 days to prepare
written answers to questions raised about the EIR. The land use permit
hearing was continued until December 3 with IT Corp's consent. At the
end of this meeting the commission announced the receipt of a letter
from another waste disposal firm, requesting delaying the Oil Well de-
cision until a decision had been reached on the Ginochio site. IT Corp.
officials later speculated that the purpose of this request was solely
to attempt to defeat their proposal. The request was subsequently de-
nied on the grounds that the Ginochio site proposal was no longer vi-
able.
The Shell Oil Company announced in late November, 1974, that it would
oppose the development of a hazardous waste management facility on the
Oil Well site. A Shell official was quoted in the Pittsburgh
(California) Post-Dispatch as saying that "a thorough investigation of
the Industrial Tank Inc. proposal... has disclosed that it would not be
compatible with the high pressure gas producing operations at the Brent-
wood Field site."
The final hearing on the land use permit application was held on De-
cember 3. Again, expert testimony was provided on both sides of the
permit application issue. Shell Oil officials testified that a chemical
waste dump on the site would hamper their oil and gas drilling oper-
ations and that chemicals dumped might corrode Shell wells and lines.
Furthermore, they stated that it was their position that Shell had ex-
clusive right to use the land under the terms of its lease. The plan-
ning commission then voted to deny the permit. The main reason cited
was that the site was technically unsuitable.'
Shortly thereafter, on January 2, 1975, the IT Corp. Antioch facility
was closed by the Regional Water Quality Control Board. IT Corp. sub-
sequently indicated its intent to appeal the planning commission's de-
cision to the County Board of Supervisors. However, in the face of
increasing opposition from local residents and Shell Oil, the firm
withdrew its application and cancelled the appeal in May of 1975. IT an-
nounced at the same time plans for upgrading and expanding its existing
Martinez site.
IV.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
Late 1960's — Zoning of property adjacent to IT Corp.'s Antioch
facility is changed from heavy industrial to residential.
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Housing developments are later constructed close to the
facility, and public opposition to its continued oper-
ation develops.
1970 — Antioch City Manager requests that IT Corp. consider moving
its operation to another site.
June, 1971 — IT becomes involved in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt
to site a facility in Ginochio, California.
Winter, 1972 — IT Corp. search for a new site for a hazardous
waste management facility begins.
April 5, 1973 — IT Corp. officials and Contra Costa County Planning De-
partment staff tour six proposed hazardous waste man-
agement sites. ,
April 25, 1973 — Letter to IT Corp. from the Planning Department iden-
tifies two "least objectionable" sites.
October 1, 1973 — IT Corp. submits an application for a land use permit
for the "Oil Well" site to the Planning Department.
January 24, 1974 — IT Corp. files for Waste Discharge Require-
ments with the Regional Water Quality Board.
March, 1974 — Regional Water Quality Board prohibits dumping
of Group 1 liquid industrial wastes at IT
Corp.'s Antioch site after October 1, 1974;
this in effect closes the site as of that date.
March 20, 1974 — Regional Water Quality Control Board issues tentative
discharge requirements for the Oil Well site. These
requirements cannot be finally acted upon until IT
Corp. receives a land use permit from the county.
July 18, 1974 — The draft version of Environmental Impact Report on the
proposed facility, prepared by an independent en-
gineering consulting firm, is completed and released.
July 23, 1974 — IT Corp. Martinez facility is named as source
of foul odors plaguing north Contra Costa County.
August 23, 1974 — The planning commissioners of the city of Brentwood
adopt a resolution opposing the proposed facility.
September 10, 1974 — Brentwood City Council passes a resolution de-
claring its opposition to the facility.
September 13, 1974 — The staff of the Contra Costa County Planning De-
partment recommends that approval of the land use
permit would be "premature" and that approval be
deferred, or else denied.
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September 18, 1974 — The first public hearing on the EIR and the land
use permit is held before the Contra Cos.ta County
Planning Commission. The hearing is continued un-
til October 1.
September 27, 1974 — Regional Water Quality Control Board defers clos-
ing of the Antioch site until January 1, 1975.
The board requires that the site not accept any
odor-producing wastes or acids greater than 15
percent concentration.
October 1, 1974 — Second public hearing on the EIR and the permit ap-
plication. The EIR hearing is closed and the plan-
ning department staff directed to prepare answers to
questions on the EIR. The hearing on the permit is
continued until December 3.
November 25, 1974 — Shell Oil Company announces that the proposed
facility is incompatible with the company's1 high-
pressure gas producing operations, and that it will
oppose the facility.
December 3, 1974 — Contra Costa County Planning Commission votes to
deny land use permit application; IT Corp. announces
it will appeal the decision to the County Board of
Supervisors.
January 1, 1975 — Antioch facility is closed.
May 20, 1975 — IT Corp. withdraws its application for a land use permit
for the Oil Well site; cancels its appeal of planning
commission denial of the permit; announces plans for up--
grading and expanding its existing Martinez site.
V.
ATTEMPTS TO SECURE SUPPORT
Few attempts were made by IT Corp. to secure support for the Oil Well
facility. These attempts include:
o Involving the County Planning Department in the initial
site selection process.
o Requesting the support of the local industry and labor
groups during the land use permit application evaluation.
o Presentations to community associations (e.g., Rotary) in
the Brentwood area stressing the need for such a facility
and the care with which it would be operated.
VI.
SUMMARY EVALUATION
With the exception of IT Corp. officials, the consensus of opinion on
242
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this siting attempt seems to be that the problem was not so much with
the siting process as with the site itself. The site may well have been
technically suitable but it was, in a broad sense, politically un-
suitable. The site was approximately five miles from IT Corp.'s Antioch
facility, which had already achieved a certain notoriety.
IT Corp. has indicated that its corporate philosophy at the time of the
siting attempt was to keep as low a profile as possible. IT approached
the permitting process through official channels and the news media were
not informed of the intention to site such a facility nor of the
progress of siting* Neither were any public information or
participation options considered, other than presentations to a few
selected community associations.
The public hearings on the EIR did provide substantial information on
the pros and cons of the facility to the interested public. However, by
this time public attitudes toward the site were already fixed, and this
information had little if any effect on them. The hearings allowed the
County Planning Commissioners to gauge the direction and extent of
public feeling on the issue, a not insignificant factor in their final
decision. Thus, even though the proposed site was on unincorporated .
land, local residents were,able to provide some meaningful input to the
Planning Commission decision. Local public opinion was that they would
not have succeeded if they had not had Shell Oil Company on their side.
The issues and concerns raised by the public reflected those raised in
the EIR. These are listed below. ,
Site suitability - Questions about site suitability focused on the
impact of the facility and surrounding agricultural and residential land
uses, as well as on the permeability of soils underlying the site, and :
the likelihood of contamination of groundwater supplies.
Facility operations - Because of similar problems associated with other
IT-operated sites, odors- from the facility were a concern. Air
pollution from evaporation ponds and other processes was also mentioned
as a possible adverse impact.
Access - Site access would have been along a minor two-lane rural road.
Fears were expressed about the possibility of spills.
Contingency plans - Particular concern was expressed over the presumed
inability of the local (volunteer) fire department to cope with the
fires at the facility. This concern was based at least in part on
adverse experience with IT Corp.'s Antioch facility.
Land use planning - Although the site was outside the city limits of
Brentwood, it was cla'ssified as a future residential area in the
Brentwood proposed land use plan. Local officials and residents saw the
siting attempt as an attempt to preempt local land use control.
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VII. FACTORS LEADING TO PUBLIC OPPOSITION/ACCEPTANCE
Only those who would have benefited from the facility (e.g., local
unions and-industry) accepted this particular facility, although nearly
all concerned claimed they were aware of the need for this type of
facility in Contra Costa County. Factors leading to public opposition
included:
o Public recognition and/or perception of problems with IT
Corp.'s Antioch and Martinez facilities.
o Proximity of the proposed facility to the Antioch facility.
o Lack of public information supporting the proposed
facility.
o Efforts by Brentwood City Council and other local public
bodies to organize public opposition.
VIII. RETROSPECTIVE VIEWS
Facility opponents stated they would not have done anything differently.
An official of IT Corp., on the other hand, felt that the siting process
had two principal shortcomings. The first was IT Corp.'s failure to
make substantive efforts to involve the public in the siting process
before a definite site was chosen and public opinion formed. The second
was the California permit process. He indicated that it would make more
sense to evaluate the site on technical grounds first and then, if the
site were technically acceptable, to use this information as an input to
the final, political decision of whether to allow the facility to be
constructed on that site. Currently, the political decision (which
seems to include the most opportunity for substantive public input)
precedes the technical decision. In his mind, the key factors in siting
a facility are the developer's technical competence and his ability to
communicate this competence.
IX.
GENERAL COMMENTS
Industry and local officials were united in their feeling that there was
no need for EPA to play a role in the siting process. Negotiation,
mediation or arbitration were not thought to have any useful role to
play in this process. This is both because no necessarily neutral
parties were perceived to exist and because it was felt that the system
could be made to work properly without this (if it did not already work
properly).
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PADRE JUAN
VENTURA, CALIFORNIA
I.
INTRODUCTION
The Ventura .Regional County Sanitation District (VRCSD) attempted in
1974, for the third time in three years, to site a landfill which would
accept both hazardous wastes and non-hazardous solid wastes. The
proposed site was located in the area around Padre Juan Canyon,
northwest of the City of Ventura. After an Environmental Impact Report
(EIR) was prepared and a series of public hearings held, the VRCSD Board
voted to abandon the siting attempt.
Rather than attempt to develop support for the facility among
constituent groups which could be expected to support it, VRCSD's effort
seemed to have been directed toward alleviating concern about the -..
facility among the residents in the vicinity of the proposed site.
These efforts were largely unsuccessful. Local residents were able to
muster sufficient political support to defeat the siting attempt.
II.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The proposed Padre Juan facility would have been located in Ventura
County,, California, approximately 45 miles northwest of Los Angeles and
seven miles northwest of the City of Ventura. The entire Padre Juan
Canyon area lies over the Ventura oil field, an active oil-producing
area. ,
Access to the area is gained via U.S. Highway 101, to either the Solimar
Beach exit or the Seacliff exit to Pacific Coast Highway (old Highway
101). At the tj.me of the siting proposal, the route to the area was via
the Padre Juan overcrossing of U.S. 101 to an oil company road.
However, the project as proposed would have included an interchange on
U.S. 101 which would have provided direct access to the facility.
Across U.S. 101 from the proposed site are a number of .expensive summer
homes which faced the Pacific Ocean. .
The Padre Juan facility would have been owned• and operated by the VRGSD.
It was primarily intended to receive hazardous wastes from Ventura
County, although it was anticipated that it would have also served Santa
Barbara County (located directly to the northwest of Ventura County).
Ventura County is among the most rapidly growing counties in the nation.
The county population increased by 21.4 percent between 1970 and 1977.
Ventura County's Pleading source of income is still agriculture, which is
a source of some chemical wastes (e.g., pesticides). Major industries >
include electronics and other high-technology sectors. '
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The facility would have included up to four separate disposal sites.
These four sites are discussed and compared in the Environmental Impact
Report (EIR) which was prepared for the Padre Juan facility.^ The
area, expected lifetime, and capacity of each site are shown in Table 1.
The permeability of the soil underlying these sites ranges from 10-3
to 10-5 cm/sec. Average slope in the proposed landfill areas of the
sites ranges from 8 percent in Site 2 to 20 percent in Site 4. The area
as a whole is located in Zone III (high severity) of the Maximum
Expectable Earthquake Intensity Region for California. Sites 1 through
3 were covered with natural vegetation. Site 4 was a highly disturbed
area polluted by oil sludge with large bulldozed areas, and covered by
degraded, non-native vegetation.
The Padre Juan facility was never designed since the site was abandoned
prior to this step in the process. Nevertheless, the EIR does include a
general description of the processes that would have been used. The
facility would have been a Class I sanitary landfill,2 very similar to
the existing VRCSD facility in the, Simi Valley. Three disposal methods
were in use at the latter facility; soil blending, soil spreading, and
pit methods. Oily wastes, aqueous liquids, and semi-liquid wastes would
have been spread on and blended with soil. All other wastes would have
been buried. Containers of less hazardous wastes would have been
emptied into a prepared pit, while more dangerous, containerized wastes
would have been placed in such a pit directly. These materials would
then be covered by three to four feet of soil. Hazardous wastes would
not have been mixed with Group 2 wastes^ (e.g., municipal solid waste)
as is currently the practice in some other California sites. Group 2
and 3 wastes would be disposed of separately at this facility. It is
estimated that the facility would have received on the order of 40,000
gallons per day of liquid Group 1 wastes. These wastes would have
reportedly been similar to those accepted at the Simi Valley facility,
of which approximately 70 percent was paint sludge and purifax sludge.
Ventura Regional County Sanitation District, Padre Juan Canyon
Class I Sanitary Landfill, Ventura County, California; Final
Environmental Impact Report and Technical Appendices.
2 „
Class I disposal sites are those at which complete protection is
provided for all time for the quality of ground and surface waters
from all wastes deposited, therein, and against hazard to public
health and wildlife resources". California State Water Lawsj
Subchapter 15, Article 1.
Group 1 wastes are defined to include those wastes which consist
of or contain toxic substances. Group 2 wastes consist of or.
contain chemically or biologically decomposable material which does
not include toxic substances nor those capable of significantly
impairing the quality of useful waters and includes municipal solid
wa'ste. Group 3 wastes consist entirely of non-water soluble,
nondecomposable inert solids (California State Water Resources
Control Board). '•..'.
24€
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Table 1
Site Area, Lifetime and Capacity
Site
Area
Lifetime
1
2
'3
4
28
135
51
125
acres
acres
acres
acres
1
25
10
25
year
+ years
+ years
+ years
Capacity
200,000 cubic yards
250,000,000 cubic yards
4,000,000 cubic yards
26,000,000 cubic yards
Sites 1 and 2 were within the drainage of the Padre Juan Canyon; Site 3,
part of Jovan Canyon to the westj and Site 4 in Faria Canyon to the
east. All four sites are within two miles of the Pacific Ocean.
Although so close to the coastline, the area is an oil producing area,
and in this sense was in industrial use. There were no producing wells
within any of the sites proper, but wells did border each of the sites.
Other than these oil-producing operations, land immediately adjacent to
the sites was undeveloped. However, land immediately to the north of
the area was in agricultural use, and land along the coastline in
residential use.
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The VRCSD proposed to develop Site 1 as a short-term facility to be
utilized while one of the larger sites was being developed. Ultimately,
three or all four of the sites would have been developed. However, the
sequence of development was not determined prior to the abandonment of
the siting attempt.
III. HISTORY OF FACILITY DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC RESPONSE
In order to develop and operate a hazardous waste management facility in
California, at least three permits are needed. These are: 1) land use
permit; 2) Regional Water Quality Board Waste Discharge Requirements
(permit); and 3) Department of Health Services permit. The land use
permit, which is issued by the local city or, in unincorporated areas,
county planning board, certifies that development and operation of the
proposed facility would not conflict with existing land use or land use
plans. In practice, it indicates that the facility has local political
support. A significant factor in gaining this support is facility
compatibility with local land use. This permit is a precondition for
the granting of the other two permits. The decision of the local
planning board can be appealed to the local board of supervisors.
The Regional Water Quality Control Board Waste Discharge Requirements
specify what types of wastes the facility may receive and what measures
must be taken to prevent groundwater pollution. These requirements are
in effect a permit since they will not be issued if the geology and/or
hydrology of the site are inappropriate.
The Department of Health Services permit is for the most part based on
the existence of proper procedures for aboveground handling of chemical
wastes. The procedures should include a contingency plan for "an
accident or accidental discharge."1
In addition, two other permits are often required, depending on the
particular types of storage, processing or disposal of chemcial wastes
that are proposed. If hazardous wastes are to be disposed of with
municipal solid wastes, then the State Solid Waste Management Board
grant a permit for the facility. This permit regulates the disposal of
residential and commercial refuse so that nuisances are not created.
The power to grant this permit can be granted by the Solid Waste
Management Board to local political entities, such as the local city or
county government. .
If some sort of evaporation, neutralization or incineration process or
any other process which will produce a significant amount of atmospheric
emissions is proposed, a permit will be required from the Regional Air
Pollution Control District. Evaporation ponds, for instance, are
permitted as emission points. Depending on existing air quality in the
region, this permit can be very restrictive as to types of processes
and/or wastes accepted.
California Department of Health Services, Hazardous Waste
Regulations, Chapter 2, Article 4, "Hazardous Waste Permit".
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Permits may also be required from agencies such as the Coast Regional
Commission, if the proposed site is located in any of the areas which
are under their purview.
The Padre Juan facility would have required permits or approvals from
the following agencies: ,
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
Ventura County Planning Commission
Ventura County Board of Supervisors
Regional Water Quality Control Board
California State Department of Health Services
California State Solid Waste Management Board.
South Central Coast Regional Commission
California State Highway Commission
California State Utilities Commission
The approval of the last two agencies would have been required for the
VRCSD to construct an interchange, which would have in turn necessitated
the moving of a railroad right-of-way. In the case of the Padre Juan
facility, a permit from the Regional Air Pollution Control District
would not have been required.
The responsibility for disposal of solid wastes in Ventura County was
transferred by the County Board of Supervisors to the VRCSD on July 1,
1972. As noted above, Ventura County has been one of the fastest
growing areas in the country over the last deoade and the VRCSD
recognized that it faced a critical solid waste problem. In addition,
it was at that time anticipated that the Santa Clara landfill in Ventura
County—which accepted Group 2 and 3 wastes—would be closed in 1976 in
compliance with a Ventura County ordinance which prohibits renewal of
land use permits for privately operated landfills. The only existing
site for the disposal of Group 1 (hazardous) wastes was a landfill
located in the Simi Valley, over 30 miles from the Ventura City area.
Therefore, the VRCSD felt it: necessary to site a new facility for the
disposal of both hazardous and other wastes in the latter area.
In the summer of 1972, the City of Ventura and VRCSD filed for and
received a grant from U.S. EPA to develop a model sanitary landfill.
However, the site chosen for, this landfill—known as the Lake Canyon
site—was shown to have environmental problems that could not be
mitigated. In particular, trucks going to and from the facility would
have had to travel through a residential area and by a school. As a
result, there was intense public opposition to this site. The
opposition was initially expressed at meetings held by the VRCSD to
receive local public input to the siting process. Local elected
officials played a significant role in having this siting attempt
abandoned. This was accomplished when the City of Ventura, the. "Lead
Agency" for the EPA grant, decided to abandon it. ,
The VRCSD then retained a consulting firm to evaluate other potential
landfill sites in the vicinity of the City of Ventura. The report
prepared by this consultant indicated that a site in Welden Canyon would
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be the most suitable for use as a landfill for hazardous and municipal
solid wastes. However, a subsequent investigation by VRCSD revealed
that the area had "groundwater development potential and.;.was
potentially suitable for housing".1
It was therefore decided to remove this site from consideration. The
search for sites was then moved away from the City of Ventura to the
coastal area northwest of the city to avoid conflicts with existing
residences and residential development. This decision was made in-house
at VRCSD and was not subject to public review. Officials of VRCSD have
indicated they felt that the proposed landfill would not be incompatible
with existing oil producing activities. The Padre Juan Canyon area was
identified as a potential site, and studies of its geological and
geotechnical feasibility were conducted for VRCSD by consulting firms.
These studies indicated that there were suitable sites within the canyon
area for a Class I landfill.
During the Spring of 1974, while the search for a site along the north
coast was still going on, VRCSD sought a citizens group to talk to.
This was done in order to try to head off public opposition, a lesson
learned during the Lake Canyon siting attempt. During the Lake Canyon
attempt it was found to be very difficult to elicit public concerns
outside of the formal and often adversarial public hearing process.
However, there was no citizens group in the Padre Juan area. Therefore,
VRCSD called a public meeting at a local school. ' At this meeting they
described the siting process and the type of facility they were trying
to site, and invited those in attendance to form a liaison committee.
Such a committee was formed, made up entirely of local residents.
In a short time, however, the liaison committee became the focus of
opposition to the committee. Led by a woman who was a substantial
landowner in the area, the commitee marshalled the support of both
summer and year-round residents of the area. The committee did not
attempt to negotiate with the VRCSD. Instead, it took its case directly
to county elected officials, some of whom had homes in the vicinity of
Padre Juan Canyon. Due in part to the affluence of the affected
community, the committee-was eventually very successful in enlisting the
support of these political leaders in their opposition to the facility.
Because of the scope of this project, an Environmental Impact Report was
required (as per the California Environmental Quality Act of 1970). On
June 20, 1974, VRCSD announced that it had hired a consulting firm to
prepare this EIR. Analyses of the environmental impact of the proposed
facility were carried out during June, July and August, 1974. The first
Public Opportunity meeting—to receive public input and comment on the
proposed site and facility—was held on July 17. The reaction of the
public, and of local officials to all four proposed sites was entirely
negative. Public concerns expressed at this meeting included the wisdom
of selecting a site in a seismically sensitive area so near the ocean;
VRCSD, Padre Juan Canyon final EIR, ibid.
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odors, dust and litter from the facility; the possibility the facility
would attract scavengers (i.e., seagulls and rodents); traffic; and the
effect on the quality of life in Ventura County, especially in terms of
induced development. Other problems frequently mentioned were the
possibility of contaminating the ocean and the visual impact of the
facility on what is otherwise a relatively unspoiled area. There was
also considerable feeling that the problem of hazardous waste disposal
could be mitigated or avoided if a comprehensive resource recovery
program were established. Finally, there was opposition to accepting
wastes from neighboring Santa Barbara County. A second Public
Opportunity meeting was held on August 22. Again, no support for these
sites was expressed and the same public concerns were voiced.
The draft EIR was submitted to the VRCSD board on September 26. Adverse
impacts identified in the EIR included the production of noxious odors
and gases from fill-areas, particularly from Site 4; that an area of
Site 4 would be visible to some residents along pld Route 101 and to
traffic on U.S. 101; that there would be .an increase in truck and auto
traffic,(if the interchange directly to the facility were -built, this -
increase would be very small); and that there would be an increase in
erosion, runoff and dust from the canyons. The VRCSD Board held a
public hearing'on the EIR on November 14. All 15 speakers—all of whom
were residents .from the Padre Juan vicinity—at .this hearing spoke
against the use ,of these sites as landfills of any type. Letters from
the public received by the board were also in opposition to the
facility.. Concerns expressed included the facility's,impact on the
aesthetics of the area and the adverse impacts projected in the EIR.
However, comments from state agencies on the EIR were generally
favorable, in that they concurred with the findings. The only
criticisms of the report were' in effect requests for more information.
At the November 14 meeting the Board deferred its decision on whether or
not to go ahead with the facility until Deconber 12 to give the ,
consultant time to respond to comments on the draft EIR. The December
12 meeting was later postponed to January 30, 1975 to give the
consultant more time to respond to these comments. In response to
public and official comments, the final EIR proposed several changes in
the project. These included: 1) limitation of all project operations
to the area more than 1,000 yards from the coast;! and 2) construction
of an interchange on Route 101 to provide direct access to the site.
However, these changes did not materially affect the level of opposition
to the facility. The Board held its second hearing on the EIR on
January 30, 1975.. This hearing attracted about 175 people, a large
percentage of whom were residents from the Padre Juan Canyon vicinity.
It was.reported in the local press that the only people to voice support
for the facility were VRCSD staff members. Concerns expressed by the
public were generally the same as at the first hearing — aesthetics,
environmental pollution, and traffic impacts in particular.
To limit the intrusion of the facility into the Coastal Zone.
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The Board then voted to conclude the public hearing but to continue the
meeting until February 13 to allow themselves time to discuss the mat-
ter. On February 13, the Board voted (13-8) to abandon the proposed
site. One particular reason for the outcome of the vote was that the
three members of the County Board of Supervisors on the VRCSD Board were
all opposed to the project. These three members constituted a majority
of the County Board of Supervisors. They would have been able to deny
the project its land use permit even if the Planning Commission had de-
cided to grant one.
IV.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
July 1, 1972
Ventura County Board of Supervisors transfers re-
sponsibility for county solid waste to VRCSD.
1973 — VRSCD tries but fails in two hazardous waste facility siting at-
tempts. .
Spring, 1974 — VRCSD holds public meeting in north coast area to de-
scribe the siting process. Assists in the formation of
liaison committee. Committee subsequently becomes
source of opposition to the facility.
June 20, 1974- — VRCSD announces it has hired an engineering consulting
firm to prepare an EIR for the Padre Juan sites.
July 17, 1974
First Public Opportunity meeting held by engineering
consulting firm to receive public input and comment.
The reaction to the facility is entirely negative.
August 22, 1974 — Second Public Opportunity meeting is held with same
result.
September 26, 1974 — Draft EIR is submitted to the VRCSD board.
November 14, 1974 — VRCSD board holds hearing on draft EIR. All 15
speakers speak against the proposed site. Decision
on site is deferred to December 12 to give en-
gineering consultant time to respond to comments.
December 12, 1974 — Meeting postponed to January 30, 1975 to give con-
sultant more time to respond to comments.
January 30, 1975 — VRCSD holds second hearing on EIR. Hearing is
well-attended. Of all speakers, only VRCSD staff
support the facility. Board votes to conclude hear-
ing but to continue the meeting until February 13 to
allow themselves time to disucss the matter.
February 13, 1975 — VRCSD board votes, 13-8, to abandon the proposed
site.
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V.
ATTEMPTS TO SECURE SUPPORT
As noted above, the VRCSD's efforts were directed more towards
alleviating concern about the facility among residents in the vicinity
of the proposed site than to developing support for it among other
concerned groups. These efforts included:
o The public meeting held in Spring, 1974 for residents in
the vicinity of the proposed site to:
- describe the proposed facility and the siting
process; and
- assist in the formation of a citizen liaison
committee.
VI.
o Public Opportunity Meetings held to receive public input
and comment on the site for inclusion in the EIR.
o Individual responses were sent to all communications
received in regard to the facility.
SUMMARY EVALUATION
Ultimately, insufficient support for the Padre Juan site was generated,
yet while the actual attempts to secure support for the facility cannot
be faulted, they did not go far enough. The prevailing mood in the
county at that time was not at all favorable for siting this facility,
as is evidenced by the failure of two'. previous siting attempts. In
particular, it appears that not enough effort was made to secure support
for the facility from either the industries which would use it or from
county residents who did not live in proximity to the proposed site.
One such person—who was involved in the opposition to the Lake Canyon
site—noted that while she had been in favor of the Padre Juan site, she
had not become involved and had not attended any of the public hearings.
No explicit attempt was made to involve such interested persons.
Although technical issues were raised by the EIR and in the public
hearings, the ultimate-decision not to pursue this siting attempt was
based on political rather than technical factors. The failure by VRCSD
to marshal the support of those of its constituencies who had reason to
favor this site (i.e., industry and non-abutters) enabled the residents
of the Padre Juan Canyon area to gather sufficient political support to
defeat the, project. ..;•.-•'
During the series of public hearings, a -number'.of issues and concerns
were raised by the public. These are summarized below.
Site suitability - Particular concern was expressed at the selection of
a site so near the coast. Aspects that were frequently mentioned were
the possibility of contaminating the ocean and the visual impact of the
facility on what is otherwise a relatively unspoiled area. Another
issue was the technical suitability of the site itself. Here concern
was expressed about the likelihood of waste materials leaking out of the
facility, especially given the possibility of a severe earthquake in the
area.
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Facility Operations - Odors, dust and litter from the facility were a
concern, as was the possibility that the facility would attract
scavengers (i.e., seagulls and rodents). Traffic induced by the
facility—as well as the attendant noise and air pollution effects—was
also an issue.
Quality of Life in Ventura County - The public, and especially local
residents, expressed concern about the effect the facility would, have on
the quality of life in Ventura County. Their perception was that this
quality of life was strongly tied to the relatively underdeveloped state
of that part of the county and the lack of environmental pollution.
They expected the proposed facility to increase development and to
pollute the environment.
Resource Recovery - There was considerable public feeling that the whole
problem of waste disposal could be avoided if a comprehensive resource
recovery program were established.
VII. FACTORS LEADING TO PUBLIC OPPOSITION/ACCEPTANCE
The following were major factors leading to public opposition to the
proposed site.
o The proximity of the site to the Pacific Ocean and to an
area of expensive homes.
o
o
o
Failure of two previous siting attempts.
Location of the site in an area of high seismic activity.
The public expectation that the site would accept wastes
from Santa Barbara County.
VIII. RETROSPECTIVE VIEWS
Area residents' comments on the siting process were generally consistent
with their satisfaction with the result of the siting process. The only
concern expressed was with the VRCSD for even attempting to site a waste
disposal facility in what they perceive as a sensitive area. An
official with the Regional Water Quality Control Board noted that there
had been better sites than Padre Juan available to VRCSD at the time,
from both technical and public relations standpoints. However, the
Padre Juan site was chosen because it would have been less costly to
develop than the alternative sites.
IX.
GENERAL COMMENTS
The VRCSD general manager stated that siting hazardous waste facilities
had become sufficiently difficult that the state or federal governments
would have to at least own, if not operate them. He felt that rather
than trying to purchase new sites, a preferable location would be
somewhere on the tremendous amounts of land already owned by government.
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There are, he felt, a number of infrequently mentioned factors which are
important in finding a truly acceptable site. These are: 1) access by
rail, since this has the potential to be the safest way of transporting
hazardous wastes; and 2) more use of resource recovery to reduce the
quantities of wastes which are disposed of.
Limiting, at least initially, the types of hazardous wastes accepted at
a new facility was mentioned as a possible strategy for gaining public
acceptance. Relatively less hazardous waste would be accepted during
the first' few years of facility operation. -Only then, when the local
public presumably has confidence in the facility, will more hazardous
waste be accepted. ,
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SCA CHEMICAL WASTE SERVICES INCORPORATED
MODEL CITY, NEW YORK
I.
INTRODUCTION
Since 1972 a hazardous waste facility, now owned by SCA Services, has
operated in Model City, New York. While the facility has expanded its
operations over the years, the basic technologies — landfilling,
treatment, and storage — employed at the site have not changed since
operations began. The Model City facility replaced an earlier, similiar
facility located in Blasdell, New York, some 30 miles to the south.
The facility was sited and began operations without opposition.
Beginning in 1973 area officials and residents began to raise concerns
about on-site operations and spills from trucks transporting waste to
the facility. Concerns have evolved into opposition and a substantial
group of local residents and officials appear to be unalterably
committed to closing the facility.
During the seven years of the facility's operation a variety of attempts
have been made to provide public information, to solve problems giving
rise to opposition, and to address in other ways public concerns.
Although there is widespread acknowledgement of some changes for the
better, these changes have not substantially altered the positions held
by opponents.
II.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The Model City facility is located a few miles west of Ransomville, New
York within the Towns of Porter and Lewiston.* Prior to its develop-
ment as a hazardous waste facility, the site was federally owned and
known as the Lake Ontario Ordinance Works. It was used for research
purposes by Olin-Mathison as a part of the Manhattan Project until the
1960s. The resulting radioactive contamination precluded any use of the
site until a government "clean-up" effort reduced contamination to a
level acceptable for industrial use. Much of the surrounding land
remains in the hands of the federal government. Abutting the site are a
number of government or government-sponsored facilities including a
tower immediately to the south which contains the world's largest
concentration of radium. (The tower is reportedly leaking radioactivity
and is a source of concern to area residents and officials.) The
closest non-industrial uses are a public school complex and scattered
residences within a mile and one-half of the site.
In New York, the town is the jurisdictional level immediately
below that of the county. As in a township, residents of a town
elect a board of supervisors and the town government provides some
basic services (e.g., sewers) to its residents.
25B
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Access to the site is by a,two-lane road and the site is about five
miles from the Robert Moses Parkway, a limited access divided highway.
The site is also served by a rail spur; however, rail service was
discontinued in 1978 because of track deterioration.
SCA environmental officials characterized the hydrogeolbgy of the
developable portion of the site as good. (They indicated that a maximum
of 200 acres would be developable.) An environmental assessment1 of
the site listed a range of permeabilities for jLn situ soils at levels
significantly more permeable than the pending RCRA standard. The site
is also traversed by Four Mile Creek which empties into Twelve Mile
Creek and Lake Ontario. Both creeks are subject to intermittent flows
particularly during the dry summer months.
The facility provides treatment, processing, and disposal services.
There are seven existing landfills, a number of which are closed, as
well as a proposed eighth landfill. Because of the permeability of in
situ soils, SCA uses a compacted clay liner (minimally two-feet of
10~7 cm/sec clay) underlain by a Hypalon liner.2 A leachate
collection is installed above the clay liner. SCA staff estimated that
developable landfill capacity could have a remaining life of 20 to 25
years.
Treatment facilities are primarily designed to handle aqueous waste
streams. Facilities for the distillation of solvents and for fuel
blending are also on-site. There are five lagoons for the storage of
treated liquid effluent. According to a Niagara County Health
Department official, SCA is currently storing about 90 million gallons
of effluent suitable for discharge. Also on-site are a temporary drum
storage area and a laboratory for analysis of incoming wastes. SCA also
operates a waste hauling service and, according to the draft EIS, 80
percent of accepted wastes are hauled by SCA trucks. Provisions for
post-closure care will follow applicable state or federal regulations.
The facility accepts a broad spectrum of hazardous wastes. Specifically
excluded, however, are shock-sensitive, radioactive, flammable (unless
capable of being blended for fuel), and extremely hazardous wastes such
as dioxin. These wastes come from a multi-state region as well as the
province of Ontario. According to the draft EIS, 1.7 percent of accepted
wastes are generated in the Erie-Niagara counties area, 42 percent
within New York state, and the remaining 58 percent from out of New York
state.
Draft Environmental Impact Statement for a SCA Chemical Waste
Services, Inc. Facility in Model City, New York, prepared by Fred C.
Hart Associates, Inc. for the New York Department of Environmental
Conservation, Region 9 Headquarters on behalf of SCA Services,
Boston, Massachusetts, February 27, 1979.
Opponents claim that the earliest landfills, developed prior to
SCA's ownership, are unlined.
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The Model City facility is but one of four hazardous waste facilities
owned by SCA Services of Boston, Massachusetts. SCA staff estimated
permanent employment at Model City at 60 to 75 workers. The number of
workers increases significantly in the summer when soil is neither
frozen nor so muddy as to restrict work on the site. SCA's other
hazardous waste facilities are in Illinois, New Jersey, and South
Carolina. SCA is the third largest waste services company in the nation
and reported total revenues of over $180 million in fiscal 1978.
Model City is located in northern Niagara County (estimated 1976
population, 240,000). That section of the county is relatively rural in
character and historically has been a farming area. More recently it
has developed residentially as employees from Niagara Falls have moved
into the area. Model City is within ten miles of Niagara Falls and
within 25 miles of Buffalo. While Niagara Falls has been linked
historically to the beauty of American and Horseshoe Falls and the
attendant tourist industry, the city is a major manufacturing center of
chemicals, electrical machinery, and paper products. Together with
Buffalo, the entire metropolitan area is the second largest in New York
state. As such it is the major trade, service, financial, cultural and
transportation center for western New York and southeastern Ontario. In
recent years Love Canal and other less publicized hazardous and radio-
active waste dumps have made area residents extremely sensitive to the
dangers of improperly disposed wastes.
Ill- HISTORY OF FACILITY DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC RESPONSE1
When originally sited in the early 1970s the facility was subject to
local zoning and state health department regulations enforced by the
Niagara County Health Department (NCHD). The state Department of
Environmental Conservation (DEC) was formed in 1972 and began issuing
permits for waste management facilities in 1973. In 1977 these
regulations were revised, in part to address more specifically hazardous
waste. As a result, existing hazardous waste management facilities were
required to apply for new, more restrictive permits.
The Model City facility is subject to the latest DEC permits (there are
separate construction and operation permits). Because of the facility's
The history of facility operations and the public and regulatory
response to those operation is one that has become increasingly
complicated. To clarify this flow of events, a number of incidents
have not been described in this section; these generally are
spills either at the site or on roads leading to the site, some
smaller fines imposed by DEC as a result of these spills, and tactics
considered but not actively pursued by opponents. The implications
of these omissions are subsumed by other events described in this
section.
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need for discharging treated effluent and due to other peculiarities of
the site and facility operations (addressed later in this section) a
number of other permits or approvals are required. As listed in the
draft EIS, these include a U. S. Corps of Engineers dredge and fill
permit, state certification that no water quality standards are
contravened during construction of the eighth landfill, several permits
from DEC and others from the state transportation department in
connection with installing a pipe to discharge into the Niagara River,
and three local permits. Local permits have been the subject of
extensive legal action (as will be described) and it is unclear if all
local, permits would be required. ,
The existing Model City facility replaced a similar facility located in
Blasdell, New York just south of Buffalo. According to local papers,
the facility was the brainchild of two Buffalo area men with extensive
backgrounds in chemical manufacturing. 'These men founded Chem-Trol
Pollution Services, Inc. in 1969 with the concept of recovering valuable
materials from waste streams, destroying the remaining hazardous wastes,
and burying the innocuous residuals. The 20-acre Blasdell site was
purchased in August 1969, and initial operations began in July, 1970.
The Chem-Trol facility operated at Blasdell for almost two years; that
period was marked by a growth in operational capabilities and in volume
of business. Incrementally, facilities for thermal oxidation (i.e., an
incinerator), waste neutralization, the removal of metals from wastes,
the positive control of salts resulting from treatment procedures (i.e.,
impoundments), and laboratory analysis were added. Because there was a
need to stockpile an inventory of wastes, lagoons and storage tanks were
added. During this period employment grew from five to 35 workers.
The operation of',the Chem-Trol facility in Blasdell did:not proceed
without public notice. Opponents of the Model City facility, citing
local officials in the Blasdell area, and the local press/reported that
the facility on numerous occa.sions operated in violation of applicable
environmental, regulations and that six.formal pollution complaints were
lodged. In July, 1972, several hundred drums exploded and burned at the
site. Area residents reportedly feared that the explosion would lead to
pollution of an area creek. As late as August, 1978, (over six years
after closure), residents complained of odors from the site and
expressed skepticism about claims that wastes buried on-site were
neutralized.
By late 1971 Chem-Trol's growth led company officials to seek another,
larger site. According to an article in the Buffalo Courier-Express,
"Chem-Trol officials with the help of the Army Corps of Engineers
surveyed several sites. In early 1972 the General Services
Administration (GSA) declared the Model City site surplus property.
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According to newspaper accounts and those interviewed1, the selection
of the Model City site was based in part on.its size, its hydro-
geological characteristics, and its relative isolation. Chem-Trol
purchased 240 acres of land and in February, 1972, closed the Blasdell
facility and began to move to the Model City site.
When the Model City facility was developed few regulations applied. Be-
fore GSA declared the site surplus federal property, the Atomic Energy
Commission stipulated that, because of radioactive contamination on-
site, the property would be restricted to relatively inactive uses; The
zoning status prior to Chem-Trol's purchase was industrial; thus the
proposed industrial use was not out of conformance with local reg-
ulations. The major regulatory action was conducted by NCHD which at
that time implemented the state health department's sanitation code reg-
ulations for waste facilities. Chem-Trol submitted its plan for de-
veloping the facility to NCHD. That plan called for waste water treat-
ment, secure landfilling, recycling of waste, and waste disposal via
fuel blending. At that time Chem-Trol had arranged for the lease of
tanks to store liquid wastes prior to their treatment. The original
plan also included an incinerator, but this operated for only a short
period before it was closed because of air pollution problems. NCHD re-
view of the plan included a review by the Town of Porter which wrote
that it had no objections to the proposal. NCHD then granted a one-year
permit for 1972. In 1973 NCHD renewed the permit for an additional
period of one year.
In May, 1972 the Model City facility began operations after investing
about $2 million in land and equipment. For more than a year the facil-
ity operated without particular concern on the part of the public. Con-
tinued growth led to expansions in employment so that by late 1972 there
were 80 workers, more than double the number when Blasdell closed.
The lack of concern during this period appears to have stemmed from a
lack of any noticeable operational accidents and a perception of the
facility as a resource recovery and reclamation operation, not a land
disposal operation. While land disposal has always been part of the
facility's operations, area residents claim that the higher costs of re-
covering and treating hazardous wastes led Chem-Trol to change
The original founders of Chem-Trol are no longer associated with
the Model City facility. Some of those key figures subsequently
founded a waste service company in Niagara Falls, a subsidiary of
which operates the only other DEC-permitted hazardous waste
landfill in New York. As of April, 1979, that company was under
attack from local officials and citizens. Concerns had been raised
over the hazardous waste landfill and charges had been made that the
company was trying to monopolize solid waste collection in the
Niagara Falls area. The latter charge stemmed from the company's
contract with Hooker Chemicals to provide solid waste for a planned
Hooker waste-to-energy recovery plant.
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operations. Consequently there was an increased use of landfilling
contrary to original plans and intentions. Press coverage of«. the
facility during this initial period was quite favorable and focused on
the recycling of wastes and the destruction of the hazardous residuals.
Chem-Trol officials were quoted as saying that their treatment and
processing procedures resulted in "no effluent whatsoever..." arid that
the only substances leaving the site were saleable residues, steam, and
carbon dioxide.. The solid remnants remaining after treatment were
buried in "scientific landfills" developed according to a proprietary
process. Company officials claimed "zero ground percolation." The
articles clearly portrayed Chem-Trol as an environmentally innovative
company which provided alternatives to the dumping of wastes on land or
into waterways. •
The initial response to the facility was apparently predicated.on this
image of recycling and recovery. The then president of Chem-Trol made
presentations to local officials during this period and reportedly
stressed the recycling aspects of the facility. A Lewiston town
supervisor indicated that at that time recycling was ranked with
motherhood and that the general response to recycling was very positive.
A Porter town supervisor indicated that the return of that land to local
tax roles was viewed as a benefit by the town and a reason for the early
favorable response.
In 1973 Chem-Trol was bought by SCA Services of Boston, Massachusetts.
With this purchase Chem-Trol became an SCA subsidiary and retained its
•original management staff.
Local attitudes began to shift in September of 1973. That month piles
of salts generated by operations were discovered by local officials.
The salts were reportedly haphazardly stored and had resulted in the
destruction of trees and other vegetation. While the piles of salt were
the focus of concern, a Lewiston official also charged that chemicals
had been dumped in the wrong places. Reportedly Chem-Trol made no
effort to clean up the salts and the Lewiston town board threatened the
firm with a lawsuit to force a clean-up.
The following spring a spill in Four Mile Creek resulted in a fish kill.
In March of 1974, NCHD concluded that phenol in the creek which had
originated from Chem-Trol was responsible for the fish kill. Chem-Trol
denied responsibility.
In September of 1974, Lewiston and Porter officials charged that
Chem-Trol was discharging liquid wastes (variously described as aqueous.
wastes and as untreated acids) illegally into Four Mile Creek and
thereby into Lake Ontario. There are a number of abandoned sewer lines
underlying the Model City site. Lewiston officials were reportedly
registering significant use of these lines at a lift station in the area
but could not explain where this "sewage" was coming from. In September
a Porter official noticed wastes flowing in Four Mile Creek. Upon
investigation he found that the wastes were coming from an abandoned
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sewer line which ran two feet underneath the creek bed. According to
that official the creek bed had been excavated above the line and the
line had been broken allowing wastes to flow into the creek. On
learning this Lewiston plugged the abandoned lines. .
Subsequent to the plugging of the sewer lines, Chem-Trol reportedly
constructed a number of storage lagoons on the site. Three months later
in December, 1974, DEC granted Chem-Trol a State Pollution Discharge
Elimination System (SPDES) permit to discharge liquid effluent into the
Niagara River. Chem-Trol, however, had no direct access to the river
and that lack of direct access has continued to plague the facility up
to the present day.
In the summer of 1975 SCA began to take more direct control of
Chem-Trol. A manager of an SCA solid waste operation in Connecticut was
sent to Chem-Trol to serve as a troubleshooter. In a relatively short
period the top management of Chem-Trol was fired. The troubleshooter
was promoted to vice president of operations (i.e., the top management
position at the facility). In a 1977 interview with the Niagara
Gazette, the vice president described on-site conditions when he arrived
as appalling, with "...thousands of drums... piled recklessly all
around, some of them rusty and leaking, or covered with rainwater." He
characterized the dangers of these conditions as "very real."
Consequently SCA began a campaign to reduce a backlog of unprocessed
wastes, to re-engineer parts of the facility, and to make additional
changes and improvements. Over the next two to three years SCA
reportedly spent between $500,000 and $1 million on improvements to the
facility.
In 1975 local jurisdictions showed signs of continued concern over the
facility. In July the Lewiston Town Attorney was told to consider legal
actions to restore vegetation to areas affected by the salt piles. In
November the Town of Porter issued a notice of violation of town zoning
law.1 This was appealed to the courts by Chem-Trol. A Porter town
supervisor also claimed that Chem-Trol was polluting the town's air and
water.
In early 1976 two incidents at the site fueled local concerns and led to
an increase in individual actions against Chem-Trol. In January a
reported 1,500 gallons of wastewater containing phenols, dissolved
metals, and organics spilled into Four Mile Creek, turning the creek and
the snow along its banks blue. Chem-Trol spent $50,000 cleaning the
water and NCHD claimed the spill posed no danger. The following month a
landfill caught fire and burned for several hours. A series of
explosions was reported during the fire.
The specific basis of this action was not determined. Subsequent
legal actions by the local jurisdictions and the decisions of
appellate courts would suggest both probable motives of the town
(i.e., restrictions of Chem-Trol operations) and cast doubt on their
legal viability.
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Regardless of the environmental or public health impacts, area residents
were alarmed. In the next few months the rate of complaints from
citizens in the area markedly increased. Though unsubstantiated, there
were reports of small explosions on the site. Beginning in January
officials from Lewiston and Porter began to work together to pressure
DEC into stricter enforcement of state regulations.
In July of 1976, Chem-Trol received.a shipment of 200 tons of pesticides
from Massachusetts. The director of DEC's regional office in .Buffalo
ordered a halt to the processing of the pesticides. Citing recent
spills and other incidents at the site, the director stated that
procesing could not continue until Chem-Trol could prove that no
environmental damage would result. Chem-Trol's vice president claimed
that the company already had permits to dispose of pesticides and had
been doing so for four years. In addition he explained that DEC's
Albany office had been notified of the shipment. After a meeting
between officials of Chem-Trol, DEC's Buffalo office, and NCHD, DEC
issued approval for the disposal of the pesticides subject to several
conditions.
In September, DEC's Buffalo office director requested Chem-Trol to stop
using one of its landfills because it had become filled,with a reported
3 million gallons of rainwater. Claiming that the order,would stop most
or all site operations, Chem-Trol ignored the request.
In October, another spill took place at the site when a lagoon wall
collapsed. The wall had been undermined by a bulldozer. Chem-Trol said
the bulldozer operator's actions were an unintentional mistake; local
critics claimed it was intentional. .DEC investigators studying the
spill from the lagoon discovered a hose leading from a treatment lagoon
to a manhole which connected to Four Mile Creek. Although investigators
saw no material flowing into the manhole, local critics were convinced
that Chem-Trol was illegally discharging into the creek. DEC's
investigation led to a fine against the company for the lagoon spill.
During this same period resident and officials' attitudes began to
change from concern towards opposition. In September, before the lagoon
spill, a Porter town supervisor citing residents' complaints of noxious
odors 1 called for a closing of the facility. In October residents .-
began a petition drive which eventually collected about 2,000
signatures. The petitions, which called for an end to pollution caused
by Chem-Trol, were delivered to the town boards of Porter and Lewiston.
The village board of Youngstowti, a community five miles northwest of the
site, called for the closing of the facility. The town board of
Lewiston asked the town attorney to determine how a local government
An NCHD official explained during the site visit that odor
complaints are most frequent during summer months. Because of
seasonal thermal inversions odorous gases are prevented from rising
thus leading to their dispersion in the area around the site.
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Chem-Trol. Also in October, citizens from around the area formed a
group called Operation Clean with the purpose of closing the facility.
By the end of 1976 the local opponents had begun to seek additional
avenues for fighting Chem-Trol. Local jurisdictions had begun to seek
consultants to perform independent analyses of the site. Local
residents claiming the facility posed a danger to the water table sought
state and federal action to close it. The area U.S. congressman had
also become involved. Having asked DEC and U.S. EPA to investigate
citizens' complaints, he had received assurances that Chem-Trol was
following those agencies' recommendations for improvements. DEC
indicated it would regularly report to the congressman on Chem-Trol.
In December of 1976, the Niagara Gazette reported that DEC had given
serious consideration to a summary abatement order which would have
closed Chem-Trol. Without explanation, the report indicated that DEC
rejected taking such an action. Subsequently the director of DEC's
Buffalo office, who had earlier criticized the company, termed it an
essential service for disposing of toxic wastes and stated that
Chem-Trol was making a determined effort at correcting past problems.
In January of 1977, the state supreme court issued a decision on the
Town of Porter's zoning suit against Chem-Trol which had been initiated
in November, 1975. Overturning a lower court decision, the court ruled
that after the fact opposition by the town could not stop Chem-Trol from
developing the site.
The same month Chem—Trol announced that it would no longer process
liquid wastes and that it planned to lay off about 70 employees, over
half the peak work force. The company explained its decision in terms
of the public concerns raised about liquid wastes and new DEC
requirements for handling such wastes. It was claimed that these
requirements would cost $30,000. Solid waste disposal would continue.
In spite of this statement and subsequent problems, liquid wastes
continued to be accepted.
In February a spill containing phenol occurred; a leak was found and
corrected. Although DEC admonished Chem-Trol, it took no further
action. This failure by DECjjito take stronger action was cited as
contributing to citizens' disillusionment with DEC. As a result DEC
became part of the problem from the point of view of local opponents.
By March the local jurisdictions had hired a Buffalo consulting firm to
test for pollution at the site. Although the firm spent some months
attempting to collect data, local officials indicated a complete report
was never prepared. The partial results of the study were considered
very unsatisfactory. Those officials pointed particularly to
Cheia-Trol's refusal to allow the consultants on the site as a cause of
the report's incompleteness.
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Ihroughout this period Chem-Trol's problems with discharging treated
affluent had not been solved. By the spring of 1977 one .options for
resolving the problem had been identified. That option would be to use
a 42-inch sewer line owned by the Town of Lewiston. The line ran to the
Niagara River and was not in use. With the active support of DEC
Chem-Trol sought to lease the line from the town. As Chem-Trol already
had a DEC^permit to discharge into the river, the lease of the sewer
line represented the only barrier to disposing of millions of gallons of
treated effluent. The line has reportedly been contaminated and some
opponents claim the contaminant is PCB-laden sludge. It was also
reported that Chem-Trol offered to decontaminate the line if the company
was allowed to use it. Without the use of the line, Chem-Trol claimed
it would have to close. Whether the town board of Lewiston would
approve Chem-Trol's request became a major focus of the controversy.
In late spring and early summer of 1977, the controversy began to heat
up and positions began to polarize. In May DEC specifically asked
Lewiston to approve Chem-Trol's use of the sewer line. An NCHD
official, responsible for weekly monitoring and inspection of the
facility, declared that the closing of Chem-Trol would precipitate a
decline in the economic and environmental health of the area and a
rise in illegal dumping of hazardous wastes. He said that Chem-Trol's
top management had done a "tremendous" job in the past year, cleaning up
the site. Opponents were declaring that the Chem-Trol management was
inept, incompetent, and dishonest. The president of an industrial park
near the site claimed adverse impacts to his ability to promote the park
because of Chem-Trol. In June local officials and representatives
appealed to the governor of New York to intercede on their behalf. In
an editorial that month the Niagara Gazette defined pollution as the
sole legitimate issue. Should the company be able to operate without
perceptibly lowering environmental quality, the paper said it would be
happy to have Chem-Trol in Niagara County.
At a June meeting the Lewiston town board delayed a vote on the sewer
line question and asked Chem-Trol for a list of hazardous wastes
accepted by the facility. On the basis that the data were proprietary,
Chem-Trol denied the request. In a related action, DEC announced that
it would hold a public hearing in late July on a Chem-Trol permit
modification including the land application of treated effluent.
In July the Town of Porter again served Chem-Trol with a notice of
zoning violation. The town charged that the company did not receive a
local excavation permit before developing a new landfill. Chem-Trol
ignored the notice and appealed to the courts. The state Supreme Court
then temporarily enjoined any further excavation work during the appeal,
Before the Supreme Court, Chem-Trol argued that DEC had sole authority
over hazardous waste management facilities. DEC, however, denied this
and affirmed the validity of the local permit. In late July the Supreme
Court ruled that the local excavation permit was necessary before work
could be resumed on the landfill. Town officials indicated they would
closely study the application for the excavation permit.
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Also in July the Niagara County legislators established the Niagara
County Environmental Management Council (NCEMC). Composed of various
county elected and regulatory officials NCEMC was designed to act as a
neutral party and to issue a report on Chem-Trol. A. budget of $15,000
was allocated for the study. Chem-Trol pledged full cooperation with
the study, provided NCEMC with requested data and opened the facility to
commission members. Over the next six months NCEMC proceeded with its
work.
In September the Porter town board by a one-vote margin denied
Chem-Trol's request for an excavation permit. The actual vote was three
to two for granting the permit. However, the Niagara County Planning
Board had denied Chem-Trol a special excavation permit three days'
earlier. As a result of the planning board's action, Chem-Trol needed
four out of five town board votes to receive the excavation permit.
Again, Chem-Trol appealed the town board decision to the local zoning
appeals board and asked for a stay of the ban on excavating. Although
DEC entered into the appeal in support of the company the zoning appeals
board denied the permit application in October.
In mid-November the area's U.S. congressman arranged a meeting of
opponents and officials from Chem-Trol, NCHD, DEC, and U.S. EPA. Prior
to that meeting local officials had appealed to the congressman for
support and he reportedly asked the U.S. president, to compel U.S. EPA to
monitor Chem-Trol. At the meeting itself the congressman declared that
"...our biggest problem is that the people here don't trust [elected and
regulatory] officials." The deputy administrator of EPA Region II
provided information on RCRA and indicated that he was not at the
meeting to close down the facility. According,to Chem-Trol opponents,
however, the EPA official promised that the Region II office would take
direct action if it could be proved that Chem-Trol polluted any
navigable water. Perhaps the most dramatic statement was made by an
NCHD official. He explained that the original permit issued by NCHD had
been reviewed and approved by town officials. This statement was
reportedly met with disbelief by the assembled citizens.
By the end of 1977 Lewiston elected officals directed the town attorney
to begin legal action against Chem-Trol, DEC, and U.S. EPA. This
decision was made after a December spill which resulted in another
DEC-iinposed fine.
In January of 1978 a series of meetings were held between Chem-Trol and
DEC officials. The meetings were designed to provide solutions to
Chem-Trol problems with liquid waste disposal. Specifically DEC would
determine whether a temporary permit for liquid wastes granted by DEC's
Albany office in October of 1977 would be continued. By mid-January
Chem-Trol had submitted a management plan which called for applying for
a permit for an additional storage lagoon by late February, identifying
outfalls for treated effluent by mid-March, submitting monthly waste
water reports, and limiting Chem-Trol's acceptance of liquid wastes to
450,000 gallons a month. DEC declared that the plan had fulfilled the
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agency's requirements. DEC, which had threatened to revoke the
temporary permit if.the plan was unacceptable, extended the temporary
permit until mid-March, 1978.
Various other parties involved in the controversy also took actions in
January. NCEMC, which had been, formed in July, 1977 by county
legislators, issued its report. That report found laws to be vague but
that Chem-trol appeared to be complying with those laws. It stated that
the facility should continue to operate but that monitoring should
increase. Long-term care was considered to be the major issue and the
ultimate objective for the site (i.e., its post-closure use) should be
defined. To facilitate communications between the concerned parties it
recommended that a panel of regulatory agency officials and citizens be
established. :
In late January a state appeals court lifted the ban on excavating a new
landfill. The ban had been in effect since July of 1977 when the Town
of Porter claimed that the company needed a local excavation permit. ' In
its decision the court stated that "...(the) record fails to show how
(the landfill) will result in irreparable injury..." and that delaying
excavation would be punitive to. Chem-Trol.
In January another spill occurred which discharged a "green acid" into
Lake Ontario. According to local officials, the spill ran for:five days
while local and DEC officials argued over whether the spill was from the
Chem-Trol facility. DEC finally determined that it was., By February,
armed with data generated by technical consultants that showed pollution
of navigable water, local officials and residents went to Region II to
seek federal monitoring of the facility. EPA declined tp do so.
Instead, according to local residents, EPA; indicated that such requests
were routinely turned over to state agencies (i.e., to DEC). Local
residents felt that* EPA had broken the promise to act made at the
November, 1977, public meeting.
In mid-March DEC finally held,public hearings on the water, discharge
permit. These hearings had originally been scheduled for the previous
July but had been postponed several times because of intervening events.
At issue was whether effluent could be discharged into Four Mile Creek
and thus into Lake Ontario. Although the existing permit allowed for
discharging into the Niagara River, Chem-Trol had no direct access to
the river. The Lewiston town board had not allowed the use of its sewer
line to the Niagara River. The company reportedly wanted to pursue both
discharge options.
The hearings proceeded for four days. The question of discharge into
Four Mile Creek was complicated by the fact that there is substantial
water flow in the creek only during a one-month period in the fall and
another in the spring. Any effluent discharge by Chem-Trol would have
to take place during these peak flow periods. Chem-Trol and its
consultants testified that the discharge would have no effect on fish in
the creek and that samples of fish from the creek showed no build up of
toxic materials. Opponents openly doubted the reliability
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of Chem-Trol's consultants and claimed the company had no credibility.
They also questioned the company's ability to monitor its discharges.
On the last day of the hearings Chem-Trol offered to pay the Town of
Porter to hire a security agency for 24-hour surveillance of discharge
operations.
In early April, three weeks after the hearing closed, DEC approved a
permit allowing Chem-Trol to discharge up to 450,000 gallons a day into
Four Mile Creek. This was subject to the condition that the volume of
discharge not exceed 5 percent of the volume of water in the creek. DEC
also announced that it would monitor discharge operations. Discharges
were then made by Chem-Trol and the company paid Porter to have the
operations surveilled. During the discharge operations a Porter town
supervisor acknowledged that more monitoring was taking place than ever
before but that he was still scared by the potential impacts of the
facility.
In June, 1978 the New York Department of Health declared a state of
emergency in the area around Love Canal, some ten miles south of Model
City site. This official confirmation of the disaster surrounding Love
Canal gave added impetus to the concerns of Chem-Trol's opponents.
Operation Clean and local officials had developed some ties to citizens
active in the Love Canal fight. In addition, various local leaders .
indicated that Niagara Falls residents fearful of the impacts,of Love
Canal had moved into Lewiston and Porter and had joined those concerned
about Chem-Trol.
Despite local attempts to restrict Chem-Trol's operation the company had
been able to expand its site.- Through a number of purchases beginning
in 1976, the land owned by SCA was increased so that by June of 1978 a
total of 860 acres were owned. In July, SCA confirmed a number of local
rumors by announcing that it was considering purchasing an old chemical
plant in Lewiston. If bought, the plant would be converted into a
treatment facility for hazardous wastes. (At the time of the site
visit, no further evidence of such a purchase could be determined.)
In late summer and early fall of 1978, actions against Chem-Trol
increased. In early September a resolution was proposed to the Niagara
County legislature to oppose all permits allowing Chem-Trol to
discharge. Opponents argued that there was a 50-50 chance of
contamination resulting from disposal operations while others countered
that the area should be responsible for the hazardous wastes it
generated and that the resolution was too broadly written. The
resolution was defeated by a vote of eight to four. The following month
local officials and citizens appealed to the state attorney—general to
investigate the site. The attorney-general's office subsequently began
an investigation. Citizens opposed to the facility also received a
boost when the United Auto Workers and the Farm Bureau independently
passed resolutions supporting the efforts of Operation Clean.
U.S. EPA became directly involved with Chem-Trol when the Region II
office granted a PCB disposal permit in October. During the public
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comment period EPA received a number of letters from area residents. An
EPA official, however, indicated that most complaints related to
discharge, not directly to PCB disposal. For some opponents EPA's
permit approval resulted in a wholesale plummetting of. the agency's
credibility. ,
In December opponents organized an informational meeting which attracted
a reported 700 persons. Speakers included local opposition leaders, the
assistant attorney-general of Illinois who had prosecuted SCA for its
Wilsonville facility, and a cancer researcher from the Roswell Park
Memorial Institute. The cancer researcher decried the burial of mixed
hazardous wastes and argued that thermal destruction was the only
responsible disposal method. She also stated that the Chem-Trol
facility could be the "Love Canal" of the future. The Illinois official
declared that Chem-Trol could be worse than Wilsonville.1 A Lewiston
town supervisor urged the state attorney-general to close Chem-Trol and
called on industry to neutralize the hazardous waste it generated.
In early 1979 opponents began to focus their attention on the Porter
town board and a proposed pipeline. Operation Clean presented that
board with a petition signed by 6,500 persons; the petition urged the
town to close the site.^ Soon after the petition, SCA-^ presented
plans to Niagara County officials for a 32,000-foot pipeline from the
site to the Niagara River. The pipeline, which would provide SCA access
for discharging into the river, required approvals from the Town of :
Porter, Niagara County, DEC, the state transportation department, and '
U.S. EPA. Operation Clean opposed the pipeline and in late January the
Porter town board unanimously voted to oppose the plan. In March
Niagara County gave its approval for SCA to construct the: pipeline on ,
county right-of-ways. Yet by mid-April Porter officials had still not
acted on SCA's request that the town approve the pipeline. The town's
continuing opposition was based on the view that the line was an,
industrial use and any leakage would pose a threat to the areas
traversed by the pipe including an area dedicated to residential use.
The pipeline crossed one water line and paralleled another, raising
fears of contamination of drinking water supplies.
In late January DEC called a meeting of Lewiston and Porter officials,
along with other area officials at the county, state, and national
In of August 1978, a trial judge ordered an SCA subsidiary to
close a hazardous waste facility in Wilsonville, Illinois and to
exhume all buried waste. The exhumation order was stayed while the
decision was, appealed.
The petition was also sent to Lewiston, Niagara County, and state
officials, as well as to the governor, U.S. EPA, and the president.
In late 1978 or early 1979 the facility1s name was changed to SCA
Chemical Waste Services, Inc.
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levels. This was the first in a series of meetings between DEC area
officials1 and local opposition leaders. According to DEC, the meetings
were designed to facilitate the exchange of accurate information on the
SCA site, hazardous waste problems, state regulatory procedures, and
DEC's attempts to regulate SCA.
The following month SCA submitted to DEC an application for an operating
permit under revised state hazardous waste regulations. The new
regulations subsumed earlier state regulations and all operating
hazardous waste facilities were required to apply for new permits. The
SCA permit also included some expansion to the facility, principally a
new landfill. DEC anticipated holding public hearings on the
application in May of 1979 prior to making any decison on the
application.
In early March SCA was fined $15,000 by U.S. EPA for improper storage of
PCBs. This was the second fine levied against SCA in 1979; in
mid-January DEC had fined the company because of odors and other
charges.
In mid-April (when the site visit was conducted) the conflict over SCA's
facility appeared not to be near resolution and showed signs of renewed
activity. Long-standing opponents (i.e., local officials and citizens
organized as Operation Clean) had begun to seek the support of Canadians
across the Niagara River in Ontario. In the first several months of
1979 those Canadians were reportedly organizing their own anti-SCA
group. Canadian officials at the local and provincial level had
contacted DEC to express their concern over the possibility of SCA
discharging into the Niagara River which is a source of water for some
Canadian jurisdictions. Opponents appeared to be concentrating their
energies on the anticipated public hearings on the new DEC permit for
the facility. Operation Clean was also preparing to study health
problems in the area to determine if they were related to the SGA
facility. In the longer term, opponents looked to the state attorney-
general's office as the most probable, and perhaps only, means to close
the facility. Opponents specifically called for a suit analogous to the
one pressed by the Illinois attorney-general against the Wilsonville
facility.
While a substantial, apparently immutable group sought closure, other
actions in 1979 were directed toward upgrading facility safeguards.
Thus in January the state attorney-general's office reportedly
recommended the creation of a state closure authority as a mechanism for
additional control of hazardous waste facilities, particularly after
those facilities were closed. The Porter town board was pressing
Niagara County legislators to enact a perpetual care law that would
apply strong standards.
SCA was still faced with the problem of discharging its treated
effluent. Its only recourse in April was to discharge into Four Mile
Creek. That option was severely restricted by the fact that the
stream's flow could only accommodate discharge for short periods in the
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spring and fall. Estimates of the amount'of treated effluent SCA had
on-pite ranged from 40 to 90 million gallons. Long-te^rm -jsolutip-ns re-
qui^red either the use of the Lewiston sewer line or the construction of
SCA,'s own pipeline. Both solutions required approvals by local of-
ficials who showed few, if any, signs of granting such approval. A'
Porter town supervisor expected a suit would be pressed against SCA if
it tried to construct the pipeline, even though he doubted the town.
could win such a suit. In February SCA'changed. its top management at
the facility. For at least one local official .who has been a long-time
opponent, this change in management may have created the potential for
resolving the conflicts. Most opponents, however, seemed unchanged in
their attitudes. .SCA staff also ,'saw little chance for any change in the
•basic outlook of area residents over the short- or medium-term future.
IV.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
April, 1969 —Chem-Trol incorporated. , ,
August, 1969 -— Blasdell site purchased. .
July, 1970 — Operations begin. :
.1971 — Search for new site begins. ,
Early 1972 — GSA declares Model City surplus federal
property; Chem-Trol purchases site. . , , •• .
February, 1972 --- Blasdell site is closed; move to Model City begins.
Spring 1972 —• NCHD.grants Chem-Trol operating permit. .
May, 1972 — Model City site begins operations. •
July, 1972 — Fire and explosion occurs at Blasdell site.
1972 •-- Chem-Trol makes presentations to local officials stressing rec-
lamation and recycling aspects of facility operations.
1973 — SCA purchases Chem-Trol; original management retained.
September, 1973-..— Salt piles and damaged vegetation discovered by local
--.-.- officials. , •„•••.-, -,
March, 1974— Phenol-contaminated spill results in fish kill. NCHD de-
termines material was from Chem-Trol.
September, 1974— Local officials charge that Chem-Tro!-, illegally dis-
charges wastes into Four Mile Creek via abandoned
sewer lines. Town plugs line; subsequently lagoons
reportedly developed on site., •
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December, 1974 — DEC grants Chem-Trol SPDES permit for discharge into
j , Niagara river.
Summer 1975 — SCA replaces original Chem-Trol management, new man-
agement begins concerted effort to clean up facility.
July, 1975 — Lewiston Town Attorney directed to investigate legal
actions against Chem-Trol.
November, 1975 — Porter issues notice of zoning violations to Chem-
Trol; Chem-Trol appeals decision to courts.
January, 1976 — Wastewater from Chem-Trol spills into Four Mile Creek.
Local officials begin meetings to push for DEC en-
forcement.
February, 1976 — Fire and explosions occur in landfill.
June, 1976 — Chem-Trol acquires more land, owns a total of 407 acreas.
July, 1976 — Shipment of pesticides received; DEC Buffalo office orders
halt in processing pesticides; DEC and Chem-Trol develop
plan allowing for processing of pesticides.
September, 1976 — Porter town supervisor calls for closing of faciltiy;
DEC requests halt to use of landfill filled with
rainwater; Chem-Trol ignores request because it would
idle facility. •
October, 1976 — Spill at site occurs when bulldozer undermines lagoon
wall; DEC investigators find hose leading from treat-
ment pond to manhole. Residents begin petition drive
against facility and form Operation Clean. Youngstown
village board calls for closing of facility.
November, 1976 — Area's U.S. congressman asks DEC and U.S. EPA to mon-
itor site. DEC.reportedly considers, then rejects, an
order to close facility.
January, 1977 — State Supreme Court rejects town zoning suit against
Chem-Trol. Chem-Trol management claims it will stop
receiving liquid wastes but it does not.
February, 1977 — DEC admonishes facility for spill; lack of stronger
action by DEC reportedly leads to local disil-
lusionment with that agency.
March, 1977 — Local jurisdictions hire consultant to analyze Chem-Trol.
May, 1977 — DEC advises Lewiston to allow Chem-trol to use a town sewer
line for discharge into Niagara River.
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June, 1977— NCHD official argues for the continued operation of Chem-
Trol. Opponents appeal to governor for help, openly
charge company with incompetence and dishonesty. Lewiston
j delays vote on Chem-Trol use of sewer line.
July, 1977 — Porter issues zoning violation to Chem-Trol claiming com-
pany must have excavation permit. Chem-Trol ignores order
to stop excavation until order affirmed by state supreme
court. NCEMC created by county legislators to be neutral
party investigating the controversy. DEC public hearing
on permit for wastewater discharge postponed.
August, 1977 — Porter holds hearings on Chem-Trol application for ex-
cavation permit.
September, 1977 — Niagara County Planning Board denies special permit
to allow Chem-Trol to construct landfill; Porter de-
nies excavation permit for landfill; Chem-Trol ap-
peals town's decison and DEC supports Chem-Trol1s ap-
peal.
October, 1977— Area's U.S. congressman asks president to compel U.S.
EPA to monitor Chem-Trol.
November, 1977 — Congressman arranges meeting with officials from U.S.
EPA, DEC, NCHD, and local jurisdictions and with area
residents.
December, 1977—Spill discovered at Chem-Trol; DEC criticizes Chem-
trol for number of spills and violations; company
fined by DEC. Lewiston Town Attorney is directed to
take legal action against Chem-Trol, DEC, and U.S.
EPA.
January, 1978 — Series of meetings between DEC and Chem-Trol results in
plan for handling liquid wastes and extension of liquid
waste permit for two months. NCEMC issues report
finding Chem-Trol generally in complance with state
laws but calls those laws vague. State appeals court
lifts ban on excavation of Chem-Trol landfill.
February, 1978 — U.S. EPA refuses to monitor Chem-Trol in spite of op-
ponents' data on previous month's spill. Opponents
consider U.S. EPA to have broken promise made at
November, 1977 meeting.
March, 1978 — DEC holds four-day public hearing focusing on Ghem-Trol's
plans to discharge treated effluent.
April, 1978 ~ DEC approves discharge of facility's effluent into Four
Mile Creek; Chem-Trol pays Town of Porter for surveil-
lance of discharge operations. ,
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June, 1978 — Chem-Trol now owns 860 acres.
I -. > )
July, 1978 — SCA announces that it is considering buying Stauffer
Chemical plant in Lewiston to convert into treatment
facility.
September, 1978 — Resolution to oppose all permits for Chem-Trol dis-
charge defeated by Niagara County legislators.
October, 1978 — UAW and Farm Bureau declare support for Operation
Clean. Opponents appeal to state attorney-general's
office which begins investigation.of Chem-Trol. EPA
grants PCS disposal permit.
December, 1978 — Opponents organize informational meeting; 700 attend.
Late 1978, early 1979 — Facility name is changed to SCA Chemical Waste
Services, Inc.
January, 1979 — DEC imposes $5,000 fine for violations. Operation
Clean obtains 6,500 signatures on petition to close
facility. SCA announces plans for 32,000-foot pipeline
to Niagara River, Porter town board votes to oppose
plan. Local officials meet with DEC to discuss SCA
facility and general problems of hazardous waste.
Attorney-general's office recommends creation of state
closure authority for hazardous waste facilities.
February, 1979 — SCA changes top management at facility, submits ap-
plication for revised DEC permit. Porter town board
encourages county to adopt perpetual care law.
March, 1979 —
Niagara County gives approval for SCA pipeline to cross
county right-of-way. U.S. EPA fines SCA $15,000 for
improper PCB storage.
Spring, 1979 — Operation Clean seeks and obtains support of Canadian
residents; Canadian officials express concerns to DEC
over SCA discharge into river.
V.
ATTEMPTS TO SECURE SUPPORT
Numerous attempts have been made to gain support for the facility, to
address or to correct specific and broad concerns of local residents, or
to create a means for addressing those concerns. The most significant
of these follow.
o The review of the original NCHD permit by the Porter town
board.
o Early presentations by Chem-Trol to local officials
stressing recycling and reclamation techniques.
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VI.
o The clean-up effort begun when SCA placed its own ?
management personnel in charge of the facility. "
o Chem-Trol's offer to decontaminate Lewiston's sewer line if
it could be used to discharge into the Niagara River.
o Various statements by NCHD and DEC officials arguing that
Chem-Trol was an environmental and/or economic asset.
o Meetings and other actions by the area's congressman
directed towards greater monitoring of the facility and
better communications between key parties.
o U.S. EPA's reported promise to intervene if navigable
•-.•.. waters were polluted. . ..-•
o NCEMC's creation as a neutral party and its report on
Chem-Trol and state law and regulation.
o DEC's March, 1978 public hearings on the modification of
Chem-Trols's state permit.
o Chem-Trol's payment to Porter of the costs of surveilling
discharge operations. .
o Meetings in early 1979 between DEC and local officials.
o Anticipated public'hearings to be held by DEC in May of
1979 in connection with the issuance of a revised operating
permit. . , ., -v- ,
SUMMARY EVALUATION
In its first year or so of operation Chem-Trol operated with a degree of
support from local officials. This can be said to stem in part from the
review of the permit by Porter officials and early Chem-Trol public re-
lations efforts. Approval of the NCHD permit was due to the benefits
officials attributed to the development of the faciltiy,:including the
return of a sizeable piece of land to local tax rolls and, more
generally, the broadening of the area's industrial base'. Equally
important was the impression given local leaders that the facility would
recycle and reclaim industrial wastes. It is probable that Chem-Trol
stressed these facets of the operation and downplayed the burial of
anything other than innocuous residues.
Subsequent attempts to secure support or address concerns did not occur
until three years after the facility opened. All have clearly failed to
generate support for the facility. Few if any gains have been made in
overcoming public concern and opposition. The simplest and perhaps most
accurate explanation of this failure is that in the eyes of area
residents the attempts • were too little and too late. '•-,_'•
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Opposition to the facility evolved over a relatively long period of
time. Most opponents described this as starting with concern over
spills or other operation problems which continued over time; repeated
problems deepened concerns. The perceived failure of DEC to recognize
the gravity of these problems added disillusionment; the perceived un-
willingness first of DEC and later U. S. EPA to firmly and quickly en-
force applicable regulations added frustration. The continued spills
and accidents, intentional or unintentional, reduced SCA's credibility
to near zero. Finally, outside events added a clear element of fear.
To paraphrase an opposition leader, Love Canal demonstrated that
landfills can kill and U.S. EPA demonstrated that there is no such thing
as a secure landfill.1 Over time opposition became more widespread
and more profound. Attempts to deal with this appear not to have
matched the magnitude of the opposition.
Since at least September of 1976, opponents have called for the closing
of the facility. Thus for more than two years opponents have stated
their major goal as being completely at odds with the facility's
attempts to reduce spills, to upgrade monitoring, and to make other
reforms. A clear impression from all key parties is that there is
almost no middle ground, no room for compromise. There is some sense
that better public education/ information may in the long run persuade
residents that'SCA's facility is an environmentally appropriate response
to hazardous waste disposal problems. However, there is an equal if not
greater sense that opposition will continue until every tactic to close
the facility has been tried.
A great many issues have been raised, and major issues have changed as
events have changed, a prime example being the concerns the Town of
Porter has over the proposed SCA pipeline to the Niagara River. There
are overriding issues, however, which encompass most of the shifts of
focus. There are listed below.
The safety of landfills — The burial of hazardous wastes is seen as a
continuing and long-term danger extending beyond the operational life of
the facility. It is also seen as a low-cost, high-risk disposal tech-
nique.
Perpetual care — Linked to the concern over landfills is concern over
provisions for maintaining and monitoring the integrity of the facility
after it is closed.
A U.S. EPA-sponsored study found that leachate was migrating from
over 80 percent of 50 industrial waste land disposal facilities,sur-
veyed. The study concluded that groundwater contamination at such
facilities is a common occurrence. It should be noted that some of
the study's data were challenged by state agencies. See The Preval-
ance of Subsurface Migration of Hazardous Chemical Substances at
Selected Industrial Waste Land Disposal Sites, EPA/530/SW-634, Oc-
tober, 1977.
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Operational safeguards — Opponents feel that there have been too many
odors, spills and accidents. Many see these accidents as intentional
actions by the company to solve its discharge problem. SCA's
credibility has been consistently questioned and doubted. A major focus
of concerns over operations has been the discharge of effuents. These
are seen as major pollutants of Lake Ontario and potentially the ^Niagara
River, the latter being a source of public water supplies.
The credibility of regulatory agencies — Residents seriously doubt that
DEC is willing to implement a strong regulatory program. DEC is seen as
insufficiently responsive when violations of state regulations occur.
While most of these regulatory concerns have been directed at DEC, the
credibility of U.S. EPA has also been questioned. These agencies tend
to be seen as being biased towards SCA and against opponents.
Equity — Area leaders have stated that provisions should be made for
hazardous wastes generated in the area. At the same time, opponents
feel that the area is being asked to bear the costs, while a much larger
group of others reap the benefits of those industries which generate
hazardous waste. ."..'.
VII. FACTORS LEADING TO PUBLIC OPPOSITION/ACCEPTANCE
Initial acceptance of Chem-Trol was primarily the result of the
following factors.
o The return of the Model City site to local tax rolls.
o The'desire of local officials to increase the area's
industrial base.
o The image of Chem-Trol as a recycling and reclamation
facility utilizing innovative, non-polluting techniques.
The subsequent creation of local concern and opposition resulted from
the following.
o Spills, odors, and other operational problems at the site
and in the transport of wastes to the site.
o The perception that Chem-Trol turned increasingly to the
burial of hazardous wastes as a disposal technique.
o The conviction that DEC, and to a lesser extent U.S. EPA,
were not fulfilling their regulatory responsibilities and
were not helping to solve problems at the facility.
o The events surrounding Love Canal and a variety of
information which confirmed the potential dangers
of hazardous waste disposal and cast serious doubt on the
integrity of landfills as a disposal technique.
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VIII. RETROSPECTIVE VIEWS
Almost everyone interviewed felt that if the initial promises and
proposals made in connection with the Model City facility had been
adhered to, opposition would not have developed. For local leaders this
primarily meant that no burial of hazardous materials would have taken
place. For SCA and regulatory officials this meant that no spills or
other accidents would have occurred. An NCHD official also indicated
that if the original proposal had encompassed some permanent method of
discharging effluents much of the controversy could have been avoided.
Given that there have been a number of operational problems, those
interviewed agreed that opposition was inevitable.
IX.
GENERAL COMMENTS
Local leaders saw a number of general problems with current hazardous
waste management. 'RCRA was strongly criticized for condoning
landfilling of hazardous waste and for limiting "perpetual care"
provisions to a 20-year period. Implementation of hazardous waste
programs should be carried out by one lead agency as opposed to the
array of agencies with some regulatory control over these problems.
Greater responsibility should be placed on hazardous waste generators
although one official cautioned that this might place undue burdens on
small businesses. More monitoring of sites was considered critical
although it was acknowledged that DEC has limited staff resources. When
violations occur fines should be much larger. It was argued that a
$1,000 or $5,000 fine made little difference to disposal companies.
These leaders also saw the transportation of hazardous wastes as a major
problem. Finally, one local official felt that problems might ease in
two to three years as regulatory agencies gained more expertise and
thereby gained the confidence of the public.
These local officials and residents agreed that the state or federal
government must own disposal sites and be responsible for operations.
Industry was seen as being naturally concerned with reducing cost and
therefore not willing to spend the required money for proper disposal.
They also called for complete treatment of wastes to render them
non-hazardous and the burial only of harmless residuals. Several of
those interviewed pointed to European treatment facilities that
reportedly operated in such a fashion. The facility being proposed by
the state of Michigan was also seen as a model. A national approach was
emphasized so that no state would become a haven for hazardous wastes.
Finally, there is a need for compensating local areas for costs from
studies commissioned by local governments and from legal fees as well as
the more general costs associated with being a host community for a
disposal facility.
An NCHD official also felt state or federal ownership of sites may be
the only viable option. With the use of eminent domain the government
could acquire the best possible site regardless of whether the site was
for sale. Government could contract with private industry for facility
operations. A major concern was perpetual care and who would be
27B
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responsible if problems arose 20 or 100 years after closure. He argued
that government would be there to solve problems long after private
industry had left the scene.
SC.A officials also felt that eminent domain may be necessary in some
cases because public opposition will be a major obstacle in securing
future sites. They, also saw this potential increase in governmental
involvement as making siting more cumbersome and problematic. In the
longer run, they felt, public education by government and industry is
the only real way to overcome opposition. They saw a need for
widespread understanding of the societal impacts .created by contemporary
industry. People need to realize the inevitable costs -- both financial
and environmental — of the products that cpntribute to the present
standard of living. It was hoped that such an understanding would lead
to greater confidence in the ability of government and private industry
to solve hazardous waste problems. Finally, these officials felt that
there should be stricter government regulation and stronger enforcement
of existing regulation, including fines tied to costs. These
regulations should impose high standards for disposal and require
greater quality control for operations.
State views are discussed in state agency reports elsewhere in this
report.
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ENSCO ENERGY SYSTEMS COMPANY
EL DORADO, ARKANSAS
I. INTRODUCTION
Ensco is in the business of disposing of industrial waste chemicals by
high-temperature incineration. They operate a facility in Union County
near El Dorado, Arkansas. The facility consists of a modified incinera-
tor and storage tanks left over from an abandoned oil refinery. The
facility has been operating commercially since 1977. In 1978, Ensco
requested permission from EPA to incinerate PCBs-'-. However, before
this request could be acted upon, the county passed an ordinance
prohibiting the transportation, storage or disposal of PCB wastes in the
county. EPA had scheduled but subsequently postponed a test burn of
PCBs to ensure the effective and safe destruction of these wastes by the
Ensco facility.
At the present time, the company is continuing to dispose of non-PCB
hazardous wastes. The company is also fighting a court case against
the county ordinance forbidding PCB storage, disposal and transportation
activities. Pending a decision in this case, EPA will again reschedule
a test burn to verify the incinerator's effectiveness in PCB disposal.
There has been local public opposition to this facility almost since its
inception. This opposition was initially based on adverse publicity
surrounding a previously unsuccessful Ensco waste disposal facility in
Minnesota. Ensco's decision to request permission to incinerate PCBs
then raised the level of public opposition, due to the public awareness
of the hazards associated with PCB wastes. Although the facility
appears to be technically adequate and represents the current
state-of-the-art in high temperature incineration, the management and
physical appearance of the facility and the past history of the company
have provided the public with issues on which to base their opposition.
Various attempts by Ensco have been made to assuage public concern, and
a number of technical studies and reports have generally upheld the
facility's viability. These various actions have had little impact on
general public opposition.
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The site of the Ensco facility occupies 45 acres in an industrial park
within the unincorporated portions of Union County, Arkansas. The site
is part of what was an abandoned oil refinery that was converted into an
industrial park. It is zoned for industrial use and is completely
surrounded by other industrial uses. Every phase of the oil industry
Under the provisions of the Toxic Substances Control Act, EPA
must approve any such operation.
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operates in this area — exploration, drilling, production, refining,
sales and transportation. Within the county there are several
refineries, a chemical fertilizer plant and several bromide plants.
However, the site is also immediately adjacent to the city limits of El
Dorado and less than a mile from populated areas. The Ensco facility
makes use of several storage tanks and an incinerator that were part of
the abandoned refinery. The basic incinerator consists of a primary
combustion area (3000 ft3) and a retention chamber (3000 ft3)
separated by a 180-degree bend and a brick baffle. The primary
combustion area has two burners: Model 6514-9 Fire-All Dual Burner
manufactured by North American. The waste is fed into a central nozzle
in each burner and atomized with 100 psi air. Two annular rings
encircle each nozzle, one to deliver secondary air and one to provide
natural gas to act as a pilot light and a flame stabilizer. Mounted on
the rear wall of the primary combustion chamber are two spray nozzles
which are used to inject well water into the flame front to control the
temperature of incineration. The incinerator is equipped with a venturi
scrubber, and a cyclone de-mister for removal of particulates, HC1 and
S02.
The incineration process proceeds as follows. Drums full of waste are
first dumped into grinding mills that shred any packaging so that it
will burn better. The combined packaging and chemical waste then falls
into a hopper and is dumped into a 34-foot rotary kiln. The kiln is
lined and turns constantly. The waste retention time is 30 minutes.
The temperature inside the kiln reaches 1,500 degrees. Organic material
is turned to an inert ash. The ash and non-combustible organic
materials, which together comprise the solid waste output of the
incinerator, is suitable for landfilling.
The incinerator burns both liquid and solid wastes. Liquid wastes are
used as fuel for the incinerator. Waste air and vapors are pulled out
of the grinder and recirculated into the system. The combustion system
operates under negative pressure, so that air would be drawn into rather
than out of any hole in the structure. Pressure-sensitive switches ,
automatically close down the system if interior pressure exceeds given
parameters. Ash is.dumped out of the kiln and gases are recirculated.
The kiln temperature is increased to 2,200° to break liquids into a
fog. A wet scrubbing system then removes dust and acid vapors. In the
smoke stack a de-mister removes dirty water from the resultant gases,
leaving clean flue gases. The stack gases are monitored to ensure that
they include no harmful materials. ,
In addition to its incinerator, Ensco has storage tanks originally used
by the refinery. The company maintains a laboratory on the site. All
wastes received are analyzed before incineration and samples of waste
are kept. Ensco also has four tanker trucks to provide hauling services
for hazardous waste. There are about 80 employees.
The Ensco facility accepts a relatively broad range of solid and liquid
wastes suitable for thermal destruction, including chlorinated
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hydrocarbons. Wastes are accepted from generators and in some cases
other disposal firms that lack incinerators. Most wastes are from
out-of-state and the market area served by the facility is national.
Ensco is a privately owned firm which has evolved from an earlier
disposal firm with a hazardous waste landfill which operated between
1965 and 1976 in Minnesota. As will be described in Section III, Ensco
is also linked to an El Dorado firm with which it merged in the early
1970s. The El Dorado facility is the only one currently being operated
by Ensco.
El Dorado is located in southern Arkansas, 120 miles from Little Rock.
The estimated population of El Dorado was 26,500; that of Union County,
46,500 (1977 figures). Average family income in El Dorado was $10,617.
Major industries located in the county include the oil industry,
chemical industry and the lumber and wood products industry. El Dorado
also has the largest poultry processing plant in the South.
III. HISTORY OF FACILITY DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC RESPONSE
To operate an incinerator in the state of Arkansas, one is required,to
have a permit from the Arkansas Department of Pollution Control and
Ecology (DPCE). This permit specifies what can be burned in the
incinerator. In this case, for instance, the permit had to be amended
to allow the burning of PCBs. As noted above, permission from the EPA
to incinerate PCBs was required under the provisions of the Toxic
Substances Control Act. No regional or local permits were required for
this facility.
In March of 1971, American Oil Company (Amoco) donated to Union County
certain property to be used for industrial development purposes. The
donation was made since Amoco had closed a refinery there and had moved
from the Union County-El Dorado area. In August of 1973, a lease-
purchase agreement was entered into between Union County, the El Dorado
Industrial Development Corporation, and a private individual who was
personally associated with Pollution Controls, Incorporated (PCI). The
agreement covered several lots on the old Amoco properties. In March of
1974, a sub-lease agreement was made between that individual and Grace
Properties, Incorporated for approximately 45 acres. The 45-acre site
included an abandoned oil refinery and storage tank facilities. The
abandoned equipment was to be the nucleus of ah incineration process for
hazardous chemical wastes. This arrangement was approved by Union
County and the El Dorado Industrial Development Corporation. Graco
Properties soon became known and referred to as Graco Chemicals. Graco
Chemicals subsequently took the name of Pollution Controls,
Incorporated. This was in essence a merger with PCI, a Shakopee
(Minnesota) chemical disposal firm. (PCI was founded in Shakopee,
Minnesota, in 1965. The Shakopee plant was closed in 1975, following
continuous complaints from residents and continuous disputes with the
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency.)
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PCI s first contact with DPCE in connection with the development of the
incinerator came in 1973. Following these discussions PCI submitted an
application for a permit for the El Dorado site. In July of 1974 DPCE
granted PCI a permit for the construction of a chemical waste disposal
facility. The major component of PCI's facility plan was an incinerator
which would be constructed over a period of about 18 months. The
facility plan also included the use of existing storage tanks for the
storage of hazardous waste. By offering storage services, PCI could
.begin to accept wastes as soon as the permit was granted. As a result
PCI was able to generate revenues during the incinerator construction '
period. The wastes were to be stored until they could be incinerated.
In early 1975 the future plant engineer for PCI, a chemical engineer who
was then a professor at the University of Arkansas, spoke as a : '
representative of PCI with local civic groups on company plans for a
waste disposal incinerator in El Dorado. At these initial meetings with
elected officials and public groups it was explained that the plant
would be less hazardous than existing industries now operating in the
S^i N° noti"abl\opPOSition t0 PCI's plans was expressed. However,
shortly thereafter the local newspaper started a campaign opposing the
proposed site., The main themes of the news story were PCI's previous
difficulties in operating a chemical waste disposal facility in
ppf?Pee;- The ne^PaPer ^ronicled, the major public opposition to that.
PCI facility and foresaw similar problems if PCI moved to El Dorado.
The newspaper also quoted the plant managers as saying that if Minnesota
prevented them from disposing of Dioxin at their Shakopee site the
material eventually would be moved to a new incinerator planned in El
Dorado. The paper alerted its readers to the "lethal" nature of Dioxin
and previous accidents that had occurred in other parts of the country
through mishandling of the chemical. The paper also portrayed PCI as
incompetent and as operated by people of questionable integrity.
In June of 1976, PCI, in cooperation with the EPA, shredded
approximately 7,000 pounds of capacitors containing PCBs. PCI had PCBs
in storage at this time but had not yet completed construction of its
incinerator. The incinerator's shredder, however, was operational.
This shredding was done under control and direction of the EPA and the
Arkansas Department of Pollution Control and Ecology. The shredded
capacitors were packaged, in drums and shipped to the Rollins
Environmental Services incinerator at Houston, Texas. The PCB materials
were incinerated by.Rollins and testing was done to determine the
destruction efficiency of the incinerator while incinerating PCB solids.
The results of those tests indicated a destruction efficiency of greater
than 99.99 percent. These tests confirmed that incineration is an
effective means of destroying chlorinated hydrocarbons such as PCBs.
In September of 1976, the Arkansas Department of Pollution Control and
Ecology approved a modification to the earlier (1974) construction
permit. This allowed PCI limited operation of the incinerator for
purposes of curing refractories and testing design calculations.
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Two months later PCI suffered an accidental spill while transporting a
chemical waste to the El Dorado facility from Kansas. Based on what
Ensco thought was in the waste load, no alarm was sounded over the
spill. However, the load was inislabeled and severe wildlife kills
resulted along the stream where the spill took place. The accident and
especially the mislabeling fueled public opposition to the PCI
operation. Residents were not only fearful because wastes being brought
to El Dorado were lethal but also because if those wastes were
mislabeled, there would be no way of knowing what the dangers really
were. These fears added to existing concerns over odors from wastes
being stored at the PCI site.
In January of 1977 the mayor, responding to concerns over the spill and
odors and general citizens' fears over the development of a hazardous
waste facility, appointed a committee to investigate PCI. On the
committee were represented local elected officials, business leaders and
the general public. The committee hired a noted.consulting firm with
experience in this area to conduct a technical investigation of the PCI
facility and its operation. During the consultant's investigation,
PCI's president answered the public opposition with his own letter to
the editor. He admitted to and explained some of the odor incidents and
tried to dispel the fears of fires and explosions. The letter described
the operation of the plant and the sophisticated monitoring systems.
PCI also was said to expect that the consultant's report, OSHA reports
and EPA ambient air quality studies would confirm the safe operation of
the plant and, if necessary, correct any shortcomings. The president of
PCI noted that there were chemical industries in the area producing
hazardous materials in much greater concentrations than those handled by
PCI, and pointed out that PCI did not generate the wastes, but merely
treated them and rendered them harmless.
In February construction of the incinerator was completed and a month
later it came on line. In the summer of 1977 PCI publicly announced its
name change to Ensco and its intent to operate a thermal oxidation
(incinerator) process on the El Dorado site.
EPA had had tests conducted on the Ensco incinerator in June of 1977.
The final report of the EPA contractor, published in May of 1978, called
the test one of the most intensive and exacting tests ever performed on
a commercial-scale incinerator. The tests were conducted on four
consecutive days. The materials incinerated were polychlorinated
liquids similar in chemical structure and combustion characteristics to
PCBs. Test results showed the destruction efficiency to be greater than
99.99 percent, and confirmed the operational capability of the unit.
In July of 1977 a permit was granted by the state for full operation of
the incinerator as long as no fuel was burned which is recognized to be
more difficult to thermally decompose than polychlorinated hydrocarbons,
-------
unless such materials were burned under test conditions supervised by
EPA and state officials. Included in these permitted wastes were liquid
PCBs. Public opposition to the facility continued during 1977 from
individual citizens using the paper's editorial page as a forum. Their
opposition centered on the inherent danger of dealing with hazardous
substances, the possibility of fires, toxic fumes, plant malfunctions,
transportation spills and odors. Odors seemed to be the most frequent
public complaint. Although other odor-producing industries are in the
area, most of the complaints were leveled at Ensco. One of these odor
problems was traced to Ensco's poor handling of mercaptan, an odor-
producing additive for natural gas. The company discontinued accepting
mercaptan in an attempt to assuage public opposition, but to no avail.
In March of 1978 Ensco submitted an application to the state for
incineration of PGB solids — such as capacitors, fluorescent light
ballasts and, clean-up from spills — and PCB liquids. Also curing
early 1978, EPA reported in a public newsletter that in cooperation with
the state of Arkansas it had recently conducted a highly successful
incineration test at El Dorado, destroying toxic chemical wastes
(chlorinated hydrocarbons). Ensco subsequently received approval from
the state to incinerate drummed solids, semi-solids and liquids such as
PCB-impregnated capacitors. Also, under provisions of the Toxic
Substances Control Act, EPA made a public announcement: that it was going
to conduct a test burn of PCBs at Ensco in July of 1978. (The previous
test had been- of polychlorinated liquids similar to PCBs, not of PCBs
proper.)
Public opposition was exacerbated by the announcement of the PCB test.
Because of this opposition and attendant political pressure, .the test
was soon put off by EPA until September, 1978. A local radio station
broadcast a strong editorial against the test burn. The editorial
pointed out the extreme danger posed by PCBs, which had been linked to
cancer and birth defects. The editorial then asked whether it was in
the community's best interest to have PCBs transported to El Dorado and
then disposed of near populated areas; and if approval were given for
PCBs, what toxic chemicals would be added in the future. The station
received a large number of letters, all in opposition to the'PCB test
burn and Ensco. No letters were received in favor of the operation.
Under the equal time provisions, Ensco responded to the station's
editorial, citing EPA's announcement in the Federal Register that
incineration is the only currently available means of destroying PCBs.
Ensco's response described the uses of PCBs, the plant's safe operating
procedures and the successful testing of the incinerator that previously
had been done by EPA. Ensco noted that while PCBs are toxic, they are
not flammable and pose no threat unless improperly handled.
Sensing the rising pitch in public opposition over the PCB issue,, Ensco
engaged a public relations expert and proceeded to run large ads in the
paper in support of their operation. These ads explained the sources of
PCB wastes, alternative methods of disposal, and the Ensco facility.
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Ensco also suggested to the municipality that their incinerator could be
used to help them dispose of their municipal wastes. (The capacity of
the local sanitary landfill was rapidly being exhausted.)
By now the letters to the editor had dropped the odor issue in favor of
the more emotional PCS issue. The opposition asked why EPA did not
provide its own incinerator to dispose of PCBs, and the health of the
community became the key issue. The site was said to be too close to
populated areas and short-term tests proposed by EPA were said not to
answer questions about long-term effects. Concerns were voiced about
the safety of future generations. Questions were again raised about
Ensco's reputation and past track record in Minnesota.
In the latter part of August 1978, Union County attempted to pass 'an
emergency ordinance banning incineration, shipment or storage of PCBs in
the county. The emergency ordinance failed to pass. However, the same
ordinance minus the emergency status passed a week later. In the
intervening week, Ensco voluntarily ceased accepting any PCB wastes,
hoping that the ordinance would not pass.
In early September of 1978, EPA held a public hearing in El Dorado on
its proposal to conduct a test burn of PCBs. The hearing was attended
by over 450 persons. The testimony reiterated many of the concerns
voiced earlier in the press over the company's financial stability, past
spills, fire hazards and their Minnesota track record. Witnesses were
brought from Minnesota to bolster the opposition's contention that the
owners of Ensco had a questionable past and that El Dorado did not want
this type of operation. Ensco replied with its own presentation which
restated much of the information Ensco had already made available to the
public. A 4,600-signature petition was introduced into the hearing
record stating citizen opposition to the EPA test burn of PCBs.
Petitioners felt that the dangers of PCBs were too great in an area
surrounded by residential properties. The public hearing demonstrated
EPA's limited technical role and provided a forum for both sides of the
local issue. The public hearing did not dampen public opposition.
After the public hearing, the letters to the editor continued to voice
opposition to the Ensco plant. They pointed out that out of 1,256
personal contacts in El Dorado, 1,200 opposed the plant and the
importation of wastes from out of state and out of the county. The
letters also congratulated the county commissioners for their decision
to pass a resolution against further storage, disposal or transportation
of PCB materials.
Ensco filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court to reverse the county
ordinance. It argued, among other things, that the ordinance is
unconstitutional in view of the federal Toxic Substances Control Act
which preempts local law, the interference with interstate commerce, and
the interference with Ensco's right to engage in business. This case
has not yet been heard but most people on both sides of the question
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.agree that the county has a weak case especially since recent state and
federal Supreme Court rulings in similar cases have been in favor of the
waste disposal operations.
At the end of September, 1978, the consultant released his final report
to the Mayor's Committee. The evaluation did not uncover any serious
problems. The Ensco staff was said to be knowledgeable, informed,
courteous, and well trained. The report concluded that Ensco should be
able to conduct its operations without endangering or significantly
degrading the safety, health, or welfare of the community. However,
according to El Dorado's mayor, there were a few blatant errors in the
evaluation which helped discredit the report, thereby failing to
diminish public fears over Ensco1s operation.
At the close of 1978 the Mayor's Committee reported that Ensco was not
the type of industry that the Committee would solicit for location
inside the city limits of El Dorado or immediately adjacent to-it.
However, the Committee's role was not to recommend an industry for El
Dorado but rather to evaluate an existing industry. Based on available
data, the Committee felt that with upgraded facilities, a careful
monitoring program, a system of periodic inspections, and a system of
approvals by state and federal authorities for each new waste stream to
be handled, the Ensco facility could be safely operated.
The Mayor's Committee went on to note that a citizens group had recently
been formed to become involved in environmental issues concerning
Ensco's operations. The Committee was concerned over whether a local
group could possibly have the technical expertise to evaluate so
sophisticated a technology as environmental impacts. It felt that such
a group would become simply a publicity-oriented sounding board for real
and imagined issues.
The group known as the Citizens for a Safe Environment was incorporated
in January of 1979 with the purposes of promoting a safe environment by
advising the public of environmental abuses, educating- industry and the
public, and securing community support for environmental matters. A
spokesperson for the group said that it was up to the people rather than
the government to monitor the actions of Ensco.
No further action is taking place regarding the PCB test burn until the
court case over the county ordinance is settled. However, it appears
that public opposition will not be a determining factor in EPA's de-
cision to approve or not approve the Ensco application to incinerate
PCBs. EPA's decision will be based on technical grounds regarding stack
emissions and residues. The State Department of Pollution Control and
Ecology is in a similar situation.
IV. ' CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
1971 ~ Amoco donates abandoned refinery property to Union County
to be used for industrial development purposes.
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1973 — County reaches lease-purchase agreement with El Dorado
Industrial Development and a private individual associated with
Ensco for 45-acre tract within the former refinery. Ensco
initially approaches DPCE about hazardous waste incinerator.
March, 1974 — Sub-lease agreement is made between a private individual
and Graco Properties (later Ensco) for part of the re-
finery property, to be used as the site of a hazardous
waste incinerator.
July, 1974 — DPCE grants Ensco a construction permit for incinerator.
1975 — PCI (a Shakopee, Minnesota chemical waste facility) is closed
following complaints from local residents and disputes with the
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency. Ensco1s future plant en-
gineer presents description of projected Ensco operations to lo-
cal elected officials and civic groups. Local newspaper begins
a campaign opposing the Ensco facility.
June, 1976 — Ensco, in cooperation with the EPA, shreds approximately
7,000 pounds of capacitors containing PCBs, and ships them
to the Rollins Environmental Services Incincerator.
September, 1976 — The Arkansas Department of Pollution Control and
Ecology approves a modification of an earlier (1974)
construction permit. This allows Ensco limited oper-
ation of the incinerator for curing refractories and
testing design calculations.
November, 1976 — Ensco suffers an accidental spill while transporting a
mislabeled chemical waste to the El Dorado facility.
Severe wildlife kills result.
January, 1977 — Mayor's committee is formed to investigate the Ensco
operation. The commitee hires a consulting firm to
conduct a technical investigation of the Ensco facility
and its operation.
February, 1977 — Incinerator construction completed.
March, 1977 — Incinerator comes on line.
June, 1977 —EPA contractor conducts tests on the Ensco incinerator.
These tests confirm its operational capability.
July, 1977 — The Arkansas Department of Pollution Control and Ecology
grants Ensco a permit for full operation of the
incinerator so long as no fuel is burned which is
recognized to be more difficult to thermally decompose
than polychlorinated hydrocarbons.
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March, 1978 — Ensco submits an application to the state for permission
to incinerate PCBs. .Permission is received shortly
thereafter.
Spring, 1978 —• EPA makes a public announcement that it is going to con-
duct a test burn of PCBs at Ensco in July, 1978. Due to
intense public opposition, this test is postponed until
September.
August, 1978 — Ensco voluntarily ceases accepting any PCB wastes.
Union County passes an ordinance banning the
incineration, shipment or storage of PCBs in the county.
September, 1978 — EPA holds a public hearing in El Dorado on its
proposal to conduct a test burn of PCBs. The hearing
does not dampen public opposition. Ensco files suit
in U.S. District Court to reverse the county ordi-
nance. Consultant's report concludes that Ensco
should be able to conduct its operations without en-
dangering or significantly degrading the safety,
health or welfare,of the community.
December, 1978 — Mayor's committee reports that the Ensco facility
could be safety operated.
January, 1979 — Citizens for a Safe Environment incorporated to advise
the public of environmental abuses and, in particular,
to monitor Ensco's operations.
V.
ATTEMPTS TO SECURE SUPPORT
In an effort to secure local support for their operations, Ensco under-
took several actions.
o They hired a public relations consultant and took out
several newspaper ads to help the public understand the
nature of the wastes being processed, the incineration
process itself, the safety precautions, and the reasons for
locating in El Dorado.
o They responded to media editorials and letters to the
editor with their own letters and public notices.
o They participated in talks to local civic and government
groups.
o They complied with and advertised their degree of
compliance with federal and state regulations.
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VI.
o They suggested the future use of their incinerator to help
the city dispose of municipal wastes. (The local sanitary
landfill was rapidly being exhausted.)
o They cooperated with outside tests and evaluations of their
facility.
SUMMARY EVALUATION
The conflict over Ensco's operation in El Dorado has not been resolved.
Although the company is operating at the moment, incinerating chemical
wastes that are less dificult to dispose of than,PCBs, they have yet to
win EPA approval for the commercially attractive PCB disposal. Their
attempts to gain public support have failed and the emotional level of
the controversy has risen.
The company's attempt to educate the public and to comply with state and
federal regulations has missed the point of public concern. The,
citizens of El Dorado do not want to be educated on hazardous waste
disposal or on safety precautions. Their concern seems to be over the
past and present integrity of the owners and the physical image of the
site, and of course, over the potential hazards associated with PCBs.
More attention to and display of open and above-board business dealings
as well as to site appearance may have done more good than all the
technical education on chemical wastes and their treatment.
Ensco may well gain all the necessary state and federal approvals to
expand their existing incineration facility to handle PCBs. They also
stand a good chance to win their court case against a local county
ordinance banning PCBs. However, a significant part of the local
population will remain frustrated in their attempts to not have
hazardous wastes imported to El Dorado for disposal. The major issues
in this controversy are:
PCB disposal — The hazardous nature of PCBs has generated a highly
emotional opposition to their disposal regardless of the manner of that
disposal.
Operational and other problems connected with the facility —Odors at
the facility, the unpleasant appearance of the facility, and a spill of
wastes en route 'to the facility have been major sources of complaints.
The mislabeling of spilled wastes added to general concerns about the
nature of wastes handled at the facility. .-.,.. ,
Importation of wastes — Because many of the wastes are delivered from
out of state, residents feel they are bearing the burden of others'
problems. They do not want El Dorado to become a dumping ground for
other states. ,
The integrity of Ensco — Based primarily on major problems with the
Minnesota landfill, citizens have serious questions as to the ability of
Ensco to operate the incinerator in a safe and efficient manner.
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Local control and the unresponsiveness of regulatory agencies — Local
officials in response to citizen pressure have tried to establish local
controls over Ensco. Opponents feel that DPCE and EPA, in only
addressing technical questions, fail to consider other equally important
questions.
VII. FACTORS LEADING TO PUBLIC OPPOSITION/ACCEPTANCE
The factors contributing to public opposition are:
o Poor image of the owners based on questionable track record
of waste disposal in Minnesota, inadequate financial re-
serves, past accidental spills en route to Ensco, and the
appearance of wheeling and dealing in connection with site
acquisition.
o Most of the wastes are imported from out-of-state sources.
o The company's management is made up of out-of-state
individuals with no previous business history in the area.
o The site is situated in an industrial park but too close to
the city limits and populated areas.
o The site is visually unattractive with, rusting storage
tanks arid construction debris.
o National news on cancer and birth defects attributable to
PCBs has fueled local editorials in opposition to Ensco1s
operation.
o • EPA is viewed by the local public as having an interest in
only the technical merits of the facility and unable to do
anything about local public opposition.
VIII. RETROSPECTIVE VIEWS
The final outcome of the Ensco operation is still uncertain. The case
against the county ban on PCBs is still in court and public opposition
to EPA's forthcoming test burn is still strong. Very few participants
in this situation had any comment as to what could have been done dif-
ferently. Ensco felt that they should have started their public re-
lations campaign earlier, prior to the PCS controversy. They also felt
that had they set up a local corporation with local financial interests,
the opposition might have been reduced or at least there could have been
more support. .
State comments are listed in the state agency write-ups elsewhere in
this report.
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CALABASAS
LOS ANGELES COUNTY SANITATION DISTRICTS
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
I. INTRODUCTION
The Los Angeles County Sanitation Districts' (LACSD) Calbasas landfill
began operations in 1961 and began accepting hazardous wastes in 1965.
Several years later, however, a residential development was constructed
immediately adjacent to the facility. When the LACSD announced in 1973
that it planned to move its operations closer to and into the view of
the housing development, they met with intense opposition from the
residents of this development. The issue was not resolved at that time.
Although the LACSD did meet with community leaders regarding the
dispute, their overall strategy was to maintain a low profile. It has
become apparent to them that this approach has not been particularly
successful. They now plan to adopt a more open policy when they bring
the issue up again in the next year or so.
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The Calabasas landfill site, which is owned and operated by the LACSD,
occupies a total area of 416 acres. A conditional use permit has been
obtained for the whole site. However, only 300 acres are covered by
Regional Water Quality Control Board Waste Discharge Requirements. Of
these 300 acres, 260 are planned for the disposal of Group 1 and Group 2
wastes, and the remaining 40 acres for Group 2 wastes only.-'- The
remaining area is comprised of an 80-acre parcel to the north of the
site and a 30-acre parcel to the east. The LACSD plans to apply for
Waste Discharge Requirements for use of these parcels as Group 1
disposal sites.
The site is located approximately one-half mile north of U.S. Highway
101 (the Ventura Freeway), one mile east of Agoura, California. It is
surrounded on the east, west and north by undeveloped land which is
used, if at all, for grazing or oil producing operations. Immediately
Group 1 wastes are defined to include those wastes which consist
of or contain toxic substances. Group 2 wastes consist of or contain
chemically or biologically decomposable material which does not
include toxic substances nor those capable of significantly impairing
the quality of useful waters and includes municipal solid waste.
Group 3 wastes consist entirely of nonwater soluble, nondecomposable
inert solids (California State Water Resources Control Board). A
Class 1 landfill can accept wastes in Groups 1, 2, and 3.
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to the south of the site, between i"t and the Ventura Freeway, is located
a development of moderately expensive suburban homes. The population of
this community is comprised mainly of upper-middle income professionals.
(House values are in the range of $150,000-$200,00d).
The site is underlain by sandstone conglomerates and shales. Steep dips
in these layers of material restrict horizontal movements of liquids, so
that wastes deposited in the greater part of the site will be
hydraulically isolated from groundwaters of adjacent canyons. Test data
indicate permeability values of 10-20 gallons per day per square foot.
The only exception to this is a small alluvial area which is not
approved for the dumping of hazardous wastes.
The landfill handles municipal solid wastes as well as hazardous solid
and liquid wastes. The operation of the facility is as follows. Early
each day a tractor builds a dam of municipal wastes, and a "pond" is
formed between the dam and the previous day's wastes. Hazardous liquid
wastes are dumped into this pond and municipal wastes are then pushed in
to absorb the liquid. At the end of each day the pond is filled with
refuse, compacted and covered with earth. Liquid wastes disposed of in
this manner include relatively innocuous substances such as oil field
brines and paint sludges. Odorous, flammable or reactive liquids are
disposed of in injection wells which have been drilled into areas
previously filled with refuse. .Hazardous solid wastes and other special
wastes are buried in excavations in the waste pile.
The facility accepts two general classes of hazardous wastes. The first
is oily waste from petroleum refineries. The second class includes
biological products such as discarded culture .tests, chemicals from
manufacturing industries, spent acids and caustic solutions from the
metal finishing industry, pesticides, tannery wastes, and refined
petroleum products. These wastes may present more of a hazard —
they are often reactive, toxic, flammable, or infectious and must be
handled with care. The Calabasas landfill is not suitable for and does
not accept very hazardous or highly reactive wastes (for example,
cyanide and water reactive wastes), except in small quantities.
Explosives and radioactive wastes are not accepted at all.
The facility currently accepts approximately 2,400 tons of wastes per
day, including 250 tons per day of hazardous wastes. The existing
disposal area has capacity for another 15 million cubic yards of refuse;
if disposal is ultimately permitted on the whole site, remaining
capacity may be on the order of 50 million cubic yards. Given current
densities'of approximately 1,4'00 pounds per cubic yard, the life
expectancy of tiie existing disposal area is approximately 13 years, and
is 40 years or more if the whole site is permitted.
The facility serves western Los Angeles County and to a lesser extent
Ventura County. However, even wastes from out of state have been
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accepted in the past. The LACSD operates one other, very similar
hazardous/municipal waste landfill at Palos Verdes. However, they plan
to close this site in 1980. In addition, there is a commercial
hazardous waste management facility in West Covina and one is currently
proposed in the Sauges/Newhall area. Los Angeles County is the
industrial center of southern California. Major industrial sectors
which produce significant amounts of chemical wastes include
electronics, petroleum and natural gas. The area is also a major
agricultural center.
II.
HISTORY OF FACILITY DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC RESPONSE
In order to develop and operate a hazardous waste management facility in
California, at least three permits are needed. These are: 1) a land use
permit, 2) Regional Water Quality Board Waste Discharge Requirements
(permit), and 3) State Department of Health Services permit. The land
use permit, which is issued by the local city or, in unincorporated
areas, county planning board, certifies that development and operation
of the proposed facility would not conflict with existing land use or
land use plans. In practice, it indicates that the facility has local
political support. A significant factor in gaining this support is
facility compatibility with local land use. This permit is a
precondition for the granting of the other two permits. The decision of
the local planning board can be appealed to the local board of
supervisors.
The Regional Water Quality Control Board Waste Discharge Requirements
specify what kinds of wastes the facility may receive and what measures
must be taken to prevent groundwater and surface water pollution. These
requirements are in effect a permit since they will not be issued ,if the
geology and/or hydrology of the site are inappropriate. The State
Department of Health Services permit is for the most part based on the
existence of proper procedures for above-ground handling of chemical
wastes. These procedures must include a contingency plan for "an
accident or accidental discharge."
In addition, two other permits are often required, depending on the
particular types of storage, processing or disposal of chemical wastes
that are proposed. If hazardous wastes are to be codisposed with
municipal solid wastes, then the state Solid Waste Management Board must
grant a permit for the facility. This permit regulates the disposal of
residential and commercial refuse so that nuisances are not created.
The Solid Waste Management Board may authorize local political entities,
such as the local city or county government, the power to issue
municipal waste permits.
If some sort of evaporation, neutralization or incineration process or
any other process which will produce a significant amount of atmospheric
California Department of Health Services, Hazardous Waste
Regulations, Chapter 2, Article 4, "Hazardous Waste Permit".
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emissions is proposed, a permit will be required from the Regional Air
Pollution Control District. Evaporation ponds, for instance, are
treated as emission points. Depending on existing, air quality in the
region, this permit can be very restrictive as to types of processes
and/or wastes accepted. Permits may also be required from agencies such
as the Coast Regional Commissions if the proposed site is located in any
of the areas which are under their purview.
The Calabasas landfill required a land use permit and permits from the
Regional Water Quality Control Board, the State Department of Health
Services, and the State Solid Waste Management Board. In this case,
permits were not required from the Regional Air Pollution Control
District and the Coast Regional Commission. ;
The LASCD began planning for a municipal solid waste landfill in the
western part of Los Angeles Country during the late 1950s. This
planning was in response to increasing residential and commercial
development in that part of Los Angeles County. There were no
publicly operated landfills in this area prior to that time. The
Calabasas site was one of several considered, and was chosen on the
grounds of its superior access and geology. In the spring of 1958, Los
Angeles County made application to the Regional Planning Commission-
(RPC) for a zone exception (land use permit) approving the use of the
Calabasas site as a landfill. A public hearing on the zone exception
case was held on May 23, 1958. Several persons spoke in opposition to
the zoning exception, on the grounds that the facility would be
detrimental to a proposed school and to the health, safety and general
welfare of property owners in the vicinity. The Zoning Board
nevertheless approved the application. However, because the LACSD did
not begin dumping in the next two years, the zoning exception expired.
The county submitted a request for a new exception to the RPC on
September 12, 1960. This was approved on October 4 and forwarded to the
County Board of Supervisors, who approved it on April 25, 1961.
Meanwhile, the Regional Water Quality Ccontrol Board had, in December,
1960, set requirements for waste discharge at the Calabasas landfill.'
The site at that time was planned to accept only Group 2 and 3 wastes,
i.e., non-hazardous wastes. The site began operating in mid-1961, '
accepting only Group 2 and 3 wastes. In 1965, the LACSD announced its*
intention to adapt the Calabasas landfill so that it could accept
certain Group 1 wastes. Group 1 waste discharge requirements for the
Calabasas landfill were adopted by the Regional Water Pollution Control
Board in September, 1965, and Group 1 industrial wastes, subject to some
limitations, were accepted beginning in late 1965.
During the development and first several years of operation of the
Calabasas landfill, the surrounding land was largely undeveloped. The
only uses found there were grazing and oilfield operations. In 1968,
however, a developer purchased the tract of land lying between the
landfill and the Ventura Freeway. The eastern and northern border of
this parcel is bordered by the access road to the landfill. As a
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condition of the site, the previous owners of the land petitioned the
RFC for a change in the zoning of the parcel from heavy agricultural to
residential. This petition described the surrounding area as "presently
undeveloped acreage," and made no reference to the adjoining landfill.
The zoning change was granted in June, 1964. The parcel, subsequently
named Saratoga Hills, was developed in three phases. Development of the
first tract, furthest away from the landfill, was begun in 1968; the
second, in 1969, and the third, in 1972. (The parcel is now almost
fully developed.) The information sheet on the development provided to
prospective property owners1 during the first two phases made no
mention of the landfill. The one provided during the third phase states
that the "tract is located three-fourth mile south of dump site (sic).
Heavy truck traffic along north side of tract may be noticeable to
prospective residents."
Notwithstanding the proximity of the landfill to the development, there
were no recorded complaints about it or its operation until 1973. In
July of that year, the LASCD posted a sign — in two canyons located 350
feet from the closest homes — which stated that they intended to use
these canyons as landfill space in the near future. Prior to that time,
all dumping operations had been carried out in the back part of the
landfill, behind a ridgeline and out of sight of Saratoga Hills
residents. A local association — the Community Association of Saratoga
Hills (CASH) had been established earlier as a forum for concerns. CASH
became the focus of opposition to the proposed movement of landfill
operations in the front canyons. At a meeting of CASH officers in
September, 1973, it was decided to call a general meeting of the
community to decide how to respond to the LACSD action. Such a meeting
was held in autumn of 1973, and was well attended. The primary concern
of local residents was the effect the new landfill area would have on
their view of the hills. Other concerns included those related to
odors, rats and other scavengers, landslides, fires, spills, and the
behavior of truck drivers. Residents reported that truck drivers had
been involved in several unpleasant incidents, including shouting
obscenities at teenage girls in the tract. In subsequent months,
concern was expressed over the geology and hydrology of the front
canyons, which were said by local residents to be inappropriate for a
landfill. At this meeting it was decided that the strategy CASH would
adopt in opposing the landfill extension would be to approach their
local political representatives, as well as the LACSD, to try to have
the decision revoked. Therefore, starting in late 1973 and continuing
through mid-1975, CASH representatives met several times with their
state representatives, the Los Angeles County Supervisors, the RFC and
the LACSD in an attempt to gain support for their plans.1 These
meetings had some immediate results but were ultimately inconclusive.
Since these meetings were informal, and since many of the
principal participants have left either the development or the
respective government agency, neither their dates nor precise
sequence could be determined.
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CASH did get support for its position from the local state senator,
assemblyman and County Supervisor, and as well.from the Los Virgenes
Homeowners' Association, the Agoura-Los Virgenes Chamber of Commerce and
the Los Virgenes School District. The County Supervisor directed the
LACSD to work out an agreement with CASH, and proposed that they should
operate only in the back portion of the site.
The LACSD offered to resolve the dispute by moving the landfill access
road away from and out of sight of the development (at a cost in excess
of $1 million). They also informed the community that, if dust or trash
from the landfill was blown onto their property, they had only to call
the LACSD to have it quickly removed. However, the LACSD refused to
limit their operations to the back part of the landfill. They noted
that this would reduce the capacity of the landfill by 60 to 70 percent.
This counter-offer was accepted at first by CASH officers, but the
membership as a whole voted to reject it, because the front canyons
would still have been used as landfill space. Although discussions
continued in 1975, no progress was made, arid the result was a stalemate.
During their meetings, the LACSD made some attempt to respond to local
concerns. They stated that if the landfill is properly operated t;here
should be no danger of rats, landslides or fires. They did acknowledge
that there have been some spills of materials along the access road.
Local residents reported in this regard that they have had difficulty
getting the county health department to investigate spills, and that on
one occasion when they did come, the material was sent to LACSD for
testing, in the residents' eyes a not unbiased evaluation. As recently
as April, 1978 a truck on its way to the landfill overturned and spilled
its load of construction wastes onto a car parked next to the housing
tract, wrecking it but causing no injury to its occupants. On the other
hand, the LACSD has found a way to keep seagulls away from unburied
garbage — by stringing wires which interfere with their flight above
the current waste area, and they are currently undertaking a full-scale
investigation of site geology and hydrology to determine whether these
are suitable.
Another issue which was frequently raised, but which was not at all a
point of contention between CASH and the LACSD, .was the incorrect
information about the landfill which the developer had provided to
prospective property owners. Furthermore, residents reported that the
developer stated as far back as 1969 that the landfill would become a
park in "10-15 years". To compound the confusion, residents also
maintained that the L.A. County Regional Planning Commission until
recently had the Calabasas landfill on its maps as a park. As noted
above, if the whole landfill is developed, it will not become a park for
another 30-50 years.
Since 1973, when the dispute first surfaced, residents have become more
aware and thus more concerned about the dumping of hazardous wastes in
this facility. In October of 1976, 2,500 gallons of nitric acid were
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pumped into a well containing traces of sulfuric acid. The resulting
reaction sent a cloud of toxic gas over the Saratoga Hills tract, but
the gas was dissipated before it reached the ground. Local residents
have indicated that aesthetic concerns are still primary in this
dispute, but that they expect the safety of hazardous waste operations
to be an issue when the LACSD again moves to bring its operations into
the front canyons.
The LACSD has decided not to pursue moving into the front canyons until
a year and a half from now. At that time they intend to conduct
workshops and if necessary use other means to•open lines of com-
munication to the community in order to amicably resolve, if possible,
the dispute.1 LACSD attorneys have determined that they must file an
Environmental Impact Report if they wish to expand the landfill into the
front canyons. It is expected that the EIR will be prepared and
submitted in or. about 1980, and that local residents will at that time
file suit to overturn the EIR and in that manner prevent dumping near
their homes.
IV.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
June, 1958 —The Los Angeles County Regional Planning Commission (RFC)
grants the LACSD a zone exception, approving the use of
the Calabasas site as a disposal facility.
June, 1960 — Zone exception expires.
October, 1960 — RFC again grants LACSD zone exception for the Calabasas
landfill.
December, 1960 — The Regional water Quality Control Board adopts Class
II waste discharge requirements for the landfill.
April, 1961 — The Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors approves the
zone exception for the landfill.
Summer, 1961 —The Calabasas landfill begins accepting Class II and III
wastes.
1963 — Developer acquires the parcel of land between the.landfill and
the Ventura Freeway. The land is rezoned from heavy
agricultural to residential. .
Workshops differ from public meetings in that the number of
public attendees is limited and there are relatively many staff
members from the sponsoring organization — one for every eight or so
of the public. In this way all questions can be answered and public
input received. Furthermore, the discussion format is not so
conducive to confrontation as that of the typical public meeting.
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965 — LACSD applies for and receives Regional Water Quality Control
Board Class I requirements for the Calabasas landfill; begins
accepting Group 1 wastes.
1968 -— Construction of housing is begun on parcel of land between
landfill and highway.
July, 1973 — The LACSD posts a sign in the front canyons— in close
proximity to the housing development — announcing its
intention to begin dumping in these canyons in the near fu-
ture.
September, 1973 — Officers of the Community Association of Saratoga
Hills (CASH) decide to hold general meeting to organ-
ize opposition to the landfill extension.
October, 1973 — General meeting is held. Decide to approach local
politicians to try to revoke LACSD decision to move
operations into the front canyons.
Autumn, 1973/Winter, 1974 •— CASH representatives meet with local
politicians, RFC and LACSD to try to gain
support for their position.
Summer, 1974 — The LACSD offers to change the route of the access road
but refuses to consider limiting dumping to the back
part of the site. CASH refuses to accept this offer.
Autumn, 1974/Summer, 1975 — Meetings between CASH and, respectively lo-
cal officials and the LACSD continue, but
to no avail.
October, 1976 --Accidental mixing of two acids in landfill sends cloud
of toxic gas over the housing development.
1980 — Expected date of the LACSD EIR on the movement of operations to
the front canyons, and of CASH action to overturn the EIR and
prevent the movement.
V.
ATTEMPTS TO SECURE SUPPORT
During the early stages of this dispute, the LACSD underestimated the
effect public opposition could-have on their activities. Therefore, at-
tempts to secure support were limited. These attempts included the fol-
lowing: ;
o Meetings were held with CASH representatives to attempt to
settle the dispute.
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VI.
o The LACSD offered to re-route the access road to take it
further away from residences, in return for CASH support
for their using the front canyons.
o The LACSD promised to take immediate action to remove any
dust or trash blown from the site into the housing tract.
SUMMARY EVALUATION
The LACSD has not yet solved its problem at the Calabasas landfill.
They acknowledged that gaining local public acceptance would have been
considerably easier if they had invested more time in working with the
public. For instance, it was not wise to announce that the LACSD
expected to be dumping soon in the front canyons merely by erecting a
sign which said as much. Consultation with community leaders might have
given them a better chance at gaining initial approval. Furthermore,
while their response to the public outcry against this dumping did
indicate that they were aware of the threat that this opposition posed,
it was not sufficient to head it off. Subsequent public relations
efforts made by the LACSD at other landfills were more sophisticated
(see below).
An official of the Regional Water Quality Control Board commented that
the mere fact that the landfill had preceded the residences should not
be relied upon to ameliorate public relations problems. He felt that
this would make little if any difference to the perspective of local
residents.
The issues and concerns raised by the local residents during the attempt
to move operations included the following:
Aesthetics — One of the amenities which this housing development has to
offer is the view of the surrounding hills. Local residents object to
dumping in the front canyon because this view would be adversely af-
fected.
Facility operations — There was considerable feeling in the local com-
munity that the landfill is not operated as competently as it might be,
and that their problems as a result of this"would be exacerbated if the
landfill operation was that much closer to their homes. Particular con-
cerns include odors and blowing trash and dust.
Traffic — The truck traffic to and from the facility is considered by
local residents to be both a safety hazard and a nuisance.
Hazardous wastes — Following the accident in 1976, residents have be-
come concerned about the possibility of a serious accident or fire due
to mishandling of hazardous wastes. They percieve that the danger will
be greater if these operations are closer to them.
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Site Suitability — Local residents have questioned whether the geology
and hydrology of the front canyons are suitable for landfilling, and
particularly for hazardous waste disposal. LACSD's analysis may resolve
this issue when it is complete.
VII. FACTORS LEADING TO PUBLIC OPPOSITION/ACCEPTANCE
The following factors can be said to have led to public opposition to
the proposed dumping in the front canyons.
o . Residents' reaction to discovering the proximity and ex-
, pected life of the landfill after having been misled by the
developer.
d The anticipated impact of this dumping on the aesthetics of
the area.
o The LACSD's announcing their plans to dump in the front
canyons by posting a sign to this effect.
o Incidents involving truck drivers and the local residents,
including but not limited to traffic accidents.
VIII. RETROSPECTIVE VIEWS
The LACSD in retrospect perceived two major problems in their handling
of the Calabasas landfill. The first was their failure to provide for
buffer space around the landfill. Their experience shows that the mere
fact that land around a landfill is zoned for agricultural (or other
non-residential) use when the landfill is sited should not be grounds
for assuming that no residences will ever be built there. Zoning is not
an adequate tool to prevent residential development. The only exception
to this need for buffer space would be if the facility is located in a
developed industrial area.
An official with the Regional Water Quality Control Board commented,
similarly, that land use questions are very important in siting
hazardous waste facilities. By this he meant not just adjacent land but
also any development expected in proximity to the planned facility
during its lifetime. It is necessary first that some provisions be made
for a permanent buffer zone unless existing surrounding land use is not
only compatible but very likely to remain so. He recommended that local
planning commissions not be free to allow subdivisions near existing
sites. , ,
The second LAGSD critique of their own strategy relates to the
low-profile approach to public relations they had adopted at that time.
They now feel that it is necessary to make the public aware of their
operations, but recognize that this in and of itself is not sufficient
to guarantee public acceptance. Local residents seemingly agree with
the latter point. They felt that they had had a very difficult time
getting information from the LACSD.
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Some of these ideas have subsequently been put into practice. When
residential construction began around their Palos Verdes landfill, the
LACSD attempted to ensure that all prospective purchasers were aware of
the landfill, and even offered tours of the operation to anyone who
wanted them. When people had moved into these houses, workshops were
held to describe the operation, to answer questions and to make clear to
the residents whom they could get in touch with if there were any
problems. However, the public relations problem at this particular
landfill was not so difficult because the landfill was to close in five
years or so, and part of it which had already been closed had been
converted to a botanic garden. Notwithstanding these very significant
differences, the LACSD now believes that if it were possible to
virtually eliminate public opposition at Palos Verdes, it will also be
possible to do so at Calabasas. One tactic they are considering is to
fill in the front of the "front canyons" first, had thereby construct a
barrier between their operations and the housing development. They do
realize that a major problem they still face is that of correcting the
effects of past bad publicity.
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SCA/EARTHLINE, INCORPORATED
WILSONVILLE, ILLINOIS
,1*
INTRODUCTION
Earthline, Inc., a private disposal company which is now a division of
SCA Services of Boston, Massachusetts, is currently appealing a "circuit
court decision which required them to close a hazardous wast,e landfill
in Wilsonville, Illinois/ In 1976 the Illinois Environmental Protection
Agency (IEPA) granted Earthline a permit to operate the facility.
However, five months after the start of operations, local townspeople
learned of a shipment of PCB-contaminated soil to the facility and
within a matter of days became violently opposed to it. The town (and
shortly thereafter the state Attorney General) .took Earthline to court
to close the facility and subsequently won their case at the circuit
level.
Most attempts to secure public support for the Earthline facility
occurred prior to this litigation. During the litigation, only one
.(unsuccessful) attempt was made to regain public support. However,
support was received from industry, state and local officials during
this time. Since the resolution of the lawsuit is still in doubt, the
effectiveness of this support is not yet apparent.
II.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The Earthline hazardous waste management facility occupies approximately
130 acres, 90 of which are within the boundaries of the village of
Wilsonville, Illinois. This land is the site of an abandoned
underground coal mine formerly owned by the Superior Coal Company. The
general geological profile of the site shows a surface layer of about 10
feet of loess (wind blown silt and clay material) underlain by about 40
to 65 feet of till material. Permeability studies conducted during site
design measured a permeability of 10-^ cm/sec for the till material.
About 40 acres of the site is covered by a pile of mine waste (or "gob
pile") made up of coal, shale and clay. No reclamation procedures had
been carried out after the mine was closed. Water passing through the
gob pile had become acidic due to oxidation of the pyrites in the waste.
The landfill was designed so that excess soil from the trenches in which
wastes were buried would be used to cover the surface of the gob pile.
This would retard the flow of water into the pile and thus reduce the
flow of acid mine drainage.
The site is bordered on the north by residential land in the village of
Wilsonville and on the east, west and south by agricultural and/or
undeveloped land. The waste burial area is located one-quarter mile
from the northern boundary of the site. The facility's main gate is
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located at the end of the main street of Wilsonville. While the
'facility's burial area is not immediately visible from the village,
on-site buildings and the surrounding fence are within 100 feet ,of some
residences. Truck access to the site is via Wilsonville1s main street.
The hazardous waste facility is primarily a landfill, but also includes
facilities for short-term storage of recyclables and for landfarming of
waste. All types of hazardous wastes were accepted by the facility,
with the exception of radioactive wastes, strong acids and explosives.
Although the site is reported to have received wastes from as far away
as Texas, industries from the St. Louis area comprise its primary
market. The site is projected to have a 20-year landfill capacity.
Provisions for long-term post-closure maintenance of the site were in
accordance with state regulations (i.e., Illinois Pollution Control
Board Rules and Regulations). Currently, these require that:
The owner or operator of a sanitary landfill shall monitor gas,
water and settling at the completed site for a period of three
years after the site is completed or closed.
The owner or operator shall take whatever remedial action is
necesary to abate any gas, water or settling problems which
appear during the three-year period.
These regulations are expected to be amended shortly to comply with RCRA
requirements.
Originally a privately owned corporation, Earthline was purchased in
October of 1976, by SCA Services of Boston, Massachusetts. The
Wilsonville facility is one of four hazardous waste management
facilities owned by SCA. Others are located in New Jersey, New York,
and South Carolina. SCA is the third largest waste services company in
the nation and reported total corporate revenues of over $180 million in
fiscal 1978.
The population of Wilsonville (700) is comprised largely of low- to
middle-income Italian and Polish-Americans whose principal sources of
employment are the coal mines in the area. Wilsonville is located in
Macoupin County, about 50 miles northeast of St. Louis, Missouri and 60
miles south of Springfield, Illinois. The economy of Macoupin County is
based largely on farming and mining. Area residents also commute to
employment centers in the East St. Louis metropolitan area.
III. HISTORY OF FACILITY DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC RESPONSE
The state of Illinois preempts any local regulatory control over the
siting of hazardous waste facilities. Regulatory powers rest with IE PA.
The IEPA landfill permit process is a three-step process. First,
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application must be made, for a permit to develop the site, at which time
a complete description of the site and proposed processes must be
furnished to IEPA. If this permit is granted and development proceeds,
then the finished site must be: inspected by IEPA personnel to ensure
consistency with the site descriptions in the development application
and with State of Illinois regulations. Only then can an operating
permit be issued. Finally, supplemental permits are required for each
type of hazardous waste from each given source.
Earthline, Inc., was chartered in 1974 by a Springfield, Illinois
consulting engineer who had previously served as manager of the IEPA
division of land pollution control. He has stated that he had become
aware of serious environmental problems caused by co-disposal of
hazardous and municipal wastes—then and now a common practice in
Illinois. Therefore, given the likelihood of more stringent state and
federal regulation of industrial waste disposal, he thought that a
hazardous waste management facility would be a good investment.
' After leaving IEPA to found his own consulting engineering firm, he
began a search for an appropriate site for a hazardous waste facility in
Illinois. Primary considerations in the site selection process were
proximity to major industrial areas, hydrogeological data, and whether
the area surrounding the site was developed.
Several sites were considered. The Wilsonville site which was
ultimately chosen had first been considered as a possible recreational
site in connection with another project of his. The site is, however,
partially covered by a pile of mine wastes and had also been used as an
open dump by village residents. This rendered it unfit for recreational
use. Earthline's founder indicated that it then occurred to him that a
mine slag pile reclamation operation and a hazardous waste landfill
might be able to operate in concert, such that earth removed in burying
hazardous wastes would be used to cover the mine slag pile.
At some point in late 1975 or early 1976, he reached an agreement with
the owner of the site on the financial terms under which the site could
be developed. The original site owner retained ownership of the land.
The inital application, submitted in February of 1976, proposed five
processes. These were: 1) hazardous wastes landfilling; 2)
acid-alkaline neutralization; 3) chemical fixation; 4) short-term
storage of recyclables; and 5) medium-term storage of recyclables. ' IEPA
rejected the application oil the grounds that it would not approve
medium-term recyclable storage. The application was resubmitted in May
of 1976 without this process, and a development permit was granted
Earthline in July of 1976.
A letter of notification describing the proposed facility was sent by
Earthline to various local officials and residents in February, 1976.
The letter stated that the Wilsonville Research Division of Earthlinp
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was planning to build a facility which would assist in "conserving our
precious resources and protecting our environment," implicitly promised
that there would be jobs for local residents, and stated that the
facility would eventually reclaim the site, which was then partly
covered by a pile of mine wastes. The function of the facility was said
to be "the recovery, treatment, storage and containment of industrial
residues."
Initial development of the site took place from February through
November of 1976. During this time, facilities for secure landfilling
of hazardous wastes and short-term storage of recyclables were prepared.
Earthline, Inc., was sold to SCA,Services on October 1, 1976. Earth-
line's founder had had previous contact with SCA through his work for
SCA-owned firms in the St. Louis area. He was retained by SCA as the
consulting engineer for the facility. According to the Illinois
Attorney General's Office, under the sales agreement he is also to
receive two percent of the gross receipts of the facility. A separate
agreement was reached between SCA and the owner of the land, who was
made regional director for SCA Services.
The operating permit for the facility was granted in early November,
1976. Operations began November 15, 1976. That same day, an open house
was held for local residents to acquaint them with the facility. The
open house consisted of a luncheon, presentations by SCA personnel, and
a tour of the facility. Shortly thereafter, a meeting was held between
SCA and the board of the village of Wilsonville for the same purpose.
Accounts of exactly what SCA told the residents on these occasions
differ widely. Earthline's founder claims that the nature of the wastes
to be disposed of was made clear. The mayor of Wilsonville and other
village residents maintain that the facility was presented as a center
for the "recovery of industrial residues" and as a way to reclaim the
mine site.
Residents of Wilsonville say that there were only minor problems in
SCA-village relations during the following four months of facility
operation. There were some complaints about odors from the facility,
and that the facility did not hire as many local residents as the
residents felt they had been led to expect. Trucks traveling to and
from the facility caused some damage to local streets,and property; and
there were a few spills of hazardous materials. In general, however,
local public feeling about the facility during this period has been
characterized as neutral to slightly positive.
On April 4, 1977, the Missouri Department of Conservation contacted
the U.S. EPA Region VII office to request help in the disposal of earth
contaminated with waste oil containing PCBs and other chemicals. The
oil had been illegally dumped and had polluted a creek near Dittmer,
Missouri. U.S. EPA and the U.S. Coast Guard are responsible for the
^306
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removal of oil or any hazardous substance discharged into the waters of
the United States.i •
To prevent further water pollution, all the contaminated soil was
removed from the dump site and stored in drums. It was not feasible to
incinerate this waste, and the only alternative was to place it in a
chemical waste landfill. The closest such landfill was the facility at
Wilsonville. An emergency supplemental permit to accept these wastes
was granted Earthline by IEPA.
Newspaper accounts of the spill stressed the toxicity of PCBs and noted
that the wastes were to be taken to Wilsonville. Wilsonville residents,
who seem to have been previously unaware of the function of the
facility, very quickly became violently opposed to the contaminated soil
being dumped there. Their principal concern at this time was the
toxicity of PCBs. On Friday April 15, State Senator DeMuzio held an
"information meeting" in the village. Although the manager of the
hazardous wastes subdivision of IEPA spoke in favor of the facility, the
meeting served to intensify the fears of the village residents. On'
Sunday morning (April 17) a local parish priest reportedly told
parishoners in his sermon the facility was a danger to them and should
be shut down. By Sunday evening tensions had increased to the point
where some residents had armed themselves and were prepared to use these
arms in some way-against either the facility or the trucks bringing in
wastes. These armed residents had gathered into an angry mob. Some in
the crowd reportedly had sticks of dynamite under their belts and
threatened to blow up the facility. By this time, however, the priest
and some other residents had contacted a recently retired circuit court
judge and the State's Attorney for Macoupin County with regard to
obtaining a court injunction to forbid the facility to accept any PCBs.
The retired judge agreed to serve as special attorney for the village,
but only on the grounds that no violence should take place. A blockade
of trucks coming to Earthline planned for Monday morning was called off
because of its potential for violence, and none subsequently occurred.
Legal proceedings against Earthline were begun by the village's attorney
on Monday, April 18. The presiding judge of the Macoupin County Circuit
Court immediately granted a temporary restraining order against burying
any of the contaminated soil in the Wilsonville landfill. However, this
restraining order was soon appealed, and was overturned in ail Appellate
Court. The facility then remained open until shortly after the circuit
court decision against Earthline (September, 1978). IEPA filed an
amicus curiae brief in favor of Earthline as part of this appeal and
again during the trial. The village of Wilsonville was joined in the
suit by Macoupin County and the County Farm Bureau,
That same day (Monday, April 18th) Earthline's founder called IEPA and
requested that IEPA protect Earthline's trade secrets'and customer list
by keeping all supplemental hazardous waste disposal permits
Under Section 311 of the Clean Water Act.
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confidential (as permitted under Section 7 of the Illinois Environmental
Protection Act). The confidentiality of these permits eventually became
a legal issue since the permits provide a record of the types of wastes
that are buried in the landfill.*
During this time, tensions beween the village and Earthline were made
worse due to misinformation and some public statements ascribed to
Earthline officials. For example, during the early stages of the
litigation between the village and Earthline—when the litigation only
dealt with PCB shipments—the site manager was quoted in a local
newspaper as saying that there were much worse things than PCBs buried
in the site. Next some local residents confused PCBs with PBBs. The
contamination of cattle feed by the latter substance had resulted in
birth defects in calves, severe deformities in cattle, and had
necessitated the destruction of hundreds of cattle in Michigan. Local
farmers reportedly became concerned that they would soon be in the same
situation. And third, an unfounded report to the effect that nerve gas
was being buried in the site was circulated. The owner of the land was
then quoted in a local newspaper as saying that although there was no
nerve gas in the site at that time, Earthline was free to store nerve
gas there if it wished.
Illinois State Geological Survey personnel visited the Wilsonville site
for the first time on May 10 at Earthline's request, and again in July.
Four months later, ISGS issued a generally favorable report on the
hydrogeology of the site.
On May 17, the circuit court judge denied a motion by Earthline to admit
U.S. EPA into the suit because, he said, it was "not a necessary party
in the legal sense." U.S. EPA was eventually admitted to the suit as a
friend of the court.
In early May, the Illinois Attorney General, who had been representing
the IEPA in court, had visited the site and decided that its continued
operation was not in the public interest. Therefore on May 25, he
advised the agency to retain its own counsel and announced plans to file
suit to close down Earthline. This proceeding was later consolidated
with Wilsonville's request for an injunction against the landfill
accepting PCBs. The Attorney General later amended his complaint to ask
for removal of all wastes buried at the facility and $1.24 million in
fines.
Five days later (May 30), the Governor of Illinois issued a 45-day
moratorium on the issuance of new supplementary permits. This had no
impact on facility operations due to the large number (over 200) of
This issue Was eventually resolved by a compromise by which the
State Attorney General's Office could have access to all informa-
tion on these permits with the exception of the name and location
of the generator.
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outstanding supplemental permits previously issued by IEPA. The
following day, on the basis of this moratorium, the mayor of Wilsonville
stopped five 'trucks from entering the landfill.
On June 8, a U.S. EPA technical evaluation team visited Earthline to
evaluate" the landfill's technical suitability. This team issued a
report the following October which concluded that the Earthline facility
"is a well-designed, 'secure landfill which provides disposal by
environmentally acceptable methods" and "...is capable of managing
PCBs." However, the only criteria used in this analysis were the rules
for managing and disposing of PCBs, since regulations for the treatment,
storage and/or disposal of hazardous wastes under the Solid Waste
Disposal ,Act (as amended by RCRA) had not been promulgated at that time.
Midway through the trial, SCA officials asked for and received a meeting
with local officials. At this meeting, SCA asked if anything could be ;
done to settle the lawsuit out of court. It is reported that they
offered to settle all outstanding damage claims by village residents
against Earthline, and to pave the village main s'treet which was used by
trucks hauling wastes to the facility. The response of the Wilsonville
officials present was that the only thing SCA could do to end the
lawsuit was to close down the facility and remove the wastes already
burled there. ' ', "
The trial lasted for 16 months. Extensive testimony was presented by
both sides (eventually filling 14,000 pages of record). The major
issues in the trial were the technical suitability of the site and the
concomitant threat posed by the site to the health of local residents.
Specific technical issues raised during the trial included the
permeability of the soil and the potential for subsidence. As noted
above, permeability studies conducted during site design measured a
permeability of 10~8 cm/sec. Subsequent measurements made* by
geologists working for the village of Wilsonville found the permeability
to be 10~6 cm/sec. The implication of the latter figure is that it
would take a given waste 1/100 as long to permeate a layer of soil than
if the permeability were 10~^ cm/sec. ' ,. ...
The potential for subsidence of-land above an abandoned mine was also an
issue. Geologists from the Illinois State Geological Survey (ISGS)
maintained that the potential for problems due to subsidence is
negligible, but this was disputed by mining experts hired by the
village.
Other issues raised during the trial included the contention that
disposal was frequently carried out in a manner contary to state
regulations. Smoking was allowed on the site. Containers were
reportedly emptied and reused rather than buried with the wastes. No
record was kept of the location of buried wastes during the first few
months of facility operation. The facility was said to produce
offensive odors. The local population also expressed concern about the
possibility of health problems due to the facility, and about the fact
that the facility had" had an adverse effect upon local property values.
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On August 14, 1978, the circuit court judge ruled that Earthline must
close the landfill and remove all wastes previously dumped there.
Earthline immediately requested permission from the Appellate Court to
keep the landfill open during the appeals process. However, before the
Appellate Court reach a decision on this, the village of Wilsonville be-
gan culvert repair work to control flooding. This required digging a
trench across the access road to the Earthline facility, and effectively
closed the facility. On September 14, the Appellate Court denied Earth-
line's request to remain open during the appeals process. That same
month, the Governor directed IEPA not to issue any more supplemental
permits to Earthline for the Wilsonville facility and prohibited all
IEPA personnel from any further participation in the court action. It
is reported that officers of a number of industries in the state wrote
to him cricitizing these actions. The Illinois Manufacturers' As-
sociation subequently released its letter to the Governor in which it
stated that the "Earthline facility.. .is one of the best landfill sites
for industrial wastes in the United States", and that "[this] case seems
to boil down to emotionalism on one side, and scientific state of the
art on the other." They requested that the governor reconsider his
position.
The appeals court is not expected to reach a decision before September
of 1979. Moreover, it is expected that this decision will in turn be
appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court. Two issues form the basis of
the appeal. These are 1) whether the Macoupin County Circuit Court has
jurisdiction over such disputes; and 2) whether the Circuit Court erred
in its findings on the safety of the site. With regard to the former,
the state Environmental Protection Act gives authority to the Illinois
Pollution Control Board to "conduct hearings upon complaints charging
violations of this Act or of regulations thereunder." During'the trial,
Earthline had requested a change of venue to the Board, but this was de-
nied them. As' of June 1979, EPA Region V was reviewing an Earthline ap-
plication for a permit to dispose of PCBs. It was not expected that
this application would be acted upon until the lawsuit is resolved.
IV.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
February, 1976
First application submitted to IEPA for a development
permit for the Wilsonville facility. Application re-
jected.
February 11, 1976 — Letter of Notification sent out by Earthline to lo-
cal officials and residents.
May, 1976 — Application resubmitted with changes.
July, 1976 — Development permit granted.
October 1, 1976 — Earthline, Inc., sold to SCA Services.
November, 1976 — Operating permit granted.
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November 15, 1976— Operations begin. Open house held for village res-
idents. Shortly thereafter, meeting held between
SCA and the village board.
April, 1977 —Wilsonville facility selected for disposal of con-
taminated soil. •
April. 4, 1977 --.Missouri Department of Conservation requests U. S..EPA,
assistance in cleaning up spill of oil containing PCBs
in Dittmer, Missouri.
April 15,.1977— State Senator holds "informational meeting" in Wilson-
ville. .
April 17, 1977
Wilsonville parish priest asks parishioners to block
delivery of contaminated soil.•
April 18, 1977 Legal proceedings begin against Earthline at Macoupin
County Courthouse in Carlinville, Illinois. IEPA re-
quested to protect Earthline's trade secrets and
customer list by keeping all supplemental hazardous
waste disposal permits confidential. Blockage of
1 • . trucks coming to Earthline threatens to turn violent
, • . ; : , '•"' and .is called off. . • • .
May 10, 1977 — Illinois State Geological Survey personnel visit Wilson-
.- ville site at Earthline1 s request.
May 17, 1977— Macoupin County Circuit Court Judge denies Earthline mo-
tion .to admit U.S. EPA into the suit.
May 25> 1977 Illinois Attorney General advises IEPA to get its own
' . . lawyer, and announces plans to file suit to close down
Earthline.
May 30, 1977 — Governor issues a 45-day moratorium on issuance of sup-
; . ,. plemental permits to Earthline, which turns out to be
i ineffectual due to large numbers of outstanding sup-
plemental permits already issued by IEPA.
May 31, 1977— Acting on the basis of governor's moratorium,
Wilsonville village Mayor stops .five trucks from
entering the landfill.
June 1, 1977—Attorney General requests injunction against Earthline.
June 8, 1977
U.S. EPA Technical Evaluation Team visits Earthline to
assess landfill's suitability. Issues a report in Oc-
tober, 1977 which concludes that the facility is well-
designed, secure and capable of managing PCBs.
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July 1, 1977 — Attorney General amends complaint to ask for removal of
all wastes buried at Earthline and $1.25 million in
fines. ,
July 19, 1977 — ISGS staff makes second visit to Earthline; takes
samples.
November 3, 1977 — ISGS issues a generally favorable report on the
Wilsonville site.
April 6, 1978 — Trial testimony ends in Macoupin County
Court. ..-.,.,
August 14, 1978 — Judge rules that Earthline must close its landfill
and remove all previously deposited wastes.
September 1, 1978 — Governor directs IEPA not to issue any more sup-
plemental permits to Earthline for the Wilsonville
landfill and prohibits all IEPA personnel from any
further participation in the court action.
September 6, 1978 — Village of Wilsonville begins culvert repair work
to control flooding.
September 14, 1978 — Appellate court denies Earth!ine's request to re-
main open during the appeals.process.
September, 1979 — Likely date for decision on Earthline's appeal of
circuit court order. , .
V.
ATTEMPTS TO SECURE SUPPORT
Attempts to secure support for the Wilsonville hazardous waste man-
agement facility can be divided into two categories: 1) attempts to
secure support from local residents prior to the PCB-dumping contro-
versy; and 2) attempts to secure support from industry groups and local,
state and federal officials during subsequent litigation. Attempts to
secure local residents' support included:
o ' The letter of notification sent to various local officials
and residents in February, 1976.
o The open house held for village residents at the facility.
o The meeting held with village officials to explain the
operation of the facility. '
o The meeting held with village officials, midway through the
trial, to attempt to settle the dispute out of court.
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Subsequent to the events of April, 1977, most attempts to secure support
for the facility were directed at industry and state and federal of-
ficials. These included:
o Earthline's attempt to have U.S. EPA admitted into the
suit. ,
o The Illinois Manufacturers' Association letter-writing
campaign protesting the Governor's decision to forbid IEPA
any further participation in the suit.
VI.
SUMMARY EVALUATION
Earthline's efforts to secure industry, state and federal support seem
to have been successful. It remains to be seen whether this support
will be sufficient to allow them to reopen the facility.
Very few things could have been done, given the location of the
facility, to avoid the confrontation that arose between the village of
Wilsonville and Earthline. Even if Earthline had decided not to accept
the PCB-contaminated wastes, it does not seem likely that local
residents would have remained forever ignorant of the true nature of the
facility. Some problems might have been avoided if Earthline had made
clear from the outset that it was preparing to build and, operate a
hazardous waste landfill. However, it is equally possible that had
this been done, the facility might have faced opposition from the >very
beginning.
While Earthline's initial efforts to secure local public support—the
letter of notification and open house for village residents—were
successful in the short run, they were certainly unsuccessful and
possibly counterproductive in the long run. However, the point has been
raised that this might not have been the case if Earthline's actions
subsequent to the beginning of operations had been different. First,
Earthline might have made a greater effort to meet local residents'
expectations which had been raised by the letter of notification.- In
particular, providing jobs for more local residents would have both
given the community an economic interest in the facility and opened up
more avenues of communication between Earthline and village residents.
Second, Earthline might have responded more rapidly and more
substantively when residents became concerned about the PCB shipments.
Officials of SCA did eventually meet with village officials to see if
anything could be done to resolve the dispute, but only when the trial
was.well underway. At least some Wilsonville residents and officials
suggested that if such a meeting had been held shortly after the initial
controversy, some sort of accommodation might have been reached.
Earthline lost most of its credibility among residents of Wilsonville
when it was discovered that PCB-contaminated wastes were to be shipped
there and that the facility was actually a hazardous waste landfill.
Furthermore, its public image was damaged by some statements attributed
to Earthline and SCA personnel.
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The key issues and concerns in this dispute differ according to the
perspective of the participant. These issues and concerns are outlined
below.
Fear of the unknown - According to Earthline's founder and IEPA, fear of
the unknown is a major issue. This includes such things as a lack of
understanding of the need for and operations of the facility, and the
linking of any kind of hazardous waste management facility to increased
risks of cancer and birth defects, and the confusion of PCBs with PBBs.
Site suitability - As noted above, a major issue in the trial has been
the suitability of the Wilsonville site as a hazardous waste landfill.
Both IEPA and U.S. EPA have stressed the technical suitability of the
site, while Wilsonville residents and technical experts hired by them
note many technical shortcomings. At issue here are the permeability of
the soil and the possibility of mine subsidence.
Another concern expressed by local residents is the proximity of the
site to the village of Wilsonville (the waste burial area is located
one-quarter mile from the nearest residences). In this case, the
concern stems from two factors: first, the possibility that existing
residents might experience health problems due to the facility; and
second, that the presence of the facility has had a very adverse effect
on the market for houses in Wilsonville.
Facility operations — Residents who have witnessed facility operations
have testified that dumping was frequently carried out in a manner
contrary to state regulations. The no-smoking rule was reportedly not
enforced on the site. Containers were reportedly not buried with wastes
but emptied so that they could be reused. No adequate record seems to
have been kept of the location of buried wastes. Odors from the
facility have been a concern since shortly after it began operating.
Transportation of wastes to the facility - Concerns were expressed over
the danger of spills of hazardous wastes and over damage to local
streets and private property caused by trucks going to and from the
facility. These concerns became and" have remained major points of
contention between the village of Wilsonville and Earthline.
VII. FACTORS LEADING TO PUBLIC OPPOSITION/ACCEPTANCE
Factors which led to the initial acceptance of the facility by residents
of Wilsonville include:
o The letter of notification sent by Earthline to local
officials and residents describing the proposed facility.
This letter was thought by the recipients to indicate that:
- the 'facility would be a resource recovery and mine
reclamation project;
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- the facility would provide jobs for local residents;
and
- the facility would ultimately reclaim the abandoned
.coal mine. . . • .-..••
o The open house held at the completed facility for village
••-..;. .residents. ... , , , •
o The meeting held by SCA officials with village officials to
explain the function of the facility.
In retrospect,
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area and trucks going to and from the site travelled down the main
street. This might have been ameliorated if access to the site had been
by some other road.
Officials of IEPA and the State Attorney General's Office agreed that,
had Earthline given the community a financial stake in the operation
such as employing local residents or paying a fee on wastes brought in,
the local community might have been less ready to have the facility
closed. Earthline1s founder felt that neither compensation to nor
negotiation with the community would prove especially useful in siting
hazardous waste management facilities. The former, he stated, will not
be perceived as sufficient recompense for the risk the community is
bearing and the latter procedures are subject to judicial review.
It was suggested by the Attorney General's office that the lawsuit could
have been settled if Earthline had agreed within a week or so of the
initial filing not to bring in the PCB-contaminated wastes. This again
presumes that residents would not have subsequently become aware of the
other substances in the landfill.
Both local officials and the Attorney General's office criticized lEPA's
role in the siting of the facility. Although they recognized the need
for hazardous waste disposal sites, they felt that IEPA did not have the
expertise necessary to judge the suitability of the site and its.
operation. The Attorney General's office questioned the wisdom of
relying on the judgments of a consulting engineer who had a financial
stake in the outcome, and recommended that IEPA hire outside experts to
review future permit applications for hazardous waste disposal sites.
Local officials expressed considerable dissatisfaction with the total
lack of a substantive local role in the siting process. It was noted
that local residents might have petitioned the Illinois Pollution
Control Board to conduct a public hearing which would have given them at
least a nominal role in the process. However, this assumes that the
local populace was aware of their opportunity to petition the board,
which in this case did not seem to have been true. In fact, the siting
process was completely in the hands of the facility sponsor except for
technical review by IEPA.
IX. GENERAL COMMENTS
Opinions differed somewhat on the extent of U.S. EPA's role in the
siting of hazardous waste management facilities. Local officials felt
that the only way to resolve the problems of siting and long-term care
was to put such facilities on federal lands under U.S. EPA management.
The Attorney General's Office thought that U.S. EPA's primary role
should be to provide technical assistance to state agencies such as
IEPA. Earthline's founder felt that U.S. EPA should not take an active
role, but that it should force the states to take a stronger role.
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RESOURCE RECOVERY CORPORATION
PASCO, WASHINGTON
I.
INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 1972, Resource Recovery Corporation began disposing
hazardous waste in a leased portion of an existing sanitary landfill
operated by Basin Disposal. The owners of Resource Recovery also owned
the Preservative Paint Company of Seattle, and had a solvent manu-
facturing and reclamation operation calle4 Chemical Processors, Inc.,
also of Seattle. The wastes produced by Chemical Processors had been
disposed of in local landfills and in an abandoned coal mine outside of
Seattle. However, their activities were terminated after several .
accidental fires. Resource Recovery was then formed with the leasing of
Basin Disposal's facilities to dispose of paint wastes as well as other
industrial and agricultural wastes. ''.""'
The facility operated for two years during which time public opposition
to the site grew as a result of its pesticide waste disposal 6peration.
For some' time prior to the operation of the site local grapegrowers had ••
complained about crop dataage from an herbicide {2,4-D), which was being
used in aerial applications by wheat growers. The disposal of 2,4-D
sludges at the Pasco site added fuel to this controversy, especially
since their wastes were being imported from Oregon.; Finally, the County
Commissioners ordered the closure of the agricultural and industrial
waste disposal operation in December of 1974.
The only support for the site came indirectly from the technical
approvals given by the State Department of Ecology as a result of '
reports prepared by the state following their official investigations.
The State Department of Ecology and the State Department of Agricultural
had studied.the situation and found that the site could be operated
safely with no ill effects to the vineyards 12 miles away. They
concluded in their report that grape damage had dccured prior to the
site's disposal of hazardous wastes, and was probably due to windbprne
herbicides from wheat spraying operations. Nonetheless, public
opposition forced the County Commissioners to not renew the land use
permit for the hazardous waste operations. • •
II.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The Pasco site had been used as a sanitary landfill since 1958. Farm •
land surrounds the site. The 250-acre site is about 2 miles east of
Pasco, 3 miles north of the Columbia River and 2.6 miles northwest of
the Snake River. The climate in the area is semiarid and average
precipitation is eight inches, with most of the precipitation occurring
as rain and light snow during the winter months. The mean annual
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temperature is 56° F. Daytime temperatures often exceed 100° F during
the summer. Annual evaporation potential is about 60 inches per year
with about 80 percent of the evaporation occurring from May through
October.
The Pasco facility was planned as a landfill operation with evaporative
lagoons to be used as a means of concentrating wastes either for
eventual resource recovery or final burial. The actual on-site
facilities were several evaporation lagoons and trenches for the burial
of drums. The Pasco site is in an excellent climatic location for
ground disposal (by evaporation) of industrial solid wastes if proper
safeguards are observed. The arid climate, with approximately eight
inches of annual precipitation, prevents leaching of solid wastes
disposed to the ground. Thus there is little likelihood for migration
of hazardous elements vertically through the ground to the water table
or laterally to be exposed at ground surface at lower elevations. The
climate and low humidity of the air is conducive to on-site evaporation
and concentration of liquid wastes where a large surface area of the
liquid is exposed to the atmosphere. However, the hydrogeology of the
site is not acceptable to dispose of liquid wastes directly to the
ground in unlined pits or trenches. The water table is relatively
shallow at the disposal site (approximately 60-80 feet) and there are no
sub-surface impermeable zones that would prevent movement of the liquid
to the groundwater although the alternating, nearly horizontal layers of
sands, silts, and gravels would tend to spread the liquid and impede
downward percolation. The silt and sand would also remove some elements
from the liquid by adsorption and ion exchange. Under a carefully
controlled operation and proper research on soil/waste reactions,
selected and limited liquid wastes could be disposed directly to the
ground without adverse effects.
Resource Recovery leased a portion of the Basin Disposal landfill with
the intent of storing some wastes for eventual resource recovery
operations and permanent storage of other wastes. The Pasco facility
involving the hazardous waste operation7 employed about 9 persons at the
site. The wastes accepted at the Pasco site by Resource Recovery came
from the Pacific Northwest area and included paint wastes, empty
pesticide and herbicide containers, wood treatment wastes, etching
solutions, metal casting wastes, MCP and 2,4-D tars, and chrome plating
wastes. Much of the waste contained potentially valuable materials such
as copper, chrome and other elements that may occur in small amounts in
industrial debris.
Resource Recovery constructed a series of evaporation lagoons (50 ft. x
100 ft. x 6 ft.) at the site. Liquid wastes, with almost 90 percent of
the waste being fluid, were poured into the lagoons. The water quickly
evaporated in the dry Eastern Washington climate. About 6,000 gallons
can be evaporated in one day in the hot sun. These lagoons were lined
with impervious materials. Deep in the ground beneath the bottom of the
lagoons the company installed sensors which measured moisture and could
detect any leaks in the lagoons. An impervious layer, manufactured from
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a waste material, was placed over the dried material in the lagoons and
topped with three feet of soil. Grass was planted to prevent wind
erosion.
Some of the lagoons became permanent disposal areas and their contents
were not to be recycled. They had more extensive impermeable liners and
moisture sensors. On these lagoons three feet of soil covered the dry
sludges topped with another impervious layer, another layer of soil and
finally grass.
It was assumed that eventually, perhaps not for years, there would be a
demand for some of the stored materials in the lagoons and it would be
worthwhile to dig them out for reprocessing and re-use. Chemical
Resources had planned to operate the site for approximately 50 years.
Paint wastes, insecticide and herbicide wastes with no recovery
potential were stored in covered trenches in drums. Soil was mixed with
the drums to make up a safe mixture to prevent waste flows from leaking
drums from escaping the trenches.
Forty test wells were drilled around the disposal site. Water samples
were analyzed regularly to be sure that groundwaters were not
contaminated by wastes leaching from the storage area.
Resource Recovery at the time of its operation was not required to post
any bonding or closure costs. However, after their land use permit was
not renewed they sought a temporary extension during which they were
required to post a closure bond and promise to carry out post-closure
monitoring.
Resource Recovery Corporation was connected to three other corporations
— Chemical Processors (which was the majority stockholder in Resource
Recovery) and Preservative Paint Company (which owned Chemical
Processors). While Resource Recovey had no hazardous waste management
experience prior to the development of the Pasco facility, Chemical
Processors had been operating since 1959. Chemical Processors had
experience with hauling, reclaiming and processing hazardous waste
generated by Preservative Paint Company and other industries in the
Pacific Northwest. Basin Disposal, with extensive experience in solid
waste disposal,, had a minority interest in Resource Recovery. The Pasco
site was the only facility ever developed by Resource Recovery.
Pasco (1979 estimated population: 16,000) is located in southeastern
Washington. Along with Richland and Kennewick, Pasco forms the
Tri-Cities urban area with a population of over 100,000. The Tri-Cities
is a rapidly growing urban area because of the federally owned Hanford
Reservation, a production center for nuclear fuel. Historically the
southeastern part of Washington has been a sparsely populated area with
an agriculturally based economy. ,
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III. HISTORY OF FACILITY DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC RESPONSE1
When the Pasco facility first started accepting hazardous wastes in
1972, the only permits required were a county zoning variance and a
county health department permit. Shortly thereafter the state
Department of Ecology required a waste discharge permit to.guarantee a
zero hazardous discharge into the waterways.
In 1959 Basin Disposal started a sanitary landfill operation near Pasco,
Washington serving the Tri-Cities area. Franklin County granted a
zoning variance to allow the agriculturally zoned land to be used as a
sanitary landfill. However, through an oversight by the owner of basin
disposal this zoning variance lapsed in 1961 unbeknownst to either the
county or the owner.
Preservative Paint Company of Seattle has been in operation for about
fifty years. It formed a solvent manufacturing and reclamation
operation called Chemical Processors. Chemical Processors also
collected and hauled industrial solvents, crankcase oils, contaminated
diesel fuels from ships and paint wastes. The impetus for developing
the Pasco site as a hazardous waste facility came from Chemical
Processors which had, up until 1972, disposed hazardous wastes in
abandoned coal mines and sanitary landfills in the Seattle area. There
had been several fires at these sites and public concern over these
fires had mounted to the point where the company sought an acceptable
hazardous waste site. Basin Disposal offered Chemical Processors the
opportunity to lease a portion of their sanitary landfill for a
hazardous disposal operation. The lease arrangement was coupled with
the formation, by Chemical Processors and Basin Disposal, of a new
company called Resource Recovery Corporation.
The intent of the Resource Recovery operation, which was started in
1972, was to recover materials (e.g., copper and chrome) from waste
streams, primarily through evaporation of the largely liquid wastes.
Since many of the valuable products in wastes came in small quantities
or the technology for their recovery was not yet economically feasible,
Resource Recovery intended to temporarily store these products in dried
lagoons or trenches until recovery operations were more profitable.
Some wastes, of course, were destined for permanent disposal.
During the site visit, the State Department of Ecology asked
Centaur not to interview local officials and leaders' so as not to
interfere with the state attempt to site a hazardous waste disposal
facility on the Hanford Reservation. This request was honored and,
consequently, secondary sources were used to determine much of the
public response to the Resource Recovery facility. Despite this
restriction, this case study provides valuable information for the
overall study of public response.
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Resource Recovery submitted an operational plan for the Pasco hazardous
waste disposal site to the Benton-Franklin County Health District in
September of 1972. In November of 1972, the Health District granted
approval of the operation on an interim basis pending a new forth-
coming state permit system. Resource Recovery applied to the State
Department of Ecology in November of 1972 and was granted a waste
discharge permit in March of 1973. The discharge permit from the state
was described as an inverted pyramid permit. This pyramid permit
allowed the firm to handle specified wastes approved by the state. It
started out with a/few items like paint, copper-bearing sludges, and
insecticide wastes. Then as the company found new wastes, the state
certified the site for their disposal and the pyramid base grew broader.
Since the site was already an operational landfill, dating back to 1959,
the company felt that there was no apparent need for coordination with
local officials or a public relations campaign for the addition of a
hazardous waste disposal operation. However, in an attempt to gather
new business, the president of Resource Recovery outlined his operation
in a news article in the summer of 1973. As a result of this exposure,
the public learned for the first time of the extent of the hazardous
waste operation and especially of the disposal of herbicide waste
containers, specifically 2,4-D. The state, various newspaper accounts
and company officials described public, concern as becoming uncomfortable
with the knowledge that a hazardous waste site was operating in their
area. The public was also unhappy over the fact that.these wastes were
shipped to the Pasco area from out of state.
In August of 1973, the state began studying the 2,4-D disposal problem
partly because of. large-scale 2,4-D damage .that had been inflicted on
the grape industry that year. The damage to the grape crop was among
the most extensive ever recorded and the grape growers felt their
economic livelihood was at stake. The grape growers were angry at the
wheat growers because of their use of 2,4-D in aerial spraying
operations. The herbicide in minute quantities is very dangerous to the
grape leaves during their rapid growth cycle. It was assumed by the
state that the herbicide spray had strayed from wheat fields as far away
as Oregon to affect the vineyards near Pasco. However, the grape
growers voiced concern over the possible connection between disposal of
2,4-D wastes and damages inflicted on their vineyards. There was no
specific proof as to the source of the 2,4-D that was damaging the
grapes. However, it was generally believed by Resource Recovery that
the wheat growers .pointed the finger at the Pasco disposal operation
which was handling 2,4-D wastes to take the "heat", off their spraying
operations.
In the'Fall of 1973, studies were conducted by the State Department of
Agriculture to determine if the disposal site was the source of the
herbicide. They even planted grape plants at the dump site. These
grape plants were able to grow at the site. The studies could not
determine any link between the Resource Recovery operation and damage to
the grape crop. They concluded that the operation was not damaging to
the local environment. ••
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With all this attention by the association of wheat growers and grape
growers co-operative, the County Commissioners became alarmed. They
were surprised to learn of the extent of the hazardous waste operation.
They had not realized that hazardous wastes were being imported from out
of state to be disposed in Pasco. They intended to investigate this
matter and if necessary stop the operation.
In September of 1973 Resource Recovery had voluntarily stopped accepting
2,4-D wastes. However, public pressure mounted with almost daily news
articles appearing on the 2,4-D dumping. (According to Resource
Recovery and the State Department of Ecology, a local reporter became
extremely active in the opposition. Consequently, the local paper
became a major force behind the opposition and served to place
additional pressure on the County Commissioners to close the operation.)
The County Commissioners, in October of 1973, finally ordered a halt to
the dumping of all industrial wastes. Resource Recovery did not comply
with this order, arguing that they had contracts to honor and would wait
for the outcome of a full public hearing on their right to dispose
industrial wastes since they had a valid discharge permit from the
state. At this time, the state was also feeling the pressure of the
wheat and grape growers and ordered a halt to the disposal of 2,4-D
pending further studies. This move on the part of the state was a
complete reversal of their earlier stand that the operation posed no
threat to the environment.
Towards the end of 1973^ the County Commissioners held a public hearing
on the continued operation of the Pasco site. The hearing revealed for
the first time that the firm had no legal zoning permit to operate a
landfill. Therefore, the county again ordered Resource Recovery to
cease operations at the Pasco site on the basis of an invalid zoning
permit. The company immediately filed for a belated zoning permit and
another hearing was scheduled.
At this second hearing, Resource Recovery appealed the order to
terminate their operation and requested a new zoning permit. Evidence
was presented on the safety of the operation based on past studies by
the agriculture and ecology departments. The company also presented
expert geological evidence to counter allegations that 2,4-D was
escaping the disposal site. However, the grape growers threatened to
take legal action against the county and the firm if the county did not
close the hazardous waste site. Under public pressure, the county
denied the zoning permit and allowed the company to continue its 2,4-D
industrial disposal till May of 1974. It was hoped that current
activities by the state to locate another hazardous waste disposal site
would solve the contractual problems that the Pasco closure would cause
the firm.
The May deadline was later extended to December of 1974, after
negotiations with the county. Resource Recovery made several
concessions to the county. The company agreed to post a $5,000 bond to
assure that no dumping would take place after the December closing date.
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A $30,000 performance bond would be put up to guarantee that Resource ,
Recovery maintained and operated the site properly. The $30,000 could
have been used to correct any problems that might have developed on the
land after closure. Furthermore, Resource Recovery agreed to monitor
the site for two years after closure with supervision by the state.
The site was eventually closed to hazardous waste, at the end of 1974.
It continues to operate as a sanitary landfill.
During this period^ the Department of Ecology began intensive efforts to
locate a single hazardous waste site for the entire state. A history of
this effort closely parallels the Pasco experience and is therefore ap-
pended to the end of this case study.
IV.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
1959 — Basin Disposal starts a sanitary landfill operation serving the
Tri-Cities area. Franklin County grants a zoning variance for
the site.
1961 — The zoning variance lapses and due to an oversight is not
renewed. However, operations of the sanitary landfill
continue.
1972 — After several fires in local landfills and an abandoned coal
mine, Chemical Processors searches for a new site for paint and
solvent wastes. Basin Disposal offers to lease a portion of
their sanitary landfill to Chemical Processors for industrial
wastes. Resource Recovery, Inc. is formed with ownership links
to Chemical Processors and Basin Disposal.
September, 1972 *~ Resource Recovery submits an operational plan of a
hazardous disposal site and requests approval from
Benton-Franklin County Health District.
November, 1972 —Health District approves operation on an interim
basis pending a forthcoming permit system. Resource
Recovery applies for a waste discharge permit from
the State Department of Ecology.
March, 1973 —.Waste discharge-permit is granted by the state.
includes mercury, paint and insecticide wastes.
Permit
Summer of 1973 —Anew business-type article promoting Resource Re-
s' , " covery's hazardous waste operation indicates that
2,4-D wastes are handled at Pasco site.
August of 1973 —State Departments of Agriculture and Ecology and
County Health Department meet to discuss the safe
disposal of 2,4-D at the Pasco site.
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Fall of 1973 -
- Wheat farmers face an angry grape industry following the
worst 2,4-D damage ever recorded. Grape growers voice
concern over the possible connection between disposal of
2,4-D and the 2,4-D damage inflicted on their vineyards.
State Department of Agriculture conducts tests to de-
termine whether grapes grown in the disposal site are
affected by 2,4-D. No damage is found. County Com-
missioners become alarmed over theehazardous waste site
not realizing that it is being used for! out-of-state
wastes.
September, 1973 — Resource Recovery voluntarily halts shipments of 2,
4-D for disposal until investigations as to the con-
nection between these wastes and grape damage are as-
sessed.
October, 1973 — Franklin County Commissioners order a halt to indus-
trial dumping. Resource Recovery continues non-2,4-D
operation pending hearing. The State Department of Eco-
logy orders Resource Recovery to stop disposing of
2,4-D.
November, 1973 — County Commissioners hold hearing to determine if the
dump violated zoning laws. Resource Recovery learns
that their zoning variance had long since lapsed. Re-
source Recovery applies for a renewed zoning variance
(operating permit). County Commissioners again order
the company to stop their industrial operation.
December, 1973 — Public hearing is held for new zoning permit with
testimony pointing to the safety of the site along
with abutting farm owners complaints over crop damage.
April, 1974 — County Commissioners deny zoning permit application and
allow operation until May 1974.
May, 1974 — Resource Recovery offered concessions in return for permis-
sion to operate until the end of the year. The concessions
included posting a $5,000 bond 'to cease operating by De-
cember 31 and a $30,000 bond to operate properly up to and
through the closure period. Resource Recovery also agreed
to monitor the site for two years after closure.
June, 1974 — Public hearing was held on Resource Recovery's request for
operating permission until the end of the year. Permis-
sion was granted.
December, 1974 — The hazardous waste disposal operation at Pasco ends.
The sanitary landfill operation continued.
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V.
ATTEMPTS TO SECURE SUPPORT
Direct attempts to .secure support for the Pasco operation were few.
o Technical evidence was presented by Resource Recovery at
i public hearings to show that the site was safe. The firm
had hired expert consulting geologists to counter al-
legations that 2,4-D was escaping from the site and damag-
ing the grape vines. ,
o The firm voluntarily stopped the disposal of 2,4-D in the
.face of growing pressure from both wheat and grape growers,
VI.
SUMMARY EVALUATION
The efforts outlined above proved to be insufficient to achieve public
acceptance of the operation.
Although the technical evidence did exonerate the site insofar as caus-
ing the grape damage it did not conclusively identify the true source of
the herbicide damage. Since the damage affected the very livelihood of
local agricultural interests they were not willing to take uncessary
chances on the hazardous disposal site. Furthermore, since the site was
primarily a service to outside industry, it generated very little local
sympathy. Finally, concurrent efforts on the partof ithe state to -lo-
cate a single hazardous waste site for the entire state lessened the
pressure on county officials to keep the Pasco site operating even
though it was the only licensed hazardous site in the state at that
time. . .
The oversight on the expired zoning variance proved to be the most con-
venient vehicle by which the county was able to stop the hazardous waste
disposal operation.
In summary, the most important factors in the closing of the Resource
Recovery operation were:
State responsibility — State efforts to locate a single disposal site
for the entire state provided the county with a convenient alternative
which appeased the grape growers and relieved the county of having the
responsibility for the only approved hazardous site in the state.
Intensity of 2,4-Q issue — The animosity between wheat and grape
growers over 2^4-D had existed for some time prior to the Pasco disposal
operation. Resource Recovery's disposal of 2,4-D tars was a convenient
scapegoat during a period of unusually heavy herbicide damage to the
vineyards. ,
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VII. FACTORS LEADING TO PUBLIC OPPOSITION/ACCEPTANCE
The general public opposition to the Pasco site can be attributed to the
following factors:
o Public became aware of herbicide disposal at the site
through company efforts to advertise their business.
o Uncertainty over the cause of 2,4-D herbicide damage to
local vineyards and the possibility that it might have
originated at the disposal site.
o Discomfort over the fact that Pasco was being used to dis-
pose of industrial and agricultrual wastes generated
outside of Franklin County and throughout the Pacific !
Northwest.
VIII. RETROSPECTIVE VIEWS
In retrospect, Resource Recovery thought that there were three areas
that could have been handled better. First, the County Commissioners
should have been approached much earlier as soon as public opposition
surfaced. This would have provided the Commissioners with technical
information to fend off the pressures of the wheat and grape growers.
Secondly, the oversight on the lapsed zoning variance should never have
been allowed to happen. With a valid permit, the firm would have had
more time to work out solutions to public opposition. And finally, more
attention should have been paid to countering the news articles against
the Pasco operation. ,
The state had no retrospective views especially since it is in the.midst
of its own publ3.c opposition battles with regard to a single centralized
hazardous waste site for the entire state (see appendix).
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APPENDIX TO PASCQ CASE.STUDY
A HISTORY OF EFFORTS TO ACQUIRE A HAZARDOUS
WASTE SITE IN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
By Tom Cook and Jim Knudson—
Introduction
It is necessary to understand a bit about the climate and geography of
the State, of Washington to see where and how our search was farrowed t(°
Federal lands. Western Washington is populous, contains most of the
industry and receives considerable rain except for three or four months
in the summer. Eastern Washington receives as little as 6 inches of
rain per year because the Cascade Mountains remove most of the Pacific
Ocean moisture. Eastern Washington also is sparsely populated, largely
agricultural ir nature. The area around Richland, Pasco, and Kennewick,
however, is an exception because of the presence of the Federal Govern-
ment Hanford Works. The Tri-Cities boasts of a population of 100,000
and is rapidly growing.
Hazardous wastes produced in the state include heavy metal sludges from
oil refineries, pesticides from agriculture, plating wastes from aircraft
manufacture, and chemical wastes from the electro-chemical industry.
Electrical utilities also produce P.C.-B.s from facilities that include
numerous dams on the Columbia River.
Early Efforts - Pfivate/Non-Federal Sites
Private industry began the effort to develop disposal sites dedicated to
hazardous waste in 1971. After one unsuccessful attempt at Badger •
Junction, a private chemical waste firm opened a site near Pasco and
adjacent to an existing sanitary landfill. The site accepted a large
va'riety of industrial wastes from Western Washington and some agricul-
tural pesticide wastes as well. The site operated until 1974 when the
issue of 2,4-D disposal was raised by nearby grape farmers. 2,4rD is a
broad-leaf herbicide used by wheat farmers extensively. Grape growers
have historically fought the use of such chemicals because of spray
drift that can severely damage grape plants even in minute quantities.
The general public furor, publicity, and clamor was enough to force
closure of the state's first recognized chemical waste disposal site.
As a result, the private firm and others turned to the State of Washing-
ton, Department of Ecology for help in locating another site.
We began this effort by contacting Atomic Energy Commission officials
about use of federal lands. Our request was rejected until all other
efforts were exhausted. This led us to searching state lands, mainly
Department of Natural Resource lands.
Twenty sites were evaluated ana
I/ Tom Cook is Chief, Hazardous Waste Section, Solid Waste Management
Division, Department of Ecology, State of Washington; Jim Knudson
is a member of the Hazardous Waste Section.
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narrowed to three sites. The most acceptable of the three was in Frank-
lin County. ^It was known as the Eltopia site. Its fate was similar to
that of the original Pasco site - public pressure brought to bear on
county officials who had no choice, in view of the intense political
pressure, but to oppose the site. The project was abandoned in mid-1975
before the land was even purchased. As a result of continuing failures
to locate sites on private or state lands, the Department of Ecology
returned to federal lands.
The Search on Federal Lands
In addition to the earlier AEC talks, the department approached federal
authorities in the Department of Army in 1974. The site was the Yakima
Firing Range, a desert-type training ground used for tank maneuvers and
troop warfare training. The site was rejected because of insufficient
cover material.
In 1975, formal efforts to locate a hazardous waste site on the Hanford
Reservation were begun. The Hanford Reservation is located in south
central Washington State, in the Columbia Basin. Rainfall is 6 inches
per year with pan evaporation rates of 50 inches per year. The 540-
square mile reservation was taken over.by the U.S. Government during
World War II for the production of weapons-grade plutonium. The site
was choosen for its isolation and proximity to the Columbia River and
abundant supply of cooling water used in some of the nation's first
nuclear reactors. The reservation has become a center for research and
development of nuclear fuels reprocessing and nuclear waste disposal.
Both high-level (i.e., spent reactor fuel elements) and low-level radio-
active wastes are being stored on the reservation awaiting a solution to
the long-term disposal question. The reservation is also becoming a
nuclear energy park with one nuclear reactor operating and three under
construction.
Such land uses made the reservation a natural choice for the siting of a
non-nuclear hazardous waste site. Discussions with federal officials of
the Atomic Energy Commission (now the Federal Department of Energy) soon
revealed that:
(a) Federal officials desired state ownership of the waste
and hence the land upon and in which the waste was to be
disposed. Leasing the land was therefore rejected.
(b) The site was to be located away from any existing nuclear
activities on the reservation.
Legal council at the state level also revealed that the State of Washing-
ton did not have the legal authority to purchase federal land for the
purpose of owning a hazardous waste facility. That authorization was
therefore inserted into hazardous waste legislation enacted by the State
of Washington in March of 1976.
Federal Department of Energy officials then presented a series of possi-
ble sites for the department's evaluation. The same criteria was used
to judge the proposed six sites ->»
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After considerable discussion and evaluation, the department chose
Section 15 in the southern part of the Hanford Reservation as the most
acceptable site of the given six. Section 15 is located about 12 miles
from the center of Richland and 3 1/2 miles from the nearest resident to
the south. Desert sagebrush land, devoid of any activity, acts as a
buffer zone between the site and any residents. Ground water is 125
feet below the site and the nearest surface water is the Columbia River,
7 miles to the east. The land is flat, with no possibility of flooding
or erosion even during occasional desert downpours. The site is acces-
sible and served with power and telephone facilities. Work began on the
writing of a draft environmental impact statement (EIS) for the proposed
site. In August 1977, the department held four statewide hearings on
the draft EIS whicti covered not only the proposed site, but also, draft
regulations to implement the State Hazardous Waste Disposal Act of 1976.
Benton County officials were briefed two weeks prior to the hearing on
the nature of th*» project and its location.
Little citizen comment was heard at the public hearings, including one
in the City of Richland. One real estate agent did make informal comments
on the proximity of the site to potential home sites near the southern
boundary of the Reservation, 3 1/2 miles away. After the meeting was
covered by the media, protests over site location led local legislators
to ask for another informational meeting.
The second meeting was held in mid-September and saw about 50 concerned
citizens and considerable media interest. The City of Richland's Ecolog-
ical Commission testified on both the site and the proposed regulations.
Many commentors were technical persons working either directly or indirect-
ly with federal governmental activities. Also represented were real
estate interests and citizens of no particular identified affiliation.
The Department of Ecology spent the next three months preparing the
final EIS and responding to criticism on the site location and the draft
EIS. Worst case scenarios were constructed for fires, explosion, spills
to ground water, arid dust storms. Attempts were made to relate overall
risks of concentrating hazardous1 waste as opposed to continued disposal
at the local level. Every written comment was included in the final EIS
and a written response prepared. The final EIS was issued in mid-
December 1977 and the regulations signed into effect in late January
1978.
Despite the efforts of the department to satisfy the City of Richland ir.
the final EIS, the city felt the need to bring court action against the
department for its choice of site locations. The City of Richland
approached the Governor and also contacted members of the Washington
Congressional Delegation. Because all federal land transfers require
the review and approval by the House Governmental Operations Subcommittee,
the Washington delegation asked for a hold on the transfer of land to
state ownership. The directive to the state was to settle its differences
with the City of Richland. This, in effect, dictated that a new site on
the reservation be found and that the acquisition process begin anew.
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This process resulted in the selection of a new site, Section 1, which
is 3 1/2 miles to the northwest of the previous site, Section 15. With
assistance from the Governor's Office, representatives of the City of
Richland and the Department of Ecology hammered out a memorandum of
understanding on how the department will proceed with the new acquisi-
tion. The Ecological Commission, a Department of Ecology advisory
board, held a hearing in Richland in early June 1978 to hear public
comments on the Memorandum of Understanding. The City of Richland
testified asking for frequent consultation in the preparation of the
draft EIS supplement.
The Department then began preparation of a draft supplemental EIS on
Section 1, with frequent and early consultation with the City of Richland.
A public hearing in December 1978 drew an audience of 50 persons. The
City of Richland commented upon the draft but generally in a positive
tone. Of four additional commentors; two state legislators were still
opposed to the general location of the site. The final supplemental EIS
was issued in February 1979. The department expects to complete site
acquisition by mid-1979.
This is where the acquisition of a hazardous waste site stands today.
Some obstacles have been overcome, but some in the Richland area continue
to resist the site location. A private firm has also made its presence
felt in arguing against the need for a second site within 80 miles of
its Oregon facility, which it claims as a regional site already. The
department has felt that every state should have its own hazardous waste
facility to guarantee a place for politically controversial wastes.
Although the site development monies were appropriated by the Legislature,
along with site acquisition monies, the site controversy resulted in all
but the site acquisition money being revoked. As a result, the depart-
ment is looking for private funding to develop the site. The operator
would recover all capital costs from disposal changes, according to this
plan.
Conclusions
Acquiring federal land for this site is complicated by the numerous
federal agencies involved and the approval mechanisms. Very long lead
times are therefore necessary before successful transfer can occur.
The other aspect is that of the role that local communities do or do not
play in controlling the activities that occur on federal lands. Even
though activities on federal lands are somewhat autonomous, it is criti-
cal that early and constant communication and involvement of the local
community be maintained so they can be fully informed of all activities.
The difficulties of writing EISs for hazardous waste facilities should
not be underestimated. The sponsoring agency must be prepared to spend
the time and money in answering "what if" questions in great detail.
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Recommendations
It is difficult to draw parallels between siting problems that are a
continent apart. However, I would advise the following:
1. Provide current state laws and regulations which detail and
authorize the system you want to implement for siting hazardous
waste facilities.
2. Hiring of appropriate staff (planners, chemical engineers,
chemists) is vital to the ultimate success of such an under-
taking.
3. Where federal lands are concerned, the involvement of congres-
sional level politicians should be actively sought.
4. Some method of selecting and involving the local community
must be found that does not lead to the familiar cycle of
protest and outrage. Perhaps a region-wide publicity effort,
coupled with financial incentives, would be more productive
especially if private lands are to be chosen. This would call
for local' communities to make application for such a site. A
final choice could be made based upon an evaluation of the
ffiost favorable environmental choice. Quite clearly, any process
which reverses that process is bound for trouble from citizen
protests.
5. If. a regional concept is recommended, guarantees of waste
acceptance of all hazardous wastes will need to be provided.
Otherwise, the concept of a regional site cannot and will not
make sense. The role of private enterprise in constructing
competing sites will also have to be clarified.
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APPENDIX B
NEW ENGLAND REGIONAL COMMISSION REPORT
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NEW ENGLAND REGIONAL COMMISSION '
HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
I.
OVERVIEW OF,PROGRAM
In April of 1978, the New England Regional Commission (NERCOM) formally
resolved to seek a regional solution to New England's hazardous waste
problem. As a result of that, resolution a multi-faceted program was
developed to address a range of issues from preparing an inventory of
hazardous waste generated in the region to providing for public input
into the program. A major component of NERCOM's program is a study of
the need for disposal facilities and procedures for siting such
facilities.
When NERCOM first embarked on this program the agency had no experience
with hazardous waste management although it had been involved in a few
solid waste projects. Because of the agency's economic development
activities, however, it had established good working relationships,with
New England businesses that generate hazardous waste. To provide needed
expertisej advisors from state agencies, industry, and public interest
and other organizations have been utilized. In addition, private
consultants have been hired to develop much of the program.
The current work of the program will be completed in September, 1979 and
presented to-NERCOM's governing board. The governing board will then
determine what activities should be continued by NERCOM and which will
be taken up by the individual states in New England.
II.
THE NEW ENGLAND REGIONAL COMMISSION
NERCOM was created in 1966 to address problems of potential and real
economic decline in the New England region and to seek to reverse what
was perceived to be incipient economic deterioration. The legislative
mandate for NERCOM was Title V of the Public Works and Economic
Development Act of 1965 which created a number of .other regional
commissions across the country. The act and subsequent amendments- are
administered by the U.S. Department of Commerce.
NERCOM serves six states --Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The governors of the^six states
along with a presidentially appointed federal co-chairman serve as the
governing board which determines overall policy. NERCOM maintains a
permanent staff of research and administrative personnel; these in-house
capabilities are expanded through the use of state agency staffs and
outside consultants in each of the program areas addressed by the
agency, ...-•• ••.:..-•
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The primary concern of NERCOM is economic development in the six-state
region and this concern is addressed by short-term programs for specific
problems as well as long-term planning towards the establishment of
regional economic development priorities. There are two other major
areas of concern — energy and transportation. The former is concerned
with solutions to the region's substantial reliance on imported energy
resources. The latter is oriented towards the development of an
integrated regional transportation system and major emphasis is placed
on rail systems.
III. ORIGIN OF THE HAZARDOUS WASTE PROGRAM
In January 1978 the governor of Rhode Island first approached NERCOM
about hazardous waste management problems in New England. According to
NERCOM1s hazardous waste program director, industry officials in Rhode
Island had come to the governor to express their concerns about the
impact of RCRA on Rhode Island. Those officials foresaw major problems
for hazardous waste generators because of a lack of disposal facilities
that would meet RCRA standards. The governor, feeling that hazardous
waste disposal was a problem difficult for individual states in the
region to manage, turned to NERCOM and asked its staff to prepare a
background paper.
By mid-March the six New England governors and the federal co-chairman
had called for a meeting to discuss a regional approach to hazardous
waste management. That meeting, held at the end of March, brought
together government officials from the six states and EPA's Region I
office and representatives of generators and disposers of hazardous
waste. At the meeting individual states discussed their hazardous waste
programs and industry representatives discussed their current methods of
managing hazardous waste. The major conclusion of the meeting was that
a regional approach to hazardous waste management was required. It was
also decided that NERCOM's first task should be an inventory of the
region's generation of hazardous waste.
By the end of April NERCOM was ready to make a formal commitment to the
hazardous waste program. The issues that needed to be addressed had
been outlined and an organizational framework had been developed.
Initial estimates by NERCOM had indicated.that 4,500 industries would be
impacted by forthcoming RCRA regulations. On April 27, NERCOM's
governing board passed Resolution 182 which committed NERCOM to seeking
a regional solution to New England's hazardous waste management problem.
IV.
THE NERCOM HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
Resolution 182 established the broad tasks of the program. An advisory
group -- composed of representatives of each state, EPA Region I, and
the hazardous waste generation and disposal industries — was to be
created. The state representatives were gubernatorially appointed,
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senior-level officials from the state environmental agencies. EPA's
representative was appointed by the EPA Regional Administrator^ and the
industry officials' by NERCOM's governing board. This group was to
develop a work plan for.the consideration of NERCOM's governing board.
The work plan would outline a regional plan, activities needed to ,
implement this plan, and potential funding sources. Earlier attempts by
NERC0M,to, inventory, tjie region's hazardous waste generation, would be
refined. Comments at that time by state and industry officials-involved
in the early efforts suggested that a regional plan would be the most
cost-effective approach to hazardous, waste problems. By expeditiously
developing an effective plan New England would not only help "to retain
existing industries.but.also attract new industries. One of the; biggest
obstacles to implementing a regional approach would be public opposition
to siting facilities. ?
In late May the advisory group held its first meeting and began to - .
organize its efforts. The major substantive action was the agreement on
the major components of the regional plan. Those were: 1) regionwide
inventory of waste generation and disposal,facility.needs, 2) site
selection process and siting criteria, 3) institutional and
organizational structures (including facility operation), 4)
institutional barriers (including importation bans), 5) implementation
strategy, 6) environmental assessment, and 7) citizen, involvement. ,. The
preparation of issue papers on the first five components was assigned to
the various, New England states and NERCOM. The development...of issue
papers on the last two components was postponed. The issue papers were
designed to serve as the ,f irst step in developing a regional, hazardous
waste management plan. ,; The preparation of a work, program for the,.plan
was scheduled to coincide with NERCOM's timetable for fiscal year 1979
budget decisions. At the meeting it was also decided to establish a
technical committee, composed of advisory group members, to perform and •
coordinate technical tasks among the six states.; ,
In August NERCOM sponsored a workshop for advisory group members to
•inform them of hazardous waste problems in other areas, of the country.
At the workshop regulatory officials from Minnesota, Texas and
Washington related specific experiences with attempting to site disposal
'facilities in their respective states. . •
The day following the,workshop the advisory group held its second
meeting. At the meeting,presentations were made: on the.progress.of
individual issue papers which had been prepared after the May meeting.
The meeting also focused on the advisory group's future activities and
recommendations to be made to NERCOM's governing board. The advisory
group agreed on the .need for maintaining itself as a means to coordinate-
state efforts, influence U.S. EPA actions and policy, oversee public
involvement in hazardous waste management, and direct .any future . ~-,
consultant work. 'With regard to the last item, it was agreed to .
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recommend a consultant study to examine resource recovery, facility
needs and financing, site selection process, long-term care and
liability, and management options. •
The State of Massachusetts was responsible for preparing the issue paper
on site selection process. Siting criteria developed by Camp Dresser
and McKee for Massachusetts Division of Water Pollution Control were
summarized. Criteria for land disposal were accessibility,
hydrogeological conditions, adaptability, environmental impact,
compatibility with existing and proposed zoning and land use, and
relative construction and operating costs. It was noted that no one
site was likely to meet all criteria. Accordingly, Massachusetts had
adopted a policy that physical characteristics were less important than
the site's proximity to waste generators, in part because of reduced
hauling costs, but more importantly because employment opportunities
with generators might offset inevitable opposition to any site. For
incinerators, sites with good atmospheric ventilation and remoteness
from particularly sensitive activities (e.g., hospitals, schools) should
be selected.
The siting issue paper stated that local acceptance of a designated site
was possibly the single most important factor in siting. Public
education was seen as critical to establishing an awareness of existing
disposal problems and thereby support for solutions to these problems.
Compensation in the form of payments per unit of disposed waste to host
communities was seen as a potential incentive. Finally, the use of
eminent domain or the threat of its use was seen as a potential last
resort if opposition could not be overcome and if a clear need for a
facility site existed.
The issue paper examined NERCOM's role in siting. Citing earlier
advisory group discussions which considered the development of a single
regional disposal facility, this approach was thought to be unjustified
because of the potential for greatly reducing the volume of residual
hazardous waste through treatment and processing. Accordingly the
following tasks were suggested for NERCOM: the dissemination of
information on safe intrastate disposal technologies, the provision of
technical assistance on specific disposal problems, the promotion of the
region's only waste exchange facility, the avoidance of choosing any
specific site and concentration on siting criteria to be applied within
individual states, and investigation of the feasibility of a regional
reprocessing center.
By late September the advisory group had prepared recommendations for
the NERCOM governing board. Acting on those recommendations the
Because the major emphasis of Centaur's project is public
response to the siting and operation of HWMFs, this issue paper is
summarized here and appended to this report on NERCOM's hazardous
waste program.
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commissioners passed Resolution 195 on September 22. This resolution
expanded the advisory group by adding six public-members (e.g., local
officials, representatives of environmental and public interest groups)
and created a steering committee of advisory group memebers serving in
an ex officio capacity. In addition, the advisory group .was charged
with ensuring the compatibility of the six states' individual hazardous
:waste programs, developing interim strategies and solutions to hazardous
waste management problems, surpervising medium- and long-term,planning
efforts, directing any NERCOM-sponsored consultation work, and
implementing a public information/participation program. To provide
support for this effort, $245,000 was allocated to the program. These
funds were allocated primarily to consultation work ($190,000) and the
public information/participation program ($50,000). Within two weeks a
public information sub-committee, was formed and a request for proposals
had been reviewed and revised by the full advisory group. To help in
the selection of a consultant and to work with the selected, consultant
during the contract period, a consultant committee composed of advisory
group members was created. On October 13 the request for proposals was
distributed to 36 prospecti\js contractors.
The request for proposals called for a six-month contract not to exceed
$190,000 in cost.. Five major tasks were outlined in the scope of work:
1) a regionwide hazardous waste inventory organized by management option
was to be prepared;* 2) a site selection process was to be developed
to .provide a vehicle for the identification of, but specifically not
identify, one or more regional disposal facilities and consider
acquisition methods, public acceptability and incentives. Roles of
public and private parties were to be examined as were the relationship
between the location of generators and site selection; 3) management
options were to be examined. These included the number and types of
facilities required by New England, various public/private arrangements
for facility planning, construction, ownership and operation, and
financing arrangements; 4) provisions for long-term care and legal
liability in case of incident were to be studied;.5) the previous four
tasks were to be integrated into a .set of realistic scenarios and
implementation options. Included within these options would be specific
references to the number and type of facilities needed in New England
and their respective service areas.
By early January NERCOM announced the selection of Arthur D. Little
as the consultant for the study. Work began on the contract in
Earlier:.efforts to aggregate individual state inventories had
been frustrated by variations in the data collected and tabulated by
the individual states.
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mid-February and was due to be completed in mid-August of 1979.
NERCOM's consultant committee organized smaller groups around each of
the major tasks of the contract. These groups have played an active
role meeting with the consultant on at least a monthly basis to review
the project's progress and to make recommendations and advise the
consultant.
While this contract will be the major focus of NERCOM's efforts in
fiscal year 1979, the public information program has also been active.
In December, 1978, the public information committee (as with other
committees, also composed of advisory group members) met for the first
time and defined its goals as the promotion of public understanding of
New England's hazardous waste concerns, the encouragement of public
involvement in finding solutions to those problems, the promotion of
environmentally sound disposal facilities, the identification of key
groups and their concerns, the ensuring that all management options, are
explored, and the monitoring of the Arthur D. Little contract. A broad
range of possible key groups that could play a major role in NERCOM's
hazardous waste program (e.g., environmental groups, hazardous waste
generators) were identified and the most critical of these were targeted
for particular attention. A list of methods for implementing the
committee's goals was also developed.' The committee met; for a second
time in late.January. At the meeting it was decided to include the
following efforts in the public information program: a speakers bureau,
a slide show, brochures, facility tours for advisory group members,
media efforts, special meetings, contributions to conferences, arid a
film. The committee will also utilize a public information consultant
to assist in implementing the program. The public information committee
expected to begin parts of the program (i.e., slide show, brochures,
speakers bureau) in the summer of 1979.
By late May of 1979, the NERCOM program was .proceeding as planned with
no major problems. The Arthur D. Little contract was roughly at
mid-stage. From those interviewed it was clear that a broad range of
issues had been examined. This was particularly true of issues directly
relating to the siting and development of facilties. Equally clear was
the fact that any final recommendations to come out of that study would
have to take into consideration a range of technical, economic, legal,
institutional, and political considerations which vary significantly
among the six New England states. Decisions on what to do next would be
made by the NERCOM governing board in September, '1979.
V.
VIEWS ON THE NERCOM PROGRAM AND FUTURE ACTIONS'1
Two views stand out from discussions with those invo.lved in or
potentially impacted by NERCOM's program. One is support for a regional
The material in this section is based on interviews with state
and EPA officials in New England who have either worked on NERCOM's
advisory group or are directly involved in state hazardous waste
management efforts.
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approach to hazardous waste management and the attendant perception of
NERCOM as the obvious agency to promote a regional approach. The other
is the view that individual states, rather than NERCOM, must play the
major role in the implementation of any hazardous waste program,
particularly with regard to the development of specific facility sites.
The two views are not necessarily conflicting, but do underscore the
need (and desire) for careful consideration of future roles of NERCOM
and the states.
NERCOM's continued role has been defined in a number of ways. The basic
distinction between these conceptions of NERCOM's' role is whether NERCOM
will be supportive of state actions or will take the lead iii identifying
sites and developing facilities. According to NERCOM and state
officials, the latter role, which could involve the development of a
regional hazardous waste authority, is unlikely. More likely is that
NERCOM will be asked to continue to support the advisory group. At a
minimum the advisory group would then continue to monitor and coordinate
the states' programs to try to ensure compatibility and would also
continue its public education/information efforts. NERCOM might also
serve as a proponent of specific facilities proposed by the private
sector.
Decisions on government roles in siting will in all likelihood be left
to the individual states. Because of variations between the
states,* there will be varied responses to the siting. To date
Massachusetts" has taken the most direct action in siting. Efforts to
identify and acquire facility sites have been active since early
1978.2 The state is currently preparing a statewide plan focusing on
Management, institutional and other non site-specific aspects of
hazardous waste management. The NERCOM study will be used as input to
this plan. Connecticut is studying its hazardous waste generation and
developing siting criteria. Connecticut expects to identify candidate
areas for facility sites by eliminating areas in the state which are
unsuitable because of hydrogeoldgy and/or land use. Connecticut
officials are scheduled to meet with Arther D. Little staff three times
during the course of the NERCOM-sponsored study. NERCOM's study should
provide analyses which Connecticut can use along with its own study.
For example, Maine encompasses about half the land area of New
England, but has less than 10 percent of the region's population and
3 percent of the hazardous waste generators. Massachusetts, on the
other hand, has 12 percent of the land area, 48 percent of the
population, and 45 percent of the generators of the region.
See the Sturbridge, Massachusetts case study and the .
Massachusetts agency write-up elsewhere in the appendices to this
report.
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Most states do not envision direct involvement by states in developing
specific sites. Most of those interviewed saw states as being arbiters
for siting processes initiated by the private sector. The primary goal
of the states was thus seen as not only developing strong and effective
regulatory programs but also becoming much more sophisticated with
respect to the needs of hazardous waste generators, the options
available to the disposal industry, the concerns of the public, and
other critical aspects related to the development of specific
facilities. It was expected that NERCOM's program would provide states
with a substantial amount of information which would enable them to
analyze more critically the proposals of private industry. By serving
as a knowledgeable arbiter but not as a developer or proponent of
specific facilities, states could avoid real or perceived problems of
credibility or conflict of interest. By leaving facility ownership and
operation in private hands, cost-effectiveness would increase and the
potential for public subsidies of useful but uneconomic, facilities
would be eliminated.
Massachusetts and Connecticut have between them 70 percent of the
region's identified industries which generate hazardous waste. These
states contemplate an active state role in siting. Massachusetts has
committed itself to acquiring one or more facility sites which would
probably be developed by private industry. Three potential sites have
already been designated and an ongoing site survey could produce
considerably more sites. An environmental review of these sites
preparatory to acquisition is scheduled to begin in 1980. As stated
earlier, Connecticut expects its current study to identify areas within
the state that would be suitable for disposal facilities. The state
expects public opposition to any potential site to be vigorous.
Accordingly, state acquisition of sites and operation of facilities has
been considered with state or federally owned land being a potential
source of sites. The Connecticut Resource Recovery Authority, a state
agency which contracts with private vendors for waste-to-energy
facilities, might be a means for state control of hazardous waste
facility operations.
EPA has played an active role in the NERCOM program. However, in the
future, EPA, from its own and from the states' perspective, would focus
on ensuring the development of state programs required by RCRA and on
abandoned sites. EPA would have a role in any continued NERCOM program
but little if any role in siting of new facilities.
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NERCOM Issue Paper: Site Selection Process
Submitted by: The Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Prepared by: David Standley, Commissioner, Department of Environmental Quality
Engineering, and Anthony D. Cortese, Director, Division of-Air and Hazardous
Materials
Date: August 7, 1978
In our opinion the principal criteria to be employed in siting hazardous waste
disposal facilities will ultimately be determined by the final regulations pronul-
gated by EPA under Subtitle C, Hazardous Waste Management, of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA). According to our best information, EPA hopes to have
Section 3001, Identification and listing of hazardous wastes, ready for public
distribution by January 1979. Region I of EPA is of the opinion that April 1979
is a more realistic date. The. public hearing and review process will take at
least six (6) months. Therefore, October 1979 is the earliest date by which
Section 3001 will be ready. Sections 3002-3011 inclusive, and more particularly
Section 3004 which addresses standards applicable to owners and operators of
hazardous vrasta treatment, storage, and disposal facilities, will not be promul-
gated until the final definitive Section 3001 has been issued.
In the meantime draft versions of Subtitle C Sections 3001-3011 inclusive
are being circulated to all interested parties for review and comment. Of
particular interest to State regulatory agencies concerned with land and water
use are the "cradle-to-the-grave" supervision of all hazardous wastes, the "no
endangermGnt" concept with respect to ground-water resources, the dispute now
going on within EPA as .to whether or not the protection of ground water is
properly within the jurisdiction of the Solid Waste Program, and the regulatory
implications of long-term facility monitoring and in-perpetuity maintenance and
repair;. Of continuous concern to regulatory agencies responsible for protecting
air quality standards are'the interstate implications of air pollutant transport
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(i.e., Che New Jersey case), especially with respect to possible emissions from
a hazardous waste disposal incinerator. Recognizing that the situation within
EPA is dynamic and subject to change between now and October 1979, the following
criteria for disposal of hazardous waste by landfill techniques or incineration
are proposed for consideration.
Land Disposal
The technical, environmental and institutional factors affecting the criteria
for identifying and evaluating potential sites for land disposal of hazardous wastes
have been rather comprehensively addressed in the Camp Dresser and McKee (CD&M)
report entitled "Site Selection and Evaluation for Disposal of Hazardous Wastes -
First Report," dated July 1978, prepared under contract to the Massachusetts
Division of Water Pollution Control. A listing and brief summary of their siting
criteria is, as follows:
1. Land requirements (site capacity) - For disposal by landfill
technology, the required jt:-aa will be dependent upon the form
in which the wastes are delivered to the site, the volume of
wastes generated in the area served by the landfill, and the
contemplated serviceable life of the facility. Barreled wastes
will consume available site capacity at a greater rate for a
given waste volume than disposal sites accepting bulk wastes.
2- Location - Preferably centrally located with respect to the
region of largest generation of hazardous wastes. A single
site within a state may impose excessive hauling costs for waste
generators remote from a central site;- Therefore, consideration
should be given to establishing smaller, more local sites to,serve
the needs of -other waste generators, too remote from a central
facility.
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Accessibility - The characteristics of the roadway to the disposal
site will affect haul times and overall safety of transportation
operation.
Geological/hydrogeological Conditions - Given primary importance b}'
CD & M are the natural characteristics of a site - its soil types,
ground-water levels, and site drainage conditions. If possible, sites
within the watershed of public surface water supplies should not b.e
considered in initial site selection. Sites underlain by extensive
deposits of sands and gravels should be avoided unless overlain by
substantial thicknesses of fairly impermeable materials. Sites
considered appropriate would consist of low-permeability underlying
soils such as clays, silts or glacial tills.
Adaptability - Characteristics of hazardous wastes necessitate an
absolutely secure landfill. This can be both engineered and
constructed at any site, but an area of level or gently sloping
terrain will facilitate construction of the base liner and perimeter
embankments. The area method of landfilling is recommended as the
most suitable.
Environmental Impact - Land disposal of hazardous wastes may have
an impact on air, land and water quality which can be eliminated
or reduced to acceptable levels by competent engineering design of
the facility, proper operation, and continuous taaintenance. One of
the problems of landfill disposal of hazardous wastes not yet
addressed by RCRA or EPA is the possibility of very long-term release
of hazardous or toxic substances into the environment. Provision for
long-term facility monitoring, active site closure, and in-peirpetuity
maintenance and repair should be included in the design phase. Funding
such activities is a new institutional problem to be solved.
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7. Compatibility with Existing and Proposed Zoning and Land Use - Because
of the nature of the wastes, the best location for a hazardous waste
disposal site is in an area of low population density isolated from
most public activities.
8. Relative Construction and Operating Costs - Capital costs include site
acquisition and preparation, such as lar.d clearing, grading, liner
preparation, installation of drainage facilities, access roads, buildings,
fencing, sanitary facilities, extension of utilities to the site, special
site preparation, planting or buffer strips, leachate collection and/or
treatment facilities. The major operating costs to be considered are
adequate suitable cover material, equipment operation, utilities,
personnel and operation of a leachate treatment system, if required.
Some gross haul cost estimate should be made or integrated into the
evaluation process for the relative costs of different sites.
Obviously no single site will be able to satisfy completly all of the foregoing
criteria. Some trade-offs will be necessary between environmental, public health,
political, economic and social considerations. In Massachusetts, the Department
of Environmental Quality Engineering, a regulatory agency, has adopted the policy
that the physical characteristics of a site are less important than its physical
proximity to the largest generators of hazardous wastes. Public opposition to the
siting of a hazardous waste facility will be generated whenever and wherever a
particular site is designated. This opposition should be moderated or offset
by the employment opportunities offered by a large waste generator. Locating a
facility within the major area of waste generation not only saves transportation
costs, but, even more importantly, may result irTless public opposition.
In terms of purely physical characteristics, geological/hydrogeological
conditions form the single most important criterion. 'This is due to the re-
quirement that there be no degradation of ground-water or surface water, which
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in effect general!} means total containment, with provision for collection and
treatment of, any.Icachate.. Where natural geological conditions cannot provide the
required containment, artificial barriers may be used, but these must be in
the form of a 5-foct thickness of soil having specified characteristics. Synthetic
liners may not be t.sed in place of earthen barriers. A.consideration of great
importance is the requirement that funds and procedures must be provided for in-
perpetuity maintenance and repair. . . .
The proposed I.CRA regulations do not at present consider any variation ±n
the degree of hazard, of the various materials which will come under the definition
of "hazardous waste." If, as appears to be the case, "highly" hazardous wastes
account for only a small percentage of the total volume of hazardous waste
generated, there may be an advantage in dealing with the two categories in separate
facilities. A landfill for the less hazardous materials would still be required
to meet stringent RCRA standards, but may nevertheless offer the following potential
benefits: 1) it would create less of an environmental and public safety danger,
while solving a large part of the disposal problem for industry; 2) it may engender
less public and political opposition;.and 3) it would allow the very best site
(geologically and environmentally) within a wide area (probably larger than New
England) to be reserved for disposal of the most dangerous wastes.
Incinerat ion
1. A site should be located in an area of good atmospheric ventilation such
that there will be good dilution and dispersion of the emissions (i.e., not in
a valley).
2. A site should be located in a rural area such that there are no sensitive
receptors proximate (hospitals, nursing homes, schools, etc). In addition, there
should be a buffer zone. This buffer zone, should be to protect against upset
conditions and the area- of the buffer zone should be sized such that if an upset
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occurs concentrations of the contaminants or. its complete or incomplet products:
of combustion would not exceed one half of applicable threshold limit values outside
the buffer zone.
Public Acceptability
Perhaps the single most important factor to be taken into account in siting
a hazardous waste disposal facility is local acceptance of a designated site.
Public oppostion to the siting of solid waste disposal facilities for non-hazardous
wastes is a matter of historical record. How then can we hope to overcome the
opposition which can be anticipated to the location of a proposed hazardous waste
disposal facility?
Various factors affect the acceptability by the public of a hazardous waste.
disposal facility.. The public must be educated, establishing general public support.
Compensationcan be a useful incentive in gaining some local support of hazardous
waste disposal facilities. A method of site acquisition must be established which
is generally acceptable but implementable given inevitable local opposition.
Public Education
To establish general public support for a solution to the hazardous waste
problem, an awareness of the existing disposal problem must be created. The
public must be educated through well-controlled passage of information to interested
groups, key individuals, etc. The aim should be to communicate the importance
of siting a facility for the region-wide benefit and develop public pressure
to achieve that goal. The establishment of effective cooperation between industry
and citizens groups should ease the passage of information and therefore communicate
the necessity of siting a facility. State sup'pbrt of industry must be displayed
openly. Legislative mandates should be obtained to involve the state in assisting
industry with hazardous, waste disposal.
To enlist specific local support for siting a hazardous waste disposal
facility, a combination of support from local officials and community groups must
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be gained. Environmental laws have provided the opposition with tools to support,
their views. The requirements for environmental impact statements have given
groups increased power to.block or delay possibly environmentally adverse or even
environmentally reasonable projects that are deemed undesirable. There is also a
traditional and legal commitment to local autonomy and local control over .land
decisions as demonstrated in the manner zoning has developed. The number of
examples that demonstrate that local or other special interest groups can block
the siting of potentially dangerous facility (prisons, nuclear power plants, ns-.tural
gas facilities, solid waste disposal sites, oil rafineries, tanker docks) is '.
increasing.
Ideally, it would.be nice to achieve voluntary local acceptance of a facility
through bargaining and sound environmental and technical arguments. However, some
people who deal with local public opposition will cite the "irrationality" of the
public response to many issues. This may be particularly true for a hazardous waste
facility, as the track record for both solid waste dumps and hazardous waste
handling companies is poor. Because such a poor history pf disposal operations
can be cited, perhaps it is misleading to term public reaction to the siting of
another, even less attractive waste facility, as "irrational". However, such
irrational local opposition to facilities that may, to some people, appear ben&ficial
must be considered in siting such a facility. If there is enough opposition to a
specific proposal, a very rational argument can almost .always be developed and
used to influence the decision-making process.
This works at cross purposes to the ..common approach to siting a facility.
The approach is to develop technical and economic arguments so sound that any
ensuing political battles can be easily weathered under the roof of sound reason.
However, the determining issues are frequently more than technical. The political
process can uncover a variety of opposing goals and vested interests, and
technical arguments can be found to support or refute any conclusion offered.
This is illustrated by the difficulties the courts have had in hearing many
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environmentally related cases. Particularly, for these cases, and similarly foe
arguments opposing facility siting, technical arguments can be "on the frontiers
of scientific knowledge," and proof, in fact, cannot be achieved. But even for
well known scientific subjects, opposing technical arguments can be; formulated.
Judge Bazelon of the B.C. Circuit Court has expressed the Court's uneasiness with
judging technical facts: "...in cases of great technological complexity, the bast
way for courts to guard against unreasonable or erronebus administrative decisions
is not for the judges themselves to scrutinize the technical merits of.each decision.
Rather, it is to establish a decision making process that assures a reasoned decision
that can be held up to the scrutiny of the scientific community and the public.''•
A community should be informed of a decision to investigate a specific site
within its boundaries for the possibility of hazardous waste disposal. Public
meetings should concentrate on allox-ring citizen input into the .decision-making
process. Before meetings are conducted, it is necessary to have a good understanding
of all relevant facts and environmental impacts associated with site acquisition and
development
It is important to note at this point that financial and manpower resources
are necessary for public education needs to be met.
Compensation
In the siting of resource recovery plants, it has been shown that the payment
of a "bonus" of one dollar a 'ton for solid wastes accepted from outside the immediate
area can be a useful incentive for communities to accept negatively viewed facilities.
In the case of siting a hazardous waste disposal facility, considering that it may
be relatively more dangerous, a similar compensatory approach requiring payment of
a greater monetary sura may reduce local opposition. Following the determination
of a fair compensation sum by all parties concerned (local government, industry, and
state ), a statutory basis for comensation must be established.
Acquisition ~ 34
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necessary to the public good. Experience with State use. of eminent domain •
powers when locating socially dangerous facilities, such as prison siting,
illustrate why a state is reluctant to use this power, However, when local
opposition cannot be overcome by public education and financial incentives,
and when the need for siting a hazardous waste disposal facility clearly exists,
• exercising the power of eminent domain must be seriously considered.
The most realistic approach to siting a hazardous waste disposal
facility will probably be a combination of the above mentioned approaches.
Various types of bargaining techniques may be employed, such a mediation. It
appears that compensation and, at least, the threat of eminent domain will be
involved if all parties are to bargain from positions of strength. It is
becoming clear that lack of public involvement in the decision-making
process may lead to serious confrontations when the decision is ready to
be implemented. Unfortunately, there is no assurance that full public
involvement from the beginning will lead to a more acceptable decision.
"The siting of a hazardous wasLe facility warrants care in planning the
approach to dealing with the local group to be negatively impacted by the
facility. In particular, the timing and degree of public involvement in the
decision-making process is important. A delicate balance will have to be
struck between the traditional completely technical approach and a possibly
protracted and unwieldy citizen participation".
Technical Considerations
Public opposition _to the siting of a hazardous waste disposal facility
will unquestionably be successful unless the following technical factors have
been thoroughly considered and evaluated for their potential impact as either
a public nuisance or a threat to public safety:
(1) All of the siting criteria suggested by CD&M;
(2) Screening and distance separation from residential areas;
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(3) Transportation routes to and from the facility;/
(4) Spill planning; •...-.. . ..•_,.: ••,•;•.-, ;t-,;, :;-
(5) Noise control; -,,„,._. , ., ... ,..>j. : v
(6) Failsafe engineering for prevention -of explosion and leakage;
(7) Controlled access to site to prevent accidental trespass by •
children or domestic animals.
The Role of NERCOM in the Site Selection Process . ..
At the last meeting of NERCOM the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in conjunction
with, the other New England states, was contemplating the idea of. a single regional
hazardous waste disposal facility which could serve the needs of the entire region.
Since that time we have thoroughly researched the need within Massachusetts for
such a facility. We have reached the conclusion that the largest volume of so-
called "hazardous wastes" generated .in the State are capable of being detoxified
or stabilised to a point where they can safely be disposed of by special landfilling
practices or by incineration. We have developed and implemented a policy for the
environmentally safe disposal of metal hydroxide sludges, liberally borrowing
from the Connecticut guidelines. We are now in. the process of developing state
policy for handling and disposal of oil spill debris, reprocessing solvents, and
latex wastes. When we have solved the disposal problem for these four (4) types
of wastes, we anticipate that the total volume of residual hazardous wastes shall
be greatly reduced. For the remaining hazardous wastes we advocate disposal at
one of the existing hazardous waste disposal facilities, either in New York or
New Jersey.
We believe that the other New England states would benefit from a similar
evaluation of their own "hazardous wastes" volumes. If similar satisfactory
techniques and state - sponsored disposal practices can be developed and
implemented in each of the-New England states, there is a strong possibility that
the total remaining volume of "hazardous wastes" would be insufficient to justify
the establishment of a New England regional disposal facility.
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If that should prove to be the case, we believe that NERCOM can provide a
valuable function as an institution: --.-'._•••
(1) to dissemirate information about policies and procedures for safe
intrastate disposal of "hazardous wastes"; ;
(2) to provide technical assistance on specific chemical wastes .and
suitable methods for their safe immobilization and-disposal;
(3) to publicize the existence and availability of the only privately
operated waste exchange facility in New England, the Natural Resource
Recycling Center, 286 Congress St., Boston, MA;
(4) to avoid activities designed toward site selection of a suitable
New England site and concentrate on the suitability of the siting
criteria tc be applied within the individual states; and
(5) to investigate the feasibility of establishing a New England regional
reprocessing center for resource recovery rather than disposal.
Reference
1. International Harvester Co. V. Ruckelshaus, U.S. App.
D.C., 411, 448 478 F.2d 615, 652, 673
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APPENDIX C
INFORMATION ON STATE REGULATORY AGENCIES
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ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF POLLUTION CONTROL AND ECOLOGY
In the state of Arkansas the primary responsibility for regulatory
hazardous waste management facilities rests with the Department of
Pollution Control and Ecology (DPCE). A hazardous waste management act
became law in Arkansas in March, 1979. Interim regulations are expected
to be promulgated by July, 1979. The discussion below refers to these
regulations.
AGENCY CAPACITIES AND COMMERCIAL HWMFs
Staff Positions: 21
Agency Budget: $132,000 (FY 1978)
Commercial HWMFs: 1 permitted facility
SELECTED ASPECTS OF STATE HAZARDOUS WASTE PROGRAM
Facility Inspections — DPCE has the right of access to hazardous waste
management facilities to determine whether they are in compliance with
the regulations. What institutional arrangements will be used to carry
out these inspections has not yet been determined, but it is expected
that there will be a group of inspectors working out of the central
office in Little Rock.
Enforcement Actions —In the case that there is an imminent hazard, the
DPCE is empowered to issue a cease and desist order (the recipient of
the order then has 10 days to contest this in court). There are also
civil and criminal penalties for violating the regulations, but these
must be handed down by the courts. At present the DPCE must work
through local prosecutors to take a violator to court. However, an .
enforcement branch is now being organized which will enable them to do
this for themselves.
Monitoring — The hazardous waste management act allows the DPCE to
establish monitoring programs for hazardous waste management facilities.
It is expected that these programs will follow EPA guidelines.
Facilities may require different types of monitoring depending on the
type of operation and types of wastes being stored, treated, or disposed
of.
Manifest System — The new regulations establish a manifest system for
cases in which a generator is disposing of wastes in a commercial site.
On-site disposal is not covered, and they have not yet decided whether
shipments to off-site, captive facilities will be covered. In making
this decision the DCPE will probably follow EPA's lead. Also, it is not
certain whether special wastes (e.g., waste oil) will be covered by this
system. . ,
DPCE has authority for 11 positions as of July 1, 1979.
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Defining Hazardous Waste — The definition of hazardous waste closely
follows the EPA definitions, with two exceptions. Hazardous waste is
defined as:
A solid waste, or combination or solid wastes, which because of
its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical or infectious
characteristics, may, in the judgment of the department —
(a) cause or significantly contribute to an increase in
mortality or an increase in serious, irreversible, or
incapacitating reversible, illness; or,
(b) pose a substantial threat or potential hazard to
human health or the environment when improperly
treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or
otherwise improperly managed.
The underlined sections were added by the DPCE.
Coverage of Permit System — Any facility which stores, treats and/or
disposes of hazardous wastes, and any person who develops and/or
operates such a facility must first receive a DPCE permit. For a given
operation, this permitting can be done together or separately.
AGENCY VIEWS'
The DPCE feels that siting of hazardous waste management facilities will
be the most difficult problem they will face in the hazardous waste
field in coming years, and that gaining public acceptance for these
facilities will be the reason it is so difficult. The technical
problems they face are not that great. There are technically acceptable
areas for hazardous waste facilities in the state.
The DCPE has an embryonic public awareness program which is being set up
to try to deal with this problem, but the extent of this program is very
limited because the state legislature declined to fund it sufficiently.
They now hope to get EPA assistance in this area. However, they are not
sure that such a program can be effective.
Respective government roles in siting depend, the DPCE has indicated, on
the type of facility being sited. A facility which intends to accept
PCBs, for instance, would obviously need much more federal involvement
than would one which does not. Generally, though, they feel- that EPA
should have a supporting role—providing technical assistance and
funding. The states should themselves be directly involved to the
extent that direct government involvement is necessary (e.g., public
awareness). Local governments were seen to play a critical role, but
not to be officially involved in the process per se. They are
considering options such as fee-splitting to give local government
officials an acceptable reason for supporting the siting of such
facilities in their districts.
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CALIFORNIA"DEPARTMENT ?QF. HEALTH. SERVICES
Within, the state of California, the.regulation,of hazardous, waste
management,is primarily the responsibility of.the State Department of
Health Services (DH.S). However, other .state and, local. agencies also
play a significant role in the regulation of such facilities and
operations. The,more important of these latter agencies, include the
.Regional Water Quality Control Boards, the Regional Air Pollution
Control Districts, and the local.planning board.
AGENCY CAPACITIES AND COMMERCIAL HWMF ....
Staff Positions:, 291 '."'.. :.:-...•'•
Agency Budget: $1,489,0001
Commercial HWMFs: 11 permitted facilities
SELECTED ASPECTS OF STATE HAZARDOUS WASTE PROGRAM ,
Facility Inspections — DHS regulations allow Department representatives
to enter any "factory, plant, construction site, waste disposal site,
transfer station or other area where wastes are stored, handled,
processed or disposed of" to "inspect the premises and gather evidence
on existing conditions and procedures." Vehicles suspected of
transporting hazardous wastes may also be stopped and inspected. No
specific schedule of inspections is required.
Enforcement Actions—The DHS maintains an inspection and compliance
program, with inspectors permanently in. the field. DHS response to
violation of regulations can'range from merely requesting that the
conditions or practice be corrected to criminal prosecution. The latter
must be undertaken by the state Attorney General. Sanctions are
identical to those proposed by the EPA.
Monitoring — Monitoring is not required by DHS regulations. Monitoring
of ground and surface water is required, however, by the Regional Water
Quality Control Boards. These programs are established on an individual
site basis. For processes and operations which may affect air quality,
monitoring may be required by the Regional Air Pollution Control
Districts..
Manifest, System — The regulations require that all hazardous waste
transported off-site, except those transported by .pipeline, must be
accompanied by a manifest. This manifest must first be filled out by
Source: U.S. Government Accounting Office, ."Hazardous Waste
Management Programs Will Not Be Effective," January 23, 1979.
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the producer, who must provide a'description of the waste including the
type, chemical composition and special handling instructions. Both the
hauler and the off-site facility operator are required not to accept any
wastes without a properly completed manifest, and the operator must
inspect the wastes before accepting them to ensure that the manifest
description is correct. The producer, hauler and operator must each
submit a copy of each manifest to the DHS.
Defining Hazardous Waste — "Hazardous waste" is defined in DHS
regulations as "any waste material or mixture of wastes which is toxic,
corrosive, flammable, an irritant, a strong sensitizer or which
generates pressure through decomposition, heat or other means, if such a
waste or mixture of wastes may cause substantial injury, serious illness
or harm to humans, domestic livestock or wildlife."
Coverage of Permit System — Permits are required for any facility which
"handles, stores, treats or disposes of a hazardous waste" and which
contains at least one area where "hazardous wastes are stored, mixed,
handled, treated, discarded or disposed of." The only exceptions are
for facilities "using a biological process on the property of a producer
treating oil, its products and water..." The DHS is required to review
each permit at least every five years. Haulers of hazardous waste are
required to hold a valid registration issued by the DHS.
AGENCY VIEWS
The DHS role in the regulation and planning of hazardous waste
management activities in California has been expanded during the last
several years. From 1973 through 1978 their role was purely advisory.
Since 1978 a DHS permit has been required for operation of hazardous
waste facilities, and starting January 1979, DHS is to provide statewide
planning for hazardous waste site identification and assessment.
The agency feels that the following factors are most likely to cause
difficulties in siting facilities:
o public opposition;
o time required to obtain environmental reviews and required
permits;
o cost of providing environmental impact reports and other
information required for approval of proposed facilities;
o environmental conditions at proposed sites; and
o cost of transporting wastes to the proposed site.
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They report that it currently takes three to five years to establish a
site, and that during the years 1970-1976, only two of seven proposed
sites were approved.
The criticism.most frequently voiced of the current system of hazardous
waste regulations in California is that there are too many agencies
involved in this process. The proposed Padre Juan facility, admittedly
an,exceptional case, would have required permits form eight agencies.
One result of this problem is that wastes which are considered hazardous
by one agency are not necessarily so regarded by the other agencies
concerned. For instance, brines are considered hazardous by the
Regional Water Quality Control Boards, but not by the DHS, and asbestos
is considered hazardous by the Regional Air Pollution Control Districts,,
but not by the Regional Water Quality Control Boards. It is reported
that a coordinating committee has been set up to resolve such problems
and to establish a one-step state-level permit process.
With the exception of these institutional problems, it is generally
thought in California that their system of hazardous waste regulations
go beyond and are superior to RCRA. One example of this which was'cited
is their monitor reserve fund. In California, the fund is based on the
estimated cost of site closure — not a fixed cost for. all sites— and
is revised and updated annually. This fund can be borrowed from for
emergency corrective action. In addition to this individual fund for
each site, there is a statewide revolving fund — based on a per unit
disposal charge — which would be used if an owner's fund is exhausted.
The attitude in California seems to be ,that they do not need EPA.
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IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE , • .> :',
In Idaho the principal responsibility for the regulation of hazardous
waste management rests with the state Department of Health and Welfare
(DHW). ;
AGENCY CAPACITIES AND COMMERCIAL HWMFs
Staff Positions: 3 ' ' .
Agency Budget: $83,0001
Commercial HWMFs: 2 permitted facilities . ,
SELECTED ASPECTS OF STATE HAZARDOUS WASTE PROGRAM • -:
Currently, there are no state laws specifically pertaining to hazardous
waste disposal in Idaho. However, there are regulations which govern
the disposal of solid waste, and legislation covering hazardous waste
disposal is now being prepared by the DHW.
The proposed legislation is expected to be roughly equivalent to EPA's
proposed RCRA regulations, with the exception that DHW might classify
hazardous waste into several categories.
Facility Inspections — The present solid waste disposal law provides
for the inspection of all solid waste disposal sites, which therefore
covers all sites at which hazardous solid waste is disposed. The
proposed legislation would extend this to all hazardous waste disposal
sites.
Enforcement Actions— DHW's first step in enforcing regulations is to
provide technical assistance. If this is not successful, they now have
authority to take the offender to court, as a result of which fines up
to $1000 per day per violation can be assessed.
Monitoring — Existing regulations do not require any monitoring. The
proposed regulations would require the monitoring of ground and surface
water.
Manifest System — Neither the existing regulations nor the proposed
legislation has a provision for a manifest system. It is still possible
that such a system will be added to the proposed legislation.
FY 1978; FY 1979 figure is $106,000.
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Defining Hazardous Waste — Existing regulations define only solid
waste. The proposed legislation, on the other hand, defines hazardous
waste very broadly. It refers to any solid, liquid or gaseous .material
which is toxic, corrosive, flammable, bioconcentrative, infectious, or
which causes an increase in mortality. It does not include high-level
radioactive wastes which are subject to other Idaho state regulations.
Coverage of Permit System — The current system of regulation includes
an approval process for all solid waste disposal sites. The proposed
legislation would include a requirement that all hazardous waste
storage, treatment and disposal facilities be permitted.
AGENCY VIEWS :-....,..
The DHW has indicated that it feels there are three broad categories of
problems to be faced in siting and operating'hazardous waste facilities:
public acceptance,.technical assessment and operation.. Project
acceptance by local elected officials was not, however, seen as a
problem. National media emphasis on the hazards associated with
chemical wastes was blamed for much of the public opposition. Technical
assessment of proposed sites was felt to be a problem due to the
difficulties of assessing the role of improbable events. They recommend
that the site and operation be able to manage a "worst case". Potential
operational problems include financial responsibility, bonding, daily
site operation, employee safety and accident prevention.
T,he DHW proposes that specific authority to review and establish the
suitability of sites in advance of specific proposals would be, in their
case, useful. They also noted that government agencies should provide
technical assistance, inspection and review of hazardous waste ,
management facilities, and that they would support a state or federal
waste disposal tax to be used in case of accidents or for long-term
care.
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ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY ; :.
The regulation and planning of hazardous waste management in the state
of Illinois is primarily the responsibility of the Illinois
Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA).
AGENCY CAPACITIES AND COMMERCIAL HWMFs
Staff Positions: 71 .
Agency Budget: $124,OOO1
Commercial HWMFs: 2 permitted facilities2
SELECTED ASPECTS OF STATE HAZARDOUS WASTE PROGRAM
Facility Inspections — The IEPA is authorized "to conduct a program of
continuing surveillance and of regular or periodic inspection.. .of the
refuse disposal sites'1.^ The Division of Land Pollution Control's
Regional Environmental Protection technicians have as one of their
responsibilities to routinely inspect and report on the operational
status of all refuse disposal sites in Illinois, including hazardous
waste management facilities.
Enforcement Actions — Cases involving serious.or repeated violations of
IEPA regulations are taken before the Illinois Pollution Control Board,
and the IEPA is represented there by the state Attorney General's
office. The Board has the authority to levy fines up to $10,000 plus
$1,000 per day per violation.
Monitoring — There are no requirements for monitoring. Any data the
IEPA requires are gathered by its own technicians during their routine
inspections.
Manifest System — New Special Waste Hauling Regulations took effect on
July 1, 1979 in Illinois. Special wastes are in essence all wastes
except garbage, and include hazardous wastes. A manifest is required
for all such waste generated in Illinois and hauled for storage,
disposal and/or treatment within or out of state, and for all such waste
hauled into the state.
Source: U.S. General Accounting Office, ."Hazardous Waste
Management Programs Will Not Be Effective", January 23, 1979.
Illinois has 2 permitted HWMFs, only one of which is currently
operating. In addition there are approximately 50 facilities which
co—dispose hazardous and solid waste.
Environmental Protection Act, Title 1, Section 4.
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Defining Hazardous Waste — Hazardous waste is defined as "solid waste
with inherent properties which make such waste difficult to manage by
normal means including but not limited to chemicals, explosives,
pathological wastes, radioactive materials, and wastes likely to cause
fire."*
Coverage of Permit System — A permit is required to engage in any
treatment, storage, transportation or disposal of hazardous waste. The
only exception is for "any person engaged in agricultural activity who
is disposing of a substance which would normally be classified as
hazardous if that substance was acquired for use by that person on his
own property."^
AGENCY VIEWS .
The IEPA already has a system of hazardous waste regulations. However,
they anticipate that these regulations will soon be changed to conform
.with EPA's RCRA regulations. They expect that this will result in their
regulation of hazardous waste management being considerably more
stringent. At the same time, they feel that EPA and RCRA have created
more problems than solutions. In particular, they noted the failure in
RCRA to distinguish between the degrees of hazard posed by different
types of hazardous waste. Notwithstanding these planned changes, they
feel that it will become increasingly difficult if not impossible for
private firms to site hazardous waste facilities, and that more direct
government involvement will be necessary. This involvement could be
limited to perpetual maintenance, or the site itself might have to be
owned by state or federal government and leased to a private operator.
IEPA is not enthusiastic about the latter option, but feels it may be
necessary. With this in mind, they saw no role for EPA in siting now,
but a substantial role in the future.
The state of Illinois can now preempt local zoning to site hazardous
waste facilities. However, this was not seen as a solution to the
siting problem because it cannot avoid due process. Preemption does,
however, allow local elected officials to save face by protesting
publicly against the site while otherwise cooperating. In siting new
facilities, they suggested that it might be wiser to first determine
what sites are politically acceptable and only then conduct a thorough
technical review, rather than the other way around, since the former
factors are more likely to cause problems.
Illinois Pollution Control Board Rules and Regulations, Chapter
7, Part 1.
Illinois Environmental Protection Act, Section 21(e).
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KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT
In Kansas regulatory responsibility for hazardous waste rests with the
Department of Health and Environment (DHE).
AGENCY CAPACITIES AND COMMERCIAL HWMFs
Staff Positions: 5
Agency Budget: $251,000
Commercial HWMFs: 1 permitted facility. '
SELECTED ASPECTS OF STATE HAZARDOUS WASTE PROGRAM ' ''
Facility Inspections — DHE has the authority to inspect facilities and
one DHE staffer's primary responsibility is the inspection of Kansas'
only commercial disposal facility. Inspections are regular and
frequent.
Enforcement Actions — A variety of actions 'may be taken to enforce
state law and regulations including orders to alter procedures,
suspension or revocation of permits, and, in addition to other penalties
provided by law, fines of up to $500 per Violation per day.
Monitoring — Environmental quality monitoring systems are required for
all hazardous waste facilities. DHE establishes specific requirements
for monitoring wells, air monitoring stations, frequency of sampling,
analyses required, and post-closure monitoring on a case<-by-case basis.
Manifest System — State regulations require the use of manifests by
generators, transporters, and facility operators. Copies of the
manifest must be sent to DHE by generators and facility operators.
Defining Hazardous Waste •— State law defines hazardous wastes as those
which are harmful to human health or the environment because of their
quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical or infectious
characteristics.
Coverage of Permit System — Generators, transporters, storers, and
disposers are covered by state regulations and/or permits. Permits must
be obtained for facilities that store, transfer, process, or dispose of
hazardous waste.
AGENCY VIEWS ' ' :\ " i:; : :;.;;;;'
DHE officials noted that Kansas is in a fortunate position with repsect
to hazardous waste management. The state is not a major generator of
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hazardous waste and so the one commercial facility in the state should
serve its needs.for a considerable period. In addition DHE felt much of
the waste brought into the state can be rendered non-hazardous.
Nevertheless they did consider siting to be probably the most difficult
obstacle to overcome in implementing RCRA. A number of factors were
seen as contributing to the siting problem. People do not have great
trust in EPA or state agencies. It has become more difficult to
convince localities of the need for siting commercial facilities,
particularly in remote areas where local economies do not depend on the
industry which generates hazardous waste. Local communities .see.no
economic benefit flowing to their communities and there is no extant .
system for rewarding communities for the economic damage they may
suffer. If, as is likely, facilities would need to import wastes from
out of state to be economically viable, the economic disbenefits would
be perceived as being even more remote. Regardless of facility design
or operation, risk cannot be eliminated. For these reasons local
opposition to facilities was seen as expected and in keeping with
growing opposition to siting of any number of facilities such as
airports, dams, and nuclear generating stations.
EPA was seen as contributing to the problem. EPA was criticized for
focusing on traditional.regulatory sanctions and on hazardous waste
problems, while ignoring the need for creative solutions to the siting
problem. Concern was also expressed over the fact that siting will
become increasingly complicated and long as RCRA takes effect. As the
siting process becomes more intricate, the chance for procedural error
increases and thus the chance for legal action based on procedural error
increases. .
The siting problem was thought to be sufficient to lead to more :.
governmental involvement. Veto power over local zoning may have to be
given to state or federal agencies. (It was noted, however, that a
facility spqnspr, could simply avoid sites regulated by local zoning.)
Should this governmental power be used to benefit private industry,
precautions would need to be taken to prevent abuse, and utility-type
regulations might have to be applied to disposal facilities. .
If in the next several.years the siting problem cannot be resolved then
government ownership of sites may have to occur. .Actual facility
construction and operation could be accomplished by private industry.
While such an option would not address many or any public concerns,
government ownership could guarantee the best available site selection
and perpetual care of closed facilities. These are two issues of
critical concern to DHE.
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MARYLAND.WATER RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION
The Maryland Water Resources Administration (WRA) regulates hazardous
waste management. Maryland Environmental Services (MES) has planning
and management responsibilites for a variety of industrial waste
problems, including hazardous waste. ,
AGENCY CAPACITIES AND COMMERCIAL HWMFs . ,
Staff Positions: 71
Agency Budget: $265,OOO1
Commercial HWMFs: 4 permitted facilities . ,• . • .
SELECTED ASPECTS OF STATE HAZARDOUS WASTE PROGRAM
Facility Inspections — Regulations require that WRA representatives be
given access to facilities at any reasonable time to inspect facilities,
review records, or gather any needed information.
Enforcement Actions — WRA may modify, suspend, or revoke in whole or in
part any permit or other approval it has granted. Violations are also
subject to civil and criminal penalties.
Monitoring— Facility sponsors must include plans for the design and
installation of piezometers, ground and surface water monitoring
systems, and air emission sampling stations. The frequency and extent
of monitoring activities and reporting requirements are determined
individually by WRA.
Manifest System — Generators, transporters, and facility operators must
use a manifest sytem and facility operators must submit manifest reports
to WRA periodically. • • ..
Defining Hazardous Waste — Maryland defines hazardous substances in
three classes by degree of-hazard. Criteria which include and go beyond
•those defined by RCRA are used and specific substances are listed.
Coverage of Permit System — Generators, transporters, and facility
operators are covered by regulations and/or permits. Permits must be
obtained for storage, treatment, and disposal facilities.
Source: U.S. General Accounting Office, "Hazardous Waste
Management Programs Will Not Be Effective", January 23, 1979.
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"AGENCY VIEWS
WRA officials considered local opposition to siting a major problem in
developing new disposal capacity. Easing these problems and overcoming
public fears might be possible by demonstrating' safe operations at a
facility; however, if no facility can be sited then it becomes difficult
to demonstrate a successful operation.
WRA noted several factors that could improve siting processes. The .
probable location of sites can fall into two categories — remotes sites
which are "hidden" from public veiw and industrial sites which are
"camouflaged" by surrounding industrial development. Public involvement
should begin early before positions are hardened and opposition becomes
emotional. Public education should be stressed so that local residents
can become valuable contributors. Education should stress the benefits
from industries which generate hazardous waste.
Regardless of these or other actions, it was considered likely that
local opposition could not be overcome. Given that the lack of disposal
capacity will have a severe impact on industry, states may have to
acquire and operate sites. If this option is chosen, WRA already has
the power to condemn land for sites.
MES has had more experience in siting then WRA and expects to be more
directly involved in future siting efforts. MES feels there is a clear
need for state assistance in developing one, or more secure landfills.
It was involved in an unsuccessful siting attempt for a facility to
serve Allied Chemical (see the Allied case study elsewhere in this
report). In part because of that experience MES feels that a
multi-county regional approach to developing facilities should be
adopted with facilities serving all regional generators. This would
reduce problems associated with single industries siting facilities
outside of the community which receives economic benefits from that
industry. A regional approach might also reduce political pressures on
local officials. If states were to take strong positions, possibly by
overriding local controls, then political pressures could be directed
away from the local level and towards the state level where they could
be more easily endured. Because most facilities would likely be located
in rural communities distant from industry, amenities and financial
compensation may be politically necessary incentives. However, the use
of such incentives in and of themselves was seen as probably ineffective
in overcoming opposition.
Industry was seen as being in a position to facilitate siting. Industry
could publicize its need for disposal facilities to make the public
aware of the hazardous waste problem. More effective use could also be
made of industry's political power to ensure that government is aware of
its needs.
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MES officials felt that EPA should probably not require all states to
have hazardous waste landfills. States would Resent this federal
intrusion which would likely involve an unnecessarily large and
burdensome set of regulatory and administrative requirements. Only if
states are totally unable to solve the hazardous waste problem should
EPA become directly involved in siting.
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MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL DUALITY ENGINEERING
The Massachusetts Department of Environmental Quality Engineering (DEQE)
has regulatory responsibility for hazardous waste. The responsibility
for hazardous waste planning and management rests within the Department
of Environmental Management (DEM).
AGENCY CAPACITIES AND' COMMERCIAL HWMFs
Staff Positions: 4J
Agency Budget: $100,000
1
Commercial HWMFs: 28 licensed firms''
SELECTED ASPECTS OF STATE HAZARDOUS WASTE PROGRAM
Facility Inspections — DEQE may inspect any facility at reasonable
times on reasonable notice for purposes of examining the facility, its
records and inventory and taking any samples of wastes.
Enforcement Actions — Violations of regulations are subject to fines of
up to $1,000.DEQE may also revoke any license subject to applicable
hearing requirements.
Monitoring — Existing regulations do not specify any monitoring
requirements. In developing plans for a facility in Sturbridge,
however, proposed RCRA regulatory requirements were followed by DEM,
including the provision of monitoring wells.
Manifest System —- Transporters of hazardous waste must carry records
describing the origin, quantity, and destination of their loads. These
records must be retained for one year, and monthly summary reports must
be forwarded to DEQE.
Source: U.S. General Accounting Office, "Hazardous Waste
Management Programs Will Not be Effective," January 23, 1979.
Data refer to DEQE. ,
In 1978 DEQE records showed 22 commercial firms licensed for the
storage of hazardous waste, the majority of which handled waste oils
or oil spill debris. Of six licensed commercial treatment and
disposal firms, half were restricted to waste oils or solvents. No
major commercial facilities which ultimately disposed of a broad
range of hazardous waste were licensed. Consequently, out-of-state
facilities were used.
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Defining Hazardous Waste — The definition encompasses waste which is or
may be dangerous to public health or the environment by virtue of its
chemical, radioactive, flammable, explosive, or other characteristics.
These wastes are also classified by groups, and disposal methods
emphasizing reuse or detoxification are prescribed for each group.
Coverage of Permit Sytstem — Transporters, storers, and disposers are
covered by the regulations, as are facilities for the storage,
treatment, reclamation, incineration, and land disposal of hazardous
waste. Generators are exempted from existing regulations but will be
covered by new legislation expected to take effect by early 1980.
AGENCY VIEWS
A DEQE official saw essentially two roles for that agency. One was to
encourage in a general fashion the development of disposal facilities.
In support of this role the agency sponsored an evaluation of ten
prospective sites in the state; it also has made public presentations to
explain the nature of the state's hazardous waste problem. The other
major role is the enforcement of existing regulations to ensure proper
disposal of waste.
DEM as a planning and management agency is more directly involved in the
siting of specific facilities and managing the disposal of waste. A DEM
official indicated that the agency has taken a position of promoting
waste reduction, the use of waste exchanges, and processing and
treatment over land disposal which is considered a last resort solution.
Hazardous waste management was seen as a private sector problem
requiring a private sector solution. Industry faces formidable
obstacles to siting facilties, however, and DEM can play a needed role
in overcoming that barrier. (Unlike private industry, DEM does not need
local approval to acquire a disposal site.) While DEM originally
envisioned a role primarily confined to site acquisition and facility
planning, its recent experience has led to greater involvement. A
DEM-sponsored state plan is being prepared which addresses a range of
general hazardous waste issues and may lead to greater state control
over the treatment and disposal of waste. In part this evolving role
has resulted from public concerns expressed over the potential
development of disposal facilities at three sites in the state.*'
Among the options to be considered is compensation to host communities
to offset the disincentives of developing a facility.
From OEM's perspective, EPA must be willing to support the states which
are attempting to develop,facilities and must be willing to absorb the
inevitable abuse and criticism from opponents of state efforts. Because
of its public credibility, EPA can play a major public relations role.
EPA's Region I office was considered quite useful in supporting state
For a discussion of OEM's siting experience, see the Sturbridge,
Massachusetts case study in Appendix A.
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efforts. On the other hand, EPA headquarters was seen as having a more
academic understanding of problems, but not being implementation
oriented and having no practical experience. As a result, EPA
headquarters was seen as having no appreciation of the real problems in
siting hazardous waste facilities. One role DEM specifically did not
want EPA to play was that of needlessly scrutinizing and criticizing
minor points of state efforts to site facilties and thereby avoiding any
real involvement in or support of state efforts. Finally EPA was seen
as a potential provider of liability funds in case of operational,
problems at facilities. Liability and long-term care of facilities was
seen as a governmental (though not necessarily federal) function because
these burdens could markedly discourage any private sector involvement.
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MINNESOTA POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY
The regulation of hazardous waste management in the state of Minnesota
is primarily the responsibility of the Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency (MPCA). Hazardous waste regulations in Minnesota have only
recently been approved and take effect in June 1979. It is anticipated
that these regulations will be challenged in court by a group of
industries which generate hazardous waste.
AGENCY CAPACITIES AND COMMERCIAL HWMFs
Staff Positions: 41
Agency Budget: $140,OOO1
Commercial HWMFs: None^
SELECTED ASPECTS OF STATE HAZARDOUS WASTE PROGRAM
Facility Inspections — The MPCA does have the authority to inspect
HWMFs, but there is no requirement that they do so on a periodic basis.
Enforcement Actions — The MPCA itself has authority to invoke sanctions
such as site closure to enforce its regulations, although such a severe
penalty is not common. A stipulation agreement requiring the correction
of a violation is a more likely result if regulations have been found to
have been broken. The regulations do not provide for specific civil or
criminal penalties for violation other than site closure.
Monitoring — MPCA regulations require that the operator of a hazardous
waste management facility have in operation a monitoring system before
accepting any hazardous wastes. The nature and extent of the monitoring
system depends on the type of facility and is determined on a case-by-
case basis, subject to approval by the MPCA.
Manifest System — The regulations require that each generator prepare a
manifest ("shipping papers") for each shipment of hazardous wastes. The
hauler and management facility operator in turn are required to sign the
manifest and are forbidden to accept any wastes not accompanied by a
manifest. On-site facilities and generators and haulers of waste
crankcase oil are exempted from these requirements.
Defining Hazardous Waste — Hazardous waste is defined as "any refuse or
discarded material or combinations of refuse or discarded materials
Source: U.S. General Accounting Office, "Hazardous Waste
Management Program Will Not Be Effective", January 23, 1979.
The 3M Company operates an incinerator and landfill (temporary)
for its own hazardous wastes in Cottage Grove, Minn.
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in solid, semi-solid, liquid or gaseous form which cannot be handled by
routine waste management techniques because they pose a substantial
present or potential hazard .to human health pr other human organisms
because of their chemical, biological or physical properties."1
Wastes specifically- excluded include:
! o wastewater discharge pursuant to an NPDES or State Disposal
System permit;
o air contaminants or emissions pursuant- to an Emission
Facility Operating Permit;
o radioactive wastes covered by other regulations; and
o
asbestos in taconite wastes.
Coverage of Permit System — An MPCA permit is required for any facility
"used for the management of-hazardous waste,"2 including transfer,
stations and storage, treatment and disposal facilities. Such a permit
is required to .construct a new facility or modify an existing one, as
..well as,,to operate an existing facility. The only exceptions are for
on-site facilities that are operated solely to recycle wastes produced
by.that generator, and for hazardous waste containerized storage ,
facilities with capacities of.less than 5000 gallons, if no other
hazardous waste facilities are located on the same site. Such storage
facilities are not required ,to have an'MPCA permit.
AGENCY VIEWS /' / , .......
MPCA officials have noted four factors which have.caused particular
difficulties in attempting to site hazardous waste management
facilities. These are: ,
o public misperceptions of the hazards associated with
properly sited and operated hazardous waste management
, ,, ,. facilities,
o . the difficulties' involved in developing a mechanism for
public participation in the siting process,
o institutional barriers, in-particular existing zoning and
development plans, and
o , economies of scale — whether the state produces enough
hazardous waste to justify a facility.
Laws Relating to the Minnesota .Pollution Control Agency, Section
116,06, subd. 13.
State of Minnesota Hazardous Waste Regulations, Section HW-1,
A. 16. ,..'..,. • , - .-
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Reacting to these and other problems, the MPCA has proposed several
strategies for siting hazardous waste management facilities, as follows:
o state ownership of the site and of a buffer zone, , .
o state preemption of local zoning and/or use of eminent
domain,
o financial compensation for the affected community to make
up for disincentives such as lost property tax revenues and
to provide an incentive, and
o a public participation program that involves interested
publics in the siting process from the beginning.
They noted in particular that on-site facilities have not faced such
difficulties and do not require such strategies.
The MPCA recommended then that the federal government role in siting of
hazardous waste management facilities be limited to coordinating the
development of regional facilities. They felt that state governments,
on the other hand, could either be directly involved in the siting
process—through preemptive zoning or eminent domain—or could merely
encourage the development of sites by other parties (e.g., industry or
regional governments). They stressed that an important issue to be
resolved in this regard is the issue of site ownership.
The state should, they felt, also be responsible for public education
and participation and for long-term liability if the federal government
is not. They proposed that local government be involved in the long-
term planning for hazardous waste management facilities as well as in
particular siting attempts, but that they not have veto power over sites
within their jurisdiction.
With regard to Minnesota's particular situation, an MPCA official has
stated that the state must take either of two options to enable the
future siting of hazardous wastes facilities. One would be to permit a
site in the face of local zoning and then let the local government
concerned take them to court (assuming that'the MPCA would win such a
case). The other is for the legislature to grant the state the power of
eminent domain, either for a particular hazardous waste facility or for
any such facility.
The private disposal industry has been contacted by the MPCA with regard
to siting a hazardous waste facility in Minnesota, but is said to have
adopted a wait-and-see attitude. Currently both the market and the
political climate are uncertain. The only option now available to most
firms which produce chemical wastes is long distance hauling to sites in
other states. This is not a viable long-term solution because of the
hazards involved, and for economic and political reasons.
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The MPCA saw no technical reason that there should not be a site in
Minnesota, although it was noted that there are few if any desirable
sites close to generators in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area
where the bulk of the state's industry is located.
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MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
The Missouri Department of Natural Resources (DNR) has sole regulatory
responsibility for hazardous waste management in the state.
AGENCY CAPACITIES AND COMMERCIAL HWMFs
Staff Positions: 21
Agency Budget: $60,000*
Commercial HWMFs: 3 permitted facilities
SELECTED ASPECTS OF STATE HAZARDOUS WASTE PROGRAM
Missouri's hazardous waste law was enacted in 1977 and it called for the
adoption of all rules and regulations by September, 1979. The .following
material is taken from the 1977 law and proposed regulations developed
as a result of that law.
Facility Inspections ~ Missouri law allows DNR representatives to
inspect facilities at reasonable times on reasonable notice for purposes
of investigation and of enforcement of rules and regulations.
Enforcement Actions — A broad range of enforcement options are defined.
These include meetings to persuade violators to correct inappropriate
actions, written abatement orders, the modification or revocation of any
DNR-issued permit and penalities up to $50,000 per day and/or two years
in jail for repeated violations.
Monitoring — The law permits DNR to require any monitoring activities
considered necessary. Proposed regulations require groundwater
monitoring wells for landfills and monthly analyses of samples.
Monitoring provisions are also established for incinerators and
landfarms.
Manifest System — Regulations establish a manifest system to describe
and to track waste from generator to transporter to disposer and these
parties must retain copies for three years. Disposers must file copies
with DNR quarterly.
Defining Hazardous Waste — State law defines hazardous waste as that
which poses a threat to human health or other living organisms by virtue
of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious
characteristics. ,
Source: U.S. General Accounting Office, "Hazardous Waste
Management Programs Will Not Be Effective", January 23, 1979.
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Coverage of Permit System -— All generators, transporters, storers, and
disposers of hazardous waste are covered by state regulations and/or
permits. Permits must be obtained for all storage, treatment, and
disposal facilities with the exception of on-site interim treatment
facilities.
AGENCY VIEWS
In recent years DNR has had experience with one successful and one
unsuccessful hazardous waste landfill siting attempt. Both involved
substantial oppostion from area residents. That experience has
convinced DNR officials that many facility opponents are not motivated
by a desire to guarantee safe facilities but by the desire to prevent
any facility from being developed.
A natural outgrowth of this finding is DNR's conclusion that the only
apparent solution to siting is to have a state regulatory agency willing
to issue permits in the face of political pressure and citizen
opposition which may reach strident levels. Two additional factors are
seen as significant. One is whether local zoning exists. (In much of
Missouri which is suitable for developing disposal facilities no zoning
exists.) The other is the existence of a strong state regulatory
program to enhance public confidence in governmental decision-making.
The final promulgation of Missouri's hazardous waste regulations in late
summer,, 1979, was seen as a major step in enhancing DNR's credibility.
> \ ' •- ' • "
In addition to issuing strong regulations state agencies should create
more publicity for proper hazardous waste management than improper
management. A DNR official, however, did note that the media's
predilection for hazardous waste disaster stories has made it difficult
for the other side to be heard. The use by states of special authority
to override local decision-making (e.g., zoning regulations) was seen as
a last resort option. It was felt that such actions would be seen as an
unwarranted intervention in local government affairs and would generate
stiff opposition.
It was considered possible that localities with major industrial
development would support the development of disposal facilities .and
would be able to overcome zoning problems. In some cases local
governments could own sites with private industry developing and
operating facilities.
DNR saw one role the federal government should play and one it should
avoid. EPA could make a concerted effort to create favorable publicity
for proper hazardous waste management practices. It was specifically
suggested that EPA release ten favorable press releases for every press
release describing improper practices. The federal government, however,
should not develop any special authority whereby it became directly
involved in siting. Such actions would delay sitings for years and lead
to major cost increases. Opposition to siting might well increase
because of a general dislike for federal intervention in local actions.
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Finally, the inability of the federal government to site radioactive
disposal facilities after years of efforts was seen as dubious evidence
of the likelihood of successful federal action in the area of hazardous
waste.
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NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
In New Jersey hazardous waste management is primarily the responsibility
of the Solid Waste Administration (SWA) of the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection.
AGENCY CAPACITIES AND COMMERCIAL HWMFs
Staff Positions: 71
Agency Budget: $225,OOO1
Commercial HWMFs: 1 permitted treatment facility^
SELECTED ASPECTS OF STATE HAZARDOUS WASTE PROGRAM '
Facility Inspections — As of January, 1979 the New Jersey state
legislature was considering legislation that would require SWA to
inspect all special (i.e., hazardous and chemical) waste facilities on a
weekly basis. For SWA a critical question with respect to the
legislation was whether funds would be appropriated to cover the costs
of inspections or whether it would have to allocate existing scarce
resources to cover these inspections.
Enforcement Actions—SWA has an enforcement section responsible for
inspecting facilities on a routine basis. Criminal and/or civil actions
are possible. Civil actions may be carried out at three levels. In
order of increasing severity they are notice of violation (the most
routine action), notice of prosecution (this may include levying of
fines), and administrative order for appropriate action (including the
option of closing facilities). Actions may begin at any level and may
progress from lower to higher levels of severity.
Monitoring — State regulations cover monitoring in two areas.
Provisions for monitoring ground and surface water must be established
at special waste facilities prior to the beginning of operations and the
acceptance of wastes. Analyses of monitoring must be submitted to SWA
as determined by SWA. Based on gas generation potentials•of accepted
wastes, SWA may require the implementation of a gas monitoring '
program. '•• ' ,
Source: U.S. General Accounting Office, "Hazardous Waste
Management Programs Will Not Be Effective", January 23, 1979. ' ":
SWA has granted permits for six on-site hazardous waste
facilities.
Proposed new rules and amendments concerning the operation,
registration and engineering plan requirements for special waste
(chemical and chemical waste) facilities. These proposed regulations
were expected to be adopted by late spring 1979.
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Manifest System — The Special Waste Manifest Regulations provide for a
manifest system covering the transport of special wastes and include
requirements for facilities to maintain records and provide reports
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a'rrive at sound, independent conclusions on the viability of specific
sites. (Currently, SWA's lack of resources compel the agency to rely
primarily on industry-generated data.) •
Various dispute resolution techniques were seen as having limited
impacts on siting. Based on recent state experience, industry offers of
compensation and/or amenities to host communities were not seen as being
effective inducements. Negotiation or other methods of reaching
compromise between host communities and facility sponsors would likely
not have any impact on siting because, from a local perspective,
facilities would not be seen as inevitable. Siting opponents would not
•feel compelled to compromise so long as their major goal was not to have
the facility developed.
Finally SWA saw a major long-term trend towards fewer commercial
disposers. Because the costs of securing sites and operating facilities
will inexorably rise, small firms with little capital will drop out of
the market. An SWA official speculated that in ten years' time, only a
half dozen large companies will be operating hazardous waste facilities
on a national basis. ,
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NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION
In New York state, authority for regulating hazardous waste management
activities rests with the Department of Environmental Conservation
(DEC).
AGENCY CAPACITIES AND COMMERCIAL HWMFs
Staff Positions: 71 ;
Agency Budget: $140,000*
Commercial HWMFs: 3 permitted facilities^
SELECTED ASPECTS OF STATE HAZARDOUS WASTE PROGRAM
Facility Inspections — The responsibility for inspecting HWMFs may be
delegated by DEC to county health departments if those departments can
demonstrate the requisite expertise. All three HWMFs permitted1 by DEC
are in Niagara County and the Niagara County Health Department has
assumed the primary responsibility for inspections, which are conducted
as frequently as once a week.
Enforcement Actions — DEC uses consent decrees as the primary means of
enforcing state regulation and individual permit conditions. In
practice the Niagara County Health Department documents violations and
forwards this documentation to DEC. Violations may result in fines. In
extreme cases DEC may close a facility by issuing a summary abatement
order.
Monitoring — For landfills state regulations require a minimum of three
monitoring wells, two of which must be downgradient from fill areas.
More wells may be required if deemed necessary by DEC. The permit for
the facility will specify the testing and frequency schedules of the
water monitoring program. Secure landfils must also monitor leachate
collection and treatment systems.
Manifest System — State law has established a manifest system for the
transportation, storage, and disposal of hazardous wastes; this system
conforms to RCRA requirements.
Defining Hazardous Waste — State law defines industrial hazardous
wastes as those that contribute to irreversible or incapacitating
illness or
Source: U.S. General Accounting Office, "Hazardous Waste
Management Programs Will Not Be Effective", January 23, 1979.
One facility provides treatment and processing; the others
provide land disposal and some treatment and processing.
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that pose a substantial hazard to human health or the environment.
Waste is also defined by criteria derived from RCRA regulations.
Coverage of Permit System —Permits must be obtained for any facility
that stores, treats, processes, incinerates,-or land disposes of
hazardous waste. Regulations apply to generators, transporters, and
disposers of such waste.
AGENCY VIEWS
Public opposition has arisen to the two HWMFs in New York which use land
disposal technology. Given this experience, DEC considers public
opposition to be one of the major problems in developing and maintaining
disposal facilities. Two manifestations of this opposition—citizen
lawsuits resulting in court injunctions and restrictive local laws—were
specifically noted.
Overcoming this opposition to the extent of achieving local public
acceptance of facilities may be impossible. Two approaches, however,
can contribute to reducing opposition. Public education was considered
helpful but by no means a panacea. Probably more important were
concerted efforts to upgrade disposal technologies to reduce the need
for land disposal. Specifically, technologies_which destroy the
hazardous components of waste must be developed. Recent European
experience with such facilities was cited as a model for the U.S.
The Niagara Falls area of New York has received enormous publicity
because of Love Canal and other disposal sites. This publicity has
stimulated a great deal of government.action which has helped to upgrade
New York's hazardous waste program. (A DEC official described that
program as the least mature of the state's environmental programs.) The
recent interest in disposal problems plus the current problems •'....
associated with developing facilities may lead to a need for direct
government involvement. Thus it was considered possible that states may
have to site and construct disposal facilities and use general funds
and/or user fees to defray costs. Finally, EPA musf insure that
hazardous waste management be a national program. For the program to be
effective, no state can become a haven for the disposal of hazardous
wastes. , • . \. ,., '
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OKLAHOMA STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Primary responsibility for the regulation of hazardous waste management
in Oklahoma rests with the state Department of Health (ODH). The
regulations covering hazardous waste management (Rules and Regulations
for Industrial Waste Management) have recently been modified. These
modified regulations took effect on June 12, 1979. The discussion below
refers to these revised regulations. * ';" ' -, 7; ;
AGENCY CAPACITIES AND COMMERCIAL HWMFs ' \
Staff Positions: 21
Agency Budget: $80,0001
Commercial HWMFs:. 3 permitted facilities
SELECTED ASPECTS OF STATE HAZARDOUS WASTE PROGRAM
Facility Inspections — Inspection per se is not- mentioned in ODH
hazardous waste regulations. However, Oklahoma case law has determined
that when a person applies for a permit and/or receives a license or
permit he has waived the right to a search warrant. On this basis the
ODH conducts periodic inspections of hazardous waste facilities (with
the exception of storage facilities: see below).
Enforcement Actions — Enforcement of ODH regulation is carried out by
the state Attorney General or by county district attorneys with the
assistance of ODH attorneys. Sanctions include injunctive action,
permit revocation or suspension and civil or criminal penalties. Civil
penalties range up to $2,500 per violation per day, and criminal
penalties up to 30 days in jail per violation per day.
Monitoring — State regulations provide for monitoring of ground and
surface waters and, in certain cases (e.g., incineration or disposal of
volatile hydrocarbons), air monitoring.
Manifest System — The regulations require that every shipment of
hazardous waste must be accompanied by a manifest which specifies the
generator, hauler and disposal plan, and "information regarding
emergency procedures to be used in the event of spillage, leakage, or
accident."2
Defining Hazardous Waste — In these regulations hazardous waste is
termed "controlled industrial wastes," and is defined as solid or
Source: U.S. General Accounting Office, "Hazardous Waste
Management Programs Will Not Be Effective", January 23, 1979.
Rules and Regulations for Industrial Waste Management, Section
11.3.1.2.
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liquid refuse products which are to be discarded by the producer and
which are toxic to humans, animals or plants and which are produced in
such quantities that they cannot be safely disposed of in state-approved
sanitary landfills, or in waste or sewage treatment facilities. This
does not include radioactive wastes. In addition, state law excludes
oil and gas,brines and drilling muds from ODH purview.
Coverage of Permit System — The permit system covers all hazardous
waste processing, treatment and disposal facilities, with the exception,
as implied above, of oil and gas field operations. Permits are not
required for storage facilities, which do, however, require ODH
approval. The latter differs from a permit in that it is not subject to
a public hearing and does not have insurance and bonding requirements.
AGENCY VIEWS . ,. ' " '
The ODH has in the past few years sucessfully sited a hazardous waste
landfill and a few injection wells. Such siting attempts have only
recently begun to face public opposition, and this opposition has been
successful only in those cases where the proposed site was not
technically suitable. „,. Although the. ODH does think that ,it is possible
that public opposition may become more of a problem in the future,
currently they feel that site selection can be left to industry. They
do propose that some sort of general public education program be
developed to alleviate "unfounded" fears about hazardous waste
management facilities. Another problem they are aware of but do not yet
have a solution to is the effect of such sites on surrounding property
values, .particularly in non—industrial areas.
In summary, the ODH position is that proposed solutions to the siting
problem such as eminent.domain or even government-owned and operated
sites are not yet necessary because the private sector is doing an
adequate job at this time.
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TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES ......
The Texas Department of Water Resources (DWR), formerly called the Texas
Water Quality Board, has principal responsibility for the regulation of
hazardous waste management in Texas. The Texas Department of Health
(DOH) has jurisdiction over municipal solid waste disposal sites which
currently accept some low-level hazardous wastes. However, the DOH is
of the opinion that EPA1 s proposed new regulations will preclude these
sites from accepting any hazardous wastes. The disposal of drilling
muds and brine wastes from oilfield operations is regulated by the Texas
Railroad Commission.
AGENCY CAPACITIES AND COMMERCIAL HWMFs ,
Staff Positions: 32.51
Agency Budget: $753,1221
Commercial HWMFs: 25 (including 3 permitted hazardous waste landfills).
SELECTED ASPECTS OF STATE HAZARDOUS WASTE PROGRAM . .
Facility Inspections — The DWR has the authority to inspect all
permitted hazardous waste management facilities, as is specified in
their permits. Inspections are conducted out of the 12 DWR regional
offices to ensure that these facilities are being operated in accordance
with their permits.
Enforcement — "The Executive Director is authorized to institute or
cause to be instituted [by the state Attorney General's office]...legal
proceedings for injunctive relief or to recover a civil penalty [or
both]...".2 Injunctive relief might mean site closure or merely
future adherence to the regulation violated. The civil penalty can
range from $50 to $1,000 per day per violation. .
Monitoring — Permit stipulations require that each facility monitor
groundwater. Monitoring data—usually less than 10 parameters—are
required to be submitted monthly the first year of the permit and
quarterly thereafter. Air quality is under the jurisdiction of the
Texas Air Control Board, which, however, does not require gas monitoring
programs. t
Manifest — A "Shipping Control Ticket" must accompany all shipments of
Class I industrial waste being hauled to off-site facilities. Neither
Source: U.S. General Accounting Office, "Hazardous Waste
Management Programs Will Not Be Effective," January 23, 1979.
Texas Department of Water Resources, Rules of the Texas Water
Development Board Pertaining to Industrial Solid Waste Management,
156.22.01.011.
384
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haulers nor management facility operators are allowed to receive any
Class I waste without this ticket. , ;
Defining Hazardous Wastes— "Hazardous Industrial Waste" is defined as
any waste or combination defined as such by the EPA. However, some
sections of the DWR regulations do not make use of this term and refer
instead to Class I wastes. Class I wastes are defined as "any
industrial solid waste" or mixture of industrial solid wastes which
because of its concentration, or physical or chemical characteristics,
is toxic, corrosive, flammable, a strong sensitizer or irritant, a
generator of sudden pressure by decomposition, heat or other means, and
may pose a substantial present or potential danger to human health or
the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported or disposed
of or otherwise managed, including hazardous industrial waste."I
Specifically excluded are wastes which result from oilfield operations
and material in sewage and irrigation return flows.
Coverage of Permit System — All hazardous waste management •
facilities—storage, treatment, processing and disposal—are required to
have a permit to operate. However, such a permit may be obtained,
depending on the type of facility, from the DOH or other state agency.
AGENCY VIEWS2
Texas DOH officials view political .and public opposition to the siting
of hazardous waste management facilities as an insurmountable problem.
Many Texas public officials have informed DOH that they are unwilling to
subject their communities to public hearings involved in the issuance of
permits and that they are certainly unwilling to advocate facilities.
Indeed, these officials have told DOH that such advocacy would be
tantamount to political suicide and they would actively resist siting
attempts.
DOH feels that public opposition is associated automatically with any
hazardous waste. Because current EPA regulations do not distinguish
between degree of hazard, DOH feels that EPA has magnified the public
opposition problem and foreclosed the opportunity to dispose of less
hazardous'• wastes in ways that would not engender public concern.
Specifically, DOH feels that through the application of sound scientific
and engineering principles, existing solid waste disposal sites can
provide capacity for a large portion of hazardous waste that is
hazardous only if improperly handled.
Texas Department of Water Resources, op. cit. , 156.22. .01 (c).
These views are derived primarily from communications between the
Director, Division of Solid Waste Management, Texas Department of
Health and U.S. EPA. Views of the Department of Water Resources,
also communicated to U.S. EPA were not available to Centaur in time
to be included here.
385
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In DOH's view, by demanding that every hazardous waste disposal facility
be engineered to stringent standards designed for the most hazardous
waste, many sites will be overengineered and disposal costs will be
unnecessarily high. In turn, this will lead to more illegal disposal
practices. ,
386
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WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT'" OF ECOLOGY :
The agency in the state of Washington with the principal responsibility
for regulating hazardous waste management is the State Department of
Ecology (WDOE). The Washington Department of Agriculture has authority
over matters involving pesticides, including inspection of disposal
areas and investigation of complaints of injury to' humans or to land.
The Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission regulates garbage
and refuse collection companies, and the Washington State Patrol
regulates the transport of dangerous materials over state highways.1
AGENCY CAPACITIES AND COMMERCIAL HWMFs
Staff Positions: 42
Agency Budget: $100,OOO2
Commercial HWMFs: None
SELECTED,ASPECTS OF STATE HAZARDOUS WASTE PROGRAM
The WDOE currently has only limited authority to regulate hazardous
waste management. They have proposed legislation which would give them
much broader authority and would bring them into compliance with
EPA/RCRA requirements. However, this legislation is not expected to be
enacted until 1981 at the earliest.
Currently, the WDOE only regulates the transportation, storage and
disposal of extremely hazardous wastes. Extremely hazardous wastes are
those wastes which are acutely toxic or which are persistent and
represent a long-term hazard (and are a subset of hazardous wastes).
The WDOE has the authority to force a generator to dispose of extremely
hazardous wastes in an approved facility, and as of this summer will
implement a manifest, system for all extremely hazardous wastes.
Otherwise, even their authority over extremely hazardous wastes is
limited to their soon-to-be operational, extremely hazardous waste
disposal site on the Hanford Reservation. At this facility, which WDOE
will own but which will be privately operated, they will regulate the
methods of treatment, storage and disposal.
AGENCY VIEWS
WDOE comments on the siting process, hazardous waste management, and the
EPA role can be found in the Appendix to the Resource Recovery
U.S. EPA, State of Hazardous Waste Regulations and Legislation.
Source: U.S. General Accounting Office, "Hazardous Waste
Management Programs Will Not Be Effective", January 23, 1979.
387
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Corporation case study, "A History of Efforts to Acquire a Hazardous
Waste Site in the State of Washington." Briefly, these comments
indicate that WDOE feels the following are major aspects to be
considered in siting hazardous waste facilities:
o the need for state laws and regulations to detail and
authorize the siting implementation system,
o the involvement of local elected officials,
o the hiring of appropriate staff, and
o the involvement of the local community in a way that does
not necessarily lead to its being opposed to the facility;
this might include intelligent publicity and financial
incentives.
yo 1869
SW-809
{tU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1979-632-755/232
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EPA REGIONS
U.S. EPA, Region 1
Solid Waste Program
John F. Kennedy Bldg.
Boston, MA 02203
617-223-5775
U.S. EPA, Region 2
Solid Waste Section
26 Federal Plaza
New York, NY 10007
212-264-0503
U.S. EPA, Region 3
Solid Waste Program
6th and Walnut Sts.
Philadelphia, PA 19106
215-597-9377
U.S. EPA, Region 4
Solid Waste Program
345 Courtland St., N.E.
Altanta, GA 30308
404-881-3016
U.S. EPA, Region 5
Solid Waste Program
230 South Dearborn St.
Chicago, IL 60604
312-353-2197
U.S. EPA, Region 6
Solid Waste Section
1201 Elm St.
Dallas, TX 75270
214-767-2734
U.S. EPA, Region 7
Solid Waste Section
1735 Baltimore Ave.
Kansas City, MO 64108
816-374-3307
U.S. EPA, Region 8
Solid Waste Section
1860 Lincoln St.
Denver, CO 80295
303-837-2221
U.S. EPA, Region 9
Solid Waste Program
215 Fremont St.
San Francisco, CA 94105
415-556-4606
U.S. EPA, Region 10
Solid Waste Program
1200 6th Ave.
Seattle, WA 98101
206-442-1260
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