Office of
Radiation Programs
Washington, DC 20460
September 1983
EPA 520/1-83-008-2
Final Environmental
Impact Statement
for Standards
for the Control
of Byproduct Materials
from Uranium Ore Process!n
(40 CFR 192)
Volume II
EP 520/1
83-008-2
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EPA520/1-8340&2
Final
Environmental Impact Statement
for
Standards for the Control
of
Byproduct Materials from
Uranium Ore Processing
(40 CFR 192)
Volume II
September 1983
Office of Radiation Programs
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
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FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR STANDARDS
FOR CONTROL OF BYPRODUCT MATERIALS FROM URANIUM ORE
PROCESSING (40 CFR 192): RESPONSE TO COMMENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No.
FREQUENTLY USED ABBREVIATIONS v
FREQUENTLY USED REFERENCES vi i
I. INTRODUCTION 1
II. MISCELLANEOUS LETTERS 5
III. COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED STANDARDS 7
A• 40 CFR PART 192. SUBPART D -STANDARDS FOR URANIUM BYPRODUCT MATERIALS
1.0 SCOPE OF THE STANDARDS, THE DEIS, AND THE RIA A. 1-1
1.1 Coverage of the Standards, the DEIS, and the RIA A.1-1
1.2 Form of the Standards A. 1-16
1.3 Definitions A.1-20
1.4 Responsibilities of the EPA and the NRC A.1-22
2.0 RISK ASSESSMENT A. 2-1
2.1 Radiological Health Risk Assessment A.2- 7
2.1.1 Exposure Pathways A.2-21
2.1.2 Risk Models A.2-23
2.2 Nonradiological Health Risk Assessment A.2-36
References A.2-37
3.0 RATIONALE FOR STANDARDS A.3-1
3.1 Basis for Standards A.3-1
3.2 Benefits/Risk Reduction A.3-1
3.3 Costs Estimates A.3-17
3.4 Cost Effectiveness A.3-33
3.5 Population Density-Dependent Standards A.3-38
References A.3-40
4.0 STANDARDS FOR OPERATIONS A. 4-1
4.1 Design and Operating Requirements for Surface
Impoundments (liner requirements, 40 CFR 264.221) A.4-3
4.2 Groundwater Protection A.4-15
4.2.1 Standards (40 CFR 264.92) A.4-18
4.2.2 Hazardous Constituents (40 CFR 264.93) A.4-29
4.2.3 Concentration Limits (40 CFR 264.94) A.4-33
4.2.4 Point of Compliance (40 CFR 264.95) A.4-36
4.2.5 Compliance Period (40 CFR 264.96) A.4-38
4.2.6 Corrective Action Programs A.4-40
4.3 Surface Water Protection (40 CFR 440) A.4-42
4.4 Control of Radon Releases A.4-45
4.5 Dose Limits Other than from Radon Emissions
(40 CFR 190) A.4-49
ill
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page No.
5.0 STANDARDS FOR DISPOSAL A.5-1
5.1 Period of Effectiveness (Longevity) A.5-19
5.2 Radon Emission Limit A.5-25
5.3 Radium-226 Soil Concentration Exemption
(40 CFR 192.32(b)(2)) A.5-33
6.0 IMPLEHENTAT10N A.6-1
6.1 Standards for Operation A.6-1
6.2 Standards for Disposal A.6-2
6.3 Supplemental Standards A.6-4
7.0 MISCELLANEOUS COMMENTS A. 7-1
B. 40 CFR PART 192. SUBPART E - STANDARDS FOR THORIUM BYPRODUCTS MATERIALS
1.0 SCOPE OF THE STANDARDS, THE DEIS, AND THE RIA B.l-1
1.1 Coverage of the Standards, the DEIS, and the RIA B.l-1
1.2 Definitions B.l-3
1.3 Responsibilities of the EPA and the NRC B.l-4
2.0 RISK ASSESSMENT B.2-1
2.1 Radiological Health Risk Assessment B.2-1
3.0 RATIONALE FOR STANDARDS B.3-1
3.1 Bas i s for Standards B.3-1
4.0 STANDARDS FOR OPERATIONS B. 4-1
4.1 Design and Operating Requirements for Surface
Impoundments (liner requirements, 40 CFR 264.221) ... B.4-2
4.2 Groundwater Protection B.4-3
4.2.1 Standards (40 CFR 264.92) B.4-3
4.2.2 Hazardous Constituents (40 CFR 264.93) B.4-4
4.2.3 Concentration Limits (40 CFR 264.94) B.4-5
4.3 Surface Water Protection (40 CFR 440) B.4-6
4.4 Control of Radon Releases B. 4- 7
5 .0 STANDARDS FOR DISPOSAL B. 5-1
5.1 Period of Effectiveness (Longevity) B.5-2
6.0 MISCELLANEOUS COMMENTS B.6-1
IV
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TABLE OP CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
APPENDIX
Submittals — EPA*s Docket A-82-26-VI-D List
with Comraenter Affiliation Identifiers
Table C-l—Written Submittals, Grouped by Affiliation .... C-l
Table C-2—Public Hearings, Grouped by Affiliation C-14
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FREQUENTLY USED ABBREVIATIONS
AEA Atomic Energy Act
AEG Atomic Energy Commission
Agency U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable
AMC American Mining Congress
BEIR Biological Effects Ionizing Radiation Committee of the
Committee National Academy of Sciences
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CWLM Cumulative WLM
EOF Environmental Defense Fund
DEIS Draft Environmental Impact Statement
DOE U.S. Department of Energy
DOE/EIA U.S. Department of Energy/Energy Information Administration
EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
FEIS Final Environmental Impact Statement
ICRP International Commission on Radiation Protection
NAS National Academy of Sciences
NCRP National Council for Radiation Protection and Measurements
ND No data available
UNSCEAR United Nations Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation
NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (also SWDA)
RIA Regulatory Impact Analysis
SWDA Solid Waste Disposal Act (also RCRA)
UMTRCA Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act
USC U.S. Congress
U.S.H.R. U.S. House of Representatives
WLM Working Level Month
vi
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AEA 83
CAA 81
SWDA
RCRA 76
RCRA 82
UMTRCA 78
UMTRCA
"as amended"
DEIS-I
FEIS-I,
Volume I
FE1S-1,
Volume IT
DRIA 83
RIA 83
DEIS
FREQUENTLY USED REFERENCES
U.S. Congress, Clean Air Act, Public Law 90-148,
42 USC 7401 et. seq., 1967.
U.S. Congress, Clean Air Act, Public Law 97-23,
42 USC 7401, 1981.
U.S. Congress, Solid Waste Disposal Act (Reference is to
the Act as amended by RCRA) Public Law 94-580, 42 USC 3251
et. seq., 1976.
U.S. Congress, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
Public Law 94-580, 42 USC 6901 et. seq., 1976. Amends
Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA).
U.S. Congress, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
Public Law 97-272 as amended, 42 USC 6901, 1982.
U.S. Congress, Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control
Act, Public Law 95-604, 42 USC 7901, 1978.
U.S. Congress, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Authorization
Act of 1982, Public Law 97-415, January 1983.
EPA, Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Remedial
Action Standards for Inactive Uranium Processing Sites
(40 CFR 192), EPA 520/4-80-011, 1982.
EPA, Final Environmental Impact Statement for Remedial
Action Standards for Inactive Uranium Processing Sites
(40 CFR 192), Volume I, EPA 520/4-82-013-1, October 1982.
EPA, Final Environmental Impact Statement for Remedial
Action Standards for Inactive Uranium Processing Sites
(40 CFR 192), Volume II, EPA 520/4-82-013-2, October 1982.
EPA, Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis of Environmental
Standards for Uranium Mill Tailings at Active Sites,
EPA 520/1-82-023, March 1983.
EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis of Final Environmental
Standards for Uranium Mill Tailings at Active Sites,
EPA 520/1-83-010, September 1983.
EPA, Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Standards
for the Control of Byproduct Materials from Uranium Ore
Processing (40 CFR 192), HIPA 520/1-82-022.
VI 1
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FEIS. EPA, Final Environmental Impact Statement for Standards
Volume I for the Control of Byproduct Materials from Uranium Ore
Processing (4O CFB 192), Volume I. EPA 52O/1-83-008-1,
September 1983.
Preamble Preamble to the Final Environmental Impact Statement
(FEIS, Volume I) for the Control of Byproduct Materials
from Uranium Ore Processing (4O CFR 192), EPA 52O/1-83-OO1,
September 1983.
VI11
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RESPONSE TO COMMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
This part of the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS),
Volume II, presents responses to written and oral comments submitted to
the Agency on the proposed standards for the control of byproduct
materials from uranium ore processing. It also addresses comments on the
Draft Environment Impact Statement (DEIS) and the Regulatory Impact
Analysis (RIA). Proposed Standards for Uranium and Thorium Mill Tailings
at Licensed Commercial Processing Sites were issued on April 29, 1983
(48 FR 19584). The Draft Environmental Impact Statement was issued in
March 1983. Public hearings on the proposed standards were held in
Washington, D.C., May 31, 1983, and in Denver, Colorado, June 15 and 16,
1983.
This volume includes summarized comments and responses for comments
received by the Central U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Docket as of
July 14, 1983. All written comments and hearing transcripts are available
for review in Docket No. A-82-26, IV-D. located in the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, 401 M. Street, S.W., West Tower Lobby, Gallery One,
Washington, D.C. 20460.
The method used in responding to comments was to assign comments to
general topic categories. Commenters were assigned an affiliation/
submittal identifier. Comments addressing the standards were identified,
summarized, and assigned to the appropriate topic category. Within each
category, comments of common concern were consolidated, where possible,
into a composite comment that could be addressed by a single response.
Most responses are intentionally brief and make reference to the DEIS,
and RIA, or supporting reference when more detailed technical information
is appropriate. Where an adequate response required it, however, a more
lengthy discussion of the technical considerations relevant to the comment
is presented. We did not respond to a few comments which indicated only
general agreement or disagreement with the DEIS or standards and which
were not accompanied by any supporting data or arguments.
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This procedure avoids, as much as possible, duplication of comments
and responses and aids finding a response according to its topic. In
Section III we attempted to summarize only comments addressing the
proposed standards, although comments addressing related areas may
occasionally appear.
Each comment is followed by a code letter/numbers identifying:
(1) the commenter and its affiliation; (2) the origin of the submittal
(written or from the Public Hearing); and (3) the number of the comment
within a submittal, since when a commenter made more than one submittal,
these were sequentially numbered. Table 1 explains the identifiers' code
and is followed by an example on how to interpret the identifiers.
An index of the commenters with identifiers of their affiliation and
of their submittal appears in the Appendix, Tables C-l, C-2.
The Final Standards, referenced to as 40 CFR 192, are in Appendix A
in Volume I of the FEIS.
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TABLE 1
CODE LETTER NUMBERS
Identifiers
(i) A Refers to comments on Uranium Standards
B Refers to comments on Thorium Standards
(2) P Member of the public, public interest groups, and the
scientific community
I Industry
F Federal agency
S State or local government
(3) HI Refers to the public hearing, held in Washington, D.C.,
on May 31, 1983.
H2 Refers to the public hearing held in Denver, Colorado,
on June 15 and 16, 1983.
(4) (i) A number in parentheses refers to the sequence in which
the submittals were received when more than one submittal
was received from one commenter.
(5) For commenters' affiliation identifiers, consult
Tables C-l and C-2 (Appendix).
(6) Full identifiers have meaning only in conjunction with the
Outline of Topics (see Table of Contents, Section III).
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Example for interpreting a code letter/number
Identifier: 1-6(3).5
1^ refers to a commenter from industry
6_ refers to the 6th industrial member with its first written
submittal to docket No. A-82-26.IV-D
(3j refers to the 3rd written submittal by this commenter.
5. refers to the number of the comment in sequentially
numbered comments, when more than one comment
has been identified in a submittal.
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II. MISCELLANEOUS LETTERS
Letters requesting extension of the comment periods, letters
requesting that the respondents be scheduled to present testimony during
the public hearings, and other miscellaneous requests or statements have
been addressed in this section.
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Miscellaneous Requests
Extension of Comment Period
1. We request that the Agency extend its written comment period
for 30 days. (P-l.l, P-3.1, F-3.1, F-4.1, 1-4.1, 1-5.1,
1-6.1, 1-7.1, 1-8.1, 1-9.1, 1-10.1, 1-12.1, P-5(l).l).
2. We request that EPA extend its written comment period 45
days. (S-2.1)
3. We request that EPA extend its written comment period 60
days. (1-1.1, 1-2.1)
4. We request additional time, beyond the May 31 deadline, to
prepare comments (no time period specified). (1-3.1, 1-15.1)
Response: The period for written comments was extended to June 14,
1983, and an additional hearing was held on June 15-16, 1983, in Denver,
Colorado. The hearing record was held open for written submissions until
June 30, 1983. In effect, EPA extended the period for written comments by
one month.
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III. COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED STANDARDS
(40 CFR Part 192, Subparts D & E)
This Section presents the summarized and consolidated comments, and
the responses to these comments. The comments were categorized according
to the Outline of Topics (Table of Contents, Section III).
Comments were categorized by the commenter's identification and by
topic, as described in Section I. Occasionally a comment may appear in
more than one category. Comments that logically fit into a more general
category, such as 3.1, Basis for Standards, but address a more specific
area, for example, basis for groundwater standards, will more likely
appear under the specific subcategory, such as A.2.1 Groundwater
Protection - Standards (40 CFR 264.92).
As much as feasible, comments within a subtopic have been grouped
according to the issue they address. The outline of the issue appears as
a subheading (in italics) above each such group of comments.
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AO CFR PART 192. SUBPART D - STANDARDS FOR URANIUM BYPRODUCT MATERIALS
A.1.0 SCOPE OF THE STANDARDS. THE DEIS. AND THE RIA
A.1.1 Coverage of the Standards, the DEIS, and the RIA
'.The Nonradlological Portions of the Standard Are Not Authorized!
Comment 1; In the Preamble to its proposed standards (p. 19592),
EPA states that Congress in UMTRCA78 exempted uranium mill tailings from
the hazardous waste regulatory system of Subtitle C of the SWDA. Then it
argues that Congress "could not have meant" what it said. We find EPA's
reasoning to be convoluted at best. (1-9(2).1, 1-4(3).78)
Response: In support of the contention that EPA lacks authority
to set groundwater standards for active mills, commenters argued that
Subtitle C of the SWDA does not apply to exempted materials, and is
therefore "inapplicable" to the hazards associated therewith; and,
relatedly, that standards "consistent" with Subtitle C standards cannot
mean standards "identical" to Subtitle C standards because Congress could
have specified "identical" standards if it wanted to.
EPA considers that Congress could not have self-defeatingly
required standards "consistent" with Subtitle C if Subtitle C required no
standards because the SWDA generally exempts "byproduct material"
regulated under the Atomic Energy Act. Congress manifestly desired to
assure a comprehensive scheme of "protection" of health and the
environment, while avoiding duplicative regulation under SWDA and the
Atomic Energy Act through permits and license requirements that addressed
different facets of the same materials. This differentiation between
goals — protection against the hazards addressed by the SWDA — and
means helps to effectuate comprehensive protection. In contrast, the
interpretation proposed by the commenters would subvert Congress' plan by
leaving unaddressed a significant source of hazard to the environment and
public health.
The interpretation that "consistent" cannot mean "identical"
appears to assume that the only alternative interpretation is that
Congress limited EPA's authority in the self-defeating fashion described
above. As we just explained, that is not the only interpretation. EPA
explained in the Preamble, moreover, that Congress may also have intended
to provide EPA some latitude to adapt SWDA requirements when and where
the particular nature of the hazard warranted.
A. 1-1
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\EPA Should Not Continue with the Afonradiological Portions of this
Rulemakingl
Comment 2: EPA's proposal to impose nondegradation and Table 1
standards of 40 CFR 264.92-94 on uranium processing facilities directly
contravenes Section 275(b) of the Atomic Energy Act, Section 7 of SWDA,
and the intent of Congress. The SWDA standards which EPA proposes to
apply to uranium processing were developed for hazardous waste facilities,
not mineral extraction industries as required. Thus, EPA either must
wait for groundwater standards to be developed for the mineral extraction
industry under the SWDA, or develop and justify proposed standards under
its Atomic Energy Act authority. (1-2(2).2, 1-2(2).4, 1-5(2).6,
1-6(3).57, 1-4(3).74, 1-20.3, 1-22.12, 1-4(3).76, 1-4(3).75, 1-7(2).3,
1-22.3, 1-4(3).81, 1-4(3).80, 1-4(3).77, 1-4(3).8, 1-30.6, 1-30.7,
1-2(2).1, 1-22.15, 1-25.1, 1-19.10, 1-9(2).2)
Response: While the SWDA standards apply to hazardous waste
management facilities it does not follow that EPA is without authority to
set UMTRCA standards consistent with such SWDA standards because such
UMTRCA standards would apply to "mineral extraction operators." Mineral
extraction in this case of uranium results in waste which Congress
intended be "managed," i.e., controlled and disposed of. The fact that
other portions of the mineral extraction industry have not yet been
addressed under SWDA does not alter the fact that Congress has directed
EPA to establish standards for this part of the mineral extraction
industry comparable to Subtitle C standards. Congress interposed no
requirement that other segments of the mineral extraction industry be
addressed first nor did it require sub silentio that the UMTRCA standards
be consistent with only a portion of Subtitle C standards. EPA explained
the basis for its selection of surface impoundment regulations as the
SWDA regime most analogous to uranium tailings piles, and has made due
allowance for the relevant differences between such impoundments and such
tailings piles, (48 Federal Register 19592). Nothing in UMTRCA or other
laws bars EPA from proceeding by analogy to surface impoundments so long
as the analogy itself is, as EPA believes, reasonable.
The fact that uranium wastes are comparatively speaking, isolated
high volume low toxicity wastes does not invalidate the analogy to
surface impoundments or warrant deferral of regulation in defiance of
Congressionally imposed deadlines. It remains important to protect
groundwater, assure proper disposal of the waste and to protect existing
and future populations. The further fact that Congress has deferred
regulation of some mining wastes pending a study of the hazards
associated therewith might change this if the relevant 1980 amendments,
42 US (6921(b)(3)) impliedly amended Section 275(b). Implied amendments
are, of course, disfavored. Considering that Congress expressly amended
UMTRCA in 1982 but made no effort to limit or revise EPA's authority to
address groundwater protection, EPA's interpretation can hardly be
considered unreasonable.
A.1-2
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Finally, the UMTRCA simply requires that these standards protect
against the hazards consistently with SWDA standards, not against the
sources of the hazards.
Comment 3: We do not believe that an engineering design standard
as proposed in this rule would be appropriate for application to
phosphogypsum from the phosphate fertilizer industry. (1-32.2)
Response: This rulemaking does not apply to the phosphate
fertilizer industry.
!Additional Operations Should Be Covered by the Standards'.
Comment 4: EPA should address water and radon impacts from
in-situ mining and propose appropriate standards. (S-6.5)
Response: We noted in the Preamble to the final rules that
groundwater is protected from in situ mining by the Underground Injection
Control Program promulgated under Sections 1421 and 1422 of the Safe
Drinking Water Act (regulations codified in 40 CFR 144, 145, and 146),
and implemented in either EPA or approved State programs. Radon impacts
from above ground wastes are covered under the UMTRCA Standards.
Comment 5: The standard should include control of waste rock,
overburden, and low grade ores as these are recognized hazardous wastes.
(P-8(H1).8, S-3(2).2)
Response: UMTRCA directs EPA to set standards for ore processing
wastes. An EPA report on the hazards of uranium mining wastes and
recommendations for their control was sent to Congress in June 1983,
(Potential Health and Environmental Hazards of Uranium Mine Wastes,
EPA/1-83-007). Regulations for uranium mine wastes will be considered in
a separate rulemaking, if required.
Comment 6: The standard should address the cleanup of contaminated
off-site locations, particularly where tailings from active piles have
been used as construction material. (S-3(2).l)
Response: We believe that the Standards (40 CFR 192, Subpart B)
we have already published for the off-site cleanup program for inactive
mills under Title 1 of UMTRCA would be suitable for application to
off-site contamination from active mills.
A.1-3
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Comment 7: The standards should require programs to reclaim
contaminated areas in the vicinity of operating mills. (P-15(H2).5)
Response: See the response to Comment 6, A.1.1. We believe that
cleanup near active mills is an area for NRC and Agreement States to
address.
Comment 8; The standard should address dusting from piles to
control contamination of adjacent land. (S-3(H2).l, P-13(2).3)
Response: The standard' contains provisions for the operational
(Sections 192.32 (a)(3) and 192.32(a)(4)) and post-closure (Section
192.32(b)) periods that will control dusting.
Comment 9: Regulations do not consider technologies still to be
developed. How will they be regulated? (P-8(H1).21)
Response: These standards take account of the current
technological state-of-the-art. If new control technologies are
developed that warrant changes in the standards, EPA has the authority
to modify the standards accordingly.
Comment 10: All new tailings should be disposed of as required by
the rule, regardless of whether they are generated at new or existing
facilities. (P-3(2).A)
Response: The only difference in the rule for new and existing
facilities involves the liner requirement, which applies only for new or
laterally expanded impoundments. Application of the secondary standard
to remaining wastes is discussed in the Preamble.
{Application to //on-arid Regions Should be Specified!
Comment 11 : EPA assumes a 5-year drying out period for the
tailings. How are the tailings going to dry out in Virginia?
Response: We have acknowledged that most of our experience with
tailings relates to relatively arid regions in the West where the uranium
milling industry has operated in the United States. The "dry out" period
is an analytical assumption, not a regulatory requirement. The purpose
of a "dry out" period is to facilitate disposal operations. If uranium
is to be milled in the East, other techniques may have to be applied,
such as dewatering methods, in order to prepare the tailings for disposal.
A.1-4
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Comment 12: The EPA proposed standard, based on assumptions made
in sections of the Clean Water Act, may not be able to be met in
Virginia, which is a net precipitation state. (P-10(H1).3)
Response: The Clean Water Act standards apply to wet as well as
dry climates, as do the final standards for uranium mill tailings issued
under UMTRCA. We have no reason to believe they cannot be met in
Virginia, but we recognize that experience with milling uranium in such
locations is relatively limited. (Also see the response to Comment 11,
A.1.1.)
Comment 13: Tailings pile discharge may be very difficult to
prevent because of Virginia's elevated water table (vs. arid region's
water table). (P-8(H1).5>
Response: The final standard allows necessary discharges, subject
to concentration limits given in 40 CFR 440, Subpart C.
Comment 14: Does 40 CFR 192 apply to tailings disposal in
non-arid regions? If not, how would a standard for non-arid regions
differ from the proposed standard? (S-5.10)
Response: The standards apply to all licensed uranium processing
facilities, whether located in arid or non-arid parts of the United
States,
Comment 15: The proposed standards do not consider mining in
non-arid regions. (F-1.7, 1-19.1, 1-27.1, S-5.10)
Response: Non-arid regions were considered in determining final
standards.
Comment 16: EPA bases its standards on the assumption that
mining and milling activities will continue to be restricted to arid, low
population areas of the West, and fails to take into consideration the
proposed uranium development in the Commonwealth of Virginia. (P-5(3).l,
P-33.2, P-38.1, P-39.1, P-40.1, P-43.1, S-3(2).18, P-4(H1).15, P-5(Hl).l,
P-5(H1).3, P-10(H1).2, P-8(Hl).l, 1-15(6), S-5.10, 1-19.1, F-1.7,
P-5(H1).16, P-5(H1).10, 1-15(2).5, P-65.1)
Response: EPA's analysis refers to practices and conditions that
characterize the U.S. uranium milling industry, which generally does
operate in arid and semi-arid regions of the West. For the most part,
these characteristics affect our analyses of the technical and economic
requirements for satisfying alternative standards. We are confident that
the final standards provide adequate public health protection for all
regions of the United States. In fact, the basic water protection
A.1-5
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requirements were developed for national application to hazardous waste
sites. Until we analyze uranium mill operations in high precipitation
climates, however, we will not be as knowledgable of the costs and
techologies needed to satisfy these standards under such wet conditions
as we are for mills operations in arid or semi-arid climates. Also see
responses to Comments 11-15, A.1.1.
Comment 17: Virginia should not be sacrificed in order to find
out the effects of tailings in a net precipitation area. (P-40.5)
Response: See the responses to Comments 11-16, A.1.1.
Comment 18: EPA should consider imposing a temporary moratorium
on the construction of uranium mills in net precipitation zones until
such disposal can be demonstrated to be safe or 10 CFR 192 is amended to
specifically address this problem. (P-l(2).47)
Response: We don't believe such a moratorium is necessary. The
disposal standards have adequate provisions for wet and dry areas. See
the responses to Comments 11-16, A.1.1.
!Adequacy of the DEIS!
Comment 19: The DEIS is defective in that it does not designate
and support a proposed Agency action. (P-4(H1).4, (P-2.5)
Response: The DEIS is primarily an analysis of alternative
actions. The comment is inconsequential, however, because EPA published
and distributed its proposals simultaneously with issuing the DEIS.
Comment 20: We concur with EPA's primary control objectives, but
note that the DEIS does not provide sufficient data to evaluate the
effectiveness of the alternatives. (P-9(3).6)
Response: The comment refers to certain judgments regarding the
performance of covers in stabilizing piles and inhibiting misuse. The
FEIS, Volume I provides such information as is available and useful in
judging, on the one hand, the expected performance of a given cover
design, and, on the other hand, the designs needed to satisfy stipulated
performance criteria, such as effective longevity. Ultimately, however,
site-specific factors may dominate engineering decisions of the
particular designs needed to comply with a standard. Our analysis is
sufficient for its purpose, i.e., to compare the costs and benefits of
alternative degrees of control.
A. 1-6
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With regard to misuse, the issue is more judgmental. EPA believes
that earthen covers of, say, less than 1 meter thickness, provide
virtually no significant barrier to misuse, and that covers greater than
2 meters thick do provide a significant barrier. Again, such broad
judgments are sufficient for analytical purposes.
Comment 21; Limiting the analysis to tailings generated by the
year 2000 underestimates the health risks from uranium tailings.
Projections to the year 2020 can be made with confidence now. (P-4CHD.9)
Response: We disagree with the statement that projections of
tailings generation can be made to the year 2020 with confidence. Even
if a reliable schedule of operative reactor capacity to this date were
well known, which it isn't, there would still be a great deal of
uncertainty in projecting the quantity of mill tailings generated
throughout this period. To estimate the quantity of mill tailings, one
has to know the uranium production at conventional mills, the ore grade
and the uranium recovery rate. The ore grade and recovery rate varies
significantly from mill to mill and also changes over time at a given
mill. To project the uranium production at conventional mills, one has
to postulate scenarios for the following: a schedule of utilities'
uranium deliveries to DOE enrichment plants, the role of imports of both
natural and enriched uranium, a schedule of inventory adjustments,
production from nonconventional uranium sources, and capacity utilization
rates at conventional mills. We believe that extending the industry
projection beyond the year 2000 would extend these uncertainties to an
unacceptable level. In any case, such an analysis would not affect our
conclusions for the standards, which primarily depend on analysis of a
generic pile.
lDa.ta In the DEIS Are Incorrect or Out-of-Date'.
Comment 22: Table 3-1 in EPA 520/1-82-022 has outdated or
incorrect information concerning the Dawn Mining Company mill tailings in
Ford, Washington. EPA lists Dawn Mining Company as an operating mill,
when it is actually shut down. Also, Western Nuclear in Wellpinat,
Washington, is anticipated to enter a shut-down mode within the next
several months. (S-6.7, S-6.8)
Response: Information on all tailings piles and the operating
status of all mills has been updated.
Comment 23: Table 3-1 on page 3.6 of the DEIS includes a figure
of 7.8 kCi/y for estimated radon release from the Atlas Moab mill. This
estimate appears to be unnecessarily high. (1-5(2).15)
A.1-7
-------
Response: This estimate was made using the radium concentration
in the tailings and the total area covered by the tailings. It was
assumed the tailings are dry, which is appropriate for representing
post-operational conditions. The footnotes (b), (c), and (d) apply to
this estimate.
Comment 24: Table 3-1 on page 3.6 of the DEIS designates the
impoundment as unlined. This designation is technically correct in that
no engineered liner was installed. However, significant self-sealing may
have occurred due to acidic effluent mixing with lime and alkaline leach
to form gypsum. (1-5(2).16)
Response: No response is necessary.
Comment 25: Table 3-2 on page 3.8 of the DEIS indicates that the
pH for Atlas' tailings pond liquids is neutral. Current readings show
the pH to be 1.7, due to the fact that the alkaline-leach has been
curtailed. (1-5(2).17)
Response: This value has been changed in Table 3-2.
Comment 26: Contrary to EPA's conclusion, no groundwater
degradation has occurred beyond Western Nuclear's Split Rock Mill site
boundary in the direction of defined groundwater users. However, EPA's
arbitrary imposition of drinking water and nondegradation standards
within the site boundary could require cessation of use of the current
tailings pond. 1-1(2).23
Response: This conclusion was reached by the Mineral Resources
Waste Management Team of the College of Mines and Earth Resources,
University of Idaho, in their report, "Overview of Groundwater
Contamination Associated with Six Operating Uranium Mills in the United
States," dated December 30, 1980, and referenced in the DEIS and in
Volume 1 of the FEIS. EPA agrees that one of the options for corrective
action for cleanup of contaminated groundwater is cessation of use of the
current tailings pond and use of a new lined impoundment but other
methods may also be considered. We don't agree that the standards are
aribtrary, non-degradation is a reasonable basis for long-term health and
environmental protection standards.
Comment 27: EPA implies that pump-back systems will be used to
control groundwater contamination at Dawn Mining Company. Since the
levels don't appear to present a health problem and appear to have
stabilized, this engineering control measure is not necessary at this
time. (S-6.9)
A, 1-8
-------
Response: Groundwater pump-back systems are options for
corrective actions to cleanup contaminated groundwater. EPA does not
imply that any particular option should be used at any particular site,
since this is a regulatory decision.
JData in the RIA Are Irrelevant, Out-of-Date, or Incorrect*.
Comment 28: Comments regarding the Regulatory Impact Analysis for
Active Sites (DRIA 83):
Comment 28-01: Re: Page 2-17, Table 2.10 - Table is out of date.
(1-1(2).71)
Response: Data in this table have been updated to January 1983.
Comment 2J-Q2: Re: Page 2-18, Table 2.11 - Table is out of date
and has no relevance to the RIA. (1-1(2).72)
Response: EPA disagrees with the comment that the table has no
relevance to the RIA. Concentration ratios are widely used and accepted
measures of industry characteristics, the presentation of which is the
purpose of the industry profile. The table shows the trend in
concentration ratios for selected years from 1971 through 1982. We do
not believe that this information is out of date.
Comment 28-03: Re: Page 2-19, paragraph 3 - Data used in this
statement is out of date. EPA had more current data in Reference E but
did not update its statement. (1-1(2).73)
Response: The data for 1982, from the most recent Department of
Energy, Energy Information Administration (DOE/EIA) survey have been
added to this paragraph. However, the point of the statement has not
been changed by the updated estimates.
Comment 28-04: Re: Page 2-19, paragraph 4 - Data is out of date
and incorrect. U.S. exports have declined substantially. The statement
does not reflect the actual and current situation. (1-1(2). 74)
Response: The data for 1982 have been added to this paragraph.
Comment 28-05: Re: Page 2-20, Table 2.12 - Data is out of date.
(1-1(2).72)
Response; See the response to Comment 28-04.
A.1-9
-------
Comment 28-06: Re: Page 2-21, Table 2.13 - Table has no relevance
to RIA. It is incomplete. (1-1(2).74)
Response: The role of imports in supplying future uranium
deliveries has been assessed according to DOE/EIA's latest estimates and
has been incorporated into the new projections used in the RIA, as
explained in Appendix B.
Comment 28-07: Re: Page 2-22, paragraph 3 - EPA's statement on
uranium reserves is wrong. The EPA reference states "resources," not
"reserves." The EPA reference is out of date. Further, EPA states
Sweden has 17 percent of world reserves, whereas that nation does not
list uranium reserves. Reserves are not resources, as EPA states.
(1-1(2).77, 1-1(2).114)
Response: This statement has been revised, and reflects
information contained in a recent DOE/EIA report.
Comment 28-08: Re: Page 2-23, Table 2.14 - This table has no
relevance to the RIA. (1-1(2).78)
Response: EPA disagrees with comment. Estimates of domestic
uranium reserves are relevant to an analysis of domestic uranium
production.
Comment 28-09: Re: Page 2-24, Section 2.2.4 - Employment data are
out of date. (1-1(2).79)
Response: The data have been updated.
Comment 28-10: Re: Page 2-24, paragraph 5 - Data and projections
for planned expenditures are out of date. (I-1(2).82)
Response: The data have been updated.
Comment 28-11: Re: Page 2-25, Table 2.15 - Data are out of date.
(1-1(2).83)
Response: The data have been updated.
Comment 28-12: Re: Page 2-26, Table 2.15a - Data are out of
date. (I-"l(2).84)
Re.s_P-9J!JL§.: Tne data have been updated.
A.1-10
-------
Comment 28-13: Re: Page 2-1, Paragraph 3 - DOESlb is outdated.
It is a~1981 report which used 1979 data. (I-1(2).50)
Response: The statement has been deleted from the RIA.
Comment 28-14: Re: Page 2-2, Paragraph 6 - Data are out of date.
Eighty-six reactors have been cancelled since 1975, not 50. (1-1(2).52)
Response: The data have been updated.
Comment 28-15: Re: Page 2-5, Table 2.2 - Data are out of date.
Re sponse: The data have been updated.
Comment 28-16: Re: Page 2-6, Paragraph 1 - Data are out of date.
Projections of U.S. uranium demand for nuclear fuel through the year 2000
are again being revised downward. (1-1(2).54)
Response: The statement has been revised.
Comment 28-17: Re: Page 2-6, Paragraph 2 - Data used in Appendix
B, Projections of Price, Demand, and Production are out of date.
(1-1(2).55)
Response: A new projection of uranium industry activities based
on the most recent projections made by DOE/EIA was used in the RIA and is
described in Appendix B.
Comment 28-18: Re: Page 2-6, Paragraph 4 - Data in Reference Ta79
are incorrect. (I-1(2).56)
Response: The statement has been revised to reflect the most
recent DOE/EIA estimates.
Comment
28-19: Re: Page 2-7, Table 2.3 - Statistics are out of
date. (1-1(2).57)
Response: See the response to Comment 28-17, A.1.1.
A.1-11
-------
Comment 28-20: Re: Page 2-8, Paragraph 1 - The statement, "...
about 80 percent of anticipated uranium deliveries from 1981 to 1990 will
be purchased under either contract or market price contracts" has no
relevance to the purpose and objective of the RIA. (1-1(2).58)
Response: EPA disagrees with the comment. We feel that
information on the type of procurement mechanisms used in the uranium
industry is relevant for presenting an economic profile of that
industry. The quantities of uranium upon which these percentages are
based has been included in the table.
Comment 28-21: Re: Page 2-9, Table 2-4 - This table is not
relevant to this study, as EPA does not indicate how much uranium is
involved versus total demand. (1-1(2).62)
Response; See the response to Comment 28-20, A.1.1.
Comment 28-22; Re: Page 2-10, Table 2-5 - Not relevant to this
study, as EPA does not say how much uranium is involved in contracts
versus total demand. (1-1(2).63)
Response: The quanities of uranium underlying the reported
contract prices are unpublished, but we have obtained the information
from DOE/EIA and included it in the relevant tables.
Comment 28-23: Re: Page 2-11, Table 2-6 - Not relevant to this
study, as EPA does not say how much uranium is involved in contracts
versus total demand. (1-1(2).64)
Response: See the response to Comment 28-22.
Comment 28-24: Re: Page 2-13, paragraph 3 - The paragraph leads a
person to believe that the uranium mining and milling industry was
expanding up to 1981 whereas the industry slumped in the first six months
of 1980. Furthermore, it was not the surplus of uranium from domestic
sources forcing a curtailment of operations. It was the impact of
foreign imports from Canada, Australia, and South Africa operating under
government subsidy, lower wages, and less regulatory control. (1-1(2).65)
Response; EPA disagrees with the comment. Inventory surplus was
created before significant import penetration was established.
A.1-12
-------
Comment 28-25: Re: Page 2-13, paragraph 3 - In the same
paragraph, EPA says 8 mills closed during 1981 and 1982. The data are
out of date. (1-1(2).66)
Response: The data on the operating status of mills has been
updated from September 1982 to January 1983.
Comment 28-26: Re: Page 2-13, paragraph 5 - Data are out of
date. (1-1(2).67)
Response: The data have been updated.
Comment 28-27: Re: Page 2-16, paragraph 3 - Statement is not
relevant to the RIA. (1-1(2).69)
Response: EPA disagrees. Identification of the companies that
own uranium milling operations is relevant to an analysis of the milling
industry.
Comment 28-28: Re: Page 2-16, paragraph 4 - Statement is out of
date and not relevant to RIA. (1-1(2).70)
Response: See the response to Comment 28-02.
Comment 28-29: EPA's use of out-dated industry data makes its
regulatory analysis of the impact on industry totally unrealistic. EPA's
conclusion that one mill will close as a result of its proposed standard
totally ignores the depressed state of the industry. EPA must consider
market conditions in its analysis. (1-4(3).Ill, 1-4(3).114)
Response; All historical data in the RIA have been updated to
include the most recently published information available. Additionally,
a new set of uranium activity projections, based on the most recent
DOE/EIA projections, was used in the analysis. Also, a different
methodology of projecting impacts of tailings disposal costs on aggregate
industry capacity and production was used which we believe incorporates
the effect of more realistic market conditions. The comment is
erroneous, however, when it states that "under the EPA methodology, the
worse the market and industry conditions, the smaller might be the
additional adverse impact of imposing EPA's proposed standards (since EPA
counts only closures that are not attributable to market conditions)".
EPA makes separate estimates of both market closures and control-caused
closures. The control-caused closures are estimated independently of the
market closures. However, market conditions are reflected in the
cash-flow analysis by way of the DOE/EIA price projection.
A.1-13
-------
Comment 28-30: Re: Page 2-1, Paragraph 2 - The industry has
experienced rapid growth as a result of promotion by the AEC, not because
of expectations of rapid increases in demand. This forced utilities to
prematurely enter the market place. (1-1(2).48)
Response: EPA does not disagree with the comment, but feels that
it is not necessary to determine if it was the Federal Government or
utilities that created the expectation of increases in uranium demand.
Comment 28-31: Re: Page 2-1, Paragraph 2 - A better description
of the uranium marketplace is that inventories continue to grow,
production has fallen, demands continues downward, and foreign imports
are increasing. (1-1(2).49)
Response: The statement has been revised.
Comment 28-32: Re: Page 2-2, Paragraph 5 - Contrary to EPA's
belief, higher fuel costs did not have an impact on the slowdown of
nuclear plant construction. (1-1(2).51)
Response: The statement refers to the (slower) growth in demand
for electricity, not nuclear plant construction. EPA has re-examined the
statement and decided that it is correct.
Comment 28-33: EPA errs in stating that a richer deposit "permits
lower pricing." Richer deposits, in fact, permit higher profits, or
allow marginal operations to continue operating. (1-15.7)
Response: EPA agrees that the statement should be revised.
However, we have not been able to find the statement within the
voluminous documentation that was prepared in support of the standards.
The commenter's letter did not indicate where the statement was contained
and an inquiry to the commenter has been unanswered as of this time.
Therefore, we have been unable to make the revision.
Comment 28-34: Re: Page 2-22, paragraph 2 - The statement that
"the use of foreign uranium, though economic, appears to be limited for
other reasons" is without foundation. We would like to see EPA develop
more factual evidence of "Buy American." As a producer, we have not
experienced the "Buy American" phenomenon stated by EPA. (1-1(2).74,
1-1(2).75)
Response: Whether or not there is factual evidence to support the
"Buy American" phenomenon is not an issue in the RIA. The RIA merely
cites a variety of public statements by prominent people in the uranium
business to establish that there is uncertainty in predicting the future
penetration of imports in supplying U.S. utilities' uranium demand.
A.1-14
-------
Comment 28-35: Re: Page 2-22, paragraph 2 - EPA could have used
available data to develop projections of foreign imports instead of
facing the issue head-on. 1-1(2).76
Response: See the response to Comment 28-06.
A.1-15
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A.1.2 Form of the Standards
!The Standards Should Consider Site-Specific Factors!
Comment 1; The standards should be more flexible and realistic so
that site-specific factors can be taken into account. (1-20.7, 1-10(2).3)
Response: The analysis we presented in the RIA and EIS
extensively considered a realistic range of circumstances, in part
to assure that our general standards would be practical to apply
site-specifically. Indeed, except to the extent required by law, our
standards do not specify the methods by which they may be satisified, and
site-specific factors clearly may be taken into account in the choice of
such methods.
Comment 2; The Agency should consider site-specific
recommendations in preference to a general standard. (P-9(H1).6)
Response: Public Law 95-604 (UMTRCA78) requires EPA to
"...promulgate standards of general application...". The legislative
history indicates very clearly that Congress did not intend EPA to
establish site-specific requirements.
Comment 3: EPA should develop standards stressing stablization
and isolation and considering site-specific factors to prevent misuse and
erosion. Since such regulations would be unrelated to radiation
exposures, they should not be expressed in terms of release or dose
limits. (P-9(3).8)
Response: We don't believe EPA could issue such standards under
our authority. Furthermore, we believe a radon emission limit is needed
for adequate public health protection.
!The Standards Should Be General!
Comment 4: We recommend the adoption of general standards
governing radon release, groundwater protection and long-term stability,
applicable to all sites. (P-45.5)
Response: EPA agrees, and is issuing such standards.
A.1-16
-------
JStandards Should be in Terms of Emission or Emanation Rates!
Comment 5: A radon emanation standard is preferable to a
fencepost concentration standard because radon emanations are easily
measured and provide a confirmed value for exposure pathway analysis.By
contrast, a fencepost concentration standard does not provide the same
positive control and would make implementation and verification
impossible. (P-4(H1).13, P-26.9)
Response: The comment refers to the post-closure standard. EPA
agrees. EPA also prefers an emission standard; however, see the
responses to Comments 6 and 8, A.1.2.
Comment 6: A radon flux standard for disposal is preferable to a
health-based standard since radon measurements will have to be made to
verify the thickness and appropriateness of cover materials. (P-l(2).29)
Response: EPA also prefers a flux standard, but we believe covers
can adequately be designed using measurements of the tailings and cover
materials, without measuring flux. See the response to Comment 8, A.1.2.
Comment 7: The Clean Air Act requires that standards be expressed
as emission standards subject to monitoring. Thus, design standards are
necessary but not sufficient. (P-45.14, P-45.9)
Response: We don't believe a requirement to measure emissions for
1000 years is practical. This disposal standard must necessarily be a
design standard. See the response to Comment 1, A.6.2.
JStandards Should Not Be In Terms of Emission or Emanation Rates!
Comment 8: Radon flux measurements are imprecise and give results
of such variability as to invalidate this technique as a basis of
measurement. (1-22.7)
Response: Flux measurements are highly variable, but averages
over time and area are nevertheless meaningful. However, our standard
does not require flux measurements. See the responses to Comment 6 and
7, A.1.2.
Comment 9: Measuring the average flux from the soil surface is
difficult because of the huge temporal variations in flux values that are
known to occur. (I-16(2).4, 1-29.4)
Respons^: See the responses to Comments 6, 7, and 8, A.1.2.
A.1-17
-------
JStandards Should Be in Terms of Concentrations'.
Comment 10: A radon concentration (performance) standard is
preferable to an emanation standard as it relates directly to public
health and risk, and can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the
remedial action. Radon emanations are difficult to measure and cannot be
directly related to risk and safety. (P-9(H1).9, S-13(H2).3, 1-4(3).36,
1-5(2).5, F-5(3).4, 1-30.2, 1-29.3)
Response: EPA disagrees. Based on current scientific evidence,
we believe it prudent to establish standards for radon on the assumption
that any level may be harmful, and that the likelihood of harm increases
with the exposure. Therefore, exposures should be kept as low as is
reasonably achievable. Considering that radon released from tailings may
be transported long distances, the best way to limit overall population
exposure is by limiting releases. Our emission standard applies to the
design of the disposal system, and does not require measurements of radon
emanation.
Comment 11: We recommend that, rather than a radon emanation
standard, EPA adopt a radon daughter concentration limit (expressed in
Working Levels) at the site boundary. (1-4(3).35, 1-4(3).40, 1-23.4)
Response: A radon concentration (or working level) standard at
the site boundary must be enforced by institutional methods, i.e., by
limiting people's access to and use of the area within the boundary where
the standard may be exceeded. For long term control, EPA believes
reliance on physical controls is preferable. Furthermore, as noted
above, a concentration standard at the site boundary would not
necessarily limit radon emissions. We find that limiting emissions for a
long time is practical, and that the benefits justify the costs.
Comment 12: We support the approach recommended by national and
scientific organizations, and adopted by the NRC, in which acceptable
concentration limits for specific isotopes in water are established for
restricted and unrestricted areas. (1-11(2).11)
Response: The comment refers to maximum concentration limits
established for application without regard to the nature of the specific
radioactivity source. These organizations also require specific sources
to maintain radiation exposures at levels that are as low as reasonably
achievable. EPA's standards, in effect, represent the lowest reasonably
achievable generally applicable levels for uranium mill tailings. These
standards, therefore, are consistent with the approach of these
organizations.
A.1-18
-------
Comment 13: We suggest that it might be better to establish an
absolute radon concentration limit around a tailings pile instead of a
concentration above background, since in many areas the background values
are not well known and also the absolute value more nearly reflects the
true public health hazard. (1-16(2).5, 1-29.5)
Response: Were EPA to establish a radon concentration standard,
this would be an important practical consideration. For reasons
described above, however, we have chosen an emission standard.
Comment 14: EPA should adopt a radon concentration standard to
allow flexibility in the means of achieving compliance. (1-4(3).37)
Response: A concentration standard applied at an arbitrary and
movable location, such as the "site boundary," would not be adequate
because it could be satisfied by dispersion. EPA finds it practical and
justifiable to reduce radon emissions, so as to reduce the overall long
term effects of such emissions on populations.
'.The Standards Should Be in Terms of Emission Rates or Maximum
Concentrations!
Comment 15: We strongly support the use of emission rate or
concentration standards in preference to dose rate standards. The
uncertainties involved in analysis of dose rates make them unworkable.
Further, changing land use around a facility could result in
noncompliance with dose rate standards even though the facility met the
standards when it was designed. (P-22(H2).l)
Response: EPA agrees, at least with respect to our preference for
an emission standard.
Comment 16: If EPA adopts a radon flux standard it should provide
all licensees the option of complying with an alternative equivalent
radon concentration standard. (I-10(2).10, F-5(3).4)
Response: We do not believe an equivalent concentration standard
would be useful, because determining equiivalence implies relating the
concentration to the emission rate by using meteorological transport
calculations. An emission standard is simpler and more direct. Also see
the response to Comment 11, A.2.0.
A.1-19
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A.1.3 Definitions
Comment 1: It is possible to construe Section 192,32(a)(2)(i) as
requiring uranium and molybdenum to be considered hazardous constituents
only during processing and not afterwards. They should be treated as
hazardous constituents at all times. (S-5.5)
Response: The final rule makes it clear that uranium and
molybdenum are added to the list of hazardous substances "for the
purposes of this subpart," with no other restrictions indicated.
Comment 2: EPA should define exactly which stockpiles at mills
are covered by the proposed standard. (S-3(H2).2)
Response: This is defined by UMTRCA itself. The covered
materials are those defined as byproduct materials under Section lie of
the Atomic Energy Act, as amended by UMTRCA.
Comment 3: EPA incorrectly defines the Working Level Month (WLM)
as a physiologically weighted exposure. The WLM is simply a
time integrated exposure unit. (P-9(3).12)
Response: EPA agrees in part. The working level month is a time
integrated exposure unit for underground miners. Rather then introducing
a new unit for time integrated population exposure, EPA staff chose to
weight the occupational exposure unit to take account of differences in
the breathing patterns of working uranium miners vis a yjyL a residential
population of both sexes (EPA 79a). We believed that this was compatible
with Dr. Robley Evans' injunction (Ev79) "to describe radiation exposure,
the Working Level unit of short-lived radon decay product concentration
should be multipled by an average breathing rate in 1/min, by an average
fractional retention in the lung, and by the duration of exposure".
Nevertheless, it might have been more defensible in a purely technical
sense to express the daughter product concentration as potential alpha
energy per unit volume of air, in units of joules per cubic meter. We
note, however, that such a unit would be meaningless to almost, all
readers of the EIS and would inhibit relating risk data for uranium
miners for any given time-integrated exposure to the risk for the general
population from a similar level of exposure.
Comment 4: Arid regions should be defined. (F-1.7)
Response: We have used the term "arid regions" loosely to
characterize the areas in the western S.S. where most uranium production
occurs and where the average evapotranpiration rate exceeds the
precipitation rate. The final rule clearly distinguishes "arid" and
"wet" regions where such a distinction is needed (see Section
192.32(a)(D).
A.1-20
-------
Comment 5: EPA's concepts of costs and benefits should be more
precisely defined and quantified.
-------
A.1.4 Responsibilities of the EPA and the NRG
Comment 1: We wish to offer a clarification to NRC's
interpretation of the recent amendments to the Atomic Energy Act, enacted
in the NRC Authorization Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-415; see NRC letter; Docket
A-82-26, IV-D-137), as it relates to EPA's role in setting the level of
protection from tailings. The intent of these amendments is to give
Agreement States and licensees authority to propose alternative means of
reaching a certain level of protection, but the level of protection is to
be set by the NRC and EPA. Furthermore, the NRC and EPA are not required
to adjust the level of protection to the alternatives proposed by
licensees. (F-4(2).l)
Response: EPA understands that EPA is required to set generally
applicable standards, and that NRC and Agreement States are to establish
regulations that implement EPA's standards.
Comment 2: EPA's proposal to issue "facility permits" is a
duplication of the NRC's authority to license under UMTRCA. (1-28.2,
1-28.9)
Response: EPA did not propose 'to issue facility permits, and is
expressly forbidden from doing so by UMTRCA. Also see response to
Comment 25, A.1.4.
!The Standards Weet EPA's Responsibilities'.
Comment 3: The proposed standard provides adequate measures to
control radiological hazards during operations and disposal. The
measures for control and stabilization of tailings assure adequate
protection of public health, safety, and the environment. (F-2.1, S-6.1)
Response: EPA agrees. The final standards differ in detail from
the proposals, but they provide the same basic level of protection.
!The EPA HAS a Responsibility to Upgrade the standards to Protect the
Public!
Comment 4: Under UMTRCA and the CAA, EPA is directed to set
standards which will protect public health. It was not authorized to
decide how. Neither Act limits the degree of health protection to the
level which EPA thinks is affordable or "cost effective." EPA is without
statutory authority to decide that our society will not pay the cost of
protecting victims of preventable radiation pollution. (P-45.12)
A.1-22
-------
Response; UMTRCA, as amended, is very clear in requiring EPA to
consider all relevant factors, including cost and health risk. The Clean
Air Act requires standards that in EPA's judgement provide an ample
margin of safety. Congress did not describe the degree of protection
that provides an ample margin of safety, nor did it describe what factors
EPA should consider in making judgements on the appropriate standard.
Comment 5: Given the potential hazards associated with tailings,
it is reckless of EPA to propose these weakened standards. It is
mandatory to impose strict standards to protect groundwater.
Promulgation of disposal standards should be deferred unless they require
complete (3 meter), long term (1000 year) surface cover for the
tailings. (P-31.2)
Response: The groundwater protection standards are quite
protective. The primary groundwater protection standard is for new
impoundments to be designed to be capable of isolating wastes from the
ground. The secondary standard protects groundwater at new or existing
impoundments from degradation by any hazardous constituents that may
reach an aquifier. The disposal standard requires reasonable assurance
of control for up to 1000 years; the cover will be designed
site-specifically to reduce radon emissions to 20 pCi/m -sec. We
estimate that such covers generally will need to be at least 2-3 meters
thick.
Comment 6: The proposed standards allow too great a cancer risk
for residents in uranium processing areas such as our own, specifically,
the 1 per 500 allowable deaths. These residents have just as much right
to protection from the potential threats of radiation as do citizens
protected under other standards where the allowable risks in the range of
one death in 100,000 to 1 in one million are customary. (P-35.3)
Response: Based on an improved analysis, we have revised our
estimate of the maximum risk for people who live very near tailings
piles, downward to less than 1 in 1000. As we describe more fully in the
Preamble, we have concluded that it is not reasonable to reduce the
emission standard for disposal of tailings piles because of (1) the
uncertainty associated with the feasiblity of implementing undemonstrated
technology to satisfy a requirement for a significantly lower standard,
(2) the small increase in total health benefits associated with a lower
standard, and (3) the limited circumstances in which the maximum
theoretical risk to individuals might be sustained.
Comment 7: EPA's proposed standards are less protective of the
public than those previously enforced by the NRC. Rather than a 95%
reduction in risk, EPA's standards result in a tenfold increase over the
2 pCi NRC standard. This is not justified by the EPA. (P-5(3).3,
P-5(3).4, P-5(H1).5, P-5(H1).10, P-8(H1).13)
A.1-23
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Response: EPA's standard does indeed amount to a 95 percent risk
reduction. Except for a brief period, Congress has forbidden NRC from
enforcing its regulations ever since they were issued in October 1980.
Furthermore, NRC's comments on EPA's proposal recommended against
applying an emission control requirement. Detailed radon emission
analysis justifying EPA's standard is given in the EIS, RIA, and the
Preamble for the final standards.
Comment 8: Why are cleanup standards being weakened, groundwater
not being protected and the allowable level of radon gas emissions being
raised tenfold? (P-6.2, P-5(Hl).ll, P-8(H1).13, P-8(H1).16)
Response: See the responses to Comments 5 and 7, A.1.4.
Comment 9: The proposed standards must be thoroughly upgraded.
NRC's standards are more appropriate. (P-6(2).4, P-44.1)
Response: See the response to Comment 7, A.1.4.
Comment 10: The standards should be more stringent.
Alternative F in the DEIS comes closest to meeting our concerns for
longevity, radon emanations, and groundwater protection. Such an
alternative is feasible, and its costs are insignificant compared with
the price of l^Og and the unknown impacts of future generations.
(P-35.8)
Response: EPA believes the benefits gained by requiring control
at the levels of Alternative F rather than Alternative D are small
compared to the incremental costs and the questionable technical
feasibility of achieving the standard. (The designations "F" and "D"
used here refer the Preamble and DEIS for the proposed standard.) The
alternatives were reformulated for analyzing a final standard. Our
reasons for selecting the final standards are fully described in the
Preamble to the final standards.
Comment 11: I urge the adoption of the most stringent of the
proposed standards designated as "Alternative F": in your Draft
Environmental Impact Statement. (P-12.1)
Response: See the response to Comment 10, A.1.4.
A.1-24
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Comment 12; EPA's proposed standards are inexcusably and
unacceptably lax and contrary to EPA's statutory responsibility to
protect the public health and safety. (P-33.14, P-5(H1).6, P-5(H1).2,
P-5(H1).8, P-8(H1).15, P-8(H1).16, P-36.1)
Response: EPA disagrees. Detailed justifications for the
standards are given in the EIS, RIA, and the Preamble.
Comment 13: The EPA should err in the direction of being
overcautious rather than too lenient. (P-12.2)
Response: EPA recognizes that its primary responsibility is to
protect health and the environment. We base our actions on the best
scientific information we can obtain, with prudent allowance for
uncertainties.
Comment 14: Is the Agency intervening to protect the public only
at the convenience of industry? (P-8(H1).9, P-8(H1).19)
Response: Clearly not. EPA analyzes technological and economic
effects of the standards mainly to assure they are practical and to
comply with legislative or policy directives. We determine the need for
standards, however, primarily by analysis of health risks.
Comment 15: We must be responsible to future generations in our
effort to regulate mill tailings. (P-60.1)
Response: EPA agrees.
\BPA's Responsibilities Do Not Requite Such Stringent Standards!
Comment 16: In the past, the methodology of nuclear regulators in
an uncertain situation has very often been to compensate by making
conservative assumptions, producing conclusions and overdesigns in which
errors on the side of conservatism are multiplied manyfold. In the case
of the present standards, we believe that EPA need not and should not be
so conservative, for several reasons: (1) the health risk consequences
of being wrong are relatively inconsequential, and can be remedied when
and if indications of problems arise; (2) the spectrum of remedial
technical options available at a later time may be larger and more
attractive than those now known; (3) experience may reveal institutional
controls more reliable than EPA now credits; and (4) there is little room
for unnecessary excess caution because much of the industry is now
economically vulnerable to permanent closure. (1-10(2).2)
A.1-25
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Response: EPA believes that Comments 1, 2, and 3 are inconsistent
with the legislative history and language of UMTRCA, which indicate that
Congress intended long term control of tailings to be applied now. EPA
has not found reasons to defer action. Specifically, (1) we find the
health risk sufficiently well established to justify the standards we are
issuing; (2) we believe available technical options are sufficient for
our current purposes; and (3) we believe institutional methods are not
capable of controlling radon emissions, nor of preventing releases of
harmful substances to groundwater, which are two major goals of the
standards. Furthermore, further experience may or may not show
institutional controls to be reliable. With respect to Item 4, EPA has
analyzed the impact of the standards on the industry and finds it
marginal (see the RIA for details). We estimate that for the most
probable case, where market conditions force mills to absorb the entire
cost of the standards, only one small (model) mill may close because of
the standards.
Comment 17; The standards being required by the proposed
regulations are excessive and not necessary to protect the health of
nearby residents and the environment. For example, New Mexico has in
place groundwater and radiation standards that adequately fill this
need. (1-9(2).5)
Response; The EIS and RIA present extensive analyses indicating
that the cost of the standards is justified by the benefits. Radon
emission controls are shown to be necessary to avoid excessive risks for
nearby residents and cost effective in reducing the cumulative lung
cancer risk for the general population. The adequacy of groundwater
standards is a matter of judgement. Congress directed EPA to issue
standards for nonradiological hazards (which primarily occur through
waterborne pathways) that are consistent with standards the Agency has
adopted for hazardous constituents from other waste disposal sites.
Comment 18: The proposed standards are overly restrictive,
unnecessary to protect public health, unreasonable on the basis of costs
and benefits, and will inhibit continued operation at most sites. EPA
should substantially revise the proposed standards for uranium tailings.
(1-11(2).!, 1-6(3).86)
Response: The EIS, RIA, and Preamble provide extensive analyses
that refute these comments. In particular, the economic impact analysis
shows that the standards will most likely not lead to any mill closures.
A.1-26
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Comment 19: The proposed standards are excessively stringent,
insufficently supported by scientific data, and will result in
unjustified costs to industry. In some cases compliance is impossible,
and in other cases meaningful measurements cannot be made to verify
compliance. (1-22.5)
Response: EPA disagrees. The commenter's specific criticisms are
answered elsewhere in this document under appropriate headings.
Comment 20: It is ironic that the Federal Government is
regulating this trivial source of radon exposure, while at the same time
is encouraging citizens to seal up their houses as a conservation
technique, thus exposing people to the principal radon hazard. The
principal reason for society's fixation on radon from uranium is that
uranium is used to generate nuclear power. (I-6(H2).26, 1-6(4).7,
I-6(H2).22)
Response: EPA believes radon from tailings is a significant
radiation source, but recognizes that nature as a whole constitutes a far
larger source. The remainder of the comment does not require a response,
as it does not relate to this congressionally-mandated rulemaking for
controlling tailings piles.
Comment 21: EPA owes a duty to workers not to impose requirements
which unnecessarily make their companies uncompetitive and which throw
them out of work. (P-48.2)
Response: See the last part of the response to Comment 16, A.1.4.
IEPA Has Exceeded its Authority by Proposing On-site Engineering Design
Standards!
Comment 22: Many of EPA's proposed standards, such as the liner
standard, and its specification of the compliance point and compliance
period for groundwater protection, are implementing regulations which are
beyond EPA authority to impose. EPA should leave implementation
requirements to the NRC and the agreement state. (1-10(2).22, 1-7(2).10,
1-10(2).14, 1-10(2).!, 1-4(3).7, 1-4(3).101, 1-4(3).102, 1-4(3).100,
1-19.2)
Response: UMTRCA requires EPA to establish standards for hazards
of nonradiological substances from tailings that are consistent with
EPA's standards for similar hazardous constituents established under the
Solid Waste Disposal Act, as amended. The liner standard and compliance
point for groundwater protection are key elements of the existing SWDA
standards. EPA has left implementation requirements to the NRC and
Agreement States, as UMTRCA requires.
A.1-27
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Comment 23: EPA should propose performance standards for
groundwater protection and avoid specifying that synthetic liners be
used. Natural liners can equal or surpass synthetic liners in
groundwater protection. The regulatory agency should specify liner
materials, based on site-specific characteristics. (1-23.1, 1-28.1,
1-6(4).14, 1-13(2).2)
Response: The standards do not specify synthetic liners.
However, as noted immediately above, EPA's standards for uranium mill
tailings must be consistent with standards the Agency established for
hazardous waste under the SWDA, as amended. These latter regulations
require a liner that is capable of preventing the migration of wastes
into the ground. Natural liners normally would not satisfy such a
criterion. Natural liners or no liner may be used, however, where
certain water protection criteria are satisfied. Our rulemaking record
for tailings does not establish that either synthetic or natural liners
have unequivocal advantages or disadvantages. We have concluded that
commenters did not establish that conditions at tailings impoundments are
sufficiently different from conditions EPA considered in developing the
SWDA standard as to justify departures from that standard.
Comment 24: EPA's liner requirement is unlawful. EPA only has
the authority to set off-site concentration limits, not to specify design
and engineering requirements to meet such a limit. (1-6(3).49, 1-7(2).10)
Response: EPA's authority is not limited to setting off-site
standards. The allocation of responsibilities between it and NRC is
functional, not geographic. See the response to Comment 22, A.1.4.
Comment 25: EPA's proposed 40 CFR 192.32(a)(2)(iv), which vests
EPA with the authority to exempt hazardous constituents and to set
alternative concentration limits, interjects EPA into site-specific
licensing decisions. This is both unnecessary, inefficient, and contrary
to the intent of Congress. (1-5(2).8, 1-6(3).50, 1-10(2).21, 1-10(2).24,
1-6(3).9, I-6(H2).33, I-6(H2).16, 1-10(2).20, 1-19.2, 1-19.8, 1-22.16,
S-3(H2).8, F-6(2).3, F-5(3).7)
Response: Exempting hazardous constituents and setting
alternative standards are standard setting functions, which EPA is
authorized to perform. In the interest of administrative efficiency, EPA
has revised the standard so as to minimize the need for the regulatory
agencies to seek EPA's concurrence with site-specific exemptions and
alternatives.
Comment 26: EPA's suggestion that there are a number of SWDA
regulations that NRC must address is unclear. If EPA's meaning is that
NRC must adopt additional regulations developed for hazardous wastes, the
suggestion is unsupported, unlawful, and arbitrary. (1-6(3).71)
A.1-28
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Response: EPA has not yet determined whether existing NRC
regulations satisfy the requirements of UMTRCA as they relate to
comparability with requirements EPA established for hazardous wastes
under the SWDA. EPA has merely noted that NRC (and EPA) will have to
address such issues once the final standards are promulated. We have
also noted a need for NRC, as an implementer of EPA's standards, to
establish necessary implementation rules and procedures.
Comment 27: The EPA standard for tailings covers should state
that the tailings are to be protected against wind and water erosion for
the specified time period, and should leave it to the implementing agency
to determine how that standard should be achieved at the licensee's
specific site. (1-10(2).8)
Response: Under EPA's standard, the implementing agency does have
the responsibility and discretion to decide site-specific methods of
compliance. We have found it necessary, however, to specify a radon
emission limit in addition to a standard for erosion control.
Comment 28: EPA's rationale for the 20 pCi/m^-sec standard
makes it clear that it is not an environmental standard. It is an
engineering design standard to require a 3-meter cover on tailings. EPA
has exceeded its statutory authority. Such an on-site design limit can
only be imposed by a licensing agency. (1-6(3).16, 1-4(3).38, 1-4(3).39,
1-24.2, 1-4(3).39)
Response: The statutory distinction between EPA's and NRC's
jurisdiction is between standard-setting and implementing functions, not
between off-site and on-site boundaries. The radon emission design limit
supports several EPA objectives for disposal of tailings piles, including
the reduction of radon emissions to avoid lung cancers such emissions may
otherwise cause. We anticipate that such earthen covers will often be
applied to satisfy the standard, which is consistent with our goals of
inhibiting misuses of tailings, protecting tailings against spreading by
wind and water erosion, protecting water, and eliminating any significant
gamma radiation exposures. The standard does not require any specific
cover design. We believe we are authorized to set a limit on the
emission rate for radon from tailings sites.
IEPA is Required to Submit Proposed Standards for Scientific Advisory
Board (SAB) Review!
Comment 29: The proposed standards, by SPA's own definition,
require submission to the SAB as a "significant regulatory action."
EPA's failure to submil the proposed regulations to the SAB before
publication is an egregious and fatal error. A possible remedy for EPA's
action is to recall the regulations, submit a new set of proposed
A.1-29
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regulations to the SAB, and then, after review of the SAB's comments,
publish a new set of proposed regulations. (1-5(2).2, 1-5(2).1)
Response: This rulemaking has been listed on EPA's regulatory
agenda for at least the last three years. The SAB from time to time
reviews the agenda and selects rules for review. The SAB had the
opportunity to review this rule, but did not choose to do so.
A.1-30
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A.2.0 RISK ASSESSMENT
lEPA's Model Mill-Site Is Unrealistic1.
Comment 1: EPA's framework for developing the standards employs a
"model mill-site" which has only limited similarity to actual mill-sites.
(1-10.1)
Response: We believe the model adequately represents the average
characteristics of mill sites for the purpose of establishing these standards,
Comment 2: EPA should have used real-world, field data in its risk
assessment. (S-6.3)
Response: Epidemiological data were considered in arriving at EPA's
risk estimate for exposure to radon daughters and other forms of radiation.
Comment 3: Canonsburg, Pa., data are not included in the lung cancer
table of incidence. We question any study which does not address the specific
characteristics of the Canonsburg site. (P-65.2)
Response: The text of the DEIS contained risk estimates for the
Canonsburg, Pa. site. The data in the table referred to were developed for an
earlier report that did not consider this site.
IThe Assumptions Used by EPA Are Too Conservative]
Comment 4: EPA has developed an excessively conservative set of
standards because of overly conservative assumptions. (1-15.9)
Response: EPA disagrees. Health risk estimates are based on
reasonable interpretations of available radiobiology data and on reports by
primary investigators dealing with the raw epidemiology data. Metabolism and
dosimetry estimates are state-of-the-art, and are not known to be
conservative. Dispersion and pathway models are generally accepted
methodology, with parameters chosen to reasonably estimate environmental
concentrations. A conscious effort was made to avoid combining assumptions in
such a way as to provide inappropriately conservative estimates.
Comment 5: There is little evidence that EPA considered testimony at
Congressional hearings in setting its standards. The testimony provided ample
evidence that radon risks from tailings are relatively low and that health
effects are minimal unless tailings are misused. The standards should be
directed towards preventing human health effects, should be stated in terms of
dose limits, and should allow implementing agencies flexibility in meeting the
standard. (F-5(3).2)
A.2-1
-------
Response: The comment is in error. The hearings developed no evidence
regarding radon risks. A number of individuals presented their views
regarding radon risk. To the extent that these views were based on published
studies, they were considered by EPA.
\EPA's Assessment of Health Decrements Is Not Inclusive Enough!
Comment 6: EPA has failed to consider non-fatal cancers, non-malignant
diseases, and cumulative risks of ingestion, inhalation, and external exposure
from a combination of radioactive elements. (P-l(2).21, P-15(H2).3, P-35.7)
Response: EPA disagrees. Cumulative risk of ingestion, inhalation,
and external exposure are included in the DEIS Tables 6-1 to 6-6. Mention is
made of non-fatal cancers, DEIS, reference Su81^, but the issue was not
discussed explicitly in the DEIS. The DEIS shows that the risks from tailings
are dominated by lung cancer due to radon by about two orders of magnitude.
Survivorship for lung cancer is negligible; hence, for the dominant risk there
are no non-fatal cancers. Even for inhalation or ingestion of particulates
most of the highly affected organs — e.g., lung, red marrow -- are not noted
for survivorship if cancer develops. Non-fatal cancers would be a relatively
inconsequential addition to the total risk.
Comment 7: EPA's data sets and risk models are out of date and
inappropriate. They understate health effects since they do not consider
cancers other than lung cancer, non-fatal cancers, childhood diseases, adverse
genetic outcomes, or other somatic effects linked to radiation exposures.
(P-41.1, P-45.19, P-33.4)
Response: Risk estimates were made for cancers other then lung cancer;
see Tables 6-1 thru 6-4, and Appendix C (FEIS I, Volume I). Compared to lung
cancer, they represented an incremental risk of less then 1%. The estimated
number of excess non-fatal cancers would be about the same as fatal ones,
again about 17o or less of the estimated excess in lung cancer fatalities. The
combined risk for fatal cancer other than lung cancer and for all non-fatal
cancers is very much smaller than the uncertainty in the estimated risk of
lung cancer. Parameters for calculating the genetic risk were given in
Appendix C. We have used these data to calculate genetic impact and
incorporated this information into the final EIS. Again, the estimated risk
is much less than the uncertainty in the only major health effect, lung cancer
due to radon exposure. We do not know of any childhood diseases associated
with radiation exposure that have been omitted; at the dose rates of interest,
no developmental effects are anticipated.
A.2-2
-------
Comment 8: EPA cost benefit analysis considers only fatal lung
cancers, and neglects other health issues, such as genetic effects.
(P-l(H2-2).3, P-l(2).20, P-26.2)
Response: The DEIS discusses other health effects and points out that
they are not significant in comparison to lung cancer. For this reason it is
not meaningful to include them in the consideration of benefits and costs.
Comment 9: The greater sensitivity of the embryo, the fetus, and the
young child to damage caused by radiation should be taken into account in
setting these standards. (P-12.3, P-45.17)
Response: The risk estimates made in the DEIS are based on lifetime
exposure and include risks incurred before adulthood. For the particular case
of exposure to radon decay products, by far the most important health risk
(see below), we made appropriate allowance for the smaller organ size and the
decreased minute volume of children. The net effect of these changes is to
increase exposure during childhood. However, we did not presume children had
an increased risk per unit exposure, i.e., per working level month, because,
as yet, there is no direct evidence for increased lung cancer sensitivity from
radiation exposure during childhood. Nevertheless, there is evidence of
increased sensitivity to radiation for the totality of all cancer risks.
Therefore, in 1978, we examined how this might increase the lifetime risk
(EPA79a). We calculated that if children were three times more sensitive than
adults, it would increase their lifetime risk by about a factor of 1.5.
Although this increase is less than the uncertainty in our risk estimates for
lung cancer, we agree it may turn out that our risk estimates are somewhat
low. For other cancers we used a lifetable analysis that made allowance for
the increased sensitivity of children. However, all exposure pathways other
than inhalation of radon daughters constitute only about 1% of the total
health risks estimated in the DEIS.
Comment 10: EPA fails to consider cumulative or synergistic effects
between radionuclides and toxic metals in its risk assessment. (P-45.18)
Response: EPA disagrees. The cumulative effects of exposure from
radioactive materials released from the piles is given in the DEIS (Tables 6-1
to 6-6). The question of cumulative or synergistic effects of radionuclides
and toxic metals is both speculative, since neither phenomenon has been
demonstrated, and open-ended, since it would require knowledge of all past,
present, and future exposures. The Agency addressed the risks it could
identify, but not the hypothetical issue raised here. If the tailings are
controlled, the issue should be moot.
A.2-3
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!Alternative Limits Proposed!
Comment 11: After reclamation, tailings should meet a radon
concentration standard at the downwind edge of the tailings equivalent to the
radon emission rate. (P-l(2).44, P-l(2).59)
Response: The majority of the health impact of tailings is estimated
for populations located at a distance from the tailings. This is effectively
limited by a flux standard alone. A radon concentration-in-air limit would
serve no significant additional purpose and would require long-term
monitoring, which is clearly impractical for the 1000 years contemplated by
these standards. The Agency chose a design standard rather than a performance
standard precisely to avoid such an unreasonable monitoring requirement. Also
see the response to Comment 16, A.1.2.
Comment 12: We recommend that a performance standard of 0.5 pCi per
liter be applied upon stabilization of the impoundment. (S-12(H2).2)
Response: See the response to Comment 11, this section.
Comment 13: We recommend a regulatory standard in terms of
concentrations of radon decay products, and support the levels prescribed by
10 CFR Part 20 (0.03WL). As an alternative, the NCRP is recommending an
exposure limit for radon decay products of 2 WLM per year. (I-6(H2).12,
P-29.3, 1-25.16, 1-28.11, I-4(H2).10, I-4(H2).ll, 1-6(4).9)
Response: A standard in terms of radon decay products would suffer
from the same deficiencies as a radon concentration standard (see Comment 11,
above). In addition, the recommended values (0.03 WL and 2 WLM per year)
would permit unacceptably high levels of risk (on the order of 3 in
100 lifetime risk of death from lung cancer). The EPA standard is set at a
value at least 30 times lower. The NCRP has not recommended the value quoted.
Comment 14: EPA should establish a general performance standard of 0.3
pCi/liter to apply to the maximum individual or, alternatively, at the edge of
the pile. NRC would implement such a standard using ALARA. (F-6(2).10)
Response: See the response to Comment 11 regarding "performance"
standards. In addition, EPA does not choose to delegate its standards-setting
authority to NRC via an ALARA process when there is no difficulty in
establishing an appropriate generally applicable numerical standard. We also
do not believe that it was the intent of UMTRCA that EPA do so.
A.2-4
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JEPA's Assessment Should Include uncertainties of Estimates and Probabilities
or" Occurrence!
Comment 15: It is difficult to judge the conservatism in the analysis
when only one value is used for each parameter. EPA should perform a
quantitative uncertainty analysis on its risk estimates, similar to that
applied to EPA's proposed radionuclide release limits for high-level waste
repositories (40 CFR 191). (1-9(3).2)
Response: EPA agrees that a quantitative uncertainty analysis of its
risk estimates would provide useful insights into the sensitivity of the risk
assessment to the uncertainties in the various parameters used for that
purpose. However, we believe that in order to be useful, such a study would
require careful evaluation of the relevant parameter distributions, taking
into consideration that they are mutually interdependent. In the meantime, we
believe that the more qualitative perspective gained from experience and
consideration of such references as Ho78, Ho70, and Chapter 3 of Wa80,
provides a sufficient basis for the rulemaking process.
Ho78 F.O. Hoffman, D.L. Shaeffer, C.W. Miller, and C.T. Garten Jr.
Editors, "Proceedings of a Workshop on the Evaluation of Models
Used for the Environmental Assessment of Radionuclide Releases",
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, CONG-770901, April 1978.
Ho79 F.O. Hoffman, C.F. Baes III, editors, "A Statistical Analysis of
Selected Parameters for Predicating Food Chain Transport and
Internal Dose of Radionuclides", Oak Ridge National Laboratory,
NUREG/CR-1004, ORNL/NUREG/TM-282, October 1979.
Wa80 J.A. Watson, Chairman, "Upgrading Environmental Radiation Data -
Health Physics Society Committee Report HPSR-1 (1980),"
Environmental Protection Agency, EPA 520/1-80-012, August 1980.
Comment 16: EPA failed to utilize probabilistic risk analysis
techniques to assess the realistic potential for misuse. EPA merely states
that the possibility of misuse is "real" (RIA at 3-3), without analyzing or
even discussing assumptions that purport to lead to such a conclusion.
(1-4(3).12)
Response: That the potential for misuse is "real" is amply
demonstrated by the large number of instances of misuse documented not only at
Grand Junction, Co., but, to a lesser extent, at many other sites. This
extensive misuse has occurred in a period of only a few decades. The hazard
from these tailings will persist for many thousands of years.
A.2-5
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Comment 17. EPA has not adequately addressed the risks from uranium
milling tailings. This assessment should include major geologic, climatic,
and institutional impacts on disposal facilities. The risks to radiosensitive
populations, all exposure pathways, the contributions of radioactive elements
other than radon, and other diseases associated with uranium processing.
(P-35.6, P-35.7)
Response: EPA disagrees. Satisfying the longevity standard (see the
Preamble) requires that events of low probability but high disruptiveness be
considered if the design is to provide "reasonable assurance" of attaining
design criteria (See Chapter 8 in the FEIS). Each class of events that may
affect disposal longevity should be evaluated on a site-specific basis in
developing the disposal program for that site.
The risks have been estimated as realistically as possible for all
identifiable pathways for radon and radioisotopes found in tailings (See
Chapters 4, 5, and 6, in the FEIS, Volume I). Currently available scientific
information on radiosensitivity of specific population groups has been
incorporated in the models (see Comment 2, A.2.1.2.). Those risks identifiable
with radiation or uranium processing have been estimated. Other conditions
hypothesized to be associated with radiation or uranium were also considered,
but proof of relationship is lacking.
A.2-6
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A.2.1 Radiological Health Risk Assessment
!Existing Epidemiology Indicates Hazards Are Greater Than EPA Has Used*.
Comment 1: The March of Dimes Birth Defects Study for the Navajo Tribe
shows twice the number of still births, miscarriages, infant deaths,
congenital or genetic malformations and childhood cancers which are likely
caused by tailings pile emissions located in the immediate area. (P-6.1)
Response: EPA agrees there is reason for concern about tailings and
has documented these concerns in the FEIS, Volume I. EPA also agrees that
there appear to be health problems in the Navaho Nation population. However,
there is no evidence that the Navaho Nation problems are related to tailings
control. As noted by attendees at the meeting on "Birth Effects in the Four
Corners Area" (submittal IV-1-97), reported findings there are preliminary. A
number of other variables must be considered, and, to the degree possible,
quantified. These include demographic, socioeconomic, exposure, genetic,
health care data, etc. Data must be gathered not only for the Four Corners
Area but also for similar areas without uranium mining and milling. It will
take a fair amount of work to discover if uranium mining and milling is even
potentially implicated in the health problems referred to by the commenter.
In any case, the control levels in the standard should prevent, to the extent
indicated in the FEIS, the adverse effects of uncontrolled tailings.
Comment 2: Recent studies on local communities in or adjacent to
uranium mining and milling areas indicate excess adverse health effects and
birth defects. (P-l(2).23, P-37.1)
Response: See the response to Comment 1, A.2.1.
Comment 3: Based on known studies in uranium mines and preliminary
observations in populations having environmental exposures to uranium mining
and milling in the Four Corners area, there is reason to be concerned about
the effects of radiation from mill tailings. (P-31.1)
Response: See the response to Comment 1, A.2.1.
Comment 4: The death rate from malignant melanoma in Jefferson County,
Colorado which contains a large uranium mine and a plutonium plant, is
excessively high. (P-30.10)
Response: The observations on malignant melanoma are not necessarily
relevant to the proposed standards. The best evidence is that radiation
related skin cancers are basal cell cancers, or, less frequently, squamous
cell carcinomas. (H. Martin, et al., Cancer, 25: 61-71, 1970; M. Sevcova, et
al.. Health Physics, 35: 803-806, 1978). Malignant melanomas, on the other
A.2-7
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hand, appear most related to ultraviolet (sun light) exposure (Measurements of
Ultraviolet Radiation in the United States and Comparisons with Skin Cancer
Data. DHEW No. (N1H) 76-1029, National Institutes of Health, Washington,
1975). The risk of melanoma is related to the annual ultraviolet exposure
(T.R. Fears, et aJL., Am. J. Epidemiol, 105: 420-427, 1977).
Comment 5: A study of uranium miners found a 38% increase in the rate
of chromosomal abnormalities for the lowest exposure group of less than 100
Working Level Months. (P-30.11)
Response: While there was an increase in chromosomal abnormalities in
the study cited by the commenter, the control abnormality rate was low and the
numbers of subjects small. It is not known if the reported increase is
statistically significant. The significance, if any, of increased chromosomal
abnormalities in peripheral blood lymphocytes has not been established.
Studies on chromosome abnormalities try to use the changing abnormality rates
as biological dosimeters for the radiation exposure. This was done in the
study cited by the commenter. However, clinical or hereditary implications
have not been associated with these changes.
Comment 6: Dr. John Gofman estimates that a minimum of 450,000
additional persons will die prematurely in the future for each year that a
full-scale nuclear power program continues to operate.
Response: The continuation or non-continuation of this nuclear power
program is not the subject of this rulemaking.
Comment 7: Our knowledge about the reproductive hazards of low-level
radiation contamination of the environment from mill tailings, including the
effects of radon and radon daughters, is incomplete. There is no good reason
to assume that such effects will be negligible. (P-31(2).l, P-61.1)
Response: See the response to Comment 1, A.2.1.
\Existing Epidemiology Indicates Hazards Are Lower Than EPA Has Estimated*.
Comment 8: Epidemiological studies have not detected increased cancers
or other health effects associated with elevated levels of natural background
radiation, thus risks must be estimated for low level radiation. EPA's linear
non-threshold model is conservative. It does not recognize well-known
biological repair mechanisms, it ignores increasing evidence of a threshold,
and it is not compelled by the data. Therefore, EPA's estimates of fatalities
are excessive. (1-6(3).30)
A. 2-8
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Response: The commenter has confused the ability to prove or
disapprove a hypothesis with the validity of the hypothesis. Numerous reports
have reviewed the basic requirements of epidemiologic studies of background
radiation. In general, in addition to detailed demographic, socio- economic,
health statistics and exposure data across the time period involved, they
require a base of millions to hundreds of millions of person-years of data to
detect the incremental increase in risk projected by current risk
coefficients, even for exposure levels around 4 times average background.
Charles Land has examined this problem in some detail (C.E. Land, Science,
209: 1197-1203, 1980); see also: E.E. Pochin, Health Physics, 31: 148-151,
1976; S.G. Goss, Health Physics, 29: 715-721, 1975; C. Buck, Science, 129:
1357-1358, 1959; G. Hems, Brit. Med. J., 1: 393-396, 1966. None of the
geographic epidemiology studies published to date has been able to meet the
necessary criteria. This includes both negative and positive reports.
The commenter also alludes to "well-known biological repair
mechanisms". EPA is not familiar with any such mechanisms related to
radiation induction of cancer. Although at the cellular level there are known
repair systems for sublethal and potentially lethal damage, there are also
unscheduled DNA synthesis and error-prone repair systems which have been
related to increased transformation of cells. Repair systems affecting
survival are not the same as those influencing malignant transformation. The
details of radiation inducible repair systems are unknown, but the systems
appear to be of the error-prone variety. Any attempt to project the current
morass of data on repair at the cellular level as a "well known biological
repair mechanism" that will reduce the effects of ionizing radiation exposure
is scientifically invalid.
Also see Comments 13 and 14, pp. D-23 and D-24 of FEIS-I, Volume II,
for additional information.
Comment 9: The epidemiological work of Dr. Stephen F. Lanes, studying
the possible association between lung cancer and radon exposure from mill
tailings in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, concludes that there is no significant
correlation, if any, between radon emanations from the tailings and cancer
risks. Further, since Dr. Lanes* study established confidence levels, if
risks were as large as EPA's model suggests, a correlation would have been
detected at Canonsburg. (1-4(3).30)
Response: EPA strongly disagrees. Dr. Lane's study was too small to
detect any difference in health risk even if the risk were present. The power
of this study to determine a carcinogenic effect, assuming one was present, is
only 0.38, i.e., less then a 50-50 chance. Even though Lane calculated
(incorrectly) a somewhat greater power, on page 34 of his thesis he states,
"This is a relatively low power, however, and, consequently, a negative
finding may be attributed to small sample size and should not be considered
strong evidence for the null hypothesis of no association". Moreover, we do
not agree that this study can be used to test EPA risk estimates. Using the
radon daughter concentrations reported in his thesis, we have calculated,
using the same EPA risk models as described in the FEIS, what difference in
A.2-9
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lung cancer mortality due to radon might have occurred in his case and control
groups for lifetime exposure. This difference was less than 0.2 cases, not a
detectable amount in any epidemiological study, let alone one consisting of
fewer than 100 participants.
Comment 10: Several experts have testified that the health effects of
radon in the general population are insignificant. (P-29.2, I-4(H2).6,
1-22.9, 1-4(3).26)
Response: EPA agrees that relevant data bases are not large, most
exposure data are relatively poor, and the follow-up period of exposed miners
is considerably less than a lifetime. Moreover, there is considerable
extrapolation involved in estimating risks for a general population on the
basis of occupational health studies. This leaves room for differing
opinions. Nevertheless, a considerable body of expert opinion agrees with
EPA. The Canadian Atomic Energy Control Board, roughly equivalent to the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, has recently issued a report, "Risk Estimates
for the Health Effects of Alpha Radiation" (INFO-0081)(2) that examines the
radon risk question more thoroughly than other published documents. This 323
page report, in contrast to assertions by "experts," provides a full
epidemiologic analysis, i.e., a Cox regression analysis of all of the
available data, and explicitly states what criteria were used in assessing the
individual studies. The report concludes that the best projection model for
lung cancer due to the inhalation of radon progeny is a relative risk model
with a risk coefficient of 2.3% increase per WLM. EPA has used a relative
risk model with a coefficient of 3%. For a general population that includes
children, this is not overly conservative. In addition to the Canadian study,
the 1980 NAS BEIR committee critiqued risk estimates for radon. Although the
committee preferred an absolute risk projection model in which the risk
coefficient increased as a function of age, in contrast to the EPA relative
risk model where the increased age follows the age pattern of the U.S. lung
cancer incidence, their numerical estimate of lifetime radon risk is almost
identical, 850 cases per 106 person WLM^) vis a vis 860 cases per 10°
person WLM'^'. We emphasize that due to the uncertainties in the data base,
the agreement between NAS, Canadian AECB, and USEPA risk estimates should not
be taken as a sign that our risk estimates are precise or even correct within
a factor of two. We expect our risk estimates will change as more information
becomes available. With time, perhaps, so will those of other "experts."
Comment 11; A 1972 EPA report, "Estimates of Ionizing Radiation Doses
in the U.S., 1960-2000 (ORP/CSD 72-1) at 27-28 (1972)" states that uranium
tailings as sources of radioactivity were insignificant. (1-12(2).4)
Response: The report cited was based on the rather scanty data
available in 1970. Many of the sections of the report are no longer accurate
because of the increased data base developed since 1970. For example, in the
A.2-10
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report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic
Radiation, treatment of uranium mining and milling has increased from one half
page with no numerical estimates of exposure in 1972 to three or four pages
with transport and exposure estimates in 197?'^' and 1982* . As data
have been obtained, the perspective has changed.
!The Assumptions Used By EPA Are Not Conservative Enough*.
Comment 12 : Several of EPA's assumptions tend to artificially lower
the projected population exposure. These include the assumed radon emission
rates, the lack of growth in p6pulation near the tailings, cover degradation,
and the assumption that residents of rural and remote sites produce the same
amount of their own food supply as urban residents and therefore ingestion of
contaminated locally-grown foodstuffs is minimized. (P-KH2-2) .2 , P-l(2).15,
Response: Radon emission rates were chosen to be consistent with those
used in the NRC GEIS,^8^ and are based on a 280 pCi/g radium-226
concentration in tailings and radon emission factor of 1 pci/m^-s of
radon-222 per pCi/g of radium-226 in the tailings. These values correspond to
dry tailings of ore representing grades currently being processed. As
indicated in the response to Comment 35, A. 2.1, we believe it is more prudent
to consider a fixed population than to guess at what the population growth
scenario will be in a given area 100 or 1000 years from now. As stated in the
RIA (p. 3. 8) "The goal of long term protection is to provide all reasonable
controls for as long a period as the potential hazards remain." The balance
of Section 3.3 in the RIA considers the long term isolation of mill tailings,
including the possibilities for degradation. In general, uranium mills have
not been sited in agriculturally productive regions. Our use of urban factors
for individual consumption of home-produced foods is based on the expectation
that in such an area an individual uses his or her garden to supplement the
home food supply rather than to provide the bulk of it. This is true in rural
as well as urban areas. Our intent is to provide reasonable estimates of the
food intake, not upper limits. There will be circumstances where those
estimates will be exceeded and others where they will overestimate the actual
intake of home grown food.
Comment 13 : EPA's risk assessment underestimates both exposure and
risks per unit exposure. These considerations convince us that the assumption
of 75% to equate non-occupational to occupational exposure is, if anything,
too low. (P-45U) .25)
Response: The Agency assumed that on the average residents were in
their homes 75% of the time, i.e., 18 hr/day. While the Agency agrees that
some infants may spend 100% of their time indoors, infancy does not last
beyond a year or so and the total exposure estimate over a life would not be
unduly increased. The difference is about 1/2 %. Also see the response to
Comment 15, A. 2.1.
A.2-11
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Comment 14: EPA's analysis appears to understate ingestion exposures
for areas with greater agricultural productivity than the average values used
by EPA. (P-45.21)
Response: See the response to Comment 2, A.2.1.1.
Comment 15: By including (or confusing) occupancy factors, breathing
rates, organ sizes, etc., in a unit of cumulative exposure, EPA incorrectly
equates continuous residential exposure to 0.01 WL with a cumulative exposure
of 0.27 WLM per year. Assuming 100% of the time is spent indoors, the
cumulative exposure would be 0.5 WLM per year. (P-9(3).12)
Response: A cumulative exposure of 0.5 WLM per year is obtained if one
assumes members of the general population have the same ventilation rate and
minute volume 24 hrs per day - 7 days a week, as working miners do 8 hrs per
day - 5 days a week. In practice, their breathing patterns are quite
different when sleep, light activity, and labor are taken into account^'.
Alternatively, one could express radon exposure to the general population in
terms of potential alpha energy inhaled per year rather than WLM, since the
latter is formally defined only for occupational exposure. While technically
correct, such an approach might be less useful. See the response to
Comment 3, A.1.3.
Comment 16: Based on EPA's own estimate (DEIS 6-1), the acid leach
process only removes 90 percent of the uranium in the ore, and not 93 percent
as EPA assumes for the model mill (DEIS 4-8) and bases its risk assessments
on. But, 10 percent (vs. 7 percent, as EPA assumes) of the original uranium
in the ore means a 43 percent increase of the uranium in the tailings, which
means that emissions from the piles will be higher, or risks higher than shown
in the DEIS. (P-45.22)
Response: EPA's estimate is based on the best data available. The 90
percent value was numerically rounded off.
Comment 17: One death is too many from cancer or any other disease
caused by improper disposal of tailings waste. (P-63.2)
Response: EPA agrees. However, we must decide what is "proper" and
"improper" disposal, since society does not have the ability to provide
perfect isolation of wastes. That is the purpose of the rulemaking.
A.2-12
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JThe Assumptions Used by EPA Are Too Conservative1.
Comment 18: EPA consistently uses excessive conservatism when
determining health effects from radiation exposure. EPA used inflated values
for: (1) increased lung cancer cases per WLM, (2) effective exposure time,
and (3) equilibrium value. EPA's assumption that a person potentially exposed
to radon emissions will live in the same house for 70 years is also
conservative. Although EPA estimates someone living continuously next to a
tailings pile may experience a lifetime excess lung cancer risk as high as 4
chances in 100, a more realistic estimate yields a risk less than 0.04 in
100. (1-2(2).9, 1-1(2).39)
Response:
1. The Agency has detailed in the FEIS and in responses to Comments 10,
A.2.1; 8, A.2.1.2; 10, A.2.1.2; and others, the growing scientific consensus
of the primary investigators and other scientists that the relative risk model
is the appropriate model for lung cancer estimation. Use of this model is not
inherently excessively conservative. The inherent errors in the absolute risk
model estimates cited by several commenters lead them to underestimate the
risk.
2. The commenter has a misconception of how the Agency program for
calculating risk operates. The appropriate latent periods and periods of
expression are included in the calculation of estimated risk. This is quite
independent of the period of exposure, which is, of course, the period when
the person is exposed to the radiation source. See Appendix C of the FEIS and
related references.
3. The Agency is revising the estimate of equilibrium fraction in the
Final EIS. See Comment 14, A.2.1.2.
4. The commenters' use of ICRP Publication 26^*' assumptions
concerning occupational exposure patterns is not relevant to environmental
exposures. The Agency position on duration of exposure is outlined in an EPA
report^ 7^ :
"In these risk estimates it is assumed that the population at risk
is subject to lifetime exposure and the distribution of ages is
that in a stable (stationary) population (Un75). The Agency
recognizes that residential dwellings are seldom occupied by one
family group for their lifetimes. However, this has little effect
on the ultimate health impact if another family occupies the
structure. The health risk to a particular family is a function of
the time they occupy the dwelling and to a lesser extent their
ages. For most practical purposes, the risk due to occupancy of
less than 70 years can be found by taking a fraction of the risk
given below as proportional to the years of occupancy. For
example, 7-year occupancy would be expected to yield one-tenth the
estimated risk of lung cancer due to lifetime exposure,
approximately 70 years. Residences which serve primarily as
children's or geriatric's homes would be obvious exceptions."
A.2-13
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It is prudent to assume that a dwelling will be occupied by someone
with about the same mix of ages, for extended periods, or that there will be a
similar occupied dwelling at that location.
Comment 19: EPA's risk estimate for a maximally exposed individual is
based on unrealistic assumptions as to the location of the individual, length
of exposure, and the magnitude of the exposure. (1-4(3).28, 1-4(3).57)
Response: EPA has considered the risk to an individual at a number of
distances from the pile (e.g., table 6-1). We do not expect that every
tailings pile will have an associated individual living 600 meters from its
centroid. Our base case for risk assessment is an individual living a
lifetime under a given set of exposure conditions. While we realize that it
would be unusual for a person to live a lifetime at the same location, we
believe that it is appropriate to consider the risk to an individual under
these circumstances. This point is discussed further in the response to
Comment 18, A.2.1.
Comment 20: EPA's dispersion model overestimates close in radon
concentrations by a factor of 3 to 10, thereby overestimating risks to nearby
residents by as much as an order of magnitude. (1-4(3).43, 1-6(4).8)
Response: The sector-averaged Gaussian plume model has been used as
the basic work horse of local dispersion estimation for years. In 1977, the
participants of a group assessing atmospheric transport of radionuclides
(Ho78) concluded that for distances out to 10 km in reasonably flat terrain
and given good local wind observations that, "Accuracy for the usual annual
average concentration is about a factor of 2." At distances between 10 to 100
km, they concluded that accuracy could be about a factor of 4 for long term
averages. While there is considerable uncertainty in such dispersion
estimates, they are based on an empirical approach that is inherently unbiased
so that they are as likely to underpredict as to overpredict.
It should be noted that we are not modeling background concentrations
of radon. While it may be difficult to observe the increment of radon above
background due to the tailings pile at distances greater than 1 km from the
pile, there is no reason to believe that conservation of mass (or activity)
does not continue to be a valid concept. Once released to the atmosphere,
radon continues to disperse until it is removed by radioactive decay. In
conclusion, we believe that for a given source term and set of wind data, the
sector-average Gaussian dispersion estimates provide a reasonable basis for
calculating local concentrations of radon.
Ho78 P.O. Hoffman, D.L. Shaeffer, C.W. Miller, and C.T. Garten Jr.,
"The Evaluation of Models Used for the Environmental Assessment
of Radionuclides Releases," Proceedings of a Workshop held at
Gatlinburg, TN, September 6-9, 1977, Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN, CONF-770901 1978.
A.2-14
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Comment 21: We suggest that EPA reconsiders its entire risk
calculation for radon to bring the calculations into the range of a true "best
estimate," by considering the actual levels of radon in ambient air in
conjunction with naturally occurring background radon levels. (1-24.4)
Response: The commenter has perhaps missed the point of this
rulemaking. The purpose of these standards is not to regulate naturally-
occurring background radon levels in ambient air, but to regulate radon from
uranium mill tailings. For this reason, we calculate, for example, the number
of lung cancer deaths from radon emissions from tailings piles, not those from
radon emissions from other sources.
Comment 22: Radon emanating from tailings is an insignificant fraction
of natural background emissions. The doses and risk to the general population
from radon and its decay products from tailings can only be predicted by
theoretical dispersion models since elevated concentrations cannot be measured
beyond approximately one-half mile, and the estimated incremental doses and
risks are insignificant compared to background and other sources. (1-6(3).28,
1-6(3).36, I-6(H2).29, 1-4(3).27, 1-4(3).29, 1-25.14, I-4(H2).8, P-28.2)
Response: While experimentally it may be difficult to demonstrate the
increment above background due to a tailings pile at a distance greater than
1 km from the pile, there is no reason to believe that conservation of mass
(or activity) does not continue to be a valid concept. Once released to the
atmosphere, radon should continue to disperse freely until it is removed by
radiological decay. In conclusion, EPA believes that for a given source term
and set of wind data, that sector average gaussian dispersion estimates
ppovide a reasonable basis for calculating local concentrations of radon.
Also, see response to Comment 10, A.3.1.
Comment 23: The inherent problem with EPA's approach to standards
development rests in the hypothetical "worst case" models EPA preferentially
chooses to evaluate. Regarding calculated health effects, EPA conservatively
overestimates the impacts by a factor of at least 100 by assuming hypothetical
"worst case" scenarios. Realistic scenarios are not entertained. (1-1(2).2)
Response: The comment is not correct. EPA did not consider "worst
case" models, but instead used models which describe average conditions. The
Federal Register notice of final standards (as well as various parts of this
response to comment) details our response to the allegation that we
overestimated health effects.
Comment 24: The cumulative effect of EPA systematic overestimation of
the factors which determine potential health effects is to overestimate risks
by a factor of 60. Thus, all the benefits EPA claims for 95 percent radon
control or a 20 pCi/m^-sec standard could be achieved simply by using the
correct factors. (1-4(3).50)
A.2-15
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Response: The commenter expressed the view that the models used by EPA
overestimate potential health effects from mill tailings. In the aggregate,
these overestimates combine to yield an overestimate factor of about 60.
These factors are:
Area of model tailings piles 1.4
Radon flux per unit activity 1.8
Transport and dispersion models 5.0
Equilibrium for radon decay products 1.7
Risk of lung cancer 3.0
Population near tailings piles unknown
We will discuss each of these factors in turn.
The radon emission from tailings is directly related to the surface
area covered by tailings. EPA used the same area that NRC used in their
/ Q \
FGEIS^ ', 80 hectares, to estimate radon emissions. The AMC prefers 50
hectares, and points out that NRC^^' later revised its estimate to 50
hectares. However, current projections of uranium production indicate that
very few new mills or piles, if any, will start up between now and the late
1990's. Thus, essentially all radon emissions will be from existing piles,
which have an average area of 68 as shown in the FEIS. In addition, radon is
emitted from areas contaminated by windblown tailings. We conclude the area
of piles has been overestimated by at most a factor of 1.16.
The emission rate of radon per unit area of tailing is directly related
to the activity of radium-226 in tailings. Several factors which are not well
understood influence this emission rate. In the report cited above, the NRC
concluded: "Considering the variation observed under differing conditions at
a number of sites, the staff has elected to apply conservative specific flux
values of 0.3 [pCi of radon-222 per square meter-second/pCi of radium-226 per
gram of tailings] for wet tailings and 1.0 for dry tailings and to count moist
tailings as dry in making the calculations." EPA agrees with this conclusion
and believes no correction is needed for this factor.
Regarding transport models, measurements are consistent with the
transport and dispersion models we used. This is discussed in detail in the
FEIS. The method used by EPA has been the basic work-horse of local
dispersion estimation for years. In 1977, the participants of an expert
group assessing atmospheric transport of radionuclides (Ho78, see page 2-14
for citation) concluded that, for distances out to 10 km in reasonably flat
terrain, and given good local wind observations: "Accuracy for the usual
annual average concentration is about a factor of + 2." Furthermore, these
dispersion estimates are based on an empirical approach that is inherently
unbiased and that should therefore be as likely to overpredict as to
underpredict.
It should be noted that we are not modeling background concentrations
of radon. While it may be experimentally difficult to demonstrate the
increment above background due to a tailings pile at distances greater than
1 km, there is no reason to believe that the basic physical principle of
A. 2-16
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conservation of mass does not continue to be valid. Once released to the
atmosphere, radon, which is a chemically inert gas, disperses freely until it
is removed by radioactive decay. We conclude that our dispersion estimates '
provide a reasonable basis for calculating atmospheric concentrations of radon.
There appears to be a misconception about the conditions to which EPA's
assumption of a 0.7 equilibrium fraction for radon decay products apply. Most
of the data cited by commenters to support a lower equilibrium fraction are
based on the diffusion of radon into houses from underlying soil, in which
radon the initial decay product equilibrium fraction is zero. For the
airborne radon from piles considered in EPA's estimates, the decay product
equilibrium fraction in outdoor air approaches 1.0, beyond the near vicinity
of a pile. After taking account of periods of time an individual spends
outdoors, and periods of time a house is well-ventilated by outdoor air, we
conclude use of a 0.7 equilibrium fraction for airborne radon is more than
justified at distances far from tailings piles. This value is therefore
retained for calculations of total impact of radon releases from piles. Very
close to tailings piles, however, the decay product equilibrium fraction in
outdoor air is low. We conclude, therefore, after taking the same
indoor/outdoor factors into account, that an average effective radon decay
product equilibrium fraction about one half as large is probably more
appropriate next to piles. This lower value should be applied to estimates of
maximum individual risk next to piles.
The EPA estimate of lung cancer risk from radon decay products is based
on studies of uranium and other heavy metal miners, is consistent with
recommendations of the NAS BEIR Committee^', and is within 20% of the value
recommended for use in a recent, exhaustive study conducted in Canada (Ref).
See Comment 18, A.2.1. EPA used two regional populations for its risk
estimates; the first population, identified as for a "remote" site, was
hypothetical, and was taken directly from NRC's FGEIS.^ The second
population, identified as for a "rural" site, is that for the Edgemont, S.D.
site, based on 1970 census data. We assumed that a mix of six "rural" and 17
"remote" sites would properly represent the 23 sites modeled in the DEIS.
Since publication of the DEIS the Agency has received the results of a
population survey for all 52 mill tailings sites performed for us by Battelle
Pacific Northwest Laboratories.(25) xhis survey, which was limited to
individuals within 5 km of the piles, shows that the total population at the
26 active sites was 2054 within 2 kilometers of the edge of all active
tailings piles, and 14,737 within 5 kilometers. We also used 1970 census
results to re-evaluate populations from 5 to 80 km of the 26 active sites.
These data indicate that our initial estimate of health effects to
populations within 80 kms is correct, if we assume that there will be no
increases of populations at these sites. Our estimates of risk to more
distant populations, i.e., to the remainder of the United States, are also
unchanged.
In summary, we do not believe the total health effects in the DEIS have
been overestimated. The factor of about 1.16 due to slightly changed average
pile area is likely to be negated by normal population increases well within
A.2-17
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the first century of the lifetime of the hazard posed by these tailings. The
estimate of maximum individual risk for a model pile is affected principally
by our assumption for the equilibrium fraction for radon to radon daughters,
and should be reduced by 50%. We believe these changes are insufficient to
warrant changing our basic conclusions regarding the risk from tailings or
these standards.
Comment 25: EPA's estimate of 12 to 14 fatalities per year by the turn
of the century is excessive. In addition to the conservative risk model used
to estimate risk, EPA overstates the amount of tailings that will be in
existence and failed to recognize that radon emanations will increase only
marginally, as most of the new tailings will be placed on existing tailings
piles. (1-6(3).31)
Response: The comment is correct regarding tailings projections and
the use of remaining capacity in existing tailings piles. We have made the
appropriate corrections in the FEIS.
Comment 26: EPA's radon risks are based, in part, on the NEC's post-
operational source term for a model mill. NRC has determined that its source
term is unrealistically high, because of over-estimating the area of
tailings. Thus EPA risk estimates are high by about a factor of 1.3.
(1-4(3).41)
Response: See the response to Comment 24, A.2.1. EPA's area (80
hectares) is closer to the actual average area of existing piles (70 hectares)
than the new NRG^"' model area (50 hectares).
Comment 27: By ignoring such factors as the wet portion of the pile,
EPA overestimates the amount of radon released from active tailings by a
factor of three to six. (1-6(4).10)
Response: Consistent with the NRC GEIS^®', EPA has assumed "...that
during operations, one fourth of the tailings area is covered by water, and
another one-eighth is wet..." (p. 4-7). No radon is assumed to be released
from these portions of the pile during the active phase of milling operations.
Comment 28: EPA's radon source term is based, in part, on the
assumption that the radon emission rate per unit area is 1 pCi/m^-sec per
pCi/g of radium-226/g of soil. Based on EPA's measurements at inactive
tailings, 0.5-0.6 pCi/m^-sec per pCi/g of radium 226/g is the best
estimate. Thus, risks are overstated by a factor of 1.8. (1-4(3).42)
Response: These measurements are for piles which still contain
moisture. The EPA estimate is for tailings which are completely dry. See the
response to Comment 24, A.2.1.
A. 2-18
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Comment 29: EPA's risk estimate for population exposure is based on
unrealistically high population densities around existing mills. (1-4(3).49)
Response: Since preparing the DEIS, EPA has obtained complete current
data for the populations in the vicinity of uranium mills (see the response to
Comment 24, A.2.1. and Appendix E of the FEIS I-Volume I). The results show
fewer people very close and more people at intermediate distances. The
population risks have been recalculated accordingly.
Comment 30: EPA's radon daughter level of 0.02 WL for indoor
structures is five times as conservative as the limit NCRP recommends for
remedial action. (1-4(3).58)
Response: The NCRP has not published any recommendations on a limit
for indoor radon. Furthermore, the Agency notes that such a limit, i.e., 0.1
WL (5x.02WL) could correspond to a residential exposure of 2 WLM per year at
an occupancy factor of 0.75. i.e., 18 hrs per day. This is exactly half of
the occupational exposure limit for underground uranium miners. Typically an
underground uranium miner works in this environment for less than twenty five
years.
JTfte Assumptions Used By EPA Are Questionable!
Comment 31: EPA's use of occupational studies of uranium miners to
estimate risk to the general population is questionable because of
uncertainties in exposure, age-dependent factors, behavioral differences, and
exposure to other toxins. (P-45.25)
Response: We recognize that extrapolation of data based on the
experience of underground miners to the general population is not straight
forward. This problem has been discussed in FEIS-I, Volume I, reference (7).
Although the miners' age and sex distribution differs from that of the general
public, it is the only meaningful data base for human cancer due to radon and
has been used by the ICRP and UNSCEAR and other authorized bodies.
We do not believe "other toxins" etc., in uranium miners is a
particularly relevant issue and call attention to detailed comments on
etiology of lung cancer in uranium miners in Heupers' Monographs: Occupational
Tumors and Allied Diseases by W.C. Heuper, C.C. Thomas, Baltimore, 1942 and
Occupational and Environmental Cancers of the Respiratory System by W.C.
Heuper, Springer-Verlag. New York, 1966.
Comment 32: EPA fails to use age adjusted life tables for the
incidence of lung cancer. (P-45.20)
A.2-19
-------
Response: The comment is incorrect; we used age-adjusted life tables.
EPA introduced the use of age-adjusted life tables for the analysis of
radiation risks (J. R. Cook, et^ al. , A Computer Code for Cohort Analysis of
Increased Risk of Death. EPA 520/4-78-012, USEPA, Washington, 1978, and B. M.
Bunger, et al.. Health Physics, 40: 439-455, 1981.)
!Addltional Cowments\
Comment 33: Since EPA uses NRC's Model Mill, a comparison of EPA's and
NRC's projected doses and estimated risks should be provided. (S-6.2)
Response: Both EPA and NRC use adequate risk estimates. We do not see
the relevance of the comment to the rulemaking.
Comment 34: EPA failure to specify dose levels of gamma radiation make
it impossible to evaluate EPA determination of gamma risk. (P-45.24)
Response: EPA stated the risk coefficients based for gamma doses (FEIS
Tables 6-1 and 6-2. These can be used to estimate doses from the risks EPA
published.
Comment 35. EPA failed to adjust their risk estimations for population
growth. (P-45.20)
Response: EPA agrees that population changes have some impact on
health effects estimates. However, even for the same total population,
changes in structure of the population pyramid can mask the radiation
effects. EPA feels that such changes can be usefully incorporated into the
analysis only when it is possible to make realistic demographic projections
for a specific area. Since over the time frame of interest, greater then 1000
years or even the shortest time span relevant to those standards, 200 years,
demographic projections are as likely to be too high as too low. We do not
believe inflating the population at risk by assuming a constant population
growth of a few percent per year would serve a useful purpose in considering
the adequacy of these standards.
A.2-20
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A.2.1.1 Exposure Pathways
!Omitted Pathways!
Comment 1: Several exposure pathways including use of contaminated
water, grazing and farming on contaminated land, airborne particulates, and
releases from accidents, flooding, and misuse are not addressed because EPA
considers them "unlikely". They should be assessed. P-13(2).A, P-15(H2).2,
P-l(H2-2).5, P-19(H2).l, P-30.3, S-6.4, P-l(2).19)
Response: EPA disagrees. While the impact of airborne particulates
has been addressed in the DEIS, the assessment of the other exposure pathways
is so site-specific that in our opinion a meaningful generic assessment is not
possible. It is our expectation that any potential impact of these pathways
would be the basis for appropriate site specific control measures.
Comment 2: EPA's model underestimates the fraction of food grown in
the close-in assessment area. Further, the transfer factors used to estimate
uptake of radionuclides by vegetation probably result in underestimating
ingestion dose by a factor of 10-1000. (P-l(2).17)
Response: As indicated in the response to Comment 12, A.2.1, EPA
considers the typical siting of a uranium mill to provide conditions where an
individual living near the facility will supplement other sources of food with
a garden rather than home produce the major portion of his or her food
supply. The soil to plant transfer factors we have used are based on values
reported in the literature which are relevant to growing conditions which
might reasonably be expected in normal agricultural practice. While we
recognize that under particular conditions higher transfer factors can be
measured, we do not believe they are appropriate for our assessments.
Comment 3: It is unclear from EPA's supporting documents how much
indoor exposure is caused by tailings radon. Numerous studies have found
significant radon exposures in homes far removed from any tailings.
(I-4(H2).9)
Response: EPA's calculations in the DEIS are all for radon from the
tailings pile. At distances far removed from the tailings, the radon released
from the tailings pile makes a small but finite contribution to the total
radon concentration (see response to Comment 20, A.2.1. EPA is not suggesting
that tailings piles are the sole source of environmental radon.
A.2-21
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Comment A: Doses associated with ingestion are not necessarily small,
as stated in the Federal Register, p. 19588. EPA should change this to "are
generally smaller" than doses due to inhalation. (F-3(2).6)
Response: EPA realizes that "small" is a relative term and has changed
the phrase to "smaller than." It should be noted that compared to effects due
to inhalation radon progency, estimated effects due to inhalation ingestion of
particulates are at least a factor of 100 smaller.
Comment 5: Details of the assumptions used in atmospheric dispersion
of radon are not lucid. (P-9(H1).5)
Response: EPA believes that the material presented in Chapter 4 and 5
of the DEIS, together with reference^', should be sufficient to explain the
methodology and define the parameters used. The response to Comment 20, A.2.1
might also be helpful.
A.2-22
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A.2.1.2 Risk Models
!EPA's Explanations Are Unclear I
IThe Risk Models Used By EPA Are Not Conservative Enough'.
Comment 1: EPA's estimate of lung cancer attributable to radon decay
products are too low by a factor of 25. The risk of lung cancer in the
general population due to radon is about 2.5 x 10"-' per WLM, rather than
Evans' estimate of only 1CT4 per WLM. (P-19(H2).2, P-19(H2).5)
Response: The commenter is in error. He compared his estimate of
2.5 x 1(T3 cases/WLM with the Evans, et al.(11) estimates of 1 x 10~4
cases/WLM when discussing radon daughter related lung cancer risks. The
Agency does not and has not used the Evans, et al. estimates. The Agency
estimated 9.6 cases x l
-------
Response; As stated in Section 4.4.1 of the FEIS for inactive uranium
processing sites (FEIS-I, Volume I) we recognize that estimates of risk to the
general population that are based on occupational exposure are not exact.
Nevertheless, we believe they are useful for examining the risk potential from
inactive tailings piles and other radon sources. The comment seems to be
based on the thought that low dose rates and low doses are intrinsically less
damaging, per unit dose. Although this is being debated for lightly ionizing
radiations, there is a consensus by radiation scientists that the carcinogenic
effects of highly ionizing radiations are not reduced at low doses and low
dose rates<3),(4).
Indeed, for radon, there is evidence that at high exposure, effects per
WLM are less than at low levels. For these reasons, we believe a linear
extrapolation of low-dose occupational data to environmental levels is not
unduly conservative. Moreover, the lifetime cumulative exposure at 0.015 WL
is about 20 WLM, not a great deal less than cumulative exposures of miners (60
WLM) who have died of radiogenic lung cancer^-^). xhe increased number of
lung cancers observed in Ontario uranium miners in the range from 0 to 30 WLM,
while not statistically significant, is fully consistent with the risk
observed in these miners at much higher levels of exposure^-^) , (13) _
Finally, we reviewed other potential causes of lung cancer associated with
hard rock mining in^^, and concluded that there is no evidence that
anything other than radon decay products are the cause of the excess lung
cancer that has been observed in persons working in a variety of mines have a
wide range of suspected co-factors for carcinogenesis. A recent report by the
Ontario Government arrived at a similar conclusion^-^) , Also see response
to Comments 4, A.2.1.1 and 9, A.2.1.2.
Comment 4: EPA should use a Quality Factor of 20, rather than 10, in
assessing lung cancer risks from alpha radiation to populations exposed to
uranium tailings. (P-l(2).ll, P-l(2).12, P-l(H2-2).l, P-30.1, P-41.2, P-45.16)
Response: Because quality factors are largely an administrative device
to regulate occupational exposures, EPA does not use them in risk assessments
but proceeds directly from basic data on dose (in rads) and effects per rad
for the same evaluation, to the extent possible, using the life table analysis
outlined in Appendix C of the DEIS. Risk factors, for low and high LET
radiation, are shown in Table C-l. For the special case of radon daughters,
EPA does not attempt to calculate lung doses but makes estimates the risk in
terms of exposure to radon daughters.
Comment 5: Some research suggests that effects at low levels of
exposure may be higher than those at higher doses and dose rates. (P-33.5,
P-30.1, P-45.16)
Response: Although there is evidence for radon daughter exposure that
the carcinogenic response per WLM at exposures greater than a few hundred
working level months is less than at lower levels, there is no conclusive data
A.2-24
-------
indicating a significant departure from linearity at the levels we used to
estimate the risk coefficient. Moreover, sampling uncertainties in the
epidemiological data are so large at low exposures that a somewhat greater
response would not be apparent. Given the uncertainty in the miner data and
its application to a general population, any small departure of the response
from linearity is unlikely to change the risk estimates significantly.
!The Risk Models Used By EPA Are Too Conservative*.
Comment 6: EPA's radiation risk coefficients are higher than the "best
estimates" of ICRP and NCRP by a factor of approximately six. We strongly
urge EPA to consider judging "unreasonable risk" by the 100 mrem/year dose
used By the ICRP. (1-4(3).21, 1-31.1)
Response: The commenter alludes to statements by their consultant Dr.
Leonard D. Hamilton from the Brookhaven National Laboratory (see pp. 28-29, 62
of docket IV-D-87), who examined three other risk estimates and concluded that
the EPA estimate is too high by a factor of 6, (Hamilton pp. 22-24, 26). The
validity of Dr. Hamilton's analysis of EPA and other estimates should be
considered on the basis of their comparability. Dr. Hamilton selected four
risk estimates for comparison but did not explore the assumptions on which
they were based. Following his notation we have done so below to show their
lack of comparability.
I. EPA-890/106/WLM
a. assumptions: lifetime exposure from birth (0-110 yrs. with
actuarial probability of death due to all causes in
this interval)
b. a relative risk of 3%/WLM
The correct EPA estimate should be 860/106/WLM given at the top
of page C-12 of the DEIS.
II. ICRP (e) - 150-450/106/WLM (ICRP-Report 32)(15)
assumptions:
a. risk of 5-15/106/yr/WLM
b. mean manifestation period of 30 years
c. exposure from age 18 to 65
This epidemiology based estimate of the ICRP is not directly comparable
to EPA's. The periods of opportunity for expression in the EPA model are
greater since exposure is considered to start at birth and the mean life
expectancy is 70 years. While the numbers cannot be compared because of
differences in age structures and competing risks in the two populations, a
first approximation could be made by doubling the ICRP estimate to account for
the more extended period for expression. In this case the ICRP estimate would
be equivalent to 300-900/106/WLM.
-------
It should also be noted that the ICRP assumption of an annual risk
5-15/10°/yr/WLM is an estimate based on values ranging from 2 to
20/10°/yr/WLM, which were averaged over all age periods during occupational
exposure. Their 2-20/10^/yr/WLM is the range of estimates they took from
epidemiologic studies. The true range is greater since Archer^-*-^
documented a range of 1.4 to 35.0/10°/yr/WLM and BEIR III documents a range
of 6-47/106/yr/WLM. The ICRP estimate is perhaps a factor of 2 too low for
occupational exposure and a factor of 4 too low for valid comparison with the
EPA estimate.
III. NCRP - 80-200/106/WLM (unpublished referred to by the
commenter) assumptions:
a. 10/106/yr/WLM
b. no lung cancers before age 40
c. induced cancers disappear exponentially with a
halftime of 20 years
d. lifetime exposure from birth (0-85 + years)
While EPA can not use data from an unpublished draft report in support
of rulemaking, this estimate can be compared to EPA's in the discussion of
comments. The NCRP model has a unique feature not found in other lung cancer
risk models, i.e. radiation induced lung cancers disappear or become
unavailable for expression with time. Mathematically a function is introduced
which removes cancers exponentially with a halftime of 20 years. We do not
know why this function is introduced or where it is supported by valid
observations and analysis. We do know that if this function is removed, the
NCRP estimate increases from about 80-200/106/WLM to 200-500/106 WLM.
Moreover, the NCRP estimates an average of 10/10°/yr/WLM lung cancers could
occur. As noted above, Archer'^"' documented a range of 1.4 to
35/106/yr/WLM and BEIR HI, 6 to 47/106yr/WLM. It is not certain to what
extent NCRP considered the entire range of risk estimates but their risk
coefficient 10/yr/WLM is about half of the BEIR-80 risk coefficient (averaged
for all ages). In addition, absolute risk coefficients should be weighted by
the length of the follow-up in the study, since for less than life time
follow-up the absolute risk coefficients increase with increasing length of
observation, (BEIR'^),d?) For example, a weighted average for exposures
to less than 500 WLM in Archer's paper yields about 17 cases /10°/yr/WLM.
It is likely that the NCRP estimate is another factor of two lower than it
should be.
IV. ICRP(d) - 45-138/106/WLM (ICRP-32)
The ICRP dosimetric approach is subtle. As ICRP Report 32 points out,
their risk concept assumes a proportional relationship without threshold
between the dose to relevant target tissues and the associated excess
probability for the induction of cancer. ICRP 32 then continues, "On the
basis of this concept the risk - relevant dosimetric quantities for radon
daughters in the lung are the mean dose or dose equivalent to the two target
tissues mentioned above, the basal cell layer in the tracheo-bronchial (TB)
region and the mean dose to the epithelium in the pulmonary (P) region." ICRP
32 then uses dosimetric models to calculate the dose equivalents of interest.
A.2-26
-------
In these, assumptions are made that may or may not be either correct or
relevant. These uncertainties coupled with ICRP assumptions on weighting
factors and quality factors leads to very uncertain conclusions.
However, even if these models are correct, ICRP's use of the mean
dose-equivalent for bronchial tissue reduces the REM/WLM by about a factor of
3 since the dose equivalent in the region of the lung where most cancers
develop (lobar, segmental and subsegmental bronchi) is about 3 times higher
than the mean dose calculated in the models referenced by ICRP 32. Likewise
ICRP split the risk weighting factor for lung cancer between bronchi and
pulmonary lung, so that each has 50% of the risk originally calculated by ICRP
for the lung. This reduces the REM/WLM by a factor of two. Since no radon
daughter-related cancers have ever been observed in the pulmonary lung, it is
unfortunate that 50% of the risk is assigned there, thus reducing their risk
estimate for bronchi cancer by a factor of 2. Correcting for these ICRP
assumptions would increase their risk estimate to about 270-828/10°/WLM.
Adjustments for lack of follow-up in the studies from which ICRP derived its
estimate of 1.2xlO~2 cancers/Sv ICRP 26 would increase the risk still
further.
Dr. Hamilton is in error when he states that the ICRP or NCRP would
argue that the EPA estimate is 6-10 times too high. The ICRP estimates are
not comparable since EPA did not estimate occupational pisk, and age of
exposure and period of expression are different. When ICRP and NCRP estimates
are appropriately adjusted they are not too inconsistent with EPA's estimates.
There is no evidence in Dr. Hamilton's analysis that shows that EPA
estimates are overestimated. It shows rather that different models and
assumptions give different answers. The Agency feels the weight of evidence
supports the EPA and BEIR-80 estimates. Estimates by the ICRP and NCRP are
likely to underestimate the risk whether to miners or to a general population.
The commenter contends that Dr. Hamilton's conclusions are consistent
with those of other experts and then cites NCRP members' conclusions. While
this may be true, Dr. Hamilton's conclusions are not consistent with those of
the experts collecting the data in the studies and analyzing the raw data.
Nor are they consistent with analyses agreeing with EPA's, e.g. Risk Estimates
for Health Effects of Alpha Radiation by Duncan C. Thomas and K.G. McNeill,
Atomic Energy Control Board Report, INFO-0081 and reference (3). The Agency
prefers to rely more on the opinion of primary investigators in developing its
risk coefficients rather than second or third hand estimates from consensus
reports.
Comment 7: EPA's radon risk estimates are based almost entirely on
EPA's study of indoor radon in Florida, not the work of the BEIR committee and
UNSCEAR as stated in the DEIS. EPA's risk model is based on unrealistic
estimates of normal background incidence of cancer in non-smokers and projects
equivalent fatal cancers for equal doses to lung and whole body. (P-9(3).1A)
A.2-27
-------
Response: The cotnmenter is in error in the statement of the basis for
the radon risk estimate. The statement in the DEIS is on page C-6, "The risks
and effects on health from low-level ionizing radiation were reviewed for EPA
by the National Academy of Sciences in reports published in 1972 and in
1980.d8)t(3) We have used these studies and others to estimate the risks
associated with the radiation doses calculated in this report." This was done
and as can be seen in the response to Comment 10, A.2.1.2 and by comparing
references^, (FE1S-I, Volume I), and the DEIS. The Agency has continually
modified its risk estimates as new data becomes available. We have also
considered new reviews of health risk which have been published. This does
not, however, mean that we have necessarily adopted their conclusions. See
the response to Comment 6, A.2.1.1.
The comment on non smokers is apparently related to the commenter's
interpretation of selected data on lung cancer mortality and smoking habits.
The relevance of the discussion to EPA estimates is not immediate. For
example the commenter's estimated risk of death for nonsmokers is 0.6%. Risks
are more likely 1.05% in males and 0.0058% in females. (Calculated using
1966-68 ratio of mortality in smokers and non smokers from J.E. Enstrom, JNCI,
62: 755-760, 1979 times the lifetime risk i.e., probability of dying at birth,
due to respiratory cancer in DHEW Publication No. (HRA) 75-1150, United States
Life Tables by Cause of Death. 1969-71. NCHS, 1975). Effective use of these
data, given the continual rise in lung cancer mortality in non smokers (J.E.
Enstrom, JNCI, 62: 755-760. 1969) and^the likelihood that relative risk may be
significantly higher in non smokers than in smokers (E.P. Radford, pp. 151-163
in Banbury Report 9: Quantification of Occupational Cancer, Cold Spring Harbor
Laboratory, 1981), is not possible now but is likely in the future. However,
since the EPA relative risk model uses age-specific mortality data in a
life-table calculation for smokers and non smokers both male and female, the
lung cancer incidence in non-smokers does not have a large impact on the
overall risk estimate.
The commenter's comparison of fatal cancers for lung and whole body
exposure, based on arbitrary organ and whole body risk weighting factors
derived by ICRP for regulation of occupational exposure, with the EPA radon
daughter related lung cancer estimate is not relevant. Differences in the
basis of each derivation prevent a commensurable comparison. Any such
comparison is strongly dependent on what is assumed as the dose (in rads) per
WLM. We believe this is an unknown parameter even though, as the commenter
points out, many persons assume 1 WLM is equal to 10 rads. We also point out
that 25 years of occupational exposure can not be compared to a lifetime
exposure period to the general population on a one to one basis.
Comment 8; EPA's estimates of radon risk are at the high end of the
range of estimates, and might be on the order of a factor of ten or more
high. (P-9(H1).7, 1-4(3).46, 1-4(3).47, 1-4(3).48, 1-25.15, 1-25.10)
Response: Several commenters have referenced statements by a
consultant to the American Mining Congress, Dr. Leonard Hamilton, whose
analysis will be addressed here and was previously addressed on our response
A.2-28
-------
to 6, A.2.1.2. The commenter states that EPA's estimate of 3% increase in
lung cancer/WLM is not explained and Dr. Hamilton derives an estimate of 0.8%
to 1.8% from BEIR III and calculates an average of 1% (Hamilton p. 19-21A).
The EPA risk estimates for the general public are referenced by a
footnote: "(1) See Indoor Radiation Exposure Due to Radium-226 in Florida
Phosphate Lands (EPA 79a) for greater detail of such an analysis."
Dr. Hamilton's estimate of relative risk derived from BEIR III
considers only the U.S. and Czech uranium miners, relative risks 0.8% and 1.8%
per WLM respectively. We note that BEIR III also included a relative risk
estimate for the Newfoundland Fluorspar miners. If this relative risk of 8.0%
per WLM is included, the average relative risk for the three groups is about
3.5% per WLM. This is about 3 times Dr. Hamilton's estimate of 1% per WLM.
Archer, in the paper quoted by Dr. Hamilton^"' estimated relative risks
ranging from 1.0% to 5.1% per WLM for groups exposed to cumulative WLM ranging
from 21 CWLM to 488 CWLM (p. 354) and concluded (p. 356) for exposure rates of
0 to 0.01WL and up to 3 CWLM; the relative risk could be 3.1% per WLM. For
higher exposure rates, 0.01 to 0.35 WL, 3.1 to 100 CWLM he estimated the
relative risk could be 2.8% per WLM. These assessments were after EPA's and
were independent of ours.
Hewitt in a paper in the same proceedings'") calculated relative
risks of 2% to 2.5% per WLM for his study of Canadian uranium miners. The
most recent unmodified preliminary relative risk estimates for the Canadian
miners are Bancroft, 2, 264 miners, 44.5 CWLM average exposure relative risk
3.2%/WLM, Elliot Lake, 12,294 miners 31.1 CWLM average exposure; relative risk
2%/WLM (J.Muller, e_t al. . Study of Mortality of Ontario Miners Part 1,
Ministry of Labour, Toronto, May, 1983).
These values are similar to EPA's estimate of 3% which was also
documented in the same proceedings'^''. Dr. Hamilton also cites a paper by
Myers, et al. with a figure showing a range of 0 to 1.8% relative risk per
WLM. Myers*20) jn turn states that his Fig. 3 was derived from Table 1 of
Archer, et al. (Archer, 1979). However, the values of relative risk listed by
Archer of 5.1% and 2.9% in Canadian miners; 3%, 2.3% and 2.4% in Czech miners
and 2% in U.S. miners do not seem to be represented in the figure. Perhaps if
the full data set was represented the interpretation might be different.
In an extensive review of the health effects of alpha radiation, the
Canadian Atomic Energy Control Board^ selected a relative risk projection
model and concluded the best estimate of excess relative risk for the radon
exposure data was 2.28%, + 0.35% and that this was unlikely to underestimate
the excess risk at low doses by more than a factor of 1.5. They further
concluded the risks from radon daughters and smoking were intermediate between
multiplicative and additive but on the balance chosen to multiplicative.
Whittemore and McMillan (see page 2-31 for citation) concluded for U.S uranium
miners radiation exposure and cigarette smoking were multiplicative risks.
There does not appear to be any valid reason for EPA to change its risk
estimate for radon daughter exposure. Dr. Hamilton's conclusion that 1%
relative risk per WLM has not been justified. See Comments 6 and 10, A.2.1.2
for supplemental discussion.
A.2-29
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Comment 9: EPA's published estimates of health risk from radon are
excessive and unsupported. (1-6(3).27, I-6(H2).5, 1-24.3, I-4(H2).6, F-3(2).8>
Response: EPA disagrees. See Comments 6, 8 and 10, A.2.1.2; 18, A.2.1.
Comment 10: EPA fails to substantiate its selection of the relative
risk model to estimate the risk of having cancer as a result of exposure to
radon daughter. (1-4(3).45)
Response: EPA disagrees. Adequate support of use of relative risk for
estimating lung cancer is readily available. The absolute risk and relative
risk models were introduced in BEIR I*18) and used in BEIR
As currently defined:
Absolute Risk - "Expression of excess risk due to exposure as the
arithmetic difference between the risk among those exposed and that obtaining
in the absence of exposure."
Relative Risk - "Expression of risk due to exposure as the ratio of the
risk among the exposed to that obtaining in the absence of exposures."
The risk projection models were also defined in reference (3): Absolute
Risk Projection Model "According to this model, if a population was irradiated
at a particular dose either all at once or over some period, expressions of
excess cancer risk in that population would begin at some time after exposure
(the latent period) and continue at a rate in excess of the expected rate for
an additional period, the 'plateau* or expression period, which may exceed the
period of followup. In this model, the absolute risk is defined as the number
of excess cancer cases per unit of population per unit of time and per unit
of radiation dose, and, though it may depend on age at exposure, it does not
otherwise depend on age at observation for risk."
Relative Risk Projection Model - "In the second model adopted in BEIR
I, the so called relative-risk model, the excess cancer for the interval after
the latent period was expressed as a multiple of the natural age-specific
cancer risk for that population. The chief difference between the two models
is that the relative-risk model took account of the differing susceptibility
to cancer related to age at observation for risk."
"If the relative-risk model applies, then the age of the exposed
groups, both at the time of exposure and as they move through life, becomes
very important. There is now considerable evidence in nearly all the adult
human populations studied that persons irradiated at higher ages have in
general a greater excess risk of cancer than those irradiated at lower ages,
or at least they develop cancer sooner. Furthermore, if they are irradiated
at a particular age, the excess risk tends to rise pari passu with the risk of
the population at large. In other words, the relative-risk model with respect
to cancer susceptibility at least as a function of age, evidently applies to
some kinds of cancer that have been observed to result from radiation
exposure."
A. 2-30
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The 1980 BEIR Committee also made some caveats regarding the certainty
of our knowledge on the two models. However, they later commented (p. 137),
"If risks are given in absolute form - i.e., number of cancers induced per
unit of population and per unit of radiation exposure - then a single value
independent of age may be inappropriate." For lung cancer the 1980 BEIR
committee used no single value but a risk coefficient which varied with age.
Since BEIR III provided an extensive analysis of lung cancer induction
due to radon progeny, the projection model they used - age specific absolute
risk was compared to the relative risk model used by EPA. As mentioned in the
DEIS there was very little numerical difference. We have concluded that our
relative-risk model and the BEIR. 1980 age-dependent absolute risk model are
essentially equivalent.
The commenter's consultant, [Dr. Hamilton (17-18)], found only that the
study by Dr. C. Land and J. Norman'^l' supported a relative risk model for
lung cancer. He felt the Smith and Doll paper^2^) involved proportionality
among sites and in general did not support relative risk. However, on page
216 of his sited reference Smith said, "The statement I made was based on our
finding that the risk of a radiation-induced cancer seems to increase with age
at exposure in direct proportion to the expected number of deaths from cancer
that would be suffered by persons first treated at a particular age. This
suggests to us the radiation is interacting with whatever other factors are
inducing cancer." This statement is comparable to the definition of
relative-risk given by BEIR III. Since BEIR III (p. 312-313) reported a
significant increase in lung cancer in the population studied by Smith and
Doll, it is reasonable to consider lung cancer one of the cancers described by
Smith's statement.
Dr. Hamilton cited the Kato and Schull report (H. Kato and W. J.
Schull, Radiation Res., 90: 395-432, 1982) and concluded that an absolute risk
or, if external exposure and radon daughter exposure are equivalent, a lower
relative risk than EPA's should be used. Unfortunately, the dose estimates in
Japan are unreliable and no comparisons should be made until after the
dosimetry review now ongoing is complete. EPA reference was to Kato and
Schull's conclusion (p. 408). "Thus, though in the recent BEIR report two
different models (relative risk and absolute risk models) have been used for
projection of risk beyond the period of observation, the present data support
the relative risk model projection more strongly. The excess deaths from
cancers other than leukemia increase with age at death for the same age cohort
in proportion to the age-specific death rate from cancers in the population of
all Japan and do not show a constant excess value by age at death for the same
age cohort."
The report by Shi-quan and Xiao--ou(23) shows that even at ages less
than 10, exposure to radon does not lead to lung cancer before the age at
which "spontaneous" lung cancer develops. This pattern as noted in the DEIS
is consistent only with relative risk and age specific absolute risk lung
cancer induction models. It is not consistent with simple absolute risk and
thus it does lend additional support to EPA's use of the relative risk model.
A.2-31
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Most recently Prentice, et al. (R.L. Prentice, et al.. JNCI,
70:611-622, 1983) and Whittemore and McMillan (A.S. Whittemore and A.
McMillan, Technical Report No.68, prepared for SIMS, Stanford University,
California, 1983) have used the relative risk projection model on estimating
radon related lung cancer hazards as have Drs. Thomas and McNeill^ in a
detailed analysis of radon-daughter related lung cancer.
Comment 11: EPA's use of the linear non-threshold model for radium is
contrary to its stated policy of using "the best available detailed scientific
knowledge in estimating health impact." Both BEIR III and UNSCEAR have
concluded that the dose-response for radium includes a dose-squared term. If
a radium standard is to be set, there is no reason to set it any lower than 30
pCi/liter. (1-6(3).65, 1-6(3).6)
Response: Although a dose squared term is included in the BEIR III
risk coefficient for bone cancer, it predominates over the linear term only
at doses exceeding 1000 rad, compare the coefficients in Table A-27 in Na80.
For the range of doses and dose rates of interest here, i.e., much smaller
than one rad, the dose squared term is negligible.
Comment 12: EPA used a 70-year effective exposure time, without
subtracting the latency period, resulting in an overestimate by a factor of
between 1.2 and 1.6. (1-25.11)
Response: EPA uses a life table approach to calculate stochastic
risk. The latency period, i.e., the minimum induction period, and the risk
plateaus, are an integral part of these calculations. Latency is accounted
for on an annual basis for each successive year of life. The methodology is
described in Appendix C and plateau values are given in Table C-l.
Comment 13: EPA based its projected health risks on a person living in
the same house for 70 years, resulting in a factor of five overestimate in
risk. (1-25.13)
Response: See the response to Comment 18, Section A.2.1.
Comment 14; EPA's risk model for radon decay product levels in houses
overestimates the degree of radon daughter equilibrium. This results in
estimates that are excessive and belied by the actual data, including actual
EPA data. (1-6(3).34, F-3(2).10, P-9(3).ll, 1-24.3, 1-25.12, 1-4(3).44,
1-4(3).29)
Response: Several commenters have questioned the use of an equilibrium
fraction of 70 percent for radon daughters in structures. Observations of
this fraction are highly valuable. The degree of equilibrium depends on many
A.2-32
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variables such as ventilation and plateout but is also strongly dependent on
the degree of equilibrium which exists in the incoming air. For example, a
calculation using a ventilation rate of 1 h~* and an effective plate out
rate of 1 h~^ yields an equilibrium fraction of 0.36 for an initial
equilibrium fraction of 0 and 0.68 for an initial equilibrium fraction of
1.0. Since the degree of equilibrium in the air entering structures within
areas adjacent to tailings piles would be expected to be low under normal
meteorological conditions, EPA has reduced its estimate of the equilibrium
fraction by one half for the calculation of risk to maximum exposed
individuals. Although some commenters have suggested lower values, these
appear to be based primarily on studies of structures in which the radon
entered only by diffusion so that the initial equilibrium fraction was zero.
Comment 15: On page 5-4 of the DEIS, it is stated the assumed
equilibrium fraction for indoor radon and its decay products is 70 percent.
Our more extensive measurements indicate that the proposed number is about 30
percent high; the more appropriate range is 50 to 55 percent. (1-16(2).7,
1-29.7)
Response: See the response to Comment 14, A.2.1.2.
Comment 16: Cigarette smoking is the most important factor in
determining whether a health effect will result from exposure to radon. EPA's
projections incorrectly assume that cigarette smoking will persist over the
next several thousand years. (1-15.4, 1-15.3)
Response: We agree, however, there are many possible confounding
factors, e.g., medical advances, smoking habits, etc., which cannot be
accurately projected, particularly over long time spans. In general, attempts
to extrapolate even such basic health data as birth and death rates has a
greater impact on the magnitude of risk estimates than the cause under
investigation. One reason for EPA's use of a "current experience" life table
is to avoid making such projections. Although certain unspecifiable
confounding factors may be neglected, the stationary population so defined
provides meaningful estimates of health effects on a present value basis.
Comment 17. EPA may have overestimated the risk of lung cancer per WLM
by a factor of eight. (1-25.10)
Response: EPA disagrees. The commenter cites a radon-daughter lung
cancer risk coefficient of 1.2xlO~4 cases/WLM used by Evans, et al. ^^
and Bair, et al.^4) Actually, Bair, et al. used the Evans, et al. ; but
they stated the upper estimates may be 2 to 3 times different.
There is no way to determine how the Evans ejb al. estimate was made.
The paper goes from selected annual risk coefficients in some miners to a
lifetime estimate without indicating latent periods, period of expression,
etc. Apparently they assumed a 15 year expression period even though the
A.2-33
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documented risk is over twice this long. These problems, in addition to other
questionable assumptions, cast doubt on the validity of this estimate in
comparison to more fully documented estimates for which there is an adequate
rationale.
Comment 18: EPA's risk estimates discount advances in medical science;
this is confounding. (1-15.5)
Response: See the response to Comment 16.
!Additional Comments'.
Comment 19: EPA should give greater consideration to the BEIR III
report in making quantitative estimates of radiation risk. (F-3(2).2)
Response: As shown by the risk estimates in Chapter 6 of the DEIS,
almost all of the estimated risk due to uranium milling operations excess is
lung cancer due to inhalation of radon progeny. Although EPA has used its own
relative risk model to estimate this risk, we have compared our results for
lifetime exposure to lifetable calculations using the age dependent absolute
risk coefficient for radon given in the 1980 BEIR report.^) The estimated
risks are nearly identical, 860 cases per 10° person WLM vis a vis 850 cases
per 10^ person WLM.'^' The difference in these two risk estimates is much
smaller than the uncertainty in either, see the response to Comment 2, A.2.1.
Comment 20: The underlying bases for the calculations of health
effects are not fully addressed in the DEIS. (P-33.3)
Response: The EPA risk assessment procedure is complex and
presentation of the complete methodology in each standard or regulation would
be overly prolix. We agree that some persons may require more complete
technical information than provided in the DEIS. The material cited in the
references to Chapters 5 and 6 of the DEIS provide more complete descriptions
of the methodology underlying the analysis. The references cited, if not
available through EPA or the sponsoring agency, may be obtained through the
National Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, 5285
Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161. See the response to Comment 10,
A.2.1.
A. 2-34
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Comment 21: We urge you to take into account the health effects that
may arise from mining in Virginia, an area of higher population density and
net precipitation. (P-51.1, P-52.1, P-53.1, P-54.1, P-55.1, S-7.1, P-56.1,
P-57.1, P-58.1, P-59.1, P-61.2, P-63.1, P-64.1)
Response: There is currently no milling of uranium ore in Virginia.
However, radon emissions would be lower from any tailings that may be produced
in Virginia than from the tailings modeled in the FEIS, because Virginia is an
area of net precipitation and wet tailings emit one third or less radon than
do dry tailings.
A.2-35
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A.2.2 Nonradiological Health Risk Assessment
Comment 1: EPA does not provide risk estimates for potential exposure
to nonradioactive toxic compounds and heavy metals associated with uranium
deposits, such as cyanide, arsenic, cadmium, lead, mercury, selenium and
molybdenum. (P-KH2-2) .4, P-l(2).22)
Response: Estimates of levels that might produce chronic toxicity were
given in the DEIS pages C-21 to C-23, and readers were referred to the final
EIS for inactive sites (FEIS-I, Volumes I and II) for a more extensive
discussion of the question.
As pointed out in the DEIS pages 5-3, 5-17, and 6-12, there is
insufficient information for risk modeling for toxic materials. The problem
is quite site-specific.
Comment 2: Would residues of solvents used in the extraction process
be expected to be present in mill tailings and, if so, are such residues
leachable? What hazards do they pose to the integrity of a disposal system
and to human health? (S-5.6)
Response: The last two paragraphs on page C-21 of the DEIS summarize
what little was known about these organic chemicals. Basically, they are
valuable, so they are recycled and only fugitive emissions are expected.
In any case, application of existing SWDA regulations at 40 CFR 264.92
(and related section) as proposed in the standards would require
identification and control of those hazardous chemicals in Appendix VIII
of Part 261 of the SWDA regulations. This should control currently recognized
hazardous solvents, if present. This was discussed on p. 19594 of the
Supplementary Information. (Fed. Reg., 48: 19584-19603, April 29, 1983)
A.2-36
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REFERENCES
(1) Sullivan R.E., et al. , "Estimates of Health Risk from Exposure to
Radioactive Pollutants," ORNL/TM-7745, Oak Ridge National Laboratory,
Oak Ridge, Tennessee, 1981.
(2) Thomas D.C. and McNeill K.G., "Risk Estimates for the Health Effects of
Alpha Radiation," Prepared for the Atomic Energy Control Board, Ottawa,
Canada, INFO-0081, September 1982.
(3) National Academy of Sciences, "The Effects on Population of Exposure to
Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation," Committee on the Biological Effects
of Ionizing Radiations, NAS, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.,
1980.
(4) Radiation Policy Council, "Report of the Task Force on Radon in
Structures," RPC-80-002, U.S. Radiation Policy Council, Washington,
1980.
(5) United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation,
"Source and Effects of Ionizing Radiation, Report to the General
Assembly," U.N. Publication E.77.IX.1, United Nations, N.Y., 1977.
(6) United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation,
"Ionizing Radiation: Sources and Biological Effects, 1982 Report to
the General Assembly," U.N. Publication E.82.IX.8, United Nations, New
York, 1982.
(7) Environmental Protection Agency, "Indoor Radiation Exposure Due to
Radium-226 in Florida Phosphate Lands," EOA 520/4-78-013, Office of
Radiation Programs, USEPA, Washington, D.C., July 1979.
(8) Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Final Generic Environmental Impact
Statement on Uranium Milling," NUREG-0706, Office of Nuclear Material
Safety and Safeguards, USNRC, Washington, D.C., 1980.
(9) International Commission on Radiological Protection "ICRP Publication
26," Pergamon Press, N.Y., 1977.
(10) Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Radon Releases from Uranium Mining and
Milling and Their Calculated Health Effects," NUREG-0757, Office of
Nuclear Material and Safety and Safeguards, USNRC, Washington, D.C.,
1981.
(11) Evans R.D., et al., "Estimate of Risk from Environmental Exposure to
Radon-222 and Its Decay Products," Nature, 2_90:98-100, 1981.
(12) Hewitt D., "Biostatistical Studies on Canadian Uranium Miners,"
pp. 264-287 in Conference Workshop on Lung Cancer Epidemiology and
Industrial Applications of Sputum Cytology. Colorado School of Mines
Press, Golden, 1979.
A.2-37
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(13) Chovil A., "The Epidemiology of Primary Lung Cancer in Uranium
Miners in Ontario." J. Occup. Med., 23.:417-421, 1981.
(14) Ministry of the Attorney General, "Report of the Royal Commission
on the Health and Safety of Workers in Mines." Province of
Ontario, Toronto, 1976.
(15) International Commission on Radiological Protection, "ICRP
Publication 32, Limits for Inhalation of Radon Daughters by
Workers." Pergamon Press, N.Y., 1981.
(16) Archer V.E., "Factors in Exposure Response Relationships of Radon
Daughter Injury," pp. 324-367 in Confergnce/Workshop on Lung Cancer
Epidemiology and Industrial Applications of Sputum Cytology.
Colorado, School of Mines Press, Golden, 1979.
(17) Wakabayashi, T., et al., Studies of the Morality of A-Bomb
Survivors, Report 7, Part III. Incidence of Cancer in 1959-1978,
Based on the Tumor Registry, Nagasaki. Radiation Research;
93_: 112-146, 1983.
(18) National Academy of Sciences, The Effects on Populations of
Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation, Report of the
Advisory Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation,
PB-239 735/AS, NAS, National Technical Information Service,
Springfield, Virginia, 1972.
(19) Ellett W.H. and Nelson N.S., "Environmental Hazards from Radon
Daughter Radiation," pp. 114-148 in Conference/Workshop on Lung
Cancer Epidemiology and Industrial Applications of Sputum
Cytology. Colorado School of Mines Press, Golden, 1979.
(20) Meyers O.K. and Stewart C.G., "Some Health Aspects of Canadian
Uranium Mining," pp. 368-397 in: Conference/Workshop on Lung
Cancer Epidemiology and Industrial Applications of Sputum Cytology.
Colorado School of Mines Press, Golden, 1979.
(21) Land C.E. and Norman J.E., "Latent Periods of Radiogenic Cancers
Occurring Among Japanese A-Bomb Survivors," pp. 29-47 in: Late
Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation, Volume I, IAEA, Vienna,
1978.
(22) Smith P.G. and Doll R., "Age- and Time-Dependent Changes in the
Rates of Radiation-Induced Cancers in Patients with Ankylosing
Spondylitis Following a Single Course of X-ray Treatment,"
pp. 205-218 in Late Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation,
Volume I, IAEA, Vienna, 1978.
(23) Shi-quan S. and Xiao-on Y., "Induction-Latent Period and Temporal
Aspects of Miner Lung Cancer," unpublished report (in English),
1982.
A.2-38
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(24) Bair W.J., et al., Estimates of Potential Health Effects Resulting
from Radioactive Materials Contained in Inactive Uranium Mill
Tailings Piles, pp. 207-219 in: Management of Commingled Uranium
Mill Tailings. H.A.S.C. No. 97-55, House Armed Services Committee
Hearings, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1982.
(25) Bloomster C.H., et al., "Estimated Population Near Uranium Tailings
Ponds," Report by Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory, to be
published, June 1983.
A.2-39
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A.3.0 RATIONALE FOR STANDARDS
A.3.1 Basis for Standards
I The Standards Are Inadequately Supported!
Comment 1; Analysis of the information contained in the RIA reveals
that EPA: (1) used faulty reasoning, out-of-date industry data, and unlikely
assumptions about the likely effects of its proposed standards; (2) failed to
justify the stringency of the proposed standards; (3) neglected to give
adequate consideration to less costly alternatives and the benefits that would
result therefrom; (4) failed to satisfy its statutory obligation to propose
standards with a reasonable cost/benefit relationship; and (5) acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in proposing these standards. (1-4(3).107)
Response; EPA has responded elsewhere in this document, particularly
in Section A.3.3, to specific assertions and recommendations the commenter
supplied in support of the views summarized above.
Comment 2; The bases for EPA's proposed standards are in most cases
impossible to discern. Information, including the technical data apparently
relied upon, is presented in a confusing manner and the Agency discloses no
logical relationship between its assumptions, findings, and conclusions.
These deficiencies raise substantial questions as to whether EPA has permitted
informed, meaningful comment in this rulemaking proceeding or provided an
adequate record for later judicial review. (1-4(3).6)
Response: EPA responds elsewhere throughout this document to the
specific assertions and recommendations the commenter supplied in support of
the views summarized above. We agree with the commenter that EPA should
engage in and provide an adequate record of reasoned rulemaking. EPA believes
it has done so.
Comment 3: Inadequate justification exists for EPA to promulgate these
standards as proposed. EPA arbitrarily establishes a standard and retrofits
both health effects and economic arguments to justify the standard. Any
responsible scientific arguments contrary to EPA's standards development are
summarily categorized as unfounded, incorrect, or not in the best interests of
public health and safety and are ignored. Therefore, the proposed standards
should be remanded for reconsideration and redevelopment. (1-1(2).4, 1-1(2).1)
Response: EPA disagrees. The standards are supported by lengthy and
detailed analysis, presented in the EIS and RIA. Scientific arguments have
been analyzed and critically evaluated, not ignored (see, for example,
Section 2, above).
A.3-1
-------
Comment 4; The proposed regulations are not based on supportable
scientific data and are arbitrary. (1-5(2).4, 1-20.1)
Response: In Section 2, above, and elsewhere as appropriate we have
responded in detail to specific comments on scientific data and analyses we
have used in this rulemaking. We believe our use of available data is
consistent with the current state of scientific knowledge and is adequate to
support the rulemaking.
Comment 5: Even the most advanced technology used in uranium mining
and milling has not come close to protecting the health of the people and the
environment. (P-62.1)
Response; EPA believes that technology is available to satisfy these
standards, which will adequately protect public and the environment.
IThe Standards Should Be Based on Existing Regulations and Guidance!
Comment 6: EPA's proposed standards are not in accordance with the
generally accepted radiation protection principles of the NCRP and ICRP.
EPA's 20 pCi/m^-sec radon standard was proposed without any discussion of
the ICRP 500 mrem recommended standard or the NCRP 500/170 mrem recommended
standards and without any showing as to the need to reduce these
recommendations. (1-4(3).17, 1-4(3).16)
Response: The NCRP and ICRP "recommended standards" are intended as
general upper limits for protecting public health without regard to the
characteristics of any specific radiation producing activity. It is also a
generally accepted radiation protection principle that doses from individual
activities be kept as low as is reasonably achievable. Congress directed EPA
to set specific standards for tailings. EPA has shown, in the EIS and RIA,
that the 20 pCi/m2-sec limit represents the lowest reasonably achievable
long-term emission rate from tailings, which will result in the lowest
reasonably achievable health impact on the general public.
Comment 7: EPA should not adopt standards which are inconsistent with
the well-founded and workable regulations of the State of New Mexico. (P-28.7)
Response; EPA's analysis in the EIS and RIA shows that standards that
are more stringent in some respects than those adopted by New Mexico are
reasonable to apply. Furthermore, UMTRCA requires EPA's standards for
nonradioactive materials in tailings to be consistent with standards EPA
established for hazardous wastes under the Solid Waste Disposal Act, not with
New Mexico's standards.
A.3-2
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Comment 8: EPA should adopt a. radon emission standard under the
procedural and substantive mandates of the Clean Air Act. The proposed radon
rule is inconsistent with the CAA, in at least four respects
a. The Agency could not lawfully rely on cost consideration as a
basis for setting the standard.
b. The CAA requires a standard more protective of the public health.
c. The standard would have to be a performance standard and not
simply a design standard.
d. Periodic post-closure measurements of actual emissions would be
required to ensure long-term compliance with the standard.
(P-45.11)
Response:
a. EPA considered cost, as UMTRCA, as amended, requires, but it did
not rely exclusively on cost as a basis for setting the standard.
b. The Agency believes the disposal standard established in this rule
provides protection of public health comparable to that which
might be established under the Clean Air Act, for the reasons
stated in the Preamble.
c. We believe a performance standard that applies over 1000 years is
not feasible.
d. We believe it is not feasible to require post-disposal monitoring
for 1000 years, the period over which the emission standard
applies. Furthermore, it may take many years for covered tailings
to reach a stable long-term condition, particularly with respect
to moisture content. Measurement during that transition period
would not reliably indicate long term emission rates. We believe
thorough pre-disposal analysis that takes adequate account of
uncertainties and careful installation of the disposal system are
the most reliable and the only practical way to provide reasonable
assurance of long-term emission rates.
Comment 9; The 15 mrem referenced in these rules is inconsistent with
the 10 mrem proposed limit in the proposed Air Emission rule. (S-3(H2).3)
Response: The commenter appears to be referring to the 25 mrem (not
"15 mrem") standard (40 CFR 190) for uranium fuel cycle facilities that is
referred to in Section 192.32(a) of this rule for tailings, and contrasts it
with a proposed 10 mrem standard under the Clean Air Act for certain
NRC-licensed and DOE-operated facilities. The reference to 40 CFR 190 merely
reaffirms that it still applies under this new rulemaking. The 10 mrem
A.3-3
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standard is a proposal for diverse facilities, most of which are very
different from uranium mills. We understand that there is a potential for
confusion whenever several different standards are issued in similar forms.
Because they apply to different kinds of operations, however, being
numerically different is not the same as being inconsistent.
!The Standard Should Be Based on Comparison with Other Risks!
Comment 10: One of the inherent problems in judging the significance
of a health risk - in this case a mortality risk - is the absence of agreement
on the definition of "significant." We think that the key to evaluating the
significance of risks in this context is to avoid judging them in a vacuum.
In the present proposal, EPA has evaluated the risks posed by several
alternative disposal standards against each other, but not against the
considerable array of other risks associated with activities of contemporary
life. EPA has failed to demonstrate the significance of the radiation risks
from milling because it has not performed a comparative risk assessment. Had
EPA provided such a comparison the risk to the general population would be
seen as vanishingly small. (1-10(2).4, 1-6(3).29, 1-6(4).7)
Response; Several commenters argued that EPA has not demonstrated that
the risks associated with radon emissions from tailings are significant, and
observed that much of the health impact attributed to tailings accrues to very
large numbers of people at very low levels of individual risk. They suggested
that the proper test of significance is to compare such risks with common
hazards, such as the risk from the natural background radiation. For example,
they would compare the 6 lung cancers per year that EPA estimates (see FEIS)
could result from uncontrolled tailings piles after the year 2000 with: the
21,000 such cancers a commenter estimated as caused annually by background
radiation; deaths from motor vehicle accidents (50,000 per year) and home
accidents (25,000); tornadoes (130); etc. Based on such comparisons, these
commenters concluded that the risks from radon emitted from tailings are not
significant, and that EPA's standard should not limit such emissions.
EPA believes these comparisons are misdirected and do not address a
central purpose of the legislation that requires this rulemaking, which is to
"...make every reasonable effort to...prevent or minimize radon diffusion into
the environment... from...tailings." EPA recognizes that radiation background
and other common hazards cause far greater total annual harm than anyone would
reasonably estimate might occur from uncontrolled radon emissions from
tailings. However, these other risks are not the subject of this rulemaking.
Comparisons of the type suggested may be useful for setting priorities for
efforts to reduce the variety of hazards to public health (to the extent that
they are avoidable), but they are not useful for deciding the appropriate
level of control for a specific source of hazard. That decision must be based
upon the specifics peculiar to the hazard under consideration. The existence
of other hazards does not, absent Congressional direction, justify EPA's
delaying these standards until all other controllable hazards are addressed,
or justify EPA's ignoring Congress* will that standards be set.
A.3-4
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The fact that the health impact of tailings is in large part
attributable to small radiation doses delivered to large numbers of people
over long periods of time was recognized when UMTRCA was enacted. The then
Chairman of the NRC testified as follows: "The health effects of this radon
production are tiny as applied to any one generation, but the sum of these
exposures can be made large by counting far into the future, large enough in
fact to be the dominant radiation exposure from the nuclear fuel cycle.
Whether it is meaningful to attach signficance to raidation exposures
thousands of years in the future, or conversely, whether it is justifiable to
ignore them, are questions without easy answers. The most satisfactory
approach is to require every reasonable effort to dispose of tailings in a way
that minimizes radon diffusion into the atmosphere." (H.R. Rep. No. 1480,
95th Cong., 2nd Sess., Pt. II, p.25.) We have concluded that maximum
individual lifetime risk (estimated as 2 in 100) and the long-term cumulative
impact on populations (potentially many tens of thousands of deaths over the
long term) due to radon emissions from tailings are clearly signficant enough
to justify controls. As discussed in the FEIS, RIA, and Preamble, our
analysis shows that tailings can, at a reasonable cost, be disposed of in a
manner that provides, among other benefits, greatly reduced radon emissions.
Comment 11: Risk of radon from tailings is not placed in context with
other hazards, other sources of radon, or other natural background radiation.
(F-3(2).3, 1-4(3).29, 1-6(3).75, 1-6(4).7, P-9(H1).8, 1-15(2).!)
Response: We have noted (Preamble) that EPA estimates six lung cancers
per year could result from uncontrolled tailings piles after the year 2000 and
that commenters established: 21,000 such cancers might be caused annually by
background radiation; 50,000 deaths occur annually from automobile and 25,000
from home accidents; 130 annual deaths occur from tornadoes, etc. As we
indicate in the response to Comment 10, above, however, we don't believe such
comparisons are relevant to this rulemaking.
Comment 12: Congress specifically provided in amendments to the Mill
Tailings Act that EPA and NRC must consider the significance of risk posed by
mill tailings. EPA should perform a comparative risk assessment, placing the
risks it has identified in context with risks one faces everyday. Comparison
of the risks EPA has identified from radon from uranium mill tailing with
natural background radiation, and risks people face in every day life shows
that the risks from tailings radon are insignificant. (1-4(3).24, 1-4(3).23,
1-6(3).29, 1-6(4).7, I-6(H2).28)
Response: EPA followed all legislative directives in establishing
these standards. Congress directed EPA to consider "all relevant factors,"
which we have done.
A.3-5
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!The Radon Standards Should Be Based on Comparison with Background Radiation!
Comment 13: EPA has not demonstrated that radon from tailings
constitutes a significant risk because it has not evaluated the significance
of the risks identified, has not provided any criteria for evaluating risk, or
presented any evidence that it has conformed with any accepted risk assessment
procedures. We suggest EPA provide a comparison of the risk it has identified
with risks from natural background as this is a widely accepted method.
(1-4(3).22)
Response; See the response to Comment 10, A.3.1. EPA has estimated
maximum individual lifetime risk from uncontrolled tailings as 2 in 100 and
the long-term cumulative impact on populations as potentially tens of
thousands of deaths. We believe it is self evident that these are significant
risks that warrant consideration of appropriate controls.
Comment 14; EPA should consider background radiation levels and their
variability in assessing exposure due to tailings radon. (F-3(2).4,
I-6(H2).4, 1-24.4)
Response; Background levels and their variability must be accounted
for when interpreting measurements to assess how much a specific source is
contributing to the measured values. When tailings are used in and around
buildings, the resulting indoor radon levels are often many times the values
one would expect from "background." When measured values are not that high,
it is indeed difficult to estimate the contribution of the tailings to the
total. Similarly, when outdoor radon levels are measured farther than
one-fourth to one-half mile or so from tailings piles the results are often
within the normal range of variation of background. Thus, in assessing risk
from radon emitted by tailings piles, we use well-established atmospheric
transport models. However, risk assessment is only one aspect of standards.
The reasonableness of risk reduction is another. If we find it technically
practical to reduce risk for costs that are in reasonable relation to the
benefits, it is immaterial whether the risks from that source for some
population are measurably discernible relative to the background. See the
response to Comment 16, A.3.1.
Comment 15: In comparison to the risks associated with exposure to
natural background, and given the remoteness of many sites, control of most of
the radon exposure due to tailings would generally present a negligible risk
to the U.S. population. (I-4(H2).7)
Response: See the response to Comment 13, A.3.1.
If all sites were locally unpopulated and the cumulative effect of exposure on
large, distant populations were very small, then the radon exposure would be
negligible. The facts are otherwise, however. People do live near tailings
and more may live there in the future. The cumulative long-term effects of
exposures to radon from tailings may be tens of thousands of deaths.
A.3-6
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Comment 16: EPA's attempt to establish radiation protection standards
within the variations of natural background is contrary to long-standing
radiation protection principles. (1-4(3).19)
Response: The "long-standing" principles the commenter mentioned are
the general upper-limit of dose allowed to a member of the public (500 mrem/yr)
and the obligation to keep actual radiation exposures as far below this upper
limit as is reasonably achievable. We fail to understand why it is
inconsistent with these principles to set standards for a specific category of
activities that will keep exposures from that category as low as is reasonable
to achieve. Indeed, nuclear fuel cycle facilities in the U.S. and Europe have
for years operated under categorical limits that are small fractions of 500
mrem/yr.
IThe Standards Should Be Based on Reasonable Control of Significant Risks!
Comment 17: EPA's proposed standards are faulty since they were
developed under the false premise that Congress (through UMTRCA) directed EPA
to minimize or eliminate radon emanations from tailings piles regardless of
risk or cost. In fact, UMTRCA requires both EPA and NRC to identify
significant environmental hazards (as determined by comparative risk
assessment) and to take reasonable measures to control them. (1-6(3).1,
1-6(3).14, I-6(H2).28, 1-4(3).3, I-4(H2).2)
Response: UMTRCA clearly required EPA to take reasonable measures to
minimize or eliminate radon emissions, and to consider cost and risk in doing
so. EPA has complied with UMTRCA. We have not found, however, that UMTRCA
requires EPA to determine significant risks by comparative risk analysis.
Comment 18: SPA's failure to provide a supportable rationale for a
conclusion that the aspects of tailings management that it seeks to regulate
pose a significant risk, and its neglect of cost/benefits leads it to propose
controls that are not reasonably required by the abstract risks EPA has
identified. This is unlawful. (1-6(3).15, 1-6(3).51, 1-6(4).7, 1-30.1)
Response: Regarding "significant risk," see the Preamble and the
response to Comment 17, above. Regarding "cost/benefit," EPA has evaluated
costs and benefits, as described in the Preamble, RIA, and FEIS. Further,
determining that a risk is significant enough that regulation is warranted is
not necessarily the same as determining that the hazard has in fact been
realized in actual harm, that the risk compares unfavorably with risks
associated with background levels, workplace hazards, natural events, etc., or
determining that whatever risks to health exist may be discounted - and
regulation withheld - based on expectations which, if realized, would limit
the actual occurrence of the anticipated hazard. Whether or not such bases of
evaluation of risk are reasonable is not the issue. The issue is whether
public health and environmental protection may also be based on a rational
expectation of nonnegligible harm. Nothing in the relevant statute suggests
A.3-7
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that Congress intended EPA to abandon that traditional regulatory approach to
protecting health and environment or provides EPA with any basis for adopting
another basis for evaluating "significance" of risks. To the contrary,
Congress indicated its "displeasure" with EPA's delay to set standards, as to
which Congress emphasized that protection considerations must be "paramount."
Such expressions of intent are not consistent with a Congressional
intention that EPA defer - on some basis or other - regulation of this
component of manmade and other risks comprising our (controllable and
uncontrollable) risk environment. Nor does the fact that deaths from other
causes statistically outnumber deaths attributable to radon (epidemiologically
speaking) diminish the significance of the latter. Suggestions that societal
concern to address these risks- is misguided should therefore be addressed to
Congress, not the EPA.
Comment 19: EPA's active site standards must be based on a finding of
significant risk to public health and safety. Court decisions that support
the significant risk doctrine include:
a. Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum
Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (Benzene)
b. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft v. Secretary of Labor, 649 F.2d 96, 104
(D.C. Cir. 1981)
c. Ethyl Corporation v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied. 426
U.S. 941 (1976)
(1-4(3).4)
Response: Comments arguing that decisional law generally requires a
threshold finding that a risk is significant misconstrued the cases cited and
seem selectively to limit methods for establishing significance to comparative
evaluations. While tending to criticise evaluations of risk which cumulated
nationwide, intergenerational and/or lifetime exposures, such commenters
pointed to large-scale national risks not addressed by Congress in UMTRCA as a
basis for minimizing the level of protection afforded by the standard.
In Industrial Union Dept. AFL-CIO v. API, 448 U.S. 607 (1980)
("Benzene Case") the court held that OSHA must make a "threshold finding that
a place of employment is unsafe in the sense that the significant risks are
present and can be eliminated or lessened by a change in practices" at 642.
The Benzene decision is clearly the product of the terms of the OSHA statute
and, in the absence of comparable provisions in UMTRCA, is not directly
relevant to UMTRCA standards. The Benzene court relied heavily, for instance,
on the terms of Section 3(8) empowering OHSA to promulgate standards
"reasonably necessary and appropriate to provide safe places of employment,"
id. Pratt and Whitney Aircraft v. Secretary of Labor. 649 F. 96, 104 (D.C Civ.
1981) follows the Benzene case in interpreting the requirements of OSHA.
Independently, Ethyl Corp. v. EPA 541, F. 492 (DC Civ. 1976) cert.den. 426
A. 3-8
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U.S. 941 (1976) interprets a Clean Air Act standard ("will endanger") as
requiring not that actual harm be demonstrated but only that EPA establish a
"significant risk of harm."
Even if the Benzene or Ethyl decisions might be generalized to all
health regulation or even if a finding of significant risk were a necessary,
if implied, predicate to such regulation as a matter of administrative law,
EPA has found that risk sufficient to warrant regulatory concern exists. It
is true, but irrelevant, that it has not made such a finding in terms of
comparison to nonstatutory risks. EPA's finding is instead properly based on
protection considerations of the sort identified in the statute. It has
found, for instance, that risk of radon exposure from tailings piles to
populations and individuals is unacceptably high, that risk of contamination
of groundwater to levels exceeding appropriate standards is high, that the
possibility of such risks to continue is significant, and that methods are
probably available to reduce such risks. Comments that these risks are
overstated and negligible are addressed elsewhere.
Commenters argued that UMTRCA requires EPA to evaluate significance of
risk when selecting the standard as well so that the increments of risk
reduction achieved are themselves "significant"; see, e.g., Docket item
IV-D-87, p.7. No statutory authority for this comment is provided. The
comment is based instead on the assertion that "this will assure" EPA
compliance with its responsibility to regulate only significant risk. The
comment assumes, however, that the Significance of a risk is to be determined
exclusively by the "burdensomeness" of the control measure rather than by the
degree of hazard to health or environment which remains after control. The
basis for such an assumption is far from clear.
Comment 20: We believe that tailings should be stabilized and
effectively controlled and that they should not be allowed to erode or
disperse, to be misused, or to contaminate groundwater. After the development
of appropriate stabilization criteria, EPA should determine whether any
additional isolation might be justified for the reduction of individual or
collective radiation doses. (P-9(3).9, P-9(Hl).ll)
Response: EPA discussed at length in the Preamble why a specific
requirement to reduce radon emission is needed and justified. Briefly, it
assures that individual risk will be held to reasonable levels and that
cumulative health effects from radon emissions will be minimized as much as is
practical in view of technical uncertainties associated with an undemonstrated
technology. Because we are not authorized to specify detailed disposal
techniques, stabilization criteria alone would not assure the same degree of
radon emission reduction.
Comment 21: EPA is obligated to accept the best available scientific
opinion that has been offered on the subject of risk assessment. We feel the
most authoritative opinion belongs to that of the NCRP, and the most
comprehensive scientific evidence was presented by the American Mining
Congress. We urge the EPA to embody the recommendations and proposals of NCRP
and AMC into its regulations. (1-5(2).3)
A.3-9
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Response: EPA believes it is obligated to fully consider all
scientific work that is relevant to its standards. This is clearly necessary
when "authoritative opinions" do not coincide, as is the case for estimating
risks associated with radon from tailings. In Section 2 we have responded in
detail to comments by NCRP, AMC, and others on scientific aspects of our
rulemaking. Our conclusions are generally in better-agreement with
recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences and the results of a
recent comprehensive Canadian study than with the recommendations of NCRP and
AMC.
!Inappropriate Bases for the Standards!
Comment 22: The scientific community has repeatedly warned against
using the linear nonthreshold theory (and other risk assessment procedures) as
a substitute for judgment. Instead of using risk estimates as an aid to
reasoned decisionmaking, EPA apparently treats them as actual risks and then
states without analysis that they are significant. (1-4(3).20)
Response: The citation the commented1) provides does not
necessarily reflect current scientific thinking. In 1977, the ICRP concluded,
"one such basic assumption underlying the Commission's recommendations is
that, regarding stochastic effects, there is, within the range of exposure
conditions usually encountered in radiation work, a linear relationship
without threshold between dose and the probability of an effect."(2) They
further concluded, "These risk factors are intended to be realistic estimates
of the effects of irradiations at low annual dose-equivalents (up to the
Commission's recommended dose-equivalent limits). ICRP, thus, recommends
linear nonthreshold risk coefficients, similar to EPA's, for annual exposures
of less than 5 rem.
The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic
Radiation States: "For another class of effects there seems to be no evidence
of a threshold dose and no relationship between dose and clinical severity,
such as cancer induction. These effects have been called 'stochastic' by the
ICRP [12]. At the present state of knowledge a reasonable presumption is that
increased exposure to radiation carries an increased probability of subsequent
'stochastic' health effects. Therefore, for an individual, the level of
exposure can give an indication of the presumed probability of occurrence of a
stochastic health effect. Such indication may be found by consulting the
appropriate dose-response relationship forthe health effect being
considered."^)
It would appear from the contemporary scientific literature that the
approach used by EPA is not only reasonable but realistic. Although it is
recognized that for low LET radiations, e.g., x-rays, the linear nonthreshold
model may give an upper limit of risk(2, 4) the linear nonthreshold model
may lead to underestimates of risk for high-LET radiation.^) It certainly
is not very conservative for high LET radiation.
A.3-10
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The comment does not appear to represent the views of the entire
scientific community. As we noted, for example, the 8EIR III report of the
National Academy of Sciences cautioned that the linear hypothesis for high LET
radiations (such as radon decay products) may underestimate the risk. EPA
believes its risk estimates are realistic and consistent with the weight of
scientific evidence.
Comment 23: EPA's generally applicable radiation protection standards
apparently were based on the ALARA concept. As NCRP's representative
testified in a similar context, EPA's standards leave "no room for further
ALARA procedures" on a site-specific basis. (1-4(3).18)
Re_spQ_nse_; The NCRP testimony did not provide evidence or analysis for
its contention in this regard. In any case, the comment would not invalidate
the standards. Indeed, it could be taken as a recognition that the standards
are very well matched to the circumstances to which they apply.
Comment 24: EPA's cumulative addition of risks over very long time
periods due to the long-term nature of the risk is not a valid way to assess
the significance of risk. Risks do not add across generations, thus one
generation, or at most 100 years is the appropriate time frame for evaluating
significance. (1-4(3).31, 1-4(3).32, 1-6(3).32)
Response: EPA can hardly ignore the possibility that radon from
tailings may produce future adverse health effects. In the absence of
specific knowledge of the future, we estimate total impacts by assuming that
health effects will continue to accumulate at current estimated rates. There
are many reasons why long-term cumulative health effects might be higher or
lower than we estimate. People are people, whether they are members of this
generation or the next. We have no scientific justification for ignoring
deaths that may occur farther in the future than the commenters' suggested
cut-off period. Adopting such an arbitrary assumption as the commenters
recommend would be contrary to the interest of developing public health
protection policies, which is the primary objective of this rulemaking.
Therefore, EPA rejects the recommendation.
Comment 25: It is not appropriate to base a standard on the level of
voluntary risk that people undertake in their lives all the time, and it is to
EPA's credit that EPA does not make such a comparison in its supporting
documents. (P-5(H1).18)
Response: No response is required.
A.3-11
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Comment 26; It would be unwise to set rules for other states based on
New Mexico's regulations. (P-40.2)
Response: EPA is obliged, in any case, to develop its own rulemaking
record and justify its conclusions, independently of conclusions any other
regulatory entity had previously reached for its own purposes.
Comment 27: EPA's use of "worst case" risk estimates results in
standards that are excessively costly. EPA should use the "expected case" as
the basis of its standards. (F-5(3).l)
Response: As we indicated in the responses to Comments 23, A.2.1, and
22, A.3.1, our estimates are intended to represent "expected cases."
Comment 28: Application of existing RCRA (SWDA)regulations is
inadvisable for technical reasons. The differences in magnitude, physical
properties and proximity to population concentrations between mill tailings
and regulated hazardous wastes are too significant to allow for the effective
application of common standards. (1-30.8)
Response: The fundamental principle that underlies the (SWDA)
hazardous waste standards is to protect public health and the environment by
preventing hazardous substances from entering the ground. The principal tool
for carrying out this requirement is to place the wastes over an impermeable
liner. The standards further provide for preventing degradation of
groundwater in the event that contaminants do enter the ground. We have
applied these standards to the processing of uranium and thorium wastes
because our rulemaking record has not established that such differences as the
commenter alludes to would justify deviating from UMTRCA's expressed
requirement that we be consistent with the SWDA standards.
!The Standards Should Be Cost-effective!
Comment 29: EPA is required to engage in a balancing process to assure
that the cost of regulation bears a reasonable relationship to the expected
risk reduction benefits. (1-4(3).5)
Response: Nothing in statute "requires" EPA to engage in a balancing
process. We have shown, however, that the costs do bear a reasonable
relationship to the benefits. The costs, as discussed in the RIA and the
Preamble, are quite consistent with lifesaving expenditures that have been
made in many other contexts.
A.3-12
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Comment 30: We recommend that EPA heeds the advice of the BEIR
Committee by balancing the benefits of its proposed standards against the
costs, using commensurate units such as dollars. (P-9(3).10)
Response: The comment refers to a report (the "BEIR II" report)
prepared under EPA's sponsorship by a committee of the National Academy of
Sciences.^5) The authors urged EPA to use benefit/cost analysis, but they
noted severe limitations on the possibility of performing such analyses and on
its usefulness in decisionmaking. Many of these limitations relate to having
uncertain information, particularly regarding future events, and to social or
ethical considerations. These limitations result from our inability to
quantify costs and benefits in commensurate terms, such as dollars. We
believe that the degree to which we have analyzed costs and benefits is
consistent with the advice we were offered in this report. The commenter
appears to be urging that we rely on cost/benefit analysis to a far greater
degree than we believe the authors of the BEIR II report would find justified
for this rulemaking.
Comment 31: The judgmental factors used in defining the most
cost-effective alternative for reducing the impacts of tailings misuse and
disposal should be explicitly stated. (F-3(2).17)
Response: We agree, and have attempted to do so in the EIS, RIA, and
the Preamble. Cost-effectiveness is not our only concern, however. Certain
aspects of the standard, such as preventing misuse, are very difficult to
subject to cost-effectiveness analysis. Our approach to such issues is guided
by technical factors, common sense, and Congress' intentions, e.g., that it
would not be a good public health policy to rely primarily on institutional
controls for long term protection when physical control methods are available
and reasonable to apply.
Comment 32: EPA has failed to obtain specific input for its standards
from the industry that it is about to regulate. Further, EPA's approach to
radiation protection is to select limits based on what the staff believes is
barely feasible economically which results in arbitrary regulations.
(I-6(H2).l, 1-11(2).11)
Response: EPA issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in 1979,
in which it specifically requested information from the public relevant to
this rulemaking. EPA also benefited from the records of extensive industry
participation in earlier rulemakings by EPA and NRC on related subjects.
Furthermore, the voluminous industry comments on the proposed standards have
been carefully considered in formulating final standards. We believe our
ample rulemaking record and extensive documentation of our analysis shows that
the regulations are not arbitrary, and that the costs bear a reasonable
relationship to the benefits.
A.3-13
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SCosts should Not Determine the Standards!
Comment 33: We wonder whether the cost/benefit approach used to
develop the standards is appropriate in setting public health standards.
(P-35.5)
Response: We don't believe the approach we used can be fully described
as a cost/benefit approach because of limitations in quantifying costs and
benefits and the need to satisfy legal requirements that may not strictly be
subject to cost/benefit considerations. To the degree that we were able to
and where it was relevant to the rulemaking, we identified and compared the
costs and benefits of alternative standards as completely as we could. Our
choices of standards, however, took account of additional factors, such as
technical feasibility, maximum risks, and legal requirements.
Comment 34: EPA's primary objective should be to protect public
health, welfare, and safety of the environment; short-term economic costs for
something that is going to be around for hundreds of thousands of years should
be secondary. (P-14(H2).l, P-l(2).36)
Response: EPA agrees.
Comment 35: EPA should establish the objective in its benefits
analysis of reducing radon-induced premature deaths from uranium mill tailings
to zero. (P-33.15)
Response: EPA believes that doing so would be arbitrary and
unrealistic for carcinogens such as radon decay products, which we presume
have no threshold for their potential to cause cancer. We attempt instead to
reduce residual risks to the lowest reasonably achievable levels, considering
all relevant factors consistent with our legislative authority.
•Suggested Bases for Establishing the Standards'.
Comment 36: In establishing standards for mill tailings, EPA should be
guided by the principle of justification, namely for every radiation exposure,
there should be a concrete benefit resulting from the exposure. (P-22(H2).6)
Response: By definition, there is never a benefit associated with
exposure to waste products. Rather, the waste must be considered as resulting
from some useful process, in this case primarily production of fuel for
electrical energy generation. Because the fuel has no other major use, all
the detriments of the entire fuel cycle need to be justified by the benefits
of the electrical production, and this decision is made in licensing nuclear
power plants. Our standards for tailings limit the portion of risk that is
derived from wastes at uranium mills.
A.3-14
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Comment 37: EPA must:
a. Base its standards on a finding of significant risk to public
health and safety.
b. Assure that the cost of regulation bear a reasonable relationship
to the expected benefits (reduction of significant risks).
c. Analyze and consider whether reasonable alternatives to the
proposed regulations might achieve a better balance between costs
and benefits.
d. Engage in reasoned decisionmaking by stating its assumptions,
giving the reasons for its rejection of alternatives, and clearly
setting forth the rationale for its proposed regulations.
e. Promulgate only general environmental standards which do not
preempt NRC's authority to establish engineering, design and
operational standards.
Response: See responses to other comments regarding significant risks,
and the Preamble. EPA believes that the risks to health of existing and
future generations and of environmental contamination are sufficient to
warrant regulatory concern. EPA considers that the cost of regulations is
reasonable in relation to the benefit achieved and that it has selected the
levels of control that are the most effective to satisfy the goals it has
identified. The rationale for the standards are set forth in the preamble.
The standards leave the NRC due scope for its implementing responsibilities.
Comment 40: The proper basis of EPA's standard should be the
prevention of misuse, erosion, dispersion, and groundwater protection; not
radon control. Actual health effects are the proper basis of the standard.
If this were adopted, controls at specific sites could well differ.
(P-9(Hl).ll, 1-6(3).26, P-9(H1).2, P-9(H1).14)
Response: EPA is charged with issuing generally applicable, not site
specific standards. We see no reason to preclude controlling radon emissions
as part of an overall strategy for controlling tailings. Our analysis
indicates that radon control is needed for adequate public health protection
and is practical.
Comment 41: EPA's RIA must compare the risks from the problem with the
risks entailed in implementing a proposed solution. For example, remedial
action at the Ambrosia Lake pile would result in an estimated 2.3 fatalities
and 47 injuries. (1-6(3).33)
A.3-15
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Response: The RIA presents a cost-effectiveness analysis that
indicates the relative effectiveness of adding increasingly more restrictive
levels of control. As such, costs and benefits only indirectly related to
control methods are not considered. The cost-benefit analysis presented in
the DEIS and FEIS accounts for indirect costs and benefits, such as accidental
deaths during construction. (See Section 9.4 of the DEIS and the FEIS.)
EPA estimated 0.33 deaths as the number of accidental and
radiation-induced deaths which statistically would occur during disposal of a
large tailings pile such as the Kerr-McGee pile at Ambrosia Lake. This
estimate was for Alternative C3-E (FEIS), the level of protection required by
the UMTRCA standards. The number of deaths was then considered in the
cost-benefit balancing in Chapter 10 of both DEIS and the FEIS. The
commenter's estimate appears high, or to be based on more restrictive control
levels than required by the standards.
Comment 42: EPA must, by law, consider the radon risks from nearby
uranium mines in assessing the risks from tailings. (P-45.15)
Response: Radon risk from uranium mines is beyond the scope of this
rulemaking.
A.3-16
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A.3.3 Cost Estimates
JTfce Costs Will Overwhelm Industry!
Comment 1: Requirements of large amounts of capital and increased
operating costs to meet the proposed standards will only further destroy
domestic uranium producers, thereby jeopardizing national security
requirements of the United States and making our nation's utilities
dangerously dependent upon foreign uranium. EPA must abandon its use of
inaccurate data and hypothetical cases and utilize site-specific data to
properly evaluate the financial and nonfinancial benefit-cost analyses of the
proposed standards. (1-1(2).122)
Response: Since UMTRCA requires the EPA standards to be of general
application, we decided to assess the costs to the industry on the basis of
model facilities rather than perform the analysis for each individual site.
However, we used a significant amount of site-specific data to determine the
values of the model mill parameters. The size of the tailings impoundments,
the ore capacity, and the remaining economic life for each existing mill were
estimated. Financial information from individual companies was also used in
the economic analysis.
Comment 2: EPA's analysis of the industry's ability to generate
capital to comply with its proposed regulations is faulty in two respects.
First, the 20 percent cash flow EPA assumes simply does not exist for most of
the companies. Second, EPA's assumption that companies will make the needed
investments as long as the present value of the future income is positive is
not supported by the actual decisionmaking process used by corporations.
Corporations select investments based on the relative profitability of all
alternative investments. EPA's speculation that producers may be able to pass
on price increases of $1.00 or $2.00 per pound ignores the fact that spot
market prices are so low that they do not cover "forward costs." The costs of
EPA's standards will compel many producers to abandon the market to foreign
producers. (1-4(3).109, 1-4(3).115, 1-4(3).118, 1-4(3).119, 1-4(3).113,
1-4(3).117)
Response: Chapter 5 of the RIA states that mills may close for a
variety of reasons, including "a pessimistic long-run outlook on the uranium
industry by the parent corporation compared to other business ventures." To
analyze the "relative profitability of all alternative investments" for the
companies which own uranium mills is clearly beyond the scope of this
rulemaking and, frankly, not relevant to developing this standard. As
explained in Appendix A of the RIA, the mill closure analysis attempts to
estimate how significant an obstacle the tailings disposal costs are to the
continued operations of uranium mills. The analysis accomplishes this by
estimating the revenues and costs of individual uranium mills and enables a
determination to be made solely on the basis of the economics of the mill
itself. If a corporation can make more money from another business venture
and elects to do so by closing a mill, then we do not believe that this
A.3-17
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closing should be attributed to the tailings disposal costs. A "no closure"
determination by our analysis means that the mill can still be operated
profitably even after absorbing the cost of tailings disposal. It does not
mean that a company will not choose to exit from the industry. It is possible
that a company which does not have these "profitable investment alternatives"
could take over the operation of the mill.
The 20 percent cash flow assumption (the RIA also analyzes the effects
of a 15 and 25 percent margin) is an average which applies throughout the
remaining economic life of a mill. Although this margin may not exist right
now, based on historical data in the uranium industry and comparisons in
similar industries, we believe that the 15-25 percent cash flow margin
assumptions over the remaining life of mills are reasonable. Margins lower
than these would probably result in market closures, even before consideration
of tailings disposal costs.
Comment 3: EPA's analysis states that the impact of its proposed
regulations on uranium imports could not be assessed, but that more utilities
have a preference for purchasing from domestic suppliers. This "buy American"
assumption is not supported by the surveys done by DOE's Energy Information
Administration. (1-4(3).116)
Response: The role of imports in supplying future uranium deliveries
and the impact of the EPA standard on imports have been assessed according to
DOE/EIA's latest estimates and are reflected in the projections used in the
RIA, as explained in Appendix B.
Comment 4: Re: Page 2-24, paragraph 4 - If EPA states the industry is
declining, then why add more regulatory expenses on the industry? What is the
economic justification? (1-1(2).81)
Response: UMTRCA requires EPA to develop these standards. Congress
determined that these standards are needed to protect the public health and
the environment. Congress did not say that if the industry is declining, EPA
should not develop the standards. In developing these standards, EPA has
tried to balance the benefits of the standards with the costs of the
standards. We believe that most of these costs would be required anyway in
the absence of the standards, due to other regulations such as NRC and State
licensing regulations.
Comment 5: Re: Page 2-27, Table 2.16 - If Kerr-McGee is disregarded
because capital expenditures are not available, then the cumulative operating
income for the companies in the 1978-1980 time period is $78 million.
However, during the same time frame, the companies invested $290 million in
their operations. These companies are, therefore, operating in a negative
cash flow position. Thus, the financial health of the uranium mining industry
is worse than estimated by EPA. (1-1(2).85)
Response: The comment states that for the three year period from 1978
to 1980 the companies noted are operating in a negative cash flow position
A.3-18
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because operating income was $78 million and capital expenditures were $290
million. To properly represent the numbers, the $86 million shown as
depreciation and depletion for the same period should be added to the $78
million operating income, for a total of $164 million. However, a more
important issue is that the time horizon for the RIA is longer than a
three-year period. Thus, what is particularly relevant here are the capital
expenditures for 1981 through 1984, as shown in Table 2.18 of the RIA.
Planned capital expenditures fall precipitously from their 1980 level, (which
was also their peak level) to less than 4 percent of the 1980 level by 1984.
Therefore, if one increases the time frame beyond that considered in the
comment by just a few years, the cash flow is no longer negative. Lastly, the
analysis of impact had to be performed by both looking at the past and into
the future. The profitability (model mill closure) analysis was performed
using forecast prices and past cash flow levels related to revenues, and the
capital availability analysis was performed using the high debt-to-equity
ratios currently experienced by the firms.
Comment 6: EPA's standards will permanently lower the profitability of
the industry by as much as 12 percent. We doubt any U.S. producers could
justify continuing operations or constructing new facilities if EPA's
standards are imposed. (1-4(3).112)
Response: EPA believes that the estimates calculated in this comment
are erroneous. The spot market price of uranium is not an indicator of
revenues as the comment purports. According to the latest DOE/EIA survey, the
average delivered uranium price for 1982 was greater than $38 per pound, while
the reported average price for 1983 is nearly $36. If the disposal cost
increases are related to these price estimates, the percentage reductions in
profit are not only less than those presented in the comment, but less than
the production cost increases estimated in the RIA, which assumes a base
production cost of $30 per pound (see the response to Comment 34-08 for the
basis of this assumption). Additionally, the comment states that the
percentage reductions in profit, erroneously calculated on basis of an $18 per
pound spot market price, would be permanent, or would last as long as the mill
is in operation. However, these calculations are already out of date, as the
spot market price has risen to $24 per pound as of August 31, 1983.
Comment 7: Liner requirements make no sense if more cost-effective
means are available to meet reasonable off-site standards. Requiring liners
may shut down what remains of our domestic industry. (P-28.6)
Response: EPA's groundwater protection policy for a new disposal area
is to prevent releases of contaminants. EPA knows of no control technology,
other than liners, that can achieve this goal. Also no evidence was presented
in these proceedings that would indicate other methods are available to
achieve this goal. EPA's economic analysis indicates that it is unlikely that
any existing mills would close due to the cost of installing liners at new
tailings impoundments.
A.3-19
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Comment 8; EPA's proposed groundwater standards, if enforced, will
force many mills to shut down because of costs for new disposal sites and
restoring existing sites. (1-1(2).119, 1-1(2).3, I-6(H2).13)
Response: In the RIA, EPA analyzed the economic impacts associated
with starting new disposal sites for a variety of control levels. We estimate
that it is unlikely that any existing mills will have to shut down as a result
of these standards, even if they are required to start new tailings piles.
Comment 9; We recommend that EPA review the costs of meeting the
groundwater protection criteria of SWDA, and review its mill closure analysis
in light of these costs. (F-5(3).8)
Response; See the responses to Comments 7 and 8, A.3.3. EPA believes
its mill closure analysis is adequate.
!The Costs fflll Not Affect the Industry!
Comment 10: Industry can afford the estimated cost to comply with the
proposed regulations. EPA should not help the industry externalize its costs
at the expense of public health and the environment. (P-5(H1).15, P-5(H1).7,
P-5(3).5, P-5(H1).7)
Response: EPA believes that UMTRCA standards are reasonable in that
they provide a high degree of protection of public health and the
environment. Additional requirements would provide very little additional
protection, and at significantly greater costs. EPA believes additional
requirements are unreasonable.
Comment 11: Because the proposed standards are less stringent than
current NRC standards, EPA effectively returns regulatory costs to uranium
producers. (P-4(H1).3)
Response; EPA's standards (for post-closure radon releases) are
established as upper limits for the design of tailings disposal systems.
NRC's current (suspended) standards were lower design goals. EPA believes
there is little difference in the end result. Both would require a thick,
durable cover that would last a long time. EPA's standards are stricter in
other respects.
Comment 12: EPA's cash flow analysis in its mill closure analysis
fails to account for mill closings which are caused by insufficient market
demand for uranium. Given the high levels of predicted inventory, mill
closures due to regulatory costs are likely to represent only a small portion
of the capacity which should close in light of larger market factors. Given
the excess capacity of the industry and EPA's failure to take market factors
into account, it is unreasonable to predict that any portion of existing
capacity will be closed because of regulatory costs. (P-45.34)
A.3-20
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Response; There are several inaccuracies in this comment. The RIA for
the proposed standards does account for mill closures due to market
conditions, as noted by the entries in the "Premature Closure" column of
Tables B.3 and B.4 for the years 1981 through 1984. Contrary to the comment,
the closures are explicitly due to the excess inventory condition of the
industry, estimated in 1980 as being about four years worth of annual demand
for conventionally milled uranium. We assumed that this excess inventory
condition would be eliminated by the end of a six-year adjustment period, so
that by the beginning of 1987 the inventory level would represent
approximately one year's worth of demand. In Tables B.3 and B.4, the
inventory estimates for 1987 represent 1.4 (Baseline Demand) and 1.5 (Low
Growth Demand) year's worth of demand. We further assumed that there would
not be a buildup of excess inventories over the remainder of the projection
period and constrained the model so that inventories would not be greater than
two years worth of demand, a level which we do not consider to be excessive.
At the end of the year 2000 the inventory level represents 1.8 (Baseline
Demand) and 2.0 (Low Growth Demand) year's worth of demand. Therefore, the
comment is erroneous in stating that the "level of excess inventory is quite
high." The comment is correct in stating that the model does not consider
(presumably after the inventory draw-down period) "the feedback loop of excess
inventory affecting production." However, since we constrained the model not
to have an excess inventory, it is a moot point.
In the revised model in the RIA for the final standards, we have
treated inventories, as well as demand, in an exogenous fashion, relying on a
projection of inventory adjustments based on DOE/EIA's uranium industry model
(EUREKA). Demand and capacity are linked together so that market closures due
to changes in demand are calculated endogenously in the model. In the new
demand projection used in the RIA, market closures are estimated for the years
1983, 1984, 1987, and 1997. In this manner, market closures are estimated
separately from regulatory closures.
'.The Cost Estimates Are Inadequate and Not In Perspective!
Comment 13: EPA's failure to even try to estimate actual compliance
costs make it impossible to determine whether the estimated costs are
reasonably accurate, whether a particular facility can comply at any cost, or
whether a facility will be able to comply without interrupting production.
(1-4(3).108)
Response: EPA disagrees with this comment. Realistic cost estimates
are presented in the FEIS (Chapter 9 and Appendix B). The RIA economic
analysis included consideration of wide range of situations, including
different mill sizes, remaining lifetimes and sizes of existing tailings
piles. EPA also allows up to 18 months for initiation of a protective action
program (up from a proposed 12 months) for cleanup of contaminated
groundwater. This is the only requirement that could possibly interrupt
production. EPA believes 18 months is adequate for the initiation of
corrective actions.
A.3-21
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Comment 14: EPA's evaluation of the economic impact and benefit-cost
analyses of various disposal methods or uranium mill tailings are merely rough
estimates. Site-specific examination will show that many mills presently
closed will not be reopened. (1-1(2).118)
Response: See the response to Comment 1, A.3.3.
Comment 15: EPA does not provide sufficient information on the risk.
and costs of compliance with its radium soil standard to allow its
cost-effectiveness to be assessed. EPA should provide this information and
allow public comment before promulgating its final radium in soil standard.
(1-4(3).10)
Response: EPA has added an analysis of the radium in soil standard in
the FEIS. EPA believes this radium in soil concentration limit has been
sufficiently reviewed in past rulemaking proceedings to promulgate it without
further public review and comment. See the FEIS-I, Volumes I and II.
Comment 16: EPA did not include in its analysis the costs of
implementing a liquid management strategy and groundwater monitoring and
response program which are necessary prior to closure or disposal, and which
form the primary means of achieving EPA's primary objective relative to water
pathway. (1-25.6)
Response: EPA did not include these costs in the RIA because they are
relatively insignificant in comparison with tailings disposal costs, based on
estimates reported in the background documents in support of the SWDA
regulations. We have analyzed the extreme case whereby implementation of the
SWDA regulations would result in tailings being placed in a new impoundment
with a protective liner.
Comment 17: We are concerned that the economic impact analysis may be
based on assumptions that are valid only for the short-term, but is being
treated as though it includes all long-term costs for balancing against
long-term benefits. (P-9(3).3)
Response: The economic impact analysis in the RIA covers the domestic
uranium production through the year 2000. EPA believes that this is a
suitable time period for estimating long-run economic impacts.
Comment 18: EPA should prepare a range of disposal costs to account
for the likely effects of site-specific considerations. (1-25.7)
Response: EPA recognizes that site-specific conditions will produce
variations in the estimated costs used in the economic analysis. Cost
variations were accounted for in two ways: for existing piles costs for three
different sizes were used; for future piles, above grade and below grade
disposal costs were estimated. However, EPA did not attempt to estimate costs
A.3-22
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for site-specific variables, such as availability of materials, unique
drainage patterns, etc., since the UMTRCA standards are generally applicable
and such evaluations infringe on the prerogatives of the regulatory agencies.
Comment 19: It may be that if the full social costs of
nuclear-generated electricity were internalized in the cost of the product,
the market place would choose another alternative. A fundamental deficiency
of EPA's benefit-cost analysis is that it does not consider costs in this
broader context. (P-34.4)
Response: The comment is beyond the scope of the benefit-cost analysis
of mill tailings standards. EPA has not explicitly analyzed the impact of the
alternative standards on power plant selection. However, based on information
presented in the industry profile chapter on the portion of electricity
generation provided by nuclear power and the small percentage of nuclear
generation costs represented by fuel costs, we do not believe that the
standards will have any impact on power plant decision-making.
Comment 20: In 1982, DOE reported a 56 percent decline in $30.00 per
pound or less, forward cost ore reserves from 470,000 tons to 205,000 tons.
(1-1(2).116)
Response: Table 2.14 of the DRIA for the proposed standards contains
the information presented in the comment.
Comment 21: EPA does not say how many pounds of uranium oxide are
involved in the uranium contracts versus total demand. When prices in these
contracts are compared to EPA's price forecast, no wonder a person draws the
conclusion of a healthy mining industry. (1-1(2).117)
See the response to Section A.1.1, Comment 28-22.
Comment 22: EPA errs in stating that a richer deposit "permits lower
pricing." Richer deposits permit higher profits, or allow operations to
continue when lower grade operations are forced to close. (1-15(2).6)
Response: EPA agrees. See the response to Section A.1.1,
Comment 28-33.
\Cost of Covers and Liners!
Comment 23: Since radon emanation is a function of moisture content of
the cover, EPA's Alternative F, based on two additional meters of cover, may
over-estimate the cost of greater radon control. (P-4(H1).10)
A.3-23
-------
Response; It is possible EPA overestimated the cost of greater radon
control; however, it is unlikely. Control of radon is to be effective for the
order of 1000 years. Over this period it is reasonable to expect moisture
levels in cover material to approach local ambient levels in soils.
Therefore, EPA did not use elevated moisture levels in calculating radon
attenuation and thicknesses of cover material, but instead used ambient
moisture levels. This leads to a thicker cover and, at least initially, lower
radon emissions.
Comment 24: The cost of covering the tailings with 10 feet of soil to
meet the radon emission limit in New Mexico would be high, not only in terms
of construction expense but also in terms of environmental degradation due to
heavy traffic and borrow pits. (P-28.1)
Response: EPA believes its cost estimates are realistic for most
sites, including those in New Mexico. EPA also considered the environmental
degradation caused by borrow pits and the cost of reclaiming such pits. EPA
also considered the number of accidental and radiation-induced deaths that
would occur for various disposal options. EPA considered the environmental
impact of traffic only in the sense that it would be small compared to other
impacts since suitable cover material is expected to be found close to most
active sites.
Comment 25: When clay is available within a few miles of the tailings
disposal area, clay liners can be installed for less than plastic liners. A
3-foot thick clay liner can be installed for approximately $.20 per square
foot, while the cost of plastic liners installed range from $.50 per square
foot to over $1.00 per square foot. (1-2(2).7)
Response: EPA agrees that if clay with suitable characteristics for
liner material is found locally, the cost of clay liners is less than the cost
of synthetic liners.
Comment 26; When one considers factors such as transportation costs
and correct compaction it is questionable that clay would be cheaper than a
synthetic liner. (I-16(H2-1).4, 1-16(3).2)
Response: EPA agrees that the costs of clay liners are highly
dependent on the distance the clay must be transported and somewhat dependent
on compaction characteristics.
!Additional Comments!
Comment 27: EPA's assertion that its proposed standards are not
"Major" within the meaning of Executive Order 12291 is very doubtful
considering the projected costs of compliance. (1-4(3).106)
A.3-24
-------
Response; The standards are classified as not "Major" because the
incremental costs attributed to them are believed to be less than the
criterion specified in the executive order. Regardless of whether or not the
standards are major, EPA has proceeded as if they were and prepared a
Regulatory Impact Analysis. The content of the RIA is the same in either case.
Comment 28: EPA's statement that mill tailings have no market value
ignores the fact that some tailings have been reprocessed and that other
resource recovery may be desirable in the future. (F-3(2).23)
Response: Other parts of the statement said the mill tailings are
"essentially a waste product" and that "there is some small possibility for
mineral recoverability." Since the amount of tailings that have been
reprocessed, in relation to the total quantity of mill tailings in existence,
is slight, EPA believes that the statement is correct as written.
Comment 29: Although the problem of foreign competition in the uranium
market is discussed in the economic impact analysis, it is not used in any
quantitative manner in the overall cost/benefit analysis. Perhaps some value
in the cost/benefit analysis should be given to a healthy industry.
-------
costs of deeper drilling to obtain uncontaminated water is difficult since
there are several unknowns, such as the depth to the uncontaminated aquifer
and the number of wells that would be drilled. In EPA's analysis the fact
that costs can be saved by not drilling deep for drinking water is considered
a benefit.
Comment 32: Reasonable degradation should be allowed at existing
impoundments when degradation results from a beneficial activity. Cost
estimates to comply with EPA's proposed standards range from approximately
$100 million to $200 million per site, or approximately $5 to $10 per pound of
yellowcake produced. (1-1(2).25)
Response: EPA established its policy of nondegradation of groundwater
after an extensive rulemaking proceeding under the SWDA. This proceeding
under UMTRCA is not the forum for reopening this question. EPA believes these
cost estimates for meeting the groundwater standards are reasonable. In fact,
the commenter's estimates appear to be for moving existing tailings into new,
lined impoundments, which would generally be done for long term stabilization,
in most cases, if done at all, rather than for groundwater protection. The
worst case in terms of costs for groundwater protection is construction and
use of a new, lined tailings impoundment and in situ disposal of the existing
pile. The costs for this "worst" case are substantially less than those made
by the commenter.
Comment 33: The multi-layered controls required to comply with the
proposed groundwater standard will cost between $61 and $250 million
(depending on liner requirements for future tailings) during the operational
phase at the Ambrosia Lake Mill. (1-6(3).53, I-6(H2).34)
Response: EPA believes these cost estimates are high, as discussed
above in Comment 31, The worst case for the Kerr-McK.ee Ambrosia Lake tailings
would be $27 million for disposal of the existing pile (Table B-8, FEIS) and
$32 million for construction, use, and final disposal of a new, lined tailings
impoundment (Table B-ll, Method C3, FEIS). If closure costs are subtracted
for the new impoundment, the cost of excavating and lining a new impoundment
is $17 million, which can be compared to the commenter's estimates.
'.Specific Problems With the Cost Estimates in the RIA\
Comment 34: It should be noted that in the RIA for active sites:
Comment 34-01: Re: Page 5-5, paragraph 3 - EPA falsely assumed that
the industry demand forecast is unaffected by the EPA standards. EPA should
consider the impact these "closure" standards will have on forcing utilities
to go foreign for future supplies as domestic costs rise because of increased
regulation and lower ore grades outpace foreign sources. (1-1(2).86)
A.3-26
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Response: The revised methodology (discussed in Appendix B of the RIA)
estimates the impact of each alternative standard on the ability of the
conventional milling sector to supply the uranium that is necessary to meet
demand. These impacts include any shifts from conventional production to
imports or nonconventional production.
Comment 34-02: Re: Page 5-6, paragraph 4 - EPA used out-of-date
information for its baseline projections. (1-1(2).87)
Response: A new projection of uranium industry demand based on the
most recent projections made by DOE/EIA was used in this RIA and is described
in Appendix B.
Comment 34-03: Re: Page 5-13, Table 5.5 - The table is based on
out-of-date information. There have been further reductions and deferrals in
nuclear generating capacity because of additional cancellations. (1-1(2).88)
Response: New projections of uranium industry demand and prices based
on the most recent projections made by DOE/EIA were used in this RIA and are
described in Appendix B.
Comment 34-04: Re: Page 5-14, paragraph 1 - EPA proceeds from a false
assumption. Projections are based on out-of-date information and inaccurate
cost data not based upon site-specific situations. (1-1(2).89)
Response: See the response to Comment 34-02, A.3.3.
Comment 34-05: Re: Page 5-19, paragraph 1 - If there is so much
uncertainty about the uranium industry, EPA should not have proceeded with the
standards and RIA until sufficient and accurate data was available.
(1-1(2).90)
Response; UMTRCA does not allow EPA to refrain from setting standards
because there is uncertainty about future industry activities. As the
Congress has pointed out, there are substantial quantities of mill tailings
existing today which may pose significant risks to people. Thus, there is a
need for standards now regardless of future activity. Also, the uncertainty
of future industry production primarily relates to the amount of future
tailings generation and, therefore, the estimates of industry-wide disposal
costs and health effects. The benefit-cost relationships of control of mill
tailings, which contribute to the selection of the standards, are generally
not affected by variations in the quantity of mill tailings forecasted in the
future.
A.3-27
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Comment 34-06; Re: Page 5-19, paragraph 2 - EPA proceeds from false
assumptions. There is no "Buy American" phenomenon in the uranium industry.
EPA bases this statement on a prediction of a "uranium broker." If EPA had
consulted with DOE, this faulty assumption would have been dispelled.
(1-1(2).91)
Response: See the response to Comment 3, A.3.3.
Comment 34-07: Re: Page 5-19, paragraph 3 - If this statement is
related to EPA's limited references, then anyone associated with the industry
can assume the agency did not .spend much time evaluating the uranium business
and economic situation. (1-1(2).92)
Response: By examining all the references used in developing the RIA,
one would determine that this comment is incorrect.
Comment 34-08: Re: Page 5-20, paragraph 1 - EPA does not state how
average production costs were developed. In data in Reference K, pages
131-139, DOE points out that very little domestic production is available
under $30.00 per pound forward cost, whereas the entire U.S. demand could be
fulfilled by foreign uranium at less cost than our lowest cost reserves.
(1-1(2).93)
Response: EPA consulted with the staff of DOE/EIA on this issue, who
replied that while current production costs may range from $20 to $50 per
pound, $30 per pound was a reasonable number to use as an industry average.
The higher the base production cost, the lower the percentage increase due to
tailings disposal costs.
Comment 34-09: Re: Page 5-21, Table 5.10 - Table is wrong because it
is not based on full economic recovery costs. (1-1(2).94)
Response: See the response to Comment 34-08, A.3.3.
Comment 34-10: Re: Page 5-26, Table 5.13 - The table should be based
on the uranium divisions of the companies listed. In the case of Exxon and
Atlantic Richfield, uranium sales amount to less than one percent of sales.
EPA attempted to establish cost-benefit results upon "deep-pocket" scenarios.
(1-1(2).95)
Response: The comment does not reflect a distinction between
profitability and capital availability for a business segment within a larger
company as did the different parts of our analysis. Rational capital
budgeting decisions based on economic grounds require that a project is
expected to be profitable in order to justify a capital investment in the
project. The RIA states this in the following manner: "If an investment is
not projected to be profitable, then there is no economic incentive to raise
A.3-28
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capital, even though the firm may have the ability to do so." Therefore, with
respect to those items that determine profitability, the RIA did use
information for the uranium business segment of the firms listed in the mill
closure analysis. However, in examining the issue of capital availability,
the RIA correctly focuses attention on the financial resources of the entire
firm rather than merely the uranium business segment. The reason for focusing
attention on the resources of the entire firm is that the normal business
practice is for the firm to raise capital at the corporate level. This gives
the firm access to a broader range of capital markets, and also achieves a
better financing rate than would otherwise be the case.
Comment 34-11: Re: Page 5-27, paragraph 2 - We disagree with EPA
analysis. EPA is attempting to build a case that the profitable oil and gas
operations of some of the oil companies should be used to subsidize losses in
uranium operations. (I-l<2).96)
Response: See the response to Comment 34-10, A.3.3.
Comment 34-12: Re: Page 5-28 and 5-29, Table 5.14 - We disagree with
procedure. EPA should utilize the uranium division of the companies listed,
not the total assets and sales. (I-;l(2).97)
Response; See the response to Comment 34-10, A.3.3.
Comment 34-13: Re: Page 5-31, Table 5.15 - Again, we disagree with the
procedure. EPA should utilize the uranium division of each company to
evaluate whether uranium operations are profitable. (1-1(2).98)
Response: See the response to Comment 34-10, A.3.3.
Comment 34-14: Re: Page B-l, paragraph 2 - DOE data are out of date.
Data are based upon 1979 information. Nuclear reactor capacity has been
substantially reduced since 1979. (1-1(2).99)
Response: New projections of uranium industry demand and prices, based
on the most recent projections made by DOE/EIA, were used in this RIA and are
described in Appendix B.
Comment 34-15: Re: Page B-l, paragraph 3 - DOE data are out of date
and no assumptions should be based upon this data. (1-1(2).100)
Response: See the response to Comment 34-14.
A.3-29
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Comment 34-16: Re: Page B-l, Table B.I - Data are out of date. There
have been substantial nuclear reactor capacity reductions since the report was
published by DOE/EIA in 1980. (1-1(2).101)
Response: See the response to Comment 34-14.
Comment 34-17: Re: Page B-3, paragraph 1 - Data are out of date.
According to the Atomic Industrial Forum there are presently 147 nuclear
reactors with operating licenses, under construction, or on order,
representing 135 megawatts. (1-1(2).102)
See the response to Comment 34-14.
Comment 34-18: Re: Page B-3, paragraph 2 - Data based on the EUREKA
Model are out of date. (1-1(2).103, 1-1(2).120)
Response: See the response to Comment 34-14.
Comment 34-19; Re: Page B-3, paragraph 2 - EPA states in Section 2,
page 2-22 that reserves are listed by 'forward cost reserves' and do not
include all previous exploration and development expenses and future income
taxes, profits, cost of money. EPA states on page 2-22, "It is common
practice in the uranium industry to obtain full costs by multiplying forward
costs by 1.7." In Sections 2 and 5 of the RIA, EPA states the industry has a
base forward cost of $30.00 per pound. Therefore, full recovery costs would
be $51.00 per pound. Now, if full recovery costs are $51.00, how can EPA
state in Appendix B they are $33.45 per pound in 1983 for the entire
industry? (1-1(2).104, 1-1(2).115)
Response: In the new projections described in Appendix B of the RIA,
the uranium prices used are the annual delivered prices as estimated by
DOE/EIA's uranium industry model (EUREKA). The comment is incorrect .in
reporting that "EPA states that the industry has a base forward cost of $30
per pound." The RIA assumes an industry average base "production" cost of
$30, not a base "forward" cost. The production cost estimate represents all
the costs of production, to which the incremental cost of tailings disposal is
related.
Comment 34-20: Re: Page B-4, paragraph 3 - These data are extremely
outdated. EPA has access to more current information. (1-1(2).105)
Response: See the response to Comment 34-14, A.3.3.
A.3-30
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Comment 34-21: Re: Page B-4, paragraph 4 - Since EPA is using data
which in some cases are five years old, EPA is "not qualified" to make price
projections. (1-1(2).106)
Response: See the response to Comment 34-14, A.3.3.
Comment 34-22: Re: Page B-5, Table B.2 - Data are out of date. EPA
has access to more current information. (1-1(2).107)
Response: See the response to Comment 34-14, A.3.3.
Comment 34-23: Re: Page B-6, paragraph 1 - EPA is not qualified to
address the subject of mill closures. They should have relied on DOE or the
NRC for projections on mill closures. (1-1(2).108)
Response; See the response to Comment 34-14, A.3.3.
Comment 34-24: Re: Page B-6, paragraph 3 - EPA relies again on
out-of-date data. There was not any additional conventional milling capacity
added in 1982 and 1983 and it is questionable whether there will be any in
1984. Why does EPA use 1980 projections in 1983? (1-1(2).109, 1-1(2).121)
Response: See the response to Comment 34-14, A.3.3.
Comment 34-25: Re: Pages B-7 and B-8, Table B.3; Page B-ll, Table B.5;
Page B-12, Table B.6; Page B-16, Table B.8; Page B-17, Table B.9; Page B-19,
Table B.10, Page B-20, Table B.ll - Data are out of date. EPA has no
expertise in projecting uranium inventory drawdown or production. This
responsibility is legislatively assigned to DOE. EPA did not consider the
impact of foreign imports. EPA should have relied on EIA projections.
(1-1(2).110)
Response: See the response to Comment 34-14, A.3.3.
Comment 34-26: Re: Page B-21, References for Appendix B - The
references utilized in Appendix B relied upon three telephone conversations
and one journal article. The references serve no solid basis for
projections. (1-1(2).110)
Response; See the response to Comment 34-14, A.3.3.
Comment 35: Throughout the RIA, EPA addresses the current plight of
the industry, but none of the statistical compilation supports this scenario.
(1-1(2).Ill)
A.3-31
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Response; All historical data displays in the RIA have been updated to
contain the most recent published information available. Projections of
uranium industry activities are also based on the most recent DOE/EIA
projections. Therefore, the RIA reflects "the current plight of the industry"
as described by these sources of information.
Comment 36: Section 2 of the RIA, Industry Profile, portrays the
industry incorrectly because the data utilized are obsolete. (1-1(2).112)
Response; The data in the industry profile have been updated.
{Specific Problems with the Cost Estimates in the RIA — The Cost Estimates
are Rough and Not In Perspective!
Comment 37; Re: Page 2-24, paragraph 2 - It is not proper for EPA to
arbitrarily use a $30.00 per pound cost figure based upon the reference in
Business Week. EPA has access to more accurate data developed by DOE-EIA.
(1-1(2).80)
Response: See the response to Comment 34-08, A.3.3.
Comment 38; Re: Page 2-8, paragraph 2 - EPA's analysis of new
procurement in 1980 and 1981 indicates the majority of contracts are market
priced. This means buyers will be paying less than present published Spot
Market price and not over the projected $30.00 figure used by EPA to support
the RIA in later chapters. (1-1(2).59)
Response: See the responses to Comments 34-08 and 34-14, A.3.3.
Comment 39: Re: Page 2-8, paragraph 3 - EPA's price determination is
misleading since EPA does not state whether 5,000 or 5 million pounds are
involved in the 1981-1990 deliveries. (1-1(2).60, 1-1(2).61)
Response: See the response to Comment 28-22, A.1.1.
A.3-32
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A.3.4 Cost Effectiveness
JCost Effectiveness Analysis Is Not Adequate*.
Comment 1: While EPA's cost/benefit analysis follows widely accepted
methodology, it is deficient in many respects including: the judgmental
aspects of the effectiveness index; the short time span considered; and the
failure to consider cumulative impacts on future generations. Factors other
than economic costs must determine the choice of control technology. (P-34.3)
Response: Economic costs are not the only factor which determines the
selection of the standards. We have also addressed the maximum exposure of
individuals, population health effects, and the technical practicability of
implementing undemonstrated technology for control over very long periods of
time, subject to legislative constraints.
Comment 2: EPA's inability to monetize benefits and the insensitivity
of the "deaths avoided" calculation makes it essential that EPA base its
cost/benefit analysis not on deaths avoided but on reductions in risk to the
most affected individuals. (P-45.32)
Response; EPA recognizes the limitations of the "cost per radon death
avoided" calculations and discusses these limitations in the RIA. Because of
these limitations, we have examined'other ways for basing the selection of the
standards. However, these calculations do give one perspective on setting a
level of control. The maximum risk to the individual is clearly another way
of establishing the standard, and one which we have discussed in detail in the
Preamble. We recognize that the maximum individual risk, even after control
to the level required by these stanards, may still be relatively high.
However, the practicability of providing more radon control below this limit
falls rapidly.
Comment 3: The appropriate baseline for the cost/effectiveness
analysis in the DEIS is the current NRC regulations, not the "no standard"
alternative that was used. (P-4(H1).2, P-4(H1).3)
Response: According to PL 95-604, NRC must change its regulations to
accord with EPA's standards. That NRC already has issued regulations for
uranium mill tailings is irrelevant to EPA's analysis. (EPA's standards are
in some respects more stringent and in others less stringent than NRC's
regulations.)
Comment 4: EPA failed to properly evaluate costs and benefits by its
failure to determine (1) whether risks at the level of control are
significant, and (2) whether the incremental risk reduction achieved by
additional controls is significant. Had EPA done this, it would have chosen a
radon standard closer to 100 pCi/m2-sec. (1-4(3).33)
Response; The questions are not relevant to a consideration of costs
and benefits. In any case EPA determined that the risks (identical to
A.3-33
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incremental risks) are significant at the level of 100 pCi/m^-sec, and can
be cost-effectively reduced to the 20 pCi/m^sec- level required by the
standard.
IThe Standards Are Not Cost Effective]
Comment 5; EPA is proposing to require a costly earthen cover, the
success of which is unpredictable. EPA admits that the hazard, whatever its
magnitude, could be controlled by far less expensive measures. However, the
Agency rejects the less expensive measures - without evidence - on the claim
they are unpredictable. In EPA's selective view, unpredictability is a bar to
relatively low-cost measures, but not to high-cost measures, to control an
uncertain hazard. (1-7(2).17)
Response: EPA does not agree that institutional controls are
necessarily "far less expensive." In additional, we find the cost of earthen
covers are justified by other benefits, e.g., radon emission control.
Comment 6: There are several approaches to covering a tailings pile
which will endure for 200 to 1000 years and protect against the hazards EPA
considers that are less costly than the three meters of earth required by
EPA's proposed emission standards. (1-4(3).120, I-6(H2).7)
Response: EPA does not preclude the use of other approaches if they
truly satisfy the standards.
Comment 7: If EPA had properly analyzed cover requirements, a one to
three foot cover would have been selected as the most cost-effective. Using
EPA's assumptions and estimates, allowing one-half meter covers would save 23
to 28 percent. Deleting the liner requirement would bring total savings to
between 50 and 60 percent. Since all the benefits EPA deems important would
still be achieved, such alternatives are clearly more cost effective.
(1-4(3).121, 1-4(3).122, 1-4(3).123, 1-4(3).124, 1-4(3).67)
Response: We do not agree that such a cover would provide the benefits
of a cover satisfying the standard. Further, regarding the "liner
requirement" UMTRCA requires that there standards be consistent with EPA's
regulations under the Solid Waste Disposal Act, wherein a. liner is a primary
standard for a new impoundment.
Comment 8: Notwithstanding EPA's acknowledgment that it cannot predict
the extent of possible misuse of tailings in the future, the Agency has
presumed to make just such a prediction in a table that purports to present
the "Benefits of Controlling Uranium Mill Tailings at Active Mill Sites
Through the Year 2000." 48 F.R. 19584, 19597. EPA's ascription in this table
of the "chance for misuse," from "very likely" to "very unlikely," is totally
speculative and in direct contradiction to the agency's acknowledgment of its
inability to predict. (1-7(2).21)
A. 3-34
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Response: EPA1s characterization is indeed speculative and expressed
in the terms described because we do not believe it is possible to quantify
the probable extent of misuse. These table entries represent our best
judgements,
Comment 9: The small risks identified by EPA do not justify the costly
solutions EPA has proposed. (I-6(H2).3, 1-4(3).105, I-6(H2).30>
Response: The estimated cost for implementing these standards per
death avoided is well within the range that has resulted from other health
protection precedents, apart from other nonquantified benefits. See the
response to Comment 14, A.3.4.
Comment 10: EPA has not demonstrated that its proposed groundwater
regulations and liner requirements are "cost justified." (1-4(3).97,
1-4(3).98, 1-6(3).31, 1-6(3).54)
Response: UMTRCA requires EPA to protect the environment as well as
health. Risk to environmental resources like groundwater may warrant
regulatory concern under UMTRCA, therefore, independently of the existence or
not of significant risk to individuals. The seriousness of the threat of
groundwater contamination is indicated by the fact that several existing piles
already have groundwater contamination problems. The existence of a liner
will assist the protection of groundwater by preventing or reducing migration
of contaminants during the active phase of mill operation and for some period
thereafter. This is an important function considering the apparent role the
hydraulic head plays in migration of contaminants to groundwater.
Comment 11: EPA has failed to demonstrate the cost-effectiveness of
its groundwater proposals, and the analysis with respect to cover and radon is
deficient. (P-29.8)
Response: See the response to Comment 10, A.3.4.
Comment 12: The proposed standard, at approximately $1 million/health
effect averted, is not cost effective. We estimate, adopting EPA*s
assumptions, that the actual cost of radon control alone ranges from $27,000
for Alternative C to $41,000 for Alternative F per year of life saved. These
values represent 4 to 5 times the per capita gross national product, and are
obviously disproportionate to the benefits obtained. (P-9(3).5, P-9(H1).10)
Response: The comment is incorrect. The proposed standard corresponds
to Alternative D, not to Alternatives C, E, or F (the designations C, D, E,
and F being taken from the DEIS and the Preamble for the proposed standards;
the alternatives have since been redefined). The cost-benefit ratio for
Alternative D is $72,000 per life saved, or $5,000 per year of life saved, not
six to eight times higher, as asserted in the comment. This rate of spending
is comparatively small for measures to protect public health, not large, as
the commenter asserts.
A.3-35
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Comment 13: EPA's groundwater standards may protect against
degradation for a time, with great costs to industry, but will not better
protect the public health. (1-11(2).9)
Response: It is not clear why the commenter concludes that avoidance
of degradation will not better protect public health.
JGreater Protection Mould Be Cost-Effective!
Comment 14: We estimate a total savings to Society of $5 to $10
billion for EPA's Alternative F compared with an industry cost of $709
million. Including estimates of the health risks in addition to fatal lung
cancers would vastly tilt the cost benefit analysis in the direction which
affords the greatest protection at a reasonable cost. (P-l(2}.24)
Response: The benefits, as estimated in the comment, are derived by
placing a value for avoiding a death on the total deaths avoided for all time
by the control. EPA does not believe that human life should be monetized and
then factored into an economic benefit-cost calculation to determine selection
of the standard. Nonresolvable issues, such as equating expenditures made
today with a stream of benefits occurring thousands of years into the future
and determining acceptable values of avoiding death (valued at the margin or
over all deaths avoided), make this an inappropriate procedure to follow in a
rigorous manner. Chapter 4 of the RIA has, however, estimated the incremental
cost per radon death avoided for alternative control levels and under a
variety of health effect scenarios relating to time-frame and geographic
distribution of estimated deaths. This type of comparison provides one with
perspective on what the implicit value of an avoided death would be given the
conditions of each scenario. EPA believes that these types of benefit-cost
perspectives are useful in policy decision-making, but do not necessarily
constitute the basis for the bottom line.
Comment 15: The total pass-through cost to the consumer for the radon
control of alternative F is 7.5 to 9 cents/month. Given that in 1980 average
electric bills ranged from $15.28 to $110.84, such costs are not burdensome.
We believe that the vast majority of Americans would willingly pay this much
for the benefits of improved human health and environmental protection.
(P-45.33)
Response; EPA agrees that if the cost of disposal were entirely passed
through to electricity rate payers, the size of the pass-through would be in
the general ballpark of the estimates contained in the comment. However, EPA
disagrees with the use of this measure as an indicator of economic impact of
tailings disposal costs. Since the impact on rate payers for electricity
consumption is several steps away from the production of uranium in the
uranium fuel cycle, this measure does not capture the potential consequences
on the activity to which this rulemaking directly applies. Let us assume that
the domestic production of uranium is outlawed by some hypothetical
rulemaking. If the production of nuclear-powered electricity is to continue,
A.3-36
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and assuming that the production cost advantage of foreign uranium sources
versus domestic sources both continues and is reflected in uranium prices,
then the impact of this hypothetical rulemaking on electricity consumers will
register a reduction in electricity bills and not account for the impacts on
the uranium milling industry or disruptions to other parts of the fuel cycle.
We believe, therefore, that the use of this measure as an indicator of
economic impact is misleading.
Comment 16: In the long run, maintaining a tailings pile on the
floodplain would appear to be a much more expensive proposition than removal
from the floodprone area. (F-1.5)
Response; We don't know that this is necessarily the case. Some piles
in floodplains are subject only to high water floods, which are not
necessarily destructive. Piles subject to high velocity water may, depending
on site-specific circumstances, be adequately protected for very long times by
dikes. We believe the comment should be considered in determining
cost-effective, site-specific disposal measures that will comply with the
standards.
A.3-37
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A.3.5 Population Density-Dependent Standards
Comment 1: Although there is no provision in the Act for setting
different requirements for remote sites, the Agency might justify some
differences on the basis of its cost/benefit analysis. (P-5(H1).21)
Response: EPA has examined this issue carefully and found that,
insofar as radon releases are concerned, the estimated lung cancers that might
be induced nonlocally justifies controlling radon to the level of the final
standard. Further details are given in the Preamble and the RIA.
Comment 2: The degree of radon control at remote sites should be
equivalent to the degree of control at more densely populated rural sites.
(F-1.8, F-3(2).21, P-26.5, P-26.4, P-33.7, S-l.l, S-3(H2).l, P-14(H2).2,
S-12(H2).15, P-22(H2).3, P-l(2).32, P-l(2).34, P-l(2).63, P-33.9, P-33.12,
P-32.4, P-44.4, S-3(2).21, S-12(H2).5)
Response: EPA agrees, for reasons given in detail in the Preamble.
Among these is that demographers have concluded that it is not possible to
determine that a population at a specific location will remain low in the
future, if it is low now. Therefore, having two different standards implies a
need for institutional oversight of future population shifts, and for
upgrading the disposal at those sites that exceed some criterion of
"remoteness." Presumably, the State or Federal custodian would be
responsible, not the original owner. We believe such an arrangement is
readily avoidable by applying adequate physical controls now to all sites.
Also see the Response to Comment 1, above, and to numerous comments in Section
5.0 that involve reliance on institutional controls.
Comment 3: EPA should set a risk-based radon standard (rather than
20 pCi/m^-sec) so that Agreement States have the flexibility (as permitted
by the Act) to consider site-specific factors (including population density)
in approving cover designs. Such a risk based standard would apply equally to
sites located in remote and more densely populated areas. (F-6(2).9,
F-6(2).13)
Response: Congress provided Agreement States with flexibility in
choosing methods for satisfying EPA's standards and NRC's implementing
regulations. We have found that remoteness is not a factor for which
flexibility in the degree of control is justified (see the responses to
Comments 1 and 2, above). Apart from that, the standard as written allows
considerable flexibility regarding specific cover designs.
A.3-38
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Comment A: Alternate radon standards should be considered for remote
sites since emissions from such sites have little effect on public health and
safety. (F-5<3>.&)
Response: As discussed in the Preamble, we found that the estimated
health effects from remote uncontrolled tailings sites justifies controlling
them to the level of the final standard.
A.3-39
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REFERENCES
(1) National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, "Review of
the Current State of Radiation Protection Philosophy," Report No. 43,
Washington, D.C., 1975.
(2) International Commission on Radiological Protection "ICRP Publication
26," Pergamon Press, N.Y., 1977.
(3) United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation,
"Ionizing Radiation: Sources and Biological Effects, 1982 Report to
the General Assembly," U.N. Publication E.82.IX.8, United Nations, New
York, 1982.
(4) National Academy of Sciences, "The Effects on Populations of Exposure
to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation," Committee on the Biological
Effects of Ionizing Radiations, NAS, National Academy Press,
Washington, D.C., 1980.
(5) National Academy of Sciences, "Consideration of Health Benefit-Cost
Analysis for Activities Involving Ionizing Radiation Exposure and
Alternatives," "BEIR II" report, EPA 520/4-77-003, 1977.
A.3-40
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A.4.0 STANDARDS FOR OPERATION
Comment 1: EPA's proposed operating requirements should be revised.
Since liners will eventually leak, EPA should require: (1) Dewatering
prior to or as part of emplacement disposal in deep below-grade trenches;
(2) careful siting criteria specifying distance to the aquifer; and
(3) permeability limits to isolate the tailings from groundwater and
surface water. These requirements would also meet all of EPA's disposal
criteria. They should be applied to all tailings generated two years
after the effective date of this rule and to any existing piles that
cannot be shown to achieve and maintain the air, water and longevity
standards. (P-45.2, P-45.3, P-45.4, P-45.6, P-45.29, P-45.1, P-45.28)
Response: EPA agrees liners will eventually leak. However, they are
expected to maintain their integrity during the operating period. After
disposal primary reliance for groundwater protection is placed on the cap
which prevents water migration into the tailings.
Dewatering tailings as part of emplacement in deep trenches is
advantageous for groundwater protection. However, it allows increased
emissions of radon (until the trench is covered) since water is the
primary material that attenuates radon. EPA believes staged disposal
methods including deep trenches, on balance, offer environmental
advantages and encourages the use of s'uch methods for future tailings in
new impoundments. Dewatering at closure under regulations comparable to
40 CFR 264.228 is an NRC responsibility.
Specifying a (minimum) distance to the aquifer is an option for
groundwater protection. However, such a criterion implies that distance
to the aquifer, with the concurrent attenuation of hazardous constituents
by soil, is an acceptable method for groundwater protection. This
implication conflicts with the primary goal of SWDA standards for new
impoundments - no seepage of hazardous constituents into the underlying
soil or groundwater.
Permeability limits were rejected in favor of a synthetic liner
requirement during extensive consideration under the SWDA. Since UMTRCA
standards must be consistent with SWDA standards, there was no reason to
reconsider this question in these proceedings.
EPA believes it is not necessarily more protective of the environment
and public health to apply this commenter's suggested requirements to all
tailings generated two years after the effective data. New tailings
disposal methods would increase radon emissions until the old pile dries
out and is covered and would also contaminate more land.
Comment 2: EPA should (1) require all impoundments to meet the
design requirements of NRC Reg. Guide 3.11; (2) require neutralization of
process solutions; (3) specify a minimum permeability of 10~' cm/s for
liners. (P-KH2-1) .8, P-K2) .50)
A. 4-1
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Response: (1) EPA incorporated 40 CFR 264.221 into these standards,
which contains very similar requirements to NRC's Regulatory Guide 3.11.
(2) EPA reviewed the advantages and disadvantages of tailings
neutralization and concluded that a standard requiring neutralization
would be inappropriate. (See Preamble) (3) See the response to
Comment 1, A.4.0.
Comment 3: EPA should not adopt standards that interfere with
uranium sand backfilling operations. Specifically, proposed 192.32(a)
could be interpreted as requiring liners for future backfilling
operations. Such a requirement would make backfilling infeasible.
(1-6(3).73)
Response: "Backfilling" applies to placement of tailings in deep
mines. This practice has several environmental and public health
advantages and one disadvantage - the potential contamination of
groundwater. Users of this method must still comply with the narrative
requirements of 40 CFR 264.111, and NRC regulations comparable to EPA's
SWDA regulations.
A. 4-2
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A.4.1 Design and Operating Requirements for Surface Impoundments
(liner requirements. 40 CFR 264.221)
!Liner Materials!
Comment 1: Clay liners should not be allowed because they are not
impermeable and they do not allow for a leakage protection system to be
installed. Groundwater is so scarce in the West that it must be even
more stringently protected than in areas where it is plentiful.
Thus, the justification of a clay liner in western states is
ill-conceived. (I-16(H2-1).5, I-16(H2-1).2)
Response: Under the requirements of 40 CFR 264.221 which is
incorporated in UMTRCA standards, clay liners can only be used if they
"prevent the migration of any hazardous constituents into the groundwater
or surface water at any future time."
Comment 2: Clay liners are susceptible to cracking, and hence leaks,
particularly in areas of fluctuating groundwater depth. (P-8(H1).24)
Response: EPA recognizes that clay liners may leak. It seems
unlikely that a clay liner for a tailings pond will dry out until the
tailings dry out; leaks without water will be inconsequential.
Furthermore, a potential virtue of clay liners is their capacity to seal
leaks that may form because of shifting foundations, inadequate
installation, etc.
Comment 3: Use of synthetic liners will lead to a longer drying out
period and may hinder final stabilization efforts because of moisture
retention. This trapped moisture may also compromise long term
stability. (1-4(3).70, 1-4(3).90)
Response: A synthetic liner is intended to prevent the movement of
liquids from the hazardous waste, or tailings, into underlying soil or
groundwater or surface water during the operational period. The free
water will have to be removed from the impoundment before the cover is
installed. Drying out the impoundment may entail the use of evaporation
ponds, recycling of liquids, and other methods to prevent movement of
liquids into subsurface soils.
Comment4: EPA should revise its liner requirements to allow
operators the flexibility to determine the type of liner. RCRA
regulations in effect stipulate a synthetic liner unless an exemption is
granted, but. such liners are generally unworkable at tailings sites
associated with mineral extraction. Further, they require complicated
A.4-3
-------
drainage systems that require active maintenance and monitoring, which is
directly contrary to the admonition in the Mill Tailings Act that active
maintenance should be minimized. (1-6(3).56, I-6(H2).35, 1-7(2).13)
Response: As discussed in the Preamble, the final standards allow
use of either synthetic or natural liners. Under the SWDA (RCRA)
standards, liners are relied on for groundwater protection during the
operational period of an impoundment. After closure (disposal) of an
impoundment, groundwater protection is provided by the cap (cover). The
UMTRCA admonition refers to the disposal period.
Comment 5: The EPA should obtain supporting information on the
desirability of synthetic liners before requiring their use. (1-12(2).7)
Response: EPA is continuing to evaluate the performance of synthetic.
liners. Based on current information synthetic liners have a reasonable
likelihood of achieving the goal of the standards, i.e., to minimize the
migration into the environment of hazardous constituents in land disposal
units.
Comment 6 EPA's confidence in synthetic liners is without basis.
Careful site selection and clay liners is the best way to minimize
seepage and leakage. Therefore, EPA must allow the flexibility to use
natural materials for liners. (S-13(H2)
Response: Based on the goal of the standards (see response to
Comment 5 above), the EPA selected the liner material that was at least
potentially capable of meeting the goal.
Comment 7: The EPA groundwater standard should protect groundwater
on the basis of its potential use. On this basis, the EPA should allow
clay liners. (F-6(2).14)
Response: We have indicated in many other responses that standards
based on potential use would not satisfy UMTRCA's requirement for
consistency with EPA's standards for hazardous wastes. However, clay
liners are allowed, under very strict conditions. See the response to
Comment 1, A.4.1.
Comment 8: Clay liners are "impermeable" to waste constituents of
concern, despite the fact that they may not be as "impermeable" to the
actual water. This is because the clay has such ideal geochemical
removal capabilities that it allows the passage of water and certain of
the conservative contaminants such as sulfate, but fixes the bulk of the
toxic and radiochemical contaminants. (1-27.5, 1-2(2).9.)
A. 4-4
-------
Response: EPA has reviewed the performance of clay liners in
removing inorganic materials from leachate and has concluded clay liners
are not necessarily effective in removing certain hazardous inorganics,
such as selenium, arsenic, and molybdenum.
Comment 9: Section TIB of the Preamble suggests that clay liners
deteriorate under the action of acid solutions. Geochemical test work
has shown the contrary, due to the interaction between acidic solutions
and calcite minerals present in the clay. (1-27.2)
Response: The interaction of acidic solutions and calcite minerals
in clay has been considered in Appendix D of the FEIS.
Comment 10: If EPA allows clay liners it must specify the type of
clay to be used or the properties it must possess. (P-16(H2).l)
Response: There is no need to specify the type of clay or its
properties since clay can only be used as a liner material under
conditions that prevent the migration of any hazardous constituents into
the groundwater or surface water at an.y future time.
Comment 11: An effective synthetic liner system requires a double
liner and a leak detection system. Such systems are available at
reasonable cost. A single synthetic liner with groundwater monitoring
should not. be allowed since the damage is done before it is detected.
The minimum thickness for synthetic liners should be 80 mil, not the 30
mil specified by EPA for hazardous waste storage. (I-16(H2-1).1,
1-16(3).!, I-16(H2-1).3>
Response: EPA selected use of synthetic liners as a primary
standard, as specified in 40 CFR 264.221 and 264.228, after an extensive
rulemaking procedure under the SWDA. The SWDA rules recognize the
advantages of double liners, however, by exempting sites where they are
used from certain monitoring requirements. There is little reason to
reconsider such general issues in this forum.
Comment 12: Combining clay and plastic liners may be the most
effective means of retaining tailings wastes. We suggest that a typical
liner should be comprised of layers of bentonite, fabric filter, liner,
and sand. (S-1.9, P-49.9)
Response: The virtues and limitations of liner systems are discussed
in Chapter 7 of the FEIS and in the Preamble. EPA believes that all
liner systems pose some potential problems. See the response to Comment
11, A.4.1.
A. 4-5
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!Site-Specific Soil Characteristics Should Determine Need for Liners!
Comment 13: All new tailings should be placed on liners. However,
when natural material underlying the site have the characteristics of a
good liner, the requirement to use other IJner materials should be
waived. (F-1.2)
Response: The UMTRCA standards require new tailings to be placed on
liners at new tailings impoundments and extensions of existing
impoundments. However, new tailings can also be placed on existing piles
if environmental requirements are met, since this leads to lower radon
emissions and less contaminated ground surface than starting new
impoundments. There is an exemption procedure (40 CFR 264.223(b)) for
situations involving good local materials.
Comment 14: EPA estimates that for a new tailings pond (EPA model) a
clay liner would cost $12 million (1981 dollars) and a Hypalon liner
would cost $10.9 million (1980 dollars). Analyses to demonstrate the
need or lack of need for liners would be a fraction of this amount.
Contrary to EPA's conclusion discounting detailed site-specific analyses
of hazardous waste sites, the cost-benefit of analyzing the site prior to
commitment of such funds is certainly warranted. (1-1(2).10)
Response: EPA recognizes the cost advantages of not installing
liners and has provided an exemption procedure (40 CFR 264.221(b)).
Comment 15: The general requirement for synthetic liners should be
dropped and replaced with a requirement for adequate control of migration
based upon site-spec5fic characteristics, including geotechnical,
geological, hydrological data and proximity to present and future
groundwater use. Such an approach may prove in many cases that a liner
requirement is redundant for groundwater protection. (1-2(2).9, 1-30.10)
Response: EPA concluded a liner was required as part, of a
comprehensive liquid management, program during an extensive rulemaking
procedure under SWDA. It was recognized however, that at certain
locations a liner might not be needed and an exemption clause was
provided. See the response to Comment 14, A.4.1. Some, but not all of
the factors the commenter recommended are to be considered in granting an
exemption.
Comment 16: Synthetic liners do leak. Only the site-specific
characteristics of the sub-strata will determine the site-specific
impacts of a leak. (1-1(2).6)
A. 4-6
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Response: EPA agrees with this comment. The secondary standards
were written to provide protection when liners leak, including
requirements for monitoring and corrective action programs.
ISet Permeability Limits Instead of Specifying Liner Material1.
Comment 17: EPA should simply specify a minimum permeability of
10~^ cm/s for any liner. This would avoid technical disputes over what
are appropriate materials, and allow liner decisions to be made on a
site-specific basis. (P-l(2).49)
Response: EPA believes there is no need to specify a minimum
permeability for any liner since synthetic, liners are required. In
extraordinary situations where clay liners might be applicable, there are
numerous other considerations that tend to minimize the importance of the
liner permeability.
Comment 18: We support EPA's liner requirement, except there should
not be any exemptions. EPA should require any alternative to a synthetic
liner to achieve a seepage rate of less than one foot/1000 years.
(P-26.13, P-l(2)39)
Response: EPA intends the liner exemption to be applied only where
the environment would be very well protected without a liner. (See 40
CFR 264.221(b).)
\Exempt Lateral Extensions From The Liner Requirement!
Comment 19: We support EPA's intent to allow continued use of
existing piles so long as appropriate groundwater standards are met.
40 CFR 192.32 should be modified to allow lateral expansion of existing
tailings retention areas without mandating use of a liner. Since
appropriate groundwater standards must be complied with in all cases,
this proposed modification to Section D92.32 remains consistent with the
goal of protection of groundwater uses. (1-1(2).13, 1-1(2).11, T-6(3).3,
1-6(3).55, I-6(H1).17, P-24.5, 1-19.6, 1-6(4).13, 1-7(2).12, 1-7(2).15))
Response: In the mill tailings case, EPA determined that there was
no reason to allow lateral expansion of a pile without requiring a liner
or its equivalent. See the response to Comment 20, A.4.1.
Comment 20: Application of a liner to lateral expansions of existing
tailings piles is not justified. To impose a liner requirement at this
juncture will not significantly decrease any subsoil or groundwater
degradation that may have occurred to date or that could ultimately occur
from the existing portions of tailings ponds. (1-3(2).12, 1-2(2).8)
A.4-7
-------
Response: Applying a liner requirement, to lateral extensions of
existing impoundments will limit, the potential source term to that, from
the area of the existing impoundment. This could be a significant.
limitation, depending on the relative areas of the existing versus new
(lateral extensions) impoundments.
'.The No Migration Requirement Is Not Feasible Or Necessary*.
Comment 21: EPA's proposed liner requirements effectively impose the
mandatory nondegradation standard for groundwater protection developed
for hazardous wastes under SWDA.- (1-28.4)
Response: EPA knows of no rationale that would justify changing the
fundamental protection policy of nondegradation of groundwater quality.
Also, no rationale was presented in public comments that, would justify
less restrictive standards for uranium and thorium mill tailings than for
other hazardous wastes.
Comment 22: In certain cases nondegradation is too restrictive, and a
synthetic liner is not really needed. (F-3(2).12)
Response: This view was considered in the extensive rulemaking
process for developing the SWDA standards. This proceeding is not the
forum to review basic changes in the rationale for the SWDA standards.
Comment 23: The "no migration" requirement is technically unfeasible
as (1) all liners, under normal operating conditions, eventually leak,
and (2) some facilities allow leakage that actually enhances the
stability of the tailing basin structure. (1-2(2).3)
Response: The "nondegradation" or "no migration" policy of EPA is
the goal of the SWDA primary groundwater protection standard and is the
rationale for the liner requirement. Since EPA recognizes some liners
may fail, secondary standards were established as concentration limits of
hazardous constituents in groundwater based on the "nondegradation"
policy for such constituents in groundwater. Designing surface
impoundments to intentionally leak into underlying soils or groundwater
is prohibited, even if it. means a more costly design (clay core dams,
etc.). Existing impoundments that, leak may continue to be used provided
the secondary standard is satisfied, which may require corrective actions
to be taken.
Comment 24: EPA's zero discharge requirement, for new retention areas
is inconsistent, with its own findings that, "any liner will begin to leak
eventually". EPA should allow the continued use, as recommended by NRC,
of cost-effective clay liners. (1-28.5, 1-22.10, 1-9(2).6, F-6(2).2)
A. 4-8
-------
Response: EPA's analysis indicates clay and synthetic liners cost
about the same. However, synthetic liners are capable of retaining
liquids whereas clay liners allow passage of some liquids. Therefore,
synthetic liners can fulfill the groundwater protection goal and have
been adopted after an extensive rulemaking process under SWDA.
Comment 25: Ground water contamination at existing mills should be
dealt with by minimizing and containing seepage within the site
boundaries as specified by NRG guidance. Eliminating seepage is not
cost-effective or necessary to protect public health. (1-11(2).8,
1-30.11)
Response: Subject to certain criteria, the UMTRCA standards allow
the NRC to establish alternate concentration limits within the site
boundary up to 500 meters from the edge of the disposal area.
Eliminating seepage from hazardous waste management units is the goal of
EPA's program under SWDA.
Comment 26: EPA's requirements for obtaining an exemption to the
synthetic liner requirement cannot he met. How does one prove no
migration of hazardous wastes in perpetuity?
Response: 40 CFR 221(b) indicates criteria that will be considered
in this determination. Consider, too, that hazardous constituents may no
longer be mobile after a site has been closed in conformance with the
SWDA regulations.
Comment 27: Please explain the "no migration policy" of the Agency
based upon synthetic liners with a 15-year life expectancy. Why does EPA
assume a 15-year liner life when experience shows frequent failures after
one or two years?
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alternatives need further study before RCRA standards are applied to
uranium mill tailings. (F-6(2).4)
Responses: The RCRA (SWDA) rules, having been issued in their
present form in July 1982, were developed for national application to a
large number of diverse hazardous waste sites. UMTRCA, as amended,
directs EPA to issue standards for uranium mill tailings before October
1, 1983 and requires such standards for nonradiological hazards to be
consistent with the SWDA standards. We have applied modified standards
to tailings where we found differences between tailings and hazardous
wastes that justified such changes. In view of the broad applicability
and scope of the hazardous waste standards, the congressional directives,
and a lack of compelling justification in our rulemaking record that
would support deferring standards, we are issuing standards now. We note
that UMTRCA provides EPA with authority to revise the standards. EPA
intends to monitor the implementation of these standards in order to keep
informed of their workability in the present form.
Comment 29: Existing operations should not be exempted from the liner
requirements. (P-30.5, P-36.2)
Response: EPA considered this alternative and rejected it based on
the increase of radon emissions until the existing pile is dried out and
covered and also on the increased amount of land that would be
contaminated and removed from productive use, essentially forever.
However, new impoundments with liners may be the only suitable corrective
action at some existing sites where corrective actions are required.
Comment 30: EPA's provision which allows new tailings to be placed on
existing piles does not protect the public, provides an incentive to
employ substandard tailings disposal practices, and rewards producers who
contribute most to the problem. (P-4(H1).8)
Response: Requiring all new tailings be placed in lined impoundments
would provide mixed blessings. While this alternative may reduce
groundwater contamination if the new lined impoundment does not leak, it
also increases radon emission because of the larger tailings area, both
during operations and after disposal. It also contaminates more land and
effectively remove this land from production forever. On balance, EPA
believes the continued use of existing piles and impoundments is
preferrable to starting new impoundments if groundwater can be adequately
protected, as under the secondary standard.
Comment 31: Considering the experience of five New Mexico sites,
liners should be required at all existing facilities. (P-KH2-D.il)
A.4-10
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Response: See the responses ho Comments 29 and 30, A.4.1. EPA
believes alternative corrective actions should be considered and tested
before drawing blanket conclusions such as this.
Comment 32: Although liners may not be effective for long term
isolation, they provide the best currently available control and should
be required at all disposal sites. (F-3(2).9)
Response: See the responses to Comments 29 and 30, A.4.1.
! Add! ti onal Conanen ts \
Comment 33: EPA's liner requirements appear adequate to protect
groundwater. (P-9(H1).15, F-2.3, P-23.2, P-49.7)
Response: EPA agrees with this comment.
Comment 34: EPA's exception to the monitoring requirements of 40 CFR
264.228 is appropriate, since ownership will be transferred to the
government after stabilization. (1-6(3).47)
Response: EPA did not incorporate or except the monitoring
requirements of Part 264.228. The regulatory agency will establish
post-closure monitoring requirements.
Comment 3S: Tn some cases use of a liner would be technically unsound
and could create serious environmental problems. (I-6(H2).19, 1-6(4).14)
Response: This comment relates to the "bathtub" effect that can
occur in surface impoundments when there is little or no seepage through
the bottom and water is allowed to infiltrate into the impoundment. EPA
considered this condition and concluded that proper disposal methods at
"dry" sites would be likely to prevent this from occurring. At "wet"
sites, however, this condition could lead to serious environmental
problems. Therefore, the post-closure standards require a cover (cap)
that is less permeable than the liner or underlying soil at "wet" sites.
Comment 36: EPA's proposed liner requirements, without meaningful
allowance for exemptions, is arbitrary and inappropriate. As EPA
acknowledged in its FEIS on Inactive Mills, potential contamination must
be considered on a site-by-site basis. Thus, liner requirements must be
determined on the basis of site-specific factors. (1-4(3).89)
A.4-11
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Response: EPA selected standards requiring liners based on a no
migration policy after an extensive rulemaking procedure under the SWDA.
Standards under the UMTRCA are required to be generally applicable and
consistent with SWDA standards. There is no reason to treat mill
tailings differently from other wastes. The UMTRCA rulemaking procedure
is not the forum for changing basic policy and rationale regarding
groundwater protection.
Comment 37: The liner requirements are unnecessarily restrictive and
unnecessarily costly. Even without consideration of water table levels,
the requirements appear to be excessive when the attendant risks are
fully evaluated. (1-5(2).9)
Response: EPA disagrees that the liner requirements are
unnecessarily restrictive and costly. They are consistent with SWDA
requirements and EPA policy regarding groundwater protection
Comment 38: To require mill operators to transfer all tailings
already deposited in an unlined tailings pond to a lined tailings pond is
arbitrary, capricious, and a waste of money with no defined benefits. No
definable impacts have been noted and none are projected on groundwater
resources downgradient. of the authorized permit boundary. (1-1(2).26)
Response: EPA considered the costs and benefits of moving tailings
from their existing piles to lined impoundments primarily for prevention
of massive spreading of tailings by floods. Furthermore, tailings need
not be moved to comply with the groundwater standards, because other
corrective actions will usually be available. See the response to
Comment 7, A.4.2. Therefore, this alternative was not considered in the
final EIS.
Comment 39: EPA should consider osmotic action occurring within the
tailings ponds, which tends to bring vadose zone water into the ponds.
(1-27.6)
Response: EPA considered this phenomenon among others (see Chapter
3, FEJS) and concluded it would not lead to serious groundwater
contamination problems.
Comment 40: For reclamation purposes, the benefits of removing water
contained in tailings sands during operations can certainly outweigh the
benefits of preventing seepage during operations. EPA fails to address
various methods utilized to drain water retained in tailings by using
limited controlled leakage, drains on top of liners, sumps, or other
mechanisms. (1-1(2).5)
A.4-12
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Response: Water in tailings reduces radon emissions from tailings
during operations. However, to the extent that these standards are still
satisfied, water can be removed from tailings to achieve other benefits.
Closure requirements (AO CFR 264.228) for surface impoundments include
elimination of free liquids by removing liquid wastes.
Comment 41: Evaporation cannot be relied upon to significantly dry a
tailings mass due to the typically low permeability of tailings material
and the great thickness of most tailings deposits. Minimization of
seepage by use of a liner wil] result .in preservation of the saturated
condition of the tailings deposits for many years. (1-30.12)
Response: EPA considered this question and used a five year dryout
period for its analysis. The tailings will retain significant quantities
of water that is chemically attached, whether there is a liner or not.
Stabilization of piles should take place when they have dried
sufficiently to permit contouring and covering using heavy equipment.
Comment 42: It is interesting only EPA differentiates between active
(including future) and inactive sites. (1-1(2).7)
Response: There are two parts of'the Uranium Mil] Tailings Radiation
Control Act that involve EPA: Title I - Remedial Action Program, which
addresses "inactive" sites, and Title IT - Uranium Mill Tailings
Licensing and Regulations, which addresses existing and future licensed
sites. EPA is separately directed to establish standards for each part.
!Alternative Requirements'.
Comment 43: We believe siting and design of impoundments should be in
accordance with NRC Reg. Guide 3.11, except the criteria for flooding
should be the probable maximum or maximum credible event rather than a
100-year event. (P-l(2).51, P-KH2-D.8)
Response: EPA agrees with the thrust of the comment. Also, Subpart
K - Surface Impoundments (40 CFR 264.223) has requirements similar to
those of NRC's Regulatory Guide 3.11.
A.4-13
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Comment 44: EPA should adopt the provisions of NEC Reg. Guide 3.11
and the proposed NRC guide for liners at uranium mills as requirements
for all new facilities, additions to existing facilities, and disposal
sites to which existing tailings are moved. (P-26.15, P-49.10)
Response: EPA incorporates 40 CFR 264.221, which has similar
requirements to NRC's Regulatory Guide 3.11, into these UMTRCA standards
Comment 45: Disposal on barren bedrock should be prohibited if the
bedrock exhibits fracturing, faulting, or other potential stability
problems, or if it has hydraulic conductivity greater than 10~^.
(P-26.14)
Response: The comment appears reasonable.
Comment 46: A "relatively impermeable" liner is preferable to an
"impermeable" liner, as proving impermeability is difficult. Further, a
well designed cap on the tailings at the end of operations would reduce
the potential for leachate loss through a relatively impermeable liner.
(F-3(2).13)
Response: A "relatively impermeable" liner could allow seepage into
the soil underlying an impoundment or the groundwater and thus might not
achieve the environmentally preferable goal of "no seepage." The
decision will be up to the regulatory agency.
A.4-14
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A.4.2 Ground Water Protection
Comment 1: EPA seeks to prevent the addition of tailings to existing
piles, yet states, "Subsurface soils beneath existing, unlined impound-
ments are usually already contaminated. The groundwater beneath these
contaminated soils may or may not also be contaminated. However, if it
is, corrective actions must be taken to achieve compliance with the
groundwater protection standards. This situation (contaminated
subsurface soil and, possibly, groundwater) exists regardless of whether
or not new tailings are added to existing impoundments." (T-l(2).24)
Response: EPA does not seek to prevent the addition of tailings to
existing piles. The only identified situation in which these IJMTRCA
standards would cause cessation of adding tailings to existing piles is
where construction and use of a new lined tailings impoundments is the
only feasible corrective action.
Comment 2: The same site-specific considerations EPA has agreed
should govern whether and to what degree to restore an aquifer at an
inactive site should be used to evaluate the degree of protection
required for an aquifer at an active site. (1-1(2).17)
Response: Most groundwater contamination appears to be caused during
the operational period of an impoundment when process water pumped with
tailings into the impoundment creates a hydraulic head that causes
seepage into the underlying soils and aquifers. Once this pumping stops
and the pile dries, there is no driving force to cause such seepage.
Since the inactive piles have been out. of use for years, new groundwater
contamination is now thought to be slight at these sites. See the
response to Comment 16, A.4.2.1.
Comment 3: Many of the first generation uranium facilities were
sited in locations totally inappropriate to the present regulatory
climate. As a result, there has been migration of contaminants for
finite distances downgradient from the facility. Despite this,
geochemical removal mechanisms have generally been successful in cleaning
up the radiochemical and toxic, contaminants. T would recommend that the
existing sites be allowed to operate, under monitored conditions, until
the end of the useful life of the facility, at which time the site could
be reclaimed and a program of groundwater monitoring continued. (1-27.11)
Response: EPA agrees with this comment, with the addition that
corrective actions be taken at sites where the groundwater standards are
exceeded. At a minimum, these standards require that the contaminants
pose no substantial present or potential hazard.
A.4-15
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Comment 4: Because many of the existing piles already have
contaminated groundwater beyond the standards of Section 264.94(a), the
regulatory agency is going to be forced into the alternative
concentration limits of Section 264.94(b). The important thing is to
protect those groundwaters that are not yet affected and this should be
EPA's minimum performance criterion in these situations.
Response: EPA believes that, groundwaters that, are not yet
contaminated should be protected and, also, that contaminated groundwater
should be cleaned up to the extent required by the secondary standard.
Comment. 5: We believe the concept of primary groundwater protection
should be followed, but the rules should allow seepage requirements to be
established for each site based on site-specific conditions. (F-3(2).14,
1-4(3).103)
Response: In rare instances site-specific conditions can be
considered to allow exemptions from the liner requirements under 40 CFR
264.22Kb). Site-specific conditions can be considered for existing
sites regarding monitoring programs and corrective action requirements,
and in determining whether exceptions to the basic requirements of the
secondary standard should be allowed.
Comment 6: Ground water must, be protected. (P-6(2).l)
Response: EPA agrees with this comment.
Comment 7: The EPA should describe those cases where "more permanent
protection" for tailings disposal sites is required, and proposed 40 CFR
Part 192 should indicate, with such specificity as is reasonably
possible, when an alternate site for processing operations or disposal
shall be used. (S-5.12)
Response: Choosing alternative sites is simply a method for
satisfying the standards, not a component of the standards per se. We
discussed using alternative sites (Preamble to proposed standards, page
19590) to indicate that such methods should be considered when engineered
protection measures could not assure adequate long-term control of water
pollution at an existing tailings site. Based on site-specific factors
the regulatory Agency should decide when alternative siting is necessary
for compliance with the standards. See the response to Comment 38, A.4.1.
Comment 8: Where tailings piles extend below the water table,
removal of the piles to other sites or special isolation measures, such
as containment walls or slurry dikes, should be considered. (F-l.l)
A.4-16
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Response: EPA agrees. The post-closure standard adopts by reference
40 CFR 264.111, which requires the facility to be closed in a manner that
controls, minimizes, or eliminates post-closure escape of such leachate
to the groundwater.
A.4-17
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A.4.2.1 Standards (40 CFR 264.92)
JBasis for Standards (40 CRF 264.92)\
Comment 1: EPA clearly has the statutory and regulatory authority to
prevent movement of radioactive and toxic materials into groundwater of
current or future use at the point of use. (P-l(2).l)
Response: EPA agrees with this comment.
Comment 2: We believe nondegradation is the proper standard, but
question the ability of synthetic liners to restrict water and
contaminants from reaching the groundwater. (P-3(2)-3)
Response: See the response to Comment 27 of Section A.4.1.
Comment 3: A certain degree of misfit is evident when trying to adapt
RCRA regulations to uranium tailings management. (1-10.3)
Response: EPA considers that certain of its responsibilities for
hazardous wastes controlled under the SWDA, as amended, are made the
responsibility of the U.S. NRC under the UMTRCA. Examples of these
responsibilities are listed in the Preamble.
Comment 4: On what basis does EPA conclude that radionuclides and
heavy metals in the seepage will not reach groundwater? It is common
knowledge that it is very difficult to remove these contaminants once
they reach groundwater.
Response: EPA did not conclude that radionuclides and heavy metals
will not reach groundwater. Nondegradation standards and concentration
limit standards are established for these substances.
Comment 5: EPA has interpreted Section 275b.(2) as requiring
regulation of nonhazardous constituents to be the same as regulations
under Subtitle C of SWDA. We believe that a consistent reading of
Sections 275b(2) and 84a(3) of the AEA allows EPA more latitude, and thus
EPA can formulate less rigid and restrictive groundwater standards.
(F-6(2).5)
Response: The statute requires that the standards be "consistent."
EPA interprets this to mean that it should follow SWDA standards unless a
reasonable basis for differentiation exists between mill tailings and
hazardous wastes.
A.4-18
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Comment 6: EPA has not adequately considered the voluminous evidence
in the literature and in Federal Government contractor reports that
conflict with EPA's assumptions on the need to control tailings and
seepage from tailings. (1-30.9)
Response: EPA established the SWDA standards and regulations after
an extensive rulemaking procedure which included consideration of a vast
quantity of information.
Comment 7: EPA should not allow degradation of existing groundwater
supplies from their current or potential use. But, we do not support
EPA's proposal to subject uranium processing operations to the
groundwater standards developed for community drinking water supplies and
applied to hazardous waste facilities under SWDA. (1-4(3).92, 1-5(2).6,
1-6(3).6, 1-6(3).62, 1-11(2).5, F-6(2).l, F-6(2).6, F-6(2).14, 1-30.15,
1-10(2).13, 1-10(2).15, 1-10(2).16, 1-4(3).103, 1-7(2).7, 1-10(2).15,
1-10(2).13, S-12(H2).10, I-6(H2).14, S-13(H2).3, P-28.5, 1-22.13)
Response: The major issues raised in these comments were considered
by EPA in establishing the SWDA standards for hazardous waste
facilities. Congress directed EPA to issue standards for uranium mill
tailings that are consistent with the SWDA standards. A fundamental goal
of the SWDA standards is to protect groundwater from degradation by
waste, in the first instance by preventing contaminants from entering the
ground, and, failing that, by preventing hazardous constituents from
degrading the quality of groundwater. The SWDA standards provide for
exemptions from and alternatives to the basic standards to be granted
site-specifically, when doing so would not pose "a substantial present or
potential hazard to human health or the environment." Granting such
exemptions and alternatives is based on examination of certain specified
factors (see 40 CFR 264.93(b) and 40 CFR 264...94(b)) , which include most
of the factors the commenters would have EPA consider in establishing
standards. The standards we are issuing for uranium mill tailings are
consistent with the SWDA standards; standards based on the commenter's
recommendations would be inconsistent.
Comment 8: There is no reasonable basis for imposing radium and gross
alpha concentrations developed for drinking water systems to unused (and
often unusable) aquifers, at locations long devoted to mineral
extraction, or at locations where such limits would foreclose the
development of resources. (1-6(3).67)
Response: Water whose radium and gross alpha concentrations are
lower than the values in Table A (which are the same as in EPA's drinking
water standards) may be degraded up to those values under the UMTRCA
standard. Water whose "background" concentrations of these substances
exceeds the
A.4-19
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values in Table A may not be degraded by tailings. This standard follows
the environment and health protection policy adopted in the SWDA
regulations for nonradioactive substances. Some of the factors the
commenter discusses may be taken into account in determining
site-specifically whether alternative concentration standards are to be
granted. Also see the response to Comment 1, A.A.2.3.
Comment 9: EPA's proposed nondegradation standard for uranium which
protects all groundwater regardless of potential use or cost of control
is contrary to radiation protection philosophy and ALARA. (P-9(3).13)
Response: We don't consider this a radiation standard. Based on
their presence in tailings, their environmental mobility, and their
toxicity, we added uranium and molybdenum to the list of hazardous
constituents for this rule. These substances thereby become subject to
the standards EPA had already adopted for nonradioactive hazardous
constituents under the SWDA. See the response to Comment 7, 4.2.1.
Comment 10: EPA's nonmigration standards do not take into account
either the fact that some facilities were designed to allow limited
seepage to enhance stability, or the difficulty in installing a retention
system that will not leak over the 200-1000 year regulatory time frame.
EPA should take these facts into account and propose standards based on
the quality of use concept used by some states. (1-25.3, 1-20.3)
Response: With respect to the operating period of the mill, see the
response to Comment 7, A.4.2. With respect to the post-closure period
the applicable requirement is to close the impoundment in a manner that
...controls, minimizes, or eliminates, to the extent necessary to prevent
threats to human health and the environment, post-closure escape..." of
hazardous waste, etc. After closure, whether or not the system was
designed to leak during operations is not material; the primary method of
satisfying the closure standard is to keep water from entering the
impoundment.
Comment 11: Ground water resources can be adequately protected by
allowing some degradation within groundwater classifications based on
both current and reasonable future use. Where the current and future
impacts on groundwater resources have not only been defined, but also
mitigated via containment in a "buffer zone", protection of public health
and the environment is secured. 1-1(2).22, 1-1(2).18)
Response: See the response to Comment 7, A.4.2.1. Note that the
final standard provides a feature (192.32(a)(2)(iv)) that some people may
regard as permitting a very limited "buffer zone."
A.4-20
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Comment 12: EPA should base its standards on nonimpairment of use
(the quality of use concept), and should provide an exemption procedure
if the licensee can show the costs of meeting the standards outweigh the
benefits and compliance is not necessary to protect public health and the
environment. (1-10(2).19, 1-10(2).18)
Response: See the response to Comment 7, A.4.2.1.
\The Standards Have No Risk Basis or Are Unsubstantiated1.
Comment 13: The proposed standards are not health based, and are
impractical, arbitrary, unlawful, and inconsistent with existing
regulations without a reasonable basis. EPA should adopt standards
similar to New Mexico's. (1-7(2).2, 1-7(2).5)
Response: See the response to Comment 7, A.4.2.1.
Comment 14: EPA's proposed nondegradation standard is arbitrary in
that it ignores the benefits of the activity, fails to identify any
adverse effects on public health, protects all groundwater without regard
to potential use, and ignores costs. "(1-4(3).93, 1-6(3).58, 1-6(3).52)
Response: See the response to Comment 7, A.4.2.1.
Comment 15: EPA's authority to regulate radiological and
nonradiological hazards associated with uranium mill tailings derives
soley from Section 275, of the Atomic Energy Act. This authority is
limited to protecting public health and safety and the environment from
significant risks. Since EPA has not established that: (1) Significant
groundwater contamination has occurred as a result of seepage from
tailings; (2) The public has been exposed to such contamination
groundwater; and, (3) That such exposure may cause adverse health
effects, EPA has failed to establish that a significant risk exists.
Therefore, its proposed groundwater standard is illegal. (1-4(3).82)
Response: UMTRCA requires EPA to establish standards that protect
the environment as well as health.
Comment 16: EPA has failed to demonstrate that groundwater has been
significantly contaminated by seepage from uranium mill tailings. This
view is supported by the fact that when the EPA decided to reject the
option of setting uniform groundwater standards for inactive sites, it
did so in recognition of the lack of data demonstrating such
contamination. Also that there is not significant contamination from
inactive sites is supported by the testimony of Dr. Thomas Shepherd
A.4-21
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(F-5(H2).4), presented at the June 15, 1983, Denver, Colorado, Public
Hearing on 40 CFR 192. (1-4(3).84)
Response: This rulemaking concerns standards for active uranium
mills, including for the operational period when large amounts of water
may be discharged to the ground via a tailings pile. The FEIS reviews
existing groundwater contamination near active sites, and notes instances
where corrective actions had been found necessary even before EPA
proposed these standards. Dr. Shepherd's testimony indicated that under
certain circumstances contamination of groundwater near inactive sites
did not occur, because the water table was very deep. In other cases
contamination by hazardous substances was limited. These generalities
from incomplete studies of inactive sites do not justify ignoring
evidence of contamination from active sites, nor the obligation to
monitor the sites to determine whether significant contamination is
present or might occur. Such decisions for an operating facility require
standards, which, to be fairly applied, should be generally applicable.
Congress directed EPA to issue standards for tailings that are consistent
with EPA's standards for hazardous wastes. See the response to
Comment 2, A.4.2.
Comment 17: EPA has failed to demonstrate that the public may be
exposed to groundwater contamination from uranium mill tailing sites, but
merely speculates on the possibility that contamination from the tailings
is possible and could affect crops, animals, and people. Tailings sites
are isolated from current and potential population centers, and neither
the FEIS for inactive standards nor the DEIS for those proposed for
active sites present any factual material showing the existence of any
present exposure or likely future exposure. (1-4(3).83)
Response; See the responses to Comments 7, 15, and 16, A.4.2.1.
Comment 18: The only scientific data on which the EPA seems to be
basing the proposed regulations are the elevated contaminant
concentrations which the EPA claims to have observed in groundwater at
seven active sites identified in the DEIS for active sites. The data
relied on by EPA in the DEIS and the conclusions EPA has drawn from it
are suspect. Independent studies (see Appendix V at 4-8, of 1-4(2)
submittal) on the data at three of these seven sites do not confirm the
data accepted by the EPA. (1-4(3).85)
Response: Tables 3-2 and 3-3 of the FEIS show that hazardous
constituents are present in tailings piles. Considering the high
qualifications of some investigators, the number of instances of
groundwater "contamination," and the theoretical reasons for believing
contamination from active mills could occur, this controversy over
aspects of the data does not dissuade us from concluding that seepage
from piles should be regarded as a potential hazard that it is prudent to
control.
A.4-22
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IEPA Should Not Issue Design Standards!
Comment 19: EPA should modify its groundwater standard to establish
protection of groundwater as the primary standard and leave design
requirements to the regulatory agency. The standard should include: a
leak detection system to monitor the upper most aquifer underlying the
site, to provide immediate notice of liner failure and to function to
recover contaminants before they contaminate the aquifer being protected;
corrective action to restore degraded aquifers so sites can be released
for unrestricted use; and a post-closure monitoring period to assure
compliance with the standard for a reasonable period after close-out.
(S-3(2).12)
Response: The requirements the commenter recommends are incorporated
in the EPA's regulations for hazardous wastes. In our view, they are
primariliy regulatory functions. Therefore, under UMTRCA, the regulatory
agency is responsible for issuing regulations covering these functions,
comparable to corresponding regulations EPA has issued for hazardous
waste under the SWDA.
Comment 20. EPA should establish a standard of performance that will
assure safe utilizations of groundwater resources and permit the experts
in engineering to design the most cost-effective approach to meet the
standard for particular site-specific conditions. 1-1(2).8
Response: EPA is required to establish generally applicable
standards that are consistent with EPA's standards for hazardous wastes
under the SWDA. The latter standards include both design and performance
requirements. Engineers have considerable, though bounded, discretion
regarding site-specific methods of compliance.
Comment 21: EPA should set forth general guidance principles in its
regulations, similar to the quality of use concept. Classification of
use, locations of monitor wells, determination of monitoring limits, and
exemptions should be left to NRG and the Agreement States. This approach
would be in keeping with Congressional intent and allow the flexibility
to consider site-specific conditions. (1-25.A)
Response: General guidance principles, in this instance, are no
substitute for issuing generally applicable standards that are consistent
with the standards EPA has issued for hazardous wastes under the SWDA, as
UMTRCA requires.
Comment 22: EPA's adoption of detailed design standards developed
under SWDA fails to recognize the difference between low toxicity, high
volume tailings wastes and high toxicity, low volume hazardous wastes.
This is contrary to Congressional intent. When EPA has completed its
A.4-23
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required study of hazards associated with mining wastes, it should issue
generally applicable performance standards mandating consideration of
site-specific characteristics. Design standards should be left to the
regulatory authorities. (I-4(H2).14, 1-1(2).16)
Response: EPA disagrees. See the responses to Comments 7 and 20,
A.4.2.1. (EPA has also completed a study required by UMTRCA of the
hazards of uranium mining wastes.)
!The Standards Should Conform With State Regulations!
Comment 23; EPA should modify its proposed standards for
groundwater to include the alternative of complying with Agreement
States' groundwater requirements. (1-6(3).61, I-6(H2).13, I-6(H1).20,
S-3(2).10, S-3(2).ll, 1-30.16)
Response: See the response to Comments 7, A.4.2.1. We note further
that most states do not have groundwater protection requirements.
Comment 24: EPA should not only defer primacy in regulating
groundwater resources to the appropriate States (Wyoming being a prime
example), but also should support classification of waters predicated on
use. (1-1(2).19, 1-12(2).6)
Response: See the responses to Comments 7 and 23, A.4.2.1.
Comment 25: EPA should adopt regulations similar to New Mexico's
which protect groundwater at the point of reasonably foreseeable future
use. This approach implicitly recognizes the complexities of the
geochemical behavior of the elements of concern, the difficulties of
establishing background, and the beneficial chemical reactions that occur
in the subsurface. (I-6(H2).25)
Response: See the response to Comments 7 and 23, A.4.2.1.
Comment 26: EPA's proposed standards address only human hazards, and
although nondegradation is envisioned this performance standard seems to
become secondary to the synthetic liner standard. Wyoming's approach,
where established minimum performance standards allow some degradation
but protect all groundwater according to its potential uses, seems
preferable to relying on synthetic liners. If a liner fails the Agency
will be forced to retreat to some unacceptable level of protection.
(S-3(2).7, S-3(2).9)
A.4-24
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Response: EPA's standard is designed to protect both human health
and the environment. If a liner fails, the secondary standard provides
fully adequate protection of human health and the environment. Also see
the response to Comment 7, A.4.2.1.
IThe Standards Are Contrary To EPA's Underground Injection Program!
Comment 27: EPA's proposed nondegradation standard is contrary to the
Agency's underground injection control program under the Safe Drinking
Water Act. The underground injection program, which applies to in situ
extraction, protects only underground sources of drinking water.
Requiring conventional milling operations to protect all groundwater is
arbitrary and places them at a competitive disadvantage. (1-4(3).95,
1-6(3).60, 1-7(2).4, 1-7(2).15)
Response: UMTRCA requires the standards for uranium mill tailings to
be consistent with EPA's standards for hazardous waste established under
the Solid Waste Disposal Act, as amended. Consistency with requirements
established for different circumstances under different authorities is
not required.
Comment 28: EPA's stringent nondegradation standards are in direct
conflict to the Agency's underground injection control program.
(1-1(2).20)
Response: See the response to Comment 27, A.4.2.1.
!Additional Comments'.
Comment 29: EPA should establish a general groundwater standard
protecting existing and probable uses of groundwater against significant
degradation. The standard should apply at the boundary line of the
property. (1-13(2).!)
Response; See the response to Comment 7, A.4.2.1.
Comment 30: It is sufficient to question whether groundwater
resources (80% of the potable water supply in the United States comes
from groundwater resources) in the vicinity of a tailings pile are of
sufficient quantity and quality to motivate an individual to choose to
construct a home at the edge of a tailings pile. (1-1(2).40)
A.4-25
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Response: See the response to Comment 7, A.4.2.1. EPA has
determined, in effect, that an appropriate public health and
environmental protection policy for groundwater renders such questions
immaterial. That is, if the water is not degraded, then the presence of
a nearby tailings pile needn't restrain the uses of the surrounding land.
Comment 31: EPA's nondegradation and no migration standards represent
an illegal taking against the mill owners. The standards presume that
the mill owner install systems requiring no future maintenance or
monitoring to comply. This is beyond the authority of the Atomic Energy
Act (as amended by the UMTRCA), which provides for the government to
assume ownership of the land and to maintain the tailings and the
groundwater influenced by the tailings. (1-7(2).11)
Response: UMTRCA is clear in requiring disposal regulations that
minimize the need for future monitoring and maintenance. UMTRCA provides
NRC with authority to require financial assurances from licensees to
support such post-disposal functions as it (NRC) may determine are
necessary.
Comment 32: In its preamble to the proposed regulations, EPA failed
to explain why groundwater protection standards will not be established
in a permit until after hazardous constituents have already entered the
groundwater. (1-4(3).72)
Response: That is the procedure followed by the SWDA regulations.
The point is that one doesn't know what substances will appear in the
groundwater until they appear. The resources necessary for establishing
site-specific license requirements, including determinations of
background levels and consideration of exemptions and alternatives, would
be wasted if they were applied to the hundreds of hazardous constituents
covered by the standards for the operational period unless as is
exceedingly unlikely, all the substances were actually present in the
groundwater.
Comment 33: Most existing tailings ponds were designed to seep and
will be unlikely to meet the drinking water standards being imposed by
EPA. Since the proposed standards cannot be met, the standards are, in
effect, "ensure" standards--! .e. , a shutdown order for existing uranium
tailings operations. (1-1(2).15)
Response: The standards provide for implementing a corrective action
program designed to achieve compliance (40 CFR 192.33).
A.4-26
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Comment 34: EPA's secondary groundwater protection standards will
cost hundreds of millions of dollars. The standards will force closure
of many processing facilities. (1-1(2).21)
Response: See the response to Comment 8, Section A.3.3.
Comment 35: EPA's nondegradation and no-migration standards are
directly contrary to New Mexico's water law. By imposing such stringent
standards, EPA intrudes upon areas of law traditionally left to the
States. (1-7(2).6)
Response: See the response to Comment 7, A.4.2.1. EPA is acting
under a Federal law that specifically directs the Agency to establish
national environmental and health protection standards for uranium mill
tailings that are consistent with national standards for hazardous wastes
Comment 36: If air emissions are evaluated according to some
comparative risk analysis, it seems appropriate to evaluate any proposed
water effluent standards in the same manner. (1-5(2).10)
Response: Congress provided little specific guidance regarding
standards for substances emitted to air, so the Agency evaluated and
considered all relevant factors. UMTRCA, however, does require
consistency between standards for nonradioactive substances from tailings
and standards for nonradioactive substances from hazardous waste. The
latter standards relate primarily to waterborne pathways. Therefore,
major aspects of water protection policies for tailings were established
and implemented by EPA* s rulemakings under the SWDA for hazardous
wastes. We note, in addition, that it is much more difficult to
quantitatively evaluate the general risks from radioactive and
nonradioactive substances in groundwater than for radioactivity emissions
to the air. The FEIS discusses the toxicology of such substances through
waterborne pathways, but for the reasons stated above, it does not
systematically compare risks under alternative levels of control.
Comment 37: The groundwater constituents to be monitored (under
Appendix VIII of 40 CFR 264.99(f)) are not appropriate to the uranium
milling process. Requiring analysis of these constituents is arbitrary
and potentially very expensive. (1-9(2).8, 1-6(3).48, 1-7(2).1,
1-10(2).15)
Response: According to 40 CFR 264.93(a), the standard applies only
to substances that "are reasonably expected to be in or derived from
waste contained in" uranium mill tailings piles. We have identified
40 CFR 264.99 as an area of regulation that NRC must address in carrying
out its responsibilites under UMTRCA. EPA's concurrence is required to
the effect that NRC's regulations in this area are comparable to EPA's
A.4-27
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requirements for hazardous wastes. At the appropriate time, EPA will
consider whether any monitoring requirements NEC proposes for uranium
mill sites are consistent with the corresponding requirements of 40 CFR
264.99. We anticipate that eliminating monitoring requirements for
constituents listed in Appendix VIII that could not be related to
tailings piles would be consistent with the hazardous waste
requirements. However, the possibility that such constituents may be
produced by chemical reactions involving nonconstituents would have to be
carefully considered.
A.4-28
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A.A.2.2 Hazardous Constituents (40 CFR 264.93)
!Overall Comments!
Comment 1; Many of the constituents of concern in tailings are also
found at some concentration in the soils underlying the waste piles.
Whether this occurs with an inactive, existing or new pile, it does not
indicate that these hazardous constituents are migrating from the
tailings impoundment. (1-30.14)
Response: The hazardous constituents are to be monitored in the
uppermost aquifer at the point of compliance (40 CFR 264.95 and 40 CFR
264.97(a)), and not in the soils underlying tailings piles. The test of
the secondary standard is whether the monitored levels exceed the
previously determined background levels.
Comment 2: EPA should provide performance criteria for
"nonhazardous" as well as hazardous constituents. (S-3(2).8)
Response: Analyzing water samples for the substances (non-hazardous)
from tailings that are expected to be.most mobile in a given groundwater
environment is a very useful feature of site-specific monitoring
requirements. The regulatory agencies may establish such monitoring
requirements.
Comment 3: We support adding uranium and molybdenum to the list of
hazardous constituents. (P-26.18, P-22(H2).7, P-49.8)
Response: No response needed.
!Adding Uranium and Molybdenum Is Without Basis!
Comment 4: To categorize the uranium processing industry as
hazardous waste facilities subject to the hazardous waste regulations by
arbitrarily categorizing uranium and molybdenum as hazardous is analogous
to begging the question. (1-1(2).14)
Response: EPA does not categorize the uranium processing industry as
hazardous. EPA categorized uranium and molybdenum as hazardous for the
tailings or wastes produced by the extraction or concentration of uranium
or thorium from any ore processed primarily for its source material
content. There are other already-categorized hazardous constituents in
such tailings. EPA lists uranium and molybdenum as hazardous for UMTRCA
standards only. EPA does not add uranium and molybdenum to Appendix VIII
of 40 CFR 261 in this action.
A.4-29
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Comment 5; EPA's listing of uranium as a hazardous waste before
completing the Congressionally mandated report to Congress and the
rulemaking procedure on the desirability of applying RCRA requirements to
the uranium industry is arbitrary, capricious and unlawful. (1-20.6)
Response: UMTRCA requires EPA to set standards for nonradiological
hazards from tailings which are consistent with standards for such
hazards under Subtitle C of SWDA, as amended.
Comment 6 : No public health basis exists for adopting nondegradation
standards for uranium and molybdenum. EPA's nondegradation proposal for
these constituents does not constitute reasoned rule-making. If
regulation is imposed, it should be as Table 1 contituents. 1-4(3). 96,
. 94)
Response: EPA considered the health risks from uranium and
molybdenum (Appendix C, FEIS) and concludes that a sufficient basis
exists to list them as hazardous constituents for purposes of UMTRCA.
Uranium and molybdenum are to be controlled on a nondegradation basis
similar to numerous other hazardous constituents because there is not a
scientific consensus on safe concentrations.
Comment 7: Molybdenum should not be listed as a hazardous
constituent. First, EPA has not demonstrated that the toxicity risk
justifies imposition of standards. And second, EPA has not followed its
own procedures and methodologies for listing hazardous constituents under
Subtitle C of RCRA. I-18(H2).l)
Response: Molybdenum is classified as a hazardous constituent for
purposes of UMTRCA only. It is not added to Appendix VIII—Hazardous
Constituents of 40 CFR 216. EPA reviewed toxicity information for
molybdenum and concludes there is sufficient evidence to support
controlling molybdenum from uranium tailings (see Appendix C of the FEIS
for Inactive Uranium Mill Tailings).
Comment 8: I am not aware of any showing of hazard of molybdenum to
humans. Molybdenum, therefore, should not be added to the list of
hazardous constituents. (1-27.7)
Response: See the response to Comment 7, A.4.2.2 above. Molybdenum
has been shown toxic to livestock (see Appendix C of FEIS for Inactive
Uranium Mill Tailings).
A.4-30
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Comment 9: EPA's proposed nondegradation for uranium is not
supported on the basis of scientific evidence. There are no radiological
or chemical toxicity effects associated with levels much higher than EPA
proposes, and thus there are no benefits associated with the proposed
limits. (1-6(3).69, 1-10(2).17)
Response: EPA's policy of nondegradation of groundwater was
established after an extensive rulemaking procedure. Commenters
disclosed no reason to treat tailings differently. Uranium is
radioactive and radioactive contamination of groundwater is incompatible
with nondegradation, apart from health risks. There is no
EPA-established concentration limit for uranium in water; therefore,
EPA concludes uranium should be controlled similarly to other hazardous
constituents with no established limits. Also see the response to
Comment 9, A.4.2.1.
Comment 10: The mere fact uranium and molybdenum have never been
listed in the National Primary Drinking Water Standards provides
sufficient evidence these metals have shown insufficient hazard to date
to warrant regulating. (1-1(2).27)
Response: Adding uranium to groundwater is incompatible with
nondegradation. Because uranium is radioactive, any exposure to uranium
represents a health risk. Molybdenum may have a threshold for toxicity.
However, this has not been established and EPA chooses to control
molybdenum similarly to many other toxic substances for which thresholds
have not been established.
Comment. 11: We oppose adding uranium and molybdenum to the list of
hazardous substances, as this imposes nondegradation as the governing
groundwater standard for these elements. (1-9(2).3, P-6(3).8)
Response: See the response to Comment 4, A.4.2.2.
Comment 12: Since uranium levels in drinking water supplies range
from 0.01-653 pCi/1, and intakes five times the ICRP 30 and 10 CFR 20
levels of 100 ug/kg are safe, uranium should not be listed as a hazardous
material. (1-2(2).5, 1-25.5)
Response: See the response to Comment 9, A.4.2.2.
A.4-31
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IEPA Should Consider Other Constituents'.
Comment 13: All potential hazardous contaminants in mill tailings
should be specified and assessed by the Agency and, where appropriate,
added to the list of hazardous constituents. (S-5.7)
Response: EPA reviewed and considered potentially hazardous
constituents in uranium mill tailings (see Chapter 3 of FEIS).
Monitoring requirements in the SWDA rules (40 CFR 264.97 through 264.99)
provide assurance that any seepage of hazardous constituents from
tailings will be found and identified. As we note in the Preamble, NRC
must adopt "at least comparable" monitoring requirements for tailings
sites.
Comment 14: EPA should cover sulphate and chloride, as these can
degrade water to the point that it is unuseable. (P-14(H2).4)
Response: This is required of the regulatory agencies regardless of
whether or not EPA sets standards, as an early warning monitoring
requirement.
Comment 15: Some mention of thorium should be made as a potentially
hazardous constituent of mill tailings. (F-3(2).l)
Response: Thorium is included in the consideration of hazardous
constituents in tailings and in groundwater in Chapter 3 of the FEIS.
Also, thorium in groundwater is limited by the gross alpha-particle
activity in Table A of the UMTRCA standards.
Comment 16: Sulfates and nitrates should have been considered in
determining hazardous constituents from tailings. (F-3(2).9, S-3(H2).9)
Response: See the response to Comment 14, A.4.2.2, and Appendix C of
the FEIS.
A.4-32
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A.4.2.3 Concentration Limits (40 CFR 264.94)
!Overall Comments'.
Comment 1: Adoption of the specific standards embodied in 40 CFR
294.94, Table 1 is unreasonable since these standards were developed for
community water systems. (1-6(3).62, 1-20.4, 1-23.2, 1-25.2, 1-19.7)
Response: The concentration limit standards in Table 1, 40 CFR 264.94
are directly from the National Interim Primary Drinking Water Regulations.
These standards were selected since they assure that the action level is
directly related to the protection of human health or the environment
(see the Federal Register notice for the SWDA standards, 47FR32274 dated
July 26, 1982). This selection is in keeping with the EPA goal of
protection of groundwater quality for future uses. Also see the response
to Comment 8, A.4.2.1.
Comment 2: Many of the concentration limits in Table 1 (e.g.,
selenium, molybdenum) are arbitrary in that they do not reflect levels
required to assure that water is safe for human consumption. Indeed, the
levels specified may adversely affect the public health. (1-6(3).63),
1-6(3).68, 1-20.4, I-6(H2).15, 1-6(3).7)
*
Response: Neither Table 1 of 40 CFR 264.94 nor Table A of
40 CFR 192.32 include molybdenum. EPA recognizes that a balance must be
struck for these elements between what level is needed for human health
and what level is toxic. Also see Appendix D, Section 4.2, of the FEIS
for inactive sites (EPA 520/4-82-013-2).
Comment 3: The "gross alpha" parameter was originally intended as a
screening device to detect if there were other radionuclides present. It
was not intended as a regulatory device. (1-27.9)
Response: Regardless of the original intent of the gross alpha
"parameter," a gross alpha maximum contaminant level of 15 pCi/liter
serves to protect the environment and public health. See the response to
Comment 11, A.4.2.3.
Comment 4: I recommend continuing to utilize radium-226 as the
radionuclide of concern (as opposed to combining radium-226 and
radium-228), since it is the one liberated in the activities under
consideration. (1-27.8)
Response: EPA wishes to retain consistency with the SWDA standards,
which adopted the NIPDWR values without modification as Maximum
Concentration of Constituents for Groundwater Protection, Table 1, 40 CFR
A.4-33
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264.94. Radium-228 generally will be present in tailings, though in
lower amounts than radium-226. If site-specific conditions warrant, a
mill operator may be granted an alternate standard under 40 CFR 264.94(b)
Comment 5; Why didn't EPA issue uranium and molybdenum water
concentration limits for comment? (S-12(H2).9)
Response; At present there is no scientific consensus as to what
constitutes "safe" levels of uranium and molybdenum in water.
Comment 6: Why do the regional EPA administrators have the power to
establish higher concentration limits for hazardous constituents without
public notice? (P-8(Hl).ll)
Response: These UMTRCA standards are intended to be consistent with
SWDA standards for nonradiological hazards. Although the SWDA
regulations require no public comment opportunity for alternate standards
established by the Regional Administrator, 40 CFR 264.93(b) and 264.94(b)
specify the criteria that must be used.
!t/ranium, Radium and Gross Alpha Limits!
Comment 7: EPA should adopt A 5-10 pCi/1 concentration limit for
uranium, since its radiotoxicity is similar to radium. (P-30.2)
Response: See the response to Comment 5, A.4.2.3.
Comment 8: EPA's conservative risk model projects an annual risk of
approximately 1.5 in a million from consuming water containing 5 pCi/1 of
radium. This risk is insignificant. EPA should adopt the ICRP II
recommended value of 30 pCi/1. (1-6(3).66)
Response: EPA estimates the annual risk for intake of 5 pCi/1 of
radium-226 in drinking water to be 1.5 in 1 million. The lifetime risk
is thus about 1 in 10,000, which is relatively high compared to other
risks from hazardous constituents. Therefore, EPA concludes that the
5 pCi/1 limit for radium-226 in drinking water should not be increased.
Comment 9; It should be noted that numerous sites around existing
uranium mill tailings have natural radium-226 concentrations greater than
the proposed limit. (1-27.10)
A.4-34
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Response: 40 CFR 262.94, which is incorporated in these UMTRCA
standards, requires that hazardous constituents listed in Table 1 (or
Table A in these UMTRCA standards) must not be caused to exceed the
concentration listed in the tables if the background level of the
constituent is below the value given in the tables. If the background
level of a hazardous constituent exceeds the value given in the tables,
the concentration must not be caused to exceed the background level.
Comment 10: EPA's proposed concentration limits of 5 pCi/1 and 15
pCi/1 for radium and gross alpha, respectively, in groundwater is
unreasonable when one considers that many public drinking water systems
in the United States have levels in excess of 5 pCi/1. (1-5(2).7,
1-6(3).64, 1-20.5)
Response; EPA's nondegradation policy, as described in establishing
the SWDA standards, has the goal of protecting groundwater resources for
future use. As such, it has no relationship to existing concentrations
of hazardous constituents in drinking water. In any case, EPA estimated
when it established the radium limit in drinking water that only about
1 percent of community supplies would be affected (EPA 570/9-76-003).
Comment 11: EPA should drop the proposed 15 pCi/1 gross alpha limit.
After deletion of uranium and radon, this number is so low and inaccurate
as to be meaningless. (S-12(H2).4)
Response: The gross alpha concentration limit is specified to assure
control of alpha emitting radionuclides in water other than uranium and
radon. For example, concentrations of 110 and 80 pCi/1 of thorium-230 in
shallow aquifers near active tailings piles have been reported. (See
Table 3-4, FEIS) . A limit is needed to assure control of such
contamination.
A.4-35
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A.4.2.4 Point of Compliance (40 CFR 264.95)
Comment 1: EPA's proposed point of compliance at the edge of the
pond cannot be met by any existing pond or technology. Thus, EPA's
proposed standards will force closure, even though no exposure occurs at
the point of compliance. EPA should consider this in its assessment of
cost-effectiveness. (1-4(3).86, 1-4(3).88, 1-4(3).99)
Response: EPA has no information that would indicate all existing
tailings impoundments either presently or after corrective actions would
fail to comply with the secondary standard. However, the SWDA rules,
which we have adopted for uranium and thorium mills, permit establishing
site-specific exemptions from and alternatives to the basic requirements
of the secondary standard where to do so would pose no substantial hazard
to public health or the environment. We expect many operators of
existing mills to seek such alternatives. Therefore, we have established
an efficient administrative procedure whereby the regulatory agencies may
approve such requests from existing mills without EPA's concurrence when
the basic secondary standard would be exceeded only at onsite locations
closer than 500 meters from the tailings. Otherwise, EPA's concurrence
with such decisions will be required. The point of compliance, however,
remains at the edge of the impoundment. EPA believes that any
alternative to permit contamination that would pose a substantial hazard
could not be cost-effective in protecting health and the environment.
Also see the response to Comment 2, A.4.2.5.
Comment 2: The point of compliance monitoring should be determined
by the NRC or Agreement States based on site-specific factors. The point
of compliance should be outside the site boundary at the point of current
or reasonably foreseeable future use. (1-4(3).104, 1-4(3).87, 1-7(2).9,
1-7(2).10, 1-7(2).15)
Response: The point of compliance is an important element of the
SWDA standards for groundwater protection. EPA established the point of
compliance at the edge of the impoundment to implement the goal of the
standards that there be no seepage into underlying soils or the uppermost
aquifer from hazardous waste units, and to provide the earliest practical
notice of any seepage that may occur. However, as discussed in the
response to Comment 1, A.4.2.4, EPA is allowing alternate standards to be
established based on site-specific characteristics, among other
considerations.
Comment 3: The point of compliance, as identified by EPA, is the toe
of the dike. Compliance at the site boundary is a more meaningful point
of compliance. (1-9(2).7)
Response: See the response to Comment 2, A.4.2.4.
A.4-36
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Comment 4: Since synthetic liners are unworkable, groundwater
protection can only be achieved by alternative management techniques such
as natural adsorption and dilution, collection wells, and injection
wells. But these techniques cannot be employed if the point of
compliance is the toe of the tailing pond. 1-7(2).13)
Response: This commenter makes the assumption that all synthetic
liners will fail. EPA disagrees with this assumption. Liner technology
can and should be improved through proper design and quality assurance.
See the responses to Comments 1 and 2, A.A.2.4.
Comment 5: EPA's proposed standards for background levels at the
edge of the tailings cannot be met by existing ponds and may not be
reasonable for new ponds. EPA must consider the effect dilution has on
groundwater contamination. (1-11(2).6, 1-10(2).15)23
Response: See the response to Comment 1, A.4.2.4 above. Dilution
can be considered in issuing alternate standards under 40 CFR 264.94 (b)
(1) (iii).
Comment 6: It will be impossible for most existing mines to comply
with the proposed standards, and it is* unrealistic in many circumstances
to expect new operations to meet drinking water standards at the edge of
the pond. (I-4(H2).13)
Response: EPA recognizes this potential problem and provides a
possibility of relief through the issuance of alternate standards, as
discussed in the responses to Comments 1 and 2, A.4.2.4.
A.4-37
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A.A.2.5 Compliance Period (40 CFR 264.96)
Comment 1; The EPA has not put a definite time on corrective action in
the pollution of groundwater. We sincerely hope that "as soon as practicable"
as it relates to corrective action time limits, is definitely less than one
year. (P-8(H1).18)
Response: EPA believes that corrective action should be taken as soon
as practicable after it is found that groundwater standards have been
exceeded. Two time limits apply for this action. Section 26A.99 of 40 CFR 264
provides that a correction action plan be submitted within 180 days. Section
192.33 of these 40 CFR 192 regulations provides that a corrective action
program be put into operation within 18 months at the very most. The
regulation was changed to 18 months instead of a year because we agree with
commenters that it may take more than one year to devise and implement an
effective corrective action. The appropriate regulatory agency is responsible
for seeing that corrective action is taken in a timely manner, and certainly
within the 180-day and 18-month requirements.
Comment 2: EPA's one year compliance or closure rule is without
redeeming value. Many repositories operated for many years before seepage
occurred and it will take many more for the tailings to dry and seepage to
stop. EPA's abrupt revision of current rules will cost millions, disrupt
operations, and force many operations to close. (1-11(2).7)
Response: EPA has considered comments that one year may be too short a
time to devise and implement effective corrective action, and has changed the
regulations to require implementation of corrective action within 18 months.
EPA considered the costs of corrective actions in the FEIS
(Section 7.3.3). Such costs need be incurred only where the secondary
standards are not satisfied. EPA considers these costs reasonable for
assuring adequate environmental and public health protection. Also see the
response to Comment 1, A.4.2.4.
Comment 3: EPA's proposed corrective action time-frame of one year is
unreasonable. Establishment of appropriate standards, development of
appropriate actions, and conformance with State and Federal requirements makes
such a time-frame unsuitable. (1-6(3).70)
Response: See the response to Comment 1, A,4.2.5.
Comment 4: Section 192.33, which provides a limit of one year for
putting a corrective action program into operation is unnecessarily
restrictive. (1-5(2).14)
Response: See the response to Comment 1, A.4.2.5.
A.4-38
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Comment 5: The requirement to report in writing any level not in
compliance within seven days of receipt of analysis is unreasonable.
Additional time would be needed for lab analysis. (1-9(2).9)
Response: The commenter is under a misapprehension. The applicable
subsections of 40 CFR 264 are 264.98(h)(l) for a groundwater detection
monitoring program and 264.99(h)(2) for a groundwater compliance monitoring
program. Both of these apply when there has been a statistically significant
increase over the concentration limit for any hazardous constituent. The
seven-day notice period begins after this determination, which in turn is made
after the analyses.
Comment 6: The requirement for 30 years of post-closure monitoring is
excessive. The tailings piles will dry in several years. After a water
resistant cap is then installed, the potential for movement of tailings
effluent into the groundwater is removed. (1-9(2).12)
Response: See the response to Comment 3, A.6.2.
Comment 7: The compliance period seems irrelevant for geographic
regions where the tailings pile may never dry out. (P-8(H1).4)
Response: The tailings needn't "dry-out;" the "free liquids" must be
removed, by mechanical means if necessary. The closure standards require a
low permeability cap to be placed over the tailings to keep water from
penetrating through to the ground. Other protective actions may be employed,
based on any needs that are determined from monitoring during the compliance
period.
A.4-39
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A.4.2.6 Corrective Action Programs
Comment 1: EPA should specify the consequences of noncompliance.
(P-l(H2-2).6)
Response: Penalties for non-compliance are established by law
(See UMTRCA - P.L. 95-604, Sec. 205).
Comment 2: We generally support EPA's proposed primary and secondary
groundwater standards, but suggest the secondary standard be improved by
requiring a liner in-situ or removal to below grade trenches if a licensee
fails for two consecutive years to comply with the proposed hazardous
concentration limits in seepage fluids. For sites with known seepage
problems, EPA should require immediate cessation of tailings deposition and
implementation as soon as possible, of the proposed 192.33 compliance
program. (P-l(2).8, P-l(2).25, P-30.8, P-1(H2).9, P-l(2).41, P-26.17, P-30.2,
P-13(2).5, P-13(2).10, P-l(2).53, P-l(2).53, P-HH2-1).10, P-l(2).40, P-26.16)
Response: Corrective actions can take a number of different forms and
can also be highly dependent on specific site characteristics. The regulatory
agencies have the responsibility to approve corrective actions and must
include specific measures to be taken and time periods in the license. 40 CFR
264.100 also specifies the period over which corrective actions must continue
after closure if they are being conducted at the time of closure. EPA
believes any corrective actions undertaken should have a reasonably high
probability of success, but administration of the corrective actions is a
regulatory function.
Comment 3; EPA should prohibit additional depositions at existing
sites after one year of noncompliance with the hazardous concentration limits
during the operation of a noncompliance program. (P-26.16)
Response: EPA was faced with a trade-off regarding continued use of
existing piles versus construction and use of new lined impoundments in the
groundwater protection question. New impoundments would contaminate more land
area and release more radon, but would probably cause less groundwater
contamination, once the old pile dried out. On balance, EPA believes
continued use of existing piles minimizes health risks and environmental
contamination. See the response to Comment 3, A.4.2.6.
Comment 4: EPA should clarify its prohibition on additional
dispositions to limit the prohibition to the leaking impoundment, not all
impoundments at the facility. (1-10(2).25)
Response: Regulatory agencies are responsible for approving corrective
actions and making them part of a mill's license. Therefore, the regulatory
agencies must decide which impoundments may be operated and which must
A. 4-40
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terminate use. The purpose of EPA's standards are to protect or restore water
quality, using whatever means the regulatory agencies may approve.
A.4-41
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A.4.3 Surface Water Protection (40 CFR 440)
'.Standards are Unlawful, Unnecessary, or Excessive*.
Comment 1: We oppose EPA's application of Clean Water Act standards to
uranium mills. EPA's proposed application of Clean Water Act standards to
uranium mills is unlawful since EPA lacks jurisdiction under the act to
regulate source and by-product materials. If EPA wants to propose surface
water effluent standards, it must devise such standards under Section 275 of
the Atomic Energy Act and propose them for comment. (1-6(3).78, 1-6(3).12)
Response: UMTRCA extends EPA's jurisdiction under the Atomic Energy
Act to mill tailings as byproduct material. EPA is required by UMTRCA to
protect health and the environment from adverse effects from mill tailings by
all routes, including surface water. EPA has decided that the existing
provisions of 40 CFR 440, Subpart C (Uranium, Radium, and Vanaium Ores)
provide adequate protection for surface water.
Comment 2: Existing standards for protection of surface water under 10
CFR 20 Appendix B, are adequate to protect public health. (1-6(3).79)
Response: EPA does not agree. The standards of 10 CFR 20, Appendix B,
correspond to the basic Radiation Protection Guide of 500 mrem/yr to
individuals in the general public. It is generally recognized that this level
is a ceiling, and that radiation doses should be maintained as far below this
standard as is reasonably practical. See also response to Comment 5, A.4.5.
Comment 3: We agree that no additional standards for surface water are
needed under UMTRCA. (1-11(2).4)
Response: No response required.
Comment 4: EPA's regulation prohibiting discharge of process waste
water from mills does not merely prohibit contamination, it also prohibits
discharge of water treated to the extent that a receiving stream would benefit
by a discharge. (1-15.8)
Response: These regulations are contained in 10 CFR 440, Subpart C,
which was promulgated on December 3, 1982 (Federal Register, Vol. 47,
p. 54598-54621). The preamble to that rule presents (p. 54603) the reasoning
behind the requirement for zero discharge for new uranium mills. Also see the
response to Comment 7, A.4.3.
A.4-42
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Comment 5: Contrary to ICRP protection criteria, EPA insists on
overprotecting some hypothetical users by arbitrarily imposing very
restrictive and costly standards that were never originally designed to be
applied to industrial settings. 1-1(2).28
Response: ICRP protection standards and criteria are similar to those
issued by the Federal Radiation Council in 1960 (Federal Radiation Council
"Background Material for the Development of Radiation Protection Standards,"
May 13, 1960. ICRP recognizes these levels as ceilings, and recommends that
radiation doses be kept below these levels as much as practicable. See also
the response to Comment 5, A.4.5,
Comment 6: Flood control should be required over the same length of
time as the longevity requirement. (P-49.6)
Response: Flood control is included in the longevity requirement. The
FEIS in discussing longevity, says that of all natural processes "floods are
probably the greatest hazard to integrity." (Section 8.2.3). This section of
the FEIS discusses how the longevity requirements and the recurrence time of
floods at a site combine to affect design requirements.
Comment 7: EPA's regulations prohibit discharge of water treated to
the extent that a receiving stream would benefit by a discharge. In net
precipitation states, where seepage is also prohibited, how does one remove
the waste water? (1-15(2).7)
Response: The response to Comment 5, this section, applies also to the
first part of this comment. The second part of this comment refers to new
mills, since there are no mills currently operating in non-arid areas.
Subsection 440.34(b)(1) , which given New Source Performance Standards,
provides for discharges from mills to the extent that precipitation and runoff
exceed evaporation.
•Standards Are Inappropriate For Net Precipitation Areas!
Comment 8: EPA's enforcement of surface water protection through the
Clean Water Act allows for loopholes in net precipitation areas. The
concentration of tailings pile effluent constituents allowed in net
precipitation areas are unacceptably high. (P-5(H1).9, P-5(8).2, P-5(H1).12)
Response: EPA's New Source Performance Standard for uranium mills (40
CFR 440.34(b)) prohibits discharge of liquid effluent to surface water, except
for mills in areas where the rainfall exceeds evaporation. In such net
precipitation areas, the allowed discharge is subject to volume and
concentration limits given in Part 440.34(a). EPA believes they are adequate.
A.4-43
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Comment 9: By ignoring non-arid areas and failing to set concentration
limits for surface water discharges in the regulations, EPA has placed a great
regulatory burden on net precipitation states. (P-5(H1).16)
Response: The commenter is incorrect in stating the EPA has failed to
consider non-arid areas and to set concentration limits for surface water
discharges. Concentration limits for existing mills are given in Subsection
440.32(b) of 40 CFR 440. All existing mills are in arid regions and only one
of these discharges waste water (Federal Register, Vol. 47, p. 54603).
Regulations for new sources in subparagraph 440.34(b)(l) provide for
discharges to the extent that precipitation and runoff exceed evaporation, and
provide concentration limits for any such discharges.
!Additional Comments I
Comment 10: Surface water standards should include the possibility of
flooding. (P-8(H1).15, F-1.4)
Response: Flooding of an operating mill has many site-specific
engineering and operational implications. We believe the regulatory agencies'
licensing process is the best place to deal with operational period flood
protection specifications. Also see the response to Comment 6, A.4.3.
Comment 11: Seepage from tailings disposal areas has generally been
shown to be nondetrimental. However, if the tailings ponds are lined to
prevent seepage, there will be many sites which have a discharge. Thus,
surface water quality will become a greater concern. (1-27.4)
Response: The Agency believes that uranium mills in the arid or
semi-arid areas where U.S. milling occurs can use evaporation, recycle, or
both to make discharge to surface water unnecessary. This problem was
considered in the rulemaking process for 40 CFR 440 and is briefly summarized
on p. 54603 of volume 47 of the Federal Register. December 3, 1982. Also see
the response to Comment 9, A.4.3.
A. 4-44
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A.4.A Control of Radon Releases (during operations)
!Controls of Radon Release Are Inadequate*.
Comment 1: The radon emission standards are unacceptably high and
threaten the public health. (P-5(H1).13, P-8(H1).20, P-8(H1).7, P-l(2).33)
Response: Based on currently available evidence, EPA believes that
regulating individual mills so as to keep their emissions "as low as
reasonably achievable" within the numerical Federal Radiation Protection
Guides is the best regulatory approach to limiting such releases. However, we
are asking for public comments on whether work practice standards issued under
the Clean Air Act are needed and would be a reasonable means to further limit
such emissions.
Comment 2: Why are there no limits on permissible radon releases from
tailings being pumped into the pond or while they are supposedly drying?
(P-8(H1).6)
Response: There are no significant releases of radon from tailings in
a slurry while it is being pumped into* the pond. There are no limits on radon
releases while tailings are drying out because there is no practical control
that will also permit the tailings to dry. The small health detriment arising
from radon emissions while tailings are drying out is more than compensated
for by this process, which makes it possible to stabilize the tailings for
many centuries.
Comment 3: Radon concentrations should be limited to 0.3 pCi/1 at the
site boundary. But we do not support allowing mills to achieve this
concentration by acquiring additional land. Compliance should be achieved by
reducing emanations from the pile. (e.g., Require below grade disposal of new
tailings) (P-l(2).29, P-l(2).31)
Response: EPA did not establish a concentration limit at the site
boundary for reasons detailed in the Preamble of the standards.
Comment 4: Radon control during operations could be achieved by
requiring thin soil cover or various fixitants to portions of the tailings
that are drying out. (P-26.23)
Response: We do not believe such methods will achieve control of
radon. Rather, they prevent spreading through wind erosion.
A.4-
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Comment 5; EPA should limit the total surface area not under cover
(i.e., final disposal) to limit radon emissions. (P-45.8)
Response: See the response to Comment 3, A.4.4.
Comment 6: No radon releases above background should be allowed.
Dewatering should be done in enclosed facilities equipped with radon
collection systems. (P-3(2).2)
Response: Such a system would be prohibitively expensive and provide
only a small health benefit. See the response to Comment 2, A.4.4.
Comment 7: EPA should explicitly incorporate ALARA into the radon
control requirements. (F-3(2).24)
Response: We have done so.
Comment 8; Your continuation of the ALARA principle for the milling
operation period is of concern to us. (P-5(H1).6)
Response: See the response to Comment 1, A.4.4.
Comment 9: EPA should clarify its intent of how ALARA should
supplement the radon emission standard of 10 CFR 20. (S-3(2>.5)
Response: The application of ALARA is well-established in NRC
licensing procedures. EPA's intent is that NRC should require all practicable
methods for minimizing radon emissions. These will vary from site to site,
from time to time, and for old versus new tailings. EPA will, in addition to
its consideration of this matter under the Clean Air Act (see Comment 1),
maintain cognizance of the NRC and Agreement State implementation of the ALARA
requirement.
!Control Of Radon Releases Is Not Required And Impractical1.
Comment 10: We agree with EPA's decision to retain the radon/radon
decay product release limits in 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, during the operational
period. Coupled with the NRC's ALARA requirement, they provide ample
protection. (F-2.2, F-3(2).20, 1-6(3).2, 1-6(3).37, 1-11(2).3, P-9(Hl).l,
P-9(H1).13, S-12(H2>.2, F-3(2).ll, F-6(2).12, F-5(3).9)
Response: EPA has required that exposures be maintained As Low As
Reasonably Achievable below the upper limits specified in 10 CFR 20.
Operation at 10 CFR 20 levels on a continuous basis would not constitute
A.4-46
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compliance with this requirement of the standard, unless that level of
operation is shown to be ALARA.
Comment 11; Even if EPA's excessive radon risk estimates are accepted,
they do not reflect a level of significant risk that would warrant control.
(1-6(3).35, 1-6(3).36)
Response: We do not agree. We estimate the lifetime risk for maximum
exposed individuals is about 2 in 100 and we project total national population
impacts of five cancer deaths per pile per year. These risk estimates are
confirmed by our review for the FEIS.
Comment 12: There are no reasonably available controls or work
practices available to reduce radon emissions from operating uranium mills.
Disposal in trenches is generally not feasible at existing locations due to
costs and local geology. Mills in New Mexico proposing such a system have
never been constructed or operated because of the high costs. Controlling
radon concentrations by extending site boundaries is not feasible since mills
do not have the power of eminent domain and many land interests are simply not
available. Further decreases in radon levels, below 10 CFR 20 limits should
be achieved on a case-by-case basis through ALARA. Any such standards would
cause higher prices and/or plant closings without demonstrable benefit.
(1-6(3).38, 1-6(3).41, 1-6(3).40, 1-6(4).12)
Response: The comment is incorrect. Disposal in trenches is feasible
at many sites and existing piles can be kept wet. We agree ALARA should be
practiced on a case-by-case basis, at least as an interim measure.
Comment 13: We oppose incorporation of a guidance into regulations that
will numerically limit to 1 pCi/1 the radon concentration to which real
individuals in the proximity of tailings ponds are exposed. EPA's proposal to
incorporate guidance into regulations will again place the burden of proof on
industry. (1-1(2).30)
Response: Federal guides are already in effect, since they govern
NRC's regulations. The burden of proof that radiation standards are being
complied with is traditionally and properly the responsibility of the licensee.
Comment 14: Industry currently complies with the radon concentration
limits of 3 pCi/1 as well as the philosophy of maintaining effluent releases
ALARA. Beyond the retrofitting that has already occurred, additional
engineering design features to further control radon emissions are not
justified both in potential costs and nominal projected health effects.
(1-1(2).31)
A.4-47
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Response; EPA agrees that if releases are, in fact, shown to be ALARA,
there will be no need to add any new engineering design features to further
control operational releases of radon. Controls needed to comply will have to
be determined on a site-by-site basis.
A.4-48
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A.4.5 Dose Limits Other Than Radon Emissions (40 CFR 190)
\40 CFR 190 Limits Are Too Stringent I
Comment 1: The cost of complying with the 25 mrem limits of 40 CFR 190
are greater than one million dollars per mill. Since there are no
demonstrated health effects at this low level, the costs are clearly
unreasonable. Even if EPA's unsupported linear nonthreshold model is
accepted, the approximately five billion dollars required to avert one
potential health effect is unwarranted.
Response: Failure to demonstrate adverse health effects does not mean
that there are no such effects. The epidemiological studies that would
demonstrate these effects are inadequate to either prove or disprove the
hypothesis that there are adverse health effects. Numerous reports have
reviewed the basic requirements of epidemiological studies of background
radiation. They require a base of millions to hundreds of millions of person
years of data to detect the incremental increase in risk projected by current
risk coefficients, even for exposure levels around four times average
background. Such data bases do not exist for any areas near facilities
regulated by 40 CFR 190.
The costs of controlling operational nonradon emissions from the model
tailings pile are given in Table 7-2 of the FEIS. We consider these costs,
which also serve to reduce radon emissions to be reasonable. The cost-
effectiveness of these limits was considered in the rulemaking for 40 CFR 190.
Comment 2: We do not support EPA's proposal to continue to apply 40
CFR 190 to uranium mills. (1-6(3).11)
Response: EPA disagrees. See the response to Comment 1, A.4.5.
Comment 3: 40 CFR 190 should be dropped. After two years of expensive
monitoring, we can distinguish no significant doses to the public. (1-11(2).2)
Response: EPA notes that the comment implies that the site is
apparently in compliance with 40 CFR 190. Also see the response to Comment 1,
A.4.5.
Comment 4: The dose limits were arbitrarily chosen and based primarily
on the number of companies that could achieve compliance rather on the number
of projected health effects which were conservatively overestimated.
(1-1(2).29)
A.4-49
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Response: The dose limits of 40 CFR 190, which have been applicable to
uranium tailings piles, were not based on the number of companies that could
achieve compliance. They were based on a cost-effective balance between
reduction of risk and the cost of controls. We believe these limits are
reasonable for controlling windblown erosion from tailings piles, without
excessive cost to the industry.
Comment 5: 40 CFR 190 dose requirements are totally unrealistic and
should not apply to uranium mills. The internationally recognized standard of
500 mrem (100 mrem to sizeable populations) is much more reasonable. (1-28.3,
1-28.9)
Response: The Radiation Protection Guide of 500 mrem/yr for
individuals in the general population has always been recognized as a
ceiling. The Federal Radiation Council, in establishing this Guide, and the
associated Guide of 170 mrem/yr for the average of population groups, said
(FRC 60): "Every reasonable effort should be made to keep exposures as far
below this level as practicable." Similar guidance by NCRP and ICRP have
always made equivalent statements. The applicability of lower standards to
specific situations has been recognized by the NRC, in Appendix I to 10 CFR
50, regulating radiation from releases from lightwater nuclear power plants.
(FRC 60): Federal Radiation Council, 1960, "Background Material for the
Development of Radiation Protection Standards," (May 13, 1960), paragraphs 5.3
and 5.4.
\40 CFR 190 Limits Are Too Lax!
Comment 6: 40 CFR 190 standards for particulates are inadequate to
protect people from wind-borne particulates. Further, it is a virtually
unenforceable dose standard and should be replaced with a zero emission
standard. (P-3(2).l, P-49.11)
Response: We believe the 40 CFR 190 standards, which are already in
effect for uranium mill tailings, are adequate to protect people. This
question was considered in the 40 CFR 190 rulemaking and is documented in the
FEIS and FR notice for 40 CFR 190. NRC, as the appropriate regulatory agency,
has been enforcing 40 CFR 190 by well-established methods of determining the
source term and its dispersion, and by appropriate field monitoring.
Comment 7: 40 CFR 190 is inadequate because it does not limit gamma
exposure, and gamma exposure from windblown tailings could exceed 500 mrem.
(P-45.24)
A.4-50
-------
Response: The cotnmenter is incorrect. 40 CFR does include gamma
radiation, and a gamma exposure of 500 mrem/yr from windblown tailings would
violate the standards.
Comment 8: 40 CFR 190 is inadequate because it does not limit radon
and its daughters. Control of tailings dust should be an integral part of the
standard. (S-3(2).3)
Response: The commenter is correct in saying that 40 CFR 190 does not
limit emission of radon and its short-lived daughters. We have in this
(UMTRCA) regulation required that the regulatory agency make every effort to
keep radiation doses from radon emissions from tailings as low as is
practicable, and in any case less than the Federal Radiation Protection Guide.
We concur with the commenter that control of tailings dust should be an
integral part of the standard. We have reaffirmed the applicability of 40 CFR
190 in the UMTRCA standard.
Comment 9: EPA should propose the same 10 mrem standard, proposed
April 6, 1983, to all industries that emit radionuclides. (S-3(2).4)
Response: EPA's proposed regulation for radionuclides emitted to air,
referenced by the commenter, did not apply a dose limit of 10 mrem/yr to all
industries. That standard was proposed only for DOE facilities, for
NRC-licensed facilities not in the uranium fuel cycle, and to other (non-DOE)
Federal facilities, EPA based the proposed 10 mrem limit on studies of the
characteristics of these specific radiation sources. The analyses we made
earlier for the 40 CFR 190 rulemaking supported a dose limit of 25 mrem/yr for
uranium mill tailings, and we believe this standard is reasonable.
A.4-51
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A.5.0 STANDARDS FOR DISPOSAL
\The Standards Are Too Lax*.
Comment 1; EPA1s rejection of the nondegradation alternatives (for
disposal standards) (48 FR Section V. p.19596, Column 3, first paragraph)
is inconsistent with EPA's reasoning and requirements for nondegradation
of groundwater. (F-3(2).16)
Response: We believe our reasoning is consistent. The standards
must consider several hazard pathways, as described in the Preamble and
EIS, both during operations arid after closure. For all pathways, we have
attempted to identify the lowest reasonably achievable environmental and
health risk, when all relevant factors are considered, including
applicable legal constraints. This process, consistently applied to all
the pathways, has led to standards that differ in the stated degree of
control among the various pathways.
Comment 2: EPA's preferred Alternative D will not meet the
Congressional mandate under UMTRCA. The chosen option (200-year
performance) does not provide basic protection from all pathways, namely,
radon, airborne particulates, misuse of tailings, and groundwater
protection. (P-4(H1).7, P-15(H2).4, P-22(H2).2, P-35.2, P-30.4, P-34.1,
P-35.1, P-36.1, P-41.4)
Response: EPA has retained the 200-year longevity minimum, for
reasons described in the Preamble.
Comment 3: Even alternative F falls woefully short of assuring the
isolation of these wastes and protection of groundwater for the millenia
these wastes will remain hazardous. (P-33.6)
Response: The standard affords protection that is reasonably
assured to be highly effective for at least 200 years, and should be
partially effective for thousands of years thereafter. We know of no
practical way to assure full protection for the much longer periods the
wastes may continue to pose some hazard to people or the environment.
Comment 4: The Draft Environmental Impact Statement clearly
indicates a preference for Option E over that ultimately chosen by the
Agency. (P-4(H1).5)
Response: EPA disagrees. Our reasons are discussed in the Preamble
and the RIA.
A.5-1
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Comment 5: We support Alternative F for governing tailings
disposal, since these standards will provide the greatest protection at
the most reasonable cost. (P-l(2).3, P-41.4, P-35.8, P-49.1, P-60.2)
Response: EPA disagrees. Our reasons are discussed in the Preamble
and the RIA.
Comment 6; Alternative F would accomplish the ALARA goal of
reducing radiation exposure from mill tailings. (P-l(2).9)
Response; After careful re-consideration, we believe the radon
release requirement of Alternative F is impractical, for reasons that are
fully stated in the RIA and the Preamble.
!Basis for the Standard!
Comment 7: In developing a standard for disposal of tailings, the
following groundrules should be adopted:
a. Tailings should be stabilized to prevent dispersal;
b. Disruption of stabilized tailings by man-made and natural
forces should be minimized;
c. Institutional controls are essential;
d. Occupied structures should not be built within a half-mile of
the reclaimed tailings;
e. Reclaimed tailings should be considered dedicated land;
f. Stabilization of medium and low priority inactive mill sites
should be evaluated on a site-specific basis; and
g. 10 CFR 20 should be used as a prime performance standard.
(P-20CH2).1)
Response; EPA agrees with points a., b., and c. Points d through g
require a high degree of institutional control, however, which EPA has
found to be neither necessary nor prudent, and inconsistent with
Congress' intentions under UMTRCA. Physical control systems needed to
satisfy points a. and b. and a radon emission requirement, as under EPA's
is standard, minimize the need for long-term institutional controls.
A. 5-2
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Comment 8: Given our inability to assure control over long time
periods, EPA should set the minimum standards which assure control and
revisit the problem regularly. (P-9(H1).6, P-4(H1).12, S-1.4)
Response; EPA is authorized to reconsider the standards whenever it
seems advantageous to do so. Under the final disposals standards we are
establishing, however, we do not anticipate revisions will be needed.
The routine conduct of our radiation program responsibilities will assure
that we maintain an adequate level of awareness of how well the standards
are working. Also see the response to Comment 7, A.5.0.
Comment 9: We oppose application of 40 CFR 264.111 to uranium mills
to the extent that it will require cover systems designed for wet areas
to be applied in arid areas. Cover designs should be determined by the
licensing agency to permit cost effective designs to be used. (1-6(3).46)
Response: 40 CFR 264.111 represents a value judgment that applies
equally well to wet and dry areas. The licensing agency has considerable
discretion regarding methods for complying with this requirement.
Comment 10: The Agency should consider additional disposal
alternatives at existing mills, such as new disposal facilities which
would handle some fraction of existing tailings. (P-4(H1).17)
Response: Provided existing tailings comply with the standards, we
believe it is self-evident that requiring the tailings to be moved to a
new facility would not be a cost-effective means of accomplishing our
health and environmental protection goals. The SWDA standards, with
which we must be consistent in the absence of specific circumstances that
justify differences, do not have such a requirement. We know of no
differences between tailings and the hazardous wastes covered by the SWDA
rules that would justify imposing the requirement for tailings.
Comment 11: EPA mistakenly assumes that UMTRCA prohibits EPA from
considering a package of active and passive controls to stabilize
tailings. The final version added the word "minimized" so that 42 U.S.C.
Section 220KX) (2) (Supp.V 1981) reads "need for long term maintenance and
monitoring of such site ...will be minimized and, to the extent
practicable, eliminated." (1-4(3).64)
Response; EPA has made no such assumption. We believe we have
fully complied with the quoted passage from UMTRCA, and with other
indications of Congress' intentions regarding active and passive controls.
A. 5-3
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Comment 12; The standard should only require reasonable controls to
protect against erosion and dispersion for a reasonable period of time,
coupled with Government ownership. This would assure reasonable
protection for the public and the environment. (I-6(H2).31)
Response: EPA considered a range of alternatives, including the
one suggested. EPA's final standard provides much greater health and
environmental protection benefits with a far lesser reliance on future
institutional functions. We believe EPA's standard complies with
Congress' intention under UMTRCA to apply long-lasting passive control
measures if EPA, having examined all relevant factors, finds it
reasonable to do so. Our analysis shows that standards that provide
effective, long-lasting protection against erosion, dispersion, misuse,
radon emissions, and water pollution are technically feasible and
economically practical. We see no reason to adopt the commenter's
suggestion, which would provide inadequate protection at a higher cost in
relation to the benefits obtained.
Comment 13: Although EPA's proposed regulation sets different
standards for the control of radiological and non-radiological hazards,
the Preamble addresses only the types of control measures that EPA thinks
would satisfy its radiological hazard standards. The implication is that
the two to three meter thick cap that will be required to bring
radiological hazards within their proposed standard would also satisfy
the nonradiological hazard standard. (1-4(3).73)
See the response to Comment 50, A.5.0.
Comment 14: If EPA retains its current longevity requirement
(200-1,000 years) and adopts the suggested risk-based environmental
standard (0.3 pCi/1) for radon, NRC would implement using a three-tiered
system, as follows:
a. Design a 1,000 year stability standard in terms of erosion
control and prevention of misuse and intrusion.
b. Include design features to meet the radon standard.
c. Apply ALARA on a site-specific basis.
Response; EPA has retained the minimum 200 year and up to 1000 year
control requirement. We have also retained a radon flux limit rather
than adopt the suggested concentration standard. Nevertheless, NRC's
suggestion of a three-tiered approach to satisfying the final longevity
and radon emission requirements should be workable. We believe, however,
that reversing the order of steps (a) and (b) would be more efficient.
A.5-4
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!Standards Should Include!
Comment 15; EPA's standards should include a siting criterion for
an isolation distance between the disposal site and any floodplain
through which a stream is likely to cut. (P-45.30)
Response; Deciding the means of complying with EPA's standard is a
regulatory function. NRC and its Agreement States may adopt whatever
regulations they determine are necessary to satisfy the longevity
requirement.
Comment 16: We support a siting standard to protect against the
effects of a probable maximum flood. (P-l(2).51)
Response: See the response to Comment 15, A.5.0. In the Preamble
and the EIS, we discuss the relevance of flood protection specifications
to compliance with the longevity requirement.
Comment 17: EPA's reliance on purely passive measures is a
mistake. Active mechanisms must be in place to take corrective action,
if necessary. (1-4(3).66, 1-4(3).66, 1-4(3).68, 1-10(2).12)
Response: EPA does not rely entirely on passive measures. UMTRCA
provides NRC with adequate authority to take corrective action if the
need arises. Congress clearly intended to minimize the need for such
actions, however. See the response to Comment 11, A.5.0.
Comment 18; We support active control measures in the early years
to assure that long-term stabilization measures and passive controls will
be effective far into the future. (F-3(2).22, I-4(H2).15, S-12(H2).13)
Response: EPA agrees, in the sense expressed in the response to
Comment 17, above. The disposal system should from the outset be
designed for long-term effectiveness, as EPA's standard requires.
Comment 19: The 200-year standard implies passive management of the
tailings pile. The expectation of the EPA to engineer & system requiring
no maintenance for in excess of 200 years is unreasonable when New Mexico
has already made provisions to perform ongoing maintenance activities,
and the mill operators have already contributed a maintenance fund.
(1-9(2).11)
Response: EPA recognizes that a tailings pile may need maintenance,
and believes it prudent to provide for any needed maintenance, as UMTRCA
and New Mexico have done. The EPA standard, however, requires disposal
A.5-5
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systems to be designed to last for the longevity period. Significant
maintenance should be needed only if the system fails to perform as
designed. See the response to Comment 17, A.5.0.
Comment 20: We do not believe that institutional controls are
adequate to protect public health and safety from immediate hazards, to
say nothing of the hazard identified by the Agency for hundreds of
thousands of years. (P-4(H1).12, S-1.4)
Response: EPA believes it is prudent and sensible not to rely on
institutional controls when adequate physical control methods are
available and practical to apply. We rely on institutional controls when
alternatives are not reasonably available, such as to prevent
inappropriate development of the tailings disposal site. We have not
identified any practical control method for tailings, physical or
institutional, that we could expect to be effective for hundreds of
thousands of years.
Comment 21; The Agency should redraft the regulation to
unambiguously mandate that, to the maximum extent practicable, long term
maintenance and monitoring of tailiqgs be eliminated. (S-15.13)
Response: The Preamble and final standard combined make EPA's
intentions adequately clear that the standard applies to the design of
the disposal system, and cannot be satisfied by institutional
arrangements alone. See the response to Comment 19, A.5.0.
Comment 22: Institutional controls are not feasible for long-term
or even for short-term protection. (S-1.5, S-12(H2).13, P-26.3, P-33.10,
P-34.2)
Response: No response is required.
Comment 23: EPA should consider the government ownership stipulated
by UMTRCA in evaluating the controls needed to prevent intrusion, misuse
and dispersal by people. (F-6(2).15)
Response; EPA did consider Congress' intention in providing for
government ownership of the site. We believe the language and
legislative history of UMTRCA clearly indicate its intent is to
supplement adequate long-term physical controls with institutionally-
based protection mechanisms. For example, Section 161(x) of the Atomic
Energy Act, as amended by Section 203 of UMTRCA, requires mill site
decommissioning to minimize, and, to the maximum extent practicable,
A.5-6
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eliminate the need for long term maintenance and monitoring.
Nothwithstanding this requirement, the next paragraph authorizes NRC to
secure financial arrangements from licensees to assure funding for any
long term maintenance and monitoring NRC determines is necessary.
Furthermore, House Report 95-1480, Part I, states that the custodian of
the disposal site should treat the tailings "...in accordance with the
substantial hazard they will present until long after our existing
insitutions can be expected to last in their present forms." With
respect to inactive sites, Part II of the House Report warns against
"...using technology that may be effective for a short period of time."
"The remedial action must be done right the first time," it stated.
!Probability of Misuse Is Over-estimated Or The Solution Ts
Inappropriate!
Comment 24: EPA does not justify its proposed tailings cover
requirement. The chance of future misuse of tailings is remote,
particularly in light of the requirement for the government to own
stabilized tailings and to monitor them in perpetuity. (I-6(H2).8,
1-23.4, 1-25.20, 1-25.21)
Response; See the response to Comment 23, A.5.0.
Comment 25: The best approach to discourage misuse of tailings is
to retain the tailings site under Federal or State control, noting
appropriate land records and periodic surveillance to detect any
encroachments. (F-1.6, F-5(3).3)
Response: See the response to Comment 23, A.5.0.
Comment 26: EPA's proposed cover requirement will not necessarily
prevent misuse and ignores cost effective measures, such as notations on
land title records, as a means of alerting society that some hazards may
be associated with certain uses of the property. (1-4(3).15, 1-7(2).16)
Response: EPA's cover requirement is intended, among other
benefits, to inhibit misuse; we agree that the standard will not
necessarily prevent misuse. See the response to Comment 23, A.5.0.
Comment 27: EPA has failed to provide any analysis of the
probability of misuse for alternative cover thicknesses to support its
characterization of thick covers as effective. Moveover, the
probabilities of misuse it assigns to various covers are inconsistent
with the probabilities used in the FEIS on inactive sites. (1-4(3).11)
A.5-7
-------
Response; It is not possible to determine probabilities- of misuse
especially over long periods. EPA discusses this in the DEIS (page 8-9)
and the FEIS (page 8-12). EPA considered it sensible to list the
relative protection different thicknesses of earth would provide for this
important benefit. The probabilities of misuse (chance of misuse) are
listed in qualitative terms which differ slightly between the inactive
FEIS and the active DEIS. However, the relative ratings are consistent
between the two, i.e., a cover that meets 20 pCi/m2-sec provides more
protection against intrusion than a cover that meets 60 or 100
pCi/m2-sec.
Comment 28: Active maintenance of tailings piles cannot necessarily
prevent misuse. However, active maintenance can effectively restrict the
degree of misuse. (1-1(2).33)
Response; EPA agrees, so long as maintenance and surveillance are
applied. However, we believe the proper role of such institutional
controls are as supplements to adequate physical barriers to misuse. We
believe the effectiveness of the physical barriers over long-time periods
is more predictable than the effectiveness of institutional controls.
Also see Comment 23, A.5.0.
Comment 29; Any hypothetical scenarios wherein current institutions
fail have the same probability of protection as they lack protection; to
deem otherwise, as EPA is alluding to, merely evokes phobic responses to
such sensationalism. (1-1(2).34)
Response; The point is rather that the long-term effectiveness of
physical methods is more predictable. We cannot predict the future
implementation of institutional arrangements; numerous examples of both
effective and ineffective long-term institutional arrangements could
readily be cited. UMTRCA clearly requires that reliance on maintenance
and monitoring be minimized. We have found that meeting this requirement
is feasible and practical.
Comment 30: The fundamental institutional control is governmental
ownership of the disposal sites, which requires no activity on the part
of the government and, in EPA's own view, is sufficient to prevent such
misuse as building habitable structures on the sites. (1-7(2).24
See the responses to Comments 20, 23, 28, and 29, A.5.0.
Comment 31; EPA states that institutional controls are "essential,"
though, in the Agency's view, primary reliance cannot be placed upon
them. EPA should note that the fundamental institutional control is that
of governmental ownership of disposal sites, which should be effective in
preventing misuse. (1-7(2).22, 1-30.5)
Response; See the responses to Comments 20, 23, 28, and 29, A.5.0.
A. 5-8
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Comment 32: EPA fails to note that the Agency has assessed the
extent of misuse near inactive mills and has found that, with the
exception of a very small site in Idaho, misuse has actually occurred
only at a few sites located in the vicinity of population centers. Such
use occurred during a time when there was little recognition of the
hazards presented by these tailings. (1-7(2).20)
Response: EPA agrees that widespread tailings misuse occurred
before the hazard was appreciated. EPA staff continue to receive
anecdotal reports, however, of small-scale misuse of mining and milling
wastes. Contrary to the commenter's impression, Table 3-6 of the FEIS
for Remedial Action Standards for Inactive Uranium Processing Sites (EPA
520/4-82-013-1) notes evidence that tailings have been found in several
communities near mills in low population areas. In many instances,
tailings have been transported 10-15 miles to their point of use.
Comment 33: The failure of institutional controls is highly
unlikely and will occur only if the government determines at some time in
the future that the controls mandated by the UMTRCA are unnecessary.
Guarding against such a determination is not within EPA's authority under
UMTRCA. In effect, EPA is claiming authority to protect against a change
in standards by the government itself, contrary to existing law, and
would impose the cost of such protection on private parties - clearly an
unconstitutional taking without just compensation. (1-7(2).18, 1-7(2).25)
Response: EPA has been guided by the language and legislative
history of UMTRCA, which contradicts the commenter's interpretation.
Congress clearly intended long-term control measures to be applied, so as
to minimize reliance on government. The House Report itself noted that
institutional controls could not be expected to remain effective for the
very long periods the hazard would persist. EPA has set standards based
on the best currently available information. UMTRCA authorizes EPA to
revise these standards at any time. We cannot now determine whether any
such future revisions would be in the direction of loosening or of
strengthening the standards. Therefore, the commenter's remarks are not
only speculative, but express only a single side of the speculations that
might be made. Also see the response to Comment 23, A.5.0.
Comment 34: EPA gives insufficient weight to the lessons learned
from the Grand Junction incident and minimizes the long term control by
Federal or state governments after operations have ceased. (1-22.3)
Response: EPA disagrees. The standard in no way limits using any
additional institutional controls Federal or state governments may find
are needed for health or environmental protection purposes. UMTRCA
authorizes such actions. EPA is merely supporting UMTRCA's directive to
minimize reliance on such controls. See the responses to Comments 23,
28, 29, and 32.
A.5-9
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Comment 35: The only property of tailings making them attractive
for construction purposes is that the material is a homogeneous sand of
convenient particle size distribution. Other sandy materials would serve
equally well; there is nothing unique about uranium mill tailings for
such an application. Therefore, in order for such misuse to occur, it is
not sufficient that the tailings be accessible; rather, they must be more
conveniently accessible than alternate materials which can serve the same
purpose. (1-10(2).7, 1-7(2).19)
Response: An extensive survey conducted for EPA in 1972 found
thousands of locations where tailings had been used for many purposes.
We agree that tailings are not unique, and that their potential for miuse
depends on their accessibility. That is why we have adopted inhibiting
misuse by physical means of limiting access as a goal of the standards.
Comment 36: EPA*s assessments of the risks of intrusion into or
misuse of tailings overstates the hazards and the need for prevention.
Tailings are not acutely toxic, thus there is ample time to detect and
correct intrusion and misuse before any individual is placed at
significant risk. Studies of Grand Junction, EPA's prime example of
misuse, have found no increase in fatalities or incidence of cancer.
(1-6(3).20, I-6(H2).9)
4
Response: We disagree. Considering that tailings piles are not
likely to be under frequent surveillance (indeed, Congress intended this
to be the case), tailings could be removed for use at many locations
before authorities noticed. It would require deliberate and costly
searches to determine where the material had been taken, and additional
expense to recover the tailings. We believe that inhibiting misuse by
physical methods is one among several mutually compatible control
objectives of reasonable and adequate standards for tailings piles. EPA
has previously described the reasons such studies of Grand Junction are
unlikely to be sensitive enough to detect health effects that are
actually occurring (see the FEIS for Remedial Action Standards for
Inactive Uranium Processing Sites, Vol. II, EPA 520/4-82-013-2, October
1982; Section D.2.1.2, Comment 15). We have estimated that 150 excess
lung cancers would occur in the Grand Junction area from tailings used in
construction if remedial actions were not taken.
Comment 37: EPA's justification of a 20 pCi/m2-sec cover is based
primarily on the premise that such a three meter cover is necessary to
prevent misuse. This justification is flawed in two respects. First,
misuse has not been widespread; rather misuse has been limited in both
time and place, and either occurred before tailings were viewed as
hazardous or as an intentional unlawful act. Second, burying tailings
will not in and of itself prevent misuse. The key factor in preventing
misuse is simply the knowledge that the material is hazardous.
(1-6(3).18, 1-6(4).11)
Response: See the response to Comment 26, A.5.0.
A.5-10
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Comment 38: EPA's justification of 20 pCi/m2-sec covers to
prevent misuse after failure of institutional controls is both illegal
and contrary to fact. The U.S. Constitution is intended to be
perpetual. Further, UMTRCA provides generally for federal and state
ownership and control of stabilized tailings and NRG has proposed a fund
to assure annual inspection of every stabilized site. This is sufficient
to prevent misuse. (1-6(3).19, 1-7(2).23, 1-4(3).14)
Response: Reliance on passive controls to protect health involves
no implication or assumption that the U.S. Constitution was not intended
to be perpetual. See the responses to Comments 23, 26, and 33, A.5.0.
Comment 39; EPA assumes that someone is living atop a pile and
being exposed, but Federal law provides for Government ownership and
control, making this assumption unrealistic. (P-28.3)
Response; EPA has not made such an assumption. We note in the
Preamble to the Final Standard that "...even with the disposal actions
required by these standards it would not be safe to build habitable
structures on the disposal sites. Federal or State ownership of the
sites is assumed to preclude such inappropriate uses."
Comment 40: The Grand Junction tailings misuse should not be
applied to the development of environmental standards for tailings
because these tailings were misused before there was realization that
mill tailings might pose a hazard, and because they were available at no
cost from an uncovered pile near the center of the city. (1-25.19,
I-4(H2)5, 1-22.14)
Response; See the responses to Comments 35 and 36, A.5.0.
Comment 41. Future tailings misuse is unlikely, considering that
for it to occur all individual and institutional knowledge that tailings
may be harmful would have to disappear, they would have to be discovered
by someone planning substantial development, and the cost of excavating
and transporting the tailings would have to be cheaper than the cost of
commercially available sand near the construction site. (1-25.20,
1-25.21)
Response: We have no assurance that people who were either ignorant
of or uncaring about the hazard will not misuse tailings if they perceive
some personal benefit from doing so. We agree that large-scale misuse
seems unlikely. However, even small-scale uses of tailings can produce
substantial lung cancer risks for the affected individuals, who may be
entirely unaware of the origin of the materials used in or around their
homes. Also see the responses to Comments 35 and 36, A.5.0.
A.5-11
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Comment 42: There have been no reports of criminal trespass or
theft of fencing on Homestake's property in Cibola County. (S-8.1)
Response: EPA staff have received numerous anectodal reports of
fence thefts and vandalism in open areas of the West. An instance
involving a Federally-owned tailings pile has been documented (Rogers and
Sandquist, in a report to NRC, RAE-21-1, Rev. 1, August 1981). Also see
the responses to Comments 32 and 33, A.5.0.
\EPA's Cover Standard Js Appropriate!
Comment 43; Two to three meters of overburden not only would
attenuate radon release, but would protect the piles from erosional and
dispersal forces. (P-13(2).7, P-23.3, P-26.8, S-1.2)
Response: EPA agrees.
Comment 44: The Agency has misstated the principal mechanism for
long-term containment. EPA considers soil cover requirements, while the
principal concern of long-term containment is geologic stability.
(P-4(H1).6)
Response; EPA agrees that geologic stability is the principal
factor in containment, but the cover is a very significant factor.
However, covers are needed to control radon emissions and protect the
tailings from penetration by water, apart from their role in
containment. For these reasons, our analysis very thoroughly considered
cover requirements.
!Surface Disposal Js Jnadeguate!
Comment 45: Below grade burial with staged disposal should be
required for new tailings, and phased removal of existing tailings to
trenches upon a finding that disposal of an existing pile in place will
not meet the post-closure standards of 40 CFR 192.32(b). (P-l(2).43)
Response; If disposal of an existing pile in place will not meet
the standards, we agree that disposal in trenches should be considered.
In the Preamble to the Final Standards, EPA has announced its intention
to consider whether work practice standards or other methods-specific
standards such as staged disposal should be issued under EPA's Clean Air
Act authority for the purpose of controlling radon emissions during
operations.
A.5-12
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Comment 46: We support a siting criterion that emphasizes disposal
in stable rock formations which are isolated from groundwater supplies as
well as from disruption by severe natural forces. (P-l(2).42)
Response: We believe our final standards will have the general
effect the commenter has recommended.
Comment 47: We suggest that all licensed tailings should be buried
to discourage disruption by humans and to assure isolation for the
millenia of toxicity. (P-33.ll, S-1.3, S-1.8)
Response: EPA considered this alternative and found it
unreasonable. Adequate protection can be provided by disposing of
existing tailings above grade. However, EPA encourages the disposal of
tailings generated in the future in lined, below-grade impoundments.
Comment 48; EPA should consider deeper geological disposal, as
liners have proven inadequate to serve their purpose for the full period
of toxicity. (P-33.8)
Response: A liner is the primary standard for protecting
groundwater. EPA is aware that liners sometimes fail. Therefore, EPA
has a secondary standard to prevent groundwater from degradation by any
seepage that does occur. This is adequate because the primary threat to
groundwater occur during the mill's operation, when application of the
secondary standards is assured. Over the long term, a suitable radon
attenuating cover or low permeability cap will adequately prevent rain
water from penetrating tailings and entering the ground whether or not a
liner is fully functional. Finally, we note that deep burial might place
tailings in groundwater.
Comment 49: There is much to be said for burial of tailings
subgrade. (S-3(2).20)
Response: EPA agrees, with some reservations. See the responses to
Comments 45, 47, and 48, A.5.0.
Comment 50: EPA's cover requirement is inconsistent with the
requirements for substances EPA regulates under SWDA. Yet, those
substances remain hazardous in perpetuity. Assuming any control is
needed, a relatively dense cover (clay or rock) is all that is
necessary. (1-6(3).21)
A.5-13
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Response; Protecting groundwater from nonradioacrive contamination
was the main concern for hazardous waste sites whereas attenuating
radioactive radon emissions is an additional goal for tailings.
Retaining moisture in the cover and the tailings helps to control such
gaseous emissions. Therefore, in areas where groundwater would be
adequately protected by an efficient radon attenuating cover, such a
cover is consistent with the SWDA requirements. Where groundwater might
not be adequately protected, such as in areas where there is a relatively
high precipitation rate, the final standard requires a low permeability
cap to be used, such as the combined plastic/clay/rock/soil caps required
for hazardous waste sites. Under wet climate conditions, such caps may
need little modification to satisfy the radon emission and longevity
requirements.
Comment 51: EPA assumes an earthen cover of 3 meters is required
for optimum cover design. However, the validity of the equations to
calculate estimated cover thickness is questioned since the existing
equations were derived from data that failed to consider such critical
factors as residual moisture and compaction at optimum moisture.
(1-1(2).35)
Response; EPA is aware of uncertainties in applying state-of-the-art
attenuation equations to estimate long-term radon emission rates. The
Preamble states that such uncertainties should be taken into account in
designing disposal covers that provide "reasonable assurance" of
complying with the numerical requirements of the disposal standards.
IEPA's Cover Requirements Is Excessive*.
Comment 52: We do not support EPA's proposal to require 10 feet of
cover on tailings piles. Considerably less than 10 feet of earthen cover
would suffice to protect piles against erosion and with the proper type
of cover, would also suffice to reduce radon levels. (I-4(H2).16,
P-KH2-D.7, 1-6(3).5, I-6(H2).ll, 1-4(3).64)
Response: The standard does not require 10 feet of cover, but we do
anticipate that satisfying the stated requirements will result in
comparably thick, durable surfaces being placed over the tailings. By
stating numerical radon emission and longevity requirements, and a
narrative closure standard, EPA leaves the regulatory agencies and mill
operators considerable flexibility in choosing cover designs to satisfy
the standards.
A.5-14
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Comment 53; EPA's proposed 20 pCi/m2-sec cover is not required to
protect groundwater in arid or semi-arid regions, since there will be no
significant flow of water through the tailings. EPA's proposed 20
pCi/m^-sec cover requirement is not necessary to protect groundwater in
wet climates. The inactive Canonsburg site shows that one to two feet of
clay is sufficient to protect groundwater in such regions. (1-6(3).24,
1-6(3).25)
Response: Groundwater protection is only one among several disposal
goals that are supported by such a cover. A thick earthen cover may not
be "required" for groundwater protection in arid regions, but it serves
to reduce water penetration during sporadic or seasonal high rainfall
episodes. Also see the response to Comment 50, A.5.0.
Comment 54: EPA's 20 pCi/m^-sec cover requirement is far in
excess of what is needed to control erosion and is not cost/effective.
EPA's guidance documents for hazardous waste sites suggests two feet of
soil cover is sufficient to provide adequate erosion resistance.
(1-6(3).22)
Response; The standard may lead to thicker covers than would
generally be needed to control erosion alone. The RIA shows, however,
that thicker covers are cost effective in achieving overall health
protection, largely because they substantially reduce radon emissions and
the potential for misuse.
Comment 55: If tailings are properly graded, covered, and provided
proper drainage, thin covers of approximately one meter may not require
long-term active maintenance. (1-1(2).36)
Response: EPA agrees, depending, of course, on site-specific
details. However, also see the response to Comment 54, A.5.0.
ICover Should Not Be A Surrogate For Unrelated Goals!
Comment 56: The issues of radon emission and tailings
isolation/stabilization are separate, and requirements for their control
should be developed independently. (F-3(2).19)
Response; As controlling radon emissions and providing for
isolation/stabilization involve cover requirements, we don't understand
how they could be considered entirely separately. However, we did
consider them separately to a high degree, and provided individual
specifications for them in the standard.
A.5-15
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Comment 57: EPA should consider the practical means by which its
inter-related goals can best be achieved instead of using the
inter-relationship of the goals to justify its excess cover
requirements. (1-4(3).71)
Response: EPA believes it followed the recommended approach to a
greater extent than the commenter suggests. (See the response to Comment
56, above, for example.) EPA does not agree that its cover requirements
are "excess." The requiremens are amply justified by their benefits of
inhibiting misuse, avoiding lung cancers that might otherwise be caused
by radon emissions, and limiting the risk to individuals who may live
very near tailings piles.
Comment 58: The 20 pCi/m^-sec radon standard is not necessary to
achieve any of EPA's objectives. Individual standards should have been
proposed for each objective, allowing implementing agencies and licensees
more flexibility to design controls to achieve each standard.
(1-10(2).6, 1-12(2).2)
Response: See the responses to Comments 54, 56, and 57, A.5.0. The
20 pCi/m^-sec standard is indeed necessary to avoid lung cancers that
might otherwise result from long term radon emissions. Furthermore, EPA
expects the standard will lead to cover designs that will significantly
inhibit access to the tailings for misuse. Devising a separate standard
for misuse within our authority would be conceptually very challenging,
but is not necessary in view of our other approach to the problem.
Comment 59: EPA considers adequate stabilization - the prevention
of dispersal of tailings by wind and water for the prescribed period - to
be an integral part of its standard. Yet, it is not entirely clear from
a review of EPA's proposal and supporting materials the extent to which
EPA relies upon stabilization as support for the excess cover (i.e.,
approximately 10 feet) it projects as necessary to meet its standard.
(1-4(3).62)
Response: The documentation in the EIS shows that a thicker earthen
cover will generally be needed to satisfy the radon emission requirement
than would be needed to stabilize the pile against erosion for 1000 years
(assuming the surface is protected with stones). Also see the response
to Comment 54, A.5.0.
Comment 60: EPA should base its radon standard on what is necessary
to reduce the hazard associated with radon, not as a proxy for meeting
other objectives. (1-10(2).4, 1-4(3).69)
See the responses to Comments 52-59, A.5.0.
A.5-16
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Comment 61; Any proposed standards directed at controlling misuse
should be segregated from the issues directed at controlling radon flux,
(1-1(2).32)2
Response: See the response to Comment 58, A.5.0.
Comment 62: Radon emanation should not be used to formulate
stabilization requirements. Stabilization and isolation should be
addressed as distinctly separate issues from controlling radon
emanation. (1-1(2).37)
Response: See the response to Comment 56, A.5.0.
'.Additional Comments'.
Comment 63: EPA's claim that the magnitude and frequency of floods
can be predicted for periods of several hundreds of years conflicts with
standard geomorphic and hydrologic thought. (S-3(2).17)
Response: The commenter may be overstating EPA's claims; indeed the
DEIS noted that uncertainties in the characteristics of long term floods
could affect disposal system designs. The FEIS and the Preamble address
this point more thoroughly. We conclude that, in practice, disposal
systems should be designed to withstand the "Probable Maximum Flood,"
which may be determined from site-specific meteorological limitations.
This avoids inaccuracies associated with incomplete knowledge of
long-term flood frequency/magnitude relationships.
Comment 64: We do not believe that tailings disposal areas should
be released to unrestricted use. (S-3(2).20)
Response: EPA agrees. We have noted that building on the site
could be unhealthful and needs to be restricted. The UMTRCA permits the
NRC and the custodian of the site to allow appropraite uses, talcing
account, however, of the very long term persistence of the potential for
tailings to be hazardous. See the responses to Comments 20 and 23, A.5.0.
Comment 65: We support a balanced approach between passive and
institutional controls, the extent of which will be determined on a
site-by-site evaluation. (1-12(2).5)
Response: EPA agrees with the Congress, which clearly intended to
favor passive over institutional controls.
A.5-17
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Comment 66: We believe that controlled access to closed tailings
piles will be necessary even with cover, and that institutional controls
such as fencing can be just as effective as cover in minimizing hazards
from tailings. We believe that EPA's emphasis on a very thick cover does
not take into account the very high costs of such covers or the very
significant environmental impacts of obtaining appropriate soils in some
areas.
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A.5,1 Period of Effectiveness (Longevity)
!The Reguired Period If Effectiveness Is Too Short!
Comment 1; The 200-year period of effectiveness proposed by the
Agency is an unacceptably short time period. (P-4(H1).5, P-4(H1).7,
P-4(H1).20, P-8(H1).14, P-8(H1).17, P-8(H1).18)
Responses: EPA has retained the 200 year minimum longevity
requirement, for reasons given in the Preamble.
Comment 2: The longevity requirement should be at least 5,000 years
to put the proper emphasis on control. The radon emanation standard
provides an identifiable, measurable, and enforceable basis of
determining longevity and integrity of the soil cover. (P-4(H1).16,
P-4(H1).20)
Response; We do not know any specific design features that a 5000
year criterion would impose as distinguished from a 1000 year criterion,
or, for that matter, a 200 year criterion. We believe that the proposed
longevity requirement will produce the same long term protection, and be
more suitable for assessment by engineers designing the disposal. See
the Preamble for further discussion, and the response to Comment 26,
A.5.1.
Comment 3; EPA should establish a minimum period of control of
1000 years, as specified by the NRC rules. (P-8(H1).14, S-12(H2).6,
P-13(2).6, P-24.1, P-l<2).27, P-44.2, S-3(2).13)
See the response to Comment 1, A.5.1.
Comment 4; Congressional intent was to control tailings until long
after existing institutions can be expected to last. On this basis, 1000
years is not too long. (F-3(2).26, P-8(H1).17, P-8(H1).18, P-l(2).l,
2, P-l(2).27, S-3(H2).12)
Response: We agree that 1000 years is not too long. We believe the
final standard provides appropriately long-lasting protection, consistent
with Congress' intent. See the Preamble for further discussion.
Comment 5: Consideration should be given to stabilization designed
to accommodate the thorium-230 half-life (77,000 years), possibly by
disposing of tailings in areas that are not influenced by erosion, such
as heads of ephemeral drainage ways, behind topographical wind breaks,
etc. (S-1.3)
Response: As discussed in the Preamble and FEIS, Volume I, we
believe that the proposed longevity requirement gives adequate long-term
A.5-19
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protection. We do not know practical means of general application for
stabilizing tailings for hundreds of thousands of years. See also the
response to Comment 2, A.5.1.
Comment 6; Tailings should be stabilized on a responsible long-term
basis. (P-6.3, P-25.1, P-32.5)
Response; We agree that the tailings should be stabilized on a
reasonable long term basis and believe that our standard meets that need.
Comment 7; The time period for control in the standard should be
driven by the consideration of the half-life of thorium-230, not just
radium-226. (S-12(H2).l, P-l(2).27)
Response: See the response to Comment 5, A.5.1.
Comment 8; EPA should establish a minimum effectiveness requirement
of 1000 years because of the long half-life of thorium-230, the high
chances of flooding for shorter time periods, and the attendant benefit
of controlling radon emissions. Modern engineering methods can assure
covers lasting tens of thousands of years which would not be
prohibitively expensive. (P-26.7, P-KH2-D.6)
Response: For reasons discussed in the Preamble, we have retained
the minimum 200 year requirement. Also see the responses to Comments 2
and 5, A.5.1.
Comment 9: Control technologies needed to meet thousands of years
of containment have been proposed and approved for use by two mill
operations in New Mexico. (P-l(2).35)
Response: No response required.
Comment 10: EPA should set a longevity requirement that addresses
the thousands of years that tailings remain hazardous. (P-l(2).58,
P-33.1, P-33.6, P-34.2, P-37.2, P-35.4)
Response: See the responses to Comments 2 and 5, A.5.1.
Comment 11; The longevity requirement should provide a minimum
period of isolation of uranium tailings piles of 500 thousand years.
(P-30.6, P-32.2)
Response; See the response to Comment 5, A.5.1.
A.5-20
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Comment 12; EPA's rules replace consideration of long-term disposal
procedures with short-term actions.
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Comment 17: We consider the 1,000 year to the extent reasonably
achievable, and 200 year minimum stabilization requirement a practical
approach to achieving the primary goals of limiting dispersion and
misuse. (F-6(2).7)
Response: No response required.
Comment 18; We believe that the kind of performance standard
proposed by EPA for effective cover life will allow the flexibility
needed to permit licensees to design and NRC to analyze site-specific
cover designs for compliance with the standard. (F-6(2).8)
Response; The standard applies to the design of the covers.
Otherwise, no response is required.
!Longevity Requirements is Unclear!
Comment 19; EPA standards are ambiguous on the effectiveness
requirement; is it 200 years or 1000 years? (S-5.9, S-12(H2).6)
Response: The Preamble contains a discussion of this issue.
Comment 20: EPA's longevity standards creates an ambiguity as to
the amount of soil cover that is required if the standard is interpreted
as requiring a radon flux of less than 20 pCi/m^-sec after 1,000 years,
20 rather than 10 feet of cover could be required at the time of
disposal. This should be clarified. (1-6(3).44)
Response: The radon flux standard applies over the entire control
period. We believe the needed thickness is far less than the commenter
indicates. See Chapter 8 of the FEIS, Volume I.
Comment 21; EPA should state the period of performance which must
be met for non-radiological hazards. This should be the same as for
radiological hazards. (1-6(3).45)
Response: We intend the longevity requirement to apply to the
integrity of the control system. Radon gas is emitted from tailings to
the air through the cover. Applying the longevity standard to the
radiological hazard, in effect regulates the integrity of the cover and
accomplishes our purpose.
A.5-22
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Comment 22; In the longevity standard, EPA's use of the preposition
"for" should be replaced by the phrase "up to", so that implementing
agencies may not require costly efforts to prove that a cover system will
last 1,000 years. (1-6(3).43)
Response: This issue is discussed in the Preamble.
Comment 23; The concept of "reasonable assurance" in meeting the
1,000 year disposal design limit is not clear. Moreover, we do not
believe that it is cost effective to design controls to last for 1,000
years. Verifying such a design cannot be done, and EPA should abandon
the concept. At most, the longevity requirement should be a few
decades. (F-5(3).10)
Response; We have provided expanded and clarified discussions of
reasonable assurance as regards the longevity standard (see the FEIS and
the Preamble) to indicate that we expect standard engineering (design)
criteria to be used to limit the probability of failure over the design
period to a value consistent with other design situations where public
health and safety are important concerns. We have also indicated the
factors that we believe are most important to determining the longevity
of an impoundment design. We agree that verification cannot be done.
That is why the standard applies to the design of the disposal system.
The weight of evidence in our rulemaking record indicates that the
longevity standard is a workable regulatory requirement.
{Additional Comments!
Comment 24: EPA should analyze the potential means of cover
degradation, over time. (P-22(H2).5>
Response: In the EIS, EPA outlined various means of degradation of
protection, including erosion, deposition, flooding, climatic change,
earthquakes, vulcanism, glaciation, and various human activities. See
the FEIS, Volume I, Chapter 8.
Comment 25: EPA's claim that "flood protection must be based on
very infrequent but high magnitude floods" (1,000 year flood) is
inconsistent with Clean Water Act requirements, fails to consider the
highly site-specific nature of the potential risk, and may lead
implementing agencies to impose costly controls to minimize remote risks
of insignificant tailings disruptions. (1-6(3).23)
Response: EPA is fully authorized to establish these standards for
disposal of uranium mill tailings, independently of any Clean Water Act
requirements that may have been established for other purposes. The need
to consider floods follows from the requirement that piles be adequately
A.5-23
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controlled for up to 1000 years, and a recognition that, in general,
flooding is one of primary disruptives forces that may occur over such a
period. We do not believe that potential risk from such disruptions can
be estimated site-specfically, because we cannot predict future human and
environmental conditions site-specifically for such a long period. We do
know, however, that any major disruption of a pile would increase its
radon emissions to the air. Controlling such emissions is a goal of the
standards.
Comment 26: Design events with return periods of 10,000 years or
more must be used to achieve a containment standard of 200 or 1000
years. Maximum credible events should be used in the evaluation of
tailings disposal areas so that an acceptable level of risk can be
achieved. The use of maximum credible events is a well-understood,
accepted practice in industry and government. (P-21(H2).l)
Response; As discussed in the Preamble and the EIS, we agree that
tailings should be designed to withstand any disruptive events that have
more than a small probability of occurring during the period for which
"reasonable assurance" of control is required. In practice, this may be
equivalent to considering maximum credible events.
A.5-24
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A.5.2 Radon Emission Limit
!General Comments!
Comment 1: We concur with EPA's regulatory approach that the radon
emanation limit applies to the design of the tailings disposal facility.
(F-3(2).25)
Response: No response required.
Comment 2; The radon emanation rate standard determines the soil
cover standard, and the longer you look, beyond 1000 years the two
standards become indistinguishable. (P-4(H1).18)
Response: The durability of the surface has a great deal to do with
the longevity of the cover. Otherwise, EPA agrees.
Comment 3: The depth of cover needed to meet the radon emanation
standard should be based on the estimated release at the end of 1000
years. Minimum cover depths should not be specified. The design
necessary to meet the performance should be left to the regulatory
agency. (S-3(2).14, S-3(2).15)
Response: We concur with the commenter. The regulations require
that the radon emanation standard be met over the full required period of
control, but the way in which this is to be done is not specified.
However, see the response to Comment 1, A.5.1.
Comment 4: EPA should refrain from establishing any definitive
position on cover designs and allow the NRC and the uranium mill
operators to work out site-specific solutions to each of EPA's
objectives. (1-30.4)
Response: We agree. See the response to Comment 3, A.5.2.
!The Radon Limit Is Too Stringent and Unjustified!
Comment 5; EPA's proposed 20 pCi/m^-sec radon flux limit is not
justified by the need to control radon or direct gamma radiation.
Indeed, it is proposed as a proxy to require three meter soil covers
which cannot be justified on the basis of prevention of misuse,
prevention of surface spread of tailings, or groundwater protection.
(1-4(3).9, 1-4(3).34, 1-4(3).69, 1-6(3).17, 1-10(2).5, 1-10(2).11,
1-28.11, 1-22.1, P-29.4)
A.5-25
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Response: The 20 pCi/m^-sec radon emission limit combined with
the longevity requirement can indeed be satisfied by a control system
that appropriately employs a thick., durable cover, not necessarily 3
meters. Limiting radon emissions is only one among several goals of the
standard, however. Our analysis addressed all these goals. We did not
attempt to justify the radon emission limit solely on the basis of the
need to control radon, but the RIA shows that there is such justification.
Comment 6: Even if EPA's excessive radon risk estimates are
accepted, they do not reflect a level of significant risk that would
warrant control. (1-5(2).11, 1-6(3).35, 1-5(3).36, P-29.1, 1-25.16)
Response; See the response to Comment 7, A.5.2.
Comment 7: Given the de minimis risks, the minimal populations at
risk, and the projected costs, the EPA-proposed radon flux limit of 20
pCi/m^-sec is not justified and should be remanded for reconsideration
and redevelopment. (1-1(2).41)
Response: The commenter states that the risks from unregulated
radon emissions would be so low that regulation is unjustified. EPA does
not agree, although we recognize that the risks are less than some from
other causes. We are required by UMTRCA to "...make every reasonable
effort to...prevent or minimize radon diffusion into the
environment... from...tailings" We have concluded that uncontrolled radon
emissions would produce both a high maximum individual risk (estimated as
2 in 100) and a high potential cumulative effect of thousands of deaths
over time. We believe such effects require control. The commenter
further states that the costs of regulation are excessive. Our studies,
as given in the FEIS and the RIA, show that tailings can be disposed of
in such a way as to limit radon emissions to 20 pCi/m2-sec at a
reasonable cost.
Comment 8: The radon emission limit is inappropriate because:
a. The radon flux limit is not to control radon emanation but to
prevent misuse.
b. Radon emanation from tailings piles does not contribute a
significant risk to the general population.
c. It is not even possible to measure the radon contribution from
a tailings pond source term at a distance exceeding one mile.
(1-1(2).38)
A.5-26
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Response:
a. See the response to Comment 5, A.5.2.
b. See the response to Comment 7, A.5.2.
c. The commenter confuses the detectability of a material with
its presence. Radon released to the air continues to disperse
until it is removed by radioactive decay. The sector-averaged
Gaussian plume model has been used for years to estimate the
concentration of material at a distance, using a source term
and atmospheric and wind condition data. See the response to
Comment 20, Section A.2.1.
Comment 9: Considering the fact that stabilization to prevent
misuse and erosion is the primary objective of tailings control and the
the cost benefit analysis fails to justify any additional cover solely
for the purpose of radon control, we are unable to concur in the proposed
radon emission limit. (P-9(3).7)
Response: We believe that protecting people from radon emissions is
an objective of tailings control as well as inhibiting misuse and
erosion. See Section 8 of the FEIS. We have considered the cost of
radon control in our analysis for the regulations. See the response to
Comment 7, A.5.2.
Comment 10: If a radon standard is deemed necessary, the 10 CFR
Part 20 values of 3 pCi/1 for unlimited access and 1 pCi/1 for permanent
access are appropriate. (P-9(H1).12, 1-6(4).9, 1-30.3)
Response: The concentrations in 10 CFR 20 are intended to determine
those areas associated with an operational facility for which public
access restrictions are needed to control radiation exposure. 10 CFR 20
also requires operators of such facilities to keep radiation exposures as
low as reasonably achievable, notwithstanding these maximum allowable
concentrations. EPA is following established radiation protection
practices by issuing generally applicable standards for such facilities.
I The Radon Flux Is Too High I
Comment 11; The 20 pCi/m^-sec limit may produce unacceptable
population doses in eastern (more populated) states. The proposed limit
should be reexamined. (P-4(H1).22, P-5(H1).17)
A.5-27
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Response: We don't believe there is a valid basis for the
statement. The most immediate prospects we know of for uranium milling
in the East involve currently rural areas. Therefore, we don't expect
there to be large populations very near the tailings, at least in the
near future. Radon emitted from tailings in these areas would quickly be
carried to the ocean. Although we have not carried out a risk assessment
specifically for an eastern mill, we believe the results would not be
qualitatively different from our assessment results for inactive and
active mills in the West.
Comment 12: To allow increases in radon emanations (up to 20
pCi/m2-sec) in an area of dense population removes people's opportunity
to choose to live at background exposure levels. (P-5(Hl).ll, P-5(H1).5,
P-5(H1).18)
Response; From Table 5-1 of the FEIS we may infer that radon from a
tailings piles that satisfies the standard will increase the natural
radon background rate by a small fraction at any distances from the pile
that people are likely to live. The estimated risk for people who live
permanently very close to tailings piles can still be relatively high, up
to 1 in 1000 for an emission limit of 20 pCi/m2. We concluded that it
is not reasonable to reduce the emission standard below this value
because of (1) the uncertainty associated with the feasibility of
implementing a significantly lower standard, (2) the small increase in
total health benefits associated with the thicker covers that would be
required, and (3) the limited circumstances in which the maximum risk to
individuals might be sustained. (See the Preamble for further details).
In a practical sense, people's opportunities to live at background levels
will not be affected by the standard.
Comment 13: The residual risk of two in 1,000 allowed by EPA's
proposed radon limit is too high and illegal under Section 112 of the
Clean Air Act. (P-45.13)
Response; We now estimate the maximum risk at about 1 in 1000
(see the response to Comment 12, above). Because this risk is relatively
high, we carefully examined whether the standard should be significantly
lowered (see the Preamble for details). As noted above (the response to
Comment 12), we found it could not.
Comment 14: EPA should require that sufficient cover material is
provided to reduce the radon emission level to as near to background as
possible. (P-26.12, P-45.7, P-5(H1).14, P-49.4)
Response: EPA believes the final standard reduces emission rates as
low as is reasonable (see the response to Comment 12, A.5.2).
A.5-28
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Comment 15: We support a 2 pCi/m2-sec emission standard (as
specified by the NRC rules). (S-12(H2).2, P-26.10, F-3(2).5, P-6(2).2,
P-l<2).6, P-l(2).26, P-l(2).28, P-l(2).57, P-13(2).8, P-30.7, P-37.3,
P-36.3, P-44.3, P-49.2)
Response; Our analyses indicates that a standard of 20 pCi/m^-sec
is as low as may reasonably be achieved. See the response to Comment 12,
A.5.2.
!Alternative Limits Proposed! .
Comment 16: After reclamation, tailings should meet a radon
concentration standard at the downwind edge of the tailings equivalent to
the radon emission rate. (P-l(2).44, P-l(2).59)
Response: See the response to Comment 16, A.1.2.
Comment 17; We recommend that a performance standard of 0.5 pCi per
liter be applied upon stabilization of the impoundment. (S-12(H2).2)
Response: See the response to Comment 10, A.1.2.
Comment 18: We recommend a regulatory standard in terms of
concentrations of radon decay products, and support the levels prescribed
by 10 CFR Part 20 (0.03WL). As an alternative, the NCRP is recommending
an exposure limit for radon decay products of 2 WLM per year.
(I-6(H2).12, P-29.3, 1-25.16, 1-19.11, I-4(H2).10, I-4(H2).ll, 1-6(4).9)
Response: See the responses to Comment 17, A.5.2, and Comment 13,
A.2.0.
Comment 19: We recommend that the radon protection standard be
based on a concentration limit in air of 3 pCi/l/.03 radon daughters
working level. (1-12(2).!
Response; See the response to Comment 17, A.5.2.
IEPA Should Clarify The Standards!
Comment 20: EPA should clarify whether the 20 pCi/m^-sec is only
a design standard or both a design and performance standard. (S-13(H2).2)
A.5-29
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Response: The emission rate standard of 20 pCi/m^-sec is a design
standard. Clearly, performance over 200-1000 years should not be
monitored.
Comment 21; The footnote to the radon emission standard
(192.32(b)(l)(ii)) should be clarified to express EPA's purpose, that for
purposes of satisfaction of the radon emission standard, only radon from
tailings should be counted. The footnote should also prescribe a limit
to the amount of radioactive materials in the cover. (P-l(2).62)
Response: The footnote states that only radon from uranium
byproduct materials (tailings) should be counted. It also states that
releases of radon from the covering materials should be estimated in the
closure plan, although it is not included in the release limit. The
selection of cover material is a regulatory matter.
!Analysis Is Inadequate To Justify Standard!
Comment 22: EPA should clarify its basis for the 20 pCi/m2-sec
radon standard. Is the basis feasibility, acceptability of risk, a
combination of the two, or some other factor? (P-9(H1).3)
Response: The Preamble discusses how the radon emission limit
combined with the control longevity requirement addresses several
objectives: long-term containment of tailings, reduction in risks
associated with radon emissions water protection, and protection against
misuse. The overall basis for the entire standard is to reduce health
and environmental hazards to the lowest reasonably achievable level,
consistent with any legislative constraints.
Comment 23: EPA should clarify the technical basis for its 20
pCi/m^-sec standard. There is no logical connection between radium in
the soil, radon emission rates, and health effects. (P-9(H1).4)
Response: We believe the technical basis for the rule is clearly
stated in the Preamble and supplemented by the information in the EIS,
RIA, and other referenced documents. The statement that there is not a
logical connection among radium concentration in soil, radon emission
rates, and estimated health risks to people is incorrect. Clearly, the
higher the radium concentration in soil (or tailings), the higher the
rate of emission of radon, the direct decay product of radium. The radon
emission rate from a tailings pile is in turn directly relatable to radon
and daughter transport to populations through models employing long-range
meteorological transport calculations in common use throughout the
nuclear industry. Because of this direct relationship, the proposed
standard for disposal of tailings piles is expressed as a limitation on
the radon flux from the surface of the tailings. This relationship
A.5-30
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between radium, radon emissions, and health risks has been documented in
publications of the International Commission on Radiation Protection, the
United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation,
and, recently, in draft NCRP reports.
Comment 24: There is insufficient justification given for using
radon flux measurements for specifying cover thickness. The number in
the Table in 48 FR 19590 of estimated cover thickness to achieve
20 pCi/m2-sec have never been confirmed by field measurements. (1-22-8)
Response; There is some field information available regarding the
practicability of reducing radon emissions to levels approaching
background. This information, reviewed in the Preamble, is in reasonable
agreement with predictive calculational models, at least with regard to
designing covers to satisfy the final standard (20 pCi/m2-sec). EPA
recognizes, however, that uncertainties remain, and we have discussed in
the Preamble how such uncertainties should be taken account of in
providing "reasonable assurance" that the standard will be satisfied.
Some of these uncertainties involve predicting the performance of the
cover over time, particularly as the moisture in the cover changes.
However, contrary to the commenter's implication, the standard does not
require flux measurements. The standard applies to the design of a
cover, which may be carried out from measurements of physical/chemical
properties of the tailings other than flux.
Comment 25: There is strong evidence to indicate that the ultimate
effects of covering tailings will be much different and the radon release
rates will not be as predicted. For example: the transport effects of
barometric pressure changes, temperature changes, gas and water vapor
effects are expected to increase the radon movement by substantial
amounts. (1-29.1)
Response: See the response to Comment 24, A.5.2. We recognize
these phenomena and have considered them carefully. We believe these
factors need to be taken into account in designing covers that provide
"reasonable assurance" of satisfying the 20 pCi/m^-sec limit for up to
1000 years.
Comment 26: Moisture effects on the cover and the tailings may be
much more complicated than indicated in the DEIS. Because of this and
other uncertainties, we believe it would be essential to measure the
radon concentrations in the areas around the tailings piles after
corrective actions are taken. (1-29.2)
Response; We have noted that changes may occur over long periods of
time after disposal that may affect radon emission rates. We do not
A.5-31
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intend compliance with up to a 1000 year requirement to be determined by
monitoring. Therefore, while monitoring may be useful for research and
development purposes, we do not require monitoring for regulatory
compliance. See the response to Comments 24 and 25, A.5.2.
Comment 27; The Agency should include alternatives between the
20 pCi/m2-sec and 2 pCi/m2-sec radon levels proposed in the DEIS.
Response; We have made an analysis for a radon emission rate limit
of 6 pCi/m^-sec in addition to the values of 20 and 2 pCi/m^-sec.
This analysis indicates that the standard of 20 pCi/m^-sec is the
lowest that is reasonably achievable.
A.5-32
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A.5.3 Radium-226 Soil Concentration Exemption (40 CFR 192.32(b)(2))
Note to the reader: The purpose of the proposed standard is
discussed in the response to Comment 24, A.5.3, below.
!The Standards Are Too Stringent!
Comment 1: We oppose EPA's proposal to require clean up of
restricted areas to radium-226 concentrations of 5 pCi/g of soil in the
surface and 15 pCi/g of soil in the subsurface. No justification is
presented for such a stringent standard, and the limits are far below
levels where, under any reasonable scenario, these is a significant
risk. (1-6(3).10), (1-6(3).74), (1-25.17), (I-4(H2).12), (1-4(3).59),
(1-4(3).51), 1-4(3).55)
Response; We do not agree that this represents an overly stringent
standard. Higher concentrations in a substantial quantity of subsurface
soil under a house can be expected, on the average, to result in indoor
radon levels in excess of 0.02 working levels, and could pose clearly
significant risks. Thousands of acres of land may be involved, which, if
adequately cleaned up now, could be used without restrictions for the
indefinite future. The costs and benefits of alternative standards are
discussed in Chapter 9 of the FEIS.
Comment 2: The radium-in-soil standard appears to be arbitrarily
established as a number above background; it should be justified on the
basis of potential health effects. (S-13(H2).l)
Response; The standard was established on the basis of potential
health effects. The value was influenced by the need to provide a
reasonable margin above background so as to make implementation
reasonably achievable. Furthermore, the purpose of the standard is to
clean up tailings, not to reduce background levels of radium.
Comment 3: A limit of 20 pCi radium-226 per gram of soil is more
appropriate than 5 pCi on the basis of estimated risk in residences.
(1-25.17, 1-25.18, 1-4(3).55)
Response; See the response to Comment 1, A.5.3.
Comment 4; EPA's radium-in-soil standard is overly conservative
since it is too closely related to fluctuations in natural background
levels of radium-226 is soil. (1-4(3).52, 1-4(3).59)
Response: The standard applies to radium-226 in byproduct
materials, and is well above normal background levels.
A.5-33
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Comment 5; In deriving its radium-in-soil standard, EPA made a
number of excessively conservative assumptions which render the standard
highly questionable; for example, EPA did not take into account a barrier
factor which limits radon diffusion from soil into a dwelling, nor did
EPA allow for more than one full change of air per hour. (1-4(3).54,
1-4(3).56)
Response; Experience in Florida, Canada, Colorado with remedial
measures for indoor radon do not justify taking any credit for barriers.
Similarly, one air exchange per hour is normal, and will probably
decrease in the future due to economic pressures for energy conservation.
Comment 6; Neither radium-226 in contaminated soil in the vicinity
of piles, nor radon emanating from such soil pose a health risk from
inhalation, ingestion, or external exposure under any reasonable
scenario. Therefore, the 5 pCi/g radium-266 standard within the
restricted area is unreasonable. (1-6(3).76)
See the response to Comment 1, A.5.3.
Comment 7: The proposed Radium-226 standard in soil of 5 pCi per
gram of soil constitutes a negligible health risk with a substantial
economic burden. Originally, the limit was based on asserted
correlations between radium concentration in soil and radon progeny
concentrations inside structures built on reclaimed phosphate wastes in
Florida. Its application to the uranium mill tailings standards is
questionable. (1-2(2).10)
Response: There is no basis for assuming that the results obtained
in Florida (and elsewhere) will not apply to areas where tailings are
disposed of.
Comment 8; Realistic scenarios should be considered. Standards
should be predicated on realistic scenarios based on both current and
projected land use patterns, institutional land-use controls,
construction codes for ventilation, and active maintenance to restrict
residential development on such lands. (1-1(2).47)
Response: EPA does not agree that protection of public health over
the period these hazards will continue to exist should be predicated on
the assumption that institutional controls will be maintained when simple
and inexpensive cleanup can make their use unnecessary.
A.5-34
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Comment 9; EPA's assumptions in developing the Ra-226 standard are
erroneous.
a. EPA's response appears based on studies performed on
slab-on-grade homes constructed in Florida. This construction
technique is atypical for homes built in the western U.S.
b. Calculated values derived from EPA data in no way correspond to
EPA assumptions.
c. EPA overestimates the indoor radon decay product level.
d. EPA overestimates the radon emanation rate in soils beneath a
home.
(1-1(2).42)
Response: The correctness of EPA assumptions regarding indoor radon
is exemplified by the observations that the average indoors radon decay
product level in U.S. homes is approximately 0.004 WL, and several times
this level is not unusual. This is attributable to an average soil
concentration of somewhat less than 1.0 pCi/g radium-226. (It is
well-documented that most indoor radon is attributable to soil radium.)
In general, higher radium concentrations under a house will produce
higher radon levels inside the house.
Comment 10: Given the degree of conservatism realized by EPA, it is
evident a uniform concentration of 30 pCi Ra-226/gram would result in a
residual risk of lung cancer of less than 0.1 hypothetical case in 100
individuals, a value EPA deems acceptable. The cleanup costs would be
correspondingly lower--!.e., less than $12 million for all mills
considered vs. $80 million under the proposed standard. (1-1(2).44)
Response: We estimate that 30 pCi/g radium in subsoil under a house
could, on the average, result in more than 0.1WL in indoor air. This
would result in a greater than 1 in 10 lifetime risk of lung cancer for
each resident, a clearly unacceptably high risk. See Chapter 9 of the
FEIS for EPA's far lower estimate of the cleanup costs under the standard.
Comment 11: EPA has not shown an abnormal or excessive threat to
health exists from soils containing 30 pCi radium-226/gram. (1-1(2).45)
Response: See the response to Comment 10, A.5.3.
A.5-35
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Comment 12; EPA should not require cleanup of mill areas where
there are no tailings and where only low levels of contamination exist,
say under 50 pCi Ra-226/g. (1-13(2).3)
Response: See the response to Comment 10, A.5.3.
Comment 13: EPA's proposed cleanup levels are commonly found as
background levels in mine/mill areas. (1-13(2).4)
Response: See the responses to Comments 2 and 4, A.5.3.
Comment 14; EPA should base any general cleanup standard not on
radium concentration in the soil, but on assuring a maximum radon
daughter concentration in a habitable structure. (1-13(2).5)
Response: The conditions exempting parts of tailings sites from the
disposal standards serve two purposes: (1) to avoid high wholebody gamma
exposures due to surface contamination, and (2) to avoid high indoor
radon levels in structures due to subsurface contamination. If the mill
operators cleanup the land upon closure, then the post-closure Federal or
State custodian will not have to supervise as much land, nor monitor its
use as closely.
Comment 15: Post-closure standards should apply where radium
concentrations exceed pre-operational background levels. (F-3(2).7)
Response: See the responses to Comments 2 and 4, A.5.3.
!Standards Are Too Lax!
Comment 16: If sampling shows that contamination has moved more
than one foot into soils due to the spread of tailings, cleanup should be
required to such a depth that will comply with a 5 pCi/g radium-226
concentration. (P-26.22)
Response: Experience shows that when tailings are found deep below
the surface they were usually deposited there in concentrated form, the
15 pCi/g standard should easily include such tailings.
Comment 17; By conforming the radium-226 requirement to the
disposal site EPA ignores the radon contribution from potentially
windblown tailings. Thus, the radium-226 requirement should apply to
areas outside of the facility's restricted area. (P-KH2-1) .4,
P-K2) .30, P-l(2).61)
A.5-36
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Response; The question of the applicability of NRC or Agreement
State authority to off-site areas is outside EPA's jurisdiction.
However, if clean-up of such areas is carried out, the standards are
appropriate for this application.
Comment 18: EPA's proposed radium-226 limitations in soils must
include provisioning for cleaning up tailings that have been moved from
the disposal area. (P-26.19)
Response: See the response to Comment 17, A.5.3.
Comment 19: All lands in and around the tailings containing
radium-226 concentrations in excess of 5 pCi per gram of soil should be
cleaned up and disposed of in lined trenches. (P-l(2).45)
Response; The appropriate location for materials removed from such
lands is a disposal area. However, EPA does not specify the means of
satisfying its standards.
Comment 20: We support a maximum radium-226 concentration in
contaminated soils on and outside of the mill site of 5 pCi/g of soil in
the first 12 inches. (P-37.5, P-30.7, P-36.3, P-26.21, P-13(2).9)
Response: See the response to Comment 17. The depth to which the
standard for surface cleanup applies is largely governed by consideration
of the monitoring depth possible for gamma survey instruments. A depth
of 12 inches would require coring, a much more expensive survey technique.
Comment 21: The radium-in-soil standard appears to be arbitrarily
established as a number above background; it should be justified on the
basis of potential health effects. (S-13(H2).l)
Response: See the response to Comment 2, A.5.3.
Comment 22; The Agency's proposed standards mirror a request by
Union Carbide to delete the clause in the standards (192.32(b)(2)), which
includes mine or waste rock byproducts with elevated levels of radium.
(P-5(H1).4)
Response; The comment is incorrect. The standards apply to
byproduct materials, as defined in UMTRCA 78.
A.5-37
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!Standard Js Unclear!
Comment 23: The proposed radium-in-soil standard is subject to
divergent interpretation. (S-12(H2).3, P-26.20)
Response: The wording has been clarified.
Comment 24: The radon standard is flawed in that it covers only
areas with high radium soil concentrations. The Agency's intent appears
to have been to set a different radon standard for contaminated areas
adjacent to the tailings, but that is not what the letter of the rule
provides. The rule appears to exempt tailings covered with low radium
content soils. (P-4(H1).14)
Response; EPA intended the proposed Section 192.32(b)(2) to
distinguish disposal areas for tailings piles from other land areas on
disposal and/or licensed sites that are sufficiently uncontaminated by
tailings as to not require application of the disposal standards of
Section 192.32(a) . The definition of "disposal area" and the language
of Section 192.32(b) have been revised to clarify this objective.
Comment 25; It is unclear whether EPA's proposed radium-in-soil
standard is to apply to cover materials for tailings piles. If so, EPA's
proposed radon emanation standard of 20 pci/m^-sec could effectively
result in as little as 5 pCi/m2-sec of radon. (1-4(3).53)
See the response to Comment 24, A.5.3.
Comment 26; It is not clear how EPA's proposed radium-in-soil
standard relates to EPA's proposed post-closure radon emanation
standard. (1-4(3).52)
Response: See the response to Comment 24, A.5.3.
JOther Comments!
Comment 27; The proposed radium in soil standard should be
reconsidered because it could be applied under RCRA or SWDA to
characterize certain substances as hazardous wastes. (1-4(3).61)
Response: Such an application would have to be the subject of a
formal rulemaking, and is not a reason for changing this standard.
A.5-38
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Comment 28; We recommend there be a prescribed depth below the
surface to which the standard applies. (1-5(2).13)
Response; We did not specify a depth because we believe that this
should be left to the regulatory agency to determine on a site-specific
basis. This will make it possible to minimize unnecessary and expensive
subsurface measurements.
Comment 29: Standard procedures for measurement should be
developed. (1-12(2).3, P-49.3)
Response; We presume that the NRC will develop and/or encourage
such procedures if the need arises as part of its implementing role. We
are aware that NRC has the necessary experience as a result of
investigations it sponsored in South Dakota and elsewhere.
A.5-39
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A.6.0 IMPLEMENTATION
Comment 1; EPA should discuss the establishment of an environmental
monitoring program, which is a fundamental part of the implementation of
these standards. (S-6.6)
Response: NRC and Agreement States have the responsibility under
UMTRCA of implementing the standards. EPA will keep informed of the
adequacy of the implementation and will consider revising the standards
or issuing such guidance if the need to do so should become apparent.
Comment 2: The standard should provide guidance on the scope of a
radiological monitoring program that should be conducted during the
processing operation, closure period, and after the closure period.
(F-2.1)
Response: See the response to Comment 1, A.6.0.
Comment 3: Pre-operational monitoring must be required to assure
the validity of operational monitoring. (P-3(2).4)
See the response to Comment 1, A.6.0.
Comment 4: EPA's rules don't even support fines or shutdowns if an
operator chooses to ignore its rules. Fines for violation of operating
standards should be suggested by the EPA to the NRC. EPA should indicate
that there would be action taken for noncompliance. (P-8(H1).10,
P-8(H1).22)
Response: As we noted, above, NRC and Agreement States are
responsible for implementing the standards EPA issues under UMTRCA for
active uranium mills. The NRC is authorized to establish civil penalties
for violations. See Section 205 of UMTRCA.
Comment 5; EPA's current deference to the NRC for enforcement could
be used by opponents of the regulation to delay any action for many
years. (P-2.8, P-2.7)
Response: EPA has not deferred to NRC; the Agency is carrying out
its responsibilities under UMTRCA to set standards that NRC and Agreement
States are responsible for implementing. Where appropriate, such as with
respect to initiating programs to attain compliance with groundwater
protection standards, we have specified time limits. However, we believe
other compliance decisions are most appropriately made site-specifically,
i.e., by the implementing agencies.
A. 6-1
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A.6.1 Standards for Operation
Comment 1: EPA's proposed nondegradation standard for groundwater
may not be feasible to implement since it is extremely difficult to
establish background levels in a mineralized region. In an area such as
Ambrosia Lake, where the up-gradient aquifers have been drained,
establishing background levels is impossible. Even if feasible, the
economic costs would make implementation unreasonable. (1-6(3).59,
I-6(H2).23, I-6(H2).24, 1-7(2).8)
Response; The SWDA regulations applicable to monitoring
requirements and programs (40 CFR 264.97 through 264.99 and Appendix IV
of 40 CFR 264) provide complete criteria for establishing background
concentrations of hazardous constituents, including situations where
background sampling wells are not upgradient from the piles
(40 CFR 264.97(g)(3)). NRC has the responsibility for addressing this
issue in their regulations. The costs are discussed in the responses to
Comments 31 and 32 in Section A.3.3.
Comment 2: Decontamination of impacted groundwater should begin
immediately for existing sites where contamination problems are
documented or where contamination is discovered as a result of
investigations conducted under the proposed compliance program in 40 CFR
192.33. (P-26.25)
Response: We would agree that remedial actions should begin as soon
as practicable. However, in fairness to the licensee, an orderly process
should be conducted to determine noncompliance with the standards, and
adequate time allowed to design a suitable remedial action. The standard
allows up to 18 months for remedial actions to be put into operation
following a noncompliance determination by the regulatory agency.
Comment 3; EPA should require monitoring of the vadose zone so that
the nondegradation standard of 40 CFR 264.92 can be met and contamination
controlled before it reaches an aquifer. (P-l(2).38, P-l(2).48,
P-K2) .54)
Response: Monitoring of indicator contaminants is discussed in the
Preamble. NRC will develop monitoring programs that are at least
comparable with the SWDA monitoring requirements. See the response to
Comment 1, A.6.1.
Comment 4: Surveillance of emissions, liquid discharges, and
environmental levels of radiation should be conducted in and around mill
tailings sites by EPA personnel. (P-30.9)
Response: See the responses to Comment 1, A.6.0, and Comment 3,
A.6.1.
A.6-2
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Comment 5: The compliance program requirements of 40 CFR 192.33
fall short of providing a remedy for noncompliance; there is no provision
for formal remedial action to correct a lingering problem. (P-l(2).52)
Response: The requirements of 40 CFR 192.33 incorporate
40 CFR 264.100 which requires that: "The owner or operator must continue
corrective action measures during the compliance period to the extent
necessary to ensure that the groundwater protection standard is not
exceeded. If the owner or operator is conducting corrective action at
the end of the compliance period, he must continue that corrective action
for as long as necessary to achieve compliance with the groundwater
protection standard." (40 CFR 264.100(f)). This adequately addresses
"lingering" problems.
Comment 6; EPA should specify the procedures for applying for an
exemption to the liner requirement and the criteria on which such an
application will be reviewed. (1-25.8)
Response: The criteria for considering such applications are
described in 40 CFR 264.221(b).
A.6-3
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A.6.2 Standards for Disposal
Comment 1: The Clean Air Act requires monitoring to assure the
emission standard is being met. (P-45.14)
Response: We have issued a design standard because we believe it is
impractical to monitor tailings piles for the up to 1000 years the
standard applies and because short term monitoring will not reflect the
long term performance of the control method.
Comment 2: Tests of compliance of the disposal standards by
monitoring of radon appear to be an absolute minimum requirement.
(P-7.3, S-5.8, P-45.27)
Response: EPA disagrees, for reasons stated in the response to
Comment 1, above. We require reasonable assurance of compliance with the
numerical radon emission requirement by careful design and execution of a
disposal system.
Comment 3: We agree with EPA that the post-closure environmental
groundwater monitoring should be site-specific rather than the standard
30-years normally required under the Solid Waste Disposal Act.
(F-3(2).15)
Response: NRC is responsible for establishing post-closure
monitoring requirements that are comparable with those EPA established
for hazardous wastes under the Solid Waste Disposal Act. The regulatory
agency should recognize, however, that monitoring of groundwater for
shorter or longer periods than 30 years may be needed for the specific
sites where tailings are located.
Comment 4: Variations in climate require that a maintenance and.
control monitoring program should be established so that corrective
action can be taken promptly, if needed. (F-1.3), (P-2.6), (P-7.3),
(S-5.8)
Response: NRC is authorized to establish such programs as it may
find necessary, and which are comparable with corresponding requirements
EPA has established for hazardous wastes.
Comment 5: We suggest that an adequate test program for the
materials involved in reclamation should be a requirement, and that
maintenance and control monitoring be followed with prompt corrective
action if the opening of potential vertical channels occurs. (F-1.3)
A.6-4
-------
Response: EPA agrees that providing "reasonable assurance" of
compliance with the standard requires that adequate information be
obtained. This is a regulatory function to be performed by NRG and
Agreement States. Also see response to Comment 4, A.6.2.
Comment 6: Some provision should be made for practical monitoring
of heterogeneous waste by gamma-measurements, water concentrations, and
measurements of working levels. (P-2.6)
Response: We have emphasized in the Preamble to the standards that
providing reasonable assurance of compliance with the standards depends
on obtaining sufficient knowledge of the materials that are involved and
making reasonable allowance for uncertainties. The regulatory agencies
may develop their own procedures for obtaining such information, however.
Comment 7: Determining compliance with the radium-226 concentration
criteria will be very difficult, and the standards should address the
methodologies acceptable for implementing these standards. We support
the use of gamma survey techniques as an acceptable methodology.
(F-3(2).27)
Response: EPA investigated the practicality of making such
measurements when the Agency established cleanup standards for inactive
uranium processing sites. (See the FEIS for Inactive Sites, especially
Volume II.) The Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission have been performing such measurements in several of their
programs. We agree that gamma ray survey techniques can be very useful
in this regard. However, we believe it is not necessary for EPA to
specify methods of implementation, which is more properly a regulatory
function.
Comment 8; We are concerned that the radium-in-soil exemption could
be implemented by selective sampling, and not by proper sampling based on
a 95% confidence test. (P-K2-D.2, P-l(2).30, P-l(2).61)
Response: See the response to Comment 7, A.6.2. We believe
establishing such procedures is a regulatory function. As with other
aspects these standards, however, we intend to monitor implementation and
will consider additions or revisions if the need to do so should become
apparent.
Comment 9; Radon measurements should be made on the piles with a
closed cover with the atmosphere interface. Monitoring at the site
boundary does not give a realistic picture of the radon coming off the
piles. (P-16(H2).2)
A.6-5
-------
Response: We certainly agree that measuring at the site boundary
would be a very difficult way to determine emissions from a pile. Our
standards do not require radon measurements to be made, however, so it is
not necessary to discuss radon measurement techniques in any detail.
!Additional Comments!
Comment 10: A large, permanent marker should be erected to mark the
location of uranium tailings piles. The boundaries of the disposal area
should also be permanently marked. (S-1.6), (S-1.7)
Response; We believe consideration of such markers is a regulatory
function to be performed by NRC and Agreement States.
Comment 11: EPA should require disposal (covering) operations to
begin immediately at existing sites where portions of tailings have dried
out. (P-26.2A)
Response: We noted in the Preamble certain difficulties in deciding
when closure of a tailings impoundment should take place. We have
decided that the regulatory agency should determine the time of closure,
by site-specifically judging the advantages and detriments of all
pertinent factors, some of which are discussed in the Preamble. We
specifically noted, however, that some older mill sites already contain
filled impoundments, and we urge the regulatory agencies to promptly
identify and require disposal of tailings in such impoundments.
Comment 12: EPA's suggestion that NRC adopts a 30 year post-closure
monitoring requirement is contrary to congressional intent. Since the
tailings will be owned by the government after closure, any monitoring is
properly their responsibility. (1-6(3).72, 1-7(2).14)
Response: UMTRCA directs NRC to establish general requirements for
tailings that are at least comparable to requirements EPA has established
for hazardous wastes. See the response to Comment 3, A.6.2.
A. 6-6
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A.7.0 MISCELLANEOUS COMMENTS
!Editorial Errors!
Comment 1; On page 19588, Column 1, bullet 2 "disposal" should read
"dispersal". (F-3(2).5)
Response; The comment is correct.
Comment 2: On page 19588, Column 2, it is misleading to refer to
the gamma radiation dose rates as "high". This refers to dose rates of
3 mr/h and less. We suggest that a more accurate word be chosen to
describe gamma doses. (F-3(2).7)
Response: Considering that the term clearly refers to doses for the
general public from an environmental radiation source, we believe the
statement requires no revision.
Comment 3: On page 19597, Footnote 1 to the Table in Column 3, EPA
meant to say, "We assume that the average radon-222 emission rate from
existing and future tailings will be 500 pCi/m^-sec and 300
pCi/m2~sec, respectively." (F-3(2).JL8)
Response: The comment is correct.
Comment 4: The exemption in Section 192.32(a)(l) to the monitoring
requirements of 264.228, referenced in 264.221 must be misreferenced.
40 CFR 264.221, revised July 1, 1982, makes no reference to 264.228.
Response: The revisions to 40 CFR 264 published in Volume 47 of the
Federal Register on July 26, 1982, (pages 32274-32388) include a Section
221 that refers to Section 228.
'.Undue Influence Should Be Disclosed1.
Comment 5; The panel members for the EPA rulemaking should be
required to file affidavits concernings potential conflicts of interest.
(P-30.12)
Response: EPA follows the conflict of interest provisions of
40 CFR 3. These include the periodic filing of "confidential statements
of employment and financial interests" by the staff involved with this
rulemaking. These statements are reviewed by senior agency officials
under procedures established and administered by the Office of General
Council. Based on statements filed by the staff of the Office of
A.7-1
-------
Radiation Programs in 1983, the reviewing officials concluded there were
no potential conflicts of interest relating to the development of these
standards.
Comment 6; If OMB or any other agency has influenced EPA* s proposed
rulemaking or the development of its standards a full disclosure should
be made of the nature of this involvement. (P-32.3)
Response: Communications regarding OMB's review of the final
standard are filed in the rulemaking docket (Docket Number A-82-26).
{Application to Other Industries!
Comment 7: EPA's regulatory approach for mill tailings would be
inappropriate for industries which encounter radionuclides as a secondary
by-product. EPA should not consider comparable regulation for
phosphogypsum. (1-24.1)
Response: This rulemaking applies only to uranium and thorium
processing sites where source material is the primary product.
Comment 8: It is doubtful that a mineral extraction industry could
survive if EPA's proposed controls were applied to all mining and milling
operations. (P-29.6)
Response: EPA has analyzed the effects of the standard on the
uranium and thorium processing industries to which they apply. Based on
our analysis in the RIA, we believe there will not be any major economic
impacts on the uranium industry. EPA has not analyzed any hypothetical
application of similar standards to other industries.
{Additional Comments!
Comment 9; The statement made in the RIA that "historically there
has been no federal regulatory control of uranium mill tailings," is at
best a fiction. Tailings were recognized as a problem previous to the
passage of UMTRCA. The NRC began requiring tailings disposal plans
consistent with their current regulations beginning in 1965. (P-4(Hl).l)
Response: The statement has been revised; "no" has been replaced by
"little."
A. 7-2
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Comment 10: It is not unreasonable to think that a family would
want to move away from a tailings operation even if the water quality was
not jeopardized, (P-10(H1).4)
Response: EPA has established these standards to insure reasonable
protection of public health. We agree that there may be other
considerations that govern the choice of location of a residence, or that
some may not agree with our judgements on the adequacy of protection
provided by these standards. For this reason we have been as explicit as
possible in describing the protection provided.
Comment 11; In addressing active milling sites, EPA should also
have stated that all but two of the inactive tailings sites in the State
of Colorado are under current specific licenses. The two that are not
under licenses have been determined to have met the general license
provisions of the Colorado regulations. (S-12(H2).11)
Response: We are happy to have this information for the record, but
it does not apply to this rulemaking.
Comment 12; As provided by UMTRCA, states can have more stringent,
not less stringent, standards than those promulgated by EPA and the NRC.
-------
Comment 16; Promulgation of the standards should be delayed until
EPA authorizes an independent study to evaluate the environmental and
public health impacts of mill tailings. (1-22.6)
Response; Congress has directed EPA to promulgate these standards
by October 1, 1983. In any case, we do not agree that such a study is
needed to establish a basis for standards.
Comment 17; Industry's proposal (non-arid regions case) regarding
management of their tailings impoundments, is to use the low-level
storage method, with trench capacity for seven and eight months supply of
mine tailings. My concerns: What happens to these tailings in the
interim period of seven and eight months, in the interim period of total
reclamation? Where can we find total reclamation? (P-lO(Hl).l)
Response; Regarding the risk from tailings during the predisposal
period, see the FEIS and Section 4 of these comments. Regarding
reclamation, that objective is not a part of EPA's authorization under
UMTRCA, which addresses the areas of public health, safety, and
environmental protection.
Comment 18: EPA suggests that reducing water inventories on the
piles can have beneficial effects. It must be recognized that such water
reductions can result in the release of extra radon from the sites.
(1-27.3)
Response: We recognize that excessive removal of water could permit
piles to dry out and increase this release of radon during operations.
We meant that water should be minimized during operations only to the
extent compatible with radon control so as to reduce the potential for
groundwater contamination.
Comment 19: We support the New Mexico Legislative Radioactive
Materials Committee's resolution. (P-48.1)
Response: The comment is noted. (EPA's standards are more
protective than those the comment supports. They require greater
longevity of control and lower radon releases after disposal.)
Comment 20: Please consider the fact that tobacco is very sensitive
to air and water pollution. Uranium mining in Virginia could affect this
crop. (P-50.1)
Response: The basis for our water protection standards is
nondegradation. We have not identified any effects of airborne
radioactivity on tobacco that applies in the context of these standards.
A.7-4
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Comment 21; We urge you to reject the recommendations of Governor
Toney Anaya (New Mexico) concerning the proposed regulations.
(P-29<2).1, P-29(3).1)
Response: The comment is noted. (The comment refers to Submittal
S-ll.)
A.7-5
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B. 40 CFR PART 192. SUBPART E - STANDARDS FOR THORIUM BYPRODUCT MATERIALS
In commenting, many of the respondents did not specifically
differentiate between uranium and thorium standards, although "thorium"
may have been part of their statement. Thus, many of the comments
summarized in Part A could be added to Part B; however, this was deemed
redundant and was not done. Only comments specifically addressing issues
on thorium were included in Part B.
B.1.0 SCOPE OF THE STANDARDS. THE DEIS. AND THE RIA
B.I.I Coverage of the Standards, the DEIS, and the RIA
Comment 1: Since the only facility affected by the proposed
standard has already developed a comprehensive decommissioning plan, and
NRC has already issued a FEIS, the proposed standard amounts to
duplicative regulation that will only complicate, confuse, and delay
final decommissioning. This is not in the public interest. The proposed
standards should be withdrawn.
-------
Comment 4; If EPA decides to retain its proposed standards, it
should exempt Kerr-McGee's West Chicago Facility. (1-6(4).5)
Response: The commenter suggests no basis upon which EPA could
reasonably exempt the West Chicago facility from the general rule. The
imminence of a plan to stabilize waste would seem to be the sort of
circumstance that warrants evaluation in light of the standards Congress
has required. Also see the response to Comment 1, B.I.I.
Comment 5: EPA does not indicate if the different isotopes (for
example radon-222 and radon-220) should be treated completely
independently or whether they should be combined. Since some uranium
mines also have thorium in the tailings it would seem appropriate to
combine the isotopes because they can produce combined health effects.
(1-29.6)
Response: EPA believes that the final standards for thorium
wastes need to include the provisions for uranium wastes, because there
may be sufficient uranium decay products present in thorium wastes as to
constitute a hazard if not explicitly addressed. We believe the converse
requirement (i.e., incorporating thorium standards explicitly in the
uranium standards) is not needed, however. The final standards have been
written accordingly.
B.l-2
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B.I.2 Definitions
Comment 1: Does Section 192.41(a) add thorium to the list of
hazardous constituents in 40 CFR 264.94? If not, thorium should be
added. (S-5.4)
Response: Section 192.41 states that provisions applicable to
uranium shall apply to thorium. This applicability extends to the
designation of uranium as a hazardous constituent, so that thorium is
also so designated for purposes of UMTRCA only. Neither uranium nor
thorium are added to Appendix VIII, Hazardous Constituents of Part 261.
B.l-3
-------
B.I.3 Responsibilities of the EPA and the NRG
Comment 1: EPA has, in effect, turned over the thorium standards
to the NRC. EPA should remain involved in the standards setting process
(P-2.7)
Response; EPA has two obligations in setting these standards.
One is to retain primary responsibility for setting standards for health
and environmental protection. The other is to minimize administrative
and regulatory burdens resulting from the responsibilities that UMTRCA
assigned to EPA and NRC. We believe we have fairly balanced these
obligations. Note that there is an EPA concurrence requirement for any
substitute provisions under Section 192.42.
Comment 2; EPA's proposal to retain authority over variances to
SWDA numerical standards is an unwarranted and illegal intrusion into
site-specific licensing decisions. (1-6(3).9, 1-6(3).85, 1-6(4).6)
Response; See the response to Comment 25, A.1.4.
B.l-4
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B.2.0 RISK ASSESSMENT
B.2.1 Radiological Health Risk Assessment
Comment 1; Appropriate comments on the risks from thorium
tailings emission as well as uranium tailings emission should be made,
even though the EPA states that the best measurement for thorium emission
is a rough calculation. (P-2.3)
Response: Appendix G, which evaluates the potential risk from a
thorium tailings pile, has been added to the FEIS.
Comment 2; EPA has failed to demonstrate any health effect
attributable to thorium or its decay products at high background levels.
(1-6(3).81)
Response: As pointed out in the response to Comment 8, A.2.1, it
has been estimated that millions to hundreds of millions of person years
of observation with good vital statistics data, would be required before
one could hope to demonstrate the effects of continuous exposure to
about 4 times normal background radiation. It is not unexpected that
increased cancer has not been demonstrated. We do not now have the
technical ability to prove or disapprove the hypothesis given the numbers
of persons exposed and the level of exposure.
The Kerala region of India has a population of about 70,000 with
an estimated average exposure of about 342 mrem/yr, even though a small
fraction (3105 persons) is exposed to 915 mrem/yr (C.M. Sunta, et al..
TLD Survey of Natural Radiation Environmental Along the South-West Coast
of India, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Bombay, 1978). While the
commenter cites Gopal-Ayengar, et al. (p.117) as showing no effects in
Kerala, he does not mention positive reports by Kochupillai, et al. (N.
Kochupillai, e_t al. Nature 262: 60-61, 1976) on increased congenital
abnormalities, nor reproductive problems in 22 couples at about 20 times
background (Sunta, e_t al. 1978).
Likewise in the Brazilian study group, a 1970 report by Cullen,
e_t al. is referenced but not a 1975 report by Costa-Ribeiro, et. al,
(C. Costa-Ribeiro, et a1. Health Physics, 28: 225-232, 1975) showing
increased chromosome aberrations in cytogenetic studies of lymphocytes of
workers in a monazite plant. No reports on cancer incidence in the
exposed Brazilian population are expected. A recent report by the
Brazilian investigators (T. L. Cullen, e_t al pp. 805-808 in Radiation
Protection A Systematic Approach to Safety. 5th IRPA Congress, Pergamon
Press, NY, 1980) concluded, "The lack of reliable medical practice and
records renders an epidemiological study impractical".
B.2-1
-------
Finally the commenter referenced the High Background Radiation
Research Group in China. This study was updated in 1981 (J. Radiat.,
Res. 22: 88-100, 1981). This update reported 383,653 person years and
418,265 person years in the cancer mortality study in the high-background
and control groups respectively. Since exposure in the high-background
area was about 3 times that in the control area, it should not be
expected that an increase in radiation-related cancer would be
demonstrated if present. Cytogenetic studies showed an increase in
two-hit aberrations, the type one might expect to be associated with
high-LET radiation, in the high background study group. However, the
total number of cases is small and the significance is not known.
About all that can be said of the high background area studies is,
they can't answer our questions. They do show we are not underestimating
risk by orders of magnitude.
Comment 3: Epidemiological studies of thorium workers and people
exposed to high background levels of thorium have not found any evidence
of adverse health effects. This indicates that thorium and thorium
wastes at the levels involved at thorium sites do not present a special
radiological hazard. (1-6(3).81)
Response: See the response to Comment 2, B.2.1.
B.2-2
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B.3.0 RATIONALE FOR STANDARDS
B.3.1 Basis for Standards
Comment It We support reasonable, cost-effective and
scientifically based regulation of thorium milling facilities. (1-6(3).1)
Response: We agree. EPA has, to the best of its ability, made
its thorium standards reasonable and cost-effective, and has based them
on the best available scientific evidence.
Comment 2; We oppose EPA's proposal of standards for thorium
tailings without explanation or analysis of the one site to which they
will be applicable. This failure deprives us of our right to provide
meaningful comments and makes the proposal unlawful. (1-6(3).13,
1-6(3).80, I-6(H2).21, 1-6(4).2)
Response: EPA has considered the Kerr-McGee site in West
Chicago(*) in developing Appendix G of the FEIS, Volume I. EPA chose to
analyze a model thorium tailings pile with the same basic specifications
as its model uranium tailings pile. Section G.2 (Tailings Piles) of
Appendix G of the FEIS gives the reasons for this choice. Also see the
response to Comments 1 and 4, B.I.I.
(*)Ref: Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp., "Plan for Decommissioning the
Factory Site and Stabilizing Under License the Disposal Site of the
Kerr-McGee West Chicago Rare Earths Facility," Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp.,
1979.
Comment 3: The EPA's rules under the UMTRC Act will, in part,
govern the pending NRC proceeding involving a firm's plans to operate a
thorium milling operation in West Chicago. Therefore, the EPA should
clarify whether the proposed Part 192 applies to disposal in nonarid
regions. (S-5.11)
Response: Part 192 applies to both arid and nonarid regions. We
have made changes in Section 192.32(a)(l) that detail the requirements
for nonarid sites.
Comment 4: Management of thorium tailings during processing and
after closure should not differ from management of uranium tailings since
the hazards associated with the tailings are similar in all pertinent
respects to those associated with uranium tailings. (S-5.3)
Response: We agree. See the response to Comment 5, B.I.I.
B.3-1
-------
Comment 5: The simple difference in decay times of Rn-222 vs.
Rn-220, the level of research activity, standards studies, and lack of
administrative concern all confirm the paucity of evidence that thorium
standards should be numerically equivalent to uranium standards. (P-2.2)
Response; See the response to Comment 2, B.3.1.
Comment 6: EPA's proposed st&ndards for thorium are arbitrary in
that they ignore radiological and biological differences between thorium
and its daughters and uranium and its daughters. Although the risk from
thorium is much smaller than from uranium, this difference is ignored in
the proposed standards. (1-6(3).82, 1-6(4).3)
Response: We do not agree that risks from thorium mill tailings
are much less than those from uranium mill tailings. Our analysis, in
Appendix G of the FEIS, indicates that risks from thorium mill tailings
are reasonably comparable to those from uranium mill tailings, and that
the same numerical standards are appropriate.
Comment 7: We note that in the proposed standards in Subpart E
the same numerical standards are proposed for radon-220 and radium-228 in
the thorium series as for radon-222 and radium-226, respectively, in the
uranium series. It is not technically correct to use the numerical
standards derived for uranium daughters for the daughters of thorium
because of differing decay times and modes. From the properties of
radon-220 and its daughters, we would expect the standard for radon-220
to be significantly less restrictive than that for radon-222. For
radium-228, because of its short half-life, we would also expect the
standard to be less restrictive than that for radium-226. (F-5(3).ll)
Response: The risks from radon-220 emissions from a tailings pile
are comparable to those from radon-222 emissions, when the much larger
source term radon-220 is taken into account. See Appendix G of the
FEIS. The effects of radium-228 in water are about the same as those of
radium-226 as reflected in the National Interim Primary Drinking Water
Regulations. Also, see the response to Comment 5, B.I.I.
B.3-2
-------
B.4.0 STANDARDS FOR OPERATIONS
Comment 1: Your references to existing standards, rather than
developing new numerical values, is desirable. However, do not forget to
include thorium when developing these regulations. (P-2.4)
Response: Section 192.41 applies all the standards to thorium
byproduct material.
B.4-1
-------
B.4.1 Design and Operating Requirements for Surface Impoundments
Comment 1: We agree with EPA's decision to allow continued use of
existing tailings systems so long as groundwater standards are met.
(1-6(3).3)
Response: No reply needed.
Comment 2: Since cleanup of the only thorium tailings site will
involve mining tailings with pond sediment and other wastes, these could
be construed as new tailings subject to a liner requirement. Such a
liner would create a bathtub effect which is clearly undesirable. Liner
and cap requirements should be left to the implementing agency.
(1-6(3).83, 1-6(4).4)
Response: If tailings containing thorium residues are moved
to a new impoundment, they would be subject to the regulations.
Section 192.32(a)(l) would apply, subject to Subpart E. Section
192.32(a)(i) is explicitly designed to avoid the "bathtub" effect.
B.4-2
-------
B.4.2 Groundwater Protection
B.4.2.1 Standards (40 CFR 264.92)
Comment 1: EPA's proposal to apply SWDA requirements to thorium
tailings is unsupported and unnecessary. (1-6(3).84)
Response: The nonradiological impact of thorium mill tailings on
groundwater would be expected to be similar to that from uranium mill
tailings. The SWDA requirements are relevant not by virtue of the nature
of thorium, but by virtue of the statutory requirement that the standards
for nonradioactive hazards be'consistent with those of Subtitle C.
B.4-3
-------
B.4.2.2 Hazardous Constituents (40 CFR 26A.93)
Comment 1; If it is not already the intent of the EPA, then
thorium should be added to the list of hazardous constituents under 40
CFR 264.94. (S-5.4)
Response: Thorium is listed as a hazardous constituent for
purposes of UMTRCA only. Thorium is not added to Appendix VIII of
Section 261 by this action. See the response to Comment 1, B.I.2.
B.4-4
-------
B.4.2.3 Concentration Limits (40 CFR 264.94)
Comment 1; We do not support EPA's proposed concentration limits
for certain substances (e.g., selenium) in groundwater affected by
thorium tailings. (1-6(3).7)
Response: Under the SWDA as amended, selenium and other
constituents found in tailings are classified as hazardous. This was
done after extensive rulemaking procedures. These UMTRCA standards are
required to be consistent with the Subtitle C standards issued under the
SWDA for nonradiological hazards from tailings. We have no reason to
believe that selenium as a constituent of thorium wastes is any less
hazardous than as a constituent of wastes regulated under the SWDA.
B.4-5
-------
B.4.3 Surface Water Protection (40 CFR 440)
Comment 1: We oppose EPA's application of Clean Water Act
standards to thorium mills. (1-6(3).12)
Response: These UMTRCA standards for effluents from thorium mills
require the control of COD, zinc, radium-226, radium-228, uranium,
thorium, pH, and TSS for new sources if the precipitation exceeds the
evaporation at any site; the standards require control of TSS, COD,
arsenic, zinc, radium-226, radium-228, ammonia, and pH for existing
sources. Since the only difference between Subpart D and Subpart E is
the addition of requirements for thorium for new sources, we believe
application of the effluent guidelines imposes no unreasonable burden on
the industry, especially since thorium is easily controlled.
B.4-6
-------
B.4.4 Control of Radon Releases
Comment 1: We agree with EPA's decision to retain the radon/radon
decay product release limits in 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, during the
operational period. (1-6(3).2)
Response: See the response to Comment 10, A.4.4.
B.4-7
-------
B.5.0 STANDARDS FOR DISPOSAL
Comment 1: We do not support EPA's proposal to require 10 feet of
cover on tailings piles. (1-6(3).5)
Response; The rule does not specify any particular thickness of
cover on tailings piles. For any specific case, the thickness will
depend on the need to satisfy the longevity requirement while maintaining
emission rate limits for radon-220 and radon-222 of 20 pCi/m -sec.
B.5-1
-------
B.5.1 Period of Effectiveness
Comment 1: We agree with EPA's proposal to require
maintenance-free stabilization of tailings for 200 years. (1-6(3).4)
Response; See the response to Comment 1, A.5.1.
B.5-2
-------
B.6.0 MISCELLANEOUS COMMENTS
Comment 1: Some clear recognition that uranium tailings dominate
the proposed standards is in order. Some reference to this fact should
be found in the title, the summary, or the introduction to the
regulations. (P-2.1)
Response: We do not agree that uranium tailings dominate the
proposed standards. The standards regulate both uranium and thorium
milling operations, both existing and future. It is true that there is
(and has been) much more uranium milling than thorium milling. We do not
know whether this situation will continue in the future. The standards
are neutral on this point.
B.6-1
-------
APPENDIX
-------
TABLE C-l
WRITTEN SUBMITTALS
DOCKET A-82-26
CATEGORY IV-D
AFFILIATION DATE RECEIVED
& SUBMITTAL DOCKET AT CENTRAL DATE OF
CODE NUMBER DOCKET SECTION COMMENTER DOCUMENT
COMMENTS FROM MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC, PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS,
AND THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY
P-l(l) 3 6-01-83 Southwest Research and 5-11-83
Information Center (New Mexico)
P-K2) 97 7-5-83 Southwest Research and 6-30-83
Information Center
P-2 4 6-01-83 James G. Terrill, Jr. 5-25-83
and Associates
P-3(l) 8 6-06-83 Technical Information Project ND
P-3(2) 45 6-16-83 Technical Information Project 6-11-83
P-4(l) 18 6-06-83 Environmental Policy Institute 5-18-83
P-4(2) 36 6-08-83 Environmental Policy Institute 5-18-83
P-4(3) 80 6-30-83 Environmental Policy Institute 6-30-83
P-4(4) 146 7-25-83 Environmental Policy Institute 7-19-83
P-5(l) 25 6-06-83 Piedmont Environmental Council 5-20-83
P-5(2) 37 6-08-83 Piedmont Environmental Council 5-18-83
P-5(3) 53 6-28-83 Piedmont Environmental Council 6-22-83
P-6U) 26 6-06-83 Phaedra Levy, 5-28-83
Taos Environmental Assn.
C-l
-------
TABLE C-l
WRITTEN SUBMITTALS
AFFILIATION
& SUBMITTAL
CODE
DOCKET
CATEGORY
DATE RECEIVED
DOCKET AT CENTRAL
NUMBER DOCKET SECTION
A-82-26
IV-D
COMMENTER
DATE OF
DOCUMENT
COMMENTS FROM MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC, PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS,
AND THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY (Continued)
P-6C2)
P-7
P-8
P-9(2)
P-9(3)
P-ll
P-12
P-13(2)
P-23
P-24
74
27
35
50
82
47
52
54
6-30-83
6-07-83
6-08-83
6-02-83
6-30-83
6-21-83
48
51
56
109
6-22-83
6-23-83
6-28-83
7-05-83
6-24-83
6-28-83
Kathryn McElmur 6-28-83
Taos Environmental Assn.
Cornell University, Lab. of 5-17-83
Atomic and Solid State Physics
Eloise F. Nenon, Chatham, VA 5-19-83
for Southside Concerned Citizens
National Council on Radiation 5-31-83
Protection and Measurements
National Council on Radiation 6-30-83
Protection and Measurements
Center for Alternative Mining 6-15-83
Development Policy
University of Colorado 6-16-83
Radiation Education Council 5-26-83
Radiation Education Council 6-24-83
R. Young, 6-27-83
Rocky Mountain Chapter
Sierra Club and Colorado
Open Space Council
Rocky Mountain Greenpeace ND
R.C. Kalom, Taos, NM 6-23-83
C-2
-------
TABLE C-l
WRITTEN SUBMITTALS
DOCKET A-82-26
CATEGORY IV-D
AFFILIATION
& SUBMITTAL
CODE
DATE RECEIVED
DOCKET AT CENTRAL
NUMBER DOCKET SECTION
COMMENTER
DATE OF
DOCUMENT
COMMENTS FROM MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC, PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS,
AND THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY (Continued)
P-25
P-26
P-27
P-28
P-29U)
P-29(2)
P-29(3)
P-30
P-3K1)
P-3K2)
P-32
55
57
63
64
65
130
140
67
68
129
70
6-28-83
6-28-83
6-30-83
6-30-83
6-30-83
7-11-83
7-14-83
6-30-83
6-30-83
7-11-83
6-30-83
P-33
P-34
P-35
71
72
73
6-30-83
6-30-83
6-30-83
Virginia Reynolds,
El Prado, NM
Eagle Rock Committee
for Survival
City of Grants (New Mexico)
New Mexicans for Jobs
& Energy
Americans for Rational
Energy Alternatives, Inc.
Americans for Rational
Energy Alternatives, Inc.
Americans for Rational
Energy Alternatives, Inc.
Carl J. Johnson
University of New Mexico
School of Medicine
University of New Mexico,
School of Medicine
Environmental Coalition on
Nuclear Power
Solar Lobby
Western Colorado Congress
Friends of the Earth
6-23-83
6-22-83
6-
6-
28-83
29-83
6-24-83
6-30-83
6-30-83
15-83
27-83
6-27-83
6-28-83
-30-83
-27-83
-27-83
C-3
-------
TABLE C-l
WRITTEN SUBMITTALS
DOCKET A-82-26
CATEGORY IV-D
AFFILIATION DATE RECEIVED
& SUBMITTAL DOCKET AT CENTRAL DATE OF
CODE NUMBER DOCKET SECTION COMMENTER DOCUMENT
COMMENTS FROM MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC, PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS,
AND THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY (Continued)
P-36 75 6-30-83 Bruce Martin 6-26-83
P-37 76 6-30-83 Alan B. Goodman 6-28-83
P-38 89 7-01-83 Mrs. Frederic W. Scott 6-17-83
P-39 90 7-01-83 Timothy M. Michel 6-17-83
P-40 91 7-01-83 Donald J. Walsh 6-17-83
P-41 95 7-01-83 Joseph K. Wagoner, ND
Springfield, VA
P-42 100 7-05-83 Hugh and Virginia Bowers, 6-23-83
Sutherlin, VA
P-43 101 7-05-83 Colonel David Foster, 6-24-83
Gordonsville, VA
P-44 103 7-05-83 Ministry of Concern for 6-29-83
Public Health
P-45(l) 104 7-05-83 Environmental Defense Fund 6-30-83
P-45(2) 126 7-11-83 Environmental Defense Fund 7-01-83
P-46 107 7-05-83 Dr. A. Mangalik, 6-27-83
Albuquerque, NM
P-47 108 7-05-83 Daniel Kelinsky, M.D., 6-28-83
Albuquerque, NM
P-48 112 7-11-83 Letter to W. Ruckelshaus from 6-27-83
33 individuals from New Mexico
P-49 113 7-11-83 Comments on Behalf of the 6-30-83
Navajo Nation
C-4
-------
TABLE C-l
WRITTEN SUBMITTALS
DOCKET A-82-26
CATEGORY IV-D
AFFILIATION DATE RECEIVED
& SUBMITTAL DOCKET AT CENTRAL DATE OF
CODE NUMBER DOCKET SECTION COMMENTER DOCUMENT
COMMENTS FROM MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC, PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS,
AND THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY (Continued)
P-50 114 7-11-83 Joanne Spangler, Danville, VA ND
P-51 116 7-11-83 Janet Donavant, Martinsville, VA ND
P-52 117 7-11-83 Steve and Brenda Reynolds, 6-26-83
Chatham, VA
P-53 118 7-11-83 Mr. and Mrs. John Cole, 6-27-83
Chatham, VA
P-54 119 7-11-83 Linda Calhoun, Chesapeake, VA 6-26-83
P-55 121 7-11-83 Wyatt and J'nene Oakes, ND
Chatham, VA
P-56 122 7-11-83 Mary Levy, New Canton, VA 6-25-83
P-57 123 7-11-83 Sam and Elma Reynolds, ND
Chatham, VA
P-58 124 7-11-83 Hattie Cooke, Martinsville, VA 6-29-83
P-59 125 7-11-83 Northwest Environmental 6-27-83
Preservation Committee
P-60 128 7-11-83 Dan Kenlensky, M.D. ND
P-61 131 7-11-83 Barbara Lambert, Rochelle, VA 6-25-83
P-62 132 7-11-83 Carol Bratton, Rochelle, VA 6-26-83
P-63 133 7-11-83 Belva Sours Uppercue, 6-27-83
Portland, ME
C-5
-------
TABLE C-l
WRITTEN SUBMITTALS
DOCKET A-82-26
CATEGORY IV-D
AFFILIATION DATE RECEIVED
& SUBMITTAL DOCKET AT CENTRAL DATE OF
CODE NUMBER DOCKET SECTION COMMENTER DOCUMENT
COMMENTS FROM MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC, PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS,
AND THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY (Continued)
P-64 134 7-11-83 Kathleen Hayden, 6-27-83
Martinsville, VA
P-65 139 7-14-83 Pennsylvania Public Interest 7-01-83
Coalition
P-66 142 7-25-83 Mrs. David Flick, Blairs, VA 7-21-83
P-67 143 7-25-83 Donald Ober Real Estate, 7-22-83
Orange, VA
P-68 144 7-25-83 William Winn, Martinsville, VA 7-21-83
P-69 147 7-26-83 Angus Wyman MacDonald 7-21-83
P-70 152 8-06-83 Letter from the Mayor of 6-27-83
Gallup, NM. (Same letter
as IV-D-112)
P-71 155 8-15-83 Katharine Fitzerald 6-24-83
P-72 156 8-15-83 Karl Z. Morgan 8-01-83
COMMENTS FROM INDUSTRY
1-1(1) IV-D-1 5-13-83 Western Nuclear, Inc. 5-04-83
1-1(2) 61 6-29-83 Western Nuclear, Inc. 6-28-83
1-2(2) 2 5-13-83 Rocky Mountain Energy Co. 5-10-83
1-2(2) 62 6-29-83 Rocky Mountain Energy Co. 6-28-83
C-6
-------
TABLE C-l
WRITTEN SUBMITTALS
CATEGORY IV-D
AFFILIATION
& SUBMITTAL
CODE
DOCKET
NUMBER
DATE RECEIVED
AT CENTRAL
DOCKET SECTION
COMMENTER
DATE OF
DOCUMENT
COMMENTS FROM INDUSTRY (Continued)
1-3(1)
1-3(2)
1-4(1)
1-4(2)
1-4(3)
1-5(1)
1-5(2)
1-6(1)
1-6(2)
1-6(3)
1-6(4)
1-7(1)
9
85
10
38
87
12
88
15
31
40
86
16
6-06-83
6-30-83
6-06-83
6-08-83
6-30-83
6-06-83
7-01-83
6-06-83
6-08-83
6-13-83
6-30-83
6-06-83
UNC Mining and Milling
United Nuclear Corp.
(submitted by Stephenson,
Carpenter. . . )
American Mining Congress
American Mining Congress
American Mining Congress
Comments with 9 volumes
of Appendices
Shaw, Pittman, Potts &
Trowbridge for Atlas Corp.
Atlas Corp. (submitted by
Shaw, Pittman. . . )
Kerr-McGee Corp. (submitted
by Covington and Burling)
Kerr-McGee Corp. (submitted
by Covington and Burling)
Kerr-McGee Corp. , et al
(with Appendices)
Kerr-McGee Corp., et al.
Home stake Mining Co.
5-05-83
6-29-83
5-06-83
6-03-83
6-30-83
5-10-83
6-30-83
5-16-83
5-20-83
6-14-83
6-30-83
5-16-83
C-7
-------
TABLE C-l
WRITTEN SUBMITTALS
DOCKET A-82-26
CATEGORY IV-D
AFFILIATION
& SUBMITTAL
CODE
DATE RECEIVED
DOCKET AT CENTRAL
NUMBER DOCKET.SECTION
COMMENTER
DATE OF
DOCUMENT
1-7(2)
1-7(2)
79
84
COMMENTS FROM INDUSTRY (Continued)
6-30-83 Homestake Mining Co.
(testimony of George V. Sabol
submitted by Stephenson,
Carpenter...)
6-30-83
1-8
1-9(1)
1-9(2)
1-10(1)
1-10(2)
1-10(3)
1-11(1)
1-11(2)
1-12(1)
1-12(2)
1-13(1)
1-13(2)
1-14(1)
17
19
105
20
83
94
21
46
22
110
23
136
24
6-06-83
6-06-83
7-05-83
6-06-83
6-30-83
7-01-83
6-06-83
6-16-83
6-06-83
7-08-83
6-06-83
7-12-83
6-06-83
Homestake Mining Co.
(submitted by Stephenson,
Carpenter...)
Exxon Minerals Co.
Anaconda Minerals Corp.
Anaconda Minerals Corp.
Newmont Mining Corp.
Newmont Mining Corp.
Dawn Mining Co.
(Subsidiary of Newmont
Mining Corp.)
Rio Algom Corp.
Rio Algom Corp., Lisbon Mine
Conoco Inc.
Conoco Inc.
Colorado Mining Assn.
Colorado Mining Assn.
Union Carbide Corp.
6-29-83
6-29-83
5-17-83
5-20-83
6-24-83
5-20-83
6-30-83
6-30-83
5-16-83
6-13-83
5-20-83
6-29-83
5-24-83
7-06-83
5-24-83
C-8
-------
TABLE C-l
WRITTEN SUBMITTALS
CATEGORY IV-D
AFFILIATION
& SUBMITTAL
CODE
DOCKET
NUMBER
DATE RECEIVED
AT CENTRAL
DOCKET SECTION COMMENTER
DATE OF
DOCUMENT
COMMENTS FROM INDUSTRY (Continued)
1-14(2)
1-15(1)
1-15(2)
1-16(1)
1-16(2)
1-16(3)
1-17
1-18
1-19
1-20
1-21
1-22
1-23
1-24
1-25
1-26
1-27
1-28
148
28
127
29
60
99
30
32
42
43
49
69
78
81
92
93
102
58
7-27-83
6-07-83
7-11-83
6-08-83
6-29-83
7-05-83
6-08-83
6-08-83
6-14-83
6-15-83
6-23-83
6-30-83
6-30-83
6-30-83
7-01-83
7-01-83
7-05-83
6-28-83
Union Carbide Corp.
Chevron Resources Co.
Chevron Resources Co.
Schlegel Corp.
Schlegel Corp.
Schlegel Lining Technology, Inc.
Amax Inc .
Climax Molybdenum Co.
Marline Uranium Corp.
(submitted by Shaw et al.)
Pathfinder Mines Corp.
Mini tome
Atomic Industrial Forum
Silver King Mines, Inc.
The Fertilizer Institute
Cotter Corp.
Ebasco Services, Inc.
Envirologic Systems, Inc.
Wyoming Mining Assn.
7-22-83
5-27-83
6-29-83
5-16-83
6-22-83
a*
6-27-83
5-19-83
5-25-83
6-14-83
6-13-83
6-15-83
6-30-83
6-27-83
6-30-83
6-29-83
6-27-83
6-27-83
6-24-83
C-9
-------
TABLE C-l
WRITTEN SUBMITTALS
CATEGORY IV-D
AFFILIATION
& SUBMITTAL DOCKET
CODE NUMBER
DATE RECEIVED
AT CENTRAL
DOCKET SECTION
COMMENTER
DATE OF
DOCUMENT
COMMENTS FROM INDUSTRY (Continued)
1-29 59
1-30 66
1-31 111
1-32 153
6-29-83
6-30-83
7-08-83
8-08-83
Terradex Corp.
Getty Oil Co.
Simplot Co.
Gunderson Oil Company
5-27-83
6-28-83
6-30-83
6-27-83
COMMENTS FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES
F-l 6
F-2 7
F-3(l> 13
F-3(2) 44
F-4(l) 14
6-02-83
6-02-83
6-06-83
6-15-83
6-06-83
U.S. Dept. of Interior
U.S. Dept. of Health and
Human Services
Tennessee Valley Authority
Tennessee Valley Authority
U.S.H.R., Committee on
5-31-83
5-27-83
5-10-83
6-10-83
5-11-83
F-4(2)
151
7-25-83
Interior and Insular Affairs,
M. Udall, Chairman
U.S.H.R., Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs, M. Udall,
Chairman
7-22-83
F-4(3)
157 8-15-83 U.S.H.R., Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs,
M. Udall, Chairman. Letter
to Nunzio Palladino,
Chairman NRC
6-27-83
34
6-08-83
U.S. Dept. of Energy
5-25-83
C-10
-------
TABLE C-l
WRITTEN SUBMITTALS
DOCKET
CATEGORY
A-82-26
IV-D
AFFILIATION
& SUBMITTAL
CODE
DATE RECEIVED
DOCKET AT CENTRAL
NUMBER DOCKET SECTION
COMMENTER
DATE OF
DOCUMENT
F-5(2)
F-5(3)
F-6(2)
F-6(3)
F-7
F-4<4)
F-8(2)
F-9
COMMENTS FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES (Continued)
94 7-01-83 U.S. Dept. of Energy
U.S. Dept. of Energy
115
106
137
138
154
164
158
160
159
7-11-83
7-05-83
7-12-83
7-12-83
8-09-83
8-25-83
8-22-83
8-25-83
8-24-83
John F. Ahearne of the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (Personal views)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, enclosing responses
to NRC's proposed suspension of
selected provisions of the
Commission's mill tailings
regulations.
U.S. Senators Pete Domenici
and Alan K. Simpson. Letter
to Nunzio Palladino,
Chairman NRC
M. Udall, Chairman,
U.S.H.R. Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs
U.S.H.R., Committee on
Armed Services,
S.S. Stratton, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Procurement
and Military Nuclear Systems
U.S.H.R., Committee on
Armed Services
Office of Management and Budget
6-30-83
6-30-83
6-29-83
6-08-83
6-08-83
7-25-83
8-10-83
6-28-83
3-18-83
C-ll
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TABLE C-l
WRITTEN SUBMITTALS
DOCKET A-82-26
CATEGORY IV-D
AFFILIATION
& SUBMITTAL
CODE
S-2
S-3(2)
S-4U)
S-4(2)
S-5
S-6
S-7
S-8
S-9
DATE RECEIVED
DOCKET AT CENTRAL
NUMBER DOCKET'SECTION
COMMENTER
DATE OF
DOCUMENT
COMMENTS FROM STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
S-l 5 6-02-83 South Dakota Dept. of Water and 5-27-83
Natural Resources
11 6-06-83 State of Wyoming, 5-10-83
Office of the Attorney General
33 6-08-83 Wyoming Dept. of 6-01-83
Environmental Quality
98 7-05-83 Wyoming Dept. of 6-27-83
Environmental Quality
39 6-08-83 Commonwealth of Virginia 5-26-83
Office of the Governor
141 7-22-83 Commonwealth of Virginia, 7-18-83
Council of the Environment
41 6-14-83 State of Illinois, 6-09-83
Attorney General
77 6-30-83 Washington State Dept. of 6-28-83
Social and Health Services
120 7-11-83 Halifax County, VA, Planning 6-27-83
Commission
135 7-12-83 Sheriff of Cibola County, NM 7-06-83
(submitted by Stephenson,
Carpenter...)
145 7-25-83 State of New Mexico 7-05-83
Legislative Council
C-12
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TABLE C-l
WRITTEN SUBMITTALS
DOCKET A-82-26
CATEGORY IV-D
AFFILIATION DATE RECEIVED
& SUBMITTAL DOCKET AT CENTRAL DATE OF
CODE NUMBER DOCKET SECTION COMMENTER DOCUMENT
COMMENTS FROM STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (Continued)
S-10 149 8-01-83 State of New Mexico 7-18-83
Office of the Governor
S-ll(l) 150 8-01-83 Louise Yellowman-- 7-25-83
Coconino County, Supervisor
S-1K2) 163 8-25-83 States of Colorado and 7-08-83
New Mexico; Sen. Gary Hart,
Colorado;
Gov. Richard D. Lamm, Colorado;
Gov. Toney Anaya, New Mexico
C-13
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TABLE C-2
WRITTEN SUBMITTALS
DOCKET A-82-26
CATEGORY IV-D
AFFILIATION
& SUBMITTAL
CODE
COMMENTER
TESTIMONY PRESENTED AT PUBLIC HEARINGS
WASHINGTON. D.C. (May 31. 1983)
COMMENTS FROM MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC, PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS,
AND THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY
P-4(H1) David M. Berick for Environmental Policy Inst.
P-5(H1) G. H. Herbert for Piedmont Environmental Council
P-8(H1) Eloise Nenon
P-9(H1) W. K. Sinclair for NCRP
P-lO(Hl) Sarah A. Motley
C-14
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TABLE C-2
WRITTEN SUBMITTALS
DOCKET A-82-26
CATEGORY IV-D
AFFILIATION
& SUBMITTAL
CODE
COMMENTER
DATE OF
HEARING
TESTIMONY PRESENTED AT PUBLIC HEARINGS
DENVER. COLORADO (H2)
COMMENTS FROM MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC, PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS,
AND THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY
P-KH2-1) Chris Shuey, for Southwest Research and 6-15-83
Information Center
P-KH2-2) Linda Taylor, for Southwest Research and 6-15-83
Information Center
P-14(H2)
P-15(H2)
P-16(H2)
P-17(H2)
P-18(H2)
P-19(H2)
P-2CKH2)
P-2KH2)
P-22(H2)
Grant Parker, for Powder River Resource Council
Joseph Pierce, for Two Rivers Citizens
Association
Dennis Eberl, University of Illinois
Roy Young, for The Sierra Club
Robert Fried, M.D.
Dr. Edward Martell, for National Center for
Atmospheric Research
Albert Hazle, for the Conference of Radiation
Control Program Directors
Ray Junge
Luke Danielson, for National Wildlife Federation
6-15-83
6-15-83
6-15-83
6-15-83
6-15-83
6-16-83
6-16-83
6-16-83
6-16-83
C-15
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TABLE C-2
WRITTEN SUBMITTALS
DOCKET A-82-26
CATEGORY IV-D
AFFILIATION
& SUBMITTAL
CODE
COMMENTER
DATE OF
HEARING
TESTIMONY PRESENTED AT PUBLIC HEARINGS
DENVER. COLORADO (H2)
COMMENTS FROM INDUSTRY
I-4(H2) Robert Beverly, for American Mining Congress
I-6(H2-1) George Rice, for Kerr-McGee Corporation
I-6(H2-2) Dr. Donald Runnells, for Kerr-McGee Corporation
I-6(H2-3) Charles Montagne, for Kerr-McGee Corporation
I-16(H2-1) James Price, for Schlegel Corporation
I-16(H2-2) Joyce Underberg, Schlegel Corporation
I-18(H2) James Gilleland, for Climax Molybdenum Company
COMMENTS FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES
F-5(H2-1) Mark. Mathews, for U.S. Dept. of Energy
F-5(H2-2) Vern Rogers, for U.S. Dept. of Energy
F-5(H2-3) John Nelson, for U.S. Dept. of Energy
F-5(H2-4) Dr. Tom Shephard, for U.S. Dept. of Energy
6-16-83
6-15-83
6-15-83
6-15-83
6-15-83
6-15-83
6-15-83
6-15-83
6-15-83
6-15-83
6-15-83
C-16
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TABLE C-2
WRITTEN SUBMITTALS
DOCKET A-82-26
CATEGORY IV-D
AFFILIATION
& SUBMITTAL
CODE
COMMENTER
COMMENTS FROM STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
S-3(H2) Gary Beach, for Department of Environmental
Quality, State of Wyoming
S-12(H2) Warren Jacobi, Department of Health, State of
Colorado
S-13(H2) Jerry Stewart, Uranium Licensing Section,
State of New Mexico
6-15-83
6-16-83
6-16-83
C-17
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TECHNICAL REPORT DATA
(Pletae nod Instructions on the reverse before completing)
1- RIpXRRepbrt 520/1-83-008-1
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Final Environmental Impact S
the Control of Byproduct Mat
Processing (40 CFR 192)
2.
tatement for Standards for
erials from Uranium Ore
7. AUTHOR(S)
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Office of Radiation Programs (ANR-460) , Washington, D.C.
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS
12. SPONSORING AGENCY NAME AND ADDRESS
3. RECIPIENT'S ACCESSION NO.
5. REPORT DATE
September 1983
6. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION CODE
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NO.
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.
11. CONTRACT/GRANT NO.
13. TYPE OF REPORT AND PERIOD COVERED
14. SPONSORING AGENCY CODE
15. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
16. ABSTRACT
The Environmental Protection Agency has issued health and environmental
protection standards for the control of uranium and thorium tailings during ore
processing operations and for final disposal. These standards will apply to tailings
licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the States under Title II of
the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-604). This
Final Environmental Impact Statement examines health, environmental, technical, and
cost considerations and other factors important to developing the standards.
Volume II of this document contains the Agency responses to comments received
as a result of the public review that is part of the regulatory process.
17. KEY WORDS AND DOCUMENT ANALYSIS
a. DESCRIPTORS
uranium mill tailings
radioactive waste disposal
radon radium thorium
hazardous constituents
Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
18. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT
Release Unlimited
b. IDENTIFIERS/OPEN ENDED TERMS
19. SECURITY CLASS (This Report)
Unclassified
20. SECURITY CLASS (This page)
Unclassified
c. COSATI Field/Group
21. NO. OF PAGES
22. PRICE
EPA Form 2220-1 (R»v. 4-77) PREVIOUS EDITION is OBSOLETE
-------
TECHNICAL REPORT DATA
(Please read Instructions on the reverse before completing)
1>IWRepbrt 520/1-83-008-1 *
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Final Environmental Impact Statement for Standards for
the Control of Byproduct Materials from Uranium Ore
Processing (40 CFR 192)
7. AUTHOR(S)
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Office of Radiation Programs (ANR-460), Washington, D.C.
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS
12. SPONSORING AGENCY NAME AND ADDRESS
3. RECIPIENT'S ACCESSION NO.
5. REPORT DATE
September 1983
6. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION CODE
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NO.
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.
11. CONTRACT/GRANT NO.
13. TYPE OF REPORT AND PERIOD COVERED
14. SPONSORING AGENCY CODE
15. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
16. ABSTRACT
The Environmental Protection Agency has issued health and environmental
protection standards for the control of uranium and thorium tailings during ore
processing operations and for final disposal. These standards will apply to tailings
licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the States under Title II of
the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-604). This
Final Environmental Impact Statement examines health, environmental, technical, and
cost considerations and other factors important to developing the standards.
Volume II of this document contains the Agency responses to comments received
as a result of the public review that is part of the regulatory process.
17. KEY WORDS AND DOCUMENT ANALYSIS
a. DESCRIPTORS
uranium mill tailings
radioactive waste disposal
radon radium thorium
hazardous constituents
Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
18. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT
Release Unlimited
b. IDENTIFIERS/OPEN ENDED TERMS
19. SECURITY CLASS (This Report)
Unclassified
20. SECURITY CLASS (This page)
Unclassified
c. COSATI Field/Group
21. NO. OF PAGES
22. PRICE
EPA Form 2220-1 (R«v. 4-77) PREVIOUS EDITION is OBSOLETE
------- |