Municipal
Solid
Waste
Reprinted from
The Tenth Annual Report of the
Council on Environmental Quality
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U.S. Environmental Protection Agency SW-843
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Municipal
Solid
Waste
Reprinted from
The Tenth Annual Report of the
Council on Environmental Quality
December 1979
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FOREWORD
As the nation's cities enter the 1980s, they face new problems in
managing solid waste. Landfill sites are no longer easy to obtain. As
we learn more about the value of certain habitats and the need to
prevent air and water pollution, various sites once commonly used
for disposal—wetlands and floodplains, for example—must be ruled
out. Local residents oppose other proposed new sites because they
will bring traffic, noise, odors, and other kinds of environmental
degradation to their neighborhoods. Disposal costs are rising. Yet
the amount of waste that we generate continues to increase. It was
up 10 percent per capita in the last decade.
A number of city managers, planners, and other officials who deal
with solid waste are experimenting with new ways to turn urban
trash from a liability into an asset. More than 20 cities, some with
assistance from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
have built plants designed to convert their trash to energy. The plants
range from a small 20 ton-per-day facility in Siloam Springs, Arkan-
sas, to plants in Akron, Ohio, and Saugus, Massachusetts, capable of
handling close to 2,000 tons per day. More than 40 cities are requiring
residents to separate their garbage into its recyclable components—
paper, cans, glass, other wastes—and are separately collecting and
selling the reusable portions.
This report describes some of these efforts and discusses the chang-
ing economics and regulatory framework of solid waste disposal.
These pioneering efforts to recover valuable resources from solid
waste—some of them assisted by EPA and the Department of
Energy—brought environmental benefits. Many helped solve the
mounting problem of municipal waste disposal and also saved the
taxpayers money. EPA is encouraging more efforts of this kind
through planning grants to several dozen cities.
Originally published as Chapter 4 of Environmental Quality—
7979: The Tenth Annual Report of the Council on Environmental
Quality and reprinted by EPA, this report offers ideas and informa-
tion useful to public officials and private citizens concerned about
disposing of waste at reasonable cost and about saving landfill space,
energy, and materials.
Gus SPETH, Chairman
III
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CONTENTS
Page
Foreword iii
Background: Factors Affecting Resource Recovery 6
Potential for Resource Recovery 6
Economics of Waste Disposal _ 6
Impact of New Environmental Control Regulations 8
Source Separation.. 10
Existing Programs 10
Advantages 11
Public Participation Rates 13
Cost and Market Problems 15
Long-Term Prospects for Markets 17
Centralized Waste Processing 21
Current Status 21
Advantages 22
Technological Barriers. 27
Pollution and Workers' Safety and Health Problems 32
Market Problems 32
Institutional Barriers 33
Economic Barriers 35
Compatibility of Source Separation and Centralized Resource Recovery
Systems 36
Federal Activities 40
Economic Incentives for Waste Reduction and Recycling 41
Beverage Container Deposits 41
Other Deposit Systems 42
National Litter Tax 42
Solid Waste Disposal Charge 43
Local User Fee 44
Product Design Regulations 44
Tax Policies 45
Freight Rate Discrimination 45
Materials Recycling 47
Beverage Container Deposits at Federal Facilities. 47
Federal Procurement of Recycled Materials 48
Energy Recovery Programs 48
Research and Development 48
Planning Assistance 49
Capital Cost Assistance 51
Outlook for the Future 51
References 54
IV
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MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE
Before 1970 the question of what to do with a city's waste was
hardly ever asked. The answer was obvious: either burn it in an
incinerator or take it to a dump.
During this decade conditions have changed. Obtaining land for
dumping has become more difficult as existing sites have filled up,
nearby residents have opposed new sites, and the commercial or eco-
logical importance of places once considered convenient dump sites—
such as wetlands—has been recognized. At the same time, the total
amount of waste has been increasing. Municipal waste, which rose
at a rate of 5 percent a year from 1960 to 1970, slowed to a rate of
about 2 percent a year from 1970 to 1978, but is still on the upswing.
In fact, as Figure 4-1 shows, residential and commercial gross dis-
cards rose in every year of this decade except 1974 and 1975, both
recession years. Total U.S. municipal waste was estimated at 154
million tons for 1978, the equivalent of 1,400 pounds per person.
The amount of municipal waste generated per person also in-
creased overall for the decade, declining somewhat during 1974 and
1975, but then rising again to an average level of 3.85 pounds per day
in 1978 (see Figure 4-2). The rate of increase per person for the
period 1970 to 1978 averaged approximately 1 percent annually.
During this period, labor and equipment costs associated with waste
disposal also rose.1
As the economics and politics of waste disposal have changed, so
has environmental awareness. Solid waste disposal is now coming
under much more stringent regulation than in the past. The Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act,2 passed by Congress in 1976, set as
an objective the complete elimination of open dumps and the up-
grading of other waste disposal practices. It offered federal help to
states to create waste management plans and to bring waste disposal
systems up to federal standards. These changes could easily double the
cost of landfilling wastes in many areas.
Squeezed by increasing amounts of waste, disappearing disposal
sites, and tightening restrictions on use of the sites, many local gov-
ernment officials and businesses involved in solid waste disposal have
begun to consider alternatives to disposing of wastes in sanitary land-
fills. Municipal trash, after all, contains many potentially useful items.
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Figure 4-1
Estimated U.S. Post-Consumer Solid Waste Generated
and Recycled, 1960-85a
M
200 i-
180
160
140
120
100
80
SO
Amount recycled
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
'Projections assume no major new federal policies to reduce waste generation
Source: Analysis by Franklin Associates, Ltd for U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Office of Solid Waste.
Newspapers, aluminum and steel cans, glass bottles, and rubber tires
can all be reused, either as is or after reprocessing. Food wastes have
potential value as compost. A wide variety of components, including
paper, food, and yard wastes, can be burned to make energy—a fact
of great importance in a world of rapidly rising energy prices. (The
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Figure 4-2
Estimated Average Individual Waste Generation,
1960-85 a
5 r
3.5
3
2.5
i
1960
1955
1970
1975
1980
1985
'Projections assume no major new federal policies to reduce waste generation.
Source. Analysis by Franklin Associates, Ltd. for U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Office of Solid Waste.
estimated composition of the nation's municipal waste for the pe-
riod 1960 to 1985 appears in Figure 4-3.)
Two of the cities that showed an early interest in recycling were
St. Louis, Mo., and Denver, Colo. In St. Louis, the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Union Electric Co., a
private utility, began operating a small pilot plant for recovering
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Figure 4-3
Estimated3 Generation of Residential and Commercial
Post-Consumer Solid Waste, by Material, 1960-85
200 i-
150 -
g 100 -
1960
1965
1970
1977
1980
1985
'Projections assume no major new federal policies to reduce waste generation.
Source Analysis by Franklin Associates, Ltd for U.S Environmental Protection
Agency, Office of Solid Waste.
recyclable materials and energy from municipal wastes, in 1972.' By
1976. the success of the pilot project had convinced Union Electric
and city officials that it was time to mount a major resource recovery
effort. Union Electric proposed building a trash-to-cnergy plant
that \\oulcl be more than 50 times larger than the test facility, \\ith
the capacity to handle all the solid waste from the city of St. Louis
as well as some from surrounding counties—8.000 tons per day.'
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Shredding machines \vould tear the tons of garbage into inch-long
pieces. Magnets would extract the iron. Blowers would separate out
the lighter, burnable portion (paper, food wastes) from the heavier
glass and other nonburnable materials. The burnable fraction would
then be fed, together with coal, into Union Electric's boilers. The
plant would generate 5 percent of the electricity for Union Electric's
service area, which includes most of the eastern half of Missouri as
well as parts of Illinois and Iowa.5
At about the same time, the Director of Public Works of the
suburban community of Northglenn, Golo., near Denver, proposed
quite a different approach, based on household separation of wastes
and biological decomposition processes. Residents would be asked to
sort their garbage into glass, cans, newspapers, and organic wastes
(food, grass clippings, etc.). The organic material, together with
manure from farms in the area, would then be fed into anaerobic
digesters where bacteria would convert the wastes into natural gas
(methane) and a sludge. The sludge, and possibly the newspapers,
would be fed to earthworms, and the earthworm castings marketed
as potting soil.6
The proposals developed for these two cities exemplify the two
basic alternatives for recycling solid waste: source separation, which
is based on sorting of trash in the home or business and appropriate
reuse of its various components; and centralized resource recovery,
which usually involves burning trash at a central facility for its
energy value and may also include separation of some components
for recycling.
Each approach has its advocates. Source-separation enthusiasts
argue that their method is highly energy-efficient because people
rather than machines separate components; that it is easy to imple-
ment; and that centralized systems are impractical and unreliable
because their massive size and technological complexity make them
prone to breakdowns and failures. Centralized-system proponents ar-
gue that it is source separation that is impractical and unreliable,
depending as it does on cooperation from the general public, and
that central systems can provide a significant new source of energy.
Some people have also argued that the two approaches are incom-
patible, alleging that institution of a centralized plant would pre-
clude neighborhood recycling efforts or efforts to reduce the total
amount of garbage generated. The economics of the central facility,
it is claimed, depends on having large amounts of garbage to process.
Happily, evidence is accumulating that the two approaches are
not incompatible except, perhaps, in their extreme applications. A
100-percent-effective bottle, can, paper, and compost recycling pro-
gram might be incompatible with an extremely high-technology
facilitv designed to separate °;lass. steel, and aluminum trash and
make methane or artificial oil from the residue, because the central
plant would lack the necessary raw materials. However, as a practical
matter, neither a 100-percent-effective recycling program nor a high
technology trash-to-gas resource recovery plant has yet been
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shown to be a realistic option. No example of either one exists any-
where in the country today, despite numerous attempts. As we shall
see, neither the St. Louis nor the Northglenn projects cited above
actually proceeded as planned, in part because they were too am-
bitious. On the other hand, reasonably effective recycling programs
are possible and are compatible with most of the simpler resource
recovery systems. Indeed, for a variety of reasons discussed below,
they should enhance or complement each other's effectiveness.
BACKGROUND: FACTORS AFFECTING
RESOURCE RECOVERY
POTENTIAL FOR RESOURCE RECOVERY
Recovery of energy and materials from municipal solid waste is not
a new idea. European countries began recovering energy from urban
wastes after World War II, when it became apparent in many cities
that garbage would have to be incinerated to conserve landfill space.
By 1977, Denmark was converting 60 percent of its wastes to energy,
Switzerland 40 percent, and the Netherlands and Sweden each 30
percent.7
The United States, by contrast, converted less than 1 percent of its
municipal wastes to energy in 1977. Even optimistic projections show
that figure rising to just 10 percent by the late 1980s.8 In 1977, an-
other 7 percent of the nation's municipal solid waste was being re-
covered for its material value by recycling centers and other source
separation programs.9 Estimated rates of resource recovery for the
period 1960 to 1977 are shown in Table 4-1, together with projec-
tions for 1985, assuming a continuation of present trends.
The potential for "mining the trash" for materials and energy is
very large. The composition of municipal trash, on a percentage
basis, is indicated in Table 4-2. The amount of paper and glass in
municipal waste is equal to more than two-thirds of the annual na-
tional consumption of these materials.10 Likewise, the amount of
aluminum in wastes is more than one-fifth of national consumption.11
The Department of Energy (DOE) estimates that 200 million
tons of municipal solid waste, the amount now projected for 1990,12
plus another 14 million tons of sewage solids, represent a total re-
coverable Btu content of 2 quads.13 (A quad is one quadrillion British
thermal units, or Btus; total U.S. energy use in 1978 was approxi-
mately 78 quads.) Recovery of metals and glass in waste would
save an additional quad because it takes less energy to recycle these
materials than to process them from virgin ores. According to DOE,
waste-to-energy technologies that are already available could re-
cover about two-thirds of the potentially recoverable energy resources
in wastes.14
ECONOMICS OF WASTE DISPOSAL
Until very recently, the cost of land disposal was low enough and
land for this purpose plentiful enough that local governments had
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Table 4-1
Estimates and Projections of Recovery of Residential
and Commercial Post-Consumer Solid Waste,
Selected Materials, 1969-85
(in thousands of tons, as-generated wet weight)
Material
Ferrous metals
Source separation
Magnetic separation •
Mixed-waste processing
Total
Aluminum
Source separation
Mixed-waste processing
Total
Paper
Source separation
Glass
Source separation
Mixed-waste processing
Total
Rubber
Source separation
1960
—
50
—
50
—
—
—
5,575
100
—
100
330
1970
—
150
—
150
10
—
10
7,115
160
—
160
255
1977
35
200
50
285
140
—
140
10,180
500
—
500
160
1985
50
200
400
650
225
5
230
12,150
865
5
870
170
Total Materials Recovery
Source separation
Magnetic separation *•
Mixed-waste processing
Total
Energy recovery from combustibles
Total recovery
Total gross discards
Percent recovered
Percent source separated
6,005
50
6,055
6,055
7,540
150
7,690
7,690
11,015
200
50
11,265
750
12,015
87,000 131,000 148,000
13,460
200
410
14,070
9,400
23,470
175,000
13
8
a Includes systems magnetically separating ferrous scrap, but doing no other
resource recovery.
Source: Franklin Associates, Ltd., "Post-Consumer Solid Waste and Resource
Recovery Baseline," prepared for the Resource Conservation Committee (Washing-
ton, D.C., April 6, 1979), p. 21.
little incentive to recover energy or useful products from solid waste.
In 1978, municipal solid waste in the United States was being sent
for disposal to 18,500 sites covering a total of 500,000 acres.15
In recent years, however, public opposition to new disposal sites
has become a major hindrance to sanitary landfill. A 1978 study of
23 cities reported "moderate" or "severe" public opposition to new
disposal sites in two-thirds of the localities contacted.16
Public concern, coupled with rising labor, equipment, energy, and
environmental control costs, has caused cost increases for waste dis-
posal in many areas to become acute. By 1978, the average cost of
solid waste collection and disposal was estimated at more than $25
per capita, or about $43 per ton.17 The cost of land disposal alone
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Table 4-2
Estimated Composition of Residential and
Commercial Post-Consumer Solid
Waste, 1977
(as-generated wet weight in millions of tons and percepts)
Materials
Paper
Glass
Metals
Ferrous
Aluminum
Other nonferrous
Plastics
Rubber & leather
Textiles
Wood
Total nonfood products
Total nonfood products
Food waste
Yard waste
Miscellaneous inorganics
Total generation
Millions
of Tons
49.5
14.7
13.6
(11.8)
(1.4)
(0.4)
5.3
3.9
3.0
4.7
94.7
94.7
25.2
25.9
2.2
148.0
Percent
of Total
33.5
9.9
9.2
(8.0)
(0.9)
(0.3)
3.6
2.6
2.0
3.2
64.0
64.0
17.0
17.5
1.5
100.0
Source: Franklin Associates, Ltd., "Post-Consumer Solid Waste and Resource
Recovery Baseline," prepared for the Resource Conservation Committee (Washi-
ngton, D.C., April 6, 1979), p. 11.
(excluding collection costs), according to a 1974 survey, the most
recent data available, averaged $4.62 per ton nationally, ranging
from less than $1 per ton to $19.60 per ton.18 It is estimated that in-
flation had raised these costs to $5.39 per ton, on the average, by
1978.19
IMPACT OF NEW ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL REGULATIONS
One of the most important factors now affecting local govern-
ment decisions on solid waste is new environmental control regula-
tions. The Council of Environmental Quality (GEQ) estimates that
compliance with existing and proposed environmental standards for
municipal solid waste disposal \vill increase annual disposal costs by
about $700 million annually, or about $4.50 per ton on a national
average. The average cost of disposing of a ton of waste at a sanitary
landfill will thus almost double. A majority of the increase can be
attributed to proposed federal criteria for sanitary landfills al-
though a substantial portion is still due to existing state standards
with which localities have yet to comply.
These cost increases will occur gradually between now and the
mid-1980s, as the planning and enforcement mechanisms set in mo-
tion by the 1976 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act go into
effect. The Act requires states to set up solid waste management plans
in order to receive certain kinds of federal aid. It also prohibits open
dumping except under a timetable or compliance schedule established
under an approved state plan. EPA was assigned the task of develop-
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ing guidelines in both these areas. The agency issued guidelines for
evaluating the acceptability of state plans in July 1979.20 EPA has
also been working on precise criteria for states to use in determining
which disposal facilities are acceptable and which should be classified
as open dumps. After much debate, classification criteria were pro-
posed in February 1978.21 They were scheduled to become final in
September 1979.22
The criteria to be used in identifying "open dumps," known as the
"Criteria for Classification of Solid Waste Disposal Facilities," will
be far-reaching in their effect. They were proposed under both the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 23 and the Clean
Water Act of 1977 24 because of similar objectives outlined in both
laws.25 They define acceptable and unacceptable disposal facilities
in terms of effects on surface and ground water, air quality, and
public safety, as well as in terms of use of a cover material. Facilities
that allow open burning or facilities sited in wetlands, floodplains,
habitats of endangered species, or recharge zones for principal sources
of local drinking water are generally defined as unacceptable under
these regulations and will have to be phased out.20
In addition, the RCRA also required EPA to develop guidelines
for environmentally sound management of solid wastes for states
to use as standards. A portion of these guidelines, those pertaining
to landfill disposal practices and procedures, were proposed in March
Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, open dumps will have to be
phased out. Photographer: Milton Baron.
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1979.2r Final issuance is planned for January 1980.28 They specify
practices to be used to prevent ground water pollution, for example,
and to prevent explosions and fires from gas generated by natural
decomposition processes.29
As of March 1979, all states had taken the first step toward par-
ticipation in the federal program, namely that of designating a
particular state agency to develop a state solid waste disposal plan.30
The states are now expected to identify, in phases, environmentally
unacceptable dumps and to upgrade or phase them out within 5
years from the date of identification.
Many localities are aware of the content of these guidelines and are
coming to grips with the fact that as a result they will probably be
paying more for landfilling and, in some cases, may simply have no
environmentally acceptable landfill site. In the latter case, resource
recovery may be a necessity because incineration, the only other
alternative, is generally more expensive. However, even if an en-
vironmentally sound landfill site is available, resource recovery may
prove preferable from an economic point of view. There are two
basic approaches to resource recovery: source separation for re-
covery of materials and centralized waste processing for recovery of
energy.
SOURCE SEPARATION
EXISTING PROGRAMS
Source separation programs take a number of forms. Cities col-
lect newspapers, for example, and occasionally glass and cans. Pri-
vate dealers collect high-quality office paper waste and computer
cards. Companies sponsor programs for aluminum can collection,
and community groups man drop-off centers for paper, glass, and
cans. In 1978, 40 cities had some kind of separate collection program
for the full gamut of recyclables, and another 196 collected news-
papers. More than 3,000 independent voluntary community recy-
cling centers were in operation, concentrated in California and the
Northeast.31 EPA has estimated that more than 500 offices have
paper recycling programs.32
EPA gave source separation programs direct encouragement in
1976 when it issued guidelines requiring all federal offices with 100
or more employees to set aside waste paper for recycling.33 The same
guidelines required federal facilities housing 500 or more families,
such as military bases, to recycle newspapers. In March 1979, 175,000
federal employees working in 135 facilities were participating in
the program and another 100,000 workers were expected to be
covered by the end of the year.34 About 15 state governments were
carrying out office source separation programs for waste paper re-
covery as of May 1978.35
At present, paper products—office paper, newsprint, cardboard,
etc.—are the materials that are recycled most. Paper accounts for
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Many government and private offices separate paper from other wastes for recycling.
Photographer: Daniel Brody.
90 percent, by weight, of the materials recovered through source sep-
aration.36 Approximately 20 percent, by weight, of all discarded
paper products are recycled.37
Recently, the aluminum industry has stepped up its efforts to re-
cover more aluminum because recycling requires only about one-
twentieth of the energy needed to produce aluminum from virgin
sources.38 One out of four aluminum cans is now recycled, and it is
estimated that 10 percent of all post-consumer aluminum waste is
recovered.39
The opposite trend is evident in the glass industry. As recently as
1950, 99 percent of all soft drink and 70 percent of beer containers
were returnable bottles.40 Soft drink bottles averaged 40 trips before
being discarded. Today, only 25 percent of soft drink and beer bottles
are returnable.41 Altogether, only 3 percent of the glass in municipal
trash is recovered through source separation programs.42 The rate of
recovery for iron is even worse: only 2 percent of all iron-bearing
municipal waste is reclaimed through source separation or any other
recovery technology.43
EPA has estimated that a maximum feasible source separation
effort nationwide could result in the recycling of about 25 percent,
by weight, of total gross discards.44 Based on projected gross discards
of 175 million tons by 1985, a national source separation effort could
yield 40 to 45 million tons of paper, metal, glass, and rubber for
recycling. However, as discussed below, some towns have been able
to cut their wastes by as much as 50 percent, by weight, through
recycling.45
ADVANTAGES
The main advantage of source separation is that it yields high-
quality waste products that can command a relatively high price in
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the secondary materials market. It is the only proven method for
recovering recyclable newspaper, office paper, corrugated cardboard,
color-sorted glass, plastics, and rubber from municipal solid waste,
and it is still the best method of recovering aluminum.46
Another advantage of source separation is the relative ease with
which a program can be started, especially compared with centralized
waste processing. Source separation requires minimal capital invest-
ment, in many cases less than $50,000 (see Table 4-3). The basic
costs are for a warehouse to collect sorted wastes, and, in some cases,
for purchase or modification of collection vehicles, as opposed to con-
struction of a large factory complex involving complicated shredding
machinery, conveyors, and boilers. Source separation systems may be
as large or small as desired. Another advantage is that they consume
little energy, other than human, in operation. They may thus be the
only practical choice for communities that want a resource recovery
system but are too small or remote to build or adequately supply a
centralized processing plant.
Table 4-3
Capital Costs for Seven Municipal Source
Separation Programs
Municipality
Somerville, Mass.
Marblehead, Mass.
Nottingham, N.H.
University of New Hampshire
Regional Center
Swanzey, N.H.
Plymouth, N.H.
Meredith, N.H.
Population
Served
90,000
23,000
1,200
49,100
4,900
3,200
3,800
Year Built
1975
1975
1973-75
1974
1975
1976
1976
Capital Cost,
Source
Separation
Facilities
(in dollars)
$41,000
40,000
42,600 •
104,000
39,700
201,000 »
100,200 «
• Includes some costs related to site preparation and construction of enclosure for
incinerator.
Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 4th Annual Report to Congress,
Resource Recovery and Waste Reduction (Washington, D.C., August 1, 1977), p. 34;
and Tichenor and Jansen, Recycling as an Approach to Solid Waste Management in
New Hampshire (Durham, N.H.: University of New Hampshire, June 1978).
These very attractive features of source separation programs have
led not just municipalities, but also many public-spirited citizen
groups, to establish recycling centers across the country. Unfortu-
nately, many such projects have failed, for the simple reason that the
costs of running the program, however low, are still more than can
be consistently covered by revenues in the rapidly fluctuating sec-
ondary materials market. Source separation still cannot be counted
on to be a moneymaker. Such programs are attractive to municipali-
ties at this time because they provide a less costly way of getting rid of
some waste than .trucking it to, and burying it in, a landfill site. Even
so, to make a source separation program work, municipalities must
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solve two potential problems: insuring adequate public participation
and finding secure markets.
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION RATES
A key obstacle to instituting a municipal source separation program
is uncertainty as to its effectiveness. Source separation programs de-
pend heavily on public cooperation for success. Under the right cir-
cumstances, public participation rates can be very high. For example,
in the small town of Nottingham. N.H., (population 1,200) a source
separation program was instituted in 1974 by town ordinance after
environmental regulations required closing of the town dump. A
study made 3 years later showed that townspeople were recycling
97 percent of the glass, 93 percent of the cans and other metal, and
85 percent of the newspaper (by weight) in their garbage.47 This
meant that the total amount of waste that the town had to incinerate
and landfill was cut in half.48
The success of this program has been attributed in part both to
the manner of its beginning and to the continuing information and
education efforts during its operation. The plan was not "imposed
from above" by town officials, but rather was adopted, after much
public discussion, by a community vote. Compartmentalized waste
containers were offered free to anyone wanting them, and more
than half the households did. The town sent at least one mailing per
year explaining to residents how the system worked and describing
its accomplishments.49
Source separation programs have been less successful when they
are a voluntary adjunct to the main refuse disposal system, rather
than an integrated part of it, required by ordinance. EPA reports
that voluntary recycling centers on the average reduce the total
amount of waste going to disposal in the community by only 1 per-
cent,50 although some do much better. For example, almost 15 per-
cent of the wastes in Berkeley, Calif., are taken to voluntary
community recycling centers.51
Socioeconomic factors may also play a role in levels of participa-
tion, although very little data exist on this subject, and what evidence
there is is far from conclusive. Beginning in 1976, EPA sponsored
experimental source separation programs in two Massachusetts
communities: Marblehead, a relatively affluent suburb, and Somer-
ville, a blue-collar, densely populated urban community. The towns
were motivated to try the programs for similar reasons: high disposal
costs—$18.95 per ton and $14.75 per ton, respectively—paid to
landfill operators to get rid of their wastes.32 If the total volume of
waste could be reduced and a portion of it sold for reuse, the savings
would be considerable.
Both towns passed local ordinances requiring source separation,
and both obtained favorable contracts for the sale of recovered
materials. Marblehead residents were asked to separate wastes into
four categories, Somerville into three, and recyclable wastes were
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m an a umsai mi mm KCOT
VOI/8 KCKUK MOWS OH KM EBIUK
6USS OTSMHS »F /WTO ». 30«
im
im
Integration of source separation into a city's mam refuse disposal system generally
results in higher participation rates. Photographer: Daniel Brody.
picked up weekly in both towns by compartmentalized garbage
trucks.53
The results in the two towns differed significantly. In Marblehead,
with an estimated 75 to 80 percent of households participating,r'4 the
town reduced its total amount of solid waste by 23 to 33 percent dur-
ing the first 9 months of the program.53 Somerville, with somewhat
lower participation, reduced its solid wastes by 7 to 10 percent.50
During this period, Marblehead's net savings, counting money not
spent on landfilling as well as revenues from materials sales, were
approximately $3,000 per month. Even at its lower participation
rate, Somerville's net savings in some months ran as high as $1,700,
but overall the town approximately broke even for the 9-month
period.57
The Somerville program was discontinued within the year. Ac-
cording to EPA, its demise was due partly to political problems be-
tween the mayor and the sanitation union that produced strikes and
disrupted the project5S and partly to several severe snowstorms that
so taxed city manpower that wastes could not be collected separately.
Both factors may have led Somerville residents to lose faith in the
project. However, the Marblehead program, now in its fourth year
of operation, continues to achieve a 25 percent reduction of wastes.59
The results of this test might seem to suggest that source separa-
tion programs do better in areas populated by relatively well edu-
14
-------
Compartmentalized waste containers make household separation of wastes easier.
cated, high-income citizens. However, the experience of the town
of Nottingham, N.H., a rural area with relatively low average in-
come and education levels, contradicts this conclusion. Many other
factors—from degree of public involvement in the decision to effec-
tiveness of publicity efforts—may be important to a program's
success.60
COST AND MARKET PROBLEMS
Besides possible difficulties with participation rates, source separa-
tion programs also face problems in keeping down costs and obtaining
markets for their recycled materials. Municipal source separation
programs are seldom profitmaking enterprises on the basis of the
materials recovered alone. The cost of collecting, sorting, and baling
the recyclables generally exceeds the revenues from their sale. Source
15
-------
separation is an economically viable proposition for most towns that
have instituted it because it is a cheaper way of getting rid of wastes
than operating a sanitary landfill or town incinerator. The costs of
collection and sorting are thus balanced by revenues from sales of
materials plus savings from not having to landfill these materials.
Cost factors for the town of Marblehead. which recovered about
200 tons of waste per month, are shown in Table 4-4. The table
shows that, for most months, the cost of operating the source
separation program ("incremental collection costs"), including capi-
tal, labor, and collection costs, after revenues from sale of recyclables
are taken into account, is less than $5 per ton of recycled waste. Be-
cause Marblehead would have had to pay nearly $19 a ton to have
those wastes landfilled, the source separation program was competitive
with the alternative disposal method.61 A regional source separation
program serving the University of New Hampshire and several sur-
rounding towns incurred similar costs: approximately $7 per ton of
waste processed, after revenues were counted/'2 With the average
cost of disposing of a ton of waste in a landfill expected to rise from
around $5.50 to about $10 per ton as environmental standards tight-
en, source separation—even if it cannot pay for itself—should be-
come an economically attractive disposal solution in more and more
places.
Table 4-4
Marblehead Program Economics, January-
September 1976
(in dollars)
Month
January (12-31)
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
Incremental
Collection
Costs •
2,930
3,570
4,450
4,470
3,850
4,240
4,040
4,240
4,050
Revenues
From Sales
1,870
2,560
3,790
3,500
3,400
3,730
3,280
4,340
3,360
Diverted
Disposal
Savings
2,990
3,390
3,680
3,640
3,390
3,850
3,350
3,850
3,580
Net Savings
1,930
2,380
3,020
2,670
2,940
3,340
2,590
3,950
2,890
• Includes labor costs as well as operation, maintenance, and capital amortization
for the compartmentalized trucks and all other equipment added as a result of the
source separation program.
Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Fourth Report to Congress, Re-
source Recovery and Waste Reduction (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, August 1, 1977), p. 35.
The major operating costs of a source separation program are
generally collection of the separated wastes, and operation of the
reycling center. Collection may be made either by separate trucks
(in which case extra workers may have to be hired to make the
rounds) or by normal garbage collection, with modified trucks. The
latter option is generally cheaper, but problems can develop because
16
-------
progress over a route is slouer. or because one truck compartment
fills up faster than another.1'1" Collection problems can be compli-
cated by local scavengers who sometimes take newspapers put out
for municipal pickup. Several communities have had to pass anti-
scavenger ordinances.
A greater source of difficulty to many programs is obtaining ade-
quate markets for materials collected. Prices for recycled materials
are subject to wide and sudden swings. It is. therefore, critical to
the success of any recycling program to develop contractual arrange-
ments for purchase of its recycled materials. Cities that pass recycling
ordinances and fully integrate source sepaiation into their waste
disposal system do seem to be able to find contractors willing to guar-
antee them a floor price for their recyclables. generally with an es-
calator clause tied to spot market prices. In return, the contractor is
assured a stable supply of materials delivered in a known, reliable
form. Marblehead's guaranteed floor prices in 1976, for example,
were $5 per ton for paper, $12 per ton for glass, and $10 per ton for
cans.04
LONG-TERM PROSPECTS FOR MARKETS
Obviously, however, these prices are very low. At this point the
likelihood of their increasing, or of U.S. industries absorbing sig-
nificantly larger quantities of recyclables, is highly uncertain. Cur-
rently, most U.S. industries are set up to make their products from
virgin raw materials. In the paper industry, the percentage (though
not the actual tonnage) of paper products made from recycled fiber
actually decreased since World War II, from 30 percent of the total
in 1950 to about 22 percent in 1977.°3 According to an analysis by
EPA, most paper producers favor using virgin pulp, and waste paper
prices have risen dramatically only in periods when, for one reason
or another, virgin pulp was in short supply.66
Increased paper recycling is technically and economically feasible.
Only about 12 percent nationally of all newsprint is made from re-
cycled newspapers,67 yet one company operates three mills that make
newsprint from nothing but recycled fiber. The company, Garden
State Paper, supplies newsprint to the New York Times and Wash-
ington Po\t, among others, and was scheduled to open a new facility
in Georgia in 1979. The company has shown that the recycling
process can save energy and generate less air and water pollution
than conventional newsprint plants.'18 Nevertheless, it appears that
for the present, the amount of paper being recycled is limited not by
insufficient supply, but by lack of paper industry demand.69
Much the same situation appears to hold true in the iron and steel
industry. Less than 10 percent of all steel produced in this country
is currently made from scrap steel that has gone through a cycle of
use,7" and almost all of this amount represents industrial rather than
consumer waste.71 A study conducted for the Institute of Scrap Iron
and Steel indicates that at present rates of scrap use, there is a 14-
17
-------
•.»,««MP> ^. .^^KSuy
j»... *"• ••T»"t, " « « »
Labor costs are often a significant component of the total cost of a source separa-
tion program. Photographer: Daniel Brody.
18
-------
The market for recycled iron is not strong. There is a 14-year backlog of scrap at
junkyards across the country. Photographer: Daniel Brody.
year backlog of scrap iron available for recycling- at junkyards and
other locations around the country.72 Steelmaking technology is such
that some furnaces could accept more scrap. But using scrap adds
uncertainties and potential problems to the Steelmaking process in
the form of possible contamination with dirt, plastics, aluminum, and
other metal impurities that steelmakers would just as soon avoid.73
In the aluminum industry, the long-term outlook for markets for
recycled materials is more encouraging. The reason is simply and
clearly the energy crisis. Although it takes two to four times as much
energy to make steel from virgin materials as from recycled materi-
als,74 it takes at least 20 times as much energy to make new aluminum
as to recycle it.75 As a consequence, the aluminum industry has been
paying up to $400 a ton for aluminum cans,76 as opposed to the $20
per ton generally offered for steel cans.77 There are no backlogs of
aluminum cans for recycling, and it appears that the industry will
be willing to purchase as much aluminum as source separation sys-
tems can supply.
19
-------
The market for glass may strengthen. One company has pioneered new techniques
in making recycled glass. Photographer Daniel Brody.
The market in glass is nowhere near as strong, but may strengthen.
At present, only 3 percent of glass production uses recycled raw mate-
rials.78 However, one company, Glass Container Corp., has pioneered
new techniques in making recycled glass and operates regularly using
50 to 60 percent consumer "wastes." 79
For source separation to grow as a waste disposal method in the
United States, long-term markets will have to be found for the sys-
tems' products. It is presently not certain whether those markets will
exist in the paper, steel, or glass industries. To some extent, this is a
chicken-and-egg problem. Industry spokesmen commonly cite lack of
reliable sources of supply as one of the reasons for setting up their
processes to use virgin rather than recycled raw materials. An analy-
sis by the U.S. Congress' Office of Technology Assessment asserts that,
at present, neither the paper nor glass industry is technically
equipped to absorb the full amount of these materials potentially
recoverable from municipal solid waste.80
20
-------
CENTRALIZED WASTE PROCESSING
CURRENT STATUS
In a central resource recovery scheme, household and commercial
wastes are taken to a waste processing facility, rather than a commer-
cial incinerator, landfill site, or recycling center. At the processing
plant, the waste is generally burned and the heat energy used to make
steam, which may in turn be put to a variety of uses, from space heat-
ing to industrial processes to generation of electricity. Steel cans and
possibly other materials may also be recovered from the waste, either
before or after incineration.
Interest in this technology began in Western Europe in the 1950s
and 1960s as an adjunct to efforts to reduce waste volume via in-
cineration. A number of these countries now feed from one-third to
one-half their municipal waste through such plants.81 The United
States, with its cheaper energy prices and greater availability of land
for dumping, has been slower to take advantage of the technology.
Only three centralized waste processing facilities, two in New York
state and one at a U.S. Naval Station in Virginia, were built in this
country before 1970.82 But interest has grown. As Table 4-5 indi-
cates, the General Accounting Office was able to identify 20 trash-
to-energy plants in operation and another 10 under construction at
the end of 1977.83 Advanced planning had been completed for 30
more, and preliminary planning had begun on another 70 facilities.84
As noted earlier, the 20 operating facilities process only about 1
percent of the nation's municipal solid waste.85 If they were operat-
ing at full capacity, however, and if all 40 plants under construction
or in advanced planning were complete and operating at full ca-
pacity, they could be extracting energy from about 10 percent of the
Refuse-burning district heating plant in Horsens, Sweden. Some European countries
convert over a third of their municipal solid waste to energy.
21
-------
country's waste, or 18 million tons per year.86 If all 70 plants now
in the preliminary planning stage were also built, this figure could
be doubled, and the nation could be processing close to 20 percent of
its municipal waste.87
ADVANTAGES
The advantages of energy and material recovery are clear. First,
the weight and volume of wastes to be landfilled is drastically re-
duced. Though there is some variation depending on how well non-
burning materials such as glass and cans are removed, the amount left
over after processing is no more than 10 percent by volume, and 25
percent by weight of the original.88 This residue is sanitized and is
largely inert.
The second important benefit of operating such facilities is the
energy they can recover. Not all municipal solid waste is, from a
practical point of view, available for energy recovery. EPA estimates
that perhaps 75 percent of all municipal waste is generated in areas
with sufficient population density that the cost of transporting wastes
to a central processing facility would not be prohibitive.89 The agency
calculated in 1973 that the maximum possible energy yield from this
trash was about 900 trillion Btus, or the equivalent of 424,000 barrels
of oil per day. That amount is equal to about a quarter of the 1979
flow of the Alaska pipeline and is enough energy to meet the home
and office lighting needs of the entire nation.90 Total gross discards
have risen by 10 percent since EPA made the estimate; the amount
of energy potentially available from trash should have risen
proportionally.
A third possible benefit of centralized resource recovery is its po-
tential for producing iron, steel, aluminum, glass, and even paper
from waste for recycling. Iron-bearing items, including cans, broken
appliances, nails, pails, and drums, are easily removed from garbage
by magnets. The technology for iron recovery is not new; it has been
used for years at landfills, junkyards, and elsewhere.91 However, as
noted earlier, the current market for iron is not good.
The market for aluminum is better, but the technology for recovery
in processing plants is more complex and less advanced. In the case
of glass, both markets and recovery technology are poor. Various
ingenious schemes involving blowers, electrical charges, and air bub-
bles in water have been tried for separating aluminum and glass from
wastes.92 A few such systems have been incorporated in some of the
plants now operating or under construction, including those in
Bridgeport, Conn.; Ames, Iowa; and Milwaukee, Wis.93
Both glass and aluminum recovery systems have consistently suf-
fered from technical deficiencies—chiefly, a low recovery rate and a
recovered product containing significant amounts of impurities and
contaminants.94 The Office of Technology Assessment reports effi-
ciencies of 50 to 70 percent (see Table 4-6). In several cases, owners
of installed systems have not used them because they cannot find a
market for their product.
22
-------
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Table 4-6
Material Recovery Efficiencies at Centralized
Waste Processing Facilities
Estimated Achievable
Material/Technology Efficiency of Recovery
Technology
(in percent)
Ferrous/magnetic
Paper/wet slurry
Aluminum/magnet
Glass/froth flotation
Glass/optical sorting
90-97
50
65
65-70
50
Source: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology and Assessment, Materials and
Energy from Waste, final draft (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, June 1978), pp. 6-11.
At one test facility, the potential for recovering paper from wastes
for industrial use has been demonstrated. At the EPA-sponsored
facility in Franklin, Ohio, garbage was turned into a wet slurry, and
paper fibers recovered from it, for use in making felt roofing shin-
gles.95 However, the very small output of this test facility (it pro-
cessed only about 25 tons of waste a day) eventually led the shingle
plant to terminate its purchasing arrangement, and in March 1979
the Franklin plant closed.96
Despite technical problems with glass and aluminum recovery,
centralized waste processing systems seem to be eminently worth-
while methods of obtaining energy and conserving landfill space
What, then, is preventing cities, utilities, and private trash disposal
companies from adopting them widely and rapidly? There is no
single answer, but rather a broad range of potential problems, some
technological, some institutional, and some economic, that can stymie
progress.
TECHNOLOGICAL BARRIERS
Technological barriers are probably the least serious obstacle to
wider resource recovery at this time. Problems can be minimized
by employing proven, relatively simple trash-to-energy systems now
in use in both Europe and the United States. The "workhorse" of
trash-to-energy is the waterwall incinerator, and 7 of the 20 operating
U.S. facilities are of this type.97 The sides of the incinerator are
lined with pip'es for water to pass through. When waste is being
burned in the incinerator, the exhaust gases heat the water in the
pipes. The hot water is used to make steam, which can then be used
to heat homes or offices, generate electricity, or run industrial proc-
esses. A 1,200-ton-per-day waterwall incinerator plant in Saugus,
Mass., began operation in 1976 and processes the wastes of a dozen
Massachusetts communities. The plant sells steam heated to 845° F
to General Electric for all three uses listed above.98
27
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A second reliable technology for recovering energy from wastes is
the modular incinerator. These "packaged" units are small, factory-
made incinerators equipped with waste heat boilers. The boilers
capture the heat from the incinerator's exhaust gases, which may
then be used for the same purposes as outlined above. However,
modular units are not as efficient at recovering heat as the waterwall
incinerators.
The main advantages of these units are their small size and rela-
tively low cost. This makes them suitable for small-scale and small-
town use. The smallest of the waterwall facilities is a 175-ton-per-day
plant operating at the U.S. Navy base at Portsmouth, Va.; however,
economic concerns usually dictate waterwall plants in the 1,000-ton-
per-day range. The larger size facility requires the wastes of at least
half a million people to run at full capacity. However, modular in-
cinerators processing as little as 20 to 40 tons per day have been built
in such places as Siloam Springs, Ark., Groveton, N.H., the John
Deere plant in Dubuque, Iowa, and at the Pentagon." Four of the
country's 20 municipal trash-to-energy facilities are of this type, and
perhaps several dozen more such units are being employed in factories
and various institutions.100
A third proven technology for extracting energy from garbage is
to convert a major portion of the trash to a fuel that can be burned
not only in incinerators but in standard utility and industrial boilers
as well. This fuel has been dubbed refuse-derived fuel, or RDF.
Both waterwall and modular incinerators can handle unprocessed
wastes. Garbage is simply dumped in the incinerator and burned.
The leftover ash is landfilled. However, to improve efficiency, allow
production of hotter steam, and permit extraction of recyclables, some
American builders and operators of such systems have felt it desirable
to process wastes before feeding them into waterwall incinerators.
The technology for this process is fairly reliable, and involves reduc-
ing all garbage to small pieces so that nonburnable materials such
as glass and metal can be removed before incineration. The size of the
pieces is reduced by various processes including shredding, milling,
flailing, trommeling, and screening. As of the end of 1978, no such
facilities were in operation, but five were under construction.101
Such processed wastes can also be burned in electric utility boilers.
The pioneer in this field was the EPA-sponsored facility which sup-
plied wastes to Union Electric in St. Louis, Mo. It operated on
an experimental basis for 4 years. Six of the 20 operating facilities
now use this technology.102 At the St. Louis-type plants, waste is first
shredded. It then passes through blowers that separate the light
materials—generally easy-to-burn materials like pieces of leaves, plas-
tic containers, paper, and food—from the heavier materials, such
as hard-to-burn items like bottles and cans. The lighter fraction
becomes the RDF. At St. Louis, it was burned, together with coal,
in Union Electric's boilers. The heavier portion, after recovery of
iron-bearing wastes, was landfilled.103
28
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A variant of this technology is production of "wet RDF." Origi-
nally tested at the Franklin plant in Ohio as a means of recovering
paper fiber, it involves reducing all wastes to a wet pulpy mass. This
mush is then fed into a cyclone and spun around. Centrifugal force
separates the lighter from the heavier materials.104 The lighter frac-
tion is then partially dried and burned in specially designed boilers
to produce energy.
A plant that produces dry RDF. rather than one that burns waste
for steam, has the advantage of making a transportable energy prod-
uct that can be burned in a pre-existing energy plant. However, be-
cause dry RDF is highly flammable and subject to spontaneous com-
bustion, it generally must be burned in the immediate vicinity of
the trash-to-energy facility. This also minimizes transportation costs.
If one of these relatively well-developed technologies is not em-
ployed, serious technical difficulties are far more likely to arise. As
noted earlier, systems to extract glass and aluminum from trash are
desirable because they make valuable materials available for re-
cycling, but they are hampered by technical problems. Even more
serious technical problems have developed with plants designed to
turn garbage into oil or gas. If these fuels could be produced suc-
cessfully, they would, of course, be even more useful and versatile
than dry RDF.
The city of Baltimore, with federal help, was the first to attempt
to build a commercial-scale trash-to-gas plant using a technology
called pyrolysis. In 1972, Baltimore contracted with Monsanto En-
viro-Chem Systems, Inc., to build a 1,000-ton-per-day pyrolysis fa-
cility at a cost of $16 million. The gas produced was to be burned to
make steam, which Baltimore Gas and Electric would purchase for
heating and cooling large buildings in the downtown area.105 The
immediate impetus for the plant was the fact that the city's landfill
capacity was virtually exhausted.106 The federal government, through
an EPA grant, contributed $7 million toward the cost.107
The plant, scheduled to go into full operation in 1975, has experi-
enced an enormous number of difficulties, and 4 years later was
still undergoing modifications projected to total over $4 million.108 In
principle, the plant was supposed to operate by passing wastes through
a shredder and then feeding them into a large kiln, where at tem-
peratures of 2000° F the organic material in the garbage would break
down into the burnable gas.109
It appears that everything has broken down but the garbage. A
Congressional Research Service report noted the following problems:
the conveyor systems failed to function properly; the lining of the
kiln broke up and fell out; a fan controlling the movement of the
gases suffered uncorrectable vibration problems; the gas burner was
half as big as needed; and the waste hopper did not work as designed,
to a point where on at least one occasion solidified garbage had to be
blasted out with dynamite.110 The worst problem was the failure of
the air pollution control system, which finally required the purchase
of a new electrostatic precipitator at a cost of $1.2 million.111
29
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Experimental flotation cells for extracting glass from wastes. Photographer: Perry
Bagalman.
30
-------
Despite its problems, the plant had, by early 1978, processed 70,000
tons of waste in the course of its intermittent operation. It had also
generated 250 million pounds of steam that sold for $750,000.112 Ac-
cording to EPA, the plant, as of May 1979, had completed modifi-
cations and was just beginning new test operations.113
Another attempt at a pyrolysis plant was that undertaken by San
Diego County and Occidental Petroleum, with EPA assistance. The
plan was for a 200-ton-per-day plant to convert waste to a form of oil
through a "flash" pyrolysis process. The plant, completed in 1976.
was designed to shred wastes to dust-like fineness and then heat
them to 900° F in less than 2 seconds in a vertical shaft.114
Shakedown operations, begun in December 1977. ran into num-
erous mechanical problems.115 As of mid-1979 the plant's future was
uncertain. This plant was designed to be a test facility and, ac-
cording to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), requires so-
phisticated personnel to run it. The CRS feels that a facility of at
least 1,000-ton-per-day capacity, costing about $50 million, would
be required for it to be economical.116
Another drawback of these complex processing systems, beyond
the technical difficulties, is that the net energy recovered decreases
as the amount of processing increases, because of the additional
energy requirements. As Table 4-7 indicates, solid refuse-derived
Table 4-7
Comparison of Energy Recovery Efficiencies for
Selected Solid Waste Energy Recovery Processes
(percent of higher heat value contained in input solid waste)
Process
Fluff RDF
Dust RDF
Wet RDF
Waterwall combustion furnace
Modular incinerator
Purox gasifier
Monsanto gasifier
Torrax gasifier
Occidental Petroleum Co. pyrolysis
Biological gasification d
Net Energy
in Fuel
Produced »
° 70
80
76
—
—
64
78
«84
26
° 33
Net Energy
Available
as Steam i>
= 49
63
48
59
« 25-50
58
42
-58
23
. 29
• This is the higher heating value of the fuel product less the heat value of the
energy used to operate the system (in the case of electric power consumption it was
assumed that the electricity was produced on site using the system's fuel product),
expressed as a percent of the heat value of the solid waste.
b In order to compare all the processes on an equal basis, the net energy avail-
able as steam was calculated using the boiler efficiency for each fuel product.
« Updated figure drawn from U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
Materials and Energy from Waste, final draft (Washington, D.C. June 1978),
pp. 6-12.
d Includes energy recovered from sewage sludge.
Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Publication SW-157.2, 1976.
AM calcul ations based on solid waste input at 5,000 Btu per pound (higher heating
value) with some inorganic materials removed.
31
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fuel that is produced by mechanical means is more energy-efficient
than liquids and gas from pyrolysis. But the gas or liquid produced
would be expected to sell for a higher price and, therefore, might be
economically justified if the technical problems could be worked
out.117
POLLUTION AND WORKERS SAFETY AND HEALTH PROBLEMS
A final area of technological uncertainty for all trash-to-energy
plants relates to potential pollution and occupational safety and
health problems. To date, operating facilities appear able to meet
current state and EPA standards for particulates and for sulfur di-
oxide and nitrogen oxide emissions, although at some sites this has
been at considerable expense and after much effort. Trash-burning
plants also have certain very appealing environmental characteristics
when compared with other energy facilities. They produce no radio-
active wastes. Nor do they emit large quantities of sulfur dioxide, since
the sulfur content of municipal waste is between 0.1 and 0.2 percent,
compared with the troublesome 2.5 to 3.5 percent sulfur content
of most power plant coals.118 Nevertheless, trash-to-energy plants do
emit measurable quantities of fine particulates, certain potentially
hazardous organic compounds, viruses and bacteria, and toxic ele-
ments such as cadmium, lead, and mercury. The latter toxic sub-
stances occurred in higher concentrations in the refuse-derived fuel
than in the coal at the St. Louis demonstration plant.110 Leaching of
toxic heavy metals such as arsenic and cadmium from residues and
ash that are landfilled may also prove to be a problem.120 Health
hazards, such as harmful dusts and vapors, infectious disease or
viruses, and excessive machine noise, may also occur inside the facili-
ties. Noise levels of up to 108 dBu were recorded inside the St. Louis
facility.121 Furthermore, as of early 1979, existing facilities had ex-
perienced over 100 explosions and a number of fires. Most of the ex-
plosions caused serious damage to buildings and equipment, injuries
to employees, and at least one death.122 Much more needs to be known
both about the potential hazards to health inside such plants and
about the levels at which hazardous substances are emitted from waste
processing facilities before the extent of the pollution hazards can be
accurately assessed.
MARKET PROBLEMS
Technical difficulties constitute only one obstacle to wider use of
centralized resource recovery. Despite our current energy crunch, a
second important problem is finding appropriate markets for the
steam or fuel produced. One reason for this, according to an analysis
by the Office of Technology Assessment, is that a reasonable size for
a centralized resource recovery facility, in terms of the amount of
waste generated by a moderate-sized city, is an extremely awkward
size in terms of finding markets for potential energy products.123 It
32
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appears that an "average" she for a new waterwall incinerator is in
the neighborhood of a 1,000-ton-per-day capacity. Such a facility can
process the wastes of about 600,000 people.124 The United States has
approximately 70 metropolitan areas of this size or larger.125 The
economics of building and operating such a plant seem to work out
well.126
A plant of this type and size could be used to produce electricity.
However, the 37 megawatts of power it could generate would satisfy
the needs of only 3 percent of 600,000 people. Many electric utilities
see this as too small a contribution to justify the effort and cost of
adopting a new technology. On the other hand, the energy output
from a 1,000-ton-per-day plant is much too large for most alterna-
tive customers for the steam or hot water. A plant of this size, for
example, could serve the heating and cooling needs of 5 million
square feet of office space. The Pentagon, one of the world's largest
office buildings, has 6.5 million square feet; the U.S. Capitol has only
0.75 million square feet.127
A municipality that wants to build a centralized recovery facility
thus faces several choices, none of which is completely satisfactory:
build much smaller units with lower energy efficiency and the
proliferation of siting and logistics problems; experiment with one
of the less technically reliable methods of producing solid, liquid, or
gaseous fuels; find industrial customers whose needs match the energy
production of a larger plant; or line up a series of customers for the
steam. One city that adopted the last course is Nashville, Tenn. The
experience of that city, which was ultinately successful, illustrates still
another area of problems for centralized resource recovery that can
only be described by the vague term "institutional."
INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS
American political and business institutions are structurally ill-
adapted to centralized resource recovery. In most cities wastes are
collected by the municipality, although some types of waste, e.g.,
commercial, and some portions, e.g., from unincorporated suburbs,
may be collected by private haulers. The makers of recovery systems
are, of course, private, while the most likely buyers of the recovered
energy—electric utilities—are private concerns heavily regulated by
government agencies unrelated to the cities.
Getting all the relevant institutions to cooperate successfully on
a major resource recovery project is a formidable task. It can be
difficult, for example, to round up enough wastes from various dis-
posers to make a plant economically viable. Usually, some entity
must be found or created to operate the facility. The engineering
firms that construct the plants usually want to sell them and go on
to build more plants. The firms that formerly disposed of wastes—
haulers and landfill operators—have no expertise in operating a large.
high-technology energy plant. City sanitation departments likewise
are ill-suited for such a complex business and engineering venture.
33
-------
Furthermore, in the interests of preventing misspending of public
funds, city and state charters sometimes prohibit these entities from
entering into longer than 1-year contracts for buying or selling of
goods and services, making it extremely difficult to plan or to in-
volve private businesses in such facilities.128
Finally, the utilities, which might logically be the best market for
the energy produced and are prime candidates for owning and oper-
ating recovery facilities, appear loath to get involved. Many of the
reasons relate to the way in which they are regulated. Many utilities
are allowed to pass fuel price increases directly on to consumers
through "fuel adjustment clauses." Such clauses reduce the incentive
to use cheaper fuels. Utilities are also required by law to provide
reliable service, something that discourages them from experiment-
ing with technologies that have not been proven beyond all possible
shadow of doubt, especially when the technology can make only a
modest contribution to a utility's total output.
The city of Nashville dealt with a number of these institutional
problems in an unusual and interesting way. As part of a downtown
renewal program, Nashville decided in the late 1960s to create a
district heating and cooling system for public and private buildings
in the central city area. The city solved the "who should do it" prob-
lem by creating a not-for-profit corporation called Nashville Thermal
Transfer Corp. to build and operate the system. The city then de-
cided to fuel the plant with wastes, thereby solving another city
problem. After due study, Nashville Thermal became a refuse dis-
posal organization as well as a heating and cooling utility.129
Nashville Thermal eventually built a 720-ton-per-day waterwall
incinerator facility designed to handle only a portion of the city's
The city of Nashville, Tenn., solved several problems at once when it created the
Nashville Thermal Transfer Corp., an independent, not-for-profit corporation, to
build and operate this trash-burning district heating and cooling plant.
34
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wastes.130 The plant began operating in 1974 and was subsequently
upgraded to a 1,060-ton-per-day capacity.131 The system serves 30
buildings 132 and processes a quarter of Nashville's wastes. Its rela-
tively modest size obviated a number of potential pitfalls. For ex-
ample, the system has had sufficient amounts of waste to process,
in contrast to several others, including those in Ames, Iowa, and
Saugus, Mass., where waste volume did not meet projections.133 In
addition, seasonal fluctuations in volume of waste could be accom-
modated by varying the amount of waste delivered to the landfill.134
By creating an independent not-for-profit corporation to process
wastes and distribute steam, Nashville avoided many of the in-
stitutional problems involved in trying to pull numerous disposal
entities, an entrenched bureaucracy, and conservative utilities to-
gether for an experimental venture. Nevertheless, the project did
suffer as a result of another institutional difficulty: the need for
government entities to let contracts at the lowest possible cost. The
Nashville plant experienced numerous technical problems in starting
up, including such a serious malfunction of air pollution controls
that a whole new system had to be added. Such problems did not
occur at the Saugus plant, which is similar in design. An EPA assess-
ment attributes the far poorer performance of the Nashville plant to
cutting corners in the design of the project. A consultant's report
states: "The critical problem was one not unique to waste processing
facilities, but inherent in the low-bid requirements of government
purchasing .... The lesson to be learned from Nashville is that a
bargain in industrial equipment is a rarity." 135 Fortunately, it has
proved possible to make the needed changes, and the plant now ap-
pears to be functioning reasonably reliably and within emission
limitations.136
ECONOMIC BARRIERS
Related to the issue of "who is responsible for what" at a centralized
resource recovery facility is the question of "who pays for what." Such
facilities must be economically viable. At present, despite the eco-
nomic pressures of higher energy and landfill costs, their profitability
is still marginal.
Solely on the basis of the energy they produce, complex trash-to-
energy facilities definitely are not yet economically competitive. En-
ergy can still be produced more cheaply using conventional fuels
burned in conventional boilers. Resource recovery facilities are able
to break even or turn a profit only because the revenue they receive
from sale of steam or fuels is supplemented by the amount the mun-
icipality pays them for getting rid of the wastes, known as a "tipping
fee," plus any revenues from recovered materials.
The total cost of a centralized resource recovery facility consists
of two components: capital costs and operating costs. Capital costs for
such plants are high enough to strain the resources of many mun-
icipalities (see Table 4-5). The 2,000-ton-per-day Hempstead, N.Y.,
35
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plant—the most expensive built to date—cost $81 million. A more
typical figure for a 1,000-ton-per-day facility that produces an RDF
fuel, but does not involve electricity generation equipment, is $25
million.
Table 4-8 presents the annual capital and operating costs, ex-
pressed in terms of cost-per-ton of capacity, for the Saugus, Mass.,
and Ames, Iowa, plants and estimates of projected costs for three
other plants. The total annualized costs of the five plants range from
approximately $15 to $23 per ton of refuse processed. A 1978 theore-
tical analysis of possible resource recovery options for the greater
Kansas City area projects similar costs—in the neighborhood of $20
to $25 per ton—for the most cost-effective options for that area (see
Table 4-9).
This, then, is the amount that must be recovered by a combination
of energy sales, material sales, and tipping fees. The amount that
can be charged in each category will vary greatly from place to place.
A locality that is paying $20 per ton to landfill its wastes will ob-
viously be willing to pay a much higher tipping fee than one that
is paying $1 a ton for landfilling. Likewise, a recovery plant could
probably charge more for steam in the Northeast, where energy costs
are high, than in the Southwest, where fossil fuels are available
more cheaply. The Kansas City study cited above estimated possible
revenues from sale of steam in that locale of $18 per ton of waste
processed. For the most cost-effective options, that amount would
almost cover the cost of building and operating plants, and the
operators could break even charging a tipping fee of only about $3
per ton. Such a result may not be too far off the mark. In Nashville,
the city makes a lump sum contribution to the operation of the
plant to make up the deficit not covered by revenues from sale of
steam. That annual contribution—approximately $1.3 million in each
of the last 3 years—is the equivalent of a tipping fee of approximately
$8 per ton.137 As shown in Table 4-10, actual tipping fees at four
other plants currently in operation range from $8 to $15 per ton, a
level competitive with the cost of landfilling in many areas.
COMPATIBILITY OF SOURCE SEPARATION AND
CENTRALIZED RESOURCE RECOVERY SYSTEMS
Can source separation and centralized waste recovery coexist?
On the face of it, it might appear that they are mutually exclusive.
After all, if all the bottles, cans, glass, and paper are removed from
waste before it is collected, then it would seem that centralized fa-
cilities will have little of value to recover or burn for energy. Some
even argue that the economics of recovery plants is now so borderline
that they could not tolerate even a small source separation effort. A
bottle and can recycling program that was 50 to 90 percent effective
might eliminate any revenues from materials recovery. A newspaper
recycling program might lower the Btu content of the wastes to such
a degree that the energy efficiency of the plant would be severely
36
-------
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37
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Table 4-9
Projected Costs and Revenues for Energy Recovery
Systems for the Kansas City Area, 1978
(in dollars per ton processed)
Annual Cost »
Type of System
Modular Combustion
Units t>
25 tons/day
50 tons/day
100 tons/day
200 tons/day
Waterwall Combustion
200 tons/day
500 tons/day
1500 tons/day
Refuse-Derived Fuel
System"
500 tons/day
1000 tons/day
Ownership
$17.50
15.48
12.38
10.85
16.27
14.34
13.25
12.09
10.78
Operating
and Main-
tenance
$23.41
15.08
11.93
10.14
12.68
8.75
7.15
10.78
9.33
Total
$40.91
30.56
24.31
20.99
28.95
23.09
20.40
22.87
20.11
Revenues
$18.00=
18.00=
18.00=
18.00 =
18.00=
18.00=
18.00 =
10.02'
10.02'
Net Cost
$22.91
12.56
6.31
2.99
10.94
5.09
2.40
12.85
10.09
a Annual costs include interest on land, amortization of equipment, insurance,
and operating and maintenance costs.
'> Plants are assumed to operate at 95 percent of rated capacity, 5 days a week,
50 weeks a year.
= The plants are assumed to sell steam at $3 per thousand pounds in competition
with fuel oil.
'' Plants are assumed to operate at 78 percent of rated capacity, 7 days a week,
50 weeks per year. Capital investment was calculated at $43,370 per ton at 200
tons/day capacity; $38,157 per ton for 500 tons/day; and $35,187 per ton for 1500
tons/day.
"The system is assumed to operate at 85 percent of rated capacity, 6 days per
week, 50 weeks per year. Capital investment includes modification of an existing
boiler, and was calculated to be $32,102 per ton at 500 TPD capacity and $26,819
per ton at 1000 TPD capacity.
' The plants are assumed to sell RDF at $8.00 per ton. Ferrous and aluminum
scrap are assumed recovered and sold.
Source: Black and Veatch and Franklin Associates, Ltd., "Detailed Technical and
Economic/Analysis of Selected Resource Recovery Systems," for the Mid-America
Regional Council, 1978, Tables 1, 3, and 4.
Table 4-10
Tipping Fees at Selected Resource Recovery Facilities
Location
Braintree, Mass.
Harnsburg, Pa.
Milwaukee, Wis.
Saugus, Mass.
Normal
capacity
(TPD)
240
720
1,600
1,500
Technology
Waterwall
Waterwall
RDF
Waterwall
Tipping
Fee
(dollars/
ton)
8.00
12.60
11.64
14.58
Date
Feb. 1979
July 1977
March 1979
March 1979
Source: Franklin Associates, Ltd., "Post-Consumer Solid Waste and Resource
Recovery Baseline," Prepared for the Resource Conservation Committee (Wash-
ington, D.C., April 6, 1979), p. 55.
38
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impaired. Finally, a source separation program that reduced the total
volume of wastes by 25 to 50 percent might reduce the recovery
plant's tipping fees to a point where it was no longer economically
viable.
These problems of potential incompatibility are actually less serious
than they appear. As explained above, the technology for extraction
of recyclables, except for iron, is in its infancy for central resource
recovery plants. At most such plants operating today, materials re-
covery contributes a very small amount to overall revenues.138 Many-
plants burn wholly unprocessed wastes and do not recover any mate-
rials at all. Thus a bottle or can recycling program would generally
not interfere, per se, with a centralized facility's economic position.
The question of whether the removal of paper and other recycl-
ables from waste in a source separation program would seriously
reduce the energy value of municipal wastes is a more open one.
However, recent EPA data suggest that the impact would be minimal
and, depending on the type of source separation program, might
even be positive.
The reason for this is that recyclables in general, and newspapers
in particular, actually constitute only a small portion of the burnable
substances in refuse. Approximately 75 percent of all waste can be
burned.139 This includes everything from banana peels and plastic
bags to old shoes and broken chairs. In general, newspapers, books,
and magazines average only about 9 percent of municipal wastes.140
According to EPA calculations, even an extremely effective news-
paper recycling program would reduce the solid waste stream by no
more than 7 percent, by weight, and the Btu value of the waste would
decline by only 3.5 percent (see Table 4-11). If beverage container
legislation significantly reduced the amount of bottles and cans in
waste, the Btu value per pound of waste would actually increase by
about 6 percent.
The third argument—that source separation could reduce tipping
fee revenues at a centralized facility below the breakeven point—is
more compelling. However, it holds true only under certain circum-
stances. It applies only when source separation is introduced after
a centralized plant has been built, when the centralized plant in
question is processing all of a region's waste, and when it has no
access to additional wastes, either because transportation costs for
such wastes would be too high or because political jurisdictional prob-
lems would be too great. In such a situation, the introduction of a
source separation program would reduce the amount of wastes going
to the centralized facility and thus its revenues from tipping fees
(which are charged on a per-ton basis).
A plant that handled only a portion of a city's wastes would not.
however, experience this problem. In the event that local source
separation was instituted, or a national program of beverage container
deposits or some other waste reduction measure took effect, such a
plant could maintain the volume of wastes processed (and thus
revenues) by increasing the proportion of the city's wastes it handled.
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Table 4-11
Impact of Source Separation Options on Btu
Content of Municipal Trash
Type of Source Separation Program Average Btus Percent
per Pound Change
of Trash
No source separation 4,600 —
High level, all wastes » 4,660 +1.3
(25% reduction in total waste stream)
Low level, all wastes » 4,510 —2.0
(10% reduction in total waste stream)
High level, newspaper 4,440 —3.5
(7% reduction in total waste stream)
Low level, newspaper 4,550 —1.1
(3-4% reduction in total waste stream)
Glass and cans (beverage container legislation) 4,890 +6.3
»AII wastes defined as glass, cans, newspaper, office paper, and corrugated
cardboard.
Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste, unpublished
study, 1979.
Many people in fact now think that the best approach in develop-
ing a centralized recovery facility is to design the system to work in
tandem with source separation at the outset. This would take advan-
tage of the strengths of both systems: materials recovery from the
source separation program and energy recovery from the centralized
facility. If the source separation program did not materialize or
proved less effective than hoped, it would mean a somewhat heavier
load on the backup landfill site. However, EPA has pointed out that
many other factors can also affect the amount of waste available to
a plant, including seasonal fluctuations, jurisdictional problems, and
the fact that many localities have only the roughest idea of how
much waste they actually generate.141 In general, EPA believes that
it is better to plan conservatively and perhaps underbuild, than to
build a centralized resource recovery facility that might eventu-
ally prove too large for the needs of the locality and. therefore, be
uneconomical.
FEDERAL ACTIVITIES
Beginning with the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965 14" and
continuing with the Resource Recovery Act of 1970 143 and the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976,144 Congress has
asked the federal government to attempt to do something about the
nation's solid waste problems. These laws directed EPA to develop
and to encourage use of better systems for disposing of solid waste,
particularly where health hazards are involved. In addition, DOE
has responsibilities for research, development, and demonstration of
the energy potential of solid wastes.
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The 1976 law created the Resource Conservation Committee, a
special interagency Cabinet-level group.* for the purpose of exam-
ining various possible "incentives and disincentives to foster resource
conservation." 14'' The committee selected for study 10 existing or
possible federal policies that could affect waste generation and re-
coven. The findings and recommendations of the committee, pre-
sented in its July 1979 final report. Choices for Conservation™6 are
discussed in the following section.
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR WASTE REDUCTION
AND RECYCLING
Beverage Container Deposits
Given the national interest in and political prominence of the issue.
the Resouice Conservation Committee gave special consideration to
a mandatory national s\stem of deposits and refunds for beverage
containers. Deposits would ieduce \\aste by encouraging recycling of
bottles and cans.
Staff studies summarized in the committee's final report147 indi-
cated that such legislation would:
• Reduce litter volume by 35 percent eliminating 15 to 20 percent
of the number of individual litter items:
• Reduce the amount of solid \\aste by up to 2 million tons per \ear,
or 0.5 to 1.5 percent;
• Realize an annual savings in lo\\er disposal costs of $25 to $50
million annually;
• Sa\e 250.000 to 380.000 tons of aluminum (5 to 10 percent of
annual production!, reducing bauxite imports by a potential 1.6
million tons:
• Reduce steel consumption by about 1.5 million tons (1 to 2 percent
of annual production ) ;
• Reduce total atmospheric emissions caused by bottle and can pro-
duction by 0.75 billion to 1.2 billion pounds;
• Reduce uaterborne wastes from container production by 140 to
210 million pounds:
• Save 70 to 130 trillion Btus, equivalent to 33,000 to 61,000 barrels
of oil per day. or 0.1 percent of total national energ\ consumption:
• Reduce the retail price of beverages an average of 0.5 to 1.5 cents
per container, saving consumers a total of $0.66 billion to $1.76
billion annuallv:
*The members of the Committee uere: Douglas Costle, Administrator,
EPA, Chairman; Juanita Kreps, Secretary of Commerce: Cecil D. Andrus.
Secretary of the Interior: F. Ray Marshall, Secretary of Labor; W. Michael
Blumenthal, Secretary of Treasury; Charles Warren, Chairman, Council on
Environmental Quality Eliot Cutler, Office of Management and Budget.
Lawrence J. White, Council of Economic Advisors: Alvin Aim, Department
of Energy.
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• Cause an unquantifiable amount of inconvenience to beverage
consumers who presently purchase beverages in nonrefillable con-
tainers and discard the containers when empty;
• Eliminate between 4,900 and 10,400 jobs in the glass container
production industry and between 14,200 and 22,000 jobs in the
metal can production industry over a 5-year period; and
• Create between 80,000 and 100,000 new jobs in the beverage dis-
tribution and retail sectors.
In the committee's final report, four of the nine agency and de-
partment heads who were members of the Resource Conservation
Committee recommended national beverage container legislation.
Two officials wanted to wait to see the effect of such laws in the
states—Maine, Michigan, Connecticut, Iowa, and Delaware—that
have recently adopted them, before taking a position. (Only Oregon
and Vermont have had beverage container deposit laws for several
years.) One member of the committee took no position, and two
were opposed.
The committee also recommended that if beverage container legis-
lation were adopted, it should apply to all sealed beer and soft drink
containers, regardless of material used, except cartons and carriers;
that the deposit should be for a minimum of 5 cents, with possible
increases scaled to the Consumer Price Index; and that the deposit
should begin at the distribution-wholesaler level.
Other Deposit Systems
A waste management concept similar to beverage container de-
posits is that of a system of deposits or bounties for durable or hazard-
ous goods. Under this arrangement, a consumer would pay a deposit
when buying a refrigerator or auto battery, for example, which would
be returned when the item was turned in at a disposal depot. The
system would be valuable in encouraging proper disposal of hazard-
ous substances, such as the chemicals in the car battery. However, its
impact on total volume of municipal solid waste would probably be
limited, because these items would still have to be disposed of. The
Resource Conservation Committee decided that it did not have suffi-
cient information to evaluate this concept and recommended further
research.148
National Litter Tax
A concept that is often put forth as an alternative to beverage con-
tainer and other deposit systems is that of a litter tax, that is, a special
tax on frequently littered items such as beer cans. Such a tax could
be earmarked to clean up litter and might provide an incentive
against littering. The committee unanimously recommended against
such legislation at the national level, however, for a number of rea-
sons. First, such a tax would penalize those who do not litter as well
as those who do. Second, to act as an incentive against littering, it
would have to discourage buying the product altogether. To do
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The Resource Conservation Committee rejected the concept of a litter tax on the
grounds that it would create no incentives for individuals to clean up or reduce
wastes. By contrast, beverage container deposits would do both. Photographer: Tom
Raymond.
this would require an extremely large tax, perhaps 20 to 40 percent
of the sales price. Such a structuring was considered both infeasible
and undesirable. Lastly, the tax would create no incentive for indi-
viduals to clean up or reduce wastes. By contrast, beverage container
deposits would do both.149
Solid Waste Disposal Charge
Congress specifically asked the Resource Conservation Committee
to investigate and issue a report on the concept of levying solid waste
management charges on consumer products; that is, a federal weight
or unit-based tax on products and packaging that would be charged
to the producer of the item and would be tied to the cost of dispos-
ing of the item. To take a hypothetical example, the manufacturer
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of a pair of shoes might be charged 2 cents per pair, reflecting the
cost of disposing of those shoes and the shoebox in \\hich they are
sold in a municipal landfill. Revenues from the tax would be dis-
tributed to local governments. Recycled materials used in products
would be exempt from the tax.
The aim of this scheme is to create a financial incentive for manu-
facturers to avoid excess packaging and use recycled materials, and
for consumers to do likewise, assuming that the tax will be passed
along. However, the committee found less merit in this concept than
in several others. No committee members voted to recommend a
national disposal charge, largely because the effects of such a tax
are simply too difficult to predict. The committee members were not
convinced that the si/e of the incentives would be sufficient in prac-
tice to discourage excess packaging or to encourage use of recyclables.
Yet such a tax would raise shelf prices of consumer goods.150
Local User Fee
The committee was more interested in a slightly different concept
with a similar goal—the "local user fee"—but felt it lacked sufficient
information to fully endorse the concept. Under this system, a munic-
ipality charges a household for waste pickup according to volume
or weight of trash collected, i.e., by the bag. rathei than financing
garbage collection out of general or property tax revenues. The more
waste, the higher the fee. Such systems are already used by some pri-
vate waste collectors. In theory at least, it should be possible to set
the fees so that consumers have an incentive to choose less wasteful
products. It should also encourage households to recycle newspapers,
bottles, and cans and to compost, thus reducing waste. However, it
might encourage households to engage in illegal or "midnight"'
dumping of \\astes in undesirable locations.
The committee acknowledged that little empirical data exist on
how such fees actually affect householders' habits and stated that
"the present state of knowledge makes it premature to create positive
incentives for local governments to adopt user fees." It suggested
further research and proposed that, in the meantime, the federal
government should provide information to local governments on
this technique.151
Product Design Regulations
Another potential method of reducing wastes and encouraging re-
cycling is through direct intervention in the design of products. The
government could require manufacturers to use more durable or
simply fewer materials in the products they produce, or recycled or
easily recyclable raw materials. The federal government could, for
example, require that all newsprint contain a certain minimum per-
centage of recycled fibers. Or it could ban products like bimetallic
(part aluminum, part steel, part other metals) cans that are difficult
to recycle and interfere with the efficient operation of source separa-
tion programs.
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The Resource Recovery Committee rejected the notion of direct
regulat'.on, because its impact is unpredictable and because it would
be immensely difficult to administer and enforce. A newsprint rule,
for example, might simply result in the diversion of recycled paper
from some other use, like production of cellulose insulation, rather
than actually causing a net increase in paper recycling. Detailed defi-
nitions as to what exactly is or is not recycled, would be necessary: for
example, whether to count newsprint wastes produced at the paper
mill or printing shops, as well as newsprint actually purchased and
used by readers of the nation's dailies.
The committee did recommend further study, however, of poten-
tial regulation of materials that cau^e special hazards in disposal and
those that significantly impede resource recovery operations (like
bimetallic cans) ,152
Tax Policies
The Resource Recovery Committee also considered whether cer-
tain government policies might be hindering recycling. In particular,
it considered whether recycled raw materials are at a competitive
disadvantage, either because certain tax subsidies for virgin materials
are not offered for recycled materials, or because freight rates are set
at levels that discriminate against recycled materials in favor of virgin
ones.
The committee's staff analysis confirmed the existence of a num-
ber of special tax advantages for virgin resource development. These
policies were originally instituted on the grounds that stimulating
resource development would contribute to economic growth and
make the nation more self-sufficient. They include percentage de-
pletion allowances for certain minerals and treatment of annual
royalty income from iron ore and coal mining and income from sales
as capital gains. These and several other provisions of the tax code
are considered subsidies in that they depart from normal methods of
taxin? business income, to the industry's benefit. According to the
committee's analysis, these subsidies amount yearly to $375 million
for nonfuel minerals production and $275 million to $550 million
for timber growing.15'' The committee stopped short of recommend-
ing abolition of the subsidies, however, recommending instead fur-
ther study by other government entities considering tax reform.
Freight Rate Discrimination
The Institute of Scrap Iron and Steel and many others have long
maintained that the rail freight rates established by the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) discriminate in favor of virgin raw
materials at the expense of recycled materials. National policy on
this issue \sas firmly enunciated in 1976, when Congress included a
provision in the Railroad Revitalizatioii and Regulatory Reform Act
requiring the ICC to imestigate its current rate structure and revise
any rates found to be discriminatory.154
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The Interstate Commerce Commission lowered freight rates for recycled paper and
several other materials in certain parts of the country in 1979, after 2 years of in-
vestigation over whether its rates discriminated against recycled commodities.
In 1977, the ICC, using certain narrow definitions of the term,
affirmed that its rate structure did not "discriminate" against re-
cycled materials.135 The ruling was appealed by two secondary ma-
terial industry trade associations, the Departments of Energy and
Justice, and EPA. In August 1978, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia ordered the ICC to examine its rates again
using a broader definition of discrimination.156 The ICC reopened its
investigation and in April 1979 announced that it had found that,
in fact, several commodities did suffer rate discrimination relative to
competing virgin materials. It ordered secondary material rates to
be reduced on scrap iron and steel in the South and West, on alu-
minum scrap in the East and South, on copper scrap in the West,
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on lead and zinc scrap in the South, and on waste paper in the West
and South.157
At the same time that the ICC was conducting its latest investiga-
tion, the Resource Conservation Committee staff made its own anal-
ysis of ICC data. It also concluded that freight rates discriminate
against important secondary materials, but felt that the most serious
discrimination was against waste paper and glass. It calculated that
rate reductions of 38 percent for waste paper, 34 percent for glass,
1 to 29 percent for iron scrap, and 9 percent for waste aluminum
might be in order.1'"'8 Most of the committee members concurred in
a recommendation that the Administration file a brief with the ICC
presenting their findings and expressing its interest in achieving com-
pliance with the Railroad Revitalization and Reform Act of 1976.
MATERIALS RECYCLING
Whatever the success of any economc incentives in reducing wastes,
large amounts of waste will continue to be discarded. Municipalities
will still face the same choices in dealing with their wastes: landfill-
ing, incineration, materials recovery, and/or energy recovery.
EPA has taken certain direct steps toward stimulating materials
recovery, with mixed success. It has issued guidelines for institution
of beverage container deposits at federal facilities and is developing
guidelines to increase federal purchasing of recycled products.
Beverage Container Deposits at Federal Facilities
Under authority granted it by the Resource Recovery Act of 1970,
EPA issued guidelines in 1976 requiring a refundable 5-cent deposit
on all beer and soft drink containers sold at federal facilities, except
in cases where costs would be excessive.159
Federal agencies have been slow to implement these guidelines.
despite a recent Executive order (October 1978) spelling out the
responsibility of federal facilities to comply with federal environ-
mental laws.160 As of March 1979, only 14 of 52 agencies reported
that they were implementing the guidelines agency wide.101 More
than half reported that their facilities were under the jurisdiction of
the General Services Administration (GSA), which as of May 1979
had decided not to implement the guidelines on a broad scale. GSA
made this decision on the basis of test projects at 12 sites which, it
reported, had difficulty finding markets for collected containers and
caused inconvenience to vendors.1*52
The Department of Defense also conducted a test of the guidelines
at 10 military bases for a 1-year period ending June 1978. One of its
findings was that where it was convenient, post lesidents would at-
tempt to evade the deposits by buying beer and soft drinks off the
post, causing a decline in beverage sales of 13 to 56 percent at the
10 installations. On the basis of that result, the Department of De-
fense declined to implement beverage container deposits at any of
its installations. Nevertheless, the actual return rates for the con-
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tainers purchased were quite good, ranging between 68 and 93 per-
cent at the 10 bases.103
Federal Procurement of Recycled Materials
As noted earlier, municipal recycling efforts currently suffer greatly
from the instability and inadequacy of industrial demand for re-
cycled materials. One way the government could increase that de-
mand would be for the government itself to buy products made
from recycled materials. Such a policy would have many benefits
beyond simply furthering municipal recycling programs: conserving
natural resources; reducing dependence on foreign raw material
supplies; reducing pollution; and conserving energy.
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act required EPA to set
guidelines for federal agencies "to procure items composed of the
highest percentage of recovered materials practicable." 1C1 Although
the agencies were supposed to be carrying out this policy by October
1978, EPA had issued no guidelines by that date. The agency is
scheduled to propose its first guidelines in this area—regarding use
of fly ash in concrete and cement—in February 1980.
EPA attributes some of its slowness in issuing these guidelines to
the fact that it was initially faced with 45,000 different federal prod-
uct and material specifications to review and evaluate. The agency
has now decided to concentrate on a few products where use of re-
cycled materials could be significant. EPA is due to issue additional
guidelines—for federal purchase of recycled paper and of parkland
soil conditioner that incorporates sewage sludge—later in 1980.
Guidelines for procurement of construction products that use recvcled
paper, of glass, and of rubber are scheduled to be proposed in 1981.165
EPA points out that even if procuring agencies were ready to comply,
industries producing recycled products would not yet be prepared to
supply all the products the government needs.160
ENERGY RECOVERY PROGRAMS
As explained above, a number of technical, institutional, and eco-
nomic obstacles inhibit increased energy recovery through centralized
waste processing facilities.
Research and Development
Both EPA and DOE have research and development programs
whose goal is to overcome technical barriers to waste processing.
EPA's program, begun by the Bureau of Solid Waste Management at
the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW),
dates back to 1967. Since EPA's creation in 1970, the agency has
spent about $5 million a year on trash-to-energy technology and has
sponsored six major demonstration plants.107 EPA's involvement in
the field, budgeted at $4.25 million for fiscal year 1978 and $2.5
million for fiscal year 1979 and scheduled to go lower in 1980, is now
decreasing.108 For the future, EPA expects to limit itself to assess-
ments of environmental impact of trash-burning facilities and devel-
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opment of better air pollution control methods. DOE's program
began in 1976 under its predecessor agency, the Energy Research and
Development Administration. It is funding demonstrations of less-
developed trash conversion technologies, mainly pyrolysis and anaer-
obic digestion. DOE's expenditures were about $11 million in this
field in fiscal year 1978 and are budgeted at $8.5 million for fiscal
year 1979.169
In a February 1979 report examining the federal waste-to-energy
program, the General Accounting Office charged the program with
being "fragmented, uncoordinated, inadequately funded, uncertain
in its priorities, and lacking in detailed overall strategy." 17° GAO
believed that DOE and EPA were failing to coordinate their pro-
grams adequately, despite an interagency agreement worked out in
1976 to do so. It pointed out, for example, that research and devel-
opment contracts were not being reviewed for possible duplication.171
It is especially vital that adequate lines of communication between
the two agencies be established and used in the coming year. Such
communication is necessary to insure that, as EPA phases out its in-
volvement in technology development, DOE takes advantage of the
experience and lessons that EPA has gained. DOE currently spon-
sors a number of projects in pyrolysis. This technology has the poten-
tial for helping to supplement the nation's oil supplies; however, EPA
has found that technically it is very difficult to make pyrolysis proj-
ects work. It is also important that DOE adequately pursue technol-
ogies that EPA found promising. EPA feels that development of
"briquets" of refuse-derived fuel, for example, could be an extremely
fruitful avenue of research.172
Planning Assistance
As discussed earlier, too often the barriers to building and oper-
ating a waste processing facility are not so much technological as
institutional. In the past, EPA provided some assistance to communi-
ties in how to go about the complex task of planning and organizing
such a facility, with panels consisting of EPA staff members, outside
consultants, and state and local officials with expertise in engineer-
ing, finance, and management. Between January and October 1978,
245 requests for assistance had been filled under this program.173 The
budget for the panels program was $3.75 million in fiscal year 1978
and is expected to be about $4.5 million in fiscal year 1979.174 How-
ever, EPA has indicated that, for the future, the panels will in-
creasingly be used to deal with hazardous wastes and solid waste
problems other than resource recovery.175
In 1979, Congress allocated $15 million under President Carter's
urban program to assist cities in initiating resource recovery proj-
ects. Grants can be used for investigating markets, assessing technol-
ogies, doing feasibility studies, analyzing local issues, and negotiating
contracts. EPA selected 68 communities to receive awards under this
program in 1979. It hopes to continue the program for 2 more
years.176
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EPA plans to issue guidelines for federal purchase of recycled rubber in 1981. Mean-
while, tires continue to accumulate in dumps and landfills across the country. Less
than 4 percent of the rubber disgarded in municipal waste was recycled in 1977.
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DOE also has a technical assistance program that provided $2 mil-
lion in planning grants in fiscal year 1978.17'
Finally, some of the funds EPA is providing to states for the over-
all planning of their waste management strategies under RCRA
may be used for planning of resource recovery. These funds totaled
$14.2 billion in fiscal year 1978 and are budgeted for $15.2 million
in fiscal year 1979.178
Capital Cost Assistance
A waste processing facility capable of handling 1,000 tons of refuse
a day can cost $25 million to $50 million to plan and build. Coming
up with such a large sum is not easy, especially when, because of the
newness of the field, many financial institutions regard such plants
as high-risk ventures.179
Government can assist communities in this area through loan
guarantees, tax exemptions for municipal industrial development or
pollution control bonds, other tax benefits for facilities, or outright
construction grants. To date, many of the larger waste processing
facilities have, in fact, been financed by issuance of tax-exempt
municipal bonds.180
Another tax benefit now available to builders of waste processing
plants is an investment tax credit. The Energy Tax Act of 1978 allows
businesses to take an additional 10 percent investment tax credit for
installing alternative energy systems, including recycling equip-
ment.181 According to DOE, such credits are expected to reduce the
cost of producing energy from municipal solid waste by 5 to 19
percent.182
A third possible form of federal aid is loan guarantees. Although
the Energy Conservation and Production Act of 1976 183 authorized
such guarantees up to $2 billion, none has been made. GAO has
criticized DOE for failing to request any appropriations under this
program, which expires at the end of fiscal year 1979. The DOE
Energy Act of 1978 also authorized certain kinds of loan guarantees,
although the Congress declined to appropriate money for this pur-
pose for fiscal year 1979.184
OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE
Municipalities facing high disposal costs or the lack of an environ-
mentally acceptable landfill site may want to institute a source separa-
tion program or build a centralized waste processing facility, or both.
Each system has advantages and disadvantages that may suit it for
one area and not another (see Table 4-12).
Instituting a program of household separation and recycling of
wastes will cost a city a certain amount (up to $7 per ton of waste
processed, exclusive of collection costs). However, it will probably
cost less than building and operating a centralized facility ($3 to
$15 per ton) and almost certainly less than building and operating
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Table 4-12
Comparison of Source Separation and Centralized
Waste Processing as Methods of Municipal
Waste Disposal
Source Centralized
Separation Waste Processing
Typical size of processing facility 10 tpd 1000 tpd
Typical capita! investment (dollars) low (50,000) high (25,000,000)
Net cost per ton processed $0-7 $3-15
(after revenues)
Reduction in waste stream 10 to 50 75 and up
(percent)
Products recovered glass, paper, iron, energy, iron
aluminum
Environmental impact negligible some air pollution
and worker health
hazards
tpd=tons per day
an incinerator ($25 to $35 per ton).185 Source separation can be
instituted in a city of any size. However, the fact that public coopera-
tion is essentia] means that source separation may be begun more
easily in small towns and rural areas, where citizens can be closely
involved in the decisionmaking process.
There are two basic disadvantages of source separation relative
to centralized waste processing. First, source separation generally
reduces wastes by 10 to 50 percent (by weight), compared with 75
percent or more at a centralized facility. Second, separation yields
materials, which may be most useful to a more-or-less distant in-
dustry, rather than energy, which is useful locally. However, although
a centralized waste processing facility can help meet a locality's
energy needs, it requires a large initial investment. It is also a rela-
tively costly disposal method, may cause air pollution problems, and
may not produce energy in an optimally useful form. The best mar-
kets for energy-from-trash seem to be industrial facilities or district
heating systems that can make use of steam. Because the economics
of centralized waste-processing plants usually dictates a capacity of
at least several hundred tons per day, such facilities appear best
suited to urban areas where wastes from 100,000 or more people are
available. However, some smaller towns are experimenting success-
fully with small modular units.
A number of cities are already experimenting with both kinds of
systems. A modest, step-by-step approach seems to be working best
in most places. The relatively elaborate source separation program
considered in 1976 by the city of Northglenn, Colo., never got off
the ground. City officials found they were simply too busy dealing
with other problems, including construction of a $31 million sewage
treatment plant, to get a new $200,000 waste system involving anae-
robic digesters and earthworm colonies underway at the same time.186
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The city elected instead to institute a limited source separation effort
in 1977, involving separate collection of newspapers, which are
sold, and grass clippings, which are composted on city land. The city
still hopes to institute the more advanced program eventually, re-
cycling and selling bottles and cans, and using bacteria and earth-
worms to process grass, other organic wastes, newspapers, and manure
from a local dairy into useful soil.18'
A plan for a very large trash-to-energy plant, which Union Elec-
tric of St. Louis first proposed in 1976, also ran into difficulties and
delays. First, because of the great quantities of waste involved (had
it been built, the facility would have been four times larger than
any plant operating today), the plant required four transfer sta-
tions at different locations. The planners were able to acquire the
sites for three of them, but local residents vehemently protested the
fourth. Shortly thereafter, a state referendum denied all utilities
the right to pass interest costs involved in building new plants along
to their customers until the projects are actually producing electricity.
In 1977, Union Electric announced that it would not go forward with
the St. Louis project, and a much more modest venture is now
planned.188 The Bi-state Development Agency—an independent
authority that runs the local bus system—is considering a 1.000-ton-
per-day facility, which will supply steam to a local industry, rather
than the originally planned 8,000-ton-per-day plant.18"
The experience of these cities points up the need to proceed incre-
mentally in projects of this type. Other lessons also may be drawn
as well. The prerequisites for success of a source separation program
seem to be:
• Obtaining long-term contracts that dictate floor prices for purchase
of recyclable materials;
• Having those whose cooperation is essential to the project, i.e..
householders and refuse collectors, solidly behind the project before
initiating it: and
• Integrating the source separation program full)- into the regular
town waste disposal system with household separation mandated
by ordinance.
The prerequisites for success of a centrali/ed \\aste processing facility
appear to be:
• L'sing one of the simpler, proven technologies:
• Locating a user for the energy produced: and
• Designing a facility to process only a portion of the jurisdiction's
waste.
The latter measure not only avoids waste shortfalls, but leaves the
door open to instituting complementan waste reduction or source
separation schemes.
GAO has pointed out that the speed with \\hich we expand our
resource recovery efforts over the next 5 to 10 years depends upon a
number of factors including the ability of cities to work out institu-
53
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tional problems, the degree to which industry will provide markets
for recovered energy and materials, and the degree to which cities
can solve capital and financing problems. Cities may have a strong
incentive to solve these problems, however, as it becomes increasingly
difficult to find land that is sufficiently remote and undesirable and
that the public is willing to let be allocated to waste disposal; and
as it becomes increasingly expensive to discard the wastes in an en-
vironmentally sound fashion. The cost of sanitary landfilling, last
estimated at $1 to $20 per ton, is expected to rise by $3 to $12 a ton,
depending on the size of the site, environmental factors, and previous
practice, as new federal and state standards go into effect.190 At these
higher rates, source separation and resource recovery will undoubtedly
become a competitive disposal option in many more cities. EPA's
$15 million planning grant program under President Carter's urban
assistance program may aid a number of cities in taking new initia-
tives to recover valuable resources from city waste.
REFERENCES
1. Resource Conservation Committee, "A Cost Analysis of the Solid
Waste Management Industry." Staff Background Paper No. 11 (draft,
Washington, D.C., December 1978), p. 15-16.
2. 42U.S.C. §6901 (1976).
3. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste, Fourth
Report to Congress: Resource Recovery and Waste Reduction (Wash-
ington, D.C., August 1977), p. 78.
4. Information provided by Union Electric Co., August 29, 1979.
5. Ibid.
6. Richard P. Lundahl, "A Public Official Evaluates Resource Recovery
Systems," Environmental Action Bulletin, February 19, 1977.
7. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste, "Solid
Waste Facts" (Washington, D.C., May 1978), p. 10.
8 Franklin Associates, Ltd., "Post-Consumer Solid Waste and Resource
Recovery Baseline," prepared for the Resource Conservation Commit-
tee (Washington, D C., April 6, 1979), p. 19
9. Id. at 21 and 33.
10. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, "Materials and Energy
from Waste" (final draft, Washington, D.C., June 1978), pp. 2-5 and
2-8.
11. Id. at 2-8.
12. Franklin Associates, Ltd., "Post-Consumer Solid Waste" supra note 8.
at 1.
13. U.S. Department of Energy, Urban vVaste Technology Commercializa-
tion Task Force, "Urban Waste Commercialization Strategy I, II, and
III" (draft, Washington, D.C.. July 19, 1978), p. 1.
14. Ibid.
15. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Solid Waste Facts,'' supra note
7, at 1.
16. SCS Engineers, "Availability of Land for Solid Waste Disposal," pre-
pared for the American Paper Institute (Washington, D.C , August
1978), p. 1.
17. Resource Conservation Committee, supra note 1, at 1
18. Id. at 10.
19. Id. at 15-16.
20. 44 Fed. Reg. 45066-086 (1979).
21. 43 Fed. Reg. 4942-4955 (1978).
54
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22. Communication from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Au-
gust 1979.
23. 42 U.S.C. §6901 (1976).
24. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1977).
25. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste, Annual
Report to the President and Congress Fiscal Year 1978: EPA Activities
Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (Wash-
ington, D.C., March 21, 1979), p. 4-4.
26. 43 Fed. Reg. 4492-4955 (1978).
27. 44 Fed. Reg. 18138-18148 (1979).
28. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 22.
29. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 7978 Annual Report, supra
note 25, at 4-5.
30. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1978 Annual Report, supra
note 25, at 3-4 and 3-5.
31. Information provided by Penelope Hansen, U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, Office of Solid Waste, April 23, 1979.
32. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Fourth Report to Congress,
supra, note 3, at 38.
33. 41 Fed. Reg. 16950 (1976).
34. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1978 Annual Report, supra
note 23, at 5-9.
35. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Solid Waste Facts," supra
note 7, at 12.
36. Id. at 10.
37. Id. at 11.
38. Z.A. Munir, E. Fuss, and L. Ivers, An Analysis of the Recycling of
Metals, prepared for Division of Conservation Research and Tech-
nology, U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration (final
report, Washington, D.C., January 1, 1978), p. 264.
39. Franklin Associates, Ltd., "Post-Consumer Solid Waste," supra note 8,
at 11, 14, 21.
40. U.S. Comptroller General, U.S. General Accounting Office, "Potential
Effects of Mandatory Deposits on Beverage Containers" (Washington,
D.C., December 1977), pp. 5 and 6.
41. Mark Trautwein, Environmental Study Conference, "Beverage Con-
tainer Deposits: What a Difference a Nickel Makes," Fact Sheet (Wash-
ington, D.C., April 18, 1978), p. 2.
42. Franklin Associates, Ltd., "Post-Consumer Solid Waste," supra note 8,
at 11, 21.
43. Ibid.
44. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Fourth Report to Congress,
supra note 3, at 7.
45. Id , at 37.
46. U.S. Congress, "Materials and Energy from Waste," supra note 10,
at 5-4.
47. Richard Tichenor, "Compliance in a Mandatory Source Separation
Recycling System," Compost Science /Land Utilization, July 1978, p. 23.
48. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Fourth Report to Congress,
supra note 3, at 37.
49. Richard Tichenor, supra note 47.
50. Penelope Hansen, "Resource Recovery Through Multi-Material Source
Separation," U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Resource Recov-
ery Update (Washington, D.C., October 1976), p. 1.
51. Ibid.
52. Id. at 3.
53. Ibid.
54. Id. at 2.
55. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Fourth Report to Congress,
supra note 3, at 36.
55
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56. Id. at 37.
57. Id. at 35, 36.
58. Information provided by Penelope Hansen, U.S. Environmental Proteo
tion Agency, Office of Solid Waste, April 23, 1979.
59. Ibid.
60. Richard Tichenor, supra note 47, at 20-23.
61. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Fourth Report to Congress,
supra note 3, at 35.
62. R.L. Tichenor and E.F. Jansen, "Recycling as an Approach to Solid
Waste Management in New Hampshire" (Durham: University of New
Hampshire, June 1978), p. 17.
63. Penelope Hansen, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Residential
Paper Recovery:.A Municipal Supplementation Guide'' (second print-
ing, Washington, D.C., February 1979), p. 7-8.
64. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Fourth Report to Congress,
supra note 3, at 35.
65. Franklin Associates, Ltd., "Post-Consumer Solid Waste," supra note 8,
at 14.
66. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste Manage-
ment Programs, Third Report to Congress: Resource Recovery and
Waste Reduction (Washington, D.C., 1975), p. 50.
67. ICF, Inc., "Estimates of Substitution and Supply Elasticities for Post-
Consumer Waste Materials," prepared for the U S. Environmental
Protection Agency (draft report, Washington, B.C., 1978), p. 8.
68. The Environmental Industry Council, "Top Waste Management
Award Is Won by Newspaper Recychr," press release, Washington,
D.C., February 28, 1979.
69. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Third Report to Congress,
supra note 66, at 50.
70. Z.A. Munir, el al., supra note 38, at 75.
71. Ibid.; and ICF, Inc , "Estimates," supra note 67, at 14.
72. Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc., Iron and Steel Scrap: Its Accumu-
lation and Availability Updated to December 31, 1977, prepared for
Metal Scrap Research and Education Foundation (Washington, D.C.:
Metal Scrap Research and Education Foundation, 1978), pp. 3 and 4.
73. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Third Report to Congress,
supra note 66, at 56-57.
74. Z.A. Munir et al., supra note 38, at 267
75. Id. at 264.
76. Franklin Associates, Ltd., "Post-Consumer Solid Waste," supra note 8,
at 14.
77. U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Joint Executive Task Force, Solid Waste Management, and Franklin
Associates, Ltd., Report to the Secretary of Defense on Department of
Defense Test of Environmental Protection Agency Solid Waste Manage-
ment Guidelines for Beverage Containers (Washington, D C., March
1979), p. 4-18.
78. ICF, Inc., "Estimates," supra note 67, at 11.
79. Environmental Industry Council, "Connecticut Firm is Cited for Glass
Recycling Gains," press release, Washington, D C., February 28, 1979.
80. U.S. Congress, "Materials and Energy from Waste," supra note 10, at
4-10, 4-11,4-15.
81. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Solid Waste Facts," supra
note 7, at 10.
82. David B. Sussman, Office of Solid Waste, U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, "Resource Recovery Facilities in the United States"
(Washington, D.C., November 1978), p. 3-4.
83. U.S. Comptroller General, U.S. General Accounting Office, Report
to the Congress- Conversion of Urban Waste to Energy: Developing
56
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and Introducing Alternate Fuels from Municipal Solid Waste (Wash-
ington, D.C., February 28, 1979), p. ii.
84. Ibid.
85. Franklin Associates, Ltd , "Post-Consumer Solid Waste," supra note 8,
at 19.
86 U.S. General Accounting Office, supra note 83, at 3-21.
87. Ibid.
88. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Fourth Report to Congress,
supra note 3, at 45.
89. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Third Report to Congress,
supra note 66, at 33.
90. Ibid.
91. Franklin Associates, Ltd., "Post-Consumer Solid Waste,'' supra note 8,
at 14.
92. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Fourth Report to Congress,
supra note 3, at 53-54.
93. David B. Sussman, supra note 82, at 5-6
94. U.S. Congress, "Materials and Energy from Waste,'' supra note 10,
at 6-11.
95. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Fourth Report to Congress,
supra note 3, at 78.
96. Information provided by Bernard Irholtz, former Franklin, Ohio, City
Manager, August 29, 1979.
97. David B. Sussman, supra note 82.
98. Id. at 3.
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid.
102. U.S. General Accounting Office, supra not? 83, at Appendix II, p
II-1-II-9.
103. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Fourth Report to Congress,
supra note 3, at 78.
104. Id. at 56.
105. U.S. General Accounting Office, Conversion of Urban Waste, supra
note 83, at 2-9.
106. Id. at 2-10.
107. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Fourth Report to Congress,
supra note 3, at 80.
108. U.S. General Accounting Office, Conversion of Urban Waste, supra
note 83, at 2-10.
109. David B. Sussman, supra note 82, at 1-2.
110. Mark E. Anthony Reisch, Congressional Research Service, "The Status
of Resource Recovery: A Report of Site Visits,'' prepared for the
Subcommittee on the Environment and the Atmosphere of the Com-
mittee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives
(Washington, D C., April 1978), pp. 13, 14.
111. U.S. General Accounting Office, Conversion of Urban Waste, supra
note 83, at 2-10.
112. David B. Sussman, supra note 82, at 2.
113. Information provided by David B. Sussman, U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, Office of Solid Waste, May 15, 1979.
114. David B. Sussman, supra note 82, at 2.
115. U.S. General Accounting Office, supra note 83 at 2-12.
116. Congressional Research Service, "The Status of Resource Recovery,"
supra note 110, at 14.
117. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Fourth Report to Congress,
supra note 3, at 59.
118. E. Milton Wilson, et al., The Ralph M. Parsons Company, Engineering
and Economic Analysis of Waste to Energy Systems, prepared for thi1
57
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U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Cincinnati, Ohio, May 1978),
p. A-13.
119. K.P. Ananth, L.J. Shannon, and M.P. Schrag, Midwest Research Insti-
tute, Environmental Assessment of Waste to Energy Process: Source
Assessment Document, prepared for U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (Cincinnati, Ohio, August 1977), p. 2-3.
120. D.E. Fiscus et al., Midwest Research Institute, St. Louis Demonstration
Project Final Report: Refuse Processing Plant Equipment, Facilities and
Environmental Evaluations, prepared for U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, EPA-600/2-77-155a (Cincinnati, Ohio, September
1977), pp. 2, 91-100.
121. Id. at 108.
122. Communication from the U.S. Department of the Interior, August 1979.
123. U.S. Congress, "Materials and Energy from Waste,'1 supra note 10, at
6-22, 6-23.
124. Id. at 6-24.
125. Ibid.
126. Information provided by Joseph Boren, Connecticut Resource Recovery
Association, April 16, 1979.
127. U.S. Congress, "Materials and Energy from Waste, supra note 10, at
6-22.
128. Id. at 8-13.
129. E. Milton Wilson et al, supra note 118, at 58-59.
130. U.S. General Accounting Office, supra note 83, at II-3.
131. Information provided by Nashville Thermal Transfer Corporation,
August 28, 1979.
132. E. Milton Wilson et a!., supra note 118, at 48, 53.
133. Franklin Associates, Ltd., "Post-Consumer Solid Waste," supra note 8,
at 28.
134. E. Milton Wilson et al., supra note 118, at 58-59.
135. Id. at 45 and 46.
136. David B. Sussman, supra note 82, at 4.
137. Information supplied by Nashville Thermal Transfer Corporation,
August 28, 1979.
138. Information provided by Joseph Boren, Connecticut Resource Recovery
Association, April 16, 1979.
139. U.S. General Accounting Office, "Conversion of Urban Waste," supia
note 83, at 3-1.
140. Data supplied by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of
Solid Waste, and by Franklin Associates, Ltd., reported in Resource
Conservation Committee, Status Report on Solid Waste Disposal Charge
Analysis (Washington, D.C., July 1978), p. 7.
141. Information provided by Penelope Hansen, U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, April 23, 1979.
142. 42 U.S.C. §3251 (1965).
143. Pub. L. No. 91-512, 84 Stat. 1227.
144. 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1976).
145. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §6962 (1976).
146. Resource Conservation Committee, "Choices for Conservation," Final
Report to the President and Congress (Washington, D.C., July 1979).
147. Id. at 101-117.
148. Id. at 118-122.
149. Id. at 123-128.
150. Id. at 136-144.
151. Id. at 131-135.
152. Id. at 93-98.
153. Id. at 56.
154. Pub. L. No. 94-210 § 204, 90 Stat. 40 (1976).
155. Ex Par'e No. 319, Investigation of Freight Rates for the Transportation
of Recycled Materials.
58
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156. 585 F.2d 522 (D.C.Cir. 1978).
157. Resource Conservation Committee, "Choices for Conservation," supra
note 146, at 83.
158. Id. at 87.
159. 40C.F.R. §244 (1977).
160. Executive Order 12088, October 1978.
161. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 7978 Annual Report, supra
note 25, at 5-10.
162. Communication from the U.S. General Services Administration, July
13, 1979.
163. U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Report to the Secretary of Defense, supra note 77, at 4—28.
164. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §6901 (1976).
165. Information supplied by U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office
of Solid Waste, August 1979.
166. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 7978 Annual Report, supra
note 25, at 5-26.
167. U.S. General Accounting Office, "Conversion of Urban Waste," supra
note 83, at 5-4.
168. Information supplied by David Berg, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Office of Research and Development, May 22, 1979.
169. U.S. General Accounting Office, "Conversion of Urban Waste," supra
note 83, at 5-5.
170. Id. at 6-3.
171. Id. at 5-7.
172. David Berg, supra note 168.
173. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 165.
174. Ibid.
175. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 7978 Annual Report, supra
note 25, at 3-9.
176. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 165.
177. Information supplied by U.S. Department of Energy, Urban Waste and
Municipal Systems Branch, September 1979.
178. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 7978 Annual Report, supra note
25, at 2-11,3-13.
179. U.S. General Accounting Office, supra note 83, at 4-7.
180. Ibid.
181. The Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-618.
182. Urban Waste Technology Commercialization Task Force, supra note
13, at 9.
183. 42 U.S.C. § 6881(g)(l) (1976).
184. U.S. General Accounting Office, supra note 83, at 4-9.
185. Franklin Associates, Ltd., Resource Recovery Plant Costs: Semi-
Suspension Incinerators and Small Modular Incinerators with Materials
Recovery, prepared for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(Washington, D.C., May 1978).
186. Information provided by Richard Lundahl, Director of Public Works.
Northglenn County, July 1979.
187. Ibid.
188. Information provided by Robert Holloway, U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, April 1979.
189. Ibid.
190. James F. Hudson and Michael R. Alford, Urban Systems Research and
Engineering, Inc., "Projections of Solid Waste Management Costs,
Paper No. 10 in Support of the Resource Conservation Committee,"
prepared for the President's Council on Environmental Quality (draft,
Cambridge, Mass., 1978), p. 16.
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