EPA 903-R-00-007
PEMA AAR-00-003
VIGILANT LION EXERCISE
(VL-99)
After Action Report
FT. INDIANTOWNGAP
ANNVILLE, PENNSYLVANIA
SEPTEMBER 29-30, 1999
-SK
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Disclaimer:
The observations in this report have been distilled from reports submitted by the exercise
evaluators, controllers and participants. The exercise findings flow from the observations. This
report has been circulated for review among the participating agencies, and their comments have
been incorporated to the extent that is practical. The "lessons learned" and exercise findings are
the opinions of the report authors and do not necessarily reflect the policies of all the sponsoring
agencies.
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Acknowledgements:
The Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) wishes to acknowledge the
contributions and participation of the following individuals and organizations to the planning and
implementation of the exercise:
Environmental Team: Department of Energy's Steve Centore, Kathleen Mclntyre, Alex Rebin,
Lloyd Nelson Brookhaven National Laboratories; Jay Cook, Tom Black, Paul Evancoe, Office of
Emergency Response, and Darryl Lankford, Bob Morrowski, Lou Palm, and Doug Boyd, ORISE
provided excellent exercise planning, training and response resources. The Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection's Emergency Response Program's Charlie High, Kerry
Leib, Mark Schaffer, John Maher, Len Insalaco, and Dan Holler provided insight on day-to-day
hazardous material response to build reliable timelines for the exercise. The Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection Bureau of Radiation Protection's Randy Easton and
Marty Vyienelo along with the US Environmental Protection Agency's Bill Belanger, who also
spent numerous hours on this report, provided the radiation analysis and data for the isotopes
simulated in the exercise. Marty Powell, EPA WMD Coordinator provided invaluable
environmental impact insight during the planning and execution of this exercise.
Emergency Management: The Federal Emergency Management Agency's Dave Hall and Henry
Skozalek and DOE's Emergency Management Office, Pat Bjerke and Becky Watson, reviewed the
consequence management issues and commented on impacts that this would cause to the local,
state, and federal communities in this and the crisis management phases. The Pennsylvania
Emergency Management Agency's Bob Churchman, Joe Jordan, Norm Smith, John Bahnweg,
Bob Long, Ed Burke, Mike Stamilio, Jack Rozman, Bob Broyles and supplied numerous hours
of planning and operational expertise to ensure the exercise took place. The Pennsylvania State
Fire Academy's Tim Dunkle, Pat Pauley, Rich Wessel, and Bob McCaa ensured that Incident/
Unified Command issues were thoroughly documented for future training and operational
opportunities. PEMA and the State Fire Academy continue to reinforce "Vigilant Lion" Lessons
Learned in internal and external WMD instructional events.
Local Responders: -The Lebanon County Emergency Management Agency's Clyde Miller (Dir.),
Annette Smith (Dep. Dir.), Chris Miller, and John Wilson, coordinated all local efforts without
which this exercise would never have happened. Lebanon County Hazmat Team 50, Lickdale Fire
Police, Annville Union Hose Co., and Richland Fire Companies coordinated efforts with the Ft.
Indiantown Gap and Good Samaritan scenario responses. Ft. Indiantown Gap's FD (military)
Chief Bachman ensured that his unit was available for preliminary radiological training and rapid
"cognizant" local initial fire response for the exercise. Daryl Emrich, East Hanover Township
EMC, provided local emergency management input.
Military: The Military Support to Civil Authorities office under the direction of Colonel Richard
Matason, Colonel Frank Sharr and Major Richard Dyke did a lot of leg work so that exercise
players had the use of many of the post's best facilities that were made available for exercise
players and exercise facilitators In addition, they, along with Lt. Colonel Xavier Stewart, Captains
Charles Cuthbert and James Gerrity, coordinated and planned for the first full-field exercise
participation of the 3rd Weapons Of Mass Destruction Civil Support Detachment (formally the 3rd
Military Support Detachment [MSD] Rapid Assessment Initial Detection [RAID] element). The
Civil Air Patrol's Pennsylvania Wing's Majors Rich Gale and Warren Parks provided their
outstanding training facilities for the two exercise planners training sessions and the Controller's
Operations Center. The Unites States Air Force's HAMMER ACE unit was well represented by
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TSGT Tom Kinney and his staff. They were able to plan and work with the civilian Pennsylvania
Urban Search & Rescue communications component to operate the communication trouble desk
and field questions to troubleshoot all communications obstacles that arose during the exercise.
Law Enforcement/EOD: The FBI's Chris Rigopolous (Philadelphia Office) and Jeff Goebel
(Harrisburg Office) coordinated the field and main office planning and response activities. Those
activities then combined with the local and state response structure in an organized manner. Capt
Jeffrey Davis and Lt. Barry Reed Pennsylvania State Police, and Chief Jon Worley, Ft. Indiantown
Gap PD, should be commended for their traffic control, crime scene, and command and control
planning for the local and state law enforcement components. SSGT Ken Erickson, DOD
Indianhead, Sgt. Robert Shilling (City of Reading PD), Capt. Jim Grimm (Allentown FD), Mike
Baker FBI-Philadelphia and ATF's Chris Catone provided extensive technical assistance in the
Explosive Ordnance Disposal/Bomb Squad subject area.
Medical Team: The medical team created scenarios for Good Samaritan Hospital and a private
residence with contamination. Brenda Pittman (Lancaster County EMA), Joan Gill (Good
Samaritan Hospital), Louise Wennburg (Chester County EMA), and Chiquita Morrison (PA
Health) developed the victim's symptoms, medical play, and medical support functions that forced
medical responders and command staff to consider medical issues during the entire exercise.
Gloria Fluck (Ephrata Community Hospital), Denise Freeman (Lancaster County Hazmat), Duane
McClosky (Emergency Health Services Federation), and Linda Williams (PA Dept of Welfare)
provided valuable evaluations and observations. This is the first time public mental health issues
have been addressed in scenarios involving contamination. Critical Incident Stress Management
was not incorporated into the exercise however, there were Peer providers available to address any
issues. The medical planners, through their extraordinary labor, worked through the associated
problems and made it work. Good Samaritan Hospital EMT and First Aid Safety Patrol provided
"real-world" and scenario medical support for the pre-hospital and hospital portions of the
exercise.
Media Team: Linda Vizi (FBI), Karen Sitler & Sandy Roderick (DEP), John Maietta (DMVA),
Marko Bourne (PEMA) provided "real world" and "mock" interviews and press coordination
before, during, and after the exercise. The amount of live coverage that the event received is a
tribute to the hard work that this team performed.
Comfort Team: Cynthia Yearsley and the Salvation Army ciew really outdid themselves. The
on-site beverages, meals, and snack food provided over the two days hit the spot. The two
canteens served the 100 observers, 300 first responders, and press corps/VIPs like it wasn't a field
exercise but an indoor event. Hats off to a top-notch chapter and organization!
Safety Team: Tom Dougherty, OSHA, Allentown Office and Rich Gale ensured that overall
safety procedures were followed throughout the exercise. The absence of any major or minor
injuries during the exercise can be attributed to the fine attention to detail.
If there are others who are not listed above, and or not identified in the After Action Report (AAR), the
developers sincerely apologize to those unintentionally omitted. It must be noted that not all agencies
submitted requested fallow-up material thatwas to be included in Ms After Action Report. For items
that are agency specific, and that are not listed within this AAR,, it is recommended tliat you contact the
specific agency directly.
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Manuscript Completed: April, 2000
Date Published: May 2000
Prepared by:
Bill Belanger, EPA Region m
Tom Hughes, PEMA
Steve Centore, DOE Region I
The US Department of Energy's VL-99 After Action Report can be requested through:
Steve Centore, US DOE Region 1, Emergency Response Coordinator, Brookhaven
National Laboratory, 53 Bell Avenue, Upton NY 11973 or e-mail: centore@bnl.gov
Abstract;
"Vigilant Lion", a two-day exercise sponsored by the Pennsylvania Emergency
Management Agency (PEMA), in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Energy,
involved emergency personnel in a mock Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) incident
involving a simulated radiological material release. This full-scale exercise involved
more than 300 participants representing 40 local, state and federal emergency response
agencies that were tasked with managing hazardous materials, explosive ordnance,
emergency management, law enforcement and emergency medicine response activities.
Except for the meetings in preparation for the exercise, many of these agencies had never
worked together before.
Although the exercise revealed some minor problems in the overall coordination of
exercise response actions, none had a detrimental effect on the exercise's overall
execution. The primary problems were with the implementation of a Unified Command
at the individual site locations and with the lack of anyone designated to supervise the
overall safety of the responders in dealing with a real incident of this kind. There were
other operational issues, which arose from people being unfamiliar with their counterparts
at other levels of government, from the unfamiliar threats they had to address, and from
artificiality imposed by the exercise logistics. Interagency cooperation occurred but the
associated sharing of information did not always take place in a timely manner,
specifically in the Joint Operations Center and the Federal Radiological Monitoring and
Assessment Center. In some cases, a duplication of effort occurred which led to the
unnecessary engagement of personnel and equipment use.
On broad overview, the exercise showed that the various local, county, state and federal
agencies have the ability to deal with the terrorist incident that was simulated. Each
agency came to the exercise with capable and dedicated people who knew their jobs and
did them well. The exercise revealed a number of important "lessons learned" which
should lead to a significantly strengthened ability to respond to a terrorist incident if the
appropriate corrective measures are implemented.
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Table of Contents; Page Number
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6
INTRODUCTION - 9
Needs Assessment 9
EXERCISE PLANNING 11
Exercise Scope 11
Logistics 12
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 16
Overall Objectives 16
Simulation 16
EXERCISE DEVELOPMENT 17
Staff Exercise Development Training 17
Evaluation Training 17
Player Training 18
Key Decision-Maker Tabletop Exercise 18
EXERCISE SCENARIO 18
The First Day 18
The Second Day 19
Exercise Results 20
EXERCISE EXPECTATIONS 20
Local Response 21
State Response 21
Federal Response 22
OBSERVATIONS 22
Hospital 22
Ft. Indiantown Gap . 24
Incident Command 24
Incident Action Plan/Documentation 26
Unified Command 29
Command Post Facilities 30
Joint Operations Center 31
Depth of Coverage 32
Site Safety 32
Survey Techniques 34
Federal Radiological Monitoring & Assessment Center 35
Traffic Control Points 35
Communication 36
Communication Technical Support 37
Terminology 38
Criminal Investigations 38
Continuity of Municipal Operations 38
Scene Safety (Exercise Play) 39
Evidence Collection/Planning 39
Press 39
Bomb Squad/Explosive Ordnance 40
Exercise Preparation Comments 42
CONCLUSION 43
ANNEXES 46-128
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Executive Summary
"Vigilant Lion," a two-day exercise sponsored by the Pennsylvania Emergency Management
Agency (PEMA), in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Energy, involved emergency
personnel in a mock Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) incident involving a simulated
radiobgical material release.
This full-scale exercise involved more than 300 participants representing 40 local, state and
federal emergency response agencies that were tasked with managing hazardous materials,
explosive ordnance, emergency management, law enforcement and emergency medicine response
activities. Except for the meetings in preparation for the exercise, many of these agencies had
never worked together before. In particular, the county and local teams had not worked directly
with their counterparts from the federal agencies. In addition, the radiological threat was
somewhat unfamiliar to the hazardous material teams, and there was a need to address the threat
of explosives and booby traps, which were unfamiliar to the radiation experts. Overall, everyone
was forced into an unfamiliar threat at one point or another. This provided an opportunity for a
significant learning experience, and also accurately reflects the situation that would occur if a real
incident were to happen.
The exercise included full-scale response to a simulated incident at a fictitious county in
Pennsylvania (Fig County.) Two "crime scenes" were simulated in real buildings, the Fig County
office building, and the home of the terrorist. The office building was a two story commercial-
style building which was vacant at the time of the exercise. The scenario called for a dispersal
device which spread strontium-90 through the ventilation system. After several days, "victims"
began to show up at a local hospital with non-specific symptoms. The hope was that the hospital
personnel would make the connection that all these people worked in the same building.
The second location was the "home" of the terrorist. This building, which was also unused base
housing, was darkened and fitted with dummy grenades, trip wires, and a simulated bomb. A
small but real sealed radiation source (Na-22) was included in the "bomb". This gave the
responders practice in dealing with a real radiation source in simulated but realistic hazardous
conditions. The explosives experts on the response team were required to use survey meters to
find the bomb in the darkened house. A radiation safety officer, provided by EPA, assured that
the entry team did not receive significant radiation exposure during this activity.
In both cases, entries were made using actual protective clothing and under realistic conditions.
Six cottages were rented to simulate residences that included family "members" and property,
which needed to be interviewed and surveyed immediately. Exercise planners designed emotional
and physical problems into the exercise to simulate events that would be encountered in a real
event.
Exercise play involved the activation of emergency operations centers and the deployment of
personnel and air and ground assets from all levels of government. Vigilant Lion also involved
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the Department of Energy's Radiological Assistance Program (2 teams) and the Pennsylvania
National Guard's 3rd Weapons Of Mass Destruction Civil Support Detachment (formally the 3rd Military
Support Detachment [MSD] Rapid Assessment Initial Detection [RAID] element). The 3rd WMD CSD
is one often federally mandated teams responsible for supporting local and state emergency
response to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. This was the first large-scale, joint
agency training exercise that the 3rd CSD actively participated in. Lebanon County EMA and the
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources provided personnel from their Emergency
Response Team Program and the Bureau of Radiation Protection responded on scene with their
Emergency Response cell. The Pennsylvania State Police provided on site security and crime
scene expertise. The Environmental Protection Agency provided a Federal OSC, their Site
Assessment and Technical Assistance (SATA) team and an EPA representative for the FRMAC /
JOC. The planning and preparation for Vigilant Lion took more than nine months and required
participants to undergo extensive, specialized nuclear, biological and chemical training.
Prior to the exercise, each participating agency developed its own individual objectives to be
accomplished and performance measures for its response to the incident. Evaluation of these
individual Agency objectives is not included in this report. It is left to the individual Agencies to
assess their individual performance and any need for improvement. Instead, this report will focus
on the overall exercise objectives in terms of overall response effectiveness and coordination and
various activities as a whole.
The exercise revealed some problems in the overall coordination of the response. The primary
problems were with the implementation of a Unified Command at the individual site locations and
the lack of a designated individual to supervise the overall safety of the responders in dealing with
a real incident of this kind. There were other operational issues that arose from people being
unfamiliar with their counterparts at other levels of government, from the unfamiliar threats they
had to address, and from artificiality imposed by exercise logistics. Early on, the interagency
communication and coordination was very good, however, associated sharing of information did
not always take place in a timely manner.
On a broader scale, the exercise showed that the various local, county, state and federal agencies
have the ability to deal with the terrorist incident that was simulated. Each agency came to the
exercise with capable and dedicated people who knew their jobs and did them well
The exercise revealed the following lessons learned. The principal lessons are:
The Joint Operations Center (JOC) was activated on Day 2 of the exercise. In theory, this
becomes a group of key decision-making representatives from the main response agencies whose
function is to coordinate the response and to plan at the strategic level. The unified command
structure, which would be established early in the incident, retains the responsibility to carry out
tactical activities required to bring the event to closure. During this exercise this concept did not
work as designed. Upon activation of the JOC, the unified command that had already been
established in the field was largely ignored as officials in the JOC began to communicate directly
with their personnel in the field.
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Additionally, the coordination between agencies located in the JOC began to deteriorate as the
law enforcement effort began to focus on the apprehension of the perpetrators. The information
flow tended toward direct communication between agency representatives as opposed to all
representatives within the JOC sending information to the FRMAC and Unified Command
Structures. This lack of coordination became most noticeable on the afternoon of the second day
when actions directed along law enforcement lines led to difficulty in attempts to discuss public
safety issues. These issues include evacuation of civilians, site safety considerations, EMS
support, field interviews and survey, and decontamination procedures. This problem did not flow
from any particular agency or player, it was simply a symptom of two different response
philosophies. There is a need to examine these differences in response philosophy and to devebp
a common framework that is comfortable for both law enforcement and HAZMAT responders.
The presence of law enforcement people on a crime scene (as opposed to HAZMAT responders
on a spill scene) also made it necessary for responders to carry credentials in order to move in
and out of the affected area. Such credentials would be essential in a real incident. There is a
need for law enforcement and other response organizations to work closely with hazardous
materials response organizations on a more regular basis. Law enforcement personnel have a
responsibility to respond to the criminal aspect of the incident, are invaluable in securing the
scene, and can provide protection from terrorist threat to the HAZMAT responders.
Conversely, the HAZMAT response element can protect law enforcement personnel from dangers
from chemical, biological and radiological threats. The team is complete only when both law
enforcement and HAZMAT responders understand the responsibilities of the other and the
contributions that each makes to the overall response.
While the crisis management activities are very important at a WMD event, consequence
management, as it relates to public safety, cannot be ignored. There are many organizations and
political leaders that have a legal responsibility to the public at an incident scene. All response
organizations must work cohesively if there is to be a successful outcome. Even though a
considerable amount of public safety resources were available through the county or state
response systems, the JOC relied primarily on federal resources. Training in the Incident
Command System, a clear knowledge of other response agency's capabilities, as well as clearly
understanding the needed relationships in a crisis management/consequence management incident,
is the key to an efficient, coordinated response.
There needs to be a designated official at the site of the response activity who is responsible for
overall management of site safety. During the physical response activity, response personnel were
not wearing a consistent set of personal protective equipment. There seemed to be no one who
was making careful decisions on the protection of personnel for all response personnel. Instead,
each participating agency made its own decisions, which resulted in inconsistencies. The most
glaring example of these inconsistencies was when one team surveyed the exterior of the Fig
County building in street cbthed while another was in fully encapsulated suits (Level A.)
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The local response organizations have competent and dedicated people, many of whom are
volunteers. It is not reasonable to expect these volunteers to attend extensive schooling on every
aspect of chemical, biological and radiological response. In addition, in a terrorist situation, the
responders themselves may become targets. There needs to be a rapid response capability to
assist the local responders when the problem goes beyond their normal training and experience.
There is a need for a rapid assistance mechanism to assist the first responders in assessing the
situation, and a rapid assistance mechanism to get technical help to the scene very quickly after a
threat is identified. This is as much to protect the health of the responders as it is to address the
threat. The newly commissioned CSD can supply much of this needed mechanism. In addition,
there is a need for a rapidly available expert consultation service. A good model for this service
would be the DOE funded REACH'S function at Oak Ridge, TN. This service is geared to
provide immediate medical consultation in the event of a nuclear accident. Similar capabilities for
chemical and biological threats would be quite valuable, and such an assistance service should not
be restricted to medical aspects of the problem. Responders need a central place to call for
immediate advice before they enter a potentially life threatening situation.
In the Vigilant Lion Exercise there was significant interaction with the news media. This was
intended to allow the news media to provide coverage of the exercise itself and to alfow them to
see how an actual incident would be handled. In future exercises and definitely for all actual
events and/or incidents, a large staff of public information officers will be needed to address the
significant number of media issues and requests for information. We placed the simulated media
interactions late in the exercise after a Joint Information Center had been established. However
we realized that much of the media coverage would occur during the initial response, and we did
not simulate this press coverage. Instead, reporters covering the exercise were allowed access to
first response personnel.
Overall, this exercise must be viewed as a success because of the problems that were identified
and the learning experience it provided.. The fact that everything did not go as smoothly as
planned provided many important lessons for the participating agencies. While it is apparent from
the exercise that the capability to deal with a radiological terrorist event is in pkce, there is room
for improvement in the coordination of the available resources. The Vigilant Lion Exercise
Report, available soon from the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency and EPA Region
III, provides many recommendations which should improve the response capability to actual
terrorist incidents.
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INTRODUCTION
Needs Assessment;
The United States is fortunate to have been spared the extensive terrorist activity
that occurs in some parts of the world. The principle incidents have been the World
Trade Center bombing, the Oklahoma City bombing and the Bomb at the Olympics in
Atlanta. While this comparative lack of terrorist activity is a blessing, it also means that
we in the United States are relatively inexperienced at dealing with the problem. Our
experience is mostly in handling accidents and natural disasters, not deliberate acts of
terrorism.
While all the skills that are used to address accidents and natural disasters are also
useful in dealing with the results of a terrorist act, there are some aspects, which are
unique. These include the need for technical experts in chemical, nuclear and biological
threats, and the need to deal with the law enforcement aspects of a deliberate act. In
addition, a terrorist act is a deliberate attempt to cause harm. The threat may be a
combined chemical/ biological/ nuclear threat, or a threat from explosive devices, and the
hazard may be deliberately concealed in order to cause more casualties. Working in such
an environment requires a close coordination between many disparate technical
disciplines as well as among agencies at all levels of government. This level of
coordination is seldom required for accidents and natural disasters. This need for
coordination is central to the Vigilant Lion Exercise.
While actual terrorist acts are rare in the U.S., the potential threat cannot be
ignored. Worldwide, most acts have involved simple explosives, the notable exception
being the Sarin subway attack in Japan. From our limited experience, and drawing on
the experience of less fortunate countries where terrorism has become common, we can
build a basis for the skills and resources which would be needed to address a terrorist
threat.
Should a terrorist act strike the streets or rural areas of America, the first few
minutes will be critical. The first people on the scene would be the local emergency
medical services, firefighters and police. The situation would be chaotic and dangerous.
For many injured victims, what these responders do in those first minutes could mean the
difference between life and death. There is also a threat to these first responders, either
from the primary terrorist act, or in the event the terrorist makes the responders a target.
Thus there is a need to consider risks to the responders as well as risks to the public at
large.
For nearly a year prior to the exercise, PEMA had been working with other
agencies to help state and local agencies prepare to respond to terrorist incidents. DOD
had delivered the Domestic Preparedness Training Program to the cities of Philadelphia
and Pittsburgh and PEMA had delivered an NBC Phase I & n course and a
nuclear/radiological terrorism workshop to the potential exercise participants. In the
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course of this preparation, we determined that one major element lacking in Domestic
Preparedness training was the adequate addressing of radiological material as a potential
threat. In addition, historically, Explosive Ordnance has not been simulated in NBC
exercises to any significant extent.
Finally, a new response element has been recently added to the available
resources. The Pennsylvania National Guard's 3rd Weapons Of Mass Destruction Civil
Support Detachment (formally the 3rd Military Support Detachment [MSD] Rapid Assessment
Initial Detection [RAID] element). The 3rd CSD is one often federally mandated teams
responsible for supporting local and state emergency response to incidents involving
weapons of mass destruction. This was the first joint agency, large scale training exercise
that the 3rd CSD actively participated in. They had little experience in dealing with the
broad scope of support available from the local, state and federal agencies and none of
these agencies had experience with the 3rd CSD. The exercise provided the opportunity
to integrate this new resource into the response structure in the United States.
Unfortunately, at the time of the exercise the 3rd CSD did not have their $1.5 million 2-
person Unified Command Suite, which capabilities include KU Band, HF, UHF, VHP,
HF Wideband, and UHF Satcom (.06 MHz - 800 MHz) frequencies.
In summary, the factors that led to the development of this exercise are:
- WMD training courses that were available did not adequately address nuclear/
radiological issues. The concentration was on chemical threats. Medical issues were also
inadequately treated.
- Areas of responsibilities for radiological response were not completely clear,
especially with the addition of the RAID element. The existing emergency response
plans were not designed around a terrorist threat and it was not clear how well they were
suited to this unique problem.
There had been few opportunities for a full-scale exercise involving a large number of
participants and agencies from all levels of government. There was a plan on paper and a
few tabletop exercises had been conducted by various county and state agencies. What
we did not know is how the various agencies, in a large-scale, field exercise environment,
would perform when equipment was mobilized and people actually had to work together
with other response and non-response personnel that they normally do not work with.
- Because of a canceled exercise in another location, resources were available to
conduct the exercise.
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EXERCISE PLANNING -
Scope of the exercise;
The exercise included full-scale response to a simulated incident at a fictitious
county in Pennsylvania (Fig County). Two "crime scenes" were simulated. This was
done using unused buildings at Fort Indiantown Gap. The Fig County office building was
a two-story brick building that was temporarily unoccupied at the time of the exercise.
The home of the terrorist was simulated in base housing. In both cases, entries were
made using actual protective clothing and under real-time conditions. Six cottages were
set-up as residences so that surveys and interviews would have to be performed. Most of
the physical problems, which would be encountered in a real event, were included in the
exercise. Realistic dispersion devices and booby traps were set to challenge the
participants with a realistic situation.
This exercise was designed to test the concepts and procedures required for local,
county, state, and federal government agencies to respond to a weapon of mass
destruction (WMD) event in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The Vigilant Lion
exercise concentrated on local response, notifications, crisis management, consequence
management, criminal (terrorist) investigations, and interagency coordination and
communication.
Prior to the exercise, each participating agency developed its individual objectives
to be accomplished and performance measures for its response to the incident.
Evaluation of these individual Agency objectives is not included in this report. It is left
to the individual Agencies to assess their individual performance and any need for
improvement. Instead, this report will focus on the overall exercise objectives in terms of
overall response effectiveness and coordination and various activities as a whole.
This full-scale exercise involved more than 300 participants representing 40 local,
state and federal emergency response agencies that were tasked with managing hazardous
materials, explosive ordnance, emergency management, law enforcement and emergency
medicine response activities. Except for the meetings in preparation for the exercise,
many of these agencies had never worked together before. In addition, the radiological
threat was somewhat unfamiliar to the hazardous material teams, and there was a need to
address the threat of explosives and booby traps, which were unfamiliar to the radiation
experts. This provided an opportunity for a significant learning experience, and also
accurately reflects the situation that would occur if a real incident were to happen.
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Logistics;
Location:
This exercise was the first large-scale civilian counter-terrorism exercise where
terrorist response was realistically simulated. In addition, a number of participating
agencies had never worked together to this extent and knew little of each other's mission
and capabilities. Knowing that the exercise would involve a large number of responders
converging on one area, we wanted to make sure that we had a big enough "play area"
that would suit our exercise needs but not pose safety issues to the players or the general
public. At first, some of the agencies were in favor of conducting this exercise in the
City of Hershey/Derry Township, an area with a population of 19,000. The state police
academy and a major hospital were in close proximity. However, the needed approvals
would have been quite difficult. In addition, conducting a large-scale realistic exercise in
a public setting would have generated significant public concern. There was a real
possibility that the 911 lines could be tied up with people inquiring about the exercise.
After considering the issues involved, we decided against holding an exercise as large and
complex as this in a heavily populated area.
It was finally decided that we would approach Ft. Indiantown Gap Military
Reservation, the home of the 3rd Civil Support Detachment, to hold this exercise. A two-
story, brick building, unoccupied at the time due to a change of command (the post had
recently been turned over to the National Guard and the state was handling the paperwork
to accept ownership), was obtained. This building simulated the 550-employee FIG
city/county office building. The selected building proved to be an excellent location as
the incident was more manageable in that there was limited interruption, disruption,
distraction, or conflict with the civilian community. Since Lebanon County EMA, based
in the City of Lebanon, was participating, we asked them to invite the Good Samaritan
Hospital and associated EMS units. The timing could not have been better. The Good
Samaritan Hospital, City of Lebanon had just completed construction on a new hazardous
material wing that was designed to care for multiple chemically and/or radiologically
injured or contaminated victims and wanted to test their in-house site security protocols
and the facility's effectiveness to care for these individuals in the event of a hazardous
material incident.
Agreements'.
Mutual Aid/Assistance agreements were identified and agreed upon early on in
the exercise planning stages. Issues such as overtime, time off, union involvement, were
resolved by each participating agency.
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Communication:
Communication flexibility, security, and compatibility were issues that faced
exercise organizers but those issues were surprisingly resolved rather quickly. It was
necessary for the exercise controllers and evaluators to communicate effectively so those
exercise objectives could be evaluated without restricting exercise flow and play.
HAMMER ACE, the United States Air Force's contingency communication package,
based at Air Mobility Command's Headquarters, Scott AFB, Illinois, was contacted by
DOE RAP Region 1 to see if they could support the communication needs and to
technically assist communication technicians assigned to the exercise. HAMMER Ace
provided fourteen encrypted VHP Motorola Saber handheld radios, one base station and
one VHP repeater to support the RAP Region 1 & 2 communication needs. They were
able to use one of the pre-approved US and Providence allocated frequencies for
HAMMER ACE missions. The Pennsylvania Urban Search and Rescue Task Force (PA
TF-1) provided nineteen UHF Motorola HT-1000 hand-held radios with six available
frequencies and two UHF Motorola repeaters for use by safety, controllers, evaluators,
and the invited press.
Feeding:
A contract was negotiated between the Lebanon County Emergency Management
Agency and the FIG Community Club for two lunches. These lunches were provided
through a PEMA grant and were to feed the volunteer participants and LEMA personnel.
State and federal agencies agreed to pay the travel costs of their participating personnel.
Documentation [Video, Still Pictures, Written]:
DOE Region 1 provided two videographers to tape exercise activities on both
days. DOE Region 1 produced a 20-minute radiological response training film of the
exercise to be used for first responder training. The Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) will be using this tape during the FEMA S302 Advanced Radiological
Incident Operations (ARIO) Course, June 11-16, 2000, at FEMA's Mount Weather
Emergency Assistance Center, Bluemont (Berryville), Virginia.
Media Exercise Coverage:
The exercise design team wanted to provide the media the access to adequately
cover the exercise as it unfolded. A Press Kit was put together and two press briefings
were held, one two weeks prior, and one at 9:30 a.m. on day one of the exercise. The
Department of Military and Veteran Affairs took the lead on coordinating the briefing in
the VIP/Press Building established for the exercise. Before the response activities were
initiated at Ft. Indiantown Gap, the media pool were taken through the "FIG City/County"
Office building to view first-hand what the responders were going to be facing. They
were then taken to a safe distance, under tentage, to view the initial response activities.
PSP participated in a live news briefing/interview on Day 1 with Reading, PA, radio
station WEEU, 830AM.
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Two media information meeting dates were established. It was decided that the
PEMA Press Secretary would take the lead on the dissemination of preliminary
information regarding the exercise. PEMA Operations and Training designed the various
press releases, which were then approved by PEMA's Press Secretary! Due to the
unforeseen "real world" hurricane events that occurred on day one of the exercise, the
Pennsylvania's Department of Military and Veteran Affairs Press Secretary took the lead
for on-site arrangements to ensure the media had the information that they needed to
adequately describe the unfolding event. The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Protection provided two working PIO "players" for both days.
Eight television crews, ten print media observed and reported on the exercise to
include a team of reporters from Sweden. Three stations provided live noontime
coverage of the event on the first day. One radio station in the City of Reading did a live
interview with the PA State Police. Additional information releases were mailed or e-
mailed to numerous emergency management, environmental response, military, fire, law
enforcement and medical publications throughout the United States. Media briefing
times were set and first-responder spokesmen were identified to assist the media
coverage. A few agencies provided media players while other agencies provided press
representatives to cover the exercise event itself.
Role-Players:
Lancaster County EMA and Civil Air Patrol's Pennsylvania Wing were asked to
find "actors" to be used as city/county employees and family members for two of the
scenarios. Both organizations were able to provide them plus injects for the family
members.
Props:
During the exercise development course participants found out how sensitive it is
to have an agency make an exercise "device." Participants feared that if they made the
device, it would than become "classified" items, and would not be available for exercise
use. FBI, DOE, and DOD controllers resolved this issue so that a Radiological Dispersal
Device (ROD) would be available for hazardous material team and explosive ordnance
disposal recognition and play.
Air Support:
DMVA, CAP, DOE Region 1 and DOE HQ coordinated the air logistic
coordination for the two Aerial Measurement Assets (Beechcraft B-200 and Bell 412) to
operate in FIG airspace in and around the exercise play area.
Staffing:
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Each organization provided at least one controller and one evaluator to support the
exercise oversight. All controllers were on one radio frequency and the evaluators on
another. Exercise support from PEMA staff was limited due to the Hurricanes Dennis
and Floyd staff commitments. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was granted three
Presidential Emergency Declarations through FEMA that in rum led to the opening of one
Disaster Field Office and seven Disaster Recovery Centers in fifteen counties. At one
point in time, there was a serious threat that PEMA might cancel the exercise. However,
the PEMA Director agreed to let the exercise move forward with the limited amount of
PEMA staffing so that other participating agencies would not lose this excellent
opportunity to test their WMD response capabilities.
Exercise Support Staff Credentials:
Each agency provided a copy of their ID tags so that the Pennsylvania State Police
and Ft. Indiantown Gap Police Department had a copy for security purposes. In a major
incident, you would not have the luxury to do this but we needed this for safety reasons.
Controllers included breach of security injects to keep the security net honest.
Waivers for Volunteers:
When Ft. Indiantown Gap was under federal ownership, a waiver was required for
volunteers to participate in exercises on post. The wording was slanted more towards
soldiers and not emergency volunteers. Requests were made to the state agencies to find
out who the agency's controllers, evaluators, players, and media personnel would be to
provide a "duly enrolled" roster to the post commander's exercise designee. Each
agency's legal counsel reviewed civil liability and worker's compensation issues.
Facility Usage:
Once the scenario was written, and the exercise play was formulated, exercise
planners needed to plan for pre-exercise briefings and enough buildings to accommodate
the anticipated building requests from players. Exercise planners had to do this in
advance as to lessen the daily workload on the post's Directorate of Logistics. A total of
15 buildings were made available to the exercise players, controllers, evaluators, and
VIPs/Press.
Exercise Constraints:
The Ft. Indiantown Gap leadership wanted to make sure that all buildings were
turned back to the post in good condition. No incendiary devices were allowed and no
damage could result from their use, e.g. knocking in doors, breaking windows for entry,
etc. In addition, exercise planners needed to demonstrate to the post commander what
security and traffic flow planning measures were in place. It was agreed that Rte 26,
Fisher Avenue, would be shutdown no earlier than 9:00 A.M and no later than 3:00 P.M.
as to not impede post employees from getting to or leaving their place of employment.
Exercise planners also needed to notify major employers and the nearest residence outside
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the post that this exercise would be taking place. The township officials adjacent to the
post were also notified and participated in the exercise.
Budget:
Originally, this exercise was scheduled to occur elsewhere in the northeast. After
it appeared that some insurmountable logistical issues could not be resolved, the exercise
was cancelled. DOE RAP Region 1 approached the Pennsylvania Emergency
Management Agency to see if the Commonwealth would be agreeable to host the exercise
in Pennsylvania if financial arrangements could be agreed to. A few of the state agencies
and the Lebanon County Emergency Management Agency thought that this would be a
great opportunity to exercise many facets of the emergency management and radiological
protection system components, therefore, they agreed to pursue internal avenues to
conduct the exercise. DOE Region 1 was able to fund three exercise-training sessions
(Exercise Design, Exercise Controller/Evaluator, and Search Response Team).
Associated per diem and lodging costs were paid by course attendees' agencies was more
palatable than one agency bearing all the costs. In addition, DOE Region 1 funded some
of the necessary props (exercise identification caps, video capture, threat assessment,
building rental, communication support, and Aerial Measurement System flight time).
Concept of Operations:
Objectives - Overall;
Each participating organization was asked to provide objectives prior to the
ORISE Exercise Design Course that was presented April 6-8, 1999, at the Pennsylvania
Civil Air Patrol Wing Headquarters building, Ft. Indiantown Gap, Annville,
Pennsylvania. The exercise objectives list, in its entirety, can be viewed in Annex B.
The exercise scenario and framework was then built around those objectives to ensure
that each agency had an opportunity to play out and evaluate those objectives.
Simulation;
Exercise designers did not want to limit the scope to a tabletop demonstration.
They all wanted an exercise, which would involve full-field mobilization of assets in as
realistic, a situation as was possible. To do this, a field setting was chosen which would
allow for realistic exercise play. The exercise included full-dress response to a simulated
incident at a fictitious county in Pennsylvania (Fig County.) Two "crime scenes" were
simulated in real buildings, the Fig County office building, and the home of the terrorist.
In both cases, entries were made using realistic protective clothing and under realistic
conditions. Most of the physical problems, which would be encountered in a real event,
were included in the exercise.
Exercise play involved the activation of emergency operations centers and the
deployment of personnel and air and ground assets from all levels of government.
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Vigilant Lion also involved the Department of Energy's Radiological Assistance Program
(RAP) and the Pennsylvania National Guard's 3rd CSD. Very few notifications and
response times were simulated. The evaluators wanted to confirm that estimated times in
the exercise time line were accurate. All participating agencies wanted a good template
for planning and checklist purposes for a WMD response to back to their own
organizations.
Exercise Development;
Exercise Development Staff Training:
Exercise Design training was supplied by the Department of Energy (DOE) for the
exercise development team. A list of the individuals on the design team and who
contributed to the development of the exercise are listed on page 43. The DOE Exercise
Design Course was conducted by Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE)
and built on what the exercise design team had put together prior to the course. The
purpose of this course was to train exercise developers on their responsibilities and to
provide the basic understanding and skills necessary to develop an emergency
management/ preparedness exercise. The training focused on the exercise requirements,
and the design, development, conduct, and evaluation of a full participation exercise.
Exercise developers were than able to develop and integrate the components of an
exercise package. During the course, attendees developed the exercise purpose, scope,
objectives, limitations, prerequisites, scenario and formulated a time line. This training
greatly improved the quality of the exercise and we recommend it for others planning an
exercise of this scope and complexity.
Evaluator Training:
On August 11-12, DOE Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE)
provided a two-day exercise Controller and Evaluator course that culminated with a
Leadership Tabletop Exercise. The first day discussed the evaluation and control
components. It set the groundwork for the development of exercise evaluation criteria,
the evaluation organization, and the proactive determination of the final report form. In
addition, the attendees were able to identify and develop the control organization,
simulations, and control logistics. Attendees refined the exercise objectives and Master
Scenario Events List (MSEL), initiated formalization of Mission Essential Task Listings
(MTEL) items, and prepared for the Leadership Tabletop. Prior to this course,
participating agencies were requested to bring key decision-makers to this tabletop
exercise. Participating agency key decision-makers were provided two scenarios: one
chemical and the other radiological. It was decided to provide two scenarios, closely
paralleled to our scenario, but not too close as to "tip our hand" on the actual scenario
developed. DOE ORISE did an excellent job in the facilitation of the two tabletop
exercises which provided the future Vigilant Lion Exercise Evaluators and Controllers an
insight on what areas needed to be more defined and what areas would be potential
bottlenecks.
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Player training:
The exercise involved over 300 players from over 40 different organizations. The
players included a wide variety of well-developed skill levels in a wide variety of fields
including hazardous material response, law enforcement, bomb disposal, health physics
and radiation safety, biological weapons, and operations and command. PEMA held
training sessions for first responders on basic radiation response, though these sessions
were not given specifically for this exercise and were available to responders statewide.
This was desirable because the exercise would be primarily radiological in nature and
local response teams are typically not trained in depth on radiation. For most players, no
exercise-specific training was provided. We anticipated that the training they already had
would be sufficient. Key decision-makers from each agency attended a tabletop pre-
exercise described below. If there were to be a problem because of inadequate player
training, it would become a lesson learned from the exercise. It would demonstrate a
weakness in our ability to deal with terrorism and would need to be remedied.
Key decision-makers table top pre-exercise:
A tabletop exercise for the key decision-makers was held on August 12, 1999.
This session was intended to facilitate the exercise coordination when the field exercise
was conducted in September. There was no real effort to segregate the players from the
exercise planners for this tabletop exercise. The only objective was to be sure that each
participating agency knew its role in relation to the roles of the other agencies. The intent
was to avoid unnecessary confusion at the field exercise. Had this pre-exercise tabletop
not been held, the difficulties inherent in establishing agency coordination may have
prevented many of the other exercise objectives from being achieved.
Exercise Scenario; (Full Scenario - Annex C)
The First Day;
The following sequence of events was developed as the exercise scenario:
On Monday evening, September 27th, a disgruntled ex-employee places a
radioactive dispersal device on the Fig County Office building's HVACC intake vent
located on the roof (Building 19-76). Approximately 550 Fig county and city employees
work in this two-story building. This device dispersed radioactive material throughout
the building through the use of a small fan connected to a tuner. Fig City has an
estimated population of 650,000 and has two trauma hospitals.
By Wednesday, September 29th, at approximately 4:00 p.m., office workers from
the Fig County office building are arriving at the local hospitals (Good Samaritan and
Lebanon VA Hospitals) and secondary care facilities. Employees are complaining about
respiratory problems and skin irritations. Anticipating more patients than one hospital
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can handle, Good Samaritan institutes its Mass Casualty/Disaster Plan. Based on
preliminary data, state and local health officials have pinpointed the origin of the skin
irritant to the Fig County office building. The local municipality declared a "State of
Emergency" upon consultation with county officials.
The local Fig County hazardous materials team, which has been certified by the
state, along with Fig County health officials were dispatched to the office building and to
the local hospitals. The building's evening shift (approximately 50 people) are evacuated
by local police and staged at a nearby building. Night shift employees were instructed to
stay home due to an unknown chemical release in the building. As a consequence of the
hazardous materials team being dispatched, the State Emergency Operations Center is
then notified and briefed on the current situation, as required under the Pennsylvania
Emergency Information Reporting System (PEIRS) criteria. Lebanon County relays their
intentions to PEMA regarding an issuance of a county declaration. At this point, the
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, Pennsylvania Department of
Health, and Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry are also briefed on the
magnitude of the "hazardous material" incident.
The HAZMAT Team arrived to find a heating and air conditioning van parked
adjacent to the building with a ladder going to the roof. The HAZMAT team discovered a
suspicious device and note on the HVAC System located on the roof. The Local EOD
team was requested to the scene.
An anonymous phone call was then received by the county 911 center that
"radiological material was used in the county office building and that more radiological
and explosive devices can be found at a residence somewhere in Fig City". This
information was then followed by a fax that referenced the same.
The Second Day
All federal response agencies arrived and the FBI became the lead crisis
management agency and established a Joint Operations Center. After several hours, the
Department of Energy's Aerial Measurement System unit, Department of Energy's
Search Response Team, PANG 3rd CSD, Pennsylvania Department Environmental
Protections Bureau of Radiation Protection and Emergency Response offices, and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation's hazardous materials element located additional
radiological material in a residential area.
After bringing in more sensitive equipment, the SRT located the unknown
radiological material on Lazy Eye Street at a rundown, two-story dwelling using a
vehicle-based search to identify the specific house, then by a search on foot, located the
device. The SRT members detect high radiation readings from the radiological material
from outside the house.
As local, state, and federal law enforcement officials entered the dwelling on Lazy
Eye Street, additional explosive devices were located inside, along with subversive
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documents and publications that include instructions to build additional explosive
devices. Booby traps are both expected and identified in the house. After rendering safe
the secondary and tertiary devices, the DOE representative on scene reported that a
second RDD is located inside the dwelling. The RDD had a two-hour timer which
appeared to have been momentarily activated.
Termination of the exercise occurred when it was demonstrated that a majority of
the exercise objectives were completed.
EXERCISE RESULTS:
To present the results and lessons learned form this exercise, a comparison
between expectations and the results of the exercise play will be provided. We recognize
that many actions we would like to see or we expected could not happen due to time
constraints or other exercise artificialities. We have tried to account for these limitations
in interpreting the exercise results as presented by the individual evaluators.
Expectations (based on the scenario and individual Agency goals');
The key decision-makers participated in a tabletop exercise at the Civil Air Patrol
Wing Headquarters building. This pre-exercise was to be sure the interactions and
command structure was well rehearsed and would go smoothly during the two-day full-
scale exercise. Because of this opportunity for rehearsal, the exercise design group
anticipated a smooth transition from the Incident Command System to a Unified
Command Structure on the first day. They also thought that an organized transition to an
operational Joint Operation Center (JOC) and Federal Radiation Monitoring and
Assessment Center (FRMAC) would take place.
The exercise design group expected that each agency would have 24-hour 7-day
coverage availability and would be deep enough to handle manpower staffing for the
Incident Command System / Unified Command System, Joint Operation Center, and
Federal Radiation Monitoring and Assessment Center. Due to Hurricanes Floyd and
Dennis, the Federal Emergency Management Agency's Regional Operation Center and
the State's Emergency Operations Center partially activated for the exercise. This
limited State participation off-site to some extent.
There had been some thought as to whether hospital Emergency Medical
Personnel would be able to identify and cluster symptoms from "walk-ins." The exercise
design group thought that medical personnel at the hospital might or might not be able to
identify the cause of the symptoms but would at least be able to identify the "sick
building." We knew in advance that the symptoms presented to the hospital would not
come from a radiation exposure, but wanted to give them a sudden cluster of ER patients
with non-specific symptoms who worked in the same building to see if this would be
recognized.
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The exercise design team thought every response organization would use the same
radiological surveys units (R, mR, etc.) and if not, would be able to convert to both SI
units and old "U.S. radiation units of measure.
The exercise design group thought that the FIG on-scene Unified Command
System would be prioritized in the following format: (most important to least important):
1) Responder Safety
2) Lifesaving/Victim Removal
3) Incident Site Control - Zone Determination
4) Secondary Device Sweep - Inside facility
5) Public Safety
6) Evidence Gathering/Preservation
Local Response Expected:
As patients were rolling into the Good Samaritan Hospital, we expected that some
on-scene contamination would occur, symptomology review and interviews would be
conducted promptly which would lead to suspicion of the FIG City/County Office
building. Local federal support would come from the Lebanon VA Hospital via a MOA
with Good Samaritan and the VA. Once notification to Lebanon County EMA, PEMA,
PADEP, and PA Health were made, we thought that the local law enforcement agency in
FIG City would be overwhelmed quickly. FIG PD presently has 2-3 officers on duty at
any time. It was anticipated that the FIG FD would respond quickly and set a safe
perimeter and wait for the arrival of the county hazardous material team. Incident
Command at FIG would transfer from the Police Chief to the Fire Chief to the Lebanon
County Emergency Management Coordinator.
State Response Expected:
Exercise planners anticipated a quick response by PA State Police (traffic
control/LE Backfill) and PADEP Emergency Response Team (hazardous material
technical support) which then would move the command structure into a Unified
Command System. It was not clear when and at what point the scene would be
considered a "crime scene/terrorism event" which would generate the FBI Field
Response. Once the scene started to look like a crime scene, it was envisioned that the
State Police would become the Lead State Agency (still under Unified Command) and the
FBI Field Office would be contacted and then assume command once on-scene. Local
and State emergency declarations, if made, could come at any time; with a fluid exercise
scenario, we were not sure when that would happen. This determination was made
concurrently by PA State Police. FBI, and LEMA at 12:20 p.m.
Federal Response Expected:
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The federal involvement on scene would begin once the scene was considered a
crime scene, which would trigger the involvement of the FBI, DOE Region 1
Radiological Assistance Program, EPA Region 3, and FEMA Region 3. FBI-HMRU
coordination with evidence collection resources would occur.
Observations! (based on evaluator comments)
The evaluators recorded the following observations. It must be noted that the
evaluator comments provided in this document in no way imply a lack of
competence on the part of any of the participants. Exercise evaluators as a rule tend
to find more wrong than right, and the underlying cause of a negative observation is
frequently due to working new faces from strange agencies or to artificiality's of the
exercise itself rather than the fault of any participant. While it would perhaps be
kinder and gentler to edit out negative observations, we felt the need to present the
evaluators comments in full. The reader should keep in mind that, in spite of seemingly
negative comments, the participants all did their jobs well and to the best of their
abilities! Where there was a significant event, which leads to a significant lesson
learned, an italicized comment will follow the evaluator's comments. Exercise lessons
learned are based on the input from many evaluators and interpreted in light of the overall
exercise.
HOSPITAL:
Exercise "victims" were briefed and costumed at 0630 at the Civil Air Patrol
Headquarters building at Ft. Indiantown Gap. They were then transported to the Good
Samaritan Hospital where additional evaluators and controllers were on station [to
include an Office of Mental Health (state) representative]. At 8:00 a.m. victims (5)
started walking into Emergency Department patient entrance, spaced at about 3-minute
intervals. Patients registered complaints with triage nurse. Two of patients were initially
triaged back to "chairs" to wait. There was some confusion among staff as to which
patients were exercise patients since they mixed in with real patients and were not
wearing specific "exercise identification." (Evaluators and controllers were wearing
appropriate caps.) Intake appeared to be handled smoothly although the exercise
evaluator did note that the postal worker may not have been identified as an exercise
patient until rather late in the tune period. Also, at about 08:30 a.m., the Emergency
Room physician expressed concern for the confidentiality issues of other patients
speaking to the triage nurse.
Five patients may have doubled the regular patient flow but certainly did not
stress the staff in any manner. At 0840 and 0850 two injects were given to the hospital
regarding employers, located in the FIG City/County office building, reporting that 30
employees had called off sick with flu like symptoms and that they had heard some may
be at Good Samaritan Hospital. Both employers reported that those at work were
coughing. Both employers asked for an update on their employees and stressed their
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concerns." Reply was that the employers needed to provide names of anyone they were
concerned about, and they were not aware of any particular illnesses e.g. flu at this time.
At 0905 Controllers consulted with the ER Physician and Emergency Department
(ED) Director and requested that the ED activate its Disaster Plan for the purposes of
following the exercise on time. The plan was activated; personnel responded and were
thoroughly briefed about the incident. Their triage and treatment of patients presented
was appropriate and efficient. With the Good Samaritan Hospital's pre-established
objectives were being observed, the "patients" were released from ED and proceeded
back to FIG. Patients were then placed in the FIG Building as workers to be found,
removed, and decontaminated for the FIG City/County Office Building Scenario. Good
Samaritan personnel responded and were briefed as to the exercise information.
"Early" identification of a pathogen or hazardous material is not likely to happen
in a Hospital Emergency Department due to the low index of suspicion and high focus on
individual patient management.
Scenario shortfalls;
The incident began at the Good Samaritan Hospital in Lebanon, PA where the
players, evaluators, controllers knew information, and Hospital Staff; however, some
information was either changed or misunderstood. Things did not start and continue
exactly as planned. Minor details regarding patient symptoms/conditions and so forth
made a difference in the beginning of a critical exercise. Once the scenario hit its
anticipated rhythm, the Lebanon County E.M.A. did an excellent job of overcoming some
obstacles created by the information snag.
There were a few times when the scenario stalled, or nearly so. At the onset, at
the Lebanon Hospital, the initial findings of the ER Staff were not of sufficient severity to
justify notifying civil authorities. Time elapsed before an inject was generated to allow
the scenario to proceed. Several times, observers cited instances where certain things
were supposed to happen to trigger the next stage in the operation. When this did not
occur, a lengthy delay resulted until a controller was forced to freelance to move the
timeline along.
Insufficient patients were available to actually stress the capabilities of the ED and
activate the emergency plan. Because of the nature of emergency medical care, it was
suspected that the Emergency Department would have had to have been totally
overwhelmed (20-25 patients) before staff would have suspected a common denominator
to be found.
Hospital/Medical facilities must be prepared to participate (if possible) in the
exercise as not to compromise regular patient care. Even though Controller/Evaluators
are near the "victims", the victims must also be clearly marked as not to be seated with
real-world patients. This scenario did test a triggering of various diagnosis support from
different departments within the hospital itself.
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Hospital personnel seem to have a rapport with Lebanon county EMA probably as
a result of interaction with emergency services on a regular basis. Any reporting chains or
request for assistance during any kind of emergency would probably be directed toward
the county EMA. It was noted that additional resources were not requested from the
contiguous counties because a sufficient number of injects and symptoms were not
received to force this outcome. Exercise controllers and evaluators thought that this
might occur directly by the county. In addition, the State EOC was more focused on
hurricane flooding support so the situation analysis section injects in this area were not
entered into the state's exercise message traffic flow nor followed up on. This "real-
world" focus also led to the delay of critical exercise notifications that would have
mobilized or activated many of the state resources earlier on in the exercise on Day 1.
FT INDIANTOWN GAP
A cumbersome transfer of command occurred from the Incident Command
System to the Unified Command System. Although transition from the Unified
Command System occurred to the Joint Operations Center, it was not as smooth as it
could have been. The Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center knew of
the transfer of command but did not acknowledge the unified command presence within
its own established facility. (Again, the readership must realize that this was not a
graded exercise!)
Incident Command -
Incident Command was immediately established upon initial arrival of emergency
response forces, and was maintained (in some form or another) throughout the scenario.
Initially, there was a delay in setting up the Incident Command System attributed to 1)
response personnel identification problems, 2) congestion at the scene, 3) an unknown
amount of resources on-site, enroute, or on standby, and 4) the time-compression reaction
time written into the scenario. Usually, even in the biggest of "normal" hazardous material
incidents, there is some "catch-up" time for putting together the Incident Command structure.
Responders were not afforded this luxury in this scenario. This lead to a period of
disorganization. The command structure worked through this period of information and
resource overload and started to gel really well at approximately 1:00 p.m. once the
recognition of roles and responsibilities were sorted out by the Lebanon County EMA staff
and local and state support agencies.
The transfer of command process should have been stronger, especially prior to
the establishment of the JOC. Transfer of command is a very formal process. It must be
clearly understood by both the gaining and relinquishing parties, as well as all operational
elements in the incident, that a transfer of command has taken place. Responders were
questioned repeatedly to determine if they were aware of who was in command. At no
time could any responder identify the command structure beyond his/her immediate
supervisor. In most cases, even that supervisor was unclear on the command structure.
Transfer of command and the basic command structure must be communicated
effectively to all responders through radio communications and periodic briefings.
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Upon arrival of Lebanon County Hazard Material team, the FIG fire chief
appeared to concede command to the Lebanon County EMA coordinator by default.
Personal observation and questioning of the players on the scene indicated that this
individual was effectively acting as Incident Commander long before any formal transfer
of command took place. Again, if an Incident Commander chooses to transfer command,
he/she must make the transfer clear. Responding command personnel, especially those
with technical knowledge crucial to mitigation of the incident at hand, must resist the
strong temptation to usurp, however innocently or unintentionally, command functions
until a formal transfer of command has been affected.
While acting as Incident Commander, the Lebanon County EMA Coordinator
became too involved in managing the tactical aspects of the incident, specifically the
operation of the hazardous materials team. Emergency responders tend to be very 'hands-
on' people, reluctant to delegate to subordinates, especially when we possess great
technical knowledge and expertise on the subject in question. This invariably leads to
problems with span-of-control, division of labor, unity of command, and organization of
the command structure. Incident commanders in this situation must either delegate
tactical issues to subordinates, confining themselves to the strategic goals and incident
organization issues that are the proper domain of the 1C, or decline to accept overall
command, remaining in charge of their particular tactical element under some other
incident commander.
A more formal command structure needed to be established much earlier in the
incident. The Incident Command System provides for such a structure to insure that no
commander is overwhelmed by the incident, so that agencies coming in on the incident at
a later point understand the response structure and their role in it, and so that a common
terminology vocabulary that all responders can relate to is established. This needed to
begin very early on in the incident, especially when it can be reasonably anticipated that
agencies will be responding that are unfamiliar with the terminology and structure of the
Incident Command System. This is especially true when such agencies are highly likely to
eventually become the 'lead' agency for the incident. Failure to have such a structure in
place will increase the chances that such an agency will establish its own system, or,
worse yet, that parallel command structures will be established. This actually appeared to
occur for a short time between the arrival of significant State Police resources and the
arrival of the FBI and establishment of the JOC. If a good system is established and
functioning well upon arrival of such agencies, they are far more likely to 'plug
themselves in at the appropriate place, and maintain a continuity in the incident command
structure. The command structure eventually established, although certainly functional,
bore little or no resemblance in either structure or terminology to the Incident Command
System that first-response elements are trained in and use.
Initially the Gap Fire Department Fire Chief assumed command. However,
neither a command post nor a hot zone was properly established. When command was
transferred to Lebanon EMA, neither did they. As a result, the commander was rapidly
overwhelmed by arriving responders looking for work, the decontamination line was
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placed some distance from the hot zone, and at least one large conference took place in
the hot zone. In addition, the 3rd CSD WMD established a redundant decontamination
line even farther away. It should be noted that they too need to work under the Incident
Command System, and ultimately under the Incident Commander. Not only do they work
directly for their own CSD WMD commander, but in coordination with the civilian
Incident Commander. Most times, responders queried by evaluators had no idea that was
in charge, where zones and perimeters were established, or where the Command Post was
located. The situation eventually got sorted out, but only after a considerable time
elapsed. The "play area" was not clearly defined, and as a result a number of vehicles
operated by evaluators and observers wound up in the hot or warm zone. This in part
displaced the decontamination lines"
Incident Action Plan/Documentation;
The incident could have been documented better. It was difficult to determine if
there was any concerted effort to create an incident log; there did not appear to be.
Because a Documentation Section was not established, the command and control
structure evolutions were not charted. This shortcoming contributed materially to the
communications problems alluded to previously. There appeared to be no documented
Resource Status (RESTAT) or Situation Status (SITSTAT) accessible to all players.
Complex incidents must be properly documented. SITSTAT and RESTAT reports, and
an organizational chart showing the existing command structure should be drawn, posted
in the Command Post or JOC, and kept current. A designated Scribe should keep an
Incident Log. This is especially important in incidents like this, where; agencies are in
coming, agency representatives may be changing as higher-ranking individuals arrive, and
long duration with the possibility of shift changes is anticipated.
The Incident Commander must insure that all critical 'stakeholders' (such as the
municipal government) are represented in the unified command structure. Information
needs to flow downhill as well as uphill and across levels. Agencies did not
communicate well between levels.
Exercise Finding: It is important that incident commanders deal with the big strategic
picture, delegating responsibility for implementation of tactical objectives to subordinate
elements of the command structure. This is especially crucial in the first stages of in an
incident. It is impossible for an incident commander, no matter how gifted, to attend to
tactical details and simultaneously be thinking 'an hour or two ahead of the incident' as
is required of a strategic commander. Command needs to be established early on, and
clearly marked. All operational personnel must know whom, or at least where, the
Command Post is. Zone and site security must be rigidly enforced, to avoid spreading
contamination or exposing people, and to keep command from getting overwhelmed.
The Incident Command/Unified Command structure as it evolved may have looked like
the one provided below (Figure 1). This diagram was added to allow readers of the
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document the opportunity to see what faced the Command Staff during the different crisis
and consequence management response phases of the exercises.
27
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THE ICS ORGANIZATION
Inddent Command
1
1 1
Information Offlcar
Lebanon County PIO/OMVA
Safety
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Figure 1
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Unified Command
The transfer of the Incident Command System to a Unified Command System
occurred at 11:00 a.m. from the Mobile Command Post to Building 95 where the PA
State Police had configured the building for coordination of the response with the now
multiplying response organizations. The formalized operational transfer was
cumbersome because many of the key-decision makers, such as the hazardous material
representatives and staging officers, were engaged in response and support activities.
The Unified Command System was in place on Day 1 but was not well
established on Day 2. There still existed a level of interaction between the response
organizations but this interaction was not based within a strong command structure. The
command structure was a by-product of the command level personnel present. These
individuals were of a personality and temperament that facilitated this coordination
despite a somewhat fragmented unified command. Having individuals like this at the
incident may not always be the case.
Exercise Finding:
The Concept of Unified Command must be further refined in an operational sense.
Allied professionals from all disciplines who are tasked to respond to emergencies like
this must receive training and familiarization with the Incident Command System as
promulgated by the National Fire Academy. This is the terminology and command
structure that will (or should) have been established by the local (municipal and county)
first responders well before the arrival of many of these agencies. Understanding the
language and structure of the system in use will permit a smooth integration of efforts and
a likewise smooth transition of command responsibility as called for by the dynamics of
the incident.
Training for all responders in the implementation and use of the Unified Command
incident management structure must be developed and made available. Unified command
worked, in part, at this incident because the command-level personnel of the involved
agencies were of a personality and temperament that facilitated unified command. That
may not had worked together on other large-scale response activities; this may not always
be the case. Training in unified command is critical to making unified command a
workable incident command system under a variety of circumstances and conditions.
Plans for the rapid and effective communications of information up and down the chain
of command and across the full spectrum of responders/involved agencies must be
quickly devised and implemented. As much of this as possible should be done by pre-
planning and exercise. At incidents, commanders must insure themselves that information
on incident status and action plans are fully communicated (with considerations for
security issues) to all responding agencies.
Command Post Facilities
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For this exercise, the organizers pre-arranged buildings that would be used as
command posts and other purposes. In a real incident, such arrangements would have to
be made on the spot and it is more likely that sufficient space might not be available at a
real event location. In spite of the pre-arranged space, the various command facilities
were too crowded.
There is a need to issue credentials to response personnel so that the only
occupants of critical facilities are those who belong there. Credentials were a problem for
the changeover from the parking lot Incident Command Post to the Command Post in
Building 95. There was also a problem with the number of people in the Joint Operations
Center (JOC - See Figure 2) and credentialing was again a problem. Response
individuals presented agency specific identification badges but were not initially allowed
entrance into the facility. Some organizations had neither vests nor badges. It was
suggested that signs should be developed to help identify command structures so that
these command and control structures can be assisted by essential support agencies.
Mobile Command Posts such as those provided by EPA are extremely important
resources. It would be very worthwhile to include an inventory of the available mobile
facilities in local emergency plan documents. This would not guarantee their availability, but
at least the responders would know from whom to request these resources.
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Joint Operations Center Operations:
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Figure 2
The transfer of command from the Unified Command structure occurred at 13:00
hours, however the transition was not seamless. At this stage of the exercise, a number of
FBI agents needed to be briefed regarding the current status of the operations and what
available resources and capabilities were at their disposal. The transfer of command may
have been better postponed until those informative briefings occurred. Once the FBI had
current assessments, a more active crisis management role could have been initiated.
While information was passed back and forth freely at the Strategic Level, it did
not always filter down to the tactical level. The identification of the isotope was known at
the JOC a long time before some of the field Radiation survey teams knew what they
were looking for. In fact, some teams were never told upon termination of the exercise.
This would have made a difference in who was used to do the searching, and what
equipment was used.
Some operational unit chiefs were allowed access into the JOC. It was noted that the
CSD, which is an operational hazardous material support team, was represented in this
strategic setting and at times CSD leadership left the JOC to deal with operational issues.
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Exercise Finding:
The Unified Command concept is essential in a situation where multiple agencies with
different and perhaps overlapping jurisdiction must work together to solve an immediate
problem. Traditionally, the Joint Operations Center has been thought to fulfill this role.
In this exercise, we note that there are really two separate and distinct functions in need
of a Unified Command. These are the strategic and the tactical levels of command. The
JOC in its traditional form addresses only the strategic level and substantially ignores
the tactical. The observations of this exercise point to the need for a tactical Unified
Command at the scent of the action in addition to the strategic Unified Command in the
Joint Operations Center. The meaning of the terms "strategic " and "tactical" should be
obvious from the evaluator 's observations above. The strategic command tends to be
concerned with the overall strategy and allocation and coordination of resources. The
tactical command is concerned with the detailed response to the incident at the scene of
the action. It appeared that some of the Law Enforcement personnel were not familiar
with the roles, responsibilities, and resources of state and local responders and visa
versa for the emergency management and environmental management personnel. In
addition, some operational support elements need to stay with the unified command
structure and not in the JOC.
Depth of Coverage
Back-up capability was not as expected. A few of the agencies had enough
personnel that were familiar with the Incident Command System. Additional personnel
were needed from a number of local, state, and federal agencies. Many of the state
agencies sent their Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLOs). Since the State
Emergency Operations Center was not fully activated, the EPLOs were able to fill this
role. However, had the State EOC been operational, the EPLOs would have been tasked
to support state logistical efforts. Even though the state has run eight (8) Nuclear,
Biological, and Chemical Weapons of Mass Destruction courses for county and state
personnel, many of the state responders who responded, had not attended these courses.
Exercise Finding:
The state needs to identify more individuals that have completed Incident Command/
Unified Command WMD courses and exercise those individuals to support the local
authorities.
Site Safety;
PSP were not sure where the inner perimeter was and access to the site by various
agencies was at times confusing. During the initial response, a pre entry/safety briefing
was not conducted.. Although identified, the entry backup team was not fully dressed out
when the first entry occurred. Early in the exercise the county hazmat team entered the
the building in full Level A personal protection. Team 1 entered the building without
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reading the radiation meter. Team 2 realized that Team 1 did not have any meter readings
and realized that their survey meter was saturated as soon as they entered the building.
Team 2 called Team 1 back to the building entrance. The Incident Commander instructed
Team 1 to complete their rescue mission according to their training. This resulted in
unnecessary stair climbing in Level A protection. (What was needed was a higher range
gamma survey meter.) One PSP criminal investigator gained access, without escort, to
the city/county office building and was contaminated. It was observed at this time that
the site safety officer was not present. The 3rd MSD team then resurveyed the exterior of
the building in Level A protection but this was after the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection's Bureau of Radiation Protection personnel surveyed the same
area in street clothes.
Observations on Site Safety included the following:
Decontamination Operations: Radiation surveys were done on personnel leaving
the Hot Zone but some were not monitored leaving the decontamination area.
Specifically, county hazardous material personnel did not seem to be checked
after removing their suits. It did not appear that decontamination back up teams
were designated.
Video Surveillance - Operationally, many of the response teams thought that
"Live time feeds" (to JOC/UCS, etc.), could have enabled responders to operate
more effectively for four reasons.
1) Responders could have a "Quick Look" through the use of Robotics that could
be used for victim and secondary device search and assessments if robotics
with video were used optimally;
2) The Incident Safety Officer could monitor the Responder Safety while
operating in Level As;
3) Videotaped documentation could later be used in the evidence processes;
4) Subject expert, whether EOD or radiation, could support the response
(backstop) if something could or did go wrong, that individual could respond,
if necessary, and know where the dangers or mistake could be averted in the
second attempt.
Hazardous material teams did not appear to share resources (decontamination and
survey equipment) and look into mobile transportation for equipment and personnel if the
scene is as large as it was at this scenario. The sharing of resources was compounded
because a clear staging area/manager was never established.
Level A entry teams could not have climbed and fit through roof hatches. SOPs
for response to such situations should address the need to conduct Level A work on
rooftops and the use of aerial trucks, ladders, hydraulic platforms, etc. More generally,
the responding organizations should have a better understanding of Level A operations
(removing patients and hauling equipment can be difficult).
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Exercise Finding:
Overall this points to a total lack of unified approach to site safety. It is not a
"fault" on the part of any individual participant or participating agency, since each was
operating under their own established procedures. The problem is that there is no
procedure to bring these procedures together. There are no established procedures to
deal with unified interagency control over site safety, but this should be one of the
functions of a unified command structure. If a site safety officer is needed in such a
situation, one of the EPA OSCs volunteered that this could be an EPA role. We
recommend that the interagency plans at all levels be revised to include inclusion of a
unified approach to site safety within the Unified Command structure at the tactical level.
Survey Techniques;
Not every response organization used same radiological units of measure (R, mR,
etc.). CSD element instrumentation should be capable of providing data in English and
Standard International units. The DOE vehicle mounted radiation detectors failed to
locate the radioactive source in the "bomb lab" even though the AMS helicopter detected
it. This suggested some attention needed to be paid to the capabilities and deployment of
the system, particularly to training. The system had detected the source but did not alarm.
Operators were waiting for an alarm and were not looking at the display, which did show
the presence of the source. It should be noted that CSD, PADEP, EPA, DOE teams all
identified the radioisotopes at various points in time. Additionally, initial entry teams
should consider biologic indicators.
More interfaces between the local and state resources needed to occur. In the
FRMAC organization chart (Figure 3) there is a place for this coordination to occur but
many did not know that the Unified Command Structure had moved adjacent to the
FRMAC on Day 2. Both the FBI and DOE believed that the "Unified Command"
functions were covered in the Joint Operations Center. There were actually two
operational sites and a number of individual team surveys that were being coordinated,
although rather loosely. This points back to a need for a more focused approach, by the
local/state Unified Command structure located next to, in the same building, as the
FRMAC.
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EPA SENIOR OFFICIAL^)
FRMAC DIRECTOR
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Legal, Quality Assurance
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Deputy Assessment Mgr,
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State Representativi
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Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center
(Figure3)
The Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) failed to
initiate the first briefing until it was prompted by a state official that was observing the
exercise. The unified command staff, which was present and consisted of local and state
response agencies, were not periodically briefed by DOE staff within the FRMAC.
Traffic Control Points/Access Control Points
PSP command and supervisory personnel quickly established perimeter security
and traffic control around the incident personnel. RAP's initial entrance to the incident
command post was blocked but after displaying the recently designed RAP badge, was
allowed access. External and Internal Security was lacking at most operations.
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Communication;
There appeared to be no effective communications plan. The lack of effective
communications up and down the lines of authority is one of the most important elements
of the command structure. Throughout the incident, personal questioning indicated that
subordinate response elements below the strategic level were, for the most part, unaware
of the incident status, the overall incident action plan, their role in it, or anything beyond
specific task assignments. This can have serious consequences for incident stability and
safety, i.e. law enforcement officers operating without protection in what hazardous
material/ radiological response forces had determined to be 'hot zones'. I questioned
several different responders at different times as to who was in charge and where the
command post was, and got as many as three different answers at the same point in time.
It should be noted that later in the incident, the Incident Commander recognized this
need, and repeatedly urged those agency representatives at the JOC to share information
with their respective operational elements, but this did not seem to occur in any planned
systematic fashion. Example: PSP lacked the technical assessment personnel's input
while setting up the perimeter. PSP communication, when allowed, between the JOC,
UCP, and field forces were adequate. PSP was hampered by not having enough phone
lines in the JOC and this communication shortfall led to the overuse of cellular
telephones.
When the incident transferred to the Ft. Indiantown Gap facility, information
exchange was good for critical decisions, but the lack of proper Incident Command
establishment and transfer caused some problems. As the day went on the people needing it
received most of the pertinent information, but there was a definite lack of knowledge among
most responders concerning whom or what the status of command was. As can be expected
and certainly did occur, separate command posts or commanders appeared. Dedicated
persons overcame this in many instances because of some excellent work. These people put
aside their differences or attitudes and worked to resolve the problem pertaining to the
incident. Most of the information got to where it had to be on Day 1 by one means or
another.
As the second day started the information for some agencies, players, evaluators
and controllers was confusing but again was eventually received. Information between
agencies and locations seemed to flow rather well and most players knew what was going
on most of the time. Again the lack of information for the incident evaluators and
controllers caused some problems that could have been resolved with "injects" at specific
times or lacking certain predetermined results. The establishment of the "Joint Operations
Center" on day 2 helped a great deal with the flow of information. This occurred on dayl
in a much less organized and attended fashion which then led to the failure of some
information being obtained by certain agencies in a timely fashion.
Decisions were made without thorough coordination (told others they were to do
something but did not provide adequate explanation and consultations on what impacts it
might have on others.
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Communication Technical Support (Exercise & "Real World" Response Issues)
The US AF-Hammer Ace and the Pennsylvania Task Force 1, Urban Search & Rescue
communications components, provided much of the exercise radio communications to the
exercise controllers and evaluators. Due to the large number of participants and exercise
staff, it was necessary to establish robust radio communications capabilities. These
communications services could not be provided using telephone circuits because many of the
persons who had a need to communicate were at remote locations. In a real event, there
would be a similar need for radio communications capabilities, but in a real event it would be
far more important to use secure radios to prevent unauthorized persons from eavesdropping
on critical messages. US AF-Hammer Ace was able to provide the needed communications
capabilities. This is an important aspect in the preplanning for a real event.
The following evaluation is based on observations provided by TSG Tom Kinney of Scott
AFB,IL
Although there were some initial glitches with communication support, the
communication infrastructure was able to support the exercise and all of the objectives.
However, we have the following observations and recommendations for improvements.
1) All communication was clear (not secure), and as such subject to outside monitoring or
eavesdropping. This communication insecurity may have adverse ramifications. The
press may have access to information that does not need to be released. Also the hostile
faction may well be able to gather information and this too may have adverse
consequences.
2) Health of communications network was not actively monitored. Up channel reporting
of information was not always timely or discriminated.
3) Roles of communication support teams and capabilities of communications assets they
deployed were not clear.
Exercise Finding:
A method needs to be identified to provide secure communications for response
personnel. The press may have access to information that does not need to be released. Also
the hostile faction may well be able to gather information and this too may have adverse
consequences. If the DOD system is too restrictive with its authorized user constraints -
then another system needs to be developed for use in the event of a situation as envisioned in
this scenario.
In an ideal situation, a control cell needs to be established and good wire diagrams
for agency/cell interaction need to be developed. It is also at this point the communications
working group can be established to assess each cell's requirements and develop a scheme
and obtain necessary equipment or frequencies for the command and reporting information
flow. Simply stated, this means being able to identify the requirements of others. The
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working groups established for other cells will have functional area experts, but their
expertise is in their functional area not communications. Communications needs to be a
central part of planning for response as well as in the execution of a response, either real or
in an exercise.
During operations, functional experts must take an active role in ensuring their
systems are healthy and satisfying user requirements. This includes user education in
advance of an event and active intervention when communications problems are identified
during an event. It may not be possible to pre-arrange all the details in advance, but there is
a definite need to pre-plan communications needs of a generic event and how they might be
met. There is a need for a communications planning conference for counter-terrorism
events.
Terminology;
Terminology was a problem from the beginning and throughout the incident. It is
obvious that all agencies need to attend Incident Command training of some kind (the
N.F.A. Incident Command System recommended). If pre-incident questioning reveals
that this has not occurred, a mini session prior to the drill, or a set of terms could possibly
be provided.
Criminal Investigation;
PSP had a criminal investigation team on-site that were available to interview
victims, witnesses, and first responders and had the resources to canvas the neighborhood
for witnesses, videotape, and photograph the crime scene and to conduct other
investigative operations while the evidence was fresh and leads could easily be pursued.
FBI, however, did not request any immediate investigative operations.
Continuity of Municipal Operations;
An issue that was not addressed was a plan to maintain a continuity of operations
in "Fig City" while this incident was being addressed. In an incident of this type, fires
will continue to occur, citizens will continue to become ill for reasons unrelated to the
incident, police complaints will continue to come in, public works related emergencies
(i.e. water line breaks, etc) may take place. Therefore, plans to cope with this type of
incident must include provisions to deal with these matters.
The PSP criminal investigative team was a valuable resource severely
underutilized during day one, presumably a time when evidence is fresh and leads could
be most effectively utilized.
3rd CSD WMD needs to further their efforts in synchronizing training objectives
to enable them to forecast and use their resources effectively to support local responders.
They would also like to obtain more exercise controller training to help them evaluate
their internal exercises.
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Scene Safety During Exercise Play:
The scene remained safe with no actual injuries or vehicle accidents reported.
Dosimetry could've been monitored on a scheduled, more frequent basis. All managers
and response personnel did a great job looking after their personnel so that heat stress
issues did not occur.
Evidence Collection/Planning:
FBI coordination with evidence collection resources, to include chain of custody,
filming/document, did occur. 3rd CSD was tasked for an assessment but not collection.
There was a miscommunication on the JOCs tasking regarding this mission. By tasking
the 3rd CSD to do this, the JOC removed a valuable state asset from the local and states
resource survey capabilities manpower pool. The county and state would've have used
the team to support ongoing residence survey taskings that were already underway in Day
2. The FBI's Philadelphia Hazardous Materials Response team was available to meet the
FBI's evidence collection needs.
Press:
In the Vigilant Lion Exercise there was significant interaction with the news
media. This was intended to allow the news media to provide coverage of the exercise
itself and to allow them to see how an actual incident would be handled. We placed the
simulated media interactions late in the exercise after a Joint Information Center had been
established. However we realized that much of the media coverage would occur during
the initial response, and we did not simulate this press coverage. Instead, reporters
covering the exercise were allowed access to first response personnel.
The press had accessibility to the whole exercise and it was a good training tool,
but on the other, it hampered the first responder's ability to function in a media free
environment. The state police were very lenient, as previously agreed upon, to allow the
press the necessary access; access, which would not have been granted, had this been a
real world incident. The internal and external press coverage for the exercise was
excellent. It must be noted that had this been a real event, not enough state or county
Public Information Officers were available early on in the exercise, however, on the
second day, the "mock" press briefings went off without a hitch. More injects could have
been forwarded on to the "mock press" into the JIC to really task the Center but all press
objectives were met anyway. Most press "players" agreed that it would be helpful to have
more than one press person from each agency to help with the media coverage. In reality,
there probably would be more activity in the JIC than the JOC. Another item that was
tough for the media group was the validation of information released. The recording of
releases and information release is essential so that the media covering the event does not
cause any liability issues later in the incident by drawing out/confirming information that
was not previously authorized for release.
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The FBI representative from the Philadelphia Office coordinated the Joint
Information Center media activities. The FBI representative facilitated all "mock" press
briefings and ensured that subject matter agency experts were available for media
questions. Most of the media "players" arrived with the necessary equipment to generate
needed press releases and to capture both releasable and non-releasable information. The
center simulated that the PEMA satellite truck was available to address public issues and
safety concerns. The JIC scheduled a number of press briefings and conducted "mock"
interviews. The center also initiated staffing assignment and designated safe media areas
to cover various aspects of the response/crime scene coverage in the event that there
would be multiple incident scenes.
Exercise Finding:
Based on the outcome of this interaction, participants believe that a trained cadre
of Public Information Officers, to include the county PIOs, should arrive early at the
scene. This cadre should be trained on whom to go to as to safely obtain the needed
information quickly without jeopardizing the operation. A flexible, but secure, uniformed
badge system should be developed for the Public Information Officers and their staff. All
of this should be developed into a state Public Information Officer plan, quickly. The
designated press corps needs immediate and efficient media resources in order to provide
critical information to the reporters who will converge on the scene. The only way to
effectively meet this mission tasking is to have a well thought out and exercised plan. In
particular, the electronic media can be an important tool to allow protective actions to be
conveyed to the public. If this is not done, local responders, who are already highly
stressed, will be distracted from other important duties and important public safety
information may not be adequately communicated to the responders and the general
public.
Bomb Squad/Explosive Ordnance Disposal Teams:
On the first day of the exercise, it was planned that the bomb squad be assembled,
which consisted of bomb technicians from both civilian and military units, would
reconnoiter the FIG City/County Office building, inside and out, in coordination with the
local, state, and federal response agencies. Unfortunately, due to exercise timeline
constraints, exercise controllers had to condense or delete some of those activities.
On the second day, the house with the second device was identified. The FBI, as
the lead federal agency, responded with the "local" bomb squad. The bomb technicians
made the necessary entry (caused by the scenario and monitored by controllers). Once
inside, the bomb technicians also discovered that the house was booby-trapped. The FBI
agent directing personnel outside informed the DOE representative a path had been
cleared to the discovered radiological source and that the DOE RAP personnel now on-
scene needed to retrieve the source material. This caused the exercise "anticipated"
timeline to run a little longer than planned but a much needed discussion on roles and
responsibilities in this area ensued. The RAP team leader informed the FBI agent-in-
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charge that RAP personnel could not enter the building, even if a path had been cleared,
and if a suspected Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD) was identified. Eventually, the
DOE did take possession of the RDD after the RAP Team Leaders concern regarding
adequate room for RAP maneuvering was satisfied. The DOE RAP Team Leaders entered
the room with the FBI Bomb Tech to demonstrate what would be required to remove the
source had this been a real event.
Exercise Finding: This operational activity needs to be reviewed and clearly understood
by all parties concerned.
Corrective action: FBI and DOE have already identified their roles and responsibilities
under the DEST Guidelines, CT-JTF, and CJCS Conplan. Further training in this area is
already taking place at Hazardous Devices School, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.
Near the conclusion of the exercise, and when the "Bomb Squads" were still
operating, there wasn't any Fire Service or Hazardous Material Team representation. Law
Enforcement, Radiation Protection, and Environmental Protection personnel were on-
scene. There was a lengthy delay in getting the radiological material recovery phase
moving. The command element for this portion of the exercise was difficult to find and
identify. The "Bomb Squads" however, did get to operate. One exercise evaluator was
unsure what happened here, perhaps there was a reluctance to commit additional
resources that late in the scenario, or perhaps there was at this point the feeling that the
exercise was already over.
Exercise Finding:
Exercise Controllers need to monitor timelines more closely. Prompts need to be made
"by the clock" as to rectify stalls. It was evident that exercise play stalls/stoppages
affected additional play by 1) bomb technicians and the DOE RAP teams on Day One and
2) the bomb technicians exercise time needs for diagnostics on the second day.
Exercise Finding:
A terrorist incident is likely to involve a large number of people from many
disciplines with greatly varying areas of expertise. It is unreasonable to expect any
responder to be highly competent in every field. This is especially true if the threat is
chemical, radiological, or biological instead or in some combination with conventional
explosives. The first responders may be required to address a terrorist incident with only
minimal technical training in chemical, biological or radiological hazards as they relate
to a terrorist act. Complicating the situation more, first responders may not be able to
identify the full scope of the problem, for example a mixed threat. A similar problem can
occur in later phases of the response. For example, if the first responders are faced with
an explosive device and are not aware of a radiological threat, then only a bomb squad
would be mobilized and radiological expertise may never be called in. Since a bomb
squad cannot be expected to have chemical, biological or radiological expertise, there is
ample room for problems to develop.
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There is a need for a rapid assistance mechanism to assist the first responders in
assessing the situation, and a rapid assistance mechanism to get technical help to the
scene very quickly after a threat is identified. This is as much to protect the health of the
responders as it is to address the threat. The newly commissioned RAID teams can
supply much of this needed mechanism. In addition, there is a need for a rapidly
available expert consultation service. A good model for this service would be the DOE
funded REAC/TS function at Oak Ridge, TN. This service is geared to provide
immediate medical consultation in the event of a nuclear accident. Similar capabilities
for chemical and biological threats would be quite valuable, and such an assistance
service should not be restricted to medical aspects of the problem. Responders need a
place to call for immediate advice. ,
Exercise Preparation;
More information packets needed to be sent to the necessary agencies, players,
eyaluators, controllers, and media prior to the exercise. Additional radios or scanners
should have been provided to the evaluators and controllers to monitor radio traffic
pertaining to the exercise play. Some evaluators could then monitor incident information
between players while the other evaluators could monitor traffic among controllers and
organizers. Although an assignment board was completed prior to each day's activities
for the exercise evaluation and controller members, it was under utilized for evaluation
and controller taskings. Some members of the evaluation team could have been assigned
to evaluate other portions of the exercise instead of waiting for their next scheduled
assignment, meanwhile, other exercise evaluators had more than they could handle due to
the fast-paced flow of the exercise in certain areas.
42
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Conclusions:
We have the capability to handle a Weapons of Mass Destruction incident. This
first time attempt of a radiological exercise of its type and magnitude had every reason to
fail; but it didn't. It went off better than the exercise team members had imagined. There
are, however, many issues that need to be resolved quickly so that loss of life and
property of the general public and responders can be greatly diminished.
On broad overview, the exercise showed that the various local, county, state and
federal agencies have the ability to deal with the terrorist incident that was simulated.
Each agency came to the exercise with capable and dedicated people who knew their jobs
and did them well. The exercise revealed a number of important "lessons learned" which
should lead to a significantly strengthened ability to respond to a terrorist incident if the
appropriate corrective measures are implemented. This after-action report and its
attached annexes can serve as a template for any agency, which wants to attempt an
exercise of its kind. From the beginning of the exercise the group wanted to ensure that
as much data was captured as possible, and this compilation of information has been
provided within the report and will be shared with authorized response agencies that
request this report. Another benefit identified was that Pennsylvania now has a large
number of trained cadre of evaluators and controllers for state and regional sponsored
exercises. This cadre, as well as the exercise participants has a great understanding on
what resources and personnel are available should an incident like this occur here in the
Commonwealth.
The benefit of the personal contacts from the planning process of the exercise
didn't fully appear in the exercise itself because the players had never interacted before.
The exercise design team members were occupied during the exercise with duties related
to control and evaluation of the exercise, and so were not available as responders. These
were the people who were most familiar with the various response agencies. However if
a real world incident had occurred, the exercise design team members would have been
the players and the face-to-face planning would have had strong positive impact.
This was observed in the Lost Source Exercise of 1997 held in Coatesville,
Chester County, which was co-sponsored by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission-
Region 1, and the Environmental Protection Agency, Region 3 offices. Three weeks prior
to the exercise, a real incident occurred which involved the same individuals who had
planned the exercise. As a result of the strong personal bonds that had developed and the
intimate familiarity of each person with the other's responsibilities and capabilities, the
response went exceptionally smoothly. The planning of the exercise had a benefit
because it forced the various participants to work together as a team. This is a graphic
demonstration of a secondary value of exercises. It could be expected to result form the
Vigilant Lion Exercise, too.
The participating agencies need to train more people in response support
activities. It was apparent that the number of people who are trained in response is
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sufficient in the short term and agencies would have difficulty in responding on a 24-
hour, seven days a week basis for a protracted period.
PEMA should continue to develop the role of state agency NBC Officers and
provide higher levels of training. Additional terrorism exercises should be planned for
other areas of the state as well as across the country. The personal benefit of this exercise
will be mainly to the participants. The lessons learned should help in developing a
counter-terrorism infrastructure, but ideally all responders should participate in at least
one exercise. Unfortunately, exercises of this scope are unlikely to occur on a regular
basis.
There is a need for development of a pocket Field Operations Guide (such as the
US&R Program) would ensure that ICS/UCS is implemented in a multi-agency response.
Pre-identification of response personnel is important. Each response agency
should have the ability to request assistance quickly through well-established channels.
Responders from various agencies need to be pre-credentialed. People who need to be
on the scene must have access immediately and other agencies must know who and what
agencies they represent. This would help the security operations immensely.
The CSD is a new, important and valuable resource for the State and Local
responders. The CSD thought that this was an excellent opportunity for the 3rd CSD to
interface with local, state, and federal agencies and afforded them an opportunity to
improve their Standard Operating Procedures. This exercise and the subsequent changes
that will be made in their present checklists and plans will make it easier when interfacing
with other local and state responders in FEMA Region HI.
The exercise team listed below hopes that whomever reviews this information would
benefit from this and would attempt to formulate and execute this type of exercise. The
citizens and elected/appointed officials of your jurisdictions are looking to you for a
quick, concise response. Planning on paper doesn't mean anything unless you can really
make it happen in the field and under the most adverse of condition.
Exercise Group;
Planners; ,
Clyde Miller, Lebanon County Emergency Management Agency (LEMA)
Annette Smith, Lebanon County Emergency Management Agency
Chris Miller, LEMA Hazardous Materials Response Unit
Joan Gill, Director Administrative, Good Samaritan Hospital, City of Lebanon
Brad Fultz, Director of Safety, Good Samaritan Hospital, City of Lebanon
Larry Phillips, Director of Security, Good Samaritan Hospital, City of Lebanon
Steve Centore, Department of Energy, Region 1, Brookhaven National Laboratory
Bill Belanger, Environmental Protection Agency Region HI, Philadelphia
Ken Erickson, SSGT, NAVSCOLEOD Det 1 Indianhead, Maryland
Tom Hughes, PA Emergency Management Agency, Bureau Operations & Training
44
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Jeff Davis, PA State Police, Bureau of Emergency and Special Operations
Randy Easton, PA Department of the Environment, Bureau of Radiation Protection
Richard Matason, Colonel, PA Department of Military & Veteran Affairs, MSCA
Richard Dyke, Major, PA Department of Military & Veteran Affairs, MSCA
Xavier Stewart, Lt. Col., 3rd Civil Support Detachment (WMD)
Chiquita M. Morrison, PA Health, Emergency Medical Services Office
Brenda Pittman, Lancaster County Emergency Management Agency
Chris Rigopolous, FBI Philadelphia
Mike Baker, FBI Philadelphia (EOD)
Robert Shilling, Sergeant, Reading Police Department, Bomb Squad
Jim Grimm, Capt, Allentown Fire Department, Bomb Squad
Becky Watson, DOE Safeguards and Emergency Operations 413
Pat Bjerke, DOE Safeguards and Emergency Operations 413
Lou Palm, DOE Oak Ridge Institute of Science & Education (ORISE)
Kerry Leib, PA Department of Environment Protection, Emergency Response Program
Controllers:
Steve Centore, Department of Energy, Region 1
Bill Belanger, Environmental Protection Agency Region HI
Ken Erickson, SSGT, NAVSCOLEOD Det Indianhead
Tom Hughes, PA Emergency Management Agency
Tim Dunkle, PA State Fire Academy
Jeff Davis, PA State Police, Bureau of Emergency and Special Operations
Randy Easton, PA Department of the Environment, Bureau of Radiation Protection
Richard Dyke, Major, PA Department of Military & Veteran Affairs
Brenda Pittman, Lancaster County Emergency Management Agency
Chris Rigopolous, FBI Philadelphia
Becky Watson, DOE Safeguards and Emergency Operations 413
Pat Bjerke, DOE Safeguards and Emergency Operations 413
Lou Palm, DOE ORISE
Evaluators:
Marty Vyenielo, PA Department of the Environment, Bureau of Radiation Protection
Barry Reed, Lt, PA State Police, Troop L, Reading Barracks
Len Insalaco, PA Department of the Environment, Northeast Region
Dan Holler, PA Department of the Environment, Northwest Region
Richard Wessel, PA State Fire Academy
Pat Pauley, PA State Fire Academy
Bob McCaa, PA State Fire Academy
Len Carsley, Lt. Col, PA Department of Military & Veteran Affairs
Chris Catone, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Philadelphia
Dr. Goans, DOE Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site, Oak Ridge, TN
Mark Register, DOE-Westinghouse, Savannah River Site, SC
Doug Boyd, DOE ORISE
45
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Vigilant Lion Annexes Page Numbers
A) Scope 47
B) Objectives 52
C) Scenario 71
D) Timeline 74
E) Safety Plan 86
F) Communication Plan 92
G) USAF HAMMER ACE Observations 97
H) VL Release Form 98
I) VL Press Advisory 99
J) Participant Contact List 101
K) VL Acronym/Definitions 103
L) Glossary 121
M) Lebanon County News Release 123
N) Participating Organizations 125
O) Regulations 126
46
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EXERCISE PURPOSE & SCOPE
Exercise Purpose:
This exercise is designed to test the concepts and
procedures required for local, state, and federal
government agencies to respond to a weapon of
mass destruction event in the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. The exercise will concentrate on
local response, notifications, crisis management,
consequence management, criminal (terrorist)
investigations, and interagency coordination and
communication.
EXERCISE SCOPE MATRIX
ORGANIZATION
FEDERAL AGENCIES
FBI
< Headquarters
< Credibility Assess
< DEST
< Quantico (HMRU)
< Pennsylvania
< Hostage Rescue Team
<
DOE -*Need to Verify this
< Headquarters
NN-60
NN-62
Office of Science
Defense Programs
LLNL Threat Assess
< Chicago Ops Office
< Brookhaven
< RAP Region 1
LEVEL OF PLAY; DAY 1
Full
Full
Simulated-Notification only
Part or simcell
Part or simcell
Part or simcell
Part or simcell
simulated
Simcell
Notification point only
6 hours actual - Pre-staged
LEVEL OF PLAY; DAY 2
DEST Simulated otherwise
full
Full
Full
Simulated-Notification only
Part or simcell
Part or simcell
t
Part or simcell
Part or simcell
Simcell
Simcell
Full
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ORGANIZATION
< NEST
< AMS
ARAC
< FRMAC
< REAC/TS
EPA
< Headquarters
< Region HI
< Onscene Coordinator
Laboratories (Mobile AL and
LV
< Technical Assist
Contracting Team
Department of Treasury
< ATF
<
DOD
< 756 EOD
< Tech Escort
< HAMMER ACE
< Indianhead
FEMA
< Headquarters
< FEMA Region ffl
Liaison and ERT
< Regional Operations
Center (ROC)
LEVEL OF PLAY; DAY 1
Participates in Sim DEST
simulated
Notification only
Phase I
Partial
Notified - rest simulated
DEST
EOC Part
Full
Simulated
part
TBD
N/A Supplied Evaluator
Unknown, Deployed
Simulated - Notification only
Comm Support
EOD Controller/Evaluator
Simulated
Partial
Simulated
Possible part activation
LEVEL OF PLAY; DAY 2
Full
simulated
Simulated or pre-stated
Phase I
Partial
Simcell
Part
full
simulated
part
TBD
N/A Supplied Evaluator
Unknown, Deployed
Simulated
Comm Support
EOD Controller/Evaluator
Simcell
Partial
Part
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ORGANIZATION
US Veterans Affairs
Department of Agriculture
HHS
STATE OF PA AGENCIES
Govenor's Office
< Lt. Governor
<
PA Bureau of Investigation
< State Police
< Bureau Special
Operations
<
PA National Guard/DMVA
< RAID
< Military Support
< Civil Air Patrol
< 128th Chemical
Company
PEMA
< RJM&C
< CENIC (Public
Affairs)
Satellite Vehicle
(Communications Vehcile)
< SEOC
PA DEP
Bureau of Rad Protection
LEVEL OF PLAY; DAY 1
Part
TBD
TBD
TBD
Possible
Intell - Simulated
Full
Full
Full
Full
N/A No Mondays
Full
Full
Full
Full
Full
LEVEL OF PLAY; DAY 2
Part
TBD
TBD
TBD
part
simcell
full
Full
Full
Full
N/A
Full
Full
Full
Full
Full
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ORGANIZATION
ERT
PA Health Department
PIO
LeHigh County EMA
< Allentown Bomb
Squad
< Reading Bomb Squad
<
Lebanon County EMA
< HAZMAT
< EOC/Comm Center
< Ft Indian Gap FD
< Ft. Indian Gap PD
EMS
Basic Life Support/Advance
Life Support
HAZMAT Mutual Aid
Good Samaritan Hospital
< County Comor
< Funeral Director
East Hanover EMA
East Hanover Governing
Official
LEVEL OF PLAY; DAY 1
FULL
Partial
Full
Limited
Full
Full
Full
Full
Part
Full
Full
Full
Full
Simulated
Full
Full
Full
Full
Full
LEVEL OF PLAY; DAY 2
Full
Partial
Full
Limited
Full
Full
Full
Full
Part
Part
Full
Part
Part
Schuylkill County Assistance
During Interviews/Surveys
Full
part
part
TBD
TBD
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Exercise Objectives
Local Organizations:
A. Lebanon County EMA
Objective #A.l
Objective #A.2
Objective #A.3
Objective #A.4
Objective #A.5
Objective #A.6
Objective #A.7
Given notification of a large number of patients arriving at Good
Samaritan Hospital, Activate the HAZMAT team in accordance
with Lebanon County Emergency Operations Plan, Lebanon
County PA Act 78 (911) Plan, Lebanon VA Hospital/Good
Samaritan Hospital Mutual Aid Agreement and Lebanon County
HAZMAT Dispatch SOP.
Given the notification from Good Samaritan Hospital and
activation of the HAZMAT Team, make notifications to PEMA in
accordance with the Lebanon County EMA Notification SOP and
Pennsylvania Emergency Information Reporting System.
Given information from the HAZMAT Team, Activate the
Lebanon County EOC in accordance with Lebanon County
HAZMAT Dispatch SOP and Lebanon County Emergency
Operations Plan.
Given an operational EOC, support response assets with
communications and logistical support in accordance with Lebanon
County EOC SOP and Lebanon County Emergency Operations
Plan.
Given an expanding event scope, implement mutual aid
agreements in accordance with Lebanon County HAZMAT
Dispatch SOP and Lebanon County Emergency Operations Plan
Given Federalization of the response, coordinate the county
response with the Federal on-scene commander in accordance with
Lebanon County HAZMAT Dispatch SOP, Unified Command
System.
Given fatalities, coordinate interment with the county coroner in
accordance with Lebanon County EOC SOP and Lebanon County
EMA EOP.
Objective #A.8 Given an activated Joint Information Center, provide county PIO
support in accordance with the Lebanon County EOC SOP and
Lebanon County EMA SOP.
B. Lebanon County HAZMAT
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Objective #B.l
Objective #B.2
Objective #B.3
Objective #B.4
Objective #B.5
Objective #B.6
Objective #B.7
Objective #B.8
Objective #B.9
Objective #B. 10
Given notification of a large number of patients arriving at Good
Samaritan Hospital, Activate the HAZMAT team in accordance
with the Lebanon County HAZMAT Dispatch SOP.
Given an operational HAZMAT, dispatch the team to Good
Samaritan Hospital and establish incident command in accordance
with the Lebanon County EMA HAZMAT SOP.
Given a suspected HAZMAT event, establish and operate a
decontamination unit at the Good Samaritan Hospital in
accordance with Lebanon County HAZMAT Dispatch SOP
{Reference: OSHA 1910.120}.
Given suspected radiological contamination, notify PEMA in
accordance with the Pennsylvania Emergency Information
Reporting System (PEIRS) and 911 Protocols and Lebanon County
EMA SOP.
Given the information that all patients worked at the FIG
City/County Office Building, dispatch a HAZMAT team to FIG
City and survey the building for hazardous materials in accordance
with Lebanon County EMA HAZMAT SOP.
Upon arrival at FIG City/County Office Building, establish
incident command in accordance with Lebanon County EMA
HAZMAT SOP.
Upon establishment of incident command, conduct an evacuation
of the building to include evacuation to a predetermined assembly
point where evacuees are controlled in accordance with Lebanon
County EMA HAZMAT SOP and Lebanon County EOC SOP.
Given identification of the same or similar symptoms of the
evacuees, survey evacuees in accordance with the Lebanon County
HAZMAT EMA SOP
Given contamination of building evacuees, establish and decon
evacuees in accordance with Lebanon County EMA HAZMAT
SOP {Reference: 1910.120}.
Given a possible relocation of Lebanon County residents, activate
Critical Incident Stress Management Teams for deployment to
shelters in accordance with county plan.
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Lancaster County EMA
Objective #C.l Given a request for assistance, provide HAZMAT mutual aid in
accordance with the Lancaster County/Lebanon County Mutual
Aid Agreement for Emergency Services.
Objective #C.2 Given a request for assistance, provide medical mutual aid in
accordance with Lancaster County/Lebanon County Mutual Aid
Agreement for Emergency Services.
Objective #C.3 Given a request for assistance, provide radiological monitoring
resource mutual aid in accordance with Lancaster County/Lebanon
County Mutual Aid Agreement for Emergency Services.
Objective #C.4 Given an increase of scope of the event in Lebanon County,
activate the Lancaster County EOC in accordance with Lancaster
County/Lebanon County Mutual Aid Agreement for Emergency
Services.
Objective #C.5 Given a request for assistance, deploy the bomb search dog to
Lebanon County in accordance with Lancaster County/Lebanon
County Mutual Aid Agreement for Emergency Services.
Objective #C.6 Given a possible relocation of Lebanon County residents, prepare
to activate shelters in accordance with Lancaster County/Lebanon
County Mutual Aid Agreement for Emergency Services.
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Good Samaritan Hospital
Objective #D. 1 Given a large number of patients with same or similar symptoms,
activate the Hospital Mass Casualty Plan in accordance with the
Good Samaritan Hospital (GSH) Disaster Plan.
Objective #D.2 Given a mass casualty event, request Commonwealth assistance in
accordance with the GSH Mass Casualty Plan.
Objective #D.3 Given a mass casualty event, request mutual aid in accordance with
the GSH Mass Casualty Plan and transfer Tertiary acute care in
accordance with the Hazardous Material Emergency Plan,
Appendix K.
Objective #D.4 Given the identification of a radiological event, survey the hospital
for contamination in accordance with GSH Disaster Plan,
HAZMAT Adden. G.
Objective #D.5 Given contaminated areas in the hospital, decontaminate these
areas in accordance with the GSH HAZMAT Plan, Appendix J.
(Ref: R/HMETA)
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Fort Indian Gap Fire Department
Objective #F. 1 Given a suspected HAZMAT event at Good Samaritan Hospital,
support the HAZMAT team in accordance with
Objective #F.2 Given a suspected HAZMAT event at building XXX, support the
HAZMAT team in accordance with
Objective #F.3 Given Federalization of the event, support the emergency response
in accordance with
Fort Indian Gap Police Department
Objective #G. 1 Given a suspected HAZMAT event at the FIG City/County Office
Building, execute a security cordon around the building in
accordance with Ft. Indiantown Gap Police Department's
Protocol/Operations Procedure 41.2.
Objective #G.2 Giving an increasing event scope, request mutual aid in accordance
with Ft. Indiantown Gap Police Department's Protocol/Operations
Procedure 41.2.
Objective #G.3 Given a radiological event, provide road blocks around the affected
area in accordance with Ft. Indiantown Gap Police Department's
Protocol/Operations Procedure 41.2.
Objective #G.4 Given fatalities, notify next of kin in accordance with Ft.
Indiantown Gap Police Department's Protocol/Operations
Procedure 41.2.
Lebanon County Coroner
Objective #H. 1 Given contaminated fatalities, coordinate the decontamination and
temporary storage of the fatalities in accordance with GSH Disaster
Plan, Hazmat Addendum.
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Explosive Ordnance Disposal/Bomb Squad
Objective #1.1 Given the request for assistance, activate and deploy the bomb
squad in accordance with civil bomb squad operation instructors
(or 52nd Group Operating Instruction).
Objective #1.2 Upon arrival at the event scene, receive briefing from incident
command and security personnel in accordance with past accepted
procedures.
Objective #1.3 Upon locating the suspected explosive device, survey the device in
accordance with applicable publications.
Objective #1.4 After surveying and analyzing the device, render safe in accordance
with applicable publications.
Objective Series J and K reserved for future use
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Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Organizations
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), Emergency Response Program
Objective #L. 1: Given notification of an event, notify ERTs within 15 minutes and
deploy the emergency response teams to the event scene.
Objective #L.2: Notify DEP State and Regional Directors of the emergency
response within 20 minutes.
Objective #L.3: Upon arrival of initial DEP responders, assess the event scene in
accordance with the DEP Emergency Response Plan.
Objective #L.4: Upon activation, the DEP ERTs will respond with the capability to
conduct assessments, monitoring, mitigation, and communications
in accordance with DEP Emergency Response Plan.
Objective #L.5: Based on the results of the assessment, make request additional
assets in accordance with DEP Emergency Response Plan.
Objective #L.6Maintain information flow between deployed staff and Headquarters in
accordance with DEP Emergency Response Plan.
Objective #L.7Liaison with federal, local, and other commonwealth agencies in
accordance with DEP Emergency Response Plan.
Objective #L.8Make preliminary determination of radionuclide(s) in coordination with
other agency deployed assets, using field instruments and
techniques as recommended by attenuator analysis techniques.
Objective #N.9 Coordinate media inquiries with other agencies in accordance with
DEP Emergency Response Plan.
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Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency
Objective #M.l
Objective #M.2
Objective #M.3
Objective #M.4
Objective #M.5
Objective #M.6
Given an emergency notification, document event notification
information in accordance with the Commonwealth's Emergency
Operations Plan.
Upon notification of an emergency, establish communications with
the county EMA office and document event information in
accordance with the Commonwealth's Emergency Operations Plan
Given notification of an emergency via the Pennsylvania
Emergency Information Reporting System (PEIRS) criteria, notify
off-site personnel and agencies in accordance with the
Commonwealth's Emergency Operations Plan.
Given notification of an emergency, activate and staff the State
Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) in accordance with the
Commonwealth's Emergency Operations Plan.
Given the activation of the SEOC to level m, declare the SEOC
operational when key staff members are present and briefed in
accordance with the Commonwealth's Emergency Operations
Plan, the PEMA Administrative SOP, and Terrorism Checklist.
Given verification of public warning siren activation, initiate the
activation of the Emergency Alerting System (EAS) message in
accordance with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's EAS
Operational Plan.
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Objective #M.7
Objective #M.8
Objective #M.9
Objective #M. 10
Objective #M. 11
Objective #M. 12
Objective #M. 13
Objective #M. 14
Objective #M. 15
Given an operational RAP Mobile Laboratory communications
links, request information and event updates via the satellite up-
link vehicle and National Communication System Shared
Resources System in accordance with accepted communication
protocols.
Given receipt of event information from the scene, develop
situation reports based on chronological information in accordance
with the Commonwealth's Emergency Operations Plan.
Given an operational SEOC, review and evaluate the protective
action recommendations (PARs) with the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection (PA DEP) and PA Health
for impacted jurisdictions in accordance with the Commonwealth's
Emergency Operations Plan.
Given information from PA DEP and Bureau of Radiation
Protection (BRP), develop an assessment of the impacts of the
event in accordance with the Commonwealth's Emergency
Operations Plan.
Given an operational emergency, provide emergency instruction to
the public via the Emergency Information Officer in accordance
with the Commonwealth's Emergency Operations Plan.
Given an operational emergency, maintain event information in
EIS/GEMS in accordance with the Commonwealth's Emergency
Operations Plan.
Given an operational emergency, and in coordination with the
affected site, develop long-range strategies for recovery operations
in accordance with the Commonwealth's Emergency Operations
Plan.
Given an operational emergency involving sensitive information,
receive and process classified information in accordance with the
Commonwealth's Emergency Operations Plan
Given an operational emergency, use mast-cam to observe team
movements in the event scene hot or warm zones in accordance
with
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Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), Bureau of Radiation Protection
Objective #N.l:
Objective #N.2:
Objective #N.3:
Objective #N.4
Objective #N.5:
Objective #N.6
Objective #N.7
Objective #N.8
Objective #N.9
Objective #N. 10
Objective #N. 11
Given notification of an event, notify BRP personnel within 15
minutes and deploy appropriate personnel to the event scene.
Notify DEP BRP decision-makers of the emergency response
within 20 minutes.
Upon arrival of initial DEP responders, assess the event scene in
accordance with the DEP Emergency Response Plan.
Upon arrival, liaison with the DEP ERT on-scene to conduct
assessments, monitoring, mitigation, and communications in
accordance with DEP Emergency Response Plan.
Based on the results of the assessment, make request additional
assets in accordance with DEP Emergency Response Plan.
Given deployed response teams, maintain information flow
between deployed staff and the DEP/BRP Headquarters in
accordance with DEP Emergency Response Plan.
Given an initial assessment, formulate and communicate protective
action recommendations for public health and safety in accordance
with DEP Emergency Response Plan.
Given an operational ERT on scene, formulate and communicate a
preliminary dose assessment using RASCAL Dose Projection
software and/or by computing calculations manually.
Given deployed ERTs, liaison with federal, local, and other
commonwealth agencies in accordance with DEP Emergency
Response Plan.
Given deployed ERTs, make preliminary determination of
radionuclide(s) in coordination with other agency deployed assets,
using field instruments and techniques as recommended by
attenuator analysis techniques.
Given deployed assets, coordinate media inquiries with other
agencies in accordance with DEP Emergency Response Plan.
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Civil Air Patrol
Objective #O.l
Objective #O.2
Objective #O.3
Objective #O.4
Objective #O.5
Objective #O.6
Objective #O.7
Given notification from DMVA/PAWG of a possible mass
casualty event, identify and activate assets through the PAWG
(Pennsylvania Wing) call out procedures.
Given notification from DMVA/PAWG of a possible mass
casualty event, activate the PAWG HQ EOC in accordance with
CAPR 50-15, 55-1, and 60-1.
Given the identification of assets, report opening strength to the
PAWG EOC in accordance with CAPR 50-15, 55-1, and 60-1.
Given the request from the SEOC, provide airborne slow-scan for
site recon in accordance with CAPR 50-15, 55-1, and 60-1.
Given the request from the SEOC, provide air-rad monitoring in
accordance with CAPR 50-15, 55-1, and 60-1.
Given the request from the SEOC, provide
logistical/communications support through transport and High-bird
flights in accordance with CAPR 50-15, 55-1, and 60-1.
Given the request from the SEOC, provide ground teams for
radiological monitoring in accordance with CAPR 50-15, 55-1, and
60-1.
Objective #O.8
Given the request from the SEOC, provide communications
support through the CAP frequencies and radio equipment in
accordance with CAPR 50-15, 55-1, and 60-1.
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3 CSD WMD (formally Rapid Assessment Initial Detection Element)
Objective #P.l:
Objective #P.2:
Objective #P.3:
Objective #P.4:
Objective #P.5:
Objective #P.6:
Given the request for 3rd MSD RAID assets from the Governor's
office, activate the 3rd MSD RAID team in accordance with 3rd
MSD Alert Roster.
Given an activated 3rd MSD RAID Team, pre-operations check all
equipment and vehicles in accordance with 3rd MSD Pre-
Operations Checklist.
Upon deployment, report to the Incident Commander for situation
briefings and mission assignments in accordance with 3rd MSD
Arrival Standard Operations Guide (SOG) and Checklists.
e
In coordination with the Incident Command, conduct Assessment
by monitoring and sampling in the HAZMAT area in accordance
with 3rd MSD Standard Operations Guide.
Upon receipt of training by the DOE NEST team, conduct initial
searches for radiological devices in accordance with 3rd MSD
Survey SOG.
Upon arrival of RAID, decontaminate RAID members in
accordance with 3rd MSD SOG and Decontamination Checklist.
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Pennsylvania State Police
Objective #Q. 1 Demonstrate the ability to mobilize Department resources to
request for assistance from FIG PD in accordance with Field
Regulation 2-1, Section 1.03 C.
Objective #Q.2 Demonstrate the ability to participate in a unified command
structure at the scene of a suspected hazardous materials incident.
Assist in the development of an Incident Action Plan. Reference:
Operations Manual 7-1, Emergencies and Unusual Occurrences,
Chapter 4.
Objective#Q.3 Establish traffic control and perimeter security appropriate to the
incident in accordance with Field Regulation 6-13, Direction and
Control of Traffic.
Objective #Q.4 Assist the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in crisis
management activities, as requested, and within Department
capabilities: Reference: Field Regulation 1-2.14.
Objective #Q.5 Demonstrate the ability to integrate Department supervisors/
commanders into the FBI's Joint Operations Center (JOC) in
accordance with Field Regulation 1-2.14.
Objective #Q.6 Demonstrate the ability to participate in a Joint Information Center
(JIC) in accordance with Administrative Regulation 6-1.
Objective #Q.7 Participate in Exercise Debriefing and After-Action Critiques.
Objective Series Q and R reserved for future use
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Federal Agencies
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Harris burg RA:
Objective #S. 1 Given notification of a possible WMD/terrorist event from a
county EMA, notify the Philadelphia Division FBI Office in
accordance with FBI Philadelphia Division, Weapons of Mass
Destruction Plan.
Objective #S.2 Given notification of a possible WMD/terrorist event from a
county EMA, conduct a logical investigation to assist in the
credibility assessment in accordance with Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Manual of Investigations and Operations Guide.
Objective #S.3 Given the Harrisburg RA's arrival at the scene, interview patients
to identify the source in accordance with Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Manual of Investigations and Operations Guide.
Objective #S.4 Demonstrate the ability to integrate with the Incident Command
System/ Unified Command System on-scene in accordance with
Federal Bureau of Investigation Weapons of Mass Destruction
Incident Contingency Plan.
Objective #S.5 Demonstrate the ability to provide an incident briefing to the
Senior Agent In-Charge/Assistant Agent in Charge upon his or her
arrival in accordance with Federal Bureau of Investigation
Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident Contingency Plan
FBI Philadelphia Office:
Objective #S.6 Given notification of a possible WMD/terrorist event and initial
credibility assessment from the RA, complete the credibility
assessment and provide the information to the FBI HQ in
accordance with Federal Bureau of Investigation, Manual of
Investigations and Operations Guide.
i
Objective #S.7 Given notification of a possible WMD/terrorist event, deploy bomb
technicians, HM Tech resources, and ERT in accordance with the
Crisis Management Plan.
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Objective #S.8
Given regional deployed assets, establish the JOC in accordance
with Federal Bureau of Investigation, Manual of Investigations and
Operations Guide.
Objective #S.9 Given a JOC, the SAC establishes unified command in accordance
with Federal Bureau of Investigation, Manual of Investigations and
Operations Guide.
Objectives #S.10 and S.ll reserved for future use
FBI Headquarters:
Objective #S. 12
Objective #S. 13
Objective #S. 14
Objective #S. 15
On scene Actions:
Objective #S. 16
Objective #S. 17
Objective #S. 18
Objective #S. 19
Given notification of a possible WMD/terrorist event from the
Philadelphia Regional Office, confirm credibility assessment in
accordance with Federal Bureau of Investigation, Manual of
Investigations and Operations Guide.
Given a credible assessment, activate and deploy the DEST in
accordance with Federal Bureau of Investigation, Manual of
Investigations and Operations Guide.
Given a credible assessment, make notifications to other federal
agencies and assets in accordance with Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Manual of Investigations and Operations Guide.
Given a credible assessment, the bomb tech makes notifications of
military and local bomb squad assets in accordance with Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Manual of Investigations and Operations
Guide.
Given credible intelligence, conduct search for a secondary device
in accordance with Federal Bureau of Investigation, Manual of
Investigations and Operations Guide.
Given deployed ERT and HM Teams, collect evidence on scene in
accordance with Federal Bureau of Investigation, Manual of
Investigations and Operations Guide.
Given credible intelligence, notify DOE of the search environment
and request deployment of NEST for covert operations in
accordance with Federal Bureau of Investigation, Manual of
Investigations and Operations Guide.
Given an identified second device, make safe in accordance with
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Manual of Investigations and
Operations Guide.
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U. S. Department of Energy (DOE)
RAP Region 1:
Objective #T.l Given a request for radiological assistance from the Pennsylvania
Emergency Management Agency, notify DOE HQ within 15
minutes in accordance with DOE 5000.3A Occurrence Reporting
and Processing of Operations Information and DOE 5530.3,
Radiological Assistance Program (RAP).
Objective #T.2 Given a request for RAP assistance, deploy the RAP Team to the
event scene in accordance with DOE 5530.3, Radiological
Assistance Program (RAP) and DOE RAP Field Operations Guide
(FOG).
Objective #T.3 Given a deployed, on scene RAP Team, review the analytical and
diagnostic information provided by on scene state and local assets
in accordance with local and state response procedures as agreed
upon in the DOE RAP Region 1 and Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania Memorandum of Understanding.
Objective #1.4 Given a deployed, on scene RAP Team, establish and maintain
communications with DOE-HQ in accordance with DOE 5530.3,
Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) and DOE RAP Field
Operations Guide (FOG).
Objective #T.5 Given a deployed on scene RAP Team, maintain and process event
information in accordance with local and state response procedures
as agreed upon in the DOE RAP Region 1 and Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania Memorandum of Understanding.
Objective #T.6 Given a deployed on scene RAP Team, develop and provide
protective action recommendations in accordance with local and
state response procedures as agreed upon in the DOE RAP Region
1 and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Memorandum of
Understanding.
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Objective #T.7
Objective #T.8
Objective #T.9
Objective #T. 10
Objective #T. 11
/>OE Headquarters:
Objective #T. 12
Objective #T. 13
Objective #T. 14
Given a deployed on scene RAP Team, receive, formulate,
coordinate, and distribute public information via the JIC in
accordance with local and state response procedures as agreed
upon in the DOE RAP Region 1 and Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania Memorandum of Understanding.
Given a deployed on scene RAP Team and events involving
security issues, disseminate classified information in accordance
with DOE 5650.2B, Identification of Classified Information and
DOE 5635.4, Protection of Unclassified Controlled Nuclear
Information.
Given a deployed on scene RAP Team and events involving
security issues, coordinate security with the FBI and local law
enforcement agencies in accordance with Weapons of Mass
Destruction Incident Contingency Plan.
Given a deployed on scene RAP Team, coordinate assessment and
monitoring with other federal, state and local assets in accordance
with local and state response procedures as agreed upon in the
DOE RAP Region 1 and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Memorandum of Understanding.
Given the arrival of the Nuclear/Radiological Advisory Team
(NRAT) leader, turnover responsibility in accordance with DOE
5530.3, Radiological Assistance Program (RAP).
Given notification of the activation of the Region I RAP, convene a
monitoring team in the HQ EOC in accordance with DOE
Headquarters EMT procedures.
Given notification of the activation of the Region I RAP, brief
DOE senior official of the event in accordance with DOE
Headquarters notification procedures in accordance with HQ
Emergency Management Team (EMT) procedures.
Given notification of a potential terrorist WMD, conduct and
coordinate with the FBI a threat assessment in accordance with
DOE NN-64 threat assessment procedures.
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Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Objective #U. 1 Given verified notification of a possible WMD event, establish a
state liaison/ERT-A at the regional operations center in accordance
with the FEMA Regional Response Plan.
Objective #U.2 Given verified response notification of a possible WMD event,
make notifications in accordance with the FEMA Regional
Response Plan and the Federal Response Plan.
Objective #U.3 Given the probability of a terrorism incident and probable
Presidential Declaration, deploy the ERT to the state operating
locations and liaison with FBI Field Operating locations in
accordance with the Federal Response Plan and Regional Response
Plan.
Objective #U.4 Given the probability of a Presidential Declaration, conduct
planning for the activation and deployment of the ERT-A and the
establishment of a Disaster Field Office in accordance with the
FEMA Regional Response Plan and Federal Response Plan.
Objective #U.5 If the President makes a declaration, FEMA executes coordination
of all Federal Consequence Management activities and resources in
support of local and state government under the Federal Response
Plan as directed in PDD-39.
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U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Objective #V.l
Objective #V.2
Objective #V.3
Objective #V.4
Given notification of a possible WMD event, make internal and
external notifications in accordance with the National Contingency
Plan.
Given a WMD event, activate and deploy EPA assets in
accordance with the National Contingency Plan.
Given deployed FBI assets, the EPA on scene coordinator provides
support to the FBI SAC in accordance with the National
Contingency Plan and PDD-39.
Given a FEMA activation, EPA fulfills ESF #10 duties in
accordance with the Federal Response Plan
Objective #V.5
Given a radiological WMD event, deploy EPA radiation response
personnel and coordinate response with DOE RAP assets in
accordance with the Federal Radiological Emergency Response
Plan.
END
69
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ANNEXC
FINAL SCENARIO (September 23,1999)
On Monday evening, September 27th, a disgruntled ex-employee places a radioactive
dispersal device on the Fig County Office building's HVACC intake vent located on the
roof (Area 19, Building 76). Approximately 550 Fig county and city employees work in
this two-story building. This device dispersed radioactive material throughout the
building through the use of a small fan connected to a timer. Fig City has an estimated
population of 650,000 and has two trauma hospitals.
On Wednesday, September 29*, at approximately 4:00 p.m., office workers from the Fig
County office building are arriving at the local hospitals (Good Samaritan and Lebanon
VA Hospitals) and secondary care facilities. Employees are complaining of respiratory
problems. Some of these walk-ins had been called by an anonymous caller who stated
"that something was released in the building and that they better go to the emergency
room and get looked at." From the start of the patient influx, care providers mistakenly
diagnose the signs and symptoms as a chemical irritant. State health and county
emergency management officials are notified by the local health system, which is now
concerned with the number of patients that are being received by their hospitals.
Anticipating more patients than one hospital can handle, Good Samaritan institutes its
Mass Casualty plan. Based on preliminary data, state and local health officials have
pinpointed the origin of the respiratory and minor skin irritation to the Fig City/County
office building within two hours. The local municipality declared a "State of Emergency"
upon consultation with county officials.
The local state certified Fig County hazardous materials team, along with Fig County
health officials are dispatched to the office building and to the hospitals. The building's
evening shift (approximately 50 people) are evacuated by local police and staged at a
nearby building. Night shift employees were instructed to stay home due to an unknown
chemical release in the building. Since the hazardous materials team was dispatched, the
State Emergency Operations Center is then notified and briefed on the current situation,
as per the Pennsylvania Emergency Information Reporting System (PEIRS) criteria.
Lebanon County relays their intentions to PEMA regarding an issuance of a county
declaration. At this point, PADEP, PA Health, and PA Labor and Industry are also
updated on the magnitude of the "hazardous material" incident.
The HAZMAT Team arrives to find a heating and air conditioning van parked adjacent to
the building with a ladder going to the roof. The HAZMAT team, enters the building,
and conducts a building sweep for other employees.
Based on the number of walk-in cases reported by local hospitals, medical officials
continue their symptom evaluations and diagnosis suspecting that the affected individuals
may have received radiological contamination. The Nuclear Medicine Physicians and
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Radiation Safety Officer from Fig County General Hospital verify this assessment.
PADEP and DOE Radiation Assistance Program (RAP) representatives assess the
incident scene and determine that a radioactive release was due to a malevolent act. The
HAZMAT team discovers a suspicious device and note on the HVAC System located on
the roof. The Local EOD team is requested to the scene.
At this point, Lebanon County issues an emergency declaration. Through enhanced
patient radiation surveys, local health officials discover that the patients have received
external and internal radiation exposures. Based on this information, Federal
notifications are made by the State EOC. The County requests the 3rd MSD RAID
element. PEMA notifies the respective area offices and they are sending an area
representative to the scene. The PEMA executive staff briefs the Governor and Lt.
Governor's staff on the situation. State and County officials discuss the possibility of
issuing a Governor's Declaration of Emergency. A Presidential Emergency Declaration
is requested through the FEMA Region HI Office by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
EMA, municipal police, fire/HAZMAT team, county health, DEP Emergency Response,
and State health officials (moved from Incident Command to Unified Command) develop
an Incident Action Plan.
Public Safety officials on scene issue a brief press release. At this time (9:30 PM) an
anonymous phone call is received by county 911 that "radiological material was used in
the county office building and that more radiological and explosive devices can be found
at a residence somewhere in Fig City". This information is then followed by a fax (10:21
hours) that references the same. It is at this point that the local FBI office is contacted
and briefed. An FBI Special Agent is now designated as the "Special Agent in Charge."
The State EOC is informed by the FBI (crisis management activities) and FEMA
(consequence management activities) that the Federal Response Plan is in effect. Due to
the magnitude of the incident, the PEMA Press Officer is dispatched to link up with the
County, PA Health, PADEP, RAID, and Federal Public Information Officer(s).
The state and local police, FBI field agents, and DOE Radiation Assistance Program
(RAP) representatives are now on scene. A Unified Command Post is set up at adjacent
to the FIG county/city office building. Federal, State, County and Municipal officials
determine a course of action to survey and locate a suspected second device. The RAP
Coordinator requests the Service Response Team (SRT) from DOE HQ.
(Issues to be addressed: PPE, Decontamination, Site Safety/Security, Communication,
Employees interviews, Resident & Residence surveys, Critical Incident Stress
Debriefings, EOD operations, Evidence Collection, General Public Mental Health, Press
Briefings/Media Concerns, Resource Requests, Staging of Resources, etc.)
2nd Days activities -
The FBI establishes a Joint Operations Center. The SRT reports to the JOC SAIC and
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conducts surge search training for 3rd MSD RAID, PADEP, PSP, FBI Hazmat, and
Lebanon County Hazmat Team members. After several hours, the DOE AMS unit, DOE
Search Response Team, 3rd MSD RAID, DEP BRP/ERT, and FBI HAZMAT team think
that they have located additional radiological material in a residential area. After bringing
in more sensitive equipment, the SRT has located the unknown radiological material on
Lazy Eye Street at a rundown, two-story dwelling. The SRT members are getting really
high readings from the radiological material. The FBI obtains a search warrant.
An Incident Action Plan (operational actions) is continually updated by the Unified
Command on scene and reviewed by the JOC (Technical Support).
Meanwhile, Commonwealth survey teams from the now functional PADEP Assessment
Center, have been dispatched to employee's dwellings to confirm whether on not family
members, homes, vehicles, and personal belongings have been contaminated. Interviews
and surveys are conducted by the 5-7 person Radiological Response Teams.
Data and samples are obtained and are taken back to the Assessment Center for further
action. The PADEP Bureau of Radiation Protection's Lab is provided swipes for
analysis.
As local, state, and federal law enforcement officials enter the dwelling on Lazy Eye
Street, additional explosive devices are located inside along with subversive documents
and publications that include instructions to build explosive devices. FBI, DOD, and
local bomb technicians are requested and arrive on scene. After rendering safe the
secondary and tertiary devices, the DOE representative on scene reports that a second
ROD is located inside the dwelling. The RDD has a timer with 2 hours to go on it. The
JOC and 1C discuss their options and courses of action.
A FRMAC has staffed to Phase I. The JOC has requested and received additional
communication equipment and manpower from the FBI.
Termination of the exercise will occur when it is deemed that all players objectives have
been demonstrated.
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ANNEX D
VIGILANT LION TIMELINE OF KEY SCENARIO EVENTS
TIME
01-
04
05
06
08
10
13
LOCAL AGENCIES/EVENTS
Good Samaritan Hospital calls Lebanon
County 911 indicating a large number of
patients with same symptoms; requests
assistance. 911 notifies HAZMAT unit
Lebanon County HAZMAT activates [A.I;
B.I]
Lebanon County HAZMAT notifies
PEMA of activation [A.2; M.I]
GS Hospital activates Mass Casualty Plan
[D.I]
GS Hospital calls LEMA [D.3]
STATE AGENCIES/EVENTS
PA Health confers with ATSDR
CDCf. ]
PEMA Watch Officers enters
hazmat incident into EIS/GEM in
SEOC [M.12]
PA Health reviews GS Hospital
mass casualty plan f. J
PEMA makes internal
notifications (C/A Director).
SEOC Notifies PADEP South
Central Region ERT [N.I]
LEMA contacts SEOC, PA
Health EPLO contacts PA
Health Region # or name f. J
-PA DEP notifies ERTs [N.I] and
closes loop with PEMA HBG
Duty Officer.
FEDERAL AGENCIES/EVENTS
73
73
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TIME
17
25
29
33
45
60
1-hour
LOCAL AGENCIES/EVENTS
Lebanon County activates their EOC [A.4]
Lebanon County EOC operational; comm
established with PEMA
Lebanon County HAZMAT arrives
ICS Operational at OS Hospital [B.6]
Patients all work at same building;
reported to ICS
ICS notifies SEOC (PEMA relays to PA
Labor and Industry *Need 1-2 people
staggered here, up to 10, rest simulated.
*Need REAC/TS injects and EMS
moulage.
Lebanon County sends team to County
Building (30-45 minutes)
NOTE: RAD MAYBE IDENTIFIED
WITHIN THE NEXT 30 MINUTES
STATE AGENCIES/EVENTS
-PEMA notifies contiguous
counties & PA Health per PEIRS
via E-Comm & fax
- PA DEP notifies state and
regional directors [N.2]
PEMA establishes
communications with Lebanon
County EOC SEVAN &
PEMARS [M.2]
PEMA notifies PA Labor &
Industry EPLOthat all patients
were at the same county building
PEMA goes to Level II
PA DEP ERT assets arrive GS
Hospital [N.3; N.4; N.6]
FEDERAL AGENCIES/EVENTS
74
74
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TIME
LOCAL AGENCIES/EVENTS
STATE AGENCIES/EVENTS
FEDERAL AGENCIES/EVENTS
90
95
96
Lebanon County EMA requests mutual aid
[A.5;C.1;C.3; possibly C.2]
PEMA receives notification of
possible hazardous material
contamination via ECOMM &
fax from county
97 -GS Hospital begins to survey hospital
Lebanon County establishes hot, warm,
and cold zones and notifies PEMA of rad
event [B.4] -NOT sure they would call
PEMA - GS Hospital Doctor may call
REAC/TSfor telephonic technical
assistance
PEMA sends notification of
suspected event to DEP's
Emergency Response Team
SCRO, PSP, DMVA, PA Health,
Attorney General, L & I, PA Ag,
PADOT EPLOs
105 - Fig City PD/FD sends support assets to
GS Hospital [F.I; G.I]
- Lebanon County HAZMAT and Hospital
teams receive hits for Beta Emitters
- DEP ERT teams receive hits
for Beta
Emitters
(confirmation)
at Good
Samaritan
Hospital
[N.3,N.4,N.9]
- PEMA activates EOC to
Levelm
- PEMA notifies BRP, PSP,
DMVA, Atty Gen, contiguous
counties, *******
75
75
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TIME
106
107
110
113
115
117
LOCAL AGENCIES/EVENTS
- Lebanon County HAZMAT sets
up decon at GS Hospital
- Lancaster County activates EOC [C.4]
- Lebanon County HAZMAT
arrives at county building &
establishes ICS [B.7]
- Beta info sent to EMA/PEMA
Lebanon County Requests a Notice to
Airment to be requested
Lebanon County HAZMAT notified of
radiation findings
Fig City Police Department requests
mutual aid bomb squad
- Fig City Fire and Police Departments
request mutual aid
- Lebanon County HAZMAT establishes
ICS at county building
Lebanon County HAZMAT evacuates
county building; evacuees are contained
[B.7]
STATE AGENCIES/EVENTS
PEMA & DEP contact
Brookhaven National Lab for
RAP support [N.5]
PEMA notifies, briefs and
provides FEMA [M.3]
Region III Situation Report #1 .
[M.8]
PADOT- Aviation requests
NOTAM through FAA Region
- RAID notified of the event by
DMVA [P.I]
- DMVA notifies CAP
- DEP has media inquiries
[N.ll]
CAP begins to identify available
assets [O.I]
3rd MSD RAID activates team
[P.I]
American Red Cross EPLO is
notified through PEMA. PEMA
VOAD notified (Salvation Army
etc.)
FEDERAL AGENCIES/EVENTS
- BNL notifies DOE Chicago and
DOE HQ of RAP request [T.I]
- DOE NN-60 and DP staff arrive
[T. 12; T. 13,1.4]
- National Response Center
notifies EPAC [V.I]
- FEMA RIH notifies FEMA HQ
Alert Staff & OFAs [U.I, U.2]
FAA Region issues NOTAM for
incident scene
756th EOD contacted and briefed.
76
76
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TIME
120
2-hours
125
128
135
140
160
LOCAL AGENCIES/EVENTS
Allentown and Reading deploys bomb
squads; estimate 140 minute arrival time
- CNN Breaking News (Place here?)
Lebanon County HAZMAT begins to
survey evacuees at county building [B.8]
Lebanon County HAZMAT sets up decon
unit at county building [B.9]; requests
mutual assistance in decontamination
effort. Provides location (GPS)
coordinates to 911
Good Samaritan Hospital reports one of
the patients with radiological
contamination dies of complications
Lebanon County Coroner Requested.
STATE AGENCIES/EVENTS
- SEOC upgrades to Level m
operational level [M.5]
- PEMA activates CENIC (Public
Affairs)
- BRP evaluates radiological
measurements against emergency
action levels. Initial protective
action recommendation is made
to PEMA director
CAP activates EOC [O.2]
- PEMA notifies PADOT to close
airspace
PEMA contacts contiguous REP
risk & support counties for
availability of mon/decon teams
For radiological support if needed
PEMA RIM&C Shop opened for
TLD support
RAID team assembles at FIG
[P.2] Provided Coordinates of
Building by SEOC Air
Operations Desk.
FEDERAL AGENCIES/EVENTS |
- RAP deploys to PA - ETA 4 hours
[T.2]
- DOE HQ Watch Office calls
NN-60 and DP duty officers and
reports RAP activation
- CAP HQ Given mission to pick
up RAP Coordinator
756* EOD Arrives at FIG Office
Bldg. Requests additional EOD
support from FBI.
FBI Philadelphia authorizes
additional EOD teams.
77
77
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TIME
LOCAL AGENCIES/EVENTS
STATE AGENCIES/EVENTS
FEDERAL AGENCIES/EVENTS
165
PADEP/BRP Field Staff arrive
on-scene at Hospital and prepare
personnel for Office Building
support [N.5]
173
CAP assets identified and ready
for use
180
3-hours
205
RAID operational; equipment op-
checked [P.2]
210
- Fax received by county, Fig PD,
GS Hospital, and media taking
credit for rad contamination
- ICS, EMA Director, Chief of
Police, Hospital Administrator
notified of RAD fax
Fig City police notifies Harrisburg RA of
radiation and the fax
State Police notifies
Harrisburg RA (FBI) of fax
and radiation contamination
SEOC Updates Harrisburg
and Philadelphia FBI of event
status
Harrisburg RA (FBI) notifies
Philadelphia FBI Office of
suspected terrorist activity [S.I]
213
Harrisburg RA begins logical
investigation [S.2]. Philadelphia
FBI Office notifies FBI
Headquarters of the Fig City events
FEMA RIH notified by FBI and
LNO is deployed, ERT-A activated
[U.3]
215
SEOC deploys RAID team to
county building [.]
PEMA deploys satellite vehicle
Harrisburg RA deploys to Good
Samaritan Hospital
78
78
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TIME
230
238
240
4-hours
245
250
255
260
270
275
280
300
5-hours
LOCAL AGENCIES/EVENTS
LEMA Director asks PEMA If they
should send out an EAS message
Allentown and Reading bomb squads
arrive at county building; reports to ICS
Bomb squads receive briefing from
Incident Commander and are deployed for
bomb search [1.2]
STATE AGENCIES/EVENTS
to scene [M.5]
RAID arrives at county building
and reports to incident
commander [.]
DEP develops a PAR using EPA 400
[N.7, N.8]
PEMA issues an EAS [M.6]
PEMA Constructs Situation
Report #2.
Lt. Governor (staff) requests air
transportation (PSP, PADOT,
FEDERAL AGENCIES/EVENTS
Harrisburg RA Office faxes initial
logical investigation information to
Philadelphia Office
-
Additional FBI Harrisburg staff
deploys to Good Samaritan Hospital
EPA Objective for PAR
Harrisburg RA arrives at GS
Hospital and begins to interview
patients [S.3]
- DOE Emergency Management
briefs DOE senior official [T.I 3]
79
79
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TIME
310
315
320
325
355
365
LOCAL AGENCIES/EVENTS
STATE AGENCIES/EVENTS
CAP).
DEP determines radionuclide
[N.10]
PEMA "SHARES"
Communication with Federal
Agencies [M.7]
FEDERAL AGENCIES/EVENTS |
- Philadelphia FBI completes
information package and logical
investigation information and
provides information to FBI HQ
[S.6]
FBI Philadelphia arrives at Fig City
[S.8]
DOE RAP arrives [T.7]
EPA makes internal/external
notifications, activates, and employs
EPA assets [V.1,V.2]
DOE RAP coordinates assessment
and monitoring with other federal,
state, and local assets [T. 10]
FBI HQ begins to notify other
federal agencies and places DEST
assets on standby
FBI HQ sends DOE HQ information
needed to complete credibility
assessment
- FBI Philadelphia deploys to Fig
City with bomb techs, HM tech
resources and ERT [S.7]
- DOE HO activates monitoring
80
80
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TIME
360
6-hours
375
380
385
405
410
425
430
435
440
LOCAL AGENCIES/EVENTS
STATE AGENCIES/EVENTS
RAID operates decontamination
line at FIG City/County Building
with LEMA HAZMAT [P.5]
CENIC integrates with JIC
FEDERAL AGENCIES/EVENTS
team [T. 121
DOE HQ requests threat assessment
advise from NN-60 and Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory
FBI HQ activates and deploys DEST
- ETA 6 hrs
-DOE Emergency Management
briefs DOE senior official [T.I 3]
DOE's LLNL verifies possible
WMD
FBI Philadelphia begins to establish
the JOC and implement unified
command [S.8; S.9]
FBI activates the JIC
81
81
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TIME
420
7-hours
455
460
480
8-hours
535
540
9-hours
780
LOCAL AGENCIES/EVENTS
Bomb search complete - no other devices
identified
- Activate EMS units (LEMA)
- Setup Mass Care Facility
Good Samaritan to Mass Care
with ER Personnel (Good Sam Hospital)
- Call to ARC to run Mass Care (LEMA)
STATE AGENCIES/EVENTS
RAID deployed to assess the
levels of radiation in the county
building
RAID assessment complete
END OF D AY 1
FROM HERE ON, OPEN far
Assistance on Timeline
Rumor Control Set-up (SEOC)
EAS Message from SEOC
(PEMA)
Track down contamination (DEP)
FEDERAL AGENCIES/EVENTS
JIC Operational
JOC Operational; SAC is
coordinator of unified command for
investigative purposes
****NeedEPA objectives
completed for Day 1&2 (Bill &
Marty) Have FEMA check their
objectives. Have VA check
objectives.
82
82
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TIME
0800-
0900
0900-
1200
0800-
0900
0900-
1000
1200
1200-
1400
1200-
1230
1230-
LOCAL AGENCIES/EVENTS
- RM's to Mass Care
County Hazmat Team (played by
Schuylkill County Hazmat) conducts
interviews and surveys
Local LE
STATE AGENCIES/EVENTS
Assist in surveys (DEP,
PAHealth)
PADEP & PA Health initiates
visits
LE, PSP, FBI Establish Security
Perimeter by quadrant
RAID assists in Search
Locate "Subject Dwellings"
3rd MSD RAID
3rd MSD RAID enters building
and discovers devices
EOD support request
FEDERAL AGENCIES/EVENTS
AMS Flyover
NRAT plans with PADEP to
conduct home visits to employee (5
for exercise) homes
NRAT assists with visits
Command Post Staff Set-up
FBI Assist in Perimeter
756th EOD, FBI, DOE SRT,
PADEP/ERT execute search
FBI Clears dwelling sets new
perimeter
DOE SRT establish hot/warm zone
83
83
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TIME
1430
LOCAL AGENCIES/EVENTS
STATE AGENCIES/EVENTS
EOD renders safe 2 devices,
discovers RDD
FEDERAL AGENCIES/EVENTS
84
84
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ANNEX E
VIGILANT LION SAFETY PLAN
(Safety Plan/Checklist (1 of 6)
Scope
This plan has been included as a checklist so controllers will be able to anticipate and recognize unplanned events
that could result in personal injury or unforeseen property damage. It enables event participants to be governed by
the safety guidelines established for the event.
Pre-drill Safety Requirements
Controllers must be staged before the event is scheduled to begin to ensure there are no pre-existing safety concerns
that could affect the start of the event. Controller assignments and locations are identified in Controller/Evaluator
Binders. The Drill Lead Controller must obtain a safety check from all lead controllers prior to event
commencement.
Drill Activity Boundaries and Off-Limit Areas
Drill boundaries are defined by the "extent of play" for each objective. Specific boundaries will be discussed and
depicted on maps in this briefing. Safety concerns that arise during the drill will be dealt with immediately by the
drill controllers in the affected area. As objectives are accomplished, certain areas may be allowed to return to
normal activities.
85
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Safety Plan/Checklist (2 of 6)
Safety Equipment
Drill participants are required to follow all existing safety guidelines for the use of protective
equipment. From the checklist below, mark an X next to the items that are applicable to this drill or
exercise, and ensure that these items are provided for participants, as applicable.
x controller communications
x drill/exercise identification (i.e. armbands, vests, caps, etc.)
x illumination devices
_x first aid kit
_x water coolers (field teams may be directed to carry their own water)
water carriers (rovers may be directed to deliver water to personnel)
personnel comfort items (specify)
_x fire extinguishers
safety harnesses/lifelines, etc. (specify)
_x eye/hearing protection devices (specify)
_x gloves (specify who and when they should be worn)
hard hats (specify who and when they should be worn)
_x_ other protective clothing (specify)
_x miscellaneous hand tools (specify)
Site Specific Hazards
Drill or exercise participants are required to follow all hazard postings in event areas. Participants must obey all
traffic laws during the event. Response participants will NOT use emergency lights and sirens when responding to
simulated accident scenes. Field teams will travel on designated roads and trails. Field team vehicles will be
equipped with fire extinguishers and shovels. No vehicles should go off road where wildlife such as snakes and
insects may be encountered. In the event of electrical storms, high winds or other severe weather, participants will
follow controller instructions. Field activities should be suspended or terminated under these conditions.
Controllers and responders must be mindful of symptoms of heat/cold stress. Controllers will
ensure that emergency response personnel are allowed the opportunity to rest whenever necessary.
Controllers must halt drill play anytime a responder appears to be in distress and take all appropriate
actions to ensure the well being of individuals.
86
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Safety Plan/Checklist f3 of 6)
From the checklist below, mark an X next to the actual hazards that may be applicable to this
drill or exercise. Special safety provisions should be made for all items checked.
x traffic (field teams need to be aware of road condition hazards and traffic,
especially when surveying)
x terrain (field teams may be required to use unpaved roads. Each vehicle will be
equipped with a fire extinguisher, a shovel and bucket, and communications
capabilities)
overhead obstructions
electrical storms
___x__ heat stress
cold stress
high winds
x visibility conditions (maybe during night operations)
x electrical equipment hazards (halogen lights for night ops)
mechanical equipment/machinery
hazardous material/storage areas
fuel loading concerns
thermal hazards
x tripping hazards
confined spaces
_x elevated locations
_x hazardous materials
_x pest control (i.e. fire ants, wasps, snakes, ticks, mosquitoes, etc.)
_x personnel safety provisions (individuals responsibilities/limits)
_x off-site agency safety provisions (responsibilities/limits)
_x vehicle safety provisions (i.e. traffic laws shall be obeyed, seat belts used, etc.)
_x drill/exercise control provisions (i.e. safety briefings, how to handle actual
emergencies, etc.)
87
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Safety Plan/Checklist (4 of 6)
General Safety Provisions
This section outlines personnel assignments and functions related to safety and specialized
concerns. No changes will be made to controller assignments without prior assurance that
any replacements have equal or greater understanding of safety concerns that could be
encountered at the location to which they are assigned!!
All safety concerns must be brought to the attention of the Drill/Exercise Lead Controller Tom
Hughes-PEMA and the Drill/Exercise Safety Lead, Tom Doherty-OSHA through the controller
organization.
Specific incidents and materials that may have adverse effects on people have been addressed in
specific sections of the scenario manual. Every effort has been made to anticipate and minimize
hazardous situations inherent in this drill/exercise. From the checklist below, mark an X next to
the safety provisions that are applicable to this drill or exercise, and ensure that these provisions
are communicated to participants and/or enforced.
x individual participants are personnel responsible for their individual
safety
x each participant who observes another person injured or otherwise in need of
assistance will immediately cease drill/exercise activities and render aid/call
for assistance
x all injuries, no matter how slight, must be immediately reported to the nearest
controller
x all ascents or descents from elevated heights will be by ladder, stairway or
other safe method. Jumping from elevated positions is not allowed
x controller must be familiar with the hazards of the equipment involved and
the required safety measures (rad source material & detection equiptment.)
x actual emergencies will be dealt with by a shadow force. If an emergency
occurs that requires drill/exercise responders to assist, the Lead Controller
will suspend or terminate part or all of drill play as he/she deems necessary
88
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Safety Plan/Checklist (5 of 6)
Security/Public Safety Provisions
From the checklist below, mark an X next to the security and public safety provisions that are
applicable to this drill or exercise. Special safety provisions should be made for all items
checked.
x a backup or "shadow" force (fire, EMS and police) is in place to ensure
community coverage is not impacted by event response (FIG FD)
_x event calls should/may go to non-emergency lines to ensure that actual
"9-1-1" calls are handled expeditiously
_x security personnel must keep firearms bolstered at all times during the
drill/exercise
_x drill/exercise play will be suspended in the event of an actual emergency
_x emergency vehicles will respond without lights and sirens
x cordoning off of large public areas will be simulated, (case by case basis)
x rerouting traffic will be simulated
Vehicle Safety Provisions
From the checklist below, mark an X next to the vehicle safety provisions that are applicable to
this drill or exercise. Ensure that these provisions are communicated to participants and/or
enforced.
x no vehicle will be driven in such a manner that posted speed limits are
exceeded or safe driving rules are violated
x only those vehicles involved in the drill/exercise will be used for movement
x vehicles may not be mounted or dismounted until they come to a complete stop
x spotters will be used when backing vehicles out of areas where other people
or vehicles are present
x roadblocks will be simulated by placing a blocking vehicle on the shoulder
of the road and notifying a controller that a roadblock has been established
x all accelerations, decelerations, cruising, turns, etc., will be accomplished in
a safe manner
x seat belts must be worn in moving vehicles if the vehicle is equipped with
them
Safety Plan/Checklist (6 of 6^1
89
-------
This completed Safety Checklist should be kept as part of the hard-copy documentation file for drill
planning for this event.
9/28/99
Thomas S. Hughes, CEM Drill Date
PEMA Radiological Officer
90
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ANNEXF
FOR OFFICIAL EXERCISE USE ONLY
VIGILANT LION Exercise Communication Guide
A radio net is authorized, engineered, and employed for mission essential support of a functional
mission when there is a clearly demonstrable need for two-way radio voice communications to
control, direct, or coordinate the actions or movements of ground vehicles and personnel within a
geographical base environment. The net is an organization of stations capable of direct
communications on a common frequency. Intrabase radio nets are classified as either general or
special purpose. Some examples of the general-purpose nets that will be used during this
exercise will be the Ft. Indiantown Gap Fire, EOD, Security, etc., emergency frequencies.
Land mobile radios that sponsor organizations will use will provide two-way communication.
A two-way communication system normally consists of a base station or remote control, and
portable or mobile units. Radio waves normally travel in a straight line. The maximum range of
your radio system is the distance to the horizon, as it appears from the radio's antenna. Other
factors that may affect coverage, includes barriers such as high steel buildings or irregularities in
the terrain that cause a "dead spot(s)." Dead spots can be overcome by turning and facing a
different direction. Portable units usually have less power than base stations and may have
difficulty reaching the base station radio.
Operation is divided into three main areas: Operator maintenance, transmission, and radio
checks.
a. Everyone using radio equipment should ensure they:
(1) Keep outside covers clean. Don't allow water or cleaning materials to enter the unit and
don't use cleaning materials that will harm the finish of the unit. (i.e. solvents or
abrasives)
(2) Charge portable units to provide peak performance. Eight hours of continuous use is
about maximum for portable units.
b. Radio transmission should be short and concise. Speak in natural phrases, not word-by-
word. During transmission of a message, you should pause periodically to allow other
stations to break in if necessary. To avoid interfering with other radio traffic, listen and
make sure that the circuit is clear before transmitting. When making contact with other
stations, always use your full call signs. For example:
Caller 1 transmits: "Call 2 THIS IS caller one - OVER."
Caller 2 answers the initial call: "Call 1 THIS IS caller 2 - OVER."
MANDATORY!!!! - All Vigilant Lion Exercise Transmissions will be pre-empted and
terminated with "This is an Exercise Message" The code word for exercise health
FOR OFFICIAL EXERCISE USE ONLY
91
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injuries will be LIFESAVER. All exercise activities will cease (TIMEOUT) when LIFESAVER
is transmitted and only communication to assist the incident will be permitted on exercise nets.
The exercise will only commence when controllers tell you that the exercise TIMEOUT has been
recinded.
c. Use radio checks to determine readability and signal strength between two units. A station
is understood to have good signal strength and readability unless otherwise notified. If you
notify another unit of their signal strength and readability, use a short and concise report,
such as: "weak but readable", "loud, but distorted", weak with interference", etc. Be
cautioned that radio transmissions are subject to public scanners. Avoid transmitting the
operator's personal sign or name.
Common sense should suffice for operating requirements not covered under communication
security. Good radio discipline avoids the following practices:
a. Unofficial conversation between operators.
b. Excessive testing.
c. Profane, indecent, or obscene language
d. Giving false distress calls or call signs.
Jamming is the deliberate radiation or re-radiation of energy with the object of impairment.
Interference is identified as any degradation that limits the effective performance of electrical or
electronic equipment. When experiencing interference or jamming, attempt to identify the source
and report it to your organization communication specialist or USAF HAMMER ACE
representative.
FOR OFFICIAL EXERCISE USE ONLY
92
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FOR OFFICIAL EXERCISE USE ONLY
PORTABLE RADIO BASIC OPERA TIONS GUIDE
1. Turn on, set volume, set squelch, and monitor. Rotate the volume (VCL) control
clockwise about one-half turn.
2. Rotate the squelch (SQ) control to the maximum counterclockwise position.
3. If your radio is a "Private-Line" (PL) model place the PL switch in the off position.
4. If your radio is a selective call model, place the page/talk (PT) switch in the T position.
5. With the antenna fully extended, listen for a broadcast and set the volume control to a
comfortable listening level.
6. When the channel is clear, slowly turn the SQ control clockwise until the noise just stops.
This is the threshold setting. DO NOT turn the control further. Excessive squelch
reduces the sensitivity of the radio and may prevent reception.
7. Set the frequency elector switch (multi-frequency models) to the desired frequency and
monitor the channel for broadcast. If the channel is clear set the PL switch in the on
position and prepare to transmit.
8. Hold the radio with the fully extended antenna in a vertical position and with the
speaker-microphone grille about two inches from your lips.
9. Press the push-to-talk switch on the side of the housing and speak slowly and clearly
across the grille area. When finished transmitting, release the push-to-talk switch to
receive.
FOR OFFICIAL EXERCISE USE ONL Y
93
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FOR OFFICIAL EXERCISE USE ONLY
PHONETIC ALPHABET
LETTER EQUIVALENT
LETTER EQUIVALENT
/? ^
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Cff-iRTTF
DPI T\
FCtfn
FfJYTR/JT
Gill F
ffOTFT
-r - TNT)!*
rjrr rpT
KIT D
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MTKF
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p
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7.
n*ZC4R
P4P4
nTJFRFC
..... . . ff/7MF/l
erj7i>D A
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TJNTFftRM
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WHTVKFY
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min
Phonetic equivalents are desirable in expressing lettered coordinates, in operational order, or
ordering equipment by letter and number. They will not be used:
1. When names are transmitted: example, use J C Porter or John Cook Porter instead of Juliet
Charlie Porter.
2. When the actual word might be more definitive: example, 26 degrees West instead of 26
degrees Whiskey.
FOR OFFICIAL EXERCISE USE ONLY
94
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FOR OFFICIAL EXERCISE USE ONLY
^OICE COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES
JWHAT TO DO!
I. LISTEN
II. THINK about what you will say before
you transmit.
III. MAKE THE CALL. Give:
A. The call sign or identification of the
station called
B. The words "THIS IS."
C. The call sign or identification of the
calling station.
IV. COMMUNICATE
Speak Clearly.
Plain language; no codes.
Repeat back critical items for
confirmation.
V. USE PHONETICS for:
A. Call Signs.
B. Station Identification.
C. Spelling words and names that are
easily understood
JWHYTODOni
A. To make sure your transmission won't
interfere with another communication
B. To be aware of other things going on.
A. To communicate your idea effectively.
B. To use only the air time needed and no
more.
A. To be clear.
B. To be understood reliably on the first
call.
C. To use a procedure that is universally
accepted.
A. To be understood.
B. To be fast.
C. To avoid confusion.
D. To be accurate.
A. To be clear.
B. To be accurate.
C. To be fast.
D. To use a procedure that is universally
accepted.
*As taken from the Federal Emergency Management Agency Urban Search and Rescue
Response System Field Operations Guide, September 1, 1993.
95
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VIGILANT LION EXERCISE ANNEX G
USAF-Hammer Ace-
TSG Tom Kinney
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE COMMUNICATION CMD
HQ/AFCC/DOXZ, SPECIAL COMM DIVISION
SCOTT AFB, IL
Although there were some initial glitches with communication support, the communication infrastructure was
able to support the exercise and all of the objectives. This being said, we have the following observations.
Observation One: Roles of communication support teams and capabilities of communications
assets they deployed were not clear.
Recommendation: These are issues that are identified and responsibility assigned in planning
conference, do not deviate from established plan unless need dictates.
Observation Two: Up channel reporting of information was not always timely or
discriminated.
Recommendation: This responsibility again needs to be established and published in the
working groups prior to the exercise. Control cells need to be established and good wire
diagrams for agency/cell interaction need to be developed. It is also at this point the
communications working group can assess each cells requirement and develop a scheme and
obtain necessary equipment or frequencies for the command and reporting information flow. As
a communications troop this often means being able to identify others requirements. The
working groups established for other cells will have functional area experts, but their expertise is
in their functional area not communications.
Observation Three: Health of communications network was not actively monitored.
Recommendations: Functional experts must take an active role in ensuring their systems are
healthy and satisfying user requirements. This includes user education and active intervention
when problems are identified.
Observation Four: All communication was clear, and as such subject to monitoring. This
communication insecurity may have adverse ramifications. The press may have access to
information that does not need to be released. Also the hostile faction may well be able to gather
information and this too may have adverse consequences.
Recommendation: A method needs to be identified to secure communications. If the DoD
system is too restrictive with its authorized user constraints - then another system needs to be
solutioned.
96
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ANNEX H
RELEASE AND HOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENT
1. PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT: Personal data is solicited under authority of 10 USC 3012 and AR
27-40. The information is for use to determine eligibility for voluntary participation in the Vigilant Lion
Exercise in the area of Ft. Indiantown Gap. Disclosure of requested information is voluntary, but failure
to disclosure all or any part of it may result in denial of permission to participation in such activities
scheduled for September 28-30, 1999.
2. PERSONAL DATA:
NAME: AGE:
First Middle Last
ADDRESS: CITY: STATE: 1 ZIP:
Person to be notified in case of emergency
Relationship
ADDRESS: CITY: STATE: ZIP:
(If different than above)
TELEPHONE: Area Code: Number: -
3. DECLARATION: I desire to participate at my own risk in the activity described above. I represent
that I will take all safety precautions necessary thereto, assuming sole and full personal responsibility for
ensuring that all reasonably foreseeable safety requirements are met to my personal satisfaction prior to my
active participation in such activity. I state that I am in good health, physically fit to engage in this activity,
and have no known medical condition which could foreseeably jeopardize my safety during such
participation or be aggravated by such participation. As a condition precedent to my being permitted
engage or participate in such activity, I personally hereby forever release, acquit, discharge, indemnify and
hold harmless the United States, it's agents, officers, and employees, from any and all causes of action,
including personal injury, illness, death, and property damage, costs, charges, claims, demands and
liabilities of whatever kind, name or nature in any manner arising out of or in connection with my
participation in the indicated activity. I understand and agree that I may be held liable for any damage or
loss to the United States Government that is caused by my negligence, willful misconduct, or fraud while
participating in this activity. I further understand that any and all buildings at Fort Indiantown Gap may
contain lead paint and/or asbestos and willingly accept any responsibility or possible danger associated
with those elements.
9/28/99
DATE Signature of Participant
Printed Name of Participant
97
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ANNEX I
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
Department of Military and Veterans Affairs
Emergency Management Agency
Commonwealth News Bureau
Room 308, Capitol
Harrisburg, PA 17120
NEWS ADVISORY
DATE: April 14, 2000
TO: Editors, News Directors
and Capitol Correspondents
FROM: John P. Maietta, Press Secretary, DMVA
(717) 861-8720
Marko Bourne, Press Secretary, PEMA
(717)651-2139
SUBJECT: Joint exercise at Fort Indiantown Gap to test civilian and military response
to mock terrorist attack
Event will kick off with media briefing at 9:30 a.m. Wednesday Sept. 29
On Sept. 29 and 30, Fort Indiantown Gap will host a large-scale field training exercise, testing
the response of civilian and military officials to a mock terrorist attack. The Pennsylvania
Emergency Management Agency is conducting the exercise, in cooperation with the U.S.
Department of Energy, the Pennsylvania National Guard, and more than 30 other county, state
and federal agencies.
Dubbed "Vigilant Lion," the exercise will involve more than 300 individual participants, reacting
to the gradual discovery of a simulated terrorist device. The event will include
the first deployment of the Guard's newly established 3rd Military Support
Detachment, specially trained and equipped to assist civilian authorities in
responding to incidents involving "weapons of mass destruction." News media
are invited to cover the exercise, beginning with a press briefing at 9:30 a.m. on
Wednesday, Sept. 29. To avoid disrupting the exercise, photographers are
asked to comply with the same ground rules that would apply during an actual
emergency - i.e., close access to the scene may be limited by the incident
commander if there is an imminent threat of danger to the public.
# # #
98
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Directions to the briefing: From 1-81, take exit 29B and proceed onto Fort Indiantown Gap.
From the stoplight, proceed on the main road (Fisher Road) an additional 1.3 miles. Turn right
on Blair Road, then immediate left on Hawkins Street. The media center (building 4-81) is the
first building ahead on the right. Park in the open field to the front.
99
-------
ANNEX!
Organization Point of Contact(s)
Organization Point of Contact(s)
PA Emergency Management Agency
Tom Hughes, Radiological Officer
Bureau of Operations & Training
2605 Interstate Drive
HarrisburgPA17110
717-651-2001
thughes@state.pa.us
US Department of Energy
Steve Centore
55 Bell Ave
Brookhaven National Labs
Upton NY
516-344-7309
centore@bnl.gov
PA State Police
Capt. Jeffrey Davis
Bureau of Emergency & Special Ops
171 E. Hershey Park Drive
Hershey PA 17033-0444
717-787-4969
jdavis@state.pa.us
Federal Bureau of Investigations
Chris Rigopolous
8th FL, 600 Arch St, Wil
Philadelphia PA 19106
(215)418-4097
CRIGOPOU@LEO.GOV
PA Depart, of Environmental Protection
Marty Vyenielo, Emergency Response
Bureau of Radiation Protection
Rachel Carson State Office Bldg.
PO Box 8469
HarrisburgPA 17105-8469
(717)787-2699
vyenielo.martin@dep.state.pa.us
Environmental Protection Agency, RHI
William E. Belanger
Regional Radiation Specialist
Energy, Radiation & Indoor Env. Branch
1650 Arch St., 3AP23 Air Protection Div.
Philadelphia PA 19103-2029
215-814-2082
belanger.bill@epamail.epa.gov
PA Depart, of Military & Veteran Affairs
Richard Dyke
Military Support to Civil Authorities
Ft. Indiantown Gap
Annville PA 17003-5002
(717)861-8829
dykerc@pa-amg.ngb.army.mil
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Region in
Dave Hall, Chief
Response Operations Branch
615 chestnut St 6th Fl
Philadelphia PA 19106
(215)931-5660
david.hall@fema.gov
PA Depart, of Public Welfare
Linda Williams
Office of Mental Health
& Substance Abuse Svcs Rm 206
Beechmont Bldg, PO Box 2675
Harrisburg, PA 17105
(717)772-7934
lwilliams@dpw.state.pa.us
PA Dept. of Environmental Protection
Charles High, Program Coordinator
Emergency Response Program
Rachel Carson Bldg, 16th Fl
PO 2063-4000
Harrisburg, PA 17105-2063
(717) 787-5027
high.charles@dep.state.pa.us
100
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PA Department of Health
Chiquita Morrison, EMS Program Spec.
Emergency Medical Services Office
PO Box 90
Harrisburg PA 17108
717-787-8740
cmorrison@health.state.pa.us
NAVSCOLEOD Det Indianhead
Kenneth Erickson, SSGT
101 Strauss Ave, Bldg. 1662
Indian Head, MD 20640-5035
(301)744-6611
ericksonkc@ih.navy.mil
Lebanon County EMA
Clyde Miller, Emerg. Mgmt. Coordinator
Rm#19 400S 8th St.
Lebanon PA 17042
717-272-7621
Iema5@lmf.net
Lancaster County EMA
Brenda Pittman, EMS Coordinator
PO Box 219
Manheim PA 17545-0219
(717)664-1200
bbp205@co.lancaster.pa.us
Good Samaritan Hospital
Joan Gill, Director of Administration
Fourth & Walnut Sts., PO Box 1281
Lebanon, PA 17042
(717)270-7727
JGill@gshleb.com
Civil Air Patrol
Pennsylvania Wing Headquarters
Richard Gale, Major
Building 3-108, Ft. Indiantown Gap
Annville, PA 17003-5002
(717)861-2335
pawghqcap@aol.com
Ft. Indiantown Gap Police Department
John Wurley, Chief
75 Wiley Rd, Bldg. 7-5
Annville PA 17003-5002
(717)861-2727
Ft. Indiantown Gap Fire Department
Jay Bachman, Chief
5-117 Fisher Ave
Annville PA 17003-5002
(717)861-2111
United States Air Force
HQ/AFCA/SYH
Attn: HAMMER ACE
203 W Losey St.
Scott AFB IL 62225
(618)256-3431
Thomas.Kinney@scott.af.mil
101
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Annex K
PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
ACRONYM LIST
AC Assessment Center (DEP/BRP)
ACP Access Control Point (Law Enforcement)
AEOC Alternate State Emergency Operations Center
AFRCC Air Force Rescue Coordination Center
AFSS Automated Flight Service Station
ALARA As Low as Reasonably Achievable
ALS Advanced Life Support
AMS Aerial Measuring System
AFNSEP Air Force National Security Emergency Preparedness Division
ALERT Automated Local Evaluation in Real Time
ANS Alert and notification system
ARAC Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability
ARATCC Air Route Traffic Control Center
ARC American Red Cross
ARCCC Accident Response Capability Coordinating Committee
ARES Amateur Radio Emergency Service
ARG Accident Response Group
ARL Activities-Results List
ARMAT Advance Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Team
ARRL American Radio Relay League
ASH Assist. Sec. Of Health, Dept. of Health and Human Services
ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (US Treasury)
ATSDR Agency for Toxic Substance and Disease Registry
BHG Brookhaven Group
BLS Basic Life Support
BNL Brookhaven National Labs (DOE)
BOA Bureau of Administration (PEMA)
BOOT Bureau of Operations & Training (PEMA)
BPP Bureau of Plans and Preparedness (PEMA)
BRP Bureau of Radiation Protection (PEMA)
BTS Bureau of Technical Services (PEMA)
CAMEO Computer Aided Management of Emergency Operations
CAP Civil Air Patrol
CARL Computerized Activities-Results List
CAT Crisis Action Team
CB Citizens Band Radio
CBR Chemical - Biological - Radiological
102
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cc Cubic Centimeter
C&C Command and Control
CCA Comprehensive Cooperative Agreement
CCP Casualty Collection Point
CCS Contamination Control Station
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CDCE Contamination Disposal Coordinating Element
CDE Committed Dose Equivalent
CEDE Committed Effective Dose Equivalent
CDRG Catastrophic Disaster Response Group
CDRG, EST Catastrophic Disaster Response Group, Emergency Support Team
CDV-700 Survey Meter (Geiger Mueller)
CDV-715 Survey Meter (Geiger-Mueller)
CDV-730 Self-reading dosimeter with a scale from 0-20R
CDV-742 Self-reading dosimeter with a scale from 0-200R
CENICCommonwealth Emergency News and Information Center
CEO Chief Executive Officer
CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
C&ETL Containment and Effects Team Leader
C&ETM Containment and Effects Team Manager
CEWG Containment and Effects Working Group
CFA Cognizant Federal Agency
cfm Cubic Feet Per minute
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CHEMTREC Chemical Manufacturers' Assoc. Chemical Transportation Emergency Center
CHIP Capability and Hazard Identification Program
CHRIS Chemical Hazards Response Information System
ci Curie
CINT Crisis Incident Negotiations Team (FBI)
CIRG Critical Incident Response Group
CLEAN Commonwealth Law Enforcement Assistance Network
CMC Crisis Management Coordinator (FBI)
CMRT Consequence Management Response Team
CMT Crisis Management Team
CMU Crisis Management Unit (FBI)
CNU Crisis Negotiation Unit (FBI)
COE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
COG Continuity of Government
COMMO Communications
COMSEC Communication Security
CONPLAN Federal Concept Plan
COSINControl Staff Instruction
cpm Counts per minute
CR Congressional Relations
CRC Crisis Response Cell
103
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CRM Crisis Resource Manager
CRN Computer Reporting Network
CRP Crisis Response Plan (FBI) .
CRT Crisis Response Team (FBI)
CT Counter-terrorism
CTCA Communicated Threat Credibility Assessment
CSEPP Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program
CWA Clean Water Act
DA Designated Area
DAT Damage Assistance Team
DATL Device Assessment Team Leader
DATM Device Assessment Team Member
DADMIN Director, Bureau of Administration (PEMA)
DBOOT Director, Bureau of Operations & Training (PEMA)
DBOP Director, Bureau of Plans (PEMA)
DBTS Director, Bureau of Technical Services (PEMA)
DCA Department of Community Affairs
DCA-622 Commercial dosimeter similar to CDV-730
D & C Direction and Control
DCF Dose Conversion Factor
DCNR Department of Conservation and Natural Resources
DCO Defense Coordinating Officer
DEP Department of Environmental Protection
DEO Director of Emergency Operations (DOE/HQ)
DES Data Encryption Standard
DEST Domestic Emergency Support Team (FBI)
DFO Disaster Field Office (FEMA, PA)
DOS Department of General Services (PA)
DHHS Department of Health & Human Services
DIATLDiagnostics Team Leader
DIATM Diagnostics Team Manager
DISTM Disablement Team Manager
DMAT Disaster Medical Assistance Team
DMORT Disaster Mortuary Team (NDMS)
DMVA Department of Military and Veterans Affairs (PA)
DOD U.S. Department of Defense
DOE U.S. Department of Energy
DOH Department of Health
DOI U.S. Department of Interior
DOJ Department of Justice
OOP Disaster Operations Plan
DOT U.S. Department of Transportation
DP Defense Programs (DP)
DP AW Deputy Public Affairs Officer
DPW Department of Public Welfare
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DRC Disaster Recovery Center
DRL Derived Response Level (DEP/BRP)
DRM Disaster Recovery Manager
DSCO Deputy State Coordinating Officer
DSFO Deputy Senior FEMA Official
DSO Director Site Operations
DSR Damage Survey Report
DT Domestic Terrorism (FBI)
DTN Data Transmission Network (Weather Radar Computer)
E Emergency (Title V of P.L. 93-288, Section 102-1)
EAL Emergency Action Level
EAS Emergency Alert System
ECL Emergency classification level
ECOMM (Satellite/Electronic Communications)
EDE Effective Dose Equivalent
EDES Electronic Data Exchange System
EDP Electronic Data Processing
EDPC Electronic Data Processing Coordinator
EEE Emergency Engineering Equipment
EHTR Emergency Highway Traffic Regulation
EICC Emergency Information and Coordination Center (FEMA)
EIS Emergency Information Systems (State)
EIS/C Emergency Information System/Chemical (State)
EMA Emergency Management Agency (local, county, state or federal)
EMAC Emergency Management Advisory Committee
EMC Emergency Management Coordinator (local or county)
EMND Emergency Management & Non-Proliferation Division
EMP Electromagnetic Pulse
EMRT Emergency Medical Response Team (US VA)
EMS Emergency Medical Systems
EMS Emergency Management Specialist
EMS Emergency Medical Services
EMS Emergency Management System (DOE Order 5500.1 A)
EO Executive Order
EOC Emergency Operations Center
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal (U.S. Army or civilian team)
EODCC Explosive Ordnance Disposal Control Center
EOF Emergency Operations Facility
EOP Emergency Operations Plan
EOV Emergency Operations Vehicle (FEMA MERS)
EPA U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
EPCRA Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
EPG Emergency Planning Guide
EPI Emergency Public Information
EPLO Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer
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EPZ Emergency Planning Zone
EPZ Plume Exposure Pathway
ERAMS Environmental Radiation Ambient Monitoring System (US EPA)
ERC Emergency Response Coordinator (ERC)
ERU Evidence Response Unit (FBI)
ERO Emergency Response Officer
ERT Environmental Response Team (US EPA)
ERT Emergency Response Team (PA DEP or FEMA)
ERT-A Emergency Response Team Advance Element
ERT-N Emergency Response Team National
ERV Emergency Response Vehicle
ESCS Emergency Satellite Communication System
ESF Emergency Support Function
ES&H Environment, Safety, and Health
EST Emergency Support Team
ETO Exercise/Training Officer
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FAsT Field Assessment Team
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBI OSC Federal Bureau of Investigation On-Scene Commander
FCC Federal Communication Commission
FCFO Federal Coordination Field Office
FCO Federal Coordinating Officer
FCP Forward Control Point
FCRM Fundamentals Course for Radiological Monitors
FCRO Fundamentals Course for Radiological Officers
FCRRT Fundamentals Course for Radiological Response Team
FDA Food and Drug Administration
FECA Federal Employes Compensation Act
FECC Federal Emergency Communication Coordinator
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FERC FEMA Emergency Response Capability
FESC Federal Emergency Support Coordinator
FEDLER Field Instrument for the Detection of Low-Energy Radiation
FmHA Farmer Home Administration
FNS-USDA Food and Nutrition Service, the U.S. Department of Agriculture
FPEIS Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
FRERP Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan
FRCM FEMA Regional Communication Manager
FRMAC Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center
FRMACD Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center Director
FRMAP Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan
FRP Federal Response Plan
FSA Forward Staging Area
F/S/L Federal, state, local
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FTCA Federal Tort Claims Act
FTS Federal Telecommunications Systems
FTSL Federal Technical Support Location
GAR Governor's Authorized Representative
GIS Geographic Information System
GMT Greenwich Mean Time
GPS Global Positioning System
HAMMER ACE Scott Air Force Base (Communication package)
HAZMAT Hazardous material
H&E Hazards & Effects
HE High Explosive
HET Hazards Evaluation Team
HF High Frequency (3-30 Mhz)
HLW High Level Waste
HMRU Hazardous Material Response Unit (FBI-Lab, Quantico, VA)
HPGe High Purity Germanium Spectroscopy
HRGS High Resolution Gamma Spectroscopy
HRT Hostage Rescue Team (FBI)
HVA Hazards Vulnerability Analysis
I&A Intelligence and Assessment
1C Incident Commander
ICP Incident Command Post
ICS Incident Command System
ICW in coordination with
IDTL Identification Team Leader
IDTM Identification Team Manager
IED Improvised Explosive Devise
IEMS Integrated Emergency Management Systems
IINNFO Interagency Information Network for NEST Field Operations
IMA Individual Mobilization Augmentee
IMS Incident Management System
IND Improvised Nuclear Device
INMARSAT International Maritime Satellite
IR Infrared
IRD Information Resources Division (FBI)
IRP Immediate Response Party (see AAT)
IRZ Immediate Response Zone
1ST Incident Support Team
ISU Investigative Support Unit
JHEC Joint Hazards Evaluation Center
JHECD Joint Hazards Evaluation Center Director
JIC Joint Information Center
JIS Joint Information System
JMMO Joint Medical Mobilization Office
JNACC Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center
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JOA Joint Operations Area
JOC Joint Operations Center
JTF Joint Task Force
JTF-CM Joint Task Force-Consequence Management
JTIC Joint Tactical Intelligence Cell
JTOC Joint Technical Operations Cell
JTOT Joint Technical Operations Team
JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force
KI Potassium Iodide
LCEMA Lancaster County Emergency Management Agency
LCO Local Coordinating Officer
LD Laboratory Division (FBI)
LEMA Lebanon County Emergency Management Agency
LEPC Local Emergency Planning Committee
LEU Low-enriched Uranium
LFA Lead Federal Agency
LFO Lead Federal Official
L & I Labor and Industry (PA)
LLD Lower Limit of Detection
LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLW Low Level Waste
LNO Liaison Officer
LOA Letter of Agreement
M&A FRMAC Monitoring & Analysis Division
MADU Materials and Devices Unit (FBI)
MARS US Army Military Affiliate Radio System
MCC Message Control Center
MCL Maximum Contaminant Level
MCM Message Center Messenger
MERS Mobile Emergency Response Support Detachments (FEMA)
MO A Memorandum of Agreement
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
MM&T Menial, Mundane, and Trivial
mph Miles per hour
mr milliroentgen
mr/hr milliroentgen per hour
M & S Maintenance and Services Program
MRAT Medical Radiological Assistance Team (DOD)
MRE Meals Ready to Eat
MSEL Master Scenario Events List
MTM Message Traffic Manager
Mw Megawatt
NAREL National Air and Radiation Environmental Lab (EPA Montgomery, AL)
NAWAS National Attack Warning System
NBC Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
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NCAVC National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime (FBI)
NCP National (Oil & Hazardous Substances Pollution) Contingency Plan
NCSP National Communications Support Plan
NCSRM National Communications System Regional Manager
NDA National Defense Area
NDMOC National Disaster Medical Operations Center
NDMS National Disaster Medical System (US HHS)
NDMSOSC National Disaster Medical System Operations Support Center
NECC National Emergency Coordination Center
NEST Nuclear Emergency Search Team
NFDA National Funeral Directors Association
NGB National Guard Bureau
NICC National Interagency Coordination Center
NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
NMC National Meteorological Center
NMRT National Medical Response Teams
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NOI Notice of Interest
NRAT National Radiological Advisory Team
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission; National Response Center
NRT National Response Team
NSD National Security Division (FBI)
NSSE National Security Special Event (US Secret Service)
NUREG Nuclear Regulation
NWS National Weather Service
NWSO National Weather Service Office
OA Office of Administration (PA)
OEP Office of Emergency Preparedness (US HHS)
OEMP Office of Emergency Medical Preparedness (US VA)
OPORD Operational Order
OPS Operations
OPSEC Operations Security
ORAU Oak Ridge Associated Universities
ORISE Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education
ORM Other Regulated Materials
OSC On-Scene Coordinator
OSHA U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PA Public Address, Public Affairs
PAANG Pennsylvania Air National Guard
PAARNG Pennsylvania Army National Guard
PAG Protective Action Guide
PAO Public Affairs Officer
PAR Protective Action Recommendation
PAST Protective Action Support Team (DEP/BRP)
PA WAS Pennsylvania Warning System
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PAWG Pennsylvania Wing
PAWG CAP Pennsylvania Wing Civil Air Patrol
PAZ Protective Action Zone
PBAPS Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station
PDA Preliminary Damage Assessment
PDD Presidential Decision Directive
PEHSC Pennsylvania Emergency Health Services Council
PEIRS Pennsylvania Emergency Incident Report System
PEMA Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency
PEMARS Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency Radio Systems
PEMC Pennsylvania Emergency Management Council
PennDOT Pennsylvania Department of Transportation
PEP Plume Exposure Pathway
PES Personal Earth Station
PEWANS PEMA Emergency Warning and Notification System
PF Protection Factor
PIO Public Information Officer
PIR Priority Information Request (FBI)
PL Public Law
PNG PA National Guard
POD Point of Departure
P&OTL Plans & Operations Team Leader
P&OTM Plans & Operations Team Member
PPE Personal Protective Equipment
PPP Population Protection Planning Program
PSP Pennsylvania State Police
PUC Public Utility Commission
PX Nuclear Explosive Packaging Expert
PZ Precautionary Zone
R Roentgen
RAD Radiation Absorbed Dose
RAID Rapid Assessment, Identification, and Detection
RASCAL Radiological Assessment System for Consequence Analysis
REM Radioactive Effect on Man
RAC Regional Assistance Committee
RACES Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service
RADCON Radiological Control Team
RAM Radioactive Material
RAP Radiological Assistance Program (US DOE)
RAT Radiological Assistance Team
RD Restricted Data
ROD Radiation Dispersal Device
REACT Radio Emergency Associated Communications Teams
REAC/TS Radiological Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site
REC Regional Emergency Coordinator
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RECC Regional Emergency Communications Coordinator
Region I U. S. Department of Energy, Brookhaven National Labs, Upton, NY
Region HI U. S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Philadelphia
Region in U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, Philadelphia
REM Roentgen Equivalent Man
REP Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program
RERO Radiological Emergency Response Operation
RERP Radiological Emergency Response Plans
RERT Radiological Emergency Response Team
RERP Radiological Emergency Response Procedures
RF Radio Frequency
RIDIC Radiation Internal Dose Information Center (DOE Oakridge)
RM Radiological Monitor
RML Radiation Measurements Laboratory (DOE/BRP)
RO Radiological Officer (PEMA/County)
ROC Regional Operating System (FEMA)
ROD Record of Decision
ROST Regional Operational Support Team (FEMA)
RRP Regional Response Plan (DOE)
RRT Radiological Response Team (PEMA)
RSL Remote Sensing Lab (DOE, Nellis AFB)
RST Rapid Start Team (FBI)
RSO Radiation Safety Officer
SA Staging Area
SAD State Active Duty
SAR Search and Rescue
SAS Scientific Analysis Section, Laboratory Division (FBI)
SAT Search Augmentation Team (DOE)
SCBA Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus
SCO State Coordinating Officer
SEOC State Emergency Operations Center (@ PEMA HQ)
SEMA State Emergency Management Agency
SERC State Emergency Response Commission
SERL Significant Events Response Level
SERT Special Emergency Response Team (PA State Police)
SEVAN State Emergency Voice Alerting Network (PEMA, County EMA)
SFC State Fire Commissioner
SFO Senior FEMA Official
SIED Sophisticated Improvised Explosive Device
SITREP Situation Report
SIOC Strategic Information Operations Center (FBI)
SLG State and Local Guide
SLPSD State and Local Programs Support Division
SNM Special Nuclear Material
SO Security Officer
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SOG Special Operations Group (FBI)
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
SRT Search Response Team (DOE)
SRV Supply Response Vehicle
SSA Supervisory Special Agent (FBI)
SSC Special Shaped Charge
STARC State Area Commands
STCC Standard Transportation Commodity Code Number
STU-in Secure Telephone Unit (Mod 3)
TCP Traffic Control Points
TCP Telecommunication Priorities
TEC Technical Escort Unit (US Army)
TEDE Total Effective Dose Equivalent
TH Temporary Housing
TL Team Leader
TLD Thermoluminescent Dosimeter
TLV Threshold Limit Value
TPFDL Time-Phased Force Deployment List
TRT Technical Response Team, ES, IRD (FBI)
TSC Technical Support Center
TSP Telecommunications Service Priority
u Windspeed
UHF Ultra High Frequency (225-400 Mhz)
URS UHF Ranging System
USC United States Code
USDA United States Department of Agriculture
USGS U.S. Geological Survey
USHHS United States Department of Health and Human Services
UV Ultra Violet
VA Department of Veteran Affairs
VHF Very High Frequency (30-300 Mhz)
VMAT Veterinary Medical Assistance Teams (NDMS)
VOR VHF Omni Range
W & C Warning and Communications System
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
WMDCU Weapons of Mass Destruction Countermeasures Unit (FBI)
WMDICP Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident Contingency Plan (FBI)
WMDOU Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations Unit (FBI)
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SOME COMMON DEFINITIONS
Access Control Points (ACP): Manned posts established primarily by State or municipal police,
augmented as necessary by the National Guard, around the perimeter of the plume
exposure pathway EPZ on roads leading into it when it is evacuated or occupants are
taking shelter for the purpose of controlling access into the area.
Advance Element of the Emergency Response Team (ERT-A) - The portion of the Emergency
Response Team (ERT) which is the first group deployed to the field to respond to a
disaster incident.
Catastrophic Disaster - An event that results in large numbers of deaths and/or injuries; causes
extensive damage or destruction of facilities that provide and sustain human needs;
produces and overwhelming demand on State and local response resources and
mechanisms; causes a severe long-term effect on general economic activity; and severely
affects State, local, and private sector capabilities to begin and sustain response activities.
Catastrophic Disaster Response Grout) CCDRG) - the national-level group of representatives
from the Federal departments and agencies under the Plan. The CDRG serves as a
centralized coordinating group which supports the one-scene Federal response and
recovery efforts. Its members have access to the appropriate policymakers in their
respective parent organizations to facilitate decisions on problems and policy issues.
Crisis Management Unit (CMU) - provides crisis management support to FBI field division in
the form of JOC expertise and the management of crisis related information.
Crisis Negotiations Unit (CNU) - provides crisis negotiations support to FBI field divisions
Consequence Management (focus on effects): includes measures to protect public health and
safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to
governments, businesses and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism.
Contamination: The unwanted deposition or presence of radioactive matter.
Crisis Management (focus on causes): includes measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of
resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism.
Crisis Response Team - responsible for supporting major cases in the field by providing full field
command post facilities, including independent communications links for "secure" voice,
text, and imagery capabilities through both terrestrial and satellite links.
Curie: The basic unit of radioactivity, equal of 3.7 x 1010 atomic disintegrations per second.
Decontamination: The removal of radioactive contaminants from personnel, instruments,
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equipment, buildings and environment to reduce or eliminate potential hazards to
personnel.
Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) - supported and provided by the Department of Defense
(DoD) to serve in the field as the point of contact to the Federal Coordinating Officer
(FCO) and the ESFs regarding requests for military assistance. The DCO and staff
coordinate support and provide liaisons to the ESFs.
Designated Area - the geographical area designated under a Presidential major disaster
declaration which is eligible to receive disaster assistance in accordance with the
provisions of Public Law (P.L.) 93-288, as amended.
Disaster Field Office (DFO) - the office established in or near the designated area to support
Federal and State response and recovery operations. The DFO houses the FCO and the
Emergency Response Team (ERT), and where possible, the State Coordinating Officer (SCO)
and support staff.
Domestic Emergency Support Team - specialized interagency U.S. government team designed to
expeditiously provide expert advice, guidance and support to the FBI on-scene commander.
Dose'. The energy imparted to matter by ionizing radiation.
Dosimeter: A device which measures the radiation dose accumulated. This may include pocket
or permanent record dosimeters, film badges and thermoluminescent badges.
Emergency - as defined at Title V of P.L. 93-288, Section 102(1), an emergency is any occasion
or instance for which, in the determination of the President, Federal assistance is needed
to supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property
and public health and safety. Title V includes authority for the President to direct Federal
agencies to provide emergency assistance to save lives and protect property and public
health and safety for emergencies other than natural disasters. Under Title V, the
President may direct the provision of emergency assistance either at the request of a
Governor (Section 501 (A)) or upon determination by the President that an emergency
exists for which the primary responsibility for response rests with the United States
Emergency Operations Center (EOC) - a site from which civil government officials (municipal,
county, State and Federal) exercise direction and control in an emergency or disaster.
Emergency Response Team (ERT) - an interagency team, consisting of a lead representative from
each Federal department or agency assigned primary responsibility for an ESF and key
members of the FCO's staff, formed to assist the FCO in carrying out his/her coordination
responsibilities. The ERT provides a forum for coordinating the overall Federal response,
reporting on the conduct of specific operations, exchanging information, and resolving
issues related to ESF and other response requirements. ERT members respond to and
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meet as requested by the FCO. The ERT may be expanded by the FCO to include
designated representatives of other Federal departments and agencies as needed.
Emergency Support Function (ESF) - a functional area of response activity established to
facilitate the delivery of Federal assistance required during the immediate response phase
of a disaster to save lives, protect property and public health, and to maintain public
safety. ESFs represent those types of Federal assistance the State will most likely need
because of overwhelming impact of a catastrophic or significant disaster on its own
resources and response capabilities, or because of the specialized or unique nature of the
assistance required. ESF missions are designated to supplement State and local response
efforts.
Emergency Support Team (EST) — an interagency group operating from the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) headquarters. The EST oversees the national-level
response support effort and coordinates activities with the ESF primary and support
agencies in supporting Federal response requirements in the field.
Evidence Response Unit - coordinates and manages the FBI's Evidence Response Team
Program, which is designed to train and equip field personnel to conduct crime scene
searches and collect evidence.
Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) - the senior Federal official appointed in accordance with
the provision of P.L. 93-288, as amended, to coordinate the overall response and recovery
activities. The FCO represents the President as provide by Section 303 of P.L. 93-288, as
amended, for the purpose of coordinating the administration of Federal relief activities in
the designated area. Additionally, the FCO is delegated responsibilities and performs
those for the FEMA Director as outlined in Executive Order 12148 and those
responsibilities delegated to the FEMA Regional Director in Title 44 Code of Federal
Regulations, Part 205.
Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU) - are available to assist the field in advisory and
liaison capacity with on-scene military and civilian personnel. HMRU is equipped to
direct the proper evidence handling procedures in a contaminated environment and to
provide expert technical assistance to FBI personnel conducting the investigation.
Hostage Response Unit (HRU) - the FBI's primary tactical response element in a significant
WMD incident.
Irradiation - Exposure to any source of radiation.
Joint Information Center (JIC) - the primary field location for the coordination of Federal and
State media relations, located in or near the DFO.
Limited Consequences — within State and local capabilities.
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Major Consequences - exceed State and local capabilities, requiring a Federal response.
Major Disaster - as defined under P.L. 93-288, any natural catastrophe, (including any hurricane,
tornado, storm, flood, high water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake,
volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought) or, regardless of cause,
any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the determination
of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major
disaster assistance under this Act to supplement the efforts and available resources of
States, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage,
loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby.
Mass Care Centers: Fixed facilities suitable for providing emergency lodging and all essential
social services and capable of providing for victims of disaster left temporarily homeless.
Materials and Devices Unit (MADU) - Personnel assigned to the Materials and Devices Unit are
experts in a wide variety of explosive devices.
National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crimes (NCAVC) - personnel assigned to the
NCAVC are equipped to provide behavioral and linguistic assessments during FBI's
internal WMD credibility assessment.
National Emergency Coordination Center (NECC) - the FEMA facility which provides
notification to Headquarters and Regional responders of implementation of the Plan.
Operational Facilities - all of the facilities required to support response and recovery operations,
such as the DFO, points or arrival, points of departure, mobilization areas and staging
areas. ;
Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone: The area which potentially is subject to
radiation exposure as a result of an incident involving radioactive material emanating
from a radiation device.
Potassium Iodide: A thyroid-blocking agent that prevents the accumulation of radioiodine by
blocking its absorption by the thyroid gland through the presence of stable (non-
radioactive) iodine.
Primary Agency - the Federal department or agency assigned primary responsibility to manage
and coordinate a specific ESF. Primary agencies are designated on the basis of their
having the most authorities, resources, capabilities, or expertise relative to
accomplishment of the specific ESF support. Primary agencies are responsible for overall
planning and coordination of the delivery of ESF-related Federal assistance to their State
counterparts, in conjunction with this support agencies.
Protective Action: An action taken to avoid or reduce a projected dose of radiation.
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Public Information Statements: Public announcements made by PEMA or county official
spokesperson(s) via newspapers, radio or television to explain government actions being
taken.
Rod: A basic unit of absorbed dose of ionizing radiation. A measure (applicable to any form or
ionizing radiation) of actual energy absorption.
Radiation: The propagation of energy through space or matter.
Radiological Response Team: A cadre of trained personnel from local emergency service
organizations that serve as advisors to initial responders to radiological emergencies.
Rapid Start Team (RST) - team comprised of information management personnel who are
prepared to deploy on short notice to the scene of FBI major cases.
Rem: A unit of absorbed dose of ionizing radiation in biological matter; specifically the absorbed
dose in Rads multiplied by a constant which takes into account the biological
effectiveness of a particular radiation.
Region III: Refers to the Federal Emergency Management Agency's jurisdictional sub-area of the
U.S. that includes the states of Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West
Virginia and the District of Columbia.
Recovery - activities traditionally associated with providing Federal supplemental disaster
recovery assistance under a Presidential major disaster declaration. These activities
usually begin within days after the event and continue after the response activities cease.
Recovery includes individual and public assistance programs which provide temporary
housing assistance, grants and loans to eligible individuals and government entities to
recovery from the effects of a disaster.
Regional Operations Center (ROC) - the temporary operations facility for the coordination of
Federal response and recovery activities, located at the FEMA Regional Office (or at the
Federal Regional Center) and led by the FEMA Regional Director or Deputy Director
until the DFO becomes operational. Coordination of operations shifts to the State EOC
upon arrival of the ERT-A at the location. From that time forward, the ROC performs a
support role for Federal staff at the disaster scene.
Response - activities to address the immediate and short-term effects of an emergency or
disaster. Response includes immediate actions to save lives, protect property, and meet
basic human needs. Based on the requirements of the situation, response assistance will
be provided to an affected State under the Federal Response Plan using a partial
activation of selected ESFs or the full activation of all ESFs to meet the needs of the
situation.
Roentgen (R): A unit of exposure dose of ionizing radiation. A measure of the ability of gamma
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or x-rays to produce ionizations in air.
Significant Threat - the confirmed presence of an explosive device or WMD capable of causing
a significant destructive event, prior to actual injury or property loss. (FBI)
Standard Operating Procedure (SOP): A minimum set of action steps that must be taken to carry
out a functional activity or task during a radiological emergency.
State - for the purpose of this Plan and as defined under P.L. 93-299, any State of the United
States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American
Samoa, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, or the Republic of the Marshall
Islands.
State Coordinating Officer (SCO) - the representative of the Governor who coordinates State,
Commonwealth, or Territorial response and recovery activities with those of the Federal
Government.
Support Agency - a Federal department or agency designated to assist a specific primary agency
with available resources, capabilities, or expertise in support of ESF response operations,
under the coordination of the primary agency.
Technical Operations - include operations to identify, assess, dismantle, transfer, dispose, and
decontaminate personnel and property exposed to explosive ordnance or NBC/WMD
material.
Technological Hazard - includes a range of hazards emanating from the manufacture,
transportation, and use of such substances as radioactive materials, chemicals, explosives,
flammable, agricultural pesticides, herbicides and disease agents: oil spills on land,
coastal waters or inland water systems; and debris from space.
Terrorist Incident - a violent act, or an act dangerous to human life, in violation of the criminal
laws of the United States or of any State, to intimidate or coerce a government, the
civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social
objectives. (FBI)
Traffic Control Points (TCP): Manned posts established at critical road junctions for the purpose
of controlling or limiting traffic.
Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) - (a) any destructive device as defined in section 921 of
this title (which reads) any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas, bomb, grenade, rocket
having a propellant charge of more than four ounces, missile having an explosive or
incendiary charge of more than one quarter ounce, mine or device similar to the above;
(b) poison gas; (c) any weapon involving a disease organism; or (d) any weapon that is
designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life. (18
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U.S.C., Section 2332a)
Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations Unit (WMDOU)- FBI - Specialized mission of this
unit is to combat the use or threatened use of WMD as a means of terrorism directed
against the U.S., its citizens, or its interests.
Weapons of Mass Destruction Countermeasures Unit fWMDCU) — mission of this unit is to
ensure the FBI, State, and local responders are prepared to handle incidents involving the
use or threat to use WMD in a terrorist act against the U.S., its citizens, or its interests.
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ANNEXL
Glossary;
Terrorist Incident - The FBI defines a terrorist incident as a violent act, or an act dangerous to
human life, in violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, to intimidate or
coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or
social objective.
Crisis Management - The FBI defines crisis management as measures to identify, acquire, and
plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism
Consequence Management - FEMA defines consequence management to protect public health
and safety, restore essential government services, and provide relief to governments, businesses,
and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism.
Credible Threat - The FBI conducts and interagency threat assessment that indicates that the
threat is credible and confirms the involvement of a WMD in the developing terrorist incident.
Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD): Title 18, U.S.C. 2332a, defines a weapon of mass
destruction as (1) any destructive device as defined in section 921 of this title, [which reads] any
explosive, incendiary, or poison gas, bomb, grenade, rocket having a propellant charge of more
than four ounces, missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter
once, mine or device similar to the above; (2) poison gas; (3) any weapon involving a disease
organism; or (4) any weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level
dangerous to human life.
Incident Command System: a management system, under the control of a single individual (the
Incident Commander) that uses commonly accepted business management techniques to control
and manage personnel, equipment, and other resources for the purpose of mitigating an
emergency situation.
Unified Command: the structure employed in the Incident Command System to manage
emergencies involving or impacting on multiple geographic, functional, or legislatively-
mandated jurisdictions. In Unified Command, all involved agencies participate actively in
determining the strategic (and in some cases tactical) goals and objectives, although there
remains only one overall Incident Commander.
Strategic Unified Command: The command structure involved with obtaining and assigning
resources and with the overall management of the response. In particular, this command
oversees the coordination between the various agencies and assures that the overall response is
unified and that internal conflicts do not develop. The Joint Operations Center is an example of
this command. It is generally located very near the scene of the action, usually in a trailer or a
building which can be quickly obtained and equipped. Communication lines and radio
capabilities are essential to this command structure, and much of its efforts are directed toward
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dealing with people external to the immediate response effort.
Tactical Unified Command: The command structure at the scene of the action. This command
structure deals with the immediate aspects of site entry and response efforts, including such
things as levels of personal protection, addressing immediate threats to the responders and the
public, site security and site access, etc. Tactical command would be located in sight of the
scene of the action, and may be run from a fire truck or some other vehicle with radio
communication. The focus here is on immediate site activities rather than overall coordination of
multiple agencies.
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ANNEXM
County To Train In Defense Against 'Weapons Of Mass Destruction'
Sunday, August 15,1999
By LES STEWART
Daily News Staff Writer
A terrorist leaves a series of bombs in the Lebanon Valley Mall and walks away, leaving
them to detonate and kill and injure a crowd of helpless shoppers. Panic sets in as the
wounded struggle to cope with the carnage around them.
Sounds like the premise for a Bruce Willis action film, doesn't it?
Far from it. It's a scenario that may sound far-fetched, but emergency officials say it's
possible.
Most Americans, they point out, never thought a terrorist attack on U.S. soil could
happen until the bombings of the World Trade Center in New York City and the Alfred
P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City proved them wrong.
"That was a wake up call for a lot of America," said Marko Bourne, press secretary of
the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency.
Since those acts of terrorism, emergency officials statewide have taken on the added
task of training for a terrorist attack. Now, they are taking steps to ensure it doesn't
happen in the Lebanon Valley.
Late next month, personnel from Lebanon County's Emergency Management Agency
will join some 250 to 300 people from more than 30 federal, state and local agencies in
an ominous sounding exercise called "Weapons of Mass Destruction."
To put it simply, it'll test how the various agencies would respond to a an act of
terrorism involving nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.
Part of the two-day event, set for Sept. 29 and 30 at Fort Indiantown Gap Military
Reservation, will be a table-top exercise, such as decontaminating "victims" in the
incident. The rest of it will be an actual drill, Bourne said.
"We want to test our own capabilities," he explained.
Because PEMA coordinates other types of emergency drills for local emergency
agencies, it was only natural that the state agency would also run this type of exercise,
Bourne said.
In fact, PEMA has helped conduct similar exercises in other parts of the state, such as
Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, he said. Lebanon's, however, is a bit unusual.
"This one is unique because of the size and other (agencies taking part)," Bourne said.
"The whole purpose of this is to see what kinds of problems we run into," said Clyde
Miller, Lebanon County EMA director.
In the past, local emergency management agencies were kept busy with storms or
cleaning up spilled diesel fuel after a traffic accident. But training for something like this
is completely different.
"The whole ball game has changed," he said. "This is indeed the granddaddy of them
all."
A terrorist act occurring in Lebanon County wouldn't be beyond the realm of
possibilities, Miller said. As such, local officials want to be ready. After all, he pointed
out, anyone can now get information about making bombs just by looking for it on the
Internet.
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Besides the county's Hazardous Materials crew, representatives from the FBI, U.S.
Department of Energy, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency will be training alongside staff from the Fort
Indiantown Gap Fire Co., Good Samaritan Hospital, the county coroner's office, First
Aid and Safety Patrol and Good Samaritan ambulance services and fire departments
from Richland and Annville.
"If anything ever happens, it will be the local response services that make or break it,"
Miller said.
Federal authorities are developing response teams throughout the United States to help
local agencies handle these types of events, Miller said.
The exercise is designed to better coordinate various government agencies responding
to a terrorist act, Bourne and Miller agreed.
Fort Indiantown Gap, with its insulated and somewhat isolated location, was selected as
the site for the exercise because it provides the chance of conducting the training with a
minimum disruption to the community, Miller said.
Another aspect of the exercise is maintaining the safety of local agencies responding to
a terrorist act, according to Miller. At the county level, hazardous materials crews are
better prepared for these incidents because of the equipment and training. Local fire
and police departments, however, also need training, he added.
A number of task forces have been formed throughout Pennsylvania, Miller said.
Lebanon is teamed up with Lancaster, Luzerne, Schuylkill, Berks and Columbia
counties. The counties will share resources. If Luzerne would need assistance, for
example, Lebanon could send it, the local EMA director said.
During the past two and a half years, the county's EMA staff has been quietly receiving
training from federal and state authorities on how to respond to terrorist activities
involving chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, Miller said. Other counties are doing
the same, he added.
Article used by permission of the Lebanon Daily News, Chief Editor, 718 Poplar
Street, Lebanon, PA, 17042, (717) 272-5611.
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ANNEXN
Participating Organizations;
East Hanover Township Supervisors
East Hanover Township EMA
Ft. Indiantown Gap Police Department
Ft. Indiantown Gap Fire Department
City of Reading Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
City of Allentown EOD
Lebanon County EMA
Lebanon County Hazardous Material Team
Lebanon County Fire Police
Lancaster County EMA
Schuylkill County EMA
Good Samaritan Hospital
Good Samaritan Hospital EMS
Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency
Pennsylvania State Police (Headquarters, Bureau of Emergency & Special Operations, Reading,
Jonestown, Hamburg, Schuylkill Haven, Frackville Barracks)
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, Emergency Response Team
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, Bureau of Radiation Protection
Pennsylvania Department of Military and Veteran Affairs
- Civil Air Patrol (CAP)
- PA National Guard's Rapid Assessment, Initial Detection (RAID) Element
- Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA)
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, SCI Frackville
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation
Pennsylvania Department of Health, Emergency Medical Services
PA TF-1 Pennsylvania Urban Search & Rescue Task Force
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Philadelphia
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Harrisburg
US Dept. of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Philadelphia
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region HI, Philadelphia
US Department of Defense (DOD)
- 756th EOD, Ft. Indiantown Gap
-NAVSCOLEOD-Indianhead, MD
- USAF HAMMER ACE, Scott AFB
US Department of Energy - Emergency Response Program
- Radiological Assistance Program (RAP), Region 1, Brookhaven National Labs
- Radiological Assistance Program (RAP), Region 2, Oakridge National Labs
- Defense Program-23, Germantown, Maryland
- Headquarters, Washington, DC
US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
- Region HI, Philadelphia
- Region HI Site Assessment & Technical Assistance Team(SATA)Wheeling,WV
US Dept. of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Administration - Allentown Office
Salvation Army, Eastern Region - Harrisburg and Myerstown Chapters
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ANNEXO
LIST OF PLANS AND PROCEDURES,
TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE EVALUATION CRITERIA
FOR THE VIGILANT LION EXERCISE
SEPTEMBER 29-30,1999
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Emergency Operations Plan, Annex X, August 1998.
Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency Standard Operating Procedures, State Emergency Operations
Center, Current.
Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency Watch Officers' Manual, Current.
Pennsylvania Emergency Information Reporting System, 1993.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's EAS Operational Plan, May 1999
Federal Response Plan, April 1999.
Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan, May 6, 1996.
Good Samaritan Hospital Mass Casualty Plan, February 1999
Good Samaritan Hospital Disaster Plan, February 1999
Lebanon County Emergency Operations Plan, August 1999.
Lebanon County HAZMAT Team SOP, August 1999.
Lebanon County PA Act 78 (911) Plan, 1999.
Lebanon VA Hospital/Good Samaritan Hospital Mutual Aid Agreement, 1998.
Lebanon County/Lancaster County Mutual Aid Agreement for Emergency Services, February 4, 1993.
Pennsylvania National Guard Joint Emergency Operations Plan 9901 (PNG-JEOP)
Pennsylvania National Guard Commanders' Emergency Battle Book, Current
Ft. Indiantown Gap Police Department Standard Operating Procedures, 41.2,
August 23, 1999.
Ft. Indiantown Gap Fire Department Standard Operating Procedures, Current.
3rd Military Support Detachment Arrival Standard Operations Guide, Current.
3rd Military Support Detachment Standard Operations Guide, Current
3rd Military Support Detachment Survey Standard Operations Guide, Current.
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection Emergency Response Plan, Annex X, Nov 97
PA Department of Environmental Protection Incident Response Plan, November 1995
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PA Department of Environmental Protection Office of Field Operations, Emergency Operations Plan, Document
400-5900-101, 1 PA Code Chapter 1.4, November 15, 1997
PA Department of Environmental Protection, Bureau of Radiation Protection's Nuclear Emergency Plan for Nuclear
Power Plants, January 1994.
USAF/CAP CAPR 50-15, Civil Air Patrol Operational Missions
USAF/CAP CAPR 55-1, Civil Air Patrol Emergency Services Mission Procedures
USAF/CAP CAPR 60-1, Civil Air Patrol Flight Management
EPA 40 CFR 300 National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 1996.
EPA 400-R-92-001 Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, May 1992.
EPA Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP), 1999.
Pennsylvania State Police, Troop L Task Force Plan, 1999.
Pennsylvania State Police Operations Manual, 7-1, Emergencies & Unusual Occurrences, 1999.
Pennsylvania State Police Field Regulation Manual, 1999.
Pennsylvania State Police Administrative Regulations, 1999.
Presidential Decision Directive -39, United States Policy on Terrorism, June '95
Presidential Decision Directive - 62, Protection Against Unconventional Threats to Homeland and Americans
Overseas, May '98.
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff CONPLAN 0300-97, DOD
Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident Contingency Plan, August 26, 1998.
DOD Directive 3025.1, "Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA),
FDA 83-8211 Preparedness and Response in Radiation Accidents, August 1983.
DOT P 5800.5, North American Emergency Response Guidebook, 1996.
NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards (Revised 97-140)
NIOSH Guide to the Selection and Use of Paniculate Respirators (DHHS [NIOSH] publication 96-101)
USHHS Radiological Health Handbook.
NRC Response Technical Manual (RTM-96), March 1996.
NRC Response Coordination Manual (RCM-96), September 1996.
OSHA 17 CFR 1910.120 Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response
OSHA 29 CFR 1926.65, Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response.
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NFPA 471 Recommended Practice for Responding to Hazardous Materials Incidents
NFPA 472: Standard for Professional Competence ofResponders to Hazardous Materials Incidents, April 1997.
NFPA 473: Standard for Competencies for EMS Personnel Responding to Hazardous Materials Incidents, April
1997.
NFPA's Hazardous Materials Handbook, 1997.
U. S. Department of Energy's RAP Region 1 Response Plan, January 1, 1996
DOE Region 1, Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, December 17,
1998.
DOE 151.1, Comprehensive Emergency Management System, September 1994
DOE 5000.3 A Occurrence Reporting and Processing of Operations Information, May 1990.
DOE 5530.2, Nuclear Emergency Search Team, September 1991.
DOE 5530.3, Radiological Assistance Program (RAP), September 1991.
DOE 5530.4, Aerial Measuring System, September 1991.
DOE 5635.4, Protection of Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information, February 1988.
DOE 5650.2B, Identification of Classified Information, December 1991.
DOE RAP Field Operations Guide (FOG), October 1998.
DOE Emergency Public Information Pocket Guide, Emergency Management Laboratories, Oak Ridge Institute for
Science and Education, November 1997.
Public Law 83-703, Atomic Energy Act of 1954
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Application (DASMA) Operational Emergency Management Plan (OEMP),
June 1989.
Federal Bureau of Investigation Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident Contingency Plan (WMDICP), August 26,
1998.
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Manual of Investigations and Operations Guide, Current.
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Manual of Administrative Operations & Procedures, Current.
FBI Philadelphia Division, Weapons of Mass Destruction Plan, Current.
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