UTURE/ flflD
»arch and Development


 UTUR6/ flflD
           MAY 1973
 401 M Street
jarch and Development
 Environmental Research Center
Intal Studies Division



     The quality of the environment is now a major policy issue for govern-
ment and industry officials. Policy-makers also find an emerging quality of
life ethic among the public resulting in ever more persistent articulation of a
desire for a higher standard of living,  more freedom c' choice, more leisure
and more personal fullfillment.
     The  overriding concern  for  the  environment arises from  the in-
creasingly visible signs of air pollution, water pollution, waste accumulation,
noise pollution and contamination by toxic substances resulting from how
we do  things today.  There  is often great  pressure for short-range,  im-
mediate solutions to problems  Short-term plans and the means employed
to achieve these objectives are sornet:mes implemented without adequate
consideration for the possible long range environmental degradation which
may result.
     What is needed, then, to  complement immediate action programs is a
policy assessment  process  involving analysis  of long-range pitfalls and
     For example,  the Bureau  of the Census  recently reported that the
population growth rate in the United States has been decreasing to the
point which will eventually produce zero population growth. Does this mean
that the population will not reach the  higher numbers forecast only a short
time ago? Does it mean that contingency planning being done today which
is sensitive to population fluctuations  will require  some modification?
Would,  for instance, a smaller population  be expected to produce  less
pollution and solid wastes? Demographers  tell  us that family units having
fewer children,  or children at a later time in  life, which  is indicative of zero
population growth,  results in a greater number of women willing and able to
work. The first  order effect of  zero population  growth, they tell us, is ex-
pected to be a  greater number of people in  the work force.  Does the com-
bination  of greater  business capacity  ana  higher  per capita  income,
produced by this  eventuality,  produce a greater pollution and solid waste
problem than  would  initially   be  expected from a declining  population
growth rate?
    When faced with these questions, the policy-maker finds limited infor-
mation available. The more rhetorical  and crisis  oriented information tends
to be most available and tends to pervade the consciousness of the public
and of public officials. Thus, there appears to be a need for a forum in which
the ramifications of long-term  viewpoints can be discussed. We need to
establish a mechanism for continuing  dialogue between policy-makers and
ecologists,  land-use planners, economists,  systems analysts, and human
behaviorists of  all persuasions.

     What, then, are the full policy implications of zero population growth; of
the newly evolving environmental ethic; of new economic concepts which
span from  rental economics to expanded ownership patterns?
     It was in this spirit that the Environmental Studies Division, Washington
Environmental Research Center, Office of Research and Development in-
vited a number of experts, to present their views on alternative futures, the
environment and the quality of life. Each was asked to prepare comments in
one of the three following research themes: The Nature of the Environmental
Crisis, Zero Population Growth and the Environment or  Implications of
Alternative  Growth Policies on Environmental Quality. The invited authors
are listed following this foreword. The Topic area assigned each author,
which became titles of papers produced for possible presentation at a sym-
    As  intimated, it was initially planned that this research project  would
utilize a symposium as the vehicle to elicit comment and response from a
representative cross-section  of  governmental officials having decision-
making  responsibilities affecting the future.  However, it soon became ap-
parent that the complex web of ideas being generated within any one of the
three theme areas was too much for one group of individuals at one sitting.
Consequently,  it was thought that a more appropriate tactic would be to
produce this volume expressive of the kind of dialogue  needed to assist
policy-makers  develop comprehensive perspectives for  assessing  future
needs and  priorities on a continuing basis.
                       Stanley M.  Greenfield
                       Assistant Administrator
                         for Research and Development, EPA.
 August 1973


    Ideas and suggestions contained  in the three theme areas mentioned
in the Foreword are reflected in the six Chapters of this book. Portions of
each contributed paper were  used, as  appropriate,  to explore as full  a
range of opinion  in each area as possible. The charge given the editors was
to present in dialogue fashion for  each  area: the classical concepts and
trends: new concepts and  possible trends  and  implications  for growth
policy.  Generally the introductory material prepared by the staff is identified
within the text by horizontal  line separations.
    This book is divided into two parts. Part One, Challenges of Alternative
Futures,  reviews the  environmental  and  population issues,  presents  a
recent  systems  method of analyzing  the  problems of  growth and  sum-
marizes the  international implications  of growth policy.  Part Two, Coping
with Alternative  Futures,  presents classical  and modern  concepts  of
economics and reviews the  implications of economics  for growth policy.
Human behavioral factors and their  influence on growth policy conclude the
    The  book was written for  policy-makers and planners at all levels of
government  in the hope that the most recent thinking on population, en-
vironment and economic growth can be diseminated   to initiate discussion
and dialogue and to expand the information base on which decisions are
based. We have many  "alternative futures";  we seek  alternatives which
preserve the  environment and improve the quality of life.
                                 John Gerba
                                 Paul Boulay

Peter Barth
  Director of Research, U.S. Department of Labor
Murray Bowen
  Clinical Professor of Psychiatry, Georgetown  University
John Calhoun
  Laboratory of Brain  Evolution and Behavior,  Nationa1 Institute of
    Mental Health
Alexander Christakis
  Center for Contemporary Problems
Chester Cooper
  Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Lincoln Gordon
  Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Garrett Hard in
  Professor of Human Ecology, University of California
Carl  Madden
  Chief Economist, U.S.  Chamber of Commerce
Graham Molitor
  Director of Government Relations, General Mills, Inc.
Eugene Peterson
  Representing Pacific Northwest River Basins Commission
Ronald Ridker
  Resources  for th? Future
S. Fred Singer
  Professor of Environmental Sciences,  University of Virginia
Donald Spencer
  Consulting Ecologist, National Agricultural Chemicals  Association
Beatrice Willard
  Member, Council on Environmental Quality

                        Table  of Contents

Foreword  	i
Preface 	iii
Acknowledgements	iv

Part  1: Challenges ot Alternative  Futures
Chapter 1. The Nature of the  Environmental Crises
  Introduction	5
  Elements of the Environmental  Crisis 	7
  Definition of Environmental  Crisis
    Bettie Willard  	'&
  Environmental Policy and Management  	 16
  Lessons Learned—An Opposing Viewpoint
    Donald Spencer  	21

Chapter 2. Implications of Zero Population  Growth
  Introduction	35
  The Pressure of Population
    Graham Molitor 	37
  U.S.  Population Forecasts 	38
  Determinants of Population  Growth
    Graham Molitor 	41
  Will the U.S.  Maintain a ZPG Birthrate
    S.  Fred Singer	48
  Urbanization of Population. Alexander Christakis 	51
  Effects of Urban Overpopulation,  Graham Molitor  	52
  Can Man Adapt to  Urban Living,  Graham Molitor  	54
  Environmental  Effects of Population Growth	55
  A Classical Model for Environment and Population
    Alexander Christakis 	56
  Economic and Welfare Implications of ZPG
    S.  Fred Singer	60
  Resource and  Environmental Consequences of  ZPG
    Ronald Ridker 	62
  The Policy Implications of ZPG
    Ronald Ridker 	76

Chapter 3  Analysis of Ecosystem Capacity
  Introduction	87
  Ecology of the  Biosphere  	89
  The Spaceship  Earth Concept  	90
  Implications for Today  	91
    (Remainder of Cnapter by Eugene Peterson)
  The Classical Problem of Population and
    Industrial Growth	92
  Limitations of Classical Planning 	97
  New Concepts  for Planning  	98
  Carrying  Capacity Analysis  of the
    Pacific Northwest   	102
  Alternative Goals for the Pacific Northwest 	124
  Carrying  Capacity Implications  for Policy	127

Chapter 4.  International Implications of Growth  Policy
  Introduction  	135
    (Remainder of Cnapter by Lincoln Gordon)
  The Internationa! Impact of National
    Growth  Policy Alternatives	 136
  implications of International Competition  	137
  Implications of National Alternatives  for
    the World Structure  	142
  Implementing International-Oriented  Growth   	147

Part 2: Coping with Alternative Futures

Chapter 5.  Growth and Behavior
  Introduction  	161
  Human Short Range Thinking  	162
  Responsibility and Personal Commitment 	1^2
  Productivity and the Quality of  the Work
   - Environment,  Peter Barth	164
  Changing the Attitudes of Society,
    Garrett  Hardin  	168
  Human Consciousness and Management of
    Multidisciplinary Activities, John Calhoun	1 71
  The Systems Viewpoint of  Human Behavior.
    Murray Bowen  	174

For Environmental Protection Agency
  Anton Schmalz,  Staff Consultant,  Program Coordinator
  John Gerba, Chief,  Special Projects General Editor

For Mind Three Communications  Group, Inc.
  Paul Boulay, President, Technical Editor

Environmental Protection Agency
   Stanley M. Greenfield, Assistant Administrator for Research & Development
  Leland D. Attaway, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Research
  Peter W. House, Director, Environmental Studies Division
  Martin  J.  Redding,  Chief.  Comprehensive  Environmental  Planning
    Branch, ESD
  Alan Neuschatz, Chief, Environmental Management Branch
  Richard M.  Laska, Communications Director

Mind Three Communications Group, Inc.
  Peter  Boulay,  Director of Editorial Services
  Scott Callander, Director of Graphic Arts


Chapter 6. Growth and Economics
  Summary	  183
  Classical Concepts of Economic Growth
    Carl Madden  	  184
  New Concepts of Economic Growth
    Car/ Madden  	196
  Sustainable Growth. Chester Cooper 	207
  Who Pays for Change,  Carl Madden 	  212
  Implementing Change.  Carl Madden 	  217
  Implications for Economic Policy	221
  Attributes of Successful Planning
    Chester Cooper  	  221
  Features of a Government-Business
    Growth Policy, Carl Madden	224


            Part One


  The "challenges  of alternative futures"  encompass the  problems of
providing a high quality of life with minimum environmental degradation to a
growing population tending to cluster in crowded urban areas and requiring
industrial,  economic and technological growth.
  In Part  1 several aspects of population and environment are discussed
from several viewpoints. The Nature of the Environmental Crisis is defined
in Chapter 1 from a viewpoint of ecological balance and stability. Seven
ecological principles are proposed and their implications  for :v ; r.i goals
and policy are outlined.  Present activities of the  Federal  government in
managing the environment are reviewed;  the need for economic incentives
complementary to and supporting regulation is discussed. The control of
pesticides is reviewed, recent information on decreasing residues of DDT
found in several test programs are presented  leading to the author's con-
clusion that,  with more complete information now available,  pesticide
regulation  might take a different  course.
  In Chapter  2 the Implications  of Zero Population  Growth (ZPG) are
discussed from several viewpoints. Recently the United States birth rate has
been decreasing and is currently below the replacement rate. Thus a Zero
Population Growth rare has been achieved. However,  the population will
continue to grow in absolute numbers and trends to urbanization resulting
in densely populated areas will continue. Therefore population growth will
continue to be a problem for national and regional  planners and decision-
  In the Chapter current population forecasts are reviewed, reasons for the
declining fertility rale are  presented and one contributing author concludes
that the rate will remain near its present value. He presents social, cultural
and economic reasons for his conclusion. The effects of population growth
on  the environment  under conditions of ZPG are reviewed first using a
single model to illustrate relationships, then presenting the results of a
more complete study.
  In conclusion policy alternatives for achieving an improved quality of life
and environment are reviewed. Direct methods, i.e. specific pollution con-
trol, planned land use and similar procedures and shown by this author to
be  superior to  less specific goals such as "zero  growth".
  In Chapter 3 an Analysis of Ecosystem Capacity is presented. The paper
from which this material was taken presents a first attempt at applying an
analysis of carrying capacity to a  region.  First approximation numbers are
developed for the Pacific Northwest as a specific example of the technique.
  The author's methodolgy includes the following steps:  1) establish a ben-
chmark quality of life standard (per capita  income level and apportionment),
2) determine the capacity  of resources  in the region  to supply material
goods, 3)  determine the  capacity of resources in the region to supply

amenities  (measured  as  recreational  land  available), 4)  quantify the
variation of environmental quality as a function of population numbers and
5) evaluate alternative  combinations of population and pollution control by
comparing the quality of life and regional capacity obtainable for each alter-
native. The author concludes  that the approach is viable, given  more
research and inforrration. He recommends that this analytical tool be used
to support policy and planning analyses; he suggests that full dissemination
of information to the public, development of public conception of goals, ef-
fective land use and energy use and control are essential to long-range im-
provement of the environment.
  In Chapter 4 the International  Implications of Growth Policy  are  sum-
marized.  The international dimension of environmental policy is discussed
from two viewpoints: 1) constraints of freedom of national action imposed by
international realities (i.e. oil importation) and 2) the  effects of alternative
national growth policies  on the world  structure. Clearly, the international
dimensions of growth policy nust  be incorporated in planning at the outset.

  Planners and decision makers at all levels of government and industry
are faced with the reality of pressure from the public to improve the quality
of the  environment and the quality of  life.  This demand comes from a
general awareness  of the degradation we inflict on our surroundings and
from a  fear we may destroy ourselves if degrading trends are not reversed.
Concern for quality of life stems from an increasing emphasis on human
and social values. National, state and local  policies must allow for these
  Quality of life is as difficult to define as happiness. It is highly subjective
and the concepts change with time. Attempts  to define and measure quality
of  life center  on enumeration  of  economic,  social, aesthetics,
psyschological and  environmental factors generally agreed to affect quality
of life.  It is clear than a quality of life ethic has become deeply engrained in
our society and that a growing  demand for improving and  maintaining the
quality of the environment is a principal component of that ethic.
  Nearly everyone  knows that ecology is the science dealing  with the
relationships between organisms  and their environment; that the biosphere
is that portion of the earth and its environment within which life is contained.
Nearly  everyone perceives that all things in the biosphere  are interrelated
and form a complex ecosystem.  Everyone understands, to some degree,
that the environment includes not only the physical reality surrounding man
but that man himself is an integral part of  the environment. Indeed, he is the
only part able to willfully modify the environment. Everyone has heard of the
"environmental crisis" and the "population explosion." Most are concerned
about depletion of natural resources and many question the potential effects
of "uncontrolled technology."
  Divergent views are  held  regarding the nature and extent of the en-
vironmental crisis and what should be done about it. Some believe we have
already set in motion irreversible processes degrading the environment
beyond its capacity to sustain life as we know it. Others hold that "crisis"
statements are made only to attract attention and to gain public support for
environmental management to assure that the  crisis stage is never reached.

Some hold thai the concept of crisis itself is a dangerous illusion—we will
never reach a turning point after which unalterable degradation or dramatic
improvement will be realized.  Instead we are faced with a slowly (lately
more rapidly) evolving change which must be controlled by continuous hard
work. Some put economic growth and other values above quality of life and
quality of environment and are unconcerned about environmental degrada-
tion. Some feel technology will find solutions to most of the problems before
they become critical.
  This  range of viewpoints  exists because we are  really quite ignorant
about  many  of  the  relationships between  population,  economics,
technology,  and the environment. In the past economic growth has been
empha  zed not knowing at what expense it caused qualitative growth. The
social cost of environmental  degradation has nowhere been accounted for
adequately.  The  environment  as  a  comprehensive  system  with  in-
terdependent  parts  including   man has hardly  been  perceived. En-
vironmental considerations hardly entered the policy and decision process.
  This  report  presents  discussions of the major environmental issues,
taken from invited papers  and other sources. In this Chapter current en-
vironmental  poitcy and  management are reviewed and  an opposing view-
point, questioning whether we are guilty of over-control  is presented. This
discussion illustrates the need for more  nformation, more research,  better
understanding  and  the  need  for a  comprehensive  conceptualiza-
tion—models, methods of analyses and unifying systems concepts—to bet-
ter analyze and evaluate environmental  policy.
  Subsequent Chapters will  cover population growth and the implications
of Zero Populaton Growth, the application of carrying capacity analysis to
regional planning, the international implications of growth policy, and the
relationships between growth, economics and behavior.

Elements of the  Environmental Crisis
  The  principle elements contributing to  our environmental problems are
population, degradation of the physical environment changing technology,
and economic growth.
  The  National Goals Research Staff summarized the principle issues as
 Population Issues
      The traditional view of peculation growth as a source of national
    pride and strength is being re-examined.  Some authorities argue
    for zero population growth on the grounds that population stability
    is imperative for survival, or will improve the quality of our society.
    (For example,  it might enable us to avoid the issue of limitations
    on the use of  energy and materials.)
      The merits  of sheer  size now  appear more  debatable  than
    heretofore, particularly in  the case of large metropolitan areas.
    Large concentrations of population generate serious  pollution
    problems, traffic congestion, and  higher per  capita public ex-
    penditures.  And they are  unduiy  vulnerable to  power  failures.
    riots, and other disruptive social action. Thus, major questions are
    asked: should we limit our population size, and if so, how? And
    should we redistribute our population, and if so. how?
Environmental Issues
      Historically,  our concern over resources focused on  whether
    there would be enough food, energy, and materials to meet our
    needs. Today,  in the  United States, the concern is  about the ability
    of land, air,  and water to absorb ail the wastes we generate. We
    already have violated the aesthetic limits of pollution and,  from
    time to time and place to place, we have violated health and sur-
    vival  limits of  pollution.  Some argue that  the long-run issue may
    well be our survival. Questions often asked are: What can  be done
    to repair the damage already done? To what extent  and  by  what
    means will future pollution be contained within tolerable limits?
    Are there fixed limits of environmental tolerance that might make it
    imperative to  limit the size of our  population or set per capita
    quotas on the amount of energy and material  we may use?
Technology Assessment
      Technology  is becoming both more voluminous and more com-
    plicated. The complexity of much new technology makes it more

     difficult to anticipate how it will  do its primary job and what its
     second-order consequences will be. As  our  understanding  of
     biological, ecological, economic, and social processes improves,
     we are struck  with the complexity  of the consequences which
     technology can produce. We have a growing determination and
     belief in ocr capacity to evaluate the second-order consequences
     of all our  actions  including the use of technology, and to include
     their costs in our policymaking process.
Economic Issues
       In the past, the  air and water have been readily available for any
     purpose.  Our production and consumption activities could be
     carried  out without particular concern for conserving  our natural
       But as  production  and  consumption  have risen  (along  with
     population) more and more impositions have been made on the
     air and  waters.  These  incursions  are  the  consequence  of
     economic growth  and the notion that the environment is available
     at no cost tor whatever use we want, including that of disposal of
     the wastes from economic activity. Thus, when we impose on our
     air and waters in ways and amounts that use up these necessities,
     we levy a real social cost. These resources are no longer free to
       Because private use of the physical environment is available at
     no cost, the market system which allocates resources operates im-
     perfectly. To attack pollution requires a balancing of the costs of
     imposing on the environment with the economic benefits obtained
     from the associated production and consumption.

Definition of Environmental Crisis

  The following definition and  discussion of  the environmental crisis is
taken from the invited paper prepared by Bettie Willard, a member of the
Council on  Environmental  Quality. She  defines  the  term environmental
crisis,  reviews the fundamental  principles of ecosystems, and  presents
recent examples of  ecological  problems and man's   response.  She
suggests general strategies which can be implemented to deal with  the

  The  definition of an "environmental crisis" is:

  1.  An imbalance among the physical, chemical, and biological elements

     and/or  processes  of  an ecosystem  that threatens the vitality and
     productivity of some or all species of the system.
  2. A disruption of a biological system to the point where it no longer can
     support some or all the organisms in it.
  3. A reversal of ecological processes of an ecosystem to a point where
     several to many generations are required to restore the productivity,
     complexity, and stability of the system.
 The Rhetoric of Crisis
  Much of the rhetoric about an environmental crisis is being used in an at-
tempt to awaken man to  his  relationship  to the environment and to  his
responsibility for being  sure we  approach no nearer a threshold,  beyond
which there is no return. Man assumes this responsibility a little by default,
in that he, by his nature, is the only species on the earth that can remember
and transmit complex knowledge. This feature of man makes him capable of
forecasting the future in some  limited ways, based on observations arising
from the past. Because he has this ability, it is incumbent on him to use it in
constructive ways.
  The important thing to realize about an environmental crisis is that we do
not want to reach the point where we actually have one of any magnitude. I
think we  can all see that we have had one of minor magnitude in some of
the waterways and urban areas of  our Nation. Fortunately these problems
have not reached major proportions yet. But we do not, under any condition,
want to reach the point  of the  major environmental crisis. The price is too
high—massive famine, extensive disease, stark landscapes, degeneration
of civilization as we know it. Therefore,  why all this talk of  environmental
crisis, when we have not yet experienced one?
  I should like to draw two analogies, to illustrate why we are  using the

  1.ln training  children about hot stoves,  poisons,  cars, cliffs,  etc.,  we
     make the situation imperative because we know the consequences and
     do not want the person to reach the point of crisis.
  2.  As adults we make budgets  of time, materials, labor, money, because
     we know the consequences of  not doing  so. Again we are unequivocal
     in our approach,  as a  preventive rather than curative thing.
  In  each of these cases, the dire results of negative action are clear before
the adult mind. That clear picture motivates  positive  clearcut  action.
Examples of Response to  Environmental Problems
  Now, in the case of "environmental crisis," the  dire results of the trends
now  in motion cause ecologists  who see these consequences clearly,  to

 use the term "environmental crisis" to get attention and motivate people
 positively.  For example:

   LSoii erosion  in the early 1900s led us  to take  positive  action to
     establish the  Soil  Conservation Service.
   2. Exploitive  forestry "practices" at the turn of the century led  to the
     establishment of the U.S.  Forest Service and  adoption of  more ad-
     vanced,  long-range forest  practices from European countries.
   3. Overgrazing in the West resulted in the Taylor Grazing Act and in wise
     wildlife managemenl practices, such as  carrying capacity.
   4. The Kaibab deer herd die-off in the 1920s caused us to accept the role
     of predators and to determine the carrying capacity of the  range.

Principles Governing Ecosystems
   Ecosystems, of which we are an integral part, are governed by the follow-
ing principles:
   First,  everyth ng affects  everything else.  The more we  learn  of the
ecosystems of the earth the more we realize the  truth of this  principle.
Never have we found evidence to the contrary. For example, just try to find a
biological sample from pole to pole without DDT or radiation in it. And how
did it get there?
   Second,  all living things exist as part of systems composed of physical
environmental factors—climate, soil,  exposure,  etc.;  organisms; and the
processes that operate among the organisms and environment factors. Also
each species of living  thing has a specific role to play in the ecosystem.
   Third, in  each  system there are factors that limit the growth, reproduction,
or activities of some or a I the species; therefore the distribution of species
is determined by these physical and chemical parameters interacting with
the nature  of the species.
   Fourth, each system  has a definite capacity to carry the organisms of that
system, determined both by the physical features of the environment and
the nature  of the biological  components.
   Fifth, in these  systems all  materials  cycle—are reused, but the  energy of
the systems flows  in one direction—downward to uselessness.
   Sixth, as specialization develops in  a system, diversity increases; and as
diversity  increases, stability of  the system increases.
   Seventh, all surfaces of the earth are either in varying stages of develop-
ment toward stability or at the permanent ecosystem for a given site for the
present conditions of climate.
   As we examine these principles in light  of their meaning to human
ecology, we find that man has  rejected these principles as being not ap-

plicable to him. He has, after all, demonstrated dominion over lack of food,
over fluctuating climate, over disease. So these principles obviously do not
apply to him—only to those other organisms less fortunate than he. This is
where and how he has created a potential  short-or long-range ecological
crisis.  For he is  a part of the systems to  which these principles apply,
whether he accepts the fact or not. And his overlooking of these principles
has precipitated potential or actual ecological crises of varying magnitudes.
Examples of  Environmental Crisis
  To emphasize this point to get man's attention focused on the problem
before it is too late, ecologists have talked of "environmental crises", they
have talked of "our plundered planet" (Osborne, 1941), of a "road to sur-
vival" (Vogt, 1941), a "land ethic" (Leopold, 1945)and an "ecological con-
science"  (Sears,  1937). They have even spoken of a "silent spring" (Car-
son,  1962) in efforts to awaken man to the neccessity to take his niche—his
role in the ecosystems, not over these systems.
  At this point in time, it behooves man to quickly bring himself into con-
formance  with these principles. An ignominious end may await man—not
an end  to the  ecosystems of the earth, which have the potential to survive
the crisis.  After all, man is the first organism, so far as we know, that has the
quality of rational thinking accompanied  by memory  and  transmittal of
knowledge. This  unique ability carries a special responsibility that it be
used for the benefit of all of the earth.
  To implement man's conformance with the ecological  principles outlined
above and to measure  his degree of harmony with his ecosystem, we need
a variety  of monitoring systems.  We need  to  know the limiting factors
operating  and  how close we are to reaching them  We need to  know the
level of energy consumption  and what types of uses  consume  less. We
need  to know the carrying  capacity  of  ecosystems  for  man  and  his
processes, as  well as for deer,  elk, cows, sheep—and how close we are to
maintaining or exceeding this capacity. We need to augment  the conscious
cycling  of materials  and  to know better  how these cycles  affect the
ecosystems. We need to favor stability and diversity and know that we are.
Some of these monitoring  systems are  in use now. Some we will need to
  To bring portions of the  system into balance with other components,  we
need to use pollution control  devices. These are  best designed to ac-
complish the balancing in the way the system always-has.  For example,
spray irrigation for land disposal of sewerage,  rather than river disposal.
  All terrestrial organisms but man dispose of their  organic wastes  on
land—trees drop  leaves and fruits—animals defecate on soil—all of which
returns nitrogen, carbon, phosphorous to the material cycles in a short time.

But man sends his wastes out to sea to be made into rock to be mined by
some as yet unknown organisms in eons to come, thus enforcing his own
need to mine more of these substances to return to the land from whence
he has taken them as food or fiber.  A cycle of incredible magnitude and no
known utility!
  Let us examine a few major environmental crises  of recent years. Well-
known,  but highly instructive  is the Aswan Dam situation in which several
major imbalances were triggered by the closing of  the dam:

  1.  Change in nutrient balance throughout the Nile Valley, traditional to the
     productivity of this valley for literally thousands of years, by collecting
     of sediment  in  Lake Nassar that once yearly fertilized  the valley.
  2.  Change in nutrient level in the Mediterranean, towering the productivity
     of invertebrate fish food  (shrimp), therefore of fish (sardines).
  3.  Change in soil  moisture, allowing one stage of a parasite carrying
     schistomyosis to develop and invade man which  before had been con-
     trolled  by the  periodic  flooding,  leading  to  major  disease in the
  Therefore, what was  intended as a great blessing  to the Egyptians as a
source of power and controlled irrigation water, turned out to be a serious
detriment to food sources and the health of the nation.
  Could this have been predicted and averted? Yes, definitely; but so doing
would have required one to several years of intensive ecological research
of the natural systems inhabiting the area to be affected. The technology to
accomplish  this  research existed.  The  desire  to know and use it was
  A  second and somewhat less dramatic example of environmental crisis is
represented by fire  control practices in the Western United States. It has
recently been discovered that fire  protection allows tinder to build up in
stands, so that when a fire does occur, the destruction is many times greater
than  if the fire had been allowed to periodically clean out the tinder. Also
with  fire protection, some valued tree species, such as sugar pine and giant
sequoia, are overgrown by less valued trees, such  as  incense  cedar.
  A  third example was cited above—when man protected the Kaibab deer
of Grand Canyon from their life-long predators, they increased their num-
bers by 25  percent  per  year, soon to eat themselves out  of house and
home. Having devastated their range, they died of starvation in large num-
bers. Some  favor we did them!
  So it is with man's not-so-infinite wisdom. He frequently turns out to be
much more like a bull in a china shop, not recognizing or obeying the time-
less  principles that have operated to keep the systems that have spawned
him  operating in  a dynamic equilibrium. As Lynn White points  out, man's

complex of "having  dominion" over everything has provided the roots of
our ecological crisis. Man has interpreted "having dominion" as having the
right to exploit, desecrate, destroy as he pleased. And now he is awakening
to the results of his  actions; potential ecological  crises.
   Man has long believed, and with some justification, that any change he
brings to the natural system will be beneficial.  At first, this was  true. The
development of agriculture and the domestication of animals both enabled
man to be  free of the need for  hunting and to use this time for cultural pur-
suits. The  construction of houses and the use of  fossil fuels to heat them
enabled  man to leave the cave.
   Why did this awakening not happen earlier? Mainly because the systems
are capable of absorbing some abuse without changing drastically. Also, in
1969 two events made him see these systems more clearly. The Santa Bar-
bara oil spill and the landing on the Moon made him realize dramatically
how tenuous but important is that thin film of the Earth's biosphere.  Now
these changes are showing cumulative degradation—trends which, if not
reversed, could  lead to  destruction  of the  race.  Not a violent, catastrophic
destruction, but  a slow, painful, whimpering destruction.
Application of Ecological Principles
   When  man applies the principles  of ecosystems the results are  strikingly
good. For  example, when the limnologists at the University of Washington
realized the downward trends in motion in Lake Washington due to sewage
outfall into the lake,  they designed  a method of sewage disposal to bring
the system back closer to its original pre-man functioning. The results were
a  dramatic return to  a healthy ecosystem  within three years.
   A second example is the Pribiloff seals which, when protected against
hunting pressure during the crucial mating  period and rearing of  young,
made a significant comeback in population numbers. Similar examples can
be seen  with several other rare and endangered species.
   Thirdly,  western ranges that have been  managed  at  or below  their
carrying capacity for cattle, deer, elk. have shown amazing recovery to their
once  high  productivity.
   Seeing how quickly and dramatically results of obeying ecological prin-
ciples can  occur, let us now examine each ecological principle in light of
some things man can do now to implement that principle in  his activities:
   First principle: If everything  we do affects everything else, we need to
trace  out the direct and indirect effects accurately, so as to know how to
modify action adequately and accurately.  Examples are  in DDT  and
phosphate, where we  have only been concerned  with  the primary ef-
fects—dead pests and clean clothes, without looking at the secondary, ter-
tiary, etc., effects of  these  substances in the pathways they follow in the
ecosystems of the world.

   Stopping  phosphates  in  the ecosystem  can be  equally or  more
 devastating than too much, as phosphate provides an essential  component
 to transfer of energy in all biological  systems.
   The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 is  causing agencies to
 have to answer these questions and many more—at least in part. This is a
 vast improvemen;. for even without all the  answers: seriously  addressing
 the questions is a sobering experience that usually leads to more conserva-
 tive  action.  More needs to be done.
   Sometimes when we do find out where materials are going in the systems
 with which we are dealing, we discover a natural pathway that protects man
 from the harmful effects, thus  we can put the pathway to use consciously. A
 beautiful example of this is in the cypress swamp bordering the Savannah
 River, downstream from the large AEC test reactor. This swamp  was left in-
 tact to separate the reactor visually from the surrounding  area.  Recently it
 has been demonstrated that the swamp is a perfect sponge, absorbing all
 radionucleides in the waters  issuing from  the reactor. But other pathways
 need to be researched and then designed to build in effective buffers. We
 cannot assume ws will have  such a simple situation in every  site.
   Second  Principle: Not  recognizing  that all organisms play a  role  in
 systems we  sometimes remove one  component (a  predator) to benefit
 another component (sheep) while severely putting out of balance the rodent
 population so they eat the grains and  herbs to the detriment of the sheep.
 By this  same attitude we could easily  have deprived  ourselves of  an ugly
 dirty bread mold—penicillin!  We need to  research the life cycles of all
 organisms and to understand  better what role they are playing in the whole
 scheme of things.
   Third Principle: Knowing of the need for dry climate in the maturing of
 dates, man brought the All-American Canal system to Coachella Valley and
 along with it, a climate much  less favorable for its prime cash crop, dates,
 while also bringing water for  a lesser cash crop, truck farming. Thus the
 limiting factors of two organisms clashed to the detriment of the farmers' in-
  Also,  not wanting to admit that where one flood has been, another will be,
we continue to build expensive structures in floodplains,  then  expect the
taxpayers of the Nation to support the  construction of  protective structures
to partially obviate the situation, instead of assisting people in relocation of
these structures  and development of conforming uses of the floodplain.
  We  need  to  investigate how  to  integrate man's activities with the
processes  of existing  systems—to utilize the potential  of the existing
systems, rather than altering them beyond recognition and to our detriment.
  Fourth Principle: Believing that we can graze as many cattle on an area of
land as can stand  on the  ground, we  alter  the productivity of grasslands,

sometimes totally,  so they are no longer grasslands but desert scrub. We
do the same thing with businesses and industry, believing that space is the
only determinant to carrying capacity, not demand, critical ecosystems,
operating ecosystem  processes  and  neighborhood  needs. We need  to
study carefully, with a systems approach to determine the carrying capacity
of various systems tor the activities we wish to impose on them. Once these
capacities are known, we need to function within them,
  Fifth Principle: Oblivious of the natural cycles of materials, we dispose of
our wastes in such places and  by  such  manners  as to achieve a linear
rather than cyclic pathway for the materials. Also, since higher consumption
of energy is rewarded by lower prices per unit, we  hasten the end of fuels
by a price structure and use pattern that is against the natural energy con-
servation modes  Also, we do not analyze how some substances move  in
the system, so awaken with surprises like the release of mercury by the bur-
ning of fossil fuels.
  Knowing that such things  can happen should  alert us to tracing  out all
pathways of materials in our  environment, especially such substances as
cadmium, plutonium, and arsenic that are potentially damaging to the living
system in small quantities. Also, the pending energy crisis should propel us
to use energy in the most efficient marner possible, and to use renewable
sources over nonrenewable sources  For  example, in  Miami homes that
once had solar water heaters had recently abandoned them in favor of the
"all-electric home". What a tribute to Madison Avenue!
  Sixth Principle:  To accommodate mechanical harvesting devices  and
desire for crops of uniform structure and performance, we abandon systems
of diversity, only to  wail  and  moan when such systems are not  resilient to
slight fluctuations of climate,  etc. We need to evolve systems of  agriculture
that have both diversity and high performance, and are resilient because of
their diversity.
  Seventh Principle: Forgetting  the decades,  centuries, even  millenia it
takes to develop ecosystems, we scrape them off with abandon, only to
wonder what happened to our clear fishing streams and animal populations.
We need to be as expert at transplanting or restoring ecosystems as we are
at eliminating them. The Germans strip-mine  property  and  return the
property to its owner with guaranteed 25 per cent increase in productivity.
Why can't we?
  Instituting these and many other ideas ecologists abound with will begin
to bring man into his niche as a  member of the community of  life and to
alleviate the ecological crisis.  But it takes practicing the "land ethic", using
our "ecological conscience".

 Environmental Policy and Management
   Early efforts at managing  the environment were hampered by a lack of
 understanding  and information regarding the ecosystem. Bettie  Willard
 summarizes these problems as follows.

 Compartmentalization of action and legislation:

  —forests are dealt with in Agriculture
  —fisheries are managed  in  Commerce and Interior
  —soils are managed in Agriculture
  —wildlife are managed in Interior
  The closest we come to managing whole ecosystems is the National Park
 Service. Nor are data integrated anywhere centrally. So little wonder we get
 no  holistic policy-making or decisions.
  Homogenization of application of standards, management practices, fun-
 dings, with little or no recognition of the differences in processes operating
 in different ecosystems,  regions, communities. After all, individualization is
 a basic American tradition, but we forget it frequently,  when dealing with the

  Fractionalism of efforts to alleviate environmental  problems:
  —set air standards with little look at where pollutants will go, once cap-
 tured (perhaps to  make dirtier water or land);
  —develop water law with  no concern for the fact that water is integral to
 the land on whicn it arises  and flows;
  —manage agriculture solely from a political and economic point  of view,
 not from the standpoint of where crops grow best and with the minimum of
 disruption and  expenditure  of energy, money, land  resources;
  —manage resources in a linear, rather than a cycle fashion—have goods
 and material always eventually destined to the junk heap and using valuable
 land for that!
  —using energy  and resources as though they were infinite and eternal;
  —appropriate funds on a short-term  base for long-term management,
 then  change  horses  in mid-stream,  forgetting  that the  objects being
 managed have a longer lead-time for adaptation than we have given them.
 We can all learn valuable lessons in policy-making from systems analysis
 and use of what such analysis tells us.
  In 1970 these problems were attacked and the Federal environmental
program organized and consolidated with the passage of the National En-

vironmental Policy Act of 1969 which defined national policy and created
the Council  on  Environmental  Policy  in  the  Executive  Office  of  the
President. Later in 1970 the Environmental Protection Agency was formed
to consolidate federal activities in pollution, solid waste disposal, pesticide
regulation and environmental radiation.
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
   The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) established a
national environmental  policy and created the Council on  Environmental
Quality in the Executive Office of the President.
   The major  requirement  of NEPA was  that all  Federal  agencies  be
required to include in all proposals for legislation and other major activities
an environmental  impact statement summarizing the environmental  effects
of the action.  Since its inception the courts have held the environmental  im-
pact procedure is court  enforceable upon citizen  suit. The best  known
citizen action  involved the proposed Alaskan pipeline.
   The Council on Environmental Quality was established to develop and
recommend  national environmental  policy  to the President, to conduct
studies, review programs and to assist in preparation of the annual Environ-
mental Quality Report, required by the NEPA.

Activities of  the  Council on Environmental Quality

Shortly after  the  Council  was established,  the  Office of  Environmental
Quality was  formed (Environmental  Quality Improvement Act of 1970} to
provide staff to the Council. Later by Executive Order the Council was em-
powered  to  recommend  priorities  in  environmental  programs  to  the
President and  Federal agencies. The Council began to  encourage  the
development  and  use of environmental quality indicies and monitoring sys-
   The Council has been active  in  projects  such as  nonpolluting  power
sources  for  automobiles,  solid waste  management,  pollution control,
pesticides, control of toxic  substances, reduction of pollution by Federal
facilities and  land management.

The Environmental  Protection Agency

   EPA was established in December 1970 and consolidated into one of-
fice the major Federal programs dealing  with air and water pollution, solid
waste disposal, pesticide  regulation and environmental radiation.  As an

operating  line agency,  EPA  is  responsible for  the conduct  and  ad-
ministration of Federal pollution control programs.
   EPA established national air quality standards, established a framework
for state establishment of emission standards and enforces the provisions
of the Clean Air Act. EPA also administers the 1975-76 auto emission stan-
dards  program,  regulation  of  gasoline additives,  other  motor vehicle
pollution regulations and is supporting research on development of a clean
   EPA also established and enforces water quality standards through the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act and the permit provisions of The Refuse
Act and conducts air and water  quality monitoring programs and research.
   Control of pesticides is maintained through the registration provisions of
the  Federal  Insecticide,  Fungicide  and  Rodenticide Act. EPA  issued
notices  of  cancellation  of  all  DDT  and  other  persistent  pesticide
   !n the area of solid waste  management the Resource Recovery Act of
1970 requires EPA to publish guidelines for construction and operation of
solid waste systems and to develop methods  for disposal of hazardous
wastes.  Many open  dumps  were closed and  replaced with improved
disposal systems.
   Other  EPA activities  irelude cleanup of  federal facilities,  control  and
regulation of toxic substances, setting air-wate-' ambient radiation standards
and the study of noise po lution. Basically, then EPA has functioned as the
federal  environmental regulatory agency.

Economic  Incentives and Regulation of Pollution

   Pollution control requires regulation and enforcement. There is growing
recognition that regulation alone, without economic incentives is not the op-
timum  approach and  is  difficult to implement. A  recent commentary by
Stanley M.  Greenfield,  EPA's  Assistant Administrator for  Research  and
Development states the case as follows:

   A purely regulatory system leaves pollution itself cheap while effective
control is expensive. Therefore, the firm or industry or municipality which is
best able to delay having effective abatement forced upon it will gain in the
market. Among firms in an industry, the first to develop an effective but ex-
pensive control technique for itself risks being  forced by  the regulatory
agency to apply it. Because availability and reasonableness of technology
is  determined on a plant-by-plant basis, in legal fact if not in legislative or
administrative theory, the hapless innovator  is likely  to find that his com-
petitors escape with much less costly actions unless  his new techniques

are applicable and available to them; a polluter has little to gain and much
to lose  by being  first to develop a  new, more costly technique.
  The same principles hold for industries  in an economy.  For example, if
the copper smelters develop and have forced upon them expensive control
measures, copper loses  relative to aluminum in the electrical conductor
  In a regulatory system,  the strongest incentive for research and develop-
ment by the polluters is the need to defend themselves against charges that
technology is available but they are  not using it.  In  court,  an excellent
defense is to demonstrate  that major efforts are being  made  but  that
technical difficulties have not yet been overcome. This type of research and
development effort also allows the polluters to  produce a good fall-back
position: after much work, they can  say that it is technically impossible to
reach the original control target,  but they now are going ahead with con-
struction of a compromise technique wnich is the best currently possible.
  Until  we have some measures of true  total costs and total benefits in
which we have confidence, we really do not have a rational basis for deter-
mining economic viability of any level of environmental quality. We certainly
do  not  want  to incur costs for increments of environmental quality im-
provement if  the incremental  benefits are  less than those  costs.
  A major environmental policy issue is: How much improvement in the
quality of the environment does society wart?  The corollary to ihis is.  how
much will society  pay to improve the quality of the environment? What will
they trade off (and how much of it) to get environmental  improvement? I
believe  this  issue has to  be resolved before any comprehensive  en-
vironmental policy can be developed
  Neither the total costs  nor the total  benefits are developed to the point
where they can be used to select  levels of  pollution abatement or en-
vironmental quality with confidence that the test of incremental  benefits
equalling incremental costs has been met.

  In commenting  on  the policy dilemma of providing economic incentives
within the  existing  regulatory framework  Greenfield points  out  that the
regulatory process fails to

  ... use financial incentives and the mechanisms of the market  place to
encourage industry to abate rather than to pollute because it will remain
more profitable to pollute than  to  be innovative in applying  expensive
abatement technologies. How do we go about developing public policy to
change  this so that the same economic forces which  drive the economy
successfully in other areas will work to enhance environmental quality?

   To approach an answer to this question, we must understand why market
forces have hitheto made it more profitable to poliute than to abate. Simply
put, air and water until recently  have  been for  all practical purposes.
treated as free goods. In like manner, we have considered land and many
natural resources sufficiently plentiful or of such  little market value that we
use land for dumps for solid wastes, toxic substances, etc.;  we abandon
strip mines  without restoration,  and we encourage  the depletion of natural
resources, such as oil. So long as this philosophy prevails, the market costs
of technological enterprise will not include the social costs of the human
and ecological damages of pollution. So  long as such costs can be "ex-
ternalized" by shifting them to others, the polluter finds it more profitable to
pollute rather than abate.
   Policies to include such costs as part of the cost of production will in-
crease the prices paid by consumers. This will "internalize" the costs, and
the market pricing mechanism will no longer be distorted by allowing con-
sumers to shift the pollution externalities to other sectors of society who do
not benefit.
   At the present  time, sulfur and auto emission taxes to complement the
Clean Air Act, and effluent fees and sewerage charges mandated under the
new water quality act, are being considered to provide market incentives for
abatement rather than pollution. The simple  economic  logic of such ap-
proaches is  that if taxes or charges have to be paid on pollutants, and if they
are sufficiently high to make it more costly to continue to pollute than to
abate,  then there  will be a profit incentive to develop and apply abatement
   In addition to the need to develop the information required  to determine
the appropriate structure of such tax (as opposed to subsidy) incentives,
there are two general problems which create a dilemma for EPA in develop-
ing plans to implement such a  policy. One stems from the real fact of life
that producers and consumers  now avoiding paying the costs of pollution
will  not willingly accept  the higher costs of production/price  of  con-
sumption. Thus, pressure against  such incentive taxes  may  be expected
from present groups not now internalizing such  pollution costs.
  A second issue arises from the fact that EPA must carry out the mandate
to abate pollution within  a regulatory framework.
  The  mandate  requires research,  development and demonstration
capability to carry out this mission. In a sense this is counter-productive to
the longer-range objective of providing incentives for technologically-based
enterprise to assume this responsibility and  incorporate the total cost of
abatement into costs  reflected in market prices.

Other Elements of Environmental Policy
  The review of major government activities in the environment presented
above shows that the thrust of the government programs has been largely
regulatory. Other approaches to environmental management which have not
yet started to any extent but which may become increasingly important
methods for  implementing  environmental policy  include development  of
economic incentives and application of technology assessment.
  Certain economic incentives  have  been proposed as supplements  to
regulation or as additional means of managing the environment. Tax write-
offs and federal  assistance to  industry have been  suggested to foster
pollution control.  Charges  or taxes on  pollutive effluents  or  emissions,
especially backed by standards and regulation, could provide an incentive
to industry to control  pollution.  Examples are the gasoline lead tax and
proposed taxes on  sulfur oxides emission.
  In many instances  the cost of controlling  pollution  will probably be
passed on to the ultimate consumer Therefore, the public can be expected
to take a strong  interest in  such proposals, if adequately informed.
  Technology assessment  means  determining  the  full impact of  new
.echnology, including secondary and tertiary effects before the technology
is applied. This follows from the emerging viewpoint that the manufacturer
or industry must show that his proposed activity will produce  no harmful en-
vironmental effects before he precedes The idea is not new, but its applica-
tion to environmental management is new.
  Such  proposed environmental management techniques illustrate the
need for a systems approach. Technology assessment, by definition re-
quires a detailed understanding of all elements of the  environment in order
to accurately assess the impact of  new  technology.  Incentives, to be ef-
fective, also require detailed knowledge of the environmental system and its
Lessons Learned—An Opposing  Viewpoint	
  One of the environmental areas receiving  wide attention is that of
pesticides. Following Rachael Carson's dramatic plea  in "Silent Spring"
public concern led to  greatly  increased  federal and state regulation of
pesticides. The use of DDT was  essentially eliminated.  In the following
discussion  Donald  Spencer,   Consulting  Ecologist  for  the  National
Agricultural Chemicals Association questions some of the earlier analyses
and forecasts and points out some little-discussed potential positive effects
of enlightened use of pesticides.       '	 	

Evidence of Declining Pesticide Residues
   Most of the tests that have been designed to show the acute and chronic
toxicity of pesticides in water use a solution of the pesticide.  In long-term,
low-level exposure, a solution of the  pesticide is "dripped" into a mixing
stream  on a continuous basis, then into the lest aquaria.  For example, in
one   well-conducted study oysters were raised from juveniles to sexual
maturity at a constant exposure of one part  per billion of (ppb) DDT in
flowing seawater. By the end of the 12th week of the  test, the oysters had
acquired a body residue of 74 parts  per million (ppm), a factor of 75,000
greater than the quantity at any one time in the seawater. The residue in the
oyster had not changed significantly at the end of the 24th week,  and by the
end of  the 36th week of continuous exposure  had dropped back to 60
ppm( 1).
  What was observed is a common  phenomenon with DDT and  related
chlorinated hydrocarbons. When first exposed  to  the pesticide,  residue
levels  in the  body rise rather sharply, then  level off or may subsequently
decline to a somewhat lower plateau. This is a "steady state" in which input
is balanced by degradation and excretion of  the DDT. The height of the
body residue level will vary with the degree of  exposure. After 36 weeks of
exposure  to these very  dilute solutions of  DDT (which is the maximum
solubility of DDT in pure water) the DDT use was terminated and the oysters
exposed only to uncontaminated seawater, In  the following 12 weeks, the
DDT residues in the oyslers declined from  60 ppm to 0.16  ppm.
  The  above study illustrates  the oyster's capability to accumulate DDT
residues some 75,000 times the environmental background levels—if the
chemical is in solution.  In December 1972, Dr.  Philip A.  Butler, who has
been in charge of the National Estuarian Monitoring Program since its in-
ception in 1965  reported on  the results of pesticide analyses in 8,095
samples of oysters  collected from  183 permanent estuarian sites in the
United States, including Alaska. The maximum DDT residues detected (1.0
to 5.4  ppm) occurred in less than 0.5 percent  of the samples. The per-
centage of samples containing negligible residues  (0.01 ppm) during the
last year (1971) as compared to earlier years increased 85 percent in 12 of
the 15  States where estuarian  monitoring took  place.  His concluding
paragraph states, "The data demonstrate that the decline in DDT residues
in molluscs has been nearly universal on the Atlantic,  Gulf of  Mexico, and
Pacific Coasts, although beginning at different times at different places. In
some areas DDT has disappeared from this filter-feeding level of the trophic
web within 12 months of the termination of its local use. This suggests that
barring  further input,  DDT will disappear biologically within one or two
generations of sensitive estuarine fauna."(2).

   Given the  oyster's ability  to  accumulate  75  ppm of DDT  from a
 background level of only 1.0 ppb, and a finding that the highest residue in
 natural populations was 5 ppm, we must conclude that most of the DDT was
 precipitated out in silt and organic matter before it reached the estuaries, or
 that the silt-complexed DDT is not as available for cycling in the food web
 as had been anticipated, or that it undergoes fairly rapid degradation in the
 brackish waters of the estuaries. Regardless of the explanation,  residue
 levels are declining.
   Before leaving the  discussion of the declining residues of DDT and its
 metabolities, it might prove useful to indicate  supporting data from  other
 studies. Since 1964, the Food and Drug Administration has been recording
 the  pesticide  residues in ready-to-eat foods.  Samples of every  class of
 foodstuffs were collected  from 30  markets in 28  different cities  and
 prepared for the table. The diet used was that of a  16-year-old boy. In  the
 period June 1969-April 1970, "the daily intake of total chlorinated organics
 dropped 22 percent from the previous reporting period (June 1968-April
   One  segment  of  the  "National  Human  Monitoring  Program  for
 Pesticides" has now been published (4). This activity comes under the
 Pesticide Community Studies  of  EPA which, among  other projects,  has
 established  and maintained in 14 States epidemiology studies  by con-
 tractual  arrangement  with State health departments and/or local  medical
 schools.  The  State of Utah, Department of Social Services,  Division of
 Health, reports, "Mean values of total DDT in adipose tissue for the years in
 which these samples were obtained  were 9.0  ppm in  1968,  7.2  ppm in
 1969, and 5.3 ppm in 1970, indicating a decrease in storage  levels" (5).
   The English have also been following the residue levels in human fat in
the United  Kingdom since  1963. In  a report covering the period 1969-
 1971, published in the British  Medical Journal, the following conclusions
are drawn:
"It is again gratifying  to record  that the mean concentrations of the three
 main organochlorine pesticides  found  in  human  fat  (in  the  United
Kingdom)—namely BHC, dieldrin, and DDT—have  continued to decrease
over recent years .... If the results from the latest study are compared with
those obtained in 1965-67,  the decrease in the dieldrin content, based on
the geometric  means for all samples,  is equivalent  to about 30 percent of
the earlier value ..  . while the decrease for the total  DDT is slightly over 20
percent of the earlier value." (6).
   It is difficult  to reconcile the above  monitoring results with the following
statement from a Report for The Club of Rome's  project on the predicament
of  mankind, entitled "The Limits of Growth" (7): "The graph (Figure 22, DDT
Flows in the Environment) shows what would happen if in 1970 the world

 DDT application rate began to decrease gradually until  it reached zero in
 the year 2000. Because of the inherent delays in the system, the level of
 DDT in fish continues to  rise  for more than 10 years after DDT use starts
 declining, and the level in fish does not come back down to the 1970 level
 until the year 1995—more than two decades after the decision is made to
 reduce DDT application.'  I believe that the error made here was that in their
 computer programming they equated DDT with persistent chemicals known
 to have half-lives running into tens of thousands of years.  For example, at
 another point in the Report the following statement appears: "We include
 only one class of pollutants—the long-lived, globally-distributed family of
 pollutants,  such as lead,  mercury, asbestos, and stable pesticides and
 radioisotopes—whose dynamic behavior in the ecosystem we are begin-
 ning to understand."
  In no way can DDT and related chlorinated hydrocarbon insecticides be
 classed with lead, mercury, asbestos, and certain stable radioisotopes in
 terms of persistence in the environment.  DDT can be degraded by light,
 high temperatures, chemical action, and a goodly number of fungi and bac-
teria. I  know of 10 species of fish, bird or mammal that cannot at least par-
tially metabolize and excrete  DDT, although at  greatly differing  rates. The
 compound  may last as short  an  interval as two hours in activated sewage
 sludge. On the other hand, a soil can be so overloaded with DDT that it kills
the very micro-organisms on which degradation may depend.  Certainly
when incorporated in  soil below the zone occupied by living organisms,
 and in the  absence of oxygen, it persists for  long  periods.  But the fact
 remains that it is degradable and does not accumulate remorselessly in the
 living environment. Had we from the outset of this era  of environmental con-
cern been able to demonstrate that,  by adjusting the input of DDT, unac-
ceptable residues in non-target species could be reduced as rapidly as the
current monitor ng programs are indicating, our regulatory programs might
 have taken a different course.
Specific Lessons Learned
  It was generally assumed that the far-flung residues of DDT found in fish
and wildlife were the result of  progressive build-up of environmental levels
from 25 years of continued use. Many statements appeared warning that to
add another season's use, another pound,  might push  the residue level
beyond a threshold where another species of wildlife might become en-
dangered. None of the monitoring programs to date that have covered a
span of years have shown any progressive build-up of environmental back-
ground  residue levels of  DDT. The perfection of gas chromatography for
residue analysis, and the extension  of residue monitoring beyond that of
man and raw agricultural foods, did not take place until the middle 1960's.

We cannot document the general environmental background residue levels
of DDT and its metabolities prior to 1965. However, I hold the conviction,
based on more recent studies of rates of disappearance of DDT residues,
that an environmental background "steady state" had been reached by the
mid-1950's and  was being sustained at that point by the  annual input.
Please note that we are still working  with residue information for 1965-
1970, at which time there were still  fair amounts of DDT in  the "user
pipeline" in the  United  States.  I look forward with much interest to the
residue  information for the period  1971-1973, during which time most of
the remaining uses of DDT in the United States were phased out.
   DDT does  not represent the type of problems  encountered  by all
pesticide chemicals—only a very  small  group  of  related chlorinated
hydrocarbons.  The remaining 99 percent show a wide range of chemical
structure, differing one from the other in  possible effects  beyond their
design purpose.  But from  our experience  with  DDT, there are  several
valuable lessons that have applicability to future regulatory programs gover-
ning  all  classes of chemical contaminants.
   First: There is need for greater understanding of, and appreciation for the
principle of dose-related effects!
   Second: The design of tests to develop pre-registration, or pre-marketing
safety information should take cognizance of the applicability of the data to
actual field use. For example, if the limit of solubility of a given pesticide in
water is 2 ppm, then an acute toxicity study,  in which the aquatic animal is
exposed to 20 ppm with the aid of auxiliary solvents,  is merely an academic
exercise—but it will mislead and alarm the public. The highly controversial
study  conducted  at the  Bionetics  Research  Laboratories on a  technical
sample of the  herbicide 2,4,5-T not  only focused  attention on a manu-
facturing impurity in the  herbicide, but introduced a "fudge factor" in the
study by using dimethyl  sulfoxide as  a solvent (8).
  Third: We have moved  too rapidly in some cases when unanticipated ad-
verse effects surfaced and discarded a tool before we had  another to cope
with the  pest problem. A moratorium imposed on  the use of a  pesticide
whose safety is not flawless should stipulate that the Administrator, after
careful review of the risk/benefit equation based on an environmental im-
pact study, could permit the use on a case-by-case basis.
  Fourth:  The  regulation of pesticide chemicals presently falls  under six
pieces of Federal legislation (Table 1). Regulation of pesticide chemicals
began as early as 1910.  In  1947, the passage of the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Ftodenticide Act provided for registration  of all pesticide
products and set up an enforcement procedure based on labeling and con-
trol of interstate shipments. The requirements for registration specified that
the manufacturer provide test data showing his product to be both effective

      Table 1. Federal Legislation Regulating Pesticides-*-1973
        Regulates manufacture and sale.   Regulates the  practice  of
        formulator, distributor,  and applicator.   User  can  be  penal-
        ized for incorrect use.   Requires very comprehensive pre-
        roarketing evaluation of  product  effectiveness,  safety, and
        environmental  Impact.  Authorizes research and  monitoring
        programs on pesticides.

        (Pub.  Law 92-500)
        Regulates point discharges of effluents (including  pesti-
        cides).  Sets  standards  for individual chemical residues
        in water.

3)  FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG,  AND COSMETIC ACT:  Miller pesticide residue
        amendment of I95
and safe. This 1947 law was  periodically updated and the pre-marketing
requirements  made more  exacting. The new  Federal  legislation  that
amends and  supplements the earlier Act are truly comprehensive  and
   The State  legislation on pesticide regulation and associated environ-
mental  quality actions form a veritable maze of controls (Table 2). The at-
tempt to legislate "safety" has now been carried to such a  length as to
justify the question,  have we over-reacted?
Are Pesticides Over-Controlled?
   The evaluation of  the safety and effectiveness  of a pesticide chemical
before it can be marketed has become so detailed  and time-consuming that
if a promising new pesticide emerged from the preliminary screening trials
this morning,  it would be a minimum of five years  before it could be made
available for public sale. The research needed to satisfy Federal registration
will take that long. Despite this intense pre-market  safety check, not enough
questions can be answered to preclude the development under subsequent
use of  some  undesirable effects. A very necessary adjunct to the  pre-
market  evaluation of  pesticides are the national monitoring programs. Star-
ted as a voluntary, interdepartmental Federal program in 1964, it is now a
required program under the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of
1972, for which the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency is
responsible (Section 20(b) and (c)). This  monitoring activity supplements,
in the general environment,  the pesticide  residue monitoring  programs in
raw agricultural food products that have been conducted by the Food and
Drug Administration  since 1954; and by the U.S. Public Health Service for
pesticide residues in man since 1951. Initially the broadened program in
1964 put too much reliance in the yet-developing gas chromatography,  thus
quantification  of a given residue was often inaccurate. Still another short-
coming  that  plagues  the  monitoring  program  is  the  loss  of  time—2
years—between the  collection of  samples and the publishing of results. If
the monitoring programs are to pinpoint trouble spots, and alert us to prac-
tices that result in environmental accumulation  so  that the problem can be
met before a crisis arises, then prompt release of information is imperative.
  The task of the residue analyst is an exceedingly difficult one, for he must
recover not only the parent compound but also its metabolities from a wide
range of biological materials loaded with  interfering substances. He often is
forced to work in the parts-per-billion or in the  parts-per-trillion range.  But
what is  most  disconcerting  is to study  an  excellent piece of residue
analysis, then  find that such inadequate notes  have been taken  when  the
sample  was collected  as to obviate any application of the  residue in-
formation. Despite its present shortcomings, environmental monitoring is

Table  2.  State Legislation Augmenting  Federal Regulation of Preticides
December 1971
                     Al)  SO  States  and Puerto Rico have a

                         PESTICIDE  REGISTRATION LAW

                  36 States  have  established a category of

                          RESTRICTED USE PESTICIDES

                         21  States  have legislation

                          REGULATING HERBICIDE USE

                         20  States  have legislation

                         LICENSING  PESTICIDE DEALERS

                         35  States  have legislation


                         36  States  have legislation

 NOTE:   During 1972  the States enacted  Into law 1(1 additional pieces of
        legislation  bearing  on pesticide regulation.  The Federal require-
        ment for licensing of custom applicators will, of course, be
        nationwide within the next  four years.  Likewise, the federal list
        of restricted-use pesticides will also apply nationwide.  At the
        State level  the use-restrictions can only be more stringent.

still  one of our most valuable tools for achieving environmental quality.
There is no completely safe pesticide, any more than there is a completely
safe lawnmower or a completely safe electrical circuit just safe ways of
using them. A given pesticide of high toxicity may be used effectively and
with no significant adverse side effects by limiting the amounts used, by
placement that avoids exposure of beneficial species, by timing that  ac-
complishes the same end  and by formula additives that warn or repel.
Benefits From Pesticides  and Chemicals
   Pest control chemicais were intended from the outset to make this earth a
better place in which to live. They are designed to assist in improving  en-
vironmental quality—not to  degrade it. It is not difficult to find where these
chemical tools have been incorrectly employed by intent or accident. There
will always  be need for improvement. Nevertheless, the end result is that
today in the United States  we have better health and  live  longer than  the
people  who preceded us.  In  the early 1900's, the corner grocery  store
carried  about 100 food items and no fresh fruit or vegetables out of season.
Now the modern supermarket carries about 6,000 food  items in better
variety,  quality, and availability throughout the year. There are more fish to
be caught in our freshwater streams and lakes, and more wildlife than there
was 40  years ago when the new class of pesticides began to be used. I  am
not saying,  that because of pesticides there is more wildlife today,  but
neither  am I discounting the role it plays  in our total wildlife management
programs (Table 3).
   We have more leisure time since chemical tools have  replaced much
drudgery and  wearisome toil. We have more  recreational opportunities in
the great outdoors  than people anywhere else around the globe, partly
because our advanced thechnology—which includes chemical tools—has
made it  possible for us to provide ourselves with  the basic requirements for
existence on fewer acres. For example, the technological package that per-
mits us  to  produce more food on fewer acres  (by soil conservation,  im-
proved cropping procedures and irrigation, new plant varieties, new breeds
of  livestock,  sophisticated machinery, fertilizers  and  pesticides)  has
released approximately 290 million acres that we can now use for other
purposes, such  as  open space, recreational  areas, and wildlife refuges.
Forests  and timbered tracts  occupy about a third of our total  land area in  the
United States.  Although trees are a renewable resource,  which should  be
promptly harvested at some optimum stage in their growth and the area  im-
mediately restocked, nevertheless we  would  like to be able to retain a
significant portion of this resource to frame our homes, shade our parks,
furnish recreation and wilderness areas, and even become decadent and
hollow, thus providing bird  and wildlife nesting sites. But lumber and pulp

      Table 3. Enhancement of Wildlife Population by Pesticide Use
MORE FISH  IN FRESH WATERS for 25 million anglers a year to harvest.
    Fish hatchery support impossible without chemical  tools.

    Re-build fish stocks possible after control of Lamprey eel.

    Hatchery and rearing pond operations require chemical  tools

AQUICULTURE OF FISH AND SHELLFISH requires algal and parasite control.
    Mountain trout and catfish farming--aiso new maricuiture  operations.

    percentage of the annual food requirement of many  species.

    herbicides without cultivation or replanting.

    selective herbicide methods benefits game and non-game animals.

    scale forest defoliation and destruction, serious  denuding of
    range lands by grasshoppers, etc.

    of our capability to control insect vectors of disease for man,
    such as the mosquito, blackflies, etc.

    exotic big game in Texas increased rapidly following suppression
    of the Texas cattle fever tick and the screwworm.

    A part of the success of the re-introduction of the wild  turkey
    can be credited to lessened exposure to poultry diseates.

    For example, Canadian geese suffer mortality from  a form  of  malaria,
    transmitted by a marsh mosquito.

    we have pesticides to control  the insect vectors, we are  privileged
    to keep these potential  carriers of diseases around us, such as  song
    birds/encephalit is.

will be in short supply by 1980. So our set-asides for the above purposes
will depend on the  success of the technological  advances recently an-
nounced  by the forest industry—that  through  the development  of fast-
growing, superior class trees and improved silvacultural practices, they
can triple the  production of fiber  per acre of commercial forest.
  Similarly,  the technological package that  enables us  to ship, store,
process, package and serve foods after they are harvested,  with minimal
loss or lowering of quality, makes it unnecessary to employ still more acres
to make up for losses that in some under-developed countries may equal a
third of their production. Chemicals to control  fungi and bacteria which
cause  spoilage and  decay of foods  are required to be registered  as
pesticides along with the better known chemicals that control insect pests
and rodents. Pesticides do  a yeoman job as sanitizing agents in flour mill,
bakery,  retail  store,  restaurant, and in  our  homes. How would we run a
hospital without them?
  Technology  indirectly releases  another huge  block  of  land—perhaps
another 200 million acres—and helps to conserve  non-renewable resour-
ces for the furture by prolonging the utility of manufactured goods. In the
home many items such as rugs, draperies, overstuffed furniture, mattresses,
and clothing received some chemical assistance at the manufacturing level
against factors of deterioration and destruction. The housewife  supplements
this with spot treatments against  fabric-eating pests like carpet beetles,
silverfish, moths, roaches, and even an occasional mouse or rat. She fights
mildew  and mold. She  launders  these  fabrics with gentle soaps and
detergents in a modern washing machine. This is a far cry from the harsh
soaps, and the repeated flailing of the wet garment  on a rock at the river's
edge  (as is common at  the village level in  India). All this means less
replacement, fewer acres needed to grow cotton, less pasture for sheep,
and less basic chemicals from wood and oil.
  Man's  technological ability is forever creating  new problems but at the
same  time  it   has provided  him  many  choices  and opportunities for
developing and maintaining a quality environment in  which to live. As stated
by Dr. Rene J.  Dubos in a lecture given before the American Association for
the Advancement  of Science,  "In my  opinion, the  human use of natural
resources and of technology is compatible with ecological health, and can
indeed bring out potentialities of the earth which remain unexpressed in the
state of  wilderness"  (9).
  Spencer's discussion is an excellent illustration of the common problems
of environmental management. Early perceptions and analyses of potential
persistence  of  pesticides  and entry into the food  chain  led  to  in-

tensive regulation.  Now, although data are not complete and continual
monitoring is required, Spencer sees evidence that perhaps the pesticides
were not as persistent as originally thought
  He  relates  advantages of controlled pesticide use emphasizing that
millions of acres may be released for recreational and other uses through
enlightened management.
  He also shows that pesticides are now regulated by at least six pieces of
legislation  administered by several  different agencies.
  In this example, tnen, we see the omnipresent need for research and in-
formation,  unifying concepts and systems  analysis.

                  /VOTES FOR CHAPTER I
I.Lowe,  Jack  I.  Wilson,  Paul D. Rick,  Alan J. and  Wilson, Alfred J.
  "Chronic Exposures of Oysters to DDT, Toxaphene, and Parathion",
  Proc.  National Shellfisheries Association, 61:71-79. June  1971.
2. Butler, Philip A., "DDT in Estuarian Mulluscs", Bioscience, 22{12): let-
  ters, 1972. (Note:  Full text of the monitoring project  has been ac-
  cepted for publishing  in the  March,  1973  issue of the  Pesticides
  Monitoring Journal).
3. Corneliussen,  P.E., "Pesticide  Residues in Total  Diet  Samples",
  Pesticide Monitoring Journal, 5(4):313-330.  March, 1972.
4. Yobs,  Anne R.,  "The National  Human Monitoring  Program for
  Pesticides",  Pesticide  Monitoring Journal, 5(1):44-46, June, 1971.
5. Warnick,  Stephen  L  "Organochlorine  Pesticide  Levels  in  Human
  Serum and Adipose Tissue, Utah—Fiscal Years  1967-71", Pesticide
  Monitoring Journal, 6(1):9-13,  June, 1972.
6. Abbott,  D. C.,  Collins, G. B. and  Goulding,  R.  "Organochlorine
  Pesticide Residues in  Human  Fat in the United  Kingdon,  1969-71",
  British Medical Journal, June 3,  1972.
7. Meadows, Donella H., Meadows,  Dennis L. Randers, Jorgen "The
  Limits to Growth:  A Report for the Club  of Rome's  Project on the
  Predicament of Mankind", A  Potomac Associates  Book: Universe
  Books, N.Y.
8. "Report on  2,4,5-T",  A Report  of the Panel on Herbicides of the
  President's  Science Advisory Committee.  Executive  Office of  the
  President, Office of Science and Technology.
9. Dubos, Rene J., "Humanizing the Earth", B. Y.  Morrison  Memorial
  Lecture, 139th Annual  Meeting,  AAAS, Washington, D.C., Dec.  29,


1. Buchsbaum, R. and  M.,  Basic  Ecology.  Boxwood  Press, 1957. A
  telegraphic presentation of the concepts and principles of ecology.
2. Kormondy, Eugene, Concepts of Ecology. Prentice Hall, 1964. A con-
  cise statement with examples  of ideas basic to ecology.
3. Leopold,  Aldo, A Sand County Almanac, Ballentine Press, 1945. Con-
  cise statement of ethics and principles of environmental management,
  together with first-hand illustrations.
4. Odum. Eugene P., Fundamentals of Ecology. 3d Ed., W. Saunders,
  1972. A  basic comprehensive text on  ecology.





  Our population is growing and public perception of environmental quality
 and other social problems is focused on our population growth. Public of-
 ficials at all levels of government have expressed concern and indicated a
 need  for  action.
  Recently the birth rate in the United States dropped to about 2.1  children
 per female, less than the replacement rate. We have, at least at this instant
 of time, reached the magical Zero Population Growth (ZPG) rate. Even if the
 birth rate  remains at or below this level for many years, we will not achieve a
 Zero  Population  Growth in absolute numbers.  This  is so  because  the
 relative number of young women in the  population mix is large. As each of
 these women bears an average of about two children, the population will
 grow. We are also  faced  with  the problem of high concentrations  of
 population in urban areas. Therefore it is likely we will experience a growth
 in population,  more  intense in  urban  areas,  and must deal with an  ac-
 companying  economic  growth and  possible environmental  degradation
 while we also seek to discover new approaches for improving the quality of
  The discussions of ZPG, its effect on the environment and implications for
 policy are taken from several invited  papers. Current population forecasts
 are reviewed. Graham Molitor discusses reasons for the decline in fertility
 rate. Fred Singer concludes that the fertility rate will remain somewhere
 near the present low and presents social, cultural  and economic reasons for
 his conclusion. Christakis and Molitor !      . the trend toward urbanization
 and review its  social  and economic  consequences.
  The effects of population growth on the environment under conditions of
ZPG rate  are outlined by Christakis using a simple model to  illustrate the
relationship between population,'population density and pollution levels.
  Singer discusses economic and welfare implications of ZPG, outlining a
hoped-for improvement in quality of life which might be possible if the birth
rate remains low.

  After  reviewing the determinants of resource and environmental pres-
sures. Ridker presents the results ot an analysis of the effect of population
growth and current policies on the quality of life,  life style, and adequacy of
resources and-quality of the environment.
  Ridker concludes that direct methods of achieving an improved quality of
life and  environment are superior to indirect methods and less specifically-
stated goals such as Zero Economic Growth and Zero Population Growth.

The Pressure of Population
  The world's population  is currently increasing at about two percent an-
nually,  causing a doubling in population every 35 years. It took two million
years for the earth's human  population to reach the one billion mark. This
milestone was achieved in the year 1830. By 1930, merely a century later,
the world population had  become two billion. If the current annual rate of
growth of world population were to continue at this pace, the earth would be
home for 12 billion human beings by the year 2030. Just seventy years after
that, in the year 2100, there would be 50 bilNon human inhabitants of this
small planet!
  Von  Foerster and his  colleagues  calculated an  equation  describing
current worldwide trends of population growth (1). The Von Foerster data is
based on the best estimates of world  population over the past 2,000 years.
In simple form, the equation reveals that each successive doubling of world
population has required only half the time as the prior doubling.
  This  growth process is characteristic only of  man as a self-conscious
being. All the advances accruing over the past forty millenia with regard to
individual capacity,  understanding, elaboration of social  roles, technology,
and  human well-being  are  mirrored in this increase  in  population. In-
creasing population led to successive environmental crises which served
as stimuli for their creative resolution through the generation of concepts
that permitted linking more people into larger communication networks and
the more  effective fabrication of natural resources to meet new demands.
  Thus we are  led to the conclusion  that the  overall impact of increase in
numbers has been  beneficial. But we are further led to ask the question:
"How much longer can this trend persist?"
  For man to survive and to evolve further there must be a sudden shift in
certain aspects of the growth process. Calhoun  states forcefully that: "The
guiding of man and nature  through  this phase shift stands as the basic
issue in the presently emerging environmental crisis" (2). Ameliorating
pollution and stabilizing the biosphere, though they are essential  actions,
are insufficient to  assure resolution of the  current evolutionary-environ-
mental  crisis. Graham Molitor comments as follows:

  In his Population  Message of July  18, 1969.  President Nixon stated:
"One of the most serious challenges to human  destiny  in the last third of
this century will be the  growth of the population."
  Kenneth Boulding adds: "One of the most difficult problems facing man-
kind in the present historical era is the control of its own population !"  (3).
Boulding refers to "population equilibrium" as a critical unsolved problem.

   The President also attributed the wrenching dislocations in coping with
 problems in the last few decades to the geometrical growth  of population
 during  the  last half century: "I believe that many  of our present social
 problems may be related to the  fact that we have had only fifty years in
 which to accommodate the  second hundred million Americans." (4).
   These  remarks  underscore the importance of current  population
 pressures.  In  responding  to the  importance  of  the  issues posed by
 population growth, a Commission on Population Growth and the American
 Future was  established by Act of  Congress and signed into law on March
 16,  1970.
   The studies published by this Presidential Commission articulate, quan-
 tify,  and realistically describe the seriousness  and pervasiveness of the
 world  population  problem.  The  ultimate  conclusion  reached  is  that
 population growth (and perhaps  economic growth) must halt because of
 finite resources—the ony questions are "when, where,  and how." (5).
US.  Population Forecasts

  The latest population forecasts for the United States, as estimated by the
Department of Commerce, are shown in Figure 1 and Table 1 (6). Forecasts
are made for four assumed fertility rates as shown in the Figure. The fertility
rates  have  been revised downward since previous forecasts due to sharp
declines in ferti ity since  1970 and to the sharp decline in the birth ex-
pectations of young wives during the past five years. Assumptions for mor-
tality rates have been revised slightly and net immigration is assumed to be
400,000 per year.
  The assumption of lower fertility rate appears  to be justified by recent ex-
perience. For the first nine months of 1972 the rate fell to 2.03. This rate is
below the replacement rate—the rate at which children must be born for the
population  to  maintain  itself.  This does not  mean,  however, that the
population  can be expected to  level off or be reduced in the near term. The
relative number of young women in the  population mix is high, therefore the
population  will continue to grow for some time.  For example, at a constant
birth rate of 2.1,  the population would grow from the present 210 million to
320 million in 70 years, then level off. At a rate of 1.8, the population wou-.J
grow  to 260 million in 50 years, then  level off.  Thus, although the Lh, ted
States is experiencing a birth rate equal to or less than a Zero Population
Growth rate at this  instant in time, we will ^xperience a population growth
for  some time to come.

Millions of Persons

 (Average Number of
  Bi rths Per Woman)
  Series C = 2.8
  Series 0 = 2.5
  Series E = 2.1
  Series F = I.8

       1972        1980          1990        2000        2010        2020

Source:   U.S.  Department  of  Commerce  Series P-25, No. ^93, December 1972
          Figure 1. Projections of Total Population.  1972 to 2020

Table 1. Summary of Projections of Total Population: 1960 to 2020. (Population in thousands. Total
population including Armed Forces abroad)
(July 1)
1 960 	
1972. .
] 980 	
20 1 5 	

Series C

215 872
230 955
248,71 1
266 238
282 766
300 , 1*06
321 025
3i|ii 091)
367 977
392 030

Series D
215 324
228 676
258 692
272 21 t
301 397
318 156
335 028
351 368

Series E
2)1 92<>
22** 132
235 701
24$ 639
256 015
273 053
281 968
290 432
297 7^6

Series F

2!1 178
221 8*18
230 913
239 084
24s <;QI
250 686
255 209
2";q 312
262 631
264 564


Determinants  of Population Growth

  The basic determinants of population growth are three: birth rate, death
rate and net  migrat:on. Graham Molitor comments as follows:
  Of these three factors, by far the least stable is birth rate. During the past
half-century the United States, as well  as other countries,  has achieved a
fairly constant death rate, based on decreasing  infant mortality rates and
relative  stability of life-spans.  The  U.S.  Census Bureau estimates  net
migration for the U.S. at  approximately 400,000 per year.
  The birth rate of the United  States  and other industrialized countries,
then, emerges as the single  most  important variable in  forecasting future
growth,  as well as  in selecting means to  control future  population.

The U.S. Birthrate

    The factor determining a nation's birth rate is  the fertility rate found
within its population. The fertility rate in the U.S. has been steadily declining
as shown  in Figure 2. Graham Molitor lists reasons for  this decline,  as
  —more young women staying single;
  —more women starting families later;
  —more  working wives ("when women are able to work, birth rates
  —more women careerists (in 1971  women accounted for some 43 per-
     cent of the labor force; in 1960 the figure was 34 percent);
  —increased use and effectiveness of contraception;
  Expanding on these reasons Molitor states that a wide variety of ad-
ditional natural and artificial constrictions on family size provides a fuller un-
derstanding of this  downward shift:
  1. Child bearing capacity: Women can bear children for some 30 years
    (ages  15 through  45) and  may  give birth to a  maximum  of  ap-
    proximately 20 children (7). Few women, however, produce maximum
    broods. Cultural and economic inhibitions and the tendency to marry
    later deter maximum sized families.  Modern "fertility drugs" and the
    side-effect of multiple births could raise this level somewhat In other

  6 -
               i	r	1	1	r
1830    1850   1870    1890     1910     1930    1950
 Figure 2. Historical Trend in U.S. Fertility Rate (SOURCE: "Population and
.the American Future: The Report of the Commission on Population Growth
 and the American Future." March 1970.)

  words, social variables, rather than biological factors, tend to constrict
  birth rates.
    Techniques for bypassing one  mate or the other must be consid-
      —children  conceived  by   artificial  insemination  (anony-
         mous  or selected semen donors);
      —surrogate  (host)  mothers   (ovum  and  sperm  from anony-
         mous  or selected donors).
    Also to be factored are new life science developments  that may
    completely bypass  normal reproduction:
      —human clone (humans grown from "cuttings");
      —extra-uterine  developments ("ectogenesis,"  human  "hat-
      —artificial wombs;
      —creation of artificial life forms.
2. Females in child-bearing age bracket.  Women  in the prime child-
  bearing age group—females age 20-34—bear special attention, since
  4 of each 5 babies born come from this group. Some 25 million women
  will be in  this age group in 1975; the number will grow to some 30
  million women by 1985. The Commission on Population  views prime
  childbearing ages at 20-29 and predicts that this group will grow 5 1/2
  million by 1985. Such increases  would exert even stronger upward
  pressure on population growth (8). This projected 20 percent growth
  pattern will have an upward pressure  on population growth.
3. Number of marrieds.  The number  of married couples is another factor
  bearing on population trends. The size of this group "is expected to
  rise from 42.3 million in  1965 to  51 million in 1975 to 60 million in
  1985" (9). This increase of nearly  50 percent will  add to potentials for
  population growth. Currently there are  unusually large  numbers of
  young men and women, a result of the post war "baby boom." Naturally
  the number of marriages and  household formations  has been  in-
  creasing.  Despite these facts, the birth rate has  been declining and
  has actually reached the lowest point  in our history.
4. Sexual permissiveness. The "sexual  revolution" and growing per-
  missiveness in sexual relations and cohabitation between consenting
  adults  could  significantly affect  population growth.  Women's new
  sexual permissiveness made possible by more effective  and simpler
  contraceptives,  sterilization, abortion, and other new technologies en-
  courages  sex  for pleasure rather than  propagation.  Widespread
  availability of inexpensive and effective  contraceptives should netralize
  the overall impact of sexual permissiveness  on population growth.

  More permissive attitudes towards homosexuality and lesbianism also
  may have some incremental effect on subduing population growth.
5, Age at first marriage.  Putting marriage off to later life provides fewer
  years for married couples to conceive children and the potential for
  population  growth is reduced. The higher proportion of children going
  on to college and military service  obligations contribute to marriage
  postponment. Between 1956 and 1967 the median age for marriage
  rose from 20.1  to 20.8 years for females, and 22.5 to 23.1 years for
  males (10). More current Census figures indicate continuation of the
  trend toward postponed marriage—between  1960 and  1972,  the
  median age at first marriage for women rose from 20.3 to 20.9 years,
  and the proportion of  single (never married) among women 20 to 24
  years old rose  from 28  percent to 36 percent (11).
6. Childless   couples. The number  of childless couples  has been
  declining.   In  1940 23 percent of married  women age 30-34 were
  childless; by 1960 the proportion dropped to 10 percent and then to 6
  percent in  1968 (12). This  has an obvious  impact on population in-
7. Unwanted  births.  Portending further decrease in the "replacement
  rate"  is the fact some 20 percent of current births are "unwanted." The
  1965 National Fertility Study speculated that "elimination of unwanted
  births would result in fertility levels ultimately commensurate with near-
  zero growth" (13). Given increased acceptance and availability of con-
  traceptives  and other "emancipating"  techniques, it is highly likely that
  the fertility  rate will decline still further.
  7a. Unplanned births  The  Population Commission  not  only
      estimated up to one-fifth of all births were unwanted but that
      fully 44  percent  were unplanned.  If  contraceptive
      technology applies to anything approaching this extent, the
      results  on population growth will be most  significant.
  7b. Illegitimate births. Growing in seriousness  and importance
      is illegitimacy. In 1967  some 4.5  million children under 18
      years were illegitimate.  A study in the District of Columbia
      disclosed in 1970 that over 40 percent of all births were
      illegitimate, and projected the figure would reach 50  per-
      cent by 1973. Rates of illegitimacy among young women
      ages 15-19 increased 2-3 times  between  1940 and 1968.
      Legalized   abortion,  effective  sex  education  and  con-
      traceptive  technologies  doubtless would  substantially
      reduce these demographics.

   7c. Birth expectations. Wives in the 18-24 year bracket expect
       to have fewer births. The average dropped from 2.9 in 1967,
       to 2.4 in 1971, to 2.3 in 1972 (14). This decline is a con-
       tinuation of a downturn in birth expectations of young wives.
       The changed attitude toward smaller families has an impor-
       tant bearing on the population slowdown.
8. Smaller  family  size.   Family  size has  been  steadily  downtrending
  throughout the course  of  history.  During  the  period of  agrarian
  development family size was much larger. At that time high infant mor-
  taility rates encouraged additional births, as did  the need for manual
  labor to  perform  labor-intensive work in the  fields. The 5  member
  family was not uncommon. At the time of the Revolutionary War, the 8-
  child family was common; in 1850 family size dropped to 6; then to 4
  by 1900. Children born to couples in the 1930's averaged 3.3. In 1968
  American families averaged  2.7 children.  Today in post-industrial
  America we are down to the 2 child family. These trends have obvious
  effects on population decline.
9. Abortion, Legalizing abortion and widespread  social acceptance and
  legal recognition thereof will decrease the number of likely births. Con-
  tinuing to grow is the notion a woman should have the right of control
  over her body. Free abortion in Hungary, reportedly, contributed to the
  negative  zero population  growth in  that country.  Since  1968  the
  estimated number of recorded abortions has increased impressively
Number of Abortions
  The Commission on Population  estimates in 1971  between 200,000
  and  1,200,000 abortions  were  performed in the U.S. Some com-
  mentators view "therapeutic abortions" as an increase in the freedom
  of the mother (16). True. But, moral questions surrounding freedoms of
  the person  conceived must also be considered.
10. Divorce. Marriages that stay together have an important bearing on
  population increases.  In the first 9 months of  1972, the divorce  rate
  stood at 4.0 per 1,000 Americans, close to the highest rate which ever
  occurred in the U.S.—4.3 persons per 1,000 (17). A related question
  concerns remarriage after divorce. Remarriages are far more prevalent
  among males than females.

11. New lower Census projections. Lower birth rate trends have been of-
  ficially recognized by Census action in dropping Series B projections
  (assumed fertility rate of 3.1) and addition of the new Series F tract.
  Hard times like the Great Depression or involvement in World War II,
  which depressed  birth  rates  to all-time historical  lows,  are  un-
  derstandable.  What is truly extraordinary about the present all-time
  historical lows for birth rate is that it is occuring during a period of un-
  precedented   prosperity. Many factors, especially those enumerated
  above, should be watched closely to track this trend. Should trends
  continue in their  present direction,  the U.S.   will  have entered  a
  population stabilization or even negative population growth  rate.

The United States Death Rate
  In terms of historical life expectancy,  those  of us living today  are  a
privileged group of individuals. Before the birth of Christ, life  expectancy
was a mere 18 years. In the United States in 1970 life expectancy has been
extended to 70 years. In less than 2,000 years man has quadrupled his life
expectancy. The following  is taken from Graham Molitor's paper.
  The following tabulation indicates  life  expectancy increases in  recent
Life Expectancy
18 years
  It is contemplated that average life expectancy will continue to climb,
though at a slower rate. By the end of the century it could climb 1 '/2 years.
Major breakthroughs in medical sciences could substantially increase this
estimate. The prospect  of people living  longer has an obvious direct
bearing on further population  increases.
  Because of the increased number of older persons, due partly to greater
life expectancy, public policy is likely to focus increasingly on degenerative
diseases manifested in later life. Life expectancy increases will come about

due in part to development of major medical advances.
  A wide  range  of  exotic  bio-engineering possibilities  for  extending
longetivity,  rejuvenating or even postponing aging follow:

  —Discovery of a cure for cancer, heart disease and other major diseases;
  —Better understanding and control of possible health hazards, such as;
     smoking,  heart disease, air pollution, traffic fatalities;
  —Improving medical systems including (computer monitoring of patients;
     computer assisted hospital  care;  closed  circuit TV  surveillance of
  —Development  of immunizing agents protecting against bacterial and
     viral diseases;
  —Widespread use, low cost  availability of artificial  organs;
  —Easily available electromechanical implants,
  —Renewal of organs by chemical, hormonal  balance;
  —Growing new  organs to replace old ones,  then storing or "booking"
     them until  needed;
  —Artificial hearts (implanted  machines which will not be rejected);
  —Postponing aging;
  —Human hybernation;
  —Suspended animation.
  Political  problems posed  by such exotic developments are substantial.
How to control rackets in transplantable organs;  how to determine the point
at which a host full  of implants or external assists, or artificial organs ceases
as a legal entity and becomes a new person; how to determine when a per-
son is legally  dead,  how to determine inheritance rights,  continuity of
marital contract, responsiblity for legal contractual arrangements; how to
allocate medical equipment when it is scarce and  so  expensive as to be
unavailable to all but the rich; how to decide when to unplug persons  from
life-sustaining machines  if the decision means certain death; how to  view
  Potential advances  in  medical science are mindboggling. Man stands
close to the threshhold of breakthroughs which will have a major impact
upon increasing life expectancy.  Breakthroughs of the kinds enumerated
will have a profound effect upon population pressures in the future.
                           Infant Mortality
  In recent years, the U.S. has ranked 16th in infant mortality. This is not an
enviable position for the "most advanced" nation in the world. Once such
quantifiable data is adduced and room for improvement becomes obvious,
these facts  become a force for change in their own right. We can  expect in-
creased efforts  by  the Federal government to reduce  infant mortality.

                       Life Expectancy Factors
   Measuring all the factors which bear on life expectancy is an extremely
 difficult undertaking.
   To underscore the complexity and subtlety of the kinds of data which are
 necessary to get a "total view" of such parameters, consider the partial
 listing of factors which might give a more sophisticated and holistic view of
 the national health and provide insights on the calculus of computing life
 expectancy: heart disease incidence; protein consumption; fat and sucrose
 consumption; caloric consumption; cancer incidence; poisonings; levels of
 radiological hazards; environmental  hazards (toxic levels of gases,  etc);
 decibel levels; infant mortality; preventive health rates; violent crimes; men-
 tal  health average  exercise;  dental  health;  number of  eye glasses and
 related eye disorders; consumption of selective drugs
  Such a list could go on and on. It is only partially elucidated to indicate
 the very complexity  fully describing the nature of any particular facet of
 qualitative measurement. We already have volumes of such data. We need
 merely to collect it, aggregate it, interpret it,  and develop a through-going
 and searching assessment of  our current position  based upon this quan-
 tifiable data.
                          Net Immigration
  Net immigration into the United States is expected to continue at present
 levels of about 400,000 per year,  according to the Census Bureau and im-
 migration  officials. The demographic impact  of immigrants is important
 because a high  percentage of immigrants are in child-bearing prime and
 may be more likely to have larger families. From 1960-65, net civilian im-
 migration  averaged 364,000 yearly — twice the average of the 1940-9 era.
Around 1900, immigrants per 1000 population stood at eight;  around 1970
the rate had sunk to two immigrants per 1 000 population — a fourfold reduc-
tion. Immigration  is likely to be stabilized for the forseeable  future — Con-
gressional action to enhance immigration is less likely than action to restrict

 Will  the U.S.  Maintain a ZPG  Birth Rate?
  Singer believes that  the  present  low fertility rate  is not a temporary
phenomenon but  is a  permanent change  in  the family pattern  of our
population. The  sociological, economic and technical  reasons, given by
Singer are discussed beiow.

  First of all, there is the increasing level of education which, in addition to
allowing more effective contraception, also opens up to women  other op-
portunities and other career goals  rather than that  of a housewife  and
  Coupled with this is  the greater  affluence  of  the average American.
During 1972 the median family income exceeded $10,000 per year, com-
pared to $3300 in 1950. Even taking inflation into account, real income has
more than doubled in a little more than 20 years. The proportion of families
considered  poor  by the  criteria  that the  U.S.  government uses  has
decreased sharply;  from  18 percent  in 1959 to 10 percent in 1968,  and
may be expected to decrease further.
  Not only has family income increased, but  so has the income of women.
To a large extent the changes have been legal and political as well as
cultural and social. Rights legislation, the Equal Employment Opportunities
Commission,  and  increasing  acceptance  of women into higher  paying
positions have had two effects. They have increased the income of women,
but also opened up new prospects and increased expectations. Since large
families and professional careers are not easily compatible, it  is very likely
that the incentive for larger families will be reduced.
  A further change which appears irreversible has been the increased ur-
banization  of the American population. In  a  rural environment the  in-
cremental  costs of  children are  fairly small  since they  require little ad-
ditional housing, and purchased food.  In an urban environment, housing
and maintenance can become quite costly.  In a rural environment children
provide a labor force—or at least did in past years in the United States,  and
still do in  many countries.  In the city, children do not have economically
useful functions and usually need to be totally supported.
  Increased social programs, such as social  security and medicare for the
aged, have removed to some extent the insecurity which many people feel
concerning their maintenance in old age. In turn, this diminishes the need
for children and other relatives who  in the  past have provided support for
their parents.
  A  lower infant  mortality  may also be connected with a lower fertility.
Having  reasonable  assurance that  children will  survive to adulthood,
couples place less emphasis on a large family.
  Altogether  there  has  been a decline  in pronatalist  sentiments  and
policies. Whereas at one time large families were the source of general
societal approval, this is  no longer so.  Families with six  or more children
are looked on as somewhat odd, and those  with more than 10  or 12 are
regarded with social disapproval. Unfortunately these social views have not
as yet  translated themselves into governmental policies.  For  example, we
still have a pronatalist tax policy, although it is only mildly so. More serious,

 perhaps,  is the fact that the costs of raising  children are borne more and
 more by society as a whole, rather than being incident on the parents who
 derive pleasure from the child but few of the disbenefits.
   We need to recognize, of course, that fertility may be determined to a
 large extent by fashions and fads.
   One wonders to what extend our current environmental and ecological
 concerns are  responsible for  a lower fertility  and to  what  extent  the
 existence of ZPG groups throughout the country has influenced fertility.
 Such a correlation may exist,  but  it  is  not  necessarily rational. The  en-
 vironmental and ecological concerns may translate themselves into a lower
 fertility because of a perception that we have too large a population. This is
 based on experience of local crowding, on air pollution and water pollution
 which is observed in the urban environment, and  on the rapid urbanization
 of  countryside  in  the vicinity  of metropolitan  centers. Traffic  snarls,
 inadequate parking, and similar annoyances produce an impression that we
 have at least exceeded optimum population concentrations for portions of
 the United States  We may have,  but on the other hand, we may not have. All
 these items are really evidence of a poor distribution of population, of poor
 planning, expecially  in the field of transportation and  land use, and of
 inadequate abatement of pollution.
   But whether the arguments are rational or not  matters  little. The effects
 may be there, and they are certainly in the direction of diminishing fertility. A
 powerful impulse towards smaller families comes from the awareness of en-
 vironmental  and ecological problems, as well as from the realization that
 certain  resources,  such as fossil fuels,  open space,  wilderness  areas,
 beaches,  etc.  may be finite after all.
   Overall, one would judge that there  have now appeared  irreversible
 trends which have affected the decisions of millions of individuals towards
 having smaller families. These decisions  are based on the expectation that
 thereby they will derive a higher quality of life, although  their definition of
 "quality of life" is never spelled out and depends on  individual perception.
 Nevertheless,  it is remarkable  that the  sum  total of these millions of in-
 dividual  decisions can  result  in -a  societal  situation  leading to zero
 population growth  and a situation in which societal welfare as  well will be
 benefited—in addition to individual welfare. In essence, people who are at-
tempting to maximize their personal happiness may in the process also im-
 prove the state of  societal  economic and social welfare.

Urbanization of Population
  Christakis points out another dominant trend that needs to be seriously
acknowledged. This  is the dynamic  evolution of  human  settlements into
continuous urban systems. Some observers, such as C.A. Doxiadis, believe
that  urban  areas  may  merge  into  a  continuous  universal  city or
  "(Ecumenopolis) is the inevitable future of Human Settlements in the
  next few generations, as we can foresee that, assuming we avoid any
  major catastrophe,  we will have to deal  with a universal  city whose
  population will tend to be stable in numbers but increasingly  more
  developed intellectually and  socially, which will dispose of much
  greater quantities of  energy and achieve greater social  interaction"

  The trend towards the Ecumenpolis is particularly  dominant in emerging
post-industrial societies such as the  United  States. The metropolitan area
growth of the United States has been consistently more rapid than the in-
crease of national  population during the 20th century. Measured as a per-
centage of national population, metropolitan areas in 1960 contained  66
percent of the nation's population. By 1970 this percentage had increased
to 71 percent of the national total. This meant that the United States was
transformed from a country that was  60 percent rural in  1900 to one that
was more than  70 percent urban  in 1970.  By the  year 2000, based  on
trends of 1940-1970, 85 percent of the nation's population is projected to
reside in major  metorpolitan  areas.
  The most startling feature of projected population growth and distribution
is that the majority of Americans will  most likely live in giant metropolitan
regions along the seaboards  and  the Great Lakes. In 1960, the United
States contained 23 great metropolitan areas  of  one million or more people,
each amounting to a total population of 68.2  million—38 percent of  the
national total population. The 1970  census reveals that the number of such
metropolitan  areas  has  risen to 29  and  the  population  residing  in
metropolitan regions to 89.3  million  or 44 percent of the national total. If
these trends are extended to the year 2000, the  proportion of the population
residing in metropolitan regions of one  million or more will amount to  65
percent (under the series B projection of the U.S. Bureau of the Census,
amounting to 321  million people by  the year 2000), residing in 50 such
large urban agglomerations.

 Effects of Urban Overpopulation
   In discussing tie effects of urban overpopulation, Molitor says there is a
 growing body of evidence that animal  overcrowding produces psychotic
 behavior. Fruit flies do over populate to extinction in Bell jars; lemmings do
 take periodic death plunges into the seas.

   Sheer density nas undersirable effects on social behavior.  In dense ur-
 ban-industrial areas, behavioral responses to  overcrowding may help ex-
 plain exploding criminal behavior, increasing group disorganization, even
 the growing incidence ot  mental disorders. Instead  of a "nice  to have
 luxury," there may be a biological necessity to  relieve urban environmental
 pressures and to restore (19):

   —quiet (freedom from excessive noise pollution);
   —privacy (limits on invasion  by electronic surveillance, systematic com-
     puterized data collection,  etc.);
   —independence (mechanisms to  relieve system breakdown  from over-
   —initiative (constricted by the mob's crush);
   —open space (green belts,  recreation areas).

   Population policy is increasingly becoming a public concern. Population
 policy once largely left to undirected decisions is "now on the verge of
 becoming a public concern, as a result of the dangers of overpopulation
 and the possibilities of avoiding them that are inherent in new birth control
 technologies" (20). One of the central problems is that there is no precise
 method of determining  "optimum population."
   Though environmental hazards posed by urban-industrial density are
 substantial,  caution should  be taken  to avoid over-reacting. Current mood
 and sentiment verges on an "alienation hysteria" (21). The Population Com-
 mission  final  report  cau:ions that,  "An  attitude of indifference of com-
 placency (toward population growth)  is unwarranted; so is the cry of early
 catastrophe  and crises."
   Christakis summarizes changes in  life style brought about by the shift to
 urban  living.  He states that urbanization has caused major  economic,
 social, and  environmental  changes  for  both  the  receiving  metropolitan
 areas and the people  left behind. As recently as the turn of the century,
 some 35 percent of America's workers were  involved in agriculture. Today
 only 4.4 percent of the labor force is employed in agriculture and that figure
 is  projected to decline  to two percent by the  year 2000.  Employment in
goods-producing industries  such as  manufacturing,  construction,  and

mining  has also been continuously declining  relative  to  the total em-
ployment  since the 1950's when the post-industrial or  service economy
emerged.  Around  1956, the service-producing  industries (trade, finance,
services, real  estate, public utilities, transportation, and government) took
the lead over jobs in the goods-producing industries. When this happened,
the U.S. became the first nation in the history of the world where the number
of manual  or  blue-collar workers was exceeded by the so-called white-
collar occupations.  It appears that the policy implications of  this shift have
not yet  been completely analyzed and explored by  policy scientists.
  The continuous eclipse of traditional industrial pursuits, i.e.,  agriculture
and manfacturing, and  the rise of the service-producing industries within a
continuously growing metropolitan population, bring on  a whole array of
significant shifts that will profoundly affect the business structure, our daily
life styles, and our value systems. Some of the basic shifts that are well  un-
der way are:

  • From  primary and  secondary industries (agriculture/manufacturing) to
    tertiary and quaternary industries (service, knowledge activities),
  • From  goods to services.
  • From goods/services produced by muscle power to those produced by
    machines and  cybernetics.
  • From  the  materialistic to the sensate.
  • From  "things" to experiences.
  • From  physiological to psychological needs.
  • From  scarcity to abundance and  eventually  to super abundance.
  • From  a few stark choices to a bewildering array of choices.
  • From durability to disposables and planned obsolescence and back to
    recyclables, reclaimables.
  • From self-interest motivation to a broader social and humanitarian out-
  • From  independence and self-sufficiency to interdependence.
  • From individual freedom, to voluntary restraints, to mandatory restraints.
  • From  Puritan hard-work ethic  to leisure as a matter of  right.
  • From  Darwinian self-survival to humanistic security.
  • From  atomistic to  large-scale  pluralistic institutions.
  • From  national  to multi-national and "one-world" scale operations.
  • From  decentralization to centralization and eventual  globalization.
  • From  irrational  chaos to futures-creative long range  planning.

 Can Man Adapt to Urban Living?
   Molitor believes that living organisms and even man-made institutions
 have a tendency to specialize and proliferate to the point where extreme
 demands bring  on  ultimate demise—entrophy.  Catastrophic  collapse
 brought about by over-population, or any other excess, can be postponed
 or avoided altogether by adaptation. Adaptability—that has been the secret
 of man's mastery over the environment.
  On the European Continent during the 14th century, as large urban cities
 emerged and grew, the Bubonic Plague wiped out some 25 percent of the
 entire  inhabiting population  (22).  Man was  unprepared.  Adapting  the
 human  organism to  large social complexes tested the mettle  of then-
 existing technology and organizational skills. The stakes, literally,  were life
 or death. Man did adapt. Sanitation and  public  health measures were
 developed and prevented epidemic spread of communicable diseases.
  Natural growth limits for organisms depend upon the ability of getting rid
 of wastes—"this is what limits the size of a colony of bacteria on a nutrient
 surface" (23). In urban-industrial complexes limitations  are similar. Ad-
 justment is necessary if large-scale populations  in urban industrial areas
 are to thrive.
  Today, new adjustments to  the giant-sized urban industrial habitats man
 has created are required. There are suggestions that man's physical health
 may be  jeopardized by  ecological  imbalances in overly-stressed en-
  Man is what  he consumes,  and he consumes (24,  25):

  —3 pounds of food solids;
  —4 1/2-6 pounds of water;
  —30-60 pounds  of air.

 Substantial changes in urban  air and the water supplies have come about
 since the industrial period onward.  Considerable evidence indicates that
 physical health itself may be imperiled by changes in the air we breathe, the
water we drink, and the new environment. The peril will increase and unless
appropriate corrective measures are taken, over-population and over-indus-
trialization may  over-tax ecologically balanced  systems.
  Developing knowledge suggesting population density may create disrup-
tive social and psychological stresses, and that confrontations with air and
water pollution are becoming  increasingly hazardous, may be evolutionary
 handwriting on the wall.
  One commentator suggests  that genetic science may provide a means for
"fitting men"  to the environmental conditions—"fitting of the  survivors," in-
stead of survival of the fittest (26). Thus, instead of aiming our efforts  at

changing environmental factors, science and public policy could accept en-
vironmental circumstances and merely adapt man to cope with his changing
environment. In all likelihood, both adaptation of the human  organism and
environmental adjustments will be required for survival.
   Buckminster Fuller  poses the following statistics  implying man's  num-
bers are manageable and that the population explosion  is overstated (27).

   —man  lives in "scattered patches covering less than 5 percent of the
    earth's surface";
   —"all the cities of our planet cover sum-totally less than 1  percent of the
    earth's surface";
   —megalopolises cover  less than one-half of 1 percent of the earth's total

Dramatically making his  point,   Fuller contends  that  as  of  1965,  "all
humanity  could  be brought  indoors  in the buildings of  greater New York
City, each of us with as much floor  room as at a cocktail party."
   That is  one cocktail party  I hope to miss!
   Census Bureau domestic calculations  based on the 1970 Census,
estimate distributing  U.S. population  equally over all 50 states would result
in a density of  about 57 persons per square mile.  Similar calculations
based on 1960 data estimated 50.6  .       per square mile. New Jersey
with 953.1 persons per square mile was the most densely populated state;
Alaska,  with some 2 persons  per  square mile was the least densely
populated (28).  Population density based  on 1970 Census data for all ur-
banized areas (central cities over 50,000 population) was 3,376 persons
per square mile (29).
   Regardless of the validity of these statistics, they underscore the point
that urban density is the real  crisis point. In this respect, the most populous
metropolitan areas in the world—Shanghai {10 million), Tokyo (8.8 million),
New York (7.9 million). Peking (7.5 million), and London (7.4 million)—are
the cauldrons of change. The full force and effect of population implosions
in these  areas  should be  carefully studied  to ascertain prospects for
mankind. As other areas reach similar size and density, they should be able
to benefit from experience in these  precursor jurisdictions.

Environmental Effects  of Population Growth

   From the information presented in the previous section, it is clear that the
U.S. population will continue to grow, even if the birth rate remains at or
below the ZPG rate.  Further,  shifts in the regional population distribution,

 especially moves to urban areas, will create urban and regional population
 pressures. As the national and regional populations grow and change, the
 respective economics will grow and change.
   The resource and environmental consequences of a growth in population
 and economy are  not  totally predictable. The  state of the science of
 demographics is such that we are not certain to what extent, and  in what
 directions. The U.S. population and economy will grow, especially over the
 long-run. As we  have seen, there  is considerable evidence that the nation
 has achieved a ZPG rate, though this is offset by other factors, such as the
 high incidence currently of young women capable of bearing children. Fur-
 ther, should a ZPG rate be achieved, can it be maintained?
   Nevertheless,  it is possible to arrive at close approximations of the effect
 on the environment—particularly on the nation's natural resources—of any
 specified growth pattern. Given the assumption, then, that the U.S. is about
 to experience, or has experienced already a ZPG rate, what can be said
 about  its effect on the environment?

 A Classical Model for Environment and Population

   Christakis presents a s mple classical model of the environmental impact
 of population and concludes, from  study of the  model,  that uncontrolled
 growth can cause serious environmental damage even under conditions of
 ZPG. One of the  principal reasons for this conclusion is population density,
 i.e., urbanization.  He also discusses  results  obtained  by analysis with
 another model.

   Christakis'  model is developed from a  relationship of the form (30).

                             W = APq                            (1)
       W = pollutants emitted  during a period
       P=total population of a geographic entity
       q = per capita output
and    A = a proportionality constant.

  To transform the quantity W to a spatial  concentration  C of pollution, or
what is normally known as pollution levels, one must introduce the volume V
of the medium in which the wastes are placed. One also needs to take into
account the natural ability of the environment  to cleanse  itself through
various biochemical processes. Hence, the rate of change in concentration
at a point in time t will be the sum of what is added to the environment and

what is subtracted because of the cleansing,  i.e.,

                           dC/dt = (W/V)-rC
where r is the  rate at which the particular medium cleanses itself.  By in-
tegrating Equation (2) and setting the integration constant equal to  K one
obtains, after substitution  from  Eq. (1),
                   = (APg/Vr)(1-exp(-rt)) +  K exp(-rt)
The adverse environmental impacts, or damage D, can be considered as a
function of concentration C, i.e.,
Our present state of knowledge of the functional form relating environmental
damage to population and output (i.e., the feedback effects) is very limited.
Also,  the  positive and negative  synergisms that might exist between dif-
ferent  pollutants  at  different  levels of concentration  is  not  yet  known.
Following a simple  analytic  approach, the per capita  damage d  is set
proportional to the concentration C, the  proportionality constant B itself
being  assumed to be  a monotonically increasing  function  of the con-
centration of pollutants,
                            d = BC = f(C)C

The total damages, D, can then be represented by


Substitution of Equation (3) leads  to

                d = (AB/Vr)(1-exp(-rt))qP  +  BK exp(-rt)


              D = p((AB/Vr)(1-exp(-rt)}qP +  BK exp(-rt))
Defining a "volume" population density p= P/V, one can rewrite Equations
(7) and (8) as
                   = (k/r)(1-exp(-rt))qp +  BK exp(-rt)

                D=p((k/r)(1-exp(-rt))qp + BK exp(-rt))
 where K is in general a coefficient whose numerical value depends on the
 concentration level  and  the  amount of capital  invested  in  pollution
 abatement facilities.
   Equations (9) and (10), although very approximate and simplistic, enable
 one to make a number of useful observations concerning the environmental
 impacts  of such factors as (1)  the  size of the population, P; (2) the
 geographic distribution or concentration of the population, p; (3) the amount
 of production (or consumption) per capita,  q, i.e., the "affluence" variable;
 and (4) the amount of pollutant generated per capita of production (or con-
 sumption)  k,  which  is  essentially a  variable  reflecting  technology and
 abatement policies. One can see, for example,  that the damage to the en-
 vironment D increases in proportion to the population P, the per capita out-
 put q, and the  population volume  density,  p.  If per capita output and
 population density are held constant, Equation (10) tells us that pollution is
 directly proportional  to  population. But if population were held  constant
 pollution could  just   as well  increase,  either  because of  increases  in
 population volume densily,  or  because of  increases in per capita output.
 Hence, in this simple formulation, one is led to the conclusion  that "un-
 controlled" affluence, and "unplanned" metropolitanization of population
 can  cause environmental damage  even at  zero  population growth
 (assuming no  fundamental  changes  in  production  and pollution
 technology). It is noteworthy that such a simplistic analytic model has con-
 firmed our intuitive  knowledge of  the  gross  relationships  between
 population, economic growth, and environmental degradation.
  The accuracy  and  reliability of the  simple  analytic model leading  to
 Equation (10) is limited  Realizing  this limitation,  the  Commission on
 Population Growth and the American Future commissioned Resources for
 the Future  (RFF) to develop an elaborate and highly disaggregated com-
 puter  model for the purpose of analyzing the environmental impacts of alter-
 native population and economic growth projections (31). The RFF approach
 consists  essentially   of an  industrial input-output  model  coupled  to
 exogeneous  information  derived  on  the  basis  of  four alternative
demographic  and economic  scenarios, high  population and economic
growth (Census Bureau series B-High GNP), low population and economic
growth (Census Bureau series E-Low GNP) and  the two intermediate cases
(B-Low and  E-High). Fcr each  one of  the four  scenarios the model
calculates:  (1) the main economic indicators, (2)  estimates  on  resource
 requirements, (3) estimates of pollution levels under different  assumptions

regarding abatement policy and available technology and (4) the regional
and metropolitan  area impacts of air pollution.
  Employing this model the RFF study arrives at a number of policy-
oriented  findings. Some of the  most conclusions are  paraphrased below

  (1) For the time horizon of the study,  i.e.,  the  next 30 to 50 years,  the
    changes in technology, tastes,  institutions, policies, and international
    relations will play  more important roles than  population growth in
    determining resource adequacy and environmental quality.
  (2) For the time horizon of the study, a change  in population  growth  ap-
    pears to  have a smaller impact  on resource consumption than a
    change in economic growth. A one percent reduction in  population
    would reduce consumption of resources in the year 2000 by 0,2 to 0.7
    percent, whereas the equivalent percentage reduction in  per capita
    GNP would reduce consumption in that year by 0.6  to 3.5 percent.
  (3) The United States appears to be in good shape relative to other coun-
    tries, provided we have sufficient lead time to develop domestic alter-
    natives to foreign sources, should the need arise. A slower population
    growth rate leading to a stable population  within the next 50 to 75
    years, wilt buy  us time to overcome  our  ignorance of  ecological
    processes and expand our options in deciding how we want  to live in
    the  future; a slowdown in population and  economic growth would
    clearly help in this  respect by  giving us sufficient lead  time.
  (4) The relative position of the poorer two-thirds of the world  is likely to
    deteriorate further  during  the   next 30 to  50  years  unless some
    dramatic technological breakthroughs, rapid  declines in  birthrates, or
    massive transfers of resources  from richer countries take  place.
  (5) While there is mounting evidence that environmental quality is lower in
    metropolitan  areas  that are more densely populated,  the  underlying
    causes for the lower quality may not be scale  but factors such as: urban
    forms and transportation systems more appropriate to an earlier era;
    old,  unintegrated service facilities;  inappropriate pricing of public
    facilities and common property resources such as roads  and waste
    disposal;  multiple political jurisdictions; and the factors  leading to
    inadequate financing and a predominance of  minority groups and poor
    in the core cities.
  Christakis  points out that  models such as the one  described  above
should also provide for analysis of social issues. Later we will present his
suggestions for methodology to achieve this  end.

Economic and Welfare Implications of ZPG
  Singer has  developed a different demographic-economic model (33).
This model calculates a "per-capita welfare index" or a "Q-index" as a fun-
ction of various demographic and economic parameters.  In the following,
Singer discusses the  implications of a situation  of increased welfare  in
which all members of society have some money left over  for discretionary

  If we can maintain  our level of population near optimum, then it appears
that each generation will become better off than the preceding  one.  In fact,
maintenance of optimum population  may mean, and almost certainly will
mean, a declining  level of population, but declining at a very slow rate.
  The burning question, of course, centers on how people will choose  to
spend their income.  In essence, we  are really asking what life styles will
people adopt tor the  future. There are, of course,  several possibilities and
any one of these, or any combination, may hold true. It would be useful  to
list these possibilities  in order.

  1.  More Leisure People may choose to take their greater welfare in terms
    of more leisure time. We have existing trends that show not only fewer
    working hours per week and fewer working days per year, but also
    fewer working years per lifetime. People today retire at an earlier age
    and  also  enter the labor force  at a later age then they did some
    decades ago. There is no reason to expect that this trend will not con-
    tinue, although,  leisure,  like every  other good,  has  a  decreasing
    marginal utility.  By this is  meant that the first  hour  of discretionary
    leisure time is  much  more valuable  than  each  succeeding  hour;
    beyond a certain point leisure time may not be very worthwhile to some
    people.  These points have been considered  in  the model.
  2. More consumer  goods. In the future, it is quite likely that people will
    spend more on luxury goods. Such goods include second homes, third
    homes such as vacation cottages, beach houses, etc.. vacation trips  of
    more elaborate dimensions.
  3. More services.  Spending  on a variety of  services is  one  of the
    strongest existing trends and has also been incorporated in the model
    calculations. Naturally, it cannot continue forever, that is, services can
    never constitute  100 percent of all  expenditures. We cannot run  a
    country or the world by taking in each other's laundry. But we can cer-
    tainly lavish a great deal of effort on such items as better health care,
    specialized  education,  cultural activities,   as  well  as  visits  to

  4. Finally, the mode! considers the possibility of increasing public invest-
     ments,  not only in conventional public works designed to improve the
     working of  the economy,  such as highways, flood control projects,
     irrigation projects, etc.  but  also  in  environmental  quality and con-
     servation projects. These investments by their very nature have  to be
     made through government, i.e.  on a collective basis, with everyone
     contributing  through  tax payments,  and  presumably  everyone
     benefiting somewhat in the relation to the payment of taxes.

  As for  any investment,  public investment  raise  the question of  cost-
benefit analysis.  Not only is it necessary to quantify the benefits (it is usually
quite easy to quantify  the costs) but there are additional and very  serious
problems when most of the benefits accrue to future years and perhaps to
future generations.  We know that a benefit today is worth more than one in
the future, quite apart from any inflationary  trends which can presumably be
accounted for. We can take a benefit today, expressed in dollars, and invest
this sum of money and arrive at a  larger value in the future, simply because
it has been invested.
  One  of  the  consequences  flowing  out  of the  results of  the model
calculation is the  greater availability of funds for investments of all  sorts
because of greater discretionary  income.  Under a situation where capital
becomes less scarce,  it is possible to  think of a situation of lower  interest
rates as well. But  a lower interest rate,  a  lower return on invested  capital,
also means an enhanced value for future benefits. Under these conditions,
it becomes  attractive to consider diverting larger amounts of  investments
into projects which will  yield  benefits  beyond the  immediate ones, and
benefits even into the far distant future.
  Essentially, we are saying that with larger discretionary income there will
be  a larger propensity to  invest in projects that benefit future generations,
as well as in projects that lead to enhancement of current recreational bene-
  Under these  conditions,  it  is  possible to visualize an effort through
political action to increase levels of environmental quality, both by setting
higher standards, as well as by undertaking restoration projects. Not only
does it  become  worthwhile  and  profitable to undertake  such  major
programs  as soil  conservation,  and  control of  agricultural  pollution,
separation of urban sewer systems into sanitary and storm sewers, dealing
with acid mine drainage, but large scale restoration  projects, also become
more feasible:  restoring the quality of the Great  Lakes by  appropriate
remedial measures, restoring natural  areas and wildlife habitats, reforestra-
tion, and reclamation of stripmined land,  etc.

   To sum up: with a projected increase in discretionary income we can look
forward to a simultaneous  increase in   a number of unrelated activities:
more leisure will be taken, more luxury goods will be bought, more services
will  be  required, and large scale public programs will be  undertaken not
on!y to  protect but also to  improve our  physical and social environment.
Resource and Environmental Consequences of ZPG

   Ridker  discusses the resource  and  environmental consequences  of
population and economic growth and the results of the RFF study men-
tioned in  a previous section.  In his  discussion,  particular emphasis  is
placed on the effects of ZPG.  He reviews the determinants of resource and
environmental pressures. Then he presents the consequence of growth as
determined  in the study ushg the RFF model and  comparing those results
with results  obtained from more detailed and conventional  studies  of
specific factors such  as  energy and agriculture.  Population forecasts for
high birth rate (Bureau of Census Series B; birth  rate 3.1) and low (ZPG)
birth rate  {Series E; 2.1) were combined with several levels of economic
growth. The  new series F forecast, of course, was not available at the time of
the study. His discussion is presented in the next section.

      Determinants of Resource and  Environmental Pressures
  To begin,  we must identify  the factors that are most influential in  deter-
mining resource requirements and environmental pressures. Changes  in
any of these determinants can significantly alter the nation's requirements
for natural resources and they can just as significantly affect the quality  of
the environment. These determinants  are usefully grouped under  seven

  —Demographic variables. The size of  the population, its rate of growth,
     its age structure, the  number and size of the households involved, and
    the labor force participation rates: all have a bearing on the resources.
    They  directly affect the level of consumption goods purchased, the
    types of goods purchased, as well as the level of economic activity we
     can expect from the population. This economic activity, of course, is an
     important determinant of  the output of  materials  we can expect.
  —Standard of living. Measured by per capita GNP or per capita income,
    the standard of living plays a similarly important role in determining the
     output of materials. Moreover, the distribution of the standard within the
     population is a separate, but related, factor of great importance.
  —Geographic distribution.  The distribution of the population and of the
     nation's economic activities bear heavily  on  resources and the en-

     vironment. They are obviously important in explaining environmental
     pressures in  given areas. They affect  the cost—in terms of natural
     resources—-of efforts  to overcome these environmental  pressures.
     Transport  requirements between  persons and  producing  units  in
     various places exert further  resource and  environmental pressures.
  —Technological methods.  The  methods used at each stage of economic
     activity, from  mining and  energy conversion through transport and
     production, to emission  and  treatment of effluents,  can make a  great
     difference in the character and magnitude of the problems we will face
     as a consequence of population and economic growth.
  —Life styles. The role of life  styles—preferences for leisure and  for
     various kinds  of commodities and ways of using them—reflect directly
     on the state of the  environment and on the availability of natural resour-
     ces. Certainly, a style of  life that includes throwaway bottles, suburban
     living and  high compression  automobiles places vastly more pressure
     on the environment than does  one that involves less emphasis  on
     packaging and advertising, urban apartment living,  and mass transit.
  —International considerations.  A sixth set  of factors, which is sometimes
     overlooked but which is  likely to play an increasingly important role in
     the future, pertains to international developments. In particular, the
     terms at which the United States can acquire  resources  and finished
     commodities from abroad are crucial  in environmental and resource-
     availability considerations.
  — Po//cy. Finally, all  the above  factors are influenced by policy:  by  rules
     and regulations for managing effluents and land use, by important
     policies with  respect to  fuels and minerals, by decisions  made with
     respect to location of public investments, and so on.

  At the outset let us  recall that  under any  reasonable assumption about
births-per-women during the next  few decades, the population of the United
States will grow quite substantially during the next quarter to half century. If
ZPG is taken literally to mean a cessation of population growth, we are still
far from achieving it. There  are  three reasons for this.  First, the United
States has a relatively young population, with a large fraction of women just
entering childbearing years. Even if these women decide to have  no  more
than the 2.1  children  necessary  for replacement,  this age structure will
result in population growth by nearly 40 percent  before stability is reached.
Second,  to achieve ZPG immediately, U.S. women  would have to  have an
average  of only slightly more than one child for some  decades  into the
future, at least until the age distribution corrects itself. While it is  true that

fertility and  expectations about completed fertility among young women
have fallen sharply in the last five years, the most recent survey on birth ex-
pectations reports that women 18-24 expect to complete their childbearing
years with an average of 2.1 children, a far cry from the 1.2 or so necessary
to achieve immediate ZPG.  Put in terms of birth rates, to achieve ZPG and
sustain it over time the crude birth rate would have to fall from 16 to less
than 10 per thousand and remain there for some decades, an event that ap-
pears highly unlikely in the  near future. Third,  all the above ignores net im-
migration  which has been set by law at 400,000 per year. This figure is
more than 20 percent of the natural  increase in population in recent years.
There is no  reason to believe that it will decline in the near future.
  What has happened in  recent years is a decline in fertility and fertility ex-
pectations that sets the  stage  for  the ultimate achievement of ZPG,  or
something very near it. Between 1957 and 1969 the total fertility rate has
steadily fallen; the five-year averages from 1955-59 through 1965-69 being
3.69, 3.46, and 2.63. Today,  this figure probably stands  at around  2.1.

                  Standard of Living and Life Style
  While it seems quite likely that life styles will change significantly during
the next half century, it is  not at all certain that they will be in the direction of
conserving on resources, unless  official policy dictates such a course.
  Consider  the  preference for savings  over consumption. The  personal
savings rate  might rise if with growing  opulence and fewer children we
become sated with goods and services, or if we channel increasing por-
tions of our incomes into housing (for example, second homes).  But the ex-
pectation of  routine prosperity and economic security guaranteed through
extensions of unemployment,  health, and old  age and survivors insurance
is likely to dampen individual incentives to save. So too would the per-
sistence of secular price inflation. Increased leisure would also operate in
the  same direction, increasing  consumption especially  of recreational
goods and services. On net these trends may mean less personal savings.
But this is a trend  that can be offset by business and government savings
behavior. Provided  we are willing to let businesses and government save
for  us, long-term growth  prospects need  not  be seriously affected by this
shift in preferences.
  So far as  shifts  in preferences among types  of goods are concerned,
there seems to be  some  evidence to indicate a shift from private to public
goods  and services, and within  each category from goods to services.
Since cross-section consumption studies indicate that the income elasticity
of demand for services and many types of public expenditures tends  to be
higher than for other kinds of goods, there is some reason to believe that
such shifts will continue in the future as incomes rise. But a large fraction of

public goods involve construction and a significant component of what are
called consumer services  involves transportation,  both  heavy users of
resources,  especially of energy.
  A significant shift in preference for leisure over work could have a major
impact on resource requirements, at least so long as this shift is not offset
by increased automation that results in more goods  to be enjoyed during
the increased leisure hours. In  recent years, work  hours per  year  have
ceased their slow,  long-term decline.  In addition, increasing numbers of
women have been entering the labor market. One possible explanation is
the need for additional income in the face of the price inflation of recent
years.  But  these changes seem  to be independent  of family income. In-
deed, often it is the wives of well-off husbands who appear most eager to
give up leisure for work. An alternative explanation may be that for many in
our society work has ceased to be considered a "bad" to be avoided to the
extent one's income permits. Perhaps, over time  the  workplace  is offering
increasing  numbers  of nonmonetary as  well  as  monetary benefits:  a
pleasant physical  environment,  interesting,  "meaningful" things  to do,
friends, status, respect—and sufficient on-the-job  leisure to take  advantage
of these opportunities.  As  machine-paced  labor is  replaced  by more
automated  processes, and as jobs for more intrinsic interest increase in
number, this phenomenon is likely to become more and more important. So
far as the economy and resource  needs are concerned, the result is almost
the same as if off-the-job leisure increased,  except that it shows up as  a
decline in man-hour productivity  rather than as a  decline in work hours or
labor force participation rates.
  To  account for these possible changes  in  preferences,  the following
assumptions are made: no change in the overall propensity to consume and
save, a continuation in the trend towards  services and public goods, and
shifts in the composition of consumer purchases that arise from changes in
the numbers of families in different age, income, and family size classes.
Two alternative assumptions about labor productivity and  work  hours can
then be considered, First,  man hour productivity  can be assumed to con-
tinue growing at 2.5 percent per year and  annual  work hours to decline by
0.25 percent per year, more or less on trend. As a  second alternative the ef-
fect of a decline in work hours by 1.0  percent per year can be considered.
While still far from a zero economic growth case, the shift towards  leisure
implied by this second,  low economic growth  case  is fairly dramatic: in-
stead of weekly work hours falling over a thirty-year period from 40 to 37 in
the high growth case, they would fall  to 29 in the low growth scenario.
  It should be noted that the equivalent low growth case can be  generated
by assuming a fall in the growth of manhour productivity to 1.5 percent per
year while  holding to the first  assumption about annual work hours. Con-

 sidering the possibility  of  on-the-job rather  than  off-the-job leisure  in-
 creasing, this may be more realistic;  but  in no way does it change the
                       Technological Changes
   Five types of tecnnological  changes should be distinguished. The first,
 overall changes in labor productivity,  has  already  been considered.  The
 others involve changes in materials used per unit of output, changes in the
 generation of residuals per unit of output (or  per unit of materials input),
 changes in the emission of wastes per unit of residuals generated,  and
 changes in pollution per unit  of wastes.
   So far as materials other than energy used per unit of output are con-
 cerned, the trend has been  distinctly downward. Twenty years ago a ton of
 peaches would produce  40 cases of canned fruit; today 55 cases can be
 produced  from one ton. In addition,  the  composition of materials  has
 changed dramatically,  energy and  capital  substituting for labor, cheaper
 materials substituting for higher cost minerals, chemical fertilizers  and
 pesticides substituting for land and natural manures. There is no reason to
 believe that such changes will not  continue in the future, although the par-
 ticular direction they will  take is difficult to predict.
   In general the arrount of wastes generated per unit of materials input has
 also been  improving. For example, in 1943, the production  of container
 board generated 0.45 tons  of waste per ton of final product whereas by
 1963 this figure had dropped to 0.21. For the economy as a whole it is dif-
 ficult to generalize because of the introduction of new processes, products,
 and materials over time.
   The third type of technological  change, changes in  the  emission of
 wastes per unit  of residuals,  has  to do with the extent of recovery and
 recycling. Here the picture is mixed, the trend since World War II involving
 less recycling of waste paper and more recycling  of a number of metals.
The principal factors influencing these  trends   are changes in  the
geographic distribution of the sources  of  wastes—for example,  subur-
 banization  trends that make collection of waste paper more  costly—and
 relative prices which are, of course, subject to influence by government
 policy. Considering the fact that the incentives for recycling and recovery
 have been few in the past, it seems quite likely that there is considerable
scope for improvements  in these directions.
   The last category of technological change involves the form in which the
wastes are emitted. In large part,  this has to  do with  pollution treatment
technology, but change in production processes can also have a significant
effect on the toxicity of the wastes. Over time, as the chemical industry has
 learned to synthesize compounds not found  in nature, and hence in general

not readily assimilated by plants and animals, the situation has worsened.
Treatment technology, however, has been improving and with the proper in-
centives can be expected to continue improving.
  The projection of this mixed  bag of effects is, of course,  very difficult to
project without introducing technological fixes that may never happen, one
must figure it very conservatively, permitting ongoing changes to work their
way out but not introducing much that is new. Ongoing substitution of one
material for another  in particular  uses—e.g., plastic for  metal  in  pipe
production—are permitted to continue up to some specified maximum; and
today's best practice  is assumed to oecome  the average practice in  each
industry by the year 2000. But new processes, substitutions, and products,
with both their good and bad effects, have for the most part been left out.
                       Geographic Distribution
  By now the principal trends  in distribution of population and economic
activities are well known and documented: the emptying out of the coun-
tryside, the rapid territorial spread of metropolitan areas, and the reduction
in population densities in many  central cities. A continuation  of these trends
is likely to result in an  increase in  the percent of the population living in
metropolitan areas from 71 percent  in 1970 to 85 percent in the year 2000
and an increase in the geographic area classified as  urban from 200
square miles in 1960  to 500 square miles by 2000. By the  latter date, this
would mean that one-sixth of the land area of the United States (exclusive of
Alaska and Hawaii) would be devoted to  urban settlement (34).
  But these trends are heavily dependent on a number of policies. While it
is difficult to predict  whether  densities will increase  or decrease in the
Washington, D. C.  metropolitan area as a consequence of the introduction
of both a subway and a frequently proposed tax on downtown parking, there
can be no doubt that such changes will have profound effects. To account
for  such changes,  at  least insofar  as air  pollution  is  concerned, several
alternatives to  this basic trend have been considered, one requiring that 10
percent of  the  additional economic activity that might otherwise locate in
metropolitan regions be located outside these area,  another restricting the
geographic spread of  current metropolitan  areas, and so on. Several of the
results obtained are presented in the analysis.
                     International Developments
  Unfortunately, far too little time has been devoted to the study of  in-
ternational trends of importance for the United States. Basically, the Bureau
of Mines "high" projections for minerals  and energy consumption in the
rest of the world can be accepted at face value and it can be assumed that a
relatively free trade regime would prevail. This could give quite misleading
results, especially  so  far as  the energy picture is concerned.

                           Policy Changes
   In order to highlight the effects of population and economic growth, in
 most of the basic scenarios studied the policy regime  is assumed to be
 constant  as of about  1967-70. But  several variations  of  an "active
 abatement policy" were also explored and  are reported on below.
                     The Consequences of ZPG
   The implications of these determinants and our assumed changes in
 them over time were examined in  two ways: first using a mathematical
 model of  the  economy cesigned  to  highlight  the resource and  en-
 vironmental elements under study, and, second,  comparing these results
 with those obtained from more detailed and conventional  studies of specific
 sectors such as energy and agriculture.  Those results that are most salient
 for the discussion of policy and research implications are presented below.
                           The Economy
  To simplify the task, four basic scenarios were developed from the set of
 alternative assumption with which we worked: a high population-(Bureau of
 Census Series  B) high  economic growth (denoted H) case (B-H),  a low
 population (Bureau of Census Series E)-low economic growth (denoted L)
 case (E-L),  and the two intermediate cases. We  started by assuming no
 change in resource or environmental policy  from the base period. Table 2
 presents the results.
  As can  be seen by the year 2000 the. U.S. economy will be somewhere
 between double and triple its current size, with all that entails for resource
 and environmental pressures. A slowdown  in population growth will help, of
 course: it  results in a higher per capita income and a smaller GNP, that is,
 greater per capita material welfare with a smaller output of materials.  But
 even with  a significant shift towards leisure—and despite the shift towards
 services built into these projections—it is clear that we shall  face much
 greater resource and environmental pressures in the future than we have so
                        Resource Adequacy
  Figure 3 presents a picture of the total amounts of five of the 19 minerals
 studied that are needed to  achieve these basic scenarios between now and
the year 2000.  The bars representing an  "active  recycling policy" reflect
 our judgment about the additional amount of recycling (over and above what
was already present in  the base period) that should be feasible  given
 current technology and proper incentives. For these minerals, as  well as for
the others studied, the slowdown in population growth is  not as  effective in
 saving on resources as  is a reduction in  economic growth;  but the com-
 bination of both plus an active recycling policy can achieve a considerable

Table 2. Demographic and  Economic Indicators for Alternative Population
and Economic Assumptions, No Policy Change.

labor Force (mi 1 1 i ors ) 	
GNP Per Capita (19&7 S) 	 ...
Disposable Income Per
Capita (1958 S]
GNP (bi 1 196? $)
Con Sump t ion (bil, 19&7 S) 	
Investment (bil 1S&7 $) . .

Defense (bil. 1967 S) 	
Non-Defense (bil. 1967 $) . . .
Met Exports (bil. 1967 S) 	
Total Output (bil. 1967 S) 	
Primary (bil 1967 S)
Mining (bi 1 I9&7 $)
Construction (bil. 196? $)..
Manufacturing (bil. 1967 $).
Food (bi 1 1967 S) 	
Paper (bil 1967 $}
Petroleum (biT. 1967 S) . . .
Chemicals (bil. 1967 S)...
Primary Metals (bil .
1967 S) 	
Rubber and plastics
(bi 1 1967 $)
Stone and Clay (bil.
1967 5) 	
Textiles (bil. 1967 5) 	
Lumber and Wood (bil.
1967 s) 	
Leather (bil. 1967 S) 	
Services (bil 1967 $)
Electricity (bil. 1967 S) .
Consumption Purchases
(br i 1967 $) ... . .
Durables (bi 1 1967 $)
Nondurable! (bil. 1967 S) . . .
Services (bil. 1967 S) 	
Absolute Figures
3 334
 *? Increase from B-H
        U.S. Commission on  Population Growth  and the American Future, Popylation. Resourcest
        and the Envi ronment. Ronald G.  Ridker, editor, Vol. I 11 of Carnnission Research
        Reports (Washingtont D.C.:  U.S. Government Printing Officef  1972), adapted from
        Table 2, p. 41.

                                                     o, —  u >~

                                                        U  > U
                                                      4)  >. ._ ._

                                                      irt  u _i —

                                                      (5  4)  JO

hout Active
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ative Requi

                                                                                                                       cp p
                                                                                                                       u.  tr

saving. Unfortunately, at this juncture we could not evolve a clear idea of the
cost in economic or environmental terms involved in this much recycling.
  Figure 4 presents a  picture of annual energy requirements. Because it
assumes  only  modest changes  in  energy  technology from the  base
period—an assumption that is rapidly becoming outdated—the breakdown
by fuels is probably not very significant. For example,  gasification of coal
will probably be necessary before the turn of the century to meet some of
the natural gas  requirements. But the breakdown does indicate in general
terms the extent to which we shall continue to be dependent on petroleum.
  When  these   requirements projections  are  matched against supply
projections for  the United States and against  demand  and supply projec-
tions for the rest of the  world, the principal conclusion that emerges is that
the United States is  not likely to  experience any truly serious shortages
during the  next quarter  to  half century  solely as  a  consequence of
population and  economic growth. By "serious shortages" are meant shor-
tages that would cause the relative price of a significant number of these
minerals and fuels to increase by more than 50 percent or so. Other factors
may of course come into the picture  to upset this conclusion,  a point that
must be amplified later. Environmental groups may refuse to permit the con-
struction of a sufficient  number of nuclear or other electric power plants or
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries may successfully im-
pose  monopolistic control over a large  fraction of the world's petroleum
supplies. But strictly as a consequence of population and  economic growth
in this country and perhaps also in the rest of the world,  the United States is
likely to be  able to find the necessary supplies to meet rising demands
without price increases of such a  magnitude that the general welfare is
  Figure 5 illustrates our findings with  respect to a number of different
pollutants. The  bars labeled A represent the amount of various pollutants
generated in  1970 and  likely to be generated in the year 2000 under alter-
native  assumptions about  population and economic growth. The  bars
labeled B in  1970 indicate the amount of these pollutants emitted, the dif-
ference between A and B indicating the small amount of treatment present
in that year. The bars labeled B  in the year 2000 indicate the amount of
various pollutants likely to be emitted in that year assuming the same level
of treatment  as  in 1970 but taking into account the changes in technology
that are likely to come  along  even  in the absence of an  active  abatement
policy. In  principle,  such technological  changes could result in either a
higher or a lower level of residuals per unit of output; in fact, however,  most
of the changes  investigated reduce residuals.  To a large  extent, this result

Figure 4. Annual Requirements for Energy,  Basic Scenarios.  (Source:
"Population,  Resources, and the Environment," op. cit, p. 43.)
   225 -,
   200 -
   175 -
   150 _
   125 -
                                       (QuadriI I ion Btu)
                         -H      E-H     B-L      E-L

               HIGH POP.
               HIGH GNP
                    LOW POP.
                    HIGH GNP
                               fL_    ru.
arises from the assumption that best practice in 1970 becomes average
practice by the year  2000; while this  assumption by itself is very  con-
servative, we purposely left out new processes and  products that might
come along to raise new problems.
  To arrive at the bars labeled C representing an active abatement policy,
EPA's recommended  emission standards for 1975 were applied. While it
appears likely that the technology will exist by 1975 to  meet these stan-
dards, we applied them in the year 2000. by which time, at least  from a
technological point of vew, it should be  possible to  surpass them.
  As far as can be judged the  cost of meeting these standards does  not ap-
pear excessively  expensive.  In  1970,  the annualized costs of pollution
abatement were estimated by EPA to be $8.45 billion (1967 dollars), about
one percent of GNP. To meet the emission standards implied by this active
abatement  policy, it is estimated that these costs will have to rise  to bet-
ween $34 billion (for the case E-H) and $47 billion {for the case B-H) by the
year 2000  (all figures in 1967 dollars). While these are, very  large num-
bers, they still amount tc less than two percent of GNP in the year 2000. To
make room for such expenditures we would have to give up less than one-
tenth  of one percentage point  in annual growth of GNP. Once  again,
however, there are some qualifications which must be brought up again in
discussing  policy implications.
  It should be noted, however, that the pollutants that were studied for the
most  part  have  relatively short half-lives.  Because of data  and other
analytical problems, radiation,  heavy  metals, persistent pesticides,  and
similar pollutants that can accumulate in the environment over time were not
studied in as much depth.
                        Regional Problems
  A second qualification to the analysis of pollution problems arises  from
regional concerns: some regions could face serious problems even though
they achieve the 1975 emission standards. To determine whether this is the
case,  regional projections were developed,  for three air pollutants in 47
cities and applied to a general air diffusion model.
  Table 3 summarizes the results for a special case in which the land  area
of each city expands in proportion  to  its  population increase, thereby
keeping density constant. As can be seen, a growing  number of cities will
not be able to meet the ambient standards without the active abatement
policy (35).
  For these two areas, both of which are already above the nitrogen dioxide
standard, something must give: the use of the  internal combustion engine,
inmigration  of  people  and  activities  or the  standard  itself.   While

Table 3. Number of Cities Among 47 Studied Not Meeting Specified Ambient Standards

S0£ (80 micrograms)3
S02 (60 micrograms)3
N02 (100 micrograms)3
(75 mi crograms)3
(60 micrograms)3
No Pol icy Changes
6 6 4 5
4] 43 41 42
27 32 15 19
42 43 32 37
Abatement Policy
 aAnnual  arithmetic mean in mierograms  per  cubic meter

 SOURCE:   U.S. Commission on Population  Growth and the American Future,  Population,
          Resources, and the Environment, Ronald G, Ridker, editor,  Volume  I II of
          Commission Research Reports(Washington, D.C.:  U.S.  Government Printing
          Office, 1972), Tables 10,  II,  and  12, pp. 52-56.

Washington, D.C., was not included among the 47 urban areas in this sam-
ple, a recent study suggests that the same situation applies here as well. It is
likely that more detailed studies of other metropolitan areas and  other
pollutants will provide additional cases of this sort.
   If we assume that urban land area expands less  rapidly than population,
the situation worsens rapidly. On the other hand, when in one run of this
model it was assumed that 10 percent of the additional economic activities
that would  otherwise  have  located in  these urban  areas  were instead
required  to locate in  nonurban  areas,   the  situation  improved  only
marginally, reducing the number of cities not meeting the sutfate standards
from two to one  and the number not meeting particulate standards from 27
to 17, while those  not meeting the nitrate standard remained the same.
   A final point of interest about these  regional projections is their  great
diversity. Population density is increasing in some while it is decreasing  in
others. For sulfates in 1970.  the highest  average concentration level for any
city is six times that of the  lowest.  Even with an active abatement policy,
some areas will  grow worse over time while others improve.  Moreover, the
trend is not the same for all  three pollutants: particulate levels  are likely to
fall in a number of cities even without an active abatement policy  while
nitrate levels are likely to worsen in some even with such a policy.

The Policy Implications  of Zero
Population Growth

   It appears obvious that the historical trend  cannot continue in which
successive doublings of world population  require only half the time of the
prior doubling.  Still, it is  possible for the world population growth to con-
tinue at  a slowe^ rate of increase than at present for many years, subject to
the constraints of food  production, availability of energy, and availability of
natural resources. An earth population  numbering as many as  35 to 50
billion has been considered possibly by some forecasters.
  As  we have seen, the world population  could be stabilized  into a ZPG
state at  some desired  level,  as one alternative. Or, a phase of declining
population or "negative population growth"  could ensue. A third alternative
is that of continued  growth.
   Calhoun considers these alternatives from the viewpoint of the "evolution
of consciousness." (See  Chapter 6.) It is  his contention that if ZPG is the
choice, the capacity of the individual human will stay as constant as the rate
of population increase itself. There will be no further evolution of con-
sciousness; evolution for  humans will have been terminated. It will be all
over except for  a "continuous hedonistic  traditionalism."

  Other animals have had this choice thrust upon them and have persisted
for millions of years. Calhoun notes the same possibility for humans, but
warns that only through our own intent and deliberate actions can we alter
the pattern and allow the evolution of our consciousness to continue.
  During the current domain of evolution, the total worth of humanity has
progressed according to the product of the population and the capacity (or
consciousness) of the  average individual. This total worth of humanity,
which Calhoun terms "ideomass", has steadily increased,  despite the fact
that the "biomass"  (or product of population and average body weight)
became constant
  If population is allowed to increase to the  limits possible, according to
Calhoun, then the average individual would become less aware of less and
less, until most individuals had dropped below the level of consciousness
required for initiating cultural evolution.

Policy and Research Implications

  Ridker discusses two implications for policy and research. He believes
direct  measures for dealing  with  resource  shortages and  pollution  are
superior to the indirect measures of population  control and control of the
economy. Secondly, he suggests that more comprehensive approaches to
problem solving should improve our environmental situation with less social
and economic cost. His discussion follows.

Direct versus Indirect Approaches
  It has become commonplace in the last few years  to hear calls for ZPG
and ZEG (Zero Economic Growth) as ways to contain the encroachment of
man  on the earth's limited supplies of  raw  materials and environmental
carrying capacity. In contrast to measures like zoning, effluent charges, and
mass transit,  such policies  would operate indirectly  on  our resource and
environmental problems. They are said to be necessary because the direct
measures are only  palliatives,  attempting to  correct  the symptoms rather
than attacking the main causes.
  So far as population growth is concerned there is little argument. Even if
there were no necessity for  such growth to cease, its  continuance provides
us with no social advantages and a number of  costs at this stage in our
history. But the same cannot be said about economic growth which, with ap-
propriate changes in composition, can  be utilized so solve many of the
problems it creates. The question  of whether  it must also cease is of more
  There can be no doubt that all population and economic growth must
someday cease. Exponential growth in a limited  space cannot continue
forever. Technological advance can postpone  that ultimate day, but it cannot


 repeal the laws of nature. But this fact by itself is of little relevance. Far more
 important is the question, when? Must it cease within our lifetime, that of our
 grandchildren,  or some far-off distant generation?  It  makes an enormous
 difference for policy today how we answer this question.
   Unfortunately, the information does not exist with which to answer this
 question,  except to say that there is no reason why it must cease within the
 next 50 years or so. Beyond that point, we must admit ignorance. We do not
 know what kind of disasters we may be letting ourselves in for by permitting
 economic growth  to continue;  but we  are  also ignorant  of possible
 technological and institutional breakthroughs that may come along not just
 to save future generations from disaster  but  perhaps to make them sub-
 stantially  better off than the current  generation.  For the  time  being,
 therefore,  we can still choose whether to slow growth down  as a way  of
 coping with  our problems or to rely on more direct attacks on the problems
 that face us.
   Within this fifty-year time frame, our  analysis strongly suggests that as
 policy instruments for dealing with  raw materials shortages and pollution,
 direct  measures  are far superior  to across-the-board  restrictions  on
 population and economic growth. The clearest indication of this is found  in
 Figure 5 which compared the reductions in pollution that might  be achieved
 using direct and  indirect approaches.  Other  examples  can be found by
 comparing the amount  of reduction in  GNP per capita that would be
 necessary to curtail  the emission of a given pollutant, say sulfur oxides, by a
 given amount, with the extent of the reduction in GNP per capita that would
 occur as a consequence of a more  selective approach. Analysis indicates
that a one percentage point reduction in GNP  per capita would reduce this
 pollutant by  0.87 percent, but that if the output of the five sectors with the
 highest  emission coefficients were reduced by 2.5 percent this same 0.87
 percent reduction in sulfux oxides could be achieved  with only a third of a
percentage  point reduction  in GNP per  capita.  An even more dramatic
example would involve a direct attack on the automobile, which by itself ac-
counts for 12 percent  o' hydrocarbon  emissions,  60 percent of carbon
 monoxide emissions and 25 percent of nitrogen oxide emissions from all
 manmade sources.  The  same argument applies to resources, at least to
resources in general: given the substitution possibilities that are present,
why reduce  the consumption of all  resources because a few  are in short
  Of course, such  direct approaches  will result  in   some slowdown in
economic growtn. But with the exception of  a few especially vulnerable
regions, the  extent of this slowdown  is not likely to be great during the next
quarter  to half century.  Beyond this period, it is possible that measures

which  bite  more  heavily  into  aggregate economic growth will  prove
necessary. But  that is as it  should be. So  long  as other options  are
available, including the option of changing the composition of growth, there
is no sense in limiting aggregate economic growth until we  have to.
Piecemeal, Restrictive Measures
versus Structural Changes
   A more difficult  issue involves the question of which direct measures to
use. All that Figure 5 suggests is that we have the technological know-how
to reduce future emission levels  at reasonable cost, despite the population
and economic growth  that will occur in the interim; it does  not say that
policies can or will be  devised to accomplish such reductions. This would
not be the first time that we accomplished far less than we know how to do.
   Most of the  measures in use today, especially in the environmental field,
can be characterized as restrictive in character. The imposition of standards
that must be met by a future date  is perhaps the best example. Even effluent
charges,  or full-cost pricing, which for good reasons most economists favor,
are restrictive in the sense thai the person faced with the charge is induced
to restrict his own behavior to reduce the burden of these addititional costs.
While  it is somewhat more difficult to characterize resource  policy in this
same way since subsidies for research and exploration are also part of the
scene, it  is certainly the case in both the  resource and environmental fields
that most of our policies are not  integrated into any overall framework that
considers all the ways of skinning  the  cat and all  the  consequences  of
doing  so by different methods. To illustrate the kinds of problems that can
arise from  such piecemeal, restrictive approaches, we  take  an example
from the  energy and urban transport fields, first considering  the resource
and then the environmental sides of these interrelated problems.
   On the basis of the assumptions incorporated into the study, there appear
to be adequate supplies of petroleum to  meet the world's needs during the
next half century or so, if not considerably beyond. One might be inclined to
predict from this that our current  energy  system based  on liquid petroleum
fuels can continue for  some time to  come.
   But it is not difficult to make a case to the contrary. Consider a few of the
problems the United States will face in the energy field during the next 10
to 15 years. Suppose that the OPEC cartel becomes stronger and decides
to set its  long-term price on the basis of the costs of producing alternative
sources of petroleum in the United States, rather than in relation to its much
lower costs of production. The choices for the United States would involve
reliance on imports—with all the attendant balance of payments, political,
and military risks that would entail—attempts to break the cartel through the
application of  colonial policies—which we as well as the Europeans may

 have lost the will if not also the capacity to adopt—or efforts to reduce our
 long run dependence on foreign oil. Most  likely the United States will try to
 opt  for this latter course.
   But the production of oil from offshore sources, tar sands and shale, will
 involve serious environmental problems, problems that will not be resolved
 cheaply, quickly, or to the satisfaction of many local groups with the power
 to hold up  developments. On the  basis  of this scenario,  either  en-
 vironmental concerns will be subverted or the lifespan of our liquid energy
 system will be short, despite the existence of adequate worldwide supplies.
  The alternatives on the supply side are to  develop coal gasification,  and
 nuclear, solar, and geothermal sources of electricity. Some of these alter-
 natives raise  new kinds of environmental  concerns,  perhaps the most
 serious  being  the need  to store highly  lethal, radioactive wastes  from
 breeders in ever-increasing amounts for literally thousands of years. But in
 any event, unless significant changes occur in our transport system, the ex-
 tent  to which gas and electricity can be substituted for liquid fuels will be
 quite limited. Sooner or  later we shall have  to look for alternatives on the
 demand side, that is, alternatives which reduce our need for liquid fuels.  If
 we do so by restrictive means, for example,  by permitting the price of fuel
 oil and gasoline to rise  significantly,  considerable hardships will result for
 an extended period of time, until structural changes in our transport system,
 commuting patterns, and the layout of cities  are forced to occur. If we an-
 ticipate these structural  changes, at least by  building them into all new ur-
 ban  developments, many of these hardships can be ameliorated.
  A  similar conclusion  emerged when  the study focussed on  the  en-
 vironmental problems of a number of regions. At least two  urban areas in
 the sample of 47 wilt not be able to achieve the ambient standards set by
 EPA, solely through the use of emission controls on  internal combustion
 engines; and more detailed studies of other cities and pollutants are likely
 to provide additional examples.  The standards may be too stringent  and
 should be relaxed. But  when we add in the problems of auto  congestion
 consequent on the growth of populations in urban areas during the next half
 century, it seems highly probable that restrictions on the use of the private
 automobile in many central cities will be necessary  in any event. Once
 again,  planned structural changes in city form, commuting patterns,  and
 mass transit systems will be required to achieve an orderly and timely tran-
  The  principal purposes in presenting these examples are to demonstrate
the need for more comprehensive approaches to the problems we face  and
to suggest  a situation  in which  more  resource  conservation and  en-
vironmental improvement may be possible at less economic and social cost
through planned technological,  institutional,  and urban design changes

than by the application of the more traditional  approaches of regulatory
agencies. The latter may ultimately induce the same changes, but the social
cost of doing so is likely to be much higher. Of course,  to apply this ap-
proach one must know in advance just what structural changes are needed,
and then must find some way to  implement them.
Research Implications
  Given  the above discussion and our obvious  ignorance about the con-
sequences of alternative courses of action that  may profoundly affect our
lives, many research needs  practically suggest themselves. Comments
here are limited to just five points which are more in the  nature of caveats
than specific suggestions for research, but which nevertheless are quite im-
portant in the formulation of detailed projects.
  Long-term comprehensive planning.  There can be no doubt about the
need for careful,  interdisciplinary study of the kinds  of problem sets
discussed  above,  where  questions  of  resource adequacy  and  en-
vironmental quality overlap and are mediated by developments in fields as
disparate as international politics  and urban design.  Often, the researcher's
response to problem sets of this  kind is to suggest more comprehensive
simulation  models.
  The principal problem with such models is that we know exceedingly lit-
tle  about physical, biological and  social responses to changes in en-
vironmental  and  other factors  we wish  to study. Before  our level of con-
fidence can be increased to the point where such  models become more
useful  in the policy  formation process;  vastly more information on basic
relationships is needed.
  This is true even in the environmental field, narrowly defined. What, for
example, is  the relationship between a given rate and duration of effluent
emissions  into a  water  body and ambient concentrations  of resulting
chemical compounds in that body; what is the relationship between  such
concentrations and effects on plant and animal life associated with this
water body; once man is directly or indirectly affected, how will he adapt to
these changes; and how is he likely to assess the costs of such changes in
his  environment  and adaptive behavior? Similar and vastly  more difficult
questions can be asked about behavioral relationships in other fields that
should be included in  such comprehensive models.
  It will be along time before an acceptable level  of confidence can be
placed in many of the critical relationships. How can we satisfy the need for
comprehensive, long-term planning in the interim?  Perhaps the only thing
that can be done is to rely on the judgment of mature and experienced per-
sons, who come  to these problems  with a certain frame  of mind: a
willingness to consider and obtain expert advice on all  important factors

that can impinge on the problem, no matter in what field or specialty they
occur, the ability to maintain a sense of proportions about the relative im-
portance of these factors and the usefulness  of various tools of analysis.
   Technological development. Many of the constraints we are facing can be
significantly pushed back in time by technological  developments.  But  in
many of the fields we are concerned with, these developments will not oc-
cur without public support and stimulation. Until recently, for example, there
has been little if any interest on the part of private business in the develop-
ment  of alternatives to the internal combustion engine, alternatives to our
dependence on petroleum, or technological and  institutional systems for
economical  recycling, recovery and waste treatment.  If these developments
are to occur in a timely fashion, the Federal government will have to rethink
its  research  priorities and  provide  significantly   greater stimulus  to
technological developments, especially in the field of energy, than it  has so
far. Agencies concerned with environmental quality should, quite obviously,
play a major role in this process.
  Environmental  consequences. As these technological  changes  occur,
priorities for study  of environmental consequences must also change. If
some of the above judgments are correct, it is none too soon, for example,
to devote far greater efforts to the study of the environmental problems  of
shale, tar sands, and coal gasification, the suggestion of standards  and  of
methods for the control of these problems. Nor is it any too soon to consider
the technical and institutional implications of the requirement to store vast
quantities of nuclear wastes in perpetuity, should the decision be made  to
opt for the  fast breeder on a large scale.
  Experimental approaches. To obtain  the behavioral relations that are
necessary,  complete reliance cannot be placed on empirical observations
drawn from  past experience or from cross-section studies; in many  cases,
we simply do not have past experience to draw upon. How, for example,
can we  estimate the behavioral response to a  significant increase in taxes
on downtown parking when commuters have not been faced with such a tax
in the past? In such situations, the only way to obtain reliable information
may be to  encourage demonstration of an imposed  tax  and observe the
  Admittedly, this approach raises extremely difficult practical problems.
But there are a few areas in which this approach is currently being  used,
and with imagination it might be extended to others. A few experiments  in
the use of alternative fuels are under way; so too are some pilot programs
testing  out alternative  systems  of mass transit. These activities can and
should be encouraged on a much greater scale. It should be possible to ex-
tend  this  approach  to the  development  of alternative  methods for
establishing and implementing  effluent charges and other monetary in-

centives in the environmental field.  For  example, local  citizens  groups
representing all interested parties could be established to fix rates which
would be subject to revision,  upwards or downwards, depending on how
they were working,  to meet standards for environmental  quality (laid down
nationally or locally).
   Institutional Implications. While the study reviewed above does not direc-
tly suggest many institutional implications, two suggestions can be raised in
   First, problems can be cut down to manageable size by splitting them up
into their functional  parts and dividing responsibility, or by treating them in
smaller geographic areas. In  the case of  many  environmental problems
many of which must be handled in a fairly comprehensive way, geographic
subdivision makes especially good sense. The great diversity we observed
above in the experience that urban areas face and will increasingly face in
the future lend weight to this suggestion. So too does the problem of ap-
propriately reflecting  the  preferences of all interested parties in making
decisions about zoning and other aspects of environmental quality.
   What we have in mind is the  establishment of regional environmental
management agencies, with fairly  comprehensive authority to set standards
above certain  national  minimal  levels,  to levy  charges,  to guide and
schedule the use of land, water, and air with respect to pollution emissions,
and to the extent possible within certain overall guidelines, to reflect the in-
terests  of alt relevant parties. At  a minimum, such a region should  en-
compass a whole metropolitan  area, rather than just the central city or major
suburbs within the  region. I believe that a good start has recently been
made  in developing new institutions  along these lines; it should  be  en-
couraged  and promoted.
   The second point is that consideration of the problems  and prospects in-
volved in this country's long-term future convinces most researchers that an
important dimension of policy  formation is  being  overlooked. This dimen-
sion involves the identification, study,  and  initiation of actions with respect
to future problems that may require lead times of decades rather than years
to resolve. There is  a need for continuous monitoring and evaluation of the
long-term implications of demographic changes, of future  resource demand
and supplies, of possible pollution overload  situations and of the underlying
trends in technology and  patterns of social behavior that  influence these
factors;  and once future  problems are identified, there  is a need to  un-
dertake the  necessary  research  and  development  and  formulate  the
policies to resolve them. While parts of these tasks are being performed by
isolated agencies, coordination and analytical assessment on a broad level
is lacking, Most government agencies are of necessity present-oriented or
mission-oriented and sometimes do not serve these functions adequately;

nor can they be left to ad hoc commissions as we have tended to do so far.
Thus, we conclude, there would seem to be a need for a small, strategically
located public agency to serve as a "lobby for the future." with the respon-
sibility for undertaking long-term strategic planning for the nation.

                     Notes for Chapter 2
  1. Von Foerster, H, et al, "Doomsday  Friday 13 November, A.D. 2026",
    Science, No. 132.  1960.
  2. Calhoun, John B. "Environmental Design Research and Monitoring from
    an  Evolutionary Perspective."  Paper  prepared  for Environmental
    Protection Agency.
  3. Bouldmg, Kenneth E.  "The Meaning of the 20th Century: The Great
    Transition,"  Harper &  Row  N.Y., 1965
  4. "Population  Growth and America's Future " Commission on Population
    Growth  and  the American Future. March 1970.
  5. Fuller,  Buckminster,  "Utopia  or  Oblivion?  The  Prospects  for
    Humanity", Bantam Books, N.Y., 1969.
  6. U.S Dept. of Commerce, "Projections of the Population of the United
    States by Age and Sex: 1972 to 2020", Series P-25 No  493, Decem-
    ber. 1972.
  7. Brown,  Harrison "The  Challenge of Man's Future", The  Viking Press,
    N.Y.,  1954 ,
  8. "Population  Growth &  America's Future". Commission on Population
    Growth  and  the American Future (Interim Report). March  1970.
  9. Ibid.
10. Schaller. Lyle E., "Impact of  the Future". Abmgdon Press. Nashville,
11. "Population  Characteristics:  Birth  Expectations  and Fertility."  U.S.
    Bureau  of the Census. June  1972.
12. Schaller, Lyle E. op. cit.
13. "Population  Growth &  America's Future." op. cit.
14. Tram. Russell E.,  Speech delivered  to  Los  Angeles World Affairs
    Council. March 29. 1972.
15. The Futurist.  Vol. VI. No. 6. December 1972.
16. Thompson. William I..  "At  the Edge of  History: Speculations on the
    Transformation of Culture". Harper  and  Row,  N.Y., 1972.
17. The Futurist,  op. cit.
18. Doxiadis,  Constantinos. "The Future of Human Settlements". Nobel
    Symposium Paper.  Stockholm. 1969.
19. Theobald, Robert. "Futures Conditional", The Bobbs-Merrill Company,
    Inc., 1972.
20. Mesthene, Emmanuel G.. "Technological Change. Its Impact on Man
   and Society", New  American Library, N.Y., 1970.

21.Traviss, Irene, "Our Tool-Making Society",  Prentice-Hall, Inc.,  Engle-
   wood Cliffs, N.J.,  19^2.
22. McHale, John,  "The Changing Context for Management", The Con-
   ference Board,  N.Y.,  1972.
23. Kahn, Herman and Bruce-Briggs, B., "Things to Come; Thinking About
   the Seventies and Eighties," The Macmillan Company, N.Y., 1972.
24. "Ecology: Tne Man-Made Planet",  Kaiser News, 1970.
25. Fuller. R.  Buckminster, op.  cit..
26. Thompson, William I, op. cit.
27. Fuller, R.  Buckminster, op.  cit.
28. "U.S.  Population  Density Increased by 7 Persons Per Square Mile,
   1970 Census Shows," U.S. Bureau of the Census Press Release, June
   22, 1971.
29. "Fifty-Eight Percent of U.S. Population  in 248 Urbanized Areas, Cen-
   sus Shows,"  U.S.  Bjreau of the Census,  Press Release, Feb.  22,
30. This illustrative formulation follows Ronald G Ridker, "Population and
   Pollution in the United States",  Science, June 1972, p. 1085; Also,
   Paul R. Erlich and John  P.  Holden, "impact of  Population Growth",
   Volume III o* the Population Commission Research Reports, Washing-
   ton, D.C.:  GPO, 1972.
31. Ridker, Ronald G., Editor. Vol, III of the Population Commission Re-
   search Reports. Washington, D.C.:  GPO  1972.
32. Ridker, Ronald G. "Resource and  Environmental Consequences of
   Population Growth  in the  United  States", GPO,  1972.
33. Singer, Fred  S. "The Environmental Implications of Zero Population
   Growth." Paper prepared for Environmental Portection Agency.
34. "Population and the  American Future", U.S. Commission on Popula-
   tion Growth and the  American Future, Washington, D.C.,  1972.
35. In the E-H case, Philadelphia will also be above the standard in 2000.
   The fact that the E-H case presents more regional environmental dif-
   ficulties than do the other cases results from a combination of  factors
   the most important of which  is the assumption that land area expands
   in proportion  to population.

  An ecosystem is a set of living things and their environment. The system
concept  emphasizes the interdependence  and  interrelatedness  of  all
elements of the  ecosystem.  The  term  and  concept can be applied to
systems of any size. A pond, a region or the complete biosphere can each
be studied  as  an  ecosystem. Whatever  the size, an ecosystem  has finite
limitations. The natural resources, renewable and non-renewable, available
to sustain life in any period of time  are limited.
  When we apply the ecosystem concept to a geopolitical region we  see
that the natural resources available to produce goods and services,  Gross
Regional Product (GRP), are  limited.  Given the inevitable population
growth, accompanied by some economic growth discussed in the previous
chapter, we see that ultimately some limit must be reached. Whether  this
limit is near or whether we should be concerned  about a doomsday, we
dont't know. We do know that the public demands a high quality of life. This
requires use of resources not only for goods and services but also  for in-
tangibles and amenities. Planners  and decision-makers must address the
problems of  providing material  goods  and amenities  to  growing
  In  the  past the  concept of carrying capacity has  been  defined as  the
ability of a  region to sustain some population, usually a specific animal
population. In this Chapter, we will apply the concept in a broader sense.
We define carrying capacity as the  ability of the  natural  resources of a
region to provide material goods and services and amenities  to a human
population while  maintaining some  acceptable quality of life.  With this
definition carrying capacity  analysis becomes a  tool for planners and
decision-makers to evaluate  alternative goals  and  plans.
  The discussion  of carrying capacity analysis is taken from the invited
paper by E  K. Peterson. He presents a method for establishing a ben-
chmark standard for quality of life and evaluating alternative combinations
of population, GRP and levels of pollution control. Using first approximation
numbers, the concept is applied to the  Pacific Northwest.

  The  carrying capacity analysis presented by Peterson is an example of
the  multidisciplinary  analysis  required  to  determine the  relationships
among the many factors influencing the environment and the Quality of Life.
The need for such methodologies was discussed in the Study of Critical En-
vironmental Problems (SCEP) sponsored by MIT in 1970. The  major fin-
dings of this study are presented, in summary form, to introduce Peterson's
paper.  The "Spaceship Earth" concept is also described in the introductory
material.  This popularized model  illustrates the finite limitations  of our
resources and the interdependence of all elements of the biosphere—facts
of life which can be dealt with by means of analyses such as  presented by

Ecology of the  Biosphere
  The Study of Critical Environmental Problems was sponsored by MIT in
1970 as a means of providing information for the 1972  U.N. Conference on
the Human Environment and for other environmental activitiesd). A total of
115 scientists, representing many disciplines, participated in the study. The
major conclusions and recommendations of the study are presented below.
  A major conclusion of the SCEP  study was that data of all types are
lacking  and that new methods of collecting, compiling and standardizing
data are required. Peterson's paper presents a first effort at compling data
describing the resources available for producing goods and ammenities in
the Pacific Northwest region.
  The  SCEP report notes  that agriculture,  mining and  industry are  in-
creasing at a rate of above five percent annually, approximately twice as fast
as global population growth. Man is using natural resources at rates greater
than the rates of erosion and deposition;  the distribution of resources is
  The gradual pollution-caused  attrition of natural systems is a measure of
the total impact of man on the environment. Most pollutants affect predators,
specific species and general biological  activities—all of which  must be
balanced to maintain a healthy  ecology.
  The SCEP recommends an intensive program of technology assessment
to determine the effects of pollutants, to identify the sources of pollutants
and to integrate such information into plans for technological development.
It also recommends a program of environmental assessment to determine
the distribution routes of pollutants and their passage through ecosystems.
  In a broad sense the carrying capacity analysis presented here can be
used as a tool  for technology and environmental assessment. One such
analysis of pollution as a function of regional  production and  population
level is  presented by Peterson.
  Speaking of global climatic effects, the SCEP report  states that man may
affect climate by introducing, through fossil fuel combustion, carbon dioxide
into the atmosphere.  Recently,  the carbon dioxide density has been  in-
creasing by about 0.2 percent per year. The study estimates,  based on a
"primitive  model," that doubling the carbon dioxide concentration would
result in an increase of about 2°C in surface temperature, which could lead
to  long term  warming  of the planet. The study concludes that climatic
change  as a result of changes  in the carbon dioxide content of the at-
mosphere is unlikely in the near term, however, the  long-term effects could
be serious and continued study and monitoring are required.
   Man  introduces significant quantities  of sulfates, nitrates and hydrocar-
bons into  the atmosphere. The optical properties of  these particles and how

they scatter and absorb energy from the sun and the surface of the earth
must be studied, improved measurement techniques must be developed
and  specific particle content must be  monitored to improve  our  un-
derstanding of  their impact.
  The report emphasizes that the  system  of ocean  and air currents,
evaporation and precipation, surface and  cloud reflection and absorption,
form a complex feedback system which  maintains the global energy in
balance. The delicacy of this balance and the consequences of disturbing it
make it important to assess the present and future impact of man's activities
on this system.
  In summary, the SCEP report cites the need for more data and further
study. It emphasizes the balance  which must be maintained between the
many factors  influencing the environment.  A further  example of  the
limitations and interrelated ness of the biosphere is presented in  the next
The Spaceship  Earth Concept

  Comparing the earth and its life support systems to a spaceship is a vivid
way of illustrating the finite nature of our ecosystem.  As described  by Lyn-
ton Caldwell  (2), this  model

       "Illustrates relationships between man and his environment that
    are basic to his welfare and survival. Ecological facts that man
    prefers to evade  on earth are universally acknowledged for the
    spaceship. For example, no  one doubts that there is a limit to the
    number of passengers that  the ship can accommodate, and the
    need for  reserve capacity to  meet unforeseeable contingencies is
    not questioned. It is obvious  that the spaceship cannot indefinitely
    transform its nutrients into waste.
       If  extruded  from the ship as   waste, energy sources  are
    irretrievably lost; if accumulated as waste, viability of the ship is
    ultimately destroyed from within.  There  is no escape from the
    necessity of recycling  waste materials.  For the duration of the
    voyage, the  ship must remain in ecological balance. Disruption of
    any of its systems may mean  disaster for the mission and the crew.
    Systems  maintenance  is,  therefore, one of the essential com-
    ponents of a program of space exploration."

  Comparing the ecology of the  spaceship to that of the earth,  Caldwell

       "The ...  (earth) is a  unified  system dependent upon the co-
     ordinated and continuing functioning of interrelating systems and
     parts.  It has surpluses, redundancy, and backup capacity, but its
     resources are nevertheless limited. Because carrying capacity is
     one of its limits,  it must  so far as  possible recycle its resources
     unless it can obtain  them at feasible cost from external  sources.
     Changes in the system must be studied in relation to their total ef-
     fects,  because altered  relationships among the  parts,  even in-
     tended improvements, may adversely affect the  performance of the
     whole. Maintenance of the system and its subsystems  must be
     watched, for failure at any critical point could lead to the destruc-
     tion of the entire enterprise."
Implications for Today

  The  SCEP report discusses  the  balance which must  exist among all
elements  of the biosphere  and states  that man has caused significant
damage to the environment. It presents  specific recommendations for im-
proving the data available and recommends methodologies which must be
developed to support environmental planning. The Spaceship Earth con-
cept emphasizes the finite limitations of  our resources and again stresses
the interdependence among the elements of the biosphere.
  Although these discussions focus on the total biosphere and global en-
vironmental problems, the SCEP report  notes that the existence of global
problems  does  not necessarily  imply a need for global solutions. Most
corrective action must be applied at the national, regional and local  levels,
where the sources of pollution and the activities of man can be controlled
and  regulated.
  To control and manage the environment at the local  or regional level
requires information and data to define and quantify the factors affecting the
environment.  New methods  of analysis  which help  planners and policy-
makers evaluate the probable results of alternative  actions are required.
The  carrying capacity analysis presented by Peterson is one approach to
such analysis. He presents data quantifying the  resources  available for
producing  goods and for producing ammenities. The latter permits an
evaluation  of the Quality  of Life available  under  alternative  policies. He
describes the relationships between population levels, production of goods
and  energy, pollution, pollution control and the Quality of Life.

 The  Classical Fundamental Problem of Population
 and  Industrial Growth
   As a prelude to his discussion of carrying capacity analysis, Peterson
 summarizes  relationships between population  and  industrial  output  as
   Frequently natural resource and  environmental quality problems  have
 been equated with population. However, human members are only one part
 of the equation.  The  other part is the goods and services (gross product)
 man  produces with  energy applied to machines. This energy may  be
 derived from domestic animals, from hydro power, from  burning wood or
 fossil fuels,  from nuclear or direct solar sources. For a nation  or a  large
 region the consumption of natural resources and the  potential detrimental
 impact on the environment is assumed to increase roughly in proportion to
 the increase in  the  gross product. However, there are  variations in the
 potential impact from basic industries as compared to secondary  industries,
 or  between  individual  basic  industries;  also  the  relationship can  be
 modified substantially by recycling and by other forms of  pollution control.
   Gross product also  is assumed  to vary in proportion to energy  con-
 sumption. The re ationship between income,  gross product, and energy
 use, on  an annual per capita basis for selected nations, is shown in Figures
 1, 2, and 3. Although the relationship has been approximately correct in the
 past it is not necessarily inviolate for all time.  But at present there is  in-
 sufficient evidence upon which to base an assumption of a  change. On a
 national basis the-e was a slight  downward trend in the use  of energy per
 unit of GNP between 1950 and  1968, but since then it has been  rising.
 Per Capita  Share of GNP
   For convenience the per capita share of GNP in 1965 dollars,  is used  as
the measurement of goods and services produced. In 1967 the situation in
 one affluent nation and and one  underdeveloped nation was as shown in
Table 1.
                              Table 1
               Comparison of Per Capita Consumption1
Per Capita Share GNP in  1967
Energy Equivalent Required (tons of coal)
Steel (pounds per capita per year)
United States

'"The Next Ninety Years," proceedings of a conference sponsored by the Office lor Industrial
Associates at the California Institute of Technology (1967),  Harrison Brown, Professor of


 —  o ,
 =  •=*•


















   It appears dear that the total impact per capita upon the environment is
 much greater in industrialized countries such as the United States than in
 underdeveloped countries such as India. The latter uses far less land and
 natural  resources,  far  less  goods and services, and causes  far  less
 pollution on a per capita basis. In other words,  in India most of the en-
 vironmental stress is caused directly by the human population. In the United
 States, which has only moderate population density, the bulk of the en-
 vironmental stress results f'om economic activity.
 Per Capita Servant Machines
  A portion of the gross product is produced by unassisted human labor.
 Through the use of energy and technology the capacity of an average in-
 dividual to produce goods and services multiplies as  a nation becomes
 more  industrialized. One way of illustrating the relationship is to assign a
 portion of the per capita production of gross product to  humans and the
 remainder  to their "servant machines"  (3).
  An  exact dollar  figure representing what an  average  person could
 produce  without modern  powered  equipment  (exclusive  of  domestic
 animals)  probably  cannot  be  established.  In  1870,  according to the
 Historical Statistics of the United States,  U.S. Bureau of the Census, the per
 capita share of  the GNP in the United  States was $440,  in 1965 dollars.
 Earlier statistics are not available. The 1870 figure  probably was above the
 world base due to the very favorable natural resource supply situation and
 rudimentary industrialization. On the other hand the $88 figure for India in
 1967 appears low for use as a worldwide base. Much of the economy of In-
 dia, and other undeveloped nations, is barter and  subsistence. This is not
 conducted through established markets  and therefore not priced in national
 statistics. A figure of $250 per year appears to be a good compromise and
 more realistic. It would approximate 4 kilowatt years of electrical energy or
the energy  equivalent resulting from the  combustion of about 1,700 pounds
of coal. Lacking a more refined comparison,  let us make this assumption.
This would  mean that in the Uited States in 1967, the average person had
 13 "servant machines" ($3,490/$250 less 1) at his disposal—each "ser-
vant" producing as many beneficial outputs, and using as much resources
and space and causing as much pollution in the process as its owner. This
 is without considering  the amount of  pollution control.
  In comparison, a citizen cf Sweden had 8.5  servant machines; Canada, 8;
West Germany,  5.6; Japan,  2.8; Russia, 2.3; and mainland China or India
only a fraction (4).
  In 2020,  with increasing affluence, the number of  servant machines is
projected to increase to 61  per person  in the United States. However, the
end point of uncontrolled expansion is total destruction. Sooner or later we

must achieve a sustainable balance between the rate we use and exploit
basic resources and the capacity of the environment to support such use
and abuse. As the British technologist, Dr. Dennis Gabor, expresses it (5):
    "Exponential curves grow to infinity only in mathematics,  In the
    physical world, they either turn around and saturate or they break
    down catastrophically."
   it is possible that, if environmental quality is to be maintained, the total
number of humans that could be sustained in a given region would tend to
decrease as individual affluence (servant  machines) increases; or con-
versely, the greater the number of people at a given time the fewer there
would be who could "live like kings  " As Garrett Hardin in "Tragedy of the
Commons"  points  out, Jeremy  Bentham's  19th Century principle "The
greatest good to the greatest number in  the long run" is a mathematical and
biological  impossibility (6).  The two   variables  cannot be  maximized

Limitations of Classical Planning

   Peterson  believes that traditional methods of planning, based on  ex-
trapolation  of historical trends  is no longer adequate. We  need a sys-
tematic method  of identifying long-range goals  and evaluating alternative

   Concern in the past about comprehensive long  range  goals has been
minimal.  There is little  understanding of the long term effects that different
rates and kinds of growth would have on the quality of life. There has been
little concerted action toward adopting coordinated  long range  goals as a
formal state or  regional policy.  There  is  no agreement  on what mix of
material goals and intangibles are needed for the highest attainable quality
of life.  Each  person,  each corporation, each  governmental  unit,  each
citizens'  organization  historically  has pursued his  or its own  ends. The
result has been unplanned,  uncoordinated  and  uncontrolled growth. This
kind of growth historically has produced in the United States a high materia.'
standard of living.  But it  ;ilso  is  increasingly  yielding undesirable  en-
vironmental  results.
Classical Forecasts for the Pacific Northwest
   The  1967 forecast of the Office of Business Economics, U.S. Department
of Commerce,  and Economic  Research  Service,  U.S.  Department of
Agriculture (OBERS), to the year 2020  include a change in  population for
the Northwest region from 5.9 million in 1965 to 12.7 million (216%); and

 in per  capita annual personal income, in constant 1965  dollars, from
 $2,785 in 1965 to $13,189 (474%). In per capita share of gross regional
 product, they project a change from $3,520 to  $16,700,  Such increases
 would result in 10.2 times the production of  goods and services that existed
 in 1965 or from $20.4 billion to $208 billion in constant 1965 dollars. The
 1971 projections based upon 1967 data show population in 2020 as 11.97
 million  and per capita incotie as $13,181, in  1965  dollars. These  are
 shown graphically in Figure 4.
  Similar forecasts, including  some consideration of individual resource
 capability, frequenty have been accepted by planners and decision makers
 as goals and are used to forecast the long  range "needs" and "demands"
 for other national and local programs such  as public  lands and resources,
 transportation,  energy supply,  housing,  health  and education. The Battelle
 Memorial  Institute and the Bonnevilie Power Administration  used such
 methods for projecting Pacific Northwest long  range  growth in population,
 employment, and income.
 Questions  Unanswered by the Forecasts
  This type of economic projection has proven to be a reasonably accurate
 forecast during  the past 50 years and no other system for identifying goals
 has been readily available. However, it frequently ignores natural resource
 supply  constraints, assumes unlimited growth, and fails to quantify either
 the combined capacity of all Northwest natural  resources to sustain growth
 or the effect that the projected growth and economic development would
 have  on the livability, the congestion, the air and water pollution, and  the
 natural or the intangible values. Specifically, the following questions must
 be answered:
  1.  Would the result be mining without renewal of the  natural resources?
  2.  Would the caoacity  of our natural systems to assimilate man-made
     waste be overwhelmed?
  3.  Would Northwest conditions in the year 2000 be comparable to con-
     ditions in  1972  in  :he  Los Angeles  area  or the  East  Coast
  4.  Would people have  a  higher material standard of living but  enjoy it
 New  Concepts for Planning
  To  answer questions such as those  posed in the preceeding  Section
and to incorporate alternative approaches  to solving these problems,  the
 study draws only slightly or either the  pure ecologists  or the economists,
whether  classical  or  contemporary.   Instead  it utilizes  contemporary

             	 PER CAPITA INCOME
     2 ~
                                               \     I     T
                                              90  2000  10    20

SOURCE:  Office of business  tc'inor-.j cs,  U.S.  Department of Commerce; and
        Economic Research Service, U.S.  Department of Agriculture  (06ERS),
        1967 base year (1965 dollors)
  Figure 4. Pacific Northwest Growth in  Total Personal Income, Income Per
  Capita and  Population from 1929 to 1967, with Projections to 2020

multidisciplinary efforts that attempt to gain a balanced perspective of the
two, such as:

  '.Tragejdy_of the Commons", Garrett Hardin, 1968. (6).

  "Resources and Man", Preston Cloud, Ed., National Academy of Scien-
ces. (7).

  "Man's Impact on the Global Environment" Report of SCEP, sponsored
by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 1970. (8).

  "Population,  Resources,  Environment",  Paul R.  Ehrlich &  Anne  H.
Ehrlich. (9).

  "The Closing Circle", Barry Commoner.  (10).

  "A Blueprint for Survival", in  The  Eco/ogist. January 1972. (11).

  "Report of the  Commission on Population and  the American Future".

  "Economic Growth and Environmental Decay", David W. Seckler & Paul
W.  Barkey. (13).
Assumed Limitations to Growth
  Any function monotonically  increasing  in a positive non-fractional
geometric progression will approach an infinite amount This is commonly
referred to as exponential growth. Since land and other resources are finite
and since population and gross regional product increase in a geometric
series, a limit will be reached if growth continues. One natural law that is as
immutable as the  law of gravity is that  noth ng physical on this planet can
expand forever. Based upon these princip.es tne assumptions are made
  (1) It is physically impossible for either the gross regional product or the
population to expend forever.
  (2) A state of equilibrium must be reached eventually, the unknowns are
when and how.
  (3) At some point in time, further increases  in population  and gross
regional  product begin reducing the overa.l quality of life.
  The foregoing assumptions challenge the American ethic—the doctrine
of "manifest destiny"—of Keynesian economics—that growth is progress
and  progress  is good—that the "invisible guiding hand"  of the market

place will automatically produce the optimum mix of material and intangible
benefits. There has been relatively little scientific effort devoted to studying
such  basic issues (14).
  Reluctance  to tackle  the basic issues directly may arise because it is
contrary to the growth drive that has been United States gospel since 1776
and has in fact motivated  much  of mankind  since  prehistoric times.  But
changes in our way of life  and the quality of living are increasing rapidly.
Since 1950 the real output of goods and services in the  United States has
exceeded the total for the previous 330 years. What we do now. or fail to do,
fixes future patterns of life.  We can no longer afford to approach the future
haphazardly. The choice is whether to plan for and guide  future changes or
be engulfed by them. This paper is devoted to exploring  in a systematic
manner one of the possible ways of identifying  long range goals, using the
Pacific Northwest as an example.
New  Assumptions lor  Planning Guidelines
  Most of the planning assumptions to date have been that the future will be
an extension of the past:  that population increases and industrial  growth
inevitably will continue at an exponential rate and the proper course of ac-
tion is to supply the  highways electrical power, water,  urban  expansion,
and all  other things  needed  to accommodate this growth; that plans  are
needed only to organize the inevitable; that any problems which result from
the growth will be solved  by  using science and technology to  manipulate
natural ecosystems.
  There  is  a rapidly  developing differing view that (15);
  (1)  Today's  problems are a result of successes as defined in yesterday's
  (2)  An extension of the past is not  the right prescription for the  future.
  (3)  The primary planning goals for  this nation should be altered—with
high quality livability as the major long term objective (including a major im-
provement in the economic position of many of our citizens) and economic
development shaped  around  this overriding determinant.
  (4)  Science and technology, if oriented toward harmony with nature, can.
within limits, assist in reaching the highest  attainable quality of life  goals.
  (5)  Through  social and  political action  it  is possible to encourage,
modify, or block growth and development trends so that they are compatible
with those long range goals which are supported by a  popular consensus.
  Unquestionably,  the attainment of the present United  States material stan-
dard of living  coupled with a high level of  personal freedom and  leisure
time has been a magnificient achievement—the envy of much of the world.
But there were unforeseen and  costly consequences too. Now there  are
new challenges.  The foresight exercised in today's planning decisions and

 actions (or  lack of actions) will determine the quality of life and material
 standard of  living available for our children and grandchildren. Land, water,
 and air resources  must be recognized as  inseparable components of a
 single life support system, not as independent reservoirs for both raw
 materials and waste disposal to be appropriated and exploited at will. Some
 way must be found to balance and harmonize both economic and ecologic
 goals while maintaining our democratic principles.
 Alternative Goals
   If the desire of the people is to control their own destiny and build a future
 which differs from an extension of the past  it will be  necessary to decide
 upon long range goals and tailor long range plans and action programs to
 best fit those goals. It  would require changes in many of our traditional
 procedures  and priorities. Among them is  the system  of preparing long
 range plans based primarily upon the projection of historical growth trends
 in population and  economic activity.
  We thus have four alternative fundamental  growth policies we can adopt.
  Alternative one.  Arbitrarily adopt  a  "no growth" policy.
  Alternative two.  Make every  effort to accelerate growth.
  Alternative three. Combine several scenarios of pollution, natural beauty,
 living space, and other  environmental  quality trends with several alternate
economic projections to present a better balanced picture (quality of life in-
dices)  of the possible futures.
   Alternative four. Manage and control our use of resources on a carrying
 capacity basis. This could be a steady  state scenario under alternative
 three.  The  carrying capacity  alternative  appears to have considerable
 potential for identifying sustainable balances between ecology and  the
 economy. It is a new approach. In contrast, the other three approaches  are
 either  in use or being explored by others.

   Carrying  capacity analysis provides a  means of identifying alternative
 goals for population and economic growth, quality of life and quality of the
 environment It is based on the assumption that uncontrolled growth of  the
 population and economy  of a region  cannot be sustained forever.
Carrying  Capacity Analysis of the Pacific Northwest
  The  remainder of this paper presents, within the limits of available in-
formation, the basic features of a prototype system for identifying different
combinations of population levels,  economic activity levels, and intangible
value levels that are possible for the Pacific Northwest—an  approach that
identifies both the limits of basic natural resources of a region to support

future growth and the desirable and undesirable consequences of various
levels of growth.
  Carrying capacity is an ancient principle in man's relationship to the land.
It is an established  method  in the management of renewable resources
such as agricultural land,  forests, watersheds,  and wildlife, but has not
previously been applied to the entire economy and environment of a region.
It was the way  of life for mankind prior to the industrial  and technological
age beginning in the  early  1800's—the age when man  began the ex-
ponential  exploitation of non-renewable resources. It represents  capacity
under  a  steady state or  equilibrium  conditions  with  only moderate
oscillations in population but with continuous invention to increase choices
and provide greater diversity.
  It has been established that most, if not all, species of wild animals have
instincts which  usually tend to prevent overcrowding in their native habitat.
They frequently thrive best  at less than the maximum density which would
be  possible  with  the  available food and shelter, etc. In other words,
sustained carrying capacity estimates for different species of wildlife must
recognize population density in addition  to other constraints.  There is
growing evidence, but no conclusive  proof and  no consensus among ex-
perts, that similar principles apply to human society. Congested sections of
some of our urban centers, for example, are experiencing social unrest and
appear too crowded.  There is growing evidence that there is a basic human
need for natural open space ana there may be an optimum population and
acreage for individual urban areas. The carrying  capacity in visitor days is
being determined for parks, golf courses, hunting and fishing areas, wilder-
ness areas, and similar recreation lands.
  In the Pacific  Northwest, both the bulk of the basic industries and the high
quality scenery and outdoor  amenities are dependent upon renewable
natural resources—forests  and  grassland, mountains and valleys,  rivers
and lakes, agricultural land, urban and industrial land, seaports, ample high
quality water, hydroelectric power sites.a continuous influx  of clean  air off
the Pacific Ocean and good climate.  Industries based upon location,  such
as  those manufacturing transportation or electronic equipment or metals
from imported ones,  find the Northwest a desirable location because of its
renewable natural   resources.  The  secondary  industries,  which  are
generated by the basic industries, are similarly  oriented.
  The only basic Northwest industry which the study considers to be based
primarily upon non-renewable resources is mining. But the Northwest sup-
ply of its most important minerals such as stone, limestone, phosphate, cop-
per, lead, zinc, and nickel should last from 50 years to indefinitely. The Nor-
thwest  presently is not self-sufficient in  several vital minerals such  as oil
and gas, iron or aliminum ore. But this is  no more of a disadvantage  to the
Northwest than  it is to other  mineral short regions of the  nation.

   With such a preponderance of the economy and the livability of the Nor-
 thwest  based  upon  renewable  natural  resources now  and  for  the
 foreseeable  future,  would  it be  possible  and desirable to  determine
 carrying capacity for the Northwest in terms of population and production of
 goods and services per year (gross product)? Such an undertaking would
 require defining benchmark optimum needs in terms of gross product per
 capita as well  as intangibles per capita.  Such an  approach does  offer
 promise as  a way to achieve a 'balance of nature"  under the  spaceship
 earth concept.  It offers  promise as an  alternate  to the  historical  trend
 technique. It might avoid some of the pitfalls and  uncertainties of long range
 Methodology for Carrying Capacity Analysis
   There are several teciniques, very sophisticated, that might be used to
 apply the carrying  capacity  concept. This initial study attempts to  con-
 centrate on the major principles and critical factors, present them in a direct
 skeletal fashion, and illustrate the concept in the Pacific Northwest with first
 approximation numbers. The procedure is summarized as follows:
   1. Determine  benchmark  standards  tor  measuring  Quality  of  Life.
 Average per capita income will be chosen as the parameter; an optimum
 apportionment of  incone  among material  necessities and  intangibles,
 based on social theory, will be identified.
   2  Assess the Gross Regional Product (GRP) and the amount of pollution
 in the base  year (1965).  Then determine the  relationship between ad-
 ditional GRP and pollution with different levels of pollution control.  Also
 assess potential constraints.
   3. Assess the utilization of  natural resources in the base year (1965) for
 GRP and  for intangible purposes  and their potential for the future on a
 carrying capacity  basis. Assess potential constraints.
   4  Within  carrying  capacity  constraints  identify the  optional goals
 available for fut jre grow:h in the Pacific Northwest in terms of various com-
 binations of population and per capita GRP  Determine the relationship of
 each combination to (a) overall pollution levels in 1965, and (b) the quality
 of life benchmarks.
A Quality of Life Benchmark
   The  first step  in  the orocess of applying carrying capacity analysis to
 identifying alternative "acceptable" long range  goals for a  region is to
 determine  the  various combinations  of economic  affluence and  en-
 vironmental quality that are  attainable and how close these would be to the
 "optimum." In other words a technique is  needed to measure the trade-offs
 between  mater al quantity  and intangible quality.  There is no universal

agreement concerning what would constitute an optimum quality of life in a
particular geographic area for humans. To a degree, such perceptions are
culturally oriented. However, probably a majority in the United States would
agree that in an ideal environment the basic needs of every citizen would  be
satisfied and he or she would have full opportunity for personal fulfillment
and have the assurance that  his or her children and grandchildren, ad  in-
finitum,  would have the same opportunities.
  Personal fulfillment ordinarily means reasonable opportunity to develop
one's innate potential for creativity and constructive effort for the long term
benefit of both himself or herself and society as a whole. In an optimum en-
vironment there would be  ample challenge, diversity, and inspiration to
satisfy a wide range of interests. There would also be moderate stress and
competition—not an  effortless society on the one hand or a ruthless, over-
demanding one on the other.  Every human would be needed, and respec-
ted as an individual.  Everyone would have personal freedom and freedom
of choice to pursue his own goals, whether they be economic, moral, social,
or aesthetic. There would be ample opportunity for a wide variety of cultures
and life styles.  No one would be forced to reside where he either suffered
from lack of human companionship or felt hemmed in by too many people.
  There has been little scientific effort devoted to systematically identifying
the elements that comprise an optimum quality of life. Yet if the people are
to guide their future destiny, the ultimate goals must be described in both
comprehensive and understandable terms. One way to come to grips with
such a complicated problem,  in the absence of adequate information about
alt its aspects, is to propose a basic conceptual framework and subject it to
review,  revision, improvement, and refinement. This description of a quality
of life benchmark represents such  a  pioneering effort. It is needed as a
reference point for  measuring  the quantity-quality trade-offs. Both the
material  elements and  the  intangible  elements  are  essential  to the
realization of the desired quality  of life, but one of the  greatest potential
threats this nation faces  is that the intangible values  will be irretrievably
destroyed during the pursuit of  short term, material  values.  Indeed, the
tragic evidence of such myopia is  already apparent in too many parts of this
  To better their  quality of  life the people of nations throughout the world
historically  have  placed  initial  emphasis  upon  acquiring  the  basic
necessities. Frequently this required sufficient concentrations of population,
and knowledge of science and technology to  make more efficient use of
available energy, automation, and mass production. Similar economies of
scale usually  have  been  necessary  to  maintain  adequate facilities for
security, education, health, government, and entertainment

  As soon as per capita income exceeds the amount needed to satisfy the
most essential  portions  of basic  and  immediate  material  needs for
existence  such as  food, clothing,  housing,  security,  health,  and  tran-
sportation, the average person's (and nation's) interest and emphasis shifts
to longer  range and  more  intangible  items (and our  most perishable
amenities) such as education, recreation, clean air, clean water, quietness,
open space, personal elbow room,  variety, and  stimulation, cultural op-
portunities,  attractive design and landscaping, natural scenic beauty and
wilderness. Usually such amenities require a substantial number of servant
machines per capita, including those used to control the adverse effects of
production. Because of tie increasing affluence and rising expectations of
the average person, it appears that in the next century there will be sharply
increasing interest  in  cultural  and  aesthetic pursuits and other quality
aspects of the environment in the United States—an  interest that was very
low key during the past century—all concentrating on a land, water, and air
resource base that  is finite.
  Other nations are  similarly motivated.  Those struggling for an economic
toehold have little energy left for planning long range  improvements;  or as
John Ga.braith expresses it, "The natural priorities of a society  proceed
from getting the goods to getting the surroundings in which they can be en-
joyed" (16). The United States  now has the economic capability to  invest
heavily  in  measures  designed  to enhance the well-being  of  future
        The Hierarchy of Human Needs as a QOL Rationale
  Psychologists who have been studying human  motivation in the United
States refer to the relationship as the "hierarchy of human needs." Those
needs are depicted as a triangle  consisting of  five compartments with
physiological needs  at the base and self-fulfillment needs at the apex. The
arrangement indicates that a need at one level tends to be the primary
motivation after the  most essential, but not necessarily all, of the needs at
the lower levels have been satisfied (Figure 5). There are many individual
exceptions, and the need   categories  tend  to  blend  and  intermingle.
However,  on the average, after the physiological and security needs are
satisfied, energy is available for satisfying more intangible needs, assisting
others and  providing  for  future generations.  Of  course,  without the
necessary  motivation, it may not be  used for such purposes.
  The hierarchy theory is that with each  step upward (or downward) a per-
son's, or a nation's, short range goals and priorities change. The long range
hazard that some can clearly foresee, and others do not yet perceive, is that
a nation's efforts to  satisfy the basic material  needs for an ever increasing
population can foreclose the opportunities for eventually satisfying the in-
tangible self-fulfillment needs essential  for an optimum quality  of life.

    Sense of accomplishment and achievement
    of full  capability;  acceptance of new
    challenges;  broadening of horizons of
    interest;  self  actualization

    Achievement  of  independence,
    self-esteem,  deserved  respect
    of peers,  recognition, confidence

3.  SOCIAL MELDS            	

    Sense of belonging  to  a group and
    acceptance by other people, 'ove
    and affection

    Protection  from physical harn, assurance
    of continuing  Income and employment,
    protection  of  home  (including land and
    natural  resources which provide the basis
    for quality of life over the  long term)
    Food,  shelter, clothing, sleep,
    reproduction of  the species,
    identity,  stimulation, etc.
               Figure 5. The Hierarchy of Human Needs (17).

  The hierarchy of  needs theory may be useful as an illustration but the
reader should be aware that it has limitations; it is not universally accepted.
Also the emphasis on the various steps varies with different cultures bet-
ween nations  and within  an  individual nation.
                Marginal Utility as a QOL Rationale
  As  a supplement, and  for  those who have reservations about using the
"hierarchy of needs" as  an  illustration, the "marginal utility" approach  is
presented also. As  Seckler and Barkley explain it (13):
       "In the  developed countries goods and  services  have  ac-
    cumulated in upper middle class homes to such an extent that the
    marginal utility of "things" has surely dropped. At the same time,
    fresh air,  clean water, wilderness and  quiet (things often called
    "amenities') have one by one become more scarce,  more dear".
  The curves  in Figure  6 show the decreasing marginal utility (MU)  of
goods over time and the  increasing  marginal utility of amenities over time.
  Under such conditions the wisdom of producing more and more goods
should be questioned since, by moving into the future (past time period P in
Figure 6) the added utility of goods  and services would be lower than the
marginal utility of the amenities that had to be sacrificed in order to produce
the goods.  At point P1, amenities with  marginal values of OD have  been
sacrificed to obtain goods with marginal utility of OA. The difference (BC)
indicates the net loss.
  On the other hand, if the production of goods and  services should level
off,  the marginal utility  of amenities  would tend to level off  also.
              Per Capita Income as the QOL Standard
  In order  to  satisfy all  levels of human needs,  financial resources are
necessary.   A  generally understood  and  readily  available  common
denominator for setting  forth the specific  elements which contribute  to
quality of life is an apportionment of average per capita income. Despite its
deficiencies,  money is a remarkably reliable and versatile measure  of
human reaction.
  Therefore, with the concepts  of  the  hierarchy of human needs and
marginal utility of goods and amenities as background  and supporting
philosophies,  we have chosen per capita  income as the  parameter for
measuring quality of life. The assumption is that when a sufficiently high in-
come is attainec, quality  of life, based on individual  taste and philosophy
can be attained by the members of society.
  After a brief study of benchmark quality of life standards for 15 different
categories of  living expenses, an average per capita annual income  of
$7,500 in constant 1965 dollars ($30,000 gross for a family of four) is used

      MU  OF  GOODS
                                                < Z
                                                2 <
 p    p'             0

Figure 6. Marginal Utility of Goods and Amenities

 to represent the amount needed to satisfy benchmark quality of life stan-
 dards now or in the foreseeable future. This would be comparable to adop-
 ting the 1972 upper middle income  standards as an average.  No major
 change in income distribution is assumed. Individual incomes are expected
 to vary substantially from the $7,500 average, comparable to variations from
 the average in 1972.
   The uses to which income is put are perhaps as important as the absolute
 level  of  income. A preliminary standard for  apportionment  of income to
 achieve a benchmark quality of life is shown in Table 2. The apportionment
 is related to the hierarchy of human needs in Table 3.
   Our preliminary estimate is that about 28 percent of the $7,500 would be
 for physiological needs; 21 percent for security needs; 18 percent for social
 needs; 15 percent for ego needs; and 18 percent for self-fulfillment needs.
 The benchmark standards are pioneering examples. This apportionment is,
 not based upon exhaustive or conclusive analysis; no such detailed studies
 are available (18).
   In contrast, the  Office of Business Economics  Research  Service, U.S.
 Department of Commerce (OBERS) projects that the $7,500 average will be
 reached  about the year 2000  and advance to $13,200 by the year 2020.
 The $7,500 in per capita income compares to about $9,500 in per capita
 share of gross regional product. The latter is  about  2.7 times the national
 average in 1967. It appears attainable only by  increasing the productive ef-
 ficiency or output of the average worker  by 170 percent above the 1967
 level. This would require major improvements in science and technology
 and continued availability of energy at acceptable prices.  It would require
 an increase in servant machines per person from 13 in 1965 to 37. The per
 capita income ir the Pacific Northwest is now,  and is assumed to continue,
 at approximately the same  level as for the remainder of the United States.
  The per capita income of $7,500 and its apportionment, will be taken as
 the benchmark for quality of life standard. As the analysis proceeds, the in-
 come achievable under various  combinations  of population and economic
 growth will be used to assess the acceptability of each set of conditions.
 Capacity for GRP as a Function of Pollution Control
  In 1965, our data base year, the Pacific Northwest  GRP was about $20.5
 billion but the average annual per capita income ($2,785) was only 37% of
the benchmark standard. There was localized  air pollution, water pollution,
visual pollution, and land misuse. However, for the Northwest as a whole,
 natural systems were assimilating practically all of the waste produced. The
 Northwest  was relatively uncongested and  its high quality natural  en-
vironment was largely  intact.

Table 2.  Average Apportionment of Income to Achieve Benchmark Quality
of Life
Expenditure Category
1. Food
2. Clothing
3. Housing
4. Transportation
5. Health
6. Education
7. Clean Air
8. Clean Water
9. Solid Waste Disposal
10. Quiet
11. Attractive Surroundings
12. Recreation
13. Open Space
1*4. Savings, Contributions,
Insurance, and Misc.
15. Federal, State, and
Local Government (Note 3)
Average Per Capi ta
for Member of
Fami ly of A in I960
(Note 1)
Dol lars
$ JtOO
(Note 2)
(Note 2}
(Note 2)
(Note 2)
(Note 2)
(Note 2)
Average Per Capita
Under Benchmark
Standards, in 1965 $
$ 960
1 ,200
(Note >0
of S7.500
9- 34
if. 26
  NOTE  I:  U.S. Department of  Labor, Bureau of  Labor  Statistics, Survey of Consumer
          Expenditures,  Western Region.
  NOTE  2:  Not segregated by BLS In I960--probably  included under other items.
  NOTE  3=  Includes government expenditures for I terns other than the 14 categories
          listed In Table 4.  Government expenditures assumed to be 60% Federal,
          20% State, 20% Local.   Information concerning government expenditures
          from the Federal Budget—I960, and State of Washington, Office of
          Program Planning and Fiscal  Management.
  NOTE  4:  Equivalent to  $9,500 in per capita share of gross product.

ationship Between the "Hierarchy of Human Needs" and "Average Apportionment of In
imark Quality of Life
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   As used in this study, the term pollution includes all kinds of activities by
 man  which cause  land  spoilation, water quality degradation, air quality
 degradation, or harmful  noise.
   The adverse effects of pollution can, within limits, be mitigated by in-
 creasing  pollution  control. Techniques for  pollution control  include: (1)
 redesigning processes, machines, etc.. to reduce pollution at its source, (2)
 shift  of emphasis  to goods  and  services with inherently less pollution
 problems (changing the composition of the GRP); (3) cleaning up effluents
 and  emissions before  releasing  them;  (4)  recycling  wastes; and (5)
 deliberately planning and implementing all development so that it is in har-
 mony with natural ecosystems.
            Estimated Artificial  Pollution  Control in  1965
   The exact amount of articifical pollution control in the Pacific Northwest in
 1965 is unknown. A rough estimate of the amount of recycling (mostly solid
 wastes) is 10% Other forms of artificial pollution control did  exist (primary
 and secondary sewage treatment  plants and  rudimentary erosion  control
 are two examples),  but there was almost no control of noise or of emissions
 to the atmosphere. The total artificial pollution  control, in  addition to
 recycling, was perhaps between 5  and 10% Let us assume 7% making the
 total 1 7% The exact amount is not  critical, it could vary  5% + or - without a
 significant effect upon the end results.
           Estimated Natural Capacity to  Assimilate  Waste
   In addition to artificial pollution control, we must account for the capacity
 of natural  systems to assimilate waste. The capacity of natural  systems must
 not be exceeded if the benchmark  quality of life standards are to be met. In
 the Pacific  Northwest in 1965  there was  localized air pollution, water
 pollution,  land abuse, visual pollulion. and solid waste problems, for exam-
 ple. This indicated that the assimilative capacity of the natural  systems had
 been exceeded locally. In many other'cases  however, it appeared that the
 natural systems had additional pollulion absorption capacity. If the pollution
 in 1965 had been distributed more widely it  might have been absorbed by
 the natural systems without degradation. This is probably on the optimistic
 side and is debatable. However, for purposes of this study let us make such
 an assumption. That assumption would mean  that, on a regional average
 basis, the combined capacity of the natural and the artificial systems was
 adequate  to handle the total  pollution  load in 1965.
      Technological Limitations to Achievable Pollution Control
  A goal of either 100% artificial pollution control or zero waste per unit of
 GRP is unattainable from  both the technological and economic standpoints.
The cost and technical difficulty of reducing, by artificial means, the amount

 of pollution from a given source increase rapidly as zero pollution is ap-
 proached.  The absolute limit is reached when the pollution created by the
 clean-up servant machines is  as  great as the improvement in  pollution
 levels. There has oeen no overall assessment of what this limit on reduction
 of pollution may oe. There is only limited information for individual com-
 ponent industries. The best we can  do is to assume a limit based upon
 present partial  information  and revise  it as more complete information
 becomes available. Our assumption  is that technological constraints limit
 pollution control to 90%
        Economic  Limitations to  Achievable Pollution Control
  The benefits (both material and  intangible) resulting from  additional in-
 vestments  for pollution control must exceed the costs. But here the law of
 diminishing returns becomes increasingly important as the  90% physical
 limit is approached.
  Unfortunately, there is,  at present, no reliable overall assessment of what
 the upper economic limits may  be. Possibly they lie between 80% to 90%
 Let us make the optimistic assumption of 90% and revise it in the future as
 more information becomes available.
           Assumed Maximum Achievable  Pollution Control
  Combining the 90% technological limit and the 90% economic  limit, the
 maximum achievable pollution control will be assumed to be 90%x 90% =
 80% (rounded).  Attainment of the  80% would require a substantially in-
 creased application of (a)  science and technology, (b) natural resource
 management, and (c) land use controls. This is clearly beyond the  scope of
 such measures ir effect or seriously contemplated anywhere in the nation in
 1972 (19).
                     Definition of Pollution Unit
  For  discussion  purposes,  we  will define one  pollution  unit as that
produced by $1  billion in GRP, with no artificial or natural pollution control.
This definition provides a convenient way of relating pollution to GRP and
permits a first approximate way  of studying the effects of pollution control.
  With this definition the number of pollution units produced by a region is
(GRP in billions of 1965 dollars) x (100%-%of pollution control)/(100). For
example, a region with $100  billion GRP and 20% pollution control  would
produce (100) x (100-20)/100  = 80 units.
  The relationships  for five levels of pollution control are shown in Figure 7.
The following  can be seen from the  Figure
  1. With 80% pollution control, the GRP cannot exceed $85 billion if the
objective is to maintain  pollution  at the assimilative  capacity of natural
systems (1965 level).

      2<(0  -

      220  -

      200  -
    z  180  -

    £  160  -I
                         T   I     I     I    I     I    I     I     I
                20    kO   60  80   100   120  ftO 160  180  200  220 240

     This assumes that no units  of  pollution occur until the pollution
assimilative capacity of  natural  systems  is reached and that after that point
one unit of pollution is  equivalent to  $]  billion  in gross  regional product.
The GRP in 19&5 was $20,5 billion with  17? pollution control.  Total pollution
produced was 20.5 x (I. 00-0.1?)  or  17 units.   It is assumed that these units
represented the full  assimilative capacity of  natural systems with the results
that there were zero net  units of pollution in  1965-  (3-5 units were con-
trol led artificial ly . )
Figure 7. Units  of Pollution  With  Alternative Combinations  of  GRP and
Pollution Control

   2.  If the pollution standard is relaxed to permit 51 units (3 times the 1965
 level) the GRP could be $340  billion, with 85% pollution control.
   3.  If only 17% pollution control is achieved,  $340 billion in GRP would
 produce a net 282 pollution  units in the region.
   4.  The $208 billion GRP projected forecast by OBERS for the year 2020,
 given the 80% maximum pollution control,  will  produce 42 pollution units,
 25 units above  the  1965 level or about 11/'  times the assumed natural
 assimilative capacity of tie region.
   These examples should not be taken as firm conclusions. They serve only
 to illustrate the technique we have chosen for  assessing relative levels of
 pollution resulting from alternative combinations of  pollution control and
Capacity for Sustained Use of Natural
Resources for Material Purposes
  The second major step in applying carrying capacity analysis is to deter-
mine the capacity of the region for sustained use of natural resources for
material  purposes, i.e.  generating GRP.
  An approximation of the long term carrying capacity of the Pacific Nor-
thwest as a who e for both population and  gross product may be made by
analyzing its available land and its natural  and  man made resources. This
approximation includes the assumption that the relatively good quantity
and quality of Northwest capital, management,  and labor would continue. It
assumes that inter-regional and international  trade will increase,  limited
however by the capacity of Northwest natural resources to provide the base
for such  trade on a sustained basis. It is also based upon the proposition
that  although major future breakthroughs  in science and technology are
possible, they are by no neans assured. The first priority should be a major
re-orientation of science and technology to correct the backlog of problems
caused  by economic  growth such  as ecosystem  disruption,  poisons,
eutrophication, soil erosion, maldistribution of population, excessive noise,
and all manner of emissions and effluents. A prudent procedure is to base
assessments  of sustainable future  economic;  activity  upon today's
knowledge.  Changes  in those  assessments  are warranted only after
breakthroughs in science and technology actually occur and are proven to
be a  positive step in the direction of an optimum quality of life.
               Methodology for Determining Capacity
  The capacity  of the Pacific  Northwest  was estimated by cataloging the
available renewable and non-renewable  natural resources and estimating
the goods and services which could be  produced by primary and  secon-
dary industries. A full discussion of the technique is presented in Appendix
6 of Reference  18.

  To illustrate the procedure a summary of the analysis of the commercial
forest land is presented here. For comparison purposes it is necessary to
determine the capacity production in the base year, 1965. The Census of
Manufacturers published by the  Bureau of Census estimated that lumber,
wood, paper and allied products contributed $1,936 million to the regional
GRP in 1967. Comparable figures are not available  for 1965, however,
assuming the production was 15% less, the 1965 production was taken as
$1,670  million.
  Research revealed that the production volume could increase by a factor
of 1.6 assuming full stocking, full utilization and all other measures to take
advantage  of full soil productivity on all available acreage.
  In addition to  increased forest production the local manufacturing could
also increase by a factor of 1.25.  Together these factors yield a potential in-
crease by a factor of 2, thus resulting in an estimated capacity for the com-
mercial  forest land of $3,340 million annually.
                         Results of Analysis
  Using similar forecasting techniques the results shown in Table 4 were
obtained.  Some  preliminary  conclusions  can  be drawn,  relating the
capacity for GRP to pollution  levels (refer to  Figure 7):
  1. With 80% pollution control, the region can sustain  only $85 billion
GRP without raising pollution above the 1965  level.  The tentative $116
billion exceeds that limit by 36.5%
  2. If the GRP reaches $116 billion the pollution will  rise to 23 units {1.4
times 1965 levels) with 80%pollution control or to 57 units (3.3 times 1965
levels) with 51% pollution control.
  Given the desire of the population to maintain pollution at or near the
1965 level, it is clear that effective pollution control  must  be planned now
whatever growth is experienced in the next decades.  It is also clear that the
region might consider  means of  keeping growth  below the estimated
capacity of $116 billion.
  However, a factor of greater potential concern is the  availability and cost
of energy to fuel an increase in GRP. This study assumes that energy will
not be a limiting factor for Northwest growth in relation to other regions of
the United States.  However, there  is growing  evidence that  increasing
costs and  decreasing availability of energy  sources  and environmental
problems associated  with  energy may sooner  or  later limit economic
growth of the nation as  a whole.
  The $116 billion GRP for the  Northwest would be over 51/2 times the
level in  1965 and would  require about 51/2 times the  use of energy (20).
Probably electrical energy will comprise an increasingly larger share of the
total energy needs than was the case in 1970. At that time the total energy

Table 4. Estimated Potential of Pacific Northwest Resources to Produce Continuous Gross Regional
Product (Millions of 1965 dollars, rounded)
Resource Use For
Material Purposes
Commercial Forest Land
Agricul tural Land
Commercial Fisheries
Recreation and Tourism
Industry Based Upon Location
Mining and Minerals
Anci 1 lary
Secondary Industries
Production, I9&5

$ 1,670
$ 7,680

Production Potential

$ 3,3^0
$ 28,930


used in the Pacific Northwest consisted of 43% electricity and 57% other
forms. Electrical energy is a convenient method for converting both falling
water and various kinds of fuel into energy needed to power machines.
Most authorities agree that, if equipped with the best available air pollution
control devices, even fossil fuel electric generating plants produce far less
air pollution than burning an  equivalent amount of fossil fuel in individual
motors. Under optimum conditions electricity would provide perhaps 75%
of the total energy needs for the Northwest or nearly seven times the 1965
level of use of electricity,  assuming combination 4b in Table 6 (21). Fusion,
solar (including sea-thermal),  and geothermal generating plants may even-
tually prove to be both feasible and relatively pollution free. Also, electrical
energy can be used to produce by electrolysis an excellent pollution free
portable fuel,  hydrogen (22).
Capacity for Sustained Use  of Resources
For Intangible Purposes
   Intangible benefits  to the individual from both  the natural and the man-
made environment include all manner of physical and  mental well-being,
peace of mind, exhilaration, aesthetic satisfaction, comprehension of man's
relationship with other parts of the natural and man-made world and other
factors not readily nor necessarily equatable with the material rewards that
flow from the exploitation of natural resources. Wild areas are part of man's
past and essential to his welfare.  The biological  rhythms of modern man,
which shape his life, are often tied to the natural forces beyond his urban
surroundings (23).
                Methodology for Estimating Capacity
  The best available common  denominator for measuring the  uses for in-
tangible  purposes appears to be the  recreation land classes  originally
recommended by the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission
in 1961  and adopted by the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation (BOB)  in 1964.
Despite a lack of detail in the  BOR classification system about urban and
multiple use categories of recreation land and deficiencies in BOR's first
national inventory, it does provide an acceptable framework for a begin-
ning. The results of applying  this technique to  carrying capacity for in-
tangible purposes is shown in Table 5.
  One purpose of the BOR system, as well as other similar systems and
standards,  is to help  measure otherwise imponderable needs. The basic
structure of the BOR  system  appears sound, but since the  needs  and
carrying capacities to be measured are mostly intangible, some of the
results summarized in Table 5 necessarily are subjective.
  The acreage of dedicated and  potentially available recreation land  in
each of six land classes and three sub-classes is determined. The carrying





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capacity in recreation visits per acre per year for each class and sub-class
is indicated.  Also an estimate is made of the number of annual visits an
average resident would make to each class of land per year under "op-
timum" conditions.  A percentage of non-resident use for each recreation
land class is assumed.
  The benchmark optimums selected are based upon personal judgment.
They are not supported  by authoritative research reports because  such
research  has  not  been  conducted. Hence, the benchmark use  figures
should be considered as temporary until adequate studies are completed
and  more reliable  information becomes available.  Also,  it  is emphasized
that the number of visits are assumed optimums, not forecasts or historical
trend projections.
  Additional discussion of the standards and rational used in estimating
carrying capacity  for  intangible purpose is  found in Appendix  6 of
Reference 18.
                         Results of Analysis
  It  is evident that the  most critical  intangibles that would limit future
population growth are located mostly on the 60% of Pacific Northwest land
which  is in public ownership. These values are wildlife areas, wilderness
areas,  outstanding natural areas, and wild and scenic rivers. The present
supplies of these resources cannot be expanded. They are all that will ever
be available.  However, some of the  areas,  particularly those used by
wildlife, could be improved or better managed.
  In  1970 there was insufficient acreage of land dedicated to any of the
above four  purposes to  serve the benchmark  "optimum" needs  of a
resident population of 10 million plus an assumed percentage of use by
non-residents. However, if all or most of the lands that qualified were also
dedicated there would  be sufficient. But much of the otherwise qualified
acreage would  not be ideally located since it lies in portions of the region
the farthest from population centers.
  Presently,  as compared to optimum  conditions, there is  a large
deficiency of land in Northwest urban areas devoted to recreation and open
space purposes. Sufficient open land is available which could be dedicated
to such purposes for present  urban centers; also  new urban centers could
be  created  with  ample dedicated open  space  from the  inception.
Theoretically, the availability of urban recreation and open land should not
place a constraint upon future Northwest growth. However, very poor per-
formance in both preserving and developing public use areas in urban cen-
ters in the past and the difficulty in insuring adequate funds, authority and
integrity of long range  planning, give little reason for optimism.
  A truly farsighted approach to long range planning avoids irrevocable

commitments now on all the land and resources. It leaves a significant per-
centage undeveloped so that future generations can exercise their own op-
tions  in light  of future  conditions—conditions that we presently cannot
   In summary, using the  standards  employed  in  this study,  land and
resources of the Pcific Northwest, if managed according to sufficiently com-
prehensive and farsighted planning, are adequate to permit "optimum" use
for intangible  purposes by 10  million residents, plus about 25% use by
non-residents. Population growth beyond that point  probably would  be at
the expense of "otpimum" livability for the average resident. The  most
fragile areas, such as wilderness and wild rivers, would be the first to be
overused (or use denied).
   Of course sacrifice of some of the "optimum"  amenities would  leave a
type of environment "acceptable" to many people.  However,  once living
conditions deteriorate below the optimum, the difficulty of regaining the op-
timum probably would increase exponentially  as compared to the  arith-
metic  rate of  decline  (24).  Extreme  and  arbitrary controls  would  be
necessary—a  totalitarian type government. Obviously it  is  far  easier, and
more  compatible  with the almost universal desire for personal freedom,
diversity, and for multiple choices, to keep population and  industry levels
that permit the optimum use of the limited  supply of resources which yield
intangible values than it is to allow excessive  growth, then attempt to
remove some of that growth and restore intangible values in order to gain
optimum livability.
Summary of Carrying Capacity Analysis
   The principal assumptions and results of the analysis are summarized as
   1. A per capita share of annual GRP equal to $9500 is required to attain
the benchmark quality of life standard. This is equivalent to $7500 annual
per capita  income,  apportioned as shown in Tables 2 and  3.
   2. Because  of technological  and  economic  limitations a maximum ar-
tificial pollution control of 80% is assumed attainable. Pollution in a region
is calculated in pollution units as:  GRP (1-PC)-(the pollution absorbed
naturally). PC is the pollution control expressed as a decimal fraction. Thus
in 1965, with a GRP of $20.5 billion, no pollution control and 17 pollution
units absorbed naturally, there were 3.5 pollution units in the Pacific Nor-
   3, The capacity of the  Pacific Northwest for GRP was estimated to be ap-
proximately $116 billion.
   4. The capacity of the Pacific Northwest for intangible  purposes was
estimated  at  10  million residents with 25% use of resources by  non-

  5. The number of servant machines per capita is estimated as (share of
GRP)/($250)-(1.0). Thus in 1965 with a per capita share of GRP equal to
$3520  the  number  of  servant  machines per  capita  was  equal  to
(3520)/(250}-1  == 13. It was also pointed out that as the number of servant
machines increases the pollution they produce must be controlled. Another
way of stating this is that the impact per servant machine must be no more
than 1-PC.
  6. Given the ccnstraints; a) maximum pollution control achievable is 80%
and b) pollution must be kept at 1965 level, then the GRP of the Pacific
Northwest must  not rise above $85 billion.

Alternative Goals for  the  Pacific Northwest

  Within the constraint of the benchmark qualify of life, there are  many
alternative goals for the Pacific Northwest.  Some choices are summarized
in Table 6.
  Note that in 1965, with no artificial pollution control, the natural systems
absorbed 17 pollution units and 3.5  units were not absorbed. It would
require  17% artificial  pollution control to reduce the region pollution to
  Cases number 1, 2, 3,  5 show conditions for pollution control at 2, 3, 4
and 5 times the 17% required for no pollution in 1965. In each case the
GRP sustainable for no pollution is given. The a, b (and c in case 5) alter-
natives  show the population sustainable for several alternative per capita
share of GRP.  Cases 5  and  6 present the same information for  80%
(maximum achievable) and 95% pollution control. Obviously 95% control
represents over-control if the  GRP remains $116  billion.
  For each case, the number  of servant  machines  per capita and  the
required impact imitations of the servant machines  is also  given.
  The apparent optimum set of conditions is  given in case  4b.  The
population of 9 million is  less than the capacity  for intangible purposes,
with a 10% margin.  Per capita share of GRP equals our benchmark stan-
dard for quality  of  life,  and  each person has  37 servant machines.
Technology would have to be  developed to achieve 80% pollution control
(and 20% servant machine impact).
  Similar data,  showing sustainable population as a function of share of
GRP for several evels of pollution  control are  shown in Figure 8.
  The carrying capacity estimates in this study are not "fixed for all time";
neither is the benchmark definition of quality of life, nor the 80% ceiling on
reduction  of  adverse effects  of production. As new  knowledge,  new
methods of resource management,  new  technology,  and  better  un-
derstanding  of  man's social  and environmental needs  are discovered,

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thoroughly tested and proven, adjustments should be made. For example, a
percentage correction  factor could be applied to  the $250 per servant
machine if actual experience demonstrates that the Pacific Northwest gross
product mix in the future has a different adverse effect per servant machine
than in 1965. However,  the assumption should not be  made that new
knowledge will always make possible upper  adjustments in  growth of
population and production. The opposite could occur.

Carrying  Capacity Implications for Policy
  Although the carrying capacity concept is in  its infancy  and is untested
as far as the population, economic activity, and intangibles (amenities) of a
large geographic area is  concerned it is not too early to speculate about
the practical aspects of implementation. Peterson's recommendations for
future goals, policy and implementation techniques are presented below.

Incentives and Other Tools Available
  Even a cursory examination reveals a number of means that are presently
available to provide financial and  other incentives and guidance for the
desired direction and rate for population and industrial growth or no-growth
within  a region.  The most obvious  of these are listed below. These are
proven techniques  fully in accord  with traditional democratic principles.
Most of them have long been used in the United States to promote  or ac-
commodate growth and development. They are equally available to dampen
or channel that growth but have not been used consistently for such  a pur-
pose.  They would  apply  equally  to  both  residents and potential new
residents. Most of  them could induce feedback in the market system that
would slow or halt the more damaging kinds of growth. Obviously there are
other techniques which would be undemocratic or  unconstitutional  (such
as a quota system with gates at the borders).  The techniques  include:
  1. Full public information  and education about resources, population,
pollution, and  growth potential.
   2. Legislation. (Example:  land use planning and zoning, environmental
policy, growth policy.)
   3. Encouragement or  discouragement of growth in population  or in-
dustry in a specific region or locality, both urban and rural, by public of-
ficials. (Example: advertisements in national  magazines.)
   4. Organization  of  executive  departments  of  government—Federal,
state, and local. (Example: regional  and multi-state associations of govern-
   5. Location and capacity of highways,  waterways,  airports, railroads,
ports, and other transportation facilities.

    6.  Availability of credit for development projects.
    7.  Availability and cost of electric power and other forms of  energy.
    8.  Availability,  cost, and control of water supplies.
    9.  Financial and other incentives for new industries on the one hand or
 special charges or requirements on the other.
   10.  Urban and rural land use development controls such as subdivision
 and zoning regulations, and  covenants in  land titles.
   11.  Public acquisition or disposal  of key tracts of land, and control of
 resource development, settlement and  use of lands in public ownership.
   12.  Enactment and enforcement of anti-pollution laws and regulations
 and use of effluent and emission  charges.
   13.  Regulation of land  speculation and  real estate  promotion.
   14.  Tax  policies.
   15.  Policies for providing  public services such  as  schools, hospitals,
 communication facilities, waste disposal facilities, and welfare benefits.
   16.  Policies concerning family planning  by residents.
   Of the 16 possible tools I sted above, the indispensible elements appear
 to be as a  minimum (1) full public information. (2) a popular consensus of
 what the goals should be, and (3) effective land use and energy  planning
 and controls.
   The  fact  that proven tools are available does not mean that long range
 growth goals will  magically evolve  and  the  tools to implement them
 automatically be used for such purpose. A major and constantly increasing
 multi-pronged effort by influential persons and interests representing a
 cross  section of our society would be essential.
 Need  for Public Information
   To set a solid foundation for  such a sustained effort we need,  in the
 opinion of  the author, to  give first priority to full  public information  and
 education  about resources, population, pollution,  and growth potential.
 Also we must have a solid foundation of facts to support conclusions. In
 many instances such facts can be obtained only with  more research  and
 field tests,  particularly interdisciplinary, and using synthesis and deductive
 techniques. The interrelationship  between natural resources,  science  and
technology, population, economic growth, and quality  of life needs much
 more attention at all educational  levels.
   At all levels we need to replace the rhetoric and exaggeration of both the
 instant environmentalists and the reactionary addicts of exponential growth
with solid facts.
Needed Legislation and Reorganization
   In the legislative and organization area I think first priority should be a
 national land  use  policy  act  plus  compatible  state  legislation.

Organizationally, in my opinion, we need Departments of Natural Resour-
ces, both nationally and at the state levels. These departments offer hope
for much better coordination in our land use, energy, water, and air policies
and  programs.  We also  need  effective  organization  for coordinated
management of natural  resources  in multi-state regions,  and at the state
level, for multi-county regions.
   At the national level  there needs to be  better coordination among all
responsible agencies  at  all levels. We  need  reliable  indices for en-
vironmental quality as well as for economic activity and for natural resource
supply.  (The latter provides the foundation for the other two.) We must be
able to assess the consequences of increased activity  in one category
upon the other two and to measure the trade-offs.
   Assuming that land use policy acts are enacted, Departments of Natural
Resources created, and better correlation  between environmental quality,
economic activity,  and  natural  resource supply attained, we will need a
large number of qualified agents to help explain the situation at the grass
roots level over a  period of years. An example of a  highly successful
program of this type is the Cooperative Extension Service sponsored  by the
U.S. Department of Agriculture and the land grant universities. This service
to farmers in the last 50  years has brought about a benevolent revolution in
agricultural production in the United States. Couldn't a similar approach be
equally  beneificial  in urban and rural land use and water and energy plan-
ning  (including population  and   economic  growth and environmental
quality)? Do we need a national land and water resources council and sub-
sidiary regional commissions?
Needed Research and Methodology Development
   Regardless  of  whether  carrying  capacity  concepts  are  adopted
nationally, regionally, by states, or not at all, it appears to me that new in-
formation and different ways of assimilating the information would be  highly
useful. Much of such effort may be  considered in the category of research.
   1  Economic activity,  environmental quality, and natural resource supply
indices  should be on a  par (receive equal emphasis) and be based on a
common framework of data  compilation, assumptions,  methodology, and
language so that one can  be readily compared with the other two and ac-
curate interrelationships and trade-offs determined. All  official  reports,
statistics, etc., should reflect this common  framework.
   2. A  common  natural  resource inventory data system  used  by all
national, regional,  state, and local planning and program agencies and
private interests is needed  as  is  a system for keeping  it  updated con-
   3. There needs to be a standard definition of various categories and
subcategories of pollutants,

    4. A technique for determining capacity of natural systems to assimilate
various categories of pollutants without  degrading natural  ecosystems
needs to  be perfected.
    5. A system is  needed for measuring the percentage of existing ar-
tificial pollution control by various categories and subcategories.
    6. Accurate methods for determining the technological and economic
upper limits for artificial  control of  various categories of pollutants  are
needed. Also some method for weighing the various categories to get an
overall figure would be very useful.
    7. A common system  for monitoring all major types of pollutants and
several subcategories is needed.
    8. The relationships between natural resources and economic activity
need considerable  clarification.  In particular the natural resources which
support "industries based upon  location" need attention. Also, the per-
centage relationships  between "basic" and  "secondary" industries and
potential  future changes  has  had inadequate  study. All studies  in this
category should be multidisdplinary and not left as the  exclusive province
of economists.
    9. The extent  to  which  the carrying  capacity of various renewable
natural resources can be  increased and the life of non-renewable resour-
ces extended by  management  intensity,  science and technology, con-
servation,  and recycling is a fertile field for research.
   10. The carrying capacity  of  various categories of  renewable natural
resources in terms of human use and enjoyment needs to be determined.
   11. A considerable effort should be devoted to studying "optimums" for
the long range future in  terms  of per capita income  (with  various sub-
categories)  and intangibles (with various subcategories).

                     Notes for Chapter 3
 1. Report of the Study of Critical Environmental Problems, "Man's Impact
   on the Global Environment", MIT Press, Cambridge,  Mass., 1970.
 2. Caldwell,  L  K., "Environment:  A Challenge  to  Modern  Society",
   American  Museum of Natural  History, the  National  History Press,
 3. It is emphasized  that the "servant machine"  is only a convenient
   illustration and is  not  a central issue in  developing  the  carrying
   capacity concept.
 4. Business Week, October 24,  1970. Also, "Economic Report of The
   President", 1971.
 5. Gabor, Denis, "The Mature Society", Praeger,  1972.
 6. Hardin, Garrett, "The Tragedy of the Commons," Science, Vol.  162,
   Dec. 13,  1968.
 7. Committee on Resources and Man - Preston Cloud, Chairman, "Re-
   sources and Man," National Academy of Sciences,  W. H. Freeman &
   Co.,  1969.
 8. SCEP (Report of Critical Environmental Problems), "Man's Impact  on
   the Global Environment," sponsored by the Massachusetts Institute of
   Technology,  MIT Press, 1970.
 9. Ehrlich and  Ehrlich,  "Population,  Resources,  Environment," W.  H.
   Freeman & Co., 1970.
10. Commoner,  Barry,  "The  Closing Circle," Alfred Knopf, 1971.
11. Goldsmith,  Edward, et al., "A Blueprint for  Survival," The Ecologist,
   January, 1972.
12. "Commission on Population Growth and the American  Future, Final
   Report" The New American Library, Inc., March, 1972.
13. Seckler, David  W., & Barkley, Paul W., "Economic Growth and En-
   vironmental Decay," Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.,  1972.
14. See Chapter VIII, Population, Growth, and Resources "The First Annual
   Report of the Council on Environmental Quality", August,  1970.
15. An example  is the July  17, 1970, report  to the  President by the
   National Goals Research Staff entitled "Toward Balanced  Growth:
   Quantity with Quality." Another example is the March  1970 report of
   the  California Select Committee on  Environmental  Quality, which
   recommends  an amendment to the State Constitution providing  an
   "Environmental Bill  of Rights." A third is a sketch version of a plan for
   the future of California to the year 2000 developed by the organization
   California Tomorrow, San  Francisco, 1972.

 As Professor Elbert  BowderV  observes, "Once he ventures into the,
    realm of concepts to which  meaningful numerical values cannot be
    assigned, the regional economist loses the opportunity to apply much
    of his specialized methodology. He is stripped of his aura of mysticism
    and compelled to comrrunicate with policy-makers and administrators
    in their own language. Suddenly he is faced with the need to demon-
    state his understanding of the real world workings of a broad range of
    economic theory. It is easy to understand the desire to shy away from
    such demanding circumstances."
 'Professor of Economics, State University of New York, Fredonia, in Land
    Economics Journal, May 1971.
16. Galbraith, John, "Economics and the Quality if Life," 5 Science, 1964.
17. McGregor, Douglas, "Leadership and Motivation," Massachusetts In-
    stitute of Technology Press, Cambridge,  Mass. (1966); also Maslow,
    Abraham H, "Motivation and Personality," Harper & Row, New York
 The area in the five compatments does not represent the importance or
    weight assigned to each.  Only the most essential needs (not the
    ultimate  needs)  at one level must be satisfied before attention  is
    devoted to needs at higher levels. The "most essential needs' in each
    category vary widely between individuals and cultures.
18. A more detailed discussion of the rationale used to  apportion the in-
    come can  be  found in "Ecology and the Economy", Appendix  5,
    prepared  by E. K. Peterson for the Pacific Northwest River  Basins
19. An illustration  of pollution  control limitations is the air quality of the
    Los Angeles basin. Despite heroic measures since the early 1950's air
    quality has steadily deteriorated. From 1966 to 1970 an overall reduc-
    tion was made in atmospheric hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide but
    this was more than canceled out by  a  sharp  increase in nitrogen
    oxides (a  major  component  of  photochemical  smog). From "The
    Closing Circle,'  by Barry Commoner.
20. Energy consumption per capita is approximately proportional to per
    capita income—Standard Oil Co., of California Bulletin, Summer 1970.
    Also,  report  of  National  Economic  Research Associates, Inc.,
    Congressional  Record,  July 15,  1971.
21. Daly,  Herman E.,  in  "Electric  Power,  Employment and  Economic
    Growth," before 1971 AAAS Convention. Also see Cong. Record, Feb.
    8, 1972.

22. Jones, Lawrence W.,  "Liquid Hydrogen as a Fuel for the Future,"
   Science, Oct. 22, 1971, Vol.  174; Anderson, J. H.,  "The Sea Plant; A
   Source of Power, Water and Food Without Pollution," International
   Solar Energy Conference, May 12,  1971.
23. "The First  Annual Report  of the Council on  Environment  Quality",
   August 1970, Chapter IX, Land Use—The Natural  Environment.
24. lltis, H. H.; Andrews, P; and  Loucks, 0. L; "Criteria for an Optimum
   Environment," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, January,  1970.


   The international dimension of national growth policies has two com-
 ponents: international  constraints or opportunities affecting our national
 freedom of action, and effects of alternative national growth policies on the
 world structure.
   These two dimensions  and  their  policy implications for environmental
 policy were discussed by Lincoln  Gordon  in his paper invited  for this
 project. The material in this Chapter was taken from this paper.

   The United States is not  a closed and self-sufficient society, isolated from
 the rest of the world. Although the proportion of our international economic
 transactions to the total economy is smaller than for any other major in-
 dustrial nation, except the Soviet Union, the absolute size of these tran-
 sactions is the largest in the world. International interdependencies have a
 major impact on our economic welfare. Even less are we an isolated society
 in terms of security, of the flow of knowledge and ideas, and of political and
 social currents.
   It follows that the international dimensions of growth policy should not be
 treated as afterthoughts, or as minor adjustments to completed domestic
 policies to take account of residual impacts abroad. They should rather be
 incorporated from the start as an integral element of policy making. In prac-
 tical terms, that requires  participation at the earliest stages by persons
 knowledgeable in the attitudes and interests of our principal foreign part-
 ners and  competitors  and sensitive to the  dangers and opportunities
 created by our external relations.
  The  international dimension has  two major  components:  (1) the in-
 ternational impact on national policies, which on the one hand places con-
 straints on our freedom of  action,  though it also opens wider opportunities
for meeting national aspirations than could be accomplished by national ac-
tion alone;  and (2) the effects of alternative national growth policies on the
shaping of a world structure which  is  conducive or antagonistic to the
achievement of national goats.

 The International Impact of National
 Growth Policy Alternatives

   Before considering the international dimension of growth policy, it may
 be useful  to recapitulate the principal elements determining the rates and
 directions of growth, most of which have some degree of international in-
 terdependency. The major determinants of the rate of  growth are (1) the
 scale and  character of investment; (2)  the education  and health of the
 people; (3) technological change;  (4) the quality and cost of available
 natural  resources  (those four  elements  together  largely determining
 productivity); (5) the size of the labor force; (6) the proportion of the labor
force employed; and (7) the hours of work. In analyzing direction of growth,
 the major categories to bear in mind are (1) the distribution of output among
 primary products,  manufactured  goods, and  services,  and (2) the
 distribution between private  consumption and collective consumption, the
 latter being subdivided between governmental defense and domestic ac-
tivities. Finally, there  is the  international impact through foreign trade  in
goods  and  services,  international  investment, the international  flow  of
technology,  and (now of  relatively minor importance for the United States)
the migration ol people and its effects on the labor force. It is through one
 or another of those categories that national growth policies are constrained,
or enlarged, by the international dimension.
   Increasing dependence on imported materials other than energy resour-
ces need  not constrain otherwise desirable growth policies, provided that
action is taken to  assure adequate worldwide production and availability to
the U.S. A vast expansion of oil  imports could impose undesirable con-
straints for both  economic anci security reasons. It can and  should be
 limited in  size and duration through measures of conservation in use and
expansion of domestic supplies,  especially of low-sulphur coal, with ap-
propriate environmental safeguards.
  Derived export  dependence requires, in the short, term special attention
to continued  agricultural  efficiency and technological innovation  in
manufacturing  with  a steady displacement of low by  higher technology
production.  For the longer term,  international cooperation among all in-
dustrialized  nations should look toward  "growth control" to avoid growth
patterns desired by none but adopted by each for competitive balance-of-
payments   reasons.  Within  the  same  grouping of  OECD  members,
cooperation is  especially important in harmonizing environmental standards
and methods of regulation. Identical standards should not be sought in less
developed countries, and a degree of relocation to them of certain types  of
polluting^fldustries  is not undesirable.

  Growth policies are  interlocked with  the world structure through (1)
problems of strategic security, (2) competition and cooperation among in-
dustrialized nations,  and (3) the North-South relationship between the in-
dustrialized and  the  less  developed  nations.  Nuclear proliferation is a
special concern under (1).
  Within  the  industrialized group, competition should be  tempered  by
cooperation in resource extraction and  conservation, environmental protec-
tion, and avoidance  of trade disortions,  together  with harmonization of
broad growth objectives. There should  also be more systematic exchanges
of information and experience on national  growth  issues.
  The  most serious  long-term problems  of the world structure arise from
growing bi-polarity between rich and poor countries. The major challenge is
to find  ways of (1)  extending  the time period for adapting to  ultimate
limitations on material growth, (2) accelerating the shift of the richer coun-
tries toward consumption patterns (services, leisure, etc.) at lower material
growth rates, and (3) developing  new international  economic relationships
which can reconcile  slower material growth in the  industrialized countries
with faster material growth (and more  effective population control)  in the
less developed  regions. This may ultimately  imply  significant global  in-
dustrial relocation.
  On all fronts, there is need for clarification of alternatives,  improvement of
adjustment mechanisms, and  identification of  issues  requiring strategic
discrete decisions. Process  and  institutions  require  intensive research
along with substantive issues of  policy.
Implications of International Competition

  The question of international competition centers on the inbuilt pressure
for maintaining competitive strength even if social preferences within the
nation might dictate otherwise.
  Lest this be considered an unreal hypothesis, note the official Canadian
document on  A Science  Policy  for  Canada (the  "Lamontagne report"),
reviewed  in Science for January 12, 1973.  The report  calls for a "first
generation" policy  during this  decade aimed at promoting  economic
growth,  white  a later volume not yet published  is to describe  policies
designed  to serve a broader range of collective social needs. In Professor
Lakoffs paraphrase: "Canada has no choice but to keep abreast of the rest
of the world. As long as  all  other developed nations continue to exploit
science and technology for economic advantage, it would be imprudent for
Canada to stand aside  from the competition.

  A similar concern is evident in trie recent testimony of Pierre Rinfret to the
House Ways and Means Committee, to the effect that "American  capital
would  inevitably go into investment overseas as  long  as the  tax laws
provide a faste' recovery of capital there than in the  United States."
  As the richest country in  the world, the United States is on the leading
edge   of  consumption  patterns.  Europe  and   Japan  have  witnessed
Americanization of their lifestyles since World War II, and the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe now appear to be following  suit. So are the more  ad-
vanced of the less developed countries, at least among their middle and
upper classes.  The merits of these consumption  patterns may certainly be
disrupted. Since we are on the  leading edge, we also have reason to be
more aware than others of  their disadvantages  along with their benefits.
Some portion of them may be attributed to advertising and social snobbery.
Abstracting from elitist conceptions of what truly constitutes the "good life,"
however, these patterns do appear to evoke a  positive response  among
consumers everywhere once incomes pass the range of $600 to $1000  per
  Family incomes in the United  States now average about $10,000. At the
"normal"  real growth rate  of 3 percent per capita per year,  that figure
should multiply fourfold  in  less  than fifty years.  Clearly consumption pat-
terns would change markedly during such an evolution. To cite one  im-
portant example, the number of registered automobiles per thousand in the
American population has risen from 188 in 1930  to 429 in 1970; if the rate
of increase of tne last twenty years were to continue unaltered, we would
pass one per capita (including newborn babies) around the year 2005!  It
seems plausible  to assume that,  long before  family  incomes average
$40,000  at present prices,  there will be a substantial shift in preferences
toward leisure time over work time, toward services  over goods,  toward
higher environmental standards, and perhaps toward preferences for more
satisfying but possibly less productive (in the narrow  economic sense) ways
of working.
  Will  international competition  hold us back from adaptations we might
prefer along these lines? Does it, in other words,  dictate a kind of mindless
pressure for growth, akin to the  competition in armaments? Does it distort
the  growth alternatives, driving away from environmental improvement and
other forms of collective consumption?  Some  international trade theorists
would argue that it cannot do so as long as foreign exchange rate changes
are  available to equilibrate each  nation's balance  of payments. It might only
imply a more  rapid closing of the gaps in world income levels, if other
nations maintained  their commitment  to conventional economic  growth
while we relaxed ours.

  What is not clear is whether changes in foreign exchange rates and other
international  economic  adjustment mechanisms  can adequately  ac-
commodate structural  adjustments  of this type. It would be a paradox in-
deed if several of the advanced countries simultaneously had domestic
social  preferences for slowing  down conventional  economic growth,  but
each refrained from doing so because of fear for its balance of payments in
competition with the others.  If there is validity to the analogy of the arms
race, the alternative suggests itself of some form of negotiated "growth con-
  It takes no great stretch of the imagination to envisage within a decade or
two  a degree  of  economic  integration among all  the open  market in-
dustrialized countries  at least as great as that which binds the members of
the European Community today. Just as  the commitment to  internal  free
trade has pushed the European  nations to efforts at harmonization of a wide
range  of economic  and social policies,  including a start  in  the  en-
vironmental field,  similar pressures may develop in the larger framework of
the Organization  of  Economic  Cooperation and  Development (OECD).
Monetary unit would necessitate much more far reaching harmonization, ap-
proaching a confederal political structure,  and that fact  is at the root of the
difficulties in moving  forward toward monetary unity in Europe.  Short of
monetary unity, however,  the realistic alternative to a substantial degree of
economic and  social  policy harmonization  would probably have been a
breakdown before now in the Common Market itself. If the conception of
technology assessment emerges from its present chrysalis into operational
machinery in  various  of  the  industrialized  nations,  international
collaboration  among the  responsible authorities might constitute  the  first
faltering  steps toward some  form of coordinated "growth  control."
  The  expression  "growth control" is obviously not intended to  suggest
that growth is bad or wasteful, as armaments beyond the requirements for
internal security would be in  a rational and peaceful world. The analogy is
valid only for those forms of growth which all components of an international
community would  prefer to limit  if they were making the decision on purely
domestic grounds. I would personally place the supersonic air transport in
that  category,  as a  clearly  uneconomic  mode  of transportation with
questionable  environmental  effects, which  I suspect  neither the Soviet
Union, France, Britain,  nor the United States would ever have undertaken in
the absence  of concern for  international competition,  prestige,  or their
respective balance of  payments.

Environmental Standards
  The  international dimension imposes two kinds of constraints on  en-
vironmental policies. There is a range  of measures whose effectiveness

 requires  international  collaboration,  such  as  ocean  pollution  control,
 regional air and water control crossing national boundaries (e.g. in the
 Great Lakes), and global  monitoring. Such matters comprised the bulk of
 the  1972 agenda for the United  Nations Stockholm Conference on the
 Human Environment.
   The second category is a specialized but very important subset of the
 broad  issues:  the effects of international competition in limiting  national
 freedom of action to take  otherwise desirable measures for environmental
 protection. Differing standards for pollution control  are a  new factor af-
 fecting relative costs and the comparative position of producers in different
 countries. At the  same time, the severity of pollution  is not uniform among
 countries, and environmental concerns have a lower priority in some than in
   It would be fanciful to expect world-wide agreement on tolerable ambient
 air or water pollution !im ts or on specific process or product standards. Nor
 is there any rational basis for seeking to impose such uniformity. Poorer
 countries in  particular  may  understandably accept  some  pollution  as a
 tolerable  cost  of industrialization,  raising  agricultural  productivity, and
 promoting economic growth  generally.
   The potential effects on trade and investment patterns depend partly on
 the nature of the  controls  (whether imposed  on products, processes or ef-
 fluents) and the method of payment of the costs (whether by the industry
 concerned, and therefore its consumers, or by the general public in the
 producing countries through taxation and government subsidies). Specific
 product or process inspection requirements can also  easily become a
 disguised form of international economic protectionism.
   There is some  reason to believe that the overall effects of environmental
 controls on the United States balance of payments are not likely to be very
 large, even with less stringent policies being applied  by our principal com-
 petitors.  The effects or  specific industries  and firms,  however,  can be
 critical, including in extreme cases the relocation of existing plants and in
 many more cases the decisions on location of new plants. These effects in
 turn  create new pressures for trade and investment  protectionism.
   Among the  more  industrialized nations,  systematic  collaboration  is
 clearly in order to minimize undesirable international  economic distortions
 resulting from  national environmental controls.  In general, product stan-
 dards are to be preferred to  process standards. Where goods are heavily
traded, product standards  should be as uniform as possible; and abatement
or control costs should generally be  borne by producers  (and therefore
 passed on to consumers) rather than  offset  by government subsidies (1).
The Organization  for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has
already endorsed the "polluter pays"  principle as a guideline to member

governments,  although the implementation still leaves a good deal to be
desired. The OECD Environmental Committee also provides a most useful
forum  for ongoing intergovernmental  consultation and  exchange of  in-
formation,  and  a promising  foundation  for  the  kinds  of  international
collaboration suggested  here.
  When it comes to the less developed countries, however, the issues are
more complex. In many of them, industrial activities are so slight that both
air  and water  could  absorb  much  larger quantities of industrial waste
without passing thresholds of natural  absorption  or dispersion. For the
same reasons  that a  rational  domestic environmental policy would favor
dispersion of  large population concentrations and decentralization of  in-
dustrial production complexes, it could be argued that a rational world en-
vironmental policy would favor a broader distribution of high-pollution  in-
dustries. Moreover, poor societies are bound to give lower relative priority
to long-term environmental considerations than to short-term expansion of
production and incomes.  Hence the possibilities of "exporting pollution" or
of "pollution havens"  in  less  developed countries.
  In considering national growth alternatives, it would be unwise to give
blanket approval  or   blanket condemnation to  international   industrial
relocation on  environmental grounds. Where the pollution concerned  in-
volves serious global hazards (e.g., toxic heavy metals), the process should
be altered to eliminate such pollution regardless of its location. Where new
control technology can produce satisfactory products at comparable costs,
it would be absurd to export the old  technology to new locations;  less
developed countries should not repeat the environmental errors of our own
past. Where the negative  side effects in the new location are substantial, the
country concerned should  certainly be encouraged to evaluate  them fully
before initiating a new investment, again learning from the mistakes of the
more industrialized nations. That evaluation, however,  will be in terms of the
standards of the less developed country, which may be quite different from
those appropriate to a more advanced nation. But there is almost certainly a
significant class of industrial activities whose pollution effects are localized
and  in  which  advanced country environmental standards do  add  con-
siderably to product costs. In such cases, it is hard to  see why a com-
parative advantage in  justifiably lower environmental  standards in the less
developed  countries should not be a legitimate factor in  international  in-
dustrial location.
  Japan  has already begun  to encourage the shift of  some  pollution-
intensive industries to the Asian mainland, along with the  low productivity
labor-intensive  industries already  mentioned.  Her  tight employment
situation, exceptionally heavy pollution, and  strong  balance-of-payments
position in  recent years has made such a policy easier than it would be in

 the United States today.  Its implementation evidently requires effective
 arrangements for local  adjustment, retraining, and reemployment of any
 displaced workers and capital.  Like most such adaptations, it is a line of
 policy much easier to apply to the location of incremental  new investments
 than to the relocation of existing ones. The institutional mechanisms which
 might be  involved include measures  for  foreign investment financing or
 guarantees, the international financial institutions (especially  the World
 Bank  and  the  international  Regional  Banks), and consultation between
 government agencies and multinational  corporations.  In any  event, the
 questions of industrial  relocation, both  domestic and  international, are
 major matters for continuing  research and  identification of policy issues as
 part of the consideration of  national growth  alternatives.
 International Cooperation:  Straitjacket or Opportunity
   Several of the foregoing sections have  pointed to the desirability of in-
 ternational  cooperation  as part of national growth  policy  making.  That
 suggestion always raises  the specter  of  excessive constraint on national
 freedom. In  the  real world, moreover,  the difficulties  of securing  in-
 ternational  agreement, the painfully slow pace  of deliberation, and the
 notoriously low efficiency (measured  by output per unit  of effort) of  in-
 ternational  institutions often  makes national authorities reluctant even to
 contemplate any derogation  of sovereignty.
   Yet the trends  fostered by technology  and  economic  development all
 point toward continuously greater international interdependence. In these
 circumstances,  the right kind of international cooperation can be more
 liberating than  constraining; it can on balance  enlarge the  potential for
 meeting national aspirations. It  is particularly effective in functional areas
 when  the  participants in  international  negotiation include those directly
 responsible for the corresponding domestic policies, as well as  foreign of-
 fices concerned with the overall framework  of international relationships.

 Implications of National  Alternatives
 for the  World Structure

  Let us  turn now to the  other  side of the coin:  the effects of national
 growth alternatives on the world structure. The  United States  is neither
 isolated nor self-sufficient in any major dimension: security, environmental,
 economic,  or ideological.  The world  framework  affects  our freedom  of
 choice for better or worse. As the most powerful national unit in both military
 and economic te-ms,  we exercise—by  commission or omission—more in-
fluence than any other single nation on the shape of that framework. We can
 no longer lead by ourselves,  but our co-leadership is indispensable.  And
as  the  highest income society in the world,  with wider margins  for

discretionary expenditure, we are freer than others to develop new patterns
and directions of growth without sactificing universally felt basic needs.
Growth Alternatives and  Strategic  Security
   Strategic security is a powerful source of pressure for economic growth, a
massive diverter of resources from the satisfaction of human needs, and a
substantial  user of  scarce material resources  and generator  of en-
vironmental pollution.  In a world  of sovereign nation-states, it is an un-
fortunate but inescapable necessity, which can never be left out of account
in considering national growth  alternatives.  Environmental  concerns are
simply an  added weight  in favor of  maximum efforts for qualitative and
quantitative arms limitations among the actual or potential  major powers.
   Security concerns may have other impacts on growth policies. A notable
example is the relation between nuclear fission waste management and the
dangers of nuclear arms proliferation. It is not implausible that by  ten or
twenty years hence, the major element in strategic  arms posture will no
longer be the maintenance of mutual deterrence between the Soviet Union
and the United States, but instead a joint effort by the  superpowers to offset
and control the widespread proliferation of nuclear arms  to lesser nations
(or even organized  groups other than  governments).  Such a posture might
be as costly as the  present one and considerably more unstable. It follows
that  the avoidance  of proliferation should be  given great weight  in the
choice among energy supply alternatives.
   The  greatest solvent to security concerns  would obviously be a world
structure sufficiently favorable to a variety of national aspirations and in-
volving so complex a web of interdependencies  that no nation would be
tempted to alter it by violent means. That is a distant ideal pending which
defensive power must continue to play a large role. The balance between
the essentially negative factor of defensive power  and the positive factor of
mutuality of interest, however, will be greatly influenced by various national
policies toward rates  and directions of growth.
Cooperation  and Competition  among
the Industrialized Nations
   Implicit in the earlier discussion  is recognition of a mixture of competitive
and cooperative relationships among the United States and the other major
industrialized  areas, notably Europe, Japan, Canada, and the Soviet Union.
In these days of chronic balance-of-payments  deficit and monetary crisis, it
would be  superfluous to emphasize how severely our short-run economic
policies are constrained by international considerations. Nor should com-
petition be opposed as such; it has been and can be a very healthy stimulus
to constructive innovation and to efficiency in the  allocation and use of alt
kinds of scarce resources. Just as federal regulation forbids child labor as

,an instrument of interstate competition within the United States, however,
 some kind of international governance is required to avoid destructive com-
 petition among the induslrialized countries while encouraging constructive
   Some of the needed fo*ms of cooperation have already been suggested:
 technological development  in resource extraction and conservation; en-
 vironmental protection standards and avoidance of trade distortions; and
 harmonization of broad growth policies to fit shifts in preferences in the en-
 tire community of advanced nations ("growth control"). Although it may still
 be at an early stage, there is evidence in all these countries of what Hugo
 Thiemann terms a "change of phase"—away from an exclusive focus on
 conventional economic growth as measured by GNP per capita and toward
 a balancing of such growth with other objectives. Some of those are  simply
 compositional shifts within GNP as presently measured, including a larger
 proportion of health, educational, and  recreational services. Others are not
 properly measured by GNP, although they might be, such as some forms of
 environmental improvement. Still others may detract  from conventionally
 measured growth, such as added leisure, participation versus hierarchy in
 management decisions, or changing attitudes toward  work.
   There is obviously roon for a great deal of diversity in the way in which
 such changing  preferences are implemented in various societies. It would
 scarcely be desirable that international machinery should force the pace in
 some or delay all to the pace of the slowest. What is indicated, however, is
 cooperation to avoid a lag imposed on all through competitive pressures
 desired by none.
   International cooperation can  also  assist  national adjustments through
 learning from one another's experience. In the Netherlands and France, for
 example, the national  planning organizations (whose basic charter is for in-
 dicative rather than directive planning) are trying to analyze the interactions
 among broad national goals and to quantify the linkages and trade-offs so
 that policy decisions on growth can be made with better awareness of their
 entire spectrum of indirect as well as direct consequences.  Japan is un-
 dertaking  major  new experiments in industrial relocation. It is well to bear in
 mind Kenneth Boulding's prophecy  that "Japan has  had  the most rapid
 voyage through this social space of development, so it  is likely to be one of
 the first societies which  will have to face the problems of reentry and  of
 establishing a  new,  high-level,  much more stable, conservation-minded
 society  ...  a more  'looped'  economy in  which the waste products  of
 society, both material and psychological, will have to be re-cycled and used
 as raw  materials in a continuing circular process (2).  In general, while
 European and Japanese income levels are below  ours, their higher den-
 sities of population are  making them face  some issues  of  urban over-

 concentration and industrial pollution earlier than we. There is no monopoly
 on social wisdom, and all stand to gain from maximum interchange of ex-
 perience,  including  failures  as well  as  successes,  in  such fields  as
 population  dispersion, land use control, mass transportation, urban im-
 provement,  energy  conservation,   pollution  abatement  incentives,  job
 satisfaction, and other aspects of growth policy.
   The most important single area for cooperation among the industrialized
 countries, however, has to do with their relations with the rest of the world.lt
 is on the North-South axis that the  gravest issues arise relating alternative
 growth policies to the world structure.
 Directions of Growth in a Bipolar World
   Foreign policy attention is currently focused on relations among the five
 "great power" areas of North America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe,
 China and Japan. The avoidance of war among any pair of these nations or
 regions  is  obviously the most urgent short-term  requirement  of a viable
 world structure. If that can be accomplished, however, it is much easier to
 visualize a workable  affirmative   relationship  among the industrialized
 nations,  especially the three open-market groups, than between them and
 the less developed  countries.  Many of  the  present trends  suggest in-
 creasing global bipolarity. In the richer nations there live about one billion
 people with per capita incomes in the $1,000 to $5,000 range, confident of
 a fairly steady pace of continuous growth, and with birth rates only slightly in
 excess of mortality. In contrast, there are almost  three billions in the poorer
 nations,  with per capita incomes between $50 and $500, great uncertainty
 as to their growth prospects, and very high rates of population increase. The
 intermediate  category of  semi-industrialized  nations, mostly  in  Latin
 America and the Middle East, is painfully small.
   Even  if overall growth rates favored the less developed  nations, the dif-
 ference  in  population growth  would  probably  more  than  offset this ad-
 vantage. And even if the per capita growth rates favored the less developed
 countries, the disparity in the base is so enormous that the absolute dif-
 ference  in  living standards would continue to increase for many decades.
 Mass famine is still an imminent possibility in several of the less developed
, regions,  and mass  malnutrition is  more  common  than  not.  Levels  of
 education,  health, housing, and all  the other indexes of measurable social
 welfare  display a corresponding bipolarity. Political polarization between
 rich and poor is becoming the standard experience of the United  Nations
 and its specialized agencies.
   How might these  relationships evolve in the middle term, say twenty to
 fifty years?  Three broad alternative scenarios come to mind. A continuation
 of present trends would suggest a  general confrontation between rich and

 poor on many fronts. A second possibility would involve clusters of less
 developed  countries as satellites  of  each  of  the  major powers,  with
 preferential trade  and   investment  relations  and  mutual  security  pacts
 providing some binding force for each cluster. The third possibility—most
 difficult but most desirable—would unite  both rich and poor in a  world
 structure offering significant benefits to all its members.
   Which course the North-South relationship may follow will be critically in-
 fluenced by policies  on rates and directions  of growth.
   The accelerated shift away from  material growth in the richer countries
 will  be encouraged  through market forces  by  the inclusion of  full  en-
 vironmental costs in  product prices and by the  gradual rise  in materials
 costs. Market forces alone, however, are unlikely to suffice. To give an ob-
 vious example, a shift from automotive commuting to mass transit needs not
 only an increase in the cost of the former, but also major investments in
 mass transit systems which  entail strategic decisions  by the appropriate
 political authorities. Nor is it clear that full  environmental costs can always
 be included in product  prices. It is easy to visualize air pollution abatement
 and  marginal energy extraction costs being  included  in automobile and
 gasoline prices but not  so easy when it comes  to the indirect costs of urban
   To the extent that the shifts involve collective rather than individual con-
 sumption, fiscal and budgetary policy can go a long way, provided that the
 full  implications  of choices are clarified  for the public and legislative
 authorities. It  is interesting  in this connection that the  Dutch  trade  union
 leadership, more sophisticated than most,  is reported to prefer that three-
 quarters of the expected four percent annual increase in output be devoted
 to improvements  in educational  opportunities, environmental protection,
 and  social security, taking only one-quarter   in  additional  individual in-
 comes. On the plane  of work versus leisure, there is need for institutional
 arrangements to  provide greater freedom of choice  in working hours,  the
 arrangement of the work week, holiday schedules, and age of retirement.
 What is clearly not wanted  is involuntary "leisure"  in the form of unem-
 ployment. The kinds  of  issues involved here  are largely domestic rather
 than international, although international exchanges of experience can be
 most useful in informing domestic policy making.
   The most difficult aspect  of the broad transition  envisaged here is  the
development  of new  international economic  patterns  to maintain or  ac-
 celerate material  growth in the less developed countries while it slackens
 off in the industrialized  nations. Present patterns are not so designed. The
 key economic bottlenecks in the poorer regions today are foreign exchange
earnings and  availability of capital, both of  which are positively correlated
with  high material growth rates in the industrialized countries. Such growth

 improves the market and terms of trade for primary product exports from the
 less developed countries,  eases their access to markets for labor-intensive
 manufactured goods in the richer nations, and facilitates governmental and
 private capital transfers. There is no logical incongruity in an altered pattern
 favoring  higher material growth  in the less developed countries, but how to
 achieve  it requires concerted  thought  and  new forms  of  international
   Economic  market forces are  the best-known examples of smooth ad-
 justment mechanisms,  but in  some fields analogous results may flow from
 decentralized political  decision-making within a  sound  framework  of
 national  or international guidelines. Many economic  markets  are very im-
 perfect, fail to include  all  relevant  costs and do not signal the future suf-
 ficiently far in advance to  permit corrective  measures to be taken in time.
   Process and institutions, therefore,  require at least as much research and
 innovation as specific substantive  policies.  Given the rudimentary state of
 evolution of the world order, that may be even more true on the international
 than on the domestic front. At the same time, the increasing complexity of
 technology, the increasing interdependence of nations, and the diminishing
 margins  of   resource  and environmental  tolerance as  population and
 economic growth press against the biosphere suggest that a growing class
 of strategic and  often irreversible decisions will have to be identified and
 subjected to  the most rigorous  analysis  of their direct and  indirect con-
 sequences. The  creation of both national and  international institutions for
 this purpose  is the greatest single challenge in the development of policies
 toward national and world growth  alternatives.
Implementing lnternational~0riented Growth

  The best means for handling the international dimension in such cases
will depend on the institutional arrangements designed mainly for domestic
reasons; it would be foolish  to suppose that the  international tail should
always swing the domestic dog. The critical point is that the international
dimension not be treated as an afterthought, but be built in from the start as
an  integral element in  any policy-making machinery intended to guide
national growth or to select among national growth alternatives. There are
no  existing governmental  or private institutions  in  the  United States at-
tempting to formulate  such  comprehensive growth policies. If such an
organization were established it would obviously deal  with a much longer
time-frame than the  four principal comprehensive policy agencies that now
exist (the  Office of Mnagement and Budget; the Council of Economic Ad-
visers, the Council on  Environmental Quality; and  the  National  Security

Council). To have any real impact on  operating decisions, any long-term
growth policy agency won d require organic ties to these present agencies,
to the major sectoral operating departments {such as Transportation, Hous-
ing and Urban Development, Interior, Commerce, Agriculture, and Health,
Education, and Welfare), and to the Congress (including the new Office Of
Technology Assessment).
  Without specific proposals for  such  machinery, which would be judged
mainly on domestic grounds,  it is not  possible to specify how best to in-
corporate the international  dimension. The following points, however, in-
dicate some of the specific actions and institutional mechanisms (some
existing and some new) appropriate to the suggested lines of policy.

Import Dependence: The  Materials Problem

  1. Stockpiling of and substitution  for exotic imported materials. Stock-
     piling could be handled by existing  machinery (successor to Office of
     Emergency  Preparedness for this purpose).  Research might  be in
     Bureau of Standards or stimulated through NSF  program of Research
     Applied to National Needs (NSF/RANN).
  2. Conservation  of  depletable minerals,  including  incentives to and
     research on recycling and process and product improvement. This is
     mainly a domestic policy field,  in which EPA and CEQ are already
     engaged.  Removal or  reversal  of transportation rate  preferences for
     virgin materials is one obvious example of the several appropriate ac-
     tions. Since primary material  market  prices are very sensitive to  short-
     term demand  and supply fluctuations but do not  provide adequate
     long-term advance warnings of prospective scarcities, government-
     sponsored research to anticipate shortages and facilitate conservation
     is warranted to supplement  normal  market incentives in these  direc-
  3. Inclusion  of balance-of-payments considerations  in  environmental
     decision-making affecting domestic versus imported materials sup-
    plies. This should be one explicit criterion for possible exception to
     otherwise desirable environmental quality standards, including federal
     preemption  of  State or local standards where necessary. It would
     require stern administration  to  reject specious claims or threats of
     abandonment  of  individual  mines  or smelters.  A floor  might be
     desirable setting a maximum limit to the degree of reduction in stan-
     dards  acceptable  en balance-of-payments grounds.  To  justify
     relaxation of standards, the import swing should be required to be of
     significant magnitude.  Formal endorsement  might be required from
    those units of the Departments of Interior and  State involved  in in-

  ternationai  study groups or international environmental coordinating
  activities in relation to the  specific material  under review.
4. International cooperation in geological surveying. This point essen-
  tially involves a review and possible intensification of efforts underway,
  including   resource  surveys financed through  the  United Nations
  Development Program, the application of earth resource satellite in-
  formation to this end, bi-lateral technical assistance programs, and the
  training of geologists from less developed countries. Other  large
  material  importing  nations  should  be persuaded to  collaborate in
  similar activities.
5. New  relationships between  multi-national  corporations and  host
  governments, especially in /ess  developed countries.  These relation-
  ships have been rapidly evolving in recent years, with the development
  of new forms of concession contracts. They  include arrangements for
  joint ventures, management agreements  coupled with  long-term pur-
  chase  contracts,  and  arrangements for  voluntary  periodic
  renegotiation. Primary material development should have priority in the
  lending and guarantee activities of the Export-Import   Bank and the
  OPIC. Consideration might  also be given  to government guarantees in
  the most risky  cases to put a floor under possible future price fluc-
  tuations. In addition, in view of the sensitivity of natural resource in-
  dustries to political charges of exploitation, a larger involvement of the
  World Bank and international Regional Banks should be sought in the
  financing of materials development ventures.
6. Cooperation with other importing nation  governments to avoid costly
  scrambles  for  scarce materials. The first  requirement here  is for
  organized  cooperation  in  monitoring  of   market   situations  and
  prospects.  This can best be done through commodity  study groups, a
  number of which already exist. In order to avoid the political criticism of
  apparent "buyers cartels" the principal supplying nation governments
  should be  invited to participate  m such commodity study groups. The
  main  emphasis should be placed on assurance of  adequate and
  geographically diversified  supplies,  but in  market crisis situations,
  such as those that accompanied the Korean war, cooperation among
  importers can avoid hoarding or other forms of  non-productive com-
  petition to  corner supplies.
7. Adjustment of  bi-laterat economic policies  in relation to major sup-
  pliers. The importance of  future raw  materials  supplies should be
  regularly  taken into  account  in  the  formulation of  aid,  technical
  assistance,  and investment policies.  The appropriate  locus of  this
  responsibility depends on the organization of foreign economic policy-
  making generally, which is understood to be under review.

   8. Exploitation of deep seabed minerals. The responsibility for develop-
     ment and negotiation of a United States position concerning some form
     of international control regime rests with the Department of State as
     part of its general preparations for the United Nations Conference on
     the Law of :he Seas scheduled to begin late this year. The Department
     of the Interior works with the State Department in this effort. There have
     been  some informal  discussions  of a possible interim  agreement
     among the major countries with interest and potential for deep seabed
     exploitation (Japan,  Germany, and  possibly others as well as the
     United States).
   9. Materials policy coordinating agency. The points made above suggest:
     a need for some focussed responsibility to follow all  aspects of supply
     and demand for depletable  materials and to recommend appropriate
     action to the various operating  agencies concerned. Since in almost all
     cases supplies  come  partly from domestic  sources and partly from
     abroad, any such coordinating agency would have  to deal with both
     domestic and international aspects.

Energy Resources: The Critical Case
   The establishment of an Energy Policy Coordinating Agency is an ob-
vious necessity and a prerequisite  to implementation  of the lines of policy
suggested below. It should have extensive powers for promotion and finan-
cing of research in the various energy sectors and authority for initiative as
well as conflict resolution among operating agencies. The issues  involved
in adequate supply and conservation of energy are so pervasive, however,
that it would be foolish to suppose that all operating responsibilities effect-
ing energy  could be consolidated  in  a single agency.  The elements of
energy policy  might  include the  following.
   1. Energy conservation in use and in conversion to electric power. As
suggested above, market forces will work in this direction as relative  costs
of energy rise, but they will work  too slowly to  accomplish the needed
results. A coordinated  set of energy conservation policies would include
higher minimum standards for building insulation; a steeply graduated ex-
cise tax on  automobile engine horsepower, phased in over a number of
years; greatly enlarged  encouragement and financial help for the building of
intra-urban mass transit systems; incentives to shift freight transportation
from highways :o railroads and inland waterways;  more intensive research
on  magneto-hydro  dynamics;  experimentation  in  local  "total  power
systems," etc.  The NSF/RANN program is doing some work in these direc-
tions, but on much too small a scale.
  2.  Domestic fossil fuel expansion. The problem of price and other in-
centives for increased  oil and gas  exploration and production is both too

complex and too well-known to require  elaboration here. The  major ad-
ditional need is for intensive expansion of use of low-sulphur western coal,
including appropriate public land  policy changes to that end, greatly in-
tensified research in land reclamation from strip mining on low-slope dry
lands, and gasification and liquefaction. On the environmental policy side,
there is a strong case for federal preemption of environmental standards af-
fecting national energy supplies.
  3.  Deferral  of commitment to  major  reliance on nuclear fission and
speeding up of research on long-term alternatives. The President's energy
message of June,  1971,  placed  major emphasis on  nuclear  fission,
especially with liquid metal breeder reactors,  as the prime source of ex-
panded power supplies from the middle 1980's forward. Uncertainties with
respect to reactor safety,  waste product control,  and possible weapons
diversion suggest that  a  major commitment  to applied nuclear fission
should be deferred until much more extensive technological and social
research demonstrates that its risks are acceptable.  Given the ample sup-
plies  of fossil fuels, nuclear fission  need  not be a major alternative to ex-
cessive oil imports for some decades to come. At the same time, it would
be desirable to enlarge research on  nuclear fusion to the maximum that can
be usefully absorbed and also to intensify research on the effective use of
solar  energy for both  low-grade and  power  production purposes.  The
Atomic Energy  Commission and  the  National Science  Foundation are
adequate instrumentalities  for this  purpose,  given sufficient funds  and
guidance from the energy  policy  coordinating agency mentioned above.
Geothermal  energy should also  be included  in an  enlarged  research
Derived Export Dependence
  1.  Stimulation of agricultural productivity and technological innovation in
manufacturing.  Collaborative  efforts should  be  developed  among the
Departments of Agriculture  and Commerce and the National Science Foun-
dation to identify and encourage promising research leads.
  2. Displacement of labor-intensive industries to lower-wage countries.
Any policy working in this direction would require a more effective program
of industry adjustment assistance than has thus far been associated with in-
ternational trade legislation. If that condition could be met, so that displaced
labor and capital could be  assured  of opportunity for engaging in  higher-
productivity work, market forces would largely accomplish the objective.
They might be reinforced through policies of the international financing in-
situtions, the Export-Import  Bank, and the OPIC. It would also be  helpful to
commission a  special study of Japanese experience along these  lines,

International Competition and Long-Term Growth Policies
  The concept of negotieted "growth control" among industrialized nations
set forth here requires research and informal exploration and consultation
as  a preliminary to policy formulation and implementation, The needed
research would aim at the identification of areas of technical development
or product development not desired for domestic needs but being fostered
exclusively for  international  competitive reasons. It should also look for
cases in the converse, is., areas desired domestically but  being retarded
for  international  competitive reasons.  Exploration and  consultation would
seek to identify  corresponding areas  in the principal competing nations,
especially Western Europe and Japan. If some or all of  the governments
concerned establish  formal  agencies for technology assessment,  those
agencies would be a major source of information for this purpose. Pending
that development, environmental protection agencies in the several  coun-
tries would be a logical source. After the assemblage of information of this
type, the OECD would probably be the best forum for initiating intergovern-
mental discussions looking toward coordinated "growth  control."
Environmental Standards
  1. Environmental cooperation among industrialized countries. The EPA
and CEQ are   already  involved in  international  environmental  policy
discussions along the  lines suggested here. The OECD and the UN
Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) provide mechanisms for this pur-
pose, and a further one will be added when the United  Nations environ-
mental program agency  is established in Nairobi. In the forthcoming trade
negotiations on  non-tariff barriers,  there will  oe further  opportunity  to
negotiate the principles suggested here.
  2. Export of certain types of polluting industries to less  developed coun-
tries. This topic will certainly be on the agenda of the new UN environmental
program agency, one of whose central concerns is the relationship between
environmental protection and economic development  in the poorer coun-
tries.  As  stated previously,  the  questions  of  industrial  relocation,  both
domestic and international, are major matters for continuing research. The
aims of such research  should  be to clarify hazards,  new technological
requirements and costs, and to  identify activities  suitable for relocation,
(Development  cf hydro-electric  power in South America  and  Africa for
energy  intensive electro-chemical  and electro-metallurgical  industries
suggests itself as one major possibility.)
Cooperation and Competition  Among the Industrialized Nations
  Several European countries and Japan are far ahead of the United States
in the development of lorg range analysis and planning on broad issues of
national growth and development, including land use control, transportation

systems, and industrial location.  Systematic research is indicated to can-
vass these experiences and to analyze the extent to which they might be ap-
plicable to American conditions.
Directions of Growth in a Bimodal World
  This section  sketches  a number of  major  areas for needed ongoing
research concerning long-term growth alternatives.  They include:
  (1) Strategic  sectors  affecting  long-term regional and  global growth
limitations. To the items listed there should be added the fundamental issue
of atmospheric heating and climatotogical modification through energy use,
which might lead to the need to concentrate on solar energy, even at much
greater  cost, as the ultimate reliance of mankind.
  (2) A second major area concerns ways and means to accelerate a shift
in growth patterns in the wealthier countries away from material-consuming
  (3) The third major area concerns changes in international economic pat-
terns (trade,  investment,  industrial  location, etc.) to permit more  rapid
material-consuming growth in the poorer countries.
  These areas would be among the key concerns of any national long-term
growth policy agency that might  be established,  and should constitute a
major part of the agenda for the in-house and external research of any such
agency. Pending the creation of such an agency, a start might be made un-
der the auspices of NSF/RANN, supplemented in specific cases by resour-
ces from EPA and CEQ, other interested government agencies, and private
foundations and research centers.

                   /VOTES FOR CHAPTER 4

  1. For a more extended discussion,  see Allen V.  Kneese and others,
    Managing The Environment: International Economic Cooperation for
    Pollution Control. Praeger, New York, 1971, especially chapters by
    Kneese, Matmgren, and Eldin.
  2. Kenneth E. Bculding, A Primer on Social Dynamics, Free Press, New
    York,  1970.
                       Suggested Reading

 1. Atdelman, M.A.,  "Is the Oil Shortage  Real?"  Foreign Policy,  Winter
   1972-73, p.  69-107.
 2. Akins, James E.,  "The Oil Crisis: This Time the Wolf Is Here," Foreign
   Affairs, April, 1973, p. 462-490.
 3. Cook,  Earl,   "Energy for  Millenium  Three,"  Technology Review,
   December,  1972. p.  16-23.
 4. Development and Environment, Founex, Switzerland, June 1-12, 1971,
   Environment and Social Sciences, The Hague, 1972.
 5. Dorfman, Robert and Nancy S.  Dorfman, Economics of the En-
   vironment, Norton, 1972.
 6. Faltermayer,  Edmund, "The Energy 'Joyride' is Over," Fortune, Sep-
   tember,  1972.
 7. Fuel and Energy Resources, 1972, Hearings before the Committee on
   interior and Insular  Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-second
   Congress, April,  1972.
 8. Garvey,  Gerald, Energy, Ecology, Economy W.W.  Norton & Co., 235
 9. Gregory, Derek P.,  "The Hydrogen Economy," Scientific American,
   January, 1973 p. 13-21.
10. Hirst,  Eric and John  C. Moyers, "Efficiency and  Energy Use in the
   United States," Science, March 30, 1973, p. 1299-1304.
11. Levy. Walter J., "An Action Program for U.S. Energy Policy During the
   Seventies,"  Address  made during the 1972 Annual Meeting  of the
   American  Petroleum  Institute, Chicago,  Illinois,  November 13-14,
12. Novick,  Sheldon, "Toward a Nuclear Power Precipice,"  Environment,
   March, 1973, p. 33-40.
13. Ridgeway James, "The Last Play" E.P. Dutton. & Co.,  New York, 1973.
14. Rocks, Lawrence and Richard 0. Runyon, The Energy Crisis, Crown
   Publishers, New York, 1972,  p. 177.

15. Schurr,  Sam H.,  Energy Research Needs, Resources for the Future
   Inc., Washington, D.C.,  1971.
16. Science, Growth, and Society, Report of the Secretary-General's Ad
   Hoc Group on New Concepts of Science Policy, O.E.C.D., Paris, 1972.
\7.(J.N.  Conference on the  Human Environment,  Stockholm,  1972,
18. U.S.  Energy Report,  A Report  of the NATIONAL Petroleum Council's
   Committee on  U.S. Energy Outlook, December, 1972.
19. Weinberg, Alvin, "Social Institutions and  Nuclear Energy," Science,
   July 7, 1972, p. 27-43.
20. Weinberg, Alvin,  "Long-Range Approaches for Resolving the Energy
   Crisis, presented  before the ASME Symposium, The Energy Crisis,
   Long  Term Solutions, New York,  November  29, 1972.
21. World Energy Demands and the Middle East, the 26th Annual Con-
   ference of the Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., September 29-
   30, 1972. Part I.


           Part Two


  In Part 2 the implications of economics and human behavior for growth
policy and the environment are discussed.
  In Chapter  5  Growth and  Behavior are discussed  by several authors
presenting several interesting  and innovative  concepts relating  human
behavior to the  environment  and environmental policy. The editors com-
bined these somewhat disparate papers under a central theme that man's
short-range and self-centered thinking,  sometimes enhanced by a lack of
commitment and responsibility, are primary behaviorial factors contributing
to environmental degradation. A second theme  somewhat common to the
papers contained in this Chapter is man's emotional response to "crises".
  The possibility of affecting  a major change in the attitudes of society is
discussed by one author and he concludes that the crisis label may result in
no action. This happens because crisis denotes an impossible situation in
which one merely  "hangs-on" and rides out the developments. In reality,
there is no crisis  but an evolving problem which can be solved only by
diligent and continuous hard work.
  The evolution of human consciousness and the brain  are discussed in
another paper. The author relates evolution to population density, showing
that man created information and coded it into concepts that permitted new
social roles to limit social interactions to tolerable levels. He concludes that,
as evolution continues, man will  be linked into a single,  world-wide com-
munication network. Ability to function in this network and to manage his in-
creasingly multidisciplinary activities will require delineation of concepts
and the linkages among them.
  In the final paper a systems viewpoint of human behavior is presented.
The concepts presented view man as sometimes reacting emotionally in
predictable fashion, not, as he would like to picture himself, acting from
rational  thought. What man does is often different from what he says he will
do. This author also concludes that the crisis label should  be removed from
the environment to encourage more rational action.
  In Chapter 6 the  relationship between Growth  and  Economics  are
discussed in  some detail.  The classical economic concepts,  which  will
continue to remain valid, are reviewed with emphasis on their effects on en-
vironmental planning.  New concepts shaping new economic viewpoints are
also presented.  The author applies the concept of entropy to economics,
concluding that waste accumulates faster than useful output  but also con-
cludes that the  situation is  not hopeless. By  applying knowledge and
energy we can escape the "entropy trap". The author reviews changes
which he  expects  will accompany growth,  discusses the costs  of change
and concludes that these costs can be borne, principally from added profits
realized from economic growth.  In conclusion he outlines a proposal for a
government-business  growth policy which could  lead  to  an improved
quality of  life.

  Another author introduces the concept of sustainable growth, defined as
economic growth which provides sufficient discretionary income per capita
to achieve a desired quality of life without environmental degradation. He
outlines action required now to achieve such growth. These recommenda-
tion include developing a concept of legacy for future generations and fin-
ding ways to coordinate goal-setting and planning functions to develop in-
dicative,  integrative planning.

  Short-range and self-centered thinking coupled with  a  lack of com*
mitment and responsibility are  primary factors  of human behavior  con-
tributing to environmental neglect and degradation. In this Chapter some of
the major reasons for these attitudes and methods for dealing with  human
factors affecting the environment are discussed.
  Concepts of expanded ownership, developed  by the Sabre Foundation,
and improvement  in the quality of the work environment taken from Peter
Barth's invited  paper are presented as possible  methods  for  improving
man's sense of  commitment and responsibility.
  Garrett Hardin discusses the possibility of effecting major changes in the
attitudes of society and the "crisis"  label so often associated with the en-
vironment. He concludes that this label may be necessary to initiate action
but emphasizes  that  hard work over a long time is what is really needed.
  Murray Bowen  takes  a systems viewpoint  of human  behavior.  He
discusses the communication of emotional reaction to crisis, the maturity of
society, and approaches to solving  environmental  problems based on in-
creasing  responsibility and consistency between what we  say and what we
do. He also  recommends thai the crisis label be removed from environ-
mental issues

Human Short Range  Thinking

  One  of the  reasons we do  have environmental  degradation  is that
mankind stresses short-range goals and tends to be most concerned with
individual gain, even when he may realize this gain is obtained at the ex-
pense of society as a whole.  Hardin aptly illustrated this tendency in  an
example he called "The Tragedy of  the Commons" (1),
  Hardin describes a common  pasture in which neighboring herdsmen
graze their animals. When  the population  becomes  sufficiently large  in-
creased grazing will have detrimental effects on the pasture and each herd-
sman realizes this. However, when deciding whether or not to add another
animal to his herd, he asks himself,

    "What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd? This
  utility has one negative and one positive component.
    1. The  positive component  is a function of the  increment  of one
  animal. Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of
  the additional an mal, the positive utility  is nearly +1.
    2. The  negative  component  is  a  function  of  the additional
  overgrazing created by one more animal. Since, however, the effects of
  overgrazing are shared  by all the herdsmen, the negative utility for any
  particular decision-making herdsman  is only a fraction of -1.
    Adding together the component  partial utilities, the rational herdsman
  concludes  that the only sensible  course for him to pursue is to add
  another animal to his herd."

  When  this process  is  repeated  by all the herdsmen,  serious en-
vironmental degradation occurs and ultimately all suffer loss. The parallel of
this example  to our present environmental  behavior is  obvious.

Responsibility and Personal Commitment
  Another factor contributing  to our problem is the  lack of a feeling  of
responsibility evident among many of our citizens.  In part this is due to a
decrease in commitment to personal possessions and to the area in which
they live. This could be offset by expanding  ownership, perhaps by making
ownership more easily attainable.  Responsibility and commitment could
also be improved by improving the quality of the working environment.

Rental Economics
  Rental economics is a term used to describe the temporary commitments
increasing numbers of  individuals and  institutions make when they rent
clothing, automobiles, household  furnishings,  housing and many other

things. The trend is most dramatic in housing. In "Future Shock" Alvin Tof-
fler observes that "as late as 1955 apartments accounted for only 8 percent
of new housing starts. By 1961  it reached 24 percent. By 1969, for the first
time in the United States, more building permits  were being issued for
apartment construction  than for private homes."  People increasingly want
minimum involvement to survive the uncertainties of rapid change.
  This trend has two  implications  for environmental quality.  First, the
reduced sense of identity, commitment and responsibility encourages in-
difference to the environmental. Second, there is  a possible positive effect.
Rented items are the responsibility  of the owner for major maintenance.
This could incentivize the market and increase  the demand for products
designed for longer life and lower  maintenance  requirements.
Expanded  Ownership
  Expanded ownership is a term used to characterize various methods
whereby ownership of income-producing capital  can  be made available to
those who  have little or none.  Ownership may strengthen one's sense of
identity with the goals of an enterprise or of the community.
  The concepts of expanded ownership are delineated in a study directed
by John McClaughry for the Sabre Foundation. Excerpts from the report are
presented below.

    The men who founded the United States of America—John Adams,
  Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison  in particular—believed that a
  widespread  distribution of property ownership was essential to the
  establishment of republican  self-government and the preservation  of
  individual liberty.
    Today  the idea of a private property base for free government and a
  free society is increasingly called  into question. Three differing views
  of public policy exist:
    1. Those who find the concentration of ownership and economic
  power  desirable, as  Alexander Hamilton  once did, and oppose any
  public  policy which would alter the status quo.
    2. Those who advocate increased governmental control of the large
  concentrations of ownership  and economic power in the name of "the
  people"  including those  who favor government  ownership  of the
  means of production.
    3. Those, as yet few, who believe that free government and individual
  liberty  must continue to be  based on ihe widespread ownership  of
  genuine  private property, and who thus favor a public policy of ex-
  panding  ownership opportunities to achieve that objective, while at the
  same  time forestalling demands for government  controls  and

     The Sabre report, describing methods for expanding the ownership
   of property to those who have little or none of it, is squarely based on
   this third public policy position.

   The Sabre Foundation's study makes a strong case in favor of expanding
 classic private ownership opportunities. One part of the case is the link that
 exists between private property ownership  and such traditional virtues as
 individual  liberty,  respect for  law  and order,  responsible political par-
 ticipation,  economic;  understanding, and individual productivity. Another
 part of the case is the link between the use  of private capital and entrepre-
 neurship in production and the growth of wealth. It has been the productivity
 of capital that has generated the huge rise in incomes and accumulation of
 wealth in modern times. It is the productivity of capital whose fruits finance
 the growing welfare sector of the economy and the increased consumption
 of public goods.
   The Sabre study recommends an extensive national commitment to ex-
 panded  private  ownership opportunities  to  broaden  the ownership  of
 productive capital and consumer capital. This would mean that govern-
 mental policy would be devised to enlarge ownership in United States cor-
 porations.  Programs  to encourage individual  purchases of homes,  farms,
 and small  businesses would be strengthened and  extended.  Tax policy
 would give incentives to employees to buy stock in corporations where they
 work and  to  employers and owners to provide the  opportunity. The study
 proposes  that the President and the Congress establish a Commission on
 Expanded  Ownership to  further explore and  implement  ideas  to promote
 more general private ownership.
   All these current controversies center on the future of the private owner-
 ship of productive and consumer capital. The broader that ownership is, the
 stronger can be the ownership  voice in the  councils of public and private
 Productivity  and the Quality of the Work Environment
   Productivity reflects how well  managers use corporate resources. In part,
 productivity is a function of the attitude and  motivation of managers and
 workers. If they can genuinely feel a  personal identity which the activities of
 the company their persona  productivity will  tend  to  increase. It seems
 reasonable to assume that,  under conditions of increased identiy with com-
 pany activities, they might also experience and increased identification with
 the environmental responsibilities of the company.
   Peter Barth observes, "A ob  is no longer valued solely as the means of
acquiring income. It is also valued in terms of the opportunities it affords to
satisfy equally basic  social and  psychological needs."  Other observations
from his invited paper are  presented in the remainder of this  section.

  Although we have been prone to treat work as a discrete segment of life
because of its temporal and geographical separation from the home and the
community, it is becoming quite obvious to social observers that life cannot
be so neatly compartmentalized. The quality of work is inextricably tied to
the quality of  life, with the former conditioning  and setting  limits on what
may be achieved in the latter. Research has established that the adverse of
employment experience are not confined within the boundaries of the work-
place,  but can spill over into virtually every area of life functioning—per-
sonal, familial, social  and political.  Work  for some may  be the principal
means of earning "the coin of fun," but it is also a potent determinant of the
utility or what  is purchased.
  We are  beginning, with the  aid  of  research,  to appreciate the per-
vasiveness of  work problems throughout the population. We have learned,
for example, that the "blue collar blues" is not an affliction experienced by
a limited segment of the work force, but is a term  more appropriately  ap-
plied to a wide  range of workers holding  jobs with common  attributes at
numerous  points throughout  the  occupational  hierarchy.  Although  the
assembly  line worker continues to be the example par excellence of  the
dysfunctional  consequences  of  scientific  management and bureaucratic
rationalization, his frustrations are not nearly so unique  as was once
assumed.  Just as there is impressive commonality of values sought in em-
ployment,  so too is  there a wide sharing of the frustrations  induced when
the goals of workers are thwarted by the structure and organization of work
systems. Excesses in routinization. job simplification, rules of conduct, and
the imposition of authority affect white- as well  as blue-collar workers,
professionals  as well as laborers, and  managers as well as rank-and-file
  But how can we gauge the quality of the  working  environment? What  are
its major dimensions? What indices can be constructed and what statistics
can  be compiled to enable  us  to  measure  the impact  of the work  en-
vironment  on individual well-being, to determine where problems are more
and  less  severe, to chart changes over time,  and to assess the gains
achievable through private action and public policy? It is this measurement
process which will transfer issues of work quality from the  realm  of pure
conjecture and polemic to the arena of social policy and programs.
  A  vital distinction should be made at this  point between the objective
determinants of  dissatisfaction, the subjective experience and attitudinal
expression of dissatisfaction,  and the larger behavioral  outcomes or
manifestations of dissatisfaction. There  is little evidence that the objective
circumstances of workers, whatever criterion is used, have  significantly
deteriorated over the years. Indeed, the  application of most economic yard-
sticks  would  reveal  considerable  progress  in  assuring  secure and

 /enumerative employment.  To some extent what we may be witnessing is
 the growing tendency of workers to critically evaluate their circumstances
 and to articulate such evaluations both in words and deeds. As more is ex-
 pected of employment,  particularly  its non-economic features, more is
 going to be found lacking. In addition, in  areas where dissatisfaction  has
 long  been experienced,  workers may  now be  less willing to accept and
 adapt to it as an inevitable requirement of employment
   In short, there may be some striking parallels to be drawn between what
 is now being observed in employment and what has already occured else-
where on the social  scene, particularly in the civil rights area. Suffering in
silence is no longer  a commendable virtue. The benefits of the forceful ex-
pression  of grievances and militant  action  to  correct them have been
established for all to witness.
  Although existing data bearing on the question of trends in discontent are
ambiguous, the evidence  regarding the  distribution of satisfaction and
dissatisfaction throughout the labor force is reasonably clearcut. Discontent
is more common to black  than  to white workers,  more prevalent  among
youth than among older workers, more frequent in some industries  than in
others, and more concentrated  in some occupational categories than in
other  groupings. While individuals higher in the occupational hierarchy are
far less prone to express dissatisfaction than those lower  in the structure,
there  are  also  notable  differences  within  gross occupational classes:
Discontent is more  endemic to workers  whose jobs are fragmentized,
routinized, allow little opportunity for autonomy, yield low wages, offer little
security, and  subject them to hazardous or unpleasant working conditions.
  The existence  of  substantial  "pockets" of dissatisfaction is  hardly a
recent revelation. Yet wcrker satisfaction more often has been regarded by
organizational managers as a serendipitous outcome of employment than a
condition to foster and nurture. However, there is now being created  a body
of data which  should  argue compelling  for its acceptance as a  major
organizational and social goal.

  1. For the worker, the consequences of dissatisfaction may be profound
    as well as pervasive.  A recent  study of aging  found level of work
    satisfaction to be the most powerful predictor of longevity, surpassing
    the predict ve ability of all other variables examined. This relationship
    is all  the more credible in light of the evidence that dissatisfaction can
    manifest  itself in various symptoms of poor physical and mental  health,
    and the suspicion that  it may be a factor underlying excessive  use of
    alcohol and drug abuse. Although the broader personal outcomes of
    dissatisfaction have not yet been fully  traced, it is beginning to reveal
    itself as a potent influence on the quality of non-work life, including the

     richness of  leisure and the extent of involvement in the  social and
     political affairs of the community.
   2, For the employer, dissatisfaction has been found to be a factor in labor
     turnover, absenteeism and tardiness;  it may be a important moderator
     of productivity and product quality; and it is increasingly viewed as a
     cause of sabotage and other counterproductive work behavior.
   3. For society,  dissatisfaction  may impede  productivity growth and con-
     tribute to higher  price levels; it may be an important factor  underlying
     anti-social behavior and encourage the growth of social and political
     alienation; and it surely  retards the  development and  value  of the
     Nation's manpower resources.
   These are not, of course, firmly established principles which have gained
 universal acceptance; but neither are they merely the idle speculations of
 social theorists. A body  of research and experiential data  is  not  being
 assembled which appears likely to  engender a new  appreciation  of the
 varied consequences of  worker discontent.  Hopefully,  also,  it  will en-
 courage the  development of innovative approaches to the design of jobs
 and work environment which may remedy it.
   Before considering what directions such remedial efforts might take in
 the job satisfaction area, it may  be instructive  to review what actions have
 already been taken to protect and improve the physical  health and  safety of
 workers  with view to  assessing  their applicability to job  satisfaction.
   In enacting the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, the most am-
 bitious legislation in the area, Congress declared its intention "to assure so
 far as possible every working man  and  woman in  the  Nation safe and
 healthful working conditions." It imposes on employers  the legal obligation
 "to furnish to  each of his employees employment  and  a place of em-
 ployment free from recognized  i',i/ ,r <,-. that  are causing or  are  likely to
 cause death or serious physical harm to his employees," and assigns to the
 Secretary of  Labor the responsibility for promulgating and enforcing oc-
 cupational safety and health standards
  Although the full potential of this legislative remedy for health  and  safety
 problems is yet to be realized, unqestionably it must be supplemented by
 actions  on a number of other fronts. These include the more  thoughtful
 design of equipment, jobs and work environments; the sensitization of em-
 ployees to occupational hazards and  the encouragement of positive  safety
 attitudes and habits; and the intensification of research enabling the more
 precise  specification  of  occupational hazards  and the  health   con-
  Given  the state of existing  knowledge, it should be possible  in time to
build into jobs and work environments sufficient safeguards to  effect im-
pressive reductions in the frequency and severity of occupational injuries

and  illnesses, including  those which stem from on-the-job pollutants, of
special interest to EPA  The principal impediments to achieving this goal
may be less a matter of know-how than the knotty question of costs and how
they are to be apportioned.

Changing the Attitudes  of Society

  If man's perception of the environment is incomplete and if his thinking
sometimes emphasizes short-term gain to the detriment of the long-term,
can his perception be changed? Garrett Hardin believes  it can, and cites
recent  attitudinal  charges  experienced  in  this country. However,  he
suggests that labeling the environmental  problem as a crisis is misleading,
but perhaps necessary to assure action.  His discussion, taken from his in-
vited paper is presented below.	
  The  basic question raised by the analyst of environmental problems is,
"What  must we do?"  So staggering is the roster of things that we really
should do,  and so fundamental are some of the changes in economic and
social arrangements that he recommends, that it is not long before the en-
vironmentalist asks: "What can we do?"  Politics, as some one said, is the
art of the possible, and -:here is little point in saying we must have pie in the
sky if meteorology tells us we can't. What is  possible'' What is not?
  Recent evenvs justify out being much more optimistic about the possibility
of change than we could be even so recently as a decade ago. It is im-
portant that the broadening of the dimensions  of the possible receive wide
publicity, because we are operating in a  realm of truth that is populated by
what Robert K. Merton called "self-fulfilling prophecies." What is possible
is determined oartly by what we think is possible. Politics  may, in fact,  be
redefined as "the ethic;; of thinking the possible and the  art of bringing it
into  being."  In use.  this will probably  prove to be  a more  responsible
definition than the usual one of politics as "the art of the possible." which is
too  often used as an  excuse for fiddling while  Rome  burns.
  Events of  the  last  cecade  give us valid  reasons for doubting what
Galbraith has called "the conventional  wisdom"  about the possibility  of
rapid social change (2).  Conventionally it is  held that nothing less than
generations will suffice to bring about social change whenever: (a) the topic
arouses strong emotions: or (b) the reform called for is more than "in-
cremental," i.e., a succession of tiny steps. Discussion of the second point
is deferred for the present, as we look into the effectiveness of emotions in
preventing  change.
  The decade of the '60s was marked by a sustained drive to being an end
to "compulsory pregnancy"  i.e.,  to  remove abortion-prohibition laws/from
the statute  books (3). As one of  perhaps two  dozen activists in this area I

was repeatedly cautioned  that no rapid change was possible  in  so
emotional or "controversial" an area.  One wise elder statesman in the
medical world told me that he agreed with me that abortion-on-request was
desirable, but that he felt that the most we could hope for the present was a
so-called "therapeutic abortion" law that would permit abortions only in har-
dship cases: threat to  life of mother, serious  threat to her mental health,
probability of a deformed child, and for relief in cases of rape and incest. It
would be, he thought, a hundred years before society could bring itself to
permitting abortion-on-request (4).
  That was in 1965. Within a mere five years two states passed abortion-on-
request bills; and in January, 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that state
laws could not abridge the right of a woman to have an abortion her doctor
was willing to perform.
  History has thus given a critical testing of the conventional wisdom that it
takes generations  to bring about change in  highly emotional areas. Few
areas were as emotional as abortion in 1963, yet it took only ten years, not a
hundred, for a small band of abortion activists to create the new climate of
opinion on which  the  Supreme Court opinion could rest. Such  a rapid
change in a highly emotional area should be an immense encouragement to
all  Utopians. Now that we see that substantial alteration is possible, the
responsibility for being right in our goals should weigh more heavily upon
The Illusion of Crisis
  The word "crisis" stands for a curious idea,  half fact half fable. A medical
crisis, more often seen (or perhaps imagined) a hundred years ago than
now, is  a mixture  of pathology and drama. At a  heart-clutching "turning
point"—the literal  meaning  of the Greek root—the patient suddenly and
dramatically starts on the road to recovery or he dies. The medical crisis is
marvellous for the stage; occasionally  it  is even encountered in the sick-
  In a crisis there is nothing  much that anyone can do except hold on tight
pray, if you are religious, or rub a rabbit's foot if you are superstitious. But
you cannot really do anything at the critical point, which (for better or worse)
will soon be over.... In Chamberlain's mind, the troubles of Europe toward
the end  of the '30's, had reached a crisis. A concession here, a concession
there—and surely  it would soon be over?... Please?
  He  was wrong, and  history marched on to  produce the Second World
War. The underlying troubles were much more enduring than a crisis. What
was required was not mere holding on (or prayer or incantation), but hard
thought  and prolonged effort: blood, toil, tears and sweat in Churchill's

   It is significant that we have a name for the time-limited crisis, but no
word for its time-extended contrast. We speak of a "chronic condition," but
tack the needed noun. Chronos? This would do if word-and-meaning were
established—but they are not.  Perhaps people don't want to recognize
realities of this sort. A crisis is good theatre;  the grinding demands of a
chronic condition seldom is. Willing not to think about the reality, people
are quite content to muddle along without a name  for it.
   There is no environmental crisis. We are confronted with no dramatic tur-
ning point that will  soon be past if only we will pray or curse  or  hold our
breaths. The conditions that have produced our present trouble are still with
us, in greater degree every day. Without effort on our part, there will be no
change for the  better, and  probably no sudden change for  the worst.
Tomorrow will simple  be a  little worse  than today,  and the next day still
worse. Holding one's breath is futile;  sweat and toil are what the situation
demands of us  (accompanied,  no  doubt,  by unavoidable  blood  and
irrelevant tears).
   It is tempting to the reformer to use the  rhetoric  of crisis to arouse his
audience. He should resist  the temptation. The dynamics of chronos (if I
may use the word) is different from the dynamics of crisis. The worsening is
not sudden but gradual and  almost imperceptible. When the fears aroused
by the word  crisis are not soon realized a "backlash"  is all too likely to
develop, and the environmental baby may be thrown  out with the bath water
of "crisis." The understandable result is a book like  The Doomsday Syn-
drome (5).
   The expectation of crisis  interferes  with our perception of world events
and  with our ability  to foretell, recognize,  and  react  to approaching
catastrophe. We are trapped by this implicit argument:

   1. A crisis must occur before the public will take action;
   2. There is no crisis now;
   3. We will  recognize the crisis when  it comes;
   4. In the meantime nothing can be  done.

   The worst errors center around the  third point, our perception of reality.
As has been said before,  "Nobody ever dies of overpopulation" (6). Deaths
of chronically malnourished people are attributed variously to cyclones,
cholera,  tuberculosis,  leprosy,  riot,  civil  insurrection and  war. Even star-
vation is seldom recorded as the cause of death:  the diseases favored by
malnutrition are the "causes" of choice  when it comes to  filling out death
certificates. Worse, in times and places where starvation is  most serious no
one is filling out death certificates; all  too often no one is witnessing death
and reporting it to the outside world.  Thus are our  perceptions protected

against recognizing a deperate condition which, were it recognized, would
call for action (which we try to avoid).
  The city of Calcutta stands as a symbol of our expectations and our moral
paralysis. For several decades its desperate situation has been universally
recognized, both inside India and out. Paralyzed, the world waits for a crisis
to overtake Calcutta,  at which point massive intervention would  seem
justified. But the crisis  never comes. As Geoffrey Moorehouse has  noted
(7),  the spectacular and  critical  events we  might label  disintegration,
collapse and breaktown, seem  not to occur. Instead, we are witnessing
"something more akin to petrifaction" of the total organism we call a city.
This is not a crisis;  and so we do nothing.
  Almost everywhere, man's situation is "desperate but not critical." Is this
qualified judgment a cause for rejoicing? Only if we can bring ourselves to
take action  in a situation that  is merely desperate.
Human Consciousness  and Management of Multidisciplinary
  As early life forms  evolved  into  modern  man,  consciousness  also
evolved. John Calhoun believes that development of human consciousness
was influenced by population density. Eventually man had to develop a
"conceptual space" to replace physical space as a means of maintaining
social  interactions within a tolerable  level. Conceptual  space, the ideas
available to an individual, provided a means  of defining  different social
roles which buffered man from too many social interactions. Calhoun traces
the stages  of evolution of consciousness and concludes that we are on the
threshold of a new domain of consciousness.
  He states that evolution of the brain necessarily accompanied evolution
of consciousness. To enter the new domain of consciousness, Calhoun be-
lieves that man  must develop a prosthetic-synergistic brain. The brain must
be  prosthetic in that  technological aides to information processing will
become increasingly important. He believes this is so because man will be
linked  into  a single, world-wide communications network. The brain must
be synergistic in order to effectively direct the multidisciplinary activities of
this universal, interdependent  network.

Influence of Population Density on the Evolution of Consciousness

   The evolution of consciousness  has  required two billion years.  Most of
this time has been required to consolidate living matter into cellular struc-
tures and to develop multicellular organisms with neural nets.  Late in the
evolutionary process, man developed and initiated a sapient domain of con-
sciousness  which Calhoun calls the Cultural-Conceptual Domain. During
this domain culture superceded genetics as the means for increasing con-
sciousness  and responsiveness. Environmental  structures, both physical
and social,  were designed by man as  prostheses to the biological brain.
Thus, man's brain evolved into a prosthetic-social  brain.

  At the time of the beginning of the Cultural-Conceptual Domain man had
reached a density-dependent equilibrium with the natural environment in
which, as with other animals, his numbers were in harmony with resources.
A by-product of  having evolved at this  low density and as  a small group-
living social animal was a genetically acquired tolerance and  need for a
certain  rate  of meaningful contact  and interaction with associates.  This
required social interaction at a particular rate consistent with  living  in a
territory approximately 15  miles in diameter  and as a member of  a small
  Socially speaking, density became  synonymous  with  meanmgtui in-
teractions per day. As population grew  humanity required a redefinition of
"space" to include some parameter that could  maintain interactions within
tolerable limits despite increases in physical density. In prior  studies we
have  shown that the creation of information  and its codification into con-
cepts that permitted  definition of new social roles represented the  needed
new kind of space.
  Any individual's occupation of a social role buffered him from excessive
interaction  with  individuals  occupying  other  social  roles not  closely
associated with  his  own.  This  new kind of space,  the total pool of in-
formation that may be condensed into  concepts permitting elaboration of
social roles, the linkage of large numbers of individuals into communication
networks,  and the devising  of technologies  for acquiring and  fabricating
resources, may be designated as "conceptual space." Since, from  a social
interactional perspective, density must be maintained constant, it follows
that additions of conceptual space must keep pace with  increases in
population.  Soon after the beginning of the  Cultural-Conceptual Domain,
conceptual space became more important than physical space. Further-
more, the number of  persons alive at any time provides an approximate in-
dex of the amount of conceptual space then existing.

   As conceptual space increases the total ideas available to any individual
 increases. To the extent that these  ideas are acquired and utilized the
 capacity and potentiality of the individual increases.
   One of the environmental structural categories in this evolution of con-
 sciousness and brain involves the linkage of people together into effective
 socio-political networks. In the past each revolution of consciousness has
 been marked by an enlargement of this network. At the conclusion of the
 Cultural-Conceptual Domain all the world will be bound effectively into a
 single such communication network. That time, a half century from now, will
 mark the termination of the domain during which increase in numbers of in-
 dividuals  will augment consciousness. Depending upon how we choose to
 guide further population change, the  upper optimum world population will
 stand between 6.2 and 9.0 billion. Beyond  that additional individuals will
 merely interfere with that metabolism of information which is prerequisite to
 further increase in consciousness.
   Solution of the emerging environmental crisis and continued evolution of
 consciousness will  require that we  shift into the Prosthetic-Synergistic
 Domain of consciousnes and that we  seek harmony with the expansion of
 freedom  and responsibility  provided through  the  evolving brain.
  The new type of brain may be designated  as prosthetic-synergistic
 because of the likely accentuation of these two properties. Prosthesis will
 become much  more important in the future because in the  new domain
 people will tend to be linked into a world-wide communication network, thus
 leaving physical information processing prosthesis as the only major means
 of enhancing consciousness.  Synergism will become  important because
 the main function of the new brain, beyond increasing consciousness, will
 be to develop qualities of compassion and empathy which are necessary for
 individuals and institutions to function as nodes in a totally interconnected
 and interdependent network. The health of every node will depend upon the
 health of every other node. Self concept will  be developed in terms of be-
 coming a  more effective node in the network. Ideational transformation will
 result from the synergistic focusing of diverse capabilities in united efforts
 to resolve problems. Be it noted that  such synergistic  organization is the
 basic implication of the "multidisciplinary approach" as contrasted to the
 isolated,  individualistic,  reductionism  now characterizing most of  basic
  The reason for these  changes lies in population growth. As mentioned
 earlier, if population growth continues without limit we will eventually reach
a saturation point. Beyond this point additional individuals will interfere with
the metabolism of information and retard further evolution of consciousness.
 If we allow population to increase to the limits possible,  subject to the con-
 straints of available resources, then the average individual would become

 less aware of less and less until most individuals have dropped below the
 level of consciousness requisite for initiating cultural  evolution.
   If zero population growth is the choice, the capacity of the individual will
 tend  to remain  constant also. There will be no further evolution of con-
 sciousness. Evolution will be terminated; for this corner of the universe it
 will  be all over except for a continuous hedonistic traditionalism.  Other
 animals have made this choice and persisted for millions of years. So might
 we, but only through our  intent and actions can evolution continue.
   If we elect  to continue  the evolutionary process of enlarging the con-
 sciousness  of the individual, and the accompanying responsiveness and
 capacity for relating to the environment, then a necessary condition will be a
 compatible  decline  in population.  But decline  in  population, though
 necessary for further increase in individual  potentiality, does not of itself
 suffice. By the end of the current domain, roughly fifty years from now,  it may
 be anticipated that the linkage of people and institutions into an effective
 world-wide network will have been accomplished. This will leave physical
 information  processing p'osthesis  as  the  only  major means for further
 enhancing  consciousness.  Elaboration and  diversification  of  such
 prosthesis will  become the  main  characteristic of the next domain of
 evolution,  if we  choose to initiate it.
  In  the  remainder  of  his invited  paper  Calhoun  concludes  that  a
metascience, transcending traditional science, must be developed to solve
the environmental crisis and to address the increasingly multidisciplinary
nature of  other problems. He believes that a new management strategy
must be developed to manage this metascience. To develop a strategy, the
many concepts which constitute  conceptual  space must be understood.
Therefore, as a first  step  in developing such a  strategy he defines  con-
ceptual space by identifying known concepts and specifying the relations
between them.
The Systems Viewpoint of Human  Behavior

  Earlier in  this  Chapter  Hardin pointed out  the  difficulties arising
from labeling a situation as a crisis and discusses difficulties arising from
the need to communicate problems and  solutions to a rapidly increasing
population. Enlarging on these themes Bowen discusses the behavior of

societies  in  crisis situations and  discusses the  emotional  maturity of
society. He begins by describing behavior from a systems viewpoint.

  A systems view of  man represents a different order of thinking than is
represented in our conventional theories. First I will present some of the
major differences between systems  and conventional thinking. It is difficult
for  man to shift from conventional toward systems thinking. I am not sure he
can ever shift to systems thinking, when he is thinking about himself. I will
present the key theoretical  concepts that interlock to  make  up this total
Family Systems Theory. This will be followed by some of the numerous
relationship patterns  in society that parallel  family relationship patterns.
Finally, there will be a summary of man's predictable emotional reactions to
crisis situations, the difficulty in finding solutions that are  not emotionally
determined, the tendency of emotionally determined solutions to merely
preserve the status quo, and ways emotionally determined solutions can in-
tensify the  problem. Systems thinking provides no magical answers, but it
does provide a different way of conceptualizing human problems, it offers a
more realistic evaluation of the difficulty in changing the basic patterns in
any human dilemma, and it suggests ways to avoid some of the pitfalls of
conventional  thinking  and to institute progress toward  long-term  goals.
Background Assumptions and Hypotheses
  The first of these assumptions  was worked  out early in  the  research.  It
came from previous study and experience and was based on the notion that
emotional illness is deeper than a one generation product of parent-child
relationships; that it has about the same incidence in different cultures with
widely different child rearing practices, if there is allowance for the ways dif-
ferent  cultures deal  with emotionally  impaired  people;  that  there  are
suggestions it might even exist in wild animals; and it would be profitable to
have this broad assumption in the  background. The other assumptions were
also defined as broadly as possible, but they were more directly related to
early  observations in  the research. The earliest research  models  about
relationships were based on systems thinking but there was not  specific
awareness of this at the time. As time passed,  the  term "systems" was
spontaneously used to refer to the automatic predictable behavior between
family members.
  1. That Emotional Illness Is Directly Related to the Biological Part of Man.
This was based on the assumption that man is more intimately related to the
lower forms of life than is generally recognized,  and that emotional illness is
a dysfunction of that part of man  which he shares with lower forms.

   2. That Emotional Illness Is a Multigenerational Process. There were early
 experiences and observations to support this working general assumption.
 This was later defined in detail and incorporated as one of the theoretical
 concepts in the total theory. This postulated that the problem in the patient
 is a product of imperfections in the parents, and the parents a product of im-
 perfections in  the  grandparents,  continuing  back for  three  or more
 generations, and that each generation was  doing the  best it could con-
 sidering stresses and available resources. The most important function of
 this postulation was to help observers escape from the  narrow limits of in-
 dividual theory which blames parents for the  child's problem, and to gain a
 more objective overall perspective.
   3. That There  Is a Wide Discrepancy Between What Man Does and What
 He Says He Does. The beginnings of this were based on early research ob-
 servations. This  was another guiding principle that permitted observers to
 gain some distance and  begin to  see some  order to the multiplicity of
 messages  and actions that are part of the hour-to-hour observations.  The
 second year a member of the research team did a paper, "The Act Dialogue
 in an Intense Relationship"  which told a story  based on action alone,  that
 appeared to have more validity than verbal  dialogue.
   4. Structuring "Hard to Define" Concepts into Functional Facts. This was
 part of an effort to find some structure and Fact in the  shifting, subjective
 world of human experience. It is  difficult enough to conceptualize sub-
 jectivity in  dealing with one  person. In a family relationship system it is far
 more complex. Over a period of time, we began developing a formula which
 helped  to  move more rapidly  into systems  thinking  and which made
 research observations more objective  and measureable. The incorporation
 of functional concepts into therapy has resulted in therapeutic results  that
are far superior  to conventional therapy. For instance, one concept would
say, "That  man  dreams  is  a scientific fact, but what  he  dreams is  not
 necessarily a fact." The same formula was applied to a wide range of func-
tional concepts,  such as "That men  feels (or  thinks, or talks) is a  scientific
fact, but what he feels (or thinks or says) is not necessarily fact."
   5. Cause and Effect  Thinking.  Man has been a cause and effecf thinker
since he first became a thinking  being and he began to look for causes to
explain  events in his life. We can review the  thinking of primitive  man and
be amused at the evil and malevolent forces blamed for  his misfortunes, or
we can  review the history of recent  centuries and chuckle at the  errors in
the assignment  of blame that resulted from  lack of scientific knowledge,
while we smugly assure  ourselves  that new scientific breakthroughs and
logical reasoning now  enables  us  to assign accurate causes for most of
man's problems.

Limitations of Cause and Effect Thinking
  Systems thinking, which this research has tried to implement  in human
relationships, is  directed at getting beyond cause and effect thinking and
into a systems view of the human phenomenon. In the course of trying to im-
plement  systems theory and  systems therapy, we have encountered the
intensity  and rigidity of cause and effecf thinking in the medical sciences
and  in all  our social systems. Man  is deeply fixed in cause and effect
thinking  in all areas that have to do  with himself and  society.
  Systems thinking is not new to man. He first began to use it in theories of
the universe, much later he started thinking systems in the natural  sciences,
and also in the physical sciences. There was a rapid increase in systems
thinking with the  beginning of the computer age, until now we hear about ef-
forts to implement systems thinking in many new areas of the applied scien-
  The medical model has been one of the proven cornerstones of good
medical practice. It is based on cause and effect thinking and the principles
of careful examination, the establishment of etiology (cause), making an ac-
curate diagnosis,  and specific treatment directed at  the  etiology.  The
medical model has served medicine and society well for all diseases within
the person of the patient
  The theory and practice of psychiatry also employs the medical model,
and cause and effect thinking. The theory, based on  the  study  of the in-
dividual,  postulates an illness in the  patient developed  in relationship with
the parents or other close family members,  it requires a diagnosis,  and
treatment is directed to the patient. The model "blames" the parents for the
illness, even though the psychiatrist may deny that he  blames the parents,
and the model excludes other family members from the treatment process.
  And so. the medical model created a dilemma when applied to emotional
(functional) illness. Family research was directed at trying to find an answer
to this dilemma. The development of systems theory and therapy  has been
superior  in  treating  emotional  problems  but  it is  conceptually  and
therapeutically out of step with medic ne and concentional psychiatry.  The
medical centers in which a family orientation has been  most successful are
those in which conventional psychiatry has not been too strict in enforcing
the medical model  and family therapists have not tried to oversell  their
A Communication Model for  Transmission of Emotional  Reactions
  Emotional  reactiveness  in a family, or other group  that lives  or works
together, goes from one family member to  another in a chain reaction pat-
tern. The total pattern is similar to a communication system in which  each
person is "wired" or connected by radio, to all the other people with whom

 he has relationships. Each person then becomes a nodal  point or a com-
 munication center through which single or multiple signals  pass in rapid
   Different kinds of signals exist, and each  with a wide  spectrum of  in-
 tensity and degree  of importance. A more important set of  variables has to
 do with the way each nodal point, or person, functions in the system. Each
 person is programmed from birth to serve a certain set of functions. Each
 "senses" what is required or expected, more from the way the system func-
 tions around him than from verbal messages stating he is free to function as
 he pleases. Each person, or nodal point, has  varying degrees of ability for
 handling  signals (native ability), styles for handling  signals (personality
 characteristics), a  narrow range of  choice  in  rejecting  or transmitting
 signals, and an intellectual awareness (intelligence) for understanding the
 operation of the system.
   There is another important set of variables that have to do with the way the
 family unit functions together.  Each person becomes aware  of his depen-
 dence on all the other nodal points. To be remembered is that each nodal
 point is "wired" to the others by a two-way channel. There  is  a wide variety
 of subtle alliances for helping each other, refusing to help, or hurting the
 others. The larger unit can punish a single member, and a single member in
 a  key position  can  hurt the whole unit.
   Another predictable pattern  is the placing of "blame" for failure to func-
tion (cause and effect thinking) and the pattern of either blaming the other
or blaming self.  Under tension, every person  tends  either to place the
"blame" outside of self (blamer), or within self (self-blamer), or alternate
 between the two, which is the pattern of cause and effecf thinking. If the
 head of the family unit is calm, the entire  family unit can be  calm and the
communication system operates  smoothly. When the head  goes into panic
and transmits panic signals, the others send  back panic messages which
further panics the head, in a mounting  cycle of panic, with poor handling of
messages, disorderly and conflicting  messages, and increasing paralysis
of functioning. Any  unit can recover from periodic panic or overloads, but
when the  panic becomes chronic one or more of the  individual  units can
collapse (become sick), and there are several variables for handling that.
There is another set of very important variables having to do with the way
the family unit is wired into other families and larger social  systems, and
into the total system of all  society.

  This systems approach postulates the environmental problem as having
been created by biological man (in contrast to intellectual man) as he has
evolved,  developed,  and propagated; that  man  has permitted the en-
vironmental  problem to develop so far he is beginning to threaten his own
future existence; that the biological-instinctive-feeling oriented part of man
will not provide consistent help in finding solutions; and that constructive
solutions to the problem will depend on the highest functioning of  in-
tellectual man in directing total man toward solutions. A systems approach
strives to view the environmental problem as a functional  part of society's
other problems, rather than separate from other problems.
  From a systems standpoint, what are some of the things society might do
to modify the environmental problem and what are some reasonable predic-
table outcomes of the various approaches? Society's most common ap-
proach would be emergency, feeling oriented, fragmented measures direc-
ted at a specific symptom. It could even go on to specific  legislation "with
teeth in it" to apprehend violators. This type of approach would be similar to
the distraught family and its crisis oriented measures to relieve the symp-
tom of the moment.
Emotional Functioning of Society
  This can lead to the delusion that the problem is solved, a complacency
that permits  him to continue what he was doing to add to the problem, and
then the rude awakening  with new and more serious crises, and  a  basic
problem that grows worse. These  are some of the characteristics of efforts
at corrective measures that make the problem worse and worse. It is easy
now to see corrective activity, most of which is good,  which attacks a symp-
tom here and another there, which leads people to believe they are working
out a solution while the basic problem remains unchanged. The  various
"ecology" programs to limit the use of pesticides, to control air and water
pollution, to  recycle waste products, clean up litter, etc., are all positive, but
any program directed at symptoms as they surface can well lead to missing
more basic  issues and  a  long term "making the problem worse."
  Any approach to the environmental  problem must take  into account the
current lower functioning  level of society. Any issues that are settled  by
public debate  and  congressional  action  will automatically  reflect the
average level of society and emerge with emotionally  determined corrective
action.  Society  tends  to elect  public  officials,   from  local level  to
congressional level, who reflect the average functioning of society. There
are some notable  exceptions but the majority represent  the  emotionally
determined average of society. Whatever happens, any proposed solutions

should come from the best brains and the highest levels of technical and
emotional functioning in society who can lead and set an example. To ex-
pose the critical issues to the emotional average level of society would ex-
pose the whole program  to a lower level of emotionally determined Cause
and  Effect thinking. Perhaps an agency similar to the Space Agency could
accomplish the mission.
Need for a More Differentiated Society
  There  may  be some guidelines  from the  long  term effort  toward dif-
ferentiation in a family. In the beginning, when symptoms are high, it might
be indicated to use anxiety relieving measures,  such as meetings with the
entire family unit or with  the parents, the heads of the unit, to re-establish
communication and  settle  disharmony.  If the goal  is  toward  long  term
stability and the differentiation of self,  this eventually becomes the effort of
one  person who can give primary attention to self. This involves the  prin-
ciple that all family members play a part in everything that goes on in the
family.  It  is never possible  to  really change another person,  but  it is
possible to change the pal that self plays. The modification of self requires
that person to be sure of self on all life principles that involve himself and
his family,  to  have the courage  to take action on his convictions, and to
devote primary attention  to becoming the most  responsible possible per-
  Most people operate  on  poorly  defined  principles and have  never
devoted much time to their  own beliefs. There are repeated principles that
are hard to clarify. At such moments of indecision, it is common for people
to discuss issues with spouses or other close family members who use this
opportunity to se I their own values, which, if accepted,  modifies the self of
the differentiating one toward a "family self." At such points, if one is to be
successful at drferentiation  of a self,  discussion should be with those
emotionally removed from the family, or he could go to the literature, or go
into  isolation  to work it through for  himself. A  person  working  toward
responsibility  in self is always aware of his responsibility to others. As he
devotes primary energy to self, he automatically becomes more responsible
toward others, and less irresponsibly over-involved with others. As the dif-
ferentiating one moves toward more differentiation, the others  go through
the brief period  of attacking, designed to re-establish the old level of
togetherness.  When the differentiating one is  through his first nodal point,
then another, and another, and other family members begin the same kind
of effort. Such  a family is a far more healthy organism with freedom from old
regressive symptoms. The family is calm, with a new, more mature level of
togetherness and  a new ability  to responsibly handle  problems as  they

  A more differentiated society would not have as serious an environmental
problem as we now have. If society functioned on a higher level, we would
have a higher percentage of people oriented to responsibility for self and
others, and for the environment, and a lower percentage, focused on rights
and force and on legal mechanisms to guarantee  rights. A  more dif-
ferentiated society could take the present environmental problem and find
better solutions than will be possible in our present less differentiated state.
  The differentiation of self on a societal level would be hard to implement.
In a family, differentiation begins with one responsible family member in a
key position. When this person pulls up to a higher level of functioning, then
another, and then others automatically do the same. This family, with  each
focused on the responsibility for self, is automatically more responsible for
others.  With  each responsible for self,  there  is  no longer the intense
emotional triangles that impinge  certain  family members,  nor a family
projecting process in which  the  stronger family members improve  their
functional strength at the expense of the weak  who  become weaker.
  In our society,  the whole of  the middle  and upper classes  of society
spend a fair percentage of their time, energy, and money being concerned
about and trying to be helpful to the less fortunate.  The effort activates the
family projection process and the well-to-do segment of society, through the
projection process, further impairs the less  fortunate. Man has  a respon-
sibility to those less fortunate. Responsible man fulfills such responsibilities
automatically.  If the most influential segment of  society could work  toward
the differentiation of self, it would automatically spread through the less  in-
fluential segments and really benefit the less fortunate segment and  raise
the functional level of  all society. The powerful togetherness forces in
society oppose any efforts at differentiation of self. The lower the level of dif-
ferentiation, the harder it is to start a differentiating effort. The togetherness
forces at the  present are intense. However, any differentiation in any key
person  in society automatically rubs  off on others.  Anyone who moves in
this direction benefits society.
Remove Crisis Label  from Environmental Issues
  Finally,  I think  the word  "crisis" should be removed from the  term
"environmental crisis"  and  replaced  by a term  implying  a  long  term
process. Our  society is oriented to the use of Cause and Effect thinking and
instituting crash solutions directed at symptoms which lull people into the
belief the problem is solved.  Man's disharmony with his environment is a
long term evolutionary process and  if it continues man may exterminate
himself. The thesis here is that man is not going to change the environment
enough to correct the disharmony, and that the ultimate change will require
an order of change in  man he  is not yet able to contemplate.

                 NOTES FOB CHAPTER  5
 1. Hardin,  G.,  "The Tragedy of the Commons'7,  Science, Vol.  162,
  December,  1968.
2. Galbraith,  John Kenneth,  "The Affluent  Society,"  Houghton Mifflin,
  Boston,  1958.
3. Hardin,  Garrett, "Abortion—or Compulsory Pregnancy?" Journal of
  Marriage and the Family. 30.  1968.
4. Hardin,  Garrett, "Stalking the  Wild Taboo," William  Kaufmann,  Los
  Altos, Calif.,  1973.
5. Maddox, John, "The Doomsday Syndrome," McGraw-Hill. New York,
6. Hardin, Garrett, "Nobody Ever Dies ol Overpopulation," Science, 1 71,
7. Moorhouse,  Geoffrey,  "Calcutta," Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,  New
  York, 1971.
8. Hardin, Garrett, "Population Biology, and the Law," Journal of Urban
  Law, 48,  1971.



  If some economic growth  is inevitable, then some economic change is
also inevitable. If we wish to manage growth and also improve our quality of
life, our economic concepts  and philosophy must change.  New economic
concepts, their relationships to  classical  concepts,  and  implications for
economic policy are discussed  in this Chapter. The discussion is taken
from the invited papers of Carl Madden and Gordon Cooper.
  Madden discusses classical economic concepts  which, together with
newly emerging thought, will influence economic policy. He also reviews
changes in our  culture and  describes a global view shaping economic
thought. By applying the concept of entropy to economics he concludes that
waste accumulates faster than useful  output but also concludes that the
situation is not hopeless; zero economic growth need not  be  enforced to
preserve the quality of  the environment. He proposes the application  of
knowledge to create  new concepts of wealth and  more efficient  use  of
energy as possible solutions to the economic entrophy trap.
  Madden also states that economic growth,  especially that  which provides
for  social issues, necessitates  change. He reviews the  costs of such
change and concludes that the costs can be borne. To implement change,
business must be provided a profit motive and other incentives. Sugges-
tions for providing these incentives are given and the concept of corporate
social accounting is introduced. He also discusses the policy implications
of economic change, outlimiting the elements of a government-business
growth policy which could lead to an  improved quality of  life.
  Cooper introduces  a concept  of  "sustainable  growth"  defined as
economic growth which  provides sufficient discretionary income per capita
to provide a  desired quality  of life without environmental degradation. He
states that such growth  requires a perception of stewardship or legacy  by
society so that resources are  conserved and the environment is preserved
for future generations.  In discussing policy and planning he stresses the
need for developing goals responsive to the needs of society and em-
phasizes the need for close coordination between the goal-setting process
and the planning process. He believes that planning should be integrative,
addressing social as well as economic and physical issues.

Classical Concepts of Economic Growth
  Some economic growth is inevitable. Somewhere between the extremes
of uncontrolled massive growth and zero growth lies the growth and change
we require. In the next decades, hoever, the character of our growth must
change. Ways to minimize environmental degradation and to provide a bet-
ter quality of life for a greater portion of our population must be found.
  If economic changes are to be brought about, new economic concepts
will have to be developed. However, the classical economic concepts will
continue to be valid. Economic growth will occur within the existing frame-
work and will be accomplished over a long time. The classical concepts,
within which the new  policies must be made, are explained by Madden.

  Madden points out  that change and economic growth are inextricably
linked. Economic growth does not refer merely to the increase in the num-
ber of physical and tangible  objects.  It is a more complicated concept,
rooted in human values, and still subject  to advances in understanding.
  At times economists have refered to physical economic growth in  "real"
output in ways  suggesting  their  oversight or ignorance  of the  laws of
biology and physics. Without doubt, the growth in numbers of any specific
form ot economic product within any given space is subject to the biological
and physical  laws of retardation.
  The confusion concerning economic growth arises from efforts to  depict
"extensive" economic growth in physical terms,  as when economic growth
has encompassed the structural growth of an economy, the extension of
geographic frontiers —as in the economic history of the United States, the
development  of a steel industry in a backward  nation, or the doubling of
electric capacity in an advanced economy. Economic growth, as we have
known it, does have a physical counterpart in the increase in the number of
physical objects of given types resulting from the growth of an industry or
firm.  But economic growth is  more.
Economic Growth Means Growth in Value
  Economic growth  is growth in value. This can be seen by examining
basic concepts. In economic theory, a commodity is not a  physical  object
only. A commodity is a relationship  between three  entities: a producer
(seller), a physical object or person, and a user (buyer). The market value of
a commodity is the discounted  present value of the expected (annual) future
services that flow from tt~e physical object  or person. Wealth is defined as
the stock of commodities. Thus, wealth is the sum of the present discounted
(market) value of the expected future services that flow from the totality of

   For  a nation,  economic  growth  is measured by  an  increase  in gross
 national  product, more  precisely by an increase in net national product
 (which allows for use of capital  in the  growth  process).
   Gross and net national product  are measures of  value,  not of physical
 size or physical  numbers of objects. GNP is defined as  the total market or
 exchange value of the final output of goods and services  by the nation's
 economy, measured in current monetary value. "Real," or  constant dollar
 (pound, mark, franc, etc.) GNP is not a measure of physical size of output,
 but a relative measure of value corrected for changes in the  value of money
 measured from a base period.
   Economic growth, as distinct from growth in simple physical output terms
 (i.e., the growth in the number of physical objects made by  man), is an im-
 portant and evolving concept. Economic growth provides a measure, ad-
 mittedly limited to market or exchange value (hence,  excluding non-market
 wealth creation), of the values hence satisfaction attached by people to the
 increase in wealth.
   The  concept of wealth, as the stock of commodities, is also an important
 and  evolving concept. It is  important to notice that wealth, as  representing
 the present discounted value  of expected future services flowing from ob-
 jects or people, does not refer to  the past, but to the future. It is important to
 notice that all measures of economic value, and hence of economic growth,
 are anthropomorphic. That is,  these measures of value are meaningful only
 in relationship to human purposes, judgments, and  evaluations. Indeed,
 their meaning is even more restricted by conventional reference to market
 or exchange value,  excluding all other forms  of human value.
   In measuring economic growth, it is well known that GNP measures the
total  value of output unreliably, but from period to period GNP measures
 reasonably well the change in the value  of output. GNP, as  mentioned, in-
cludes the cost of maintaining  or replacing  an economy's productive
capacity of plant and equipment (but not human skills). National income,  a
measure of the income attributable to the agents of  production, excludes
these costs and is a better measure of the net increase in the  value of out-
put available to firms and people.
Economic Growth Means  Growth  in Productivity
   Economic growth also may be viewed in productivity terms.  The concept
of productivity is not widely grasped with any accuracy. The concept is an
analogy to physical efficiency, but it is not the same as physical efficiency.
Physical efficiency is defined as the ratio of useful output to total input. The
concept is anthropomorphic;  someone  has to  define useful.  Physical ef-
ficiency also is subject to the laws of thermodynamics: energy is conserved;
entropy increases (of which more later).

   Productivity refers to economic output as a ratio to total input. Because of
 the  difficulty in measuring  accurately the inputs  of capital and natural
 resources  to the processes  of wealth creation,  productivity —as a con-
 venience—is measured most often  in labor  input terms  Hence, producti-
 vity  is most often expressed as "output-per manhour." The difficulty with
 measuring productivity in oJtput per manhour terms  is the tendency created
 thereby for false irferences from the measure to the conclusion that produc-
 tivity gains are attributable to improvements  in the  productivity of labor it-
 self. In fact, gains in productivity  occur  in  an  exceedingly roundabout
 process, ranging  from cultural  behavior (in religious,  social,  political
 beliefs, habits, and institutions), through  basic science and educational
 policy, to the nature  of economic institutions and incentives (the  patent
 system, tax incentives for investment,  and the like),  The point about  the
 origin and configuration of productivity gains is important to understanding
 who pays for change  and how.
   Economic growth, when viewed in productivity terms, is expressed as  the
 increase in GNP, or in national income, per worker.  Or, it may be stated on
 a per capita basis if we wisn to consider output or income in relation to total
 population. Here, too, the emphasis is on the increase in value terms. At
 bottom, then, economic growth implies growth in 1) the total value of  the
 nation's output, 2) consumption per capita, and 3) the level of living stan-
 dards that the population enjoys.
 Economic Growth  (Means Change
   Economic  growth  is inseparable  from change,  and  growth is  ac-
 companied by change, although not all change is growth. The conditions
 under which growth occurs impose change.  "Creative Destruction" is  the
term employed  by  the late Joseph A. Schumpeter to characterize  the
 method or process of  economic change in the enterprise system (1).
Schumpeter described the Creative Destruction process this way:

       "The opening up of new markets,  foreign or domestic,  and the
   organizational development of the craft shop and factory to such con-
   cerns as Uniteo States 5>teel illustrate the  same process of industrial
   mutation —if  I  may use  that  biological term —that  incessantly
   revolutionizes  the   economic  structure  from  within,   incessantly
   destroying the old one,  incessantly creating a new one."

   Change and growth come  about when a  new product or service invades
 an existing market. As, in that market, consumers shift their preference from
the old to the new commodity, the capital used to  produce the old com-
 nodity is gradually devaluated —-destroyed —as profits in its sale decline.

  Capital is attracted to the new commodity by its high rates of profit.
Growth comes about as the result of innovation derived from new invention.
Together they render obsolete  the plant and equipment, and even the
organization, devoted to producing existing commodities; that is, eventually
they reduce its value to salvage.
  In an enterprise economy, competition in the marketplace serves a social
function analogous to the mechanism of survival in the evolutionary process
of biology. The test of success in the marketplace is nothing less than sur-
vival, and the reward  of survival for a given commodity may be growth. In the
market,  competition  is  impersonal  but pervasive;  and advances  in
technology of worldwide transport and communication  increase  and in-
tensify the worldwide forces of competition if not limited by restraints on
trade and investment among nations.
  Competition in a nation exists not only between products  or services of a
given  type  but  also between  geographic  regions and  geographically
separated urban regions. In a political system such as the United States,
which  provides freedom for the geographic flow of information,  ideas,
money capital, people, and  jobs within a broad geographic area, resources
tend to flow to those places where they yield the most human satisfaction.
The process operates in small, marginal  movements which,  however, when
cumulated over time periods, reveal very large changes.
  This principle, not at all  well  understood,  helps explain migration  pat-
terns. For example,  at present stages  of affluence and technical means of
transport,  the  United States  is   becoming  more  (1)  urbanized,  (2)
metropolitanized, (3) suburbanized, and (4) coastalized.  Urban movement
is explained by  greater economic  opportunity, even for poor blacks, in
cities than on farms or in the rural countryside. Studies of the Urban Institute
show that poor blacks, drawn from the 1967 OEO sample of the poor, who
migrate to urban areas, within five years experience increases of $2,000 in
real  income over non-migrants  in the  sample.
  Economic growth  is thus  an  evolutionary  process  in   which  new
technology is  tested for its survival value in terms of superior ability to
provide human satisfaction. It is important to  understand that  in a market
economy, growth is impelled by the organization of firms in markets.  The
firm  provides  a  means  of  comparing private benefits,  as measured  by
revenues of firms, to  costs of production, or private  resource costs, includ-
ing  ancillary taxation costs  to firms  of  public goods necessary to produc-
tion,  such as the overhead  costs of urban life. Private firms are driven to
reduce costs through the motivation of profit  in the face  of  competition by
other producers.
  It is also important to understand that the social function of profit is to im-
pel producers to provide the goods and services that people want and have

the ability to buy, at reasonable prices, without being forced to do so. The
profit system gives us (1) a method of organizing economic activity that en-
courages enterprise, (2) a way to stimulate risk-taking and innovation, (3) a
way to allocate the skills of people, our natural resources, and our know-
how to purposes consumers think are most useful, and (4) a way to make
heads of firms, whether they want to or not, always try to cut costs and make
resources go as far as  possible consistent with consumer tastes and in-
  Finally, it  is important to understand  that economic processes  supplant
one another as do biological species, according to their survival value.  Sur-
vival value among economic processes is determined by relative  produc-
tivity, in relation :o consumer values expressed  in purchasing habits and
preferences. The result is that the economic growth process is evolutionary
with respect to rising productivity, in turn related to physical efficiency. The
marketplace app ies the lest of  economic productivity  to the many com-
peting technologies which may add to physical efficiency. Thus, economic
evolution is  directly and profoundly  related, in market  economics, to the
evolution of  scientific knowledge and technical  proficiency. And it is  con-
strained by definitions and content of cultural concepts such as wealth, in-
come, productivity, and cost. These concepts have changed their meaning
during the course of industrial evolution and the advance of knowledge. We
can  expect  that  n the future their meaning and content will continue  to
change  in response to broadened human understanding.
Economic Growth Needs A Cultural  Framework
  GNP,  the  value of output, in the United Stales grew at a rate of 3.3 per
cent a year during the 1929-1969 period, or 2.0 per cent a year  on a per
capita basis, both figures adjusted for  price changes.
  What is the mechanism by which economic growth occurs in our society?
We must realize that the conditions favoring economic growth develop in a
framework of social beliefs, customs, and institutions. Economic  life must
not be rigidly constricted by custom or tradition;  rather,  it must emphasize
individual creativeness and self-reliance. It must foster the idea that people
are to be esteemed for v/hat they do rather than for their family's social
position.  Work and material success must be admired. A degree of respon-
sible competition among people must be favored. And opportunities for in-
dividual economic betterment  should be widely  available.
  The climate of thought must favor a reasoned approach to problems.
People must be willing to give up digging sticks for plows, horses for cars,
sulfur drugs  for penicillin, through faith in the validity of material advance,  or
in the validity of the principle that applied knowledge improves the quality
of life. The scient fie spirit, the experimental attitude, and respect for univer-

sal  physical and  biological  pattern and  configuration  stimulate
technological  progress. Supersitition,  witchcraft, fatalism, elements which
have dominated many cultures, are enemies of economic growth.
  There must be a unifying and reasonably stable government to maintain
law and order, to protect both political and economic rights, to enforce con-
tracts, and in general to establish, maintain, and alter rules of the economic
game. Private investors cannot make investment decisions which look to the
future unless life is in some degree orderly and predictable. Producers can-
not market complex services stemming from technological advance unless
there exists  widespread understanding of the beneficent purposes of such
  Managerial and technological talents must be developed by society and
available for employment. The educational system, and ancillary cultural in-
stitutions of  mass media,  entertainment, journalism,  the church, the univer-
sity must share to some degree a common "public philosophy" concerning
ultimate human values. There must  be people  who can and do  organize,
launch,  and  guide new organizations and new ways of doing things.
  There must be investment in transportation and communication networks.
People  who are  isolated may not  engage  in  industrial  or   regional
specialization. Also, there must be institutions  of banking and the capital
market to provide a monetary medium for trading, for saving, and providing
throughout the geographic reaches of an economy many competitive chan-
nels through which  savings can move to investors.
Government Fosters Economic Growth
  Government and  enterprise have to  cooperate  to  achieve  economic
growth.  In the specific processes of the market, business leaders in the
United States (each firm acting independently of others) provide the primary
leadership for economic  growth. In  pursuit of  profit, adventure,  prestige,
power, and creative satisfaction, business leadership struggles to survive in
the  marketplace  according to existing customs and rules at  a given time.
Management decisions to build more  plants, to do more research, to ex-
pand employment, to re-organize firms, to adopt new marketing techniques,
to change processes, to introduce  new products or services, to borrow
more funds are all market-conditioned and geared to short run (ten-year, at
most) planning horizons.  Investment analysts follow corporate  results  in
profits on  a year-to-year, or even shorter basis, and in  making investment
decisions. The long run is heavily discounted as against immediate per-
  Government in the United States, however, has made powerful long-run
contributions to  the  conditions of  economic  growth.  Perhaps  the most
powerful contributions  have  aimed  at designing framework goals within

 which economic development could flourish. Provision of personal freedom
 and mobility of resources, prvale property, and limited federal government
 is a keystone concontribution of  government. The constitutional  rights
 provide mobility of key economic  elements—ideas, information, money,
 goods, jobs, people The public education system, beginning with the Nor-
 thwest Ordinance  of  1789,  jsed public capital (land) to finance human
 capital investment (educated people). In the early  nineteenth century,  in-
 vestment  in "inland improvements"  with government  funds, later use of
 public land to  spur hand settlement (Homestead Acts), a laissez-faire policy
 of bank and corporate chartering, all  stimulated economic development. In
 the  mid-nineteenth century and beyond,  government devised  powerful
 means of transfering  throughout all the  states  knowledge of science and
 technology to farming  and allied arts through the Morrill Act of 1862, setting
 up land grant colleges, and through later legislation, creation of the Federal
 Reserve System in 1913 gave the country a  central  banking system to
 check recurrent money panics. And so on, until the  Employment  Act of
 1946 established federal responsibility  for high employment levels.
  Government also directly participates  in economic growth. It has been
 and  is a major investor in research and development. In transportation,
 Government helped finance canals and railroads, and today it continues to
 build highways and to subsidize aviation and shipping. It invests in labor
 force improvement through public education, contributes greatly to college
 education by creating and improving state institutions for technical and
 higher education,  by awarding  research grants to universities, and  by
 making  loans  and  giving scholarships to students.
  Government promotes  growth   indirectly  through  its   international
 economic policies, such as tariffs in the nineteenth century and foreign aid
 since World  War II, or as in the space effort that has produced technological
fallout for  industry as  well as vast new public understanding ("Spaceship
 Earth") of natural laws and ol our economic and technological capabilities
(If man can  go to the moon, why can't he ...).
  Government also promotes growth  in the U.S. by  its policies of fostering
competition.  Beginning in the nineteenth century with the New York law of
 1811, states began passing general incorporation laws to enfranchise cor-
 porations.  By  1875,  such  general laws  of incorporation,   including
 provisions to protect  credito's,  were common. By  as  early  as  1865, the
 modern conception of the corporation had emerged, holding that the rights
of creditors and owners as well as technical operation of the business were
subject to  the discretion of management,  acting  as trustees for the owners.

  Government  fosters  competition also  by  social  policy  respecting
monopoly. If a corporation has a monopoly of a desired good, it can hold off
the  market  a  portion  of  the  supply,  force the  price  up,  and  make
"monopoly" profits. Our social policy deals with monopoly in several ways.
If the  monopoly  is  "natural" because technology  is too  expensive to
duplicate, we regulate corporations, as in utilities, telephone, television, air
transportation,  banking,  natural  gas, and  other  industries.  If U.S. cor-
porations engage in  practices that  restrain trade or tend toward monopoly,
they are subject to suit by the U.S. government for violation of antitrust laws.
  Corporations are also subject to  a variety of regulations concerning their
standard of behavior in  relation to  public necessity or convenience. These
regulations,  in effect, change the definition of cost, productivity, or revenue
for  regulated  corporations,  adding  social  to private  costs or reducing
revenue  (which amounts to  increasing cost) by restricting behavior. Such
regulations relate to product purity,  conditions of safety, or protection of the
Science and Technology Stimulate Economic Growth
  The  basic economic factor causing economic growth is  investment, but
productivity-improving  investment  is most  often  based on advances in
science  and technology.  A distinction  should  be made  between  labor-
saving investment, as improving the internal combustion engine,  and  in-
dustry-creating  investment, as creation of the electronic computer industry.
Science  and technology contribute to both processes. They do so by im-
proving the physical  efficiency of an existing process (making  cars) or by
an invention or discovery creating  a new economic process (discovering
the logic of computers, inventing  the computer as an application of the
  In the broad sweep of industrial history, science and technology have in-
teracted  in creating  a rising spiral of efficiency  in processes, leading to
productivity gains in  the economy.  Science and technology make possible
waves  of innovation in the economy. An innovation is something new; in art,
drama,  commerce, industry, finance, or government. An economic  in-
novation  is not the same as an invention. The  inventor is an individual gifted
in  translating technical  knowledge into  a new technique  or product;  in-
ventors tell us they are rebels against fixed attitudes in a technical area of
life. An innovation occurs when some person or firm develops inventions
(either social, economic, or technical) into workable productive processes.
Innovation, however,  traces out in history the  forward march of science and
  The  scientific revolution, which has gained momentum since World War
II, promises  to speed the evolution of economic processes throughout the

world. This  broad-scale revolution of knowledge not only generates new
products and services; it creates also a new perception of the relationship
of ecology to economics. This means that the scientific revolution is not a
typical wave of inncvation. Rather, the scientific revolution creates a time of
broad social change; it fits Hegel's tenet that gradual quantitative change
can ultimately burst into a qualitative revolution.  Earlier, the three stages of
the industrial revolution created waves of economic innovation, resulting in
social change. The  new knowledge of the scientific revolution demands
social innovation as a pre-requisite to economic change.
Growth Requires Saving and Investment
  Economic growth results from  the process  of saving and  investing.
Saving means not  consuming. Investing  means spending {or  allocating
resources) for goods  and  services other than for consumption. Saving
means withholding resources from consumption: investing means using the
resources for non-consumption purposes i.e.,  to increase or improve the
means of  production.
  Savings decisions and investment decisions in our economy are made by
two different groups which, though  some members  in the groups may be
the same,  have to be linked by an institutional mechanism —the capital and
credit markets. Savers include individuals, families,  business firms, finan-
cial  institutions,  and governmental  units.  Investors include individuals,
business firms, and  financial institutions. Obviously, for  example,  families
are "on both sides of the market" in that they may be both savers and in-
vestors. This is  also true of other participants  in the capital and credit
  These markets work by linking together in a nationwide  network of volun-
tary interfacing between institutions of the market, the countless decisions
to save and funneling the savings into financial institutions. Decisions by in-
vestors, lenders, managers of financial  institutions —such as  insurance
companies,  pension funds,  mutual  funds—determine the uses to which
savings will be put.
  Stock exchanges  provide no new savings or investment but represent
means for shifting ownership  or creditor rights  through trading of equity
shares or fixed-income securities. But in the credit and capital markets and
within corporations (in part) new savings flow to higher priority investments.
These higher  priority investments provide the  productivity gains, an in-
crease in the value of output per worker or per capita, that are  translated
into economic growth.
Business  Runs  on Profits
  Every one knows that the corporation is a device for starting and running
a business. Businesses create economic  growth. How do they do it? Busi-

nesses produce, buy and sell, trade, or perform services  in the market-
place, motivated by profit. The public, according to polls, believes manufac-
turing business  makes 28 per cent profit after taxes compared to the cor-
rect figure (1971) of 5 per cent. For all financial corporations, the figure for
profit rates on sales after taxes is only 2.3%. For the average wholesaler or
retailer, the figure is 1.5%. Communications firms have the highest average,
6.2%,  but these firms, many of which are government regulated, use far
more capital equipment per sales dollar than most industries (they are
"capital-intensive"), and in part  they must use after-tax  profits to buy it.
   Modern corporations,  then, organize and carry on trade and production to
operate on a profit margin averaging less than  a nickel on a dollar of sales
after  taxes.  Owners of corporations; that  is, shareholders,  who invest  in
equity shares, may make gains resulting not only from profits (dividend in-
come) but also capital gains (a rise in the market value of the assets behind
the shares  owned).  "Growth" companies pay out small dividends, but
owners risk savings  in them to get "capital gains."
   The profit system puts a premium on people who can do things other
people want done. It gives people opportunity by  and large based  on what
they  can do,  regardless of  circumstances  of  birth  (excepting
discrimination —defacto—as in  other leading  institutions of church, labor
union, university, and government, against black and female minorities).
   Business firms, operating under the profit motive and facing competition,
respond  quickly and flexibly  to  changes  in  consummer  tastes  and
technology.  Although  television was invented  in the 1920's,  years were
required to  perfect its mass production.  But,  through competition, mass
production from 1947 to about 1970 placed black and white  television sets
in more than 90 per cent of  United States homes. When people began  to
"eat out"  more, franchised fast-service restaurants learned to limit menus,
rigidly control time of preparation,  cut costs  through  self-service, locate
stores conveniently, and buy large quantities  with precision, timing and
skill. These are only two of thousands of examples, taken for granted in a
market economy, of how business firms respond flexibly to consumer tastes
and technology.
   It is important to understand that, by and large,  individual  existing firms,
whether they want to change  or not, are impelled to change by competition.
To an existing firm, sudden change devaluates its existing capital. But, if it
does  not change, the value of its assets, and the value of ownership rights
to them suffer capital losses.  Individual firms are free to change or not
change, but profit is  a powerful  lash and a powerful reward.
   Now, naturally,  the larger  in  scope  or  substance  is  a  change  in
technology or consumer tastes, the longer it takes for business to respond.
For example, a  major change in technology  is resisted  by firms whose

present capital would be rendered less valuable. This is the reason Schum-
peter spoke of  innovation  as  "invading  a market."  This,  too,  is the
philosophy behind the patent system, which gives an inventor a 17-year
monopoly but publishes the design for others to  learn  from.
  However  the market syslem and the  profit motive spread the risk of the
destruction of capital that results from economic growth. If a large firm or in-
dustry is "invaded" by an innovation, the market allows time for adjustment,
but competition in the market spurs adjustment. There is no central direc-
tion, however. And the risk is spread not only over time, but as  between
management,  workers,  and  stockholders;  suppliers and  bankers;  and
others related to the firm or  industry —all of whom are  free to make their
own adjustments  to developments.
  Keep in mind, however, that major firms, faced with the invasion of an in-
novation, are reluctant to change in a way that devalues existing capital. In-
deed,  invasion  by  an  innovation is analogous  to  a  struggle  between
species, and managers of existing firms may choose to resist rather than
risk the new. What's more,  business managers have  to  keep in mind the
real changes in technology and taste, not such changes advocated by in-
ventors or students of taste. As a result, managers  of existing firms may be
cautious simply because of  past success, and this is why the possibility
should always be kept open for new entry into an industry facing com-
petition. Existing firms seldom invest in capital-devaluating new technology
until it is thoroughly market tested. And,  it may be good management policy
for dominant firms to let some other firm pay the costs of market-testing, and
to move only wher  results are unmistakable.
  Even with such a  proviso,  however, the dynamic United States economy
in the past, swept by vast waves  of innovation, has been  no great friend of
the  industrial status quo One great institutional innovation of the enterprise
economy is bankruptcy. Bankruptcy gives a way of getting rid of unwanted
institutions. In a highly developed society experiencing change, getting rid
of unwanted ins^tut ons, those whose value is declining is a critical task. In-
deed, perhaps  he time is not far off to create, by analogy to corporate
bankruptcy,  a concept and means for  instituting "social bankruptcy"  for
non-profit  institutions or government  programs of  low priority.
  Milton  Friedman  (2)  has  explained  the advantage  of  the enterprise
system in  changing the sfalus quo.

      "An unrecognized virture of the market vs. political arrangement is
  precisely that it is far less subject to the tyranny  of the status quo. It is
  only necessary for one individual to see how  he can  benefit from
  changing the status quo for him to start to do so. In  a truly free market
  he does not have to get permission from anyone  ... Contrast this with

  {he political process. To adopt some measure requires first persuading
  a majority before the measure can be tried. It is hard to start small, and
  once started,  to fail. That is why governmental intervention is at once so
  rigid and unstable."
Limits to Economic Growth
  Do we have to stop economic growth in order for mankind as a species to
survive on earth? Will the earth's interlocking resources be unable to sup-
port  present rates of economic and population  growth much beyond the
year 2100, if that long, even with advanced technology? This is the basic
problem  facing  mankind,  in the opinion of Jay W. Forrester of MIT and  his
colleagues Donella H. Meadows,  Dennis L Meadows, Jorgen Banders and
William H. Behrens III, who in  1972 published The Limits To Growth, as a
report of the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of  Mankind (3).
  The "Zero Economic Growth"  movement is  the  extreme form of the
proposition that major emphasis should be placed  on quality as against
quantity of output. Proponents  of this doctrine expound the thesis that we
are now about a generation from the point of no return in overusing natural
  The Club of Rome comprises some eighty members, including scientists,
humanists, economists, educators, civil  servants; members are represen-
tatives of a wide variety of cultural and value systems,  none of them involved
in current political decisions, nor has the Club as a whole any ideological,
political or national commitments. They  share the common conviction that
the problems facing  mankind are  of such  complexity and interrelationship
that traditional   policies and institutions are no  longer able to cope with
them. Members of the Club of Rome point out that the  club is not to be iden-
tified with the work of Forrester and colleagues but probably would endorse
its main conclusions.
  The project tried,  through a  set of mathematical models (the method is
called "systems dynamics"), to simulate the world economy, and, by com-
puting values of the model through 100 or  more years of time, to trace out
the dynamics of the system. The major model  asked what  were  the  in-
terrelations between  global population growth, pollution,  food production,
natural resources depletion, and economic development,  stated in quan-
tifiable terms of rates of change  and absolute levels.
  The research  explores the effects  of the interaction of the growth modes
of these  variables,  which  mutuahy influence  and  often reinforce one
another. It provides, in effect, and for the first time, a panoramic view of the
world's working, that could  never  have been obtained by making separate
analyses.  It is,  therefore,  a description  of present dynamic situations and
outcomes; it is not intended to  indulge in predictions; it is explorative. And

if not even predictive, it is  surely not prescriptive.
  Complex systems are sometimes counter-intuitive. The modern complex
economy  is  beset by  information feedback.  Our dependence  on the
automobile is growng through feedback effects on population distribution.
That is, the more cars and roads we have, the more people are enabled to
live in suburbs; bu: the  more people are living in suburbs, the more cars
and roads we need. Or, people in cities live in poverty, so we build low rent
housing for the poor, so more poor people move  into the city, creating an
oversupply of  the poor for  sxisting jobs,  and thus poverty  in the  city  in-

New Concepts of Economic Growth
  Many studies take our present cultural  norms of "industrialism"  as
given. They describe the dynamics of  rising world population and spread-
ing industrialism, to show that limits exist on the growth of world population,
expressed  as depletion of natural resources,  mounting environmental
damage, or food shortages. Much evidence now suggests that the era of in-
dustrialism is indeed drawing to a close.

  If we are entering a new economic era,   our  economic concepts will
evolve. In this Section  Madden  reviews some  of the features  of new
economics which must be implemented to improve the quality of  the en-
vironment and the quality of life.
  He discusses cultural changes and a new global view in which the whole
is seen as more than just the sum of its parts and man is seen to be closely
interdependent with his  environment.  Madden applies the concept of en-
tropy to economics, concluding that with our present technology,  waste ac-
cumulates faster than useful output as the economy grows.  He discusses
whether we can find ways to retard this economic entropy; the proponents
of Zero Economic Growth contend these is no way to pile up output without
being buried  by waste. He discusses  two strategies  for overcoming
economic  entropy:  more efficient use  of  energy  and  application  of
knowledge to develop new concepts of wealth, new principles for selecting
economic  processes and formulation  of new  economic growth policies.
Cultural Changes
  The earlier waves of innovation created by economic growth harnessed to
productivity-increasing science and technology changed the culture of in-
dustrial  societies. These economic processes  have been evolving; that is,
they have changed our  society and its values, creating at each stage a

future different from the past. A moment's reflection brings up countless
examples of cultural change created  by economic growth.
  Now, the scientific revolution presents us with a culture crisis. The search
for improving the quality of life, at its extreme proposing Zero Economic and
Population Growth,  is directed toward how to abandon culture of the past
and to create new culture —a more livable environment. What is meant here
by culture is the definition of anthoropologists who, in the nineteenth cen-
tury, studied the nonbiological extensions of human beings that allow them
to achieve more effective interaction with their environment. Culture refers
to all the things and devices, including  nonmaterial things such as myths,
beliefs, and stories, that human groups use to enhance,  protect, or express
themselves. Culture allows the human species to survive in the evolutionary
process without having to accomplish biological specialization.
  If we do not control our culture: in the evolutionary advance of mankind, it
will devour us. Through the ages, man has  controlled his culture in order to
survive. He has adapted it to conditions. Ours  is an age when the existing
culture is strained by  new knowledge that conflicts  with our beliefs and
customs. The  explosion of new  knowledge is not the  same order of im-
portance as the earlier  waves of innovation, and they were  powerful enough
in changing  our  culture.   It is  epochal in scope,  ranking with  the
Renaissance. When  a  culture is put under strain, its alternatives are few.
One alternative is that population is checked. This has happened before to
other cultures that did  not adapt A second alternative is that the culture is
fragmented  by  internal dissension  or external  domination. The third alter-
native, and by far the more  consistent  with survival, is the invention  of new
culture.  In the long history of mankind  all evidence  favors adaptation.
The  New Culture Changes Our World View
  Epochal changes in  mankind's history stem from new knowledge that is
so general,  powerful, and persuasive that it invades the predominant "view
of reality" or "world-view";  the  set of  assumptions, beliefs, and  mental
habits that shape our  perception of reality. We find  ourselves at such a
hinge of human history, where the old culture at almost every turn clashes
with  the new.
  What is the  old culture,  where did it  come from?  As Peter Drucker (4)
points out, since  Descartes,  we  have exercised  300 years of intellectual
habit. Renes Descartes, the  French philosopher and  mathematician, more
than  anyone else —more than even Galileo, or Calvin, or Hobbes, or  Locke,
or Rousseau, more than Newton—has determined the scope  of our per-
ception, our basic concept of what is rational, what is plausible, "common

   Descartes made two magnificent contributions that have impelled us for
300 years.  First,  he gave  us our basic axiom about the  nature  of the
universe, that is, the  nature of the order in the universe. It is the axiom, "The
whole is the result of its  parts."
   Second, Descartes invented the method to make  his axiom effective in
probing nature and organizing knowledge. His  mathematics established a
universal quantitative logic. We have relied on this universal  logic to deter-
mine relationships between concepts,  and it has been capable of serving
as universal symbol and  universal language.
   Descartes'  formulaticn created modern scientific  analysis and the
modern specialized university, army,  and business organization.  It  now
eventuates in a maddening confusion of tongues among various branches
of knowledge.  It  makes  easy the  growth of  delimited  bureaucracy.  It
stultifies perception  of any aspects of reality except analytical.
  The characteristics of  our modern disciplines are  incompatible  with
Descartes. Every one of them has moved from cause to pattern and con-
figuration. They are concepts of a whole, of an organism or an institution or
a process that can only be understood as a whole, as a pattern, as  a con-
  The contrast is sharp between the two world views. First, the basic axiom
is that the whole is more than, different from, the sum  of its parts; whole and
parts are interacting.  Second, man may not stand, as it were, outside nature,
analyzing  nature apart from  himself.  Cartesian thought led to control over
nature —the promethean myth —as man separated his mind from his body,
following Desc&rte's dictum, "I think; therefore,  I am." And finally, the new
world view is that  of irreversible process, not reversible action within ab-
stract time and space.
  The three characteristics of the new era may be called holism, naturalism,
immanentism. We  are about to embark on a strategy of knowledge which
sees  processes holistically—sees  the  patterns and  configurations  that
determine the flow of events within processes.  The guiding  philosophy of
the new culture also  incUdes a new naturalism,  which affirms that man is a
part  of nature, of the  universe, that  itself is  always  in the process of
becoming. And, third, a new immanentism sees that the system, organism,
or situation that is in process of evolving is determined not from outside but
from within.
  The debate over limits to growth  signifies that a profound re-examination
is taking place in man's view of his relationship to nature, to his institutions,
and  to  his  fellow man.  Ours is  a  society which,  until  recently,  rarely
challenged  the virtue of continued economic growth, per se. But today's
concern about the quality of life and about the impact of economic  and
population growth  on human survival  is the outcome of the very scientific

revolution that has generated much of today's industrial capacities. It is the
very new knowledge itself which challenges old viewpoints.
  As a result, our society is at a point of profound change, from a society in
which production of goods was of primary concern to one guided by a new
growth policy, dominated more by services and by the creation  and use  of
new knowledge. The  present is a period of marked social  change,  one
aspect of which is the search for a new policy of balanced growth to guide
that change. Such a new policy of balanced growth will have profound ef-
fects in changing present  institutions.  These institutions themselves are
required now to undergo evolution, in order to re-orient themselves toward
the tasks appropriate for a society reaching for a new level of performance.
The range of criteria  by  which  to judge  institutional  performance will be
broader  in scope and  longer  in time perspective.  To  determine these
criteria is a major cultural task  of our times.

Entropy In The Economic Process
  In terms of  economic theory and policy, the concern of environmentalists
that eventuates in doctrines of Zero Economic Growth and Zero Population
Growth  raises the issue of the relationship of entropy to economics. As
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen argues, the issue is fundamental  (5).  The
issue addresses the  meaning of the flow and  irrevocability of time, the
characteristics  of life, the nature of causality   in biological and  social
science,  and  the theory of economic development.
  To understand the impact of the idea of entropy, consider first the con-
cept of  time  in economics. The concept is drawn directly from classical
mechanics, in turn  derived from the mathematics of  Descartes. The Car-
tesian, reference-axis  depiction of time assumes that time intervals are car-
dinally measurable.  That is, it is assumed that qualitative differences in time
periods can  be ignored in  measuring time intervals. The  implication  of
assuming that time is cardinally measureable is that time is also reversible.
Economists,  in  employing  the mathematics  of Descartes,  unwittingly
assume that time is reversible. Economic theory studies the allocation  of
resources among competing ends, assuming that tastes, technology,  and
resources are given. In analyzing the relationships between revenues and
costs, economists pay little or  no regard to the impact of  the economic
process itself on tastes,  technology, or the availability of resources  These
aspects of the economic  processes are considered as "externalities," that
ts, as costs or benefits  which are "external" to the theory of the firm  or
market.  Unwittingly, economists  have failed to realize  that waste  and
pollution are  not "external" to  the economic process,  but flow from the
irrevocable nature of time.

   In the classical theory of thermodynamics physicists have had to face the
irrevocable character of time. The first law of thermodynamics holds that
throughout the flow of time, in any closed energy system, energy is con-
served; that is, total energy remains constant and may be transformed but
not created or destroyeo. The second law of thermodynamics involves en-
tropy.  Broadly, entropy measures the rate at which  free or latent  energy,
available to do work,  becomes  bound energy no longer able to do work.
The Entropy Lav/,  simply stated, holds that the entropy of energy systems in-
creases constantly and irrevocably. The Entropy Law means that waste and
pollution (i.e.,  bound energy unavailable to do work) increase inevitably in
the flow of energy in any closed energy system operating through dynamic,
irreversible time.  The laws of thermodynamics clearly apply to economic
processes just as they also apply to any other processes involving energy
flows.  Indeed, other things being equal, waste and  pollution pile  up at a
faster rate than output grows.
The  Accumulation of Waste
  To grasp, therefore, the implications of this new insight into the nature of
the economic  process, and to arrange policy measures consistent with its
significance,  is a part of the  new world-view through  which alternative
growth processes, and questions such as who pays for growth and how,
must be seen. To begin to see them, it may be helpful to examine the Zero
Economic Growth and 2'.ero Population  Growth arguments from the per-
spective of the earlier Malthusian theory.
  Malthus (1766-1834) focused his entire social and economic thought on
his ideas about population. He argued  that population  when unchecked
grows  at a rate so much faster than it is possible to increase the supply of
food, that population is constantly pressing on the means of subsistence.
What Malthus  overlooked  is easy to  see by hindsight.  It is the growth  of
productivity in the last century and a half. To put the  point another way, we
know that in physical terms, output is a function of inputs, in any production
process. We call the relation "the production function." Malthus thought the
production function would stay stable, that the relation itself of inputs to out-
put would not change.
  But the production function did not stay fixed and invariant. By ever-
increasing productivity in the Western World, we have shifted the produc-
tion function to get each year on average more output for a given input  of
resources. So, in the  industrial countries, both our population and our stan-
dard of living have risen, and we have so far escaped  "the Malthusian trap,"
  The  present-day Zero  Economic Growth school  may be called "neo-
Malthusian." To see why, we need to focus on the waste created by produc-
tion,  which, as we have seen, piles up at a faster rate than useful  output

does. To see how, we may consider a twentieth-century discovery of the
relation Eugene Zubrow  of the University of Colorado calls,  not only  aptly
but accurately, "the crud function."
   A crud is defined as a stockpile of floods, and a nood is defined as a
negative good. An economic good is the physical embodiment of a stream
of services which is scarce and useful. A nood is the physical embodiment
of something that must be harmful—and so,  results in disutility. Also, it must
be relatively abundant. And crud is, as we have seen, a function of output,
just as output in turn is a  function of input. Crud mounts with output, but at a
faster, exponential, pace. The Zero Economic Growth thesis is that there is
no way to keep piling up output without being buried in mountains of crud.
Strategies for Retarding Entropy
   The issue  posed  by  the Zero  Economic Growth thesis  is  whether
mankind can systematically shift the crud function, as it earlier has shifted
the production function. We need to get less crud for a given output. But
how? To answer this  question is to lay the groundwork for understanding
generally the requirements of alternative growth policies consistent with the
morality of science seen  as  natural philosophy. And, by the same token, to
answer this question provides a rationale for policies involving trade-offs of
distributing the benefits and costs of the economic process with equity and
clarity, and therefore, with political legitimacy.
   The escape from "the entropy trap"  posed by the Zero Economic Growth
thesis requires a step forward in cultural evolution to full recognition of the
meaning to the economic process of the laws of thermodynamics. It is not
technology which is to come to mankind's rescue. Already, as we have seen
earlier,  market economies provide a  survival  test  of  alternative
technologies.  What may come to our rescue   is therefore  not  "more
techology." Rather, it is the guideposts provided by the scientific revolution
itself. Our knowledge, and its implied  morality, not technology, provide the
   By analogy to biological evolution, industrial society has, in general, only
two strategies of escape from the  entropy trap:

       1. deliver more useful  energy to  our systems and substitute
   energy for  matter in processes;  or
      2. bring to bear more useful information in social and economic

  These two  abstract  and interrelated  strategies —not  now fully
grasped —offer the rationale for designing policy consistent with balanced
economic  growth.  They suggest that  the Zero Economic Growth thesis,

though certainly  as  valuable as the earlier Malthusian theory, does not
means necessar  ly an end to the growth of wealth. Far from it. The  Zero
Economic Growth thesis has, as its highly significant positive value, the vir-
tue of challenging the wor!d-view of the industrial society which has hitherto
ignored the crucial role of environmental balance and resource depletion.
In its industrial stage, mankind has  learned to "get more from the same."
Now, say the Zero Economic Growth advocates,  he must learn to "accept
the same, but from less." It is the thesis of the present argument that the
Zero Economic Growth thesis misstates the alternative. The alternative is, as
Buckminster Fuller has argued, "to  get more from less."  That is, the view
held here is that wealth  can positively  increase from economizing  much
more severely on material inputs to the economic process than before.
Using Energy to Retard Entropy
  The first strategy, bringing more useful energy to our systems, means im-
proving  energy-conversion  ratios  over the  widest  possible range of
physical, economic, and social processes. We  can no longer rely as a mat-
ter of principle on brute increases in total energy use. We have as yet to
take into accoun: how growth in total energy use carries  system effects in
heat pollution and environmental imbalance. Limitless energy appears no
more possible  than  limit ess growth in populations of physical objects,
because the Entropy  Law olaces a limiting factor on total energy use as well
as material use.
  Substituting energy for materials,  however, is not incompatible with im-
proving energy-conversion ratios. Involved is  a design principle of great
power to create future wealth.  Examples include Fuller's geodesic dome,
giving a saving of one to a hundred  in the use  of physical resources to en-
close  space.  Economizing physical resource-use in  achieving  given
purposes, through substituting useful energy,  extends to house and com-
munity design as both a functional  and aesthetic  principle. Overhanging
eaves and  reflective glass  are entropically more effective than profligate
use of air conditioning. In communities, attention  to human group behavior
reduces dependence on automobiles, as in Columbia, Maryland, for trips to
school and  church,  or in protection of  pedestrians from car traffic.  Sub-
stituting communications for transportation is far less an  entropic burden,
where messages  are useful. Thus, Dartmouth's president John Kemeny's
proposal for a nationwide, automated and computer-based reference library
is a  great entropic gain. Future universities, seen as television production
centers, having two-way networks of communications,  and using teachers
as tutors or coaches or educational managers,  but  not lecturers offers
similar energy-conversion gains.

Using Knowledge to Retard Entropy
  The  second strategy  for avoiding or  postponing the  Entropy  Trap  in-
volves  bringing more useful information to  bear on social and economic
processes. The strategy  is likely to generate (1) new definitions of  the con-
tent of wealth and welfare, (2) a new principle of  selection of economic
processes  and technology, and (3) a new formulation of economic growth
policy.  Such a revision of the strategy of advance in industrial societies also
will revise the means of  allocating the  costs of growth and financing them.
  To  bring more  useful  information  to bear on  social and  economic
processes  calls first for reorganizing education, to aim it at Life  in all  its
manifestations and at imbuing the  processes of education with com-
munication of universal  pattern and configuration. Such  an "invasion" of
education by innovation creates new wealth and devaluates old wealth. The
new wealth is entropically a gain  of many magnitudes, and it is  likely to
stimulate the growth of wealth in unforeseen amounts. From the viewpoint of
the morality of science  as natural philosphy, our slow reorganization of
education is both dangerous and  wasteful.  Second, the strategy  calls for
revolutions in the  nation's  communications style and  policy. The age of
specialization  risks destruction of the vestiges of a "public  philosophy"
through the proliferation  of "sub-cultures" and obstruction of economic ad-
vance from ignorance and fear of advanced technology. Turning the point
around,  the conception of the media as  to their role, and the view of cor-
porations  as  to  their   responsibility  in  communications  also  need
revolutionary change. The media role should be to seek for positive as well
as negative understanding. Corporations  should communicate what they do
and why and how. Such changes in policy bring more useful information to
bear generally on  social  processes.
New Concepts of Wealth
  To be more specific, bringing more useful information to bear means in-
venting new systems of measurement for social and economic processes in
order to bring about a perception of these processes more consistent with a
global   view.  The  pay-off  in  such  new  measurement  systems is a
changed perception of social and economic processes that will permit the
creation of  new wealth. New wealth, be it remembered,  competes with and
destroys old wealth while adding to human welfare. To create new wealth, in
a period of a change in world-view,  people  must be able to "see" the
possibilities of advance  and welfare in doing so.
  Keeping  in mind, then, that wealth itself has an anthropomorphic aspect
(even  the  simplest of physico-economic measures,  efficiency,  requires
human beings to specify purpose),  it seems that if perceptions of wealth are
to change,  then measurement systems have to change. All this seemingly

 remote concern for  perception is at the heart  of developing policies for
 balanced growth. The present is a time when one world-view gives way to
 another  How is the new world-view to be imparted?  In the personal sense,
 as  has been said above, it is to  be  imparted  by restructuring the com-
 munication of knowledge.  In the technical sense, the new world view has to
 be imparted in new measurement systems, which correspond in conception
 with the new understandings of the 20th century scientific revolution.
   In other words,  new content has to be given  to concepts of wealth and
 welfare,  in a deeply  technical sense. The substantive reason imbedded in
 the scientific revolution itself is that a new economic strategy is called for.
 The new growth strategy defines the content of  wealth not only in terms of
 gains in productivity, conventionally defined,  but also  in terms of entropic
  The technical issue is to include new systems of measuring social costs
 and benefits in the calculus of social  and economic processes. The prin-
 ciple has many applications, only  sketched here, in relation to redefining
 wealth and welfare. One application is the rapid development, as  recom-
 mended by the National Academy of Scence and Engineering, of worldwide
 systems of measuring in physical terms the state  and  changes in the state of
 the  physical environment.  A counterpart, equally important, is  similar
 systems of measuring the social environment, at least  in the nation, and if
 possible,  worldwide  (6). Far larger resource-investment in environmental
 measurement systems has a high pay-off  in  bringing more useful in-
 formation to  social  and  economic processes,  while  suppression of in-
 formation is threatening to human  survival.
  Another application lies in fuller social costing of environmental impacts
 of economic  processes. It should be understood that fuller social costing
 changes the content  of concepts of wealth, costs, productivity, and income.
 New systems of measurement can "internalize" social benefits and costs of
 environmental impacts over a  wide range. Doing so will allow for  market
 evaluations  to  shift  the structure  of  production from  processes  rapidly
 creating large amounts of waste and pollution to processes —in some por-
 tion, entirely new ones —that slow the growth of  waste and pollution. Fuller
 social  costing  of  private  production gives a generalized answer  to  the
 question of who pays for change and how. The answer given is that, through
 the market, the  risks  of enterprise in the face of social costing are borne as
 before in a complex  combination of producers and consumers, but a com-
 bination in which costs of  devaluating capital are widely shared according
to market principles  of independent jugment.
  Fuller resource costing operates through pricing principles. The price of
 products or services  rises  in proportion to their environmental drain, either
 in production o' use.  The price.relative to theirs,  of substitutes having tower

social costs, will fail. Consumers, paying fuller social costs, remain free to
choose. But surely, some processes whose private benefits now exceed
their private costs, will be driven out of production by high new social costs.
New Principles for Selecting  Economic Processes
  The recognition of entropy in economics creates a new principle of selec-
tion of economic processes. How could any change be more powerful and
pervasive than a new principle of selection in evolution? The dogma of
"Bigger and Better" is replaced by a maxim closer to "Smaller is Better."
Economic value becomes identified with minimizing the drain on resources
and  the environment of a given economic process and function. A  new
policy goal for balanced growth  is  to discover and attain a degree of
pollution control at which the cost of a little more control or prevention just
equals the benefits —both private and public —of reducing pollution.
  Fuller social costing that creates a new selection principle for social and
economic processes requires developing new social indicators of benefit
and  cost. Far more investment is  needed at  once in  creating  both en-
vironmental and social indicators. The technique of technology assessment
is only in its infancy. These new systems of measurement are vital to fuller
social costing.
  To formulate  a   new policy  of  balanced  growth requires fuller  un-
derstanding of the  role of knowledge in the social and economic  process.
Knowledge, or something amounting to knowledge by virtue of  a highly
improbable structure, is the only thing that can grow  or  evolve  in the
process of cultural evolution. While Zero Economic Growth as a policy ap-
pears to  overstate the  constraints  on  the  economic process, Zero
Population Growth  appears to understate  the  constraints, according to
present  understanding. Mankind needs to give  more concern to  the long
term future in making present decisions, since these decisions change the
process of cultural  evolution. In concept the concern should be aimed at
maximizing  what Georgescu-Roegen calls  "total  Life Quantity," that is,
the  sum of all  individuals to  be alive  in the future.  Zero Population
Growth,  it could be argued, takes too superficial a view.
Organizing —Knowledge
  In considering knowledge as a process, Kenneth Boulding distinguishes
between "printing" and "organizing" as forms of knowledge.  Printing refers
to the ability of a structure to reproduce itself, to make a copy of itself. We
see this in the behavior of genes. We see it, Boulding points out, in the
mass production  of physical commodities,  which is  largely  three-
dimensional  printing. Rote learning  and  basic emotional sets  are  a
neurological form of printing. Organizing knowledge, by contrast, is the ac-

tion of a gene in generating its phenotype —"As ye sow, so shall ye reap."
In this sense, an idea creates an organization. Or an industrial strategy for a
nation organizes  its economic history.
   What shall  be the organizing  knowledge that creates the social and
economic development of the United States and  the world in the decades
ahead? The process of economic development is not a process of "prin-
ting"  but of "organizing"  knowledge. No system of equations can describe
an evolutionary process in which  novelty is inherent. The United States, it
could be argued,  s in a period of economic development when organizing-
knowedge  rather than printing-knowledge represents" its major comparative
advantage,  in  relation  to Western Europe and Japan. Our dynamic  com-
parative advantage appears  to lie in low-cost agriculture (not allowing for
fuller  social costing) and high technology  products and  services. Our
earlier advantages  in mass production  are being reduced.
   To  explore further the  idea of organizing-knowledge, consider the con-
cept of capital. The traditional view of capital  is physical capital —physical
structures such as; plants and equipment, schools, buildings, and the like.
But, in considering the role of knowledge in  economic processes,  we can
see that capital, as economic value, refers to the value of the knowledge im-
posed on the design of  physical capital.  In essence, from  an  economic
view,  capital consists of knowledge  imposed  on  the  physical world.
Economists are trying to develop and measure a concept of  "total capital"
that includes intangible as well as tangible resources. The idea suggests
that, to increase  our  capital, we should concentrate our  energies  on
knowledge processes —that is, on  organizing knowledge.
   A new growth strategy of  bringing to bear more knowledge and useful
energy in order to slow down the growth of waste and pollution in effect in-
troduces into  growth  policy a far  longer time dimension  than  is  now
possible to cope with effectively. Governmental and business  policy  is more
and more  geared  to shor: run payoffs. Government, by taking on  more
operational responsibilities,  subjects itself to more evaluation in terms of
short  run  benefits and  costs.  Corporations,  now  largely   managed  by
professionals, are under short-term scrutiny of investment analysts and por-
tfolio  managers having stringent performance standards for short  run in-
vestment objectives. For  top corporate  executives, the pressures of  short
run profit results are implacable. To the  extent, then, that planning horizons
for balanced growth object ves must be  lengthened, the lengthening has to
be built into the benefit-cost  measurement system both in government and
in business.

Sustainable Growth
  Given that new concepts of growth and its relationship to new societal
values and the quality of life are emerging what growth can we expect, and
what changes must we achieve in our fundamental philosophy? Chester
Cooper discusses these questions in his invited paper, with a viewpoint of
ZPG differing with that of the preceding author.	
  Before embarking on an inquiry into the relationship between growth and
the Good  Life, it is  important to advance  one preliminary observation:
Population growth as opposed  to economic growth  is  not at issue.  No
society can  make perceptible improvements in  its quality of life if its
energies are absorbed in providing survival kits for its  human census. And
while economic growth,  at least as measured by GNP, is related in  part to
population growth, few societies currently in the "have-not" category can
honestly promise  its members anything  but a continuing struggle  for
existence unless it moves vigorously and expeditiously toward effective
family  planning. This is becoming a matter for serious consideration even
among the "have" societies. Thus, Zero  Population Growth (with  a few,
trivial  exceptions)  must now be regarded as an  essential  goal for any
society concerned with providing a meaningful choice of life-styles for its
  The  question of economic growth is much more complex and subtle.
Here, the issue is not growth or no-growth. Nor does passage to  Utopia
come with a firm and unequivocal vote for Zero Economic  Growth.
  Two fundamentals  condition the prospects for achieving some measure
of societal well-being: a substantial sector of society must have access to
discretionary income, and a society must be able and willing to provide ser-
vices and amenities over and above minimal necessary law and order and
security  from external  threats. Obviously,  neither the  existence  of
discretionary income  nor a socially motivated government elite, alone,  is
sufficient.  The quantities,  the kinds  and  the quality  of  social  services,
whether in the form of police protection or nursing care, reflect the choices
and expectations  manifested within the society.
Need For  Discretionary Income
  The  amount and distribution of discretionary income available to or on
catl in a society is  a product of past (and, to some  extent,  anticipated)
economic growth and of governmental policy with regard to the distribution
of the fruits of such growth within the society. It is  no accident that "poor"
societies have inferior educational systems, medical care programs and
mental health facilities, regardless of the  aspirations and desires of their
people. On the other hand,  if "rich"  societies do not reach out for ex-

 cellence or at least adequacy in these and other fields, it is because either
 they  have chosen  not to do so, perhaps  because of other  priorities  or
 because  of cultural or religious constraints.  Thus, economic growth has
 been a necessary,  but not a sufficient, condition for making possible the
 exercise of meaningful choice  on an  individual level (how many hours  of
 work and how many hours of  leisure) or on a societal level (how many
 visiting nurses in a town and  how many children in  a classroom).
   Clearly, then, if  a society is to entertain realistic aspirations to move
 beyond the level  of more  survival to a more advanced state of social
 fulfillment, the  size  of the  proverbial  "pie"  must exceed minimal  critical
 dimensions and must be sliced so that there is enough to go around. For
 many societies, especially but  not exlusively less-developed societies, a
 moratorium  on  baking bigger pies (no growth) would not only be patently
 unjust, but would be a rec pe for domestic and international tension. In any
 case, we are probably addressing an academic issue;  it seems unlikely that
 any responsible society would permit it to happen especially as a voluntary,
 self-denying act to  satisfy the  advocates of Zero Economic Growth.
 Need For Social Services
   The balance  struck among social services  as well  as between services
 and  industrial production in a  society is a reflection (in democracies  at
 least) of the desires and aspirations of its members. This is the case, even
 though  competitive,  sometimes  countervailing  individual  and  social
 desires  and even  though unresponsive  governmental  and  corporate
 bureaucracies prevent anything like a perfect match between what is wan-
 ted and what is provided.
   But even  if the system were much more efficient and the signals dispat-
 ched to government and corporate policy makers were more sharply discer-
 nible, time lags between decision and implementation would have to be
 reckoned with.  Modern societies (and this  encompasses virtually every
 society concerning us here) are complex; any consequential shift in  policy,
 either government  or corporate, involves a cycle of research,  planning,
 decision making, staffing, and  implementation more likely to be measured
 in years rather than  months. And in the meantime, new concerns,  revised
 expectations and perhaps new knowledge may make yesterday's decisions
 redundant or even  counter-productive in  terms of today's requirements.
Growth and Stewardship
  Any critical inquiry into the concept of growth invokes considerations  of
the future. But humility as  well as prescience  is important  here.  Such
deliberations, particularly  if they evolve  into prescriptive forms,  intrude
upon  the lives of those to come. We  must, as we project our thinking, be
wary of the traps that lie in trying to penetrate the mists of distant decades;

who, as he attempted to portray the future in the mid-1940's, would have
been able to sketch more than  an abstract impression of our world today?
The  kind of judgments we wish to make about the future are much more
complex than can be provided  through the extrapolation of a few selected
statistical series.
  Since the concept of "stewardship" implies present restraint for the sake
of future benefit, we would be prudent  to limit our considerations to a few
decades ahead.  Personal, even  collective,  discounting  of  the future
becomes increasingly great as a society plans for generations it is destined
never to see. This takes on a different dimension, however, when one con-
templates the  span  of  a  generation  or  two.  Only  the  pathologically
hedonistic would not profess a readiness to limit current consumption in or-
der to leave something of value  for his children, possibly for theirs. This im-
pulse varies  from culture to culture,  from society to society, from income
level to income level, indeed from individual  to individual. It has been par-
ticularly strong in the United States, which  might explain why economic
growth has  been  such  an important  element in American policy  and
mystique.  In  any  case,  somewhere between profligacy and miserliness,
most men in most societies have long conducted their personal affairs with
the  concept of legacy in  mind.  On a societal basis, however, at least until
the  recent past, this concept has tended to be ignored; personal legacies
were one thing, collective  legacies another.
  Savings and the accumulation of capital are the usual means for funding
growth, especially in industrialized-societies. Savings,  of course,  are the
product of abstinence; by consuming  less than their income, individuals or
communities  can  produce surpluses  which, through the mechanisms and
institutions of modern societies, can be  so invested as to enlarge the stock
of capital. Much  of the  present concern about growth and stewardship
stems from societal and individual confusion about the process of capital
accumulation and the  consequences of  its  dissolution. If  by  capital we
mean, as the economists do, investable  funds or plant or equipment, its ac-
cumulation provides the foundation for further economic growth and its ex-
penditure, deterioration or depreciation can be replaced. What troubles
many of those who are uneasy  about the future is that economic develop-
ment involves invading the stock of nonrenewable resources and of starting
what may be the irreversible  pollution  of  the environment.  And while
miserliness  in the expenditure of depletable  resources is obviously a
masochistic  and self-defeating policy for those now inhabiting  the planet,
profligacy and carelessness by  individuals, corporations, or societies as a
whole cheats future generations of  their rightful legacy.  Thus,  collective
Stewardship must take two forms: accumulation of capital through saving
and investment; restraint  in the  depletion of non-renewable resources and
in the pollution of the environment.

  There are distinguished scientists who make the point that technological
breakthroughs have expanded the resources horizons by several orders of
magnitude over the past century and that technology can  be counted on to
do the same for general ons to come. And  there are  eminent economists
who maintain that the market  place and the price mechanism will provide
warnings of the dangerous curves and road blocks that  lie ahead in  suf-
ficient time so that individuals, corporations and whole societies can alter
their course.
  It must be acknowledged that, to the extent that history over decades past
provides evidence,  these views  are persuasive.  But,  it must  also be
recognized that scientists and economists must  ply their trades within the
system—a  system which, in  virtually every country of the world,  has
become increasingly complex and constipated. In short, technological  and
economic solutions,  if they exist, may not be  implementable or even per-
ceptible in time to help over the tricky decades immediately ahead. Relying
blindly on  technological  innovation or economic forces may be playing
roulette with the future.
Characteristics ol Sustainable Growth
  If growth, especially economic growth, is to be addressed as an issue of
public policy, particularly in terms of its relationship to  such nonquantifiable
concepts as the Quality of Life and Stewardship the  matter is much more
subtle than the discussion, thus far, may indicate. To imply that the question
can  be put  in terms of growth or no growth is to oversimplify the central
dilemma. Few knowledgeable people would argue that in the industrialized
countries economic growth should (or even can) proceed for more than a
few more decades without regard to the profligate consumption  of energy
and  non-renewaole resources or the despoilment of the  environment.  Nor
would many argue that a halt to economic growth would be a valid, univer-
sal solution to the present predicament. Indeed, it is implausible to suppose
that any single formula could be generally applicable, given the enormous
present  disparities  in  income   levels,  cultural  backgrounds,  popular
aspirations,  and  population-resource ratios.  Although  growth  obviously
means something very different to the already-developed as opposed to the
developing  areas of the world,  growth  as opposed  to stagnation is
ingrained  in the political, social, economic, and psychological fabric of vir-
tually every westernizing society.  Perhaps the most that can be said is that,
with prudent consumption of non-renewable resources  and with careful
consideration for the envi-onment, the moment of truth  for economic growth
can  be pushed  back several  generations during which  time  growing
wisdom, technological  progress  and institutional innovation may provide'
some solutions that are not now discernible.

  in thinking about the longer term, the concept of sustainable growth may
prove a more useful point of analytical departure. Sustainable growth is not
only that rate and kind of growth which the economic calculus and the
resource traffic will bear,  but the rate and  kind of growth a society,  for a
variety  of  reasons,  is  anxious  to  achieve or  able to tolerate.  Thus,
sustainable  growth should not  be interpreted as "sustained" growth.  In-
deed, some countries (Holland is an example) may have already passed
the point where sustained growth is sustainable. Sustainable growth,  then,
would take the form of a conscious national  or societal objective as well as
a process.  It implies certain reasonably well-defined views about the  long-
term future,  both in terms  of  available resources  and of needs and
aspiration. This,  in turn, assumes that governments, as well as  large cor-
porations have the willingness and capacity to engage in  meaningful  long-
range planning and that policy and decision-makers have adequate  in-
formation, tools and techniques for gauging a society's aspirations and for
measuring  the effectiveness of response.
  The choice  of the  adjective "sustainable" to modify the noun "growth."
was influenced by several  considerations:

  1. The inquiry should be projected into the future rather than simply con-
     sist of an analytical snapshot of the present: Thus, in the light of what
     we now  know  (or think we know), what forms and  directions  of
     economic growth would best meet the requirements and aspirations of
     our own generation and yet not place in jeopardy the requirements and
     aspirations of the generation or two to follow?
  2. The concepts of  growth,  quality of life  and  stewardship  must be
     represented  in the matrix of the analysis and  in any prescriptions that
     might flow from it.
  3. Advocacy of Zero  Net Economic Growth, on the one hand,  or of con-
     tinued rapid  economic growth, on the other,  has no validity as an ab-
     stract concept;  to the extent that either may be valid depends on
     detailed analysis of particular situations. In any case,  neither position
     can be wholly right or wholly wrong:  present amenities are largely the
     consequence of past growth, but the  indefinite continuation of past
     rates of growth will almost certainly be constrained by physical and in-
     stitutional factors.
  4. From this follows that the optimum growth  that may apply to one
     society  cannot  be  generalized  as a  model for others, and that  a
     generalized model is likely to have  limited applicability at best to any
     particular society. If this be so,  generalized models and the  prescrip-
     tions that  flow from them are likely to be of little practical use to plan-
     ners and  policy-makers

  5. Judgments with respect to the kinds, directions and rates of economic
     growth appropriate to a particular society obviously must take account
     of such quantifiable factors as mineral and agricultural resources, size
     of population, levels and  distribution of income, accessible, useable
     land and availability of fresh water. But they must also be based on the
     political, social and economic institutions and the cultural and religious
     patterns which may stimulate, constrain or even shape the environment
     in which economic growth takes place,
  6. Account should be taken of  the international tensions that may arise
     and the adaptations  and new institutional developments that may be
     required to cope with resource and environmental constraints and dif-
     ferential  rates and directions of growth.

  There  are those who argue that physical constraints need not inhibit
economic growth over the long term. Confidence  in the problem-solving
capabilities  of  technology and  the regulating capabilities of the price
mechanism looms large in this bullish view of the future. There is much to
be said for such optimism; we need only look back over our own lifetimes
for  impressive, corroborative evidence.  Invention,  innovation,  and adap-
tation since the eighteenth century have eased past  problems of population
and  economic growth.
  One  can be justifiably uneasy about the future,  however, without
derogating the accomplishments of the past. A gnawing question is whether
the pace of technological,  economic and social change can continue to
keep up with the  problems created by ever-more rapid growth and its ac-
companying environmental degradation, physical clutter and social tension.
There is no dearth of technical plans to save the cities, clean up the rivers,
dispose of solid waste. But, unhappily, there is also  no dearth  of public
lethargy, political  inertia and institutional rigidity. Thus  we continue to con-
front  rotting,  virtually  bankrupt  cities,  congested  highways,  energy
shortages, and frequent "pollution alerts."
  It seems clear  that the cultural,  political and social characteristics of a
society will play an important role  in influencing the direction and shape of
its economic growth.  Indeed, these factors may have a more important effect
in constraining  or channelling  growth than the decreasing availability and
increasing cost of non-renewable  resources. But the unplanned movement
of growth into lines of least institutional resistance is not necessarily a for-
mula for achieving a pattern that  is sustainable over the long  term.

Who Pays for Change?

  Economic growth has nany costs. Included are  the cost of  investment
and  foregone  consumption, foregone  leisure, the destruction  of  capital


made obsolete by new products and technology and others. The costs ot
growth are spread throughout the economy and Madden concludes that the
costs of change can be borne. Basically, growth can be financed from the
additional income derived from growth. Madden's discussion is presented
The Change —Costs of Growth Are Widely Spread
   Economic  growth,  as portrayed  here,  refers to the increase in the
capacity of the  economic process  to provide whatever values have the
highest priorities in a particular society, more goods, of whatever kind most
desired,  or more services, or even  more leisure (7). There  is no one op-
timum rate of growth, since growth itself is not free of charge, but has costs
that rise  disproportionately with  its  rate,  and with  its  benefits.  It  is
meaningless  to  express economic  growth as a percentage  increase  in
some index, since the composition of the growth increment is as important
as  its size. In farm  economies, growth in agricultural output may have the
most meaning. After the food and fiber criterion come durable goods. And
after the  durable goods  standard  of  growth,  perhaps come Abraham
Maslow's  higher  human  needs —of  belonging,  esteem,  and  self-'
realization —in education, in travel, in leisure, in helping others, in getting-
  Certainly, in a consumer-oriented  society, we must balance the benefits
of growth against the costs of achieving various growth rates,  to establish at
a given time  a desired rate of growth, not necessarily the maximum rate.
Economic growth has real resource costs, the values foregone in acquiring
it.  In the pursuit of balanced growth, we must not lose sight of other goals,
such as individual freedom, the flexibility of private enterprise and market
responsiveness,  or  the principle of  limiting the  role of government.
  As explained earlier,  in an enterprise economy dominated by markets,
the change-costs of economic growth are widely spread throughout the
economy. Even at times of nearly full  employment, some areas or industries
have high  jobless  rates, and even  in prosperity, some regions  and  in-
dustries and occupations are under-paid. However, the period since World
War II has seen an epic migration or rural blacks to urban areas inside and
outside the South, with resulting gains in real income and some (though not
enough) gap-closing as between median income of white and non-white
  Measured by expectations, the change-costs of growth may appear  inor-
dinately high. However, measured by performance in raising  real incomes,
by mobility patterns of large groups, by international comparisons, and  by
standards of  consumption, it  is difficult  to resist the  conclusion that the
change-costs of growth have been widely distributed in the United States.

Growth Has Economic Costs
   At any  one time, the rate of growth depends  largely  in a complex in-
dustrial economy  on  the  share of resources diverted from  current con-
sumption for investment purposes. Investment has to be broadly interpreted
to include any economic activity which increases the total supply of produc-
tive resources or impress their quality. Productive resources of course in-
clude managerial and technical as well as other labor skills and supplies,
so that investment includes education and research as much as power
plants  and machine tools.
   Two ways are available to increase the rate of growth: raising the share of
current income allocated to investment, and increasing current income it-
self. To increase current income, we must use existing resources of capital,
natural resources, and labor more intensively. More intensive use of human
skills means the sacrifice of leisure. To the extent that increased labor use
is a reduction of joblessness,  it is costless in all but the drain on natural
resources and the  environment. It is costless, that is, in foregone labor ser-
vices. Leisure, when freely chosen, is a form of income. Idleness, on the
other hand,  is the  deprivation  of income; it is involuntary, not a matter of
choice, yields no income,  and has no economic uses.
   If increased leisure is a  human goal, in other words, is one of the goods
and services to' which we work,  then it has a value and a cost.  The value,
measured by the cost,  is the foregone growth. Thus, it is hard to make com-
parisons; as between a fi^e per cent growth rate and a three per cent growth
rate, who can say which is  more desirable? It is not even possible validly to
hold that in all countries and at all times, growth as measured by national in-
come statistics is better than no growth. National income statistics omit the
value of leisure,  either as  income to  people or as the contribution it may
make to the total supply of  goods and services. The loss of leisure values in
order to achieve more rapid growth has to be counted among the costs of
growth. In short, growth costs  leisure.
   Growth  not only costs leisure, it also costs consumption. To speed up
growth, and  so to speed up gains in per capital income, takes investment;
and comsumption has to be given up in order to invest more. Saving and in-
vestment are made possible through abstinence and work. By working
more, and thus getting more production and income, both more saving and
investment become possible.  In short, the costs of growth are the leisure
and consumption given up to get it. Presumably, these are given up in the
present to get more of them in the future.
   Another cost  of  growth, borne by owners and, to some  extent,  by
managers, is the cost of creative destruction of capital.  New technology,
plants,  products, and services may render existing capital obsolete, and
thus  impose costs  in  the  form of lower capital values on the  owners of

productive resources. This is true of capital equipment, from which there is
in effect an  involuntary disinvestment by owners (although this disinvest-
ment is voluntary so far as society  is concerned). Similarly, human beings
sustain a loss in "human  capital" when their knowledge and skills  become
obsolete because of new knowledge and skills or  because they are sup-
planted by capital equipment. Localities and broader geographical  regions
may suffer  substantially the  same costs  in that their  "capital,"  their
specialized  contributions,  is  rendered  obsolete,  supplanted by  more
productive resources elsewhere. These costs are unavoidable in a dynamic
society. They could  he held  to a  minimum  in a static society, if it were
possible in the face of presently available knowledge already extant but not
used,  to  maintain  one.  But  given  the pressure of  existing, unusued
knowledge on existing institutions, it is doubtful that the social organism
could avoid  the  requirement of change, either advance or retrogression.
   Many  displaced resources  and workers  can  be  reabsorbed in the
economy, but only by incurring the costs of shifting from one use or  place to
another. Of course, in a dynamic market economy, these shifts are going on
all the time.  Mobility costs are incurred in changing jobs, in changing oc-
cupations, in moving from one area to another. However, corresponding to
these mobility costs are mobility benefits. In general, the costs are borne by
owners of resources, but typically they are shared at large by society
through the  tax structure, which provides some offsets both for capital and
labor costs.  A sharing of  displacement  costs also is accomplished  through
various private  and government programs,  such  as  company-provided
moving costs, terminal pay, retraining programs and government-provided
manpower programs.
  The  extent to which private  corporations  today  are charged for costs
borne  by business for social purposes is not well known, but it is already
substantial. The costs referred to are costs not directly related to production
of output.  They include: (1) Federal corporate income  taxes, (2) state and
local corporate  income  taxes,  (3) property  taxes, (4)  sales and  gross
receipts taxes,  (5) miscellaneous  state and  local taxes, (6) occupational
safety  and health costs, (7) pollution abatement costs, (8) social  security
costs,  (9) unemployment and workmen's compensation costs, (10) health
insurance costs,  (11) private pension costs, (12) group  life insurance costs,
(13) temporary disability  costs. This list is  not  inclusive, but  these  costs
alone probably amount to a substantial share of gross corporate product,
perhaps one-sixth or even one-fifth.
  It should be obvious that,  up to now, benefits have exceeded costs of
growth, as  measured by rapidly  growing  population  and living at  un-
precedentedly higher standards than ever before, both here and elsewhere
in the world. The issue of the future is how to maintain the increase  in the

 capacity of the economic process to provide whatever values have the
 highest priorities in the particular society, economic growth, while slowing
 down  the  rate of growth  in waste  and pollution.  Economic growth,  as
 defined here,  is required  both (1) to attain new values of high priority and
 (2) to  slow down the rise of waste and pollution.
 The Economic Costs of  Growth  Can Be Borne
   How to pay for the costs of change is the source of most discussion and
 criticism of growth. This is  a highly important question because how we
 decide it will  have significant and  long-lasting effects on the allocation of
 resources, on the efficiency of their use both in productivity and in entropic
 terms,  and therefore on ne ultimate satisfactions derived from the economic
 system. Valid  economic calculations, relating  benefits  to costs, and thus
 setting values, is the sine qua  non of an effectively functioning economic
   The  essential task of economic calculation is performed through the
 market system.  The  market system  prices both  output and input, i.e.,
 productive resources of capital, labor,  and natural resources. The system
 provides a continuous  feedback of  the cost-benefit relationships. In the
 market, the costs of change and growth are being paid  all the time, in diz-
 zying array. For example, the 21 million United  States citizens 65 years and
 older  have adjusted to  the telephone,  radio, television,  automobiles,
 propeller-driven airplane,  jet plane,  and the like.  They have adjusted to
 massive  shifts in population that  since  1910  has seen the  Industrial
 Crescent, from the New England mill towns through the states bordering the
 Great Lakes to west  of Chicago lose relative shares of  prople and jobs to
 newer  regions. They have adjusted to equally massive changes in taste,
fashion, and behavior norms.
   Throughout  this  period  of  massive change  both  the  political and
 economic systems have remained largely intact, but with a continuing trend
towards an increased role for government in the society and a trend toward
public  and private provision  of various forms of  indemnity payments against
 industrial risks of injury, illness, and old age.  Poverty, although its official
definition  has been  redefined  higher several times,  has  declined  from
perhaps two-thirds to under one-eighth of the population.
   As early as 1963, the  business community had concluded, as mentioned
earlier, that "ours are now largely the problems  of wealth and success," that
"the extremes of poverty, if not entirely eliminated, are no longer economic,
but  political  and social  problems."  The  business  group   implicitly
acknowledges in  this statement the principle that, in a  balanced way, the
costs associated with growth should  be financed from the increment of in-
come derived  from growth —the growth dividend. The conclusion thus ap-

pears strongly persuasive that the economic costs of growth and change
can be borne in our society. The issue remains that of how to assess these

Implementing Change

  In general, the costs of change should  be  levied consistent with the
flexibility and  responsiveness of the  market system. That the system is
responsive to new demands  placed  on it is  illustrated by the "social
responsibility" issue in business. The idea that corporate business respon-
sibilities should encompass social issues was fairly novel in 1966, but by
1973 was widely accepted by major business and  banking leaders (8). As
Donald  A.  McNaughton,  Chairman of Prudential,  has pointed out, in the
19th century the corporation concentrated on economic performance, and
in doing so, invented  new measurement systems for evaluating economic
performance. Today, given the public demand  for quality of life, the cor-
poration is called on to develop new  social measurement systems.
  Madden points out that business  needs incentives to  implement social
responsibility.  Profitizing social output or finding  ways to develop social
demands into new markets are suggested as possible incentives. Govern-
ment policies which could provide incentive are also presented. He also
discusses the need for methods of measuring social output so that it can be
properly managed and directed, Corporate Social Audits are suggested as
a measurement device and a typical Social Audit  is outlined.

The Profit Motive and Other  Incentives
  The problem facing  the corporation is how to  meet the various demands
for  "socializing" its output when its operations are based on satisfying
private  demands.  The corporation  has always had a  responsibility  to
society,  derived from its franchise from the state. In the nineteenth century,
its major goal  was private production  of material goods and  services, to
raise material living standards. Today's emphasis  on social responsibility
makes of the corporation  a social  as  well  as an  economic organization,
willly nilly,  since  corporations succeed by  producing  the values people
want. Whether social-and-economic, or merely economic-as-in-the-past, the
corporation is motivated and disciplined by the market mechanism and the
profit motive in a competitive economy.
  To meet new demands, as we have seen, the corporation is re-examining
cost concepts. It is also examining possibilities of turning social demands
Into new markets. This requires market research to find which of the new
demands a given  corporation could meet, what  it would cost, how it could
respond. Since social responsibilities are "layered," the corporation has to

 anticipate (1) which are legal requirements,  (2) which additional respon-
 sibilities the public expects, (3) which are newly emerging social demands,
 and (4) which emerging demands prompt an activist role for business.
   Business has to "profitize" corporate social performance, A key aspect of
 the  current corporate "social  responsibility"  movement is  the lack of
 balance between the business resources available and the new social com-
 mitments of  the  individual business firm. The before-tax residual after
 private costs average  less than 10 per cent of sales.  For almost all cor-
 porations the current demands on this residual, beginning with taxes, are
 great Federal income taxes took 44.7 per cent  of the profit residual in
 1971, for example. Since fulfilling such social responsibilities as helping to
 reduce pollution a'e costly, the cost must be  borne somewhere else. And,
to the extent that environmental control facilities require real resources for
their production,  producing  them draws off  those  resources from other
uses. This  point was underscored at the  UN-sponsored Stockholm Con-
ference in June 1972 where the under-developed countries, as well  as the
poor in the industralized  countries, interpreted improving the quality of life
as increasing their materia consumption.
  Since  business cannot be expected to  perform  its proper role  of  ef-
fectively using resources in production without a profit incentive, business
must have a clear reading rot only of consumer preferences but also of the
new ground rules of government  in meeting  these demands.  Government
has to set guidelines that aliow business to privatize social costs; otherwise
corporations follow their individual interests rather than the social interest in
the absence  of guidelines. To the extent,  then, that  government sets the
rules to conform to social costs of private production, corporations respond
consistently with consumer preference.
  Traditional maximizing  of profits is already too narrow, if it refuses to con-
cern itself with social  and ecological  problems,  for today's  large,  high-
visibility  corporations.  Few alternatives are  left: (1) the "stick" of legal
requirements,  (2) the "carrot" of government  contracts  or subsidies  or (3)
direct allocation. To make the "carrot" approach work, government, in prin-
ciple, has to subsidize enough to make rates of return competitive with
other uses. But the risk factor can be high in meeting new social respon-
sibilities,  depending on consumer preference. Whether Congress would in-
demnify all  the extra risk is not  so clear judging from recent experience of
defense contractors and  their ownership shares in the market.
  Direct  allocation  could take  various forms. One business  leader  has
argued for establishing "minimal profit" subsidiaries to perform social serv-
ices. However, this solution is peripheral to the basic need for a change in
the strategy of economic development,  to increase output (value) but slow
down the growth of waste and pollution. It should be clear by now that such

a new strategy is far more pervasive in its influence over the entire range of
corporate activity.  Direct allocation could take a  compulsory form. A law
could require firms over a certain size to invest a specified percentage of
their assets to produce  social output. Already, foundations are required to
disburse annually a given percentage of their assets in order to retain their
favorable tax status.  One  result might be  more corporate  philanthropy
(currently tax deductible, within limits). But here again, does this approach
go to the heart of the corporate role in society?
  No doubt,  in  any event the corporate-business relation is in for change,
as the distinction blurs  between production of private and public goods.
Many demands on corporations for more social  responsibility are being
made by those who spearhead the corporate responsibilities movement: (1)
tough new regulation, (2) breakup of large corporations, (3) federal charters
for all  corporations, (4)  public directors for  firms over  a given size, (5)
publicly elected directors, (6)  shareholder rights  enlarged to raise social
issues,  (7) due process rights for corporate employees who "blow the
whistle" on corporate  practices, (8) personal criminal accountability of cor-
porate officials for some public offenses, such as pollution, (9) suspension
of advertising for convicted fraudulent advertisers, (10) a concept of "social
bankruptcy" for companies whose social  costs exceed its private and social
benefits, (11) public examination of corporate tax returns, (12) required
recycling, (13) active manpower  policies required for minorities,  (14)
required participation  in solving urban problems, (15) required increase in
voluntary contributions.
  How can business operate as an instrument of public policy? One way is
through government standards of minimum performance, with penalties for
failure to meet them. Another is through  business-government consortia. A
third is through private production of public goods. The third approach
would require a radical change in national economic policy. The suggestion
is that the market-oriented government-business cooperation would be for
government to invent public goods on the demand side (i.e., including the
creation of a market-type demand), and for  business to compete in in-
vesting and promoting public goods on the supply side. Could corporations
market new garbage disposal systems, new and economical education TV
programs, systems for delivering health care, systems for setting up public
parks,  systems  for renovation of slum housing,  or the like?
Corporate Social Adults to Measure Social Output
  The  corporate "social  audit"  or  "social accounting" device represents
the beginning of a new measurement system, by which corporations can
examine what they are doing and guage their performance. The social audit
is intended as a tool to  enable a corporation (1) to review its performance

 against accepted social objectives, (2)  determine the dollar value of its
 commitment,  (3)  evaluate to the  extent possible the "social impact" of
 management decisions, and (4) determine how much corporate social in-
 volvement is  in the self interest of the corporation. Professor Raymond A.
 Bauer  of the  Harvard Graduate School of Business, a leader in the search
 for a workable social audit,  has concluded that the first three of the four
 steps of the audit set down above are now possible, but that the fourth will
 be extremely difficult acccmplish.
   Although formal social audits have not yet been devised, some large cor-
 porations  today are keeping  track informally  of  their  own  social  per-
 formance. About 60 per cent of the top 500  corporations included an ac-
 count of some aspects of their social performance in their  1972 annual
 reports, up from 35 per cent in 1971.
   A typical social audit might cover such aspects of corporate operations
 as: (1)  Employee Relations,  (2) Minority Enterprise Development, (3) En-
 vironmental Protection, (4) Contributions, (5) Community Involvement, (6)
 Consumer Affairs and (7)  Organizational Reevaluation.
   To decide  how far to go in filling any gaps in its performance, the cor-
 poration has  to  make some kind of  cost/benefit analysis, but  social
 benefits  are  difficult to  quantify.  Indeed,  a  calculus  of  quality
 will be needed to evaluate benefits, and it may turn out that polling tech-
 niques, as Raymond  Bauer suggests, are as  valid measures as can be
 developed. The business  firm's effort to "internalize" costs  of social im-
 provement programs are, in  effect, efforts to broaden the concept of what
 once were largely private costs (excluding  taxes). Private costs can be
 reduced per unit of output. But environmental costs of business engaged in
 physical production rise per unit of output, since waste and pollution are an
 exponential function of output. Thus,  the market mechanism will inhibit
 production of physical commodities whose environmental costs are in-
 ternalized. It will do so by raising the relative price of such physical  com-
 modities relative to substitutes, thus enforcing  more stringent economy in
 their use and stimulating ways of "innovating around" them in consumer
 uses. From the viewpoint of social welfare, the relative rise in price of
 physical products heavy in their environmental drain is desirable. However.
 consumers have  to  strike an equilibrium  price that balances  off  their
 demand for the product against its fuller costing.
   But social benefits are even more difficult to measure. Costs are at least
 represented by outlays. As a bizarre example, infant mortality in the U.S. is
 higher  than in Europe. However,  there are suggestions this results from
 keeping weight gain down for pregnant women in the  U.S. compared to
.European  practices.  It  would be easy to infer, without knowledge of this
 possibility, that the social benefit  lay elsewhere,  perhaps in reform of the

U.S.  health care system, when all that would be needed is a change in pre-
natal care of easy accomplishment Which  of a given set of social benefits
should be pursued and to what extent—i.e.,  how much should  it be pur-
sued —before the added social  benefit of competing uses comes  to ex-
ceed the declining added benefit of pursuing the social benefit? In  other
words, since society's resources are scarce, relative to all the  desirable
uses for  them,  as greater amounts of resources are devoted to environ-
mental protection,  the added social benefit of such spending will fall and
the added  social  cost will rise, causing  the added benefit and the added
cost to equalize at some spending level. That is to say, even if they are com-
pletely known, our social desires  can  no  more be met in total than our
private desires.

Implications For Economic  Policy

  The implications of a global view for economic policy are many and are
just  emerging  into national  consciousness. The  need  for  more  com-
prehensive long-range goals and planning which include a wider range of
social issues and directly address means of emproving the quality of  life is
generally recognized.
Attributes  of Successful Planning
  Commenting  on societal  goals,  Cooper discusses  the  need  for  long-
range planning. He believes that there is general agreement about what the
goals of  society  should be.  However,  government  and  business  goal-
setting have been  ineffective because the process has been isolated from
the planning process. He concludes that  planning  should be indicative,
rather than directive and should  be integrative in that it  should include
physical  and  social  factors  as  well as  economic factors. He briefly
discusses the possibility of organizing a national planning staff and  sum-
marizesdesirable  features of such a staff.	
  Cooper says that, to be something more, and more useful, than a  set of
lofty platitudes, societal goals must be thoughtfully defined and periodically
reviewed. Collective introspection precedent to the development of goals is
rare in our  own society, and indeed in most others. To the extent national or
institutional goals are formulated, they tend to take the form of short-term,
specific,  quantiatively-expressed performance targets.  As  a consequence,
"progress" or "growth" has tended to be characterized,  over the longer
term, by  lurches and  zig-zagging toward  unarticulated  or viscerally-
determined objectives. But  one senses that if societal yearnings could be
articulated  in terms of desired goals, the short-term targets of government
agencies, corporations and labor unions might turn out to be irrelevant if not
altogether wrong.

   Whatever the approach used, there seems to be fairly wide agreement on
 the priority of objectives. The problem arises when one moves from goal-
 setting to implementation.  A Brookings  discussion of the 1973  Federal
 Budget puts the point well: "There is widespread consensus ...  that in-
 creasing equality of opportunity, improving the quality of public services,
 and resucing the environment are, and should be, important concerns of the
 federal government. There is far less consensus, however, on how these
 objectives should  be accomplished or how success should be identified
 and measured" (9).
   An Administration official also alluded to the gap between aspirations
 and implementation in testimony to Congress: "It is the conviction of this
 Administration that  public policies for balanced and orderly growth wilt be
 more effective than the mechanisms through which they are shaped and
 carried out." (10).
   The ambitious efforts at national goal-setting over the past decade turned
 out to have little practical significance because they were removed from the
 planning process. Goal setting is but a necessary prelude to the major task
 of laying out the  routes which will permit  policy makers to have  a high
 degree of confidence that the goals can be achieved.  Thus if growth is to
 serve  identified ends and  if it is to proceed in cognizance of resource
 availabilities,  environmental  considerations and  societal needs and
 aspirations, that is, if growth is to be economically and socially sustainable.
 planning by governments and large quasi-public and private institutions is
 an essential element for success.
   "Policy planning", whether  undertaken  in great departments  of  the
 Executive Branch  of government or in large corporations has  not been
 distinguished by stunning success. There are many reasons for this which
 may have little to do with the validity of the planning  process, itself. The
 most  expeditious road to  career advancement, for example, is through
 operating rather than planning elements of an organization; few Cabinet
 members or corporation presidents are plucked from the ranks of planning
 staffs.  Few Cabinet members or corporation presidents tend to pay much
 more  than lip-service to the results of elaborate policy planning studies.
   But there is more to the story than simply the bureaucratic handicaps or
 top-side neglect under whicn planners typically ply their trade. There are
 some fundamental disabilities of methodology that inhibit the use of the
 planning process as a managerial tool. Progress is being made in develop-
 ing more effective planning techniques, but  for many years ahead, at least,
we will have to rely on the  blunt instruments at hand. This means that em-
 phasis must be placed on indicative rather than directive planning, on iden-
tifying  and then analyzing  alternative  courses of action,  rather than, with
arrogance unbecoming the start of the art,  laying down policy prescriptions.

   The analysis of policy alternatives need not be the only responsibility or
 contribution of planners to the process of translating goals into programs.
 Along the analytical path critical decision points can be identified, flagged
 and gamed; "if it is decided to do A, consequences W and X will follow; if
 Course B is selected, consequences Y and Z will have to be anticipated."
   Recognizing,  then,  that  by "planning" we are talking about indicative
 planning, a policy of sustained  growth calls for long-term  planning  un-
 dertaken at a high  enough  echelon to permit direct  access to senior
 decision makers.  Such  a planning process  would involve considerations
 longer than the annual  budget cycle, longer than the four year terms of
 Presidents  or coporate executives.  It goes  well beyond projecting produc-
 tion schedules  or extrapolating  sales. The  process,  in  short,  involves  a
 scale  of time measured in decades rather than years. This kind  of planning
 is not  being done in the United States, either by government agencies or in
 the  private  sector.
   Planning for sustainable growth must also be integrative in the sense that
 it reflects physical and social as well  as economic considerations. Basic to
 this broad and humanistic approach is a conversion by both  planners and
 policy-makers from worship of the false god of Gross  National Product to
 other,  or at least modified, measures of progress. In short,  a society must be
 able to judge how effectively it is  performing as well as how much it is
   No  planning function, whether  in or out of government, can be effective
 unless it is meshed closely with the decision-making process and decision-
 makers,  themselves.  Nor can effective planning be done unless  planners
 are  able to call  on the resources of their colleagues in the operating and
 research elements of their organizations. The "boys-in-the-back-room" and
 "the ivory tower" syndromes thus fall far short of describing the nature of
 the  planning process envisaged  here —within either the national govern-
 ment or large corporations.
   Some governments have already taken steps to develop a long term plan-
 ning function. In France, the Netherlands and Japan,  for example, small,
 multi-disciplinary staffs of planners are attached to the  Offices of the Prime
 Ministers (11). In each case the staffs  endeavor to integrate  economic,
 technological  and  social planning  and,  in  each case, too,  the planning
 period extends well into the 1980's  (12).
   It would be beyond the scope of this paper and beyond the  frontiers of
 current thinking to try, at this point, to define the precise charter, form, and
 organization  structure  of  a  national  planning  staff  concerned with
 sustainable growth. But there are  a few  points worth  noting. We have
•already emphasized the need for a  long-term frame of  reference, the need
 to cut across intellectual disciplines and departmental  areas  of respon-

 sibility and the need for planners to operate from a real-world perspective.
 The basic approach, as we have observed, should be indicative rather than
 prescriptive, both in terms of sharpening the choices rather than spelling
 out specific goals and of analyzing alternative policy options rather than
 serving up a set  of concre:e recommendations, A national planning staff
 should also engage in, or have direct access to, the assessment of the
 long-range social, environmental and economic effects of the applications
 of new high-technology. Finally, one would like to think that a national plan-
 ning staff would act and react substantively with the long-range planning
 going on in government departments, other governments, the large national
 and multi-national corporations, and private research organizations.
 Features ol a Government —Business Growth Policy	
   Madden states that action consistent with the new concepts of economics
 and the global view and traditional policy and economics  is needed to
 provide a humane world in which mankind can achieve short-range goals
 consistent with long-range survival and also achieve a rising quality of life.
 People's perceptions  must  be  adapted  to  new  possibilities of wealth
 creation which  include not  only physical goods  but  new  social  and
 economic values.  New knowledge of the physical and social sciences must
 be applied move  ntensive'y and organized more effectively.  Government
 and business must pay more attention to the  changing values of people.
 The new economic growth strategy for business means developing a func-
 tional, social  performance-oriented mode of marketing. He suggests the
 following as principal elements required for a comprehensive government-
 business growth  policy to provide these features.

  It might be desirable for government to create new policy in support of
the values of environmental  enhancement, research in science, the com-
munication  of science,  energy,  social  measurement  and  analysis,
education,  and economic policy.
  In all these areas —since  all are related to concern with the environ-
ment —major tasks of policy re-examination consistent with the new world
view are urgently needed. It is not so much a question of large expenditures
as it is the development of new rules of the game that reflect  new  un-
derstanding of the growth process of the future.
  The proposal bristles with implications that cannot all be drawn out here.
More progress is needed now in monitoring world weather, world environ-
ment, study of farm practices, and a host of related topics, looking towards
world-wide management of the world environmental balance. Such basic in-
vestment, well-financed, will generate unpredictable new sources of wealth,
both public and  private. It   should  be a goal to  create  world-wide,
cooperative environmental measurement and management.
  The  time  is at hand to re-think science  and technology policy, not in
relation mainly to experiments in utilization, but in efforts to unify science, to
communicate it widely, to apply methods, not technology, in a broad sweep
to social affairs. Multi-media scientific  education —that is, superb and  en-
tertaining education —needs financing more,  far more, than  yet another

fragmented and unrelated  scholastic exercise in scientific specialization.
Dartmouth president John  Kemeny's suggested  national, computer-based
reference library should be financed  now. At the expense of some old or in
effective government  program.
   Instead of more government education aid to existing  universities, some
small funding might be provided to a corporation,  balanced in  make-up,
which saw itself as a nation-wide, open, TV university, modelled after the
British  Open  University.  Courses  should  not be  allowed that are not
multimedia productions.
   At some point soon,  U.S. energy  policy will have to face up to the im-
• plications that lie in the plentiful supply of hydrogen, the fact that a few day's
supply of energy from the sun equals all the stored energy on earth, and the
present positive feed-back  between the rise in output and the rise in energy
use. Abstractly,  the issue would seem to be more GNP (or human  value)
with less expenditure, but more useful  expenditure, of energy. At least,
such an inference appears to follow from the thesis presented by Limits To
   Social measurement and analysis now languishes partly because of lack
of fresh or original  study of  U.S.  statistical systems,  now mainly two-
dimensional even  in economics, where measures of  wealth  are  sadly
lacking.  Fresh initiatives in statistical design suited to computers, aimed at
systems viewpoints, holistically conceived, are lacking. Meanwhile, fears of
"data banks" divert interest and confuse purposes, and existing systems of
statistics  receive patchwork attention.
   Education is on the verge of an explosion and of large cost  reduction
through a  radical change in the organization of  instruction brought  on  by
technology. How is it  that Western Civilization's great artists were financed
to communicate the symbolism of Biblical  creation to generations, while
only Time-Life  Science books  have dared  to portray the creation  of the
universe in pictures? The pursuit of knowledge is corrupted by comparison
to the marvels of fused art-and-knowledge creations lying in every cranny of
the  society, to become  entertainment, whether as drama or as epic
narrative, or whatever, combined with education.
   Education is on the verge of an explosion also through informal intimacy
of discourse by ad hoc groups springing up everywhere, bored  by the for-
mal trappings of instruction, but effective in their own fields and yearning for
personal  conversation,  involvement, enterprise,  and creation. These are
people at home in a nation that is only five hours wide and three hours long;
people who are impatient with papers and footnotes, appalled by our
society's lack of coherence and coordination, but determined to realize our

   Economic  policy  stands  at  a  similar threshold   ready  for intelligent
 economic similation and modeling, development of policy analysis, testing
 of policy changes by simulation and reform of institutions.
   All these changes implicit in the new world view represent a new initiative
 for adaptation of our  culture  that  are breathtaking, but of course require,
 above all, a  new orientation of thought in policy making far  more than
 massive investment in technology. The task lying before our society is that
 of re-organizing thought processes, images, language, and  perception far
 more than the creation of programs or "solutions" to "social problems."
   Madden outlines some specific elements of economic policy for govern-
 ment and  business which he believes  should be  implemented.

   1. Creation of Social Markets. Government should set  new priorities to
 create social markets for private  business operation  by massive aban-
 donment of our dated and ineffective social welfare and industry—subsidy
 programs. The  missing  link in  revenue sharing is the creation of social
 markets tor business  corporations.
   2. Urban Policy, Government could initiate broad measures to achieve
 governance of urban regions, such as a national network combining urban-
 observatory development banks with a federal-private development bank at
 the center,  in order to analyze  and finance urban innovation.
   The missing  link in revenue sharing is access  to  knowledge. As men-
 tioned above, the bringing to bear on economic processes of more useful
 knowledge is a cultural blockbuster of an  idea, bristling with design im-
 plications. Even at risk of being tiresome,  we don't  know anything, as a
 people, about what is happening in our urban regions. Most of  us don't
 even know we live in urban regions, except intuitively, since we go to great
 lengths, using phrases I ike "urban," "rural," "rural-nonfarm," and "central-
 city", "suburb," and the like, to obscure our perceptions. How can we think
 clearly about governing urban regions, not knowing we live in them? We
 don't even  have visual TV cr newspaper symbols, like stylized maps,  to
 create any unity of feeling among people in these regions. They have  to
 apologize for saying they live in "the New York area" when they really live
 in, say, Summit, New Jersey. And certainly we  have no visual system  of
 orienting people easily to parts of a metropolitan area. All the buses go to
 some unknown stopping point  like "Kings Park" or "Floating Hill," the
 name of a real  estate development.
  At the next  level  of confusion, we  lack any  regular  means  of  com-
 munication about what is happening in our urban regions. Our newscasters
 and journalists  appear never  to have thought  of urban regions, except for
the weather forecaster. Planning board decisions come after murder,  rape,
dope, police  line-ups, and sports in importance. It is not  easy for the res
pubtica —the public thing —to escape from such a melange with anything
 much intact.


  But still another level exists, where patterns and configurations of change
move with logic, order, and even beauty across the urban scene, as well as
patterns filled with ominous foreboding. Nobody ever hears about these ex-
cept specialists of one sort or another, who seldom talk together.
  The idea of bringing useful knowledge to bear in public understanding of
what is happening in cities has obviously got a far, far lower priority of value
than weather  forecasting.  If you think  about it,  weather forecasting is
organized,   scientific observation,  arranged  in  a  system,  employing
specialists  financed  both  by  government and  business,  to  give  us
knowledge about the weather. What is the  analogy for urban change and
development? The idea seems to escape, somehow, through the cracks of
confusion in our ability to imagine.
  3. Environmentally—Sensitive Economic  Policy. Government would  re-
structure economic policy consistent with environmental and policy science
insights,  would revise incentives in order to stimulate the creation of en-
tropy-retarding  new wealth, and  would remove restrictions to competition
that are widespread  in law and regulation.
  Here  again, the  proposal is intended to  convey implications of the in-
tellectual framework  portrayed throughout the above.  The task is  an enor-
mous exercise in fresh thinking.  One example illustrates this point, perhaps
apocryphally. A house in Phoenix, having a 20-foot picture window facing
the  sun, keeps a 20-foot Venetian blind closed except at night. But, it is so
hard to raise, the owner installs a motor. The appraiser increases the value
of the house $1,000 because of the blind  and the motor. Another house,
with ferns and an overhanging eave and high ceilings is valued  less —it
has no motor and  perhaps no Venetian blind.
  4. Recommendations for New Business Policy
  a. Re-organize marketing to  create holistic,  performance-oriented sup-
plies of services.
  b. Re-define balance  sheet concepts.
  c. Engineer holistic product systems to achieve product miniaturization,
zero defect  reliability, greater durability.
  d. Create new marketing concepts of private production of public goods.
  c. Exploit  marketing  opportunities in  "new  health" —invisible
wealth—of holistic community planning, beauty, education, cultural growth,
and health improvement.
  f. Create  new communications and  advertising strategy consistent with
knowledge as a form of wealth.
  g. Create new management attuned to new wealth.

                  NOTES FOR CHAPTER 6

 1. Schumpter, J.S., "Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy", 3rd edition,
   New ¥ork, Harper and Bros., 1950, Chapter VII.
 2. Quoted in Introduction to The "Regglated Consumer," by Mary Bennett
   Peterson Nash Publishing Company,  Los Angeles, 1971.
 3. Meadows, et al, "The Limits to Growth", A Potomac Associates Book,
   New York, Universe Books, 1972
 4. Drucker,  P., "Landmarks of Tomorrow," New York, Harper and Row,
 5. Georgescu-Roeger, N., "The Entropy Law and the Economic Process",
   Harvard University Press,  Cambridge, Mass., 1971.
 6. See "Social Measurement", American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
   countants, New York, 1972.
 7. See "The Promise of Growth", Chamber of Commerce of the United
   States, Washington,  D.C.,  1963.
 8. See "The Corporation  in  Transition," Chamber of Commerce of the
   United States, Washington, D.C., 1973.
 9. Setting National  Priorites—1973 Budget", Charles  Schultze,  Ed.,
   Brookings Institution, 1972.
10. "National Growth Policy", Hearings  before the Subcommittee  on
   Housing  of the  Committee on  Banking  and Currency,  house of
   Representatives, 92nd  Congress, June 6 and  7, 1972—Part I.
11. In France, The Commissariat General  du Plan, in the Netherlands, the
   Central Planning Office, in Japan, The Director-General for Economic
12, A good  example of the  long-term,  wide-ranging, inter-disciplinary
   nature  of French planning is "1935.  La France  Face au Choc  du
   Futur," Commissariat General du Plan, Librairie Arnaud Colin, Paris,
   1972. Foreword.




     Early in the organization of the Environmental Studies Division (ESD), a
branch  was formed  to  conduct research  of an exploratory nature. This
Branch  had as its objective:

     "To extend the  time-horizon for policy analysis"  and further to
     build "upon recent advances in the state-of-the-art in the develop-
     ment and application of approaches for generating and studying
     alternative futures."

     One of the first  projects undertaken by this branch for FY72 was an
EPA Symposium on  the Quality-of-Life (QOL) Concept which was held at
Airlie House in the late summer of 1972. As interest by the social science
community grew in the symposium during its planning phases, ESD staff
thought  it  desirable to  undertake  a  series of inter-disciplinary  study
seminars  as a part  of its  FY73 work  program to  reinforce the interest
generated in QOL and other closely related subject matter.
     Topics suggested for the seminar  series ranged from environmental.
management to questions of aesthetics. Lying somewhere between were
topics concerning:   land-use carrying  capacity; the  nature of the en-
vironmental  "crisis"   and  development of indicators  of  environmental
quality. The latter topic was eventually researched in-house and included as
a part of the QOL Symposium.
     As  a lead-in to the FY73 symposia ESD had been given tentative ap-
proval to fund an EPA publication to be entitled "Environmental Issues and
the Social Sciences." The purpose of the project was to engage a number
of respected authorities  in a wide range of disciplines to:

     "..  .focus on the expected contributions that social  scientists may
     offer to: (1) a better understanding  of how to go about managing
     our existing environment (both natural  and man-made)  and (2) a
     process for creating desirable  alternative  environments for the

     As  most research managers are  aware, program changes are "a
given" fact of life. The topic on environmental management became funded
as a separate ESD symposium project.  The topic of aesthetics was given
research support in the form of a grant to an unsolicited proposal. The "En-
vironmental  Issues and  the  Social  Sciences"  book  project undertook
several turns of events to become the publication you. the reader, now have
in  hand.

   Following the successful completion of the QOL symposium in August of
 1972, ESD was approached by one of the invited attendees—Anton Sch-
 malz, then engaged as a general consultant on the Federal Assistance
 Review Program of the Office of Management and Budget—who suggested
 ESD should follow up on the Airlie QOL symposium with mini-regional ver-
 sions throughout the country. After discussing areas of mutual interest, ESD
 hired Mr. Schmalz  as a staff  consultant to pursue the alternative futures
 aspects of the .ntended environmental  issues  and social sciences book for
 the Division. As explained elsewhere,  the original intent was to  institute a
 dialogue between government officials and invited participants.
  The original symposium outline, as  developed by Anton Schmalz with
 Peter House, Philip Patterson, Martin Redding and John Gerba of the ESD
 staff, is reproduced on the following pages.  The outline includes topics
assigned to the contributing authors and questions which each author was
asked to address within his or her research  theme.

                      Research Symposium
         Alternative Futures and Environmental Quality

    In keeping with the policy of the Office of Research and Monitoring to
encourage research in all areas relevant to the charter of this Agency,  the
Environmental Studies Division plans to conduct a research symposium  ad-
dressing "Alternative Futures and Environmental  Quality," The symposium
will be held in Room 1112, Building 2, Crystal Mall, Arlington, Virginia,
March 7 and 8,  1973.
    Symposium sessions will explore alternative future effects on the  en-
vironment of the way in which three pivotal clusters of issues are handled in
the immediate future. The issue clusters are:

  1. The nature of the environmental crisis.
  2. Zero population growth and environmental quality.
  3. (mplications of alternative growth policies on environmental quality.

    The purpose of the symposium is to pursue a comprehensive approach
for assessing future research needs and priorities and to delineate con-
siderations for policy and program planning  in each of the issue categories.
A detailed explanation and  outline of the symposium is enclosed.

                   Research Symposium of the
                 Environmental Studies Division
                           Focusing on
         Alternative Futures and Environmental Quality

                        March 7 and  8. 1973
                       Ftoom 1112, Building  2
                             Crystal Mall
                          Arlington, Virginia

     Environmental Quality is both an immediate and a long-term issue with
many  interdeperdent options,  benefits,  and  risks.  The  most relevant
policies and programs will derive from a periodic reassessment of the im-
plications of  evolving issjes on environmental quality. In this spirit the
proposed symposium is intended to maximize the benefits from both new
knowledge and long experience.
     The  Environmental  Studies  Division,  Office  of  Research  and
Monitoring, of the Environmental Protection Agency plans to bring diverse
viewpoints together in a research symposium devoted to a reassessment of
three major issue areas conditioning environmental quality.
     The EPA research symposium is intended to provide a current focus on
comprehensive identification of options  and alternative approaches to the
three issue areas as they relate to environmental quality.
     An average of six participants will be commissioned to prepare papers
in each subject area.  The symposium will be interdisciplinary to provide for
the fullest exposure and interaction of viewpoints. Participants will attend all
three sessions to ensure maximum involvement in, and exposure to, the
three areas considered at the  symposium. Papers will be published and
distributed nationally. A  discussion session of  the symposium  will be
devoted to each of the three issue areas. These  three areas  are:

  1.  The Nature of the Environmental Crisis

     Diverse views exist regarding the possibility of an imbalance between
human institutions and the ecology of the biosphere. General societal sup-
port  of an  ethic to care for the environment may be substantially affected by
perceptions of the reality and urgency of a crisis. What are the  implications
for environmental  quality?

  2.  Zero  Population  Growth and Environmental Quality

    ZPG has  been proposed as a national and world goal. Current U.S.
statistics indicate  ZPG  fertility rates. What are the implications for  en-
vironmental  quality?

  3. Implications of Alternative Growth Policies

    Growth, equilibrium, dispersion of population and industry, and  the
elimination of  pollution all have  their costs. The implications of growth in
terms of dollars, as well as in terms of environmental  quality,  social costs
and the overall quality of life, need continuous evaluation.

    Providing for environmental quality  requires a  comprehensive,   in-
terdisciplinary and long-range approach on the part of people at all levels of
government and throughout the  private sector.
    Principal objectives of the EPA Research Symposium are to delineate:
(1) the issues; (2) feasible approaches and incentives for dealing with them;
(3) research needed  and rationales for prioritizing  these needs;  and (4)
specific  attitudes,  costs,  and  other  considerations for implementing
changes  in  government and  private sector  institutions. These con-
siderations will be presented from the point of view of decision-makers in-
volved in  policy formulation.
    At a minimum, the papers and  discussions in each of the  three issue
areas will address the immediate and long-term  considerations in seven
categories of questions for each issue:

   1. Is there really a problem?  What  is it?  Who says? Why? Have  the
    problem and  associated issues been overstated  or underestimated?
  2. How  can we  best distinguish between cause and effect?
  3. What are the principal factors conditioning solutions to the problem in
    terms of technical,  economic, and social behavior?
  4. What can and/or should be  done to ensure environmentally sensitive
    comprehensive  planning and  decision  making?  What  incentives,
    regulations or other policies can help:

    a. political officials;
    b. managers and staffs at all levels of government;
    c. managers and  staffs in specific institutions, industries
      and/or geographic regions; and
    d. segments of the  general  public?

  5. What are the considerations for implementing proposed new policies?
    What are  some feasible  strategies?

   6. Is there any urgency? What are the realistic time considerations for im-
     plementing proposed policies?
   7. Who  should  participate  in the  planning,  implementation,  and
     monitoring or evaluation phases  of the policy process? Who can or
     should be responsible?

     Environmental issues are inextricably involved with individual or group
 perceptions of needs, frustrations,  satisfactions, etc.  These perceptions
 condition the  concepts of relative priorities and feasibility as well as the
 credibility of po icies and, therefore, the degree of support or cooperation
     An outline of Jhe three issue-oriented sessions follows. In addition to a
 consideration  of the seven categories of questions discussed above,  each
 participant will address the representative questions listed for the session
 in which he is a  principal.

                             Session I
                   EPA Research  Symposium
                           Focused  on
         Alternative Futures and Environmental Quality
            The Nature of the Environmental Crisis
A. Is there an environmental crisis?

   1. What are its characteristics?
    a. Immediate.
    b. Long-term.
  2. New Perspectives on balancing human ecology and the ecology of the
  3. What do the current trends show for pollution control?
  4. Approaches to continue monitoring  and assessment.

B. Pros and  Cons regarding an environmental crisis.

   1. Myths and  reality of pollution.
  2. Viability and limitations of the biosphere.
  3. Lessons learned from the implementation of environmental policies.

C. One approach to averting environmental  crisis.

  1. The carrying capacity concept (the ecosystem).
  2. Resource viability and limitations.
  3. Comprehensive government-private  sector growth policy.
  4. Lessons learned  in balancing economic and population growth.

D. Cultural  myths and  realities of  problem solving.

  1. Human perceptions  of cause and effect relationships—the disease
    model, ego consciousness, and other barriers  to objective thinking.
  2 Pervasive conditioning factors on problem  definition and  decision

E. Where do we go from  here?

  1. Highlight  concepts of environmental management.
  2. How do/can  we  achieve the technical,  economic, and  behavioral
    modifications to ensure an environmental ethic throughout our society?

Representative Questions

  1. To what extent is there a convergence of the environmental imperative
    and the environmental ethic?
  2. Has the problem been exaggerated?  Has the environmental imperative
    been  correctly  stated  or  overstated?  What  are  realistic  standards,
    measures and  policies to  ensure  nature's balance?
  3. To what extent are  flora, fauna  and  ecosystems really threatened
    today?  Is there  a long-term hazard? What is our best knowledge of time
    and tolerance considerations?
  4. Do we know enough to  validate  the imperative  of major technical,
    economic  or behavioral change in our  society?
  5. What are the social, psychological, economic and political implications
    of an environmental ethic?
  6. What  would be the   time and other  major  considerations for im-
    plementing  the  kinds  of technical,  economic  and behavioral
    modifications recommended by each participant?

                            Session II
                   EPA  Research  Symposium
                           Focusing on
         Alternative Futures and Environmental Quality
      Zero Population Growth  and Environmental  Quality
A. What are the implications of zero population growth?

   1. Implications of  needs/values/benefits and thresholds of behavior on
    ZPG and other  population alternatives.
  2. Social pathology—population density and distribution.
  3. Environmental  design for optimum  group size and to  balance
    gratification and frustration.
  4. Federal government activities to preserve and improve  environmental

B. Considerations  underlying development of environmental policy.

   1. Settings.
  2. Awareness.
  3. Social roles,  pathology, density, and distribution.
  4. Policy implications.

C. Resource and environmental consequences of population growth  in the

   1. Projections and trends in long-range perspective.
  2. How population affects resources and the environment:
    a. Land use.
    b. Pollution.
    c. Mobility.
  3. Resource requirements and pollution levels.
  4. Ecological perspectives.

D. Public and private policy interactions and implications of
   population policy.

   1. Needs/problem identification and  assessment.
  2. Mechanisms  tor policy formulation and analysis.
    a. Federal.
    b. Regional.

    c. State.
    d. Local.
  3. Mechanisms for implementing policy.
    a. Incentives.
         (1) Financial,  taxes, etc.
         (2) Legal.
         (3) Other.
    b. Communication.
    c. Education.
  4. Barriers, constraints and options.
    a. Resources.
    b. Institutions.

E. What is the effect of ZPG on growth policies?

  1. Goals, objectives  and comprehensive  plans.
    a. Individual and societal.
    b. Political: legislative and  executive.
    c. Government  operations.
    d. Other institutions.
  2. Strategies for social and economic development planning.
    a. Incentives.
    b. Alternatives.
    c. Communications.
    d. Education.

Representative Questions

  1. What are the traditional conditioning factors which must be considered
    in any population  policy?
  2. How can the needs,  values and beliefs of people be effectively deter-
    mined? Is an index of these perceptions feasible? Could such an index
    objectively reflect  the viewpoints of people in their several  societal
    roles of:
    a. Political office holders responsible for policy,  program and fiscal
    b. Career government  employees  who  are  responsible  for  im-
    plementing policy and ensuring the effectiveness of delivery systems?
    c. Specific  citizen  groups  or interest  constituencies  potentially im-
    pacted by proposed or ongoing policies?
  3. Are  changing  value systems  and  life styles  significantly affecting
    reproduction among their  adherents?  What are the secondary im-

    plications of these life styles on concepts of societal roles and respon-
  4. What are the social psychological, economic and political implications
    of a U.S. pooulation  ethic?
                            Session III
                   EPA  Research  Symposium
                           Focusing on
         Alternative Futures and Environmental Quality
          Implications of Alternative  Growth Policies
A. Social and productivity costs and benefits of growth.

  1. Rethink concepts of productivity, GNP, national income accounts, and
    other economic measures.
    a. Productivity.
    b. Social accounting.
  2. Diverse perceptions of needs and  urgency.
  3. Law and regulation, stabilization programs, etc.
  4. Incentives.
  5. Who  pays  and how?  What are the second  order  costs/benefits or
    frustrations,  ong term good will, etc?
  6. Shifts in the employment base:
    a. Decrease in agriculture and manufacturing.
    b. Increase h knowledge and service  industries.
  7. Expanded concepts of gross  national  product and productivity.

B. Implications of sustainable  growth.

  1. Growth  vs. equilibrium.
  2. Delineate the perceived limits and  implications of economic growth.
  3. Define sustainable growth.
  4. What kinds of growth can a nation or region, or the world as a whole,
    sustain to achieve maximum economic and social benefits and minimal
  5. What kinds  of  individual and  institutional  adjustments may  be
  6. Alternative  patterns and goals of growth.

C. International implications of growth policy.

  I.New  concepts  of  wealth  and  ownership  correlated with resource
    utilization/consumption product  quality, production,  employment and
    quality of life.
  2. Rental vs. purchase of goods.
  3. Expanded concepts of ownership.
  4. Recycling vs. new  materials.

D. Who pays for change and how?

  1. Rethink  concepts of  time, priorities,  responsibility,  incentives, risks,
    rewards  for business as a citizen.
  2. Rethink concepts of costs, profits, and return on investment in a longer
    time frame and  including intangibles such  as goodwill.
  3. Incentives:
    a. Financial, tax, etc.
    b. Legal.
    c. Goodwill.
    d. Other.
  4. Considerations  for  a comprehensive  government-business  growth

E. How can/do we achieve an equitable, comprehensive  national
  growth  policy?

  1. Goals, objectives and comprehensive plans:
    a. Individual and societal  perceptions of needs, values,
       frustrations, satisfactions,  etc.
    b. Political: legislative and executive.
    c. Government operations.
    d. Academic institutions.
    e. Profit institutions.
  2. Strategies:
    a. Incentives.
    b. Alternatives.
    c. Communications.
    d. Education.
  3. Priorities.
  4. Comprehensive government-private  sector  growth  and  priority
    a. Federal.

     b. Regional.
     c. State.
     d. Local.
   5. Major considerations for developing and  implementing a viable and
     comprehens ve growth policy.

 Representative Questions

   1. Is comprehensive policy and program planning possible when it in-
     volves various levels of government, academic and profit institutions?
   2. Can the long term cost/benefits and  other consequences of growth
     policy be identified?
   3. Who  should pay for changes to achieve  environmental quality stan-
     dards? How?
   4. Is it imperative to have a national growth  policy?
   5. How can regional and local growth policies be effectively integrated?
   6. Is  is possible  to  establish  or  require  a consistent  growth  ethic
     throughout our society? How?
   7. What are the social, psychological, economic and political implications
     of a U.S. and a world growth imperative and  ethic?
                     Research Symposium
        Alternative Futures and Environmental Quality

                       March 7 and 8,  1973
                      Conference Room 1112
                       Crystal Mall. Bldg. 2
                         Arlington, Virginia

    Dr. Betti Willard
    Member, Council on Environmental Quality

    Dr. Donald A. Spencer
    National Agricultural Chemicals Association

    Eugene K. Peterson
    Urban and Rural Land Committee, Pacific Northwest River Basin

    Dr. Murray Bowen
    Georgetown University

    Dr. Garret Hardin
    University of California


    Dr. S. Fred Singer
    University of Virginia

    Dr. John B.  Calhoun
    National Institute of Mental Health

    Ron Ridker
    Resources for  the Future

    Graham Molitor
    General Mills,  Inc.

    Dr. Alex Christakis
    Center for Contemporary Problems


    Dr. Michael H. Moskcw
    Department of Labor

    Chester Cooper
    Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

    Dr. Loncoln Gordon
    Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

    Dr. Carl Madden
    US.  Chamber of Commerce

    Dr. George Kozmetsky
    University of Texas


       Route 8, Box 116
       Highway 70, West
   Raleigh, North Carolina ^/b I c.