United States Office of Solid Waste and Emergency
Environmental Protection Response
Agency
vvEPA PROCEEDINGS
United States — Hungary
Workshop on
Chemical Emergency
Preparedness, Response, and
Prevention
Veszprem, Hungary
September 18—21, 1990
Printed on Recycled P.
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PROCEEDINGS
UNITED STATES - HUNGARY WORKSHOP ON
CHEMICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND PREVENTION
Veszprem, Hungary
18 - 21 September 1990
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 1
PLENARY SESSIONS 3
REPORT BY ALUN J. WILLIAMS, GENERAL RAPPORTEUR 5
Opening Session 7
Emergency Preparedness — Technical Presentations/Discussion 11
Emergency Response — Technical Presentations/Discussion 15
Prevention of Chemical Accidents — Technical Presentations/Discussion 19
WORKING GROUP FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 23
WORKING GROUP ON LEGISLATION AND PROGRAM APPROACHES 27
WORKING GROUP ON PROCESS/OPERATIONS/COORDINATION 31
WORKING GROUP ON INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 33
WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 37
APPENDIX I - LIST OF PARTICIPANTS 39
APPENDIX II - ANNOTATED AGENDA 47
APPENDIX III - DISCUSSION DOCUMENT 61
APPENDIX IV - ACRONYMS 75
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
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INTRODUCTION
The United States Environmental Protection Agency and the Hungarian Ministry for Environment
jointly sponsored a workshop on chemical emergency preparedness, response, and prevention, which was
held in Veszprem, Hungary, in September 1990. The workshop brought together 132 delegates from
Eastern and Central European nations, the United States, and several international organizations to
discuss issues and share experiences in these areas. The workshop was the first project funded under the
U.S.-Hungary Joint Science and Technology Board and the first event affiliated with the Regional
Environmental Centre in Budapest, which opened two weeks before the workshop.
Chemicals and other hazardous materials play an important role in the modern world, but the
hazards they pose make it imperative that all due care be taken to eliminate risks associated with their
manufacture, processing, handling, storage, transportation, and use. A series of major chemical accidents
— at Flixborough, England in 1974, at Seveso, Italy in 1976, at Bhopal, India in 1984, and at Basel,
Switzerland in 1988 — heightened both public and governmental awareness of the potentially devastating
effects of accidental releases of chemicals into the environment. These accidents and others highlighted
the need for communities, regions, and nations to be prepared for and capable of responding to the types
of chemical accidents that may occur within their areas. Equally important, the effects of these accidents
on both the workers, the community, and the environment emphasized the necessity of concerted actions
directed towards accident prevention.
Chemical emergency preparedness, response, and prevention are the focus of many national and
international programs. In 1988, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
undertook a project to develop guidance for member countries in this area. To gather information, OECD
sponsored workshops on (1) the role of industry in preventing accidents; (2) the role of workers in
preventing accidents and information needed by the public; (3) the role of government in preventing
accidents and land use planning; and (4) emergency preparedness and response, and coordination of
research. A fifth workshop on human factors will be held in Japan in 1991. The findings and
recommendations of these workshops will be used in the development of guidelines. In addition, the
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) has developed the Awareness and Preparedness for
Emergencies at the Local Level (APELL), a set of guidelines for establishing emergency preparedness
programs. APELL is being implemented in several developing countries. Other international
organizations working this area include the International Labor Organization (ILO), which is
concentrating on the role of workers, and the World Health Organization (WHO), which is sponsoring a
conference on emergency preparedness in June 1991. On the national level, numerous programs exist for
national, regional, and local governments.
The objectives of the workshop were:
• To provide an opportunity for participants to exchange experiences and address issues of
concern; and
• To develop recommendations that may be of use to participating nations as they evaluate,
revise, or develop programs in these areas.
Structure of the Workshop
After the opening remarks, the workshop began with presentations from each of the Eastern and
Central European nations. The presentations gave each delegation an opportunity to review efforts in
their countries that relate to chemical emergency preparedness, response, and prevention and to discuss
their current concerns. The presentations also helped to create a common understanding of the status of
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national programs and of the issues most relevant to each delegation. The presentations helped focus the
rest of the workshop's sessions to ensure that the workshop addressed the concerns of participants.
The workshop had three technical sessions, with presentations related to chemical emergency
preparedness, response, and prevention. The technical presentations, given by experts in the areas,
provided an introduction to current programs, practices, and technologies, and formed the basis for
subsequent detailed discussions.
Participants took part in working groups in which every delegate had an opportunity to take part
in the discussions and contribute to the findings and recommendations. The working groups focused on
issues that cut across the subject areas of the technical sessions and relate directly to actions that might be
taken: legislation/program development; process, organization, and coordination; information
management/systems; and research and development. Each working group developed findings and
recommendations, which were presented at the final session by the working group chairs.
The chairs, rapporteurs, presenters, and participants were invited to represent the spectrum of
organizations involved in these issues, including environment and public health ministries, fire services,
research institutes, academia, labor, industry, and green groups.
Organization of this Document
Following this introduction, this report is organized into two additional chapters.
• Chapter 2 presents the General Rapporteur's report on the meeting and the summaries of
the four plenary sessions.
• Chapter 3 presents the findings and recommendations from the four working groups.
In addition, the report contains several appendices.
• Appendix I provides the list of participants.
• Appendix II provides the annotated agenda for the workshop.
• Appendix III provides the discussion document distributed to participants.
• Appendix IV provides a list of acronyms used by participants.
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CHAPTER 2
PLENARY SESSIONS
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5
PLENARY SESSIONS
REPORT BY ALUN J. WILLIAMS, GENERAL RAPPORTEUR
The workshop was deliberately organized to include a wide range of participants - an appropriate
step for this first event of its type. Although not all participating countries achieved the wide spectrum of
representation sought, nevertheless a good discussion ensued on all topics addressed. Participants included
officials from environmental ministries, public health institutes, research institutes, ministries of industry,
agriculture, and economic affairs, green groups, and industry. After the overview provided in this
introductory meeting, a narrower targeting for successive meetings will probably be appropriate.
The international horizons of the issues addressed were broadened by the active participation of
such organizations as UNEP, ILO, WHO, OECD, and EC member states. The subject of major chemical
accidents and their control was seen to be only one example of the wide macroeconomic and
environmental issues currently undergoing changes in the region. For example, the EC is moving toward
economic integration and many Eastern and Central European nations are shifting from centralized
government control of the economy to a free market system. These changes will have a significant effect
on the management of environmental programs.
The workshop achieved many positive and concrete results. The first, relatively intangible but
invaluable in the long term, was the establishment of new contacts at many levels between representatives
having common interests and concerns. OECD experience has confirmed the value of such contacts and
relationships, once mutual trust has been established. Already the workshop has resulted in the exchange
of much information during its course. More generally there was an appreciation of the existence of much
work already completed by others, and sources of such material were identified.
The workshop recognized that it was addressing not a problem previously unknown within the
region, but one whose existence has not been openly acknowledged and debated. Once the issues were
examined it was found that many problems were not unique to a single country but shared by others in the
region; the contributors from Western European countries and North America confirmed they had faced
(and still face) similar conflicts - the interface between central and local government levels was an obvious
example.
The workshop learnt of, and identified the need for further study of various supra-national
legislative models and programs such as those of UNECE, ILO, WHO, UNEP, OECD, EC. The
workshop agreed on the crucial need for local delivery of emergency preparedness and response functions,
and interest was expressed in the UNEP (APELL) process. Certain presentations on the practical
implementation of these aspects emphasized that sectoral needs would require a more narrowly focused
meeting to explore them fully. Specifically, meetings on issues related to the Seveso Directive and
transboundary response concerns may be useful.
The workshop agreed on the need for coordination of efforts first at the national level within each
country, and also at a supra-national level - whether through long established mechanisms such as UNEP
or UNECE, or through more recent developments such as the Regional Environmental Centre, Budapest
(REC). Coordination within each country is also necessary among local, regional, and national authorities.
In terms of ways to take the work forward on this subject, the Workshop saw a clear need for
discussion at, and endorsement by, the highest political levels of the need for action both inside each
country and supra-nationally. The need for a legislative framework was clear, but the Workshop realized
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that other positive collaborative initiatives should not await these developments. Land use planning (both
control of siting of installation themselves and other nearby developments) was noted as an urgent issue
given the likely industrial redevelopment in the near future.
Where possible, it was seen as advantageous to build new emergency preparedness/response
arrangements for chemical accidents on existing civil protection infrastructures. In many countries, the fire
services already take the lead in organizing response actions. Their activities must be coordinated with
other civil protection authorities such as the police or military and the emergency medical services.
Participating countries noted with interest the complementary approaches on public information
and participation reflected in the "need to know" requirements of the Seveso Directive, and the "right to
know" approach of U.S. legislation. The Workshop recognized the need for active public participation in
decision making and the need for transparency in such processes to foster trust and understanding. This
need for trust extended not only to companies, but also to government, local authorities, and their
agencies.
The Workshop concluded that the process of emergency planning and of preparing a safety
report/analysis was itself intrinsically crucial, as much as the output documents themselves.
The Workshop affirmed the utility of work sharing, i.e., agreeing to development of
complementary centers of excellence in different countries. On research issues in particular, the priority
action lay in acquiring the results and benefits of existing research before deciding what new efforts were
needed.
Finally, the Workshop saw a possible increased role for the new Regional Environmental Centre
both as a facilitator of activities between member countries, and as a clearing house for information
exchange. With so much acknowledged as needing to be done, it is important to avoid a duplication of
effort. Countries will first need to identify and prioritize their particular needs.
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Workshop on Chemical Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Prevention
Opening Session
Jim Makris of the United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) opened the
session. He noted that the workshop marked several firsts: the first meeting of this group of nations, the
first project funded under the U.S.-Hungary Joint Science and Technology Board, and the first event
affiliated with the recently opened Regional Environmental Centre. He said that behind this effort were
the efforts of a number of multilateral organizations including the United National Environment Program
(UNEP), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the International Labor
Organization (ILO), and the World Health Organization (WHO), as well as work by multinational
organizations such as the EC, and the ECE.
Mr. Makris stated that the goal of the meeting was for participants to go home with more
information than they came with, to have an opportunity to learn where information can be obtained, and
to renew friendships and make new connections. He then introduced Elemer Kiss, Hungarian Minister for
Environment, Don R. Clay, Assistant Administrator of the U.S. EPA, and Gerard Scannell, Assistant
Secretary of the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, each of whom made introductory
remarks.
Dr. Kiss expressed the hope that the workshop would be profitable. He cited an axiom that to act
was easy, to think was difficult, and to act without thought could be unpleasant. He said he hoped the
workshop participants would act with thought.
Mr. Clay said that the U.S. delegates wanted to share their knowledge, but that the U.S. does not
have all the answers and that the U.S. delegates had come to learn as well. He stated that chemical
accidents can and do happen. Therefore, it is essential that risks of chemicals be examined and that
countries build their ability to respond and plan. Adapting a prevention mentality, however, is the key.
Because chemical accidents are a global problem, it is critical that countries share their expertise and
information. He noted that a lot of data are collected, but information based on the data is limited.
Because accidents occur at the local level, information is critical at that level.
Mr. Clay reviewed the U.S. EPA programs on chemical emergencies. In 1968, the federal
government established the first National Contingency Plan. Under this plan, a National Response Team
was established; 14 agencies are now members of the team. Regional Response Teams and On-Scene
Coordinators also work under the national plan to ensure a coordinated federal response to large-scale
emergencies. In response to the chemical release in Bhopal, EPA established a voluntary Chemical
Emergency Preparedness Program. At the same time, the U.S. chemical industry began its Chemical
Awareness and Emergency Response program to ensure that chemical manufacturers develop emergency
response plans for their facilities and work with the local community. In 1986, much of EPA's voluntary
program was enacted as the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, also know
as Title III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA). This law was a major
expansion of planning efforts. In addition, Title III makes information more available to and usable by the
public. The U.S. and Mexico have developed a Joint Response Team; the U.S. and Canada are developing
a similar bilateral structure on planning. On the prevention side, EPA is collecting information on
chemical accidents, conducting audits, and working with external groups. He emphasized that prevention
requires a holistic approach that considers safety at every step, from the design of the facility to its closure.
Mr. Clay briefly reviewed U.S. programs on waste management, again stressing prevention as the
key. After 10 years of the Superfund program, which cleans up uncontrolled hazardous waste sites, it is
clear that it is easier to prevent pollution than to clean it up. Hazardous waste cleanups are costly and
difficult; there are limits to what technologies can do to remove wastes, especially from ground water.
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EPA has learned that many choices lie in the hands of individuals; the government needs to take a holistic
view of waste management.
Mr. Scannell stated that he was pleased that the workshop had invited all the stakeholders, that is,
everyone who could influence or be affected by chemical accidents. He emphasized workplace safety as a
first line of defense against chemical emergencies. He stated that it is impossible for the government to
police every work place that handles hazardous chemicals. Management is responsible for conducting safe
operations; employees should assist and be involved in the process. The government role is oversight,
consultation, and training. He said that experience indicates that safety pays; safe operations are more
productive, have higher morale, and fewer losses.
Mr. Makris introduced Istvan Szemenyei of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry who discussed the
development of the U.S.-Hungary Joint Science and Technology Board and noted the importance of
science and technology in building bridges between nations.
Summary of National Programs
Hungary. Hungary has declared its intention of harmonizing its environmental laws with those of
the European Community. Most of the environmental work has been done by the central government.
The fundamental issue at present is the need to decentralize control of some programs. Management
systems are not currently integrated into a whole.
A second problem involves information. There is a surplus of data, but a lack of information
derived from the data. The government must also deal with disinformation and poorly developed
information. Hungary needs to develop a coordinated information exchange, which should be handled by
the environmental protection agencies. Hungary must also decide on the proper centralization and
decentralization approaches. Several ministries will be involved in these issues.
Austria. Austria is implementing the Seveso Directive, which requires safety reports from
hazardous installations. Under its industrial codes, Austria has a licensing system for industrial facilities.
The public has the right to take part in the licensing process. Once a facility is licensed and has filed a
safety report, the government must inspect the facility at least once every three years and after any major
accident. As a result of the inspection, the government may require the facilities to make technological
changes. Regarding emergency response, the Ministry of the Interior has established national and regional
alarm centers to facilitate rapid response.
Bulgaria. Bulgaria considers the hazardous effects of chemicals a major problem. The
government is working to inform the public about the potential hazards from industrial chemical use.
Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia has a long tradition of chemical industries. A series of major
accidents made the nation aware of the potential hazards posed by and led to the development of
programs to address specific chemical hazards. The nation has also developed a complex emergency alert
and notification system and has installed mitigation and detection systems.
Czechoslovakia would like to develop a legal system to address safety issues and is interested in
introducing computerized emergency response systems.
Germany. Germany is implementing the Seveso Directive. In addition, it has a national
Hazardous Incidence Ordinance, establishing a structure for emergency response organization. This law is
implemented at the local level based on national guidelines. The national government runs a disaster
control academy to provide training in civil defense, self protection, technical training, and disaster
management.
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Italy. Italy is also implementing the Seveso Directive. Italy has, however, set lower thresholds
than are listed under the directive. Facilities that meet the directive thresholds have their safety reports
reviewed by the national government. Other facilities are inspected and reviewed by regional authorities.
Italy is stressing the need for the central government to standardize the rules and for decentralization of
implementation.
Poland. Poland is not currently active in the area of chemical emergency preparedness, response,
and prevention. It has, however, developed a computerized decision support system to aid in responses to
hazardous incidents. This software includes databases on the chemical and physical properties of
chemicals.
Romania. The Romanian government has established a new ministry to handle environmental
affairs. The ministry is beginning to look at conditions at industrial and storage facilities. It is in the
process of developing and evaluating laws, policies, and regulations. The government is placing special
attention on chemicals used in small, hard to reach communities.
USSR. The Soviet government is aware of the dangerous conditions created by some industries
and recognizes that accidents at chemical facilities may have impacts on other nations. The government
thinks that inadequate attention has been paid to accidents and is beginning to address the issue. Services
are being developed in several ministries. The government believes it is essential to learn from accidents
and is considering the need for licensing.
Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavian government is developing plans to form mobil units in major cities
to respond to chemical emergencies. Transboundary considerations are also being stressed.
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Emergency Preparedness — Technical Presentations/Discussion
Chair: Jim Makris, U.S.
Rapporteur: Zoltan Illes, Hungary
The session opened with presentations on the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP)
project on chemical emergency preparedness, Awareness and Preparedness at the Local Level (APELL).
Robert Young of UNEP described the development of the APELL program, which is designed to help
developing countries and others establish emergency response plans. APELL emphasizes the need for
cooperation and coordination between the public sector and industrial facilities in planning for
emergencies. The APELL program encourages communities and industries to start the planning process
separately if necessary; that is, facilities should develop plans even if there is no immediate interest in the
community. The APELL program is being implemented in several countries, including Bahrain and
Mexico.
Khalid Fahkro of the Bahrain Environmental Protection Committee discussed the implementation
of APELL in his country. Bahrain began with an analysis of potential hazards. Because of its location,
the country is not susceptible to natural disasters; its location in the Persian Gulf, however, makes it
vulnerable to emergencies that result from war or sabotage. The country has pipelines to the mainland
and refineries. The location of all potential hazards were mapped to identify areas where populations may
be affected. The primary problem Bahrain has encountered in implementing APELL has been the
unwillingness of other government departments to make information on hazards available to the public,
claiming that the information is secret.
Michael Baram of Boston University Law School in the United States (U.S.) discussed legislative
issues related to emergency preparedness. He stated that there are two contrasting approaches: under the
Seveso Directive of the European Community (82/501/EEC as amended by 88/610/EEC), information is
provided to the public on a "need to know" basis. The 1988 amendment to the directive lists the
information that must be provided to the public; under the directive, however, the government and
industry are not required to provide any additional information.
The U.S. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, also known as Title III
of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), provides information on a right-to-know
basis. Title III has a number of provisions related to information. Facilities are required to report
accidental releases to the national, state, and local governments. Follow-up reports are also required to
provide additional information on the release and its potential effects. For any chemical considered
hazardous, facilities must submit Material Safety Data Sheets (or a list of chemicals) to the state and local
governments. Facilities must also provide, on an annual basis, information on the location and quantity of
all hazardous chemicals on site. This information is important both for planning and for response actions.
Finally, Title III requires manufacturers to submit annual estimates of their releases of chemicals to all
environmental media. The annual estimates have provided valuable information for evaluating the total
impact of chemical releases to the environment. These data are made available through the states and a
national database.
All information submitted under Title III is available to the public on request. Unlike the Seveso
system, no information is automatically provided to the public, but all information submitted to the
government is available to anyone who. requests it. Title III contains provisions for the protection of trade
secrets, but these provisions limit the amount of information that can be claimed as a secret to the
chemical identity. If a facility claims the exact chemical identity as a secret, the facility must provide a
generic chemical identity. In practice, very few facilities have made trade secret claims.
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Raymond DiNardo of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) discussed hazards analysis
as a critical element in emergency planning. A hazards analysis has three steps: (1) hazard identification;
(2) a vulnerability analysis; and (3) a risk assessment. The hazard identification requires planners to locate
all hazardous chemicals in the community and to determine the quantity in each location. The hazardous
properties of these chemicals must also be determined. The information submitted under Title III in the
U.S. provides these data to emergency planners.
The vulnerability analysis defines the area of potential impact of a chemical release. The
vulnerability analysis requires planners to determine worst case releases and then develop estimates of how
far from the point of release people could be affected. To determine the distance of potential impact,
planners must select a concentration that they consider potentially dangerous. The distance is then
calculated by estimating the point at which the concentration of the chemical falls below the level set. In
the U.S., EPA recommends using a concentration that is one-tenth the Immediately Dangerous to Life and
Health (IDLH) concentration. Different choices (e.g., one-fifth the IDLH) will alter the results of the
vulnerability analysis. In general, the selection of a concentration level is a policy choice.
The final part of the hazards analysis is the risk assessment. This assessment is not a formal risk
assessment, but rather a general determination of which hazards in the community pose the greatest threat.
Planners rate each chemical on the likelihood of a serious release and the potential impact of a release.
For example, a chemical that is only mildly toxic but present in very large quantities may pose more of a
threat than a highly toxic chemical that exists in small quantities. The location of the chemical also affects
its potential threat; a small quantity of a toxic chemical in a populated area may pose a greater threat than
a large quantity of the same chemical in an isolated location. The risk assessment process allows planners
to set priorities so that their plans focus on the most serious potential threats first.
Gerald Poje (U.S.) of the National Wildlife Federation, an environmental group, spoke about the
importance of including the public in the decision-making process. He noted that chemical accidents are
frequent occurrences. According to one EPA analysis, over the last 25 years, there have been 17 accidents
in the U.S. that had the potential to be as serious as Bhopal. He outlined five steps needed to ensure
effective risk communication with the public:
(1) Develop the ethic of informed consent. Everyone potentially affected by chemical
accidents has the right to understand the nature of and potential for chemical accidents.
(2) Create an awareness of information need. People must be made of aware of their
responsibility to obtain and evaluate information about chemical risks.
(3) Define information availability. Effective risk communication needs to explain not only
what is known about chemical hazards, but also should inform the public about what they
need to know to evaluate the hazards.
(4) Provide information access. Information needed by the public must be made easily
accessible.
(5) Assure public verification of information. The public should have the right to check data
provided by industry, including the right to collect samples at facilities.
Pal Popelyak of the Hungarian Fire Service discussed the role of the fire service and the value of
testing emergency response plans. He said that although the public expects to be protected, the fire
departments cannot be prepared for all hazards. In Hungary, all fire service personnel are professionals;
they usually arrive at an accident before the ambulances. The fire departments handle registration of
facilities, so they have information about the hazards that are present at facilities. The majority of
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facilities in Hungary have the capability to deal with small accidents. They have experts on chemical
hazards, but the experts are only available during working hours. Major accidents require a response by
the public fire service. The fire service currently has the equipment to deal with accidents, but needs
more.
In Hungary, most of the chemical accidents have involved the transportation of chemicals.
Therefore, the fire service is focussing its program of emergency response exercises on road accidents.
These exercises are the first step in the program. In a videotape, showing an exercise conducted at a fixed
facility, the fire service used a distillation tower that was to be torn down to test their ability to deal with a
complex fire that required both water (to cool the tower) and foam (to suppress the fire).
After the presentations, the panelists answered questions on several topics. Of particular concern
was the issue of obtaining information from government installations. One questioner asked whether the
U.S. required information on chemicals and other hazards at military installations and other government
facilities. In response, Michael Baram and Jim Makris explained that Title III does not apply to such
government facilities, but that the federal government is committed to complying with the law to the
extent possible. They noted that in some cases citizens have demanded information from the government
and have obtained it. On another topic, a questioner asked how the APELL program could be used if
some of the parties were reluctant to participate. Robert Young of UNEP replied that it was important to
start the process with whoever was willing to participate and that countries, communities, and industry
should not wait until everyone was actively involved.
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Emergency Response — Technical Presentations/Discussion
Chair: Janos Zakonyi, Hungary
Rapporteur: Deborah Lukesh, U.S.
The session opened with a presentation on the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). Francine Schulberg described the work of the OECD accidents program as it
relates to chemical emergency preparedness, response, and prevention. She also gave a brief summary of
new developments at OECD concerning relationships with Central and Eastern European countries. With
respect to the accidents program, she noted that the focus of the three-year program, which began in 1988,
is two-fold: to further the exchange of experience and information, and to develop common policies and
procedures. Among the information and exchange projects is the preparation of two users' guides, one on
information systems in OECD member countries that are useful to emergency planners and responders,
and the other on hazardous substance data banks available in OECD member countries.
With respect to the objective of developing common policies, she noted that one project is
developing guiding principles on accident prevention and response; these principles will include a section
on investment and aid programs concerning installations in non-OECD countries. She emphasized that
the member countries of the OECD are working to ensure that the output of this program is made
available to non-OECD countries. She also noted that all the work is being undertaken in close
cooperation with other international organizations.
Ferenc Bodnar of the Hungarian Fire Service HQ presented the organizational structure and
responsibilities of the Hungarian Fire Service, as well as areas of concern related to emergency response
and future needs. The fire service is responsible for responding to chemical emergencies and natural
disasters for fixed facilities and for transportation-related incidents. The fire service is organized on a
regional/county basis with personnel trained to respond to all types of incidents. Civil Defense supports
the activities of the fire service; both organizations coordinate responsibilities.
Mr. Bodnar emphasized several areas of concern related to responding to an emergency, including
classification of emergencies, human error, risk evaluation, prevention integration, facility and community
demographics, information access and distribution to facility personnel and community, establishment of a
central coordinating organization for handling a response, training and education, and evaluation of
response activities and integration of lessons learned.
For the future, he emphasized that national, regional, and local legislation in Hungary needs to be
refined or developed to more effectively address emergency planning, response, and prevention activities.
He emphasized the importance of including the local government and community in this process.
Michael Callan, a fire captain in Wallingford, Connecticut (U.S.), presented an eight-element
management procedure for responding to a hazardous materials incident. He stressed that the elements of
this procedure also apply to responding to any other type of emergency incident, such as an aircraft
accident or a major medical operation. The eight-step procedure assists the emergency responder in
structuring decision-making and achieving a more favorable outcome.
The eight elements of emergency response management include:
(1) Scene management
(2) Identification of material(s) involved
(3) Hazard and risk assessment
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(4) Selection of protective clothing and equipment
(5) Resource coordination
(6) Control and confinement of release(s)
(7) Decontamination
(8) Termination activities
All eight elements may not be needed at each emergency, but each should be evaluated at every
emergency. The order of the elements is also important. For example, it is important to control the scene
first, before attempting to identify the materials involved; without scene control, responders may be
exposed to materials before they can determine the hazards. He stated that experience has shown that
incidents that are not managed well in the early stages are very difficult to correct later. Mr. Callan
stressed that these elements need to be considered and incorporated during the development of an
emergency response plan. Teamwork, which can be fostered by planning and exercises, is crucial to an
effective response action.
Kent Gray, U.S. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), discussed the
importance of understanding what constitutes an emergency, identifying who can be potentially impacted
by an emergency incident, and effectively communicating to these groups. An emergency was defined as a
condition/situation that one is not prepared to handle. He emphasized that effective planning can
minimize the development of an "emergency."
The importance of understanding the needs of each group that is potentially impacted by an
incident was also addressed. The manner in which information is disseminated and how it is presented
needs to be tailored to each particular audience in order to communicate the intended message effectively.
Emphasis was placed on establishing and maintaining public trust for the authorities in charge of an
incident.
Rainer Alho, Helsinki, Finland, Fire Department, discussed several key considerations in planning
for an emergency, including:
• Local government and community coordination and integration with the planning process;
• Resource identification;
• Medical support and integration;
• Inclusion of all community organizations and groups; and
• Coordination of human factors and technological practices.
As an example, he discussed the organization that the Helsinki fire department uses for its emergency
response actions.
William Keffer, U.S. EPA On-Scene Coordinator, described the importance of understanding what
constitutes an emergency, the need for a centralized organization of control, and the need to identify
support resources. (U.S. EPA On-Scene Coordinators evaluate chemical releases and determine when the
national government needs to take charge of the response action.) In his presentation, Mr. Keffer
addressed these elements by describing a national response to the hazards associated with a former
pesticide manufacturing facility that required thorough decontamination to eliminate the hazards. This
response action demonstrated both the technical complexity of clean-up actions and the role of the
national government in responding to incidents that are beyond the capabilities and resources of local and
state agencies.
Jukka Takala, International Labor Organization (ILO), discussed common elements to both
emergency planning and response. He stressed the importance of coordination at the local level,
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17
identification and inclusion of respective organizations in the planning process, and effective identification
of and communication to all organizations.
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19
Prevention of Chemical Accidents — Technical Presentations/Discussion
Chair: Wayne Tamarelli, U.S.
Rapporteurs: J. Molnar, Hungary, and Elizabeth Averill, U.S.
The Chair, Wayne Tamarelli, opened the session and focused on the importance of mutual
assistance and cooperation between all involved parties in order to "work for the best and prepare for the
worst."
The first presentation was by John Haines of the International Programme on Chemical Safety
(IPCS), established in 1980 by the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Labour
Organization (ILO), and UNEP, as a joint venture to provide evaluated information on toxic chemicals
and to strengthen national capabilities of member states for chemical safety. In addition, WHO has its
own emergency preparedness and response activities.
Mr. Haines outlined the structure of WHO, which is comprised of a central headquarters and six
regional offices worldwide. Each office has activities in the fields of chemical safety, emergency
preparedness, and response. The IPCS provides the technical input related to management of chemical
emergencies of WHO emergency preparedness and response activities. The essential mandate of WHO is
health; several programs have been initiated focussing on protection of human health and the environment
in the case of chemical incidents. Evaluated information on health and environmental effects of chemicals
and on how to diagnose and treat the adverse effects is being provided, as is guidance on establishing
health facilities for chemical emergency preparedness and response. Another area of significant activity is
education and training.
Specific program initiatives include: (1) research into antidotes and other agents used in the
treatment of chemical poisoning; (2) establishment of the INTOX poisons information package with the
preparation of poison information monographs (PIMs)), available in computerized and hard copy forms, in
English, French, and Spanish; (3) publication of health and safety guides (HSGs) and International
Chemical Safety Cards (ICSCs) for specific chemicals, covering physical-chemical and toxicological
properties, health and environmental effects, prevention, first aid, environmental cleanup, and legislation
related to the chemical; and (4) preparation of guidelines on poison control, a Handbook on Poisoning,
and a Manual on Analytical Toxicology. Future planned initiatives include: organizing regional awareness
workshops and training courses on the medical aspects of chemical emergency preparedness and response;
and the development of mechanisms for international collection of compatible data relating to exposure
and observed clinical features, including long-term sequelae of chemical incidents. Mr. Haines noted that
a conference on human health and chemical accidents, being jointly organized by WHO, OECD, UNEP,
and the IPCS, will be held 10-13 June 1991 in Utrecht, the Netherlands.
Mr. Alun Williams of the U.K. Health and Safety Executive outlined the major provisions,
amendments, and scope of the Seveso Directive. The general duties of manufacturing facilities (covered in
the original directive) and storage facilities (added as a result of the second amendment) are to prevent
major accidents and limit their consequences, demonstrate this capacity to the competent authority, and
report incidents to the competent local authority who must subsequently report them to the European
Commission. Incidents covered include not only those that have resulted in a loss of life but also those
"near misses" with catastrophic potential. The directive outlines the role of the competent authority.
Specific duties are prescribed for facilities with highly hazardous substances, including the
requirement to produce a safety report for new facilities and for major modification of existing facilities,
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20
and on-site and off-site emergency plans. The directive provides for information to the public on a "needs
to know" basis as distinguished from the broader "right to know" provided under U.S. law. In the future,
land use planning provisions may be added, involving siting requirements for future facilities and
development of residential and non-commercial property near existing facilities. Other modifications may
include ecotoxic considerations, a more generic approach to covered substances, and extension of coverage
to presently excluded facilities (e.g., mining, nuclear, and waste disposal). A great degree of latitude exists
in approaches taken to implement the directive in the respective member countries.
Gees van Kuijen, Netherlands Ministry of Housing Physical Planning and Environment, described
the implementation of the Seveso Directive in the Netherlands, as well as other approaches taken by that
country. Four major legislative acts (Nuisance, Working Environment, Disaster, and Physical Planning
Acts) contribute to various aspects of the Netherlands prevention strategy. A central feature of their
approach is a rigorous licensing system and the production of an external safety report. Under Dutch law,
all facilities in the Netherlands are covered and must produce this report, which is available for public
inspection. In addition, the government has mapped all facilities and conducted individual and societal
risk assessments of all regions surrounding these facilities. These risk assessments aid decision-making by
the authorities. Risks are categorized as "negligible," "risk reduction-acceptable," or "unacceptable" based
on agreed ranges of calculated risk. Land-use planning that balances the need for new housing
development and industrial development while minimizing risk is a central concern.
Ray Brandes, ICI Americas, Inc., discussed his company's systematic approach to hazard
identification. Central to this approach is the concept that hazards must be recognized, understood, and
controlled. Identification is the critical first step in prevention, without which preventive efforts would be
"planted in mid air." It is also the foundation of the risk assessment. Hazard identification relies upon
good engineering and good judgement. It must be systematic and rigorous. A multidisciplinary team
approach is recommended and good updated documentation of the process upon which the study is based
is advised. The ICI hazard study system comprises six studies, each done at specific times in the project,
from inception through construction to operation. Critical tools and methods employed include hazard
and operability studies (HAZOP), "what if1 structures, and checklists. Although the hazard identification
process can be costly, it can result in substantial long-term savings. For every hazard identified, 20
operability problems are discovered. The resulting improved operations lead to opportunities to recover
costs. The investigation of incidents, such as minor spills and containment failures, in order to find root
causes can often identify potential sources of catastrophic events. Once a problem has been identified in a
given process or procedure, all related processes should be evaluated for similar problems.
William Mottel, of DuPont, followed with a presentation of risk management, which he views as
increasingly challenging as technology expands to meet growing social demands. He stated that all events
are preventable, and that industry must strive for zero major incidents. Risk management includes risk
assessment, analysis, and hazard control. DuPont adopts a comprehensive approach and audits all
facilities. Highlights of its approach are an analysis of management of change, training programs, quality
assurance systems, and disseminatipn of process safety information. Industry must be equally prepared to
develop the skills of risk analysis and install the controls that will keep new technology safe. Although the
above steps are very critical, even more important is the demonstrated attitude and commitment of
management. A policy of total prevention and total dedication to safety, as management's highest priority,
is likely to succeed. The knowledge and skills to solve the technical-problems of process safety exist, but
accident prevention requires ongoing efforts because of continually changing processes. In addition, he
emphasized the need to deal with human factors such ^s boredom, fatigue, and others that can contribute
to risk. Environmentally sound processes and products can give competitive advantage, and good safety,
health, and environmental practices can attract and retain qualified employees. Finally, risk management
means more than solving the safety problems of the plant; it means conveying information on the risk
management steps undertaken to the community through informational meetings and plant tours, to win
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21
their support and confidence. All members of the plant should function as "ambassadors" to the
community.
Istvan J. Csalagovits of Hungary next spoke on monitoring and regional information management
development alternative strategies. Mr. Csalagovits discussed major principles of integration and
monitoring harmonization. He observed that the current generation of environmental policy is correlated
with the corresponding generation of information management and network technology. While he
understood historical rationales for data collection systems that are narrow and developed within the scope
of a particular scientific discipline, he viewed these "closed and separated" monitoring systems as
insufficient to the task of effectively protecting natural and human resources. He analyzed three
monitoring systems: UNEP's "GEMS," UNECE's "NORDIC," and the EEC-Hungary's "PHARE RIM," as
the monitoring integration efforts based on the global, continental, and subregional-local approaches. By
the last one, on the base of four "GIR" system principles, he proposed a revised, integrated system for the
high-risk industrial regions of Central and East Europe, and discussed expansion of this approach to
ensure a more effective, comprehensive source of information. One of this "GIR system principles," is the
"BIRD principle," an acronym for BACKGROUND (air/water/waste), IMPACT (soil/biota/human),
RESOURCES (bio-mass/mineral/property), DISASTER (natural/technological/social), which attempts to
interconnect and relate data that were previously isolated. He viewed this approach as one that more
accurately reflects the complex interrelatedness of the ecological condition.
Peter Campbell from the U.K. BP Chemical Company and the Vice Chair of CEFIC/European
Chemical Association addressed the issue of industrial/governmental cooperation in research and
development from a European perspective. He acknowledged that all EEC countries fund research, and
that individual companies also fund research. In his view, research "coordination" equals "control," and
would likely be restrictive. Mr. Campbell discussed the ways in which research information is
disseminated. In the European Community there is a mechanism "SHARE," which stands for Safety
Hazard Assessment Research, a cooperative initiative. Additionally, the OECD has an ad hoc committee,
which has proposed a central clearinghouse function. Mr. Campbell illustrated the important
interrelatedness between operator error and systemic error. He described the typical reaction to a problem
as being attributed to the failure or "incompleteness" of an individual, whereas, upon closer inspection, one
can uncover root or systemic causes.
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CHAPTER 3
WORKING GROUP FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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25
WORKING GROUPS
The workshop was divided into two types of activities: plenary sessions in which experts presented
current work in the three general topic areas — chemical emergency preparedness, response, and
prevention; and working groups where conference participants had the opportunity to discuss issues and
their concerns and contribute to the workshops findings and recommendations. The working groups were
designed to focus on practical, cross-cutting issues that must be addressed as programs are developed,
refined, and implemented. Specifically, the four working groups discussed: legislation and program
approaches; process, operation, and coordination; information management; and research and
development. The purpose of this working group organization was to focus the findings and
recommendations on issues that may be of assistance to nations as they work on programs in this area.
This chapter presents the findings and recommendations of each working group. The principal
findings and recommendations include the following:
• Any framework will have to be expanded and adapted to suit each country's institutional,
political, economic, and cultural needs. Thus, the development of legislation and working
programs will involve the identification and resolution of issues specific to that country.
Development of a comprehensive program may not be accomplished immediately and may
evolve over time.
• Legislation and programs to implement laws should clearly define roles and
responsibilities whether it be for the competent authority, government bodies, industrial
facilities, or other concerned parties. There must be mechanisms for coordinating actions
of responsible parties. Coordination mechanisms may be needed.
• As countries develop legislation, a key area of discussion and designation will be the roles
and responsibilities of the central government versus those of provincial or local
authorities. A complementary support structure should be part of the program.
• While all countries have had significant experiences and developed approaches to these
different aspects of planning and response, there is a need to share guidance, information,
and experiences. For future developments, prevention activities must be the first concern
of all individuals including plant management, labor, governments, and citizens, and
mechanisms must be established to facilitate this.
• Planning for response is essential at all levels from the plant through the community,
region, and national and international authorities if a successful response is to occur. No
one organization has sufficient resources to do the entire job and, therefore, working
relationships must be established to ensure that a viable planning and response system is
developed. Relationships must be developed between community, regional, and national
authorities to resolve transborder issues.
• Information needed for chemical emergency preparedness, response and prevention is
presently incomplete at all levels of government. The most pronounced information need
exists at the local and departmental level of government to support response actions.
Information gathering for chemical emergencies should be closely linked with the data
collection required for broader environmental issues related to the production, use, and
disposal of chemicals.
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The institutional structure within Central and Eastern Europe is such that no existing
information system in the U.S. or Western Europe will totally meet the needs of the
region. Information systems developed for the region, while perhaps based on
international technology, should be created with careful attention to the institutional and
cultural realities of the region.
A first priority should be to establish mechanisms for accessing information on ongoing
research and results to ensure that information is shared and resources are not wasted on
duplicative research.
Many Eastern European countries have research institutes. Given the current limitations
on funding, these institutes might form a consortium to work together in selecting
research projects and identifying the appropriate institute to conduct the research. Such a
consortium would constitute a major resource for both Eastern and Western nations.
The Regional Environmental Centre can assist many of the proposed efforts by identifying
appropriate individuals and resources and disseminating information among Eastern and
Western nations.
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WORKING GROUP ON LEGISLATION .AND PROGRAM APPROACHES
Chair: Michael Baram, U.S.
Rapporteur: Elaine Davies, U.S.
Several examples of legislative and program approaches for preparedness for, response to, and
prevention of chemical accidents exist in the European Community (Seveso Directive), United States, and
Canada. Eastern European participants in the working group voiced particular interest in the Seveso
framework, compliance with which would be required if their nations were to join the EC. Several
countries in the region have legislation that addresses many of the chemical emergency issues; this
legislation will form the basis upon which to build.
One key issue discussed was the provision of information on chemical hazards to the public. Two
models - the "right to know" model used in the U. S. (i.e., broad availability of information to any person
on request) and the "need to know" model used in Europe (i.e., specific information provided to specific
groups of people) - may be examined by countries developing legislation and programs.
The working group developed the following findings and recommendations:
FINDINGS
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORKS
• Any framework will have to be expanded and adapted to suit each country's institutional,
political, economic, and cultural needs. Thus, the development of legislation and working
programs will involve the identification and resolution of issues specific to that country.
Development of a comprehensive program may not be accomplished immediately and may
evolve over time.
• In developing programs to implement legislation, a country must set forth goals,
objectives, and a vision, and must examine barriers to implementation.
INFORMATION MODELS
• The public will need to be educated about how to interpret and use information on
chemical hazards in situations where the public is not used to being given information,
where no event such as an accident stimulates public interest, or where expertise to
interpret the information may not be available. Programs on emergency preparedness,
response, and prevention must be designed to overcome these problems. For example,
programs may have to include training, technical assistance, and guidance to overcome
such barriers.
• Another information issue involves the definition and protection of trade secrets. For the
most part, the experience of Western Europe and the U.S. indicates that trade secret
protection is not a major barrier to the provision of information on chemical hazards.
When specific information is not provided, generic information can be made available.
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IMPLEMENTATION
• Legislation and programs to implement laws should dearly define roles and
responsibilities whether it be for the competent authority, government bodies, industrial
facilities, or other concerned parties. There must be mechanisms for coordinating actions
of responsible parties. Coordination mechanisms may be needed:
* Where several Ministries have authorities in this area (e.g., Ministries of
environment, health, industry, et al.);
> Where responsibilities are delegated by several levels of governments; and
*• To ensure communication among and input from concerned groups such as
industry, green organizations, professional organizations, labor, and other relevant
parties.
• Countries developing legislation should consider the need for creation of formal
coordination mechanisms by law or reliance upon more informal mechanisms such as
committees.
• The technical presentations and experiences in Europe, America, and countries
implementing Awareness and Preparedness for emergencies at the Local Level (APELL)
indicate that preparedness must take place at the local level. As countries develop
legislation, a key area of discussion and designation will be the roles and responsibilities
of the central government versus those of provincial or local levels. A complementary
support structure should be part of the program. The central government could provide
support in terms of standards, guidance, training, and assistance to decentralized
authorities. A more decentralized government will create different needs, especially for
enhanced communications.
• To make legislation work (i.e., to have industries and local communities comply with
legislative requirements) compliance authorities must be defined. Programs should be
developed to inform industry and communities about requirements and to help them
comply. Funding mechanisms must also be addressed. Further, countries must develop
mechanisms to build trust among those responsible for emergency preparedness, response,
and prevention, including industry, government, and the public.
TRANSBOUNDARY
• Legislation on information policies should be examined to consider the impact of laws on
transboundary issues. For example, is information on hazardous facilities near borders
available to authorities on both sides?
RECOMMENDATIONS
• A workshop should be held on a regional basis for legislators, top management in industry
and government, and other responsible actors such as green groups, professional
organizations, labor, and trade groups to share experiences on legislative frameworks such
as the Seveso Directive, the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act, or
other models, and on their implementation. Written information should be presented and
distributed as part of these efforts. This workshop could be under the auspices of the
Regional Environmental Centre.
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In cases where countries are amending, expanding, or creating new legislation and
programs, they should investigate the use of a high-level coordinating commission or task
force with representatives from all responsible ministries and potentially other responsible
actors (e.g., industry, green groups) to determine legislative changes and needs to fit the
chosen framework. High-level political support should be sought early in the process.
Countries in this area developing or expanding legislation and programs should provide
for a system of technical assistance reaching to the local level. Experts used should be
overseen to ensure an adequate understanding of the country's specific organization and
need.
The convening of a regional ministerial level meeting should be considered to discuss
topics such as transboundary emergencies, information sharing, common legislative
concerns, etc.
The Regional Environmental Centre can play an important role in the identification of
key persons in the region concerned with various aspects of chemical emergency
preparedness, response, and prevention. The center should consider establishing expert
groups to deal with specific issues such as legislation development or technical standards.
It may be able to provide support to green groups in verifying information, and to all
responsible actors in overcoming sociological barriers such as lack of trust and other basic
economic concerns.
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WORKING GROUP ON PROCESS/OPERATIONS/COORDINATION
Chair: Kent Grey, U.S.
Rapporteur: Wayne Bissett, Canada
Preparing for, responding to, and preventing chemical accidents requires the development of
systematic approaches and coordination with the many groups that are involved and affected. The working
group participants discussed the current state of emergency response plans in their nations. All
participating countries believed that plans existed to address the issues; in subsequent discussions, all
countries came to the conclusion that their plans were in various stages of development and none were
complete at all levels.
Many of the factors that need to be considered in preparedness and response actions must reflect
societal concerns, priorities, and resources. Nonetheless, the working group participants identified the
following findings and recommendations:
FINDINGS
• All participants identified common concerns:
>• Out-of-date technologies
> Human error
>• Lack of training/education
»• Secrecy about accidents
> Demands for increased production
>• Need for emergency planning guidelines
• Planning for response is essential at all levels from the plant through the community,
region, and national and international authorities if a successful response is to occur. No
one organization has sufficient resources to do the entire job and, therefore, working
relationships must be established to ensure that a viable planning and response system is
developed.
• Relationships must be developed between community, regional, and national authorities to
resolve transborder issues.
• Guidance, standards, etc., are needed to enhance the development of plans and ensure the
compatibility of response systems. All plans must reflect consequence analyses and
vulnerability of the area.
• The purpose of response is to favorably change the outcome either by taking defensive
action, offensive action, or even no action: all are viable alternatives.
• Definitive information is lacking on the presence of facility fire brigades, community
hazardous response teams, and national support including use of the military.
Nonetheless, there is room for development and improvement through training, etc.
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Prevention activities start before the plant is even built and can be considered in terms of:
* Siting of the facility (relative to population and services, transportation routes,
geography, environmental resources potentially affected); and
> Design of the facility (mechanical safety measures, facility layout — location and
separation of process units, storage tanks, etc. — human factor concerns).
When a facility is built, it must gain the acceptance of the community. Techniques to
build public trust include providing the public with information about the facility,
coordinating the facility's emergency response plan with the community's plan, providing
an independent assessment of the facility's safety practices, marketing "environmentally
sound" products, and ensuring the plant is safe for workers.
Laws, regulations, etc., may be needed to protect citizens and perhaps ensure reliability of
the plant. Safety is good business. Plant reliability provides profit, safety, security, trust,
and a quality product. Plant reliability can be achieved by training, monitoring/audit
(internal/external), maintenance, and management commitment to safety. Many
approaches exist in all countries to ensure reliability.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Prevention, preparedness, and emergency response form a continuum and must be
interrelated.
While all countries have had significant experiences and developed approaches to these
different aspects, there is a need to share guidance, information, and experiences.
Coordination of resources among response forces is needed.
For future developments, prevention activities must be the first concern of all individuals
including plant management, labor, governments, and citizens, and mechanisms must be
established to facilitate this.
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WORKING GROUP ON INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
Chair: John Robinson, U.S.
Rapporteur: I.J. Csalagovits
Information needs and management are central both to the development and implementation of
programs related to chemical emergency preparedness, response, and prevention. Several speakers at the
plenary sessions noted that although a large amount of data is collected, information based on these data
is frequently not available. At local, national, and international levels, data needs must be defined and
methods for managing and disseminating the data developed.
The working group on information management drew the largest number of participants of the
four working groups. To facilitate its discussion, the group divided into two sections, one discussing
information needs and means of developing and disseminating information, and the other covering issues
related to generating data via research methodologies such as analytical methods, modelling, and risk
assessments. The findings and recommendations were developed during a final joint session of the two
sections.
The first group defined four basic types of data needed for planners and responders and added a
fifth, miscellaneous category. The groupings established were:
(1) Chemical data: data necessary and sufficient for "front-line" chemical emergency
preparedness, response, and prevention. These data are principally generated in
laboratories of manufacturers or of research/academic institutions.
(2) Inventory data: data that profile what currently exists in terms of hazards, effects and
consequences of accidents, and resources available to aid in minimizing risks related to the
hazards.
(3) Case histories: data on the actual experience of people dealing with chemical accidents
that might prove helpful to others dealing with the same or analogous hazards.
(4) Statistics: data that allow for the development of baselines, trends, frequencies, and the
likelihood of accidents for given profiles.
(5) Other: other relevant information.
Annex I provides the working group's evaluation of which of these data are needed and available at the
local, national, and international levels.
The working group considered approaches to disseminating information. However, the group
chose to address the broader issues of information exchange in general rather than the more limiting issue
of communicating with the public. On the basis of its discussions, the working group developed the
following findings and recommendations:
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FINDINGS
• Information needed for chemical emergency preparedness, response and prevention is
presently incomplete at all levels of government. The most pronounced information need
exists at the local and departmental level of government to support response actions.
• Information gathering for chemical emergencies should be closely linked with the data
collection required for broader environmental issues related to the production, use, and
disposal of chemicals.
• The institutional structure in Central and Eastern Europe is such that no existing
information system in the U.S. or Western Europe will totally meet the needs of the
region. Information systems developed for the region, while perhaps based on
international technology, should be created with careful attention to the institutional and
cultural realities of the region.
• There is a need to adopt standardized models to assess the severity of internal or
transboundary chemical releases.
• There is a need to develop a consistent, state-of-the-art approach for risk assessment
associated with chemical emergencies.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Information collection related to chemical emergency preparedness, response and
prevention should be considerably expanded at the local, national, and international level
to fill the needs identified in Annex I. Priorities for information collection are:
> Chemical data (properties, hazards, response recommendations, etc.)
> Chemical inventory data
»• Case histories (including reports of near misses)
+ Statistical trends/probabilities
• Information collection should be standardized in terms of units of measure and other
parameters to enable consistent approaches to be used in data analysis and interpretation.
• Existing air and water models should be further evaluated for adaptation to both
centralized and decentralized needs. Unless existing methods of data communication can
be significantly enhanced, consideration should be given to implementing localized
modeling capability.
• A capability for risk assessment should be developed with the assistance of the Regional
Environmental Centre. Risk assessments should consider both short and long-term effects
of chemical exposures.
• Recurring issues that must be dealt with in information management are compatibility of
media, data quality and validation, an* the need for guiding principles for confidentiality
that may affect response operations.
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Annex I
EVALUATION OF INFORMATION NEEDS AND AVAILABILITY FOR
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND PREVENTION
CHEMICAL DATA
Identification
MSDS
Hazards Identification Codes
Response information
Treatment
Toxicology
Chemical ructions
INVENTORY
Facilities
Storage
Transportation/iafrastructiire
Response resources
Disposal sites
MAPS
(health facilities, day-
night population
concentration,
topographic,
hydrogeologic, etc. —
natural and man-
made environment
characteristics)
;;;;d^^itt»lEMEPQRT4' v
;v;ii^E^:i|ili|s;';:!: V .-V-:
STATISTICS
:|^t^^'pilni|pis| • vj .;.- i :
Trends
OTHERS
Best/safest technology
i Ij^ii^tkin/isguiation;
Standardized identification
schemes
Local
Info.
Needed
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Ye&
Yes
Yes
Yes,
Yes
Ye»
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
i:<:< Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Info.
Available
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Ye*
YB*.:"'
Yes
Yes
National
Info.
Needed
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Info.
Available
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Y»
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes '
Yes
International
Info.
Needed
Yes
Yes
Ye»
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Info.
Available
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
•
Yes
Yes
Yes
: Yes
Yes
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WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Chair: A. Bekes, Hungary
Rapporteur: T. Carmody, U.S.
A number of techniques and technologies have been developed and continue to be developed that
relate to emergency planning, response actions, and prevention. These technologies and techniques
include models and risk assessment techniques as well as technologies for responding to, mitigating,
monitoring, detecting, and preventing releases. The working group discussed ongoing research in each
participant's country and focused on methods of coordinating research efforts and disseminating results.
The working group identified some research needs and classified potential projects by order of
importance (see Annex II), but thought that more study was needed to determine the appropriateness of
these projects. Generally, the group developed the following findings and recommendations:
FINDINGS
Considerable research has been conducted in the East and West. At least one research
institute or center exists in each country that conducts research related to these issues.
Before additional research is begun, the results of completed research should be shared to
ensure that research is not conducted in areas that have already been adequately
addressed. The financial limitations of most countries make this sharing essential.
Eastern and Western countries can learn from each other.
RECOMMENDATIONS
A first priority should be to establish mechanisms for accessing information about ongoing
research and results to ensure that information is shared and resources are not wasted on
duplicative research.
Many Eastern European countries have research institutes. Given the current limitations
on funding, these institutes might form a consortium to work together in selecting
research projects and identifying the appropriate institute to conduct the research. The
Regional Environmental Centre might help by surveying the existing institutes to identify
skills and interests. These institutes should also coordinate their efforts with those of
Western research facilities to prevent duplicative research. Such a consortium would
constitute a major resource for both Eastern and Western nations.
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Annex II
POTENTIAL RESEARCH PROJECTS
First Priority
Second Priority
Third Priority
Emergency
Preparedness
and Response
Develop more data on chronic
effects from acute exposures.
Develop antidotes when none
exist or improve antidotes if
appropriate.
Develop a classification system
which can be used early on after
the accident to describe the
severity of the accident.
Develop systems to put out
relatively small fires that are
continuously fed by hydrocarbons
or other flammable liquid (e.g.,
situations where the cut off valve
cannot be reached.)
Develop a classification system
for ecotoxic hazards.
Develop data and a system that
enables a community to study the
various response organizations
and select the most appropriate
for their case.
Research the best method for
getting a preparedness or
response message to the public
(consider television).
Develop materials to mitigate
ecotoxic effects.
Develop a quality control system
to verify abilities of responders.
Prevention
Develop a system to test
operators' abilities when under
stress.
Develop software to list the
hazards of specific processes and
the worst and most likely
consequences.
Develop software for community
study of multi-plant event.
Research the effectiveness of
current systems used to prioritize
plants and other sites.
Research best panel board system
for operators' use when under
stress; research best staffing level
for normal operation versus
emergency operation.
Research the value (best use to
date) of Quantitative Risk
Assessments.
-------
APPENDIX I - LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
-------
41
WORKSHOP ON CHEMICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND PREVENTION
18-21 SEPTEMBER, 1990, VESZPREM
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Country
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
Family Name
Averill
Bagdy
Baram
Brandes Jr.
Callan
Carmody
Clay
Davies
Dinardo
Gallagher
Gray
Jennings
Keffer
Kososkl Dr.
Lindsey
Lukesh
Makrls
Mottel
Nelson
Po|e
Robinson
Scanned
Speight
Tamarelli
Wassersug
Schlenker
First Name
Elizabeth
Zoltan
Michael
Raymond L
Michael
Thomas
Don R.
Elaine
Raymond
Kevin
Edwin Kent
Kimberly
Bill
John F.
Heather
Deborah
Jim
William
Madeline
Gerald V.
John H.
Gerard
Randy
Wayne
Steve
Tomas
Firm
Workplace Health Fund
U.S. Occupational Safety & Health Administration
Bracken & Baram
ICI Americas Inc.
Wallingford Fire Dept.
Am. Inst. of Chemical Engineers
U.S. EPA
U.S. EPA
U.S. EPA, New England Lab.
Navy Reg. Data Automation Centre, Wash. Navy Yard
Emergency Response & Consultation Branch, ATSDH
U.S. EPA
U.S. EPA
John Kososki and Associates
ICF Incorporated
U.S EPA
U.S. EPA
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company
ICF Incorporated
National Wildlife Federation
NOAA Hazardous Materials Response Branch
U.S. Occupational Safety & Health Administration
U.S. Coast Guard HQ
Dock Resins Corporation
Reg. Env. Centre for Central and Eastern Europe
American Embasy
Address
815 16th Street, NW, Rm 301, Washington, DC 20036
200 Constitution Av. NW, Washington, DC 20210
33 Mount Vernon Street, Boston, MA 02108
Concord Pike & New Murphy R., Wilmington, DE 19897
293 Bee Street, Meriden, CT 06450
345 East 47th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017
401 M Street, SW, OS-100, Washington, DC 20460
401 M Street, SW, OS-120, Washington, DC 20460
60 Westview St. Lexington MA 02203
Washington, DC 20374-1435
ATSDR (E32) 1600 Clifton Road, Atlanta, GA 30333
401 M Street, SW, OS-100, Washington, DC 20460
25 Funston Road, Kansas City, Kansas 66115
1331 Elmwood Av. Suite 50, Columbia, SC 29201
1 1 Rue de Madrid, 75008 Paris, France
401 M Street, SW, OS-120, Washington, DC 20460
401 M Street, SW, OS-120, Washington, DC 20460
ERD, N11543, Wilmington, DE 19898
9300 Lee Highway, Fairfax, VA. 22031-1207
1400 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036-2266
NOAA 7600 Sand Point Way, NE, Seattle, WA 981 15
200 Constitution Av. NW, Washington DC 20216
2200 2nd. St SW, Washington DC 20598
1512 West Elisabeth Av. Unden, NJ 07036
1035 Budapest, Mlklos ter 1., Hungary
1054 Bp Szabadsag ter 12
Telephone
2028427834
202 523 6104
6177424950
302 885 5501
203 630 0784
2127057319
202 382 4610
202 475 8600
617861 4385
202 433 4218
4046390615
202 475 7046
9132363888
803 254 5929
33 1 43870426
202 475 8247
202 475 8600
3027734190
703 934 9740
202 797 6890
2065266317
2025236194
2022679417
201 862 2351
(36-1)1688 685
(36-1)1126450
Fax
202 842 7838
302 886 5585
203 630 0784
212 838 8274
202 252 0927
404 639 0655
803771 6142
33 1 43873280
202 252 0927
202 252 0927
302 774 2097
703 934 9740
202 797 6646
206 526 6329
202 523 6064
201 8624015
(36-1)1687851
Telex
641055
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42
Interntl.
Rep.
Finland
Canada
CEFIC
Bahrain
WHO
Hungary
The Netherlands
OECD
ILO
United Kingdom
UNEP
Family Name
Mho
Bissett
Campbell
Fakhra
Halnes Dr.
Hardl
Van Kuljen
Schulberg
Takala
Williams
Young
First Name
Ralner
Wayne D.
Peter G.
Khalld
John A.
Peter
Cees
Franclne
Jukka
Alun J.
Calvin Robert
Firm
The City of Helsinki Fire Dept HO.
Chem. Ind. Div., Ind. Prog. Branch Env.
Safety Branch, BP. Chemicals Ltd.
Environmental Protection Committee
IPCS/WHO
Reg. Env. Centre for Central and Eastern Europe
Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning & Env.
OECD Environment Dlr., Chemical Div.
International Occupational Safety & Health Inf. C.
Hazardous Installation Policy Branch, HSE
UNEP, Industry and Env. Office
Address
15 Agricolankatu. 00530 Helsinki, Finland
Ottawa K1 A OH3, Canada
76 Buckingham Pat. Road, London 9W1W CSV, U.K.
P.O. Box 18809, AdUya, Bahrain
CH-1211 Geneva 27, Switzerland
1035 Budapest, MIWos Mr 1., Hunga/y
P.B. 450, 2280 MB Leidschendam, The Netherlands
2, Rue Andre Pascal, 75775 Paris Cedex 16 France
ILO. CH-1211 Geneva 22, Switzerland
Stanley Precinct, Bootte, Merseyslde L20, 3QZ, U.K.
38-43, qua! Andre Citroen, 75730 Paris 15 France
Telephone
32503036200
1 819 953 8257
44771 5818102
973293693
41227912111
(38-1)1668685
31 70 320 9367
33 1 45247885
41 22 799 8740
051 951 3212
33 1 40588814
Fax
1 819 997 0547
4471 5818459
973293694
41 22 791 0746
(36-1)1687 651
31 70 327 9866
33 1 45247676
41 22 798 8885
051 922 7918
33 1 40588874
Telex
620180
415647
628235
204897
Country
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Family Name
Aidlcs
Abraham
Bajtay
Bakonyl Dr.
Baltazar Dr.
Baumstark
Banhldi
Bence
Bekes Dr.
Bleszlty Dr.
Bognar
Bodnar
Bonifertne Szigetl
Bzeszlty Dr.
First Name
Laszlo
Kalman
Andras
Arpad
Zsolt
Marlon
Istvan
Bela
Andras
Janos
Nandor
Ferenc
Marta
Janos
Firm
Hungarian Red Cross
Institute for Environment Management
Ministry for Welfare
Ministry for Industry and Commerce
Ministry for Environment
M.I. Fire Brigade Training C.
National Oil & Gas Ind. Trust
Life Saving Service
Hungarian Labour Inspectorate
Fire Service HQ
VITUKI
Fire Service HQ
Ministry for Environment
Ministry of Inert
Address
Budapest, Arany J. u. 17
1054 Budapest, Alkotmany u. 27-29
1051 Budapest, Arany J. u. 6-8
1024 Budapest, MartJrok utja 85
1011 Budapest, Ffi u. 44-50
Budapest, Laktanya u. 33
1117 Budapest, Schonherz u. 18
1 135 Bp. Robert K. Korut 77
1054 Budapest, Akademia u. 10
1064 Budapest, Izabella u. 62-64
H-1085 Budapest, Kvassat J. ut 1
1084 Budapest, Izabella u. 62-64
101 1 Budapest, F5 u. 48-50
1126 Budapest, Vorosko ut 10
Telephone
(36-1)1128635
(36-1)1118276
(36-1)1153614
(36-1)1664 000
(36-1)1203 638
1324376
(38-1)338-160
06-1)1154840
(36-1)1110492
Fax
3611362198
(38-1)1391-519
Telex
224150
227885
22-4859
-------
43
Country
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Family Name
Csalagovits Dr.
Deak
Florian
Futo
Gal Dr.
Gotz
Illes
Hies Dr.
Jakab
Kakonyi
Kalman
Kiss Dr.
Kozenkai
Kurucz
Lindner Dr.
Molnar Dr.
Mogyorodi
Muzsay Dr.
Nagy
Papp
Paszto
Paszto Dr.
Pazmanyl
Popelyak
Ratosi
Reininger Dr.
Reti
Scheuring
Sebestyen
Szabo
First Name
Istvan
Peter
Endre
Rita
Jozsef
Tibor
Mihaly
Zoltan
Istvan
Gabor
Gyorgy
Elemer
Jeno
Imre
Erno
Jeno
Ferenc
Geza
Gusztav
Kalman
Eszter
Peter
Gabor
Pal
Erno
Robert
Tamas
Imre
Bela
Geza
Firm
Ministry for Environment
Ministry of Interior
Institute for Environment Management
Okoservice
Min. of Inert
National Oil & Gas Ind. Trust
M.I. Fire Brigade Training C.
Ministry for Environment
Borsod Chemical Works
GEOCOMP LTD.
Tisza Chemical Works
Ministry for Environment
Aerocaritas
Great Plain Oil & Gas Prod. C.
US-Hungarian J.F.
National Inst. of Public Health
Chem. Wks. of North Hungary
Hungaria Insurance Company
Inst. for Safety in Chem. & Expl. Industries
Ministry for Environment
Ministry for Industry and Commerce
Institute for Environment Management
DKV
Fire Service HQ
OKGT DVK Oil and Gaz Trust
Ministry for Environment
Nitrokemia Wks.
Envir. Proyt. Inst.
Duna Oil Industrial Comp.
Hungaria Insurance Company
Address
1011 Budapest, F8 u. 44-50
1051 Budapest, Jozsef A. u. 2-4
1054 Budapest, Alkotmany u. 27-29
1035 Budapest, Miklos ter 1
1903 Pf. 314
Budapest, Schonherz u. 17
Budapest, Laktanya u. 33
1011 Budapest, F5 u. 44-50
1021 Budapest, Kuruclesi ut 44
3581 Leninvaros, Pf. 20
1011 Budapest, FS u. 44-50
Budapest, FS ter 2
5001 Szolnok, Ady E. u. 26
1111 Budapest, Szent Gellert ter 4
1097 Budapest, Gyali ut 2-6
3792 Sajobabony
Budapest, Bank Ban ut 17/L
1119 Budapest Serleg u. 9
1011 Budapest FS u. 48-50
1024 Budapest, Martirok utja 85
11 13 Budapest Aga u. 4
2443 Szazhalombatta Pf. 1
1064 Budapest, Izabella u. 62-64
1011 Budapest, FS u. 44-50
1110 Budapest, Serleg ut 9
Szazhalombatta
Budapest, Bank B. ut 17
Telephone
(36-1)1151 897
187350
(36-1)1686229
(36-1)1295683
(36-1)1665710
(36-1)1669 121
(36-49) 21-983
(36-1) 1804-432
(36-56)
(36-1)1664-011
1142250
4667111
(36-1) 1850-558
(36-1)1611-087
1362198
(36-1)1611 417
1620673
(36-1) 1611-087
(36-1) 1620-673
(36-1) 1820-750
Fax
(36-1)1362 198
(36-1)1884 105
(36-1) 1763801
36493,1322
(36-1) 1804 432
365630103
(36-1) 1664419
1362198
Telex
224879
227465
226419
5623320
62320
224879
227465
-------
44
Country
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Family Name
Stefan
Szaloki
Szapary
Szemenyei
Szllagyi
Tamas
Ufalvi Dr.
Uzonyi
Valu
Varsa
Vago
Zakonyi
Zsengeller
First Name
Fcrenc
Istvan
Bela
Istvan
Gyula
Janos
Annamaria
Tamas
Ferenc
Endre
Istvan
Janos
Istvan
Firm
Borsod Chemical Works
OKGT NKFV Oil and Gaz Trust
Mitrokemia
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Duna Oil Industrial Trust
NKF
Ministry of Inert
Hungaria Insurance O.
Ministry of Inert
Water Research Centre
Min. of Inert
Ministry for Environment
Hungarian Oil Trust
Address
3700 Kazincbarcika, Bolya ter 1
5001 Szolnok, Ady Endre ut 26
Fuzfogyartelep
1025 Budapest, Bern rkpt. 47
2443 Szazhalombatta Pf 1
6720 Szeged, Roosevelt ter 7-9
Budapest, Jozsef A. ut 2-4
Budapest Jozsef A. ut 2-4
1095 Budapest Kvassay J. ut 1
1903 Pf. 314
1011 Budapest, F8 u. 44-50
Telephone
(36-48) 10-211
56/40713
(36-80) 52-133
(36-1) 1568-000
(36-26) 54-322
(36-62) 22-088
(36-1) 1121-710
(36-1) 1121-710
(36-1) 1344823
(36-1) 1297450
(36-1) 352-995
Fax
56/30103
Telex
23320
224879
Country
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Family Name
Goller
Neubauer
Schober Dr.
Tomek
Zeplichal
First Name
Rudolf
Gustav
Walter
Sabine
Gustav
Firm
Ministry for Economic Affairs
Ministry of Environment, Youth and Family
Ministry of Environment, Youth and Family
Magistratsabteilung 36
Fachverband der Chemischen Ind.
Address
Stubenrtng 1, A-1011 Wien
Kadetzkystrasse 2, 1031 Wien
Kadetzkystrasse 2, 1031 Wien
Dresdenerstrasse 75, 1200 Wien
Si Peterstrasse A4021 Linz
Country
Bulgaria
Bulgaria
Bulgaria
Bulgaria
Family Name
Bozhanov
Naidenov
Ninov
Vitkov Dr.
First Name
Simeon
Naiden
Nino
Tzeno
Firm
Ministry of Environment
Ekoglasnost
Ministry of Environment
Ministry of Environment
Address
1000 Sofia, bul. VI. Poptonov 67
1000 Sofia, bul. Al. Stambolijsni 25
1000 Sofia, bul. VI. Poptonov 67
1000 Sofia, bul. VI. Poptonov 67
Telephone
022271100/5834
022271158/4846
022271158/4119
0222/35661 1/335
073259173399
Fax
02227139311
0222 7129681
0222 7129681
07325917 143
Telex
111145
221324
Telephone
522583
873046
518992
392117
Fax
Telex
-------
45
Country
Czecho-Slovakia
Czechoslovakia
Czecho-Slovakia
Czecho-Slovakia
Czecho-Slovakia
Czecho-Slovakia
Family Name
Blazicek
Culh
Maty as
Moucha
Zika
Skarka Dr.
First Name
Vladimir
Juraj
Radomir
Bohuslav
Ivan
Jaromlr
Firm
City Town Hall
Slovak Commision for Environment
Ministry of Industry
Federal Environmental Committee
Spolana Enterprise, Neratovlce
Chemoprojekt
Address
Primacilne nam. 1. 81471 Bratislava
SCe, Hlobka, 2, 812 34 Bratislava
NaPorid2411180Praha1
FVZP, Stezska 9, 12029 Praha 2
Spolana, Enterprise 277 1 1 Neratovice
1 1 185 Praha 2, Stepanska 15
Telephone
07 356 175
0742451
2327088
02259593
0208 882151
422291246
Fax
07 476 25
2323747
422299286
Telex
92565
121 104
121157
121114
Country
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Family Name
Fendler
Hesel
Muller
Neuhoff
Steuer
First Name
Roland
Oieter
Gunther
Firm
Oko-lnstitute e.V.
TUV Hheinland
Technical Inspection Service (RM TUR)
Address
Prinz Christians Weg 7. D-6100 Darmstadt
5000 Cologne am Graune Stein
Stendenstrasse 53, Essen D-4300
Koeln
Dormagen
Telephone
(0)6151 409612
0221/806-2155
201 8252E16
Fax
(0)6151 409633
0221/8061753
201 8252517
Telex
8873659
8579680
Country
Italy
Italy
Family Name
Marsili
Serra
First Name
Giovanni
Sebastiano
Firm
Instituo Superiors di Samita
Ministry of Environment
Address
Viale Regina Elena 299, Rome 00161
Via Volturno, 58 00100 Rome
Telephone
064990/878
39 6 675 93282
Fax
064O40O64
39 6 675 93267
Telex
Country
Poland
Poland
Family Name
Bogacki
Hanusik
First Name
Andrzej
Antoni
Firm
Institute of Environment Protection
Institute of Environment Protection
Address
00 548 Warsaw, Krucza 5/1 1
40 832 Katowice ul. Kossutha L
Telephone
299254
546-031
Fax
299063
541-717
Telex
816419
0312532
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46
Country
Romania
Romania
Romania
Romania
Romania
Family Name
Eseanu
lonescu
lonescu
Jircche
Moroianu
First Name
Dan-Ion
Carmen
Marioara
Dana
Ion
Firm
Ministry of Water, Forest and Environment
Ministry of Water, Forest and Environment
Int. of Res. for Environmental Engineering
Ministry of Water, Forest and Environment
Inst of Env. Res. & Engineering
Address
Str. Negustori Nr. 3, Sector 2 Bucharest, 7008
Str. Negustori Nr. 3, Sector 2 Bucharest, 7008
Splalul Independents 294, sector 6, Bucarest 7000
Str. Negustori Nr. 3, Sector 2 Bucharest, 7008
Splalul Independentei 294, sector 6, Bucarest 7000
Telephone
136880/158
136880/158
373060
136880/158
136880/158
Fax
Telex
11457
11457
10672
11457
11457
Country
Soviet Union
Soviet Union
Soviet Union
Soviet Union
Soviet Union
Family Name
Nikolaev
Pavlikhina
Shelan
Sukhorukov
Vavilin
First Name
Venedict V.
Alexandra V.
Ivan Arkadievic
Georgy A.
Igor Alexeevich
Firm
All-Union Sci. & Res. Information Center on Env.
Central Ints. of Agrochem. Sen/, for Agriculture
The USSR State Comm. for Env. Protection
All-Union Sci. & Res. Inst. of Water Protection
The USSR State Comm. for Env. Protection
Address
1 17463 Moscow ul. Karamzina, 17
Moscow, ul. Priashnikova, 31, Korp. 2
103009 Moscow, ul. Nezhdanovoy, 11
310888 Kharkov-sea, ul. Bakulina, 6
117321 Moscow, Kedrov st 8
Telephone
4221655
2163750
22921 58
245 21 63
1255281
Fax
Telex
441692
125569
111114
Country
Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia
Family Name
Lovincic
Dolinsek
Fuchs
Tosovic
First Name
Davor
Franci
Rodovan
Slobodan
Firm
University 1st. for Health & Environment
Inst. "Josef Stefan'
University of Zagreb
Inst. of Public Health
Address
61000 Ljubljana, Trubarjeva 2
Janova 39, 61 1 1 1 Ljubljana
M. Pljode 158, 41000 Zagreb
str. 29 novembra 54-a, Beograde
Telephone
061 323 645
061 214399
041 434188
01 1 338 230
Fax
061 323 955
219383
041 434 522
01 1 339 207
Telex
31296
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APPENDIX II - ANNOTATED AGENDA
-------
49
U.S. - HUNGARIAN WORKSHOP
The U.S.-Hungary arc sponsoring a workshop on chemical emergency preparedness, response, and
prevention will bring together delegates from Eastern and Central European nations, the United States,
and several international organizations. Chemicals and other hazardous materials play an important role
in the modern world, but the hazards they pose make it imperative that all due care be taken to eliminate
risks associated with their manufacture, processing, handling, storage, transportation, and use. A series of
major chemical accidents — at Flixborough, England in 1974, at Seveso, Italy in 1976, at Bhopal, India in
1984, and at Basel, Switzerland in 1988 — heightened both public and governmental awareness of the
potentially devastating effects of accidental releases of chemicals into the environment. These accidents
and others highlighted the need for communities, regions, and nations to be prepared for and capable of
responding to the types of chemical accidents that may occur within their areas. Equally important, the
effects of these accidents on both the workers, the community, and the environment emphasized the
necessity of concerted actions directed towards accident prevention.
Chemical emergency preparedness, response, and prevention are the focus of many national and
international programs. In 1988, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
undertook a project to develop guidance for member countries in this area. To gather information, OECD
sponsored workshops on (1) the role of industry in preventing accidents; (2) the role of workers in
preventing accidents and information needed by the public; (3) the role of government in preventing
accidents and land use planning; and (4) emergency preparedness and response, and coordination of
research. A fifth workshop on human factors will be held in Japan in 1991. The findings and
recommendations of these workshops will be used in the development of guidelines. In addition, the
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) has developed the Awareness and Preparedness for
Emergencies at the Local Level (APELL), a set of guidelines for establishing emergency preparedness
programs. APELL is being implemented in several developing countries. Other international
organizations working this area include the International Labor Organization (ILO), which is
concentrating on the role of workers, and the World Health Organization (WHO), which is sponsoring a
conference on emergency preparedness in June 1991. On the national level, numerous programs exist for
national, regional, and local governments. The Economic Convention of Europe (ECE) is exploring the
need for a convention related to these issues.
The objectives of this workshop are:
• To provide an opportunity for participants to exchange experiences and address issues of
concern; and
• To develop recommendations that may be of use to participating nations as they evaluate,
revise, or develop programs in these areas.
The workshop will have technical presentations related to chemical emergency preparedness,
response, and prevention. Participants will then take part in workshops on legislation/program
development; process, organization, and coordination; information management/systems; and research and
development. The chairs, rapporteurs, presenters, and participants have been invited to represent the
spectrum of organizations involved in these issues.
-------
50
AGENDA
September 18. 1990
Opening Session
The first session provides participating nations an opportunity to review briefly their
programs in the areas of chemical emergency preparedness, response, and prevention.
The summaries will cover insights gained from national experiences and issues the
countries face. The purpose of this session is to create a common ground of
understanding among participants about the types of existing programs and issues of
particular importance to the delegations.
8:30 AM REGISTRATION OF PARTICIPANTS
9:00 AM OPENING SESSION
Introduction — Jim Makris, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Opening Remarks — Elemer Kiss, Hungarian Ministry for Environment (HME)
Background and Context/Keynote Speech on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
Prevention Systems — Don R. Clay, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA);
Worker Safety Issues — Gerard Scannell, U.S. Occupational Safety and Health
Administration
Introductory presentations — current approaches in the area of chemical emergency
preparedness, response, and prevention, key issues and insights, workshop expectations (10
minutes each)
Austria
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
Germany
Italy
Poland
Romania
USSR
Yugoslavia
Regional Environmental Centre, Budapest, Hungary, Presentation Steve Wassersug
12:00 PM LUNCH
1:00 PM United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) — Awareness and Preparedness at the
Local Level (APELL) Robert Young, UNEP
Implementing APELL — Khalid Fakhro, Bahrain
-------
51
1:40 PM EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS TECHNICAL PRESENTATIONS/DISCUSSION
Chair: Jim Makris, U.S. EPA
Rapporteur: Zoltan Illes, HME
Issues
• What approaches should government authorities take to facilitate planning for
chemical emergencies?
• What must be included in an emergency response plan and who must participate
in the planning process?
• How can potential risks be identified, analyzed, and communicated to the public?
• How can communities and facilities ensure that plans, once developed, work?
Chemical emergencies are, by definition, unpredictable events. To be able to
respond efficiently and effectively during an emergency, facilities and communities
must plan in advance for the response. Developing an effective plan requires a
knowledge of the potential risks facing a community and the involvement of every
party (or stakeholder) likely to be involved in a response action. Identifying risks
includes determining the hazards present in a community and evaluating the
consequences of accidental releases of one or more of the chemicals. The
stakeholders include fire fighters, police, emergency medical services, government
officials and personnel at various levels, the facility involved, other facilities with
response equipment, the media, and the public. Because each emergency has
different characteristics, no plan can cover every problem that may arise; plans,
therefore, must be flexible enough to adjust to the unique circumstances of each
accident. Testing of plans can be of critical importance in identifying problem
areas and finding solutions before an emergency occurs. Emergency responders at
facilities and in the community must be trained in emergency response and
hazardous materials procedures.
The purpose of this session is to review approaches taken in different nations to the
question of the government role in encouraging or mandating the planning process, as
well as to examine the critical elements of the planning process. The discussions in this
session will provide a framework for the workshop sessions on issues related to emergency
planning.
Technical Presentations (20 minutes each)
Legislative/Program Approaches Michael Baram, U.S., Boston University
Hazards Analysis Raymond DiNardo, U.S. EPA
2:40 PM Break
3:10 PM Technical Presentations (20 minutes each)
Communicating Risk; Information to the Public Gerald Poje, U.S. National Wildlife
Federation
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Exercise and Update — Training and Cooperation in Action P. Popelyak, Hungarian
Government Fire Service
4:10-5:00 PM Discussion
EVENING Hungarian Reception
September 19.1990
8:30 AM Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Presentation — Fran Schulberg
OECD
9:00 AM EMERGENCY RESPONSE TECHNICAL PRESENTATIONS/DISCUSSION
Chair: J. Zakonyi, HME
Rapporteur: Deborah Lukesh, U.S. EPA
Issues
• What government approaches and industry programs exist on notification (of
authorities, adjacent jurisdictions and nations, and the public) and response
actions?
• What are the key elements of a response action?
• What are critical response technologies?
• How should the public be notified and informed?
Effective emergency response actions depend on the prompt notification of the
appropriate authorities and coordinated actions of all concerned stakeholders. The initial
notification of a chemical emergency must not only reach the appropriate authority
quickly, but it must also include the information responders need to evaluate the severity
of the emergency and to identify the needed equipment and response strategies. Once a
response begins, coordination among the various stakeholders (e.g., fire fighters, police,
medical services, emergency managers) is critical. Where an accident may affect more
than one political jurisdiction, information must be rapidly conveyed to other potentially
affected areas. Decisions must be made about protective actions that may be needed to
protect the public.
The purpose of this session is to review the experiences of different nations in emergency
response management and to discuss related questions. The discussions in this session
will provide a framework for the workshop sessions on issues related to emergency
response.
Technical Presentations (20 minutes* each)
Legislative/Program Approaches (Response and Notification) F. Bodnar, Hungarian Fire
Service
Key Elements of Response Actions Mike Callan, U.S., local fire chief
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Dealing with the Public Kent Gray, U.S., Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry (ATSDR)
10:00 AM Break
10:30 AM Technical Presentations (20 minutes each)
Response Technologies Rainer Ahlo, Finland, fire chief
Case Study: William Keffer, U.S. EPA, On-Scene Coordinator
International Labor Organization Jukka Takala, ILO
11:20 AM Discussion
12:30 PM LUNCH
WORKSHOP: EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE
2:00-5:00 PM Legislation/Program Approaches
Chair: Michael Baram, U.S.
Rapporteur: Elaine Davies, U.S. EPA
Issues
• What models exist for legislation and programs in this area?
• What are the key features, advantages, and disadvantages of each approach?
• If adjacent nations adopt different approaches, how will this affect the
coordination of transborder incidents?
Different nations have adopted varying programs in this area. In some countries, planning
and response programs are voluntary efforts carried out by industry in conjunction with
local authorities. In other countries, legislation has mandated planning either at the local,
regional, or national level. Notification of accidental releases may be required even where
planning is voluntary. Each approach has advantages and disadvantage. For example, if
planning is conducted at the national level, the plan may not be able to take into account
the different risks that exist in local communities or the varying capabilities of local
responders.
The purpose of this workshop is to examine the differing approaches adopted in various
nations and to develop recommendations for legislative or program approaches to
emergency preparedness and response that may be useful to participants. The
recommendations will be developed in the context of the needs and differing governmental
structures of the participating nations.
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2:00-5:00 PM Process/Operations/Coordination
Chair: Kent Gray, US ATSDR
Rapporteur: Wayne Bissett, Canada
Issues
• What are the critical elements of emergency response plans and actions?
• What types of chemical emergencies should a plan address? How should risks
associated with these potential emergencies be evaluated?
• What are the roles and responsibilities of the stakeholders in planning and
response actions?
• How should coordination during a response be carried out?
• What particular issues are involved in emergency planning and response for
transborder incidents?
Developing an emergency response plan, testing the plan, and putting the plan into effect
during an emergency require substantial coordination efforts. The types of emergencies
and risks that are of concern may vary from area to area. For example, an area with large
facilities may decide to concentrate only on those facilities and ignore smaller facilities
that would be of primary concern in an area with no large facilities. Many parties have
roles to play in each phase, but unless the roles and responsibilities are agreed upon,
conflicts and oversights can occur during a response, limiting the effectiveness of the
response action. Specific roles and responsibilities may also vary depending on
governmental structures and traditional roles assigned to different groups. These national
or regional variations may be a particular importance during transborder incidents.
The purpose of this workshop is to develop recommendations on the types of chemical
hazards that should be considered in the development of emergency response plans, the
key elements of such plans, and the approaches that could be taken to assigning roles and
responsibilities. The workshop will also develop recommendations on approaches for
coordinating transborder responses.
3:15-3:45 PM Break
2:00-5:00 PM Information Management/Systems
Chair: John Robinson, U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Rapporteur: I.J. Csalagovits, HME
Issues
• What information is needed from industry to develop emergency response plans
and actions?
• How can information on hazards be managed to be readily accessible during an
emergency?
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• How can information collected during an emergency be managed and used most
effectively?
• What information needs to be shared and what systems are available for such
sharing?
• How is information on risks best communicated to the public?
The ability to plan for an emergency and to respond quickly once a release occurs depends
on the availability of accurate information about the hazards. Planners and responders
must know what chemicals are present and the specific hazards those chemicals pose.
Such information can be managed manually or with computer systems, but whichever
approach is used, responders must be able to access the information immediately when an
accident occurs. The dissemination of monitoring information collected during a release
must also be managed. Some of these monitoring data can be used in dispersion models
to predict the path of the chemical. In addition to managing data, planners and
authorities need to develop systems for sharing information with the public and with other
authorities, including other nations.
The purpose of this session is to develop recommendations for information management
systems that may be of use to participating countries and authorities. The
recommendations will address the issue of the types of information that should be shared
and methods for sharing information among nations. Recommendations on providing the
public with information before, during, and after an accident will also be developed.
2:00-5:00 PM Research and Development
Chair: A. B6kes, Hungarian Labor Inspectorate
Rapporteur: Tom Carmody, U.S., American Institute of Chemical Engineers
Issues
• What technologies and techniques require further research or development?
• What are the priorities for research and development?
• How can research efforts be coordinated?
• How can research results be disseminated effectively?
A number of different technologies and techniques arc currently being used in the
development of plans as well as in emergency response actions. For example, dispersion
models are used to analyze potential hazards as well as lo predict the path of gases
following a release. A variety of notification and alert systems to warn the public are in
use or being tested. Mitigation technologies exist to handle some types of releases. Most
of these technologies and techniques are still being developed; for some chemicals, no
adequate mitigation technologies exist. Research is needed in many areas, but such
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research should be coordinated to prevent overlapping efforts. Once results are gained,
they should be disseminated rapidly to all interested parties.
The purpose of this session is to identify the areas in which the participating nations think
research is most needed. Recommendations for research will be developed as will
recommendations for coordination and dissemination.
Evening: Excursion and Dinner
September 20. 1990
8:30 AM World Health Organization (WHO) Presentation John Haines, WHO
9:00 AM PREVENTION OF CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS TECHNICAL
PRESENTATIONS/DISCUSSION
Chair: Wayne Tamarelli, U.S., Dock Resins
Rapporteurs: J. Molnar, Hungarian National Institute of Public Health; Elizabeth
Averill, U.S.
Issues
• What are the approaches and main features of policies or programs developed by
national governments, industrial associations, and individual companies, to
promote chemical accident prevention?
• What are the key elements of a comprehensive in-plant accident prevention plan,
and the key steps in the development of such a plan?
• What techniques and technologies have been developed to identify hazards and
manage chemical process safety?
Comprehensive in-plant chemical accident prevention programs are complex, and touch on
virtually every aspect of plant operation. While many of the general principles and
techniques involved in such programs are applicable to a wide range of industries, the
details of each in-plant program are necessarily specific to each individual plant, and to
the individual operation within each plant. Numerous techniques and technologies have
been developed that serve as important tools in the prevention of accidents. The
European Economic Community and several national governments have promulgated
policies intended to promote the implementation of accident prevention plans in
hazardous industries. In addition, national industrial associations in several countries, as
well as many multinational corporations, have adopted programs intended to promote or
ensure the implementation of accident prevention plans in the industrial facilities within
each organization.
The purpose of this session is to review legislative and program approaches as well as to
discuss techniques and technologies for identifying and managing risks. The discussions in
this session will provide a framework for the workshop sessions on issues related to
chemical accident prevention.
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Technical Presentations (20 minutes each)
Seveso Directive Alun J. Williams, U.K.
Legislative/Program Approaches Cees Van Kuijen, Netherlands
Identifying Hazards Ray Brandes, U.S., ICI Americas
Managing Risk William Mottel, U.S., DuPont
10:00 AM Break
10:30 AM Technical Presentations (20 minutes each)
Monitoring I.J. Csalagovits, HME
Industrial/Governmental Cooperation in R & D/Technologies (Peter Campbell, Conseil
Europden des F6d6rations de 1'Industrie Chimique)
11:30 AM Discussion
12:30 PM LUNCH
2:00 PM WORKSHOP: PREVENTION OF CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS
2:00-5:00 PM Legislation/Program Approaches
Chair: Michael Baram, U.S.
Rapporteur: Elaine Davies, U.S. EPA
Issues
• What are the main features of the programs and policies adopted to date to
promote implementation of industrial action prevention plans? What approach
does each program and policy take?
• Which approaches and features appear to be the most effective?
• What are the advantages and disadvantages of each approach?
EEC Directive 82/501 (the Seveso Directive), policies promulgated in several countries
(e.g., CIMAH in the U.K., the Circular of December 28, 1983 in France, and equivalent
policies in each of the EEC member countries), programs adopted by industrial
associations (e.g., Responsible Care by the U.S. Chemical Manufacturer's Association and
the Canadian Chemical Producers' Association, and equivalent programs in France,
England, Sweden, and other countries) and in-house programs adopted by large
corporations are all intended to ensure that appropriate accident prevention plans are
adopted by industrial facilities. The approaches embodied in each of these programs and
policies are very different, however.
The purpose of this workshop is to review the approaches used and main features of each
of these programs and policies. The advantages and disadvantages of each approach will
be discussed, and the apparent effectiveness of the various approaches will be compared.
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Recommendations of approaches that may be useful to participating nations will be
developed.
2:00-5:00 PM Process/Operations/Coordination
Chair: Kent Gray, US ATSDR
Rapporteur: Wayne Bissett, Canada
Issues
• What techniques are available for identifying hazards and quantifying chemical
accident risks associated with industrial processes? What technologies are avail-
able for minimizing or eliminating the identified risks?
• What are the key aspects of chemical accident prevention plans as they pertain to
the operation of industrial facilities?
• What are the coordinating mechanisms required to ensure that all aspect!? of
accident prevention plans remain active and effective?
Comprehensive chemical accident prevention programs affect virtually every aspect of the
day-to-day operation of industrial facilities. Various techniques have been developed for
incorporating safety principles into every aspect of plant operation. Such techniques
generally begin with the identification of hazards and evaluation of associated risks, and
proceed to the establishment of technical design standards, operation and maintenance
procedures, employee qualification and training, and numerous other systems for
minimizing the potential for accidents. Management role in accident prevention is
paramount. In addition for establishing a general safety-first philosophy and ensuring that
each component of the plan is implemented, management must oversee coordination of
all efforts such that the individual components function together to constitute an effective
prevention plan.
This workshop will explore the various techniques for incorporating accident prevention
principles into the processes and operation of industrial facilities, and for coordinating the
overall accident prevention plan. Recommendations on process-, operation-, and
coordination-related accident prevention strategies will be developed.
3:15-3:45 PM Break
2:00-5:00 PM Information Management/Systems
Chair: John Robinson, U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Rapporteur: I.J. Csalagovits, HME
Issues
What types of information do facilities need to assess risks and implement
accident prevention plans?
What sources of information are available, and what are the techniques for
developing information specific to individual facilities?
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• How can information about accidents and near misses be collected and shared
among facilities and among nations?
Information about hazards (from chemicals, processes, equipment, and operators) is
needed for facilities to evaluate their risks and develop actions to address -those risks.
Some of this information can be obtained from databases, industry sources, and
manufacturers. Identifying potential sources of information and accessing that
information should be facilitated. In addition, industry and governments can study
accidents and near misses to develop information of general applicability. Common
definitions of accidents and common approaches for acquiring and presenting such data
are needed to make the data useful internationally.
This workshop will discuss facility information requirements and methods of developing
and sharing accident data. Recommendations regarding information management
approaches that may be useful to the participating nations will be developed.
2:00-5:00 PM Research and Development
Chair: A. B6kes, Hungarian Labor Inspectorate
Rapporteur: Tom Carmody, American Institute of Chemical Engineers
Issues:
• What research is ongoing regarding technologies and techniques useful in the
prevention of chemical accidents?
• What areas of chemical accident prevention require further research and develop-
ment efforts?
• How can research efforts be coordinated?
• How can research results be disseminated effectively?
The field of chemical accident prevention is dynamic, changing with changing chemical
processing technologies and products, and with advances in accident prevention techniques
and processes. Research is ongoing in many fields, while the need for additional research
can be identified in some areas of chemical accident prevention. For example, monitoring
and detection systems are needed for many hazardous materials.
This workshop will review ongoing research work, and identify areas where additional
research would be beneficial in the field of chemical accident prevention.
Recommendations will be developed regarding additional research needs, means of
coordinating research efforts, and systems for effective dissemination of research results.
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Evening: Regional Environmental Centre Reception
DEMONSTRATIONS - COMPUTER SYSTEMS/POSTER SESSION
Excursion (optional) to Veszprem University of Chemical Technology, Institute of
Toxicology
September 21. 1990
During this session, the four general rapporteurs will summarize the findings and
recommendations from the four workshop topics. This session will given all participants
an opportunity to discuss the findings and recommendations and to reach consensus.
Based on the comments made during this session, the workshop findings will be revised
before inclusion in the conference proceedings.
9:00 AM Chairs: Jim Makris, U.S. EPA and Elemer Kiss, Hungary
General Commenter: Alun Williams, U.K.
REVIEW OF RAPPORTEUR CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM
LEGISLATIVE/PROGRAM SESSIONS Elaine Davies, U.S. EPA
REVIEW OF RAPPORTEUR CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM
PROCESS/OPERATIONS/COORDINATION SESSIONS Wayne Bissett, Canada
REVIEW OF RAPPORTEUR CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM
THE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT/SYSTEM SESSIONS I.J. Csalagovits, HME
REVIEW OF RAPPORTEUR CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM
THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SESSIONS Tom Carmody, U.S., American
Institute of Chemical Engineers
Summation by General Commenter Alun Williams U.K.
Regional Environmental Centre - Comments Peter Hardi
Final remarks
Conference adjourns
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APPENDIX III - DISCUSSION DOCUMENT
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Chemical Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Prevention
An Overview
Chemicals and other hazardous materials play an important role in the modern world, but the
hazards they pose make it imperative that all due care be taken to eliminate risks associated with their
manufacture, processing, handling, storage, transportation, and use. A series of major chemical accidents
— at Flixborough, England in 1974, at Seveso, Italy in 1976, at Bhopal, India in 1984, and at Basel,
Switzerland in 1988 — heightened both public and governmental awareness of the potentially devastating
effects of accidental releases of chemicals into the environment. These accidents and others highlighted
the need for communities, regions, and nations to be prepared for and capable of responding to the types
of chemical accidents that may occur within their areas. Equally important, the effects of these accidents
on both the workers, the community, and the environment emphasized the necessity of concerted actions
directed towards accident prevention.
Chemical emergency preparedness, response, and prevention are inextricably linked. The
assessment of needs and development of a plan make response actions more effective. Planning identifies
the types and severity of hazards to which the community and the environment may be exposed and, hence,
identifies and promotes prevention efforts. When a facility management adopts a holistic approach to
managing risks, combining safety management practices and technologies, the risk to the community is
lessened. Resource gaps identified during planning may make steps taken under other programs more
urgent. For example, if a community discovers it lacks adequate equipment to handle the hazards posed
by a facility, one approach may be for the facility to lessen the potential hazards by reducing the amount of
Chemicals stored on site.
Before programs are developed or revised to address these chemical emergencies, certain initial
assessments should be made. These assessments will ensure that when programs are developed or revised,
they accurately address to the situations that exist in the nation. This document provides a discussion of
the elements thai should be addressed during initial assessments, brief introductions to emergency
preparedness, response, and prevention with a review of elements common to mosi approaches in these
areas, and a brief discussion of issues related to transborder responses.
This document is meant to help focus discussions during the workshop. It will be complemented
by the following documents:
• Findings and recommendations from three Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development workshops on chemical accident prevention;
• The European Community's Seveso Directive;
• The United Nations Environment Program's APELL program;
• A fact sheet on the United States Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know
Act of 1986;
• The Hazardous Materials Emergency Planning Guide developed by the U.S. National
Response Team; and
• A factsheet on the U.S. National Contingency Plan.
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Chemical Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Prevention
Initial Assessment Issues
A number of initial assessments should be completed before a national program on emergency
preparedness, response, and prevention is developed or revised. Nations "have distinctive and individual
government structures and cultural traditions; these initial assessments can be critical to developing new
programs, evaluating existing efforts, and revising programs to ensure that they are tailored for the nation's
specific needs and conditions.
Governmental Issues
First to be considered are the existing government policies, laws, and regulations related to
emergency preparedness, response, and prevention. For example, do laws assign responsibilities for
specific functions such as planning and emergency management to specific ministries or levels of
government? In the area of prevention, laws may relate to codes (e.g., fire and electrical codes). Once the
existing laws and policies have been surveyed, the next step is to identify gaps or areas where revisions may
be needed.
The structure of the national government as well as the political system should also be considered
to identify ministries that have the expertise, resources, and authorities that are required for effective
chemical emergency programs. Unless all the authority and resources reside in a single agency, some
mechanism for coordinating efforts will probably be required. Interagency agreements or the establishment
of a coordinating body may be needed before new programs or legislation can be adopted. For example, if
one ministry is responsible for industrial safety and another for protecting the environment, the areas of
mutual interest need to be defined and discussed. These considerations are of special importance if any
significant government restructuring is contemplated. The roles of other parties involved in the issue, such
as industry, workers, and green groups, should also be examined.
Another important governmental question concerns responsibilities that fall under the jurisdiction
of local and regional governments. Because most emergency response actions are carried out by local
responders, the authorities provided the local governments should be reviewed to determine if additional
or different powers or coordinated support such as guidance and training are required. The answers that
each nation develops for these questions will help identify the opportunities and barriers created by
current structures and laws.
Basic Capabilities
The ability of a national government to provide support to emergency preparedness and response
actions and to develop or revise prevention programs depends on the current capabilities of the
government and the nation in general, in regard to chemical emergency preparedness, response, and
prevention. Therefore, an assessment of those capabilities is a critical step in deciding priorities and
assigning roles and responsibilities. Among the issues that should be assessed are the following:
• What level of economic commitment is feasible from each affected level of government?
• What plans currently exist? Are tl^ere national, regional, and local emergency plans? Do
they include chemical emergencies (as opposed to natural disasters)? How current are the
plans? Have they been tested?
• What expertise is available? Does the government have experts in handling hazardous
materials incidents, effects of hazardous chemicals, chemical process design, hazard
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evaluation, etc.? Where in the government does the expertise exist? Where else in the
nation does this expertise exist (universities, industry, professional organizations, medical
community, etc.)? How is the expertise distributed geographically?
• What emergency response equipment exists at the national and regional level? How is it
distributed geographically? Does the geographical distribution create any problems for
providing support during an emergency response?
• What trained personnel are available and how are they distributed geographically? What
training programs are available? Are they being used sufficiently?
• What information is available on hazardous chemicals present in the nation? Who has
access to it?
The answers to these questions can help the government structure, evaluate, or revise a program.
Hazards
A key question in the development or evaluation of any program directed toward chemical
emergencies is what constitutes a hazard. Programs that focus on worker protection may have different
standards than programs directed toward public health and the environment.
The hazard posed by the release of a chemical depends on a number of factors, including the
health and environmental effects caused by exposure to the chemical, its flammability, it explosivity, the
quantity that could be released, the location of the release, the potential pathways of migration, and the
populations and environment likely to be affected. Some programs focus only on chemicals that are
acutely toxic; others include flammables and explosives; still others include chemicals that have chronic
health impacts. Some programs develop a list of covered chemicals; others define criteria for deciding
whether a chemical is covered.
The questions, therefore, that may need to be addressed on hazard definition include:
• What criteria should be applied? Should different criteria be used for different programs
and, if so, do they need to be coordinated?
• Who should define the criteria — technical experts, government, industry, joint committees
of government agencies, industry, labor, etc.?
The government may also want to consider whether there should be flexibility in applying the
criteria. Because the hazard posed by any chemical release depends on both the characteristics of the
chemical and release, and the location of the release, some chemical releases may pose little danger
because of the location; a facility located miles from any population may be of less concern than a facility
located in a city. Some programs allow local agencies to exempt facilities that are believed to pose little
risk.
Information
The types of information that the government may need depend on the programs for which the
information will be used. Some programs require information on the chemicals present and on the
quantities and location of each chemical. Other programs will ask for information on facility emergency
response plans and equipment. Prevention programs may require detailed information on the chemical
processes, worker training, and management practices.
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The first questions on information is for what purposes is the information needed and by whom.
Once the purposes are determined, the specific data needed to meet those purposes should be defined.
Information can often be divided into that which is essential to the program, and that which is useful to
know, but not critical. The government has to decide what criteria will apply to selecting information
requirements. Different programs and groups may need the data for different purposes. Decisions need to
be made about whether access to some of the data may be restricted and, if so, under what conditions.
This issue can be central when the data sought would reveal manufacturing process information that the
facility considers secret. If a government decides to allow claims of confidentiality, the government must
decide which information will be covered, what criteria will apply, and who will review claims to determine
their merit.
Assessment Questions
The following questions may help participants assess their current programs.
• What national laws currently exist on emergency preparedness and response? Do these
laws address all types of emergencies? Are there specific laws addressing chemical
emergencies?
• Are there governmental policies related to emergency preparedness and response that
supplement any existing laws? What do these policies cover?
• What national laws currently exist related to chemical accident prevention or chemical
process safety? Are there national codes and standards on issues such as facility siting,
construction, fire prevention, etc.?
• Which government ministries are involved in programs that are directly or indirectly
related to these issues? What are their specific authorities?
• Is there some formal or informal mechanism in place to facilitate coordination among
ministries?
• Which responsibilities in this area are delegated to regional or local governments? Is the
delegation a matter of law or tradition?
• Whal aspecis of the political structure affect these issues?
• What are the basic capabilities in these areas?
• Whai resources (expertise and equipment) are available at the national and regional
levels? Are there mechanisms for transferring and sharing information?
• What information is currently available on the type, quantity, and location of hazardous
chemicals?
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Introduction to Emergency Preparedness
Accidents are, by definition, unpredictable, but the likelihood that an accident will have a serious
impact on workers, the community, and the environment can be lessened if the facility and the community
are prepared to respond to the accident.
Although different approaches may be used for planning for chemical emergencies, certain
elements are common among programs:
• Everyone who may be involved in an emergency response action should participate in the
planning process. Plans developed by a single person or agency are generally not well
understood by other parties and, therefore, poorly implemented. The groups who may be
included in the planning process are:
• Fire fighters, who in many countries handle special hazardous materials
response equipment;
• Police or militia (or other organizations responsible for public order);
• Emergency management authorities, where they exist;
• Emergency medical crews (ambulance crews, medics, etc.);
• Hospital staff;
• Public health authorities, who may be called on for advice on health effects;
• Facilities with hazardous chemicals, which may have facility emergency response
plans, emergency response equipment, and teams, and may be able to render
assistance to one another in the event of an emergency;
• Political officials, who may be responsible for issuing evacuation orders;
• Public works authorities such as water, utilities, and roads;
• The media, which can help explain the emergency to the public; and
• The public.
• Existing plans should be reviewed to determine whether the chemical emergency response
plan can be incorporated into other plans (e.g., natural disaster plans) or whether
elements of those plans can be used.
• Hazards in the community should be analyzed. The analysis involves identification of the
chemicals in the community, review of potential worst case accident scenarios, and
assessment of the potential risks. The analysis should identify special populations that
may pose problems during an emergency; for example, hospitals may be difficult to
evacuate.
• The capabilities of the community should be assessed. The response equipment and
special hazardous materials equipment available to the community should be inventoried.
The availability of trained personnel should be documented. This assessment identifies
resource needs and, therefore, enables the community to develop strategies for meeting
the needs. For example, training may be sought or cooperative agreements with other
communities may be developed to meet resource needs.
• A chemical emergency response plan should be developed based on the hazards analysis
and capability assessment. The plan should cover such issues as the chain of command
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during a response action, strategies for responding to specific hazards in the community,
evacuation routes, etc.
• The plan should be tested periodically. Simulated accidents, whether conducted in the
field with a full deployment of equipment and responders or at a table with response
groups represented, are a valuable way to identify potential problems and to allow the
response team to work together before an accident occurs.
Assessment Questions
The following questions may help participants assess their current programs.
• Are there emergency response plans at the national, regional, and local levels? What
types of emergencies are covered in these plans? Are the plans coordinated?
• How is planning currently conducted?
• Who is involved in emergency response planning at each level of government? How is
information shared and coordinated?
• What are the governmental roles in emergency response planning?
• What kinds of guidance are available on planning, evaluating hazards, and testing plans?
How is this guidance transferred and shared with local planners?
• What training is available to local responders?
• Have hazards in communities been identified and analyzed? What information is available
from facilities? Do facilities have emergency response plans and equipment?
• Are plans regularly tested and revised?
• Are there programs to inform the public about hazards and actions to be taken during
emergencies?
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Introduction to Emergency Response
A well-developed and tested emergency response plan will make emergency response actions more
effective. Plans may take different approaches, based on the specific characteristics of the community, but
certain response issues are common to any emergency actions. These common elements include the
following:
• The chain of command should be set, with a single person in charge. Because serious
accidents generally require the involvement of different groups, each participant should
understand whom they report to directly and who has overall authority. Generally, the
plan will establish the command structure.
• The facility where the chemical release occurs must notify the community promptly. The
plan may designate single points of contact between the facility and the community to
ensure that time is not lost determining who needs to be informed.
• The facility should provide adequate information on the chemical being released to allow
the responders to make rapid decisions about appropriate response actions, including
protective steps. In extreme circumstances, when the accident is so severe that the facility
cannot be sure of the chemicals being released or the magnitude of the releases, other
potential information sources (e.g., other similar facilities, experts) may be required and
should be identified in advance.
• A series of decisions may need to be made involving appropriate actions to protect
responders, the public, and property. These decisions include appropriate protective gear
for responders, methods of handling the released substance, and evacuation or sheltering
in place. Decisions to protect property may have unintended consequences as the Sandoz
accident showed. At Sandoz, the decision was made to put out a fire to protect adjacent
buildings. The water poured onto the fire became contaminated and the resulting runoff
into the Rhine contaminated the river.
• The movement of released chemicals will need to be monitored to determine which
populations may need to take protective actions. Although air dispersion models exist
that predict the movement of chemical clouds, few models have been validated with site-
specific data and, therefore, models are of limited use during a real-time emergency.
• Methods for notifying and informing the public are needed. These methods may vary
from alarms, loudspeakers, radio alerts, to sophisticated telephone systems.
Assessment Questions
The following questions may help participants assess their current programs.
• Do communities or regions have established or traditional chains of command for
emergency situations?
• Are there agreements on when a facility should notify the community?
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Are there central sources of information on chemical hazards that responders can
contact in an emergency? Is information on these sources widely available?
What communications systems are used to notify the community of a potential
emergency?
How are chemical releases monitored?
What research is being conducted in this area? How is research coordinated and results
shared?
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Introduction to Chemical Accident Prevention
Although emergency preparedness is essential because accidents inevitably will occur, the most
cost-effective approach to limiting the risk to workers, the community, and the environment is to take
steps to prevent chemical accidents. The responsibility for chemical accident prevention rests primarily
with the management of individual facilities and companies. Governments may facilitate process safety
improvements or impose requirements related to accident prevention, but the implementation of
prevention measures rests with facility management and workers. Without a commitment to safety by
management and workers, a prevention program is unlikely to succeed and satisfy the community desire to
minimize risk. The best equipment is of little use if it is poorly maintained or improperly used.
The technologies required for safety are usually facility, process, and chemical specific. A number
of elements related to management of risk at chemical facilities, however, are generally recognized as
essential. These management practices include the following:
• Facility and equipment designs should be analyzed prior to start-up to identify safety
problems and solutions. Standards and codes developed by the government, industry, or
professional associations should be met, but meeting standards may not be adequate to
ensure safety when hazardous chemicals are involved. Facilities must identify potential
hazards and design and operate the facilities to minimize risks.
• The technical specifications for equipment and processes should be documented. Standard
operating procedures should be written and provided to all workers in a language and
style that the workers can understand.
• Hazard evaluations such as Hazards and Operability studies, Fault Tree Analyses, should
be conducted on a regular schedule (e.g., one every three years). Such evaluations should
also be conducted on new processes and after major modifications.
• All employees must be trained in the standard operating procedures that apply to their
work, and in the hazards of the chemicals and processes with which they deal. Refresher
training should be provided. Specific training should be provided concerning danger
signals and response actions. For workers with key responsibilities for safety, development
of diagnostic skills should be emphasized.
• Maintenance programs should be established and preventive maintenance performed on
all critical equipment (that is, equipment whose failure could result in a release).
• Accidents and near misses should be formally investigated to determine the causes and
identify needed changes in equipment or practices. Recommendations should be tracked
to ensure implementation.
• Audits of key elements such as the training program, maintenance practices, and testing
programs, should be conducted. Deficiencies and corrective actions should be
documented.
• Facility emergency response plans should be developed and tested regularly. These facility
plans should be coordinated with community emergency response plans.
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Besides the steps that a facility should take to manage risks and prevent accidents, other steps
related to chemical accident prevention or mitigation may include:
• Siting the facility away from populated areas. As Bhopal and other chemical accidents
have indicated, close proximity of a chemical facility and dense populations magnifies the
consequences of any release. It is important, therefore, to maintain buffer zones that exist
when facilities are first constructed. In many cases such as Bhopal, the construction of a
facility will attract development close to it. Such developments should be analyzed for
safety impacts before they are approved. Once development has occurred, creating a
buffer zone around a facility may be difficult.
• Using less hazardous chemicals or reducing amounts of chemicals stored on site. Either
approach may lessen the risk, though they may not be feasible for some facilities.
• Installing back-up or redundant equipment for critical equipment such as pressure gauges.
The need for such equipment depends on the particular process and chemical and should
be identified through the hazard evaluation process.
• Installing detectors to alert workers of releases before they become serious. The use of
detection systems is limited because such systems do not exist for many chemicals or are
not yet sufficiently reliable.
• Using technologies to reduce the seriousness of releases once they begin. These
technologies may include scrubbers, flares, water curtains, deluge systems, etc. The
appropriateness of any of these technologies depends on the chemicals and processes
involved.
Assessment Questions
The following questions may help participants assess their current programs.
• What is the current government role in chemical process safety and chemical accident
prevention? What laws exist that are designed to protect workers and the public from
chemical accidents? What is the role of the community?
• What resources (e.g., guidance, training programs) are available to facilities regarding risk
management and technologies? How are these resources transferred?
• What codes and standards related to chemical process safety exist? Are they up-to-date?
• Is information on chemical accidents (e.g., data on post-accident prevention activities)
being collected? How is this information being used? Is it being appropriately
disseminated?
• Do facilities have emergency response plans and capabilities?
• What research is being done in this area? Are the research efforts being coordinated to
prevent overlaps? How are results being shared?
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Introduction to Transborder Response Issues
Most chemical releases do not affect more than one country, but those accidents with transborder
impacts pose a special challenge because the response must be coordinated across national borders. The
likelihood of such international response is, of course, greatest where facilities are located close to a
border, although releases to water may impact countries far downstream from the release as the accident at
Sandoz did.
Certain issues are common to developing transborder responses:
• Even though response actions may occur at the local level, development of a joint
response plan usually requires a treaty or written agreement between national
governments.
• Nations may have very different laws related to emergency preparedness and response.
These laws must be identified and a common approach, consistent with each country's
laws, developed.
• The organizations involved on both sides of the border should be identified. Depending
on governmental structures, different levels of government may be involved. For example,
in the U.S., most planners and responders are from local governments, but in Mexico,
some planners and responders are regional representatives of the national government.
• Notification procedures that already exist should be defined. If these procedures are
inconsistent, joint procedures need to be established.
• Language barriers can hinder notification and coordination. People assigned as contact
points should be fluent in both languages or in a commonly understood language. Liaison
staff should also be bilingual.
• Normally, one person is in charge of an emergency response action. When two or more
nations are involved, however, each needs to have a person in charge within its nation.
Each country should designate a single person or position who will be in charge on its
side of the border.
• Where response equipment or technical experts may need to cross a border, clearances for
such movements should be facilitated. Clearance procedures should be worked out in
advance.
Assessment Questions
The following questions may help participants assess their current programs.
• What agreements related to these issues exist between your country and neighboring
countries?
• How are transborder notifications currently handled?
• What levels of government are likely to be involved in a transborder incident?
• Are language barriers likely to be a problem and, if so, for which neighboring countries?
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Are there mechanisms in place to facilitate movement of resources and experts across
borders during an emergency?
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APPENDIX IV - ACRONYMS
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ACRONYMS
APELL
CEFIC
EC
ICSC
ILO
IPCS
OECD
SHARE
UNECE
UNEP
U.S. ATSDR
U.S. EPA
U.S. OSHA
WHO
Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at the Local Level
Conseil Europeen des Federation de 1'Industrie Chimique
European Community
International Chemical Safety Cards
International Labor Organization
International Programme on Chemical Safety
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
Safety Hazard Assessment Research
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
United Nations Environment Program
United States Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
United States Environmental Protection Agency
United States Occupational Safety and Health Administration
World Health Organization
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