United States
 Environmental Protection
 Agency
 Air and Energy Engineering
 Research Laboratory
 Research Triangle Park NC 27711
 Research and Development
EPA/600/S8-87/034J Feb. 1988
Project  Summary
 Prevention Reference Manual:
 Chemical  Specific, Volume  10:
 Control  of Accidental  Releases
 of Hydrogen  Cyanide

 D. S. Davis, G. B. DeWolf, and J. D. Quass
  Interest in reducing the probability
and consequences of accidental toxic
chemical releases  that might  harm
workers within a process facility and
people in the surrounding community
prompted preparation of a series of
reference manuals on loss prevention in
process industries. The manual  on
hydrogen cyanide (HCN) is one of a
series of chemical-specific manuals that
addresses accidental release issues.
HCN has an IDLH (Immediately Dan-
gerous to Life and Health) concentration
of 50 ppm, making it an acute toxic
hazard.
  To reduce the risk associated with an
accidental release of HCN. the potential
causes of such releases in facilities using
HCN must be identified. Examples of
such causes are discussed and measures
that can reduce the accidental release
risk are identified. Such measures in-
clude possible changes to plant design;
release prevention,  protection, and
mitigation technologies; and more re-
sponsible operation and maintenance
practices. Conceptual cost estimates of
example prevention,  protection, and
mitigation technologies are provided.
  This Project Summary was developed
by EPA's Air and Energy Engineering
Research Laboratory, Research Triangle
Park, NC, to announce key findings of
the research project that Is fully docu-
mented In a separate report of the same
title (see Project Report ordering In-
formation at back).


Introduction
  Increasing concern about the potentially
disastrous consequences of accidental
 releases of toxic chemicals has prompted
 the preparation of a series of reference
 manuals on chemical loss prevention and
 control. This manual compiles technical
 information on HCN, specifically on pre-
 venting, protecting against, and mitigating
 accidental releases of HCN.
  Two processes for manufacturing HCN
 account for most of the chemical produced
 in the U.S. The most widely used process
 produces HCN by reacting natural gas
 (methane), ammonia, and air. A second
 process, called the BMA process, pro-
 duces HCN by reacting methane with
 ammonia. HCN is also produced as a by-
 product of acrylonitrile manufacture. As
 of 1983, the major use of HCN in the U.S.
 was in the production of nylon-6.6. HCN
 is also used in the production of poly-
 methyl methacrylate, or Plexiglas ®, and
 in the manufacture of various pesticides,
chelating agents, and sodium cyanide. In
the U.S., HCN is stored in small cylinders
(approximately 150 Ib or 68 kg), railroad
tank cars, and bulk storage tanks.

 Process Hazards
  Anhydrous HCN is a colorless or pale
 yellow liquid with a mild odor of bitter
 almonds.  The liquid boils  at  78.3°F
 (25.7°C) at 1  atm (1 kPa) and forms a
 colorless, flammable, toxic  gas.  Three
chemical properties of HCN contribute to
 its accidental  release potential:  1) it is
flammable in air at concentrations of 6 to
41 %; 2) the addition of alkaline chemicals,
water, and/or heat may promote exother-
mic self-polymerization and decomposi-
tion of the HCN; and 3) the addition of
large quantities  of acid can  cause the
rapid exothermic decomposition of the
HCN.

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  Potential HCN releases may be in the
form of either liquid or vapor. Liquid spills
can occur when HCN is released at or
below its boiling point of 78.3°F, or when
a sudden release of the chemical above
its boiling point results in vapor flashing.
  Failures leading to accidental releases
may be due  to process, equipment, or
operational problems. Process causes are
related to the fundamentals of process
chemistry. Examples of possible process
causes of a HCN release include:
  •  Overheating of cyanide manufactur-
     ing reactor, resulting in rapid thermal
     decomposition;
  •  Loss of flow or composition control
     when  acid stabilizer is added to a
     HCN stream, resulting in excess acid
    (high acid levels can lead to rapid
     decomposition and overpressure);
  •  Loss of flow or composition control,
     as above, but resulting in low acid
     levels  that can lead to polymeriza-
     tion-decomposition;
  •  Loss of  pH control where acetone
     cyanohydrin is present, resulting in
     the  decomposition  to  acetone and
     HCN,  which could  lead to  over-
     pressure;
  •  Excess HCN feed  leading to over-
     filling or overpressuring equipment;
     and
  •  Catalyst  decay in  HCN production
     reaction, resulting  in overheating of
     the reactor.
  Equipment  causes of accidental  re-
leases that result from  hardware failure
include:  excessive stress caused by im-
proper fabrication,  construction, or  in-
stallation; mechanical fatigue and shock
from age,  vibration, stress cycling, or
collisions;  creep failure in equipment
subjected to extreme operational upsets,
especially excess  temperature; and
corrosion.
  Operational causes of accidental  re-
leases result from incorrect procedures
or human errors,  including:  overfilled
storage  vessels; errors in  loading  and
unloading; inadequate maintenance,
especially of  pressure relief systems and
other protection and prevention systems:
and lack of inspection and nondestructive
testing  of  vessels and  piping to detect
weakening from corrosion.


Hazard Prevention and Control
  To prevent, protect against, or mitigate
an accidental toxic chemical release,  the
following  areas must  be considered:
process  design, physical plant design,
operating and maintenance practices, and
protective systems.
                                    2
  Most large manufacturers of HCN assist
their customers in understanding proper
storage and handling procedures. Equip-
ment and procedures must accord with
applicable codes, standards, and regula-
tions. One company requires  all cus-
tomers  to comply  with  their safety
practices  and routinely  inspects cus-
tomers' facilities for compliance.
  Process design and chemistry must be
evaluated to see how deviations from
expected conditions could initiate a series
of events that would lead to an accidental
release. The primary focus is on how the
process is controlled: by the basic process
chemistry; by  the  variables  of flow,
temperature, pressure, composition, and
quantity; and by control instrumentation
and fire protection. Process  design can
be modified to  enhance the overall  in-
tegrity of the system or that of specific
units within the system.
  Physical plant design concerns equip-
ment (vessels, piping,  valves,  instru-
mentation),  siting  and  layout, and
transfer/transport  facilities.  Anhydrous
HCN is not generally corrosive; therefore,
carbon steel is an acceptable construction
material appropriate for ambient storage
of the chemical. Elevated  temperatures,
acid stabilizers, and water will affect the
corrosiveness of HCN solution, possibly
resulting in the stress corrosion cracking
of stainless steels and nickel-chromium
and nickel-copper alloys. Water solutions
of HCN containing  sulfuric acid as a
stabilizer severely corrode carbon steel
(about 100°F or 38°C) and stainless steels
(above 175°F or 79°C).
  Most  HCN is stored  in refrigerated
atmospheric storage vessels.  Safety
features that address the  ability of HCN
to undergo polymerization-decomposition
should be incorporated into the design of
any storage tank. All  vessels that handle
HCN  must be equipped with  adequate
overpressure protection. The contents of
HCN  vessels should be kept under  an
inert  atmosphere because of  its flam-
ma bi I ity. Because HCN is  so toxic, even
small leaks in a piping system could be
dangerous to operating personnel. Piping
should be constructed with welded con-
nections  that are fully   radiographed.
Threaded  fittings should never be used.
Piping, valves, and fittings should all be
constructed of 316 stainless steel.
  Facilities and equipment should be laid
out to reduce personnel exposure in the
event of a release. HCN piping should not
be adjacent to other piping, and  inven-
tories of  the chemical should be kept
away from  sources  of possible fire or
explosion.  Storage  should be  situated
away from control rooms, offices, utilities, ^
other storage areas, and laboratory areas.
Multiple means of emergency access to
the facility should be provided.
  Transfer and transport facilities should
be equipped with grounding connections
for rail cars and rails, drainage control
systems, rail car  temperature  monitor
and alarms, warning signs and lights,
and a  deluge  system or sufficient fire
hoses or monitors.
  Protection technologies, used to con-
tain, treat,  and neutralize  a  released
chemical, include: enclosures, flares, and
scrubbers.
  If, in spite of all precautions, a  large
amount of  HCN  is released, workers in
the immediate vicinity must be  rescued,
and persons downwind  must be evacu-
ated. The source of the release should be
determined and  the leak should  be
stopped, if possible. To reduce the effects
of the released chemical, mitigation  mea-
sures (e.g., physical barriers, water sprays
and fogs, and foams)  may be employed.
Physical barriers include dikes,  high im-
pounding walls, and excavated and natural
basins. A spill of HCN can be diluted with
water,  which will also reduce the vapor
generation rate. Water sprays and fogs
are also useful for dispersing and/or   <
removing HCN vapor from the air. Large  '
fans or blowers  can direct the  vapor
away from populated or other sensitive
areas, if the weather is calm.
  Although quality hardware, contained
mechanical equipment, and protective
devices all  increase  plant safety, they
must be supported by the safety policies
of management and by appropriate train-
ing, operation, and maintenance proce-
dures that  relate  to  the prevention of
accidental releases of HCN. Management
is responsible for such things as:  ensuring
worker competency; developing and en-
forcing standard  operating  procedures;
adequately documenting  policy  and
procedures; communicating and promot-
ing feedback on safety issues; identifying,
assessing,  and controlling hazards; and
conducting regular plant audits.

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     D. Davis. G. DeWolf, andJ. Quass are with Radian Corp., Austin, TX 78766.
     T. Kelly Janes is the EPA Project Officer (see below).
     The complete report, entitled "Prevention Reference Manual: Chemical Specific,
       Volume  10: Control of Accidental Releases of Hydrogen Cyanide," (Order
       No. PB 88-107 032/AS; Cost: $18.95, subject to change) will be available
       only from:
            National Technical Information Service
            5285 Port Royal Road
            Springfield, VA 22161
            Telephone: 703-487-4650
     The EPA Project Officer can be contacted at:
            Air and Energy Engineering Research Laboratory
            U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
            Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Center for Environmental Research
Information
Cincinnati OH 45268
U.S.OFF]OALMAiL
       ~~U.S.PO$iTG'r

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Penalty for Private Use $300

EPA/600/S8-87/034J
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