December 1992
f/EPA Office of
Inspector General
Report to Congress
H
HLIGHTS
1992
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Office of Inspector General
The Inspector General Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-452), as amended, created
Offices of Inspector General (OIG) to consolidate existing investigative
and audit resources in independent organizations headed by Inspec-
tors General. At EPA, the QIC's role is to review EPA's financial
transactions, programs, and administrative activities; investigate alle-
gations or evidence of possible criminal, civil, and administrative
violations; and promote economic, efficient, and effective operations
with in the Agency. For fiscal 1992, the OIG received $41.2 million and
was authorized 366 full-time equivalents.
The EPA Inspector General reports directly to the Administrator
and the Congress and has the authority to:
Initiate and carry out independent and objective audits and
investigations,
Issue subpoenas for evidence and information,
Obtain access to any materials in the Agency,
Report serious or flagrant problems to Congress,
Select and appoint OIG employees,
Fill Senior Executive Service positions,
Administer oaths, and
Enter into contracts.
The Inspector General is appointed by, and can be removed only
by, the President. This independence protects the OIG from interfer-
ence and allows it to function as the Agency's fiscal and operational
watchdog.
Office of
Inspector General
John C Martin
Deputy Inspector General
Anna Hopkins Virbick
Office of Audit
Kenneth A. Konz
Assistant Inspector General
James O Rauch
Deputy
Technical Assistance Division
Gordon Milbourn
Director
Planning and Resources
Management Staff
Kenneth Hockman
» Acquisition and
Assistance Staff
Vacant
Internal and Performance
Audit Staff
Vacant
Office of Management
John C Jones
Assistant Inspector General
n
Office of Investigations
Daniel S Sweeney
Assistant Inspector General
Michael J Filzsimmons
Deputy
-* Program Management Division
John Walsh
Director
Michael J. Binder
Director
OIG Divisional Inspectors General are listed on the inside back panel.
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Profile of Activities and Results
Information reported in the semiannual report for the period ending
March 31,1992, may have been adjusted subsequent to the end of that
period. Consequently, totals for the semiannual periods ending March
31 and September 30, 1992, may not add to the fiscal year totals
presented below.
Audit Operations (Dollars in Millions) Fiscal 1992
Questioned Costs - Total* $348.3
- Federal Share $245.2
Recommended Efficiencies (Funds be Put to Better Use)
Total* $199.7
- Federal Share $194.1
Costs Disallowed to be Recovered
- Federal Share $ 70
(costs which EPA management agrees are unallowable
and is committed to recover or offset against future payments)
Costs Disallowed as Cost Efficiency
- Federal Share $ 14.4
(funds made available by EPA management's commitment
to implement recommendations in OIC performance
or preaward audits)
Recoveries from Audit $ 59.8
Resolutions of Current and Prior Periods (cash collections _
or offsets to future payments)**
EPA Reviews Performed/Issued by OIC 1,962
Reports Resolved (agreement by 493
Agency officials to take satisfactory corrective action)***
Investigative Operations
Fines and Recoveries (including civil) $4.9
Investigations Opened 255
Investigations Closed 243
Indictments of Persons or Firms 29
Convictions of Persons or Firms 60
Administrative Actions Taken against EPA Employees 29
Fraud Detection and Prevention Operations
Debarments, Suspensions, Voluntary 79
Exclusions, and Settlement Agreements (actions to deny
persons or firms from participating in EPA programs or
activities because of misconduct or poor performance)
Hotline Cases Opened 81
Legislative and Regulatory Items Reviewed 156
Personnel Security Investigations Adjudicated 1,066
* Questioned Costs (Ineligible, Unsupported and Unnecessary/Unreasonable) and Rec-
ommended Efficiencies (Funds be Put to Better Use) are subject to change pending
further review in the audit resolution process.
**lnformation on recoveries from audit resolution is provided by the EPA Financial
Management Division and is unaudited.
"'Reports resolved are subject to change pending further review.
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High Risk Areas of Concern to the DIG
Contract Management
EPA relies extensively on contractors to assist in carrying
out its mission to clean up past pollution problems, develop
national policy, and set the environmental agenda for the
future. As a result of our audits and the efforts of others over
the past year, EPA has initiated steps to correct its many
basic contract management problems.
Financial Management
The OIG has repeatedly reported that EPA's accounting
systems do not provide complete, consistent, reliable and
timely data for Agency decision making. Although EPA has
devoted considerable time to improving the Agency's
overall performance in the area, results have been less than
anticipated. We will continue emphasizing audits in the
financial management areas.
Scientific Data Integrity
Accurate and reliable scientific data is crucial to EPA's
accomplishment of its mission as a regulatory agency.
However, audits and investigations show that EPA is not
always getting the research for which it pays, nor is such
research always accurate or objective.
Information Resources Management (IRM)
EPA's IRM program is still hampered by many problems
including: (1) significant cost overruns and delays in devel-
oping and implementing information systems; (2) material
data quality deficiencies; and (3) exposure of the Agency's
most sensitive information systems to access by unethical
users.
Enforcement
Although EPA management has worked diligently to im-
prove EPA's enforcement program, our audits of EPA's
water, pesticide, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
and Superfund programs show continuing instances of
ineffective Federal and State enforcement.
Audit Followup and Implementation of Corrective Actions
Information in the Agency's Management Audit Tracking
System has not been reliable, and the Agency's Semiannual
Reports to Congress on audit followup activity have been
inaccurate. As a result of our reviews, EPA has elevated
corrective action on our find ing to the highest management
levels and appears committed to making improvements.
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Questioned Costs and Recommended Efficiencies
By Type of Assignment - Fiscal 1992
$350
300
(Millions of Dollars)
Non-Federal
Recommended
Efficiencies
Non-Federal
Questioned Costs
Federal Shared
Recommended
Efficiencies
Federal
Questioned Costs
Superfund
Examples of Significant Audits
The following represents examples of some of our most significant
types of findings. They should not be considered representative of the
overall adequacy of EPA management.
Mismanagement of Contractor Jeopardizes Agency's
Control of Operations and Procurement Practices
A general laissez-faire culture affected EPA's management of its
support contract with the Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC). EPA
heavily relied on CSC for development, enhancement, operation, and
maintenance of most of its critical information and financial manage-
ment systems, lessening its own control over critical program opera-
tions. Also, EPA administered the CSC contract as a personal services
contract, violating Federal procurement regulations. EPA assumed
responsibilities for supervising, hiring/firing, evaluating, promoting,
and trainingCSC employees who performed on site and spent $ 154,000
for their training for which CSC should have paid.
Some of CSC's actions created the appearance of the contractor
performing functions so intimately related to the public interest that
they should be performed only by Federal employees. An organiza-
tional conflict of interest existed because CSC assigned itself work and
managed its contract with EPA. Free movement of personnel between
EPA and CSC for over a decade increased the risk of individual conflicts
of interest. The Agency generally agreed with our findings and initiated
a comprehensive program to improve its contract management activities.
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Inadequate Procurement and Contract
Monitoring at Duluth Laboratory
We found questionable events involving support contracts at EPA's
Duluth laboratory. Shortly before leaving government service in 1985,
an EPAscientist solicited work through the Small Business Administra-
tion for a company he owned, AScI, which provided toxicological
support services. Federal criminal law prohibits government employ-
ees from soliciting work on behalf of a contractor. EPA contracting
officials knew of this potential conflict of interest. Nevertheless, 8
months after the scientist left the Agency, AScI received a $1 million
sole-source contract from EPA. This was contrary to EPA regulations
prohibiting such awards to former employees within 1 year of their
leaving the Agency. In 1990, EPA contracting officials approved and
processed three sole-source toxicological support services contracts,
each at slightly less than $3 mi 11 ion, avoid ing the competitive procure-
ment that is required when certain small business contracts are over $3
million in value. The Agency took a number of corrective actions in
response to our recommendations.
After 12 Years, EPA's Information Resources
Management Problems Continue
EPA has over 500 information systems as well as computer models
supporting its mission. We found that the absence of top management
central direction and control over EPA's Information Resources Man-
agement (IRM) program contributed to many of the continuing defi-
ciencies including adversely impacting the IRM contract management
process, information system development and operation, and EPA's
ability to accomplish its cross-media mission. EPA had not established
an integrated long-range IRM planning and budgeting process to help
acquire, manage, and use its computer resources. Also, the Agency
had not instituted a comprehensive, independent quality assurance
program to ensure that its mission-critical information systems operate
effectively and accurately. EPA experienced serious and costly data
integrity and software problems in its operational information systems.
Finally, EPA had no assurance that its valuable and mission-critical
information resources are adequately protected from fraud, abuse, and
unauthorized manipulation. The Agency fully agreed with our findings
and took a number of corrective actions.
After $581 Million and 27 Years of Mismanagement,
Puerto Rico Still Failed To Meet Water Standards
Despite tremendous Federal financial participation and numerous
court ordered actions, the Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority
(PRASA) continued to be a poorly run utility. Although we found
improvements during our on-site tours of 23 of PRASA's wastewater
treatment facilities, significant deficiencies still remained. Many were
noticeably understaffed, poorly operated and maintained,
undersuppiied and violating National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System and Clean Water Act (CWA) requirements. PRASA's highly
bureaucratic organizational structure caused inordinate delays in
equipment repair or replacement. Also, PRASA did not provide suffi-
cient training and did not hold managers accountable for safety
violations until an accident occurred. PRASA's financial position was
m
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overstated because provisions were not made for uncollectible receiv-
ables of $21 .6 million, identifiable bad debts ranging from $2.9 to $14
million were not written off, large accounting adjustments were not
sufficiently supported, and appropriate accounting procedures and
practices were not always fol lowed. Sufficient revenues were not being
received because of ineffective and inefficient collection procedures.
The Agency agreed with the report's major findings, but added that its
sustained rigorous enforcement has produced an increasing level of
grantee compliance with the CWA.
Underground Storage Tank Inventory Not Reliable
The national inventory of underground storage tanks (UST) is unreli-
ableforallocatingresourcesand measuringEPA'sprogress in minimiz-
ing the impact of leaking tanks on human health and the environment.
Groundwater provides drinking water for half of the Nation's
population. EPA's current inventory shows there are about 1.8 million
tanks subject to Federal regulation. However, EPA does not maintain
a complete and accurate national inventory and the inventory may be
understated by 40 percent for individual states. EPA had not provided
adequate guidance and oversight to ensure the accuracy, reliability,
and completeness of the data provided by the States nor had EPA
required the States to periodically update their inventories. EPA and the
States rely primarily on tank owners' voluntary compliance with the
requirement to register their tanks. Because of the unreliability of the
data, the allocation of Federal funds to EPA regions for cleaning up
leaking tanks may be inequitable (of the $53.2 million available in
fiscal 1991, EPA allocated $38 million to its 10 regions based in part
on the number of petroleum tanks reported in the region). The Agency
agreed to implement several of our recommendations to improve data
reliability.
Actions Needed to Better Ensure the Integrity of
Data Supporting Pesticide Registrations
EPA was not effectively implementing its Good Laboratory Practices
(CLP) Program. As a result, the Agency lacked assurance that the data
submitted by independent laboratories in support of pesticide registra-
tions and regulatory decisions was accurate and reliable. However,
CLP inspections have not targeted studies which support chemicals
that are under regulatory review. The program lacks standards for
accepting or rejecting laboratory studies. As of July 1, 1992, approxi-
mately 2,247 audits had identified significant deficiencies during CLP
inspections. Ninety-six percent of these audits, however, had no
impact on the registered status of the pesticide product. Laboratory
studies were often selected for audit for pesticides that had already
been canceled or rejected by the Agency during the scientific review.
The Agency generally agreed with our findings and provided correc-
tive action plans for each of the recommendations.
Nearly $63 Million of Questioned Costs
Claimed for Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Project
EPA awarded twelve grants to the City of Philadelphia to modify and
upgrade the Northeast Water Pollution Control Plant to meet National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit requirements and to
improve sludge management. The grantee claimed $20,603,639 of
ineligible costs under those grants, including $8,679,712 of costs
associated with abandoned systems and equipment. We also ques-
tioned $42,355,847 of unsupported costs, including engineering and
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construction costs associated with uncompleted and inoperable facili-
ties and costs of construction deficiencies needing inspection.
Over $26.5 Million of Ineligible and Unnecessary
Costs Claimed for Underutilized Russian River Project
EPA awarded three grants totalling $27,720,178 to plan, design, and
construct a wastewater treatment plant for the Russian River County
Sanitation District, Guerneville, California. The grantee claimed
$8,344,066 of ineligible construction, engineering, legal and admin-
istrative costs. We identified $707,629 of eligible costs not claimed by
the grantee which were offset against the above questioned costs. We
also questioned $ 18,247,400 of claimed costs as unnecessary because
(1) the facility was operating at only 41 percent of its design capacity
and (2) change orders could not be reconciled to source documents.
Los Angeles Claims $14.3 Million of
Ineligible and Unreasonable Costs
EPA awarded a grant for $14,373,882 to the City of Los Angeles for
planning, designing, and constructingthe Los Angeles/Glendale Water
Reclamation Plant. We questioned $2,1 74,976 of the costs claimed by
the grantee under that grant as ineligible, including construction costs
applicable to inoperable, abandoned, and oversized equipment. We
also questioned $12,198,906 of claimed costs as unreasonable be-
cause the grantee did not (1) comply with special grant conditions
concerning the elimination of sewage overflows and the reclamation
of wastewater, (2) maintain force account records in sufficientdetail to
demonstrate benefit to the project, and (3) Mm it engineering fees to the
maximum amount considered reasonableforthis type of construction.
Alternative Remedial Contracting Strategy
Fails to Accelerate Cleanups of Hazardous Waste Sites
In an effort to expedite cleanups of hazardous waste site, EPA decided
to change its approach by adopti ng the Alternative Remedial Contract-
ing Strategy (ARCS). Under this concept, the remediation of each site
becomes the responsibility of a single contractor as long as perfor-
mance is satisfactory. We found that ARCS failed to meet the Agency's
goal of expediting the remediation or cleanup of Superfund sites in
Regions 1, 3, and 5. Of 68 work assignments issued during the first 2
years of the ARCS program, only seven had been completed as
scheduled, 19 had been completed beyond their schedule, and most
of the remaining assignments will have exceeded EPA's goal by over
1 year (11 by more than 2 years) if completed as planned. In Region 3,
the cleanup of sites was delayed because of ARCS contractors'
ineptitude. Delays in Regions 1 and 5 were attributed to misdirected
site samples, inexperienced contractor and EPA personnel, and a lack
of adequate contractor personnel. The Agency generally accepted our
recommendations for improving the implementation of the program.
Better Administration Needed of Superfund
Contractor-Operated Sample Management Office
EPA's ineffective monitoring of its Sample Management Office con-
tractor, which assists with the management and administration of the
Contract Laboratory Program (CLP), resulted in inadequate consider-
ation of performance histories in selecting laboratories to analyze
samples. As a result, EPA used laboratories with poor performance
histories to analyze samples, while laboratories with superior perfor-
mance histories were not used to their capacity. Sample results are
pivotal in deciding how to clean up a hazardous waste site. Further,
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lack of competition increased EPA's vulnerability to how the contrac-
tor controls samples, cost inefficiencies, and confusion over the
respective roles of the Agency and the contractor. EPA sometimes
improperly influenced the contractor to assign tasks to specific con-
tractor personnel, creating the appearance that a personal services
relationship existed between the Agency and the contractor or that the
contractor performed inherently governmental functions. The Agency
generally agreed with our findings and recommendations.
Report Resolution
During fiscal 1992, the Office of Inspector General issued 1,962
reports and closed 493. Of the 339 reports in the follow-up system at
year end, 102 reports remained for which no management decision
was made within 6 months of issuance.
For the reports closed, $70 million of questioned costs were
disallowed for recovery, and $14.4 million were agreed to by EPA
management as funds that could be put to better use. The Agency
reported cost recoveries from current and prior periods of $11.8
million in cash collections and $48 million in offsets against billings.
Assessed Penalties Against RCRA Violators
Have Increased But Should Be Higher
In September 1989 we reported that under the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA) EPA had assessed penalties which were in
some cases insufficient to eliminate the economic benefits of violators'
noncompliance, were not sufficient for the gravity of the offense, were
excessively mitigated, and were not properly documented. Ourfol lowup
report found that while improvements in the RCRA enforcement
program were evident, the Agency's corrective actions on our recom-
mendations were not timely or fully successful. The regions had not
submitted required penalty calculation worksheets with 11 of 17 final
Consent Agreements/Final Orders submitted to the Office of Solid
Waste and Emergency Response (OSWER), and OSWER had not
always followed up with the regions when the required documents
were not attached. In addition, OSWER conducted no formal reviews
of proposed or assessed penalties during fiscal 1991. As a result,
conditions similar to those previously reported still existed.
EPA Continued to Negotiate Unreasonably High Equipment
Rates on Emergency Response Cleanup Services (ERCS)
Contracts
Our September 1986 report showed that EPA was in a poor negotiating
position during the award of the initial Superfund ERCS contracts
because of limited competition and lack of contractor cost data to
support contractor-proposed fixed equipment rates. Our March 1992,
followup report found that the Agency had taken many of the actions
needed to improve its ERCS contracts. However, after 10 years, EPA
continued to rely on price analysis rather than cost data to determine
the reasonableness of fixed equipment rates negotiated with contrac-
tors. Competition was still limited. EPA was updating its data base of
ERCS labor and equipment rates and will encourage Headquarters and
regional contracting officers to use the data for price analysis.
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Investigative Activities
During this fiscal year, our investigative efforts resulted in 29 indict-
ments, 60 convictions and $4.9 million of fines and recoveries from
individuals or entities which defrauded the Agency.
Super-fund Contract Laboratory Program Investigation
The Office of Investigations has a major investigative initiative under-
way within the Superfund program, directed at fraud in the Contract
Laboratory Program (CLP). Laboratory analyses under the CLP are the
empirical basis for the entire Superfund program. Based on testing for
the presence of hazardous chemicals by these laboratories, the
Superfund program decides which cleanups to initiate and how to
carry them out. Fraudulent analyses could result in a danger to the
public health and safety as well as the unnecessary expenditure of
cleanup funds. In addition, fraudulent analyses could hinder the
Department of Justice's efforts to collect the cost of cleanups from the
responsible parties. Several examples follow.
New York Lab President Convicted of Fraud
The president of Nanco Environmental Services, Inc., of Dutchess
County, New York, was convicted in September 1992 of mail fraud and
submitting false statements to EPA, as well as conspiring to submit false
statements. Arun Gaind, the president, and Sohail Jahani, a supervisor,
engaged in a scheme of setting back the dates on the computer data
systems to which gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer instruments
were attached in order to make it appear that laboratory analyses of soil
and water samples were performed within EPA-approved holding
times when, in fact, they were not. Jahani pleaded guilty in May 1992
to conspiracy to defraud EPA, and James Daly, another supervisor at
Nanco, pleaded guilty in October 1991 to causing false submissions
to be made to EPA.
Lab Firm Vice President Pleads Guilty
In July 1992, Richard Posner, a former vice president of United States
Testing Company of Hoboken, New Jersey, a subsidiary of SGS North
America, Inc., pleaded guilty to a charge of making a false statement
to EPA. Posner admitted that he caused company employees to falsify
information contained in his laboratory's report on the chemical
analysis of a performance evaluation test submitted by EPA as part of
its laboratory evaluation procedure. In April 1 991, the company was
ordered to pay a $100,000 criminal fine and to repay the entire
contract price of $869,487 as restitution to the United States.
Two Lab Employees Banned from CLP
Two employees of Analytical Services Corp., Darren Cothren and
Randy Creighton, have admitted to falsifying data submitted to EPA.
The two have agreed to a pre-trial diversion agreement which includes
being banned from CLP work for 3 years. Lee Kidd, former manager,
admitted directing the two employees to falsify data. Analytical
Services had previously pleaded guilty to making a false claim and was
fined $500,000.
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EPA Computer Supplier Made False Claims
American Coastal Industries, Inc. (ACI), a former supplier of computer
equipment and software to EPA, pleaded guilty in July 1992 to making
false claims to EPA. The corporation was fined $600,000 and ordered
to pay restitution in the amount of $1.11 million, as part of a civil
settlement. This case arose from an QIC audit and subsequent criminal
investigation which revealed thatACI had intentionallysubmitted false
cost or pricing certifications and had overcharged EPA approximately
$600,000 under a contract to provide personal computers and related
products to EPA. The contract, with a potential value of $67.5 million,
was the largest small business set-aside contract ever awarded by EPA
and one of the largest in the nation.
Defendants Sentenced, Fined in
Texas Telemarketing Scheme
Seventeen of 18 individuals indicted in Dallas in a telemarketing fraud
case have been sentenced. All were found guilty. Douglas Cox of
Arlington, Texas, received the longest prison term, 10 years. He was
also fined $5,577 and court costs, and will be on probation for 3 years
after his release. The others sentenced had jail terms ranging from
home confinement for 4 months to 6-1/2 years in prison. Another
defendant, United Financial Group of Beverly Hills, California, which
processed charge card orders in the scheme, was fined $350,000. The
sentences to the defendants total led over 34 years in prison, $352,750
in fines, and restitution to private individuals of $101,750. These cases
resulted from a joint investigation by the EPA OIG and the U.S. Postal
Inspection Service.
Agency Gains Settlement Under Program
Fraud Civil Remedies Act
The Inspector General Division of the Office of General Counsel
negotiated an agreement with an EPA employee who admitted to
submittingtwo fraudulent taxi vouchers for reimbursement. Underthe
agreement the employee paid $700, more than ten times the amount
of the fraud, as a civil penalty under the Program Fraud Civil Remedies
Act.
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Fraud Prevention Activities
Suspension and Debarment Activities
EPA's policy is to do business only with contractors, grantees, and
persons who are responsible, honest, and who comply with applicable
rules and regulations. EPA enforces this policy by suspending or
debarring any organization or person for acting improperly, having a
history of substandard work or willfully failing to perform on EPA or
other Federally funded activities. Suspensions and debarments deny
participation in Agency programs and activities to those who represent
a business risk to the Government. Both procurement and
nonprocurement debarments or suspensions by one agency are effec-
tive in all agencies.
In fiscal 1992, 79 debarment or suspension actions arising out of
OIC audits or investigations were taken, including the following
examples.
Charles A. Donohoo Jr., a demolition contractor operating in
Jefferson County, Kentucky, was debarred for 3 years by EPA
following his December 1989 conviction for improper removal
of asbestos, in violation of the Clean Air Act. The Court also
convicted Donohoo of failure to notify EPA of a release of
asbestos, in violation of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act.
Dominic Nicassio, Inc. (DNI), Dominic Nicassio, Western
Pennsylvania Minority Enterprises Inc. (WPME), and Eugene
Minard all allegedly participated in a scheme to fraudulently
obtain EPA-funded sewer construction contracts totalling
millions of dollars by misrepresenting that WPME was a
legitimate minority business enterprise. EPA debarred WPME
and Minard for 3 years. In addition to their suspensions for 1
year, EPA debarred DNI and Nicassio for 2 additional years.
Personnel Security Program
The Personnel Security Program is one of the Agency's first line
defenses against fraud, using background investigations to review the
integrity of EPA employees and contractors. During fiscal 1992, 1,066
investigations were reviewed. Examples of resulting actions follow.
The access of four contractor employees to Confidential
Business Information was terminated for failing to list, on the
SF-86, Questionnaire for Sensitive Positions, previous drug
usage, continuous usage of controlled substances, and
conviction for assault.
Three employees resigned rather than face possible disciplinary
action for failure to list previous convictions for assault,
claiming degrees not awarded, and failure to list previous
terminations.
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Hotline Activities
The QIC Hotline Center opened 81 new cases and completed and
closed 83 cases during fiscal 1992. Of the cases closed, 15 resulted in
environmental, administrative, or prosecutive action. We also re-
ceived 5,232 calls in which callers were referred to the appropriate
program office, State agency, or other Federal agency for assistance.
The following are examples of corrective action resulting from
calls to the QIC Hotline Center:
A complainant alleged that an EPA employee was conducting
personal business on Government time and was using a
Govern ment computer to f aci I itate the operation of a f urn iture
business which the employee owned. A review of the complaint
disclosed that the employee had used Government time,
equipment (computer, printer, paper, toner), and employees
to operate a personal business. As a result, the employee was
given a written reprimand and strongly cautioned that any
future misconduct could result in severe disciplinary measures.
A complainant alleged that an EPA employee had abused the
Federal Telecommunications System by accepting long
distance telephone calls on a daily basis. A review of the
complaint disclosed that the employee had accepted over
$400 in collect calls and used approximately 36 hours of
Governmenttimeonthose calls. Further investigation revealed
that the employee had also submitted falsified travel vouchers
for people in the office and had kept the money. As a result,
the employee entered into a Pretrial Diversion Agreement
which included 40 hours of community service and restitution
of $2,022 to EPA. In addition, the employee was terminated
from EPA.
If you are aware of any fraud, waste, or mismanagement, please
contact the EPA Inspector General Hotline or the appropriate Divi-
sional Inspector General listed on the inside back panel.
Information is confidential.
Calls can be made toll free on (800) 424-4000. Callers in area
code 202 may also use (202) 260-4977
Remember Act Like It's Your MoneyIt Is!
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Divisional Inspectors General
Region
Headquarters
1 &2
3
4 & 6
5
5,7 &8
7 &8
9 & 10
Subject
Audit
(Headquarters
Audit Division)
Audit
(Financial
Audit Division)
Investigations
(Washington Field
Investigations
(Procurement
Fraud Division)
Audit
Investigations
Audit
Investigations
Audit
Investigations
Audit
Investigations
Audit
Audit
Investigations
Name
Edward Gekosky
Melissa Heist
Francis C. Kiley
Division)
Emmett Dashiell
Paul McKechnie
Robert M. Byrnes
Paul R. Candolfo
Martin Squitieri
Mary Boyer
James F. Johnson
Anthony C. Carrol lo
Allen Fallin
Nikki Tinsley
Truman R. Beeler
H. Brooks Crfflin
Telephone
(703) 308-8222
(202)260-1479
(703) 308-8282
(202) 260-0053
(617)565-3160
(212) 264-0399
(215) 597-0497
(215) 597-9421
(404) 347-3623
(404) 347-2398
(312) 353-2486
(312) 353-2507
(913) 551-7824
(415) 744-2445
(415) 744-2465
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