Office of
                       Solid Waste and
                       Emergency Response
 SEPA
DIRECTIVE NUMBER:
9832.7
           TITLE:
                Guidance Regarding CERCLA Enforcement
                Against Bankrupt Parties
           APPROVAL DATE: May 24, 1984
           EFFECTIVE DATE: May 24, 1984
           ORIGINATING OFFICE:  OECM
           Q FINAL
           D DRAFT
            LEVEL OF DRAFT
              DA — Signed by AA or DAA
              D B — Signed by Office Director
              DC — Review & Comment
           REFERENCE (other documents):
S \NER      OS WER       OS WER
  DIRECTIVE   DIRECTIVE   Dl

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                     United States Envite-—:-••:'
                          Wai.'...-.,,..:... -	-.--
                OSWER Directive Initiation Request
                                                     1. Directive Number
                          2. Originator Information
Name of Contact Parson
John Fleuchaus
ffittfe
°6'ifcM
^^^K^P^AVd^iu^VkDfir
 3. Title
   Guidance Regarding CERCLA Enforcement Against Bankrupt Parties
 4. Summary of Directive (Include trie! statement of purpose)

     To Assist  the Regions in Developing CERCLA Enforcement Actions
  against'Bankrupt Parties.  The guidance is intended to encourage
  aggressive enforcement against insolvent parties and insure national
  consistency in current and future bankruptcy cases brought by the Agency
 5. Keywords
  Bankruptcy,
 6a. Does this Directive Supersede Previous Directive^)?  Jl Yes  (Xj No  What directive (number, title)
b. Does It Supplement Previous Directive**)?
Yes
                              No  What Directive (number. title)
7,; Draft Level

  DA — Signed by AA/DAA  p3 B — Signed by Office Director  LJ C —
                                       For Review & Comment
                            LJ In
                                                        Development
 This Request Meets OSWER Directives System Format
8. Signature of Lead Office Directives Coordinator
9. Name and Title of Approving Official
Data
3-fe-
87
0616
OSWER          OSWER         OSWER
       DIRECTIVE       DIRECTIVE      i

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                                           9832,7
          Attachment VIII

Guidance  Regarding CERCLA Enforcement
       Against Bankrupt Parties
              5/24/84

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                                                     9832,7
     *
     \ UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AUENCY
     /                WASHINGTON. DC. 20460
                          MAY £4 1984
                                                       OP
MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT:  Guidance Regarding CERCLA Enforcement^Against
          Bankrupt Farcies
FROM:     Courtney M. Price
          Assistant Administrator for'Enforcement
            and Compliance Monitoring

TO:       Regional Administrators,  l-X
          Regional Counsels,  I-X
          Lee M. Thomas, Assistant-Administrator for
            Solid Waste and Emergency Response


     The attached guidance has been developed to assist  the
Regions in developing CERCLA enforcement actions against bankrupt
parties.  The guidance is intended to encourage aggressive
enforcement against insolvent parties and insure national
consistency in current and future bankruptcy cases, brought by  •
the Agency.

     The guidance provides.-  1) an overview and summary  of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act and existing bankruptcy case lav;  2) a
discussion of enforcement theories available to the Agency to
pursue insolvent parties under CERCLA; and 3) references to
current bankruptcy pleadings and appeals.filed by the Agency.

     Pages 24 and 25 of the attached guidance describe referral
procedures for a proof of claim in bankruptcy.  A bankruptcy
referral will ordinarily be processed in the tame way as other
hazardous waste referrals. ' However, expedited.. Headquarters  and
DOJ concurrence and abbreviated referral packages may be neces-
sary and acceptable if required to meet deadlines in  bankruptcy
eases.

     If you or your staff have any further questions  regarding
CERCLA enforcement against bankrupt parties, please contact
Kirk Sniff at (FTS) 382-3050 or Heidi Hughes.at (FTS) 382-3109.


Attachment

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                                                     9832,7
                       TABLE  OF  CONTENTS

                                                      PAGE
                                               <•


I. -INTRODUCTION	  1 •

     A. .Scope and Duration  of the  Problem	  1
     B. When to Proceed Against  a  Bankrupt
          Party	  2

        1.   Probability of  Recovering  the Cost
            Litigation.	  2

        2.   Deterrence of Frivolous or Fraudulent
            Bankruptcy Filings	  3

II. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE:  An  Overview	  4

     A. Organization of the Code.	  4
     B. Voluntary vs. Involuntary  Bankruptcy	  5

III. CERCLA AND BANKRUPTCY  ACTIONS	  6

     A. Proceedings in District  Court  or
          Bankruptcy Court	  6

     B. Cost Recovery Under Section  107 of  CERCLA	   11

          1. Distribution of  Assets	   12

          (a) Secured Creditors	..   12
          Cb) Priority Structure	   13

          2. Theories of Recovery  Beneficial  to
               the United States	   15

          (a) Administrative  Costs	   15
          (b) Recovery Under  Section  506(c)
                of the Code	...	   17
          (b) Equitable Liens	   18
          (d) Restitution	 ..v	   18

     C. Other Matters in Bankruptcy  and
          Insolvency Cases	;..   19

          1. Abandonment of Property	   19

          2. State -Involvency Laws	   23

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                                      9832,7
    INFORMATION,REGARDING CERCLA
ENFORCEMENT AGAINST BANKRUPT  PARTIES

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                                                       983-2,7

                         I.   INTRODUCTION
     	and Duration of the Problem
     The U.S. E.P.A. is charged with the duty of managing  and
replenishing the limited Superfund to the greatest  extent  possible.
While our enforcement activities under the Comprehensive Environ-.
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)  will
generally be directed against solvent parties, there have  been
and will, continue to be times when a responsible party declares
bankruptcy.
     This memorandum sets forth enforcement options for dealing
     t
with bankrupt parties.  It includes guidance on when to proceed
against bankrupt parties.  It also discusses the theories  and
procedures for recovering cleanup costs from bankrupt parties
under both federal bankruptcy law and common law theories  ot
recovery.  Finally, it is intended to serve as a bankruptcy infor-
mation clearinghouse, listing materials available from OECM-Wastr'e
on bankruptcy and related subjects.
     In the long run, the requirements of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA), particularly the closure and financial
requirements, should, insure the orderly closure of storage or
                                                9-
disposal facilities.  Nonetheless, this will not always occur.
Thus, while the purpose of this memorandum is to aid the EPA official
enforcing CERCLA, much of it will be relevant to future efforts by
EPA to require bankrupt owner-operators of. storage or disposal
facilities, generators, and transporters  to contribute as much as

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                             - 2 -

IV. PROCEDURES	  24
     A. Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.'	  24
     B. Filing Proof of Claims	  25
     C. Pleadings	  27
     D. Appeals	  27
     E. Federal Bankruptcy Court
          Jurisdiction	  28
V. THEORIES OF INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY	  30
     A. Personal Involvement in Acts
          and Omissions..	  31
     B. Piercing the Corporate Veil	...	  33
     C. Personal Jurisdiction in Cases Involving
          Corporate Officers or Shareholders	  35
VI. INDEX OF RESOURCES	  36
     PLEADINGS	  36
          Proofs of Claim	  36
          Other Briefs and Motions	  36
     ORDERS.	  37
     RESOURCES	  38
     RULES	  38

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              -  -                -2-                       9832.7

possible co the cleanup of the  hazardous  conditions they have
created.
B.   When to Proceed against  a  Bankrupt  Party
    •                                              . .        •
          In making the determination  of  when to proceed against
bankrupt parties the Regions  should  balance the likelihood of
recovering assets  from the estate  of the  insolvent party against
the extent of Agency resources  required  to prosecute bankrupt
parties.  The Regions should  also  evaluate the effect  that pursuing
parties who have filed bankruptcy  will have in deterring future
frivolous or fraudulent bankruptcy claims.                       -
          1.  Probability of  Recovering  the Cost Litigation
          Two' questions should  be  answered by the  Regions  to  determine
the efficient use  of enforcement resources and the extent  to  which
the Agency should  pursue bankrupt  parties in CERCLA actions.
          The first question  to answer in determining  whether to
proceed against a  bankrupt party is  related to the scope of the
r*se:   Are there other solvent  parties in the case?   If  so, CERCLA's
purposes may be served by proceeding against them  alone.   In  general,
actions against bankrupt parties such  as generators lacking assets
should not be undertaken when there  are  other solvent  parties.
     The second question that oust be  answered by  the  Regions
relates to the value of the case:  Are there assets tn the estate
of the bankrupt party?  The Assistant  United States Attorney  in
the District where the Bankrupty Court sits may  be able to send

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              ....                                     9.832,7
                                -3-

copies of the case docket to an EPA attorney.^/  Depending  on  the
•tage of proceedings, the docket say include an  itemization of
assets.  It may be pointless to proceed if there are few assets.
The position of the other creditors should also  be considered.
          In general, EPA and the Department of  Justice should  maximize
its use of attorney resources by pursuing bankrupt responsible
parties when there appear to be assets in the estate,  and  there
are either few secured creditors with relatively limited claims or
some basis exists for recovering funds from the  estate despite  the
presence of secured creditors.£/
          2.  Deterrence of Frivolous or Fraudulent Bankruptcy  Filings
          On occasion, EPA may elect to pursue a bankrupt  responsible
party even when it appears unlikely that we will recover sizeable
anounts from the Bankruptcy Court.  The Regions  should pursue bankrupt;
actions where the case may serve as a deterrent  to other parties
who would otherwise consider escaping liability  'through a declaration
1/   The most common form of bankruptcy is liquidation under
~~    Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (11 U.S.C.
S101 ec seq.) (hereinafter cited as "the Bankruptcy Code").
However, several CERCLA cases have involved responsible parties
in Chapter 11 reorganization (see United States, et al. v. Johns
Manville Sales Corporation, et al.. Civil No. 81-299-D)..  Th"e
distinctions between a Chapter 7 liquidation and a Chapter 11
reorganization are discussed infra.  Unless otherwise stated the
discussion in this memorandum concerns Chapter 7 liquidation
proceedings.
2/   This evaluation should be documented in the case referral
~"    package prepared by the Region.  The Department of Justice
has requested that all bankruptcy referrals include a "quick look"
financial assessment of the potential defendant's assets  (i.e. a
summary of assets listed in the bankruptcy papers, a Dunn and
Bradstreet report, etc.)

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                                                       9832*7
                                -4-
  i        ~         •
of insolvency.  For instance, through' the prosecution  of  bankrupt
parties*the Agency could provide an effective  deterrent to  under-
financed "fly-by-night" companies who see bankruptcy as a way  to
avoid their liabilties to the federal government.   Similarly,  it
is important that responsible parties are treated  equitably.   For
example, in a case involving a bankrupt site owner/operator
whose actions contributed significantly to the waste condition,
EPA could pursue the bankrupt site owner to further the enforcement
policy goal of treating responsible parties even-handedly and
equitably.
             11.   THE BANKRUPTCY.CODE:  An Overview
A.   Organization of the Code
         The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (11 U.S.C.  S 101 e_t sec.
(1978)) replaced and liberalized the Act of 1898 (11  U.S.C. S  1 et ;
seq. (1898)).  The new act, commonly called the Bankruptcy-Code,
consists of eight chapters.  Those relevant to EPA claims are:
Chapters 1,  General Provisions; 3, Case Administration; 5,  Creditors.
and Debtor,  and the Estate; 7, Liquidation; mnd 11, Reorganization.
                                     4
     Chapters 1, 3, And 5 set forth; definitions and procedures
common to all bankruptcies.  The provisions of Chapters 7 and 11
set forth the specific procedures for liquidation^ and reorganiza-
tions.  Under « Chapter 7 "straight bankruptcy" or "liquidation,"
a debtor is granted a discharge of all debts but must liquidate
all assets.  A Chapter 7 bankruptcy is administered by a trustee
appointed by the Bankruptcy Court.  Under Chapter  11, there is no
liquidation of assets.  Rather the goal of  this chapter  is to   •<

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                                                        9832,7
                                -5-

reorganize the obligations of the debtor in order to  give  the
debtor a "fresh start" in carrying out his business.   The  debtor
and his creditors oust arrive at a reorganization plan whereby  a
•hare of the debts is paid to the different classes of creditors
on a schedule.  The debtor normally administers  the reorganization.
B.   Voluntary vs. Involuntary Bankruptcy
         Under either Chapter 7 or 11, the debtor himself  nay
initiate a voluntary action.3/  The debtor does  not have to be
insolvent^/ and no formal adjudication of bankruptcy  is required
ir. "rluntary cases.  An order for relief is automatically  entered
by the Bankruptcy Court in a voluntary case.
     An involuntary petition under Chapter 7 or  11 oay.be  filed
against most debtors by certain creditors.  The  debtor may contest
the petition, however, and the issue of whether  the  debtor is  or  is
not insolvent will then be adjudicated.  The Bankruptcy Court  will
only enter an order for relief if the debtor is  not  generally  paying
u^ j-w.. --• »-K»y become due, or if a custodian, within the last  120
days before the filing of the petition, has taken possession of or
has been appointed by Che Court to take charge of substantially all
of the debtor's property,5/
I/   11 U.S.C. S 109(b).
4/   Insolvency in bankruptcy 'law is a term of art derived from
~~    common law.  If a corporation or individual claims insolvency
under the common law of a State (as opposed to filing under the
federal .Bankruptcy Code), he is generally only deemed insolvent if
he is not paying his debts as they become due and if a receiver or
other custodian has been appointed by the Court, to take charge of
his property.
5/   11 U.S.C. I303(h)

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                               .6-                       9832.7

               III. . CERCLA AND BANKRUPTCY  ACTIONS
Section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code  defines  "creditor" as:
          (A)   [an] entity that has  a  claim  against
          the debtor that arose at  the  time of  or before
          the order for relief [dismissal decision -of
          Bankruptcy Court which follows the  approval of
          the trustee's Final Report] concerning the
          debtor ...
Under section 101 of the 1978 Act,  a  "claim"  is a:
          (A) right to payment whether  or not such
          right is reduced'to judgment,  liquidated,
          unliquidated, fixed, contingent,  matured,
          unmatured, disputed, undisputed,  legal,
          equitable, secured, or
          (B) right to an equitable remedy  for  breach
          of performance if such breach gives rise .to
          a right to payment, whether or not  such
          right ... is reduced to judgment, fixed,
          contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
          secured, or unsecured.    .                 *
     The statute clearly states that  a  claim  need not be premisea
on a civil action or a final judgment;  it is  sufzicient  if  the
claim is based on a simple right to payment as  a result  of  work
completed and cost incurred.  Thus, the United  States need  not
                   •
have received a judgment under CERCLA before  making  a claim againsc
* bankrupt party.  It is enough that the United States  has  a right
to payment or an injunctive claim.   The United  States'  right to
payment can be baaed upon CERCLA Sections 107 and/or 104,  or other
authorities.  Thus, the United States can proceed  to file  a claim
in Bankruptcy Court. '                        ;
                     i
A.   Proceedings in District Court  or Bankruptcy Court.
     An important question that must be resolved in each case is
whether to initiate proceedings in District Court  or Bankruptcy

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              ....                                    9832,7
                               -7-


Cuurt.  An ordinary creditor muse  proceed  in  Bankruptcy Court

because under the automatic  stay provision  (Section 362 of the

Bankruptcy Code,  11 U.S.C.  $362(a)),  the filing of a Chapter 7 or
                                             »
    s-     •• •
Chapter 11 petition operates as an  automatic  stay of any proceedings

against the debtor.  The stay halts the following:

          (1)   the commencement or continuation  ... of a
                judicial,  administrative,  or  other proceeding
                against the  debtor  that was or could have beer.
                commenced  before the  commencement of che case
                under this title;

          (2)   the enforcement, against the  debtor or  against
                property of  the estate, of a  judgment obtainea
                before the commencement of the case  ...

          (3)   any act to obtain  possession  of property of
                the estate or of property  from the estate;

          (4)   any act to create,  or enforce any lien
                against .property of the estate;

          (5)   any act to create,  perfect, or enforce  against
                property of  the debtor any lien to the  extent
                that such  lien secures a claim that arose
                before the commencement of che case  ...;

          (6)   any act to collect, assess, or recover  a claim
                against the  debtor that arose before  the
                commencement of che case  ...; and,

          (7')   che teeoff of any  debt owing  co che  debtor  ...

     In a number of situations, however, Che  filing  of  a petition

does not operate as a stay,  including (Scccion 363(b)):
                                                 f-
          (4) ... Che commencement or continuation'of
              an action ...  by a  governmental unit  Co
              enforce such governmental un.it's policy  or
              regulatory power;

          (5) ... che enforcement  of a judgment other  Chan
              a money judgment, obtained  in an action  or
              proceeding by a governmental unit  co  enforce
              such governmental unit's police or  regulatory
              power.

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                                                       9832.7
                               -8-
     The purpose of these exceptions,  as articulated in the  House

Report accompanying the Bankruptcy Code, is Co permit governmental

authorities to pursue actions to protect public health and safety^/

and to allow governmental units to sue or continue suit against  a

debtor to abate violations of environmental protection lavs.?/

     The exception in Section 361(b)(4), as interpreted by the

government, is broad.  It matters not  what is sought:  The government

may commence or continue any police or regulatory action.   This

includes actions for money (CERCLA $107) and actions for injunctive

relief (CERCLA §106). £/  At the stage  of seeking to execute any
6/   H.R. Rep. No. 95-595 95th Cong., 2d sess. 343 (1978);  95.
     Cong. Rec. H 11092 (Sept. 28, 1978)

y   H.R. Rep. No. 95-595. at 343.  See also; In re Bay Bridge
~"    Inn..Inc. v. New York State Liquor Authority. 94 F.2d 555
(2d Cir.  1938); In re Colonial Tavern v. Charles L. Byrne,  420 F.
Supp. 44  (D. Mass. 1976} and In re Dolly Madison. 504 F.2d. 499
(3d. Cir. 1974) [held; ar bankruptcy court should not interfere with
governmental regulatory programs]; Aaron, Bankruptcy Stays  tor
Environmental Regulation; Harvest of Cocmerical Timber as an
Introduction to a Clash of Policies. 12 Envfl. Law 1. 5-8  (19fel)
I-..*.£Uf.tcy Law - When is a Governmental Unit's Action to Enforce
its Policy or Regulatory Power Exempt from the Automatic Stay
Provisions of Section 362?. 9 Fla. Univ. L. Rev. 369. 380 (1981).
See: ii U.S.C. i362(c)-(g) for the conditions under which the
automatic stay remains in effect and other rules applicable to
obtaining relief from the stay.

8_/   A motion to overcome the stay should generally be filed in
~~    Bankruptcy Court before proceeding in District Court.  (See
Pleadings section, infra.)  A recent opinion in which a Bankruptcy
Judge discussed -- and rejected -- holding a citizens' group in
contempt for failing to overcome -.the stay is In Re Revere Copper
and Brass. Inc. . 29 B.R. 584 (Bkrtcy.N.W., 19F3TWhen the govern-
ment proceeds in District Court, a timely proof of claim should
also be filed in Bankruptcy Court (see page 24 infra)  When a
Regional attorney wishes to pursue in District Court a cost recovery •
judgment againt a bankrupt party, it is particularly important that
this strategy be discussed with appropriate EPA H/Q and DOJ attorneys
before referral of a case.     '

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                                                     9832,7
                                -9-

judgment chat nay be obtained,  the government  should be prepared
to argue that enforcement of the judgment  is a continuation of the
governmental unit's enforcement of its  regulatory power.  Thus the
                                                    i
Bankruptcy Code read in conjunction  vith CERCLA and other authorities
allows the United States to seek an  order  from Federal District
Court requiring the Bankruptcy  Court co order  the debtor  in posses-
8ion or trustee to use assets of the bankrupt  to abate a  hazardous
condition or to reimburse the government for its expenditures.
     In two recent cases, the courts rejected  the government's
view of the exceptions-.  In United States  v. Johns Manville £/ ,
the District Court in New Hampshire  denied EPA's motion  to vacate
an Order issued by the Bankruptcy Court in New York  staying  all
proceedings in an EPA enforcement action against .Manville.   The
opinion characterized the government's  action  for  injunctive  relief
as tantamount to an action for  a money  judgment.  Since  Section
362(b)(5) of the Code prohibits enforcement of a money judgment,
the Court held that the injunctive relief  sought by  the  government
did not fall within the parameters of Che  bankruptcy stay exemption.
The Court noted that if the government  had instead  sought an
injunction to prevent active, on-going  disposal rather  than  cleanup
of an existing hazard, such an  action would not have been stayed
by the bankruptcy filing.  In our view, the District Court
9/   No. 81-229-D (D.N.H. decided Nov. 15, 19*2),

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                                                      9832.7
                               -10-

erred._]_£/  The Agency has proceeded  with CERCLA response  activities
at the Johns Manville sites.
     In In Re Kovacs. ^/  Ohio was stayed from  proceeding in
                                           <       "
State Court in its efforts to enforce an injunction  requiring
Kovacs to clean up a hazardous waste site.  Kovacs,  a  corporate
officer and operator of the Chem-Dyne site, had declared  bankruptcy.
The Sixth Circuit, affirming the District Court and  Bankruptcy
Court decisions, held that Ohio, in  proceeding  to enforce the
injunction in State .Court was actually seeking  a money judgment.
                         •       *
The Supreme Court granted the State  of Ohio's petition for a
writ of certiorari on January 24,  1983.  The  Supreme Court vacated
the judgment and remanded the case to the Sixth Circuit to consider
the issue of mootness.  The Supreme  Court has accepted certiorari
for a second time in the Kovacs II case.J_2/   The issue presented
in Kovacs II is whether a bankrupt defendants nay rely on the
discharge provisions of the Bankruptcy code  to  void  an injunction
which requires him to cleanup a hazardous waste facility*.  In
January 1984, the United States filed an amicus curiae b'rief  in
107  The government took the position that the Johns Manville
     District Court «rred, in a notion to dismiss^in AM Inter-
national v. United States. Case No. 82-B04922 .(N.D. Hi. Bkrtcy
Ct.) (CERCLA SI06 Action;..
H/  681 F.2d 454 (6th Cir.  1982).
I2./  State of Ohio v. Kovacs (Kovacs II), 717 F.2d 984 (6th Cir. ,
     1983) (cert, granted, Sp. Ct. No. 83-1020).-

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                                                     9832,7

                               -ii-


the Kovacs II case stating that the case has national implication

for environmental enforcement under the Clean Water,  RCRA.  and

CERCLA and further the states that the 6th Circuit  decision
    •                                             •
"obviously encourages polluters to abuse the Bankruptcy  Code

and defy state and federal environmental protection." 1_3/

B.   Cost Recovery under Section 107 of CERCLA

     The United States should be prepared at -the time of filing

of a proof of claim in Bankruptcy Court to prove that its  claim

should be allowed by the court.  That is, if the agency  has spent

tor wiii spend) ^/ money at a site under the provisions of CERCLA

104, and wishes to recoup such expenditures under CERCLA Section

107, the United States will have to demonstrate to  the,Bankruptcy

Court that the estate is in fact liable for such expenses  under

Section. 107 ,]*J                      •

     Therefore, when the United States files a proof of  claim
                                          \
with the Bankruptcy Court, Department of Justice and EPA attorneys
13/  Id.,  Memorandum for the United States as amicus curiae
     supporting petitioner (January, 1984).

14/  In the ease where the Agency has not spent Superfund money
     at the cite but where we intend to conduct a fund-iinanced
response action, the United States can file a proof or claim for
an ''open account."  The proof of claim would indicate that the
claim is founded on an open account which will become due upon
Che completion of the abatement actions by EPA.
   \    m
157  A usual commercial claim of a creditor is established by the
     existence of a receipt or invoice indicating that the debtor
received goods or services which he contracted to receive.  When
EPA has performed work on a site, however, there has been no agree-
ment to perform such work between EPA and the bankrupt party.
Therefore, we must be prepared to prove Section 107 liability in
order to prove our claim.

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                               -12-

should be prepared to prove all elements of a Section 107  cost
recovery action.  The case must be referred to the Department
of Justice in the normal way, although there may be situations
when.a referral by telephone may be necessary.  See Procedures.
infra.
              1.   Distribution of Assets
                   (a)   Secured Creditors
                   The claims of secured creditors are satisfied
fully before assets are distributed to any unsecured creditors,
including creditors claiming administrative expenses.  The
justification for this treatment of secured creditors is statutory
(11 U.S.C. SS507, 726).  A valid lienJ.fi a right to repayment,
created by agreement, which exists independently of bankruptcy
laws.  As iuch, it is a charge against assets which must be met
before distribution to unsecured creditors.JJj/  For example,  a
bank that has made a loan to the owner of a facility that is
secured by a lien on the heavy equipment will receive "off the
"top" the amount representing the value of the heavy equipment or
the equipment itself before distribution of assets to unsecured
creditors In order of their priority under Section 507 of the
Code.
 16/  3  Collier on Bankruptcy.  Para  507.02 507-12.6  (15th  Ed.

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              - •-   •            -13.  -'

     In Chapter 7 proceedings,  secured creditors  vill  recover
before unsecured creditors,  including EPA,  unless Che  Bankruptcy
Court is persuaded by our arguments  to Jump our claims  ahead of
all others.]2J  *n Chapter 11 proceedings,  the government  should
be prepared to play an active role in working out the  terns of a
reorganization plan with the various classes of creditors  which
provides for eventual repayment of our cleanup expenditures.
The classes of creditors that have secured  interests will  have
the greatest leverage in negotiation of a plan.
          (b) Priority Structure
              Section 507 of the Code sets  up the priority
structure for satisfaction of unsecured claims.JJ*/  Payments  to
the unsecured creditors are  generally made  on a  pro rata basis.
Ten, fifteen or twenty cents to the dollar is common,  depending
on the assets remaining in the estate.  The following  expenses
                   \
and claims have priority in che following order  under  Section
507(a>:          :
              1.   First, administrative expenses ...  and any  fees
                   and charges assessed against  the estate ...
17/  I507(b) establishes a "Super Priority" which'would require
tKe Agency to have priority over every other claim allowable.
Under S507(b) EPA would have to prove (1) that EPA has a claim
(for administrative expenses) and (2) that this claim is protected
by a lien on the debtor's property (mechanics lien or prejudgmenc
lien) and (3) that the stay has prevented use of the property
(clean up).  See Motion for Allowance of Administrative Expenses,
In Re TriangleThemicals Inc.. Case No. 80-00993-HS-7.
LB/  11 U.S.C. 507(a)

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                               -14-
              "  ' "   *         *>*
              2 <.   Second, unsecured claims allowed under
                  ' Section 502(f) of this title,  [regarding
                   certain claims arising in involuntary cases]
              3.   Third, allowed unsecured claims .for wages,
                   salaries, or commissions, including vacation,
                   severance and sick leave pay.
              4.   Fourth, allowed unsecured claims for contributions
                   to employee benefit plans.
              5.   Fifth, allowed unsecured claims of individuals,
                   to the extent of $900.*..
              6.   Sixth, allowed  [certain] unsecured [tax or
                   penalty fee] claims of governmental units  ...
     Claims by  the United States are classified as sixth priority
claims'or general unsecured  creditors.  Because government claims
are so  low in the priority line, attorneys  for the government  should
'be prepared to  argue that our claims should be given greater
preference, based on one of  the theories described below.
     Congress is currently considering a bill ]$J intended to
give claimants  undet R~CRA or Superfund a priority in bankruptcy
proceedings superior to all  other creditors, whether their claims
are secured or  unsecured.  Four states have already enacted
            •             *
 1..9/  H.R. 2767  tponsored by Rep.  Florio.

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                                                      9832-7
                               -15-
sioilar provisions in their own environmental  lavs.Q/

          2 .  Theories of Recovery Beneficial  to  the United Scaces

              (a)  Administrative Costs

     The proof of claims filed so far by the United States have

asserted that cleanup expenditures should be considered  adminis-

trative expenses of preserving the estate of the  bankrupt, thus

deserving to be satisfied as top priority claims.  While there

is little caselaw on point, one case provides  support  for this

theory.  In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker 21 / ( the Court upheld the

decision of the Bankruptcy Court which required the trustee to

expend sums of money as administrative costs in order  to remove  a

hazardous nuisance.  The condition was created when the  bankrupt

party abandoned several barges in Baltimore Harbor.  The Court
207  Massachusetts oil. and Hazardous Materials Release Prevention
     and Response Act, Mass. Gen. Laws.  Ch. 21E;  New Hampshire
Solid and Hazardous Waste Management Act,  N.H. Rev.  Stat.  Ann.
Ch. 147-B: 10; New Jersey Spill Compensation and  Control Act,  53
N.J. Stat. Ann. $10-23.11f (1981).  Colorado has  also enacted
superlien legislation.  For a dismissal of these  statutes  and  the
pending federal legislation »ee "Superlien 'Solutions' to  Hazardous
Waste: Bankruptcy Conflicts" ABA Environmental Law Newsletter,
winter 83/84.

2jy  Ottenheimer v. Whitaker. 198 F. 2d 289 (3rd  Cir. 1952) was
     decided under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30.Stat. 544, which
hat been replaced by the current Bankruptcy Reform Act of  1978,
92 Stac. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C.).  See also. In re Lewis
Jones. Inc. 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 277 (Bk. Ct. E.D. Pa.  1974;  for
the proposition that the bankruptcy court is under a duty  to
protect the public interest and may order a Trustee to take
action to protect such interest.  Various memoranda supporting
filed proofs of claim contain further caselaw and arguments.
These are available trom OECM-Waste.

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                                                      9832.7
              ' •'   '           -16-

reasoned that obstruction of the Harbor would conflict with  the
purposes of the Rivers and Harbor Act.
     In its opinion the court stated,  "The judge-made rule
[allowing abandonment] must give way when it  cooes  into  conflict
with a statute enacted in order to ensure the safety ot  navigation;
                                                      i
for we are not dealing with a burden imposed  upon  the bankrupt  or
his property by contract, but a duty and a burden  imposea upon  an
owner of vessels by an Act of Congress  in the public  interest."227
     The United States has argued, by  analogy,  that expenditures
made by EPA in the public interest under the  authority of CERCLA
should be reimbursed as administrative  expenses.   This public
interest argument should stress the importance of  recovering
money to replenish the fund to clean up additional sites.   There-
fore, in a CERCLA case, as in Ottenheimer, an Act  of  Congress
enacted for the public health and welfare should  take priority
over the usual bankruptcy distribution order.
     In a recent ruling from the bench in a case  entitled  In re
T.P. Long, in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District
of Ohio, held that the trustee is liable to EPA for cleanup
costs at a hazardous waste site.£37  While the Judge  did not
specifically state that the Government's cleanup expenses  were
"administrative expenses" for bankruptcy purposes, the  written
order is expected to elaborate on the ruling from the bench.
227  Id. at 290.
237  In Re T.P. Long Chemical Co.. Inc.. Case No. 581-906 (N.D,
     Ohio, Bkrtcy. Eastern District, April 5, 1984).

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                               .17.                    9832.7
             • * *         .       ' '

The United States is- expeced to file briefs  on  the  question of
priority for reimbursement  as between the secured  interest holder
. _ j .u . ..... ___ -— r
«... -..— O  i..»—>-«tU»
                                         t
          (b) Recovery Under Section 506(c)  of  the  'Code
              This subsection states: "The trustee  may recover
from property securing an allowed secured claim the reasonable,
necessary costs and expenses of preserving,  or  disposing of,  such
property to the extent of any benefit to  the holder of such  clairz."
(11  U.S.C. $ 506(c)). .In a situation involving real property
securing a loan made by a bank or savings and loan, cleanup  coses
that preserved the property would presunably benefit the lender
and would be .recoverable.  This would allow  the Agency to object
to any liquidation of the real property.
     The language of Section 506(c) states,  however, that the
trustee rather than the;government can recover.  The government
could deal with this by specifically requesting the trustee's
ratification of EPA cleanup plans or obtaining from the  trustee an
agreement to seek reimbursement under 506(b).2V
24/  See Robinson v. Dickey. 36 F. 2d 147 (lienholders did not
     object to water being pumped out of nines for .safety reasons
and were liable for expenditures).  First Western Savings & Loan
Association v, Anderson. 252 F. 2d 544; Miners Savings BanCToT
Pittston. Pa. v. Joyce. 97 F.2d 973.

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                                -is-               .   $832*7.

          (c) Equitable Liens
              It has also been suggesced by the Civil Division  of
the Department of Justice that, depending on the facts of  the
situation, the United States could argue that expenditures  of
funds for cleanup create an equitable lien on the property.  Such
a lien would create an implied contract for reimbursement  of EPA
as a secured creditor.  State law on equitable liens  should be
researched if this theory is attempted.  It may be of limited
use since State law may only allow for imposition- of  an equitable
lien in situations involving a fraudulent conveyance  of real
property.  State law may also require the trustee to  have  re-
quested cleanup of the property, or at least agreed to.. it.2_5/ .
  -        (d)  Restitution
               Equitable restitution of the United States  has been
approved by the court in cases in which the United States  acted to
alleviate a potential health hazard..  In Vyandotte Transportation
Co. v. United States 2671 the Coast Cuara unloaded a  barge loaded
with liquid chlorine gas that the defendant had refused to unload
promptly.  The Supreme Court required reimbursement of costs
incurred by the United States.  The Court noted that  denial .of
reimbursement would have financially penalized the United States
257  For a discussion of State Law on "Mechanics Lien Statutes as
     «n Enforcement Tool in CERCLA Cost Recovery Actions."  See meao
from R. Schaefer to A.J. Barnes and C.M. Price dated January 11, 19o-
                                                                    ;
267  VJyandotte Transportation Co.. v. United States. 389 U.S. 191
     (1967).

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                                                        9832.7
                                -19-

for acting expeditiously to protect  public  health  and safety,
while unjustly enriching the defendant.
     The Vyandotte case has been invoked  in proof  of claims filed
by the United States as a basis for  recovery of  CERCLA costs that
Che government has incurred.  In a recent order  issued in United
States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical  and Chemical Co.,  Inc., et al.
(NEPACCO) 1Z/, Che court stated that  restitution was available under
§7003 of RCRA because the bankruptcy  action was  an action  in equity.
United States v. Reserve Mining 28/  also  lends  support to  a claim
Daseo on restitution.  In that case,  the  Court  held that when the
United States is seeking reimbursement for  alleviating a potential
public health hazard caused by one who is in violation-of  a federal
statute, reimbursement may be granted under the Court's  equitable
powers.
C.   Other Matters In Bankruptcy and  Insolvency Cases
                                ,                                *
     1.   Abandonment of Property                  .
          *i. «ny bankruptcy case,  the trustee may  choose to petition
the Court to allow abandonment of some or all of the assets of  the
estate on the grounds that care of  the assets by the trustee would
be excessively burdensome to the estate.  29/  The  rationale for
277  United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co.,
     Inc.. et al.~(NEPACCO) (September 30. 1983. W. Dist. Missouri
S.W. Div.).
287  United States v. Reserve Mining. 408 F. Supp. 1212, (D.  Minn.
     1976).•
19/  11 U.S.C. 5 554.

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                                                      9832.7
             *  "                -20-             "              .
               \                           .     ' -           .
permitting abandonment was articulated in In  re Ira Haupt &  Co . :
          . .-. [T]he courts have always  recognized  that
          a Trustee is under no duty  to retain the Title
          to a piece of property or a  cause of action
          that is so heavily encumbered,  or so costly,
          in preserving or securing,  that it  does not
          promise any benefit to the  funds  available
          for distribution.
     The United States will oppose abandonment  in  certain  circum-
stances because the procedure may allow the  estate to avoid
liability for on-going environmental obligations and may allow' the
trustee to rid the estate of an asset in which  the United  States
may ultimately have an interest,  (based on equitable lien, resti-
tution or administrative expenses).  For example,  if contaminated.
property is abandoned by the trustee, the property reverts back to
the secured creditor and the Agency may have no claim against  the
nonbankrupt party after clean up.  Accordingly, the United States
should normally take the position that abandonment is only permis-
sible when public health and safety obligations (statutory or
-•Vrrvise) are met, and when a third party will not recover  a
windfall from EPA's clean up actions.  Abandonment may  be  preferred
prior to clean up 'if Che property will revert to a viable  party
whoa EPA may pursue for contribution to the  clean  up.
     The position of the United States is supported by  the reasoning
Of the Ottenheimer v. Whitaker case, 317 and by In Re  Lewis  Jones .
307  In re Ira Haupt & Co., 398 F.2d 607 (2d Cir. 1968).
3W  Supra. note 13.

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                                                            f
                                -21-

Inc. 327  in the Ottenheiaer case, the Court refused to allow the
trustee to. abandon assets that created a hazardous condition.
Rather, the Court required the trustee to use assets of the  estate
to remove from Baltimore Harbor several barges belonging to  the
debtor that night have otherwise obstructed the Harbor.
     In In Re Lewis Jones, Inc^ . the Court reiterated the Otten-
heiaer position and held that the bankruptcy trustee could not
simply abandon the property.  Instead, the trustee was required  tc
repair various steam pipes and manhole covers to protect public
health and safety.  The Court in Ottenheiaer had held that abandon-
ment of the debtor's barges by the trustee would conflict with the
Rivers and Harbors Act.  The Court in In Re Lewis Jones went a
step further, stating that "even absent the violation of a state
or federal act, the public interest must be protected by the Bank-
ruptcy Court." 337                                       :
     The law on abandonment under the Code is unsettled.  In the
recent bankruptcy case, In Re Quanta Resources.^4/ the New Jersey
District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's ruling allowing
abandonment of a hazardous waste site over the objection of  the
City of New York and the State of New York.  The Court allowed the
company co abandon a hazardous waste site on grounds that the
327 -Id.
33_7  In Re Lewis Jones, supra at 280.
347  In Re Quanta Resources Corp.,  	 F. Supp.
     No. 82-3524 (D.N.J. Jan 24, 1983) Appeal Pending
No. 83-5142 (3d Cir.).

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                                                        9832.7
              •  •'               -22-

property was burdensome to the estate.    At  the  site,  there were
500,000 gallons of waste oil,  sludge and hazardous waste.stored  in
52 tanks and about 70,000 gallons of waste oil contaminated by
PCBs.'3_5_/  While Quanta had previously signed a consent order
with the N.Y. Department of Environmental Conservation to  clean  up
the site, the Bankruptcy Court's favorable ruling on abandonment
effectively nullified the order.
    .New York City and State had asserted that the holdings  in
Ottenheimer and Lewis Jones required that the Court deny the
trustee's petition to abandon and allocate assets  in  the estate  to
be used for site cleanup rather than distribution  to  creditors.
The Court rejected this argument, pointing out that the two  cases
were decided before passage of the 1978 Bankruptcy Act.  Before  the
Act, che Court noted, abandonment was allowable  under  judge-cade
rule.   Section 554 of the Bankruptcy Code, however, provided  specific
statutory authority for the abandonment, of burdensome  property.   ,
This authority, the Court stated, was not conditioned  by Congress
upon a finding that abandonment does not harm the  public interest .367
     The Court was similarly unpersuaded by  New  York's argument
that S959(b) of the United States Judicial Code, (28  U.S.C.  Section
.357  Hazardous Waste Litigation Reporter, (July 6, 1982) at 2,646
36/  Id. at 3,671 and 3,672.                   .

-------
               -  ••  '            -23-                       "   .

959(b)) prohibited abandonment.  Section 959(b) provides that the
trustee shall "manage and operate" property in his possession
•www*U*i.6 ;o valid laws.  The Court found that this provision did
not apply to the trustee in a Chapter 7 context, but only to
receivers and trustees involved in business operations rather than
in distribution of an estate.
     2.   State Insolvency Lavs
          States can enact insolvency 'laws that affect bankrupt
parties as long as the substance of those laws does not overlap
with the Ftderal Bankruptcy Reform Act's jurisdiction.  The United
                                                   t
States Constitution gives Congress the power to establish uniform
laws on bankruptcy 22/ but does not prevent states from passing
valid laws on insolvency.  To the extent there is no conflict
between a state's insolvency law and the federal .bankruptcy law,
the state law remains in operation.3£/ .
     The United States may benefit from being a creditor in state
insolvency proceedings in appropriate situations.  Under 31 U.S.C.
S191 (1979), debts to the United States are given  top priority in
state insolvency proceedings.  The top priority for government
debts does not create a lien on the debtor's property in favor of
the federal government.  At a minimus, however., it gives the
government a right of priority over all unsecured  creditors to
3T./  U.S. CONST art 1, S8 cl 4.
^£/  In re Wisconsin Builders Suooiv Co., 2<39 F.2d 649  (7th Cir.
     1956), Cert, denied 353 U.S. 965  (1958).

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              -  -   -            .24-                    9832.7.


payment out of Che property in the hands  of  the  debtor's  assignees

or other representatives under the conditions  specified  in  the

statute.^l/

                          IV.    PROCEDURES

A.   Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure

     The Supreme Court,  advised by the Judicial  Conference  of the

United States, has the authority to promulgate rules  governing

cases under the new Bankruptcy Code.^_£/  The Advisory Committee  on

Bankruptcy Rules was duly appointed by Chief Justice  Burger to

draft rules.  The Committee was nearing completion  of work  on the

Proposed Rules when the  decision in Northern Pipeline Construction

Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co. cast doubt on  the Code and ..the Proposed

Rules.  Thus, no new rules have yet been  promulgated.

     The existing rules  were summed up in a  Bankruptcy Monograph

drafted by the Office of the Attorney General:

           "Until ... rules of practice and  procedure are
           approved, at  least two different  sets of rules
           oust be consulted.   First, there  are  the "Suggested
           Interim Bankruptcy Rules"  prepared  by the  Advisory
           Committee on  Bankruptcy Rules  of  the  Judicial
           Conference of the United States which were published
39/  Bramwell v. United States Fidelity & Co..  269 U.S. 483
     (1926).  The United States could"also argue that satisfaction
of CERCLA-based claims precedes consensual liens, such as mortgages.
The question appears to be open.  Collier, at any rate, expresses
the view that whether consensual liens come ahead of the Government's
S191 priority has not been finally and authoritatively determined.
Vol. 6A Collier, §913(2] p. 246.

40/  Under Public Law 95-598 $248, Congress conferred this power
     on the Supreme Court, amending the grant of rule-making power
set forth in 28 U.S.C. 52075 to include the new Title 11 Bankruptcy
Code.

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                                                    9.832,7

              -  •-  •              -25-


           in August'1979 as 'guidelines' that could be .adopted
           .as local  rules.  The interim rules have been adopted
           in many districts, albeit with occasional variations....
           Local district court rules apply' in some jurisdictions.
           Some bankruptcy courts have adopted numerous local
           rules in  addition to, or in lieu of, these interim
           rules.  Second, if a point o.f procedure "is not covered
           by the applicable local rules, consult the Bankruptcy
           Rules in  effect under the Bankruptcy Act of 1889. "^ i

    Government attorneys involved in bankruptcy cases will find

rules and all forms  (such as proof of claim forms) in Collier on
                            /
Bankruptcy (15th ed. 1981).

B.   Filing Proofs of Claim

     To have standing as a creditor, the United States must file' a

proof of claim form which states the name of 'the claimant; the anour.t

of the debt or claim; the grouno of liability; the date the c la its

became due or will become due under an open account theory*" see

footnote 10 supra; and, the nature .of the claim (secured or general,

unsecured).^/

     The filing of proofs of claims or interests j.s explained  in

Section 501 of the Bankruptcy Code.f^/  In a liquidation case under

Chapter 7, a claim ordinarily oust be filed within six months after

the first date set for the first neeting of creditors.^/  Claims bas
41/  Bankruptcy Monograph dated Novemoer 22, 1982, prepared oy the
     Office" of the Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, for
use of U.S. Attorneys, at pp. 6,7.

42/  See. Bankruptcy Rules, Proof of Claim official forms.  Proof
     of claims filed so far have included brief affidavits from
the On-Scene Coordinator stating amounts spent and describing the
nature of the work done as well as copies of bills submitted to
EPA by contractors.
43/  11  U.S.C. 1 , 501.

44/  3 Collier on Bankruptcy Para. -501.02(2] (15th ed. 1979).

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                               '             -         9.832,7
                               -26-
on administrative expenses can be filed any  time  before  the  Court
has granted the debtor a discharge.of debts.   It  is  more difficult
Co determine when to file a proof of claim in  a Chapter  11  reorgan-
ization because while the filing is required prior  to  the Court's
acceptance of the reorganization plan,  there is no mechanise for
determining when that acceptance will cake place.  A proof  of
claim should be filed immediately, with telephone concurrence by
                    /         .
EPA HQ (OECM and OWPE) and DOJ,  if there is  any reason to believe
that a reorganization may be about to be concluded.         . .
     Section 502 of the Code governs the allowance  of  claims or.
interests; a claim is deemed allowed "unless a party in  interest
... objects."^/  In most cases, the proof of  claim should  be
included in the litigation referral package sent~'to OECM which
will then be sent to the Department of Justice- and  signed by the
Assistant Attorney General for Land and Natural  Resources or his
delegate.  The Department of Justice must, be involved  i.n the
filing of a proof of claim in Bankruptcy Court.f^j/   As. stated
above, special procedures nay be available in  emergency situations
in which che government would otherwise miss filing^deadlines.
Headquarters and DOJ should be contacted.
457  11 U.S.C. § 506(a).See also (b)-(j) [Procedure after objection]
467  See, fn 1 , page 3 supra for referral documentation that the
     TJepartment of Justice has requested regarding che.r financial
status of responsible parties.

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                                -27-                   9832,7

C.   Pleadings
     See the attached Index of Resources  for a listing  of  proofs of
claim and other pleadings that EPA has filed, so far.
     One problem area involves the issue  of  whether.or  not the
United States should file a notion to overcome the  stay in Bankruptcy
Court before proceeding to seek injunctive relief  in District Cour;.
Arguably, the statute is clear on its face and no  special  motion
is necessary for continued exercise of our regulatory powers.
Nonetheless, Bankruptcy Courts have held  attorneys  in contempt
for failing to.overcome the stay.  It is  recommended, therefore,
that a motion to overcome the stay be filed with Bankruptcy Court
when the government seeks .injunctive relief from a .bankrupt party
in District Court.          -                           •
D.   Appeals                                  •                    .
     Bankruptcy appeals are heard by appellate panels of three
bankruptcy judges appointed to the circuit counsel, on election of
the circuit.^/  If this procedure is not available, appeals are
to the District Courts.^£/  EPA and the Land and Natural Resources
Division of DOJ will involve the Appellate Staff of the Land and
Natural Resources Division in appeals from decisions of a Bankruptcy
Court and in filing of amicus briefs on bankruptcy issues related
           •
to hazardous waste site cleanup.                 ".
     28 U.S.C. § 160
48/  28 U.S.C. S 1334
~"~"      \

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              	              2S                      9832.7
                                • Zo~

E.   Federal Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction
     The jurisdiction of Bankruptcy, Courts  has  been  in  a  confused
•fate since the Supreme Court's decision  in Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v.  Marathon Pipe Line  Co.  4?/.  The  Court held
unconstitutional the grant of power  in  the  Bankruptcy Reform Act
(28 U.S.C. 1471(b)(c)) that gave Bankruptcy Courts jurisdiction
over all "civil proceedings arising  under title 11  [of  the  U.S.
Code, Bankruptcy] or arising in or related  to  cases  under title
11."^P/.. This broad  jurisdictional grant  to the Bankruptcy  Courts
was deemed unconstitutional because  bankruptcy  judges do  not have
the" protection conferred by Article  III of  the  U.S.  Constitution
(i.e. lifetime tenure subject to removal  only  by impeachment  and
irreducible compensation).  It is unclear what  effect  the decision
in Northern Pipeline will have on the type  of  cases  that  can  be
brought in Bankruptcy Court until Congress  legislates  a solution.
At the least, however, it is clear that the traditional state
common-law actions (commonly called "Marathon  claims"  by  bankruptcy
practitioners) may no longer be litigated in Bankruptcy Court  absent
che consent of che litigants.5V
A9/  	U.S.	_, 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982).
50/  28 U.S.C. 1471(b)(c).
51/  Cook, New Bankruptcy Quandary Could Be Easily Solved.
     Legal Times, Sept. 6, 1982 at 10 Col. 1.

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                                .29-


     In reaction to Congress'  failure to enacc  legislation  thac

would rectify the constitutional infirmity of the  Code,  the Adminis-

trative office of the United States Courts,  Washington,  D.C.,  form-

ulated model rules to be used as interim measures  b-y the United

States Circuit Courts.5£/  jhe cover explanation circulated with

the rules summarized the main points as follows:

          Under the model rule, all bankruptcy matters are
          initially referred to a bankruptcy judge.   [Section  b(l)
          of the Rule].   In proceedings not involving a final
          judgtaent on a Marathon claim, the bankruptcy judge may
          enter orders and judgments that become effective  immed-
          iately, subject to district court review if requested  by
          a party.  [Section (c)(2).J  With respect  to final judg-
          ments in Marathon claims, the bankruptcy judge prepares
          recommended findings and conclusions and a proposed  judg-
          ment.  [Section (c)(3.)]  A district judge then reviews
          the recommendation and enters a judgment.  [Section (cK5)j
          Where circumstances require, an order or judgment
          entered by a-bankruptcy judge will be confirmed by a ais-
          trict judge even if no objection is filed.53/

     Because the United States claims are based.on federal  rather- •

than state law, the provisions are not directly relevant to our

claims. Nonetheless, the Rules do appear to .allow  the government

—.  „--_ .. ---jrinent with options for »eeking relief in the Bank-

ruptcy Court.  For example, the United States can  move the District
                         •w
Court to "withdraw the reference to the bankruptcy judge."£^/   If
52/  See; Memorandum from William E. Foley (Dir. Udmin Officer
     of U.S. Courts) to Judges, Clerks U.S. Court System Regarding
.Continued Operation of the Bankruptcy Court System after Dec. 24,
1982 in the Absence of Congressional Action.

53/  Id.                                                  .
5&/ ' §1471 (d) grants Bankruptcy Judges the authority to refuse-
     jurisdiction.

-------
                                 «                      9832.7
such a notion were granted, • the; :D/|;4. t r i c t Court could retain the
                               > •;:•'₯% V,..
entire matter, refer part of it back to the bankruptcy judge or

refer Che entire matter back to tne bankruptcy judge.   The govern-
                                Sfi'
oent should also make a simultaneous motion co overcome the stay.

If, however, an action in Bankruptcy Court has already been initiacec,

che government may file a motion to stay the bankruptcy matter in

order to proceed in District Court.557

                               •::|:;-

                V.  THEORIES OF DIVIDUAL LIABILITY

     The government anticipates situations in which individuals

responsible for the creation of hazardous waste site conditions are

financially solvent even though the corporate owners and operators

are bankrupt.In"such a case, the United States may choose to

ignore the estate in bankruptcy and pursue the responsible individ-

uals -- as individuals -- directly, or che United States could

pursue -both the assets of che bankrupt corporation and the appro-

priate individuals. 5j»/          ,;>
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                                -31-                    983.2-7

A.    Personal Involvement in Acts and Omissions
     The scope of personal liability of corporate officers is  broad.
A corporate officer, director, or agent is liable for torts he
commits regardless of whether he acted on his own b'ehalf or to
benefit the corporation, regardless of whether he personally bene-
fited from the commission of the tort and regardless or whether
the corporation is also liable.  He is also liable tor the torts
of the corporation and of other directors, officers or agents  if
he failed to exercise reasonable care.57/
     The liability of corporate officers is generally lisitec  to.
situations in which the corporate defendant has knowledge or
responsibility for tortious acts being committed within his area
o'f responsibility.  A general duty of supervision may be an insuf-
ficient basis for liability.587
     The United States plans to make use of this theory of liability
in pursuing, in certain cases, the assets of individuals involved
with corporations that have declared bankruptcy.  The fact patterns
of these particular cases seem well-suited to the law.  They involve
situations in which hazardous waste treatment or disposal operations
57/  See:  19 C.J.S. Corporations §5845, 850 (1940).  Accord:
     TT75. v. Hess. 41 F. Supp. 197, (S.D. N.Y. 19S3).  See also:
Miller v. Muscarelle. 1970 A. 2d (N.J. Super., 1961); Donsco Inc.
v. Casper Corp.. 587 F. 2d. 609 (3d Cir. 1978); Pa tyro an v. Howey.
340 Mo. 11, 100 S.W. 2d. 851, 856 (19b3).  Sinaleton v. Armor"—
Velvet Corp.. 4 P. 2d 223 (cal. App).  See also Brief in U.S. v.
Mahler (H.D.  Pa.) drafted by Michael Steinberg, Attorney, Environ-
mental Defense Section, OOJ. (April 1, 1983) for a discussion or
personal liability^
58_/  Martin v. Wood. 400 F. 2d 310 (3d. Cir. 1968).

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                                                         98-32-7
               - ••               -32-

vere directed by employees of  corporations  that  later declared
corporate bankruptcy and abandoned  the  facilities,  leaving  public
nuisance conditions essentially of  their  own  creation.
     In fact, EPA and the Department  of Justice  have already used
this legal theory successfully.  In one RCRA  Section 7003 case,  the
United States argued that this Section  imposes personal  liability
on corporate officers.  The Court denied  defendant's motion to
dismiss, stating:
          "In,Missouri,  a corporate officer who  participates
          in the commission of a tort may be  held  personally
          liable for any resulting  damage.   Patyman v. Howey,
          100 S.W.  2d 851, «56 (Mo. 1936).   'A contrary  rule
          would enable a director or  officer  of  a  corporation
          to perpetrate  flagrant injuries and escape liability
          behind the shield of his  representative  character,
          even though the corporation might be insolvent or
          irresponsible.' 19 Aa. Jur. 2d  S  1382  at 77.££/
     In addition to theories of individual  tort  liability,  CERCLA
explicitly allows individuals  to be held  liable  for cleaning  up
hazardous waste sites.  Section 107 of  CERCLA clearly permits  impo-
sition of strict liability upon broad classes of persons including
an individual owner or operator, any  person who  at the  time of
disposal of any hazardous substance owned or  operated any facility,
persons who arranged for disposal and persons vho  accepted  for
transport hazardous substances.££/  The Act defines "person"
                               """              '   9-
as, inter alia, "an individual."6J/  One  purpose of che corporate
597  U.S. v. North Eastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co.. Inc.
     et al.. (NEPACCO) No. 8U-5066-CV-SW. (Western Dist. Mo. 19di).
A later NEPACCO decision based a determination of liability on SI 07
of CERCLA.  (see discussion infra)
607  CERCLA S107(a)(l)(2), (3)(4)
6V  CERCLA S 101(21).

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                                                       9832,7
                                -33- •

structure is to insulate shareholders  from liability.   There  is,
however, no insulation from liability  --  no corporate  veil  to
                                                      *
pierce -- when officers or agents of a corporation  commit tortious
Acts or participate personally in the  commission  of torts.
B.   Piercing the Corporate Veil
     By piercing the corporate veil, the  United States may-  be
able Co establish the individual liability of shareholders  for
torts committed by the corporation.  The  case law tends to  uphold
protection of the corporate form.  Courts will, however,  make
exceptions to this rule when shareholders have commingled individual
and corporate affairs so that the corporation appears  to  be no
more than the "alter ego" of the individual shareholder.
     Federal courts have relied on the.tollowing factual  tests in
determining when to pierce the corporate  veil: 1) Is the  corporation
undercapitalized for its purposes?  2) Does the corporation observe
corporate formalities?  3) Does the corporation pay dividends?
A) Is the corporation solvent?  5) Have the dominant shareholders
siphoned corporate funds?  6) Does che situation present  an element
of "fundamental unfairness"?££/  Courts have refused to pierce the
veil absent a showing of fundamental unfairness.£3/  However,
627  United States v. Plsani. 646 F.2d. 83, 88 (3d. Cir. 1981).
637  DeWitt Trucking Brokers v. W. Ray Fleming Fruit Company.
     540 F. 2d 681, 667 (4th Cir. 1976).

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                                -34-
9832.7
fraud need not be sh'own if federal lav governs  a case.^/   The
general rule applied by federal courts co cases involving  federal
statutes is that the individuals nay be held liable, in  the interest
of public convenience,  fairness and equity.   The sp'ecific  statutory
directives of CERCLA support a federal law.   In addition,  the
language of CERCLA establishes liability for individuals who owned,
operated or otherwise controlled activities  at  hazardous waste
     Fact situations faced by the United States  involving -hazardous
waste disposal or treatment operations should prove appropriate.
for piercing the veil.  In many cases, the United States  is finding
that CERCLA problems have been created by corporations that have
been mismanaged and undercapitalized for the purpose of handling
hazardous waste.  Moreover, in some cases, the same individual
shareholder/directors have dissolved and reformed essentially the
same hazardous waste operations several times, an indication that
the corporate form is being used as a shield and "alter ego" for
individuals.
64/  United States v. Normandy House Nursing Home. 428 F.Supp.421,
     424 (D. Mass. 1977). The government will want.to argue that
federal' law applies co piercing the veil.  U.S. v. Kimbell Foods.
440 U.S. 715 (1979), holds that «pplication""oI~St*te law should
not frustrate the objectives of federal statutes. * In the Pisam
ease, supra, at 87. the Third Circuit stated, "We believe it is
undesirable to let the rights of Che United States change whenever
State courts issue new decisions on piercing the corporate veil."
65/  See, pages 7-9, Guidance Memo "Liability of Corporate Officers".,
    .fn 49 supra.

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                                                        9832,7
              •  ••               -35-

C.   Personal Jurisdiction in Cases Involving Corporate
     Officers or Shareholders
     If the United States proceeds to initiate action agains't
individual corporate officers or shareholders, the -government  should
anticipate that defendants may raise the defense of improper juris-
diction or service of process if they reside outside the state
where the CERCLA site is.  For example, in U.S. v. North Eastern
              •%.                             *m^^mmM•    «^«^™^^—«i^"^^^^^-^^^^^-—
Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co.. Inc.. e't 'al. (NEPACCO)££/,  defendants
alleged that, as Connecticut residents, they vere not subject  to
                                                                  t
extraterritorial service of process under Missouri rules of civil
procedure.  They argued that since their acts in directing the
disposal of hazardous waste in Missouri occurred not as their
individual acts but as the corporate acts of NEPACCO, they could
not be subject to extraterritorial service of process as defined in
the Missouri rules.
  *                                        .                   •.
     The Court rejected this argument as overly technical and
affirmed that: it had valid personal jurisdiction over the defendants
	 	,*, iiuwever, points to the need for attorneys to research
state law regarding personal jurisdiction and service* of process.
Referrals to the Department of Justice should include anticipated
defenses related to personal Jurisdiction.       -
667  Order No. 5066-CV-SW, (June 11, 1981, W. Di'st. Missouri,
~"~   SW Div.)

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              •  ••   •            -36-                  9832-7


                     'VI.   INDEX OF RESOURCES


     These materials can be sent to EPA Regional  attorneys  on

request.  Because OECM-Vaste does not  have  the  resource  capability

to reproduce and send numerous copies,  mailings will  be  limited  to

one copy per region of each document listed.
                                     ,  .   -                      \

PLEADINGS

   Proofs of Claim

     In the Matter of Aidex Corp.. Case No.  79-0-111, APPLICATION
   :  FOR PAYMENT OF FUNDS  HELD IN TRUST BY  THE  CLERK  OF  THE COURT
     FOR CLEAN UP OF HAZARDOUS WASTE SITE CONDITION.

     U.S. v. Jack L. Neal  and Geraldine Faye Neal (Globe),  Case  No.
     SinJom, COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AflD APPLICATION
     FOR ORDER TOR REIMBURSEMENT OF COSTS INCURRED BY THE U.S.
     IN RESPONSE TO A HAZARDOUS SITE CONDITION.

     In re Liquid Disposal Inc.. Case  No 82-01846, APPLICATION  FOR
     ORDER FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF COSTS  INCURRED  BY THE UNITED STATES
     TO CLEAN UP A HAZARDOUS SITE CONDITION and accompanying
     affidavit and invoices. (Eastern  Dist., MI)

     In re Triangle Chemicals. Inc.. Case No. «0-00993-H-C ',
     plus APPLICATION FOR ORDER FOR REIMBURSEMENT etc       'ffidavit,
     (Southern Dist., TX)

     In re Crystal Chemical Company. Case No                  'MS
     UNITED STATES MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT "
     (Southern Dist., TX)

   Other Briefs and Motions

     In the Matter of Aidex Corr
     VACATE AUTOMATIC STAY, an'
     OF MOTION TO VACATE AUTr
     order granting notion,

     In re Crystal Chem?...                                         -4,
     OBJECTION TO PROPOSED GKA..                             .    JSED
     DISCHARGE OF LIEN and accompa,.,               .. a.      iL-ioti.on.
     (Southern Dist., TX)                      '           ^

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                                                       9.832.7
               - -•   •            -37-


     State of Ohio. Petitioner v.  William Lee  Kovacs.  ON  PETITION
     FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARl TO THE  UNITED STATES  COURT  OF APPEALS
     FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT,  Brief for the United States as Aaicus
     Curiae. (Brief supporting appeal of Ohio  to the  Supreme Court).

     In re Triangle Chemicals. Inc..  Case No.  80-00993 HS-7 MOTION
     FOR ALLOWANCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE  EXPENSES  AND PROPOSED ORDER
     REQUIRING TRUSTEE TO PAY EPA18 EXPENSES.   Filed  Aug. 22, 1983.

     In the Matter of Quanta Resources Corp..  Debtor.  State
     of New York and City of New York. Appellants,  v.  Thornls
     J. O'Neill, as Trustee, Appellee. (QUANTA hereafter) Appeal
     from the District Court for the  District  of New  Jersey,
     Brief of Appellants. (U.S. Court of Appeals for  the  Third
     Circuit, No.  83-5142).

     QUANTA, Brief of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and
     State of New Jersey, Amici Curiae. (U.S.  Court of Appeals
     for the Third Circuit,  No. 83-5142).

     In Re A.M. International, Inc..  Case No.  82-B-04922, Defendant's
     (United.States') Reply  Memorandum in Support of  Defendant's
     Motion to Dismiss.

     State of Ohio'"v. Kovacs (Kovacs  11), 717  F.2d 984 (6th  Cir.,
     1983)
ORDERS
     United States of America, et al. v. Johns Manville Sales
     Corporation, et al.. Civil No. 81-299-D.Order of the
     District Court denying-United States and New Hampshire
     U..WWA.JII to vacate the automatic stay. (Nov. 15, 1982;
     U.S. District Ct., N.H)

     State of Ohio v. William Lee Kovacs. No. 81-3320. Decision
     affined District Court and Bankruptcy Court decisions that
     Kovacs was entitled to protection of automatic stay.  (June 16,
     1982, U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit)

     United States ot America v. North Eastern Pharmaceutical
     and Chemical Co.. Inc.. ec al.. No. »0-5Q6b-CV-SW.Decision
     denying defendants' notion to oismiss for lack of personal
     jurisdiction. (June 11, 19ttl; Western District of Missouri,
     S. Western Division)

     Universal Metal Stamping. Inc. v. Pennco Machinery. Inc..
     Bankruptcy No. 81-01262K.Bankruptcy Court'held that automatic
     stay does not stay a separate suit against the bankrupt's
     "sister" corporation.  (December 7, 1981; Eastern District,
     Pennsylvania)

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                                                     9832.7
                                -38-
RESOURCES
     Bankruptcy Monograph conveyed  to  U.S. Attorneys Offices
     November 22,  1982.Summary  of bankruptcy law and procedure.

     EPA Guidance  Manual:  Pursuing  RCRA Subpart H Interests
     ICF. (February,  1983) :            '.                   "

     Brief in U.S. v.  Mahler  (M.D.  Pa.) drafted by Michael Steinberg,
     Attorney, Environmental  Defense Section, DOJ (April 1, 1983).
     Discusses personal  liability of corporate officers.
RULES
     Memorandum from William  E.  Foley,  Director of the Administrative
     Office of the United States Courts on  CONTINUED OPERATION OF
     THE BANKRUPTCY COURT SYSTEM AFTER  DECEMBER 24, 1982, IN THE
     ABSENCE OF. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION  (the "Emergency Rules" or  '
     "Interim Rules"),  (December 3, 1982).

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