United States Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Environmental Protection Response Agency vvEPA PROCEEDINGS United States — Hungary Workshop on Chemical Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Prevention Veszprem, Hungary September 18—21, 1990 Printed on Recycled P. ------- PROCEEDINGS UNITED STATES - HUNGARY WORKSHOP ON CHEMICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND PREVENTION Veszprem, Hungary 18 - 21 September 1990 ------- TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1 PLENARY SESSIONS 3 REPORT BY ALUN J. WILLIAMS, GENERAL RAPPORTEUR 5 Opening Session 7 Emergency Preparedness — Technical Presentations/Discussion 11 Emergency Response — Technical Presentations/Discussion 15 Prevention of Chemical Accidents — Technical Presentations/Discussion 19 WORKING GROUP FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 23 WORKING GROUP ON LEGISLATION AND PROGRAM APPROACHES 27 WORKING GROUP ON PROCESS/OPERATIONS/COORDINATION 31 WORKING GROUP ON INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 33 WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 37 APPENDIX I - LIST OF PARTICIPANTS 39 APPENDIX II - ANNOTATED AGENDA 47 APPENDIX III - DISCUSSION DOCUMENT 61 APPENDIX IV - ACRONYMS 75 ------- CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION ------- INTRODUCTION The United States Environmental Protection Agency and the Hungarian Ministry for Environment jointly sponsored a workshop on chemical emergency preparedness, response, and prevention, which was held in Veszprem, Hungary, in September 1990. The workshop brought together 132 delegates from Eastern and Central European nations, the United States, and several international organizations to discuss issues and share experiences in these areas. The workshop was the first project funded under the U.S.-Hungary Joint Science and Technology Board and the first event affiliated with the Regional Environmental Centre in Budapest, which opened two weeks before the workshop. Chemicals and other hazardous materials play an important role in the modern world, but the hazards they pose make it imperative that all due care be taken to eliminate risks associated with their manufacture, processing, handling, storage, transportation, and use. A series of major chemical accidents — at Flixborough, England in 1974, at Seveso, Italy in 1976, at Bhopal, India in 1984, and at Basel, Switzerland in 1988 — heightened both public and governmental awareness of the potentially devastating effects of accidental releases of chemicals into the environment. These accidents and others highlighted the need for communities, regions, and nations to be prepared for and capable of responding to the types of chemical accidents that may occur within their areas. Equally important, the effects of these accidents on both the workers, the community, and the environment emphasized the necessity of concerted actions directed towards accident prevention. Chemical emergency preparedness, response, and prevention are the focus of many national and international programs. In 1988, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) undertook a project to develop guidance for member countries in this area. To gather information, OECD sponsored workshops on (1) the role of industry in preventing accidents; (2) the role of workers in preventing accidents and information needed by the public; (3) the role of government in preventing accidents and land use planning; and (4) emergency preparedness and response, and coordination of research. A fifth workshop on human factors will be held in Japan in 1991. The findings and recommendations of these workshops will be used in the development of guidelines. In addition, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) has developed the Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at the Local Level (APELL), a set of guidelines for establishing emergency preparedness programs. APELL is being implemented in several developing countries. Other international organizations working this area include the International Labor Organization (ILO), which is concentrating on the role of workers, and the World Health Organization (WHO), which is sponsoring a conference on emergency preparedness in June 1991. On the national level, numerous programs exist for national, regional, and local governments. The objectives of the workshop were: • To provide an opportunity for participants to exchange experiences and address issues of concern; and • To develop recommendations that may be of use to participating nations as they evaluate, revise, or develop programs in these areas. Structure of the Workshop After the opening remarks, the workshop began with presentations from each of the Eastern and Central European nations. The presentations gave each delegation an opportunity to review efforts in their countries that relate to chemical emergency preparedness, response, and prevention and to discuss their current concerns. The presentations also helped to create a common understanding of the status of ------- national programs and of the issues most relevant to each delegation. The presentations helped focus the rest of the workshop's sessions to ensure that the workshop addressed the concerns of participants. The workshop had three technical sessions, with presentations related to chemical emergency preparedness, response, and prevention. The technical presentations, given by experts in the areas, provided an introduction to current programs, practices, and technologies, and formed the basis for subsequent detailed discussions. Participants took part in working groups in which every delegate had an opportunity to take part in the discussions and contribute to the findings and recommendations. The working groups focused on issues that cut across the subject areas of the technical sessions and relate directly to actions that might be taken: legislation/program development; process, organization, and coordination; information management/systems; and research and development. Each working group developed findings and recommendations, which were presented at the final session by the working group chairs. The chairs, rapporteurs, presenters, and participants were invited to represent the spectrum of organizations involved in these issues, including environment and public health ministries, fire services, research institutes, academia, labor, industry, and green groups. Organization of this Document Following this introduction, this report is organized into two additional chapters. • Chapter 2 presents the General Rapporteur's report on the meeting and the summaries of the four plenary sessions. • Chapter 3 presents the findings and recommendations from the four working groups. In addition, the report contains several appendices. • Appendix I provides the list of participants. • Appendix II provides the annotated agenda for the workshop. • Appendix III provides the discussion document distributed to participants. • Appendix IV provides a list of acronyms used by participants. ------- CHAPTER 2 PLENARY SESSIONS ------- 5 PLENARY SESSIONS REPORT BY ALUN J. WILLIAMS, GENERAL RAPPORTEUR The workshop was deliberately organized to include a wide range of participants - an appropriate step for this first event of its type. Although not all participating countries achieved the wide spectrum of representation sought, nevertheless a good discussion ensued on all topics addressed. Participants included officials from environmental ministries, public health institutes, research institutes, ministries of industry, agriculture, and economic affairs, green groups, and industry. After the overview provided in this introductory meeting, a narrower targeting for successive meetings will probably be appropriate. The international horizons of the issues addressed were broadened by the active participation of such organizations as UNEP, ILO, WHO, OECD, and EC member states. The subject of major chemical accidents and their control was seen to be only one example of the wide macroeconomic and environmental issues currently undergoing changes in the region. For example, the EC is moving toward economic integration and many Eastern and Central European nations are shifting from centralized government control of the economy to a free market system. These changes will have a significant effect on the management of environmental programs. The workshop achieved many positive and concrete results. The first, relatively intangible but invaluable in the long term, was the establishment of new contacts at many levels between representatives having common interests and concerns. OECD experience has confirmed the value of such contacts and relationships, once mutual trust has been established. Already the workshop has resulted in the exchange of much information during its course. More generally there was an appreciation of the existence of much work already completed by others, and sources of such material were identified. The workshop recognized that it was addressing not a problem previously unknown within the region, but one whose existence has not been openly acknowledged and debated. Once the issues were examined it was found that many problems were not unique to a single country but shared by others in the region; the contributors from Western European countries and North America confirmed they had faced (and still face) similar conflicts - the interface between central and local government levels was an obvious example. The workshop learnt of, and identified the need for further study of various supra-national legislative models and programs such as those of UNECE, ILO, WHO, UNEP, OECD, EC. The workshop agreed on the crucial need for local delivery of emergency preparedness and response functions, and interest was expressed in the UNEP (APELL) process. Certain presentations on the practical implementation of these aspects emphasized that sectoral needs would require a more narrowly focused meeting to explore them fully. Specifically, meetings on issues related to the Seveso Directive and transboundary response concerns may be useful. The workshop agreed on the need for coordination of efforts first at the national level within each country, and also at a supra-national level - whether through long established mechanisms such as UNEP or UNECE, or through more recent developments such as the Regional Environmental Centre, Budapest (REC). Coordination within each country is also necessary among local, regional, and national authorities. In terms of ways to take the work forward on this subject, the Workshop saw a clear need for discussion at, and endorsement by, the highest political levels of the need for action both inside each country and supra-nationally. The need for a legislative framework was clear, but the Workshop realized ------- that other positive collaborative initiatives should not await these developments. Land use planning (both control of siting of installation themselves and other nearby developments) was noted as an urgent issue given the likely industrial redevelopment in the near future. Where possible, it was seen as advantageous to build new emergency preparedness/response arrangements for chemical accidents on existing civil protection infrastructures. In many countries, the fire services already take the lead in organizing response actions. Their activities must be coordinated with other civil protection authorities such as the police or military and the emergency medical services. Participating countries noted with interest the complementary approaches on public information and participation reflected in the "need to know" requirements of the Seveso Directive, and the "right to know" approach of U.S. legislation. The Workshop recognized the need for active public participation in decision making and the need for transparency in such processes to foster trust and understanding. This need for trust extended not only to companies, but also to government, local authorities, and their agencies. The Workshop concluded that the process of emergency planning and of preparing a safety report/analysis was itself intrinsically crucial, as much as the output documents themselves. The Workshop affirmed the utility of work sharing, i.e., agreeing to development of complementary centers of excellence in different countries. On research issues in particular, the priority action lay in acquiring the results and benefits of existing research before deciding what new efforts were needed. Finally, the Workshop saw a possible increased role for the new Regional Environmental Centre both as a facilitator of activities between member countries, and as a clearing house for information exchange. With so much acknowledged as needing to be done, it is important to avoid a duplication of effort. Countries will first need to identify and prioritize their particular needs. ------- Workshop on Chemical Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Prevention Opening Session Jim Makris of the United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) opened the session. He noted that the workshop marked several firsts: the first meeting of this group of nations, the first project funded under the U.S.-Hungary Joint Science and Technology Board, and the first event affiliated with the recently opened Regional Environmental Centre. He said that behind this effort were the efforts of a number of multilateral organizations including the United National Environment Program (UNEP), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the International Labor Organization (ILO), and the World Health Organization (WHO), as well as work by multinational organizations such as the EC, and the ECE. Mr. Makris stated that the goal of the meeting was for participants to go home with more information than they came with, to have an opportunity to learn where information can be obtained, and to renew friendships and make new connections. He then introduced Elemer Kiss, Hungarian Minister for Environment, Don R. Clay, Assistant Administrator of the U.S. EPA, and Gerard Scannell, Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, each of whom made introductory remarks. Dr. Kiss expressed the hope that the workshop would be profitable. He cited an axiom that to act was easy, to think was difficult, and to act without thought could be unpleasant. He said he hoped the workshop participants would act with thought. Mr. Clay said that the U.S. delegates wanted to share their knowledge, but that the U.S. does not have all the answers and that the U.S. delegates had come to learn as well. He stated that chemical accidents can and do happen. Therefore, it is essential that risks of chemicals be examined and that countries build their ability to respond and plan. Adapting a prevention mentality, however, is the key. Because chemical accidents are a global problem, it is critical that countries share their expertise and information. He noted that a lot of data are collected, but information based on the data is limited. Because accidents occur at the local level, information is critical at that level. Mr. Clay reviewed the U.S. EPA programs on chemical emergencies. In 1968, the federal government established the first National Contingency Plan. Under this plan, a National Response Team was established; 14 agencies are now members of the team. Regional Response Teams and On-Scene Coordinators also work under the national plan to ensure a coordinated federal response to large-scale emergencies. In response to the chemical release in Bhopal, EPA established a voluntary Chemical Emergency Preparedness Program. At the same time, the U.S. chemical industry began its Chemical Awareness and Emergency Response program to ensure that chemical manufacturers develop emergency response plans for their facilities and work with the local community. In 1986, much of EPA's voluntary program was enacted as the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, also know as Title III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA). This law was a major expansion of planning efforts. In addition, Title III makes information more available to and usable by the public. The U.S. and Mexico have developed a Joint Response Team; the U.S. and Canada are developing a similar bilateral structure on planning. On the prevention side, EPA is collecting information on chemical accidents, conducting audits, and working with external groups. He emphasized that prevention requires a holistic approach that considers safety at every step, from the design of the facility to its closure. Mr. Clay briefly reviewed U.S. programs on waste management, again stressing prevention as the key. After 10 years of the Superfund program, which cleans up uncontrolled hazardous waste sites, it is clear that it is easier to prevent pollution than to clean it up. Hazardous waste cleanups are costly and difficult; there are limits to what technologies can do to remove wastes, especially from ground water. ------- EPA has learned that many choices lie in the hands of individuals; the government needs to take a holistic view of waste management. Mr. Scannell stated that he was pleased that the workshop had invited all the stakeholders, that is, everyone who could influence or be affected by chemical accidents. He emphasized workplace safety as a first line of defense against chemical emergencies. He stated that it is impossible for the government to police every work place that handles hazardous chemicals. Management is responsible for conducting safe operations; employees should assist and be involved in the process. The government role is oversight, consultation, and training. He said that experience indicates that safety pays; safe operations are more productive, have higher morale, and fewer losses. Mr. Makris introduced Istvan Szemenyei of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry who discussed the development of the U.S.-Hungary Joint Science and Technology Board and noted the importance of science and technology in building bridges between nations. Summary of National Programs Hungary. Hungary has declared its intention of harmonizing its environmental laws with those of the European Community. Most of the environmental work has been done by the central government. The fundamental issue at present is the need to decentralize control of some programs. Management systems are not currently integrated into a whole. A second problem involves information. There is a surplus of data, but a lack of information derived from the data. The government must also deal with disinformation and poorly developed information. Hungary needs to develop a coordinated information exchange, which should be handled by the environmental protection agencies. Hungary must also decide on the proper centralization and decentralization approaches. Several ministries will be involved in these issues. Austria. Austria is implementing the Seveso Directive, which requires safety reports from hazardous installations. Under its industrial codes, Austria has a licensing system for industrial facilities. The public has the right to take part in the licensing process. Once a facility is licensed and has filed a safety report, the government must inspect the facility at least once every three years and after any major accident. As a result of the inspection, the government may require the facilities to make technological changes. Regarding emergency response, the Ministry of the Interior has established national and regional alarm centers to facilitate rapid response. Bulgaria. Bulgaria considers the hazardous effects of chemicals a major problem. The government is working to inform the public about the potential hazards from industrial chemical use. Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia has a long tradition of chemical industries. A series of major accidents made the nation aware of the potential hazards posed by and led to the development of programs to address specific chemical hazards. The nation has also developed a complex emergency alert and notification system and has installed mitigation and detection systems. Czechoslovakia would like to develop a legal system to address safety issues and is interested in introducing computerized emergency response systems. Germany. Germany is implementing the Seveso Directive. In addition, it has a national Hazardous Incidence Ordinance, establishing a structure for emergency response organization. This law is implemented at the local level based on national guidelines. The national government runs a disaster control academy to provide training in civil defense, self protection, technical training, and disaster management. ------- Italy. Italy is also implementing the Seveso Directive. Italy has, however, set lower thresholds than are listed under the directive. Facilities that meet the directive thresholds have their safety reports reviewed by the national government. Other facilities are inspected and reviewed by regional authorities. Italy is stressing the need for the central government to standardize the rules and for decentralization of implementation. Poland. Poland is not currently active in the area of chemical emergency preparedness, response, and prevention. It has, however, developed a computerized decision support system to aid in responses to hazardous incidents. This software includes databases on the chemical and physical properties of chemicals. Romania. The Romanian government has established a new ministry to handle environmental affairs. The ministry is beginning to look at conditions at industrial and storage facilities. It is in the process of developing and evaluating laws, policies, and regulations. The government is placing special attention on chemicals used in small, hard to reach communities. USSR. The Soviet government is aware of the dangerous conditions created by some industries and recognizes that accidents at chemical facilities may have impacts on other nations. The government thinks that inadequate attention has been paid to accidents and is beginning to address the issue. Services are being developed in several ministries. The government believes it is essential to learn from accidents and is considering the need for licensing. Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavian government is developing plans to form mobil units in major cities to respond to chemical emergencies. Transboundary considerations are also being stressed. ------- 11 Emergency Preparedness — Technical Presentations/Discussion Chair: Jim Makris, U.S. Rapporteur: Zoltan Illes, Hungary The session opened with presentations on the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) project on chemical emergency preparedness, Awareness and Preparedness at the Local Level (APELL). Robert Young of UNEP described the development of the APELL program, which is designed to help developing countries and others establish emergency response plans. APELL emphasizes the need for cooperation and coordination between the public sector and industrial facilities in planning for emergencies. The APELL program encourages communities and industries to start the planning process separately if necessary; that is, facilities should develop plans even if there is no immediate interest in the community. The APELL program is being implemented in several countries, including Bahrain and Mexico. Khalid Fahkro of the Bahrain Environmental Protection Committee discussed the implementation of APELL in his country. Bahrain began with an analysis of potential hazards. Because of its location, the country is not susceptible to natural disasters; its location in the Persian Gulf, however, makes it vulnerable to emergencies that result from war or sabotage. The country has pipelines to the mainland and refineries. The location of all potential hazards were mapped to identify areas where populations may be affected. The primary problem Bahrain has encountered in implementing APELL has been the unwillingness of other government departments to make information on hazards available to the public, claiming that the information is secret. Michael Baram of Boston University Law School in the United States (U.S.) discussed legislative issues related to emergency preparedness. He stated that there are two contrasting approaches: under the Seveso Directive of the European Community (82/501/EEC as amended by 88/610/EEC), information is provided to the public on a "need to know" basis. The 1988 amendment to the directive lists the information that must be provided to the public; under the directive, however, the government and industry are not required to provide any additional information. The U.S. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, also known as Title III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), provides information on a right-to-know basis. Title III has a number of provisions related to information. Facilities are required to report accidental releases to the national, state, and local governments. Follow-up reports are also required to provide additional information on the release and its potential effects. For any chemical considered hazardous, facilities must submit Material Safety Data Sheets (or a list of chemicals) to the state and local governments. Facilities must also provide, on an annual basis, information on the location and quantity of all hazardous chemicals on site. This information is important both for planning and for response actions. Finally, Title III requires manufacturers to submit annual estimates of their releases of chemicals to all environmental media. The annual estimates have provided valuable information for evaluating the total impact of chemical releases to the environment. These data are made available through the states and a national database. All information submitted under Title III is available to the public on request. Unlike the Seveso system, no information is automatically provided to the public, but all information submitted to the government is available to anyone who. requests it. Title III contains provisions for the protection of trade secrets, but these provisions limit the amount of information that can be claimed as a secret to the chemical identity. If a facility claims the exact chemical identity as a secret, the facility must provide a generic chemical identity. In practice, very few facilities have made trade secret claims. ------- 12 Raymond DiNardo of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) discussed hazards analysis as a critical element in emergency planning. A hazards analysis has three steps: (1) hazard identification; (2) a vulnerability analysis; and (3) a risk assessment. The hazard identification requires planners to locate all hazardous chemicals in the community and to determine the quantity in each location. The hazardous properties of these chemicals must also be determined. The information submitted under Title III in the U.S. provides these data to emergency planners. The vulnerability analysis defines the area of potential impact of a chemical release. The vulnerability analysis requires planners to determine worst case releases and then develop estimates of how far from the point of release people could be affected. To determine the distance of potential impact, planners must select a concentration that they consider potentially dangerous. The distance is then calculated by estimating the point at which the concentration of the chemical falls below the level set. In the U.S., EPA recommends using a concentration that is one-tenth the Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) concentration. Different choices (e.g., one-fifth the IDLH) will alter the results of the vulnerability analysis. In general, the selection of a concentration level is a policy choice. The final part of the hazards analysis is the risk assessment. This assessment is not a formal risk assessment, but rather a general determination of which hazards in the community pose the greatest threat. Planners rate each chemical on the likelihood of a serious release and the potential impact of a release. For example, a chemical that is only mildly toxic but present in very large quantities may pose more of a threat than a highly toxic chemical that exists in small quantities. The location of the chemical also affects its potential threat; a small quantity of a toxic chemical in a populated area may pose a greater threat than a large quantity of the same chemical in an isolated location. The risk assessment process allows planners to set priorities so that their plans focus on the most serious potential threats first. Gerald Poje (U.S.) of the National Wildlife Federation, an environmental group, spoke about the importance of including the public in the decision-making process. He noted that chemical accidents are frequent occurrences. According to one EPA analysis, over the last 25 years, there have been 17 accidents in the U.S. that had the potential to be as serious as Bhopal. He outlined five steps needed to ensure effective risk communication with the public: (1) Develop the ethic of informed consent. Everyone potentially affected by chemical accidents has the right to understand the nature of and potential for chemical accidents. (2) Create an awareness of information need. People must be made of aware of their responsibility to obtain and evaluate information about chemical risks. (3) Define information availability. Effective risk communication needs to explain not only what is known about chemical hazards, but also should inform the public about what they need to know to evaluate the hazards. (4) Provide information access. Information needed by the public must be made easily accessible. (5) Assure public verification of information. The public should have the right to check data provided by industry, including the right to collect samples at facilities. Pal Popelyak of the Hungarian Fire Service discussed the role of the fire service and the value of testing emergency response plans. He said that although the public expects to be protected, the fire departments cannot be prepared for all hazards. In Hungary, all fire service personnel are professionals; they usually arrive at an accident before the ambulances. The fire departments handle registration of facilities, so they have information about the hazards that are present at facilities. The majority of ------- 13 facilities in Hungary have the capability to deal with small accidents. They have experts on chemical hazards, but the experts are only available during working hours. Major accidents require a response by the public fire service. The fire service currently has the equipment to deal with accidents, but needs more. In Hungary, most of the chemical accidents have involved the transportation of chemicals. Therefore, the fire service is focussing its program of emergency response exercises on road accidents. These exercises are the first step in the program. In a videotape, showing an exercise conducted at a fixed facility, the fire service used a distillation tower that was to be torn down to test their ability to deal with a complex fire that required both water (to cool the tower) and foam (to suppress the fire). After the presentations, the panelists answered questions on several topics. Of particular concern was the issue of obtaining information from government installations. One questioner asked whether the U.S. required information on chemicals and other hazards at military installations and other government facilities. In response, Michael Baram and Jim Makris explained that Title III does not apply to such government facilities, but that the federal government is committed to complying with the law to the extent possible. They noted that in some cases citizens have demanded information from the government and have obtained it. On another topic, a questioner asked how the APELL program could be used if some of the parties were reluctant to participate. Robert Young of UNEP replied that it was important to start the process with whoever was willing to participate and that countries, communities, and industry should not wait until everyone was actively involved. ------- 15 Emergency Response — Technical Presentations/Discussion Chair: Janos Zakonyi, Hungary Rapporteur: Deborah Lukesh, U.S. The session opened with a presentation on the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Francine Schulberg described the work of the OECD accidents program as it relates to chemical emergency preparedness, response, and prevention. She also gave a brief summary of new developments at OECD concerning relationships with Central and Eastern European countries. With respect to the accidents program, she noted that the focus of the three-year program, which began in 1988, is two-fold: to further the exchange of experience and information, and to develop common policies and procedures. Among the information and exchange projects is the preparation of two users' guides, one on information systems in OECD member countries that are useful to emergency planners and responders, and the other on hazardous substance data banks available in OECD member countries. With respect to the objective of developing common policies, she noted that one project is developing guiding principles on accident prevention and response; these principles will include a section on investment and aid programs concerning installations in non-OECD countries. She emphasized that the member countries of the OECD are working to ensure that the output of this program is made available to non-OECD countries. She also noted that all the work is being undertaken in close cooperation with other international organizations. Ferenc Bodnar of the Hungarian Fire Service HQ presented the organizational structure and responsibilities of the Hungarian Fire Service, as well as areas of concern related to emergency response and future needs. The fire service is responsible for responding to chemical emergencies and natural disasters for fixed facilities and for transportation-related incidents. The fire service is organized on a regional/county basis with personnel trained to respond to all types of incidents. Civil Defense supports the activities of the fire service; both organizations coordinate responsibilities. Mr. Bodnar emphasized several areas of concern related to responding to an emergency, including classification of emergencies, human error, risk evaluation, prevention integration, facility and community demographics, information access and distribution to facility personnel and community, establishment of a central coordinating organization for handling a response, training and education, and evaluation of response activities and integration of lessons learned. For the future, he emphasized that national, regional, and local legislation in Hungary needs to be refined or developed to more effectively address emergency planning, response, and prevention activities. He emphasized the importance of including the local government and community in this process. Michael Callan, a fire captain in Wallingford, Connecticut (U.S.), presented an eight-element management procedure for responding to a hazardous materials incident. He stressed that the elements of this procedure also apply to responding to any other type of emergency incident, such as an aircraft accident or a major medical operation. The eight-step procedure assists the emergency responder in structuring decision-making and achieving a more favorable outcome. The eight elements of emergency response management include: (1) Scene management (2) Identification of material(s) involved (3) Hazard and risk assessment ------- 16 (4) Selection of protective clothing and equipment (5) Resource coordination (6) Control and confinement of release(s) (7) Decontamination (8) Termination activities All eight elements may not be needed at each emergency, but each should be evaluated at every emergency. The order of the elements is also important. For example, it is important to control the scene first, before attempting to identify the materials involved; without scene control, responders may be exposed to materials before they can determine the hazards. He stated that experience has shown that incidents that are not managed well in the early stages are very difficult to correct later. Mr. Callan stressed that these elements need to be considered and incorporated during the development of an emergency response plan. Teamwork, which can be fostered by planning and exercises, is crucial to an effective response action. Kent Gray, U.S. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), discussed the importance of understanding what constitutes an emergency, identifying who can be potentially impacted by an emergency incident, and effectively communicating to these groups. An emergency was defined as a condition/situation that one is not prepared to handle. He emphasized that effective planning can minimize the development of an "emergency." The importance of understanding the needs of each group that is potentially impacted by an incident was also addressed. The manner in which information is disseminated and how it is presented needs to be tailored to each particular audience in order to communicate the intended message effectively. Emphasis was placed on establishing and maintaining public trust for the authorities in charge of an incident. Rainer Alho, Helsinki, Finland, Fire Department, discussed several key considerations in planning for an emergency, including: • Local government and community coordination and integration with the planning process; • Resource identification; • Medical support and integration; • Inclusion of all community organizations and groups; and • Coordination of human factors and technological practices. As an example, he discussed the organization that the Helsinki fire department uses for its emergency response actions. William Keffer, U.S. EPA On-Scene Coordinator, described the importance of understanding what constitutes an emergency, the need for a centralized organization of control, and the need to identify support resources. (U.S. EPA On-Scene Coordinators evaluate chemical releases and determine when the national government needs to take charge of the response action.) In his presentation, Mr. Keffer addressed these elements by describing a national response to the hazards associated with a former pesticide manufacturing facility that required thorough decontamination to eliminate the hazards. This response action demonstrated both the technical complexity of clean-up actions and the role of the national government in responding to incidents that are beyond the capabilities and resources of local and state agencies. Jukka Takala, International Labor Organization (ILO), discussed common elements to both emergency planning and response. He stressed the importance of coordination at the local level, ------- 17 identification and inclusion of respective organizations in the planning process, and effective identification of and communication to all organizations. ------- 19 Prevention of Chemical Accidents — Technical Presentations/Discussion Chair: Wayne Tamarelli, U.S. Rapporteurs: J. Molnar, Hungary, and Elizabeth Averill, U.S. The Chair, Wayne Tamarelli, opened the session and focused on the importance of mutual assistance and cooperation between all involved parties in order to "work for the best and prepare for the worst." The first presentation was by John Haines of the International Programme on Chemical Safety (IPCS), established in 1980 by the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Labour Organization (ILO), and UNEP, as a joint venture to provide evaluated information on toxic chemicals and to strengthen national capabilities of member states for chemical safety. In addition, WHO has its own emergency preparedness and response activities. Mr. Haines outlined the structure of WHO, which is comprised of a central headquarters and six regional offices worldwide. Each office has activities in the fields of chemical safety, emergency preparedness, and response. The IPCS provides the technical input related to management of chemical emergencies of WHO emergency preparedness and response activities. The essential mandate of WHO is health; several programs have been initiated focussing on protection of human health and the environment in the case of chemical incidents. Evaluated information on health and environmental effects of chemicals and on how to diagnose and treat the adverse effects is being provided, as is guidance on establishing health facilities for chemical emergency preparedness and response. Another area of significant activity is education and training. Specific program initiatives include: (1) research into antidotes and other agents used in the treatment of chemical poisoning; (2) establishment of the INTOX poisons information package with the preparation of poison information monographs (PIMs)), available in computerized and hard copy forms, in English, French, and Spanish; (3) publication of health and safety guides (HSGs) and International Chemical Safety Cards (ICSCs) for specific chemicals, covering physical-chemical and toxicological properties, health and environmental effects, prevention, first aid, environmental cleanup, and legislation related to the chemical; and (4) preparation of guidelines on poison control, a Handbook on Poisoning, and a Manual on Analytical Toxicology. Future planned initiatives include: organizing regional awareness workshops and training courses on the medical aspects of chemical emergency preparedness and response; and the development of mechanisms for international collection of compatible data relating to exposure and observed clinical features, including long-term sequelae of chemical incidents. Mr. Haines noted that a conference on human health and chemical accidents, being jointly organized by WHO, OECD, UNEP, and the IPCS, will be held 10-13 June 1991 in Utrecht, the Netherlands. Mr. Alun Williams of the U.K. Health and Safety Executive outlined the major provisions, amendments, and scope of the Seveso Directive. The general duties of manufacturing facilities (covered in the original directive) and storage facilities (added as a result of the second amendment) are to prevent major accidents and limit their consequences, demonstrate this capacity to the competent authority, and report incidents to the competent local authority who must subsequently report them to the European Commission. Incidents covered include not only those that have resulted in a loss of life but also those "near misses" with catastrophic potential. The directive outlines the role of the competent authority. Specific duties are prescribed for facilities with highly hazardous substances, including the requirement to produce a safety report for new facilities and for major modification of existing facilities, ------- 20 and on-site and off-site emergency plans. The directive provides for information to the public on a "needs to know" basis as distinguished from the broader "right to know" provided under U.S. law. In the future, land use planning provisions may be added, involving siting requirements for future facilities and development of residential and non-commercial property near existing facilities. Other modifications may include ecotoxic considerations, a more generic approach to covered substances, and extension of coverage to presently excluded facilities (e.g., mining, nuclear, and waste disposal). A great degree of latitude exists in approaches taken to implement the directive in the respective member countries. Gees van Kuijen, Netherlands Ministry of Housing Physical Planning and Environment, described the implementation of the Seveso Directive in the Netherlands, as well as other approaches taken by that country. Four major legislative acts (Nuisance, Working Environment, Disaster, and Physical Planning Acts) contribute to various aspects of the Netherlands prevention strategy. A central feature of their approach is a rigorous licensing system and the production of an external safety report. Under Dutch law, all facilities in the Netherlands are covered and must produce this report, which is available for public inspection. In addition, the government has mapped all facilities and conducted individual and societal risk assessments of all regions surrounding these facilities. These risk assessments aid decision-making by the authorities. Risks are categorized as "negligible," "risk reduction-acceptable," or "unacceptable" based on agreed ranges of calculated risk. Land-use planning that balances the need for new housing development and industrial development while minimizing risk is a central concern. Ray Brandes, ICI Americas, Inc., discussed his company's systematic approach to hazard identification. Central to this approach is the concept that hazards must be recognized, understood, and controlled. Identification is the critical first step in prevention, without which preventive efforts would be "planted in mid air." It is also the foundation of the risk assessment. Hazard identification relies upon good engineering and good judgement. It must be systematic and rigorous. A multidisciplinary team approach is recommended and good updated documentation of the process upon which the study is based is advised. The ICI hazard study system comprises six studies, each done at specific times in the project, from inception through construction to operation. Critical tools and methods employed include hazard and operability studies (HAZOP), "what if1 structures, and checklists. Although the hazard identification process can be costly, it can result in substantial long-term savings. For every hazard identified, 20 operability problems are discovered. The resulting improved operations lead to opportunities to recover costs. The investigation of incidents, such as minor spills and containment failures, in order to find root causes can often identify potential sources of catastrophic events. Once a problem has been identified in a given process or procedure, all related processes should be evaluated for similar problems. William Mottel, of DuPont, followed with a presentation of risk management, which he views as increasingly challenging as technology expands to meet growing social demands. He stated that all events are preventable, and that industry must strive for zero major incidents. Risk management includes risk assessment, analysis, and hazard control. DuPont adopts a comprehensive approach and audits all facilities. Highlights of its approach are an analysis of management of change, training programs, quality assurance systems, and disseminatipn of process safety information. Industry must be equally prepared to develop the skills of risk analysis and install the controls that will keep new technology safe. Although the above steps are very critical, even more important is the demonstrated attitude and commitment of management. A policy of total prevention and total dedication to safety, as management's highest priority, is likely to succeed. The knowledge and skills to solve the technical-problems of process safety exist, but accident prevention requires ongoing efforts because of continually changing processes. In addition, he emphasized the need to deal with human factors such ^s boredom, fatigue, and others that can contribute to risk. Environmentally sound processes and products can give competitive advantage, and good safety, health, and environmental practices can attract and retain qualified employees. Finally, risk management means more than solving the safety problems of the plant; it means conveying information on the risk management steps undertaken to the community through informational meetings and plant tours, to win ------- 21 their support and confidence. All members of the plant should function as "ambassadors" to the community. Istvan J. Csalagovits of Hungary next spoke on monitoring and regional information management development alternative strategies. Mr. Csalagovits discussed major principles of integration and monitoring harmonization. He observed that the current generation of environmental policy is correlated with the corresponding generation of information management and network technology. While he understood historical rationales for data collection systems that are narrow and developed within the scope of a particular scientific discipline, he viewed these "closed and separated" monitoring systems as insufficient to the task of effectively protecting natural and human resources. He analyzed three monitoring systems: UNEP's "GEMS," UNECE's "NORDIC," and the EEC-Hungary's "PHARE RIM," as the monitoring integration efforts based on the global, continental, and subregional-local approaches. By the last one, on the base of four "GIR" system principles, he proposed a revised, integrated system for the high-risk industrial regions of Central and East Europe, and discussed expansion of this approach to ensure a more effective, comprehensive source of information. One of this "GIR system principles," is the "BIRD principle," an acronym for BACKGROUND (air/water/waste), IMPACT (soil/biota/human), RESOURCES (bio-mass/mineral/property), DISASTER (natural/technological/social), which attempts to interconnect and relate data that were previously isolated. He viewed this approach as one that more accurately reflects the complex interrelatedness of the ecological condition. Peter Campbell from the U.K. BP Chemical Company and the Vice Chair of CEFIC/European Chemical Association addressed the issue of industrial/governmental cooperation in research and development from a European perspective. He acknowledged that all EEC countries fund research, and that individual companies also fund research. In his view, research "coordination" equals "control," and would likely be restrictive. Mr. Campbell discussed the ways in which research information is disseminated. In the European Community there is a mechanism "SHARE," which stands for Safety Hazard Assessment Research, a cooperative initiative. Additionally, the OECD has an ad hoc committee, which has proposed a central clearinghouse function. Mr. Campbell illustrated the important interrelatedness between operator error and systemic error. He described the typical reaction to a problem as being attributed to the failure or "incompleteness" of an individual, whereas, upon closer inspection, one can uncover root or systemic causes. ------- CHAPTER 3 WORKING GROUP FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ------- 25 WORKING GROUPS The workshop was divided into two types of activities: plenary sessions in which experts presented current work in the three general topic areas — chemical emergency preparedness, response, and prevention; and working groups where conference participants had the opportunity to discuss issues and their concerns and contribute to the workshops findings and recommendations. The working groups were designed to focus on practical, cross-cutting issues that must be addressed as programs are developed, refined, and implemented. Specifically, the four working groups discussed: legislation and program approaches; process, operation, and coordination; information management; and research and development. The purpose of this working group organization was to focus the findings and recommendations on issues that may be of assistance to nations as they work on programs in this area. This chapter presents the findings and recommendations of each working group. The principal findings and recommendations include the following: • Any framework will have to be expanded and adapted to suit each country's institutional, political, economic, and cultural needs. Thus, the development of legislation and working programs will involve the identification and resolution of issues specific to that country. Development of a comprehensive program may not be accomplished immediately and may evolve over time. • Legislation and programs to implement laws should clearly define roles and responsibilities whether it be for the competent authority, government bodies, industrial facilities, or other concerned parties. There must be mechanisms for coordinating actions of responsible parties. Coordination mechanisms may be needed. • As countries develop legislation, a key area of discussion and designation will be the roles and responsibilities of the central government versus those of provincial or local authorities. A complementary support structure should be part of the program. • While all countries have had significant experiences and developed approaches to these different aspects of planning and response, there is a need to share guidance, information, and experiences. For future developments, prevention activities must be the first concern of all individuals including plant management, labor, governments, and citizens, and mechanisms must be established to facilitate this. • Planning for response is essential at all levels from the plant through the community, region, and national and international authorities if a successful response is to occur. No one organization has sufficient resources to do the entire job and, therefore, working relationships must be established to ensure that a viable planning and response system is developed. Relationships must be developed between community, regional, and national authorities to resolve transborder issues. • Information needed for chemical emergency preparedness, response and prevention is presently incomplete at all levels of government. The most pronounced information need exists at the local and departmental level of government to support response actions. Information gathering for chemical emergencies should be closely linked with the data collection required for broader environmental issues related to the production, use, and disposal of chemicals. ------- 26 The institutional structure within Central and Eastern Europe is such that no existing information system in the U.S. or Western Europe will totally meet the needs of the region. Information systems developed for the region, while perhaps based on international technology, should be created with careful attention to the institutional and cultural realities of the region. A first priority should be to establish mechanisms for accessing information on ongoing research and results to ensure that information is shared and resources are not wasted on duplicative research. Many Eastern European countries have research institutes. Given the current limitations on funding, these institutes might form a consortium to work together in selecting research projects and identifying the appropriate institute to conduct the research. Such a consortium would constitute a major resource for both Eastern and Western nations. The Regional Environmental Centre can assist many of the proposed efforts by identifying appropriate individuals and resources and disseminating information among Eastern and Western nations. ------- 27 WORKING GROUP ON LEGISLATION .AND PROGRAM APPROACHES Chair: Michael Baram, U.S. Rapporteur: Elaine Davies, U.S. Several examples of legislative and program approaches for preparedness for, response to, and prevention of chemical accidents exist in the European Community (Seveso Directive), United States, and Canada. Eastern European participants in the working group voiced particular interest in the Seveso framework, compliance with which would be required if their nations were to join the EC. Several countries in the region have legislation that addresses many of the chemical emergency issues; this legislation will form the basis upon which to build. One key issue discussed was the provision of information on chemical hazards to the public. Two models - the "right to know" model used in the U. S. (i.e., broad availability of information to any person on request) and the "need to know" model used in Europe (i.e., specific information provided to specific groups of people) - may be examined by countries developing legislation and programs. The working group developed the following findings and recommendations: FINDINGS LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORKS • Any framework will have to be expanded and adapted to suit each country's institutional, political, economic, and cultural needs. Thus, the development of legislation and working programs will involve the identification and resolution of issues specific to that country. Development of a comprehensive program may not be accomplished immediately and may evolve over time. • In developing programs to implement legislation, a country must set forth goals, objectives, and a vision, and must examine barriers to implementation. INFORMATION MODELS • The public will need to be educated about how to interpret and use information on chemical hazards in situations where the public is not used to being given information, where no event such as an accident stimulates public interest, or where expertise to interpret the information may not be available. Programs on emergency preparedness, response, and prevention must be designed to overcome these problems. For example, programs may have to include training, technical assistance, and guidance to overcome such barriers. • Another information issue involves the definition and protection of trade secrets. For the most part, the experience of Western Europe and the U.S. indicates that trade secret protection is not a major barrier to the provision of information on chemical hazards. When specific information is not provided, generic information can be made available. ------- 28 IMPLEMENTATION • Legislation and programs to implement laws should dearly define roles and responsibilities whether it be for the competent authority, government bodies, industrial facilities, or other concerned parties. There must be mechanisms for coordinating actions of responsible parties. Coordination mechanisms may be needed: * Where several Ministries have authorities in this area (e.g., Ministries of environment, health, industry, et al.); > Where responsibilities are delegated by several levels of governments; and *• To ensure communication among and input from concerned groups such as industry, green organizations, professional organizations, labor, and other relevant parties. • Countries developing legislation should consider the need for creation of formal coordination mechanisms by law or reliance upon more informal mechanisms such as committees. • The technical presentations and experiences in Europe, America, and countries implementing Awareness and Preparedness for emergencies at the Local Level (APELL) indicate that preparedness must take place at the local level. As countries develop legislation, a key area of discussion and designation will be the roles and responsibilities of the central government versus those of provincial or local levels. A complementary support structure should be part of the program. The central government could provide support in terms of standards, guidance, training, and assistance to decentralized authorities. A more decentralized government will create different needs, especially for enhanced communications. • To make legislation work (i.e., to have industries and local communities comply with legislative requirements) compliance authorities must be defined. Programs should be developed to inform industry and communities about requirements and to help them comply. Funding mechanisms must also be addressed. Further, countries must develop mechanisms to build trust among those responsible for emergency preparedness, response, and prevention, including industry, government, and the public. TRANSBOUNDARY • Legislation on information policies should be examined to consider the impact of laws on transboundary issues. For example, is information on hazardous facilities near borders available to authorities on both sides? RECOMMENDATIONS • A workshop should be held on a regional basis for legislators, top management in industry and government, and other responsible actors such as green groups, professional organizations, labor, and trade groups to share experiences on legislative frameworks such as the Seveso Directive, the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act, or other models, and on their implementation. Written information should be presented and distributed as part of these efforts. This workshop could be under the auspices of the Regional Environmental Centre. ------- 29 In cases where countries are amending, expanding, or creating new legislation and programs, they should investigate the use of a high-level coordinating commission or task force with representatives from all responsible ministries and potentially other responsible actors (e.g., industry, green groups) to determine legislative changes and needs to fit the chosen framework. High-level political support should be sought early in the process. Countries in this area developing or expanding legislation and programs should provide for a system of technical assistance reaching to the local level. Experts used should be overseen to ensure an adequate understanding of the country's specific organization and need. The convening of a regional ministerial level meeting should be considered to discuss topics such as transboundary emergencies, information sharing, common legislative concerns, etc. The Regional Environmental Centre can play an important role in the identification of key persons in the region concerned with various aspects of chemical emergency preparedness, response, and prevention. The center should consider establishing expert groups to deal with specific issues such as legislation development or technical standards. It may be able to provide support to green groups in verifying information, and to all responsible actors in overcoming sociological barriers such as lack of trust and other basic economic concerns. ------- 31 WORKING GROUP ON PROCESS/OPERATIONS/COORDINATION Chair: Kent Grey, U.S. Rapporteur: Wayne Bissett, Canada Preparing for, responding to, and preventing chemical accidents requires the development of systematic approaches and coordination with the many groups that are involved and affected. The working group participants discussed the current state of emergency response plans in their nations. All participating countries believed that plans existed to address the issues; in subsequent discussions, all countries came to the conclusion that their plans were in various stages of development and none were complete at all levels. Many of the factors that need to be considered in preparedness and response actions must reflect societal concerns, priorities, and resources. Nonetheless, the working group participants identified the following findings and recommendations: FINDINGS • All participants identified common concerns: >• Out-of-date technologies > Human error >• Lack of training/education »• Secrecy about accidents > Demands for increased production >• Need for emergency planning guidelines • Planning for response is essential at all levels from the plant through the community, region, and national and international authorities if a successful response is to occur. No one organization has sufficient resources to do the entire job and, therefore, working relationships must be established to ensure that a viable planning and response system is developed. • Relationships must be developed between community, regional, and national authorities to resolve transborder issues. • Guidance, standards, etc., are needed to enhance the development of plans and ensure the compatibility of response systems. All plans must reflect consequence analyses and vulnerability of the area. • The purpose of response is to favorably change the outcome either by taking defensive action, offensive action, or even no action: all are viable alternatives. • Definitive information is lacking on the presence of facility fire brigades, community hazardous response teams, and national support including use of the military. Nonetheless, there is room for development and improvement through training, etc. ------- 32 Prevention activities start before the plant is even built and can be considered in terms of: * Siting of the facility (relative to population and services, transportation routes, geography, environmental resources potentially affected); and > Design of the facility (mechanical safety measures, facility layout — location and separation of process units, storage tanks, etc. — human factor concerns). When a facility is built, it must gain the acceptance of the community. Techniques to build public trust include providing the public with information about the facility, coordinating the facility's emergency response plan with the community's plan, providing an independent assessment of the facility's safety practices, marketing "environmentally sound" products, and ensuring the plant is safe for workers. Laws, regulations, etc., may be needed to protect citizens and perhaps ensure reliability of the plant. Safety is good business. Plant reliability provides profit, safety, security, trust, and a quality product. Plant reliability can be achieved by training, monitoring/audit (internal/external), maintenance, and management commitment to safety. Many approaches exist in all countries to ensure reliability. RECOMMENDATIONS Prevention, preparedness, and emergency response form a continuum and must be interrelated. While all countries have had significant experiences and developed approaches to these different aspects, there is a need to share guidance, information, and experiences. Coordination of resources among response forces is needed. For future developments, prevention activities must be the first concern of all individuals including plant management, labor, governments, and citizens, and mechanisms must be established to facilitate this. ------- 33 WORKING GROUP ON INFORMATION MANAGEMENT Chair: John Robinson, U.S. Rapporteur: I.J. Csalagovits Information needs and management are central both to the development and implementation of programs related to chemical emergency preparedness, response, and prevention. Several speakers at the plenary sessions noted that although a large amount of data is collected, information based on these data is frequently not available. At local, national, and international levels, data needs must be defined and methods for managing and disseminating the data developed. The working group on information management drew the largest number of participants of the four working groups. To facilitate its discussion, the group divided into two sections, one discussing information needs and means of developing and disseminating information, and the other covering issues related to generating data via research methodologies such as analytical methods, modelling, and risk assessments. The findings and recommendations were developed during a final joint session of the two sections. The first group defined four basic types of data needed for planners and responders and added a fifth, miscellaneous category. The groupings established were: (1) Chemical data: data necessary and sufficient for "front-line" chemical emergency preparedness, response, and prevention. These data are principally generated in laboratories of manufacturers or of research/academic institutions. (2) Inventory data: data that profile what currently exists in terms of hazards, effects and consequences of accidents, and resources available to aid in minimizing risks related to the hazards. (3) Case histories: data on the actual experience of people dealing with chemical accidents that might prove helpful to others dealing with the same or analogous hazards. (4) Statistics: data that allow for the development of baselines, trends, frequencies, and the likelihood of accidents for given profiles. (5) Other: other relevant information. Annex I provides the working group's evaluation of which of these data are needed and available at the local, national, and international levels. The working group considered approaches to disseminating information. However, the group chose to address the broader issues of information exchange in general rather than the more limiting issue of communicating with the public. On the basis of its discussions, the working group developed the following findings and recommendations: ------- 34 FINDINGS • Information needed for chemical emergency preparedness, response and prevention is presently incomplete at all levels of government. The most pronounced information need exists at the local and departmental level of government to support response actions. • Information gathering for chemical emergencies should be closely linked with the data collection required for broader environmental issues related to the production, use, and disposal of chemicals. • The institutional structure in Central and Eastern Europe is such that no existing information system in the U.S. or Western Europe will totally meet the needs of the region. Information systems developed for the region, while perhaps based on international technology, should be created with careful attention to the institutional and cultural realities of the region. • There is a need to adopt standardized models to assess the severity of internal or transboundary chemical releases. • There is a need to develop a consistent, state-of-the-art approach for risk assessment associated with chemical emergencies. RECOMMENDATIONS • Information collection related to chemical emergency preparedness, response and prevention should be considerably expanded at the local, national, and international level to fill the needs identified in Annex I. Priorities for information collection are: > Chemical data (properties, hazards, response recommendations, etc.) > Chemical inventory data »• Case histories (including reports of near misses) + Statistical trends/probabilities • Information collection should be standardized in terms of units of measure and other parameters to enable consistent approaches to be used in data analysis and interpretation. • Existing air and water models should be further evaluated for adaptation to both centralized and decentralized needs. Unless existing methods of data communication can be significantly enhanced, consideration should be given to implementing localized modeling capability. • A capability for risk assessment should be developed with the assistance of the Regional Environmental Centre. Risk assessments should consider both short and long-term effects of chemical exposures. • Recurring issues that must be dealt with in information management are compatibility of media, data quality and validation, an* the need for guiding principles for confidentiality that may affect response operations. ------- 35 Annex I EVALUATION OF INFORMATION NEEDS AND AVAILABILITY FOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND PREVENTION CHEMICAL DATA Identification MSDS Hazards Identification Codes Response information Treatment Toxicology Chemical ructions INVENTORY Facilities Storage Transportation/iafrastructiire Response resources Disposal sites MAPS (health facilities, day- night population concentration, topographic, hydrogeologic, etc. — natural and man- made environment characteristics) ;;;;d^^itt»lEMEPQRT4' v ;v;ii^E^:i|ili|s;';:!: V .-V-: STATISTICS :|^t^^'pilni|pis| • vj .;.- i : Trends OTHERS Best/safest technology i Ij^ii^tkin/isguiation; Standardized identification schemes Local Info. Needed Yes Yes Yes Yes Ye& Yes Yes Yes, Yes Ye» Yes Yes Yes Yes i:<:< Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Info. Available Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Ye* YB*.:"' Yes Yes National Info. Needed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Info. Available Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Y» Yes Yes Yes Yes ' Yes International Info. Needed Yes Yes Ye» Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Info. Available Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes • Yes Yes Yes : Yes Yes ------- 37 WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT Chair: A. Bekes, Hungary Rapporteur: T. Carmody, U.S. A number of techniques and technologies have been developed and continue to be developed that relate to emergency planning, response actions, and prevention. These technologies and techniques include models and risk assessment techniques as well as technologies for responding to, mitigating, monitoring, detecting, and preventing releases. The working group discussed ongoing research in each participant's country and focused on methods of coordinating research efforts and disseminating results. The working group identified some research needs and classified potential projects by order of importance (see Annex II), but thought that more study was needed to determine the appropriateness of these projects. Generally, the group developed the following findings and recommendations: FINDINGS Considerable research has been conducted in the East and West. At least one research institute or center exists in each country that conducts research related to these issues. Before additional research is begun, the results of completed research should be shared to ensure that research is not conducted in areas that have already been adequately addressed. The financial limitations of most countries make this sharing essential. Eastern and Western countries can learn from each other. RECOMMENDATIONS A first priority should be to establish mechanisms for accessing information about ongoing research and results to ensure that information is shared and resources are not wasted on duplicative research. Many Eastern European countries have research institutes. Given the current limitations on funding, these institutes might form a consortium to work together in selecting research projects and identifying the appropriate institute to conduct the research. The Regional Environmental Centre might help by surveying the existing institutes to identify skills and interests. These institutes should also coordinate their efforts with those of Western research facilities to prevent duplicative research. Such a consortium would constitute a major resource for both Eastern and Western nations. ------- 38 Annex II POTENTIAL RESEARCH PROJECTS First Priority Second Priority Third Priority Emergency Preparedness and Response Develop more data on chronic effects from acute exposures. Develop antidotes when none exist or improve antidotes if appropriate. Develop a classification system which can be used early on after the accident to describe the severity of the accident. Develop systems to put out relatively small fires that are continuously fed by hydrocarbons or other flammable liquid (e.g., situations where the cut off valve cannot be reached.) Develop a classification system for ecotoxic hazards. Develop data and a system that enables a community to study the various response organizations and select the most appropriate for their case. Research the best method for getting a preparedness or response message to the public (consider television). Develop materials to mitigate ecotoxic effects. Develop a quality control system to verify abilities of responders. Prevention Develop a system to test operators' abilities when under stress. Develop software to list the hazards of specific processes and the worst and most likely consequences. Develop software for community study of multi-plant event. Research the effectiveness of current systems used to prioritize plants and other sites. Research best panel board system for operators' use when under stress; research best staffing level for normal operation versus emergency operation. Research the value (best use to date) of Quantitative Risk Assessments. ------- APPENDIX I - LIST OF PARTICIPANTS ------- 41 WORKSHOP ON CHEMICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND PREVENTION 18-21 SEPTEMBER, 1990, VESZPREM LIST OF PARTICIPANTS Country U.S.A. U.S.A. U.S.A. U.S.A. U.S.A. U.S.A. U.S.A. U.S.A. U.S.A. U.S.A. U.S.A. U.S.A. U.S.A. U.S.A. U.S.A. U.S.A. U.S.A. U.S.A. U.S.A. U.S.A. U.S.A. U.S.A. U.S.A. U.S.A. U.S.A. U.S.A. Family Name Averill Bagdy Baram Brandes Jr. Callan Carmody Clay Davies Dinardo Gallagher Gray Jennings Keffer Kososkl Dr. Lindsey Lukesh Makrls Mottel Nelson Po|e Robinson Scanned Speight Tamarelli Wassersug Schlenker First Name Elizabeth Zoltan Michael Raymond L Michael Thomas Don R. Elaine Raymond Kevin Edwin Kent Kimberly Bill John F. Heather Deborah Jim William Madeline Gerald V. John H. Gerard Randy Wayne Steve Tomas Firm Workplace Health Fund U.S. Occupational Safety & Health Administration Bracken & Baram ICI Americas Inc. Wallingford Fire Dept. Am. Inst. of Chemical Engineers U.S. EPA U.S. EPA U.S. EPA, New England Lab. Navy Reg. Data Automation Centre, Wash. Navy Yard Emergency Response & Consultation Branch, ATSDH U.S. EPA U.S. EPA John Kososki and Associates ICF Incorporated U.S EPA U.S. EPA E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company ICF Incorporated National Wildlife Federation NOAA Hazardous Materials Response Branch U.S. Occupational Safety & Health Administration U.S. Coast Guard HQ Dock Resins Corporation Reg. Env. Centre for Central and Eastern Europe American Embasy Address 815 16th Street, NW, Rm 301, Washington, DC 20036 200 Constitution Av. NW, Washington, DC 20210 33 Mount Vernon Street, Boston, MA 02108 Concord Pike & New Murphy R., Wilmington, DE 19897 293 Bee Street, Meriden, CT 06450 345 East 47th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017 401 M Street, SW, OS-100, Washington, DC 20460 401 M Street, SW, OS-120, Washington, DC 20460 60 Westview St. Lexington MA 02203 Washington, DC 20374-1435 ATSDR (E32) 1600 Clifton Road, Atlanta, GA 30333 401 M Street, SW, OS-100, Washington, DC 20460 25 Funston Road, Kansas City, Kansas 66115 1331 Elmwood Av. Suite 50, Columbia, SC 29201 1 1 Rue de Madrid, 75008 Paris, France 401 M Street, SW, OS-120, Washington, DC 20460 401 M Street, SW, OS-120, Washington, DC 20460 ERD, N11543, Wilmington, DE 19898 9300 Lee Highway, Fairfax, VA. 22031-1207 1400 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036-2266 NOAA 7600 Sand Point Way, NE, Seattle, WA 981 15 200 Constitution Av. NW, Washington DC 20216 2200 2nd. St SW, Washington DC 20598 1512 West Elisabeth Av. Unden, NJ 07036 1035 Budapest, Mlklos ter 1., Hungary 1054 Bp Szabadsag ter 12 Telephone 2028427834 202 523 6104 6177424950 302 885 5501 203 630 0784 2127057319 202 382 4610 202 475 8600 617861 4385 202 433 4218 4046390615 202 475 7046 9132363888 803 254 5929 33 1 43870426 202 475 8247 202 475 8600 3027734190 703 934 9740 202 797 6890 2065266317 2025236194 2022679417 201 862 2351 (36-1)1688 685 (36-1)1126450 Fax 202 842 7838 302 886 5585 203 630 0784 212 838 8274 202 252 0927 404 639 0655 803771 6142 33 1 43873280 202 252 0927 202 252 0927 302 774 2097 703 934 9740 202 797 6646 206 526 6329 202 523 6064 201 8624015 (36-1)1687851 Telex 641055 ------- 42 Interntl. Rep. Finland Canada CEFIC Bahrain WHO Hungary The Netherlands OECD ILO United Kingdom UNEP Family Name Mho Bissett Campbell Fakhra Halnes Dr. Hardl Van Kuljen Schulberg Takala Williams Young First Name Ralner Wayne D. Peter G. Khalld John A. Peter Cees Franclne Jukka Alun J. Calvin Robert Firm The City of Helsinki Fire Dept HO. Chem. Ind. Div., Ind. Prog. Branch Env. Safety Branch, BP. Chemicals Ltd. Environmental Protection Committee IPCS/WHO Reg. Env. Centre for Central and Eastern Europe Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning & Env. OECD Environment Dlr., Chemical Div. International Occupational Safety & Health Inf. C. Hazardous Installation Policy Branch, HSE UNEP, Industry and Env. Office Address 15 Agricolankatu. 00530 Helsinki, Finland Ottawa K1 A OH3, Canada 76 Buckingham Pat. Road, London 9W1W CSV, U.K. P.O. Box 18809, AdUya, Bahrain CH-1211 Geneva 27, Switzerland 1035 Budapest, MIWos Mr 1., Hunga/y P.B. 450, 2280 MB Leidschendam, The Netherlands 2, Rue Andre Pascal, 75775 Paris Cedex 16 France ILO. CH-1211 Geneva 22, Switzerland Stanley Precinct, Bootte, Merseyslde L20, 3QZ, U.K. 38-43, qua! Andre Citroen, 75730 Paris 15 France Telephone 32503036200 1 819 953 8257 44771 5818102 973293693 41227912111 (38-1)1668685 31 70 320 9367 33 1 45247885 41 22 799 8740 051 951 3212 33 1 40588814 Fax 1 819 997 0547 4471 5818459 973293694 41 22 791 0746 (36-1)1687 651 31 70 327 9866 33 1 45247676 41 22 798 8885 051 922 7918 33 1 40588874 Telex 620180 415647 628235 204897 Country Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Family Name Aidlcs Abraham Bajtay Bakonyl Dr. Baltazar Dr. Baumstark Banhldi Bence Bekes Dr. Bleszlty Dr. Bognar Bodnar Bonifertne Szigetl Bzeszlty Dr. First Name Laszlo Kalman Andras Arpad Zsolt Marlon Istvan Bela Andras Janos Nandor Ferenc Marta Janos Firm Hungarian Red Cross Institute for Environment Management Ministry for Welfare Ministry for Industry and Commerce Ministry for Environment M.I. Fire Brigade Training C. National Oil & Gas Ind. Trust Life Saving Service Hungarian Labour Inspectorate Fire Service HQ VITUKI Fire Service HQ Ministry for Environment Ministry of Inert Address Budapest, Arany J. u. 17 1054 Budapest, Alkotmany u. 27-29 1051 Budapest, Arany J. u. 6-8 1024 Budapest, MartJrok utja 85 1011 Budapest, Ffi u. 44-50 Budapest, Laktanya u. 33 1117 Budapest, Schonherz u. 18 1 135 Bp. Robert K. Korut 77 1054 Budapest, Akademia u. 10 1064 Budapest, Izabella u. 62-64 H-1085 Budapest, Kvassat J. ut 1 1084 Budapest, Izabella u. 62-64 101 1 Budapest, F5 u. 48-50 1126 Budapest, Vorosko ut 10 Telephone (36-1)1128635 (36-1)1118276 (36-1)1153614 (36-1)1664 000 (36-1)1203 638 1324376 (38-1)338-160 06-1)1154840 (36-1)1110492 Fax 3611362198 (38-1)1391-519 Telex 224150 227885 22-4859 ------- 43 Country Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Family Name Csalagovits Dr. Deak Florian Futo Gal Dr. Gotz Illes Hies Dr. Jakab Kakonyi Kalman Kiss Dr. Kozenkai Kurucz Lindner Dr. Molnar Dr. Mogyorodi Muzsay Dr. Nagy Papp Paszto Paszto Dr. Pazmanyl Popelyak Ratosi Reininger Dr. Reti Scheuring Sebestyen Szabo First Name Istvan Peter Endre Rita Jozsef Tibor Mihaly Zoltan Istvan Gabor Gyorgy Elemer Jeno Imre Erno Jeno Ferenc Geza Gusztav Kalman Eszter Peter Gabor Pal Erno Robert Tamas Imre Bela Geza Firm Ministry for Environment Ministry of Interior Institute for Environment Management Okoservice Min. of Inert National Oil & Gas Ind. Trust M.I. Fire Brigade Training C. Ministry for Environment Borsod Chemical Works GEOCOMP LTD. Tisza Chemical Works Ministry for Environment Aerocaritas Great Plain Oil & Gas Prod. C. US-Hungarian J.F. National Inst. of Public Health Chem. Wks. of North Hungary Hungaria Insurance Company Inst. for Safety in Chem. & Expl. Industries Ministry for Environment Ministry for Industry and Commerce Institute for Environment Management DKV Fire Service HQ OKGT DVK Oil and Gaz Trust Ministry for Environment Nitrokemia Wks. Envir. Proyt. Inst. Duna Oil Industrial Comp. Hungaria Insurance Company Address 1011 Budapest, F8 u. 44-50 1051 Budapest, Jozsef A. u. 2-4 1054 Budapest, Alkotmany u. 27-29 1035 Budapest, Miklos ter 1 1903 Pf. 314 Budapest, Schonherz u. 17 Budapest, Laktanya u. 33 1011 Budapest, F5 u. 44-50 1021 Budapest, Kuruclesi ut 44 3581 Leninvaros, Pf. 20 1011 Budapest, FS u. 44-50 Budapest, FS ter 2 5001 Szolnok, Ady E. u. 26 1111 Budapest, Szent Gellert ter 4 1097 Budapest, Gyali ut 2-6 3792 Sajobabony Budapest, Bank Ban ut 17/L 1119 Budapest Serleg u. 9 1011 Budapest FS u. 48-50 1024 Budapest, Martirok utja 85 11 13 Budapest Aga u. 4 2443 Szazhalombatta Pf. 1 1064 Budapest, Izabella u. 62-64 1011 Budapest, FS u. 44-50 1110 Budapest, Serleg ut 9 Szazhalombatta Budapest, Bank B. ut 17 Telephone (36-1)1151 897 187350 (36-1)1686229 (36-1)1295683 (36-1)1665710 (36-1)1669 121 (36-49) 21-983 (36-1) 1804-432 (36-56) (36-1)1664-011 1142250 4667111 (36-1) 1850-558 (36-1)1611-087 1362198 (36-1)1611 417 1620673 (36-1) 1611-087 (36-1) 1620-673 (36-1) 1820-750 Fax (36-1)1362 198 (36-1)1884 105 (36-1) 1763801 36493,1322 (36-1) 1804 432 365630103 (36-1) 1664419 1362198 Telex 224879 227465 226419 5623320 62320 224879 227465 ------- 44 Country Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Family Name Stefan Szaloki Szapary Szemenyei Szllagyi Tamas Ufalvi Dr. Uzonyi Valu Varsa Vago Zakonyi Zsengeller First Name Fcrenc Istvan Bela Istvan Gyula Janos Annamaria Tamas Ferenc Endre Istvan Janos Istvan Firm Borsod Chemical Works OKGT NKFV Oil and Gaz Trust Mitrokemia Ministry for Foreign Affairs Duna Oil Industrial Trust NKF Ministry of Inert Hungaria Insurance O. Ministry of Inert Water Research Centre Min. of Inert Ministry for Environment Hungarian Oil Trust Address 3700 Kazincbarcika, Bolya ter 1 5001 Szolnok, Ady Endre ut 26 Fuzfogyartelep 1025 Budapest, Bern rkpt. 47 2443 Szazhalombatta Pf 1 6720 Szeged, Roosevelt ter 7-9 Budapest, Jozsef A. ut 2-4 Budapest Jozsef A. ut 2-4 1095 Budapest Kvassay J. ut 1 1903 Pf. 314 1011 Budapest, F8 u. 44-50 Telephone (36-48) 10-211 56/40713 (36-80) 52-133 (36-1) 1568-000 (36-26) 54-322 (36-62) 22-088 (36-1) 1121-710 (36-1) 1121-710 (36-1) 1344823 (36-1) 1297450 (36-1) 352-995 Fax 56/30103 Telex 23320 224879 Country Austria Austria Austria Austria Austria Family Name Goller Neubauer Schober Dr. Tomek Zeplichal First Name Rudolf Gustav Walter Sabine Gustav Firm Ministry for Economic Affairs Ministry of Environment, Youth and Family Ministry of Environment, Youth and Family Magistratsabteilung 36 Fachverband der Chemischen Ind. Address Stubenrtng 1, A-1011 Wien Kadetzkystrasse 2, 1031 Wien Kadetzkystrasse 2, 1031 Wien Dresdenerstrasse 75, 1200 Wien Si Peterstrasse A4021 Linz Country Bulgaria Bulgaria Bulgaria Bulgaria Family Name Bozhanov Naidenov Ninov Vitkov Dr. First Name Simeon Naiden Nino Tzeno Firm Ministry of Environment Ekoglasnost Ministry of Environment Ministry of Environment Address 1000 Sofia, bul. VI. Poptonov 67 1000 Sofia, bul. Al. Stambolijsni 25 1000 Sofia, bul. VI. Poptonov 67 1000 Sofia, bul. VI. Poptonov 67 Telephone 022271100/5834 022271158/4846 022271158/4119 0222/35661 1/335 073259173399 Fax 02227139311 0222 7129681 0222 7129681 07325917 143 Telex 111145 221324 Telephone 522583 873046 518992 392117 Fax Telex ------- 45 Country Czecho-Slovakia Czechoslovakia Czecho-Slovakia Czecho-Slovakia Czecho-Slovakia Czecho-Slovakia Family Name Blazicek Culh Maty as Moucha Zika Skarka Dr. First Name Vladimir Juraj Radomir Bohuslav Ivan Jaromlr Firm City Town Hall Slovak Commision for Environment Ministry of Industry Federal Environmental Committee Spolana Enterprise, Neratovlce Chemoprojekt Address Primacilne nam. 1. 81471 Bratislava SCe, Hlobka, 2, 812 34 Bratislava NaPorid2411180Praha1 FVZP, Stezska 9, 12029 Praha 2 Spolana, Enterprise 277 1 1 Neratovice 1 1 185 Praha 2, Stepanska 15 Telephone 07 356 175 0742451 2327088 02259593 0208 882151 422291246 Fax 07 476 25 2323747 422299286 Telex 92565 121 104 121157 121114 Country Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Family Name Fendler Hesel Muller Neuhoff Steuer First Name Roland Oieter Gunther Firm Oko-lnstitute e.V. TUV Hheinland Technical Inspection Service (RM TUR) Address Prinz Christians Weg 7. D-6100 Darmstadt 5000 Cologne am Graune Stein Stendenstrasse 53, Essen D-4300 Koeln Dormagen Telephone (0)6151 409612 0221/806-2155 201 8252E16 Fax (0)6151 409633 0221/8061753 201 8252517 Telex 8873659 8579680 Country Italy Italy Family Name Marsili Serra First Name Giovanni Sebastiano Firm Instituo Superiors di Samita Ministry of Environment Address Viale Regina Elena 299, Rome 00161 Via Volturno, 58 00100 Rome Telephone 064990/878 39 6 675 93282 Fax 064O40O64 39 6 675 93267 Telex Country Poland Poland Family Name Bogacki Hanusik First Name Andrzej Antoni Firm Institute of Environment Protection Institute of Environment Protection Address 00 548 Warsaw, Krucza 5/1 1 40 832 Katowice ul. Kossutha L Telephone 299254 546-031 Fax 299063 541-717 Telex 816419 0312532 ------- 46 Country Romania Romania Romania Romania Romania Family Name Eseanu lonescu lonescu Jircche Moroianu First Name Dan-Ion Carmen Marioara Dana Ion Firm Ministry of Water, Forest and Environment Ministry of Water, Forest and Environment Int. of Res. for Environmental Engineering Ministry of Water, Forest and Environment Inst of Env. Res. & Engineering Address Str. Negustori Nr. 3, Sector 2 Bucharest, 7008 Str. Negustori Nr. 3, Sector 2 Bucharest, 7008 Splalul Independents 294, sector 6, Bucarest 7000 Str. Negustori Nr. 3, Sector 2 Bucharest, 7008 Splalul Independentei 294, sector 6, Bucarest 7000 Telephone 136880/158 136880/158 373060 136880/158 136880/158 Fax Telex 11457 11457 10672 11457 11457 Country Soviet Union Soviet Union Soviet Union Soviet Union Soviet Union Family Name Nikolaev Pavlikhina Shelan Sukhorukov Vavilin First Name Venedict V. Alexandra V. Ivan Arkadievic Georgy A. Igor Alexeevich Firm All-Union Sci. & Res. Information Center on Env. Central Ints. of Agrochem. Sen/, for Agriculture The USSR State Comm. for Env. Protection All-Union Sci. & Res. Inst. of Water Protection The USSR State Comm. for Env. Protection Address 1 17463 Moscow ul. Karamzina, 17 Moscow, ul. Priashnikova, 31, Korp. 2 103009 Moscow, ul. Nezhdanovoy, 11 310888 Kharkov-sea, ul. Bakulina, 6 117321 Moscow, Kedrov st 8 Telephone 4221655 2163750 22921 58 245 21 63 1255281 Fax Telex 441692 125569 111114 Country Yugoslavia Yugoslavia Yugoslavia Yugoslavia Family Name Lovincic Dolinsek Fuchs Tosovic First Name Davor Franci Rodovan Slobodan Firm University 1st. for Health & Environment Inst. "Josef Stefan' University of Zagreb Inst. of Public Health Address 61000 Ljubljana, Trubarjeva 2 Janova 39, 61 1 1 1 Ljubljana M. Pljode 158, 41000 Zagreb str. 29 novembra 54-a, Beograde Telephone 061 323 645 061 214399 041 434188 01 1 338 230 Fax 061 323 955 219383 041 434 522 01 1 339 207 Telex 31296 ------- APPENDIX II - ANNOTATED AGENDA ------- 49 U.S. - HUNGARIAN WORKSHOP The U.S.-Hungary arc sponsoring a workshop on chemical emergency preparedness, response, and prevention will bring together delegates from Eastern and Central European nations, the United States, and several international organizations. Chemicals and other hazardous materials play an important role in the modern world, but the hazards they pose make it imperative that all due care be taken to eliminate risks associated with their manufacture, processing, handling, storage, transportation, and use. A series of major chemical accidents — at Flixborough, England in 1974, at Seveso, Italy in 1976, at Bhopal, India in 1984, and at Basel, Switzerland in 1988 — heightened both public and governmental awareness of the potentially devastating effects of accidental releases of chemicals into the environment. These accidents and others highlighted the need for communities, regions, and nations to be prepared for and capable of responding to the types of chemical accidents that may occur within their areas. Equally important, the effects of these accidents on both the workers, the community, and the environment emphasized the necessity of concerted actions directed towards accident prevention. Chemical emergency preparedness, response, and prevention are the focus of many national and international programs. In 1988, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) undertook a project to develop guidance for member countries in this area. To gather information, OECD sponsored workshops on (1) the role of industry in preventing accidents; (2) the role of workers in preventing accidents and information needed by the public; (3) the role of government in preventing accidents and land use planning; and (4) emergency preparedness and response, and coordination of research. A fifth workshop on human factors will be held in Japan in 1991. The findings and recommendations of these workshops will be used in the development of guidelines. In addition, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) has developed the Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at the Local Level (APELL), a set of guidelines for establishing emergency preparedness programs. APELL is being implemented in several developing countries. Other international organizations working this area include the International Labor Organization (ILO), which is concentrating on the role of workers, and the World Health Organization (WHO), which is sponsoring a conference on emergency preparedness in June 1991. On the national level, numerous programs exist for national, regional, and local governments. The Economic Convention of Europe (ECE) is exploring the need for a convention related to these issues. The objectives of this workshop are: • To provide an opportunity for participants to exchange experiences and address issues of concern; and • To develop recommendations that may be of use to participating nations as they evaluate, revise, or develop programs in these areas. The workshop will have technical presentations related to chemical emergency preparedness, response, and prevention. Participants will then take part in workshops on legislation/program development; process, organization, and coordination; information management/systems; and research and development. The chairs, rapporteurs, presenters, and participants have been invited to represent the spectrum of organizations involved in these issues. ------- 50 AGENDA September 18. 1990 Opening Session The first session provides participating nations an opportunity to review briefly their programs in the areas of chemical emergency preparedness, response, and prevention. The summaries will cover insights gained from national experiences and issues the countries face. The purpose of this session is to create a common ground of understanding among participants about the types of existing programs and issues of particular importance to the delegations. 8:30 AM REGISTRATION OF PARTICIPANTS 9:00 AM OPENING SESSION Introduction — Jim Makris, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Opening Remarks — Elemer Kiss, Hungarian Ministry for Environment (HME) Background and Context/Keynote Speech on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Prevention Systems — Don R. Clay, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA); Worker Safety Issues — Gerard Scannell, U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration Introductory presentations — current approaches in the area of chemical emergency preparedness, response, and prevention, key issues and insights, workshop expectations (10 minutes each) Austria Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Germany Italy Poland Romania USSR Yugoslavia Regional Environmental Centre, Budapest, Hungary, Presentation Steve Wassersug 12:00 PM LUNCH 1:00 PM United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) — Awareness and Preparedness at the Local Level (APELL) Robert Young, UNEP Implementing APELL — Khalid Fakhro, Bahrain ------- 51 1:40 PM EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS TECHNICAL PRESENTATIONS/DISCUSSION Chair: Jim Makris, U.S. EPA Rapporteur: Zoltan Illes, HME Issues • What approaches should government authorities take to facilitate planning for chemical emergencies? • What must be included in an emergency response plan and who must participate in the planning process? • How can potential risks be identified, analyzed, and communicated to the public? • How can communities and facilities ensure that plans, once developed, work? Chemical emergencies are, by definition, unpredictable events. To be able to respond efficiently and effectively during an emergency, facilities and communities must plan in advance for the response. Developing an effective plan requires a knowledge of the potential risks facing a community and the involvement of every party (or stakeholder) likely to be involved in a response action. Identifying risks includes determining the hazards present in a community and evaluating the consequences of accidental releases of one or more of the chemicals. The stakeholders include fire fighters, police, emergency medical services, government officials and personnel at various levels, the facility involved, other facilities with response equipment, the media, and the public. Because each emergency has different characteristics, no plan can cover every problem that may arise; plans, therefore, must be flexible enough to adjust to the unique circumstances of each accident. Testing of plans can be of critical importance in identifying problem areas and finding solutions before an emergency occurs. Emergency responders at facilities and in the community must be trained in emergency response and hazardous materials procedures. The purpose of this session is to review approaches taken in different nations to the question of the government role in encouraging or mandating the planning process, as well as to examine the critical elements of the planning process. The discussions in this session will provide a framework for the workshop sessions on issues related to emergency planning. Technical Presentations (20 minutes each) Legislative/Program Approaches Michael Baram, U.S., Boston University Hazards Analysis Raymond DiNardo, U.S. EPA 2:40 PM Break 3:10 PM Technical Presentations (20 minutes each) Communicating Risk; Information to the Public Gerald Poje, U.S. National Wildlife Federation ------- 52 Exercise and Update — Training and Cooperation in Action P. Popelyak, Hungarian Government Fire Service 4:10-5:00 PM Discussion EVENING Hungarian Reception September 19.1990 8:30 AM Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Presentation — Fran Schulberg OECD 9:00 AM EMERGENCY RESPONSE TECHNICAL PRESENTATIONS/DISCUSSION Chair: J. Zakonyi, HME Rapporteur: Deborah Lukesh, U.S. EPA Issues • What government approaches and industry programs exist on notification (of authorities, adjacent jurisdictions and nations, and the public) and response actions? • What are the key elements of a response action? • What are critical response technologies? • How should the public be notified and informed? Effective emergency response actions depend on the prompt notification of the appropriate authorities and coordinated actions of all concerned stakeholders. The initial notification of a chemical emergency must not only reach the appropriate authority quickly, but it must also include the information responders need to evaluate the severity of the emergency and to identify the needed equipment and response strategies. Once a response begins, coordination among the various stakeholders (e.g., fire fighters, police, medical services, emergency managers) is critical. Where an accident may affect more than one political jurisdiction, information must be rapidly conveyed to other potentially affected areas. Decisions must be made about protective actions that may be needed to protect the public. The purpose of this session is to review the experiences of different nations in emergency response management and to discuss related questions. The discussions in this session will provide a framework for the workshop sessions on issues related to emergency response. Technical Presentations (20 minutes* each) Legislative/Program Approaches (Response and Notification) F. Bodnar, Hungarian Fire Service Key Elements of Response Actions Mike Callan, U.S., local fire chief ------- 53 Dealing with the Public Kent Gray, U.S., Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) 10:00 AM Break 10:30 AM Technical Presentations (20 minutes each) Response Technologies Rainer Ahlo, Finland, fire chief Case Study: William Keffer, U.S. EPA, On-Scene Coordinator International Labor Organization Jukka Takala, ILO 11:20 AM Discussion 12:30 PM LUNCH WORKSHOP: EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE 2:00-5:00 PM Legislation/Program Approaches Chair: Michael Baram, U.S. Rapporteur: Elaine Davies, U.S. EPA Issues • What models exist for legislation and programs in this area? • What are the key features, advantages, and disadvantages of each approach? • If adjacent nations adopt different approaches, how will this affect the coordination of transborder incidents? Different nations have adopted varying programs in this area. In some countries, planning and response programs are voluntary efforts carried out by industry in conjunction with local authorities. In other countries, legislation has mandated planning either at the local, regional, or national level. Notification of accidental releases may be required even where planning is voluntary. Each approach has advantages and disadvantage. For example, if planning is conducted at the national level, the plan may not be able to take into account the different risks that exist in local communities or the varying capabilities of local responders. The purpose of this workshop is to examine the differing approaches adopted in various nations and to develop recommendations for legislative or program approaches to emergency preparedness and response that may be useful to participants. The recommendations will be developed in the context of the needs and differing governmental structures of the participating nations. ------- 54 2:00-5:00 PM Process/Operations/Coordination Chair: Kent Gray, US ATSDR Rapporteur: Wayne Bissett, Canada Issues • What are the critical elements of emergency response plans and actions? • What types of chemical emergencies should a plan address? How should risks associated with these potential emergencies be evaluated? • What are the roles and responsibilities of the stakeholders in planning and response actions? • How should coordination during a response be carried out? • What particular issues are involved in emergency planning and response for transborder incidents? Developing an emergency response plan, testing the plan, and putting the plan into effect during an emergency require substantial coordination efforts. The types of emergencies and risks that are of concern may vary from area to area. For example, an area with large facilities may decide to concentrate only on those facilities and ignore smaller facilities that would be of primary concern in an area with no large facilities. Many parties have roles to play in each phase, but unless the roles and responsibilities are agreed upon, conflicts and oversights can occur during a response, limiting the effectiveness of the response action. Specific roles and responsibilities may also vary depending on governmental structures and traditional roles assigned to different groups. These national or regional variations may be a particular importance during transborder incidents. The purpose of this workshop is to develop recommendations on the types of chemical hazards that should be considered in the development of emergency response plans, the key elements of such plans, and the approaches that could be taken to assigning roles and responsibilities. The workshop will also develop recommendations on approaches for coordinating transborder responses. 3:15-3:45 PM Break 2:00-5:00 PM Information Management/Systems Chair: John Robinson, U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Rapporteur: I.J. Csalagovits, HME Issues • What information is needed from industry to develop emergency response plans and actions? • How can information on hazards be managed to be readily accessible during an emergency? ------- 55 • How can information collected during an emergency be managed and used most effectively? • What information needs to be shared and what systems are available for such sharing? • How is information on risks best communicated to the public? The ability to plan for an emergency and to respond quickly once a release occurs depends on the availability of accurate information about the hazards. Planners and responders must know what chemicals are present and the specific hazards those chemicals pose. Such information can be managed manually or with computer systems, but whichever approach is used, responders must be able to access the information immediately when an accident occurs. The dissemination of monitoring information collected during a release must also be managed. Some of these monitoring data can be used in dispersion models to predict the path of the chemical. In addition to managing data, planners and authorities need to develop systems for sharing information with the public and with other authorities, including other nations. The purpose of this session is to develop recommendations for information management systems that may be of use to participating countries and authorities. The recommendations will address the issue of the types of information that should be shared and methods for sharing information among nations. Recommendations on providing the public with information before, during, and after an accident will also be developed. 2:00-5:00 PM Research and Development Chair: A. B6kes, Hungarian Labor Inspectorate Rapporteur: Tom Carmody, U.S., American Institute of Chemical Engineers Issues • What technologies and techniques require further research or development? • What are the priorities for research and development? • How can research efforts be coordinated? • How can research results be disseminated effectively? A number of different technologies and techniques arc currently being used in the development of plans as well as in emergency response actions. For example, dispersion models are used to analyze potential hazards as well as lo predict the path of gases following a release. A variety of notification and alert systems to warn the public are in use or being tested. Mitigation technologies exist to handle some types of releases. Most of these technologies and techniques are still being developed; for some chemicals, no adequate mitigation technologies exist. Research is needed in many areas, but such ------- 56 research should be coordinated to prevent overlapping efforts. Once results are gained, they should be disseminated rapidly to all interested parties. The purpose of this session is to identify the areas in which the participating nations think research is most needed. Recommendations for research will be developed as will recommendations for coordination and dissemination. Evening: Excursion and Dinner September 20. 1990 8:30 AM World Health Organization (WHO) Presentation John Haines, WHO 9:00 AM PREVENTION OF CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS TECHNICAL PRESENTATIONS/DISCUSSION Chair: Wayne Tamarelli, U.S., Dock Resins Rapporteurs: J. Molnar, Hungarian National Institute of Public Health; Elizabeth Averill, U.S. Issues • What are the approaches and main features of policies or programs developed by national governments, industrial associations, and individual companies, to promote chemical accident prevention? • What are the key elements of a comprehensive in-plant accident prevention plan, and the key steps in the development of such a plan? • What techniques and technologies have been developed to identify hazards and manage chemical process safety? Comprehensive in-plant chemical accident prevention programs are complex, and touch on virtually every aspect of plant operation. While many of the general principles and techniques involved in such programs are applicable to a wide range of industries, the details of each in-plant program are necessarily specific to each individual plant, and to the individual operation within each plant. Numerous techniques and technologies have been developed that serve as important tools in the prevention of accidents. The European Economic Community and several national governments have promulgated policies intended to promote the implementation of accident prevention plans in hazardous industries. In addition, national industrial associations in several countries, as well as many multinational corporations, have adopted programs intended to promote or ensure the implementation of accident prevention plans in the industrial facilities within each organization. The purpose of this session is to review legislative and program approaches as well as to discuss techniques and technologies for identifying and managing risks. The discussions in this session will provide a framework for the workshop sessions on issues related to chemical accident prevention. ------- 57 Technical Presentations (20 minutes each) Seveso Directive Alun J. Williams, U.K. Legislative/Program Approaches Cees Van Kuijen, Netherlands Identifying Hazards Ray Brandes, U.S., ICI Americas Managing Risk William Mottel, U.S., DuPont 10:00 AM Break 10:30 AM Technical Presentations (20 minutes each) Monitoring I.J. Csalagovits, HME Industrial/Governmental Cooperation in R & D/Technologies (Peter Campbell, Conseil Europden des F6d6rations de 1'Industrie Chimique) 11:30 AM Discussion 12:30 PM LUNCH 2:00 PM WORKSHOP: PREVENTION OF CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS 2:00-5:00 PM Legislation/Program Approaches Chair: Michael Baram, U.S. Rapporteur: Elaine Davies, U.S. EPA Issues • What are the main features of the programs and policies adopted to date to promote implementation of industrial action prevention plans? What approach does each program and policy take? • Which approaches and features appear to be the most effective? • What are the advantages and disadvantages of each approach? EEC Directive 82/501 (the Seveso Directive), policies promulgated in several countries (e.g., CIMAH in the U.K., the Circular of December 28, 1983 in France, and equivalent policies in each of the EEC member countries), programs adopted by industrial associations (e.g., Responsible Care by the U.S. Chemical Manufacturer's Association and the Canadian Chemical Producers' Association, and equivalent programs in France, England, Sweden, and other countries) and in-house programs adopted by large corporations are all intended to ensure that appropriate accident prevention plans are adopted by industrial facilities. The approaches embodied in each of these programs and policies are very different, however. The purpose of this workshop is to review the approaches used and main features of each of these programs and policies. The advantages and disadvantages of each approach will be discussed, and the apparent effectiveness of the various approaches will be compared. ------- 58 Recommendations of approaches that may be useful to participating nations will be developed. 2:00-5:00 PM Process/Operations/Coordination Chair: Kent Gray, US ATSDR Rapporteur: Wayne Bissett, Canada Issues • What techniques are available for identifying hazards and quantifying chemical accident risks associated with industrial processes? What technologies are avail- able for minimizing or eliminating the identified risks? • What are the key aspects of chemical accident prevention plans as they pertain to the operation of industrial facilities? • What are the coordinating mechanisms required to ensure that all aspect!? of accident prevention plans remain active and effective? Comprehensive chemical accident prevention programs affect virtually every aspect of the day-to-day operation of industrial facilities. Various techniques have been developed for incorporating safety principles into every aspect of plant operation. Such techniques generally begin with the identification of hazards and evaluation of associated risks, and proceed to the establishment of technical design standards, operation and maintenance procedures, employee qualification and training, and numerous other systems for minimizing the potential for accidents. Management role in accident prevention is paramount. In addition for establishing a general safety-first philosophy and ensuring that each component of the plan is implemented, management must oversee coordination of all efforts such that the individual components function together to constitute an effective prevention plan. This workshop will explore the various techniques for incorporating accident prevention principles into the processes and operation of industrial facilities, and for coordinating the overall accident prevention plan. Recommendations on process-, operation-, and coordination-related accident prevention strategies will be developed. 3:15-3:45 PM Break 2:00-5:00 PM Information Management/Systems Chair: John Robinson, U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Rapporteur: I.J. Csalagovits, HME Issues What types of information do facilities need to assess risks and implement accident prevention plans? What sources of information are available, and what are the techniques for developing information specific to individual facilities? ------- 59 • How can information about accidents and near misses be collected and shared among facilities and among nations? Information about hazards (from chemicals, processes, equipment, and operators) is needed for facilities to evaluate their risks and develop actions to address -those risks. Some of this information can be obtained from databases, industry sources, and manufacturers. Identifying potential sources of information and accessing that information should be facilitated. In addition, industry and governments can study accidents and near misses to develop information of general applicability. Common definitions of accidents and common approaches for acquiring and presenting such data are needed to make the data useful internationally. This workshop will discuss facility information requirements and methods of developing and sharing accident data. Recommendations regarding information management approaches that may be useful to the participating nations will be developed. 2:00-5:00 PM Research and Development Chair: A. B6kes, Hungarian Labor Inspectorate Rapporteur: Tom Carmody, American Institute of Chemical Engineers Issues: • What research is ongoing regarding technologies and techniques useful in the prevention of chemical accidents? • What areas of chemical accident prevention require further research and develop- ment efforts? • How can research efforts be coordinated? • How can research results be disseminated effectively? The field of chemical accident prevention is dynamic, changing with changing chemical processing technologies and products, and with advances in accident prevention techniques and processes. Research is ongoing in many fields, while the need for additional research can be identified in some areas of chemical accident prevention. For example, monitoring and detection systems are needed for many hazardous materials. This workshop will review ongoing research work, and identify areas where additional research would be beneficial in the field of chemical accident prevention. Recommendations will be developed regarding additional research needs, means of coordinating research efforts, and systems for effective dissemination of research results. ------- 60 Evening: Regional Environmental Centre Reception DEMONSTRATIONS - COMPUTER SYSTEMS/POSTER SESSION Excursion (optional) to Veszprem University of Chemical Technology, Institute of Toxicology September 21. 1990 During this session, the four general rapporteurs will summarize the findings and recommendations from the four workshop topics. This session will given all participants an opportunity to discuss the findings and recommendations and to reach consensus. Based on the comments made during this session, the workshop findings will be revised before inclusion in the conference proceedings. 9:00 AM Chairs: Jim Makris, U.S. EPA and Elemer Kiss, Hungary General Commenter: Alun Williams, U.K. REVIEW OF RAPPORTEUR CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM LEGISLATIVE/PROGRAM SESSIONS Elaine Davies, U.S. EPA REVIEW OF RAPPORTEUR CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM PROCESS/OPERATIONS/COORDINATION SESSIONS Wayne Bissett, Canada REVIEW OF RAPPORTEUR CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT/SYSTEM SESSIONS I.J. Csalagovits, HME REVIEW OF RAPPORTEUR CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SESSIONS Tom Carmody, U.S., American Institute of Chemical Engineers Summation by General Commenter Alun Williams U.K. Regional Environmental Centre - Comments Peter Hardi Final remarks Conference adjourns ------- APPENDIX III - DISCUSSION DOCUMENT ------- 63 Chemical Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Prevention An Overview Chemicals and other hazardous materials play an important role in the modern world, but the hazards they pose make it imperative that all due care be taken to eliminate risks associated with their manufacture, processing, handling, storage, transportation, and use. A series of major chemical accidents — at Flixborough, England in 1974, at Seveso, Italy in 1976, at Bhopal, India in 1984, and at Basel, Switzerland in 1988 — heightened both public and governmental awareness of the potentially devastating effects of accidental releases of chemicals into the environment. These accidents and others highlighted the need for communities, regions, and nations to be prepared for and capable of responding to the types of chemical accidents that may occur within their areas. Equally important, the effects of these accidents on both the workers, the community, and the environment emphasized the necessity of concerted actions directed towards accident prevention. Chemical emergency preparedness, response, and prevention are inextricably linked. The assessment of needs and development of a plan make response actions more effective. Planning identifies the types and severity of hazards to which the community and the environment may be exposed and, hence, identifies and promotes prevention efforts. When a facility management adopts a holistic approach to managing risks, combining safety management practices and technologies, the risk to the community is lessened. Resource gaps identified during planning may make steps taken under other programs more urgent. For example, if a community discovers it lacks adequate equipment to handle the hazards posed by a facility, one approach may be for the facility to lessen the potential hazards by reducing the amount of Chemicals stored on site. Before programs are developed or revised to address these chemical emergencies, certain initial assessments should be made. These assessments will ensure that when programs are developed or revised, they accurately address to the situations that exist in the nation. This document provides a discussion of the elements thai should be addressed during initial assessments, brief introductions to emergency preparedness, response, and prevention with a review of elements common to mosi approaches in these areas, and a brief discussion of issues related to transborder responses. This document is meant to help focus discussions during the workshop. It will be complemented by the following documents: • Findings and recommendations from three Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development workshops on chemical accident prevention; • The European Community's Seveso Directive; • The United Nations Environment Program's APELL program; • A fact sheet on the United States Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986; • The Hazardous Materials Emergency Planning Guide developed by the U.S. National Response Team; and • A factsheet on the U.S. National Contingency Plan. ------- Chemical Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Prevention Initial Assessment Issues A number of initial assessments should be completed before a national program on emergency preparedness, response, and prevention is developed or revised. Nations "have distinctive and individual government structures and cultural traditions; these initial assessments can be critical to developing new programs, evaluating existing efforts, and revising programs to ensure that they are tailored for the nation's specific needs and conditions. Governmental Issues First to be considered are the existing government policies, laws, and regulations related to emergency preparedness, response, and prevention. For example, do laws assign responsibilities for specific functions such as planning and emergency management to specific ministries or levels of government? In the area of prevention, laws may relate to codes (e.g., fire and electrical codes). Once the existing laws and policies have been surveyed, the next step is to identify gaps or areas where revisions may be needed. The structure of the national government as well as the political system should also be considered to identify ministries that have the expertise, resources, and authorities that are required for effective chemical emergency programs. Unless all the authority and resources reside in a single agency, some mechanism for coordinating efforts will probably be required. Interagency agreements or the establishment of a coordinating body may be needed before new programs or legislation can be adopted. For example, if one ministry is responsible for industrial safety and another for protecting the environment, the areas of mutual interest need to be defined and discussed. These considerations are of special importance if any significant government restructuring is contemplated. The roles of other parties involved in the issue, such as industry, workers, and green groups, should also be examined. Another important governmental question concerns responsibilities that fall under the jurisdiction of local and regional governments. Because most emergency response actions are carried out by local responders, the authorities provided the local governments should be reviewed to determine if additional or different powers or coordinated support such as guidance and training are required. The answers that each nation develops for these questions will help identify the opportunities and barriers created by current structures and laws. Basic Capabilities The ability of a national government to provide support to emergency preparedness and response actions and to develop or revise prevention programs depends on the current capabilities of the government and the nation in general, in regard to chemical emergency preparedness, response, and prevention. Therefore, an assessment of those capabilities is a critical step in deciding priorities and assigning roles and responsibilities. Among the issues that should be assessed are the following: • What level of economic commitment is feasible from each affected level of government? • What plans currently exist? Are tl^ere national, regional, and local emergency plans? Do they include chemical emergencies (as opposed to natural disasters)? How current are the plans? Have they been tested? • What expertise is available? Does the government have experts in handling hazardous materials incidents, effects of hazardous chemicals, chemical process design, hazard ------- 65 evaluation, etc.? Where in the government does the expertise exist? Where else in the nation does this expertise exist (universities, industry, professional organizations, medical community, etc.)? How is the expertise distributed geographically? • What emergency response equipment exists at the national and regional level? How is it distributed geographically? Does the geographical distribution create any problems for providing support during an emergency response? • What trained personnel are available and how are they distributed geographically? What training programs are available? Are they being used sufficiently? • What information is available on hazardous chemicals present in the nation? Who has access to it? The answers to these questions can help the government structure, evaluate, or revise a program. Hazards A key question in the development or evaluation of any program directed toward chemical emergencies is what constitutes a hazard. Programs that focus on worker protection may have different standards than programs directed toward public health and the environment. The hazard posed by the release of a chemical depends on a number of factors, including the health and environmental effects caused by exposure to the chemical, its flammability, it explosivity, the quantity that could be released, the location of the release, the potential pathways of migration, and the populations and environment likely to be affected. Some programs focus only on chemicals that are acutely toxic; others include flammables and explosives; still others include chemicals that have chronic health impacts. Some programs develop a list of covered chemicals; others define criteria for deciding whether a chemical is covered. The questions, therefore, that may need to be addressed on hazard definition include: • What criteria should be applied? Should different criteria be used for different programs and, if so, do they need to be coordinated? • Who should define the criteria — technical experts, government, industry, joint committees of government agencies, industry, labor, etc.? The government may also want to consider whether there should be flexibility in applying the criteria. Because the hazard posed by any chemical release depends on both the characteristics of the chemical and release, and the location of the release, some chemical releases may pose little danger because of the location; a facility located miles from any population may be of less concern than a facility located in a city. Some programs allow local agencies to exempt facilities that are believed to pose little risk. Information The types of information that the government may need depend on the programs for which the information will be used. Some programs require information on the chemicals present and on the quantities and location of each chemical. Other programs will ask for information on facility emergency response plans and equipment. Prevention programs may require detailed information on the chemical processes, worker training, and management practices. ------- 66 The first questions on information is for what purposes is the information needed and by whom. Once the purposes are determined, the specific data needed to meet those purposes should be defined. Information can often be divided into that which is essential to the program, and that which is useful to know, but not critical. The government has to decide what criteria will apply to selecting information requirements. Different programs and groups may need the data for different purposes. Decisions need to be made about whether access to some of the data may be restricted and, if so, under what conditions. This issue can be central when the data sought would reveal manufacturing process information that the facility considers secret. If a government decides to allow claims of confidentiality, the government must decide which information will be covered, what criteria will apply, and who will review claims to determine their merit. Assessment Questions The following questions may help participants assess their current programs. • What national laws currently exist on emergency preparedness and response? Do these laws address all types of emergencies? Are there specific laws addressing chemical emergencies? • Are there governmental policies related to emergency preparedness and response that supplement any existing laws? What do these policies cover? • What national laws currently exist related to chemical accident prevention or chemical process safety? Are there national codes and standards on issues such as facility siting, construction, fire prevention, etc.? • Which government ministries are involved in programs that are directly or indirectly related to these issues? What are their specific authorities? • Is there some formal or informal mechanism in place to facilitate coordination among ministries? • Which responsibilities in this area are delegated to regional or local governments? Is the delegation a matter of law or tradition? • Whal aspecis of the political structure affect these issues? • What are the basic capabilities in these areas? • Whai resources (expertise and equipment) are available at the national and regional levels? Are there mechanisms for transferring and sharing information? • What information is currently available on the type, quantity, and location of hazardous chemicals? ------- 67 Introduction to Emergency Preparedness Accidents are, by definition, unpredictable, but the likelihood that an accident will have a serious impact on workers, the community, and the environment can be lessened if the facility and the community are prepared to respond to the accident. Although different approaches may be used for planning for chemical emergencies, certain elements are common among programs: • Everyone who may be involved in an emergency response action should participate in the planning process. Plans developed by a single person or agency are generally not well understood by other parties and, therefore, poorly implemented. The groups who may be included in the planning process are: • Fire fighters, who in many countries handle special hazardous materials response equipment; • Police or militia (or other organizations responsible for public order); • Emergency management authorities, where they exist; • Emergency medical crews (ambulance crews, medics, etc.); • Hospital staff; • Public health authorities, who may be called on for advice on health effects; • Facilities with hazardous chemicals, which may have facility emergency response plans, emergency response equipment, and teams, and may be able to render assistance to one another in the event of an emergency; • Political officials, who may be responsible for issuing evacuation orders; • Public works authorities such as water, utilities, and roads; • The media, which can help explain the emergency to the public; and • The public. • Existing plans should be reviewed to determine whether the chemical emergency response plan can be incorporated into other plans (e.g., natural disaster plans) or whether elements of those plans can be used. • Hazards in the community should be analyzed. The analysis involves identification of the chemicals in the community, review of potential worst case accident scenarios, and assessment of the potential risks. The analysis should identify special populations that may pose problems during an emergency; for example, hospitals may be difficult to evacuate. • The capabilities of the community should be assessed. The response equipment and special hazardous materials equipment available to the community should be inventoried. The availability of trained personnel should be documented. This assessment identifies resource needs and, therefore, enables the community to develop strategies for meeting the needs. For example, training may be sought or cooperative agreements with other communities may be developed to meet resource needs. • A chemical emergency response plan should be developed based on the hazards analysis and capability assessment. The plan should cover such issues as the chain of command ------- 68 during a response action, strategies for responding to specific hazards in the community, evacuation routes, etc. • The plan should be tested periodically. Simulated accidents, whether conducted in the field with a full deployment of equipment and responders or at a table with response groups represented, are a valuable way to identify potential problems and to allow the response team to work together before an accident occurs. Assessment Questions The following questions may help participants assess their current programs. • Are there emergency response plans at the national, regional, and local levels? What types of emergencies are covered in these plans? Are the plans coordinated? • How is planning currently conducted? • Who is involved in emergency response planning at each level of government? How is information shared and coordinated? • What are the governmental roles in emergency response planning? • What kinds of guidance are available on planning, evaluating hazards, and testing plans? How is this guidance transferred and shared with local planners? • What training is available to local responders? • Have hazards in communities been identified and analyzed? What information is available from facilities? Do facilities have emergency response plans and equipment? • Are plans regularly tested and revised? • Are there programs to inform the public about hazards and actions to be taken during emergencies? ------- 69 Introduction to Emergency Response A well-developed and tested emergency response plan will make emergency response actions more effective. Plans may take different approaches, based on the specific characteristics of the community, but certain response issues are common to any emergency actions. These common elements include the following: • The chain of command should be set, with a single person in charge. Because serious accidents generally require the involvement of different groups, each participant should understand whom they report to directly and who has overall authority. Generally, the plan will establish the command structure. • The facility where the chemical release occurs must notify the community promptly. The plan may designate single points of contact between the facility and the community to ensure that time is not lost determining who needs to be informed. • The facility should provide adequate information on the chemical being released to allow the responders to make rapid decisions about appropriate response actions, including protective steps. In extreme circumstances, when the accident is so severe that the facility cannot be sure of the chemicals being released or the magnitude of the releases, other potential information sources (e.g., other similar facilities, experts) may be required and should be identified in advance. • A series of decisions may need to be made involving appropriate actions to protect responders, the public, and property. These decisions include appropriate protective gear for responders, methods of handling the released substance, and evacuation or sheltering in place. Decisions to protect property may have unintended consequences as the Sandoz accident showed. At Sandoz, the decision was made to put out a fire to protect adjacent buildings. The water poured onto the fire became contaminated and the resulting runoff into the Rhine contaminated the river. • The movement of released chemicals will need to be monitored to determine which populations may need to take protective actions. Although air dispersion models exist that predict the movement of chemical clouds, few models have been validated with site- specific data and, therefore, models are of limited use during a real-time emergency. • Methods for notifying and informing the public are needed. These methods may vary from alarms, loudspeakers, radio alerts, to sophisticated telephone systems. Assessment Questions The following questions may help participants assess their current programs. • Do communities or regions have established or traditional chains of command for emergency situations? • Are there agreements on when a facility should notify the community? ------- 70 Are there central sources of information on chemical hazards that responders can contact in an emergency? Is information on these sources widely available? What communications systems are used to notify the community of a potential emergency? How are chemical releases monitored? What research is being conducted in this area? How is research coordinated and results shared? ------- 71 Introduction to Chemical Accident Prevention Although emergency preparedness is essential because accidents inevitably will occur, the most cost-effective approach to limiting the risk to workers, the community, and the environment is to take steps to prevent chemical accidents. The responsibility for chemical accident prevention rests primarily with the management of individual facilities and companies. Governments may facilitate process safety improvements or impose requirements related to accident prevention, but the implementation of prevention measures rests with facility management and workers. Without a commitment to safety by management and workers, a prevention program is unlikely to succeed and satisfy the community desire to minimize risk. The best equipment is of little use if it is poorly maintained or improperly used. The technologies required for safety are usually facility, process, and chemical specific. A number of elements related to management of risk at chemical facilities, however, are generally recognized as essential. These management practices include the following: • Facility and equipment designs should be analyzed prior to start-up to identify safety problems and solutions. Standards and codes developed by the government, industry, or professional associations should be met, but meeting standards may not be adequate to ensure safety when hazardous chemicals are involved. Facilities must identify potential hazards and design and operate the facilities to minimize risks. • The technical specifications for equipment and processes should be documented. Standard operating procedures should be written and provided to all workers in a language and style that the workers can understand. • Hazard evaluations such as Hazards and Operability studies, Fault Tree Analyses, should be conducted on a regular schedule (e.g., one every three years). Such evaluations should also be conducted on new processes and after major modifications. • All employees must be trained in the standard operating procedures that apply to their work, and in the hazards of the chemicals and processes with which they deal. Refresher training should be provided. Specific training should be provided concerning danger signals and response actions. For workers with key responsibilities for safety, development of diagnostic skills should be emphasized. • Maintenance programs should be established and preventive maintenance performed on all critical equipment (that is, equipment whose failure could result in a release). • Accidents and near misses should be formally investigated to determine the causes and identify needed changes in equipment or practices. Recommendations should be tracked to ensure implementation. • Audits of key elements such as the training program, maintenance practices, and testing programs, should be conducted. Deficiencies and corrective actions should be documented. • Facility emergency response plans should be developed and tested regularly. These facility plans should be coordinated with community emergency response plans. ------- 72 Besides the steps that a facility should take to manage risks and prevent accidents, other steps related to chemical accident prevention or mitigation may include: • Siting the facility away from populated areas. As Bhopal and other chemical accidents have indicated, close proximity of a chemical facility and dense populations magnifies the consequences of any release. It is important, therefore, to maintain buffer zones that exist when facilities are first constructed. In many cases such as Bhopal, the construction of a facility will attract development close to it. Such developments should be analyzed for safety impacts before they are approved. Once development has occurred, creating a buffer zone around a facility may be difficult. • Using less hazardous chemicals or reducing amounts of chemicals stored on site. Either approach may lessen the risk, though they may not be feasible for some facilities. • Installing back-up or redundant equipment for critical equipment such as pressure gauges. The need for such equipment depends on the particular process and chemical and should be identified through the hazard evaluation process. • Installing detectors to alert workers of releases before they become serious. The use of detection systems is limited because such systems do not exist for many chemicals or are not yet sufficiently reliable. • Using technologies to reduce the seriousness of releases once they begin. These technologies may include scrubbers, flares, water curtains, deluge systems, etc. The appropriateness of any of these technologies depends on the chemicals and processes involved. Assessment Questions The following questions may help participants assess their current programs. • What is the current government role in chemical process safety and chemical accident prevention? What laws exist that are designed to protect workers and the public from chemical accidents? What is the role of the community? • What resources (e.g., guidance, training programs) are available to facilities regarding risk management and technologies? How are these resources transferred? • What codes and standards related to chemical process safety exist? Are they up-to-date? • Is information on chemical accidents (e.g., data on post-accident prevention activities) being collected? How is this information being used? Is it being appropriately disseminated? • Do facilities have emergency response plans and capabilities? • What research is being done in this area? Are the research efforts being coordinated to prevent overlaps? How are results being shared? ------- Introduction to Transborder Response Issues Most chemical releases do not affect more than one country, but those accidents with transborder impacts pose a special challenge because the response must be coordinated across national borders. The likelihood of such international response is, of course, greatest where facilities are located close to a border, although releases to water may impact countries far downstream from the release as the accident at Sandoz did. Certain issues are common to developing transborder responses: • Even though response actions may occur at the local level, development of a joint response plan usually requires a treaty or written agreement between national governments. • Nations may have very different laws related to emergency preparedness and response. These laws must be identified and a common approach, consistent with each country's laws, developed. • The organizations involved on both sides of the border should be identified. Depending on governmental structures, different levels of government may be involved. For example, in the U.S., most planners and responders are from local governments, but in Mexico, some planners and responders are regional representatives of the national government. • Notification procedures that already exist should be defined. If these procedures are inconsistent, joint procedures need to be established. • Language barriers can hinder notification and coordination. People assigned as contact points should be fluent in both languages or in a commonly understood language. Liaison staff should also be bilingual. • Normally, one person is in charge of an emergency response action. When two or more nations are involved, however, each needs to have a person in charge within its nation. Each country should designate a single person or position who will be in charge on its side of the border. • Where response equipment or technical experts may need to cross a border, clearances for such movements should be facilitated. Clearance procedures should be worked out in advance. Assessment Questions The following questions may help participants assess their current programs. • What agreements related to these issues exist between your country and neighboring countries? • How are transborder notifications currently handled? • What levels of government are likely to be involved in a transborder incident? • Are language barriers likely to be a problem and, if so, for which neighboring countries? ------- 74 Are there mechanisms in place to facilitate movement of resources and experts across borders during an emergency? ------- APPENDIX IV - ACRONYMS ------- 77 ACRONYMS APELL CEFIC EC ICSC ILO IPCS OECD SHARE UNECE UNEP U.S. ATSDR U.S. EPA U.S. OSHA WHO Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at the Local Level Conseil Europeen des Federation de 1'Industrie Chimique European Community International Chemical Safety Cards International Labor Organization International Programme on Chemical Safety Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Safety Hazard Assessment Research United Nations Economic Commission for Europe United Nations Environment Program United States Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry United States Environmental Protection Agency United States Occupational Safety and Health Administration World Health Organization ------- |