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requests for proposals, and contracts, and to perform functions such as
assessing the legality of financial and management packages and evaluating
recovery system proposals. Their help is also necessary for other tasks
the Task Force lacks the time or the expertise to execute, such as
formulating new procurement strategies or writing long-term market and
service contracts.
Because of the complexities involved 1n the overall resource
recovery implementation process, the Task Force should require that each
consultant it hires has the expertise necessary to execute all the specific
tasks he is assigned. This means, for instance, that a consulting
engineer or management consultant hired to do a complete planning study
must possess or acquire the appropriate personnel to execute the technical,
marketing, legal, and financing aspects of the work. Frequently, all of
these skills do not reside in a single firm, and then a team approach may
be useful.
Cities that hire consulting engineers to develop their resource
recovery plans should be sure that the firm it hires is capable of
analyzing and evaluating all available resource recovery alternatives.
This can be assured by selecting firms with personnel who are familiar
with the full spectrum of current technologies, including the more
developmental ones like pyrolysis, wet processing, and glass and nonferrous
recovery, or who plan to work jointly with such a firm on the project.
Consultant teams without a broad focus may tend to recommend approaches
that unjustifiably rely on only those technologies with which they are most
familiar.
Prior to the choice of a system designer, the Task Force needs
Impartial advice and should not rely heavily upon any company with a
technological ax to grind. Therefore, it should choose as its technical
consultant an independent firm rather than any company that is marketing
a proprietary process. On the other hand, the Task Force should recognize
the potential disinclination of an independent consultant to recommend
any process which he might not be able to design, such as a proprietary
one. To eliminate any potential bias caused by the possible inducement
of subsequent work, one county explicitly excluded the firm that helped
plan its system from competing for its design and operation.
Utilization of Consultants. Before the Task Force commits itself
to a major resource recovery study, it should perform a rough preliminary
study of local conditions to determine if resource recovery is locally
possible at all. A quick survey of the city's goals, its existing dis-
posal options, the costs of resource recovery, and the possibility of
local markets may rule out resource recovery in the near-term altogether
On the other hand, the preliminary study may indicate the need to retain
a consultant to conduct further investigations. Then, the preliminary
study would serve as the basis for intelligently hiring and guiding him,
by indicating the areas that need more examination.
Guidance is important. The Task Force should require that the
consultants perform problem-oriented work geared to the specific situation
and problems of the city. This will require that the Task Force expend
effort and time itself, planning the consultant's scope of work and
monitoring his progress.
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The consultant's work should not be confined to gathering general
resource recovery information that may have only limited relevance to
the city's specific problems. What a Task Force needs and should ask its
consultant for is individualized information about how recovery problems
and technologies apply to the local situation. For instance, that energy
prices are going up is a cliche"; what is important is how this national
trend affects the prices that nearby markets will pay for specific products
that can be generated from local waste. What is needed are the names of
companies that might buy, the particular specifications of the products
that would be bought, the types and costs of specific technologies that
can provide the product, and the procedures involved in actually getting
a system underway.
System Designers. It is important during the study stage for the
Task Force to obtain direct and specific information on the forms of
technology that are available. This is done by initiating discussions
with the system designers that are offering to design systems for cities,
namely consulting engineering companies and system contractors.
Cities are familiar with consulting engineers and the services they
provide in planning capital improvements. In fact, a consulting engineer
may already be serving the Task Force as an impartial consultant to
analyze resource recovery technologies and formulate a plan. On the other
hand, system contractors are relatively new to the experience of cities.
A resource recovery system contractor is a company that has developed
a particular recovery concept and has tested it out in a pilot plant
operation. Now it is offering to design and construct a scaled-up plant
for a city, and possibly to handle other aspects of getting a plant operating,
such as financing, operating the plant, and marketing the products. It may
subcontract major portions of the work to other companies. For instance,
plant design may be subcontracted out to an engineering firm, or opera-
tions and residual disposal to a waste management firm.
A distinguishing characteristic of a system contractor 1s that it
is a monolithic legal entity that signs a two-party contract for a
resource recovery plan with the city and, therefore, must bear full legal
responsibility for plant failure.(1) This is in contrast to the situation
where the city retains one party, a consulting engineer, to design a
plant, and another party, a construction firm, to build it. Such an
arrangement clouds the issue of responsibility if difficulties in perfor-
mance arise.
Obtaining Preliminary Information. The types of information that
the Task Force should acquire from system designers include the following:
* technical aspects --this includes the proposed technology, as
well as recovered products, markets, and environmental impacts.
Pilot plant experience should also be specified.
10
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• economics—this will include rough estimates of the capital and
operating costs of a facility that would suit the city's needs, as
well as a rough idea of the revenues that might be expected from
the recovered products.
• management packages—this will give the Task Force an idea of the
types of institutional arrangements (operation, financing, risk
sharing, etc.) that are available. Since the management package
has a strong impact on risk, costs, and efficiency, this informa-
tion is as important as is information about economics and
technology.
A good way a Task Force can obtain the above information from
system designers is to request qualifications and conceptual proposals
from a number of companies through a Request for Qualifications (RFQ).
The responses would include detailed information on the company's technical
and financial capabilities, as well as a general idea of the type of
system each company would propose to build for the city, and under what
type of management, cost, and risk arrangements. The city should stipulate
that no final contract award would be made on the basis of these proposals,
but that they will serve as the starting point for city-company discussions.
The responses to the RFQ will enable the Task Force to eliminate
some technical concepts on the basis of the city's particular constraints,
such as finances, lack of particular markets, or city goals. Then, the
field of possible designers can be narrowed on the basis of whether they
offer the type of system and arrangement the city wants and whether
they have proven themselves qualified.
Itjs important to distinguish between an RFQ and a formal Request
for Proposals (RFP, to be discussed in detail later), because some
cities make the mistake of issuing the latter while they are still in
the study stage. A formal RFP calls upon each company to propose a
highly specific technical system, including plant layout, equipment
specifications, expected product output, etc. The company is also asked
to specify the contractual obligations that will exist between the
parties, and to bid a fixed price for this package. This is in contrast
to the less exacting RFQ, which requires only a conceptual plan and no
precise price or contract. Another difference is that the RFP implies
an intent on the city's part to make a prompt contract award on the
basis of the proposals received, while the RFQ expressly denies this
intent.
The problem with using an RFP during the planning stage is that the
Task Force is in no position to make a final choice, and it will be
using the companies' formal proposals as a means of defining its own
needs and goals. It likely will find that it wants a technical and
11
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managerial package that is a combination of many proposals, and will
have to throw out all proposals and prepare a new RFP that specifies the
city's new requirements. This will be demoralizing and unfair to the
bidders who may have spent considerable time and upwards of $50,000 in
preparing their proposals.
Careful Pace Required. A recurrent danger in resource recovery
decision-making is that a Task Force will seize upon the first resource
recovery system that is proposed to it, even though better approaches
may be available. This rush to judgment may stem from impatience or
from ignorance of other possiblities. It usually occurs when an advocate
of a particular type of system is able to convince city officials to buy
his system before they have considered in depth the relative strengths
and weaknesses of all available systems.
The most troublesome "advocate" to the city is the "blue skies"
system promoter who takes advantage of the city's enthusiasm for resource
recovery and its ignorance of the actual processes involved. These
entrepreneurs themselves may know relatively little about technology,
though they are usually sincere in the belief that their system will
work if it is "only given a chance!" They may be sure that their 15-
ton-per-day pilot plant will readily scale up to 1000-ton-per-day, or
they may feel that a pilot plant is not necessary at all. Such naive
technological optimism is a danger the city should avoid.
The city should likewise be wary of promoters (or subsidiary
companies) who do not have the financial backing to implement
their systems themselves, but instead want the city to put up all the
necessary capital or, at least, to provide the legitimacy of a city
contract so construction funds can be borrowed. The city should also
be wary of appeals to extraneous factors such as local pride--if local
citizens are involved as inventors or stockholders.
Obviously, the city should avoid an arrangement where its partner
in resource recovery has neither proven technical ability nor the
capacity to limit the city's financial risk if the system does not
perform. For this reason, the Task Force should not closet itself early
with a single vendor, but should get information from and maintain
contacts with many outside parties, including other system designers and
impartial observers like the EPA. Open discussions with many points of
view expressed bring out the flaws of the undesirable options, and may
save the city money, time, and embarrassment in the long run.
12
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SELECTION
The selection stage is the culmination of the information-gathering
and goal-setting of the study stage, and it synthesizes these inputs
into a general plan for resource recovery. As already noted, the selection
stage is often combined with the study stage into a single phase of the
overall process, namely the planning phase. A Task Force, for instance,
may prepare a single report combining the conclusions of the selection
stage with the justifying backup data of the study stage. Similarly, a
consultant may be asked to prepare this comprehensive document. Though,
in that case, the Task Force should participate significantly in the
selection stage of the consultant's work to insure that the tradeoffs
and decisions made reflect the city's goals.
Just as the consultant should coordinate closely with the Task
Force during the selection stage, the Task Force must coordinate with
the political authorities to which it is responsible, such as the mayor
or the city council. Only in this way can it be assured that the decisions
reached are understood by, and have the backing of, those who have the
power to carry them out.
Major Decisions to be Made
There are a number of individual but interrelated decisions to be
made in the selection stage which, when taken together, add up to a
complete plan for resource recovery. The individual decision areas
include:
a) Site - specific sites for recovery operations and residual
disposal must be determined. The problem of winning public acceptance
of these must also be considered.
b) Technology - the Task Force must choose between technologies
for conversion of waste to energy such as waterwalled incineration,
shredded fuel processing, wet pulping, pyrolysis, etc., and must decide
between materials recovery options for fiber, ferrous, glass, and aluminum.
c) Markets - specific markets for recovered major products must be
established.
d) Operation - operational responsibility must be determined. It
can be assigned to the city's department of public works, a newly-
constituted public authority, the company that designed the plant, or a
local service contractor.
e) Ownership - ownership can be public or private.
f) Financing - a variety of capital financing options are available.
g) Procurement Strategy - this includes choices between using
consulting engineers or system contractors, and whether to use an architectural
and engineering approach, a turn-key approach, or a full service approach.
h) Schedule - a schedule should be formulated that indicates the
time-phasing of all the steps necessary to complete the plan.
13
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Interrelationship of Choices. All of the above decisions must be
combined to form a coherent, logical implementation plan. Choices in
one category may preclude certain options in another category; for
instance, a pyrolysis system may not be procurable from a consulting
engineer, or a public operation may make private ownership unlikely. If
the Task Force is unsure whether its plan is workable, it must consult
with experts.
The Task Force does not have to make its decisions in the order
listed above, since "pacing" constraints will vary from city to city.
For a city in a budgetary squeeze, the financing decision is paramount.
This decision, in turn, would determine the choice of ownership, which
would be private in this case. Another city may have procurement laws
that forbid design and construction by the same company, thus limiting
the Task Force's choice of technology to only those that are available
from independent consulting engineers (i.e. do not construct). The Task
Force must understand its own city's constraints and the interrelation-
ship between the choices so it can determine which decisions must come
first and how they will affect the others.
Some of the general tradeoffs in the various categories are sketched
below. Further data and considerations are discussed in other EPA
publications.
Technology - Markets
Since each technology has characteristic output products that must
be matched against the needs and constraints of potential users, the
choice of a technical system must be made concurrently with the identification
of markets for recovered products. Shredded fuel resource recovery, for
instance, is workable only if there are nearby boilers with ash-handling
capability, similarly, glass recovery requires glass furnaces within an
economical haul distance.
A city that fails to identify markets at an early date takes the
risk of choosing a system that will produce unmarketable outputs. At
its worse, this can create a new waste problem, such as the cases of
composting plants that surrounded themselves with their unsaleable
product. But even if the major "output" is readily disposable, such as
steam from a waterwalled incinerator, the economics of the facility may
be completely undermined. OSWMP knows of two examples in the United
States where steam went unused because the problem of marketing this
product was downplayed until after the facilities were constructed.
Other factors besides markets affect the choice of technology.
Consider, for example, the effects of risk, ownership, and operation.
Concern about risk may lead a city to choose a technology of relatively
low efficiency rather than accept the risks associated with a more
complex technology whose economics and feasibility are more uncertain.
On the other hand, the city might accept the riskier technology if it is
to be privately owned and financed, for then it is not the city's investment
that is at stake. Finally, the operating mode also affects the choice
of technology, for if the city decides to use city personnel, it may
want a less sophisticated, more trouble-free technology.
14
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Ownership-Operation
The responsibilities for ownership and for operation of a recovery
plant can be distributed between the public sector and the private
sector in a number of different ways (Table 2). The table shows that
a publicly-owned and-operated facility can be operated either by an
established city department or by a newly-formed public authority which
is only loosely coupled to existing governments. Similarly, in the
rare case of private ownership and public operation, either a city
department or an authority would be in charge.(2) Next, a publicly-owned
facility could be operated privately either by the system contractor,
who built the facility for the city, or by an independent service contractor
who had nothing to do with plant design or construction.(3) Finally, a
private ownership-private operation situation might occur if the operator
had also designed and built the plant (i.e. he was the system contractor
and was confident it would work), or if he were a part of a consortium
with the system contractor.
The Task Force's choice between these various options depends on a
diversity of factors including:
(a) Price. A private company may offer to build its own plant and
process the city's wastes for a lower price than the city could do it
itself.
(b) Financing. The city may not wish to raise the capital to pay
for a plant itself, and may instead let a private company build and own
it. The city would repay the company's capital costs by including a
debt service component in its per-ton dump fee. This would appear in
the city's books as an operating cost rather than a capital cost.
(c) Efficiency. In some cities, the operation of sophisticated
facilities by public employees has proven to be unsatisfactory for a
number of reasons. These include: union and civil service rules and
pay scales that make it difficult to hire and promote only motivated and
competent employees, the city's lack of the necessary technical and
marketing sophistication, and the lack of profit incentives for public
managers to run an efficient operation.
(d) Control. The city may be committed to maintaining direct
operational control over its solid waste management system since it may
fear that substandard disposal practices or possible plant shutdowns may
result if it lacks direct operational authority. Also, it may not wish
to give up job opportunities for public employees.
(e) Public Authority Advantages. It may be advantageous to create
a public authority to manage resource recovery in an area. An authority
may simplify regionalization, facilitate implementation, or be eligible
for State funds. A drawback of authorities is that they are less
responsive to the public than elected bodies are.
15
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TABLE 2
AGENCIES AND GROUPS THAT COULD TAKE
OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY UNDER VARIOUS
OWNERSHIP-OPERATIONS ARRANGEMENTS
PUBLIC
to
a;
PRIVATE
OPERATIONS
PUBLIC
•City department
•Public authority
•City department
•Public authority
PRIVATE
'System contractor
•Service contractor
•System contractor
•Consortium
16
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Financing
Just as there is a spectrum of ownership-operation options, there
is also a wide variety of options for financing resource recovery plants.
Table 3 arrays the most commonly discussed possibilities and some of
their characteristics. It is seen that tax-exempt financing is possible
even under private ownership through the use of Pollution Control Revenue
Bonds (PCRB). Other options include equity financing, revenue bonds,
and general obligation (GO) bonds.
The financing decision is sensitive to other implementation factors.
A city, for instance, may find that it is unable to own a plant itself
because public financing options are not open to it. This may be because
a) the city is at or near its GO bonding limit, or is unable to get
voter approval to float bonds for a recovery plant; or b) the desired
plant could not guarantee a secure enough revenue stream to ensure that
revenue bonds would be paid off. Under such circumstances, the city
would have to give up the idea of public ownership and seek a system
contractor that would be willing to finance and construct a facility.
The most often suggested private financing option is the PCRB,
which may be used to finance systems in Hempstead, New York, and Dade
County, Florida. This mechanism allows a corporation to borrow money at
low interest rates by taking advantage of the tax-exempt status of the
city whose solid waste will be recovered or of an associated industrial
development agency. In effect, the city (or the agency) borrows the
money for facility construction. Once the plant is completed, the city
leases it to the corporation for the exact amount that will pay off the
bonds, interest included. It is the guaranteed stream of lease payments
the company promises to the city, and in turn to the bond holders, that
guarantees the bonds. Thus, PCRB financing rests on the credit-rating
of the company and relieves the city of any responsibility for the
debt.(4)
In a common variation on the PCRB approach, a system contractor
insulates himself from bankruptcy by creating a subsidiary company. The
subsidiary floats the PCRB, runs the plant, and depends on the city's
dump fee for its revenues. This arrangement has the effect of transferring
the risk of plant failure to the bondholders since, under failure, the
city would not pay the dump fee, the bankrupt subsidiary would not pay
the lease payment, and the city would not pay the bondholders. Consequently,
bond underwriters have been more cautious about floating this kind of
PCRB than floating GO bonds or fully secured PCRB's. In fact, in periods
of tight money, such high risk obligations are not likely to be marketable
at all.
Procurement Strategy
Just as there is more than one technology for recycling municipal
solid wastes, there is more than one strategy a city can choose to
procure resource recovery services. In fact, when deciding its strategy,
a city must make two related choices. The first is who should be the
system designer, a consulting engineer who specializes in design and
17
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engineering services, or a system contractor whose services encompass both
design and construction. Related to this choice is the second one, whether
to acquire the plant by the traditional architectural and engineering (A & E)
approach, or to use a turn-key or full service approach.
These choices are related, since consulting engineers usually offer
only the A & E approach, while system contractors usually will only serve
on turn-key or full service projects. The methods by which the city hires
these different system designers are also distinct, since consulting
engineers are usually hired via negotiations, while system contractors are
usually hired via a "competitively" bid RFP,(6)
Because the choices of designer and approach are coupled, they need
not be discussed separately. The remainder of this section will be
organized around the tradeoffs between the alternative approaches. (The
techniques by which the services of a consulting engineer or of a system
contractor are procured are discussed in the Procurement section of this
paper.)
The three procurement approaches—A & E, turn-key, and full service--
differ on the basis of how the various responsibilities of design,
construction and operation are allocated between the city and the design
firm. Table 4 displays the various job assignments. Each approach will
now be discussed in detail.
Architectural and Engineering. This is the traditional approach
cities have taken to procure public works like schools, bridges, or
incinerators. It involves two main steps, the retention of an engineer
to draw up plans and specifications for the desired capital improvement
and the hiring of a construction contractor to construct the facility
from these plans.
In the first step, the city hires an experienced consultant to
perform the necessary architectural and engineering services for the
desired facility. He is told specifically what the city wants and where
to locate it. In the case of Ames, Iowa, for instance, the consultant
was told to draw up plans for a plant to be located on East Lincoln Way
that would mill and air classify 50 tons of waste an hour, modelled
after the St. Louis-Union Electric Company project.
Later, with these plans firmly in hand, the city would go out for
construction bids and would award the contract to the construction
contractor with the lowest bid. His task would be to order the steel,
cement, and process equipment, to hire the laborers, to supervise
construction, and to bring the facility to completion.
This approach is almost always coupled with city ownership and
operation and with public financing.
19
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Turn-key. Under the turn-key approach, the city hires a system
contractor to design, build, and start up a recovery system for the city
for a price. Some pricing arrangements include cost plus fixed or percentage
fee, a target price with incentives, or, though rarely, a guaranteed maximum
price. As Table 4 shows, the city assigns sole responsibility for the
execution of these steps to a single party.
A turn-key approach usually puts the city in the position of not having
to accept the plant until it has been shown to operate according to specifi-
cations. The contract between the city and the contractor will stipulate
acceptance tests that the plant must pass if the city is to take it over and
pay for it. If it does not operate as specified in the contract, the city
can refuse to accept it, leaving the contractor bearing the capital cost of
construction. In reality, of course, the division of losses between the two
parties is affected by the strength of the contract, the payment arrange-
ments, and the possibility that the city will be willing to accept an imper-
fect processing plant as opposed to a continuing solid waste problem.
Generally speaking, a turn-key approach involves much less risk to the city
than the alternative of constructing its plant via the traditional A & E
approach mode.
Full Service. In the case of the full service approach, the system
contractor offers the city a resource recovery service instead of a plant.
The contractor finances and builds a plant to perform this service. The
contractor owns it and is responsible for ensuring that it performs the
recovery service throughout the life of the city's disposal contract
(Table 4).
The system contractor will usually charge a set dump fee for each ton
of solid waste delivered by the city for processing. This fee will vary over
the life of the plant, according to escalator and renegotiation clauses in the
contract between the city and the contractor. The contractor will make its
profit and pay for its plant with the revenues from the dump fee and from
the product sales. Contract life must be long enough to enable plant pay-off,
usually 15 to 20 years.
A full-service contract shifts even more risk from the city to the
system contractor since the system contractor is obligated to perform a
certain service at a stipulated price. Cost escalators in the contract
may transfer to the city some of the risks of higher than anticipated
capital and operating costs, but, as in a turn-key approach, catastrophic
failures would be the contractor's worry. (The city, in that case,
would still have its solid waste to dispose of, but a performance bond
by the contractor could somewhat compensate the city for its trouble.)
Relative Merits of Different Approaches. No one approach fits the
needs of all cities. The Task Force's weighing of various factors will
determine which approach to follow: A & E, turn-key, or full service.
A & E Approach Advantages and Disadvantages. One advantage is ease of
procurement. Many cities planning for resource recovery prefer the A & E
21
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approach because it is easier to perform organizationally since the
"rulebook" for it is "tried and tested", and since all the relevant city
personnel know what is expected of them. In fact, State laws governing
municipal procurement often make deviations from the A & E approach
procedures difficult.
Ironically the turn-key and full service approaches to building a
recovery plant should be faster than the A & E approach because one
party is responsible for design and construction and can save time by
ordering major equipment before all the design work is completed. But
usually city law and tradition are ill-suited to these approaches and
can cancel out the time-saving advantage.
A second advantage of the A & E approach is that it can be potentially
the lowest cost solution to a city's problem. If the city hired a
system contractor to design, construct, and possibly operate a recovery
facility for the city, the cost to the city would include management
fees (e.g. hiring and supervising of construction contractors) and a
profit for the company. The city would pay a lower total price for the
same physical facility by managing the procurement itself via the A & E
approach route. Many people do argue that the inherent inefficiency of
publicly-managed projects would wash out any savings here, though; the
truth of this depends on the particular municipality and its track
record in managing public works.
Another cost-reducing feature of the A & E approach is that the
city need not pay a premium for the risk of system failure, which it
would if a system contractor underwrote that risk. The city does not
have the option of refusing a plant if it has accepted the A & E approach
drawings from its consultant and farmed them out to a construction
contractor. The contractor can only be liable for faults such as
failing to put an I-beam where the blueprint specifies or putting too
much sand in the cement. A faulty system concept is not his fault.
If the city selects the A & E approach, it is hoping to save the cost
of the risk premium a system contractor would charge. The key disadvantage
of the A & E approach is on the other side of the risk coin, for if the
system fails to operate at the expected price or, worse yet9 does not
operate at all, the city has a financial and political embarrassment on
its hands.
Another potential limitation of the A & E approach is that it is not
applicable to those technologies that are patented by system contractors
that require a turn-key or full service arrangement. It is also less
likely to be used to implement the more developmental, and consequently
more risky, technologies, since in those cases cautious city officials
will probably prefer to transfer as much risk as possible over to a system
contractor.
Turn-key and Full Service Advantages and Disadvantages. Turn-key
and full service approaches are especially important today in light of
the state of resource recovery technology, which is complex, expensive,
and still largely unproven at the scale of operations that many cities
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require. It is generally assumed that there may be some scale-up problems
when the larger systems are built, even if the pilot plants worked
perfectly. Also, even in the best of circumstances, system debugging
will be a necessary and non-trivial task. A laundry list of unexpected
problems at OSWMP's St. Louis-Union Electric demonstration project gives
a sampling of the variety of problems that require solution: materials
bridging in conveyors, excessive wear in pneumatic feed pipes, air
pollution uncertainties, and fire hazards.
The owner and operator of a recovery plant will have to come to
grips with these malfunctions as they occur. From the standpoint of
risk, it can be seen that turn-key or full service offers two key benefits
for cities:
1. Deferred acceptance. The city bears only a fraction of the
risk that these problems will be insoluble, since it pays for the plant
only after it is working.
2. Direct experience. Turn-key and full service approaches allow
the system developers' engineers to design and start up the plant,
increasing the likelihood of success because they developed the concept
and they have the most experience with it through their pilot plant
work.
Full service has still other features. One is that it involves
private ownership, which makes public borrowing unnecessary. Another is
that it does not necessitate the city to staff the new plant with its
existing sanitation workers, who may be ill-prepared to operate the new
technol9gy and possibly may even resent its introduction. A third is that
it exempts the city from the problem of marketing the recovered products,
transferring that responsibility to the contractor who may have more
proficiency in that role anyway.
Most of the disadvantages of turn-key and full service approaches
have already been discussed, such as possibly higher cost and the difficulties
of procurement. An additional one is the city's loss of control in the
selection of specific process equipment and design. This couVd have signi-
ficant effect on economics. In the case of turn-key, the system contractor
could, in his design, sacrifice operating economics in order to lower
initial equipment and construction costs. The city might then be penalized
over the lifetime of the plant by paying larger than necessary maintenance
and operating costs. In the case of full service, the city may have no
recourse in the event that the system contractor, for some reason, fails
to install dump fee reducing technological or operational innovations that
were unknown when the original contract was signed.
The problem of procuring a system designer to design and construct a
resource recovery plant will now be discussed.
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PROCUREMENT
Once the Task Force has selected the complete system package it
desires, it must procure the services it needs to implement it. Depending
on whether the Task Force wants to go the A & E approach, the turn-key,
or the full service approach, it will have to retain the services of a
system designer, be it a consulting engineer or a system contractor. It
is the purpose of this section to examine the methods of doing so.
In the following, the stress will be on the hiring of system contractors,
(in particular, on the use of RFP's), because this technique is relatively
new to city officials -and has proved to be a stumbling block.
Procuring a Consulting Engineer
The A & E approach in which the consulting engineer does the design
work is often viewed as a prtce competitive approach, but this Is only half
right. The first step is not price competitive in the sense that the
lowest bidder gets the contract, for the hiring of a consulting engineer
never involves competition on the basis of price; the engineering community
recommends against it. This is because bid prices do not reflect the com-
petency and efficiency of the bidders, and a city's choice of a consultant
is instead based upon such factors as technical qualifications, professional
experience, prior performance, and personal and professional integrity.
Cities normally hire consulting engineers via a process of screening
professional proposals, interviewing three to five of the top-ranking
firms, and then negotiating a contract and a scope of work with the winner.
General factors to be considered in evaluating and ranking are available
from professional societies, as are various methods of contracting and
compensation.
The second step of the A & E approach is price competitive, as any
number of construction firms can respond when the city advertises for bids
to construct the facility according to the consulting engineer's plans
and specifications. The lowest responsible bidder will win the contract
and will construct the facility, or the part he bid on, for the price he
bid.
The first step in the A & E approach is the key one: choosing a
consulting engineer. The Task Force must assure itself that the consulting
engineer it chooses can design a system that will perform satisfactorily
and can be constructed at a reasonable price. This assurance can only come
from the Task Force's examination of three factors.
• whether the consulting engineer can demonstrate relevant and
comprehensive experience in the recovery field. This includes
knowledge of solid waste and its problems, as well as knowledge
of the particular technology under discussion. One indicator
would be experience, having successfully designed a plant of a
similar size and technical concept.
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• whether the proposed technical concept has been proven anywhere,
either at pilot-or full-scale size. Since the city's money is at
stake in the A & E approach, a "show-me" attitude is in order.
•whether the consulting engineer is confident of the product specifications
of the plant's recovered output and whether he has matched them
against the input requirements of the local markets. Here again,
it is the city's loss if its products are unmarketable.
Not all engineering firms are likely to be able to fulfill the above
conditions. The highly specialized nature of resource recovery coupled
with the relatively small market for it means that only a relatively few
firms will be able to allocate the manpower to study the field in depth
and acquire sufficient "hands-on" design experience. Of course, a firm
experienced in recovery technology may want to retain a local consulting
engineer for his knowledge and perspective on the local disposal system
and its problems.
The Task Force should not rest once it has chosen a consulting
engineer to begin design; there are many preparations to be made for
plant start-up. First, the management framework for the plant must be
developed, to determine who will manage it, who will operate it, how the
various jobs will be carried out, etc. Ideally, the city and its system
designer will have developed "operating manuals" and will have recruited
personnel for the facility before construction is complete.
A second task is marketing. The city must not wait until a product
is being produced to sign contracts for its purchase; rather this should
be an important activity all through the planning, design, and construction
stages. If necessary, arrangements can be made to obtain sample products
for marketing purposes from similar recovery plants in other cities.
Officials of Lane County, Oregon, for instance, obtained shredded, air-
classified solid waste from the St. Louis resource recovery plant to use
for test-burning purposes in a local electric utility boiler.
With adequate preparation of personnel and other arrangements, the
city will be able to begin operations soon after the construction contractor
has finished his work.
Finally, the city usually will want an arrangement with the consulting
engineer to assist the city during the shakedown phase. It also may want
him to redesign any plant features that are found to perform inadequately,
possibly without further charge. This is one form of performance guarantee
the city can acquire under the A & E approach.
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Procuring a System Contractor
The RFP approach for hiring a system contractor requires a great
deal of sophistication on the Task Force's part to be successful, both
in RFP preparation and in follow-through. The Task Force and its consultants
must perform the..foilowing steps:
a) prepare an RFP and distribute it to possible bidders,
b) evaluate proposals and choose a winner,
c) negotiate a contract and arrange financing.
After these steps, the winning system contractor will design and construct
the facility. Then the contractor will either operate it or turn it
over to the city to operate it, depending on whether the arrangement is
for the turn-key approach or for the full service approach.
In the following, a general set of rules is offered that will
increase the chance of success of the RFP approach. For specific help,
the Task Force probably should obtain the services of consultants, for
few cities can marshal! internally all the necessary technical, managerial,
legal, financial, and marketing expertise. To date, consulting engineers
and management consultants have been especially helpful to cities,
counties, and states involved in RFP preparation and proposal evaluation.
It is important to obtain their help early to insure that avoidable
complications do not arise in the later stages when they can be rectified
only at the price of serious delay and great effort.
Specialized, in depth help is mandatory because one city cannot
adopt in its entirety the RFP or procurement procedures of another city,
since each city has a unique set of opportunities and constraints. The
following rules are intended only as general guidance and are insufficient
in themselves to guide a city through a procurement.
Preparing the RFP. The RFP is a major document that details with a
high level of specificity the city's desired resource recovery system,
how system contractors may bid to provide this system, and how bids will
be evaluated. It must be the culmination of the Task Force's and its
consultants' conscientious work in the study and selection stages, and
its final determination of the city's resource recovery requirements.
Once the RFP is distributed to potential bidders, it cannot be amended
without embarrassment to the Task Force and inconvenience to the bidders.
Four rules for RFP preparation follow:
1. Specify technical parameters. The RFP must contain specific
technical parameters so that bidders know exactly what is desired of
them. This means stipulating information like the particular recovery
technology, the tonnages, the products local industries might buy, the
environmental control standards that must be met, and the disposal
techniques for process residuals. (EPA recognizes that in some cases,
e.g., where many possible markets exist, a particular technology may not
have to be specified. Still, in depth studies and specification of other
parameters are required.)
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Some cities prefer to set only performance goals in their RFP; they
call for a "black box" that must accept a certain input tonnage and must
generate a certain output. The output performance specifications may be
vague, requiring, for instance, that a certain percentage of input waste
be "recovered," but not specifying what, how, or how efficiently.
Some cities set imprecise performance specifications because their
competitive bidding laws forbid process specifications that might only
allow one system contractor to bid, as might be the case if wet pulping
or "Purox" pyrolysis were called for. Other cities do not have a valid
reason for setting performance specifications alone. They may just have
put off making a choice or they may be "keeping their options open,"
hoping for a miracle system to come along.
This is unfortunate. The use of performance specifications alone
will make the proposal evaluation stage just that much more difficult,
since all the bidders will claim that their system can meet them. Some
may not, and the Task Force may neither be able to technically evaluate
the proposals to the extent that it can determine which can or cannot
meet the specifications at the stated cost, nor be able to ascertain the
cost-risk tradeoffs involved. (Should it choose the lower cost project
that has a higher risk of failure?) Tradeoffs between the competing
technologies should be analyzed in the selection stage and, if possible,
one should be chosen before proposals are on the table.
This is not to say that performance specifications are unnecessary;
they are an important part of the definition of the city's desired
system and will have a significant impact on price. The lack of performance
specifications will affect proposal comparability. For example, a city
may desire a fail-safe processing plant to lower its dependence on its
backup landfill. If this requirement for dependable performance is not
explicit in the RFP, problems will arise when low-cost, non-redundant
systems are proposed and must be evaluated alongside systems with dual
processing lines and other reliability-increasing features. The Task
Force group may have to decide questions such as:
a) whether a system contractor with an otherwise good proposal
should be allowed to revise his bid to include redundancy,
b) whether a high-price proposal can legally be accepted if a non-
redundant system proposal was low bid,
c) whether a low-bidding, non-redundant proposal is just being
used to "buy into" the project, since the system contractor may plan to
raise his price drastically when the redundancy requirements become
explicit.
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2. Specify organizational arrangements. The RFP must specify the
legal, financial, and managerial arrangements required by the city, so
that all contractors can bid on the same overall package. This includes
who will own and operate the plant, how and who will finance the plant,
how dump fees will be paid, how product revenues will be shared, etc.
The RFP should also contain a preliminary contract spelling out most
of this information and explicitly stating how risks and responsibilities
will be divided between the parties and what expectations the city has
of the contractor.
These non-technical factors must be spelled out just as the technical
specifications must be. Otherwise, it will be difficult to compare bid
packages against each other since they may vary in so many factors.
Also, the Task Force may find it likes one system contractor's technical
ability and another one's management package. If the Task Force had
specified a preferred management package in the RFP, the first company
could have bid to it and could have given the Task Force all of what it
wanted.
Another reason why the non-technical features must be explicit is
that they impact strongly on price. Obviously, public versus private
financing and 15 versus 20 year amortization periods will affect cost,
but so too will contract provision about risks and responsibilities.
Suppose the dependability-minded city in number 1 above decided to go
full service and to insure reliability by making the cost of shutdowns
great by putting a $200,000 per day damage clause in the contract. If
the system contractor knows this will be in the contract, he will certainly
build in redundancy and make the city pay for it. But if this is not
stipulated in the RFP, bidders will propose lower cost, non-redundant
systems and will properly balk when the Task Force broaches it later.
Actually, any risk responsibility the Task Force puts upon the
system contractor will affect the contingency he will add to his bid
price and will thus affect the cost of the total system to the city. So
the city must spell out all these risk assignments in the RFP if it is
to get a true estimate of cost.
3. Dictate proposal format. The proposal procedure itself should
stress comparability by laying down ground rules for proposals that will
facilitate their eventual evaluation. The format of the proposals
should be dictated; for instance, bid price sheets and a proposal table
of contents should be included in the RFP. Of course, if the city's
definition of what it wants is vague (10 year, 20 year contract?, city
finances, company finances?), such refinements as bid sheets only give a
dangerous illusion of comparability, for the factors that are not included
on the bid sheets are far more important than the conditional numbers
that are.
The appendix gives a listing of the variety of items that might be
included in an RFP, from the technical specifications, to the bid format,
to the contract. Not all items on this list are necessary, but each
should be explicitly considered by the Task Force before being excluded.
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4. Require qualifications. The RFP should require that bidders
demonstrate technical and financial capability. The Task Force might
even pre-qualify bidders in cities where that is legal.
Stressing qualifications is important because it is a rare city
that will be able to judge accurately the technical and economic merits
of a complex resource recovery proposal, even with the help of a consultant.
But it can hedge against the risks of escalating costs, unmarketable
products, and process breakdowns by depending on companies with demonstrable
prior experience in solid waste and resource recovery, and with the
financial capability to stay afloat through the false starts and down
periods that are inevitable.
Proven technical experience can often take the form of resource
recovery pilot plant work and large-scale solid waste operations. A
functioning plant, even of pilot-scale, is worth a thousand advertising
brochures.
Financial capability is another qualification cities should require
since performance guarantees in the contract do not help the city if
they only drive the system contractor to the bankruptcy court. In fact,
there is the danger that a small company will assume the city's disposal
function long enough for the city to lose its own disposal capability
and then find that it can not continue at its quoted disposal price.
The company can issue the valid ultimatum: "increase the dump fee or we
will go under." All the contract guarantees in the world will not make
the city's garbage disappear the next day.
The city might guard against such a scenario by hiring a company
with a solid financial background. It might require from bidders things
like a strong financial history, substantial assets (or performance bonds),
and experience with projects of comparable magnitude. Naturally, if a
subsidiary is set up locally to bid a project, the final contracts must
look through the subsidiary back to the parent company.
The above bidder qualifications should be called for and considered
in the proposals stage, but the city should address itself to this
whole question much earlier as well. If a city is sure that a potential
bidder will not meet the experience or financial qualifications, it is
foolish to allow him to enter a substantive bid. It is hard to throw
out a low bidder after he has outlined his plan, especially if the plan
has flaws which are obvious only to the technically sophisticated.
Therefore, a pre-qualifying round of bids, where allowed by law, is
a good idea. The city can zero in on a particular system concept and
call for the technical and financial qualifications of companies with
relevant experience. Then, the city can set a minimum standard and
narrow the field substantially. It must be remembered, of course, that
the remaining bidders are still not "equal" and the lowest bid should
not necessarily be accepted; rather, relative capability should still be
a criterion in the bidding round to follow, albeit a less important one.
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Non-competitive Procurement. An option open to some cities is to
bypass the RFP altogether and negotiate directly with one or a few system
designers to procure a system. These might be selected on the basis of
the RFQ competition (as discussed on page 11). In a new field like
resource recovery, it may be as wise to "go with the man," as to "go with
the system." The technologies available may be uncertain, but many
reputations are not.
A negotiated procurement allows the Task Force to engage in one-to-
one discussions phased over many months, during which time it can gain
and digest the information needed to choose a system that serves the
city's purposes and to develop the outline of a contract that protects
its interests. Such negotiations do not necessarily have to lead to a
final contract award or preclude concurrent discussions with other
companies or outside consultants. Nor do they preclude an eventual RFP,
if the city decides that many companies could provide the decided-upon
service.
Of course, in most cities, a negotiated award is probably unacceptable,
either legally or politically. Negotiated procurement has its advantages.
This is testified to by its common use by the private sector.
Proposal Evaluation. Proposal evaluation should be no problem if a
good RFP has been prepared because each company will be bidding comparable
system packages and the choice will be between "apples and apples."
Price can now play the key role in the decision: the construction price
if it is a turn-key project, or the dump fee if it is a full service
project.
There are some other factors that should still be weighed, such as
relative bidder capability and market arrangements. Another is the
bidder's management plan for plant construction and start-up, including
the personnel to be utilized.
The concern with personnel and management is that an otherwise
acceptable bidder may be overly committed, in terms of manpower and
finances, because he has commitments in too many cities. A city may be
better served by a company that can assign to it its best talent full-
time, instead of just one week in four. Also, a company with contracts
in only one or two cities will view each as very important, both to its
profits and to its reputation, and will work harder in each for an
optimized showcase system.
Contract Negotiation. After a system contractor has been selected,
a final contract must be negotiated and signed. Though the basis for
discussions is the preliminary contract contained in the RFP, deviations
from this contract will probably be necessary to accommodate particular
needs and concerns of the winning bidder. Substantial deviations should
be avoided as they could appreciably affect the cost picture and would
be unfair to the bidders who have been eliminated.
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Legal and financial counsel at this stage is important, and both
the Task Force and the system contractor may wish to retain it. This is
especially true in the case of the full service approach because the
contract will be complicated since it must span a 15 to 20 year period
to assure a reasonable plant payback time. The contract must anticipate
the myriad of situations that could occur in this time-new technologies,
natural disasters, new laws-and make provisions for them.
City attorneys usually do not have sufficient experience in writing
contracts for long-lived, capital-intensive service facilities; they are
more familiar with short-term service contracts or outright purchases of
capital facilities. Expertise with turn-key and full service contracts
will likely be found in law firms that deal with the private sector
where long-term contracts are more common.
Financial assistance must be recruited, too, if it has not been
done already, to insure that the contract that is signed can be financed.
This can be a problem if project financing by PCRB's or municipal
revenue bonds is involved. This is because bond buyers must be convinced
that the project will succeed and that the bonds can be paid off. Not
only does this require that the technical plan get the seal of approval
from independent engineers, but that the contract between the city and
the contractor insure that a sufficient stream of revenues will be
generated to amortize the investment, even in the face of changing solid
waste and market conditions over a period of 15 or 20 years. Therefore,
provisions that may be necessary include:
a) Put or pay provisions, --requiring that the city pay for a
guaranteed minimum tonnage of waste to be processed, whether it is
delivered or not,
b) Composition change adjustments, --to compensate the plant
operators for changes in the waste stream that affect the recovered
product revenues (e.g., can bans, separate collection drives),
c) Price adjustments, --if new environmental standards require
further capitalization or more expensive operating procedures.
In effect, the city must be willing to share some or all of the
risks of such changes if construction funds are to be raised.
It is to the benefit of all parties that the contract be as explicit
as possible to avoid misunderstandings later. Terms like "recovered
resources" and "inert residue" must be defined in operational terms that
a court can understand. In the case of a turn-key approach, the standards
for acceptance of the facility after start-up must be spelled out;
requirements that the plant "perform satisfactorily" are vague and
unenforceable. Instead, a set of test procedures should be specified.
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Such precision is also necessary in the area of environmental
standards that the plant must meet. Agreements reached in advance must
include: procedures for calling for tests, responsibility for performing
the tests, and the method of correcting deficiencies.
In the case of the full service approach, it may be useful to set
up in the contract an arbitration board so that adjustments in the city-
contractor relationship can be made over the life of the contract as
required. Some contingencies are certain to be overlooked, and only an
arbitration procedure can give the project the flexibility necessary. A
threat to break the contract on a technicality is a very blunt instrument
for accommodation ten years down the road.
Construction Completion and Start-up. The construction completion
and plant start-up stages should create no problems for the city if a
reliable firm has been hired and a comprehensive contract has been
written. Technical problems may appear and may be costly to correct,
but a clear specification of responsibilities will insure that the
contractor will put his effort into solving problems rather then searching
for a way to break the contract. And troubleshooting by the system
contractor is encouraged if the contract contains financial incentives
like delay penalties and dump fees that depend on the quality of processing,
This discussion ends here because, at this stage, the city is
beginning to return to familiar ground; if its Task Force has done its
work properly, there should be no catastrophic surprises ahead.
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FOOTNOTES
1. A system designer need not be a single company, but can be a
consortium of companies acting as a single body in relation to
the city. Consortiums might include an engineering firm and a
construction firm, or an engineering firm, a construction firm, and
an operations firm, jn a joint venture to handle the city's wastes.
2. Private ownership - public operation is a rare option, but can take
place under what financiers call a leveraged lease. Therein, the
city could lease a plant from investors who help the city finance
the facility in exchange for formal ownership of it and the tax
advantages such ownership entails.
3. Arrangements whereby a city contracts out the operation of a city-
owned facility to a private firm are rare today, but could become
more common if clear benefits are found, such as increased operating
efficiency or reduced debt service. A problem might be that the
private contractor would feel little incentive to properly maintain the
city-owned plant, though.
4. The PCRB mechanism has not yet been used to finance a recovery plant,
so there is some uncertainty as to how it will be applied. The U.S.
Internal Revenue Service must make determinations about what kinds
of plants, and what parts of plants, will be eligible for this tax-
exempt financing.
5. Technically speaking, the city owns the facility in the case of a PCRB,
hence its tax-exempt status. We have called it private ownership be-
cause not only does the company usually have control of the plant for
a 20-year period, but often it purchases the plant from the city
under a lease-purchase agreement, or installment sale. This added
feature entitles the company to investment tax credit advantages in
addition to the PCRB's tax-exempt status.
6. Naturally, there are exceptions, such as in Monroe County, New York,
where the County is following a modified A & E approach in which a
system contractor, selected by an RFP competition, provides only
"professional services". This variation was used because the County
might have violated New York State's competitive bidding laws if the
contractor had been given formal responsibility for construction.
Another variation is a negotiated procurement of a system contractor's
services. This approach is often impossible under existing laws.
7. This table only indicates those services provided by system designers
that relate to plant design, construction, and operation. Other
services are also necessary, although they are not included in the
table. Regardless of which of the three approaches is followed, cities
will require consultants to execute a myriad of tasks, including
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performing feasibility studies, surveying markets, drafting authorizing
legislation, preparing RFP's, evaluating proposals, preparing contracts,
obtaining financing, and acting as a liaison between the city and its
chosen system designer. Such services may be provided by consulting
engineers, management consultants, law firms, etc.
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APPENDIX
ITEMS FOR POSSIBLE INCLUSION IN A REQUEST
FOR PROPOSALS FOR A RESOURCE RECOVERY PLANT
I. Technical Specifications
A. Plant Specifications (especially important for turn-key approach
construction)
site information - location, geology
waste-receiving facilities - design, capacity, weigh stations
storage facilities - type, capacity
technical concept - e.g., pyrolysis, shredded fuel
equipment specifications - type, capacities, performance guarantees
redundancy and expansion requirements
safety features
pollution monitoring and control features
building specifications
residue disposal - landfill and equipment
facilities for special wastes
B. Performance Standards (especially important for full service contract)
solid waste input - tonnage, composition, fluctuations, special wastes
environmental standards for plant residue storage site
safety standards
recovery specifications - products, quality, tonnage
residue specification - tonnage, composition
dependability
II. Legal Constraints on City and Contractor
solid waste collection and disposal laws
procurement laws
building codes and standards
zoning laws
employment laws (e.g. equal opportunity, minimum wage)
insurance requirements
occupational safety and health standards
tax obligations of plant owner
legal authority of proposal solicitor
budget authorization of proposal solicitor
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[II. Management Plan
A. Project Phasing
1. Architectural and Engineering Approach
scope of work for each step
CE role in construction supervision and shakedown
allocation of risk and responsibility
client-engineer relationship
compensation mode
2. Turn-key Construction
scope of work for each step
time allowed
procedure for certification of step completion
payment schedules
penalties for delays, substandard performance
3. Full Service Contract
start-up dates
commencement procedures
city options to buy
end of term procedures - what belongs to city, option to extend
or renegotiate
B. Rights and Responsibility of Parties (especially for full service contract)
land arrangements
tax arrangements
financing arrangements
city's right to approve specifications before construction
hours and days of operation - regular and emergency
delivery and weighing procedures
performance criteria for plant
disposal procedures
maintenance procedures
marketing requirements
city's access to plant, books
environmental performance criteria
C. Dispute Resolution Procedures (especially for full service contract)
1. Procedures for determining if environmental, marketing,
residual disposal, or general performance criteria are met
how testing instituted
who pays for tests
who tests, and how
how determination of non-performance made
how satisfaction given
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2. City - contractor liaison board
members
meeting frequency
powers - e.g. dispute settlement, contract amendment
3. Arbitration Procedures
D. Financial Arrangements (for full service contract)
dump fee payment procedures, dump fee escalation formula
resource recovery revenue sharing formula
incentives for efficiency, resource recovery, maintenance,
environmentally sound operation
IV. Provision for Unplanned Contingencies (for full service contract)
termination procedures if contract default by either party
facility removal provisions
force majeure - conditions, procedures to follow
option to buy, option to negotiate service contract
non-city waste - whether allowable and whether city gets rebate
unusual or emergency situations - procedures, city's right to be
informed
performance bonds
compensation and obligations during overly long shakedown period
fee schedules if no resource recovery
fee adjustments in case of changes in capital costs, operating costs,
recovery revenues, waste stream tonnage or composition, environmental
regulations, residual disposal costs.
V. Sample Contract (statement in contract language of above stated responsi-
bilities of the parties)
VI. Other Information for Bidders
local tax rate
utility rates and facilities
contact people at local government, city consultant, potential markets
market study
VII. Items Required of Bidder
process description (detailed)
physical layout of plant and equipment
residue disposal site and operating procedures (for full service contract)
environmental impact assessment
material/energy balance
price bid and derivation of cost
market commitments
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sample products (specifications)
proposed management plan for project
technical qualifications of company staff
technical experience of company
financial capability of company
managerial capability of company
marketing capability of company
VIII. Proposal Format Information
sample table of contents
bid sheets
bid bond
formats for other required information (e.g. environmental impact
assessment, cost derivation)
IX. Proposal Evaluation Process
schedule for RFP process
proposal due date
oral presentations
contract award
negotiations
evaluation procedure to be followed
evaluation criteria
city option to reject
procedures for communication with officials during solicitation period
US GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1975—210-81049
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