oEPA
            United States
            Environmental Protection
            Agency
            Administration And
            Resources Management
            (PM-221D)
EPA/IMSD/91-006
June 1991
Selected Management
Articles
Public Policy Mechanisms:
Non-Regulatory Options
For Environmental Protection
                      PEOPLE

-------

-------
   PUBLIC POLICY MECHANISMS:
    NON-REGULATORY OPTIONS
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
               JUNE 1991
          EPA Headquarters Library
   Information Management and Services Division
      U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
           RoomM2904 PM-211A
             401 M Street, SW.
           Washington, DC 20460
          U S. Environmental Protection Agency
          Region 5, Library (PL42J)
          77 West Jackson Boulevard, IZtn noor
          Chicago, IL 60604-3590

-------
' 'i'

-------
                          TABLE OF CONTENTS
       Introduction

       I.    GENERAL OVERVIEW
^     II.    ECONOMIC INCENTIVES

            A.    MARKET-BASED	   8

            B.    TAX-BASED	  1 0

            C.    EMISSIONS TRADING	  1 2

            D.    BUBBLE POLICY	  26

            E    INTERNATIONAL	  31

       III.   APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVES

            A.    ACID RAIN	  37

            B.    AGRICULTURE	  38

            C.    AIR POLLUTION	  39

            D.    HAZARDOUS AND SOLID WASTE	  4 0

            E    PUBLIC UTILITIES	  44

       IV.   PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS	  45

       V.    DEBT-FOR-NATURE	  51

       VI.   POLLUTION PREVENTION	  60

       EPA Headquarters Library Management Collection List of
       Management Bibliographies	  63

-------
               PUBLIC POLICY MECHANISMS:
               NON-REGULATORY OPTIONS
            FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

                       INTRODUCTION
     Traditional  environmental protection mechanisms favor
command-and-control legislation  backed by strong  enforcement.
Today, EPA  is expanding  its use of non-regulatory mechanisms that
encourage partnerships with  governments, environmental
communities,  industries and businesses.  Public Poiicv
Mechanisms: Non-Regulatory  Options for Environmental
Protection was developed as a  tool for EPA managers to  identify
and explore  various options for  non-regulatory environmental
protection.  The bibliography focuses on techniques and applications
of non-regulatory options  on  national  and international levels.

     Each entry  in Public Poiicv  Mechanisms:  Non-Reoulatorv
Options  for Environmental  Protection includes  a  summary of a
journal article with the source  of the entry noted  at the end of the
sunmmary.   The  information is organized into the following  sections:
General Overview; Economic  Incentives: Market-Based, Tax-Based,
Emissions Trading, Bubble Policy, International;  Aplications of
Economic Incentives: Acid Rain/ Agriculture, Air  Pollution,
Hazardous and Solid Waste,  Public  Utilities;  Public-Private
Partnerships; Debt-for-Nature; and  Pollution Prevention.

     Public  Poiicv  Mechanisms:  Non-Requlatorv  Options  for
Environmental  Protection was  compiled from the following
databases: ABI/INFORM, MANAGEMENT CONTENTS,  ENVIROLINE, NTIS,
POLLUTION ABSTRACTS, and PAIS. Entries from PAIS  do not have
full  abstracts  but include a brief descriptive summary.  For  copies
of articles listed  in this bibliography,  contact Sigrid N. Smith,
Reference Librarian, EPA  Headquarters Library, (202) 382-5922 or
Email  address, Library.HQ/EPA3738.               M>O

-------

-------
I.  GENERAL OVERVIEW


Green Economics
Kay, John; Silberston, Aubrey
National Institute Economic Review  (UK) n!35 PP: 50-64 Feb  1991

   The  principal environmental  problems  generally are  not the
result of an inappropriate pursuit of the  interests  of the current
generation; they derive  from a failure to  perceive  correctly what
the  interests  of that generation are  or  to establish mechanisms
that properly  reflect them. A positive policy for the environment
begins not from broad generalization, but from specific analysis of
the environmental costs  and benefits of actions and policies. The
most  serious  fallacy in  green  policies may be  the assertion of
general  remedies  for  problems  whose solution  is  sensitively
dependent on the facts of a particular case. A careful evaluation
of  costs  and  benefits  is insufficient, however, when  costs and
benefits accrue to different groups.  Environmental improvements
will always entail losses for some and gains for others, and this
should be recognized.   (ABI/INFORM)


Revenue-Neutral incentives for Efficiency and Environmental Quality
Koomey, Jonathan; Rosenfeld, Arthur H.
Contemporary Policy Issues v8n3 PP: 142-156 Jul 1990

   Interest has grown in using monetary incentives as an efficient
way  to promote  energy  efficiency  and environmental quality.  A
description is presented of issues raised in designing revenue-
neutral incentive policies  to achieve these goals.  Such policies
involve charging fees in proportion to undesirable characteristics
and giving rebates in proportion to desirable characteristics. The
fees pay for the rebates and  for  any administrative costs of the
program. Conceptual issues raised in designing such incentive plans
are  analyzed   to  correct for  externalities  and  to promote the
efficiency of buildings and automobiles. The nature  and importance
of externalities are examined,  the  rationale for revenue-neutral
incentive policies is  presented,  and 6 revenue-neutral  incentive
programs for achieving  these goals are described. The criteria that
should be used in determining the  size of rebates and  fees are
analyzed.  (ABI/INFORM)


Acceptance  of  Need  for  Choices  Brightens  Hopes   for  Solutions
Berry, John M.
Financier v!4n7 PP: 5-9 Jul 1990

   Since the first Clean Air Act was  passed  in  1970,  it has been
updated and strengthened. Recent estimates of the  annual cost of
pollution control in the US are in the neighborhood of $90 billion,
or 1.7% of  the gross national product. Economist Paul Portney has

-------
estimated that passage of Clean Air Act amendments will add between
$25 billion and $30 billion to the current total cost by the year
2005. Public  awareness  of  the  health and  other  damage  done by
pollution has  made many people willing  to  pay for  cleanup  - at
least if the cost is not too burdensome.  By using low-sulfur fuel
at Southern California Edison, most  customers  have accepted that
the  approximately  5% extra on  electric bills  is  a  reasonable
contribution to improve air quality. An incentive-based approach to
the problems  of meeting standards of air emissions and selling
credits is being adopted  by many utility companies  and is being
accepted by environmental groups.  (ABI/INFORM)


Regulating Bureaucratic Polluters
Lyon, Randolph M.
Public Finance Qtrly v!8n2 PP: 198-220 Apr 1990

   The behavior of polluting  public  sector  agencies  and other
bureaucracies  under   environmental  policies  based on economic
incentives,  such as transferable permits  and pollution taxes, and
under direct  regulations are  analyzed.  A  theoretical  model is
developed to consider the incentives for bureaucratic behavior that
can  arise where   the  provision  of   pollution  control  services
increases the salary,  prestige,  and other perquisites of decision
makers.   The  possible  existence  and magnitudes  of the effects
implied by the model are then respectively examined by considering
actual  and  simulated  environmental  management  programs.  The
evidence  considered  suggests  that  public-sector polluters  may
participate in  a manner somewhat different   from private-sector
polluters under programs relying  upon economic  incentives.  The
simulations  imply  that,  even  in the presence of  bureaucratic
distortions,  programs relying upon economic incentives are likely
to be less expensive than direct regulations.
(ABI/INFORM)


THE GREENING OP CORPORATE AMERICA
SMITH, EMILY  T. ;   CAHAN,  VICKI;  ELLIS,  JAMES  E. ;  WEBER,  JOSEPH
BUSINESS WEEK, APR 23,  90, N3156,  P96(8)

   WITH   INCREASING   PUBLIC  CONCERN  ABOUT   THE   ENVIRONMENT,
CORPORATIONS ARE GRADUALLY TAKING  A PROACTIVE ROLE IN CONSERVATION
AND POLLUTION  ISSUES. POLLUTION MANAGEMENT IS  OFTEN IN THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE COMPANY,  AS PROFITS  ARE ERODED BY CONSUMER DISMAY
AS WELL AS SHARP FINES   FOR VIOLATIONS OF POLLUTION REGULATIONS.
SUCCESSFUL CORPORATE INITIATIVES HAVE TOP-LEVEL POLITICAL SUPPORT,
AND  SHOP-LEVEL PARTICIPATION,  OFTEN  OPERATING  IN  CONCERT WITH
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES.  (ENVIROLINE)

-------
Using Economic Incentives to Maintain Our Environment
Tietenberg, T. H.
Challange  v33n2  pp.42-46 Mar/Apr 1990

   Instead  of  mandating environmental  policies,  environmental
groups and regulators are offering economic incentives to achieve
their objectives.  Using incentives  can:  1.  reduce  the  conflict
between environmental protection and  economic development, 2. ease
the  transition   to   a  sustainable   relationship   between  the
environment and the  economy, and 3.  encourage  the development of
more  environmentally benign  production  processes.  An  economic
incentive appraoch known as the "offset policy" was introduced in
the mid-1970's to lower air pollution in a number of U.S. cities.
Emission  reduction   credits  were   awarded  to  companies  that
voluntarily lowered  their emissions below regulation standards.
These credits could be sold to new firms seeking to move into the
city as long as the acquiring firm bought 1.2 emission credits for
each 1.0  units of emissions  added by  the  new plant. With this
approach, air quality improved every time a new  firm moved into the
area. (ABI/INFORM)


Earth Day: Twenty Years Later
Miller, William H.
Industry Week v239n6 PP: 86-97 Mar 19, 1990

   The 20th anniversary of the  first  Earth Day, April 22, 1970, is
approaching. There are indications that many companies are becoming
more  responsive to  the environment,  and environmentalists  are
expressing more  interest   in   market-based  incentive solutions.
One example is the Environmental Defense Fund's  close work with the
Environmental Protection Agency and the White House in developing
the emissions-trading scheme in the acid rain portion of  President
Bush's  1989  clean air  proposal. The  president of  the  National
Audubon Society,  Peter  A.  A.  Berle,  praises Du  Pont Co. for its
decision to discontinue production of chlorofluorocarbons, but he
criticizes  oil  companies  for  their  tepid   support  of  energy
conservation. Sierra Club Executive Director Michael Fischer says
that good deeds have  been centered mostly in small and medium-sized
firms. Like industry, the environmental movement is not monolithic.
Dialogue with industry has not  increased on the aggressive side of
the  spectrum.  On the  conservative  side,  the  Nature Conservancy
refuses to  join in  lobbying coalitions with  other environmental
groups. (ABI/INFORM)


Environmental performance will count in the 1990s
Wells, Richard P.
Marketing News v24 March 19, 1990, p22(l)

   Marketing  research  indicates that  environmental  issues  are
important to  consumers,  and firms hoping  to  succeed in  the 1990s

-------
will be the ones that achieve a performance in the marketplace that
is sensitive to the environment. Firms can achieve success by using
an  environmental  management  strategy which  responds  to  market
incentives and uses innovative marketing approaches. It also will
be important to develop advertising which reflects a commitment to
environmental performance and is simple to comprehend. Additionally
firms  will need to monitor consumer response to the market-focused
environmental  techniques  used   in   corporations.   (MANAGEMENT
CONTENTS)


Breaking the circle of the Short-Term Fix: we Must Earn the Right
to operate
Mahoney, Richard J.
Executive Speeches v4n8 PP: 16-19 Mar 1990

   To earn the right to operate, to regulate, and to legislate, the
cycle  of the  short-term  environmental  fix must  be  broken.  The
current  system of  command  and  control   used  by government to
achieve  environmental  improvements  in  industry is  the slowest,
most  expensive,  and most contentious   way   to   a   solution.
Moreover, voluntary environmental initiatives by industry tend to
be penalized  by the  system.  The US must accept a  more realistic
view of what is possible and achievable.  Laws and regulations must
become  less  prescriptive, and cooperative  solutions must  be
encouraged, not politicized  as collusion.  Approaches are needed
that  encourage voluntary and  creative  initiatives  and  market
incentives  for  industry to eliminate waste at the source rather
than at a Superfund site years  later.  Industry  must  embrace the
concept  of  environmental stewardship,  work  toward  a goal  of
absolute zero chemicals  in the  environment, and commit itself to
the  idea of  making  no  significant   impact on the  environment.
(ABI/INFORM)


"PROFITS ARE FOR RAPE AND PILLAGE"
MORGENSON GRETCHEN AND  ; EISENSTODT GALE
FORBES, MAR 5, 90, V145, N5,  P94(6)

   WHILE  GOVERNMENT  REGULATION AND  CONSOLIDATION IS  GENERALLY
CRITICIZED  IN MOST POLITICAL  REALMS,  IN  THE AREA OF ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION IT IS AS STRONG AND PERSISTENT AS EVER. INDUSTRY LEADERS
ARGUE THAT POORLY  PLANNED LEGISLATION COSTS BILLIONS OF  DOLLARS IN
COMPLIANCE ANNUALLY;  EXAMPLES  ARE GIVEN FROM THE CLEAN AIR ACT AND
THE  RESOURCE  CONSERVATION   AND   RECOVERY ACT.   PROPONENTS  OF
DEREGULATION ARGUE THAT  THE FREE  MARKET SYSTEM,  IMPLEMENTED WITH
GREATER  SUCCESS  IN SOME  COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, WOULD DO  MORE TO
ENCOURAGE  ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND  INDUSTRIAL PRACTICES.   OPTIONS
SUCH AS EMISSIONS CREDIT TRADING AND SELECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION ARE
PROPOSED AS ALTERNATIVES TO UNILATERAL REGULATION.  (ENVIROLINE)

-------
BUSINESS AND  THE  ENVIRONMENT
SIWOLOP SANA  AND  ;  BARRETT AMY
FINANCIAL WORLD,  JAN 23,  90,  V159,  N2,  P40(3)

   GIVEN  THE  GLIMPSE  OF  FEDERAL REGULATIONS  TO COME, A  GROWING
NUMBER  OF COMPANIES  ARE  WILLING TO  TAKE PREEMPTIVE,  UNILATERAL
ACTION  EVEN  IF  IT MEANS  SACRIFICING  SANE  LINES  OF  BUSINESS.
CORPORATE  INITIATIVES ON  POLLUTION CONTROL  BEING  TAKEN AT  SUCH
COMPANIES AS  MONSANTO, LOUISIANA LAND  & EXPLORATION,  3M,  AND H.B.
FULLER ARE EXAMINED. MONSANTO HAS VOLUNTARILY AGREED TO REDUCE ITS
TOXIC AIR POLLUTION TO ONLY 10%  OF  1987 LEVELS TO KEEP FROM BEING
SEEN  AS A  POLLUTER.  LOUISIANA  LAND &  EXPLORATION RECEIVED  THE
CONSERVATION  AWARD  FOR RESPECTING THE ENVIRONMENT FROM THE USDI IN
1989. AND 3M AND H.B. FULLER HAVE TAKEN  THE LEAD IN LEARNING HOW TO
MAKE  POLLUTION  CONTROL  EQUAL  COST  CONTROL.  DISCUSSED  IS  THE
PRACTICE OF FIXING  BLAME  FOR POLLUTION ON COMPANIES EVEN  IF  THAT
POLLUTION OCCURRED  BEFORE THERE WERE LAWS AGAINST IT.. SUGGESTED IS
A  REMEDY  OF  ASSESSING A  SURCHARGE ON  COMMERCIAL AND  INDUSTRIAL
PROPERTY-CASUALTY INSURANCE PREMIUMS TO CLEAN UP THE MOST DANGEROUS
HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES.  (ENVIROLINE)


THE CRITICAL  DECADE.  ENVIRONMENTALISM IN THE  1990S: WHERE  ARE WE
HEADED?
RUSSELL DICK
E MAGAZINE, JAN-FEB 90, VI,  Nl,  P30(8)

   MAN'S  WANTON  DISREGARD  FOR  THE EARTH  SINCE  THE  INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION HAS  RESULTED IN THE CONTAMINATION OF THE WORLD'S  AIR,
LAND, AND WATER BY TOXIC POLLUTANTS. ENVIRONMENTALISTS BELIEVE THAT
THE 1990S WILL BE A CRITICAL DECADE AND WILL DETERMINE  THE  FUTURE
OF THE EARTH.  MANY NATIONAL LEADERS PURPORT  TO BE COMMITTED TO THE
ENVIRONMENTAL CAUSE AS CONCERN  CROWNS   AMONG   THE  CITIZENS  OF
THEIR NATIONS. GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS CAN ONLY OCCUR IF
INDUSTRY  MAKES  THE  ENVIRONMENT A  PRIORITY.  GOVERNMENTS COULD
ENCOURAGE  CORPORATE   ENVIRONMENTAL  RESPONSIBILITY  BY OFFERING
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES TO THOSE THAT ARE RESPONSIBLE.  MANY STATE AND
LOCAL  GOVERNMENTS  HAVE   EMERGED AS  STAUNCH  ADVOCATES  FOR  THE
ENVIRONMENT   AND,   JOINED   BY  A GROWING  NUMBER   OF   GRASSROOTS
ORGANIZATIONS,  HAVE  WAGED  THE  BATTLE  TO   SAVE  THE  EARTH  FROM
DESTRUCTION.  (ENVIROLINE)


ECONOMIC INCENTIVES TO RESOLVE URBAN CRISES
HARRINGTON WINSTON
RESOURCES (RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE), WINTER 90, N98, P13(4)  THE
   TRAFFIC CONGESTION, SITING OF LOCALLY UNDESIRABLE FACILITIES,
AND AIR POLLUTION ARE THREE SERIOUS URBAN ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
THAT APPEAR MORE UNMANAGABLE TODAY THAN 20 YEARS AGO. CONSTRUCTION
OF AN EXTENSIVE NETWORK OF EXPRESSWAYS AND INTERSTATE HIGHWAYS HAS
PERMITTED THE SPREAD OF LOW-DENSITY DEVELOPMENT THUS INCREASING

-------
CONGESTION  AND TRAVEL  TIME FROM  HOME TO  THE  WORKPLACE.  URBAN
SERVICE  FACILITY  SITINGS   HAVE  BECOME  A  DIFFICULT AND  COSTLY
PROBLEM,  SINCE THIRD  PARTIES NOW MAY  FIGHT  SITING DECISIONS.
ALTHOUGH  THE  CLEAN AIR ACT HAS  HELPED REDUCE  EMISSIONS OF SOME
POLLUTANTS,  THE US  STILL  FACES  POTENTIALLY  SERIOUS ACID  RAIN
PROBLEMS. TO REMEDY THESE PROBLEMS, MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES  THAT RELY
HEAVILY ON ECONOMIC INCENTIVES ARE BEING CONSIDERED.  (ENVIROLINE)


INCENTIVES, MCDM, AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
NAGEL  STUART   (UNIV  OF   ILLINOIS,   URBANA)  AND ; NAGEL ROBERT
(CONGRESSIONAL STAFF OF SEN. THOMAS HARKIN, D-IA)
J ENV SYSTEMS, 1989-90, V19, Nl,  P25(8)

   ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CAN BE FACILITATED BY THE  SUBSTANCE OF
INCENTIVES  THEORY  COMBINED WITH  MULTI-CRITERIA DECISION-MAKING
METHODS (MCDMS). IN INCENTIVES THEORY, PUBLIC POLICY SHOULD SEEK TO
ENCOURAGE SOCIALLY DESIRABLE BEHAVIOR  BY  INCREASING THE BENEFITS
AND DECREASING  THE COSTS OF SUCH  BEHAVIOR.  THE  ESSENCE OF MCDM IN
A PUBLIC-POLICY CONTEXT IS  THE  IDEA OF  SYSTEMATICALLY  PROCESSING A
SET OF SOCIETAL GOALS TO BE ATTAINED, ALTERNATIVE PUBLIC POLICIES
FOR ACHIEVING  THEM,  AND RELATIONS BETWEEN  GOALS AND ALTERNATIVE
POLICIES IN ORDER TO CHOOSE THE BEST OPTION  OR PREDICTIVE DECISION
RULE. SIMPLE AND REALISTIC  MODELS  ARE  APPLIED TO THE ANALYSIS OF
POLLUTION-CONTROL INCENTIVES FOR ILLUSTRATION.  (ENVIROLINE)


Here Comes the Big New Cleanup
Main, Jeremy
Fortune Vll8nl2 PP:  102-118 Nov  21, 1988

   Evidence of ecological damage and dangers to the environment are
making  environmental issues  national  and  bipartisan.   The  next
Administration will immediately confront major pollution problems
that include: 1. acid rain, 2. ozone at ground level  and the lack
of it in the stratosphere,  3. toxic waste, and 4. water pollution.
While current environmental regulations have made progress in some
areas, they are expensive,  prone to regulatory and legal problems,
tied to unrealistic goals,  and  locked into the wrong technologies.
Some say the US could continue the cleanup process without excess
regulation  and expense  by  adopting  a more commonsense, market-
oriented strategy.  The US should harness market forces by providing
incentives  for  business  and  individuals  to  go   beyond  what
regulators can  require.  Specific  suggestions  for dealing with 16
major  environmental  problems  include: 1.  tradable  credits  and
permits,  2.  taxes,   3.  refunds,  4.  swaps,   and   5.  deposits.
(ABI/INFORM)

-------
New Instruments for Environmental Policy: A Perspective
Huppes,  Gj alt
International Jrnl of Social  Economics  (UK) v!5n3-4 PP: 42-50 1988


  In  the  postwar  years  of  fast  economic  growth,  extensive
government regulations to curb growing environmental problems were
devised in most Western nations.  Three main types of policy can be
distinguished:  1.   physical     activities     undertaken     by
governments,   2.   institutional  arrangements  such  as liability,
price corrections,  and education that indirectly affect private
behavior,  and  3.  regulation of  the physical  aspects  of private
activities such as licenses,  standards, and codes. The latter type
of regulation  has  become dominant in both Western  and communist
countries. The  regulative emission  tax is a  financial instrument
with theoretical advantages but with practical limitations. Because
of various problems,  none   of  the policy  instruments  has  been
developed  systematically on  a practical  level.-. A tax-like system
such as a security deposit system could solve a number of problems
in a very  cost-effective  manner.  In contrast to process-oriented
policies, product-oriented policies are a  domain where improvements
can be made largely on a voluntary basis. (ABI/INFORM)


Markets for Pollution Control
Gates, Wallace E.
Challenge v27n2 PP: 11-17 May/Jun 1984
AVAILABILITY: Challenge, 80 Business Park Dr., Armonk, NY 10504

   Almost  every economist favors  use  of pricing instruments to
protect the environment, but politicians and regulators have chosen
the traditional command-and-control (CAC)  techniques under which
the environmental  authority specifies the  technology that polluters
must  adopt to  control or treat their  waste  discharges.  It is
estimated that a well-designed system of pricing incentives could
cut the costs of pollution control by at least 75%. Economists have
long favored the effluent fees  suggested by  A. C.  Pigou early in
this century. However, a system of marketable permits to pollute,
first suggested by  J.  H. Dales in the mid-1960s,  has several
advantages over an effluent  fee program. Now  there  is a growing
consensus among environmental economists  that marketable emissions
permits represent  a more promising policy  alternative  for pollution
control. Two recent programs of economic incentives are examined:
the Environmental  Protection  Agency's emissions trading experiment
with  air  pollution  control,  and  Wisconsin's  program  for  the
management of water quality using transferable  discharge permits.
(ABI/INFORM)

-------
A Simpler Path to a Cleaner Environment
Alexander, Tom
Fortune v!03n9 PP: 234-254 May 4, 1981

   While  some  environmental  legislation has  achieved gratifying
gains, the most ambitious statutes have proved to be failures, and
some have produced additional environmental ills. Legislation, now
a maze of complexity, was enacted at a time when  the spirit was one
of emergency,  and things appeared to need to be done in a hurry. At
the same  time,  US pollution  control spending has risen  to $48.5
billion in 1979 from $34.5 billion in 1972.  Today,  public opinion
is changing and beginning to focus more on economic renewal than on
pollution  control.  Thus,  there  exists  a  good chance  that  in
rewriting  the  Clear  Air  Act,  Congress will  simplify  present.
complexity and  lessen  the burden of compliance on  industry.  The
present  system of  offsets  and increments  has proved  far  too
baffling  for  those who  want  to increase  plant  and equipment.
Incentives can  be used to cut through the regulatory maze,  and
Congress should support that concept when  renewing  the  Clean Air
Act. Regulatory overkill could be eased if emissions charges were
varied to take into account costs of controlling various pollution
sources.   (ABI/INFORM)
II.  ECONOMIC INCENTIVES

A. MARKET-BASED
How to Fill the Holes in Ozone Policy
Shrivastava, Paul
Business & Society Review n75 PP: 59-62 Fall 1990

   Depletion of stratospheric ozone is  one of the most devastating
crises affecting the environment. The natural balance through which
oxygen reacts with ultraviolet  light to  create and destroy ozone
simultaneously  has been  disrupted  by manufactured  substances,
mostly  chlorofluorocarbons   (CFC).  The  Montreal  Protocol,  an
international  agreement  for CFC  reduction,   was signed by  34
countries in 1987 and provided for a 50% reduction of CFCs by 2000.
No real reductions in CFCs had been achieved  by  1990. Technological
solutions are available, but  for them to be applied,  corporations
must acknowledge their primary role and ethical responsibility in
dealing with the  problem.  Economic  incentives  and political will
and leadership are needed to  completely eliminate harmful CFCs in
the immediate future. Companies  should raise this problem to the
strategic level  by appointing a board of directors  committee to
oversee their responses to the ozone crisis. The public can create
economic pressures for major  changes.  (ABI/INFORM)

-------
The carrot or the stick? some environmentalists are pinning their
hopes on a "market-incentive" approach to environmental protection
Engle, Claude and Hawley Truax.
Environmental Action 20  (i.e. 21):12-15  My/Je  '90

   Explores the concept of pollution trading—where it comes from,
how it will work, and the  ramifications  of  its becoming a part of
the new Clean Air Act.  (PAIS)


Using economic incentives  to maintain our environment: regulators
can persuade developers to respect nature by making it worth their
while; environmentalists  have come to  realize that their former
adversary, the market, can be a powerful ally
Tietenberg, T. H.
Challenge 33:42-6 Mr/Ap  '90

   Calls  for harnessing  the power  of  the  market with economic
incentive policies for the achievement of environmental goals.
(PAIS)


Variety of Imperfect Strategies Must Be  Pursued for Control
Eads, George C.
Financier v!3n!2 PP: 30-33 Dec 1989

   When air pollution was  first  becoming a national issue in the
mid-1960s, the use of market-like mechanisms to control pollution
was in disfavor with politicians and environmentalists alike. There
is now a growing  realization that effective control of pollution
requires the use of the power of the markets because the problems
are   too   complex  to   be  addressed   through   source-specific
regulations.  Such regulations are  unfeasible  because  there  are
literally   millions  of different  contributing emission sources.
Market-based mechanisms of pollution control can be either simple
or complex,  with much  depending on  the characteristics  of  the
pollutant that one is trying to control.  Economic  incentives also
offer  much more  flexibility  and  provide  a  broader  scope  for
innovation. Market-based regulation does  not eliminate the need for
tough political  decisions relating to  regulation and may  even
complicate  global  negotiations,   but   there   is  no   realistic
alternative. (ABI/INFORM)


An incentive-conscious approach to toxic chemical controls
Roe,  David.
Econ Development Q 3:179-87 Ag '89

   California's Proposition 65,  the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic
Enforcement Act,  in effect  since  early 1988. Market  incentive
created by the requirement  to label  products that exceed a defined
level of  exposure. (PAIS)

-------
Clean profits:  using economic incentives to protect the environment
Stavins, Robert N.
Policy R p 58-63 Spring '89

   Reviews the recommendations of Project 88,  a bipartisan effort
to find innovative solutions to major environmental problems; US.
Advantages of market-based approaches to deter pollution or reduce
resource degradation.  (PAIS)


Approaching Pollution Control via the Wallet
MacKerron, Conrad B.
Chemical Week Vl41nl8 PP:  41-42 Oct 28, 1987

   The  Environmental   Defense  Fund   (EDF),  the  Foundation  for
Research  on  Economics  and  the  Environment,  and  2  Columbia
University Law School professors  have   proposed   a market-based
approach to environmental  regulation in which part of the incentive
to clean up the environment is that participants earn money doing
it. Their program is  based on marketable permits  to  pollute the
environment that would be auctioned off periodically by the federal
government. EDF's Frederic  Krupp  says  the system  would eliminate
the inefficiencies of the present program, which is based on laws
that  reguire companies  to  use  the  best  available  technology to
clean up  pollution and ignore  the fact  that  cleanup  costs for
plants  and industries  vary.  By  charging  fees  for  permits  to
pollute, a financial incentive would be created for those who can
clean  up most  cheaply to  sell  their  permits to  those  whose
treatment costs  are  highest.  The result would be a  least-cost
allocation of control  burdens. The Environmental Protection Agency
already is using a similar concept in its emission trading rights
in the air pollution area.  (ABI/INFORM)
B. TAX-BASED
Feasibility  Study  of  the  Privatization  of  Public  Wastewater
Treatment Works
Heilman, J. G. ;  Johnson, G. W.
Auburn Univ., AL. Water Resources Research Inst.
Sponsor: Geological Survey,  Reston, VA.  Water Resources Div.
Jan 89  472p
NTIS:PB89-155642/XAB

   The  report outlines the  research and the results of a national
feasibility  assessment  of  capital-intensive privatization (CIP)
of  municipal  wastewater   works   (WTW).   The   initial  WTW  CIP
agreements, of which there were fewer than  a dozen, were driven in
part by  federal  tax  incentives  created  in 1981 and  1982.  These
agreements involved private sector financing, design, construction,
operation, and ownership of WTW  facilities.  Tax reform  in 1986

                                10

-------
removed most of the tax incentives, but the water industry remains
interested in developing the CIP option. The conclusion reached is
that the  WTW CIP  option  offers inherent efficiencies  which are
independent of tax incentives. WTW CIP is a feasible option which
merits     serious  consideration  by  municipalities   or  other
authorities planning to develop wastewater treatment capacity. WTW
privatization  raises  many  issues  which must  be  recognized and
addressed if accountability  and the  benefits  of the efficiencies
inherent in CIP are to be realized.  These issues  are identified and
addressed in greater  detail in order to provide  information and
guidance    for   authorities   and   policymakers   considering
privatization.   (NTIS)


The potential for private cost-increasing technological innovation
under a tax-based, economic incentive pollution control policy
McHugh, Richard
Land Economics v61 Feb, 1985, p58(7)

   It   is  shown   that  the   implementation   of  a   tax-based
economic-incentive  policy makes total  private compliance costs
increase  (potentially) when new, less expensive pollution control
technologies are introduced despite the benefits in terms of lower
real   control    outlays.   The   conditions  present    when   the
'cost-increasing1 innovations occur are described,  and the process
is   shown  numerically.  Ways   to  avoid  the  cost-increasing
technologies,  including coupling  the  tax  incentive  with  a net
revenue lid for the pollution control authorities, are discussed,
and  support  for  private  permit  plans  relative  to  tax-based
incentive plans is shown. (MANAGEMENT CONTENTS)


Financing and Taxation for Urban Control of Pollution
1964-April, 1981
(Bibliographic Citations from the NTIS Data Base)
(Kept, for 1964-Apr 81)
Apr 81  264p
NTIS:PB81-805970

   The citations relate to urban and  regional planners who wish to
study means of  financing pollution abatement programs and of taxing
sources as a means of  pollution reduction. The reports are divided
into three  sections:  Air pollution studies,  solid waste disposal
studies,  and water pollution and  sewage treatment studies.  (This
updated bibliography  contains  255  citations,  24 of which are new
entries to the previous edition.)   (NTIS)
                                11

-------
C. EMISSIONS TRADING
Emissions Trading and the Natural Gas industry
Palmisano, John; Friday, Janet; Brooks, Thomas
Gas Energy Review v!8n9 PP: 15-23 Sep 1990

   Despite the  obvious  environmental  advantages  of using natural
gas over  other fuels, there  are  few incentives in  the existing
Clean Air Act to use natural gas for environmental purposes. A less
traditional federal air pollution program, known as air emissions
trading, can provide the gas industry with a much richer array of
opportunities  for  increasing  the  value of gas by  leveraging its
environmental benefits.  Emissions  trading  allows firms to create a
marketable  asset,  the   emission  reduction   credit  (EEC),  by
voluntarily reducing air emissions to levels below those mandated
by their  air permits. To  date,  industry  has saved  well  over $1
billion by taking advantage of emissions trading opportunities. The
pending Clean Air Act  Amendments will expand emissions  trading
opportunities by incorporating them into a new regulatory program
focusing on acid deposition control. The new amendments will also
reduce  the  uncertainty  regarding the  permanence  of  emission
reduction credits.  (ABI/INFORM)


Comparison  of  direct  control and market  based  policies  for
controlling emissions
Fox,  J. A. ; Hanson, D.  A. Argonne National Lab.,  IL.
Intersociety energy conversion engineering conference  (25th) , Reno,
NV, 12-17 Aug 1990.
Sponsor: Department of Energy, Washington, DC.
Report No.: CONF-900801-5 1990 4P.; NTIS:DE90011113/XAB

   Emission control can be achieved by employing  direct  control
policies such as performance standards and technology standards or
by employing  market  based policies  such  as emissions  trading,
emissions taxes and marketable permits. This paper describes these
policies  and   discusses   the   economic,   social   and  political
advantages and disadvantages of each type of policy.  As the paper
will  show the chief disadvantage of  the direct control policies is
that  they do not minimize the cost of obtaining the desired
level of emissions in either the short or long run. One advantage
of these policies  is that they may be easier to administer then the
market  based  plans.  The  chief  advantage  of the market  based
policies is that they  are more likely to attain a desired emissions
level at  least  cost  in  both a static  and   dynamic  sense. These
market based  plans do have  some  shortcomings which  are  largely
political in nature.  For example,  some people perceive these plans
as  '•licenses  to  pollute11  where  wealthy firms  can  continue
polluting by simply paying a tax,  buying a permit or trading.
(NTIS)


                                12

-------
Pollution: Trading Places
Anonymous
Economist  (UK) v316n7662 PP: 32-33 Jul 7, 1990

   Tradable permits are at the core of the new clean-air bill now
before Congress,  and  the  group doing most to promote them is the
Environmental Defense  Fund.  The  20-year-old  idea combines the
flexibility and cost-effectiveness  of an economic  instrument with
the certainty of regulatory standards. In essence,  a regulator sets
a ceiling  on the  amount of pollution allowed for a  whole industry
and  issues permits to individual  firms  for their  share  in that
amount. Polluters can then buy or sell permits so that those who
can  clean  up  cheaply do so and then  make money by selling spare
permission to others. The  main feature  is  the cap  the program
imposes  on emission  from electricity-generating  plants.  Severe
penalties  are a  2nd  vital feature.  The Bush administration wants
emissions  trading incorporated into any international agreement on
climate change.  An international trading system in greenhouse gases
would allow countries that could reduce emissions more cheaply to
sell  gas-emitting allowances to  those for which  cuts  were more
expensive.  (ABI/INFORM)


Exposure  Trading: An  Approach to  More  Efficient  Air  Pollution
Control
Roumasset, James A.; Smith, Kirk R.
Jrnl of Environmental Economics & Mgmt v!8n3  PP: 276-291 May 1990

   To  improve the cost-effectiveness  of air  pollution control,
emissions  trading among  sources  has  long been  recommended  and
recently implemented  in the  US.  However,  the implicit conceptual
framework  underlying  emissions trading  falls  well short  of  the
theoretical optimum.  The concept of exposure trading is introduced,
which makes the linkage between pollution sources and human health
more explicit by  focusing on exposure rather than  concentration.
One  result of this shift is that  incentives  are  established for
regulated sources to  consider unregulated  sources, including those
outdoors,  and  programs to  induce behavioral changes  in  exposed
populations as part of decisions to  reduce their costs of exposure
control.  Exposure trading also facilitates  a  more comprehensive
environmental policy by providing an administrative mechanism for
including pollution sources other than the large industrial point
polluters that are the focus of traditional analysis.  (ABI/INFORM)


WHERE DID  ALL THE MARKETS  GO?  AN ANALYSIS  OF EPA'S  EMISSIONS
TRADING PROGRAM
HAHN ROBERT W. AND ;  HESTER GORDON L. CARNEGIE MELLON  UNIV,  PA.
YALE J ON REGULATION,  WINTER 89, V6, Nl,  P109(45)

   RESEARCH CONCERNING THE  USE  OF  MARKET  SYSTEMS TO  REGULATE
ENVIRONMENTALLY DAMAGING ACTIVITIES IS REVIEWED, AND THE

                                13

-------
LEGISLATIVE  AND REGULATORY  FRAMEWORK  OF  EMISSIONS  TRADING  IS
SUMMARIZED. THE PERFORMANCE OF EMISSIONS TRADING IS EXAMINED, AND
FOUND TO HAVE PROVIDED ECONOMIC  BENEFITS WHICH DID NOT REACH THEIR
POTENTIAL. REGULATIONS  WHICH STYMIE  EFFECTIVE  USE OF  EMISSIONS
TRADING ARE  CONSIDERED,  AND PROPOSALS FOR  REFORM  ARE SUGGESTED,
(ENVIROLINE)


Trading Emission Reduction Credits
Palmisano, John
Plant Engineering v43n!4 PP: 78-80 Sep 14, 1989

   With  emission trading,  plant managers  have  the  freedom  to
control air pollution in  the most cost-effective  manner.  In some
cases,  a  firm  can  substitute  less  expensive  surplus  emission
reductions at one  emission point  for  expensive reductions  at
another.  Emission  credits  can  be  created  in  several  ways,
including: 1.  through  alternative  fuel  strategies,  2.  through
equipment shutdowns,  and 3. through curtailments of production. The
trading process can be handled through any one of 4 avenues. These
include:  1.  offsets, which  enable  existing  firms to  locate  in
nonattainment areas, 2. bubbles, which allow managers of existing
facilities to increase pollution controls where  the costs are low
in exchange  for  reducing pollution  controls where the  costs are
high, 3. netting, which refers to sources using emission credits to
avoid certain new  source requirements,  and  4.  emission banking,
which  is  the creation,  certification,  and storage  of  emission
reduction credits for future use.  (ABI/INFORM)
               _L
Capital Turnover and Marketable Pollution Rights
Maloney, Michael T.; Brady, Gordon L.
Jrnl of Law & Economics vSlnl PP: 203-226 Apr 1988

   The empirical question is addressed of whether restrictions on
emissions trading enhance or retard the rate of ambient air quality
improvement. Ambient  air quality has  improved since  the 1970s,
though it is uncertain whether the improvement is due to the 1970
Clean Air Act or to other  factors. Rules that  limit the scope of
the  pollution-permit  market  create  an  incentive  to  postpone
retirement of old pollution sources, which has a negative impact on
air quality. Using  air pollution control regulatory expenditures as
a measure  of the  strictness of  regulation,  it was  found that a
doubling in regulation results  in an  8%  increase in capital's age.
When the age of capital is related to  actual pollution rates, it is
found that a 1% increase  in age has a  1% increase in pollution. The
estimates  suggest  that stricter restrictions on  trading permits
result  in a  higher  rate  of  pollution  than would  have  existed
without restrictions.  (ABI/INFORM)
                                14

-------
Bureaucratic politics and regulatory reform:  the EPA and emissions
trading
Cook, Brian J.
'88 xvi+165p
SERIES: Contributions in pol. science no. 196

   Chronicles  15  years  of  congressional  debate  over the use
of incentive-based regulatory instruments  for pollution  control;
implications for administrative agencies. (PAIS)


EMISSIONS TRADING: WHY IS THIS THOROUGHBRED HOBBLED?
DUDEK DANIEL J.  (ENV DEFENSE FUND, NEW YORK) AND  ; PALMISANO JOHN
(AERX, WASHINGTON, DC)
COLUMBIA J ENV LAW, 1988, V13,  N2, P217(40)

   EMISSIONS TRADING IS AN EPA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION REFORM THAT
HAS PROVEN SUCCESSFUL IN NUMEROUS WAYS: BY REDUCING TENSION BETWEEN
ECONOMIC AND AIR QUALITY GOALS,  BY MEETING POLLUTION STANDARDS FOR
LESS  MONEY,  AND  BY FOSTERING  PRIVATE  SECTOR  POLLUTION CONTROL
EXPERTISE. THE FLEXIBILITY AND  EFFECTIVENESS OF  PRIVATE SECTOR AIR
POLLUTION  CONTROL INITIATIVES  HAVE  PROVEN  THAT  OTHER  AREAS  OF
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL COULD PROFIT FROM MARKET-BASED SYSTEMS, WHICH
ARE   A   REASONABLE   COMPROMISE   BETWEEN    OVER-REGULATION   AND
DE-REGULATION. (ENVIROLINE)


Economic  Implications of Emissions  Trading Rules for  Local and
Regional Pollutants
Atkinson, S. E.; Tietenberg, T. H.
Canadian Jrnl of Economics (Canada) v20n2 PP: 370-386 May 1987

   In 1975, the US Environmental Protection Agency began a historic
process of regulatory reform,  now known  as the Emissions Trading
Program. For nonuniformly mixed pollutants such as  sulfur  dioxides,
air quality is a function not only of the level of emissions, but
also of their location and stack heights. Attention is focused on
how to  protect local air quality and limit long-range  pollutant
deposition  caused  by emission  trades,  while permitting as much
cost-reducing trading activity as possible.  Programming simulation
models are employed to examine  the implications  of 2 trading rules
in 2 different airsheds. These rules are compared in terms of: 1.
compliance costs, 2. ambient degradation,  3. emission loadings, and
4.  long-range deposition.  It  is  found  that  the use  of either
trading rule represents a great improvement  over exclusive reliance
on the current allocation  of  control  responsibility.
(ABI/INFORM)
                                15

-------
The Market for Bads: EPA's Experience with Emissions Trading
Hahn, Robert W.; Hester, Gordon L.
Regulation vlln3/4 PP: 48-53 1987

   Recently, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)  has allowed
some  modest  reforms  in  its   rigid  approach  to  environmental
management.  For  example,   the  emissions trading  policy  gives
companies the  opportunity  to devise less  costly  ways to control
their emissions.  This policy  includes  the bubble  program  and  3
other programs. A review  of the emissions trading policy shows that
it has  resulted  in  substantial economic  gains,  in  the form  of
reduced compliance costs for companies, with little effect on the
environment. However, the gains have been limited  as a result of a
struggle  over  property  rights  between  industry  groups  and
environmentalists. Reforms would reduce  the uncertainties involved
in trading and encourage more external trading. One change should
be to improve information about baseline emissions. Also, the use
of emissions credit banks should be encouraged. (ABI/INFORM)
"EMISSIONS TRADING" TO MEET CLEAN-AIR LAWS
WEISS MALCOLM ; PALMISANO JOHN
RESIDUALS MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGY, FAIRMONT
NATURAL GAS APPLICATIONS FOR AIR POLLUTION CONTROL,  1987,  P83(ll)

   EMISSIONS TRADING COMPRISES  THE OFFSET POLICY, BUBBLE POLICY,
NETTING,  AND EMISSIONS  BANKING.  THESE  CONCEPTS ALLOW  FIRMS TO
SUBSTITUTE  RELATIVELY  CHEAP,  SURPLUS  EMISSIONS  REDUCTIONS  FOR
EXPENSIVE  REDUCTIONS  AT  OTHER  EMISSION POINTS.  EPA'S   POLICIES
PERTAINING  TO  THE  FOUR  COMPONENTS OF  EMISSIONS    TRADING  ARE
DISCUSSED, AND  UTILITY  TRADING  EXPERIENCE IS REVIEWED. SINCE  ALL
EMISSIONS  TRADING  IS  BASED  ON  EMISSIONS  REDUCTION   CREDITS,
INDIVIDUALS AND FIRMS CAN PARTICIPATE ONLY AFTER CREATING EMISSIONS
REDUCTIONS.  (ENVIROLINE)


"EMISSIONS TRADING" FOR AIR POLLUTION.CONTROL: A VIEW FROM EPA
LEVIN MICHAEL H. EPA,  FAIRMONT:
NATURAL GAS APPLICATIONS FOR AIR POLLUTION CONTROL,  1987
P73(10)

   EMISSIONS TRADING (ET)  CAN ALLOW FIRMS TO  COMPLY WITH THE  CLEAN
AIR ACT OF 1977 IN  THE  MOST COST-EFFECTIVE MANNER RATHER THAN BY
MEETING UNIFORM REQUIREMENTS. THE FOUR BASIC COMPONENTS OF ET  ARE
EXPLAINED: BUBBLE  POLICY,  NETTING,  OFFSETS, AND  BANKING.   THESE
ELEMENTS  PROVIDE BALANCE  SHEET REASONS  FOR  BETTER THAN  REQUIRED
PERFORMANCE. OVER 200  BUBBLES WERE APPROVED IN  29 STATES BY EPA BY
1985, WITH TOTAL ESTIMATED SAVINGS OF OVER $800  MILLION. SELECT  USE
BUBBLES CAN  BE  USED EITHER  BY SWITCHING ONE  SOURCE COMPLETELY TO
GAS, OR BY  SWITCHING  IT TO A LOWER-EMITTING MIXTURE OF COAL  AND
GAS,  IN  ORDER  TO  ALLOW AN  EQUIVALENT  INCREASE  IN EMISSIONS AT
ANOTHER SOURCE. (ENVIROLINE)

                                16

-------
Trade-Offs in Designing Markets with Multiple Objectives
Hahn, Robert W.
Jrnl of Environmental Economics & Mgmt v!3nl PP:  1-12 Mar  1986

  According  to  targets-instruments  literature,   at   least  one
instrument is required  to meet each target of problems that  have
multiple objectives. When there are costs associated with utilizing
instruments,  there  are  trade-offs  to  consider  in   meeting   a
prescribed set of objectives.  Such trade-offs are examined in the
context of using markets to control externalities. For example, the
basic  goal of  the  Environmental  Protection  Agency's emissions
trading policy is to achieve better environmental quality at lower
cost, and this requires  that  an increase in emissions at one source
be  offset by a  greater reduction at another  source.  The  states
preside  over  trading under  this constraint, using the  ''offset
ratio.''  Three basic mechanisms  are used to minimize the  risk  of
air  deterioration:   1.  the  requirement  of  detailed atmospheric
modeling  to  demonstrate  a  net air quality improvement,  2.  the
specification of a region for trading without modeling,  and 3. the
employment of an offset ratio greater than unity.  Thin markets and
high  transactions  costs  can be  circumvented,  but the solutions
typically involve trade-offs.  (ABI/INFORM)
THE  CONCEPTUAL  FRAMEWORK
(EMISSIONS  TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN REFORMING POLLUTION POLICY)
TIETENBERG T. H.
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE REPORT, 1985, P14(24)

   THE TRADITIONAL  COMMAND-AND-CONTROL APPROACH TO AIR POLLUTION
CONTROL IMPOSES A LARGE INFORMATION BURDEN ON CONTROL AUTHORITIES,
WHO HAVE IN RESPONSE PROMULGATED EMISSION STANDARDS THAT ARE NOT
COST-EFFECTIVE. COST-EFFECTIVE  EMISSIONS  TRADING SYSTEMS MUST BE
DESIGNED ACCORDING  TO THE  NATURE  OF THE  POLLUTANT REGULATED.  A
COST-EFFECTIVE  ALLOCATION   OF  UNIFORMLY  MIXED,  ASSIMILATIVE
POLLUTANTS COULD  BE ACHIEVED BY AN  EMISSIONS  PERMIT SYSTEM. FOR
NONUNIFORMLY  MIXED  ASSIMILATIVE POLLUTANTS,  AN  AMBIENT PERMIT
SYSTEM  WOULD  YIELD  THE COST-EFFECTIVE   ALLOCATION  OF  CONTROL
RESPONSIBILITY. UNIFORMLY   MIXED  ACCUMULATIVE POLLUTANTS CAN BE
CONTROLLED USING A CUMULATIVE EMISSION PERMIT SYSTEM. (ENVIROLINE)


ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
US CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE REPORT, MAR 85 (134)

   THE EFFECT OF POLLUTION CONTROL EXPENDITURES ON  THE EFFICIENCY
WITH WHICH U.S. GOODS AND SERVICES ARE PRODUCED IS  ANALYZED, BOTH
ABSOLUTELY AND RELATIVE  TO  THE EXPERIENCE OF  MAJOR U.S.  TRADING
PARTNERS. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY STANDARDS AND ATTAINMENT STRATEGIES
IN THE U.S. AND ABROAD ARE COMPARED, AS ARE ATTENDANT EXPENDITURES.
FINDINGS SUGGEST THAT ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION HAS NOT BEEN A MAJOR
                                17

-------
CONTRIBUTOR  TO A  LOSS  IN  THE  EFFICIENCY OF  THE  U.S.  PRIVATE
ECONOMY. EMISSIONS TRADING AND EMISSIONS TAXES CAN BE IMPLEMENTED
TO ALLOW  POLLUTERS MORE  ATITUDE WHEN COMPLYING  WITH REGULATION
WITHOUT RELAXING OVERALL POLLUTION ABATEMENT GOALS.   (ENVIROLINE)



EMISSIONS TRADING GIVES FLEXIBILITY IN MEETING CLEAN-AIR LAWS
WEISS MALCOLM ; PALMISANO JOHN
RESIDUALS MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGY, POWER, MAR 85, V129, N3, P55(4)


   EMISSIONS TRADING REPRESENTS A REGULATORY REFORM UNDERTAKEN BY
EPA INTENDED TO IMPROVE THE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFICIENCY OF EACH DOLLAR
SPENT ON AIR POLLUTION CONTROL ACTIVITIES.  THE PROGRAM GIVES PLANT
MANAGERS THE FLEXIBILITY TO  TAKE ADVANTAGE  OF CONTROL ALTERNATIVES
TO FIND THE MOST COST-EFFECTIVE AND EVEN PROFITABLE WAYS TO CONTROL
AIR  POLLUTION.  EMISSIONS TRADING  IS  COMPRISED  OF  FOUR SIMILAR
CONCEPTS: OFFSETS, BUBBLES,  NETTING, AND BANKING. UTILITY TRADING
EXPERIENCE IN  ATTAINING EMISSION REDUCTION CREDITS  IS SURVEYED,
(ENVIROLINE)
REGULATORY REFORM IN AIR-POLLUTION CONTROL
TIETENBERG TOM
COLBY COLLEGE,
RESOURCES, WINTER 85, N79, P17(4)

   THE EPA EMISSIONS TRADING  PROGRAM  IS  AN ATTEMPT AT REGULATORY
REFORM.  IT SEEKS  TO  RENDER THE  COMMAND  AND CONTROL  APPROACH
MANDATED  IN THE  CLEAN  AIR ACT OF 1970 MORE FLEXIBLE BY ALLOWING
POLLUTERS  MORE   OPTIONS  IN  MEETING   THEIR   ASSIGNED  CONTROL
RESPONSIBILITIES. RELATED BUBBLE AND OFFSET POLICIES ARE EXPLAINED;
REVISIONS AUTHORIZED UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT OF  1977 ARE DISCUSSED.
THE ENDURING ROLE THAT THE EPA EMISSIONS TRADING PROGRAM IS PLAYING
IS DIRECTLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE FACT THAT IT WAS PRECEDED  BY A VERY
COST-INEFFECTIVE REGULATORY POLICY.    (ENVIROLINE)


EVALUATION AND PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER REFORM
(EMISSIONS TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN REFORMING POLLUTION POLICY)
TIETENBERG T.  H.
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE REPORT,  1985, P188(29)

   THE EPA  EMISSIONS  TRADING POLICIES  ARE EVALUATED IN TERMS OF
COST-EFFECTIVENESS   AND   SPEED   OF COMPLIANCE. PROPOSALS  FOR
FURTHER REGULATORY  REFORM ARE OUTLINED. WHILE THE TRADING POLICY
IS MORE COST-EFFECTIVE THAN COMMAND-AND-CONTROL POLICIES,  IT IS NOT
FULLY COST-EFFECTIVE. RECOMMENDATIONS ARE  SUMMARIZED FOR GAINING
CONTROL OVER EMISSION TIMING, REINTERPRETING NEW SOURCE PERFORMANCE
STANDARDS AND BEST  AVAILABLE  CONTROL  TECHNOLOGIES, AND  IMPROVING
THE AIR QUALITY ACCOUNTING SYSTEM.  (ENVIROLINE)
                                18

-------
ENFORCEMENT
(EMISSIONS TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN REFORMING POLLUTION POLICY)
TIETENBERG T. H.
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE REPORT, 1985, P168(20)

   EMISSIONS CONTROL ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT OF 1977  IS
ADDRESSED.  ENFORCEMENT PRACTICES  UNDER  THE  COMMAND-AND-CONTROL
APPROACH HAVE RESULTED IN A HIGH PERCENTAGE OF NONCOMPLIANCE. THE
1977  AMENDMENTS  ADDED  A   NEW  NONCOMPLIANCE  PENALTY  TO  THE
ENFORCEMENT ARSENAL, BASED LOOSELY ON THE ZERO NONCOMPLIANCE MODEL,
WHICH IS DESIGNED TO  REDUCE  THE PROCEDURAL BURDEN. THE EMISSIONS
TRADING  PROGRAM  CAN  BE  EXPECTED  TO  HAVE  MIXED  EFFECTS   ON
ENFORCEMENT. BY LOWERING COMPLIANCE COSTS, IT REDUCES THE INCENTIVE
TO RELAX EMISSION  STANDARDS  AND TO VIEW  NONCOMPLIANCE AS A LESS
EXPENSIVE ALTERNATIVE.  HOWEVER, IT  OPENS NEW  POSSIBILITIES FOR
RELYING  ON   SOURCES   WHICH  ARE  MORE   DIFFICULT  TO   MONITOR.
(ENVIROLINE)
THE TEMPORAL DIMENSION
(EMISSIONS TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN REFORMING POLLUTION  POLICY)
TIETENBERG T. H.
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE REPORT, 1985, P149<19)

   MEETING SHORT-TERM EMISSION STANDARDS  COST-EFFECTIVELY MEANS
CONTROLLING  THE TIMING  AS WELL  AS  THE  QUANTITY  OF  EMISSIONS.
TRANSFERABLE PERMIT SYSTEMS CAN BE  DEFINED TO MEET THESE STANDARDS
COST-EFFECTIVELY.  PERIODIC   AND   EPISODIC  PERMIT  SYSTEMS  ARE
DISCUSSED. ESTABLISHING A COMPLETE PERIODIC CONTROL PROGRAM COULD
INCREASE EMISSION LOADINGS SIGNIFICANTLY IN PERIODS OTHER THAN  PEAK
PERIODS. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A TRANSFERABLE EPISODE PERMIT SYSTEM
WOULD MAKE IT EASIER TO IDENTIFY THOSE SOURCES  WHICH CAN UNDERTAKE
EMISSIONS  REDUCTIONS  RELATIVELY   CHEAPLY    ON   SHORT   NOTICE.
(ENVIROLINE)
MARKET POWER
(EMISSIONS TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN REFORMING POLLUTION  POLICY)
TIETENBERG T. H.
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE REPORT, 1985, P125(24)

   TWO TYPES OF MARKET POWER ARE POSSIBLE  IN TRANSFERABLE EMISSION
PERMIT MARKETS. THE FIRST ARISES WHEN A PRICE-SETTING SOURCE  OR A
COLLUSIVE COALITION OF SOURCES SEEKS TO  MANIPULATE THE PRICE  OF
PERMITS FOR  THEIR  OWN FINANCIAL GAIN. THE  SECOND STEMS FROM THE
DESIRE OF ONE PREDATORY SOURCE OR A COALITION OF SOURCES TO USE THE
PERMIT MARKET AS A VEHICLE FOR REDUCING THE COMPETITION THEY  FACE
IN PRODUCT OR FACTOR MARKETS. AUCTION, SUBSIDY, AND  GRANDFATHERING
APPROACHES TO MARKET MANIPULATION ARE DISCUSSED.   (ENVIROLINE)
                                19

-------
DISTRIBUTING THE FINANCIAL BURDEN
(EMISSIONS TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN REFORMING POLLUTION POLICY)
TIETENBERG T. H.
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE REPORT, 1985, P93(22)

   THE COMMAND-AND-CONTROL APPROACH IMPOSES A LARGE AND UNEQUALLY
DISTRIBUTED  FINANCIAL BURDEN ON  COMPLYING SOURCES.  BECAUSE THE
ALLOCATION OF THE  BASELINE CONTROL RESPONSIBILITY CAN BE USED TO
AFFECT THE  DISTRIBUTION OF  COSTS  WITHOUT INCREASING  THE AMOUNT
SPENT  ON  CONTROL  TECHNOLOGIES,  EMISSION  TRADING  OFFERS  THE
OPPORTUNITY TO ACHIEVE  BOTH  COST-EFFECTIVENESS  AND FAIRNESS. THE
CONTROL AUTHORITY  HAS MANY OPTIONS IN DISTRIBUTING THE FINANCIAL
BURDEN. IT  CAN AUCTION  OFF  ALLOWABLE EMISSION  OR CONCENTRATION
PERMITS OR ALLOCATE A BASELINE CONTROL RESPONSIBILITY ON THE
BASIS OF SOME INITIAL DISTRIBUTION RULE.  (ENVIROLINE)
Emissions Trading and What It May Mean for Acid Deposition Control
Raufer, Roger K.; Feldman, Stephen L.
Public Utilities Fortnightly vl!4n4 PP:  17-25 Aug 16, 1984

   One of  the  most controversial topics in  the  debate over acid
deposition control strategies for electric utilities has been the
potential use and benefits of emissions trading.  The potential for
emissions trading by electric utilities is important for proposed
emission reductions  and  as  a mechanism  proposed to  handle the
growth of  new  emission sources.  The electric  utility  market has
already faced a number of impediments that have slowed the use of
emissions trading in the existing Environmental Protection Agency
program,  such as:  1. regulatory constraints,  2.  uncertainty, and 3.
transaction  costs.  Utility-specific   impediments   include:  1.
ratemaking,  2.  construction  planning  times,   and  3.  enhanced
potential  for  future regulatory actions. The  market impediments
have  resulted   in  the  hoarding  of  emission  reduction  credits.
Emissions trading in an acid deposition program could be minimized
by the proper  emissions  reduction  allocation,  but it may display
many  of  the characteristics of the existing emissions trading
program.  The experiences  of  electric utilities in the Ohio River
Valley support this idea.  (ABI/INFORM)
                                20

-------
Legal  Issues  Related  to  Creation, Banking  and Use  of Emission
Reduction Credits  (ERCs).
Part I: The 'Taking1  Issue - Is Compensation Required if a Sta .e or
Local Government Confiscates or Reduces the Quantity of Banked ERCs

(Final rept.)
Tether, Ivan J.
ICF, Inc., Washington, DC.
Sponsor: Environmental Protection Agency, Washington,  DC.
Report No.: EPA 230/04-82-001; NTIS:PB82-221854
(See also PB81-214249 and PB81-235046.)
May 82  23p

   Emissions Trading,  under the  Clean Air Act, includes bubbles,
netting, emission offsets, emission reduction banking, and is the
subject of an  EPA  proposed Policy Statement (47 Fed. Reg.  15076,
Apr. 7, 1982). These alternatives involve the creation of surplus
reductions at certain stacks or vents and use of these reductions
to  meet  requirements  applicable  to  other  emission  sources.
Emissions trades can  provide more flexibility, and may therefore be
used to reduce control costs,  encourage  faster  compliance and free
scarce capital for  industrial revitalization. Where  private parties
have banked  surplus  emission  reductions for future use or sale,
states may determine  that a portion of these reductions is required
for clean  air  purposes.  This   paper  provides legal  analysis of
the Constitutional issue of whether by  'taking'  all or part of a
person's banked emission reduction credits a state becomes liable
to compensate that  person. The paper concludes that  the state would
not be liable in this circumstance, particularly if the state had
set out  in  advance,  in its banking rule,  the  circumstances that
could give  rise  to such a taking and the way  it  would be done.
(NTIS)


Legal  Issues  Related  to  Creation/ Banking  and Use  of Emission
Reduction Credits  (ERCs).
Part 2. The Public Trust Doctrine
Environmental Protection Agency,  Washington, DC.
Report No.: EPA 230/02-84-004   NTIS:PB84-195460
(See also PB82-221854)
May 84  14p

   This report presents an overview on which involves the creation
of surplus  pollution reductions   (Emission  Reduction Credits)  at
certain  emission   sources and  use of  these reductions to  meet
requirements applicable to other emission sources. The public trust
doctrine holds that some public resources, notably land, are held
in trust  by the  state for the  public.  Insofar as  an Emission
Reduction Credit (ERC) might be construed as a private right in a
public resource  (air),  the  doctrine  may be of  concern to  states
adopting an emissions trading program.  At  most,  the public trust
doctrine is common law,  and  presumably a  properly enacted state

                               21

-------
regulatory program (enacted under state and federal statute) would
preempt a common law doctrine. The only consistent reading of the
public trust  doctrine is that  the  state must  administer public
property in a way that ensures broad public use for all purposes.
An  emissions  trading  program  is  consistent  with  this  end,
allocating competing  uses  of  a limited resource. An  ERG program
does not conflict with the public trust doctrine, and the doctrine
should prove no obstacle to Emissions Trading. (NTIS)


On Marketable Air-Pollution  Permits:  The Case  for a  System of
Pollution Offsets
Krupnick, Alan J.; Dates, Wallace E.; Van De Verg, Eric
Jrnl of Environmental Economics & Mgmt v!0n3 PP: 233-247 Sep 1983

   An examination of the properties of several  alternative forms of
marketable air-pollution  permit systems  for  the control  of air
pollution leads to a  proposal  for a  system of pollution offsets as
the  most  promising   approach.  Under this  scheme,  sources  of
emissions  are  free   to  trade  emissions  permits  subject  to  a
constraint  of no  violations   of  the  predetermined air quality
standard at any given receptor point. The pollution-offset system
is  shown  to  have  the  capacity  to achieve  the  predetermined
standards of air quality at the minimum aggregate abatement cost,
but  it  still makes  comparatively modest  demands both  on the
administering agency and on the pollution sources. Working through
its Emissions Trading Policy,  the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) already has provided a framework for the  introduction of such
a system. However, changes must be  made  in the Clean  Air Act and
existing  regulatory  procedures  before   cost  savings  from  a
market-oriented approach can be fully realized. (ABI/INFORM)


EMISSIONS  TRADING IN THE  UNITED   STATES:  AN  OVERVIEW  AND THE
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS
BRADY GORDON L.
CEQ, J ENV MANAGEMENT, JUL 83, V17, Nl, P63 (17)

   EPA UNDER THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS INTRODUCED THE CONCEPT
OF THE ''EMISSIONS TRADING POLICY STATEMENT,'' WHICH ALLOWS STATES
TO  ESTABLISH  AN  EMISSION  TRADING  SYSTEM BASED  ON THE  IDEA OF
MARKETABLE DISCHARGE PERMITS.  THE STATEMENT DOES NOT FUNDAMENTALLY
ALTER THE EXISTING REGULATORY  APPROACH AND DOES NOT ALLOW STATES TO
DEPART   FROM   THE   CURRENT    ADMINISTRATIVE   PROCEDURES.   THE
STATE-OF-THE-ART OF TECHNICAL  COMPONENTS NECESSARY FOR IMPLEMENTING
THE STATEMENT IS DESCRIBED.   (ENVIROLINE)
                                22

-------
A STEP FORWARD? AN ECONOMIC APPROACH IN AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT
BRADY GORDON L.
CEQ, ENV POLICY & LAW, JAN 83, V10, Nl, P3  (9)

   THE USE OF  TRADING AND MARKET-BASED APPROACHES IN AIR QUALITY
MANAGEMENT IS  CONSIDERED.  TRADE  RECOGNIZES THAT MUTUAL GAINS AND
PAYOFFS TO A PARTICULAR REGION MAY BE SECURED THROUGH COOPERATIVE
BEHAVIOR. TRADING CAN LEAD TO AN EQUILIBRIUM IN WHICH THE COSTS FOR
ALL ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA ARE  EQUAL TO  THE  PRICE OF DISCHARGE
PERMITS. A FULL-SCALE MARKET IN AIR POLLUTION ENTITLEMENTS CAN SAVE
INDUSTRY UP TO 90%  COMPARED WITH COMMAND AND CONTROL APPROACHES.
ASPECTS  OF   EPA'S   EMISSION  TRADING   SYSTEM,   ESPECIALLY  ITS
COST-EFFECTIVENESS   AND   LONG-TERM  VIABILITY,   ARE    DISCUSSED.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FOUR MAJOR PROVISIONS OF THE  1970 CLEAN AIR
ACT IS HIGHLIGHTED:  NAT'L  AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS,  NEW SOURCE
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS,  STATE  IMPLEMENTATION  PLANS,  AND EMISSION
STANDARDS FOR HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS.   (ENVIROLINE)


Emissions Trading: An Overview of the EPA (Environmental  Protection
Agency) Policy Statement
(Research rept.)
Brady, G. L. ; Morrison, R. E.
National  Science  Foundation,  Washington,  DC.   Div.   of  Policy
Research and Analysis.
Report No.: NSF/PRA-82013; PRA/RR-82-2; NTIS:PB85-150316/XAB
26 May 82  39p

   The   Environmental  Protection  Agency's   Emissions  Trading
Statement  is  examined. The  Statement consolidates the emission
reductions  achieved  and  used  through   current  administrative
procedures for the  bubble, netting,  offset,  and banking programs
into a common  currency: the Emission Reduction Credit  (ERC). The
Statement provides guidelines for air quality management  regions to
develop  generic  state  implementation  plan  provisions  governing
transactions  in  ERCs.  The  Statement  invites  firms   to  create
1 surplus'discharge reductions  beyond current control requirements.
The incentive  for participation is the opportunity to make a profit
by selling ERCs to other firms that  face higher marginal emissions
control costs. The existing regulatory  implementation  incentive
structure for stationary source dischargers is described, and the
evolution of the  Statement is traced. Issues  that  may  limit the
cost-effectiveness of the ERC program are  considered.  (NTIS)
                                23

-------
Incentives for Technological Innovation in Air Pollution Reduction:
An ETIP  Policy  Research series,  volume  9: internal  Offsets and
Technological Innovation: Six Case Studies
Mogee, Mary Ellen
National  Bureau  of   Standards,   Washington,   DC.   Experimental
Technology Incentives Program.
Report No.: NBSIR-82-2475; NTIS:PB82-208372
(See also Volume 8,  PB81-218273.)
Apr 82 73p

   This report describes the  experiences of  six industrial firms
with the new Federal policy of internal offsets. Offsets are part
of a  group  of regulatory reforms  initiated by  the  Environmental
Protection Agency and called by  the generic title  of  'emission
trading1.  Offsets  were  introduced to  allow continued  economic
growth  in nonattainment  areas and  to  stimulate innovation  in
pollution control and  process technology by making  it profitable
for firms to create  more reductions than the law now requires. The
report discusses the problems  of defining and measuring innovation
as well  as  presenting industrial   firm perceptions  of innovation
associated with offset cases.  (NTIS)
Manual for a Prototype Emissions Banking and Trading Recordkeeping
System
(Final rept.)
Berg, Dennis
American Mangement Systems, Inc.,  Arlington,  VA.
Sponsor: Environmental Protection Agency,  Washington, DC.
Report No.: EPA230/04-82-002; NTIS:PB82-209610
Apr 82  69p

   The manual describes a prototype recordkeeping system for use by
state  and local  agencies that  adopt an  emissions banking  and
trading program.  The  manual is organized to  demonstrate how the
prototype would be used to record  information  for various types of
emissions trades, and to produce various reports of use to program
managers, participating firms,  and other interested organizations.
The documents  comprising  the prototype system  are  described and
examples  are provided for tracking  emission  reduction credits
through: creation and  deposit; sale or transfer;  and withdrawal and
use. (NTIS)
                                24

-------
Tax Considerations Related to the Creation, Financing,  Banking, Use
and Disposition  of ERGS in Controlled  Trading Approaches to Air
Pollution
(Final rept.)
Baker, E. P. ; Winslow, Peter H.
ICF, Inc., Washington, DC.
Sponsor: Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC.
Report No.: EPA 230/01-82-001; NTIS.-PB83-148361
(See also PB81-214249)
Jan 82 86p
Prepared in cooperation with Scribner, Hall,
Thornburg and Thompson, Washington, DC.

   Emissions trading,  under the  Clean Air Act, includes bubbles,
netting, emission offsets, emission reduction banking, and is the
subject of an EPA  proposed Policy Statement (47 Fed.  Reg. 15076,
Apr. 7, 1982). These alternatives involve the creation of surplus
reductions at certain stacks or vents and use of these reductions
to  meet  requirements  applicable  to  other  emission  sources.
Emissions trades can provide more flexibility, and may  therefore be
used to reduce control costs,  encourage  faster  compliance and free
scarce capital for industrial  revitalization. This paper discusses
tax considerations regarding the currency of emissions  trading, the
Emission Reduction  Credit,  or  ERG.  Major issues include:  (1) tax
benefits available to. a firm creating an ERC, (2) financing issues,
(3)  tax attributes of  an ERC,  and  (4)   ERC  sales and  option
transactions.  Like most  business  and  financial  activity,  ERC
transactions turn substantially on tax issues. The study includes
issues raised by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981.  (NTIS)


Emissions Trading: Technical/Scientific Requirements
Brady (Gordon L.), Washington, DC.
Sponsor: National Science Foundation, Washington, DC.
Report No.: NSF/PRA-82043; NTIS:PB83-166736
1982  197p

   This study examines the institutional, scientific, and technical
issues in  the  Environmental Protection  Agency regulatory reform
proposal for rulemaking   entitled:    'Emissions  Trading   Policy
Statement: General Principles for the Creation,  Banking, and Use of
Emission Reduction Credits. ' The existing regulatory implementation
incentive structure for stationary source dischargers is described.
Requirements for uniform technology  standards are found to vary in
stringency according  to  whether  the discharger  is  an  existing
source or a modified source and according to the attainment status
of the  region.  Market-based approaches  that may be  used  in air
quality management are considered, and the Emissions Trading Policy
Statement is presented as a logical  extension of  administrative
innovations already in limited use. The value of the pricing system
in air  quality management is discussed.  Simplification of the
Emissions Trading  Policy  Statement and  abandonment of  uniform

                               25

-------
technology standards are recommended.  Reviewer   comments  and a
response  from the  principal  investigator*  are  included  in  the
report. (NTIS)


Modified Fiscal Incentives in Environmental Policy
Blackman,  Sue Anne Batey; Baumol, William J.
Land  Economics v56n4 PP: 417-431 Nov 1980

   Pigouvian effluent charges and markets  in emissions rights, the
2 mainstays  of economists'  environmental proposals,  have gained
little support among policy makers.  The US Environmental Protection
Agency and other environmental authorities have introduced several
regulatory  programs  based  on  financial  incentives  which  have
aroused minimal opposition. An analysis is presented of several new
programs and the degree to which they approximate measures that are
theoretically  ideal.  The  emissions  offset policy is  examined
showing its  close similarity to a  market  in pollution  rights.
Despite their limitations, the policies described are a step in the
direction   of   increased   efficiency   in   pollution   control.
(ABI/INFORM)
D. BUBBLE POLICY
Emission Control  Technologies  and Emission. Factors  for unpaved
Road Fugitive Emissions. (User's Guide)
Fitzpatrick, M.
JACA Corp., Fort Washington, PA.
Sponsor: Environmental  Protection Agency,  Cincinnati,  OH.  Center
for Environmental Research Information.
Report No.: EPA 625/5-87/022; NTIS:PB90-274101/XAB
Sep 87 56p

   During  the  past decade,  research  has shown  that  particulate
emissions  from open  sources  such  as  unpaved  roads  contribute
significantly to ambient particulate matter concentrations in many
areas. The current EPA emission trading policy,  commonly called the
bubble policy,  allows  excessive emissions from  one source  to be
offset by improved control of another source within the same plant.
In  implementing the bubble  policy,  some  plants have  agreed to
reduce  fugitive dust emissions  in  lieu  of tighter  controls on
process emissions. The document has been  prepared  to assist control
agency  personnel  in evaluating  unpaved road  fugitive  emissions
control plans and to assist industry personnel in the development
of effective control  strategies for unpaved roads. The document
describes control techniques for reducing unpaved road emissions,
methods  for  quantifying or estimating  emissions generation,  and
provides data or  estimating  the  efficiency of  the performance of
various control technologies. Although fugitive particulate
                                26

-------
emissions can be reduced by reducing the extent of the source, the
document focuses  on the  use  of  'add-on1  controls which  do not
affect the size or throughput of the source. (NTIS)


An Optimization Approach to Environmental Policy  Making:  A Case
Study of Coal Liquefaction Process
Tayi, Giri Kumar; Rubin, Edward S.; Lincoln, David R.
Energy Systems & Policy v9n2 PP: 141-169 1985

   Coal  liquefaction  plants  are among  the energy  conservation
processes that may  achieve environmental  quality objectives in a
more  cost-effective and environmentally  acceptable manner via
innovative approaches  to regulation permitting  trade-offs among
multiple emission sources of a complex facility. "The issues implied
by  this  view  of  conservation and  regulation  are  considered
quantitatively in the context of a  ''bubble policy11 for meeting
sulfur  dioxide  emission  limitations   for  a  coal  liquefaction
process. The  analysis is carried out with a computerized simulation
model to compare the bubble concept with source-specific emission
standards. Application of the methodology to different scenarios
affirms that  the  bubble policy could result  in  lower production
costs  while  still  meeting air  quality  requirements.  Secondary
environmental impact to other media, such  as water and land, could
also be minimized with  the approach. The review of the methodology
addresses its general applicability and limitations.  (ABI/INFORM)


A 'Bobbly' Win for EPA Policy
Anon
Chemical Week Vol.135,  No.l, July 4,  1984, P. 14.

   The  United  States   Supreme   Court  upheld  the  Environmental
Protection Agency's bubble policy  for  industrial air pollution
control. The  policy allows a  plant to  treat all air pollution
sources as if one source.  This  permits  plants to implement fewer
controls on higher emission sources. The Natural Resources Defense
Council (NRDC) opposes the policy as a loophole against the Clean
Air Act. (MANAGEMENT CONTENTS)


A Plan that Bends the Clean-Air Rules
Anon
Business Week, No.2777, Feb. 14, 1983, P.  48H.

   The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is introducing a new
policy it hopes will help companies reduce  antipollution costs. The
so-called  bubble policy  would  permit   some  plants  to  exceed
pollution limits  if others would cut below  required levels. The
savings companies would realize  could then be used to acquire more
advanced antipoluution technology. (MANAGEMENT CONTENTS)
                                27

-------
How to Limit the Rising Costs of Stricter Regulation
Anonymous
Chemical Week v!28n3 PP: 36-40 Jan 21, 1981

   Chances are slim that the Reagan Administration will eliminate
the governmental rules that cost businesses millions of dollars. In
the effort by the business community  to  contain these  costs, the
discipline  of  regulation  management  will  play  an increasingly
important   role   for    chemical   companies.   Under   the   new
Administration,  forecasting regulations, monitoring compliance, and
negotiating with regulators may become even more important than in
the past.  Balance sheet  considerations  are motivating  firms to
invest in tools  for managing  regulation,  such as hiring of experts
and  implementing  specialized  monitoring devices.  Monsanto  is
installing a computer system to organize issues such as employee
health and  chemical  hazards, and its Environmental Policy Staff
tries to  forecast what  new  regulations  will be  promulgated and
when.   Cost  control efforts  of  companies  concentrate  on  the
Environmental Protection Agency's  (EPA)  ''bubble policy'', whereby
a firm can deal with total emissions of a  locality  rather than with
individual sources.  Future innovative approaches may also be needed
to deal with regulations cost effectively.  (ABI/INFORM)


Will John Barker's Bubble Burst?
Johnson,  Greg
Industry Week v206n7 PP: 63-65 Sep 29, 1980

   Armco, Inc.,  Middletown,   Ohio,  is  trying out  a  simple and
logical plan that could  save industry millions  in the  war on air
pollution.  John  E.  Barker',  corporate director of environmental
engineering, is  trying  to convince the  Environmental  Protection
Agency (EPA) that his so-called ''bubble-policy11  is as effective
but far less expensive than the traditional air pollution control
program mandated by EPA to control  particulate emissions at Armco' s
Middletown steelworks in southern Ohio.  If Barker is successful,
Armco will  spend only  $4 to $5 million,  compared to spendiing an
additional  $15 million  if the  company  is forced  to install EPA
controls. The bubble plan  is based on a  '"trade-off''  of process
emissions  control  for   control  of windblown  fugitives.  It  is
expected that the bubble will cut particulate emissions 4,000 tons
per year, 6 times as much  as traditional process  controls   Any
pollutant would  have to exit through a  single smokestack on the top
of  an imaginary  bubble  that  encompasses the  entire  Middletown
Works, in contrast with  the  individual  stack  and process control
stack which EPA has traditionally relied upon. (ABI/INFORM)
                                28

-------
Bubbles and Efficiency: Cleaner Air at Lower Cost
Maloney, M. T.; Yandle, Bruce
Regulation v4n3 PP: 49-52 May/Jun 1980

   In  December 1979,  one year  after endorsing  an experimental
1'bubble11  policy,  the  Environmental  Protection Agency   (EPA)
announced 2 new options for reducing air  pollution.  This new  cost-
effectiveness or ' 'bubble' ' approach is simple enough to understand
when  applied  to  a  single plant:  if the cost  of removing an
additional unit of a given pollutant  is higher for some sources
than for others, the manager can reduce  the plant's total cost of
achieving the desired air  quality by shifting emission control from
the  higher-cost to  the  lower-cost  sources until the point is
reached  when  the  incremental  cost  becomes  the  same  at   each
source.Studies have indicated that the application  of the regional
bubble  concept can be  very  cost-effective in  terms  of  emission
control costs. Results  showed that the regional bubble applied to
52 DuPont plants yielded  significantly more clean air than source
standards, while generating considerable  cost savings. Even though
these  results  appear  to  be positive,  there are  still   some
unanswered  questions  concerning  applicability,  costs,  and net
social benefits.   (ABI/INFORM)


Steel's Bid for Softer  Standards
Anonymous
Business Week n2636(Industrial Edition) PP: 1220-122P May 12,  1980

   The  Environmental   Protection  Agency  (EPA)  is  considering
renegotiating  2  large  consent  agreements  signed  with US   Steel
Corporation. Signing  of the 2 landmark  agreements  last  year was
seen  as  a  victory   for  the   EPA.   One  major  agreement  for
renegotiation  is the  extensive unemployment resulting  from plant
closings  which were  partly  due  to  the  high  cost  of  meeting
environmental regulations. The current agreements require the  steel
companies  to  be  in  compliance  with  air  quality standards by
December 31,  1982, the nationwide compliance deadline. The proposed
delays by the steel companies could jeopardize the 1982 deadline or
eliminate it.US Steel Corporation is considering installing a new
basic oxygen furnace and wants a delay to decide. US Steel is also
seeking credits against pollution  in  other plants  as  a result of
reducing emissions with the new furnaces. US Steel is also trying
to get  changes in  the Pennsylvania laws  which would allow the
bubble policy of extending pollution credits over an area.  The EPA
is concerned  with the  precedent that would be set  if it  made
changes in the agreement.  (ABI/INFORM)
                                29

-------
Industry Ready to Test EPA ''Bubble1'
Anonymous
Industry Week v204n3 PP: 70,75 Feb.  4,  1980

   Since the Environmental Protection Agency  (EPA)  announced its
1'bubble policy,''  a number of corporations have stepped-up work on
proposals  to  determine  if  the policy  is a  cost  effective air
pollution control mechanism as its proponents claim.  The concept is
based on an imaginary bubble over an  industrial plant with a single
imaginary  smokestack  for all  plant  emissions. Industry  has been
required in the past to  control airborne emissions from individual
smokestacks scattered  across  a plant  site.  The  bubble  allows
engineers to concentrate on least-cost approaches so  long as the
total pollution  is within permissible  limits.EPA  predicts that
steel producers will save 5-10% on particulate control,  utilities
will  trim  15% from sulfur  dioxide control  costs,  and  chemical
producers could save as  much as 60% on hydrocarbon control. Armco,
Inc., is implementing a bubble  strategy at its  Middletown,  Ohio,
steelmaking facility. It plans to limit  wind-blown or  open-dust
emissions  from roads and  open  lands  rather  than  install  more
expensive controls on individual steelmaking  processes.  Minnesota
Mining & Manufacturing Co.  (3M) believes the  bubble  is applicable
to processes using hydrocarbons.  (ABI/INFORM)


Buying and Selling for Cleaner Air?
Yandle,  Bruce
Business v29n2 PP:  33-36 March/April 1979

   In July, 1978,  the Environmental  Defense Fund  (EDF) petitioned
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to  consider the use
of  an  auction  system,  along  with   various   other  marketing
approaches, for allocating the use of air quality  in  the Ohio River
Valley region of the U.S. Following the mandate  of  the  Clean Air
Act,  the  EPA  required  each  state  to have an approved  plan for
implementing the provisions  of the Act.  The EPA then  developed
emission  guidelines  and standards  for  the  various  pollutants
defined  in the  national standards.  The  regulations were  very
uniform and did not take into account the diversities  of regions,
thus  causing   difficulties   for   firms  and    industries.   In
nonattainment areas, environmentalists and industrialists learned
that  something had  to be traded off in order to  achieve more of
something else, bringing EPA to announce its "offset policy." This
policy means that  an industry can  expand if the demand  for its
product  is sufficient   to  pay  the  cost of  emission  offsets.
(ABI/INFORM)
                                30

-------
E. INTERNATIONAL


Taxation: Uncertain Incentives
Crowe, Ian
CA Magazine (Canada) v!24n3 PP: 51-52 Mar 1991

   Social policy  has always had  a significant influence  on the
formulation of  income tax law. Thus,  it is  surprising  that,  in
these environmentally sensitive times, Canada has  only a few tax
incentives designed to encourage environmental protection. Two of
these are by way of accelerated capital cost allowance. Classes 24
and 27 essentially  provide for a  3-year  write-off  of the cost of
pollution-control equipment. Class 34 also provides for a 3-year
write-off and includes  equipment designed  to encourage  energy
conservation and use of alternative energy sources. Tax-motivated
investments and expenditures have  a history of abuse, and no doubt
the government will be cautious about encouraging expenditures in
this  area.  Nevertheless,  these  incentives   do  work,  so it  is
inevitable  that  pressure will build for  government  to  provide
incentives to encourage the  collective effort necessary to solve
environmental problems. (ABI/INFORM)
GREEN DIPLOMACY: A COOL LOOK AT HOT AIR
ECONOMIST, JUN 16, 90, V315, N7659, P17(3)

  SINCE THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL OF 1987  DICTATED CURBS ON THE USE OF
CFC'S, INTERNATIONAL  DIPLOMACY HAS HAD TO  ADDRESS ENVIRONMENTAL
ISSUES AT EVERY LEVEL OF  INTERACTION.  MOST  "GREEN ISSUES" EXTEND
BEYOND NATIONAL BOUNDARIES, AND BECOME THE  SUBJECT OF INTERNATIONAL
DEBATE. AN ANALYSIS   OF THE  MONTREAL  PROTOCOL REVEALS THE EXTENT
AND   ECONOMIC   IMPLICATIONS   OF   SUCH  INTERNATIONAL  TREATIES.
(ENVIROLINE)


The "Greening" of Europe
Hawk, Ruth
Europe n300 PP: 6-8 Oct 1990

  The European Community (EC)  governments  increasingly favor green
taxes as  a  means  to harmonize their  differing  directives into a
system of stricter pollution  control.  Taxes and  other economic
instruments are incentives to encourage consumers and industry to
behave in ways  that do little harm to the environment. For example,
in May 1990, France became the first country to put in place taxes
to control pollution. France's decree allows substantially higher
taxes to  be  put on air and water  pollution and on household and
industrial  waste.  The  tax  revenues  will  be  used  to fund  the
development  of  new  technologies  for  reducing  and  measuring
pollution levels.  West Germany has called  for a world agreement on
environmental   issues,   particularly   carbon   dioxide  emission

                                31

-------
reductions.  The agreement is  to be prepared  for the  June 1992
Conference on Environment and Development. The European Environment
Agency, now in the formative stage, is expected to publish a code
of ethics  to be met  by Western companies building  factories in
Eastern Europe to ensure that the less stringent environmental laws
in these countries are not exploited.  (ABI/INFORM)


CAR EMISSIONS IN THE FIELD
RIJKEBOER  R.  C.  (NETHERLANDS  ORG  APPLIED  SCIENTIFIC  RESEARCH,
DELFT) AND  ;  ZWALVE W.  J.  (NETHERLANDS  MINISTRY PUB HOUSING PHYS
PLANNING & ENV PROTECTION),
SCIENCE OF THE TOTAL ENV, APR 90, V93,  P159(8)

   A FIVE-YEAR PROGRAM WAS LAUNCHED IN THE NETHERLANDS TO PERFORM
IN-USE   COMPLIANCE    TESTS    ON  VEHICLES  CERTIFIED UNDER  THE
REQUIREMENTS  OF THE  EEC  TAX  INCENTIVE  SCHEME  FOR  CONTROLLING
EXHAUST  EMISSIONS.  MEASUREMENTS HAVE  BEEN MADE ON ABOUT  350
VEHICLES OF 68 VEHICLE  TYPES TO  DATE.  THE VEHICLES ARE TESTED
BEFORE AND  AFTER TUNING OVER URBAN AND   RURAL   DRIVING  CYCLES.
AVERAGE EMISSIONS OF CARBON MONOXIDE, HYDROCARBONS,  AND  NITROGEN
OXIDES ARE REPORTED. TUNING PROTOCOLS SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED  CO AND
HYDROCARBON  EMISSIONS.  WHEN TUNED,  MOST VEHICLES WERE  FOUND TO
COMPLY WITH THE EMISSION STANDARDS.  (ENVIROLINE)


An International Tax  on Pollution  and  Natural  Resource Depletion
Sterner,  Thomas
Energy Policy (UK)  v!8n3 PP: 300-302 Apr 1990

  During 1989, the world witnessed a surge in top-level political
concern  for  environmental  problems, as seen  in major  "green"
speeches from such  politicians as Thatcher, Gorbachev,  and Bush
advocating  the  strengthening   of  international  environmental
cooperation.  However,  when it  comes to  actual   implementation,
policies  adopted  are  comparatively  weak,  as  illustrated  by
insufficient support for the United Nations Environment Programme,
which  still carries  a  vast responsibility  and workload with a
completely  undersized  budget  and staff.  To  resolve  these global
problems,  global   institutions   and policy instruments  must be
introduced. An  international  tax based  on pollution  and natural
resource depletion is proposed. Such a tax would not only finance
urgent environmental work, but would  also be  a valuable instrument
of environmental policy.  Also,  a global  tax on  fossil  energy is
proposed.  (ABI/INFORM)
                                32

-------
A  COMPARISON OP  NEW  ECONOMIC METHODS  IN  USSR  ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
WITH WESTERN APPROACHES
EBERHARDT ALFRED UNEP, NAIROBI,  KENYA
ENV MANAGEMENT,  MAR-APR  90, V14, N2,  P151(10)

   COMPARISON   OF   THE   EXPERIENCES   OF  SEVERAL   DECADES   OF
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMIES, REPRESENTED BY
THE USSR, AND  IN MARKET  ECONOMIES EXEMPLIFIED BY THE US AND WEST
GERMANY, DEMONSTRATES THE SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THEM IN SPITE OF  THE
DIFFERENCES  IN  POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE.  ONE  OBVIOUS
SIMILARITY  IS  SEEN IN THE FACT  THAT ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT  IN
BOTH  THE EAST AND  WEST EMERGES  AS  A  REGULATORY  "COMMAND  AND
CONTROL"  APPROACH,  WHICH  WAS  LATER  SUPPLEMENTED  BY ECONOMIC
INCENTIVES.  THE  ECONOMIC METHODS  INTRODUCED  IN  THE  1988 USSR
RESOLUTION "ON THE RADICAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE SYSTEM  OF  NATURAL
CONSERVATION" INCLUDE CHARGES FOR THE USE OF NATURAL RESOURCES  AND
THE EMISSION OF POLLUTANTS.  EXPERIENCES WITH THIS APPROACH  WILL BE
OF INTEREST TO WESTERN NATIONS, WHILE LIABILITY  REGULATIONS OF  THE
US CAN  BE USED  TO DESIGN  PROVISIONS  TO  IMPLEMENT   THE USSR
RESOLUTION. RECENT POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENTS,  INCLUDING A NUMBER  OF
BILATERAL TREATIES, HAVE  DEMONSTRATED THE RELEVANCE OF AN EAST-WEST
EXCHANGE OF EXPERIENCE IN ENVIRONMENTAL  MANAGEMENT.  (ENVIROLINE)


Green Taxes: Where There's Muck There's  Brass
Anonymous
Economist (UK) v314n7646 PP: 46-47 Mar 17,  1990

   When the Organization for  Economic  Cooperation & Development
(OECD) reviewed the economic measures for environmental protection
that countries had in place by mid-1987, it  found that most had
been introduced  to raise the  money to pay for regulation.   In the
past  couple of  years,  however,  governments  have  become more
interested in changing behavior - the encouragement of recycling,
for instance. The OECD is currently working on  guidelines for green
taxation.  The  guidelines are  to be published in summer 1990 and
given to OECD environment ministers when they meet in January 1991.
The measures being tried in Europe generally fall  into one of 2
categories: 1.  taxes  or charges, or 2.  refundable deposits.  Denmark
has   an   elaborate   set  of  green  imposts,   including   a
chlorofluorocarbon tax, a refundable deposit on drink containers,
and a charge on  pesticides  in small containers. Germany plans  to
change the basis for automobile tax  from engine size to  exhaust
fumes and noise. Ireland has  announced a ban  on the sale  of soft
coal in central  Dublin,  and  in  Belgium, proposals to  tax waste
water and solid waste are being considered.  (ABI/INFORM)
                                33

-------
Economic instruments for environmental regulation
Tietenberg, T. H.
Oxford R Econ Policy 6:17-33 Spring '90

   Experience with emissions trading in the US and emission charges
in Europe. (PAIS)


Britain: A Greener Budget
Anonymous
Economist  (UK) v314n7639 PP: 61-63 Jan 27, 1990

   The UK's Institute for Fiscal Studies has conducted a study to
see how environmental  (green) taxes might work.  Ways to apply green
taxes to transport include:  1. widening the gap between leaded and
lead-free gasoline, 2. using a tax on new  automobiles or a vehicle
excise  duty  on  current cars  to encourage  use  of  catalytic
converters,  and  3.  raising the   gasoline  duty  to  reduce  fuel
consumption. A tax on carbon dioxide production could encourage a
shift to low-carbon or no-carbon fuels, but if the UK introduced a
carbon tax unilaterally,  the structure of  industrial  production
would alter. A value-added tax on domestic gas and electricity is
another option.  Green  taxes may be  more  appropriate for encouraging
energy conservation than for preventing other kinds of pollution,
such as indirect pollution.  Green  taxes need to be imposed at high
levels  to have  much  environmental  effect,  but  they do  offer
governments a new source of cash.   (ABI/INFORM)


A GREENER BUDGET
ECONOMIST, JAN 27, 90, V314, N7639, P61(3)

   THE INST FOR FISCAL STUDIES,  UK, HAS STUDIED THE FEASIBILITY OF
TAXES ON ROAD TRANSPORT,  FOSSIL  FUELS, FERTILIZERS, AND DISCHARGES
OF INDUSTRIAL EFFLUENTS INTO RIVERS.  THESE "GREEN TAXES" COULD BE
AN EFFICIENT  WAY FOR  THE UK GOVERNMENT  TO RAISE REVENUE  WHILE
HELPING TO CLEAN UP THE ENVIRONMENT. THE PROS AND CONS OF TAXES ON
ROAD USE, CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS, AND CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION OF
SOIL AND WATER ARE  DISCUSSED IN DETAIL.  HOWEVER,  THESE TAXES MAY
PROVE TO BE A DISAPPOINTMENT TO GOVERNMENTS ANXIOUS TO CLEAN UP THE
ENVIRONMENT. THEY OFTEN NEED TO BE IMPOSED AT HIGH LEVELS TO HAVE
MUCH  EFFECT.   BUT  AS  FAR  AS   REVENUES,  GOVERNMENTS  SHOULD  BE
DELIGHTED; THEY ARE OFTEN A  BETTER ALTERNATIVE TO MORE BUREAUCRACY
AND MORE PUBLIC SPENDING ON REGULATION.   (ENVIROLINE)


Greening Europe: The Freedom to Be Cleaner than the Rest
Anonymous
Economist  (UK) v313n7624 PP: 21-24 Oct 14, 1989

  The European Community (EC) is trying to develop rules that allow
countries  at  different stages  of  economic development to pursue

                                34

-------
national environmental policies that do not hinder free trade. Long
before it had legal authority to do so, the EC commission had been
trying  to get  the EC  countries  to  adopt common  environmental
standards. As amended by the  Single European  Act, the EC treaties
allow one  country  to impose higher environmental  standards than
others,   but  only  if  it does not  create an  open  or   disguised
barrier to intra-EC trade. Some of the environmental consequences
of 1992 will arise not  from  the removal  of barriers but from the
lower prices and faster growth that will occur. The conclusion of
a  study by  the EC  probably will  be  that  1992  will hurt  the
environment if EC countries do not take measures to steer the new
growth into wholesome channels.  (ABI/INFORM)


The  economic  approach  to  the  environment: economic instruments
—charges tax differentiation or "emissions trading"
—provide incentives to reduce environmental  damage
Barde, Jean-Philippe
OECD  (Org Econ Coop and Development)  Observer 158:13-15 Je/Jl '89

   Role in environmental policy; OECD countries. (PAIS)


Hazardous waste management: a West German approach
Linnerooth, Joanne and Allen V.  Kneese
Resources p 7-10 Summer  '89

   Approach using both economic incentives and regulatory control;
Bavaria, Germany.  (PAIS)


And Now, the Greening of Europe
Maremont, Mark
Business Week n3104 (Industrial/Technology Edition) PP: 98D-L May 8,
1989

  The environment, largely ignored by  Europeans in the past,  has
become   a   popular  topic.   Environmental    group   Greenpeace
International reports that its list of European members has grown
by 50% in the past 18 months. Sensing the environmental concerns,
major political parties are  trying to  appropriate  the issue.  The
UK's  prime minister,  Margaret Thatcher, known  for opposition to
almost anything that may harm British industry,  is now alluding to
a pro-environment sentiment. Industrial catostrophes and widespread
worries about the ozone layer are contributing to the new concern
among Europeans.  Germany  is at  the  forefront  of environmental
concern, while the Mediterranean nations lag behind. The European
Community is assuming a  higher profile  on environmental affairs as
1992  approaches. In  November 1988,  European  automobile companies
and governments agreed on a country-by-country phase-in of tougher
exhaust standards by 1993.   (ABI/INFORM)


                                35

-------
A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO A TECHNOLOGY-BASED RESPONSE TO THE GREENHOUSE
GAS ISSUE
HAMILTON L. D. BNL, UPTON, NY,
OECD/IEA ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES FOR REDUCING EMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE
GASES SYM, PARIS, FRANCE, APR 12-14, 89, VI, P207(32)

   USING A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO A TECHNOLOGY-BASED RESPONSE: TO THE
GREENHOUSE-GAS  PROBLEM,   TECHNOLOGIES  ARE  EVALUATED WITHIN THE
CONTEXT OF THE ENERGY, ECONOMIC, AND ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS OF WHICH
THEY ARE AN INGREDIENT.  THE  SYSTEMS APPROACH THAT HAS EVOLVED TO
ADDRESS THE ACID-RAIN PROBLEM IN EUROPE EXEMPLIFIES THIS  PROCESS.
AN INTERNATIONAL EFFORT IS PROPOSED TO EXTEND OR DEVELOP  NATIONAL
SYSTEMS MODELS OF ENERGY AND ENERGY-RELATED EMISSIONS  OF GREENHOUSE
GASES FOR  INDUSTRIAL NATIONS.  GUIDELINES  FOR ASSESSING EMISSIONS
TRADEOFFS  AND  GENERATING APPLICABLE   TECHNOLOGY  DATABASES  ARE
PRESENTED.  (ENVIROLINE)


Environmental Management and Economic Development
Schramm, G. ; Warford,  J. J.
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Washington,
DC.
Report No. ISBN-0-8013-3904-1 c 1989 220 p; NTIS:PB89-217210/XAB

   Environmental  management   and  economic  policy in  developing
countries;    Environmental    and    natural  resource accounting;
Marginal opportunity cost as a planning concept in natural  resource
management; The  environmental basis of sustainable  development;
Economic incentives for  sustainable production; Deforestation in
Brazil's Amazon  Region:  magnitude,  rate,  and causes; An  economic
justification  for  rural afforestation:  the  case  of  Ethiopia;
Managing the supply of and demand  for fuelwood  in Africa;  Economic
aspects    of    afforestation and   soil  conservation  projects;
Multilevel  resource  analysis  and  management:  the   case  of
watersheds. (NTIS)


HOW TO PAY FOR CONSERVING BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY
MCNEELY JEFFREY A. IUCN,  SWITZERLAND
AMBIO, 1989, V18, N6,  P308(6)

   GOVERNMENTS ARE HAVING DIFFICULTY FINDING SUFFICIENT FINANCIAL
RESOURCES FOR ADDRESSING  THE  PROBLEMS OF BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION
IN A WAY THAT IS COMMENSURATE WITH  THE NEEDS OF SOCIETY. FUNDING
MECHANISMS USEFUL  PRIMARILY AT THE  NATIONAL AND LOCAL LEVELS ARE
IDENTIFIED. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AGENCIES CAN CHARGE ENTRY FEES TO
NATIONAL  PARKS,  CHARGE  FOR  ECOLOGICAL  SERVICES  PROVIDED  BY
PROTECTED AREAS  AND FORESTS,  AND  COLLECT  SPECIAL TAXES ON TIMBER
EXTRACTION,  WOOD  TRADING,  AND TRADE   IN  WILDLIFE  AND   WILDLIFE
PROJECTS. MECHANISMS USEFUL  PRIMARILY  AT  THE INTERNATIONAL  LEVEL
INCLUDE EXPLOITATION OF  INTERNATIONAL  CONVENTIONS FOR PROVIDING
FINANCIAL  SUPPORT, SEEKING   DIRECT SUPPORT  FROM INTERNATIONAL

                               36

-------
CONSERVATION   ORGANIZATIONS,   AND   SWAPPING  DEBT   FOR  NATURE
CONSERVATION.   (ENVIROLINE)


Public-private partnership salvages recyclables in Sweden
Pollock, E.L.
WASTE AGE VOL. 18, NO. 1,  p. 78+,  Publ.Yr: 1987

   One of the world's oldest refuse companies in now in the sixth
year of a  successful  collection and recycling partnership with a
consortium  of  nine  municipal   entities  in Sweden.   (POLLUTION
ABSTRACTS)
III.  APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVES

A. ACID RAIN
Acid Rain Control and Public Utility Regulation
Trisko, Eugene M.; Wayland, Robert E.
Public Utilities Fortnightly vl!4n5 PP: 15-22 Aug 30, 1984

   In  view  of  the  probable  costs   to   electric  utilities  of
compliance   with   pending  federal   acid   deposition  control
legislation,  state  regulatory  agencies  with  rate   and  other
jurisdiction over utilities would be wise to  anticipate and start
planning  for  that  contingency.   Timely   development   of  policy
positions  on control  cost  recovery   and  other  consequences  of
federally enacted  requirements  would  diminish many uncertainties
associated  with  the  control  effort. The   current  legislative
proposals would have implications for several acid rain control and
public utility  regulation areas,  including:  1.  fuel procurement
oversight, 2. fuel supply  contract practices, 3.  fuel switching and
power  plant performance,  4.'  scrubber retrofit  and plant  life
extension programs,  5.  emerging control  technology,  6. emission
trading potential, and 7.  rate level and structure. The costs and
administrative complexities of acid rain control could be reduced
by state and regional cooperation.  (ABI/INFORM)
Acid Rain Reduction Credits
Tietenberg, Thomas H.
Challenge v32n2 PP: 25-29 Mar/Apr 1989

   Attempts by Congress to legislate an effective policy response
to  the problem  of  acid  rain  have  failed.  There are  several
obstacles to adopting more stringent controls on older sources of
acid rain. An  innovative  regulatory  approach to overcoming these

                                37

-------
obstacles is the acid rain reduction credit (ARRC) program, which
is patterned after the Environmental Protection Agency's successful
emissions trading program.  This economic incentive approach offers
the possibility for achieving emission reduction targets at a lower
cost, while dealing realistically with electrical generating units
that are about to be  replaced or are in  a financially precarious
position. Any sources of emissions  contributing  to acid rain could
have excess reductions, or credits, which could be transferred to
other plants.  This plan offers:  l.  lower costs, 2. incentives for
reduced emissions,  and 3. greater flexibility.  (ABI/INFORM)
B. AGRICULTURE
NATIONAL AGROENVIRONMENTAL INCENTIVE PROGRAMS:  THE U.S. EXPERIENCE
REICHELDERFER KATHERINE H. USDA, WASHINGTON, DC.
AGRICULTURE  &  WATER  QUALITY:  INTERNATIONAL  PERSPECTIVES  (LYNNE
RIENNER PUBLISHERS),  1990, P131(15)

   INCENTIVE PROGRAMS BASED ON VOLUNTARY  PARTICIPATION HAVE BEEN A
HALLMARK OF US  AGRICULTURAL POLICY.  NEGATIVE INCENTIVE PROGRAMS  TO
CONTROL  POLLUTION  HAVE   BEEN  LESS  COMMON,   BUT  ARE   GAINING
ACCEPTANCE. MAJOR AGRICULTURAL INCENTIVE PROGRAMS  SINCE  1930 ARE
REVIEWED AND ANALYZED FOR FACTORS DETERMINING  SUCCESS  OR  FAILURE.
THESE PROGRAMS INCLUDE DIRECT  PAYMENT  FOR APPROPRIATE PRACTICES,
DISINCENTIVES  FOR ENVIRONMENTALLY  INAPPROPRIATE  PRACTICES, AND
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO ENCOURAGE CERTAIN TYPES OF FARMING.  [Book
chapter] (ENVIROLINE)


CONTROL OP AGRICULTURAL POLLUTION BY REGULATION
ANDERSON GLENN D. ENV LAW INST, WASHINGTON, DC,; DE BOSSU ANN E.;
KUCH PETER J.
AGRICULTURE  &  WATER  QUALITY:  INTERNATIONAL  PERSPECTIVES  (LYNNE
RIENNER PUBLISHERS),  1990, P63(39)

   AGRICULTURAL  POLLUTION  HAS BEEN  SUBJECT TO RELATIVELY  LITTLE
REGULATION   IN  THE   US   EVEN   THOUGH   VOLUNTARY   CONTROL   OF
NONPOINT-SOURCE POLLUTION HAS PROVEN INADEQUATE. THE ECONOMIC BASIS
OF REGULATORY  CONTROL IS  ANALYZED, AND  REGULATORY POLICIES ARE
COMPARED WITH INCENTIVE POLICIES. REGULATORY APPROACHES  IN THE  US
AND  EUROPE ARE  SURVEYED  AND  COMPARED WITH  INCENTIVE  PROGRAMS.
[Book Chapter] (ENVIROLINE)
                                38

-------
C. AIR POLLUTION
Saving the climate saves money: the threat of global warming
Flavin, Christopher and Nicholas Lenssen.
World Watch 3:26-34 N/D '90

   Suggests various economic incentives for reducing air pollution.
(PAIS)


Clean Air and Natural Gas Vehicles
Tilley, C. Ronald
Public Utilities Fortnightly v!26n6 PP: 31,34 Sep  13, 1990

   The US is losing the fight against air pollution. Since 2/3 of
the  carbon  monoxide that  contaminates  the air  comes  from motor
vehicles, cleaner burning fuels are imperative. A  national market
for natural gas vehicles (NGV) would improve air quality and help
reduce dependence on foreign oil. It would be appropriate for the
federal  government  to set an  example  by  making  10%  of  its
nonmilitary vehicles NGVs.  Regulatory commissions can expedite the
sale  of  NGVs by  removing  regulatory  restraints on the  sale of
natural gas. To  assist in  environmental improvements, regulatory
programs must: 1. permit the  recovery  of the reasonable costs of
establishing  fuel   facilities   for   fleets   and  fleet  vehicle
conversions or privately owned NGVs, 2. provide regulatory support
or financial incentives to private fleet owners who use NGVs, and
3. provide special, clean-fuel tax incentives. (ABI/INFORM)


Study of Economic  Incentives  to  Control Photochemically Reactive
Organic Compound Emissions from Consumer Products
(Final rept)
Gibbs, M. J. ; Tlaiye, L.  ; Letourneau, M.
ICF Consulting Associates,  Inc.,  Universal City,  CA.
Sponsor:  California State Air Resources Board, Sacramento.
Report No.:  ARB-R-90/447;  NTIS:PB91-129346/XAB
Aug 90 231p

   The study  investigates   and  evaluates two  economic  incentive
systems (emissions fees and guotas) as potential control strategies
for  reducing  emissions   of   photochemically  reactive  organic
compounds (PROCs)  found in consumer products.  Hair sprays and spray
paints were examined  in detail.  Current emissions  in California,
technical options for  reducing emissions and economic incentives
needed to promote the implementation of the technical options were
identified.  Options  for  designing and  implementing the economic
incentives  were  discussed.  The  study  concludes   that  economic
incentives can be used to reduce PROC emissions from hair spray and
spray  paint products.  Because  cost   is  the  principal  barrier
preventing  the  wide-spread use  of  most of  the PROC-reducing

                               39

-------
formulations and packaging systems, an  incentive  fee or quota is
appropriate for promoting the use of the desired formulations and
packaging  systems.  The effectiveness  of economic  incentives is
reduced  when  non-cost  barriers,  such  as  inadequate  product
performance  information,  prevent  the  use  of  emissions-reducing
formulations and packaging. In these situations, consumer awareness
programs or  other  steps in conjunction  with  economic incentives
should  be  considered.   It   is  also  recommended  that  economic
incentives be implemented for a group  of products,  as opposed to
for a single product. (NTIS)


Empirical properties of economic incentives and command-and-control
regulations for air pollution control
(economic and non-economic approaches to controlling air pollution)
Kolstad, Charles D.
Land Economics v62 Aug, 1986, p250(19)

   The  application of  a  spatial,  stochastic  model  of  emission
regulation design to the southwestern 'Four Corners' states (Utah,
Arizona,  Colorado,  and New  Mexico)   examines the   efficacy  of
command-and-control  regulations  versus  economic  incentives  in
minimizing air pollution. Moreover,  the  regional case  study of air
pollution regulations and alternatives addresses the  issues of: (1)
price  controls versus  quantity  controls,  within   the  area  of
economic incentives;  and  (2)  the spatial resolution of economic
incentives. The objective of  this  analysis is not to encourage air
pollution  regulation reform,  but  to  provide  insight as to air
pollution regulatory alternatives. Efficiencies of various forms of
pollution control  regulation are  appraised  according to types of
environmental   damage   ("linear   damage,"   "kinked   damage,"
"superlinear damage," and "slightly superlinear damage").
(MANAGEMENT CONTENTS)


D. HAZARDOUS AND SOLID WASTE


State Policies on Waste-to-Energy Facilities
Migden, Janine L.
Public Utilities Fortnightly v!26n6 PP: 26-30  Sep  13, 1990

   As more attention is focused on the  crisis  of disposing of all
the solid waste the US produces, incinerators  coupled with energy
production  emerges  as  one  of   the  viable  alternatives.   Some
environmental advantages of incineration are that air emissions are
not  latent with sulfur dioxide  or nitrogen   oxides and that  a
renewable  resource is  replacing  a fossil  fuel,  a  nonrenewable
resource, thus promoting conservation. Economic benefits of waste-
to-energy  (WTE)  include the creation  of jobs, stabilization of
tipping  fees  for  solid waste  disposal, and  the generation of
reliable,  long-term,  low-cost  electricity.   Many  states  have

                                40

-------
recognized the special attributes of WTE and have enacted policies
that provide additional rate incentives.  However, these incentives
are not the  only  mechanisms used by commissions to encourage the
development  of WTE.  Maine  and a  number of  other  states have
implemented  competitive bidding options. The most receptive state
toward  cogeneration  and   small  power  production  is  probably
California.  For WTE to reach its full potential, it is imperative
that state regulation decompartmentalize.  (ABI/INFORM)


Recycling: The Newest Wrinkle in Waste Management's Bag
Bremner, Brian
Business Week n3148 (Industrial/Technology Edition) PP: 48-49 Mar
5, 1990

   Waste Management  Inc.   (Oak  Brook,  Illinois) has  7 hazardous
waste landfills and 5  incinerators that  handle millions of tons of
waste a year.  Waste Management's  Recycle  America  subsidiary has
become  the US' largest  recycler.  Waste Management is  not just
looking to placate the  environmental groups  that have criticized
the  firm  in  the  past; recycling  is turning   into  a profitable
business.  Also, it conserves precious landfill space. Underscoring
its interest in recycling,  Waste Management recently signed joint
ventures with papermaker Jefferson Smurfit Corp. and Du Pont  Co. to
recycle paper  and plastic. The  recycling  push  complements Waste
Management's  strategy of  offering  curbside-to-landfill  garbage
services to  cities. Waste Management is not likely to make much
money  in  recycling  anytime soon,  and  the  company  faces  stiff
competition.  Congress is  considering a  package of tax incentives
that are designed to spur use of recycled materials.
(ABI/INFORM)


What Have You Done for Me Tomorrow?
Cook, James
Forbes v!45n4 PP:  88,92 Feb 19, 1990

   Safety-Kleen Corp.   (Elgin,  Illinois)  services 180,000 service
station and automobile repair shop  customers through a nationwide
network of 162 branches and 1,100 salespeople.  In the mid-1980s,
Safety-Kleen began recycling fluids of  all kinds,  beginning with
small-quantity industrial  fluids  and moving  up to large-quantity
truck  and  tank  load  lots.   In  1989,  Safety-Kleen  earned  an
impressive $46 million on  $480 million in sales  for  a 20% return on
equity.  While this was enough to hold the company's  stock at around
30 per share, up  from  a low of 13  in 1982, it  is  well below the
1987 high  of  39  1/2.  Safety-Kleen  would like  to see  service
stations charge recycling  fees  of  50 cents for each  oil change.
However, service stations  will not  levy the surcharge unless they
have an economic incentive. The US  Congress and the Environmental
Protection Agency are  considering increasing  the environmental
restrictions on the disposition of used oil, which almost certainly

                                41

-------
will  enable  Safety-Kleen  to  increase  prices  for  recycling
(ABI/INFORM)
DEMAND  AND MARKET  INCENTIVES:  A  LOOK AT  INDUSTRIAL  POLICIES
HEMPHILL THOMAS A. NEW JERSEY DEPT OF ENV PROTECTION
WASTE AGE, JAN 90, P24(3)

   FOR RECYCLING  TO BE  SUCCESFUL,  CERTAIN  ECONOMIC PREREQUISITES
MUST BE MET: SUPPLY MUST BE  CONSISTENTLY GENERATED,  AND CONSUMER
DEMAND MUST EXIST. THE GOVERNMENT COULD  PLAY A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN
GENERATING  DEMAND-SIDE  INTEREST. •  TO   FACILITATE   RECYCLING,
GOVERNMENT  POLICIES  AT   THE  FEDERAL AS  WELL  AS STATE  AND LOCAL
LEVELS MUST SUPPORT THIS MARKETING EQUATION,  AS WELL AS MANDATING
WASTE REDUCTION GOALS. SUCH POLICIES SHOULD  ADDRESS STABLE MATERIAL
RESOURCES,  EXPEDITED  CONSTRUCTION  AND  ENVIRONMENTAL  PERMITTING
WITHIN THE RECYCLING INDUSTRY, CAPITAL FINANCING OR INCENTIVES, AND
LEADERSHIP IN PROCUREMENT OF RECYCLED MATERIALS. (ENVIROLINE)


Protecting the environment
Weidenbaum, Murray.
Society 27:49-56 N/D  '89

   Partial  contents:   Economic   solutions  to  hazardous  waste
problems; Economic incentives needed; A birth control approach to
pollution.  (PAIS)


To clean up landfills,  the  leader should be municipalities using
economic incentives to settle
Bernstein, Norman W.
Environmental Law Reporter 19:10012-15 Ja  '89

   Urges   municipalities  to   take  initiative   in  developing
settlements with polluting companies; outlines  New York City case.
(PAIS)


Economic Incentives and Disincentives for  Recycling of Municipal
Solid Waste
Franklin Associates Ltd., Prairie Village,  KS.
Sponsor: Center for Economic Policy Analysis, Chicago, IL. ; Office
of Technology Assessment, Washington, DC.
Dec 88  142p
NTIS:PB91-119099/XAB

   The  purpose of the  study is to  identify  and analyze various
Federal  government   policies  that   may  discourage  or  act  as
disincentives  to  the  recycling of matericils from municipal  solid
waste.  The study  primarily  evaluates economic policies, but also
examines  tax  policies   and  their  potential    effectiveness   ifn

                                42

-------
reducing or eliminating the barriers  to  recycling.  The report is
prepared as an internal document to be used by the Congress of the
United  States,  Office  of  Technology Assessment  (OTA)  in  their
assessment  of municipal  solid  waste.   The  report  organization
follows the scope of work as  defined  by  OTA:  Chapter 1 - Federal
Subsidies for Virgin Materials; Chapter 2 - Federal Subsidies for
Recycled Materials;Chapter 3  - Federal  Subsidies  for Alternative
Energy Sources; and Chapter 4 - State Tax Incentives.  (NTIS)


Solid  Waste Management Alternatives: Review of Policy Options to
Encourage Waste Reduction
Zimmermann, E.
Illinois Dept. of Energy and Natural Resources, Springfield. Energy
and Environmental Affairs Div.
Feb 88  91p
Report No. IL/ENR/RE/PA-88/03; NTIS:PB88-188560/XAB

   In order to adopt effective waste reduction policies,  States
must first develop a  framework for evaluating alternative policy
options.  Such a  framework should  include a clear  definition of
'waste  reduction1,   a  set   of  policy    evaluation    criteria,
consideration of a variety of policy approaches,  and targeting of
policies   to   appropriately   distinguished   sectors  of   waste
generators. Three  general approaches  are possible  to encourage
waste   reduction:   (a)   regulatory   approaches;   (b)   financial
incentives and/or disincentives;  (c)  research  and education. The
report outlines a wide range of policy options which encourage both
post-consumer and industrial  waste reduction.  The most effective
waste reduction  policies will  most probably include  a  balanced
mixture    of    educational     programs,    financial
incentives/disincentives, and regulations designed to best meet
overall   waste   reduction  goals   consistent  with  established
evaluation criteria.  (NTIS)


Assessing  the  viability  of  marketable  permit   systems:  an
application in hazardous waste management
Opaluch, James J.;  Kashmanian, Richard M.
Land Economics v61 Aug, 1985, p263(9)

   The increasing number of hazardous waste dumps discovered near
residential neighborhoods,  such as  the Love Canal area  in New York
State, has led to increased awareness  in the general population of
the dangers of hazardous wastes, which in turn has made hazardous
waste management a persistent  societal problem.  The use  of economic
incentives for pollution  control is examined from  two points of
view: a strategy allowing flexible response by companies to test
for efficient  benefits,  and the distribution of cost savings among
kinds of companies to test the political pressure likely to result
in response to proposals for marketable permit plans.
(MANAGEMENT CONTENTS)

                                43

-------
E. PUBLIC UTILITIES


Regulatory aspects of emissions trading: conflicts between economic
and environmental goals
Bohi, Douglas R. and Dallas Burtraw.
Electricity J 3:47-55 D '90

   Implications of proposed distribution of credits for emissions
control that can be bartered by electric utilities.
(PAIS)


Weighing environmental  costs in utility regulation:  the task ahead.
Gordon, Kenneth.
Electricity J 3:54-63 0 '90

   Economic incentives for factoring  the  environment into energy
planning  decisions;  US.  Evaluation  of  current approaches,  and
possibilities for routine adoption of the process.
(PAIS)


EEI's New Risk-Taking President Talks About the Electric Utility
Industry
Rodgers, Lori M.
Public Utilities Fortnightly v!26n3 PP: 17-19 Aug 2, 1990

   Thomas R.  Kuhn,  who became  president  of the Edison Electric
Institute (EEI) in May 1990,  indicated that one topic of concern
within the electric utility industry is implementation of the Clean
Air Act. EEI has supported the clean coal technology  (CCT) program,
and,  regarding  the emissions trading portion  of the  bill,  Kuhn
remarked that  the  free marketplace ultimately  should  work.  Kuhn
believes the industry  should  retain nuclear energy as an option,
although significant progress  needs to be made in the nuclear waste
area. EEI  favors  a standardized  design for nuclear  plants.  The
issue  of efficiency  and demand-side management  (DSM)  is  also
something electric utility companies are involved in. All of EEI's
member companies have DSM programs, which,  in the past decade, have
increased from around  130 programs  to over 1,300.  Kuhn mentioned
that  the  public needs to  be educated  on topics such  as global
warming and health concerns associated with electric and magnetic
fields. EEI proposes to  meet that challenge by doing additional
research. In  order to  ensure that  the public   is  aware that the
industry  is  environmentally  oriented, EEI  plans   on  increasing
advertising and public relations efforts.
(ABI/INFORM)
                                44

-------
Emissions trading in the electric utility industry
Krupnick, Alan J. and others
Resources p 10-13 Summer '90

   Economic incentives  for  reduction of sulfur dioxide emissions
under the proposed revision of the Clean Air Act. (PAIS)


Cost-Minimizing Regulation of Sulfur Emissions:  Regional Gains in
Electric Power
Gollop, Frank M.; Roberts,  Mark J.
Review of Economics & Statistics  (Netherlands) v67nl PP: 81-90
Feb 1985

   Maximum  allowable  rates  for  sulfur  dioxide emissions  from
electric utilities  are set by environmental  regulations.  These
standards do not minimize the cost of reducing emissions because
they  ignore firm  differences  in marginal  abatement  costs  and
prevent emissions trading. Marginal abatement cost functions for 56
utilities for 1973-1979 are estimated,  thus quantifying the cost
effect  of  sulphur  dioxide  emission  restrictions.  The data  are
derived from Environmental  Protection Agency,  state,  and Federal
Energy Regulatory  Commission publications and  are  classified by
subperiod and geographical region. Marginal costs are found to vary
considerably across firms as a result of differences in the price
of low and high  sulfur fuels and the intensity of regulation.  The
potential savings from a cost-minimizing reallocation of abatement
resources are estimated for the  5  geographical regions.  Results
indicate  that   current expenditures  are  47%  higher   than  cost
minimizing levels.   (ABI/INFORM)
IV.  PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
Public private partnerships for environmental facilities: a self-
help guide for local governments
United States. Environmental Protection Agency
Admin, and Resources Mgt. My '90 iv+40p

   Partial contents:  Building  a  public-private  partnership:  an
action checklist; Finance,  procurement,  and the service agreement.
(PAIS)
Encouraging Signs
Hersch, Paul
Water Engineering & Mgmt v!37n4 PP: 18 Apr 1990

   George Ames, executive director of the Council of Infrastructure

                                45

-------
Financing Authorities, foresees positive developments in fulfilling
the US' infrastructure needs. A  particularly  encouraging sign is
the Environmental Infrastructure Act of 1989. The bill would create
a separate  category of tax-exempt  infrastructure bonds,  and it
would expedite cost recovery  of  wastewater facilities,  improving
the economics of public-private infrastructure  projects. Ames notes
that the  Environmental  Protection Agency, through its  Office of
Resource Management, has been marketing the advantages of public-
private partnerships  in  building and  operating  new water  and
wastewater  facilities. In Ames1  assessment of the potential for
long-term   improvement   of  the  US'   infrastructure,   state
infrastructure financing agencies (SIFA) are the most encouraging
development. SIFAs provide subsidized assistance for diverse water
and wastewater  projects,  as  well  as   for  other projects.  Ames
believes that SIFAs can become the primary public source of funding
for the environmental infrastructure.  (ABI/INFORM)
Funding Environmental Programs:  An Examination of the Alternatives
Shields, Evelyn
Public Budgeting & Finance vlOnl PP: 110-112 Spring 1990

   Since the late 1970s, the cost of environmental protection for
state government has increased while the federal contribution has
decreased. To help  meet the higher costs,  almost  all states are
utilizing alternative financing mechanisms  (AFM)  to help support
environmental programs.  The primary types of AFMs are user fees and
pollution discharge  fees, environmental taxes, bonds, and revolving
loan  funds.   Even  though  AFMs  are  an  integral   part   of  most
environmental programs today, they cannot cover the full  costs of
environmental protection. A few ways that federal, state,  and local
governments can  reduce  the cost  of  environmental  protection are
through the emphasis of pollution prevention and the application of
public-private partnerships. (ABI/INFORM)


WASTE: HOW BIG A MARKET?
BOWEN DOUGLAS JOHN
RAILWAY AGE,  JAN 90, V191,  Nl,  P44(2)

   THE  UNIVERSAL MESSAGE DELIVERED AT  A RAIL  MOVEMENT  OF SOLID
WASTE CONFERENCE IS  THAT THE SOLID WASTE ISSUE IS A POTENTIAL BOOM
TO THE RAIL INDUSTRY. IN THE NEXT DECADE, THE VOLUME OF SOLID WASTE
MOVED  BY RAIL  COULD  INCREASE  TO  AS  MUCH AS  25 MILLION  TONS
ANNUALLY,  WHICH WOULD  CONTRIBUTE  SIGNIFICANTLY  TO  BOTTOM  LINE
REVENUES. FACTORS DRIVING THE MOVEMENT OF SOLID WASTE BY  RAIL ARE
THE  INCREASING  LANDFILL CLOSURE  RATE,  BROADENING ENVIRONMENTAL
CONCERNS, GROWING OPPORTUNITIES FOR PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS,
AND THE  ENDLESS  SUPPLY  OF  THE  COMMODITY. PRESENTLY, A CONCERN TO
MANY STATES IS THE FACT THAT ONLY FOUR LANDFILLS HAVE DIRECT ACCESS
BY RAIL, INDICATING A NEED  FOR RELOAD CENTERS. IN ADDITION, PROPER

                                46

-------
EQUIPMENT  FOR CARRYING  SOLID  WASTE  IS  CURRENTLY  VERY  SCARCE.
(ENVIROLINE)


Business & Government: Effecting Change - Joining Forces
Miller, Jack
World V24H3 PP: 38-39 1990

   In the 1980s, governments began working with private interests
to solve public problems, a result of governments being asked to do
more with limited  resources.  Public-private  partnerships cover a
broad  spectrum that  includes short-term  projects in  which  the
private sector volunteers  its services to the  public sector and
ongoing  contractual  alliances  between  business  and government.
Formal public-private partnerships provide for varying divisions of
responsibility,  such as:  1.  facility  financing,  2.  design,  3.
construction, 4.  ownership, 5. operation, and  6. maintenance. While
US public-private partnerships are considered a phenomenon of the
1980s, the concept is as  old  as  the US.  The American colonies were
established  with  partnerships  among  the  UK,  merchants,  and
religious groups. Recently, there has been an increase in public-
private partnerships to improve  city and state infrastructure. The
environment   also   is  the  focus  of  many  new  partnerships.
(ABI/INFORM)


The development  of substitutes  for  chlorofluorocarbons:  Public-
private cooperation and environmental policy
Miller, A. Cent. Global Change,  Univ.  Maryland
AMBIO VOL. 19, NO. 6-7,  pp.  338-340,   Publ.Yr: 1990

   US regulations restricting the use of  chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)
are  a   noteworthy  example  of  a   market-based  environmental
regulation.  In  contrast  with  traditional  regulation  dictating
specific technologies, the rules limit total  production leaving
allocation of the permitted use  to market choices.  In addition to
the regulations,  the Environmental  Protection Agency  (EPA)  has
continued to  be actively  involved  in the search  for acceptable
substitutes. These activities complement private-sector efforts to
develop substitutes in several important ways  that will be reviewed
in this paper.  A similar public/private partnership may be the most
productive approach to reducing emissions of greenhouse gases.
(POLLUTION ABSTRACTS)


Minnesota's public-private partnership
Connell, J.J.
WASTE AGE VOL. 21, NO. 10,   pp.  73-76,  Publ.Yr: 1990

   Dakota County's Recyclables Collection Center is the result of
teamwork among local haulers, county government, and a marketer.
(POLLUTION ABSTRACTS)

                                47

-------
Risk allocation in a changing MRF industry
Ewel, D.; Shaw, F.C.
BIOCYCLE VOL. 31, NO. 4,  pp. 64-67,  Publ.Yr: 1990

   Technological  risks,  financial  risks,  marketing  risks,  and
change in law risks have all discouraged municipalities  and private
industries  from  investing  in   recycling.  By  entering  into  a
public/private  partnership,  both the  private developer  and the
municipality can reduce their respective risk exposure, and hence
increase   the   overall  chances   of   a  successful  project.
Municipalities  and  private  vendors   have  distinct   skills  and
resources—particularly, differing capacities to bear certain types
of risk. By allocating responsibilities and risks to the party best
able to bear them,  a  public/private  recycling venture  can turn
these skills and resources to best effect,  transforming  a problem—
a lack of disposal capacity—into an opportunity.
(POLLUTION ABSTRACTS)


Proceedings   of   the  Privatization   Council's   third  national
conference
Privatization R 4:21-35+ Fall '89

   Edited versions  of  the six  Partnership  Opportunity Workshops
presented at   the  conference,  Making Ends Meet:  Public-Private
Partnerships into the 1990's, held in  Washington, D.C., May 15-16,
1989.  Environmental  infrastructure,   transportation,   municipal
service contracting, health  care, contracting out  for  assets and
services,  and labor relations  and public/private partnerships.
(PAIS)


Financing  environmental  infrastructure:  a  national   challenge
Grizzle, Charles L.
Munic Fin J 10:231-9 Fall '89

   Problems  at   the  local  level   due  to  the   expansion  of
environmental  programs  and  activities;  US.  Reviews  the use  of
public/private partnerships as an alternative  financing mechanism.
(PAIS)


Public-private partnership  case studies: profiles  of  success  in
providing environmental services
United States Environmental Protection Agency.
Admin,  and Resources Mgt. S  '89  vi+118p

   Components  of  successful partnerships in  the  areas  of  solid
waste   management,  wastewater  treatment,  and drinking  water;
experience of 23 US communities.  (PAIS)
                                48

-------
Strategies for EV commercialization
Mader, G.H.; Bevilacqua
O.M. Electr. Veh. Dev. Corp. Cupertino, CA 95014, USA
82.  Annual Meeting  of the  Air  &  Waste  Management Association
Anaheim, CA (USA)  25-30 Jun 1989 p68

   Electric vehicle  (EV)  technology  represents  one of  the most
promising  alternatives  for  improving  air  quality. This  paper
describes the utility industry's work to develop market-ready EVs,
including  vehicle  development  and testing,  market  analysis,  and
support system development. It proposes a partnership between the
public and private  sectors to build the initial EV market, focusing
on  the  need to  lower vehicle  costs by establishing  a  critical
production volume.  (POLLUTION ABSTRACTS)
Privatization: An Emerging Management and Financing Trend
Seader, David
Water Engineering & Mgmt vl36n3 PP: 44-49 Mar 1989

   A recent Environmental Protection Agency Municipal Sector Study
concluded that the ability of local governments to raise capital is
being rapidly  exceeded by mandated investments  in environmental
protection. A growing  number  of  local  governments are turning to
private  sector   financing   and  the   codevelopment   of  public
facilities. Among the many types of private participation that have
evolved  in  recent  years,   the   most   common  is  the  design,
construction,  and operation  of  public  facilities by  a  private
sector organization for  public use. A public-private partnership
may be created  using  a  range of  ownership  structures,  including
turnkey design-build,  and can  operate with public  ownership of the
facility, leases, limited partnerships,  or  some  variation of the
above. As the economic  pressures faced by municipalities increase,
many will weigh the advantages of private versus public provision
of services or facilities.  (ABI/INFORM)
Privatization moves to the forefront
Seader, D.
SOLID WASTE POWER VOL. 3, NO. 2,  p. 59+,  Publ.Yr: 1989

   New federal guidelines are forcing many communities to implement
new  MSW  disposal  technologies,  but  don't  address  how  these
communities can raise the money to pay for them. The solution may
be an expansion of the public-private partnership already in place
for solid waste disposal.  (POLLUTION ABSTRACTS)
                                49

-------
The partnership works in Riverside
Anon.
WASTE AGE VOL. 18, NO. 3,  pp. 34-41,   Publ.Yr:  1987

   A large new landfill, which will be  a  major  disposal site for
this  California  county,  was  developed  by   a  public-private
partnership from which, participants say,  all have benefited.
(POLLUTION ABSTRACTS)


Implementing  the  public/private  nonpoint  source   management
partnership: A state forestry perspective
Davis, R.L.; Miller, R.L.
For.  Div.,  Oklahoma  State  Dep.  Agric.,  Oklahoma City,  OK,  USA
Perspectives  on  Nonpoint  Source  Pollution:  Proceedings  of  a
National Conference   Kansas City,  MO  May 19-22, 1985
pp. 325-329, Publ.Yr: 1985
U.S. EPA,  OFFICE OF WATER REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS, WASHINGTON, DC


   State forestry agencies  currently recognize two principal areas
of concern  in nonpoint source water quality management:  to work
with the private sector to  get the management job done in the face
of poor  economic conditions, and  to  establish  a  more effective
framework in law and policy for doing so. The new national nonpoint
source policy promises to be  an important  advancement toward these
ends, particularly  because  of its support   for   a   cooperative
public/private   partnership   approach.  Opportunities  exist for
improvements  where  economic  factors are  not  primarily limiting,
particularly  in  public  sector  actions.  As first priority,  the
public  sector should  put its  house  in  order  by applying the
public/private  partnership  provisions  of the  national nonpoint
source policy. (POLLUTION ABSTRACTS)


Planning  for  energy recovery from  municipal refuse in New York
State
Rhodes, M.; El-Baroudi, H.; Al-Iman, H.; et al.
General Electric Co.
Fifth annual industrial pollution conference: Proceedings. Atlanta,
Ga. Apr. 19-21, 1977
Edited by L. Delpino and A. Krigman Publ.Yr: 1977  pp.  545-564
Water and Wastewater Equipment Manufacturers Association

   An  investigation  was  made to  identify  the  energy recovery
systems for New York urban communities (excluding New York City and
Long Island) that constitute a statewide  optimum management plan.
Water  wall  incineration with  heat  recovery  and co-firing  in
existing coal-fired  power plants are the  established technologies
proposed for implementation by optimally defined urban regions. For
the  developed plans,  cost  estimates   and  recommendations   for
enhancing   implementation  by  a  public-private partnership were

                                50

-------
made. New York  State  data  and information on population centers,
solid  waste  generation,   legislation,   and  electric  generating
stations were the bases for the development of the statewide energy
recovery management plan. It is noted, however,  that the approaches
and models developed and applied in the study are applicable to a
great extent in other urban regions.  (POLLUTION ABSTRACTS)
V.  DEBT-FOR-NATURE
World Wildlife Fund: The Call of the Wild
Sweeney, Paul
CFO: The Magazine  for  Senior Financial Executives v7n3 PP: 63-64
Mar 1991

   Lawrence   J.    Amon  is   vice-president   for   finance  and
administration at  World Wildlife  Fund (WWF)  and The Conservation
Foundation.  The   last 7   years   have  been  a  transition  and
transformation for the organization.  Before  their affiliation in
1985, culminating  in a legal merger in 1990, World Wildlife Fund
and The Conservation Foundation were separate entities. Each group
had skills the other coveted.  The merger resulted in a nonprofit
organization with a fiscal  1991 budget of $54  million and a million
members,  making   it   the  largest  private  environmental  group
operating worldwide. The bulk of WWF's operating budget (85%) goes
to underwriting field programs,  organizing  conferences, and  policy
making.  The  rest of the  operating  budget  is  expended  on
administration and  fund-raising activities.  Debt-for-nature swaps
have been a major tactic in WWF's conservation strategy since 1987.
To date,  the  organization  has bought  $3.8 millon worth  of debt,
generating $15.1 million worth  of conservation projects  in Asia,
Africa, and Latin America.  Many other private environmental  groups
are also  arranging debt-for-nature swaps,  and WWF  has  taken the
lead in lobbying Washington to adopt the strategy on a grand  scale.
(ABI/INFORM)


SWAPPING DEBT FOR DEBT  IN LESS-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: A CASE STUDY OF
A DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAP IN ECUADOR
SUNDARAM ANANT K.  AMOS TUCK SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMIN.
INTL ENV AFFAIRS,  WINTER 90, V2, Nl, P67(13)

   THE ECONOMICS BEHIND DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS IN LESS
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES ARE ANALYZED.  THE EXAMPLE OF A DEBT-FOR-NATURE
SWAP  MADE  BY THE  WORLD   WILDLIFE  FUND  TO  FINANCE  A   NATURE
CONSERVATION PROJECT IN ECUADOR IS USED TO CALCULATE THE EXPECTED
RETURNS FROM THE PROJECT. ALSO DISCUSSED ARE RISKS TO CONSIDER IN
SUCH TRANSACTIONS,  AND HOW TO ADDRESS  THESE RISKS.  MATHEMATIC
MODELS ARE PRESENTED.  (ENVIROLINE)
                                51

-------
Debt-for-nature swaps: effective but not enforceable
Hrynik, Tamara J.
Case Western Reserve J Internat Law 22:141-63 Winter '90

   Development  and  success  of  a  swap  in  Bolivia.  Includes
discussion of debt servicing and debt-for-nature swaps as an
alternative debt relief program. (PAIS)


Credit Where Credit's Due
McEvedy, Imogen
Management Today (UK) PP: 88-89 Jul 1990

   In  1984,  Thomas  Lovejoy,  then  of the  World  Wildlife  Fund,
proposed  the  idea  of debt-for-nature swaps.  These would  allow
conservation groups to purchase a debt and  then swap it with the
debtor country to pay for environmental projects. The bank gains a
proportion of its money back by  selling the debt, clears the books
(claiming a large tax relief on the loss), and relends the money.
The conservation  group can increase  dramatically the  amount of
local currency it receives from donations, and the debtor nation,
which had no hard currency with which to pay,  has now wiped out the
debt using its own  currency to  pay  for projects in its own land.
Conservationists have concentrated  on  areas of great biodiversity,,
such as the tropical rain forests.  Swaps have taken place in such
countries as  Bolivia, Ecuador, Costa Rica,  and  Madagascar.  One
criticism of the  swaps is that the sums  involved  are  too small;
consequently,  so are  the  areas  saved.  Karl  Ziegler,  who has just
completed a  study  of debt-for-nature swaps  for Friends  of the
Earth, is proposing a $50-billion debt swap with Brazil.
(ABI/INFORM)
DEBT-POR-NATURE SWAPS: THE TIME HAS COME
REILLY WILLIAM K. EPA, WASHINGTON, DC
INTL ENV.AFFAIRS, SPRING 90, V2, N2,  P134(6)

   DEBT-FOR-NATURE AGREEMENTS ARE  PART  OF  A NEW WAVE OF THINKING
ABOUT THE LINKS BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT AND DEBT.
ONE WAY TO BEGIN TO ESTABLISH A POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEBT
AND THE  ENVIRONMENT IS TO  AVOID  REPEATING PAST  MISTAKES;  IT IS
ESSENTIAL THAT THESE  AGREEMENTS BE ON SOUND FINANCIAL FOOTING BY
THINKING THROUGH THOROUGHLY THE SHORT- AND LONG-TERM ENVIRONMENTAL
EFFECTS OF THE  PROJECTS.  BUT THEY CAN WORK.  TO DATE THESE SWAPS
HAVE REDUCED  FOREIGN DEBTS  BY  OVER  $85  MILLION, AND  THEY HAVE
HELPED POOR COUNTRIES IN  LATIN  AMERICA,  ASIA, AND AFRICA PROTECT
ONE OF THE FEW RESOURCES IN WHICH THEY ARE VERY RICH: FORESTS AND
WILDLIFE. SIX GENERAL PROPOSITIONS ARE SUGGESTED TO HELP ACHIEVE AN
ORDER-OF-MAGNITUDE   INCREASE  IN   THE  RESOURCES  COMMITTED  TO
CONSERVATION THROUGH DEBT-FOR-NATURE TRADES.  (ENVIROLINE)
                                52

-------
DEBT, CONSERVATION, AND INNOVATING SUSTAINABLE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
JAEGER CARLO SWISS  FEDERAL  INST  OF  TECHNOLOGY
INTL ENV AFFAIRS, SPRING  90,  V2, N2,  P166(8)

   RECENT ATTEMPTS  TO LINK DEBT AND  CONSERVATION  HAVE INNOVATION
POTENTIAL. IN THE AREA OF DEBT-FOR-NATURE  SWAPS, THE FOCUS IS NOT
ON  A FIXED  FINANCIAL TECHNIQUE,   BUT  ON  AN ONGOING SERIES  OF
INNOVATIVE STEPS. WAYS IN WHICH THESE SWAPS COULD BE WIDENED ARE
DISCUSSED.  DEBT-FOR-NATURE  SWAPS   COULD   BE  USED  TO  REORIENT
INTERNATIONAL  FINANCIAL  FLOW ACCORDING  TO THE  REQUIREMENTS  OF
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT.  NEW FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS  COULD THEN BE
USED IN A FRAMEWORK OF ECOLOGICAL CONDITIONALITY BY VARIOUS AGENTS
RANGING  FROM  NONGOVERNMENTAL  ORGANIZATIONS TO GOVERNMENTS,  FROM
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO PRIVATE FIRMS. THE POINT WOULD BE TO
INVEST THE MONEY SO AS TO FOSTER INNOVATIVE REGIONAL MILIEUS WHICH
DIRECT  THEIR  INVENTIVENESS  TO  THE  DEFINITION  OF  SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT ON A REGIONAL SCALE.  (ENVIROLINE)
DOING MORE WITH DEBT-FOR-NATURE  SWAPS
WAGNER RODNEY B. MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST  CO OF NEW YORK
INTL ENV AFFAIRS, SPRING  90, V2,  N2, P160(6)

   DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS  HAVE  BECOME UNPOPULAR IN MANY
LESS-DEVELOPED  COUNTRIES  (LDC) AND HAVE  BEEN LIMITED  OR  STOPPED
COMPLETELY,DUE  OFTENTIMES TO  INFLATION OR OPPOSITION  TO  FOREIGN
PRIVATE  INVESTMENT.  AN  ANALYSIS  OF   THE  LDC  DEBT  PROBLEM  IS
PRESENTED. DEBT-FOR-NATURE  PROJECTS MUST  BE  DEVELOPED,  DISCUSSED
WITH  THE HOST  GOVERNMENT,  DISCOUNTS  ESTABLISHED,  AND  PAYMENT
METHODS FOR LOCAL CURRENCY PUT INTO PLACE. DONATING DEBT IN THE US
IS HINDERED BY TWO REASONS: TAX  LAWS ARE  RIGOROUS ABOUT WHAT KIND
OF ORGANIZATION  RECEIVES  DONATIONS, AND  DONATING DEBT  IS  NOT AS
ATTRACTIVE AS SELLING DEBT FOR  CASH.  BUT EVEN WITHOUT  A  TAX-LAW
CHANGE,  DEBT-FOR-NATURE  SWAPS ARE AN  IDEA WORTH  PURSUING;  THESE
SWAPS ARE NOT INFLATIONARY, AND  HAVE THE  POTENTIAL TO CREATE JOBS
AND GET ECONOMIES MOVING. WHILE  DEBT-FOR-NATURE  SWAPS WON'T SOLVE
THE LDC'S DEBT PROBLEM, THEY HAVE THE POTENTIAL  TO DEMONSTRATE TO
THE WORLD THAT WE ARE DEFENSELESS IN THE FACE OF PROBLEMS THAT ARE
LARGER THAN OURSELVES. (ENVIROLINE)


DEBT-FOR-NATURE CONVERSION: WHAT LIMITS THEIR FURTHER GROWTH?
TAMMES GERRIT J. MNB  BANK, AMSTERDAM, NETH.
INTL ENV AFFAIRS, SPRING  90, V2,  N2, P153(7)

   THE WORLD BANK HAS CALCULATED THAT BY  APPLYING ALL OF THE
OTHER  TYPES   OF TRANSACTIONS   IN WHICH   BANKS  ARE  ACTIVE,  THE
AGGREGATE EXTERNAL DEBT OF THE  DEVELOPING NATIONS DIMINISHED BY $11
BILLION  IN   1988   COMPARED   TO  THE  $100  MILLION   USED   FOR
DEBT-FOR-NATURE CONVERSIONS. THE QUESTION  ARISES OF HOW MUCH LARGER
CAN THE  AMOUNTS  BE  MADE AVAILABLE FOR  FURTHER SWAPS. DUE  TO THE
FACT THAT RESTRUCTURED BANK  LOANS ARE BEING TRADED IN THE SECONDARY

                                53

-------
MARKET, A MAJOR PART OF THE DEBTOR-COUNTRY  DEBT REMAINS UNSUITABLE
FOR DEBT CONVERSION.  CALCULATIONS  BY THE WORD RESOUCES INST  SHOW
THAT, FOR NATURE CONSERVATION PROJECTS IN  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES
ALONE, $20-50  BILLION ARE REQUIRED EACH YEAR. A WAY TO  OVERCOME
THIS IS TO GET PRIVATE INVESTORS TO INVEST IN COMMERCIAL  PROJECTS
THROUGH   DEBT-EQUITY   CONVERSIONS,    OR  HAVE   NONGOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS AND A  PRIVATE INVESTOR PROVIDE PART OF THE FOREIGN
EXCHANGE. NUMEROUS  COMBINATIONS ARE  POSSIBLE  BETWEEN THE  BANKS,
CONSERVATION ORGANIZATIONS, AND THE CREDITOR COUNTRIES
WHO ARE GIVING DEBT RELIEF  TO POOR COUNTRIES.  (ENVIROLINE)
BANKS, DEBT, AND DEVELOPMENT-I
QUESADA ALVARO UMANA MINISTRY OF NATURAL RESOURCES ENERGY & MINES,
COSTA RICA
INTL ENV AFFAIRS, SPRING 90, V2, N2, P140(10)

   APPROPRIATE ECONOMIC INCENTIVES  TO TROPICAL  DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES COULD  SIGNIFICANTLY  REDUCE DEFORESTATION AND  SUPPORT A
MASSIVE BIOMASS  BUILDUP ON A GLOBAL SCALE. DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS
HAVE  PROVEN  TO  BE  ONE  OF THE MOST  INNOVATIVE  AND  EFFECTIVE
ALTERNATIVES TO CREATE VALUE IN  THE FORM OF LOCAL CURRENCY BONDS,
WHICH YIELD RESOURCES  THAT CAN BE UTILIZED TO  TRANSFORM THE DEBT
PROBLEM INTO  NEW OPPORTUNITIES TO SUPPORT CONSERVATION,  RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT, AND REFORESTATION. THE  DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS IN COSTA
RICA ARE PROFILED, BY ASSESSING  THE INDIVIDUAL  PROJECTS  AND
THE  EFFECTS  ON  INFLATION.  ALSO DISCUSSED  ARE  BILATERIAL  DEBT
OBLIGATIONS AND THE ROLE OF DEVELOPMENT BANKS.. EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE
URGENT GLOBAL TREATIES RECOGNIZING  AS COMMON RESOURCES OUR SHARED
ELEMENTS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED  AND EXPEDITED.
(ENVIROLINE)
BANKS, DEBT, AND DEVELOPMENT-II
SEVILLA ROQUE FUNDACION NATURA,  ECUADOR
INTL ENV AFFAIRS, SPRING  90, V2, N2,  P150(3)

   A BRIEF ASSESSMENT  OF  DEBT-FOR-NATURE  SWAPS  IS GIVEN BY
THE PRESIDENT OF THE FUNDACION NATURA, ECUADOR.  IN THE DEBT FIELD,
INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS MUST HELP IMPROVE THE STANDARD OF LIVING AND
EDUCATION OF THOSE LESS FORTUNATE LIVING IN THE DEVELOPING NATIONS.
BANKERS MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THEY HAVE AN ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITY TO
SOLVE THESE  LONG-TERM PROBLEMS,  AND NOT EXPECT A QUICK RETURN ON
THEIR  INVESTMENT.   AND CONTRIBUTIONS MUST  COME  FROM ALL  SIDES:
DEVELOPING  NATIONS  MUST  BEGIN  TO DEAL  WITH OVERPOPULATION AND
DEFORESTATION, WHILE INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS MUST REDUCE THEIR TOXIC
EMISSIONS.  (ENVIROLINE)
                                54

-------
THIRD WORLD DEBT:  ARE  THERE OPPORTUNITIES FOR FORESTRY?
PRESTEMON,  JEFFREY P.  (NORTH CAROLINA STATE  UNIV,  RALEIGH)  AND;
LAMPMAN,  SCOTT  E.  (INTL  COMPUTERS  &  TELECOMMUNICATIONS  INC,
ARLINGTON, VA)
J FORESTRY, FEE  90, V88,  N2,  P12(5)

   DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES  OWED MORE  THAN  $1.2 TRILLION  TO  OTHER
COUNTRIES  BY  1988. TO REPAY  THESE  LOANS,  DEBTOR COUNTRIES  HAVE
BEGUN  TO  LIQUIDATE  NATURAL RESOURCES,  OFTEN   WITH  DISASTROUS
ENVIRONMENTAL    CONSEQUENCES.    ALTERNATIVE    DEBT-EQUITY    AND
DEBT-FOR-NATURE  SWAPPING OPPORTUNITIES,  IN  WHICH FOREIGN DEBT IS
EXCHANGED  FOR  LOCAL  COMMERCIAL  OR  NON-COMMERCIAL  INVESTMENT,
REQUIRE THE COOPERATION OF DEBTOR COUNTRIES, THE  WILLINGNESS OF A
BANK  OWNING  DEBT OF  THAT  COUNTRY  TO  SELL   AT  A   DISCOUNT,
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS  OR PRIVATE VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS THAT
PURCHASE THE DEBT,  AND A FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY.  THE ADVANTAGES AND
DISADVANTAGES TO THESE PARTIES ARE OUTLINED, AND  OPPORTUNITIES FOR
FORESTRY ARE DESCRIBED.   (ENVIROLINE)
DEBT-FOR-NATURE  SWAPS
FULLER KATHRYN S.  PRESIDENT,  WORLD WILDLIFE FUND
ENV SCIENCE  & TECHNOLOGY,  DEC 89,  V23, N12, P1450(2)

   THE DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAP IS AN  INNOVATIVE FINANCIAL MECHANISM
AIMED AT LEVERAGING  CONSERVATION DOLLARS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD.
THE SWAPS INVOLVE THE ACQUISITION OF A DEVELOPING NATION'S DEBT BY
CONSERVATION ORGANIZATIONS AT A DISCOUNT, ITS REDEMPTION IN  LOCAL
CURRENCY,  AND  ITS  USE  FOR  CONSERVATION  PURPOSES.  SUCCESSFUL
DEBT-FOR-NATURE  SWAP  EFFORTS  HAVE  SERVED  TO PROTECT  TROPICAL
FORESTS AROUND AN EXISTING RESERVE IN BOLIVIA  AND TO EXPAND  THE
PARK SYSTEM  IN COSTA RICA.  WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SIX PRIVATE
DEBT SWAPS TO DATE, WORLDWIDE ACCEPTANCE  FOR THESE  DEALS HAS  GROWN
AND THE CONCEPT  IS RIPE FOR EXPANSION IN LIGHT OF THE CONTINUING
DEBT CRISIS  AND  INCREASING CONCERN OVER THE  STATE OF THE GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENT.   (ENVIROLINE)


DEBT-FOR-NATURE  SWAPS:  EXPERIENCE GAINED, LESSONS LEARNED
PAGE DIANA WORLD RESOURCES INST,  WASHINGTON,  DC
INTL ENV AFFAIRS,  FALL 89,  VI,  N4,  P275(14)

   DEBT-FOR-NATURE PROGRAMS WERE FIRST INITIATED IN LATIN AMERICA
IN THE LATE 1980S.  THE PROGRAM INVOLVES CANCELLING A CERTAIN AMOUNT
OF  FOREIGN  DEBT  IN  EXCHANGE  FOR  LOCAL  CURRENCY  INVESTMENTS  IN
PROGRAMS  THAT WILL  IMPROVE  NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT  IN  THE
DEBTOR COUNTRY.  RESULTS OF THE PROGRAM ARE ASSESSED FOR BOLIVIA,
COSTA RICA,  ECUADOR, AND THE PHILIPPINES.  IT IS  STILL TOO EARLY TO
EVALUATE WHETHER OR NOT THE PROGRAM IS WORKING. ASSESSMENTS OF  THE
PROGRAM  IN  GENERAL  INCLUDE  TERMS  OF  THE SWAPS  AND  THE  NATURE
PROGRAM TARGETED. WHILE NOT ALL GOVERNMENTS ARE WILLING TO DELEGATE
MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY OF AN INTERNATIONALLY  FUNDED ENVIRONMENTAL

                                55

-------
PROGRAM, THE PROTECTION OF BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, REFORESTATION, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION  ARE  NOW RECEIVING MORE  FUNDS THAN WOULD
HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE WITHOUT THE DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS.  (ENVIROLINE)


Doing It Naturally: The Greening of International Finance
Burand, Deborah
International Financial Law Review (UK) v8n9 PP: 37-39 Sep 1989

   Faced   with  a   growing   need   for  financial   resources,
conservationists working in developing countries have initiated a
new finance mechanism -debt-for-nature exchange - for turning their
dollars into local currency investments in conservation. In these
exchanges, the conservation organization acquires a debt and agrees
to extinguish  it  in return for the  host  country' s commitment of
additional  local  resources to  conservation programs.  The first
debt-for-nature exchange occurred in Bolivia in July 1987, and many
countries have followed suit. Three factors make these transactions
a  viable  means  of  supporting  ecosystem conservation  in  less
developed countries (LDC) : 1.  an  increasing  number of commercial
debt holders are disposing of their Third World loan portfolios, 2.
the price of Third World loans in the  secondary market  is dropping,
and  3.  many LDC  governments recognize  that debt exchanges  for
nonprofit purposes  are  of equal or  greater  importance  than many
other  profit-oriented   investments.   However,   these  exchanges
illuminate many of the difficulties confronting those involved in
the LDC conservation and debt crises.  (ABI/INFORM)


Debt-for-nature swaps: debt relief and biosphere preservation?
Winthrop, Stephen VanR.
SAIS (School Advanced  Internat Studies) R  9:129-49  Summer/Fall '89

   Programs, similar  to  debt-equity swaps,  designed  to conserve
tropical rain forests  in Central and South America.,  Experiences in
Bolivia, Costa Rica, and Ecuador since 1987.   (PAIS)
USING RED INK TO KEEP TROPICAL FORESTS GREEN
WORK CLEMENS P. AND ; SMITH GERI
US NEWS & WORLD REPORT, MAR 6, 89, V106, N9, P48(2)

   DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS HELP RESCUE FRAGILE ECOSYSTEMS FROM
DEVELOPMENT  WHILE  REDUCING   ECONOMICALLY  STRESSED  COUNTRIES'
ECONOMIC  DEBT.  NEGOTATIONS ARE  CURRENTLY  UNDERWAY TO  SAVE THE
REMAINING FORESTS OF THE MATA ATLANTICA COASTAL FOREST OF BRAZIL.
THE ECONOMICS OF THE SWAPS CALL FOR SALE OF A COUNTRY'S DEBT AT A
DEEP DISCOUNT TO A CONSERVATION ORGANIZATION. THE COUNTRY'S CENTRAL
BANK THEN REDEEMS THE  DEBT  AND ISSUES LOCAL-CURRENCY BONDS WHICH
PROVIDE  INTEREST  TO   FINANCE  LOCAL  ENVIRONMENTAL  PROTECTION
PROJECTS. THIS ARRANGEMENT TENDS TO EXACERBATE LOCAL INFLATION,
AND OFTEN DOES  NOT SIGNIFICANTLY  REDUCE OVERALL DEBT.  SWAPS HAVE

                                56

-------
BEEN  SUCCESSFUL   IN   BOLIVIA,   ECUADOR,  COSTA  RICA,  AND   THE
PHILLIPINES.   (ENVIROLINE)


DEBT FOR NATURE SWAPS: OVERVIEW AND DISCUSSION OF KEY  ISSUES
HANSEN STEIN ORNEVEIEN, BEKKESTUA, NORWAY,
ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS,  FEB 89, VI, Nl,  P77(17)

   THE PRESENT DEBT SITUATION OF MANY DEVELOPING NATIONS POSSESSING
TROPICAL FORESTS IS VIEWED AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO TRADE  OFF  BAD
DEBTS AGAINST  HABITAT PRESERVATION.  IN  THE  DEBT FOR  NATURE  SWAP
CONCEPT, A  DEVELOPING NATION'S  DEBT  IS PURCHASED  AT A DISCOUNT
VALUE IN  THE SECONDARY DEBT MARKET  AND CANCELLED  IN RETURN FOR
ENVIRONMENT-RELATED ACTION N THE PART OF THE DEBTOR  NATION. IF THE
AMOUNTS AT STAKE ARE MARGINAL RELATIVE TO A NATION'S DEBT  BURDEN,
SUCH ARRANGEMENTS  MAY  PROVE BENEFICIAL BECAUSE  THE  OPPORTUNITY
COSTS OF THE FREED FUNDS ARE VERY LOW. THE MOST IMPORTANT
CONTRIBUTION OF  AGGRESSIVE  PROMOTION  OF SUCH SWAPS  WILL BE THE
REALIZATION  BY  POLICY  MAKERS   OF   THE  MANY  CONSEQUENCES  OF
ACCELERATING ENVIRONMENTAL  DEGRADATION  OF  MANY  FRAGILE TROPICAL
HABITATS ALONG WITH INCREASED AWARENESS OF  THE  OPPORTUNITY  COST OF
DIMINISHING RENEWABLE  RESOURCES.   (ENVIROLINE)


HANDS ACROSS THE SEA  (PLANET OF THE YEAR)
SANCTON THOMAS A.
TIME, JAN 2, 89, V133, Nl, P54(3)

   MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION IS ESSENTIAL TO EFFECTIVELY
PROTECT THE EARTH'S ENVIRONMENT.  RESEARCH,  EDUCATION, AND CONCRETE
ACTION ARE NEEDED TO PROPEL  COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES.
THE  LARGEST  STUMBLING BLOCK  TO  SUCH  INITIATIVES  IS   POVERTY AND
FOREIGN DEBT. A GREATER SHARE OF THE WORLD'S CAPITAL WILL  HAVE TO
FLOW INTO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES FOR THE  CORRECTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
IMBALANCES.  ONE SOLUTION SCENARIO  CALLS  FOR  REDUCED MILITARY
SPENDING BY WORLD  POWERS  WHICH WOULD  IN TURN FREE  UP  FUNDING FOR
DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS. ADDITIONAL AGENDA
INCLUDES  RAISING GASOLINE  TAXES, TIGHTER AUTO  FUEL  EFFICIENCY
REQUIREMENTS, INCREASED WASTE RECYCLING, PROMOTION  OF  NATURAL GAS
USAGE,  EXPANSION OF FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAMS, RATIFICATION OF THE
1982  UN  CONVENTION   ON  LAW  OF  THE   SEA,   ENCOURAGEMENT  OF
DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS, AND MAKING THE ENVIRONMENT AN INTERNATIONAL
PRIORITY.  (ENVIROLINE)
DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS: A NEW STRATEGY FOR PROTECTING ENVIRONMENTAL
INTERESTS IN DEVELOPING NATIONS
HAMLIN TIMOTHY B.
ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY, 1989, V16, N4, P1065(24)

   DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS  ATTEMPT TO  CONTROL  THE EXPLOITATION  OF
NATURAL RESOURCES WITHOUT IGNORING THE ECONOMIC NEEDS OF DEVELOPING

                                57

-------
NATIONS. THE  SWAPS RESTRUCTURE  OR RETIRE  SOME OF  A DEVELOPING
NATION'S  DEBT  IN  RETURN  FOR  PROTECTION  OF  UNDEVELOPED  AND
ENVIRONMENTALLY SENSITIVE AREAS WITHIN THE COUNTRY. THE DEBT-FOR-
NATURE SWAPS IN BOLIVIA, ECUADOR, COSTA RICA, AND THE PHILIPPINES
ARE ASSESSED.  CONSERVATION INTL INITIATED THE FIRST AGREEMENT WITH
BOLIVIA IN 1987,  FOLLOWED BY A  SIMILAR AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE WORLD
WILDLIFE FUND AND THE  THREE OTHER COUNTRIES. DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS
HAVE NOT MET  THEIR GOALS  AS  WELL AS  WAS  FIRST HOPED,  BUT THEY
REMAIN AN APPEALING SMALL-SCALE MEANS FOR PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS TO
PROTECT ENVIRONMENTAL INTERESTS ABROAD. IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT LARGE-
SCALE SWAPS ARE ECONOMICALLY OR POLITICALLY FEASIBLE OR DESIRABLE
AT PRESENT. AS TROPICAL FORESTS HAVE ONLY AS MUCH PROTECTION AS THE
TROPICAL STATES DESIRE, IT IS HOPED THAT THESE COLLABORATIONS WILL
CONTRIBUTE  TO A  CONSTRUCTIVE  FRAMEWORK FOR  FUTURE  CONSERVATION
EFFORTS.   (ENVIROLINE)


Save a tree/ donate some debt
(debt-for-nature swaps in developing countries)
Barrett, Scott
Multinational Business Wntr (end of year),  1988, p37(2)

   Costa Rica, Ecuador,  and Bolivia  have  improved their finances
and  protected their  rain  forests by  trading debt  purchased by
conservation groups for  promises to  protect the rain forests. US
conservation groups have contributed $3.2 million to the program in
Costa Rica and $1 million in Ecuador. US tax changes have made it
more  attractive  for   banks to  donate their  foreign  loans  to
conservation  groups.   Argentina,   Chile,  Brazil  Mexico  and  the
Philippines are also interested in trading debts for conservation.
(MANAGEMENT CONTENTS)


Back to Nature — The Financial Way
Burton, Jonathan
Banker  (UK) v!38n754 PP: 22-25 Dec 1988

   Environmentalists  have  created  debt-for-nature  swap  deals
designed to retire a country's  debt in  exchange  for cooperation on
environnmental matters. For example,  a debt-for-nature arrangement
could  involve a  conservation  group's  purchase  of  debt  in  the
secondary market at a  steep discount. A government then can buy the
debt in local currency at a premium but below face value, and the
proceeds can  be  utilized by local  conservationists  to fund such
efforts as land preservation, forestry  projects, and environmental
education.  These  deals apparently satisfy  all  parties:  the bank
rids itself of a troubled asset, the government reduces some  of its
debt burden,  and  conservationists help preserve nature.  However,
these conversions have totaled  only about $10 million thus far, and
they are having  difficulty finding acceptance in mainstream debt
solutions. Most banks  initiating  the debt-for-nature swaps have not
been of the large money-center variety. (ABI/INFORM)

                                58

-------
Conservation Groups Help to Bail Out the Big Banks
Anonymous
Business & Society Review n65 PP: 34-38 Spring 1988

   Conservation  groups  have  found  a way to  protect  natural
resources in developing nations while helping these countries meet
their debts.  "Debt-for-nature swapping" involves the acquisition of
debt by conservation groups and its redemption in local currency to
be used for  conservation  purposes.  In July 1987, Bolivia entered
into the first debt-for-nature swap with Conservation International
(CI) ,  a  US  organization.  CI  purchased  $650,000 of Bolivia's
commercial debt for $100,000, and, in exchange,  Bolivia agreed to
demarcate 3.7 million  acres  of tropical  rain forest as protected
area. The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) has entered a swap  with Ecuador
that converts external  debt into local currency bonds to be held by
Fundacion   Natura,   Ecuador's   leading    private   conservation
organization.  The  Treasury  Department  has recently  adopted  new
rules giving banks a better tax break if they wish to  donate debt
for conservation purposes. (ABI/INFORM)
GUANACASTE: THE DAWN OF A PARK
MCLARNEY WILLIAM 0.
ANAI, COSTA RICA,
NATURE CONSERVANCY, JAN-FEB 88, V38, Nl, Pll(5)

   NOT ALL TROPICAL FORESTS ARE RAIN FORESTS. RARER ARE DECIDUOUS
DRY FORESTS LIKE THAT  OF  GUANACASTE NATL PARK IN NORTHWEST COSTA
RICA. THROUGH A PROGRAM OF LAND ACQUISITION, THE PARK IS EXPANDING.
CREATIVE LAND  MANAGEMENT  IS ENCOURAGING EXPANSION  OF THE FOREST
ITSELF, EVENTUALLY ENCOMPASSING 280 SQUARE  MI,  FROM  THE PACIFIC TO
THE CORDILLERA DE GUANACASTE. MUCH OF THE SUCCESS OF  THE PROGRAM SO
FAR HAS BEEN DUE TO INTERNATIONAL INTEREST  AND A  ""DEBT PURCHASE'1
PLAN. WHEN A DONOR PAYS OFF SOME OF  COSTA RICA'S  FOREIGN DEBT, THE
COSTA RICA  GOVERNMENT RELEASES MATCHING FUNDS AT A  FOUR TO ONE
RATIO. SINCE THE LAND BEING ACQUIRED BELONGS ON THE  WHOLE  TO A FEW
FAMILIES, THE PARK MEANS JOB OPPORTUNITIES  FOR THE LOCAL POPULACE,
NOT  DISPLACEMENT.   FOR THE  WILD POPULATION-AGOUTIS,  WHITE-FACE
MONKEYS, SATURNIID  MOTHS,  BOAT-BILLED  HERONS AMONG THEM-IT MEANS
THE PRESERVATION OF THEIR HABITAT.    (ENVIROLINE)


DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS: A NEW CONSERVATION TOOL
WORLD WILDLIFE FUND LETTER, 1988, Nl, PI(9)

   DEVELOPING NATIONS,  PRIMARILY THOSE IN LATIN AMERICA, OWE NEARLY
$1.2  TRILLION  TO PUBLIC  AND PRIVATE LENDING  INSTITUTIONS.  MANY
NATIONS HAVE EXPERIENCED DIFFICULTY IN MEETING THEIR OBLIGATIONS,
LEADING  TO  THE EVOLUTION  OF DEBT  EXCHANGE PROGRAMS.  DEVELOPING
NATIONS MAY NOT BE WILLING OR ABLE TO PROVIDE THE US  DOLLARS NEEDED
TO REPAY THEIR DEBTS, BUT THEY CAN OFFER CREDITORS SOMETHING ELSE
INSTEAD. DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS HELP REDUCE  ENVIRONMENTAL  PROBLEMS

                                59

-------
SUCH AS  TROPICAL DEFORESTATION  WHILE  RELIEVING DEBT  BURDENS AND
ALLOWING  CONTINUED  ECONOMIC GROWTH. THE SUCCESS OF  SEVERAL SUCH
SWAPS TO DATE IS NOTED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING SUCH DEBT
EXCHANGE EFFORTS AND FOR LINKING CONSERVATION WITH DEVELOPMENT ARE
OFFERED.  (ENVIROLINE)
VI.   POLLUTION PREVENTION
"PLASTIC IS BAD" AND OTHER MYTHS
TOMPKINS DAVID HIMONT,
INNOVATION, SUMMER 90, V9, N2,  Pll(4)

   PLASTICS  COMPRISE  7%  BY  WEIGHT  OF  AMERICAN  SOLID  WASTES
GENERATED ANNUALLY. THE SOLUTION TO SOLID WASTE REDUCTION IS REUSE
AND RECYCLING. APPROXIMATELY  200 MILLION LB OF PLASTIC SOFT DRINK
BOTTLES ARE CURRENTLY RECYCLED; THIS TOTAL MAY  REACH 700 MILLION LB
BY 1993.  FACED WITH REGULATIONS  RESTRICTING  OR  BANNING PLASTIC-
BASED  PRODUCTS,  MANUFACTURERS  AND THEIR  CUSTOMERS ARE  DEVISING
TRASH RECOVERY  SYSTEMS AND IDENTIFYING  APPLICATIONS  FOR RECYCLED
PLASTIC.  VERSATILE,  COMPATIBLE  FAMILIES  OF  PLASTICS  SUCH  AS
POLYPROPYLENE ARE BEING DESIGNED FOR USE  IN VARIED APPLICATIONS AND
FOR  EFFICIENT  RECYCLING.  INDUSTRIAL  DESIGNERS  NEED  TO TAKE  A
PRIMARY  ROLE ON  BEHALF  OF  ENVIRONMENTALLY   RESPONSIBLE  DESIGN.
(ENVIROLINE)
TAKING OUT AMERICA'S TRASH
EHRBAR TOMMY
PITT MAGAZINE, JUN 90, V5, N3,  P30(6)

   ABOUT 10% OF US TRASH  IS RECYCLED,  ANOTHER 10% IS INCINERATED,
AND THE REMAINING 80% IS SENT TO LANDFILLS. BETTER DUMPING, BETTER
BURNING, AND RECYCLING CAN ALL HELP MANAGE  OUR SOLID WASTE PROBLEM,
BUT  SOURCE   MINIMIZATION  IS   BECOMING  THE   MOST  SIGNIFICANT
DEVELOPMENT  IN  THIS  FIELD.  THE  STATE  OF OUR SOLID  WASTE PROBLEM
TODAY  IS  ASSESSED, AND  FUTURE   DIRECTIONS  ARE  PROPOSED.  UNIV OF
PITTSBURGH'S NATL ENV TECHNOLOGY APPLICATIONS CORP,  A  CENTER SET
UP  FOR THE  COMMERCIALIZATION   OF ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY,  IS
PROFILED.   (ENVIROLINE)


AFTER 20 YEARS: THE CRISIS OP ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
COMMONER BARRY
NEW SOLUTIONS, SPRING  90, VI, Nl,  P22(8)

   A MAJOR REORIENTATION OF THE  ENVIRONMENTAL EFFORT, WHICH FOR THE
LAST 20 YEARS HAS BEEN BASED ON CONTROL ONLY AFTER POLLUTANTS HAVE
BEEN PRODUCED, IS NECESSARY;  POLLUTION PREVENTION IS REQUIRED.
                                60

-------
POLLUTION  PREVENTION  MEANS  ELIMINATING A  POLLUTING  PRODUCTION
PROCESS  BY SUBSTITUTING A  MORE  ENVIRONMENTALLY BENIGN  METHOD OF
PRODUCTION. EXAMPLES ARE PRESENTED OF HOW POLLUTION CAN BE ATTACKED
AT  ITS SOURCE  AND THEREBY  PREVENTED.  THE  IDEA  THAT A SPECIFIC
POLLUTANT  HAS AN  ACCEPTABLE HEALTH  RISK  IS  THE  INVERSE OF  THE
PREVENTIVE  PUBLIC  HEALTH APPROACH. THE MOST SERIOUS  HINDRANCE TO
THE  PREVENTION  STRATEGY IS  IMPLEMENTATION.  CURRENT METHODS  OF
PRODUCTION  ARE  THE  PRESUMABLY  PROFIT-MAXIMIZING  RESPONSES  TO
ECONOMIC  FORCES, AND  THERE WILL BE  MUCH  RESISTANCE TO CHANGING
THEM. THIS HURDLE CAN ONLY BE SURMOUNTED BY CONCERTED GOVERNMENTAL
ACTION.   (ENVIROLINE)
AMERICA'S ENERGY FUTURE:  CONSERVATION AND RENEWABLES ARE THE PATH
TO TAKE
ROSS JEFFREY S.
BEYOND EARTH DAY  (SCIENCE FOR  THE  PEOPLE),  MAY 90,  PI(2)

   THE FUTURE OF ENERGY USE  IN THE US SHOULD INVOLVE CONSERVATION
AND RENEWABLE SOURCES.  THE GREATEST  ENERGY  CONSERVATION  COULD BE
ACHIEVED BY SIMPLY ELIMINATING PURE WASTE AND UTILIZING AVAILABLE,
MORE  EFFICIENT  TECHNOLOGY.  A  1985  NAS  STUDY  PREDICTED THAT  US
ENERGY CONSUMPTION  COULD BE CUT IN HALF BY LEAK PLUGGING  ALONE,
WITH  TECHNOLOGIES  SUCH  AS  WEATHERSTRIPPING,  HEAT  EXCHANGERS,
GREENHOUSES, SUPERWINDOWS AND  OTHER INSULATION DEVICES.  RENEWABLE
ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES WORTH PURSUING INCLUDE BIOMASS,  WIND POWER AND
SOLAR ENERGY. BESIDES THE OBVIOUS  ECONOMIC COSTS, MANY SOCIAL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS COULD BE  AVOIDED THROUGH THESE AVAILABLE ENERGY
SOURCES.  AS A  NATION,  WE  MUST  DEMAND  THAT CONGRESS  AND  THE
PRESIDENT CHANGE THE DIRECTION OF US ENERGY POLICY,  SO THAT ENERGY
EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLES CAN ACHIEVE THE PROMINENCE THEY DESERVE.
(ENVIROLINE)
SAVING AN ECOSYSTEM: FROM BUFFER  ZONE  TO  PRIVATE  INITIATIVES
LEAL DONALD
POLITICAL ECONOMY RESEARCH CENTER,
THE YELLOWSTONE PRIMER: LAND  & RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE GREATER
YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM  (PACIFIC RESEARCH),  1990, P25(21)

   MANY ENVIRONMENTALISTS FEEL THAT THE BEST WAY  TO SLOW ABUSE IN
THE GREATER YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM IS TO CREATE A BUFFER ZONE AROUND
YELLOWSTONE AND GRAND TETON NATL PARKS, WHICH WOULD LEGALLY PROTECT
THE  ECOSYSTEM  FROM  ACTIVITIES  CONSIDERED  THREATENING  TO  THE
ENVIRONMENT.  ARGUMENTS ARE PROPOSED  TO REFORM  THE AREA  WITHOUT
INCREASING GOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTION.  RATHER THAN DEMANDING BUFFER
ZONES TO PROTECT THE  PARKS, ENVIRONMENTALISTS SHOULD WORK TO REFORM
EXISTING GOVERNMENT  INSTITUTIONS, SUCH AS  THE USFS TIMBER PROGRAM
THAT IS RUNNING A DEFICIT IN ALL  OF THE NATIONAL  FORESTS
SURROUNDING YELLOWSTONE. AN END TO DEFICIT TIMBER SALES WOULD STOP
OVERSTRESSING THE  ENVIRONMENT AND SAVE  TAXPAYERS MONEY.  GREATER
EFFICIENCY IS ULTIMATELY OBTAINED  THROUGH PRIVATE STEWARDSHIP; ONLY

                                61

-------
THROUGH PRIVATE OWNERSHIP IS AUTHORITY ALIGNED WITH RESPONSIBILITY.
[Book chapter]  (ENVIROLINE)


THE NEW RESOURCE ECONOMICS
COPELAND MICHAEL D.
MONTANA STATE UNIV, BOZEMAN
THE YELLOWSTONE PRIMER: LAND & RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE GREATER
YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM  (PACIFIC RESEARCH), 1990, P13(ll)

   NEW RESOURCE ECONOMICS (NRE)  CRITICALLY EXAMINES THE PREVAILING
ENVIRONMENTAL ORTHODOXY.  NRE WAS DEVELOPED AT THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
RESEARCH CENTER IN BOZEMAN, MT, FROM A CONCERN FOR THE ENVIRONMENT,
WHICH  WAS  BEING   COMPROMISED  BY  THE  VERY GOVERNMENT  AGENCIES
ASSIGNED  TO  PROTECT  IT.   THIS  PHILOSOPHY  IS APPLIED TO  THE
PRESERVATION  AND   IMPROVEMENT   OF  YELLOWSTONE  NATL   PARK.   BY
ADVOCATING THE  PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF RESOURCES, NRE PROVIDES  SOME
ALTERNATIVES   TO   THE  PRESENT   COMMAND-AND-CONTROL  MANAGEMENT
TECHNIQUES. NRE WOULD  CREATE  PRIVATE INCENTIVES AND INSTITUTIONS
WHENEVER POSSIBLE, AND WOULD UTILIZE THE MARKET SYSTEM TO GENERATE
THE PRICE INFORMATION NEEDED TO  MAKE GOOD DECISIONS. THUS, PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP  WOULD,   IN  MANY  CASES,  REPLACE  GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP.
[Book chapter]  (ENVIROLINE)
                                62

-------
     EPA HEADQUARTERS  LIBRARY MANAGEMENT COLLECTION

          List of Management Bibliographies

1.   EFFECTIVE CONFERENCE PLANNING
     by Sigrid N. Smith, March 1991
     EPA/IMSD-91-002

2.   CONTRACT MANAGEMENT
     by Mary Hoffman and Sigrid N. Smith, January 1991
     EPA/IMSD-91-001

3.   MANAGING A DIVERSE WORK FORCE
     by Anne Twitchell,  September 1990
     EPA/IMSD-90-011

4.   PROJECT MANAGEMENT
     by Anne Twitchell,  June 1990
     EPA/IMSD-90-007

5.   STRATEGIC PLANNING
     by Anne Twitchell,  March 1990
     EPA/IMSD-90-005

6.   TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT
     by Anne Twitchell,  December 1989
     EPA/IMSD-89-009

7.   LEADERSHIP: QUALITY MANAGEMENT FOR THE FUTURE
     by Anne Twitchell,  September 1989
     EPA/IMSD-89-005

8.   COMMUNICATION SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT
     by Anne Twitchell,  June 1989
     EPA/IMSD-89-003

9.   EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS
     by Anne Twitchell,  March 1989
     EPA/IMSD-89-002

10.  OFFICE OF THE FUTURE: THE MANAGER'S ROLE
     by Anne Twitchell,  December 1988
     EPA/IMSD-88-013

11.  OFFICE OF THE FUTURE: THE CHANGING ROLE OF SECRETARIES
     by Mary Hoffman and Anne Twichell,  revised May 1989

12.  MANAGEMENT TRANSITION
     by Mary Hoffman and Anne Twitchell,  September 1988
     EPA/IMSD-88-007

                           63

-------
         13.   MANAGING  IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
              by Mary Hoffman,   March 1988
              EPA/IMSD-88-003

         14.   RESISTANCE  TO CHANGE
              by Mary Hoffman,   December  1987
              EPA/IMSD-87-011

         15.   INTRAPRENEURSHIP:  THE EMERGING FORCE
              by Mary Hoffman,   September 1987

         16.   SUPERVISORS AND HUMAN RESOURCES
              by Mary Hoffman,   June 1987
              EPA/IMSD-87-0062

         17.   TECHNICAL EXPERT TURNED MANAGER
              by Mary Hoffman,   March 1987
US. Environmental Protection Agency
Region 5, library (PI-12J)   12th Roor
77 West J»cks«n Boulevard, 12th rioor
Chicago, IU 60604-3590
                                     64

-------