vvEPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Office of Solid Waste
and Emergency Response
Washington, DC 20460
EPA/530-SW-86-033
October 1986
Solid Waste
Report to Congress
Minimization of Hazardous Waste
Appendices
-------
Report to Congress
Minimization of Hazardous Waste
Appendices
Prepared by
Office of Solid Waste
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
401 M Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20460
October 1986
Printed on 75% Recycled Paper
-------
TABLE OF CONTENTS
APPENDIX A: OPTIONS
Introduction A-l
Performance Standards Limiting the Volume
or Toxicity of Wastes from Generators A-l 1
Prohibit or Restrict Generation
of Specific Wastes A-31
Waste Generation or Management
Phasedown Permit Program A-40
Requirements for Certification of
Waste Minimization A-57
Ban the Landfilling, Treatment,
or Incineration of Potentially
Recyclable Wastes A-66
Segregation of Wastes A-73
Mandatory Waste Audits A-81
Technical Assistance
Programs A-91
Procurement Practices A-109
APPENDIX B
Waste Minimization Options
Not Considered B-l
APPENDIX C
History of OSW Waste Minimization C-l
APPENDIX D
Toxicity Scoring Methodology D-l
APPENDIX E
Waste Minimization Correspondence
and Briefings £-1
-------
Appendix A
OPTIONS
-------
Introduction: Appendix A
OPTIONS EVALUATION
Introduction
Appendix A provides a detailed evaluation of the options summarized in Chapter
Three. The purpose of this appendix is to present a more complete analysis of the impacts
of each option, as well as to explore the circumstances and conditions under which the
option might be useful for meeting the waste minimization objectives. The evaluation
criteria remain identical to those found in Chapter Three. They cover the specific
characteristics of each option (i.e., technical effectiveness, impacts on industry, and
implementation issues). Two additional sections provide (1) a general summary of the
option (e.g., description, how it will work, and the purpose for which it would be used)
and (2) recommendations for adoption as part of EPA's overall waste minimization
program.
The nine options have been grouped into four categories. Three of the categories
selected were mandated by Congress. These include performance standards, legislative
changes to RCRA, and management practices. A fourth option category was added to
cover voluntary activities industry might take to reduce waste generation. Table A-l lists
both the categories and the options.
Page A—1
-------
Introduction: Appendix A
Table A-l
List of Categories and Options
Option Category
Options
1. Performance Standards
2. Legislative Changes to HSWA
3. Management Practices
4. Other Potions
1. Performance Standards Limiting
the Volume or Toxicity of
Wastes
2. Prohibit, Restrict the Generation
of Specific Wastes
3. Phasedown Permits
1. Modifications to Requirements
for Certification of Waste
Minimization
1. Ban the Landfilling, Treatment,
or Incineration of Potentially
Recyclable Wastes
2. Segregation of Wastes
3. Mandatory Waste Audits
1. Technical Assistance
Programs
2. Procurement Practices
An important issue in evaluating options is the time required for implementation.
Figure A-l displays a time line that divides each option into three different implementation
stages (Congressional Action, EPA Program Milestone, and Activity of Industry). These
are only preliminary estimates, and reflect EPA's best estimate of the shortest realistic
implementation schedules.
General Summary
The summary section describes the option. It explains what the option would look
like and how it would work. The summary also covers the purpose of the option and,
where possible, describes any previous experience that EPA or State agencies may have
had with the option.
Page A—2
-------
Introduction: Appendix A
Criteria for Evaluation
Waste minimization options must be evaluated not only in terms of their
effectiveness in minimizing waste but also in terms of their implementation requirements.
The evaluation should consider the following:
• What the private sector costs and other impacts would be on
industry, as industry attempts to accommodate the many new
requirements of HSWA;
• What the internal impacts would be on EPA for each option, in
terms of new research requirements, additional regulatory
development burdens, and implementation and enforcement
burdens; and
• What burdens would be put on States.
The criteria used to evaluate the options have therefore been put under three general
headings:
• Technical effectiveness: How well does the option meet the goals of
waste minimization?
• Impacts on industry: What will be the costs and other burdens of
compliance with each option?
• Implementation issues: How will this option be implemented, and
what will be the burdens on EPA and State resources?
Each of these areas is discussed separately below. As is evident from the detailed
discussions contained in this appendix, the information necessary to properly answer many
of these questions is often unavailable.
Technical effectiveness
The first consideration in evaluating any option is the degree to which it achieves
the objectives set by Congress for minimizing the volume, or quantity and toxicity of
wastes that are generated or that would otherwise be sent to land disposal (i.e., not
recycled).
Page A—3
-------
Introduction: Appendix A
Volume reduction: Volume reduction is a key concern for any waste minimization
option and will be particularly important in the short term, especially for those firms that
must rely on offsite commercial treatment facilities. While the overall goal of waste
minimization is to produce significant aggregate reductions in the total volume of hazardous
waste produced each year, it may often be important in the short term to direct minimization
efforts to those industries or waste streams for which treatment capacity is in shortest
supply. In assessing the effectiveness of a particular option in terms of potential for
reducing waste volume, questions include the following:
• What proportion of total national waste volume could it reduce?
• What proportion of the waste from the affected industries or waste
streams might be reduced?
Toxicity reduction: The effectiveness of an option in achieving toxicity reduction
may be harder to estimate than its effectiveness in reducing waste volume, but the questions
involved are similar to those asked in regard to volume reduction:
• To what degree would the option tend to reduce the toxicity of a
particular waste stream?
• Would toxicity reduction interfere with volume reduction of the
option?
Other technical effectiveness issues: There may be additional criteria under this
heading that are important to some options and not to others. This section will allow a
more detailed discussion of the option and will focus on issues such as the following.
• Side effects and intermedia transfers: Important technical
considerations in the evaluation of any option are the relationships
between volume reduction and toxicity reduction and the possibility
of unwanted transfers of pollution from one location or media to
another. As pointed out in Chapter Two, for instance, volume
reduction may produce more concentrated, and therefore possibly
more toxic, wastes. Conversely, toxicity reduction may involve
dilution of wastes, increasing their volume. Certain options may
appear to effectively minimize waste, but in fact may only be
transferring pollution to the air or water. Questions about such
concerns include:
Page A—4
-------
Introduction: Appendix A
— Will this option tend to produce undesirable side effects in terms
of the volume or toxicity of hazardous waste reduced?
— Will it produce adverse effects in environmental media other than
hazardous waste?
• Transaction costs: Some waste minimization options, such as those
of waste exchanges, merely facilitate access to information, i.e.,
they reduce the transaction costs associated with improving the
management of hazardous wastes. Evaluating the technical
effectiveness is, thus, quite subjective. Pertinent questions include:
— What waste minimization transactions are affected by this
option, and what specific problems is it aimed at correcting or
ameliorating?
— How effective will it be in its stated objective?
•
• Measuring results: A key factor in the technical effectiveness of any
option is the degree to which its success can be predicted in advance
or measured after implementation. Standards of performance, for
instance, might have fairly easily predictable and specific effects on
the composition and volume of wastes produced. On the other
hand, it may be extremely difficult to estimate the effects produced
by various types of incentive programs (such as loans, grants, or
technology transfer), or options aimed at reducing transaction costs
(information hotlines, waste brokers). It is not necessarily critical to
be able to measure the effectiveness of an option, but it may be an
important factor to consider, especially if the costs of the option are
high. Questions include:
— Is it possible to measure the effectiveness of the option?
— If it is measurable, what are the relevant variables and what
methods would be employed to measure it?
Impacts on industry
There are a variety of potential burdens that a particular waste minimization option
might put on industry, especially since several of them could intrude significantly further
into the details of production processes than traditional environmental programs have done.
Compliance costs are usually the first concern. Other factors include equity considerations,
confidentiality issues, and incentives for noncompliance.
Page A—5
-------
Introduction: Appendix A
Economic impacts: The costs of complying with a particular waste minimization
option can be negative as well as positive, since waste reduction often saves rather than
costs money. Cost questions that might be asked are the following:
• What are the capital costs associated with the option? (These may be
incurred in regard to major process modifications.)
• What are its operation and maintenance costs? (These can include
changes in feedstock requirements, energy use, transportation
expenses, and so forth.)
• What is the reporting burden? (The costs of reporting to EPA or the
State may be considerable for some options.)
Equity to industry: Because some industries, and some firms within industries,
have already voluntarily begun to minimize their wastes, equity among firms can be an
important consideration in determining the desirability or feasibility of a particular option.
Some options may, in effect, penalize industries that have already reduced their wastes.
Others may unnecessarily interfere with the current competitive structure of markets.
Pertinent questions include the following:
• Do costs of compliance with this option vary significantly across
firms or industries with respect to size, category, location, or some
other factor?
• Does the option tend to distort markets for products, or to affect the
current competitive relationships among firms or industries?
Does the option risk violating the legitimate confidentiality of
proprietary processes?
Incentives for noncompliance: Some waste minimization options could create
strong incentives for noncompliance of one type or another, ranging from nonparticipation
or nonreporting to deliberate violation of regulatory requirements (falsification of records,
illegal dumping, etc.). Questions include:
• Does this option encourage noncompliance?
• Are enforcement tools adequate to compensate for noncompliance
incentives?
Page A—6
-------
Introduction: Appendix A
Implementation issues
A wide variety of issues are of concern here, including all aspects of developing,
implementing, and enforcing the option. Also important are the effects of the option on
State programs, its effects on other environmental programs, its flexibility in responding to
changing circumstances, its acceptability to the public, and its effects on changes in
industrial technology.
Legislative authority: It is important to determine what changes will be necessary,
if any, in the legislative authority in order to implement each option. The types of authority
that the Agency will need depend on the option itself. In some cases, the type of additional
authority could be provided by a simple ruling change (e.g., Waste Audits), whereas in
others it may require extensive Congressional legislation. The types of questions that need
to be answered are:
r • What are the types of legislative changes that will be necessary in
order to implement the option?
• Is additional legislative change necessary or can modifications be
made to existing authority?
• Would a simple ruling change instead of additional legislative
authority be a more appropriate method to extend the Agency's
ability to implement the option?
Time required for implementation: Timing is an important variable in the evaluation
of the options. For some options implementation is contingent on the outcome of other
options or regulatory policies. It may be that an option will not take long to implement, but
that implementation cannot occur until after the other options or policies take effect.
Questions that need to be addressed are:
• What is the reasonable length of time it would take to develop the
option?
• Are there delays or contingencies that might otherwise hold up the
implementation of the option (e.g., land disposal restrictions)?
• How long after implementation would the option be expected to
influence waste minimization?
Page A—7
-------
Introduction: Appendix A
Appropriate target industries: Not all the options arc appropriate for every industry
or for every waste stream. It may be necessary to identify those industries and waste
streams that best meet the goals of waste minimization. Performance Standards, for
example, might be a satisfactory means to minimize waste, but the type of standard would
vary between the designated industries and types of waste streams. The important
questions are:
• What are the most suitable industries for the option?
• What waste streams within a targeted industry are best adapted to the
option?
• Will targeting industries interfere with implementation of other
options?
Costs of development and implementation: These include all direct costs to the
Agency for conducting research, gathering and analyzing data, writing regulations, writing
permits and enforcing regulations, or any other expenses necessary under the option. If
grants or awards were selected, for example, costs would include the amount of the grants
or awards. Questions include:
• What would the intramural staff requirements be, at Headquarters
and in the Regional Offices?
• What would extramural costs be (data gathering/data automation,
research, etc.)?
• Are there any special enforcement considerations (e.g., new
categories of regulated parties, history of poor compliance in
regulated sector)?
Other Considerations
This final category covers criteria that may not be germane to all of the options. It
is a catch all section in which it is possible to evaluate options that have unique aspects.
The additional criteria include: flexibility in implementation, impacts on States, public
perception, effects on other environmental programs, and effects on innovative technology.
• Flexibility in implementation: Flexibility may be an important issue,
particularly since the context in which waste minimization is being
Page A—8
-------
Introduction: Appendix A
enacted is still fluid. Options that have strict administrative
requirements (such as standards of performance issued as
conventional regulations) are likely to be considerably less flexible
than others (e.g., performance standards enacted as phasedown
permits). Questions include the following:
— To what degree can enactment of the option be negotiated with
involved parties?
— Are formal administrative variance and other procedures required
to modify conditions?
Impacts on States: States are already an integral part of the
hazardous waste management system. Their involvement in waste
minimization will likewise be highly important. Questions include
the following:
— Does the option interfere with or duplicate waste minimization or
hazardous waste management policies already established by the
States?
— What costs and staff burdens would the options put on the
States, and how would these expenses be defrayed?
— Is voluntary State involvement required in order for the option to
work?
— Must State involvement be uniform across the country for the
option to work?
Public perception: Because the whole subject of hazardous waste
management is of such concern to the general public, waste
minimization options must be compatible with public opinion.
Some of the options under consideration may be more difficult for
the public to accept than others: for instance, the public has always
been skeptical of environmental programs that appear to operate on a
"pay-to-pollute" basis. Therefore, although options like phasedown
permits are considered to be an economically efficient way to reduce
waste generation, the public may not endorse a program where
companies buy permits that allow them to generate hazardous
materials. On the positive side, it may also be important to consider
whether a given option reduces public anxiety about hazardous
waste. Many companies have already embarked on voluntary waste
minimization programs partly to improve their public environmental
image. The key questions are summarized below.
— Is this option compatible with public opinion?
Page A—9
-------
Introduction: Appendix A
— Does it allow industry to take legitimate credit for voluntary
actions taken to reduce hazardous wastes?
Effects on other environmental programs: Some waste minimization
options may require extensive internal cooperation among EPA
programs. An example would be the use of the effluent guidelines
program to restrict hazardous waste generation. If such cross
program relationships are important, they should be identified in
advance. The types of questions that need to be answered are listed
below.
— Does this option shift any wastes or risks out of the jurisdiction
of the hazardous wastes system and into that of another
program?
— If so, have such shifts been made deliberately, and are they in
the overall best interests of protecting human health and the
environment?
— If not, can they be mitigated or corrected?
Effects on innovative technology: Some options may tend to
stimulate technological innovations in reducing the generation of
hazardous waste, others may tend to stifle innovation and lock in
existing technology. Major questions would be:
— Would this option have a positive or a negative effect on
technological innovation?
— If so, would such effects have been noted in the development of
the option?
Recommendations
This section will discuss the circumstances and conditions under which the option
would be useful for waste minimization. It may not be possible to draw definitive
recommendations, since many of the ramifications of the options are still unclear.
However, to the extent possible, the recommendations will stress the desirability and
feasibility of implementing any changes in waste minimization policy mandated in the
Hazardous Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA) of 1984.
Page A—10
-------
Performance Standards
Performance Standards Limiting the Volume or Toxicity
of Wastes from Generators
1.0 General Summary
Under this option, performance standards setting limits on the volume or toxicity of
waste generation would be enacted as formal and enforceable regulations, similar in
concept and operation to those established elsewhere for the control of air and water
pollution (for example, under the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act). Performance
standards of this type could be applied either to an individual industry, to a particular waste
generating operation within an industry, or to common processes among several different
industries. A major difference in this case, however, is that while performance standards
for air and water pollution are usually based on pollution control procedures following
production, performance standards for waste minimization would commonly be based on
changes within manufacturing processes themselves.1 Performance standards based on
A reduction in the generation of metal hydroxide sludges or spent etchants might be
required of printed circuit board manufacturers, for example, based on assumptions as to
the additional reductions that could be made if a plant switched from the additive to the
subtractive process of etching. A performance standard could be stated in terms of
volumes of sludge or spent etchant per unit of production.
Another potential example would be a performance standard requiring reductions in the
generation of ethyl chloride, vinylidene chloride, or 1-1 dichloroethane in the production
of vinyl chloride monomer. Such a standard would be based on the assumption that the
oxychlorinau'on step in the production of ethylene dichloride would be replaced by a direct
HC1 oxidation step. (This would probably only be economically feasible—if at all—for
new, large-scale operations.)
On "the other hand, however, some standards could be based on the use of good operating
practices preceding a production process. One example of such a practice is segregating
wastes into distinct, usable components, rather than mixing all the wastes in a way which
only allows the material to be disposed of. A printing firm, for example, segregated the
toluene used to clean its presses according to the type and color of the ink cleaned and was
then able to reuse the toluene to thin future batches of the same ink, rather than having to
dispose of all the toluene. A standard requiring such an operating practice might either
specify the volume of toluene that could be disposed of per cleaning or simply require the
segregation of the wastes.
Page A—11
-------
Performance Standards
assumptions of process change or process control would require substantially more
information on industrial processes than is generally required for air and water pollution
"end-of-pipe" controls. They also have potentially greater implications for both product
quality and the economics of manufacturing.
In some cases, it might be feasible to base a performance standard on the
assumption that a waste would be reused or reclaimed within the plant itself.
(Alternatively, such use could be mandatory, although such mandatory practices decrease
the plant's flexibility in meeting the performance requirements.) Such a requirement or
assumption, however, could not reasonably be made where the waste could not be recycled
within the plant itself, since market economics and purity specifications would alter demand
for the material over time. In order to encourage recycling rather than disposal of wastes,
without creating rigid recycling requirements or assumptions that might prove to be
unrealistic, it might be desirable to develop a system of credits for recycled wastes.
Essentially, every volume unit of a waste recycled would be credited against (or
"subtracted" from) the volume generated.2
Performance standards could also impose limits on the toxicity of a waste stream,
specifying an allowable toxicity limit per unit volume of the waste stream, or placing
ceilings on toxicity per unit volume of production. To accomplish this, some type of
weighted toxicity index would probably have to be developed to characterize a stream's
The operation of a credit system would depend on the specifications of the performance
standard. The relevant elements for a performance standard would include the amount of a
waste stream, or toxic constituent, generated per unit of production or throughput (the rate
of generation), the production capacity per hour, and the hours of production operation.
If only the rate of generation were specified in the standard, the total volume of a waste
stream that a facility would be permitted to generate could be based either on (a) the actual
historical capacity utilized and hours of operation at the facility or (b) the assumption that
the facility may operate at full capacity 24 hours per day. Whichever basis is used, the
multiple of the three factors would give the total volume of the particular waste that a
plant would be permitted to generate.
Under a credit system, a plant that exceeded its total allowable limit on a particular waste
stream could come into compliance with the performance standard by recycling some
proportion of the waste and crediting the volume recycled against the excess volume
generated. A credit system could be expanded in scope beyond such straightforward credit-
for-recycling for a single waste stream to create substantial flexibility within a
performance standard system.
Page A—12
-------
Performance Standards
toxicity and to set acceptable levels for changes in toxicity once the performance standard
was implemented (as is done using copper toxicity as the basis for the cost-effectiveness
analyses for the effluent guidelines).3
Performance standards can be selective. As applied to a particular industry, it
would be possible to select the most appropriate generators within the industry rather than
to apply standards to the industry as a whole. For instance, a regulation could specify that
only facilities generating waste above a specific volume threshold must meet the standard,
or that only certain processes would have to meet the standard. Similarly, it might be
appropriate to write standards for wastes generated by one industrial process, yet not
regulate the same type of waste if it were generated by a different type of process or by a
different sector of industry. Conversely, similar wastes generated by different industries
could be required to meet identical performance standards. For example, solvent wastes
from the cleaning of metal parts in several industries might be regulated using the same
standards of compliance (e.g., metal furniture, nonelectric machinery, electric equipment,
transportation equipment).
The basic choices are as follows:
• Performance standards could be applied to new and existing
sources, or they could be restricted to new sources—at least in cases
where costly process change retrofits would be required of the
existing sources.
• Performance standards could be developed broadly for each major
industrial category, specifying limitations for regulated pollutants for
each process within that category (as is done with effluent
guidelines). Alternatively, they could be written for specific waste
streams identified because of high volume and/or high toxicity, and
developed for all sources of that waste stream (as with the National
Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs)
standards)—e.g., for specific solvents or specific metal-bearing
wastes.
The weighted toxicity index would have to take into account a number of factors, such as
the toxicity value of a chemical compound as measured against a common standard (e.g.,
some fraction or multiple of the toxicity of copper), the mass fraction of the toxic
constituent within the waste stream, and the total volume of the waste stream.
Page A—13
-------
Performance Standards
• Standards could be developed to generally reduce the total volume of
hazardous wastes, to more narrowly focus on selectively reducing
the most toxic wastes, or sequentially to attack both problems (as
with the best practical control technology (BPT) and the best
available technology (BAT) under the effluent guidelines program).
• In addition to, or in place of, performance standards for the actual
reduction of waste generation, standards for some industrial
processes could specifically incorporate requirements for recycling
the waste that has been generated.
• A performance standard system could be based entirely on
minimization, waste stream by waste stream, of the hazardous waste
generated during production, or credit could be given for any of
several alternative waste minimization activities. Credits could be
used to offset the generation of excess volumes of a particular
waste. Alternatively, the credits generated from reductions in one
waste stream could be used to offset excess generation from another
waste stream, as long as the waste stream producing the credits is of
equal or greater per unit toxicity than the waste stream with excess
generation. Credit could also be given for waste minimization or
sound waste treatment practices such as the following:
— Recycling of hazardous wastes, whether by the generator or by
another plant or manufacturer,
— Over control (beyond that required under the applicable
performance standard) of a waste stream by a generator, and
— Onsite incineration of hazardous wastes.
• Credits could either be allotted on a pound-for-pound basis (one
pound credit for each pound of creditable over control, recycling, or
incineration) or on a discounted basis (e.g., credit for one pound for
every two pounds of actual creditable reduction). In order to
prevent the possibility of a credit system wherein the least toxic
waste is purposely over controlled to provide credit for a more toxic
waste, however, it may be necessary to restrict credits to the same
toxicity class or to only allow the use of credit from a more toxic
waste stream to a less toxic waste stream. Credit use could also be
restricted to the individual generator. The system could be made still
more flexible if a generator that produces more credits than is needed
for its own operations could allot extra credits to other plants.
Although EPA has not had experience with performance standards for the
minimization of hazardous wastes, it has had substantial experience with performance
Page A—14
-------
Performance Standards
standards for the reduction of air and waste pollution. EPA has used performance
standards restricting the rates of emission, concentrations, or total volume of various
pollutants as the primary means for achieving pollution control under the Clean Air Act and
the Clean Water Act. These standards and examples provide some guidance as to how the
Agency might adapt performance standards to waste minimization.
Under the Clean Air Act (Section 111), New Source Performance Standards
(NSPS) for new stationary sources of air pollution are established for each major category
of pollution source for each of the criteria pollutants (e.g., sulfur dioxide, volatile organic
compounds, nitrogen oxides). The NSPS are emission limitations that apply to new or
modified sources of air pollution in specific industrial categories. Some of the standards
apply to pieces of equipment that are not specific to any one industry, such as industrial
boilers fired by fossil fuels. Other standards apply to equipment that is industry specific,
such as paniculate emissions from fluid catalytic cracking units in petroleum refineries.
Emissions can be expressed in terms of pounds per million BTU heat input (1.2 Ibs SC>2
emissions per million BTU), volume per unit of production or application (e.g., 0.2 kg of
volatile organic compounds per kg of coating solids applied), or a concentration limit of the
total stack gas volume being emitted (e.g., 650 ppm SO2 for emissions from copper
smelting furnaces).
Some of the NSPS are expressed in terms of a work practice and/or equipment
standard rather than a performance standard. For example, petroleum dry cleaners are
required to use cartridge filters for solvent filtration systems, and used cartridge filters must
be drained for at least eight hours in their closed housings prior to disposal.
Existing facilities are regulated under the Clean Air Act through Reasonable
Available Control Technology (RACT) performance standards, which are similar in design
and function to the NSPS standards for new facilities. The basic RACT standards are
developed by EPA. The States then incorporate the RACT standards (or equivalent or
stricter standards) into their own regulations for facilities within the State. EPA reviews the
regulations for consistency with the requirements established by the Agency. Both EPA
and the State have the authority to take direct enforcement action against any facility that
violates the regulation.
Page A—15
-------
Performance Standards
NSPS and RACT performance standards apply to emissions of pollutants which,
though they have adverse health effects, are not currently deemed severely toxic or
carcinogenic. The only performance standards intended specifically to limit emissions of
highly toxic pollutants are the National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
(NESHAPs). Functionally, these apply to facilities or classes of equipment in precisely the
same way as the NSPS and RACT standards.
In developing such performance standards, primary consideration is usually given
to the efficiencies of available control technologies (e.g., scrubbers, baghouses,
incinerators) for cleaning or controlling the emissions after they exit the process units. In
some cases, however, consideration may also be given to the potential for process or input
changes (e.g., operating parameters and type of resins used for the stripping unit for vinyl
chloride, or the substitution of water based paints for solvent based paints for paint spray
coating systems).
Under the Clean Water Act, effluent limitations are established for various
pollutants through sets of performance standards applied to plants in specific industrial
categories. For existing sources, the largest volumes of conventional effluent pollutants
(e.g., total suspended solids, nutrients) are reduced through the Best Practicable Control
Technology (BPT) currently available. An additional level of controls, Best Available
Technology (BAT) economically achievable, is applied with the specific purpose of
reducing toxic effluents remaining after the imposition of BPT. Requirements for new
sources are developed under the New Source Performance Standards (NSPS). For those
sources that send their effluents to publicly-owned treatment works (POTWs) instead of
directly into rivers or lakes, pretreatment standards have been developed both for existing
sources (PSES) and new sources (NSPS).
Under both statutes, periodic review of the performance standards is required to
take into account new technological developments that could lead to more effective control
of pollutants. If it is found that technology has improved the ability to meet the
performance standards, these standards can then be incorporated into the regulatory
requirements.
Page A—16
-------
Performance Standards
2.0 Evaluation
2.1 Technical Effectiveness
Volume Reduction
Although performance standards can provide one of the most direct means of
requiring volume reductions in the generation of hazardous wastes, it is not possible to
determine at present what the effect of such standards would be. Furthermore, current data
are not sufficient to establish a useful baseline for measurement of progress. Before
making a decision on the desirability of performance standards, the Agency will have to
differentiate between the projected impacts of performance standards and those occurring as
the result of (1) increased disposal costs caused by the land disposal restrictions and (2)
concerns for future liability.
Once this information is available, performance standards would provide a basis for
achieving predetermined percentages of reductions in the generation of wastes. Facilities
that wished to retain operating permits would have to meet such reduction requirements,
either directly or through credits from recycling or, possibly, from other waste reduction or
treatment activities (see list of creditable alternatives in the discussion above). .
Toxicity Reduction
As noted above, performance standards could also, be used to reduce waste stream
toxicity. Such standards might be analogous to BAT standards under the Clean Water Act,
where copper toxicity is used as a reference point for effluent guidelines analysis.
Examples of wastes that might be selected for the purpose of toxicity reduction are those
produced by the organic chemicals industry, which produces some of the most toxic wastes
listed by RCRA (e.g., heavy ends from distillation of vinyl chloride in vinyl chloride
monomer production [K020] and distillation bottoms from the production of
1,1,1—trichloroethylene [K095]4).
K020 and K095 are both ranked extremely high in toxicity.
Page A—17
-------
Performance Standards
Other Technical Effectiveness Issues
Impact on innovative technology: In some cases, generators might choose to
simply meet required performance targets rather than look for the most efficient method of
reducing wastes. A standard that defines compliance narrowly might therefore have an
adverse effect on technological innovation. Such effects have been noted in the past.
For example, in order to meet RACT standards for volatile organic compounds
(VOC) required under the Clean Air Act, flexographic printers needed either to use water
based inks or to install incinerators. Over the long term, use of the water based inks would
be the environmentally preferable alternative. But when the ink companies were unable to
develop water based inks rapidly enough to ensure meeting the compliance deadline, the
flexographic printers installed incinerators. Once the incinerators were installed, there was
no longer any incentive to continue research on water based inks.^
2.2 Impacts on Industry
Economic Impacts
On the basis of current data, it is impossible to predict what a performance standard
program for waste minimization would cost industry, either in terms of aggregate capital
and operation and maintenance costs, or in terms of cost per ton of reduction in waste
generated or recycled. Performance standards have the potential, however, for being one
of the least economically efficient approaches to waste minimization.
The actual cost of this type of program for industry would depend on its final
structure. For example, the most costly approach would probably be to mandate
performance standards on an individual waste stream basis, with no credit for recycling
(which could be required by a performance standard in some cases), onsite incineration, or
over control of other waste streams. The higher costs and lower economic efficiency of
this form of performance standard would be due to the rigidity of the performance
regulations and the absence of any compensating relief for generators.
Yates and Auberle, November 1985, Bubbling of Volatile Organic Compound Emissions,
(draft), prepared for the Regulatory Reform Staff, USEPA.
Page A—18
-------
Performance Standards
An illustration of the discrepancy in costs that can occur among performance
standards can be illustrated by looking at the cost of the various control measures required
under the promulgated effluent guideline for the iron and steel industry. According to the
cost-effectiveness analysis for the guideline, the lowest cost per pound equivalent (of
copper) removed was for one of the requirements for hot forming, which had a negative
cost of -$0.54 (the negative cost being due to the value of reused scale collected in the
control equipment). The highest cost was for sintering, that is, $89.73 per pound
equivalent removed. One of the control requirements for hot forming contained in the
proposed effluent guideline would have cost up to $1,195.31 per pound equivalent
removed.
If such performance standards were not required in each case without either a
highly flexible credit system or a phasedown permit system, such costs could not be
evened out through market mechanisms. Use of a credit system such as is suggested in the
summary section above would provide a means of moderating the highest cost control
requirements. Further, they would provide an incentive for technological innovation to
find the lowest cost alternatives for all waste streams, since breakthroughs in the control of
one waste stream could be used to reduce the costs of controlling other waste streams.
Several other factors should be considered and analyzed in order to more fully
evaluate the potential costs of performance standards to industry. They include:
• In estimating the incremental cost of reductions brought about by
performance standards, the higher disposal costs created by the land
disposal restrictions should be regarded as a cost avoided for each
ton of waste eliminated. Thus, the net costs of reductions in waste
generation would be significantly lower than the gross costs.
• Credits for recycling could provide some flexibility for performance
standards requiring reductions in waste generation. The fluctuations
Page A—19
-------
Performance Standards
in the market for recyclable materials, however, make any effort to
project the benefits of such credits uncertain.6
• Delays in the development of standards or in the review of permits
create uncertainty. This can add substantially to the cost to industry
of a performance standard. Because these standards would
generally affect production processes, and not just end-of-pipe
controls, the delays and their effects might be even greater than
under the air and water programs.
Equity
Performance standards are an unambiguous requirement that the generator reduce
the generation of hazardous wastes. The concern that this option is equitable will depend
on how it is imposed on the industry. There may be problems with equity if the standards
are selective, that is, the standards affect some but not all of the regulated community.
Incentives for Noncompliance
The imposition of performance standards might create a number of adverse effects
that might limit or delay the realization of waste minimization goals. Some of the issues of
concern are discussed below:
• If performance standards are imposed on the smaller generators in
an industrial category for which standards are developed, there may
Wall Street Journal, April 14, 1986. Fluctuations in market prices of virgin materials
can affect both the potential for resale of recyclable materials and decisions of the
generator to reclaim the material for its own use. Dramatic reductions in the price of
crude oil, for example, have increased the competitive problems for the recycling of used
oil, independent of whether used oil is or is not finally determined to be a hazardous
waste. Conversely, a rise in sulfur prices from $36/metric ton in 1977 to S140/metric
ton currently, to a projected $200/metric ton in 1987 has resulted in the development of a
process for recovering limestone and sulfur from the waste gypsum produced by utilities.
Reclamation and recycling of pickle liquor by steel plants to recover sulfuric acid depends
both on market conditions and geographic location. For steel plants located in the
Southwest, sulfuric acid can easily be obtained from the copper smelters, which generate
the acid from their stack scrubbing control systems. For steel plants in the East, the
question of whether it is cheaper to reclaim spent pickle liquor or to buy virgin sulfuric
acid will depend on the cost of the reclamation process, the cost of the virgin material,
and the net differential in the costs for disposal of the spent pickle liquor and the costs for
disposal of the ferrous sulfate residue from reclamation of the pickle liquor. '
Page A—20
-------
Performance Standards
be some effort by these generators to avoid compliance through such
measures as underreporting and/or illegal disposal. A report by the
General Accounting Office on illegal disposal of hazardous wastes
(General Accounting Office/RCED-85-2) indicated the difficulty of
discovering and preventing such practices with the limited
enforcement resources available. It is likely, however, that small
facility exemptions would be allowed, as is the case with many of
the air and water standards.
• Since performance standards requiring reduced generation of wastes
are likely to require significant changes in manufacturing processes,
with potentially major impacts on both product quality and
productivity, the likelihood of litigation is greatly increased,
resulting in further delays in the actual realization of waste
minimization.
• Since such performance standards would often involve redesigning
industrial processes, the effort required is in some respects different
in kind from that involved in developing effluent guidelines and air
standards. It is not clear that the necessary expertise can readily be
found outside of plant management, and this might both extend the
time required for the Federal government to develop the standards
and increase the uncertainty of the result
2.3 Implementation Issues
Legislative Authority '
A general program of performance standards to achieve waste minimization would
require enactment of legislative authority by Congress. As has been noted throughout this
report, EPA understands the legislative history of HSWA to specifically prohibit the
Agency from defining waste minimization in relation to any particular industrial production
process.
Under Section 6(a) of TSCA, however, EPA does have authority for any of a wide
range of measures with respect to any substance or waste stream that poses an
"unreasonable risk of injury to human health or the environment." Specifically, the Agency
may institute "a requirement prohibiting or otherwise regulating any manner or method of
disposal of such substance or mixture, or of any article containing such substance or
mixture, by its manufacturer or processor or by any other person who uses, or disposes of,
Page A—21
-------
Performance Standards
it for commercial purposes." This authority could be used for imposition of the waste
reduction requirement for specific waste streams that met the "unreasonable risk" criterion.
Time Required for Implementation
Performance standards are likely to require several years for development. Under
both the air and water programs, performance standards have generally required about four
years each for development, but the more complex performance standards dealing with the
largest industrial categories or processes have taken substantially longer. The effluent
guideline for the organic chemicals industry has been under development since 1977 and is
expected to be finally promulgated at the end of 1986. The NSPS standard for industrial
boilers has been under development for over eight years and still has not been promulgated.
Since performance standards for waste minimization would require imposition of
standards and limits directly impinging on the processes of production and not simply on
end-of-pipe controls,, it seems likely that the time required for development would be as
long as or longer than for the air and water standards. And if the record of those programs
provides any precedent, the larger and more complex the industry for which standards are
being developed, the longer the process.
The most plausible timetable for designing and implementing a large-scale
performance standards program would be as follows:
• Since EPA currently lacks legislative authority to implement
performance standards, new authority would have to be established
during the next round of amendments to RCRA. The earliest likely
date for this would be 1988.
• Assuming that adequate baseline data have been developed during
the intervening period, selection and ranking of candidate industry
categories and/or industrial processes would occur during 1989.
• Optimistically, the development of the performance standard
requirements by EPA for the first of the selected industrial categories
would be completed during the following four to five years (by
1993-1994).
• Implementation of the standards by EPA and/or delegated States,
and purchase and installation of new equipment by industry, would
Page A—22
-------
Performance Standards
take a minimum of two to three years (perhaps a year less if only
good operating practices are required). Thus, the earliest completion
date for implementation of a standard would be somewhere between
1995 and 1997.
• Results of the implementation would be visible the following year
(i.e., approximately 1996 to 1998).
• For more complex standards, the date by which results would begin
to become evident would probably be six or seven years later, most
likely after 2003.
If action on performance standards is delayed until it is possible to
track at least the initial effects of the land disposal restrictions on
industry waste minimization activities, from one to five additional
years would be added onto the process. With the two-year variance,
1988 will be the first year when the initial land disposal restrictions
would go fully into effect. The first year's tracking data could then
be gathered by 1989. The last of the subsequent land disposal
restrictions could go into effect as late as 1992.
Appropriate Target Industries
Performance standards for waste minimization would be appropriate for those
industries that produce high volume and/or high toxicity waste streams and that continue to
represent, after the imposition of the land bans has been completed, a serious risk to human
health and the environment.7
An evaluation would first be required to determine whether there are economically
feasible technological alternatives to current industry production and/or recycling practices.
Industries using batch rather than continuous processes, for example, are likely to
be more difficult to control, even where total volumes are high. In some cases (e.g.,
solvents), treatment by incineration may be more effective and less costly than alternative
source reduction approaches.
Such an evaluation should take into account industry practice with respect to recycling
and onsite incineration, since these practices may significantly reduce any risks created by
the initial generation of a waste stream.
Page A—23
-------
Performance Standards
According to the data currently available,8 the organic chemicals industry (SIC code
2869) is the largest source of the most toxic hazardous wastes. A recent survey by the
Chemical Manufacturers Association indicates that the chemical industry has made
substantial reductions in hazardous waste generation since 1981.9 Much of this reduction
appears to be the result of concerns for liability by the large firms that dominate production
and waste generation in the industry. In addition, process changes to maximize efficiency
in use of raw materials are more cost effective in the largest chemical facilities. A separate
study by INFORM (Cutting Chemical Wastes), however, claims that the chemical industry
has made little progress toward waste minimization. "The millions of pounds of waste
reduction reported by the study plants is only a minute fraction of the total wastes generated
by them."10 EPA currently lacks a data base that would enable it to determine exactly what
kinds of changes in waste generation have occurred within this industrial sector.
EPA's technical background report on waste minimization developed for EPA
reviewed several industrial processes included in the organic chemical manufacturing
industry, including acrylonitrile manufacture, epichlorohydrin manufacture,
1,1,1—trichloroethylene perchloroethylene manufacture, and vinyl chloride monomer
manufacture. Each of these manufacturing processes is carried out in a small number of
very large plants. While these processes produce large volumes of wastes, the engineering
analysis concluded that these facilities have significantly minimized wastes. There are still
opportunities, however, for small proportional changes that could be substantial in volume.
Many of the waste streams generated by chemical manufacturers are among the first
to be subject to the land disposal restrictions. This will create a substantial additional
incentive for plants to reduce waste generation, recycle, or incinerate their waste streams.
It will take some time to determine the impact of these new regulations. That determination
° See summary on waste generation data in Chapter 2.
" Chemical Manufacturers Association, January 1986, Results of the 1984 CMA Hazardous
Waste Survey . The survey found a 16 percent decrease in the generation of hazardous
waste between 1981 and 1984, and a 34.8 percent reduction in the volume of hazardous
solid wastes sent to landfills.
10 INFORM, Cutting Chemical Wastes, p. 31.
Page A—24
-------
Performance Standards
will be further delayed where variances of up to two years are granted because of
inadequate treatment capacity.
Other industries with waste streams identified as highly toxic include dry cleaning
and paint manufacturing. Once again, however, the waste streams
involved—tetrachloroethylene distillation residues from dry cleaning (F002) or spent
methyl ethyl ketone solvents from paint manufacture (F005)—are subject to the first phases
of the land disposal restrictions, and practices may change as a result. In addition,
although it is assumed that the dry cleaning industry recycles a large portion of its solvents,
available data are not adequate to determine the precise extent of this practice or current
trends.
An industry's suitability as a target for performance standards may also depend on
available centralized treatment and/or recovery capacity. The electroplating industry, for
example, produces large volumes of metal-bearing sludges. Since most electroplating
facilities are quite small, substantial process changes to reduce waste generation are not
likely to be financially feasible. In New Jersey, Minnesota, and Illinois, however,
feasibility studies are under way on the possibility of constructing central ion exchange
metal-recovery waste processing plants to which electroplaters could send their wastes.
The existence of such a facility would make possible a degree of waste reduction and
recycling that could not otherwise be achieved by these facilities. Where such facilities
become available, the imposition of recycling and more stringent waste reduction
requirements might be feasible.
Costs of Development and Implementation
Until the scope and design of a performance standard program is determined, it is
not possible to develop accurate estimates of the costs to government of developing a full-
scale performance standard program. The best means of getting a perspective on those
costs is by looking at the cost of developing the performance standard programs required
by the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act.
According to estimates of staff at OAQPS, the cost of development of an individual
NSPS or NESHAPs standard will generally vary from a low of $1 million to a high of $5
Page A—25
-------
Performance Standards
to $10 million, and require from four to eight or more years to complete. An analysis done
by the Industrial Technology Division in the Office of Water indicates that the total cost of
development of the effluent guidelines program from 1973 to 1986 was about $300 million
(in 1984 dollars). The cost of developing one of the most complex guidelines, that for the
organic chemicals industry, was about $15 million.
Assuming the development of performance standards for a single waste stream
within an industry sector or across industry sectors, using the authority under TSCA,
Section 6(a), the costs for single standards under the air program would probably provide
the closest analogy to what would be required.
Government implementation costs include the development and operation of a
permit program as well as resources expended at both the Federal and State levels. As in
the case of the air and water programs, a reasonably comprehensive performance standard
program would require the permitting of most of the 43,000 generators throughout the
country (excluding small quantity generators). The largest part of this effort would be
delegated to the States. The cost would depend on the scope of the program.
The 1984 Report to Congress, The Cost of Clean Air and Water, provides some
figures on the implementation costs of the two programs at both the Federal and State
levels. Federal costs (actual or projected) for administration of the air program from 1971
to 1984 (in 1981 dollars) were $1,955 million, of which $1,094 million comprised grants
to the States (which would be used for all State air program costs). Additional
expenditures by the States during those years amounted to $2,412 million (which, again,
would include administration, enforcement, and all other facets of air program costs). For
the effluent guidelines permitting program, which is delegated to the States, State
expenditures during the period amounted to $3,169 million (which includes all State water
program costs).
A performance standard program would impose enormous additional costs on the
States. Implementation of the air and water programs had been heavily assisted by Federal
cost sharing, but Federal assistance has been cut back over the last few years. It is not
clear whether, given the current Federal budgetary constraints, similar initial support could
Page A—26
-------
Performance Standards
be expected for implementation of a waste minimization performance standard program.
Imposing a program without providing for a major share of the cost to be picked up by the
Federal government would create an enormous burden for the States. It might even cause
many States to reconsider the feasibility of implementing and managing the hazardous
waste program at the State level.
Other Issues
Enforceability: A performance standard program would result in the development
of permits for specific levels of waste generation from the regulated processes within each
facility. The permit provides a clear legal benchmark against which enforcement action
could be taken. Where the standards are based on waste generation per unit of production,
standard documentation of production levels would generally be available against which
performance could be evaluated. If credits for over control or recycling are allowed, the
burden of proof would be on the generator to demonstrate that those credits are available
and allowable.
While some elements of enforcement would thus be straightforward, others cause
difficulties. To the extent that the standards might be inflexible and/or extremely stringent,
there might be an incentive for some generators either to attempt illegal disposal or to
escape inclusion in the system (although this is more likely to be a problem with small
quantity generators, who could be exempted from performance standard requirements).
This problem would be compounded by the enormous number of generators and processes
that could potentially require enforcement. Substantial new resources for enforcement
would need to be appropriated if such a program were not to become unenforceable.
Enforcement costs for performance standards would involve visiting the sites and
reviewing the paperwork to determine whether the required concentration of volume
limitations for each waste stream is being achieved. Conservatively, this would be likely to
require, at an average plant, a minimum of 1 to 1.5 person-days for enforcement personnel
for the site visit, followed by an additional 1 to 1.5 days for analysis, further review of
records, and follow up.
Page A—27
-------
Performance Standards
A possible cost estimate can be developed from this by assuming that enforcement
inspections would be carried out annually for 10 percent of all generators other than small
quantity generators (or approximately 4,300 generators annually), requiring approximately
56 additional enforcement person-years. With support staff, salary and other costs, this
would require additional annual costs well in excess of $5 million. (If small quantity
generators were included under the requirements, even a one percent inspection frequency
would add 1,750 enforcement inspections. Even assuming these took only half the time of
other enforcement inspections, this would require another $1 million.)
Public perception: Performance standards can have the positive effect of being
generally acceptable to the public. Performance standards provide clear evidence of the
effort being made to clean up the environment. This positive public perception might,
however, be tempered by the possibility of adverse economic or employment effects.
Information: The gathering of information by the government and its subsequent
use in the development of performance standards can raise serious legal questions about
confidentiality with respect to proprietary information. Alternative processes used by a
company to manufacture a given product may be a major reason for that company's
comparative advantage in the market. A proprietary process that reduces raw material
inputs or makes more efficient use of those inputs may be the basis for a company's being
able to undersell others in the market It might happen with some frequency that a firm will
be very reluctant to divulge any information about its processes to the government.
3.0 Recommendations
Under certain circumstances and conditions, performance standards might be a
desirable and feasible method for minimizing waste. As was the case when performance
standards were mandated by the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, substantial economic and
legal pressures must be overcome before a performance standard for waste minimization
can be implemented. Given current data and evidence, it is uncertain at this point what
progress will be achieved in waste minimization from other Agency activities and
regulatory policy and where there will be gaps in regulation that might be filled by
Page A—28
-------
Performance Standards
performance standards. Because of the uncertainty of the situation, the following steps
appear appropriate:
• Between now and full implementation of the land disposal
restrictions scheduled under HSWA by 1990, comprehensive data
should be developed to make possible an evaluation of trends
relevant to waste minimization. These data and information could be
gathered through the Comprehensive Assessment Information Rule
(CAIR) system authorized under Section 8(a) of TSCA and
currently being developed by the Office of Toxic Substances and
through information derived from a redesigned waste minimization
section in the biennial report. This effort should focus on obtaining:
— More adequate baseline data with respect to toxicity and volume
of waste streams, by industry and process category,
geographical area, and plant size;
— Trends in these figures over the next several years;
— Changes in recycling and treatment practices with respect to the
various combinations of these factors; and
— Changes in manufacturing processes that result in reduced
generation of waste.
• The above data should be evaluated to identify changes and trends in
waste generation and minimization. Appropriate reduction
requirements could then be mandated with respect to the specific
waste streams or industry sectors that have not minimized wastes to
the extent desirable and economically feasible. Requirements could
also be mandated for specific waste streams that pose significant
environmental or human health hazards.
• After the land disposal restrictions are in place, their effects should
be evaluated. The contributing effect of liability concerns should
also be examined. The following types of problems should be
assessed: (1) waste streams that are still causing environmental
problems despite the imposition of land disposal restrictions and
(2) industry sectors whose generation of these or other wastes are
causing environmental problems. Those waste streams and/or
industry sectors that fall under the above two criteria should be
further examined to determine whether technological alternatives to
current industry production processes exist and whether
performance standards are appropriate. If performance standards
are found to be appropriate, it would be preferable to develop
standards that maximize flexibility (and thereby minimize impact on
the actual production process) for the generator by:
Page A—29
-------
Performance Standards
—- Permitting credit for recycling;
— Permitting credit, in some circumstances, for onsite incineration;
and
— Permitting over control of one regulated waste stream to be
credited against under control of another waste stream in the
same plant or at other plants (with credit limited to use for
wastes in the same or a lower toxicity class).
Where specific hazardous waste streams are identified as causing
potentially critical environmental problems or health risks between
now and 1990, specific performance standards for these waste
streams could be developed under Section 6(a) of the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA).11
Section 6(a) of TSCA allows EPA to impose restrictions on the manufacture, processing,
use, or disposal of chemical substances. It specifically gives the Agency the authority to
impose "a requirement prohibiting or otherwise regulating any manner or method of
disposal" of a chemical substance or mixture. These authorities are all contingent on a
finding that, unless such restrictions are imposed, the substance "will present an
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment." Relatively few actions have
been proposed or promulgated to date under this section. The substances regulated or
proposed for regulation have been asbestos, chlorinated fluorocarbons (CFCs), dioxins,
formaldehyde (ANPR), methylene chloride (ANPR), and metal working fluids.
Page A—30
-------
Prohibit or Restrict Generation of Specific Wastes
Prohibit or Restrict Generation of Specific Wastes
1.0 General Summary
Under this type of performance standard, EPA would be able to ban or otherwise
restrict the manufacture, processing, or distribution of a chemical substance that poses
unavoidable human health and environmental risk. This option is distinctive for three
reasons. First, it differs from other more conventional performance standards because its
objective is to completely prevent the waste from being generated. Other types of
performance standards impose reductions through various methods, but are not specifically
oriented toward total elimination of the waste.
Second, the determination to prohibit or restrict a particular waste will be based in
part upon the feedstocks responsible for generating a waste, rather than simply on the
waste stream itself. More than any other option it is necessary to carefully evaluate the
feedstocks responsible for generating the waste under consideration, since prohibiting or
restricting the particular waste could have dramatic implications for industry. On the other
hand, this option might stimulate new and innovative approaches to resolving or
minimizing waste generation. It could also encourage better technical approaches toward
reducing waste generation because of the nature of substances being banned or restricted
and the incentives to develop substitutes. However, where production processes cannot
substitute feedstocks in order to avoid generation of a prohibited or restricted waste other
options might be better candidates for minimizing waste. Otherwise, the industry using the
process might have to stop production altogether. In this regard, it may be more
appropriate and logistically feasible to prohibit or restrict the feedstocks responsible for
generating the waste streams than to prohibit or restrict the waste itself. Prohibiting or
restricting feedstocks for production of a particular process could, among other things,
reduce the possibility of noncompliance and improve the monitoring and enforceability of
this option.
Page A—31
-------
Prohibit or Restrict Generation of Specific Wastes
Third, this option is product oriented. Some products, when used, might result in a
waste that is under consideration for prohibition or restriction. It might thus be necessary
to find substitute products in order to avoid the generation of the particular waste. For
example, methylene chloride as a paint stripper generates a hazardous waste stream.
Instead of prohibiting or restricting the waste another method of paint stripping such as
bead blasting might be used as a substitute thereby not generating the same waste.
The option can be implemented for the most part on a waste stream-specific basis.
Occasions would arise, though, for prohibiting or restricting wastes on an industry-specific
basis. Finally, the option can also lend itself to negotiated compliance schedules, similar to
the phase-out of asbestos and lead in gasoline.
2.0 Evaluation
2.1 Technical Effectiveness
Volume Reduction
While more data are needed to fully assess of its volume-reducing potential, the
effectiveness of this option is dependent upon the substances involved, their prevalence in
industry, the wastes associated with their use, and the degree to which substitutions can be
found. Prohibiting or restricting a particular waste will drastically reduce its volume.
Under certain circumstances there is the possibility that this option may result in increases
in the volume of waste discharged to other media. This option might actually have a greater
impact on the reduction of toxicity than a reduction in volume.
Toxicity Reduction
There is a significant potential for reduction in toxicity; however, like volume
reduction, there is little information available to fully evaluate the impact on toxicity. By
prohibiting or restricting the generation of specific wastes, industry will have an incentive
to seek out less toxic and persistent feedstocks to use in products. Alternatively, where
there is a threat of a future prohibition or restriction on generating wastes, industry may
Page A—32
-------
Prohibit or Restrict Generation of Specific Wastes
take the initiative and develop improved treatment processes. For example, the pesticide
manufacturing industry may develop more easily detoxified pesticides.
Other Technical Effectiveness Issues
Measuring Results: Some form of monitoring would be necessary in order to
assess the ability of this option to achieve the waste minimization objective. The option
could be measured by requiring firms to keep inventories of the substances used in
processing and manufacture, similar to the requirements of right-to-know laws. TSCA can
require that such records be kept. Resulting reductions of waste can then be tracked
through the RCRA reporting mechanisms, i.e., biennial report data, manifests, and future
RCRA surveys.
2.2 Impacts on Industry
Economic Impacts
Initial capital investments for alternative production processes are likely to be high.
Costs would be low for user industries able to substitute raw materials or feedstocks.
Since the option would result in a retooling of some plants, operation and
maintenance costs could be a problem if additional personnel and/or expertise are needed to
implement changes.
Equity
Some companies within a given industry might be affected more severely than
others; however, more data are needed to assess this issue. For example, manufacturers of
certain types of pesticides would be severely affected by a ban on the generation of waste
materials associated with their production. Manufacturers of competing compounds would
probably gain an increased market share as a result of such regulations. It is anticipated
that larger companies would be better able to shoulder the costs than would smaller
companies. Problems may arise if the waste material to be restricted from generation is
produced entirely by small companies with limited product lines.
Page A—33
-------
Prohibit or Restrict Generation of Specific Wastes
Another equity concern is the impact that this option would have on U.S. industrial
competitiveness. Foreign producers who may have less stringent waste minimization
requirements may have an advantage over U.S. manufacturers of the same product
Industry might protest this option on the grounds that government is intruding into
private manufacturing processes. Although industry maty have some incentive to develop
product substitutes or alternative processes, it is highly unlikly that such would always be
the case. Where proven substitutes are readily available, the regulated community might
rapidly switch feedstocks to avoid new regulations. For example, pesticide formulators
would handle and formulate new products having an effectiveness similar to the banned
produces if regulations restricting generation of particular pesticide wastes are enacted.
2.3 Implementation Issues
Appropriate Target Industries
At present, data are not sufficient to designate appropriate target industries.
Incentives for Noncompliance
The possibility of noncompliance could be significant for this option. If the waste
stream is prohibited or restricted from generation, facilities unable to develop substitute
feedstocks, other products or alternative treatments for the waste stream will be confronted
with two choices (1) to close down operation of the process, and perhaps the business as
well, or (2) to continue production and generation of the prohibited waste. Facilities that
choose to continue to produce the prohibited or restricted waste will be faced with
disposing of this illegally generated waste. If, instead of wastes, feedstocks or products
are prohibited or restricted, a facility would have fewer incentives not to comply. It would
be unlikely that the facility could be able to obtain the prohibited or restricted feedstock and
thus it would not be put into a position of producing the waste stream. For example,
chlorinated fluorocarbons, a feedstock which at one time was commonly used in aerosols,
is now banned. A facility is therefore not likely to use chlorinated fluorocarbons illegally in
aerosol production, since the ingredient is unavailable.
Page A—34
-------
Prohibit or Restrict Generation of Specific Wastes
Legislative Authority
EPA could use its power under Section 6(a) of the Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA) to ban or otherwise restrict the manufacture, processing, or distribution of a
chemical substance, or to regulate "any manner or method of disposal" or any chemical
substance or mixture that "presents, or will present an unreasonable risk of injury to health
or the environment." One example of the use of Section 6(a) authority is the ban on
manufacture for most uses of chlorinated fluorocarbons for aerosol propellants.
Time Required for Implementation
Because implementation of this option will require some collection and analysis of
data, it is estimated that approximately two years will be needed to identify industries,
processes, and substances to be targeted. Time will also be required to set up the option
and draft the regulations. Depending on the volume of wastes associated with particular
production processes, it may take from three to five years for the effects of this option to
become visible. For other processes, the results may not be readily apparent. For
instance, if chrome plating of auto bumpers were banned, the resulting reduction of
chromium wastes would be hard to detect because other chrome plating operations are still
being practiced.
Costs of Development and Implementation
Data are insufficient at this time to estimate the overall cost of this option, although
it is possible to determine the approximate cost of some factors such as enforcement. To
determine costs, data should address industry's behavior under the authorized land disposal
restrictions, under certain State waste-end tax regimes, and under other relevant programs.
Information is also needed on the success of particular procurement programs that are
implemented by some government agencies, such as the Department of Defense.
Enforcement activities for prohibiting or restricting generation of specific wastes
would be fairly straightforward. A site visit, a review of records, and, in some cases, the
evaluation of a sample from a waste stream would be required. At an average plant, the site
visit and sampling would require about 1 to 1.5 person-days for enforcement personnel,
Page A—35
-------
Prohibit or Restrict Generation of Specific Wastes
followed by an additional 1 to 1.5 days for analysis, further review of records, and
followup. The total effort involved might increase if more sampling is required.
A possible cost estimate can be developed by assuming that enforcement
inspections would be carried out annually for 10 percent of all generators other than small
quantity generators (or 4,300 generators annually), requiring approximately 33 additional
enforcement person-years. With support staff, salary, and other costs, this would mean
additional annual costs well in excess of $3 million. (If small quantity generators were
included under the requirements, even a 1 percent inspection frequency would add 1,750
enforcement inspections. Even assuming these took only half the time of other
enforcement inspections, this would require about $1.5 million.
Coordination with other agencies may also be necessary to improve the
effectiveness of this option. It is unclear at this time what level of coordination will be
required or what the costs associated with the coordination will be. For example, banning
certain pesticides which are difficult to detoxify might have to be coupled with, approval of
alternative products for pest control. This may require coordination with other Federal
agencies such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
The cost estimates should also include staffing requirements for the implementing
office as well as the costs for analysis of the results. The costs would probably be similar
to programs run under TSCA, in particular, the programs for banning PCBs and
chlorinated fluorocarbons in aerosols. The cost of the analysis required may be similar to
the level of effort expended for the technical support document on waste minimization or
other similar studies.
There would probably be few costs associated with Federal or State agency
interaction, since implementation of this option would not be mandatory in order for this
option to work. The program could be run autonomously by the Federal government in the
same fashion as are the bans on polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and chlorinated
fluorocarbon (CFC). The option also would not be likely to conflict with State programs.
Page A—36
-------
Prohibit or Restrict Generation of Specific Wastes
Other Issues
Information: One of the major handicaps to a full evaluation of this option is the
lack of important information. In order to better understand the implications of this option
a number of other issues must be taken into consideration, including:
• Identification of substances and processes that cause the generation
of particular waste streams.
• Identification of industries and/or processes that use such
substances.
• Identification of substitute materials that could be used in place of
materials that cause the waste stream.
• Identification and evaluation of process changes that could be
implemented in support of banning or restricting particular wastes,
either on an industry-wide or waste stream basis, or on a process-
specific basis.
• Identification of products used, the production of which may result
in the generation of hazardous wastes, and the use of which may
result in disposal of product (or its residual) in Subpart D landfills.
(For example, styrofoam products may degrade into toxic
constituents.)
• Identification of substitute products for those identified in the
previous item above, that would result in reduced or zero generation
of hazardous wastes, or generation of wastes that are less toxic or
more easily detoxified.
• Measurement of changes in air and water effluent levels. This could
probably be done in conjunction with a mass balance reporting requirement.
Public Perception: Unlike some schemes in which "the polluter pays," this option
may result in the consumer paying. If prohibition or restriction results in substitute
products that are more expensive than the original, the consumer is forced to pay the
difference. To some degree, market competition factors may keep prices at a reasonable
Page A—37
-------
Prohibit or Restrict Generation of Specific Wastes
level. Aerosol products, for example, do not seem to be appreciably higher now than
before CFC was banned.
The general public would probably accept this option since it appears to reduce
health and/or environmental risks. On the other hand, the option has the potential to
threaten employment. Since product substitution may result, there is always the possibility
of layoffs or temporary shutdowns until the particular industry(s) affected is able to re-enter
the market place via introduction of alternative products. Thus, the option creates
incentives for new industries, which could increase jobs through the need for alternative
processes and substitute products.
3.0 Recommendations
This option would be an extremely powerful tool with which to control hazardous
substances. It is probably the most direct application of a source reduction regulatory
program and has the potential to reduce the generation of specific wastes if used properly.
Certain conditions must be met before the option could be considered desirable, however.
Since this option is expected to have a more dramatic impact than others, it should
not be implemented until these other options have been analyzed and those waste streams
that are the most appropriate candidates have been specifically identified. Careful analysis
of the waste streams and processes involved must be performed in order that imposition of
the option will achieve its objective most efficiently. Where the prohibition or restriction of
a waste stream leads to product or feedstock substitution, or stimulates new and innovative
treatment technologies, it might be appropriate to impose the option. However, where it
appears unlikely that industry will find substitutes or new treatment technologies and
therefore will be forced to terminate the production process, it will be critical to assess
whether the improvement in human health and the environment will offset the other
expected impacts from implementing the option.
This option should be the last resort for stimulating waste minimization. It would
be appropriate only when the following conditions are met:
• The waste streams under consideration are extremely toxic;
Page A—38
-------
Prohibit or Restrict Generation of Specific Wastes
EPA is convinced that current management practices cannot
overcome unacceptable levels of risk from waste generated in their
facility; and
When other waste minimization measures have failed.
Page A—39
-------
Phasedown Permits
Waste Generation or Management Phasedovm Permit Program
1.0 General Summary
This approach to waste minimization would involve a variation on the concept of
marketable permits. A marketable permit regulatory program for hazardous wastes would
create transferable rights via permit stipulations limiting the total volume of hazardous
waste that industry could either legally produce or manage. It is a form of mandatory
standards of performance because it would impose specific waste generation limits either
directly on source generators, or indirectly on those who treat, store, or dispose of wastes.
In a phasedown permit scheme, permits would be reissued from time to time with the total
amount of waste allowed for all permits being reduced ("phased down") with each reissue.
Trading among permit holders would be allowed as in any marketable permit system.
While the marketable permit concept has not yet been widely applied, there are a
number of precedents suggesting that its use as a vehicle for reducing hazardous waste
generation might be effective. These include several EPA applications as well as a variety
of examples from other agencies and levels of government.
Since 1976, EPA has successfully implemented approaches resembling phasedown
permits in emissions trading, where concern centers on controlling aggregate levels of
ambient pollution allowed rather than on controlling specific geographic or source
distributions. The "bubble" allows the creation of surplus reductions beyond those legally
required at certain emissions sources to compensate for excess emissions at other existing
plants or groups of nearby plants. Emissions trading allows States and sources (1) to "net
out of preconstruction reviews for new plants or plant modernizations where plant-wide
emissions will not increase by significant amounts; (2) to offset modernization or
expansions in nonattainment areas by securing extra reductions from nearby firms; and (3)
to store or "bank" qualified emissions reduction for later use in bubble, netting, or
offsetting transactions. Banked emission reduction credits (ERCs) can also be sold or
leased to firms seeking alternative ways to meet regulatory requirements more quickly and
Page A—40
-------
Phasedown Permits
flexibly. To be used in trades, any reduction credits must be surplus (i.e., beyond current
legal requirements), permanent, enforceable, and quantifiable. Effectively implementing
such trades requires the establishment of emissions baselines while avoiding double
counting reductions that have already been taken into account in area-wide air quality
attainment plans. However, because plant-specific emissions must be quantified with
precision in order to engage in an approvable trade, individual bubbles can improve the
quality of such plans. Similarly, because potential savings from bubbles can occur, they
also can improve compliance and enforcement due to trading and willingness to agree to
invest in advanced compliance methods (e.g., continuous emissions monitoring) in order to
obtain them. Since EPA issued its comprehensive Emissions Trading Policy Statement in
April 1982 (47 FR 15076) about 100 existing-source bubbles involving an estimated
"average savings" of $3 million each have been approved by the Agency in delegated
States, with another 100 under development for total estimated savings of about $1 billion
over the cost of conventional, source-by-source pollution control. In 1985, EPA proposed
to extend this bubble approach to new facilities subject to stringent New Source
Performance Standards under Section 111 of the Clean Air Act, noting that the single trade
proposed for approval would yield estimated savings of up to $25 million per year, and
additional emissions reductions of 3,000 tons per year over traditional stack-by-stack
compliance (50 FR 3688).
In a second example, EPA has also proposed the use of marketable permits for
restricting chlorofluorocarbons. In this case, EPA compared the potential cost of a
mandatory control system to the potential cost of a marketable permits program. The
comparison showed that the permits program would be less costly overall. Nevertheless,
the expected transfer payments from consumers to industry turned out to be unexpectedly
large. The transfer payments reflected higher product prices which, in the aggregate, was
estimated by an EPA consultant to amount to $1.7 billion, or about 16 times the incremental
control costs.
EPA has also proposed a program to allow the banking, transfer, or trading of
asbestos mining and importing permits during a ten year phase down of asbestos
production. Under the proposal, miners and importers would apply for permits that would
restrict asbestos use to 30 percent of EPA's base period volumes in the first year and phase
Page A—41
-------
Phasedown Permits
down use by 3 percent per year over the subsequent years. Only those applying for
permits would be granted permits. Firms could enter the market by obtaining a permit from
a current holder. EPA is also considering acting as information liaison between parties.
Another example of government use of marketable permits is the Federal Aviation
Administration's adoption in early 1986 of a scheme for more efficient and flexible
allocation of landing and departure slots at high density airports. In this case the FAA
established a system wherein 15 percent of available slots were saved for new entrants,
with the remaining slots "grandfathered" to existing users. The administrative plan
includes a "use or lose" provision by which slots not used 65 percent of the time over a two
month period revert back to the FAA for reallocation. Although the initial allocation of
slots is free of charge to carriers, the carriers may buy, sell, or lease slots to suit their
needs. By June of 1986 there had been about 15 transactions under this program. This
has raised concern in Congress over potential windfall profits—carriers obtained the slots
at no cost, but can sell them for a substantial profit. For this reason, Congress is
considering a bill to repeal the FAA's rule. In the meantime, Texas Air recently sold three
gates and 32 slots at La Guardia Airport to Pan Am for $65 million.
A third example is that of taxi service in New York City, wherein cabs are required
to have "medallions." Medallions are in effect a form of marketable permit which owners
can buy and sell on the open market. The city established a fixed supply of medallions
allocated to preserve the historic distribution between fleets and individual owners. The
city does not allow transfers of medallions between categories.
EPA has already fully instituted or considered regulation schemes resembling
phasedown permits for certain air pollutant emissions trading, reduced lead content in
gasoline, asbestos mining, and chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) reduction. These experiences
can inform current deliberations on phasedown permits for hazardous waste minimization.
In at least one important way, the end point of a phasedown permits program is like
a performance standard mandating waste reduction: both allow EPA to decide in advance
the maximum quantity of waste which can be generated per unit of time (e.g., one year).
Page A—42
-------
Phasedown Permits
Permits would then be issued either to generators or waste treatment, storage, and disposal
facilities (TSDFs) for this volume of waste.
Phasedown permits, however, differ from performance standards in many
important ways. Most important, they potentially cost society less for achieving a given
level of waste reduction. This is because phasedown permits can be transferred (bought,
sold, leased) in an open market system. The degree of incentive for trading is primarily
dependent on variations in control costs within the participating group of firms; if variations
are high (i.e., if some firms can reduce wastes much less expensively than others) then
there is an incentive for permits to be transferred. If variations in control costs are small,
then there will be few if any trades, and the system will not be any less costly to society
than a conventional command-and-control type of performance standard.
For example, assume there are only two producers of a given waste stream. Each
manufacturer produces ten tons of waste, and that it would cost producer A $3 per ton to
reduce his waste, while producer B would incur $30 per ton to reduce his waste. If a
performance standard required a 50 percent waste reduction so that each had to reduce
waste by five tons per period, then the two firms would have total costs of $165 ($3 x 5
tons plus $30 x 5 tons). If, however, it is only important that society obtain a total
reduction of 10 tons (50 percent), independent of where the reduction occurs, then a
phasedown permit system in which permits for only 10 tons of waste production were
issued would achieve the same environmental goal at lower costs.
Assume, for purposes of illustration, that EPA makes an initial allocation of permits
at the rate of one permit per one ton of waste, with each firm allowed to receive five
permits. Firms A and B- have the option of then reducing each of their respective waste
streams by 50 percent, as would have occurred under the scenario of the performance
standard. They also have other options open to them, since they can negotiate with each
other to obtain more permits. As stated above, it is more expensive for Firm B to reduce
waste than for Firm A. Both firms would like to continue producing 10 tons of waste
apiece, but that is no longer allowed, and it is highly unlikely that either of them could
achieve or be willing to achieve a zero waste production rate. Firm B may be willing to
produce 8 tons of waste raiher than 10. Since Firm B already has been issued five permits
Page A—43.
-------
Phasedown Permits
(thus allowing it to produce 5 tons of waste) it would need three additional permits. These
three permits could be purchased from Firm A, if that firm were able to reduce its waste by
three tons.
Assuming that Firm A reduces its waste by three tons (resulting in a net waste
production of two tons), it could then sell three permits to Firm B. As stated above, Firm
A can reduce its waste at $3 per ton. It would thus be willing to produce three tons less
waste if it could sell its permits for any amount more than $3 per ton. Firm B would be
willing to pay any amount up to $30 per ton since it could save money at these prices.
When both firms are aware of each other's position, Firm A will want a price as
close to $30 as possible, while Firm B will want the price as close to $3 as possible. This
example assumes that only these two firms exist, so that the normal forces of supply and
demand competition cannot be applied to arrive at the negotiated price. The total cost to
society can be calculated, however, because the cost of reduction is still $3 per ton for
wastes reduced by Firm A and $30 per ton for wastes reduced by Firm B, regardless of the
permit price. The total cost to society is thus ($3 x 8 tons) + ($30 x 2 tons), or
$84—approximately 50 percent of the control cost under the performance standard
scenario.
A system of phasedown permits can be structured in many ways depending on the
nature and terms of the permit (e.g., who gets them—generators or disposers?); the initial
allocation scheme (e.g., are current users "grandfathered"?); and the type and extent of
government involvement in the permit market (e.g., does EPA serve as banker or broker as
well as enforcer of permit limits?).
To implement a phasedown permits system, EPA must first decide what to allow.
If permits were issued to generators, each permit, like a performance standard, would
allow its owner to generate up to a given amount of hazardous waste per year, as measured
in volume or toxicity in different waste streams. Alternatively, permits could be issued to
treatment, storage, and disposal facilities rather than to generators. The permit would then
allow its owner to treat, store, or dispose of a certain volume (or volume weighted by
toxicity) of hazardous waste per year. Since the allowed volume of waste would be less
Page A
-------
Phasedown Permits
than current volumes, the TSDFs would raise the prices charged to generators. The permit
could be permanent or temporary, with terms from one year to ten years or even longer,
with perhaps some fixed amount within each year or other restrictions on permit use. A
permit system could also combine these two approaches (e.g., by issuing 10 times more
treatment permits as disposal permits). Generators, in turn, would have a greater incentive
to find ways to reduce the waste they produce.
Once the nature of the permit is decided, the next requirement is an initial allocation
scheme. There are two practical ways to structure the initial allocation: through an auction
or through "grandfathering." In an auction, the permits would be sold at a market clearing
price. Under grandfathering, all current generators (or TSDFs) would be given permits for
a certain percentage of their current waste generation. Generators with high waste
reduction costs could then buy extra permits from generators with low waste reduction
costs, as shown in the example above.
Since owners could buy and sell permits, EPA's choice of an allocation scheme
should not affect the final cost to society of the waste minimization desired, i.e., waste
reductions would take place where they cost least, and permits would be used to generate
and dispose of wastes having the highest costs of management. The allocation scheme
would, however, determine the total amount of transfer payments (i.e., transfers of income
that result from either giving away or selling permits). Unless taken into account prior to
implementation, transfer payments could be very large, as mentioned already in the CFC
control case.
The third aspect of a phasedown permit system is the extent of Agency
involvement. Government could act only as an information broker by helping generators
find sellers or buyers and by explaining the nature of the permit and the market price.
Alternatively, it could act as a certifier, banker, and enforcer of market transactions.
Finally, government could choose to be a gatekeeper, directly involved in approving all
market transactions.
Unlike taxes, which in theory may produce the same results, transferable permits
directly limit the amount of waste to desired levels, rather than depending on prices, which
Page A—45
-------
Phasedown Permits
may entail inordinate amounts of information, frequent adjustment, and allegations that
generators are being allowed to "pay to pollute." From the perspective of social cost,
phasedown permits are the least expensive way, to attain a given waste minimization goal,
so long as permit holders do in fact engage in cost-minimizing transfers. If they do not, the
system would still be as effective as a performance standard mandating the same percentage
of waste reduction. EPA has implemented several marketable permit strategies, as have
other Federal agencies and local governments, and has proposed to implement several
others.
2.0 Evaluation
2.1 Technical Effectiveness
Volume Reduction
Since EPA can specify the maximum allowable volume of hazardous waste,
phasedown permits should be effective in achieving volume reduction of hazardous wastes,
whether permits are offered to generators or TSDFs. This option would also be
economically efficient in that the waste reduction would come from generators with the
lowest cost for source reduction or recycling.
This option would also provide many generators with additional economic
incentives to develop new technologies that lower the costs of source reduction and
recycling. If generators receive permits and can produce less hazardous waste, they can
sell unneeded excess permits. Likewise, if TSDFs receive permits, generators would be
faced with even higher costs of offsite management, thus providing a further incentive to
reduce waste volumes before treatment or disposal becomes necessary. However, issue
permits to TSDFs might raise questions about further restrictions on treatment capacity
rather than direct waste minimization at the source, especially during periods where other
traditional alternatives (e.g., land disposal) are also being substantially restructured.
Page A—46
-------
Phasedown Permits
Toxicity Reduction
In general, the phasedown permits option is most easily aimed at volume reduction
for hazardous waste streams. Wastes could be classed or rated by their toxicity, but this
would add an additional layer of complexity to the system that would restrict the size of
markets within which trades could occur. In addition, if the system allowed cross trading
among classes of wastes, risks could actually increase.
2.2 Impacts on Industry
Economic Impacts
Assuming significant variation in individual firms' control costs, and assuming that
actual trades are made, phasedown permits would cost industry and society less than either
performance standards or a ban on recyclable wastes. Generators who have the lowest cost
for source reduction or recycling will sell their permits to generators with higher costs.
Generators with low costs for reducing waste will reduce their waste and sell their new
valuable excess permits to generators with higher costs. Thus, unlike a performance
standard, firms have a strong incentive to generate additional reductions beyond those
mandated because this creates a valuable resource for them to sell or lease in the
marketplace.
Equity
Phasedown permits would entail substantial transfer payments. As EPA learned
from its proposal to establish marketable permits for CFCs, transfer payments are not
popular with the losers, and may even be unpopular with those who reap the benefits of the
transfer. If the government sells the permits at market prices, the transfer payments would
be from generators with high recycling or source reduction costs to the government. If
EPA issues permits in proportion to current volumes, the transfer payments would be from
generators with high recycling or source reduction costs to generators with low recycling
costs, or, what may or may not be the same, from firms who have already reduced
volume/toxicity to those who have not. Although the distributive effects are different
depending on the allocation scheme, any scheme potentially creates big winners and big
Page
-------
Phasedown Permits
losers. If EPA were to use a grandfathering allocation and issued permits in proportion to
current waste generation volumes, generators who have already taken the initiative to
recycle and reduce their wastes would be penalized. Allowing an appeal procedure for
generators to show that they have already significantly reduced volumes could alleviate this
inequity but could create a substantial administrative burden.
In spite of the foregoing, phasedown permits would be more acceptable to some
generators than performance standards because they allow generators to get credit for
initiatives that increase efficiency and lower reduction/recycling costs. However, the
degree of acceptability among generators may vary considerably depending on the nature of
the permit, their control costs, and the initial allocation scheme. Current generators may
prefer grandfathering since this is the least disruptive to the status quo. EPA could lessen
resistance to an auction of permits by rebating the revenues in a way that does not distort
firms' decisions, although there is some inevitable conflict between EPA waste
minimization objectives and current industry behavior. EPA could also implement a limited
auction (e.g., grandfathering a portion and auctioning the rest).
Incentives for Noncompliance
As with any additional regulations, a phasedown permit system may encourage
illegal dumping of hazardous wastes by generators unwilling to purchase the necessary
number of permits. If this approach were adopted, it would be crucial to create ways to
accurately measure permitted waste volumes. Also, if permits were allocated in proportion
to current waste volumes, there would be an incentive for generators to inflate statements of
current volumes or to increase their waste generation in anticipation of the market. (In an
auction distribution system there would be no over reporting incentive.) In general,
phasedown permits would create a whole new industry, including brokers to make the
system work. If EPA takes this role, illegal activities would be of less concern.
If, however, phasedown permits were issued to TSDFs , ather than to generators,
the related enforcement effort applies to both generators and TSDFs. Generators, faced
with diminishing capacities and high prices for waste management options, may be
encouraged to dispose of their waste illegally. EPA must then allocate its enforcement
Page A—48
-------
Phasedown Permits
resources to both groups—to the generators to ensure that they do not illegally dispose of
wastes, and to the TSDFs to ensure that they do not treat or accept wastes in excess of what
is allowed by their phasedown permits. Issuing the permits to TSDFs rather than to
generators would present EPA with a more difficult enforcement task, and could result in
more illegal dumping because of a decrease in enforcement efficiency. On the other hand,
if phasedown permits are issued only to generators, EPA's enforcement effort could be
confined to the generators, ensuring that they do not exceed their permits and do not
illegally dispose of their wastes.
2.3 Implementation Issues
Legislative Authority
EPA may need additional legislative authority, depending on allocation scheme, to
implement the program broadly and effectively. In the case of CFCs, EPA generally
believed that they lacked legal authority to auction permits, but that they could distribute
them based on historical waste generation patterns. Given recent unfavorable
Congressional reaction to the concept of letting the market set a price for landing slots at
congested airports, EPA would be prudent to seek legislation specifically allowing the
Agency to implement phasedown permits before they adopt the system.
Time Required for Implementation
A broadly based system of phasedown permits would probably require at least five
or six years to develop and implement and might require a pilot program to assure that final
implementation is successful. This estimate includes time to resolve the regulatory and
policy disputes that have generally accompanied phasedown permit schemes as well as time
for the market to work. For example, EPA's proposal to regulate chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs) took about four years from the point when the Agency began studying options to
publishing a proposed rule. It usually requires another year to review comments and
promulgate a final rule. If the Agency were to distribute permits to generators rather than
TSDFs, the process would take even longer since there are no current plans to permit
generators, and there would be a much larger population involved.
Page A—49
-------
Phasedown Permits
If Congress were to authorize EPA's development of such a system in 1988,
phasedown permits could possibly be issued to TSDFs by 1994. On the other hand, if
EPA chose to issue permits to generators, which are far more numerous than TSDFs, such
permits might not be ready for issue until 1995. The effects of such permits on waste
minimization might not be visible until 1996.
Appropriate Target Industries
EPA could target all industries and all waste streams, or apply a permit system
sequentially to each set of the land ban wastes. The choice of target industries or waste
streams would depend on whether unresolved problems continue with regard to the
management of the wastes in question, and also whether the industry sector involved is
suitable for application of a phasedown permit system. Suitability would be a function of
(1) significant variation in control costs across firms, and (2) ability to set up a market that
can support trades among firms. The choice to implement trading widely would facilitate
the operation of the market, but would raise questions regarding trades across wastes of
differing toxicities.
Costs of Development and Implementation
The costs of developing and implementing this option would depend heavily on a
number of design decisions concerning the scope and structure of the program. The issues
involved are as follows.
A phasedown permit system could fall short of its objective if permits became
concentrated in the hands of only a few owners. These owners could create competitive
barriers to entry, charge monopolistic prices, or refuse to sell permits to direct competitors.
Concentration, particularly in favor of large owners, has been a characteristic criticism of
other similar types of permit systems, particularly where current users are "grandfathered."
EPA could address this problem by specifying a "maximum market share" to prevent
concentration of permits. EPA could also try to bypass the concentration problem by
picking an initial allocation scheme that does not favor the largest generators. This could be
accomplished by random distribution (lottery), or stratified allocation of permits according
to some criteria such as large scale generators and small scale generators, SIC code, or
Page A—50
-------
Phasedown Permits
waste code. EPA could also prevent permit concentration by printing more permits and
accordingly devalue the permits. Although devaluing the permits would remedy the
concentration problem, it might also provide a disincentive for permit transactions if
potential buyers believe permit values are likely to decrease.
The efficiency of the phasedown permits system could also be diminished if for
some reason generators who have more permits than they need choose not to sell the extra
permits on the open market. For instance, if generators perceive that each year the permits
they are allowed will decrease by a certain percentage, they may want to hold on to the
extra permits in order to ensure their ability to generate waste in later years. This may not
be a problem, though, if permits are leased instead of sold. Also, if the transaction costs of
finding buyers and sellers or negotiating the conditions of trade were very high, buyers and
sellers might find that these costs outweigh any potential benefit, and choose not to
participate in the market. If, on the other hand, permit holders did not use and did not sell
their permits, aggregate waste production would be even less waste than if the system
worked as designed. If this occurred, volume reductions would be larger than planned, but
they would occur at a higher than necessary cost.
Another factor that might cause this option to fail is market uncertainty. Generators
might not buy permit credits at any price if they thought these credits could shortly become
worthless. For example, in 1981, Radio Corporation of America (RCA) auctioned
transponder rights for satellite communications. The FCC later disallowed the sale on the
grounds that the particular auction process resulted in rate discrimination. Similarly, the
FAA's current rule to allow the buying and selling of landing rights at airports by initial
allocation based on grandfathering may be reversed by Congress and the rights reallocated
by lottery instead. As noted earlier, however, this potential uncertainty has not deterred
many airlines from buying and selling slots.
Market uncertainty may also result if generators believe that EPA could decide that
the system is too expensive to administer and that the Agency will pull back the permits or
convert them to traditional ones. For these reasons initiation of any permit system will
require a firm, long-term commitment by EPA and by implementing States, with criteria
Page A—51
-------
Phasedown Permits
and mechanisms for any mid-source corrections which are clearly specified in advance in
order to counteract the compelling effect that overhanging uncertainty can have.
In each possible example of market imperfection or outright failure, the failure is
important only if it results in noncompliance with waste reduction requirements, or if it
produces other serious inequities within or across industries and firms.
EPA would therefore have to address a number of issues and perform a number of
analyses to implement this option. It would have to determine:
• What waste volume to permit,
• Whether or not to target reductions in such a way as to reduce
toxicity,
• Who gets the permits (generators, TSDFs, or both),
• What the terms would be,
• How the Agency would manage the system, and
• How to respond to market defects or trades across location and time,
or whether a certain amount of permits will be reserved for new
entrants.
First, the Agency needs to determine the quantity of waste or toxicity-weighted
volume, and how that quantity will change over time, particularly with regard to possible
industrial growth or economic contractions. A subsidiary problem is whether new
generators or waste managers will be issued additional permits or whether they will have to
buy permits from existing permit holders. If EPA decides to phase the permits or make
them temporary rather than permanent, it can achieve waste minimization gradually by
lowering the number of permits issued each cycle, or by staggering the effective date of
permits issued at auction. This might also make the option more acceptable to those who
do not secure permits at an initial allocation.
Second, EPA must decide who gets permits: does it make more sense to issue
permits to generators or to treatment, storage, and disposal facilities? There are currently
about 4,600 TSDFs, while there are approximately 15,000 generators and 170,000 newly
Page A—52
-------
Phasedown Permits
regulated small quantity generators. It would be much easier for EPA to issue permits to
TSDFs, both because there would be fewer permits to write and because those permits
would be easier to enforce.
Third, once the Agency decides who receives the initial permits, it must evaluate the
different allocation schemes in terms of implementation costs, equity, and administration.
(If EPA is to sell the permits, it needs to determine the appropriate market price.) To do
this, the Agency needs to determine how much it will cost generators to reduce the quantity
of waste they generate. With this information, it is possible to estimate who will buy and
who will sell permits in the marketplace, and what the market clearing price will be. The
necessary data include the number of current generators, their respective volumes of
particular hazardous wastes, their current management costs, and recycling and source
reduction costs per metric ton. Extensive data gathering and analysis will be necessary to
develop this information. If permits are allocated by grandfathering, the Agency needs to
decide whether to charge a fee for the permits. In both cases, EPA needs to consider what
to do with the revenue generated. The fees could help defray the significant administrative
and enforcement costs associated with this option.
Fourth, EPA needs to determine the optimal term for waste generation permits.
This would probably depend on how long it would take generators to recover the costs of
their investment in waste reduction technology, the relative impacts on State and local areas
and on total waste reduction, and whether use of credits would be confined to given
geographic areas or stratified by industry or waste stream. Permits could be marketable
nationally or they could be confined to a State or a region. If permits are marketable
nationally, EPA must decide how to handle trades across locations (e.g., moving waste
generation or management from a low risk area to a high risk area in terms of fate,
transport, and exposure). EPA must also decide how to handle a potential futures market
for waste permits.
Fifth, EPA must determine how to manage and enforce the phasedown permits
system. The more directly involved EPA gets, the higher the costs for implementation and
enforcement.
Page A—53 .
-------
Phasedown Permits
Sixth, EPA must determine if there are any market defects which may not allow the
phasedown permit system to work well. For example, concentration of ownership could be
a problem, as well as "market thinness", which means the market has very few buyers and
sellers because of the high costs of transactions. In order to encourage market
effectiveness, the Agency needs to consider whether it is appropriate to use a stratified
scheme, in which the market is segmented into two or more classes. Stratification may also
help if the Agency wants to selectively encourage waste reduction for the more toxic waste
streams. Stratification by industry group would help to avoid market concentration and
monopoly power for a few large waste generators. Consideration of other agencies'
experience with phasedown permits should provide both options and a range of potential
answers to these and related concerns.
Given the complexities of the issues discussed above, the costs to implement this
option are likely to be high. If EPA decides to act as an information broker there would be
substantial costs to put buyers and sellers in touch with each other. If the Agency decides
to act as certifier and enforcer, it would need a mechanism to keep track of permit
transactions. If EPA decides to act as gatekeeper, implementation costs would be even
higher, since this would require an administrative procedure to act on applications from
buyers and sellers, and also may incur the costs of litigation. This would also impose time
constraints and thus limit the number of transactions.
If the Agency decided to use a stratified approach (e.g., two classes of permits for
different toxicity classes of wastes), administrative costs would be higher than if there were
only one market to keep track of. The term of the permit would also affect implementation
costs. However, while a shorter term would mean more administrative cycles for EPA,
this would provide for more control over how fast waste reduction occurred.
Enforcement costs for this option would depend on whether EPA issued permits to
generators or to TSDFs. It would be more difficult and more expensive to ensure that
generators are not producing more waste than they are allowed, since EPA exercises less
oversight over generators than over management facilities. In order to enforce this option,
EPA would need to keep track of changes in the initial allocation of permits. This would be
Page A—54
-------
Phasedown Permits
possible if the Agency acts as a certifier and enforcer. All transactions would then have to
be filed with EPA.
Other Issues
Public Reaction: A drawback of this option is the common perception that it allows
the rich to pollute. In fact, a phasedown permits system would generally reward generators
who have low recycling and source reduction costs, regardless of whether they are rich or
poor.
Whether the public and industry ultimately accept this option may depend on the
allocation scheme adopted. Since all versions of this option cause significant transfers of
wealth, the general public may not like the government or certain large generators
benefiting at the expense of small generators, if small generators are less likely to be able
to reduce waste volumes economically and therefore need to purchase more permits. In
addition, there are likely to be diverse interests among state governments,
environmentalists, and industry associations. EPA would have to consider whether State
governments can become involved as subsidiary regulators controlling the buying and
selling of permits. The Agency would also have to undertake substantial public
information efforts to communicate the program's goals and benefits.
It is interesting that the cost to society for controlling any specific set of wastes is
the same for all variations of the phasedown permits option. Whether EPA auctions the
permits or generators buy and sell the permits after a lottery or grandfathering allocation,
the price of a permit should eventually reach a market equilibrium. However, while the
cost to society is the same for the various phasedown permit options, the transfer payments
differ significantly.
3.0 Recommendations
Data are not yet available to make a specific recommendation on the desirability and
feasibility of instituting a phasedown permit system for hazardous waste minimization. If
specific problems are still found to exist with regard to individual waste streams or
industrial sectors after full implementation of the land disposal restrictions program and
Page A—55
-------
Phasedown Permits
other key provisions of HSWA, then mandatory waste reduction measures may be
appropriate. A phasedown permit system would be desirable and feasible in this situation
under the following conditions:
1. For the industrial sector or waste streams in question, the costs of
control per unit reduction in waste generation vary significantly
among potential participating firms. (If costs do not vary among
firms, there would be no benefits to trades except to arrive at a
distribution of permits proportional to previous generation rates.)
2. EPA determines that the location at which waste might be generated,
treated, or disposed of would not affect human health or
environmental impacts.
3. EPA determines that it would be less expensive to implement this
system than to implement an equivalently effective conventional
performance standard.
Under this option, EPA should consider exempting small quantity generators from
the requirements or should consider subjecting them to simplified and less burdensome
requirements. Because small quantity generators collectively account for only a small
fraction of the waste generated annually, subjecting them to stringent and expensive
regulations would probably not be cost-effective.
Page A—56
-------
Modifications to Certification Requirements
Requirements for Certification
of Waste Minimization
1.0 General Summary
The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA) of 1984 impose new
requirements on generators of hazardous wastes for waste minimization.
First, generators must certify that they are making efforts, to the extent
economically practicable, to minimize wastes—a certification based entirely on the
generator's judgment. The certification of waste minimization is required on hazardous
waste manifests and on the operating log of any RCRA-permitted TSD facility operated on
the premises of a generator. Second, generators must submit information on their biennial
reports about the nature and scope of their efforts. The intent of these requirements is to
provide the generators with an incentive to think more closely about the desirability and
opportunity to minimize wastes and to keep EPA and the States abreast of waste
minimization efforts occurring throughout the country.
The specific requirement for generators to certify efforts to minimize wastes applies
in two circumstances:
• Generators shipping wastes offsite must sign a waste minimization
certification on the hazardous waste manifest.
Permitted TSD facilities on the premises of a generator must provide
a certification of waste minimization efforts being made by the
generator. This certification is retained as part of the operating log
of the facility.
The actual requirement in HSWA is the same in both cases. The generator or
permittee must certify that:
• "The generator of the hazardous waste has a program in place to
reduce the volume or quantity and toxicity of such waste to the
degree determined by the generator to be economically practicable;
and
• "The proposed method of treatment, storage, or disposal is that
practicable method currently available to the generator which
Page A— 57
-------
Modifications to Certification Requirements
minimizes the present and future threat to human health and the
environment."
The Senate Report on certification stresses at several points that the requirement is
strictly one of certification by the generator:
"While these provisions encourage the reduction of hazardous waste
generated, they are directed at the generators of such waste and do
not authorize the Environmental Protection Agency or any other
person or organization to interfere with or intrude into the
production process or production decision of individual
generators... The nature of the criteria for the certification and the
determination of compliance with those criteria are made solely by
the generator."
Only the generator, therefore, may determine what constitutes appropriate action for
reducing the volume or quantity and toxicity of waste, or what is economically practicable.
Similarly, only the generator may determine what constitutes, for the generator, the
available practicable method of treatment, storage, or disposal which will minimize the-
future threat to human health and the environment. EPA therefore interprets the
certification requirements as prohibiting the development of any formal guidance to
generators on what constitutes appropriate waste minimization. As the Senate Report on
the certification process emphasizes, the intent of the current requirement is merely to
encourage generators to consider specifically the desirability and feasibility of waste
minimization; it does not require specific waste minimization action.
The Agency believes that in most cases generators should continue to determine
what their waste minimization options are, and, at this time, that EPA should not make
specific process related decisions to force waste minimization. EPA will, however, be
developing general guidance on approaches to waste minimization which it believes to be
beneficial or desirable, and is currently engaged in research on waste audit techniques to
better identify opportunities for waste minimization. EPA has responded to letters of
inquiry on these issues by specifically endorsing certain general activities as sound waste
minimization practices. For example, the Agency has stated that sending hazardous wastes
to solvent recycling facilities for reclamation and reuse meets the intent of the waste
minimization certification. It has also encouraged transferring hazardous wastes through
Page A— 58
-------
Modifications to Certification Requirements
waste exchanges to companies which can reclaim or reuse them, when such wastes would
otherwise be disposed of.
The option under consideration here is to allow EPA to provide more specific
guidance on waste minimization practices in specific circumstances. The authority would
be used selectively in limited circumstances where the Agency has reason to believe that
self certified programs are not protective of human health and the environment. Economic
practicability assessments would remain under the purview of the generator, but EPA
would seek discretionary authority to require that a generator submit a written explanation
why he or she believes that an available and commonly used waste minimization practice is
not economically practicable in a specific case. This authority could be used as a
mechanism to ensure the exchange of pertinent technical and economic information. (While
small quantity generators might be subject to somewhat increased reporting responsibilities
under this option, EPA could consider subjecting them to less rigorous and burdensome
requirements than those affecting large quantity generators.)
There is a range of ways in which EPA's role with respect to such certifications
could be modified. The possible combinations of authority would be:
• EPA could develop guidance characterizing certain practices to be
unacceptable as waste minimization (e.g., dewatering), and
effectively prohibit their use as a basis for certification. While this
would prohibit certification based on that activity, it would, by
itself, have no mandatory effect on industry with respect to other
aspects of the certification.
— If EPA were also given authority to determine economic
practicability, it would have no additional impact unless EPA
also had the authority to develop guidance on what is waste
minimization.
• EPA could develop broad classes of waste minimization practices,
as well as industry-specific guidance as to what constitutes waste
minimization for a particular industrial sector. Depending on the
requirements for its industrial sector, a generator would be required
to meet one or more of these specifications in order to certify that it
has a waste minimization program in place. In lieu of this, the
generator could offer an explanation of an alternative practice which
the generator believes meets waste minimization objectives.
Page A— 59
-------
Modifications to Certification Requirements
— If EPA also had the authority to evaluate the generator's
certification that none of the specified practices were
economically practicable, it would in effect be empowered to
impose performance standards through the certification process.
— If the assessment of economic practicability continued to be
based strictly on the selfcertification of the generator, the
generator would still be free to certify that it had met the
requirement because it was not economically practicable to
undertake any of the waste minimization practices.
Since EPA's authority would be discretionary, these requirements could be applied
selectively in cases where analysis of baseline and trends data on waste generation,
recycling, and management indicate that particular industrial sectors are still creating
residual problems and health risks because of the volume and/or toxicity of the wastes
generated, and the waste minimization or management practices used.
Examples of circumstances where the availability of this discretionary authority
would substantially enhance the effectiveness of waste minimization efforts include:
1. Where generators' self-certified waste minimization programs are in
fact ineffective: Certain practices that generators may certify as
waste minimization may in fact produce no net reduction in waste
volume or toxicity. For instance, some companies list membership
in a waste exchange as a waste minimization program, even though
they have never made a transaction in that exchange. Discretionary
authority to define waste minimization practices specifically would
help force all generators to adopt good-faith programs.
2. Where generators' waste minimization activities present adverse
environmental risks: In a limited number of cases, generators waste
minimization efforts might actually be increasing human health and
environmental risks rather than decreasing them. An example might
be the use of air stripping to remove volatile organic compounds
from waste streams, thereby creating an air pollution problem. By
specifically describing technologies, practices, and situations that
must not be considered valid waste minimization approaches, the
Agency would discourage such activities.
3. Where valid waste minimization practices have not been adopted for
reasons of economic practicability: Where, despite clear guidance
on what constitutes a constructive waste minimization program,
generators take no action on grounds of economic impracticability,
this discretionary authority would give EPA better insight into the
Page A— 60
-------
Modifications to Certification Requirements
economic forces involved. This data would be valuable in
reviewing the practicability all other waste minimization options,
from mandatory performance standards to technical assistance
programs.
The current legislation would have to be amended to allow EPA to define these
acceptable waste minimization practices, as well as practices that could not be certified as
waste minimization in certain circumstances (e.g., those practices, such as noted above,
that result in adverse cross-media pollution transfers). As additional information becomes
available, the Agency could use this discretionary authority to focus on specific industries
that continue to create potential risks to human health and the environment. The Agency
emphasizes that this authority would be used sparingly, not as a method of enacting de
facto performance standards on a large scale.
2.0 Evaluation
2.1 Technical Effectiveness
Volume and Toxicity Reduction
It is impossible to predict the effect of modifications of the certification process on
the volume, quantity, or toxicity of wastes that could be associated with the changes to the
certification program described above, though the overall effect would certainly be positive.
Clearly, the important aspect of this program would be that it would operate as part of a
more comprehensive waste minimization strategy. As such it would allow EPA to provide
specific guidance to firms that need it (and often ask for it); it would also allow EPA to
curtail use of approaches that might be counterproductive in protecting human health and
the environment.
2.2 Impacts on Industry
Economic Impacts
For those facilities required to meet the stricter certification requirements, the costs
would depend on whether they were currently practicing waste minimization alternatives or
have a waste minimization program determined to be certifiable. If so, the certification
Page A—61
-------
Modifications to Certification Requirements
requirement would be identical to that under existing law and regulations, and would
involve no new costs. If not, the facility would have the additional cost either of describing
an alternative waste minimization activity or of writing a justification for certifying that
none of the specified waste minimization alternatives were economically practicable.
Equity
There are two equity issues of importance. The first is whether appropriate
industries are selected for application of the new certification procedure. The second is
whether the requirement for demonstrating economic impracticability is unduly
burdensome. These issues would have to be properly addressed when guidance is
developed.
Incentives for Non-compliance
Non-compliance could be an issue if a firm knowingly adopted a waste
minimization practice that EPA had specifically listed as undesirable. Since the authority
would be used selectively and in relation to known problem areas, discovery of this type of
non-compliance would presumably not be difficult
2.3 Implementation Issues
Legislative Authority
EPA would need to acquire express legislative authority to undertake any of these
alternatives, since the current statutory requirements are clearly intended to be directed at
generators. EPA could be given the authority to characterize certain practices as waste
minimization, to prohibit the characterization of specific practices as waste minimization, or
to determine economic practicability.
Time Required for Implementation
Since amendments to RCRA would be required to provide EPA with the authority
necessary to specify certifiable waste minimization activities, the earliest date at which EPA
could have the legal authority to implement this option would be 1988. A decision to use
Page A— 62
-------
Modifications to Certification Requirements
such discretionary authority would be based on a careful review of data on trends in waste
generation and management, taking into account the impacts of successive phases of the
land disposal restrictions. With the possibility of two year variances, data incorporating the
impacts of the first phase of the land disposal restrictions would probably not be available
until 1989. Specifications of particular activities as constituting or not constituting waste
minimization would require a rulemaking, necessitating at minimum an additional six
months. Subsequent implementation would depend on development of data as other
phases of the land disposal restrictions take effect. With variances, the last of these would
be in 1992.
Appropriate Target Industries
The most appropriate industrial sectors to review for possible application of the
guidance procedures outlined above would be those most affected by each successive phase
of the land disposal restrictions. Such a procedure would only be used in cases where the
available data indicate that opportunities for waste minimization are not being utilized and
there remained a significant risk to human health and the environment. It is not possible to
predict at present which industrial sectors would be most likely to require such additional
pressure. They are most likely to be among those for which reductions in waste
generation would be extremely costly.
Costs of Development and Implementation
There would be some limited costs involved in the development of guidance for the
selected industrial sectors, but much of this would be developed from already existing
information and based on ongoing data evaluations. Required rulemaking could be both
time consuming and costly, however, the overall costs would depend on how extensively
EPA made use of this authority.
Enforcement costs, like implementation costs, would depend primarily on how
often the Agency made use of its discretionary authority. Enforcement resources required
for reviewing either the alternative waste minimization strategy filings or the economic
Page A— 63
-------
Modifications to Certification Requirements
justification filings could be substantial. Enforceability would depend on use of penalties
applicable to generators who fail to fulfill permit or hazardous waste manifest requirements.
3.0 Recommendations
EPA recommends that certification by the generator should continue in order to
assure that waste minimization programs remain economically practicable; the certification
of waste minimization programs by generators on manifests and on the operating logs of
TSD facilities should also continue.
Nevertheless, as data on trends in waste generation and management become
available some problem areas may become apparent where the availability of additional
discretionary authority would be a valuable tool to enhance waste minimization. Under
circumstances where the generator has not undertaken any waste minimization activities,
which could be determined through the biennial reporting requirement, the Administrator
could be provided discretionary authority to require the generator to submit to the
Administrator a justification as to why none of the waste minimization alternatives are
economically practicable.12 The generator's rationale would not be challengeable, but
nonproprietary information would be publicly available.
The intent of the additional legislative authority would be for EPA to be able to
promulgate a limited number of programs. For instance:
After careful consideration of all the implications for cross-media
environmental effects, EPA might specify one or more practices that
could not acceptably be certified as waste minimization.
• Once data are available to develop meaningful information on what
changes and trends are occurring, EPA might increase the specificity
of its guidance, and define more precisely for certain
environmentally critical industries which practices constitute waste
minimization. Generators would remain free to specify other
practices as meeting the waste minimization requirement, and to
submit a description of those practices. Unless EPA were to choose
An alternative format of the certification would have to be written to allow for a two part
certification separately covering waste minimization activities and economic
practicability.
Page A— 64
-------
Modifications to Certification Requirements
to place such a practice on the list of unacceptable practices for
certification, it would have to accept the generator's certification.
EPA would use its new discretionary authority only in cases where data developed
through biennial reports, the CAIR questionnaire, or other data sources indicated that
current waste generation and management or specified waste minimization practices result
in potential risks to human health or the environment. The effect would be to force
industry to think more carefully about the opportunities open to it to minimize waste. If,
after these steps, the Agency still finds that unreasonable risks to human health or the
environment remain, it would use authority under TSCA Section 6(a) or 6(b) to impose
additional requirements either generally on the handling of particular waste streams by an
industrial sector, or specifically on the activities of a particular generator.
At this time EPA is not able to recommend the implementation of this option.
however, as part of the next RCRA reauthorization, EPA will provide Congress its most
current assessment of the need to modify the existing /aste minimization requirements.
Page A— 65
-------
Ban Landfilling of Recyclable Wastes
Ban the Landfilling, Treatment, or Incineration
of Potentially Recyclable Wastes
1.0 General Summary
The Agency could encourage waste minimization by imposing an option which
would ban land disposal, treatment or incineration of wastes that it considers to be
recyclable. This management practice option would force generators of selected wastes to
decide whether to recycle waste streams, find source reduction measures, or stop
producing the products that generate the potentially recyclable wastes altogether.
The types of wastes most appropriate for this option would be those that have
already been shown to be recyclable or could become recyclable with further research and
technological development. Obviously, wastes that are not yet known to be recycled or are
only in the research and development stage are not expected to be recycled by industry. It
is less obvious, however, why a waste that is known to be recyclable is not recycled.
Recycling may be more expensive than conventional methods of treating, landfilling
or incinerating wastes. Other reasons include lack of information on recycling potential, a
latent or undeveloped market for a recycled waste, an inability for a firm to meet the same
purity standards that apply for virgin materials, and lack of financial capability of a facility
to make the necessary changes in the production process to prepare a waste for recycling.
The rationale for Agency intervention using this option would be to help stimulate
industry's behavior toward recycling. The option would not only encourage reuse of
wastes but it would reduce the volume of wastes that are being disposed of through
conventional means, thus, freeing up room in landfills for wastes that cannot be recycled.
In conjunction with other options that have been evaluated in this report (e.g., technical
assistance, procurement practices), banning recyclable wastes would help speed industry's
effort to recycle wastes.
Unlike a complete prohibition or restriction in the generation of waste, this option's
primary attention is on wastes at the end-of-pipe. This option is only concerned with
Page A—66
-------
Ban Landfilling of Recyclable Wastes
feedstocks to the extent that the recycled waste can be recycled as an input in other
production processes. In some cases the waste can be recycled back into the same process
as a feedstock from whence it had been generated (e.g., dry cleaning solvents).
In developing this option, it is necessary to address a number of other issues. First,
the Agency needs to define "recyclable" and identify recyclable waste streams. Since
almost any waste stream could be recycled, albeit at a high cost, it appears that it will be
necessary to consider cost in the definition of wastes potentially recyclable. However,
there is no obvious correct level of costs below which wastes are recyclable and above
which they are not. If the cost is set too high, firms may stop producing the waste
generating product altogether. After defining the term, the Agency needs to decide how
often it will revise its list of recyclable wastes as technological advances provide increased
opportunities for reducing the cost of recycling.
A very limited example of this option exists in California. To make the ban
manageable, California only prohibits land disposal of recyclable wastes, but it allows
generators to treat or incinerate the recyclable wastes. Furthermore, the list of wastes
banned from land disposal includes only some, not all, recyclable wastes.
2.0 Evaluation
2.1 Technical Effectiveness
Volume Reduction
This option has the potential to induce significant reductions in the volume of waste
that would ordinarily be sent to landfills, treatment or incineration. The actual volume
reduction will depend On the number and volume of the waste streams classified as
recyclable. The impact on volume reduction will also be dependent on how the recycled
waste will be used. The impact on volume may be greater if the waste can be recycled
several times before it is must be disposed (e.g., dry cleaning solvents or recovery of acids
from spent pickle liquor in the primary metals industry). However, preparing a waste for
recycling may generate a waste (impurities that are removed from the recycled waste) which
will have to be disposed. In other cases a waste may only be recycled once as a feedstock
Page A—67
-------
Ban Landfilling of Recyclable Wastes
in another process (e.g., recycling of pesticide dusts at pesticide fomulating facilities).
These processes will, in turn, generate a volume of waste that must also be disposed.
Toxicity Reduction
The impact on toxicity that this option will have depends on the type of waste that is
recycled. Some wastes that are prepared for recycling may require removing impurities.
The residual waste may be more concentrated and more toxic than the waste being recycled.
If the recyclable waste does not have a residual waste then there should be no impact on
toxicity of the remaining wastes.
Other Technical Effectiveness Issues
Two factors could limit the effectiveness of this option: (1) lack of demand for
recycled wastes, and (2) the use of a variance program. Insufficient demand for the
recycled products creates potential problems with the program's effectiveness. Waste
generators are currently recycling only to the extent that demand exists to justify the cost of
recycling. This option may have to be coupled with other EPA measures (e.g., expanded
use of a waste exchange system) to increase the demand for the wastes that may be
recycled.
A variance or appeals program could also reduce the effectiveness of this option.
California currently has in place a limited form of this option. Some variances are granted.
To obtain a variance, generators are supposed to show that recycling, treating or
incinerating the recyclable waste will be either technically or economically infeasible. If
such a method is allowed under this option, it could be very cumbersome since appeals
would slow the process of implementation.
2.2 Impacts on Industry
Economic Impacts
Bans may be an expensive means of obtaining volume reductions compared to other
proposed options such as phasedown permits. Unlike these other options, the mechanism
for banning the generation of certain waste streams is not a function of a market.
Page A—68
-------
Ban Landfilling of Recyclable Wastes
Therefore, a ban is indifferent to the costs that would be involved in the actual processes
that would be required of a facility to meet the option.
Total cost to industry would depend on how much of a potentially recyclable waste
is selected to be recycled. It could be very expensive if the option is applied to all of the
waste rather than to a portion of the waste. Other factors that need to be evaluated in order
to estimate the costs to industry are:
• The costs of retrofitting a facility with the machinery to prepare the
designated waste for recycling.
• The costs for developing a market for the recycled wastes. There
may be very little demand in the early stages of recycling the waste.
Facilities may have to absorb the costs of recycling in order to
generate demand for their wastes.
Equity
Waste generators may view the option as inequitable since only selected waste
streams and generators will participate in the option.
Incentives for Noncompliance
There is the possibility that imposing a ban on recyclable wastes could create
incentives for noncompliance. If the imposition of this option is more costly than the
current way a facility disposes waste it might deliberately continue to treat its wastes rather
than comply with the recycling "regulations. The degree that a facility might choose to not
comply, however, will be dependent on the enforceability of this option.
2.3 Implementation issues
Legislative Authority
It does not appear that there is authority under RCRA to enact such a ban with the
exception of the portion relating to landfilling. An examination of Section 6 (a)(6)(A) of
the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) indicates that any disposal method can be
prohibited or regulated. Such an action may be taken only if the Administrator finds that
Page A—69
-------
Ban LandfUling of Recyclable Wastes
the disposal of a chemical substance or mixture presents an "unreasonable risk of injury to
human health or the environment,"(Section 6 (a)). Thus, to enact this option, EPA would
need to evaluate recyclable substances for their risk to human health and the environment
when landfilled, incinerated, or treated. The likelihood, however, of a waste posing an
"unreasonable risk" when landfilled, treated, or incinerated but not when recycled seems
low. Thus, TSGA does not seem to be a vehicle for implementation of this option.
Time Required for Implementation
It will take about eight years to implement this option; four years to determine
whether this option is necessary; three years to propose regulations; and another year to
promulgate them. In comparison, it took EPA a few more years to promulgate its
redefinition of solid waste, an issue only slightly more complex. It is likely that the period
during which regulations are proposed would be quite controversial and time consuming.
One of the major factors in this process will be EPA's determination of the degree that
economics will play in the definition of what wastes are recyclable.
Appropriate Target Industries
This option will be most appropriate for industries generating highly toxic waste
streams whose wastes have a potential for recycling or source reduction and for which
recycling technologies are available. Without careful analysis prohibiting waste generation
could have a deleterious effect on improperly selected industries. It is conceivable that a
ban could exceed a'facility's capability of changing its production processes. In these cases
firms would be forced to stop production.
Costs of Development and Implementation
There is insufficient information to make clear cost estimates on the implementation
of this option. First, perhaps the most costly aspect of implementing this option is
enforcement. "Honor systems" will be least apt to work under conditions where recycling
may be more expensive than conventional treatment of wastes; in such cases the Agency
would have to be particularly vigilant in monitoring recycling practices. To enforce these
regulations the Agency wculd have to discover failure to recycle before wastes are sent
Page A—70
-------
Ban Landfilling of Recyclable Wastes
offsite, since it will be difficult, if not impossible, to identify violations after treatment,
disposal, or incineration.
Second, the staffing requirements of the option may be large. This would be
particularly true for enforcement. For other administration, staffing size and cost would
depend in part on whether Regional Offices or Headquarters will be responsible for
implementing the regulations.
Third, EPA needs to aid in the promotion and development of additional, recycled
wastes, uses and markets for recycled wastes. There would presumably be some costs
involved for research and development on recylcling technologies, and continued support
of waste exchange programs would be necessary to assure continued access by regulated
generators to markets for recycled materials.
Finally, the Agency might study the experience of California for other costs that
would be involved with a ban on disposal, treatment and incineration of wastes. Their
experience can help to define the outline and logistical structure for implementation. For
instance, it would be important to study whether the ban works best under a two-stage
whereby California strictly enforces compliance for a limited number of streams, yet
encourages recycling by industry for a much larger number of wastes than are regulated. ^
3.0 Recommendations
Banning land disposal, treatment, or incineration of potentially recyclable waste
streams appears to be an expensive method of achieving reductions in the quantity of
hazardous waste generated and the risk/toxicity of wastes. It is probably premature to
consider this option prior to determining the effect that land disposal restrictions and the
issuance of Part 264 permits will have on the quantity of waste generated. This option
should probably be the last resort for inducing waste minimization. It would be appropriate
only when the following conditions are met:
« The waste streams under consideration are extremely toxic,
in California, generators must explain why they did not recycle or treat recyclable wastes.
The State cannot force generators to recycle unless the wastes exceed certain
concentrations
Page A—71
-------
Ban Landfilling of Recyclable Wastes
EPA is convinced that current management practices cannot
overcome unacceptable levels of risk from waste generated in their
facility, and
When other waste minimization measures have failed.
Page A—72
-------
Segregation of Wastes
Segregation of Wastes
1.0 General Summary
Many waste streams are in reality a mixture of t-wo or more component wastes
generated at different points in a production process, but combined to reduce handling
requirements, save transportation costs, or achieve scale economies in treatment or
disposal. This management practice would ban the mixing of waste streams where one or
more of the components is identified as recyclable. While the option would not require a
segregated waste to be recycled (this could only be done through banning the waste's
treatment or disposal), it is assumed that once having segregated recyclable wastes, a
generator would have a strong incentive to initiate recycling.
This option could be implemented at varying levels of stringency. At one extreme,
segregation could be required on a self-enforcing basis to the extent determined to be
practical or economically feasible by the generator. At the other extreme, it could be
mandated through detailed and enforceable regulations, such as in conjunction with a
general waste minimization performance standard (see "Performance Standards").
Recycling covers both reuse and reclamation activities; the recycling method most
appropriate would depend on the type of waste that is segregated. In some cases the waste
could be used for energy recovery (as is often possible, for instance, with solvents). In
other instances the waste might be appropriate as a feedstock in the production of another
product (for example, ferric chloride waste from titanium dioxide manufacturing can be
used as a feedstock in water treatment), or reused in the same production process (for
example, acids from spent pickle liquor in the primary metals industry can often be
recovered).
Internal or onsite recycling potential would have to be determined through industry-
specific analyses. Information on what materials could be recycled offsite could be
developed through industry analyses as well as through data obtained through waste
exchanges. While such a regulatory requirement might not specifically require recycling of
Page A—73
-------
Segregation of Wastes
the streams once they are segregated, it would make recycling more feasible by producing
waste streams that are relatively uncontaminated (by virtue of not being a random mixture)
and thus more amenable to subsequent recovery. In addition, the remaining waste streams
might be easier and safer to treat and dispose of than combined waste streams.
EPA could decide when waste stream segregation would be required based on the
same types of technology evaluations and economic analyses that are currently used to
make the technology-based performance standard determinations under the Clean Air and
Clean Water Acts. Management practices could include:
• Isolation of hazardous materials from nonhazardous materials,
• Isolation of recyclable materials from nonhazardous materials,
• Isolation of hazardous waste by contaminant, and
• Isolation of liquid from solid waste.
In certain cases, cost savings may be the greatest nonregulatory incentive for
segregation. Segregation can be economically attractive to a facility by potentially (a)
reducing treatment and disposal costs, (b) lowering expenses for the purchase of raw
materials, and/or (c) producing a desirable product that can be marketed or sent to a waste
exchange. In fact, requiring segregation of wastes could facilitate waste exchange efforts
by expanding the market for the purchase and sale of recyclable wastes. It should be
noted, however, that even after a segregated waste has been determined to be "potentially
recyclable," recycling is still dependent on market, geographic, and technical factors, which
can vary substantially. In some cases, generators complying with a segregation
requirement may not be able to recycle and may be forced to continue to send their wastes
to treatment or land disposal.
This option is clearly not applicable to all waste streams, and, in fact, might be
applied only in limited situations. Merging streams is usually done both for convenience
and to save costs. Streams have sometimes been combined to reduce piping requirements
or minimize treatment expenditures through the construction and operation of single large
treatment facilities, rather than through distributed smaller units. Consequently, little or no
cost savings would be realized in some situations.
Page A—74
-------
Segregation of Wastes
Data needs for establishing a waste segregation requirement would be considerable.
First, technical information would be needed on which industries and processes can
potentially segregate their wastes. Monitoring data would be needed for selected waste
streams to adequately characterize the streams to assess their recycling potential.
Information would be needed on the costs of process and treatment modifications and the
economics of the affected industries. Finally, a survey might have to be undertaken to
identify markets for recycling the segregated wastes.
2.0 Detailed Evaluation
Volume Reduction
This option has the potential to significantly reduce the volume of some wastes
otherwise treated or disposed of on land. Based on data developed for the RCRA
Risk/Cost Analysis Model, it appears that segregation of streams can be effective in
reducing waste volumes for such industries and processes as acrylonitrile manufacturing,
petroleum refining, phenolic resins manufacturing, and metal treating.
Toxicity Reduction
It is also apparent, based on limited data in the RCRA Risk/Cost Analysis Model,14
that some relatively high volume streams that have been identified as potentially
segregatable are also quite toxic. Notable among these are solvent laden wastes generated
during the cleaning of equipment and metal surfaces, pesticide dusts collected in baghouses
at formulators, and an assortment of wastes containing levels of highly toxic organic
compounds and metals. If such highly toxic wastes were segregated from existing
composite waste streams, it is possible that the remainder of the waste stream (which
would be sent to treatment or some form of land disposal) would be less toxic.
Segregating wastes may therefore indirectly accomplish some reduction in waste stream
toxicity.
14 The RCRA Risk-Cost Analysis Model: Phase III Report — Appendix, A. USEPA, Office of
Solid Waste, Washington, D.C., 1984.
Page A—75
-------
Segregation of Wastes
2.2 Impacts on Industry
Economk Impacts
Without detailed identification of potential targets, and considerable information on
compliance costs, it is impossible to estimate how much the development of technology
based standards for segregating wastes would cost industry. If other technology-based
performance standards were implemented simultaneously, then the marginal cost of
complying with segregation requirements would presumably be relatively minor.
Segregation does have the potential in selected instances to be economically
attractive, and can in some cases save an industry or a facility significant sums of money.
Actual costs, however, will vary based on the type of process, the size and composition of
the waste stream, the market for and value of the recycled waste, the age and physical
constraints of the plants, and geographic location. In addition, new prohibitions on land
disposal and dramatically increased costs for all forms of disposal, coupled with substantial
efforts to increase industry awareness of recycling possibilities, may provide adequate
information and incentive for waste stream segregation without requiring such action by
regulation. Estimating the actual cost impacts is complicated by fluctuations in the demand
for (and cost of) the segregated, recyclable material.
The cost of waste segregation may, however, fall disproportionately on the
consumer. This is so if some industrial sectors can avoid the costs of segregating wastes
by passing on these costs to the consumer. The trade off in the consumer's absorption of
the costs of segregation would be if there is a real benefit through a reduction in human
health and environmental risks. However, the benefit of reduction in the human health and
environmental risk would presumably be shared equally among both the producer and
consumer.
Equity
Because of the nature of the wastes to be segregated for recycling, the option could
fall disproportionately on selected industries. Since there is, however, the possibility that
Page A—76
-------
Segregation of Wastes
the regulated industries may realize a profit from the generation of wastes, the regulations
for those industries may not actually be much of a burden.
Incentives for Noncompliance
Compliance may not be a problem if segregation of wastes results in an economic
return. However, if compliance with the option is more costly than the way a facility
normally treats waste, it might deliberately continue to treat its wastes in a conventional
manner. The degree that a facility might choose to not comply, however, will be dependent
on the enforcement of this option.
2.3 Implementation Issues
Legislative Authority
It is not clear what the legislative authority is for requiring segregation of wastes.
Section 3002 of RCRA states that EPA shall establish standards for generators "as may be
necessary to protect human health and the environment," but d^s not specifically list waste
segregation as a requirement. If this option is not currently mandated by RCRA, the Act
may have to be amended. Another possible approach would be through the use of TSCA
Section 6.
Appropriate Target Industries
In order to identify the target industries, a survey must be undertaken to identify
those industries where segregation of wastes can, in fact, achieve significant reductions in
wastes. The survey and.the subsequent industry-specific analyses will be both resource
intensive and time consuming. Some preliminary studies have been performed to evaluate
the potential impact that waste segregation can have on minimization for specific industries.
There are a number of industries and processes where the potential for recycling would be
substantial if the appropriate wastes were segregated. The following are a few examples:
• The agricultural chemical formulation and paint manufacturing
industries could both reduce their waste volumes by using air
pollution controls (baghouses) dedicated to collecting a single type
of dust, i.e., pesticide or pigment. This would eliminate the
Page A—77
-------
Segregation of Wastes
contamination of one waste stream with a second waste, thus
expediting recycling or reuse of the recovered materials.
• By segregating aqueous and oily wastes, the petroleum refining
industry could bypass the API Separator, thereby reducing its load
and allowing for better separation efficiency for existing separators.
This could be accomplished by installing a separate sewer system to
convey oil free aqueous wastes.
• During the treatment of metal surfaces prior to electroplating,
plating, anodizing, coloring, and finishing, rinse waters and spent
baths were often mixed and treated jointly. Recycling and reuse can
be promoted by segregating various rinses.
• The wood preserving industry can apply "good operating practices"
to segregate waste streams by isolating (a) hazardous materials from
nonhazardous materials, (b) hazardous waste by contaminant, and
(c) liquid waste from solid waste.
Costs of Implementation
The cost of implementation is not yet quantifiable, but it would be likely to include
the development and operation of a permit program, and would include resources expended
at both the Federal and State levels. Incremental costs would presumably be modest if
waste segregation were implemented in conjunction with performance standards.
Implementation costs, however, would likely be significant if segregation were required in
the absence of performance standards.
As noted earlier, the development of a regulation of this type could be as simple as
requiring that facilities segregate their wastes to the extent that is feasible and practicable, or
could be as technically complex as the establishment of technology based standards.
Technology based standards would require extensive surveys of industry (to identify which
operations and processes offer potential for segregation), site visits, monitoring of waste
streams, surveys of potential facilities, and identification of markets for recycling of the
streams.
If enacted on a mandatory basis, a waste segregation requirement could impose
significant additional costs on the States. It is likely that considerable effort will be needed
to review permit applications, including design and operating modifications, and to conduct
Page A—78
-------
Segregation of Wastes
onsite enforcement inspections. Federal assistance may be needed if these best
management practice requirements are to be managed on a State level. If performance
standards were enacted to minimize wastes, then enforcement of segregation requirements
could be included at minimal additional cost to the States.
Enforcement cost would involve visiting the sites to check piping, tanks, drums,
and general waste handling practices. Except for segregation of wastes involving waste
handling practices by personnel, enforcement would primarily require verifying that the
pipes and the plant waste stream diagrams showing waste stream segregation corresponded
with each other. The site visit at an average plant could require one person-day for
enforcement personnel.
Assuming that enforcement inspections would be carried out annually for 10
percent of all generators other than small quantity generators (or 4,300 generators
annually), approximately 24 additional enforcement man-years would be required. With
support staff, salary, and other costs, this would entail additional annual costs of about
$2.1 million.
3.0 Recommendations
Several conditions should be met before this option is implemented for any
particular waste stream. First, only wastes that have realistic economic and technical
potential to be recycled on the scale at which they are produced should be segregated;
segregation would clearly not be desirable if the amount segregated substantially exceeded
the size of the recycling market. The selection of an inappropriate waste stream—a stream
with no economical recyclability, or a stream produced in far larger volume than the
capacity of the recycling market—would present unnecessary costs to industry, and would
achieve no beneficial effect (since the waste would have to be treated and disposed of as
before). Second, a market for the recycled waste should be in operation or nearing
operation, so that facilities could quickly begin to recycle their segregated wastes. Third,
there would have to be a continued effort by the Agency to encourage recycling by
promoting waste exchanges and by disseminating information to facilities on technologies
for segregation. Finally, this management practice would probably work best in
Page A—79
-------
Segregation of Wastes
conjunction with some type of performance standard, such as the option to prohibit
conventional treatment of a waste that is designated as recyclable, or in conjunction with a
major performance standard program.
Page A—80
-------
Mandatory Waste Audits
Mandatory Waste Audits
1.0 General Summary
A waste audit is defined as the formal study of waste generation within a specific
facility and identification of possibilities for reduction and/or recycling of wastes. Its
purpose is to identify the waste streams, the quantity of waste generated, and the
production processes that are responsible for generating each particular stream. Many
firms already conduct waste audits voluntarily; the option under consideration here is
whether or not to make waste audits mandatory, and if so, to what extent and in regard to
which categories of generators.
Information from an audit could be handled under two slightly different alternatives:
it could be retained by the firm for internal use, or it could be shared with EPA. The two
alternatives imply different assumptions about how audits would influence waste
minimization. The first assumes that the audit itself would provide sufficient incentive for
the firm to take corrective action. The second alternative would allow EPA to determine
whether a firm was doing everthing possible to minimize waste. In the latter instance, the
use of audit information by EPA raises serious questions regarding access to proprietary
information, as well as significant increases in Agency management costs.
Currently, several State technical assistance programs provide some waste audit
services. These may be carried out either by State personnel or through arrangements with
private sector consultants. Minnesota's MnTAP program, for example, places engineering
interns in plants for an entire summer to carry out such audits in cooperation with engineers
at the facility. The State programs, however, are strictly voluntary. Firms are not required
to undertake waste audits, nor are they required to adopt the recommendations of audits
they agree to conduct.
Page A—81
-------
Mandatory Waste Audits
A number of factors should be addressed by any waste audit, including:15
• Identification of waste streams and flow rates in the facility being
audited;
• Delineation of waste generation problems;
• Postulation of a range of solutions for each .of these problems;
• Screening to determine which of these potential solutions should be
studied more thoroughly (using criteria based on feasibility,
effectiveness, cost, current application experience within a waste
generating sector);
• Documentation of these options, and presentation to and discussion
with plant personnel; and
• Final rankings of most reasonable options in light of evaluation and
discussions.
Following the final ranking, it would be necessary to examine the feasibility of
implementing the recommended waste reduction option or options. This step would go
beyond what is generally considered to be part of the waste audit and involve an actual
engineering or feasibility study.
It is usually considered preferable to have waste audits conducted by engineers who
are not directly associated with a plant's operations or employees of the audited company.
This avoids conflict of interest problems and reduces the possibility that the auditor is
committed to the standard operating procedures within the facility. In a large company it
might be possible to meet this criterion of neutrality while having such studies carried out
by uninvolved company personnel. It is extremely important, however, to assure that such
an audit is applied as rigorously as it would be had external consulting engineers been
contracted to carry out the work.
See Carl H. Fromm and Michael Callahan, "Waste Reduction Audit Procedure—A
Methodology for Identification, Assessment and Screening of Waste Minimization
Options," in Waste Minimization Programs, pp. 427-435.
Page A— 82
-------
Mandatory Waste Audits
2.0 Evaluation
2.1 Technical Effectiveness
Volume Reduction
Since it is not possible to determine ahead of time what actions companies would
take on the basis of mandatory waste audits, it is not possible to predetermine what volume
reductions waste audits would achieve. Statistics are not available on average levels of
waste reduction following waste audits. Certainly some reductions would be achieved,
especially in plants that would have chosen to undertake such audits on a voluntary basis.
So long as there is no specific requirement to achieve reduction or recycling levels based on
audit results, companies would be likely to act only in circumstances where they saw
benefits in terms of reduced liability, reduced disposal or compliance costs, or reduced raw
material requirements. These conditions are analogous to those that would lead to action by
generators under the technical assistance program option.
If the results of waste audits were to make certain actions mandatory, volume
reductions would probably be substantially increased. But such an approach would have
most of the disadvantages of a performance standard program (high development and
implementation costs—see below) without the compensating advantage of careful economic
and engineering studies of what could reasonably be required of an waste generating
sector. It would at least be necessary to require feasibility studies to determine which of the
possibilities identified in the waste audits were truly viable. If this were done on a site-by-
site basis, the management burden on EPA and on the States would, in fact, be many times
greater than under a performance standard. EPA would at least need to establish threshold
criteria for combinations of waste minimization and economic tradeoffs that would compel
action by a company.
Toxicity Reduction
As with reductions in volume, it is impossible to predict the actual reductions in
toxicity that would result from mandatory waste audits. Unless some incentive were given
for reductions of the more toxic hazardous wastes, however, it is likely that waste audits
Page A— 83
-------
Mandatory Waste Audits
would have a proportionately larger impact on volume than on toxicity. Most of the market
incentives affecting such decisions would tend more to encourage reductions in volume,
since it is volume that most influences disposal costs as the waste management system is
currently structured.16
2.2 Impacts on Industry
Economic Impacts
The cost of a waste audit depends on such factors as its scope, the size of the plant,
the number of waste streams involved, and whether the audit is done by a company's staff
or external consulting engineers.
One engineering firm, for example, suggests the following as a cost profile for a
facility of medium complexity (i.e., three to six different waste streams with up to four
different production steps). The audit would require seven to eight engineering person-
weeks. Costs per hour for external consulting engineering services would be in the range
of $60 to $65/hour. If done by company staff, costs would be about $35/hour. Therefore,
the resulting cost range for a waste audit for such a medium-sized facility could range from
$9,800 to $20,800. For smaller facilities, the costs could be substantially lower, perhaps
under $5,000, and for large, complex facilities, the costs could be substantially higher.
Whether the demand for services created by such a requirement would drive costs
higher is not certain. A substantial reservoir of engineering expertise in environmental
auditing and value engineering already exists and could, with limited reorientation, be
available for carrying out waste audits. The effect of such a large, one-time demand,
however, is difficult to project.
16 Under some options, such as certain variations of phasedown permits, reductions in toxicity per se
might be emphasized by such measures as higher permit costs for more highly toxic wastes.
EPA's analysis at this point suggests that trying to set up separate incentive structures for volume
reduction versus toxicity reduction would raise many complex technical and implementation
issues. It may happen, however, that under the land disposal restrictions program costs of
treatment of high-toxicity wastes may in certain circumstances be higher than costs for lower-
toxicity wastes. If this occurred, it would provide an independent market incentive for firms to
reduce waste toxicity.
Page A— 84
-------
Mandatory Waste Audits
Recognizing that these figures provide no more than the roughest estimates, if
waste audits were required for all but the small quantity generators and a midpoint of
$15,000 were selected as the cost figure for audits of all such facilities, the cost to the
43,000 generators identified in the 1983 biennial report would be approximately $645
million. If a figure of only $3,000 were selected as the cost for waste audits of small
quantity generators, the cost of such audits for those generators would run to an additional
$525 million. It must be kept in mind, however, that these costs include only the waste
audits themselves. They do not include the costs of subsequent engineering, feasibility
studies, or implementation of the proposed changes at a plant.
Equity
If waste audits were applied on a voluntary basis, no new administrative burdens
would be imposed on firms, and equity concerns would not be a significant issue.
Some concern might arise if the information generated by audits were to be made
available to EPA or the States. Firms might fear that proprietary information might be
made available inadvertently to competitors.
If audits were selectively applied on a mandatory basis, equity issues might become
a more serious issue, particularly with regard to inadvertent disclosure of proprietary
information. If requirements were included to compel firms to adopt the recommendations
of audits, equity concerns would presumably be substantial. Fortunately, a mandatory
waste audit program would not tend to penalize firms that had already invested in waste
reduction: the audit would simply reveal that such firms have less additional opportunity to
reduce or recycle wastes.
Incentives for Noncompliance
If implementing the results of waste audits were not mandatory, then
"noncompliance" with the option should be realistically defined as noncooperation with the
process. Firms presumably would not deny access to plants by authorized and accredited
auditors.
Page A— 85
-------
Mandatory Waste Audits
The principal negative effect of mandatory waste audits would be that companies
may treat waste audits as a regulatory imposition rather than an effective management tool.
Resentment might be further exacerbated if a facility were required to undertake the audit in
spite of substantial previous waste minimization activity. The result might be that, even
though more audits would be done than under an active technical assistance program, less
follow-through action based on the audit results would be carried out by the plants.
Furthermore, plant personnel might resist the audit process and deny auditors relevant
information, rather than cooperate with them as potential contributors to the plant's more
efficient and profitable operation.
Industry would also be concerned that such a program could risk proprietary
information. In order to identify waste streams and the processes that generate them, a
tremendous amount of confidential information would need to be gathered. If the audits are
subject to review, they risk divulging this information when the report is forwarded to
EPA. Under these circumstances, management may be less than candid about the
information that would go into an audit report.
If implementing the results of waste audits were made mandatory, noncompliance
would clearly be a major issue, with serious implications on State and Federal enforcement
budgets (see below).
2.3 Implementation Issues
Legislative Authority
If waste audits were promoted by EPA as a voluntary measure, no additional
legislative authority would be required. -
While waste audits are less comprehensive and objective than a complete
environmental auditing program, EPA believes that the interim guidance adopted by the
Agency for environmental auditing (50 FR 46504, November 8, 1985) is appropriate for
waste audits. This guidance states that, "because environmental auditing systems have
been widely adopted on a voluntary basis in the past, and because audit quality depends to
a large degree upon genuine management commitment to the program and its objectives,
Page A— 86
-------
Mandatory Waste Audits
auditing should remain a voluntary activity." A possible exception to this voluntary
approach would be in enforcement actions, "where auditing could provide a remedy for
identified problems and reduce the likelihood of similar problems recurring in the future."
Though the Agency is reluctant to interfere with the long-term impact of a waste audit, it
may on a case-by-case basis, request reports if "...[it] determines it needs an audit report,
or relevant portions of a report, to accomplish a statutory mission...."
Requiring a waste audit of all generators would at least require a rulemaking
procedure. It might be necessary to obtain direct legislative authority, although such
authority might be argued to already exist under Section 8 of TSCA: requiring waste audits
of all generators in specific industrial categories, because of specific toxicity and health
concerns related to that industrial category, would be more clearly the kind of information
gathering permitted under Section 8. If mandatory audits were applied selectively rather
than across broad industrial sectors, use of existing authority under Section 8 of TSCA
might be feasible. The difficulty would be in demonstrating a need for such information to
be developed by all generators for effective operation of TSCA—particularly if it were not
the Agency's intention to require the information for themselves. Passage of some of the
informational requirements proposed in the CERCLA amendments, however, would
probably provide the requisite authority. Otherwise, the Agency would have to depend on
a further modification to RCRA.
Time Required for Implementation
If waste audits were supported by EPA as a voluntary program, individual firms
could begin to plan and conduct audits as soon as funds were allocate 1 for this purpose.
Since new legislation followed by a rulemaking would probably be required to
make waste audits mandatory for all industries, it would take a considerable amount of time
before the impact of a mandatory program would be visible. Impacts could be felt sooner if
current proposed information requirements amending CERCLA are passed by Congress.
Assuming that the current CERCLA amendments pass by the end of 1986 anu that
rulemaking is to be completed by the end of 1987, the requirement would most likely be
implemented between late 1988 and early 1990. Implementation of recommendations from
Page A— 87
-------
Mandatory Waste Audits
the audits would occur over subsequent years. If such authority is not created under
CERCLA, separate legislative authority under RCRA could be passed by the end of 1988,
which would delay the timetable by two years.
If EPA decides to implement waste audits on an industry-by-industry basis, a
rulemaking under Section 8 of the Toxic Substances Control Act might be feasible. The
timetable could be shortened by nearly a year.
Appropriate Target Industries
The industry studies in EPA's technical background document on waste
minimization, for example, indicate that epichlorohydrin manufacture, 1,1,1-
trichloroethane manufacture, trichloroethylene/perchloroethylene manufacture, and vinyl
chloride monomer manufacture (all of which are part of the organic chemicals industry,
SIC code 2869) are all carried out at a few very large facilities. Engineering reviews in
these studies indicate that the plants involved have already taken substantial steps toward
waste minimization and are generally well controlled. But such wastes as heavy ends from
the distillation of vinyl chloride in vinyl chloride monomer production (K020) and heavy
ends from the distillation of ethylene dichloride in ethylene dichloride production (K019)
are (ac'cording to currently available data) among the largest volume RCRA waste streams;
they are also produced from plants that are parts of integrated operations. The organic
chemicals industry, taken as a whole, is the largest single generator of RCRA wastes and
produces the most toxic wastes.
Another type of industry group to which a waste audit requirement might be applied
would be a generator group characterized by large numbers of smaller facilities, significant
commonality in operations, and the generation of large volumes of highly toxic wastes. A
principal example would be the electroplating industry (SIC code 3471).
Waste audits may actually be useful over the entire range of industries. While it
might be argued that certain industries will benefit more from a requirement that they
conduct a waste audit, many other industries might also find it a helpful way to identify
waste streams and the production technologies that generate them. Knowledge of the
Page A—!
-------
Mandatory Waste Audits
wastes and techniques that generate them can be a preliminary step by a firm in determining
what appropriate actions it may take to reduce waste generation.
Costs of Development and Implementation
If all facilities were required to undertake a waste audit, the only development and
implementation costs for government would be the costs of notifying all generators of the
requirement. Substantial additional costs would be incurred if a decision were made to
subsidize waste audits for small quantity generators, or if EPA were to decide to analyze
audit results.
If EPA requires that a facility, upon completion of an audit, implement feasible
changes identified in the audit, it would drive enforcement costs into the range estimated for
standards of performance—about $7.5 million annually.
Other Impacts
The major benefit of a mandatory waste audit program would be that companies,
once made aware of changes that would enable them to minimize wastes, would take action
to achieve feasible reductions, insofar as there was an economic reason to do so.
Such a program could be described in a way that would be appealing to the public,
since the requirement could be seen as encouraging industry to take further steps toward
waste minimization. It is not clear, however, that the actual results would provide greater,
or even equal, protection to the public than voluntary State technical assistance programs
encouraging generators to undertake audits on their own volition.
Impacts on States: Requiring waste audits might undercut State technical/financial
assistance programs by creating an adversarial situation with respect to the very kinds of
services being offered by the States. If many generators were to be less responsive than
they would be when management initiated a waste audit effort, the result could be to limit
the actual impact of some of the facets of the State programs, which depend on an effective
waste audit, or on effective State and generator cooperation.
Page A— 89
-------
Mandatory Waste Audits
3.0 Recommendations
Waste audits can be extremely useful in diagnosing the ways in which a facility can
reduce or recycle wastes. The information developed during such an audit can be a valuable
step in making plant management aware of changes in processes, operating practices, and
management of wastes that could save on disposal costs, reduce raw material demands,
increase efficiency in meeting compliance requirements under other environmental statutes,
and/or reduce future liability concerns.
Notwithstanding these advantages, EPA believes that such waste audits should
remain voluntary. EPA believes it is preferable to support State technical assistance
programs and to encourage the inclusion within those programs of a waste audit
component.
A crucial element in the success and usefulness of such audits is the recognition of
the audit's value by a facility's management. There is a greater probability that waste
reduction innovations will be incorporated into redesigned plant operations if an audit has
been initiated by management. If waste audits are imposed as an external regulatory
requirement, this commitment might often be lacking; suspicion that EPA may sooner or
later use the results of the audit to require specific changes within the plant may tend to limit
the audit's effectiveness. An uncooperative attitude would also reduce the likelihood that
the results of the audit would be used effectively by the plant in altering its operations to
minimize wastes.
Page A— 90
-------
Technical Assistance Programs
Technical Assistance Programs
1.0 General Summary
EPA already provides some technical assistance to certain active State waste
minimization programs. The range of potential additional technical support activities could,
however, be broadened substantially and its level of intensity significantly increased. Not
all States have waste minimization technical assistance programs, and among those that do,
the scope and depth of activities vary widely. The option under consideration here is
whether or not an expanded EPA-supported program would be an effective and desirable
method of encouraging firms to adopt affirmative waste minimization programs as part of
their hazardous waste managerr. u agenda, and if so, to suggest the priorities for
developing such a program.
Generic elements for an expanded program might appropriately include:
• Technical information development and transfer,
• Increased coordination and cooperation between EPA- and State-
supported activities, including direct outreach to firms; and
• Cooperative research on source reduction and recycling methods.
It is important to note that the success of this approach is not to be based
exclusively, or even primarily, on the civic concerns of the companies involved. Because
companies can choose not to participate in these programs, such nonregulatory approaches
to environmental problems are sometimes viewed as noncompelling—"voluntary" almost in
the sense of public philanthropy. A crucial and powerful element in the success of a
technical assistance programs for the minimization of hazardous wastes is that they do not
operate in isolation from the economic realities that drive the firms generating those wastes.
Several factors are involved in a firm's search for solutions to its waste generation
problems, or its receptivity to the information provided. These factors include current
regulatory requirements (e.g., Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act), steeply rising waste
Page A—91
-------
Technical Assistance Programs
management costs (which may increase further as land restrictions are implemented), future
liability concerns, and potential for savings through recycled materials. Many of the
hazardous waste generators subject to these pressures face obstacles to implementing waste
minimizing processes or practices, because they lack awareness of the technical alternatives
available, have inadequate capital to make the necessary investments, lack engineering
expertise to redesign processes, or fail to understand the importance of considering
compliance or disposal costs in time/cash flow calculations.
The principal point is that, while the incentives listed above not are as compelling as
an enforceable performance standard, they do in fact lead generators to act voluntarily to
reduce wastes. Some generators, however, will probably not be subject to these pressures,
or at least not to the extent that they will change their operating practices. Identifying these
industrial sectors, and the percentage of wastes they contribute, thus will not likely become
apparent until the programs and external financial and compliance pressures have had some
time to operate.
In general, EPA-supported technical assistance programs have had uneven and
limited success. Often support levels have been not been adequate to develop strong State
programs, or to ensure that they are sustained long enough and predictably enough to reach
their potential. Moreover, technical assistance per se has often been considered
inconsistent with EPA's primary identity as a regulatory agency. If an expanded technical
and program were found to be a desirable and feasible means of achieving waste
minimization, adequate resources would have to be available both to spur individual State
efforts and to provide a centralized information and direction upon which the States could
rely. The program would have to have a distinct and well-defined purpose and be
integrated into the Agency's overall waste minimization strategy. While the funds required
would be small relative to a typical regulatory program, they must be reliably provided if
State efforts are not to be undercut after initial commitments are made. If funding for this
option is considered "soft" (i.e., subject to unpredictable reduction or termination), it is
likely that this option would not be successful.
To avoid such pitfalls, a waste minimization technical assistance program would
have to be designed as a close adjunct to existing Federal and State hazardous waste
Page A— 92
-------
Technical Assistance Programs
programs, facilitating the regulatory goals of the rest of the RCRA effort and exploiting the
incentives for waste minimization that these regulatory programs have partially created.
Opportunities exist to build on:
• The HSWA objective to strengthen the States' basic implementation
role for hazardous waste management;
• States' direct experience with the problems and priorities of local
generators and TSDFs; and
• Industry's existing economic incentives to minimize waste, created
in large part through the land disposal restrictions program and other
HSWA initiatives.
Combining the generic elements of possible technical assistance programs with
these more focused opportunities for success in relation to RCRA objectives, a long-term
assistance program might well include the following specific elements:
• Identification of industries and waste streams creating the largest
hazardous waste problems for each State. While much of the
impetus for this process may come from the RCRA program, a non-
regulatory technical assistance program offers an opportunity to look
at the pollution generation problems in a cross media perspective.
• Analysis or survey of the barriers to waste reduction in the
industries identified. In some cases, the barriers may be strictly
informational (as with many of the smaller generators). In other
cases, there may be genuine technology problems (e.g., the
limitations imposed by the rapid technological changes in the
electronics components industry) or lack of staff engineering skills
that can be dedicated to waste minimization problems (depending, to
some extent, on the proportion of production costs represented by
waste management or the potential savings from recovered product).
• Evaluation of whether and how the various technical, and
informational options described above could meet the needs or
overcome the unidentified obstacles. It is also necessary to
determine the appropriate allocation of effort and funds for
overcoming each obstacle. At this early stage, the combination of
effort and funds will be somewhat subjective until hard evidence has
been developed for the cost-effectiveness of specific approaches.
• Focusing aid over the long term on those elements of a technical
assistance program where EPA can effectively gather, collate, and
analyze daca on a nationwide basis. For example, EPA assistance
Page A— 93
-------
Technical Assistance Programs
may be most helpful in the identification of common industrial and
waste stream problems, development and cataloguing of model
solutions to those problems, and analysis of typical financial
tradeoffs. While these factors obviously vary with the
characteristics of individual States, or with the particularities of
individual plants, the useful common base of information will
generally be substantial.
• Providing support to the States for activities that would generate
useful new information. EPA could assist, for example, in
supporting waste audits conducted as part of State technical
assistance programs. Such support would be particularly
appropriate where a State has industries with highly toxic waste
streams on which little information has been developed about
opportunities for waste minimization.
• Highlighting ongoing research and development efforts that might
serve a larger area than a single State and that would enhance waste
minimization by large numbers of generators. Some of this support
may be as much a matter of planning as financial assistance. Central
facilities for handling and recovering wastes generated by
electroplaters, for example, are in the planning and/or feasibility
study stages in New Jersey, Illinois, and Minnesota. Such central
facilities have the potential of serving large numbers of generators
who would otherwise dispose of their wastes in landfills or other
land disposal sites. The problems involved in implementing such a
project are technical, financial, and regulatory (the relationship of
the implementation schedule, for example, to compliance deadlines
under the Clean Water Act's pretreatment program). Because of the
broad potential for waste minimization in such centers, EPA could
usefully provide technical and planning assistance.
Almost all of the State assistance programs are relatively new. In some States
major resource commitments have been made, and substantial efforts to develop a waste
minimization program are underway. These programs disseminate information on waste
minimization technologies and practices to generators. Other States have offered financial
assistance to generators to make investments in waste reduction or recycling technologies
that they might not otherwise make. A signficant EPA commitment to supporting programs
could be instrumental in accelerating the growth of existing State programs and the
initiation of new programs in the remaining States.
At its most basic level, technical assistance has meant providing a library resource
of technical information that generators can review to learn which technologies would be
Page A— 94
-------
Technical Assistance Programs
useful for minimizing their own wastes. New York and North Carolina both have
established significant technical information collections available for use by generators (or
by other State agencies providing more direct technical assistance to generators). New
York's Industrial Materials Recycling Program, operated through the State's Environmental
Facilities Corporation (EFC), publishes informational newsletters, technical papers, and a
directory of permitted hazardous waste transporters. North Carolina's Pollution Prevention
Pays (PPP) program has an Information Clearinghouse with over 1,200 references on
waste minimization methods organized by SIC code. Numerous other publications are also
available through PPP, such as the Handbook of Environmental Auditing and a directory of
State recycling firms.
Some States have developed more active technical assistance programs. These
include direct efforts to help individual generators and educate important industry groups.
Minnesota, North Carolina, and Illinois, for example, provide direct advice to individual
generators. Most of the direct assistance to individual generators is provided by telephone,
followed by distribution of appropriate written information. Technical assistance staffs in
each of these States also provide onsite audits and reviews of particular plant sites. Since
onsite audits are resource intensive, often involving an effort of several days, it is important
that the sites selected represent prevalent industry problems within the State.
Minnesota has carried onsite technical assistance a step further by providing plants
with engineering students who work directly in the plant during the summer to assist in
assessing the needs and opportunities for waste minimization. During the summer of
1985, several of these interns worked on problems involving electroplating and spray
coating, two industrial processes of major importance in Minnesota. While most of the
plants were smaller companies, one intern worked with Sperry Corporation, redesigning its
metal plating processes so that wastes could be segregated and the metals recovered (rather
than disposed of as hazardous wastes). Other States are considering the possibility of
establishing senior intern positions for retired engineers who could provide the benefit of
their experience to smaller companies to assist them in designing and implementing waste
minimization options.
Page A— 95
-------
Technical Assistance Programs
Several States have designed seminar programs for specific industrial sectors. The
seminars try to cover sectors that either exhibit the most need and potential for waste
reduction or are the greatest volume generators. Tennessee, for example, has developed a
list of several initial target industries. After completing waste audits for representative
companies in each of the industrial sectors, seminars will be held throughout the State
incorporating the results of the audit and other relevant technical information to help educate
those industry groups on waste minimization opportunities.
Beyond technical engineering advice, considerable effort has gone into developing
information on the economics of waste minimizing processes, documenting for smaller
companies either the direct cost savings from recovered materials, or the net savings
resulting from reduced disposal costs. North Carolina, for example, funded several case
studies of cost savings from installation of processes to reduce wastes.17
Technical assistance programs also provide support in the area of research and
development (R&D), along with planning and feasibility studies that target industries are
often unable to initiate on their own. This aspect is illustrated by studies that have been
undertaken in both Illinois and Minnesota for a centralized facility to process electroplating
wastes. R&D has determined that such a facility, depending on its design, can either
recover the metals directly for reuse or make use of other recovered material. Not only
does it have the potential for substantially lowering the costs of the generator, but it can
also reduce the total volume of waste that would otherwise have to be disposed of. The
planning and feasibility studies stated that, for the centralized facility to be economical, a
large number of electroplating processors would have to be willing to send their wastes for
processing.
Research and development support for technical assistance efforts can also take the
form of grants to universities to investigate alternative technological approaches to waste
minimization. The results of this research can then be used by generators in the relevant
industry group within the State. For example, North Carolina this year has funded studies
Some of the North Carolina case studies are available in summary form from the PPP
program; others have been published in Proven Profits from Pollution Prevention, by
the Institute for Local Self-Reliance.
Page A— 96
-------
Technical Assistance Programs
on topics relating to pollution reduction systems for selected food processes and a new
method for recovering metals from aqueous waste solutions.
Direct financial assistance to generators is provided through a variety of State loan
and grant programs. Financial support is sometimes provided for installation of waste
reduction or recycling equipment or processes, waste audits by generators to determine the
opportunities for waste reduction, or research done directly by the generators on their own
plant sites. The goal of such research is to develop processes or technologies that will be
transferable to other generators using the same types of processes or producing similar
products.
Loan assistance is available through mechanisms ranging from tax deferred bonds
and defrayal of loan costs to direct loans. California's Pollution Control Financing
Authority, for instance, has the authority to subsidize loans for small and medium-sized
generators for the cost of purchasing waste reducing equipment. The Financing Authority
has $2.6 million to invest in these activities or in financing the cost of issuing revenue
bonds.
Illinois provides financing for waste reduction investments for generators through
environmental control revenue bonds. The interest on the bonds is exempt from Federal
taxes, which lowers the interest costs on the loans to the generators. The State, however,
does not stand behind bond repayments; that is strictly the responsibility of the borrower.
Minnesota offers research grants to generators or groups of generators to study the
applicability of known waste reduction processes to other waste streams or processes.
Generators can receive up to $30,000 for such a research project. North Carolina provides
up to $5,000 in "Challenge Grants" in matching funds to firms (or communities).
Some of the money distributed by States has been supplied by EPA. Some
examples include the following:
• Georgia's Hazardous Waste Onsite Consultation Program has been
partially funded on a pilot basis by EPA.
Page A— 97
-------
Technical Assistance Programs
Tennessee's program to identify, analyze, and develop training
seminars for various industries received $90,000 of support from
EPA for a 15-month period that began in the fall of 1984.
North Carolina's research grant program has EPA funding of
$100,000/year for three years. Minnesota has also received
$100,000 for support of a research program.
Small quantity generator audits in New York are supported by a
$30,000 grant from EPA.
2.0 Evaluation
2.1 Technical Effectiveness
Volume Reduction
It will be difficult to predict or to measure the impact of technical programs on
waste generation rates, but the Agency believes it is potentially substantial. Both direct and
indirect effects must be considered. Direct technical assistance would presumably focus on
small and medium-sized companies, not the largest generators, since the large firms tend to
have greatest access to information and capital to support waste minimization programs. A
sustained and well-publicized program would, however, help change the general climate
within which firms make waste management decisions, exploiting peer pressure and
creating a milieu in which firms can demonstrate technological leadership and innovation in
a field where public anxieties are great.
State technical assistance offices indicate that the largest reductions in disposal of
hazardous wastes as a result of the technical assistance provided to generators are taking
place through increased recycling of spent solvents (F001 to F005)—solvent wastes are
produced in significant volumes by a number of different industries. Also identified are
generators of electroplating sludge (F006), one of the largest volume RCRA wastes, as
candidates for future waste minimization technical assistance.
Page A— 98
-------
Technical Assistance Programs
Toxicity Reduction
As with volume reduction, the degree to which technical assistance programs could
help reduce waste toxicity is still speculative. However, although high-volume wastes tend
to be associated with large firms, the same is definitely not true with high-toxicity wastes.
Some categories of industries dominated by small and medium size firms are known to
generate highly toxic wastes; examples include electroplating operations and pesticides
formulators. Technical assistance could potentially have a significant beneficial effect on
the toxicity of wastes produced by large numbers of firms.
Other Issues
Multimedia Issues: One advantage of expanded technical assistance programs is
that they could encourage thinking about environmental problems on a cross media basis.
Waste audits and technical assistance provided to companies generally focus on the entire
pollution generation profile of a company—not just RCRA wastes.
2.2 Impacts on Industry
Economic Impacts
A technical assistance program would create no new costs for industry. It has the
potential to lower some costs that would otherwise exist by making companies aware of
cost saving approaches to reducing and recycling wastes, by directly financing installation
of waste reducing technologies, or by implementing waste minimizing practices. For
example, a technical assistance program might be useful in lowering costs by aiding a
company facing compliance requirements for effluent or air standards. Employing
information from a technical assistance program to develop an overall waste minimizing
strategy might be more cost-effective than just satisfying minimal performance
requirements under the applicable standard.
How well a technical assistance program works depends on the other costs industry
faces. Where disposal, compliance, and potential liability costs are high, there will be
greater concern with finding waste minimization opportunities. Costly technical,
Page A— 99
-------
Technical Assistance Programs
instructive, and economic information might prevent smaller companies from being able to
research opportunities with their own resources. State programs that remove or reduce
some of the cost barriers may, therefore, have a significant impact on company decisions.
Equity
No major negative equity issues arise under a technical assistance program. This
approach provides a benefit for industry, enabling it to find more cost-effective approaches
for compliance with environmental program standards and providing incentives for waste
reduction, which, over the long term, could reduce disposal costs or create savings through
materials recovery.
Incentives for Noncompliance
Since this option carries no mandatory requirements for industry, noncompliance is
not a direct issue in this evaluation.
The General Accounting Office report, Illegal Disposal of Hazardous Waste:
Difficult to Detect or Deter ^ recognized the potential enforcement problems of HSWA
generally, and pointed out that current State and Federal enforcement capabilities are limited
in their ability to cope with the extent of the illegal dumping problem. Because this option
provides incentives for small quantity generators and other small facilities to seek the
assistance needed to help overcome the high costs of meeting regulations on treating or
disposing of wastes, it may offer some promise of limiting the problem of illegal dumping.
2.3 Implementation Issues
Legislative Authority
Existing authority is sufficient to set up the programs contemplated within this
option; no additional legislative authority would be necessary. The only legislative
requirement would be for increased appropriations to ensure that there is a coherent and
General Accounting Office, February 22, 1985, Illegal Disposal of Hazardous Waste:
Difficult to Detect or Deter, GAO/RCED-85-2.
Page A—100
-------
Technical Assistance Programs
predictable program effort for several years. Such a commitment might well make
implementation of some of the costlier alternatives for achieving waste reduction and reuse
unnecessary.
Time Required for Implementation
Several States have already initiated technical or financial assistance programs,
some with EPA support, as a significant proportion of their budget. Both State and EPA
funding has also been provided for research into waste minimization potential in specific
industries.
EPA could accelerate and expand efforts in some States, spur the creation of
programs in other States with no current programs, and boost the research efforts that help
these programs to develop more effectively. The effects of these additional program and
funding efforts would be relatively direct and immediate. Support directly to
technical/informational assistance would show results earliest, since these would be used
within the year allocated for activities such as information dissemination and waste
auditing. Plants might begin acting on the information or analysis received within a few
months. The longest time periods between funded programs and actual impact would be
during the research phase, where the time involved would depend on the duration of the
research project and the extent to which results would be directly applicable. For example,
the market research construction and operation of oil/water separator sludges would
probably take a number of years to complete. Other projects involving research into the
transferability of existing technology into plants in other industries might show quicker
results.
Appropriate Target Industries
State technical assistance programs have focused on the industrial sectors identified
as serious sources of problems for in-plant assistance and for general education programs.
Many State programs have highlighted the problems of small quantity generators for
attention, while others have placed as much or more emphasis on medium-sized
generators. This is important because in some States the medium-sized generators are
Page A— 101
-------
Technical Assistance Programs
producers of the largest portion of the wastes, yet they often lack the resources and
expertise to identify and/or implement waste minimization activities.
Metal finishing/electroplating has been a major industry of concern in almost all the
States with active technical assistance programs. The industry is characterized by large
numbers of smaller plants that produce substantial volumes of highly toxic wastewater
treatment sludges with cadmium, chromium, copper, nickel, and other metallic wastes.
Similar waste streams constitute a large proportion of the hazardous wastes generated by
the printed circuit board industry, which is also characterized by a large proportion of
medium-sized and smaller facilities. Within individual electroplating plants, there are a
number of steps that can reduce the generation of wastes, including minimization of drag-
out from the plating bath to a rinsing bath (through increased solution temperature,
decreased concentration of metal salts and other components of the plating solution, or
reduced period of withdrawal), segregation of waste streams, or reduced use of rinsewater
by recycling.
In-plant waste audits, educational seminars, and publication and distribution of
relevant engineering information may facilitate adoption of waste minimization changes in
operating procedures. In some cases, it will require financial assistance from the State in
order to make it more feasible for a small plant to implement changes.
It should be noted that while the emphasis is on smaller or midsized facilities, it is
not limited to them. Tennessee's initial outreach was to generators of all sizes, though
State officials do not expect substantial participation by the very largest firms (partially
because their technical resources are greater and partially because of concerns about
proprietary information). In Minnesota, although most engineering interns were assigned
to smaller firms, one was assigned to a plant for Sperry Corporation to identify potential
ways to reduce electroplating wastes in the facility.
In the electroplating industry, there is an opportunity for cooperative technical
efforts involving States and generators. In areas where there is a large concentration of
plants generating electroplating wastes, States and generators may be able to jointly
sponsor construction of a central processing plant, which will make possible greater waste
Page A— 102
-------
Technical Assistance Programs
reduction at lower cost than could be achieved by individual facilities. In another example
of a cooperative venture, an ion exchange process (long used for recovering gold and silver
wastes) is currently planned for the Passaic Valley in New Jersey. Other possibilities of
technology transfer and cooperative waste reduction/recovery are being explored
elsewhere.
Many other industry groups also offer major opportunities for technical assistance
and have been the focus of efforts in several States. These include industries such as plate
making and printing, painting and coating, paper products, dry cleaners, automotive repair,
furniture fabricators, wood preservers, and chemical formulators (including pesticides).
All of these industries are characterized by large numbers of small facilities (even though
there are large plants), by substantial similarities with respect to processes and operations,
and by the volumes of wastes they generate (e.g., halogenated solvents for dry cleaners,
bottom sediment sludges from creosote or pentachlorophenol production for wood
preserving, and nonhalogenated solvents from painting). There are enough similarities
across plants, in spite of idiosyncrasies, to make general technical information and
demonstration projects of considerable value, or to make the technical and economic
lessons learned from a waste audit in one plant helpful in providing recommendations for
another. Additional opportunities will be developed as State programs become more
extensive.
By contrast, this option is likely to be the least valuable where there are small
numbers of large plants (e.g., vinyl chloride or epichlorohydrin manufacture). Similarly,
the opportunities are likely to be limited where an industry has large numbers of small and
medium-sized facilities that are undergoing continuous rapid technological change, are
highly competitive (and therefore very concerned about loss of proprietary secrets), and
must reinvest heavily in research and development in order to remain competitive. The
electronic components industry is an example where State efforts appear to have produced
limited benefits.
Direct technical assistance may be useful for industries with many small companies
for which technological innovations for waste minimization are prevented by limited cash
flow and/or poor access to capital markets. Direct technical assistance can provide a useful
Page A— 103
-------
Technical Assistance Programs
incentive in circumstances where the waste minimization techniques will involve longer
term cost savings resulting from foregone environmental compliance costs (e.g.,
pretreatment requirements for electroplaters) or decreased raw material requirements (e.g.,
through recycling of pigment dusts in paint manufacturing). Projects that would benefit
large numbers of small generators, such as the centralized metal wastes processing facility
discussed above, could be financed through a public authority with general revenue bonds.
This would essentially amount to a subsidy of waste minimization costs for all participating
facilities; the extent of the subsidy would depend on subsequent fees charged the
companies.
Grants for research do not have to be large to assist in meeting the waste reduction
requirements of smaller companies. For example, a challenge grant (maximum $5,000)
was given to a firm in North Carolina to assess the market feasibility, and design a plant,
for a vehicle maintenance wastewater pretreatment facility to recover used oil and grease
from oil/water separator sludges at vehicle repair and maintenance shops. Over a thousand
potential users in several counties were identified, and it was estimated that such a plant
would require a 1.3 million gallon/year capacity.
Targeting industries for technical assistance is primarily a State role. This would
include research dollars invested in studies on technology and technology transfer, multi-
State market analyses for waste recycling and treatment, and economic analyses of common
difficulties in an industry. Many of the industries listed below—e.g., electroplating,
printing, painting and coating—might be appropriate focuses for EPA efforts that go
beyond support of State technical assistance programs.
The type, number, and size of industries that might be targeted for this option are
listed below. The sectors include a large number of medium- and smaller-sized
facilities. !9 These industrial sectors are:
Paint manufacturing (SIC 2851)—1,321 of 1,441 facilities have
fewer than 100 employees.
Data from Appendix B of Waste Minimization:!ssues and Options, USEPA Office of
Solid Waste, February 17, 1986.
Page A— 104
-------
Technical Assistance Programs
Electroplating (SIC 3471)—3,349 of 3,450 facilities have fewer
than 100 employees.
Wood preserving (SIC 2491)—511 of 524 facilities have fewer than
100 employees.
• Organic dyes and pigments manufacturing (SIC 28652/3)—118 of
189 facilities have fewer than 100 employees.
Printed circuit board manufacture (SIC 3679)—286 of 585 facilities
have fewer than 100 employees.
• Agricultural chemicals formulation—302 of 330 facilities have fewer
than 100 employees.
Printing operations (SIC 27)—51,155 of 53,356 facilities have
fewer than 100 employees.
Costs of Development and Implementation
Although EPA support of State activities is desirable, long-term general support of
technical assistance programs involving loans, loan guarantees, or defrayal of interest costs
is a relatively high cost State-specific effort. EPA's role in such programs is not likely to
provide a major impetus to State action, nor will it be more cost-effective than the States'
own efforts. In any case, EPA's role would be unlikely to match in importance the current
Federal subsidy role allowing States to issue tax free bonds to finance pollution control
investments (at least so long as this subsidy is n-..>t eliminated in the tax reform legislation).
These types of programs should be left to the States to fund where they believe such
funding is beneficial and appropriate.
Costs to EPA for development and studies under this program would include
funding for technological research, for additional personnel to manage the program at the
Agency, for a computerized information system accessible by the States, and for analyzing
impacts of the State's efforts. The costs for each of these are variable, depending on the
scope of the program. Current ORD funding to the States for research programs, for
example, amounts to $300,000 per year (though current planning calls for phasing this
down to zero by FY 1988).
Page A— 105
-------
Technical Assistance Programs
A possible program would call for the implementation and maintenance of a
computerized information system (perhaps $100,000 a year for developing the system,
gathering, analyzing, and entering available data); an EPA supported research effort of
$500,000/year, and two additional personnel each in OSW and ORD ($275,000 total costs)
for planning, program analysis, and research.
EPA could provide direct support to the technical assistance programs of the States
of from $2.5 to $3 million in the first year and some front loading of expenditures in the
early years thereafter. The direct support would consist of grants to States beginning their
programs (of perhaps $50,000 to $100,000), and smaller support grants after the first three
years. Since not all States would begin their programs simultaneously, the peak years
would probably be the second through the fourth years. This would be a substantial
program for EPA, which would provide significant support for making State programs
effective.
Even if direct financial assistance to generators from the Federal Government were
a desirable objective, it is not a feasible one under current budget constraints. With respect
to direct technical assistance to the generators, the States are far more directly involved with
local needs, and the delegation of hazardous waste control programs to the States is one of
the stated objectives of RCRA. EPA's activities under this option, therefore, would be
twofold. The Agency would provide support to the States to assist them in their own
technical assistance efforts. EPA would also provide centralized services and support that
would be inefficiently provided if done by each State. These lines are not, however,
absolutely distinct.
The option under .consideration would involve an expansion of EPA's current level
of support of these or similar State efforts, as well as coordination with the States for the
provision of services and capabilities that can most cost effectively be provided on a
centralized basis. In particular, EPA could facilitate the rapid dissemination of each State's
research and experience to the other States. This would be particularly helpful for the
States that have not yet undertaken waste minimization programs.
Page A— 106
-------
Technical Assistance Programs
To facilitate the rapid dissemination of each State's research and experience to other
States, EPA could develop a computerized information system on waste minimization. It
would be ac.. ssible by the States and would include elements such as the following for
particular industries or waste streams identified by the States or EPA as important or
problematic:
• Technical literature on the options available to achieve waste
minimization for the particular industry or waste stream;
• Types of technical assistance provided by various States to a
particular industry group, and resultant changes in waste reduction
or reuse practices;
• Highlighting of ongoing or planned demonstration or research
projects and their status or results; and
• Economic analyses of the investment costs and recovery periods
typically experienced with respect to available waste minimization
options in an industry. Analyses of costs and results of various
approaches to technical, informational, and financial assistance
practiced by the States (these studies would be carried out
cooperatively with the States).
State costs could vary substantially and would depend both on the scope and nature
of the State commitment. North Carolina's PPP program, one of the most extensive
technical assistance efforts, has been funded for three years at $500,000 per year (with an
additional $100,000 from EPA). Minnesota's MnTAP program has received $180,000
from the State (in addition to $100,000 from EPA). California established a capital fund,
the Hazardous Waste Reduction Incentive Fund, at $5.2 million, of which $2.6 million is
available for tax exempt bond financing and other forms of credit through the California
Pollution Control Financing Authority (although this would not be exclusively for waste
minimization by generators). Other States (e.g., Tennessee) are planning several million
dollar investments in technological research to support the technical assistance efforts (an
effort where effective EPA coordination with the States could increase the
cost-effectiveness of each State's efforts). Because of the diversity of State programs and
efforts to date, and the fact that some States have not yet initiated programs, it would be
extremely difficult to make any meaningful generalizations on State costs.
Page A— 107
-------
Technical Assistance Programs
3.0 Recommendations
EPA's current technical assistance effort is restricted. Few States receive direct
support and the support that is available is limited. Research programs are selected and
funded without any systematic determination as to whether their research might duplicate
efforts of other States. Duplication could be avoided if, for example, prior to
commissioning a specific research project a State could determine through a central data
system whether other States had already undertaken or completed a similar research project.
Nevertheless, some flexibility must be built into the selection process to allow for
variability among States in the development of their own programs.
An active, aggressive, and sustained program for technical assistance appears to be
the strongest option available to EPA and the States to promote waste minimization in an
efficient manner without interfering with a generator's ultimate control over his or her
production processes. It appears to be both desirable and feasible as a near-term option.
EPA therefore recommends development of an expanded support capacity for State
technical, and informational assistance programs to encourage waste minimization. The
Agency's primary focus should be on those elements of technical assistance programs
where the EPA's contributions can be of most benefit to the largest number of State
programs.
Page A— 108
-------
Procurement Practices
Procurement Practices
1.0 General Summary
Government procurement programs may provide a means of creating additional
demand for products made with less harmful materials or for products with a higher
proportion of recycled materials. This option would involve establishing procurement
regulations or guidelines to encourage (1) additional recycling of waste materials in certain
types of products and (2) greater emphasis on waste minimization in the manufacture of
particular products.
There is ample precedent for the first part of this option. Between 1978 and 1982
EPA had a cooperative venture with the National Institute of Governmental Purchasing
(NIGP) and the National League of Cities (NLC) known as the "Buy Quiet" program; the
goal of this program was to encourage governments to ask for quieter products and
equipment (e.g., vacuum cleaners, lawn mowers) through the competitive bidding process.
A secondary goal of this program was to encourage the private sector to manufacture and
market products and equipment that make less noise.
More than 200 State and local government agencies participated in the program.
The participants asked for quieter products and equipment by using model specifications
and bid evaluation formulas that established maximum noise levels and rewarded bidders
for offering products which made less noise than the noisiest product offered, or the
maximum noise level allowed by the specification.
The Buy Quiet program achieved a number of objectives. First, it showed how the
competitive bid process could be used to obtain attributes other than "low bid" for the
products purchased. The concept was not limited to noise; this type of program was
explored by Southern California local governments to purchase vehicles and equipment that
have lower air pollutant emission levels. Second, the program demonstrated that a social
benefit could be obtained through the free market mechanism rather than through
regulations. Third, it showed that the results could be obtained by cooperative ventures
Page A—109
-------
Procurement Practices
with State and local governmental agencies, rather than solely through Federal agencies.
This is important, because EPA is not prohibited by any law from working with State and
local agencies.
Additional recycling of waste materials could be accomplished through direct
Federal Government procurement guidelines or regulations, such as the EPA guidelines
recommending purchase of cement or concrete containing fly ash, or as mandated by
RCRA for recycling paper. Other methods could include cooperative ventures with State
and local governments such as the Buy Quiet program. EPA could help the State and local
governments implement purchasing programs. There is a distinct advantage in this type of
involvement rather than EPA's developing Federal procurement policies because State and
local governments can often implement purchasing policies more easily than can the Federal
government.
As was evident in the Buy Quiet program, implementation of the purchasing
program came about as a result of shared goals of the various governments. The
implementation was enhanced by extensive interaction with the private sector. Such
interaction between government and private industry at the Federal level is difficult, since
purchasing policy at the Federal level means the preparation and publication of guidance.
That is, the guidance and implementation suggestions come from EPA, but there is little or
no interaction with the personnel actually involved in the purchasing actions and decisions
other than the requirement that consideration be given to the requestor.
In contrast, the Buy Quiet program is an example of dynamic interaction; that is, the
institutional arrangements evolved in a grass roots style of growth that has been described
as "social entrepreneuring." Such programs involve more than establishing guidelines;
they stimulate dialogues among the government purchasing departments and suppliers of
the items to be purchased.
EPA's role in such an effort would be as the facilitator or "social entrepreneur" to
encourage State and local governments to take the lead in pursuing the increased use of
recycled materials in products purchased by governmental entities. Such an effort would
not be limited to recycled materials. Product substitutes would also be a goal. For
Page A—110
-------
Procurement Practices
example, there is no actual need for cars to have chrome bumpers; possibly cars with high
impact rubber bumpers could be ordered by government agencies with large fleets of cars.
Similarly, products that are cadmium plated could be plated with less hazardous materials.
Soft drinks in glass bottles could replace the plastic bottles routinely disposed of in Class D
sanitary landfills.
Implementing the second type of procurement activity (i.e., greater emphasis on
waste minimization processes in the manufacture of particular products) is a more difficult
problem to solve. The objective would be to create a preference for the purchase of
products manufactured with processes that minimize the volume and/or toxicity of wastes.
The difficulty lies in focusing the purchasing decision on the manufacturing process rather
than on the material characteristics of the product. Products may be essentially identical,
except that the creation of one involves a manufacturing process that minimizes volume and
toxicity of waste.
The Department of Defense, for example, has the potential for implementing such a
purchasing program. Exercising this option would require cooperation between EPA and
DOD and would focus on purchases from government contractors that manufacture
equipment for DOD. Agency guidance on procurement for such products could encourage
manufacturers to voluntarily certify to DOD that they had instituted a waste minimization
program. The certification would then be made a part of the contract with DOD. The
certification statement could be the same as that required on hazardous waste manifests,
i.e., that such a program be instituted to the degree that is economically practicable. One
major difference, however, would be that the contract would allow DOD to check to see
that such a program was indeed being carried out. Such an auditing mechanism already
exists within DOD. The Defense Contract Audit Agency performs this auditing function
for DOD through the Defense Contract Administrative Services Regions (DCASR).
Briefly, it ensures that product quality control, as well as contract conditions, are being
met. The audit teams may receive training by specialists, depending on the nature of what
is to be examined. Thus, this option, if implemented by DOD, could entail training in
environmental auditing, with special emphasis on waste minimization practices for the
particular industry being audited.
Page A—111
-------
Procurement Practices
Another mechanism exists within DOD through which this option can be (and to
some degree already is being) implemented. This is through the Government Owned
Contractor Operated facilities (GOCOs) in which a manufacturing facility is owned by a
government agency and operated by a private firm. An example of such a situation is U.S.
Air Force Plant No. 44, which is a Federally owned defense system manufacturing facility
located in Tucson, Arizona. It is operated by the Hughes Aircraft Company. The Air
Force is attempting to minimize hazardous waste generation at the facility, for which it has
retained a consultant to perform waste audits and to make recommendations for changes
that should be made in operating procedures, processes, and other methods. This type of
situation offers the most control and probably represents the "ultimate procurement
specification" in that it allows direct control of the manufacturing process as well as of the
final product.
2.0 Evaluation
2.1 Technical Effectiveness
Volume Reduction
Volume reductions cannot be estimated at this time. To determine the impact this
option would have on minimizing the volume of hazardous waste generated would require
an assessment of the waste streams associated with products currently purchased through
the procurement process. These products would then have to be compared with either the
changes in volume if more recovered materials were incorporated into products or the waste
minimization techniques incorporated in the manufacture of purchased products.
Toxicity Reduction
This is difficult to assess, since this option involves the incorporation of recovered
materials into products, as well as the establishment of waste minimization practices at
manufacturing facilities, rather than direct modification of particular waste streams. The
degree to which reductions would occur in specific industries cannot be estimated at this
time.
Page A—112
-------
Procurement Practices
2.2 Impacts on Industry
Economic Impacts
Products that incorporate recycled materials may tend to be higher in cost than 100
percent virgin materials. Because costs are the driving factor in agencies' purchasing
decisions, it is unlikely that this option will drive material costs up substantially.
The cost impact of the second part of the option would depend on how waste
minimization is assessed by the agency auditors. If economic feasibility is taken into
account, costs may not rise appreciably. In certain instances there may be cost savings.
Equity
By forcing agencies to consider using products made of recycled materials that have
been perceived to be inferior to virgin products, the first part of the option may actually
ensure more equitable competition among contractors who supply the government. A
policy encouraging the use of recycled materials will increase competition among suppliers
of both virgin and recycled materials. Similarly, government contractors using recycled
materials who may have been shunned under previous government procurement practices
would now be competitive with those contractors who use virgin material. For the second
part of this option, there would tend to be a bias toward larger companies. Larger
companies would be better able to initiate waste minimization practices than would small
companies and they would often have a competitive advantage by virtue of their volume of
product and efficiency of production.
Incentives for Noncompliance
This option would not create an incentive for illegal disposal because it is involved
only with the creation of products and the enlistment of waste minimization in their
production. Enforcement will not be an issue since the option is voluntary and self-
enforceable.
The option would permit the industry to take credit for its own initiatives. The
program, if implemented, would result in a shift in evaluation procedures used for
Page A—113
-------
Procurement Practices
procurement, so that more attention would be given to recycled materials and waste
minimization. The option takes advantage of existing market mechanisms. That is, if
bidders feel that they would have a competitive advantage in marketing products that
contain recycled materials, or by committing to waste minimization programs by contract
with the procuring agency, then they will do so to the extent feasible.
2.3 Implementation Issues
Legislative Authority
The legislative authority for issuing general procurement guidelines directed at
Federal agencies exists in Section 6002 of RCRA. EPA may prepare guidelines for the use
of procuring agencies. These guidelines must designate items that "are or can be produced
with recovered materials." Procuring agencies purchasing any of these items for which
guidelines are drafted "shall procure such items composed of the highest percentage of
recovered materials practicable (Section 6002(c)(l))."
Although there is legislative authority for EPA to develop procurement guidelines
for purchase of items with recovered materials, there is no requirement that guidelines be
the only mechanism by which such a program could be implemented. EPA may choose to
work cooperatively with various procuring agencies to help the agencies develop a
procurement procedure.
The second type of procurement activity described above would also involve direct
interaction with purchasing agencies (in this case, DOD appears to be the appropriate
agency). It would be up to the purchasing agency to pursue a procurement waste
minimization strategy. Since bidders would not be required to certify that waste
minimization was being practiced, legislative authority would not be an issue. The
voluntary agreement to submit to the requirement of certification as part of the purchasing
contract would not guarantee procurement. It would only be one of the factors to be
weighed by the purchasing agency.
Page A—114
-------
Procurement Practices
Time Required for Implementation
Implementation of the option would be a continuing Agency activity. It could
initially take from one to two years to develop this option if consideration is given to
cooperative arrangements with other agencies (such as the Department of Defense) and
audit training programs (associated with greater emphasis on waste minimization in the
manufacture of particular products). It would take another two years for EPA to write
procurement guidelines, if this were to be part of the option. The earliest the program
could be fully developed would therefore be 1989, with final guidance to States and local
governments being issued no earlier than 1991.
It is difficult to judge when effects would be visible. Changes in purchasing trends
could occur within one year's time (i.e., by 1987), depending on the emphasis placed on
environmental considerations by the purchasing agencies.
There is an advantage in EPA's moving rapidly to coordinate with DOD in
developing procurement strategies and studies related to them because DOD is currently in
the process of developing a comprehensive waste minimization strategy. DOD may be
more receptive than at other times to altering procurement specifications and procedures.
EPA coordination with DOD would take advantage of a ready-made mechanism for
consideration of new ideas.
Appropriate Target Industry or Industries
This option would be directed toward internal changes in Federal procurement
practices to ensure against biases in the purchase of recycled goods. The second part of the
option (waste minimization processes rather than product content specifications) would
concern manufacturing industries. At this time, it appears that the printed circuit (P-C)
board industry would be most affected by such an option, since P-C boards are key
components of communication and computer equipment that is purchased extensively by
DOD; however, this option would not be focused exclusively on this industry.
Page A—115
-------
Procurement Practices
Costs of Development and Implementation
The costs of implementing this option would be similar to those of programs such
as the environmental auditing or the emissions trading programs, in which EPA developed
guidance to "help agencies to help themselves."
Enlistment of both aspects of this option (procurement of recycled materials and
emphasis on waste minimization processes) would require an examination of the types of
virgin materials used in products. Where a substitution of a recycled waste may result in a
substantial reduction in hazardous waste generation, a procurement policy involving these
materials could then be pursued. For example, many government agencies purchase
automobiles for their fleets. High impact rubber could be substituted for chrome bumpers,
thus reducing the generation of wastes containing chromium. An analysis would need to
be made, however, of the wastes associated with production of the high impact rubber
bumpers to determine whether the substitute product results in a decrease in toxicity of
waste produced.
Additional data would be necessary prior to any decision making regarding the type
of materials and products purchased by the government and the production processes that
may lead to a reduction in waste. These data are:
The amounts of products purchased by various government
agencies, and volumes and types of hazardous wastes associated
with such products (e.g., cars with chrome bumpers, cadmium
plated products that could be plated with less hazardous materials;
plastic beverage bottles as opposed to glass). These data would be
used as a baseline against which reductions in wastes (resulting
from changes in procurement policy) could be assessed. This
information would be essential in targeting types of products and
purchases that would result in significant reductions in hazardous
waste generated and/or treated, stored, or land disposed.
• Data on substitutes for various products and their toxicity relative to
the original product.
• The amount and types of hazardous wastes associated with P-C
board production, as well as the approximate quantity of such
equipment purchased by DOD.
Page A—116
-------
Procurement Practices
Incorporation of recycled materials in products could result in discharges to other
media, while waste minimization practices may shift waste discharge locations. For
example, wood preservers may be able to increase the amount of wood preservative that is
absorbed in the wood itself, with less waste discharged at the plant site. The wood that is
placed in the ground, however, can potentially leach more wood preservative into the
ground than before. Thus, a high yield, low waste product may result in greater
transmission of the toxic material to the environment via consumer use versus industrial
discharge at the plant site.
Measuring and monitoring the results of this option could be very difficult. It may
only be possible to document the instances in which these types of activities have taken
place rather than to measure the effects of the procurement policy. For the first aspect of
the option, agencies can track the amount of products purchased that contain recycled
materials. The type and percent of recovered materials could be broken out on a per
product basis and compared with the amounts of the same materials that are in each product
prior to implementation of the procurement program. For the second aspect of the option,
measurements could be made at the manufacturing plant. This poses problems in instances
where plants may already have been enlisting waste minimization techniques prior to
contracting with the purchasing agencies.
Other Issues
Inter-Agency Impacts:
Inter- and intra-Agency cooperation will be necessary to avoid problems in the
implementation of this option. In the case of the second part of the option, there is the
potential for cross media shifts between water and air. Coordination with the other
program offices within EPA would help to minimize the shifts. Providing auditing
guidance to DOD in assessing waste minimization programs at GOCOs or other facilities
will also helpful.
Impacts on States: The first pan of the option is most likely to work best if
cooperation is encouraged with States whose bureaucracies allow a bit more flexibility in
Page A—117
-------
Procurement Practices
developing procurement strategies. It is also not likely to conflict with State waste
minimization programs. In fact, it will probably complement existing programs.
Public Perception: The general public is not likely to find the option objectionable.
If the program results in no increase in recycled materials or no waste minimization, then
there may be some criticism of the program. In general, however, the public is not
particularly attentive to the environmental aspects of products that government agencies
purchase.
3.0 Recommendations
Although EPA could write procurement guidelines, its role would be better served
as facilitator of procurement strategies for Federal agencies. Such strategies could also be
coordinated with the procurement activities of State purchasing agencies. The difficulty of
this role is that such activities have traditionally been downplayed within the Agency
because of the problems involved in measuring results. In order for such an option to be
accepted, the Agency would probably have to issue some type of procurement guideline.
The ultimate success of such a program, however, is in convincing the various agencies to
actually change their purchasing habits.
Procurement standards should be quite flexible and should encourage negotiation
between manufacturers and purchasing agencies. DOD, for instance, could serve as a
model for companies within the private sector, particularly where waste minimization cost
savings are demonstrated.
This option appears to have the potential to change waste generation rates and
should therefore be pursued. EPA also has the added advantage of existing legislative
authority to implement it. The Agency will report on the status of these activities at a later
date.
Page A—118
-------
Appendix B
WASTE MINIMIZATION OPTIONS
NOT CONSIDERED
-------
Options Not Considered
Waste Minimization Options
Not Considered
Eight options that were listed in the Technical Support Document (TSD)l have not
received further consideration in this Report To Congress for one or more of the following
general reasons: (1) they did not further the goals of waste minimization as is defined in
this Report to Congress, (2) they were not adequately developed in the Technical Support
Document to pursue as a individual options, and/or (3) action to implement the particular
option has already begun. The options excluded from analysis include:
• Establishment of toxicity levels for delisting petitions.
• Expedited delisting petitions.
• Improved waste marketing capability for hazardous wastes
generated by the military services.
• Waste end tax.
• Developing certification standards for outstanding recycling facility
performance.
• Reduced liability for generators if using specially permitted
recyclers.
• Recycled Substances Act.
• Enforcement bounties.
Each is discussed in turn below.
* Office of Solid Waste, February 17, 1986 Draft Final Report: Waste Minimization
Issues and Options, volume 1. USEPA, Chapter eight.
Page B — 1
-------
Options Not Considered
Establishment of Toxicity Levels for Delisting Petitions
The establishment of toxicity levels was withdrawn as an option because of its
relationship to expedited delisting petitions. Toxicity levels would determine the thresholds
for delisting of wastes. Setting levels below which a waste would no longer be considered
hazardous and thus subject to RCRA regulation, would not be a genuine waste
minimization technique. Rather, it could be a technique to define away a class of wastes
that were previously considered hazardous.
The extent to which such a modification in procedure might actually minimize
hazardous waste generation would depend on whether the petitioner is encouraged to
manage wastes such that they fall below the toxicity thresholds, and/or will apply a portion
of the cost savings to waste minimization practices for the remaining hazardous wastes.
The present case-by-case delisting approach has been adopted because hazardous wastes or
hazardous constituents behave differently in different environments and in the presence of
other wastes or constituents. Adopting a standard threshold might require setting a value at
worst-case levels, which might result in having virtually no waste qualifying for delisting.
Further, determining if a petitioner's waste qualified for delisting might still require time
consuming case-by-case consideration. Given these constraints, setting toxicity levels for
delisting is not a feasible waste minimization option.
Expedited Delisting Petitions
Expedited delisting petitions was eliminated as a candidate for option consideration
because it would merely define away hazardous wastes. Currently, EPA allows a waste to
be delisted for two reasons, neither of them constitute waste minimization. The first reason
for delisting is if a waste does not meet the criteria that defines hazardous wastes. The
second reason is if a listed hazardous waste is treated to the extent that is no longer meets
the hazardous waste criteria (40 CFR 261).
Page B —2
-------
Options Not Considered
Develop Improved Waste Marketing Capability for Hazardous Waste of the Military
Services
The Department of Defense is embarking on several programs to expand its its
marketing of hazardous wastes. This approach to waste minimization is, therefore, a
current activity, and is no longer an option that requires further consideration.
Waste End Tax
A waste end tax has been proposed under the pending CERCLA reauthorization
legislation. While the purpose of the amendment is to meet the funding needs for future
clean up of abandoned hazardous waste sites, one indirect effect might be to encourage
waste minimization. The present report therefore considers this option to be within the
realm of existing activities.
Developing Certification Standards for Outstanding Recycling Facility Performance
EPA eliminated this as an option because it does not get involved in the
development of standards. This would be the purview of ASTM.
Reduced Liability for Generators if Using Specially Permitted Recyclers
This option is not considered because, in the opinion of the Office of General
Counsel, common law tort liability would remain unchanged. The option, therefore,
would have little practical effect.
Recycled Substances Act
EPA believes it already has adequate authority to encourage recycling through
RCRA, rendering a Recycled Substances Act largely superfluous. The existing mechanism
is derived from the Definition and Exemption sections of EPA's regulations for identifying
solid and hazardous wastes (§261.2—§261.4). The Agency could, perhaps, employ the
same rationale they have already used for exempting certain chemicals because of their
intrinsic value in a generator's production process. Chemicals such as pulping liquors and
spent sulfuric acid are exempt from hazardous waste regulations since generators are
unlikely to dispose of them as wastes. They, instead, continuously reclaim the chemicals
Page B —3
-------
Options Not Considered
for reuse in the production process rather than treating them as wastes for disposal. If,
after study, EPA finds that a particular chemical such as toluene or acetone is normally
reclaimed for reuse rather than disposed of by the generator, the Agency could use its
authority to exempt that chemical from regulation. Regulation of these chemicals under
these circumstances would be unnecessary as an incentive to encourage recycling since the
chemical is typically reclaimed anyway. Such an approach would essentially accomplish
the same purpose as legislation for recycled substances.
Enforcement Bounties
Third party participation in the enforcement of EPA regulations is an option that
may have some beneficial effect on EPA's monitoring and enforcement responsibility. It is
not, though, a direct means to achieve waste minimization. Several methods are currently
in existence or have already been proposed to encourage citizen participation in the
enforcement of EPA regulations. These include the setting up of telephone hot lines,
initiation of citizen suits and the awarding of money for information leading to prosecution
or punitive action against a violator.
Some States have begun developing telephone hot lines to encourage citizens to
contact them should they have questions about waste generation regulations. State and
federal telephone hot lines may also be used to anonymously report violators to the State
regulatory agency.
Section 7002 of HSWA extended the power citizen suits for the enforcement of
RCRA. It allows a citizen(s) to, "commence a civil action on his own behalf against
anyone including the government that is in violation of the RCRA. The costs of litigation
are born by the citizen(s) taking action but the court may awards the costs of litigation to
the, "substantially prevailing party, whenever the court determines such an award is
appropriate."
Finally, an award system has been proposed in the reauthorization legislation for
CERCLA. Awards for information are to be used where the information leads to the arrest
and conviction of persons engaged in criminal hazardous waste activities.
Page B —4
-------
Appendix C
HISTORY OF OSW WASTE
MINIMIZATION
-------
OSW Waste Minimization
History of OSW Waste Minimization
1.0. Introduction
Beginning with the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965 and continuing to the
promulgation of the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 (HSWA), the U.S.
Congress has directed the Federal Government, particularly the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), to improve industrial and manufacturing systems of managing and
disposing of hazardous waste. In this process, EPA's efforts have reflected three stages of
development which have resulted in the current emphasis by the Office of Solid Waste
(OSW) upon development of alternative methods to minimize the generation of hazardous
waste. Over nearly 20 years of experimentation and innovation, EPA has begun to develop
the requisite base of information on the magnitude and sources of the national hazardous
waste problem, the institutional framework for managing the volume of waste generated,
and the legal basis for encouraging aggressive development of new technological processes
from the private sector.
Phase I: 1965-1976
The Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965 ( PL-98-272) established a modest research
effort and technical assistance program for States and localities to improve management and
conservation practices with respect to municipal waste.1
The Resource Recovery Act of 1970 mandated a national disposal site study and
strengthened the programatic emphasis upon recycling of municipal and post-consumer
wastes. Although the activities of the waste generators continued essentially unregulated
during this initial phase, EPA and other organizations undertook research activities focused
on solid waste recycling. These studies concluded the following:
• Recycling was technically possible;
Senate, July 25, 1984, Congressional Record, SB. 9149.
Page C — 1
-------
OSW Waste Minimization
• Because the level of recycling was almost entirely dependent on
economics, recycling as an effective alternative to land disposal
would probably not occur until government specifications and
legislation changed to encourage development of markets for
recycled and reprocessed materials;
• Viable markets are essential to encourage industry to plan for
recycling and reuse in the design of new products;2
• Air and water pollution regulations must be strengthened to support
industrial incentives for reusing secondary materials.3
Phase II: 1976-83
Phase II was characterized by EPA efforts to essentially manage and control the
symptoms of the hazardous waste problem. By 1977, EPA estimated that about 10 percent
of industrial wastes generated may fall in the "hazardous waste" category. Industrial waste
generation was growing at a rate of about 3 percent per year.. The generation of municipal
solid waste (residential and commercial) refuse was also increasing.
The extent of the groundwater contamination problems related to improper disposal
of hazardous waste was clarified by EPA through a survey and study implemented
pursuant to Section 1442 (a) (4) of the Safe Water Drinking Act and reported to Congress
in 1977. The study concluded: "Waste disposal practices have contaminated groundwater
on a local basis in all parts of the nation and on a regional basis in many heavily populated
and industrialized areas. Nationally, the principal sources of groundwater contamination
related to waste disposal practices are industrial wastewater impoundments and solid waste
land disposal sites."4
In response to growing evidence on the serious problem of groundwater
contamination from hazardous wastes, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
Ann Tasseff, 1972, "Recycling Solid Waste, " Environmental Reporter, Volume 3, No.
13, Monograph 12, p. 26.
Office of Solid Waste Management, 1974, First Report to Congress: Resource Recovery
'and Source Reduction, USEPA, Washington, D.C., p. ix.
USEPA., 1978, "EPA Activities under RCRA of 1976" Annual Report to the President
and Congress, FY 1977, USEPA, Washington, D.C., p.3.
Page C —2
-------
OSW Waste Minimization
(RCRA) provided a "cradle to grave" management system of hazardous waste generated
from current industrial operations. Centered around Subtitle C, three distinct sets of
standards and responsibilities were applied to hazardous waste generators, transporters,
and owners and operators of disposal facilities. Concurrently, the Act established a
program for comprehensive management planning for municipal waste and called for
closure of open dumps.
Significantly, in 1976 EPA indicated the preferred future direction of hazardous
waste management efforts with publication of a statement of "EPA Preferred Waste
Management Strategies" The hierarchy of practices was the following:
1 Waste Reduction — reducing the amount of waste at the source
through process change;
2 Waste Separation — isolating wastes from mixtures in which they
occur,
3 Waste Exchange — transferring of wastes through clearinghouses;
4 Energy/ Materials Recovery — reusing and recycling wastes for
original or some other purpose, such as for materials recovery or
energy production;
5 Incineration/Treatment — destroying, detoxifying and neutralizing
wastes to less harmful substances;
6 Secure Land Disposal — including volume reduction,
encapsulation, leachate containment, monitoring, and controlled air
and surface/subsurface water releases.
From 1981 to 1983, while the OSW activities centered around development of the
regulations and guidance for generators, transporters, and owners/operators of hazardous
waste disposal facilities, new evidence of the growing volume of hazardous waste brought
increased Congressional concern toward the national program. The recent national
generators survey indicated and increase in the production rate from 11 billion gallons or
400 million metric tons of hazardous waste produced annually dated in 1980. By August
1983, EPA increased this estimate to roughly 40 billion gallons, that is, to an annual
generation rate of 1,500 million metric tons of hazardous waste each year. These estimates
involved hazardous waste generators as well as treatment, storage, and disposal facilities
Page C — 3
-------
OSW Waste Minimization
regulated under RCRA in 1981. This national survey did not include mining wastes, some
of which are hazardous, or household wastes such as discarded pesticides, paint thinners,
and cleaning solvents. These waste estimates also excluded hazardous waste generated by
individual businesses who produce less than 1,000 kilograms per month. 5 By 1984, EPA
estimated that there were more that 71 billion gallons of hazardous waste generated in the
U.S. every year. This is equivalent to 264 million metric tons.
Phase HI: 1984-1986
Promulgation of HSWA implies a new phase in the development of the national
hazardous waste management program by its new emphasis upon the cause of hazardous
waste generation. HSWA encourages alternative production processes and raises the
economic costs of relatively cheap land disposal.
HSWA adds new requirements that "the Administrator shall compile and submit to
Congress a report on the feasibility of establishing standards of performance or taking other
additional actions... and any recommendations for legislative changes to implement the
newly added statement of national policy. "Wherever feasible, the generation of hazardous
waste is to be reduced, or eliminated as expeditiously as possible. Waste that is
nevertheless generated shall be treated, stored,'or disposed of so as to minimize the present
and future threat to human health and the environment" 6
Generators of hazardous waste must now certify that they have a "program in place
to reduce the volume or quantity and toxicity of such wastes to the degree determined by
the generator to be economically practicable;" and that "the proposed method of generation,
treatment, storage and disposal is that practicable method currently available to the
generator which minimizes the present and future threat to human health and the
environment." 7
Senate, July 25, 1984, Congressional Record, SB. 9149.
Section 1003 (b), Hazardous Solid Waste Amendments to the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976.
Ibid., Amendment to Section 3002.
Page C —4
-------
OSW Waste Minimization
During Congressional debate on the amendments to RCRA proposed by the Senate,
members indicated that "the need to minimize the volume and toxicity of all hazardous
waste is clear and is made explicit national policy in this bill." 8 Senator Stafford,
Chairman of the Committee, paid particular attention to the proposed amendments in
Section 26 of HSWA. and argued that "At the Federal level, we must look for ways to
encourage the development of alternative production processes, the substitution of less
hazardous materials for more toxic ones, and other means to reduce both the quantity and
toxicity of the wastes. We must also provide incentives for the development of treatment
and disposal practices that minimize threats from the hazardous wastes that continue to be
produced...Those changes will...emphasize waste reduction with the goal of eliminating
disposal of hazardous wastes where they might in any way harm public health or the
environment. "^
Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works, 1983 Solid Waste Disposal Act,
98-284, re. S. 757. p, 65.
Congressional Record,, July 25, 1984, S.B. 9148
Page C —5
-------
Appendix D
TOXICITY SCORING
METHODOLOGY
-------
Toxicity Scoring Methodology
Toxicity Scoring Methodology
Introduction
The HSWA's language promulgating the national policy favoring waste
minimization refers to the need to reduce the "volume or quantity and toxicity" of hazardous
wastes. In discussing this policy, the Senate report on the HSWA amendments refers to
the "amount and toxicity" of wastes as targets for waste minimization. It states, for
instance, that "the need to minimize the volume and toxicity of all hazardous waste is clear
and is made an explicit national policy in this bill."1 In discussing Section 3002 manifest
certification requirements, the Senate report elaborates that certification indicates that a
generator "has a program in place to reduce the volume or quantity and toxicity of
hazardous waste...to the degree economically practicable...and that the practicable method
currently available...minimizes the present and future threat to human health and the
environment." 2
While neither the Act nor the Senate report explicitly defines the concept of toxicity,
the Senate report does imply that the concentration of toxic components in a waste affects
its toxicity when it says that "[generators] may find that the reduction of waste volume
would result in increased toxicity" 3. By calling for simultaneous reductions in both
1 U.S. Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works, 1983, Solid Waste Disposal Act, re:
Senate Bill 757, p.65.
2 Ibid, p. 65.
3 Ibid, p. 66..
Page D — 1
-------
Toxicity Scoring Methodology
volume and toxicity, Congress clearly wishes to avoid defining dewatering and other
waste-concentrating processes as being valid types of waste minimization.4
This Appendix discusses the concept of toxicity as it applies to hazardous wastes
and waste minimization. To be responsive to Congress's interest in using waste
minimization to reduce waste toxicity, EPA has conducted a preliminary screening exercise
to rank wastes in order of their toxicity and assign them to very general toxicity categories.
Such an effort explores the following questions:
• What is the range of toxicities encountered among known hazardous
wastes?
• How is toxicity of wastes distributed (i.e., what percentage of listed
waste categories are high toxicity, medium toxicity, or low toxicity)?
» How is toxicity of waste correlated with volume?
The last question addresses Congress's concern that waste minimization not simply
reduce waste volume at the expense of increasing its toxicity. The other questions are not
explicitly brought up in the Act or the Senate report, but are of interest to EPA in defining
appropriate targets for the Agency's waste minimization efforts.
General Approach to Scoring Toxicity
Although the concept of waste toxicity is intuitively meaningful, there is no
generally acknowledged scientific approach to scoring toxicity in quantitative terms. Most
toxicological studies can estimate relationships between a particular substance and health
effects,^ but such studies clearly specify (1) the context of the exposure in question,
including such factors as route of ingestion, duration of exposure, and effective dose, as
EPA agrees in principle with this policy. As stated in the main body of this report, however, the
Agency believes that Congress did not intend this wording to disqualify volume reduction by itself
(with no change in toxicity) as being legitimate waste minimization. For example, EPA considers
it beneficial if a firm can change its processes to produce less waste per unit product, even if the
composition of the waste does not change.
Toxicological studies generally involve a mammalian animal species; results of such studies can
be used to assess potential toxicity to humans. For chemicials for which epidemiological studies
are available, the results can be directly applied usually with a high degree of confidence.
Page D —2
-------
Toxicity Scoring Methodology
well as (2) the particular human health effect of concern (e.g., cancer, liver damage,
neurological effects, etc.). Toxicological considerations become more complex because a
hazardous waste may be a heterogeneous mixtures of many contaminants, each of which
could potentially pose a risk of several different human health effects, and which may
interact with other components in the waste to enhance or decrease the effective toxicity of
specific components.
The approach used here is to create an aggregate score that combines information on
constituent hazards, constituent fractions, and waste composition for each waste stream.
While such scores have no toxicological meaning, such a scoring process does permit us to
make intuitively logical distinctions among wastes. Highly dilute waste streams containing
small amounts of materials with comparatively weak adverse health effects are strongly
distinguished from highly concentrated streams made up of extremely hazardous materials
(such as PCBs or dioxins). The actual equation used to develop the score is discussed
below. Its key features are:
1. Consideration of all hazardous constituents: The score is developed
using all available information on hazardous constituents (i.e., it is
not based exclusively on the potency of, for instance, the most
hazardous compound in the waste).
2. Consideration of mass fraction of hazardous compounds: Scores
are weighted according to the combined concentration of all
hazardous constituents known to be in the waste stream.
3. All health endpoints are considered: Rather than select for a single
health effect (such as cancer), all health effects known to be
associated with the constituents are included.^
Although a variety of health endpoints are considered, no attempt is made to adjust the score to
take into account of effect thresholds that may be associated with a given health effect. This
applies to most noncancer health impacts, but has no effect on scoring for carcinogens (see
methodological discussion). Lack of consideration of thresholds is not expected to result in any
significant impact on the toxicity score component obtained using the scoring approach. In
addition, no attempt if made to weight the relative importance of health effects—all effects arc
given equal weight.
Page D —3
-------
Toxicity Scoring Methodology
Precedents for Toxicity Scoring
Comparatively few efforts have been made in the past to create scores of this type.
The most important in this context is the work done by the Office of Solid Waste to
schedule prohibition determinations for waste streams listed in 40 CFR 261 into the
required statutory "tiers" required by RCRA Section 3004.7 This effort divided wastes into
categories based on their toxicity and volume; it was intended to put wastes with high
volumes and toxicities into the first priority category.
The toxicity scoring method used in this case was different from the current
proposed method in two important ways. First, wastes were ranked based on the toxic
potency of the most hazardous constituent in the waste, rather than the toxic potencies of all
known hazardous constituents. Second, the method did not take account of the mass
fraction (concentration) of the constituent; therefore, dilute wastes and concentrated wastes
containing the same constituent were ranked identically as to toxicity. This method was,
however, appropriate to the task at hand only because the wastes in question were
frequently single-constituent wastes that were often highly concentrated. Specifically, they
included many of the U and P classified RCRA streams, which include off-specification
chemicals and spills.
For the current exercise it was determined that it is highly important to weight
scores by mass fraction because (1) of Congressional concern that waste minimization
goals not be circumvented by dilution or concentration of wastes, and (2) all classes of
wastes are of concern (including solvent and dioxin wastes, the "California list" wastes, as
well as the scheduled "tiered" wastes). To ensure as much consistency as possible with
this scoring effort, however, the toxicity score components of the overall scores for
individual waste constituents developed by this previous project were used here; gaps were
filled as necessary using the same methodology (see below).
Office of Solid Waste, March 28, 1985, "Documentation for the Development of Toxicity and
Volume Scores for the purpose of scheduling Hazardous Wastes," USEPA.
Page D —4
-------
Toxicity Scoring Methodology
Limitations of the Approach
There are a number of critical limitations in the toxicity scoring approach used here,
some of which are discussed at greater length below. Results must therefore be interpreted
accordingly. The principal caveats are:
• Quality of data on waste streams: Existing data characterizing the
identity and mass fraction of hazardous constituents within waste
streams is highly uncertain and preliminary. This effort was based
on the comprehensive information developed for the RCRA
Risk/Cost Analysis Model, since that data base is the most complete
and comprehensive currently available.
• Synergisms among health effects are disregarded: The toxic effects
of multiple toxic compounds in a mixture may be higher or lower
than the effects of exposure to the same compounds separately.
Data are not available to make any statement about such joint effects;
they are typically disregarded in standard toxicological practice.
• Scores for different health effects are added together: The score
adds together different categories of health effects into a single
score, without weighting.^
• Uncertainties in health effects data: The health effects data on which
scores were developed contain inherent unquantifiable uncertainties.
The impact of these uncertainties is that the actual toxicities of the
individual components may be higher or lower than those presented
in this report. Furthermore, health effects data on some chemicals
are extremely limited or incomplete; thus, future toxicological
research may generate more comprehensive data that would result in
different toxicity scores.
Despite these limitations, the Agency believes that the results of this scoring
exercise are useful in comparing basic patterns of variations among waste streams.
Efforts have been made elsewhere in EPA to assign relative weights to health effects based on such
considerations as pain and suffering, wages lost, years of life lost, the reversibility or
irrcversibility of an effect, and costs of treatment. One example was the scoring approach
developed in 1981 by Dr. Milton Weinstein of the Harvard School of Public Health for the
Integrated Environmental Management Program in the Office of Policy Analysis.
Page D —5
-------
Toxicity Scoring Methodology
Methodology for Toxicity Scoring
The lexicological significance of a given waste stream is defined in this report as
being proportional to the sum of the products of the toxicity ranking factor (T) and the
concentration ranking factor (C) over the n constituents in the waste stream, or:
n
overall ranking of waste stream = £ (Tj • Q)
i=l
The range of the overall rankings for all the waste streams is then condensed by
taking the logjo of these values and distributing the resulting values into ten classes. The
toxicities of the individual waste stream components are ranked in this system based on an
effective dose equivalent (EDE) calculated using unit risk values, unit risks calculated for
noncancer effects, and other lexicological benchmarks for chronic effects and acute toxicity
data.
Method for Developing Toxic Potential Scores
The report that scheduled hazardous wastes calculated the toxic potential of 363
hazardous waste constituents listed in Appendix VII of 40 CFR 261. It gave consideration
to both acute and chronic forms of toxicity and assigned a value representing toxicity
potential to each constituent regardless of the data base available to the constituent. The
constituents were ranked according to their toxic potential, but because of the assumptions
that they had to make the authors of the report considered it imprudent to use the ranking
scheme, "...for purposes other than relative comparison of the inherent toxic potential of
waste constituents. "^
Scoring Acute Toxicity: Acute toxicity represents the inherent short term hazard
potential of a chemical. It is generally expressed as the minimum quantity of a toxicant
necessary to be lethal to 50 percent of a test population based on a single exposure typically
measured over a 96 hour period. Chemicals vary in their acute toxicities. Some may be
Office of Solid Waste, March 28, 1985. Documentation for the Development of Toxicity and
Volume Scores for the Purpose of Scheduling Hazardous Wastes, USEPA; pp. 5.
Page D —6
-------
Toxicity Scoring Methodology
lethal in small doses while others that are not very potent are lethal only in large doses.
LD5o's are usually derived from oral or dermal exposure; however, the counterpart for
inhalation does exist as the lethal concentration at which fifty percent of the tested
population is killed (LC50). In cases where LD5Q or LC5Q have not been calculated the
report relies on an LDi0 (lowest dose causing death). When this is unavailable for a
particular chemical the report relies on acute data from structurally similar chemicals.
Under normal circumstances exposure to a fatal single dose of a chemical from
environmental sources is rare. Human populations normally experience long term,
intermittent, repeated, or continuous exposures at concentrations that are well below those
associated with acute toxicity. The methodology in this report takes into account typical
real world exposures to chemicals by assigning acute toxicity the highest score of one only
in those few instances where exposure to chemical compounds even at low levels is very
hazardous (i.e., for highly acutely toxic chemicals with LDso's less than 50 mg/kg body
weight). ^ Most chemicals received an acute toxicity score of zero (i.e., no acute toxic
effect on the population at expected environmental levels signifying a low acute toxicity.
Scoring Chronic Toxicity: Unlike acute toxicity, chronic toxicity refers to adverse
impacts of exposure to a chemical experienced over a long period of time (years to an entire
lifetime). An Effective Dose Equivalent (EDE) standardizes chronic toxicity in order to
make comparisons between chemicals. EDE is defined as the dose at which the,
"...estimated risk associated with a compound is comparable among all compounds being
evaluated."11 Several calculations are necessary for determining EDEs. For a given
noncarcinogen, either an acceptable daily intake (ADI), a no observed effects level
(NOEL), or a unit risk is used as a basis for determining the EDE. A unit carcinogenic risk
(UCR) value is applied for calculating EDE values for carcinogenic compounds.
Values for the UCR are based on the probability of a chemical causing cancer over a
life time of 70 years at a relatively low dose exposure(l mg/kg body weight/day). The
UCR represents the upper bound of risk, referred to statistically as the upper 95 percent
10 The report used the same cutoff value cited in 40 CFR 261.11(a)(2) which delineated acute
hazardous wastes from toxic waste.
11 Ibid. p. 9.
Page D —7
-------
Toxicity Scoring Methodology
confidence limit, which means that in 95 percent of cases, the true risk to an individual will
be equal to or less than the UCR. The risk value, which is related to the expected incidence
of cancer at this low dose, becomes the slope of the dose-response curve; this curve is
assumed to be linear at these low doses. Furthermore, for carcinogenic effects, it is
assumed that there is no no-effect threshold; that is, carcinogens will exhibit some nonzero
risk at each dosage level regardless of how small.
In order to make carcinogens comparable with noncarcinogens an adjustment is
necessary to develop an EDE. A standardization factor of 10*6 (risk of of a toxic effect
occurring in 1 in 1,000,000 population) is used for both carcinogens and noncarcinogens.
The conversion into standardized values represents uniform risk levels for carcinogens and
noncarcinogens.
EDE carcinogen = Standardization Factor
UCR
The ADI is the basis of noncarcinogenic EDE. It is defined as that quantity of a
chemical measured by mg/kg body weight/day that is not expected to have an effect on the
general population.12 An ADI is calculated by dividing a no observed effect level (NOEL)
with an uncertainty factor. The NOEL represents the highest dose level which does not
have an effect on the test population. Where a NOEL is unavailable for a chemical in
question other methods and additional uncertainty factors are used to determine an ADI.
The uncertainty factors take into account level of confidence in the supporting study, the
transposition of animal test data to the expected effect on the human population, etc.1^
12 USEPA, 1980. Water Quality Criteria Documents: Availability. Appendix C - Guidelines and
Methodology Used in the Preparation of Health Effect Assessment Chapters of the Consent Decree
Water Criteria Documents.
13 The uncertainty factor selected depends on the type of study conducted to determine ADI and is
usually a factor of 10, 100, or 1000. The lowest uncertainty factor of 10 is used where the NOEL
is based on chronic human data. This factor is meant to account for individual variability. 100 is
used where the NOEL is based on animal studies and it accounts for both inter- and intra-species
variation. The final number, 1000, is used where the NOEL is based on subchronic animal data
and takes into consideration the uncertainty of extrapolating from subchronic to chronic exposures
as well as accounting for the two previous uncertainty factors.
Page D —8
-------
Toxicity Scoring Methodology
Not all chemicals have a NOEL value available. In cases where a NOEL is not
available a LOEL or lowest observed effect level is used. In instances where subchronic
and chronic data are unavailable, the EDE is calculated by taking the EDE value of a
structurally similar chemical, or by using the chemical's known acute toxicity.
In all cases, a standardization factor must be used to convert the ADI values and
acute toxicity values when NOEL or LOEL are not available into EDEs. For the NOEL the
the formula is relatively straight forward. It is the division of the NOEL by the
standardization factor of 10'6:
EDE noncarcinogen = NQEL
Standardization Factor
For LOELs, a severity factor is applied in addition to the standardization factor. The
severity factor corrects for the type of observed effect. A lower number is selected if the
observed effect is considered reversible (2.14), a mid-range number is selected (4.68)
where there is increasing severity of the observed effect (e.g., organ necrosis, neurological
effects, reproductive dysfunction or teratogenic effects). Finally, for chemicals using only
acute toxic data, the EDE is calculated by dividing the acute toxicity value by 100,000 or
50,000 if the LD50 is based on an injection study.
Toxicity Ranking
Once EDEs are calculated for all the chemicals of concern, a ranking scheme is
created to allow comparisons of the chromic toxicities of individual chemicals. The raw
EDE values vary by 10 orders of magnitude or a 10 billion fold difference between the
highest and lowest EDE. A 1 to 9 scoring based on the 10 orders of magnitude is
calculated in order to express the differences in the toxicity of the chemicals. Table D-l
shows the boundaries for each of these categories.
Page D —9
-------
Toxicity Scoring Methodology
Table D-l
Chronic Toxicity Scoring
Equivalent Dose Estimate Score
EDE
JuH~
>10-7tolO-6 8
>10-6tolO-5 7
>10'5 to 10-4 6
>l(HtolO-3 5
>1O3 to 1C'2 4
>10-2 to 1(H 3
>10-! to 1 2
>1 1
The acute toxicity scores of 1 or 0 are then added to the chronic EDE scores to
calculate the total toxicity score for each of the chemicals. Of the 363 chemicals examined
140 (39 percent) have acute toxicity scores of 1.
Uncertainties in the Toxicity Potential Scoring
There are a number of limitations regarding this scoring methodology and the
approach to ranking taken by this report. The scores themselves have no intrinsic value but
are only used as an expression of the relative differences among the chemical compounds.
Page D —10
-------
Toxicity Scoring Methodology
There is a limitation with creating an EDE from incomplete and/or nonequivalent
data. The report notes that many of the 363 chemicals were poorly studied.14 Twenty
percent of the chemicals only have data on the acute effects of single exposure to the
chemical. The frequent lack of a NOEL or other chronic data means that this report has had
to rely on other data sources which in some instances are associated with a lower degree of
confidence.
Most of the data are derived from animal studies, requiring extrapolations to
estimate impacts on the general population. Interspecies extrapolation, while challenging,
can be accomplished by such methods as accounting for metabolic rate differences, and by
using surface area/body weight correction factors. Results from animal studies are often
generated from doses that are much higher than what the general human population would
normally experience. Probabilistic models are therefore used to generate dose-response
curves that extrapolate from the higher experimental dose levels to the lower doses
experienced by human populations from environmental sources. There are certain inherent
limitations with high to low dose extrapolations. It is sometimes difficult to accurately
predict what will be the impact on the human population due to factors that cannot be
detected in high dose animal testing.15 There are uncertainties about the synergistic effects.
The studies assume independence of the chemicals and therefore do not take account of the
impact of the combined effect they have on the human population.
Further uncertainties arise in that the scoring system attempts to compare chemicals
that have qualitatively different toxic effects on the human population.
Furthermore, the scoring of a waste stream is based on single chemical compound.
While a particular waste stream may have several constituents, the method selects the most
hazardous constituent as a proxy to characterize the relative hazardousness of the whole
waste stream.
Office of Solid Waste, March 28, 1985. Documentation for the Development of Toxicity and
Volume Scores for the Purpose of Scheduling Hazardous Wastes, USEPA; pp. 6-7.
Charles C. Brown, 1934. "High— to Low—Dose extrapolation in Animals," in, Assessment and
Management of Chemical Risks, American Chemical Society, Washington, D.C., pp. 57-79.
Page D — 11
-------
Toxicity Scoring Methodology
Calculating Toxicity Potential Scores for Wastes Not Listed in the Scheduling of
Hazardous Waste Report
There were 34 constituents for which toxic potential toxicity scores did not exist in
the report on scheduling hazardous wastes. Scores were calculated for these hazardous
waste constituents using the same methodology as employed in the scheduling report.
Table D-2 displays the constituents, their potential toxicity scores and the sources for the
data used in the calculations.
Methodology for Determining Mass Fractions of the Chemicals
The RCRA Risk-Cost Analysis Model gathered data on hazardous waste streams.
The methodology involved measuring the concentrations of the constituents that made up a
particular waste stream. The model gathered data on 154 waste streams which accounted
for an annual generation of about 158 million metric tons.16 The wastes investigated were
primarily those considered hazardous under Subtitle C of RCRA (F and K wastes listed in
40 CFR 261). EP wastes were taken from Appendix VIII to 40 CFR 161. The model did
not consider P and U wastes. The absence of P and U wastes, however, did not obstruct
our toxicity analysis since they were typically single constituent highly concentrated
wastes. Some of these streams were almost 100 percent of the chemical of concern (i.e.,
had a mass fraction of one); at such high concentration levels the toxicity scores from the
Environ, Inc. report were considered accurate.
The risk-cost model also identified the industries that generated the waste streams in
order to be able to make intra- and inter-industrial comparisons. By linking wastes with
generators it was possible to identify which industries were generating the most and least
toxic as well as the most and least voluminous hazardous wastes.
Data sources for the risk-cost analysis model came from EPA industry studies, permit applications,
delisting petitions, state data, and trade associations. For further explanation see: Office of Solid
Waste, March 1984. The RCRA Risk-Cost Analysis Model, USEPA.
Page D — 12
-------
Toxicity Scoring Methodology
Determining the Overall Toxicity Score for Each Constituent
An overall toxicity score is calculated by multiplying the toxic potential score and
the mass fraction. The raw values range by ten orders of magnitude from the most to the
least hazardous constituent.
Several alternative methods are used to determine toxicity categories. Since our
main objective is to show relative differences between groups of waste streams rather than
absolute differences between individual waste streams, it does not seem relevant to classify
constituents by their raw values. If raw values are the basis of the categories, there would
have been a clustering of a few waste streams at the highest toxicity category and the major
portion of the streams at the low end of the spectrum. In the middle there would be gaps
with very few or no waste streams. By taking a logjo of the toxicity scores it is possible to
distribute the waste streams in such a fashion that relative toxicity could be compared by
group classes. The problem with the logiQ, however, is the fact that while it softens the
impact of a relatively few highly toxic constituents, it leaves the impression that there is not
as great a difference between the high and low toxicity scores as there would have been had
the raw scores been kept. It is considered worth the minor sacrifice in accuracy by using
the logjo m °rder to be able to make some general observations about toxicity of hazardous
waste streams and there relationship to the volume of waste generated.
General Observations
Several generalizations can be deduced from the overall toxicity scores and the
ranking classification. First, the purpose of this exercise has been to weight the potential
toxic scores according to the constituent's mass fraction. Such an approach provides a
relatively accurate picture of the toxicity of waste streams and their potential hazard to the
human population. It is possible that a constituent with a high potential toxicity can have a
low overall toxicity score and low rank if the concentration of the constituent in the waste
stream is low. The converse is also possible — a constituent of relatively low toxic
potential might very well have a high concentration and, therefore, a high overall toxicity
score. What this implies is that the hazardousness of exposure to a waste stream is
Page D— 13
-------
Toxicity Scoring Methodology
dependent not only on the toxic potential of the waste but also the concentration in which it
might exist in the waste stream itself.
Second, the ten toxicity categories provides a way to make relative comparisons
between groups of waste streams. The uncertainties of the methodology for determining
the potential toxicity score weakens the ability to make cpmparisons between constituents
based on their absolute differences. This methodology works best for grouping the
constituents with similar toxicity scores and comparing relative differences between waste
streams.
Toxicity scores could be useful in the general comparison of toxicity and waste
stream volume. Volumes of waste streams were calculated from the mail survey of
hazardous waste generators, and like the toxicity scores the volumes were classified into
ten categories in descending order of volume after determining the log^ of the raw volume
scores. With these two scores it was possible to contrast a constituent's toxicity and
volume. Table D-3 displays these scores. There appears to be a weak inverse correlation
between toxicity and volume of a waste stream, but in some cases there are highly toxic
constituents appearing in very low volume, and in others there are low volume wastes that
are highly toxic. Figure D-l graphically depicts the relationship in Table D-3 for 100 of
the highest volume wastes. It is apparent that the most voluminous streams are not the
most toxic. In fact, it is at the middle and lower end of the volume spectrum that one finds
the highest toxic streams. For select industries waste streams do exhibit a correlation
between toxicity and volume. In Table D-4 three industries and their waste streams are
listed by toxicity and volume. There is a tendency for the waste streams in these industries
to be inversely correlated between volume and toxicity.
Page D — 14
-------
Figure D-1
Hazardous Waste Stream Toxlclty Scores: Descending
Order of Waste Stream Volume
6J
03
n
/.uu •
6.00 -
5.00 -
4.00 -
Raw Toxicity
Score
3.00 -
200 -
1 00 -
000 -
..n irrt.rmnJ'mfflftni n.
fl
fl
MH
1
,«l
L
^
i
100 Highest Volume Hazardous Waste Streams
Source: Using data horn the HCRA Risk-Cost Data Base, with the EPA toxicity ranking
developed (or the land disposal restriction program schedule.
H
o
X
K-
IS)
n
O
1
5'
tta
tr
a
-------
Toxicity Scoring Methodology
Table 0-2
Toxicity Potential Scores For Missing Data
Hazardous Waste
Constituent
Acute Score I Chronic Score I Total Toxicity
Potential Score
1.1, Dichloroethane °°
1,1,1 — Trichloroethane °°
1,2,4, Trichloroelhane °°
1,3, Dinitrobenzene °°
1,4 — Naphthoquinone °°
2,3,7,8, TCDD °
2,4—0*
2— Chbrophenol °°
Acenaphthene °°
Barium °°
Benzalkonium Chloride*
Benzo (K) Fluoranthene °
Beta — Hexachlorocyclohexane °
Bis(2,3,3,3 - Tetrapropyl) Either**
Cobalt"
Copper °°
Cyanide °°
Di-N-Butyl Phthalate**
Dibenzo (a,h) Anthracene °
Dichloroethane °
Dichloromethane °
Dimethyl Alkylamine °°
Epichlorohydrin °
Fluorides °°
Gamma — Hexachlorocyclohexane °
Hydroquinone °°
PCB— 1254°°
Pentachlorophenol °°
Phorate °°
Pyrene °
Toxaphene °
Trichlorobenzene °°
Vanadium °°
Znc°°
0A
0*
0A
0*
0*
1*
0
QAA
0*
Of
0
0
0*
0*
0*
0*
r
0*
0*
0*
0*
0*
r
0A
0*
QAA
0*
r
IA
0*
1*
0*
0*
0*
8
4
5
6
6
9
4
5
9
6
4
9
8
3
5
8
6
3
3
6
6
4
5
9
9
6
9
5
9
9
8
5
6
3
8
4
5
6
6
10
4
5
9
6
4
9
8
3
5
8
7
3
3
6
6
4
6
9
9
6
9
6
10
9
9
5
6
3
*Tatken, R.L; R.J. Levine (eds.), 1983, Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances,
Volumes 1,2,3; National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health; Cincinnati, Ohio.
"Office of Solid Waste, 1986, "Documentation for W-E-T Model Impact Parameters"; March, 1986.
"Office of Health and Environmental Assessment,1985, Health Assessment
Document For Nickel; USEPA—€00/8-83/012F. pp. 8—199 to 8-202.
°°ICF, Inc. 1984, The RCRA Risk—Cost Analysis Model; ICF, Inc., Washington, D.C.
A Verschverens, K., 1983, Handbook on Environmental Data on Organic
Chemicals; Van Nostrand, Reinhold Co., NY.
AA USEPA, 1979, Multimedia Environmental Goals for Environmental
Assessments; Volumes III & IV, USEPA 600/7-79-176 A&B.
•fUSEPA, 1980, Ambient Water Quality Criteria Documents; USEPA 440/5-80, Series.
Page D — 16
-------
Toxicity Scoring Methodology
Table D-3
Toxicity and Volume scorces
of RCRA Listed Wastes
SIC Code
2819
2869
2869
2869
2869
2869
2865
2812
2869
2869
2869
2869
2879
721
2869
2869
2865
2869
2879
2869
2869
2851
2865
2869
2865
2879
2833
721
2879
2851
2819
2869
2869
2869
2865
2865
2869
2819
2819
2879
2869
2879
2869
2865
2865
RCRA Code
P063
Characteristic
K030
K020
K018
K019
K083
K073
K095
K096
K029
K021
K042
F002
Characteristic
K016
K025
K017
K043
Characteristic
Characteristic
F005
K085
Characteristic
Characteristic
F002
K084
F002
K034
F005
P120
K010
Characteristic-
Characteristic
K023
K093
P016
P011
P012
P059
K026
U036
U078
K015
Characteristic
Toxicity
Score
7.0000
5.5560
5.2100
5.1990
4.9500
4.9340
4.8910
4.8850
4.8050
4.7440
4.1700
4.0020
3.5000
3.0000
2.7060
2.4850
2.4520
2.3200
2.3000
2.2740
2.0400
1.8000
1.7000
1.6080
1.6000
1.5000
1.4400
1.2500
1 .2350
1.2000
1.2000
1.1990
1.1520
1.0800
1.0000
1.0000
1 .0000
0.9000
0.9000
0.9000
0.8500
0.8000
0.8000
0.7470
0.7000
Toxicity
Group*
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
Volume
(kkg/yr)
55,831
9.60
48,400
52,700
35,400
80,300
1,800
340
35,500
3,200
1,300
270
6
38,040
2,700
1,600
1,500
6,360
4,990
1,400
8,200
3,070
4,500
2,600
17,300
1,230
500
9,510
170
5,430
1,842
26,300
140
9,100
760
2,100
72
10
140
44
1,440
150
0
680
22,700
Volume
Group*
3
6
4
4
4
3
5
6
4
5
5
6
8
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
4
5
5
5
4
5
6
4
6
5
5
4
6
4
6
5
7
8
6
7
5
6
0
6
4
Page D — 17
-------
Toxicity Scoring Methodology
Table D-3: Continued
Toxicity and Volume scorces
of RCRA Listed Wastes
SIC Code
2819
2819
2819
2819
2819
2819
2819
2865
2865
2851
2819
2819
2869
2869
2869
2819
2819
2819
2819
2865
2992
2819
2869
2869
2869
2869
2869
2819
2869
2869
2869
2865
2865
2869
2491
3333
285
2879
2869
2869
2869
2819
2819
2819
262
RCRA Code
P021
P029
P074
P098
P104
P106
P121
U023
U127
F005
P113
P115
U080
U209
U211
U214
U215
U216
U217
U242
Characteristic
U032
U043
U044
U077
U128
U131
U151
U208
U227
U228
U231
K094
Characteristic
K001
Characteristic
F005
K036
Characteristic
Characteristic
U084
U144
U145
U146
U226
Toxicity Toxicity
Score Group*
0.7000 2
0.7000 2
0.7000 2
0.7000 2
0.7000 2
0.7000 2
0.7000 2
0.7000 2
0.7000 2
0.6000 2
0.6000 2
0.6000 2
0.6000 2
0.6000 2
0.6000 2
0.6000 2
0.6000 2
0.6000 2
0.6000 2
0.6000 2
0.5300 2
0.5000 2
0.5000 2
0.5000 2
0.5000 2
0.5000 2
0.5000 2
0.5000 2
0.5000 2
0.5000 2
0.5000 2
0.5000 2
' 0.4450 2
0.4400 2
0.4356 2
0.4306 2
0.4000 2
0.4000 2
0.4000 2
0.4000 2
0.4000 2
0.4000 2
0.4000 2
0.4000 2
0.4000 2
Volume Volume
(kkg/yr) Group* j
25 7
151,222 3
2 9
6 8
0 0
637 6
10 8
58 7
201 6
580 6
82 7
6,083 5
24,094 4
1,930 5
108 7
1,231 5
1,231 5
82 7
656 6
58 7
9,000 4
24 7
243 6
318 6
2 9
193 6
96 7
219 6
193 6
11 8
155 6
0 0
700 6
43,650 4
35,700 4
500 6
1 ,030 5
130 6
820 6
40 7
169 6
1 9
1 9
0 0
6,117 5
Page D—18
-------
Toxicity Scoring Methodology
Table D-3: Continued
Toxicity and Volume scorces
of RCRA Listed Wastes
SIC Code
2865
2865
2992
2869
3312
2865
2865
2865
2869
3333
2869
2865
2869
2879
3351
2491
3341
3341
2992
2869
2869
2865
2869
2869
2892
2865
2865
2821
2869
2879
3691
3692
2851
3398
2869
2812
3333
3332
2865
2821
2869
2879
2869
3312
2869
RCRA Code
K024
K103
Characteristic
Characteristic
K087
P028
U037
U070
U083
Characteristic
Characteristic
K015
P023
Characteristic
Characteristic
Characteristic
K069
Characteristic
Characteristic
Characteristic
U045
U072
U081
U082
K045
Characteristic
Characteristic
Characteristic
Characteristic
Characteristic
Characteristic
Characteristic
Characteristic
F012
Characteristic
K106
Characteristic
Characteristic
Characteristic
Characteristic
K028
K041
Characteristic
K060
Characteristic
Toxicity
Score
0.3600
0.3485
0.3400
0.3160
0.3034
0.3000
0.3000
0.3000
0.3000
0.2808
0.2700
0.2520
0.2500
0.2400
0.2400
0.2390
0.2324
0.2272
0.2200
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.1825
0.1750
0. 1 740
0.1600
0.1570
0.1500
0.1400
0.1300
0.1255
0.1232
0.1230
0.1050
0.1046
0.1025
0.1010
0.1000
0.0905
0.0900
0.0780
0.0737
0.0706
Toxicity
Group*
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
Volume
(kkg/yr)
2,500
15,150
69,000
15,500
39,800
201
2,586
20
95
1 1 ,000
22,700
8,380
169
500
8,000
25,100
28,600
153,300
32,000
5,800
650
16
649
169
242
187,000
5,600
486,000
1,600
500
150,000
1,300
500
190
3,600
7,000
16,000
42,000
30,000
53,000
610
5,000
45,400
72,000
172,500
Volume
Group*
5
4
3
4
4
6
5
7
7
4
4
4
6
6
4
4
4
3
4
5
6
8
6
6
6
3
5
2
5
6
3
5
6
6
5
5
4
4
4
4
6
5
4
3
3
Page D — 19
-------
Toxicity Scoring Methodology
Table D-3: Continued
Toxicity and Volume scorces
of RCRA Listed Wastes
SIC Code
2879
3471
2869
2869
2869
2879
2879
2869
2812
2865
3312
2865
3312
2865
2869
3320
2865
286
2869
3000
2879
3331
2869
2865
2879
2816
2869
3313
2861
2892
2865
2865
2865
3313
2869
3471
2911
2823
2861
3313
2893
2879
3313
2879
2812
RCRA Code
K097
F006
Characteristic
Characteristic
Characteristic
K031
K035
Characteristic
Characteristic
K104
K061
K022
K062
Characteristic
K011
Characteristic
Characteristic
U240
Characteristic
Characteristic
K032
Characteristic
Characteristic
Characteristic
K040
K002
K009
Characteristic
Characteristic
K044
Characteristic
K105
Characteristic
Characteristic
Characteristic
F007
K050
Characteristic
Characteristic
Characteristic
K086
K037
Characteristic
K033
K071
Toxicity
Score
0.0682
0.0624
0.0600
0.0600
0.0600
0.0569
0.0560
0.0520
0.0500
0.0492
0.0478
0.0450
0.0425
0.0420
0.0418
0.0407
0.0400
0.0400
0.0390
0.0385
0.0350
0.0341
0.0279
0.0260
0.0259
0.0249
0.0240
' 0.0206
0.0203
0.0200
0.0200
0.0117
0.0099
0.0092
0.0090
0.0089
0.0073
0.0053
0.0044
0.0043
0.0040
0.0026
0.0024
0.0020
0.0020
Toxicity
Group*
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
Volume
(kkg/yr)
2,300
488,400
291,500
2,720
4,500
12,980
3,130
8,172,000
25,900
332,070
70,000
106,200
2,950,000
136,200
3,181,000
2,139,100
388,000
43,500
5,448,000
52,000
160
640,000
101,700
118,000
150
27,000
399,500
85,400
28,400
1,700
12,500
Volume
Group*
5
2
3
5
5
4
5
1
4
3
3
3
2
3
1
2
3
4
1
4
6
2
3
3
6
4
3
3
4
5
4
520 6
90,800
72,200
3,630
1,990
1,700
160,000
11,500
32,800
10,000
3
3
5
5
5
3
4
4
4
50 7
83,600
8,280
39,000
3
4
4
Page D —20
-------
Toxicity Scoring Methodology
Table D-3: Continued
Toxicity and Volume scorces
of RCRA Listed Wastes
SIC Code
2869
3312
2911
2869
3341
2892
2892
2911
3471
2879
3312
2879
3471
2911
2869
2911
2911
3320
2861
2911
2816
2865
2911
2911
2911
2879
RCRA Code
Characteristic
Characteristic
K048
Characteristic
K100
Characteristic
K047
K049
Characteristic
K038
Characteristic
K099
Characteristic
K051
Characteristic
Characteristic
K052
Characteristic
Characteristic
Characteristic
Characteristic
K027
Characteristic
Characteristic
Characteristic
K039
Toxlcity
Score
0.0017
0.0015
0.0014
0.0010
0.0008
0.0007
0.0007
0.0007
0.0005
0.0005
0.0004
0.0004
0.0004
0.0003
0.0003
0.0003
0.0003
0.0002
0.0002
0.0001
0.0001
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
Toxicity
Group*
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
8
8
8
8
8
9
10
Volume
(kkg/yr)
190,600
60,000
297,600
2,100
139,500
24,000,000
81,600
92,400
17,300,000
7,280
30,000
26,180
30,700
196,200
1,398,300
40,300
7,100
16,915,102
96,200
20,600
742,100
107,900
154,700
263,900
1,000
355
Volume
Group*
3
3
3
5
3
1
3
3
1
5
4
4
4
3
2
4
5 •
1
3
4
2
3
. 3
3
5
6
1= high toxicity and Volume, 10= lowtoxicity and volume
Page D —21
-------
Table D-4
Comparison of Waste Streams for Three
Industry Categories
o
X
5"
•8
to
to
Industrial Sectors RCRACode Toxlclty Rank* Volume Rank*
Industrial Organic
Chemicals (NEC) K030 1 4
K020 1 4
K018 1 4
K019 1 3
K095 1 4
K096 1 5
K029 1 5
K021 1 6
K016 2 5
K017 2 5
K010 2 4
P016 2 7
K026 2 5
U078 2 0
U080 2 . 4
U209 2 5
U211 2 7
U044 2 6
U043 2 6
U208 2 6
U128 2 6
U228 2 6
U131 2 7
U227 2 8
U077 2 9
U084 2 6
U083 2 7
P023 3 6
U045 3 6
U081 3 6
U082 3 6
K028 3 6
K011 4 1
K009 4 3
Industrial Sectors RCRA Code
Pesticides and
Agricultural K042
Chemicals K043
F002
K034
P059
U036
K036
K041
K097
K031
K035
K032
K040
K037
K033
K038
K099
K039
Petroleum Refining
K050
K048
K049
K051
K052
Toxlclty Rank*
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
4
4
4
4
6
6
7
7
10
5
6
6
7
7
Volume Rank*
8
5
5
6
7
6
6
5
5
4
5
6
6
7
4
5
4
6
5
3
3
3
5
" Ranking: 1 - high, 10 » tow
3
era
n>
B-
-------
Appendix E
WASTE MINIMIZATION CORRESPONDENCE
AND BRIEFINGS
-------
Correspondence and Briefings
APPENDIX E
Waste Minimization Correspondence and Briefings
Introduction
This appendix contains examples of correspondence from members of the regulated
community and other panics requesting clarification of specific aspects of the waste
minimization provisions of HSWA. These inquiries were received by the Office of Solid
Waste during 1985 and 1986. Appendix E also contains the OSW's response to specific
inquiries as well as the text of briefing material on waste minimization prepared for the
American Management Association.
Page E—1
-------
Correspondence and Briefings
APPENDIX E
Table of contents
Page
SUBJECT: Participation in a Waste Exchange Program
March 1, 1985
Letter from OSW to Mr. William Stough, Director,
Great Lakes Regional Waste Exchange £-5
SUBJECT: Waste Minimization Statement on the Uniform
Hazardous Waste Manifest
July 11, 1985
Letter from OSW to Mr. R.R. Saulsman, Manager
Energy and Environmental Affairs
The Boeing Company E-6
SUBJECT: Waste Minimization Certification Requirements
August 5, 1985
Letter from OSW to Ms. Faith Gavin Kuhn, Executive Director/Editor
National Association of Solvent Recyclers £-7
SUBJECT: Waste Minimization Certification Requirements
September 6, 1985
Letter from OSW to Mr. Peter Ashbrook, Head
Hazardous Waste Management
University of Illinois £-9
SUBJECT: Availability of Grant Funding for Waste Exchanges
January 17, 1986
Letter from OSW to Mr. William Sloan, Secretary
Hazardous Waste Facilities Siting Board
State of Maryland E-ll
SUBJECT: Definition of Waste Minimization
February 6, 1986
Letter from OSW to Mr. Robert Fixter, Assistant
Environmental Manager
Waste, Inc .£-13
Page E—2
-------
Correspondence and Briefings
SUBJECT: Federal Permit Requirements for In-House
Solvent Recovery Equipment
February 21, 1986
Letter from Mr. George D. Culotta (Vice President—Sales,
Progressive Recoveryjnc.)
toOSW E-15
SUBJECT: Federal Permit Requirements for In-House
Solvent Recovery Equipment
March 13, 1986
Letter from OSW to Mr. George D. Culotta
Vice President—Sales
Progressive Recovery, Inc E-17
SUBJECT: Need for Coordinated Approach by EPA Regional
Offices Regarding Grant Funding for Waste Exchanges
April 2, 1986
Letter from Mr. William Sloane, Secretary (Hazardous Waste
Facilities Siting Board, State of Maryland)
to OSW E-19
SUBJECT: Waste Minimization Certification for Small Quantity
Generators of Hazardous Wastes
April 16, 1986
Letter from OSW to Mr. Jeffrey L. Dauphin
Waste Systems Institute of Michigan, Inc E-21
SUBJECT: Fees Assessed on the Generation of Hazardous Waste
May 20, 1986
Letter from OSW to the Honorable Frederick Boucher
U.S. House of Representatives E-23
SUBJECT: Memorandum on Briefing Material on Waste
Minimization for the American Management
Association Interview from OSW
February 18, 1986 JE-26
Page E—3
-------
Correspondence and Briefings
Page E—4
-------
Correspondence and Briefings
I8CC4 .15
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
WASHINGTON, O.C. 20460
MAR i .1985
office or
SOCIO WASTE-AND eME"GENCY RESPONSE
Mr. Wi11iam Stough
Oi rect or
Great Lakes Regional Waste Exchange
r rtu n £ a n H W (•_
3250 Townsend
Grand Rapids.
N.
Mlchi gan
49505
Dear Mr. Stough
It was a pleasure to hear from you and learn of your
interest in using waste exchange programs to support the
waste minimization concept of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) Reauthorization.
Where participation in a waste exchange program affects
a generator's efforts to reduce the volume or toxicity of
hazardous waste, such participation may be used to satisfy
Section 3002(b)(l) of RCRA. Participation in a waste exchange
program could also be used as evidence of compliance with
§3002(b)(2). which requires that the generator s?lect the
method of treatment, storage or disposal which minimizes the
threat to human health and the environment.
It is
waste will
exchange programs
way
our hope that each year greater volumes of hazardous
be recycled, reclaimed and reused through waste
Achievement of this goal will go a long
toward meeting the intent of Congress regarding the disposal
of hazardous waste in or on the land.
We appreciate hearing from you. If you have further
questions, please let me knew.
John H. Skinner
Director
Office of Solid Waste (WH-562)
Page E—5
-------
Correspondence and Briefings
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20460
JU. I I B85
OFPIC6 Of
SOLID WASTE* NO EME^GcNC- J-SI
Mr. R. R. Saulsman, Manager
Energy & Environmental Affairs
The Boeing Company
P. O. Box 3707
Seattle, Washington 98124-2207
Dear Mr. Saulsman:
Thank you for your letter of June 5, 1985, concerning the
waste minimization statement which generators will be required
to sign on the Uniform Hazardous Waste Manifest (UHWM) effective
September 1, 1985.
As you indicated when you originally spoke to Carolyn Barley
in May, your concern was that Boeing Company employees would be
reluctant to sign this statement because as individuals they do
not have a waste minimization program in place as required by
the statement. Our suggestion in response to your concern was
for the employee signing the statement to include under the
signature line in Item 16 the phrase, "on behalf of The Boeing
Company." You indicated in your letter that this solution is
satisfactory provided that this phrase can be preprinted on
the form. Of course, the individual signing the statement is
responsible for the veracity of the statement, as is the company.
We recognize that preprinting this phrase on the form would
be a more efficient and less time consuming procedure than re-
quiring Boeing employees to write it in by hand. Additionally,
the Agency's March 20, 1985, regulations on the UHWM do not
specifically preclude you from preprinting this phrase on the
form. Therefore, I have no objections to your proposal.
If you have other questions about the waste minimization
statement or the UHWM system, I suggest that you again contact
Carolyn Barley (202-382-2217).
Sincerely yours,
John H. Skinner
Director
Office of Solid Waste
Page E—6
-------
UNITED
Correspondence and Briefings
TES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION t( NCY
AUG 5
Ms. Faith Gavin Kubn
Executive Director/Editor
National Association of Solvent Pecyclers
1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.w.
Suite 1100
Washington, P.C. 20036
Tear
Kuhn:
Thank you for your letter of July 19, 1985, requesting
clarif ication on the types of activities that, may be used to
satisfy the waste minimization certification as required by the
Hazardous and Solid Kaste Amendments (PSWA) of 1984. In addi-
tion, thank you for the copy of the National Association of
Solvent Recyclers1 (NASR) latest industry brochure and member-
ship list.
i
LTt
z
T
•?
•3
p
3
N;
CD
The HSVTA establish as national policy the minimization of
hazardous waste. The legislation requires waste minimization
considerations to be addressed in the Pesource Conservation and
Recovery Act (PCPA) transport manifests, generator reports, and
permits .
Senate Report Ho. 284, 98th Congress, 1st Session 66
(1983), articulates Congress' intent with regard to the waste
minimization requirements in the HSWA. As this legislative
history states, both minimization requirements for thp manifest
and biennial report, refer to a certification by the generator
that a program is in placo to reduce the volume or quantity and
toxicity of hazardous waste to the degree determined by the
generator to be economically practicable. v.'hile the requirement
to make this certification is mandatory, the determination of
what waste minimization practices are economically practicable
are to be made by the generator. The legislative history makes
clear th*»t Congress' objective in enacting the requirement for
waste minimization certification is to encourage generators of
hazardous waste to voluntarily reduce the quantity and toxicity
of waste generated.
o
3
UJ •<
•a
\ -z
CO —
I «;
fo
I ^
CO I—
ui en
CONCURRENCES
SYMBOL k
SURNAME k
OATg k
iVI i - o
E.Eh
.^,.£
6 D ;\
V
I
ivji - 3 b oA
pHansen
IVH-565
Jl^onman
^^/
V'l'Q'gf Page E— 7
OFFICIAL FILE COPY
-------
Correspondence and Briefings
As we previously discussed, and as the legislative history
suggests, generators that either recycle wastes on-site or send
choir wastes off-site to be recycled are exercising a form of
waste pininizatior that ray be user! to satisfy the waste rini-
pization certification requirement, and may certify as such on
the uniforn hazardous wast*? r>anifpst.
The Agency appreciates r-^FP's concern with the waste rini-
pization certification requirement. If you have any further
questions, pleape let T"*> know.
.Sincerely,
John h. Fkirner
Pirector
Orf'ice of solic' V.:a.ctP (VH-5^2)
Page E—8
-------
Correspondence and Briefings
3 Z
01 -
M S
Mr. Peter Ashbrook - r
Head, Hazardous Waste Management £ J.
University of Illinois 5 5
317 McKinley Hospital us -
1109 South Lincoln Avenue ^E
Urbana, Illinois 61801 ^-£
w £-
Dear Mr. Ashbrooki §
••
o
Thank you for your letter of August 26, 1985, to Lee Thomas »-
concerning the availability of guidance on implementation of waste 5
minimization practices at the University of Illinois. I am sympa- *g
thetic to the challenge you face in managing a large variety of K>
relatively small quantity wastes that, in total, represent a i
significant quantity. £
•vj
The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA) of 1984, ^
establish as national policy the minimization of hazardous waste. 3
The legislation requires waste minimization considerations to be to
addressed in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) ®
transport manifests, generator reports, and permits* >-
vo
The Agency has not developed guidance on waste minimization ^
activities that may be practiced by generators and, at this time, *•>•
does not intend to. Instead, it is hoped that activities such as yi
source reduction and recycling will be explored by individual £,
generators to reduce the volume or quantity and toxicity of the *
hazardous waste generated. ui
-2
Senate Report No. 284, 98th Congress, 1st Session 66 (1983), £
articulates Congress1 intent with regard to the waste minimiza- ^
tion requirements in the HSWA. As this legislative history states, Q
both minimization requirements for the manifest and biennial report £•
refer to a certification by the generator that a program is in *•
place to reduce the volume or quantity and toxicity of hazardous M
waste to the degree determined by the generator to be economically ^
practicable. While the requirement to make this certification is n-
mandatory, the determination of what waste minimization practices |
are economically practicable are to be made solely by the generator. £,
Page E—9
-------
Correspondence and Briefings
The legislative history makes clear that Congress1 objective in
enacting the requirement for waste minimization certification is
to encourage generators of hazardous waste to voluntarily reduce
the quantity and tozicity of waste generated.
As the legislative history suggests and as the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) has stated, generators that recycle wastes
on-site, send their wastes off-site to be recycled or participate
in a waste exchange program are exercising a form of waste minimi-
zation that may be used to satisfy the waste minimization certifi-
cation requirement, and may certify as such.
In addition to the requirements for waste minimization
certification imposed by the BSWA, the Amendments also require
that a "Report to Congress" be submitted by the EPA by October 1,
1986, assessing the feasibility of establishing waste minimiza-
tion regulations.
The Office "of Solid Waste (OSW) is undertaking extensive
technical studies on waste minimization practices including
source reduction and recycling in support of the "Report to
Congress. These studies will identify and assess current waste
minimization practices for generators of hazardous waste. These
activities include: good housekeeping practices, source reduction
strategies and recycling opportunities for generators. They will
also identify generic and specific problems associated with the
implementation of waste minimization strategies. In addition, the
studies will assess the potential for further applications of the
identified waste minimization strategies and will evaluate what
steps can be taken to mitigate problems and promote the increased
use of waste minimization. This information, as well as recommenda-
tions for legislative changes or new regulatory intiatives will be
presented in Report to Congress due October 1, 1986. In the
interim, OSW will distribute information regarding specific waste
minimization practices identified through our technical support
studies and technology transfer seminars.
The Agency appreciates your concern with the waste minimization
certification requirement. If you should have any further questions,
please contact James Berlow, Manager of the Treatment, Recycling,
and Reduction Program at (202) 382-7917.
Sincerely,
J. Winston Porter
Assistant Administrator
Page E—10
-------
Correspondence and Briefings
-'AN
r-'r. William Sloan
Secretary
Hazardous Waste Facilities Siting Board
State of Maryland
Suite 200
€C West Street
Annapolis, Maryland P14C1
Hear Mr. Sloan:
Thank you for your letter of Eecember 19, 1965, to Lee
Thomas inferring the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (TI'-A)
of the Resolution passed by the Maryland Hazardous V.'aste Facil-
jtj.es Siting Board (KHV.TSB) on October 17, 1905. The resolution
recon.-ends that the EPA provide partial funding for industrial
waste exchanges in the U.S., specifically the Northeast Industrial
'./aste Exchange (NFIl.'E).
In response to your request for funding, I would like to
tell you that Congress has appropriated funds for the Pesource-
Conservation and Recovery Act (PCPA) grant prcgran for FY 198C.
These funds will be available through the EPA Regional Offices.
The RCKA grant program is used to support a variety of State and
Iccal hazardous waste management efforts which focus en innovative
wast«» management activities. These activities include waste
reduction, waste exchange, treatment facility siting, providiro
alternatives to land disposal, shared treatment, and assistance
to small quantity generators.
However, due to the uncertainty associated with the recently
enacted Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act cf 1905
(C-raham-P.udman provisions), the Agency will not release these FY
1986 funds at this time. When we more clearly understand the
ramifications cf these provisions and are assured the funds will
not be withdrawn, the Regions will be notifie.d and the funds
released.
Page E—11
-------
Correspondence and Briefings
•Tl't rcrcluticr. alerter! ^V f>'tf !'i"Vl-^'- v;culij he an ectivity
vhjcb ecu It' he ccrs 3 .-.•c-rf-i"; fcr furcinc '_-v the l~rt- Peciopcl Offices.
T v.'culc svjf>~t"st that a proposal be subrittec' t.e tl'c- aj-rrcprictr
r!T !e^irr,cl offjrt- rr Offices tc le ccnsidcrcc' fc>r furt4ii'.c. In
trc case of t.h«=- rTIV'F, vhose servicec exterc1 Veyond ere "PA
"•ecion, ? jcir.t rrcpcsftl suhn;itted tc several P.ecicns request inc
a cccrt-inatrr funcinc rffcrt. ray be possible.
Waste oxcVar.ces provide an excel ler.t. mecbBr.isr^ for J nforrat icr
transfer arc1 brve the ability to realize actual increas?es in t.be
oae of recyclina as a vf-st.e naracener.t alternative. The A.cer.cy
applauds the wcrX dor.e \-y th.p MIV'FSL ir adopting this resolution
in addition to fHe- \«ork currently teinc r«cne by the individual
waste exchances. The strides taV.en Ly waste exchanges in recent
ytars have succtroied in rrrlucinc the volurre of hacar^oue was-tes
beina disposed i r, arc1 on t.be land. I encourage the H!-'VTPP. to
explore the possibilities of cAtairtro r.-rant funds fror the EFA
i -.-cicnal Cffices.
If you should bavo uf-y further r-ucstjons, p-leasc oont?ct
rlair'.«: tby of the Treatrent, Recyclinq, and F.eOucticn rroi.rftr^ at
(202) 3F.2-793C .
Sincerely,
Winston Porter
Assistant Adninistrator
Page E—12
-------
UNITED IS^TES ENVIRONMENTAL .PROTECTION >-•
ffl - T3
,\.
•a
O (B
3 ><
- r1
3T K
I I—
U> 0)
03 4fr
CONCURRENCES
'MBOL
» • c ..^ i
Page E—13
-------
Correspondence and Briefings
the volume or ouantity and toxicity of hazardous waste to the
degree determined by the generator to he economically practicable,
and that the proposed method of treatment, storage or disposal
is that practicable method currently available to the generator
which minimizes present and future threats to human health and
the environment, while the reguirement to make the waste minimi-
zation certification is mandatory, the nature of the criteria for
such certification and the determination of compliance with those
criteria are to be made solely by the generator.
This makes it clear that Congress1 objective for waste
minimization program certification is to encourage generators
to seek voluntarily ways or programs to reduce the quantity and
toxicity of generated waste. The reports further state that
recycling pollutants, contained in effluents, emissions, wastes,
or other pollution streams is one, but by no means the only, way
of implementing this national policy of waste minimization. A
fundamental premise of RCRA is and continues to be to encourage
the reuse of materials.
As the legislative history suggests and as the Environmental,
Protection Agency (EPA) has stated, generators that recycle, .Wfla.taa«,,
on-site or send their waste off-site to be recycled are engaging
in an activity which nay be considered waate minimization-. ' -^
The Agency appreciates your concern with the waste
minimization program definition. If you should have any further
Questions, please contact James R. Berlow, Manager of the Treat-
ment, Recycling, and Reduction Program at (202) 382-79?"^
Sincerely,
Original signed fayi
Marcia E. Williams
Marcia Williams
Director
Office of Solid Waate (WB-562)
Page E—14
-------
Correspondence and Briefings
02/21/86
/Hr. Jack McGraw
United States Environmental
Protection Agency
Solid Waste Division
401 M Street SW
Washington, DC 20460
Reference! Inhouse Liquid Solvent
Recovery Units
Dear Mr. McGraw:
O'.r ccrporation, Progressive Recovery is a leading manufacturer of
I r, house Liquid Solvent Recovery Distillation Equipment.
D.ring the past several months, many of our potential clients nave
questii->n»d the use cf inhouss recover/ units and if a Federal
Form it ic required''
Bused on my Knowledge of the existing Federal Regulation 40, part
261.6, no Federal permit is required for inhousc solvent recovery
equipment. This is as long as the following conditions are met:
"Liattd" spent solvents 'F001 through F005 in 40 CFR 261.31 and CAC
2745••*: -31 and •ipen* "Characteristic" solvents (D001 in 40 CKR
261.21 and CAC 3745-j:-21> r,usc ba stored less than 90 days be-f-ore
th?y are r o J \ * ti 1 I e-J.. Snail quantity hazardous waste gneraiors
(iesp than 1.000 Kg ;er month) are allowed up to ISO days for
Storaar.
it^c: e n 11 y, i C'jstcintf C-^cjo^st-rf we acrjuai.it ourselves with the
rftdef in iti sn of soljd waste fir.alnen in 40 CJ-1? Part 261.1 < 4 ) ,
.2 . ?61.2 <<.:• ii».
li. is my ur dc r-jtand v r.; r. h 11 tKe Federal EPA strongly encourages
gf?n.rjtor<-, of spent solvent tc recycle rather than dispr. s= of thi'_
material'
I would appreciate your comments and opinions on this matter!
TKan!< you.
!020Nortn Mam Str?»t
Columbia. Illinois 62236
(618) 281-7196
Page E— 15
-------
Correspondence and Briefings
try. Inc.
02/21/86
Sincerely,
Progressive Recovery
George 0. Culotta
Vice President-Sales
cc: PRI-STL
1020 Nortn Main Street
ColumDia. Illinois 62236
(613) 281-7196
Page E—16
-------
Correspondence and Briefings
13 1986
Mr. Georoo D. Culotta
vice Pros ident -tales
Progressive Recovery, Inc.
1020 'Jorth Main btreet
Columbia, Illinois *223f
S en
f $
LTI O
> 03
\ ^>
O O
Dear Mr. Culnttat
Thi*; is in r«jsr»ons«3 to your letter of February 21, 1386,
in whicn you requited that -M reviow your interpretation of the
•srrlieabl'' regulations for in-hou«o liquid -solvent recovery units.
In addition, you as^ed for the environmental Protection Agency's
position ro<3ar"Hny recycling of spent solvents by generators.
The spent solvents tint you described in your example are
RCrJ>. hazcr^ous w as tt« . ?"3rJl through "005 are listed bazarJous
wastes (4J CFR 261.3) and 0001 exhibits a hazardous characteristic
(4'J C?r> *r.i.21). A3 a result, the "storage, treatnent, and dis-
posal ot tnese and other hazardous wastes are regulated undar
iuntitlo C ot 9CXA. However, exemptions from ooneral permitting
regulations aro provi^od for certain types of tanks, small quan-
tity jeneratora and operational units reclaiuing or recycling
naJMrrious wastes. In your axaruple, no Subtitle C treatrrwnt
pecmt is raauir-xJ under Federal regulations tor in-houao solvent
recovery aquipnent as long as the wastes raeet the definition of
a rt-cyclan ie nateri.il, and owners or operators of treatment
facilities are in compliance with 40 CFR 251.6 requirements.
An .tart of 40 CFR 261.5 regulation, operational units are
:ron perrjitt inrj requlations when chose operations involve
of hazardous v/aotes. However, there is no exemption for
in ncvcliru-j practices conat i tut inq 'disposal. Additionally,
torage, transport an-1 qinar^tion that precedes this activity
tf-iulatcl without nny soeci^l cons iilerat ions for recycling
ities. In your spent solvents example the wastes m»««t the
ltion of 3 recyclable naterial. If the in-house nolv«»nt
oauir>.-.«*;it ire in connlianca with 40 CFR 2C1.6 reauiro-
, no RCRA Subtitle C treatment permit ifl required for the
iti«rt ~>f r^cvclin.j th«se "Articular
certa
tne s
are r
activ
•Inrin
3 rr
I rr
0 ^
O •
3 -0
(3
(O rr
O 1
h- C
•3 Q,
3" \
0 ns
3 •
(8 X
O
=»•<
n
ui O
S3 Z
w H
I 3
-J O
O
2
X ••
ON M
rients
»ctiv
CONCURRENCES
^j////&"
EPA Form I320
OFFICIAL FILE COPY
Page E—17
-------
Correspondence and Briefings
.,,-;> storage is subject to regulation as doscribed in
• i (jus paragraph some general exemptions from the storage
' -j.-is exist. These exemptions apply when the wastes are
! 'Accumulated on-site less than 90 days as stated in the
. ^ 26^.34 requirements, or are accumulated on-site up to
'" "jays &y smaii quantity hazardous waste generators (less than
" xg Per month) as stated in the 40 CFR 261.5 requirements.
I also would like to emphasize that the proposed rule for
quantity hazardous waste generators is scheduled to be
promulgated later this month. Although changes might occur in
the final rule, the proposed rule for small quantity hazardous
waste generators would exempt generators that store wastes for
180 days if they do not accumulate more than 6,000 kg of hazardous
wastes during that period. In addition, the August 1, 1985, pro-
posal (50 FR 31304 and 31305) would allow accumulation -for 270
days if the waste is being shipped 200 miles or more for off-site
treatment, storage, and disposal. I would suggest that you also
contact the State authorities of your clients because States may
regulate recyclable materials in a different manner.
I also am enclosing the. January 4, 1985, final rule defining
a solid waste (40 FR 14 through 66d), as wall as the August 20,
1935, technical corrections to this rule (50 FR 33541 through
33544). These notices provide detailed information on our
rationale in defining a solid waste. If you have additional
questions, please contact Matt Strati, Chief, v;aste Identifica-
tion uranch, at (202)475-8551.
Finally, I would like to point out that the Hazardous and
Solid Haste Amendments of 1934 establish as national policy the
minimization of hazardous wastes. It ia £PA's policy to encourage
environmentally sound techniques that reduce the volume or quan-
tity and toxicicy of hazardous wastes generated. The recycling
of spent solvents is one of the most frequently used practices
for volume reduction. We believe that properly designed and
operated solvent recovery can proviue effective reduction in tho
volu-nes ot solvents requiring disposal as hazardous wastes.
Sincerely,
Garcia S. t.'i
Director
Office of Solid Waste (WH-562)
Enclosure
Page E—18
-------
Correspondence and Briefings
STATE OF MARYLAND
teven P. Quarles, Chairman
Charlej R. Baker
Christine U. Ecclei. Ph.D.
Richmond w Hill
Donald A. J action
loren D. Jensen, Ph;
XttlXXXMWXcX
Bunon I.. Mobiey
Suzanne M. PogeU
William M. Sloan, Secretary
HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITIES SITING BOARD
April 2, 1986
J. Winston Porter
Assistant Administrator
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Office of Solid Waste i Emergency Response
Washington, DC 20460
Dear Mr. Porter:
Thank you for your letter advising the Board that funding for waste
exchanges could be considered by the Regional Offices. The message has been
circulated among exchange managers. We appreciated Elaine Eby's being present
at the Third National Conference on Waste Exchange in Phoenix.
Since your letter, which I received in late January, Lewis Cutler of
the Northeast Industrial Waste Exchange has communicated with Regions I, II,
III and V, and is prepared to submit an application as soon as one can be
considered. Mr.- Cutler has also coordinated his work with others, notably
Margo Ferguson Siekerka of the Industrial Materials Exchange Service. The
IMES — which, incidentally, is clearly the 1985 leader in business, with $7
million in material or energy value exchanged — is a part of the Illinois
Chamber of Commerce. It, like the Northeast Industrial Waste Exchange, serves
states in Region V and other federal regions.
We are finding it difficult to apply without going in different
directions, while the situation with the exchanges cries out for unity and
coordination. We are in the process of forming a non-profit association, but
incorporation is still a couple of weeks off and State acknowledgement
probably two months.
I would like to suggest, on behalf of the NIWE, the IMES, and the
Board, that you consider a coordinated approach at next week's meeting with
regional personnel on Section 8001 funding. A reiteration to the regions of
Secretary i Office • 60 Wejt Sireel • Suile :00 • Annapolis, Maryland 2I40I • Pnone (301)
Page E—19
-------
Correspondence and Briefings
Mr. J. Winston Porter
April 2, 1986
Page Two
the support that you expressed in your letter would also be very much
appreciated. Any of us would be glad to discuss the situation with you.
Many thanks for your help.
Secretary
WMS/csm
cc: Lewis Cutler, NIWE
Margo Siekerka, IMES
Ma re i a Williams, U.S. EPA/OSW
Chairman, Members and Counsel
Page E—20
-------
Correspondence and Briefings
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
'* WASHINGTON. D.C. 20460
KJ^
^T f 8 1966
OFFICE OF
Mr. Jeffrey L. Dauphin SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Waste Systems Institute of Michigan, Inc.
470 Market, S.W.
Suite 100-A
Grand Rapids, MI 49503
Dear Mr. Dauphin:
This letter responds to your request, dated April 1, 1986,
for clarification of the wa,ste minimization certification
requirement for small quantity generators of hazardous waste.
The waste minimization certification requirement was created
by the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 (HSWA), signed
by the President on November 8, 1984. Section 3002(b) of HSWA
requires that generators of hazardous waste regulated under Section
3002(a)(5) certify, on the Uniform Hazardous Waste Manifest, that
they have in place a program to reduce the quantity and toxicity
of the hazardous waste they generate, to a degree determined by
the generator to be economically practicable and that the proposed
method of, treatment, storage, and disposal is that practicable
method currently available which minimizes present and future
threats to human health and the environment. This statutory
provision does not apply to generators of less than 1000 kg per
month.
The HSWA also required EPA to establish standards for
generators of 100-1000 kg per month. These standards were
promulgated on March 24, 1986. On the same day, EPA proposed
that the waste minimization certification requirement also
apply to 100-1000 kg/mo generators. If the Agency finalizes
this proposed requirement, the waste minimization certification
statement in item 16 of the Uniform Hazardous Waste Manifest
will apply to 100-1000 kg/mo generators just as it applies to
generators of greater than 1000 kg/mo. I have enclosed copies
of both Federal Register notices, for your information.
The certification contained in item 16 of the manifest form
consists of two parts, the waste minimization certification and
the general certification of accuracy. Only one signature is
required.
The waste minimization certification requirements of HSWA
do not authorize EPA to "interfere with or to intrude into the
production process by requiring standards for waste minimization;
Page E—21
-------
Correspondence and Briefings
rather, it specifically provides that the substantive determinations
of "economically practicable" and "practicable methods currently
available" are to be made by the generator in light of his own
particular circumstances. Thus, from an en-forcement perspective,
the Acjency will be concerned primarily with compliance with the
certification signatory requirement. Each generator subject to
the waste minimization requirement should make a qood taith effort
to minimize the amout and toxicity of waste generated and to
select a means of treatment, storage, or disposal most likely to
minimize the present and future threat to human health and the
environment (50 FR 28734). The leqislative history of HSWA
makes clear that "judgements made by the qenerator [for the
purpose of the waste minimization certification] are not subject
to external regulatory action (S. Rep. No. 284, 98th Cong. 1st
Sess. 67 (1983)).
The HSWA, however, reguire the EPA to submit a report to
Conoress, by October 1, 1986, on the feasibility and desirability
of: (1) establishinq standards of performance or of takinq
additional action under the Act (RCRA) to reguire the generators
of hazardous waste to reduce the volume or quantity and toxicity
of the hazardous waste they qenerater and (2) establishinq with
respect to hazardous wastes required management practices or other
requirements to assure such wastes are managed in ways that minimize
present and future threats to human health and the environment.
In addition, the report shall include any recommendations for
legislative chanqes which EPA determines are desirable and feasible
to implement the national policy of minimizinq the generation and
the land disposal of hazardous waste by encouraging process
substitution, materials recovery, properly-conducted recycling
and reuse, and treatment.
The Agency supports all environmentally sound strategies
for reducing the amount of hazardous waste which must be disposed
of, including waste exchanges. The Agency's position on waste
exchanges, therefore, remains consistent with that expressed in
John Skinners' March 1, 1985 letter to you.
I hope that this answers your guestions about the waste
minimization certification requirement. Thank you for your
interest in the hazardous waste program.
Sincerely,
Marcia Williams
Director
Office of Solid Waste
Enclosures
Page E—22
-------
Correspondence and Briefings
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460
of
SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Honorable Frederick Boucher
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Boucher:
Thank you for your letter of April 18, 1986 regarding
your constituent's concern about fees assessed on the generation
of hazardous waste. There is currently no such fee assessed
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).
My staff checked with officials in the State of Virginia,
which is fully authorized to run its own RCRA program. The
State indicated that it, too, does not impose a fee such as
the one described by your constituent.
Your constituent may be referring to the waste management
tax approved by the House as part of its CERCLA reauthorization
bill. See the December 10, 1985 Congressional Record, p. H11666;
see also H.Rep. No. 99-253, Part 2, pp. 9-16. The proposed
waste management tax actually includes two different taxes: a tax
on hazardous waste received at RCRA Subtitle C facilities,, and a
backup tax on RCRA generators if their waste is not received at
a Subtitle C facility within 270 days. As explained below, it
appears that your constituent would not be subject to the first
tax, i.e., the tax on RCRA Subtitle C facilities. However, your
constituent may be subject to the second tax, i.e., the backup
tax. We agree that such a tax may serve as a disincentive for
recycling. The Administration did not include a backup tax in
its CERCLA reauthorization proposal.
Given your description of your constituent's waste, it
appears that these used solvents are a hazardous waste under
RCRA; see 40 CFR §261.31. The solvents are then sent to a second
company where they are stored prior to recovery. Presumably the
storage unit would meet the House bill's definition of a "qualified
hazardous waste management unit", which is provided in proposed
§4675(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (IRC). If so,
the waste would be subject to the first tax at a rate of $4.15
per wet weight ton. However, the second company would receive a
credit or refund for any tax paid for such waste. The credit
for certain qualified solvents is outlined in proposed §4673(c)
'j£ the IRC. This credit was specifically designed to avoid
creating a disincentive for solvent recycling.
Page E—23
-------
Correspondence and Briefings
Your letter states that after cleaning the used solvents,
the second company returns the recovered solvents to your
constituent for future use. Presumably this "cleaning" of the
wastes is actually reclamation. If so, then these recovered
solvents are not wastes. See 40 CFR §261.3(c)(2 ) . This issue
is specifically discussed in the preamble of our January 4, 1985
revised definition of solid waste (50 Fed. Reg. 614, 634).
Since these solvents are not wastes under RCRA, they would not
be subject to the first tax, which is imposed only on certain
RCRA hazardous waste. See proposed IRC §§4671(a)(l) and 4675(a)(l),
The second company must properly manage the spent solvents
that were not reclaimed. Such spent solvents are typically
blended with oil and then sold as fuel. Such waste-derived
fuel is still considered a hazardous waste under RCRA. See
40 CFR $261.2(c)(2). The fuel may be burned in an industrial
boiler or furnace, or a RCRA Subtitle C incinerator. If so,
then the second company may receive a credit or refund under
the incineration provision. See proposed IRC §4673(b).
As noted above, your constituent may be subject to the
proposed backup tax. That tax is imposed on hazardous Waste
which is not received at a qualified hazardous waste management
unit within 270 days of its generation. See proposed IRC
§4574(a). Thus, your constituent's potential liability under
this tax would depend on whether one of the second company's
RCRA units fits the House bill's definition of a "qualified
hazardous waste management unit." If not, then your constituent
would be liable for the backup tax. Until the Treasury Department
promulgates regulations, the waste would be taxed at the
disposal rate.
Let me reiterate that the Administration did not include
a backup tax on generators in its proposal to reauthorize CERCLA.
In designing a waste-end tax, we decided that the tax ought to
be on the management of the waste, not the generation.
Finally, I agree with you that EPA should encourage recycling
as a means of reducing the amount of hazardous waste requiring
land disposal. The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984
established as national policy the reduction of hazardous waste.
In particular, Section 224 of the 1984 RCRA amendments requires
EPA to submit a report to Congress by October 1, 1986, on the
desirability and feasibility of establishing waste minimization
regulations to implement this national policy. As part of
this effort, the Agency has identified incentives and disincentives
currently affecting the utilization of waste minimization
practices such as recycling. The report to Congress will
discuss possible actions to alleviate some of the disincentives
associated with recycling and to promote further use of recycling
and other waste minimization practices.
Page E—24
-------
Correspondence and Briefings
Please let me know if I can be of any further assistance
Sincerely,
J. Winston Porter
Assistant Administrator
cc: Robert L. Allen, Branch Chief
Waste Management Branch
Hazardous Waste Management Division
U.S. EPA, Region III
William F. Gilley, Director
Division of Solid and Hazardous
Waste Management
Virginia Department of Health
Page E—25
-------
Correspondence and Briefings
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Briefing Material on Waste Minimization for the
American Management Association Interview
FROM: J. Winston Porter
Assistant Administrator
TO: Russ Dawson
Office of the Administrator
This memorandum is in response to your request for briefina
material on waste minimization in preparation for the American
Management Association's interview with the Administrator on
February 18, 1986.
Legislative Mandate for Waste Minimization
The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA) of 1984,
establish as national policy the reduction of hazardous waste.
As a result of this legislation, waste minimization considera-
tions must be addressed in various areas of the Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act (RCRA) process. These areas include:
(1) transport manifests; (2) biennial reports; and (3) on-site
treatment, storage, and disposal permits. In addition, the HSWA
require the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to submit a
report to Congress, by October 1, 1986, on the feasibility and
desirability of: (1) establishing standards of performance or of
taking additional action under the Act (RCRA) to require the
generators of hazardous waste to reduce the volume or quantity
and toxicity of the hazardous waste they generate; and (2) estab-
lishing with respect to hazardous waste required manaqement
practices or other requirements to assure such wastes are manaqed
in ways that minimize present and future threats to human health
and the environment. In addition, the report shall include any
recommendations for leqislative changes which EPA determines are
desirable and feasible to implement the national policy of mini-
mizing the generation and the land disposal of hazardous waste by
encouraging process substitution, materials recovery, properly-
conducted recycling and reuse, and treatment.
Page E—26
-------
Correspondence and Briefings
Current Activities
The Office of Solid Waste (OSW) is responsible for implementing
the waste minimization provisions outlined in the HSWA. The waste
minimization certification requirement for manifests and on-site
permits became effective on September 1, 1985. This certification
requires that the generator certify that he has a program in place
to reduce the volume or quantity and toxicity of hazardous waste
to the deqree determined by the generator to be economically prac-
ticable and that the proposed method of treatment, storage, and
disposal is that practicable method currently available to the
generator which minimizes present and future threats to human
health and the environment. In the Codification Rule, EPA
articulated Congress' intent with respect to this requirement:
"The amendment does not authorize EPA to interfere with or to
intrude into the production process by requiring standards for
waste minimization; rather, it specifically provides that the
substantive determinations of "economically practicable" and
"practicable methods currently available" are to be made by the
generator in light of his own particular circumstances. Thus,
from an enforcement perspective, the Agency will be concerned
primarily with compliance with the certification signatory
requirement. Each generator subject to the waste minimization
requirement should make a good faith effort to minimize the
amount and toxicity of waste generated and to select a means of
treatment, storage, or disposal most likely to minimize the
present and future threat to human health and the environment"
(50 FR 28734) .
Also effective on September 1, 1985, was the requirement
that a generator include in his biennial report the following
information: (1) a description of the efforts underta
-------
Correspondence and Briefings
The technical support document is divided into two
components: (1) source reduction; and (2) recycling. The
source reduction study will profile current and potential waste
minimization strategies for 22 different product processes
(e.g./ electroplating, printed circuit board manufacturing,
vinyl chloride production). The recycling study addresses
"end-of-pipe" or "end-of-process" wastes by waste groups
(solvents, corrosives, metals, halogenated organics) and
profiles current and potential recycling practices for these
wastes. The recycling study evaluates waste minimization
activities such as waste exchanges and commercial recycling
operations. This document will be completed and submitted to
OSW by the end of February.
Other Supporting Activities
In addition to the activities supporting the requirements
and provisions of the HSWA, OSW is also involved with other
studies and activities in the area of waste minimization. The
Office of Research and Development, Hazardous Waste Environmental
Research Laboratory, is presently studying waste minimization
practices of the printed circuit board industry. This effort
includes on-site visits and detailed analysis of manufacturing
and waste management practices.
Tufts University is currently conducting a foreign practices
study which will profile current waste minimization efforts in
Canada, Japan, and western Europe. The findings of this effort
will be incorporated in the waste minimization RTC.
Last year, EPA, with the assistance of the League of Women
Voters, sponsored a conference entitled "Waste Reduction - The
Untold Story" at Woods Hole, Massachusetts (see attachment for
the list of presenters). This conference provided the opportunity
for reoresentatives from 22 large companies to showcase their
companies' efforts in waste minimization. On June 4-6, 1986, EPA,
with the assistance of Tufts University, will be sponsoring Woods
Hole II. This year we hope to expand our program to include
waste minimization efforts by small and medium size generators.
Waste Minimization Case Studies
In response to your reguest for several notable examples
of waste minimization, attached are four case study summaries
which resulted in substantial waste reduction and cost savings
for the company. This information was provided by a 1985 report
published by the Institute fo'r Local Self-Rel iance entitled,
Proven Profits from Pollution Prevention - Case Studies in
Resource Conservation and Waste Reduction.
Page E—28
-------
Correspondence and Briefings
In preparation of the RTC, OSW has collected and analyzed
over 100 industrial waste minimization case studies utilizing
268 waste minimization techniques. These waste minimization
techniques include such activities as process modifications,
better operating practices, product substitution, reformulation,
recycling, and treatment. Also attached are two summary tables
which characterize the type of waste minimization techniques
utilized and the amount of waste reduction achieved in the
industrial waste minimization case studies-.
At the oresent, we are unable to provide you with any
specific data on the use of various waste minimization prac-
tices by industry or the volume of hazardous waste which has
been eliminated through implementaion of waste minimization
practices. Although the technical support document will profile
current efforts in waste minimization, our knowledge of waste
minimization has not advanced to the stage where we have specific
volume data.
Status of the Land Disposal Restrictions and its Effect on Waste
Minimization
On January 14, 1986, EPA proposed the framework for a
regulatory program to implement the land disposal prohibitions
as mandated by Congress. The proposal also included treatment
standards and the associated effective dates for two classes of
hazardous wastes: solvent wastes and dioxin-containing wastes.
Public hearings on the proposed rule have already been held in
Dallas, Texas; Washington, D.C.; and Chicago, Illinois. The
public comment period closes on March 17, 1986.
Preliminary observations suggest that the HSWA, in particular
the waste minimization certification requirements and the land
disposal restrictions, will provide incentives for generators to
reduce the volume and/or quantity and toxicity of the hazardous
waste they generate. It is too early to determine the exact
effect the current provisions of HSWA and the other requirements
of RCRA will have on a generator's decision to minimize its waste.
However, it seems quite clear that the increasinq cost of hazardous
waste manaqement (i.e., treatment, disposal, liability, insurance)
will create increased incentives for waste minimization.
I hope that this information has been helpful to you. In
addition, attached is a briefinq document which was prepared to
outline OSW's waste minimization program. If you should have any
further questions, please contact James Berlow, Manager of the
Treatment, Recycling, and Reduction Program, at 382-7917 or
Elaine Eby at 382-7930.
At tachments
Page E—29
-------
Correspondence and Briefings
CHARACTERIZATION OF REPORTED WASTE
MINIMIZATION TECHNIQUES
Total Reported
Type of Technique Cases Percent
Process Modifications 113 42
Better Operating Practices 27 10
Product Substitution/Reformulation 13 5
SOURCE REDUCTION (Subtotal) 153 57
RECYCLING 83 31
TREATMENT 32 12_
Total 268 100
Page E—30
-------
Correspondence and Briefings
CHARACTERIZATION OF REPORTED WASTE
REDUCTION EFFICIENCY
Waste Reduction Efficiency Total Reported
(Percent) Cases Percent
> 90 40 37
70-90 18 17
50-70 21 19
< 50 29 27
Total 108 100
Page E—31
-------
*»
Correspondence and Briefings *
PRESENTERS AT THE "SOURCE REDUCTION - THE UNTOLD STORY" CONFERENCE
Woods Hole, Massachusetts
June 19-21, 1985
Allied Corporation
American Cynamid • ^
Amoco Chemicals
AT&T Technologies
Chevron Chemical Company
Chrysler Corporation
Dow Chemicals
Eastman Chemical Division - Eastman Kodak
E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co.
Exxon Chemical Americas
Hewlett Packard
IBM
ICI Americas, Inc.
3M
Monsanto Company
Occidential Chemical Corporation
Olin Corporation
PPG Industries
Rohm and Haas
Shell Oil Company
Union Carbide
Velsicol Chemical Corporation
°age E—32
------- |