%     ^ O**T:ON*L FO^M NO* 10
      * MAY !'."*: , l?iT,.-!N
        GSA FPM.x Oil CF^J 101-'.!.C
          ;  / *"  r              j            reGerai Jatcr Poi iution  Oontroi
         J.V—'\J ll 'Lfo s v'iAs i/l/1 $ i/              nG,,, i lil ii u! a u i (J!l

TO     :   SifZ OELO;'.'                                           DATE:  November 3, 1967

FROM   :   Chief, Enforcement  Activities
          Section,  Division of Technical  Services

SUBJECT:   Report on Oil Pollution Control  Activities

          . iOSt or 'cne Region^.* responses  oO  ^.ne contingency oiuns c.nu  otner
          ii'ivolvr.munts in c/ater poiiutiori  situations of a nonrecurring,  but
          of an emergency nature^ have  bc-en  gratifying to this office.
          I .   /-iii  i*JuuuUlioU
              cCi,sicerauie quantify  o~.  iue;  01 \  .n ;ier Kiur.r'.ers.   IAS
              Great Lakes Region vas successful  in obtaining  an  ajreemont
              I'rem die oivnor  co iiavci cno 01 \  reinovc*-*.

              V,'ake Island.  The Southwest Region sent a man to the  scene ~.:..a
              \.or.'.ec in close ccooera'aion with "cri^ coast Guard ane  \~i\i-\ uuriiij
              iiarbor booming and cleanup procedures,  headquarters  '.:as i;eot
              advised of each operational decision by continuous  sit-reps.

          3.   Tne  oil slick that appeared in  Lake Aicnigbn in late  Ssptembor
              •,vas  continuously surveyed  by the Region.  Oil samples were taKen
              arid  analyzed and a report  v/as  prepared.  One recci.'iV.enoaticr,
              stated tnat incsiana  ridroor siiouiu  oe permancnuiy Dcosnec.

          4.   Ar.  aquatic biologist has been  permanently assigned  to Anchorage.
              /-'Ac-ska, to i  among other Invngs., patroi ano evaluate damages tnac
              mighi: res,At from the  onshore  and  offshore oil  operations around
              Cock Inlet,   lie has  oeen successful  in naving court proceedings
              brought against one  polluter,  getting a successful  cleanup
              operation from a pipeline  spill> and has another set  of charges
              penuing against an oil  discnarger.

          5.   A pipeline brcke ami spilled an estimated -1,200 gallons of fuel
              oil  into tne James River GO miles  above Richmond.   l;ater supplies
              i or  ^ne ^ i ^y Ci~ i\iC;iniOnG'-  u po.p^r  Cut..pa.iy, anu  a pov/er ptcin«
              'i,jere tnreatenec.  i ne  riiuiiic r\tiuntie .-(egioii i.'as success~ui in
              prevailing upon the  State  to uisalloi; the use of cncmicals to
              emulsify the oil.  After checking  the water plants  to be sure
                   Buy U.S. Savings Bonds ^i^xlarly on the ~P ay roll Savings Plan

    'c i; a x,  a  p i e n t ITU! s u p p i y  o v  t a s L e a n a c u o r  a;; s c r' j a n t i.. ? t e r i a i s
    w^re  In stock, !\egional  personnel were on  hand  to consult wi en
    the  pipeline company cleanup crew in ciie  installation of a
    diversion  L-cor.; and a hay filter hoem shove tne  waecr incskes.

~mch region has participated in ''pollution accidents" i;", one fi/rm
^r enOuiiwr  iii  o.'iG 'jois^ Tive  moniwib-  ano. ^,ie exaiMOles
 :1 C i o G ;1 u S  S  u 1 1 •
                    st to  Cjivc you Qii iced of th&  spGGtru'V, cnGSc;
r,aeio.ia i iy,  tiiere is evicencG  of.a'c wnsn an accicune occurs, "t.iere
iS c t o b e  cooperation L^e^vjec'ii  oiic re^erui dgunc;es  iK^Viiig poi i^-^tOii

cr.a'c ';.',"a.s, a.i flee".Q£.''.")'c eoes  occur,, ene .iiose prevaiGii'e \eeiing in  'cnc
       ~, s to 'i/ave anc  see  v/nac naooens.   ..nien  our ivegiona i sr.Qvvs
c./,c. L'.sua i ly TO i lov/eo.   it  is  a-'e 'ems ooinc ';,nen  our corveingency  pi&r,s
prove ";!.&ir investment  of  time spent in pre-;/,anning.   To those  of  you
who hc.ve  r,oc yet formalized your pollution emergency centers, let mo
encourage you to give tin's activity a eoo priority.

The Oil deport has been forwarded to the President and should he
roieasG^.  shortly.   The  Regions will be among the first to receive
C 0 p1 Go.

I „., inclosing a contingency  plan scope that was prepared by one of
tne field orcjccts.  Please feel  free to comment on this documene.
                                    Kenneth L. /iic
,-'-.; ,  : leg i ona!  J i rectors
.•'.r.  d. V.  Fit^patricic
'. cc.  h'usi ..'yer
''r.  J. Silya
;,.-.  D. helper
. ,1 . -> . Uoi ji .ovJi i
.'. r. u. u c r. n c> o n


In the development of regional contingency plans,  there are certain vital

needs which must be met.  Such a plan must provide an effective and coordi

nated response to any significant incident relating to a spill of oil  or

other hazardous substance.  It must also develop a program designed to pre

vent such disasters through surveillance,  education,  enforcement and other

means.  A plan must take into account the present  responsibility and cap-

ability of each agency and private interest that is involved.   Finally,  it

must take into account the conflict of regional or district boundaries of

the principal Federal agencies and the various jurisdictions of all levels

of government.

                    u                             u

Present Contingency Planning Practices

Except in certain geographical areas, there is little coordination between

agencies, both State and Federal, to combat and minimize effects from the

discharge of oil and other hazardous materials in a disaster of catastrophic

proportions.  The Federal agencies with primary responsibilities for these

problems include the Army Corps of Engineers,  U. S. Coast Guard, the Office

of Emergency Planning, and with the transfer of responsibility for the Oil

Pollution Act of 1924 to the Department of Interior, the Federal Water

Pollution Control Administration.  The Corps of Engineers' authority,

in these matters, is vested in the Refuse Act  of 1899.   This responsibility

extends over all navigable waters and tributaries and can result in prosecu-

tion of those parties guilty of unauthorized discharges with the exception

of sewage.  The Coast Guard has responsibilities which include:  search and

rescue; regulations of hazardous cargoes, including oil and chemicals;

safety of ports, vessels and off-shore oil drilling operations and control

of vessel movements.  The air and sea surveillance activities of the Coast

Guard, are at present, the best means of detecting an oil spill.

The Office of Emergency Planning, upon the declaration of a disaster by the

President, assumes overall responsibility for all operations designed to

combat and reduce the effects of a disaster.  A notable example of the role

of O.E.P. in such an instance, is reflected in the recovery of a chlorine

barge in the Mississippi River in 1961.

The State agencies with primary responsibilities in the event of a major

spill of oil or other hazardous materials include the Water Pollution Control

Organization and/or the Health Department, the Fish and Game organization and

the Civil Defens-. organization.  These agencies operate under a frame-

work of State 1,  73 and their role is dependent upon jurisdiction and the

nature of the situation.

Within recent years, the number of spills of oil and other hazardous

substances has increased due to an increase in volume and intensity of

traffic conveying these materials.  As a result, a number of operating

agreements have been developed, particularly where the problem has become

significant, to effect overall coordination between the responsible

agencies.  One example of such an instance is the New York City Harbor.

The Army Corps of Engineers has created a Harbor Supervision Branch to

provide enforcement under the authority of Section 451, U. S. Code Title 33

as amended.  This force consists of about 40 people and several patrol

boats.  The Branch patrol activities are greatly augmented by Coast Guard's

normal air and sea surveillance activities.  The Branch conducts investiga-

tions of all known instances of oil spills in the Harbor and collects

evidence for prosecution by the U. S. Attorney's Office.  The coordination

effected between the Coast Guard primarily as an instrument of detection

and the Corps of Engineers as an enforcement agency is to be commended.  It

is also true that the presence of such an enforcement activity has resulted

in increased awareness by the oil industry as to their responsibility in the

prevention of oil spills.  One major oil company in this area presently

notifies the Harbor Supervision Branch of each oil spill that originates

from its facilities.

         Near the mouth of the Mississippi River in Louisiana  an  alert  system  is

         in existence.  The discovery of oil  or toxic  materials in the  river is

         reported to the Louisiana State Health Department  of  the Stream Control

         Commission.  These agencies alert all  downstream water users by means

         of the Louisiana Waterworks Warning  Network.   This system utilizes river-

         boat operators, marina operators, Corps of Engineer personnel,  and

         other persons on the river to provide  intelligence.                                     f>

         These and similar examples of present  contingency  planning that exist

         do serve to illustrate several definite advantages.   These are  (1) the

         provision for exchange of information  on a regular basis by all agencies

         concerned, (2) present utilization of  the facilities  normally  operated

         by an agency for a particular aspect of the problem,  i.e.,  surveillance

         by the Coast Guard, (3) the success  of enforcement and education activi-

         ties by regulatory agencies in producing greater awareness and  coopera-

         tion from those responsible for spills of oil and  other  hazardous materials

         and (4) the development of proper procedures  to  present  evidence in a

         court of law.  The major weaknesses  of present contingency planning are

         (1) lack of coordination on a national level—procedures vary  in various

         regions, (2) lack of coordination and  communication by all  responsible

         agencies within a given region,  (3)  no provisions  for alerting  and mar-

         shalling in the event of a major disaster,  (4) little means if  any for

         containing and removing hazardous substances,  (5)  lack of rigorous pre-

         ventative programs including enforcement and  education,  (6) lack of

         readily available information concerning critical  water  uses and poten-

tial hazards, (7) no coordinated operational means  for directing disas-

ter activities, (8) insufficient surveillance and detection resources

and (9) lack of any public information facilities.

Factors to be Considered

In a discussion of the factors to be considered in regional contingency plan-

ning, it is evident that the causes of spills of oil and other hazardous sub-

stances and their effects on water use, will vary considerably,  depending

primarily upon where the incident occurs.  In certain regional plans,  facil-

ities, such as, major terminals or refineries, drilling operations,  pipelines

and similar features analogous to that area will have to be recognized and              *

dealt with.  However, on a national basis, common procedures should  be employed

by all agencies involved wherever possible.  Such methods will insure  a uni-

formity at all levels and avoid unnecessary confusion and misunderstanding.

In developing regional contingency plans, the factors indicated below should

be thoroughly developed.

1.  Operation Control Center;  Such a center must be capable of  obtaining and

evaluating all information relative to a major spill of oil or other hazardous

substance and controlling all Federal on-scene operations.  Selected regional

centers would be established at key locations in the country and would maintain

teletype communications with a National Control Center in Washington.   Within

each region it is likely that sub-regional control centers will  be required  to

provide coverage at key locations where time and distance would  preclude

effective control by the regional control center.  The operation of  the region-

al and sub-regional control centers would be the responsibility of the Regional

Director, FWPCA.  Nominal members of the control center team would include

U. S. Coast Guard, FWPCA, Army Corps of Engineers and Office of  Emergency Plan-

ning.  The centers would be activated at the direction of the responsible agency,

who would assume operational control when a disaster had occurred or appeared

imminent.  The regional center would maintain communication and  submit periodic

and end of action reports to the National Control Center.  The sub-regional

control centers would report directly to the regional control center.  The

conduct of practice alerts, training and communication tests would be the

function of the responsible agency.

2.  Preventyiive Programs;  This effort will require that regulatory agencies

obtain more effective knowledge and surveillance of oil drilling operations,

major terminals, manufacturing operations, storage facilities and transporta-

tion routes for oil and other hazardous substances and pipeline networks.  It

is likely that restrictions will be imposed, relative to water, truck and

rail routes utilizes for the transport of such materials in order to avoid

collisions and alleviate or minimize the effects of spills where a critical

water use exists.  In addition, an educational program designed to overcome

principal causes for spills should be developed on a national and regional

basis.  These factors include negligence of personnel, malfunction and de-

terioration of equipment, faulty maintenance, improper cleaning operations

and inadequate waste treatment.  Such a program must include investigative

.capabilities and should develop national regulations to provide a series of

progressive warnings and fines to offenders in order to be effective.

3.  Inventory of Potential Hazards, Critical Water Use and Containment and

Removal Equipment;• In order to effectively combat significant spills and

to be aware of potential hazards, it is necessary to develop and maintain

& current inventory of all handling facilities for such hazardous materials.

The data should cover all means of transport, including shipping routes,

production, storage, transfer and in some instances, use of these substances.

In cases where detailed information, such as pipeline data concerning size,

location, material or materials transported and location of major control

valves and pumping facilities would be useful, it should be collected.

          Of equal significance,  is a need to update current inventories  within the

          region, of critical water use.  This data would include information re-

          lating to watershed, intake, treatment and storage features  of  all  municipal

          water supplies; industrial and agricultural water uses;  bathing beaches,

          parks, marinas and other recreational facilities, wildlife areas; and com-

          mercial fishing operations, including location of shellfish  beds.   Data

          should also be developed concerning time of transit in streams  and  current

          patterns in tidal waters.

          Data must be provided which would include a current listing  of  all  types  of

          equipment and substances which might be used in order to contain and remove

          or otherwise treat spills of oil and other hazardous materials. It should

          include local, state, Federal and private sources.   In addition, the loca-

          tion of the item and any restrictions regarding its use  or availability

          should be outlined.

          k.  Surveillance and Detection;  This aspect of the problem  will require  a

          coordinated effort by all means .available on a continuous basis.  Full  use

          of all present facilities air, sea and ground must  be made.  Public informa-

          tion programs should be developed to enlist the support  of all  citizens.

          Telephone numbers would be supplied to the public where  facilities  are  constant-

          ly manned or where ap answering service could be provided.   Arrangements

          should be concluded with private and Federal facilities  to provide  immediate

          notification should any spill occur.  Care should be taken to provide uni-

          formity of information  and all facts possible in terms of what, where,  when, why

          and who in the first report.

          5.  Initial Investigation and Evaluation;   Upon the receipt  of  the  initial

          report of a spill an evaluation will have to be made immediately with regard

          to the urgency required and the best available means  of  conducting  an investi-

gat ion and further evaluation.  These procedures may involve the dispatch of

a vessel or aircraft to the scene or possibly a single investigator will be

sent.  Past experience indicates that the time factor in the initial stages

of a disaster of this type is critical.  Therefore,  investigative facilities

must be available on a 24-hour basis.  The overall investigative force avail-

able should not only include the principal Federal agencies responsible, -but

state and local personnel as well.  The investigators will have to be well             •»

trained and equipped to obtain the facts, assess the present situation, render

a meaningful report and if necessary, collect samples.  It is important that

reports be uniform in context with regard to all incidents.

6.  Alerting Key Agencies;  The alerting procedure will require that lists be

prepared and maintained in order to notify key personnel of a given situation.

Such lists would basically contain by agency the name, title, address, business

telephone number and emergency telephone number of such individuals.  Care

should be taken to contact only those persons or agencies which are affected

or may be affected.  It is likely that the alerting procedure would have to be

progressive, in that additional people would be notified as a situation becomes

more critical.  It would appear logical that agencies should be responsible

for notifying other agencies with which day by day operations are conducted.

For example, the FWPCA should alert state and interstate water pollution control

agencies.  It will be necessary in some instances to direct on-call duty

assignments for non-working hours for certain personnel,  in order to insure

an adequate response at any time.

7.  Communications;  Provisions should be contained in contingency planning

for readily available and reliable communications.  Teletype facilities

should be located in all control centers including the national  center.

Existing radio communications of the Coast Guard, Department of the Defense

and Civil Defense networks should be utilized as needed.  Telephone numbers

of key personnel and radio frequencies of all agencies should be current


and readily available.  Emergency radio frequencies should be known and


8.  Operational Jurisdiction;  Federal operational jurisdiction will be

employed by the agency responsible for directing the control center.  There

are problems which will arise when state and local jurisdiction may result

in conflict with Federal operations, or in international waters where no

Federal jurisdiction exists.  In the first instance, it may be possible to

conclude working arrangements within a given area between all agencies con-

cerned.  All such agreements should be referred to Headquarters for approval.

Any conflict or lack of jurisdiction should also be brought to the attention

of Headquarters.

9.  Containment, Removal or Neutralization;  Technical assistance, in terms

of recommending material to be used or procedures to be followed in general

or specific instances, will be -a function of FWPCA.  The actual work will be

accomplished by the party involved in the incident; state,  local or Federal

equipment and personnel or by contract with commercial facilities.  It is

likely that due to the shortage of booms and dredges,  that equipment pools

will have to be provided.

10.  Legal Prosecution;  Where Federal prosecution is  contemplated, the case

should be prepared by FWPCA where the Oil Pollution Act of 1924 as amended,

is applicable and by the Corps of Engineers where the  Refuse Act of 1899 is

indicated.  In addition, there will likely be legal proceedings instituted

by state and local agencies.  All investigative procedures  should be designed

to produce evidence which is readily admissible in court.   For example,  a log

j'     ""   •     ~\J      '     '"      "       L
         or record of sample handling from the time of collection to the report of

         analyses should be properly maintained to insure that such evidence will  not

         be barred because it cannot be proven that the results shown were actually

         related to a specific incident.  The FWPCA laboratory facilities should be

         utilized for analyses of oil samples.

         11.  Public Information Planning;  There are several aspects of public infor-

         mation related to significant spills of oil or other hazardous substances

         which should be carefully considered.

         As a situation develops which can produce an adverse effect regarding public

         health or welfare, there is a need to inform the general public of the basic

         facts.  Such action, particularly to those in the immediate vicinity, will

         prevent unwarranted alarm and insure public cooperation.

         News media representatives will be attracted to an incident .involving a major

         spill of hazardous material due to widespread public interest.  Care must be

         taken to provide these representatives, maximum opportunity to obtain proper


         Another consideration is the need to prevent contradictory, overlapping or

         uncoordinated information releases by representatives of the various agencies

         and levels of governmental authority involved in an incident.

         In order to resolve these problems, the agency responsible for operating  the

         control center will provide a public information office.  This office shall

         be responsible for all information releases, providing assistance and coordi-

         nation to the news media personnel present and maintaining contact with the

iJ  ~"~               -J
          public information office in the national control center.

          12.  Periodic and End of Action Reports;  It is vital that information relating

          to regional activities, both of a routine and special nature be submitted to

          Headquarters on a regular basis.  Formats will be prepared for such reports

          and a schedule of periodic reporting will be developed by Headquarters.  In

          this fashion, the status of readiness, the current activities and the major

          problems in each region are readily discernible on a national level.  End of

          action reports will be obtained from each region following each significant

          incident.  Such reports would be comprehensive in nature and spell out clearly

          the failures and successes of each operation so that the lessons learned, can

          be applied to future situations.
          There are other factors to consider in an overall sense in preparing a con-

          tingency plan.  It must be recognized that participation will  vary from State

          to State in terms of different resources,  organization and jurisdictions.

          All plans must be devised to assure sound engineering judgment in  evaluating

          a situation, providing a workable margin of safety in operations,  and develop-

          ing and conducting proper corrective action.  However,  such safeguards must

          be designed to avoid any undue delay in conducting necessary operations.

          In summary, the principal purpose of regional  contingency planning,  is to

          develop a coordinated means, in terms of organization,  resources and actions,

          by responsible agencies for combatting and minimizing the effects  of any

          significant spill of oil or other hazardous substances  within  a particular


 Mechanism of Control

 The needs of regional contingency planning can be basically divided into

 two elements.  First, is the requirement to provide an organization cap-

 able of undertaking immediate, coordinated and positive action to contain,

 remove and minimize the effects of a significant spill of oil or other

 hazardous substance*  The regional control center with the resources pre-

 viously outlined is equipped to alert,  evaluate, conduct on-scene operations

 and coordinate efforts with all agencies and the national control center.

 Second, is the need for a separate and  continuing organization to plan

 and administer the daily on-going programs of surveillance, enforcement,

 technical evaluation and education.  These activities are, for the most

 part, preventative, and involve many other state, local, Federal and

 private interests.  In addition, it is  recognized that such programs should

 be coordinated on a national level to prevent conflict between primary

.agencies and avoid duplication.

 An organizational chart is shown in Figure 1 which depicts a typical

 structure.  It is .possible that the regional concept may vary somewhat

 in order to compensate for factors identified with a particular area of the

 country.  The sub-groups would include  state, local and other Federal

 agencies as well as private interest.  Members of the regional operating

 group would serve on or chair the sub-groups and assure proper control and

 guidance throughout the structure.  In  addition, the sub-groups would

 provide through periodic reports, complete access to the entire operation

 to the principal agencies concerned and in turn to their respective head-

 quarters .


An added advantage would be the fact that members of the operating committee

would either operate or be closely identified with the regional control center.

The knowledge gained and the close relationships established would provide

a tremendous asset in rendering evaluation and conducting operations.

   1^,  COM.
   4 ,  7


361 «  AON