EPA/530/SW-152
OCTOBER 1975
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An environmental protection publication in the solid waste management
series (SW-152).  Mention of commercial products does not constitute
endorsement by the U.S. Government.  Editing and technical content of
this report are the responsibility of the Resource Recovery Division
of the Office of Solid Waste Management Programs.

Single copies of this publication are available from Solid Waste
Information, U.S.  Environmental Protection Agency, Cincinnati, Ohio
45268.

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RESOURCE RECOVERY PLANT IMPLEMENTATION:  GUIDES
            FOR MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS
                 INTERIM REPORT
        This report (SW-152) was written
               by Alan Shilepsky
    U.S.  Environmental  Protection Agency
                    1975

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                     Contents


  I.   Introduction 	 1

 II.   Steps to Resource Recovery	 2

III.   Study 	3

      Resource Recovery Task Force	3
      Areas for Study	4
      Setting Local  Goals	6
      Outside Planning/Implementation Assistance	7

 IV.   Selection—			-	13

      Major Decisions to be Made	 13
      Technology - Market 	 14
      Ownership - Operation	 15
      Financing 			17
      Procurement Strategy 	 17

  V.   Procurement		24

      Procuring a Consulting Engineer 	 24
      Procuring a System Contractor	26

      Footnotes 					33
      Appendix  	35

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                  RESOURCE RECOVERY PLANT IMPLEMENTATION


                               Interim  Report

by Alan Shilepsky*

     Interest in resource recovery is growing rapidly.  Scores of cities
are investigating processing systems that will divert their solid wastes
away from incinerators and landfills and back into the economic system,
to serve as replacements for expensive fuels and scarce virgin raw
materials.  Not only does this new approach to the centuries-old garbage
problem make economic sense, but it is in accord with the public's
demand that wasteful, "throw-away" attitudes be reversed.

     Cities caught up in the rush for resource recovery do have a problem
though, because they have little to guide them in making choices in this
new field.  The prior experiences of city officials offer limited guidance
to the sophisticated technologies, procurement problems, and management
alternatives involved in resource recovery.  Consequently, officials
often find decisions on resource recovery difficult and perplexing due
to the high capital requirements, the wide range of largely unproven
alternatives, the market and operational uncertainties, and the range of
procurement and management alternatives.  They may ultimately decide to
wait until they see how other cities implement resource recovery.  The
result, of course, is that many cities that could solve a major part of
their solid waste problem via resource recovery may lose years in the
waiting.

     The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recognizes the gravity
of the problem city officials face.  Consequently, EPA's Office of Solid
Waste Management Programs (OSWMP) is developing a series of guides that
will facilitate the acquisition of resource recovery plants.  This series
will be based on OSWMP's experiences as well as those of pioneering cities
1n the resource recovery field.

     Entitled Resource Recovery Plant Implementation:  Guides for Municipal
Officials, this series will examine in detail  a variety of important imple-
mentation issues, including planning, technology, markets, financing,
procurement, contracts, and an accounting format.  A separate guide will
treat each individual issue and will be published as it is completed.
The complete set of Guides will be available in early 1976.

      This Interim Report is being made available now to assist those
municipal officials who are beginning the task of resource recovery
implementation today.  A more detailed version is under development,
and will be published in March of 1976 as the  Planning and Overview
Guide of the Implementation Guide series.  OSWMP welcomes comments on
this report and will  consider them during the  preparation of the final
version.
     *Mr. Shilepsky is a physical scientist/policy analyst in the Resource
Recovery Division of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Office
of Solid Waste Management Programs.

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                         STEPS TO RESOURCE RECOVERY

     Resource recovery, namely the recapture and reutilization of
material and energy products from municipal solid wastes, can be accomplished
in two ways.  Recovered resources can be segregated at the source (e.g.
the home) and separately collected, or they can be separated out of the
waste stream by means of high-technology mechanical processing systems.
The Office of Solid Waste Management Programs recommends both these
approaches, but this report concerns itself only with the latter.

     There are three major steps to the implementation of high-technology
resource recovery: study, selection, and procurement, in that order.
Each of those steps is important to eventual success and must be conscientiously
executed in its turn.  A general description of each follows:

     Study.  The study step lays the groundwork for the other two
steps, for it creates the Task Force that is necessary to bring resource
recovery into practice and ic generates the knowledge base that is
essential for informed choice later on.  It also specifies the city's
general goals in solid waste management and resource recovery, which are
important inputs to the selection step.

     Selection.  The selection step is the major decision step in
resource recovery implementation because through it the city determines
the general outlines of the resource recovery package to be procured.
This includes questions of technical concept, management alternatives,
financing, and strategy for actually procuring the recovery plant.  In
practice, this step is usually combined with the study step into a
single "planning" step, the product of which may be a comprehensive
feasibility study and resource recovery plan.

     Procurement.  The procurement step starts with a conceptual plan
for resource recovery  and ends with an operating plant.  It includes
hiring the facility designer and builder, formulating a mutually acceptable
legal arrangement between the parties involved in procurement, and
securing financing for the system.

     The city must obtain the active involvement of experts in each of these
 three steps.  Impartial planning, engineering, and legal assistance is
 necessary in the study and selection steps in order to devise a workable
 plan.  Later, in the procurement step, a system designer must be chosen to
 actually design a plant.  Project success will depend on how wisely the city
 chooses and utilizes these various types of assistance as the implementation
 progresses.

     A discussion of the three major steps follows, with emphasis on the
issues and problems that OSWMP has found to be most significant to date
for cities involved in  implementation.

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                                   STUDY
                       Resource Recovery Task Force

     Before any resource recovery effort can begin, those in political
authority in the interested city or region must charge a single group--
it might be called the Resource Recovery Task Force—to plan a recovery
system and shepherd its implementation.  A specific set of tasks and a
schedule for completing them must be stipulated.  The political authority--
it may be the mayor or the city or county council--must also assure that the
Task Force will be able to execute its responsibility effectively, and does
this by providing it with the following three elements necessary for
success.

     Broad Participation.  The Task Force might have as its core an
existing group, like the department of public works or the city planner's
office, or it could be specially constituted, like an ad hoc interdepartmental
committee set up by the mayor.  In any case, its effectiveness depends
on inputs and participation from all  parts of the community that are
necessary for success.  Besides obvious participants such as the department
of public works, the city attorney's  office and the budget office,
others that might be included are local environmentalists, State officials,
private collection and disposal companies, any company that may prove to
be a major user of recovered products (e.g.  a iocai electric utility),
and neighboring cities, if their wastes will be necessary to make the'
economics of a plant acceptable.

     A Task Force that lacks broad participation brings only one point
of view to the planning process, and  may devise a plan that contains
embarrassing blind spots.  For instance, a Task Force composed only of
public works officials may develop a  recovery plan that can not be
implemented for legal or financial reasons,  or which overlooks the
problem of market acceptability of the recovered products.  Likewise,
city planners may overlook technical  or operational difficulties.  Such
questions should be raised and settled early in the planning and implementation
process while there is still flexibility, and while they can still be
adjusted for without a great loss of  money,  time, or morale.  The best
way to raise them early is to have a  broadly constituted Task Force ^hat
will  bring many perspectives to bear  on the problem.


      Sufficient Authority.  The Task Force must  have enough authority to
execute its responsibility effectively,  including the authority to hire
consultants,  negotiate with system  designers, and  prepare  requests for
proposals.  The Task  Force must also have the authority to  make  recommen-
dations  on  system  designers,  financial  plans, and  contractual arrangements.

     Since there are many powers necessary to implementation that are
not delegateable by the mayor (or whomever else set up the group), the
Task Force must have and maintain access to him, and keep him apprised

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of its activities and decisions.   In particular,  the Task Force must not
get so far out in front of him that he can not or will not support it at
critical stages in the implementation process.

     Adequate Resources.  A third Task Force requirement is  sufficient
resources, in terms or money, time, and manpower.   Though cities are often
reluctant to allocate large sums of money for planning activities,  the
investment is well worth it.  Cities under one million population can
usually contract for resource recovery planning assistance for less than
a fraction of a percent of the $10 to $100 million or more a large-scale
recovery plant will cost.  Therefore, planning assistance can easily pay
for itself many times over by helping optimize system selection at the
outset.

     Personnel resources are even more important than money, because the
problems in recovery implementation are complex and far-reaching.  The
city must commit knowledgeable staff and sufficient time to the activity,
especially in the case of the person whose responsibility it is to
direct the Task Force and see that its implementation schedule is followed.
Not only must the lead person be able, but he also must devote the
majority of his time to this assignment; otherwise resource recovery
will bog down when his other responsibilities demand attention.

     A mistake made in some cities is to set up an ad hoc Task Force
comprised solely of the department heads of the relevant city departments,
all of whom have concerns much more immediate than resource recovery and
who probably focus on this problem only during the infrequently called
meetings.  Then, if adequate full-time staff support is lacking, and if
the leader has as little time for the project as his colleagues, the
process will move purposelessly and fitfully, if it moves at all.

                            Areas for Study

     Probably the most important steps city officials take in preparing
for resource recovery are the first ones, for a successful system hinges
on the quality of the initial planning and analysis.  There are many
areas that require study at this stage, and the main ones are discussed
below.

     Local Solid Waste Situation.  Obvious items for study include the
dimensions of the local solid waste problem.  To determine the necessary
plant capacity, approximate disposal tonnages must be learned, both on
the average and under seasonal fluctuations.  Additionally, the increase
in local solid waste generation must be projected over the life of the
recovery system.

     Waste composition, both seasonal and yearly average, is another
important factor, especially if the averages differ significantly from
national averages.  Knowledge of the composition is necessary to determine
the marketability and quantities of possible recovered products.  For
instance, a low aluminum can content would indicate that the economics
were not right for add-on aluminum recovery equipment.  Effects that

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must be anticipated and taken into consideration include changes that
may occur from the introduction of other solid waste management strategies,
such as a change in collection practices (e.g.  separate collection of
newspapers) or source reduction (e.g. mandatory beverage container
deposits).

     Other solid waste system factors that must be surveyed include:
current and anticipated disposal costs (to get a baseline for comparison
with recovery system economics), the presence of special wastes, and
prospective locations for a plant and a residual landfill.

     Available Technologies.  The Task Force must next consider the
range of technologies available for processing and recovering solid
waste, and the characteristics of each.  Factors for study include the
concept itself, its feasibility, its reliability, its projected economics,
and the form and quality of the products it generates.

     The analysis of technology is a two-step process.  First, general
information on various technologies can be obtained through seminars and
publications prepared by various groups including EPA's Office of Solid
Waste Management Programs, the International City Managers Association,
the National Association of Counties, and the National League of Cities -
U.S. Conference of Mayors.  OSWMP, in particular, is demonstrating
technologies, evaluating their economics, and is generally serving as an
information clearing house for resource recovery information.

     Later,  with the  assistance  of technical  consultants,  the  Task  Force
should select from the general  gamut  of technologies  a few that  appear
most applicable to its city's needs and circumstances, and concentrate
on them in depth.   The Task Force, or its representatives, can accomplish
this focused study by visiting pilot  plants  and  discussing options  with
firms that are familiar with the most interesting resource recovery
concepts.

     Local Markets.  Once the Task Force has a feeling for the available
technologies and their products, it can analyze the local market situation
to determine which of these products can be sold locally, and at what
prices.  This analysis is crucial, for a suitable agreeable market is
essential if the recovery circle is to be closed.

     Success hinges on two factors:  local industries and economics.
First, an industry must be present that can use the recovered product,
otherwise it will be nothing more than a residual that must still be
disposed.  Second, the product must be able to command a sufficiently
high price on the market to reasonably offset recovery costs, otherwise
it might be cheaper to shut down the plant and haul the incoming wastes
to a low cost landfill.

     Superficial market studies are insufficient since only a detailed
look at local industries can determine if they can use and will  buy
waste-based products.  Nothing can be assumed.  For instance, some

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cities assume any electric utility can take shredded solid waste as  a
fuel.  But if the utility's boilers burn oil,  they may not have the  ash-
handling capability necessary for utilizing shredded waste.  Or, even  if
a utility does have coal-burning, ash-handling boilers, the boilers  may
only be fully fired during peak-loading periods (a few hours a day), in
which case they may not constitute a viable market for a waste fuel.
Specific details are important for ascertaining materials recovery
markets also; a scrap dealer may not be willing to pay premium prices
(or anything) for a low-quality ferrous material,  or a detinner may  not
want can stock that has been balled up by a shredder and has little
exposed surface area.

     An adequate market study should identify  a number of potential
markets and determine the specifications, quantities, and price each
would set for recovered products.  It should also  recognize the possibility
of market displacement, where new recovered products may displace old
ones from their traditional markets and thus create a new solid waste
problem.

     Institutional Factors.  The final subject for study concerns institutional
factors, as distinguished from technical and market factors.  These
include the legal, organizational, and financial factors that impact on
the city's ability to plan a system, procure it, finance it, and operate
it.  Questions to be raised here include:  what are the laws affecting
the process by which the city can procure a recovery system; can the
city efficiently operate a recovery plant and  market the product itself;
can the city assure that wastes will be delivered  to the plant; what
financing options are available to the city; and,  how do the financing
options relate to different ownership/operation arrangements.  The
complexity of such considerations can be seen  by expanding on just one
of these questions, that pertaining to procurement.

     Many States allow their cities little flexibility in procuring
capital improvements.  Often State laws require competitive bidding  and
forbid negotiated procurements and turn-key construction contracts.
Similarly, there may be constraints on the procurement of services,  such
as prohibitions of long-term contracts.  The Task  Force must be aware  of
these constraints so it can determine a workable and legal recovery
plan. (Conversely, it may wish to petition its State legislature for
remedial legislation.)  The interrelation of legal and other institutional
factors will become obvious in later sections  of this paper.

                            Setting Local Goals

     The Task Force must do more than gather factual information during
the study stage; it must also begin to consider the city's various
resource recovery goals and their relative importance.  Possible goals
include low cost, dependability, minimum environmental impact, maximum
resource recovery, and minimum land requirements (to forestall a controversial
search for a new landfill).

     Consideration of goals is important because different goals dictate
different approaches to the disposal problem,  as is suggested in

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Table 1.  If cost is the only concern, for instance, then close-in
landfill should be considered even in the face of possible citizen
dissatifaction.  Conversely, if maximum resource recovery is the goal, a
sophisticated "total" materials recovery technology may be called for,
even in the face of technological and economic uncertainties.  Clearly,
it is a fallacy to think that any one approach will satisfy all goals
equally.

     The earlier the Task Force can ascertain its primary goals, the
sooner it can eliminate unacceptable systems from consideration.  This
will speed the decision process and give the Task Force time to concentrate
on a few options in depth.  It also will benefit any system vendor who
might otherwise have gone to a great deal of expense to prepare a
proposal for the city only to learn that his system was in conflict with
hitherto unstated goals of the Task Force.

     Finally, a Task Force that specifies its key goals early is less
likely to find itself in the position of merely responding to the proposals
of outsiders, and running the risk of failing to acquire an important
system feature such as hazardous waste-handling equipment or built-in
redundancy because no proposal included such a feature.  This would be
like a shopper given to impulsive buying who defines grocery needs while
pushing the supermarket cart down the aisles, and who forgets to buy the
butter because it is not plainly in view.  A comprehensive system selection
shopping list is needed, and such a list is more easily prepared if the
Task Force tries to lay out its goals explicitly beforehand.

                Outside Planning/Implementation Assistance

     Few cities have all the information and expertise necessary for
resource recovery implementation; rather, success will depend on help
from the outside.  It is important that the Task Force knows what kind
of help it needs, where to get it, and how to use it.

      Different  types of assistance are required at different times in the
implementation  process.   It is useful to make a distinction between the
general  technical and managerial services required by the Task Force lead-
ing  up  to the choice of a specific technical concept, and the specific
engineering  design services required once the specific technical concept
has  been chosen.  (In this paper, the term "consultant" is used to
designate the provider of the former type of assistance and "system
designer" is used to designate the provider of the latter type.)  It
should  be noted  that only consulting engineers can be considered as
potential providers of both types of services.  Management consultants,
for  instance, would be unable to prepare the engineering drawings
required of  a system designer, and system contractors with proprietary
technologies would be unable to provide the impartial advice required
of  a consultant.

     Consultants.  There are a variety of types of consultants who have
proven helpful  to cities engaged in resource recovery implementation,
including consulting engineers, management consultants, legal consultants
and financial consultants.  They have been called upon to prepare necessary
implementation documents like feasibility studies, market analyses,

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 requests for  proposals, and contracts, and  to  perform  functions  such  as
 assessing  the legality of  financial and management  packages  and  evaluating
 recovery system  proposals.  Their  help is also necessary  for other  tasks
 the Task Force lacks  the time  or the  expertise to execute, such  as
 formulating new  procurement strategies or writing long-term  market  and
 service contracts.

      Because  of the complexities involved 1n the overall  resource
 recovery  implementation process, the Task Force should require that each
 consultant it hires has the expertise necessary to execute all the specific
 tasks he  is  assigned.  This means, for instance, that a consulting
 engineer  or management consultant hired to do a complete planning study
 must possess  or acquire the appropriate personnel to execute the technical,
 marketing, legal, and financing aspects of the work.  Frequently, all of
 these skills  do not reside in a single firm, and then a team approach may
 be useful.

       Cities  that hire consulting engineers to develop their resource
 recovery  plans should be sure that the firm it hires is capable of
 analyzing and evaluating all available resource recovery alternatives.
 This can  be  assured by selecting firms with personnel who are familiar
 with the  full spectrum of current technologies, including the more
 developmental ones like pyrolysis, wet processing,  and glass and nonferrous
 recovery, or who plan  to work jointly with such a firm on the project.
 Consultant teams without a broad focus may tend to recommend approaches
 that unjustifiably rely on only those technologies with which they are most
 familiar.

       Prior to the choice of a system designer, the Task Force needs
 Impartial advice and should not rely heavily upon any company with a
 technological ax to grind.  Therefore, it should choose as its technical
 consultant an independent firm rather than any company that is marketing
 a proprietary process.  On the other hand, the Task Force should recognize
 the potential disinclination of an independent consultant to recommend
 any process which he might not be able to design, such as a proprietary
 one.  To  eliminate any potential bias caused by the possible inducement
 of subsequent work, one county explicitly excluded the firm that helped
 plan its  system from competing for its design and operation.

      Utilization of  Consultants.  Before the  Task  Force  commits  itself
 to a major resource recovery study, it should  perform a rough preliminary
 study of local conditions  to determine if resource  recovery  is locally
 possible at all.  A quick  survey of the city's goals, its existing dis-
 posal options, the costs of resource  recovery, and  the possibility of
 local markets  may rule out resource recovery in the near-term altogether
 On the other  hand, the preliminary study may indicate the need to retain
 a consultant  to conduct further investigations.  Then, the preliminary
 study would serve as the basis for intelligently hiring and guiding him,
 by indicating  the areas that need more examination.

      Guidance is important.  The Task Force should require that the
 consultants perform problem-oriented work geared to the specific situation
 and problems of the city.   This will  require that the Task Force expend
 effort and time itself, planning the consultant's scope of work and
monitoring his progress.

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      The consultant's work should not be confined to gathering general
resource recovery information that may have only limited relevance to
the city's specific problems.  What a Task Force needs and should ask its
consultant for is individualized information about how recovery problems
and technologies apply to the local situation.   For instance, that energy
prices are going up is a cliche"; what is  important is how this national
trend affects the prices that nearby markets will  pay for specific products
that can be generated from local waste.  What is needed are the names of
companies that might buy, the particular specifications of the products
that would be bought, the types and costs of specific technologies that
can provide the product, and the procedures involved in actually getting
a system underway.

     System Designers.  It is important during the study stage for the
Task  Force to obtain direct and specific information on the forms of
technology that are available.  This is done by initiating discussions
with the system designers that are offering to design systems for cities,
namely consulting engineering companies and system contractors.

     Cities are familiar with consulting engineers and the services they
provide in planning capital improvements.  In fact, a consulting engineer
may already be serving the Task Force as an impartial consultant to
analyze resource recovery technologies and formulate a plan.  On the other
hand, system contractors are relatively new to the experience of cities.

     A resource recovery system contractor is a company that has developed
a particular recovery concept and has tested it out in a pilot plant
operation.  Now it is offering to design and construct a scaled-up plant
for a city, and possibly to handle other aspects of getting a plant operating,
such as financing, operating the plant, and marketing the products.  It may
subcontract major portions of the work to other companies.  For instance,
plant design may be subcontracted out to an engineering firm, or opera-
tions and residual disposal to a waste management firm.

     A distinguishing characteristic of a system contractor 1s that it
is a monolithic legal entity that signs a two-party contract for a
resource recovery plan with the city and, therefore, must bear full legal
responsibility for plant failure.(1)  This is in contrast to the situation
where the city retains one party, a consulting  engineer, to design a
plant, and another party, a construction firm,  to build it.   Such an
arrangement clouds the issue of responsibility  if difficulties in perfor-
mance arise.

      Obtaining Preliminary Information.  The types of information that
 the  Task Force should acquire from system  designers include the following:

      *  technical  aspects --this includes  the  proposed technology, as
        well  as recovered products, markets,  and environmental impacts.
        Pilot plant  experience should also  be  specified.
                                      10

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     •  economics—this will  include rough estimates of the capital and
        operating costs of a  facility that would suit the city's needs, as
        well  as a rough idea  of the revenues that might be expected from
        the  recovered  products.

     •  management  packages—this will give the Task Force an idea of the
        types of institutional arrangements (operation, financing, risk
        sharing, etc.) that are available.  Since the management package
        has  a strong impact on risk, costs, and efficiency, this informa-
        tion is as  important  as is information about economics and
        technology.

     A  good  way a Task Force can obtain the above information from
system  designers is to request qualifications and conceptual proposals
from a  number of companies through a Request for Qualifications (RFQ).
The responses would include detailed information on the company's technical
and financial capabilities, as well  as a general idea of the type of
system  each  company would propose to build for the city, and under what
type of management, cost, and risk arrangements.  The city should stipulate
that no final contract award would be made on the basis of these proposals,
but that they will  serve as the starting point for city-company discussions.

     The responses to the RFQ will enable the Task Force to eliminate
some technical concepts on the basis of the city's particular constraints,
such as finances,  lack of particular markets, or city goals.  Then, the
field of possible designers  can be narrowed on the basis of whether they
offer the type of  system and arrangement the city wants and whether
they have proven themselves  qualified.

     Itjs  important  to distinguish between an RFQ and a formal Request
for Proposals (RFP, to be discussed in detail later), because some
cities  make the mistake of issuing the latter while they are still in
the study stage.  A formal RFP calls upon each company to propose a
highly  specific technical system, including plant layout, equipment
specifications, expected product output, etc.  The company is also asked
to specify  the contractual obligations that will exist between the
parties, and to bid a fixed  price for this package.  This is in contrast
to the  less  exacting  RFQ, which requires only a conceptual plan and no
precise price or contract.   Another difference is that the RFP implies
an intent on the city's part to make a prompt contract award on the
basis of the proposals received, while the RFQ expressly denies this
intent.

     The problem with  using  an  RFP during  the  planning  stage  is that the
Task Force  is in no position  to make  a  final  choice,  and  it  will  be
using the companies'  formal  proposals  as  a means  of defining  its  own
needs and goals.   It likely will  find  that  it  wants a technical and


                                    11

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managerial package that is a combination of many proposals, and will
have to throw out all proposals and prepare a new RFP that specifies the
city's new requirements.  This will be demoralizing and unfair to the
bidders who may have spent considerable time and upwards of $50,000 in
preparing their proposals.

     Careful Pace Required.  A recurrent danger in resource recovery
decision-making is that a Task Force will seize upon the first resource
recovery system that is proposed to it, even though better approaches
may be available.  This rush to judgment may stem from impatience or
from ignorance of other possiblities.  It usually occurs when an advocate
of a particular type of system is able to convince city officials to buy
his system before they have considered in depth the relative strengths
and weaknesses of all available systems.

     The most troublesome "advocate" to the city is the "blue skies"
system promoter who takes advantage of the city's enthusiasm for resource
recovery and its ignorance of the actual processes involved.  These
entrepreneurs themselves may know relatively little about technology,
though they are usually sincere in the belief that their system will
work if it is "only given a chance!"  They may be sure that their 15-
ton-per-day pilot plant will readily scale up to 1000-ton-per-day, or
they may feel that a pilot plant is not necessary at all.  Such naive
technological optimism is a danger the city should avoid.

     The city should likewise be wary of promoters (or subsidiary
companies) who do not have  the financial backing to  implement
their systems themselves, but instead want the city to put up all the
necessary capital or, at least, to provide the legitimacy of a city
contract so construction  funds can be  borrowed.  The city  should also
be wary of appeals to extraneous factors such as local pride--if local
citizens are involved as  inventors or  stockholders.

     Obviously, the city should avoid an arrangement where its partner
in resource recovery has neither proven technical ability nor the
capacity to limit the city's financial risk if the system does not
perform.  For this reason, the Task Force should not closet itself early
with a single vendor, but should get information from and maintain
contacts with many outside parties, including other system designers and
impartial observers like the EPA.  Open discussions with many points of
view expressed bring out the flaws of the undesirable options, and may
save the city money, time, and  embarrassment  in  the  long run.
                                    12

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                                 SELECTION

     The selection stage is the culmination of the information-gathering
and goal-setting of the study stage, and it synthesizes these inputs
into a general plan for resource recovery.  As already noted, the selection
stage is often combined with the study stage into a single phase of the
overall process, namely the planning phase.  A Task Force, for instance,
may prepare a single report combining the conclusions of the selection
stage with the justifying backup data of the study stage.   Similarly, a
consultant may be asked to prepare this comprehensive document.   Though,
in that case, the Task Force should participate significantly in the
selection stage of the consultant's work to insure that the tradeoffs
and decisions made reflect the city's goals.

     Just as the consultant should coordinate closely with the Task
Force during the selection stage, the Task Force must coordinate with
the political authorities to which it is responsible, such as the mayor
or the city council.  Only in this way can it be assured that the decisions
reached are understood by, and have the backing of, those  who have the
power to carry them out.

                        Major Decisions to be Made

     There are a number of individual but interrelated decisions to be
made in the selection stage which, when taken together, add up to a
complete plan for resource recovery.  The individual  decision areas
include:

     a)  Site - specific sites for recovery operations and residual
disposal must be determined.  The problem of winning  public acceptance
of these must also be considered.

     b)  Technology - the Task Force must choose between technologies
for conversion of waste to energy such as waterwalled incineration,
shredded fuel processing, wet pulping, pyrolysis, etc., and must decide
between materials recovery options for fiber, ferrous, glass, and aluminum.

     c)  Markets - specific markets for recovered major products must be
established.

     d) Operation - operational responsibility must be determined.  It
can be assigned to the city's department of public works,  a newly-
constituted public authority, the company that designed the plant, or a
local service contractor.

     e) Ownership - ownership can be public or private.

     f) Financing - a variety of capital financing options are available.

     g)  Procurement Strategy - this includes choices between using
consulting engineers or system contractors, and whether to use an architectural
and engineering approach, a turn-key approach, or a full service approach.

     h) Schedule - a schedule should be formulated that indicates the
time-phasing of all the steps necessary to complete the plan.

                                    13

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     Interrelationship of Choices.   All  of the above decisions  must  be
combined to form a coherent,  logical implementation plan.   Choices  in
one category may preclude certain options in another category;  for
instance, a pyrolysis system  may not be  procurable from a  consulting
engineer, or a public operation may make private ownership unlikely.  If
the Task Force is unsure whether its plan is workable,  it  must  consult
with experts.

     The Task Force does not  have to make its decisions in the  order
listed above, since "pacing"  constraints will vary from city to city.
For a city in a budgetary squeeze,  the financing decision  is paramount.
This decision, in turn, would determine  the choice of ownership, which
would be private in this case.  Another  city may have procurement laws
that forbid design and construction by the same company, thus limiting
the Task Force's choice of technology to only those that are available
from independent consulting engineers (i.e. do not construct).   The  Task
Force must understand its own city's constraints and the interrelation-
ship between the choices so it can determine which decisions must come
first and how they will affect the others.

     Some of the general tradeoffs in the various categories are sketched
below.  Further data and considerations  are discussed in other  EPA
publications.

                           Technology -  Markets

     Since each technology has characteristic output products that must
be matched against the needs  and constraints of potential  users, the
choice of a technical system must be made concurrently with the identification
of markets for recovered products.   Shredded fuel resource recovery, for
instance, is workable only if there are nearby boilers with ash-handling
capability, similarly, glass  recovery requires glass furnaces within an
economical haul distance.

     A city that fails to identify markets at an early date takes the
risk of choosing a system that will produce unmarketable outputs.  At
its worse, this can create a new waste problem, such as the cases of
composting plants that surrounded themselves with their unsaleable
product.  But even if the major "output" is readily disposable, such as
steam from a waterwalled incinerator, the economics of the facility may
be completely undermined. OSWMP knows of two examples in the United
States where steam went unused because the problem of marketing this
product was downplayed until  after the facilities were constructed.

     Other factors besides markets affect the choice of technology.
Consider, for example, the effects of risk, ownership, and operation.
Concern about risk may lead a city to choose a technology of relatively
low efficiency rather than accept the risks associated with a more
complex technology whose economics and feasibility are more uncertain.
On the other hand, the city might accept the riskier technology if  it is
to be privately owned and financed, for then it is not the city's investment
that is at stake.  Finally, the operating mode also affects the choice
of technology, for if the city decides to use city personnel, it may
want a less sophisticated, more trouble-free technology.

                                    14

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                             Ownership-Operation

     The responsibilities for ownership and for  operation  of  a  recovery
plant can be distributed between the  public sector  and  the private
sector in a number of different ways  (Table 2).   The  table shows  that
a publicly-owned and-operated facility can  be  operated  either by  an
established city department or by a newly-formed public authority which
is only loosely coupled to existing governments.  Similarly,  in the
rare case of private ownership and public operation,  either a city
department or an authority would be in charge.(2)   Next, a publicly-owned
facility could be operated privately  either by the  system  contractor,
who built the facility for the city,  or by an independent service contractor
who had nothing to do with plant design or construction.(3)  Finally,  a
private ownership-private operation situation might occur if the operator
had also designed and built the plant (i.e. he was  the system contractor
and was confident it would work), or  if he were  a part of a consortium
with the system contractor.

     The Task Force's choice between  these various  options depends on  a
diversity of factors including:

     (a)  Price.  A private company may offer to build its own  plant and
process the city's wastes for a lower price than the city could do it
itself.

     (b)  Financing.  The city may not wish to raise the capital  to pay
for a plant itself, and may instead let a private company build and own
it.  The city would repay the company's capital  costs by including a
debt service component in its per-ton dump fee.   This would appear in
the city's books as an operating cost rather than a capital cost.

     (c)  Efficiency.  In some cities, the operation of sophisticated
facilities by public employees has proven to be  unsatisfactory  for a
number of reasons.  These include: union and civil service rules and
pay scales that make it difficult to  hire and promote only motivated and
competent employees, the city's lack  of the necessary technical and
marketing sophistication, and the lack of profit incentives for public
managers to run an efficient operation.

     (d)  Control.  The city may be committed to maintaining direct
operational control over its solid waste management system since it may
fear that substandard disposal practices or possible plant shutdowns may
result if it lacks direct operational authority.  Also, it may  not wish
to give up job opportunities for public employees.

     (e)  Public Authority Advantages.  It may be advantageous  to create
a public authority to manage resource recovery in an area.  An  authority
may simplify regionalization, facilitate implementation, or be  eligible
for State funds.  A drawback of authorities is that they are less
responsive to the public than elected bodies are.


                                    15

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                            TABLE 2
              AGENCIES AND GROUPS THAT COULD TAKE
           OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY UNDER VARIOUS
               OWNERSHIP-OPERATIONS ARRANGEMENTS
     PUBLIC
to
a;
     PRIVATE
                                OPERATIONS
                      PUBLIC
•City department

•Public  authority
                  •City department
                  •Public authority
                         PRIVATE
                                         'System contractor
                                         •Service contractor
                       •System contractor
                       •Consortium
                                16

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                                 Financing

     Just as there is a spectrum of ownership-operation  options, there
is also a wide variety of options for financing resource recovery plants.
Table 3 arrays the most commonly discussed possibilities and some of
their characteristics.  It is seen that tax-exempt financing is possible
even under private ownership through the use of Pollution Control Revenue
Bonds (PCRB).  Other options include equity financing, revenue bonds,
and general obligation (GO) bonds.

     The financing decision is sensitive to other implementation factors.
A city, for instance, may find that it is unable to own a plant itself
because public financing options are not open to it.  This may be because
a) the city is at or near its GO bonding limit, or is unable to get
voter approval to float bonds for a recovery plant; or b) the desired
plant could not guarantee a secure enough revenue stream to ensure that
revenue bonds would be paid off.  Under such circumstances, the city
would have to give up the idea of public ownership and seek a system
contractor that would be willing to finance and construct a facility.

     The most often suggested private financing option is the PCRB,
which may be used to finance systems in Hempstead, New York, and Dade
County, Florida.  This mechanism allows a corporation to borrow money at
low interest rates by taking advantage of the tax-exempt status of the
city whose solid waste will be recovered or of an associated industrial
development agency.  In effect, the city (or the agency) borrows the
money for facility construction.  Once the plant is completed, the city
leases it to the corporation for the exact amount that will pay off the
bonds, interest included.  It is the guaranteed stream of lease payments
the company promises to the city, and in turn to the bond holders, that
guarantees the bonds.  Thus, PCRB financing rests on the credit-rating
of the company and relieves the city of any responsibility for the
debt.(4)

     In a common variation on the PCRB approach, a system contractor
insulates himself from bankruptcy by creating a subsidiary company.  The
subsidiary floats  the PCRB, runs  the plant, and depends on the city's
dump fee for its revenues.  This arrangement has the effect of transferring
the risk of plant failure to the  bondholders since, under failure, the
city would not pay the dump fee, the bankrupt subsidiary would not pay
the lease payment, and the city would not pay the bondholders.   Consequently,
bond underwriters have been more cautious about floating this kind of
PCRB than floating GO bonds or fully secured PCRB's.  In fact, in periods
of tight money, such high risk obligations are not likely to be marketable
at all.

                           Procurement Strategy

     Just as there is more than one technology for recycling municipal
solid wastes, there is more than one strategy a city can choose to
procure resource recovery services.  In fact, when deciding its strategy,
a city must make two related choices.  The first is who should be the
system designer, a consulting engineer who specializes in design and

                                    17

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engineering services,  or a system contractor whose  services  encompass  both
design and construction.  Related to this choice is the  second  one, whether
to acquire the plant by the traditional  architectural  and  engineering  (A  & E)
approach, or to use a  turn-key or full  service  approach.

     These choices are related, since consulting engineers usually offer
only the A & E approach, while system contractors usually  will  only serve
on turn-key or full service projects.  The methods  by  which  the city hires
these different system designers are also distinct, since  consulting
engineers are usually  hired via negotiations, while system contractors are
usually hired via a "competitively"  bid RFP,(6)

     Because the choices of designer and approach are coupled,  they need
not be discussed separately.  The remainder of this section  will be
organized around the tradeoffs between the alternative approaches.   (The
techniques by which the services of a consulting engineer or of a system
contractor are procured are discussed in the Procurement section of this
paper.)

     The three procurement approaches—A & E, turn-key,  and  full  service--
differ on the basis of how the various responsibilities  of design,
construction and operation are allocated between the city and the design
firm.  Table 4 displays the various job assignments.  Each approach will
now be discussed in detail.

     Architectural and Engineering.   This is the traditional approach
cities have taken to procure public works like schools,  bridges, or
incinerators.  It involves two main steps, the retention of  an  engineer
to draw up plans and specifications for the desired capital  improvement
and the hiring of a construction contractor to construct the facility
from these plans.

     In the first step, the city hires an experienced consultant to
perform the necessary architectural  and engineering services for the
desired facility.  He is told specifically what the city wants  and  where
to locate it.  In the case of Ames,  Iowa, for instance,  the  consultant
was told to draw up plans for a plant to be located on East  Lincoln Way
that would mill and air classify 50 tons of waste an hour, modelled
after the St. Louis-Union Electric Company project.

     Later, with these plans firmly in hand, the city would  go  out  for
construction bids and would award the contract to the construction
contractor with the lowest bid.  His task would be to order  the steel,
cement, and process equipment, to hire the laborers, to  supervise
construction, and to bring the facility to completion.

     This approach is  almost always coupled with city ownership and
operation and with public financing.


                                    19

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     Turn-key.  Under the turn-key approach, the city hires a system
contractor to design, build, and start up a recovery system for the city
for a price.  Some pricing arrangements include cost plus fixed or percentage
fee, a target price with incentives, or, though rarely, a guaranteed maximum
price.  As Table 4 shows, the city assigns sole responsibility for the
execution of these steps to a single party.

     A turn-key approach usually puts the city in the position of not having
to accept the plant until it has been shown to operate according to specifi-
cations.  The contract between the city and the contractor will stipulate
acceptance tests that the plant must pass if the city is to take it over and
pay for it.  If it does not operate as specified in the contract, the city
can refuse to accept it, leaving the contractor bearing the capital cost of
construction.  In reality, of course, the division of losses between the two
parties is affected by the strength of the contract, the payment arrange-
ments, and the possibility that the city will  be willing to accept an imper-
fect processing plant as opposed to a continuing solid waste problem.
Generally speaking, a turn-key approach involves much less risk to the city
than the alternative of constructing its plant via the traditional A & E
approach mode.

     Full  Service.  In the case of the full service approach, the system
contractor offers the city a resource recovery service instead of a plant.
The contractor finances and builds a plant to perform this service.  The
contractor owns it and is responsible for ensuring that it performs the
recovery service throughout the life of the city's disposal contract
(Table 4).

      The  system  contractor will usually charge a  set dump  fee  for  each  ton
of  solid  waste delivered  by the city  for  processing.  This  fee will  vary  over
the life  of  the  plant, according to escalator and renegotiation clauses in the
contract  between  the city and the contractor.  The contractor will make its
profit  and  pay for  its plant with the  revenues from the dump fee  and  from
the product  sales.  Contract life must be  long enough to enable plant  pay-off,
usually 15  to 20 years.

      A full-service contract shifts even more risk from the city to the
 system contractor since the system contractor is obligated to perform a
 certain service  at a  stipulated price.  Cost escalators in the contract
 may transfer to  the city some of the risks of higher than anticipated
 capital and operating costs,  but,  as in a turn-key approach, catastrophic
 failures  would be the contractor's worry.  (The city, in that case,
 would still  have its  solid waste to dispose of,  but a performance bond
 by the contractor could somewhat compensate the city for its trouble.)

      Relative Merits  of Different Approaches.  No one approach fits the
 needs of  all cities.   The Task Force's weighing  of various factors will
 determine which  approach to follow:   A &  E, turn-key,  or full  service.

      A &  E Approach Advantages and Disadvantages. One advantage is ease of
 procurement.  Many cities planning for resource recovery prefer the A & E

                                     21

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approach because it is easier to perform organizationally since the
"rulebook" for it is "tried and tested", and since all  the relevant city
personnel know what is expected of them.  In fact, State laws governing
municipal procurement often make deviations from the A  & E approach
procedures difficult.

     Ironically the turn-key and full  service approaches to building a
recovery plant should be faster than the A & E approach because one
party is responsible for design and construction and can save time by
ordering major equipment before all the design work is  completed.   But
usually city law and tradition are ill-suited to these  approaches  and
can cancel out the time-saving advantage.

     A second advantage of the A & E approach is that it can be potentially
the lowest cost solution to a city's problem.  If the city hired a
system contractor to design, construct, and possibly operate a recovery
facility for the city, the cost to the city would include management
fees (e.g. hiring and supervising of construction contractors) and a
profit for the company.  The city would pay a lower total price for the
same physical facility by managing the procurement itself via the A & E
approach route.  Many people do argue that the inherent inefficiency of
publicly-managed projects would wash out any savings here, though; the
truth of this depends on the particular municipality and its track
record in managing public works.

     Another cost-reducing feature of the A & E approach is that the
city need not pay a premium for the risk of system failure, which it
would if a system contractor underwrote that risk.  The city does  not
have the option of refusing a plant if it has accepted  the A & E approach
drawings from its consultant and farmed them out to a construction
contractor.  The contractor can only be liable for faults such as
failing to put an I-beam where the blueprint specifies  or putting too
much sand in the cement.  A faulty system concept is not his fault.

     If the city selects the A & E approach, it is hoping to save  the cost
of the risk premium a system contractor would charge.  The key disadvantage
of the A & E approach is on the other side of the risk coin, for if the
system fails to operate at the expected price or, worse yet9 does not
operate at all, the city has a financial and political  embarrassment on
its hands.
     Another potential limitation of the A & E approach is that it is not
applicable to those technologies  that are patented by  system contractors
that require a turn-key or full service arrangement.  It is also less
likely to be used to implement the more developmental,  and consequently
more risky, technologies, since in those cases cautious city officials
will probably prefer to transfer as much risk as possible over to  a system
contractor.

     Turn-key and Full Service Advantages and Disadvantages.  Turn-key
and full service approaches are especially important today in light of
the state of resource recovery technology, which is complex, expensive,
and still largely unproven at the scale of operations that many cities
                                     22

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require.  It is generally assumed that there may be some scale-up problems
when the larger systems are built, even if the pilot plants worked
perfectly.  Also, even in the best of circumstances, system debugging
will be a necessary and non-trivial task.  A laundry list of unexpected
problems at OSWMP's St. Louis-Union Electric demonstration project gives
a sampling of the variety of problems that require solution:  materials
bridging in conveyors, excessive wear in pneumatic feed pipes, air
pollution uncertainties, and fire hazards.

     The owner and operator of a recovery plant will have to come to
grips with these malfunctions as they occur.  From the standpoint of
risk, it can be seen that turn-key or full service offers two key benefits
for cities:

     1.  Deferred acceptance.  The city bears only a fraction of the
risk that these problems will be insoluble, since it pays for the plant
only after it is working.

     2.  Direct experience.   Turn-key and full  service approaches allow
the system developers' engineers to design and start up the plant,
increasing the likelihood of success because they developed the concept
and they have the most experience with it through their pilot plant
work.

     Full service has still  other features.  One is that it involves
private ownership, which makes public borrowing unnecessary.  Another is
that it does not necessitate the city to staff  the new plant with its
existing sanitation workers, who may be ill-prepared to operate the new
technol9gy and possibly may  even resent its introduction.   A third is  that
it exempts the city from the problem of marketing the recovered products,
transferring that responsibility to the contractor who may have  more
proficiency in that role anyway.

     Most of the disadvantages of turn-key and full service approaches
have already been discussed, such as possibly higher cost and the difficulties
of procurement.  An additional one is the city's loss of control in the
selection of specific process equipment and design.   This couVd  have signi-
ficant effect on economics.   In the case of turn-key, the system contractor
could, in his design, sacrifice operating economics in order to  lower
initial equipment and construction costs.   The  city might then be penalized
over the lifetime of the plant by paying larger than necessary maintenance
and operating costs.  In the case of full  service,  the city may  have no
recourse in the event that the system contractor, for some reason, fails
to install dump fee reducing technological  or operational  innovations  that
were unknown when the original  contract was signed.

      The problem of procuring a system designer to design and construct a
resource recovery plant will now be discussed.
                                 23

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                               PROCUREMENT

     Once the Task Force has selected the complete system package it
desires, it must procure the services it needs to implement it.  Depending
on whether the Task Force wants to go the A & E approach, the turn-key,
or the full service approach, it will have to retain the services of a
system designer, be it a consulting  engineer or a system contractor.   It
is the purpose of this section to examine the methods  of doing  so.

     In the following, the stress will be on the hiring of system contractors,
(in particular, on the use of RFP's), because this technique is relatively
new to city officials -and has proved to be a stumbling block.

                    Procuring a Consulting Engineer

     The A & E approach in which the consulting engineer does the design
work is often viewed as a prtce competitive approach,  but this  Is only half
right.  The first step is not price  competitive in the sense that the
lowest bidder gets the contract, for the hiring of a consulting engineer
never involves competition on the basis of price; the  engineering community
recommends against it.  This is because bid prices do  not reflect the com-
petency and efficiency of the bidders, and a city's choice of a consultant
is instead based upon such factors as technical  qualifications, professional
experience, prior performance, and personal and professional  integrity.

    Cities normally hire consulting  engineers via a process of screening
professional proposals, interviewing three to five of  the top-ranking
firms, and then negotiating a contract and a scope of  work with the winner.
General factors to be considered in  evaluating and ranking are available
from professional societies, as are  various methods of contracting and
compensation.

    The second step of the A & E approach is price competitive, as any
number of construction firms can respond when the city advertises for bids
to construct the facility according  to the consulting  engineer's plans
and specifications.  The lowest responsible bidder will win the contract
and will construct the facility, or  the part he bid on, for the price he
bid.

    The first step in the A & E approach is the key one:  choosing a
consulting engineer.  The Task Force must assure itself that the consulting
engineer it chooses can design a system that will perform satisfactorily
and can be constructed at a reasonable price.  This assurance can only come
from the Task Force's examination of three factors.

       • whether the consulting engineer can demonstrate relevant and
         comprehensive experience in the recovery field.  This includes
         knowledge of solid waste and its problems, as well as knowledge
         of the particular technology under discussion.  One indicator
         would be experience, having successfully designed a plant of a
         similar size and technical  concept.
                                         24

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    • whether the proposed technical  concept has been proven anywhere,
      either at pilot-or full-scale size.   Since the city's money is at
      stake in the A & E approach,  a  "show-me"  attitude is  in order.

    •whether the consulting engineer is  confident of the product specifications
      of the plant's recovered output and whether he has matched them
      against the input requirements  of the local markets.   Here again,
      it is the city's loss if its  products are unmarketable.

      Not all  engineering  firms  are likely to be  able to  fulfill  the  above
 conditions.   The highly specialized  nature of  resource  recovery  coupled
 with  the relatively small  market for it means  that  only  a  relatively few
 firms will  be able to allocate  the manpower to study the field  in depth
 and acquire  sufficient  "hands-on"  design  experience.  Of course, a firm
 experienced  in  recovery technology may want to retain a  local consulting
 engineer for his knowledge and  perspective on  the local  disposal system
 and its problems.

     The Task Force should not rest once  it has chosen a consulting
engineer to begin design;  there are many  preparations to be made for
plant start-up.  First, the management framework for the plant must  be
developed, to determine who will manage it, who will operate it, how the
various jobs will be carried out,  etc.  Ideally, the city and its system
designer will have developed "operating manuals" and will have recruited
personnel  for the facility before  construction is complete.

     A second task is marketing.  The city must not wait until a product
is being produced to sign  contracts for its purchase; rather this should
be an important activity all through the  planning, design, and construction
stages.  If necessary, arrangements can be made to obtain sample products
for marketing purposes from similar recovery plants  in other cities.
Officials of Lane County,  Oregon, for instance, obtained shredded, air-
classified solid waste from the St. Louis  resource recovery  plant to use
for test-burning purposes  in a local  electric  utility boiler.

     With adequate preparation of  personnel and other arrangements,  the
city will be able to begin operations soon after the construction contractor
has finished his work.

     Finally, the city usually will want  an arrangement with the consulting
engineer to assist the city during  the shakedown phase.   It also may want
him to redesign any plant features  that are found to perform inadequately,
possibly without further charge.  This is  one form of performance guarantee
the city can acquire under the A &  E  approach.
                                 25

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                        Procuring a System Contractor

     The RFP approach for hiring a system contractor requires  a great
deal of sophistication on the Task Force's part to be successful,  both
in RFP preparation and in follow-through.  The Task Force and  its  consultants
must perform the..foilowing steps:

     a)  prepare an RFP and distribute it to possible bidders,
     b)  evaluate proposals and choose a winner,
     c)  negotiate a contract and arrange financing.

After these steps, the winning system contractor will design and construct
the facility.  Then the contractor will  either operate it or turn  it
over to the city to operate it, depending on whether the arrangement is
for the turn-key approach or for the full service approach.

     In the following, a general set of rules is offered that  will
increase the chance of success of the RFP approach.  For specific  help,
the Task Force probably should obtain the services of consultants, for
few cities can marshal! internally all the necessary technical, managerial,
legal, financial,  and marketing expertise.  To date, consulting engineers
and management consultants have been especially helpful  to cities,
counties, and states involved in RFP preparation and proposal  evaluation.
It is important to obtain their help early to insure that avoidable
complications do not arise in the later  stages when they can be rectified
only at the price of serious delay and great effort.

     Specialized,  in depth help is mandatory because one city cannot
adopt in its entirety the RFP or procurement procedures  of another city,
since each city has a unique set of opportunities and constraints.  The
following rules are intended only as general guidance and are insufficient
in themselves to guide a city through a procurement.

     Preparing the RFP.  The RFP is a major document that details  with a
high level of specificity the city's desired resource recovery system,
how system contractors may bid to provide this system, and how bids will
be evaluated.  It must be the culmination of the Task Force's and its
consultants' conscientious work in the study and selection stages, and
its final determination of the city's resource recovery requirements.
Once the RFP is distributed to potential bidders, it cannot be amended
without embarrassment to the Task Force and inconvenience to the bidders.

     Four rules for RFP preparation follow:

      1.   Specify  technical parameters.   The  RFP must contain specific
technical  parameters  so that bidders  know exactly what  is desired of
them.  This  means  stipulating  information like  the  particular recovery
technology,  the tonnages,  the  products  local  industries might buy,  the
environmental control  standards  that  must be met, and the disposal
techniques  for  process  residuals.   (EPA  recognizes  that  in  some cases,
e.g.,  where many  possible  markets  exist,  a  particular technology  may  not
have  to  be  specified.   Still,  in  depth  studies  and  specification  of other
parameters  are  required.)
                                    26

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     Some cities prefer to set only performance goals in their RFP; they
call for a "black box" that must accept a certain input tonnage and must
generate a certain output.  The output performance specifications may be
vague, requiring, for instance, that a certain percentage of input waste
be "recovered," but not specifying what, how,  or how efficiently.


     Some cities set imprecise performance specifications because their
competitive bidding laws forbid process specifications that might only
allow one system contractor to bid, as might be the case if wet pulping
or "Purox" pyrolysis were called for.  Other cities do not have a valid
reason for setting performance specifications  alone.  They may just have
put off making a choice or they may be "keeping their options open,"
hoping for a miracle system to come along.

     This is unfortunate.  The use of performance specifications alone
will make the proposal evaluation stage just that much more difficult,
since all the bidders will claim that their system can meet them.  Some
may not, and the Task Force may neither be able to technically evaluate
the proposals to the extent that it can determine which can or cannot
meet the specifications at the stated cost, nor be able to ascertain the
cost-risk tradeoffs involved.   (Should it choose the lower cost project
that has a higher risk of failure?)  Tradeoffs between the competing
technologies should be analyzed in the selection stage and, if possible,
one should be chosen before proposals are on the table.

     This is not to say that performance specifications are unnecessary;
they are an important part of the definition of the city's desired
system and will have a significant impact on price.  The lack of performance
specifications will affect proposal comparability.  For example, a city
may desire a fail-safe processing plant to lower its dependence on its
backup landfill.  If this requirement for dependable performance is not
explicit in the RFP, problems  will arise when  low-cost, non-redundant
systems are proposed and must be evaluated alongside systems with dual
processing lines and other reliability-increasing features.  The Task
Force group may have to decide questions such  as:

     a)  whether a system contractor with an otherwise good proposal
should be allowed to revise his bid to include redundancy,

     b)  whether a high-price proposal can legally be accepted if a non-
redundant system proposal was low bid,

     c)  whether a low-bidding, non-redundant  proposal is just being
used to "buy into" the project, since the system contractor may plan to
raise his price drastically when the redundancy requirements become
explicit.
                                     27

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     2.  Specify organizational  arrangements.   The RFP must specify the
legal, financial, and managerial  arrangements  required by the city, so
that all contractors can bid on  the same overall  package.  This includes
who will own and operate the plant, how and who will  finance the plant,
how dump fees will be paid, how  product revenues will  be shared, etc.
The RFP should also contain a preliminary contract spelling out most
of this information and explicitly stating how risks  and responsibilities
will be divided between the parties and what expectations the city has
of the contractor.

     These non-technical factors must be spelled out  just as the technical
specifications must be.  Otherwise, it will be difficult to compare bid
packages against each other since they may vary in so many factors.
Also, the Task Force may find it likes one system contractor's technical
ability and another one's management package.   If the Task Force had
specified a preferred management package in the RFP,  the first company
could have bid to it and could have given the Task Force all of what it
wanted.

     Another reason why the non-technical features must be explicit is
that they impact strongly on price.  Obviously, public versus private
financing and 15 versus 20 year amortization periods  will affect cost,
but so too will contract provision about risks and responsibilities.
Suppose the dependability-minded city in number 1 above decided to go
full service and to insure reliability by making the  cost of shutdowns
great by putting a $200,000 per day damage clause in  the contract.  If
the system contractor knows this will be in the contract, he will certainly
build in redundancy and make the city pay for it.  But if this is not
stipulated in the RFP, bidders will propose lower cost, non-redundant
systems and will properly balk when the Task Force broaches it later.

     Actually, any risk responsibility the Task Force puts upon the
system contractor will affect the contingency he will add to his bid
price and will thus affect the cost of the total system to the city. So
the city must spell out all these risk assignments in the RFP if it is
to get a true estimate of cost.

     3.  Dictate proposal format.  The proposal procedure itself should
stress comparability by laying down ground rules for proposals that will
facilitate their eventual evaluation.  The format of the proposals
should be dictated; for instance, bid price sheets and a proposal table
of contents should be included in the RFP.  Of course, if the city's
definition of what it wants is vague  (10 year, 20 year contract?, city
finances, company finances?), such refinements as bid sheets only give a
dangerous illusion of comparability,  for the factors that are not included
on the bid sheets are far more important than the conditional numbers
that are.

     The appendix gives a listing of  the variety of items that might be
included in an RFP, from the technical specifications, to the bid format,
to the contract.  Not all items on this list are necessary, but each
should be explicitly considered by the Task Force before being excluded.


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     4.  Require qualifications.  The RFP should require that bidders
demonstrate technical and financial  capability.   The Task Force might
even pre-qualify bidders in cities where that is legal.

     Stressing qualifications is important because it is a rare city
that will be able to judge accurately the technical  and  economic merits
of a complex resource recovery proposal, even with the help of a consultant.
But it can hedge against the risks of escalating costs,  unmarketable
products, and process breakdowns by depending on companies with demonstrable
prior experience in solid waste and resource recovery, and with the
financial capability to stay afloat through the  false starts and down
periods that are inevitable.

     Proven technical experience can often take  the form of resource
recovery pilot plant work and large-scale solid  waste operations.  A
functioning plant, even of pilot-scale, is worth a thousand advertising
brochures.

     Financial capability is another qualification cities should require
since performance guarantees in the contract do  not help the city if
they only drive the system contractor to the bankruptcy  court.  In fact,
there is the danger that a small company will assume the city's disposal
function long enough for the city to lose its own disposal capability
and then find that it can not continue at its quoted disposal price.
The company can issue the valid ultimatum: "increase the dump fee or we
will go under."  All the contract guarantees in  the world will not make
the city's garbage disappear the next day.

     The city might guard against such a scenario by hiring a company
with a solid financial background.  It might require from bidders things
like a strong financial history, substantial assets  (or  performance bonds),
and experience with projects of comparable magnitude.  Naturally, if a
subsidiary is set up locally to bid a project, the final  contracts must
look through the subsidiary back to the parent company.

     The above bidder qualifications should be called for and considered
in the proposals stage, but the city should address itself to this
whole question much earlier as well.  If a city  is sure  that a potential
bidder will not meet the experience or financial qualifications, it is
foolish to allow him to enter a substantive bid.  It is  hard to throw
out a low bidder after he has outlined his plan, especially if the plan
has flaws which are obvious only to the technically sophisticated.

     Therefore, a pre-qualifying round of bids,  where  allowed by law, is
a good idea.  The city can zero in on a particular system concept and
call for the technical and financial qualifications  of companies with
relevant experience.  Then, the city can set a minimum standard and
narrow the field substantially.  It must be remembered,  of course, that
the remaining bidders are still not "equal" and  the  lowest bid should
not necessarily be accepted; rather, relative capability should still be
a criterion in the bidding round to follow, albeit a less important one.

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     Non-competitive Procurement.   An option open  to some cities  is  to
bypass the RFP altogether and negotiate directly with one or a  few system
designers to procure a system.  These might be selected on the  basis of
the RFQ competition (as discussed  on page 11).  In a new field  like
resource recovery, it may be as wise to "go with the man," as to  "go with
the system."  The technologies available may be uncertain, but  many
reputations are not.

     A negotiated procurement allows the Task Force to engage in  one-to-
one discussions phased over many months, during which time it can gain
and digest the information needed  to choose a system that serves  the
city's purposes and to develop the outline of a contract that protects
its interests.  Such negotiations  do not necessarily have to lead to a
final contract award or preclude concurrent discussions with other
companies or outside consultants.   Nor do they preclude an eventual  RFP,
if the city decides that many companies could provide the decided-upon
service.

     Of course, in most cities, a  negotiated award is probably unacceptable,
either legally or politically.  Negotiated procurement has its  advantages.
This is testified to by its common use by the private sector.

     Proposal Evaluation.  Proposal evaluation should be no problem if a
good RFP has been prepared because each company will be bidding comparable
system packages and the choice will be between "apples and apples."
Price can now play the key role in the decision:  the construction price
if it is a turn-key project, or the dump fee  if it is a full service
project.

     There are some other factors  that should still be weighed, such as
relative bidder capability and market arrangements.  Another is the
bidder's management plan for plant construction and start-up, including
the personnel to be utilized.

     The concern with personnel and management is  that an otherwise
acceptable bidder may be overly committed, in terms of manpower and
finances, because he has commitments in too many cities.  A city may be
better served by a company that can assign to it its best talent full-
time, instead of just one week in four.  Also, a company with contracts
in only one or two cities will view each as very important, both to its
profits and to its reputation, and will work harder in each for an
optimized showcase  system.

     Contract Negotiation.  After a system contractor has been selected,
a final contract must be negotiated and signed.  Though the basis for
discussions is the preliminary contract contained  in the RFP, deviations
from this contract will probably be necessary to accommodate particular
needs and concerns of the winning bidder.  Substantial deviations should
be avoided as they could appreciably affect the cost picture and would
be unfair to the bidders who have been eliminated.

                                     30

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     Legal and financial counsel at this stage is important, and both
the Task Force and the system contractor may wish to retain it.  This is
especially true in the case of the full service approach because the
contract will be complicated since it must span a 15 to 20 year period
to assure a reasonable plant payback time.  The contract must anticipate
the myriad of situations that could occur in this time-new technologies,
natural disasters, new laws-and make provisions for them.

     City attorneys usually do not have sufficient experience in writing
contracts for long-lived, capital-intensive service facilities; they are
more familiar with short-term service contracts or outright purchases of
capital facilities.  Expertise with turn-key and full service contracts
will likely be found in law firms that deal with the private sector
where long-term contracts are more common.

     Financial assistance must be recruited, too, if it has not been
done already, to insure that the contract that is signed can be financed.
This can be a problem if project financing by PCRB's or municipal
revenue bonds is involved.  This is because bond buyers must be convinced
that the project will succeed and that the bonds can be paid off.  Not
only does this require that the technical plan get the seal of approval
from independent engineers, but that the contract between the city and
the contractor insure that a sufficient stream of revenues will be
generated to amortize the investment, even in the face of changing solid
waste and market conditions over a period of 15 or 20 years.  Therefore,
provisions that may be necessary include:

     a)  Put or pay provisions, --requiring that the city pay for a
guaranteed minimum tonnage of waste to be processed, whether it is
delivered or not,

     b)  Composition change adjustments, --to compensate the plant
operators for changes in the waste stream that affect the recovered
product revenues (e.g., can bans, separate collection drives),

     c)  Price adjustments, --if new environmental standards require
further capitalization or more expensive operating procedures.

     In effect, the city must be willing to share some or all of the
risks of such changes if construction funds are to be raised.

     It is to the benefit of all parties that the contract be as explicit
as possible to avoid misunderstandings later.  Terms like "recovered
resources" and "inert residue" must be defined in operational terms that
a court can understand.  In the case of a turn-key approach, the standards
for acceptance of the facility after start-up must be spelled out;
requirements that the plant "perform satisfactorily" are vague and
unenforceable.  Instead, a set of test procedures should be specified.
                                     31

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     Such precision is  also necessary in  the  area  of  environmental
standards that the plant must meet.   Agreements  reached  in  advance must
include:  procedures for calling for tests, responsibility  for  performing
the tests, and the method of correcting deficiencies.

     In the case of the full service approach,  it  may be useful  to set
up in the contract an arbitration board so that  adjustments in  the city-
contractor relationship can be made  over the  life  of  the contract as
required.  Some contingencies are certain to  be  overlooked, and only  an
arbitration procedure can give the project the  flexibility  necessary.  A
threat to break the contract on a technicality  is  a very blunt  instrument
for accommodation ten years down the road.

     Construction Completion and Start-up. The  construction completion
and plant start-up stages should create no problems for  the city if a
reliable firm has been hired and a comprehensive contract has been
written.  Technical problems may appear and may be costly to correct,
but a clear specification of responsibilities will insure that  the
contractor will put his effort into  solving problems  rather then searching
for a way to break the contract.  And troubleshooting by the system
contractor is encouraged if the contract contains  financial incentives
like delay penalties and dump fees that depend  on  the quality of processing,

     This discussion ends here because, at this  stage, the  city is
beginning to return to familiar ground; if its  Task Force has done  its
work properly, there should be no catastrophic  surprises ahead.
                                    32

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                                 FOOTNOTES
1.  A system designer need not be a single company,  but  can  be  a
    consortium of companies acting as a single body  in relation to
    the city.  Consortiums might include an engineering  firm and  a
    construction firm, or an engineering firm, a construction firm,  and
    an operations firm, jn a joint venture to handle the city's wastes.

2.  Private ownership - public operation is a rare option, but can take
    place under what financiers call a leveraged lease.   Therein, the
    city could lease a plant from investors who help the city finance
    the facility in exchange for formal ownership of it and the tax
    advantages such ownership entails.

3.  Arrangements whereby a city contracts out the operation of a  city-
    owned facility to a private firm are rare today, but could become
    more common if clear benefits are found, such as increased operating
    efficiency or reduced debt service.  A problem might be that  the
    private contractor would feel little incentive to properly maintain the
    city-owned plant, though.

4.  The PCRB mechanism has not yet been used to finance a recovery plant,
    so there is some uncertainty as to how it will be applied.   The  U.S.
    Internal Revenue Service must make determinations about  what  kinds
    of plants, and what parts of plants, will be eligible for this tax-
    exempt financing.

5.  Technically speaking, the city owns the facility in the case  of  a PCRB,
    hence its tax-exempt status.  We have called it private ownership be-
    cause not only does the company usually have control of the plant for
    a 20-year period, but often it purchases the plant from the city
    under a lease-purchase agreement, or installment sale.  This  added
    feature entitles the company to investment tax credit advantages in
    addition to the PCRB's tax-exempt status.

6.  Naturally, there are exceptions, such as in Monroe County,  New York,
    where the County is following a modified A & E approach in which a
    system contractor, selected by an RFP competition, provides only
    "professional services".  This variation was used because the County
    might have violated New York State's competitive bidding laws if the
    contractor had been given formal responsibility for construction.
    Another variation is a negotiated procurement of a system contractor's
    services.  This approach is often impossible under existing laws.

7.  This table only indicates those services provided by system designers
    that relate to plant design, construction, and operation.  Other
    services are also necessary, although they are not included in the
    table.  Regardless of which of the three approaches  is followed, cities
    will require consultants to execute a myriad of tasks, including
                                    33

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performing feasibility studies,  surveying markets,  drafting  authorizing
legislation, preparing RFP's,  evaluating proposals, preparing  contracts,
obtaining financing, and acting  as a liaison between the  city  and  its
chosen system designer.  Such  services may be provided by consulting
engineers, management consultants, law firms, etc.
                                    34

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                                 APPENDIX

                 ITEMS FOR POSSIBLE INCLUSION IN A REQUEST

                FOR PROPOSALS FOR A RESOURCE RECOVERY PLANT


 I.  Technical Specifications

     A.  Plant Specifications (especially important for turn-key approach
             construction)
         site information - location, geology
         waste-receiving facilities - design, capacity, weigh stations
         storage facilities - type, capacity
         technical  concept - e.g., pyrolysis, shredded fuel
         equipment specifications - type, capacities, performance guarantees
         redundancy and expansion requirements

         safety features
         pollution monitoring and control features

         building specifications
         residue disposal - landfill  and equipment
         facilities for special  wastes

     B.  Performance Standards (especially important for full service contract)

         solid waste input - tonnage, composition, fluctuations, special  wastes
         environmental  standards for  plant residue storage site

         safety standards
         recovery specifications - products, quality, tonnage
         residue specification - tonnage, composition
         dependability

II.  Legal  Constraints on City and Contractor

     solid  waste collection and  disposal laws
     procurement laws
     building codes and standards
     zoning laws
     employment laws (e.g. equal opportunity, minimum wage)
     insurance requirements
     occupational  safety and health standards
     tax obligations of plant owner
     legal  authority of proposal solicitor
     budget authorization of proposal solicitor
                               35

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[II.  Management Plan

     A.   Project  Phasing

          1.   Architectural  and  Engineering Approach
              scope of work  for  each step
              CE role in construction supervision and shakedown
              allocation of  risk and responsibility
              client-engineer relationship
              compensation mode

         2.  Turn-key Construction
             scope of work for each step
             time  allowed
             procedure for certification of step completion
             payment schedules
             penalties  for delays, substandard performance

         3.  Full  Service Contract
             start-up dates
             commencement procedures
             city  options to buy
             end of term procedures -  what belongs to city, option to extend
                or renegotiate

     B.  Rights and Responsibility of Parties (especially for full service contract)

         land arrangements
         tax arrangements
         financing arrangements
         city's right to approve specifications before construction
         hours and days of operation - regular and emergency
         delivery and weighing procedures
         performance criteria for plant
         disposal  procedures
         maintenance procedures
         marketing requirements
         city's access to plant, books
         environmental  performance criteria

     C.  Dispute Resolution Procedures (especially for full service contract)

         1.  Procedures for determining if environmental, marketing,
               residual disposal, or general performance criteria are met
             how testing instituted
             who pays for tests
             who tests, and how
             how determination of non-performance made
             how satisfaction given


                                     36

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          2.   City - contractor liaison board
              members
              meeting frequency
              powers - e.g.   dispute settlement, contract amendment

          3.   Arbitration Procedures
      D.  Financial Arrangements (for full  service contract)

          dump fee payment procedures, dump fee escalation formula
          resource recovery revenue sharing formula
          incentives for efficiency, resource recovery, maintenance,
            environmentally sound operation

 IV.  Provision for Unplanned Contingencies (for full service contract)

      termination procedures if contract default by either party
      facility removal  provisions
      force majeure - conditions, procedures to follow
      option to buy, option to negotiate service contract
      non-city waste -  whether allowable and whether city gets rebate
      unusual or emergency situations - procedures, city's right to be
        informed
      performance bonds
      compensation and  obligations during overly long shakedown period
      fee schedules if  no resource recovery
      fee adjustments  in case of changes in capital costs, operating costs,
        recovery revenues, waste stream tonnage  or composition, environmental
        regulations, residual disposal  costs.

  V.  Sample Contract (statement in contract language of above stated responsi-
        bilities of the parties)

 VI.  Other Information for Bidders

      local tax rate
      utility rates and facilities
      contact people at local government, city consultant, potential markets
      market study

VII.  Items Required of Bidder

      process description (detailed)
      physical layout of plant and equipment
      residue disposal  site and operating procedures (for full service contract)
      environmental impact assessment
      material/energy balance
      price bid and derivation of cost
      market commitments

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       sample products  (specifications)
       proposed management  plan  for  project
       technical qualifications  of company staff
       technical experience of company
       financial capability of company
       managerial  capability of  company
       marketing capability of company
VIII.  Proposal Format Information

       sample table of contents
       bid sheets
       bid bond
       formats for other required information  (e.g.  environmental  impact
         assessment, cost derivation)

  IX.  Proposal Evaluation Process

       schedule for RFP process
           proposal due date
           oral presentations
           contract award
           negotiations
       evaluation procedure to be followed
       evaluation criteria
       city option to reject
       procedures for communication with officials during  solicitation  period


                                               US GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1975—210-81049
     uall60  A
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