Guide to Exercises in
Chemical Emergency Preparedness Programs
MAY 1988
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U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
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GUIDE TO EXERCISES IN
CHEMICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAMS
Foreword
This Guide has been prepared by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
as a service to local and state chemical emergency response and planning
authorities, including local emergency planning committees (LEPCs) and state
emergency response commissions (SERCs) created pursuant to Title III of the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986. It consists of
three Technical Assistance Bulletins previously distributed by EPA:
#1 Introduction to Exercises in Chemical Emergency Preparedness Programs
#2 A Guide to Planning and Conducting Table-Top Exercises
#3 A Guide to Planning and Conducting Field Simulation Exercises
For purposes of this Guide. each of these original bulletins has been revised
to ensure comprehensive coverage and consistent format. In addition, a fourth
section, providing example simulation exercise scenarios, has been added to
complement the three bulletins.
The purpose of this Guide is to provide local and state officials with a
self-contained manual for use in conducting a wide range of chemical emergency
exercises. Many agencies have discovered that such exercises are an effective
way both to test existing hazardous materials emergency plans and to identify
priority concerns in developing new or revised plans. The resource materials
provided here, as well as additional materials referenced herein, should
enable emergency response and planning agencies to undertake exercises on
their own.
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PREPAREDNESS & PREVENTION
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BULLETIN #1
Introduction to Exercises in
Chemical Emergency Preparedness Programs
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EPA PREPAREDNESS AND PREVENTION
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BULLETIN #1
INTRODUCTION TO EXERCISES IN
CHEMICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAMS
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years emergency planners and managers have employed various
types of exercises in the development and testing of contingency plans and
response capabilities for a wide range of emergencies. A number of these
exercises have been conducted with the support of federal agencies such as
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), and the United States Coast Guard (USCG), as well as with the
support of private industry, especially through the efforts of the Chemical
Manufacturers Association (CMA).
Many communities have reported that they are confused by the existence
of the various types of exercises and are often unsure as to which type(s) of
exercises will meet their needs. This Technical Assistance Bulletin provides
an overview of the major exercise types and describes some resources
currently available for conducting exercises.
2. AN OVERVIEW OF EXERCISES
The first section of this overview includes a discussion of the
essential elements of exercises, differences among major exercise categories,
descriptions of hypothetical exercises, and the use of exercises in the
planning process.
2.1 The Essentials Of Emergency Exercises
A chemical emergency exercise is a distinctive type of directed activity
with the following essential elements:
• The triggering event of the exercise is a simulated
hypothetical accident that generates problem(s) for
participants;
• The participants are representatives or principals of some,
most, or all of the major organizations that would respond to
an actual emergency, including first responders, HAZMAT teams,
medical personnel, public works personnel, emergency services
officials, city managers, and elected officials;
• The participants solve the problems presented to them by using
existing plans and operating procedures, activating emergency
response systems, and/or deploying equipment;
• Problems are presented sequentially and each problem requires
some type of response by the participants, whether it be in
the form of discussion, written messages, and/or actions; and
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• These .responses are related to one or more emergency
activities (e.g., coordination of various response units, fire
suppression, emergency medical services).
Following the exercise the participants are debriefed, and a summary and
critique of the exercise are prepared.
2.2 Differences Among Exercises
In addition to the shared exercise elements listed above, there are
important differences among the various types of exercises that can be
employed in emergency preparedness. Exercises can have differences in
purpose, scope, level of stress, and types of responses or actions required
of participants:
Purposes. The purposes of emergency exercises range from training and
familiarization of participants with their roles and responsibilities to a
rigorous test of contingency plans and response capabilities.
Scope. By scope of the exercise is meant the number of functions to be
exercised and/or the depth to which the functions are examined. Among the
functions that can be exercised are prevention and control, warning, incident
assessment, and containment. (See Exhibit 1 for a list of major emergency
response functions.) Exercises can deal with one, several, or all functions
and/or some or all of the activities associated with each function.
Stress. Exercises impose varying degrees of stress on participants. In
low-stress exercises, participants are given fairly simple problems and ample
time to solve them. In high-stress exercises the problems are numerous,
complex, and presented in real time.
Actions. Participants in an exercise may be asked to respond orally to
problems (e.g., to discuss responses or actions that they might take, and/or
verbally "walk through" a process); simulate actions that they would take I
without actually deploying personnel and equipment to the scene of an
accident (e.g., activate the communication system, provide technical
assistance); or simulate all actions that they would take in an emergency,
including those at the scene of an accident.
Exercise planners create different types of exercises by combining the
variables of purpose, scope, stress, and actions in different ways.
2.3 Major Exercise Categories
There are three major categories of exercises -- table-top, functional,
and field, each of which is described below. A list of the exercises and
their sponsors is presented in Exhibit 2. Because the various agencies that
sponsor exercises do not use consistent terminology to describe the various
types of exercises, the subcategories in Exhibit 2 indicate some of the names
used by different sponsoring agencies. While this list is representative of
the types of chemical incident exercises available to states and local
communities, it is by no means exhaustive.
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EXHIBIT 1
List of Major Emergency Response Functions^-
Initial Notification of Response Agencies
Direction and Control
Communications (among responders)
Warning Systems and Emergency Public Notification
Public Information/Community Relations
Health/Medical Services
Response Personnel Safety
Human Services
Personal Protection of Citizens (Indoor Protection, Evacuation)
Fire and Rescue
Law Enforcement
On-going Incident Assessment
Resource Management
Public Works
Containment and Cleanup
Documentation and Debriefing
This list of functions, compiled from the National Response Team's
Hazardous Materials Emergency Planning Guide, is not intended to suggest
priorities among activities.
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EXHIBIT 2
Exercise Types Employed by EPA, FEMA, USCG and CMA
EXERCISE TYPES
Table-Tops
Functional
Functional
Emergency
Operations
Simulation
OSC/RRT (Yorktown)
Field
Drill
Field
Full-Field
OSC/Local
Full-Scale
EPA
x
-Sponsoring Organizations -
FEMA USCG
x
X
X
CMA
x
X
X
X
X
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Table-top.Exercises. The first category of exercises is the
"table-top." The distinctive characteristic of the participant action in all
table-top exercises is "talk," which may range from informal responses to
questions about emergency situations to a verbal "walk-through" of procedures
and processes.
"Table-tops" are generally low-stress activities. They are usually held
for the purpose of training or familiarizing participants with plans and
procedures. They may differ significantly in scope, however. Any given
table-top may focus on one, several, or all of the major response functions.
They may also differ in the depth to which each function is exercised. The
principal output of a table-top is to highlight problems in broad response
categories, such as communications or traffic control. Procedural training
and equipment problems show up more so in the field exercises.
As shown in Exhibit 2, the specific types of exercises in this category
include:
• EPA's Table-top Exercise;
• FEMA's assistance for Table-top Exercise; and
• CMA's Table-top Exercise.
(See Technical Assistance Bulletin #2 for a more detailed discussion of
table-top exercises.)
Functional Exercises. The second major category of exercises is the
"functional exercise", i.e., a simulated exercise with no actions in the
field. The dominant feature of this category is the actual performance of
some or all of the actions that would be required of participants in an
actual emergency, except those activities that are performed at the scene of
an accident. These functions could include the activation of emergency
systems, such as warning or communications systems.
Functional exercises tend to have moderate to high stress. Often they
focus on a single function (e.g., direction and control, providing technical
assistance to responders). Their purpose is generally to test planning and
response capabilities of personnel and systems without actually deploying
response equipment.
As shown in Exhibit 2, the exercises in this category include:
• FEMA's Functional Exercise;
• U.S. Coast Guard's OSC/Regional Response Team Simulation; and
• CMA's Emergency Operation Simulation (EOS).
Field Exercises. The third major category of exercises is the "field
exercise". The dominant participant activity in field exercises consists of
response operations conducted at the site of a simulated emergency.
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Field exercises involve all or most of the emergency response functions.
The common purpose of field exercises is to provide a rigorous test of
emergency capabilities of the total emergency response system. Response
equipment is deployed, realistic scenarios are used, medical personnel and
equipment including-operating rooms are included, and plant managers and
other industry employees are participants. Because these events involve key
community groups and agencies, these exercises often elicit media attention.
As shown in Exhibit 2, the exercises in this category include:
• EPA's Full-Field Exercise;
• FEMA's Full-Scale Exercise;
• CMA's Drill and Field Exercises; and
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• USCG's OSC/Local Response Teara Exercise.111
2.4 Descriptions of Hypothetical Exercises
The following capsule descriptions of a hypothetical chemical emergency
exercise for each of the three categories may help illustrate the differences
among these categories. These descriptions are in the form of brief
"information bulletins" that might be issued by officials of a hypothetical
"Lake City" following the conclusion of each exercise. These descriptions
provide information on the purpose, participants, location, scope, and
activities of exercise participants.
Table-Top. During a recent table-top exercise, officials of Lake City
reviewed the city's plans for responding to a major chemical emergency.
Senior managers of the police and fire departments, the city's new Hazardous
Materials Team, a representative from the Red Cross, a local hospital
liaison, and the field commanders of all major response units conducted
Informal discussions of actions that their units would have taken if this had
been an actual emergency. Their discussions covered the full range of
required responses to such an emergency. A brief evaluation or "lessons
learned" period followed the exercise.
Functional Exercise. Officials in Lake City report the completion of a
major test of the city's capabilities to provide emergency medical services
to affected populations following a major leak of a highly toxic chemical.
The test focused on the local Bayfront Chemicals plant on Bay View Avenue and
nearby neighborhoods. Participants in the exercise included the City's
Emergency Services Director, officials of the public health department and
Bayside Hospital, and medical emergency units from the fire department.
Emergency activities of interest in this test included the coordination of
responses, the management of resources, and the identification of medical
requirements arising from such an emergency. Participants simulated the
activation of the emergency warning system and the city's new emergency
medical response system. The major activities were conducted from the
2 This exercise may also be a "functional exercise." For purposes of
this analysis, we have listed it as a "field exercise."
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operations center in City Hall. An evaluation was conducted by key
participants following the exercise.
Field Exercise. City officials announced today the completion of a
major test of the city's new emergency operations plan for chemical
accidents. The test involved all the major offices and departments of the
city with responsibilities under the plan, including the mayor's office, and
the police, fire, medical, public health and emergency services departments
as well as a representative from the Salvation Army and the Red Cross. All
aspects of emergency response were tested, including direction and control by
officials in the emergency operations center (EOC), coordination of all
operations at the site of the simulated accident (the local plant on Lakeview
avenue), and all operations required to suppress the simulated leak and treat
all affected persons in the plant and the nearby residential area. An
extensive debriefing was held, and an evaluation of the exercise will be
prepared. Following the evaluation, officials will revise the city's
emergency plan and operating procedures.
3. USE OF EXERCISES IN THE PLANNING PROCESS
The Hazardous Materials Emergency Planning Guide, recently issued by the
U.S. National Response Team (NRT), suggests that local planning teams^
complete four major tasks:
• Review existing plans;
• Assess current response capabilities to respond to chemical
emergencies;
• Develop an emergency response plan for chemical accidents; and
• Revise, exercise, and update the plan.
The "exercises" referred to in the fourth task can be useful in the
completion of the other planning process tasks as described below.
Reviewing Existing Plans. Exercises provide insight into how response
functions would actually be carried out under an existing plan. An existing
contingency plan can be tested by presenting exercise participants with a
simulated chemical accident requiring a simulated response based on the
provisions of the local plan. Use of an exercise is often more effective in
many cases than a review of the plan by a single planner. Exercises also are
useful in obtaining input and expertise from a variety of people from
different agencies, rather than from a single planner or set of planners.
Field exercises provide the most complete review, and they are most useful
when plans are relatively complete and formal. Table-top exercises can be
used effectively in communities where resources are limited or existing plans
are less complete. The results of these exercises can be used to revise and
improve plans which lack sufficient provisions for chemical emergencies.
O
These planning teams may be either a local emergency planning
committee (required by Title III of SARA) or other local authorities.
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Assessing Capabilities. Assessment of current capabilities is a major
task for any planning team. An assessment:
• Identifies gaps in resources and readiness that need to be
addressed-in the planning process;
• Produces an inventory of response resources within a community
(e.g., chemical containment equipment, fire apparatus,
hospital beds); and
• Identifies the level of preparedness of emergency response
units and systems in the event of serious chemical accidents.
This assessment can be done through exercises designed specifically to test
current capabilities. Exercises can uncover potential capabilities and
weaknesses that are often overlooked by other methods.
Developing. Revising or Updating the Plan. One of the basic principles
of emergency planning is that each planning team needs to design its
contingency plans to fit local circumstances. All of the elements of the
plan (e.g., required procedures, policies, coordination mechanisms) need to
be specifically related to the existing resources, capabilities-, and
organizational structure for the given community or emergency planning
district. An exercise is a very useful way to identify gaps in existing
emergency response procedures or to determine planning factors necessary for
developing specific plans for chemical emergencies. In addition, an exercise
can be a powerful stimulus for building interest in developing a
comprehensive local emergency plan.
4. AVAILABLE RESOURCES FOR CONDUCTING EXERCISES
This section of this Technical Assistance Bulletin includes a
description of resources available for conducting exercises from the
Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S.
Coast Guard, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Chemical
Manufacturers Association, and the National Response Team.
4.1 Environaental Protection Agency (EPA)
EPA provides training as well as technical assistance to develop and
deliver table-top and field exercises. This assistance is offered through
EPA Headquarters, Regional Offices, or through EPA's Environmental Response
Team (ERT). In the case of joint EPA/FEMA training, the training is
coordinated by FEMA's Emergency Management Institute located in Emmitsburg,
Maryland.
EPA Headquarters. EPA Headquarters provides contractor support to EPA
Regional Offices to conduct table-tops and field exercises in priority areas
designated by the Regions in consultation with the States. Support for these
exercises is coordinated by EPA's Regional Preparedness Coordinators.
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EPA Headquarters provides periodic Technical Assistance Bulletins such
as this one, designed to provide technical information relevant to chemical
emergency preparedness and prevention. Current Bulletins can be obtained
from the EPA Regional Preparedness Coordinator.
EPA Regional Offices. EPA's Regional Offices will provide States and
communities in designated priority areas with the following assistance:
• Programmatic and technical assistance to help communities
determine the steps to follow in conducting an exercise;
• Facilitation assistance for both table-tops and full-field
exercises; and
• Coordination of EPA Headquarters and Regional Office resources
to assist States.
This assistance is provided to States and communities upon request to the EPA
Regional Preparedness Coordinator. (See Technical Assistance Bulletin #3 for
the addresses of all EPA Regional Offices.)
EPA's Environmental Response Team. The Environmental Response Team
(ERT) provides technical assistance in developing and conducting full-field
hazardous materials exercises. This support includes developing scenarios,
working with EPA Regional Training Coordinators to provide assistance to the
States and local communities in determining appropriate limitations of the
exercise, serving as facilitators/evaluators during the exercise, and
providing support in critiquing the exercise at the debriefing session
following the exercise. ERT provides this assistance upon request from the
EPA Regional Preparedness Coordinators or Regional Training Coordinators.
(The ERT can be contacted at (513) 569-7537.)
4.2 Federal Emergency Management: Agency (FEMA)
FEMA provides exercise training courses, as well as direct assistance
for personnel, training, and support materials to aid jurisdictions in
developing and coordinating their own exercises. (See Technical Assistance
Bulletin #3 for the addresses of FEMA Regional Offices.)
FEMA's Exercise Training Courses. FEMA conducts classroom and field
exercise training at the Emergency Management Institute (EMI) and at the
State level. Using the EMI facility located in Emmitsburg, Maryland, FEMA
delivers 12 to 14 exercises each year in the classroom as part of their
Exercise Design Course (train-the-trainer) and the Integrated Emergency
Management Course. Other FEMA emergency management courses, such as the
Radiological Emergency Preparedness Planning Exercise Evaluation Course, also
contain material useful in developing an exercise program, conducting
exercises, and evaluating exercises. Additionally, FEMA provides instructor
guides, student manuals, and resource manuals for resident and field courses.
FEMA's Comprehensive Cooperative Agreement (CCA) mechanism provides
funding for State and local attendees in the field. For access to these
courses, contact the appropriate State Emergency Response Commission or the
FEMA Regional Office.
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FEMA's Exercise Assistance. All State and local jurisdictions receiving
FEMA funds through the CCA must exercise their emergency operations plans and
procedures annually. Each jurisdiction roust submit as part of its annual CCA
statement of work an updated 5-year exercise plan. At least one full-scale
exercise must be conducted during the 5 years, and a functional exercise is
to be held in each of the other 4 years. Exercise scenarios must be rotated
among national security, natural, and technological hazards. The exercise
focus is on multi-agency and intergovernmental involvement as well as public
and private interaction.
Technical assistance is provided through a State Exercise Assistance
Officer (100 percent FEMA-funded) and FEMA Regional Office Hazardous
Materials Program staff for scenario development, pre-exercise training, and
post-exercise evaluation. For information on upcoming exercises involving
hazardous materials, contact the FEMA Regional Hazardous Materials Program
staff or the Regional Training and Education officers.
FEMA Exercise Support Materials. FEMA furnishes a variety of exercise
support materials, including a computer-aided exercise generator and an
exercise library containing a variety of exercises developed by State and
local jurisdictions. The computer-aided exercise generator covers a number
of different scenarios: hazardous materials accident, nuclear power plant
accident, flood, winter storm, earthquake, tornado, mass casualty, and
nuclear attack. The generator has been incorporated into software packages,
enabling the user to design different exercise patterns by varying the
objective and timeframe. For more information, contact your State Emergency
Management Agency or FEMA Regional Office.
4.3 United States Coast Guard (USCG)
The USCG annually conducts six On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) and Regional
Response Team (RRT) simulation command post exercises. These simulations
focus on specific issues of concern to the OSC and RRT and are designed to
exercise the relationship among the pre-designated OSC, the RRT, and response
coordinators of Federal, State and local agencies with responsibility for oil
and hazardous chemical pollution. representatives of potential pollution
sources (i.e., truck, rail, vessel and facilities) and cleanup contractors
are also included. (For information contact the USCG at (202) 267-2010.)
4.4 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration provides reports and
critiques on its past field simulation exercises. (These materials are
available by contacting the Hazardous Materials Responses Branch, Ocean
Assessment Division of NOAA at 206-526-6273 or FTS 392-6273.)
4.5 National Response Team (NRT)
The NRT has recently published the Hazardous Materials Emergency
Planning Guide to assist local planners in preparing emergency plans. This
guide includes a description of the materials that should be included in a
local emergency plan and provides a sample outline of a plan. The guide
identifies exercises as a principal method for testing, revising, and
updating plans. (Copies of the Guide can be obtained by contacting the EPA
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Regional Office or the Chemical Emergency Preparedness Program Hotline at
(800) 535-0202 or (202) 479-2449.)
4.6 Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) Exercise Assistance
CMA members have conducted several simulation exercises through CMA's
local Community Awareness and Emergency Response (CAER) programs. These
exercises involve local industry and response officials (e.g., fire, police,
Red Cross) and are often videotaped. CMA provides these and other tapes
through their lending library. Funding for exercises is at the discretion of
the local CAER coordinator and/or the sponsoring facility. (Contact the CMA
hotline (202-463-1599) for additional information on exercises and the CAER
program.)
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PREPAREDNESS & PREVENTION
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BULLETIN #2
A Guide to Planning and Conducting
Table-Top Exercises
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U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
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EPA PREPAREDNESS AND PREVENTION
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BULLETIN #2
A GUIDE TO PLANNING AND CONDUCTING
TABLE-TOP EXERCISES
1. INTRODUCTION
This guide provides a process for planning, conducting, and evaluating a
table-top exercises. More specifically this guide:
• Describes a set of specific preparatory steps that can be
followed by any community desiring to use a table-top exercise
to advance its own emergency preparedness;
• Offers guidelines for use in conducting a table-top exercise;
• Recommends methods for debriefing participants and evaluating
the exercise; and
• Provides a description of a hypothetical table-top exercise
held in "Lake City" and the Lake City exercise control
materials.
The distinctive characteristic of the participant action in all
table-top exercises is "talk," which may range from informal responses to
questions about emergency situations to a verbal "walk-through" of procedures
and processes. Table-tops are generally low-stress activities. They are
usually held for the purpose of training or familiarizing participants with
plans and procedures. They may differ significantly in scope, however. Any
given table-top may focus on one, several, or all of the major response
functions (e.g.-, coordination, evacuation, emergency notification) . They may
also differ in the depth to which each function is exercised.
To give readers an example of materials prepared for and used in a
table-top exercise, this general discussion is preceded by a brief summary of
the table-top exercise held in "Lake City" (a pseudonym). The Lake City
table-top exercise was a half-day event held in a conference room at the
offices of a regional planning commission. The primary objective of the
exercise (described more fully in Appendix A was to gain experience and
insights that could be used to advance the chemical emergency planning
process in the city. The participants were managers of the first line
emergency response units of Lake City and neighboring jurisdictions,
including representatives of police and fire departments and emergency
medical services, a plant manager, a Red Cross representative, and other key
community personnel. During the play of the exercise ("play" refers to the
step-by-step execution of a table-top), the participants verbally responded
to a sequence of events associated with a major chemical accident by
describing the typical response actions that would occur in the event of a
real emergency. Subsequently, they evaluated the exercise to identify
preparedness and planning needs that Lake City was beginning to address in
the development of its first hazardous materials accident contingency plan.
(The materials used to conduct the Lake City table-top are provided in
Appendix B.)
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2. MAJOR STEPS IN DEVELOPING A TABLE-TOP EXERCISE
The following discussion outlines the essential steps to be completed by
those responsible for planning the exercises. (The order in which these
steps are presented is suggestive only. Completing all of these steps is
more important than following the prescribed order.) These steps include:
• Describe the emergency response system to be exercised;
• Develop a clear statement of the general objectives of the
exercise;
• Use the statement of objectives to define the scope of the
exercise;
• Present the results of the first three steps to the leadership
of the necessary participating organizations (if they are not
members of the exercise planning team) in order to secure
their approval and commitments of participation;
• Define the critical features of the accident to be simulated;
• Decide on the identity of all the table-top participants;
• Deter*1' the identity and responsibilities of key persons who
will =;t in conducting the exercise;
• Decide on the ground rules to be followed in the conduct of
the exercise;
• Arrange for all the logistical requirements, including space,
exercise materials, and seating arrangements; and
• Develop the exercise materials.
In this discussion we assume that an exercise leader or a coordinator of
the team effort has been designated by the local planning committee and that
all of the major steps are completed in concert with the key officials
concerned with preparedness and response. Although table-tops vary in their
complexity, they all require planning and coordination. It is critical that
problems that arise reflect genuine response capability problems, rather than
problems that may be due to a haphazardly planned and coordinated exercise
process.
Step 1: Describe the emergency response system to be exercised
The description of the emergency response system should contain, at a
minimum, the following:
• A listing of all the major response agencies, e.g., fire,
medical and police departments, and HAZMAT team;
• The emergency response roles and responsibilities of these
agencies; and
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• How the system would respond to a major chemical accident.
It is important to understand how the emergency system operates. To
accbmplish this, the exercise leader or coordinator should: (1) consult all
available plans, procedures, agreements, etc., of the responsible agencies;
(2) review prior exercises and reports on responses to past accidents; and
(3) hold informal discussions with representatives of the major response
units. It is not necessary for the system to be outlined in formal plans and
procedures for this step to be completed. If formal plans do not exist, the
exercise leader should identify the informal system of operating procedures
that typically have governed response to previous incidents.
Step 2: Develop a clear statement of the general objectives of the exercise
Virtually all table-top exercises for chemical emergencies have the
common objective of testing the capabilities of a jurisdiction's emergency
system to respond to a chemical accident threatening public health and.
safety. To this generic objective might be added something about the type
and size of the accident or the emergency response functions to be tested.
For example:
"The objective of the exercise is to test the capabilities of the City's
police and fire departments and emergency medical service units to
respond to a major chemical accident at a fixed facility in the City and
to minimize the effects of that accident on public health and safety."
Step 3: Use the statement of objectives to define the scope of the .exercise
The scope of the exercise refers to the number and identity of response
functions to be exercised and the depth to which any of the functions will be
examined. For example:
"The exercise will test the procedures for dispatching response
personnel, containing an accident, and treating on-site injuries."
Table-tops can deal with a single function, multiple functions, or all
of the functions required for a major response.
Step 4: Present: the results of the first three steps to the leadership of
the necessary participating organizations (if they are not members
of the exercise planning team) in order to secure their approval
and commitments of participation
This may be an interactive process requiring the revision of some of the
results of the first three steps.
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Step 5: Define the critical features of the accident to be simulated
Once the general objectives and scope of the exercise have been agreed
upon, three specific features of the exercise should be determined:
• The nature of the accident which poses the threat;
\
m The facility or transportation route where the accident is to
occur; and
• The characteristics of the neighborhood(s) threatened by exposure
to accident effects.
One or more of these features may be dictated by the general objective
of the exercise and/or by its scope. The exercise scenario should be
realistic and specific to the kinds of releases a particular community is
likely to experience. For example, the objective provided in Step Two (i.e.,
"...to test the capabilities of the city's police and fire departments and
emergency medical service units to respond to a major chemical accident...")
requires an exercise accident that causes injury to workers in the facility
or nearby citizens. Otherwise there would be no problems for which emergency
medical services are called. Likewise a decision to test multiple functions,
as illustrated in Step Three, leads to the requirement that the accident be
complex enough to require the response of different units of the community's
emergency system, each of which may be responsible for a different function.
Step 6: Decide on the identity of all the table-top participants
The participants should include the directors of the various units
(e.g., police, fire, Red Cross) that would be dispatched to an actual
emergency of the type being simulated in the exercise, as well as local
officials (e.g., mayor, city manager), and local plant representatives.
Step 7: Detemine the identity and responsibilities of key persons who will
assist in conducting the exercise
Persons assisting in conducting the exercise may include:
• A facilitator, who will introduce the exercise events into the
"play" of the exercise and facilitate the completion of
responses;
• A recorder, who will take notes during the exercise and
collect materials; and
• Observer(s)/evaluator(s), who will observe and evaluate the
play of the exercise.
Collectively these persons constitute the exercise control group.
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Step 8:
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Decide on the ground rules to be followed in the conduct of the
exercise
Table-tops are conducted most effectively under a clear set of ground
rules. These rules typically control such matters as actions expected of the
participants, how their decisions are to be reported to other participants
and to the exercise control group, and the length of time to be allocated in
responding to each event. It is crucial that these be developed in advance
of the exercise and understood by the control group and the participants.
(See Appendix C for an example set of table-top ground rules.)
Step 9: Arrange for all the logistical requirements, including space,
exercise materials, and seating arrangements
All arrangements should be checked by a member of the exercise planning
'team, who is designated as the exercise coordinator, to make sure that they
will support the exercise design. An improperly configured conference room
can make the conduct of a table-top very difficult, as can the lack of key
exercise materials such as maps and copies of plans. It can be very helpful
to have a large map showing the accident site, the surrounding neighborhoods,
and key public facilities such as schools, hospitals, and potential
evacuation facilities.
Step 10: Develop the exercise materials
The exercise materials consist of three parts:
• The scenario which sets the stage for the exercise;
• A sequence of events, which stimulates the play; and
• Anticipated responses.
The exercise material used in the Lake City Table-top Exercise is
provided in Appendix B. The scenario is a brief written statement that
provides an overview of the emergency situation. The scenario should contain
the following:
• A brief description of the community, the facility, and the
area surrounding the facility;
• A description of the chemical accident that is the triggering
event for the exercise; and
• Any other information that is important to the setting for the
first event in the sequence of events (e.g., the wind
conditions at the time of the accident, casualties, and the
exact location of the accident).
The sequence of events is presented to the participants, either orally
or in writing one event at a time. The events are arranged in a logical and
chronological sequence designed to portray the essentials of a developing
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emergency situation. The events represent changes in the circumstances of
the accident or in conditions over which the participants have no control,
e.g., a change in the weather or a major change in the rate of spill or
leakage of the chemical.
The events in this sequence should be:
• Directly relevant to the response functions being exercised,
the roles and responsibilities of the participants, the
exercise objectives, and the locale of the accident;
• Tailored to the specific characteristics of an actual facility
and the community in which the accident occurs; and
• Realistic, factual, and arranged in the proper sequence.
In selecting the events for the exercise, the exercise coordinator will
find it useful to construct a set of anticipated responses tied to the
various events. These anticipated responses can be used by the exercise
facilitators and evaluators as a standard against which to compare actual
responses during the table-top. These standards are not shared with exercise
participants in order to ensure realistic responses. Anticipated response
actions may be derived from relevant contingency plans or standard operating
procedures used by one or more of the participating organizations. If plans
or procedures do not exist, the anticipated response measures should be
developed and written down prior to the exercise, constructed logically from
the circumstances being simulated, or idtmtified through discussions with
response personnel regarding their informal operations procedures.
An example of an exercise event and an anticipated response follows:
Exercise event: Flow of chemical continues at rapid rate.
Anticipated response: First responders on the scene confer with the
plant manager on the identity of the chemical.
Even if no intervention is required during the exercise, the process of
developing anticipated responses will be valuable to the designer of the
exercise events. The set of anticipated responses will provide a useful
framework for discussion during the post-exercise evaluation session.
3. GUIDELINES FOR CONDUCTING THE EXERCISE
The major preparatory steps discussed above set the stage for a smooth
conduct of the exercise by the exercise facilitator. On the day of the
exercise, the facilitator must assume direct responsibility for the conduct
of the exercise to ensure adequate accomplishment of its objectives. The
facilitator's job is to:
• Describe the ground rules for the exercise, including the
roles that the various participants are to play;
• Present the players with the exercise narrative;
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• Announce the first event of the scenario;
• ^Stimulate player responses, without intervening in a way that
assumes control of the play, unless it appears likely that the
players will not initiate a response critical to the objective
of the exercise;
• Control the flow and pace of the exercise by introducing the
remaining events in sequence; and
• Keep the exercise on schedule and terminate play at the
specified end time.
In general, it is best to let the exercise play develop naturally, with
participants responding to prescribed events as they deem appropriate.
However, some anticipated responses may be so critical to the purposes of the
exercise that the exercise facilitator will have to intervene in the play to
assure that they take place. (The fact that such intervention is required
will, of course, represent a very important lesson for the exercise
participants and should be noted for further discussion in the post-exercise
debriefing and evaluation.) An example would be the activation of an
evacuation process during an exercise whose objectives include testing the
community's evacuation plan. (Appendix D provides a lengthy "checklist" of
suggestions for the successful conduct of table-top exercises.)
4. GUIDELINES FOR CONDUCTING A POST-EXERCISE DEBRIEFING AND EVALUATION
A post-exercise debriefing and evaluation can be as valuable an
experience as the exercise itself. These post-exercise sessions are critical
for capturing the lessons of a table-top so that they can be used to revise
and improve emergency plans and procedures. The facilitator should first
conduct a debriefing session, whose primary objective is to review the
experiences of the participants during ^the exercise. A debriefing works best
if the facilitator leads the participants through an event-by-event
recapitulation of the exercise, discussing the actual responses and how they
compared to anticipated responses. The debriefing may cover all events and
responses before they are evaluated, or it may proceed one event at a time,
allowing an opportunity for evaluation ias well.
Once the debriefing is completed, the facilitator should elicit
evaluations from the participants concerning both their own performance
during the exercise and the characteristics of the exercise as a whole. This
process will be enhanced if the participants understand that the purpose of
the evaluation is to develop a set of recommendations for improving the
response system, rather than to find fault with the performance of the
participants. These recommendations may include actions to improve emergency
response plans, procedures, and equipment as well as additional training
needs for members of the response system.
It is important that problems in the response system (e.g., lack of
plans or procedures) be separated from problems related to the specific
exercise design or conduct (e.g., a scenario event that did not match
conditions in the community). Thus the facilitator should allow opportunity
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for the participants to evaluate the exercise itself. The facilitator should
be alert to both the possibility that participants may be more critical of
the exercise than of their own performance and the fact that problems with
exercise design and conduct may have produced some responses that do not
reflect existing plans, procedures, or the response capabilities of the
participants.
5. IMPROVING RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS FOLLOWING THE EXERCISE
The results of the debriefing/evaluation period, especially the remedial
actions, need to be implemented by the response system in order to take
maximum advantage of the table-top experience. These results should be
included in the on-going planning and preparedness activities of the
community. Local planners should initiate efforts to revise existing plans
and procedures or develop new ones to reflect the lessons from the exercise
(e.g., revise notification procedures, clarify responsibilities for providing
services to an evacuated population.) Exercise planners should use the
evaluation of the exercise itself to improve future exercises. All other
parties (e.g., police, fire, emergency, medical) should take actions
appropriate to their roles in the preparedness effort. Approximately three
to six months following the exercise, the contingency plans and procedures
should be reviewed to ensure that appropriate changes and revisions were
incorporated.
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LIST OF APPENDICES
Appendix
A
B
C
D
Title
Lake City Advances Preparedness Through Table-
Top Exercise
Lake City Table-Top Exercise Control Materials
Example Table-Top Exercise Ground Rules
Suggestions for the Conduct of Table-Top
Exercises
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APPENDIX A
LAKE CITY ADVANCES PREPAREDNESS
THROUGH TABLE-TOP EXERCISE
Introduction
On July 30, 1986, emergency response personnel from Lake City,
Middletown, and Plainville, gathered at the offices of the Regional Planning
Commission (RFC) to participate in a table-top Chemical Emergency
Preparedness Program (CEPP) exercise. Also present were representatives of
the State Police, the State Department of Environmental Protection, RPC, the
American Red Cross, the Salvation Army, Lake City Bus Transit, Lake City Air
Quality Control, various chemical industries, EPA Headquarters staff, and EPA
Regional staff. The immediate purpose of this exercise was to test and
improve the response capabilities of Lake City's municipal agencies; another,
longer-range objective was to provide impetus toward the development of a
chemical emergency contingency plan for Lake City.
Extensive preparatory activities had preceded the table-top exercise.
This bulletin briefly discusses these activities as well as the broader
context of chemical emergency preparedness in Middle County. The purpose of
this bulletin is to share with other communities the "lessons learned" in
Lake City, with the hope that those lessons will contribute to successful
table-top exercises and related contingency planning efforts elsewhere.
Background
Lake City, located in Middle County, is a medium-sized industrial city.
Lake City is home to numerous chemical, oil, steel, and other industrial
facilities. Although Lake City's police, fire, and emergency medical
departments have been called upon to respond to numerous small-scale
transportation-related hazardous materials incidents, and although the Lake
City Fire Department has developed formalized procedures for so-called
"hazmat" incidents, no comprehensive contingency plan has yet been developed.
Among area jurisdictions, Lake City is not alone in this circumstance.
Recognizing this situation, RPC has spearheaded the formation of a Middle
County Hazardous Materials Task Force.
Preparatory Activities
EPA released interim guidance for its Chemical Emergency Preparedness
Program (CEPP) late in 1985. The CEPP coordinator for EPA Region ZZ, decided
that the Middle County area would be a suitable location for a case study of
how CEPP guidance could be implemented at the local level. An RPC official
meanwhile, saw the CEPP initiative as one way to foster cooperation and
communication among various jurisdictions "that faced potential chemical
incidents from fixed facility releases and/or transportation accidents. The
Safety, Health, and Environmental Director at the XYZ chemical plant in Lake
City, offered use of plant grounds for a field simulation of a hazardous
chemical incident to which nearby cities and towns could respond.
Meetings at RPC involving various interested parties revealed that
Middletown had recently developed and tested an emergency response plan.
Other jurisdictions and industries in the area have informal cooperative
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agreements to assist each other during emergencies, but those agreements are
not written into contingency plans. Two counties bordering Lake City have
hazmat teams, as does the City of Middletown.
In 1986, EPA Regional officials held a series of meetings with
interested parties to take more formal steps toward a field simulation
exercise. Because adequate written contingency plans were not yet available,
officials agreed that a carefully-planned table-top exercise should precede a
field simulation. It was also agreed that, because the XYZ company's
facility is located in Lake City, active cooperative leadership from Lake
City officials would be essential to the success of any exercise. Lake City
political leaders voiced their support for the proposal and the Deputy Police
Chief agreed to lead the planning effort.
In 1986, emergency response and safety personnel from cities and
chemical plants in the Lake City area were interviewed. The purpose of these
interviews was to determine the existing response procedures in order to
assure that the exercise scenario would present a realistic test of local
response capabilities and practices.
A one-page accident scenario narrative was developed and circulated for
comment by interested parties in the Lake City vicinity. Potential
participants were invited by EPA and RPC to be present. After the proposed
narrative was approved, an exercise "script" was developed, in the form of a
sequence-of-events that might realistically be expected to occur following
the accident described in the narrative.
The Table-Top Exercise
Exercise participants and observers met at 8:30 a.m. Everyone
introduced him/herself. Ground rules for the exercise were announced.
the significant ground rules were the following:
Among
Participants would "enter" the exercise, as specific events in
the script unfolded, to represent those parties who would be
involved in a response if the event were a real one;
For each event, the appropriate participants would describe
fully the actions that they would take in response;
Because the exercise was especially meant to test the response
capabilities and procedures of Lake City and neighboring
jurisdictions (rather than the. safety procedures of local
chemical plants), industry representatives were not
participants in the table-top; instead, realistic industry
reactions were "built-into" the exercise script; and
Exercise facilitators could call a time-out in the exercise
whenever technical advice or information was needed to assure
the fidelity of the simulation.
Each individual event was projected onto a screen by an overhead projector
while participants described response procedures. A recorder summarized the
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responses on large paper pads for use in future review and evaluation of the
table-top. The simulation began at about 9:00 a.m. and lasted approximately
two hours.
After a fifteen-minute recess all participants and observers reconvened
to discuss the, exercise. This discussion was not meant to produce a decision
about the quality of the simulation exercise, nor to judge the
appropriateness of the response decisions that had been made by the
participants. Instead, the purpose of the discussion session was to have
everyone identify issues that must be faced by area planners preparing for
possible hazardous materials incidents. In this way, the table-top became a
direct input into Lake City's ongoing contingency planning process.
The major planning issues identified concerned the need to develop
evacuation procedures and to improve formal coordination of and communication
among area emergency responders. Participants noted a general emergency
personnel shortage in the area. These issues and their constituent
sub-issues were written down during the discussion session and will be
revised over time. It is intended that this list serve in effect as a
contingency planning agenda once the field simulation has been completed.
Next Steps
Participants agreed that the next step is to constitute a planning
committee, including representatives from each major Lake City emergency
response agency, to develop plans for a field simulation. The ultimate end
of Lake City's exercise effort, however, will be the completion of a
contingency plan which will guide future exercises as well as, in the event
of a real chemical emergency, future response actions.
Lessons Learned
Although Lake City's response officials are, as of this writing, still
in the early stages of the: contingency planning process, a few lessons can
clearly be discerned from the Lake City experience to date:
• Active local leadership is key to the successful planning of
chemical emergency response exercises and the development of
contingency plans. In Lake City, the leadership of the Deputy
Police Chief and RPC staff has been instrumental in carrying
process this far.
• Close cooperation with local chemical plant officials is also
very helpful. In Lake City, the XYZ Company's representative
took an early lead both within the Middle County Hazardous
Materials Task Force and in volunteering XYZ's plant site for
the field simulation. Moreover, his technical knowledge will
prove essential as Lake City turns its attention from the
field simulation to contingency planning.
• Although there is wisdom in the conventional approach of
developing a contingency plan prior to undertaking response
exercises, experience in Lake City clearly demonstrates that
table-top exercises can usefully precede the planning effort.
They can serve both as motivators of the planning process (by
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getting people energized to deal with demonstrated response
weaknesses) and as substantive guides to the specific issues
and problems the community needs to address in that process.
Emergency response exercises in one locality can help raise
awareness and motivate hazmat planning over a broader
geographic area. In the case of Lake City, the table-top
exercise attracted county-wide participation and interest and
has provided an impetus to similar efforts in neighboring
jurisdictions.
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APPENDIX B
LAKE CITY TABLE-TOP
EXERCISE CONTROL MATERIALS
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LAKE CITY TABLE-TOP
Scenario
XYZ Chemicals, Inc., produces a small line of acids for sale in the
manufacturing and trade markets. XYZ stores and handles a variety of
chemicals on-site for use in its own processes; in addition, XYZ products are
often stored on plant grounds pending shipment to customers.
XYZ's Lake City plant is located in a neighborhood characterized by a
mix of industrial and residential land uses. Local industrial facilities
.include two large steel plants, an oil refinery and numerous specialty
chemical plants. The XYZ facility itself is bounded on the north by a spur
of the Union Railroad; on the south by the Grand River; on the west by Elm
Street and a rail line; and on the east by First Street. Beyond the river on
the south is an interstate highway that is heavily traveled. Within two
miles north of the plant are seven schools and a hospital. Just north of the
plant, across the Union tracks, is a residential neighborhood; additional
residential zones of Lake City and Middletown lie one and one-half miles to
the south and southwest, and three miles to the southeast.
Returning from their 12 p.m. break, two XYZ workers resume the task of
transferring anhydrous hydrogen fluoride (AHF) from a pressurized rail car to
a 15,000 gallon outdoor storage tank. They had allowed the transferring pump
to operate unattended and found upon returning that the failure of an
automatic shutoff valve resulted in a spill of approximately 1000 gallons.
The liquid AHF has begun to pool, giving rise to vapor. Inhaling these
vapors, both workers suffer severe respiratory injury. Although one worker
collapses immediately, the other succeeds in activating the plant safety
alarm, thereby alerting the shift supervisor that an emergency has occurred
at the transfer site.
The supervisor drives to investigate the accident. Smelling the strong
presence of HF vapors in the air, the supervisor stops his vehicle 200 feet
from the accident site and radios the plant gate to notify the Lake City
emergency response authorities by calling 911. In the process of suiting up
with protective equipment, the supervisor himself collapses.
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LAKE CITY TABLE-TOP
Sequence of Events and Expected Actions
EVENT 1: PLANT SUPERVISOR GALLS 911.
Message
• From: Plant employee
To: 911
"This is a drill. There has been a chemical spill at the XYZ plant on
Elm Street."
Note: No infomation is provided on identity of chemicals involved.
Expected Actions
• 911 makes necessary notifications, including1:
Police Department
Fire Department
Emergency Medical Services
« Other notifications made, including:
State Department of Environmental Management
State Police
Plainville Fire Department (to activate mutual aid)
Middletown Hazmat Squad
CHEMTREC/CHEMNET
National Response Center
^Underlining identifies most important response activities.
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HOLD
No further events intxoduced until first responders arrive on
scene
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EVENT 2: FLOW OF CHEMICAL CONTINUING AT A RAPID RATE PLANT PERSONNEL
EVACUATE. SIX WORKERS SUFFERING EYE AND RESPIRATORY IRRITATION.
CONDITION OF SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND TWO WORKERS UNKNOWN. ALSO
UNKNOWN WHETHER ALL OTHER PERSONNEL ARE SAFELY OUT OF PLANT.
Expected Actions
First Responders (whether Fire, Police, or Emergency Medical Services (EMS))
• Situation assessment:
Confer with plant personnel to determine identity of
chemical(s)
Count the number of evacuated personnel
Messages
• From: Plant employee
To: First responders
"The chemical leaking from tank is Anhydrous Hydrofluoric
Acid (AHF); judging from the rate of vapor formation, it is a
rapid leak."
• From: Plant employee
To: First responders
"Plant personnel have evacuated. Six evacuated workers have
suffered injury. Shift supervisor and two employees are
known missing. Not known whether all other workers have been
safely evacuated."
Police Department (when they arrive)
• Close off access to plant
EMS (when they arrive)
• Establish treatment zone in a safe area
• Begin examining/treating injured workers
• Radio for backup units
• Notify City Hospital to expect injured
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Fire Department (when they arrive)
• Establish command post in a safe area
• Delineate "restricted areas", staging area, decontamination zone
• Determine personnel and equipment needs
Call for additional resources, as needed
• Squad 1 personnel (and possibly Middletown Hazmat team) suit up in
protective clothing to investigate leak and injured
• Squad 1 approaches accident site from upwind position
• Spokesman issues initial press statement
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PAUSE
Present: tie next event soon after all 3 agencies have arrived
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EVENT 3: WIND OBSERVED BLOWING OUT OF SOUTH/SOUTHWEST AT 5 MFH.
Message
From: Exercise Director
To: Fire Department Incident Commander
"Winds blowing out of south/southwest at 5 MPH."
Expected Actions
• Begin consideration of evacuation option
• Evacuation notifications begin:
School bus company (to dispatch 3 buses)
Red Cross, Salvation Army
Lake City Civil Defense
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HOLD
No further events introduced until sufficient tine has passed to allow
initial response actions to he well under way
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EVENT 4: THREE ADDITIONAL INJURED PLANT WORKERS DISCOVERED IN PLANT
POWERHOUSE.
Message
From: Exercise Director
To: Fire Department Incident Commander
"Three more injured workers have called in from plant powerhouse."
Expected Actions
Fire Department/Middletown Hazmat personnel (with protective gear)
dispatched to powerhouse to evacuate additional injured
Shift supervisor, two other initial injured employees evacuated by
Squad 1 personnel to decontamination zone
Initial injured are decontaminated (as necessary)
Initial injured are taken to EMS treatment zone
EMS begins triage/hospital evacuation procedures on initial injured
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B-ll
HOID
No furtiher events introduced until valve is closed by Fire Department and
flow of AHF is stopped
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EVENT 5: AS A RESULT OF VALVE CLOSURE, THE FLOW OF AHF HAS STOPPED; VAPOR
FORMATION STOPS.
Messages
None
Expected Actions
• Fire Department crew notifies Fire Department Incident Commander that
leak has been stopped
• Fire Department begins vapor suppression, pool containment procedures
• Fire Department personnel evacuate additional injured from powerhouse
to decontamination zone
• Squad 1 members, additional injured decontaminated (as necessary)
• Additional injured taken to EMS treatment area
• EMS begins triage/hospital evacuation procedures
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HOLD
No further events introduced until Fire Department contains AHF pool,
completely suppresses AHF vapors
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B-14
EVENT 6: RESPONSE COMPLETED; INCIDENT OVER.
Messages
• From: Exercise Director
To: Fire Department Incident Commander
"The incident is over."
Expected Actions
• All response personnel notified
• Triage/hospital evacuation completed
• Access to plant reopened
• Clean-up contractor(s) notified
• Press is briefed by press spokesman, plant spokesman
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APPENDIX C
EXAMPLE TABLE-TOP EXERCISE GROUND RULES
There will be two tables for participants at the exercise; one for "on-
scene" participation and the other for EOC or command post
participation. Participants will "enter" the exercise, as specific
events in the script unfold, to represent those parties who would be
involved in responding if the event was real. It is important that
participants do not enter the exercise until they normally or
reasonably would do so.
For each event, the appropriate participants will describe fully the
actions that they would take in response. Discussions as well as
statements are encouraged. It is important to try and speak as loudly
and clearly as possible for the benefit of those affected by the
actions being described, as well as for the observers and the recorder.
The recorder will write down the actions taken as described by each
participant on the event sheet to which it pertains. These sheets will
later be reviewed in the self-evaluation portion of the exercise to
compare the actual responses to the anticipated responses.
When a player's participation is no longer required at either table,
the player should return to the observer section.
The exercise facilitator may call a time-out in the exercise if
technical advice or information is needed to assure the realism of the
simulation.
When anticipated responses which are critical to the purpose of the
exercise are not carried out, the exercise facilitator may intervene in
the play to assure that they take place.
All questions should be directed to the exercise facilitator. Comments
by observers should be made during the evaluation period and not during
the exercise.
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APPENDIX D
SUGGESTIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF TABLE-TOP EXERCISES
The following are some suggestions to assist in the conduct of table-top
exercises. They are subdivided into four stages -- pre-exercise, exercise,
break, and evaluation.
Pre-Exercise Stage
• You should arrive in town the day before the exercise in order to make
sure that all necessary arrangements have been made (meeting logistics,
etc.) and to meet with your local contacts.
• The meeting room should be arranged so that there is a large table and
chairs at one end and a general seating area at the other. This
arrangement facilitates the use of the table as the.simulated scene of
the accident; exercise players come up to the table as if they were
arriving at the scene of an actual emergency. You may include two
tables, one for the accident scene and one for the EOC, for more
complex table-tops.
• If the exercise is to be videotaped, you should plan out in advance
where the camera(s) should be located and make sure that all necessary
equipment is available and in good working condition.
• It is useful to have on the walls a large map of the area, clearly
showing the site of the simulated accident and the key local
infrastructure -- highways, schools, hospitals, etc.
a Each event in the pre-scripted sequence should be written on a separate
page of a "butcher-block" paper pad. (It is on this paper, under each
event, that the exercise recorder will record the response actions
taken during play.)
• You should know the sequence-of-events by heart. The need may arise
during the exercise to re-script as a result of unanticipated response
actions. A thorough knowledge of the pre-scripted sequence will help
you re-script quickly.
Exercise Stage
• You should begin the exercise itself by summarizing the objectives and
scope of the table-top as formulated by the local officials.
a Next you should clearly and quickly explain the groundrules for the
exercise -- i.e., the role of the facilitator and recorder, that people
should come up to the exercise table as they become involved in the
simulated response, that people are to make decisions as realistically
as possible, etc.
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D-2
You should also briefly tell people that the evaluation will follow the
play (i.e., that there should be no evaluation during the exercise
itself). Put people at ease regarding the evaluation by stressing that
they will be evaluating themselves.
Start the actual exercise play by reading the narrative (each
participant should have a copy in front of them).
Next you should begin by displaying (on the overhead projector) the
first event.
In general, let exercise play proceed realistically, without much
prompting or intervention either by facilitator/recorder team or by
members of the audience.
Some prompting may be necessary, however, either to remind people to be
as realistic as possible in their actions (e.g., if certain responders
in real life would confer before the incident commander makes a
specific decision, they-should confer during the exercise) or to keep
things moving.
As play proceeds, the facilitator should make mental or actual notes
regarding the correlation between the actual response actions taken
during the exercise and the "anticipated responses" identified in
advance. These notes will help later during the evaluation session.
In general, the exercise should take about 1 hour 45 minutes, followed
by a 15 minute break and a 1 hour evaluation. If there is extra time
available, it should go to the evaluation. It is important that the
participants not feel that the exercise is "dragging"; they are busy
people, don't waste their time. (The time constraint should be
included in the initial "groundrules" announced at the beginning.)
The recorder should keep an ongoing list of response actions on the
butcher-block paper mentioned above.
Stay on your toes! The need to re-script may arise at any time. If
you need to call "time-out" in order to re-script or to confer before
answering a procedural question, do so. But keep it brief!
Break
• During the break, the recorder and facilitator should tape each of the
event/response sheets to a wall within easy eyesight. These will help
as a reference point during the evaluation.
• Keep the break to 15 minutes maximum. Any longer a break risks the
danger of dissipating the energy and momentum generated during the
exercise.
Evaluation Stage
• For the evaluation, the key responders should be back at the table.
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D-3
The facilitator should start things off by re-explaining the purpose
and process of the evaluation. The goal is to produce a list of
planning issues and response problems identified during the exercise
that the local officials can use in improving their plans and response
systems.
Next the recorder or facilitator should briefly (5 minutes)
recapitulate the key response actions taken at each event. If you are
running short on time, dispense with this and skip straight to the
evaluation.
The facilitator should then ask people to identify (in free-association
style) the key issues or problems (and successes) that they observed
during the exercise. Keep things moving. The recorder should register
each of these either on a blackboard or on another sheet of butcher-
block paper. If comments are long-winded, summarize in a few key
words.
Identify and eliminate any duplication in the concerns raised.
Have people vote on those they believe are the 5 (more or less, use
your judgment) most important, these then should each be discussed
individually. The goal here is to identify very specific comments and
concerns.
If questions arise about what actually happened during play, refer
people back to the event/response summary sheets taped to the wall.
The list of concerns which comes out of this (including both the master
list of issues and the more detailed.comments on the "top five" issues
should be written up after the exercise and provided to the local
officials as, in effect, an agenda for future action.
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PREPAREDNESS & PREVENTION
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BULLETIN #3
A Guide to Planning and Conducting
Field Simulation Exercises
\
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/
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
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EPA PREPAREDNESS AND PREVENTION
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BULLETIN #3
A GUIDE TO PLANNING AND CONDUCTING
FIELD SIMULATION EXERCISES
1. INTRODUCTION
This bulletin is intended as a guide for local emergency preparedness
and response personnel to use in planning, conducting, and evaluating field
exercises. The Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986
requires Local Emergency Planning Committees to prepare emergency plans by
October 17, 1988 and review the plans annually. The exercises described in
this guide may be used in formulating, testing, and revising those plans.
Planning and exercises may be used as interactive elements to maintain an
effective and up-to-date emergency response system.
With this purpose in mind, this bulletin is organized as follows:
• Section 3 describes the components of planning for a field
exercise from the decision to perform a field exercise through
the final pre-exercise check and set-up;
• Section 4 provides guidelines for actually conducting the
exercise;
• Section 5 presents methods for the post-exercise debriefing
and evaluation;
• Section 6 relates the exercise experience to emergency
preparedness planning; and
• The appendices provide a sample exercise scenario and sequence
of events, example planning checklists, an exercise evaluation
guide, information contacts, and reference information.
The information presented here can be supplemented by contacting the
regional representatives of both EPA and FEMA (see Appendix E) and by
referring to other published guides to emergency exercises and planning (see
Appendix F) .
2. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF FIELD EXERCISES
Field exercises are the most complex and rigorous of the various types
of emergency preparedness exercises (described in the overview of chemical
emergency preparedness in Technical Assistance Bulletin #1). The procedures
presented in this bulletin are based on the assumption that the community has
either sufficient direct experience or expertise available to perform
exercises of this complexity.
Field exercises proceed according to a chemical accident scenario and
pre-determined sequence of events to simulate, as realistically as possible,
a chemical emergency. Problems are presented to participants for resolution
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via existing plans, standard operating procedures, emergency response
systems, and/or equipment deployment protocols. As defined here, field
exercises vary in complexity:
• A basic of limited field exercise involves testing single
components of a community's emergency response system. Such
an exercise may, for example, test only the warning and
emergency public notification components. In place of a full-
scale response, only certain first response agencies will be
involved -- e.g., fire and emergency medical services. The
exercise may involve a mix of on-scene response by a limited
number of agencies and table-top simulation.
• A full-scale field exercise involves extensive site activity,
as if the emergency is actually occurring. In this type of
exercise, the responders may not be told in advance that an
exercise is going to occur. When the notification of a
hazardous chemical incident is received, the emergency
response system goes into action, including all components and
auxiliary services.
In order to appreciate the level of realism and complexity involved in a
full-scale field exercise, the reader should refer to the appendices at the
end of this bulletin. Appendix A provides an illustrative emergency scenario
that might be used to commence an exercise. Appendix B provides the
subsequent sequence of events that follow the beginning of the exercise and
control the flow of exercise play.
3. STEPS IN DEVELOPING A FIELD EXERCISE
This section presents the various steps involved in developing a field
exercise. The order in which the components are described is not necessarily
the order in which they must be performed. Although some of these steps
obviously must be performed before others, successful exercise planning will
require interactions and overlaps among the components and should progress
according to the needs of the locality. The components are presented as
follows:
• Establish exercise objectives;
• Determine the basic characteristics of the exercise;
• Secure appropriate approval and commitments;
• Design and plan the exercise;
• Consider other factors such as involvement of media, or the
extent of participation by public officials; and
• Provide for staging, set-up, and pre-exercise tasks.
Successful planning and execution of these components requires ;
systematic attention. Toward this end, it is advisable to convene
appropriate representatives of the agencies expected to participate in the
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exercise as part of. a relatively formal exercise steering committee. Regular
committee meetings should be held to make necessary decisions, assign
planning and logistical responsibilities, and to make sure that everything is
"on track" for a successful exercise. This steering committee is also a
useful mechanism for ensuring that the results of the exercise evaluation are
linked back to the planning process.
Step 1: Establish Exercise Objectives
The decision to perform a field exercise will be based on various local
requirements or perceived needs.-'- A jurisdiction may wish, for example, to
exercise a new component of its emergency response system or a part of the
emergency response system that has not been used or exercised for a long
time. Testing multi-community response capabilities under a mutual aid
agreement could also be an objective. The exercise may be based on existing
emergency preparedness plans or be used as a tool in the development of such
plans.
The reasons for performing the exercise provide the basis for the
exercise objectives. These objectives should include the functions that will
be exercised and the purposes of the effort (e.g., new systems, new chemical
hazards, training, new or updated plan, or to gain experience). A clear
statement of the general objectives of the effort should be developed. For
example, a statement of objectives for the exercise for which the scenario in
Appendix A may be used, might read as follows:
"The exercise will test the procedures for spill notification,
emergency response dispatch, containment and control measures, and
evacuation."
Step 2: Determine the Basic Characteristics of the Exercise Based on
Objectives
Scale of the Exercise. As described above, the field exercise can range
from a limited to a full-scale, on-scene response. In determining which type
of exercise you want to stage, you should consider the number of people,
amount of equipment, and time-frame, as well as the level of complexity
(e.g., limited field or full-scale field). Decide if the responders are to
be notified beforehand or if the exercise will occur as if it is a real
situation.
Functions/Systems to be Exercised. A clear statement of objectives will
guide the development of the exercise. With the objectives and scale
established, this component of planning should identify the emergency
response system, sub-systems, or functions to be exercised. For example, the
scenario in Appendix A, in keeping with the statement of objectives (above),
could be used to test the emergency notification/ communications system;
fire, rescue, and hazmat response units; and the contingency plan for
evacuation.
For assistance in making the decision to perform a field exercise
refer to Exercise Design Course Guide to Emergency Management Exercises.
Federal Emergency Management Agency, June 1984, SM # 170.2, pp. 17-18.
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Organizations and Individuals Involved. The basic characteristics of
the exercise should also include the jurisdictions, agencies, and industries
(if any) involved. The organizations participating should be those
referenced in emergency response systems, contingency plans, or emergency
preparedness plans." (If no plans exist or organizations are identified that
are not in the systems or pl-ans, provisions should be made to follow-up the
exercise by preparing or updating such systems or plans.) Industrial plants
or other hazardous substance handlers may be invited to participate using
their response capabilities. Each of the exercise participants should be
represented in the exercise planning process, preferably by someone who in
real life is involved in responding to emergencies but who will not be a
"player" in the exercise. A clear distinction should be maintained between
those who are responsible for planning and those who will be responding.
This distinction will aid in the assignment of responsibilities and preclude
any special pre-exercise preparation, on the part of the players, that would
compromise the integrity of the exercise as a test of the responders'
capabilities.
Type and Number of Continuous or Simultaneous Activities. The type and
number of continuing or simultaneous exercise activities should be described.
These activities are those basic response functions which tend to be ongoing
throughout much of an emergency response, including first aid and triage,
chemical spill abatement and containment, and notification and evacuation of
local residents. Coordination of these activities is critical to the success
of the exercise because they typically are critical in a real-life emergency.
The type and number of continuous or simultaneous activities should be
appropriate to fit the scale of the exercise, the functions that are to be
tested, and the organizations to be tested, as previously determined in the
exercise planning process.
Level of Stress. The level of stress of the exercise should also be
determined. Level of stress (as described in Technical Assistance Bulletin
#1) varies with the type of exercise, problems presented to the participants,
and time constraints. Full-scale field exercises impose the highest degree
of stress. The level of stress in the field exercise will increase as the
exercise it, made more true-to-life. Simultaneous activities in greater
numbers and complexity will increase the level of stress. For example, a
full-scale response to the spill site in a mixed residential/commercial/
industrial area, described in the Appendix A scenario, will impose more
stress than a limited field exercise testing only, for example, a
communications facility under the same scenario.
Step 3: Secure Appropriate Approval and Commitments
A statement of the objectives and basic characteristics of the exercise
should be prepared for presentation to, and approval (if warranted) by, the
chief executive of the jurisdiction(s) involved. This prepared statement
should also be presented to the leadership of the necessary participating
organizations (if they are not members of the exercise steering committee) to
secure their approval and commitments to participate. Press releases;
announcements to interested parties; and invitations for support, volunteers,
and observers may also be developed from the statement of objectives and
characteristics, once they have been officially approved. Broad assignments
or directives to participating agencies and their commitments to participate
and support the exercise should be made final at this time.
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Step 4: Design and Plan the Exercise
Designing and planning a simulation exercise involves determining the
appropriate emergency scenario and establishing the framework for preparing,
managing, performing, and evaluating the exercise. Designing and planning
efforts involve the following components:
• The Scenario;
• The Sequence of Events;
• Control Mechanisms;
• Participants;
• Physical Facilities;
• Simulation Equipment and Materials;
• Special Effects;
• Set-Up and Break-Down of Simulation;
• Schedule and Tasks;
• Communications; and
• Community Impacts.
Appendix C provides several checklists that may help systematize the
planning process.
The Scenario. The scenario, which should be directly based on the
already determined exercise objectives and basic characteristics, describes
the incident that is being simulated. In effect, the scenario is the script
for the accident, and should provide the following types of information:
• The hazardous materials involved including the threat they
present, their form, the type of containment vessels from
which they are leaking, and the quantity of leaking material;
• The nature of the accident (e.g., release, spill, fire or a
combination of the three);
• The facility or transportation route where the accident
occurs, including such specifics as location, setting, and
building type or mode of transport;
• The characteristics of the neighborhood(s) threatened by
exposure to accident effects;
• The initial number of victims, and potential victims;
• Weather conditions.
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The scenario is used to create the simulated on-scene emergency which
activates the emergency response system. Logistical considerations, such as
scheduling, transportation, personnel assignments, and physical facilities,
are central to the implementation of the scenario. The scenario should be
realistic enough to meet the exercise objectives by presenting appropriate
problems to the responders. The simulation, once initiated, should have the
look and feel of an actual emergency, eliciting reactions from the response
system without apparent interference from the exercise controllers. Problems
that arise during the exercise should reflect actual weaknesses in local
emergency response plans, procedures, and/or systems and not faults in the
design of the exercise itself.
Refer to the scenario in Appendix A for its description of the hazardous
materials involved, the nature of the accident, the facility, affected
transportation routes, threatened neighborhoods, initial number of victims,
and weather conditions.
The Sequence of Events. A sequence of events should be developed to
accompany the scenario. The sequence of events proceeds step-by-step through
the simulation indicating the occurrence of events, written, verbal, and
simulation messages (e.g., seeing liquids spill or hearing warning devices)
sent or received, and problems presented.
The sequence of events is presented to the participants, either orally
or in writing, one event at a time. The events are arranged in a logical and
chronological sequence designed to portray the essentials of an evolving
emergency situation. The events represent changes in the circumstances of
the accident or in conditions over which the participants have no control
(e.g., a change in the weather or a major change in the rate of spill or
leakage of the chemical).
The events in this sequence should be:
• Directly relevant to the response functions being exercised,
the roles and responsibilities of the participants, the
exercise objectives, and the locale of the accident;
• Tailored to the specific characteristics of an actual facility
and the community in which the accident occurs; and
• Realistic, factual, and arranged in the proper sequence.
Appendix B is an example of a sequence of events that might accompany the
scenario in Appendix A.
Control Mechanisms.
Control mechanisms, which are critical in
maintaining the direction and intensity of the exercise, include:
• Messages, both verbal and simulated, that provide response cues to
the exercise players (examples of both types of messages have been
included in Appendix B);
• Anticipated responses, actions or dialogue of any actors
involved;
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• The duration of the response from incident to completion;
and
• Communications links to preserve the reality of the
response, while not unduly alarming outside people or
agencies (e.g., notification or requests for assistance
to information services or local, state and federal
agencies).
Anticipated responses can be used by the exercise simulators and
evaluators as a standard against which to compare actual responses during the
exercise. These standards are not shared with participants in order to
ensure realistic responses. Anticipated response actions may be derived from
relevant contingency plans or standard operating procedures used by one or
more of the participating organizations. If plans or procedures do not
exist, the anticipated response measures should be developed and documented
prior to the exercise, constructed logically from the circumstances being
simulated, or identified through discussions with response personnel
regarding their informal operations procedures. Appendix B provides
illustrative anticipated responses appropriate to the sample sequence of
events.
Participants. All participants or players should be identified as early
as possible in the exercise planning process. The number and roles of
participants will vary depending on the characteristics of the exercise and
available resources. (See Appendix C.I for a checklist of potential
participants.) Roles and responsibilities should be defined for each
participant and an accurate roster compiled. The roles of responders and
participating agencies should be defined in contingency plans; specific
response units may be pre-selected as the responders on the exercise. Roles
and responsibilities may include the following:
• Exercise Coordinator. The exercise coordinator is in charge
of the exercise. In that capacity, he or she is responsible
for controlling the flow of events, coordinating all
activities involving evaluation and taping, and determining
the beginning and end of play. The exercise coordinator also
explains to observers what actions are taking place and why.
(See Section 3 below for a detailed discussion of the
coordinator's role in conducting the exercise.)
• Simulation Control Team. The simulation control team controls
responder command post communications; monitors activities in the
command post, on site, and in the "hot zone" (the area contaminated
due to the incident) to keep responders aware of the effects of
their actions and maintain the flow and direction of the
simulation; documents events on paper, camera, and video if
desired; and keeps the observers or audience informed.
• Incident Commander. The incident commander is generally a senior
official in the fire or police department or other local emergency
response organization, often responsible for inter-agency emergency
response coordination. The incident commander provides extensive
assistance in planning the exercise and is in charge of all local
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response personnel and coordination of responding agencies during
the simulation. Although the expertise of the incident commander
will be valuable throughout the planning of the exercise, the
incident commander should not be directly involved in the
development of the simulation scenario in order to maintain the
realism of the emergency and avoid preparation for specific
incident response.
• Evaluators. Evaluators observe and assess various activities
during the simulation in order to report, during the formal
exercise evaluation session, the strengths and weaknesses in
the emergency response operations.
• Safety Officer. The safety officer checks that safety
standards and plans are followed throughout the exercise,
including the planning, performance, and break-down stages.
• Simulators. Simulators bring the scenario to life by handing
notes to participants, controlling props (e.g., setting off
smoke grenades), purposely getting in the way (e.g., "rubber-
neckers"), and performing as actors (e.g., playing the role of
"victims"). "Victims" in the simulation may be played by
representatives of participating response agencies, other
emergency response auxiliary groups, or the general public.
Playing the role of a victim may be a valuable learning
experience in itself, providing emergency response personnel
an opportunity to experience the response from the victim's
perspective.
• Observers. Observers may be selected by the planners for
various substantive, political, and public relations reasons,
and may include the press, local politicians, politicians or
officials from neighboring jurisdictions, and officials from
state and federal agencies involved in the exercise.
Physical Facilities. Arrangements must be made for pre-production work
space, simulation support space, the simulation site, and post-exercise
evaluation meetings. Meeting rooms and practice areas may need to be located
and reserved in advance. Work plans should be reviewed to ensure that such
facilities will be available when needed.
Simulation site selection should be completed early in the planning
stages to provide adequate time to notify neighbors and evaluate the
logistics of using the site. If a simulation site is not identified in the
development of the scenario, a site that will satisfy the scenario should be
selected. The layout and size of the site should be such that the scenario
can be successfully performed. On-site locations for the hot zone, an area
for the command post and response equipment, documentation vantage points and
seating, shelter, and restrooms for observers should be identified and
confirmed. The site should be thoroughly researched and prepared to
accommodate the exercise, with steps taken for the displacement of normal
traffic flow or parking.
Arrangements must be made for the transport of simulation equipment to
and from the site, as well as for the set-up, staging, and break-down of the
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Transportation for observers and victims must also be
Materials and equipment to support the planning and staging of the
simulation should be identified and acquired. An inventory of equipment and
materials should be prepared with notes on sources, availability, and costs.
Planning and staging equipment and materials may be available through
participating groups or other local agencies.
Identify Simulation Equipment and Materials. An array of equipment will
be needed to make the simulation realistic. Necessary equipment should be
identified and purchase arrangements made as early as possible during the
exercise planning process. (See Appendix C.3 for an equipment checklist.)
The participating groups may have equipment on hand that they can use or loan
to other participants. Other organizations or local groups may be willing to
loan or donate equipment (e.g., portable bleachers for the observers, or
junked cars for the accident scene). Some equipment may need to be purchased
outright; such equipment, as.well as a source, should be identified early.
Private industry facilities are often a good source of "loaner" equipment.
Various materials will be needed to conduct the simulation. In addition
to or in lieu of special effects materials described below, victims will need
such items as refreshments and background information materials (e.g., the
scenario and sequence of events); documentors will need paper, cameras, or
video recorders and film; and the simulation scene may need signs, props,
cleanup materials, or other items to enhance the realism of the accident.
Special Effects. The exercise should be as realistic as possible. The
realism of a simulation can be greatly enhanced by special effects such as
props, make-up for the victims, imitation spills and vapor plumes, fire, and
smoke. Special effects should be linked to the scenario to ensure
appropriate timing and cue actors, victims, or responders to perform certain
actions. The materials should be acquired and tested in advance; sufficient
quantities must be available at the time of the simulation. Also, the
special effects must be able to function under all conditions (e.g., rain).
Set-Up and Break-Down of Simulation. Provisions should be made for the
orderly and timely set-up and break-down of the simulation scene. The set-up
of props, such as overturned vehicles, should be completed the day before the
exercise if possible. Safety of exercise participants, observers, and site
neighbors, as well as site security, should be provided for as long a time as"
the exercise activities require personnel or equipment on the site. Set-up
also includes seating, food, and restrooms for observers, narrators,
documenters, and other participants, as well as roadblocks or warning tape to
delineate parking/no parking areas and detours.
The exercise plan should provide for the orderly dismantling and
restoration of the simulation site to provide an orderly and timely break-
down. Break-down of the site should proceed as quickly as possible after the
simulation to ensure the safety and convenience of site neighbors. Clearing
wreckage could be included in the exercise as an element of the emergency
response.
Schedule and Tasks. Field exercises are complex activities that depend
on effective organization for, success. Scheduling and tasking should begin
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early in the planning process, as soon as possible after approval of the
exercise by the necessary officials. Scheduling and tasking essentially
involve the development of a work plan to assign responsibilities for
specific activities, with deadline dates, to the participating groups and
individuals. The schedule should include such items as meeting dates,
procurement and preparation milestones, scenario development deadlines, and
simulation set-up and performance dates.
Communications. Reliable communication is a necessity for responders in
actual emergency response, and critical for simulators in an exercise.
Telephone service, equipment, and directories should be provided where
appropriate during the planning stage and particularly during the exercise
itself. Communication linkages in preparedness plans should identify
hardware and frequency compatibilities or incompatibilities to ensure that
responders know who they can contact. A network of telephones is extremely
important during the exercise to simulate and control the flow of information
in a realistic fashion. The incident command post will require phones for
the incident commander and other response officials, and separate lines for
the simulation control team. In some cases actual lines and phone numbers
may be used, in other cases the numbers of various response and support
agencies may be assigned to certain simulators or locations. For example, in
a limited field exercise, an exercise room with several desks equipped with
phones may be set up to simulate some of the response activities.
Responders and simulation participants may be using "walkie-talkies" to
communicate. The radio frequencies and compatibility among the response
groups and simulators should be identified. If radio contact is not (
possible, alternatives should be identified and acquired.
Community Impacts. Impacts from the simulation on the community should
be anticipated, monitored, and controlled. A simulation may require a number
of disruptive actions including re-routing of traffic, use of public areas or
facilities, and use of emergency vehicles. Parties who may be affected by
the simulation -- e.g., residents and businesses at or near the simulation
site --should be notified well in advance.
Step 5: Consider Other Factors
Performing an emergency response exercise is a complex undertaking; many
peripherally-related, but nonetheless important considerations must be kept
in mind throughout the various phases of an exercise. The type and number of
these factors often depends on the community sponsoring the exercise.
Although this guide does not go into detail on any of these considerations,
they are mentioned here to ensure that planners are aware of them:
Safety. Safety of all participants, observers, and curious on-lookers
should be considered throughout the exercise. The designated safety officer
will have the responsibility of ensuring this safety, but will need the
cooperation of all participants and the aid of safety plans and protocols.
The more complex and realistic the exercise, the greater the likelihood of
accidents.
Liability. Especially in full-scale field exercises, there is
significant potential for accidents to participants, observers, and "innocent
bystanders." Potential liabilities should be considered and minimized. The
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signing of a liability waiver might be considered for all participants and
official observers.
Cost. The cost of field exercises varies greatly with the scale and
nature of the exercise itself. In many cases, however, the cost of the
equipment and supplies needed to stage a field simulation will be
significant. Private facilities participating in the exercise should be
urged to donate time and the use of equipment. Even where such donations are
made, field exercises require a great deal of coordination and pre-planning
and, therefore, consume scarce public agency staff time. Before undertaking
an exercise, the planning committee should carefully identify and estimate
all likely expenses and evaluate all available means of reducing those
expenses.
Step 6: Provide for Staging and Set-Up, Pre-Exercise Check, and Briefing
for Participants
After weeks or .months of planning and coordinating, performance of the
exercise should not be jeopardized by last-minute problems. Staging and set-
up of the exercise should be done a day in advance if possible. This will
provide for last-minute problems with the site or equipment and, time and
resources permitting, a shake-down or trial-run of all props and special
effects. Omissions or oversights may be caught at this time and corrected.
Immediately before the exercise, the pre-exercise check should be performed
as a last-minute run through of checklists and logistics. The pre-exercise
briefing may be used to inform participants of last-minute changes or
problems that may require alternative actions and resolve any uncertainties
the participants may have.
4. GUIDELINES FOR CONDUCTING THE EXERCISE
The major exercise development steps, discussed above, set the stage for
the smooth conduct of the exercise by the exercise coordinator. On the day
of the event, the exercise coordinator must assume direct responsibility for
the conduct of the exercise to ensure adequate accomplishment of its
objectives. The exercise coordinator's job is to:
• Describe the "ground-rules" for the exercise, including the
roles that the various participants are to play;
• Present the players with the exercise narrative;
• Announce the first event of the scenario;
• Stimulate player responses, without intervening in a way that
assumes control of the play, unless it appears likely that the
players will not initiate a response critical to the .--
objectives of the exercise;
• Control the flow and pace of the exercise by introducing the
remaining events in sequence; and
• Keep the exercise on schedule and terminate play at the
specified end time.
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In general,- it is best to let the exercise play develop naturally, with
participants responding to prescribed events as they deem appropriate. Some
anticipated responses, however, may be so critical to the completion of the
simulation that the exercise coordinator will have to intervene in the play
to assure that such"responses take place. (The fact that intervention is
required will, of course, represent a very important lesson for the exercise
participants and should be noted for further discussion in the post-exercise
debriefing and evaluation.) An example, based on the scenario in Appendix A,
would be the activation of the evacuation process (one of the objectives on
which the scenario would have been based). If the participants in an
exercise using the Appendix A scenario did not respond to messages or cues
with activation of the evacuation process, the exercise coordinator would
intervene.
5. GUIDELINES FOR CONDUCTING A POST-EXERCISE DEBRIEFING AND EVAUUATION
A post-exercise debriefing and evaluation can be as valuable an
experience as the exercises. These post-exercise sessions are critical for
capturing the lessons of the field exercise so that they can be used to
revise and improve emergency plans and procedures. The exercise coordinator
should first conduct a debriefing session, in which the primary objective is
to review the experiences of the participants during the exercise. A
debriefing works best if the exercise coordinator leads the participants
through an event-by-event recapitulation of the exercise, discussing the
actual responses and how they compared to the anticipated responses. The
debriefing may cover all events and responses before they are evaluated, or
it may proceed one event at a time, allowing an opportunity for evaluation as
well.
Once the debriefing is completed, the exercise coordinator should elicit
evaluations from the participants concerning both their own performance
during the exercise and the characteristics of the exercise as a whole. This
process will be enhanced if the participants understand that the purpose of
the evaluation is to develop a set of recommendations for improving the
response system, rather than to find fault with the performance of the
participants. These recommendations may include actions to improve emergency
response plans, procedures, and equipment as well as additional training
needs for members of the response system. Appendix D provides criteria that
may be useful in conducting the debriefing or exercise evaluation.
It is important that problems in the response system (e.g., lack of
plans or procedures) be separated from problems related to the specific
exercise design or conduct (e.g., a scenario event that did not match
conditions in the community or a special effect that failed). Thus, the
exercise coordinator should allow opportunity for the participants to
evaluate the exercise itself. The exercise coordinator should be alert to
both the possibility that the participants may be more critical of the
exercise than of their own performance and the fact that problems with
exercise design and conduct may have produced some responses that do not
reflect existing plans, procedures, or response capabilities of the
participants.
Following the debriefing and self-evaluations by the participants, the
exercise coordinator or exercise sponsors may want to open up discussions
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with community.groups, local industries, and the press. A mock or actual
press conference may be called. An open forum to discuss the exercise may
aid in community relations and cooperation by allowing citizens and
representatives of perhaps controversial local industries to comment on the
exercise and emergency response system. This type of evaluation, conducted
some time after the exercise, may prove to be a useful complement to the
immediate debriefing session. Intervening time and the participation of a
broader cast of evaluators may provide fresh or at least additional
perspectives.
6. USING EXERCISES TO IMPROVE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, PLANNING, AND
RESPONSE
The results of the debriefing/evaluation period, in the form of
improvements in the response system, need to be implemented if the exercise
is to be of maximum benefit. These results should be included in the
continuing planning and preparedness activities of the community. Local
planners should initiate efforts to revise existing plans and procedures or
develop new ones to reflect the lessons from the exercise (e.g., revise
notification procedures, clarify responsibilities for providing services to
an evacuated population). Exercise planners should use the evaluation of the
exercise itself to improve future exercises. All other parties (e.g.,
police, fire, emergency, medical) should take actions appropriate to their
roles in the preparedness effort. Approximately three to six months
following the exercise, the contingency plans and procedures should be
reviewed to ensure that appropriate changes and revisions have been
incorporated.
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LIST OF APPENDICES
Appendix
A
B
C
D
E
F
Title
Sample Field Exercise Scenario
Sample Sequence of Events
Sample Planning Checklists
Criteria for Assessing State and Local
Preparedness
Regional Federal Agency Contacts
References to Additional Information
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APPENDIX A
Sample Field Exercise Scenario
The PQX Chemical Co. plant, located on Lee Highway, manufactures a
variety of corrosive, toxic, and flammable chemicals. Many of these
chemicals are stored at the plant pending shipment to customers. The plant
occupies 50 acres of land and is situated in an area composed of commercial,
industrial, and residential buildings. The plant property is bounded on the
north by Lee Highway, on the east by a rail line, on the south by Interstate
20 and on the west by the Black River. Beyond the river to the west, is the
Black River Estates housing development. South of Interstate 20 is the
Clover Hill housing development. On the north side of Lee Highway lies a
mixture of commercial and industrial buildings. East of the railroad line,
there are a variety of industrial facilities. A railroad siding extends into
the plant property to the outside storage area.
One clear Saturday morning, a day when the plant is not operating, a
repair crew is working on replacing a section of pipe that is connected to
the top of an empty tank. After disconnection, a crane is used to lower the
pipe onto a flat bed truck. As the crane boom is swung over a nearby tank of
liquid sulfur trioxide, the cable snaps, thus, dropping the pipe. The
falling pipe shears off the 803 tank's feedline between the tank wall and the
first block valve. The four-inch diameter feedline leading from the tank to
the process plant begins leaking immediately. An excess flow valve between
the leak and the tank limits the rate of flow to 30 gallons per minute.
Spilled liquid from the S03 tank collects within the containment dike
surrounding the tanks. Upon contact with the moisture in the air, the
spilled 803 vaporizes into a white mist resembling steam. The wind, coming
from the northwest at 5 mph, blows the vapors directly onto the nearby repair
crew that had removed the old piping. Three of the four repairmen are
affected by the vapors, with two of them lying unconscious on top of the tank
they had been working on. The lone conscious repairman drags the remaining
workers from the hazardous area and then runs into the main plant to report
the accident. Experiencing burning eyes and difficult breathing, he decides
to remain indoors awaiting the arrival of the fire department.
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B-l
APPENDIX B
Sanple Sequence of Events
EVENT #1: The northeasterly wind blows the vapor cloud coming off the
spilled 803 towards the southwest across plant property. Arriving
fire/rescue personnel find an unconscious person just beyond the diked area.
Simulation Message: Simulators will set off a white smoke grenade or other
smoke/cloud generation device to simulate the 803 vapor cloud. Large
portable fans may have to be employed to direct the vapors in the desired
direction dictated by the exercise. An exercise "victim" should be lying
outside of the diked area but away from the white smoke/cloud. Water from a
hoseline attached to the feedline of the 803 tank will be flowing at a rate
of 30 gpm into the diked area to simulate the leaking 803.
Written/Verbal Messages: None.
Expected Actions:
1. First arriving fire/rescue units report the on-scene situation to the
emergency communications center and request additional fire/rescue and
police units (if necessary).
2. Rescue unconscious person near diked area and provide emergency medical
treatment following rescue.
3. Incident commander takes command and establishes:
• Command post (in safe location)
• Communications among response agencies at scene
• Staging area for in-coming apparatus
• Mechanism for on-going incident assessment
4. Ensure that emergency personnel wear appropriate protective gear.
5. Secure area around the incident scene.
6. Attempt to locate a plant official who can identify the leaking material
and provide technical expertise concerning the tank, feedline, control
valves, dike, etc.
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B-2
EVENT #2: The injured repairman that reported the accident advises
fire/rescue personnel of the two unconscious workers on top of the tank next
to the leaking tank: The repairman tells how the accident occurred and warns
of the hazards of the vapors emanating from the spilled liquid.
Sinulation Message: Simulators will continue to generate a white cloud to
simulate the vaporizing 803. The simulated leak will also be continued. The
repairman "victim" will be acting as if he is having trouble breathing and a
burning sensation in his eyes.
Verbal Message:
To: Fire/Rescue Personnel
From: Injured Repairman
Message: Joe and Charlie are still up .on the tank. I think they've passed
out. Do you see them? They were still up there when the pipe fell
from the cable and hit the other tank. I don't know what that
leaking stuff is, but watch it, it's nasty.
Expected Actions:
1. Plan strategy for the rescue of the two unconscious workers on top of
the tank.
2. Provide emergency medical treatment for the repairman experiencing
difficult breathing and burning eyes.
3. Contact CHEMTREG and/or other technical assistance organization for
assistance in identifying the leaking chemical.
4. Activate the off-site emergency operations center (EOC) and notify key
officials and agencies of the local government.
5. Continue efforts to locate a plant official.
6. Continue efforts to identify the leaking material.
7. Identify strategies and options for controlling the leak.
8. Arrange for specialized equipment to be brought to the scene:
Encapsulated suits
Self-contained breathing apparatus
Environmental monitors
Patching/plugging materials
Foam
Diking materials
Emergency medical supplies
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B-3
9. Notify the following:
Community Emergency Coordinator
National Response Center
State Environmental Protection Agency
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B-4
EVENT #3: The vapor cloud is approaching Interstate 20.
Simulation Message: Simulators will continue to generate the white cloud but
not in amounts great enough to transport the cloud to the interstate, thus
avoiding obstructing the view of passing motorists not involved in the
exercise. The purpose of the cloud is for realism at the actual storage tank
area.
Verbal Message: (via two-way radio)
To: On-Scene Incident Commander
From: Emergency Communications Center
Message: Motorists on Interstate 20 are reporting "white smoke" just north
of the interstate. Could that be coming from your location?
Expected Actions:
1. Initiate monitoring of vapor cloud and spill.
2. Confirm vapor cloud movement.
3. Close Interstate 20 downwind of the vapor cloud.
4. Consider protective actions for residents south of Interstate 20.
5. Request mutual aid (if necessary):
• Fire/rescue
• hazardous materials team
• Emergency medical services
• Law enforcement
6. For arriving mutual aid units:
• Brief them about incident
• Assign tasks to them
• Ensure they wear appropriate protective gear
• Establish inter-organizational communications
7. Establish communications between the on-scene command post and the EOC,
and coordinate all response actions.
8. Expand efforts to secure the area around the incident scene:
• Roadblocks
• Rerouting of traffic
• Spectator control
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B-5
9. Establish a media center and appoint a public information officer.
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B-6
EVENT #4: Fire/rescue personnel have located the two unconscious workmen on
top of the tank next to the leaking tank.
I
Simulation Message: Simulators will continue to generate the white cloud and
allow the 30 gpm flow of water into the diked area to continue. The two
"victims" on top of the tank should lie still to simulate unconsciousness.
Written/Verbal Messages: None.
Expected Actions:
1. Rescue the two unconscious workers if it is decided that adequate
protective gear is available at the scene for rescuers.
2. Provide emergency medical treatment for the two unconscious workers
following their rescue.
3. Establish an on-scene triage area for injured workers and emergency
response personnel.
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B-7
EVENT #5: The vapor cloud has moved as far as Interstate 20 and is fast
approaching the Clover Hill housing development. A plant official arrives on
the scene and advises the incident commander that the leaking product is
liquid sulfur trioxide and that the 70-ton capacity tank was approximately
80 percent full prior to the accident.
Simulation Message: Simulators will continue to generate the white cloud in
the area near the tanks and continue the flow of water into the diked area.
Verbal Messages:
To: Oh-Scene Incident Commander
From: Emergency Communications Center
Message: Motorists are now reporting a white mist coming across the
interstate from the northwest. They advise that it's irritating to
their eyes and throats.
To: On-Scene Police Department Commander
From: Patrol Unit
Message: The vapors from your location have reached Interstate 20 and are
heading towards Clover Hill. Please advise.
To: On-Scene Incident Commander
From: PQX Chemical Company Official
Message: The leaking product is sulfur trioxide. As of close of business
yesterday, it contained approximately 55 tons of 803.
Expected Actions:
1. Evacuate Clover Hill and other nearby residences.
2. Open emergency shelters for evacuees.
3. Disseminate information to all emergency response personnel and agencies
involved in the incident that the leaking material has been identified
as liquid sulfur trioxide.
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B-8
4. Contact CHEMTREC and/or other technical assistance organizations for:
• Chemical specific information
• Associated health hazards
• Recommended control/cleanup actions
5. Ensure that protective gear is compatible with 803 is worn by all
emergency personnel operating in the vicinity of the leaking tank and
vapor cloud.
6. Continue monitoring the vapor cloud for movement and concentration.
7. Identify strategies and options for reducing the quantity of vapors
emanating from the spilled 803.
8. Continue efforts to identify strategies and options for controlling the
leak.
9. Coordinate response efforts between the on-scene incident commander,
plant officials, and the EOC.
10. Provide public information concerning:
• Hazards
• Evacuation
• Safety/precautions
• Details of remedial actions
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B-9
EVENT #6: Despite vaporization, the diked area is filling up rapidly with
spilled liquid.
Simulation Message: Simulators will continue to allow the water to flow from
the hoseline into the diked area at a rate of 30 gallons per minute. The
white cloud will also continue to be generated to simulate vaporization of
product.
Written Message: (via messenger)
To: On-Scene Incident Commander
From: Simulator
Message: The diked area contains a considerable amount of 803 and continues
to fill at a rapid rate.
Expected Actions:
1.
2.
Arrange for the off-loading of the 803 from the damaged tank to other
large capacity tanks that are compatible with 803.
Identify strategies and options for removing the 803 contained within
the dikes.
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B-10
EVENT #7: Winds begin to shift from the northeast to the southeast. The
National Weather Service's forecast calls for temperatures and humidity to
increase as winds shift.
Simulation Message: Simulators will employ the use of large fans (if
necessary) to simulate a wind shift so that the white cloud will blow towards
the west instead of the southwest. The simulated 803 spill will be continued
at 30 gpm.
Written Messages: (via messenger)
To: On-Scene Incident Commander
From: National Weather Service
Message: Be advised that winds will be shifting over the next 10-12 hours to
the southeast at 3 mph. Temperatures will rise 5-7 degrees, and
humidity will increase as well,,
Verbal Messages: (via two-way radio)
To: On-Scene Police Department Commander
From: Patrol Unit
Message: I'm at the roadblock along westbound Interstate 20. It looks as
though the vapor cloud is heading more towards the west now, in the
direction of Black River Estates.
To: On-Scene Incident Commander
From: Emergency Communications Center
Message: Citizens are reporting irritating vapors in the Black River Estates
area. We've received several calls on this.
Expected Actions:
1. Disseminate information to all emergency response personnel and agencies
involved in the incident concerning the wind shift and weather forecast.
2. Evacuate the Black River Estates housing development.
3. Open additional emergency shelters for evacuees.
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B-ll
4.
5.
6.
Expand efforts to secure the area to the west of the plant:
• Set up roadblocks
• Reroute traffic
• Control spectators
"-N
Consider evacuating the commercial/industrial area northwest of the
plant.
Continue monitoring the vapor cloud for movement and concentration.
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B-12
EVENT #8: An unconscious person has been spotted in a canoe floating down
the Black River just west of the plant. In addition, numerous residents west
of the plant have been injured.
Simulation Message: Simulators will continue their efforts to direct a white
cloud towards the west. They will also continue to allow water to flow at ;
30 gpm into the diked area. One "victim" will lie in a slumped position in a
canoe in a calm spot on the river. Several "victims" in the Black River
Estates will act as though they are experiencing difficult breathing and
burning eyes.
Verbal Messages: (via two-way radio)
To: Emergency Medical Services Commander
From: Emergency Communications Center
Message: We've received a report of an unconscious person in a canoe on the
Black River between the PQX plant and Interstate 20. The caller
saw the canoe floating from the area affected by the vapor cloud.
To: Emergency Medical Services Commander
From: Emergency Communications Center
Message: Police report finding numerous persons in the process of evacuating
Black River Estates who have requested emergency medical treatment
for irritated eyes and noses.
Expected Actions:
1. Provide emergency medical treatment for numerous injured persons.
2. Prepare the local hospital for numerous chemical-related casualties and
make arrangements for transporting patients to other hospitals, if
necessary.
3. Rescue the unconscious canoeist.
4. Evacuate the commercial/industrial area northwest of the plant.
5. Expand efforts to secure the area to the northwest of the plant:
• Set up roadblocks
• Reroute traffic
• Control spectators
6. Continue monitoring vapor cloud for movement and concentration.
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B-13
7. Apply acid-based foam (if available) to the surface of the contained 803
to prevent the release of hazardous vapors.
-------
B-14
EVHENT #9: Two railroad tankcars have been brought onto the siding next to
the 803 tank. Off-loading operations of the tank will be difficult due to
the presence of spilled liquid around the tank within the diked area.
Simulation Message: Simulators will continue to allow water to flow into the
diked area and will continue to generate a white cloud and direct it towards
the west.
Verbal Messages:
To: Plant Official
From: Railroad Engineer
Message: How should I position the two empty tankcars for off-loading
operations?
To: On-Scene Incident Commander
From: Senior Fire Department Officer
Message: We're going to have a difficult time gaining access to the
unloading outlet on the tank with all this liquid 803 around the
base of the tank. It would be unsafe to have anyone walk through
the liquid, even if they're wearing Level A protective gear.
Expected Actions:
1. Identify strategies and options for gaining access to the unloading
outle . on the 803 tank without endangering the lives of the personnel
assigned the task.
2. Off-load the 803 from the tank to the railroad tank cars.
3. Continue monitoring the vapor cloud for movement and concentration.
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B-15
EVENT #10: The product has been completely off-loaded from the tank to the
railcars, thus, ending the leak. Vapors, however, continue to be given off
from the spilled liquid within the dikes.
Simulation Message: Simulators will continue to generate a white cloud and
direct it towards the west until actions are taken to prevent the
vaporization of product and/or pump the product to tanks.
Verbal Messages:
To: On-Scene Incident Commander
From: Senior Fire Department Officer
Message: We just finished off-loading the 803 to the tankcars.
stopped.
The leak has
To: On-Scene Incident Commander
From: Senior Fire Department Officer
Message: The contained liquid is still vaporizing.
Expected. Actions:
1. Disseminate information to all emergency responders and agencies
involved in the incident that the leak has been stopped but that
hazardous vapors continue to-be generated from the spilled material.
2. Continue monitoring the vapor cloud for movement and concentration.
3. Apply acid-based foam (if available) to the surface of the contained 803
to prevent the release of hazardous vapors (if not already done).
4. Pump liquid 803 from the containment dikes into rail tank cars'or other
compatible tanks.
5. Consider post-incident operations, following the complete elimination of
hazards, including:
• Cleanup
• Decontamination of personnel, equipment, apparatus, and
property
• Removal and disposal of hazardous wastes
• Re-entry of evacuees to residential areas
• Opening of roads and the evacuated commercial/industrial area
• Continued air monitoring
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APPENDIX C
Sample Planning Checklists
Appendix
C.I
C.2
C.3
Title
List of Possible Simulation
Exercise Participants
Planning Checklist
Equipment Checklist
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C-l
APPENDIX C.I2
List of Possible Simulation Exercise Participants
Fire Departments
Local
Industrial
Medical
Ambulance
Rescue squads
Toxicologists
Doctors
Poison control center
Hospital
Red Cross
Police Departments
Local
County
State
Highway patrol
Sheriff
Industrial security
2 This list adapted from "The Day Before...,11 a simulation exercise
planning guide developed by the EPA Region VII Technical Assistance Team (see
Appendix F).
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C-2
Civil Defense/Disaster Services
Local
State
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Health Departments
Local
State
Federal Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
Public Works/Utilities
Water
Sewage treatment
Electric/gas
Environmental Scientists
Local
State
Private
Universities
Local Emergency Response Contractors
Mitigation
Removal
Heavy equipment
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C-3
Federal Agencies
U.S. Coast Guard
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Department of Transportation
Army Corps of Engineers
National Guard
Environmental Protection Agency
Geologic Survey
Fish and Wildlife Service
Local Hazardous Materials Carriers
Truck
Rail
Barge
Chemical Experts
Industry
University
CHEM1XEC
Meteorologists
National Weather Service
Television
Airport
Communications
Radio
Television
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C-4
APPENDIX C.23
Planning Checklist
Key Threshold Actions
• Has the site of the simulated incident been identified?
• Is there a local contingency plan or standard operating procedures in
effect?
• Have planning issues or response needs been identified? If so, what are
they?
• What type of simulation do you want to undertake?
• Who will participate in the exercise?
• How will the exercise be documented?
• Has the scenario description been developed?
• Have the sequence of events and control materials been written?
• What equipment is required for the exercise? (See separate list in
Appendix G.3.)
Pre-Productlon Planning and Logistics
• Has the date been set for the exercise?
• Have the participants been notified?
• Has the site of the exercise been identified and arranged for?
• Is there an area for observers?
• Is there an area for the narrator? "~
• Where will video equipment be located?
• Where will the press be located?
• Have special effects been arranged for?
3 This list adapted from "The Day Before...", a simulation exercise
planning guide developed by the EPA Region VII Technical Assistance Team (see
Appendix F).
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C-5
• Is there someone designated to manage special effects?
• Have all essential equipment, supplies, and props been acquired?
Simulation Staging
• Are all members of the Exercise Steering Committee prepared?
• Have site arrangements been confirmed?
• Have invitations to and arrangements for observers been confirmed?
• Has the press been notified?
• Has video documentation been arranged?
• Are all equipment, supplies, and props in ready condition?
• Have all necessary manifests or bills of lading been prepared?
• Has set-up and staging help been arranged for?
• Has prop placement and set-up plan been completed?
Follow-up Review and Evaluation
• Has a meeting room been arranged?
• Have necessary audio-visual aids been arranged?
• Has a review and evaluation procedure been determined?
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C-6
APPENDIX C.34
Field Simulation Equipment: List:
Props
Drums
Tanks
Boxes
Vehicles
Moulage
Water
Simulated hazardous materials
Smoke
Pyrotechnic supplies
Other
Firefighting/Suppression
Trucks/apparatus
Tools/equipment
Foam and equipment
Fire extinguishers
Other
4 This list adapted from "The Day Before...", a simulation exercise
planning guide developed by the EPA Region VII Technical Assistance Team (see
Appendix F) .
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G-7
Rescue and First: Aid
Vehicles
Stretchers
First aid/trauma kits
Oxygen
Other
Containment Devices
Booms
Patches, plugs
Sand bags
Pneumatic bags
Plastic sheets/tarps
Neutralizers
Sorbents
Shovels
Other
Personal Protective Equipment
Respirators
Pressure demand SCBA
Air-purifying respirators
Chemical protective clothing
Splash suits
Fully-encapsulating suits
Gloves
Boots
Disposables
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C-8
Hardhats
Eye protection
Face shields
Duct tape
Other
Monitoring Instruments
Combustible gas indicators
Oxygen meters
Detector tubes
Organic survey meters
Radiation survey meters
Passive dosimeters
Specific survey instruments
Litmus paper, pH paper
Other
Sampling Equipment
Sampling devices
Containers
Labels
Packaging
Other
Coaraunications Equipment
Radios/"walkie-talkies"
Telephones
Megaphones
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C-9
Horns
Other
Contamination Reduction Equipment
Buckets, tubs, containers
Plastic
Brushes
Water
Detergent
Sprayers
Other
References
EPA Extremely Hazardous Chemicals Profiles
Department of Transportation Emergency Response Guidebook
Documentation Equipment:
Video cameras
Still cameras
Tape recorders
Note pads
Other
Heavy Equipment
Backhoes
Dump trucks
Vacuum trucks
Offload tankers
Cranes
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C-10
Bulldozers
Other
Miscellaneous
Meteorological equipment
Clipboards
Binoculars
Salvage drums
Barriers for site control
Tools
Other
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D-l
APPENDIX D5
Criteria for Assessing State and Local Preparedness
C.1 INTRODUCTION
The criteria in this appendix, an adaptation of criteria developed by the Preparedness
Committee of the NRT in August 1985, represent a basis for assessing a State or local
hazardous materials emergency response preparedness program. These criteria reflect
the basic elements judged to be important for a successful emergency preparedness
program.
The criteria are separated into six categories, all of which are closely interrelated. These
categories are hazards analysis, authority, organizational structure, communications, re-
sources, and emergency planning.
These criteria may be used for assessing the emergency plan as well as the emergency
preparedness program in general. It must be recognized, however, that faw Stata or
local governments will hava tha need and/or capability to addraaa all these lasues and
meet all these criteria to the fullest axtant. Resource limitations and the results of the
hazards analysis will strongly influence the necessary degree of planning and prepared-
ness. Those governmental units that do not have adequate resources are encouraged to
seek assistance and take advantage of all resources that are available.
Other criteria exist that could be used for assessing a community's preparedness and
emergency planning. These include FEMA's CPQ 1-35 (Hazard Identification, Capability
Assessment and Multi-Year Development Plan for Local Governments) and CPQ 1-8A.
Additionally, States may have issued criteria for assessing capability.
C.2 THE CRITERIA
C.2.1 Hazards Analysis
"Hazards Analysis" includes the procedures for determining the susceptibility or vulner-
ability of a geographical area to a hazardous materials release, for identifying potential
sources of a hazardous materials release from fixed facilities that manufacture, process,
or otherwise use, store, or dispose of materials that are generally considered hazardous
in an unprotected environment. This also includes an analysis of the potential or probable
hazard of transporting hazardous materials through a particular area.
A hazards analysis is generally considered to consist of identification of potential hazards,
determination of the vulnerability of an area as a result of the existing hazards, and an
assessment of the risk of a hazardous materials release or spill.
The following criteria may assist in assessing a hazards analysis:
a Has a hazards analysis been completed for the area? If one exists, when was it
last updated?
D Does the hazards analysis include the location, quantity, and types of hazardous
materials that are manufactured, processed, used, disposed, or stored within
the appropriate area?
_
•* These criteria have been reprinted from the Hazardous Materials
Emergency Planning Guide (NRT-1), prepared by the National Response Team.
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D-2
D Was it done in accordance with community right-to-know laws and prefire
plans?
D Does it include the routes by which the hazardous materials are transported?
D Have areas of public health concern been identified?
Have sensitive environmental areas been identified?
Have historical data on spill incidents been collected and evaluated?
Have the levels of vulnerability and probable locations of hazardous materials
incidents been identified?
D Are environmentally sensitive areas and population centers considered in ana-
lyzing the hazards of the transportation routes and fixed facilities?
C.2.2 Authority
"Authority" refers to those statutory authorities or other legal authorities vested in any
personnel, organizations, agencies, or other entities in responding to or being prepared
for responding to hazardous materials emergencies resulting from releases or spills.
The following criteria may be used to assess the existing legal authorities for response
actions:
D Do clear legal authorities exist to establish a comprehensive hazardous materials
response mechanism (Federal, State, county, and local laws, ordinances, and
policies)?
D Do these authorities delegate command and control responsibilities between the
different organizations within the same level of government (horizontal), and/or
provide coordination procedures to be followed?
D Do they specify what agency(ies) has (have) overall responsibility for directing
or coordinating a hazardous materials response?
D Do they specify what agency(ies) has (have) responsibility for providing assis-
tance or support for hazardous materials response and what comprises that
assistance or support?
D Have the agency(ies) with authority to order evacuation of the community been
identified?
D Have any limitations in the legal authorities been identified?
C.2.3 Organizational Structure
"Organization" refers to the organizational structure in place for responding to emergen-
cies. This structure will, of course, vary considerably from State to State and from locality
to locality.
There are two basic types of organizations involved in emergency response operations.
The first is involved in the planning and policy decision process similar to the NRT and
RRT. The second is the operational response group that functions within the precepts set
forth in the State or local plan. Realizing that situations vary from State to State and
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D-3
locality to locality and that emergency planning for the State and local level may involve
the preparation of multiple situation plans or development of a single comprehensive plan,
the criteria should be broadly based and designed to detect a potential flaw that would
then precipitate a more detailed review.
D Are the following organizations included in the overall hazardous materials emer-
gency preparedness activities?
• Health organizations (including mental health organizations)
• Public safety
o fire
o police
o health and safety (including occupational safety and health)
o other responders
• Transportation
• Emergency management/response planning
• Environmental organizations
• Natural resources agencies (including trustee agencies)
• Environmental agencies with responsibilities for:
o fire
o health
o water quality
o air quality
o consumer safety
• Education system (in general)
o public education
o public information
• Private sector interface
o trade organizations
o industry officials
• Labor organizations
D Have each organization's authorities, responsibilities, and capabilities been de-
termined for pre-response (planning and prevention), response (implementing
the plan during an incident), and post-response (cleanup and restoration) activi-
ties?
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D-4
n Has one organization been given the command and control responsibility for
these three phases of emergency response?
D Has a "chain of command" been established for response control through all ,
levels of operation?
D Are the roles, relationships, and coordination procedures between government
and non-government (private entities) delineated? Are they.understood by all
affected parties? How are they instituted (written, verbal)?
D Are clear interrelationships, and coordination procedures between government
and non-government (private entities) delineated? Are they understood by all
affected parties? How are they instituted (written, verbal)?
i
D Are the agencies or departments that provide technical guidance during a re-
sponse the same agencies or departments that provide technical guidance in
non-emergency situations? In other words, does the organizational structure
vary with the type of situation to be addressed?
D Does the organizational structure provide a mechanism to meet regularly for
planning and coordination?
D Does the organizational structure provide a mechanism to regularly exercise the
response organization?
D Has a simulation exercise been conducted within the last year to test the organ-
izational structure?
n Does the organizational structure provide a mechanism to review the activities
conducted during a response or exercise to correct shortfalls?
D Have any limitations within the organizational structure been identified?
D Is the organizational structure compatible with the Federal response organization
in the NCR?
D Have trained and equipped incident commanders been identified?
D Has the authority for site decisions been vested in the incident commanders?
D Have the funding sources for a response been identified?
D How quickly can the response system be activated?
C.2.4 Communication
"Communication" means any form or forms of exchanging information or ideas for emer-
gency response with other entities, either internal or external to the existing organizational
structure.
Coordination:
D Have procedures been established for coordination of information during a re-
sponse?
D Has one organization been designated to coordinate communications activities? ,
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D-5
a Have radio frequencies been established to facilitate coordination between dif-
ferent organizations?
Information Exchange:
D Does a formal system exist for information sharing among agencies, organiza-
tions, and the private sector?
D Has a system been established to ensure that "lessons learned" are passed to
the applicable organizations?
Information Dissemination:
D Has a system been identified to carry out public information/community relations
activities?
D Has one organization or individual been designated to coordinate with or speak
to the media concerning the release?
D Is there a communication link with an Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) point
of entry (CPCS-1) station?
D Does a communications system/method exist to disseminate information to re-
sponders, affected public, etc.?
D Is this system available 24-hours per day?
D Have alternate systems/methods of communications been identified for use if
the primary method fails?
D Does a mechanism exist to keep telephone rosters up-to-date?
D Are communications networks tested on a regular basis?
Information Sources and Database Sharing:
n Is a system available to provide responders with rapid information on the haz-
ards of chemicals involved in an incident?
D Is this information available on a 24-hour basis? Is it available in computer soft-
ware?
D Is a system in place to update the available information sources?
Notification Procedures:
n Have specific procedures for notification of a hazardous materials incident been
developed?
D Are multiple notifications required by overlapping requirements (e.g., State,
county, local each have specific notification requirements)?
D Does the initial notification system have a standardized list of information that is
collected for each incident?
D Does a network exist for notifying and activating necessary response personnel?
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D-6
D Does a network exist for notifying or warning the public of potential hazards re-
sulting from a release? Does this network have provisions for informing the
public what hazards to expect, what precautions to take, whether evacuation is
required, etc.?
D Has a central location or phone number been established for initial notification of
an incident?
D Is the central location or phone number accessible on a 24-hour basis?
D Does the central location phone system have the ability to expand to a multiple
line system during an emergency?
Clearinghouse Functions:
n Has a central clearinghouse for hazardous materials information been estab-
lished with access by the public and private sector?
C.2.5 Resources
"Resource" means the personnel, training, equipment, facilities, and other sources avail-
able for use in responding to hazardous materials emergencies. To the extent that the
hazards analysis has identified the appropriate level of preparedness for the area, these
criteria may be used in evaluating available resources of the jurisdiction undergoing re-
view.
Personnel:
D Have the numbers of trained personnel available for hazardous materials been
determined?
O Has the location of trained personnel available for hazardous materials been
determined? Are these personnel located in areas identified in the hazards
analysis as:
• heavily populated;
• high hazard areas - i.e., numbers of chemical (or other hazardous materi-
als) production facilities in well-defined areas;
• hazardous materials storage, disposal, and/or treatment facilities; and
• transit routes?
D Are sufficient personnel available to maintain a given level of response capability
identified as being required for the area?
D Has the availability of special technical expertise (chemists, industrial hygienists,
toxicologists, occupational health physicians, etc.) necessary for response been
identified?
D Have limitations on the use of above personnel resources been identified?
D Do mutual aid agreements exist to facilitate interagency support between organi-
zations?
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D-7
Training:
n Have the-training needs for the State/local area been identified?
D Are centralized response training facilities available?
D Are specialized courses available covering topics such as:
• organizational structures for response actions (i.e., authorities and coordi-
nation) ;
• response actions;
• equipment selection, use, and maintenance; and
• safety and first aid?
D Does the organizational structure provide training and cross training for or be-
tween organizations in the response mechanism?
D Does an organized training program for all involved response personnel exist?
Has one agency been designated to coordinate this training?
D Have training standards or criteria been established for a given level of response
capability? Is any certification provided upon completion of the training?
D Has the level of training available been matched to the responsibilities or capa-
bilities of the personnel being trained?
D Does a system exist for evaluating the effectiveness of training?
n Does the training program provide for "refresher courses" or some other
method to ensure that personnel remain up-to-date in their level of expertise?
D Have resources and organizations available to provide training been identified?
D Have standardized curricula been established to facilitate consistent Statewide
training?
Equipment:
D Have response equipment requirements been identified for a given level of re-
sponse capability?
a Are the following types of equipment available?
• personal protective equipment
• first aid and other medical emergency equipment
• emergency vehicles available for hazardous materials response
• sampling equipment (air, water, soil, etc.) and other monitoring devices
(e.g., explosivity meters, oxygen meters)
• analytical equipment or'facilities available for sample analyses
_
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D-8
• fire-fighting equipment/other equipment and material (bulldozers, boats,
helicopters, vacuum trucks, tank trucks, chemical retardants, foam)
D Are sufficient quantities of each type of equipment available on a sustained ba-
sis?
D Is all available equipment capable of operating in the local environmental condi-
tions?
D Are up-to-date equipment lists maintained? Are they computerized?
D Are equipment lists available to all responders? —
D Are these lists broken down into the various types of equipment (e.g., protec-
tive clothing, monitoring instruments, medical supplies, transportation equip-
ment)?
D Is there a mechanism to ensure that the lists are kept up-to-date?
D Have procedures necessary to obtain equipment on a 24-hour basis been identi-
fied?
D Does a program exist to carry out required maintenance of equipment?
D Are there maintenance and repair records for each piece of equipment?
D Have mutual aid agreements been established for the use of specialized re-
sponse equipment?
D Is sufficient communications equipment available for notifying personnel or to
transmit information? Is the equipment of various participating agencies com-
patible?
D Is transportation equipment available for moving equipment rapidly to the scene
of an incident, and its state of readiness assured?
Facilities:
n Have facilities capable of performing rapid chemical analyses been identified?
D Do adequate facilities exist for storage and cleaning/reconditioning of response
equipment?
D Have locations or facilities been identified for the storage, treatment, recycling.
and disposal of wastes resulting from a release?
D Do adequate facilities exist for carrying out training programs?
D Do facilities exist that are capable of providing medical treatment to persons
injured by chemical exposure?
D Have facilities and procedures been identified for housing persons requiring
evacuation or temporary relocation as a result of an incident?
D Have facilities been identified that are suitable for command centers?
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D-9
C.2.6 Emergency Plan
The emergency plan, while it relates to many of the above criteria, also stands alone as a
means to assess preparedness at the State and local level of government, and in the
private sector. The following questions are directed more toward evaluating the plan
rather than determining the preparedness level of the entity that has developed the plan.
It is not sufficient to ask if there is a plan, but rather to determine if the plan that does exist
adequately addresses the needs of the community or entity for which the plan was devel-
oped.
D Have the levels of vulnerability and probable locations of hazardous materials
incidents been identified in the plan?
D Have areas of public health concern been identified in the plan?
D Have sensitive environmental areas been identified in the plan?
D For the hazardous materials identified in the area, does the plan include,informa-
tion on the chemical and physical properties of the materials, safety and emer-
gency response information, and hazard mitigation techniques? (NOTE: It is not
necessary that all this information be included in the emergency plan; the plan
should, however, at least explain where such information is available.)
D Have all appropriate agencies, departments, or organizations been involved in
the process of developing or reviewing the plan?
D Have all the appropriate agencies, departments, or organizations approved the
plan?
D
D
D
D
D
D
Has the organizational structure and notification list defined in the plan been
reviewed in the lasjt six months?
Is the organizational structure identified in the plan compatible with the Federal
response organization in the NCP?
Has one organization been identified in the plan as having command and control
responsibility for the pre-response, response, and post response phases?
Does the plan define the organizational responsibilities and relationships among
city, county, district, State, and Federal response agencies?
Are all organizations that have a role in hazardous materials response identified
in the plan (public safety and health, occupational safety and health, transporta-
tion, natural resources, environmental, enforcement, educational, planning, and
private sector)?
Are the procedures and contacts necessary to activate or deactivate the organi-
zation clearly given in the plan for the pre-response, response, and post-re-
sponse phases?
Does the organizational structure outlined in the plan provide a mechanism to
review the activities conducted during a response or exercise to correct short-
falls?
Does the plan include a communications system/method to disseminate infor-
mation to responders, affected public, etc.?
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D-10
D Has a system been identified in the plan to carry out public information/commu-
nity relations activities?
D Has a central location or phone number been included in the plan for initial notifi-
cation of an incident?
D Have trained and equipped incident commanders been identified in the plan?
D Does the plan include the authority for vesting site decisions in the incident com-
mander?
D Have government agency personnel that may be involved in response activities
been involved in the planning process?
D Have local private response organizations (e.g., chemical manufacturers, com-
mercial cleanup contractors) that are available to assist during a response been
identified in the plan?
D Does the plan provide for frequent training exercises to train personnel or to test
the local contingency plans?
D Are lists/systems that identify emergency equipment available to response per-
sonnel included in the plan?
D Have locations of materials most likely to be used in mitigating the effects of a
release (e.g., foam, sand, lime) been identified in the plan?
D Does the plan address the potential needs for evacuation, what agency is
authorized to order or recommend an evacuation, how it will be carried out, and
where people will be moved?
D Has an emergency operating center, command center, or other central location
with the necessary communications capabilities been identified in the plan for
coordination of emergency response activities?
D Are there follow-up response activities scheduled in the plan?
D Are there procedures for updating the plan?
D Are there addenda provided with the plan, such as: laws and ordinances, statu-
tory responsibilities, evacuation plans, community relations plan, health plan,
and resource inventories (personnel, equipment, maps [not restricted to road
maps], and mutual aid agreements)?
D Does the plan address the probable simultaneous occurrence of different types
of emergencies (e.g., power outage and hazardous materials releases) and the
presence of multiple hazards (e.g., flammable and corrosive) during hazardous
materials emergencies?
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E-l
APPENDIX E
Regional Federal Agency Contacts
The following are contacts at the Regional offices of both EPA and the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) that can be of assistance in
planning and conducting field simulation exercises.
EPA REGIONAL OFFICES (direct inquiries to "EPA Regional Preparedness Staff")
Region I (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island,
Vermont)
John F. Kennedy Building, Rm. 2203
Boston, MA 02203
(617) 565-3715
Region II (New Jersey, New York, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands)
26 Federal Plaza, Room 900
New York, NY 10278
(212) 264-2525
Region III (Delaware, Washington, D.C., Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia,
West Virginia)
841 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19107
(215) 597-9800
Region IV (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Tennessee)
345 Courtland Street, N.E.
Atlanta, GA 30365
(404) 347-4727
Region V (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Wisconsin)
230 S. Dearborn Street
Chicago, IL 60604
(312) 353-2000
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E-2
Region VI (Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas)
1445 Ross Avenue
Dallas, TX 75202-2733
(214) 655-6444
Region VII (Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska)
726 Minnesota Avenue
Kansas City, KS 66101
(913) 236-2800
Region VIII (Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Wyoming)
999 18th Street, Suite 500
Denver, CO 80202-2405
(303) 293-1603
Region IX (Arizona, California, Hawaii,, Nevada, American Samoa, Guam)
215 Fremont Street
San Francisco, CA 94105
(415) 974-8153
Region X (Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, Washington)
1200 6th Avenue
Seattle, WA 98101
(206) 442-5810
FEHA REGIONAL OFFICES (direct inquiries to "Hazmat Program Staff")
Region I
442 J.W. McCormack POCH
Boston, MA 02109
(617) 223-9540
Region II
Room 1338
26 Federal Plaza
New York, NY 10278
(212) 238-8200
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E-3
Region III
Region IV
Region V
Region VI
Region VII
Region VIII
Liberty Square Building
105 S. 7th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19106
(215) 931-5500
Suite 700
1371 Peachtree Street, N.E.
Atlanta, GA 30309
(404) 347-2400
4th Floor
175 W. Jackson
Chicago, IL 60604
(312) 431-5500
Federal Center
Attention Hazmat
800 N. Loop 288
Denton, TX 76201
(817) 898-9399
911 Walnut Street, Room 200
Kansas City, MO 64106
(816) 283-7063
Denver Federal Center, Building 710
Box 25267
Denver, CO 80225-0267
(303) 235-4811
Region
Building 105
Presidio of San Francisco, CA 94129
(415) 923-7100
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Region X
E-4
Federal Regional Center
130 228th St., S.W.
Bothell, WA 98021-9796
(206) 481-8800
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F-l
APPENDIX F
References to Additional Information
The following sources have been used as background information in the
preparation of this Technical Assistance Bulletin and may be useful in
planning specific exercises:
• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Environmental Response Team (ERT)
26 W. St. Glair St. ~^~~-
Cincinnati, OH 45268
(513) 569-7537
The ERT has considerable experience in planning and evaluating
field exercises. They can assist directly in state and local
exercises; alternatively, they have resource material (e.g.,
sample scenarios and checklists) that can be used.
• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region VII Technical
Assistance Team: "The Day Before...Chemical Response Planning
Through Simulation, A Production Guide." Contact: Regional
Preparedness Staff at (913) 236-2800.
A very useful, hands-on guide to planning and conduction field
simulation exercises.
1 • Federal Emergency Management Agency: "Exercise Design Course Guide
to Emergency Management Exercises." (See Appendix E for FEMA
Regional contacts.)
Although this was prepared as an accompaniment to a course
taught by FEMA, it is also useful as a stand-alone
introduction to designing all types of emergency exercises.
• National Response Team: Hazardous Materials Emergency Planning
Guide (NRT-1), March 1987. Contact National Response Team at G-
WER/12, 2100 2nd St., S.W., Washington, D.C. 20593.
This is the Federal "bible" on planning for hazardous
materials emergency responses. It is intended to provide
state and local agencies with very specific guidance in their
own planning efforts. Will be helpful in evaluating the
results of a field simulation exercise and in linking
exercises to an effective planning process.
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EXAMPLE SIMULATION EXERCISE SCENARIOS
Scenario 1: Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride Spill During Transfer Operations
XYZ Chemicals, Inc., produces a small line of acids for sale in the
manufacturing and trade markets. XYZ stores and handles a variety of
chemicals on-site for use in its own processes; in addition, XYZ products are
often stored on plant grounds pending shipment to customers.
XYZ's Lake City plant is located in a neighborhood characterized by a
mix of industrial and residential land uses. Local industrial facilities
include two large steel plants, an oil refinery, and numerous specialty
chemical plants. The XYZ facility itself is bounded on the north by a spur
of the Union Railroad; on the south by the Grand River; on the west by Elm
Street and a rail line; and on the east by First Street. Beyond the River on
the south is an interstate highway that is heavily traveled. Within two
miles north of the plant are seven schools and a hospital. Just north of the
plant, across the Union tracks, is a residential neighborhood; additional
residential zones of Lake City and Middletown lie one and one-half miles to
the south and southwest, and three miles to the southeast.
Returning from their noon break, two XYZ workers resume the task of
transferring anhydrous hydrogen fluoride (AHF) from a pressurized rail car to
a 15,000 gallon outdoor storage tank at a transfer point 200 yards from the
main part of the plant. They had allowed the transferring pump to operate
unattended and find upon returning that the failure of an automatic shutoff
valve has resulted in a spill of approximately 1000 gallons of AHF. The
liquid AHF has begun to pool, giving rise to vapor. Inhaling these vapors,
both workers suffer severe respiratory injury. Although one worker collapses
immediately, the other succeeds in activating the plant safety alarm, thereby
alerting the shift supervisor that an emergency has occurred at the transfer
site.
The supervisor drives to investigate the accident. Smelling the strong
presence of AHF vapors in the air, the supervisor stops his vehicle 200 feet
from the accident site and radios the plant gate to notify the Lake City
emergency response authorities by calling 911. In the process of suiting up
with protective equipment, the supervisor himself collapses.
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Scenario 2: 803 Spill From Severed Feedline
The PQX Chemical Go. plant, located on Lee Highway in Blackrock City,
manufactures a variety of corrosive, toxic, and flammable chemicals. Many of
these chemicals are stored at the plant pending shipment to customers.
The Blackrock plant occupies 50 acres of land and is situated in an area
composed of commercial, industrial, and residential land uses. The plant
property is bounded on the north by Lee Highway; on the east by a rail line;
on the south by Interstate 20; and on the west by the Black River. Beyond
the river to the west, is the Black River Estates housing development. South
of Interstate 20 is the Clover Hill housing development. On the north side
of Lee Highway lies a mixture of commercial and industrial buildings. East
of the railroad line, there are a variety of industrial facilities. A
railroad siding extends into the plant property to the outside storage area.
One clear Saturday morning, a day when the plant is not operating, a
repair crew is working on replacing a section of pipe that is connected to
the top of an empty tank. After disconnection, a crane is used to lower the
pipe onto a flat bed truck. As the crane boom is swung over a nearby tank of
liquid sulfur trioxide, the cable snaps, dropping the pipe. The falling pipe
shears off the 803 tank's feedline between the tank wall and the first block
valve. The four-inch diameter feedline leading from the tank to the process
plant begins leaking immediately. An excess flow valve between the leak and
the tank limits the rate of flow to 30 gallons per minute.
Spilled liquid 803 collects within the containment dike surrounding the.
tanks. Upon contact with the moisture in the air, the spilled 803 vaporizes
into a white mist resembling steam. The wind, coming from the northwest at
5 mph, blows the vapors directly onto the nearby repair crew that had removed
the old piping. Three of the four repairmen are overcome by the vapors, with
two of them lying unconscious on top of the tank on which they had been
working. The lone conscious repairman drags the remaining worker from the
hazardous area and then runs into the main plant to report the accident.
Experiencing burning eyes and difficult breathing, he decides to remain
indoors awaiting the arrival of the fire department.
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Scenario 3: Petrochemical/Chlorine Spill Front Truck/Train Collision
Alpha Transfer Depot, Inc., facilitates the transfer of various bulk
commodities from trains to trucks for local delivery within the Junction City
metropolitan area. Alpha's specialty is the bulk handling of petroleum and
hazardous substances.
Alpha's facility is located adjacent to a regional train yard. Alpha's
facility and the train yard itself are bounded by an interstate highway,
which serves as a commutation route between Junction City's outlying suburbs
and its Central Business District (CBD), and Small Creek, which is a
tributary of Big River, which in turn flows through the CBD. The
neighborhood surrounding the depot and train yard, which are 3 miles from the
CBD, is primarily a run-down industrial/warehouse district. On the opposite
creek bank, however, is a large mobile home park primarily populated by
elderly and low-income people.
At 6:00 on a. warm summer morning, an Alpha delivery truck carrying a
full load of 55-gallon drums containing various petrochemical products
accidentally collides with a slow-moving haul train towing 2 tank cars of
liquid chlorine. Both tank cars derail, with substantial denting and a
puncture occurring to one, resulting in a rapid leakage of chlorine. The
truck overturns, spilling and rupturing many of its barrels with a resulting
leakage of a significant quantity of petrochemicals. Light, directionally
variable winds begin spreading chlorine fumes. Liquid chlorine and
petrochemicals begin to mix on the ground.
The accident is observed from a distance by another truck driver who
notifies the manager-on-duty. The conductor of the haul train, although
shaken and suffering eye irritation due to chlorine fumes, is able to rescue
the truck driver, who has been overcome by chlorine fumes, dragging him away
from the accident site. The'exertion of the rescue and additional exposure
to the fumes finally cause the conductor to pass out. Both men are attended
to by a skeleton crew of depot workers. Realizing that both the truck driver
and conductor are unconscious, and seeing evidence of skin burns, the depot
manager calls 911 to ensure that emergency medical personnel and hazmat units
are summoned.
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Scenario 4: Acid Spill From Ruptured Pipeline
Lakeside Chemicals, Inc., produces a variety of acids for sale as
intermediates to other chemical manufacturers. Lakeside stores and handles a
wide variety of chemicals on-site, both for process use and in storage for
shipment to customers.
Lakeside's plant is located in a neighborhood which is primarily
industrial in nature. There are several other industrial plants nearby as
well as a number of warehouses. The warehouses are adjacent to port
facilities along Muddy River, which carries a significant volume of barge and
recreational boat traffic. Lakeside's plant is adjacent to a spur of the IHR
Railroad on the north; warehouses on the south and east; and a metal plating
facility on the west. Kennedy Boulevard and Eisenhower Avenue, both major
arterial streets, intersect one block from the plant gate. Just across the
IHR tracks is the Lakeside Community Airport, which provides commuter service
to major airports in the region. Muddy River lies a quarter-mile to the
east.
The nearest dense residential neighborhoods are two miles distant to the
north and west.
At 3:30 on a drizzly weekday afternoon, a charter plane carrying 6
people takes off from the Lakeside Airport. The plane- experiences engine
trouble and fails to achieve sufficient altitude. The pilot attempts to make
an emergency landing on vacant land within Lakeside's plant property. After
safely touching down, the plane collides with a pipeline carrying sulfuric
acid from a Lakeside storage facility to the IHR rail spur for loading on
tank cars. The plane flips over and catches fire 100 yards from the
pipeline. The pipeline immediately begins to spew acid, which comes in
contact with rain puddles that have formed over two days of rainy weather.
Winds are light and blowing from the south.
The incident is observed from a distance by plant workers in the midst
of a shift change. One of the workers calls the safety manager, who in turn
directs the plant's emergency crew into operation. The emergency crew
approaches within 200 yards of the accident scene. Spotting acid fumes
rising from the area of the pipeline, the crew stops and radios the safety
manager. Informed about the fumes, the safety manager instructs the crew not
to approach any closer. He calls 911 to summon the Lakeside Fire Department.
There are no immediate signs of survivors from the plane crash.
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Scenario 5: Anaemia Spill At A Pesticides Plant
The'Green Fertilizer Company manufactures a variety of fertilizers for
sale in the retail market. Their Exurbia Township plant specializes in
ammonia-based fertilizers, which are produced and trucked to Green's regional
distribution centers around the country.
Green's Exurbia plant is located ten miles outside Centerville, a major
regional trading center. Exurbia Township is sparsely populated and is
characterized primarily by a mix of agricultural and light industrial land
uses. Along the western boundary of the is Ample River, which serves as the
maj'or source of drinking water for Centerville. In the immediate vicinity of
the plant are a large truck stop along an interstate highway, 150 yards east
of the plant; and a county farm labor housing project, 300 yards south of the
plant.
At 10:00 on a blustery winter weekday morning, plant workers hear a loud
noise coming from the vicinity of a pipe carrying. Anhydrous Ammonia from a
10,000 gallon storage vessel into the building housing the fertilizer
manufacturing process. The pipe has ruptured, resulting in the rapid flow of
product onto the ground. Although the Ammonia is rapidly vaporizing, it has
also begun to pool. The weather is relatively warm, due to a temperature
inversion. Winds are blowing out of the northwest.
r
A plant worker walks out of the plant building to investigate the noise.
Seeing the leaking ammonia and smelling fumes, the worker quickly retreats
inside the building and radios the plant safety manager. The plant manager
in turn radios the plant emergency response team to report for duty, and
calls the Exurbia Township Fire Department to request back-up assistance.
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Scenarlo 6: Nitric Acid/Diesel Fuel Spill At A Munitions Plant
Precision Weaponry Co. manufactures ordnance for sale to the U.S.
Government and private companies. Its principal products include explosives
and ammunition. Although Precision does store a small quantity of its
products on its Middlesex County plant site, it consciously strives to
minimize explosion hazards by maintaining minimum inventories.
Precision's Middlesex facility is quite large, with idle ground used as
a buffer between production facilities and the plant fenceline. When it was
constructed after World War II, the plant was in an isolated location.
However, development over the last two decades has introduced a variety of
low-density industrial and commercial land uses into the immediate
neighborhood. A large retiree mobile home village, located two miles south,
is the nearest residential development. The Precision plant lies in the
Whisky River Valley, a two mile-wide drainage basin framed by the Saddleback
Hills.
At 3:00 one weekday afternoon, a tanker truck delivering diesel fuel to
the plant collides with an empty Precision delivery truck. The force of the
impact drives the Precision truck into a 20,000 gallon tank full of Nitric
Acid stored for use in manufacturing explosives. The Nitric Acid tank begins
to leak profusely. The delivery truck immediately catches fire. The diesel
tanker truck careens into an adjacent utility building, causing a release
valve to open. Diesel fuel begins to leak and mix with Nitric Acid ponding
on the ground. Fumes immediately begin forming.
The driver of the diesel tanker is unhurt and is able to climb out of
his cab. Immediately assessing the situation, he runs 100 yards to the
nearest building to notify plant management. Shortly thereafter, the driver
collapses, suffering from respiratory difficulties. The plant safety manager
begins to marshall his emergency response team and calls for assistance from
the Middlesex County Hazmat Squad.
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