United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Office Of
The Administrator
(A101F)
171 R-92-012
ApriM992
Delegating Superfund
Responsibilities: Implementation
Strategies And Political
Ramifications Of A State-Wide
Lead Metal
28 ^
Printed on Recycled Paper
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DISCLAIMER
This report was furnished to the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency by the student identified on the cover page, under a National
Network for Environmental Management Studies fellowship.
The contents are essentially as received from the author. The
opinions, findings, and conclusions expressed are those of the author
and not necessarily those of the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency. Mention, if any, of company, process, or product names is
not to be considered as an endorsement by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency.
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Delegating auoerfupd Responsibilities; ...
implementation strategies and political Ramifications of
A state-wide Lead Model
By Steve Schwartz
National Network for Environmental Management Studies
Office of Emergency and Remedial Response, U.S. EPA
11/25/91
U.S. tVivl.i'.ircenta! Protection Agency
Ki,,;i;3ii'.':.(,t;»>v (P!.-!2J)
7? \vv%< •. ^..',. . • ;--:.-5vdJ i?th Floor
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYI
PURPOSE:
Federal officials manage the great majority of Superfund
program work. States have assisted in this process on a site-by-
site basis. This contrasts with other EPA programs in which states
take responsibility for all work within their boundaries. This
paper presents a model for an increased delegation of Superfund
responsibilities to qualified states and tribes. Guidelines for
implementing this policy shift are addressed as well as political
ramifications for various stakeholders.
BACKGROUND:
This paper was written with a National Network For
Environmental Management Studies Fellowship grant sponsored by the
Office of . Emergency and Remedial Response, United States
Environmental Protection Agency.
ASSUMPTIONS:
1. Certain states are at least as qualified as the
EPA to cover all aspects of Superfund work.
2. A site by site delegation to these states is
costly, inefficient, time consuming and
unnecessary. ...
3. States will only take on added responsibilities if
a delegation program includes incentives to
encourage this.
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PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS:
Delegation should provide maximum flexibility in
implementing clear federal standards for cleanup fo
sites.
Model delegation after EPA's Underground Storage
Tanks program.
Authorization should be contingent on a state's
adoption of a policy of "No Less Stringent" than
federal regulations.
EPA regional - offices should make decisions on
authorization with formal input from interested
parties including industry and the environmental
community.
Create and write into law a mechanism for state-
wide lead. Alternatively, expand on the Core Grant
program to facilitate the transfer of funding to
states.
RAMIFICATIONS:
A delegation will be met with mixed response both inside and
outside of the EPA. States and industry are likely to support
enhanced authority for qualified state programs. Opposition will
likely come from Congress due to the high political visibility of
Superfund. EPA officials represent a range of views. To overcome
any opposition and to ensure effective implementation EPA
executives must strongly support a delegation program.
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INTRODUCTION;
This paper proposes an improved process of delegating
responsibilities for Superfund program work to state and tribal
governments. The paper describes the program briefly, including a
description of state involvement, as well as criticisms from
various analysts. The next section examines the desirability of
delegation vis-a-vis clients affected by Superfund. Finally, using
a comparison of three Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
programs the paper derives an improved method of delegating
responsibilities from federal jurisdiction to states.
Delegation to state and tribal government is consistent with
the current Administration's views of federalism as well as the
legislative intent of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) and the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA). To fully
implement the policy changes recommended in this paper the Agency
will need to obtain statutory changes from Congress during the
reauthorization process in 1993.
in comparison to Superfund, both the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Underground Storage Tanks program (UST)
represent a categorically larger amount of state managed work. Both
programs provide insight into an appropriate policy design for
Superfund. RCRA has advantages in that it provides a state with
full authorization to implement the program and includes clearly
defined areas for federal intervention including when to revoke a
state's authorization. UST provides considerable flexibility to
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Regional offices determining whether or not to delegate. The UST
program also offers states flexibility in designing a system to
meet the federal standards. The UST program process of delegation
provides the fundamental elements for the proposed Superfund model.
However, the model incorporates aspects of both systems in order to
best address the large budget and high political visibility of
Superfund.
METHODOLOGY:
This paper represents research at EPA headquarters in
Washington D.C., Arlington, Virginia, and EPA Region 9 in San
Francisco. In addition representatives of diverse advocacy groups
were interviewed in San Francisco, Washington, D.C. and Sacramento,
California. These lobbyists represent waste management officials,
and environmental organizations. Written research materials
included EPA publications, and to a lesser degree, independent
non-governmental sources.
The paper presents a process model illustrating, broadly, the
crucial actors involved in decision-making for each of the
programs. Systems diagrams based on the work of Beer1, and
Schoderbek et. al2 are used. The paper attempts to build on recent
work done on increasing the states' role in implementing Superfund.
This includes brief comment on two EPA commissioned studies,
Enhancing State Superfund Capabiliites; A Nine-State Study and An
Analysis of State Superfund Programs; A Fifty State Study.3
Research was funded by a grant from the National Network For
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Environmental Management Studies. The grant is sponsored by the
Environmental Protection Agency's Office of Emergency and Remedial
Response in Washington, D.C.
SUPERFUND:
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act was first passed in 1980 to ensure cleanup of the
nation's worst hazardous waste sites. Superfund accomplishes this
by forcing responsible parties to pay for. the problems they
created. The act created a $1.8 billion fund to pay for sites for
which responsible parties could not be identified or forced to pay.
Additionally, the fund provides for guick emergency cleanup
measures while litigation or negotiation takes place. The Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) provided for
growth in the fund to a projected $8.5 billion dollars, and called
for expanded citizen involvement. In 1990 Congress approved a
simple reauthorization of Superfund which maintained current
statutory authority while continuing the taxing authority.
PRESENT STATE AND TRIBAL INVOLVEMENT IN SUPERFUND:
CERCLA reflects Reagan/Bush era federalism represented by
Reagan's 1982 state of the union address, Executive Order 12372
(1982) and Executive Order 12612 (1987). Executive Order 12612
requires federal agencies "to accord states maximum flexibility in
administering federal programs, and to avoid or minimize preemption
of state policies."4
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States are presently used predominantly to do response
actions. CERCLA authorizes the federal government to transfer the
necessary funds and management responsibility to a states, to
political subdivisions of states or to federally recognized Indian
Tribes. Federally recognized indian tribes are treated virtually
the same as states in terms of CERCLA. This paper uses the term
"states" interchangeably with "states and tribes" unless otherwise
noted.
The agency or government taking primary responsibility for
cleanup at a particular site is known as the "lead". Regardless of
what level of government has the lead, the National Oil and
Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) (40CFR Part
300) sets the regulatory standards that must be'followed. The NCP
and CERCLA as amended reguire that EPA work with States during:
1) Negotiations with potentially responsible
parties (PRP's)
2) The National Priorities List (NPL) listing and
deleting process
3) Study of the site to determine cleanup options
4) Selection and Implementation of the Remedy5
Before EPA will take remedial action within a state, that state
must provide assurances to the Agency. The state must commit to:
ensure availability of a disposal site, and assume full
responsibility for future operation and maintenance. States have a
further obligation to pay a portion of any expenditures from the
fund. State contributions are either 10 or 50 percent depending on
whether or not the state is considered a responsible party. The
maximum burden, fifty percent, is only applicable for sites which
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the state or a political subdivision operated at the time of
disposal.
In the early 1980's state waste management officials expected
to have a considerable role in the implementation of Superfund
according to Stan Phillippe, California Toxic Substances Control
Division. Phillippe is the former Chair of the CERCLA Subcommittee
at the Association of State and Territorial Solid Waste Management
Officials (ASTSWMO). The states reduced their role when they found
there were "two EPA project managers reviewing for every one we
had", says Phillippe.6 The trend has again begun to reverse
recently. The number of state-leads on remedial activities have
increased.7 EPA is supporting further involvement of states
according to "State and Local Involvement in the Superfund
Program", a Fall 1989 Agency fact sheet:
"As the Superfund program continues to address the
hazardous waste issue nationwide, State and local
governments will assume an increasingly active role in
confronting issues at Superfund sites."
A policy designed to increase state involvement, if designed well,
should improve Superfund generally and help the Agency address
criticism of the program.
SHORTCOMINGS OP SDPERFUND AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM:
The Superfund program has a history of criticism from the
media, academia, the business community, the environmentalist
community, state governments and EPA officials alike. According to
a 1989 Los Angeles Times article:
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"More than 30 separate studies have criticized the slow
pace of hazardous waste cleanup under the (Superfund)
program, which has been saddled with cost' over-runs and
tainted by scandal."9
Public frustration has grown as the estimated cost per cleanup site
rose from five to seven million dollars in 1980 to an estimated $25
million in 1989.10 While some analysts complain of too much
paperwork, others claim that a lack of bureaucratic oversight has
led to contractors, with a conflict of interests, cutting corners
with their site cleanup work. The media has often pointed to the
low number of sites that are taken off the National Priorities List
(NPL). Critics also site the overly litigious nature of the
program. Michael Pickard of the Sacramento Toxics Campaign says it
is "cheaper to hire lawyers to delay rather than cleanup11.11
When William Reilly became Administrator of EPA he called for
a full review of the program. The resulting broad critique produced
two reform oriented documents: A Management Review of the Superfund
Program. known as the 90-Day Study, and the accompanying
Implementation Plan.12 These documents, along with a recent
emphasis on Total Quality Management, define the guidelines of
change for the system. The next section reviews reforms recommended
by the EPA and other organizations.
The paper identifies seven strategic goals supported with 48
specific recommendations. Only one of these specifically mentions
the potential role of states in helping meet Superfund challenges.
A second point implies an increased role for states. Specifically
recommending that EPA:
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"Identify more effective ways to include interested
parties in the policy debate at a national level—start
a national dialogue with Superfund's many constituencies
on important elements of the program."
Problem areas identified by the management review team could be
addressed in numerous ways. In many cases the best approach would be
delegation. However, the EPA studies consistently overlook this policy
option. For example the "90 Day Study" calls for: "reduction in the
Regional Project Manager workload, and expansion of the work force and
modifying expected accomplishments."14 From the pro-delegation
perspective which this paper adopts, such a recommendation invites a
larger state role. The committee instead recommended more EPA staff
be hired to achieve the objectives. Similarly, the report calls for
"Encouraging full participation by communities."15 Again greater
utilization of state officials could achieve this.
The agency responded to recommendations in the "90 Day Study"
with a variety of efforts relating to delegation. EPA began working
with the Association of State and Territorial Solid Waste Management
Officials and the National Governor's Association to meet with
representatives at the state level seeking ways to improve state
involvement.
While the recommendations were beginning to be considered within
the Agency, senior management was simultaneously planning a pilot
program in Total Quality Management (TQM) . These executives decided to
test TQM in two EPA offices including the Office of Emergency and
Remedial Response; the Superfund Office. TQM strategies have improved
relations between EPA headquarters and regional offices. Regional
Superfund coordinators are required to prioritize their top five
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hazardous waste sites; reducing review work at headquarters. The EPA
document Incorporating TOM Into OERR. identifies two crucial "building
blocks" of the TQM program; a client or customer orientation, and
delegation of responsibility.16 The Superfund program has a variety
of clients with often conflicting priorities. The TQM approach to
management can provided many insights on how to plan a delegation to
qualified states.
ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF DELEGATION:
To preview, "state-wide lead" and "site-by-site" are two models
used by different EPA programs to delegate responsibility to states.
This paper has argued that some form of increased delegation of
Superfund responsibilities to states and tribes is practical, and
desirable from the perspective of increased efficient cleanup of
hazardous waste sites. Four policy options are available under the
current Superfund system:
1. Continuing federal lead on the majority of sites
while occasionally allowing state lead management on
a site-by-site basis: status quo.
2. Full delegation of Superfund to the 50 states and
relevant tribal governments: orthodox federalism.
3. Selectively delegate to specific states or tribes a
lead role for all the sites in their political
jurisdiction: state-wide lead.
4. Delegate parts of Superfund, i.e. community relations
work, or all enforcement sites:
• piecemeal state-wide lead.
The next section recommends a model for implementing the preferred
option, state-wide lead; option 3. Before developing a process for
deciding which states are qualified it is appropriate to review
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previous work by the agency that sheds light on this question.
The Q state study and the Fifty state Study each highlighted
specific aspects of state capabilities in various states. The main
value of these two detailed analyses was in demonstrating that
different states have alarmingly varied abilities to manage Superfund
responsibilities at this time. For example, the number of staff
working on hazardous waste cleanup range from eleven states which have
10 or fewer states to eight states which have over 100 employees
working in this area.17
This contribution notwithstanding, the reports must be viewed
viewed with caution due to a presupposition underlying the analysis.
The reports imply that quantified description of state capability can
adequately guide decisions regarding a state's qualifications to
implement Superfund responsibilities. Such "bean counting" of the
number of toxicologists or the size of the state program in dollars
may cause decision-makers to overlook the bigger picture. The Nine^
state Study warns against making this mistak explicitly:
The most significant lesson of the study is that a state
program should always be looked at comprehensively—not
just in terms of how many dollars are avialable. Many
different programs can be constructed on the same
resource foundation through different combinations of
approaches.18
Following the UST model, the important issue should be a commitment to
policies and regulations "No Less Stringent" than the federal policy.
THREE SYSTEMS FOR MANAGING STATES INVOLVEMENT:
This section applies a systems or "process" approach to compare
three EPA programs; the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),
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the Underground Storage Tank program (UST) and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("Superfund").
Identifying advantages to each of the first two systems will shed
light on appropriate changes for the implementation of Superfund.
RCRA, UST and CERCLA each deal with hazardous waste management.
RCRA prescribes preventive work to avoid future damage to the
environment while CERCLA is concerned with cleaning up damage already
done. UST addresses both preventive and cleanup work. Though different
programs utilizing very different resources, comparison can provide
insight to EPA strategists considering delegation of responsibility to
states and tribes.
Delegation to states in the Superfund program is done on a site
by site basis, a strong contrast to the other two programs. The system
of state authorization used for UST was designed after the RCRA
program and deliberately sought to improve upon that program. Lite
CERCLA, RCRA and UST delegation programs represent an EPA response to
Reagan Administration new federalism. The next section describes
delegation systems in the three programs.
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act was passed in 1976.
Section III, subtitle C of the act addresses one key goal of RCRA:
"to reduce or eliminate the generation of hazardous waste as
expeditiously as possible." Subtitle C describes the regulation,
generation, transport, treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous
waste. The relationship between the states and indian tribes, and the
U.S. EPA, in implementing RCRA subtitle C, serves as the foundation
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for understanding the other two programs.
RCRA mandates that EPA authorize states, to run the permitting
programs. The process focuses on EPA Headguarters level approval of
state regulations. (See Diagram 1.) The EPA headquarters and regional
offices review a particular state's plan and compare for line by line
congruence with the federal regulations. EPA Headquarters reviews
approvals done at the regional level. A denied application means that
the state must again revise regulations. Authorized governments become
responsible for all RCRA permitting within the state's boundaries.
Tribes receive the same treatment. After a state or tribe gains
approval, the federal officials' job becomes one of occasional
overseer or "auditor". In the event that a state is not enforcing its
approved laws sufficiently the EPA can step in to do independent
enforcement, or in extreme cases to revoke authorization. This has not
yet occurred in practice.
As of 1991, 47 states have been authorized. For the states which
have not been authorized there appears to be little incentive to hurry
up. Richard Vaille of EPA's Western Region State Programs Branch, says
the RCRA program provides neither a carrot nor a stick. Vaille
estimates that EPA funds approximately 65 of 700 of California
hazardous waste management positions. Due to the relative
insignificance of the federal funding a "threat is not so important"
according to Vaille.19
Due to the emphasis on line-for-line equivalence with federal
regulations, state RCRA laws are constantly in need of revision. This
continuous process leads to frequent repetition of the cycle, for some
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RCRA DELEGATION MODEL
INPUT
PROCESS
OUTPUT
Application
Preparation
Resources
(State)
EPA funds
State
Application
Revised
State
Regulations
RCRA
Legislation
EPA HQ Policy
on Delegation and
—&*
Calls for
Delegation
Application
to the EPA
Regional
Offices
» ^
^
— *•
Decentralization
EPA Regional
Office Reviews
1. Comparison
line-by-line to
Federal Reg.s
2. Checks state
capabilities;
i.e.staffing levels
EPA
Headquarters
Review
Authorized
I
Denied Authorization
Pressure to:
-Seek Approval
State
Authorized
to Do All
Decisions
(For One Year)
-(or Deny Authority)
a. Interest Groups
b. Politicians
Diagram 1
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aspects of a state's plan. This may have discouraged qualified states
from applying for authorization.
The UST program was established under RCRA, Section III, subtitle
I. "The objective is to prevent leakage from tanks and to clean up
past releases." The UST model of delegation varies from subtitle C in
four crucial ways: UST allows flexibility for state implementation,
regional authorization decisions, varying definitions of authorization
and a formal funding mechanism for applications. Most importantly the
UST model does not focus on equivalence with federal standards.
Instead, a decision to authorize is based largely on whether or not
the state's program is "no less stringent" than the federal
regulations in the technical and financial responsibilites areas. In
the language of systems analysis this is "equifinality". Schoderbek
et. al describe the concept of "equally valid ways to reach the same
objectives".20 This system allows for state level policy design as
opposed to simple program management and oversight. Empowering the
states in this way deserves accolades. However, at the same time it
brings challenges: environmental lawyers used to RCRA style
line-by-line interpretations find the new approach difficult according
to Jerry Parker of the Office of Underground Storage Tanks.21
A second innovation with UST concerns the level at which a
decision to authorize takes place. The EPA regional office has the
most important role here. State applications go to the regional office
for review. If the region approves, then the state receives
authorization. Only if the region plans to deny an application does
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headquarters become involved. In such cases regional officials consult
headquarters. However, the region still makes the final decision. (See
diagram 2.)
A third important difference with the UST program lies in the
outputs of the state authorization system. A RCRA authorization is a
clear mandate for a state to control permitting and citing of waste
management facilities. In contrast, state authorization in the UST
program has a different meaning depending on the EPA Region which did
the authorization. Jerry Parker, responsible for the state delegation
program of EPA's UST program, describes two paradigms that the regions
use to guide their decisions within the framework of "No Less
Stringent." The first paradigm is remnant of RCRA decisions: a
regional decision maker would ask 'Are we confident the state is ready
in all ways to implement and enforce the regulations they have
passed?'
Regional officials using the second approach require that states
meet minimal levels of compliance. They grant authorization with the
intent of helping the state develop the specific capabilities needed
to improve their program during the implementation phase. This
flexibility suggests that EPA wants every state to gain authorization.
Parker says, however, that headquarters does not pressure the regions
to delegate quickly.22 As evidence he describes that in the first one
and a half years of the program no states were authorized.
Part of this may stem from the complexity involved in making
application. Some states may have as few as five or six staff members
working directly with UST issues. These staff resources are
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UST DELEGATION MODEL
INPUT
Application
Preparation
Resources
(State)
EPA Funds
State Application
Incentive to
Apply (Proposed)
Revised
State Regulations
PROCESS
EPA HQ Policy
on Delegation and
RCRA
Legislation
Decentralization
Calls for
Delegation
EPA Region reviews for
"No Less Stringent"
Using HQ Guidelines
Regions use
9 narariinmfi*
Region
Approves
Region Plans
To Deny
Authorization
\
Region Consults HQ
T~
Region Denies
Authorization
Pressure to seek
approval (or deny authority)
Lust
Trust
a. Interest groups
b. Politicians
Fund
OUTPUT
(Dependent on
Regional Paradigm)
1. State Authorized
to do UST Permitting
OR
2. State Ready to
Develop Capability
with EPA Tutorship
Revoke
Authority
* 2 Paradigms: 1. Confidence the state is ready
2.Plan to work with authorized state.
Diagram 2
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represented as inputs in Diagram 2. These states can not have a month
of full-time staff time to devote to filling out a quality
application. The staff resources problem may exist even in fully
qualified states. For this reason the UST program formalized a de
facto component of the RCRA system; helping fund application writing;
the fourth innovation of the UST delegation program.
CERCLA is the biggest single program EPA coordinates. The CERCLA
Trust Fund makes RCRA subtitle C budgets look small and the LUST Trust
Fund look minuscule.
The Superfund process includes identifying sites, searching for
responsible parties, ranking them for severity, selecting a remedy,
deciding on a governmental unit to coordinate a particular site,
clean-up and maintenance. Which of these steps is done by which level
of government depends on the particular site. The federal government
generally "leads" efforts however. The Superfund system involves much
more federal control than either of the previously discussed programs.
The final section addresses the reasons for this which appear to be
primarily political.
The degree to which delegation does occur within the Superfund
program occurs on a site by site basis. This contrasts the other two
programs; states and tribes authorized for UST and RCRA program work
have control over the whole state. The current system of state
involvement in Superfund can be described as a site specific model of
delegation. Technically states do not have to become authorized to do
work under Superfund. Instead they can voluntarily enter into a
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Cooperative Agreement, or a Superfund State Contract. Another
mechanism, the Superfund Memorandum of Agreement, is non-site-specific
and describes EPA's working arrangement with a state. Cooperative
Agreements and Superfund State Contracts are legally binding
documents. In addition, Core Program Cooperative Agreements provide
general funding to states including; legal assistance, interagency
coordination, financial and contract management and clerical support,
and general program management and supervision.23
In the site specific system the regional office analyzes a
particular site to determine whether it should be controlled by the
federal government or by the states. The Superfund Comprehensive
Accomplishments Plan (SCAP) process involves EPA regional and
headquarters officials working together to document the lead role.
States do have the opportunity to request access to this process.
State concerns are sometimes considered and incorporated. For example,
on the Stringfellow site in California the state was one of numerous
responsible parties. For these reasons the state wanted to
"administer" and requested the lead. When citizens' groups lobbied
EPA to retake the lead, California lobbied hard including efforts by
Governor Deukmejian to maintain the lead status.
In a state lead situation state officials become responsible for
organizing the cleanup efforts, contracting, procurement and legal
challenges that arise. They can continue to work with federal
officials who may be best equipped to handle various aspects of the
work at the particular site. The most common example of this is
technical assistance from experienced EPA scientists. Diagram 3
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SUPERFUND SITE SPECIFIC MODELOF DELEGATION
INPUT
PROCESS
OUTPUT
State Expresses
Interest in
Lead at the Site
1,200
NPL
Sites
A/
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represents this system graphically. Responsible parties and
state/tribe officials do have some two-way input into the process.
Community environmental groups and congress have no direct input into
the system by which EPA officials make a decision on which government
agencies will lead. They may attempt to influence decisions through
their roles as outsiders.
in Diagram 3 dotted lines around the "CERCLA Requires" box
indicate that the EPA has some control over the law. Though
Congressional legislation normally would be considered beyond the
control of officials responsible for implementation, in this case
EPA's ability to interpret the legislation and draft federal code
brings power to the Agency. Jim McElfish, of the Environmental Law
institute, says a conflict over CERCLA's mandate regarding state and
federal negotiation took place during the reauthorization period in
1986. At that time consensus within the Agency was against delegation
due to interpretations concerning illegality. At least one member of
the Office of General Counsel disagreed with his colleagues however.24
The debate suggests that EPA needs new statutory authority to
significantly augment the level of delegation.
ADVANTAGES AND CHALLENGES OF DELEGATION FOR 8UPERFUND CLIENTS;
This section describes ramifications of an increased delegation
for various clients involved in the Superfund program. These include
the Environmental Protection Agency, state-level environmental
management programs, parties responsible for various National
Priorities List sites, environmental activists groups and, finally,
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citizens. Overall, a delegation system, such as the one to be
described below, will heighten efficiency by replacing a detail
oriented federal management with an audit system. In designing
governmental policy, efficiency can never be considered in a vacuum
however. Political reality must be taken into account through
consideration of those who would be affected.
EPA
From the EPA perspective, a system which empowers qualified
states represents an opportunity to increase efficiency and quality in
the management of Superfund. Keeping administration and decision
making geographically close to the problem at hand saves time and
other resources. A delegate and audit model would allow EPA staff to
spend more of their time on ensuring consistent, quality and timely
cleanup and less time doing contracting and other paperwork. This
allows EPA's staff to use their strong technical skills where they are
most needed. This will be described in greater depth in following
sections. At the same time, such a change represents uncertainty which
calls for detailed planning, including planning for surprises.
EPA is faced with a problem so vast that micro-level
administration is impossible even if it were desirable. The current
Administration's support of decentralization heightens the need for
delegation. Superfund policy analysts should consider the decisions of
their colleague at RCRA and UST as well as decisions in other federal
agencies which have delegated numerous programs. Some states have
field officers already engaged in this type of work. For example, the
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California Division of Toxics has permanent staff constantly on hand
at four regional offices. Peter Orth, of the San Francisco Regional
Office of Contracting Oversight, says that in his region 80 percent
of the sites have groundwater 'components so it "makes sense" to
maximize the role of state Regional Water Quality Control Boards who
have expertise in the area. "There's already a state structure" Orth
says.25
Each of the three programs discussed here entail more work than
the federal government can effectively manage. In the cases of UST and
RCRA, EPA decided to delegate work to states to manage. In the case of
CERCLA, EPA has to a greater degree, delegated work it could not
accomplish to contractors and responsible parties. The present system
causes loss of time and money because EPA Regional staff can be called
in from 500 miles or two states away. The AVTEX site in West Virginia
stands as a clear example. On-Scene Coordinators travel approximately
4 hours from the Regional EPA Office in Philadelphia for two week
shifts at the site. In addition to Agency incurred costs of per-diem
and travel, the staff is inconvenienced. One EPA On-Scene Coordinator
at the AVTEX site felt the Agency "should have a staff member
permanently stationed here." That would be impractical for the EPA,
but not necessarily for a state agency.
EPA staff interviewed presented a broad range of attitudes
towards increasing the power of states vis-a-vis Superfund
responsibilities. Viewpoints reflected the particular official's
position in the administrative hierarchy as well as whether they
worked at headquarters or the regional offices.
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A Management Review of the Superfund Program, the "90 Day Study",
recommends that the Agency:
"Resolve the fundamental policy question of what States' long-
term role in the Superfund program will be, develop short- and
long-term strategies to enhance State program capability.
Viewed in this light, delegation is the most powerful way to enhance
State program capability. The 90-Day Study also calls for increased
community involvement and quicker access to information by community
groups. 27 States appear to be especially capable in this area.
Fred Leif, Regional Enforcement Officer at Region 9 in San Francisco,
feels that states are "more in tune with communities."
EPA simply cannot administrate cleanup of an estimated 38,000
sites that are expected to meet current standards for listing on the
National Priorities List. As the agency has recognized, the number of
potential sites is so high that the scoring and ranking of potential
sites was delegated to states for assistance. Other specific tasks
such as community relations appeared to be delegable. The list of
specific components of Superfund that should be left to states grows
until the analyst recognizes that some states are prepared to manage
every part of the program.
Utilizing EPA officials as auditors for the authorized "State-
wide lead" programs would free up staff resources for work on other
projects including redoubled efforts to enhance the capabilities of
unauthorized states. Highly qualified EPA technical staff could spend
more of their time on technical questions and less on administrating
contracts and waiting for town meetings to begin. Delegation means
cutting out redundant reviews of state-lead sites. One state official,
21
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complaining of the lack of decentralized decision-making says that
"$100 decisions were sent all the way back to Washington."28
Potential liabilities for EPA also exist. The Agency would risk
negative publicity. The media, and possibly members of Congress, could
claim the agency is avoiding its responsibility. Additionally, some
staff may react negatively to what they could consider the increased
bureaucratization of their roles. Specifically some On-Scene
Coordinators would disdain a shift from full-time inspector and
overseer to occasional "watchdog" or "auditor".
STATES AND TRIBES
State officials have much to gain. According to Karen Ueno, some
states "have ambitious programs but no funding to implement them."29
Delegation would provide states the chance to engage in classic empire
building; funding would promote consolidation of technical expertise
and political power. Staffing up to meet their new responsibilities.
States would use funding from federal grants, cooperative
agreements.
Beyond staffing and funding gains, qualified states would not
have to deal with "second guessing" which is common with the present
system. Stan Phillippe, of California's Environmental Protection
Agency'-s Site Mitigation Branch, describes a situation where states
negotiate with responsible polluters under the shadow of constant
doubt that their agreements will be overturned by federal officials.
Presently the federal EPA officials will frequently overturn a state
decision. The result is that state officials have wasted their effort.
22
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A true delegation would mean virtual autonomy for qualified states.
Organizations representing states have generally supported a
delegation/The National Governor's Association analysis has been
that, put simply, there are two types of states; haves and have nots.
According to Chris O'Donnell, formerly with the NGA, the federal
government should give authority to qualified states while helping
others to qualify.30 ASTSWMO has been working for an expanded state
role for "quite some time" according to Phillippe. He says the
Association proposed a compromise whereby qualified states would
administer all enforcement lead sites. This would leave the federal
government to administer sites financed by the CERCLA Trust Fund.
The question of empowering tribal governments brings up many of
the same concerns relevant to those of state governments. Significant
differences include the smaller and less technically competent staffs,
lower budgets, and minimal enforcement capabilities of the tribes.
This situation suggests that giving tribal governments
responsibilities they are not prepared to handle would be disastrous
in terms of environmental protection. Poorly managed and leniently
enforced state hazardous waste cleanup projects would attract
irresponsible "fly-by-night" contractors, according to Bradley Angel
of Greenpeace.31
CONGRESS
The high price tag of the Superfund program coupled with the
concerns of voters has led to close scrutiny from members of Congress.
Members of Congress could fear that delegation would leave them
23
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vulnerable criticisms that the federal government was shirking its
responsibilities. Critics could claim that the effective federal
monitoring of delegated responsibilities would be impractical. The
political implications of this are that Congress would only support a
delegation with strictly defined oversight and revocation power for
the EPA. A 1989 report from the General Accounting Office represents
the view of the legislative branch:
Any deferral policy that is implemented should set
minimum state eligibility stazndards, require conformance
with the NCP, and give EPA the right to monitor state
performance to ensure that cleanups are protective and
meet federal standards.32
INDUSTRY
The chemical industry, oil industry and other private sector
groups that make up the majority of responsible parties will gain from
a delegation which gave true authority to states. If responsible
parties could be confident that an agreement with a state could not
later be overturned by federal officials they would be more likely to
negotiate in good faith with state officials. Like the states,
industry gains from having one agreement stand, as opposed to being
subject to continued court or administrative review.
The increased power of an authorized state would bring stability
to the process and reduce the incidence of legal battles. Beyond this
however, responsible parties may gain or lose depending on which state
a site is located in. Karen Ueno, also of EPA, points to cases where
responsible parties did "not appreciate the state's technical
competence" and specifically requested federal lead on the site.
24
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State officials says the federal government works more slowly due to
bureaucratic structures and EPA says the same of the states, because
of their "academic" rather than practical orientation towards
details.33
ENVIRONMENTAL COMMUNITY
The environmental community—often critical of Superfund work--
will not blindly embrace a delegation. Depending on the state in
question, delegation may be perceived as beneficial or disastrous for
the environment. The crucial factor is "political will" of the state
in question according to Pickard. He also notes differences within an
individual state where the level of skill or experience of the
particular official involved can vary from site-to-site. By involving
environmental groups in the process of authorizing states, policy
makers can ensure a more balanced decision and minimize unexpected
criticisms later.
INTRODUCING A STATE-WIDE LEAD MODEL FOR SUPERFUND;
With this foundation, the paper now turns to a proposal for a
system of increasing state involvement in Superfund by delegating
responsibilities and authority to that level of government. The paper
describes a system of state-wide lead; where a qualified states
coordinate all activities within their boundaries.
25
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STATE-WIDE LEAD
For a state to gain authorization to coordinate, or "take the
lead" on all sites within its borders that state should be prepared to
manage the program at least as well as the federal government would.
The program should center on a "no less stringent" policy. Decisions
regarding a particular state should left to the Regional office with
formal input of state officials, and public interest groups.
Incentives should be provided states who take on the responsibility of
statewide lead agency. Finally, revocation of this authority should be
used as a final resort.
Decisions on delegation should be decentralized. Regional offices
are most in touch with what it takes to do Superfund work within the
states in their region. EPA Regional offices should serve as the
central body coordinating the decision to authorize a state. The UST
program requirement of consulting federal authorities when denying a
state authorization appears unnecessary. An improved Superfund program
should not emulate this aspect of UST. (See diagrams 2 and 4.)
Instead, formal consultation with state officials and citizens' groups
should be incorporated into the process. Comparing diagram 4 to
diagrams 1 and 2 illustrate that the state-lead model brings the
citizens groups into the system rather that having them in the
unpredictable area outside; the "environment" in the language of
systems theory.
This process should solicit input from state officials as well as
citizens groups. Advocacy groups should have time to comment on the
proposed change in government authority. The model in diagram 4,
26
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illustrates that concerned parties outside of the Environmental
Protection Agency need to be brought directly in to the main stream of
decision making. This contrasts with the sideline role in the three
other models described.
This system facilitates solicitation of outside opinions when
they are most needed. Michael Pickard describes the example of
Oklahoma where "the state is compromised by the oil industry, [but]
EPA has tough folks in that region. »3A In such a case the advocacy
groups would be expected to argue for the continuation of a federal
lead role in the state. Similarly on various sites in California,
notably the Stringfellow site, citizens action groups have called for
the federal government to take control away from the state.
While specific cases may represent a conflict of interest in
which the state may engage in questionable management, specifically
accepting a relatively lenient remedy, this would be a rare exception.
This argument must be balanced against the equally tempting incentives
for the federal government in cases where it is considered a
responsible party. Military bases represent the clearest example.
A more likely effect of clear boundaries of state control in
state lead sites would be that responsible parties would attempt to
play off the states against the federal government in order to receive
the least expensive alternative possible. The second UST paradigm does
not seem viable for Superfund. For political reasons EPA will most
likely have to help states enhance their capabilities before granting
authorization. Enhancement efforts should be further extended.
27
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-------
SUPERFUND "STATE-WIDE LEAD" MODEL
WITH REGIONAL DECISION MAKING
INPUT
PROCESS
OUTPUT
EPA Funds
Application
Preparation
Resources
(State)
Incentives to
Apply
Revised
State
Regulations
-4
A/ftARA Halls
CERCLA
For State/Tribe Involvement
Trust Fund
Region Reviews
Application Makes
Preliminary
Recommendation
Based on
"No Less Stringent"
Comments From:
State/Tribe,
General
Community,
Regulated
Community
Region
Makes Final
Decision
State /Tribe
Authorized
To Take Lead
Role On All Sites
Within
Boundaries
OR
Federal
Lead Norm,
State Leads
Specific
Sites
(See Diag. 3)
Congressional
Pressure For
Federal Oversight
Diagram 4
-------
-------
COMPARISON CHART OP POUR ALTERNATIVE DELEGATION SYSTEMS
^^^SSSSS^SSSS^^^S^^SSSSS^SSS^^^^SS^^Sl
Fed. Funds for
Application:
Level of
Decision-making
Incentives to
Seek Authority
Decision
Criteria
_____ — — — — ,— =^=
======
RCRA
Indirect
Region &
HQ
None
Line-For-
Line
UST
Yes
Region: HQ
Review of
Denial
Minimal
No Less
Stringent
SUPERFUND
PRESENT
No
Region &
Consult HQ
None
Situation
of Site
SUPERFUND
PROPOSED
Yes
Region
Only
Yes
No Less
Stringent
IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES FOR A STATE-WIDE LEAD MODEL:
This section addresses administrative guidelines for facilitating
an effective transition to increased delegation. First addressing the
scope a delegation should cover, the section continues with discussion
of the respective roles EPA headquarters and the regional offices.
Possible incentives or "carrots" are discussed. Finally the section
discusses the viability of various "sticks" such as penalties or
revocation of authority.
Certain categories of sites may prove inappropriate for state
management. An example is a site that crosses state or tribal
boundaries. In this case the federal government may be most qualified.
Analysts may say that sites in which the federal government is a party
should remain under the administrative control of the federal
government, i.e., military sites. This appears unnecessary as state
administrators should be expected to be more objective in such a case.
28
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-------
State management of sites in which the state government is a
responsible party must also be examined; special treatment of this
situation is not likely necessary.
The need for consistency within Superfund has been called for by
virtually every category of critic; industry, states, the 90 Day Study
and environmentalists all complain of lack of consistency. Linda
Greer, a toxicologist with the National Resource Defense Council, asks
"Why do leaks of benzene in Texas get cleaned up to a certain level,
and to another level in New Jersey?"35 Delegation and decentralization
can go hand in hand with consistency if implementing organizations are
provided clear guidelines. Management theorists such as John Q. Wilson
and Deming agree that clearly defined tasks are a key to successful
administration.36 "Too much time and effort is wasted because cleanup
objectives are not stated clearly" says Cyndy Bryck, manager for solid
waste programs at the Chemical Manufacturer's Association.37
Consistency of outcome should be a goal of the program. Equal
standards should be met throughout, the country regardless of the
implementation body. Accomplishing this does not require a single
method of implementation.
in the October 1990 report on Superfund published by Clean Sites
and other environmental organizations recommends that EPA "develop
standard procedures for using risk assessment at different sites".
and long-term development of national standards for contaminants found
at hazardous waste sites.38 Authors of the 90 Day Study recognized the
need for consistency the study calls for the agency to "develop
prototype RI/FS and remedy selection models for recurring types of
29
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sites already identified (municipal landfills, battery-cracking sites,
and wood-treatment facilities)11. This would allow states to quickly
take over management of sites and maintain and improve upon the
quality of the administration. Significantly, this prototype would be
developed in the area that EPA administrators have been most reluctant
to delegate. This concept should be expanded to go beyond remedy
selection. If the prototypes or effective guidelines are created, the
agency could undertake a delegation with confidence. To promote
participation in such a program, the Agency must provide states
incentives to take part.
ENCOURAGING STATES TO SEEK AUTHORIZATION: CARROTS AND STICKS:
To encourage qualified states to take on the responsibilities of
facilitating Superfund work within their boundaries incentives need to
be designed into the system. One possibility is financial incentives.
An expanded system of delegation inherently provides some financial
reward. Specifically, Regional and Headquarters EPA positions, such
as On-Scene Coordinators would move to state offices taking on new
responsibilities. Opportunities to staff-up are always tempting. When
the funding is available to support it the temptation becomes
virtually irresistible. (This may explain why California—with a large
and technically competent staff—avoided seeking RCRA authorization.
Vaille says that when California found out they were going to be
authorized they withdrew their application. "We're paying them to do
redundant work", Vaille says that EPA pays for any administrative work
required of the state because they have not yet been authorized. As a
30
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result they may as well keep the staff and the federal money coming.)
Incentives need not be monetary however. A less direct incentive
could earmark a percentage of CERCLA funds for qualified sites (28.5
HRS score) within authorized state-lead states. This would assure that
part of the fund would be more quickly accessible to states. The
chance to shorten the time necessary to negotiate the bureaucratic
maze will be attractive. The UST program is currently evaluating using
a system such as this.
Assistance to states that, in Agency lingo, "enhances their
capabilities", creates another form of incentive which empowers the
states. EPA can allow state Superfund staff to take part in federal
trainings. Additionally, states should have free access to the Record
of Decision Database, the Toxic Release Inventory, CERCLIS and the
many other databases and management information systems which EPA
staff utilize.
Vaille points out incentives inherent in a delegation because of
the empowerment of states. Delegation "would raise the stakes on when
we would get involved: very rarely would we overfile," he says.39 What
Vaille has described theoretically Parker sees already happening with
UST; "the main thrust is towards state enforcement, but EPA retains
authority to enforce the state regulations."40
A final aspect of an improved superfund system that needs to be
addressed is the use of revocation of authority. The size and
financial strength of the Superfund program allows for a different
model than RCRA and UST. In those programs EPA technically has the
ability to revoke authorization, but EPA could not run the programs
31
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due to inadequate resources. This would not be the case with
Superfund. If a revocation became necessary regional staff that had
been working on sites in other states could serve as a transitional
lead team.
Addressing the issue of revocation requires considering more that
feasibility. Kerry Kelly, of OERR in Washington D.C., recommends a
positive, TQM approach; ensure the states are capable then encourage
them to be responsible. Fred Leif learned from his experiences in the
EPA delegation of construction grants to states that:
"We needed to give them the flexibility to make mistakes,
you can't be micromanaging, you need to give them
responsibility and authority to implement."41
In the UST program, revocation is "not a credible option",
according to Parker. However, using federal staff to enforce state
regulations is practical he says.42 The RCRA program has developed a
face-saving compromise. If EPA auditing uncovers that a state is not
meeting the approved standards EPA informs the state they have a 30
day probation period before the federal government steps in. This
encourages the states to act fast and effectively. The threat becomes
an incentive. Such a system could be used with Superfund.
The crucial point here is that EPA should not attempt to
micromanage particular decisions at a particular site. Instead, the
shift should be to an "audit system". This would emphasize a "no less
stringent". In such a system, EPA officials would review trends in a
particular state's decision-making. Alternatively a two year
probationary period could be designed.
32
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ANTICIPATING CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING A STATE-WIDE LEAD MODEL:
Lessons from the RCRA and UST experiences as well as analysis of
the present Superfund system lead to specific recommendations for
design of a delegation policy. This section addresses four such
recommendations. The central concern lies in ensuring that only
qualified governments receive authority. Responsible follow-up can
only be accomplished with mechanisms for demonstrating that authorized
entities perform adequately. Finally, the policy maker must maintain
the capacity to handle disputes and revoke authorization if necessary.
In designing a delegation system, the EPA must prepare for a
situation where the authorized state claims it is meeting
responsibilities while the Agency disagrees. The first step in
avoiding this lies in basing authorization on a state adopted policy
of "No Less Stringent" than federal standards. This could be a legal
requirement for delegation which must be incorporated into state law.
EPA attorneys familiar with equivalency based delegations, i.e. RCRA,
will find this difficult to adjust to.
Additionally Karen Ueno recommends a "dispute resolution
procedure" be created. She expects responsible parties would sue
states who would in turn sue the federal government and vice-versa. A
dispute resolution system could use independent arbitration, for
example, to avoid dependence on litigation. This is crucial because
the role of the courts is already quite significant. "Corporations are
spending 70 percent of direct cleanup costs on lawyers and
consultants, mostly lawyers," according to Eugene A. Andersen, a
33
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partner in the law firm Anderson, Kill, Click, and Oshin.43
A system of oversight is necessary for the -responsible allocation
of public funds in the CERCLA Trust Fund. To ensure this regional EPA
officials should intermittently audit states managing Superfund work
in state-wide lead states. Audits should emphasize detailed study of
trends in a state's practices. Audits should not result in
reconsideration of a state decision on a particular site.
In other programs the EPA's ability to punish states has been
quite limited. For example EPA has never taken over a state RCRA
program. The closest the Agency came to a RCRA revocation was with
North Carolina. According to McElfish "ironically North Carolina was
not dinged for being ineffective" but rather for being "inconsistent
with RCRA". Richard Vaille describes the situation in California where
EPA funded positions make up only approximately 10% of the state's
related jobs. As a result, the State is immune to severe threats such
as cutting off federal funding. Jeffrey Zelikson, Waste Management
Division Director at EPA Region 9, maintains that EPA has had success
in taking back state's lead role on particular sites. The Superfund
situation will be quite different on fund financed sites, but will be
similar to the situation Vaille described for enforcement sites.
In cases where EPA finds a record of state failure to meet
federal standards a probationary period should be enforced. Vaille
says that the best way to do oversight is to tell a state "we're not
satisfied with their action, quality or quantity", and then say "we'll
act if you don't within 30 days."4* Leif agrees that the "states
motivation to do a good job is to keep the Fed's out."45 One way to
34
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ensure states have such motivation is to use an additional criteria
for authorization recommended by representatives of ASTSWMO;
delegation should only go to "desirous" states. "Desire" will
presumably be demonstrated by an application from the state.
Another significant concern raised by at least three EPA
officials lies in the legal status of delegation responsibilities. One
question lies in the mechanism by which a state can appropriate
federal funds. For example, though the Cooperative Agreements are
legally binding documents, Ueno feels that a new type of agreement
would have to be developed. A redesigned Core grant could prove both
legal and practical as a funding mechanism for the delegation. The
Core grant program now supports a broad use of funds including
training state staff. Use of the Core Program has expanded greatly. In
1987 only three states received the grants but by 1989, 43 states,
Puerto Rico and the Navajo Nation had become involved in the
program.46
O'Donnell says Superfund has "very different wording than RCRA
and UST; CERCLA has no authority to do state delegation".47 The point
is less than clear. According to Phillippe, ASTSWMO "couldn't speak
with one voice" on the issue of whether or not all of Superfund is
delegable. In the UST program EPA has been able to avoid this
difficulty in states administering LUST Trust fund monies.
Technically, the states are authorized to run the federal program in
lieu of EPA. What is clear is that the authority could be created if
senior EPA staff support such a move.
Zelikson says "the key issue is liability of the fund if the
35
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state doesn't feel accountable11.48 If EPA attorneys, consulting with
the Justice Department, determine delegation of fund financed sites
would be impossible to enforce, then the delegation could follow the
model recommended by ASTSWMO; delegating enforcement sites only.
CONCLUSIONS:
The present Superfund system of state involvement stresses
site-by-site decisions concerning which level of government will lead
cleanup efforts. A new delegation system should emulate the flexible
system used by the Environmental Protection Agency's Office of
Underground Storage Tanks. The EPA should do all it can to create a
system which empowers qualified states or tribes to take on
responsibilities for the whole of their jurisdictions. In 1993, when
Congress will again reauthorize Superfund, the Agency should be
prepared to fight hard for these changes.
Delegation can not be used as an isolated tool, but rather as one
part of an effort to improve efficiency and quality in the management
of Superfund. The endeavor must be coupled with heightened efforts to
provided consistent standards throughout the country.
A delegation would be consistent with the current Bush
Administration and EPA views of decentralization and federalism.
Giving-desirous states and tribes increased responsibilities, with the
resource capabilities to meet those responsibilities, will facilitate
more effective and efficient management of the nation's worst
hazardous waste sites. Such a policy will undoubtedly cause concern
among many parties involved in the Superfund process. However,
36
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expected opposition notwithstanding, other groups, and society as a
whole, will benefit from a delegation.
37
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ENDNOTES
1. Stafford Beer, Management Science: The Business Use of
Operations Research. Aldus Books Ltd., London, 1967.
2. Peter Schoderbek, Charles G.S.Schoderbek, and Asterios Kefalas,
Management Systems-Conceptual Considerations. 4th Ed., BPI/Irwin,
Homewood, IL., 1990. p. 40.
3. An Analysis of State Superfund Programs: 50-State Study. 1990
Update. Hazardous Site Control Division, U.S. EPA, September, 1990,
EPA/540/8-91/002.
Enhancing State Superfund Capabilities; A Nine-State Study, by
the Environmental Law Institute for the Office of Policy, Planning
and Evaluation, U.S. EPA, December, 1990.
4. Stephen Farber, "Federalism and State-Local Relations" in
A Decade of Devolution: Perspectives on State-Local Relations.
Edited by E. Elaine Liner, The Urban Institute Press, Washington,
D.C., 1989, p. 33.
5."State and Local Involvement in the Superfund Program", Office of
Emergency and Remedial Response Hazardous Site Control Division,
Environmental Protection Agency, Publication No. 9375.5-01/FS,
Fall, 1989, p.l.
6. Stan Phillippe, Personal Interview, Sacramento, CA., 8/15/91.
7. Status of State Involvement in the Superfund Program. Office of
Emergency and Remedial Response, Washington, D.C. 20460, EPA/540/8-
90/005, p. 20-21.
8. "State and Local Involvement in the Superfund Program", op.cit.,
p.4.
9. "EPA to Put Cleanup Burden on Industry", Los Angeles Times,
6/15/89, part 1, p. 17.
10. Lawrence J. Goodrich, "Long Road to Superfund Cleanup; After
nine uears few sites have been cleaned up, and the tab is now
estimated at $30 billion," The Christian Science Monitor, v. 81,
p.7, col. 2, 10/3/89.
11. Michael Pickard, Phone Interview, Sacramento, CA., 8/23/91.
12. A Management Review of the Superfund Program. U.S. EPA, 1989.
A Management Review of the Superfund Program; Implementation
Plan. U.S. EPA, 9/1989.
38
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13. A Management Review of the Superfund Program, op. cit., p.
Vlll.
14. A Management Review of the Superfund Program, op. cit., p. 7.
15. Ibid., p.iii.
16 incorporating Total Quality Management into OERR, Office of
Emergency and Remedial Response, U.S. EPA, November 6,1990.
17. 50-State Study, op.cit., p. 12.
18. A Nine-State Study, op.cit., p. 112.
19. Richard Vaille, Personal Interview, San Francisco, CA.,
8/20/91.
20. Schoderbek, op.cit., p. 40.
21. Jerry Parker, Personal Interview, Arlington, VA., July 30,
1991.
22. Parker, Ibid.
23. "Questions and Answers: State Involvement in Superfund",
Unpublished EPA document.
24. Jim McElfish, Personal Interview, Washington, D.C., 7/29/91.
25. Peter Orth, Personal Interview, San Francisco, 8/20/91.
26. A Management Review of the Superfund Program, op.cit., p. V.
27. A Management Review of the Superfund Program, op.cit., p. vii.
28. Stan Phillippe, op.cit.
29. Karen Ueno, Personal Interview, San Francisco, CA., 8/21/91.
30. O'Donnell, Personal Interview, Washington, D.C., July 30, 1991.
31. Bradley Angel, Personal Interview, San Francisco, CA. 8/21/91.
32 HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES: State Cleanup Status and Its
implications for Federal Policy. Report to the Chairman,
Subcommittee on Environment, ENergy, and Natural Resources,
Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, U.S.
General Accounting Office, GAO/RCED-89-164, August, 1989, p.63.
33. Steve Linder, Personal Interview, San Francisco, CA. 8/21/91.
Ueno, Karen, op.cit.
39
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34. Michael Pickard, op.cit.
35. Douglas Frantz, "Critics Urge Changes in Superfund Operations",
Los Anaeles Times. 6/19/90, p. Al, A22.
36. Walton, Mary, The Deminq Management Method. Perigee Books, New
York, NY, 1986.
Wilson, John Q., Bureaucracy; What Government Agencies Do And
Why They Do It. Basic Books, Inc., USA, 1989.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Vaile, op.cit.
40. Jerry Parker, Phone Interview, 12/19/91.
41. Fred Leif, Personal Interview, San Francisco, CA. 8/22/91.
42. Jerry Parker, Personal Interview, Washington, D.C.,
July, 1991.
43. "In the Clutches of the Superfund Mess.", New York Times -
National Edition, 6/16/91. p. Fl.
44. Vaille, op.cit.
45. Leif, op.cit.
46. Status of State Involvement in the Superfund Program FY 80 to
FY 89. Office of Emergency and Remedial Response, U.S. EPA,
EPA/540/8-90/005, April, 1990, p.26.
47. Chris O'Donnell, op.cit.
48. Jeffrey Zelikson, Persoal Interview, San Francisco, CA.,
8/21/91.
40
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Bibilioaraphv
Anderson, Jack and Van Atta, Dale, "Waste Merchants Target Reservations", The
Washington Post, 2/22/1991.
, Office of
September 1990, EPA/540/8-91/002.
A Management PAvt«w of *"*- fi«r«rfund Program. U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Washington, D.C., 1989.
Beer Stafford, Management Science; The Business Use of operations Research,
Aldus books LTd. , London, 1967.
rnh-.^-t «*.*» «np»rfund ^abilities: A Nine-State Study, by the Environmental
Law institute for the Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, December, 1990.
"EPA to Put Cleanup Burden on Industry", T.os Angeles Times, 6/15/89, Part 1,
p. 17.
FederalReoister, 40 Code of Federal Regulations, Part II, National Oil and
Kzardou. Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; Final Rule.
Frantz, Douglas, "Critics Urge Changes in Superfund Operations", Los Anqeles
Times. 6/19/90, p. Al, A22.
Getlin, Josh, "Cleaning Up or Messing Up?", Los Anqeles Times, v. 107, Sec. I,
P. 4, col. 4, 6/21/88.
response, U.S. EPA, Washington, D.C.
«TmrVM rations of State Cleanups of Hazardous Waste Sites on Federal Policy",
Statement of Richard L Sembra , Director Environmental Protection Issues,
Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, General Accounting
Office, 11/7/89.
"improving the NPL Process With TQM", unpublished document, Office of Emergency
and Remedial Response, U.S. EPA.
rnrornorating Total Qua] itv Management Into OERR. Office of Emergency and
Remdeial Response, U.S. EPA, November 6, 1990.
"in the Clutches of the Superfund Mess", New York Times-National Edition,
6/16/91, p. Fl.
Liner, E. Blaine, Editor, ft n*cade of Devolution: Persr^HvP« on State-Local
Relations. The Urban Institute Press, Washington D.C., 1989.
Murphy, Kim, "State Held Liable for Stringfellow Toxic Dump Site," Los Angeles
Times, June 3, 1989, sec I p.l column 3.
Schoderbek, Peter, Schoderbek, Charles G.S. and Kef alas , Ajt«r rios Managjmjnt
s%t«n« - Conceptual Considerations. 4th Ed., BPI/Irwin, Homewood, IL. , 1990.
"State and Local Involvement in the Superfund Program", Office of Emergency and
RemedLrResponse, Hazardous Site Control Division, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Publication No. 9375.5-01/FS. Fall, 1989.
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Status of State Involvement in the Superfund Program FY 80 to FY 89. Office of
Emergency and Remedial Response, U.S. EPA, Washington, D.C., EPA/540/8-90/005.
SUPERFUND A More Vioourous and Better Managed Enforcement Program Is Needed.
United States General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C. 1989,
GAO/RCED-90-22.
Weisskopf, "Superfund Denounced As 'Largely Ineffective'; Some Cleanups Are
Failures, OTA Finds", The Washington Post. 6/18/88, pA3, col. 5.
"Questions and Answers: State Involvement in Superfund", Unpublished Document,
U.S. EPA.
RECOMMENDED FOR FURTHER STUDY:
State Program approval Handbook, U.S. EPA, Office of Underground Storage Tanks,
to be published approximately January, 1992.
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List of individuals Interviewed;
1. Bradley Angel, Greenpeace, San Francisco, CA.
2. Denise Grabner, Association of State and Tribal Waste Management
Officials, Washington D.C.
3. Kerry Kelly, Superfund Policy and Analysis Staff, Office of
Emergency and Remedial Response, EPA, Washington, D.C.
4. Fred Leif, Regional Enforcement Officer, Office of the Deputy
Regional Administrator, EPA, San Francisco.
5. Steve Linder, Regional Project Manager, EPA, San Francisco, CA.
6. Marcia Lindsey, State and Regional Coordinator, State
Involvement Section, EPA, Arlington, VA.
7. Jim McElfish, Environmental Law Institute, Washington, D.C.
8. Murray Newton, Chief, State and Local Coordination Branch, EPA,
Arlington, VA.
9. Chris O'Donnel, Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation, EPA,
Washington, D.C.
10. Peter Orth, Chief, Contracts & Information Management Section,
EPA, San Francisco, CA.
11. Jerry Parker, Office of Underground Storage Tanks, EPA,
Arlington, VA.
12. Stan Phillippe, Chief, Site Mitigation Branch, Toxic Substances
Control Program, California Department of Health Services,
Sacramento, CA.
13. Michael Pickard, Sacramento Toxics Campaign, Sacramento, CA.
14. Richard Vaille, State Programs Branch, EPA, San Francisco, CA.
15. Karen Ueno, Regional Project Manager, EPA, San Francisco, CA.
16. Jeffrey Zelikson, Director, Hazardous Waste Management
Division, EPA, San Francisco, CA.
17. Vincent Zenone, On-Scene Coordinator, EPA, Region 3.
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