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REPORT ON AUDIT OP EPA, REGION III /
MONITORING OF SUPERFDND REMEDIAL SITES
AUDIT REPORT NUMBER E5eH7HJ3-0254-7190A
September 15,
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES 1
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 2
ACTION REQUIRED 3
BACKGROUND 3
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1 - QUESTIONABLE NPL PLACEMENTS .- 5
2 - DEFICIENT CONTRACTOR WORK PRODUCTS 11
APPENDIX A - DISTRIBUTION 17
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UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
OMICI Of THI (WtMCTOH QINIMAL
MIO.ATL.ANTIC OIVIIION
Ml CHltTNUT lUILDINO
PHILADtLPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 191C7
September 15, 1987
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT:
FROM:
TO:
Audit Report Number E5eH7-03-0254-71904
Report of Audit on Region Ill's
Monitoring of Supo/fund Remedial^Sites
P. Ronald Gandolfo
Divisional Inspector GeneH
James M. Seif
Regional Administrator
for Audit
SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES
This is the second in a series of reports we plan to issue on the audit
we conducted of Region III oversight of remedial Superfund sites administered
by the Oomoonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources
(DER). The purpose of this audit was to evaluate actions taken by DER to
clean up the sites, as well as the adequacy of EPA's stewardship over DER's
remedial program. We performed the audit in accordance with the Standards
for Auditof Governmental Organizations, Programs, Activities and Functions
issued by the Comptroller General of the United States. At the time of our
review DER was responsible for 16 National Priorities List (NPL) sites,
while 8 other NPL sites had been recently transferred back to EPA control.
We reviewed 19 of these sites plus 1 additional site that was proposed to
the NPL. Our fieldwork began on July 1, 1986 and was completed on March 31,
1987. During this audit we also:
1. Examined EPA and DER site files which contained various
reports relating to past site activities.
2. Conducted interviews with EPA and DER project officers,
U.S. Geological Survey staff, site inspection contractor
personnel, and EPA Contract Laboratory Program officials.
3. Made visits to several of the sites.
4. Discussed the preliminary results of our review with
senior staff of the Region III Superfund program.
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SUMMARY OF PIMPINGS
1. QUESTIONABLE NPL PLACEMENTS
Region III was overzealous in proposing two sices to the NPL in
order to qualify them for the remedial program. While most nomina-
tions were valid, we believe that two sites were proposed to the NPL
based OD inaccurate, incomplete, or questionable information. This
may have occurred because of a prior NCP restriction against initiat-
ing removals at sites that were not Immediate threats to the public
or the environment. However placing these sites under the remedial
program produced a variety of results. Site cleanups were delayed;
overall costs increased; site conditions deteriorated; and, most impor-
tantly, public confidence in EPA was diminished. It is important
to note that, EPA generally will not consider deleting a site from the
NPL based on erroneous MRS scores unless an Rl/FS, which on average
costs $800,000, shows that an error was made. We recommend that
EPA evaluate the first site as a removal candidate and reanalyze the
second site to determine if it is in fact contaminated.
2. DEFICIENT CONTRACTOR WORK PRODUCTS
DER and Region III contract management needs improvement. We
reviewed the files for 20 remedial sites with which DER had current
or past association, and found reports of contractor studies that
were submitted late, frequently inaccurate, and sometimes of question-
able value. Based upon the documents reviewed, we found that contrac-
tors were not penalized and received full payment for their work. We
could not always determine the amount of these payments because prior
to fiscal year 1986, EPA did not require contractor billings to be task
specific. However, we estimate the amounts to be substantial based on
the number and size of the documents produced. The overall result was
that the remedial process to address potentially hazardous sites was
delayed, which ultimately resulted in public concern over how the sites
were being handled. We recommend that EPA aggressively monitor con-
tractor performance to ensure that EPA receives high quality work
products in a timely manner. Region III personnel should also notify
contracting officers when deficient work products are received from
contractors.
Preliminary draft findings were provided to the Hazardous Waste Management
Division (HVMD) by May 22, 1987. On July 13, 1987 a draft audit report was
issued to the Regional Administrator. We held an exit conference with HWMD
officials on September 14, 1987. During this conference we were informed
that the Region would not be providing written comments to the draft report.
We were also informed that the Region basically agreed with most of the facts
contained in the report, but not necessarily with the report's conclusions
and recommendations.
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ACTION REQUIRED
In accordance with EPA Order 2750, the Administrator of Region III is
required to provide this office with a written response to the audit report
within 90 days of the audit report. If you have any questions, please contact
me or Carl Jannetti at 597-0497.
The courtesies and cooperation extended by your staff during this audit
are appreciated.
BACKGROUND
The "Superfund" program was established by the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), Public Law 96-510,
enacted on December 11, 1980. The Superfund program was created to protect
public health and the environment from the release, or threat of release, of
hazardous substances from abandoned hazardous waste sites and other sources
where response was not required by other Federal laws. A Trust Fund was
established by CERCLA to provide funding for responses ranging from control
of emergency situations to provision of permanent remedies at uncontrolled
sites. CERCLA authorized a $1.6 billion program financed by a five year
environmental tax on industry and from general revenues. CERCLA requires
that response, or payment for response, be sought from those responsible for
the problem.
Superfund's taxing authority expired on September 30, 1985. , The avail-
able funds from fiscal year 1985 appropriations along with estimated future
cost recoveries fell $657 million short of planned fiscal year 1986 program
requirements. This resulted in a slowdown of activities from August 1985.
EPA received interim funding of $150 million on April 1, 1986 which allowed
resumption of some cleanup activities.
CERCLA was revised and expanded by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthor-
ization Act (SARA), Public Law 99-499, enacted on October 17, 1986. SARA
reinstituted the environmental tax and expanded the taxing mechanisms avail-
able for a five year period. It authorized an $8.5 billion program for the
1987-1991 period. The Trust Fund was renamed the Hazardous Substance Super-
fund.
The basic regulatory blueprint for the Superfund Program is the National
Oil and Hazardous Substances Contingency Plan (NCP), 40 CFR Part 300. The
NCP was first published in 1968 as part of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Plan, and has been substantially revised to meet CERCLA requirements. A
1982 revision authorized the following types of responses for incidents
involving hazardous substances:
\
o Immediate Removal - a prompt response at any site to
prevent or mitigate immediate and significant risk
of harm to human life, health or the environment.
Generally a removal is to be completed within 6 months
or after expenditure of $1 million.
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o Planned Renoval - an expedited, but not necessarily
immediate response, at any site (1) where there will
be substantial cost savings by continuing an immediate
removal when only a small amount of work, is necessary
to complete the cleanup, or (2) when the public and/or
the environment will be at risk from exposure to haz-
ardous substances if response is delayed. The 6
month/$l million limitation also applies, and States
are required to contribute 10 percent of the costs.
o Remedial Action - a long term usually more expensive
attempt to achieve a permanent and cost-effective
solution. These actions usually require a series of
extensive investigations and studies to determine
remedial alternatives which will range from no further
action to total site cleanups. If EPA decides to take
further action, the method selected is then designed
and eventually implemented. The NCP limits these
long-term cleanup actions to sites included on the
National Priorities List (NPL). This list desig-
nates the nation's worst sites known to be con-
taminated with hazardous substances. NPL sites
are generally determined by EPA's Hazard Ranking .
System (HRS) under which individual scores are
developed based on the release or potential for
release, of hazardous substances into groundwater,
surface water, and the air. These scores are
weighed and combined to calculate an overall site
score ranging from zero to 100. Sites scoring
28.5 or higher are eligible for NPL listing.
o Initial Remedial Measure - a cost-effective expedited
remedial response at an NPL site to limit exposure to
a significant health or environmental hazard. Such
actions can include the removal of hazardous substances
found in drums, barrels, tanks and other bulk storage
containers above the surface, or the removal of highly
contaminated soils largely at or near the surface.
In November 1985, a second revision to the NCP eliminated planned
removals and Initial remedial measures as distinct response categories.
As of February 18, 1986 these responses were included under an expanded
removal authority. By quicker response EPA hoped to help reduce health
and environmental risks, as well as reduce long-term cleanup costs.
At most remedial sites, the States must pay 10 percent of the costs
of the remedial cleanup. CERCLA section 104(c)(3) provides that no reme-
dial actions shall be taken unless the State in which the release occurs
enters into a contract or cooperative agreement with EPA to provide certain
assurances, including cost-sharing. Pre-remedial activities (preliminary
assessments, site inspections) remedial planning (remedial investigations,
feasibility studies, remedial designs) and removals may be funded 100
percent by EPA. For facilities operated by a State or political subdivision
at the time of disposal of hazardous substances, the State must pay at least
50 percent of all response costs, including removals and remedial planning
previously conducted.
4
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FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. QUESTIONABLE NPL PLACEMENTS
Region III was overzealous in proposing two sites to the NFL in order
to qualify them for the remedial program. While most nominations were valid,
we believe that two sites were proposed to the NFL based on inaccurate,
incomplete, or questionable information and that a removal action at a third
site would have prevented a bad situation from becoming worse. These situa-
tions may have occurred because of a prior NCP restriction against initiating
removals at sites that were not immediate threats to the public or the environ-
ment. However, placing these sites under the remedial program produced a
variety of results. Site cleanups were delayed; overall costs increased;
site conditions deteriorated; and, most importantly, public confidence in
EPA was diminished. It is important to note that, EPA generally will not
consider deleting a site from the NPL based on erroneous HRS scores unless
an RI/FS, which on average costs $800,000, shows that an error was made.
At the time of our review, DER was still responsible for 16 NFL sites.
We examined the files for 14 of these sites, plus one additional site being
proposed to the NPL, and found conflicts between DER and the Region on the
disposition of three of the Sites. DER requests for removal actions at the
Voortman and Hebelka Sites were denied by the Region which wanted the sites
studied under the remedial program. The apparent lack of action at Voortman,
coupled with deteriorating site conditions, resulted in public criticism of
both EPA and DER. It now appears that EPA's inaction will result in a similar
condition at Hebelka. We believe that more expeditious cleanup action at
Voortman could have prevented many of the problems experienced, and that a
removal action at Hebelka now could prevent development of a similar situation.
At the third site, East Mount Zion, the samples taken by an EPA contrac-
tor disagreed with earlier DER sample results used to qualify the site for
the NPL. We believe that the East Mount Zion site should be re-examined
before procurement of additional costly and time consuming remedial studies.
Discussion of the specific issues concerning these three sites are presented
below.
Voortman
The Voortman farm site ranks number 700 on the NPL with an HRS score of
28.62. It is an example of what can go wrong when cleanup action is excess-
ively delayed. The site is a sinkhole over a groundwater channel that con-
tained an undetermined amount of battery casings, tires, drums and other
debris. A local township official brought it to the attention of DER and
Region III in March 1980. Over the next six years DER and EPA commissioned
various studies and investigations; debated over site cleanups, and inadvert-
ently confused the public by indicating a removal would occur, when in fact
money had only been obligated for further studies. The site owners refused
DER access to the site, and in time the batteries subsided further towards
the groundwater. DER was still trying to contract for remedial studies when
a fire at the site made a removal action necessary.
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Between 1980 and 1981 local township, county, and state officials pres-
sured DER to take action. OER investigated the site, searched for responsible
parties, and issued an Administrative Order to the owners to clean up the
site. The site owners appealed the order to the Pennsylvania Environmental
Hearing Board and the natter was still unsettled six years later. In 1981
DER and local officials noted that materials had subsided deeper into the
sinkhole, however in 1982 a DER contractor reported no contamination in
samples of nearby wellwater. The same contractor computed an HRS score of
28.62 and EPA placed the site on the NPL. In 1983 another contractor con-
ducted a site investigation, but did not issue a report until 1985. Noting
that about half the batteries had disappeared into the sinkhole, DER in the
fall of 1984 recommended their removal as an initial remedial measure (IRK),
and offered to pay 10Z of the cost. The Region considered the site an
immediate removal candidate and declined DER'8 offer. The Region also
obligated $513,000 on September 27, 1984 for DER to contract for remedial
RI/FS studies. In a March 1985 public meeting, the regional project officer
indicated that an "Octoberish" removal might take place. Subsequent to the
meeting, DER and EPA's Emergency Response Team (ERT) arrived at differing
conclusions concerning site samples. In Hay 1985, ERT reported that the
threat was not immediate. However, ERT also pointed out that a removal now
would be relatively quick and inexpensive, while further delay could result
in the casings subsiding into the groundwater. DER argued that ERT misinter-
preted the situation and that the threat was immediate. In August, 1985
the Region decided against a removal and instructed DER to expedite RI/FS
procurement. The local township, learning that DER requested proposals for
remedial studies, asked about the October removal that EPA had mentioned in
the March public meeting. The Region notified the township on October 16,
1985 that since there was no immediate threat the site would be more
thoroughly studied through the RI/FS process due to begin the next month.
DER was still negotiating the RI/FS contract 11 months later when the site
caught fire and burned for two weeks. A DER removal contractor took out a
portion of the batteries, but could not get them all since some had subsided
too far into the hole. The effect on the groundwater was unknown.
Hebelka
This site is a potential Voortman. Hebelka is a junkyard containing
battery casings and abandoned vehicles. In 1986, EPA proposed the site to
the NPL and announced plans to spend $500,000 for remedial studies. We
believe that full-scale RI/FS studies are not needed, and that the batteries
should be removed now to prevent the recurrence of what happened at the
Voortman site*
Since 1982 DER, EPA, and various firms under contract to both agencies
periodically inspected the site. A 1985 report on a 1983 site inspection
indicated that, although there had been no groundwater contamination, there
was a threat of contamination if the estimated 750 cubic yards of batteries
in the piles, and 250 cubic yards in the vehicles, were not removed. DER
requested a removal, but Region III opted to take the remedial route.
Between June 1983 and June 1985, the site received six HRS scores ranging
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from 18.2 to 31.94. In 1986 EPA proposed the site to the NPL and announced
plans to spend $500,000 for an 18 month RI/FS study which would include:
"... definition of the nature and extent of the problem at
the site, characterization of the hazardous substances
present, a hydrogeological Investigation, soils and sediments
analysis, a surface water investigation and air investigation,
the development of remedial response objectives, the identifi-
cation of remedial action alternatives, evaluation of the the
alternatives, an environmental assessment of the alternative,
cost analyses, recommendation of a cost-effective remedial
alternative, conceptual design of the proposed alternative,
and community relations activities."
The community relations activites would be conducted:
"...to inform and receive input from public officials and the
affected community. These will include preparing a community
relations plan, holding public meetings, organizing press
conferences and workshops, distributing press releases,
speaking to concerned citizen's groups, preparing fact
sheets, and establishing a community relations repository."
We believe that the site does not merit placement on the NPL, and that
the Region should simply remove the batteries. This belief is based on a
review of the site file, visits to the site, and interviews with personnel
from Region III, DER, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), and the site inspec-
tion contractor. The site was only proposed to the NPL after a series of
six HRS rankings. The fifth HRS document prepared by the site inspection
contractor scored the site at 21.2, well below the 28.5 NPL threshold. This
document was dated June 28, 1985. The sixth HRS document, which was prepared
by the contractor and a Region III employee, scored the site at 31.94. This
document was also dated June 28, 1985. Both documents cited the aquifer of
concern as being a groundwater basin consisting of "hydraulically intercon-
nected" flows from separate rock formations which in effect functioned as
one aquifer. The primary reason for the score differences between the two
documents was how the distance between the ground surface and the aquifer of
concern was calculated. The first document calculated the distance at 80
feet, while the second document, citing the depths of two private wells
within three miles of the site, calculated the distance at 6 feet. Both
documents referenced a "Water Resource Report" prepared by the U.S. Geological
Survey. We contacted one of this Report's authors at USGS who informed us
that:
(1) The hydraulic interconnection between the formations was
relatively poor, and there was little likelihood that
they would function as one aquifer.
(2) The wells cited in the second document were too far from
the site to have a direct bearing, and did not
necessarily provide analogous information to the
hydraulic settings on site.
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(3) The aquifer of concern was at least 100 feet below the
ground surface.
Our recomputation of the HRS score based on this information yielded a score
of only 19.16.
Based on a site inspection, DER in June of 1985 recommended that Region
III remove the batteries. DER received no response until June 1986 when it
was learned that EPA was proposing the site to the NFL. Contractor personnel
responsible for the site inspection were also of the opinion, that the
batteries should be removed and that the RI/FS was not warranted. Region
III personnel informed us that the site had been evaluated as a removal
candidate, but that the NCP precluded a removal action. We disagree with
this position and believe that the revised NCP does now authorize such
response under the expanded removal category. We also learned that the
Region had never considered the site for a removal action, and that no one
from EPA had ever visited the site to make such an evaluation.
We visited the site on three separate occasions. We found that, con-
trary to the Region's belief that the site was closed, it was in fact open
for business* There were indications that plates were being extracted from
the battery casings, and that underground gasoline storage tanks were recently
dumped on site.
East Mount Zion
This site ranks 346 on the NPL with an ERS score of 41.01, primarily
based on DER sampling results. There is however, an unresolved question
whether the site actually contains hazardous substances, as subsequent
sampling by an EPA contractor did not confirm the earlier DER findings.
Since we found no evidence that this sampling issue was ever settled, we
believe that a reanalysis is warranted before initiation of additional
remedial measures.
The East Mount Zion site is a landfill that was closed in 1972 for
operating without a permit. Based on samples taken by DER, EPA proposed the
site to the NPL in September 1983. The narrative supporting the NPL listing
stated that paint thinner and electroplating sludge were known to have been
disposed on the site, and that DER had detected vinyl chloride and benzene
in the groundwater, as well as various priority pollutants in the sludge.
During November 1983, an EPA contractor conducted a site inspection. On
September 27, 1984 the Region obligated funds for an RI/FS, and at the time
of our review two years later, DER was negotiating the award of a $933,795
contract. We subsequently learned that negotiations were terminated because
the contractor raised the price, and the DER was seeking to initiate a new
procurement.
It is still unclear what, if any, hazardous substances were placed on
the site. DER samples taken in 1983 indicated that the site was contaminated,
but other samples, also taken in 1983, by an EPA site inspection contractor
did not confirm the DER results. Unfortunately, the EPA contractor did not
report the site inspection results until late 1984, one year after the
site was placed on the NPL.
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In a November, 1984 assesseuent of the site Inspection results, a
Region III toxicologist reported that:
"Problems concerned with this Site Inspection document relate
to inconsistencies between the State analytical results and
the findings of the EPA analysis. The site was placed on
the NPl because of the reported presence of vinyl chloride
and benzene in the groundwater taken from a downgradient
monitoring well during the State analysis. These substances
were not detected during the EPA analysis."
The Toxicologist concluded that, "since this site was placed
on the NFL because of this state data it could seem reason-
able to initate a reanalysis of all possible groundwater
sources including the Test Well before any further remedial
measures are undertaken."
We interviewed the toxicologist and the regional project officer who
both Indicated that the dispute over the samples had not been resolved. We
found no evidence that the issue was settled beyond verbal assurances from
DER, that the state data was valid, and that the EPA contractor's was not.
The most recent report on the site was a Remedial- Action Master Plan
(RAMP) prepared by a DER contractor in 1984 to summarize available informa-
tion concerning the site. Rather than settling the contamination issue how-
ever, the RAMP made it more confusing. For example, the RAMP assumed that
the site may contain hazardous substances, because there were no site opera-
tion records to prove otherwise. The RAMP also mentioned an unconfirmed
statement by a person who claimed to have dumped paint thinner on the site,
and a notation that on one occasion a septic tank truck was observed dumping
sludge. The sludge was reported to be from the settling tanks of a chain
and cable company. As for the DER samples, the RAMP reported that an off-
site well sampled by DER was not ideally located to intercept groundwater
leaving the site, and that DCR had not actually found sludge on site, but
rather had found contaminants in the settling tanks located at the chain and
cable company.
Based on the above, we agree with the Region III toxicologist that a
further analysis should be performed before additional remedial measures are
initiated.
Conclusion
Under Che 1982 NCP, the Agency's option to initiate removal actions was
limited to sites considered to pose an immediate threat to the public or
environment* Therefore, it is plausible that this restriction may have
increased the Region's motivation to propose sites that did not fit the
removal category to the NPL for remedial action. However, placing such
sites under the remedial program has increased costs and delayed cleanups.
Remedial sites undergo a vast array of time-consuming studies that can take
four years to procure and complete. Unless an immediate threat arises, there
was little likelihoood that such sites would be cleaned up before the studies
were completed. Moreover, EPA was reluctant to conduct cleanups as initial
remedial measures (IRMs), as evidenced by a March 1985 GAO. report entitled,
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Cleaning Up Hazardous Wastes; An Overview of Superfund Reauthoritation Issues
(GAO/RCED-85-69). GAO cited a December 1984 EPA report which admitted that
relatively few IRMs were undertaken because little distinction was made
between the type of on-site activities conducted for IRMs and for removal
actions* The criteria established in the NCP for determining whether to
conduct an IRM were essentially the same as the criteria for determining
the need for removal actions* However, EPA required substantially more
documentation for IRMs than for removal actions. This documentation was
required to ensure that the action taken was cost-effective, and to enable
EPA to demonstrate for cost-recovery purposes that initial actions were
consistent with the NCP* Because of these additional administrative require-
ments, IRMs were more time-consuming to conduct than removals.
EPA is frequently criticized for not having cleaned up more NPL sites.
This is an oversimplification of a complicated and time consuming process.
We noted that a great deal of progress has in fact been made at some of
the sites we reviewed. Several sites were either partially or entirely
cleaned up, and appeared to only require monitoring or completion of infor-
mation gaps. We commend both EPA and DER for these successes. However, as
shown above, we believe the Region has unnecessarily complicated its workload
by placing some sites on the NPL as remedial candidates, that could possibly
now be more expeditiously handled as removal projects under the revised NCP.
Recommendations
We recommend that Region III:
1. Evaluate the Hebelka site as a removal candidate.
2. Conduct a reanalysis of the East Mount Zion site
to determine if it is in fact contaminated with
hazardous substances.
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2. DEFICLEMT CONTRACTOR WORK PRODUCTS
DER and Region III contract management needs improvement. We reviewed
the files for 20 remedial sites with which DER had current or past association,
and found reports of contractor studies that were submitted late, frequently
inaccurate, and sometimes of questionable value. Based upon the documents we
reviewed, the contractors were not penalized and received full payment for
their.work* We could not always determine the amount of these payments
because prior to fiscal year 1986, EPA did not require contractor billings
to be task specific. However, we estimate the amounts to be substantial
based on the number and size of the documents produced. The overall result
was that the remedial process to address potentially hazardous sites was
delayed, which ultimately resulted in public concern over how the sites were
being handled.
A great portion of the Superfund remedial program was contracted out to
private firms. Region 111 assigned contractors to perform site inspections,
conduct responsible party searches, and calculate HRS scores. DER hired a
contractor to assemble procurement proposals, and compile site background
reports. EPA funded all these assignments either directly through Agency
contracts, or indirectly under the cooperative agreement with DER. For
various reasons we were unable to examine all of the reports for the sites in
our review. DER was in a file reconsolidation process. Portions of files
were in boxes, or in use at other DER offices, or being reviewed by prospec-
tive RI/FS contractors. Likewise, some reports were not on file at Region
111 because they were evidently being used by the various Superfund sections.
However, we were able to review the bulk of the work products associated
with the contractor studies. We found that while some were of high quality,
others were not, which raised the question whether EPA received all that it
paid for. Specific comments are presented below.
Site Inspections
Late issuance of site inspection reports delayed the cleanup process.
Sites with waste problems suspected to be hazardous undergo site inspections.
The inspections generally include a one day visit by an EPA contractor who
takes soil and groundwater samples that are later analyzed to evaluate the
seriousness of the problem. The report on the site visit frequently becomes
a key element of the HRS score, which in turn determines placement on the
NPL. There were occasions, however, where contractors computed scores without
ever visiting the sites.
We found site Inspection reports for 9 of the 20 sites in our review.
In several instances, it had taken the contractor up to two years to finalize
the results of these one day visits. For example, samples taken at the
Voortman Farm site by the contractor underwent review for one year, and it
took an additional six months to issue a report. It took two years to issue
the Hebelka inspection report. It took one year to issue a report for the
Osborne site, and most of the test results were of questionable qualitative
significance based on a quality assurance review. The East Mount Zion report
was more than a year overdue, and the test results conflicted with those
submitted earlier by DER. Region 111 personnel blamed most of these delays
on contractor inability in the past to obtain timely lab sample analyses.
By contrast, we noted that DER and ERT inspection results for three of the
nine sites were finalized within six months.
11
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Potentially Responsible Party (PRP) Searches
Region III files contained reports of contractor attempts to determine
the parties responsible for contaminating five of the sites in our review.
Two of the reports appear adequate in that the contractor went beyond review-
ing DER/EPA files. The reports reference contractor visits and interviews
with various parties, which ...resulted in identification of PRPs previously
unknown to EPA. There is a question, however, as to the value of the other
three reports. For example, one report was basically a recapitulation of an
earlier site inspection report, plus a property title search performed by a
subcontractor. No new PRPs were identified. The report advised EPA to
visit the site, interview the owner, appraise the property, hire a private
investigator to interview neighbors, and contact employees of the PRP already
identified in the regional files. The responsible party search for a second
site was assigned by Region III to a contractor in Illinois, who subcontracted
the assignment to a company in Massachusetts. A North Carolina division of
this second company subsequently subcontracted portions of the assignment to
a private investigator, and a law firm in Pennsylvania. The Region rated
the contractor's report as unsatisfactory, but accepted it so that EPA could
"control and conclude the research." The report alleged various responsible
parties, but as noted by the regional enforcement officer no attempt was
made to confirm the allegations. The only individual clearly established as
a responsible party was the site owner. Specific comments made by the
enforcement officer on this work assignment were:
o the assignment was completed five months late, and sub-
mitted in two sections instead of being edited into one
concise report*
o Region III was seldom appraised of on-going developments
and constant prodding was necessary to complete the
project.
o Numerous copies of documents submitted were illegible.
During the same time period, Region III assigned the responsible party
search for a third site to the same contractor in Illinois, who again subcon-
tracted with the firm in Massachusetts. Basically the report duplicated the
findings of a DER investigation completed five years earlier. No new
information vas supplied to the Region. The report advised EPA to contact
PRPs; assess their financial status; and identify, locate, and interview
other individuals who might possess useful facts.
Hazard Ranking System (HRS) Scores
Sites receiving an HRS score of at least 28.5 qualify for NPL placement
and remedial Superfund expenditures. Scores for the 20 sites in our review
were computed by EPA contractors, and reviewed by DER and Region III. Revi-
sions of the contractor scores were fairly common. At least 11 of the 20
sites had multiple scores. Some of the score revisions were due either to
a reinterpretation of existing data, or to the discovery of additional infor-
mation. He were unable, however, to determine the rationale for some score
changes due to data gaps at both agencies, i.e. the files did not contain
all of the referenced scoring documents. We did note that 7 of the 11 sites
with multiple scores did not qualify for NPL status until after their scores
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were revised. Coupled with the file data deficiencies, this raised several
questions. Here the contractors competent, or was the Region overzealous to
get the sites on the NFL? Although we could draw no clear conclusions, we
do believe the Region needs to more closely Monitor the site scoring process,
and to better document site files to explain why revisions are made* This
need is demonstrated below.
o The Craig Faro site ranks number 699 on the NPL based on
a score of 28.71 computed by an EPA contractor on July
23, 1982. We found reference to a second score of
24.44 in an August 27, 1982 draft list of Region III
NPL sites submitted to EPA Headquarters. We were
unable to determine the origin or the basis upon which
the lower score was calculated.
, o The Berks Sandpit site ranks number 597 on the NPL. An
EPA contractor computed an URS score of 31.99 on April 1,
1983. A memo in the DER file Indicated that EPA Head-
quarters found an error which lowered the score to 26.02,
but that the Region "... is working on this to try to get
the score back over 28.5." On June 18, 1983, Region III
scored the site at 32.02. We were unable to obtain the
earlier scoring documents to establish what caused the
score increase.
o The Westinghouse Elevator Plant ranks number 458 on
the NPL. An EPA contractor drafted an HRS report
dated March 2, 1984 which scored the site at 27.28.
DER examined the report and concurred with the score.
Region III did not concur. The score was raised to
36.38 because the contractor had used the wrong
compound to calculate the "toxicity and persistence"
of site wastes, and because Region 111 personnel
believed the contractor had underestimated the
number of people served by domestic wells.
o The Shriver's Corner site ranks number 235 on the NPL.
The site is actually two separate properties upon which
the local township chairman allegedly dumped wastes pur-
ported to be from the Westinghouse Elevator Plant. In
May 1983 DER inspected one property, "drove past" the
second property, and estimated that the two sites con-
tained 90 drums. In 1984, an EPA contractor drafted two
HRS reports scoring the sites at 14.94 and 13.91. The
contractor relied on DER files to compute the scores
without ever having visited the sites. DER examined
the reports and concurred with the scores. Region III
did not concur. Also vising DER files, the Region com-
bined the sites and arrived at a single score of 46.13.
Aside from considering the properties as a single site,
the increased score resulted from the Region's assertion
that: (1) there was an observed release of wastes into
the groundwater, (2) the wrong compound was used to
calculate the "toxicity and persistence" of the
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site wastes, (3) the surrounding population had been
underestimated, and (4) based on testimony supplied
to DER by the alleged dumper, approximately 1,200
drums of waste had been emptied on site.
o The He be lit a site is being proposed to the NPL. Between
June 1983 and June 1985, an EPA contractor computed six
HRS site scores ranging from 18.2 to 31.94. The first
three scores were considered Invalid because the con-
tractor used a wrong site location. The next two scores
were unacceptable because the Region believed the con-
tractor miscalculated the distance between the ground
surface and the water table. The sixth score, the only
score above 28.5, was accepted. As seen in the finding
entitled "Questionable NFL Placements," this score is
also invalid because the Region miscalculated the
distance between the ground surface and the water table.
RFP/Qs RAMPs and RI/FS Workplans
Originally DER hired a consultant to prepare Request for Proposal/Quali-
fication (RFP/Q) specification packages for use by prospective contrac-
tors. However, after initial submissions proved unsatisfactory, DER removed
the consultant from this job function, and prepared its own specifications.
The same consultant was tasked by DER to prepare Remedial Action Master
Plans (RAMPs) and RI/FS Workplans. A RAMP is a summary report of available
site background data, that is generally extracted from DER and EPA files.
The RAMP is used to develop an RI/FS Workplan report, which is an outline of
tasks to be done during the actual RI/FS. These reports are also presented
to inform the public of actions taken in the past, and actions planned in
the future.
RAMPs and Workplans were prepared for 11 of the 20 sites for approxi-
mately $20,000 per 'site. The contractor was required to first submit draft
reports for EPA and DER review. After draft revision the consultant was
then to submit final reports for use by DER, EPA, RZ/FS contractors, and
the general public. We found that reports for 10 of the sites were submitted
between two and six months late, and many of the reports were deficient. To
a large extent, the deficiencies occurred because the consultant never
visited the sites. The reports reflected the consultant's interpretation of
existing DER and Region III files. Consequently, the reports contained
errors. Some were detected, others were not. In any event, DER and the
Region were forced to spend a considerable amount of time and effort to try
to correct the errors. For example,
o the East Mount Zion RAMP incorrectly described the site
as wooded.
o the Welsh Road RAMP mentioned the existence of a number
of 55-gallon drums containing coolant wastes; the Workplan
did not. Neither report explained that EPA had sampled
the drums and found that they posed an Imminent threat
of fire and explosion.
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o The Shrivers Corner RAMP/WorkpIan reported that In the
Spring of 1983 there were an estimated 500 full drums
on site, despite the fact that a Hay DER 1983 inspec-
tion indicated there were only 90 drums on site.
o One section of the Hunterstown Road RAMP/Workplan
reported the dumping of approximately 600 drums, while
another section indicated that approximately 1,200
drums had been dumped.
EPA also had contractors prepare RAMPs and Workplans for several sites.
However, DER criticized these studies as not being site specific. In a
March 1986 newspaper article, a DER official stated that reports prepared
for the Ha vert own and Brodhead Creek sites by an EPA contractor were redone
by the DER consultant. this delayed progress on the Havertown site for
six months. The Brodhead Creek situation was even more complicated. The
state official neglected to mention that DER had already rejected the revised
Workplan prepared by its consultant, and had compiled a third version of its
own. Morever, DER's Workplan Incorporated portions of a study prepared by
a consultant hired by the site owner. Therefore, there were four Workplans
for Brodhead Creek, three of which were funded by EPA/DER, and it took almost
two years to obtain an acceptable product. Understandably, the public
became upset. For example, Havertown Township officials complained about
delays and said that residents were extremely frustrated over the lack of
progress. Also, Region III mistakenly informed a local community group that
RAMPs and Vorkplans for the Westinghouse Elevator, Hunterstown Road, and
Shrivers Corner sites would be finished in May 1985. However, contractually
the DER firm was not required to submit final draft reports until August 31,
1985. And, because of deficiencies in these drafts, final reports were not
available until April 1986. As a result, a local community group accused
DER of "inexcusable failure."
Conclusion
Region III needs to become more aggressive in evaluating the products
produced by contractors. While we understand that the award of the site
inspection, responsible party search, and HRS scoring contracts is a Head-
quarters function, this does not preclude the Region from actively supervis-
ing specific site projects assigned under these contracts. If the reports
produced by contractors are late, or flawed to the extent that they require
numerous revisions, the Region should make the contracting officer aware of
the contractors1 lack of performance. On the other hand, if EPA personnel
are requesting revisions that are not really necessary, Regional management
should determine why, since they are costly and contribute to site cleanup
delays.
Contract administration problems are not a new issue. Reviews conducted
by Region III during 1983 and 1984 under the Federal Managers' Financial
Integrity Act identified weaknesses in Superfund contract management over-
sight. Regional management estimated that approximately 10 to 20 percent
of the 1983 Superfund budget could have been saved if contract oversight
was improved and warned that EPA's public image would be tarnished if it
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appeared that contractors were too ouch in control of the process. Based on
the issues discussed above, we believe that Region III still needs to improve
its administration of contracts.
Recommendation
Ve recommend that the Regional Administrator:
1. Aggressively monitor contractor performance to assure
that EPA gets work products that are timely and of
high quality.
2. Notify EPA contracting officers of deficient contractor
work products.
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Appendix A
REPORT DISTRIBUTION
Recipient ... - Copies
Office of the Inspector General . . --
Inspector General (A-109) 1
Regional Office
Administrator of Region III 2
Director, Hazardous Waste Management Division 1
Audit Follow-up Coordinator 1
Headquarters Office
Director, Financial Management Division (PM-226) 1
Comptroller (PM-225) 1
Agency Follow-up Official (PM-208)
Attention: Resource Systems Staff 1
Associate Administrator for Regional Operations (A-101) 1
a
en
V
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