600A99076
Homativt Science Robtn T. Lackey August 20. 1999
Appropriate Use of Ecosystem Health and
Normative Science in Ecological Policy1
Robert T. Lackey2
National Health and Environmental Effects Research Laboratory
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
200 SW 35th Street
Corvallis, Oregon 97333 USA
(541) 754-4601
lackey.robertoepamail.epa.gov
'Modified from a talk given at the International Congress on
Ecosystem Health, Sacramento, Califfernia, August 15-20, 1999.
2Dr. Lackey, associate director fo'r science at EPA's Western
Ecology Division, is also courtesy professor of fisheries science
and adjunct professor of political science at Oregon State
University. The views and opinions expressed do not necessarily
represent those of any organization.
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ivvrmmivc tcienci K00er, ,. Laaey Aupisl 20. 1099
Abstract
Effectively resolving complex ecological policy problems may
require something beyond traditional schemes such as command and
control regulation of pollutants, maxim/am sustainable yield, or
multiple use management. Normative science (i.e., science based
on implicit policy preferences) has emerged as a basis of some of
the most popular alternatives and modifications to traditional
environmental or natural resource management. From the suite of
contesting alternatives and modifications (e.g., ecosystem
management, community-based environmental protection, bioregional
management, ecological sustainability, ecological integrity,
precautionary principle), I use "ecosystem health" as an example
of an approach based on normative science. Increasingly,
ecosystem health is heralded as a concept that will help clarify,
evaluate, and implement 21" century ecological policy and
improve management of natural resources. It is the asserted
cornerstone of many public natural resource and environmental
management programs. As the understanding of ecosystem health
matures beyond vague explanations, it is becoming increasingly
contentious, partly because it embodies implicit policy
preferences. At the core of the debate is a struggle over which
societal values and preferences will take precedence. The
foundation of the concept is the metaphor of human health, but
this simple metaphor is both a strength and a weakness. The
metaphor provides a simple heuristic framework for describing
complex ecological policy issues in everyday terms. It falters,
however, because it fails to capture the most contentious element
of ecological policy — the decisive role played by competing
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Normative Science . Robert T. Lackey August 20, 1999
individual and societal values and preferences. It is criticized
as being excessively prone to improper use by allowing, even
beckoning, scientists and others of the "technocratic elite" to
select which societal preferences will be sanctioned. Whether
current notions of ecosystem health will evolve sufficiently to
overcome inherent weaknesses is uncertain. In sum, normative
science, personified in concepts such as ecosystem health, with
its tacitly derived value and preference character, provides
limited help in reconciling the most divisive elements of
ecological policy. Whether or not one finds intellectual
sustenance with the notion of ecosystem health, the policy
concerns its proponents attempt to confront are genuine.
Key Words: Ecosystem health; ecosystem integrity; normative
science; ecological policy; conservation biology
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Normative Science Robert T. Lackey August 20, 1999 ' -4
1. Introduction
Complex, challenging, and important ecological policy issues
confront society (National Research Council, 1997; Rapport et
al., 1998; Science Advisory Board, 1999). Significant
improvements in some aspects of the environment have been
realized. Many of the more egregious forms of pollution in North
America have been reduced, but the continuing increase in the
human population and associated human activities have created a
tangled array of ecological policy challenges (e.g., land-use
alteration, hydrologic modification, climate change, change in
biological diversity, introduction of nonnative species (also
called exotic or alien species), concern about ecological
sustainability, cumulative effects of manmade chemicals, etc.)
(U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1999). Further, commerce
is increasingly international in scope, complicating already
befuddled ecological policy issues. Recent treaties, for
example, address climate change, biological diversity, waste
transport, and environmental equity — and the directives
contained in such legally binding agreements must be considered
when addressing domestic ecological policy issues.
Traditional approaches to implementing ecological policy
typically follow the "command and cpntrol" ("promulgate and
police") paradigm (Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology,
and Government, 1990). With the command/control approach, a
narrow (e.g., water, air, chemical,-or effluent), technically
based, standard is promulgated as a surrogate for a larger, often
nebulous ecological or public health policy goal. Adherence to
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Normative Science ' Robert T. Lackey August 20, 1999
achieving the standard is enforced by a regulatory bureaucracy
(Elliott, 1997) . In practice, the typical result is a
centralization of political power:
This strategy may be characterized in simple terms as relying on
an elaborate system of planning in which a central administration
imposes production quotas on different plants and industries
through directives specifying the amount of pollution allowed to
escape into the air, water, and land." (Carnegie Commission on
Science, Technology, and Government, 1990)
Command/control approaches to implementing ecological policy
tend to be reductionist, limiting the kinds of policy problems
that can be addressed effectively (Science Advisory Board, 1990).
Further, attempts to correct one environmental problem sometimes
create or exacerbate others (National Research Council, 1997).
The command/control approach fits reasonably well for
comparatively narrow policy problems (e.g., water quality and air
quality), but does not mesh well with complex policy problems
such as the consequences of land-use changes, maintenance of
biological diversity, or the impacts of the introduction of
exotic species.
The command/control approach to implementing ecological
policy is criticized frequently as not being effective or
sufficient in addressing the most important ecological concerns.
For example, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Science
Advisory Board (1990) concluded a decade ago:
". . . controlling the end of the pipe where pollutants enter the
environment, or remediating problems caused by pollutants after
Normative Science Robert T. Lackey August 20,1999 \ 9
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Normative Science Robert T. Lackey August 20. 1999
they have entered the environment, Is not sufficient,'
In some cases, command/control approaches have been effective
(although perhaps not efficient cost-wise) at ameliorating the
most conspicuous forms of pollution, but the most important
ecological concerns today are not easily or efficiently amenable
to end-of-the-pipe and command/control approaches (Science
Advisory Board, 1°~>9).
Another criticism of command/control approaches is their
tendency to polarize the public and rouse strong opposition to
the proposed policy or regulation (Elliott, 1997) . The very
nature of the command/control approach engenders centralized
decision making, top-down policy making, and public resistance
(Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government,
1990). The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1998) has
concluded:
"In the past, there has been a 'command and control' approach to
regulation. . . . As with centralized decision making, the
regulations have been made clear, unbending, and applicable
nationally."
Lack of public support is understandable, even predictable,
because ecological issues and socioeconomic issues are
intertwined. There are winners and losers in policy choices, so
the prospect of authentic win-win solutions is illusory. Even
so, many perceive that command/control approaches to implementing
ecological policy create excessive societal strife.
Normative Science Robert T. Lackey August 20. 1999 • 2.0
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Normative Science • Robert T. Lackey August 20, 1999
Another widely voiced perception is that many
command/control regulations are excessively intrusive, especially
when the ecological benefits are not obvious or are of only local
concern. Some efforts to comply with the U.S. Endangered Species
Act, for example, can be expensive and socially disruptive for
little apparent benefit to society or even the species being
protected.
Other critics assert that command/control approaches do not
effectively use new scientific and technical information
(Elliott, 1997). Current understanding of the functioning of
ecosystems, for example, has moved away from the assumption that
the natural or climax condition of an ecosys'tem is fairly
predicable (e.g., the old "balance of nature" idea) (De Leo and
Levin, 1997) . Current thinking is a belief that the state of
ecosystems is less circumscribed (e.g., "chaotic" events are
often decisive). Although rarely explicitly stated, much of the
command/control approach to implementing ecological policy has
been predicated, in part, on the "balance of nature" world view.
Command/control, characteristically being narrowly focused
(e.g., policy reductionism), often reinforces the proclivity of
many scientists to simplify science and research (e.g., science
reductionism). That is, many scientists prefer to reduce complex
policy problems into small, compartmentalized research pieces
that can be addressed in scientifically credible ways. Thus, for
scientists working in a command/control bureaucratic environment,
there is a propensity for both scientists and policy makers to
fall victim to the reductionist snare. Research reductionism
en T. Lackey August 20, 1999 21
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Normative Science Robert T. Lackey August 20, 1999
results in excellent science that withstands rigorous scientific
scrutiny, but is not useful to policy makers in selecting from
among policy options. Many scientists tend to eschew research
problems that deal directly with complex policy problems because
such problems tend to be scientifically intractable: the results
of such research would unlikely weather the scrutiny of other
scientists.
2. Alternative Approaches
Because the limitations of the command/control approach are
widely recognized, many experts contend that effectively
resolving complex, divisive ecological policy issues requires a
different approach (Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology,
and Government; Science Advisory Board, 1990). Issues in
ecological policy are now less focused on relatively isolated
questions, such as whether it is "safe" to license a certain
chemical, whether it is good policy to build a particular dam, or
whether we ought to spend resources to control exotic species
such as the zebra mussel. Alternative and competing approaches
are widely discussed in the professional literature (Norton,
1995; Gaudet et al., 1997). For example, as the National
Research Council (1997) concluded:
". . . efforts to solve a specific problem must be considered
within a broader context. This is particularly true of the
growing number of regional- and global-scale problems associated
with population growth, industrial development, and the
corresponding pressure on limited natural resources."
Robert T. Lackey August 20. 1999 ' 22
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Normative Science Robert T. Lackey ' August 20, 1999
Specific examples of popular alternatives or modifications
to the command/control approach are ecosystem management,
community-based environmental protection, the precautionary
principle, bioregional management, watershed management, and
imposition of overarching public policy goals such as ecological
sustainability, ecosystem integrity, or ecosystem health. Each
alterative is championed, sometimes energetically, by its
partisans.
In some alternatives (e.g., ecosystem management and
community-based environmental protection), command/control is
often viewed as one of several possible policy tools to help
achieve the overarching policy goal. Other alternatives (e.g.,
bioregionalism) are the antithesis of the centralized,
bureaucratic command/control philosophy. Taylor (1991) portrays
the political propensity of adherents to bioregionalism as one of
devolved decision making:
"Bioregionalism envisions communities of creatures living
harmoniously and simply within the boundaries of distinct
ecosystems. It criticizes growth-based industrial societies
preferring locally self-sufficient and ecologically sustainable
economies and decentralized political self-rule.*
It is easy to dismiss as scholarly quibbling the arguments
about which of the competing approaches for implementing
ecological policy or natural resource management ought to be
adopted, but that would be a mistake. It is unfortunate that the
discussion about the competing concepts has the flavor of "a
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Normative Science Robert T. Lackey August 20. 1999 • 1.0
battle of buzzwords" (Noss, 1995), because the discussion is more
than a mere scholarly debate; the future direction of ecological
policy will be determined, in part, by which concept wins.
Ecosystem health is the most popular of the emerging
modifications of command/control (Gaudet et al., 1997;
Belaoussoff and Kevan, 1998; Rapport et al., 1998). Adoption of
ecosystem health as a public policy goal would have major,
although unclear, ramifications:
"... an ecosystem health focus sets the stage for a new
environmental ethic — one in which actions may be judged by their
contribution to maintaining or enhancing the health of the
regional ecosystem." (Rapport, 1995)
Some popular alternatives and modifications to command/control
(e.g., ecosystem management and ecosystem sustainability) have
notions of ecosystem health at their core (Lackey, 1998).
3. Ecosystem Health
Ecosystem health enjoys a wide following, especially in the
popular press and with some environmental advocacy groups (Gaudet
et al., 1997) . Part of the appeal is that it appears to be a
simple, straightforward concept (Ryder, 1990; De Leo and Levin,
1997). Applying the human health metaphor to ecosystems, it
proposes a model of how to view ecological policy questions. By
implication, the metaphor also defines what types of scientific
information are essential to help decision makers (Shrader-
Robert T. Lackey August 20, 1999 ' 24
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Normative,Science ' Robert T. Lackey August 20. 1999 11
Frechette, 1997).
Ecosystem health, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, was
often defined in nebulous terms — definitely not as clearly
articulated constructs (Steedman, 1994). It was typically
depicted as a broad societal aspiration rather than a precise
policy goal or management target. Lacking precise definition, it
was difficult to consider the concept as a practical public
policy goal. As the concept emerged from semantic ambiguity with
more precise definition and description, it became a serious
topic for discussion and, predictably, a lightning rod for
conflict.
The most alluring feature of the human health metaphor is
that most people have an inherent sense of personal health
(Ryder, 1990) . By extension, many proponents argue that most
people almost instinctively envision a "healthy" ecosystem (e.g.,
a forest, lake, or pastoral landscape) as being pristine or at
least appearing to be minimally altered by human action.
Most concepts of human health focus on the individual human,
whereas ecosystem health treats the ecosystem as the unit of
policy concern, not the individual animal or plant (Schaeffer et
al. , 1988) . Concerns about individual animals or plants — the
typical focus of "animal rights" and "animal welfare" policy —
are usually not the level at which ecological policy is debated.
There remains considerable variation in the concept being
conveyed by the words "ecosystem health" (Calow, 1992; De Leo and
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Normative Science Robert T. Lackey August 20. 1999 ' 1.2
Levin, 1997). Karr and Chu (1995), for example, reflect a
common, but not universal, position that concepts of ecosystem
health and integrity are fundamentally different. They define
ecosystem health as the preferred state of ecosystems modified by
human activity (e.g., farm land, urban environments, airports,
managed forests). In contrast, ecological integrity is defined
as an unimpaired condition in which ecosystems show little or no
influence from human actions. Ecosystems with a high degree of
integrity are natural, pristine, and often labeled as the base
line or benchmark condition. Natural ecosystems would continue
to function in essentially the same way if humans were removed
(Anderson, 1991) .
Others make no such clear distinction and may describe
ecosystem health and integrity as different words for the same
general concept. Regier (1993), for example, concludes that
"... the notion of ecosystem integrity is rooted in certain
ecological concepts combined with certain sets of human values"
and, thus, a desired ecosystem condition
"... other than the pristine or naturally whole may be taken to
be 'good and normal.'"
Hence, if one accepts that there are multiple (and equally
acceptable) benchmarks for ecosystems with integrity, then the
terms ecosystem health and ecosystem integrity would be
conceptually the same. However, for the remainder of this
article, I will use the concepts and definitions of ecosystem
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NormatMScience Robert T. Lackey August 20. 1999 13
health and ecosystem integrity used by Karr and Chu (1995) where
the two notions represent different, but related intellectual
constructs.
The majority of ecological policy debates concern ecosystem
"health" rather than ecosystem "integrity" (Westra, 1998) . Such
an emphasis on health (altered ecosystems) is understandable
because the vast majority of ecosystems are not pristine; hence,
according to the definitions used here, altered ecosystems lack
at least some integrity. Westra (1998) clearly describes the
relationship between the two concepts:
*. . .an ecosystem can he said to possess integrity when it
is wild — that is, free as much as possible from human
intervention today, and 'unmanaged,' although not necessarily
pristine. This aspect of integrity is the most significant one;
it is the aspect that differentiates the wild from ecosystem
health, which allows support and manipulation."
4. Normative Basis
The concept and implementation of ecosystem health ere
surrounded by controversy (Jamieson, 1995; Wicklum and Davies,
1995; Callicott, 1995; Belaoussoff and Kevan, 1P98).
Addressing questions of ecosystem health might appear to be a
fairly scholarly, perhaps even arcane, activity, free from the
policy intrigue that dominates much of the science and policy
underlying environmental management, but such is not the case.
Concepts of ecosystem health are seldom afforded the luxury of
dispassionate discussion because, as Wicklum and Davies (1995)
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Normative Science Robert T, Lackey August 10, 1999 ' 1.4
observe:
"The phrases ecosystem health and ecosystem integrity are not
simply subtle semantic variations on the accepted connotations of
the words health and integrity. Health and integrity are not
inherent properties of ecosystems."
Wicklum and Davies (1995) realize that the words "health" and
"integrity" elicit powerful, positive images even if their
meanings are ambiguous. Therefore, they argue, a precise
understanding of these words is essential because they are likely
to be used, and given a variety of meanings, by policy advocates,
politicians, bureaucrats, and the general public. In practice,
it may fall to scientists and other technocrats to provide
operational clarity to these perplexing, value-laden, normative
concepts that appeal on an intuitive level to nearly everyone.
Unfortunately, but typically, normative ecological concepts, such
as ecosystem health, become general perceptions, perhaps useful
in general conversation, but impossible to quantify (Ryder,
1990) .
Ecosystem health and other normative concepts have become
highly charged political terms (Jamieson, 1995), often to the
extent that they have become shorthand descriptors for one
faction in political debates. Even in the relatively isolated
venues of academic and government laboratories, an assertion that
ecosystem "health" and "integrity" are not intellectually sound
concepts may be sufficient to have the perpetrator branded as a
political reactionary. As Callicott et al. (1999) maintain ". .
. partisans of a single normative concept try to make it
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Normative.Scicncc Robert T. Lackey August 20, 1999 15
cannibalize or vanquish all the rest."
Some (Shrader-Frechette, 1997; Kapustka and Landis, 1998)
have counseled against using the concept of ecosystem health to
communicate to the public about environmental issues. To be
sure, thoughtful discussions about ecosystem health and similar
concepts are usually abstract, often contentious, and rarely lead
to consensus, but is the use of the health metaphor even as a
heuristic tool ill-advised? Kapustka and Landis (1998) exhort
against the metaphor because it is misleading and based on the
chosen values and judgments, not an independent scientific
reality. Conversely, Callicott (1995) concludes that ecosystem
health is intellectually defensible and heuristically valuable,
but he concedes that the value, thus the calibration, of
ecosystem health is subjective. Indeed, Callicott et al.(1999)
classify it as an "ill-defined normative concept" that reflects
the "occurrence of normal ecosystem processes and functions," but
most discussions rarely explain clearly how current policies
would chanye if attainment of ecosystem health became a public
policy goal. Perhaps one way to make progress would be to move
discussions beyond policy platitudes and definitional nuances
toward assessments the specific implications for individuals and
society of implementing the concept.
Peirhaps most frustrating .to some critics of the health
metaphor is the charge that they have rejected a concept but not
offered an alternative. Even many supporters of the utility of
the notion of ecosystem health concede that it is easy to
identify its conceptual limitations (Callicott, 1995).
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Normative Science Robert T. Lackey Augiai 20, 1999 ' 1.6
Developing alternatives that overcome the shortcomings has been
much more difficult. If critics end up spurning ecosystem
health, what do they offer as an alternative? Better
alternatives are not obvious.
Regardless of the merit and direction of the scholarly
debate, notions of ecosystem health frame important public policy
issues (i.e., sustainability of agriculture, overuse of marine
ecosystems, scarcity of water for domestic and agricultural use,
and ecological consequences of introduced species) (Shrader-
Frechette, 1997) . Ecological policy issues are not mere abstract
intellectual concerns, but matters that affect people's daily
lives.
5. Implicit Assumptions
At the core of the debate over ecosystem health are a number
of implicit but highly contested assumptions. First and foremost
is the long-debated assumption that ecosystems are "real" {Calow,
1992; Callicott, 1995). Kapustka and Landis (1998), however,
assert that "no human has ever seen an ecosystem" because it is
not a discrete unit like individual birds, trees, or worms, or
even populations of organisms. Wheji a science or policy problem
is specified (i.e., a "salmon", issue), then the ecological
boundaries (i.e., the ecosystem; follow intuitively. Thus,
ecosystems are context-specific because they cannot be delimited
without a science or policy concern or issue and, therefore, may
have heuristic and problem-solving value, but are not analogous
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Normative -Science Robert T. Lackey August 20. 1999 17
to the patient in medicine (Suter, 1993) .
Although rarely stated explicitly, in most formulations of
ecosystem health there is an premise that natural systems are
healthier than human-altered systems (Wicklum and Davies, 1995).
For example, consider a defined geographic location and given the
alternatives of a pristine woodland, a housing subdivision, or an
industrial complex, which is the healthiest? The subdivision may
be necessary, even somewhat aesthetically pleasing, and the
industrial complex may serve a worthy purpose, but almost
everyone implicitly considers the "unaltered" woodland to be the
healthiest. Tacitly, the assumption is that pristine, or the
less altered, is good and preferred; highly altered ecosystems,
in contrast, are less desirable, if not degraded. Thus,
recognizing the normative basis for ecosystem health, Fairbrother
(1998) concludes: "... use of the term 'ecosystem health' as a
definition of an idealized state is not an appropriate paradigm."
Another common assumption involves the importance of
biological diversity to society. Biological diversity is
certainly an important element in understanding the structure and
function of ecosystems, but the key policy assumption revolves
around the level of importance society has for biological
diversity or its constituent elemeats. For example, some argue
that biological diversity is such a core (i.e., societal) policy
value that scientists should actively lobby for it. As Meffe and
Viederman (1995) bluntly recommend:
"Scientists can take a clear stand that biodiversity is good, that
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Normati\t Science Robert T. Lackey Aupitl 20. 1999 18
functioning and intact ecosystems are good, that continued
evolutionary change and adaption are good, and that diversity and
variation in general is good. Scientists cannot and should not
remove themselves from these usually unstated value Judgments."
Meffe and Viederman (1995) assert that values in science are
always present, whether admitted or formally expressed by
scientists, and that the policy process merely focuses values
more clearly and honestly. Therefore, scientists should drop the
facade of policy neutrality and lobby for those policies they
deem to be in the best interests of society.
Invariably, concepts of ecosystem health implicitly assume
that certain ecosystem features such as biological diversity have
an inherent policy importance (Schaeffer et al. , 1988) .
Ecosystems are complex, typically in both structure and function,
and the diversity of species within an ecosystem is important to
determining how that particular ecosystem functions, but
biological diversity is inherently no more important to
ecosystems than is nutrient cycling, carbon storage, or the rate
of photosynthesis. As a public policy priority, and apart from
its ecological function, society collectively may ascribe high
(or low) value to preservation of certain, perhaps all, species,
based on human values and preferences.
Although not universally•assumed, a common implicit
assumption is that there is a "natural" ecosystem state (i.e.,
balance of nature) akin to the simple homoeostatic dynamics of
physiological systems (Anderson, 1991; Belovsky, 1999) . The
existence of such a natural state is appealing because disruption
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Normative fcicnce Robert T. Lackey August 20, 1999 19
of an ecosystems'a balance — deviation from its natural state —
can be used to define and measure "health." Unfortunately this
idealized view of ecosystems does not typically exist.
Ecosystems may not predictably approach single-point equilibrium,
but may oscillate over time in a fairly indeterminate manner
(Belovsky, 1999) .
Another assumption concerns the degree to which human
activities should be considered "natural." Many proponents of
ecosystem health contend that a fundamental goal of managing
ecosystems is to maintain or restore their natural structure and
function (Hunter, 1996). Outside of ecosystem reserves, some
deviation from natural would be tolerated to meet human needs,
but the benchmark would be the natural state of the ecosystem in
question (Anderson, 1991). Even defining what is the "natural"
state of an ecosystem is de facto an implicit policy preference
when used in policy discussions. For example, in North America
is the "natural" condition that which existed at the time of
initial human arrival (-13,000 15,000 years ago) or at the time
of European and African arrival (-500 years ago)? To a
dissimilar degree, both groups of immigrants and their offspring
altered ecosystems (Hunter, 1996) . Selecting which of these two
benchmarks (or another one) is "natural" is a value-based
decision.
6. Normative Science
Few challenge the assertion that societal aspirations drive
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Normative Science Robert T. Lackey August 10. I9W ' 2.0
the environmental management goals inherent in implementing
ecosystem health, but the question remains which societal
aspirations will be'selected (Gaudet et aJ., 1997). Society is
not a monolith and there are many competing opinions of what is
important.
The language and discussion of ecosystem health is value
laden (Jamieson, 1995), but how are societal values and
preferences to be incorporated when using ecosystem health in
public policy? The crux of the policy challenge is deciding
which of the diverse set of societal preferences are to be
adopted. Resolving policy issues always consists of tradeoffs,
partially or entirely exclusive alternatives, winners and losers,
and plenty of compromises.
Consider any specific ecological policy issue — who are the
stakeholders and how would their input be used to define
ecosystem health? The task is relatively easy when policy
problems are defined narrowly, such as licensing a particular
chemical or authorizing a timber harvest rate for an individual
forest, but what about for achieving broad societal aspirations
(e.g., ecosystem health)? For example, are the stakeholders for
a national forest local or national? Obviously local residents
are most directly affected by policy decisions, but the land is
"owned" by everyone in the nation. The policy preferences of
local residents are likely to differ from those with a national
perspective.
What role should science and scientists play in defining
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Normative-Science Robert T. Lackey August 10, 1999 21
ecosystem health? Scientific information is important, even
essential, but it is only part of what is needed (Gaudet et al.,
1997). Most important ecological policy issues involve large
scales. Unfortunately, most scientific information is small
scale and narrowly focused, thus not directly relevant to many
ecological policy questions. Further, political institutions
(legislative and regulatory agencies) must balance competing
values, and preferences, so scientific information is merely one
facet decision making. For adjudicating conflicts over value and
preferences, science offers no moral or ethical guidance
(Kapustka and Landis, 1998).
An argument is sometimes advanced that, because ecosystem
health shrouds difficult and painful tradeoffs under the guise of
science, its use inhibits incorporation of societal values and
preferences by not forcing an explicit selecting from competing
policy options. As Suter (1993) observes in evaluating various
attempts to implement ecosystem health:
•Use of unreal properties (particularly unreal properties with
imposing names) in environmental regulation obscures the bases for
decision making; increases the opportunity for arbitrariness; and
decreases the opportunity for informed input by the public,
regulated parties, or advocacy groups."
Toll (1999) unequivocally concludes that "... environmental
problems cannot be solved without applying some sort of value
systems." Shrader-Frechette (1997) charges that the concept of
ecosystem health does little, in spite of the volume of rhetoric,
to improving decision making because proponents have failed to:
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Ncrmative Science Robert T. Lackey August 20. 1999 ' 22
"... clarify the precise respects in which the term yields
additional scientific explanation beyond those provided by
assessments of production, biodiversity, and so on."
7. Appropriate Use
Regardless of the precise notion of ecosystem health being
asserted, it is important to understand its use in implementing
ecological policy. The most redeeming feature is its ability to
help clarify complex policy questions (Calow, 1992). The
metaphor of health applied to ecosystems is simple whereas
ecological policy problems are complex, the decision options are
many and sometimes counterintuitive, and the consequence of
implementing each option is rarely certain.
Although not essential, concepts of ecosystem health may
help explain to the public the ecological consequences of policy
choices, thus potentially reducing the likelihood (to the public)
of unexpected consequences. Helping avoid "surprises" that
result from policy decisions is a useful characteristic of any
decision-support tool, but, unfortunately, surprises are a common
trait of ecological policy decisions (National Research Council,
1997). If society decides, for example, to have a dam
constructed which causes an unexpected (to the public) loss of a
migratory population of fish, then society lacked the appropriate
scientific understanding of the consequences of the decision.
If, on the other hand, loss of the fish population was expected
(by the public), then the benefits of dam construction were
judged by the public to be sufficient to warrant the loss of the
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Normative Science ' Kobtrl T. Lackey August 20. 1999 23
fish population.
Another feasible use of ecosystem health is that it
potentially allows society to more easily understand complex
ecological policy questions (Shrader-Frechette, 1997) . If the
ecological information is complex, often the case, it is
difficult to provide helpful, understandable information to
decision makers unless there is a relatively simple intellectual
organizing framework such as ecosystem health. However,
excessive simplification of scientific information has the risk
of misleading decision makers. Thus, the complexity of
ecological systems should not be overlooked in an attempt to
provide helpful information to decision makers (National Research
Council, 1997) .
Along with appropriate uses of ecosystem health, there are
properties that make it prone to misuse. Misuses may be
intentional and done in an effort to achieve advantage in policy
debates, or be due simply to ignorance of the fact that the
concept has a normative basis.
The most pervasive misuse of ecosystem health and similar
normative notions is insertion of personal values under the guise
of "scientific" impartiality. Most concepts of ecosystem health
require a benchmark (i.e., a desired, preferred, or reference
condition) of an ecosystem. Often, the implicit assumption is
that an "undisturbed" or "natural" ecosystem is somehow superior,
thus preferred, to an "altered" one (Anderson, 1991). An
ecosystem, once altered by human activity, is different than the
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Normative Science Robert T. Lackey August !0. 1999 ' 24
previous state, but there is nothing scientific that compels
either or any ecological state to be considered preferred or
better (more healthy). Lele and Norgaard (1996) caution those
searching for scientifically derived benchmarks for ecosystems:
"Naturalness as the benchmark is neither value-free nor logically
or practically useable."
Practical expressions of ecosystem health and ecosystem
integrity should reflect societal values and preferences (Gaudet
et al., 1997) . A misuse of the concepts is the situation in
which professionals, usually operating from bureaucratic
positions, de facto determine healthy (i.e., preferred) target
ecosystems conditions. Concepts of ecosystem health or ecosystem
integrity are normative because someone must decide what
ecosystem condition or function is "good" (Sagoff, 1995).
Ecosystems have no preferences about their states, thus preferred
states or benchmarks must come from the individuals doing the
evaluation (Jamieson, 1995). One common approach is to
arbitrarily select reference sites to serve as the benchmarks for
the ecosystems in question. Kapustka and Landis (1998) conclude
that the principal danger for scientists attempting to define
"healthy" ecosystems comes from the incorporation of beliefs,
morals, values, and ethics as properties of ecological systems.
Another, less obvious, but disconcerting, use of the
concepts of ecosystem health and integrity is defining a public
policy goal in vague terms that engender broad public support and
labeling it ecosystem health or ecosystem integrity, but
camouflaging the ramifications of its adoption. Indeed, there is
Normative Science Robert T. Lackey August 20,1999
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Nomativt 'Science Robert T. Lackey August 20, 1999 25
general public support of the idea of maintaining ecosystem
health, but few members of society grasp the consequences of such
a policy approach. The implications on democratic processes are
rarely revealed, much less debated. Westra (1996), for example,
candidly stated some far reaching political consequences:
". . . no country's unilateral decision, no matter how
representative it might be of its citizens' values, should be
permitted to prevail, unless it does not conflict with the global
requirements of the ethics of integrity, thus with true
sustainability."
Another inappropriate use of the concept of ecosystem health
is pejoratively categorizing opposing policy choices. After all,
the competing policy choices must, by definition, not be
appropriate for achieving ecosystem health. One policy choice
then becomes identified as promoting "health" with the
alternatives struggling to avoid being dismissed as arguing for
"sickness." For example, a policy decision to drain a wetland to
create a corn field might legitimately be categorized as
appropriate to maintain ecosystem health. Either the wetland or
corn field could be healthy, depending on the societal
preferences embraced. Because "health" conveys a positive
political connotation, the common practice in policy debates is
to capture the high ground by labeling your policy choices as
being necessary for health and those of your opponents as leading
to sickness or ecosystem degradation.
Environmental managers are culpable, often unintentionally,
of misusing the concept of ecosystem health. Understandably,
those responsible for making difficult, controversial policy
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Normative Science Robert T. Lackey August 20, 1999 ' 2-6
decisions may be reluctant to define their goals clearly, so they
sometimes, perhaps unintentionally, embrace ecosystem health in
the belief that it is a scientifically operational term. After
evaluating the potential uses of the health metaphor in
environmental management, Suter (1993) concludes:
". . . environmental managers are active agents, translating the
inchoate norms of the current generation and the poorly predicted
needs of future generations into specific actions to protect or
restore real, valued properties of actual ecosystems. . . . Hence,
the decision to abandon ecosystem health as a goal is not jfust a
matter of semantics.*
As Kapustka and Landis (1998) admonish: "If- we are to manage the
environment, it should be done with the clear knowledge that
choices will have to be made, not fueled by misplaced desires or
myths."
8. Alternatives
Ecological policy issues such as managing the consequences
of human land use, reduced biological diversity, or the
cumulative effects of chemical use, are real and demand serious
attention by society (Science Advisory Board, 1999) . Concepts
based on normative science can be compelling, but even most
proponents concede that there are serious conceptual or
operational difficulties with such concepts. What are the
alternatives, if any?
The most direct alternative to using normative science is to
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Normative Science ' Robert T. Lackey August 20. 1999 27
cease using words such as ecosystem health and simply describe
what is proposed. More specifically, rather than propose a
policy objective of managing a forest for "health," express
exactly and clearly the management objective.
Another alternative is to demand coherent, clear definitions
of the normative concepts of ecosystem health. There are
multiple definitions for the same words, so consensus on the
exact meaning is essential to focusing policy debate on societal
tradeoffs, not semantic niceties. The Environmental Protection
Agency (1998) , for example, defined ecological integrity as the
"... ecosystem structure and function characteristic of a
reference condition deemed appropriate for its use by society."
(emphasis added) Thus, by adopting this definition, the
appropriate ecological reference condition, the benchmark for
normative evaluation, is decided by society, not by scientists
applying their own policy preferences.
Regardless of whether normative concepts are used in
ecological policy deliberations, public involvement (even as
fractured as the public often appears to be) is essential because
it is values that drive policy. Public involvement should be at
the essence of using normative concepts because of their
requirement for inherent value judgments. As Rykiel (1998)
explains:
"In a simplistic sense, science deals with true and false, whereas
society deals with good and bad. Science can delineate the
possibilities and describe the system that is lively to result from a
policy, but it cannot decide if the resulting system is good or bad."
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Normative Science Robert T. Lackey August 20. IK) ' 28
Thus, policy decisions are, by definition, normative because
values and preferences were used by the decision maker to select
a particular option.
Another alternative to using ecosystem health is to treat
ecological policy issues as yet another complex public policy
question and not to rely any metaphor. Other policy issues
(e.g., welfare, education, energy, transportation) are also
complex and challenging, but overarching, explicit heuristic
models or metaphors are not typically used.
9. Conclusions
"Ecology" has become much more than a scholarly discipline;
it has impacts far beyond simply enhancing our understanding of
ecosystems. Many uses of "ecology" have a strong normative
flavor. As Worster (1990) observes:
"The science of ecology has had a popular impact unlike that of
any other academic field of research. Consider the extraordinary
ubiquity of the word itself: it has appeared in the most everyday
flaces and the most astonishing, on day-glo T-shirts, in corporate
advertising, and on bridge abutments. It has changed the language
of politics and philosophy — springing up in a number of countries
are political groups that are self-identified as 'Ecology
Parties.'"
The future role of normative science (and ecosystem health
in particular) is uncertain. At the ideological extreme, there
are stark opinions. Some argue that normative science is
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Normative Science Robert T. Lackey August 20. 1999 29
desirable, even essential, for implementing ecological policy.
Scientists, they assert, have an obligation to incorporate policy
value judgments into ecology, even to the point that such
"science" concepts as ecosystem health should be adopted as the
cornerstone of ecological policy (Callicott, 1995). Some
scientific disciplines and professions (e.g., conservation
biology, restoration ecology) unapologetically embrace normative
science postulates as the core of their trade (e.g., biological
diversity is inherently good, extinction of populations and
species is inherently bad, ecological complexity is inherently
good, evolution is good, biological diversity has intrinsic
value) (Soule, 1985) .
Others, however, assert that normative science (e.g.,
ecosystem health) hides under a veneer of science the reality of
tradeoffs involving competing personal and societal values and
preferences (Kapustka and Landis, 1998) . The proper role of
science is to help lay out options and assess the consequences of
various choices, and it is only part of the needed input (Tingey
etal., 1990; Shaw et al. , 1999).
Scientists and scientific information will continue to play
an important role in resolving ecological policy, but the role,
in my opinion, should be carefully circumscribed (Lackey, 1999) .
Often, even within the community of scientists, "ecology" has
been treated more as a belief system than a science. It is easy,
even encouraged, for scientists to abuse privileged roles in
ecological policy debates by surreptitiously labeling personal
values and policy preferences as "science" (Salzman, 1995) .
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Normative Science Robert T. Lackey August 20, 1999 30
To appropriately implement concepts of ecosystem health,
understanding the values and preferences of society is crucial,
but obtaining such understanding credibly is difficult.
Political institutions do not provide such understanding or
guidance in "efficient" ways. To assert that concepts of
ecosystem health are merely scientific constructs is incorrect.
As Russow (1995) concludes, "... the claim that scientific
descriptions in general or measures of ecosystem health in
particular are value neutral is simply false." The likely
alternative to public involvement is that the values of
scientists and other technocrats will be used as surrogates for
societal values and preferences.
Perhaps the term "ecosystem health" has already become a
"political" term, a code word for a particular policy or
political position. Even now, invoking "ecosystem health" often
is equated with a "green" political position. Becoming
identified as a political term is unfortunate because the word
and concept lose usefulness in serious policy, public, and
scientific debate.
A different risk for the future of ecosystem health is that
it becomes co-opted and, ultimately, marginalized. For example,
if everyone adopts the term and becomes an advocate of ecosystem
health, then the term and concept have lost their usefulness. In
policy deliberations the terms are now political rhetoric -
encompassing a suite of meanings that everyone readily accepts as
reflecting their individual, though divergent, policy positions.
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Normative Science ' Robert T, Lackey August 20,1999 31
The ecological policy concerns that engendered widespread
debate over ecosystem health and other normative constructs will
not disappear. These concerns need to be addressed because of
the increasing demand on limited ecological resources (Salwasser
et al. 1997). The resolution of ecological policy is likely to
become increasingly challenging because interactions between the
planet, its non-human inhabitants, and its large, and still
expanding, human population constitute a dynamic system of
rapidly increasingly complexity (National Research Council,
1997). Whether or not one finds intellectual sustenance with the
notion of ecosystem health, the policy concerns it attempts to
confront are genuine.
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Normative Science Robert T. Lackey Juguit 10, 1999 32
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