erng the Apathetic ai
Reassuring the Alarmed
Communicating About
Radon Risk in Three
Communities
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UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460
OFFICE OF
POLiCY, PLANNING AND EVALUATION
December 21, 1988
Memorandum
To: Readers
From: Ann Fisher, Manager
Risk Communication Program
A * L/A
\\**^
Subject: Report: Alerting the Apathetic and Reassuring the
Alarmed: Communicating about Radon Risk in Three
Communities
The attached study was initiated in June 1987, early in the
Agency's efforts to identify elements of an effective risk
communication program for radon. Little information was then
available that would meet statistical criteria for
generalizations; various constraints meant that such information
would not be available for some time.
The needs expressed by the Office of Radiation Programs and
Regions II and III led to a decision to proceed with a modest
qualitative study, even though the results of such studies must
be viewed with more caution than statistically valid studies.
The Environmental Communication Research Program at Rutgers
University was selected to compare reactions to radon in three
case study communities. Anecdotal evidence indicated very
diverse reactions in these communities. High levels of naturally
occurring geological radon were found in two of them. A
concerned minority in Boyertown, Pennsylvania felt frustrated
because their neighbors ignored this potentially serious health
threat, but residents in Clinton, New Jersey calmly proceeded to
mitigate homes with elevated levels. In the third community
(Vernon, New Jersey) people were alarmed because they perceived
high radon risks from a disposal site with soil contaminated by
radium used in a watch factory.
There were multiple reasonable hypotheses about why the
reactions differed. For example, some observers hypothesized
that Clinton reacted calmly because of the high level of
education in this bedroom community; others thought it was
because of the mayor's strong leadership. Some thought the
reaction in Vernon was because the radon source was manmade;
others felt it was because the community was not involved in the
early stages of the decision about where to dispose of the
contaminated soil.
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EPA-230-08-88-036
ALERTING THE APATHETIC AND REASSURING THE ALARMED:
COMMUNICATING ABOUT RADON RISK IN THREE COMMUNITIES
Submitted to the Office of Policy, Planning, and Evaluation
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
August lf 1988
This research was supported by U.S. EPA Cooperative Agreement
No. CR814168-01-0.
Caron Chess
Associate Director
Billie Jo Hance
Research Associate
Environmental Communication Research Program
A Program of the Agricultural Experiment Station
Cook College, Rutgers University
122 Ryders Lane
New Brunswick, NJ 08903
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Community leaders were interviewed in Clinton and Boyertown.
An Eagleton Institute study of the community reaction in Vernon
was available, and the modest size of this exploratory study
precluded interviews there. Thus, Vernon is discussed separately
because the information came from a secondary source. Any
shortcomings in the Eagleton Institute study will be reflected in
conclusions about the comparison of Vernon with the other two
areas. For example, one reviewer noted that it does not discuss
sensitization to environmental issues because of debate about
satellite earth stations in the community; radon concerns could
be a spill over from this issue. The Three Communities report
now acknowledges this, in addition to responding to other
comments from reviewers.
Because the issue in Vernon is radium-contaminated soil
rather than naturally occurring indoor radon, some reviewers felt
that Vernon should not be included in the report. However, we
have included it to point out the differences between
communicating about naturally occurring and imposed risk.
Even with the qualitative nature of this study, some
patterns are clear enough to suggest recommendations about risk
communication strategies that would lead to more appropriate
reactions. These recommendations are being reinforced by more
quantitative research that is nearing completion. In the
meantime, this report is being made available to assist Regions,
States, and local groups as they plan their radon programs.
attachment
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS *
r
This report would have been impossible without the coopera-
tion of those we interviewed who spent considerable effort
recalling what happened and giving us feedback about our evolving
ideals. Peter M. Sandman, Director of the Environmental Com-
munication Research Program, proposed the project to EPA, was
instrumental in developing the design, and gave feedback to us on
an earlier draft of this report. We would also like to thank Sue
Coughlin and Kathy Fox for their many hours transcribing inter-
views. Finally, we appreciate the encouragement of Ann Fisher of
the Office of Policy, Planning, and Evaluation, which funded this
research.
The information in this document has been funded whollv or in
part by the United States Environmental Protection Agency unSer
Cooperative Agreement No. CR-814168 to Rutgers University It
and hafhffDeCted *2 the A*ency-'s P^r and administrative review
Mention 2e? aPProved for Publication as an EPA document.
^ *°es «* constitute
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY *
^
ALERTING THE APATHETIC AND REASSURING THE ALARMED-
COMMUNICATING ABOUT RADON RISK IN THREE COMMUNITIES
_ . bY Caron Chess and Billie Jo Hance
Environmental Communication Research Program, Rutgers University
th* ph * Set °ff radiati°n detectors in 1984 at
the Philadelphia Electric Company Limerick generating station
alarms were also triggered in government agencies across the '
country about naturally occurring radon. Federal, state, and
i™« J!9enCieS afe n°" faced With the difficult task of alerting
homeowners to radon risk. This report mines the experience of
government agencies for lessons learned in dealing with two
SlSifi08/^ rf?°n: (a) Boyertown, Pennsylvania, the first
"hotspot" of naturally occurring radon; and (b) Clinton, New
Jersey, the second discovery of extraordinarily high levels of
naturally occurring radon. In addition, the study examines the
events in Vernon, New Jersey, a town in which state officials
sought to dispose of radium-contaminated soil and met fierce
resistance from community residents.
cnm-S^iincrfJ'S011** t0^h\ discovery °f ^don in Boyertown and
Clinton ranged from apathy to concern in both towns, but the
response concentrated at the extremes—and was marked by greater
suspicion towards government—in Boyertown than in Clinton.
There are a number of possible reasons for the difference in
response, including:
* Because Clinton was the second community rather than the
first to deal with high levels of naturally occurring radon
it may have been easier for residents both to accept the
seriousness of the problems and to be reassured they were
not alone.
* The Pennsylvania Dutch residents of Boyertown could point to
generations of residents who they felt were relatively
unaffected by radon. These homeowners reacted with more com-
placency than the far more transient population of Clinton.
* ??c*use EpA.had established a clear policy against reme-
diating individual homes, Clinton residents were less likely
to form a citizen group to push for mitigation of their
homes than in Boyertown, where a policy had not yet been
established.
* Government officials at all levels were better prepared to
deal with Clinton from both a technical and a communication
standpoint.
New Jersey put in place an uncommonly personable and
s<»nai'hivrA •hAavn
sensitive team.
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* New Jersey officials worked closely with* an outstanding
local leader who greatly influenced public reaction.
In both Boyertown and Clinton government officials faced the
difficult task of both reassuring alarmed homeowners and alerting
complacent ones. In large part the extent of officials1 success
depended not only on what they said but also on the context in
which they said it. In fact, officials in both states built
trust and credibility for their agencies and their message by
taking both the environmental hazard and community concerns
seriously. That is, officials not only took the need to reduce
radon risk seriously, they also took homeowner problems—even
those not directly related to health—very seriously. Included
in the report is a list of recommendations based on the ex-
periences in Boyertown and Clinton.
The events in Vernon were a government official's nightmare.
When New Jersey officials sought to deposit a blend of radium
contaminated soil and "clean dirt11 in a Vernon quarry, the
proposal precipitated opposition in the form of a stormy public
meeting attended by approximately 3,000, a rally that attracted
10,000, and a demonstration at the Governor's mansion that
brought demonstrators out in a caravan of cars. One of the
ironies of the events at Vernon is that many of the residents
protesting the disposal of soil were not taking action to protect
themselves from radon in their homes. In short, Vernon residents
reacted strongly to what NJDEP considered a negligible risk—the
soil-blending plan—and failed to respond to a potentially
serious one—naturally occurring radon.
There are a number of compelling reasons why Vernon resi-
dents reacted with a great deal more anger than those of Boyer-
town and Clinton, including:
* Community resentment towards imposed risk led to resistance
to both the risk and the agency that sought to impose it.
* Because the agency didn't see the risk of the soil-blending
plan as serious, it failed to respond seriously to citizen
concerns or to involve the community in the decision-making
process.
* The risk in Vernon was imported from another community,
which made the risk seem unfair.
* The mayor in Vernon worked against NJDEP to oppose soil-
blending in his community and urged residents to do the
same.
* The soil from the other community was from a man-made source
and was awaiting disposal in drums, which carry very
negative connotations.
* While naturally occurring radon can be mitigated by the
individual, the perceived threat in Vernon was entirely
under government control. In Vernon people responded to a
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resistance to
-
Boyertown experience might be applicabie^itiaSions'sucn as
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The following suggestions are described in more detail and
with supporting examples in Alerting the Apathetic and Reassuring
the Alarmed: Communicating about Radon Risk in Three Com-
munities, by Caron Chess and Billie Jo Hance. Although these
suggestions conform to empirical research, they are derived from
qualitative analysis of two case studies, and they should be con-
sidered working hypotheses rather than proven truths.
Communicating about risks is often situational. Therefore,
these recommendations do not deal with setting priorities or
developing compromises that are often important when government
officials deal with complex issues. Instead, the goal of these
guidelines is to provide a framework on which communication about
radon risk can be constructed, not to give explicit directions
for each situation.
A. SETTING THE CONTEXT
Al. Take both the environmental hazard and community concerns
seriously. Although what agencies said was important, they were
judged in large measure by what they did. Government officials
not only took the need to reduce radon risk seriously, they took
homeowner concerns—even those not related to health—very
seriously.
A2. Release information earlier rather than later. Public
reaction was focused on the risk rather than government delay.
A3. While reassuring some members of the community, also make
sure to alert others. Government officials were very concerned
about how to avoid unduly panicking people with high levels of
radon. It is equally important to alert others to take action to
protect their health.
A4. Develop a team effort among government officials. One of
the great strengths of the effort in Clinton was the involvement
of the mayor as an equal partner and the focus on joint problem-
solving.
A5. Allow for two-way communication with the community.
Dialogue with communities helped to reduce the tension.
A6. Protect confidentiality of individuals while encouraging
homeowners to talk with each other. A distinction needs to be
made between protecting the identity of individuals and needless-
ly encouraging secrecy.
A7. Anticipate how your actions will look to those outside
government. Rather than deal with the confusion after an action
has been taken, agencies can anticipate the reaction and (a)
modify the action or (b) acknowledge in advance that the action
might be misconstrued and explain it.
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A8. Acknowledge and deal with people's feelings. Officials in
both states attempted to deal directly with people's concerns and
spent considerable effort transmitting caring as well as facts.
B. EXPLAINING THE RISK
Bl. Make sure your message consistently emphasizes the potential
seriousness of the problem and what people can do about it.
Government officials in Clinton consistently gave both the "bad
news" (radon is a serious problem) and the "good news" (you can
do something about it).
B2. Acknowledge uncertainty while being clear about the poten-
tial seriousness of the risk. While being forthright about
uncertainties, transmit clearly that the evidence strongly
suggests that radon is a serious risk.
B3. Put risk in perspective. The report suggests a number of
comparisons that seemed to work well in the case studies.
B4. Be forthright about the risk. Although it may be uncomfort-
able to discuss the risks with people facing high levels of radon
contamination, people cope better with information than without.
B5. Deal with concerns other than health risks. When motivating
people to test and mitigate, consider directly addressing
concerns about property values.
B6. Address people's immediate concerns first. Then back up and
fill in the scientific concepts. The initial homeowner's meeting
in Clinton was somewhat confusing and lengthy because NJDOH ex-
plained conceptual information before addressing people's
specific concerns.
B7. Be careful about drawing geographical boundaries. Initial
information that radon was confined to the Reading Prong led to
great confusion. Take care to avoid implying that the problem is
confined largely to one area.
B8. Be as down-to-earth as possible. The most successful
spokesman was described as a blend of scientist and schoolteacher
who "talked in plain language."
B9. Consider responding to concerns on a personal level. Some
staff volunteered their personal perspectives on the dilemmas
people were facing.
C. HOLDING PUBLIC MEETINGS
Cl. Plan meetings carefully. The New Jersey agencies spent
considerable time, both separately and jointly, clarifying goals
for the meeting, outlining an agenda, determining who was
responsible for materials, developing approaches to explaining
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information, and anticipating likely questiorfe and potential
responses. ;
C2. Choose carefully those who will represent the agency and
coordinate their roles. Homeowners1 judgments about the mes-
senger may determine whether they believe the message.
C3. Consider involving local representatives as spokespeople.
Local spokespeople who already have credibility with the com-
munity can lend an element of trust to the statements of outside
officials.
C4. Anticipate questions, address those concerns in initial
presentations, and leave plenty of time for additional questions.
Officials in both towns stayed at initial public meetings as long
as it took to answer all questions.
C5. Use meetings to encourage people to take action. Publicize
phone numbers of radon information lines or distribute testing
kits at the meeting.
C6. Hold meetings frequently in times and settings comfortable
to the community and continue ongoing dialogue with the com-
munity. Rather than waiting to release a final report, update
people as frequently as possible.
C7. Debrief and evaluate meetings. Evaluation, even in the form
of a one-page questionnaire, can help identify potential misun-
derstandings early.
D. COMMUNICATING WITH THE MEDIA
Dl. Alert local officials prior to the press and consider
involving them as spokespeople. Officials in both states were
scrupulous about briefing local officials prior to taking the
story to the media.
D2. Initiate contacts with the media rather than delaying
notification. Continue contact. Delaying release of the story
is more likely to do harm than good.
D3. Be as clear, down to earth, and quotable as possible.
Early media reports in Boyertown that quoted officials as saying
radon was not a health problem may have been confusing and
inaccurately framed the issue.
D4. Maintain the confidentiality of homeowners, but consider
ways to help reporters cover mitigation. Because it is more
difficult to cover remediation without examples, the report
suggests alternative ways to promote coverage of success stories.
Remember that reporters need a "peg11 for a story and try to
provide it.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
INTRODUCTION 1
METHODOLOGY 1
BOYERTOWN, PENNSYLVANIA AND CLINTON, NEW JERSEY 3
SUMMARY OF EVENTS
Boyertown 3
Clinton 3
PUBLIC REACTION
Clinton 4
Boyer-town 5
RECOMMENDATIONS 7
A. Setting the Context 8
B. Explaining the Risk 14
C. Holding Public Meetings 19
D. Communicating with the Media 23
VERNON, NEW JERSEY 28
SUMMARY OF EVENTS 28
ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC RESPONSE 29
RECOMMENDATIONS 32
Setting the Context 32
Explaining the Risk 34
Holding Public Meetings 35
Communicating with the Media 35
NOTES 37
APPENDIX
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INTRODUCTION
When confronted with extraordinarily high levels of
naturally occurring radon found in Colebrookdale TownshL
NoSnT^Vania (commonly Deferred to as Boyertown? and SiSton
New Jersey, government agencies faced the difficult task o?iW
reassuring alarmed homeowners and alerting apathetic ones BV
contrast, when the New Jersey Department of Environmental* Y
vf™™ Sn s°ught to Dispose of radium-contaminated soil in
™?n™' ^??r?ey'^he community responded with an enormous
outcry, mobilizing thousands of citizens in protest.
The responses of these three communities raise imoortant
issues related to public perception of risk and agency commSnica-
,!n?Vff°rtS- ?he resP°nsi*>mty of reducing radln in hoTs
unlike many environmental hazards, falls largely to the in-
dividual rather than to government. There fo?e/the effectiveness
of government communication was particularly significant in
sris Becas4 *™* «°-own«s at
bv ano»r- in,; 4. «fe the P"15110 response in Vernon was marked
by anger that too often greets government actions, an understand-
°Se 6VentS may help aenc o«i=ia
— — — —--—-fM*l **4»V4^i I
^ nelp agency officials avoid similar
responses OVWAU a>j.mij.ar
? D <3°*1°f thls study, funded by the United States Environ-
Evn^^ teotlon Agency's Office of Policy, Planning, and
Evaluation, is to review the efforts of government officials to
communicate with the three communities for lessens ?efrned: what
n ' What °^ght have been handled differently, and how
ly radln =ankcomlllunicate »°re effectively about riskf' particular-
ly radon risk.
METHODOLOGY
0
track quantitatively, such as government interaction with
communities, relationship to local officials, and development of
The case study methodology is useful in studying risk
communication because it underscores the complexity Inl richness
of interactions which might otherwise be lost in more quantita-
faT?u"«ea^h- ^Pointing to risk communication successes and
fnd ?£ S™?aS? s^es suggest to practitioners strategies to try
and to avoid in their own communication efforts. Unlike quan-
titative research, however, case studies cannot accurate^
identify precise conditions under which various effects are
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likely to happen. They can, however, offer hypotheses that may
then be the subject of more rigorous quantitative research.
The discussion of Clinton and Boyertown distills the
observations, judgments, and recommendations of those we inter-
viewed in Boyertown and Clinton, including federal, state, and
local officials; contractors; reporters; realtors; and citizen
leaders. (For a list of interviewees, see Appendix A.)
For the most part, the methodology for the case study of
these two towns was the same. In Clinton, however, there was no
defined citizens group, and the owner of the "discovery" house
was never identified. Moreover, few citizens were mentioned by
name in the media, and local officials declined to reveal the
names of townspeople in order to protect confidentiality. We
felt that interviewing a non-representative sample of citizens
(for example, the one or two who revealed their names to the
press) would be more misleading than useful. Therefore, citizens
were not interviewed in Clinton.
A separate section of this report analyzes the events
surrounding the radon communication at Vernon, NJ in light of the
recommendations drawn from the study of Clinton and Boyertown.
We employed for this analysis a case study prepared by the
Eagleton Institute of Politics and the political science depart-
ment at Rutgers University.1 We chose to use this case study as
opposed to conducting our own research in Vernon because we felt
the case study adequately covered the incidents at Vernon and we
did not want to "reinvent the wheel," disturbing participants
with another set of interviews. In addition, our thrust was
applying the positive lessons learned in the other towns to a
situation like Vernon's, and we felt that dwelling on the
specifics of the case would be less useful.
While attempting to be useful to agency practitioners, this
report is not derived from quantitative analysis and may not be
entirely free of bias. We sought to reduce bias during the
research for Clinton and Boyertown by using an identical inter-
view protocol for the individuals in each group of participants
(i.e., realtors, citizens, government officials, and contractors)
and by interviewing similar participants in each community. The
entire report was reviewed extensively by participants, academic
experts, and practitioners in state agencies and EPA. In the
case of Vernon, there may have been existing biases in the
original report that affected our analysis of it.
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BOYERTOWN, PENNSYLVANIA AND CLINTON* NEW JERSEY
SUMMARY OF EVENTS
Boyertown
In a story that is now almost legend, on December 13, 1984
Boyertown resident Stanley Watras set off radiation detectors as
he entered Philadelphia Electric Company's (PECO) Limerick
generating station, where he worked as a senior construction
engineer. After sampling (in response to Watras1 request)
detected more than 2,000 pCi/1 of radon in the home, Philadelphia
Electric contacted officials at the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Resources (PADER), who sampled at Watras1 home on
December 26, PADER's readings confirmed Philadelphia Electric's
and on January 5, 1985 PADER officials hand-delivered a letter
from the Secretary Nicholas DeBenedictus that recommended the
family "vacate11 their home.
During the following weeks PADER began sampling homes of
Watras1 neighbors, and by the middle of January publicly offered
free testing to residents of the area. (This offer was subse-
quently extended to all Pennsylvania residents living on the
Reading Prong, the geological formation which officials initially
thought defined the geographical boundaries of the problem.)
Several town meetings were conducted by officials of PADER and
the Pennsylvania Department of Health, and PADER set up a field
office in Gilbertsville, PA. In April 1985, Philadelphia
Electric announced its intention to remediate the Watras home,
and subsequently EPA remediated another 18 homes as part of a
demonstration project. In addition, PADER contracted for
comprehensive assessments of the radon problems and potential
remediation strategies on another 25 homes. In April, residents
Kay Jones and Kathy Varady formed Pennsylvanians Against Radon
(now called People Against Radon), a group of homeowners who were
frustrated by what they considered difficulty in getting infor-
mation and the slow pace of remediation.
Clinton
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP)
officials were familiar with PADER's efforts, and had already
launched a radon program. In March 1986 they received a call
from a resident of Clinton who had obtained a reading of 1000
pCi/1 through private testing. The following day NJDEP confirmed
the reading and began surveying Clinton Knolls, the development
where the house was located, for gamma radiation (a potential
indicator of a radon problem inside homes). Finding gamma levels
that were significantly higher than normal background levels,
NJDEP began sampling homes in concentric circles away from the
initial "discovery" house and found elevated levels in many of
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the homes in Clinton Knolls. f
r
NJDEP and the New Jersey Department of Health (NJDOH)
conducted a public meeting with Clinton residents and held a
number of "by invitation only" meetings to update homeowners of
Clinton Knolls while protecting confidentiality. In addition,
NJDEP staffed a part-time office in the municipal building. In
May EPA selected ten homes for remediation as part of a demon-
stration project and committed to providing diagnostic work-ups
for 20 more. By November environmental officials announced that
homes in the demonstration project had been remediated success-
fully to levels within the federal guidelines.
PUBLIC REACTION
Clinton
Gauging public reaction several years after an event is
problematic, at best. The impressions of those involved become
more susceptible to distortion as time passes. However, the
observations of those we interviewed in Clinton are remarkably
similar, suggesting a fair degree of consensus about their
perception of public reaction in this small town of 1,900 resi-
dents. Clinton, which is located in a relatively rural section
of Hunterdon County, includes a growing population of business
and professional people, particularly in the Clinton Knolls
section, a development with a population of about 500.
The discovery of high levels of radon in Clinton Knolls was
met with concern. Gerald Nicholls of NJDEP characterized public
response as "initially strong, fearful" based on the concern
shown at the first public meeting that attracted more than 300
people. He noted, however, that although people were deeply
concerned, no one "got overly emotional." In the words of Judy
Klotz of New Jersey Department of Health (NJDOH), "People were
sober, but not hysterical; they were willing to listen."
Terry Brennari of Camroden Associates, who worked in the
houses that were part of EPA's research project, noted that "The
people in Clinton didn't respond the way almost everyone else has
responded. It was a group of pretty different people getting
together in a difficult situation and working together." Brennan
also noted that he. found more concerns from people about their
health than he usually encounters, due, he suspects, to the
extremely high radon levels found in Clinton Knolls.
Clinton real estate agents reported different impressions
about the initial reaction ranging from fear to apathy but
observed a more tempered response after a relatively short time.
Mickey Greco of Schlott Realtors said that clients1 initial
reaction ("I don't want to know about it.... I'm going to hope
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"eased the fear that this was a perpetual situ»?S« i n Hi
'•«•
the 105 homeowners in Clinton Knolls lor "horn DEP had tel?
SSSiSV °f ^V^Pon^nts 23 had remedtated and another 12
?e»eS!fted d?r dlf**- (F^Ve °f the "Downers in houses
remediated did not respond to the survey, suggesting that
6 "
Reaction in Colebrookdale Township is more difficult to
^^^
^ecause new high^ys mke the comue esler
Against ?adon says that reaction to the radon
P?rt Was split bet»een the response of "the
b.ing
Public meetings in Colebrookdale attracted hundreds of
5
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people and had an atmosphere that Margot Huntf, then working for
PADER, compared to the tension of a Superfun$ meeting. Bruce
Dallas, then of PADER, also characterized the response as
"potentially extremely disruptive." While PADER officials noted
the easing of tension at the first public meeting, citizens Jones
and Watras and Tell Tappan of Arix Sciences, Inc. suggested that
there was a fair amount of disbelief and mistrust. Watras
relates walking out of the public meeting and "hear[ing] the
general public say, 'These people aren't telling us the whole
truth— . They're, holding something back.... ' "
The "skepticism and hostility" also noted by Jonathan
Smoyer, the local emergency coordinator, may have been due, in
part, to the nature of the community. As Richard Rehrer of
Rehrer and Zuber Realty put it, "Most people living in the area
had no recollection of anyone ever dying of radon...." As with
Clinton, although real estate sales leveled off for a period of
time, since then "demand has far outstripped supply," according
to David Specht of Specht Realty, Inc. In fact, several of those
interviewed in Boyertown felt that residents were relatively
unconcerned about radon. LuAnn Reichert, Colebrookdale Township
Manager suggested that despite being initially upset, "Now
there's not nearly as much concern as there was initially.
People have in their head that it's been here for many years and
it's always going to be here...."
Because Colebrookdale Township marked the first discovery of
such high levels of naturally occurring radon, the uncertainties
that faced both the agency officials and Boyertown residents were
huge. As PADER's Thomas Gerusky put it, the agency was initially
"out on a limb" without much guidance from federal agencies.
Although those interviewed, including real estate agents,
reporters, and local officials, praised the government's efforts,
some of the affected residents became sufficiently frustrated
with what they perceived as the state's inadequate handling of
remediation that they formed People Against Radon (originally
known as Pennsylvanians Against Radon). Some view People Against
Radon as a constructive force in the community, while others feel
it is neither particularly credible nor representative of the
community. Jones of People Against Radon claims that there are
still homes in the neighborhood with measurements of over 200
pCi/1 that have not been remediated, but Margaret Reilly of PADER
feels confident that homeowners with such high levels have
mitigated.
In sum, the public reaction to the discovery of radon seems
to have included apathy and concern in both Clinton and Boyer-
town, but the responses appear to be more extreme—and marked by
greater suspicion towards the government—in Boyertown than in
Clinton. Although retrospective case studies cannot easily
define the extent to which specific variables influenced public
reaction, it is possible to suggest reasons for the differences.
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f
While discovery of high radon levels in feoyertown was
entirely unexpected, that discovery prompted;in New Jersey
development of a state program, subsequent media coverage, and
some familiarity (if not concern) among homeowners about the
issue. In fact, the town of Clinton already had a program in
place for residents to order radon detectors at reduced cost In
the opinion of Alfred "Chick" Craig of EPA, who was involved'in
hi^«« *£ ' thoufh less so, also in Boyertown, "When something
happens the second time, it's not nearly the shock it is the
e» Being the second community to handle the problem
rather than the first, may have helped residents both accept the
seriousness of the problem and reassure them that they were not
alone. Craig also feels that Clinton residents would have been
less likely to develop a citizen group to push for remediation of
individual homes because by that time EPA had a clear policy not
?nhoi^?a^e^°meS except £or research purposes, in addition, the
inherent differences in the communities may have affected their
responses. The Pennsylvania Dutch residents of Boyertown who
could point to generations of relatives who they felt were
unaffected by radon, may have reacted with more complacency than
the far more transient population of Clinton.
New Jersey officials, by virtue of already having initiated
?»J2do* Program were far more equipped to deal with Clinton. In
fact, officials had discussed how they might handle the discovery
of a home with a level such as Watras'. in addition, the EPA was
oetter prepared to give NJDEP support quickly, allowing remedia-
tion efforts to become high profile rapidly. Just as important
New Jersey officials benefitted from the experience of their
Pennsylvania colleagues, evaluating actions PADER had taken for
^eiTn^PliSatl°n,^n !?ew Jersev- For example, says Donald Deieso
of NJDEP, "We realized that free testing wouldn't be sustained in
a state like New Jersey and in the long run would be limiting »
due to dependence on the legislature for funds. Finally, as
explained more fully in the following recommendations, New Jersey
put in place what many observers noted was an uncommonly per-
sonable and sensitive team that worked with an outstanding local
leader.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Those interviewed had some understandable difficulty
remembering the details of what happened, but they were often
quite clear about what should happen in similar situations. The
following recommendations are based on the observations and
recommendations of those we interviewed. Although these recom-
mendations conform with findings of empirical research, because
they are derived only from two case studies, they should be
considered working hypotheses rather than proven truths.
Communicating about risks is often situational. Therefore,
7
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these recommendations do not deal with setting priorities or
developing compromises that are often important when government
officials deal with complex issues. Instead, the goal of these
guidelines is to provide a framework on which communication about
radon risk can be constructed, not to give explicit directions
for each situation.
A. Setting the Context
The effectiveness of a message depends not only on what is
said but also on the context in which it is transmitted, that is,
the actions and attitudes which accompany information that make
it more meaningful to people. The extent to which the message is
believable (and believed) can be tied closely to trust and
credibility, which may be linked to the recommendations below:
Al. Take both the environmental hazard and community concerns
seriously. Officials of both states reacted quickly, and soon
radon became the subject of high-level attention in the agencies
of both states. Money was "found" to provide testing, rules were
"broken" to cut through red tape, staff were temporarily trans-
ferred to deal with radon, and high-ranking personnel started
routinely putting in 18-hour days.
Although what agencies said was important, they were judged
in large measure by what they did. In both Clinton and Boyertown
those interviewed stressed the importance of moving quickly once
the problem had been determined as serious. Just as important as
acting competently, was their being visibly competent and
committed. Both states held public meetings, had a staff out in
the field doing testing, and established local offices.
As Judy Klotz of the New.Jersey Department of Health put it,
"The public saw a large number of high management, a very large
effort, a very intense participation and investment and immediate
turn around. Just in terms of what was visible, before anyone
opened their mouths, this was clearly seen as a big operation."
Craig also noted how important it was that "we instilled a
feeling of confidence that we knew what we were doing." For
example, the EPA research team and contractors examined 56 houses
in 5 days. According to Craig, homeowners where "amazed" when
within several days, they reported what they found to homeowners
in one of the many homeowners' meetings conducted by state
officials. Homeowners' surprise at such swift action may have
reflected their expectatibns that government wouldn't move that
quickly.
However, government officials not only took the need to
reduce radon risk seriously, they took the homeowner concerns—
even those not directly related to health—very seriously. Both
Pennsylvania and New Jersey officials discussed concerns related
to property values at length internally, at public meetings, and
8
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with homeowners on a one-to-one basis. They klso attempted to
address these concerns in a variety of different ways, even
though dealing with issues such as property values are not
directly within the agencies' mandate. For example, the agen-
cies1 protection of confidentiality (see guideline A6) was
driven, in part, by understanding community concerns about
property values. PADER and NJDEP also worked to make low
interest loans available because they thought addressing finan-
cial concerns was critical—even if indirectly—to reducing
health risks.3 The agencies1 willingness to grant legitimacy to
community concerns other than those that directly relate to
environmental health may have been important to maintain credi-
bility with homeowners who do not categorize their concerns along
the same lines as agency mandates.
A2. Release information earlier rather than later. In both
cases officials felt the urgency of the situation and released
information relatively quickly to local officials and the public.
Thus public reaction focused for the most part on other issues
rather than government delay. As Tappan put it, "It's important
to get to people as soon as possible with information and
expertise...."
Mary Jane Schneider of the Boyertown Area Times noted the
importance of PADER holding a public meeting soon after the
announcement to the media. While NJDEP also released information
quickly, Deieso stressed the importance of waiting until they
"had a little more to offer than just saying we had found a
couple of high homes." In fact, PADER was put in the difficult
situation of needing to release information but having a great
deal of uncertainty about what to say. Thus, some observers
faulted PADER for releasing information as early as they did.
Several of the realtors interviewed would have preferred for
officials in both states to withhold information until they had
success remediating homes. However, it is doubtful the agencies
could have kept the story from being picked up by the media. In
fact, in Clinton reporters—not government—convened the first
press conference by confronting officials outside the mayor's
office.
In short, the damage to credibility caused by holding onto
information might have been greater than releasing uncertain
information earlier. However, when releasing tentative informa-
tion, government officials can take care to ensure that the
message is not confusing. (See guideline B2.)
A3. While reassuring some members of the community, also make
sure to alert the others. Government officials in both Boyertown
and Clinton were understandably very concerned about how to tell
people about radon without panicking them. As Nulman explained,
he often felt the tug to tell people "this is nothing to get
-------
panicky about" but at the same time he didn't/want to "make the
problem less than it is." It is a natural tendency in explaining
a serious risk such as radon to want to "backpedal," according to
Tappan.
To make sure that homeowners took action, Nulman was widely
quoted as saying, "If people don't get their houses checked, they
should get their heads checked." Pennsylvania and New Jersey
both offered free testing in the area surrounding the discovery
house (which Pennsylvania later expanded to cover the entire
Reading Prong). However, some of those interviewed admit that
for understandable reasons they paid more attention to reassuring
people with "hot houses" than to making sure other homeowners
tested. In Clinton, says Drautman, who is a physicist as well as
a reporter, "I think all of us played 'it's a fixable problem1
too hard. What we're saying now and what DEP is saying now, that
everybody in this county ought to test, I think we probably
should have been saying from the start." In Boyertown, efforts
to reassure might have been confusing. For example, PADER's
initial press release states radon "... is not a danger to the
general population..." and a statement by an agency spokesperson
in the Bovertown Area Times suggests that radon was "not a public
health problem." Both statements were easily susceptible to
misinterpretation.
To strike the appropriate balance between reassuring people
and alerting them, government officials must be clear about their
communication goals. Goals may evolve throughout the process of
interacting with community; however, the greater the initial
clarity, the more likely the goals will be met. "Damage con-
trol"—communicating without planning or planning with the
primary goal of keeping the phones quiet—is not sufficient,
particularly when people are apt to respond complacently. The
experiences in Boyertown and Clinton suggest that agencies should
make explicit the communication goal of alerting people to radon
risk and then develop a communication strategy to meet that goal.
(See Guideline Cl for more on goals and planning.)
A4. Develop a team effort among government officials. There was
near unanimity in those interviewed in Clinton that Mayor
Nulman's taking a leadership role in Clinton lent great credib-
ility to the efforts of state and federal officials. While
Deieso considers Nulman a "statesman," unique in his willingness
to exert leadership rather than to assign blame, Nulman suggests
that DEP also influenced his willingness to cooperate by main-
taining daily contact, giving him home phone numbers, briefing
him before the press and in general being "very careful, con-
siderate , truthful."
Perhaps just as important, state officials showed eagerness
to develop a partnership with the mayor, despite the obvious
disparity in technical expertise. In fact, a type of parity was
10
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established between Nulman's understanding off community concerns
and the state's technical expertise, so that(decisions were made
collaboratively. Nulman suggests that one of the keys to success
in Clinton was "great commitment to solving the problem rather
than anyone winning, so when there was a problem...people went
inside the team, rather than turning it into a win-lose situa-
tion." Beckley also noted that NJDEP alerting him prior to the
media announcement and involving him in the process early on "was
the beginning of trust...Right from the beginning the DEP made it
a priority to advise us every step of the way."
While Hunt also spent considerable time talking with the
Colebrookdale Township board of commissioners prior to alerting
the media—and continued to alert them prior to any public
announcements—there was not the same participation by local
officials. This may be due, in part, to the board of commis-
sioners generally playing less of a central leadership role in
Colebrookdale than Nulman did in Clinton. Hunt also suggests
that local officials may also have been reluctant to take a lead
role on such a politically sensitive issue. Finally, township
officials Smoyer and Reichert received the impression that the
problem was too serious and technical for them to play a sig-
nificant role. This suggests that agency officials might need to
emphasize the potentially valuable role local officials can play.
In both Pennsylvania and New Jersey the agencies went to
great lengths to coordinate state efforts with high level task
forces. They also spent considerable energy enlisting coopera-
tion from federal agencies. This may have been easier in New
Jersey's case because radon was a recognized problem, and a
certain amount of cooperation already existed among state and
federal agencies on the issue. Perhaps just as important,
because of Boyertown, EPA had policies and procedures in place.
A5. Allow for two-way communication with the community. Both
Pennsylvania and New Jersey officials made concerted efforts to
develop a dialogue with the community, thus by most accounts
helping to reduce tension. Community meetings were marked by
lengthy question and answer sessions, and all government offi-
cials spent hours on the phone listening to people's concerns and
personally conveying test results. In Clinton continuing
questions about health risks led to a session for homeowners on
health risks. In fact, the Saturday meetings held fairly
regularly for homeowners in Clinton at times were reported to be
closer to an informal discussion than a government-sponsored
meeting.
Informal communication and networks may have been almost as
important as public meetings and briefings. Brennan tells the
story of a homeowner who was not included in the EPA research
project and felt particularly angry because he thought he had the
highest radon level. Brennan not only corrected the mispercep-
11
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tion but made it a point to stop by and meet With the homeowner
and the contractor. Both Watras and Jones p^int out the impor-
tance of the private, off-the-record conversations they had with
government officials.
'However, Watras suggests that PADER's message in public
meetings was more general and technical, rather than specific to
people's concerns. Nulman also suggests that NJDOH's discussions
with him were easier to follow than their formal presentations.
Although it's obviously easier to talk to individuals than to go
on-the-record in public meetings, officials may want to strive to
develop a similar sense of openness and willingness to respond to
concerns.
A6. Protect confidentiality of individuals while encouraging
homeowners to talk with each other. The principle in both
Pennsylvania and New Jersey of safeguarding the confidentiality
of test results is now accepted practice. Officials went to
great lengths to protect the confidentiality of homeowners by
using unmarked cars, dressing informally, carrying equipment in
non-descript bags, and withholding identifying information from
the media.
However, a distinction needs to be made between protecting
the identity of individuals and needlessly encouraging secrecy.
Cahill feels that her sampling was made easier by people talking
to each other about the program before she got to the door, and
Brennan also noted informal networks among people that may have
helped to reduce the stress. While NJDEP protected confiden-
tiality by requiring homeowners to show invitation letters for
"homeowner-only" meetings, these meetings by virtue of their
intimacy may have also helped people to support each other and
maintain a sense of community.
Further, it is important to be clear that the reason for
confidentiality is to protect the privacy of homeowners, so it is
not mistaken for government's trying to keep information from the
community. In Boyertown, efforts to respect homeowners' privacy
may have lent the situation an air of secrecy that was misinter-
preted by homeowners, according to Jones.
A7. Anticipate how your actions will look to those outside the
agency. Government officials often deal with public reaction to
actions which seem logical, fair, and consistent to those in the
agency but appear otherwise to those outside. Rather than deal
with the confusion after the action has been taken, agencies can
anticipate the reaction and (a) modify the action or (b) ac-
knowledge in advance that the action might be misconstrued and
explain it.
For example, in order to reduce charges of inequity and
potential conflict with the community, NJDEP and EPA spent
12
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fdv,^!"*16 effor^ exPlaini"g «»e EPA research project in
advance of announcing which homes were to be - chosen Thev «o^=
but also on other variables which were carefuUy spilled out for
tntv^r*-1'1*118 Were made available^all Aomeowners'so that
they all derived some tangible benefit from the research
ssas: s/ss-s: 2s,svss SMS
s^r
.
°"aaeCeSSar *" tO 1
-------
both states recognized that people might be cVerly alarmed about
concerns ranging from health risks to property values. They
attempted to deal directly with people's concerns and spent
considerable effort transmitting caring as well as facts.
1 As Hunt put it, "The agency's goal was to empathize with
people." In both Pennsylvania and New Jersey officials at all
levels spent considerable time "hand-holding," including extreme-
ly lengthy conversations with people about issues other than
those within the agencies' mandates. NJDEP went so far as to
remove an employee from the radon information line who wasn't
able to help people talk through their concerns.
Cahill noted the importance of "taking a different approach
with homeowners based on their reaction." In essence, Cahill and
others tried to calm down homeowners who seemed overly excited
and to "wake up" those who seemed insufficiently motivated to
take action.
While indicating concern goes a long way towards creating
good relationships between the agency and people involved,
credibility is ultimately built by the translation into action.
As NJDEP's Deieso put it, "From the first public meeting on, we
promised, and then delivered."
Individuals' previous faith in government may also affect
the extent to which trust is built during a particular situation.
For example, because Watras generally has faith in government,
which was bolstered by first-hand impressions of PADER represen-
tatives as "concerned and caring," Watras was willing to give
them the benefit of the doubt in many instances. However,
government may have to spend more effort on building trust and
credibility with others in the community who are less trusting to
begin with.
B. Explaining the Risk
A great deal of research has been conducted concerning ways
to present information about radon risk most effectively.4 The
following recommendations derived from the case studies suggest
some additional concerns for officials to consider when explain-
ing radon risk.
Bl. Make sure your message consistently emphasizes the potential
seriousness of the problem and what people can do about it.
Government officials in Clinton consistently gave what Michael
Drewniak of the Hunterdon Democrat called the "bad news" (radon
is a serious problem) and the "good news" (you can do something
about it).
The dual nature of the message seems particulary important
14
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in the case of radon, which unlike other environmental health
risks poses a potentially serious risk and requires people to
take individual action, rather than relying on government. The
"bad news-good news" message can (a) alert the apathetic to have
their homes tested and mitigate, if necessary, and (b) reassure
thoste who have high levels that the problem is correctable.
The reinforcement of both parts of this message through the
media, public meetings, and actions of state officials seems
important to transform stress into meaningful action. For
example, unless officials let homeowners know that radon problems
can be solved, they will not be inclined to test. Success
stories of reducing radon levels in homes elsewhere may be a key
to both reassuring the alarmed and motivating the apathetic. As
Tappan emphasized, "I wanted to put their minds at ease that it
wasn't a problem that could not be coped with and handled...that
it was a problem that had been dealt with in other places."
Craig suggests that "Once people understand the problem and
that it can be mitigated, they looked at the problem more
realistically." Therefore, while EPA and contractors were
evaluating homes for the research project, they told people "If
you are not chosen, these are the things we recommend you do
immediately. Keep your windows open and that will take you to a
safe level." Craig explained that by the next heating season,
they hoped to have technology available that all homeowners could
use.
B2. Acknowledge uncertainty while being clear about potential
seriousness of the risk. In both Pennsylvania and New Jersey
some observers noted that agency officials seemed far more
credible because they admitted uncertainties about health risks.
As Beckley suggests, "DEP told the truth.... They said *We don't
know1 when they didn't That's the sort of public posture
that leads one to trust." Schneider also pointed out that in
Pennsylvania "There were a lot of uncertainties, and they were
honest about it."
However, the uncertainties must be placed in context to
avoid confusing people unnecessarily. For example, although
extrapolating from occupational health studies involves a great
deal of scientific guesswork, agencies feel the evidence strongly
suggests that radon is a serious risk. Klotz attempted to put
this uncertainty in perspective by saying scientists felt far
more confident about the risks of radon than the risks posed by
many of the substances people are concerned about in their
drinking water in New Jersey. Klotz stressed the importance of
explaining uncertainties but "being clear about priorities" so
the bottom line about the potential for serious health risks
comes through clearly. Stressing the uncertainties without
putting them into context can create the appearance that the
agency is revealing less than it knows, when, in fact, the agency
15
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is attempting to be forthcoming. f
r
Nulman took a pragmatic approach to explaining uncertainty
by suggesting that regardless of the doubts, people should take
action: "This is one of the few environmental hazards that you
can do something about. Why ignore it?...Why not remove all
doubt?11
Klotz noted the importance of addressing the uncertainties
of translating risk probabilities to the individual level by
anticipating "confusion ahead of time by saying we can't tell you
exactly what your individual risk is.11
B3. Put risk in perspective. Many interviewees stressed the
importance of comparing radon risks to those more familiar to
people. Pete Shellem, then of the Pottstown Mercury, emphasized
the importance of "giving comparative data so people could make
their own choices." Jones felt frustrated and confused about
radon until the comparative risks were explained to her.
Government officials, reporters, and citizens for the most
part preferred comparing radon to smoking than to other everyday
risks. (Comparing other environmental problems to smoking is
strongly discouraged because it compares a risk taken voluntarily
to those which are imposed, such as industrial pollution. How-
ever, comparing radon risk to smoking may be effective because:
(a) Natural risks feel less unfair than those "imposed" by
government or industry; (b) Government was taking the problem
seriously and using the comparison to alert people rather than to
trivialize the risk; and (c) The outcome in both cases is lung
cancer, which provides a stronger base for the comparison.)
According to William Belanger, radiation specialist with the EPA,
"Maggie Reilly had come up with the conversion that 20 pCi/1 was
equal to about one pack a day and that was a big thing we used to
communicate risk because everybody was pretty aware of the risks
of smoking..."
Officials noted that it is helpful to give people guidance
about their levels but to avoid calling levels "safe" or "dan-
gerous." Comparing readings to the federal action level of 4
pCi/1 is critical to putting the risk in context. However, Klotz
cautioned that it was important not to suggest that levels below
4 were "safe" or above 4 were "dangerous." Instead the EPA
approach to correlating ranges with other information might be
more useful. (EPA is funding further research on this subject.)
When officials are confronted with a new risk as in Boyer-
town, rarely are there established, uniform action levels.
However, it may be useful to give information about levels of
contamination that triggered actions in similar situations. For
example, Tappan felt it critical in the absence of uniform
federal guidance to tell Boyertown homeowners the readings that
16
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had been used to guide government action in Colorado for homes
built on uranium mill tailings as well as numbers used to deal
with homes in Montclair, New Jersey built on contaminated fill.
While these numbers can be given with appropriate caveats,
failing to give them may lead to resentment. For example, Jones
said that when Tappan told her, "If I had anything above a .02 WL
I would want my home fixed," it was the first time she was "given
a number to go by."
People can better understand their readings if they are
explained in relationship to exposure: (a) one reading needs to
viewed in terms of average yearly exposure; (b) a basement
reading should be supplemented by readings in living areas to
give an accurate picture of exposure; and (c) the amount of time
spent in the home must be factored in.
However, all these comparisons must be used cautiously so
they help people see their risk accurately rather than to
minimize or trivialize risks. In order to represent the risk
accurately, it might be most helpful to use several of the ways
described above.
B4. Be forthright about the risk. Although it may be uncomfort-
able to discuss risks with people facing high levels of radon
contamination, people cope better with information than without.
As Jones explained, "They said 'You may not like what I have to
tell you1 and I said *A11 I ask is that you be truthful and
honest.1" According to Belanger, there are ways to put the risk
information into context so that it is less frightening than just
simply numbers: "I told her [Jones] not only the chances of
dying of cancer, but a little more information.... [I asked]
*how long have you lived in this house?1—and looked at one-year
risks...and said * let's calculate what the risk is....1 It was
higher than you'd like to see, but it wasn't spectacular...."
Belanger felt the explanation of the risk relieved Jones' mind,
and Jones confirmed that Belanger's explanation helped her a
great deal.
Being forthright about the risks also may be important so
that people take the risk seriously. "I think you need to be
right up front with them, be very honest.... Many homes still
exist out there where there is a true health hazard," says
Tappan.
B5. Deal with concerns other than health risks. When motivating
people to test and mitigate, consider directly addressing
concerns about property values. According to those we inter-
viewed, many people other than those with very high readings seem
to be equally, if not more concerned, about questions related to
property values than they are about health risks. "Most of the
homeowners were more interested in whether the house could be
fixed if there was a problem," according to Tappan.
17
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According to some we interviewed, government might go even
further and use property values as a means to motivate people to
mitigate. Tappan states, "I've found the best way to get the
public's interest...is to relate it to the value of their
property A home is probably the biggest investment they have
in their lives, and they should protect that investment." A
number of government officials say they informally urge people to
think of property values if the health risk does not motivate
them to remediate. But Belanger suggests he would feel more
inclined to take this approach if he had some data about property
values before and after mitigation. Realtor Greco said that her
agency's emphasis was on advising people to find out and reme-
diate before they went to contract to avoid problems later on.
B6. Address people's immediate concerns first. Then back up and
fill in the scientific concepts. According to Klotz, the
homeowner's meeting dealing with health risks was somewhat
confusing and lengthy because NJDOH explained conceptual informa-
tion about risk and embedded in those explanations more specific
information about radon risk. Instead, Klotz and others we
interviewed suggested that it makes more sense to address
people's concerns directly and then give the scientific explana-
tion. As Klotz put it, "Answer the questions in the context of
[the science], but don't try to give a more formal conceptual
lesson until their emotional needs have been expressed."
Questions raised in New Jersey and Pennsylvania included:
"My daughter is 20 years old and has been living here all her
life. You say the latency period is 20 years. Does this mean
she is going to get cancer now?"
"What should we do about children's toys that have been in
basements with very high radon levels?"
"Is there more lung cancer found in our area?"
"Will people have to leave their homes?"
"What about children?"
"What about real estate values?"
People also had many basic questions about remediation
including concerns about how-to's, contractors, and financing.
Officials in both states were asked questions for which they
didn't yet have answers. Experience of agency practitioners
suggests that, in such cases, officials need to be clear about
why they don't know the answer and, when possible, indicate what
they are going to do to find out an answer.
18
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surest th °ne area' officialsn*ight gS out^f^hei^i11?^1^ a
4-v» A. i_ *-i*tsio yet T»neir homes tested
•»-K« ^ *. • maP w^s finally published that «
s-Jsissa K ssi s:.R-M""
a,. .„« •" *ch°o1-
b.
just use different words HHH; oer nand, when
.
C. Holding Public Meetings
public but also for setting the tonl °?nveyin9 "formation to the
SSS^Ssr^axSSt
role government can play." Th.lJucdiS'o^firS^ttS.111*
19
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hinges on the factors discussed in the preceding sections and the
following: ,
Cl. Plan meetings carefully. Both New Jersey and Pennsylvania
officials spent considerable time in top level, interagency
meetings determining approaches to policy issues before the first
public meeting. In addition, NJDEP and NJDOH devoted time, both
separately and jointly, to clarifying goals for the meeting,
outlining an agenda, determining who was responsible for mate-
rial, developing approaches to explaining information, and an-
ticipating likely questions and potential responses. PADER's
Hunt also coordinated a "dress rehearsal" prior to the first
meeting. "I couldn't overemphasize the need to sit down and
develop a good plan and...properly rehearsed agendas so everyone
is well aware of what the other person is going to say," states
Tappan.
New Jersey officials emphasized the need for clear goals for
the meeting, such as conveying the "good news, bad news" message
explained in guideline Bl. Telling people what they can do may
be as essential as explaining to homeowners the seriousness of
the problem. Also key was giving a sense of both government's
competence and the importance of the community in solving the
problem. "We wanted them to leave with the notion that this is
not an untenable situation, and while we may not have all the
answers to the problem, we were going to work collectively and
cooperatively on it," says Nicholls. During a crisis, when there
seems to be little time to discuss goals, it may be even more
important to clarify them; when the situation is tense, there is
less margin for error. Anticipating and planning for events that
might occur, as NJDEP did by discussing in advance policies for
evacuation of homeowners, can relieve some of the pressure and
prevent some of the problems that may arise from "flying by the
seat of the pants."
Agencies need to pay particular attention to preparing
presentations that may be confusing or problematic, such as
explanations of health risks, which many of those interviewed
said easily became overly complex and technical.
C2. Choose carefully those who will represent the agency and
coordinate their roles. Public meetings are important not only
to convey information but to give the community direct access to
government officials. While community residents generally don't
have a lot of experience assessing technical information, they
have a great deal of experience evaluating others' credibility.
In fact, homeowners' judgments about the "messenger" may
determine whether they believe the message. Thus, agencies
should consider choosing spokespeople based on technical exper-
tise and ability to communicate effectively and sensitively.
Nulman suggests that Nicholls, who is a radiation physicist
20
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with a teaching background, was a Mgood plus'f at the first public
meeting. Hunt, on the other hand, advocates;using community
relations people as lead spokespeople "because a person who is
trained in dealing with people, who does it instinctively, deals
with the real gut issue.... Technical people are worried about
how to count picocuries...." However, Tappan counsels that it is
equally dangerous to rely on non-technical staff who are not
entirely familiar with the subject matter, and he advises that
agencies might be "well-advised to lean on technical people
heavier." The mix of technical expertise and ability "to instill
a feeling of confidence" is difficult to find, but essential for
successful public meetings, according to Craig. One approach to
developing this blend of "people skills" and technical expertise
is to provide communications training for technical staff,
augmented by on-going advice and feedback from community rela-
tions staff who serve as members of the team developing radon
policy.
Tappan noted that sometimes it might be wiser to rely on a
single spokesperson at a public meeting to reduce confusion due
to "conflicting information." Others suggested that including
spokespeople with expertise in particular areas—for example,
mitigation and health risks—can be essential to give meaningful
information. In fact, NJDEP officials suggested that having a
number of spokespeople enabled them to clarify ambiguities and
correct misimpressions that individual speakers might have failed
to notice. However, they emphasized the need to coordinate
presentations carefully to avoid confusion and duplication.
Tappan suggested that sometimes it's appropriate for
agencies to bring in outside experts who can lend credibility.
C3. Consider involving local representatives as spokespeople.
Local spokespeople who already have credibility with the com-
munity can lend an element of trust to the statements of outside
officials. As Deieso put it, "Many times we will go into a
meeting and the mayor is up there with us but it's very clear
that it's not the mayor's meeting.... [But Nulman] provided an
opportunity for what had to be said, and he fully supported
everything we were saying.... The flavor was * Trust these
people; I trust them....1" Nulman felt that "If the public went
away feeling there was a good effective partnership between the
town and the state, that they weren't being given a line, and
that there was a good plan, then the meeting served a purpose."
Almost everyone interviewed gave Nulman of Clinton a large
measure of credit for helping to turn the stress into problem-
solving. As BeckLey suggests, "tensions kept turning back to
facts.... He did not get on a soapbox and emotionalize it, [but]
said they were going to work together to lick it." While this
type of role can be played by officials from outside of the
community, local officials who are respected in their communities
21
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are probably more likely to have the necessar^ credibility.
f
C4. Anticipate questions, address those concerns in initial
presentations, and leave plenty of time for additional questions.
The initial public meetings in both Pennsylvania and New Jersey
allotted substantial amounts of time for questions—at least as
long as the presentations—and officials stayed as long as
necessary to address community concerns.
Klotz suggested that presentations are most effective if
they anticipate arid address homeowners' immediate questions (see
guideline B6). Deieso remembers New Jersey officials asking each
other in advance "What are you going to say when they ask...?"
and reviewing each other's responses. In both Pennsylvania and
New Jersey agencies did some homework to respond to likely
questions such as those regarding the lung cancer rate in the
area.
While public officials grapple with issues at a policy or
public health level, homeowners' concerns are quite personal.
Although their questions may be posed in intensely personal
terms, such questions often reflect the concerns of many others
in the room and give agency officials an opportunity to clarify
statements made earlier. While some questions may be better
answered one-on-one after the meeting, Jones stressed the
importance of being able to respond to bottom-line, personal
questions publicly to avoid confusion and frustration.
C5. Use meetings to encourage people to take action. Agencies
in both New Jersey and Pennsylvania used the public meetings not
only to reassure people about high levels but to make it easy for
them to test their homes. In Clinton testing kits were dis-
tributed at the meeting, and in Boyertown residents were en-
couraged to call PADER to have technicians come out and test.
C6. Hold meetings frequently in times and settings comfortable
to the community and continue ongoing dialogue with the com-
munity. Craig emphasized the importance of frequent communica-
tion, instead of waiting to release a final report, in order to
update homeowners on progress in their community. Frequent
meetings and ongoing communication also provide an opportunity to
reinforce the messages of previous meetings, build trust, and
allow community residents to exchange information.
In both states meetings were held in the immediate community
during hours when homeowners could easily attend. Although New
Jersey officials were initially skeptical of Nulman's suggestion
for holding meetings on Saturday mornings, the timing worked out
well, adding an atmosphere of informality and allowing people to
bring their children instead of having to hire babysitters.
People also responded favorably to the agency officials going out
of their way to be helpful: "People said 'Thank you for coming up
22
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11^7- ' Xt WdS aS lf We had d°ted ^mething, »
said
C7. Debrief and evaluate meetings. Some of the agency officials
interviewed for this project acknowledged that it woSld have been
useful to debrief formally or to evaluate in other ways thl
strengths and limitations of their outreach efforts generally and
the public meetings in particular. y«neraj.j.y ana
™H o^T^f*17' *. cr*sis atmosphere prevailed in both states,
and officials worked long hours under tremendous pressure.
?^eV^' ^en llmited evaluation might have ultimately increased
the effectiveness of agency officials and identified community
attitudes or potential misunderstandings early, in addition
evaluation might have confirmed whether officials' perceptions of
community response were, in fact, on target. Some of the
interviews for this study, for example, revealed conflicting
impressions of public response at the Boyertown meetings. More
definitive feedback could have provided a better sense of
homeowners' understanding of the radon problem, their motivation
o?f£?»i. ^ conce£ns' ?m°tional response, trust in government
o etc. Just as important, evaluation could serve as
L5°^h?meOWnerS.!° have input into the Program being
for their community.
Evaluation need not be elaborate to accomplish these
™2n™1V^ — diC°Ul^ include short debriefing sessions among
agency officials and one-page questionnaires completed bv
residents at the close of the meetings.5
that s?/™^' J?J?^S SUSan Klucharich developed a questionnaire
that she mailed to homeowners to ask them to give feedback on the
state's informational efforts. Klucharich 's evaluation (which
she suggests elicited generally favorable response) was hampered
*y a number of factors, such as limited return, that could be
overcome by asking for feedback at meetings.
D. Communicating with the Media
Government officials in both states were extremely leery of
the media sensationalizing the story of extraordinarily hiah
radon levels. On the other hand, as Dallas suggested, "We felt
an important aspect was education, and the press could help us do
this." in fact, even a well-attended public meeting attracts
only a portion of community residents. Media coverage is
important to extend the impact of public meetings to others who
should consider testing. "«*« wno
While agency officials dealing with Clinton and Boyertown
found newspaper coverage in general to be what NJDEP's Jim
Staples termed "about what you'd expect in a situation like
23
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this,11 realtors, perhaps more sensitive to thfe immediate impact,
were nearly uniformly dismayed by what they perceived as the
media's over-attention to the sensational aspects of the problem.
Nearly everyone who was interviewed regarding media coverage in
Clinton also drew a clear distinction between TV and newspaper
stories, voicing great concerns about TV reporters1 disruption of
residents1 lives, predictions of doom, and inappropriate
coverage.
Many of the suggestions in the preceding sections may ba
helpful to improving media coverage. The following are specific
to dealing with the media:
Dl. Alert local officials prior to the press and consider
involving them as spokespeople. Officials in both states were
scrupulous about briefing local officials prior to taking the
story to the media. In Pennsylvania, Hunt called township
supervisors individually to discuss the situation prior to
briefing them in the presence of a reporter contacted by Hunt.
New Jersey officials briefed Nulman, and he then chose to take
the lead in dealing with reporters who were congregating outside
his office. While NJDEP officials were quoted about technical
concerns, Nulman gave a personal perspective that may have helped
reassure readers: "...This is not the time for mothers to clutch
their children and run into the streets."
D2. Initiate contacts with the media rather than delaying
notification. Continue contact. As discussed earlier, delaying
release of a story is likely to do more harm than good. Ac-
cording to Staples, "The longer you wait to notify the media, the
more they will be curious about why you delayed. The more
government lets people in on the action, the more they will
respect government for forthrightness."
Neither Pennsylvania nor New Jersey officials notified the
media through a technical briefing or press conference. In
Pennsylvania a press release was issued several days after the
briefing in the presence of the reporter. In Clinton, as Staples
put it, "Reporters began to hear the jungle drums. They were one
step ahead of our putting together a coherent presentation."
Staples acknowledged that, although the NJDEP by all accounts did
an excellent job of responding to inquiries, such a presentation
might have been useful, particularly if more than a small number
of local papers were involved. As Drewniak suggested, "If we
don't have all the information, [sources] will see the story and
say 'that's not the whole picture.' Just tell me the whole
picture and we can avoid this from the outset."
Reporters in both states gave officials credit for being
accessible throughout the story, but some agreed that holding
technical briefings might have been useful. For example,
although reporters talked afterwards with officials about the
24
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' »
information conveyed to homeowners in closed Meetings, formal
briefings might have led to additional coverage useful to
homeowners outside of Clinton Knolls. Craig also suggests call-
in shows as a good way to raise awareness, respond to homeowner
concerns, and promote dialogue.
^H™™ rep°f*ersv.ma£,,be Particulany Prone to run stories about
radon as a "time bomb" and to project fear about property values
This may be due, in part, to the nature of the medium^ which is
forced to cover cpmplex stories in short film bites. The
negative focus may also be due to out-of-town reporters beinq
less concerned about avoiding panic. Although concerned about TV
reporters' tendency to blow the story out of proportion, Nulman
decided they would do the story with him or without him and the
story would be better with his perspective than without.
In fact, media consultants generally agree with Nulman that
the best defense is a good offense; the most effective way to
temper a negative story is to supply the positive side, with
visuals for TV, if possible. Officials are now in a better
position to temper "gloom and doom" stories with examples of
successful remediation and the booming economies in both Clinton
and Boyertown. While local reporters might want to highlight the
"new" problem in the area, officials can explain the standard
approaches to dealing with radon. In addition, government
officials can supply TV reporters with visuals that are more
appropriate than "For Sale" signs might be. For example, they
can show how a radon detector or ventilation fan works. While
these visuals might not replace shots of "For Sale" signs they
might help give the story a bit more balance. Working to help
reporters cover the story more appropriately is far less time-
consuming than trying to correct misinformation after the storv
has run. *
D3. Be as clear, down-to-earth, and quotable as possible. Early
media reports have the potential to set the stage for the story
framing it so that homeowners respond with appropriate concern '
Downplaying the health risks may reassure people, but also
promotes denial of a potentially serious problem. Some early
press reports quoted PADER representatives as saying "This is not
a public health problem" and that radon was "...not a danger to
the general population." While the intent may have been to point
out that the radon problem is tied to individual homes, such
statements can be confusing. As discussed earlier, it may be
more useful to stress what can be done, and what government is
doing, to solve the problem. (Admittedly, this might have been
difficult in Boyertown due to the uncertainty surrounding mitiga-
tion soon after the first hot spot was discovered.) Sources can
point out explicitly what people can do to have their homes
tested and the cost, if any.
Reporters covering Clinton gave New Jersey sources high
25
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marks for being down to earth and understandable. "What [Sta-
ples] did best was to put it in terms that ypu could write in a
newspaper for a layman.. .very informational and quotable,11
according to Drewniak. Nulman had a knack of putting the message
in quotable statements people still recall. While most worked
well', he regrets saying that Clinton was not a "Love Canal"—the
negative assertion might have made the image more rather than
less meaningful.
Anticipating reporters' questions can help prepare useful,
coherent answers. Staples suggests that NJDEP appeared know-
ledgeable to reporters because as a former reporter he was able
to predict what they would want to know and work with Nicholls to
develop appropriate responses.
D4. Maintain the confidentiality of homeowners, but consider
ways to help reporters cover mitigation. As discussed earlier,
all government officials stressed the importance of maintaining
homeowners1 confidentiality. Staples suggests that government
should treat homeowners1 test results with the same degree of
confidentiality that doctors treat their patients1.
PADER tried very hard, but failed, to keep Watras1 identity
confidential as he requested. Reporters, knowing that Watras
worked for Philadelphia Electric and the general location of the
home, were able to track him down relatively quickly. New Jersey
officials may have been more successful protecting confiden-
tiality because less identifying information was known about the
"discovery" house.,
Newspaper reports of Clinton briefly noted that the home-
owners1 identities were withheld due to state policy. However, a
report in the Reading Eaale. that state officials "flatly refused
to identify the family..." made officials sound furtive. Because
reporters are particularly suspicious of any attempts by govern-
ment to withhold information, government officials may need to
stress why identifying information is being withheld, using the
doctor-patient relationship as an analogy. Reporters are
unlikely to be dissuaded from trying to track identities, but
they may be less likely to accuse the state of secrecy.
While reporters in Clinton acknowledged that they could
cover the story adequately without knowing homeowners1 iden-
tities, Drewniak pointed out that it was far more difficult to
write stories on remediation without examples. He felt that to
get beyond basic information, he needed to talk to a homeowner
who had remediated to discuss mitigation explicitly. Because
"success stories" might encourage more people to test and
remediate, it might be worthwhile for government officials to
make it easier for reporters to cover remediation. Craig
suggests that officials ask homeowners if they would be willing
to speak to the press and, if so, give homeowners the telephone
26
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numbers of reporters. Thus, officials could never be accused of
giving out identities and the decision remains the homeowner's.
Officials could also conduct remediation workshops or briefings
that would give reporters better "news pegs.11
IN CONCLUSION
It is not especially noteworthy that hindsight suggests ways
agencies might have communicated more effectively. It is far
more noteworthy that when faced with tremendous pressure and
uncertainty the agencies communicated as well as they did. In
both cases that effectiveness was due in large measure to
officials1 commitment to dealing with what they perceived as a
serious health hazard. But nearly all government officials
suggested that circumstances beyond their control—some used the
word "luck"—played a large part. In truth, if Watras hadn't
fortuitously worked for Philadelphia Electric, radon might yet be
waiting to sound alarms.
Officials connected with Clinton attribute their success to
circumstances that are difficult to replicate. The team was
remarkable: a mayor with outstanding leadership abilities who
was more interested in solving problems than casting blame; a
radiation physicist with teaching experience; a press officer
with extensive reporting experience; and other officials who were
not only competent but by all accounts extremely personable and
approachable. The hot spot was discovered when homeowners could
open their windows to reduce their levels, thus reducing their
fear and the pressure on government officials. And just as
important, government officials had the benefit of the experience
in Boyertown. As Deieso suggests, this combination of cir-
cumstances may never occur again. However, armed with the
lessons learned during the Clinton situation, government offi-
cials may be able to cope better with communities where the
circumstances are less ideal.
27
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VERNON, NEW JERSEY f
f
In June 1986 NJDEP officials unveiled a plan to deposit a
blend of radium contaminated soil and "clean dirt" in a quarry in
Verrion, New Jersey. The result was a government official's
nightmare. In the following months the proposal precipitated
opposition in the form of a stormy public meeting attended by
approximately 3,000, a rally that attracted 10,000, and a
demonstration at the Governor's mansion that brought demonstra-
tors out in a caravan of hundreds of cars.
It is an understatement that public response in Vernon to
radium-contaminated soil differed from that in Clinton and
Boyertown to naturally occurring radon. In fact, a NJDEP offi-
cial suggests that the only thing Vernon and Clinton had in
common was "the r word." While the situation in Vernon was
admittedly quite different than in the other communities, the
following analysis suggests why public reaction in Vernon might
have been so different and the extent to which the lessons
learned in Clinton and Boyertown might have relevance to situa-
tions such as Vernon. As described in the Methodology section of
this report, the events of Vernon and quotations from the
participants are derived from a study conducted by Rutgers
University's Eagleton Institute of Politics.
SUMMARY OF EVENTS
The radium-contaminated soil, which NJDEP tried to dispose
of in Vernon, resulted from excavation around homes in Montclair,
New Jersey. These homes had been built on contaminated fill from
the radium ore processing industry that existed in New Jersey in
the early 1900s. The excavation was part of a pilot study
initiated by NJDEP in May 1984 to reduce what state and federal
officials judged to be the significant health risks resulting
from gamma radiation and radon in these homes, which are desig-
nated as part of a Superfund site. Although NJDEP had secured a
permit in advance of excavation for out-of-state disposal of the
soil, that plan was blocked by court challenges. By the time
NJDEP tried to dispose of the soil in Vernon, there were 5,000
barrels on front lawns of homeowners in Montclair. Another
10,000 barrels were temporarily stored in Kearny, New Jersey,
which was bitterly opposed by some members of that community.
Thus, even before Vernon was proposed as a "host community," the
situation in Montclair and disposal of the radium-contaminated
soil was a high profile issue in the state.
NJDEP's idea of blending the contaminated soil with clean
soil and then burying it was investigated by an engineering firm
with a mandate from NJDEP to complete the on-going study in one
week. Before Vernon was chosen as the site for soil blending and
28
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burial, the concept was endorsed by NJDEP's Sjcience Advisory
Board, five scientists appointed to give NJDEP input on scien-
tific issues, as well as by many Montclair officials. According
to a NJDEP press release, Vernon was chosen after study of 900
sites, and nosed out another quarry site because restoring the
quarry in Vernon would add 100 acres to park land. Although
later disputed by the Vernon community, the agency felt that soil
blending would reduce the risk of the Montclair soil to a minimal
level.
The residents did not know in advance that their community
was being considered as host for the dirt. According to the
Eagleton study, "It was not until Commissioner Dewling met with
town officials on the eve of the public announcement that anyone
in Vernon knew of NJDEP's plan." Commissioner Dewling, surprised
that local officials invited the media to what he considered a
closed meeting, "simply announced that the Vernon quarry had been
chosen to host the blended dirt," rather than discussing with
municipal officials how to proceed. Within days the Vernon
township attorney had filed suit to block the soil-blending plan.
At the next township meeting the mayor took an active role in
urging community opposition to the plan and appointed a group of
citizens to advise the township. A delegation of citizens met
with NJDEP and, dissatisfied with NJDEP's response, formed a
citizen group with the stated goal of keeping the soil out of
Vernon. Citizen opposition built to a public meeting in July of
approximately 3,000 people, followed by a large protest at the
Governor's mansion. In late July a rally to oppose the disposal
of the soil was attended by 10,000 people. Meanwhile, NJDEP
asked the group of citizens appointed by the mayor to review
NJDEP documents in hopes the committee would agree that the
blending plan was safe. Because a "radical faction" of Vernon
residents threatened violence, civil disobedience training was
offered as an alternative by a New York-based group, which
organized its own protest rally of 3,500. In November NJDEP
publicly announced that soil blending and disposal would not take
place in the Vernon quarry.
ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC RESPONSE
The response of the Vernon community was obviously marked by
anger. The question is why.
One of the ironies of the events in Vernon is that Vernon
residents protesting the disposal of soil in the quarry in their
community were potentially at risk from naturally occurring radon
in their homes. Research indicates that most homeowners in New
Jersey, including those in areas more likely to be at risk, do
not plan to test.6 Therefore it is extremely likely that the
overwhelming majority of the thousands of protesters had not
taken action to test for naturally occurring radon. In short,
29
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Vernon residents reacted strongly to what NJDfeP considered a
negligible risk—the soil-blending plan—and;failed to respond to
a potentially serious one—naturally occurring radon. In
addition, although several of the same officials were involved in
both cases, Vernon residents responded with far more anger to
NJDEP officials than did the Clinton community. There are a
number of compelling reasons for these different reactions.
The story of citizen opposition in Vernon is not essentially
a story about radon. It is a showdown between an agency and a
community over an agency decision. NJDEP was perceived as
importing an outside risk, as opposed to taking action to
mitigate an existing one as in Clinton. While the agency firmly
believed the risk of the blended soil was negligible, the
community disputed the agency's process for bringing this risk to
their town (which was called by the mayor a violation of the
town's civil rights) as well as its assessment of the magnitude
of the risk. In addition, according to Larainne Koehler, health
physicist with EPA Region II, the residents of Vernon had already
been engaged in a longstanding battle with NJDEP regarding the
presence of satellite earth stations in the community. As a
result, says Koehler, residents were "already sensitized—however
unfairly—against DEP."
The events of Vernon illustrate (a) community resentment
towards imposed risk; (b) the tendency to view imposed risks as
more objectionable and therefore riskier than voluntary or
natural risks which pose the same or greater threat; and (c) the
community's commitment to fight the agency on any grounds.7 In
the case of Vernon, the contamination happened to be radioactive
soil. In truth, the exact nature of the contaminant probably was
relatively unimportant.
Whether appropriate or not, the community took the risk very
seriously, while the agency was seen as dismissing both the risk
and community concern about it. Marianne Reilley, a member of
the citizen group and one of the residents appointed by the mayor
to review NJDEP actions, charged that NJDEP dismissed citizen
fears by calling the soil "just dirt." Thus, the agency, which
was likely to be cast by the town as a villain for importing the
risk, was viewed even more suspiciously for failing to respond to
what the community felt were legitimate concerns. By responding
belatedly to what it considered the inappropriate reaction of
residents, the agency may have increased citizen hostility, and
unwittingly helped to ensure that Vernon residents would perceive
the agency even more negatively. Although the agency may have
intended a softer approach with the community and felt sandbagged
by the media and town officials from the outset, the agency's
actions spoke more loudly to the community than its intentions.
Vernon residents didn't merely oppose the soil-blending
plan, they opposed the agency. On the other hand, with naturally
30
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occurring radon, there is no enemy, no target^ that can be
identified with moving the risk or charged with unfairness for
importing the problem from one community to another. Thus the
risk is apt to be seen as less threatening, less unfair, and
ultimately less serious. Furthermore, as discussed in the
following section, government officials took the risk of natural-
ly occurring radon seriously in Clinton and Boyertown, further
reducing the likelihood of the agency being cast as villains or
the community becoming overly alarmed.
The mayors of both Clinton and Vernon also took lead roles
in shaping community response. The mayor of Clinton, who viewed
NJDEP officials as part of the solution to his community's radon
problem, not as part of the problem, made a commitment to work
with NJDEP officials and urged community residents to do the
same. On the other hand, the mayor of Vernon, who could easily
view NJDEP as part of the problem rather than as part of the
solution, worked against NJDEP to eliminate the problem from his
community and urged community residents to do the same. Thus,
while both mayors might have seen themselves as working to
protect their communities, the mayor of Clinton both reassured
people about the level of the risk and urged citizens to test and
mitigate for radon. The mayor of Vernon acted to protect the
community by alarming people further about the risk and suggest-
ing actions people could take to fight both the risk and the
agency that sought to impose it.
There may have been other factors which influenced the
reaction of Vernon residents and distinguished it from their own
reaction (or Clinton's reaction) to naturally occurring radon.
For example, people are likely to perceive their homes as "safe"
places. It may be difficult to convince them that something they
can't see or smell makes their homes hazardous.8 On the other
hand, the Vernon community's perception of the risk was in-
fluenced by highly publicized images of drums on Montclair lawns
and all the negative connotations that accompany chemical drums.
In addition, the potential risk in Vernon was ultimately from an
industrial source, which is likely to be viewed as inherently
more dangerous than a "natural" risk.
Risks that are not susceptible to individual control are
also apt to be seen as more threatening.9 While naturally
occurring radon can be mitigated by the individual, the perceived
threat in Vernon seemed entirely under government control. In
Clinton government officials increased the community's sense of
control—and reduced the likelihood of undue alarm—by suggesting
ways individuals could test and mitigate. Officials further
helped the risk seem less threatening—and increased the com-
munity's trust in NJDEP—by providing other actions for people to
take, such as calling NJDEP's information line, talking to NJDEP
staff at the municipal building, attending homeowners' meetings,
etc. In contrast, in Vernon people responded to a lack of
31
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individual control over the risk by collectives resistance to
government's control. Thus, the individual actions people could
take—from signing a petition to taking part in civil dis-
obedience training—were suggested by those who opposed the soil
blending and NJDEP.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The central issues in Vernon were ones of equity and
control. The agency attempted to impose a risk on the community,
seeing the risk as negligible and therefore acceptable. In turn,
the community resisted the imposition of the risk, the agency's
definition of the risk as minimal, and the agency's right to
determine the acceptability of the risk. While the agency spent
considerable energy attempting to convince the community that the
risk was negligible, the community remained skeptical and
continued to fight both the risk and the agency that sought to
impose it without consultation. Thus, the scenario in Vernon has
far more in common with the siting of hazardous waste facilities
than it does with alerting communities to radon risk.
The successful interactions with the communities of Boyer-
town and Clinton are unlikely to hold the key to siting, when
years of research and a multiplicity of models around the country
have failed to yield clear answers. Although the experiences in
Boyertown and Clinton do not suggest ways to ensure that an
agency can successfully site a facility or a quantity of slightly
contaminated dirt, they can suggest ways to avoid needlessly
increasing the tension between agencies and communities. The
following brief analysis suggests which recommendations from the
case studies of Boyertown and Clinton may have relevance to
siting situations such as Vernon's.
Setting the Context
As illustrated by Vernon, communities often perceive risks
differently than agencies. But the problem doesn't end there. An
agency's response to the risk is understandably based on the
agency's assessment of the risk, not the community's assessment.
For example, NJDEP did not arrange information telephone lines,
staffing of an on-site office, and EPA support in Vernon as it
did in Clinton because agencies are less likely to commit such
resources to problems they consider less serious.
In contrast, government agencies discovered the radon hazard
in Boyertown and Clinton and essentially rode into town to
protect homeowners from the threat. Because agency officials
were aware that the town could mistakenly cast them as villains,
they worked diligently to cast themselves in positive terms. The
agency officials' response to the community also differed from
32
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their response in Vernon, in large part, because of agency
officials' assessment of the risk. The agenct took community
concerns very seriously, because the officials considered the
risk serious.
Unfortunately, when agencies seem to be responding lightly
to risks that communities see as serious, they thereby increase,
rather than decrease, the disparity in the perceptions between
the community and the agency. When faced with what it perceives
as agency unwillingness to take its concerns seriously, the
community will often, as in the case of Vernon, increase its
insistence that the risk is unacceptable and continue to raise
the level of its opposition.
Agencies are thus faced with a dilemma. If a community
perceives a risk as serious but the agency perceives the risk as
minimal, a minimal response from the agency is likely to further
alarm and anger the community. However, agency officials are
understandably reluctant to make large commitments of agency
resources to problems they see as minimal. While there is no
easy way to deal with this conundrum, agencies need to recognize
early those problems which communities are apt to view more
seriously than the agency. In particular, agencies should
realize that risks imposed by outside sources are more likely
both to be resented and to be seen as serious.
At minimum, agencies should look towards involving com-
munities in decision-making processes that are as equitable as
possible. As Deputy Commissioner Michael Catania suggests, "We
should attempt a restoration of faith. That is what the advisory
board [citizens and scientists appointed by NJDEP after the
events of Vernon to make recommendations about disposal of the
barrels of soil from Montclair] is trying to do. Instead of our
consultant doing the work, we should have the people from the
towns and environmentalists participate...."
Agencies must become particularly aware of the effect their
actions (or inaction) will have on the community (guideline A7)
and strive even more diligently to allow two-way communication
with the community (guideline A5). (While NJDEP did schedule
availability sessions with the community, they were held after a
decision had been made. Hence, they were too little, too late
for the community to feel like dialogue was taking place.) Just
as important, communities must be given information quickly, so
the agencies* withholding of information is not allowed to become
a key issue (guideline A2). In addition, agencies must work even
harder to gain the trust of local officials, while realizing that
close teamwork between the officials imposing a risk and those
being handed a risk is quite unlikely. However, failure to treat
local officials with a great deal of sensitivity and considera-
tion is apt to increase hostility and distrust (guideline A4).
33
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Finally, agencies need to do careful science even when they're
confident the risk is trivial. ;
Explaining the Risk
The events in Vernon suggest that when an agency sees a risk
as less serious than the community does, agency efforts focused
on proving the minimal nature of the risk may be ineffective at
best and explosive at worst. An agency's insistence that its
view of the risk is "right" and the community's is "wrong" is
likely to escalate the power struggle. Instead, agencies should
give equal attention to setting the context for explaining the
risk and building credibility with the community.1" As Grace
Singer, chief of NJDEP's Community Relations Bureau, ac-
knowledged, by the time of the public hearing "the town was in
such an ugly mood, almost nothing would have satisfied them."
Alerting people to risks they view with apathy differs from
reassuring people about risks they view with alarm. Reassuring
people is particularly difficult if the goal of agency officials
is to push them to also accept the risk, as in Vernon, rather
than to mitigate the risk, as in Clinton and Boyertown. Regard-
less, officials are better off leading with the uncertainties
rather than waiting for community residents to point them out,
further undermining trust in the agency (guideline B2). Similar-
ly, officials should be seen as being forthright about the risk,
even if the risk is minimal (guideline B4). The resentment in
Reilley's remark shows the risk officials run by failing to
acknowledge the uncertainty: "In Montclair it was hazardous,
contaminated soil. Here it becomes 'just dirt.'" Although
officials believed the risk of the Nontclair soil would be
reduced to insignificant levels through blending, their response
seemed to the community to deny that the soil had ever been a
risk.
When an agency seeks to explain a risk it believes is
minimal to an audience that believes the risk is serious, the
agency must be very cautious about how it puts the risk in
perspective (guideline B3). Unlike the case of naturally
occurring radon, officials must guard against comparing risks
that people take voluntarily with those that are imposed, such as
the soil-blending plan. Thus, comparisons of smoking (a volun-
tary risk) to soil blending (an involuntary risk) would have made
people even angrier. Similarly, comparisons which seem intended
to trivialize the risk will be resisted by the community, as will
statements that imply that community residents can't adequately
comprehend the nature of the risk. As another citizen leader
explained, "What kind of mentality do they think we have? If
it's 'just dirt,' why move it?"
34
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Perhaps most important, officials need tb deal with people's
immediate concerns, and as in Clinton and Boyertown should be
prepared to discuss issues that may be traditionally considered
outside the agency's purview (guidelines B5 and B6). For
example, in Clinton and Boyertown agency officials discussed
concerns about property values and took steps to address those
concerns. However, the Eagleton case study suggests that agency
officials were less tolerant in Vernon of concerns about property
values. "...At face value a lot of things look like a community
is outraged for environmental reasons... and for health reasons,"
said Assistant Commissioner Donald Deieso, who implied that
community leaders' interest in plans for building condominiums
near the site might have been at the root of their opposition.
In truth, however, most communities that feel a risk is
being imposed without "due process" are likely to oppose that
risk on any grounds possible. Because the agency's and the
community's notion of due process differ, it is wise to solicit
community input on procedures. Most efforts to make the com-
munity understand risk as the agency does are unlikely to be
successful if the community feels vulnerable, angry, and un-
trusting.
Holding Public Meetings
Most of the recommendations for holding public meetings that
were cited earlier in this report also apply in situations such
as Vernon. When dealing with a hostile community it is even more
important to plan meetings well, choose spokespeople carefully,
anticipate questions, and evaluate the meeting. However, public
meetings in a community that is largely angry and greatly
committed to opposing an agency, as in Vernon, are not very
conducive to constructive dialogue. It is very difficult for
them to be anything but confrontations that give both sides an
opportunity to go on the record. To the extent possible, in
situations where the community is likely to be hostile, agencies
should hold small, informal problem-solving meetings with those
affected. These meetings are apt to be more constructive if they
are part of a decision-making process rather than merely an
opportunity for the public to respond to a decision the agency
has already made.11
Communicating with the Media
Most of the recommendations from Boyertown and Clinton also
extend to situations such as Vernon. However, as with public
meetings, by the time the issue is a battle, fighting it out in
the press is unlikely to help the community better appreciate the
agency's position. On the other hand, if an agency fails to
implement the recommendations such as alerting the press early—
35
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but after public officials—and making clear/ quotable state-
ments, the agency may worsen the situation. ;
A FINAL MOTE
Attempts to import a risk to a community, even a small risk,
will often elicit opposition. Failing to involve the community
in the decision-making process will virtually guarantee it. Once
the risk and the agency are perceived as "the enemy," changing
that image is very difficult. Implementing the suggestions from
the examples of Boyertown and Clinton may not help tremendously.
However, failing to implement the suggestions will worsen the
situation. When communities are extremely sensitive to risk,
agencies need to respond even more sensitively—while recognizing
that their efforts may not be immediately rewarded by greater
respect from the community.
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NOTES I
f
r
1. Van Horn, Carl, Jim Berzok, and Caryn Paul, "It's Just Dirt:
A Case Study of Radium-Contaminated Soil in New Jersey,"
Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers University, May
1987 •
2. Weinstein, Neil D., Peter M. Sandman, and Mary Lou Klotz,
"Public Response to the Risk from Radon, 1986," Division of
Environmental Quality, New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection, January 1987.
3. It should be noted that Pennsylvania has since abandoned its
low interest loan program that elicited little response.
While low response may have been another indication of
homeowners1 complacency, it may have been due, in part, to
other factors. For example, Jones pointed out that the
process for obtaining such loans was extremely burdensome.
4. Some of the analysis and research about explaining radon
risk:
Chess, Caron, "Recommendations for the New Jersey Department
of Environmental Protection's Radon Communications Program:
A Working Document," Office of Science and Research, New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, Trenton, NJ,
April 1986.
Edelstein, Michael R., and Valari Boyle, "Media and the
Perception of Radon Risk," in William Makofske and Michael
Edelstein, eds., Radon and the Environment (Mahwah, NJ:
Institute for Environmental Studies, Ramapo College of New
Jersey, 1986), pp. 233-240.
Fisher, Ann, Kerry Smith, Bill Desvousges, and Reed Johnson,
"EPA Radon Communication Studies: What Have We Learned?"
Workshop on "Communicating the Radon Risk: The Roles of
Journalists, Scientist, and Public Health Officials in
Informing the Public about Radon," New York University
Science and Environmental Reporting Program and Georgetown
University Medical Center Institute for Health Policy
Analysis, New York, NY, March 13, 1987.
Johnson, F. Reer1, ?.rd Ralph A. Luken, "Radon Risk Informa-
tion and Voluntary Protection: .Evidence from a Natural
Experiment," Risk Analysis. 1987, pp. 97-107.
"Radon Risk Communication Project Interim Report," Program
Evaluation Division, Office of Policy, Planning, and
Evaluation, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, October
27, 1987.
37
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Sandman, Peter M., Neil D. Weinstein, and M.L. Klotz,
"Public Response to the Risk from Geological Radon," Journal
of Communication. Summer 1987, pp. 93-108.
' Smith, V. Kerry, William H. Desvousges, Ann Fisher, and F.
Reed Johnson, Communicating Radon Risk Effectively: A Mid-
Course Evaluation, prepared for the Office of Policy
Analysis, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, under
Cooperative Agreement No. CR-811075, by Vanderbilt
University, Nashville, Tennessee, and Research Triangle
Institute, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina, 1987.
Weinstein, Neil D., and Peter M. Sandman, "Recommendations
for a Radon Risk Communication Program," Office of Science
and Research, New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection, November 1985.
5. Evaluating Risk Communication Programs: Quick and Easy
Methods for Government by Mark Kline, Caron Chess, and Peter
M. Sandman will be available in Fall 1988 from the Environ-
mental Communication Research Program, Rutgers University.
6. Weinstein, Neil D., Peter M. Sandman, and Mary Lou Klotz,
"Public Response to the Risk from Radon, 1986," Division of
Environmental Quality, New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection, January 1987.
7. Slovic, Paul, "Informing and Educating the Public About
Risk," Decision Research, Eugene, Oregon, May 1985.
8. Sandman, Peter M., Neil D. Weinstein, and M.L. Klotz,
"Public Response to the Risk from Geologic Radon," Journal
of Communication. Summer 1987, pp.93-108.
9. Slovic, p.19.
10. For more detail on building the context for explaining risk,
see: Hance, Billie Jo, Caron Chess, and Peter M. Sandman,
Improving Dialogue with Communities: A Risk Communication
Manual for Government. Environmental Communication Research
Program, Rutgers University, December 1987.
11. Ibid.
38
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APPENDIX
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES
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BOYERTOWN INTERVIEWEES
Federal Government:
William Belanger
Regional Radiation Representative
Air Management Division
Region III
US Environmental Protection Agency
Philadelphia, PA
Stanley Laskowski
Deputy Regional Administrator
Region III
US Environmental Protection Agency
Philadelphia, PA
State Government
Bruce Dallas
Formerly: Press Secretary
PA Department of Environmental Resources
Harrisburg, PA
Presently: Associate Director
Associated Petroleum Industries of PA
Harrisburg, PA
James Fox
Public Health Physician
Division of Environmental Health
PA Department of Health
Ilcirrisburg, PA
Thomas M. Gerusky
Director
Bureau of Radiation Protection
PA Department of Environmental Resources
Harrisburg, PA
Margot Hunt
Formerly: Director of Community Relations
Office of the Secretary
PA Department of Environmental Resources
Harri sburg, PA
Presently: Vice President
Enviroservices, Inc.
Devon, PA
James Logue
Director
Division of Environmental Health
PA Department of Health
Harrisburg, PA
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Margaret Reilly
Chief, Division of Environmental Radiation
Bureau of Radiation Protection
PA Department of Environmental Resources
Harrisburg, PA
Local Government
LuAnn Reichert
Township Manager
Colebrookdale Township
New Berlinville, PA
Jonathan Smoyer
Emergency Coordinator for Colebrookdale Township
Director Bldgs, Grounds & Transportation
Muhlenberg School District
Boyertown, PA
Contractors
Tell Tappan
Vice President, Sciences Division
Arix Corporation
Grand Junction, CO
Realtors
Richard Rehrer
Rehrer & Zuber Realty
Gilbertsville, PA
David Specht
Specht Realty, Inc.
Pottstown, PA
Reporters
Bill Bradley
Reporter
Reading Eagle/Reading Times
Reading, PA
Mary Jane Schneider
Editor
Boyertown Area Times
Boyertown, PA
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Peter She11em
Formerly: reporter, Pottstown Mercury
Pottstown, PA
Presently: reporter
Patriot News
Carlisle, PA
Citizens
Kay Jones
President
People Against Radon
Boyertown, PA
Stanley Watras
Sr. Construction Engineer
Limerick Generating Station
Boyertown, PA
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CLINTON INTERVIEWEES
Federal Government:
Alfred "Chick" Craig
Senior Science Advisor for Radon
Air & Energy Engineering Research Laboratory
US Environmental Protection Agency
Research Triangle Park, NC
State Government
Mary Cahill
Radiation Physicist
Radiation Protection Branch
NJ Department of Environmental Protection
Trenton, NJ
Donald A. Deieso
Assistant Commissioner for Environmental
Management and Control
NJ Department of Environmental Protection
Trenton, NJ
Judy Klotz
Coordinator of Radon Projects
Division of Occupational and Environmental Health
NJ Department of Health
Trenton, NJ
Susan Klucharich
Formerly: Health Educator Radon Project
Division of Occupational and Environmental Health
NJ Department of Health
Trenton, NJ
Presently: Office of Patient Education
M.D. Anderson Hospital and Tumor Institute
Houston, TX
Gerald P. Nicholls
Assistant Director for Radiation Protection Programs
Radiation Protection Branch
Division of Environmental Quality
NJ Department of Environmental Protection
Trenton, NJ
James Staples
Public Information Officer
NJ Department of Environmental Protection
Trenton, NJ
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Local Government
Robert Nulman
Mayor
Clinton, NJ
John Beckley
Director
Hunterdon County Health Department
Flemington, NJ
Contractors
Terry Brennan
Camroden Associates
Rome, NY
Jim Davidson
President
Radon Detection Services
Ringoes, NJ
Realtors
Pat Catanzareti
Assistant Manager
Weichert Realtors
Clinton, NJ
Mickey Greco
Manager
Schlott Realtors
Clinton, NJ
Reporters
Jim Drautman
Reporter
Hunterdon Review
Clinton, NJ
Michael Drewniak
Formerly: Staff Writer
Hunterdon County Democrat
Flemington, NJ
Presently: Staff Writer
The Courier-News
Flemington Bureau
Flemington, NJ
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Jeanette Rundquist
Formerly: Reporter
The Courier News
Bridgewater, NJ
Presently: Reporter
The Star-Ledger
Somerville, NJ
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