EPA-600/7-81-051
August 1980
ENERGY FACILITY SITING PROCEDURES,
CRITERIA, AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE
OHIO RIVER BASIN ENERGY STUDY REGION
By
E. Earl Whitlatch
' John A. Aldrich
The Ohio State University
Columbus, Ohio 43210
Prepared for
Ohio River Basin Energy Study (ORBES)
Grant Nos. EPA R805589 and R805603
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20460
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ABSTRACT
Findings are presented on the adequacy of current review procedures,
criteria, and public participation in energy facility siting (EPS) for
nuclear and coal-fired power plants. Three case studies of EPS are
presented in detail for coal-fired power plants. These are: East Bend
(Kentucky), Killen (Ohio), and Mountaineer (West Virginia). Throughout
the study, emphasis is placed on determining aspects of licensing proce-
dures, siting criteria, and siting methodologies which influence the
form and extent of public participation. Overall, the report concludes
that there has been a lack of public involvement, especially both before
and during the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) phase. This
stems largely from the sparsity of information provided to the public
before the DEIS is published. The influence of the public on the final
siting decision is further weakened by the normally short period of time
(usually 45 days) allowed for DEIS review, and by the fact that consi-
derable investment by the utility, including land purchase and site
construction work, generally takes place before the DEIS is issued.
Detailed discussion, critique, and recommendations are also given con-
cerning how to improve the siting process. Among the key recommendations
are that 1) public groups be involved in early site screening and selec-
tion (before application is made for any required permits), 2) that
regional siting reports be made available both to the public and to
permitting agencies, 3) that state Public Service Commissions (PSC's) be
more uniform in the criteria used for application review, 4) that the
criteria used by PSC's be made much more comprehensive, in order to include
more of the public's concerns at an earlier stage in the site review
process, and 5) that an experimental open planning process for EPS be
initiated on a limited geographical scale in the Ohio River Basin by a
resident utility. The research was conducted as a Special Study for the
Ohio River Basin Energy Study (ORBES), funded by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency.
KEY WORDS: Power plant siting; Public participation; Nuclear power
plants; Coal-fired power plants; East Bend Generating
Station (Kentucky); Kill en Generating Station (Ohio);
Mountaineer Generating Station (West Virginia); Environ-
mental Impact Statements; Ohio River Basin Energy Study
(ORBES); Open planning; Case studies.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors wish to express their appreciation to the ORBES review
committee assigned to this Special Study conducted under contract to
ORBES. The committee members,'composed of Boyd R. Keenan (University
of Illinois at Chicago Circle), Harry Potter (Purdue University), and
Vincent Cardi (West Virginia University) provided much useful comment
on earlier drafts of the report, as did the Core Team of researchers and
members of the Advisory Committee to ORBES. Dr. Keenan served as review
committee chairman and must be especially acknowledged.
Innumerable persons contributed their time to answer questions posed
by the authors during the case studies and review of criteria and proce-
dures. All are gratefully acknowledged.
Dr. Dale Manty, consultant to the Special Study, provided useful
comment on political and public participation aspects of the siting
process as well as work on the nuclear power plant case studies (not
included in this report).
Appreciation is also expressed for the support of the Department of
Civil Engineering and the Program for Energy Research, Education, and
Public Service (PEREPS), The Ohio State University, in the final report
editing stages.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ' i i
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iii
Chapter Page
1. STUDY OVERVIEW 1
Introduction 1
Research Methodology 1
Licensing procedures 1
Siting criteria 3
Public participation 4
2. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 7
Evolution in EPS 7
Early siting 7
Institutional gap 8
Regional siting reports ... 8
Adversarial proceedings 9
Long and costly hearings 9
PSC differences 10
Determination of need 10
Delegation of need for power 11
Separation of transmission line review n
Long EIS phase. 12
Lack of public involvement in DEIS phase 12
Lack of information during DEIS phase 13
Inadequate information transfer 14
'Limited1 site work 15
Time-conditioned permits 15
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Page
Duplicative review 16
Monitoring plant impacts 16
Generic review 17
Legislated/regulated criteria 18
NRC reform proposals 18
Changing criteria 18
Restrictive siting methodologies 19
Open siting methodologies 19
Experimental open planning. 20
3. EAST BEND CASE STUDY: KENTUCKY 21
Introduction 21
Procedures 22
Site selection 22
Land acquisition 23
Certificate of convenience and necessity 23
Kentucky air permits 24
Kentucky water permits 25
USEPA PSD determination 26
USEPA NPDES permit 27
Memorandum of agreement on historic resources 28
COE DA permit and EIS preparation 29
Criteria , .... 31
Public Participation 33
Early state public hearings 33
Regional interest groups 34
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Page
DEIS public hearing and comments 35
Findings and Conclusions 38
Abbreviations Used 48
4. KILLEN CASE STUDY: OHIO 52
Introduction 52
Procedures 54
Site selection 54
Land acquisition 55
Ohio EPA permit to install 56
State pollutant discharge elimination system
(SPDES) permit 57
COE EIS preparation and DA permit 57
Memorandum of agreement 60
Transmission lines 62
Siting Criteria 67
Public Participatioa 68
Initial announcement 68
Written and public hearing comments on the DEIS. ... 69
Comments on the FEIS 73
Findings and Conclusions 74
5. MOUNTAINEER CASE STUDY: WEST VIRGINIA • 84
Introduction 84
Procedures 86
Site selection 86
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Page
Land acquisition 87
Certificate of convenience and necessity 87
State air emission source construction permit 88
Prevention of significant deterioration permit .... 89
DA permit and EIS preparation 89
WVDNR water pollution control permit 91
NPDES permit 91
Transmission lines 92
Siting Criteria 94
Public Participation. 95
AEP announcement of plant 95
WVAPCC hearing 96
Comments on the DEIS 97
Transmission lines 100
Findings and Conclusions 104
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Chapter 1. STUDY OVERVIEW
INTRODUCTION
The objective of this study has been to determine to what extent
public participation is effective in influencing current energy facility
siting (EPS) decisions in the Ohio River Basin Energy Study (ORBES)
region. The research was conducted along three distinct but inter-related
lines of investigation. First, current and historical licensing and
review procedures and requirements governing nuclear and coal-fired
power plants in the ORBES region where studied. Opportunities for public
participation within these procedures were particularly noted. Second,
criteria utilized by reviewing agencies and by utilities to select pre-
ferred sites for power plants were determined. This aspect of the
research also called for a characterization of utility (or utility con-
sultant) siting procedures. Third, intensive analysis of the role of
public participation in three case studies (all coal-fired power plants)
were undertaken. A less intensive analysis of three other case study
plants (two nuclear and one coal-fired) was also made. This enabled
observations to be made on the apparent role of public participation in
EPS in the presence of a set of specific siting procedures, criteria,
and external factors.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The following brief description of research activities conducted in
each of the above three areas may help to indicate the approach taken in
the current research effort.
Licensing Procedures.
A detailed study was made of historical and current licensing pro-
cedures for nuclear and coal-fired power plants in the ORBES region.
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Enabling legislation and codified agency licensing regulations and cri-
teria were reviewed for the Corps of Engineers (COE), U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (USEPA), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
Since environmental impact statements (EIS's) and other requirements
of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) play an important role
in all EPS cases, an historical review of developments related to NEPA
and power plant siting was undertaken. Also, in the EIS process, the
lead Federal agency must comply with Federal legislative requirements to
coordinate with certain other Federal agencies, as called for under such
laws as the Archaeological and Historic Preservation Act (of 1974),
National Historic Preservation Act (of 1966), Fish and Wildlife Coordina-
tion Act (of 1958), Endangered Species Act (of 1973), Land and Water
Conservation Fund Act (of 1965), Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (of 1968),
and the Coastal Zone Management Act (of 1972). These laws and the
applicable regulations were reviewed to determine what influence they
might have on siting procedures and criteria.
In the review of Federal procedures and criteria, special attention
was given to statements concerning public participation requirements or
guidelines. Of particular importance in this regard are certain Execu-
tive Orders (E.G.). Executive Order 11472 (May, 1969) establishing, among
other things, the Citizens Advisory Committee on Environmental Quality,
and E.G. 11991 (May 24, 1977) calling for the Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) to promulgate regulations which, among other things, would
enhance public participation in the NEPA process, are of particular im-
portance. Also E.O. 11988 and 11990, and the associated Guidelines for
floodplain management and wetlands protection, and the Unified National
Program for Floodplain Management provide clear statements of
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administrative policy and specific requirements affecting public involve-
ment.
Since state procedures heavily influence the siting process, a
review was made of the current licensing procedures for state public
service commission (PSCs) and state air and water permitting agencies,
for each of the six states in the ORBES region.
Finally, a literature review was conducted wherein articles and
reports dealing with EPS procedures of states and Federal agencies,
and critiques of current procedures were sought. A large number of
reports on nuclear power plant siting procedures were available, but only
a few reports dealing with coal-fired power plants were found.
Siting Criteria.
To facilitate public influence on final site selection and
plant design, site .selection criteria should at least reflect the range
of concerns held by the public. The relative importance of these cri-
teria as determined by utilities, utility consultants, and lead Federal
agencies will likewise affect the extent to which public input can in-
fluence final decisions. Finally, the procedural manner in which the
siting criteria and importance judgments are applied in the siting
process can influence the final result and determine the degree to
which public participation is possible. Such procedural aspects are
termed siting methodologies herein.
Utility and agency siting criteria, criteria priority assignment,
and siting methodologies used in the ORBES region were determined through
a variety of means. The following research efforts aimed at developing
a picture of current siting criteria in the ORBES region:
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1• EIS review. All currently available EISs for power plants
.in the ORBES region were reviewed for descriptions of the
background regional siting studies used to identify the pre-
ferred and alternate sites proposed in the EIS. Siting pro-
cedures, criteria, and criteria importance levels were noted.
Approximately 15 such EISs were reviewed.
2. Case study criteria. Six case studies were examined
as described below. One aspect of these examinations
was the utility siting process. Such review enabled greater
insight into the subtleties of the siting criteria as applied
in practice.
3. Utility and PSC interviews. Representatives of all six PSC's
and four utilities in the ORBES region were interviewed
with regard to siting criteria and the relative importance of
the criteria for coal-fired power plants (nuclear plant siting
criteria were determined from NRC sources as described below).
4. Literature review: siting criteria. A review was made of
technical literature dealing with engineering and environ-
mental siting criteria for both coal-fired and nuclear power
plants.
5. Literature review: siting methodologies. A review was made
of the state-of-the-art of siting methodologies as currently
practiced, and as proposed by various sources.
6. Regional siting reports. A limited number of regional siting
reports for the ORBES region were reviewed. Since such
reports are considered confidential by the sponsoring utilities,
it was not possible to obtain many of these. It should also
be noted, however, that most power plants in the ORBES region
never had formal siting reports associated with them.
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7. Agency regulations. As discussed above, laws and agency
regulations were reviewed for both procedural aspects as
well as siting criteria. Certain Executive Orders were
also relevant with regard to environmental criteria to be
utilized.
Public Participation.
Literature reviews were conducted concerning accounts elsewhere of
public participation in EPS. In addition, throughout the study an
emphasis was placed on determining aspects of licensing procedures,
siting criteria, and siting methodologies which might influence the form
and extent of public participation. In order to examine more fully the
influence of such items on the effectiveness of public participation, six
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case studies were selected for study by the ORBES Core Team researchers
in collaboration with the authors. The major criteria for case study
selection were the following:
1) one case study plant to be in each ORBES state (resulting in
six planned case studies);
2) four case studies to be coal-fired plants, and two nuclear;
3) plants to be recent in time (post-1970 start of construction),
and;
4) plants are to be those for which licensing decisions have been
substantially finalized.
These and other minor selection criteria resulted in the following
planned case studies:
1) Mountaineer plant, Mason County, West Virginia
2) East Bend plant, Boone County, Kentucky
3) Killen Station plant, Adams County, Ohio
4) Mansfield plant, Beaver County, Pennsylvania
5) La Salle County nuclear plant, La Salle County, Illinois
6) Marble Hill nuclear plant, Jefferson County, Indiana
For the first three case studies the following activities were
conducted:
1) An average of 25 participants representing local (or displaced)
residents, public interest groups, local government 9fficials,
state agencies or divisions, Federal agencies or divisions
and the lead utility were interviewed;
2) Available transcripts from all public hearings were obtained
or reviewed on-site;
3) The Final EIS (FEIS) was analyzed in depth;
4) Questionnaires were sent to the lead utility;
5) Newspaper accounts of events were obtained;
6) Available letters of communication sent between agencies, the
public, and the utility were obtained; and
7) All relevant process steps were flowcharted,
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The last three case studies listed above were planned to be studied
in the same in-depth manner. However, unexpected difficulties encountered
in obtaining pertinent data, along with time limitations, made it impossi-
ble for the research team to complete the case studies for the states of
Illinois, Indiana, and Pennsylvania in the same depth of analysis as for
the first three. For this reason the latter three plants are not des-
cribed in this report. The latter were, however, studied in sufficient
detail to discern the major process steps and to establish the level of
public participation present. For example, interviews were held with
public and agency representatives, and environmental impact statements
were studied in detail.
Conclusions were drawn in each case study with regard to procedural
and public participation aspects.
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Chapter 2. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A summary of research findings is presented below. The findings are
given in the approximate chronological order of the major events of the
licensing process. Criteria-related findings are placed last, however,
since these permeate the entire siting process.
Evolution in EPS. A clear and consistent evolutionary process is
present in EFS decision-making procedures, criteria, and public
participation for both nuclear and coal-fired power plants.
A review of historical developments in procedures, criteria, and
public participation aspects of the major energy facility licensing
agencies at the Federal level reveals consistent trends in policies and
procedures leading to a broadening of decision-making criteria and
greater concern for public participation in the licensing decision. The
trend is not as strong at the state level in the ORBES region, however.
Also, the process is more advanced in concept by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission than it is for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers or the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency. This is due primarily to the much more
limited statutory responsibilities of the latter agencies in the energy
area.
At the same time, many public participants in the EFS process express
a strong opinion that their efforts have had little effect on decisions
related to plant need, location and design. Primary reasons for this
opinion are stated to be the lateness at which the public is made aware
of the potential energy development or becomes involved in the process;
the limited scope of decisions left open for resolution at that time; and
other process deficiencies. These are discussed more at length below.
Early siting. The most critical deficiency in current EFS pro-
cedures is. the lack of public involvement in early site screening
and selection.
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The most common statement made by public participants is that once
a site is chosen by a utility through its site screening and selection
process, there is little that can be done to overturn this decision.
In part this is due to the limited review of the siting decision conducted
by most public service commissions in the ORBES region {see below). Once
the PSC "certificate of necessity and convenience" is obtained, and often
before, land or options are purchased, thus committing the utility financi-
ally to the site. Subsequent procedures are focused on the site, with
only peripheral attention given to a very limited number of alternate
sites (usually one or two) if any. Since the subsequent process also
leads to further administrative and financial commitments to the pre-
ferred site, the outcome becomes more and more pre-determined.
Institutional gap. Since utilities and government regulators in
the ORBES region do not appear to initiate public involvement in early
site review, there is an institutional/procedural gap for conducting such
reviews in the case of coal-fired plants, and a probable gap in the case
of nuclear plants.
Since no lead Federal or regional energy agency exists in the case
of coal-fired plants, there appears to be no focal point for regional
siting studies which might directly involve the public-in the ORBES region.
In the case of nuclear power plants, NRC has initiated (1977) a process
for early site review. One of the requirements for NRC review of any
site, however, is that the site be produced through a comprehensive site
survey by some party. Since such a survey is expensive, it is question-
able whether any public group or set of groups will utilize this option.
It is not clear at this writing how comprehensive such a survey must be,
however, to qualify a site for consideration since little experience has
been accumulated in this area by NRC.
Regional siting reports. Utility regional siting studies, if con-
ducted at all, are not generally made available to the public during the
licensing process, and are not usually made a part of the record of
decision for later reference.
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Such reports form an important part of the decision process and,
if available, might lend considerable credibility to the utility's
proposed site. In the absence of such reports, agencies have generally
assumed, or at least do not question, that the studies have been conducted
in a professional and public-oriented manner, yielding the best (preferred)
site and the next best alternatives (alternate sites) from a public stand-
point. Permit approval decisions are then limited to deciding whether the
preferred site in the application is acceptable, and how best to miti-
gate environmental impacts at the site. There is no reason to believe
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however, that the best site has been selected from a public viewpoint,
since the public is not involved in the regional siting study nor does
it generally have access to the study document.
A definition of regulatory effectiveness recently adopted by the
NRC includes the concept of decision making by all parties on the basis
of a common data set available to all participants. Application of this
definition could well include regional siting studies.
Adversarial proceedings. The current licensing process, by focus-
ing on an "up or down" decision on a specific site, inevitably places
the public in an adversarial position with respect to the lead agency
and the utility.
Current practice provides little or no opportunity for effective
suggestions from the public concerning better site locations or plant
type, since permit applications are narrowly focused on, and heavily
committed to, a preferred site and plant type. If public participation
were allowed at a "time when choices were still open, a condition could
be reached wherein certain suggestions from the public might be adopted,
and a spirit of common goals might prevail.
Long and costly hearings. The adversarial setting of current
procedures encourages long, costly and formal adjudicatory hearings.
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Lacking the means to participate in informal dialogue before
the final decision stage, the primary alternative left open to the public
is terminal objection on procedural and technical grounds. Current agency
adjudicatory procedures lead to long and costly delays when this happens.
Formalized adjudicatory proceedings are a part of most permitting
agency procedures. The NRC, USEPA, public service commissions, and some
state air and water permitting agencies utilize these. The Corps of
Engineers perhaps utilizes the least formal hearing procedures.
PSC differences. States in the ORBES region differ greatly in
their requirements for PSC rulings on need for power and certificates
of public convenience and necessity at the present time.
Some states (Indiana, Pennsylvania) do not require PSC determination
of need or certificates of public convenience and necessity before a
utility can begin construction of a power plant. Others (Kentucky,
Ohio) require rather comprehensive and coordinated environmental reviews
along with PSC determination of need. Still others (West Virginia,
Illinois) consider environmental factors along with PSC determination
of need, but do so in a less rigid procedural manner.
Such differences in procedures reflect broader underlying differences
in political outlook among the six states. PSCs tend to reflect state
politics quite strongly, probably due to the direct tie of such com-
missions to the Governor's office through the appointment mechanism.
Also, differences among PSC procedures and criteria in the ORBES region
reflect similar differences found among PSCs on the national scale.
Determination of need. The determination of need for power in all
six ORBES states is generally restricted in scope.
As mentioned above, two states in the ORBES region do not require
a PSC determination of need before a utility may begin construction of
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a power plant. For those states which do require such a determination,
the scope of this review is sometimes quite limited. For example, gener-
ally only the need for power in the applicant utility's service area is
considered. Also, in some states only the intrastate portion of the
utility's service area is considered, with interstate portions not con-
sidered or given only secondary importance. The mitigation of need
through power exchanges with other power pools is not generally consid-
ered by PSCs in ORBES states. Reduction of peak power requirements
through peak load pricing is an alternative that is considered of high
importance in only some ORBES states. In all cases the certificate of
convenience and necessity, if required, is based on environmental trade-
offs at the proposed site or one or two alternative sites. Regional
site evaluations are not conducted by PSCs.
Again, such a limited scope of review reflects the national situation
very well, wherein PSCs generally give only limited review to the appli-
cation for a determination on need for power.
Delegation of need for power. NRC, in a move designed to avoid
duplicative review of the need for power, is considering the delegation
of this determination to the states. If such delegation is promulgated
by NRC, along with associated performance guidelines, it may substan-
tially alter PSC procedures as discussed above.
The assumption by states of the need for power determination for
the NRC is voluntary, yet the presence of national guidelines should
have a significant impact on individual state procedures.
Separation of transmission line review. Transmission lines and
power plants are generally considered and certificated separately by
PSCs. Transmission line routes are not generally finalized for power
plants until very late in the EIS review process.
At the time of PSC review of the energy facility, transmission line
routes are not generally specified by the applicant utility. Since
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transmission lines have significant environmental impacts, these should
be considered at the same time as plant site review. Absence of this
information during the drafting of an EIS hinders proposal evaluation
by those involved. Further, by separating integral components of energy
facility developments, people who will be affected by the lines do not
have adequate opportunities to become involved at an early stage in
total project planning.
Long EIS phase. For a number of reasons, the DEIS and FEIS phases
of the EFS process have been very long for many power plants
in the ORBES region.
The total length of time between official permit application to
the lead agency and issuance of the FEIS has often taken from two to
three-and-one-half years, even in the absence of major controversy.
Such a long period of time is usually undesirable from the point of
of view of all parties. Causes of this long time-period are not
easily identified, but appear to be one or a combination of the following:
1) lack of strong lead agency coordination or timely arbitration of
difficulties which arise, 2) changing permit criteria, 3) lack of
urgency on the part of the utility for a decision, caused by tne
recent (post-1973) downturn in electricity demand projections, and
4) misplaced attention to unimportant details in preparation of the
EIS.
Lack of public involvement in DEIS phase. Public input to the
decision (licensing) process during the draft EIS phase has been accepted,
but not promoted, by lead agencies and utilities. This has led to very
late and ineffective public involvement (in the post-DEIS phase), with
consequent ill-will engendered among public groups.
Despite the generally long period of time which characterizes the
DEIS phase, utilities and lead agencies have not actively sought public
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input during this time. Concurrently, large financial commitments
(administrative, design, land, and other costs) are incurred during
this time period (see below) which reduces the utility and lead agency's
receptivity to project design changes which might be suggested after
publishing the draft EIS.
Also, such late involvement, concentrated in a very short period
of time (less than two months) after publishing the draft EIS, results
in unpleasant urgency of review by public groups, a feeling that a final
decision has already been made on the project without their input, and
consequent mistrust of the lead agency and utility.
Recent EIS guidelines, as published by the Council on Environmental
Quality, should serve to alleviate some of this problem through use of
a "scoping process." Thereunder, public meetings are suggested to be
held immediately after a permit application has been received and a
determination made by the lead agency that an EIS is called for. The
purpose of these meetings is to determine priority issues to be ad-
dressed during the draft EIS phase.
If interest and participation in such meetings and subsequent dis-
cussion are not promoted by the lead agency, however, the scoping pro-
cess may not be very successful. This may be particularly true since
in the past the public has not generally been well aware of the power
plant project or its possible impacts at this stage of the licensing
process (see below).
Lack of information during DEIS phase. Information on the probable
impacts of individual power plants has generally not been made available
to public interest groups or local residents until the DEIS is published.
This lack of information creates apprehension among both groups, but
particularly among local residents.
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1
In the absence of finding^ from professional studies, public interest
groups and, particularly, local residents generally assume the worst,
thereby in most cases becoming unduly apprehensive. This situation
exists despite the fact that many professional studies and findings do
exist before or very early in the DEIS phase, as a part of the utility's
environmental report to the lead agency.
Although it is not certain that an information transfer program
would reduce the total level of apprehension, it should serve to reduce
the most exaggerated individual cases, and would go far in addressing
the problem discussed above concerning ill-will engendered by late
public involvement and information.
Inadequate information transfer. When the DEIS is issued, a com-
bination of its length and the short period of time (45 days) allowed
for its review acts to hinder public involvement.
The DEIS is too massive and inaccessible for most citizens to read,
especially given only the official 45-day period for review and comment.
If condensed, or summary versions (.less than 10 pages long) of the DEIS
were available and distributed to interested parties, local citizens
and officials would much more likely be able to participate knowledge-
ably in the EPS process. Capsulized reports on individual topics
would also be useful throughout the DEIS phase, as specialized studies
are completed.
It should be noted that the new NEPA regulations issued by CEQ
require that in most cases the EIS be shorter than 150 pages, and serve
more as a decision document and less a depository for all possible data
related to a project.
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'Limited' site work. Extensive site preparation, the first stage
in construction of coal-fired power plants, often begins before issu-
ance of a draft environmental impact statement by the lead agency.
Though legal, this action 1) often destroys significant environmental
amenities at the site, 2) applies unnecessary pressure on licensing
agencies for positive rulings, and 3) promotes a climate of scepti-
cism and resentment in the public participation process.
Though such site work is termed 'limited' by utilities and lead
agencies, it has a profoundly negative impact on local citizenry and
public participatory groups. In part, this action results from the
extremely long period of time to draft an EIS on the part of the lead
agency (see above), however, under any reasonable time period for such
drafting, economic pressure will still likely exist to begin construc-
tion as early as possible. From the standpoint of meaningful public
participation, such construction should not take place.
In the case of nuclear power plants, limited work authorizations
(LWA's) have been awarded by NRC, but only after a study has been made
which is essentially equivalent to a draft EIS concerning site suita-
bility (from environmental and safety standpoints). Even under this
more reasoned approach, such practice has been called into question by
NRC itself, since it leads to undue financial risks on the part of the
utility and causes significant pressure on NRC for positive final de-
terminations on construction permit issuance.
Time-conditioned permits. State regulations requiring construction
to begin within one year (or some other arbitrary time period) after
permit issuance, places unnecessary pressures on utilities during the
licensing process for coal-fired power plants.
Once obtained, such a permit applies pressure on the utility to
begin construction before other permit decisions or environmental reviews
are made. On the other hand, the same restriction naturally leads the
utility to delay application for such conditioned permits. This in-
creases the degree of uncertainty that the utility must bear in the
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licensing process since the outcome of any future permit application
•
always involves some doubt, and permit criteria frequently change.
Careful review of such conditions should be made in the context of
power plant siting, especially considering the long licensing process
common to such facilities.
Duplicative review. Closely duplicative review of air pollution
aspects of coal-fired power plants occur at the state and Federal levels.
State agency air divisions issue construction permits based on a
plant's effect relative to ambient air standards and State Implementation
s.
Plans (SIP's). This involves air pollution modeling. USEPA issues a
construction permit based upon Prevention of Significant Deterioration
(PSD). This determination also involves the same air pollution models,
and essentially duplicates the state study. None of the states in the
ORBES region have met the criteria necessary to assume the PSD permit
program from USEPA, however. This contrasts markedly with the water
quality regulatory review, wherein all states in the ORBES region except
Kentucky and West Virginia have been granted authority for NPDES review.
Monitoring plant impacts. Monitoring environmental impacts of
coal-fired power plants to insure conformance with statements in the
FEIS would benefit both the utilities as well as the public.
In the case of coal-fired power plants, insufficient monitoring
and enforcement procedures exist to ensure that actual plant design and
operation conform to the generalized statements made in environmental
impact statements. No one organization is responsible for such monitor-
ing and enforcement as is the case of a nuclear power plant (NRC). Cer-
tain parameters of air and water quality are measured after the plant
is in operation, while other factors such as landscape design, and
long-term biotic (aquatic and terrestrial), aesthetic, social, and land-
use impacts are not.
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Such monitoring would provide a solid basis for utilities to write
EIS's, thus reducing the case-by-case research effort needed for an EIS,
and would ensure more predictable environmental impacts. Public opposi-
tion to power plants on the basis of doubt about impacts predicted, would
be reduced. All parties would benefit from this.
Development of "environmental technical specifications" for coal-
fired power plants, modeled after those developed for nuclear power
plants by NRC, would aid in this monitoring effort.
Generic review. Certain issues are repeatedly raised during the
licensing process in various forums. These could be more effectively
handled in generic public hearings on a regional or even national basis.
Energy conservation, peak load pricings rate structure reform, loss
of agricultural land, fuel type, and other generalized issues could be
effectively dealt with if investigated and adjudicated as individual
topics. Findings could then be applied to specific cases as deemed
appropriate. Neither the public nor utilities are well served by the
current process of raising these issues for debate de novo in each plant
case. The administrative agency responsible for plant review is reluc-
tant to take firm action since it views such debates as far beyond its
sphere of expertise and competence. Public interest groups are there-
fore not satisfied. The utility, meanwhile, suffers by any delays caused
by such limited investigations, and receives no considered guidance on
the subject, as it might in a more concentrated review.
This problem may be relieved somewhat by the new NEPA regulations
calling for 'tiering' of impact statements whenever appropriate to do so.
Under the concept of tiering, generic environmental impact statements
would be written on National issues (e.g., electrical energy conserva-
tion), and site specific EIS's would then merely refer to the conclusions
made in the more general document as a basis for the alternative proposed.
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Legislated/regulated criteria. Lack of national and state policies f
inhibits generic review,and hampers decision-making in the siting process '
for both nuclear and coal-fired power plants.
There are recurring trade-offs to be made in the site selection and
approval process for which no national or state policy statement exists:
Examples are fuel alternatives, energy conservation, agricultural pro-
duction, and land use. Lacking a national or state initiative, generic
reviews are made more difficult. Legislation or regulations are needed
at both the state and Federal level in this regard.
NRC reform proposals. Certain of the proposals for regulatory re-
form recently made by the NRC directly relate to the improvement of
public participation aspects of EPS, and would lead to more responsive
and representative decision making.
Such measures as early site review, generic environmental impact
statements (through rulemaking), a greater coordination between all
levels of government in EPS, delegation of certain authority to states,
and other initiatives are all in various stages of implementation by
NRC. Each of these has been discussed above in the context of coal-
fired plants, as well. NRC, however, is in a much stronger position
to implement these actions than any agency in the coal-fired power plant
arena. NRC could provide needed Federal leadership in developing mean-
ingful EPS procedural reform.
Changing criteria. Frequent changes in environmental laws, ambient
pollution standards, and required pollution control technology have de-
stabilized utility planning and the licensing process.
From 1969 to the present, there has not been a period of three
years (approximate length of the licensing process for coal-fired plants)
wherein one or more major changes have not occurred in either licensing
procedures or criteria. Air and water pollution standards, control
technologies, EIS preparation procedures, EIS content requirements,
emphasis on flood-plain management and wetlands protection, and other
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requirements, have all changed in this period. Overlaid on these changes
have been new requirements for increased public involvement in decision-
making. Currently, new regulations on hazardous wastes and the increased
importance of long-range transport of air pollutants must be considered.
Procedures should be implemented which remove this source of uncertainty
in the planning process.
Restrictive siting methodologies. Certain siting methodologies used
by utilities and consultants in the ORBES region are not well suited from
a public involvement standpoint.
Most power plant sites in the ORBES region have been selected princi-
pally on the basis of engineering features (capital and operating costs,
transportation access, fuel source, system reliability, water availability,
seismic characteristics, geology, etc.). A limited number of candidate
areas meeting certain arbitrary criteria related to these engineering
features survive a first-stage screening process. Such features as
socioeconomic, environmental, aesthetic, and land-use impacts are con-
sidered at a second screening phase.
The use of arbitrary engineering cut-off criteria in the first
phase denies the opportunity for meaningful trade-offs among all siting
criteria by the public.
Open siting methodologies. Siting methodologies exist which would
enhance the effectiveness of public participation in the site selection
process.
There are a large number of siting methodologies which seem to be
appropriate for public involvement in the siting process. These fall
under the general categories of ranking and weighting methods, and
are particularly useful if applied in the context of an open planning
process wherein participants may revise their weighting functions based
upon an open discussion of all site selection criteria and concerns.
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Experimental open planning. There is a need In the ORBES region for
an experimental open planning process for EPS, initially applied on a
limited geographical scale.
There has been no experience with an open planning process approach
to EPS in the ORBES region. It may be very useful at this stage to
undertake one or more such studies on a limited geographical scale, such
as a utility service area. If successful, the experiment may establish
a climate within which open planning on a more complex geographical and
institutional scale may be initiated, or it may serve to encourage utilities
in other service areas to undertake a similar approach.
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Chapter 3. EAST BEND CASE STUDY: KENTUCKY
INTRODUCTION*
The East Bend Generating Station site is located on the Ohio River
511 miles downstream of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and 24 air miles south-
west of Cincinnati, Ohio near the small community of Rabbit Hash in
western Boone County, Kentucky. Although Boone County is experiencing
rapid growth as a whole, the area surrounding the plant site remains
rural, sparsely populated, and is of rugged terrain. Most of the land
in this area which is level enough is used for farming, with the most
important areas being the rich bottomlands along the Ohio River. The
East Bend site was such an agricultural area.
The plant is jointly owned by the Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company
(CG&E), which is responsible for construction and licensing, and the Dayton
Power and Light Company (DP&L). CG&E holds 51 percent ownership and
DP&L 49 percent. Four units, with a total generating capacity of at
least 2400 MW are presently planned, two of which are currently under
construction. Units 1 and 2, which are expected to cost at least $630
million when they are completed in 1984 and 1981 respectively, are the
only components of the development considered in the environmental analy-
sis of the site. The cost of Units 1 and 2 represents more than Boone
County's total 1974 assessed value for real, tangible and intangible
property.
* Abbreviations for parties named in this case study are defined where
first noted, and are summarized on page 48.
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The East Bend station will be coal-fired, with the fuel shipped to
the site by Ohio River barges. Make-up water will be drawn from the
Ohio River to replace that lost in evaporation from the cooling towers
and in the wet lime scrubber for sulfur dioxide removal from the gas ,
stream. The rest of the water will be used to transport bottom ash and
other wastes to a pond where solids will settle out to allow the water
discharged to meet effluent standards. Fly ash will be removed from the
gas stream with an electrostatic precipitator and will be combined with
the sludge from S02 removal for stabilization. This will be compacted
and stored on-site, forming a large terraced hill.
PROCEDURES
Site Selection.
In October, 1971, CG&E authorized a consultant, Commonwealth Asso-
ciates, Inc. (CAI),to locate suitable sites for a 2400 MW fossil-fueled
or nuclear generating facility in or near their service region. From a
total of 81 sites located in an initial topographic map search based on
land characteristics, fuel access and water supply, 55 were judged "obviously
unsuitable." Air reconnaissance eliminated two more sites. Information
was gathered on the remaining 24 sites and presented in CAI's preliminary
report R-1429 of April, 1972. No final determination could be made, how-
ever, due to a lack of information on fuel supply, air pollution control
equipment, transmission lines, etc. CG&E then appointed a four-person
committee to preferentially pick 4-5 sites based on CAI's findings,
giving special emphasis to fuel flexibility and physical characteristics.
Because of this, the four sites which were given serious consideration
were all Ohio River sites. Additional on-site inspections by the CG&E
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committee in the Fall of 1972 confirmed their decision that the East
Bend site was superior.
land Acquisition.
In January, 1973, two property owners in the East Bend reported to
the Kentucky Post that an option to buy their land had been purchased by
M. Gene Snyder, the U.S. Representative for their district, who, it was
later learned, was acting as a real estate agent for CG&E. A reporter
for the Post learned that the Congressman informed the owners that they
would be faced with condemnation suits if they did not sell. Court-
produced settlements, Snyder added, would give the owners less for their land
than he was offering. He obtained four options on a total of 725 acres
at this time. One owner, however, later refused to sell at the option
price, claiming sand and gravel under his land increased its
value. CG&E eventually won a condemnation suit against him, but at a
higher price than originally offered, contrary to Rep. Snyder's claims.
Later, six more options were obtained in the East Bend, causing con-
cern among some local residents about the loss of that large a quantity
of prime farmland. Presently, 1777 acres at the site are owned by CG&E,
most of which were purchased during 1974.
Certificate of Convenience & Necessity.
Plans for East Bend Station were announced in a News Release from
CG&E which was reported in the Kentucky Post on October 11, 1973. This
stated that one 600 MW generating unit would be built at a cost of $213
million, and that an application for a Certificate of Convenience and
Necessity reflecting this would be submitted to the Kentucky Public
Service Commission (PSC). On October 31 this application was received
and the review process for Case No. 5907 began. The PSC's review included
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a public hearing held at their office in Frankfort on November 2J, with
William Dickhoner, the president of CG&E, Bill Grieme, the president of
the Northern Kentucky Chamber of Commerce, and Judge Bruce Ferguson of
the Boone County Fiscal Court, all testifying in support of the project.
There was no reported public opposition at this hearing. The desired certi-
fication for Unit 2, the first unit to be built, was granted on December 10, 197;
Kentucky Air Permits.
The granting of permission to contruct a power plant by the PSC is
contingent on obtaining necessary construction permits from the Kentucky
Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection (DNREP).
One of these is a permit from the Division of Air Pollution Control to
construct an air contaminant source. CG&E applied for such a permit on
July 31, 1974. The state reviewed modeling results obtained by Enviro-
plan, Inc., CG&E's consultant on this matter, to see if emission limita-
tions and ambient air quality standards of the state would be met. A
preliminary determination of compliance with these standards was made
by the Division. In order to allow the public to review this action,
a public hearing, requested by the Tri-State Air Committee (TAC) in Octo-
ber, 1973, was announced in a Public Notice in the Kentucky Post, and held in
the Boone County Courthouse on July 23,1975. Less than two dozen people at-
tended, and the testimony presented did not convince state officials to change
their determination. Permit No. C-75-75was issued November 21, 1975, allow-
ing the construction of Unit 2.
Due to time constraints on the validity of the construction permit,
action on Unit 1, which wouldn't be needed until two years after Unit 2,
was not begun until September 8, 1977, when an application was submitted.
In the time since Unit 2 was permitted, however, the 3-hour PSD increment
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was tightened by the Clean Air Act Amendments of August 7, 1977, requiring
that an effluent limitation on S02 below the NSPS be established on Unit 1
to insure that Units 1 & 2 combined would meet PSD. State officials
modeled the dispersion of pollutants to see if air quality standards
would also be met. Based on the results, preliminary approval to con-
struct Unit 1 was granted. This was announced in a Public Notice appear-
ing in the Kentucky Post on June 28, 1978. In the following 30 day period
for public comment, only Federal and Indiana air pollution officials
responded. Permit No. C-78-51 authorizing construction of Unit 1 was
issued August 25, 1978.
Kentucky Hater Permits.
Two State DNREP permits concerning water and wastewater were also
required before construction could begin. One, from the Division of
Water Quality, had to be obtained before construction of an ash basin
and a sanitary sewage treatment plant could be started. An application
for this permit accompanied the one for the first air permit. The
Kentucky DNREP public hearing was jointly held fay both divisions, but no
water-related issues arose. Based on a review of material submitted by
CG&E, Kentucky officials determined that the plant would have no dif-
ficulty meeting state water quality standards, and thus granted a permit
to construct industrial and sanitary waste treatment facilities on July
30, 1975. Construction of the sanitary system did not begin within a
year as required, and a new permit was issued August 4, 1976 for this
facility.
The other required action involves the Division of Water Resources,
which must insure that water intake, outfall, and other structures to be
built would not change the characteristics of the river enough to raise
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the flood stage during high volumes of flow. Proof of this results in
a Permit to Construct in a Floodway. CG&E applied for this January 3,
1975 and provided additional requested information on January 17. Upon
the receipt of this information the Division had 20 working days to model
the situation using the HEC-2 program of the COE and, based on the results,
decide whether to give the project approval. No problems were found in
this analysis and Permit No. 1090 was issued January 27. On March 25,
1979, plans for additional sludge ponds (required for an NPDES permit)
were received, but no decision on the need to permit these has been made
at this writing.
USEPA PSD Determination.
To determine whether the PSD increment could be met by East Bend
Station, the Air Programs Branch of USEPA undertook their own modeling
study of the expected pollutant concentrations. Their model used some-
what different assumptions than those on which Enviroplan's model was
based, but both gave similar results. Thus, when CG&E submitted a com-
plete application for a PSD determination on June 4, 1976, USEPA was
ready to issue their "Preconstruction Review and Preliminary Determina-
tion for East Bend Units 1 & 2" on June 8, which stated that conditional
approval could be given based on PSD regulations. This decision was
announced in a public notice, appearing on July 1, 1976 in the Kentucky
Post and Boone County Recorder.. In the 30 day period for comment fol-
lowing this, only CG&E and the Tri-State Air Committee (TAG) responded.
Based on a final determination dated September 1, 1976, which basically
upheld the June 8 decision, USEPA gave "Authority to Construct a Sta-
tionary Source" on November 24, 1976. Because of the change in the PSD
increments mentioned previously, this authority had to be revised. CG&E
was informed of this by USEPA on September 27, 1977, provided USEPA with
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additional information on March 9, 1978, and received the revised
"Authority" on June 20, 1978.
USEPA NPDES Permit.
An agreement on the NPDES permit has yet to be reached at .this writing,
even though discussions between USEPA (Atlanta) and CG&E on the requirements
of the permit began on February 4, 1975 and a permit application was
received January 21, 1976. There are several reasons for this. Initi-
ally, the Water Enforcement Branch of USEPA, (Atlanta), which is responsible
for the NPDES determination was apparently left out of coordination efforts
between the USEPA (Atlanta) and the Corps of Engineers (COE) on the Draft
Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) preparation. Because of this, they
were aware of the DEIS's impending release, but did not learn of it until
after the fact. Also, they did not know of the DEIS public hearing
until one week beforehand. This kept them from operating under their normal
procedures of readying a Draft NPDES permit for placement in the DEIS
and soliciting public comment on the permit at the same time comments
are sought on the DEIS. Therefore, the single forum for public comment
on all Federal environmental actions, which USEPA desires, was not
available in this case.
In addition to these timing delays, disagreements over the details
of the NPDES permit also slowed the process. USEPA felt that the system
they suggested would reduce water use and allow for a higher degree of
treatment in the future, while CG&E defended their designs as the least
environmentally damaging and the least costly. A settlement was apparently
reached only after an exchange of comments on the DEIS, several meetings
in Atlanta and Washington, and the inclusion of a statement by USEPA in
the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) which said that although
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a Draft NPDES permit was provided for inclusion in the FEIS, it was by no
means final. The NPDES permit was expected to be issued before October, 1979.
Memorandum of Agreement on Historic Resources.
Two historically significant areas were found on the East Bend site.
The one which generated the most interest was Winnfield Cottage, an early
19th century river house built by one of the first settlers of the area.
When plans were announced for the East Bend Station, several concerned
citizens recognized the importance of the house and initiated a request
for its placement on the National Register of Historic Places. In July*
1974, such registration was achieved. At this time, CG&E was quoted as
saying that they would place a fence around the house to protect it.
Later, however, CG&E decided that the cottage would interfere with their
development plans, and saw no way that the house could remain where it
was. They failed, though, to directly state this to those interested
in preserving the house, represented by Judge Ferguson, the Kentucky
Heritage Commission (KHC), and the President's Advisory Council on
Historic Preservation (PAC), in several meetings and letters between
these parties early in 1975. CG&E had always maintained that they pre-
ferred the cottage's demolition and felt that a power plant and an
historic structure were incompatible, but appeared at first to be open
to compromise. The KHC, which was charged with drafting a Memorandum of
Agreement on the cottage, incorrectly believed that CG&E would set aside
land around the cottage based on the conditions of the preservation plan
the KHC supported, and thus did not rush to formally document the agree-
ment. On September 16, however, CG&E asked the COE to have the PAC
approve the demolition of the cottage, which the PAC refused to do,
instead asking the COE to resolve the conflict. The COE took no action
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and the fate of the cottage remained in doubt until it was announced in
February, 1976 that site preparation at East Bend was to begin. Reaction
was swift. The PAC proposed a plan which, by the end of the month, was
almost totally accepted by all parties. This plan included most elements
of the accepted Memorandum of Agreement, signed in May, 1976. It called
for CG&E to erect a fence around the cottage, which was done in March,
over one-and-one-half years after CG&E had first proposed to do so.
Preservationists were given two years to relocate the house before CG&E
would be allowed to demolish it. By the time of the agreement, however,
there was little left to preserve. Vandals had removed almost everything
of value from the cottage, principally during the winter of 1975-1976.
Because of this, the impetus to preserve the cottage was lost. Winnfield
Cottage was demolished during 1978.
More success was found in efforts, to preserve the other historic
resource, two archaeological discoveries, one of which was potentially
the richest recorded find in Kentucky based on the amount of chipped
stone recovered during CAI's archaeological testing of May, 1975. The
Kentucky State Archaeologist was especially interested in this, and
negotiated an agreement with CG&E which would prevent these sites from
being disturbed. He stated that the announcement of the beginning of
site preparation, however, surprised him, since a formal agreement was
not signed and it appeared construction workers knew nothing of the sites.
This was quickly resolved, however, and the agreement on these archae-
ological sites was included in the Memorandum of Agreement.
COE DA Permit and EIS Preparation.
Under the National Environmental Policy Act, any Federal permit
action on a project which would have a major impact on the environment
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must satisfy the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act
•
(NEPA). In the East Bend case, this responsibility was assumed by the
COE under their authority for granting Department of the Army (DA) per-
mits. The first contact between the COE and CG&E occurred on January
3, 1974. During 1974, CAI was selected as a third-party consultant to
perform the required environmental studies. This decision was subject
to review by Federal and State agencies and environmental groups con-
tacted by the COE. Even before this review was final, however, CAI
began the required studies, an action taken at CG&E's own peril, and aimed
at minimizing the effect of possible delays in arriving at an FEIS.
Meetings throughout 1975 and the first half of 1976 between the three
parties were held to coordinate'the studies, review the findings, and
summarize the findings and their implications in a DEIS. The most im-
portant meeting occurred January 22, 1975 when it was decided how the
most sensitive problem areas would be mitigated, it was hoped this would
reduce opposition to the plant when public involvement begain in earnest,
predicted to occur at the time of the DEIS public hearing.
The DEIS was sent to the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) on
May 21, 1976. This was noted in the Federal Register on June 7 and in
a COE Public Notice on June 8. The public review process for the DEIS
and the DA Permit included a 45-day period for written comments, and a
Public Hearing, held in Burlington, Kentucky, on July 8. The hearing
was attended by an estimated 250 people. Twenty-five people testified, 17
opposed and 9 in favor. Forty written comments were received by the COE,
17 from government agencies, 12 from interest groups, and 11 from indi-
vidual local citizens. Direct comments to the DEIS were answered in the
FEIS, and others were reviewed by the COE in making their determination.
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The revision of the DEIS for the FEIS took nearly a year. Again
this was performed and reviewed by the three parties; CG&E, CAI, and the
COE, with ultimate authority resting with the COE. Based on the comments
received, additional or revised information was included on transmission
lines, migratory waterfowl, a Spring biological survey, growth projections,
and water use and treatment systems. After a review by higher COE au-
thorities, the FEIS was sent to the CEQ on June 17, 1977. This was noted
in the Federal Register on June 24, and in a COE Public Notice on June
29.
In the meantime, the DA permit which required the EIS was being
prepared. CG&E first applied for this on July 9, 1974, but was informed
that the facility covered by the permit must be more completely planned
for the application to be accepted. The formal permit application for the
water intake and discharge facilities, coal unloading facility, and
barge dock was made January 21, 1976 and revised March 14, 1977. No
final decision on whether to grant this permit could occur until the
public interest review required by NEPA culminated with the 30 day com-
ment period on the FEIS, which ended July 25, 1977. Only eight minor
comments were received, and on August 5, 1977, the DA permit was granted.
This was not the end of the COE's involvement, however, since in Febru-
ary, 1978, talks began on the procedures for obtaining a permit for Units
3 and 4.
CRITERIA
Several-criteria which CG&E used for siting the East Bend plant are
given in the FEIS. These are:
Engineering Constraints
1. Topography
2. Condenser cooling system
3. Makeup water
4. Geology
5. Access
6. Flood protection
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Environmental Constraints
1. Scenic impairment
- 2. Air pollution
3. Water pollution
4. Water depletion
5. Land use
6. Population displacement
Economic Constraints
1. Property acquisition costs
2. Plant construction costs
3. Operational expenses
4. Fuel expenses
5. Transmission expenses
Basic engineering constraints were met by each candidate site. Of
those listed, it appears that the make-up water requirement was the most
important reason for selecting the alternative sites along the Ohio River
which were given serious consideration by CG&E. An important engineering
reason for choosing East Bend over the other sites, however, may have
been its higher elevation above the river, which afforded greater flood
protection.
Environmentally, no primary alternative site appeared greatly
superior. Pollution was not a constraint at any of these sites as long
as the proposed control equipment was used. Each site would produce
similar aesthetic impacts, and the land use and demographic patterns in
these regions were virtually identical. Based on CG&E's comments at
the DEIS public hearing, however, the last of these criteria was given
precedence when the alternative sites were chosen. A site was desired
in a sparsely populated area, said CG&E, to minimize the population im-
pacted. Critics of the plant, however, including residents of the East
Bend area, felt that a sparsely populated area was chosen to minimize
opposition to the plant from local residents.
Plant construction and operation costs didn't seem to be a major
variable among the sites considered. Fuel expenses were minimized by
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an Ohio River site. Property acquisition costs, however, were cited as
the major distinction between the East Bend site and the second-rated
site at Steele's Bottom, a few miles downstream. Tobacco grown at
Steele's Bottom, it was felt, would increase the acqusition costs, thus
East Bend was chosen.
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
Early State Public Hearings.
Several possible forums for public participation have been mentioned.
The first of these was the PSC hearing, which drew very little participa-
tion. Plans for the plant were given considerable press coverage at
this time, but the hearing itself does not appear to be mentioned in
these stories until after it occurred. The fact that it was held in
Frankfort probably served to limit the number of people who could attend.
The one major interest group active at this time, the TAG, didn't parti-
cipate because the issues to be discussed were not in their field of
expertise, air pollution. Therefore, they requested another meeting
where these concerns could be discussed. This was the Kentucky DNREP
hearing, announced in the public notice as an "informational meeting,"
which was held on a weekday morning. This time the hearing was held
in Boone County, but still only about two dozen people attended. Even
though the Winnfield Cottage issue was being debated at this time, and
the TAG voiced their concerns about the health effects of the air
pollution which would be produced, local opposition to the plant, if it
existed at all, was not heard. The sentiment of most local people at
this time was perhaps expressed by a local farmer, who said at the
hearing that he trusted the state to look out for him.
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Regional Interest Groups.
Meanwhile, regional interest groups were becoming concerned, not so
much about the East Bend plant £er_ se_, but about all the plants which
were being planned for the Louisville-to-Cincinnati stretch of the Ohio
River, one of the few River stretches left which wasn't lined with
industrial developments. Opposition to the Marble Hill nuclear plant
and Clifty Creek coal-fired plant started near Madison, Indiana, early
in the decade, leading to the formation of a group opposed to Ohio River
power plants called Save the Valley. Such regional interest increased
during 1975 when a coal-fired plant was proposed to be built directly
across the river from Marble Hill at Wise's Landing, Kentucky. Save
the Valley began meeting with the TAG, local chapters of the Sierra Club,
and other groups to keep each other informed. Interest shifted upriver
for the first time, however, in January, 1976 when plans for a new coal-
fired plant near Patriot, Indiana became known and Charles Tillotson,
a property owner at the site, actively began fighting the power company
involved. He joined with the above concerned interest groups for assist-
ance in preventing the construction of Patriot. This in turn gave these
interest groups their first opportunity to oppose a power plant this
early in the siting process.
At the same time, site preparation for East Bend (located only four
miles away from the Patriot site) had just begun (prior to the release
of the DEIS and the issuance of any Federal permits). This drew heavy
press coverage, especially in relation to Winnfield Cottage and the
archaeological sites. The East Bend proposal thus came into public
consciousness^ but local public opposition had not yet arisen. The
interest groups, however, saw the proximity of the East Bend and Patriot
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plants as a sign of an emerging proliferation of power plants and stepped
up their efforts to get a regional review of such projects. Pressure
exerted on Congressional representatives finally led to the funding of
a regional study by USEPA, which became known as the Ohio River Basin
Energy Study (ORBES). The TAG was the first local group to be informed
of this in an April, 1976 reply from the USEPA.
DEIS Public Hearing and Comments.
Early in the coordination between the three parties preparing the
EIS, the COE predicted that public reaction would not occur until after
the DEIS was issued. Their prediction proved to be accurate. This is
not surprising, however, since this was the public's only substantive
and available source of information about the effects of the project.
Following issuance of the DEIS, local citizens, although still not great
in number, became alarmed and formed the Boone County Chapter of Save the
Valley. Members went door-to-door to distribute handbills, pass on
information about the plant's impact, and drum up support to attend the
DEIS public hearing. In contrast, the organized opponent interest groups
viewed the hearing, the first in the region since ORBES was formed,as
an opportunity to state their case about the impacts of regional power
plant proliferation, and to urge that work on these plants, including
East Bend, cease until the ORBES study was complete. They were particu-
larly incensed when they learned that, according to accepted Federal
practice, only projects with applications on file prior to the receipt
of the application for the project in question would be considered in
the impact evaluation. Thus, as far as the impact evaluation of East
Bend was concerned, the Patriot plant did not exist.
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It was estimated that two-thirds of those attending the public
hearing were there because of the regional power plant issue, many from
outside Boone County. Most of the letters of comment on the DEIS in
opposition to the plant referred to this situation. Vocal proponents
of the plant represented labor unions and business concerns, and empha-
sized one theme—that the plant would provide electricity which would
stimulate .economic growth in the region and provide jobs. Opponents,
who appeared to be a majority of the public participants, were much more
diverse in their reasons for opposing the plant.
According to COE regulations at the time, the impacts of transmission
lines were not discussed in the DEIS. Numerous comments on the DEIS con-
cerning this issue, however, forced a revaluation of this position.
These repeated comments convinced the COE to include a discussion of
these lines in the FEIS. In addition to this, the Kentucky Chapter of
the Nature Conserancy, which owned several nature preserves near the
expected route of these lines, directly approached CG&E on this issue
just after it was announced that the power company was applying to the
PSC for a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity for the transmission
lines. CG&E provided a map to the Conservancy, which in turn located
on it the properties they were concerned about. This showed that no
such area would be crossed and, after a discussion on clearing and
maintenance of the rights-of-way, the Conservancy decided that there
would be no major impact.
Other public actions caused some slight modifications in plans for
the plant and the content of the FEIS. A complaint was filed by barge
operators on the possible obstruction to navigate the proposed faci-
lities at East Bend might cause. CG&E later reduced the width of the
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docked barge fleet which, it was agreed, would mitigate the problems.
William Gaither, a wildlife illustrator and biologist, was critical of
the discussion on migratory waterfowl in the DEIS. This drew special
attention from the COE, who ordered slight modifications in the FEIS on
this topic. Several people interviewed gave Gaither credit for helping
preserve some sensitive ecological areas on-site, but it appears that
the decision to preserve these had already been made by the COE and
CG&E.
When replies were written for inclusion in the FEIS, a few changes
were made, but many other suggested improvements were refuted. Several
groups gave elaborate descriptions, backed by published studies, of
how the development of the power plant could be delayed if rate struc-
tures which promoted conservation were instituted. Many commenters de-
bated the air quality model and the data used in it. Similar doubts,
including those of the USEPA, were expressed about the water treatment
system. Also some of the taxonomy given in the DEIS was questioned.
While government agencies in general had few comments about the
project's impacts, and interest groups focused primarily on the regional
power plant issue or refuted certain aspects of the environmental study,
only the local citizens who commented were vehemently opposed to the
actual plant site. This primarily resulted from their perception that
they would bear the brunt of the impacts of the plant and from the fear
that these impacts, especially air pollution, were a direct threat to
their comfort, livelihood, and even their lives. While the issues they
raised were basically sound, their fears appeared to be greatly exag-
gerated. This attitude seems to be made more extreme by a lack of under-
standing about the likely impacts. This in turn can be attributed to
37
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the limited information available to the local residents about the nature
and extent of the facility.
After the public hearing, interest in the plant diminished. The
only major action considered was a lawsuit, begun by the TAG, to stop
construction of the plant based on the regional proliferation of plant
proposals. The potential litigants eventually decided that the chances
of success of such a law suit would be improved if a plant were challenged
which wasn't as far into the licensing process as was East Bend. Thus
the suit against CG&E was never filed. An opportunity for public com-
ment existed upon the release of the FEIS and the preliminary determina-
tions on further permits, but these opportunities were largely ignored
by the public. The few comments on the FEIS were relatively minor and
were made after the comment period had expired.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. No laws or regulations were violated.
There is no evidence that any of the procedures used to obtain the
required permits, to construct according to them, or to allow public
comment violated the letter of the law. Only a few cases were noted,
however, where any party took the initiative to do more than the minimum
required. Moreover, such instances occurred only when it would benefit
the power company or not require a significant change in their plans.
Examples of these occurrences include an early meeting with Boone County
officials to discuss obtaining low-cost pollution control bonds, and a
discussion with the Nature Conservancy concerning possible impacts to
nature preserves from the transmission lines.
38
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2. New and changing rules and regulations for the permitting process,
including the use of a lead agency and third party consultant, con-
tributed to the coordination and communication problems during the
East Bend EPS process.
CG&E and many regulatory agency representatives interviewed felt
that the East Bend case study would not be representative of their normal
operations since it was one of the first plants to be sited under these
regulatory conditions. CG&E in particular feels that information can
be most effectively transmitted to the public by following the statutory
requirements of the coordinating lead agency. More public participation
can only occur, they feel, when the necessary legislation is enacted
and effectively implemented.
3. The power company and the regulatory agencies didn't prevent the
public from obtaining information about the project, but neither
did they promote any form of public information outside of required
channels.
When asked if they were encouraged or restricted from participating
in the decision process, many of those involved said they felt neither.
Information would be given if it was specifically asked for, but nothing
was volunteered by the power company unless it was to their benefit.
Several interviewees were of the opinion that CG&E would have preferred
to build the plant in complete secrecy. For the public to participate,
they had to take the initiative themselves and even then this was usually
restricted to exchanging (or arguing about) information rather than dis-
cussing alternatives to the power company's plans. The COE was given
credit for giving proper notice and running an organized public hearing,
but common opinion of attendees was that this meeting was not meant for
decision making.
4. Unless a public notice is a paid legal notice, newspapers are not
required to publish them.
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This was a rather unexpected finding. It was learned of while
trying to locate a formal notice of the DEIS hearing in the local Boone
County weekly paper. Apparently unless the space is paid for, which
wasn't done by the COE, the editor has the option of printing the notice,
using parts of it in a story, or simply ignoring it (as in the case of
East Bend). The editor of a similar paper in Switzerland County, Indiana,
across the Ohio River from East Bend, stated that they are inundated
with these notices, especially news releases from power companies. Even
though this paper has actively covered the local power plant controversy,
they rarely use the material in these news releases unless it fits a
proposed story.
5. Input to the PSC on the critical questions of plant need and site
suitability was given almost exclusively by CG&E.
Participation at this stage, which occurred before CG&E committed
themselves to the site by purchasing any land, was minimal. This could
be attributed primarily to the fact that such participation was not widely
solicited, the environmental impacts of the plant were not known to the
public at the time, and the hearing was held far from the plant site.
As a result, the plant was viewed in a positive light by most of those
involved as public hearing participants at the time. This was compounded
by a lack of review authority held by the PSC at this time. No state
environmental review was required for either the PSC certification or
the DNREP construction permits. Thus, CG&E was allowed to begin con-
struction at their own peril and invest more than $17 million before the
FEIS was issued.
6. No land was purchased until after a Certificate of Convenience and
Necessity was obtained from the PSC, however options to buy land
were held prior to this time.
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In the East Bend case, this fact was observed when certifications
were sought for both the plant itself and the transmission lines leading
to it. It is significant to note that the power company hesitated to
financially commit themselves to a site before this initial approval was
obtained. The PSC review stage thus seems to be the only point where
discussions of the plant need and alternative site choices are meaning-
ful. After this time, too much money and time is invested, both by the
utility and the licensing agencies, to give any serious consideration to
disallowing the construction of the plant.
7. CG&E and the COE based their analysis of what the public would
object to on past experience rather than through consultation
with potentially interested publics. .
Throughout the evaluation of the impacts of the plant, discussions
centered on how to anticipate and respond to expected concerns of the
people and other govenment agencies. Only the USEPA and U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service were asked by the COE to review and comment on pre-
liminary environmental findings. Steps proposed early in the coordina-
tion process were intended to lessen the public's concerns when they
learned of the plant's impacts, and to foresee and mitigate the expected
objections of the public. Thus the people's objections and the method
for resolving these objections were set in CG&E's and COE's minds well
before the public could express them. . For the most part this foresight
was accurate, and most concerns were addressed. However, environmental
interest groups and local residents resented the fact that they were not
allowed input into these decision and this caused doubt about the find-
ings of CG&E and the COE on all issues. Also, this may have led to
more concern about items left out of the DEIS than was warranted.
41
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8. Any changes made to CG&E's plans, once they were formulated, either
did not require significant design changes and/or costs to the com-
pany, or they were granted after great reluctance.
The only major change to CG&E's original design, which was drawn up
before the plant was first formally announced will (presumably) be the
water treatment scheme as mandated by the NPDES permit. At this writing,
however, this has been in conflict for over five years. Provisions for
preserving the archaeological sites and unique wildlife habitat, and
for redesigning the barge dock caused no major disruptions in the com-
pany's original design. Requests for preservation of Winnfield Cottage
and destroying less prime agricultural land were denied since they could
be accommodated only through perceived hardships to CG&E. Thus critics
on these matters were not satisfied by the ultimate outcome. Suggestions
that construction be delayed for a regional study or an attempt at energy
conservation through a revised rate structure were never given serious
consideration. Many critics felt that such actions threatened the
company's means of growth - a continuing construction program.
9. The only substantial information flow on the impacts of East Bend
to and from the people occurred when the DEIS was being evaluated.
Little was known of the size and magnitude of the project until
the DEIS was issued. The press, especially the Kentucky Post, regularly
reported the status of the plant after they first learned in January,
1973, that Rep. Snyder was acquiring options on land at East Bend. The
only major issues which arose before the DEIS, though, were the circum-
stances surrounding the acquisition of land, the uncertainty over the
amount of land required, and the preservation of the historic sites.
Apparently these issues either didn't concern most people, were negated
by the economic benefits also reported, or just were not noticed. The
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DEIS is the major document which requires identification and evaluation
of all the negative impacts of a development. The DEIS therefore at-
tracted considerable local attention probably due to the personal threat
the plant seemed to represent \n this analysis.
10. Winnfield Cottage would have had a'better chance of being saved
if the COE had acted.
NEPA requires the lead agency for EIS preparation to insure that
the negative impacts of a proposed project are as small as possible.
The COE, however, took their role to be principally facilitative, acting
to arrange meetings with other agencies on matters which had to be set-
tled before their permit could be granted. In the case of the Winnfield
Cottage controversy, they were in an ideal position to negotiate an
agreement between the two sides, who were never really far from settle-
ment, but never made a concerted attempt. While the two sides continued
to disagree, vandals destroyed the cottage. A similar case could be
made in the dispute over the NPDES permit, where a COE effort at medi-
ation may have spurred an agreement.
11. The failure to communicate within the USEPA contributed to the
delay in evaluating and resolving the NPDES permit issue.
It seems that separate branches of the same agency, USEPA (Region
IV) acted on different information. The agency responsible for major
environmental review and issuance of an important permit did not know
the complete status of the DEIS document, and thus were unable to co-
ordinate the public review of the NPDES permit for the project. The
COE, of course, is also responsible for the lack of coordination in
this review. Because of this mixup, C6&E began work on an unacceptable
treatment system, and since then has been reluctant to make major changes
43
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in it as requested by (JSEPA. Of course this debate can legally be de-
layed until the system is completed since regulations do not require an
actual permit application until 180 days before discharge.
12. The amount of time taken to produce the DEIS and FEIS was very long.
Over 3 1/2 years passed between CG&E's initial contact with the COE
and the release of the FEIS. Of this time, the first half-year was used
for organization, the next year was used to perform the environmental
studies, the following half-year was used to report and review these
findings, the half-year prior to the release of the DEIS was used to
determine impacts and prepare the study for release to the public, and
the final year was used to answer the public's comments, make revisions
based on these, and perform a final determination. It can be speculated
that the DEIS was delayed because of a drop in load growth due to the
1973 energy crisis, or a need to settle the Winnfield Cottage issue.
CG&E states that much of the wasted time resulted from changes in
requirements as to what went where in the DEIS. The FEIS, on the
other hand, appears to have been delayed primarily because of the
disagreement over the NPDES permit.
13. Local government officials were virtually powerless in the East
Bend case, having no official authority, and thus were largely
ignored.
Local officials report that the only meetings they had with the
utility were a courtesy, used for "PR" purposes. The Boone
County Fiscal Court was approached early in the licensing process, basi-
cally to get their aid in obtaining low-cost bonds on the pollution
control equipment (which are still outstanding, according to Judge
Ferguson). The Boone County Planning Commission asked to review plans
for the plant at the time of the PSC hearing, but were repeatedly
44
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ignored. When they finally got a response, CG&E sent a representative
to one of their meetings to gain their support. They were also ac-
cidentally left off the mailing list for the DEIS. After learning of
and attending the DEIS public hearing they apparently had a request to
meet with COE on their review of this document rejected. The Commission
was thus prevented from taking an active role in the planning process,
even though they continually had an interest in doing so. Although they
had no authority, their suggestions may have helped ease the tensions
which developed, caused by lack of communication.
14. Local officials favored the East Bend plant, but opposed the
Patriot plant.
The high opinion of East Bend that local officials held was due to
the tax money it would bring into the county coffers. Patriot, in the
Boone County official's view, would only bring pollution to the county.
Some reservations concerning even East Bend are presently being expressed
by these officials as the impacts become clearer, however. Originally,
only Judge Ferguson expressed any opposition, and then not to the plant
itself, but to its impact on Winnfield Cottage and the amount of prime
agricultural land being consumed. Two members of the Planning Commission
were the only local officials attending the DEIS hearing for East Bend.
At a similar hearing held for Patriot, however, several Boone County
leaders attended and/or spoke in opposition.
15. There was a basic feeling of fear among some local residents.
Those locally who wrote the COE about their opposition to the plant
I
didn't just comment on the problems the plant would cause for them;
they actually feared for their lives due;to the air pollution which would
be emitted. While the basic impacts they referred to certainly existed,
45
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the degree of apprehension held by local residents was greatly exagger-
ated. Some sort of a public information program about the control tech-
nology to be used, the actual air quality to be expected, and the health
problems which would result may have helped to reduce some of these
fears.
16. Public participation on East Bend was used primarily to emphasize
the issue of the proliferation of power plants along the Ohio River.
Much of the attention given to the regionalization issue was spurred
by the fact that the DEIS public hearing on East Bend was the first
opportunity for public comment after ORBES was formed. Those concerned
with the regional plant issue felt justified in demanding that each
plant be viewed in the environment within which it would be operating -
a fully developed region. This conflicted with Federal licensing pro-
cedures, however, which were used even though the Federal government
had funded a study which would do what these critics desired. Because
of this regional orientation, and the lack of organized local opposition
to the plant, issues specifically concerning East Bend were of secondary
importance.
17. There is a general feeling of disillusionment with the role the
public was given in the EFS decision process on East Bend and
other regional power plants.
The frustration was evident in nearly everyone contacted about their
role. Many had opposed several of the regional power plants in the past
and felt that the concessions gained in that time had only minimally
improved opportunities for making their point of view known and accepted.
These, they added, were won only in the face of numerous obstacles. At-
titudes expressed about their role in East Bend were more pessimistic,
since this case had presented little opportunity for influencing the
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decisions of the utility due to the advanced stage of development the
project was in when the public was involved. This despair reaches into
attitudes about the ORBES study also. This is because it has taken so
long to complete the study, which has allowed the power plants being
studied to continue being developed, even if not needed or improperly
planned. Opposition to coal-fired power plants has dwindled recently
in these previously involved groups, apparently because most of the
objectionable projects have now been licensed.
18. The material presented in the case study about the actual siting
procedures and criteria used, and the evaluation process conducted
for each alternative site is limited because CG&E did not answer
a questionnaire sent to them concerning these subjects.
CG&E stated that the information desired in the questionnaire had
already been placed in the public record. The discussion on siting
procedures and criteria in this case study was thus drawn from the FEIS.
Detailed information concerning the reasoning behind the choice of East
Bend and documentation of its superiority over other sites was not avail-
able, however.
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ABBREVIATIONS USED: EAST BEND CASE STUDY
CAI Commonwealth Associates, Inc., CG&E's consultant for the
siting and environmental studies;
CG&E The Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company, who owns 51% of
East Bend Station and is responsible for its licensing and
construction;
COE Corps of Engineers, Louisville District, the lead agency for
preparing the EIS and determining whether to issue the DA
Permit.
DA Department of the Army, whose permit is required for construc-
tion of structures in navigable waterways;
DNREP Kentucky Department of Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection, which issues state construction permits for air
and water;
EPS Energy Facility Siting;
EIS Environmental Impact Statement, where DEIS is Draft EIS, and
FEIS is Final EIS;
KHC The Kentucky Heritage Commission, in charge of protecting
historic resources of the state;
MW Megawatts;
NEPA National Environmental Policy Act of 1970;
NPDES National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, which sets
effluent limitations on plant wastewater streams;
NSPS New Source Performance Standards which set effluent limita-
tion on the air waste streams;
ORBES The Ohio River Basin Energy Study, a three year study by a
university research consortium on the effects of development
of energy facilities near the Ohio River;
PAC The President's Advisory Council on Historic Preservation,
the Federal equivalent of the KHC;
PSC Kentucky Public Service Commission, responsible for making
the State's determination of need for the plant;
PSD Prevention of Significant Deterioration, which limits the
amount of air pollutants any one source can contribute;
TAC Tri-State Air Committee, a branch of the Southwest Ohio Lung
Association, concerned about the health effects of air pollu-
tion, and;
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USEPA United States Environmental Protection Agency, Region IV,
Atlanta, Georgia, responsible for the NPDES permit, the
PSD determination and coordination during EIS preparation.
-------
FIGURE 1. Flowchart Of Activities, East Bend Case Study
SITE SELECTION
SITE ACQUISITION
PSC CERTIFICATION
KY DNREP
Air and Water Pemits
for Unit 1
Air and Water Permits
for Unit 2
Floodway Permit
USEPA
NPDES Permit
PSD Determination
COE
DA Permit
DEIS Preparation
Public Comment Period
FEIS -Preparation
Environmental Studies
KIIC and PAC
CO&E DEVELOPMENT
Preliminary Layouts
Plant Layout
Construction- Unit 1
Construction- Unit 2
1971
a
1972
b
1973
c
&x<
1974
a
f
1975
o
d
d
1976
h
1977
A-
1978
1979
"1980
1981
*
To
Feb
198
r
rua
4
ry
->
-------
Figure 1, continued
Key
A Date of Application
o Date of Permit or Authorization
x Date of Public Hearing
Period of Activity
Projected Period of Activity
a CAI hired to perform siting study
b CAI siting report issued
c Condemnation suit against James Mull ins
d First contact with the USEPA by CG&E and the COE
e First contact with the COE by CG&E
f Winnfield Cottage placed on the National Register of
Historic Places
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"1
Chapter 4. KILLEN CASE STUDY - OHIO
INTRODUCTION*
The Killen Electrical Generating Station site is located on the Ohio
River 390 miles downstream of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and is 32 miles
west of Portsmouth, Ohio. It is located in south-central Adams County,
Ohio, near the small community of Wrightsville, and 8 miles from the
nearest town, Manchester (population ~2400 in 1972). The limit of glacial
penetration passes through Adams County, thus the unglaciated eastern
portion is rugged with steep, wooded slopes while the western portion is
more rolling due to glaciation. This also serves to divide the predomi-
nent land use in the county between forested land in the east and agri-
culture in the leveler western region. The Killen site is located in
the midst of the rugged terrain, but lies on level ground in the bottom-
lands of the Ohio River.
The ownership arrangement for Killen involves CG&E and DP&L, as in
the East Bend case study, but with DP&L responsible for construction and
licensing in this case. The site now under DP&L's control was selected
to eventually facilitate a 2400 MW plant. Presently, only two 600 MW
units have been planned and subjected to an environmental review. These
are presently under construction at a cost of $657 million (COE public
hearing, January 1977). Indications are that a subsidiary of DP&L is
constructing the plant and that a DP&L-organized union has hired the
construction'workers. After numerous delays due to a decrease in system
demand growth beginning in 1973 and consistently falling below estimates
of growth in every year since, the scheduled startup dates for Killen
Units I and 2 are 1986 and 1983 respectively.
*Abbreviations for parties named in this case study are defined where
first noted, and are summarized on page 82.
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Killen Station will be fired mostly by low-sulfur coal transported
to the site by a rail-barge system from Logan and Kanawha Counties
in West Virginia. Use gf this coal effecively eliminates the
need for flue gas desulfurization, but a 99.52 percent efficient
electrostatic precipitator will still be required to remove particulates.
The ash thus removed will be transported with recycled water to a 250 acre,
35-year life expectancy ash basin. A maximum of 30.74 MGD will be drawn
from the Ohio River as makeup water for replacing evaporation from two
mechanical draft cooling towers and as boiler blowdown for bottom ash
transport.
Unlike Boone County, the site of the East Bend Generating Station,
Adams County has already experienced the development of a large electric
generating facility. The 2400 MW J. M. Stuart Plant, built by DP&L on the
Ohio River in western Adams County, and used by them,CG&E, and the Columbus
and Southern Ohio Electric Company, was begun in 1965 and completed in
1974. This brought an enormous tax base to this basically poor, rural
area. The county government, which is extremely pleased with DP&L and
the development they have brought, was able to place an annex on the county
courthouse due to these increased tax revenues. To spread the wealth from
the Stuart plant, however, the Ohio Department of Education pressed for
the consolidation of schools in a three county area (Adams, Brown, and
Highland Counties) into the Ohio Valley School District. The merger was
narrowly approved by voters in the early 1970's after several attempts.
According to the editor of the Manchester Signal, this has served to pit
town against town, caused mismanagement of the revenues from Stuart, and
caused an area where school levies were always voted in, to become one where
they are never passed. At this writing, this situation has climaxed into a
month-old teacher's strike which has the community in turmoil. It is
in this setting that DP&L is now developing Killen, a setting where one
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senses the changes in lifestyle taking place have caused mild Irritation
short of vocal objection.
PROCEDURES
Site Selection
Although it was never specifically stated, the description of the
site selection procedures seems to indicate that the alternative sites
considered by DP&L were drawn from the same CAI study that CG&E used to
select East Bend. Consider these facts:
1. The acquisition of options for the land, and subsequent
announcement of plans to build the two plants occurred
simultaneously during 1973;
2. Killen was selected in a regional siting study by DP&L
and CG&E in parts of Ohio, Kentucky, and Indiana, as was
East Bend:
3. The siting study picked environmentally acceptable sites
which would later be subjected to more detailed engineer-
ing and economic analyses;
4. The sites considered were all capable of at least a 2400
MW station;
5. The CG&E management team which selected the East Bend site
visited a Wrightsville site while they were making their
decision; and
6. The News Release in October, 1973 announcing East Bend
contained, according to the Manchester Signal, a paragraph
mentioning that DP&L was considering another site found in
the CAI study as a sister station to East Bend.
Because of the location of its service area, DP&L "gave overriding
consideration" to Ohio sites, choosing two sites along the Great Miami
River between Dayton and Cincinnati (near Trenton and Seven Mile in
Butler County, Ohio), three sites along the Ohio River (near the Zimmer
Nuclear Station at Moscow, Ohio, and at Wrightsville and Sandy Springs
in Adams County), and a non-river site near Bentonville in Adams County.
Based on the results of the initial siting study and a later, more detailed
study evaluating the above alternatives, the following was concluded (FEIS):
1. The Wrightsville site was selected. Here a plant could be
economically constructed and could operate in an environ-
mentally acceptable manner.
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2. The Trenton and Seven Mile sites are in an area where significant
environmental impact could result due to needed reservoirs and a
higher population density.
3. Location at Moscow would hinder the town's development since
the two plants would box in the town.
4. Sandy Springs is close to Wrightsville but would have higher
transmission costs, be located closer to a large population
center, has less area available and is bounded by Shawnee
State Forest. (This site was acquired later in 1974 by the
Ohio Power Company, but has yet to be developed.)
5. Four to five times as much land would be required at Benton-
ville for a cooling pond. Also, the other sites had a better
location for water supply and transportation.
Land Acquisition
The characters had changed, but OP&L used virtually the same methods
to obtain the Killen site that their partner, CG&E, had used at East Bend.
On March 15, 1973 the Manchester Signal reported that options were being
obtained by C. D. McClanahan, Vice Chairman of the Board of West Shell,
Robinson-Middendorf, Inc., a Cincinnati realtor. These were for an
unidentified client with "the right of eminent domain", who was offering
$1,000 for the option, an additional $5,000 if it was extended past March,
1974, and, it was belived, a standard price per acre. According to
Karl Kirshner, one of the landowners who sold, contact was made with him
6-8 months before an offer was made, and an admission that the site was
for a power plant came only when he expressed reluctance to selling.
While local residents were trying to guess for whom and for what the
options were, Adams County officials were meeting regularly with DP&L on
the plans for the plant. E. H. Roush of the Adams County Planning Comm-
ission stated that Both DP&L and the county government didn't spread
word of these plans since both wanted the plant in the county and the
county didn't want anything to possibly disrupt these tenative plans.
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While most of the landowners contacted quickly agreed to sell their
land, including hill land adjacent to their bottom land, the owner of
what turned out to be the key plot required was holding out and unsuc-
cessfully urging his neighbors to do likewise. Daniel Ralston owned a
farm which had been in his family for four generations and had no inten-
sion of selling it, refusing all offers for a year. Finally, in April
1974, he was "badgered so much," by calls at all hours of the day, being
told construction must begin soon to beat a deadline for "new EPA regula-
tions," (possibly for the Ohio Power Siting Commission, whose power began
"October 24, 1974), that he made DP&L an offer, which they quickly accepted.
The boiler and stack for Killen are now under construction on the former
Ralston farm. Had he to do it over again, however, Ralston vows he would
do anything possible to prevent this sale.
Ohio EPA Permit to Install
Announcement of the plans to build the first two Kill en units was
made in a news release, reported by the Manchester Signal on November 29,
1973. At that time, Ohio required no certification of need for a new
power plant (the Ohio Power Siting Commission and, in some cases, the
Public Utilities Commission presently rule on this). Therefore, the first
and only authorization needed before construction above the high water
mark on the Ohio River could begin was the Permit to Install Units 1 and
2 from OEPA. DP&L first applied for this permit on January 16, 1974.
This, was revised on March 27 based on additional information reauested in
a February 28 letter from OEPA. The air discharge, the waste water treat-
ment facility, and the solid waste disposal facility were all evaluated
before the permit was issued. The OEPA was ultimately responsible for
the permit, but many of the analyses were performed by authorized city,
county, and regional agencies. For instance, the Portsmouth City Health
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Department performed the required air studies (which did not require air
quality modelling).
Since Kill en was one of the first major sources to be proposed under
the permit to install procedures, a meeting was held on May 8 between
those charged with determining whether compliance could be assured to dis-
cuss some unclear areas in their procedures. DP&L was then informed at a
May 16 meeting that the permit could be issued if they would give assur-
ance by July 1, 1975, that the first 5 years supply of low-sulfur coal
had been obtained or, if not, that plans for an SCL removal system would
be drawn. Based on this assurance, OEPA issued the Permit to Install on
June 5, 1974. Under the permit, substantial construction must begin
within 18 months unless good cause for a 12 month extension could be
shown. Also detailed plans of the Station had to be submitted within 20
months for OEPA approval. These deadlines were easily met, however, since
construction began immediately after the permit was issued.
State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System CSPDES) Permit
In Ohio, the state has been given Federal authority to issue the
NPDES permit, thus it is known as an SPDES permit. Application for this
permit must be made to OEPA at least 180 days prior to wastewater dis-
charge. This permit has not yet been applied for, but application will
be made before this deadline according to the FEIS.
COE EIS Preparation and DA Permit
Since construction for Kill en was begun before the June 1, 1975 dead-
line for PSD applicability, and Ohio has retained the authority to issue
NPDES permits, the only Federal agency with regulatory authority over
Killen was the Corps of Engineers. In this case, intake and effluent
structures, a coal unloading dock, and a construction unloading dock, all
with accompanying dredging, were needed at Kill en and were subject to a
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DA permit before construction could begin on these structures. The entire
power complex was considered to have a major environmental impact, thus an
'4v
EIS and public interest determination were required as a prerequisite for
this permit.
The first contact between the COE and DP&L appears to have occurred
in December 1973. This led to DP&L's March 6, 1974 submittal of an appli-
cation for a permit to construct the construction unloading dock alone.
Since the power company did not consider this aspect of the project to
constitute a major environmental impact, they requested that this struc-
ture be permitted before the environmental review in order to maintain
their construction schedule. Although COE officials stated both now and
at the time that this action ran counter to normal procedures, the COE was
in basic agreement with DP&L's judgement on this matter, and gave their
tentative approval. This was stated in Public Notice No. 74-26, dated
June 4, 1974, and sent to interested parties, primarily State and Federal
agencies. Several agencies, especially the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
expressed their disapproval of this separation of facilities for approval,
feeling it would allow construction to proceed at a high rate before the
EIS was prepared, and thus urged that the permit be denied. Since opposi-
tion was encountered on these grounds, the COE felt that they had no
choice other than denial, and did so.
The Envirosphere Company was contracted by DP&L to perform the envi-
ronmental studies. Beginning in June, 1974, they performed field studies
on aquatic, water quality, ecology, and air quality/meterology lasting one
year. These were performed concurrently with site clearing and grading, and
thus often reflect an environmental setting influenced by this activity.
In October, however, the construction program was slowed due to a cut in
DP&L's 1974-75 construction budget stemming from a 3.2 percent decline in
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summer peak load due to user conservation during 1974. An 8.2 percent
increase in peak usage.had been predicted. In the meantime, the environ-
mental studied continued, commencing with the filing with the COE on
September 19, 1975 of the environmental report accompanied by an applica-
tion- for the DA permit for all proposed facilities.
OP&L, however, was still pressing to obtain early approval of the
construction unloading dock. The Federal Energy Administration apparently
held the same view, and sent a representative from their Task Force on
Power Plant Acceleration to meet with the COE and the Fish and Wildlife
Service-on June 25, 1976. Suggestions included a separate permit with a
requirement for restoration if the total project permit was not allowed,
and a DP&L suggestion of a temporary dock. The Fish and Wildlife Service,
though, maintained their objection that this action would accelerate the
construction program before the environmental analysis was made. To il-
lustrate their concern, they indicated that in one case a project with large
amounts of money invested was allowed to proceed by the Courts, even after
the Federal permit was initially denied.
Based on this meeting, it was agreed to again try gaining the approval
of a separate permit. The comment period ran concurrent with that on the
DEIS, which was sent to the CEQ and other agencies on or about July 9,
1976, and was announced in COE News Release 76-40 of July 15 and in the
Federal Register on July 17. Public Notice 76-110 of August 24, 1) gave
a description of the facilities being planned in the waterway, 2} announced
the availability of the DEIS, 3) requested comments on the proposed work
by September 23, 4) stated that a request for a public hearing could be
made before the same date, and 5) stated that an early permit on the
construction unloading dock would be granted if substantive objections
were not made. These announcements led to several requests for the DEIS
from universities, consulting firms, and interested groups; most of the
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—1
Federal and state agency comments on the DEIS; and requests for a public
hearing from three interest groups and five Adams County landowners resid-
ing in Cincinnati. Although no objections to the separate permit proposal
were apparent in these written comments, this proposal was again denied.
Due to the number of requests received, a public hearing was scheduled
for January 19, 1977, and held at 7:30 P.M. in Portsmouth, Ohio, just after
a severe blizzard. It was announced in Notice of Public Hearing No. 76-171
on December 17. Forty-six people were registered in attendance at the
hearing, with six speakers. Following the hearing, several more letters
of comment were received from interest groups and largely non-resident
Adams County property owners. Most of the comments received were answered
and led to revisions in the FEIS, which, after review by the Ohio River
Division of COE and the Washington, D.C. headquarters, was sent to the CEQ and
those commenting on the DEIS on or about October 3, 1977, and made available
to other parties who received the DEIS. This action was announced in News
Release 77-74 of October 25, 1977 and in the October 21 issue of the
Federal Register. Most of the comments on the FEIS were received well
after the November 20 dealine and, thus, had little bearing on the December
issuance of the DA permit.
Memorandum of Agreement
Four important archaeological sites are located on DP&L's Kill en
Station property. One of these, the Wamsley Village site of the Fort
Ancient culture, located at the mouth of Ohio Brush Creek, was long
recognized as such and, in fact, was investigated by the Ohio Historical
Society (OHS) in 1964. Another, an Adena Indian Burial Mound, was also
known to local amateur archaeologists. One of them, Roger Cunningham,
informed the Archaeological Division of the OHS about the proposed Killen
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Station late in 1973. At the same time, DP&L called the OHS to determine
if any historical sites would be impacted by the plant. Based on this
contact, a meeting was held December 18, 1973 at the Killen site between
several DP&L officials, Mr. Cunningham and Dr. Ramon Baby of the OHS
Archaeological Division to point out these sites. Since at this time
only sites on the National Register of Historic Places were subject to the
Memorandum of Agreement procedures under the National Historic Preserva-
tion Act of 1966, the OHS applied for inclusion of both of the above sites
on the Register in March, 1974, with the listing occurring on July 30. In
the meantime, DP&L was informed of this action and, in a letter of March 6,
agreed, after receiving preliminary site plans, to preserve these sites.
The mound was fenced just after DP&L took control of the Ralston property
it sat on, and the Village was set aside as a buffer for the plant, desig-
nated by DP&L as a park area.
The actual Memorandum of Agreement procedures couldn't officially
begin until a Federal Permit was applied for. Once this occurred, DP&L
contracted with the OHS in the Spring of 1976 to perform an archaeological
survey of the Kill en sites as part of the Memorandum requirements. Field
surveys, which were hampered by the lack of cultivated land and the site
work which had already taken place, began April 13, and investigated six
areas by June 2. In their report of July 5 to DP&L, it was recommended
that further studies be done on two of these sites, the Killen Ridge and
Grimes Village, which, to be included in the Memorandum, had to be deter-
mined eligible for the National Register. This occurred November 8, 1976.
Once all National Register listed or eligible properties were deter-
mined, a plan prepared by the COE was accepted on December 3, 1976 and
finalized in the Memorandum between the COE, OHS, and PAC on March 24,
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1977. This placed a stipulation on the DA permit calling for.the preser-
vation of Wamsley Village (including the site of the first Adams County
Seat), the burial mound, and the scientific excavation of the Killen
Ridge and Grimes Village sites. The excavation was performed by the
Cleveland Museum of Natural History between March 6 and May 10, 1977,
funded by DP&L, monitored by the National Park Service, and summarized in
a report to the Department of Interior Interagency Archaeological Services-
Atlanta, dated December 4, 1978.
Since the enactment of the Ohio Power Siting Law, archaeological
surveys in two alternate plant sites must be done before approval is given
to develop a site. This would have eliminated the disturbance of archae-
ological resources by construction as occurred at Killen, and would have
facilitated the search for additional archaeological areas which were
suspected to be present at Killen.
Transnris sion Lines
While DP&L was able to avoid OPSC regulations for licensing construc-
tion of the Killen Station itself, they were required to obtain separate
OPSC permits for the lines from each of the two units. These covered the
construction of approximately 80 miles of new 345kV transmission lines
from Killen to the new, OPSC-certificated Bath substation, located about
20 miles east of Dayton, and a second circuit on an existing line between
the Stuart Station and the existing Don Marquis substation in Pike County,
Ohio (the Stuart/Marquis line). These regulations were much more stringent
than those under which the Station itself was permitted by the State, and
thus required a longer review period. The licensing process for these
lines, which, in fact, is still in progress for the line servicing Unit 1,
was of the same magnitude as that required for the plant; and, in terms of
public participation, was much more comprehensive.
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The permit which has presently been granted, for the line to service
Unit 2, authorized the construction of a six mile line from Kill en to the
existing Stuart/Marquis line (the Kill en-Stuart/Marquis line). This
covered the construction of lattice towers capable of carrying two circuits
and a cable for one of these circuits. A new cable would then be placed
on a vacant circuit of the Stuart/Marquis line, intertying Stuart to Kill en
and Killen to Marquis. The second, presently unapproved permit, will, if
granted, allow the construction of a line to carry the power from Unit 1. .
The most likely route for this will be along the other circuit of the new
Kill en-Stuart/Marquis line then northwestward from Stuart/Mar uis on one
circuit of a proposed two circuit line to the Bath substation (the Killen-
Bath line).
The permitting action for the Killen-Bath line was first preceded by
approval of the Bath substation. The first public discussion of this was,
therefore, a pre-application of conference for the Bath Substation, held
in Columbus, July 7, 1976. This meeting was open to the public, but only
as observers. The notice of this meeting, however, made no mention of
the future use of the Bath substation as the tie-in point for a transmission
line from Kill en. In addition no local governments between Killen and Bath
were on the mailing list for this notice. Therefore, although the Bath sub-
station is an integral part of the Killen transmission system, it was con-
sidered independently of the Kill en-Bath line. The issues surrounding its
permit did not focus on its relation to Kill en. At the other end of the
Killen transmission network is the Killen-Stuart /Marquis line, for which
a permit was applied for on February 22, 1977. The application was for
four circuits on two separate lines, to presumably service all four planned
Killen units. Again emphasis was on this facility and its link of Killen
and an existing transmission line. Little mention was made of any further
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transmission facility needs such as Killen-Bath.
To evaluate an application to OPSC, several steps are followed.
First the application is subject to a completeness review by the state
agencies whose heads make up OPSC. Once revisions mandated by this review
are satisfactorily made, OPSC dockets the application. Following this, an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) is assigned to preside over the evaluation
process and himself evaluate the evidence submitted during this process by
the parties involved, in this case DP&L, OPSC staff, other agencies and the
general public. Then, based on his evaluation, the ALJ recommends a course
of action to the OPSC commissioners, who make the final decision. To fa-
cilitate public participation, the applicant is reauired to send the appli-
cation to the chief executive of the counties, municipalities and public
agencies whose jurisdictions would be affected, who then have 30 days to
become intervenors in the case. In addition to this, the applicant has
to publish notice in the news media along the two alternate routes. This
consists of a map of the approximate routing, a list of those who received
a copy of the OPSC application, and the applicable OPSC regulations. For
the Kill en-Stuart/Marquis permit, this was published in June, 1977. After
publication, any interested parties have 30 days in which to file a Peti-
tion for Leave to Intervene. This attracted only two intervenors in the
case, who, according to OPSC regulations, are on an equal legal basis with
the other two participant bodies, DP&L and the OPSC staff.
To give all parties a chance to state their case, as well as to allow
interested members of the public to make statements, a series of public
meetings is then held. For Kill en-Stuart/Marquis, the first meeting was
announced in the above public notice and held June 21, in West Union,
Adams County. The meeting was basically to gather information from the
public about anything overlooked in the application, to give DP&L and the
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OPSC staff a chance to explain the effects of the proposal and the deci-
•
sion making process, and to allow a question-and-answer session. Six
people gave talks at this meeting, but most of the dialogue was controlled
by an unidentified member of the audience. Following this, a more formal
public hearing was held in West Union on August 15 to present statements
from the public (two were given) and to review the recently issued Secre-
tary's Report—the recommendations of the OPSC staff. The following day,
adjudicatory hearings were held in West Union where, courtroom fashion,
expert witnesses for each side gave testimony subject to cross-examination.
One witness for the intervenors, four for DP&L and two for the OPSC staff
were questioned at this time. Based on the evidence presented, the ALJ
made his recommendation in an October 14 report. This, then, was presented
to the OPSC commissioners, who gave certification January 12, 1978. They
did, however, refuse to certify all but one of the four circuits DP&L
applied for, since the need for all of them at that time was not shown.
The final and most important piece of the transmission network is the
Kill en-Bath line. Since the circuit to service Unit 1 from Kill en to
Stuart/Marquis was not certificated by the above action, it had to be in-
cluded in the application for the line to the Bath substation. This was
filed September 28, 1978 following consultation with selected governments
along the route, and consisted of two large volumes of the results from
studies of need and environmental impact along the two alternate routes.
Several deficiencies were uncovered in the completeness review, which were
corrected by DP&L January 29, 1979, and thus the application was docketed
on March 22, setting into motion the public review process. Copies of the
application were sent to the appropriate bodies in each affected county,
and a full-page public notice was placed in the news media in mid-April.
After receiving this information, the Highland County Commissioners and
several Township Trustees therein became intervenors in the case. In
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addition to this, over 200 Petitions for Leave to Intervene were sub-
mitted by several other Highland County Township Trustees, the City of
Hillsboro, and numerous individuals living along the proposed routes.
These parties were also given intervenor status, increasing the number
so involved to 237. Several parties also filed letters of opposition or
concern, and were provided with a "Citizen Participation Brochure" by
OPSC which described the opportunities available to them.
One such opportunity was the series of public meetings in each
affected county, which was announced in the published news media notice
described above. These were held in Wilmington, Clinton County on April
24 (attendance ~100), Xenia, Greene County on April 26 (attendance ~50),
West Union, Adams County on May 1 (attendance 7) and Hillsboro, Highland
County on May 2 (attendance "115). Although many of the speakers from
the general public were upset at the short amount of time they had in
which to prepare, they were able to point out several features along the
routes which had been overlooked. The most important of these were
several small airports, which would either be crossed or interfered with
by the lines, and a hunting preserve, through which the line would pass.
Based on the areas identified at these meetings, DP&L made several
minor changes in their routing proposals. Also they were subject to
requests for additional information from both the OPSC staff and from the
intervenors. Since the revised routes had not been evaluated by DP&L as
was required the OPSC staff was given an extension on the deadline for
submitting the Secretary's Report, their evaluation of DP&L's proposal.
Also, the adjudicatory hearings were postponed from June 26 until October
23. Two formal public hearings were held as scheduled, however, in Hills-
boro on June 25 (attendance ~150) and Wilmington on June 26 (attendance
~250).
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Following these hearings, the OPSC staff filed a second request for
information from DP&L, which was answered July 26. In the meantime, the
revised application was docketed, requiring the same public information
process as occurred when initial docketing was granted. Also, the ALJ
went on a site visit of both alternate routes. Then, on August 9, DP&L
filed a request for information from the intervenors followed by the sub-
mission to the OPSC by all parties of lists of expert witnesses who would
testify at the adjudicatory hearings: 14 for DP&L; 7 for the OPSC staff;
and 5 for the intervenors. Due to the technical nature of this testimony,
the ALJ announced at a pre-hearing conference on October 12 that he was
delaying the adjudicatory hearings from October 23 to December 10 to allow
for the prefiling and review of this testimony. Another formal public
hearing was held as planned on October 22 in Wilmington (attendance 100),
primarily to discuss the Secretary's Report, which was issued October 10.
The OPSC staff's conclusions and recommendations basically criticized the
lack of support for many of the contentions DP&L made in their application
and recommended the certification of the route not preferred by DP&L.
Regardless of this recommendation, at this writing the adjudicatory hear-
ings have not taken place, and thus a final decision is still somewhat in
the future.
SITING CRITERIA
The following criteria for site selection were given in the FEIS:
Engineering — must meet certain minimum physical requirements for
1) Topography,
2) Geology,
3) Hydrology, and
4) Location.
Environmental —
1) Aesthetic impact,
2) Compatibility with surrounding land use,
3) Amount of population displacement, and
4} Environmental effects of plant operation.
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Economic—
1) Capital costs;
a) Site development,
b) Condenser cooling system,
c) Coal supply, and
d) Ash disposal and stack emission control facilities;
2) Adjustments made for differences in local wage rates, benefits and taxes;
3) Overhead costs;
4) Land acquisition costs;
5) Transmission costs; and
6) Capitalized fuel and operating costs.
The list of candidate sites was first screened environmentally, then sub-
jected to a more detailed engineering and economic analysis.
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
Initial Announcement
When it was first reported that options were being acquired at the
future Kill en site, the prospective developer was not identified. Rumors
of DP&L's involvement were later fired by a news story in the October 18,
1973 Manchester Signal, which announced the East Bend plant and stated
that DP&L was planning to build a sister plant. The article stated that
DP&L was not originally believed to be involved in the Adams County land
purchase since such a development in the proximity of the Stuart plant
would give them more than "10% of their total capacity at one site," a
situation "power companies frown at."
A few weeks after this story, DP&L's Public Relations Officer, speak-
ing at a local Lion's Club meeting, indicated that an expansion announce-
ment was forthcoming. This took the form of a News Release carried by the
Signal on November 29 and a luncheon meeting at Manchester High School the
same day. DP&L, as they did to announce the Stuart Station, sent formal
invitations for the luncheon to village mayors, members of Council, organi-
zation presidents, newsmedia, and others. Vernal G. Riffe Jr., Speaker Pro-
tern of the Ohio House of Representatives, acted as Master of Ceremonies
and introduced speakers Robert Killen, DP&L chairman and president, State
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Senator William H. Mussey, State Representative Harry C. Malott, and
•
School Superintendent Donald Dowdy. Telegrams from Ohio Governor John
Gilligan and U.S. Representative William H. Harsha were read. Although
plans were presented for the $400 million (at that time) 1200 MW plant
and the environmental safeguards to be used, the exact location of the
boilers on the huge plot DP&L desired was not divulged, probably since an
option on the Ralston property had not yet been acquired. The Signal's
coverage of this event reported that this announcement was not received
by those present with nearly the same enthusiasm as was the announcement
of Stuart Station in 1965.
Written and Public Hearing Comments to the DEIS
Other than a USEPA review of the Environmental Assessment Report in
the Spring of 1976, no substantial public participation occurred until
written comment on the DEIS was solicited in July through September, 1976.
Public comment was again opened surrounding the Public Hearing held in
January, 1977. The following are the most important areas of comment.
1) Water Resources. Many varied comments were made by the U.S.
Department of Interior, the USEPA, and its equivalents in Ohio and
Kentucky. Major emphasis was placed on the suspected inability of the
proposed treatment scheme to meet NSPS requirements, and the need to
assure that the groundwater aquifer would be protected. DP&L replied
that the plant construction had either been initiated prior to, or
changes had been made to meet, the set of NSPS cited, and that the ground-
water would be protected.
2} Air Resources. Issues over air quality drew comments from many
of the interest groups and private landowners involved, as well as from
the environmental protection agencies. Key comments concerned the need
for a flue-gas desulfurization plan, the opposition to new construction
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stemming from the regional air quality problems, and the need for consi-
deration of commercial uses of fly ash. Although DP&L replied with
assurances that a supply of low-sulfur coal could be obtained they also
had made provisions for desulfurization if ultimately needed. Kill en,
they said, would contribute little to the ambient air problems, which
were being studied by ORBES. Finally, DP&L did not anticipate any large,
short term commercial use of fly ash since enormous quantities were
already being produced.
3) Regional Impacts. Regional impacts, the major theme of comment
against the East Bend plant, again arose at Kill en, and were brought up by
many of the same groups. The interest groups commenting were unanimous
in their cry for an evaluation of the regional setting Killen was being
placed in prior to the granting of a permit to construct. Since Killen
was far from the Cincinnati-Madison-Louisville axis of interest in this
issue, it wasn't given a high priority by these groups. Tne nearest Save
the Valley chapter, Maysville, gave only passing attention to the Kill en
plant since they were involved at the time with a lawsuit over the
Spurlock plant west of town. In addition to these groups, who were
already actively involved in this issue, several individuals and the
Kentucky DNREP also pointed out the need to look at regional impacts.
The response to these comments in the FEIS mentioned ORBES, and noted
that ambient air and water quality standards, which Killen would meet,
established permissible cumulative impacts.
4) Transmission Lines. Concern was expressed by several parties,
mostly from those owning land in Adams County, over the lack of informa-
tion about transmission lines. This was primarily due to the impact
these might have on personal property, several Nature Preserves in the
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area, and Ohio Brush Creek, a candidate Ohio Scenic River. At the time
of the public hearing, DP&L had chosen seven alternative routes, but
would not state what the two preferred routes v/ere until an application
was submitted to the OPSC in February. Even though this application was for
the DP&L preferred routing, DP&L claimed at a January 12 meeting with
several of the people concerned about these scenic areas that no routing
decision had been made by them at that time. The FEIS, however, did give
the guidelines.for right-of-way selection and outlined measures to be taken
to mitigate environmental impacts. The full results of the transmission
line environmental study, required by OPSC, could not be placed in the EIS,
it was contended, since it would significantly delay approval of the DA
permit.
In both cases later considered by the OPSC, the major issue raised
was the loss of land resulting from the construction of the lines. This
was particularly true in the Killen-Bath case, where most of the routing
was through prime agricultural land. One suggestion to mitigate this,
recommended by the OPSC staff, and involving no extra cost to DP&L, would
be to use single steel poles rather than the lattice towers commonly used,
thus substantially reducing the area removed from production.
5) Vegetation and Wildlife. The most frequent comment in this area,
expressed by OEPA, the Ohio Biological Survey, and one of the non-local
property owners, expressed concern over several rare and endangered
species and their habitat located near the Killen site, especially in the
nearby nature preserves. No special impacts on these species, however,
were anticipated by DP&L or the COE above those on animals in general.
In addition to this, DP&L maintained that the report for OPSC would discuss"
impacts from transmission lines.
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6) Nature Preserves. Several land owners and the Cincinnati Museum
of Natural History, which administers several areas purchased by the Nature
Conservancy,were particularly concerned over the impact on these areas
from visual elements associated with the plant and from air pollution.
DP&L maintained that the DEIS had adequately addressed these impacts and
found them to be minimal to nil.
7) Lack of Public Information. The issue which both aroused the most
indignation and reduced the participation effort was a combination of
factors which hindered the public information process. When the DEIS
was issued, several parties, including the Nature Conservancy and several
of those interested in its lands, requested that a public hearing be held.
The parties making this request, however, were inadvertently left off the
mailing list of the COE's Notice of Public Hearing, and thus only found
out about the hearing a few days beforehand, if at all. Also, the only
paper in Adams County which chose to announce the hearing was the Manchester
Signal (even though the paper itself was not on the COE's mailing list).
To remedy this situation, the COE informed these parties and others
mentioned by hearing attendees that the hearing had been held and that
the end of the comment period for the hearing was being extended from
January 29 until February 11. This allowed most interested parties to
make their comments. Only the Nature Conservancy did not have enough time
to prepare comments on the DEIS.
8) Statements in Favor. During the comment period on the DEIS and
at the public hearing, only two or three local landowners expressed'
direct opposition to building the Killen Plant in Adams County. Other
commenters wished to insure that all issues, especially regional power
plant development and air pollution, were more fully addressed and consi-
dered before a permit was granted. Federal and State agencies merely
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offered suggestions for Improvements to the DEIS. At the public hearing,
only DP&L Environmental Engineer Harold Fox and Paul Baldridge, Assistant
Director of the Ohio Department of Economic and Community Development gave
their wholehearted approval of the plant, Mr. Baldridge emphasizing the
jobs which would be created or maintained by the electricity expected
from Kill en Station.
Comments on the FEIS
A 30-day comment period on the FEIS began when the document was
listed in the October 21, 1977 Federal Register. All such comments were
received after this period, however, and.thus after the decision had been
made to issue the DA permit. These comments were from the Ohio and
Kentucky environmental agencies and from three Federal agencies. The
only substantial comments were made by USEPA, who reaffirmed their
suspicions about whether the waste water treatment system was the most
efficient possible, and stated that the details of the monitoring system
for air and water discharges should be made a part of the DA permit.
DP&L supported the ability of their treatment scheme to meet applicable
standards, said that they would try within the limits of their present
contractual obligations to improve the system's efficiency, and were
coordinating with OEPA to provide a NSPS water quality monitoring system.
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FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1) Public participation in the Killen siting process was hindered by the
lack of knowledge about participation opportunities.
Specifically, a combination of little local media coverage and the
COE's oversight of several significant groups who should have been
directly contacted hindered the public's participatory role at the COE
DEIS public hearing. The greatest oversight was the failure to inform
the very parties who requested the hearing in the first place. It is
unclear, however, if better information would have significantly increased
attendence considering that the meeting was held over 30 miles from the
plant site following a severe blizzard.
2) The DEIS evaluation process, which included the COE public hearing,
occurred at a time when significant changes in the Killen siting
decision would have meant large financial losses by the utilities.
When site clearing began on the Kill en site, the environmental
studies were still in progress. The DEIS was not issued, in fact, until
two years after the beginning of construction. Even though construction
was slowed down during this period, contractual commitments remained to
inhibit major changes in the project based on the findings of the envi-
ronmental studies. Thus by the time certain publics became involved
(including state and federal agencies), significant financial investments
had already been made at the Killen Station site.
3) Many of the defects in the regulatory process under which Killen
Station was granted a construction permit have been corrected through
the formation of the OPSC.
When Kill en was permitted by the State of Ohio in 1974, there were no
provisions for assessing the plant's need, effect on its environment, or
modelling impacts on air quality prior to start of construction. Under present
regulations, not only do these areas have to be evaluated for site preferred by the
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power company, they must be discussed to the same degree for an alternative
site. The final choice rests with the OPSC, not the power company, and
the decision is based on extensive public review of the facts of the case.
4) Present public information methods used by the OPSC are vastly superior
to those in use when the Kill en plant was considered by state officials.
No evidence of a public notice, press release, or public meeting
about the OEPA Permit to Install proceedings on Kill en were found. The
OEPA's decision was, for all intents and purposes, closed to both the
public and other agencies. In contrast, the Killen-Bath transmission
line application to the OPSC was announced in full-page newspaper ads
giving information about the project, the location of local public offi-
cials who received copies of the application, details about a series of
public meetings and various ways to participate in the case. Without
debating the effectiveness of these methods, it is easily demonstrated
that the siting process is now more onen and attracts more participants.
5) Proper protection of archaeological resources was not given during
site preparation.
A member of the Archaeology Division of the QMS complained when
interviewed that the regulations in effect when Killen was begun did not
give his personnel an adequate opportunity to find and protect archaeo-
logical sites endangered by construction. Consequently, their efforts
lagged behind DP&L's site preparation schedule, leading to the distur-
bance of land suspected of containing relics. Although the most important
sites were apparently identified and to some extent protected, the OHS
regretted that present OPSC rules requiring archaeological investigations
as part of a permit application were not in effect at the time.
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6) None of the most active participants in the DEIS evaluation process
were permanent Adams County residents.
Adams County landowners who wrote to the COE or spoke at the COE
public hearing maintained permanent residence outside the area, primarily
in Cincinnati. In many cases, the primary goal of their living part-time
in Adams County was to escape from city life then and retire there later.
They thus saw the impacts of Killen Station in a different light than
those full-time Adams County residents who were, in general, less well off
economically and less educated. In addition, many such absentee landowners
were associated with the Nature Conservancy and were concerned about
Kill en due to its suspected impacts on Nature Conservancy lands, some of
which were donated by these same people.
7) The concerns of Adams County residents are very much different from
those of residents of the counties affected by transmission lines
related to the Kill en plant site.
Although farming is important to the depressed Adams.County economy
(especially SCL - sensitive tobacco), local concerns related to power
plant siting chiefly center around the unique natural areas which abound
there. Thus the protection of these areas and, in general, of the
undeveloped nature of this area is a primary local concern. Farther
north, however, the level land has been cleared for large farming opera-
tions. Interference with farming operations by transmission lines is
the most recognized impact to these people. In both places, however, the
major objections are related to impacts, on people very near the facility,
rather than on the region as a whole.
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8) Most people living adjacent to the plant site were never directly
officially notified about any event surrounding the development of
Killen,
To this day, no aspect of the Kill en Station development has been
discussed with those most directly visually and physically affected by
it -- those living immediately across the road. Rumors were all that
were heard when land was purchased, and rumors are all that are heard
now. Apparently the only official notices on any action surrounding
Kill en were from the COE, and those were given only to those with land
abutting both DP&L's property and the river. These people, however, are
probably the least impacted of any of the residents surrounding the
plant site since they are the farthest from construction activities.
9) DP&L, in addition to not informing their neighbors of their activities,
does not now enjoy a cordial relationship with many of them.
For example, one family living across the road from Killen told of
being denied a request to remove wood for their personal use from land
cleared by DP&L. Instead, this timber was burned. The same people have
been attempting to sell their home, but can't interest DP&L in making an
offer, even though the power company owns land on all sides of them.
Also, instead of resolving problems directly with DP&L, such as that of
fugitive dust, state agencies such as OEPA have been called in to mediate.
The only neighbors who appear to be benefitting from the presence of the
plant are the owners of two nearby restaurants.
10) Media coverage has been limited by the lack of information from DP&L
and the various permitting agencies •
As a rule, small weekly newspapers such as those serving Adams County
lack the manpower to investigate stories. Thus they rely on news releases
for much of their information. When Stuart Station was built, the media
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was kept abreast of the plant's development through numerous news releases
and conferences. For Killen, however, security has been tight, and
official news about the project has been released infrequently. Therefore,
after initial speculation about the project was settled by DP&L's announce-
ment of the plant, little news about the project has been reported. Thus,
when an announcement such as that of the COE hearing was made, there was
little previous knowledge about the issue. This may have contributed to
the lack of involvement by local citizens.
11) County officials agreed with DP&L's early policy of not releasing
information about the plant to the general public.
The Adams County government was privileged to early planning informa-
tion concerning Kill en, but did not release any information until DP&L
formally announced the plant. This was because it favored the plant's
construction and feared that early public debate over the project may
have caused DP&L to abandon their tentative plans. Part of local govern-
ment's satisfaction with the project may have been due to the courtesy
extended by, and receptivity to change of, DP&L, both in the Stuart and
Kill en projects. Also, due to its past experience, the County recognized
the revenues and jobs which Kill en would bring to its rather depressed
economy.
12) Today, there are mixed feelings about the Killen project locally.
Of those contacted, only E. H. Roush, the county official interviewed,
was totally in favor of Kill en's construction. Bill Woolard of the
Manchester Signal recognized the problems which the wealth caused by
developing Stuart had presented to the poor Adams County area, and feared
Killen would worsen conditions if not handled differently. Daniel Ralston, the
last holdout of the Kill en landowners, states that now, if he had his
way, there would be no Kill en Station since he would have fought it to the
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end. On the other hand, another former Killen property owner, Karl
Kirshner, accepted the loss of his land and felt that most of his neighbors
had accepted the Kill en Station. The Cincinnati-based Adams County land-
owners who spoke at the COE hearing, however, have not yet accepted
Killen or the proliferation of plants in the area. They did recognize
that many of their concerns were addressed, the most important being the
location of the transmission lines away from the nature preserves, but
they would still like to see a provision for scrubbers.
13) Those who spoke against the plant at the COE hearing now feel that
their efforts were entirely futile.
Even after writing DP&L, reading the DEIS, meeting with other con-
cerned parties, and speaking at the hearing, Helen Black felt a "feeling
of general helplessness". She felt she had no influence since it was a
"foregone conclusion" that DP&L would proceed as planned. Stanley Rowe,
while recognizing that DP&L had listened to the concerns of the people
when choosing the right-of-way for the Kill en-Stuart/Marquis line, felt
that his actions were "absolutely futile" since there was "no effective
way of controlling issues". "I felt better getting it off my chest", he
did admit, however.
14) The new OPSC public participation methods have been somewhat effective
in acquiring information about the proposed Kill en transmission line
right-of-ways.
For gathering obscure, but important information about the proposed
alternative right-of-ways, the public meetings held by OPSC were a success.
They also served to uncover the concerns of many of the impacted land-
owners before the final routing was chosen. This appears to be leading
to routing revisions and conditions on the equipment to be used. What
has not been resolved is the opposition to the line by those whose land
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will fae crossed. There also appears to be a lack of understanding of the
need for a new right-of-way. Since these proceedings are still in progress,
however, such resolution and understanding may still be reached.
15) Approval of a separate DA permit for the construction unloading dock
would have allowed a much more intensive capital investment to have
been made at the site, and would have further compromised the spirit
of NEPA.
Environmental studies took as a baseline the state of the site follow-
ing its abandonment by the original landowners, and even reflected the
initial site clearing underway while they were conducted. It is clear
that if materials requiring barge transport were allowed on site, a large
portion of the plant (except for river structures) could have been built
before an FEIS was issued. While the usefulness of an EIS as a resource
for planning was doubtful in this case, the spirit of NEPA would certainly
have been violated if this separate permit had been issued. As it turned
out, the slowdown in load growth delayed the need for the construction
unloading dock and the plant itself until after the EIS process was
complete, even though DP&L kept insisting that construction had to be
speeded.
16) Had there been an authority to rule on the need for new facilities
when Kill en was permitted by OEPA, such an action may have been denied.
Presently, the first Killen unit is not needed until 1983. Projec-
tions made when the plant was originally announced called for such need
in 1978. If the powers now vested in OPSC had been available, it may
have been ruled that beginning construction in 1974 was not necessary.
Daniel Ralston's report that DP&L wished to begin construction to avoid
an impending new "EPA regulation" increases such speculation. If this
new regulation was the impending OPSC, DP&L may have rushed construction
to avoid the more costly and time-consuming requirements this would have
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entailed. The fact that many plants which started construction at this
time were later delayed, could be attributed in part to a desire to avoid
soon-to-be-effective environmental regulations, or could be due to a
mis-estimation of the intensity of the load growth slowdown.
17) Information on the detailed rationale behind the choice of the Killen
Station site was not made available by DP&L.
DP&L, as did C6&E on the East Bend case study, chose not to answer
a questionnaire sent to them which would have provided such information,
again based on the claim that such information was already in the public
record. Because of this, the case study presents only limited information
on the actual decision process and detailed siting criteria used to select
the Killen site, based on the discussion contained in the FEIS.
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ABBREVIATIONS USED: KILLEN CASE STUDY
ALJ Administrative Law Judge, assigned by the OPSC to preside
over the evaluation of evidence submitted concerning a
permit decision by the OPSC;
CAI Commonwealth Associates, Inc., author of the siting and
environmental report for the East Bend Station plant, also
used to select the Kill en site;
CEQ Council on Environmental Quality, responsible for ultimately
receiving the DEIS and FEIS;
CG&E The Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company, an investor-owned
public utility, joint owner of Killen Station;
COE Corps of Engineers, Huntington District, the lead agency
for preparing the EIS and determining whether to issue the
DA Permit;
DA Department of the Army, whose permit is required for con-
struction of structures in navigable waterways;
DP&L The Dayton Power and Light Company, an investor-owned
public utility, joint owner of Kill en Station and respon-
sible for its licensing and construction;
EPS Energy Facility Siting;
EIS Environmental Impact Statement, where DEIS is Draft EIS,
and FEIS is Final EIS;
kV kilovolts;
MW Megawatts;
NEPA National Environmental Policy Act of 1970;
NPDES National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System; which sets
effluent limitations on plant wastewater streams;
NSPS New Source Performance Standards, which set effluent
limitations on the air waste streams;
OEPA Ohio Environmental Protection Agency, responsible for the
Permit to Install, under which a review of air and water
pollution control and solid waste disposal systems was
conducted;
OHS Ohio Historical Society;
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OPSC Ohio Power Siting Commission, a new, centralized one-stop
state permitting agency for power plants, major energy
facilities, and transmission lines;
ORBES The Ohio River Basin Energy Study, a three-year study by a
university research consortium on the effects of development
of energy facilities near the Ohio River;
PAC The President's Advisory Council on Historic Preservation,
the federal equivalent of the OHS;
PSD Prevention of Significant Deterioration, which limits the
amount of air pollutants any one source can contribute;
SPDES State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, the name
given to the permit issued under the NPDES by power granted
to the State of Ohio by the USEPA;
USEPA United States Environmental Protection Agency, Region V,
Chicago, Illinois, responsible for coordination during EIS
preparation on Killen Station.
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Chapter 5. MOUNTAINEER CASE STUDY: WEST VIRGINIA
INTRODUCTION*
The third case study plant is the Mountaineer plant, originally
designated by the applicant utility as Project 1301, a single 1300 MW
coal-fired unit in Mason County just outside New Haven, West Virginia
(1970 population, 1149). It is located 243 miles downstream of Pitts-
burgh, Pennsylvania on the south bank of the Ohio River. The nearest
major cities; Parkersburg (39 air miles), Huntington (53 air miles), and
Charleston (45 air miles); are located quite far from this rural, topo-
graphically rugged area. The plant site itself, however, is located in
a wide strip of bottom land along a large bend in'the river which has
previously attracted three other coal-fired electric generating stations:
the Philip Sporn Plant (immediately adjacent) in West Virginia, and the
neighboring James Gavin (10 air miles) and Kyger Creek (10.6 air miles)
plants in Ohio. In addition to this, the John Amos Plant is 24 air miles
away on the Kanawha River.
t
Mountaineer and the other plants mentioned above are all owned by
the huge American Electric Power Company (AEP). Kyger Creek is operated
solely by the AEP subsidiary Ohio Power Company (OPC). The other three,
including Mountaineer, are operated either solely or jointly with OPC by
another AEP subsidiary, the Appalachian Power Company (AP). The latter
company serves about half of West Virginia and part of Virginia. Each
plant, however, is tied directly 'into the entire AEP system, and
thus the power from any plant could be used anywhere in the AEP system.
Originially scheduled to go on line in 1977 at a cost of $420 million,
*Abbreviations for parties named in this case study are defined where
first noted and are summarized on page 111.
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Mountaineer has been subject to delays resulting from a slowdown in the
growth of electric demand which began in 1973-74, and the inability of AP,
which is financing its construction, to obtain a rate increase from the
West Virginia Public Service Commission (WVPSC). This has delayed the
start-up date to the Winter of 1980-81. Plans indicate that an identical
unit will be installed on the site at some future date.
The 3.5 million tons of West Virginia low-sulfur coal needed each
year at Mountaineer will be shipped by barge on the Kanawha and Ohio Rivers
to the plant site. Although the exact source of the coal is not yet
known, AEP owns several mines which are expected to be utilized (Charleston
Newspapers. 2/28/79). No sulfur removal will be required, but removal of
fly ash from the flue gas will necessitate the installation of an air
reheater and electrostatic precipitator. The fly ash will be conditioned
and shipped in off-highway vehicles to a valley disposal site two miles
away in the nearby hills, where it will be compacted, covered with top-
soil, and reseeded. Bottom ash will be ground and transported by jet water
pumps to one of two on-site disposal ponds, each with a two year life,
which will be excavated when full. The ash thus collected is to be taken
to the disposal area. Dispersion of the remaining pollutants in the gas
stream will be facilitated by an 1100 foot tall stack,
Make-up water will be drawn from the Ohio River, demineralized, and
used for various plant activities. These include the replacement of
evaporative loss from a 500 foot tall natural-draft cooling tower and the
transport of waste chemicals to a treatment pond. Treated water, supple-
mented fay make-up water, will then be recycled, primarily for bottom ash
transport. Potable water will be drawn from on-site wells, and sanitary
wastes will be treated in the New Haven treatment plant, with upgrading
to secondary treatment financed in part by a $50,000 grant from AEP.
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PROCEDURES
Site Selection
AEP's site selection process consisted of two steps. First, an
inventory of available sites was developed and maintained based on several
general characteristics. Apparently this was accomplished some time before
the Mountaineer site was chosen, since AEP claimed the sites considered
were all under their control. In addition to the Mountaineer site,
undeveloped sites along the Ohio River in Henderson County, Kentucky, and
Hanging Rock, Lawrence County, Ohio, and an expansion of the existing
Breed Plant along the Wabash River in Sullivan County, Indiana, were
considered.
The second step of the selection process was the evaluation of those
inventoried sites capable of-holding the required generation capacity.
This was based on a number of specific factors (which were not given in
the FEIS). It was decided in this case that the Breed site would be used
for some other future expansion; that the Kentucky site was inappropriate
due to the lack of a fuel supply by the startup date and the need for a
large investigation of the transmission lines required to tie it into the
AEP network; and finally that the Ohio site was somewhat inferior to the
New Haven site chosen.
Land Acquisition
Due to the proximity of the Sporn plant, begun in 1950, AEP recog-
nized for-many years that the present Mountaineer site was "potentially
suitable for power plant development" (AEP written statement to author).
As early as 1963, AP was purchasing plots of land as they became available
and leasing them to local farmers. One of the largest land purchases, made
in 1972, was not then intended for a plant at all, but according to the
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deeds was for a transmission line right-of-way. This forced the reloca-
tion of several families.
Instead of a line, however, the Mountaineer power plant was proposed
a year and a half later. This was announced at a press conference in
Charleston on January 24, 1974 with West Virginia Governor Arch Moore and
AEP Chairman Donald Cook; and also at a dinner meeting in Point Pleasant,
the Mason County Seat, on February 7. This local meeting was attended by
over 100 civic leaders, who heard AP Executive Vice President John Vaughan
describe the project. An informal question and answer period of over one
hour then followed. After these announcements, options to buy the remaining
required land within three months were sought, with purchase of most of
the land occurring in April. These actions were performed by AEP's realtor
in all local land purchases, the Franklin Real Estate Company of Pennsyl-
vania. The only resistance encountered was from three property owners,
members of the Roush family, who subsequently became involved in condem-
nation hearings. In West Virginia, a board consisting of local property
owners of land similar to the condemned land is appointed to determine a
fair value for the land in question. Their decision in this case, however,
was disputed by AEP, which appealed the case. The Roush's were
advised by a local lawyer that the costs incurred in an appeal process would
diminish the value of their final settlement to a point where the amount AEP
was currently offering would be greater overall, and thus they settled out
of court.
Certificate of Convenience and Necessity
AEP applied to the WVPSC for a Certificate of Convenience and
Necessity for Project 1301 on the day of the Governor's Press
Conference—January 24, 1974. This case, No. 7836, was reviewed by the
WVPSC staff based on the description of the project and the need for the
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p>lant as presented by AP in their application. On February 27, the Commission
issued a legal order which AP was required to publish. It stated that
notice of AP's application appear in the weekly Point Pleasant newspaper
once a week for two consecutive weeks, and that objections to the applica-
tion could be filed within 10 days of the last of these two weekly publi-
cations. No objections were received, and thus the WVPSC issued the
desired Certificate on March 20, finding that formal hearings were not
necessary. It is interesting to note that the WVPSC Engineering Division,
while recommending granting the certificate, noted that electric demand
had been leveling off in the preceding few months. Regardless of this,
they suggested the project begin, due to the amount of time construction
would take,and the unknown length of time the growth slowdown would persist.
State Air Emission Source Construction Permit
A permit from the West Virginia Air Pollution Control Commission
(WVAPCC), required before construction could begin, was also applied for
on January 24, 1974. The information submitted was evaluated to determine
whether ambient air quality standards would be violated- It was determined that
this would not occur if the NSPS were followed. Immediately after the
application was filed, AP was required by West Virginia law to publish
public notice of this action, to be followed by a 30 day public comment
period. Although no request for a hearing was generated, the WVAPCC
Director Carl Beard felt that a project of this magnitude should be presented
to the people, and thus scheduled a meeting in New Haven for April 17.
Notice of this meeting was carried in the Point Pleasant newspaper. Many
of those attending were workers on strike from the Sporn plant at the time.
A flyer containing technical information about the air pollution control
system was distributed at the meeting, and AP and WVAPCC officials spoke.
-------
No major objections were noted,.and the WVAPCC action on this case, required
within 90 days of the receipt of a complete application, was to grant the
permit on April 24.
Prevention of Significant Deterioration Permit
Construction of Project 1301 began soon after the WVAPCC permit was
granted, well before the PSD regulations took effect in June of 1975. The
electric demand growth slowdown, however, first caused a construction slow-
down in mid-74 and finally a suspension of the project by year's end.
It was not until June, 1977 that a full construction program resumed. The
possibility of requiring PSD thus arose since an 18 month break in con-
struction would have subjected AP to these regulations. In apparently
unrelated letters to AEP in 1976 and 1978 from EPA's Enforcement Division,
and in 1977 from the Air and Hazardous Materials Division, this possibility
was suggested. Enough evidence was presented to USEPA Region III
supporting AEP's contention that substantial construction and contractual
obligations had occurred during this period that they decided in mid-1979
that PSD did not apply.
DA Permit and EIS Preparation
Again in this case, the COE was responsible for preparing the EIS as
a requirement for the DA Permit covering the coal docks, material unloading
facilities, the makeup water intake and discharge structures, and the
relocation of Little Broad Run, a small stream crossing the plant site.
Preliminary contact was made by AEP to the COE regarding the requirements
for the permit in early 1974. This included a meeting between the two
parties and an on-site inspection by the COE. Based on this, AEP filed
an application for the required facilities on July 12. To help meet the
construction schedule, the COE stated at the time that the material
unloading facility and the relocation of Little Broad Run would be evalu-
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ated outside of the EIS-process. Only the relocation project was so
considered, however, and was presented in an August 29 Public Notice
(No. 74-52). This drew comment from the US Fish and Wildlife Service on
the design to be used for the relocation, necessitating a meeting in
October attended by representatives of the COE, AEP, AP, IJSF&WS, and
WVDNR to resolve this point. The DA permit for the relocation of Little
Broad Run was issued January 8, 1975, allowing site preparation work to
proceed.
Meanwhile, the general environmental studies to assess the impact of
the entire project, performed by AEP's consultant WAPORA, and the air
dispersion studies performed by another consultant, Smith-Singer Meteorolo-
gist, Inc., were conducted from late 1973 through mid-1974,and reported on
shortly thereafter. Much of the information used was acquired at facili-
ties already built for AEP plants in the area. The results of these
studies were then molded into a DEIS by the COE, WAPORA, and AP; sent
to the CEQ and 22 other parties on October 20, 1975; noted in the Federal
Register on November 7; and announced in a November 3 news release and a
November 13 Public Notice. Within the customary 30 day comment period
following this notice, letters were received from 14 Federal and State
agencies, but no comment or request for a hearing from private interest
groups or individuals was made. However, only the New Haven Mayor, an
adjacent industry, and a local resident appeared on the COE mailing
list. The resident now states that he only vaguely remembers the
receipt of any information. Since no hearing was requested, none was held
and thus, after the comments received were answered, the FEIS was issued
and noted in the Federal Register in May, 1977. The only party registering
a complaint at this time was USEPA which, while not objecting to the
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issuance of the DA permit, felt that stiputations should be placed on it
to insure that their questions would be answered. These were made and
the permit was issued in September» 1977.
Even though there were only a few commenters during this period, a
relatively long time passed between the release of the DEIS and FEIS, and
again between the FEIS and the DA permit. These delays can be attributed
to negotiations between USEPA and AEP on the results of the air pollution
studies and the methods by which they were obtained. The issues which
arose during this period will be discussed later.
WVDNR Water Pollution Control Permit
In an action termed an "easy permit" by the WVDNR, Division of Water
Resources, Industrial Waste Section official who prepared it, AP received
a permit "to acquire, construct, install, modify or operate a disposal
system" in, by agency standards, the record time of nine months. The
permitting action was initiated on February 1, 1977 when AEP requested
application forms from WVDNR. A completed application was received June
30 and revised on August 30 after a request to AEP for additional inform-
ation. A public notice, placed in the Point Pleasant Register during
September, drew no public comment during the 30-day reply period and,
therefore, no hearing was held. Water Pollution Control Permit No.
IW-5969-77 was issued November 1 and will run through November 1, 1982.
NPDES Permit
In West Virginia, as in Kentucky, the USEPA still retains the authority
for issuing NPDES permits. For the Mountaineer Plant, this was applied
for on January 4, 1979. At this writing, little action has been taken by
USEPA (Philadephia) toward evaluating this permit, which must be obtained
prior to any wastewater discharge.
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Transmission Lines
In the Kill en case study, the most controversial facil-ity associated
with the project was the transmission line. This was even more profoundly so
in the Certificate of Convenience and Necessity, Case Mo. 9003, before the
WVPSC on transmission lines for Mountaineer. While the plant itself was,
for the most part, sited and licensed both quietly and quickly, the
proposal to build the transmission lines drew heavy opposition once it
became known. Several steps led to public recognition and reaction.
On May 9, 1977, AP filed an application to construct a 33 mile long,
765KV transmission line south from an existing line between the Amos and
Gavin plants to AP's Culloden Station in Cabell County, West Virginia.
While this so-called Culloden-Gavin line doesn't appear to be associated
with Mountaineer by name, its express purpose was "to reinforce the existing
transmission system in the area of that plant (Mountaineer)" (WVPSC Order of May
18, 1979, p. 6). No mention of the need for this line was made in the EIS,
however. Only a brief description of three short lines from Mountaineer,
tying it into the existing transmission system, was given in the EIS.
Also not mentioned in the application to WVPSC is another line approved before
application was made for the Culloden-Gavin line, which extends transmission
from Culloden to southern West Virginia.
After application was received by the WVPSC for Culloden-Gavin, along
with a 74 page environmental analysis of the route, AP was required to
publish notice stating that a 15 day period was open to receive written
requests for a hearing. Although no requests were received, the Commission
still held a hearing in Charleston on August 31. This was for AP to defend
its application before the Commission. Notice of this meeting, published
at the expense of AP, stated that anyone wishing to,could file an objection
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to the approval of the application on or before the hearing date. Not all
matters could be addressed at this time, though, and the hearing was continued
on September 13, still with no intervenors or protestants present. Thus
tentative approval to construct this line was virtually assured.
What neither party knew throughout this process was that the route
of the lines passed through land owned by several lawyers, engineers and
others who had moved away from nearby Charleston to a group of adjacent
farms near the small community of Hurricane. They hadn't heard of the
proposal until one of them happened to glance at a story in the Charleston
newspaper about the September 13 hearing while carrying out a stack of
papers. This indicated the line would pass near their land. Further
checking found that the line would actually pass through their land. Their
concern was heightened by a recently broadcast "60 Minutes" television
segment which outlined the health effects of the electrical field created
by such lines. Other land owners along the route were informed by this
group and on October 4, a petition was filed which requested permission to
intervene and reopen the record because, thepetitioneers claimed, they did
not have actual notice of the September 13 meeting. The Commission agreed
on November 29, and set a hearing for January 25, 1978 in Charleston to
allow cross-examination of AP's witnesses and introduce new evidence. AP
was ordered to publish notice of this meeting. In the interim, other
parties asked to intervene, and thus in all 21 intervenors (individuals or
families) entered the case.
Fourteen protestants testified at the January 25 hearing, and addi-
tional testimony was given athearingson March 14-17, March 28-31, and
April 6-7. Briefs and proposed orders were submitted by AP and the
intervenors,and oral argument was presented before the Commission on June
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16. In all, 2203 pages of transcript and about 72 exhibits were recorded
from testimony and cross-examination of 56 protestants, the intervenors
and their nine witnesses, AP and their nine witnesses, and the WVPSC staff
and their one witness. After evaluating this voluminous amount of infor-
mation, and conducting inquiries of its own, the WVPSC granted the desired
certificate on May 19, 1979, but subjected their approval to various
conditions, restrictions, and modifications. The issues raised, and the
WVPSC findings and solutions will be discussed in the Public Participation
section of this chapter.
The Commission ruling did not stop the intervenors, however. They
appealed the decision to the West Virginia Supreme Court on August 20, 1979.
Litigation is underway at the present time on whether the Court will hear
the case.
SITING CRITERIA
The differences in locale between the Mountaineer plant and East
Bend and Killen Stations should be noted. While all three are in basically
rural locations, Mountaineer was sited in an area already containing
several other AEP plants of equal magnitude. This seems to run counter to
ECAR recommendations that a large portion of a company's generating capacity
not be in the same area. In addition to this, the AEP planners did not
use one of CG&E's and DP&L's primary environmental siting criteria, that
of locating where the least number of people would be impacted. The plant
was placed on the corporate boundary of New Haven, abutting a modern
subdivision. It is also apparent that AEP, due to their large service
area, had a larger region in which they could site plants, and didn't
require a formal study due to the number of prospective sites they already
controlled within this region. Thus while most of the basic criteria for
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selecting the Mountaineer site were the same as for the other plants, the
setting in wh-ich these criteria were applied varied.
The criteria used to select first the inventory of alternative sites
and then the Mountaineer site,included, according to the FEIS:
1) Power system reliability;
2) Availibility of an adequate fuel supply;
3) Environmental considerations;
4) Economic factors; and
5) Specific site characteristics and physical requirements.
One important consideration specifically stated in the FEIS is how well
the plant would tie into the existing transmission network.
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
With the exception of the hearing held by the WVAPCC, the only
comments about the project were from Federal and State agencies. Only
in the transmission line case, and there only in an area 40 miles away
from the plant site, did any members of the public become actively involved
in a licensing procedure. This is unlike the situations at Kill en and
especially East Bend where, if only for a limited time, impacted parties
pursued a role in the decision making process.
There was a notable absence of issues and participants in the
Mountaineer plant licensing process. Those few issues which did arise,
and the forums in which they were aired, are discussed below.
AEP Announcement of Plant
The mechanics of AEP's announcement have been mentioned previously.
The initial announcement at the Governor's News Conference in January,
1974, generated press coverage, and thus provided the first solid indi-
cation of AEP's plans. The first real exchange of dialogue between the
power company and local interests occurred at the Point Pleasant dinner
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meeting the following month. Accordin
Mayor of New Haven at the time, the gn
g to one person present, John Thorpe,
)up of civic leaders present accepted
the news very well, expressing no public opposition. He felt that one reason
for this was the willingness of the power company officials present to
explain the benefits of the plant, the
used, and to informally answer questions after the formal presentation.
Apparently the promise of jobs and progress through building Moun-
taineer was enough to override some of
from similar major developments in the
development of the Sporn plant spurred
environmental safeguards to be
the more negative impacts resulting
area in the past. For example,
a housing boom in the area during
construction. After the construction viorkers left, however, the bottom
dropped'out of the market. In contrast, the housing market has been "kept
tight" by local developers during the
housing surpluses are not expected lateir according to Mayor Thome.
Another effect brought about by the Spc
difficulties, including the strike in progress when Mountaineer was
announced. Since then, however, the ur
workers seem to have been satisfied with their treatment by AP. Finally,
an air pollution problem is present in
1973-1977 period,the WVAPCC was waging
meeting the air quality standards, with
state to come into compliance. Polluti
locally, however.
HVAPCC Hearing
As mentioned previously, one group
Mountaineer construction, and thus
rn plant was a series of labor
ion has been voted out,and the
the area. In fact, during the
a battle with AP over the means of
Sporn being the last plant in the
on episodes seem to be tolerated
represented at this hearing
was the striking Sporn union. It is not exactly clear, though, how much
influence they had over the proceedings. WVAPCC Director Beard recalls
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only a small group of strikers present, there solely to harass AEP. Mayor
Thome contends, however, that non-strikers also attended this "calm"
meeting, and that both pros and cons of the project were discussed. Issues
raised included potential elevated humidity, slickened highways, devalued
properties and the employment generated by the project. There is also
some question as to how large the actual attendance was. While the FEIS
reported that only 20 people were pres
house, at his estimate between 100 and
ent, Mayor Thorne remembers a packed
125 people.
Because of these divergent accounts, it is difficult to judge what
the results of this hearing were. What is known is that, for all intents
and purposes, neither the local media lor their readers had anything to
publicly say about the project afterwa
plant is more accepted now since the employment provided is a steadying
influence over the economy. This is in spite of the fact that traffic
problems exist and the expected econom
Comments on the DEIS
Federally, the agencies submitting
about the DEIS in late 1975 were the U
of the Department of-the Interior, whi
and State Geologist were the most voca
following areas.
1. Fly ash di-spo'sal system. All
cized the lack of detail in the DEIS on
system. This led to doubts about .the :
the time the FEIS was issued, however,
dry fly ash disposal system and thus,
did not require a reply.
.97
ds. Mayor Thorne feels that the
c boom has not occurred.
the largest number of comments
EPA and the Office of the Secretary
e on the state level the WVDNR
. The major comments were in the
of the above parties roundly criti-
the water-propelled fly ash disposal
ystem's ability to meet NSPS. By
AP had changed their proposal to a
they contended, these questions
-------
giral
When
2. Air Quality. Critics, led by
the poor analysis of the project's
pollution. In response, the DEIS i
from studies by AEP's consultant, Smitf
omission of this analysis in the ori
to standard practice at the time. "
ment was written, it was customary to
a new plant alone." AEP had considerec
internal investigations, however (FEIS,
analysis showed that while ambient air
violated in the area, the contribution
would be minimal due to the control
trostatic precipitation, and a tall
The latter control measure led to
USEPA and the US Forest Service. The
by tall stacks, they contended, contri
which leads to large impacts on soil,
AEP took exception to this criticism, ;
power plants to combat problems such as
standards. They promised to adhere to
which the utility felt were established
effects.
3. Cultural resources. The
contribution
incl tided
the State Historic Preservation Officer-
insure that any properties eligible for
of Historic Places would be protected.
no such sites wers present within 50
98
USEPA, very vehemently objected to
to regional ambient air
47 pages of new information
-Singer Meteorologists, Inc. The
, states Smith-Singer, was due
the Environmental Impact State-
cfirect the analysis specifically to
other pollutant sources in their
p340). The newly included
quality standards were being
to this situation by Mountaineer
measures: low-sulfur coal, elec-
stclck.
another deficiency in the eyes of
High degree of dispersion achieved
butes to the acid rain problem,
water, and their associated habitats.
tating that they could not design
this for which EPA had set no
NSPS standards formulated by EPA,
considering both local and distant
Department of the Interior, along with
(SHPO) and the PAC, wished to
or listed on the National Register
In answer to the DEIS's claim that
itriles of the plant, the SHPO provided
-------
a list of registered sites within 50 miles and their inventory of all historic
sites within 15 miles. They further indicated that none of them would be
threatened by the plant. It was also suggested by the Interior Department
that more consideration should be given in the EIS to existing and
potential recreation sites. AEP had discovered only one site in the
immediate area, a marina, which it felt would not be affected in any way.
Finally, Interior suggested that an archaeological evaluation of the area,
supervised by a professional archaeologist under the direction of the
State Archaeologist, be performed. Such a study was undertaken for the
DEIS, however, and included a search of State archaeological records
(revealing no known sites), interviews with local residents (indicating
frequent archaeological finds), a surface survey (uncovering two burial
mounds previously reduced by cultivation), and a non-productive test
excavation of one mound threatened by construction. Assurances were given
that the same care would be used in later phases of construction.
4. Vegetation and Wildlife. Comments in this area 1) disputed con-
tentions that displaced wildlife could relocate and that fish didn't
spawn in the main channel of the Ohio River, 2) suggested that an index
of the sports value of fish and wildlife and a discussion of the effects
of warm water discharges be provided, 3) indicated that commercial fishing
on the Ohio River was increasing, 4) debated some of the taxonomy in the
DEIS, and 5) in general expressed a feeling that there was a lack of
information about ecological impacts. AEP defended their analysis, stating
that any of these impacts would be minor.
5. Other areas. Other comments concerned the loss of prime agricul-
tural land, mitigation measures for transmission lines, the use of PCB's,
provisions for burning high-sulfur coal (if necessary), peak growth
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predictions, and runoff from the coal pile. These were all answered in
the FEIS.
Transmission Lines
The WVPSC case over authorizing the construction of the Culloden-
Gavin transmission line was by far the most controversial action surrounding
the Mountaineer project. In the course of the litigation over this permit,
the opponents of the line presented a variety of issues supporting their
position. This testimony was given by the intervenors in the case, their
expert witnesses, and several independent parties from out of the area
who appeared at the hearings on their own accord. AEP's major proposals,
the objections to them, and the WVPSC decision in each ease are briefly
summarized below.
1. Need for the proposed line. The primary reason stated for building
the Culloden-Gavin line was "to reinforce the existing transmission system
in the area" of the Mountaineer plant. AP presented several computer
models showing the effect of various system malfunctions coupled with
facilities out of service, conditions which had been experienced in the
past. These indicated that the increased load from Mountaineer during
such occurrences would cause instabilities and overloads in the existing
transmission and generation system. The intervenors disputed AP's fore-
casts for peak load growth upon which these models were based, contending
that overloads would occur very rarely. While the WVPSC criticized AP's
failure to analyze the probability of the overload occurences, and found
that, although nothing could then be done about it, the location of the
Mountaineer plant may have violated an ECAR reliability criteria (avoiding
a concentration of generating capacity in one area), it was basically in
agreement with AP's analysis of the need for this line and thus felt that
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it should be built.
AEP built their case on local system stability requirements, but the
intervenors felt that this was not the total reason for a project of this
magnitude. Billy Jack Gregq, attorney for the intervenors, found a series
of system expansions in an ECAR report to the FPC in 1976. These included
the Mountaineer plant, the Culloden-Gavin and Cu11oden-Wyoming transmission
lines, another line to run parallel to these, and further lines from the
Wyoming substation in southern West Virginia to Roanoke, Virginia and to
a proposed pumped storage reservoir. This later project was originally
scheduled for the New River in West Virginia, but was switched to western
Virginia when Congress declared the New River to be a Scenic River.
Gregg's theory, which he and the intervenors have unsuccessfully attempted
to prove, is that the Culloden-Gavin line is just a piece of a system for
using the power from the Mountaineer-Gavin-Amos complex during non-peak
times to pump these reservoirs full. These large power plants, he believes,
can only be operated efficiently if they are constantly at full production,
which his theorized system would do. The ultimate goal of the pumped
storage reservoirs, Gregg further speculates, is to provide peaking power
for sale to the utilities of the rapidly-growing Sun Belt cities of the
South.
2. Alternatives to the proposed line. AP presented four alternative
routes for the Culloden-Gavin line, as well as another possible routing
for the 765KV line and the use of the existing 345KV system. The route
it advocated, however, was claimed to be the most environmentally acceptable
(The WVPSC later concurred with this finding). The decision by AP was
based on an evaluation of a mile-wide corridor surrounding each route,
using twelve natural and socio-economic characteristics:
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1) Terrain,
2) Hydrology,
3} Soils,
4) Vegetation,
5) Wildlife,
6} Population,
7) Landuse,
8) Transportation,
9} Navigation,
10) Existing utilities,
11) Historic sites, and
12) Scenic and recreation sites.
Also, the Kanawha River crossing, the length of each corridor, and the
number of structures in each corridor were considered in AP's evaluation.
The intervenors desired to avoid an argument over routing since they
recognized that the chosen route was the best environmentally.
3. Right-of-way clearance and maintenance. AP proposed using clear-
cutting of all woody-stemmed vegetative growth along the selected right-
of-way except at stream and roadway crossings and on upslopes visible from
highways. They also wished to use an aerial spraying program to maintain
a clear-cut right of way. These practices had always been used on all
40,000 miles of lines in the AEP system, and AP saw no reason not to
continue them.
The intervenors, however, organized a large volume of testimony point-
ing out abuses in AEP's right-of-way maintenance practices in the past,
and urged that alternative, less damaging methods be adopted. Clear
cutting, they claimed, can increase'erosion and sedimentation, and remove
many plants desirable as wildlife habitat and food sources. In addition
to this, numerous witnesses stated that they had observed personnel aerially
spraying lines for AEP violating many of the restrictions placed on this
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practice. Prohibitions include spraying over open water, pasture!ands
being grazed, humans and animals, and within a safe distance from homes,
gardens, orchards, crops, water and animals. Instead of aerial spraying,
the intervenors requested that "selective herbicide" techniques be used,
thereby allowing low-growing plants to survive, possibly establishing a
stable shrub community requiring little or no maintenance, and retaining
a wildlife habitat.
Although AP argued that the WVPSC was not the proper forum for this
issue, and that the Commission had earlier approved these practices, the
evidence present convinced the WVPSC that it was time for a change. Their
order restricted aerial application to areas inaccessible to ground crews
and widened the regions around the various areas which are not to be
sprayed. Also they required measures to mitigate the environmental
effects caused by the construction of these lines, including the elimina-
tion of wide-scale clear-cutting.
4. Electrical environmental effects. Five categories of electrical
effects were debated; noise, radio and television interference, ozone,
shock, and health effects. The first two of these were considered to be
"foul weather" problems, since the major impacts occur when moisture enters
the electric field surrounding the lines. AP promised, and-the WVPSC
, ordered, that mitigative measures would be provided by the power company
if a problem was reported by a neighbor of the line. Ozone, the WVPSC
determined, is produced only in small quantities, and would decay
rapidly in the environment. The inducement of an electric field in insu-
lated objects near the line can cause a shock if a person comes in contact
with the charged object. Stationary objects near the right of way were
required to be grounded to prevent this occurrence. The height of the
line, it was shown, would minimize a similar problem in mobile objects
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passing under the line.
The largest body of testimony in this area concerned the effects on
human health of the electric fields surrounding 745KV lines. The inter-
venors presented evidence which indicated that, at the very least, the
possibility of such effects existed. No conclusive tests were found
showing just what the dangers were, but the intervenors1 position was that
even the slightest chance of adverse effects should be addressed. AEP
also felt this was potentially an important problem, but in defense of
these lines presented studies they had conducted which failed to prove
biological harm. They also presented numerous objections from the
scientific community to the evidence presented by the intervenors. The
WVPSC, while concerned about this matter and endorsing further studies,
felt that present evidence did not support the assertion of health effects
from these lines.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1} There was very little public participation and no demand for a public
forum during the licensing of the Mountaineer Plant.
Mountaineer is unique among the case study plants in that no indi-
vidual or private interest group made written opposition to the plant.
Attending formal public meetings was the only action taken by non-govern-
mental parties interested in the plant. When the project was announced,
there were individuals who expressed dissatisfaction or concern about as-
pects of the plant at these early public meetings, but these concerns were
never expressed in a public forum afterwards. Apparently there was, and
still is, a growing acceptance of the plant due to the diverse personal
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economic benefits it provides to members of the community. On the other
hand, local complaints about the project were still expressed by some in-
dividuals interviewed.
2) In terms of the degree to which public opposition was expressed, the
Mountaineer plant and the related Culloden-Gavin transmission line were
polar opposites.
There are several possible reasons for this marked difference. One
may be the time difference between when these two facilities were con-
sidered. Public awareness about energy facilities has increased since
1974. Another factor which may explain the increased public activity over
Culloden-Gavin lies in the social and demographic characteristics of those
involved. The leading opponents of the transmission line were more afflu-
ent, better educated, and sought to be better informed than those affected
by the plant, and thus were better able to present their case. Also, it
appears that the WVPSC was more receptive and better equipped to handle
public comment at the time of the Culloden-Gavin transmission line case.
3) The location of the Mountaineer plant violates suggested ECAR reliability
criteria according to statements made by the WVPSC.
ECAR, a utility-sponsored organization which establishes principles
and procedures for insuring the reliability of bulk power supply in their
region, has suggested that an electric company riot locate more than 10 per
cent of their generating capacity in one area. The AP plants in the New
Haven area, however, constitute a much larger portion than this. In their
ruling on the Culloden-Gavin line, the WVPSC recognized that this could
very well be concluded, even though they had certificated the plant earlier.
Thus for a purely technical reason the site selected may not have been a
good alternative.
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4) Mountaineer's contribution to the already heavy air pollutant loading in
the region surrounding it will be small.
Air quality standards for both particulates and SCL were being vio-
lated in certain places near Mountaineer when it was permitted. The ex-
pected contribution from the new plant would not significantly aggravate
this situation, according to the results of the Smith-Singer studies.
This is due to the control equipment, the use of low-sulfur coal, and the
tall stack. The tall stack height provides for the dispersion of the
pollutants over a larger area, but at lower concentrations. Control
measures instituted at the Sporn plant and required in the Ohio plants at
some future data should relieve the existing air pollution problems.
5) A long history of land purchases adjacent to the Sporn plant gave AP the
bulk of the Mountaineer site before the project was made public.
The approach taken by AP in this case was very much different than
the land acquisition procedures used by CG&E and DP&L in their respective
case study plants. These early land purchases probably would not have
occurred had the Sporn plant not be adjacent to the site, however, since
power companies often buy available, adjacent, reasonably priced land.
It is not easy to see why the land was purchased (according to the deeds
recording this purchase) as a tansmission line right of way just a year-
and-a-half before plans to construct Mountaineer were announced, however.
6) The Roush's were deterred from continuing the condemnation suit over their
land by the costs they believed they would have incurred if they contested
AP's appeal.
The Roush's settled for less than they felt their land was worth, after
being advised that the extra legal costs of an appeal process would be
more than the difference between the price they would receive if the judg-
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ment again went against AP, and the price an out-of-court settlement would
bring. Roush now questions whether he did receive good advice at the time,
however. Even if this advice was correct, it means that a landowner has
no rational choice but to accept a price below a fair market value as deter-
mined by the court system since he will lose money even if an appeals court
rules in his favor. This problem is inherent in any legal preceding, how-
ever, and is therefore not restricted to EFS condemnation cases. It does,
however, affect public opinion concerning the fairness of the siting pro-
cess.
7) In the Culloden-Gavin transmission line case, owners of the land required
for the right-of-way were not personally informed of the WVPSC preceding.
It would seem that the owners of land in the proposed routing of a
transmission line would be entitled to direct notification of any proced-
ings on such a proposal. This was not done in the Culloden-Gavin trans-
mission line case, however, nor is it required under WVPSC regulations.
Instead, it was only by accident that these landowners learned of the pro-
posal before actual approval was given. The result of the ultimate inter-
vention action point out the deficiencies of relying on obscure legal
notices and chance newspaper coverage for public information purposes.
Only through the determined efforts of the intervenors was information on
power company abuses related to transmission line maintenance uncovered.
It is encouraging, though, to note that the WVPSC did reopen their hearings
to give these people a chance to air their concerns and thus improve the
proposal.
8) The information presented by the intervenors spurred significant restric-
tions on AP's right-of-way management program.
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The one aspect of the intervenors1 case which won the judgment of the
WVPSC was the account of past abuses of right-of-way management procedures,
As valuable as the safeguards subsequently ordered by the WVPSC were, how-
ever, they are viewed by the intervenors as a compromise to their view-
point that the line was not needed at all. Also, improved management
practices are only required on this one line. Efforts are underway now by
members of the same group to try to have the state regulatory agency in-
stitute these changes statewide.
9) The main point of contention of the intervenors was the basic need for
the line, rather than its routing or environmental effects.
This approach was greatly different than that taken by opponents of
the Killen-Bath line and those concerned about the location of the line
emanating from East Bend. Opponents to Culloden-Gavin attacked the basic
motivation for even constructing the line. While AP argued that local
stability of its system was in question, the intervenors attempted to
prove that the ultimate purpose of this line was to provide off-peak
electricity to operate future pumped-storage reservoirs in Virginia, which
in turn would provide peaking capacity for the growing cities of the South.
This argument was based on AP's own long-range system expansion plans.
Enough evidence was presented to the WVPSC on the expected stability
problems, however, that they ruled the line to be essential.
10) Based on their experience in this case, the intervenors hold the view
that the WVPSC does not have the manpower nor the jurisdiction to conduct
a probing study of the need for energy facilities.
When they first entered the case, the intervenors felt that they could
present their evidence to the WVPSC and have them study in-depth the long-
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range implications of AP's expansions. Due to the fact that the WVPSC
staff included only two engineers (one electrical, and one civil for water
utility facilities), and that the multi-state AEP corporate system is the
ultimate source of long-range plans, the intervenors found that the state
regulators could not accomplish the task that they (the intervenors) had
expected. Much more analysis had to be conducted by the citizen's group
itself than had been anticipated. Since citizen groups do not have the
expertise contained in a large corporation such as AEP, and much of the
necessary data for analysis of need comes from the utility, such groups
are hard pressed to challenge utility actions.
It happened that the citizen's group in this case had much more exper-
tise represented than could be expected among other groups of residents
in the path of a transmission line. It is very important, therefore, that
Public Service Commissions have adequate staff» expert in the determination
of need for both power plants and transmission lines. It is equally im-
portant that PSC staffs are able to work with the utility and have access
to any of their relevant data to avoid the need for time consuming repli-
cate studies. The public must be kept abreast of these activities in
order to insure that their concerns are being adequately looked out for.
11) Debate over the proper method of evaluating Mountaineer's impact on the
regional air quality delayed the issuance of the DA permit.
Due to the limited presentation of air quality impacts in the DEIS,
USEPA had reservations about whether emissions from Mountaineer would
cause a violation of air quality standards. It was required that AP in-
clude the other nearby pollutant sources in their model. Even after this
was done, however, USEPA questioned the results and the assumptions used
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to obtain these results. A separate debate concerned the effect the con-
struction slowdown would have on the applicability of PSD standards.
Changing regulations coupled with the stalled construction program led to
repeated inquires by USEPA into the project's status. In their role as
the lead agency, the COE required that the concerns of USEPA be answered.
Even though this led to a year-and-a-half gap between the DEIS and FEIS,
and another four month wait thereafter before the DA permit was issued,
AP's construction schedule was not significantly delayed in this case
since estimates of the need for power were reduced slightly during this
period. This reduction was the result of a reduction in the growth rate
for electricity demand. In other situations (where the need for power is
urgent), such regulatory delays could be detrimental to the power network,
12) Intervention in the Cull oden-Gavin case was achieved at a low monetary
cost.
Due to the numerous expert witnesses who volunteered their time, and
the legal and engineering backgrounds of the intervenors themselves, a
comprehensive, thorough, and somewhat successful attack on AP's proposal
was achieved quite cheaply. It was estimated that the total financial
commitment of the intervenors was $1300. In general, however, it would
appear that a situation such as this, where opponents had a degree of
expertise and concern allowing them to wage a comprehensive series of
rebuttals to each aspect of the project, would be rare. The more common
case, which was intentionally and strictly avoided in this situation,
would be for intervenors to debate not if a line should be built, but if
it could be built somewhere else.
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ABBREVIATIONS USED: MOUNTAINEER CASE STUDY
AEP American Electric Power Company, large electric utility
holding company headquartered in New York City;
AP Appalachian Power Company, subsidiary of AEP responsible
for licensing and construction of the Mountaineer power plant;
CEQ Council on Environmental Quality, responsible for ultimately
receiving the DEIS and FEIS;
COE Corps of Engineers, Huntington District, the lead agency
for preparing the EIS and determining whether to issue the
DA Permit;
DA Department of the Army, whose permit is required for constuc-
tion of structures in navigable waterways;
ECAR East Central Reliability Council
EIS Environmental Impact Statement, where DEIS is Draft EIS,
FEIS is Final EIS;
FPC Federal Power Commission;
kV Kilovolt
MW Megawatt;
NEPA National Environmental Policy Act of 1970;
NPDES National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, which sets
effluent limitations on plant wastewater streams;
NSPS New Source Performance Standards, which set effluent
limitations on the air waste streams;
OPC Ohio Power Company, subsidiary of AEP which owns or jointly
owns power plants in the vicinity of the Mountaineer plant;
PAC The President's Advisory Council on Historic Preservation,
the Federal equivalent of the SHPO in West Virginia;
PSD . Prevention of Significant Deterioration, which limits the
amount of air pollutants any one source can contribute;
SHPO State Historic Preservation Officer, a West Virginia state
agency;
USEPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region III, Philadel-
phia, responsible for NPDES review and coordination on the
DEIS and FEIS;
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USF&WS U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior;
responsible for coordination on the EIS;
WVAPCC West Virginia Air Pollution Control Commission, issuing
agency of the Permit to Construct an air pollutant source,
whereunder review is made of NSPS and ambient air quality
effects;
WVDNR West Virginia Department of Natural Resources, responsible
for the Permit to Construct wastewater treatment facilities;
and
WVPSC West Virginia Public Service Commission, responsible for the
Certificate of Convenience and Necessity for power plants
and transmission lines.
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