O 1 C- o -,-. rv ^ (Y REVIEW OF THE REMEDIAL INVESTIGATION/FEASIBILITY STUDY FOR THE NYANZA CHEMICAL SITE ASHLAND, MASSACHUSETTS , PREPARED BY THE ENGINEERING AND SCIENCE UNIT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE STAFF OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL SEPTEMBER 1990 Report No. E1SGG8-14-0004-0400038 CO CD ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY WSHINGTON, D.C. 20460 ------- CONTENTS I. PURPOSE 1 II. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES 1 III. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 2 IV. SITE BACKGROUND 3 FIGURE 1 (Location Map) 4 FIGURE 2 (Site Map) 5 V. CONDUCT OF THE REMEDIAL INVESTIGATION/ FEASIBILITY STUDY 8 VI. FINDINGS -. 12 VII. CONCLUSIONS I 22 OIG Response to Region' s Comments. 25 APPENDIX 26 ------- Review of the Nyanza Chemical Site Remedial Investigation and Feasibility study I. PURPOSE This report has been prepared by the Engineering and Science Unit (ESU) of the Technical Assistance staff as a part of an ongoing Office of Inspector General (OIG) effort to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of EPA's Superfund Program. Specifically, this report was prepared in compliance with Section lll(k) of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), which requires the Inspector General to examine "...remedial investigations and feasibility studies prepared for remedial actions." A summary of this report will be included in the Inspector General's annual report to Congress regarding EPA's conduct of the Superfund program. II. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES The scope of this report is limited to Phase I of EPA's Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study (RI/FS) conducted at the Nyanza Chemical Waste Dump Site in Ashland, Massachusetts. Our specific review objectives are as follows: 1. Evaluate the RI/FS conducted by NUS Corporation at Nyanza under contract with EPA to determine if the RI/FS formed an adequate basis for selection of a remedial action. 2. Evaluate the contract management performance of EPA Region 1 to determine if the Region took all reasonable and necessary measures to assure that the contractor carried out the Nyanza RI/FS as required. ------- III. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS The Nyanza Chemical Site was ranked in the top ten sites on EPA's first Interim Priority List of 115 hazardous waste sites which were selected for cleanup by the Superfund Program in 1981. The site had been occupied by a series of manufacturers of textile dyes and intermediates from 1917 until 1978. In January 1983, after the completion of a Remedial Action Master Plan for the site, EPA .issued work assignments to NUS Corporation to conduct a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study (RI/FS) to determine the most appropriate remedial action for the Nyanza site. Our review of the conduct of the RI/FS at the Nyanza produced the following findings: 1. The Remedial Investigation Failed to Locate Significant Areas of Contamination at the Nyanza Site. 2. Inappropriate Sampling Methods Led to Erroneous Conclusions and Additional Expenditures to Characterize the Site. 3. EPA's contractor Exceeded Its RI/FS Budget Estimate and More Than Doubled Its Estimated Time of Completion, Yet Was Unable to Produce a Report Which Would Support the Agency's Record of Decision (ROD). 4. EPA Region 1, Although Aware of Numerous Deficiencies on the Part of the RI/FS Contractor, Was Unable to Effect Significant Improvements Despite Repeated Notices of Unsatisfactory Contractor Performance. During the time the Nyanza RI/FS was in progress, EPA split the task into three phases, with the initial work focusing on hazardous sludges and other waste materials disposed of on the Nyanza site. Phases II and III deal with groundwater contamination and contaminated sediments in the nearby Sudbury River, respectively. These tasks were covered by separate contracts and are not included in this review. After NUS had terminated its work on the Phase I RI/FS, EPA engaged Camp, Dresser and McKee (COM) to perform additional investigations at Nyanza "...needed to fill certain data gaps in the Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study done by the NUS Corporation." CDM's field work produced significant modifications of the estimated quantities and locations of sludge deposits reported in the RI/FS. In a July 1987 summary report on the status of the Nyanza site, EPA estimated that $210,000 of the CDM work was to compensate for RI/FS deficiencies. ------- IV. SITE BACKGROUND The Nyanza Chemical Site was the location of a series of manufacturers of textile dyes and intermediate dye chemicals from 1917 until 1978, when the Nyanza Chemical Company ceased operations. Large quantities of solid and liquid wastes were disposed of on site throughout the period of operation, resulting in extensive contamination of the soil, groundwater and surface water on and off the site. Principal contaminants include the heavy metals mercury, chromium, and lead, and many chlorinated and non-chlorinated organics including nitrobenzene, aniline, trichloroethylene, chlorobenzene, and a variety of phenolic compounds. The Nyanza site is a tract of approximately 35 acres located in the southwest of Ashland, Massachusetts, which is approximately 30 miles west of Boston. A location map and a drawing of the site, both of which appeared in the Phase I remedial investigation prepared by the NUS Corporation, are included in this report as Figures 1 and 2. Most of the original structures of the Nyanza Chemical Company manufacturing complex were razed after Nyanza discontinued operations in 1978. The remaining Nyanza structuresfand several new buildings on the site of the old Nyanza complex now form an industrial-commercial complex occupied by the Nyacol Corporation and several smaller companies. This developed area occupies approximately one-fourth of the total site area. In the southwest quadrant of the site Megunco Hill rises approximately 80 feet above the elevation of the industrial park. Nyanza Chemical Company disposed of sludge and other dye manufacturing waste products on this hill. An active line of the Conrail railroad forms the northern boundary of the site. An abandoned trolley right of way lies on the eastern edge of the site. Two intermittent streams originate on the site. Chemical Brook rises from springs in the northwest corner of the site and flows easterly along the railroad embankment. Trolley Brook originates at a spring on the eastern slope of the hill and flows northeast through a wetland formed by the trolley right of way embankment. The two streams join at the northeast corner of the site and flow through a culvert under the Conrail line, eventually discharging to the Sudbury River north of Ashland Center. The Sudbury River is less than a quarter mile north of the Nyanza site. Prior to 1970, Nyanza Chemical Company discharged untreated and partially treated liquid process wastes to both Trolley Brook and Chemical Brook. In addition to the liquid wastes, the brooks and the Sudbury River also received sludge and contaminated sediment which was carried off site by runoff. . ------- ------- "**» Off i I o Q. < CD t^ i 5 IAJ CO UJ FIGURE 2 ------- detailed description of the processes employed by Nyanza Chemical, raw materials utilized in the manufacture of some of the principal products, and waste products produced. The report included copies of detailed company production records for the late 1960's and the quantities of raw materials purchased by Nyanza in 1970. DEQE also described the waste treatment practices employed by Nyanza Chemical in the past, including drawings showing the locations of major waste treatment components such as sumps and lagoons, as well as points of discharge. The report described disposal practices for both liquid and solid wastes, and described the general location of major waste deposits. The DEQE report was the first comprehensive evaluation of the Nyanza site. The author pointed out that mercury, while a serious health and environmental threat, was not the only contaminant of concern at Nyanza. As part of their assessment DEQE reviewed the remedial plan originally proposed by COM and concluded that it was no longer acceptable because of the more stringent standards which had been adopted since 1974 and because the previous investigations had failed to take into account the extensive use and disposal of organic chemicals at Nyanza. The report stated that additional investigations would be required to characterize the site and a new remedial plan, meeting the updated cleanup requirements, would be necessary. A copy of the conclusions and recommendations from the DEQE report is attached as Appendix A. The new owner of the site, MCL Development Corp., engaged Connerstone, Inc. and Carr Research Laboratory to evaluate the site contamination and prepare a cleanup plan. Connerstone.and Carr prepared a site Compliance Program and Schedule, which was approved (after some modification) by DEQE in March 1981. MCL's consultants then conducted a field investigation which culminated in a report, On-site Hydrogeology and Initial Pollutant Studies on the Nyanza Chemical Waste Dump, dated August 14, 1981. DEQE and EPA had serious reservations about the sampling and analytical procedures employed by Connerstone and Carr. Also, there was considerable controversy concerning some of the conclusions made in the report. By early 1982, the differences between DEQE and the consultants had become so great that the site investigation had virtually stopped. In December 1982, MCL Development Corp. notified DEQE that it had severed its relationship with Carr Research Laboratory. Following the passage of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (Superfund), EPA expanded its hazardous waste site activities significantly. EPA Region 1, which had cooperated with Massachusetts DEQE on the Nyanza site in the past, was able to devote more resources to Nyanza once the Superfund was established. Nyanza was reported as an uncontrolled hazardous waste site in the Agency's November ------- 2, 1981 Hazardous Waste Report. It was ranked in the top ten sites on EPA's Interim Priority List of 115 hazardous waste sites which were selected for cleanup by the Superfund program. As a first step in the cleanup process, EPA engaged Camp, Dresser & McKee to prepare a Remedial Action Master Plan (RAMP), which was completed on September 23, 1982. The RAMP reviewed the history of the site and summarized findings of previous investigations which had been conducted at Nyanza. It also identified additional information required to characterize the site sufficiently to serve as the basis of a selection of a remedial action. COM estimated that the direct costs for the required Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study would run between $210,000 and $300,000 and that the tasks could be completed within a year. V. CONDUCT OF THE REMEDIAL INVESTIGATION/FEASIBILITY STUDY In January 1983 EPA issued two work assignments (one for the Remedial Investigation and one for the Feasibility Study) to NUS Corporation, the Agency's REM/FIT contractor for Regions 1-4. On March 23, 1983 NUS submitted a draft work plan which indicated that the RI/FS would be completed in 10 months at a total cost of $480,862—$362,206 for the RI and $118,656 for the FS. The Agency's technical review of the work plan concluded that it did not adequately address air quality concerns and the plan was returned for revision. After additional revisions, EPA officially approved the work plan on June 30, 1983 (more than six months after the Agency issued the work assignments) with the following conditions: Schedule: 10 months Level of Effort: 6050 hours Cost Budget: $490,944. EPA's REM/FIT contracts are cost-plus-award-fee contracts, in which the fee paid to the contractor varies depending on a rating of the contractor's performance by the Agency. The rating is determined by EPA's Procurement and Contracts Management Division personnel, with input from the Project Officers who are managing the various work assignments utilizing the contractor. Each Project Officer submits an Award Fee Performance Event Report which evaluates the contractor's performance every three months. These ratings are reviewed by the Contracting Officer and are given consideration in determining the amount of award fee paid to the contractor. The first Award Fee Performance Event Report for the Nyanza RI/FS covered performance from February 1 -. May 31, 1983. The Region 1 Regional Project Officer (RPO) noted that the "Contractor was very responsive and willing to make necessary changes. It did however take too long to receive an acceptable 8 ------- final product." The RPO awarded NUS an overall rating of 3 out of a possible 5 points for the first four-month period of performance. The contractor's inability to promptly negotiate subcontracts with drillers, geophysical experts and other firms required to initiate field work at Nyanza put the project behind schedule almost immediately. Contractor administrative errors also hampered Regional approval of payment vouchers. The RPO, in his second report on contractor performance covering the period from June 1-September 30, 1983, expressed concern about these problems and observed that "These delays have led to the loss of 3 prime months for conducting field work in New England (July, August & Sept.) and will undoubtedly lead to further delays as adverse weather conditions are encountered." The RPO, dropped NUS's overall performance rating to 2. Although the performance ratings were high during the time the contractor was collecting samples, the RPO's ratings again dropped to 2 once the contractor began to submit draft products for his review. In his rating covering June .- September 1984, the RPO questioned the contractor's technical competence. Although the contractor had agreed to initiate an accelerated project schedule early in 1984 in an attempt to make up lost time, the project continued to miss milestones, slipping further behind the original ten-month schedule. Figure 3 shows the RPO's overall ratings of NUS's performance at Nyanza throughout the term of the work assignment. By early 1985, more than a year and a half after approval of the work plan, EPA Region 1 decided to split the RI/FS into two phases. Phase I addressed the sludge on site and the contaminated sediments which had been carried offsite by runoff. Phase II was to deal with groundwater contamination. In March 1985 NUS completed draft Phase I Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study reports. The Phase I Feasibility Study discussed 11 remedial action alternatives for the Nyanza site: 1. No action. 2. No action with monitoring. 3. Selective excavation, onsite disposal, capping, surface water and groundwater diversion. 4. Selective excavation, onsite disposal, capping, surface water diversion and groundwater isolation. 5. Selective excavation, onsite disposal, capping, surface water and groundwater diversion, leachate collection and ------- treatment. 6. Selective excavation, onsite disposal, capping, surface water diversion, groundwater isolation, leachate collection and treatment. 7. Selective excavation, waste fixation, onsite disposal, capping, surface water diversion, groundwater isolation, leachate collection and treatment. 8. Total excavation, waste fixation, onsite disposal, capping, surface water diversion, groundwater isolation, leachate collection and treatment. 9. Total excavation, backfill excavation, onsite disposal in secure landfill (impermeable cap, double liner with underdrain, total isolation from groundwater) surface water diversion. 10. Total excavation, offsite disposal in permitted facility, backfill excavations, surface water control. 11. Total excavation, waste fixation, backfill excavation, onsite disposal in secure landfill, surface water control. On April 25, 1985, NUS delivered an addendum to the draft RI/FS reports. The addendum added two more alternatives to the list of possible remedial actions: 12. Total excavation, onsite disposal in secure landfill, surface water diversion. 13. Capping hill deposits, selective excavation and offsite disposal of outlying sludge deposits, backfill and restore areas. After reviewing the draft RI/FS reports, EPA Region 1 determined that the reports could not be utilized as the basis of a selection of a remedial alternative without supplemental information. EPA engaged Camp, Dresser and McKee, of Boston, to provide additional technical assistance to fill the data gaps in the NUS draft RI/FS reports. Although the Agency characterized the work as "pre-design activities," much of the work performed by COM was identical to the tasks normally associated with a remedial investigation. Upon completion of the additional field work by COM, the Regional Administrator signed the Record of Decision, Remedial Alternative Selection, on September 4, 1985. The selected remedy addressed the sludge deposits on the site, sediments which had been deposited in the streambed leading to the river, and an area 10 ------- north of the railroad tracks which was reportedly contaminated due to a leaking pipeline which had been used by Nyanza Chemical Company to convey liquid wastes directly to the Sudbury River. The selected remedy includes the following actions to contain and isolate hazardous sludge and soils: -Excavation of outlying sludge deposits/sediments and consolidation with Hill area sludge landfill. -RCRA capping of the Hill area. -Upgradient surface water/groundwater diversion system. -Downgradient groundwater monitoring system. 11 ------- VI. FINDINGS 1. The Remedial Investigation Failed to Locate Significant Areas of Contamination at the Nyanza Site. Abandoned Treatment Basin In November 1982 EPA's Environmental Monitoring Systems Laboratory (EMSL) completed an aerial photo interpretation report on the Nyanza site. The EMSL report includes a series of aerial photographs of the site from 1938 to September 25, 1981. The early photos show a rectangular basin on the east side of one of the major production buildings. This basin appeared in a photo dated April 1979, although it had been filled in when the 1981 photo was shot. This same basin was shown in sketches included in DEQE's 1980 report, which indicates that the basin was a collection tank which held wastewater prior to neutralization and subsequent sedimentation in ponds elsewhere on the site. In spite of these two detailed sources of information indicating the presence of an abandoned waste treatment unit, the RI makes no mention of any sampling in the vicinity of the basin. CDM did collect samples in the basin area while completing its "predesign" assignment for EPA. These samples confirmed the presence of organic contaminants. Subsequently, the Massachusetts DEQE conducted a more detailed survey. As a result of the DEQE investigation of the "vault" in the summer and fall of 1986, EPA initiated an emergency removal action, which the Agency justified on the -basis that the high concentrations of nitrobenzene in the soil near the vault represented a hazard to the health and safety of Nyacol employees who worked in the former Nyanza facilities adjacent to the old treatment unit. Buried Drums in "The Hill" Disposal Area In early May 1989 the remedial contractor, who was excavating a portion of the sludge disposal area on the hill in the southwest quadrant of the site, uncovered buried drums. This discovery resulted in a second removal action, which ultimately located approximately 250 buried drums. All but 22 of the drums were empty when uncovered, possibly having lost their contents through leaks due to corrosion or physical damage. Preliminary gas chromatographic analysis of the contents detected organic chemicals including toluene, benzene and trichlorethylene. The 22 drums which contained material were sampled, overpacked and staged on site. Laboratory analyses of the samples were not available when this report was prepared. 12 ------- The RI/FS contractor conducted a magnetometer survey of the sludge disposal area on the hill in the early stages of the RI. NUS attempted to subcontract the geophysical investigation, but, according to their status report for August 1983, "The geophysics investigation was to be subcontracted, but the two bids that were received were not responsive to the needs of the investigation. In order to remain on schedule, this work was then performed in-house." The manufacturer of the magnetometer used in the survey claims that the instrument is capable of detecting a group of 20 drums at a depth of 50. feet. A group of 250 drums should have been easily detectible, since depth to bedrock (the maximum feasible burial depth) on the hill was less than 20 feet in most locations, according to the geologic cross sections included in the Remedial Investigation Report. The area in which the drums were discovered also contained other metallic objects which had been discarded (old refrigerators, building debris, etc.). This may have made the presence of the drums less obvious; however, an indication of buried metallic objects in the area which had been identified as the principal waste depository for Nyanza chemical should have been followed up with a positive determination of the nature of the material. 2. Inappropriate Sampling Methods Led to Erroneous Conclusions and Additional Expenditures to Characterize the Site. The selection of sampling locations, sampling, methodology, and the skill with which the samples are collected, preserved and analyzed are critical factors in determining the quality and utility of the RI/FS. If the information obtained from the sampling activities is not reasonably representative of the site conditions, any decisions based on those samples reflect the errors introduced by the sampling deficiencies. In light of the high cost, public health and environmental implications of hazardous waste site remediation projects, it is essential, that the sampling program be well designed and executed. At Kyanza, several significant errors in sampling strategy greatly reduced the value of the RI/FS produced by NUS. Three of these errors, soil sampling techniques, monitoring well construction and test pit locations, were important, and are discussed below: Composited Soil Samples Nyanza and its predecessors deposited solid waste products in the form of sludge at many locations throughout the site. This sludge, which contained high concentrations of heavy metals, resulted from the manufacturing processes at the site. Over the 13 ------- years extensive grading and excavation, lagoon berm washouts, and sediment transport by surface runoff have further distributed these hazardous wastes. An earlier investigation by Connerstone and Carr utilized approximately 80 test pits to locate sludge deposits. Although this work did not employ sampling and analytical methods specified by EPA, NUS nevertheless incorporated much of the test pit soil profile data from the Connerstone and Carr report to estimate the quantities of sludge on the site, since the test pit information was based primarily on visual observations of sludge deposits. NUS also dug 18 additional test pits, and collected soil samples "at 67 locations in three separate areas where heavy metal sludges were suspected of being deposited," according to the RI. The Remedial Investigation report, at Sec. 7.2.2, further states that "All samples were composites taken over a depth of 68 inches using a hand auger." The analyses of 66 of these samples are summarized and discussed in Section 7 of the RI report. The utility of soil samples composited over a depth of 68 inches where the depth and thickness of the sludge deposits varies greatly from sample to sample is highly questionable. Although useful for detecting the presence of contaminants during the preliminary stages of an investigation, such sampling techniques give no indication of the amount of contaminated material which must be removed or of the concentration of contaminants within the sludge, since there is no way to tell how! much sludge or contaminated soil is in a given sample or how deep it extends. Consequently, the tabulation and discussion of the soil sample analyses have little meaning. The lack of definitive information about the sludge deposits at Nyanza necessitated extensive additional sampling after completion of the Phase I RI/FS to accurately characterize the sludge deposits at the site. This extra work is discussed in greater detail elsewhere in this report. Monitoring Well Construction The Nyanza site is located in a glaciated region, with complex geological features. Consequently, groundwater movement is difficult to predict. In addition, the groundwater pollutants of concern at Nyanza include a wide range of inorganic and organic chemicals. The organic contaminants include both light and dense non-aqueous phase liquids. Light non-aqueous phase liquids (L- NAPLs) are less dense than water and thus tend to float on top of the groundwater. Dense non-aqueous phase liquids (D-NAPLs) are heavier than water and sink through the groundwater and move along any impervious layer or the bedrock underlying the aquifer. Both D-NAPLs and L-NAPLs are only slightly soluble in water. D- NAPLs, once released into an aquifer, are generally difficult to 14 ------- trace and recover, often moving in quite different directions from the general groundwater flow. The DEQE preliminary site evaluation of 1980 documented the use of large quantities of nitrobenzene, a D-NAPL, at Nyanza. Where non-aqueous phase liquids are known or suspected to be present in the groundwater under or near a hazardous waste site, monitoring wells should be constructed in a manner to maximize the probability of detecting those contaminants. In an unconfined aquifer, such as the one at Nyanza, monitoring wells are generally constructed with relatively short screen lengths at the top of the aquifer, at the bottom, and—depending on the thickness of the water bearing formation(s)—at one or more intermediate depths. The wells are constructed so that samples can be withdrawn from any of the various levels independently, without mixing with groundwater from other levels. This can be accomplished either by constructing a number of separate wells of different depths in a cluster or by drilling a single well but isolating the different screens through special construction methods. The upper screen captures any L-NAPLs floating on top of the groundwater and the lower screen is more likely to collect D-^NAPLs moving at the bottom of the aquifer. Six of the monitoring wells at Nyanza were constructed with at least two screen intervals. Monitoring well 8A (MW-8A), according to Table 6-1 in the RI report, was constructed with a single 17-foot screen (although the boring log in the RI Appendix B indicates that a 30-foot screen was installed, covering almost the full depth of the well). The use of a single long screen is remarkable, because, on page 6-6, the RI report explains that MW-8A was the only well which was constructed with a stainless steel casing and screen, specifically because of the suspected presence of nitrobenzene, a D-NAPL which attacks PVC. All of the other wells installed by NUS were of PVC construction. Since nitrobenzene is much denser than water and only slightly soluble in water, it would most likely be found in the fractured bedrock underlying the unconsolidated glacial till and sediments. Yet MW-8A was not constructed with the capability of sampling groundwater from discrete levels of the aquifer. In July 1987, more than two years after NUS completed the Phase I RI/FS, EPA's Emergency Response Team (ERT) from Edison, NJ, constructed a well immediately adjacent to monitoring well 8A. The new well was equipped with a short screen length at bedrock level. Samples collected from the new well contained more than 54 mg/1 nitrobenzene, indicating gross contamination. Samples which ERT collected from MW-8A, however, contained less than 0.4 mg/1 nitrobenzene. Had this information been available while the RI/FS was in progress, it is possible that NUS would have discovered the area of highly contaminated soil which prompted 15 ------- EPA to initiate a removal action in the immediate vicinity of MW-8A in 1987. The cover memo transmitting the groundwater report prepared by the Environmental Response Branch to the On Scene Coordinator of the 1987 removal action included the following statement: "The poor construction of M-8A (installation of a 15' screen) prevented the EPA from understanding the character of the contaminant plume at that point until ERT-2 was completed." Groundwater Sampling The first two rounds of groundwater samples were collected from the monitoring wells in November 1983 and March 1984. NUS field staff did not filter suspended material from these samples prior to field-fixing and sending them to the contract laboratory for analysis. The acid used to fix and prepare water samples for metals analysis dissolved the metals naturally present in the suspended solids in the samples. Consequently, the concentrations of heavy metals reported by the lab included the metals associated with the particulate matter as well as those in solution in the groundwater. .- In subsurface conditions such as those found at the Nyanza site, the particulate matter does not move with the:groundwater. The metals present in the particles would have little, if any, impact on groundwater quality. The technical experts who reviewed the laboratory data assumed that the samples collected for metals analysis had been filtered when collected. Consequently, the failure to filter the samples led them to believe that metal concentrations in the groundwater were much higher than they actually were. This misunderstanding caused considerable confusion until EPA learned that the samples had not been filtered. NUS collected filtered samples in December 1984, but results from this third round were not available in time to be included in the March 1985 draft RI report. On pages 6-16 and 6-21, in the Geology and Hydrogeology section of the draft report, NUS refers to tables showing the average total concentration of four metals (arsenic, chromium, mercury, and lead). In the discussion of the results, the report states as follows: "Since the groundwater samples were unfiltered it is impossible to determine if the metal concentrations reported were in well sediments or dissolved in the groundwater, but it appears that the groundwater in the unconsolidated deposits is more contaminated than the bedrock. 16 ------- "An additional round of samples has been collected to determine only the dissolved metals in the groundwater. This sampling will address the potential for metal migration in the groundwater at the site." Consequently, the discussion of heavy metal contamination in the RI is seriously flawed. Furthermore, the costs associated with collecting and analyzing the first two rounds of metals samples produced information of questionable value. Sludae Volume Estimates NUS dug 18 test pits at Nyanza. Most of these were located on the hill in the western end of the site, which was the primary disposal area for sludge from the dye manufacturing processes. A few test pits were located on the northwest slope of the hill and in the wetland area in the extreme northwest corner of the site. The locations of 16 of these sites are shown on Drawing No. 0714-06-03, which accompanies the RI report. All of the NUS test pits shown on the drawing are in Area I—Megunco Hill—one of the eight areas identified as sludge and fill deposits. NUS's estimates of the extent and volume of the remaining deposits are shown on this same drawing. These volume estimates were apparently based on the test pit logs from the Connerstone and Carr investigation of 1981. As mentioned earlier in this report, EPA and the DEQE were critical of the methods employed by Connerstone and Carr, yet NUS apparently did nothing to confirm the data from their report which they utilized to estimate sludge volumes. After NUS had terminated its work on the Phase I RI/FS, EPA engaged CDM "to perform -pre-design work needed to fill certain data gaps in the Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study done by the NUS Corporation" (as explained in a letter of June 7, 1985 from Regional Administrator Michael Deland to U.S. Rep. Lucile R. Hicks, U.S. Rep. David P. Magnani, and U.S. Sen. Edward M. Kennedy). CDM and its subcontractors conducted extensive field work at Nyanza from June 3 through June 27, 1985. Field work included the following activities: - surficial soil sampling - water sampling - test pit excavation - soil borings and standard penetration tests - boundary and topographic surveying - analytical laboratory services. CDM's field work produced significant modifications of the estimated quantities and locations of sludge deposits reported in the RI/FS. In some cases, where Drawing No. 0714-06-03 in the 17 ------- RI/FS showed sludge deposits, CDM's investigation found nothing. Other areas which were not identified in the RI/FS as contaminated were found to contain hazardous sludge. Because approximately three quarters of the total estimated volume of the sludge was located in the hill area, the errors in the RI/FS did not result in a great change in the total amount of material to be excavated to implement the recommended alternative. However, the differences between the NUS and the COM reported locations of the contaminated material were considerable. Although CDM's final estimated total volume of 105,610 cubic yards (cu. yd.) was very close to that of NUS (102,300 cu.yd.), the sum of all the discrepancies between the two estimates totaled approximately 45,000 cubic yards, 44% of the original NUS estimate (see Table 1). The COM followup study found that approximately 21,000 of the 102,000 cubic yards of material which NUS determined to be contaminated did not have to be excavated. Furthermore, COM determined that more than 24,300 cubic yards of material which the RI/FS indicated could be left undisturbed was in fact contaminated and had to be excavated to reduce the environmental hazard to an acceptable level. 3. EPA'a contractor Exceeded Its RI/FS Budget Estimate and More Than Doubled Its Estimated Time of Completion, Yet Was unable to Produce a Report Which Would support the Agency's Record of Decision. ; NUS submitted a preliminary RI/FS work plan to EPA Region 1 on March 25, 1983. The total estimated cost of the effort was $480,862. EPA had authorized $500,000 for the RI/FS. The work plan included a schedule indicating completion of both the RI and FS reports within ten months of the start of work. EPA eventually paid NUS more than $612,000 for its efforts. NUS worked on the project for 23 months, from June 1, 1983 to May 1, 1985, producing reports which EPA was compelled to supplement with extensive additional investigations by COM in order to provide sufficient support for the selected remedial action. In a July 1987 summary report on the status of the Nyanza site, EPA estimated that approximately $210,000 of the COM "pre-design" effort was to compensate for RI/FS deficiencies. Furthermore, the final ROD addressed only the!on-site sources of contamination (sludge deposits), leaving the groundwater contamination to a Phase II RI/FS which was initiated at a later date. Neither the RAMP nor the RI/FS Work Plan anticipated dividing the project into multiple phases. This decision was not made until early 1985. None of the original schedules or cost estimates prepared prior to initiation of the RI/FS at Nyanza 18 ------- Table 1. NYANZA CHEMICAL SITE Comparison of EPA Contractor Estimates Of Volumes of Material to be Excavated Area Description Hill Area + Wet- land in NW Corner Area North of Nyanza Office Parking Lot Strip Along Northern Boundary Of Site Wetland @ Conflu- ence of Trolley & Chemical Brooks Wetland @ Head of Trolley Brook Filled Lagoon Behind Derby Chem. Trolley Brook Sediments (North of Conrail Tracks) Areas Not Listed As Contaminated In NUS Rl Report TOTALS m Name I II III IV V VII VIII N/A IS CDM Est.Vol. Cu . Yd . 75,000 1,600 12,000 7,500 4,900 500 800 0 102,300 Name B&C N/A E F 6 I J D,L, M,N Est.Vol. Cu.Yd. 92,400 ; o 1 110 , 0 6,480 1,640 1,120 3,860 105,610 Differ ence Cu.Yd. 17,400 1,600 11,890 7,500 1,580 1,140 320 3,860 45,290 % Diff. +23% -100% -99% -100% +32% +228% +40% +100% 19 ------- indicated that groundwater contamination would be addressed in a second phase. On the contrary, NUS's work plan specifically included a groundwater investigation as one of the tasks to be undertaken as part of the RI/FS. At the time NUS prepared the RI/FS work plan,, there was a considerable body of available information on the Nyanza site. Studies funded by EPA, the DEQE and three of the site owners had been completed and had been reviewed by both agencies. Nyanza was recognized as a complex site, with multiple deposits of hazardous solid wastes and documented inorganic and organic groundwater contamination which had already migrated off site. The NUS field investigation did not reveal any findings which differed markedly from information previously reported. Yet the RI/FS exceeded its budget and schedule by wide margins, and the objectives of the effort were not achieved, even after supplemental work by an additional EPA contractor. 4. EPA Region 1, Although Aware of Numerous Deficiencies on the Part of the RI/FS contractor, was Unable to Effect Significant Improvements Despite Repeated Notices of Unsatisfactory Contractor Performance. EPA's Regional Project Manager (RPM) for the Nyanza RI/FS was responsible for managing the contractor's efforts. The RPM typically monitors contractor activities through regular progress reports, review of work products, meetings and site visits, when appropriate. In addition to managing the contractor, the RPM is the primary responsible party for overall conduct of the RI/FS, including liaison with State and local government, public information, and coordination with other EPA personnel who are involved in the project (e.g., specialists required to review draft contractor reports). The RPM originally assigned to Nyanza was also responsible for three other RI/FS efforts. This was a typical work load for RPMs in Region 1 at that time. The administrative demands of project management leave little time for careful RPM review of the technical aspects of an RI/FS. Consequently, at Nyanza, as with most projects, NUS had relatively little technical input from EPA prior to undertaking field work. Most of EPA's technical expertise was devoted to the review of draft reports prior to their release by the Agency. EPA's contracts with the REM contractors are cost-plus-award-fee contracts, in which a portion of the contractor's fee is influenced by RPM performance ratings. This mechanism was introduced as an incentive to improve contractor performance, since higher performance ratings will produce larger fees. 20 ------- As discussed in Section IV of this report, the contractor rating forms periodically submitted by the RPM indicate that deficiencies in NUS's performance surfaced early in the course of the RI/FS. By the second four-month period, the overall score had dropped to 2, and the RPM had assigned the lowest possible score, 1, in two of the categories (schedule and cost control, and resource utilization) which make up the overall score. By the last rating period, February 1, 1985 to May 31,1985, the contractor's rating had dropped to 1 in all categories and overall. In the Work Assignment Completion Report, which is a comprehensive rating of the contractor's performance for the work assignment, the RPM recommended that NUS be denied any of the available award fee, characterizing the contractor's performance as "abysmal". These increasingly low ratings did not produce the desired effect on the contractor's performance, and EPA had no other feasible mechanism to remedy the situation. Consequently, NUS continued to work until the REM I contract expired, delivering RI and FS reports which were not sufficiently rigorous to support the selection of a remedial alternative. EPA Region 1 then engaged COM to fill the remaining "data gaps" in the RI/FS reports. Although EPA characterized the COM assignment as "pre-design", much of the work was to correct deficiencies in the RI/FS performed by NUS. 21 ------- VIZ. CONCLUSIONS 1. Did tba RI/FS Conducted by NOS corporation Provide an Adequate Basis for Selection of a Remedial Alternative at Nyanza? The Nyanza Site, like most hazardous waste sites, presented a complex puzzle to EPA and its RI/FS contractor, NUS Corporation. A series of chemical manufacturers had disposed of a wide variety of organic and inorganic wastes at numerous undocumented locations throughout the manufacturing complex for approximately 60 years. Because Nyanza was one of the earlier Superfund sites, EPA had not developed much of the guidance now in place to assist Agency remedial project managers. Nevertheless, the deficiencies manifested in the Nyanza RI/FS are remarkable even in a program which has been documented as having severe problems. The contractor exceeded the original budget by 25% and required 23 months to complete an assignment which it had committed to finish in 10 months. More importantly, the final product of this effort failed to fulfill its fundamental purpose—to characterize the nature and extent of risks at the Nyanza site and to provide a rational basis for the selection of a remedial option. The residents of Ashland had formed an active citizens group which was closely monitoring the progress of the Nyanza cleanup. The significant discrepancies between NUS's assessment of sludge deposits and CDM's findings were a major blow to the credibility of the RI/FS and the Agency. The two removal actions undertaken at Nyanza in response to hazards undetected during the Remedial Investigation further diminished the community's confidence in EPA's cleanup effort at Nyanza. EPA's expenditure of more than $200,000 to obtain additional data to support the Record of Decision is conclusive evidence that the Nyanza Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study was deficient. 22 ------- 2. Did EPA Region 1 Take All Reasonable and Necessary Measures to Assure that the Contractor Carried Out the Nyanza RI/FS as Required? Agency personnel responsible for oversight of the contractor's performance, although acutely aware of deficiencies early in the process, were unable to rectify the situation using the remedies available to them through the contract management process. NUS was not sufficiently concerned about the problems at Nyanza to take decisive corrective action until April 1985, when the firm replaced its Project Officer—after the draft RI and FS reports had been completed and far too late to have a major beneficial impact on the project. EPA Region 1 engaged a second contractor to correct the deficiencies in the RI/FS. Although the second contractor completed the additional investigative work prior to the issuance of a Record of Decision, the Region characterized the contract as a "pre-design".contract. According to Region 1 personnel, at least $200,000 of the cost incurred under the supplemental contract was clearly for work which should have been completed as part of the RI/FS. Much of this additional work duplicated work accomplished by the original RI/FS contractor. The superfund program has been structured to utilize contractors to perform Remedial Investigations and Feasibility Studies under the direction of EPA program officials. Because of the obvious uncertainties associated with most hazardous waste sites, the Agency employs cost-plus-award-fee type contracts for RI/FS assignments. ^Although this contracting method provides the necessary flexibility to allow the contractor to react to changing demands of the project, it also relieves the contractor from strict accountability for the quality and cost of the final product. Whether or not EPA is satisfied with the contractor's performance, a cost-plus-award-fee contract assures the contractor that all costs, including overhead, will be reimbursed. The award fee is intended to provide an incentive for superior contractor performance. At Nyanza, however, where the contractor was apparently unable to provide a satisfactory level of performance in spite of the incentive, the award fee was ineffective. This problem was aggravated by the lack of sufficient numbers of experienced, skilled technical personnel at EPA Region 1. When they are responsible for several projects as large and complex as a typical RI/FS, Remedial Project Managers cannot effectively keep abreast of the rapidly changing developments which are commonplace at remedial sites. This situation tends to place RPMs in a reactive mode, unable to detect and address developing issues before they become major problems. 23 ------- EPA Region 1 was unable to obtain acceptable performance from the Nyanza RI/FS contractor, although EPA staff appear to have taken all reasonable measures within their control toward that end. The contractor's failure to take effective corrective action after receiving repeated poor award fee performance ratings from the Regional Project Officer is strong evidence that the remedies available to the Agency under the REM/FIT contract were insufficient to address the poor performance encountered at Nyanza. 24 ------- PIG Response to The DIG provided Region 1 with a draft version of this report for review and comment in August 1989. The Acting Regional Administrator responded with the Region's comments in a letter dated September, 1989 (See Appendix). In general, the Region agreed with the substance and thrust of the report. The Region also noted that it anticipates that the Agency's recently established Alternative Remedial Contracting strategy (ARCS) will give the regions somewhat greater control over the assignment of contractors to remedial projects. However, the ARCS program , employed a contractor selection process which 'prevented the consideration of prior experience in ranking the competitors. Consequently, NUS has been selected to perform the RI/FS for the Sudbury River sediment contamination attributed to Nyanza Chemical discharges. Thus the Region is faced with the prospect of conducting another RI/FS in Ashland under the scrutiny of an active, well-organized group of Ashland citizens, many of whom have little confidence in the Environmental Protection Agency or its contractor, based on previous experience. Furthermore, the ARCS contracts employ the same cost-plus-award- fee payment system which the Region unsuccessfully attempted to utilize to improve contractor performance in the original Nyanza RI/FS. Five of the Region's six specific comments were relatively minor corrections or expansions of statements in the draft report. These have been incorporated in the final version of this report. The sixth comment disputes the report's critical discussion of the groundwater investigation—specifically the assertion that monitoring well MW-8A should have been constructed to monitor groundwater at different elevations. The Region noted that some of the terminology in the discussion of the monitoring wells (e.g. D-NAPL and L-NAPL) was unknown at the time the RI/FS was performed. Although it is true that the terminology is recent, the concept of sampling aquifers at various levels is not. In fact, six of the groundwater monitoring locations which NUS utilized at Nyanza were capable of sampling groundwater at two or more depths. Furthermore, as the final version of this report indicates, OSWER's Environmental Response Branch was also critical of the single long screen installed in MW-8A. Consequently the OIG's position on the groundwater investigation remains unchanged. 25 ------- APPENDIX 26 ------- **:>„ *-. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 8 . flEGION I f */ J.F. KENNEDY FEDERAL BUILDING, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02203-2211 September 18, 1989 / Stephen E. Burbank Acting Divisional Inspector General Eastern Audit Division J.F.K. Federal Building Room 1911 Boston, MA 02203-2211 Re: Nyanza Chemicals RI/FS Dear Mr. Burbank: Enclosed please find comments prepared by the Region's Waste Management Division on the draft report prepared by your Engineer- ing and Science Unit on the RIFS for the Nyanza site conducted by HUS and of EPA's oversight of NUS on that project. The Region gen- erally agrees with the substance and thrust of the report although we question the value of its inclusion in the,1989 Report to Con- gress since the work in question was completed in 1985. I would also like to provide you with the Region's perspective on the transition from the REM contracts to the newly established ARCS program. In interviewing prospective A/E firms for the newly established Alternative Remedial Contracting Strategy (ARCS), the Agency selec- tion panel members were.specifically directed by headquarters not to use prior experience with an A/E firm (under REM for instance) as a criterion for evaluation. Consequently, NUS has been awarded one of the seven ARCS contracts for Region I and, ironically, has been tasked to perform the RIFS for the third operable unit at Nyanza (the Sudbury River sediments). I'm sure you can appreciate the considerable discomfort experienced by the RPM in trying to explain this development to the community. Notwithstanding the aforementioned, Region I believes the ARCS pro- gram, although utilizing the same cost plus award fee system as the REM program, will provide the Agency will greater leverage to secure better contractor performance for two reasons. First, the ARCS contractors will be guaranteed only a minimum floor of work under the contract; additional work will be assigned to those con- tractors whose past performance merits it. Secondly, the ARCS con- tracts run for 10 years. This will allow the Region, in many cases, to retain one contractor throughout the RIFS, Remedial Design, and Remedial Action phases of a project and should result in greater contractor accountability. By contrast, the 2-4 yr. REM contracts resulted in continual contractor turnover from one phase of a project to the next. 27 ------- We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report. If you would like to discuss any of our comments, please contact Richard Cavagnero in the Waste Management Division at FTS: 833- 1730. Sincerely, Paul G. Kebugh Acting Regional Administrator cc: Merrill S. Hohman 28 ------- r Attachment: p. 2/3 According to State records, Nyanza never declared bank- ruptcy. The Region is currently investigating the issue of corporate succession for possible cost re-covery. p. 8 It was during CDM's "predesign" sampling activities that the vault was determined to contain organics and not metal sludges. COM conveyed this information to EPA's RPM, who initiated discussions with DEQE about the pos- sibility of DEQE performing a separate study on the vault area. EPA was out of funds at the time due to pending CERCLA funding authority termination which lasted over a year due to lack of reauthorization. These discussions concluded with the signing of an "Advance Match Coopera- tive Agreement" by EPA and DEQE, under which the State would fund the vault investi- gation and later receive credit towards its ultimate 10% cost share. p. 9 Without defending the work of NUS, it should be noted that the area where the drums were unearthed during re- mediation was a debris dump for trash including metal objects (empty barrels, refrigerators, remnants of Nyanza buildings). The presence of so many metal objects un- doubtedly hindered the magnetometer survey. p. 10 EPA's concern with the Connerstone and Carr work was primarily with the borings, monitoring wells, and sampling techniques rather than the test pits, which were excavated by conventional means. NUS1 greatest failure was in not performing confirmatory sampling to confirm or deny the earlier work. The use of composited soil samples, while clearly problematic in accurately defining sludge depths and volume, was in part necessitated by the realities of the CLP program which, at this period of time, was seriously lacking in capacity and ability to provide timely turn around. p. 11 The discussion of L-NAPLs and D-NAPLs constitutes a revisionist perspective. Dr. John Cherry, possibly the leading researcher into the behavior of D-NAPLs in groundwater systems, had not yet even coined the term D- NAPL during the time period when the RIFS was performed. The report author's conclusions regarding the proper placement of well screens also neglects the fact that this issue was the subject of considerable debate at the time the RIFs was performed. Indeed, certain states actually required that the entire saturated thickness be screened as a precaution against the possibility that discretely located screens might miss a permeable lens conducive to contaminant transport. 29 ------- The critique oversimplifies the problem of accurately defining groundwater contaminant transport in complex hydrogeologic settings like New England and fails to acknowledge that the body of knowledge in this field, while evolving rapidly, is still in its infancy and that the number of real experts in the field is also very limited. 30 ------- |