U.S. EPA Headquarters Library
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-.ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF EPA - STATE RELATIONSHIPS:.
.-;•-. A LITERATURE SURVEY
Delegation II Study
Program Evaluation Division
Office of Management Systems
and Evaluation
August, 1983
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Introduction * 1
Methodology 3
Section I: The Issue 4
Section II: Historical Perspective 7
Section III: Models .. 9
Section IV: Criteria and Evaluation 18
Conclusions 29
Bibliography 31
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 — Models by Activity ....12
. - •- ' '
Table 2 — Models by Funding 16
Table 3 — Analysis of Activitiy Models
by Criteria 23
Table 4 — Analysis of Funding Models
by Criteria 26
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Literature Survey on Models of Federal-State Relations
Module III of the Delegation II Study*
Introduction
The goal of the Delegation II study is to provide a
factual basis for considering optional roles, responsibilities
and relationships between EPA and the States once States have
assumed responsibility for direct administration of major
environmental programs. The study consists of six components,
each of which provides information on several factors which
have a potential impact on EPA activities after delegation.
In addition to this report, the components are: a profile
of current EPA activities; an analysis of environmental
trends; a presentation of views expressed by persons outs id?
he Agency regarding EPA1s performance in carrying out its
activities; and a look at how EPA currently conducts oversight
as compared to the procedures used by other decentralized
organizations.
This report presents the results of an extensive review
of the literature on Federal-State relations. The review sought
to identify models which prescribed in some detail the activities
EPA and the States should perform once delegation has taken place.
We did not focus*'oh evaluations of current performance or specific
suggestions for improving current work. Rather, we searched for
future-oriented analysis which proposed realistic alternatives
for defining EPA and State responsibilities. The activities
*Prepared by Kerry Callahan in the Program Evaluation
Division.
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sought to find assigned in the models are the same activities
developed for the profile of current EPA activities: direct
program administration, technical support, State program
approval and oversight, research, standard setting and national
information collection.
Wila this goal in mind, we found surprisingly few useful
models that addressed which level of government should take the
lead role for specific program activities. Instead, the literature
discusses the sharing of responsibilities in a much broader sense.
There is much debate in the literature regarding the appropriate
division of functions between Federal and State governments,
but by "functions" the authors mean broad topical areas like
education and transportation, not specific activities like
setting and oversight. Moreover, the Federalism debate
has been dominated by discussions of fiscal issues.
One study of a wide range of theories and models recognized
the paucity of specific activity models:
There is, in fact, no administrative theory of
federalism, in the sense of a coherent model of
how a federal- system should operate, from an
administrative perspective (Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations, June 1981).
Whatever .the reason, we found only four models that
addressed which level of government should take the lead role
across a spectrum of program activities. The four activity
models cited in this report ?re derived from proposals by the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), the Heritage Foundation, and
National Governors' Association (NGA).
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An additional three models solely address funding
issues. These models are based on the type and level of
Federal funding decisions associated with the administrations
of Presidents Johnson, Nixon and Reagan. They differ in the
amount of State discretion allowed in spending Federal funds.
Methodjology
In conducting this review, we consulted four types of
sources:
o academic literature on Federalism, including .some
legal journals;
o reports .done by evaluators of current Federal-State
relations, such as ACIR, the General Accounting
Office (GAQ), the Congressional Research Service
(CRS), in a study.done for the Senate Committee on
Environment,and Public Works (Senate) and the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO);. ;/• -•
p works by groups which advocate certain positions on
the division of EPA and State responsibilities,
such as the Heritage Foundation and the National
Governors' Association; and
o telephone interviews with individual experts in the
area of Federal-State relations.
Most of the works examined focused on the broader issue
of dividing responsibilities between the Federal and State
governments, and were not specifically directed at EPA and
the States. The GAO report on the State .concerns regarding
environmental programs and the CRS study for the Senate
Committee addressed EPA's relations with the States, but did
not offer proposals for separating responsibilities. Only
two of the sources reviewed - a report by NGA and a book by
The Heritage Foundation - recommended which activities should
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handled by EPA and which by the States following the
delegation of environmental programs. The experts contacted
by phone were asked for assistance in finding additional
prescriptive models for EPA, but they could not cite such
specific literature, and no more models were found.
This report is divided into four sections. Section I
describes the basic issues in Federal-State relations in
environmental, protection, and discusses the national and
State concerns underlying the current relationship.
Section II provides a brief historical perspective on the
theories of Federal-State relations. Section III offers
models for EPA-State relations described by activity and by
funding. Finally, Section IV introduces five criteria which
n be used in assessing the appropriate activities of Federal
and State governments, and analyzes each of the models by
these criteria,
Section It The Issue; Federal-State Relations in Environmental
Protection
The ..role of the Federal government in administering
environmental programs has greatly expanded since the late
1960s and 1970s. Before 1968 environmental protection was
consider?d a State responsibility , and the Federal government,
for the most part, restricted its involvement to research
and technical assistance to the States.
A^ the end of the 1960s, pollution control became a major
issue on^the national agenda. The Senate report noted two
"actors which contributed to the Federal government becoming
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}j.nvolved in environmental protection: 1) the need to account
for the regional and interstate nature of environmental
pollution, and 2) the concern that differing State pollution
control efforts threatened economic equity and efficiency.
States lacked the authority to regulate pollution sources
outside their jurisdictions. In some cases, they also were
either unable or unwilling to enforce strict pollution controls
on industry within their borders due to economic competition '
with each other (Senate, 1982).
In 1969, the National Environmental Policy Act set forth
the "right:to" a healthful environment", thus legitimizing
Federal involvement in environmental protection. The national
concerns which led to this and .other legislation, such as the
lean Air Act, being passed, and the State concerns which have
resulted from this Federal involvement, are discussed below.
National Concerns
The national government is primarily concerned with:
o ensuring that .the goals of national legislation
are carried out by the States;
o dealing with interstate issues that affect '
pollution control; and
o. applying consistent national standards
to the States.
The interstate nature of environmental problems requires
national attention because pollution does not respect State
borders and States do not have the authority to abate pollution
problems when they come from a source in another State. The
""ederal government seeks the consistent application of national,
uniform standards so that environmental protection is not
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|ompromised by inequities or economic rivalries among the
States (Senate, 1982).
State Concerns
Along with these main national concerns, there are a
variety of State concerns. It is clear States desire to be
equal partners with EPA in protecting the environment.
However, according to a GAO report, the States believe they
have become "forgotten partners" as a result of having too
little input into EPA's decision-making process. Yet these
same State officials "must defend the programs and justify
the resources and enabling legislation to carry out the
programs" (GAO, 1980).
State officials indicated the following concerns in
t 1980 report: •
o the need for flexibility in regulations;
o more confidence by EPA in the ability of
the States to carry out programs; and
o less detailed oversight.
Jn terms of State concerns regarding flexibility,
another study noted that:
States are healthy, responsive and, best of all,
innovative. For these reasons, States must be
free to adapt national standards to unique local
needs and programs. Many of the best national
programs started as innovations of individual
states (Lyons, 1982).
According to GAO's survey, State officials apparently
agree with this assessment. They cite inflexible regulations
as the greatest problem in administering environmental programs.
*
tfiey believe than EPA regulations do not allow them to tailor
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national standards according to State needs, problems or
resources {GAO, i960).
The desire for more confidence and less oversight from
EPA appear intertwined. In the GAO report, some State officials
expressed the belief that EPA retains almost total control of
environmental programs through regulation, guidelines, grants
and paperwork requirements because the Agency distrusts State
personnel (GAO, 1980). States seek more confidence by EPA
in their abilities, and prefer oversight in the form of an
audit which assures consistency with national objectives.
States would also rather receive technical assistance instead
of the Federal control expressed through daily supervision •.
"' *- •
'Senate, 1982).: ' .
Section lit Historical Perspective on Theories of Federalism
As the role of the Federal government in environmental
protection has changed over time, so, too, have theories of
Federalism. Dual Federalism was the dominant approach to
Federal-State relations until the 1930s. It assumed that
responsibilities of each level of government for broad
functional areas, such as education and national defense,
could be easily assigned, the image such division evoked
was that of a "layer cake", since Federal and State responsi-
bilities were not thought to overlap in any one functional area.
Environmental protection was viewed as a proper State responsi-
bility because it fell within the State police powers to
rotect the health, welfare and safety of the people. Federal
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involvement in this area was limited to technical assistance
to the States and research (ACIR, July, 1981).
Cooperative Federalism came into prominence during the
1930s, at the time of the Kew Deal when the powers of the
Federal government greatly expanded. The approacl stressed a
Federal-State partnership in program implementation. According
to this "marble cake" theory, which was dominant until very
recently, the responsibilities of Federal and State governments
for functions such as transportation were intermingled and,
like the swirls in a marble cake, could not be clearly divided
(Grodzins, 1966).
In recent years, ACIR has noted a tendency toward a
form of federalism which they term "dysfunctional".. According
to this view," every public issue becomes an matter of inter-
governmental concern. The Federal government advances issues
historically considered to be State responsibilities, while
the States are used primarily to implement policies formulated
at the national level. ACIR concludes that intergovernmental
relations have become more intrusive, unaccountable and
ineffective because of the range of issues which fall under
its scope (ACIR, June,.1981).
- The New Federalism initiative proposed in 1981 appear-,
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i
to assign functions at either the Federal or State level,
i
thus reducing the number of responsibilities which are shared
by Federal and State governments. However, this approach
has been viewed not so much as a division, but as an opportunity
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'for States to decide for themselves whether to assume those
functions no longer carried out by the Federal government
(Huffman, 1982).
Section III; Models for EPA-State Relations
The blurring of Federal and State responsibilities,
indicated both by the national and State concerns which have
developed and by the shifting theories of Federalism, demon-
strate the need for models which delineate activities to be
performed by EPA and the States. As mentioned previously,
our literature survey found that these models fall into two
types: models by activity and models by funding. The activity
models utilize the categories developed for the profile of .
mrrent EPA activities.* In this report, direct program
I
administration includes enforcement, as well as permitting
and the monitoring or clean-up of specific environmental
problems.
Models by Activity
There are four models which describe the activities to
be performed at the national or State level. None of the
models recommends a strong Federal role in direct program
administration because they focus on the division of
responsibilities after delegation.
Models 1 and 2 are general, referring to a broad
division of responsibilities between the Federal government
and the States. Models 3 and 4 are specifically directed at
PA's relations with the States.
*A full descripiton of each of the activities is contained in
the separate report on EPA activities.
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Model 1 is drawn from a paper published by the
Congressional Budget Office. It gives the States the lead
in devising and enforcing regulations, while the Federal
government's primary responsibility is national information
collection and dissemination (CBO, 1983).
Model 2 is derived from ACIR recommendations regarding
partial pre-emption statutes, many of which are environmental
statutes. Under partial preemption statutes, the national
government sets minimum national regulatory standards.
States retain responsibility for carrying out programs as
long as they establish State standards as least as stringent
as the national ones. If a State fails to adopt such standards,
the Federal agency involved, such as EPA, is authorized to••?*
jltestablish national standards within the State (ACIR, 1982).
This model is based on.ACIR proposals to improve consultation
and coordination between the national government and the States.
It therefore emphasizes joint efforts in program review, the
formulation of regulations and standard setting. However,
when a program requires rigid, uniform national standards,
ACIR calls for full Federal pre-emption, with State admini-
stration by contract (ACIR, 1982).
Model 3 is derived from proposals for the division of
EPA and State activities made by the Heritage Foundation.
States take the lead in program administration, except in
directing clean-up efforts, and obtain flexibility through
national performance rather than design standards. However,
*
pA has the responsibility for setting environmental baselinc.s
for minimum State standards (Sullivan, 1983).
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Model 4 is based upon recommendations by the National
Governors' Association. States also take the lead in program
administration in this model/ but EPA reserves the right to
plan and implement a program if a State is unable or unwilling
to do so. The model also calls for different levels of
oversight by EPA depending on the maturity of the program
(NGA, 1982). .
Table 1 summarizes the specific national and State
responsibilities proposed in each model.
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Models By Funding
Table 2 outlines the main funding models found in the
literature. Models 1-4 refer to the same activity models
discussed in the previous table. They are included here
because two of them do consider which governmental unit
should provide funding.
Model 5 gained prominence-in the mid-1960s, and is
associated with Johnson Administration. It emphasized the
use of categorical grants which set detailed conditions on
the States' acceptance of Federal financial assistance.
Grants were regarded as vehicles for cooperative federalism
since they reflected Federal and State input into areas such
as environmental protection (Walker, 1981). Project grants
ving eligibility requirements were created to deal with
specific program purposes. States assumed a substantial
matching share for program funding instead of being limited
to a significant cash contribution. There were also shifts
in the areas which received financial assistance, with money
being directed at health and social welfare programs (ACIR,
July 1981).
Model 6, proposed in the early 1970s during the Nixon
Administration, maintained .categorical grants, but added
block grants and revenue-sharing. The two new forms of
federal aid indicated a movement toward less centralization,
de-categorization and more state discretion (Walker, 1981).
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Model 7 was proposed by President Reagan in 1981.
This fiscal initiative seeks to maximize State discretion
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and responsibility for funding decisions. The plan includes
a turnback of over 40 domestic programs to the States, and
categorical federal programs would be transferred to the
States in the form of block grants. It anticipates the
Federal government providing the funds for some major programs
previously financed by the States so that State funds can be
applied to the programs being turned back.
Summary of Models
The general models delineating specific activities for
the Federal government and the States indicate a more limited
. future role for- the Federal government. In the Models 1 & 2,
have the lead in direct program administration. They
also are responsible for standard setting, either on their
own in conjunction with the Federal government. The primary
responsibilities of the Federal government in Model 1 are
research and national information collection. In terms of
State program approval and oversight, government at the
national level conducts audits rather than detailed oversight.
In the Model 2, the Federal government is given sole responsi-
. \
bility for goal setting; other than that, it jointly carries
out activities with the States.
In Models 3 and 4, which specifically refer to EPA, the
role of the Federal government varies according to the type
of activity. Both give EPA responsibility for standard
getting and .research. States have the lead in direct program
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administration, but EPA can, in Model 4, take over a program
if a State is unable or unwilling to do so. Likewise, Model
3 gives EPA responsibility for directing clean-up efforts.
However, Model 4 restricts the extent of EPA's involvement in
oversight for mature programs. In comparing the four models,
the Federal government has a stronger, though more circumscribed,
role in the EPA models than in those which refer qenerally to
Federal-State activities.
The funding models also indicate a shift to State
responsibility. In Model 5, State discretion was restricted
by the Federal government through categorical grants, which
iet conditions for the States' acceptance of Federal money.
But the most recent model reinforces the activity models'
tendency to give the States the lead in administerii.g environ-
mental programs. Just as the activity models recommend
State flexibility and input into the formulation of regulations,
this model provides State discretion in funding.
Section IV; Criteria and Evaluation
The activity and funding models presented in the previous
section divide responsibilities between the Federal government
and the States. But some criteria are needed in .order to see
what kinds of implications these models have for the States
and EPA if they are put into use. Five criteria have been
*
Let forth by .AC1R as guidelines in assessing the interdependence
within our intergovernmental system, both now and in the
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' —- .uture. These criteria are: national purpose, equity, economic
efficiency, administrative effectiveness and political account-
ability (ACIR, June, 1981).
National purpose emphasizes the importance of ensuring
that national goals specified in national .legislation are
carried out. If these goals are not being implemented; this
criterion also implies that the Federal government may involve
itself in direct program administration. In the environmental
area, ACIR points out that the national government used this
criterion to begin funding more national and fewer State
objectives.
. Equity can be divided into two components: economic
externalities and fiscal equalization.. ACIR discusses -economic
xternalities in terms of economics of scale, with responsi-
j
bilities being assigned to jurisdictions large enough to
contain their costs and benefits. Fiscal equalization entails
adequate fiscal capacity for States to finance their appropriate
roles. Along with these two components, the Senate report
suggested that equity may imply nationwide uniformity of standards
since lax pollution controls in one State may attract industry
away from a State imposing strict controls (Senate, 1982).
However, in weighing this criterion decision makers may
also want to consider two studies whose findings dispute the
concern that stringent environmental regulations result in
industrial relocation. In October 1982, a report by the
Conservation Foundation found such regulations were a minor
iterminant in siting a facility. In choosing a location,
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industry ranked such factors as low labor costs and access to
markets higher than the latitude permitted in a State's
environmental laws (Duerksen, 1982). A summary, released in
June 1983r of a report funded by the National Science Foundation
confirmed ?-he results of this study (Stafford, 1983). Therefore,
uniformity in State environmental regulations may not be
necessary to assure equity.
Economic efficiency involves assigning functions to the
level of government capable of performing them at the most
reasonable cost. States may be more efficient at program
administration because they know what human and financial
resources can be allocated. On the other, hand, it may be
more economical for the Federal government to conduct research
activities that can be applied on a nationwide basis.
Administrative effectiveness assumes that activities
will be performed at a geographic level that facilitates
effectiveness. The .jurisdictions involved should have adequate
management ability to carry out those activities. In some
cases, ineffectiveness at the state level has been attributed
to vague national goals which complicate implementation.
States have been asked to administer inflexible regulations
which may not apply" to local conditions. Much of the legislation
passed at the height of the environmental movement advocated
idealistic goals but the methods for translating them into
concrete programs were not so clearly set forth.
Political accountability emphasizes a need for citizens
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sible for the success or failure of programs. From one
perspective, State government responsibilities should be
maximized because States are closer to the people than the
Federal government. Joint Federal and State actions may have
confused responsibilities, and led to a decline in popular
control over these issues. National legislators create and
mandate policies, while State officials are obliged to imple-
ment them. The enlarged federal role has resulted in "authority
costs" to State governments, as traditional decision-making
power has shifted from the State to the national government.
The cost is incurred because national government has
abrogated to itself.a State responsibility by declaring that an
sue is a national problem to be dealt with at that level
(Hanus, 1981).
Analysis of Activity Models By Criteria
The models are rated according to the five evaluative
criteria set forth by ACIR. The models are rated "high",
"medium" or "low" depending on how closely their division of
activities comes to meeting the definition of the criteria.
For example, since political accountability is defined as
knowing whether to hold the Federal or State government respon-
sible for the outcome of a program, then ACIR's model is
rated "low" because it emphasizes joint responsibilities, which
confuses accountability. The ratings are not based on any
scientific analysis. Rather, they are strictly "judgment calls"
ffered in order to provide some perspective on the strengths
and weaknesses of the models in meeting the criteria.
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As Table 3 indicates, no model scores high on all of the
criteria. Instead, the criteria often conflict with one
another, both between themselves and among the models. In
determining which model to employ, decision-makers will have
»•
to make choices from among the various criteria, and recognize,
for example, that if equity is desired it may sometimes be
obtained at the price of national purpose.
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In looking at Table 3, Model 4 stands out because it
receives high ratings for three criteria: national purpose,
equity and administrative effectiveness. While it does give
States responsibility for direct program administration, it
receives only a medium rating for political accountability
because the model reserves the right for EPA to step in and
implement a program if the States are unable or unwilling to
do so.
Model 3 rates high in the criteria of economic efficiency
and administrative effectiveness. It is weaker in the criteria
of national purpose, equity and political accountability
because although EPA is authorized to set environmental
baselines, the level of stringency beyond these minimum standards
[may differ from State to State. The model does not describe
an oversight role for EPA, nor does it consider circumstances
where Agency intervention in direct program administration
is warranted.
Model 2 does not achieve high ratings in any of the
criteria because of its emphasis on the joint working relation-
ship between the national government and the States. In
stressing the sharing of responsibilities, without identifying
lead roles for any of them, the model receives low ratings
in administrative effectiveness and political accountability
because, except for direct program administration, neither
level of government is singled out as better able to perform
certain^activities, such as standard setting. As a result,
^citizens are not sure who to hold accountable for the
L.
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-25-
operation of programs. ACIR prefers joint activities performed
by the Federal and State governments. However, it does
recommend full Federal pre-emption for programs which require
uniform national standards. States would administer these
programs through a contract with the Federal government. In
these special cases, political accountability would be
strengthed because citizens would know to hold the Federal
government responsible for the design of the program, and
States for administration.
i
Model 1 .exhibits a range in criteria ratings. Its
strengths lie in economic efficiency, administrative effective-
ness and political accountability because only the States
are given-the.responsibility to administer programs and ~. .
.devise regulations. But these same responsibilities lead to
low ratings in national purpose and equity since individual
States may create individual standards.
Analysis ofFunding Models By Criteria
Table 4 analyzes four of the funding models by criteria.
A fifth model, Model 4, is not analyzed becaus the author
did not specify the kind or level of financial assistance
provided by EPA. As in Table 3, Table 4 indicates that
criteria must be weighed against one another in the funding
models.
None of the other models achieves consistently high
ratings across.all the five criteria. Model 3 receives the
best ratings of the four. Its main strength is economic
Isfficiency because it offers the rationale that the Federal government
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-28-
assumes the cost of expensive Federal programs because it is
in a better position to pay for them than the States. Its
greatest weakness is in equity because the rest of the funds
are to come from the States, which may vary in financial
capacity.
Model 6's lowest point is in political accountability
since the national government continues to fund programs
even though the states have more discretion in determining
priority programs. Citizens may not be sure who to hold
responsible for poor program performance: the States, which
may have given priority to another program, or the national
government, which may have provided inadequate funds. The
mixture of State discretion with Federal funds leads to
'medium ratings for the other crieria.
Model 7 emphasizes State discretion and State financing
of programs. This approach undercuts1 national purpose and
equity. It scores only slightly better in economic efficiency,
administrative effectiveness and political accountability
because while States have more control over funding, State
budgets may not be adequate in meeting these new responsi-
bilities. Citizens may blame the Federal government for
surrendering essential progr?im at a time of State budget
cutbacks.
Model 5 is the weakest of the models in terms of meeting
most of the criteria. National purpose is the strength of
this model since the national government sets conditions for
'state acceptance of Federal funds. But these same conditions
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-29-
hamper administrative effectiveness and political account-
ability because States must follow Federal guidelines.
Conclusions
A desire for more State autonomy in program administration,
expressed in the concerns voiced by the States, is reflected
in the activity and funding models, as well as in the New
Federalism initiative. Federal involvement in administering
programs, including those in the environmental area, is reined
in by the most recent models. The activity models, especially
Models 1 and 2, instead prescribe a Federal role similar to the
kind before environmental protection became a prominent national
issue. Most of the activity models view research and national
information collection as the main activities of the Federal
government. Participation by EPA in direct program adminis-
tration is confined to instances of interstate conflict.
The notable exception to the shift to a reduced Federal
role is in the area of standard setting. States had respon-
sibility for this activity before environmental protection
was placed on the national agenda. The Federal govenment
then assumed this responsibiltiy, and EPA-specific models
recommend retaining this activity at the Federal level.
The general shift toward State control over environmental
programs does advance the flexibility the States seek. It
also promotes the capabilities of the States to administer
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- 30 -
programs and results in less detailed Federal oversight.
However, the alleviation of State concerns may come at the
risk of national concerns, which was revealed when the activity
and funding models were analyzed by criteria. Decision-makers
may have to decide whether they will implement a model that
solely advances State autonomy, or one that strikes a balance
between nation.il and State concerns.
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-31-
WORKS CONSULTED
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental-Relations. An
Agenda for American Federalism: Restoring Confidence and
Competence* Washington, D.C.: Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations, June, 1981.
. Protecting the Environment; Politics,
Pollution, and Federal Policy. Washington, D.C.: Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1981.
. Regulatory Federalism; Policy, Process,
Impact and Reform. Washington, D.C.: Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations, 1982.
. The Future of Federalism in the 1980s.
Washington, D.C.: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations, July, 1981. : ..
Duerksen, Christopher J. "Siting New Industry: An Environmental
Perspective". Washington, D.C.: The Conservation Foundation,
October, 1982. • :••'.'. :.
'•'"-:' .-••.••-'• - • " •' '•?' ' • ' - •"•"
Elazar, Daniel J. American Federalism; A View From the
States, 2d Edition. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, .
Inc., 1972.
Fairfax, Sally. "Old Recipes for New Federalism."
Environmental Law 945. (1982).
12
Grodzins, Morton. The American System; A New View of
Government in the United States. Chicago: Rand, McNally,
1966.
Hanus, Jerome J. "Authority Costs in Intergovernmental
Relations." In The Nationalization of State Government,
pp. 1-38. Edited by Hanus. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath
and Company, 1981.
Hawkins, Robert B. Jr., ed. American Federalism; A New .
Partnership For The Republic. San Francisco:. Institute For
Contemporary Studies, 1982.
Huffman, James. "Governing America's Resources: Federalism
in the 1980's." 12 Environmental law 863 (1982).
Leach, Richard H., ed. Intergovernmental Relations In The
1980s. New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc.; 1983.
Leman, Christopher K. and Robert H. Nelson. "The Rise of
Managerial Federalism: An Assessment of Benefits and Costs."
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-32-
12 Environmental Law 981 (1982).
Lyons, William W. "Federalism and Resource Development: A
New Role For States?" 12 Environmental Law 931 (1982).
MacMahon, Arthur W. Administering Federalism in a Democracy.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1972.
National Governors' Association. "Report of Work Group on
Delegation and Oversight." Washington, D.C. 3 December
1982.
Norton, Gale Ann. "Decentralizing Environmental Decision Making."
In Agenda '83, pp. 339-346. Edited by Richard N. Holwill.
Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1983.
Phaup, Marvin. "Regulation, Knowledge and Federalism: Should
National Regulatory Authority Be Limited?" Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Budget Office, 1983.
Stafford, Howard A. "The Effects of Environmental Regulations
on Industrial Location", Summary. Cincinnati, Ohio: University
of Cincinnati, June, 19.83.
Stewart, Richard B. "Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems-of
Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National
Environmental Policy." 86 Yale Law Journal 1196 (1977).
Sullivan, William. "Building An Environmental Consensus."
In Agenda 83, pp. 333-339. Edited by Richard N. Holwill.
Washington, D.C.: The Hertiage Foundation, 1983.
Sundquist, James L. and David W. Davis. Making Federalism
Work. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1969.
Thomas, Richard D. "Intergovernmental Coordination in The
Implementation of National Air and Water Policies." In
Public Policy Making' in a Federal System, pp. 129-148.
Edited by Charles 0. Jones and Robert D. Thomas. Beverly
Hills: Sage Publications, Inc., 1976.
U.S. General Accounting Office. Federal-State Environmental
Programs — The State Perspective. Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1980. (CED-80-106, Aug., 22,
1980)
U.S. Senate. Committee on Environment and Public Works.
Federal-State Relations in Transition! Implications.For
Environmental Policy. Committee Print. Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1982. Prepared by Congressional
Research Service.
'walker, David B. Toward A Functioning Federalism. Cambridge,
MA: Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1981.
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-33-
Weidenbaum, Murray L. "Strengthening Our Federal System."
In American Federalism:, A New Partnership For The Republic,
pp. 89-98. Edited by Robert B. Hawkins, Jr., San Francisco:
Institute Conteporary Studies, 1982.
Wildavsky, Aaron, ed. American Federalism in Perspective.
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967.
Wright, Deil S. Understanding Intergovernmental Relations.
North Scithate, MA: Duxburg Press, 1981.
PRIMARY INTERVIEWS
Beam, David. Senior analyst with the Advisory Commission oh
Intergovernmental Relations, Washington, D.C., June* 1983.
.Fix, Michael. Research associate with the Urban Irfstitute,
Washington, D.C., June, 1983..
Higgins, Robert. Director, Center for the Study.of Federalism,
Washington, D.C., July, 1983.
Wrightson, Margaret. Professor of Government, Georgetown
University, Washington, .D.C., June, 1983.
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GROUP III
ENVIRONMENTAL PRODUCTION TARGETS
Until now, EPA's role in the Construction Grants program
has dealt almost exclusively with ensuring financial integrity,
planning, and process management. For a variety of reasons,
both technological and pragmatic, the Agency has emphasized
accountability for the quality of each major step in the
process of planning, design, and construction. But EPA has
not set explicit, accountable production standards for bringing
projects on line within a certain period. We have monitored
production, even issued report cards to our Regions to emphasize
the need for efficiency, but we have not moved to require the
achievement of a set amount of new treatment capacity as an
annual target.
One means to address this situation becomes more available
as one actor,'EPA, removes itself from the review (and delay)
chain. EPA might set certain performance standards for State
programs, negotiating with the State a given amount of treatment
capacity to be brought on line within a given fiscal year. Top
priority projects could be weighted to provide an extra measure
of success to a State program as they are completed, and States
could be "scored" each year against annual performance targets.
States could then be rated on the basis of their performance,
matching their actual score versus their target, and funds for
subsequent years could be apportioned, at least in part, on
-his basis. States failing to meet their target by a substan-
tial margin would be subject to a diagnosis of their administrative
process, with technical assistance provided, to improve their
capability, and to allow restoration of full funding for future
years. .
This proposal suggests a way of emphasizing production,
rather than.processing, as the basic means of determining State
program success, and suggests a simple but direct reward/sanction
system to reinforce the objective of completing projects in order
to realize their environmental benefits.
EPA REGULATOR - MUNICIPALITY PERMIT COMPLIANCE
The Agency posture on discharge permit standards would be to
vigorously enforce against violators. When violations are detected,
the State (or, if necessary, EPA) would notify the violator and re-
quest that the violator inform the State (or EPA) of the cause of
the' violation. If the violator is reluctant to provide the informa-
tion we would request a court order directing that the information
be'provided. -
33
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