-------
TIME-
A. SHALLOW
GV. GAS VENT PULSE
GSI. GROUND SHOCK
INDUCED PULSE
CRATERING EXPLOSION PRESSURE-TIME SIGNATURES.
FIGURE 3
1.0
0.1
.001
CABRIOLET
SEDAN
\ /DANNY BOY
m
100 200 300 400 500 600
SCALED BURST DEPTH FEET/IKTNE)1'3
TRANSMISSIVITY FROM UNDERGROUND BURSTS
FIGURE 4
323
-------
100
50 ^
20
0.5
0.2
0.1
1-MT NUClfAR CRATER ING EVENT
BURIED 1500 FT IN MOIST ALLUVIUM
V(T"0.166)
200-KT NUCLEAR
QUARRY EVENT
BURIED 1170 FT IN
DRY BASALT
(T-0.057)
1-MT DEEP UNDERGROUND
EVENT BURIED 7000 FT.
IN WELDED TUFF
(T = 0.021I
10
105
106
RANGE
EXAMPLES OF STANDARD PROPAGATIONS FROM BURIED EXPLOSIONS.
FIGURE S
324
50
§
12 5 10 20 50 100
NUMBER OF CHARGES IN ROW
ROW CHARGE EFFECTS, PERPENDICULAR AND AXIAL DIRECTIONS.
FIGURE 6
325
-------
800 900 1000 1100 1200
/ DIRECTED
SOUND
VELOCITY
800
900 1000 1100 1200
VELOCITY (FT/SEC)
DISTANCE-
SHOCK-WAVE DISTORTION BY LAYERED ATMOSPHERIC
TEMPERATURE AND WIND STRUCTURE.
FIGURE 7
SOUND
VELOCITY
RANGE
TYPICAL EXPLOSION RAY PATHS
FIGURE 8
326-327
-------
1100 1150 1100 1150
SOUND SOUND
SPEED VELOCITY
FT./SEC.
2 3
DISTANCE (MILES)
SURFACE INVERSION SOUND DUCTING.
FIGURE 9
50000 -
25000 -
1000 1100 1200
VELOCITY (fps)
10
20
30
RANGE (MILES)
JET- STREAM SOUND DUCTING.
FIGURE 10
40
50
60
328-329
-------
UPWIND
DOWNWIND
900 1000 1100 1200 120
SOUND VELOCITY (fps)
RANGE (MILESI
OZONOSPHERE WIND EFFECT ON SOUND DUCTING.
FIGURE 11
10
100
APPROXIMATE RANGE
OF MEDINA DATA
EXTRAPOLATION-
0.1 1 10
RECORDED OVERPRESSURE (MILLIBARS)
EXPECTED WINDOW DAMAGE VERSUS EXPLOSION
BLAST OVERPRESSURE; 100,000 PEOPLE EXPOSED.
FIGURE 12
33C-331
-------
QUESTIONS FOR JACK REED
I. From Charles Hardin:
How does moisture content of the air affect the blast wave?
ANSWER:
We pretty much ignore it. To be correct, you should use a virtual
temperature rather than a pure air temperature to calculate the
sound speed. That's for the water vapor content of the air and
just a correction in our refraction. On the other hand, what is
usually referred to in questions of this type: Is the blast wave
reflected off of clouds and off of precipitation? The answer is
quite firmly, no. The drop size is not adequate to do anything
other than give a very, very slight attenuation to the blast waves
or the wave length that we are involved in here.
2. From E. A. MartelI:
Wilt high speed westerlies above 30,000 feet in the isthmus area
have similar accoustic wave effects as those experienced for high
speed jet streams at higher latitudes?
ANSWER:
The jet streams in Nevada that we worry about in the wintertime
which can cause focusing of blast waves and give troubles in Las
Vegas are speeds that run typically 130 and occasionally as high
as 200 knots in speed and I don't believe that our experience in
the isthmian region or the tropical region show anything near this.
The required speed for ducting from jet stream altitudes near the
tropopause level where the temperature is very, very low—it gets
down to as low as -100° C—then it requires at least 60 and generally
over 100 knot speeds to overcome that and give you a wind ducted
propagation. I'm not sure what the studies that ESSA is conducting
are showing, but I don't think that there are very many wind speeds
much over about 60 knots at that altitude, so I do not expect any
jet stream ducting from 30,000 feet in the canal project. Our
whole problem seems to be wrapped up in the ozonosphere propagation
and caused by the winds up at 150,000 feet.
3. From E. V. Anderson:
What is the area of a focus zone?
332
ANSWER:
The calculated accoustic focus has zero width. You have infinite
pressure over zero width. What the real result is we don't really
know for sure, but we have some statistical information which says
for jet stream ducting from the Nevada Test Site using a large
number of smal I, h igh exp los i ve tests, that w i th i n +_ 10 mi les of
a calculated caustic, the average magnification came out to be,
considering the ground reflection as part of the magnification,
we got an average factor of 3.15. This is from 250 or 500 obser-
vations. It was 250 observations and I think the maximum of all
these within 10 miles of the calculated caustic was about 8-1/2 for
a magnification factor including the doubling by ground reflection
which you always get. It's pretty much of a statistical thing. It
doesn't come out as a nice, sharp focal point like you calculate by
pure accoustics, but we're not dealing with pure accoustics, we're
dealing with finite amplitude and long wave length waves and there's
quite a bit of mix-up here. The atmospheric turbulence also scatters
and diffuses it so pending more statistics, I think that you just
need to say that within +_ 10 or 20 miles of a calculated caustic,
you can get this distribution of magnitudes which gives you some
small, but finite probability of having a pretty large magnifi-
cation on very, very rare occasions.
4. From W. J. Larkin:
Since the wave has directional properties, does the orientation of
the "window panes" have an effect on damage potential?
ANSWER:
Yes, and this is mostly derived from Civil Defense housing tests
and things like that. I believe, and John Blume may amplify this,
but there is a factor of essentially 2 difference. You have on the
side facing the blast about twice as much breakage as on the side of
the house away from the blast. And on the sides of the house you
have something in between. By the time you go out to where you are
only breaking I out of 5,000 or 10,000 panes, this kind of gets
lost in the statistics so you can't really identify it. I know
one building in San Antonio we checked. I think there was a
slightly larger percentage of windows broken on the back side than
on the side facing the blast. So it is statistical and not very
welI defi ned.
333
-------
GROUND MOTION PREDICTIONS
Peter C. Loux
Director for Geophysics
Environmental Research Corporation
Alexandria, Vi rgi ni a
ABSTRACT
Nuclear generated ground motion is defined and then
related to the physical parameters that cause it. Tech-
niques employed for prediction of ground motion peak
amplitude, frequency spectra and response spectra are
explored, with initial emphasis on the analysis of data
collected at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). NTS post-
shot measurements are compared with pre-shot predictions.
Applicability of these techniques to new areas, for
example, Plowshare sites, must be questioned. Fortunately,
the Atomic Energy Commission is sponsoring complementary
studies to improve prediction capabilities primarily in new
locations outside the NTS region. Some of these are
discussed in the light of anomalous seismic behavior, and
comparisons are given showing theoretical versus experi-
mental results.
In conclusion, current ground motion prediction
techniques are applied to events off the NTS. Predictions
are compared with measurements for the event Faultless and
for the Plowshare events^ Gasbuggy, Cabriolet, and Buggy I.
INTRODUCTION
Under contract with AEC's Nevada Operations Office, Environ-
mental Research Corporation provides scientific and engineering
support to the Effects Evaluation Division by predicting specified
effects of planned underground nuclear explosions. With knowledge
of the anticipated effects, safeguards are developed and safety is
assured for persons and property within the affected range. In this
discussion we will consider the directly induced seismic ground motion
and techniques for Its prediction. Ground motion predictions are
required in order to assess the probability of damage to property and,
more importantly, to preclude the possibility of personal injury.
Energy from an underground nuclear detonation is transformed
into seismic waves which travel outward from the source in all directions.
They follow several paths and display a variety of characteristics
which can be related to effects on structures. Figure I shows a seis-
mogram composed of various elastic waves arriving at a given point at
different times. This might represent the vertical component of
velocity measured at the surface of the ground at, say, 100 kilometers
FIGURE 1
SEISMOGRAM FROM AN NTS EVENT
-*- TIME SCALE
|^ SSEC
from an event at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). Phases in the seismogram
include the compressional and shear body waves at the leading edge of
this trace and surface waves, such as the Rayleigh mode, at the trailing
edge. Analysis of such wave forms requires separation and identifi-
cation of the different modes, knowledge of their behavior in transit,
and an understanding of the influence of source parameters. Analyzing
ground motion data in this manner makes it possible to predict damage
to structures, to forecast perception of ground motion by the general
public, and to anticipate other effects such as damage to mines,
wells, and slopes. With respect to this type of oscillatory ground
motion, the remainder of our discussion will center on development of
predictive technology and applications relevant to Plowshare events.
PREDICTIVE TECHNOLOGY FOR UNDERGROUND ENGINEERING APPLICATIONS
Source of Seismic Waves
Directly induced ground motion in the elastic region is a function
of several variables, such as the energy and type of explosive, source
point medium, depth of burial and geological medium properties. Within
the immediate vicinity of the source the medium behavior is non-linear
and complex due to high pressures and temperatures. From the (initial)
vaporization cavity produced by the explosion a shock wave propagates,
carrying about 5Q% of the available energy. For a l-kt nuclear ex-
plosion, the vaporization cavity radius and pressure are approximately
2 meters and I million atmospheres,' respect!vely, varying slightly from
medium to medium. As the shock wave propagates radially outwards,
spherical expansion of the front and inelastic dissipation reduce the
loading intensity to a point, at a distance called the elastic radius,
334
335
-------
where the elastic properties of the medium begin to play a significant
role. The elastic radius is a function of the source point parameters,
being a few hundred meters for a contained l-kt nuclear event. From
this point the medium behaves elastically and the phenomena may be
described by linear theory. The waveform input to the elastic region
may be considered to be a function of the elastic radius and the input
pressure at this radius which in turn are functions of the source param-
eters. The frequency spectrum of the radiated seismic waves at the
elastic radius is band-limited and also is a function of the source
parameters.2
Most of the initial energy has been dissipated before reaching
the elastic radius, and only a small percentage of the original energy
remains to be propagated as elastic waves. In fact, published data
for 20 large-scale chemical and nuclear explosions, ranging from yields
of l-kt to 200-kt show a range of conversions into seismic energy which
varies from about 0.0216 to less than \%. The largest cratering experi-
ment to date, Sedan, with a yield of about 100-kt, coupled less than
O.l!8 of its total energy into elastic seismic waves.3
In current ground motion prediction techniques, the total yield
of a nuclear device is considered one of the few major variables in a
conventional power law relationship. Postulated power law exponents for
the increase of peak seismic amplitude with yield generally fall between
0.5 and I.O.4 Data from about 100 contained detonations at the NTS show
peak seismic amplitudes that increase with yield to the 0.6 to 0.8 power.
Variations in the exponent are attributed to source conditions, varied
seismic wave modes and their paths, local geology of the recording site,
and frequency of the ground motion.
Influence of the emplacement environment on peak seismic motions
is not yet clearly defined. Factors which have been considered include
depth of burial and the geologic medium. Some tentative conclusions,
with exceptions noted, are that hard rock tends to couple more energy
into the elastic region than unconsolidated media, and that increase of
depth of burial, also, tends to increase the seismic efficiency.5
Transmission of Seismic Waves
A model for the transmission of seismic waves is shown in Figure
2. The seismic input to the elastic region has a frequency spectrum
which is characteristic of the combination of all the source parameters.
As the disturbance propagates through the earth, it encounters many geo-
logical boundaries. At each boundary, a combination of transmission,
reflection and refraction of the energy occurs, depending on the angle
of Incidence and elastic constants of the media surrounding the boundary.
Other physical phenomena, such as wave mode conversion, reverber-
ation within and between layers, scattering, and diffraction, occur
along each transmission path and compound the complexity of the total
336
at m
s "
337
-------
process. Processes such as reverberation tend to introduce notches
and resonant frequencies in the amplitude spectrum. Scattering causes
attenuation which increases rapidly with decrease in wavelength of the
pulse. This action causes the earth to act as a low-pass filter to
seismic signals, and hence, reduces energy in the high frequency
portion of the ground motion spectrum.
The signal received at any particular location is not a single
wave. It represents the comb i ned ef feet of waves from all the different
transmission paths within the crust of the earth. Spurious signals
are also observed. They are related to wave groups arriving from
random d i recti ons, such as near-surface waves i mp i ng i ng upon random Iy-
located near-surface i nhomogenei ties.
A final major factor in the signal amplitudes at any particular
Iocati on is the i nfIuence of the surface geoIogy at that locat i on.
Current NTS data indicate that stations located on some considerable
depth of alluvium record amplitudes averaging about twice those
recorded on adjacent hard rock sites. Individual station ratios of
alluvium amplitude to hard rock amplitude range from I to 5, and are
found to be frequency-dependent.
7
Instrumentation and Data Processing
Before discussing ground motion prediction methods, let us first
consider the measurements program being conducted at the NTS. A large
effort is currently in progress and programmed for collection of seismic
data. These data are required for studies of variations in ground
mot i on and the i r causes to comp I ement the stud i es wh i ch have been con-
ducted and those now in progress, and to verify the validity of the
prediction methods.
g u v
instrumented, often at several locations in each city. The plan
also designed to collect data used to support the theoretical
ies and to provide an understanding of ground motions for select
logic conditions. A large detonation is usually monitored with
t 100 recording stations.
geol
abou
The instruments used by USC&GS were selected because of their
suitability for recording the essential information. They have a wide
dynamic range and a broad band of response to frequency. However, each
type of instrument has its own performance characteristics; one of the
most important is the response to frequency. If the instrument does
not respond as well to some frequencies as to others, the resulting
338
-------
seismograms will be distorted. Knowing the response to frequency of
the various instruments, we have developed programs which remove (within
signal-to-noise-ratio limitations) distortions produced by the instruments.
An example of this is shown in Figure 4 where much of the low frequency
information is lost without correction for instrument response. The data
FIGURE 4
SEISMIC SIGNALS BEFORE AND AFTER CORRECTION
UMCnBllECTEII
from some instruments do not need corrections because they respond uni-
formly to all frequencies of interest. Additional programs have been
developed which produce acceleration and displacement seismograms from
measured velocity seismograms.
Some of the data processing which precedes the analysis will
now be described.8 Typical velocity measurements are recorded in the
field on analog magnetic tape at two or three recording levels by
USC&GS. Several field tapes are dubbed onto the tape that we process.
This tape is previewed, the best data channels are selected, compen-
sation is made for variable instrument gain, calibration is performed,
appropriate seismometer response correction is made, and finally a
aster tape containing only usable, corrected data is generated.
ransorms,
processing can be performed on an analog computer; or, the analog
velocity traces are digitized automatically and the processing done on
a digital computer.
The response characteristics of one of the velocity meters
employed on the safety program is given in Figure 5. In our data
processing we effectively lower the corner frequency of this instru-
ment from I Hz to about 0.3 Hz.
340
FIGURE 5
RESPONSE CURVE OF VELOCITY METER
AND L-S AMPLIFIER
1.0 10 100
FREQUENCY IN HERTZ
1,000
Processing of the strong motion acceleration and displacement
photographically recorded paper traces follows another course. These
traces are digitized semi automatically and run through an editing, cali-
bration, and plot routine. The plotted, digitized trace provides an
overlay trace for verification. Peak amplitudes, amplitude spectra
and other parameters are then obtained by way of digital programs.
Statistical Analyses of Ground Motion
As a first attempt at establishing a significant relationship
between underground nuclear explosions and resulting seismic motions,
analyses were made of nuclear-generated seismic peak amplitudes
recorded in and around the NTS. We note that although the peak ampli-
tude represents only one characteristic of a complicated ground motion,
it is a good measure of the overall seismic signal strength. Using
standard regression analysis techniques, we have developed prediction
equations based on the data from previous detonations in simi lar
environments to estimate the peak motions. Examples of these equations
for stations on alluvial layers are shown in Figure 6.
We must question the applicabi lity of such equations to events
off the NTS, and also include cratering shots in our consideration.
Later we will discuss applicable theories which are validated by
this NTS experience.
341
-------
*****
d = ^w'--
where W = yield; R = distance
a = peak, su tf ace acceleration
u = peak surface velocity
d = peak surface displacement
kl,2,3 = regression constants
Figure 6 . Peak Amplitude Prediction Equations ,
Alluvium Stations
We now know that we can predict peak motions within acceptable
limits but the frequency content of the seismic motion to which
structures respond must also be predicted; otherwise, only a rough
estimate can be given for the associated structural response. Again,
on a statistical basis, we have developed the capability to predict
two kinds of seismic spectra.^ The first is n measure of the seismic
amplitude-frequency content which is, for practical purposes, independ-
ent of the duration of the seismic signals. The second, which I shall
describe here, is the spectrum obtained by plotting the peak response
of single degree-of-freedom system as a function of the center frequency
of the system. For each frequency, the seismogram is used as the input
signal. The value of this type of predicted seismic spectrum is that
it is used to determine estimates of structural response over a large
area surrounding the detonation point. Statistical analysis of the
response spectrum amplitudes at several frequencies, as a function of
yield and distance dependence (similar to the peak motion equations
shown above), reveals that both the yield and distance dependence are
functions of frequency. As anticipated, higher frequencies attenuate
more rapidly with distance, and the lower frequencies increase slightly
more rapidly with yield. A response spectrum prediction based on this
statistical analysis is shown in Figure 7 for a Las Vegas station. AI so
shown on the f i gure for compari son w i th the pred i ct i on is the observed
response for the Benham event.
Presently we are developing techniques to predict complete seismo-
grams. This will allow determination of the response of any structures
for which mathematical models are available. To date several seismo-
grams have been synthesized having characteristics very similar to those
of real sei smog rams. An example is gi ven in Fi gure 8.
342
FIGURE 1
PSEUDO RELATIVE VELOCITY SPECTRA,
BENHAM EVENT, SE-6 STATION
10J
ITT
10
£ iO
10"
-1
10-
TT
N/S COMPONENT
-i I I 11 Mill I I I
io~
PERIOD, SECONDS
FIGURES
SYNTHETIC SEISMOGRAM CORRESPONDING TO A STATION ON ALLUVIUM
DISTANCE: SO KILOMETERS
YIELD: 100 KILOTONS
343
-------
The results indicate thai synthetic seismograms can be con-
structed such that each:
I. has nearly the same Fourier amplitude spectrum as that of
given seismic records of the same yield and range;
2. contains the same frequencies in the same descending
order as real seismograms;
3. produces similar band-pass filter (BPF) and pseudo-
relative velocity (PSRV) curves comparable with those
of real sei smograms; and
4. reacts with model structures in a manner comparable
with the real seismograms.
DEVELOPMENT OF PREDICTIONS FOR EXCAVATION AND OFF-SITE APPLICATIONS
Applicability of these techniques to new areas, including cratering
as well as underground shots, has been a logical source of concern.
Fortunately, the AEC continues to pursue a comprehensive study program
to improve prediction capabilities primarily in new locations outside
the NTS region. A few of these studies will now be described.
Transmission Models
The objective of wave mode studies^ is to correlate the observed
ground motion recorded at various stations with individual elastic
wave modes having a specific travel path. The first problem, then, is
to identify these modes. Wave mode identification is based primarily
on the large body of theoretical and observational knowledge acquired
by seismologists. Figure 9 shows a good example of one type of mode
identification utilizing properties of the radial-vertical product wave-
form, taken from the Boxcar event.
The product waveform at the bottom of the figure displays
compressionaI (negative pulses at the leading edge), shear (positive
pulses at about 10 seconds), and Rayleigh modes (oscillatory wave with
twice the frequency of the surface wave on the radial and vertical
tracer). These product waveform characteristics are a direct conse-
quence of the particle motions associated with the classical wave
types.
344
FIGURE 9
PARTICLE VELOCITY SEISMOGRAM AND RADIAL-VERTICAL
COMPONENT PRODUCT WAVEFORM
RADIAL COMPONENT
rr ^SURFACE WAVE
,k "
RADIAL-VERTICAL COMPONENT PRODUCT TRACE
n . ,
Figure 10 shows a simplified model of the earth's crust in the
NTS area generated with the aid of wave modes observed in an around
the NTS. Also shown are the relative travel times for three of the
elastic wave modes (a direct P wave, refracted P wave, and a
reflected P wave) generated by a nuclear detonation. The model has
parameters of velocity and crustal thickness similar to those observed
and derived at NTS by other investigators. The major point of interest
is the fact that different wave modes arrive at a surface location with
varying but predictable relative times in direct relationship to the
physical properties of the earth, the depth and physical character-
istics of the Mohorovicic discontinuity, and the distance of the
recording site from the nuclear detonation.
alluv
The presence of a layer of unconsol i dated material, such as
ium, can cause substantial amp I i f i cati on of the magnitude of
di f ferent wave modes in an alluvial layer.
345
-------
The aim is to predict the effect of the layer on the Fourier
amplitude spectrum of the observed surface motion. Models for Love and
Rayleigh surface wave amplification, as well as for P and S body wave
amplification, have been formulated and preliminary validation with
test results is good. Figure II indicates comparison of theory with
experiments for the relative amplification of the P-wave radial
components measured at a pair of stations in Tonopah, Nevada.
FIGURE 11
A DISTANCE (KM)
ill
20.00
16.00
12.00
TONOPAH AMPLIFICATION FACTOR
(R COMPONENT, P - WAVE WINDOW)
i
8.00
4.00
0.00
I I I
THEORETICAL
I I I T^
in- COMPONENT
HORIZONTAL
COMPONENT
INCIDENT
P - WAVE
0.00
4.00 8.00 12,00
FREQUENCY, Hz
16.00
The predicted resonant frequency for the station on the uncon-
solidated material is 7 Hz, substantially the same as the measured
value. At resonance the predicted level of amplification is a factor
of six and the measured value is a factor of II. Use of further
instrumentation to provide a better check of this theory is part of
ongoing effort. These studies wi I I provide an effective means for
improving the predictions of frequency dependent phenomena (for example,
PSRV response spectra) at sites located on alluvium. The value of
347
-------
such accurate prediction of resonances associated with surface geology
lies in the ability to make provision for potential structural damage.
I should like to return now to the validity of the seismic
scaling exponents statistically derived on the basis of NTS data. In
particular, we should like to have a valid theoretical description of
the behavior of seismic amplitudes at each frequency as a function of
distance from the source and as a function of source yield. A recent
effort to describe the seismic amplitude dependence on the distance
variable is proving fairly successful. Briefly, the earth is treated
as a heterogeneous medium model in the sense that the elastic con-
stants and the density are treated as random variables. Wave propa-
gation in this model is solved for the case of a step function (sudden
initial pressure which decays with an infinitesimal decay constant)
applied to a spherical boundary. At large distances, for the case of
a homogeneous medium, the displacement solution is a damped sinusoid
which has a characteristic wave length proportional to the spherical
radius. In this heterogeneous case, a different length, the corre-
lation length, appears. This is defined as the distance over which the
density and elastic properties of the medium change substantially.
For wave lengths greater than the correlation length, the medium
appears homogeneous; for wave lengths less than the correlation length,
there is an exponential selective frequency decay with distance (due
to scattering). This frequency selective attenuation with the
distance variable is in qualitative agreement with the experimental
trend observed in the NTS data.
Seismic Spectrum Scaling with Yield
A related model has been developed for the theoretical descrip-
tion of the behavior of seismic amplitudes at each frequency as a
function of source yield.'' In this model, the influence on ground
motion spectra of source parameters such as yield, depth of burial, and
medium type, have been considered. Compared with the heterogeneous
model, the source function is an exponential function applied to a
spheri caI boundary.
It is found that for a specific medium the explosive yield
exponent is frequency, depth, and yield dependent. For the particular
case of underground explosions at set scaled depths, the yield exponent
decreases with increasing frequency at a constant yield and decreases
with increasing yield at a constant frequency. Also the bounds of the
exponent are medium dependent. Comparison with the response spectrum
yield exponents statistically derived from NTS data for a large number
of events, as well as with specific events, shows good agreement. In
a general way, this theory explains the experimental evidence that
smaller yield shots at a set scaled depth in a particular medium gen-
erate higher frequency ground motions that higher yield shots; and that
shots at a set yield in a particular medium generate higher frequency
ground motions the greater the depth of burial.
348
APPLICATION TO OFF-SITE EVENTS
Application to off-site events will be shown by comparing
predicted and measured response spectra.
Underground Events
Figure 12 shows the response spectrum at a Las Vegas station,
generated by the Central Nevada Faultless event.
10*
10"
FIGURE 12
PSEUDO RELATIVE VELOCITY SPECTRA;
FAULTLESS EVENT: SE-6 STATION
R-295 km
ur
= i imini i IT
- N/S COMPONENT
- PREDICTED
OBSERVED -
I I I I
I I I I
lo-
ID'1 10°
PERIOD, SECONDS
101
The level of the predicted (upper) curve is seen to be slightly
conservative for this station, some 295 kilometers from the source,
and the shape is seen to be a fair approximation to the measured curve.
Numerous comparisons of Faultless ground motion predictions indicated
no big surprises in application of NTS data statistics to this off-
site event which occurred at a typical depth of burial.
The composite spectrum for stations at 90 km, generated by the
northwestern New Mexico Gasbuggy event,'^ is shown in Figure 13.
NTS experience delivers a prediction which is significantly
improved when the theoretical spectrum scaling is taken into account.
349
-------
The parameter that departs most from NTS experience is the depth of
burial which, for the Gasbuqgy event, is greater than typical NTS
experience.
FIGURE 13
SPECTRA FOR STATIONS AT 90 km; EVENT GASBUGGY
10° ET
10
10~
,-1
PREDICTED
(NTS EXPERIENCE)
^-PREDICTED
\ (SPECTRUM SCALING)
-OBSERVED
10
Excavation Events
,-1
10" 101
FREQUENCY, (Hz)
10'
In Figure 14 are shown response spectra at a station in Las Veqas,
associated with the Cabriolet cratering event.5
The prediction based on NTS experience also is improved signifi-
cantly when theoretical spectrum scaling is included. Here, as with
Gasbuggy, the parameter that departs most f rom NTS experience is the
depth of burial which, for the Cabriolet event, is smaller than
typical NTS experience.
350
FIGURE 14
COMPARISON OF THEORETICALLY AND EMPIRICALLY
SCALED SPECTRA, EVENT CABRIOLET.
RADIAL COMPONENT; SE-6; ALLUVIUM
n-U
I INN! I 11113
NTS EMPIRICAL SCALWG
THEORETICAL SPECTRUM —I
SCALING
10*
FREQUENCY, Hz
An unusual source of configuration, pertinent to several engin-
eering applications, is represented by the nuclear five-element row
charge, Bugqy I. Treating the seismic data as if it were caused by a
single source of energy equal to the tota I energy in the row charge,
delivers interesting results which can be seen in Fiqure 15.
The upper curve, based on NTS single source cratering experience,
is noticeabIy higher than the observed spectrum at f requencies be Iow
I Hz where significant energy exists. In fact, in this frequency
range, the measured spectrum is more closely approximated by that
which would be anticipated with only one row charge element, as seen
by the lower curve. Above 1-1/2 Hz, the prediction based on the total
Buggy I yield is satisfactory. An in-depth report analyzing these
i nterest i ng resuIts is in prepa ration.
-------
FIGURE IS
SPECTRA FOR BUGGY I; SE-S STATION
10
,-1
10
,-2
U
11 linn i 11nun _,
-NTS CRATER1NG EXPERIENCE
(ASSUMING TOTAL ~*
BUGGY I YIELD)
-NTS CRATERING EXPERIENCE-
ASSUMING 1/5 BUGGY I
-OBSERVED SPECTRUM
I I I
10"1 10° Ml 102
FREQUENCY, Hi
CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, then, we see that much of the technology is avail-
able for making sufficiently accurate predictions of the directly
induced ground motion resulting from underground and excavating
nuclear detonations. However, some work does remain in order to
obtain correlation of ground motion with a wider range of geological
and geophysical parameters.
352
10.
12.
REFERENCES
Higgins, G. H., and Butkovitch, T. R., "Effect of Water Content,
Yield, Medium and Depth of Burial on Cavity Radii," UCRL-50203,
1967.
Beaudet, P. R., Cassity, C. R., Davis, A. H., and deCaprariis, P.
P., "Predicting the Effect of Underground Nuclear Explosions," ERC
Report, NVO-I163-165, 1968.
Mickey, W. V., "Operation Plowshare, Project Sedan: Seismic
Effects from a High-Yield Cratering Experiment in Desert Alluvium,
AEC, PNE-2I3F, February 1963.
Murphy, J. R., and Lahoud, J. A., "Analysis of Seismic Peak Ampli-
tudes from Underground Nuclear Evolosions," ERC Report, NVO-I163-
166, 1968.
Klepinger, R. W., and Mueller, R. A., "Analysis of Ground Motion,
Cabriolet Event," ERC Report, NVO-I 163-I 78, 1969.
Hays, W. W., "Identification of Elastic Wave Types on Seismograms
from Underground Nuclear Explosions," ERC Report, NVO-I 163-I 57,
1968.
Davis, A. H., and Murphy, J. R., "Amplification of Seismic Body
Waves by Low Velocity Surface Layers," ERC Report, NVO-I I 63-I 30,
1967.
Watson, 0. L., "Procedure for Recording Ground Motion Velocity
from Underground Nuclear Explosions," ERC Report, NVO-I163-93,
1967.
Lynch, R. D., "A Summary of Prediction Equations Derived from Band-
Pass Filter Data," ERC Report, NVO-I 163-I 52, 1968.
Beaudet, P. R., "Wave Propagation in Heterogeneous Media, Presen-
tation and Handout at NVOO Panel of Consultants Meeting, March, 1968.
Mueller, R. A., "Seismic Spectrum Scaling Law, Oral Presentation to
be presented at 50th Annual Meeting of American Geophysical Union,
Apri I, 1969.
Klepinger, R. W., "Analysis of Ground Motion and Containment Data,
Gasbuggy Event," ERC Report, NVO-I 163-I 58, 1968.
Cassity, C. R., and Klepinger,•R. W., Buggy I Ground Motion Analysis
Study, ERC Report to be issued.
353
-------
QUESTIONS FOR PETER LOUX
I. From R. Duff:
Can HE tests be used at a new site to help determine propagation
paths and modes?
ANSWER:
I don't claim to be an expert on the equivalents of HE and nuclear
generated seismic motions, however, I would think that the way you
phrased the question that yes, you probably could determine something
about the wave mode propagation from an HE charge. I think the only
place you might get into trouble is if you were trying to equate the
seismic spectrum that you would expect to get from a nuclear charge
from the one you measured from an HE charge.
From Mr. C. Nelson:
What is the average speed in miles per second in which the seismic
motion or signal is propagated from an underground detonation?
ANSWER:
Why don't I just give you some numbers I remember and you can convert
it yourself. Let's take the refracted wave along the end discon-
tinuity which is out beyond the critical distance of which, at the
Nevada Test Site, is about, as I recall, 100 to 150 kilometers. If
you are outside that range, the refracted arrival spends most of its
time in the upper mantle at a velocity of something like 8 kilometers.
3. From Alex Grendon:
How did the direction of the row of charges in Buggy I compare with
the direction to SE-6 station?
ANSWER:
I don't know off-hand, but I certainly can say something about the
directional properties of this charge, since I just finished a report
on trying to identify interference effects from the Dugout HE charge.
We looked for two things in the seismic information—off the end of
the row versus perpendicular to the row. We tried to find linear,
so called classical linear, interference to see if any were present
or not, and that experiment was inconclusive because the frequency
that we needed to observe for interference was somewhat in the noise
of the seismic signal and perhaps partly because the interference was
354
not present at all. The other part of the experiment was to deter-
mine if we could use the seismic reciprocity theorum on this kind
of seismic data—say broadside versus end fire. So what we did was,
having been unsuccessful on the Dugout experiment, we requested and
received instrumentation on two arcs—two quarter circles coming
from the end of the Buggy row to the center, one at a distance of
5 to 10 kilometers and the other was out farther and we did not find—
so far we are still working on it—we haven't found either reciprocity
or the classical linear interference principles applicable here. Of
course, you start thinking about where you're shooting in the source
region; it's really a non-linear problem you should be looking at to
see what the non-linear shock-wave is pumping into the elastic region
off the end versus broadside.
4. From Alex Grendon:
Is this directional factor theoretically important?
Moderator: I just checked with Mr. Reed. We were trying to ascertain
the orientation of the buggy row charges and our best recollection is
that it was oriented about north 70 east. That was the row. The
direction from Las Vegas to the row charge is about north 27.
ANSWER:
In other words the direction to Las Vegas is more broadside than it
is off the end.
5. From F. Gera:
Can you please comment on the possibility of applying the mentioned
spectrum prediction technique to natural earthquakes?
ANSWER:
Actually we have, in fact, looked at a few earthquake spectra.
El Centre is one and some others recorded by the Coast and Geodetic
Survey at about 100 or 200 ki lometers from the epicenter and so far,
and I certainly wouldn't want to be misquoted here and more work needs
to be done on this point, but so far we haven't found large differences
in the seismic spectrum from an earthquake whose equivalent yield, and
this is rather tenuous to take the magnitude and find an equivalent
magnitude-yield relationship which you can do from say 50 of the
reported magnitudes reported by the Air Force, for example. If you
convert the magnitude over the yield and then plug the yield into
the prediction equations which deliberate spectrum and compare that
355
-------
to the spectrum of the earthquake motion, the few cases that we've
tried don't show any large differences between the nuclear and earth-
quake generated motion. However, one would have to look for
differences if you were closer in to the source for example, because
obviously the source function has got to be different.
356
GROUND MOTION EFFECTS
by
J. A. Blume*
John A. Blume and Associates
San Francisco, California
ABSTRACT
Ground motion caused by natural earthquakes
or by nuclear explosion causes buildings and other
structures to respond in such manner as possibly
to have high unit stresses and to be subject to
damage or--in some cases--collapse. Even minor
damage may constitute a hazard to persons within
or adjacent to buildings. The risk of damage
may well be the governing restraint on the uses
of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Theory
is advanced regarding structural-dynamic response
but real buildings and structures are complex,
highly variable, and often difficult to model
realistically. This paper discusses the state
of knowledge, the art of damage prediction and
safety precautions, and shows ground motion ef-
fects from explosions of underground nuclear de-
vices in the continental United States including
events Salmon, Gasbuggy, Boxcar, Faultless and
B&nham.
Ground motion, whether caused by natural earthquakes
or underground nuclear explosions, causes buildings and
other structures to respond and to be stressed. Depending
upon the amount of the response, the duration of the mo-
tion, and many other factors, the structures may be sub-
ject to damage or, in extreme cases, to collapse. In
addition, ground motion can cause or accelerate soil or
rock slides and it can induce waves on bodies of water
such as lakes or reservoirs. Severe ground motion could
also rupture underground pipelines and sewers. It is
essential that these effects be predicted in advance so
that effective means can be taken to minimize or prevent
damage and to eliminate hazard to persons. The public
health would indeed be impaired if occupied buildings suf-
fered damage without warning.
*President, John A. Blume 8 Associates Research Division,
San Francisco, California
357
-------
THE RISK AND ITS CONTROL
It has become clear in recent years that structural
response to ground motion constitutes a risk that is much
more important in the nuclear field than was originally
contemplated. In fact, it may well represent the limit-
ing restraint on the yield level for planned events except
in desolate areas. An additional problem--even without
significant damage--is the matter of public reaction to
ground motion and to its effects. Education, briefings,
new releases and courtesy can be most effective in this
regard.
In order to cope with ground motion effects currently
and also to develop improved technology for the future,
the Atomic Energy Commission, Nevada Operations Office,
Effects Evaluation Division, conducts with the aid of its
contractors continuing activity in seismic problems. John
A. Blume and Associates Research Division is concerned with
all aspects of structural response and surface effects for
Nevada events and for other events in populated areas.
The scope of the work includes all possibly affected sur-
face structures and features. We also do long range re-
search in related problems and provide various services
prior to, during and after detonations. We observed the
1964 Salmon event in Mississippi since we had not been in
the program long enough to participate as we have on all
subsequent events at the Nevada Test Site, and on offsite
events such as Gasbuggy, Faultless, Sterling, and Rulison
now in progress.
A great deal has been learned and yet there is still
much to be done. Some of the effort depends upon knowledge
derived from natural earthquakes over the years. We have
been in that field for 3% decades. However, because of
certain differences between the problems and the technologies
associated with natural earthquakes and with manmade ground
motion, new techniques and much greater accuracy and care
are essential with the nuclear problem. A careful, step-
by-step program has been conducted to acquire needed data
and to improve the technology before crossing various
thresholds.
It must not. be inferred that all the risk is associated
with highrise buildings, although these buildings are the
most sensitive to distant energy releases. There are a
great many more low buildings, commercial and residential.
This statistical exposure increases the probabilities of
unusual occurrences. A particular problem, especially with
low buildings, is that there usually are minor Tacks or
358
other defects of which the owner isn't aware until he feels
the building move. Most of these, however, can be cate-
gorized as to time or cause by careful examination. There
are often latent conditions that would lead to cracks or
other problems whether or not the ground was vibrated.
The motion, however, even at low levels, may trigger the
existing mechanism sooner than under normal conditions.
The total distress may well be no more after a period of
time than if the ground motion had not occurred.
Figure 1 shows the principal area of seismic field
activities in the south and central portion of Nevada.
The large NTS events cause significant motion in the bor-
dering communities shown and also in Las Vegas, the largest
city in the area. Of course, we have to be aware of all
installations whether or not they are in communities. Our
work within the test site is generally limited to test
buildings, certain buildings which we monitor, and the
Nuclear Rocket Development Station facilities at Jackass
Flats. The map also shows the Central Nevada Testing Area
which was the site for the Faultless event for which we
considered many cities and towns not shown, including Salt
Lake City, Reno, Sacramento, etc. As yields increase the
area of interest also increases.
RESPONSE DYNAMICS
Because of the initial sparsity of strong nuclear ground
motion data we utilize all possible information from the
earthquake field in which we have been engaged for decades.
There are similarities—and also differences—between natural
earthquake and manmade ground motion data and procedures.
Figure 2 shows the measured motion of one of the strongest
earthquakes ever recorded. The USCSGS recorded the accel-
eration time history shown on the upper diagram. The velo-
city and displacements were obtained by integration. The
periods, or pulse durations, increase with integration as
shown by the number of zero crossings.
Six simple vibrating systems are shown in Figure 3.
Motion can be induced by displacing the base or the ground
as indicated. In the elastic range in which no damage occurs
the natural periods of the first five systems would not
change with amplitude. However, if the rocking block were
on a rigid base, its frequency would increase as amplitude
decreases. Real buildings are. quite complex and yet they
can be modeled reasonably well in some cases. The impor-
tant properties are natural periods, damping, mode shapes,
elastic strength, and inelastic properties beyond the linear
range.
359
-------
A basic principle in dynamics is amplification under
resonant, or "tuned" conditions. Figure 4 shows steady state
response under the continuous forcing of ground motion. If
the ground motion period coincides with that of the struc-
ture there is perfect tuning at a ratio of 1.0. In this
case, only damping or energy absorption limits the response.
With no damping, the theoretical response is infinite.
Most modern buildings have low damping ratios--in the order
of 2% to 5% of critical, where critical refers to the amount
that would just prevent free vibration. Fortunately, there
is seldom perfect tuning or sustained periodicity of ground
motion. However, real building responses are greatly am-
plified and resonant amplification is a real problem because
perfect tuning is not required for response motion to greatly
exceed the ground motion.
In practice we do not deal with simple systems or sim-
ple ground motion; both are quite complex. The analysis
requires extensive mathematics and large, high speed com-
puters. One very useful device is the response spectrum
which shows at a glance how various idealized simple oscil-
lators would respond to a particular time-history of ground
motion. Figure 5 shows how oscillators of various natural
periods and each with 5% of critical damping would respond
to ground motion recorded at the NRDS facility at the test
site. For example, an oscillator of 0.2-second period would
have had a peak acceleration of about O.lOg. Because real
buildings are not simple oscillators various corrections
must be made in applying such response spectra.
The response spectrum may be in terms of acceleration,
velocity, or displacement. If one assumes the building is
moving in harmonic motion there are simple relationships
between acceleration, velocity, and displacement and one
may consider them all at once on one plot. Figure 6 shows
such a plot for event Greeley as recorded at the NRDS facility.
Two damping values are shown, 2% and 10%. Note how greater
damping decreases and smooths the response. For 10% damping,
at a period of 2 seconds, the relative response velocity is
3.t cm/sec, the acceleration about O.Olg and the relative
displacement about 1 cm.
RESPONSE SPECTRA
The response spectra for several real earthquakes are
shown in Figure 7 together with the Boxcar and the Faultless
spectra for Las Vegas, station SE-6. All have 5% damping.
The El Centre earthquake of 1940 was very strong and caused
considerable damage in the short period range. There were
360
no buildings in the long period range. The Los Angeles
response to the Taft earthquake of 1952 caused about
$10,000,000 worth of damage to limited height buildings
situated some 80 to 100 miles from the epicenter. The
Fairbanks earthquake of 1967 caused damage to buildings
in the short period range. The earthquake shown as Sacra-
mento 1966 occurred near Truckee, California. This spectrum
is very interesting because new highrise buildings having
periods in the order of 1 second were just at the threshold
of minor damage. It is also to be noted that this response
in the range of 1 to 2 seconds is very close to that of
Boxcar in Las Vegas for which no real damage has been re-
ported. There are reasons to believe that Boxcar was close
to a threshold of damage, perhaps at a 3-or H-sigma prob-
ability. The Faultless event, as shown, was much less
severe in Las Vegas than Boxcar.
There was some minor damage in Hattiesburg, Mississippi,
from nuclear event Salmon in 1964. The response spectrum
is shown in Figure 8. Also shown in the response spectrum
for Boxcar in Las Vegas. There was no real damage in Las
Vegas, although over 100 complaints were received. This is
an example of the fallacy of using peak values as criteria
without regard to period. The low buildings in Las Vegas
(short periods) have received far less energy than those in
Hattiesburg even though the Las Vegas peak velocity is some-
what greater than Hattiesburg. Acceleration is more mean-
ingful for low, rigid buildings. Note that the Las Vegas
acceleration was much less than at Hattiesburg in the short
period range. The relative displacements in Las Vegas have
been much greater than in Hattiesburg. This affects the
long period, tall buildings, of which there are many in
Las Vegas.
Figure 9 shows the Las Vegas response spectra for the
three largest NTS events to date, Greeley, Boxcar and Benham.
Note that in some period bands one event will have the greatest
response while at other periods another event will have the
greatest response. This is especiallv true between Greeley
and Boxcar. Since buildings respond sensitively in accord-
ance with their natural periods, these variations are very
important. Broad generalizations can be very misleading
for particular cases.
Figure 10 is another way of looking at statistical
variations. These curves are not spectra but upper and
lower envelopes of 8 spectra—all 5% damped, all for one
event, Benham, and all in Las Vegas. These are for hori-
zontal motions at four different stations, all on desert
alluvium, and about U miles (maximum) distance apart.
361
-------
Since the range to the shot point was over 100 miles, its
variations to the four stations are insignificant. Also
interesting is the fact that different stations and components
control the envelopes at various period values. Statistical
variations and probabilities must be considered in predicting
response to ground motion.
Figure 11 shows 10% damped response spectra for pro-
ject Gasbuggy at five different stations. The radial dis-
tances from ground zero are shown in the figure. Note that
at Farmington, 90 kilometers out, the motion at 1-second
period approaches the acceleration of stations only 34 kilo-
meters our from GZ.
Figure 12 shows response spectra in various cities for
event Faultless detonated in Central Nevada in 1968. The
designation SE-6 is for a Las Vegas station. The motion
was felt by some persons in tall buildings at Salt Lake City,
440 kilometers away.
The more people sense ground or building motion the
more they are apt to become frightened unless pre-warned
and the more they will complain about possible damage. For
this reason, and also to obtain a better coverage of motion
over broad areas without the need for excessive instrumenta-
tion , we have studied the threshold of human perception of
motion. Figure 13 shows new data recently obtained in our
laboratory in the long period range of 1 to 5 seconds typical
of tall buildings and how this information adjoins previous
data obtained by others in the short period range. It was
found that acceleration is the best parameter for human
reaction to motion. The heavy curve indicates the mean
regression line and the lighter curves the variations at
plus or minus one standard deviation.
BUILDINGS, RESPONSE AND DAMAGE
Figure 14 is a "threshold ladder". It has no scale
but it does indicate the various levels of interest. There
is usually a big gap between human perception of motion and
the onset of damage. Many people in Las Vegas buildings
have felt the largest NTS events. The problem is to define
the damage levels. Actually, they vary greatly depending
upon many parameters. One of our major objectives is to
determine these thresholds over the entire spectrum of con-
ditions . There is no reliable formula, criterion, or rule
of thumb, although many have been proposed.
362
In estimating damage and in considering safety it is_
essential to know something about the inelastic characteris-
tics of materials and buildings. It makes a big difference
whether an overstressed material is brittle and will frac-
ture or whether it is ductile and will simply crack and
stretch. Figure 15 illustrates a ductile frame and a brittle
wall. The relative energy absorption characteristics of
these two systems may be judged by the area under the force-
deformation curves. Often, the two types of systems are
combined in real buildings. A building subject to sudden
collapse must be treated differently--safetywise--than one
that might deform but not collapse.
A 15-story building has mode shapes as shown in Fig-
ure 16 for the first three modes. The building would re-
spond to ground motion depending on the frequency content
of the ground motion. This particular building responded
largely in its third mode to a local earthquake in 1957.
The circles indicate where instruments measured the motion.
Figure 17 indicates how a 4-story building can be ideal-
ized mathematically as a system of lumped masses and weight-
less springs. Note that if the floor system is flexible
(as they are in most contemporary buildings) the system is
far coupled and indeterminate. The stiffness matrix con-
tains 10 different elements. Models like this are used to
compute the response to complete time-histories of ground
motion.
The data in Figure 18 are for a Las Vegas highrise
building. The squares represent measured response to NTS
events. The mean peak top level acceleration is about 7
times the peak ground acceleration. Empirical predictions
can be made with such regression line analysis when impor-
tant parameters are essentially constant. This is one way
to extrapolate. The points shown generally fall within one
standard deviation except for the small events for which
measurements are less accurate and more affected by "noise"
or non-event conditions. Care must be taken to note new
trends in such data. There are reasons why the linearity
indicated may not prevail at greater motion.
The spectrum curve shown in Figure 19 is for response
to Las Vegas ground motion, 2% damping, event Knickerbocker.
The circles represent the measured response of tall build-
ings in the same event after correction for participation
factor and modal combinations'. The general correlation
of the circles and the line is good, although there are
variations for some buildings. We frequently compare theo-
retical results with measured data and explore any anomalies.
363
-------
We also use more exotic prediction methods than empir-
ical and spectral response, although such are generally re-
served for special cases or studies. One of these methods
is the rigorous "time-history" procedure wherein a complete
model of a real building is subjected to the complete time
history of the ground motion as a forcing function. Fig-
ure 20 compares measured top-level motion in a 21-story
building to the same motion computed independently with
the building model and the ground motion as measured some
distance away from the building. The comparison here is
excellent--in the amplitudes, the periods, and in the time
scale. This indicates that the building was well modeled.
The results are not always this good. Large, fast computers
are necessary for such complex computations.
\
DAMAGE ESTIMATION
With no damage there is no hazard to persons. The
motion itself is not of sufficient intensity or duration
to cause physical harm. It is necessary to estimate the
type and degree of damage, if any, as a means of determining
whether evacuation should be recommended, or if those working
on scaffolds should be cautioned; or perhaps whether tempo-
rary bracing should be employed locally; or perhaps whether
any of these steps is indicated.
We have developed methods of estimating damage, or
lack of damage, which take into account—in an orderly
manner--the important theoretical and practical aspects of
the complex problem. Given a whole exposure of ground motion
from a large event, what are the probabilities of damage
and the damage forecasts for all the various communities
and types of structures and soil conditions? This is a
problem involving structural theory, dynamics, soil condi-
tions, joint probabilities of demand and capacity, and many
other factors. The Spectral Matrix Method which we have
developed uses predicted response velocities in 8 period
bands as shown in Figure 21. It also includes 12 velocity
rows as shown to form a 96-element matrix of "demand". In
addition, the various types of structures are assigned yield
point "capacities" in terms of pseudo spectral response
velocity, inelastic characteristics, reserve energy capa-
cities in the damaging range, and damping values, usually
5% of critical. The "exposure" represents the replacement
cost of all the structures in each area. Demand and capa-
city are assigned probability distributions and the prob-
abilities are computed for demand to exceed capacity, in
which case damage begins. The output is damage for each
community and category of building. This procedure is
364
limited only by the available data on real buildings and
ground motion. It has been extended to cover multiple shots
from various locations.
There are many probability problems inherent in damage
estimation. The small figure in the lower right corner of
Figure 22 indicates demand in discrete values for convenience
here. This is ground motion, generally highly skewed as
shown. The ordinate is probability. The small figure at
the upper left is for the structural capacity. The proba-
bility distribution is often similar to Gaussian, but, of
course, without negative values. The large 3-dimensional
schematic diagram shows the joint probability of all com-
binations of demand and capacity. The height represents
probability, with the volume being unity. If DEM/CAP is
less than 1 there is no damage. If it is more than 1, the
damage extent varies in some manner as DEM/CAP. In the
schematic shown, there is a small probability of damage.
One must be concerned with low capacities getting together
with high demands. This operation is included in the Spec-
tral Matrix Method of Damage Prediction. It has been ex-
tended to estimate damage in a whole country, from multiple
shots, as in damage and safety studies for the proposed
interoceanic canal.
If there is a sufficient probability of damage we may
recommend evacuation to AEC, NVO. We may in other cases
recommend precautionary procedures or warnings to persons
in that particular area. The actual warning to the people
and the conduct of any evacuation measures by the U. S.
Public Health Service is the responsibility of the NVO Test
Manager. Temporary closure of roads through an area is
sometimes recommended because of possible slope failure,
rock falls, or perhaps because of the possibility of damage
to the road itself. In such cases local highway patrol
offices or the county sheriff's staff may be called upon
by the Test Manager to establish road blocks and to advise
motorists of delays or alternate routing.
Predictions of ground motion effects with safety recom-
mendations are made before every major event at the NTS and
all offsite events in populated areas. These follow pre-
shot surveys and complete coverage of all possible hazardous
conditions or structures. During the events, instrumental
records are obtained at strategic places, and observers are
stationed at locations of special interest. Following events,
re-surveys are made to check 'for possible damage. A report
is prepared to show how the actual response compared to the
predicted, in view of the actual ground motion. This sharpens
prediction capability and adds to the long range technology.
Any complaints of possible damage are carefully and courteously
365
-------
investigated and every effort is made to determine the real
cause or causes of any existing trouble. If it can be shown
that the ground motion could have caused the trouble, it is
the policy of AEC to make appropriate settlement.
All data obtained during and after the event, includ-
ing the instrumental records, are carefully analyzed and
permanently recorded. In many cases, detailed analyses
are conducted. All of this adds to and advances the basic
technology of predicting the effects of ground motion. The
overall effort is conducted with checks and balances and
scientific objectivity. - Much progress is being made while,
at the same time, observing the public welfare and safety.
366
FIGURE 1 NEVADA TEST SITES,AND BORDER COWUNITIES
367
-------
II '
GROUND ACCELERATION
GROUND VELOCITY
GROUND DISPLACEMENT
10 15
TIME SEC.
25
J.2
0.1
0
-0.1
-0.2
-0.3
-8
30
FIGURE 2 1940 EARTHQUAKE AT EL CENTRO, CALIFORNIA; NORTH TO SOUTH COMPONENT
slender rod
""1
. 2
I L I
SPRING—* -
jack in the box
simple building
inverted pendulum
MOTION
a rocking block
FIGURE t> IDEALIZED VIBRATING SYSTEMS
368-369
-------
O.20,
CD
- 0.1«4
00
F/Q.5 -RESPOKJSE ACCELERATIOU SPECTRUM
FOR kiRDs/ ETS i -GREELEY
' DAMPIfJQ RATIO : O.O5
o.l el
Qi
LU
aosj
o
UJ
00
Z O.04
O
0.
00
LU
Qi
0.0.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.« 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 l.« ' J.
PERIOD IN SECONDS
'2.0
370-371
-------
• JOHN A. BlUME & ASSOCIATES, RESEARCH DIVISION -
sfppiiffiilslli
•: w«/q4iH XjM iK.::'- ww:(XtX
immlKMmm
'^M^Mmt
O.I 1.0
PERIOD IN SECONDS
&REELEY NRDS/E-MRD (RADIAL)
372
N
U
O
O
-TTT^fT"^ r-/^-
•Jl4&±^/L '
•il^i.i--/^'-,r
-prkif/^>
>r.\^
r^-:.-t" t.-T'.rl-irtTi/iifej;—J1
_t±l4lEL_CENTROJI 940 /,-- V: I - r - -
^!U^>-.:--t_L>
X *••'•:
OKsrii |.f|]
r-rt-/:.-Nr^-\-J
EL CENTRO 1940
•LOS ANGELES 1952
- •.•<..;~jx_4vL*
j2i^4
_ _ji^ ^ ; _ i'.f^v',.^
ir^-^^^^
S?
-FAIRBANKS 196
SliK-m^iT'
X' ;XK> 1LOS ANGELES 1952
liltyiL,
s^zttetb/ii^"
r/-r FAIRBANKS 1967'*J~-
V . \;., , '. ;.-. , 1 \>
"X^SACRAMENTO 1966'
-^m/! riLU;J^£
y-^,-\- •<'•••••**
^.^-x."i_4^::'-;4J-a
' "A-J- ASACRAMENTO
y^-f'uk'
/;i-.?;>^^n7lTi
.nfxX^BOx^Rspe^l
_-,/::;:L44-/.H, FAULTLESS SE^6.-r '-h
-^^•'^•.K j
^^-^tia
IriftEiSfec^Sf
'.' .! '^'X '' \-/' ".' ."^ ^ >.^
~~—•:—<—. -1—14.47^—__j^—:
-r*^v •• i - -I—t-.4-;»X? i——/ , —.
—' -v-'H--H>fj>*!--*-i:-^-l--
i i ?L»'_iO._j. -j_._i •' j .
, x . ; \ .'.",•>. , ;. 1 <
. .: , i * v/i'••.-:. : -« ^
>'—j-1—: i-y?^T:- j— .• ; '• —
'HM^.M^ife
^L. Mi-p.'J-: :^n-.: ;:.r>^ir4--H^:
"-•,<;;r?ir-'i r ~—~ £ lur^xL'-.^^
N
^
O.I 1.0
PERIOD IN SECONDS
FIG. 7 RESPONSE SPECTRA 5 PERCENT DAMPING
373
-------
•JOHN A. BlUME & ASSOCIATES. ENCINEERS-
k y :^,>: j.'.t.M.;. / x v >:>.•; i.t.'
CT^VrXfx <':K>X / \. i>^^
-------
• JOHN A. BLUME & ASSOCIATES, RESEARCH DIVISION -
DUH5S
SANDS
SQ.U/KSS PARK
O.I 1.0
PERIOD IN SECONDS
5% /?£S/°CW5c: SPECTRA, US VE&AS, cVENT BcNn'AM
•JOHN A. BLUME « ASSOCIATES RESEARCH DIVISION-
t RADIALQ1 KMf.
" ~ " ' • *;—r
STATION ll,K40/Ai:^
'
.STATION t6,N-S(34KM)
0.1 1.0
PERIOD IN SECONDS
F16. II - PROJECT GAS&UQGY, /O'/. 5P6CTXA
377
-------
•JOHN A. BlUMt «, ASSOCIATES RESEARCH DIVISION -
100.0 •"
5.L.C. - .Salt Lake' City ' '',';.
Sactq -'Sacramento'. " •':•.-
U.A..J- Los Angeles >..';.!
S.F, VSan Francisco (H/R -Hard Rock, All-Alluvium)
•' . . •
o.ot
Damping
0 05 FAULTLESS
\ ''.'[• • •' .i i.i ••'•'.•• 'I,'} J • • '!
01 1.0 10.0
PERIOD IN SECONDS
^78
Response Spectra Comparison of Major Cities
fRadial Component, unless otherwise noted)
'S
12
10'
0
0.
u
10"
Q
o
O
I
to'
LINE : PettcePTtON - O.OO?45 + O.OOO?5(-jr)
DEVIATION OF LINE : /S7" - tO.
-I 1—I—I I I I I
-1 1—I—I I I I
JoOLOMAN 4 YON 6ISRKE
DATA
LAS
I^L
TtBf]\
DATA (cuss an
JAR, LAB DATA
t\ STANDARD
- DEVIATION
o.ot
O.IO
1.00
10.0
: 7, sec.
F/&./3.' PERIOD VS. ACCELERATION AT THRESHOLD
OF PERCEPTION.
OATA O&TA/NSO FROM LAA T6STS,
LAS VEGAS f/ELO TESTS, AHO FHj. (a.
-------
i
il
8
8
0
8
BUILDING MATERIAL CHARACTERISTICS
DEFLECTION
ULTIMATE
"•-*
YIELD
23456
DEFLEaiON
WORK
(a) ductile
(b) brittle
330-381
-------
1st mode
T, -I25«ec.
ground
bosamBnt
2nd
T2 '0.4ls«c.
-ROOF
-\—12
3rd
T, -Q24MC.
FIGURE 16 Mode Shapes ot a 15-story Building.
382
***
M|
S23
Sw
ELEVATION
I
SI3 SW
S23 S24
S33 S34
834 844
^vV—
* s s / s
A*
,W.
DrSQ ^_
Ml -A^V^ M
DO OS
I,
O O r' O
2 -AV- Ma -AV-
(JO OK O
1
I
OK O
— M4 -AV—
O1^. O
A A ^
MECHANICAL ANALOGY
FIGURE 17 A Far Coupled System.
383
2
'/.
y
-------
z
a
H
i—
cr
CK
LU
_l
LU
u
u
cr
Qi
a
a
a.
a
UJ
a
to
CD
a
cc
LU
Q.
0.10
0.09
aoe
O.O?
0.06
aos
Q04
OO3
0.02
OOl
n
1 1
V =
s =
- VK
"%
^
^
III 1
- O. OOIO3 + (,.(*& X
0.019 (STAMOAKO O£l//ATtOfi/}
* O./Q (COGFF/CteNT Of MAWATIOM) —
!
A
f
j
i
i
^
?//
//A
Y
+a~
\
1
1
\
-A".
///-
//
'/
/
«f/
• 'L
Response Spectra at SE-6 E/W Direction
0.02 Damping (Event KNICKERBOCKER)'
vi v f - . si , , i yj-/^- vi x • r \r.xi i
Peak response for several tall tu
,rcDDnr lrUCtura' R«P°"se « Period of Mode in Which Response Occurred.
vent KNICKERBOCKER (fundamental mode unless otherwise noted). 19
385
-------
HALF • SeCOA/D TIMS. 7/C/CS
A A
/\
A
V
A
RELATIVE D/spLAce//!£ur FROM /vc-27 /eeco/2/os
1
y
FROM COMPUTATIONS,
FIG. 20 - COMPARISON OF ACTUAL ANO coMpareo RELATIVE DISPLACEMENT,
TOP PLOOfL, frUILOIHG A , GUMOMT
U A. SLUMS 4- ASSOCMTGS, R.eSEAR.C.H O///S/OA/
RESEARCH DIVISION^ J>
wt
1*'
w«
•1
IM
3
a
z
X
O
^
© C
O
, o
o
o
o
o
o
V -
o
^
O
O
O
O
O
0
O
O
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
©/ © . •
3©©4r-v'©%© © f \ ©, \ Q>
b V^V* "^ 6 N° 6 o' b . O'
O
O
0
O
o
o
o
o
O;
o
o
o
0
o
o
o
o . . . .9
p O O O (N o
'& "© "©"©'©
.0,'
o
0
- o •
o
o
0
:O -
0
o
o
0
0
o
o
o
\-
-------
QUESTIONS FOR JOHN BLUME
From R. L. Long:
Is there any way to experimentally determine the resonant frequencies
of various building types before an event?
ANSWER:
Yes, there are several ways. The most of which we employ. One of
the simplest and most old fashioned methods is simply to go up into
a tall building on a windy day and get good records and analyze these
very carefully to avoid gust factors to make sure you are getting
the building in its natural swing. The limitation of this is that
it only brings out the fundamental mode and you're still guessing
as to the higher modes, so the next thing is to run a pull test if
this is possible and we do this on test structures, but not on
private buildings. We simply pull the building over with a wire
and a rigging; snap the wire, let it vibrate and record what
happens. The third method is by force vibration using machines to
actually induce the type of response needed. We do this also, in
fact we have a small machine for this purpose, but the problem is
that it is very d i ff i cu11 to go i nto an occup ied pri vate bu iI d i ng,
and to say you want to cut their floor up and to hook a machine into
it. They just don't Iike it.
2. From Walt Kozlowski:
What is your opinion of the structural integrity of the buildings
in the Las Vegas area with respect to earthquakes and with respect
to nuclear tests?
ANSWER:
First of all, let me say that Las Vegas operates under Zone I of
the Uniform Building Code. Zone I means that it has very low seismic
design coefficients. To give you another example, Salt Lake City
operates under Zone 2 with double the design coefficients and Reno
in Zone 3 with four times the design coefficients. Now the difference
is not entirely that much, however, because the wind design may
possibly govern over the seismic design. What usually happens in any
talI bui I ding in the low seismic zone, however, is that wind will
usually govern the design and means that you have a pretty strong
bu iId i ng on the broads i de i n the moti on that is transverse and a
rather weak building in the longitudinal direction because they
didn't put much wind on the end of the bu iId i ng when they des i gned
it. So I would say that, like most cities, perhaps even a little
more so, Las Vegas could have some earthquake problems. For example,
-------
the El Centre, California earthquake of 1940 if it occurred again
or the Kern County, CaIi forn i a earthquake of 1952, in my opinion
would make the taI I bui Idings here respond. Whether or not there
wouId be damage, I don't know. The more they respond the more
chance of damage. Now why didn't this happen in 1952? There were
no high-rise bui Idings then. The situation with regards to nucI ear
events is that we j ust don't dare do much damage to bu i Id i ngs. We
don't want to do any if we can avoid it. So they are all being
watched very, very carefully. We are using them alI as guinea pigs.
In fact, I think a great deaf of information will come out of this
program that will be very, very useful in a natural earthquake
field.
3. From Jack Reed:
What would be the natural frequency of the new forty-story buildings
in Bogota and what yield would give peak motions at that frequency?
ANSWER:
A forty-story building, if it's a modern type building without many
filler walls such as we used to have, could have a natural funda-
mental period on the order of 3 to 5 seconds, possibly even longer.
However, in South America they design a frame and then come in later
and put in tile walls so the frame can't act as it was designed.
The resuIt is that the period is shortened, the building is stiffened
and the tile walls will tend to act as structural members when the
ground shoe I- f i rs t comes a I ong. This is unfortunate. It is not
exclusively South Amer i ca. We have a Iot of these in the Un i ted
States and some right in Las Vegas. The yield which would get out
there is a little bit beyond my normal scope except to say that it
would ta^e very, very heavy yields and Iong distances combined to
peak at this period. My guess is that we are probably talking 10
or 20 megatons at that great distance.
390
Remarks of Rep. Craig Hosmer
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
Symposium on the Public Health Aspects
of Peaceful Nuclear Explosives
April 8, 1969, Las Vegas, Nevada
PLOWSHARE, POLITICS AMD
THE PUBLIC INTEREST (BANQUET ADDRESS)
As a friend and strong supporter of the Plowshare Pro-
gram, I am delighted at the opportunity to come here this
evening to speak on its behalf. This is a verv irriDortant
meeting on a tremendously interesting subject. It is es-
pecially timely for a variety of reasons.
Eirst, the Senate's recent ratification of the Non-
proliferation Treaty will have a positive, long-term imDact
on world-wide interest in applications of peaceful nuclear
explosives. Article V of the Treaty deals specifically
with this subject. The United States , as a nuclear weapons
nation, promises to make the benefits of Plowshare avail -
able to the non-weapons countries on a non-discriminatory
basis.
Second, President Nixon has indicated he intends to
pursue the Plowshare program vigorously. A positive indi-
cation of this was his instruction to AEC Chairman Glenn
Seaborg regarding a feasibility study of blasting a harbor
at Cape Keraudren in Australia. The project collapsed,
but for totally non-nuclear reasons. Sentinel Mining Com-
pany withdrew its interest because it couldn't make a sale
to the Japanese of the iron ore to be shipped from Keraudren.
But Cape Hedland and Cape Preston are emerging as alternate
sites for alternate companies. An Australian Plowshare
harbor is still a real possibility. You will be hearing
about it quite soon. rly lips are sealed for now.
391
-------
In short, we are approaching a period of greatly ac-
celerated progress in Plowshare if certain obstacles are
overcome. This symposium will contribute information, par-
ticularly in the public health area, which is a prerequisite
to a broad commercial program. In addition, I would hope
that any new questions raised here and left unanswered can
be tackled by the Joint Committee at its hearing.
PROMISE OF THE PLOWSHARE PROGRAM
It is interesting to me that the papers being presented
and the topics being covered at this meeting are similar
to those at another seminar about 12 years ago. That, too,
was an historic meeting for Plowshare.
In 1956, one of the periodic Middle East uprisings
blocked off the Suez Canal to international shipping. With
the patterns of international trade disrupted, serious thought
began to focus on alternatives to and substitutes for the
Suez Canal. Creative minds at the Lawrence Radiation Lab-
oratory came up with one of the better ideas: namely, if
you can't get through the existing canal, dig a new one!
And do it with nuclear explosives.
A year later, in 1957, the year in which the first
underground shot was ever fired, a "brainstorming" symposium
was organized at LRL to examine the concept of peaceful
nuclear explosives. The program still had no name and very
little money, but the scientists were certain they were on
to something important. Sometime later, I don't recall
when, Edward Teller succeeded in attaching the Plowshare
name to it.
Unlike today's symposium, the earlier one was cloaked
in a necessary shroud of secrecy and security.
The now declassified papers of 1957 demonstrate the
remarkable clarity of foresight possessed by these Plow-
share pioneers. With very few exceptions, their message
was economics—how to introduce peaceful nuclear explosives
into the marketplace at costs competitive with conventional
industrial processes and technology.
All three categories for possible use were mentioned--
excavation technology to build canals, harbors, or knock
down geologic obstacles; underground engineering for petroleum
production, gas stimulation, and mining; and scientific
applications for seismic studies, neutron sources and new
element production. With essentially zero experience in
below-surface explosions of nuclear size, the participants
recognized the key technical problem areas—radioactivity,
containment and ground motion.
392
SOME OBSTACLES TO BE CLEARED
Today, at this meeting, we are seeing where we have
come and how far we still have to go. For a variety of
reasons, we have not moved ahead in this field as fast as
we might have. When you compare progress in reactor devel-
opment with that in Plowshare since, say, 1960, I think
it is clear that Plowshare has been dragging.
There are understandable historical reasons for this.
In the first place, Plowshare was, and to a large degree
still is, a government reserve. Industry, the potential
user, was not brought in at the beginning. Only in recent
years have we seen the development of private industrial
interest in specific applications. Meanwhile, classifica-
tion, parental jealousy and over-protectiveness--all human
frailties--have played their delaying roles.
Nor for the first decade and a half of the nuclear
age was industry particularly alert to Plowshare opportun-
ities. In 1958, for example, it rejected out-of-hand a
joint AEC-Bureau of Mines proposal to detonate a Plowshare
explosion in the oil shale of Colorado. The oil companies
found a variety of superficial flaws in the project, without
examining either its underlying concepts or its potentials.
Later, of course, the nuclear test moratorium slowed Plow-
share to a crawl and hindered establishing a rapport be-
tween government and the private sector. But that is past
history. There is a healthy interest now.
Probably the most exasperating obstacles to progress
in this area have been and still are those so-called "lib-
erals" whose conscience pangs cause them to view any peace-
ful application of atomic energy in terms of a mushroom
cloud. It strikes me as irrational that these people are
offended by attempts to develop the power of the atom for
man's benefit. They are 100% for foreign aid and the Peace
Corps, but 100% against foreign Plowshare applications and
200% against domestic ones. To hear them tell it, Plow-
share, by itself, is the single major obstacle to total
and complete world disarmament.
In addition to the assorted professors, scientists,
lawyers and literati who whine over Plowshare for philosoph-
ical reasons, a hard core of Plowshare opponents seems to
have developed within the Executive Branch of the govern-
ment itself—particularly within the Budget Bureau, the
State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
Behind the scenes, this group strenuously fights to obstruct
every attempt at upgrading the program. These people seem
to have a paranoiac distrust and abhorrence for Plowshare,
393
-------
which they cannot divorce in their minds from the weapons
program. I am sure Article V of the NPT, which gives Plow-
share international respectability, must have broken their
bleeding hearts.
Despite the fact that this program generally has strong
support within Congress, industry, the AEC and in most cor-
ners of the Executive Branch, this clique exercises consid-
erable clout in opposing it, by budget constriction and
otherwise. For example, in early 1967, the Cabriolet ex-
periment was summarily cancelled by the Johnson Administra-
tion for fear of upsetting negotiations on the NPT and the
Latin American Treaty on a Nuclear Free Zone. At that time,
I made a speech in the House of Representatives questioning
the judgment that led to this decision. It is totally beyond
me how a research program aimed at developing the peaceful
atom could be construed as detrimental to efforts at halt-
ing the spread of nuclear weapons.
Another more recent example concerns the late, lamented
Cape Keraudren project. The AEC was directed by the Presi-
dent to actively and promptly study the feasibility of the
project. Yet this same anonymous brotherhood seemed to do
everything within its power to prevent the Commission from
getting any money, even for the feasibility study.
Since the Limited Test Ban Treaty was signed in 196t,
they have never ceased forwarding overly-legalistic inter-
pretations calculated to eliminate the possibility of Plow-
share excavations. The Treaty prohibits a nation from
"causing to be present outside its national boundaries"
radioactivity from a nuclear explosive device, warlike or
peaceful. They claim one single radioactive atom beyond
the three-mile limit would constitute a violation. Yet
all of our standard radiation protection guides—even those
adopted by the United Nations--state that radiation is "not
present" when its measurable amount constitutes less than
10% of the established maximum permissible concentration.
Further, these guides relate to human exposure, not merely
to abstract presence.
Based on evidence which admittedly is somewhat tenuous,
my own belief is that the Soviets are anxious to remove
the handcuffs of the Limited Test Ban Treaty from nuclear
excavations. They have plenty of geological cosmetology
which is in their self interest to perform, just as we do.
Since any treaty means precisely what the two most power-
ful signatory nations say it means, I am of the opinion
that the LIB can be rapidly brought into line with the
facts-of-peaceful-nuclear explosions-life, if certain people
in our own government will stop throwing up artificial hurdles.
394
WHAT WE HOPE TO DO THROUGH H. R. U77
It is accurate to say that without
port of the Joint Committee, the Plowsha
have been successfully sidetracked, even
never heard of either domestically or on
scene in the form of the NPT's Article V
may not be able to overcome all the anti
in the government, but we are going to t
off the back burner by enacting H.R. 477
Plowshare Services Bill. This Bill is c
the House members of the Joint Committee
panion with similar bi-partisan support
the continuing sup-
re program might
tually buried, and
the international
provisions. We
-Plowshare forces
ry to get Plowshare
, the Commercial
o-sponsored by all
and a Senate corn-
is expected shortly.
Under present law the Atomic Energy Commission is es-
sentially confined to experiments involving research and
development. Our objective is to give the AEC authority
to make Plowshare services available on a commercial basis.
Since, under terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the
United States has an obligation to provide commercial ser-
vices to non-nuclear nations, the new legislation is suf-
ficiently comprehensive to accommodate foreign as well as
domestic customers.
PLOWSHARE--A BUSINESS
As AEC gears up to furnish commercial Plowshare ser-
vices, there are a number of business decisions and business-
like procedures which need to be concluded. There are still,
of course, technical areas needing additional R6D—which
is your job. But some of the procedural and policy issues
before us in government also need resolving:
First, exactly what the government is to furnish under
the category of "peaceful nuclear explosive services" must
be defined, and the responsibilities of the customer and
his engineering consultants must be fixed. Within the
government, a management structure must be established to
coordinate and control the various inputs which will be
made by AEC, the Public Health Service, the Interior Depart-
ment and other appropriate government agencies.
Second, a standard line of devices must be established,
perhaps 12 to 18 in number, providing a reasonable combin-
ation of yields and other characteristics. After this
initial R6D effort, it will be impossible to tailor each
shot minutely to a customer's particular requirements.
The government cannot be expected to involve itself in new
395
-------
RED expenses every time another customer comes along. The
Non-Proliferation Treaty requires that the charge for ser-
vices to foreign customers exclude RSD cost and that the
services be supplied on a non-discriminatory basis between
all customers. Since this makes R£D expenses unrecoverable,
the only way they can be minimized is by the standardiza-
tion technique.
Third, a price list must be posted which the NPT re-
quires to be "reasonable" and which, in any event, is neces-
sary if potential customers are to know enough about their
costs to make rational decisions.
Fourth, in the case of foreign customers, we must re-
examine our agreements for cooperation, under which U.S.
and other nations spell out the extent of their nuclear
collaboration to make sure that special requirements as
to Plowshare are covered. I have in mind such things as
etention of the devices under U.S. custody and control,
responsibilities.
Fifth, in the case of domestic customers, we shall
have to establish regulatory control measures not unlike
those that apply to nuclear power reactors and resolve juris-
dictional questions between federal, state and local govern-
ments .
REGULATION AND CONTROL
This area of regulation and control is as important
to the formation of an industry as price , technology or any
other factor. I foresee the AEC as the executive agent
for the government for this purpose. In addition to devel-
oping the devices and furnishing the explosives services,
AEC's role is likely to include the following:
--Absolute control of nuclear explosives until their
detonation.
--Protection of the public from harm caused by radio-
activity or seismic damage at the time of detonation.
--Protection of the public from harm caused by radio-
activity present in any commercial product result-
ing from a nuclear explosion.
--Protection from physical damage to buildings or
structures.
396
In assuming this regulatory role, the AEC should be
cognizant of several characteristics of the industries most
likely to be involved in commercial applications of nuclear
explosives. Industries such as natural gas are already
highly regulated. The FPC strictly controls the gas pipe-
line industry. It typically requires two years to process
an application for development of new gas fields, connec-
tions to existing pipelines, construction of new pipelines
and establishment of the rate structure for gas from such
a field.
Other agencies are involved in the safety aspects of
pipeline construction and operation. The recent Santa
Barbara Channel blowout bears witness to the government's
present multi-agency involvement in environmental pollu-
tion , and points to an ever expanding governmental role in
safety and pollution aspects of industry.
The point to be made here is that the AEC should recog-
nize that it is moving into an area already strongly con-
trolled by government, and that only those additional con-
trols necessary under the Atomic Energy Act need be insti-
tuted. Its function as to existing controls should be that
of a coordinator in these peripheral areas.
A possible scenario of the AEC's Plowshare regulatory
role could go like this: The industrial applicant would
be required to submit a detailed proposal for the project
including the equivalent of a reactor safety analysis re-
port which evaluates in detail radioactive and seismic safety
at the time of detonation as well as possible product radio-
logical contamination. The AEC would then conduct a de-
tailed review of the proposed project in the same way
reactor applications are reviewed. This review would be
in parallel with other government regulatory reviews so
that the already excessive regulatory times are not further
extended by the AEC process. Assuming AEC approval of the
application, provision probably should be made for a public
hearing. Our options are either to provide a mandatory
hearing in all cases, or just on request from affected
members of the public.
Once the project has been approved, the AEC and the
licensee would negotiate a contract covering the detona-
tion services, explosives and arrangements for adequate
insurance coverage. Preceding the detonation itself, the
AEC would have to perform or coordinate inspections from
the public health and safety standpoint, and assure that
all emplacement and stemming procedures have been properly
performed. Final legal permission then would be given for
detonation. Following the shot, the AEC would be required
397
-------
to retain control of the area as necessary to protect the
public health and safety.
The foregoing is not intended as a comprehensive de-
scription of the probable Plowshare regulatory picture,
but it does indicate the kinds of considerations involved
and underlines the fact that large-scale applications of
Plowshare technology are going to require carefully designed
and intelligently administered procedures.
DIVORCING PLOWSHARE BUSINESS FROM THE WEAPONS EFFORT
At this point I am going to start treading on some
toes, in the AEC in general and at the Lawrence Radiation
Laboratory in particular. For I do not see how Plowshare
can really succeed unless the responsibility for its peace-
ful explosives devices and their use is divorced from the
weapons program, which has an entirely different underlying
philosophy.
In Plowshare, the primary emphasis will have to be on
economics. In this competitive field, economics is crucial.
A Plowshare device does not have to be the most efficient
nuclear device ever built. It doesn't have to be the
smallest or the lightest. It must be safe and it must
be clean. But it does not have to possess the ruggedness,
reliability and other characteristics of a warhead. Since
it is not a weapon, it will have to be designed, handled
and used with the unique requirements of its users in mind.
These users are not the Army, Navy and Air Force. They
are civilians pursuing their economic enterprises in a
cost competitive environment.
From its inception, Plowshare has been a step-child
of the weapons program, both at LRL, the Nevada Operations
Office and at the Nevada Test Site. Until the recent series
of Plowshare tests--Gasbuggy, Cabriolet, Buggy and Schooner--
this dependence was desirable, if not absolutely necessary,
even though a side effect has been to associate the wea-
pons and Plowshare programs together in the public mind.
Now the time has come to separate the two, both in the
public mind and as to technical objectives.
LRL, NVOO and NTS from their inception have been dedi-
cated almost exclusively to weapon devices and tests. They
are geared up to satisfy one customer-~DOD. They have been
a very efficient operation for this purpose, and we can
be thankful as a nation for that. But they are not geared
up, technically or philosophically, to satisfy efficiently
398
the El Paso Natural Gas Company, the Austral Oil Company,
the Kennecott Copper Corporation, or other Plowshare cus-
tomers .
These weapons organizations are so traditionally geared
to conducting test programs for military weapon systems
that cost is of minor importance. On something as vital
to our security as weapons RSD, we can't afford to quibble
over a few dollars. But this basic attitude is incompatible
with the Plowshare program, where you must quibble over
pennies. If they don't develop economic explosives and
emplacement methods, the whole purpose of the Plowshare
program will become academic because industrial interest
will vanish.
The weapons scientists at LRL have an entirely dif-
ferent set of values than does the Plowshare group. Yet
during the execution period for any Plowshare event , re-
sponsibility is transferred to the weapons people. There
is even some evidence that Plowshare is little more than
a nuisance to the weapons organizations, and that they con-
duct Plowshare tests in the same extensive and expensive
manner that weapons test procedures dictate.
As an example, the LRL Plowshare engineering group
formulated an operational plan for the Cape Keraudren pro-
ject that involved operating from a ship anchored offshore.
Maximum preparation of the explosive would be done at LRL
before transportation to Australia by ship. At the site,
operational personnel would be housed and fed on board the
same ship. The emplacement of the explosives would be done
from the ship, utilizing barge-mounted cranes . The vessel
would then move to a safe distance, and the row charge of
explosives fired by a radio link. This procedure could
save Si.5 million over conventional land-based operations
with air transportation of the explosives, amounting per-
haps to 15% to 20% of the total project cost. But the
entire concept was vetoed by the weapons test group for
the apparent reason that they simply "don't do things that
way. "
I don't have any specific recommendations to make in
this area tonight, but I think it is something we all can
think about--particularly within AEC. And the Joint Com-
mittee should devote some careful attention to it during
the hearings. We could consider whether the Plowshare pro-
gram should be transferred to the oversight of another field
office, such as San Francisco or Grand Junction. An inde-
pendent Plowshare group could have complete responsibility
for the design and fabrication of explosives, the conduct
of experiments, and the conduct of the commercial service
399
-------
itself. It would separate weapons and Plowshare philosoph-
ically and politically, and it would assure that the pro-
gram is responsive to the civilian user's technical and
economic requirements.
PLOWSHARE AND PUBLIC RELATIONS
Before I leave you this evening, I would like to say
a few words about the public relations aspects of this pro-
gram. Despite the fact that we will be conducting these
events in very remote and unpopulated areas, it still will
be necessary to conduct an active PR campaign to demonstrate
the benefits to be achieved. I think the unfortunate ex-
perience with Project Ketch, where opposition from the
public and state officials caused the withdrawal of the
application, is an example of the continuing need to em-
phasize the benefits to society. We found during the early
days of the reactor development program that winning public
support and defusing the nut-fringe must start early in
the project and continue actively. For example, with an
underground engineering shot, if we could show convincingly
how this type of mining does not deface the surface of the
earth, as does strip mining, we might even end up with the
Sierra Club on our side.
I don't think it is possible to overemphasize the
importance of developing public support for Plowshare.
Given a clear, accurate picture of the potential benefits
and the high level of scientific precautions being taken,
the public will not be unduly alarmed about possible hazards.
For its part, industry must do its homework well and prompt-
ly respond to public inquiry and hesitation. When this is
done, this nation and the world will be able to glean the
vast benefits available by applying this new engineering
tool to man's advantage instead of his destruction.
400
-------
SESSION I I I - PART C
Chairman: Dr. Delbert S. Barth
National Air Pollution Control Administration
Durham
-------
ECOLOGICAL TRANSFER MECHANISMS - TERRESTRIAL*
Wi I Iiam E. Martin, GiIbert E. Raines,
Sanford G. Bloom, and Arthur A. Levin
Battelle Memorial Institute
Columbus, Oh io
ABSTRACT
Radionuclides produced by nuclear excavation detona-
tions and released to the environment may enter a variety
of biogeochemical cycles and follow essentially the same
transfer pathways as their stable-element counterparts.
Estimation of potential internal radiation doses to in-
dividuals and/or populations living in or near fallout-
contaminated areas requires analysis of the food-chain
and other ecological pathways by which radionculides
released to the environment may be returned to man. A
generalized materials transfer diagram, applicable to the
forest, agricultural, freshwater and marine ecosystems
providing food and water to the indigenous populations of
Panama and Colombia in regions that could be affected by
nuclear excavation of a sea-level canal between the
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans., is presented. Transfer
mechanisms effecting the movement of stable elements
and radionuclides in terrestrial ecosystems are dis-
cussed, and methods used to simulate these processes by
menas of mathematical models are described to show how
intake values are calculated for different radionuclides
in the major ecological pathways leading to man. These
data provide a basis for estimating potential internal
radiation doses for comparison with the radiation-
protection criteria established by recognized authorities;
and this3 in turn^ provides a basis for recommending
measures to insure the radiological safety of the nuclear
operation plan.
*These studies were supported by U. S. Atomic Energy Commission,
Nevada Operation Office, Contract AT(26- I )-!7l .
401
INTRODUCTION
Some of the proposed peaceful uses of nuclear explosives, which
involve nuclear cratering will result in the release of radionuclides
to the biosphere. These radionuclides will be redistributed by
ecological processes and may be transported to man in the form of
contaminated foods and water, thus resulting in his exposure to inter-
nal radiation. A thorough evaluation of the public health aspects
of these peaceful uses of nuclear explosives will therefore require
an evaluation of potential internal radiation doses to man, and this
requires an understanding of the ecological transfer mechanisms
whereby radionuclides deposited in the biosphere may be returned to
man.
During the past four years, the Battelle Memorial Institute-
Columbus Laboratories, and various subcontractors have been engaged
in a program of ecological studies designed to evaluate the radio-
logical safety feasibility of using nuclear explosives to excavate a
sea-level canal between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.1'3 The
basic objective of this program is to estimate the potential external
and internal radiation doses to people living in or near the areas
that would be contaminated by radioactive debris from the proposed
nuclear detonations. These estimates can then be used in planning
the nuclear operation in such a way that the radiological safety of
both project personnel and the general population would be assured.
Estimates of external radiation doses can be made on the basis
of source term4 and fallout5 predictions, but the models used to cal-
culate potential internal radiaton doses6 also require estimates of
the probable rates of radionuclide ingestion by the people com-
prising the reference population. These estimates are being provided
by mathematical models designed to simulate the ecological redis-
tribution of radionuclides and their transport to man via contaminated
foods and water.
In this paper we shall describe some of the general procedures
and concepts that have been used in developing ecological models. As
implied by the title, the examples used will be based primarily on
terrestrial ecosystem studies although the procedures and concepts
involved may have a wider application. Since the studies from which
these examples are drawn are not finished, emphasis will be on methods
instead of results.
Pathways c^f Radionuclj de Transport
Figure I is a highly generalized diagram showing some of the
major pathways of potential radionugIide transport from the biosphere
to man in an area such as eastern Panama and northwestern Colombia. In
this area, the subsistence economy of the indigenous population depends
primarily upon primitive agriculture, hunting in the forests, and
402
-------
fishinq in the freshwater streams and oceans. Virtually all the foods
and water comprisinq the total diet are derived from the immediate
environment. Between 65 and 85 percent of the solid foods included
in the diets of people now living in the area is derived from the
te rres t ria I env i ronment, i.e., from the forest and agricultural eco-
systems indicated by the di agram.?»8
Transfers from forest and agricultural to freshwater and marine eco-
systems are accompIi shed primar iIy by hydro Iog i caI processes.9 Transfers
f rom one compartment to another wi th i n the terrestr i a I ecosystems are ac-
comp lished by a variety of transfer mechanisms most of which involve the
movement of water and/or organic matter. For example, the transfer of
radionucIides or stab Ie elements f rom the leaf to the Iitte r compartment
of a forest may be due to the mechanical removaI of fall out particles, the
washing and leaching action of rain, leaf fall, deposition of herbivore
excreta, etc. Transfers from the litter to the soil compartment involve
decay processes, I each i ng by rain, pe rcoI ation of water th rough the soi I,
etc. Transfers from the soil to the fruit or other edible p^rts of a
pI ant i nvoIve root absorption, transpiration, translocation within the
plant, and a variety of metabolic processes. A similar array of transfer
mechanisms can be recognized for the pathways connectinq other compart-
ments; but, as will be illustrated later, it is often possible to obtain
es 11 mates of i nte rcompartrnen ta I f t ow rates and other paramete rs used in
ec'~' I cq i ca I mode ling without having an exact knowledge of the transfer
mechanisms responsible for the flow.
Genera I Approach to Mathemat i caI Mode Ii ng
A mathemat i ca t mode I des i gned to s i muI ate the ent i re process of
radionuclide redistribution, even to the relatively low degree of
resolution indicated by Figure I, wouId be requ i red to cons i der a
large number of variables including (I) the more than 300 radionucIides
produced by nuclear cratering explosions, (2) one or more patterns of
predicted fallout deposition, (3) an indefinite number of ecosystems
and all the materials transport pathways that characterize them, (4)
the physical and/or biological transfer mechanisms that characterize
each transport pathway, (5) an indefinite number of population sub-
groups depending on the ecological and cultural factors which determine
variations in dietary habits, (6) a variety of physiological parameters
whien are different for different radionucIdies and may vary with
respect to age or other characteristics of population subgroups.
From a strictly scientific point of view, c detailed mode I con-
sidenng all these parameters, especially if it had a I ready been tested
under realistic field conidtions, wouId provide an exceI lent basis for
evaluating potential radionuclide intakes by people living in or near
the area that would be contaminated by radioactive debris. However,
for present purposes, it is neither necessary nor practical to cons i der
all aspects of the radionuclide redistribution process. Many of the
radionuclides preduced by nuclear craterinq explosions are produced
in such small quantities or have such short radiological half-lives
403
that the i r contri but i ons to potentia I i nte rnaI rad i at i on doses are
probably negligible. Many of the possible redistribution pathways
are of little direct concern because they do not lead to man, and many
of those that do lead to man are inconsequential because they
represent foods that are consumed in very small quantities. Further-
more , the experimental data required for the development of a detailed
mode I are ne i ther readi ly ava i I ab le nor cou Id they be co I lected dun ng
the time ordinarily available for a feasibility study. In many cases,
where a detai led mode I couId be used, it may still be desirable to use
a simple model because the variations introduced by the detailed
model are of little consequence, and the more sophisticated mathe-
matical approach would needlessly complicate the overall model.
The app roach we have taken is des i gned to s i mpI ity the p rob I em
as much as possible in order to concentrate our attention and efforts
on the most important parameters affecting potential dose calculations.
First, the production of 318 radionuclides was calculated for each of
22 detonations. PadionucIides havinq an inventory of less than one
Curie 28 days after any detonation were assumed to make no significant
contribution to the potential internal dose. This procedure elimin-
ated all but 53 of the original 318 radionuclides f rom more deta i Ied
consideration. The 53 radionuclides remaining after the first screening
were evaluated by means of a simple two-compartment mode I which, based
on conservative assumptions concerning the general behavior of rad i o-
nuclides in the biosphere, is used to calculate the maximum, probabIe
contribution of each radionucldie to the internal radiation dose. The
22 radionuclides whose comb ined contributions added up to an insignifi-
cant dose (i.e., < I rem infinite dose) were then eliminated f rom further
cons i deration. The 31 rad i onucIi des remai n i nq after th i s step are now
being evaluated on the basis of a generalized, muIticompartment trans-
port mode I wh i ch is more rea Ii st tc than the two-compartment mode 1 but
sti I I contains a number of conservative assumptions and makes use of
parameter values which tend to overest i mate the potent i a I rad i at i on
dose due to each radionuclide. This process of elimination will be
repeated until only a few radionuclides need to be treated in the most
complex transport model.
The advantages of this approach are that the number of radionuclide
to be considered at each step is expected to decrease as the complexity
of the model increases. Obviously, the most compIe- and presumably most
rea Ii stic mode I in the series or hierarchy of mode Is will be no better
than the experimental data available for formulating the model and cal-
culating the critical parameters. The present state of the art may
not permit us to advance beyond the second or third stage in the
hierarchy; but to the extent that the preliminary models are valid, they
can be used to indicate the kinds of data required for developing more
detailed transport mode Is for the most important radionuclides in the
most important ecological pathways leading to man. The next logical
step in this procedure would be to test the different parts of the model
under realistic field conditions, but we have not yet had an opportunity
404
-------
to take this step.
Modified Specific Activity Model
The simple, two-compartment model used for the second screening
of radionucI dies is based on a number of assumptions which Lowman
will probably discuss in greater detail. First, we assume that the
radionucIides and stable elements released to the biosphere by a
nuclear cratering explosion will become mixed with the stable elements
already present in the biosphere. Radionuclides will then be redis-
tributed by the same ecological processes and follow the same routes
of transfer as their stable element counterparts. If the physical
and biological processes involved in the transport of radionuclides
and stable elements to man exhibit no significant discrimination
between a radionuclide and its corresponding stable element, the specific
activity (i.e., the ratio of the concentration of a radionuclide to the
concentration of the corresponding stable element) of man's diet cannot
exceed the specific activity of the radioactive debris.
In the two-compartment model, compartment I represents a hypo-
thetical total diet, and compartment 2 represents a critical organ of
"Standard Man. ' The specific activity of each radionuclide in compart-
ment I is assumed to be the same as that of the radioactive debris
produced by a nuclear cratering explosion. This is roughly equivalent
to substituting radioactive debris for man's normal intake of each
stable element and neglecting the dilution that would result due to
mixing with the stable elements already present in the food.
Flow rates in and out of compartment 2 are based on the physio-
logical data tabulated by ICRP11 for "Standard Man." For each element,
the flow rate from compartment I to compartment 2 is the product of
the element ingestion rate and the fraction of the element ingested
that reaches the critical organ. The flow rate out of compartment 2
depends on (a) the total amount of element, both radioactive and
stable, present in compartment 2, Cb) the biological elimination
rate coefficient of the element, and (c) the radioactive decay rate
coefficient of the radionuclide.
For all organs, except the gastrointestinal tract, the solution
to the two-compartment model can be formulated as follows:
exp (-XR t)
jCO) exp <-XR t)
[1-e
t)]
(I)
(2)
405
and
Sj(0) is the initial specific activity of the radio-
act i ve debri s ,
XR is the radioactive decay coefficient,
is the amount of radionuclide in compartment 2,
T
?2 i
AB
is the element flow rate from compartment I to
compartment 2,
is the biological elimination rate coefficient.
The movement of material through the gastrointestinal tract
cannot be adequately described by a biological elimination rate
because the material does not remain in one place long enough for
complete mixing to occur. An approximation for the average radio-
nuclide content of a given portion of the tract is the product of
the rate at which the radionuclide enters that portion and the time
it takes material to traverse it. Allowing the radionuclide to decay
during the time it takes ingested food to reach a particular portion
of the gastrointestinal tract gives
w he re,
and
T2
U_,
S1(0)
exp
is the time it takes ingested material to
reach a gi ven port!on of the tract,
is the time it takes ingested material to
traverse that portion of the tract,
is the unit step function defined by,
(3)
U l (x) = 0 for x < 0
U . (x) = 1 for x > 0.
The ICRP has also tabulated the data needed to calculate the
dose rate to a critical organ of "Standard Man" per unit (Y2> of
radionuclide deposited in the critical organ. This value is the R
term in Equation (4) and (5) below; it is a constant for a given
radionuclide in a given critical organ. Equation (4) and (5) are
obtai ned by mu11i pIy i ng Equat ion (2) and (3) by R and i ntegrat i ng
the resulting expressions with respect to time. Equation (5)
applies to the gastrointestinal tract while Equation (4) applies to
all other critical organs.
406
-------
XB (*,
(t -
(5)
Equation (4) and (5) were used to calculate the maximum likely
contributions of each of the 53 radionuclides whose inventory 28 days
after at least one of the 22 detonat ions was one Curie or more to the
critical organs I is ted by ICRP. The time interval considered for these
calculations was f rom 28 days to 50 years after the last detonat i on.
Arranging the calculated dose contributions in descending order
and calculating the cumulative sum indicated that 22 of the 53 radio-
nuclides considered would contribute a total dose of slightly less than
one rem. As a conservative estimate, a dose contribution of one rem
can be assigned to all but the 31 radionuclides whose contributions to
the potential dose are to be evaluated on the basis of a more detailed,
more reaIi sti c mode I.
The procedure described above should resuit in highly conservative
overest i mates of potentlal internal radiation because it ignores the
dilution effects of several important processes. In the first place,
the estimates of initial specific activity, S|CO), are based on the
assumpti on that rad i onucIi des produced by a nuclear crater i ng expIos i on
are mixed only with the amounts of stable elements contained in the
fireball volume. Since experimental data'2 indicate that the radio-
nuclides should be mixed with a much Iarger voIume of stab Ie elements,
the radioactive debris actually released to the biosphere should have
a much lower specific activity than that calculated for use in
Equations (I) and (2). If it is true that radionuclides and stable
elements follow the same transport pathways and exhibit the same eco-
logical behavior, environmental and biological dilution, as we I I as the
rad i oacti ve decay that will occur dun ng the process of ecolog i caI
transport from the biosphere to man, will further reduce and dilute
the specific activities of radionuclides in man's diet. Since exclusion
of these factors from the two-compartment mode I should resuit in over-
estimates of the contributions of nearly all radionuclides to the
potential, internal radiation dose, we should not be far off in assuming
that this model provides a valid method of reducing the list of radio-
nuct i des to be cons idered in the more detailed mode Is of rad i onucI i de
407
redistribution in the biosphere and transport to man. TFor simplicity's
sake we'll call the radionuclides eliminated in this model "insignifi-
cant," and those remaining we'll call "s i gn i f i cant. "3
Genera j^ Eqjjat ions f or^ Raoj_onuc I i de JTra^sport Mode I s
t of "significant"
as i I I us t rated
The general equation for the model is based on the assumptions
that ( I ) the functional components or compartments of ecosystems are
I arge enough that the average radionuclide or stable el ement content of
a compartment can be described by continuous mathematics, (2) the
radionuclide or stable element flowing into a compartment is completely
mixed with the stable element and/or radionuclide already present in
the compartment, and (31 the rate of a radionuclide or stable element
transfer is given by the product of a transfer coefficient and the
amount of radionuclide or stable element in the transmitting compart-
ment. Thus the total flow of a radionuclide or stable element in and
out of a given compartment in the food chain or food web can be formu-
lated as shown in Equation (6) below.
d Y.
N
n=l
N
X. . Y.
i = 1, 2...N
the i "*~n compartment is the compartment of reference and
all other compartments are designated n,
YI is the amount of a radionuclide in the i"1"11 com-
partment (pCi),
Yn i s the amount of a radionuclide in the n^"n com-
partment (u.Ci),
408
-------
and Xpj are rate coefficients for transfers into and
out of the i^ compartments (day"').
*ii ~ L.
n=l
and N is the total number of compartments
Usually, the X. and Xnj values can be treated as constants or
as cyclical functions of time, and this simplifies Equation (6) to a
system of linear differential equations.
Each equation of the system of equations given by Equation (6)
can be derived in different ways. The most direct method of derivation
is possible if (a) the stable element content of each compartment of
the ecosystem is known, (b) all the intercompartmentaI flow rates of
the stable elements are known, and (c) it can be assumed that the
behavior of a radionuclide is identical to that of the corresponding
stable element. The material balance for a given radionuclide is
then g i ven by
i - y J"" . Y / j_
dt - C \(C.
1, 2, ... N
where, the i compartment is the reference compartment and
all other compartments are designated n,
YJ and Yn are the amounts of a radionuclide in com-
partments i and n CuCi),
F[n and Fni are the total element, both stable and
radioactive, flow rates into and out of com-
partment i (g. element/day),
C- and C are the total element, both stable and radio-
active contents of compartments i and n (g.
element),
AR
is the radioactive decay coefficient (day"1),
409
I
is the radionuclide flow rate into
compartment i from a I I other com-
partments (pCi/day),
vi
n#i
i s the radi onucIi de Ioss rate
from compartment I to a I I other
compartments plus the loss rate
due to radioactive decay (pCi/day),
d Yi
and is the rate of change of the radionuclide content
dt of compartment i (LjCi/day).
If the stable element contents of all compartments are constant
and the intercompartmentaI flow rates are constants, the flow rates of
stable elements into a compartment must equal the loss rate, i.e.,
N
N
I 'I- • iFni
This, of course, implies an ecological steady state in which the
biomass of the various ecosystem compartments, and the concentrations of
different elements in each compartment, are more or less constant during
the time interval considered. Such conditions appear to be approximated
in climax forest ecosystems where the annual rates of community photo-
synthesis and community respiration are approximately equal and the
biomasses of plant and animal populations are approximately the same
from one year to another. For such a system, the principal data required
to construct transport models based on Equation 7 are measurements or
estimates of compartment capacities (Cj) and intercompartmentaI flow
rates (Fjn) for the element or elements of interest.
Compartment capacities can be estimated, on a unit area basis,
as the product of compartment biomass (g biomass/m^) and element con-
centration (g element/g biomass). Many of the intercompartmentaI flow
rates can be obtained by measuring the rates of water and/or organic
matter movement, and others can be inferred from these. Bloom's and
McGinnis and Golley'9 provide excelent descriptions of how these pro-
cedures may be applied to a tropical forest eco-system.
If during the time interval considered, there is an increase in
410
-------
the b i omass or stable element content of one or more of the compartments
of an ecosystem, the system will not exhibit the kind of steady state
equilibrium described above. There is, however, another kind of steady
s + ate condition which occurs when the total stable element content is a
constant fraction of the weight or biomass of the compartment. In this
case, the f|ow rate of the element i nto the compartment must equal the
sum of the Ioss rates pI us the rate of i ncrease of element content due
to growth of the compartment. This form of steady state has been used in
the evaluation of radionuclide transport in marine ecosystems, and it
shou I d be genera I I y appIi cab Ie to grow i ng organ i sms .
Equation (
reference (20).
is a oe^eraI izat i on of the de r t vation a i ven
d C.
x " f- *
*<) y —^
- Oi- + \p) Y i = 1, 2, ... N (8)
D K. 1
d Cr
where, is the i ncrease of tota I eIement content due to
dt the growth of compartment i (g/day),
e is a factorwhich converts radioactivity units
+o mass units (g/yCi),
f is the fraction of the element input to compart-
men *• i wh i ch comes f rom compartment n ( d imens i on-
less ),
L £in = !'
n=l
The relationship indicated by Equation (8) can be assumed for
either plant or animal compartments of either stable or developing
ecosystems. As will be (Mustrated in the discussion which follows, it
can also be applied to cultivated crops.
A 3i mpIe Crop Mode I
The principal food plants cultivated in eastern Panama and
northwestern Colombia are banana, plantain, rice, and corn. Banana
and plantain are usually grown in semipermanent plantations and harvested
throughout the year. Rice and corn are planted in fields which have been
prepared by cutting and burning the secondary vegetation or mature forest
and harvested once or twice per year. After a few years of cultivation,
crop yields drop off and the fields are allowed to revert to secondary
vegetation.
While a great deal is known about plant physiology and the uptake
of minerals from soils, there is no general model for predicting the
accumulation of fall out radionuclides in the edible parts of plants.
Without e.-perimental data from tracer experiments involving trie princi-
pal radionuclides, different crop species, and various soil types of
interest, the use of concentration factors may not be reliable. Analyt-
ical data show no consistent relationship between the concentrations
of elements in paired samples of plant tissues and soil extracts.21
However, the chemical composition of a given plant tissue is much less
variable than that of the different soil types on which it is grown.
In deveI op i ng a s i mpIe, conservat i ve mode I to obta i n rough
estimates of radionuclide concentrations in the edible parts of crops
grown in fallout contaminated areas, we have made the following
assumptions:
{ I) The eIement compos i ti on of the edible part is constant
and can be defined by the mean element concentrations
of representati ve samples.
(2) The concentrat i on of an element in the pI ant compartment
does not change duri ng growth.
(3) The ratio of elements taken up from the soil and via
trans Iocation from foliage is the same as the ratio of
elements in the compartment of reference, i.e., com-
partment 3 in Figure 2.
(4) All compartments are we i I mi xed, in equ i Ii bri urn with
respect to tota I eIement content and not changing in
biomass with respect to time.
These assumptions imply a situation in which harvesting is a con-
tinuous process, the rate of harvesting is equal to the growth rate,
and the biomass of unharvested edibles is constant. This is a reason-
able approximation to the harvesting of plantain and banana; and since
lifetime doses are calculated on the basis of 50 or 70 years, it is
not as bad as it might appear for annual crops. For short-term appli-
cations, models could be developed to represent the intermittent
character of crop growth and harvest, but for the present application
this does not appear to be warranted.
-------
Equation (9) shows the assumed relationship between harvesting
rate and the rate of total element input from foliage and soil.
H (X W ) = k (X W ^ + Ic (X W ) (Q1
where, H is the harvesting rate coefficient (years ),
X: is the ratio of a given element to the total
element content of the jth compartment (dimen-
sion less),
W. is the average biomass or weight per unit area
^ of the jth compartment (g/m2),
k| 3 is the trans location coefficient (years"'),
and V.2 3 is the uptake coefficient (years"').
Values for these parameters can be estimated as follows:
(I) Since the harvesting rate and the growth rate are
assumed to be equal, H is the harvesting rate or
growth rate (g/m2/y) divided by the average biomass
.
(2) The average biomass, W:, of the j^h compartment is, in
this case, equivalent to the average standing crop of
foli age or plant edibles; the value for soil is based
on an arbitrary depth of soil, the depth of the inter-
flow layer for example.
(3)
Assuming k, -, values are very small, except for radio-
nuclides, rfie
10 below.
2 3 values can be estimated using Equation
"2,3
(10)
(4) The ki -, values can be determined by means of tracer
experiments such as those described by Thomasson, Bolch,
and Gamble22 in which '34cs and other radionucI ides were
applied to banana and coconut leaves and samples of fruit
were collected at various times after the tracer appli-
cation. The transfer coefficient, k|(j$, can be determined
from the observed exponential rate of radionuclide
413
accumulation in the fruit. The rate of foliar uptake
of cesium is extremely rapid, and application of the
transfer coefficient for cesium to other radionuclides
should result in conservative overestimates of input
rates.
Analytical solutions for the time variant concentration of a
given radionuclide in each of the three compartments are given below
for a pulse input to the system. The differential equation for the
foli age compartment i s
dt
- (kl,2 + kl,3
(II)
where,
and t
For t = 0
is the radionuclide content of the foliage com-
partment on a unit area basis (uCi/cm2),
is the radioactive decay rate coefficient
(day"1),
is time (days).
\ Wl FA
(12)
W| is the average biomass of compartment I (g/cm2)*
FA i s the fa I lout i nput for the reference rad i o-
nucIi de (uCi/cm2).
The solution of Equation (II), the foliage compartment is
exp -(
(13)
(14)
*The product, a|_ W|, is the fraction of fallout intercepted by plant
foIi age.
414
-------
= speci f i c acti v i ty.
The differential equation for compartment 2, the soiI comoart-
men t, is
= k
l,2 l
k2,3 + *R> N2
( 15)
where,
is the radionucl i de content of the soi I compart-
ment on a unit area basis (pCi/cm-),
is a hydrol og i ca I removal coefficient (day"')-''11
N2(0) = (1 - ^ Wj
i.e., the fall out not initially intercepted bv foliage is deposited on
the soi I .
The solution of Equation (15), the soil compartment is
C]
= specific activity of com-
partment 2
l,3
2,3
The differential equation for compartment 3, the plant edibles
compartment, is
d N,
= k, , N, -e k, , N, - (H +• A0)
R' 3
where ,
is the rad i onuc I i de content of the p I ant edibles
compartment on a unit area basis ( pC i /cm1- ) .
For t =0,
The solution of Equation \9, the plant edibles compartment, is
kl,2+kl,3+H
2]3 N2(0)
kH + k2,3 -
k2,3 kl,2
-kl,3)(H
kl,3 ~ H>
-------
With reference to Figure 2, the first term of Equation (21)
represents the fallout-to-foliage-to-plant edibles pathway of radio-
nuclide transport; the second term represents the fallout-to-soi l-to
plant edibles pathway; and the third term represents the fallout-to-
fol iage-to-soi l-to-p lant edibles pathway. The movement of elements
from soil to roots, stems, leaves, or other parts of the plant before
deposition in the edible part of the plant, is not considered in the
model. in other words, k2 3, is an overall transfer coefficient for
the general transport pathway from soil to plant edibles. It should
also be noted that the pathway involving the transport to plant
edibles of materials deposited externally on foliage rarely accounts
for more than an insignificant fraction of the total element reaching
the plant edibles compartment even though it may account for a major
fraction of the radionuclide.
The derivation of analytical solutions given in Equation (II)
through (22) serves to elucidate the general procedure. However when
the models for different ecosystems are coupled to obtain a general
model of radionuclide redistribution and transport to man, a number
of complications arise which usually make it necessary to resort to
numerical solutions. For example, constant hydrological removal
coefficients, k^, may not be appropriate; fallout input, F^, varies
geographically and, in the case of canal excavation, it cannot be
adequately expressed as a single pulse.
A Simple Transport Model for Terrestrial and Aquatic Ecosystems
Figure 3 illustrates an eight-compartment transport model in which
the pathways illustrated in Figure 2 are coupled to other pathways lead-
ing from terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems to man. While the eight-
compartment model is more complex and more realistic than the models
described earlier, it represents a much lower degree of resolution
than illustrated by Figure I and still incorporates a number of highly
conservative assumptions.
As shown in Figure 3, man's total diet is assumed to be composed
of specific quantities of fish, surface water, plant edibles, and
terrestrial animals. The quantities used were selected to represent
the population groups having the highest fish consumption, the highest
water consumption, the highest consumption of plant materials, and the
highest consumption of terrestrial animals. Describing the total diet
according to these criteria results in a hypothetical food and water
intake almost twice as high as the intakes actually observed by
anthropologists who made quantitative dietary studies in the field.7*8
Values for the element contents of the compartments and for the
intercompartmentaI transfer coefficients were selected, on the basis of
data collected by field survey teams and data in the literature, to
represent average or typical values of the sort indicated. In cases
where "average" or "typical" values were in doubt, other values were
selected arbitrarily to maximize the final dose estimates. To further
increase the conservatism of the results, fallout input was calculated
on the assumption that all detonations occur at the same time. The
most heavily contaminated watershed was selected as the worst place
that humans could possibly be, and dry season rainfall rates were
used to minimize the rate of flushing from the land to the sea.
The radionuclides evaluated by the eight-compartment model were
the 31 radionucIides remaining after application of the two-compartment
specific activity model, namely - 3H, I4rj, 32P, 89Sr, 90sr, 95Zr, 9^Nb,
I03RU I06RU I245b( I255bj l27mTe, l29mTej 131\f !32Te, I4lce. l43Pr,
l44Ce, I5lsm, l55Eu, I8IW, I85W, !88Wf l95Au, l96Au, 2°5Hg, 2lOPbj 238PU)
^-^Pu, 240pu> an(j 24lpu_ Typical dose estimates obtained by this pro-
cedure are given in Table I. The calculation for zero time to infinity
indicates that the cumulative dose contributed by 5 of the 31 radio-
nucl ides (l24Sb, I255b, I27nrre, I5lsmj and l55Eu) would total less
than one rem. Allowing all radionuctides to decay for 100 days and
calculating the dose from 100 days to infinity indicated that the con-
tribution from II of the 31 radionuclides would be less than one rem.
(These II include the 5 listed above plus 32p, 95Nbj |32jej l43Pr< I95A(J>
and '96Au). The data from which those in Table I have been selected
provide a clear indication that SH, 89Sr, 905r, l06Ru, and some 16 other
radionuclides not shown in the table will require further evaluation.
TABLE I. TYPICAL DOSE CALCULATIONS BASED ON
THE EIGHT-COMPARTMENT MODEL
Rad i onucl i de
90Sr
3H
!32Te
89Sr
I06RU
I 27mjg
!5ISm
Dose (rem)
Time zero to °°
685
673
586
316
106
4.3 x ICH
5.3 x ID"3
ca 1 cu 1 ated
for
100 days to -°
2
5
680
663
-0
80
88
.2 x 10-'
.3 x 10-3
At this point it should be strongly emphasized that the only dose
estimates in Table I that should be taken seriously are those whose
sum is I ess than one. The area cons i dered in obta i n i ng these f i gures
is one that would be completely evacuated during the nuclear evacu-
ation phase of the canal construction program and would not be
reoccupied until some time after the last detonation. It was chosen
to represent the worst case we could imagine. We feel that this
approach provides a valid basis for identifying those radionucIides
which contribute very little to the potential radiation dose, and
that the actual contribution of all these radionuclides can be assigned
a conservative but relatively insignificant value. The 20 radionucIides
remaining in the "significant" category at this stage of the study, are
being re-evaluated by means of more detai led models which are as
418
-------
reaIi st i c as we can make them on the basis of present informat i on. In
many cases, this re-evaluation wi I I have a profound effect on the dose
esti mates. For example, a recent recalculation of the tritium dose
was based on the best i nformati on available on hydrologic red i stri-
but i on. The new caIcuI at i on was made for the same "hottest" watershed
and used the same conservative dietary input, but the new dose est i mate
for tritium is more than two orde rs of magn itude less than the value
g i van i n Tab le I .
Figure 4 shows the time dependent concentrations in the foliage
and herbivore (soft tissues) compartments. The curve for plant
leaves reflects the initial contami nation by fallout and the rapid
exponential rate of loss due to weathering. The rate coefficient
used in this example corresponds to a weathering half-time of 14 days,
a vaIue reported frequently in the I i tenature. A grow i ng body of
experimental evidence*1" indicates that the rate of loss from leaves
would be better described by a two- or three-exponent model, Dut lacking
the experimental data f rorn wh i ch "typ i ca I " va I ues of the two or th ree
exponents can be calculated, the si ngle-exponent mode I is reta i ned as
a useful approximation. The curve for herbivores peaks about 15 days
afte r t i me ze ro, and then decreases at a rate eventuaI Iy approx imat i ng
the rate of Ioss from leaves. Th i s reflects the re I ati veIy rap i d
turnover time for 90Sr in soft tissues compared to bone.
Figure 5 shows the relative concentration in soil water from time
zero to about 2,400 days. The turnover rate for soil water'^ is consid-
erably fastern than might be inferred from this graph; the slow deple-
tion rate for 90cr is due to the soil's high absorptive capacity for
st ron 1i urn.
29
To compensate for having used a low depletion rate to
max im i ze 90 5 r concent rations in the terrastri a I compartments, and to
rna-urfiize the estimates of 90sr transport to man via water and fish, ^Sr
concentrations in the surface water compartment were assumed to be the
same as those in the soil water compartment. If the other parameters
are correct, this has the same effect as ignoring the ground-water
contribution to stream flow.
The results for the fish compartment, Figure 6, were primarily
determined by an assumed concentration factor of 10^ and by the assumed
time variant concentration of ^^Sr in the water. The rapid buildup in
the fish compartment is due to the assumption of a fairly rapid turnover
time.
Figure 7 shows the calculated 90$r concentrations in the plant
edibles compartment for only the first 80 days after fallout. This
part of the curve illustrates the relative importance of foliar up-
take during the first few weeks after fallout. The late-time behavior
of this curve, not shown in the figure, would be governed by uptake
from the soi l-soi I water compartment.
The curve for the critical organ (bone) of man is shown in
Figure 8. Under the conditions prescribed by the eight-compartment
model, the peak value is reached about 2,500 days after fallout depo-
sition, a time at which the concentrations in most other compartments
have declined to levels which are insignificant in comparison to the
maximum values. The slow decline in this compartment does not
reflect the fairly rapid decline in most other compartments. Instead,
it is governed by the long half-life of 90$r and the slow rate of
biological elimination from the skeleton. The integraI of this curve
is piotted in Fi gure 9 to show the cumuI at i ve radiati on dose to bone,
the critical organ of man for 90sr, as .3 function of time. Although
still increasing, its value after about 50 years is approximately
90 percent of the i nfinite dose. This i I lustrates the uti Iity of the
simple 0 -»• « integrals for approximation.
In this particular exampie, about half of the 50-year dose was
due to the fish pathway, about a quarter was due to plants, a little
less than a guarter came from terrestrial animals, and a very small
f ract i on came f rom water. The h i gh contr i but i on from fish is partly
due to assumption that fish are eaten bones and all. In some cases
this assumption is well borne out by direct observations.
DISCUSSION
Before closing, we should again emphasize that the eight-
compartment mode I and the resuIts presented above are provi siona I.
They are presented here only to illustrate the methods being used to
deveI op ecoIog i caI mode Is of radionuclide transport. The pa rameters
used in this preliminary effort were deliberately chosen to rep resent
the worst possible case. There were many reasons for doing this, but
the major ones were (I) to compensate for uncertainties in the model
parameters and other input data, and (2) to increase the level of con-
fidence in our identification of radionucIides whose total contribution
to the potential internal radiation dose is likely to be insignifi-
cant. Since these results were first reported about seven months
ago, £••> cons i derab I e progress has been made toward increasing the
adeguacy of the mode I. Additional compartments have been added to
account for radionuclide transport to man from the marine ecosystem.
Fallout inputs to the "hottest" watershed have been recalculated on
the basis of the proposed detonation schedule (22 detonations over a
period of approximately three years). Instead of using "average" or
"typical" values for all the elements involved, we have tried to cal-
culate realistic parameter values for each element, or at least for each
of the elements for which we have analytical and/or experimental data
-------
of the proper sort. Once the model has been refined to the extent
made possible by the data available, the lifetime internal dose esti-
mates for the hottest watershed will be recalculated to determine how
soon after the last detonation it would be safe for people to reoccupy
the fallout area. One method of doing this would be to let the fallout
model run continuously from the beginning of the detonation schedule
and then to introduce man into the model at various times after the
last detonation. A graphical method of solving the reoccupancy problem
may be even more convenient. This would involve the computation of
cumulative dose curves, such as shown in Figure 9, for each radionuclide.
The effect of delayed reoccupancy could then be evaluated directly
from these graphs.
Present plans for the canal excavation project call for the
establishment of an exclusion area, i.e., an area to which local
fallout could be confined and from which people would be excluded
until some time after completion of the nuclear excavation. The
boundaries of the exclusion area are more than ample to enclose the
0.5 R lifetime external gamma dose contour of the composite fallout
pattern. When it has been completed, the ecological model will be
used to est i mate the maxi mum probable i nterna I rad i ati on doses to
people Ii vi ng outs i de the excI us i on area. Fa I I out i nput will be
calculated as equivalent to deposition along the 0.5 R external dose
contour, and food intakes will be adjusted to reflect variations in
the diets of different age groups and different cultural groups. By
adjusting the fallout input terms, this version of the model could
also be used to calculate the radiation doses to which people might
be exposed if higher levels of fallout were accidentally deposited in
populated regions outside the exclusion area.
If the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives for excavation projects
are shown to be feasible and research activities continue in the area
of ecology, we should have many opportunities to test and improve
these mode Is to a poi nt of re Ii ab i Ii ty at least equaI to the methods
now available for predicting fallout deposition patterns and external
radiation doses. Perhaps some golden day in the not too distant
future we will have at our disposal a vast library of proven parameter
values to fit almost any combination of radionuclides and ecological
transport mechanisms. Meanwhile, we hope the preceding discussion has
indicated some of the procedures that can be used, providing the results
are judiciously interpreted, until that golden day should arrive.
421
12.
13.
REFERENCES
Martin, W. E., 1969. Radioecology and the Feasibility of Nuclear
Canal Excavation, pp. 9-22 in: D. J. Nelson and F. C. Evans (eds.)
Symposium on Radio-Ecology. U. S. A. E. C., Conf-670503.
Martin, W. E., 1969. BioenvironmentaI Studies of the Radiological-
Safety Feasibility of Nuclear Excavation. BioScience 19(2):135-137.
Klement, A. W., 1969. Radiological Safety Research for Nuclear
Excavation Projects - Interoceantc Canal Studies. (This Symposium).
Fleming, E. H., 1969. Radioactivity Source Terms for Cratering
Applications. (This Symposium).
Mueller, H. F., 1969. Meteorologi caI Requi rements and OperationaI
Fallout Prediction Techniques for Plowshare Nuclear Experiments.
(This Symposium).
Kaye, S. V. and P. S. Rohwer. 1969. Methods of Estimating Exposure
to Populations from Plowshare Applications. (This Symposium).
Arauz, Reina Torres de. 1969. Demographic and Dietary Data for
Human Groups Inhabiting the Eastern Region of the Republic of
Panama. BioScience I9(4):(in press).
McBryde, F. W. and AIfredo Costales. 1969. Human Ecology of
Northwestern Colombia. BioScience I9(5):(in press).
Werner, L. B. 1969. Radioactivity in the Hydrologic Environment.
(Th i s Sympos i urn).
Lowman, F. G. 1969. The Effects of the Marine Biosphere and
Hydrosphere upon the Specific-Activity of Contaminant RadionucIides.
(Th i s Sympos i urn).
International Commission on Radiological Protection. 1959. Report
of Committee II on Permissible Dose for Internal Radiation. Perga-
mon Press, N. Y. 233 pp.
Flemi ng, E. H. Persona I commun i cat ion.
Overman, R. T. and H. M. Clark. I960. Radioisotope Techniques.
McGraw Hill, N. Y.
Patten, B. C. 1966. Systems Ecology: A Course Sequence in
Mathematical Ecology. BioScience I 9(9):593-599.
Olson, J. S. 1964. Gross and Net Production of Terrestrial
Vegetation. J. Ecol. 52:99.
422
-------
16. Mart i n , »'J. E . I 965 . Ear I y Food Chai n Ki net i cs of Rad i onuc I i des
Following Close-in Fallout from a Single Nuclear Detonation.
pp. 758-790, in: A. W. Klement, Jr. (ed.) Radioactive Fallout
fj^om Nuclear Weapons Tests. U . S, A. E. C. , Sympos i urn Se r i es 5 ,
933 pp.
17. Kaye, S. V. and S. J. Ball. 1969. Systems Analysis of a coupled
Compartment Model for Radionuclide Transfer in a Tropical Environ-
ment, pp. 731-739, i n: D. J. Nelson and F. C. Evans (eds.).
Symposium on Radioecology, U. S. A. E. C., Conf-670503.
18. BIoom, S. G. I 967. Mathemat i caI FormuI at i on of the Hydrogen
Budget Model. in: H. T. Odum, Hydrogen Budget and Compartments
in the Rain ForeJt at El Verde, Puerto Rico. U. S. A. E. C. Rept.,
BMI-171-002.
19. McGinnis, J. T. and F. S. Golley. 1969. Elemental and Hydrological
Budget of a Panamanian Rainforest. BioScience I9(8):fin press).
20. Nat i on a I Academy of Sciences, National Research Counc i I. 1962.
Disposal of Low-LeveI Radioacti ve Waste i nto Pac i fi c Coasta I
Waters. Pub I. No. 985.
21. Gamble, J. F. and S. C. Snedaker. 1969. Final Report -
Agricultural Ecology. U. S. A. E. C. Report BMI-I7I-020
(i n press).
22. Thomasson, W. N., W. E. Bolch, and J. F. Gamble. 1969. Uptake
and Trans location of '34cs, 59pe? 85sr, and I85W by Banana Plants
and a Coconut Plant following Foliar Application. BioScience
19(7) :(in press).
23. Miller, C. F. 1963. Fa I lout Mudide Solubi Ii ty, FoIiage Contam-
ination, and Plant Part Uptake Contours. SRI Proj. No. IMU-4021.
24. Channel I, R. L., T. M. Zorich, and D. E. Holly. 1969. Hydrolog-
ical Redi stri buti on of Rad i onucI i des around a NucI ear-Excavated
Sea-LeveI Cana I. Bi oScfence I 9(9 ) : (i n press ).
25. Raines, G. E., S. G. BIoom, and A. A. Lev i n. I 96^ . Ecolog i caI
Models Apphe to Radionucfide Transfer in Tropical Ecosystems.
BioScience 19(I I):(i n press).
26. Bafl, S. J. and R. K. Adams. 1967. MATEXP, a General Purpose
Digital Computer Program for Solving Ordinary Differential Equations
by the Matrix Exponential Method. U. S. A. E. C. Rept., ORNL-TM-
1933.
27. Martin, W. E. 1964. Losses of 9°Sr, 89Sr, and |3II from Fallout
Contaminated Plants. Radiation Botany 4:275-284.
28. Witherspoon, J. B. and F. G. Taylor, Jr. 1969. Retention
of Fallout Simulant Containing '54Cr by Pine and Oak Trees.
HeaIth Physics (in press).
29. Goldsmith, W. A., W. E. Bolch and J. F. Gamble. 1969. The
Retention of Selected RadionucIides from Dilute Solution by
Panama Clays. BioScience I9(7):(in press).
-------
Fallout
Weathering
Translocation-
Uptake
(Assumed
to bypass
foliage)
*• Harvest
Fig. 2 Simple Crop Model Diagram
Hydrological
removal
-------
Fig. 3. Eight-Compartment Mode I Di agrsm
Time, days(XIO')
ig. 4.
Hypothetical Concent rat i on of
An i ma I F I esh
in Plant Leaves and
-------
3.2
2.8
2.4
2.0
1.6
1.2
0.8
0.4
0
Surface water and soil water
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4
Time, days (x|Q3)
Fig.
5. Hypothetical Concentration of 90Sr in Surface Water
Soi I Water
429
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4
Time,days (x|Q3)
Fig. 6. Hypothetical Concentration of
430
-------
2345678
Time, days(XIO')
90
Fig. 7. Hypothetical Concentration of Sr in Plant Edibles
431
3 2
2.8
24
2.0
1.6
1.2
O 0.8
0.4
Man (skeleton)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 24
Time , days (x|04)
Fig. 8. Hypothetical Concentration of
jn Man (Skeleton)
432
-------
6.4
5.6
4.8
rT 4.0
O
*. 3.2
2.4
1.6
0.8
Cumulative dose
0 0,2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4
Time , days (x|Q )
Fig. 9, Hypothetical Radiation Dose, Cumulative, to Man
433
QUESTIONS FOR WILLIAM E. MARTIN
From Dr. Pendleton:
Cesium-137 has been shown to increase by a factor of about three
between trophic levels. Do your evaluations include this factor
for dose estimation for men?
ANSWER:
To answer that truthfully, I have to look at the 200 values that go
into the equations. This does happen in many of the food chains as
a result of the differences of intake and elimination coefficients,
so that there are cases where these concentrate in the food chain
and other cases where they do not.
Moderator: To briefly summarize for the record what Dr. Pendleton
just said, he feels that it is important to consider such factors
and for example if you do have an increase of a factor of three for
each trophic level and you are talking about as many as three trophic
levels, then your final estimate could be low by a factor of ten if
these factors are not taken into consideration.
ANSWER:
I agree with Dr. Pendleton 100?. But making precise measurements in
some cases we feel that even if we checked our equations, we do get
these buildups, but then when we look at the specific activity con-
cept, in other words the idea that the transfers of the stable ele-
ment and the radionuclide will be the same ratio, we come to the
conclusion that we have created radioactivity somewhere in the pro-
cess and we wind up with no radioactivity in the biosphere when it's
produced by an explosion. I have not been able to explain this re-
sult.
2. From Dr. Pendleton:
Radionuclides on the soil surface may be transferred to foliage by
rain splash or dust. Have secondary transfers of this kind been
studied?
ANSWER:
No. In fact in the model we*re using, runoff is somewhat unrealistic
in that the nature of runoff is not surface runoff, but overflow in a
very shallow hole in the soil near the surface. So we are assuming
that that layer is a mixed type which, of course, it is not. In any
case, we have made no effort to include the splash back from soil to
foliage.
434
-------
3. From M. Chessin:
To what extent are national or international radiological safety ser-
vices or commissions involved in radiation hazards evaluations of the
nuclear sea level canal projects?
ANSWER:
I don't know the answer to that. We are given to make dose estimates
as realistically or as critically as we can, so that they can be com-
pared to any criteria or standard that is adopted. We have ourselves
nothing to do with the establishment of these standards.
4. From M. E. Wrenn:
Milk in Jamaica and some areas in Florida currently contain concentra-
tions 10 to 100 times more cesium-137 than we would predict using
transfer coefficients characteristic of more temperate latitudes.
Other areas of the world have been identified where cesium-137 in
milk is in the similar excess of expected values. These include
New Zealand, Australia and more recently Chile. Do your transfer
coefficients for cesium-137 reflect these anomalously high values
or the more usual estimates?
ANSWER:
I heard about these results and I find them intriguing. I don't know
why this should occur. I don't know their ^ransfer coefficients from
cesium-137. This is one of the radionuclides that drops out of con-
sideration on other bases.
435
THE EFFECTS OF THE MARINE BIOSPHERE AND HYDROSPHERE UPON THE
SPECIFIC ACTIVITY OF CONTAMINANT RADIONUCLIDES
F. G. Lowman
Puerto Rico Nuclear Center
Mayaguez, Puerto Rico
Fusion and fission pmducts as well as neutron-
induced radionuclides Dill be produced by the use of nuclear
explosives for excavation, Stable elements from the geologi-
cal matrix which are vaporized at the time of detonation Dill
be vented in the same form as the radionuclides and Dill
dilute the radionuclides to different specific activities
depending upon the yield a>id design of the explosive, the
neutron flux, neutron cross-sections for the stable ele-
ments and the homogeneity of the rock. Padionuclides in
the cloud and fallout may be further diluted by pulverized
rock on which they plate althouah the chemical forms may or
may not be the same. This fallout material may be deposited
into the sea and will react with sea water and its contained
salts to precipitate or co-precipitate some radionuclides
and release others as colloids or solutes where they will
be subject to further dilution by the stable elements in sea
water. The radionuclides will be subjected to varying amounts
of physical and chemical dilution according to the physical
environmental parameters. In some estuarine and upwellinq
areas of high biological productivity, the radionuclides a>id
corresponding stable elaments may become incorporated into
cycles involving the biosphere, hydrosphere and bottom
sediments in which the added material will remain in the area
for longer periods of time than that expected from physical
mixing and dilution.
Health physicists have traditionally and effectively defined
hazards resulting from the ingestion of radionuclides in water on the
basis of maximum permissible concentrations (MPC) of the contaminants
in drinking water. Radioecologists have occasionally tried to apply
MPC values for water directly to problems provided by contaminated
food organisms, usually with unsatisfactory results (Lowman, et al,
1957). Major errors result from the application of MPC values to
food because the MPC values for water were calculated for conditions
4 3t>
-------
in which no allowance was made for isotope dilution in the environ-
ment or in food webs leading to man.
In I960 another method of assessing hazards in the marine
environment was proposed by the National Academy of Sciences-National
Research Council, Committee on Oceanography and Fisheries in their
I960 summary report. The method was based on the use of the maximum
permissible specific activity (MPSA)* for radionuclides in critical
organs and tissues of man. Values of MPSA may be derived from the
data provided by the International Committee on Radiation Protection
(ICRP). The method is based on the premise that marine organisms do
not discriminate between isotopes of most elements** and that the
specific activities in food items cannot exceed those in the environ-
ments. This relationship exists because the radionuclides derived
directly or indirectly from the environment undergo additional
isotope dilution from the corresponding stable elements in the food
organ i sms.
The MPSA approach relates a given radionuclide to the corres-
ponding stable element and may be used for hazards prediction by
determining: (I) the distribution of the stable elements in the
biogeochemical system, (2) physical and isotope dilution rates for
the radionuclides in the environment and (3) biological half-lives in
food organisms of man. The approach provides a method for the step-
by-step evaluation of isotope dilution of an introduced radionuclide as
it passes through the hydrosphere, geosphere and biosphere to man. The
method does not require the determination of environmental and bio-
logical compartments for each radionuclide or detailed transfer routes
and rates in food webs. Values for elemental compartments in both
the environment and the organisms vary greatly under natural conditions
and minor errors in the measurement of compartment values may introduce
serious errors in prediction.*** In most marine areas the total bio-
mass usually accounts for I0~6 or less of the total mass of the
biogeochemical system actively associated with biologically-important
elements. Because of this, the organisms normally exert an insignifi-
cant influence upon the distribution patterns of added contaminants.
They may, however, provide transport of radionuclides to man through
his food.
* MPSA used in this report refers to the amount of the radionuclide in
yCl per gram of the corresponding stable element allowed in the critical
organ of man. The specific activity which is allowed is dependent on
the annual radiation dose levels recommended by the ICRP for the
general population in which it is possible to identify the population
group expected to receive the highest dose. Equal to 1/10 the con-
tinuous exposure allowed to occupational workers.
**ln the case of the very light elements, organisms usually discriminate
against the heavier isotopes.
***See next page.
437
A simplified approach to predicting hazards in the marine
environment may be based on the documented premise that environ-
mental mechanisms provide the predominant controls for the distri-
bution and movement of individual radionuclides and that the organ-
isms reflect the resulting patterns. For most plants and animals the
patterns are modified by biological turnover times which determine the
rates at which the organisms approach the specific activity of any given
radionuclide in the medium in which they live.
The MPSA approach is subject to errors In those cases where
diluent stable elements are not in the same chemical or physical
form as the introduced radionuclides. These errors are also of
consequence in the use of the MPC method. In the sea the transition
elements and other elements which tend to form complexes with organic
material are mainly involved in this type of error. Thus, the uptake
of iron by diatoms is enhanced for newly-added iron in comparison with
"aged" iron (Johnston, 1964). Stable zinc is mostly chelated in sea
water while newly-added zinc is largely ionic for appreciable lengths
of ti me (Bernhard, M. - persona I commun i cat ion). Fortunate Iy, the
errors introduced by differences in physical and chemical form may be
assessed by polarography, micropore filtration, dialysis, analysis of
exchange reactions and by extraction methods.
The specific activity method may be applied to feasibility studies
for a sea-level isthmian canal in Western panama or northwestern Colombia
as follows:
I. Calculate the specific activity in the ejecta for all
radionuclides produced in amounts greater than 1.0
millicurie per megaton of explosive yield. Assume the
radionuclides to be diluted by the vaporized and melted
material. Delete from consideration the elements whose
radionucIides occur at an initial ratio "specific
***Transfer coefficients for most stable elements change with the
total amounts of element available in the environment. This is
especially true for many of the trace elements. Thus, the uptake
of iodine in the thyroids of animals is not directly related to
the amounts of available iodine; "iodine block" may occur with the
presence of excessive amounts of the element in the environment.
Under these conditions the accumulation of iodine-13! tracer would
be reduced in the thyroids. Similar relationships of transfer to
total amount of available element exist for iron, cobalt, strontium
(plus calcium) and several other elements. In areas of fallout
the specific activity of each radionuclide, at the time of depo-
sition, may be expected to be fairly constant but the amounts of
deposited radionuclides and corresponding stable element will both
vary greatly according to the fallout pattern. The transfer co-
efficient for a given radionuclide from the environment to primary
producers (or to higher trophic levels) may thus, also vary
significantly according to fallout pattern.
438
-------
act i vity" /"ma•imum perm i ssibIe spec i fic act i
(SA/MPSA) of less than I .0.
vi ty"
2. For the radionucIides ejected with SA/MPSA ratios
greater than one, dete rmi ne the d i str i bution patterns
ot the correspond i ng stable elements in the waters,
sediments and organisms of the marine areas near the
proposed routes.
3. Measure and calculate physical dilution rates, sus-
pended sed i ment contents, sed i ment adsorpt i on rate s and
sedimentation rates in the marine areas of interest.
Use these data to calculate physical and isotope dilu-
tion and sedimentation of added radionuc h des.
4. AssembI e data on turnover rates in food organisms of
marine origin. Calculate b i o Iog ical delay in transfer
of rad i onucI i des th rough food to man.
5. If estimates of daily intal-e of rad i onuc I i des are
desired for use in MFC considerations of foods from
other sources, calculate the concentration of each
radionucIide per unit weight of food by multiplying
the specific activity of the radionuclide (gCi/q) by the
we i i_ih t of the correspond i ng stab I e el ement in the unit
we i qht of food. Use data for human feeding habits to
determ i ne totaI daily i ntake .
These calculations have been done and are presented elsewhere.
(Ting, R. Y. I }h ~J I. The present discussion is concerned with the
envi ronmentaI and biological factors which influence and alter the
specific activities of the radionucIides ejected from the excavations.
The specific activities of tn*:- mate rial ejected f rom the nuclear
excavations are directly dependent upon trie design and efficiency ;>f
the explosives. Any reduction in the production of radionucIides will
result in proportionate decreases in the specific activities of these
nuclides in the ejecta. The estimates of radionuclide production used
in this paper are based on the "Planning Information Statement" of the
USAEC (Warner, 1957) and the report of Ng (1965) on neutron activation
of the terrestrial environment f rom unde rground e•DIos i ons. Warne r
provided data for the amounts of three radionucIides of geological
origin, sodium-^4, phosphorus-32 and calcium-45, in the cloud and fall-
out. The amounts of phosphorus-32 and calcium-45 were 3 x 10"^ the pro-
duction values reported by fig for the same nuclides. The latter
values were for total activation and were not corrected for neutron
shielding, scavenging during venting or special emplacement techniques.
The ratio, 3 x 10"^, was used in the present work to estimate, from
Ng, the amounts of the other radionuclides in the cloud and fallout
which would be produced from activation of the geological matrix.
Estimates for production of vaporized and melted rock are based on
the reports of Boardman, Fobb and McArthur (I9i"1), Johnson, Higgins
and Violet (I959); and Nordyke and Williamson (I9n5).
The ratio Specific Activity/Maximum Permissible Specific
Activity for individual r.adionucIi des in the fa I I out and cloud may be
used t ~i determ i ne wh i ch of th--.- nuc I i des provi de potent i a I hazards to man .
SA/MPSA va I ues greater than I for rad i onuc I i des produced by a I fit ;-,hr,t
in granite are shown in Table I, Column 3. The changes in specific
act i vi tv •" t the ejecta w i th s i ze of detrn at i on are shown in F i gu re I .
^rom a tota I of 72 r,ud i onuc I i des p reduced in amou nts greater than
I millicurie per megaton of explosive yield, 23 would be ejected in
the fall out and cloud at specific activities greator than those all owed
in man. These include tritium, sod i um-24, phosphorus-32, calcium-45
ca I c i urn-4 7, scandium-'!?, scandi urn-48, manganese-? 4 , manganese-56, arsenic
7n, bromine-82, rubidium-86, stronti urn-89, mo Iybdenum-99 , cadmiurn-I I 5,
i od i ne- I 3 I , technet i um- I 32, bar i um- I 40 , wo I f ram- i -r-, wo I f ram- I 87 , go 1 d-
198, and lead-203. Three mechanisms tend to reduce the specific activ-
i1ies of the radionuclides in marine waters; physical radioactive dec^y,
isotcoe dilution by the corresponding stable element in sea-water and
co-precipitation intn or adsorption onto the bottom sediments. Although
manqanese-56 would initially occur in the cloud and fallout at a
specific activity 345,00'' times that allowed in the Gl tract of man,
i ts short physical half-l'fe of 2.57 hours could cause it to decay to
th^ specific activity allowed in man in 2 days. Scandium-47 would also
decay to MPSA in 2 days, gold-198 in 3.3 days, cadmium-M5 in 4 days,
bromine-82 in 4.9 days, arsenic-76 in 7 days, wolfram-187 in 8.4 days,
rubidium-86 in 9 days and scandium-48 in 9.7 days. PadionucIides which
would decay to MPSA in 10 to 30 days include sodium-24 and te I lunum-
132 (13 days), mo I ybdenum-91^ (16 days), calcium-47 (23 days) and
lead-203 (23 days). Eight of the 72 radionuclides would require II
wpel-s or longer to decay t... the specific activities allowed in man, if
they we re not di luted with tne corresponding stable elements in the
environment. These include barium-I 40 (77 days), iodine-131 (126 days),
strontium-89 (165 days), wolfram-185 (167 days), phosphorus-32 (196
days), caIci um-45 (620 days), manganese-54 (754 days) and tritium
(97,000 days).
Cons iderable physical and i sotope d i Iut i on occurs in the sea.
Tritium, in fallout from underground nuclear detonations, would occur
mainly as tritiated water and would be diluted by normal water in marine
areas ~>f turbulence. The water content of most marine organisms is
less than 0.9 grams/gram of living material, however, hydrogen from
rioter a I so may be i ncorporgte d i nto carbohydrates, lipids and proteins
by marine plants, including phytop I ankton. Even here the h\drogen con-
tent of the organisms seldom exceeds that in an equal amount of sea wat^r
so that the organisms normally concentrate hydrogen at tactors of one or
less . Ca I ci um-45 , stront i um-i:M and wo I f ram- I 85 f rom nuc I ear excavat i ons
would also not be concentrated significantly by marine organisms over
the amounts in the water. In contrast, the other radionuclides
added to the sea at specific "activities greater than those allowed in
440
-------
J*.
w > > o
9* IB n 9
»si:
< A 0) O
A O H* i->
O. 1
CB h-> Mi O
» C h-
°" £ 3* 5*
§ £E
g-g ».
5 Si
« H>
O 9
5 ° 8-
« Ea
M O
rr MI
~ * 9
U> 00 O to ui
*-J M Ui K*
»-*
ro w a* i- .p- h- a« oo u» *-
X- X *^ X X X • X- • X X >t • X •
O O OOO Q OOO O
.p. ro t-t ^ f. To H* M ui i--
V*) CO M I—1 l-^ -C' I-O ^J VO to
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
oooooooooo o^o o o_p o o
**J O OJ O id
OOOX X O X O O X OOOOX OO
OOO O O
Ui VO CO 00 GO
EE^S^ESE^SSS^SES
ooooooooooooooooo
h- tO
O O 10 O O
vo "ro ° o o
a* 9 M w
oo o o oooooooooo
+ + TT 11
o
ooooooooooooooooo
o p
»-* o
oooo ooooooooo oo
J **J Wi 4>
*-^poc-
o
s* ri-i"
X • X X X
O OOO
vO
ON h-
o
X X X X X
^o o o o o
O O •"• W '-n
to ro j>
O X X O X
Ml-' •-•
o o o
t-> t-1 M
O M UI
X X X X X
o o o o o
Wid J> Ui
o
o o o o
O O VO O O
B
c r
o o n o A
B s
CO
z
s
8-
CD
3
1?
5
n
c
A
*
rr
X
D
3-
3
s
1
D
H
ro
>
dilutic
3
1
o
s
1
CD
o
Ml
Ml
5
o
£
CL
D>
CO
o
1
CO
r-h
enviror
i
9
rr
B>
S
S
M
O
rt
s
V
9
CL
I-*
c
A
rr
o
s
rr
g
9
rt
9
00.
c
A
A
•o
A
CL
rr
o
a.
c
rr
A
rr
o
I
rt
s-
n
o
CO
Ml
A
9
rr
s
s
m
o
III
A
1
1
o
Ml
CL
(•*
rr
s-
E
Ml
o
Ml
s
Q)
-1
a.
0
Q.
o
D
$
D
<
-J
o
3
CD
=>
-f
QJ
-t-
cr
(D
ro
ements
CD
CD
-(-
CL
c
ro
ro
-1
a>
a.
o
Q.
Wl
-f
o
D)
n
CD
OJ
cr
c
CD
l/l
01
Ifl
o
E
=J
o1
O D) Q)
i 3 cr
^ -J
CD O —
Q) -t-
— CD D)
3 -h —
C — O
n -i D
-• => n
CD
I/) O CL
O 01
£-1
0 S 0
fli H- ZJ-
D s:
-f t= O
one
S CD CL
~D Q)
CD
f. X CD
u- o n
=J — CD
O < CL
CD
ro cu
t specific
for optimu
nv i ronment
— D)
CL -l -t-
Q| —
— -+ <
-f n -f
O => CD
=5 ID I/I
Q) — l£]
re ate r than
n granite.
re shown.
=J~ H -4
CD 3~ =*•
CD O
Ql t/)
3 Q. ro
O Oi
C -< Ql
-+ —
m D 0
o -Q ro
-* C Q.
-1 —
ro i3
CL
man, and for which II weeks or more would be required to decay to
MPSA, are accumulated by marine organisms to levels many times those in
sea water. Thus, phytopIankton are able to concentrate phosphorus,
34,000; iodine, 5,000; barium, 17,000; lead, 40,000; and manganese,
4,000 times the levels in a corresponding weight of sea water. If
the corresponding radionuclides of these elements deposited in fall-
out were not di luted in the environment and in food organisms eaten
by man, potentially hazardous amounts of the radionuclides could be
ingested by some individuals.
The ratios SA/MPSA shown in Figure I change with size of
detonation. This ratio for the thermonuclear reaction product, tritium,
differs from the other radionucIides by increasing with size of deto-
nation. The fi ssi on products decrease i n ratio, SA/MPSA, by factors
of about 25 with increase in energy yield of the explosive from 100 kt
to 10 Mt. The same ratio for radionuclides from activated rock
decrease by factors of about 5 through the increased yield range.
Neutron-activated components of the device also decrease in SA/MPSA
ratio with larger detonations, but do not follow consistent patterns.
Most of the calculations for environmental dilution of radio-
nucl ides in the present work are based on a I Mt detonation. Con-
siderations of other size shots require corrections for total amount
of radionuclide and the degree of initial isotope dilution. Shown in
Figure 2 are the amounts of stable elements required to dilute the
potentially hazardous radionuclides tritium, phosphorus-32, calcium-
45, manganese-54, strontium-89, iodine-131, barium-140 and wolfram-
185 to maximum permissible specific activities after deposition of
fallout from devices ranging from 200 kt to 10 Mt explosive yield.
Tritium from a 10 Mt detonation would require 50 times as much environ-
mental dilution as from a 200 kt yield. This results from the produc-
tion of 50 times as much tritium in the large explosive with essentially
no isotope dilution from the vaporized rock, iodine-131 and barium-140
wouId a I so be subject to i nsi gni f i cant i sotope dilution by the ejecta
although the production of these, and other fission products would not
change with explosive size. As a result, iodine-131 and barium-140 would
require the same amount of isotope dilution in a 200 kt and a 10 Mt
detonation. In contrast, strontium-89 and wolfram-185, both derived
from the device, would undergo appreciable isotope dilution before
ejection and would require decreasing amounts of environmental dilution
by stable strontium and tungsten with increased size of detonation.
Phosphorus-32, calcium-45 and manganese-54 would be produced mainly
by neutron activation of the geological matrix in increasing amounts
with increased explosive yield. Because vaporization of rock would
not increase as rapidly, about twice as much environmental dilution
by stable phosphorus, calcium, and manganese would be required for a
10 Mt as for a 200 kt detonation. Because only these eight radio-
nuclides would require further dilution after ejection from the exca-
vation, corrections for explosive yield may be calculated relatively
easily from the curves shown in Figure 2.
-------
OOKt
IMt
ENERGY YIELD
lOMt
Figure I. Ratio of specific activity to maximum permissible
specific activity for radionuclides ejected from excavations
at specific activities greater than those allowed in man.
Based on the assumption that the radionuclides are mixed with
vapori zed rock.
443
id6
HI
2
? I01
,32
Ca
,45
Bo1
,131
,140
54
.89
10'
100
Kt
J85
5 IMt 2
ENERGY YIELD
10 Mt
Figure 2. Grams of stable element required to dilute radionucIides
in the fallout and cloud to MPSA for 200 kt to 10 Mt detonations in
granite. For radionucIides requiring more than II weeks to decay
to MPSA with no envi ronmentaI di Iut ion.
444
-------
The interactions of tritium, phosphorus-32, calcium-45, manganese-
54, strontium-89, iodine-131, barium-140 and wolfram-185 with the
marine waters and their dissolved salts, colloids, particles and organ-
isms are strongly dependent upon the area of introduction. Marine
estuarine and open-sea regions are present on both the Atlantic and
Pacific sides of the proposed canal sites in the Darien region of
eastern Panama and the northwest corner of Colombia. In addition, a
large semi-enclosed body, the Gulf of Panama, with seasonal upwelling,
a year-round counter clockwise surface current and rich fisheries for
shrimp and fish meal connects with the western terminus of Route 17,
through the estuarine Gulf of San Miguel.
The surface circulation of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans in
the vicinity of Panama and Colombia are subject to seasonal fluctuations
(Figures 3 and 4). From January to April, the Doldrums move to the south
and the dry northeast trade winds prevail in the Isthmian region. The
dry season is a period of strong water currents in both the Pacific
and Caribbean areas and marked upwelling of nutrient-rich deep water in
the Gulf of Panama around the Pearl Islands. In late April or May the
wind system moves northward and the Gulf of Panama is then influenced
by the Doldrums and rain-bearing southwest winds. Upwelling ceases in
the Gulf of Panama, the surface currents weaken, and the rainfall
increases by a factor of 6 to 7 (Smayda, 1966). The total annual
volume of fresh water entering the Gulf is 9,2 x I010 m3, an amount
equal to 2.5 percent of the total volume of the Gulf or enough water
to form a fresh-water layer 3.2 meters thick over the entire water
surface. The greatest annual precipitation occurs over the San Miguel
drainage basin, the site of Route 17. The net sea water flow in the
Gulf of San Miguel results from river runoff although the Gulfs of
Panama and San Miguel are subject to diurnal tides which range from
4 to 6 meters in height. These tides cause strong tidal currents,
especially in the Gulf of San Miguel which resuspend and redistribute
bottom sediments twice each day. In contrast, the maximum tidal
excursion on the Caribbean coast is less than 0.76 m and this area
receives only small amounts of runoff from Panama; however, the Gulf of
Uraba receives large amounts of silt-laden water from the Atrato River
in Co Iomb i a.
In summary, the Gulf of San Miguel, the near-shore areas of the
Gulf of Panama and the Gulf of Uraba exhibit many characteristics typical
of estuaries. The Pacific coast of Colombia and the Caribbean coast of
Panama are "oceanic" environments. The Gulf of Panama is unique with
its characteristic dry-season upwelIing-water, which moves to the north
of the Gulf before surfacing.
Estuarine areas differ from the open sea in several features
which alter the relative influence of the water, organisms and bottom
sediments upon radionuclide distribution. In the sea only limited
sedimentation occurs. In contrast, relatively high rates of sedimen-
tation are common in estuaries as a result of direct settling of
suspended sediments, chemical precipitation, co-precipitation and
445
sorption of fresh-water colloids to particles. These physicochemical
reactions result mainly from the electrolytes of sea water interacting
with the material introduced by rivers. Most of the sedimentary
products are deposited on the bottom.
One of the estuarine areas which could receive significant
amounts of high specific activity tritium, phosphorus-32, calcium-45,
manganese-54, stront i um-89, iod i ne- I 3 I , bari urn- I 40, and wo I f ram- 185 is
the Gulf of San Miguel. The distribution patterns and transport of
these radionuc I i des would be determined mainly by their chemical
characteristics which govern their interactions with the suspended
sediments, the accompanying stable-element fallout and the bottom
sediments. The radionucl ides may be divided into two groups: (I) trit-
ium, calcium-45, strontium-89 and iodine-131 would undergo little or no
interaction with the dissolved, suspended and bottom material and would
be subject mainly to physical dilution; and (2) phosphorus-32, mangan-
ese-54, barium-140 and wolfram-185 would be strongly sedimented by
phys i cochemi cal mechan i sms.
Tritiated water in fallout would rapidly mix with the water in
the Gulf of San Miguel as a result of turbulence from tidal currents.
If the worst possible case deposited 50 percent of the fallout tritium
and other radionucl ides into the Gulf, about 6 x 10^ m^ of water would
be required to dilute the tritium to MPSA. The Gulf of San Miguel
contains about 4 times this amount of water. The worst possible case
assumes maximum venting of tritium from the excavation with all of the
tritium as water and equal deposition of tritium and the other radio-
nucl ides in the area of fallout. Under actual conditions the depo-
sition of tritium probably would be lower than that for the other radio-
nuclides and its specific activity would decrease rapidly to levels
below that allowed in man.
Other radi onucl i des which would be diluted to MPSA by the stable ele-
ments in solution in water of the Gulf of San Miguel are calcium-45,
strontium-89, and wolfram-185. Thus, of the eight potentially hazardous
radionucl i des only phosphorus-32, manganese-54, iodine-131 and barium-140
wou I d requi re add! ti ona I i sotope di I ution (Tab I e I ) .
estuary, usually by channel erosion. The flooding rivers, entering
the estuary, are unable to maintain their current velocities, except
during ebb tides, and as a result drop much of their suspended sediments
which sink at rates dependent on the mass and size of the particles.
Upon mixing of the river water with the saline water of the estuaries
the dissolved and colloidal iron, manganese, aluminum, titanium, zircon-
ium, scandium and silica precipitate into hydrous gels because of the
increased pH and electrolyte content of the water. Under these
446
-------
condi tions colloidal clay particles also coacervate. S imu1taneousIy,
with the precipitation of the colloids, magnesium and calcium from the
sea water prov ide limited exchange for some of the cat i ons adsorbed to
the suspended river sediments. Not all cations, however, are released
CARIBBEAN SEA
CARIBBEAN SEA
PACIFIC
OCEAN
Figure 4. Surface circulation during the dry
season' in ocean waters off Panama.
Fi gure 3. Surface circulation during the wet
season i n ocean waters of f Panama.
-------
by ion exchange. Zinc, cobalt, copper and ruthenium often are che-
lated to sediment particles in forms that cannot be desorbed by
alkali or alkaline earth metals (Jones, I960; Johnson, CutshalI
and Osterberg, 1967).
Hydrated oxides of iron, manganese and aluminum may be termed
"scavengers" because of their ability to remove ions from solution
(Goldberg, 1954). The scavenging action of these gels is due largely
to surface adsorption of ions with charges of opposite sign from that
of the scavenger. The charge on ferric hydroxide gel in sea water is
electropositive*—on hydrated oxides of manganese it is negative. Iron
hydroxide, accordingly, should co-precipitate negatively charged ions
and manganese oxides, positively charged ions. Under natural con-
ditions, ferric hydroxide in sea water is found to concentrate multi-
valent ions of both charges. Muds, some organic particles and colloidal
materials found in waters contaminated with radioactive fallout usually
have positive surface charges and alSo are capable of adsorbing nega-
tively charged ions (Amphlett, 1961; Rubentschik et al, 1936).
Phosphorus-32, manganese-54 and barium-140, added to estuarine
regions, are rapidly co-precipitated and adsorbed to the surfaces of
suspended and bottom sediments.** Approximately 90 percent of carrier-
free barium may be removed from solution by ferric hydroxide and under
natural conditions, where the precipitates may be formed slowly, more
than 90 percent of the manganese may be incorporated into the precipi-
tate.
Phosphorus-32 is rapidly adsorbed onto suspended organic and
inorganic detritus and to bottom sediments. Pomeroy, Odum, Johannes
and Ruffman (1967) observed that phosphorus-32, introduced into
estuarine regions, was adsorbed quickly and locally near the sites of
introduction and was not transported appreciably by water during short
* According to Amphlett (1961) ferric hydroxide floe, when formed
under alkaline conditions in fresh water, is negatively charged.
**Another radionuclide, lead-203, would be potentially hazardous the
first week or two after fallout. Iron hydroxide and aluminum hy-
droxide effectively co-precipitate lead from alkaline solution
(Gibson, 1961) and El Wakeel and Riley (1961) suggested that most
of the lead sedimented from sea water is adsorbed onto ferro-
manganese minerals. According to Chow and Patterson (1962) about
99 percent of the particulate lead entering the oceans is sedimented
from the sea water in shallow near shore regions. Krauskopf (1956)
showed experimentally that lead was efficiently co-precipitated from
sea water by ferric hydroxide and that it was also sedimented by
adsorption onto clay minerals and organic detritus. This is in
agreement with the observation that phytoplankton are able to con-
centrate lead by factors of 40,000 over the amounts in water. Revelle
et al, (1955) suggested that hydrous manganese dioxide can co-
precipitate lead from sea water.
449
periods of time. The radionuclide reached equilibrium between the water
and sediments within 24 hours. In addition to being adsorbed to sedi-
ments phosphorus is almost quantitatively co-precipitated with ferric
hydroxide gel. Sedimented phosphorus-32 does not remain permanently
associated with the sediments. Pomeroy, Smith and Grant (1965) reported
that the exchange of phosphate between the water and the sediment was
controlled by two mechanisms: one an inorganic sorption reaction and
the other controlled by biological exchange, probably between adsorbed
micro-organisms and the water. In surface fractions of sediments
poisoned by formalin, the rate of inorganic exchange of phosphorus was
only 1/2 to 2/3 the rate of the inorganic plus biological exchange for
sediments containing living micro-organisms. If bacteria compete on
a I i ke basi s for other biolog icaIly important elements then they must
exert a profound effect upon these trace elements in sediments.
Iodine-131 is not co-precipitated efficiently by hydrous oxide
gels. Horma and Greendale (1959) tested co-precipitation of iodine-131
by ferric hydroxide but could only carry down 13 percent of the element.
Iodine-131 was found by Gemmel (1952) to be 88 percent removed by
bacterial and algal sewage sludge, and to subject to rapid turnover by
the bacteria.
The co-precipitation of iodine by hydrated oxides of iron, mangan-
ese and a Iumi num wouId not be sufficient to reduce the speci f i c
act!vi ty to that a I I owed in man. Similarly, stab Ie i od i ne in the water
of the Gulf of San Miguel would supply only about 1/2 the amount
required to reduce the specific activity to that allowed in man.
Although iodine-131 would equilibrate rapidly with the stable iodine
i n the sedi ments, the mechan i sm wouId be of Ii ttle practice I vaIue s ince
it wouId be necessary for the rad ionucli de to equ i Ii brate wi th the iodi ne
in the sediments about 20 cm thick. A nine-day exclusion period
would allow the radionuclide to decay to MPSA, however, after mixing
with the stable iodine in the water. Although phosphorus, manganese,
barium and lead would be almost quantitatively precipitated and sedi-
mented to the bottom, only manganese-54 and barium-140 would be diluted
to MPSA by the top centimeter of sediment shortly after time of fallout.
Phosphorus-32 and lead-203 would require mixing with II and 60 cm depth
of sediment to reach MPSA immediately after fallout. At 30 days after
detonation phosphorus-32 would require mixing with about 3 cm of sedi-
ment and manganese-54 with 0.01 cm. All other radionuclides would have
been reduced to specific activities lower than those allowed in man
(Table I).
All of the above calculations are based on a I Mt detonation in
granite. In some instances ;a total yield larger than 1 Mt may be
detonated at one time. If a total of 5, I Mt detonations were fired
simultaneously and 1/2 of the total 'fallout was deposited in the Gulf
of San Miguel, isotope dilution by the water would not be adequate to
450
-------
reduce the specific activities of tritium, phosphorus-32 , manganese-54
or barium-140 to MPSA at 30 days post-shot. If tritiated water were
deposited in the fallout at the same efficiency as the other fallout
material the specific activity of tritium in the Gulf of San Miguel 30
days post-shot would be about 2-1/2 times that allowed in man. As
stated before, the deposition of tritium in the immediate fallout may
be expected to be I ower than that for other radionuclides and the
specific activity in the marine waters would be lower than indicated
above. Phosphorus-32, f rom the 5 detonat i ons , wou I d requ i re mixing
with only 13 cm of bottom sediment to be di luted to MPSA. Manganese-
54 and barium-140 would be diluted to acceptable values by 0.05 and 0.15
cm of bottom sediments respectively. It thus appears that with the
poss ible exception of tritium the radionuclides from the s imu I taneous
firing of 5 I Mt explosives wou Id not p rov ide significant hazards to
humans in the Gulf of San Miguel after 30 days following detonat i on .
Probab I y one of the most critical marine areas for fallout at
I east in regards to fisheries—is the Gulf of Panama. Sedimentary
processes would also operate in this region because of (I) the twice
daily resuspension of the near-shore bottom sediments by tidal currents;
(2) the finely-divided precipitates of iron, aluminum, manganese,
silica, titanium and 21 rcon lum supplied by rivers; (3) the part i cu-
late organic detritus which, at t i mes may egua I the amounts of suspended
sediments and (4) the stable fallout elements. In addition to sed i -
men tat ion, wind driven surface cur rents and the upwelling of deep
currents in the northern part of the Gulf during the dry season, would
result in significant dilution and transport of water out of the Gulf
into the open ocean. Dilution and transport from the Gulf of Panama
would also occur during the wet season but would not be as pronounced as
duri ng the dry season .
The Gulf of Panama is approximately circular in shape and has
an area of 28, 850 Km2 , the max i mum dimensions being 175 Km in a north -
i '!, direction and 245 Km in an east-west direction. The waters are
relatively shallow with 91.4 percent of the Gulf being less than 200
meters deep. The total volume of the Gulf of Panama is about 2.1 x
F i QU res 4 and 5 A show the main features of the Gulf of Panama
during the dry season. The Co I omb i a Current f I ows north a I ong the
Pac i tic Coast of Co I omb i a at ve I oc 1 1 1 es of 30 to 40 cm per second
and d i v i ded i nto two parts in the area of the Pearl Islands with the
major portion flowing west across the mouth of the Gulf of Panama and
and a sma Her portion flowing counterc lockwise north of the Islands.
As the current exits from the Gulf of Panama it joins the current coming
across trie entrance and flows southwest into the Pacific Ocean. This
current pattern appears to influence the distribution patterns of
those stable elements which rapidly precipitate upon addition to sea
water from river outflows. Just south of, and in the entrance to,
the Gulf of San Miguel, enhanced amounts of i ron , scandium and
w -g
S ?
T CT O)
— 3
(- (D Q>
— til
0)
0> C
D - -1 O
0) -4- 0> S
.
— O") — I'D TJ
3 0) u-i in
3 c £
-------
manganese occur in the bottom sediments (Figure 5C) and for all of these
elements, larger fractions of the total amounts may be extracted from
the sediments toward the center of the Gulf of Panama (Figure 5D).
These extractable fractions probably represent, mainly, iron, scandium
and manganese precipitated from river additives. Fallout, co-
precipitated by the hydrous oxide precipitates would also tend to be
concentrated in the sediments of the same area.
The upweI Iing that occurs in the Gulf of Panama during the dry
season contributes significantly to the circulation in that body of
water. The deep water currents which upwell in the northern part
of the Gulf are shown in Figure 5A and the area affected by upwelling
is shown in the surface-density diagram (Figure 5B). The increased
densities indicate the areas of upwelling.
The volume flow, per second, of the currents in the Gulf of
Panama, may be calculated by multiplying the cross-sectional area of
the current by its average velocity at right angles to the cross-
section plane. The results of these calculations are as follows:
Current
Co 1 omb i a
Current
Entering Gulf
of Panama
Leaving Gulf
of Panama
Width in
Meters
1.6 x
4.0 x
5.0 x
I05
I04
I04
Depth i n
Meters
50
20
20
Average
Velocity
m/sec
0. 175
0.125
0.175
Volume of
Flow
m^/sec
1 . 4 x 1 O6
1 .0 x I05
1 .7 x I05
Only about 7 percent of the water in the Colombia Current flows
into the Gulf of Panama and an excess 7 x 10^ m^/sec of water flows
out of the Gulf of Panama in excess of that flowing into it. The
source of this water is to be found in the upweI Iing'reported by
Smayda (1966), Forsbergh (1963) and Schaefer et al, (1958). The
area of upwelling (Figure 5B) comprises about 1/8 of the surface
area of the Gulf of Panama and would result from an average upward
flow of deep nutrient-rich water of about 1.7 m/day. In the area of
upweI ling the added water equals about 70 percent of the volume added
through surface flow of the Colombia Current.
Because the surface and deep currents do not travel in the same
direction a shear zone exits at their boundaries. A model of physical
(and isotope) dilution may be made using simplified assumptions as
follows:
I. AI I significant mixing takes place in the upper mixed layer.
453
2.
Vertical mixing in the mixed layer occurs
24 hours.
n less than
3. Vertical mixing through the thermocline is slow and
for the purposes of the calculations may be considered
negligible.
4. The vertical distribution of current velocity ranges
from zero at the upper edge of the thermocline to a
maximum at the surface. Analogue and digital models
of mixing were developed and were applied to specified
conditions of fallout in the Gulf of Panama.
In addition to physical mixing, corrections were made for
biological delay of radionuclides moving through food chains to man.
A mathematical model was developed in which it was assumed that an
initial specific activity of zero in an organism for any radionuclide
will come to equiIi bri urn w i th the envi ronment after n gi ven period
of time, dependent upon the biological half-life and the increase of
activity in the food. Neglecting isotope effects, the specific
activity in the organism can never exceed the specific activity in
the environment. The calculation of the delay which a particular
organism experiences in coming to a maximum specific activity is thus
a caleu(at ion of the rate at wh i ch the organ i sm ach ieves equ i Ii bri um
with its environment. Plankton were assumed to equilibrate with sea
water in less than 24 hours. Thus, the plankton and sea water were
considered as one unit in all calculations. The Gulf of Panama was
divided into four areas based upon commercial fisheries. Area "A"
is shown in Figure 6.
The worst possible case for the deposition of fallout from a
one Mt detonation in the Gulf of Panama would occur if the entire
fallout pattern were deposited in the confines of the Gulf. This
would also constitute the worst possible case for the Gulf of San
Miguel. The results of the calculations for iodine-131 in the area of
heaviest fallout in the Gulf of Panama are shown in Figure 6. Although
the specific activity of the radionuclide in the water exceeded MPSA for
man, the specific activities in the molluscs, crustaceans and fish
remained below MPSA because of biological delay. Similar calculations
for tritium showed that the specific activity in the water or food
organisms of man would not exceed MPSA.
If the specific activities in food organisms are calculated as
shown above, and the amount of stable element per unit live-weight of
organisms is derived from analyses of organisms collected in the area
of interest, the amounts of the radionuclide in uCi per unit live-
weight may be calculated. Thus the.results of the analyses and cal-
culations may be applied in cases where the concentrations of radio-
nucl ides have been calculated on a maximum permissible concentration
basis for foods from a wide variety of sources or in cases where the
454
-------
limitations on food utilization are based on the maximum permissible
specific activities allowed in the critical organs of man.
455
Figure 6. The calculated specific activities of water (A and B) and
molluscs, crustaceans and fish (C) in an area of the Gulf of Panama
receiving the heaviest concentration of fallout from a one Mt
detonati on.
MPSA
10 IOO
HOURS
KXX) IO.OOO
Section A. I
,131
A Physical dilution
B Physical dilution plus radioactive decay
C Specific activity In mollusc and crustacean soft parts,
and fish muscle
456
-------
REFERENCES
I. Amphlett, C. B. Treatment and Disposal of Radioactive Wastes,
Pergamon, Lond. (1961)
2. Boardman, C. R., D. D. Rabb and R. D. McArthur. AEC TID 7695
(1964).
3. Chow, T. J. and C. C. Patterson. Geochim et cosmochim, Acta
1962, 26_:263.
4. El Wakeel, S. S. and J. P. Riley. Geochim. et cosmochim, Acta,
1961, 22:110.
5. Forsbergh, E. D. InterAmer. Trop. Tuna Comm., 1963, 7^:1.
6. Gibson, W. M. NAS-NS 3040 (I96'l).
7. Goldberg, E. 0. J. Geol., 1954, 62:249.
8. Honma, M. and A. E. Greendale. Engr. Chem., 1959, 5J_:697.
9. Johnson, V., N. Cutshall and C. Osterber. Water Resourc. Res.,
1967, 3_:99.
10. Johnson, G. W., G. H. Higgins and C. E. Violet. J. Geophys. Res.,
1959, 6£: 1457.
II. Johnston, R. J., J. Mar. Biol . Ass., U. K., 1964, _M:87.
12. Jones, R. F. Limnol. Oceanogr., I960, 5_:3I2.
13. Krauskopf, K. B. Geochim et cosmochim, Acta, 1956, 9_: I.
14. Lowman, F. G., R. F. Palumbo and D. J. South. AEC UWFL-51 (1957).
15. National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council. The
Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation, Summary Report,
A/AC.82/GL-358 (I960).
16. Ng, Y. C. AEC UCRL-14249 (1965).
17. Nordyke, M. 0. and M. M. Williamson. AEC PNE-242F (1965).
18. Pomeroy, L. R., E. P. Odum, R. E. Johanes and B. Roffman. Int.
Sytnp. Disp. Radioact. Wastes into Seas, Oceans and Surface
Waters, IAEA (1966).
19. Pomeroy, L. R., E. E. Smith and C. M. Grant. Limnol. Oceanogr.,
1965, 10:167.
457
QUESTIONS FOR FRANK G. LOWMAN
From Walt Kozlowski:
Your study of the Panama Zone seems impressive indeed. In view of
all you know, do you consider a nuclear generated panama sea-1 eve I
canat feasible from a safety viewpoint to man? - to marine environ-
ment?
ANSWER:
The Panama Canal Commission should answer this, but I guess I could
give my personal opinion. With proper controls, I think that the
radioactive contamination problem would not keep the canal from being
bui It. There is to be control over fisheries and control over move-
ment of people, but as far as radioactivity, I don't think there is
a problem there.
From M. E. Wrenn:
Your estimate for production of iron-55 relative to manganese-54
appeared low to me when compared for example with amounts detected
from the weapons tests in 1962. Are your estimates of iron-55
production realistic and what is the basis of the estimate?
ANSWER:
The basis for these estimates is the Warner Report, the guideline
given to us by the AEC. I don't know If I want to comment on that.
I work with the numbers that are given me. This is all 1 can do in
this case. I think that they are close enough that the errors that
would occur would not greatly change the results that we came up with.
3. From J. Cohen:
How would you compare your MPSA approach with that of Fleming's MER?
ANSWER:
I think this approach is similar to one Dr. Fleming had before and
our numbers came out pretty close, although we don't agree at alI
on the basis for arriving at our numbers. I have to look at this
one more closely before I can see how they do - whether they do agree
or not. If I may I would like to make a short statement on this
cesium thing. We studied cesium in the soil at the Eniewetok test
site where there are large amounts of rain and many tropical areas.
Anyway in that area, the cesium was taken up very highly compared to
strontium-90 and the reason was that there is a very short potassium
shortage in the soil and some of the plants couldn't get enough
458
-------
otassI urn and so they were tak i ng up ces i um i nstead. One way to prove
that there was a potassium shortage was to take a bottle of potassium
chloride solution and a paint brush and paint stripes on the leaves
of the plants as we went by and three days later there was a very
bright green stripe where we painted the potassium on. There Is a
definite potassium shortage In some tropical areas.
459
AEC CONTROLLED AREA SAFETY PROGRAM
Donald W. Hendricks
Nevada Operations Office
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Las Vegas, Nevada
ABSTRACT
The detonation of underground nuclear explosives and
the subsequent data recovery efforts require a comprehensive
pre- and post-detonation safety program for workers within
the controlled area.
The general personnel monitoring and environmental
surveillance program at the Nevada Test Site are presented.
Some of the more unusual health physics aspects involved in
the operation of this program are also discussed.
The application of experience gained at the Nevada Test Site
is illustrated by description of the on-site operational and
safety programs established for Project Gasbuggy.
The general theme of this symposium is directed toward the public
health aspects of the Plowshare program where public is in the context
of non-p rogram re I a ted res i-dents living outside the test or p roject
area. The health and safety of the workers within the on-site or
controlied area are of equal concern to the Atom i c Energy Comm i ss i on.
For a better understanding of the operations at the Nevada Test
Site (NTS), some knowledge of the site is necessary.
The first slide (Figure I) shows the NTS and the general area
around the NTS. The Nell is Air Force Range is closed to the public
and therefore provides to some extent a buffer zone between test
activities and the general public.
The next slide (Figure 2) shows the NTS proper. The site is
located in Nye County about 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas. The main
entrance to the site is at Mercury which contains the base camp with
off i ces, Iaboratories, warehouses, 11vi ng quarters, and recreat i ona I
facilities for the workers who live there.
460
-------
To the north of Mercury are the Frenchman and Yucca Flat areas.
These were the primary testing areas for atmospheric detonations prior
to the signing of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. These areas
are now used for underground testing in vertical holes with the bulk
of the tests being conducted in Areas 3, 7, 9, 10, and 2. From the
center of the forward test areas in Yucca Flat, it is some forty mi les
to the nearest off-site permanent residence.
The main control point is located midway between the Yucca and
Frenchman Flat areas.
Area 12 contains the main tunnel complexes. These tunnels are
mined into the side of Rainier Mesa to give larger work areas for
more complex experiments than can be placed in the vertical holes.
Pahute Mesa provides facilities for testing at higher yields than
are feasible in Yucca and Frenchman Flats.
The Nuclear Rocket Development Station is set aside for the
testing of nuclear engines for rocket vehicle application.
Several nuclear excavation experiments have been conducted at
the NTS, among them the Sedan event in Area 10, Buggy in Area 30, and
the Cabriolet, Palanquin, and Schooner events in Area 20.
Before describing radiological safety procedures, a few words
should be said about how releases of radioactive effluent at detona-
tion time can occur in nuclear explosives testing. Since the signing
of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, all United States nuclear
explosives tests have been conducted in an underground environment.
The majority of the tests conducted since the treaty have been designed
to be fully contained (that is, release no radioactivity to the atmos-
phere). Only In the case of such things as excavation or aggregate
production-type experiments is any release of radioactive effluent at
detonation time anticipated and even in this case the fraction of
radioactivity released is designed to be small compared to the total
amount of radioactivity produced.
For experiments designed to be fully contained it must still be
recognized, however, that some radioactivity can be released by
accident. Such releases are customarily separated Into two rather
loose categories referred to as "venting" and "seepage." Venting can
be roughly defined as a prompt release of radioactivity usually
occurring within a few minutes after the detonation and frequently
resulting in a visible and radioactive dust cloud. Seepage may also
start shortly after detonation but usually does not produce a visible
cloud. It Is characterized by a low-level, long-term release of
highly fractionated fission products consisting primarily of noble
gases and volatiles. The few ventings which have occurred, on the
other hand, have generally been relatively unfractionated and have
lasted for only a very short period of time. Causes of these
461
effluent releases are not always readily determined. Seepage has
been bound to occur through firing and diagnostic cables leading to
the explosive, through fissures in the soil, or in and around the
emplacement casing where stemming or grouting material has been shifted
by the detonation.
Causes of ventings are even more difficult to determine than for
seepages. It appears, however, that such things as shallow burial and
local weaknesses in the geological medium can combine to produce vent-
i ngs.
With this rather sketchy background, the more unusual portions of
the on-site health protection program can be described. The industrial
safety, fire protection, and medical problems encountered In testing
programs are typical of the heavy construction and drilling industries
and will not be discussed here.
At the present time the Nevada Operations Office has two^con-
tractors who provide on-site radiological safety services. At the
Nevada Test Site the Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Company (REECO)
provides these services. At sites other than the NTS our contractor Is
the Eberline Instrument Corporation. The services which both contractors
provide are basically the same.
Each contractor maintains an active on-site environmental surveil-
lance program, provides training as necessary, and controls and documents
any radiation exposures to on-slte workers by use of personnel dosimetry
and bioassays.
Because some of the health physics problems which are encountered
are unique to nuclear explosives operations, and particularly to drilling
and tunneling operations,- it is necessary that monitoring personnel
receive at least a portion of their field experience working on drill
rigs and In tunnels.
Prior to each test, air sampling units and remotely operated gamma
exposure rate measuring units are placed around the surface ground zero.
These units document any release of radioactive effluent. In addition,
the exposure rate units which comprise what is more commonly referred
to as a remote area monitoring system (or RAMS) provide an early
indication of any release and can provide information on exposure
rate levels at stations where re-entry is required. The RAMS units
in current use normally have a six-decade readout capability ..from
about one mR/hr to 1,000 R/hr. The output of these units is returned
by hardwire or r-f telemetry to the control point for evaluation by the
Test Manager and the testing laboratory. Should a release of radio-
active effluent occur, standard procedures have been developed for
estimating the quantity of radioactivity released to the atmosphere
based on meteorological conditions and an assumed source geometry.
This equipment is, of course, installed, checked out, and
462
-------
calibrated well prior to the detonation.
Based on the meteoroIogical and maximum credible radiation
predictions presen ted at the first pre-shot weather briefing, areas
around the i mmed iate test area are cleared of all personneI not
necessary for the final pre-shot preparations. Additional weather
briefings prior to detonat i on t i me may expand or shift the areas to be
cleared of personnel.
For tests which are predi cted to cause significant mot i on f rom
se i sm i c ef fects, personneI may a I so be removed f rom tunnel or under-
ground work areas, dri I I rigs may be shut down, and personnel gener-
al I y requ i red to be in non-precar i ous Iocat i ons.
Prior to the event, geophones wh i ch mon i tor se i smi c act i v i ty are
also placed in the vicinity of the surface ground zero. After the
event, these geophones monitor the progress of the underground chimney
as it works its way toward the ground surface. Personnel are kept
outside the surface ground zero area until a surface subsidence occurs
or until the geophones indicate the underground growth of the chimney
i s complete.
FoI Iow i ng the detonati on, and after geophone and RAMS read i ngs
i nd i cate it is safe to re-enter the test area, an initial rad i at i on
survey is made of the detonat i on s i te. Mon i tor i ng personneI are
equipped with anti-con tarn i nat t on cIoth i ng and resp i ratory p rotecti on
equ i pment. The rad i at i on survey includes the emplacement casing, any
instrument holes, cables, and the diagnostic or timing and firing
trailers. The radiation survey data is relayed to the control point,
recorded, and evaluated. As soon as the evaluation has established
that there are no significant radiological hazards, scientific personnel
are permitted to re-enter to recover their data and equipment. For
those rare cases where a radiological problem exists, monitors are
provided for each recovery party to assure that they do not exceed
permissible exposure standards. In such a case, scientific personnel
are also appropriately dressed in anti-contamination clothing and
p rov i ded w i th resp i ratory protect i on.
Pri or to the detonat i on a rad i oIog i caI safety check stat i on is
established at the re-entry point to control personnel access and to
assure that re-entry personneI are appropri ately outfitted. Should
a radioactivity release occur, personnel and equipment are monitored
upon exit from the area and can be given preliminary decontamination
at this check station if necessary.
Under normal conditions for those events designed for contain-
ment, no radiation problems exist and the check station or access
control trailer is moved to within a thousand feet or so of surface
ground zero as soon as the initial su rveys and data recover i es are
completed. Movement of the check station to a location close to the
emplacement site reduces the size of the area under control and permits
463
resumption of normal operations in those areas outside the immediate
empIacement s i te.
Following the detonation it is normally necessary to re-enter
the detonation zone (usually by drilling) to obtain samples of the
rad i oact i ve deb r i s. These samples are used for determination of
explosive yield and for other diagnostic information.
The next slide (Figure 3) shows three methods of post-shot
drilling used at the Nevada Test Site.
The next slide (Figure 4) depicts a general circulation system
of the drilling fluid for the drill rig. This fluid circulates from
a pump through a hose to the dri I I stem. It then flows down the
drill stem and out through the drill bit thereby cooling and lubri-
cating the bit. The fluid then returns to the surface through this
annulus carrying the cuttings in suspension. Since several drilling
f I u i ds may be used such as mud, water, air (and in the case of gas
fields, natural gas), the treatment at this point depends on the fluid
used. At the NTS some form of mud is customarMy used for post-shot
dri I I ing.
As drilling proceeds, a point is reached where circulation of the
drilling fluid is lost. This is desirable since, if circulation is not
lost, radioactive mud can be returned to the surface as the drilling
nears the radioactive melt zone. Circulation is lost because the
fluid flows out into the fractured zone near the detonation point.
In some cases radioactive gas, or radioactivity contained in
steam produced by the fluid contacting the thermally hot detonation
zone, forces its way to the surface through the annulus or drill
stem. To reduce effluent releases to the atmosphere and minimize
personnel exposures from this source, several treatment methods are
available. One method consists of making this .3 closed system so
that material returned to the surface is placed back down the hole.
For cases where this method is not practical, the fluid or gases can
be run th rough a vent i I at ion system cons isting of mud or chip traps,
a charcoal filter system, and released to the atmosphere. This system
removes essentially all radioiodine from the effluent so that for
practical purposes only the noble gases are released. Quantities of
radioactive effluent released are such that they are seldom detectable
outside the immediate work area.
Personnel are assigned for radiation monitoring on and around the
drill rig during the re-entry. At the same time air samplers and RAMS
units are set up around and on the rig venti lation system to measure and
document any release of radioactivity.
The next slide (Figure 5) shows one method of obtaining a sample
of The radioactive debris. A coring tool is lowered on a wire line
into the center of the drill string and forced out into the hole wall.
464
-------
The coring tool is then raised to the surface with the sample wedged
inside. At the surface radiation monitoring personnel remove the
sample from the tool and package it for shipment to the laboratory
sponsoring the test.
After recovery of samples, the post-shot sampling hole is sealed
off, the drill rig and tools are decontaminated if necessary, and
any radioactive waste is cleaned up.
Procedures similar to those described are used on almost all
nuclear explosive tests regardless of whether they are conducted for
weapons testing or Plowshare. Specific procedures will vary somewhat
from event to event, depending on the type and purpose of the experi-
ment and individual circumstances.
To show specific application of some of these procedures, the
next slide (Figure 6) shows the exterior of the access control trailer
used for Project Gasbuggy. Note the cribbing and tiedowns for pro-
tection of the trailer against ground motion.
One view of the interior of the access control trailer is shown
in the next slide (Figure 7). The bins and cabinets are used for
storage of protective clothing, spare parts, and miscellaneous equip-
ment. Not visible in this view are a large hot water tank, sink, and
shower for personnel decontamination.
The next slide (Figure 8) shows the Gasbuggy RAMS array used on
the day of detonation. Note that on this particular event two units
were placed in the downhole stemming. This procedure gives an early
warning should radioactive effluent begin to work its way up through
the stemming.
The final slide (Figure 9) shows the RAMS array used for the
postshot drilling. The Gasbuggy nuclear explosive was placed in the
20-inch diameter emplacement hole by lowering the explosive on the
end of a 7-inch diameter drill string. Stemming was then placed
inside the 7-inch string and in the annulus between the 7-inch string
and the 20-inch casing.
The initial re-entry into the Gasbuggy chimney was made by
drilling with natural gas to a depth of about 3,260 feet at which
point the drilling fluid was changed to a water-bentonite mixture
because of wet-hole conditions and cement buildup on the drill pipe.
Four RAMS units were placed on a circle of about 300-foot radius
around the emplacement hole.
For that portion of the drilling which used natural gas as a
dri I ling fluid, a gamma ray scinti I I at ion detector was placed on the
exhaust line to detect any release of radioactivity in the gas. For
that portion of the drilling which used the water-bentonite mixture.
465
RAMS units were placed on the mud line and on the mud storage tank.
The data from the downhole RAMS units and from other detectors mounted
be low the ri g ,f loor were also aval I ab le.
In addition to the equipment shown, an air sampling array was
established for zero time with equipment and facilities available
for calibration, maintenance, and repair of electronic equipment as
welI as a mobi le sample analysis laboratory.
Sample of the drilling fluid returns were collected and analyzed
in these facilities as well as the usual air, soil, water, and vege-
tation samples.
The maximum radiation exposure of any on-site worker for the
Project Gasbuggy detonation and subsequent post-shot drillback was
less than \0% of the maximum permissible guidelines for the experi-
ment.
In summary, the general Nevada Test Site radiological safety and
documentation program is readily adaptable for use on Plowshare experi-
ments conducted at sites other than NTS and will provide adequate con-
trol of employee radiation exposures.
466
-------
CALIFORNIA > N 1 ARIZONA
SOUTHERN NEVADA AND NEVADA TEST SITE VICINITY
FIGu-AE KO, 1
467
.
, \.M E'V A D^A I /•£ »»„« j
\ 1 I lm ,' ta ~ I
= 30 ,/
—. .
14; I CONTROL
•NUCLEAR ROCKED | (401)',
DEVELOPMENT ' ' %
•i T S BOUNDARY i_^U*i
:OUNTY LINE
>HF.A OOUNDAflY _
VWED ROADS
jIRT ROADS
"^VADA TEST SITE
GRAPHIC SCALE
-------
Method 1
Method 2
Three methods of postihot drilling at NTS.
FIGURE NO. 3
JNNI 1
—^-~~~ -j
^._
^
tl
f!
!
T*
I
aL
I
/E
M~-^L_/aL -v^ji yii - =2= ^""^i^W
1 "~irmr-w=*ji Gid^ / C^ti
] IF-*. _^._~_^ — _ --gf-4= — — ,, IL ^ i
IP — Ik J IT H ^Y~
'*-•
Is
.ij
;^j
vH_s
F ^ Circulation of drilling fluid. From the mud
~ pump (A) the fluid goes to the swivel (B). from the
,- swivel down through the kelly (C), through the drill
P; stem (D) to the bit (E). At the bit the drilling fluid
!^~ washes the cuttings from the bit and the bottom of
zT the hole and carries them back to the surface through
L, ^ the annul us (F). At the surface, o pipe carries the
^r^. cuttings in suspension through a shale shaker (G).
£ which removes the cuttings from the drilling Fluid*
ij; From the shaker the drilling fluid goes to the mud
•^ pit (H) and the whole cycle is begun again.
^5
FIGURE NO. 4
470
-------
' T;1 ur;' 'i";''ij"3''ii
iSMiMliiAV;
^ ^|_U-i,| „, .
1 ' i i!i' 11 ' iv1
i:i;i1il:i!liii!l!i,i'nii,lllli!iJlM!i
,i
nwlr m.
il ,1 Wi nlir.1 i!!i A
3T
Hint?
Figure 6: OUTSIDE VIEW OF ACCESS CONTROL TRAILER
471-472
-------
e 7: INSIDE VIEW OF ACCESS CONTROL TRAILER
NORTH
GRODNO ZERO
TERMINAL- BOX,
APPRO* ZMIi-E^. TO | N>f\O
C.P. MWN TERM. BOX
I ' F1sure 8: PROJECT GASBUGQY
RAMS ARRAY AT
SGZ
473-474
-------
475
QUESTIONS FOR DONALD HENDRICKS
I. From Tom Rozze 11:
How long is monitoring for seepage continued after each shot?
ANSWER:
As long as necessary, sometimes the seepage has lasted for a few hours
and other times it has lasted for a number of days. We try to monitor
it until we are sure that it has stopped. I should mention that In
some cases we are able to stop these seepages. It depends strictly
on how they occur. If it is coming through the stemming inside the
emplacement casing, we are able to put cement or something in there
to try and stop it. If it's leaking from just broken ground or a
crater, stopping it is not always possible. You can pour a cement pad
over it and it wi11 continue to leak around the edges and we will
monitor it as long as it is seeping.
2. From Robert Karsh:
Under your definition of a "contained" detonation, how much gaseous
radiation release is permissible before you conclude the detonation
was not contained?
ANSWER:
We, on occasion, have small releases as mentioned before from cables
around the emplacement hole - in general they range from a few curies
and by few I mean a few 10's to 100 curies or so and my personal opin-
ion is that they are satisfactorily contained. They are not, in general,
detectable outside the immediate ground zero area.
3. From Sidney Porter:
You stated that a total of \0% of Gasbuggy allowed exposure was the
maximum. What was this allowed exposure and how was the actual ex-
posure measured?
ANSWER:
The guidelines which were used, and note I am addressing myself only
to on-site workers here, the guidelines are those which are contained
in AEC Manual, Chapter 0524 and are essentially similar to those con-
tained in Part 20 with minor differences, but in this case It's three
rem per year external exposure, five times N-18 and the rest of that.
I didn't bring the exact numbers, but these are measured from film
badges, pocket dosimeters and that sort of thing. There was also a
urinalysis done on those people for whom any internal exposure of
tritium was suspected.
476
-------
4. From Robert Karsh:
A radioactive nature lover from Las Vegas recently tripped the moni-
toring device at Kennedy airport with dust in his pants cuffs. Does
this Imply excessive distribution of vented radiation?
ANSWER:
Well, I would like to know the details on the story. We heard the
same rumor and checked it out and the last I heard there was no
foundation to the story,
5. From Sydney Porter:
In Project Gasbuggy, what was the total exposure in man-rems? How
was this exposure received? How can it be reduced in future opera-
tions?
ANSWER:
I guess I should clarify one thing, when those down-hole rams detected
the leakage of gas, the radioactivity coming up through the stemming,
rather, the first sign of this was seen at something like five hours,
and when it indicated that the levels as measured by the down-hole
rams were continuing to rise somewhat, the cables were cut and the
hole was sealed off. Something less than a curie of noble gases was
released. I believe it is in the neighborhood of one curie which is
the reason, of course, the PHS monitors could not see it off-site.
As far as the original question goes, only two individuals associated
with the project received external exposures as measured by film badges.
A radiological monitor received 70 mrem while one of the laboratory
scientists received 105 mrem. The monitor's exposure is believed to
have been incurred while working with radioactive sources during
Instrument calibration. The scientist's exposure was probably in-
curred at the Nevada Test Site while working on another project.
Neither exposure is considered to be related to any release of radio-
active material from the Gasbuggy detonation.
From the day of the detonation through April 1969, there have been no
measurable internal exposures (as determined by urinalysis).
477
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE SAFETY PROGRAM
John R. McBride
Southwestern Rad iolog icaI HeaIth Laboratory
Las Vegas, Nevada
ABSTRACT
Off-Site Radiological Safety Programs conducted on past
Plowshare experimental projects by the Southwestern Radiological
Health Laboratory for the AEC will be presented.
Emphasis will be placed on the evaluation of the potential
radiation hazard to off-site residents, the development of an
appropriate safety plant pre- and post-shot surveillance activ-
ities, and the necessity for a comprehensive and continuing
community relations program.
In consideration of the possible wide use of nuclear ex-
plosives in industrial applications, a new approach to off-site
radiological safety will be discussed.
The Public Health Service Safety Program began in 1954, when the
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the Public Health Service (PHS)
entered into a contractual arrangement called a "Memorandum of
Understand i ng. ~'
This document stipulates that the PHS is responsible for assuring
the safety of the publ ic - off the test site proper - from any nuclear
tests conducted by the AEC. Although the original document referred to
the Nevada Test Site, just north of Las Vegas, we have since participated
in tests conducted in New Mexico, Mississippi, Alaska, Central and
Northern Nevada, and the Pacific.
There were four oriiginal objectives of the PHS program:
1. To verify the off-site radiological situation associated
with tests to insure protection of the public from radiological and other
effects of nuclear testing; and, in the event unacceptable situations
develop, to effectuate appropriate protective actions as required.
478
-------
2. To document, through radiation monitoring and environmental
surveillance, the radiation exposure to off-site areas.
3. To assure the public, through personal contact and a program
of community relations and public education, that all reasonable safe-
guards are being employed to protect public health and property from the
effects of testing.
4. To investigate incidents involving radiation or its effects
which could result in claims against the U. S. Government or create un-
warranted adverse public opinion.
In recent years these objectives have been supplemented with three
additional objectives:
a) To document any increase in environmental levels of radio-
activity due to nuclear testing.
b) To conduct special studies to determine transport phe-
nomenology of radioiodine in environmental and biological systems and to
determine its effect on man.
c) To assist other agencies in the protection of the public
from injury due to the seismic effects of nuclear tests.
The surveillance program was initially limited to the area within
approximately 300 miles of the Nevada Test Site. Subsequently, the pro-
gram objectives were expanded to include the 22 contiguous states west of
the Mississippi River, and to the other areas when tests are held outside
th i s reg ion.
Keeping the aforementioned objectives in mind, the PHS program can
be subdivided into six general categories:
J. Monitoring and surveillance programs.
2. Population and milk cow statistics and distribution.
3. Community relations and public education.
4. Veteri nary i nvestigat Ion.
5. Med icaI i nvest!gat ion.
6. BioenvironmentaI research.
At this point I would like to briefly review with you the essence
of these six categories and then take you through an actual Plowshare
project, Gasbuggy, to Illustrate how the program and objectives are
carried out.
479
Monitoring and surveillance includes routine surveillance of air,
water, milk, and vegetation, and event-oriented surveillance performed
by mobile teams in conjunction with specific events. Detailed population
and milk cow surveys are conducted around sites prior to tests. This
census is detailed as to numbers of adults and ages of children by specific
location. The survey includes all individual family cows as well as grade
grade A dairy cows.
The results of monitoring and surveillance efforts just mentioned
are continuously scrutinized to determine the possibility that there was
or will be significant ingestion or inhalation of radioactivity.
The Southwestern Radiological Health Laboratory (SWRHL) operates a
sophisticated and extremely sensitive whole-body counting facility as a
part of our Medical Program. The mobile monitors and aircraft crews are
more directly exposed to any effluent cloud than the general population.
As soon as possible, these men are returned to the laboratory, appropriate
bio-assays are made, and each man is given a whole-body scan to determine
the amount and distribution of radionuclides in the body. These data,
together with dose estimates derived from radioactivity in milk and water
samples, furnish conservative estimates as to the maximum doses that could
have been received by the general population.
Continuous efforts are made to retain good relations with the public
through personal contact, the dissemination of timely information on
nuclear events, and an explanation of the steps being taken to assure
public safety. An important part of this program is the day-to-day con-
tact of SWRHL monitors with the people in the performance of their duties.
To the general public, nuclear explosions instantly recall the
horrors of Hiroshima. This association and the resulting fears must be
treated with respect by the field monitors, who at the same time explain
technical details of the particular event being conducted and the associated
safety measures that have been or are being taken. In many cases the
public actively participates In the safety program by operating air, milk,
and water sampling stations as well as exposure rate recorders.
The safety program is not only concerned with radiation effects on
man, but the animal population as well. The veterinary or animal investi-
gations program was originally established during the atmospheric testing
days to investigate claims of beta burns to domestic livestock and wild-
life. Although since the advent of the limited test ban treaty, the
number of such claims has diminished considerably, we still, from time-
to-time, receive complaints from ranchers with sick animals. Each of
these claims is carefully and thoroughly investigated and the disease or
ailment is diagnosed. The veterinarians assigned to this program work
closely with local veterinarians and participate actively In professional
veterinary organizations. In addition to these activities, an experi-
mental beef herd, in excess of 40 animals, has been maintained on the
Nevada Test Site, from which samples of bovine tissue and bone are taken
periodically to determine the concentrations of fission and activation
480
-------
products. A comprehensive study of wildlife on and adjacent to the test
site has, and is, being conducted in cooperation with other agencies to
assess the radionucl ide content of edible species. The results of these
studies are available in the open literature and show no radiation either
to the animal or the consuming public.
Physicians on the laboratory staff, trained in radiation medicine,
investigate claims of personal injury from the public. They also operate
what is called the Medical Liaison Officer Network, also referred to as
MLON. This network is comprised of physicians in almost all of the
50 states who are knowledgeable in radiation injury. Local investigations
in the area immediately surrounding the NTS are made by the Laboratory's
physicians, whereas those at greater distances are handled through the
MLON physicians. Whichever method Is used, local specialists may be called
into the investigation for consulation or assistance; for example, in an
investigation involving a skin condition, a dermatologist may be consulted.
The philosophy of the MLON is not to state simply that this is or
is not a radiation injury, but rather to make a definitive diagnosis.
Simultaneously with the above mentioned action programs, the
Laboratory conducts long-range safety studies as part of the BioenvironmentaI
Research Program. As an oversimplification, this program's mission is to
investigate the transport and biological effect of radionuclides as they
move from the source to man through the food chain. Initially, the pro-
gram was established to investigate the behavior of radioiodine, although
other radionuclides of concern are or will be investigated. Again, stated
quite simply, the objective of this research is to develop reliable pre-
dictive models, whereby having a known source term and known meteorologi-
cal conditions, you can predict to an accuracy of H factor of two at the
90% confidence level the amount of radioactivity in the food chain avail-
able to man within a fallout area. It is anticipated that our investi-
gations into radioiodine will permit us, by mid-1969, to predict the
average peak levels of radioiodine in the milk of dairy cows fed feed
from a fallout area - when the source of radioiodine and the meteoro-
logical conditions are known.
Other speakers have referred to "Project Gasbuggy. I too would
like to use it as ;i typical Plowshare underground engineering experiment
and illustrate how the above-mentioned safety program operates.
As has been mentioned, Gasbuggy was detonated on December 10, 1967,
[n a gas-bearing media approximately 55 air miles east of Farmington,
New Mexico. The actual concept of the experiment was developed some
years before, and in 1965 the Laboratory was first approached to do a
paper study of the environment. This feasibility study, with partici-
pants from many AEC contractors and the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory,
resulted in the conclusion that the project could indeed be carried out
with safety and a promise of success in fulfilling the technical objec-
tives. When the agreement was signed on January 31, 1967, between the
Government and industry, the full program effort began.
481
At this point, our Laboratory made the initial contact with
officials of the State Health Department of New Mexico. We outlined
the project as proposed by the AEC and asked the State's assistance in
conducting the Off-Site Radiological Safety Program. Working in complete
partnership, the staffs of the Laboratory and the State commenced the
initial gathering of census data on population, domestic livestock,
wildlife, and other environmental media necessary to develop, a compre-
hensive program. After receiving source term information and possible
meteorological conditions, these data together with the census data
were consolidated and analyzed, and a draft operational safety plan was
developed. This plan, which pointed out certain limiting conditions,
i.e., evacuation areas or the need for post-shot protective action pro-
cedures, was forwarded to the AEC for review.
The AEC safety review considered all factors affecting the safety
of the project; among these were the depth of the device, the proximity
of an aquifer to the detonation, and the location of gas production wells
with respect to ground zero. The device was considered to be overburied
by safety standards at the Nevada Test Site since it was emplaced at a
depth of 4,240 feet. A device of the same yield would be considered
safely emplaced at a depth of approximately 1,200 feet. The nearest
aquifer was considered to represent no problem since the lowest water-
bearing formation was approximately 560 feet above the shot point. The
site chosen for the project is on land leased by the industrial partici-
pant, El Paso Natural Gas Company; the only wells in the area belong to
them, and the closest production well was 3,400 feet from ground zero.
As an added precaution, all producing wells within a five-mile radius of
ground zero were physically separated from the gas transmission system.
Nevertheless, the AEC hypothesized all possible failure modes which
could release radioactivity into the atmosphere, the ground water, or
into the natural gas production system. Although these failure modes were
considered highly unlikely, the AEC authorized the Laboratory's compre-
hensive radiological safety program for Project Gasbuggy.
In accordance with the operations plan, the SWRHL pre-shot prepa-
rations were begun in June 1967. During the summer of 1967, the census
was completed out to a distance of 100 mi Ies of the shot point. In
addition, all mining and tunneling operations within 50 miles were lo-
cated. As the census information was collected, SWRHL personnel dis-
tributed printed information to the public explaining the nature of the
experiment and answered questions by the local population regarding
their activities. The community relations program was intensified during
later periods when the SWRHL Project Officer and the State Health
Department officials visited local officials in the surrounding com-
munities. The initial environmental sampling was begun in August 1967.
This included the collection of daily air samples at 35 locations around
the site; the collection of milk from 22 stations - 13 representing
family milk cows and nine grade A dairies; 34 water sampling stations
were established, 6 representing municipal water systems, the others
open or well water sources.
482
-------
A new dimension was added to the environmental sampling program for
Project Gasbuggy in that 15 samples of natural gas from producing wells
in the area were sampled and analyzed pre-shot. Natural gas produced in
the San Juan Basin was known to contain measurable quantities of Radon-222.
Some had hypothesized that the ground shock and resulting ground motion
from the explosion would shake the medium to such an extent that the
amount of Radon found would*markedly increase in the natural gas. Inci-
dentally, this did not happen.
A network of thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) and film badges
was established at 50 stations surrounding the test site in October of
1967. The TLDs are, in our opinion, reliable personnel monitoring devices
with a low sensitivity of 4 mR.
Medical and veterinarian activities began during the summer of 1967
when the respective officers made visits to various state and local physi-
cians and veterinarians and briefed them on the safety programs as. well
as the medical aspects.
Approximately 30 people from SWRHL and the State Health Departments
of New Mexico and Colorado were assigned to the program and were on
station on December 1, 1967. A short training course was given for State
personnel on procedures to be used and all personnel were oriented with
the area around the site. At shot time of December 10, 33 personnel were
on station. Including monitoring teams in two aircraft orbiting the site.
As you alI know, the experiment was fully contained. Had there
been any prompt venting or seepage from the project, we would have been
fully prepared. An on-site remote area monitoring system would have
telemetered information back to the AEC control point, and the aircraft
teams would have measured and tracked any airborne radioactivity. This
Information would have been Instantly available to the PHS Project Officer
who was in constant communication with the mobile ground monitoring
forces. These teams would have been deployed into the path of any
cloud to assess actual radioactivity levels at downwind distances. Should
the situation so warrant, the populace could either be asked to remain
Indoors during the cloud passage or to evacuate in accordance with a pre-
arranged plan.
In addition to this emergency type action, our protective action
plan incorporates provisions to reduce radioactivity levels in the food
chain. These may Involve the covering of forage used by milk cows, sub-
stituting "clean" forage, or as a last resort diverting milk supplies to
cheese or other dairy products to allow for radioactive decay.
Since there was no venting, the environmental sampling program was
greatly reduced shortly after the experiment; otherwise, these programs
would have been continued until background levels were reached. (A re-
duced safety program has been continued at the Gasbuggy site in connection
with the flaring operations of the experimental well.)
483
It is our conclusion that from the safety standpoint the project
was a success. The population was not exposed to any airborne radio-
activity from the event; no evidence has been found of any contamination
to the ground or surface waters; and there has been no migration of radio-
nuclides Into other gas-producing wells or the existing natural gas dis-
tribution system. We also believe we were well prepared so that our per-
sonnel could effectuate pre-developed emergency procedures to Insure the
protection of the public health had an unforeseen accident occurred.
In closing,
for the future .
I would like to leave you with a thought and a challenge
As you all know, the Atomic Energy Act of 1949 reserves exclusive
jurisdiction to the AEC for all health and safety matters connected with
the detonation of nuclear devices. If the use of nuclear explosives
proves to be a success in the recovery of gas, oil, or minerals. It is
doubtful that either the AEC or the PHS would have the manpower or other
resources to handle all of the possible commercial utilization of this
new tool. What then? Some discussion is presently taking place that
industrial organizations could accept the safety responsibility along
with the site development, drilling, etc.
What is the role of the State? PHS? AEC? What kind of safety
program is adequate to protect the public when the appl ication of this
energy is moved from the experimental Into applied use. Who decides
when this transition takes place? How many experiments are necessary to
conclude the program is no longer experimental? How many experiments
are necessary before existing comprehensive safety programs can be
reduced in scope? Does this new resource enter into the same category
as an oil refinery, a chemical plant, or a nuclear power plant? There
are, of course, other questions relating to public health, dealing with
appropriate standards as to the consumer product. These will be covered
in other papers. Nevertheless, public health agencies must think of the
future now for, if industry is to seek the benefit in the peaceful
application of nuclear explosives, the time to consider the inevitable
changes Is fast approaching. The questions I have raised and to be frank
I do not have the answers are mostly jurisdictlonal in nature. We can
not afford, however, to become involved In such jurlsdictional disputes,
when the need for adequate protection of the public's health is at stake.
484
-------
QUESTIONS FOR JOHN R. McBRIDE
I. From Robert Karsh:
Do you monitor children who are known to be strategic bio-concentrators
of iodine-131, or do you merely extrapolate from measurements on cows,
milk, and adult employees?
ANSWER:
Although this didn't happen with a Plowshare experiment, we do have ac-
cidents that occur and we make all the effort that we can to prevent
them. One of the weapons shots did vent and activity was sent north
over the Test Site and a community called Hiko. There were about 80
people living in the town and we monitored every one of them including
the children. And for some reason if you extrapolate from milk to
people, you will find that their dosage should have been about five
times higher than they actually were. I think part of this is be-
cause the FRC standards assume that a child drinks a liter of milk
and I don't think this is so. We do monitor, we do look at the
children very closely and we are concerned with them.
2. From Robert Karsh:
What warning system is used or contemplated when iodine-131 is found
to be too high in the mi Ikshed?
ANSWER:
We have a source term - this is given to us before the shot occurs -
so we can calculate from the amount that under certain meteorological
conditions that should exist at distance. This is worked out before
the shot even goes. Now if, and by the way I serve and Dr. Carter
serve as members of the AEC Safety Panel before each shot, and if it
appears that this is in excess of the FRC guides, the shot is post-
poned until favorable conditions develop. Now even with all this
care is taken, if the meteorology changes and it does, we take immedi-
ate action. In a case say in the collection of milk from family cows,
when we sample the milk, we take all the milk available. Therefore,
the family is not the receptor. In other cases, we are prepared to
bring clean feed in for the cows. We are also prepared to substitute
milk and of course notify the appropriate state and local officials
of this action in advance.
3. From F. Chin:
Could you comment on the extent of the PHS role in assistance for
off-site seismic effects which you briefly mentioned as a supple-
mentaI activity?
485
ANSWER:
Since we have so many people in the off-site area and we have con-
tact with miners and ranchers and the populous in general, we more
or less do this as an additional duty. We take the ground motion
experts'predictions, and then warn the populous of the shot ad-
vising for instance to stay out of a mine during this period,
asking to stay off of scaffolding and precarious perches and high
places. Basically, we have been used to carry the message.
486
-------
STATE AND LOCAL SAFETY PROGRAM
G. D. Carlyle Thompson, M.O.
State Director of Health
Utah State Division of Health
Salt Lake City, Utah 84113
This paper wilt give emphasis to the need for an increasing role of
the states, along with the Federal agencies^ in the Plowshare Program in
order to assure state and local confidence with respect to the safety of
their residents as the Federal government seeks new methods to benefit
society.
First will be stressed the age-old principle of control at the source.
Other factors to be discussed are monitoring; standards and their use;
control action; public relations; predictions and the need to have certain
advance knowledge of tests - even if security clearance is necessary for
appropriate state representatives; the state and local government respon-
sibility to their citizens; the isolation of national decision making from
state and local concern and responsibility; cost assessments and their
responsibility; and research as it relates to the ecological system as
well as the direct short- or long-term effects of radioactivity on man.
The threat to human health of radioactivity in the environment has
received growing attention in the post-war period, and has caused health
officials in the United States considerable concern. The almost unlimited
possibilities for useful application of radioactivity or operations re-
sulting in radioactivity will attract the intellectual and practical
efforts of mankind for centuries to come. How well these applications are
thought through in advance will determine whether this new tool will be a
blessing or a curse to society.
Much evidence has been accumulated to date to show the feasibility of
controlling radioactivity at levels which will not result in unacceptable
hazards. At the same time we must not forget that radioactive fallout in
the 1950's from weapons testing was of such a degree and composition of
long-term half-life nuclides that it may be many years before we actually
are certain about any resulting hazard. Thus, past experience and the vast
487
complications of the subject argue against any complacency about our present
level of knowledge. We simply cannot take it for granted at this juncture that
our past control of radioactive exposure has been adequate nor that it will
continue to be adequate without greatly increased attention to the entire
subject and greater planning effort directed toward major decisions concerning
use of the new tools we have found. This symposium is I" '*"'* " '^i-
cation of this concern and a response for that concern.
itself an indi-
Control of environmental pollution at the source has been regarded as
the most effective means of removing or forestalling threats to the health
of the population. The philosophy is still sound, and must be applied in all
cases to the limit of practicality, and especially in the case of radio-
activity, since everyone agrees that no unnecessary radioactivity should be
imposed on the environment. When the standard practice of treating effluents
becomes impractical, as seems evident in the Plowshare Program, the decision
as to whether or not to continue promoting the possible benefits of a program
to society revolves around questions of how adequate are our predictions and
measurements of contamination and what are some long-term effects of pursuing
a certain course of action. The subjects thus opened up include monitoring,
standards, controls, public relations, methods of prediction, state and local
government responsibility, the isolation of national decision making from
state and local government concern and responsibility, costs of surveillance
and related actions, and planning of research.
Utah's geographical position with respect to the Nevada Test Site has
served to emphasize the critical responsibility devolving on state and local
health officials in protection of the population against radioactive con-
tamination, especially when source control is not feasible. Several papers
earlier in this symposium have identified our downwind location. Other
states have been involved in the usual sources of radioactivity, but many of
these do not present the problems of extensive monitoring or the critical
public relations problems which have been experienced in connection with
tests in Nevada.
As a result of the 1962 contamination experience, which involved Utah milk
supplies to a high degree, Utah was obliged to move into an extensive moni-
toring and laboratory program which it could not have supported without
substantial financial help from the Public Health Service. The 1962 event
has been reported before and will not be elaborated here except to say that
it has sensitized people in Utah to the potential hazard which exists at the
Nevada Test Site.
As indicated by SLIDE I, at the present time Utah has eighteen air
monitoring stations which operate twenty-four hours a day throughout the
year. Operators are instructed to call the State Health Division personnel
involved, night or day, when readings of atmospheric radioactivity exceed
a certain pre-determined figure. This is calculated to give early warning
for the purpose of intensifying the regular milk monitoring procedures.
Bi-weekly samples from milk tankers (routes shown on the slide) covering
all major grazing areas in the state are analyzed for lodine-131, stronttum-89
and -90, cesium-137, and barium-lanthanum-40. The existence of this monitoring
488
-------
network in 1962 would have better prepared Utah for that event. The Utah
network has gradually evolved since that time.
SLIDE II indicates air monitoring results collected in Salt Lake City,
and shows examples of types of results obtained with this monitoring net-
work. The first peak resulted from the cratering shot of 1962; the second,
in the same year, is from an unscheduled venting at the test site; the next
three peaks are those resulting from Chinese testing; and the final one is
from the scheduled venting at the Nevada Test Site in December 1968.
In the middle and late 1950's the Salt Lake air monitoring station,
the only station in continuous operation, identified atmospheric fallout
from the Nevada Test Site at levels 5 to 7 fold greater than the 1962
Salt Lake City peak shown in Slide I.
The pattern of deposition of fallout over the state from this "Schooner"
shot is indicated by SLIDE III which shows the air results of each of the
Utah stations. Charts for each of the Chinese shots show a similar pattern
for both air and milk.
In addition, a statewide monitoring system for detection of tritium in
water is now getting underway. These activities, related almost entirely to
earlier testing programs, will become more important as the testing activities
increase, whether due to weapons testing or Plowshare projects.
Not only is the Utah monitoring system presently considered to be an ab-
solute minimum commensurate with the possible hazards involved, but it is
furthermore our opinion that the system must be expanded in the future if
the proposed Plowshare Program continues. One of the reasons for this is
the past history of prediction failures which were related initially to
weapons testing programs. There is ample evidence in Utah to show that the
most careful meteorological predictions of fallout paths do not materialize
in every case, and that without an extensive monitoring system there is no
way of detecting the possible exposure of the population resulting from
certain atmospheric testing activities. And, for that matter, there is no
way to assure the population that fallout did not occur. .
Constant updating of laboratory capability is also a necessity, re-
sulting in added expenses far beyond those originally contemplated. For
example, at considerable extra cost, we have recently ac'quired a liquid
scintillation counter to handle our tritium samples. We are now faced with
the acquisition of an additional chemist because our original staff is far
overloaded in view of the increasing amount of envi rionmental monitoring
found necessary. This will be intensified, of course, as activities involving
nuclear fission increase in the area.
489
Assuming that monitor ing capabi1ities are adequate, the question of
standards is the next important consideration. Much work has been done in
this area both nationally and internationally, and ther exists an abundance
of highly technical reports related to the subject. What is sometimes
lacking is interpretation in a way which will make application of the
standards practical as well as sound in the sense of protecting public health.
This problem is being attacked from many angles and hopefully will yield to
an adequate solution; however, it must be recognized that new scientific
information is being accumulated at such a rapid rate that we will never have
a set of standards which are not subject to revision as new evidence comes in.
Differences of opinion with regard to standards are inevitable. This
has been so throughout the history of environmental controls, and radio-
activity could not be expected to constitute an exception. State and local
health departments must rely heavily on the resources of the Federal
Government and others in developing standards, but in the final analysis they
must assume full responsibility for the precise levels of protection which
are applicable to a given segment of local populations. Therefore, they
cannot blindly accept standards which are handed down from some other agency,
but must evaluate them thoroughly with whatever resources they can develop.
One such resource in Utah is the Radiological Health Advisory Committee. This
committee was appointed in Utah after the 1962 incident, and is composed of
well-known and highly respected experts in their fields. The committee's
recommendat ions are respected and prov i de the HeaIth Division with a factual
and effective base for action. The committee acts as a clearing house for
technical radiological health information and is responsible for recom-
mendations to the State Board of Health on various points, including standards,
operating surveillance and control programs.
A foreseeable complication in the area of standards development is in
the increasing number of ways by which human beings can be exposed to radio-
activity. This grows out of the great usefulness of radioactivity both to
science and industry, as previously mentioned, and the guarantee that under
these circumstances inventive minds will be devising new applications con-
tinuousIy. Standards are often based on exposure from a singIe source,
and shielding and other requirements are based on the single-source,
multiple-exposure concept. Not only are some states potentially exposed
to nuclear testing as an important source of irradiation, but they must
be cont i nuaI Iy concerned w i th mu11 i p1e exposures i n numerous rad ioact i ve
devices which may come to be in almost constant use. This seems to suggest
a need for rather comprehensive planning in the standards-setting process.
The question of control action more often than not relates to controls
over a rather specific use of radioactivity, as radiography, isotope use,
laboratory experimental use, etc. In general, it can be said that good
progress has been made in this area and controls so far adopted are achieving
some success. In Utah, the word "control" conjures up a necessity of taking
action with respect to use of foodstuffs, and possibly water, resulting
from incidents which occur beyond the State's limits of jurisdiction,
such as at the Nevada Test Site. In 1962, Utah found it necessary to
actually apply certain controls to the use of milk, but the problems related
490
-------
to that e-perienet: '.uke us sensitive to the need for continual refinement
of plans which will be brought into effect in the event of another major con-
tamination i nc i dent.
It must be recognized that if our monitoring capabilities are adequate
and if the information achieved through monitoring is properly assembled
and evaluated, the term "control" might possibly be extended to some efforts
at curtailment of Plowshare types of testing. This question was never ser-
iously cons idered in connection with weapons testing, which have a strong
defense connotat i on. It is obv i ous that it must be cons idered in all cases
of peaceful application of nuclear energy.
While this paper does not presume to determine the need for nuclear
testing, weapons or Plowshare, nor to determine the validity of its purpose,
it does presume that once this determination is made to fulfill government
policy, all effort must be devoted by the Federal government to protect the
health of the publ ic.
Apart f rom the reaI dangers to the human population which rad ioact i v i ty
causes, there is another question embodied in the term "public relations"
which has great significance, not only in Utah but everywhere else in the
country, and possibly in the world. Radioactivity is a glamour subject,
and has attracted wide attention, even on the part of the average citizen.
Sometimes, besides being fascinating, it is as someone said, a little "scary"
and this gives rise to problems which state heaIth departments must face.
A good and effective public relations program in this area is absolutely
essential under any circumstances, but it must have equal priority with con-
trol action in the case of radioactivity, and particularly the type of
radioactivity which originates beyond the State's borders as a resuit of
planned action by man.
The State and local agencies must be prepared to reassure the public
that no hazard exists just as often as they must be prepared to take controI
act ion. Somet i mes the most i nnocuous release in the press about the e^ist-
ence of radioactivity in any concentration will evoke a strong public reaction
which needs to have a counter reaction by responsible officials. At no time
should the public be fooled about the true facts, but obviously, when no
hazard exists, the State agency should be in a position to state this fact
unequ i vocably and with so I id backing from sc i ent i f i c measurements. Th i s is
one of the major reasons for the extensive monitoring and laboratory capa-
bilities already mentioned.
This problem also requires some expertise in dealing with the press,
which again devolves on the State and local officials. Even the best scien-
tific information can be quoted incorrectly and produce a near public panic
as the result of misinterpretation. Obviously, much energy should be
directed toward the prevention of such misinterpretation.
One aid in connection with these problems could come from detailed
knowledge which might be available with regard to planned tests. In the
past certain tests of necessity were shrouded in secrecy, and release of
advance information even to State officials was possible only to a very
I imited degree. As testing becomes more compI icated, it becomes more and
more necessary that State officials have complete details of planned tests
prior to the event, in order that mon itorinq and other activities can be
geared to meet the needs. If release of such information to these officials
requires security clearance, this should be provided automatically, after
the necessary checks, of course, to insure adequate security. It seems
likely that no one can provide all of the complicated monitoring needed if
there is no hint as to the specific isotopes which are likely to be pro-
duced. Again, as important as this knowledge is to those conducting the
tests, it is equally important to State and local officials who have the
responsibility of protecting the citizenry within their jurisdiction, and
of avoiding misinterpretations of information which could lead to panic
or other undesirable results.
An aspect of the overa fI probI em wh i ch needs more emphas is is the i so-
I at ion of nat ionaI dec i s i on-mak i ng f rom state and I oca I concern and
responsibility. It seems unlikely that ;i Federal Agency making a decision
whether or not to conduct a test program can have the same sense of re-
spons i b i Ii ty to a spec i f i c popuI at i on group as a state or I oca I heaIth officer
who has to cope with the results of that decision. At the State level, the
health agency has almost daily contact with many of the peopIe who may be
involved in any adverse developments, he has almost daily contact with
industry officials who might be involved, such as the dairy industry, and
he is go i ng to be he Id more d i rec11y accountabIe for any adverse effects of
the dec i s i on-mak i ng process. InvoIved here, of course, is the public
relations problem previously mentioned, but it is not a matter alone of
pub lie re I at ions.
The day-to-day decisions of the State health officer are put to test
in a practical sense and reacted to more promptly and directly than can
ever be the case for a similar official at Federal level. Even if the
State official desires to hide behind thri curtain of Federal standards and
responsiIibity, he cannot long exist in this position. Sooner or later,
he will have to face up to his responsibilities or turn his task over to
someone who will. The point is that the State health officer or his author-
ized representative must be directly informed of all pertinent data of any
testing program which may distribute radioactivity over the State area.
This, of course, raises the question of who shall bear the costs of
added surveillance and control procedures. Some basic monitoring costs are
the proper responsibility of state programs, but it seems logical that the
Plowshare program, being essentially of a research and development nature,
should absorb most of the cost imposed on States for radiation monitoring
related to this program, and also of the associated control.
As has been mentioned previously, the cost of monitoring can become a
major item for a state, and could be completely beyond state capabilities.
This will vary with each state. Currently, however, few states, if any,
are adequately prepared. Nevertheless, if the hazard is imposed by decisions
492
-------
to aid society through development of new processes, those responsible for
the. decision should see to it that states have enough resources to provide
the basic essential monitoring, and to expand it as necessary to meet new
needs, whether these develop from expanded uses of radioactivity or from
advances in knowledge which dictate greater sophistication in monitoring and
analysis capabilities. This need will continue to vary with the States. It
is most critical for Utah because the State is both relatively small and its
location is readily subject to effects from the testing programs.
Other costs, which hopefully can be avoided, but which still must be
considered as possibilities, relate to control action found necessary when
food or water become contaminated beyond acceptable use levels. Utah's
1962 incident was estimated to result in total cost to industry of about
$80,000 and total cost to government, beyond normal activities, of about
$37,000. Compared to the high cost of testing such an explosive, these costs
are small, but for states of small population these are large, and much more
so when repeated and when added to other related costi ^ctt\ as monitoring
and laboratory services. Deliberate planning to experiment with peacetime uses
of atomic energy certainly should include a positive plan to pay such costs,
however large they may become. Acceptance of this philosophy might succeed in
transferring some of the direct responsibility mentioned previously from
local to national level.
Another cost considered to be an essential part of the activities under
discussion, although not exclusively attributable to them, is that of
research. Not only is basic research involved, but also some applied
research as it relates to the eco-system and the long-term results of small
deposits of radioactivity in the environment. These small deposits cannot
be considered immediate hazards under any circumstances, and yet they might
eventually be serious hazards, particularly when they involve isotopes with
long half-lives.
A research program to investigate all aspects of this problem cannot be
simple and certainly will be costly. Most of this research is already being
done, but again, Utah's peculiar relationship to the testing area seems to
argue for an even more complete effort in this particular area, as well as
projected research activities for a long time in the future. While we are
emphasizing Plowshare activities at this Symposium, it is not too late to
also emphasize the need for support of research activities already underway
or that should have been undertaken as a part of the weapons testing program.
If this is not accepted in advance, it may prove difficult to accomplish
afterwards. For example, the Utah-Nevada-Arizona fallout study was initiated
after the event of 1962. This year we are finding great difficulty in
continued financing for a series of reasons none of which we in Utah are
able to accept. Such research should not exclude the development of better
methods of monitoring as well as development of control methods which might
some day become necessary.
Again, as mentioned previously, the allocation of this type of cost to
the Plowshare program should be done with the full realization that it may
lead to decisions to curtail the testing program. Certainly this is not too
493
much to ask in the interests of not only the population in Utah but popula-
tions through the country and possibly the world.
It should also be mentioned that there are still wide gaps in our knowledge
covering the direct short-term effects of radioactivity on man. This became
evident when we were pressed for decisions about how high atmospheric levels
could get and for how long before we would declare a crisis and instruct the
public on special protective actions. Existing standards relating to this
matter simply are inadequate to be of real practical value. At least, in Utah,
I believe we would take control action at lower levels of exposure than the
current standards seem to suggest. While it may be true that some of the re-
search in this area needs to be financed by other agencies, it again seems
logical that the Plowshare program needs to be given rather direct responsi-
bilities of this nature.
Whi le
is bec*"si
this paper has given emphasis to radiation hazards by fallout, this
s of our past experience. We must now also be concerned with seismic
events. To this end the Atomic
Energy Commission and Public
Health Service need to confer
with the states now so that a
full understanding of the scope
and possible effects of such
testing will develop.
_JUNE;JU_Y_ 1962 _ OC1 - NCW OCT- NOV-1964 NOV^ISeS JAN -196' DECT968
494
-------
QUESTIONS FOR G. D. CARLYLE THOMPSON
From Hal Mueller:
Was any iodine-131 detected In cow's milk by your network as a re-
sult of the December 1968 detonation? If yes, how much and where?
ANSWER:
No
From Mr. Phelps:
Earlier in the symposium, it was stated that the Director, State Health
Department, Utah was informed about the cloud trajectory and radio-
nuclide composition with regard to Plowshare cratering events. Do
you inform other groups (i.e., the University of Utah Radioecology
Program) of the possibility of fallout and its probable deposition
pattern?
ANSWER:
This has been a changing matter because in the beginning the Informa-
tion we received was restricted to our own official use. This was not
shared. Later on as we got information that could be shared, we did
so. Because again the classification of this information we got was
not fully understood. I think the differences that have arisen have
resulted in clarification. I understand now that the information
that we are going to recieve, we will be able to share. I can't say
that is going to be the case though, because I haven't received the
i nformat i on yet i n regard to some of the future tests. I th i nk there
have been some pI aces for mi sunderstand i ng in Utah on th i s very poi nt.
3. From Walt Kozlowskl:
You mentioned "unacceptable hazards,
which would be "acceptable?"
ANSWER:
would you describe some hazards
Well, I think this gets back to the discretion of the designer to
learn how much radiation imposed on the population is really neces-
sary. This is the old discussion of what is necessary. From our
standpoint, we don't believe that radiation coming to Utah Is an
area over which we have direct control. If it is determined to be
necessary by national policy then we need to have the information
ava i lable to monitor and to take corrective action should it arise.
I presume that if the predictions that we are going to get were indi-
cative of high level fallout, we would protest it. 1 have a committee,
though, which I'm sure would meet to discuss this point. The committee
495
already has adopted a policy about which I testified before the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy and responded to the fact that we didn't
like the new standards and therefore we would use our own judgment
in these standards. So I don't believe I can answer that question
anymore precisely than to deal with it in the nature of the event,
should it occur, and we would probably have to look at it and make
our own judgment.
4. From Walt Kozlowski:
Who are some of the well know experts on the radiological health
advisory committee?
ANSWER:
We have two practicing radiologists, we've had a recent change because
of illness, but at all times these men have been highly respected in
their field in the state of Utah. We have had some health physicists.
We've had some men from industry. We have the leading physicists from
our three large universities. We have nine people - I don't know if
I have covered them all or not.
5. From Dr. Pel letier:
How many air sampling stations do you think it is necessary to have
in Utah to assure your people that they were not exposed to the cloud
of a g 1 ven event?
ANSWER:
Th
is is a question the legislature asks me every time I go for money.
As long as we don't have any event, they think we don't need the sta-
tions. We didn't have any trouble this year after the December event.
Actually, the stations which we operate are partly owned by us and
partly owned by the Public Health Service which we operate, and some
of them, of course, are using different types of instrumentation for
which we are getting comparative results. But I would think we would
need about what we now have and if we maintain this, we would be able
to determine the fallout in any movement from outside the state. I
don't believe every state would need the coverage we have as they
move farther away from the Test Site.
6. From Robert Karsh:
The Dugway CBW incident last year made it apparent that the state of
Utah did not get advance information of what was being tested on
March 13. Are you now getting this advance information In the radio-
active field? Minnesota is now concerned with the possibility and
legality of state rules more stringent than those of the AEC. Does
Utah foresee this?
496
-------
ANSWER:
Just to clarify that first part of the question, I believe we are now
involved in being informed from Dugway about all of the events that
occur there. Heretofore, we were only involved in the biological
events, not the chemical events. We were also involved in the beryl-
Mum events at Dugway. But the setup which is now in operation is
the same for chemical events as for biological events. With respect
to the radiation aspect, we haven't had any event since December, but
I have been assured that we will be fully informed of anything that
we need and we are having some of our staff visit the Southwestern
Radiological Health Laboratory for technical consultation with regard
to sharpening our capability on our own instruments with respect to
some of the isotopes that have been mentioned here in this conference.
We do use the Southwestern Radiological Health Laboratory, of course,
for reference for specimens on a number of things and we split speci-
mens with them. I might also say, going back to the former question,
that one of the reasons we are able to operate these stations as eco-
nomically as we are because we locate them in connection with our air
pollution program for other air pollutants and so we are able to have
a separate device while the man power is common. The daily changing
and checking of motors and pads and testing samples is done by the
same person in multiple areas. This reduces the cost substantially
to what you would have to do if you were just operating a fallout
network as we were originally.
(Second part of question.) I think we have already given indication
to that answer by indicating how our own rad health advisory committee
reacted to the new FRC standards when they were adopted a few years ago
and prepared the statement which I used to testify before the Committee.
When the chairman of the Committee asked me who was going to apply the
standard in Utah, he said, "Aren't you?" and I said, "Yes, we are,"
and he said, "Well, that's the answer to your question." So I presume
we will apply the FRC standards in our own way in Utah; if that's
writing a Utah standard why it will have to be a Utah standard I guess.
It does pose a problem and that's what I said in my paper: that I
think we have to have some full discussion of these standards. As you
remember back in those days it was said that you were changing the
rules of the ball game just as you are about to score a touchdown and
there is some bad reaction to that in several of the states. I wouldn't
be surprised if Minnesota is one.
7. From John Martin:
To what extent does your state health safety program on radioactive
fallout exposure cooperate or collaborate with local universities and
private industry researchers?
ANSWER:
I don't know of any private industry researchers in this area in Utah.
There are some in the universities and I'm sure I can say that the com-
munication can be Improved in this respect.
497
-------
SESSION IV - BASIC RADIATION
PROTECTION GUIDANCE
Chairman: Dr. Gordon Dunning
Department of Operational Safety
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Germantown
-------
THE PHILOSOPHY
BEHIND THE FEDERAL RADIATION COUNCIL GUIDES
Paul C. Tompkins, Executive Director
Federal Radiation Council*
ABSTRACT
The basic philosophy of the FRC in making recom-
mendations for the control of radioactivity associated
with normal peacetime operations is given in FRC re-
port I. Radiation Protection Guides for application-
to activities such as Plowshare would be derived on
the basis of this philosophy. Considerations involve
a balance of benefit versus risk for each Plowshare
activity that is proposed for industrial application
using potential exposures small in comparison to the
basic guide of 0*1? rem per year as the primary ref-
erence condition.
Alternate approaches to achieving an appropriate
balance have been suggested. These include alloca-
tion of a fraction of the 0.17 rem per capita per
year to each relevant activity; setting a universally
applicable MFC for each nuclide of interest, and the
concept of the dose commitment. Data to show the
benefit in terms of the national need for the re-
source in question (e.g., gas production) and the
risk as indicated by the amount of residual radio-
activity is a prerequisite to setting guidance for
using Plowshare techniques in conjunction with con-
sumer products available to the general public.
It is a privilege for me to have the opportunity to dis-
cuss with you today the general philosophy of the FRC in the
formulation of basic guidance in radiation protection for use
in Federal agencies. In order to gain an appreciation of the
general philosophy used by FRC, I should start with a descrip-
tion of how the FRC operates and the general nature of some
of its principal recommendations. Formation of the FRC re-
sulted from a government-wide review of radiation protection
responsibility conducted in 1959 by the Director of the Bureau
of the Budget, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and
the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare. The decision to conduct such a review was in response
*The views expressed are those of the author and do not neces-
sarily represent the official views of any Federal agency.
498
to the public confusion and concern over fallout hazards
associated with atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, and
the fact that there appeared to be no single agency within
the executive branch of the Federal Government responsible
for the formulation of radiation protection guidance.
The study group concluded that, under the prevailing
scientific assumption that any exposure to ionizing radiation
is associated with some risk of causing harmful biological
effects, the derivation of basic guidelines for radiation
protection involves reaching a balance between total health
protection, which can be achieved only if there is no radia-
tion, and the benefits from activities causing the exposure.
This balance in turn involves health, economic, social, and
ethical considerations of such a nature that the person or
persons making the decisions represented by that guidance
should be publicly accountable. No single agency could be
found with the appropriate breadth of responsibility and juris-
diction, and it was recommended that the President be advised
by a Federal Radiation Council on radiation matters directly
or indirectly affecting health, including guidance for Federal
agencies in the promulgation of operating radiation protection
standards, and in the establishment of programs of cooperation
with the States.
The President accepted this recommendation and created
the FRC by Executive Order 10831, August 14, 1959. The Council
was made statutory in September 1959, by an amendment to the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 - PL 86-373 (section 274h).
The Council now consists of the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare (designated by the President to serve
as Chairman); Chairman of Atomic Energy Commission; Secretaries
of Defense; Commerce; Labor; Agriculture; and Interior. The
Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology
also serves as an adviser to the FRC; he has always taken a
strong interest in the activities of the Council and has been
quite influential in the formulation of many of the basic
guidelines that have been adopted.
Administratively, the FRC is treated as an independent
agency. Staff members are employees of the Council and are
independent of any operating agency. For example, we prepare
and submit our budget directly to the BOB and appear before
the Congressional appropriation committees just as all other
agencies. The heart of the FRC operation is vested in its
Working Group. Members of the Working Group are senior tech-
nical representatives appointed by the various Council mem-
bers to convey to the FRC staff the agency interest and views
in matters being developed for consideration by the Council.
When the Council is engaged in a specific project, the work
499
-------
is conducted by means of task groups of technical people in
Government, and when appropriate, consultants from the scien-
tific community, representatives of State agencies, industry,
and labor. The law states: "The Council shall consult qualified
scientists and experts in radiation matters, including the
President of the National Academy of Sciences, the Chairman
of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measure-
ment, and qualified experts in the field of biology and medicine
and in the field of health physics." We accordingly have a
contract with the Academy to support an advisory committee
to the FRC, and a contract with the NCRP to review in depth
the biological and physiological models used by the FRC in
developing its guidance for strontium-89, strontium-90, and
cesium-137.
A sincere effort is made to get unanimous agreement on
recommendations going to the President, because upon approval
by the President and publication in the Federal Register,
these recommendations become official guidance for Federal
agencies. If there is a controversy (and this happens quite
often), the basic issues are isolated with the assistance of
the WG and various alternatives are considered. Attempts are
then made to resolve the differences by appropriate meetings
of officials directly below the Secretary level to reduce to
a minimum the unresolved issues that must be solved by the
principals themselves. The basic philosophy of the FRC is
given in FRC report 1 and is similar to that of the NCRP and
also that of the International Commission on Radiological
Protection (ICRP). All three organizations have made it clear
that their guidance deals quite differently with two distinct
conditions of exposure: (1) in which the occurrence of the
exposure is foreseen and can be limited in amount by control
of the source, and by the development of proper operating
procedures; (2) in which the particular exposure is accidental
(i.e., has not been planned) and which can be limited in amount
only, if at all, by remedial actions.
In 1962, the FRC explained the distinction between these
two types of exposure conditions when it took the position
that its Radiation Protection Guides (RPG) in FRC report 2
should not be used to determine when remedial action to reduce
or limit the intake of iodine-131 from atmospheric testing
of nuclear weapons should be initiated. It pointed out to
the JCAE that the RPG's were originally developed for appli-
cation as guidelines for the protection of radiation workers
and the general public against exposures that might result
during normal peacetime operations in connection with the
industrial use of ionizing radiation. The term normal peace-
time operation referred specifically to the peaceful applica-
tions of nuclear technology where the primary control is placed
on the design or use of the source. Since the numerical values
500
and the guides were designed for the regulation of a con-
tinuing industry, they were necessarily set so low that the
upper limit of Range II, as shown in FRC report 2, is con-
sidered to fall well within the levels of exposure acceptable
for a lifetime. Furthermore, to provide the maximum margin
of safety, the upper limits of Range II were related'to the
lowest possible level at which it was believed that nuclear
industrial technology could be developed.
These guides for normal peacetime operations are not
intended to be a dividing line between safety and danger in
actual radiation situations; nor are they intended to set a
line at which protective action should be taken, or indicate
what kind of action should be taken. There is, of course,
an essential difference between environmental radioactivity
resulting from a long term permanent industrial operation and
that related to intermittent production from individual wea-
pons tests or series of weapons tests. With the former, it
is predictable that introduction of radioisotopes into the
environment will persist at a known rate throughout the life
of the source. On the other hand, weapons tests are sporadic
in nature and the radioactivity produced will rise at the time
of testing and decline at various rates for different isotopes
after conclusion of a test or series of tests. As applied to
an intermittent source, such as fallout from weapons testing,
average annual intakes of radionuclides equivalent to the
RPG's for normal peacetime operations should be used as an
indication of when a need for detailed evaluation of possible
exposure hazards and a need to consider if any protective action
should be taken under all the relevant circumstances, including
the probable continuity or repetitiveness of the activities
leading to the release.of the radionuclides to the environment.
There is substantial agreement between the ICRP and the
FRC philosophies in guidance applicable to industrial prac-
tices, fallout from atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons,
and accidental release of radionuclides to the environment.
However, there is a substantive difference in the two philos-
ophies regarding the applicability of the numerical values
for RPG's. In its report 9, the ICRP said: "Accordingly,
any dose limitations recommended by the Commission refer only
to exposure resulting from technical practices that add to
natural background radiation. The dose limitations are there-
fore intended to include such exposures as those that result
from mining, from flight at high altitudes, or from the pres-
ence of radioactive materials such as radium, uranium, or
thorium in concentrated form. '
The FRC philosophy as applied to such technological
practices as mining and high altitude flying is encompassed
501
-------
in two recommendations in FRC report 1. The applicable para-
graphs read: "There can be no single permissible or accept-
able level of exposure without regard to the reason for per-
mitting the exposure. It should be general practice to reduce
exposure to radiation, and positive efforts should be carried
out to fulfill the sense of these recommendations. It is
basic that exposure to radiation should result from a real
determination of its necessity.
"There can be different Radiation Protection Guides with
different numerical values, depending on the circumstances.
The Guides herein recommended are appropriate for normal peace-
time operations." As we have interpreted the Radiation Pro-
tection Guides in report 1, mandatory extension of the numerical
values in that report is not necessarily appropriate and each
activity of this type may be considered separately and on its
own merits under the FRC philosophy. As a matter of faqt, on
the basis of competent scientific advice, the FRC has already
set aside mandatory application of the RPG approach in deriving
its recommendations for radiation protection associated with
underground uranium mining. The guidance in this case is
derived from an evaluation of the epidemiological information
derived from the DHEW study of lung cancer rates in uranium
miners as related to exposure expressed in a unit called the
Working Level Month.
In common with the practices of the NCRP and ICRP, we
accept the concept that there is no threshold in the relation-
ship between exposure to ionizing radiation and the possibility
of causing adverse biological effects. We also accept the
concept that this relationship is monotonic; that is, the
probability of causing a harmful biological effect increases
with the radiation exposure. As do most professional bodies
concerned with deriving appropriate practices involving radia-
tion protection, we utilize many of the principles derived
from the assumption that the relationship between radiation
exposure and the probability of causing harmful biological
effects varies linearly with the radiation dose, although we
recognize that such a cause-effect relationship is not true
in the real world. Acceptance of the linear hypothesis pro-
vides a basis for deriving an appropriate course of radiation
protection, but it by no means implies that the FRC accepts
this relationship as a fundamental law of nature.
The concept that guidance for radiation protection in-
volves reaching a balance between the benefits derived from
the activities causing radiation exposure and the risk result-
ing from radiation exposure has led to the development of
several different ways of examining both the benefits and the
risks. Acceptance of the linear hypothesis as a basis for
the development of radiation protection guidelines and practices
502
permits the conclusion that the total risk increases with the
total man rems regardless of how these man rems may be dis-
tributed among various individuals in the population at risk.
However, when there is a choice we usually consider that a
very small change in incremental exposure per individual, even
though it may affect a larger population, is preferable to
a course of action that would limit the population at risk
at the cost of a sharply increased radiation dose per indi-
vidual .
A significant concept that has grown in the FRC is that
reduction in risk is correspondingly achieved by a reduction
in total man rems and cannot be achieved by simply spreading
the same exposure over a larger number of people. This con-
cept has been influential in the distinctions drawn by the
FRC in developing its Protective Action Guides (PAG) for coping
with uncontrollable exposures. An extension is the view that
a particular radiation environment considered unacceptable
for one person should also be considered unacceptable for all
persons. The guidance developed for categories 2 and 3 in
FRC report 7 resulted directly from this concept. For example,
category 2 is concerned with the transmission of strontium-89,
strontium-90, or cesium-137 to man through dietary pathways
other than through milk during the first year following an
acute contaminating event. This involves the use of feed crops
for animals, including dairy cattle, and plant products used
directly for human consumption. The intent of the guidance
for category 2 is that the purpose of protective action is to
prevent unacceptably contaminated produce from entering the
market. The population at risk may be hypothetical and the
PAG for these nuclides and crops assumes all of the crops are
utilized in the immediate local area. If the contamination
level is unacceptable, as derived in this hypothetical case,
major contributors to the potential intake should be prevented
from entering the market.
Application of the linear hypothesis is also fundamental
to the concept of the dose commitment as first developed by
the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of
Atomic Radiation. The dose commitment in this case may be
defined as the mean population dose per year of practice, and
has been used to evaluate the relative risk associated with
activities as divergent as fallout from atmospheric testing
of nuclear weapons and the significance of radiation exposure
associated with medical practice.
Of the various ways in which the risk side of the pro-
jected balance may be evaluated, the FRC prefers to examine
the dose commitment in relation to the basic RPG's as given
in FRC report 1 and against the average dose rate associated
with natural background radiation, as well as the range of
503
-------
dose rates occurring naturally in various occupied parts of
the world. These relations allow one to gain some perspective
on the significance of the practice or proposed practice in
a way that allows for qualitative as well as quantitative
ignorance of yet unr^cognizp.l radiation effects, and automatic
weighting for various somatic effects, as well as genetic
ef fects.
There is no known way by which the benefit side of the
balance can be quantitatively evaluated in a manner made pos-
sible on the risk side through utilization of the linear hy-
pothesis. The FRC has not a lopte J the often made suggestion
that it should pro-rate the basic guide of 0.17 rem per capita
per year on the basis of relative benefits, so that the sum
of dose commitments from all activities would not exceed the
basic RPG. We find this "pie cutting" approach objectionable
for several reasons. The first is that the approach presumes
clairvoyance regarding various applications, not now visualized,
and the benefits that might be presumed to accrue from them.
The second is that the RPG is not a dividing line between
safety and danger so that simple compliance with the P.PG
itself is rmt an a priori justification for the degree of
control exercised. Another reason is that both control capa-
bility and national need for the activity may be expected to
change with time. Continuous review of national needs, as
well as keeping estimates of dose commitment under surveil-
la nee, appears a more appropriate way to approach formulation
of Presidential policy guidance concerned with activities re-
sulting in human exposure.
The FRC has not developed radiation protection guidance
with the specific application of the peaceful uses of nuclear
explosions in mind. Under the FRC philosophy it is doubtful
that a single numerical criterion applicable to all potential
applications of the Plowshare type would be meaningful. Each
application such as nuclear excavation, gas stimulation, and
metal extraction from low grade ore involves such a diversity
of benefits and potential dose commitment that a single number
applicable to all would, at this time, appear to be meaningless.
The Plowshare Division ~>f AEC in its cooperative research
program with the Department of the Interior and industry is
developing quantitative information on the radionuclides pro-
duced , what nuclides appear in the consumer product and in
what quantities, and informat ion on the distribution of the
consumer products. An important part of this "source term"
is the average release rate of nuclides such as T and 9SKr
to the environment per unit of time. From the laws of radi^-
active decay, the environmental burden will stabilize when
the number of radioactive atoms decaying p°r unit time in the
environment equals the amounts added to tlr3 environment during
the same unit time.
Sinc^ both T and 85^r are by-products of other activities
such a3 the nuclear power industry, it would appear appropriate
that the addition of these nuclides from Plowshare activities
be small compared to the total environmental burden from all
activities. In addition to technical considerations, both
l-'gal and political consideration? rnav became involved. F^r
ex^r.p 1 e, petroleum products with a hiehcr than natural T/H
rat io may bo used for the manufacture of other products. If
these uses result in the hydrogen being inccrr orated into food,
the interpr'-'' tat ion of the Delaney amendment by the Food and
Drug Administration would have to be resolved within the FRC
as an integral part of its guidance.
In summary, the development by the FRC of guidance ap-
plicable to activities such as the Plowshare program would
involve an estimate of the dose commitment that might be in-
volved, an evaluation of the national need for the resources
that could be made available from the program plus possibly
some legal and political considerations that could influence
the particular form the guidance mirht take.
-------
QUESTIONS FOR PAUL TOMPKINS
From Wait Kozlowski:
At what specific levels do you expect the environmental burden
to stabilize? Upon reaching these levels, be they safe or unsafe,
would it then become necessary to shut down the radiation sources?
ANSWER:
Well, in order to answer that question, I would have to make more
assumpti ons than I am wi I Ii ng to make. Fi rst of a I I, you wouId
have to pick the nuclide, you would have to pick the specific
disposal type, and so forth. This will give a different answer
for practically any nuclide you want to mention and I have not
had occasion recently to do a check on the total environmental
burden of certain nuclides, so I don't think I could honestly
answer at what level I would expect any of these nuclides, such
as krypton-85 for example, to stabilize. As I indicated, when
you are putting in more than will be removed by decay, the level
will increase. When you are putting in less than will be removed
by decay, the level will decrease. The point I tried to make
was in an activity such as Plowshare where it is a repetitive
program and this will involve the release of certain known
quantities of radionuclides, these levels, based on the frequency
and the quantities, can be predicted, and one can get an advance
fix on the potential dose commitment. But I would have to have
the data on the number of shots per year, the number of ki lotons
per year, the fractions of these ki lotons or megatons or whatever
it is that is fission versus fusion fuel and then perhaps I could
answer it.
With regard to the second part, our philosophy in so far as it is
possible is to anticipate. The question of shutting down radiation
sources is not the kind of question that the FRC would attach a
number to. The concept involved there is that you are dealing"
with a danger line of go, no-go sort of operation. This may be
appropriate for certain legal or regulatory applications which I
am not capable of talking about, but certainly on a policy level
within the Federal government it would certainly not be approached
in this manner.
From Robert Karsh:
You have made crystal clear that when you weigh benefits against
risks, everything depends upon what you put in the balance pans.
How do you decide when national security and public welfare go
into the same pan or into opposite pans?
506
ANSWER:
Well, I would answer that in two ways also. The requirements of
national security are in a pan all by themselves. I think it
is obvious that the nation will do things where it feels that
its national security is at stake that it would not tolerate
for a lesser reason. I have been personally of the conviction
that weapons testing was never started because it's safe, that
is not true, nor was it stopped because it's overly dangerous.
The real reasons were political, strategic—many, many factors.
But whenever act i v i t ies i nvoIvi ng the nat i ona I secur i ty are done
because of national security, there is quite often a risk side
to that particular activity. Now, with regard to industrial
applications, or sources that would also be sources of exposure—
Plowshare, for example. There the benefit has to do with social
development, the real need for power, the real need for the re-
source and, as I indicated, we cannot put a quantitative state-
ment on that. In the last analysis, it becomes a high level
poIi ti caI judgment as to when and how thess two thi ngs come i nto
coi nci dence.
3. From George Anton:
Please remark on the future of the benefit versus risk philosophy.
ANSWER:
I think as a philosophy it is probably not only going to remain in
force, but will in fact be extended to many new activities, many
environmental contamination problems that have not yet quite been
so formally examined in this particular way. As a concept, I think
it has a lot to offer. It has very strong deficiencies in making
it easy to apply in a systematic way to a wide variety of con-
ditions. Conventions for balancing benefit-risk in radiation or
in any other activities are simply not as mathematically firm
as the ICRP approach to computing the appropriate MFC's and so
forth. I don't know if this really answers your question, but
if your notion is that a different or more formal philosophy
might replace it, I rather doubt it.
507
-------
APPLICATION OF ICRP RECOMMENDATIONS RELEVANT TO INTERNAL DOSE*
K. E. Cowser, W. S. Snyder, and E. G. Struxness
Health Physics Division
Oak R i dge Nat iona I Laboratory
Oak Ridge, Tennessee
ABSTRACT
The -intent of this paper is to review several of the
basic concepts of radiation protection (with emphasis on
internal dose) currently recommended by the International
Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), to summarize
the assumptions and methods used in the calculation of in-
ternal dose, and to illustrate by example the practical
application of the pertinent guidelines,
Tuo broad subject areas are considered: (1) standards
of radiation protection and (2) bases of internal dose es-
timation. Topics discussed Dithin the framework of radiation
protection standards include maximum permissible dose,
categories of radiation exposure, maximum permissible dose
commitment^ simultaneous internal and external exposure,
multiple organ exposure, and size of the exposed group.
Discussion of internal dose estimation is limited to selected
items that include the body burden of radionuclides and the
calculation of absorbed dose, the dose equivalent, the
derivation of maximum permissible concentration (frfPC), the
relationship of stable element intake to the l-^PC, and short-
term and chronic exposure situations.
INTRODUCTION
The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) is an
i nternat ionaI Iy recogn i zed author ity which sets values of maximum per-
m i ss i bIe exposure to ionizing radiation. Var ious nat i onaI organ i zations
serve a similar funct ion in the i r respect i ve countries, and in the United
States thi s i ncIudes the Nat ionaI Counc iI on Rad iat ion Protect ion and
Measurements (NCRP) and the Federal Radiation Council (FRO. The re-
latively minor differences in the recommendations of these oroanizations
concerned with limits of permissible radiation exposures seem to reflect
^Research sponsored by the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission under contract
with the Union Carbide Corporation.
differences in the publication dates of their respective recommendations.
Information contained in this paper is drawn principally from publica-
tions of the ICRP and NCRP and from selected interpretative writings of
those who have served on commi ttees of these organizations.
RADIATION PROTECTION STANDARDS
Recommendations of the ICRP are intended as guides to those respon-
sible for radiation protection and not as codes of practice or legal reg-
ulations. These later concerns are rightfully the prerogative of national
authorities. The application of radiation protection standards is intended
to prevent acute radiation effects and to limit to an acceptable level
the risk of such late effects as leukemia and premature aging.
Maximum Permissible Dose
The bas i c recommendat ions of the Comm ission are in terms of radiation
doses to the whole body or to particular organs of the body. From these
radiation doses are derived maximum permissible body burdens, maximum
permissible intakes, and maximum permissible concentrations of radio-
nuc I i des.
To some e-tent, exposure to any
but at permissible dose levels, this risk
probability of severe somatic or genetic
over n long period of time.'' Any severe
would be limited to an exceedingly small
Thus, it probably would be necessary to s
and use statistical methods to detect any
permissible doses. Faced with this diffi
"linear hypothesis" - i.e., that risk is,
port ionaI to dose. A I though conf i rmatory
assumption is believed to be, if not accu
z i ng rad i at i on enta iIs a risk;
s believed to carry a negligible
njury to an individual exposed
somat ic injury, such as Ieukem i a,
port i on of the exposed group .
tudy large groups of individuals
effects at the level of the
culty, the ICRP has assumed the
to a f i rst approx i mat i on, pro-
proof i s Iacki ng, th i s
rate, on the conservative side.
The rna-imum permissible dose (MPD) is then established in light of
current know I edge and attempts to balance as far as possible the risk of
the exposure against the benefit of the practice. Also considered is the
possible danger involved in remedial actions once the exposure has
occurred. The Commission's recommended mavjmum permissible doses are
appropriate for those situations in which the levels of radiation or radio-
active contamination can be control led.
Concern i s expressed by the Comm ission for the tota I intake of rad i o-
nuclides by individuals in various applications of radioactive materials
to be expected in the future expansion of atom ic energy and for single
types of population exposure that mioht take up a di spreport i onate share
of the totaI permissible dose.' "The use of the term critical has here
been extended to describe nuclides, articles of diet, and pathways of
exposure which deserve primary consideration as being the mechanisms of
509
-------
principal exposure of individuals.1 Clearly, it is necessary to consider
multiple sources of potential radiation exposure in planning for the growth
of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Exposure of Occupational Workers
Two changes have been made in the maximum permissible dose rate
recommended for occupational exposure. In 1934, the ICRP adopted a maxi-
mum permissible dose rate of 0.2 R/day (or 1 R/week for a 5-day work week)
for total body exposure.6 This level was subsequently reduced to
0.3 rem/week in 19507 and to 5 rem/year (or 0.1 rem/week) in 1956.8
Reductions in MPD did not result from positive evidence of damage due to
the use of the earlier permissible dose levels. Rather, consideration
was given to the lack of evidence to prove that a threshold dose existed
below which no genetic or somatic damage would result and to the prob-
ability of a large future increase in radiation use as the nuclear industry
expanded. The intent was to limit the genetically significant radiation
exposure of the population and the probability of somatic injury by
reduc i ng Ii fet i me doses."
Values of maximum permissible dose are applied to both external and
internal exposures. The present maximum permissible dose equivalents*
as recommended by ICRP for occupational exposure are summarized in Table 1.
Values recommended by NCRP, FRC, and the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) are listed for comparative purposes.^»^' The formula for
accumulated dose, 5(N-18), where N is the individual's age in years, is
intended to provide some flexibility in occupational exposure situations
when the need arises. Considering the 13-week permissible exposures
(Column 2) where the formula applies, it is seen that 12 rems could be
accumulated in one year. However, all four authorities emphasize that
workers who have accumulated a dose higher than that permitted by the
formula should not be exposed at a rate higher than 5 rems/year until
the accumulated dose is lower than that permitted by the formula. The
formula implies that occupational exposures should not be permitted for
individuals whose age is less than 18 years. However, in countries where
this occupational age restriction Is not limiting, the ICRP12 and the IAEA1*
recommend that exposures to the whole body, gonads, blood-forming organs,
and lenses of the eyes should not exceed 5 rems in any one year; and the
accumulated dose at age 30 should not exceed 60 rems.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 indicate that not all agencies have recom-
mended spec i f ic vaIues i n each case for the annual and accumuI ated occu-
pational dose. However, with the exception of the lens of the eyes, there
are no differences in the recommended values. The ICRP increased the
limits for the lens of the eyes to 15 rems/year and 8 rems/13 weeks since
the lens does not seem to assume greater importance than other tissue
from X-, gamma-, and beta-radiations.14'15 However, for radiation of
*Dose equivalent (rem) = absorbed dose (rad) x modifying factors. For
the sake of convenience, "dose" will be used hereafter instead of "dose
equivalent. '
510
Table 1. Recommended maximum permissible dose equivalents for occupational
workers.
. ... Max i mum permissible ft , j. j j
Maximum dose equivalent , K , . . Accumulated dose
Or9an (rem) in 13 weeks (reTTyear equivalent (rem)
Red bone marrow
Tota 1 body
Head and trunk
Gonads
Lenses of eyes
Skin
Thyroid
Bone
Hands, forearm
feet, and
ankl es
Al 1 other
organs
3
3
3
3
3
8
8
10
15
8
10
15
15
25
38
40
5
8
- I,A,N,F
- I,A,N,F
- N,F
- I,A,N,F
- N,F
- I,A
- N
- F
- I,A
- N
- F
- I.A
- I,A
- F,N
- 1
- A
- F
- I,A
5 -
5 -
5 -
5 -
5 -
15 -
30 -
30 -
30 -
75 -
15 -
1 ,A,N
I,A,N
N
I,A,N
N,F
I.A
1 ,N,F,A
I,N,F,A
I,N,A
I,N,F,A
I,N,F,A
51N-18) - I,A,N,F
5(N-18) - 1 ,A,N,F
5(N-18) - N,F
5CN-18) - I,A,N,F
5IN-18) - N,F
F = FRC; FRC identifies its values as Radiation Protection Guides (RPG).
A = IAEA.
N = NCRP.
I = ICRP.
51 I
-------
high linear energy transfer a lens modifying factor of 3 and a Quality
factor of 10 are applied.16 For the MPD in 13 weeks there are a number
of differences. The differences result from the 1960 decisions of the
'JL.PP and FRC in 1 Qr 6 to set for simplicity the ma•imum permissible
quarterly values at 1/3 the annual permissible dose and '"'f the ICRp'
in 1966 to set the maximum permissible quarterly values at 1/2 the annual
perm!ss i bIe dose.
It is apparent that *DT chrcn.c e-posure to ionizing radiation (,-.. .t
including planned special exposures or emergency e-,posures) that there
ore three principal ICRP regulations: (1) no more than 1/2 the annual
permissible dose to any body 'jrgan in a smqle Quarter, (j) no more than
5(N-13) rem to the orqans for wi-ich the formula is app I i c at I e; _a~d (3>
no more than the annual permissible dose tor the other organ? . *-L
Exposure of Members of the Pub I ic
The present annual dose levels recommended by the ''-"-(-, IAEA, NCPP,
and FPC tor members of the general population are listed in Table 2.
With but one exception (see fo-tnctes "d" and "e"), the values listed
are 1/10 of the maximum permissible dose equivalents permitted in one
year for occupational workers (see Column 3 of Table 1).^'-^- It is seen
that the FRC does not have Padiat i on Protect i on Guides (PPG) *or some
organs. However, in his Memorandum for the Presi dent,-- the chairman of
the FRC recommended that "where no Pad i jt i on Protect i on Gu i des are pr :>-
viJed, federal agencies continue present practices." This is taken by
these authors to mean that the dose levels (and concentration guides) to
be foil owed by ^9jer 3 I agencies in such cases should be those recommended
by the ICRP and "JCPP. Thus, there appear to be no important differences
among the recommendations of these authorities concerning permissible
exposure levels for members of the general population.
There are a number of reasons why permissible dose levels for mem-
bers of the general popuI at i on should be less thin those for occupational
workers. According to I CRP, ~~ "It is not desirable to expose members of
the public to doses as high as those considered to be acceptable for
radiation workers; members of tht public include children who might be
subject to an increased risk and who might te e-nosed during the whole
of their lifetime; members of the public (in contrast to radiation workers)
do not make the choice to be exposed, and they m.iy receive no direct bene-
fit from the exposure; they are not subject to the selection, supervision,
and monitoring required for radiation work, and they are exposed to the
risk of their own occupation."
The Comm ission defines a genetic d< >
hypothes i s " and "no thresho I d" as r urnp 1 1 ii
sessment of the genet i c burden or qenet i
Specifically, they re-'cnmend tr it the ge
I at i on f rom all rad i at ion sou re es , e -c I u ze a re involved. But the limitations of this
ou i danre must be recoqn ized. The e-posure situation to which the I CPP
f ornu I a app I i es wou I d be e • pec ted to be cont i nuous over the e~- tended
time period involved. Any e> pcsu re must be justified by the need for
its associated cause and not permitted simply because the expected dose
wou I d :>t M I be I ess than some specified level. In considering special
or one-in-a-Iifetime situations, one must keep in mind that no single
type of population e-.pi-sure should be permittod to take up a dispropor-
tion j t K share of the total dose.
The I CPP suggested that the size of the group be determined by the
5I3
-------
S = percent of total population,
K = average dose per 30 years to members of the total population
as a result of exposure to the group, and
I = average dose per year^to individual members of the group.
On the basis of occupational exposure at 5 rems/year total body
exposure and assigning 1.0 rem for the value of K,30 the size of the
occupational group is 0.756 of the whole population; and each member of
this group may accumulate 60 rems by age 30. When the entire population
is considered, S, as expected, takes on the value of 100^; i.e., when
K = 5 rems/30 years and 1 = 0.17 rem/year. Firm values of K have not
been recommended, since ICRP believes the apportionment of permissible
genetic dose is best left to the various countries.
SimuItaneous ExternaI and InternaI Exposure
Occupational exposure includes consideration of dose contributed
by external and internal sources. The total dose must be controlled;
initial recommendations simply considered the reduction of internal
exposure by the fraction of MPD contributed by external exposure.31
Subsequently, the Commission provided a set of rules governing the
addition of doses from penetrating external exposure and exposure to
long-lived bone seekers.32 These rules are enumerated as follows:
(1) No reduction need be made in maximum permissible external dose if the
body burden of a radionuclide is less than one-half of the maximum per-
missible; (2) the total body exposure to external radiation should be
reduced from 5 rems/year to 1.5 rems/year if the body burden is greater
than one-half but less than the maximum permissible; and (3) the total
body exposure should be reduced to zero if the body burden equals or
exceeds the maximum permissible. Presumably, for simultaneous external
and internal occupational exposure to short-lived radionuclides, the
recommendations for quarterly and annual dose listed in Table 1 would
apply.
Multiple Organ Exposure
Exposure to radionucl ides released to the environment may result
in dose to several organs. In those instances in which a mixture of
radionucI ides are taken into the body and the resultant doses in several
organs are of comparable magnitude, the combined exposure is considered
to constitute essentially whole body exposure.33 The limitations
imposed on occupational exposure to the gonads and the blood-forming
organs then apply, and the dose to each of the organs must be restricted
to not more than 3 rems/13 weeks, 5 rems/year, and an accumulated dose
of 5(N-18) rem.
More recent guidance by the ICRP considers the permissible occupa-
tional exposure when several body organs are concurrently exposed.
If external exposure of whole body has resulted in red bone marrow or
514
Table 2. Annual dose levels for members of the public.
Organ or Tissue
Gonads and red bone marrow
Total body
Lenses of the eyes
Other single organs
Skin, bone, and thyroid
NCRPa
(rem)
0.5
0.5
0.5
1.5
3
FRCb
(rem)
0.5°
0.5C
1.5d
ICRP
(rem)
0.5
0.5
1.5
1.5
3e
IAEA
(rem)
0.5
0.5
1.5
1.5
3e
Hands, forearms, feet, and
ankles
7.5
7.5
7.5
— These levels are based on NCRP's simple recommendation that
the permissible dose to members of the population at large be re-
duced to not more than 1/10 of the occupational values.
— The FRC does not recommend Radiation Protection Guides for
individual organ doses to the population other than gonads and
whole body.
— The FRC specifies that the RPG for gonads shall be 5 rems in
30 years for average population groups on the assumption that the
majority of individuals do not vary from the average by a factor
greater than 3; thus, the permissible annual dose to gonads and
whole body for average population groups would be 0.17 rems.
— The FRC recommends RPG's for the thyroid of 1.5 rems/year for
individual and 0.5 rem/year to be applied to the average of suit-
able samples of an exposed group in the population.
— The ICRP and IAEA recommends 1.5 rems/year to the thyroid of
children up to 16 years of age.
5I5
-------
gonad doses in excess of 2.5 rems/year (> 1/2 'PD), no two or more organs
shall be exposed at more than one-half their respective MPD (Column 3,
Table 1). The dose to three or more body organs should not e-ceed me-
half ot their respective MPD.
BASES OF INTERNAL DOSE ESTIMATION
The dose actual ly received Pv ^an as a consequence of radionucl ides
re I eased to the environment wi I I depend upon many factors. The physical
habit? and characteristics of the individual (aqe, sex, physical condi-
tion, eating habit1.-,, hygienic standards, etc.) influence the quantity of
radioactive material to which he may be e-posed and the amount of material
that may assimilate in various organs. Dose will also depend upon the
physical ana chemical properties of the radioactive material and the n-cde
of exposure (i.e., i nhaI ation, i ngest i on , punc tu re w<~ und , submers i on in
contaminated air or w,-jter, et. .). The p.iucity of d.jta to evaluate the
effects of these factors on dose has made it necessary to limit the number
ot factors considered and to use simplifying assumptions in the calcula-
tion o * body burden and ma• i mum permissible concentrations."
The principal assumptions made by the Commission in establishing tr ۥ
maximum permissible body burdens and the maximum permissible cone entra-
tions for occupational exposure are as follows:" (1 ' Exposure is con-
tinuous for a 50-year period to a constant level of rnnta^ i nat i en; (2)
calculations are based on the so-called "standard man" whose h,iPits and
characteristics have been defined (i.e., mtai-e rate of water and air,
excret i on rate, organ mass, element distribution, and biological parame-
ters); (3) the organ is homo gen 120 us i n compos ition and density and the
radioactive material is distributed uniformly within the organ; (4) the
chemical form of a particular radionuclide is classified simply as so I u-
ble or insoluble; (5) the radionuclide is eliminated exponentially from
the body organ, i.e., the fraction of organ burden eliminated per day
is constant; and (6) any daughter i so topes re ma in pre^nt in the tissue
where they are produced except for biological elimination that occurs
at their characteristic elimination rates. The only modes of e-p-sure
tabulated by ICRP are inhalation and ingestion, except in a few cases
where submersion in air presents the greatest hazard. The health physi-
cist must make appropriate adjustments when population exposure situations
and other exposure modes are involved.
Maximum Permissible Body Burden
The maximum permissible body burden, g, is based on that amount of
the radionuclide which is deposited in the totaI body and produces the
maximum permissible dose rate to the body organ of interest.-^' Thus,
to assess the s i en i f icance of an intal-e of radioactive material, it is
necessary to \- now the rates of r ad i at i r.n dose rece i ved by the various
orggns and tissues of the body as a result of the deposition f rc>m that
i n ta ke. The a ver aoe 'Jose rate per mi crocu rie deposited in any part of
the body i s then
D=qx3.2x10'xex1.6
=51 A g x — rem/day
10
1
100
q = mi crocu ries accumulated in the total body,
3.2 x 10 = number of disintegrations per day from 1 uC i ,
£ = £ EF (OF) < DF), the eff^.-five absorbed energy per
disintegration, NleV (An explanation of these terms
appears later in the te>t. ),
1.r * 10~6 = ergs per MeV,
100 = ergs per gram of tissue per rad, and
m = mass in grams of the tissue.
Two somewhat different criteria have been used by the Comm i ss i on
to determine maximum permissible dose values. ~ For bone-seeking
radionuclides such as strontium-90 and pIutonium-239, the estimate is
based on a compar ison with rad i um-226 and dauqhter products. f-'e M ance
has been placed on the considerable e-pprience gained f rom clinical find-
ings concerned with internally deposited radium. The ma•imum permissible
body burden of 0.1 \iq of radium-226 is considered to correspond to an
average dose rate of 30 rems/year to occupational empIoyees. For all
other radionuclides the body burdens are set to limit the dose received
by various organs of the body to the values listed in Column 3, Table 1.
A number of metabo lie routes must be considered in internal contami-
nation. The possible fate of radionuclides tal-en into the body depends
on the mode of entry (inhalation, inqestion, skin absorption, or punc-
ture wound) and on the physicochemicaI properties of the material (size,
shape, and density of particles, and chemical form and solubility). The
distribution of an ingested isotope in the body is determined by a number
of factors, and these are illustrated by a simple diagram (Figure 1).
For a continuous inqestion of P u^i/day, the fraction of ingested radio-
nuclide reaching the blood is f ^ and the fraction of nuclide in the blood
that reaches the critical organ is f';. The parameter f-> is the fraction
of the body burden in the critical organ and qfo is the burden of the
radionuclide in the critical organ. The fraction of that taken into the
body by inqestion that is retained by the critical organ, f, is the
product of f i, f' T . The compa rtment mode I reflects a constant elimination
rate, \, from the rritical organ. Critical oroan refers to the organ of
the body wii«i>t damage by the radiation results in the jreatest damage to
the body. Frequently, but rv->t always, this is the organ that accumulates
the greatest concentration <;f the radioactive material. Guidance is
furnished by the Cnmmission on appropri.'ite values for each of these
parameters in standard man as we I I as on the retention of particulate
matter in lungs jn.j or the crntents and residence times in the nastro-
intestinal tract. "J.J0 Possible revisions to the lung model have been
considered by a T,isk Croup of ICRP Committee 2.^' A Task Group of ICRP
5I7
-------
ORNL DWG. 69-3433
PARAMETERS CHARACTERIZING THE DISTRIBUTION
OF AN INGESTED RADIONUCLIDE
P = intake rate.
f ( = fraction of ingested radionuclide reaching the blood.
f 2 = fraction of radionuclide in blood reaching the critical organ.
f 2 = fraction of body burden in the critical organ.
A = fractional elimination rate.
Figure 1. Parameters characterizing the distribution of an ingested radionuclide.
518
Committee 4 has more recently developed the models required to calculate
dose due to a short-term or acute single intake of radionucIides. De-
tailed information has been furnished about the metabolism of thirty-one
radionucIides most frequently encountered as internal contaminants of
4"1
workers.
42
The dose equivalent in rem corresponds numerically to the product
of the absorbed dose in rad by appropriate modifying factors. One of
the modifying factors is the quality factor, OF (formerly referred to
as RBE), which now relates to linear energy transfer (LET). Another
modifying factor is the distribution factor, DF, that expresses the modi-
fication of biological effect due to non-uniform distribution of intern-
ally deposited isotopes. An example is the relative damage factor, n,
applied in certain cases to the particulate component of energy (i.e.,
all energy other than x or y) emitted by radionucIides deposited in the
bone. Other factors in the effective absorbed energy term given above
are E, the energy (MeV) absorbed per disintegration, and F, the ratio
of disintegrations of daughter to disintegration of parent. Thus,
insertion of the appropriate modifying factors in the effective absorbed
energy germ converts the absorbed dose (rad) to the dose equivalent (rem).
The cr i ticaI organ burden, Q, or the totaI body burden, q, is g i ven
by one of two equations. ^
5.4 x 10 5 m R
pCi
(2)
Ra. Ra
(3)
Equation (2) follows from equation (1) when R is the dose rate in rem/year,
and it applies to all organs except bone. Equation (3) applies in the
case of a- and 8-emitting radionuclides that localize in the bone and
relates the maximum permissible body burden to a permissible bone burden
of 0.1 uCi of radium-226. The constant in this equation is derived from
the permissible body burden of radium-226 (0.1 uCi), the fraction of
radium-226 in the bone of that in the total body (0.99), and the effective
absorbed energy of radium-226 and its daughter products (110).
Maximum Permi ssi ble Concentrations
Maximum permissible comcentrations (MPC) for all organs other than
the Gl tract are computed on the basis of a constant level of exposure
and the single exponential model leading to the equation^
(4)
519
-------
The solution of this equation when Q = 0 at t = 0 is
= effective decay constant =
0.693
T = effective half-life (T T. )/(T +T ), days;
r b r b '
T = radioactive half-life, days;
T = biological half-life, days;
t = exposure period (taken as 50 years for occupation exposure),
days;
P = rate of uptake of the radionuclide by the critical body organ,
uCi/day.
The amount of material depos i ted in the cr i 11caI organ is equa I to the
product of the concentrat ion of the rad ionucIi de in air or water taken
into the body, M(yCi/cm'), the average rate of intake, I(cm-Vday), and
the fraction of the radionuclide initially retained in the critical organ,
^a* or ^w* Thus P = Mlf. For occupational exposure at the MPC of the
radionuclide in water, M = (MPC)W and in air, M = (MPC)a.
It is clear from equation (5) that the body burden and the associated
dose rate increase throughout the exposure period, which is taken as 50
years for occupat ionaI exposure. By substitutinq appropriate values of
P in equation (5), the expression for maximum permissible concentration
MPC =
cQ
-7 -4
in which c = 10 for inhalation and c = 9.2 x 10 for ingestion of
water when the MPC is for occupational exposure of 40 hours per week.'*''
It is usuaI Iy assumed that standard man consumes half his daily intake
as air and water during the 8-hour working day. For cont i nuous occupa-
tional exposure the MPC values should be divided by 2.92, except for
submersion as the exposure mode where they shouId be d iv ided by 4.38 to
correct for i ntake and occupancy factors. Equation (6) can be mod i f i ed
for parent-daughter radionucIides and for the Gl tract as the critical
organ.
For internal exposure the pattern of dose delivered at the MPC is
illustrated for a few radionucI ides in Figure 2. The permissible dose
rate for a particular organ (Column 3, Table 1) is attained after an
occupational exposure at the constant MPC value for 50 years. Theoret-
ically, a I though a constant dose rate is never ach i eved w i th cont i nuous
520
30
15
1 8
S 7
I 6
5
4
3
Limiting rate to thyroid, skin, or bone
I
Limiting rate to kidney, liver, lung.
muscle, spleen, etc.
"Pb
Limiting rate to
__ Radionuclide for
/ which T—*•«
I I I
total body or gonads
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 20 30 40 50 60
Period of Exposure (years)
Plot of dose equivalent versus years of exposure at the constant level of MPC.
Figure 2. Plot of dose equivalent versus years ot exposure at the constant
level of MPC.
521
-------
deposition, 99? of the equilibrium value Is reached after a time period
corresponding to six effective half-lives. The intake of iodine-131
with an effective half-life of 7.6 days will reach an equilibrium thyroid
burden and a dose rate of 30 rems/year to the thyroid after about 7 weeks'
exposure at the MPC. For radionuclides such as strontium-90 and
p-lutonlum-239 with long effective half-lives, 100? of the permissible
occupational dose rate is reached after 50 years of exposure at the MPC
but, in the case of strontium-90, only B6t of the bone burden is reached.
The fact that the dose rate after 50 years of exposure may exceed the per-
missible rate is not viewed with alarm, since few, if any, workers will
be so exposed. Although the permissible dose rate for very long-lived
radionuclides is only achieved after 50 years of exposure, any safety
factor is more apparent than real. In practice, individual workers are
likely to be exposed for only a few years early in their work experience,
and the permissible dose commitment will, in fact, be nearly achieved.
The most recent guidance on MPC values for strontium-90 considers
that metabolic data provide a sounder basis for the estimation of MPC
values than the exponential model used previously in the recommendations.
"Extensive experimental data indicate that the strontium-calcium ratio of
mineral derived from diet in newly formed bone is about 0.25 of the cor-
responding ratio in the normal human diet. Data are also available on
the average concentrations of stable strontium and stable calcium in
normal human diet and bone of large populations." There was no change
made in the permissible body burden of strontium-90, but the MPC values
for bone as the critical organ were increased by a factor of 4, and the
MPC values for total body as the critical organ were increased by a
factor of 2.
Maximum Permissible Dose Commitment
The MPC or MPI are satisfactory concepts from the standpoint of
more or less continuous exposures. Only recently has the iCRP provided
detailed guidance on single exposures to radionuclides inhaled or in-
gested, and it emphasized the problem associated with rapid buildup in
the body of radionuclides having long effective half-life.48 An oc-
cupational worker who acquires a bone burden of strontium-90 such that
the dose of 15 rem is received during 13 weeks of the year, following
a single exposure or quarterly exposure, will continue to receive a bone
dose of this magnitude for many years thereafter. Thus, the worker would
be restricted to work In environments that add little, if any, additional
exposure.
To avoid the possible restriction of an employee's activity, the
ICRP has introduced the concept of maximum dose commitment. An annual
maximum dose commitment is the dose resulting from the intake of radio-
nucl ides corresponding in amount to intake at the MPC for 1 year.
Figure 3 Illustrates the application of the concept of maximum permissi-
ble dose commitment.4' Curve A represents the dose rate to the critical
body organ as a function of time, t, following a single short-term intake
of time, T, of a radlonuci ide. It is a maximum permissible dose commitment
522
ORNL-DWG 68-9822
>R
TIME (years)
50+ T/2
Figure 3. Curves illustrating the maximum permissible dose commitment concept.
523
-------
if the area under this curve (integrated dose) from t = 0 to 50 + T/2 years
is equal to the area under curve B for this same period. Curve B rep-
resents the dose rate to this same body organ when the person is occupa-
tional ly exposed to the MPC of a radionuclide for a period Y years. If
T = 1/2 year, the exposure is the maximum permissible dose for single
exposures or for exposures on a quarterly basis. In every category of
max i mum permi ss i bIe dose commi tment, the area under curve A equaIs area
under curve B equals RT, the area of the rectangle in which R is the
maximum permissible dose rate appropriate to the critical body organ for
the radionuclide as given in Column 3 of Table 1. For any exposure at
the MPC the dose rate approaches the value R, as shown by the dotted
curve C, and in every case reaches the value R at or before 50 years.
The concept of dose commitment has application where members of the
public may be exposed. An earlier study made use of this approach in the
assessment of the safety of waste releases to the Clinch River at Oak
°idge National Laboratory," and a paper to be given at this conference
iI Iustrates another application.
SingIe or jhort-Term Exposure
The ICRP has indicated that up to one-half of the maximum permis-
sible dose commitment may be accumulated in a quarter of a year.^*-
These commitments may be taken in any pattern during the quarter interval,
from single, near instantaneous exposures to continuous exposures. In
the case of internal exposure to radionucl ides having short effective
half-lives, this corresponds to a quarterly dose at twice the dose rate
permi tted on an annual basis, or to rece i v i ng one-ha If the annual dose
in 13 weeks. For internal exposure to radionucIides having a long ef-
fective half-life, this corresponds to a total intake of the radionuclide
equal to one-half of that which would be permitted for continuous ex-
posure at the MPC for 1 year. The dose equivalent over a 50-year period
would numerically equal one-half of the annual permissible dose. This
relationship between dose from a single or short-term exposure and dose
f rom cont i nuous exposure has been demonstrated by K. Z. Morgan. -^
Consj de ration^ of Stajjle^ El ement Intake
Many factors have an effect in determt n i ng the vaIue for a max imum
permissible limit. One such factor is the relative abundance or scare i tv
in the diet of stable isotopes with similar chemical properties of the
radionuclide. When data are lacking on the metabolism of a particular
radionuclide in the human body, as is frequently the case, information
on the intake and elimination of stable isotopes of the element in the
critical body organ may be used in the calculation of permissible levels.
It is assumed that the distribution of the normal stable isotope in the
body organs is typical of the distribution that would result from chronic
exposure to radionuclides of the same eIement and that an equ iI i br i um
condition exists between the stable isotope in the body organ and in the
dietary intake. When this is the case, it follows that for a stable
524
i sotope
55
O.o93 m C
rn = mass in grams of the tissue,
C = average concentration of the element in the critical organ
(grams of element per gram of wet tissue),
1 = average da iIy i ngesti on of an element (a/day), and T and f
are as defined previously.
By substituting equation (7) in equation (5) for an equilibrium situ-
ation and letting P = l*fw (where I* is equal to the permissible intake
of the radionuclide, or (MPC)W times the standard man intake of water),
it can be shown that
g element in organ
0.693 m C
If
(8)
Values of (MPC) calculated from equation (8) will then correspond to
similar values listed in ICRP Publication 2 for cases where stable ele-
ment data was judged to be acceptable and was used to calculate maximum
permissible concentrations. Thus, it can be seen that the Commission
considered stable element intake in its derivation of maximum permissible
concentrat ions.
525
-------
REFERENCES
I. International Commission on Radiological Protection, Recommendations
of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (as amended
1959 and revised 1962), ICRP Publ. 6, p. 9, Pergamon Press, London
(1964).
2. Ibid, p. 10
3. International Commission on Radiological Protection, Recommendations
of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (adopted
September 17, 1965), ICRP Publ. 9, p. 12, 15, Pergamon Press, London
(1966).
4. ICRP Publ. 6, op_ cpf, p. 26.
5. International Commission on Radiological Protection, Principles of
Environmental Monitoring Related to the Handling of Radioactive
Materials (Report of Committee 4), ICRP Publ. 1, p. 9, Pergamon
Press, London (1966).
6. L. S. Taylor, "History of the International Commission on Radiological
Protection (ICRP)," Health Physics I, 97 (1958).
7. Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological
Protection and of the International Commission on Radiological
Units—1950, National Bureau of Standards (US) Handbook 47 (19511.
8. International Commission on Radiological Protection, "Report on 1956
Amendments to the Recommendations of the International Commission on
Radiological Protection (ICRP)," Radiology 70. 261 (1958).
9. ICRP Publ. 6, op_crtj pp. 17, 18, 26.
10. International Atomic Energy Agency, Basic Safety Standards for Radiation
Protection, Safety Series Publ. 9, p. 9, Vienna (1962).
II. K. Z. Morgan, "Present Status of Recommendations of the ICRP, NCRP,
and FRC," presented at the Health Physics Society Meeting in Los
Angeles, June 14, 1965; to be published in Progress in Nuclear Energy
Series XI I, Vol. 2, Pergamon Press, London.
12. ICRP Publ. 9, op_c_rt_, p. 9.
13. IAEA Publ I. 9, op_cii, p. 17.
14. ICRP Publ. 6, op_cjt, p. 9.
15. ICRP Publ. 9, op_c_[t, p. 10.
526
16. Morgan, "Present Status of Recommendations of the ICRP, NCRP, and
FRC," op_ cij, p. 8.
17. "Maximum Permissible Body Burden and Maximum Permissible Concentrations
of Radionuclides in Air and in Water for Occupational Exposure,"
National Bureau of Standards (US) Handbook 69 (1959).
18. Federal Radiation Council, Background Material for the Development
of Radiation Protection Standards, Report No. I, U. S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D. C. (May I960).
19. ICRP Publ. 9, op_ cjjf, p. 10.
20. K. Z. Morgan and J. E. Turner (ed.). Principles of Radiation Protection,
p. 511, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York (1967).
21. Federal Radiation Council, Background Material for the Development
of Radiation Protection Standards, Report No. 2, p. 9, U. S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. (Sept. 1961).
22. ICRP Publ. 9, op_crt_, p. 13.
23. A. S. Fleming, "Radiation Protection Guidance for Federal Agencies,'
Federal Register, p. 4402 (May 18, I960).
24. ICRP Publ. 9, op_crt^, p. 8.
25. Ibid, p. 15.
26. ICRP Publ. 6, op_c_rf_, p. 31.
27. ICRP Publ. 9, op_crt_, p. 16.
28. ICRP Publ. 6, pj>_cH^, p. 32.
29. Morgan, Principles of Radiation Protection, op clt, p. 517.
30. ICRP Publ. 6, op_ cl±, p. 32.
31. International Commission on Radiological Protection, Recommendations
of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (Report
of Committee 2 on Permissible Dose for Internal Radiation), ICRP
Publ. 2, Pergamon Press, London (1959).
32. ICRP Publ. 6, op_crf_, p. 15.
33. Ibid, p. 29.
34. ICRP Publ. 9, op_ cit_, p. 12.
35. ICRP Publ. 2, op_crf_, p. 6.
527
-------
36. Ibid, p. 8.
37. Ibid, p. 10.
38. Ibid, p. II.
39. ICRP Pub I. 6, op cit.
40. ICRP Pub I. 2, op_ cit.
41. ICRP Task Group on Lung Dynamics (P. E. Marrow, chairman), "Deposition
and Retention Models for Internal Dosimetry of the Human Respiratory
Tract," Health Physics 12, 173 (1966).
42. ICRP Task Group of Committee 4 (G. C. Butler, chairman), Eva Iuation
of Radiation Doses to Body Tissues from Internal Contamination Due
to Occupational Exposure (In press)
43. ICRP Publ. 2, 0£_cn_, pp. 13, 15.
44. Ibid. p. 16.
45. Ibid, p. 16.
46. Ibid, p. 17.
47. ICRP Publ . 6, 0£ c_rf_, p. 39.
48. ICRP Publ. 9, o£C_rt_, pp. 10, 12.
49. K. Z. Morgan, "Assumptions Made by the Internal Dose Committee of
the International Commission on Radiological Protection," paper
presented at Sixth Annual Meeting of the Gesellschaft fur Nuclear
Medizin, Wiesbapen, Germany, September 26-28, 1968.
50. K. E. Cowser, W. S. Snyder, ejf_ aj_., "Evaluation of Radiation Dose
to Man from Radionuclides Released to the Clinch River," IAEA
Symposium on Disposal of Radioactive Wastes Into Seas, Oceans, and
Surface Waters, Vienna, Austria, p. 639 (1966).
51. S. V. Kaye and P. S. Rohwer, "Methods of Estimating Exposures to
Populations from Plowshare Applications," paper presented at Symposium
on Public Health Aspects of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosives,
Las Vegas, Nevada, April 7-11, 1969.
52. ICRP Publ. 9, o£ crt_, p. 10.
53. Morgan, Principles of Radiation Protection, op cit, p. 324.
54. ICRP Publ. 2, op_ crf_, p. 27.
55. ICRP Publ. 2, og_ c_rf_, p. 33.
DEVELOPMENT OF REGULATORY CRITERIA APPLICABLE
TO CONTROL OF RADIATION EXPOSURES TO THE POPULATION
FROM PRODUCTS CONTAINING RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
by
L. R. Rogers and Forrest Western
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Germantown, Maryland
ABSTRACT
Under the Atomic Energy Act of 19S4, as
amended, the Atomic Energy Commission is re-
sponsible for regulating the possession, use
and transfer of byproduct, source and special
nuclear materials in accordance with safety
standards established by rule of the Commis-
sion to protect health and minimize danger
to life and property. This paper describes
some of the basic considerations in establish-
ing safety criteria and regulations for author-
izing the transfer and use of byproduct mate-
rial (radioisotopes) in products for distri-
bution to the general public. It discusses
problems encountered in extending the broad
guidance provided by the Federal Radiation
Council (FRC) and by the International Com-
mission of Radiological Protection and the
National Council on Radiation Protection and
Measurements (ICRP-NCRP), which is limited
to total exposures of individuals and popu-
lation groups to radiation from many sources,
to appropriate controls on radioactivity in
an individual consumer product which represents
only one source of population exposures. The
paper also discusses possible approaches to
accomplishing the regulatory objectives of
providing reasonable assurance that (1) the
contribution of an individual product to total
exposures that might be permitted under FRC
and ICRP-NCRP guidance should not be dispro-
portionate to the benefits to be derived, and
12) appropriate efforts are made to limit ex-
posures to the population from individual
classes of sources of exposure as far as
528
529
-------
practicable. Existing criter
pertaining to the control of
to the population from produc
active material is purposely
scribed, and additional consi
must be taken into account fo
of further criteria and regul
applicable to the possible wi
bution of products containing
rial as a result of the Plows
exp lored .
ia and regulations
radiation exposure
ts into which radio-
introduced are de-
derations which
r the development
ations which are
de-scale distri-
radioactive mate-
hare Programs are
Previous speakers have described experimental Plow-
share projects designed to determine the feasibility of
using nuclear explosives to aid in the production of pro-
ducts such as natural gas, oil and copper. The Atomic Energy
Commission recognizes that in evaluating the feasibility
of such uses of nuclear explosives, criteria and controls
for protection of the health and safety of the public using
the products are of primary importance. A key factor is
to minimize the amount of residual radioactivity that may
become associated with the products. It is for this rea-
son that major objectives of the Plowshare program are to
develop information that will assist in the determination
of exposures to the public from the use of products pro-
duced by nuclear explosives and to investigate means of
reducing the amount of radioactivity associated with the
product. This information will permit the progressive and
timely development of regulations which are related to the
specific conditions prevailing at the various stages of
development of the use of nuclear explosives.
need project, the production
timulation, it is too early to
s as to regulations which might
es of such products. The pur-
scuss some of the general con-
evelopment of regulations applic-
tion of natural gas and other
uced with the aid of nuclear
Even for the most adva
of natural gas by nuclear s
support detailed suggestion
be imposed on wide-scale us
pose of this paper is to di
siderations in the future d
able to commercial distribu
products that might be prod
explosives.
The distribution on a commercial scale of products
such as natural gas, oil and copper to be produced by
nuclear explosives involve factors that differ in many re-
spects from those that have been taken into account by the
Atomic Energy Commission in its present regulations.
530
Exemptions from regulatory control of various products that
have been established by the Atomic Energy Commission were
not developed with Plowshare-produced products in mind and
cannot be considered to be directly applicable to such pro-
ducts. However, there are many factors, which have already
received extensive consideration by the Atomic Energy Com-
mission in controlling the distribution to the general pub-
lic of other products containing radioactive material, that
are also pertinent to the development of regulations for
the control of Plowshare products. It is useful at this
point to review these common factors.
Basic considerations for the development of criteria
and regulations designed to protect the public health and
safety, including those related to authorizing the use of
consumer products containing radioactive material exempt
from regulations, are contained in the recommendations of
the International Commission on Radiological Protection,
the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measure-
ments, and the Federal Radiation Council. (These groups
are commonly known as the ICRP, the NCRP, and the FRC,
respectively.) In summarizing quantitative recommendations
of these groups for limiting exposures of the general pub-
lic to radiation, we shall use the term, Radiation Protec-
tion Guide, adopted by the FRC. The corresponding term
adopted by the ICRP is Dose Limit.
Quantitative recommendations of the ICRP, NCRP and
FRC establish Radiation Protection Guides for limiting
exposures of the general public to radiation. For indi-
vidual members of the general public, the Radiation Pro-
tection Guide for whole-body exposures is one-half rem per
year. Corresponding Guides for limited portions of the
body are higher by factors that range from 3 to 15. For
the total population, it is recommended that the average
genetically effective exposure should not exceed 5 rems
in 30 years. For the present purpose, the most pertinent
Radiation Protection Guide established by the FRC provides
that as an operational technique, where the individual
whole-body doses are not known, a suitable sample of the
exposed population should be developed whose protection
guide for annual whole-body dose will be 170 mrem per
capita per year. These exposure guides do not include
either exposures to radiation from naturally-occurring
sources or exposures to radiation from medical procedures.
Both the ICRP and the FRC consider that the primary
purpose of Radiation Protection Guides for individual
members of the general public is to provide guidance for
limiting levels of radiation and radioactivity in man's
531
-------
environment and recognizes that it may not always be prac-
tical to assure that there will not be some individuals
who will receive greater exposures than specified in the
guide. For example, in paragraph 70 of its Publication 9,
the ICRP states:
"The Maximum Permissi
lished for occupation
are regarded as upper
to be individually mo
that the Maximum Perm
The dose limitation f
more theoretical cone
ards for the design a
so that it is unl_ike 1
viduals in the public
fied dose. The effee
by observing individu
sampling procedures i
cal calculations, and
from which the exposu
ble Doses that have been estab-
al (emphasis supplied) exposure
limits, and the doses may have
nitored and controlled to ensure
issible Doses are not exceeded.
or members of the public is a
ept , intended to provide stand-
nd operation of radiation sources
• (emphasis supplied) that indi-
will receive more than a speci-
tiveness of this is checked, not
als, but by assessments through
n the environment and statisti-
by a control of the sources
re is exoected to arise..."
Both the ICRP and FRC use these
tection Guides to develop alterna
controlling exposures from radioa
ment, expressed in terms of avera
groups of individuals. While the
dations better reflect the nature
standards of radiation protection
for selecting groups of individua
should be taken make them difficu
after discussing the selection of
concludes (paragraph 74) :
ndividual Radiation Pro-
tive recommendations for
ctivity in the environ-
ge exposures of selected
se alternative recommen-
of the environmental
, lack of precise criteria
Is over which averages
It to apply. The ICRP,
appropriate groups,
"Because of the innate variability with an apparently
homogeneous group, some members...will receive doses
somewhat higher than the Dose Limit. However, at the
very low levels of risk implied, it is likely to be
of minor consequence to their health if the Dose
Limit is marginally or even substantially exceeded.
The ICRP further observes (paragraph 75) that:
"In some situations...it may not be practical to make
the detailed studies necessary for the identification
of the critical group. To allow for individual var-
iability it will then be necessary to apply an oper-
ational 'safety factor' to the derived concentration
limits applicable to a member of the public. ...How-
ever, as the values to be recommended for such factors
532
would vary over a wide range, depending on the par-
ticular circumstances, no generally applicable values
are given in this report."
Qualitatively, the ICRP, the NCRP, and the FRC gen-
erally recommend that, within Radiation Protection Guides,
exposures to radiation be kept as low as practicable. The
ICRP adds (paragraph 87):
. . .that it is important to ensure that no single
type of population exposure takes up a dispropor-
tionate share of the total. The way in which this
is done will depend upon circumstances which may
vary from country to country, and will be determined
by national, economic and social considerations."
Recommendations of the FRC, like those of the ICRP,
which we have just quoted, are based on the nature of the
risks to health of radiation exposure which have been
discussed by Dr. Tompkins.
Considerations such as these led the Federal Radiation
Council to include, in its first recommendations on radia-
tion protection guidance, approved by the President May 13 ,
1960, the following general recommendations on the use of
the Radiation Protection Guides:
"It is recommended that:
1. There should not be any man-made radiation
exposure without the expectation of benefit result-
ing from such exposure. Activities resulting in
man-made radiation exposure should be authorized
for useful applications provided recommendations
set forth herein are followed.
2. The term 'Radiation Protection Guide' be
adopted for Federal use. This term is defined as
the radiation dose which should not be exceeded
without careful consideration of the reasons for
doing so; every effort should be made to encourage
the maintenance of radiation doses as far below
this guide as practicable.
3 .
5. There can be no single permissible
or acceptable level of exposure without re-
gard to the reason for permitting the expo-
sure . It should be general practice to re-
duce exposure to radiation, and positive
effort should be carried out to fulfill the
533
-------
sense of these recommendations. It is basic
that exposure to radiation should result from
a real determination of its necessity.
7. The Federal agencies aDDlv these Radiation
Protection Guides with judgment and discretion, to
assure that reasonable probability is achieved in
the attainment of the desired goal of protecting
man from the undesirable effects of radiation. The
Guides may be exceeded only after the Federal agency
having jurisdiction over the matter has carefully
considered the reason for doing so in light of the
recommendations in this paper."
It is within this framework that the AEC, as a regu-
latory agency, works in developing appropriate criteria,
standards and regulations governing the control of sources
objectives in developing safety criteria are to provide
reasonable assurance that:
(1) appropriate efforts are made to limit ex-
posures to the population from individual classes of
"sources-of-exposure" as far as practicable;
(2) the exposures of the general public to
ionizing radiation from all sources will not exceed
levels recommended by the Federal Radiation Council
and approved by the President; and
(3) the contributions of individual classes of
"sources-of-exposure" to exposures of the public are
not disproportionate to their net contributions to
the national welfare.
In undertaking to meet these objectives, we find that
different classes of "sources-of-exposure" involve consid-
erations that require different regulatory controls and
specific criteria for limiting their respective contribu-
tions to exposure of the public to radiation. Whenever
an activity or a product that constitutes a new "source-
of-exposure", or a substantial modification of an exist-
ing one, is proposed, it becomes necessary to review ex-
isting regulatory requirements to determine what modifi-
cations may be desirable to assure that our objectives
will continue to be met.
In considering the development of criteria and con-
trols to limit exposures of the public to radiation from
534
byproduct material contained in consumer products, it may
be observed at the outset that it will generally not be
practical to achieve AEC objectives by regulating users of
the product. Not only would the effort required to effec-
tively regulate the user be expected to outweigh the rea-
sons for introducing the byproduct material into the pro-
duct, but the impact on the user would generally be unac-
ceptable to him. Consequently, our interest is in the
development of criteria for determining whether or not the
characteristics of a particular product sufficiently limit
its potential for exposure of members of the public to jus-
tify exemption of its use from regulatory control. Assur-
ance that an exempt product meets specified requirements
must then depend upon regulations applicable to the pro-
ducer, importer, or distributor of the product.
In practice, the manufacturer or importer of a pro-
duct containing byproduct material is prohibited from
transferring the product for distribution to the public
unless the product is shown to meet the requirements estab-
lished in a specific license which authorizes the distri-
bution.
The Commission has developed general criteria for
exempting the use of byproduct material in products that
depend on the radioactivity to perform a useful function,
as in the case of self-luminous products. These criteria
appear in the Federal Register of March 16, 1965. The
key provisions of these criteria are:
"2. Approval of a proposed consumer product will
depend upon both associated exposures of persons to
radiation and the apparent usefulness of the product.
In general, risks of exposure to radiation will be
considered to be acceptable if it is shown that in
handling, use and disposal of the product it is un-
likely that individuals in the population will receive
more than a small fraction, less than a few hundredths,
of individual dose limits recommended by such groups
as the International Commission on Radiological Pro-
tection (ICRP), the National Council on Radiation
Protection and Measurements (NCRP), and the Federal
Radiation Council (FRO, and that the probability of
individual doses approaching any of the specified
limits is negligibly small. Otherwise, a decision
will be more difficult and will require a careful
weighing of all factors, including benefits that will
accrue or be denied to the public as a result of the
Commission's action. ..."
535
-------
"9. In evaluating proposals for the use of radioactive
materials in consumer products the principal consid-
erations are :
C a) The potential external and internal exposure
of individuals in the population to radia-
tion from the handling, use and disposal
of individual products;
Cb) The potential total accumulative radiation
dose to individuals in the population who
may be exposed to radiation from a number
of products;
C c) The long-term potential external and inter-
nal exposure of the general population from
the uncontrolled disposal and dispersal into
the environment of radioactive materials
from products authorized bv the Commission;
and
(d) The benefit that will accrue to or be denied
the public because of the utilitv of the
product by approval or disapproval of a
specific product."
"1. At the present time it appears unlikely that the
total contribution to the exposure of the general pub-
lic to radiation from the use of radioactivity in con-
sumer products will exceed small fractions of limits
recommended for exposure to radiation from all sources.
Information as to total quantities of radioactive mate-
rials being used in such products and the number of
items be ing distributed will be obtained through
record-keeping and reporting requirements applicable
to the manufacture and distribution of such products.
If radioactive materials are used in sufficient quan-
tities in products reaching the public so as to raise
any question of population exposure becoming a signif-
icant fraction of the permissible dose to the gonads,
the Commission will, at that time, reconsider its pol-
icy on the use of radioactive materials in consumer
products."
These criteria were intended to be specifically ap-
plicable only to products into which radioactive material
is incorporated for the purpose of performing a useful
function as part of the product such as its use in self-
luminous devices. While the criteria may provide some
guidance on an approach to development of criteria for
Plowshare products, there are many new factors introduced
536
in the use of products produced by nuclear explosives such
as the type of the product; the nature of the processing
and distribution systems; the critical pathways of exposure
to man; and the type and size of population groups that
will use the various products.
Safety criteria and conditions of exemption specifi-
cally applicable to each Plowshare-produced product should
take into account considerations such as the following:
(1) The contribution of the Plowshare-produced
product to the national welfare.
(2) The feasibility of limiting radioactive con-
tamination of the product, as released by a licensed
producer or processor, to acceptable levels.
(3) Possible and probable exposures to individuals
and population groups as a result of exemption of
the product from regulation under specified condi-
tions .
Among proposals to use nuclear explosives for the com-
merc ial product ion of various products, only the proposal
for use in the production of natural gas is in an advanced
stage. Project Gasbuggv and future Prejects Rulison and
Dragon Trail are designed to provide information on the
feasibility of commercial production of natural gas by this
means. These experiments should provide much of the infor-
mation needed to formulate controls on the distribution of
gas and conditions under which use of the gas might be ex-
empted from regulation. Addit ional studies will be required
to provide information on matters such as methods of re-
ducing the amount of byproduct material in gas to the ex-
tent practicable and relationships between concentrations
of gas introduced into various collection and distribution
systems and resultant exposures of persons and groups of
persons.
Without attempting in any way to prejudge the results
of data collection and evaluation effort that is really
just beginning, I thought you might find it instructive
if I were to sketch out what appears to be a likely way
for regulations to evolve. I would expect us to feel our
way through several stages of development of criteria and
controls as gas from test wells is introduced into distri-
bution systems in an increasing amount as information is
developed about the concentration of byproduct material
in F1 low share-produced gas and how that gas moves about in
distribution systems.
537
-------
It seems reasonable in the first place that certain
points of control in a gas distribution system would be
specified beyond which the further distribution and use
of the gas would be free of regulation, or, if you will,
the gas would then be an exempt consumer product. As in
the transfer and distribution of other exempt consumer pro-
ducts, the person introducing the gas into the distribution
system would be required to meet such limits on the radio-
active content of the gas as might be determined by the
Commission to be necessary for the protection of the pub-
lic health and safety.
The limits on maximum concentrations of radioactivity
in the gas would be applied at specified points of control
in the distribution system. These limits would be derived
from criteria for acceptable levels of radiation exposure
to a suitable sample of exposed population groups using
natural gas or products produced from gas at various stages
in the distribution system. In deriving the limits it
would be necessary to take into consideration the radio-
nuclide and its chemical form, the dilution afforded in
the distribution or processing system prior to the first
point of use of the gas, the nature of the use of the gas
(i.e., home uses, manufacturing of products, industrial
heat, etc.), and the relationship between concentrations
in the gas or product at the point of use and exposures
to people. For example, if gas were used for industrial
heat to generate power where combustion products would be
vented through a stack, the concentrations of radioactivity
that could be permitted would probably be substantially
higher than if the gas were used for cooking or nonventeo
heating in the home.
The criteria for acceptable levels of exposure to a
suitable sample of exposed population groups must of course
be compatible with both the quantitative and qualitative
recommendations of the Federal Radiation Council. This
means that the concentration of byproduct material in
natural gas should be reduced to the extent practicable.
In view of the increasing importance of other sources of
exposure to ionizing radiation, the contribution of by-
product material in exempt natural gas produced by nuclear
stimulation should not take up a disproportionate share of
total exposures of the public to radiation from all sources.
It is too early at this time to estimate what that share
might be.
We do not believe it will be appropriate or reason-
able to establish a single limit, that is applicable to
all situations, in terms of either concentrations of
538
radioactivity introduced into a distribution system or
limits on radiation exposure to the public. For example,
we suspect that it will be desirable in the developmental
phase of the production of natural gas by nuclear stimu-
lation to carry out tracer experiments in distribution sys-
tems using some of the gas produced in experimental pro-
jects. Such experiments would be useful in developing data
on such items as the behavior of gas in distribution sys-
tems, dilution factors, and critical pathways of exposure
to man that are essential to the development of limits.
The limits on concentrations of byproduct material permitted
to be introduced into a pipeline distribution system for
such tracer experiments could, of course, be substantially
higher than limits on large volumes of gas produced by nu-
clear stimulation for ultimate distribution on a commercial
basis.
It is likely that the regulatory controls which will
initially be imposed on the introduction of gas into com-
mercial channels will differ from those used at a later
time when the technology has been more fully developed,
pathways of exposure and affected population groups have
been better identified, and the accuracy of theoretical
exposure models has been confirmed by field assessment.
As the commercial production phase is fully realized, it is
possible that both the methods and specific requirements
for control will vary from one gas field to another to
achieve common objectives in limiting exposures. This
could result from important differences among gas fields
and the areas they supply, such as differences in composi-
tion of the gas, production rates, collection and distri-
bution systems, and a difference in size or nature of con-
sumer groups using the gas.
There are, of course, many questions that will have
to be resolved as the Plowshare nuclear stimulation projects
move forward. For example, how should the exposure cri-
teria and limits be related to the total volume of gas pro-
duced by nuclear stimulation as compared to the total vol-
ume produced by conventional means particularly as this
ratio increases with the use of the nuclear stimulation
technique? How do we determine all of the important path-
ways of exposure and take into account the variation in
exposure among users of the gas? The AEC is depending upon
the information and data being developed in the Plowshare
experimental program to assist in answering some of these
questions and to serve as the basis for formulating those
controls necessary for the protection of public health and
safety. I would like to point out that any proposed regu-
lations that would be developed would, of course, first
539
-------
of all be reviewed at the highest level in the Commission
and would then be published for public comment before being
put into effect.
The criteria and controls for authorizing the distri-
bution and use of other products which may be produced as
a result of the Plowshare program will probably differ from
those which will be developed for regulating the distribu-
tion and use of natural gas produced by nuclear stimula-
tion. However, the basic approach discussed in this paper
would probably be about the same.
540
QUESTIONS FOR LESTER ROGERS
From George Anton:
Since the benefit in the risk versus benefit consideration fs not
really measureable, is not the actual interim practice in estab-
lishing criteria a matter of minimizing practicable exposures for
the activity being considered?
ANSWER:
I think the answer to that question is yes. It is a matter of mini-
mizing practical exposures for the activity that is being considered.
Of course once you minimize it, one then has to evaluate what likely
exposure there is to be and then a decision has to be made on the
basis of that benefit-risk balance.
2. From Charles Hardin:
Would you care to comment on the Question of jurisdiction or
regulatory responsi bi Ii ty for radi onucIi des re leased i nto consumer
products from Plowshare Projects, when such Projects are conducted
in Agreement States?
ANSWER:
I'll be gI ad to comment on tht s. I th i nk we shou1d ho Id in mi nd
the comment I made at the beginning of my paper and that is to
the effect that the question of just how the regulatory pattern
will develop for Plowshare is somewhat of an open question. But
I wi I I answer in light of the present regulatory relationship
between the Agreement States and the Atomic Energy Commission.
Now for those of you who do not understand what the Agreement
State Program is, in 1954 under the Atomic Energy Act, the
Atomic Energy Commission was given its responsibility for the regu-
lating of all types of atomic energy activities. There was some
question about the role of states in this area and in 1959, there
was an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act, Section 274, which
authorized the Commission to relinquish its regulatory responsi-
bilities for bi-product materials, source materials, quantities of
special nuclear material less than a critical mass, when the governor
of a state certified or entered into an agreement with the Commission.
There were certain activities which were reserved by the Commission,
including the regulation of the production utilization facilities,
nuclear power reactors. One other area that was reserved by the
Commission was to regulate the transfer of products intended for
use by the general public when this transfer was made by manufacture
in an Agreement State. Now the Commission's regulatory responsibility
for the transfer of products by manufacture in an Agreement State
541
-------
is limited to the safety of the product itself and the manufacturer
must have a license from the Atomic Energy Commission to transfer
that product. The in-p!ant safety, the manufacturing of that product,
is a responsibility of the Agreement State. So under the present
regulatory relationship, the Atomic Energy Commission would regulate
the release'of Plowshare products by the manufacturer and the manu-
facturer would need a license from the Atomic Energy Commission in
order to release that product in Agreement States as well as in Non-
Agreement States.
542
PLOWSHARE RADIATION PROTECTION GUIDANCE
H. M. Parker
Environmental and Life Sciences Division
Battelfe Memorial Institute
Pacific Northwest Laboratory
Rich I and, Wash i ngton
ABSTRACT
The recommendations of the ICRP and the NCRP were developed
primarily for occupational radiation exposures. They were later
modified and applied to non-occupational exposures of populations.
Theset with appropriate interpretations, can be used to provide
Plowshare radiation protection guidance.
Exposures from Plowshare operations will tend to be acute,
arising from radionualides of relatively short half-life^ but
will have some chronic aspects due to small amounts of long-lived
radionuclides generated. In addition, the neutron activation process
of Plowshare technology will produce radionuclides not commonly
encountered in routine nuclear energy programs.
How these radionuclides contribute to personnel exposure
is known for only a few situations that may not be representa-
tive of Plowshare exposure. Further complications arise from
differences in radionuolide deposition and physiological sensi-
tivity among individuals of different ages and states of health
in the exposed population. All parameters necessary to evaluate
such exposures are not available,, even for good quantitative
approximationst resulting in the need for interpretive experience.
INTRODUCTION
Nuclear energy has shown us its destructive for
to the application of radiation protection guidance to Plo*
pe^ + ab I I cihArt .
543
-------
The development of nuclear energy programs was accompanied by effec-
tive radiation safety programs. An exceptionally good radiation safety record
resulted. The constructive application of nuclear energy to Plowshare pro-
grams should be accomplished with a similar radiation safety performance
record. Well-balanced plans to assure radiation safety for all Plowshare
programs are a necessity.
As with any safety program, the commonly undiscussed balance between
the benefits to be gained and the risks to be incurred needs to be made so
that the appropriate radiation protection guidance can be used. The difficult
questions for selecting radiation protection guidance for Plowshare are: Who
will make the benefits versus risks balance? And then once made, who will
accept the balance? It is too much to anticipate a balance that will be
accepted by everyone. What, then is the reasonable course of action?
It would appear that only professional authoritative groups, such as
the NCRP, FRC, or the ICRP, are in a position adequately divorced from the
controls and influences of government, trade unions, and the public to provide
the necessary benefit-risk balance, and hence, the selection of the appropriate
radiation protection guidance. To provide guidance is not to be confused with
determining performance. The AEC and the Public Health Service both have
major roles in assessing and evaluating environmental conditions resulting
from Plowshare activities. They both have the important role of determining
just how well Plowshare programs meet the prescribed radiation protection
guidance.
DISCUSSIONS
Presently available radiation protection guides include the publications
of the NCRP, ICRP, FRC and the IAEA, All of these recommendations are based on
limiting and controlling the radiation dose to the individual, be he a radiation
worker or a member of the general public. All concentration limits that are
derived are ultimately based on controlling radionuclide intake and depositions
so as not to exceed some prescribed dose limit.
One or more of the NCRP or FRC guides may be translated into recom-
mendations for Plowshare radiation protection guidance. For example, some
may suggest the prescribed guides for the public exposee or for the general
public can yield recommendations directly applicable to Plowshare radiation
protection. Others may advocate the use of the dose limits for the radi-
ation workers as Plowshare control limits. A few may advocate dose Iimitb
even higher than the annual limits recommended for radiation workers because
of the relatively short durations of the Plowshare radiation exposures. I
would suggest that only the guidance for the public exposee and for the
general public can be unequivocably identified as applicable for Plowshare
radiation protection guidance.
Several factors need to be considered in selecting the proper radiation
protection guidance for Plowshare. The principal factors of concern are the
size of the group to be exposed by a Plowshare program and the extent to which
544
the group can be monitored and moved to control its exposure. These factors
may not always be the same for each Plowshare program. This is perhaps the
most troublesome and often least appreciated aspect of some current deliber-
ations on this subject. By accepting the concept of different guidance for
different Plowshare programs, the risk versus benefit balance can be made more
justly. Before developing the potential of this approach, a short review of
the basis for the various radiation protection guidance for the workers, the
public exposee, and the general public may be helpful.
For the radiation worker, dose I i mi f's were established such that a
lifetime of occupational exposure within the dose limits would not result in
deleterious effects that would be objectionable to the individual or to his
physician. The public exposee is identified as the maximumly exposed individual
of the general public. His exposure is limited to 0.5 rems per year primarily
to avoid exposure of the fetus, although his general state of health and age
are important factors also. For the general public, the radiation dose guid-
ance is based on genetic mutation considerations.
Guidance for the occupational exposure to radiation is given by the
Equation, Dose = 5(N-1B), where the dose is in rems and N is the age of the
individual. This expression determines the acceptable occupational dose
that may be delivered in a well distributed pattern of both low dose and low
dose rate to the whole body. The critical organs, in determining the whole
body limit, are the gonads and the red bone marrow. It is important to
remember that the pattern of exposure needs to be relatively uniform with no
short periods of high exposure followed by long periods of little or no expo-
sure.
The exposure controls for the non-radiation worker are defined in two
ways. The public exposee, or individual, should, have his radiation exposure
limited to 0.5 rems per year; however, the general public as a whole should
receive exposure at a rate not exceeding 5 rems in 30 years, or about 0.17 rems
per year. The rate of accumulation of this exposure should be relatively
uniform. It would not be a good practice to exceed the 0.17 rems/yr rate.
A more detailed review of these dose limits indicate that there are
three categories of occupational limits: 1) the critical organ, 2) the limit-
ing organ, and 3) definable special cases. The 5CN-18) dose guidance is applie
to the critical organs. A dose of 15 rems per year is defined as the maximum
permissible for the limiting organs. Special definable cases are treated
individually. Two cases of common interest are potentially pregnant women,
whose dose is to be limited to 0.5 rem per year, and the fingers of the hands
and the forearm. The fingers may receive up to 75 rems per year; while the
transition area, the forearm, is permitted up to 30 rems per year.
Now, to return to the concept of different guidance for different Plow-
share programs. If a small group of individuals will be' involved in a
Plowshare program and if this group can be totally monitored and their dose
controlled by actions taken after the Plowshare event, should this become
necessary, then control of exposures to near the public exposee limit of
545
-------
0.5 rems per year seems appropriate. By individual monitoring, their actual
radiation exposure from all sources is known. If a large group of individuals
will be involved, such that individual monitoring or subsequent control is not
feasible or possible for any reason, then the general public guidance should
be used and their exposure should be limited to 5 rems per 30 years, or about
0.17 rems per year.
Some may advance the concept that the short duration of the exposure
for Plowshare detonations provides increased latitude and tends to permit
higher doses than those normally recommended for the general public. Such
an approach is not to be recommended because even short-term radiation levels,
equal to or approaching those established as acceptable for radiation workers,
may not be without some deleterious effect to special groups within the general
population, particularly those in early pregnancy.
The very wide variations between the makeup of a worker population and
a general population support the appropriateness of the public exposee or the
general public limit guidance. Not many would advocate the exposure of
pregnant women, children, the elderly, sick or chronically iI I to doses com-
parable to those permitted safely to a select group of radiation workers or to
a group whose exposure was monitored and was controllable to a reasonable
extent.
The ability to monitor and control the radiation dose to the population
involved should be realistically determined to decide if the public exposee or
the general population guidance should be used. The radionuclides to be en-
countered and their exposure path to and in the body should be determined so
that the allowable dose for each radionuclide can be established. The envi-
ronmental pathways and dietary habits of the population can be used to deter-
mine the permissible rates of intake for each radionuclide. Dilution factors
and radiation control practices appropriate to the specific needs of the
Plowshare program can be defined—all within the radiation protection guidance
currently available. One really needs to practice the old cliche, "Expect
the Unexpected," in each step of this calculation.
What about considerations arising from possible multiple sources of
exposure? Others have recommended reduction factors for the general population
limits of 10 or 100 to 0.5 rems per year or 0.005 rems per year In the assign-
ment of acceptable dose accumulation rates to particular radionucl ides to make
allowance for multiple radiation source contributions. Let's think about
such calculations. They do not affect the basic dose guidance for Plowshare.
They are a type of "allowance factor" to be applied in calculating doses to be
permitted from particular radio isotopes. If, for a given Plowshare program,
three radionuclides were present for ingestion and each of these had the whole
body as the critical organ, then allowing 1/3 of 0.5 rems per year or 1/3 of
0.17 rems per year for each radionuclide would be in order, however, the basic
guidance has not changed. If some other unrelated source of exposure could be
identified, then an appropriate allowance also should be made for it. However,
a practical analysis of the recommendations to use reduction factors of 10 or
100 arbitrarily for all Plowshare programs immediately runs into difficulty.
While keeping radiation exposure at the lowest practical level is our prime
546
and absolute objective, it is, however, not appropriate to prescribe mandatory
control limits with unneeded conservatism. One should consider multiple
radiation sources exposures of the general public only as they become identi-
fied. It is not necessary to develop Plowshare protection guidance from such
a restrictive position.
One can always consider the likelihood that a Plowshare population will
also be in a position to receive substantial multiple source exposures from
unknown activities. With the limited current Plowshare program and the diverse
locations where future programs may be conducted, the potential for exceeding
the population control limits from multiple sources exposures unknowingly
seems remote. To impose the more restrictive controls at this time is to apply
an unjust, improper benefit-risk burden on the developing Plowshare program.
Guidance at 5 rems per 30 years or less also seems advisable when
considering the use of Plowshare products by the general public. Consider
the tritium contamination in Plowshare-assisted natural gas wells. The
distribution of this natural gas and its small amount of tritium to homes
over very wide parts of the country can lead to the exposure of a very large
population under unmonitored conditions. This is clearly a general population
exposure in its fullest sense.
One might consider the benefit-risk balance made by a family with
respect to natural gas associated with Plowshare programs. I dare speculate
that many a family would make the benefit-risk balance at a higher cost of
gas and the absence or near-absence of tritium. Similar considerations
enforce and support actions to very seriously keep radiation exposures as low
as practical. There is more in the benefit-risk balance than company profits
and technical safety. Each family will have its own criteria for measuring
benefits and risks and hence, the general acceptability of Plowshare-linked
products. One should be reluctant to break with the long standing guidance
on exposure of the general population in any Plowshare program. It would
seem prudent to advise exposure control limits no more restrictive and no more
liberal than those used for some time now. Any change would call for a complete
review of the technical basis for change by the NCRP or FRC.
We cannot arbitrarily decide what cost will be attributed to Plowshare
radiation protection activities due to the selected radiation protection
guidance or what cost can be devoted to ecological studies to support dose
estimations. Each situation may be unique, and adequate information needs to
be collected before, during and after each program to demonstrate that a com-
pletely safe program within the dose guidance is attained. The conditions
of each Plowshare program will determine the cost required to provide total
adequate, but not excessive, radiation protection.
Two questions of thoughtful concern: What are the international legal
aspects of programs on foreign soils? What recourse might occur if improper
programs were planned or actually performed? The treaties authorizing U.S.
Plowshare programs on foreign soils will undoubtedly determine the levels of
exposure that will be anticipated.
547
-------
Some International authoritative review body would seem to have a
role to play in providing assurances that necessary and adequate precautions
and care were taken In planning and executing each test. Perhaps an arm of
the IAEA could provide this help. It wi11 be a challenging task. It needs
to be performed soundly, but on a very timely basis. An overseei—not a
roadblock—is needed.
SUMMARY "•
It appears appropriate to evaluate each Plowshare program individually,
providing the necessary -studies and population considerations, so that one may
use the correct dose limit guidance for determining acceptable conditions. The
AEC and the Public Health Service need to give careful attention to collecting
and analyzing environmental exposures and dose data so that we may learn from
experiences and assure safe conditions. We need to maintain the good record
of the nuclear energy program by not making unsafe errors in estimating the
consequences of any Plowsare programs.
Plowshare can be performed safely. To do so requires good judgment,
sound application of existing radiation protection guidance, and sufficient
funding to meet the needs of practical safety programs. A safe approach
using the public exposee or the general population dose control limits, as
the situation may demand, is necessary to helpvassure the rapid development
of Plowshare programs. A high priority should be assigned to developing methods
to apply the existing radiation protection guidance so that Plowshare programs
may proceed safely.
There seems to be no doubt but that the peaceful applications of
nuclear energy in Plowshare programs will develop as rapidly as funding and
commercial opportunities present themselves. The safe history of the nuclear
Industry, the long-term potential benefits, and the varied applications for
developing Plowshare technology may be at stake if authoritative and sound
radiation protection methods are not Incorporated in all Plowshare applications.
If Plowshare does not get off with a safe, well accepted record of radiation
management and control, then its potential benefits will be doubly difficult
to develop. It would be a long and difficult task for Plowshare to attain e
right finish after making a wrong start.
QUESTION FOR HERBERT M. PARKER
From R. Duff:
Will you comment more quantitatively about the non-linear effects
of low level radiation exposure recently discovered?
ANSWER:
Most radiation protectionists are generalists who have some com-
petence in reviewing the work of others. It has taken three decades,
remember, to get some sense into this despite the fact that the very
best radiobtologtsts in the world have been working on it. I think
'it would be very imprudent of me to comment at great lengths. I
would refer the questioner to the genetic case which is the one, I
think that socially is the most troublesome. I say that partly on
the grounds that it's not too bad if we louse up this generation, but
if we louse up the next hundred generations, that's a different issue.
Work in the area of genetics is essentially done through the out-
standing findings of Russell and Russell at Oak Ridge. Those of you
who were at the other symposium I addressed about a month ago heard
a superb review by Dr. Russell in terms that those of us who are not
geneticists, like myself, could really understand and I believe that
is going to be published by Lawrence Radiation Laboratory. I
wouldn't know a finer quick reference to what really has been found
out about effects of low dose rate and low dosage both, in this case
of course in the mouse and carried over inferentially to the human
case. Male and female cases are very different and there may be
some experts in the room who would volunteer to fill this in more
fully. I would rather not.
548
549
-------
SESSION V - EXISTING AND REQUIRED RESEARCH FOR DEVELOPMENT OF
RADIATION PROTECTION GUIDANCE FOR PLOWSHARE
Chairman: Mr. Charles L. Weaver
Bureau of Radiological Health
U. S. Public Health Service
Roc kv iI I e
-------
METHODS OF ESTIMATING POPULATION EXPOSURES FROM
PLOWSHARE APPLICATIONS*
Stephen V. Kaye and Paul S. Rohwer
Health Physics Division, Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Oak Ridge, Tennessee
ABSTRACT
When estimating doses to populations it is necessary
to divide the total population into groups that have param-
eters of similar type and magnitude in order to identify
critical population groups. Age groups constitute the most
' basic and generally useful way of dividing the total popu-
lation for estimating dose. Models for estimating dose,
particularly the internal dose from inhalation and ingestion
of radioactivity, should be written as a function of age.
The importance of considering age-dependency is emphasized
by the fact that some of the internal dose parameters change
by as much as a factor of ten for some radionuclides when
comparing a one year old with an adult. A computer code
called INREM has been written which can consider all internal
dose parameters as a function of age. The major limitation
in using this computer code for all radionuclides is the
paucity of age-dependent input data for many radionuclides.
Tritium, iodine, cesium, and strontium nave been studied in
detail with INREM and the results and interpretations are
discussed. Another code, EXREM, computes the external dose
rates and cumulative doses from both beta particles and
gamma photons from submersion in a radioactive cloud, sub-
mersion in contaminated water and exposure above a contam-
inated land surface. This code can consider up to 25
Plowshare detonations and a variety of combinations for
calculating doses and dose rates in relation to a detonation
schedule. The importance of using both INREM and EXREM to
estimate the total dose to a population group is stressed.
INTRODUCTION
Not many years ago almost all estimates of internal radiation
dose were based on biological parameters developed for a notional
^Research sponsored by the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission under
contract with the Union Carbide Corporation.
550
adult radiation worker known as "standard man.- The standard man con-
cept has been useful for estimating radiation dose to the adult radiation
worker. When this concept is applied to the general population, the dose
estimates are inadequate because standard man represents only a relatively
small group in the general population. Most health physicists recognize
this shortcoming and considerable effort has been expended to develop
methods for estimating potential doses to other groups in the population.
Additional effort is justified here because potential sources of radi-
ation exposures to the general population are increasing at a rapid
rate. We do not mean to imply that every source of potential exposure
represents a real hazard to man. Everyone knows that the atomic energy
industry has an excellent record of safety both for the worker and for
the public. The point which we wish to make here is that, in order to
maintain this outstanding safety record, the expertise for estimating
exposures to the general population must keep pace with expanded uses
of atomic energy. In the past few years we have seen a phenomenal
growth in nuclear power generation, and possibly in the near future we
will see a beginning of the utilization of the Plowshare concepts.
Thus, emphasis should be placed now on further development of methods
for estimating the expected doses to various groups comprising the
general population.
Objectives for Estimating Dose
Not all situations require estimation of expected dose; sometimes
an upper limit or conservative estimate of dose is adequate. One of
the most important objectives of a program for estimating potential
radiation doses from a Plowshare application is to provide evidence of
compliance with regulations and guidelines safeguarding the public
health. Some of the recognized authorities publishing guidelines and
regulations on radiation exposure limitations include the International
Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), the National Council on
Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP), the Federal Radiation
Council (FRO, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission CAEC), and the state
regulatory agencies. One of the hoped for achievements of the Plowshare
sponsored research at ORNL is that present efforts to predict expected
doses from various Plowshare applications will be successful in
providing some of the necessary ground work for the FRC and AEC regu-
latory groups to set guidelines applicable in this area. Presently,
there are no specific guidelines or regulations dealing with the pos-
sible population exposures from Plowshare applications.
The preliminary predetonation safety of the operation can be
evaluated usually with conservative methods such as those recommended
by Ng ejt aj_. of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory.' The technique
which they have adopted for predicting the maximum radiation dose to
man from internal sources is based upon the specific activity concept.
The conservative aspects of this approach were analyzed in detail by
Kaye and Nelson,^ as were the many factors which could affect the
usefulness of this approach for assessing the possible radiological
consequences of activity releases. The limitations appear to be most
551
-------
restrictive for terrestrial environments where there may be incomplete
mixing and unequal availability of the radioisotope and its stable
analogue.
Ng and co-workers have emphasized that the preshot prediction
should not serve the sole purpose of preshot rad-safe analysis, but
it should also provide guidance for the post-shot documentation. They
point out that this guidance may include where to measure, what to
measure, and even the precision required for the measurements. Since
the post-detonation analysis is based on actual measurements, it can
be expected to yield results which will be useful for improving the
predetonation predictions of safety.
We believe that there is a distinct possibility that the future
of Plowshare applications may be influenced more by public acceptance
than by any other important factor. Proposed operations may meet all
of the requirements of the recognized authorities that have pertinent
regulations and guidelines, but the public may not want to be sub-
jected to any radiation dose resulting from a Plowshare application.
We believe that public opinion will exert a strong enough influence
to require very detailed hazard analyses which estimate the expected^
dose to each population group exposed by any peaceful application
of nuclear explosives.
Each new application may be expected to benefit from the lessons
learned from previous applications. Eventually, this feedback should
result in an accumulation of data necessary to make good dose predic-
tions.
Essential Information for Dose Estimates
The information required for a program to estimate dose to members
of the general public has been divided arbitrarily into five categories
by Kaye et^aj_.^ for activity releases to the environment. The five
categories of information are: 1) inventory of radionucI ides produced
and fractions released to the environment; 2) environmental dilution
or concentration factors; 3) intake and/or exposure-time factors;
4) biological parameters and habits characterizing the populations
being exposed; and 5) dose-estimation equations. The extent of this
information indicates the complexity of dose estimation for the
general public. A successful program requires the cooperation of
many individuals and groups and careful integration of the essential
information to provide maximum effectiveness in protecting public
health.
Modes of Exposure and Exposure Pathways
A "mode of exposure" is the manner in which a person is exposed.
The principal modes of exposure expected to be responsible for most, if
not all, of the potential exposures from peaceful nuclear detonations
are represented schematically in Figure 1. The modes of external
552
exposure are submersion in a radioactive cloud, exposure above <) con-
taminated landscape, and submersion in contaminated water. The modes
of internal exposure are inhalation and ingestion of radioactivity.
For external exposure, the radiation source is exterior to the body of
the person being irradiated; and when either the person or the source
is removed, the person ceases to be exposed. Internal exposure is a
different case because the radiation source is inside the body of the
person, and the exposure may continue for years after the last intake
of radioactivity, if the effective half-time of the radionuclide in
the body is sufficiently long.
Exposure pathways are the actual routes of exposure for a par-
ticular mode. Consider the ingestion mode; the pathways for this
mode are the different intakes of contaminated foods and beverages.
Submersion in water would probably be made up of two pathways, bathing
and swimming.
The modes of exposure (and the exposure pathways making up these
modes of exposure) which will result in the largest dose equivalents
to the population groups depend upon many factors. Of primary impor-
tance is the type of nuclear application, i.e., gas stimulation, ore
fracturing, underground cavity formation, or cratering for a canal or
harbor. Many applications will have to be evaluated separately before
generalizations can be formulated regarding the importance of the
various modes and pathways of exposure.
Ecological Systems Analysis as a Method for Predicting the Expected Dose
Although systems analysis is a relatively new technique to the
field of ecology, it has been used successfully for a number of years
in many other areas of science, engineering, and business. In this
respect, we define systems analysis as the study of the dynamic be-
havior of a system of coupled compartments. The major question to be
answered with the systems analysis methodology is, "How much of the
radioactivity released to the environment will expose man both internally
and externally as a function of time?"
We visualize the coupling of compart-.^nts as routes for the
transfer of materials between compartments making up the system. This
may be represented graphically by a coupled compartment diagram, and
differential or difference equations may be written for the inventory
of materials in each compartment. Because of the interconnections, or
coupling of compartments, no one compartment functions on its own;
the dynamic behavior of each compartment is determined by the net
effect of all of the other compartments. Thus, it is necessary to use
a computer to solve the equations to determine the temporal responses
of all of the compartments making up a system. An example of a famil-
iar system for health physicists is a pasture contaminated by fallout
containing radioiodine. The gross compartments of interest in this
system include soil, runoff, forage, cattle, beef, and dairy products.
553
-------
To utilize the systems analysis approach for assessing the expected
dose from an environmental release, the following three steps are in-
volved: 1) environmental measurements and experimentation, 2) param-
eter identification, and 3) systems analysis. The ecological research
must be carefully planned and carried out to measure the environmental
transfer coefficients which quantify the inter-compartmental transfers.
The environmental transfer coefficients of a system are the most im-
portant and unique parameters required for systems analysis. The
second step, parameter identification, is applied to the field data
which are plotted as a function of time. Parameter identification is
the actual assignment of a numerical value to the coefficient based on
experimental data. Problems of uniqueness and time-varying parameters
are encountered here, but considerable help is available from techniques
available in other fields. Steps 2 and 3 are independent of the type
of data (biological or physical) because these steps are mathematical
and, as stated above, have already been highly refined by work in other
fields. Many excellent systems analysis computer codes have already
been written and may be used without major change for environmental
hazards analysis. For instance, the MATEXP and SFR-3 systems analysis
codes written for nuclear reactor dynamics studies were used by Kaye
and Ball4 in the systems analysis of a coupled compartment model for
radionuclide transfer in a tropical environment. The MATEXP code
utilizes a transient analysis while the SFR-3 utilizes a frequency
response and a sensitivity analysis which relates parameter uncertain-
ties to performance uncertainties. Sensitivity analysis has great
promise for identifying critical pathways and critical population
groups. If we let ARj represent the response of a compartment of
interest (change in concentration of radioactivity in a potential food
item) to AP:, a change in a parameter (the environmental transfer co-
efficient is increased or decreased), then we can define sensitivity
mathematically as
Lim
AP-K)
iR,
AP
j
3R.
3P. '
(1)
This relationship can be used to indicate which parameters are most
accountable for the radioactivity in a particular food item and thus
may suggest some remedial action to divert this radioactivity to a
compartment which has negligible inputs to man. Complex environmental
systems which have multiple couplings with feedbacks are readily
adapted to systems analysis if the transfer coefficients are known.
Environmental transfer coefficients are not easy to determine and the
need for them has not always been apparent. However, information on a
few systems is already available in the literature to formulate envi-
ronmental transfer coefficients which can be used in working models.
RadioecologicaI research underway at Oak Ridge National Laboratory
is producing a body of information on radionuclide cycling which is
useful for systems analysis.
554
Considerable emphasis is being placed on systems analysis as a
major technique in proposals supporting the International Biological
Program (IBP). It may be that IBP will result in the first large
scale test of environmental systems analysis, and thus lay the ground-
work for more extensive applications in environmental dose estimation.
DEVELOPMENT OF AGE-DEPENDENT MODELS FOR INTERNAL DOSE
To identify the critical population groups, it is necessary,
when estimating doses to populations, to consider the total popu-
lation in terms of homogeneous groups having parameters of similar
type and magnitude. Age groups constitute a basic and generally use-
ful way of dividing the total population for estimating dose. Models
for estimating dose, particularly the internal dose from inhalation
and ingestion of radioactivity, should be written as a function of
age. The importance of considering age-dependency is emphasized by
the fact that certain of the internal dose parameters change by as
much as D factor of ten for some radionuclides when comparing a one
year old with an adult. If the exposure continues over a long
enough period, the aging of the person becomes a factor, i.e., the
biological parameters and the intake function may change, and the
internal dose computations should be made using the applicable input
data.
Guidance is given in ICRP Report 2 for developing equations for
estimating internal dose to the various organs of standard man re-
sulting from ingestion and inhalation of radioactivity. These basic
ideas can be used for developing a model which has each term expressed
as a function of the age of the individual. Such a model can be used
to compute the dose as a function of age, which may be useful in
identifying the critical population groups as recommended by the ICRP
in Report 7.6
All Organs Except the Gl Tract
The rate of change of organ burden B is given by
^p = If - XB CuCi/day), (2)
where I = daily intake (pCi/day),
f = fraction of I deposited in the organ, and
X = effective elimination constant (day ).
This expression is a modification of Eq. (5) of ICRP Report 2, and may
be expanded to apply to the i**1 radionuclide in the k"*~n organ for a
person born at tb. The age of the individual at time t (usually
555
-------
revision of Eq. 1 which is rearranged for solution as a non-homogeneous,
first order, linear differential equation:
—r;r-+ \.. (t - t,) B., = I. (t - t,, t) f., Ct - t.) (pCi/day). (3)
dt ik biki b ik b
Note that I is written as a function of age, t - t , and as a function
of time, t. This equation is now of the form
B' + a(t) B = b(t),
where a = X., (t - t, } which we let equal X.. (r), and
ik b i k
In this formulation, both s and r are dummy variables. It follows that
the solut ion to Eq. (3) for organ burden is g i ven by
= exp
~r b
-J.t xi
ds (uCi)
The dose rgte dDjk/dt is simply the product of organ burden,
times the effective absorbed energy per gram [z j ^(t-t^l/m^tt-ttj)]
of critical organ, times a constant to convert MeV to rems, and is
written
dD
ik
dt
Crem/day)
(5)
The next step is to write the integral form of the equation by substi
tuting the right side of Eq. (4) for Bik(t-tb, t) in Eq. (5), and
chanqinq the sequence of integration so that we integrate first with
changing the sequence of integ
respect to t as written here:
556
Dik
,(r)dr
rt-t
exp | -/ xjk-
b
(6)
The limits of integration have been changed to account for the change
i n sequence of i ntegration. It is imp licit that for t < t ^, I. and
eIk are equal to zero. Both t and s in Eq. (6) are dummy variables
and they may be interchanged to obtain the final form which applies to
any organ except the Gl tract:
t-tb, t) fik(t-tb)
, /"f2 e.. (s-t. )
' / i k b
J t m. (s-t. )
ds ) dt (rem).
(7)
Equation (7) above is the model which is programmed in the INREM code
for cumulative dose to all organs except the Gl tract.
The relationships of the time variables used in Eq. (7) are
illustrated with the following time scale:
The reference point (tQ) is usually set equal to the time of the first
detonation for convenience. All other points in time are evaluated by
their position relative to tg. The time of birth (t^) of the individua
need not occur before tQ as shown here; it may take on any value equal
to or less than t^. The beginning and the end of the time period for
which dose is to be integrated are designated t, and ^2* respectively.
Radioactivity entering the body prior to t1 is not included in the dose
calculation; therefore, ti usually is set equal to the time at which
557
-------
radionuclide intake begins. The variables t, s, and r are dummy vari-
ables of integration for the three integrals in the equation.
This model implies a continuous intake changing with age and time,
and alt other terms changing with age. Since the hand solution of Eq.(7)
is not practical, it is in a computer code called INREM. Great flexi-
bility is built into the code so that many radionuclides, body organs,
and age groups can be handled in one run of the computer. The code
handles standard-man calculations as well as age-dependent calculations.
The radionuclide intake (pCi/day) is one of the primary input
data required for an age-dependent calculation. This information is put
into INREM as "points" from a graph of pCi/day intake vs. time since
the reference detonation. There is one graph per age group and the
number of points taken from each graph is usually determined by the
number of inflections in the curve, since the computer actually recon-
structs the graph by a linear interpolation between points. INREM
accepts up to 100 such intake points per age group and up to 25 age
groups.
Gl Tract as the Critical Organ
For dosimetry purposes, the ICRP Report 2 recognizes the Gl
Tract as being divided into four segments (stomach, small intestine,
upper large intestine, and lower large intestine). This requires that
a different equation be written to estimate the dose to each segment
as a result" of the passage of radioactivity. Such equations must
include the time required for the intake to reach the segment of
interest, the time required for emptying the segment, the mass of the
segment plus contents, and the fraction of the ingested radioactivity
which is absorbed by the blood. An alternative way of estimating
the dose to the Gl tract from any intake is to relate the intake to
dose received from intake at the (MPC)g or (MPC)W. The advantages
of this approach are that only one equation is required and that it util-
izes the MPC for the critical segment which already has built into it
all the factors mentioned above.
write
If the maximum permissible dose rate is 0.3 rem/wk, then we can
0.3/7
A. (MPC). .
J 'Jo
(8)
where A- = intake (cnrVday) of air (j = 1) or water (j=2), and
= the maximum permissible concentration (pCi/cm')
of the i radionuclide in air (j=l) or water (j=2)
where the i^*1 radionuclide is soluble (a=1) or
insoluble (a=2).
558
The dose from any single intake can be computed by direct substitu-
tion into Eq.(8) and by assuming that the simple proportion holds.
Rewriting Eq.(8) by substituting the single uCi intake, Sj, for uCi
in the denominator gives
0.3/7 S.
(rem).
This equation applies to standard man only, and must be multiplied by
a modifying factor, h (I), to make it age dependent. The dose to a
person in the Ith age group is given by
0.3/7 S.hU)
A. (MPC). .
(rem)
(10)
for a single intake. The subscript n is an index for standard man. As
written in Eq.(IO), h(t) is the product of three modifying internal
dose variables found in Eq.(14) of ICRP Report 2, and which are ratioed
to their respective standard man values. Other variables, such as
residence time of food in the critical segment could be included also,
but no body of age-dependent data is available for these parameters.
Thus,
hU> =
fujo/finja
(11)
where mp = mass (g) of the critical segment of the Gl tract of an
individual in the ith age group,
e. = effective absorbed energy (MeV) of the i radionuclide of
I iOL
type a in the critical segment of the Gl tract of an
individual in the i age group, and
f. . = fraction of the intake from inhalation or ingestion of the
llJa jth radionuclide of type a reaching the critical segment of
the Gl tract of an individual in the i1"" age group.
As a matter of convenience for simplifying the final form of the model,
let
0.
-------
If we assume a continuous intake of I. uCi/day as a function of
age and time, the cumulative dose model can'be written in the integral
form after substitution of the age-dependent correction factors for h(JU:
D.. (t t,,t.) = 0.3/7 f 2 I.(t-t.,
U" ' 2 b A. (MFC).. I ' b
jn 'jo-1 t,
tj pi
-------
The concentration, Cjp^(t), is derived from the nuclide chain
equat ions for rad ioact i ve decay. For a s i nqIe environmenta1 re I ease, an
explicit expression for the concentration at time t of the i radio-
nuclide in a pathway is denoted by
C—expf-x,!), , = ,.
C „ exp(-X.T)+T
> P '
Y..(T)X.
'J J +
l, (16)
o •
i-1
7T
VT,=[
if k=i-l
exp(-i.T) - exp (-X.T)
(X.-X.)T
i J
A . = rad iologica I decay constant (hours ) of the
rad ionucI i de,
f. = fraction of nuclei of the
i -H nuc I i de in the pathway,
radionuclide which decays to the
CT „ = q . Y.,
ipi ypia i
g . = location correction factor for the i radionuclide, the p
mode of exposure, and the i location, and
Y.
yield
of the environmental release.
To determi ne the concentrat ion of a radionuclide in a chain con-
ta i n i ng more than one pathway, contr i but ions for the nucIi de are summed
for each pathway which is unique up to that radionuclide.
The concentration, MC[D£(t), at time t of the i radionuclide re-
sulting from M environmental releases is obtained by evaluating Eq.(16)
where
C°
ipt
and where
(17)
562
t = time (hours) of the M environmental release,
for the M environmental release,
Mth
C (T ) = the concentration at time T,, of the i radionuclide resulting
M-1 ip £ M M
from the f i rst M-1 env i ronmenta I re I eases.
Obv i ousIy, on I y d i g i ta I computer solut ion is pract ica I for the externaI
dose model because the complexity of the calculations involves multiple
detonations, decay chains with branching, severa I modes of exposure,
and the Iarge number of radionuclides usually cons i dered. The EXREM
code has flexibility in handling probI ems of vary i ng compI ex i ty. Up to
fifty dose rates and/or total doses may be computed for each nuclide in
each mode of exposure. This code prints out separately the doses and
dose rates from the gamma photons and the beta particles of each radio-
nuclide, as well as the total dose and total dose rate by summing the
beta and gamma contributions (for some assessments, dose rate as wel I
as total dose is important). The latest version of this code is described
in more detail in a publication by Turner.
USING EXREM AND INREM TO ESTIMATE DOSE
A simple problem is postulated to apply the methodology discussed
in this paper. There are two reasons for including this problem. First,
to identify the type of input data required to carry out the computations,
and, second, to illustrate the format of the results of the dose compu-
tations for a cratering type of Plowshare application.
Many radiologicaI-assessments of a contaminating event are based
on conservative assumptions. Frequently, life-time or infinite gamma
from erosion, infiltration into the soil profile, wind, removal by
animals, plowing, etc., will tend to decrease the radiation field also.
Radioactive decay can be viewed as a loss of radioactive atoms from
the system, commonly denoted by the radioactive decay constant, Xr,
and the environmental inputs and losses can be described by the
algebraic sum of the appropriate transfer coefficients. For simplicity,
we consider only the net coefficient here, denoted as the environ-
mental transfer coefficient, Xe, which leads to the relationship
where X
A = *e + Xp , (18)
is defined as the effective decay constant. Substituting the
563
-------
corresponding half-times into Eq.(18) gives the following relationship:
T T
T=TTF •
e r
where
T = effective half-time,
T = environmental half-time, and
T = radioactive ha If-life.
In the treatment of the hypothetical problem which follows, we compute
both expected doses using T = TeTr/Te+Tr and conservative doses using
T - Tr and compare one with the other.
The levels of radioactivity we choose are completely arbitrary
and are not related to any real Plowshare applications. Figure 2 is a
block diagram representing in abstract form the problem we postulate and
analyze in the following pages.
The type of application postulated is a project requiring two
cratering detonations which vent to the atmosphere. Only "Cs and Ba
are vented, leading to exposure of the population by the modes shown in
Figure 2.
Outl i_ne_gf_ Hypothetical Prpbjejn
f. Source Term
A. Production vented per detonation = 1 Ci Cs- Ba.
B. Detonation schedule: Det. No. 1 at t=0 and Det. No. 2 at t=30 days.
I I. Radioactive Cloud
A. Time to reach the location of interest = 4 hours.
B. Time to pass over the location of interest = 1 hour.
10~14/cm3 = 10~8uCi/cm3, where
c- Concentration in cloud = 106yCi
10~^/cm is the location correction factor relating the fraction
vended and the concentration per cm3of air at the location of interest.
D. Inhaled vCi per detonation by a person in the t*" age group =
10~8pCi/cm3 x cm air breathed in 1 hour by that person.
III. Deposition of Fallout on Landscape
A. Exposure to contaminated landscape.
1. Concentration = 10 pCi x 10~ /cm = 10 uCi/cm ,
where 10"13/cm^ is the location correction factor
relating the fraction vented and deposition per cm
of land surface at the location of interest.
2. Height above landscape for which dose is to be
estimated = 100 cm.
3. Environmental half-time of Cs on the land surface = 1
year; thus, the effective half-time of '3'Cs on land
surface is 0.97 years.
B. Ingestion of food.
1. Age-dependent parameters in the INREM code are evaluated
with the information in Tables 1 and 2.
2. Maximum concentration of ^ Cs In food after each
detonat ion = 10 yCi/g; the maxi mum i s reached on
the 14th day following the detonation.
3. Radionuclide intake (uCi/day) = I' x C.
4. Effective half-time of Cs in the food is one year.
Transfer of Radioactivity to Surface Waters
A. Submersion in water.
1. Concentration = 106uCi x 10-I3/cm3 = 10~7yCi/cm3,
where 10 Vcm is the location correction factor
relat i ng the f ract ion vented and the concentrat ion
per cm-' of water at the location of interest.
2. Use factor = 0.5 hours/day.
3. Env i ronmentaI ha If-t i me of Cs i n the surface water
is 20 days; thus, the effective half-time of 137Cs in
surface water is also 20 days.
B. Ingestion of water.
1. Treatment similar to item I I IB.
2. Maximum concentration of 3 Cs in surface water
after each detonation = 10~"uCi/cm ; the maximum
is reached on the second day following the detonation.
3. Effective half-time of 137Cs in the surface water is
20 days.
Populat ion
A. Demographic data included in Table 3.
B. Median age = 28 years.
C. NM = NF = 5000.
D. WM = wp.
E. w for entire population estimated at 1.3 based on current
U. S. values for population size, birth rate, and life ex-
pectancy at birth.
564
565
-------
Results of Calculations for Hypdthetical Problem
The cumulative total body dose curves generated with the INREM and
EXREM computer codes for all modes of exposure are shown In Figure 3.
Only estimates applicable to adults are plotted for internal dose.
Submersion in the radioactive cloud is unique because the exposure lasts
only a relatively short time (one hour in the case of the example
problem). Consequently, the radioactive ha If- Iife is used for this
calculation because the source term represents an average concentration.
The expected cumulat ive dose due to submers ion in contami nated water is
so low (3.5 x 10 mrem) that it does not appear on this graph. On the
other hand, Figure 3 shows that drinking the same water results in a
dose commitment of 2.2 x 10 mrem, almost one hundred times larger.
Obviously, increasing the use factor from 0.5 hours per day for submer-
sion in water to 2 or 3 hours per day would not result in doses even
approaching those from drinking the same water. The magnitude of the
differences in doses here is independent of the concentration of radio-
activity in water, but is dependent on the type and energy of the
radiafion emitted. A similar comparison can be made of the relative
hazard from submersion in a radioactive cloud and simultaneously breath-
ing the same air. From Figure 3 it can be seen that inhalation of radio-
activity results in an internal dose almost four times as great as the
external dose from submersion in the radioactive cloud. It seems probable
that the dose from inhalation will always be higher than the submersion
dose, especially for radionuclides having a long biological half-time.
The expected doses which are plotted for ingestion of contaminated food
and exposure to a contaminated land surface are strictly functions of
the arbitrary input parameters and are not intrinsicly related as
are the dose estimates for submersion in water vs. drinking water and
submersion in air vs. inhalation. It is interesting, nevertheless, to
compare the expected dose (effective half-time = 1 year) from the land
surface to the conservative dose (effective half-time = radioactive
half-life = 30 years). Essentially all of the expected dose is ac-
cumulated by the fifth year after the initial detonation, whereas the
conservative dose is considerably higher and still increasing after
60 years (the asymptotic condition is not approached untiI approximateIy
150 years). The magnitudes of the expected and conservative doses
from the contaminated landscape are entirely dependent upon the arbi-
trary choice of effective half-times for this hypothetical case, but
it raises a question that merits further consideration. For any dose
integration period, what is the magnitude of conservatism of dose cal-
culated with
T = T (conservative dose) vs. a dose calculated with T =
T T
e r
T +T
(expected dose)? If F(t) represents the magnitude of conservatism for
a specified time period due to use of the radioactive half-life only,
then
F(t) =
DT
-------
problems presented elsewhere include detailed discussions of the age-
dependent parameters in the INREM code, emphasizing the need for data
describing the population for which dose estimates are being made.^'^
The input data for the INREM code for this hypothetical problem are
given in Tables 1 and 2. Although the variation of one of the age-
dependent parameters may appear to make it controlling (as does total-
body mass in this case, see Table 1), our previous work has shown that
the smaller variations of other age-dependent parameters should not be
neglected when estimating expected doses for various age groups. '
The accumulation of dose from internal exposure is shown in Figure 6
as a function of time and age at the start of intake. With the exception
of the first exposure year, the various age groups retain their relative
positions throughout the exposure period. If we assume that all age
groups have equal biological sensitivity to radiation exposure, those
individuals 10.5 years of age at the time of the first detonation com-
prise the cr i t icaI popuI at ion group on the basis of this analysis.
While it is of interest to identify the critical population group by
age, it is important in population exposure situations to identify the
age at a specific point in time. These identifications are necessary
because one age-dependent parameter (daily radionuclide intake) is
dependent not only upon the age of the individual, but also upon the
radionuclide concentrations in the intake media. Radionuclide concen-
trations in the intake media may vary considerably as functions of time,
particularly in transient exposure situations where the concentrations
attain peak values for brief periods and then decline steadily. The
parameters currently programed in the INREM code as age-dependent
variables undoubtedly will be shown to be functions of additional factors.
For example, the effective half-time term (Te) may require evaluation as
a function of ambient temperature as well as age. As we improve our
capabilities for estimating doses to populations, ever increasing
specificity will be required to identify the critical population group.
The estimated genetic doses to individuals within the various age
groups are given in Table 3. We assume the genetic dose is equal to
the estimated total-body dose due to internal exposure plus the estimated
external dose. There is very little difference among these estimated
genetic doses, primarily because external exposure constitutes approxi-
mately 75 percent of the total dose; and external dose, as currently
estimated with the EXREM code, is not age dependent. The genetically
significant dose to the population is estimated to be 0.386 mrem,
slightly exceeding the highest individual genetic dose estimate. This
undoubtedly results from the assumptions used in evaluating the future
child expectancy factor (w). However, one would expect the genetically
significant dose to approach the individual genetic dose in this situ-
ation for two reasons: 1) every individual in the population receives
approximately the same genetic dose, and 2) the median age (28 years)
of the population is well below the age (50 years) assumed as the upper
age limit for child bearing.
568
CONCLUSIONS
Estimating radiation doses to populations from Plowshare appli-
cations is a difficult and complex task. The assessment is difficult
because more bioenvironmental information than is presently available
is needed in order to make the assessment realistic. The desired
input includes information on the source term, release and movement
of radionuclides in the environment, biological and demographic
characteristics of the populations exposed, and dosimetry parameters.
We believe that an important objective in assessing population
exposure situations should be to derive the best estimate of the
expected dose from all modes of exposure. Furthermore, knowledge
of the expected dose from each important exposure mode is a prerequisite
for setting specific guidelines and regulations for Plowshare applica-
tions. Such dose estimates must be made carefully for another reason—
they will be scrutinized by a public that will want to know the best
estimate of the dose (risk) from a given Plowshare application (benefit).
There is every reason to believe that the public will be extremely
interested in all Plowshare applications, and that the success of Plow-
share may very well depend upon the public's acceptance of the risks
i nvolved.
Estimating expected doses requires knowledge of the deposition
and redistribution of radionuclides in the environment as welI as com-
plete account of product utilization. Systems analysis offers promise
for predicting the amount of radioactivity released from given Plow-
share applications that may expose man both internally and externally.
The systems analysis technique is well suited for this application
because it is a powerful predictive tool capable of evaluating complex
situations. Data already obtained from field studies can be used in
systems analysis, but additional studies will have to be carried out
to extend its application to Plowshare projects.
Estimation of the expected dose as a function of age is the first
step toward identification of the critical population group. More
data are required to evaluate the age-dependent parameters in the INREM
code. These data, incomplete for many radionuclides at the present time,
necessitate assumptions which lead to conservative dose estimates
rather than the preferred estimates of expected dose. Currently, the
critical population group, defined as that group expected to receive
the highest dose, is oftentimes identified by age relative to c given
point in time. As our capabilities develop for estimating population
dose, consideration of additional factors influencing dose will
facilitate identification of the critical population group with greater
speci f icity.
The genetically significant dose is another important consideration
in the overall evaluation of population exposures, particularly when
large numbers of individuals are involved. The additional information
required for this estimate is a demographic description of the population.
569
-------
When all individuals within the population receive the same total
expected dose, the genetically significant dose to the population
approximates the genetic dose to the individual. It is unlikely,
however, that the total expected doses resulting from Plowshare events
will be equal for all age groups; in that case, the accuracy of the
demographic information is as important as the accuracy of the age-
dependent dose estimates for the ultimate estimation of genetically
significant dose.
The Plowshare Program encompasses a variety of applications.
Each application, and perhaps each event, will have distinguishing
characteristics; thus, each will require specific radiological-safety
considerations. The methods presented here represent our progress
to date in developing a comprehensive methodology for assessing the
potential radiation hazards to the general population. This method-
ology is constantly undergoing revision as a result of experience.
In spite of anticipated changes in methodology, the central theme
will continue to stress the best possible estimates of expected doses
to the populations affected by each significant release of radio-
activity to the environment.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors are deeply indebted to William Ooyle Turner of the
Computing Technology Center at Oak Ridge for alI the computer pro-
gramming in the INREM and EXREM codes. He is also responsible for
developing the mathematical approach used in the solution of the
nuclear chain equations which appear in the models for external dose.
Considerable thanks are also due to E. G. Struxness and K. E.
Cowser who participated in the many discussions which lead up to the
formulation of this paper.
Although the contents of this paper deal with the use of peace-
ful nuclear detonations in general, much of the ground work was laid
as a result of our participation in the radiological-safety feasibility
study for constructing a sea-level canal with nuclear explosives. The
feasibility study was supported by contract AT(26-1)-171 between the
Battelle Memorial Institute, Columbus Laboratories, and the U. S.
Atomic Energy Commission, Nevada Operations Office.
570
2.
REFERENCES
Ng, Y. C., C. A. Burton, S. E. Thompson, R. K. Tandy, H. K. Kretner,
and M. W. Pratt, 1968. Prediction of the Maximum Dosage to Man from
the Fallout of Nuclear Devices IV. Handbook for Estimating the
Maximum Internal Dose from Rad ionuc I i des Released to the Biosphere,
UCRL-50163, Part IV.
Kaye, S. V., and D. J. Nelson, 1968. "Analysis of Specific Activity
Concept as Related to Environmental Concentration of Radionucl ides,"
Nuclear Safety 9: 53-58.
3. Kaye, S. V., P. S. Rohwer, K. E. Cowser, and W. S. Snyder, 1969.
"Predicting Radiation Dose Equivalents for Populations I. Dose
Models and Methods of Application," BioScience 19: 238-41.
4. Kaye, S. V., and S. J. Ball, 1969. "Systems Analysis of a Coupled
Compartment Model for Radionucl ide Transfer in a Tropical Environ-
ment," pp. 731-739 in Proc. Sec. Nat. Symp. on Radioecology (Ann
Arbor, Mich., May 15-17, 1967). CONF-670503.
5. International Commission on Radiological Protection, 1959. Recom-
mendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection
(Report of Committee 2 on Permissible Dose for Internal Radiation).
ICRP Pub. 2. Pergamon Press, London.
6. International Commission on Radiological Protection, 1966. Prin-
ciples of Environmental Monitoring Related to the Handling of
Radioactive Materials (Report of Committee 4). ICRP Pub. 7,
Pergamon Press, London.
7. Rohwer, P. S., and 'S. V. Kaye, 1969. Age-Dependent Models for
Estimating Internal Dose in Feasibility Evaluations of Plowshare
Events. Plowshare Research and Development Progress Report for
October 1, 1967 to April 1, 1968, ORNL-TM-2229.
8. Turner, W. D., S. V. Kaye, and P. S. Rohwer, 1968. EXREM and INREM
Computer Codes for Estimating Radiation Doses to Populations from
Construction of a Sea-Level Canal with Nuclear Explosives, Report
K-1752, Computing Technology Center, Union Carbide Corp., Nuclear
Division, Oak Ridge, Tenn.
9. International Commission on Radiological Protection, 1964. Recom-
mendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protec-
tion (as Amended 1959 and Revised 1962). ICRP Pub. 6, Pergamon
Press, London.
571
-------
10. United Nations, 1958. Report of the United Nations Scientific
Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, General Assembly
Official Records: Thirteenth Session, Suppl. No. 17 (A/3838),
New York.
11. Kaye, S. V., and P. S. Rohwer, 1968. Estimating External Dose in
Feasibility Evaluations of Plowshare Events, Plowshare Research
and Development Quarterly Progress Report for April 1, 1968 to
June 30, 1968, ORNl-TM-2249.
12. Turner, W. D., the EXREM II Computer Code for Estimating External
Doses to Populations from Construction of a Sea-Level Canal with
Nuclear Explosives. Report CTC-8, Computing Technology Center,
Union Carbide Corp., Nuclear Division, Oak Ridge, Tenn. (In Press).
13. Rohwer, P. S., and S. V. Kaye, 1969. "Predicting Radiation Dose
Equivalents for Populations II. Results Obtained with the Dose
Models." BioScience 19: 326-330.
572
Ul
to
-\
o
c
c
Ql
-0
CD
l/l
3"
l/l
CD
<
O
to
c
3
-f
CD
Q.
(/)
H-
-+
CD
VI
S
o
Qt
f
3
•+
O
-J,
Q
n
c
~
c
CD
01
3
<
m
o
O
o
3
O
VI
c?
<
S
o
o
3
c
3
CD
5"
0.
CD
Q.
-f
O
3
O
C
Q.
CD
O
3
~<
H-
3~
CD
Q.
Ol
**
3
H-
Q)
CD
O
H-
01
T?
£
H-
CD
-1
0)
3
Q.
CT
?
CD
0)
CD
in
CT
Ql
CD
Q.
O
3
-f
0)
TD
C
O)
-r-
-1
01
IQ
CD
CO
3
T3
in
3
?
01
VI
CD
3
o
o
_,
3
O
i
H.
o'
3
o
3
-+
3"
CD
-o
0
cr
CD
Ql
ID
CD
CD"
•o
CD
3
Q_
CD
3
CD
O
-f
3-
CD
Ul
CD
cr
O
-3
§'
O)
o
3"
in
W IS)
73 — O T3
Ql 3 -h •
Q. -+
oi n — •
-»• 3 O
— Ql *: 33
O -f l/i O
3 — 3-3-
» O O) £
3 -1 CD
— Ql CD-I
33 m Ql
TJO < 3
O CD Q-
T) 3 3
C 3 -+ tfl
cr — in •
• t/i <:
O •
is) o ;c
TJ O T-<
CD 3 H CD
ID 3) 1
3 Q. IS5
3 O vD
T)O ~
n in >
CD — T)
in o -i
Ul Ql —
r — "D — •
3 O O
Q. -f OD
O CD *-*
3 n
-(-
— o
" 3J
• CD
-o
O
^0
So
~D O
£ ?.
1-
§ if
Ul CD
O —
O
Q) 3
Q.
— (D
3
O in
n in
CD CT
in CD
™ S
CD U)
CD
-5 _t.
T3 O
CD" —
Q. 3
-f
0 ^
>
o
(D
1
i
CD
3
Q.
CD
3
-4
c?
Q.
CD
01
0
m
in
•+
|
3
0
—
_(.
CD
-i
3
_
O
o
I/)
CD
3
-n
CD
01
in
cr
^
?
m
£
01
-f
o
Ul
-*
rf
O
~1
01
*
Q.
6'
O
(0
o
I
Qi
-t-
3"
O
Ol
01
01
3
Q.
C?
T3
O
H-
in
|Ov
•^1
^
^
vO
S
V
o
—
0
Ul
0
8
O
o
Ul
o
—
^J
X
o
o
8
ro
o
Ul
o
!£
o
$
Ul
o
8
O
Ul
0
—
c^
X
0
VO
Ul
o
cr.
Ul
o
*;
o
a
±
§
o
ui
O
—
£1
X
o
CD
o
Ul
o
Ul
o
0
o
S
ro
Ul
§
o
ui
o
*o
-J
X
o
a*
c^
ts)
Ul
w
Ul
i
00
o
ro
Ul
o
o
o
Ul
o
-~J
o
X
o
CTi
^
O
o
Ul
o
^
0
00
00
o
o
o
Ul
o
Ul
£.
X
o
a\
^
o
vD
O
? "8
573
-------
Table 2. Ingestion of Cs (pCi/day) in food as a function of time after the first
detonation.
Time after
the first
detona-
tion
(days)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
224
409
589
774
1139
1504
1864
3650
7300
}Ci/day intake in food
(0-1 yr> (1-5 yr)
0 0
.0096 .010
.019 .021
.029 .031
.038 .042
.048 .052
.058 .063
.077 .084
.13 .15
.27 .29
.46 .50
.69 .75
.86 .94
•.94 .02
.96 .04
.93 .01
.94 .02
.95 .03
.95 .04
.96 .05
.97 .06
.98 .06
.0 .08
.05 .14
.18 .29
.37 .50
.60 .74
.77 .93
.85 .01
.87 .03
.32 .44
.93 .01
.66 .72
.47 .51
.23 .25
.12 .12
.058 .063
.0019 .0021
0 0
at any time for individuals
(5-10 yr) (10-15 yr)
0 0
.014 .015
.028 .030
.041 .046
.055 .061
.069 .076
.082 .091
.11 .12
.19 .21
.38 .42
.66 .73
.99 .09
.24 .37
.35 .49
.38 .52
.33 .47
.34 .49
.36 .50
.37 .51
.38 .52
.39 .54
.40 1.55
.42 1.58
.50 1.66
.70 1.87
.97 2.18
2 . 30 2 . 54
2.54 2.81
2.65 2.93
2.67 2.95
1.90 2.10
1.33 1.47
.95 1.05
.67 .74
.33 .36
.16 .18
.082 .091
.0028 .003
0 0
in each age class.
(15-20 vr) (>
0
.016
.033
.049
.066
.082
.098
.13
.23
.46
.79
.18
.48
.61
.64
.60
.61
.62
.64
.65
.66
.68
.70
1.80
2.03
2.36
2.75 ;
3.04 ;
3.17 ;
3.20 ;
2.27
1.60
1.14
.81
.39
.20
.099
.0033
0
20 yr)
0
.013
.025
.038
.050
.063
.076
.10
.18
.35
.60
.91
.13
.23
.26
.22
.23
.24
.25
.26
.27
.28
.31
.38
.55
.80
'.10
'.33
.43
.45
.74
.22
.87
.62
.30
.15
.076
.0025
0
Table 3. Table of information relative to genetic dose.
k (years)
0-1
1-5
5-10
10-15
15-20
20-25
25-30
30-35
35-40
40-45
45-50
50-55
55-65
65-75
75-85
>85
d, (mrem)
0.347
0.336
0.365
0.379
0.360
0.355
0.355
0.355
0.355
0.355
0.355
0.355
0.355
0.355
0.355
0.355
\2
180
800
1,050
1,000
900
740
600
550
600
600
560
570
890
600
300
60
•v
2.74
2.74
2.74
2.74
2.73
2.38
1.45
0.70
0.27
0.06
0.004
0
0
0
0
0
d. x N. x w.
171
737
1,050
1,040
885
625
308
137
58
13
1
0
0
0
0
0
10,000
5,025
The total dose (external exposure + internal exposure) accumulated to age
50 years, the age assumed to be the upper limit for child bearing.
Calculated with information obtained from: U. S. Bureau of Census,
Statistical Abstract of the United States. 1968 (89th edition),
Washington, D. C. (1968).
574
575
-------
ORNL-DWG 68-9201
Modes of Exposure
Figure 1. Modes of Exposure.
576
ORNL-OWC 69-3272
Figure 2. Simpl ified Block Diagram of Hypothetical Problem.
577
-------
OftNL-DWG 69-327'
f' ,
//'
//--•
\^
\ //'
"' ^
f"
.•"
' X
X
X
/
f f
,''''-'""
.-
r '- ' '
LAND SU
FOOD
SU6MEHS
TOTAL CONSERV
-----•"""
FACE
- — — ""'
ON III .,»
ATIVE DOSE
J-"--
---'
EXPECT
1
LAND SURF
FOOD
SUBMERSION
ED DOSE ( I • -^*-
CE
It_ ,
TIME AFTER INITIAL DETONATION ( YEARS )
Figure 3. Doses Accumulated in the Period 0-60 Years Following the
First Detonation for the Hypothetical Problem.
ORNL-DWG 69-3271
Tr/T= 100
T,/T=30
VT.IS
£ 5
VT-5
FIqure
TIME UNITS OF DOSE INTEGRATION
Reduces the
-------
WML-WrC (.9-3275
TIME AFTER INITIAL DETONATION ( m«nlhi)
Figure 5. Doses Accumulated in the First Year Following the First
Detonation for the Hypothetical Problem.
580
ORHL-DWC 69-3J73
Figure 6. Age-Dependent Variation in Internal Dose During the Period
0-10 Years Following the First Detonation for the Hypothetica
ProbI em.
581
-------
QUESTIONS FOR STEPHEN KAYE
From C. E. Me I son
In your discussion, what "dose'1 were you talking about, skin dose,
gonade dose, "whole-body dose, lung dose, or what? To what
structure does "cumulative dose" refer?
ANSWER:
The radionuclide we were dealing with was cesium-137 and the
critical body organ for this nuclide is total body. So these were
totaI body doses.
2. From Frank Lowman:
Microgram and microcurie frequency distributions of trace elements
and radionuclides in plants and marine animals are log-normal extend-
i ng over an order of magn i tude or more i n most populations. Ti pton's
and Foster's data suggest that this may also be true for humans. How
would one adjust considerations of Standard Man to protect the 3 to
\Q% of the population group concentrating 5 to 7 times the arithmetic
mean amount of a radionuclide concentrated by individuals of the
populat ion?
ANSWER:
You better send this one to the ICRP This really is not a problem
which we are able to deal with right now since, as Dr. Lowman has
pointed out, this is true that most all of these measurements of
stable elements in the biota and in the different organs of man are
known to follow the log-normal distribution and, of course, this can
be handled nicely statistically, but there is this part of the popu-
lation then which would be neglected when we are calculating doses
based on the mean individual. I think that this problem has been
discussed by Dr. Tipton who has conducted most of the analyses for
Standard Man and I know it's something that she continues to work on,
in fact, she has various models which show the statistical distribution
of these concentrations in various populations. I don't think this
problem actually comes under the heading of this paper and I would be
glad to refer it to Dr. Tipton at some time for you. Dr. Lowman. This
really is in her area and the ICRP. It's not up to one individual, I
think, to comment on something like this.
3. From Robert Patzer:
Does the EXREM Code include inhalation of radioactive material from
dry fallout which is re-suspended in air—for example by wind?
582
ANSWER:
The EXREM Code deals only with the external exposure, the radio-
activity which is outside the body. If the radioactivity is re-
suspended, then we would calculate the dose due to inhalation, if
it's taken back into the body, using the INREM Code.
From Robert Patzer:
Does the INREM Code handle intake of radionucIides from contaminated
consumer products? For example--contaminated natural gas to food
and air in a home.
ANSWER:
Yes, the input to the INREM Code is microcuries per day and it makes
no difference what the medium is—whether it's water, food, it could
even be with a slight 'ittle change in the mode I or the way we put
the input information in, it could be through a wound.
From S. G. Bloom:
You stressed age dependency in the INREM Code. What about the depend-
ency on i ntake rate? In part i cuIar, aren't f. and A j n funct i ons of
intake rate? What are the relative errors in neglecting intake
dependency versus age dependency? How do these errors compare w j th
the uncertainty in the biological parameters?
ANSWER:
As the Code is now written, the lambdas are not a function of the
intake rate, so wherever this is known to influence the elimination
rate, we have not taken this into consideration. You have to under-
stand that this .1 very general, working-type model which is not
intended for any one little, specific application, like if you were
only dealing with one pathway of exposure. If you were specializing
in th.at with one radionuclide, you would develop a specialized model
for that. But we're talking about a model which will handle hundreds
of radionuc)ides, many different modes of exposures and it also
considers all of the detonations so that we cannot write a model
which would restrict its use. Therefore, it has to be general. But
when we do have data on parameters, then we can make changes in the
program. No computer program, as far as I am concerned, i s ever
final. We are always updating this and our limitations here in this
internal program are that we cannot find the necessary parameters for
let's say most of the radionuclides as a function of age of the indi-
vidual. We have it for tritium, for cesium, for strontium, for iodine.
When we get out of that small little group, then we have some infor-
mat i on, but we have to fill in w i th conservat i ve estimates or
583
-------
sometimes we fill in with the Standard Man values. But I'm sure
that as time goes on, we wi II get more and more information so
that we wi I I be able to calculate the age dependent dose for many
more radionuclides. This is our hope.
584
EXPOSURE-DOSE RESEARCH FOR RADIONUCLIDES
NATURAL GAS
D. N. McNeils and R. G. Patzer
Southwestern Radio log i cal HeaIth Laboratory
U. S. Public Health Service
Las Vegas, Nevada
ABSTRACT
The fate determination of specific radionuclides in
natural gas stimulated by underground engineering appli-
cations is being examined. An experimental program, now
in its initial stages, is using gas artificially labeled
with krypton-85 and tritium under simulated domestic
situations. The following topics are being investigated
in this study:
I. The concentration of the radionuclides in a
gas-heated home.
2. The build-up of contamination on appliances
in the kitchen environment.
3. The concentration in foods as a function of
radionuclidej food type and preparation.
4. The maximum exposure plausible under specified
conditions.
INTRODUCTION
Since its beginning, the Plowshare program has moved steadily
forward from the initial cratering concepts for canals, mountain passes,
harbors and dams to underground engi neeri ng appIi cat ion concepts such
as economical methods for enhancing the recovery of petroleum, minerals
and gas. It is in this latter category, i.e., underground engineering
applications, that we have addressed this study. More specifically, we
are directing our initial research program at investigating certain
parameters of natural gas from the Gasbuggy cavity. Gas field appli-
cations are being considered first because of their advanced status
relative to petroleum products and minerals, proximity of users to
the product, and the relatively short time from production to user.
Project Gasbuggy, conducted jointly by the U. S. Atomic Energy
Commission, the El Paso Natural Gas Company, and the U. S. Bureau of
585
-------
Mines was a nominal 26-kiloton nuclear explosive detonated on
December 10, 1967, some 4,200 feet below the floor of the San Juan
Basin in New Mexico. In addition to objectives of determining produc-
tion enhancement and developing prediction capability and technical
engineering knowledge, an additional goal of the experiment was the
determination of the gas quality with respect to radioactivity. It
should be noted that Project Gasbuggy was an experiment and gas from
the stimulated and surrounding wells is not being distributed to any
consumer.
A fission device would be expected to yield such particulate con-
taminants as cesium-137 and strontium-89, but the majority of such
particulates would settle out or be filterable before use of the gas in
any commercial or domestic application. Gas cleaners are usually
required in a production plant to remove dust and solids in the lines.
Filters, liquid bath scrubbers and dry cyclone scrubbers are types
normally used and can have efficiencies for particulate material
upwards of 99%. Many field production systems also use gas and liquid
separators which collect liquid droplets from the stream.1
In addition, certain gaseous contaminants would probably be
present. Some of the major gaseous isotopes resulting from a fission
event are iodine-i3l, xenon-133 and krypton-85. All but krypton-85
i _i 1. i— i r i •. — • _ _?_LJ_ j_.._ _._ i — —i — i j i— -'i owed
half-
cal
fission explosive.^ Ihe activation product, carbon-14 t5,5bb-year
half-life), may also be produced in certain applications in sufficient
quantities to warrant consideration.
A fusion device could yield tritium (12.3-year half-life) up to
amounts of about 5 x I04 Ci/kt.3 Concentrations in Gasbuggy gas from
I to 7 months post-event remained at about 17 pCi/ft3 normal temperature
and pressure (NTP) for tritium, and 2.8 pCi/ft3 NTP for krypton-85.4
OBJECTIVES
The research project recently initiated at the Southwestern
Radiological Health Laboratory is directed at determining the ulti-
mate fate of those radionuclides in gas which, because of their half-
life and concentration, could be of concern, e.g., tritium, krypton-85
and perhaps carbon-14. The two major objectives of this study are:
I. To develop human exposure and/or dose estimates from
experimental data such as:
a. Concentration of radionuclides in various
foods prepared under realistic conditions on
or in c gas range.
586
b. Concentration of radionuclides in a home where
unvented gas appliances such as space heaters,
dryers, water heaters, refrigerators and
ranges are used.
c. Buildup of the contamination on appliances
and home surfaces in the vicinity of the com-
bustion equipment.
2. To suggest values for radiation concentration guides
for specific radionuclides in gas (RCG)Q for commercial
and domestic use.
CALCULATIONS
There are several calculations which may be performed to yield
a suggested (RCG)g for tritium in natural gas. Some of them, partic-
ularly those which rely on consumer habits and habitat, are fraught
with assumptions. Variations in assumptions for the number, design
and use of the different domestic gas appliances and in dilution
volume and ventilation rates for a home can induce a wide range in
derived (RCG)g values.
In this report the term specific tritium activity is defined as
the tritium concentration per gram of protium CyCi/g hydrogen). Two
calculations are presented which extend the calculation to a theoreti-
cal limit because of the assumption of maximizing the specific tritium
activity in man and his food water. They are used to highlight areas
where experimental measurements are essential. The calculations are
performed first for a continuous occupational exposure situation and
then the (RCG)g for the general population is discussed.
The first of these calculations considers only ingestion of
tritium via water in foods and beverages prepared on or in a gas
range. The maximum permissible concentration of tritium in water
(MPC)W for continuous occupational exposure as accepted by the Inter-
national Commission for Radiological Protection (ICRP) and the National
Committee on Radiation Protection (NCRP) is 0.03 uCi/cm3.5,6 The ICRP
report also cites 2,200 cm3/day7 as the water intake through food and
fluids for a standard man. The standard man could then continuously
ingest 0.03 yCi/cm3 x 2,200 cm3/day or 66 yCi/day as tritium oxide
(HTO) in his food and water. However, only that portion of his food
which is cooked is assumed to contain tritium, and at concentrations
dependent on its water content.
The standard man's water intake is assumed to be distributed
between three classes of food:
I. Meat, fish and poultry (m
2. Beverages (b)
3. Vegetables (v)
f, p)
587
-------
A sampling of 31 vegetables and 36 various "main course items,
i.e., meat, fish or poultry, from a USDA^ listing shows that the average
water content for the cooked vegetables is about 88% and for the cooked
meats, poultry and fish about 5\%, The per capita diet in the United
States for 1967^ shows that the average daily individual consumption
is approximately 270 grams of meats, fish and poultry, all
of which are assumed to be cooked for the purpose of this calculation.
In addition, 404 grams of vegetables are eaten daily of which 80% is
assumed to be cooked. Coffee, tea and cocoa in the powder form are
about J>.2% water and average about 98% water content as beverages. The
18.8 grams of powder consumed daily is equivalent to 18.2 grams dry
or 910 grams as beverages.
If a tritium intake of 66 uCi/day from cooked food water is
permissible then the acceptable concentration in food water is:
(MPC)W
Total H20 intake (2,200 g)
H20 intake from cooked foods (1312 g)
= 0.05
yCi
For a particular class of food the projected intake rate would be:
0.05 yCi/g x fraction by weight of H20 x consumption (g/day) = uCi/day
The tritium can be distributed over that portion of the diet
assumed to be cooked in the following manner:
0.05 pCi/g x 0.51 (water content) x 270 g (m,f,p/day) = 6.93 uCi/day
0.05 gCi/g x 0.88 (water content) x 323 g (v/day) = 14.26 pCi/day
0.05 pCi/g x 0.98 (water content) x 910 g (b/day) = 44.81 uCi/day
Total 66.00 pCi/day
The specific tritium activity in c given food will depend on the
amount of tritium that is exchanged with protium in the food solid and
water. The maximum value would be obtained in the hypothetical case
of assuming that all of the hydrogen is exchangeable and allowing the
exchange to equilibrate. In this first calculation we assume that
only hydrogen in the water fraction exchanges and that there is no
tritium enrichment factor introduced by a concentration mechanism in
the food.
For the combustion reaction:
CH4 + 202 -+ C02 + 2H20
the tritium in the gas is expected to be completely converted to HTO.
The combustion of each standard cubic food (scf) of CH4 (0.7168 g/l)
yields 45.7 g of H20. The tritium concentration in the gas necessary
to yield the (MPC)W value in body water under the foregoing assumptions
would be:
588
45.7 g H20
scf CH4
0.05
g H20
= 2.28 uCi/scf CH4
The second calculation, based on maximizing the specific tritium
activity in man, is broader in scope but only slightly more restrictive.
The major assumption is that the specific tritium activity in any
human exposed to the gas combustion products could not, in the absence
of any enrichment mechanism, exceed the specific activity in the gas.
This is true for infinite inhalation, ingestion and absorption insult.
Hydrogen accounts for about \0% by weight of the human body, and
the limiting specific activity can be calculated from the maximum per-
missible body burden for occupational exposure, i.e., 10-^ uCi. For a
70 kg man this amounts to 0.14 uCi/g of hydrogen. Since a standard
cubic food of CH4 weighs 20.3 grams of which 5.08 grams are hydrogen,
the theoretical limiting concentration is:
0.14 uCi/g x 5.08 g of H/scf of gas = 0.71 uCi/scf of gas
Since a large fraction of a population could be exposed to radio-
nuclides by extensive application of gas field stimulation programs, the
general population genetic dose guide of 5 rem/30 years or 0.17 rem/year
is applicable."^ This guide is 1/30 of the occupational guide of 5
rem/year. The values in the gas from the two calculations become:
(based on limiting Sp^H activity in food water) =
1/30 (2-28 x I06 pCi/scf) = 7.6 x I04 pCi/scf (CH4)
Q (based on limiting Sp^H activity in body protium) =
1/30 (0.71 x I06 pCi/scf) = 2.4 x I04 pCi/scf
If we had applied (a) the correction factor of O.I recommended
by the NCRP1 ' and in Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 2012
for permissible levels of radiation in unrestricted areas and (b) a
correction factor of 1/3 suggested in the Code of Federal Regulations
for time averaging of suitable samples of the population, then the
same guide of 1/30 would be applicable.
Th
i nherent ly
or externa
the two va
tration of
for the ca
very conse
that of thi
same value
assurance
foregoing calculations are, like other RCG calculations,
limited because of assuming there is no additional internal
dose contribution from other radionuclides. Neither of
ues is presented to suggest a maximum permissible concen-
tritium in gas but rather to suggest a point of departure
i.cultion of realistic values. The values calculated are
irvative because they are based on the worst possible condition,
specific tritium activity in man or his diet attaining the
as that in the gas. AI though these vaIues wouId g i ve
that individuals in the population would not receive radiation
589
-------
doses from tritium in excess of appropriate limits, they may lead to
unreasonable limitations in the development of nuclear energy utili-
zati on.
STUDY DESIGN
The studies at the Southwestern Radiological Health Laboratory
are designed to yield experimental data which can be used as input for
realistic (RCG)g values for each of the radionuclides of concern.
The philosophical considerations in setting a reduction factor for
use of the gas by the general public are beyond the scope of this
study.
The experi mentaI program recent Iy has commenced w i th the setti ng
up of a small 2,000-cubic foot laboratory which contains six fume hoods,
each having an exhaust capacity of about 1,000 cubic feet-per-minute.
A conventional domestic gas range has been installed with a metered
inlet manifolded to allow for either contaminated or clean gas to
enter the combustion chambers. The gas pressure and flow rate are
recorded throughout an experiment. The range burners themselves are
equipped with electronic ignition to eliminate problems associated with
a p iIot Ii ght.
Commercially available technical grade CH^ which contains
5 uCi/scf tritium in one case and 5 yCi/scf krypton-85 in the other,
was procured for the initial phases of the study. The original plans
to use gas from the Gasbuggy cavity had to be altered for a number of
reasons. Although pre-shot methane levels were in excess of 85%, in
samples one to seven months post-shot methane accounted for only 37 to
44% of the tota I gas in the cav i ty. Carbon d i ox i de I eve Is, ori g i naI Iy
less than 1% were then about 36£.4 Finally, some post-shot gas
samples contained up to about 0.18$ of h^S. The gas would require
processing prior to being put to representative use. Plans to use the
cavity gas, after processing, are being considered for later in the
program.
The actual laboratory studies using a contaminated gas have begun
and data will be forthcomi ng short Iy.
I. Water heated in uncovered vessels in the oven and on
a top burner is being used to establish the range of
radioactive concentrations that may be encountered in
food cooked w i th contami nated methane. The t i me
required for the concentration to equilibrate can be
measured simultaneously.
2. Foods which represent constituents in man's diet are
being prepared under both typical and extreme con-
ditions to evaluate contamination mechanisms.
590
3. Cryogen i c samp lers and liquid bath scrubbers are
be i ng used to measure air con cent rat i ons . High
efficiency filters collect that portion of the
contamination associated with parti cu lates.
Some exploratory work wi I I have to be con-
ducted to optimize the collection efficiencies
for each of the radionuc I i des .
The proceeding calculations emphasized the requirement for data
on tri t i um-proti urn exchange coef f icients, equilibrium cond i tions and
exchange rates. Air concentration measurements for carbon-14,
krypton-85 and tr i t i um upon con t ami nated methane combust i on are a I so
considered essential input to (RCG)Q evaluations. We hope that in
conducting some of these measurements the magnitude of the potential
exposure will be established and a comprehensive calculation of the
can be undertaken.
Our preoccupation with tritium in this presentation is not
meant to imply an estimate of the relative importance of the radio-
nuclides considered. Depending on the design and environment of the
nuclear device, tritium or some other radionucl i de could be the
limit! ng nuc I i de.
591
-------
REFERENCES
I. Francis, Jr., A. W. and Morris, R. L. Gas Separators, Heaters,
and Cleaners. In: Gas Engineers Handbook, pp. 4/63-4/67, The
Industrial Press, 1966.
2. Ward, D. C., Atkinson, C. H. and Watkins, J. W. Project Gasbuggy —
A Nuclear Fracturing Experiment. Journal of Petroleum Technology,
pp. 139-145, February, 1966.
3. Jacobs, D. G. Sources of Tritium and Its Behavior upon Release to
the Environment. AEC Critical Review Series, U. S. Atomic Energy
Commi ssion/Di vis i on of Techni ca I I n format i on , p . 24 , 1968.
4. Smith, C. F. and Momyer, F. F. Gas Quality Investigation Program
Status Report for Project Gasbuggy. PNE-G-IO, Lawrence Radiation
Laboratory, September 18, 1968.
5. Report of Committee II on Permissible Dose for Internal Radiation,
Recommendations of the International Commission of Radiological
Protection, 1CRP Publication 2, p. 41, Pergamon Press, 1959.
6. Maximum Permissible Body Burdens and Maximum Permissible Concen-
trations of Radi onuc I i des in Air and in Water for Occupational
Exposure, Recommendations of the National Committee on Radiation
Protection, National Bureau of Standards Handbook 69, p. 24,
U. S. Government Printing Office, June 5, 1959.
7. Report of Committee II on Permissible Dose for Internal Radiation,
Recommendat i ons of the I n tern at i on a I Commi ss i on on Rad i o I og i ca I
Protection, ICRP Publication 2, p. 152, Pergamon Press, 1959.
8. Watt, B. K. and Merrill, A. L. Compos i ti on of Foods . In: Agr i -
culture Handbook No. 8, pp. 6-67, U. S. Government Printing
Office, 1963.
9.
10.
12.
Agricultural Statistics — 1968, U. S. Department of Agriculture,
p. 597, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1968.
Background Material for the Development of Radiation Protection
Standards, Staff Report of the Federal Radiation Council,
Report No. I, U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
Section V, 5.5, p. 27, May 13, I960.
Maximum Permissible Body Burdens and Maximum Permissible Concen-
tration of Radionucl i des in Air and in Water for Occupational
Exposure, National Bureau of Standards Handbook 69, p, 6,
U. S. Government Printing Office, June 5, 1959.
Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10— Atomic Energy, Office of
the Federa I Reg i ster, Nationa I Arch i ves and Records Serv ice,
General Services Administration, p. 129, January I, 1967.
592
13. Project Gasbuggy—We I I Test Data September 1967 to September 1968,
Volume M, p. 245, El Paso Natural Gas Company.
593
-------
QUESTIONS FOR DAVID N. McNELIS
From C. E. Nelson:
How and when does tritium migrate from gas to food? During cooking?
During the cooling phase in the room after cooking has stopped? Both?
ANSWER:
We do not have any experimental data to present at this time. How-
ever, I would think that both in varying amounts would be appropriate.
2. From Walt Kozlowski:
You stated that one of the goals of Gasbuggy was the determination of
the gas quality with respect to radioactivity. You then set about
determining acceptable radioactive levels. What cost factor would
be required to process Gasbuggy gas to meet these levels? And is so
much processing required that Gasbuggy type developments are not feasi-
ble?
ANSWER:
Of course Gasbuggy was an experiment, and the gas from it is not in-
tended for consumer use. As far as this pertains to other stimulation
events, I think that this question would be more appropriately put to
other agencies.
594
THE FATE AND IMPORTANCE OF RADlONUCLIDES PRODUCED IN NUCLEAR EVENTS
B. Shore, L. Anspaugh, R. Chertok, J. Gofman, F. Harrison, R. Heft,
J. Koranda, Y. Ng, P. Phelps, G. Potter and A. Tamplin
Lawrence Radiation Laboratory
University of California
L i ve rmore, CaIi forni a
ABSTRACT
Some of the major programs at the Bio-Medical Division
concerned with the fate and importance of the fission pro-
ducts j the radionuclides induced in the device materials^
the radionuclides induced in the environment surrounding
the device3 and the tritium produced in Plowshare cratering
events will be discussed.
These programs include (1) critical unknowns in pre-
dicting organ and body burdens from radionuclides produced
in cratering events; (2) the analysis with a high-resolution
solid state gamma ray spectrometer of radionuclides in com-
plex biological and environmental samples; (3) the char-
acterisation of radioactive particles from cratering detona-
tions; (4) the biological availability to beaglest pigs and
goats of radionuclides in Plowshare debris; (S) the biolo-
gical availability to aquatic animals of radionuclides in
Plowshare and other nuclear debris and the biological turn-
over of critical nuclides in specific aquatic animals; (6)
the biological availability of Plowshare and other nuclear
debris radionuclides to dairy cows and the transplacental
transport of debris radionuclides in the dairy cow; (?) the
persistence and behavior of radionuclides^ particularly
tritium, at sites of Plowshare and other nuclear detonations;
and (8) somatic effects of Low Dose Radiation: Chromosome
studies.
INTRODUCTION
The major objectives of the Bio-Medical Division at the
Lawrence Radiation Laboratory at Livermore are:
I. To develop a predictive ability for estimating the impact
of the release of radiation and radionuclides upon the biosphere,
This research was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission.
595
-------
and in particular upon man, from any credible type of nuclear event:
reactor releases, reactor accidents, nuclear accidents, nuclear testing,
nuclear war, or peaceful uses of nuclear explosives.
2. To uti Ii ze the developi ng pred ictive ab iIi ty to mi n i mi ze
the radiation burden to man from nuclear events, planned or un-
planned, during the period pending development of a mature and com-
plete predictive ability.
3. To develop appropriate countermeasures for credible nuclear
events at any step along the route from the source of radionuclides
to man, with the objective of minimizing the radiation burden to man
before or after access of the radionuclides to his tissues.
4. To evaluate the bioenvironmental feasibility of planned
Atomic Energy Commission utilization of nuclear explosives for peace-
ful purposes, such as Plowshare events.
5. To determine the effects of radiation on man - in particular
the effects of chronic exposure to low doses of radiation or moderate
doses delivered at low rates.
The four main divisions of our program are (I) the prediction
before each event, on a global basis, of the ultimate body and organ
burden likely to be delivered to man by external radiation and by
each of the radionuclides likely to be produced in the event; (2) the
documentation or quantitation of the life history of the radionuclides
produced in the event; (3) the determination of any effects on man of
radiation from internal and external sources; and (4) the development
of countermeasures to minimize any radiation burden to man.
Many of our major programs are directly involved in research on
the fate and importance of radionuclides produced in Plowshare events.
Each of these could well be the subject of a 30- to 40-minute presenta-
tion, but because of time I can present only highlights and represen-
tative portions of several of these programs. The programs discussed
today are described in greater detail in the published text of this
Symposium. They and other programs are described fully in publica-
tions from the Division and in those that are presently in press.
PREDICTION OF ORGAN AND BODY BURDENS FROM RADIONCULIDES
PRODUCED IN PLOWSHARE EVENTS
We have developed a method for estimating the total maximum
internal dose to the whole body and organs of man and the contri-
bution of individual radioncuIides to this dose. This program has
been so designed that the predictive approach allows us to supply
quantitative guidelines at three important phases of the Plowshare
Excavation Program:
596
I. In preshot rad-safe analysis, we can determine whether or
not a particular event can be conducted without exceeding existing
tolerances.
2. In guidance for postshot documentation, we can indicate
what should be measured, where it should be measured, and with what
precision it should be measured.
3. In guidance for device design, we can indicate the maximum
amount of a radionuclide that can be produced and subsequently re-
leased to the environment without exceeding prescribed tolerances.
This predictive approach is described in a series of reports.
The first part presents the approach used to estimate the fallout
levels as a function of cloud travel time for periods up to 50 hours
after detonation. In the second, we show how these fallout estimates
can be combined with radionuclide production estimates and biological
uptake relationships to arrive at estimates of burden and dosage for
man. The third part shows how this predictive approach can supply
guidelines for the design of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes.
The fourth part is a handbook which lists the input parameters
required for the estimation of dosage. When considering the public
health and safety, one must not underestimate the dosage that can be
delivered to man and his organs after detonation. It is also important
not to overestimate the dosage, and as data become available from other
Division programs in such critical areas as the fraction of certain
radionuclides released to the atmosphere on small particles (<50 u in
diameter) and the availability in certain biological systems of certain
radionuclides, the estimates of some radionuclide dosages will be re-
placed by more appropriate values. For many radionuclides, our experi-
mental programs have used debris from Plowshare cratering events to
generate the appropriate data.
The last two parts of the series present our approach for pre-
dicting the dosage to man from aquatic foodstuffs and an analysis of
the transport of nuclear debris by surface and groundwater.
The four major sources of radioactivity from a typical Plowshare
cratering event are fission products, neutron activation of the environ-
ment, neutron activation of the device, and tritium. Estimates have been
made of the organ and body burdens from each of the radionuclides pro-
duced in each of these sources of radioactivity. Examples of these
estimates are presented in Tables I and II. Table I presents the esti-
mated maximum dosage to the child's whole body and bone from plutonium-239
fission products, assuming wet deposition by rainout at 12 hours after
detonation. Table II presents the estimated maximum dosage via milk to
the child's whole body and bone from activation products produced in
granite by neutrons, also assuming a wet deposition by rainout at 12
hours after detonation. It is to be emphasized that these values repre-
sent the estimated maximum dose as a consequence of wet deposition by
597
-------
rainout and that a maximum deposition via dry deposition would lower
these estimates by more than an order of magnitude.
Another application of our approach deserves comment. Using
this approach, concentrations were estimated of certain radionuclides
in grass and milk following a nuclear test that was presumably some
7000 to 8000 miles away. The estimated and measured concentrations
are presented in Table 111. The close correspondence between the
estimated and measured values indicates the overall capability of this
approach.
SOLID-STATE DETECTORS IN THE QUANTITATION OF GAMMA-EMITTING
RADIONUCLIDES IN BIOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLES
Several programs in the Division are concerned with quantitating
the life history of the radionucIides that interact with the biosphere.
Essential to these programs has been the development of a high-resolution,
anticoincidence-shielded gamma spectrometer to analyze complex, low-
level mixtures of gamma-emitting radionuclides in environmental and
biological samples.
Formerly, gamma-emitting radionuclides in environmental and
biological samples could be determined only by techniques involving
radiochemicaI separation followed by spectrometry with sodium iodide
scintiIlators. These techniques were frequently so laborious and time
consuming as to discourage the extensive samplings required in Plowshare
experiments. There is no doubt that the introduction of the solid state
lithium-drifted germanium CGe(Li)] detector has revolutionized gamma
ray spectroscopy, primarily because of its striking improvement in spec-
tral resolution over the sodium iodide detector. This advantage is il-
lustrated by a complex gamma ray spectrum (Fig. I) from particulate
fallout, presumably from a Chinese test, counted on the filter paper
on which it was collected. The usefulness of this spectrometer in
biological experiments is illustrated also in Figure 2, which shows
spectra from samples of feces, plasma, milk and urine from a dairy cow
24 hours after it was fed radioactive debris obtained at the site of a
nuclear detonation. Radiochemical separation and purification were not
required to obtain these data.
This spectrometer (Fig. 3) has given excellent resolution and at
the same time has been highly efficient in the assay of large volume
as well as small volume samples. Other gamma ray spectrometers with
Ge(Li) detectors and anticoincidence shielding have been reported in
the literature. While they may serve the purposes for which they were
designed, none has achieved as high resolution and sensitivity in
counting small as well as large samples (e.g., up to 200 ml) as the
spectrometer developed by us. It can quantitatively analyze radio-
nuclides with specific activities of as little as 0.02 picocuries per
gram of material present either alone or as a part of a complex mix-
ture of radionuclides." It is particularly suitable for rigorous studies
of the slow incorporation of low levels of radionuclides into biological
or environmental systems.
598
Four special features of the spectrometer contibute to its
exceI Ience:
I. The incorporation of a planar Ge(Li) detector of large
surface area (6 cm x 3 cm) and one centimeter depletion depth,
developed especially for this spectrometer.
2. The Ge(Li) detector is surrounded by a plastic phosphor
(anticoincidence) shield, and the two are operated in anticoinci-
dence to reduce the Compton continuum. This enhances the weak spec-
tral lines and consequently improves the sensitivity.
3. Inside the vacuum chamber, a cooled first-stage field-effect
transistor (FET) preamplifier adjacent to the Ge(Li) detector insures
maximum resolution.
4. The anticoincidence and coincidence spectra are recorded
separately to improve the counting sensitivity for radionuclides
whose decay schemes involve coincident events.
Our research on solid state detectors is continuing. Significant
progress has been made in establishing a reliable basis for selecting
high-quality germanium for large volume Ge(Li) detectors. A set of
standard tests has been devised that has resulted in high yields of
good detectors. It is now practical to consider a whole-body animal
counter with eight 20-square-centimeter detectors. This would represent
a truly significant advance in whole-body counting. We are also
developing a Ge(Li) detector system for field use in conjunction with
Plowshare excavation experiments. A field laboratory, trailer-housed,
will have a counting system with a supei—insulated cryogenic system to
maintain the Ge(Li) detector at -I85°C. This is necessary to insure
low consumption of liquid nitrogen under field conditions.
As the applications of nuclear energy increase, man will be con-
tinuously exposed to radiation from the released radionuclides that be-
come localized in his body. Accordingly, one of the most crucial prob-
lems will be to assess the effects upon man of low or moderate doses of
radiation delivered at very low rates. It has been suggested that ex-
posure to 10 rads may cause biological harm under some circumstances.
But what about lower doses? Is all radiation harmful? Should the extrapo-
lation to a zero-rad dose be linear or curvilinear? If it should turn
out that the correct extrapolation is a linear one, then it will be
crucial to determine very accurately at very low levels the radionuclide
content of man's food and water. Such data on gamma-emitting radio-
nucl ides can be obtained only with a system of the resolution and
sensitivity described here.
599
-------
FRACTIONAL RELEASE, TRANSPORT, DEPOSITION, AND REDISTRIBUTION OF
RADIOACTIVITY FROM PLOWSHARE CRATER ING EVENTS
The broad objectives of this program are to document the total
amount of radioactivity released by specific nuclear cratering events,
particularly at the Nevada Test Site, and to study the transport, the
deposition, and the redistribution of the debris. The solid state
spectrometers described in the preceding section are used to quanti-
tate the gamma emitting radionuclides. Studies at the Nevada Test
Site are particularly emphasized in this program, which is expected to
contribute strongly to the Bio-Medical Division's predictive effort
by providing the necessary data for reliable checks of proposed theories
and models.
This program is a broad, long-range one that began with the
Schooner Event and will be repeated on several Plowshare events to
establish good statistical data on the parameters of interest. We will
make long-term air-activity measurements at times up to 1000 hours after
detonation to record not only the primary distribution but also the
secondary redistribution that occurs. These measurements bear directly
on the question of how soon re-entry can be permitted for purposes of
add!tionaI excavation following Plowshare events. We wiI I a I so f ieId
very large-volume collectors to get large amounts of airborne debris
for subsequent feeding experiments. The collection of large amounts of
such material from the air rather than from the ground will remove many
problems of contamination associated with such studies. In addition,
we hope to cooperate with several investigators throughout the country
who would be able (as part of their normal programs) to supply us with
meaningful biological samples for the quantitation of radionuclide con-
centration. Analysis of such samples with our high-resolution counting
facilities should yield valuable information on the transport of radio-
nucl ides after Plowshare cratering events.
Fractional Release
Our immediate objective after a cratering event is to determine
the total radioactivity released into the environment. The most ap-
propriate method is to measure the radioactivity within the cloud at
early times. These measurements have been made in the past by air-
craft sampling in conjunction with photographic techniques. The
measurements made in this manner can be criticized because of the great
variability of concentration within the cloud. The Lawrence Radiation
Laboratory recently initiated a much improved method on Schooner:
several hundred samplers suspended from parachutes were dropped
through the cloud. Some of these drop-packages have sequential sam-
plers and provide data on cloud concentration as a function of verti-
cal height. The Bio-Medical Division actively participated by helping
in the package design and by performing the gamma spectroscopy on the
recovered filters. Thus data are being obtained on the isotopic
fractionation of the cloud as a function of three dimensions as well
as on the total activity contained in the cloud.
600
Information about the dispersal of the radioactive cloud as a
function of extended time and distance is desirable. In Schooner,
we participated in this area only by performing gamma spectroscopy
on several filter samples supplied by the Nevada Aerial Tracking
System of the Edgerton, Germeshausen and Greer Corporation. In the,
future we hope to extend these studies to cover more accurately
conditions of cloud shear and to secure more extensive sampling.
We will use whatever direct data are available, but our main effort
will probably be to reconstruct transport phenomena from our own
deposition data and those of other groups.
Deposition and Redistribution
The major purpose of this program is to study the deposition
of debris at distances from a few thousand feet to several hundred
miles. Eventually we hope to field about 100 stations to obtain sam-
ples of airborne debris and fallout material. The radionuclide con-
tent of these samples will be determined by gamma spectroscopy. By
using programmed samplers to obtain both air and ground samplers as
a function of time, we will study the dependency of deposition and
fractionation on time and distance. With such data from several
events, we will be able to assess the relationship between air and
ground contamination.
One of the important practical questions for a variety of
hoped-for applications of the Plowshare Program is how soon work crews
may re-enter an area for additional excavation and other operations.
Since some of our studies will continue for periods up to 1000 hours
after the event, they should help provide answers to this question.
On the Schooner Event, we fielded 13 stations to collect air
samples. These instruments were located at various points on the
six- and fifty-mile arcs as well as at the sites of animal experi-
ments. Each instrument consisted of a bank of six sequentially
operated air pumps and high-efficiency convoluted air filters. An
unique feature was a low-cost electronics system for sequential pro-
gramming of the samplers either in a logarithmic or linear function.
In addition, a sensitive radiation detector was developed that auto-
matically turned on the samplers by detecting gamma rays, thus al-
lowing unmanned operation at inaccessible locations. Figure 4 il-
lustrates a typical station with the samplers six feet off the ground
and the programmer and batteries beneath.
The several hundred samples obtained in this program are cur-
rently being analyzed for their content of gamma-emitting radio-
nuclides by solid-state spectroscopy. These data will allow us to
reconstruct the radionuclide concentration (pCi/m5) as a function of
time at several locations.
601
-------
Preliminary data on one of the most prominent radionuclides,
tungsten-181, are presented in Figure 5. Station Tl, the hottest
station on the 50-mile arc, was located near Tonopah, Nevada. Station
S25 was located on the six-mile arc. Other data suggest that the hot-
line passed close to S25. Station S8 was located upwind from ground
zero, and initial concentrations of radioactivity at this station were
qu i te Iow.
Several points of interest are presented in Figure 5. At station
Tl on the 50-mile arc, the peak concentration of tungsten-181 occurred
10 hours after detonation (integrated over six hours) and was 6400
pCi/nv3. At this time, t(je concentrations of tungsten-181 at stations
S25 and Tl were equal, although Tl was 44 miles from S25. At station
S25, very significant redistribution of debris was evident, and at 30
hours after detonation relatively large amounts of debris were still
airborne.
In terms of re-entry, the data at S8 are perhaps the most
interesting. This station was one mile upwind from ground zero, and
although the initial concentrations of activity were low at 100 hours,
this was the station that registered the greatest amount of activity.
Again very significant redistribution of debris is indicated.
Figure 6 illustrates the early distribution of iodine-131 for sta-
tions S25 and S27 in the six-mile arc and for station Tl on the 50-mile
arc. It is worth noting that at 10 hours after detonation the distri-
butions were about equal and that at 40 hours significant redistribu-
tion had occurred at stations S25 and S27.
Figure 7 is a similar plot for tellurium-132. Again we note the
equal concentrations of activity 10 hours after the shot at six and
50 miles and the redistribution 40 hours after the shot.
Several other radionuclides are being quantitated, and in addition
data at later times will be similarly quantitated to study the effects
of redistribution of radioactivity.
Sharpening of Predictive Ability
A rigorous attempt wilI be made to assemble the data obtained on
the fractional release, transport, deposition and redeposition of radio-
activity along with all other available data to gain a complete knowledge
of the amount of activity released and its transport and impact upon
man. In addition, these experimentally obtained values will be compared
with those predicted by other programs in the Division. As a result,
our ability to predict the consequences to man of a Plowshare detonation
will be refined and sharpened from event to event.
602
THE ANALYSIS OF RADIOACTIVE PARTICLES PRODUCED IN
PLOWSHARE CRATERING EVENTS
The major sources of radionuclides that enter the biosphere fol-
lowing nuclear events such as Plowshare detonations are the radio-
active particles introduced into the atmosphere after the detonation.
We have therefore established a Particle Analysis Program whose im-
mediate objective was to obtain a complete quantitative description
of the radioactive particle population produced by specific nuclear
detonations. The long-range objective of the program was to determine
how particle populations change as detonation conditions change, and
thereby to establish a capability for predicting the characteristics
of particle distribution from the specifications of detonation condi-
tions. Success in achieving these objectives would provide essential
information on the possible occurrence of "hot spots" following nuclear
events.
The radioactive isotopes produced by nuclear detonations are
distributed among the particle classes and particle sizes in a manner
that varies from isotope to isotope and from detonation to detonation.
Our studies on radioactive particles from the Plowshare Events Sedan,
Palanquin, Cabriolet, Buggy, and Schooner indicate that the partitioning
of the radionuclides produced by cratering detonations follows a pattern
that can be understood in terms of a three-stage condensation process.
The first stage of condensation occurs in the underground cavity
produced by the detonation. The refractory radionuclides, those whose
boiling points are significantly higher than the melting temperature
of the environmental soil, are quantitatively scavenged by the molten
material that lines the cavity. Other radionuclides are incompletely
scavenged in this stage. In the subsequent rupture, the molten cavity
liner breaks up into particles that constitute a distinctive class,
referred to here as slag particles. Both the radioisotopic composi-
tion and specific isotopic abundance in this particle appear to be
relatively independent of particle size, indicating that the radio-
nucl ides in the slag particles are distributed within the particle
volume.
The second stage of condensation occurs during the passage of
the cavity gas through the strongly-shocked and crushed overlying rock
or soil, up to the time of venting. During this stage the radio!sotopes
of intermediate volatility complete their condensation. However, since
this crushed material is not melted, the radionuclides are surface-
deposited rather than volume-deposited. The radioactive particles formed
during this process are for the most part separated from the remaining
radioactive gas at the time of venting and fall to the side to form the
crater lip. This particle class will be referred to here as lateral
ejecta.
The third stage of condensation occurs after venting. Only a
small fraction of the crushed soil through which the radioactive gas
603
-------
has moved remains with the gas after venting occurs. Therefore, the
highly volatile species are found to be significantly enriched in this
soil fraction. The volatility of the individual radioisotopes may be
inherent as in the case of gold or arsenic isotopes or it may be due
to the isotope's having a rare gas precursor as in the case of fission-
product barium or cesium isotopes. Again the condensation is on non-
molten particles and consequently leads to surface deposition of the
radionuclides. The particles in this class will be referred to here as
vertical ejecta.
The partitioning of the radionuclide population among the particle
categories can be determined from the fission yields in conjunction
with several assumptions derived from the foregoing phenomenological
description. These assumptions are that refractory radionuclides are
in the main scavenged by the slag particles, that aerial filter sam-
ples of the radioactive cloud contain as their major components verti-
cal ejecta and slag particles, and that close-in tray samples contain
most of the lateral ejecta and slag particles. The partition values
for typical refractory, volatile, and intermediate species for four
cratering events are given in Table IV.
METABOLISM OF PLOWSHARE NUCLEAR DEBRIS IN
PIGS, DOGS, AND GOATS
This program is concerned with the metabolism, including the
biological availability, in large mammals of the radionuclides present
in nuclear debris from Plowshare events. Studies of the biological
availability of radionuclides in complex mixtures such as nuclear debris
are essential since the data are often different and more meaningful
than those obtained after feeding the radionuclide as a single chemi-
cal species. Accordingly, we have initiated feeding and inhalation
studies of nuclear debris in pigs, dogs, and goats. Pigs (peccaries)
were chosen because their gastrointestinal physiology closely resembles
that of man and because pork is an important constituent of the diet,
dogs (beagles) because their renal physiology closely resembles that of
man, and goats because of their suitability for inhalation studies in
the field.
In one part of this program, debris from specific Plowshare
cratering events is administered orally to pigs and dogs. The animals
are analyzed daily by whole-body counting for gamma ray-emitting radio-
nucl ides as are their urine and feces. At appropriate times, animals
are sacrificed for specific organ analysis to determine the distribution
of long-lived radionuclides. Wherever appropriate, beta-emitting radio-
nucl ides are quantitated in this and other Division programs after
radiochemical separation and purification.
In other studies, pigs are placed in metabolic cages located on
an arc within the predicted path of the radioactive cloud. Their feed
is allowed to become contaminated by fallout, and is then fed daily for
a week. The radionuclide contents of their organs, urine, and feces are
then determi ned.
604
These experiments yield several kinds of information about the
radionuclides: their identity and relative concentration in specific
nuclear debris, their absorption across the intestinal wall, their
body retention times, and the body distribution of long-lived radio-
nucl ides.
Figure 8 presents distribution data from an experiment in whjch
debris was orally administered to a pig. The results obtained for
antimony-122 are representative of data obtained for molybdenum-99,
tellurium-132, gold-198, and tungsten-187, in which 10 to 30 percent
of the ingested radionuclide was absorbed across the gut wall and
excreted by the kidney. The remaining fraction was eliminated in the
feces.
Figure 9 presents data on cerium-141 from the same experiment.
Little or no cerium-141, lead-203, ruthenium-103, manganese-54,
barium-l40/lanthanum-l40 from the debris was absorbed across the gut
wall and excreted by the kidney. Most of these radionuclides were
eliminated in the feces in the first two to three days. Figure 10
presents data on iodine-131, the only radionuclide absorbed to a large
extent; 73 percent of the initial' dose was excreted in the urine.
After eight days, antimony-122, tungsten-187 and lead-203 were no
longer detectable by whole-body analysis. Two percent or less of
molybdenum-99, cerium-131, tellurium-l32, gold-198, manganese-54 and
barium-l40/1anthanum-l40 was detectable. The only radionuclide re-
maining in appreciable amount after eights days was iodine-131, whose
retention at that time was six percent of the administered dose.
Studies similar to these have now been completed in pigs and in
dogs with debris from the same event and from different events. The
metabolism of some of the radionuclides varies between animals and
among events. In summary, our results indicate the importance of
critically evaluating the biological availability of radionuclides
produced in nuclear events.
The biological availability and the tissue distribution in goats
of the gamma-ray-emitting radionuclides from a radioactive cloud were
measured at the Nevada Test Site in conjunction with a cratering event.
At each of three stations, all located three to 4.6 miles from ground
zero, a lactating goat was stationed during the detonation in such a
manner as to receive only the inhalable fraction of the radionuclides
taken in by two air samplers. Thirty hours after the detonation, the
goats were killed and their major organs were removed for quantitation
of their gamma-emitting radionuclides. The nuclides molybdenum-99,
iodine-132, iodine-131, ruthenium-103, antimony-122, tungsten-187 and
barium-l40/lanthanum-l40 tended to be more readily absorbed across the
lung; cesium-141, gold-198 and lead-203 were less readily absorbed.
Most of the radionucltdes were found in highest concentration in the
upper lobe of the right lung. Table V presents data on the radionuclide
content of some of the organs of the goat nearest the hot-line.
605
-------
THE BIOLOGICAL AVAILABILITY OF DEBRIS RADIONUCLIDES
IN THE DAIRY COW
The dairy cow represents an important link in the food chain to
man by which not only radioiodine but many other radionuclides can enter
his diet. In countries like ours, in which dairy products contribute
a significant portion of the total diet, this may well be the major
route of isotope transfer, particularly for infants and children. Con-
sequently a program was*instituted to determine the biological availability
to the cow of radionuclides in nuclear debris.
This program involves work in several interrelated areas. The
first Is concerned with the biological availability of radionuclides in
debris from nuclear events, the second with the biological availability
of pure radionuclides, the third with environmental studies, and the
fourth with in vitro studies of radionuclide binding to plasma and milk
proteins.
In a representative experiment on biological availability, a
lactating cow was fed debris from a Plowshare cratering event. Figure
II presents the data on the iodine-131 content in milk, plasma, urine
and feces. Of the administered dose, 61 percent was excreted in the
urine and seven percent was secreted in the milk. These data may be
contrasted with comparable values of 14 percent for urine and two per-
cent for milk for debris from an underground event that accidentally
vented. They agree well, however, with data from an experiment in
which sodium iodide labelled with iodine-131 was administered orally.
In both debris experiments, the plasma-to-milk ratio for iodine-131
was unity after 72 hours, and thereafter the plasma levels exceeded
those of milk, because iodine binding to plasma proteins prevented
its excretion by the mammary gland or the kidney.
Figure 12 presents data on the relatively unavailable fission
products barium-UO/lanthanum-140. Figure 13 presents data on tungsten-181;
about seven percent of the administered radiotungsten appeared in the
urine and 0.5 percent In the milk. In the experiment described here,
manganese-54, zIrconium-95/niobium-95, cerium-141, neodymium-147 and
lead-203 were not observed in milk, urine or plasma. Figure 14 presents
a spectrum of the gamma-emitting radionucIides In the feces; solid state
detectors have clearly quantitated manganese-54, zirconium-95/niobium-95,
molybdenum-99, ruthenium-103, antimony-122, antimony-124, iodine-131,
tellurium-131, tellurium-132, iodlne-133, barium-140/lanthanum-140,
cerium-141, neodymium-147, tungsten-181, tungsten-187, gold-198, lead-203
and others.
Table VI compares the recovery of orally administered radionuclIdes
from several sources: two Plowshare cratering events, an underground
accidental venting and commercially available pure radionuclides. Of
particular interest are the data on iodine-131, which show a variation
in the metabolic pattern from one kind of event to another.
606
In a study of maternaI-feta I transfer. Plowshare debris, six
weeks after the detonation, was administered to a near-term pregnant
cow; a total of one kilogram was given in gelatin capsules, at a rate
of 200 grams per day for five days. At 48 hours after the last admini-
stration, the cow was anesthetized and sacrificed. Tissue and blood
samples were taken from both the fetus and the cow. Data from this
experiment are summarized in Table VII. All values are compared to
the cow plasma values normalized to unity, so as to point up the de-
gree of concentration of specific radlonuclides in specific tissues.
The nuclide tungsten-181 appears to concentrate in maternal mammary
gland, spleen, kidney, liver and bone and particularly in fetal bone.
The last finding is in accord with other results from this Laboratory
indicating that bone-plasma ratios as high as 200 or 300 to one can be
reached in the bones of immature rats. The gold-198 seems to localize
in the maternal kidney. The iodine-131 is concentrated in both the
maternal and fetal thyroid; 4.5 percent of the administered dose was
taken up by the maternal thyroid and 6.7 percent by the fetal thyroid.
The concentration of iodine-131 per unit weight of wet tissue was
twice as high In the fetal thyroid as in the maternal thyroid. The
other radionuclides detected in the other studies were either absent or
present only in very small amounts in some organs.
METABOLISM OF DEBRIS RADIONUCLIDES IN AQUATIC ANIMALS
The release of radionuclides in or near the hydrosphere results
in their uptake by aquatic organisms in the food chain of man. At
nuclear installations such as nuclear reactors of nuclear fuel produc-
tion or processing plants, radionuclides are generally released at low
regulated rates into established ecosystems. At the sites of nuclear
detonations, large initial releases of radioactivity are followed by
continuous long-term releases of small amounts leached from the initially
deposited source.
Accordingly, a program was initiated to obtain information bearing
on the problems of radioactive contamination of the hydrosphere from
Plowshare and other nuclear events. It involves several different aspects:
(I) assessment of the biological availability of radionuclides in nuclear
debris, (2) evaluation of the biological turnover of critical elements
in specific aquatic animals, (3) elemental analysis of aquatic organisms
and their environmental water, and (4) investigation of the mechanisms
of accumulation of specific elements.
The biological availability of radlonuclides from nuclear debris
is a function in great part of the matrix of the debris particles; and
aquatic organisms can acquire radioactivity by ingesting radlonuclfdes
either in solution or in particulate matter. Therefore experiments were
designed to study the influence of physical and chemical form on the
availability. The source of the debris material was either contained
underground events or fallout and crater lip material from cratering
events. This particulate matter was separated into particle-size frac-
tions which were then leached with various solutions to determine the
607
-------
distribution coefficients of the contained radionucl ides; representa-
tive aquatic animals were then exposed to water that had circulated
through the debris.
Table VIM presents distribution coefficients in synthetic sea-
water of debris radionucl ides from a cratering event. The distribu-
tion coef f i cient is
- F
where FS = the fraction of the total activity on the solid, I - F = the
fraction of the total activity in the liquid, V = the volume of tne liquid
in mi I IiIiters equiIibrated with W, and W = the weight of the material
in grams. Comparable data are available for other radionuclides. Different
distribution coefficients were obtained for many of the radionuclides in
debri s in an underground-contained event.
The biological availability of the debris radionuclides to specific
aquatic animals has been evaluated in the past in the system shown in
Figure 15. Typical data on representative marine and freshwater animals
are presented in Tables IX and X. These data and data on other radio-
nucl ides show that a nuclide can be metabolized quite differently by
different aquatic animals. We are presently determining biological
availability in 2000-galIon aquari a in whi ch the changes in the concen-
tration of stable elements and radionuclides in the water, the sedi-
ments and the animals can be followed for extended periods of time. For
proposed Plowshare excavations, we plan to study appropriate debris sam-
ples from past Plowshare tests in aquatic animals indigenous to the pro-
posed s ites.
Table XI presents concentration ratios of radionucI ides in fresh-
water and marine animals after exposure to water circulated through
debris from a cratering event.
We have also studied the biological turnover of certain radio-
nucl ides in bivalve and molluscs and other animals. Accumulation and
loss of the nuclides were followed in the Laboratory under we I I-control led
conditions: constant concentrations of radionuclides and stable ele-
ments, controlled temperature, and specimens selected according to size.
These parameters were then varied independently in order to identify the
factors most critical in affecting biological turnover. Concentration
factors and biological turnover were assessed simultaneously.
The elements most studied to date are zinc, manganese, cobalt,
iron, europium, chromium, arsenic, cesium, and plutonium. From the re-
sults, we can conclude that the concentrations of some elements are not
under homeostatic control, and that the animals contain pools of the
elements with which the corresponding radionuclides are not readily
608
equilibrated. They suggest further that anyone who proposes to use
published concentration factors for predictive purposes should be aware
of the precise conditions under which they were determined.
THE PERSISTENCE OF RADIONUCLIOES IN THE ECOSYSTEMS
OF NUCLEAR DETONATION SITES
This program is concerned primarily with the behavior of long-
lived radionuclides in the ecological and biological systems that
re invade nuclear detonation sites. The unique aspect of this research
is the use of the detonation site as a natural laboratory in which real
environmental parameters affect the movement of a radionuclide. Field
studies were initiated in 1964 with a study of old detonation sites at
Eniwetok Atoll in the Marshall Islands. The major emphasis was on
tritium and carbon-14, two radionuclides that had not been looked for
in the resurveys conducted by the University of Washington Laboratory
of Radiation Biology. At the present, most of the radioecologicaI re-
search in this program is being conducted at the Nevada Test Site.
An example of the kind of research carried out at the sites of
Plowshare excavations is our studies at Sedan Crater. I wiI I particularly
emphasize our studies on the fate of residual tritium because of its
potential impact on the biosphere.
Approximately one million curies of residual tritium as THO was
injected into the mass of earth deposited around the crater by the
detonation. In 1966, we began studies at Sedan Crater on the behavior
of this tritium in the soil Cejecta), the invading plant species, and
the animal populations that subsist on the vegetation.
To study tritium distribution in an open ecological system, we
first had to develop specialized analytical methods to extract the
interstitial water from soils and the tissue or unbound water from plant
samples and from the body water of mammals. These methods consist pri-
marily of lyophilizing the material in glassware specially designed to
collect the water from each sample. The resulting samples are assayed
for tritium by Iiquid scinti I I at ion tehcniques. Tissue-bound tritium
is determined in plant and animal tissues by a modified Schoniger method
followed by liquid scintillation counting.
At Sedan Crater, we found essentially equilibrium concentrations
in the soil water of the plant root zone, in the tissue water of the
plant stems and leaves, and in the transpirationaI water released by
the aerial portions of the plant. Tissue-water tritium concentrations
in plants growing on Sedan ejecta are presented in Figure 16.
At the end of the annual growing season, the specific activity of
tritium in the solid phase of the tissues of herbaceous plants such as
the Russian thistle (Sal so I a kali) was almost equal to that found in the
tissue water of the plant. These data are presented in Figure 17. This
609
-------
i HC or per 3+ i on of tr i t i urn i nto The organ i c rratter syntnes i zed by D I ants
growing en Sedan ejecta is mainly responsible for the tritium concen-
trations found in small mammals, reptiles, birds and even insects
Iiv ing in the Sedan area .
Some tyoical oody-water tritium concentrations in mammals at
Sedan Crater are presentee" in Figure 13. Tritium concentrations in
the body water in tne most abundant nan me' at 5edan, tne k3rcaro-c r^r
ij)j poJorys rer_r / a^ni ) . were more closely re!a*eo to t<--o:-f of tissue bourd
frlTTum "n plariT Tissue than they were to tnose of soil-water tritium,
which vary seasonally at the depth of the burrows.
The effects of seasonal rainfall on the soil-water tr i t i urn prc-
file in Sedan ejecta are readily observed in the
-------
has been measured quantitatively down to doses in the region of 10 to
20 rads. Within such studies, however, no method has ever been pro-
posed for determining the relevance of observed chromosome damage to
the production of important somatic effects of such radiation in
humans or other intact mammals. The somatic effects of consequence
are predominantly carcinogenesis, leukemogenesis, or other bases for
life shortening. Only if the chromosome abnormalities cause cancer
will such studies bear directly upon the question of whether low-
dose radiation produces human cancer or leukemia.
The concept that abnormalities in chromosomes might be the
cause of cancer was proposed by Theodor Boveri in 1902. If this is
so, a specific abnormality or set of abnormalities should be un-
failingly associated with cancer. The known effect of radiation
on chromosomes, plus the Boveri concept of a chromosomal cause of
cancer, suggested an approach that could provide relevant answers to
the central question.
The point to be settled first is whether the concept that an ap-
propriately imbalanced cell chromosome constitution, of whatever origin,
would lead to a malignant tumor. Our approach to this question and its
relation to low-dose radiation effects are in three successive phases:
I. Is there a specific single chromosome abnormality, or a
specific set of abnormalities, in human cancer?
2. If there is, can radiation produce such abnormalities?
can be studied on human cells in culture rather than on humans.
This
3. If radiation can produce such abnormalities, is their pro-
duction linear with dose down to low doses? Particularly, is there a
true threshold dose?
For our experiments, electronic scanners and computer processing
of the scan information were used, and faster, more accurate methods of
preparing, observing, recording, and analyzing chromosome data were
developed. Suitable cells were selected, and their individual chromo-
somes were measured and separated into groups by computer processing,
with computer-programmed "cut-off" points for the group boundaries. A
sufficient number of cells is measured so that the results are statistically
significant with a high degree of confidence.
We are pleased to say that we have achieved the objective of
developing a relevant study system for low-dose radiation in relation to
human carcinogenesis and leukemogenesis. Our research indicates the
existence of an invariant common to unlimited proliferation of human
cells in vitro and to malignant growth in humans. This invariant is in
the form" of a marked excess of E-16 chromosomes, either absolute or rela-
tive to other classes of chromosomes. Our studies of 14 established human
cell lines show that the E-16 chromosomal imbalance is present without
exception and is strong in every case. We appear to be nearing the point
where it is possible to say that E-16 chromosome imbalance is an in-
variant of established human cell lines. In addition, studies on
10 cases of human cancer, including both malignant effusions and
several primary solid cancers, also demonstrate the E-16 chromosome
Imbalance.
Of great interest are our studies on the effects of viruses on
human cells. Virus alteration of normal diploid human cells to esta-
blished lines had, of course, been accomplished by other workers,
using SV-40 virus and others. Indeed, at this time, of the three
major known modalities of cancer induction (viruses, carcinogenic
chemicals and radiation) only viruses have been unequivocally able
to alter diploid eel Is to established human eel I Iines. We have
studied human cells that had been converted into a permanent line
with SV-40 virus. Chromosome studies of these cells show that SV-40
virus-altered cells show the same E-16 chromosome imbalance previously
demonstrated by us for spontaneously established human cell lines and
for human cancers (effusions or solid tumors) studied directly. Thus
a known oncogenic virus produces the E-16 chromosome imbalance in the
course of In vjjfro alteration of diploid human cells to altered cells
with malignant proliferative properties.
The major objectives ahead are:
I. Ascertainment of whether or not E-16 chromosome imbalance
determines malignant behavior of cells thus imbalanced.
2. Ascertainment of whether or not radiation can imbalance
human diploid cells in culture with respect to E-16 content and
concomitantly transform such cells into established ceil lines. Such
studies are underway at present. Wholly irrespective of the E-16
chromosome issue, the question of whether or not established cell line
production is possible with radiation alone is one of the most central
Importance^ in the entire area of the somatic effects of radiation.
-------
SELECTED PUBLICATIONS OF THE BIO-MEDICAL DIVISION
OF PARTICULAR RELEVANCE TO PLOWSHARE EVENTS
Anspaugh, Lynn R., Special Problems of Thyroid Dosimetry:
Considerations of I'31 Dose as a Function of Gross Size and
Inhomogeneous Distribution, UCRL-12492, Lawrence Radiation Laboratory,
Livermore (March 25, 1965).
Anspaugh, Lynn R., John W. Gofman, Ora A. Lowe and Walter H. Martin,
X-ray Fluorescence Analysis Applied to Biological Problems. In Proceedings
of 2nd Symposium on Low Energy X- and Gamma Sources and Applications
(March 1967) p. 315.
Anspaugh, Lynn R. and William L. Robison, Quantitative Evaluation
of the Biological Hazards of Radiation Associated with Project Ketch,
UCID-15325, Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Livermore (May 8, 1968).
Burton, C. Ann and Michael W. Pratt, Prediction of the Maximum
Dosage to Man from the Fallout of Nuclear Devices. III. Biological
Guidelines for Device Design, UCRL-50163 (Pt. Ill Rev. I), Lawrence
Radiation Laboratory, Livermore (1968).
Chapman, WilliamH,, The Changing Frequency of Thyroid Carcinoma
and Hashimoto's Thyroiditis as Related to Diagnostic Criteria, Iodized
Salt and Radiation, UCRL-50376, Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Livermore
(1968).
Chapman, WilliamH., H. Leonard Fisher and Michael W. Pratt,
Concentration Factors of Chemical Elements in Edible Aquatic Organisms,
UCRL-50564, Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Livermore (1968).
Chertok, Robert and L^zanne Lake, The Availability in the Peccary
Pig of Nuclear Debris from the Plowshare Excavation, Buggy. (In preparation)
Chertok, Robert and Suzanne Lake, A Field Study of the Availability
in the Domestic Pig of Nuclear Debris from the Plowshare Excavation,
Schooner. (In preparation)
Cranston, Fred P. and Lynn R. Anspaugh, Preliminary Studies in
Nondispersive X-ray Fluorescent Analysis of Biological Materials, UCRL-50569,
Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Livermore (January 6, 1969).
Fisher, H. Leonard, Prediction of the Maximum Dosage to Man from
the Fallout of Nuclear Devices. VI. Transport of Nuclear Debris by
Surface and Groundwater, UCRL-50163 (Part VI), Lawrence Radiation
Laboratory, Livermore. (In preparation)
Geesaman, Donald P., A Study of the Effects of Insoluble Alpha-Emitting
Aerosols on Deep Respiratory Tissue, UCRL-50387, Lawrence Radiation
Laboratory, Livermore (1968).
Gofman, John W., The Hazards to Man from Radioactivity. In
Engineering with Nuclear Explosives (Proceedings of the Third Plowshare
Symposium, University of California, Davis, April 21, 1964), TID-7695
(1964).
Gofman, John W., J. L. Minkler and R. K. Tandy, A Specific Common
Chromosomal Pathway for the Origin of Human Malignancy, UCRL-50356,
Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Livermore (Nov. 20, 1967).
54
Harrison, Florence L., Accumulation and Distribution of Mn and
Zn65 in Freshwater Clams. Proc. 2nd Natl. Symp. of Radioecology,
Ann Arbor, Mich., AEC, ESA, and Univ. of Mich., May 15-17, 1967, in press.
Harrison, Florence L., Concentration Factors - Their Use and Abuse,
UCRL-50347, Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Livermore (Nov. 7, 1967).
Harrison, Florence L., Physical and Chemical Characteristics and
Biological Availability of Debris from Underground Nuclear Detonations,
UCRL-50596 (in press).
Harrison, Florence L. and Dorothy J. Quinn, Short-Term Studies
on the Accumulation and Distribution of 46Sc, 5lCr, 59Fe, 60Co and
I55EU in Anodonta nuttalliana Lea, UCRL-71607, to be submitted to
Health Physics.
Hatch, F. T., J. A. Mazrimas, G. G. Greenway, J J. Koranda and
J. L. Moore, Studies on Liver ONA in Tritiated Kangaroo Rats Living
at Sedan Crater, UCRL-50461, Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Livermore
(1968).
Heft, Robert E. and William A. Steele, Procedures for the Systematic
Separation and Analysis of Radioactive Particles from Nuclear Detonations,
UCRL-50428, Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Livermore (May 17, 1968).
Heft, Robert E., The Characterization of Radioactive Particles from
Nuclear Weapons Tests. Advances in Chemistry, in press.
Koranda, John J., Preliminary Studies of the Persistence of Tritium
and Carbon-14 in the Pacific Proving Ground. Health Physics II, 1445
(1965). —
Koranda, John J., Agricultural Factors Affecting the Daily Intake
of Fresh Fallout by Dairy Cows, UCRL-12479, Lawrence Radiation Laboratory,
Livermore (March 19, 1965).
Koranda, John J., Residual Tritium at Sedan Crater. Proc. 2nd
Natl. Symp. on Radioecology, Ann Arbor, Mich., May 15-17, 1967 (in press).
Koranda, John J., J. R. Martin and R. W. Wikkerink, Residual Tritium
at Sedan Crater. Part II. Soil and Ejecta Studies. UCRL-50360, Lawrence
Radiation Laboratory, Livermore (Dec. 7, 1967).
615
-------
Koranda, John J., J. R. Martin and R. Wikkerink, Leaching of
Radionuclides at Sedan Crater. Advances in Chemistry (in press).
Ng, Yook C., C. Ann Burton and Stanley E. Thompson, Prediction
of the Maximum Dosage to Man from the Fallout of Nuclear Devices. IV.
Handbook for Estimating the Maximum Internal Dose from the Deposition
of Radionuclides Released to the Biosphere. UCRL-50163 (Pt. IV),
Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Livermore (1968).
Ng, Yook C., C. Ann Burton and Stanley E. Thompson, Prediction
of the Maximum Dosage to Man from the Fallout of Nuclear Devices. IV.
Handbook for Estimating the Maximum Internal Dose from Radionuclides
Released to the Biosphere, UCRL-50163 (Pt. IV ADD. I), Lawrence Radiation
Laboratory, Livermore (1968).
Phelps, Paul L., Keith 0. Hamby, Bernard Shore and Gilbert D. Potter,
Ge(Li) Gamma-Ray Spectrometers of High Sensitivity and Resolution for
Biological and Environmental Counting, UCRL-50437, Lawrence Radiation
Laboratory, Livermore (May 24, 1968).
Potter, G. D., David R. Mclntyre and Deborah Pomeroy, Transport
°f Fallout Radionuclides in the Grass to Milk Food Chain Studied with
a Germanium Lithium-Drifted Detector. Health Physics 16, 297 (1969).
Potter, Gilbert D., Deborah Pomeroy and David R. Mclntyre, Residual
Gamma-Emitting Radionuclides in Nevada Range Cattle as Observed with a
Lithium-Drifted German!urn Detector, UCRL-70812 (1967).
Potter, Gilbert D., David R. Mclntyre and Gerald M, Vattuone,
Biological Availability of Radionuclides from an Accidental Nuclear
Venting in the Dairy Cow. (In preparation)
Potter, Gilbert D., David R. Mclntyre and Gerald M. Vattuone,
Biological Availability of Radionuclides in the Dairy Cow from Cabriolet
(a Plowshare nuclear cratering event). (In preparation)
Potter, Gilbert D., Gerald M. Vattuone and David R. Mclntyre,
Maternal-Fetal Transfer of Orally Administered Radionuclides from Buggy
(a Plowshare nuclear cratering event). (In preparation)
Potter, Gilbert D., Gerald M. Vattuone and David R. Mclntyre,
Biological Availability of Radionuclides from Schooner in the Dairy Cow.
(In preparation)
Saunders, E. W. and C. J. Maxwell, Paralleling Planar Ge(Li)
Detectors for Counting Large Volume Biological Samples, IEEE Transactions
on Nuclear Science NS-15 No. I, 423 (1968).
Stone, Stuart P., Chromosome Scanning Program at LRL. Part I.
Chromo, a Set of Chromosome Pattern-Recognition Programs, UCRL-50364
Part I, Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Livermore (Nov. 25, 1967).
616
Tamplin, Arthur R., lodine-131, lodine-133 and Cow Milk,
UCRL-I4I46, Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Livermore (1965).
Tamplin, Arthur R., Discussion on "Thyroid Irradiation in Utah
Infants Exposed to lodine-131." Scientist and Citizen 8_(9), 3 (1966).
Tamplin, Arthur R., Estimation of Dosage to Thyroids of Children
in the U.S. from Nuclear Tests Conducted in Nevada During 1952 and
1955, UCRL-70787 (November 1967).
Tamplin, Arthur R., Prediction of the Maximum Dosage to Man from
the Fallout of Nuclear Devices. I. Estimation on the Maximum Contamination
of Agricultural Land. UCRL-50163 (Part I), Lawrence Radiation Laboratory,
Livermore (1967).
Tamplin, Arthur, R., H. Leonard Fisher and WilliamH. Chapman,
Prediction of the Maximum Dosage to Man from the Fallout of Nuclear
Devices. V. Estimation of the Maximum Dose from Internal Emitters
in Aquatic Food Supply. UCRL-50163 (Pt. V), Lawrence Radiation
Laboratory, Livermore (1968).
617
-------
TABLE I
TABLE II
ESTIMATED MAXIMUM DOSAGEa VIA MILK TO THE CHILD'S
WHOLE BODY AND BONE FROM 239PU FISSION PRODUCTS
ESTIMATED MAXIMUM DOSAGE" VIA MILK TO THE CHILD'S WHOLE BODY
AND BONE FROM ACTIVATION PRODUCTS PRODUCED IN GRANITE
Radionuclide
>3
-------
TABLE III
ESTIMATED AND MEASURED CONCENTRATION OF RADIONUCLIDES
IN GRASS AND MILK
Forage (pCi/kg)
Radionuclide
131i
137Cs
"MO
140Ba
132Te
Estimated
5000
19
1110
5550
900
Measured"
5000
43
1050
5740
1510
Milk (pCi/kg)
Estimated
1000
3
82
33
9
Measured"
930
2
20
71b
7
Potter, G. et al., "Biological Availability of Radionuclides in Fallout
from the Chinese Nuclear Test of December 1966," Lawrence Radiation
Laboratory, Livermore, Rept. UCRL-70301 (1966).
Determined as Ba/ La.
620
TABLE IV
RADIONUCLIDE DISTRIBUTION VALUES FROM CRATERING EVENTS
Fraction of nuclide in:
Slag
144Ce
132Te
137Cs
106D
Ru
137Cs
141Ce
137Cs
141Ce
137Cs
131j
181w
1.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
,00
393
133
264
060
922
103
695
100
538
715
Lateral ejecta
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
.553
.442
063
015
074
474
302
590
457
283
Vertical ejecta
0
0,
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
.054
.425
673
925
004
423
003
310
005
002
Cratering event
All events
A
A
B
B
C
C
D
D
D
D
621
-------
TABLE VI
RECOVERY OF ORALLY ADMINISTERED RADIONUCLIDES FROM
THE DAIRY COW
Nuclide
54Mn
74As
88y
95Zr
"»x
Mo
103Ru
122Sb
124Sb
131I
Event or
chemical form
PC Ia
PC IIa
MnCl2c
PC II
Na3As04
PC II
YCl,
PC I
Zr oxalate
PC I
UGVb
(NH4)2Mo04
PC I
PC II
RuCl3
PC I
SbClj
PC I
Percent
Feces
110
83
85
49
45
104
88
76
98
80
82
104
109
101
93
105
114
42
of administered
Urine
NDd
ND
-
O 00
•— Ui O O O O
Ui
i— Ui
i— O [\J tsj
tM O O Ul Ul
r\j
H ^ •—
C^J ^ Oo i— Ui
O*- U) ^ -J
O 0 O 0 O
Ui
o
2 w
D 3 S g
ro
ooZ^^2
GO D
— *"
2 ^
M >f* so
W -J Ui U) rf*
t~' O O O ui
o
ISJ
o
*~ CT* O
ro o o
.. z
Ul UJ ^ 00 Ul
K- 0 O O ui
Ui
vO
s°
o
^
o"
fit
H
(D
O
*"0
cr
5
»
c
o
Ul
c
£
ui^
cr
^
00
-J
o
3)
o
U
INHALABLE F
43
o >
s ^
S 1
1 ?
0 -
5 6
H o
2 z
"i C
o
r
B
w
en
^
JO
O
s
a
o
z
G
O
LIDE CONTEN
H
—
O
OQ
O
hcl
• ORGA
2
en
O
O
o
H
<
n
K
O
M
M
D
TABL.
n
<
-------
s|
Ev
mic
> _ °
^ js S
y £ v
•g 3 «
£ S "3
S « E
g
o>
X
U
TABLE VII
TISSUE/PLASMA RATIOS' OF MATERNAL AND FETAL TISSUES FROM A
PREGNANT COW FED DEBRIS FROM PLOWSHARE NUCLEAR CRATERING EVENT
Sample
Maternal plasma
Maternal spleen
Maternal pancreas
Maternal mammary
Maternal bile
Maternal placenta
Amniotic fluid
Maternal kidney
Fetal kidney
Maternal thyroid
Fetal thyroid
Maternal muscle
Fetal muscle
Maternal liver
Fetal liver
Maternal blood
Fetal blood
Maternal RBC
Maternal bone
Fetal bone
Fetal cartilage
Maternal marrow
Fetal marrow
Total pCi in
Admin, dose 2.
pCi/100 g
Mat. plasma 8.
t pCi in 100 g tisi
* Tissues with tisi
ND Not detected
181w
*-° *
1.56
"•"„
1. 40
0. 003
0.62
°'35*
8.60
0. 26
0. 60
0. 005
0. 094
0.026^
3. 14
0.033
0. 05
0.069
0.096
1.41*
21.2 *
12.8 *
0. 19^
1.14
i n
07X 10 2
46 X 103 9
196 A
Au
1.0
0. 52
0. 18
0.45
0. 12
0. 40
ND ^
10.09
0.06
ND
ND
0.04
0. 03
0. 93
0. 025
0. 83
ND
0.68
0. 60
ND
ND
ND
ND
Q
.6x 108
. 37 X 10
13II
1.0
0. 19
0. 21
0. 51
0.61
0.69
0. 31
0.45
1.26,
5,450.0
10, 500.0
0.05
0.05
°-32*
1.27
°-67*
1.97
0. 12
0. 10
0.67
0.66
ND
0. 87
Q
2. 79 X 10 2
2 1.21 X 105 1
sue/pCi in 100 g maternal plasma (wet
sue/ maternal
plasma
ratio >1. 0
103,,
Ru
1.0
ND
ND ^
K1*
3. 7
ND
ND
9.8
ND
ND
ND
ND
2. 2
ND
ND
ND*
2.8
ND
ND
ND
ND
3-5*
6. 1
g
.76 x 10
.33X 102
weight)
124Sb
'•o*
25-3*
4-2*
4-4*
49.0
ND
2L6*
88.0
4. 7
ND
ND
3-°*
3.4
ND
ND*
3. 8
ND*
8. 0
ND
ND
ND
ND
ND
ND
2.3
137,,
Cs
l-°*
169.0
230. 0
115-°*
2,840.0^
340. 0
9'6*
423.0,
128.0
ND
ND
111.0^
71. 0,,
200.0
118.0
26.0
27.0*
37.8,
34.0
45'5*
30.0,
33'°*
27.4
ND
0.05
140
Ba
1.0
•50*
1.06
16'5 *
X-3 I
3.0
°'2 *
8. 10
0. 12
ND
ND
0. 21
0. 16
0. 44
ND
1.0
ND
0.29
55-° *
113.0
91.0 *
4. 30
76.0 *
D
6. 38x 10
1. 33 X 102
4°K
1'° *
2.90,
4'55*
2-25*
1'10*
3-3°*
0. 26
3.56*
4.20
ND
ND
4'27*
3. 87,
2-14,
2.38*
3.20*
4. 50,
4. 55
ND
5.70*
3. 80
9-64*
2.32
ND
99. 0
62lt-625
-------
TABLE VIII
DISTRIBUTION COEFFICIENTS IN SYNTHETIC SEA WATER OF DEBRIS
RADIONUCLIDES FROM A CRATERING EVENT
TABLE DC
Size of particles in fraction
Radionuclide > 1000 < 4000 |i >250 < 1000 |i > 62 < 250 )i < 62 u
Mn 3,400 4,900 4,100 Z, 500
58Co 4,500a 15,000a 6, 500a 180a
59Fe NDb NDb NDb NDb
103
Ru 4,900 2,900 1,000 1,400
124Sb 520 160 74 83
14°Ba/140La 260a 52a 19a 40a
141Ce 47, 000a 3, 100a 2, 400a 8, 200a
a Fractional standard deviation of data > 0. 20.
Not detected.
p A n|f ll\] 1 U . 1 .11 IK UUr'H^il'lN 1 ICrt. 1HJ1NO UN IIOOUJ^O *~l I ivirnvllt J^ r^iii««^^J" ~.** * „„— - » —
SEA WATER CIRCULATED THROUGH DEBRIS FROM A CRATERING EVENT
Days
Animal and Tissue Exposure Mn Ru Sb I Ba/ La
Fish, whole body 6 270b 2,200 7,100 320,000 290,000
(Gobiosoma bosci)
Clam, edible portions 20 960b 1, 700 520b 16, 000 16, 000b
(saxidomis giganteus)
Crab, muscle 20 1, 800b 1,400 2, 300b 210,000 310,000
(Cancer productus)
Crab, viscera 20 1, 700b 14,000 11,000 9,500,000 2,100,000
Sea. Water
Day 6 280b 2,900 6,600 4,500 220,000
Day 20 470b 3,900 13,000 31,000 230,000
14 >Ce
c
1, 100b
l,400b
V
690,000°
110
250
Corrected for decay to time of detonation of event.
Fractional standard deviation of data > 0. ZO.
Low level* not quantitated.
626
627
-------
TABLE X
TABLE XI
RADIONUCLIDE CONCENTRATIONS IN TISSUES OF FRESHWATER ANIMALS
EXPOSED TO POND WATER CIRCULATED THROUGH DEBRIS FROM A
CRATERING EVENT
CONCENTRATION RATIOS OBSERVED IN FRESHWATER AND MARINE ANIMALS
EXPOSED TO WATER CIRCULATED THROUGH DEBRIS FROM A
CRATERING EVENT
D R d' I'd C ' a C'/k
Animal and Tissue Expolure 54Mn 103Ru 124Sb 131I 14°Ba/14°La I41Ce
Fish, muscle 7 b 4, 100C b b t 620
Fish, viscera and skeleton 7 I 2,400 6,100 230,000 360,000 2,100
(Carassius auratus)
Clam, edible portions 21 440C 6,200 15,000 150,000° 180,000 b
(Anadonta nuttalliana)
Crayfish, muscle 21 I 1 t I 47, 000C 3,500°
(Astacus sp. )
Crayfish, viscera 21 6,000 39,000 12, 000C 4,300,000 4,600,000 16,000
(Astacus sp. )
Pond Water
Dav 6 830 3 100 3 600 28 000 1 10 000 620
j j
Day 20 NDa 5,300 8,800 84,000 150,000 ND
Days of
P
Fish, whole body FW 7
SW 6
Clam, edible part FW 2 1
SW 20
Crustacean, muscle FW 21
SW 20
Crustacean, viscera FW 21
SW 20
a
Low level, not quantitated.
u
54Mn
lb
440b
"NDC
2b
a
4b
6,000
NDC
4b
Concentration ratios:
103Ru 124Sb 131I 14°Ba/14°La 141Ce
082 8 3 3
081 7 13 a
1.2 2 2b 1.3 a
V V, K Vi
0.4b 0. lb 0.5 0. lb 4°
Q 3b 3, 500b
0.4 0.2b 7 1.3 6b
7 1.3b 51 31 16,000
NlF
4 0.9 300 9 2,800b
Fractional standard deviation > 0.20.
Corrected for decay to time of detonation of the event.
Low level, not quantitated.
C Fractional standard deviation of data > 0.20.
dND (not detectable)
"Not detected
-------
Figure I. Comparison of two spectra from the same air-filter sample
(presumed Chinese test). Upper spectra obtained with a
4x4 in. NaI (Tl) scintillation system. Lower spectrum
obtained with our 8-cm^ planar Ge(Li) detector.
.239,
239NP,187W, 132Te
24Na
TMo
24 - hr feces
-'-
^;v-a;4^;...:. ..I.
.' ..""" :'-^v-—-: \
239Np, 132Te, 187W
239,
Np
24 - hr plasma
Figure 2. Gamma-ray spectra from various biological materials from
a dairy cow that had been previously fed radioactive debris
collected at the site of a nuclear detonation.
630-631
-------
1*1
U •*-
O O C
Q, .-
VI VI
— C
O ^1 Q-
D) > ID
CONTROL BOX
AIM-SNOW
SHIELD
AIR INTAKE
BATTERIES
Figure 4. Sequential air-sampling station fielded on Project Schooner.
632-633
-------
10'
I0h
o
CL
10'
• = S25
• = S27
A=T1
O.I
10
100
10
HOURS-
10
HOURS
F i gur
5. Air concentration of tungsten-181 as a function of time
observed after Project Schooner. 6J4
F i gure 6. Air con cent rat ion of iodine-131 as a function of ti me
observed after Project Schooner.
635
-------
CM
Q
zi — o
£ a"1
O ""
y M- ^
«L Q
"b
100
uj 90
(/)
§80
<70
60
u. 50
O
I- 40
z
w ,«
o 30
cr
uj2o
10
0
WHOLE-BODY
A URINE
• FECES
| 234567
DAYS
Figure 8. Uptake, retention and excretion in pig of antimony-122 from
debris from Plowshare cratering event that was orally admin-
istered to the animal.
636-637
8
-------
URINE
FECES
Figure 9. Uptake, retention and excretion in pig of cerium-141 from
debris from Plowshare cratering event that was orally
administered to the animal.
WHOLE-BODY
URINE
FECES
Figure 10. Uptake, retention and excretion in pig of iodine-131 from
debris from Plowshare cratering event that was orally
administered to the animal.
638-639
-------
T
T
DEBRIS FED COW
1311 (Tl/2 8.05 D)
-Urine
Feces
0.10
-I
_L
_L
24 48 72 96 104
AFTER ADMINISTRATION (HRS.)
144 156
Figure I I.
640
lodine-131 content of milk, plasma, urine and feces gf
lactating cow fed nuclear debris from a Plowshare cratering
event.
icy
I I I
DEBRIS FED COW
La
I400 / 140
Ba /
Feces
10' -
o>
O
E
Q.
O
10
rl
10
I
24 48 72 96 120
AFTER ADMINISTRATION (HRS.)
144
Figure 12. Barium-I40/Ianthanum-I40 content of milk, plasma, urine and
64] feces of lactating cow fed nuclear debris from a Plowshare
cratering event.
-------
CMntmEL NUMBER
Figure 14. Radionuclide content of feces of animal fed nuclear debris
from a Plowshare cratering event.
61(2-61(3
-------
1
1
1
1
L.
Aquarium
11
'I., .IL «n/'- Filter
X _ ». -v A
f ^\\ T
( 1 '
' 1 " 1 '
\ PUMP
I-;.'-': :"!•.*;"• vv.'Wi'-.»"
.vi:.;f-:--.:--V:^:U::^.Y.* •» ^% . . •
| 1 — . . . . — J
S
rilter
Figure 15. System used in determining biologica availability of Plowshare
cratering debris to aquatic an mals.
2!
TISSUE WATER TRITIUM CONCENTRATIONS
IN PLANTS GROWING ON SEDAN EJECTA
JULY 1968
•
1 1 1
• 4
• • 4 -«
4 i
• •
4 « 4 44 -
1-
°- H
Jt V) <
* " |oi
«*•*•* ^ mo<
^n ^£ CD
4 -1- ^
•• * 4 • •
" .1 . - 4 + - - 1 -J 1
DO' 1000' 2000' 3000'
DISTANCE FROM LIP
6. Tissue-water tritium concentrations in plants growing on
Sedan ejecta at Sedan Crater.
IO
o
i_
D
01
u_
"o S *Q "b
|lU/LUdQ He
6ltlt-6l»5
-------
Eg
a: uj
H V)
L_ I-
"5
UJ <
a. _i
CO Q.
LJ
t£>
O
a:
o
LJ
CO
co
x -=
y < i
i o 9
CC CO Q.
I- -I UJ
"^ CO
CD - CD
=> CO 3
[ECa:
X UJ X
to x to
I
. I
O X
~X?
E
a.
Q
tr
LJ
UJ
=>
co
CO
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 T
I06
• = DIPODOMYS
0=PEROMYSCUS MANICULATUS
A=BEETLES(ELEODES ARMATA)
• = AMMOSPERMOPHILUS LEUCURUS
W= HORNED TOAD
•= HORNED LARK OR FINCH
E
s 3
OCT FEB MAY SEPT JAN APRIL AUG NCV
1965 | '1966 | ,966 | I96f. I l967 I '967 | ,967 | ,967
APR MAR III! V
,968 1 ,968 I ,968
Figure 18. Body-water tritium concentrations in manmaIs livinq at Sedan
Crater.
6146-614?
-------
SOIL WATER TRITIUM-20A CRATER LIP STATION 1966-1967
10' -
"x
E
I05
I04
3.0
(XJT Hyi DEC JAN FEB M«R »PB UK JUH JUL »us SEP OCT MOV DCC JAM Fa MAR APR MJ» Jl|m JUL «UC SEP OCT HOV OEC JAM FEB My! A^BMy J1JH JIX Al|c
2.0 •
= 1.0-
S o..
1967
RAINFALL-NTS-BUY STATION
ll- !• ••-•-• •• I-- •••
Figure 19. Effects of seasonal rainfall on soil-water tritium profile
in Sedan ejecta.
N o — oo r- oo o
0) «' M 6 — 10 00
00 IO OJ 10 — —
o.
Q
6U8-6U9 j
-------
QUESTIONS FOR BERNARD W. SHORE
From Dr. Sternglass:
To what extent is research planned to follow up on the indication
that strontium-90 may be incorporated in genetic material leading
to increased fetal and neonatal deaths both in experimental ani-
mals and man?
ANSWER:
The first thing I would want to say is the processes of data would
indicate that strontium-90, when incorporated in genetic material,
will result in increased fetal and neonatal deaths both in experi-
mental animals and in man. The other point I would like to make
is that the AEC and the National Institutes of Health are supporting
much research in the area of low dose effects of radiation and these
studies include studies on the effects of strontium-90 on genetic
material; we do some In our own laboratory, but the tests have
not been developed. But I think in the past the problem has been
one of developing an appropriate system. Quite obviously the system
has to be one at the genetic and biochemical level because the
changes you see are going to be very small and are going to re-
quire a lot of what is called basic or fundamental research in
this area. It might very well be that the limit on strontium-90
or any environmental pollutant does require research until we
know what causes cancer or causes leukemia, what causes unbalanced
cell growth, and one of the fundamental processes of regulation
and control in humans or animals. So research is being done in
the area of relationship between radionuclide and population and
in genetic material such as chromosomes and nucleic acids and
their possible effect on fetal and neonatal deaths.
2. From Darryl Randerson:
You mentioned that your gamma-ray spectrometer could resolve radio-
nuclide concentrations as small as 0.02 picocuries. What is the
significance (accuracy) of this number? What are the advantages
of your spectrometer measurements as compared to activation analysis
techniques which have as good or better resolution?
ANSWER: (Paul Phelps)
The significance of being able to detect very low levels of radio-
nuclides allows the establishment of uptake by plants and animals
subjected to low levels of fallout. For example, 10 pCi of
cesium-137 contained in two liters of cow's milk can be ascertained
to an accuracy of + 20%. In addition, this spectrometer may be
used for determinirTg activation products produced by neutron acti-
vation procedures. In fact, the quality of neutron activation
analysis is dependent upon the resolution of the spectrometer.
650
Activation analysis has no applicability for determining radionuclide
contamination, but is very useful in elemental analysis.
651
-------
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY RESEARCH FOR NUCLEAR EXCAVATION PROJECTS
INTEROCEANIC CANAL STUDIES
A. W. Klement, Jr.
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
Las Vegas, Nevada
ABSTRACT
The general radiological problems encountered in nuclear
cratering and nuclear excavation projects are discussed.
Procedures for assessing radiological problems in such pro-
jects are outlined. Included in the discussions are source
term, meteorology, fallout prediction and ecological fac-
tors. Continuing research requirements as well as pre-
and post-excavation studies are important considerations.
The procedures followed in the current interoceanic canal
feasibility studies provide examples of radiological
safety problems 3 current solutions and needed research.
Many of the papers presented at this symposium have discussed re-
search directed toward development of radiation protection guidance for
Plowshare projects or the application of such guidance. There are
several areas in which radiological safety problems can be attacked
in this regard. These will be discussed here in terms of current ap-
proaches and some of the requirements for their improvement. The con-
text in which they are presented here may be broader than some workers
in the field would consider. Much of this discussion will reflect
experience in the current interoceanic sea level canal feasibility
studies conducted under the auspices of the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic
Canal Study Commission. In these studies, a great deal of research
has been conducted and additional needs have become apparent. A brief
description of the interoceanic canal studies will be given here,
especially of the nuclear safety aspects. For more detailed informa-
tion on the overall program, reference is made to other publications
(1-5).
The objectives of the interoceanic canal studies are to investi-
gate the various aspects of construction of a sea level canal in the
652
American isthmian region. Primary consideration is given to excava-
tion along routes in the vicinity of the Panama Canal by conventional
means (Routes 10 and 14) and along routes in eastern Panama (Route 17)
and northwestern Colombia (Route 25) by nuclear means, or a combina-
tion of nuclear and conventional means (Figure I). Under considera-
tion for nuclear excavation is a canal cross section providing a
navigation prism 1,000 feet wide and 60 feet deep. Route 8, along
the Nicaragua and Costa Rica border, involves a conceptual study only
and will not be discussed here. Initial possibilities that were con-
sidered for nuclear excavation along Routes 17 and 25 included the
elements in Table I. While studies of the plans for excavation have
not been concluded and will undoubtedly be different from these, this
table indicates the extent of the program under consideration.
In connection with these studies several comprehensive pro-
grams were established and are continuing. The Atomic Energy
Commission's role in these studies included nuclear safety programs
in (I) airblast, (2) ground shock, (3) radioactivity, and (4) nuclear
operations. Of these, the radioactivity studies are by far the most
extensive. Other studies conducted by the Army Corps of Engineers,
which to some extent provide information of importance to nuclear
safety acti vities, include (I) topography, (2) geology, (3) hydro logy,
(4) medico-ecology, (5) nucI ear excavation design, and (6) conventionaI
engineering. While the discussion here is directed toward radiological
problems, these should be kept in context with the overall purpose and
other problems of equal or greater significance.
An assessment of a radiological situation in connection with a
nuclear excavation project involves a number of factors. First, a
description of the kinds, nature and amounts of radioactivity pro-
duced in proposed nuclear detonations is required. Also, the time
sequence of radionuclide production is important. Together these may
be designated the "source term." The nuclear devices contemplated
for future excavation projects are relatively low in fission nuclide
production. Much of the radioactivity produced will be through neutron
activation of surrounding materials. While many of the radionuclides
so produced are short-lived, they must be considered from the stand-
point of total amounts produced. Therefore, the ability to estimate
production of these nuclides becomes important. Through tests in the
Plowshare program reliable estimates can be made of neutron-activated
material associated with the device, as well as the fission products.
This constitutes one area requiring study along with device design
experiments.
Radionuclides produced through neutron activation of environmental
material surrounding the device are, of course, dependent on the ele-
mental constituents of the material which varies with geographical lo-
cations. Estimates of production of these radionuclides must be based
on assumed constitution of the media in which devices will be emplaced.
Where samples of such media can Da obtained and chemical analyses made,
653
-------
the assumptions involved are improved. For feasibility studies of
large-scale nuclear excavation projects, such as the proposed sea
level canal, it is not practical to examine material at such em-
placement site. However, data obtained from a variety of forma-
tions and geographical locations provide a basis for estimating a
range of values for activation products. In general, it would seem
that these estimates would be adequate for planning purposes. Ad-
ditional experience through testing in different media may improve
our ability in this regard.
The next area of concern is the distribution of radioactivity
in the detonation process. Because of its immediate importance,
atmospheric transport and deposition is considered first. The ele-
ments required for estimation of atmospheric transport and deposition
include estimates of the radioactivity released to the atmosphere.
This varies over ;i wide range for a given nuclear yield and depth of
burial; again, it is dependent on the detonation environment. Also
again, the better the environment is known, the better assumptions
can be made in this regard, and our ability to predict these factors
will improve through testing in different media. Based on some actual
geological data estimates of these factors were made in the canal
studies. A similar situation exists with regard to the dimensions of
nuclear cIouds, another i mportant eIement i n pred i ct i ng fall out.
Through theoretical considerations and a great deal of experience
in atmospheric weapons tests, close-in or local fallout prediction models
have been developed which have proven reliable within the uncertainties
of the elements mentioned above. These, of course, require knowledge
of meteorological conditions. Here, it is important to have reliable
data, more than climatological. For preliminary or feasibility studies,
it is necessary to ascertain the frequency of favorable conditions,
i.e. conditions under which fallout is confined to acceptable radia-
tion levels within a designated sector or zone. Where such information
is poorly known (and orographic situations require assessment), field
programs are required to obtain it as is the case in the canal studies.
With these data and assumptions, estimates can be made of locally de-
posited radioactivity. However, areas of weakness in our ability to
assess this factor are (I) washout and rainout effects, (2) transport
and deposition of tritiated water, and (3) transport and deposition
beyond the local fallout zone. These, especially the first two, are
not at all well-known and constitute items needing further research.
The remainder of the technical problems with assessing radio-
logical situations deal with biological transport and its consequent
effects on man. The external gamma radiation situation can be assessed
from the treatment of deposition mentioned above. Situations so assessed
which indicate an unacceptable situation obviously preclude the need
for assessment of possible internal human radiation exposure. However,
the latter contributes to total exposure and in certain cases can be
critical. It is by far the most difficult assessment to make because
654
of its complexity and its dependence on specific environmental informa-
tion. The process involves tracing radionuclides through food webs to
man. Here, it is necessary to consider also the radioactivity which
was not released to the atmosphere. For example, ground water contamina-
tion needs consideration. Information required includes data on human
populations and habits, particularly dietary data. The nature of the
population and its habits will determine the ecological data needed.
These, of course, vary widely with geographical regions as does the ex-
tent of available knowledge concerning them. As in the canal study
situation, field studies to some degree at least are required.
Mathematical models, ranging from very simple to highly com-
plex, have been developed to estimate internal radiation exposures
to human populations. In general, the very simple models are highly
empirical and leave much to be desired in assessing complex situations.
On the other hand, the highly sophisticated models require data which
are not available and are highly theoretical, perhaps only mathematically.
Compromises have been suggested which appear to be practical, even
though some assumptions must be made. In general, reasonable and
practical field studies supplemented by existing information can pro-
vide the basic animal and plant population data required. A great deal
is known with regard to many food webs and transport of a number of
radionucIides through them. For some food webs and some radionuclides,
it is necessary to make assumptions, and in a number of cases with few
current bases. It is in these areas where continued and additional
research is required. The behavior of some elements in man should be
among these research goals.
The effects of radiocontamination of plants and animals other
than man, as it may indirectly affect man, should be considered. In
some cases, because of other activities (rapid urbanization or develop-
ment) radiation effects could easily be dismissed. In any case, some
assessment is possible at present.
The last element to be discussed here is radiation protection
guidance. To some extent all of the above should be considered in
discussions of radiation protection guidance. The application of our
knowledge of radiation effects, and the lack of it, to the establish-
ment of guides are obvious and have been discussed by others here.
Considerable research is being conducted in this area, and as methods
and techniques improve, the bases for radiation guides will become more
sophisticated. As mentioned above, some advances can be made through
research into the behavior of certain radionuclides in man. The major
problems in the area of radiation protection guidance seems to be in
the application and interpretation of guidance. Arguments of these
problems often go far beyond our technical knowledge. The balance
of risk and benefit concept is a difficult one to apply. The scales
used for the balancing are seldom adjusted properly. This is an area
where the researcher as well as the applied scientist and engineer
can contribute to solutions of problems. If the problem is approached
655
-------
and reported in a scientific manner, at least the balancing process
can be made easier in many respects.
The current interoceanic sea level canal feasibility study
offers a good example of problems in radiological safety, along with
other safety problems. The proposed project is the largest and most
complex of any to date which could involve nuclear excavation. Also,
it has involved the most detailed study of radiological safety of any
proposed project to date. The approach being used in the studies in-
volving nuclear excavation will be described briefly below.
The studies were begun assuming nuclear excavation designs
for Routes 17 and 25 developed in the 1964 study which are summarized
in Table I. The final plans, yet to be arrived at, will depend on
geological investigations, current cratering technology and safety
considerations. Based on these preliminary designs and future nuclear
devices contemplated for the projects, estimates were made of the radio-
nuclides that would be produced in each detonation (6, 7). As men-
ti oned above, the chemi caI compos i t ion of med i a of detonat ion po i nts
were assumed initially. Based on nuclear cratering experience to date
and assumed geology, the percent of radioactivity entering the atmos-
phere and cloud heights were estimated for each detonation (4). These
provided preliminary source term information.
Also, the radionucI ides produced were analyzed as to their pos-
sible importance with regard to internal radiation dose to man. This
involves a process of elimination from a list of several hundred radio-
nuclides. A number of these can be eliminated on the basis of their
very short half-lives or the very small quantities produced. The re-
mainder are analyzed C8-IO) from the standpoint of their contribution
to potential total internal radiation exposure, either to critical
organs or whole body exposure. For this purpose, data for and methods
of estimating exposure recommended by the International Commission on
Radiological Protection (ICRP) were employed. In addition, analyses
were made employing the specific activity concept in a very conserva-
tive manner (7, 9, II). For example, one can arrive at "Maximum
Permissible Specific Activities" (MPSA's) based on ICRP values of
Maximum Permissible Concentrations (MPC's) and stable element concen-
trations in "Standard Man." From these a list can be made of the
relative importance of each radionuclide, then assuming the MPSA's
to be reached, those contributing to about 99^ of the internal dose
can be determined. The remainder would be of little significance.
Other similarly conservative estimates can be made, thus confirming
the adequacy of this approach. The purpose of this analysis is not to
ignore some radionuclides but to determine which require more intense
study and especially to determine which stable element analyses should
be made in field samples.
Two weather stations were established on each route being con-
sidered for nuclear excavation. From these stations meteorological
656
data were obtained for fallout prediction purposes (4). Operations were
for about 18 months on Route 17 and wi II be for about 24 months at one
station on Route 25 (June 1969). Using wind data obtained over about
a year, preliminary estimates of fallout indicated an area which may
require evacuation of the indigenous population. Subsequently, an
analysis was made to determine the days on which specific detonations
could be conducted and the fallout confined to this exclusion zone.
A similar process was carried out to determine days on which there would
be no long range airblast damage. This provided an overall calendar
of acceptable days for all proposed detonations. With these a schedule
for each detonation was made for planning purposes. Using this schedule,
all available meteorological data available, and a rapid computer model
developed for this purpose, specific fallout predictions were made for
Route 17 excavation. The latter are currently in process for Route 25.
These predictions are in the form of external gamma lifetime i so-
dose contours for each detonation and a total for all detonations. From
basic source term data, these can be converted to quantities of each
radionuclide deposited. These provide a preliminary basis on which to
assess the radiological implications involved in nuclear excavation.
The total lifetime external gamma O.I R isodose contour for Route 17
was well within the initially selected exclusion zone. However, be-
cause of the uncertainties involved in the estimates and the possibility
of unusual changes in wind patterns, it was not felt that the exclusion
area should be reduced in area.
Concurrent with the meteorological field studies were other
studies. Among these were ecological investigations (8). These con-
sisted of literature, field and laboratory studies in human, terrestrial,
freshwater, marine, and agricultural ecology, as well as hydrologic
modeling studies. These provided a reasonably detailed description of
the areas in the various fields although, except for seasonal variations,
few studies of dynamics were made. Human populations were described with
regard to location and dietary customs, as well as other demographic
variables such as population-area trends of the various groups. About
five distinct population groups are involved.
Food webs leading to man were identified and elemental chemical
analyses of environmental samples provide information on the biological
availability and concentration of stable elements in the various systems.
With these data, ecological transport models can be realistically modified
to represent more nearly the actual situation, and assumptions of radio-
nucl ide transfer coefficients are facilitated. As mentioned earlier
the latter are currently poorly known for many situations, and this is
so particularly for the geographical areas of interest to the canal
studies. However, with the field and laboratory data along with
available data in the literature, it is felt that reasonable assump-
tions can be made.
The overall dose estimation model provides for total radiation
dose estimates, internal and external. Estimates are made for each
-------
distinct population group and for elements within each group, e.g. in-
fants. This process of dose estimation has not yet been completed.
As mentioned throughout this discussion, a number of initial
or preliminary assumptions were used in the assessment. Nuclear exca-
vation plans may change because of various factors such as actual
geological data obtained, the results of chemical analyses becoming
available (12), and additional experience in test programs. Also,
changes may be made in nuclear device design and thus in the radio-
activity produced. As these changes are made or occur, the radiolo-
gical situation must be reassessed. In fact, while it does not ap-
pear probable from information available to date, it is possible
that nuclear plans may require changes to provide more favorable
radi olog icaI s ituations.
One of the important objectives of a feasibility study is to
determine where problems may exist and suggest operational solutions
to them. For this reason the studies mentioned here include analyses
of operational methods and techniques as integral parts of the studies.
It is here that provisions are made for uncertainties in estimates. In
nuclear operations plans are included facilities for detailed timely
forecasts of radiological situations for each detonation and means of
limiting detonations to times when situations will be most favorable
from the standpoint of safety. Also, included are provisions for sur-
veillance of si tuat i ons foI low i ng detonat i ons and means for i n i t i at i ng
countermeasures on a timely basis.
Along with the studies described here, an analysis of existing
radiological protection guidance was made (10), since comparison of
estimates with some guidance is necessary to an evaluation. The
establishment of protection criteria for nuclear excavation of a canal
is clearly beyond the scope of the canal feasibility studies, and no
attempt will be made to do this. However, it is felt that the studies
will be useful in this regard and some possibilities will be suggested.
The approach in the canal studies has been to present the best esti-
mates possible in a scientific manner so that a balance of the bene-
fits and risks can be made as objectively as possible. The results
will be presented so that comparison with any criteria will be pos-
sible. Perhaps the judgement involved in this balance should be
among the bases of radiation protection guidance established for this
and other specific applications of nuclear energy. Perhaps research,
in its broader aspects, along such non-technical lines is as important
as approaches to the biological effects of radiation.
658
REFERENCES
I. Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission. 1968.
Fourth annual report. Washington. in, 67 pp.
2. Hughes, B. C. 1968. Nuclear excavation design of a transisthmian
sea-level canal. Trans. Am. Nuclear Soc. 9(2). (Also, U.S. Army
Engineer Nuclear Cratering Group, Livermore, California, tech.
memo No. 6).
3. Battelle Memorial Institute. 1967. Bioenvi ronrnental and radiological-
safety feasibility studies, Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal.
Colombus Labs., U.S. AEC report BMI-I7I-003. 99 pp.
4. Ferber, G. J. and R. J. List. 1969. Prediction of external gamma
dose from nuclear excavation. BioScience 19(3). (in press)
5. Martin, W. E. 1969. BioenvironmentaI studies of the radiological -
safety feasibility of nuclear excavation. BioScience 19(2): 135-137.
6. Vogt, J. R. 1969. Radionuclide production for the nuclear excavation
of an isthmian canal. BioScience 19(2): 138-139.
7. James, R. A. and E. H. Fleming, Jr. 1966. Relati ve s i gni f i cance
index of radionuclides for canal studies. University of California,
Livermore, U.S. AEC report UCRL-50050-l. 10 pp.
8. Various. 1969. (Along with references 4-6, 20 papers dealing with
radiological safety in the canal studies program will appear in
BioScience during 1969. Also a series of reports on the various
ecological and radiological safety studies have been issued as
U.S. AEC reports BMI-I7I-OOI through -016, including references
3, |0, and I I Iisted here).
9. Kaye, S. V. and D. J. Nelson. 1968. Analysis of specific activity con-
cept as related to environmental concentration of radionuclides.
Nuclear Safety 9(1): 53-58.
10. Cowser, K. E., S. V. Kaye, P. H. Rohwer, W. S. Snyder and
E. G. Struxness. 1967. Dose-estimation studies related to proposed
construction of an Atlantic-Pacific interoceanic canal with nuclear
explosives: Phase I. Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. AEC
report ORNL-4IOI. x, 210 pp.
II. Lowman, F. G. 1967. Phase I - final report, estuarine and marine
ecology. Puerto Rico Nuclear Center, Battelle Columbus Labs., U.S.
AEC report BMI-I7I-007. 85 pp.
12. Hill, J. H. 1968. Chemical analysis of samples from interoceanic
canal Route 17. University of California, Livermore, U.S. AEC
report UCRL-50555 . 66 pp.
659
-------
TABLE I
PRELIMINARY EXCAVAT'C'. DESIGN DATA
(ISTHMIAN CANAL STUDIES-I 964)
No. Detonations
Devices per Row
Devi ce Yields
Depth of Burial
Total Yield per Row
Total No. ot Devices
Total Yield per Route
*TotaI Iength 100 mi.
Route 17
(48.5 Mi .)
22
4-38
200 KT - 10 MT
675 - 2100 Ft.
8.4'- 30 MT
267
292 MT
Route 25
(39.3 Mi.i
19
4-45
Same
Same
9 - 30 MT
223
245 MT
661
660
-------
QUESTIONS FOR ALFRED W. KLEMENT
I. From R. M. Stewart:
In the Route 17 canal in Panama, what portion of the excavation
might be nuclear? What maximum total yield is contemplated?
ANSWER:
On Route 17 in the preliminary studies, it was intended that this
route be excavated completely by nuclear means. We now have actual
geological information on this route and this indicates that there
are some problems and we are considering various methods of exca-
vating some 20 miles of that route by a different system of nuclear
excavation, a combination of nuclear and conventional, or a com-
pletely conventional means. This decision has yet to be made as
there are still studies being made on it.
The maximum total yield contemplated, and again I have to go back
to the preliminary design, for any one row charge the highest was
30 megatons. This is still being considered. We would like to re-
duce this to the lowest we can and'still do the job and there is
a possibility that this would be done. But at this stage we're
some ways from what actual design we have to have to excavate the
canaI.
2. From George Collins:
Would you care to comment on possible adverse ecological effects
resulting from a sea level canal other than the possible radiolo-
gical effects? (For example - intermingling of different species
of marine flora and fauna from the two oceans.)
ANSWER:
This, of course, is an area in which I am not competent. I can
only say that a look at this problem is being made under the
auspices of the Canal Study Commission by those, hopefully, who
are competent. It is not an integral part of the Nuclear Safety
Studies of course and it's beyond the general area you would ex-
pect our office here to undertake.
3. From E. A. MartelI:
How will physical properties of radioactive cloud debris in the
wet isthmus environment compare with those for Nevada cratering
tests?
How well can debris cloud heights be predicted for large
cratering shots in the wet isthmian environment?
3ld
662
ANSWER:
First of all we have no experience with large scale cratering events
anywhere. This Is an area we certainly need information on and to
continue in a large scale project using large yields, it's essential
that the experimental Plowshare program continue In order to obtain
information which can be used. At the present time, we are forced-
to scale from the smaller shots that we have had in Nevada and ma-
terials are considerably different. Our largest test, Sedan, in
alluvium was very interesting. Along Route 17, I think there is
no a I Iuvium.
With regard to the properties of the radioactive cloud, I think this
is the same thing. We are still scaling from what experience we
have. We certainly need, as I mentioned, experience in various
environments in order to get a better handle on this.
4. From Danny T. Carrara:
Over what period of time would the 30 miles of nuclear excavation
take place in Model No. 25 if this model is adopted?
ANSWER:
This would depend on the final design. Whatever system is arrived
at. It would seem to me, based on our preliminary estimates, that
this could be conducted perhaps over a period of 18 months, perhaps
two years. Certainly, the data we have indicate that nuclear safety
would not prevent us from doing this, but there are other operational
problems that may. For example, with Route 25 we're talking about
a total construction time for the entire canal on the order of 15
years and the nuclear excavation part of this is relatively small.
The same is true of Route 17, except it is a much shorter route and
will take a much shorter time.
663
-------
PLANNING REQUIRED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
RADIATION PROTECTION GUIDANCE FOR
UNDERGROUND ENGINEERING APPLICATIONS
Robert H. NeiI I
U. S. Public Health Service
Rockvi Ile, Mary I and
ABSTRACT
The potential variety of engineering applications
from the peaceful uses of underground nuclear explosives
indicates an increased need for applicable radiation pro-
tection guidance to protect the public health of poten-
tially exposed populations.
To insure the orderly development of such uses,
additional operational data as well as bioeffects data
will be required to develop appropriate criteria and
guidance to inform health officials and the public of
the significance of possible exposures. The required
planning includes an evaluation of the potential bene-
fits and risks as well as the size and age of popula-
tion, multiplicity of sources, likely and unlikely
future uses, and the total environmental impact.
INTRODUCTION
ThIs paper is addressed to pIann i ng in the deveIopment of rad i-
ation protection guidance for fission products and neutron induced
activities incorporated into consumer products resulting from fully
contained Plowshare projects. The subject of guidance relating
to excavation projects and of applicable guidance in the protection
of public health in the immediate post-shot period are both being
covered elsewhere in this symposium.
Safety of consumer products is of direct interest to the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; particularly to the
new Consumer Protection and Environmental Health Service of which the
Environmental Control Administration is a component.
If the world in which we live had no financial limitations and
we were able to work in a totally orderly way, I could present a logi-
cal sequence of questions to which we could address ourselves; and as
we answered each question, we could then proceed to the next perhaps
664
as foI lows:
I. What are the actual radionuclides and actual concen-
trations that will be in each of the consumer products
obtained from Plowshare?
2. What are the amounts of consumer products that will
be used by the public?
3. What would be the resultant whole body and other organ
doses obtained by different populations?
4. Then having satisfied ourselves of the actual quanti-
tative exposures, we could then tackle and answer the
question, ''What are the long-term effects of this low-
level exposure?" Assuming that we could quantitate
this risk to everyone's satisfaction, we could then
proceed to obtaining ,3 consensus on the levels of
risk wh i ch wouId be acceptabIe to all concerned.
Unfortunately, as we all know, definitive conclusive, absolute
answers to these questions cannot be answered to everyone's satis-
fact i on.
But in order to facilitate the constructive use of Plowshare
applications for the betterment of society, we must demonstrate what
tnese potential risks of radiation exposure are so they can then be
weighed against the anticipated benefits. And this belongs in the
pub Ii c forum.
Congressman Craig Hosmer of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
emphasized the importance and need to set clear, firm guidance in this
area, and he reiterated"most strongly the need to help protect the
public health by insuring safe consumer products.
Now then, who sets the standards? By law, the Federal Radiation
Council has specific responsibilities in providing a first level of
guidance to federal agencies. The AEC has been assigned the responsi-
bility of conducting the Plowshare program for the purpose of investi-
gating and developing peaceful uses for nuclear explosives. While
the AEC controls the execution of a Plowshare project, the acceptability
of any resulting products involves the mutual responsibility of both
the Public Health Service and the involved state health departments
as well as the general public and the scientific community. In short,
the community represented here today has a mutual responsibility and
partnership in assessing the health significance of Plowshare projects.
Obtaining the required evidence of theoretical calculations and empir-
ically observed data is of greater importance than the identity of the
particular organization that may have the last word in setting the
allowable exposure level.
665
-------
DISCUSSION
In August 1959 the President assigned the primary responsibility
for the collection, collation, analysis, and interpretation of data on
environmental radiation to the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare. The intent was to separate the responsibility of evaluating
the radioactive health hazards from the responsibility of encouraging
the use and development of radiation. As part of the discharge of
this responsibility, the Bureau of Radiological Health has systemat-
ically gathered the data on levels of observed contamination of radio-
activity in the environment from our surveillance networks, other
federal agencies, state health departments, the AEC-sponsored national
laboratories and others. They have all been published each month in
Radiological Health Data and Reports, with interpretive analysis when
possible and without interpretation if time did not permit. In this
manner the results have been available for interpretation by the
scientific community as well as the general public. The importance
of publishing the data in the public forum to permit independent
evaluations cannot be overly stressed.
Perhaps the most important element of any planning is the need
to educate the public to the facts. I think we can safely anticipate
concern and fear (whether real or imagined) from certain sectors of the
public and I think the most vital ingredient in our planning is imagin-
ation— imagination to anticipate the questions which will be raised.
We must be eble to present the data and the interpretation of the
data and have it available for others to interpret.
The PHS is pleased to sponsor this symposium since it provides an
ideal mechanism to bring together all of the diverse interests involved
in the public health aspects of Plowshare, including the Federal Radia-
tion Council, the AEC, other federal agencies, state health department
officials, representatives of industry, AEC laboratories and many
others. And in bringing us together, it provides a mechanism to pre-
sent the different points of view depending upon one's primary interest
in Plowshare.
As a representative of the PHS, I would like to comment on the
philosophy of "unnecessary radiation exposure.11 If we consider a dose-
effect relationship from ionizing radiation, we can observe effects in
a population at very large doses. Increases in the dose can produce an
increase in the incidence of an observed effect. The order of magnitude
of such doses required to produce such effects involves levels of expo-
sure of 50 rem or several hundred rem depending on the particular study
being referenced. The levels that we are concerned with here are of
the order of a few times natural background which is O.I rem per year.
The question arises as to how one can extrapolate the observed data
back by a factor of 500 or 1,000 which is the region of public health
interest. What is the shape of the curve? Whi le the evidence of the
Russels at Oak Ridge suggests the presence of a threshold in mice, we
can ill afford to make such an assumption. So we extrapolate linearly
666
without using a threshold.
If one assumes that the incidence of an observed effect is
attributable to natural background radiation, values of I0~5 for the
probability of observing an effect in a population could be noted.
Two extreme positions that have been taken from this are as follows:
Multiplying the probability of IO"5 times the U. S. population of
2 x 108 would produce 2,000 effects. Hence producing a man-made
increment in dose equal to natural background would result in 2,000
effects in the U. S. population. This is a patently absurd mathe-
mat i caI extrapoI at i on.
The second extreme position that has been espoused is to say
that the probability of an effect in an individual of 10"^ is so small
as to constitute a negligible risk to an individual and can be for-
gotten. This extreme position is equally absurd.
The correct conclusion to be drawn here is to avoid unnecessary
radiation exposure, and I think we all recognize the shared responsi
bility or partnership in endeavoring to reduce all unnecessary radia-
tion exposure in our planning.
Recently one witness at the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
hearings on effects of radon daughter products in uranium miners
suggested that we should await the epidemiological evidence of
observed effects in the miner population before establishing a lower
level of permissible exposure. This approach is untenable to me.
Congressman Hosmer stated and stressed the importance of develop-
ing standards for radioactivity in consumer products to insure proper
protection of the public.
The radiation protection guidance must establish not only annual
doses but must also address itself to the rate of accumulation of
dose. For example, while the cumulative thyroidal doses to children
from iodine-131 in fresh milk during the decade beginning in 1957 are
observed to be far less than the cumulative radiation protection guides,
the rate of exposure in 1957 of I rem/year exposed those born in those
years at a rate of 10 times natural background.
FACTORS
THE DEVELOPMENT OF RADIATION PROTECTION GUIDANCE
Perhaps one of the most succinct statements regarding the develop-
ment of effective standards for the protection of man's health was made
by the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, Dr. William H.
Stewart, at the hearings held by the Senate Commerce Committee in
August 1967. He stated the following:
"I. The standards should be truly relevant to man's
health. We must assure that such a standard is
667
-------
addressed to the prevention or control of a health
hazard in man's environment.
"2. The standard must be realistic and attainable. A
health protection standard must be attainable within
the state of the art and at a financial cost which
is not truly prohibitive. Otherwise, the standard
would become in fact
-------
QUESTIONS FOR ROBERT NEILL
From James Leonard:
In reference to the benefit-risk concept as applied to problems of
radionucI ides in the environment, do you see any role for public
opinion surveys in determining acceptable activity levels? For
example, should the public be asked such questions as these:
Would you favor use of nuclear explosives to reduce the cost of
natural gas delivered to your home by "x" cents per million BTU's
if such use increased the probability of some form of radiation-
initiated health effect (say an increase in still births by "v"
incidences per 100,000 population)?
No, l dont' th i nk quest i ons such as these shouId be re legated to
a public opinion poll, nor that one should decide these things by
persona I op i oion. f th i nk, however, that the mechan i sm, for
example th i s Sympos i urn wh i ch we are ho Id i ng here today, in br i ^g i no
together under one roof the various interests, certainly the leg i s-
lative interests in the presence of Congressman Hosner of the Joint
Commi ttee i nd i cat i ng his concern and interest in the area of pub!i c
healtn aspects of Plowshare applications, as positive evidence of
this fact.
From James Leonard:
Would you favor use of nuclear explosives to reduce the cost of
natural gas delivered to your home by "x" cents per million BTU's
if such use increased the probability of some form of radiation-
initiated health effect?
ANSWER:
This is rephrasing this general question that I said that it would
be so nice to have a final, conclusive, definitive, absolute answer
to solve to everyone's satisfaction as to what constitutes the long-
term effects and what is an acceptable risk. I think, though, that
we aM have 3 shared responsibility in assessing this and I, for
one, would not be in a position today to try to describe the specific
amount in wh i ch I wouId be i nvoIved here.
670
-------
SESSION VI - SOME IMPLICATIONS OF LARGE SCALE USE OF
PLOWSHARE TECHNOLOGY
Chairman: Mr. William M. Trenholme
Arizona Atomic Energy Commission
Phoenix
-------
INDUSTRY POTENTIAL OF LARGE SCALE USES FOR
PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES
Paul L. RusselI*
Bureau of Mines
Denver, Colorado
ABSTRACT
The industrial potential for peaceful uses of nuclear
explosions is entering a critical stage of development.
Should Project Qasbuggy, an experiment to determine to
what extent an underground nuclear explosion can stimu-
late the production of natural gas from low-permeability
formations, prove a technical or economic success, a
great step forward will have been made. Should other exper-
iments now being considered in natural gas, oil shale,
copper, coal, water resources, underground storage, and
others, also demonstrate technical or economic advantage,
it is conceivable to expect peaceful nuclear explosions to
grow from our current rate of one or two experimental shots
per year to hundreds of production explosions per year.
This growth rate could be severely restricted or reduced to
zero if public safety and environmental control cannot be
exercised.
SUMMARY
The use of nuclear explosives has been proposed for a wide
range of peaceful applications. Such use will be made only if
nuclear explosives show economic advantages over conventional
explosives. To date we have no demonstrated economic commercial
application. Until the experimental research program shows that
economic use is feasible and practical, nuclear explosives will be
used for research, and the total number of experiments per year
will be smalI.
This paper reviews the principal proposed peaceful applications
for nuclear explosives and discusses each proposed use briefly. An
estimate of future requirements for nuclear explosives is made.
* Research Director, Denver Mining Research Center, U. S. Bureau of
Mines, Denver, Colorado.
671
INTRODUCTION
As early as 1945 the possibility of using nuclear explosives
for peaceful purposes was a subject for speculation. By June, 1957,
the Plowshare Program was formally established by the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC) for the purpose of developing and demonstrating
such peaceful applications. Since the first underground experiment
in the fall of 1957, the AEC has conducted well over 200 underground
nuclear explosives as well as a small number of surface cratering
tests.
Although the majority of these nuclear tests were defense
oriented, they, and a few Plowshare shots, have all contributed data
useful in the development of peaceful applications. Tests have been
conducted in eight rock types—tuff, salt, basalt, dolomite, granite,
rhyolite, alluvium, and sandstone—providing a wide variety of data
on many aspects of rock fracture and breakage, ground shock, and
radioactivity. This information was used in planning the apparently
successful Gasbuggy experiment in sandstone, and is the basis for
planning other Plowshare projects.
This paper will list and briefly discuss most of the proposed
peaceful applications for nuclear explosives. It will also consider
the apparent numerical requirements of future use and consider timing
of such needs. Technology of nuclear explosive use will be covered
very briefly, since this alone is a major subject.
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES
Nuclear explosives are unique. They release vastly larger
quantities of energy per volume and at a rate a thousand times more
rapid than the fastest chemical explosive. Nuclear devices are
compact, being packaged in a case 7 to 14 feet long and 20 or less
inches in diameter, with energy yields ranging from less than I
kiloton Ckt) to hundreds of ki lotons. The small package size permits
a nuclear explosive to be placed more easily and at fees cost than
chemical explosives with an equal energy yield.
Nuclear explosives may be of the fission or fusion type, and
in either case can be constructed to produce within about 20 percent
of any desired yield. This permits design of projects with satisfactory
safety factors, and fairly reliable prediction of radiation, rock
breakage, and seismic motion.
All proposed peaceful uses for nuclear explosives that will be
discussed in this paper are based upon either "crater" or "chimney"
formation. Both of these features have been well covered by other
speakers here. For our purpose we wi I I consider a crater a hole in
the ground surrounded by a raised lip, or rim. We wi I I consider a
chimney a cylinder or column filled with fragmented rock and completely
672
-------
contained within the earth. Figure I shows the sequence of formation of
a nuclear explosive-created chimney, and as shown, radial fracturing
accompanies cavi ty format ion. Th i s. radia I fracturi ng is an i mportant
feature for many proposed Plowshare uses. Figure 2 shows the generally
accepted profiles for nuclear crater formation based on depth of
exp1os i ve bur i a I.
GENERAL PLOWSHARE APPLICATIONS
Plowshare applications, as proposed, fall into two general
classes, (1) contained explosions, ana (2) cratenng explosions.
Under the contained classification we might list the following possible
uses: (a) Oil and natural gas stimulation; (b) j_n sjtu copper (and
other mineral) leaching; (c) in situ shale oil pToduct i on; (d) under-
ground storage faci I i t i es for gas, water, waste, and other materi a Is;
(e) development of water resources; (f) and other uses. Under the
cratering classification we would have a general heading "Excavation,
which would include the following: (a) Canal excavation; (b) harbor
formation; (c) ore stripping; (d) highway and railroad cuts; (e)
production of aggregate for dam construction; (f) construction of
slide-dams; and (g) other.
In genera 1 , the use of nuclear explosives for the conta i ned
type expIos i on has rece i ved more cons i deratI on recent Iy than the
crateri ng type expIos i on because, in the former case, rad i ati on
problems are at a minimum and do not come into conflict with current
treaties. Let us examine in more detail some of the contained type
uses.
Application to Natural Gas Stimulation
One promising use for an underground nuclear explosion is aimed
at stimulating the production of natural gas from low-permeability
formations. Currently one experiment is underway, and two others are
being planned for the very near future.
Gasbuggy is the Project for an experiment jointly sponsored by
the U. S. Government and the El Paso Natural Gas Company. A 26-kt
explosive was fired on December 10, 1967, at a depth of 4,200 feet
in the Pictured Cliffs gas reservoir near Farmington, New Mexico. This
was the first experiment in the use of a nuclear explosive to stimu-
late gas production. Because this explosion was contained there was
no venting of gas or radioacti vi ty,
Evaluation of this experiment is well along, and preliminary
results appear quite promising.
Dragon Trai I is the Project name for a proposed experiment to be
conducted about 17 miles southwest of Rangely, Colorado, using a 40-kt
explosive in the Mancos B formation, at a depth of 2,700 feet. Because
673
3 MICROSECONDS
500 MICROSECONDS
A FEW SECONDS
TO A FEW HOURS
FINAL
CONFIGURATION
FIGURE I. -A Typical Sequence Of Events When A Nuclear
Explosion Is Detonated Underground.
674
-------
s
<
o
CD
675
the Mancos B is a uniform gas reservoir, the results of this experiment
should be of considerable aid in the evaluation of other reservoirs.
Project Rulison, another gas reservoir experiment is proposed for
a site in western Colorado, about 13 miles southwest of the town of
Rifle. Here a fhicl- interbedded sand and shale formation is estimated
to contain over 100 billion cubic feet of natural gas per section.
The ideal results at RuIison would be to produce a chimney
1,600 to 1,700 feet in height to cut the major gas-bearing strata. The
initial experiment probably will not produce a chimney of this height,
but future experiments would attempt to achieve such a configuration.
If nuclear explosive stimulation is successful, the Rulison field
will be highly productive, and a major portion of the gas in place can
be produced. More than 100 individual shots of 200 kt each may be
needed to fully develop the 60,000-acre holdings of Austral Oil
Company. Research will determine whether seismic effects will permit
200-kt production shots.
Pinedale and Wasp are gas-stimulation projects being considered
for western Wyomi ng. For Pinedale, initial studies are underway and
actual testing may hinge on the resuIts of Gasbuggy and Ruli son, but
no planned date for this project has been set. The study of Wasp is
in its very early stages and the execution date, if any, is very
uncerta i n.
AppIi cat i on to In Situ Copper Leaching
Leaching is the process of dissolving metal values from an ore,
remov ing the resulting solution from the undissolved mater i a Is and
extracting the valuable consti tuents from the so Iut i on. Leach i ng of
copper ores was used as-early as 2500 B. C., and has become an important
method of producing the lower grade of ores today. Roughly 12 percent
of domestic production was derived from this method last year.
In situ leaching of ore broken by nuclear explosions has been
studied for some time and is considered to present a high potential
for use in marginal and submarg i naI depos i ts.
Projecl^ 5 loop is a proposed joing Government-Kennecott Corpor-
ation i n sj^tu copper leaching experiment, near Safford, Arizona. If
successful it would, (I) eliminate the necessity of mining and handling
hugh quantities of material, (2) increase the nation's available
domestic copper supply by allowing the economic development of copper
ore deposits now beyond the scope of current mining techniques and
costs, and (3) permit large-scale mining operations with a minimum
disturbance to the landscape.
Project Sloop presents a high potential for development of economic
uses for nuclear explosives, and at the present rate of progress might be
-------
conducted in 12 to 18 months. Commercial development might require
detonation of 30 to 50 explosives of 50-kt each if seismic effects
permi t.
Application to In Situ Shale Oil Production
That a nuclear underground explosion, under given conditions, will
produce a ch i mney of broken rock has been demonstrated in tuf f, gran i te,
alluvium, and dolomite. This feature is the basis of a proposed in situ
recovery experiment for shale oil production from the vast oil shale
deposits of Colorado.
Project Bronco experiment proposed for the Piceance Basin of
Colorado would use a 40- to 50-kt explosive to create a chimney of broken
shale some 250 or more feet in height. This chimney would then be used
as a retort vessel to recover oil by heating the shale in place.
The retorted shale oil would be pumped to the surface, and additional
treatment would follow for producing gasoline, diesel oil, and other
petroleum products.
There has been a great deal of interest in Project Bronco by a
group of companies, but the execution of this project seems months in
the future. No firm estimate of potential requirements has been made,
but if all were to go well, 100 to 300 explosives of over 50-kt might
be used.
Application ^for jjnderground Storage Space^
The concept of using nuclear explosions to produce underground
storage space is based upon the chimney formation technique, the open
spaces or voids in the broken rock and of the chimney would be used to
store gas, oil, water, or waste products.
Project Ketch- is an experiment proposed by the Columbia Gas
Corporation for the underground storage of natural gas in Pennsylvania.
In the planning stage, it involves the detonation of a 24-kt explosive
3,300 feet below the surface in a thick impermeable shale formation.
It has been estimated that some 450 million standard cubic feet of gas
at 2,100 psi might be stored in the nuclear-produced chimney.
This and similar storage applications appear quite attractive
under certain conditions and in certain sections of the United States.
It is estimated that between 5 and 25 nuclear shots of this type might
occur in the next 10 to (5 years. Yields would vary, but are estimated
at about 50-kt each.
Application to Water Resources
Nuclear explosives may prove effective in the very complex
677
problem of water management. The U. S. Geological Survey (6)* states:
"Nuc I ear detonat i on wou Id be no more than an a I ternat i ve to convent! on a I
engineering means for managing water. Regardless of the means, nuclear
or conventional, effectiveness of a management scheme may be limited
by a hydrologic feature remote from the principal management works
(detonation site). Thus, capability and acceptability of the scheme
can be judged only when the whole hydrologic system is known intimately
and rather widely."
It is further stated: "Effects of nuclear detonations under-
ground are relatively large in dimension and exceedingly coarse in
'finish'." Such dimension and finish must be in scale with thickness
of strata and other dimensions of the natural environment. Precise
fitting of detonation effects to minute dimensions of the environment
is impossible. Principal side effects of detonations — air blast (if any),
ground motion, and both prompt and residual radiations — must be of
acceptable intensity lest nuclear detonation be socially or politically
impracticab le!
Project Aquarius is a
study of nuclear explosives for w
not reached the scheduling stage.
joint U. S. Government-State of Arizona
for water management. The project has
tae.
Use of nuclear explosives for water management is indefinite, but
it would appear that from I to 5 experiments may be performed during the
next 5 to 10 years. Further use is dependent on success of these
experi ments.
Application to Excavation
Of the many potential applications of nuclear explosives, exca-
vation is perhaps the most obvious. Some broad uses proposed are
mining, removal of overburden, quarrying, recharge of aquifers and
waste disposal, storage of fluids, harbor excavation, canal excavation,
flood control, highway and railroad cuts, and slide dams.
Several of these proposals have received serious consideration
and study; others are in a very preliminary planning and consideration
stage. (will very briefly review those that have attracted the most
attention.
Cana I Excavat i on
Much engineering effort has been directed toward determining the
feasibility of constructing canals by nuclear cratering. The concept
has been demonstrated on a small scale and appears feasible. The
future uses for excavation of a trans-isthmus canal is being studied
Underlined number in parentheses refer to items in the bibliography
at the end of this report.
678
-------
and i nvoIves a great number of factors, including the current Test
Ban Treaty, radiation, air blast, and seismic shock. A decision is
not apt to be reached in the immediate future, but research continues
and resuIts Iook very p rom i s i ng.
Highway and Railroad Cuts
This type of excavation which parallels canal excavation
research was the subject of a joint study by the Sante Fe Railroad and
the California Highway Department. The principle of application appears
feasible and needs only the proper site and economic condition for
poss i ble use.
Harbor Excavation
Here again the principles involved are basically the same as for
canal or surface cut excavation. Harbor excavation (Project Chariot)
was studied for Alaska and is currently of high interest in Australia.
A test excavation might be made in a year or two, but future use
appears very I i mi ted.
Overburden Removal
Overburden covering an ore deposit might be removed by either
single or multiple cratering blasts. This use has been studied and,
as expected, such use is rather limited in the rather densely populated
United States but may be more favorable in some less densely populated
fore ign areas.
Recharge of Aquifers and Waste_ Disposa I
Either a crater or chimney would be excavated by nuclear explosives
in a favorable geologic formation to which surface water or waste could
be channeled for storage. This is a potential use that needs more study.
Flood ControI and Storage of FIu i ds
For this use either a thowout crater or subsidence crater produced
by nuclear explosives might be used to catch flood water or store
liquids. This potential usage does not appear economic and its early
use i s doubtfu I .
Quarrying and/or Slide Dams
For this application a nuclear explosive would be used to break
Iarge quantities of rock. If the rock were con f i ned to a canyon or
stream bed it might create a useful dam. Both uses have been considered
for dam construction.
All of the above proposed uses are somewhat limited at present
by the Test Ban Treaty. For those not familiar with this Treaty, it
679
basically states that all radiation produced from testing must be kept
within the boundaries of the country conducting the test. Because
nuclear explosions of the excavation type produce radiation as well as
air blast and seismic shock, areas for use appear somewhat limited.
With this in mind, it is not expected that a rapid growth of nuclear
explosive excavation will take place. Unless a sea-level canal is
cut, total excavation type blasts should number less than 10 during
the next five years.
PROBLEMS IN USE OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES
There are a number of hazards that must be considered where
nuclear explosives are planned. Because the purpose of this symposium
is to expI ore many of these in deta i I, I will ment ion only the major
hazards — radiation, air blast, and ground shock—which we might look
at in a Ii ttIe more deta i I.
Ground Shock
In many cases the most serious problem encountered in the use of
nuclear explosives may be the seismic wave. A large part of the energy
of both contained and cratering explosions is carried off by the shock
wave, wh i ch traveIs outward f rom the explosion point, losinq ene rgy by
heat i ng, crush ing, and deforming the rock. Eventually the shock
pressures fall below the elastic limit of the medium and become an
elastic wave. As this elastic wave spreads concentrically, its ampli-
tude decreases rapidly with distance. When the wave reaches structures
or other habitation, it may cause cracking of plaster or other damage
if the particle velocity is high enough. Since buildings and other
structures themselves are elastic, they may respond to the seismic
wave as free oscillators and amplify or reject the motion of the
ground. In generaI, the Iarger the explosion, the further away we
may expect buildings and other damage to occur.
Rad i at i on
Seeing that radiation in
major items of this symposium,
touch upon the subject.
its numerous forms and effects are
I would be foolish to do more than
There are two sources of radioactivity from an underground
nuclear explosion. One is the direct products of the nuclear reactions
(f i ss i on products and tr i ti urn). The second is the rad i onucIi des i nduced
in the surrounding media by the neutrons that are expIos i on byp roducts.
Where the explosion is contained, little if any of the radioactivity
escapes to the atmosphere. In the case of cratering explosions, con-
siderable radioactivity may be vented. In either case, a great deal is
known about all aspects of the radiation problem, and continued research
is producing cleaner nuclear explosions. Thus, the future for Plowshare
I ooks prorni s i ng .
680
-------
Air Blast
Air blast may be a serious problem in some cratering shots. The
hot gasses vented at extreme pressure may cause a high velocity blast
wave. As this blast wave traverses structures, •'-he resulting differ-
ence in air pressure, acting on the separate surfaces, produces forces
that can cause structural damage. In addition to static pressures,
there are dynamic pressures resulting from the air movement accom-
panying the passage of the blast wave.
As the blast wave travels away from its source, the over-pressure
at the front steadily decreases and the pressure behind the front falls
off in a regular manner. As this progresses, structures or persons in
the vicinity experience first an over-pressure and then an under-
pressure. Obviously, the safety criteria used for a particular project
wi I I depend on the area involved.
ECONOMICS OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE USE
Although there may be a few cases in which costs are not important,
these will be rare indeed. There are several basic major cost items
involved in the use of nuclear explosives: Device and emplacement
costs; fielding costs, including safety; and hole-size and device
requirements. More emphasis on the economics of individual projects
will have to be developed as commercial uses for nuclear explosives
expand.
TIME SCHEDULE OF FUTURE USE
Nuclear explosives will be used commercially only if they show
economic advantages over conventional explosives. To date we have no
such demonstrated application, which means that nuclear explosions will
be of a research nature with immediate use limited to probably less
than 5 per year. This rate of use should continue for from 2 to 5
years. Within 5 years, it is estimated that research and testing in
natural gas stimulation and copper leaching will indicate economic
feasibility. If such is the case, the use of nuclear explosives may
expand to 10 to 30 per year. This rate should grow during the coming
years (especially in gas stimulation) to possibly 100 or more explosions
per year. Growth in other areas is dependent on successful test pro-
grams that are expected to develop rather slowly. There is the poten-
tial for a few "one-shot" type uses developing within the next 10 years,
which may include harbors and canals and overburden removal and water
management.
It is expected that commercial use of cratering-type explosions
will grow very slowly and under strict limitations. Non-cratering or
contained explosions offer the earliest and potentially the largest
field for future nuclear explosive application.
681
CONCLUSION
I have very briefly listed and discussed those nuclear explosive
research projects now being conducted or planned for future consider-
ation. I have attempted to evaluate these to some extent and to
estimate the growth of nuclear explosive use for the next few years.
This projection of future use is only my own estimate; I am sure some
feel that the growth will be much more rapid, while others will feel I
am overly optimistic. Only time will permit an evaluation of our
opinions. However, I again state that I feel future use depends on
demonstration of economic feasibility. Growth in use will be rather
slow and, to some extent, will be based on development of capabil-
ities to field such use.
682
-------
REFERENCES
I. Coffer, H. F., H. E. Grier, and H. H. Aronson. The Use of Nuclear
c-"-'~-'• in Oil and Gas Production. Procee
Explosives .
Congress, 1967, 21 pp.
. e se o ucear
d i nqs WorId Pet roIeum
2. Coffer, H. F., G. H. Higgins. NuclearExplosives for Oil and Gas
Stimulation and Shale Oil Recovery. Pres. at the Southwestern
Legal Foundation's Eighth Annual Institute on Exploration and
Economics of the Petroleum Industry, '-larch f-j-3, 1968, 35 pp.
Coffer, H. F., and E. R. Spiess
osives—The Answer
Commerclal Application of
_, , .. .., _. _ _. .. _r . . uommerc lai «ppiicarion or
Nuclear Explosives—The Answer to Oil Shale7 Pres. at Third
Annual Oil Shale Symposium, Denver, Colorado, April 14-15, 1966,
I ? nn
4. "Excavation" Part II of the Proceedings of the Second Plowshare
Sympos i urn, Lawrence Rad i at i on Laboratory (Livermore), UCRL-5676,
May 1959.
5. Kruger, Paul. Nuclear Civil Engi neerinq. TID-23748 Atomic
Energy Commission, 1966, 329 pp.
6. Pi per, Arthur M. Potent ia! Application of Nuclear Explosives in
Development and Management of Water Resources—Preliminary Canvass
of the Ground-Water Envi ronment. TEI-873, Atorni c Energy Commi ssion,
1968, 173 pp.
7. Ward, D. C. and C. H. Atkinson. Project Gasbuggy—A Nuclear
Fractu ri ng Experi rnent. Soc i ety of Petro I eum Eng i neers of AI '1E,
SPE-1273.
8. Wi I son, A. R. W. , E. B. Render, and E. K. Carter. An Evaluation
for Australian Purposes of Proposed CiviI Engineering and Mining
Applications. TID-4500 Atomic Energy Commission, 1364, 219 pp.
683
APPROACHES TO THE CALCULATION OF LIMITATIONS
ON NUCLEAR DETONATIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES*
G. Hoyt Whipple
School of Public Health
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan
The long-term equilibrium levels of tritium,
krypton-8 5 and carbon-2 4 which are acceptable in
the environment hat1 e been estimated on t he fo I low-
ing premises: J ' the three isotopes reach the
environment and equilibrate throughout it in periods
shorter than their half lives} 2) nuclear detona-
tions and nuclear power constitute the dominant
sources of these isotopes, 3) the doses from these
three isotopes add to one another and to the doses
from other radioactive isotope s released to the
environment} and 4) the United States, by virtue
of its population} is entitled to 6% of the world 's
capacity to accept radioactive wastes.
These premises lead to the conclusion that
U.S. nuclear detonations are limited by carbon-14
to 60 megatons per year. The corresponding limit
for U.S. nuclear power appears to be set by
krypton-85 at 100,000 electrical megawatts,
although data for carbon-2 4 production by nuclear
power are not available.
It is noted that if the equilibration assumed
in these estimates does not occur3 the limits will
in general be lower than those given above.
INTRODUCTION
This paper presents the results of some calculations of
three radioactive isotopes produced and, in present practice,
released to the environment by nuclear explosions and by the
production of nuclear power. The three isotopes are tritium
(hydrogen-3), krypton-85 and carbon-14. These, among the
••"The work reported here was performed under the auspices of
the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission while the author was a
summer visitor at the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Liver-
more , California.
684
-------
long-lived radioactive isotopes produced in nuclear fission
and fusion, are the most likely to disperse throughout the
environment. There are few physical, chemical, or biological
mechanisms which tend to concentrate these isotopes within
any phase of the environment.
THE PREMISES
The first step is the calculation of the steady state
concentration limit for each of the three radioisotopes.
The calculations are founded on three assumptions.
1. All of each of the three radioisotopes is released
to the environment in a time shorter than its radioactive
half life.
2. Each of these isotopes equilibrates with the cor-
responding stable isotope, which is available in the environ-
ment, in a time shorter than half life.
3. The quantities of stable isotopes in the environ-
ment available to dilute the corresponding radioactive
isotopes are those given in the last column of Table 1.
It is to be noted in Table 1 that the hydrogen in the
water of ice and sediments has been taken to be unavailable
for dilution and that only one-tenth of the hydrogen in the
water of the oceans is presumed to be available for dilution.
Only the hydrogen in land organisms and one-tenth of that in
sea organisms has been taken to be available for dilution.
The carbon in undecayed organic matter and in coal, oil, tar
and gas has been neglected, and only one-tenth of that in
the oceans and in sea organisms has been taken as available
for dilution.
RADIOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The maximum dose considered permissible for a person
other than a radiation worker is 0.5 rem per year (2).
Table 2 gives the specific activities (pCi per gram of stable
isotope) which will produce C.5 rem per year by several
routes of exposure: 1) breathing, or in the case of krypton-85,
standing in an atmosphere at the maximum permissible concen-
tration, 2) drinking water at the maximum permissible con-
centration, 3) eating food that will produce the maximum
permissible daily intake, and 4) having the maximum permis-
sible body burden in one's bodv. Table 2 indicates that the
limiting specific activities for tritium and carbon-It are
those in the body itself, while that for krypton-85 is set
by air.
685
Table 1. The quantities of hydrogen, krypton and carbon
available in the world for dilution.
Hydrogen in:
Oceans
Lakes and rivers
Ice
Atmosphere
Sediments
Organic material
Total
Total (1)
1.6xl023g
5.5xl019g
2.txl021g
l.txlO"g
2.2xl022g
M.OxlO"g
Assumed to be
available for
dilution
1.6xl022g
5.5x10' 9g
7.0x10' 6
1.6xl022g
Volume of the atmosphere t.3xl02*cc
(at 0°C, 760 mm)
6 of krypton per cc of air W.3xlO"9g/cc
Krypton in the atmosphere 1.8xl016g
1.8xl016g
Carbon in:
Troposphere 5.5x10 "g 5.5xl017g
Oceans U.0xl019g i*.0x!0leg
Lakes and rivers 3.2xl017g 3.2xl017g
Land organisms 1.0xlOI7g 1.0xl017g
Sea organisms 8.0xl016g 8.0xl015g
Undecayed organic matter 3.9xl018g
Coal, oil, tar, gas 7.Uxl0leg -
Total 5.0xl0leg
686
-------
Table 2. Bases for the calculation of annual replacement
rates.
1. Radioactive half life
2. Max. perm, body burden (3)
3. MFC- in public air (2)
4. MFC* in drinking water (2)
Units
5. Max. daily intake in water (2) uCi/day
H-3
12.3
100.
Kr-85
C-14
10.4 5,6 n 0
30
UCi/cc 2xlO"7 3xlO"7 IxlO"7
yCi/cc 3xlO~J - 8x10'"
Specific activity'"" limit set by:
6. Breathing
7. Drinking water
8. Eating food
9. Max. perm, body burden
10. Limiting specific activity
11. World capacity at the
limiting specific activity
12. Annual replacement rate
uCi/g
uCi/g
uCi/R
uCi/g
pCi/g
0.6
0.3
0.2
0.01
0 .01
70.
70 .
1 .
1 .
0 .005
0.002
0.002
Ci 2x10'" IxlO12 IxlO11
Ci/vear IxlO13 7xlOl° IxlO6
Notes
"MFC stands for maximum permissible concentration.
-'''Specific activities are in uCi per gram of stable element.
ble 2 gives the limiting specific activity
hree radioisotopes, i.e. the specific activity
Row 10 of Table
for each of the thr
of each isotope which will deliver an average radiation dose
of 0.5 rem per year to every person in the world. These spe-
cific activities, with the corresponding stable isotopes avail-
able for dilution given in Table 1, permit one to calculate
the world capacity for each radioisotope; these world capaci-
ties are given in row 11 of Table 2.
Each of the three radioisotopes decays with a character-
istic radioactive half life. Thus there is for each isotope
an annual replacement rate which will just maintain the world
environment at the limiting specific activity. These annual
replacement rates are given in row 12 of Table 2.
The figures in the last three rows of Table 2 are not
suitable limits for two reasons. First, these figures make
no allowance for the differences between the calculated pre-
dictions for an average individual in the population, and the
actual exposure received by any particular individual. The
Federal Radiation Council (4) and the U.S. Atomic Energy Com-
mission (2) have both stipulated a factor of 1/3 for this pur-
pose .
The second reason why the wo
Table 2 are not suitable limits i
for the summing of the doses from
from all other man-made radioisot
from other man-made sources of ra
"persons in the general populatio
receive an exposure exceeding 0.5
to natural background and medical
to allow for the summing of doses
and other sources of radiation a
rid capacity figures in
s that they make no allowance
the three radioisotopes,
opes in the environment, or
diation. The intent is that
n at any age... should not
rem per year in addition
exposures."C5). In order
from various radioisotopes
factor of 1/10 is appropriate.
ALLOCATION
In considering the long pull, one must face the matter
of allocation: to how much of the world's capacity is each
geographical unit entitled? To what portion of this share
is each nuclear undertaking entitled?
The United States constitutes about 7% of the world's
surface and in 1966 had about 6% of the world's population (6),
On the other hand the United States is at present using about
30% of the world's energy (7). If the principle of one man,
one vote is extended to one man, one polluter, the United
States' allocation is about 6% of the world's capacity to
accept radioactive wastes.
-------
Nuclear explosives (fission and fusion) and nuclear power
(fission) are today the dominant sources of the three radio-
isotopes considered in this paper. Whether an equal share of
the available capacity is to be allotted to each of these under-
takings, or whether more of the capacity goes to one than the
other is a matter to be decided on the relative importance of
explosions and power. As an illustration, but surely not as
a recommendation, the following calculations have been made
by allocating a half of the U.S. capacity to nuclear explosions,
a half to nuclear power.
Table 3 summarizes the radiological and allocational con-
siderations, and indicates that about 1/1000 of the replacement
rates in the last row of Table 2 is appropriate for U.S. nuclear
explosions, and an equal amount for U.S. nuclear power.
Table 3. Summary of considerations.
Radiological
Individual variation from the average
Summing of doses from various isotopes
Factor
1/3
1/10
PRODUCTION OF THE THREE RADIOISOTOPES
The production of the three isotopes under consideration
by nuclear explosions is a function of several factors: a) the
fission to fusion ratio, b) the atomic composition of the
explosive device and its associated equipment, c) the compo-
sition of any neutron shield that is used, and d) the compo-
sition of the soil in which the explosive is detonated. These
factors may be manipulated for engineering purposes, and are,
further, veiled by security classification. The estimates for
the production of the three isotopes by nuclear explosives
have been based on the declassified information in the upper
portion of Table t.
The corresponding production figures for tritium and
krypton-85 are given in the lower portion of Table 4. Note
that no figures for the production of carbon-14 by nuclear
power appear in Table 4. Such production certainly occurs
by neutron capture in nitrogen whenever air and neutrons get
together, but no estimates of production rates appear to have
been made.
Tritium may be produced in nuclear reactors by neutron
capture in hydrogen-2 and in lithium-6. It has been estimated
that the amounts of tritium produced by these reactions in
power reactors may perhaps equal the tritium produced by fis-
sion (13). As a consequence, the tritium production figure in
Table 4 should be increased from 14 to perhaps 30 Ci per elec-
trical megawatt-year.
Allocation
United States' share of world capacity
Share allotted to nuclear explosions
(an equal share is allotted to nuclear
power)
combined factor
0.06
1/2
0.001
689
690
-------
Table 4 . Product ion rates of the three radioisotopes.
Nuclear explosive s
fission to fusion ratio (8) 10 kt fission for 1 Mt fusion
10 kt of fission (9) 1.46xl024 fissions
krypton-85 fission yield (10) 2.93xlO~3 per fission
krypton-8 5 production
tritium production C 8,9)
carbon-14 product ion(8)
290 Ci per 10 kt fission,
i.e. per 1 Mt fusion
IxlO7 Ci per Mt fusion
15 Ci per Mt fusion
Nuc 1 ear powe r
electrical to thermal ratio 1 MwCe) for 3 MwCt)
1 Mw(e) for 1 year (11) 9.86xl023 fissions
krypton-85 fission yield (10) 2.93xlO~3 per fission
krypton-85 production 480 Ci per MwCe) in 1 year
tritium fission yield (12) 9.5x10 5 per fission
tritium production 14 Ci per Mw(e) in 1 year
691
LIMITS ON NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES AND NUCLEAR POWER
In Table 5 the production figures developed in Table 4
for tritium, krypton-85 and carbon-14 have been used to deter-
mine the limits imposed on nuclear explosives and nuclear
power by 1/1000 of the world replacement rates, given in
Table 2, It is evident from Table 5 that the limit on U.S.
nuclear explosions is set by carbon-14 at about 70 megatons
per year and that U.S. nuclear power is limited by krypton-85
to about 150,000 electrical megawatts.
DISCUSSION
Under the idealized conditions used i
90% of the final equilibrium specific acti
reached in about three half-lives, say 35
and krypton-85, and 20,000 years for carbo
to release more than the equilibrium rates
such averages must be compensated by relea
equilibrium rates in other years. This is
on credit and does not violate the Atomic
requirement that exposures mav be averaged
longer than one year (2), provided the lim
activities are not exceeded.
n these calculations,
vities will be
years for tritium
n-14. It is possible
in some years, but
sing less than the
analogous to buying
Energy Commission
over periods no
iting specific
The premise that the three isotopes are released to the
environment in periods shorter than their half-lives should
be questioned. If it can be shown, or if it can be arranged
that 90% of the limiting isotope can be restrained from enter-
ing the environment for three or more half-lives, the limiting
rates in Table 5 may be increased by a factor of ten.
The premise that the three radioisotopes equilibrate
throughout the environment in periods shorter than their half-
lives is tenuous. However, to the extent that equilibrium
is not established, specific activities will be higher in some
locations than would be the case in complete equilibrium. If
the portions of the environment that are at higher than equi-
librium specific activities lie on human food pathways, then
limits lower than those in Table 5 must be used.
The factors used to allow for individual variations from
the average, for the summing of doses, and for rationing may
be considered as conservative safety factors. Safety and
conservatism receive great, perhaps undue emphasis in radia-
tion . However, in considerations of the environment, it is
wise to set aside certain portions to lie fallow for future
and unforeseen needs.
692
-------
Table 5. Limits on nuclear explosions and nuclear power
for the United States.
H-3
Kr-85
C-1H
World annual replacement rate,
Ci/year (from Table 2,
row 12)
The United States' share for
nuclear explosives, or
power, Ci/year (see
Table 3)
Limit imposed on nuclear ex-
plosives, Mt/year
Limit imposed on nuclear power,
Mw(e)
Ixl0l! 7xl010 IxlO6
IxlO10 7xl07 IxlO3
1,000 21(0,000 67
7x10" 150,000
693
The concept of balancing risks against benefits has been
worked very hard, perhaps to exhaustion, in radiation protec-
tion. In the present context this concept leads to two ques-
tions of singular subtlety: risks to whom? benefits to whom?
CONCLUSIONS
The deliberations presented here lead to the conclusions
that on the long view U.S. nuclear detonations are limited by
carbon-lH to an average rate of 70 megatons per year, and that
the corresponding limit for U.S. nuclear power appears to be
set by krypton-85 at 150,000 electrical megawatts. These
limits can be raised if means are devised to prevent the escape
of the limiting radioisotopes to the environment.
694
-------
REFERENCES
10.
11.
12.
13.
A. Poldervaart, ed. Crust of the Earth3 Geological Society
of America, New York, p. 121-123, 1955.
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Rules and Regulations,
10CFR20.
International Commission on Radiological Protection,
Report of Committee II on Permissible Dose for Internal
Radiation, Health Physics .5:1, 1960.
Federal Radiation Council, Background Material for the
Development of Radiation Protection Standards, Report
No. 1, p. 30, May 13, 1960.
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements,
Radiation Protection in Educational Institutions, NCRP
Report No. 32, p. 7, July 1, 1966.
L. H. Long, ed. World Almanac, Newspaper Enterprise
Association, New York, 1968.
P. C. Putnam, Energy in the Future, Van Nostran, New York,
1953.
F. W. Stead, p. 128 in Engineering with Nuclear Explosives,
TID-7695, 1964.
J. A. Miskel, •& . 153 in Engineering with Nuclear Explosives,
TID-7695, 1964".
American Institute of Physics Handbook, 2nd ed, D. 8-225.
Atomic Energy Desk Book, p. 353, Rheinhold, 1963.
E. L. Albenesius and R. S. Ondrejein, Nucleonics IB: No. 9,
p. 100, 1960.
J. E. Blomeke , F. E. Harrington, Management of Radioactive
Wastes at Nuclear Power Stations, ORNL-4070, January 1968.
695
QUESTIONS FOR HOYT WHIPPLE
From Alex Grendon:
Did you take into account the annual production of carbon-14 and
tritium by cosmic radiation? Do you know if these amounts are
significant in relation to potential production by man's activities?
ANSWER:
I do not have the f i
of these two isotope
of the rates that I
do a I i ttle s imple a
statement, wh ich is
ticular re lease rate
wouId uItimateIy
mi I Ii rem per year fr
one i n the room who
recaI I, carbon-I 4 an
smaI I part of the na
gures w i th me, but the natural p roduct i on rates
s, as I recaI I, are smaII, very smaII fract ions
have been speaking about here and I think if you
rithmetic, you'll help me gain confidence in this
based on a poor memory, which said that the par-
which is one thousandth of the release rate that
d to 0.5 rem per year would lead to 0.5 of a
om the United States alone. There may be some-
remembers the breakdown well enough, buf as I
d tritium from natural causes constitute a very
turaI background exposure.
-------
ROLE OF INDUSTRY IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND SAFETY ASPECTS
OF THE DEVELOPING PLOWSHARE INDUSTRY
Norman Hi I berry
Professor of Nuclear Engineering
University of Arizona
ABSTRACT
It -is first pointed out that no person or organisa-
tion has a more vital interest in the early establishment
of an effective health and safety program within which
commercial operations based on Plowshare technology can
be carried on with assurance than does that facet of in-
dustry which is directly involved in the attempt to prove
out these Plowshare applications. The formulation of
such a code must be a matter of the highest priority to
all concerned.
To accomplish this task successfully, however, re-
quires the exercise of a truly hard-nosed objectivity
both on the part of the Governmental agencies who bear
statutory responsibility for ensuring the public health
and safety and also on that of the industrial groups who
are trying to realize the significant economic potentials
inherent in the Plowshare technology. While it is abun-
dantly clear that achievement of a sound and reliable
public health and safety code is imperative for both
regulatory agencies and operating industry, it must also
be recognized that both groups serve the inescapable ad-
ditional responsibility of acting as the public's trustees
to assure the healthy development of a new technology which
may well prove to be of vital importance to the Nation.
The basic nature of the joint operating procedure required
in order to provide an effective way of fulfilling these
common obligations is then examined.
The discussion then turns to the present stage of
the developmental progress of the potential Plowshare in-
dustry. Scientific breakthrough has long since been ac-
complished and scientific feasibility has been quite
generally proven. For a number of important possible ap-
plications even technological feasibility has been estab-
lished. In these cases the demonstration of economic feasi-
bility and the attainment of public acceptance are the two
factors that still remain to be achieved before a full-fledged
697
if still infant industry becomes a reality. Industry alone
is capable of determining economic feasibility. It is also
upon industry that the primary responsibility for gaining
public acceptance will fall and with all other factors
"go" it will be this latter factor, the public's willing-
ness not only to tolerate but actually to "buy," that will
determine whether there is to be a business or not.
Whether or not any proposed commercial application
will prove to be economically feasible and whether or not
public acceptance can be achieved will depend critically
on the nature of the essential health and safety activities
required and on the associated costs of these activities.
For industry to proceed with effectiveness, three immediate
measures are particularly needed.
First, a tentative, "best-as-of-the-moment" health
and safety code covering operational procedures and end
product specifications should be formulated to serve as a
test set of rules for immediate field use and as a con-
crete, "point-of-departure" statement in the development
of the eventual regulatory code. The upcoming technolo-
gical feasibility tests in the Plowshare program should
then be used to evaluate its commercial applicability and
to guide its evolution toward regulatory status. Here joint
action is obviously imperative.
Next, if the foregoing is to be meaningful, the re-
search and development aspects of these upcoming tests with
respect to health and safety, important as they are, must
be scrupulously separated, at least costwise, from the
necessary health and safety operational activities as speci-
fied in the provisional code. No matter how cogent, con-
siderations of budgetary expedience must not be permitted
to intervene either within the Governmental agencies or
within the participating industrial organizations. Honest,
"unloaded" operating costs are an absolute must if the tests
themselves are to be meaningful.
Finally, it must be recognized that time is one of
the most significant factors in determining the success or
failure of any industrial endeavor. The present case is no
exception. The time factor must be kept continually in mind,
for delay can spell defeat for a commercial activity just
as surely as can technological failure. Whenever a contem-
plated course of action will impose delay, it is vitally
important that the anticipated advantages be weighed metic-
ulously against the possible detriments lest the hope of
small gains inadvertently lead to the achievement of total
ruin. Here again the truly judicial sort of appraisal
698
-------
required can be realized only to the extent that open com-
munication and joint evaluation procedures can be estab-
lished.
Success in implementing the required joint operations
with due regard to individual responsibilities is antici-
apted.
Mr. Chairman, Fellow Panelists, Colleagues. I am particularly
happy to have the privilege of being a member of this panel discus-
sion and this on two distinctly different counts. In the first place,
having not only officiated at the birth of the nuclear energy health,
safety, and b i o-medi caI research programs but also having nursed
them around the clock for their first twenty years, attending this
symposi urn is very much Ii ke comi ng back to a family reunion to see
how the children and grandchildren are doing.
In the second place, I feel highly complimented by my industrial
colleagues to be asked by them to present this discussion of the nature
of industrial responsibilities in the area of environmental health and
safety. My position as university professor and ex-National Laboratory
director speaking in behalf of industry is not quite as anomalous as
it might appear at first sight since I have served on the Board of
Directors of the Atomic Industrial Forum for the past seven years.
Thus what I have to say reflects this latter experience fully as much
as it does the former.
Before proceeding to my discussion of industry's role in environ-
mental health and safety, I would like to make one point emphatically
clear. Nowhere during my long career in the nuclear field have I found
a more deep-seated respect for a fully effective health and safety pro-
gram than I observe everywhere within the nuclear industry. I realize
that in these days it probably verges on the immoral to suggest that
any segment of industry is indeed actively safety conscious. I am con-
vinced, nonetheless, that no individual or group is more keenly and
more completely concerned with achieving a totally safe operation than
is the nuclear industry. A major segment of this industry's top manage-
ment has come up through the nuclear laboratories and nuclear energy
production facilities where traditionally an acute consciousness of
the need to monitor every conceivable source of potential trouble and
to do so ceaselessly is bred into the very marrow of their bones. No
one is more aware than they that the one nuclear accident that we can
never tolerate is the first. True, although all of us are vitally
concerned with the overall nuclear health and safety program, each of
us must perforce operate within quite different areas of responsibility
and thus may differ amongst ourselves concerning the most suitable ways
of achieving the goal of a totally safe operation. With respect to the
nature of the goal, however, and to the necessity for attaining it.
699
there exist no differences at a I I - we all share a common conviction.
Indeed from the industrial point of view, unless that goal can be ef-
fectively achieved, there can be no significant nuclear industry. It
is for this reason that that facet of industry which is directly in-
volved in attempts to prove out the industrial feasibility of econom-
ically promising Plowshare applications is vitally concerned with the
early establishment of an effective health and safety code within
which commercial operations based on Plowshare technology can be
carried on with assurance. Such a code is in a real sense the legal
skeleton upon which the operating musculature of sound safety practice
can be fixed. Such a code will not spring full formed from the waves.
It must evolve, but it can do so only if some primeval form exists
f rom wh i ch a Iogi caI evolut i on can foilow. The formuI at i on of th i s
elemental safety structure must be our first order of business and a
matter of the highest priority to alI concerned.
Now it is quite clear that the statutory responsibility for
generating this essential tentative code, for developing it through
its evolutionary stages to full regulatory status and for its enforce-
ment when established, must lie with the government agencies. With
the very considerable body of data already available both in the fields
of blast phenomena and of radiation effects, one might question why the
first steps toward such a code have not already been taken. The answer
to that to produce even a wholly tentative and purposely elemental code
is not so simple as it might appear. Permit me to illustrate with an
example from our national nuclear history.
I had the privilege of living right at the center of the first
case of the development of nuclear safety requirements. That was in
connection with the design of the X-IO nuclear reactor at what 'S now
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, with that of the Hanford production
reactors at Richland, Washington, and with the design of the chemical
Processing facilities at both locations. The need for radiation safety
guidance was first propounded in emphatic fashion by the physicists
at the Metallurgical Lab as early as March or early April 1942 and
was seconded by the chemists shortly thereafter. Prior to that, in
early February 1942, a medical examination program, with radiation ef-
fects constituting a principal objective, had already been established
at the Laboratory. Following this, a radiation monitoring organiza-
tion was set up during February and March, and an instrument division
was organized to design and produce the necessary monitoring devices.
When the full impact of the radiation problems inherent in nuclear
reactors was recognized, a Health Division was established in April
which included the existing medical examination and radiation monitoring
activities and which also initiated intensive medical and biological
research programs in radiation effects on living systems and in the
toxicology of the radioactive and other esoteric materials with which
we were deaIi ng.
The first order of business of this Health Division was to come
up with a statement on reactor shielding requirements since the X-IO
700
-------
reactor was already in the design stage. It was fortunate that the
reactor physicists, the reactor engineers, and the bio-medical personnel
had to live together. With only the sketchiest of data available and
with their own early experiments indicating that those prior data were
in some instances suspect, the bio-medical staff did the normal, to-be-
expected thing. They looked at the data and decided on what that raw
data would indicate a safe "permissible level" to be. Then on the
basis of the general state of experimental statistics in biological
investigations, they introduced a safety factor of ten. Since the data
in this case were at least partially suspect, they tossed in a tentative
additional factor of ten. Finally, since no accident could be tolerated,
not only on the basis of the value of the human lives that might be
directly involved but also because an accident could breach the military
secrecy and thus endanger the entire National security, they decided
to really play it safe and put in another factor of ten or so. Here
was where juxtaposition of personnel paid off, for when the bio-med
personnel announced their permissive dose specification, the physicists
and in particular the engineers nearly exploded. There were comments
that the proposed exposure level was far lower than the level of cosmic
rays to which man is exposed during his lifetime. This blast didn't
seem to shake the life scientists too much. However, when they saw the
engineers' figures on what their proposed level was going to mean in the
thickness of the shielding that would be required to achieve an attenu-
ation of the reactor radiation down to their stipulated level, they were
shaken. It was a sort of "fi I I-aI I-space-with-concrete-leaving-a-smalI-
hole-in-the-middle-for-the-reactor" deal. At this point, the hard-nosed
give-and-take of arguing out a fully safe but practicably achievable
reactor shielding design got under way, and in due course a suitable
design was achieved. True, the bio-medical staff did retreat from their
original extreme position, but they did so without compromising the real
safety of the reactor. What they did do was to trim some of the "super-
super" factors they had put in. These had been introduced not because of
requirements implied in the available data or even the known uncertainties
in the data, but because of that very basic human reaction that, if safe
is safe, doubly safe must per se be better - a sort of inverse "over-
kill" philosophy.
Now I suspect that I have overstated somewhat the exact values of
the safety factors that were actually involved in this case, but I have
not overstated the case itself in the slightest in terms of the opera-
tional philosophy it portrays. The project never could have met its
schedules had it not been for the intimate, hard-nosed give-and-take
between the reactor designers who, to the best of our belief at the
time, held the Nation's military survival in their hands, and the bio-
medical personnel who we held responsible for the health and safety
both of the future reactor operators and of the civilian population
who could conceivably suffer serious damage by faulty design. The out-
come of that dialogue was that each group, under the spur of the other,
exercised a degree of critical evaluation of their own scientific and
technological positions that it would have been essentially impossible
to have achieved otherwise. They arrived at the solution both demanded -
701
full safety - and they arri ved at that solution wh i le keep ing wi th i n the
bounds of technological and economic feasibility.
The situation we face today, in its basic managerial aspects, is
strikingly similar. The compulsory physical juxtaposition of the dif-
ferent concerned groups within a single organizational structure Is. ab-
sent, and the dramatic, driving sense of urgency obviously does not ob-
tain. Otherwise, the two situations have much in common. For example,
there can be no question but that both the government agencies and the
Plowshare industries involved share the firm conviction that a fully
safe operation is imperative; the agencies are under statutory require-
ment to ensure it, and the industry cannot endure without it. I would
also say that while the present state of scientific and technological
data within the nuclear business is enormously improved over that
existing in 1942, nonetheless the data in the Plowshare field are suf-
ficiently inadequate to tempt anyone devising a safety code to adopt
the "doubly safe" philosophy until strongly persuaded by circumstance
to do otherwise. Finally, it is also true that here as well as in the
historical instance, the bio-medical fraternity which must necessarily
constitute the core of the governmental agencies involved are not only
explicitly charged by statute with responsibility for essentially
guaranteeing the public health and safety, but implicitly, by the very
existence of the statute under which they operate, they are also made
joint trustees of the public interest in the attainment of the benefits
which successful exploitation of the field might yield. Had it been
otherwise, the statute would simply have prohibited the potential ap-
plications a much simpler solution than strangling the cat with the hot
butter of a body of prohibitive health and safety regulations. It seems
to me that we face much the same situation we did twenty-seven years ago,
and I believe that the same basic motivations exist on the part of the
regulators and the regulated. Today both groups require a fully safe
operation and, even though their reasons for so doing may be quite dif-
ferent, this in no way alters the identity of their joint purpose.
Again both are concerned with the achievement of a technological and
industrial goal, one that could prove to be of vital import to the nation
as a whole. The significantly augmented national reserves of proven
recoverable natural resources available to our economy without recourse
to transport outside the protection of our geographic boundaries which
could result from a successful Plowshare enterprise and the impact of
this altered domestic situation on our international relationships and
policies provides one case in point. The present Plowshare stakes may
lack the urgent crisis character of the wartime case but, if evaluated
for the long run, they could eventually prove to be of equally vast
nat i onaI s i gn i f i cance.
In one area, however, the differences are marked. In a regulatory
society any scientific and technological cohabitation between regulators
and the regulated may indeed be deemed far more immoral than are certain
more generally practised varieties of the act. Be that as it may and
as difficult as it obviously may prove to be to achieve, ws must find
a means of generating a true government agency - Plowshare industry
702
-------
dialogue - if we are to be successful in the enterprise on which we
are all engaged. All the government agencies involved must know and
really understand the full industrial implications of the measures
they propose. On the other hand, industry must know how safe is
safe. In their eyes it could turn out not to be safe enough. Industry
must also know precisely upon what safety depends, on an across-the-
board basis, and fully understand in what way, because only thus can
regulation be translated into rational operating procedure. The im-
mediate and urgent problem is that of establishing such an effective
dialogue. In my view this meeting constitutes a useful first step.
More meetings with perhaps a quite different "meeting format" might
be the next step. But whatever the answer, it will have to be sought
actively by all concerned; passivity can only spell frustration and
disastrous delay if not indeed total defeat for our time.
But having made these comments, what bearing do they have on the
question at hand? What is the nature of the industrial involvement
and of its responsibilities, direct and indirect, as far as the environ-
mental health and safety aspects of its proposed commercial Plowshare
activities are concerned? Acturally the answers depend on the way in
which one projects his views of these operations into the future. The
major Plowshare operations themselves might become a government monopo-
lized business with industry simply hiring the government to do a job
for them. If this were to be the case, however, a Plowshare industry
of the magnitude one can readily foresee, should the envisioned activi-
ties prove to be commercially feasible, would put the government among
the top elite of Fortune's Five Hundred. Unless the Commission's
statutory mandate to use its powers to strengthen competitive private
enterprise were revoked, I find it difficult to imagine such 3 develop-
ment as even remotely probable. However, it is an admittedly possible
outcome and, should it occur, industry's direct role in health and safety
matters would be essentially nonexistent as far as the direct Plowshare
phases of a project were concerned. Industry would still be directly
concerned with the health and safety aspects of product processing and
control, but only with respect to the problems involved in the commercial
distribution of those products. It would also be vitally, if indirectly,
concerned with the costs of the government's health and safety activi-
ties in its Plowshare operations, since these costs could well determine
the total feasibility of any project. Important as these concerns may
be, they require at most no more than modest direct industrial involve-
ment.
If, however, the operating role of the government in Plowshare
enterprises should eventually be limited strictly to the actual emplace-
ment and detonation of the nuclear explosive (which operation, like its
health and safety monitoring activities, must remain a statutory
monopoly of the Commission for any foreseeable future) while preparation
of the site in readiness for the emplacement and detonation becomes the
responsi b iIity of the concerned industry, then industry's respons i b i Iit ies
with respect to environmental health and safety assume a very different
guise. They are no longer matters of indirect concern; they now Iie at
703
the very core of the considerations which determine the feasibility of
a project in the first instance and, if feasibility seems assured, they
play a dominant role in the operations that follow. Since I am personally
convinced that a viable industry based on Plowshare technology can be
established in the near future only if industry plays this sort of major
management role, I will assume that this is the case in the discussion
that follows. I must emphasize, therefore, that what I have to say
has validity only to the extent that my assumption itself proves to be
vaI id.
It is easy to argue that, in this activity, industry has no responsi-
bility and hence no role whatsoever. The Public Health Service holds
under Congressional mandate the country-wide responsibility to ensure
the protection of the national health. The Atomic Energy Commission is
charged by Congressional statute with the ultimate responsibility of
ensuring the public health and safety in those specific instances in
which these might be affected by nuclear activities. None of these
concerned organizations can abdicate these responsibilities either in
whole or in part. Moreover, any governmental agency with regulatory
responsibilities must emulate Caesar's wife. Not only must it make
certain that other possible interests can in no way influence its regu-
latory judgments, it must assure that not even an appearance of such a
possibility could exist. Thus, for industry even to suggest any direct
initiative role in the development of the regulatory code under which
its operations must be-carried out would obviously be totally untenable.
Clearly, those who would argue that industry should have no part, how-
ever remote, in this procedure have a persuasive case.
However, as I pointed out earlier, the trusteeship for insuring
health and safety is inextricably enmeshed with the trusteeship for
realizing Plowshare benefits, and industry bears a very direct responsi-
bility with respect to the latter. Industry clearly faces a very real
dilemma. If it takes the easy path and washes its hands of any part
whatsoever in the development of the regulatory code, it avoids all
possible hint of collusion - and a lot of hard work - but it may, by
the same token, consign its incipient enterprise to an infant's grave.
On the other hand, even to gesture toward the other extreme of playing
a direct role in the development of the regulatory code would in my
estimation not only be both inappropriate and inadvisable but would
also constitute an act of self-immolation on a truly pyrotechnic
poli t icaI pyre.
-------
But there is a defensible middle ground, and it is this that both
industry and government must seek, difficult as that search may be. As
to what constitutes safety and proper protection of health, the public
itself, through the medium of its governmental structure, must say. No
matter how knowledgeable industry may be in health and safety matters,
its position is inescapably one that bears the appearance of bias if not
of bias itself, and even the appearance of bias vitiates its opinions
and judgments except insofar as they lend weight to the government
findings by their concurrence. Where industry can properly contribute
(and where its responsibility to the public under its Plowshare benefits
trusteeship would dictate that it must) is in making it quite objectively
clear just what are the associated costs to the economy of the proposed
regulatory measures. It has been my experience that by and large in
situations of this kind no one is more interested in this sort of demon-
strably objective information than is the regulatory body itself. It
has no desire to do its work with its overall vision blurred by" a fog
of uncertain or totally unavailable data from the economic areas of con-
cern. It welcomes all the trustworthy information it can obtain on the
true impact of its operations upon the activities it affects. Certainly
the Atomic Energy Commission has a keen realization of its "secondary
trusteeship" role, and I believe this is true of most other regulatory
bodies. While I occasionally fume at what sometimes seem to be need-
lessly involved and ponderous regulatory procedures, I have never
doubted the sincerity of the Commission's interest in attaining the
full benefits which are latent within the fields of nuclear science
and technology and which can be realized within its mandate to ensure
the public health and safety. And I must confess that after numerous
direct challenges by the Commission I have yet to suggest any very ef-
fective methods for simplifying its regulatory operations.
I am convinced that cooperation between Government and industry
in establishing an effective regulatory operation is as much needed
today as it was among the scientists and engineers in setting the
safety standards twenty-seven years ago. I believe that the will to
cooperate also exists provided a suitable framework for such coopera-
tion could be established. While the mechanism of the official publi-
cation of a proposed regulation, of submitted comment, of official
hearing, of rework, and of republtcation, etc., etc., etc., eventually
produces a result of sorts, the cumbrousness of the method almost
guarantees that the progeny so engendered will display appreciably
less than genius rating, (will return to this later with a positive
suggestion that I hope may prove to be of some value.
Let us now turn from the area of code generation to that of
field operations which I have assumed will eventually be carried on
largely by industry under such a code.
Here again, under present operating condictions, "participating
industry" has essentially no role in the direct Plowshare phase of the
project's field operations other than to take part in the planning and
to pay a share of the bills; a share, I might add, that seems to be
705
growing asymptotically toward "full cost" with perhaps improvident
speed. Under present law a Plowshare project is of necessity a govern-
ment enterprise in which industry may participate. Such an industry,
however, must exercise its participation by serving in effect as a
contractor to the Commission.
Let me break in here with an essential aside. To keep my com-
ments on contracts in proper focus, I should warn you that after the
War, General Nichols told me that it took the Manhattan District
lawyers eighteen months to straighten out the contracts I had arranged
during the first six months while the project was under OSRD auspices.
I've learned a little about contracts since, but I'm still no legal
expert. However, I've had a lot of experience in observing how these
things actually work out, which may or may not be of the way they are
supposed to do legally, and it is from this observational standpoint
that I speak.
Now back to the argument. As things now stand, the Plowshare
operator is the government, and the liabilities of its subcontractors,
including its "participating industry" partners, are covered by the
government. The government assumes full responsibility for all as-
pects of the necessary health and safety measures, and industry has in
essence no responsibility except to obey explicit instructions. Here
no code need to promulgated, for the regulator is also the only pos-
sible operator. Should an accident occur under present circumstances,
the i ndustriaI contractors, i nclud i ng the i ndustr iaI parti ci pants,
would, I suspect, actually be numbered among the injured parties rather
than among those liable and might thus escape both the direct financial
liabilities and the indirect public relations liabilities which would
otherwise be entailed. This being Las Vegas, I would bet a modest sum
on the operating contractors escaping public damnation essentially un-
scathed, but I wouldn't risk ,-3 plugged nickel that the participating
industries would receive that same public treatment. The former were
just doing a job for the government and under the government's direct
supervision, but the latter were the instigators of the affair who
pushed the government into undertaking the task.
If there is to be any private industry based on Plowshare tech-
nology, we«must clearly shift to the position I postulated at the start
of my presentation, and then the above situation becomes markedly more
aggravated, for now the entire operation, except for the actual
emplacement of the nuclear explosive and its detonation, becomes the
direct responsibility of private industry. From a purely practical
viewpoint, I am convinced that when this happens, regardless of legal
technicalities, industry must face the fact that, at least as far as
public opinion is concerned, it will be presumed to carry the primary
operating responsibilities and liabilities for all phases of the
enterprise including that of environmental health and safety. For
example, the government has fired so many underground shots without
incident that should any accident happen, it would be essentially
impossible to convince the public that the cause was other than
706
-------
negligent preparation of the site.
Now important as these considerations are at this point, I am
not primarily worried about the financial liabilities involved. I am
sure that adequate insurance will be available when required, and I
have no doubt that as long as it is really needed, Price-Anderson
coverage will continue to take care of any situation which might create
financial obligations beyond the limits of the private insurance
limits. But no Price-Anderson equivalent can be contrived that can
"cover" the i nd i rect, pub Ii c re I at i on Ii ab iIi t ies wh i ch wouId be
involved and which could prove to be fully as disastrous to industry
as would the financial losses involved. It is this fact that convinces
me that however legally sacred the Commission's specific mandate may be
for insuring the public health and safety in all Plowshare activ-
ities, the brutal facts of the matter will prove to be that should
the public health and safety suffer, it will be private industry
pr i nci pa I Iy, not the Commi ss i on, that will f i nd i ts neck i n the pub I Ic ' s
gu i I lotine. It certa inly behooves i ndustry to make certa i n not on Iy
that any Plowshare enterprise it undertakes fully satisfies applicable
governmental regulations but, even more, that it is indeed safe beyond
any thinkable doubt according to its own analysis and experience.
Now obviously, the first step in undertaking any planned Plowshare
enterpri se must be the acqu i s it ion of forma I government author i zat ion
to proceed. This serves a three-fold purpose from industry's point of
view. In the first place it protects qualified industry from the
serious, industry-wide damage that would ensue should some incompetent,
foolhardy operator undertake a project which ended in disaster. In
the second place, "passing one's exams" is a well understood facet of
our society and is accepted as proof of qualification. This definitely
carries over into authorization proceedings, and achieving authoriza-
tion does become a valuable tool in gaining public acceptance for a
project. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the regulatory code
constitutes an invaluable check list for industry's own safety analysis
and its associated program of health and safety investigations. Also,
the authorization proceedings themselves, when successfully negotiated,
provide an important endorsement to the project management that their
safety homework has been well done and that it is highly unlikely that
there are any hidden holes remaining in its arguments.
Authorization constitutes a "necessary condition, but it is not
necessarily a "sufficient condition" to assure total safety. As recent
events in other technological areas have shown, government authorization
provides no ironclad guarantee of safe operation. Consequently, as
long as independent sources exist from which cogent question and compe-
tent answer can be obtained, industry will be wise to avail itself of
their counsel and advice as well. No source of help should be ignored,
every unwet heel should be explored no matter how minor its effect on
the safety as a whole might seem to be. After all, one such heel
accounted for Achilles' demise.
707
In the final analysis, however, industry must rely on its own
internal competence in arriving at its final determination that its
proposed operations are fully safe. There are many modes by which
industry can achieve such competence ranging from major environmental
health and safety divisions to compact, tightly knit but broadly
competent evaluation groups. Whatever the mode chosen may be, however,
its effectiveness is determined by three factors. The first and
foremost is the intellectual quality and scholastic training of its
members. The second is the breadth, depth, and appropriateness of their
practical experience - the factor that gives them an instictive "feel
of safety" as it were. The third factor is the degree of true commun-
ication that exists between themselves and their top management,
Obviously .the ideal situation is realized when one or more top exec-
utive officers could personally qualify for service within their own
nuclear safety unit. But, however its internal nuclear safety competence
is achieved, industry must place its ultimate decision-making reliance
on that competence; and, until it has achieved such competence and has
gained full confidence in it, it had better stay out of nuclear-based
enterpri ses.
Continuing public concern and occasional outcry concerning all
things nuclear constitute a major hazard in realizing the very real
industrial benefits that are inherent in the nuclear field. This
public concern has served one very useful purpose, however. Industry
is no less a part of the public because it is organized as industry.
In its days of nuclear naivete, it responds to nuclear affairs precisely
as does the lay public; that is, with a deep-seated belief in the
existence of unknown dangers and with serious apprehension as far as
any direct involvement in nuclear affairs is concerned. The result
has been that those industrial concerns that have tentatively ventured
into the nuclear business have either had sufficient acumen to build
unquestionable competence in nuclear safety and to do so on an urgent
and comprehensive basis or they have gotten completely out of the
business in a hurry. This has acted as an excellent societal bandpass
filter. It has automatically eliminated from nuclear activities the
vast majority of our society's normal fringe of foolhardy operators.
Furthermore, it has insured that the sound participants do so on a
level of competence that they might fee! unnessary in some less
sophisticated field even though the actual hazards were essentially
comparable. The result has been that the nuclear industry is acutely
safety conscious. It has built up exceptional internal competence in
matters of nuclear safety, and in many instances it is already prepared
to make its own operating decisions in those cases in which, in its
opinion, its own "sufficiency" conditions establish tighter overall
limitations on its operations than the statutory "necessary" condi-
tions demand.
To summarize. The Government can advise on nuclear safety, it
can and hopefully will establish a well-considered code of safety
standards and regulations, and it can prevent the undertaking of any
708
-------
nuclear enterprise that it believes will imperil the public health and
safety. It can authorize a project it judges to be safe and monitor
it for adherence to the approved designs and operating procedures.
But there its authority stops as far as the direct initiation of any
given commercial enterprise is concerned. Only the responsible
industry itself can give final approval to proceed with the actual
field operations, and thereby it assumes the ultimate responsibility
for all phases of the project's affairs including the liabilities
involved in its environmental health and safety aspects. Indeed it
would almost appear from recent occurrences that what is actually
developing is the very strange situation in which an industrial decision
to proceed under a government authorization becomes interpreted, at
least by the public, as constituting a corporate endorsement of the
scientific and technological validity of the government code and
regulations under which the approval is granted. Regardless of how
this may eventually turn out, it certainly emphasizes the importance
of establishing an internal nuclear safety competence that is inferior
to none within government or without.
Before turning to the final section of my discussion, I would like
to interject a footnote on this matter of safety competence. One of
the most serious hurdles that industry has faced and is still facing
in the path of achieving fully effective nuclear safety judgments and
consequent design and operating decisions in its Plowshare projects
ari ses from the unava i labi Iity of essentiaI perti nent data, wh ich are
presently held as classified information under AEC security rules.
t have been assured by the Commissioners that this problem is recognized
and that it is being placed in the hands of the Senior Responsible
Reviewers. Once again the Senior Reviewers step into the communica-
tions breach which security classification always generates. The
machinery which this voluntary Review Board provides sometimes seems
frustratingly slow, but whatever the cost in slowness, it is more than
paid for in the total objectivity which it achieves. Its performance
in the reactor field was outstanding, and I have every reason to believe
it will be equally so in the present instance.
Now where do we stand and what do we do next?
As far as the Plowshare program in general is concerned, it has
successfully emerged from the laboratory as far as scientific feasi-
bility is concerned and is ready for technological test and, hopefully,
for eventual full economic exploitation. At the moment we are actively
engaged in pilot studies in a number of important applications to
determine whether technological feasibility can be demonstrated. When
this has been accomplished the demonstration of economic feasibility
and the attainment of public acceptance will constitute the two factors
that still remain to be achieved before a full fledged if still infant
industry becomes a reality. Industry alone is capable of determining
economic feasibility. Indeed industrial "personality" being as distinct
a characteristic of an industrial organization as it is, what
may be economically feasible for one industrial entity may not be so
for another and vice versa. As a rgsult, the determination of economic
709
feasibility of any given operation is only fully valid for the organi-
zation that carries out the pilot tests and from them makes its own
determination of the feasibility of commercial operations. General
paper studies of economic feasibility may furnish illuminating guide
lines in determining whether a real test is worth the gamble or not
and, if it seems worth while, in planning the test. In the ultimate
result, however, generalized economic conclusions are likely to be of
no more than strictly marginal usefulness in any specific case.
It is also upon industry that the primary responsibility for
gaining public acceptance falls. With all other factors "go", it
is this latter factor, the public's willingness not only to "tolerate"
but actually to "buy" that determines whether there is to be a business
or not.
As the Plowshare program now stands we find ourselves in the
midst of an active joint government/industry program that, hopefully,
will result in the demonstration of the technological feasibility of a
number of promi sing applications and also prov i de vaIi d preIi mi nary
data on their economic promise. Once this has been accomplished
successfully, however, it is industry that must take the lead in under-
taking the essential next steps if the applications visualized are to
become a part of our private enterprise system, for it alone can decide
whether the probable commercial benefits to be gained justify the
investment required and the economic risks involved. Whether at this
point a given industrial unit will find a given project to be econom-
ically feasible will depend in part, as noted above, on the peculiar
capabilities of the interested organization itself and in part on the
applicability to the specific test situation of the complex of
technologies involved. With technological feasibility proven, there
is no major factor in this complex which is of greater importance not
only in determining the economic feasibility of the project but also
in determining industry's ability to gain public acceptance than that
concerned with the essential public health and safety activities
required and the associated costs of these activities. Thus for the
national Plowshare program to proceed with effectiveness and dispatch,
it seems to me three immediate measures are particularly needed.
First, in order to achieve any really lasting progress, a tenta-
tive health and safety code covering design criteria, operational
procedures, and end product specifications, should be set up in
standard regulatory form to serve as a trial set of rules for immediate
study and test use in the field operations involved in the up-coming
experimental projects. The necessary information is available in a
variety of forms and in a variety of places and is already being used
by the AEC and its various contractors in insuring the environ-
mental health and safety of all present nuclear detonations. What is
needed immediately is not new data but an exercise in the formulation
of the available data into an effective code of operating procedures
and an analysis of its operating consequences. Such a tentative code
would also serve as a concrete, "point-of-departure" statement in the
-------
development of the eventual regulatory code. The contemplated techno-
logical feasibility tests in the Plowshare program would provide an
exceI Ient means by which to evaluate its commerc ial applicability and
to guide its evolution toward regulatory status. Here joint action
is imperative if the resulting code is to meet the criteria outlined
earlier in this paper. However, under these circumstances joint action
's possible without prejudice because in this situation industry's
contribution can be confined to the presentation of a running analysis
of the strengths and weaknesses of the trial code in actual day-by-day
practice as it sees it. In addition, the validity of its account can
be weighed by concurrent government observation. The government
agencies can then modify the rules or not, as they see fit, in the
Ii ght of cI ear Iy observabIe operation a I exper i ence. It seems to me
that such an operation would promote the maxi mum of critical observa-
t i on on the part of all concerned, wouId reduce any tendency on the
part of anyone involved to resort to pressure tactics in order to
substi tute treasu red be Ii ef for dete rm i nab Ie fact, and wouId prov i de
the best possible opportunity to arrive at a regulatory code that
would not only insure the environmental health and safety of the public
but would also protect the public interest in the benefits that
successful exploitation of the Plowshare technology seems capable of
prov i d i ng.
Next, if the foregoing e-.ercise is to be meaningful within the
adjunct economic framework , the research and development aspects of
these upcoming tests with respect to health and safety investigations,
important as they most definitely are, must nonetheless be scrupulously
separated, at least costwise, from the necessary health and safety
operat ional activities as specified in the provisional code. Th i s I
rea I i ze can be ope rat i ona I Iy d i ff i cu11. Moreover, no one knows better
than I how cogent the cons i derat i ons of budgetary expedience are that
argue for burying these costs as unsc rambIeabIe shards in the total
heap of operational budgetary artifacts. In this case, nevertheless,
no matter how hard it may be to unscramble the activities and however
tough the resulting budgetary sledding may be, such budgetary integra-
tion simply cannot be allowed either within the governmental agencies
or within the participating industries. Honest, "unloaded" operat i ng
costs are an absolute must if the tests themselves are to be meaningful.
Finally, throughout each such exercise it must be recognized by
all concerned that time is one of the most significant factors in
determi n i ng the success or fa i Iure of any i ndustr i a I endeavor. The
present case is no exception. In the university or the research labor-
atory, we can usually downgrade the importance of time and do so safely.
This is neither a matter of sloth nor neglect of duty. It is just true
that in the laboratory cautious conservatism and the desire for perfec-
tion outweigh the need for speed. But this is not true of an industrial
activity. The time factor must be kept continually in mind, for delay
can spell defeat for a commercial activity just as surely as can direct
technological failure. Whenever a contemplated course of action will
impose delay, it is vitally important that the anticipated advantages
be weighed meticulously against the possible detriments lest the hope
of small gains inadvertently lead to the achievement of total ruin.
Here again the truly judicial sort of appraisal required can be realized
only to the extent that open communication and joint evaluation proce-
dures can be established.
In conclusion, I would simply like to reiterate what I at least
implied earlier. As far as the nation is concerned, all of u5 connected
one way or another with the Plowshare business are in the same boat.
As is true with all industrial activities dealing with hazardous
materials, the operations with which we are concerned do bear potentials
for serious damage to the public health and safety if carried out
blindly and without due regard for safe practice. Everyone involved
will reap the whirlwind if any of us sows the wind with some act of
thoughtlessness or negligence. We are all convinced that accidents
are made, they do not "just happen," and that proper safety practice
scrupulously followed by all not only can but will insure that they
will not occur. Each member of the team has his own role to play in
th i s ach i evement, and everyone i nvoIved is mutually dependent on the
others to attain the necessary total safety surveillance. It should
be noted also that the cornerstone of safety practice is quality of
performance not quantity of service. True safety can be smothered
within the overlap arising from an unbridled proliferation of safety
measures. I believe that we would all agree that a taut ship manned
with a crew notable for its high personal abilities and its skilled
teamwork rather than its astound i ng numbers, and equipped with every
essential tool of the nuclear safety trade can maintain a total
blockade on nuclear accidents and do so indefinitely. It is this
that constitutes our mutual goal.
In add it ion, if we p I ot our course in th i s way , we will a I so
have taken the necessary steps to assure that our second objective,
the realization of the benefits inherent in Plowshare technology,
will be attained if they prove to be technologically feasible and
economically attainable. If despite our best efforts commercial
utilization eludes us at the present, we will at least have the
satisfaction of knowing that our enterprise failed honestly at the
hand of a sympathetic and fully educated reason and that it was not
the inadvertent victim of a well-meaning but misguided emotion.
712
-------
ROLE OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
W. L. Oakley
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Germantown, Mary I and
ABSTRACT
Public health aspects of nuclear explosions fall into
two categories: (I) operational safety during the conduct
of the explosion; and (2) the regulation of by-product
material resulting from the explosion. By statute, the
AEC has the responsibility for both assuring operational
safety and regulating by-product material.
Current AEC safety and regulatory practices are des-
cribed; future problems or needs discussed; and relation-
ship to federal, state and local governments outlined.
It is with considerable trepidation that anyone presumes to
speak on the future role of a government agency in a hypothetical
future. As I am sure you are well aware, there are many factors that
bear on this subject, not the least of which are the prerogatives of
the U. S. Congress and the President in matters of executive branch
organization and reorganization. Thus, anyone has to speak on this
subject with certain qualifications.
I take some cheer, though, in the fact that one of the things
carved in stone in Washington is: "What is past is prologue." With
this in mind, I believe we can look at the present responsibility
and authority of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and their source
In the Atomic Energy Act and draw some conclusions about the probable
role of the AEC in the event that Plowshare technology finds large-
scale use.
For purposes of simplification, I would like it understood that
I am speaking about the role of the AEC solely in connection with the
use of Plowshare technology in the U. S. However, in light of our
obligations under Article V of the Non-Pro Iiferation Treaty, it is
clear that the AEC will also have a role in furnishing nuclear
explosion services in other countries.
713
The basic mission of the AEC is found in the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, as amended, where the AEC is charged with promoting, "the
development and utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes
to the maximum extent consistent with the common defense and
security and with the health and safety of the public." The Act
further charges the AEC with establishing "by rule, regulation, or'
order, such standards and instructions to govern the possession and
use of special nuclear material, source material and by-product
material as the Commission may deem necessary or desirable to
promote the common defense and security or to protect health or to
minimize danger to life or property."
It is also worth noting that the Atomic Energy Act stipulates
that subject to the paramount objective of assuring the common defense
and security, atomic energy should be directed "toward improving the
pub Ii c we I fare, i nereas i ng the standard of Ii v i ng, strengthen i ng free
competition in private enterprise, and promoting world peace."
Strengthening free competition in private enterprise has provided a
keynote that the AEC has faithfully followed in developing all the
peaceful uses for atomic energy, including Plowshare. Basically,
this provision has been taken to mean that in developing any partic-
ular use for atomic energy that the AEC role should be to continue
its development only until it can demonstrate the practicality of a
part i cuIar use. Once that has been done, the AEC has tried to
confine its role to the minimum necessary to meet its health and
safety or other responsibilities and to leave exploitation of the
developed technology to industry or other entities which have such
roles in our society.
To i mpIement the Act, a Commi ss i on is estabIi shed, composed of
five Commissioners appointed by the President, one of whom the
President designates as Chairman. The Commission is, of course, the
policy making body of the AEC. The agency the Commission heads is
then divided basically into two distinct and deliberately separate
areas, one under a General Manager and one under a Director of
Regulation. For purposes of understanding AEC roles, this distinction
is very important.
Under the General Manager are the operational and promotional
functions of the agency. These functions include research and devel-
opment programs, such as Plowshare, in which technology is developed
to be made avai lable to others.
The Director of Regulation is responsible to the Commission for
the licensing and regulatory responsibilities laid down in the Atomic
Energy Act. These include the licensing of reactors, special nuclear,
source, and by-product materials; the development of proposed standards
for radiation protection as well as corresponding rules and regulations;
the inspection of licensees for compliance; and the development and
administration of programs with the States in the field of licensing
and reguIation.
714
-------
Both the operational and regulatory sides of the AEC can be
expected to have a continuing role in Plowshare in the event of its
Iarqe-scale use.
Up to now, the operational side of the AEC has been concerned with
developing the technology for peaceful nuclear e-olosions, including
carrying out the necessary e-perirents to determine the feasibility ot
various applications, such as excavation, qas stimulation, qas storaae,
coppe r I each ing, and oil shale recove ry. In these experiments, such
as Gasbuqay, the AEC has been responsibly for insuring the health and
safety of the putt lie.
On the regulatory side of the AEC, in anticipation of the even-
tual commercial use of this technology, the staff has been looking at
the question of regulations for distribution of products such as
natural gas that will be produced with the aid of nuclear e•pIos ions.
Before proceeding further to tall- about a "future role, however,
I think it would be desirable to say a word about "present status" of
the Plowshare technology. As we see it, the program has entered a
transition period where some of the applications are approaching a
practical or "commercial" level. I stress the words, "entered,"
"some" and "approaching. None of the applications being developed
have as yet reached that stage; nor will they all reach it at the same
time. Some applications are more advanced than others and will there-
fore be ready for commercial use sooner.
Since Plowshare began some twelve vears ago, we have always
foreseen and have been working toward a situation t n which the
AEC will be providing a "commercial" nuclear explosion service for
"developed" activities. We have also recognized that because of
the uneven rate of development of the various applications, we would
continue to have an experimentaI program.
To provide for this future, Mr. Hosmer has introduced legis-
lation in the U. S. Congress, supported by other members of the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy, which would provide the AEC authority to
carry out detonations for other than strictly AEC research and develop-
ment purposes. This legislation also charges the AEC with making
provisions in its contracts, for the service, relating to the pro-
tection of health and minimization of danger to life or property.
Regard ing this future "commerc i a I " explosion service, I believe
it is clear as far as we can see that the legal requirement for the
government to maintain custody and control of +he nuclear explosive
wi I I continue. Therefore, the "cormercia I" nuclear explosion service
will consist of the design and fabrication of the nuclear explosive,
i ts trans portat i on to the empI acement site, supervision of its
emplacement, and its arming and firing. The service is aiso seen
as including appropriate technical reviews of the proposed detonation.
such as those necessary to fulfill AEC safety responsibilities connected
wItn the detonat i on.
In other applications, where we would still be conduct i ng
research and deveIopment experiments, I do not foresee the situation
being much different than it currently is.
In the foregoing discussion I hope I have conveyed my feeling
that, because the program has been evolving gradually in the commer-
cial direction, we do not foresee a dramatic, clear-cut transformation
or Plowshare. We expect a continuing evolution, not a revolution.
this is true not only for the technology, but also for the standardized
procedures Deeded *or comrrerciat operations in such areas as security,
i ndemn i f i cati on, s i te d i soosaI and health and safety. I believe
various "roles" will evolve just as the technology and procedures
evoIve.
Having set the stage for +he *u + ure, I would like to ^urn new +o
a more detailed discussion of how the future role of the AEC might
evo I ve for provi d t ng a "convnerc la!" nuclear explosion service, with
particular reference to the nealth and safeTy field.
Essentially, I believe the health and safety role of the AEC can
be expected to rema in the same as it is now. From an operational
standpoint, whether tne detonation is for experi menta I purposes or for
commerci al applications, the AEC wiil ijodoubtealy oe responsiDle for a
final evaluation to insure that steps are taken or available to avoid
any effects of the nuclear explosions materializing into a hazard to
Ii fe or property.
A very significant step toward handling the safety function in
a coTimecc i a I s i tuat i on has a I ready been taken in our current orccedjres
for work i nq w i th i ndustry in joint exper i ments. Starting with the
Ru1tson expe ri ment, the AEC has been expecting industry to coI Iect the
required data and to develop a comprehensive safety plan. In these
early join4" experiments with industry and until appropriate criteria
are developed and published, +he AEC is working closely with industry
to provide guidance in the development of these safety plans.
Accordingly, using the rationale that our current procedures
provide seme usefu1 clue to o'jr fu*-re activities, I'd like to sketch
briefly how we handle the safety function in joint experiments with
i ndust ry today.
First, I want to emphasize tnat safety, even in these joint
experiments where industry is assuming a greater role, is not simply
an added factor to be considered after an exper i ment is des i gned. 11
is not, so to speak, an appendage to the main body of an experiment.
Ratner, safety is an integral part of an experi ment, f rorn its i ncept i on,
through the planning, the selection of the proper explosive, its
716
-------
f i eId i ng and executi on. Th i s may seem to be an obv i ous poi nt, but we
so often hear safety spoken of as something apart from an experiment--
an afterthought to its actual design—that I believe it is essential to
emphasize that safety has to be bui It into any future Plowshare project
from the start, just as it is today in our experiments.
Currently, the Division of Peaceful Nuclear Explosives (DPNE) has
Plowshare nuclear experiments in conjunction with the scientific
laboratories. This procedure insures that all the experienced
uur r en i i y , i ne ui v i b i un or redc«TU i INUC i ear cxp i Ob i veb v ur^n > iidb
igned responsibility to the Manager of the Nevada Operations Office
00) to work with industry in the planning and execution of these
iwshare nuclear experiments in conjunction with the scientific
iauoratories. This procedure insures that all the experienced
organ t zat ions and techn i caI and operat i ona I resources that have
already safely detonated hundreds of nuclear explosions are available
in the planning and execution of joint industrial experiments. This,
o
a
of course, includes our hosts for this important symposium—the U. S.
Public Health Service.
As the detailed safety plan is developed setting forth the
monitoring and safety procedures, it is reviewed by Nevada's Effects
Eva Iuati on Di vi s i on and other participating agenc i es such as the U. S.
Public Health Service. Every effect of the explosion is analyzed in
terms of its potential for creating a hazard. Specific problems not
previously encountered can be referred to consultants from universities,
i ndustry, or other government agenci es hav i ng expert i se in the probI em
area.
In addition, plans for the explosion are reviewed by the Test
Evaluation Panel. This panel's primary responsibility is to ensure
that every feasible measure is taken to prevent inadvertent releases
of radioactivity. Extensive reviews are made by the panel of the
construction of the emplacement hole, the geology of the site, the
location of other holes in the vicinity and the stemming plan for the
emplacement hole.
After all the detailed planning, reviewing, cross checking and
double checking is completed, and the Manager of NVOO is satisfied
that the explosion can be conducted safely and that precautions
have been worked out to cope with any eventuality, no matter how
remote, execution authority is requested through DPNE from the AEC.
Final responsibility for assuring the safety of any nuclear detonation
resides, of course, with the AEC and the AEC must give specific
authorization for each detonation.
The AEC's safety responsibility does not end with authorization
of the detonation. Safety reviews continue up to the actual detonation.
At any time, up to the final second, an AEC Test Manager can stop the
test if any indication arises that it might create unacceptable hazards.
That briefly is the safety role the AEC plays in joint experi-
ments with industry. Let me add that we recognize the need for and
are developing some generalized guidance and criteria for radiation,
717
ground motion, and air-blast so that industry can know with some
certainty what will be required of it in connection with Plowshare
projects. Until formal criteria are available, however, we will con-
tinue to work closely with individual compan ies in providing them
guidance on these matters.
I might add at this point that the AEC also has a general re-
sponsibility for seeing that the data on which our reviews and
evaluations are based are continually reviewed and refined. In
order to fulfill this responsibility, the AEC supports an active
research and development effort in subjects related to safety. A
specific example of this general effort in the case of Nevada is its
Panel of Safety Consultants, composed of recognized authorities in
such f ie I ds as hydrology, geology, structure I eng i neeri ng, geo-
physics and soi I and rock mechanics. This Panel reviews the safety
program associated with nuclear testing and recommends what
directions new research should take.
In order to make this as comprehensive a commentary as possible,
I'd like now to touch briefly on the AEC's regulatory role in the
event of large-scale use of Plowshare technology.
The Atomi c Energy Act of 1954, as amended, p rov i des that the
AEC is responsible for governing "the possession and use of special
nuclear material, source material and by-product materia I...to
protect health or to minimize danger to life or property." By-
product material is defined as "radioactive material (except special
nuclear material) yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to the
radiation incident to the process of producing or utilizing special
nuclear material." As the radioactivity intermixed in products
recovered by using Plowshare technology would be "by-product"
material under this definition, it will be subject to regulation by
the AEC.
The AEC regulates by-product material by granting licenses or
exemptions from licenses where appropriate. That is, no person may
manufacture, produce, transfer, acqu i re, own, process, i mport or
export by-product material unless he has been granted a license or
an exemption by the AEC.
The regulatory process as it applies to the distribution of
products containing by-product material was discussed earlier in an
excellent paper by Dr. Western and Mr. Rogers—for those of you who
didn't hear it I urge you to obtain a copy and read it. Since they
covered the topic so thoroughly, I don't intend to go into detail
here.
Briefly, as Dr. Western and Mr. Rogers indicated, the distri-
bution of Plowshare-recovered products on a commercial scale involves
different factors than those considered by the AEC in its present
718
-------
reg j I a^'ons . Accord! ng I y, regu I at i ons , specifically addressed to
P'cwshare applications, will have to be developed. This is not to
say that our present regulations and experience wilt not provide some
usef aI qu i dance. Here aqa i n, as we found in our discussion of oper-
ational safety, and as Dr. Western gnd ".r. Rogers also pointed out, in
controlling the public distribution of other products contain i ng
radioactive material, there are many factors that have received
extensive consideration by the A£C that are also oerTinen* to the
development of regulations *or the control or distribution of Plow-
share products.
For example, the AEC !~-as exempted from license certain consumer
products, such as I (jwi ^ous wristwatch dials or compass need les, con-
taining by-product materiai. In those cases, it is simply not prac-
tical to regulate users of the product. Instead, the AEC has developed
criteria for determining whetner the product sufficiently limits its
potential for exposure to members of the public to ius+i*y exemption
of its possession and use from regulatory control. In these cases,
regulatory controls are applied to the producers, importers or
distributors of the product to assure that tr.e exemct product meets
the spec i f i ed requ i rements. The consume1" product exempt i on s i tuat i on
is similar to tne situation of Plowshare recovered products where
again it is not feasible to license directly all the users o* products,
Dr. Western and Mr. Rogers pointed out some of the consider-
ations that should be taken into account in developino suitable criteria
for distribution of Plowshare products. These include:
I. The contribution of the Piowshare-produced product to
the national we I fare.
2. The feas i b i I ' ty c* iimi t i ng rao ioact i ve contarn i nat i on
of the product, as released oy a licensed producer or
p rocessor, to accfiptab I *? I eve I 5 .
3. Possible and probaole exposures to individuals and
population groups as a result of exemption of the
product from regulatory control under specified
Condi t ions.
In addition to these general considerations, as in other areas of
regulation of radiation, the development of criteria and regulations for
distribution of Plowshare-recovered products will be gu;ded by the
recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Pro-
tect i on, the Nati ona I Counc iI for Rad i at i on Protect i on and Measurements,
and the Federal Radiation Council.
There are two other points that Dr. Western and Mr. Rogers
brought out that bear repeat rng in this brief summary of the i r
remarks. First, our regulatory staff does not believe it will be
appropriate or reasonable to estaolish a single limit applicable to
719
all situations. Second, it is likely that the regulatory controls that
will initially be imposed on distribution of Plowshare-recovered
products will differ from those at 3 later time when the technology
has oeen more fully developed, when pathways of exposure and the
affected population groups are better identified, and when the accuracy
of theoretical exposure models have been confirmed by field assessment.
In conclusion, think it can safely be said that the role of
the AEC in the event of large-scale use of Plowshare technology is
expected to evolve gradually with time and the changing state and
needs of the technology. We believe this is both administratively
w i se and technicaI Iy sound. We hope you agree.
720
-------
ROLE OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE
Raymond T. Moore
Bureau of Radiological Health
RockviIle, Maryland
ABSTRACT
The Public Health Service must assume the role of the
overall Public Health Coordinator, seeking to afford the high-
est level of health protection both to the nearby population
as well as to the more distant groups. Data will be given
relative to the limited experience the PHS has had in the re-
moval of populations from areas of suspected hazards. Problems
inherent in the evacuation of civilians of all ages 'Jill be
discussed.
The privilege one feels in being able to participate in an event of
this kind always is heightened when he also is a member of the sponsoring
organization. I trust my est fmat i on of the vaIue of th i s sympos i um is not
biased by my dual capacity. I am convinced that our efforts here have
been greatly needed.
have needed this symposium to help us lay the
I am going to talk about the role of the Public Health Service in the
large-scale use of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes. It will be-
come clear, as I proceed, that woven through this talk is a theme, which,
however often you may have heard it at this symposium or elsewhere,
deserves to be repeated. It is that the public health role in assuring
the protection of the health and safety of the public is absolutely
critical to the future of projects for the peaceful uses of nuclear ex-
plos i ves.
My symposium presentation will be made in two parts. The first
part, which is applicable to the detonation phase of Plowshare projects,
witI be devoted to a case-history narration of two events illustrating
public health protection on a large scale.
721
The second of the two principal pa^ts of this presentation is a d i s-
cussion of the role that the Public Health Service should have ir- evalua-
ting each Plowshare project trom a public health viewpoint both for the
operat ionaI and post-operat ionaI phases.
We will begin our narration by discussing the case histories of two
events which represent a rich source for guidelines to Plowsahre safety.
The events were quite different in many respects. In fact, in one of
them, ch I or i ne gas, rather than rad iat ion, was "the agent of potent i a I
heaIth impa i rment or, poss i bIy, death. In one very important respect,
however, the events were quite s mi Iar and it was because of this s im i-
larity that they were chosen for this talk. In both events neither seri-
ous injury nor death was caused by hazardous agents against which protec-
tive act ion was ta ken; yet, in each case, measures were adopted wh ich
represented something close to the ultimate in precautions for safety,
including the evacuation of hundreds of people.
Each act i on program, in other words, rather compIeteIy ref(ected the
Pub Iic HeaIth Serv i ce v i ewpc i nt of what one shouId do when conf ronted w i th
a potential for the impairment of human life on a large scale. One should
prepare for the worst. One should cover, or try to cover, every eventu-
al ity. One should recognize that public health protection can be exer-
cised only when adequate plans have been developed and tested. The
Salmon Event of Project Dribble was the detonation of a five-kiloton
nuclear device 2,720 feet underground in a formation known as the Tatum
Salt Dome r.ear Hattiesburg, Mississippi, in the fall of 1964. The PHS,
under a Memorandum of Understanding with AEC, had certain responsibilities
for the civilian popuI at ion who Ii ved adjacent to the act i ve test s i te.
These responsibilities were not different from those we exercise here at
Nevada.
I shall not detail all the preparations here. These included a great
amount of environmental surveillance, the coflection and analysis of
meteorological data, studies of milk from the area's dairy industry, the
establishment of communications networks for the rapid dissemination of
information to operating personnel and the public.
Most of our work with people was in conjunction with the evacuation
of 451 persons, representing 105 families, from portions of the off-site
area selected on the basis of fallout predictions for the anticipated
weather conditions and ground motion. We called on every family which
was to be evacuated. We knew the first and last names and, sometimes,
the nicknames of each member of every evacuee family. We knew who was
sick and what ailed them. We made almost daily checks on the condition
of the ill and the enfeebled elderly, knowing how this may change hourly.
Incidentally, the change may come in forms one may not always anticipate,
as when a married daughter in one family decided to come home to have her
baby just before the shot.
We knew how and where we were going to move each sick person, having
made arrangements with his physician and, when necessary, with hospitals.
tt was decided to have the sick moved not only by personnel trained in
722
-------
this work but by local people who would have moved the ill in this com-
munity in any emergency. This proved a wise decision, since the appear-
ance of fam iliar taces on mov i ng day had a caIm i ng ef feet on pat i ents.
It is necessary to emphasize, I think, that planning for the evacuation
and care of people must take into consideration the individual needs of
each evacuee.
Having decided to move sick people by ambulance in advance of a shot,
we soon had to make another decision, which was whether the sick were
physically able to make the trip back home. Before-and-aften conditions
are not always the same. Furthermore, persons moved into hospitals are
no longer home patients, but hospital cases. They are subject to hospital
feed i ng, care, and rout i ne and may be re I eased only with the consent of
their physicians or if they sign themselves out. One of our evacuees re-
mained in the hospital for ten days.
All evacuation expenses were borne by the project, including, of
course, payments for ambulance services, hospitaIization, and other
medical care. All evacuees were paid a specific sum per adult and a
specific sum per child for each day they were away from their homes.
Payments were made by check, and facilities were at hand for immediately
converting checks into cash.
Surveys made of people in advance of their evacuation and in con-
nection with the security of their properties provided excellent op-
portunities for the establishment of confidence, understanding, and
personal relationships which provided a solid basis for our public
re I at ions program - and very often, in fact, were the major content of
that program. During these discussions, people were individually informed
concerning all project activities, and sometimes were informed by us
before they had a chance to read about it in the i r newspapers, The vaIue
of these relationships cannot be overemphasized.
It cannot be overemphasized that the very best relationships must be
established between State and local police, other public safety personnel,
and the local medical community. People tend to have confidence, par-
ticularly in a relatively small community, in what they are told by the
police chief or sheriff's deputy or the president of the local medical
society. No outsider's communications skill can match a few reassuring
words from a local authority who people know and often may regard as
f r i end. The most s ignIf i cant non-techn tea I f i nd i ng produced by th i s
public relations program was the knowledge that a comprehensive off-site
radiological safety program can be conducted in a populated area fjrovided
the peopIe's_confJdence in the operation is established and maintained.
Operation Safeguard provides my second case history of a large-
scale action program for safety and public health protection. Six hundred
and one persons, all of them ill and aged, were evacuated in this instance.
The locale was Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The agent for death or health im-
pairment was chlorine gas". The time of peril for tens of thousands of
people ran for 64 days.
723
It started on September 10, 1965, when Hurricane Betsy, rampaging
through the Louisiana capital, tore a barge from its moorings and swept
it ten miles down the turbulent Mississippi River before it sank in
60 feet of water with a cargo of four 150-ton tanks of chlorine under
pressure and in liquid form. The end came on November 12 when the barge,
its cargo intact, was plucked from the Mississippi mud by a giant crane.
One hesitates trying to name all the public and private agencies in-
volved during the 64 days spent protecting people and in the salvage opera-
tions. They included the Army, Navy, the State Departments of Welfare and
Hospitals, and the Board of Health, the State Police, the Louisiana Civil
Defense Agency, area hospitals, the Red Cross, medical societies, and the
U. S. Public Health Service. Early in October 1965, the Departments of
Welfare and Hospitals of the State conducted a three-day survey of the
ill and the aged within an area extending five miles on all sides of the
sunken barge. Between 500 and 700 patients were estimated to be there.
In late October arrangements were made with the Fourth Army to send
two hospital trains with seven litter cars and one kitchen car each and
five litter buses for evacuation. Twenty ambulances and five buses were
supplied by the Department of Hospitals.
Around this period and for some time afterward, the fear grew that
a small leak might develop in a valve in one or more of the tanks. Had
this occurred, the resultant hydrochloric acid might have eaten away the
remainder of the valve and 150 tons or more of potentially lethal
chlorine would have been released, much of it blown as gas to the surface
of the river. It was against this eventuality that Public Health Service
personnel analyzed air and water samples approximately every 30 minutes
around the clock.
In add i t ion to planning for evacuat ion of the sick and the aged,
preparat i ons were made for a mass exodus of peopIe. Evacuat i on routes
were selected and maps were reproduced by newspapers and television
stations. Shelters were set up at strategic locations and 40,000 cots
and blankets were furnished from Public Health Service medical stocks.
It is unlikely that any potential, or even actual, disaster ever
resuI ted i n a commun i cat i ons system more compIete than the one in use at
Baton Rouge in the fall of 1965. To describe it would take more time
than we can allow. Its existence was a recognition of the paramount im-
portance of communications to efficient operations management, as well as
to keeping the public quickly and accurately informed of developments at
a I I times.
The first evacuation train left Baton Rouge on November 10; evacua-
tion was completed 22 hours later. Fear vanished the day the barge was
raised with its four chlorine tanks intact. With the exception of two
elderly heart patients who died en route and one too sick to be moved,
all evacuees were back home by November 14. As for others in the area,
schools and businesses were closed in Baton Rouge on barge-raising day,
724
-------
November 12, and people generally remained in their homes, as urged by
authorities, or left the city for the country upwind from the site.
One illustration, among many, of the degree of preparation at
Baton Rouge for a disaster which never occurred is provided by the first-
aid station custom-built from an obsolete X-ray bus by a Public Health
Service officer and Army soldiers. It was equipped especially to care
for chlorine gas and burn cases. A filtering device was available to
clear chlorine gas out of the station and replace it with pure air. Four
pressure inhalators were available for the administration of drugs against
lung congestion which is the worst effect of the gas. Drugs and ointment
were on hand for the treatment of chlorine burns of the skin and eyes.
But there were no chlorine emergencies. There were colds and minor cuts
and bruises, fractures of fingers or toes. The most serious injury was
a broken leg.
Although the examples provided by the Baton Rouge incident and the
Mississippi nuclear Project Dribble are different in many respects, never-
theless they reflect an off-site condition of the kind we can assume might
develop as Plowshare projects become more widespread. In each case, large
numbers of people were under conditions of possible exposure to agents
potentially hazardous to health.
As long as these events are experimental, we are going to have to
program safety and health protection for Plowsahre as though we expected
the most improbable event to occur. The public must know that safety
preparations for possible events have been made or the public will not
condone, much less support, efforts to perfect Plowshare technology.
The second part of my presentation concerns the role of the Public
Health Service in evaluating each Plowshare project from a public health
viewpoint. It is recognized that the conduct of a Plowshare nuclear
detonation is an AEC responsibility by statute. The AEC controls the
execution of all phases of the operation involving the nuclear device,
Including site preparation, emplacement, detonation, disposition of
radioactive substances, and health and safety. In my judgment, it is the
responsibility of the Bureau of Radiological Health, i.e., the PHS, to
make a public health evaluation of each Plowshare project. This evalua-
tion should relate to the operational aspects'of the actual event, and
the production, handling, storage, distribution, and use of the resulting
products. The review and evaluation should be initiated as soon as suf-
ficient preliminary information is received and developed. As part of
the evaluation, the known as well as the unknown information relating to
public health would be delineated. The technical evaluation will encom-
pass the usual operational considerations for the immediate off-site area
at the time of detonation, as well as considerations of the long-term and
long-distance implications such as the distribution of consumer products
resulting from certain nuclear explosive applications.
It is the mutual responsibility of industry of several States and
Federal agencies to insure that any resulting radiation exposure from
Plowshare projects is kept as low as practicable and within acceptable
725
limits. At this time it is mast appropriate to discuss the applicable
gu i dance for rad i at ion exposure. In my judgment, th i s sympos i urn contr i b-
utes to a free exchange of ideas and information that will be helpful as
we attempt to resolve problems in this area. Because of the uncertainties
in the distribution of radioactivity in the final consumer product, it is
extremely important that both Federal and State Health agencies be knowl-
edgeable as to the sources of radioactivity that may result in an,exposure
to the popuI at i on. In order to carry out the i r respect i ve respons i b iIi t ies,
public health officials should be kept currently and fully informed of
proposed projects and resulting releases of radioactivity.
The basic guidance for public health consideration of radiation ex-
posure is that promulgated by the Federal Radiation Council (FRO and
directed by the President to be used by Federal agencies. The FRC was
established in 1959 by Public Law 86-373 to provide a Federal policy on
human radiation exposure. A major function of the Counci I is to " . •
advise the President with respect to radiation matters, directly or in-
directly affecting health, including guidance for all Federal agencies
in the formulation of radiation standards and in establishment and exe-
cution of programs of cooperation with States . . . ,"
The Radiation Protection Guide (RPG), which is defined by the FRC as
the radiation dose which should not be exceeded without careful considera-
tion of the reasons for doing so for the general population, is 0.5 rem/yr
whole body dose for an individual. This guide is applicable to normal
peacetime operations and is not intended to apply to radiation exposure
resulting from natural background or the purposeful exposure of patients
by practitioners of the healing arts. There can, of course, be quite
different numerical values for the RPG, depending upon the circumstances.
As an operational technique, where the individual whole body doses
are not known, a suitable sample of the exposed population should be
developed whose protection guide for annual whole body dose wilt not
exceed 0.17 rem per capita per year.
The Radioactivity Concentration Guide (RCG) is defined as the con-
centration of radioactivity in the environment which is determined to
result in whole body or organ doses equal to the RPG. The use of RCG's
is an operational technique which provides a means to evaluate potential
human exposure based on measurement of environmental concentrations of
radioactivity. An RCG must be based on an RPG and is applicable only
for the circumstances under which the use of the corresponding RPG is
appropriate.
Effective radiation control measures for any health hazard will
require the establishment of radiological safety procedures and guidance
for health agencies to reduce any potential hazard to an individual or
the public to as low a degree as practical. Establishment of these control
procedures requires value judgments in which the potential risks of the
hazard are weighed against the benefits to be derived. Because of this
need, the health agency must have sufficient technical information related
to the problem to derive workable control procedures. This is needed along
726
-------
with scientific knowledge concerning the biological effect of the ionizing
radiation to adequately evaluate the magnitude of the hazard under the
given condition. All agencies involved in the peaceful nuclear explosives
program must understand that this guidance is needed to assure protection
of the individual and the public and to permit anticipated benefit to the
public.
Other groups concerned with population risk should be consulted to
assist in the review of all factors which may affect the impact of the
guidance on the consumer.
Concentration guides provided by the NCRP and ICRP, supplemented by
guidance provided by the FRC, are applicable to total exposure of the
public to radiation from all sources (except medical uses and natural
background), and do not provide specific guidance for exposures to indi-
vidual sources. Appropriate guides for n particular application of nuclear
energy should be based on the following considerations: (1) Activities
resulting in man-made exposure should be authorized only under conditions
for which it is determined that the benefits outweigh the risk; (2) Within
these conditions, radiation exposures should be limited to such levels that
the reduction in risk associated with any further reduction would not
justify the total effort.
It is my understanding that radiation limits for Plowshare Projects
will be established by the AEC's regulatory group under the procedures
set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations. However, the limits for
commercial products associated with Plowshare applications may not be
developed until the projects change from an experimental to an industrial
application phase. Further, it is recognized that the FRC has applied
general guidance for these applications. For instance, the present AEC
position regarding regulatory limits for natural gas applications limits
is as follows: —
"The AEC has not developed regulatory limits which are
directly applicable to the gas storage application and
it is expected that the results of the experiment would
be used as a partial basis for developing such limits.
These limits may be some small fraction of the FRC guides
or of the recommendations of the ICRP and NCRP. After
satisfying the experimental requirements, any commercial
use of storage gas from the chimney containing radio-
activity would be subject to appropriate regulatory ap-
proval. Such approval would be granted only after a
determination has been made that use of the gas would
not result in a significant increase in the radiation
exposure normally received by the general public."
It seems clear to me also that there can be no planning compatible
with a given use of explosives without close cooperation between the
.developers of the explosive device and public health authorities. No
device ought to be brought to a mature state of development by nuclear
727
specialists working independently. If the public health is to be adequately
protected, input from public health specialists must be accepted at an
early stage.
Looking back over the Plowshare experience, I believe the capability
probably is available to insure that nuclear explosives can be used for
peaceful purposes, on a large scale, either without human and environmental
exposure or with exposure at acceptable levels. As yet this capability
has not been demonstrated. Nor do I think that the American public fully
believes the capability exists. I trust, however, that the time may be
nearing when we can agree, from the public health standpoint, that Plowshare
is ready to move forward as a tool for progress. This, ladies and gentlemen,
is the goal we seek.
728
-------
ROLE OF A STATE HEALTH DEPARTMENT
IN AN UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPERIMENT
Thomas M. Gerusky
Department of Health
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania
ABSTRACT
When Project Ketch was first announced to
Pennsylvania state officials, the Department of
Health, under its legal responsibility to protect
the health of the citizens of the state, was quick
to realize that a thoroughf independent review of
the proposal was indeed necessary. Although the
project was terminated by the sponsoring company
before on-site preliminary evaluation work was
begun, it is believed that the Department 's ap-
proach was sound and practical. This study and
the planned joint effort of the state and the
Bureau of Radiological Health will be discussed
in detail.
We, in Pennsylvania State Government, were involved
for approximately two years in a proposed Plowshare experi-
ment entitled Ketch. Our experiences, our reactions, and
the reaction of the public sector is important to discuss,
especially if future Plowshare programs are to succeed in
the Northeast. This is that story.
Project Ketch is a joint proposal by the Columbia Gas
Corporation and the Atomic Energy Commission to create an
underground gas storage reservoir with nuclear explosives.
Since gas storage is essential in providing adequate service
at reasonable cost during times of peak demand, it would
seem appropriate to provide such storage capacity in areas
removed from the gas fields where demand was increasing beyond
the present capacity of the gas delivery system.
The experiment should naturally be carried out in geo-
logical formations which would provide adequate safety and
729
still fulfill the requirements for adequate gas storage.
Pennsylvania seemed to be an ideal location for such an
experiment because of its location in the rapidly growing
Northeast and its tight geological structure.
Early in 1966, we were officially informed that the
Columbia Gas System Service Corporation and the Atomic
Energy Commission were seriously considering Pennsylvania
as a site for the Ketch experiment. My first reaction,
and I think the reaction of many state officials, was one
of disbelief. A nuclear device being exploded in our back-
yard? Unbelievable! Nevada, with its sparse population
and open spaces, was a far cry from the populated Northeast.
However, after we recovered from the initial shock and
began to consider the situation in more detail, we all re-
alized that it was not our responsibility to react from
emotion, but only from cold, hard, fact and reason.
What were our responsibilities? Only one--to evaluate
the experiment from the standpoint of public health and
safety and approve or disapprove of the proposal. But im-
mediately, many other obvious questions arose. What were
the facts? What kind of information did we need to evaluate
the project? Where would we get the expertise to evaluate
information we did receive? And, although it was never really
raised in public, one question continued to gnaw in the backs
of our minds . . "Could the Atomic Energy Commission be
relied upon to conduct the experiment in the safest possible
manner, especially when they were also attempting to promote
the use of nuclear explosions by showing that such projects
could be conducted at reasonable costs?" Did the AEC have
a review mechanism similar to that which has worked so ef-
fectively in the reactor licensing program? What was this
mechanism?
Very little information was immediately available on
the safety aspects of underground nuclear explosives. The
literature was almost devoid of good references. How much
of the information was classified and could we gain access
to it?
Meetings were held with representatives of the various
state agencies which would have to be involved. The list
is longer than one would imagine. Besides the Department
of Health, it included:
1. The Department of Forests and Waters, which was
responsible for leasing the use of state lands;
2. The Department of Mines and Mineral Industries ,
which has responsibilities for gas and oil well
drillings;
730
-------
3. The State Geological Survey, which had interest
in the information to be obtained during the eval-
uation phase of the project;
4. The State Fish and Game Commissions were involved.,
because of possible effects on the wildlife;
5. The Public Utility Commission, which regulates
the local gas industry; and
6. The Department of Commerce, because of its role
in the developmental aspects of the atomic energy
industry.
In January of 1966, former Governor Scranton signed into
law the Atomic Energy Development and Radiation Control Act.
This law provided, and I think rightly, that the developmental
aspects of atomic energy be placed in the existing Pennsyl-
vania Department of Commerce and that regulatory activities
be placed in the Department of Health. It.also provided for
an Advisory Committee to assist both Departments in the ad-
ministration of their respective endeavors. These nine com-
mittee members were appointed by the Governor, confirmed by
the Senate, and represented the varied interests in and as-
pects of atomic energy, and included individuals from indus-
try, labor, education, medicine, radiology, health physics,
and related sciences.
The Committee is directed to make recommendations to
the Department of Health, review rules and regulations, and
furnish such technical advice as may be required on matters
relating to the control of radiation.
The Ketch proposal was discussed in detail, and as more
and more information became available, the Governor and the
Departments requested a complete evaluation of the project
including appropriate recommendations. A special "Ketch"
subcommittee was established by the Advisory Committee to
provide additional scientific expertise in areas which were
not covered by individuals on the main committee. It was
chaired by an expert in nuclear engineering and presently
the Dean of Engineering at The Pennsylvania State University.
Additional experts in the areas of geology, geophysics, and
underground engineering were appointed to the Ketch subcom-
mittee .
Besides numerous contacts in Pennsylvania with officials
of the AEC Plowshare Program, the Lawrence Radiation Labora-
tory, the Public Health Service, the AEC Nevada Operations
Office, and the gas company, a group of representatives of
the subcommittee and the various departments visited the
731
Nevada Test Site and the Nevada Operations Office to^discuss
the project in greater detail and to have some additional
specific questions answered. At no time were we told that
the information was not available.
We were also invited to the Gasbuggy symposium, and I
received a personal invitation to work with the Public Health
Service's environmental monitoring team during the briefing
sessions and during the actual Gasbuggy detonation. There
was no question that an effective rapport was being estab-
lished between the Federal and State Governments to assure
that joint decisions concerning the safety of the project
could be made.
The "Ketch" subcommittee had, in the meantime, completed
its work on reviewing the proposal. The report was accepted
and forwarded to the Governor and the Departments concerned.
The report and its recommendations are indeed the most sig-
nificant single document from Pennsylvania on this project.
One of the problems arose from the method in which the
"Project Ketch" proposal was submitted. The proposal was
separated into five distinct phases as follows:
1. Site evaluation and confirmation
2. Execution
3. Chimney environment measurements
4. Storage facility development
5. Operation
The Phase I portion of the project included exploratory
drilling, logging and pressure testing, safety surveys, per-
meability and high pressure tests, and some surface construc-
tion. The Advisory Committee concerned itself primarily
with a technical review of Phase I only, since much of the
information needed to verify the safety of the project could
only be obtained during that phase. Its conclusions and
recommendations can be summarized as follows:
The committee believed that adequate details concern-
ing the test work to be done during Phase I could be
established by the AEC and the gas company as the
Phase I portion proceeded. Therefore, the committee
recommended that approval be given to proceed with
this phase only provided:
1. That the phase would encompass all data and
calculations necessary to confirm the site
-------
acceptability and that certain questions
raised in the complete report would receive
adequate attention.
2. That an opportunity would be provided at the
end of Phase I for an effective safety re-
view by the AEC, utilizing the Panel of
Safety Consultants, the Test Evaluation
Panel, the Test Manager's Advisory Panel,
and for Commonwealth representatives to
review the findings before aDproval would
be granted for Phase II.
3. That there would be assurance of appropriate
compensation for any property damage or un-
likely personal risks.
To quote directly from the report:
"Commonwealth approval to proceed with Phase II
and the subsequent phases of the project should
be given after the Phase I evaluation, if it is
found that a favorable decision by the AEC was
based on an adequate and competent safety review
to ascertain that the test would be accomplished
without injury to people, either directly or in-
directly, and without acceptable damage to the
ecological system and natural and man-made
structures."
Governor Shafer, in letters to Chairman Seaborg and the
Columbia Gas Company, granted Commonwealth approval to pro-
ceed with the first phase of the project, listing the stip-
ulations of the Advisory Committee's recommendations.
The project, as many of you know, is now in a state of
limbo, or in one of the other states in proximity to Penn-
sylvania. Why was the project postponed?
One of the first recommendations made during discus-
sions with the parties involved, was that an effective, large
public information program be established jointly by the
AEC, the Commonwealth, and the gas company. It was obvious
that the reactions of individuals in the public would be
similar to our first reaction. Pennsylvania has been one
of the leaders in the atomic energy field. There are now
13 operating or planned power reactors in the state. There
has been no adverse public response to these projects, mainly
as a result of an effective long-term public relations pro-
gram. Nuclear reactors are an accepted risk. However,
nuclear explosives are not.
733
The response to our recommendation for a joint public
information program went unheeded. Yes, public forums were
held in the area; many man-miles were traveled by represen-
tatives of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, the AEC, the
PHS, and the Columbia Gas Company to explain the project in
detail to all interested groups. But once the adverse public
reaction had begun, primarily out of fear, it was impossible
to stop. Citizens groups were formed, signatures were ob-
tained, and vocal critics of the project garnered much news-
paper space.
The following slides, which were made from selected
newspaper headlines, can tell the story much better than
I can.
The title of this presentation is "The Role of a State
Health Agency in an Underground Nuclear Experiment. ' Our
role in this experiment ended rather abruptly, but it should
have been two-fold--to protect the public health, naturally,
but also to inform the public of that role and the steps
we were taking to carry it out.
However, we, as a health agency, should not be placed
in a position of promoting the project. This is the respon-
sibility of those agencies and companies which are proposing
it. I strongly urge that the experience in Pennsylvania
not be quickly forgotten, but that an immediate effort be
made by the Atomic Energy Commission to establish an effec-
tive Plowshare informational campaign. With proper direc-
tion, such a program could have stopped the groundswell be-
fore it became unmanageable, and would have allowed for a
proper and unemotional evaluation of the safety of the pro-
ject.
What did we all learn? A real lesson in the potent
power of public opinion;
-------
QUESTION FOR THOMAS M. GERUSKY
From P. R. Frederick:
You have implied informed public opinion will support Plowshare pro-
jects. Do you have evidence of this? It seems unrealistic to me
based upon Utah's attempted fluoridation of water supply experience!
Very formidable and we I I-organized opposition developed.
ANSWER:
We have information that an uninformed public will react the opposite
way. I think an informed public reacted the proper way in the reactor
field. I think it can react properly in this field also.
735
STATE PARTNERSHIP IN ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH
AND SAFETY PHASE OF PLOWSHARE PROJECTS
S i mon Ki nsman, Ph.D.
California State Department of Public Health
Berkeley, CaIi forn i a
ABSTRACT
When experiments on projects involving Plowshare
devices are conceived, the state chosen for the project
should be invited to participate in planning the health
and safety aspects and be prepared to actively partici-
pate in the D-Day phase as well as the post-detonation
activity.
In California nuclear science technology and compe-
tence have preceded the social acceptance and use of
nuclear devices for large scale Plowshare projects.
However, the environmental surveillance program of the
Bureau of Radiological Health in the State Department
of Public Health has established an operative program
which will be ready and able to function as an active
participant or in a support role in environmental
health phases of nuclear projects scheduled in the
State.
A description of our present program will be
included in this paper. This will enable the attendees
and readers to realize capabilities which will be
activated for participation and/or support roles dur-
ing Plowshare activities in the State or in a neih-
boring state if the need arises.
neigh-
The people who planned this seminar prepared a logical outline
for the entire program and then requested speakers to cover the
respective subjects. The theme of this portion of the seminar was
the "role of the state," with the previous speaker covering the
underground engineering and this paper covering the role of the
state in cratering. I was not familiar with the cratering exper-
iments and consequently suggested an alternate title, which is a one
sentence precis of this paper, namely, that the state in which the
cratering experiment is being conducted should be an integral partner
736
-------
in the project, with the neighboring states being alerted, informed,
and ready to exercise their role in case the scheduled project did not
proceed as planned. In each state, the environmental health phase is
naturally handled by its health department.
Background Information or How it was in California
On May 28, 1957, the AEC detonated the "Boltzman" nuclear device
at 4:55 a.m., at the Nevada Test Site. About 6:00 p.m. the same day a
portion of the cloud from this shot swung northwest across California
through the area north of Lake Tahoe. It encountered localized
thunderstorms and the resulting rainout gave measurable levels of
radiation in scattered localities. Both the California Disaster
Office and AEC monitoring teams checked these areas on May 28 and 29
and reported that the rad i ati on I eve Is found were not dangerous.
However, in view of the State Health Department's responsibility
for the health of the public in general and the safety of domestic
water supplies in particular, a field survey to get firsthand detailed
information was deemed desirable.
S i nee in format ion regard ing the exact path of the radioactive air
mass was not available to the Department, the northeast quarter of the
State lying north of U. 5. Highway 40 and east of U. S. Highway 99 was
selected for study. The plan followed was that most of the major high-
ways were to be traversed with gamma survey instruments. Water, mud,
and snow samples were to be taken where background radiation indicated
fallout had occurred or where possible concentration of radioactivity
could have occurred (i.e., water reservoirs, stock ponds, other water
catchment areas).
Due to the magn itude of the task, assistance in mon i tor r ng and
sample collection was requested from Butte, Plumas, and Shasta County
Health Departments. Field monitoring instruments were furnished by the
California Disaster Office. RadioanaIyses of the samples were done by
the Sanitation Laboratory using the California Disaster Office Radio-
logical Laboratory truck which was assigned to the Division of Labora-
tories . The truck was moved to Qu i ncy for th i s study. Seventy samples
were collected for analysis and approximately 1,400 miles of highway
were monitored with gamma survey meters.
Of the 70 samples only 3 (the snow samples at Donner Summit, Gold
Lake and Lassen Summit) had significant radioactive content. None of
these snow banks drained directly to domestic water reservoirs. Water
from the reservoirs supplying the Quincy water system showed barely
measurable amounts of radioactivity. These findings were not considered
to be of public health significance due to the small size of the
reservoi rs (w i th a h i gh fIow-through rate) and the rap i d decay charac-
teristics of fallout radioactivity.
A report of these findings was included in the July report to the
Governor's office. The comment that radioactivity in the three snow
737
samples was above the limit considered "safe for continuous ingestion"
received wide publicity and resulted in several follow-up inquiries from
residents and recreational users of the Sierra Nevada area.
Because of the i n tense pub I i c i nterest , and in order to ver i f y
the earlier conclusions, a second survey was made August 7 through. 9.
Lassen Volcanic National Park, Lake Almanor, Quincy, Gold Lake, Beck-
worth, Donner Summit, and the highways between these areas were checked.
Thirty samples were collected and approximately 600 mi les of highway
were mon i to red w i th gamma survey meters . No background rad i at i on was
found above norma I nor were any of the water samp I es found to conta i n
measurab I e amounts of rad i oact i v i ty . The on I y snow samp le obta i nab I e
was from a small residual snow bank in Lassen Park. The radioactivity
found was about the same as that found on the first sampling.
These studies were executed under a 1955 law on radioactive
wastes which states, "No person shall bury, throw away, or in any
manner dispose of radioactive wastes in such a manner as to endanger
the lives or health of human beings.1
In the first calendar quarter of the fol lowing year the U.S.S.R.
was conducting atmospheric tests of nuclear devices. On March 29, 1958,
the California State Department of Agriculture collected some samples
of leafy vegetables which were submitted to Dr. Hardin Jones, of the
Donner Laboratory at the University of California, Berkeley, for
radi oassay . The rad ioact i ve content of twe I ve samp les of el even k i nds
of leafy vegetables collected from nine different localities in the
North Coastal, San Joaquin and Sacramento Valleys of California
ranged from 1970 to 41,800 disintegrations per minute for the unwashed
vegetables. The radioactivity of the washed vegetables was much lower
than that found on the unwashed samples. The radioactivity was charac-
terized as mixed fission products.
In January 1959, a paper entitled, "An Analysis of the Public
Health Implications of the Proposed Tracer Study of Grcund Water Replen-
i shment Ope rat i ons in Los Ange les County" was subm i tted by the Un i ver-
s i ty of California, Berkeley, to the California State Department of
Public Health. The introduction in this paper states, "The University
of California, Berkeley, has presented a research proposal to the Los
Angeles County Flood Control District concerned with the application
of tritium to ground water tracing. The immediate objective of the
study is to determine the water users benefiting from reclamation
operations in the Upper Canyon Basin of the San Gabriel River. The
long-range interest of the District is to confirm the extent to which
the water reclamation program in the various basins of the San Gabriel
River is effective in replenishing the ground water bodies of the Main
Basin and within and downstream of the Montebello Forebay. The primary
interest of the Sanitary Engineering Research Laboratory of the Univer-
sity is to estab lish the utility of triti urn as a means of tracing
underground waste travel. A further interest is the general phenomenon
of hydrau I i c d i spers i on in f I ow through porous med i a. "
738
-------
The second paragraph of the Conclusions states, "The hazard of
the investigation to the consumer in Los Angeles County has been
demonstrated to be insignificant. The benefits of the investigation
to the consumer are highly significant. A more economical develop-
ment of the regional water resources will result in direct material
benefits to all inhabitants. A better understanding of pollution
movement in underground formations wilt be achieved with attendant
improvements in water quality. The study is an opportunity for
nuclear science to aid in solving a common problem in Southern Cali-
fornia, that of a rapidly increasing demand for water and clearly
limited water sources."
On January 23, 1959. the State Board of Public Health adopted a
"Policy of California State Department of Public Health on Radio-
active Tracer Studies," which contained six criteria. The proposed
tritium tracer study met the six criteria but never materialized.
It was rejected by adverse local public opinion.
California Environmental Surveillance Program - 1969
The essential features of this program are a radiochemical
laboratory and a representative sampling network. The environmental
media sampled are (I) Air, (2) Rain, Fallout, and Soil, (3) Domestic
Water, (4) Sewage, (5) Milk, and (6) Diet. The samples are collected
by 105 volunteer members of our local health departments. The loca-
tion of the sampling stations and the number of stations for each of
the six media sampled are shown in the following Figures I through 6.
Table I is a summary of the environmental surveillance sampling and
analyses.
These facilities and networks were tested and described in 1967
in an article by Amasa Cornish and George Uyesugi entitled, "Detection
of Elevated Fallout Levels in California, January 1967." The abstract
of the article which was published in Radiological Health Data and
Reports, Vol. 9, Number 9, September 1968, is quoted:
"California received a heavy fallout of radioactive
debris beginning 4.5 days after a foreign nuclear device
was detonated in the atmosphere on December 27, 1966.
Highest air particulate levels occurred in Berkeley and
Sacramento. Values obtained after allowing 3 days decay
were 98 pCI/m^ of air for both. Other air sampling
stations had lesser amounts of fallout and Fresno
received essentially no fallout. All milksheds in
California were contaminated to some extent with
radioactive iodine. Del Norte and Humboldt milk with
397 and 280 pCi/liter, respectively, contained the
highest concentrations of iodine-131. These values
were estimated to result in thyroid doses to children
of 33 and 23 mrads, respectively. The apparent half-
life for iodine-131 in the environment was calculated to
CALIFORNIA
AIR NETWORK
LOS ANGEILE
0BARSTOW
SAN BERNARDINO
14 STATIONS
SAN
739
FIGURE 1
740
-------
EUREKA
CRESCENT CITY
ALTURAS'
(REDDING
OUINCY
FORT BRAGG
C
, POTTER VALLEY
SANTA ROSA
CALIFORNIA
RAIN, FALLOUT, & SOIL
NETWORK
CSSLI
'SACRAMENTO
BERKELEY UE yiNING
FRESNO
DEATH VALLEY
C SOIL ONLY
SAN LUIS OBISPO
0BAKERSFIELD NEEDLES
SANTA BARBARA
£ SAN BERNARDINO
I LOS ANGELES
23 SOIL STATIONS 5A-N
21 RAIN & FALLOUT STATIONS
FIGURE 2
7-11
CALIFORNIA
DOMESTIC WATER
NETWORK
38 PURVEYORS
FIGURE 3
it'/
-------
CALIFORNIA
SEWAGE NETWORK
BERNARDINO
ZNGELBSH-A. COUNTY'
•*%*ORANGE COUNTY
FIGURE 4
74 7j
CALIFORNIA
MILK NETWORK
MENDOCINO
10 MILKSHEDS
FIGURE 5
M.I
-------
KRESCENT CITY
>EUREKA SUSANVILLE
REDDING • •
OUINCYA
•SACRAMENTO
(BERKELEY
CALIFORNIA
DIET STUDY
BISHOP!
FRESNO
SAN LUIS OBISPO
BAKERSFIELD
NEEDLES 4
SANTA BARBARA
0 SAN BERNARDINO
LOS ANGELES •
20 SAMPLE POINTS
;
BRAWLEY I
>}&S- •*
TABLE I
» SUMMARY
ENVIRONMENTAl SURVEILLANCE
SAMPLING AND ANALYSES
Media
Sampled
Air
Fal lout
Water
Sewage
Mi Ik
Diet
Snow
Specials
SampJ i ng
Stations
14
21
50
20
10
20
12
12
Samp 1 ing
Frequency
Dai lyj
Quarter I y2
Month 1 y
Monthly
Monthly4
Quarterly^
5/Year
I/Year
Yearly
Samp les
4,224
92
600
480
120
80
60
240
5,896
Tota 1 s
Ana lyses
6,276
368
904
960
360
520
60
480
9,928
I. Gamma scan for 8 isotopes reported as one (I) analysis above.
2. 20 stations sampled quarterly; the Berkeley station is sampled
month|y,
3. 10 stations sampled on work days only; 4 stations sampled every
day.
4. Does not take into account increased sampling for continuing
atmospheric nuclear tests.
5. From 1960-1964 the individual foods composing a diet were sampled.
In 1964 the diet sampling replaced the food sampling.
FIGURE 6
-------
be 3.2 days.
tion to our radiological surveillance network, California
activities in its Bureau of Radiological Health, namely,
iation Control Program which consists of Registration and
X-Ray Generators, the facilities in which they are
educational assistance to the operators of this equip-
The Radioactive Material Control Program which includes
consists of a Licensing and Inspection group as required
Agreement. However, California and several other states
rol of Radium which has never been regulated by a Federal
In addi
has two other
(I) The X-Rad
Inspection of
operated, and
ment; and (2)
Radium. This
by AEC/States
exercise cont
agency .
The State also has considerable manpower and equ i pment i n the
State Disaster Office, including (I) radiation measuring and cali-
bration devices and facilities and (2) a statewide communication net-
work tied in with the State Highway Patrol and the Police and Sheriff's
Offices. Last year the State Department of Public Health and the State
Di s aster Of f i ce si gned a memorandum of understanding for cooperat i ve
part i ci pat ion in hand I i ng emergency i nci dents i nvol vi ng rad ioact i ve
materials. This cooperative activity includes the authority to im-
pound or quarantine the radioactive material involved for the pro-
tection of the public. We have had two training courses recently on
management of incidents involving radioactive material. These were
sponsored by the State Health Department and the U. S. Public Health
Serv i ce . In revi ew i ng th i s i n format i on , \ t becomes obv i ous that the
State has a rather complete radiation protection program.
Role of State Health Department in P I owsh_a_re_ Projects
With such equipment, facilities and competence available in a
number of states—the Utah State program having been described in detail
to you yesterday — the states are ready to assume the responsibility, in
the Plowshare Program, granted them under the Federal Constitution,
which is the protection of public health.
This role is beautifully described by Herman E. Hi I leboe, M.D.,
DeLamar Professor of Public Health Practice, Columbia University,
School of Public Health and Administrative Medicine, State of New York,
i n Chapter III, pages 23-31 , of the Rad i olog i ca I Hea I th Program Gu i de
prepared by the Southern Interstate Nuclear Board for (and published by)
the U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health
Service, April 8, 1966. Page 29 of this reference shows the respective
roles of the Public Health Service and State Health Agencies in Radio-
logical Health, including the degrees of responsibility of each agency.
The legality of the responsibility of the state in protecting the
public from radiation exposures was stated well by Mitchell Wendell,
Ph.D., L.L.B, Counsel for the Council of State Governments, Washington,
D. C., in Chapter II, Legal Aspects of Federal-State Relations in Radi-
ation Protection, Radiological Health Program Guide referenced above.
747
The following is a quotation from pages 19 and 20 of this reference.
"Federal-State relations in radiation protection from
nuclear sources is a subject of peculiar import because of
the unusuaI ci rcumstances that attended the first harnessing
of nuclear power, and because the revolutionary nature of
th i s still new force inspires awe. Log i caI Iy and practi caI ly
it is clear that radiation protection from whatever source
is merely a specialized phase of public health and safety
regulation. Yet, the activities and responsibilities of the
Atomic Energy Commission and of the military establishment
undeniably give the Federal Government a special interest.
So far the major direction of Federal and State action
has been to clarify responsibilities and relationships as
much as possible, and to fit the health and safety aspects
or radiation protection into existing patterns of State
and I oca I admi nistration and Iawmaki ng as rapidly as
practicable. Any other course would raise confusing
questions of law and practical administration.
"Conclusion. State activities in radiation pro-
tection, and more broadly in the entire field of radiolog-
ical health as we II, rest on severaI I ega I foundat i on
stones. That the poIi ce power i ncIudes the power to pro-
tect the public health is both elementary and obvious; the
convent ional definition of the constituti ona I concept of
police power is the power to regulate and protect 'health,
safety, morals, and welfare.' Since this authority is left
with the States by the Federal Constitution, its exercise is
a legal attribute of all State governments. As already
pointed out, some States have so far considered the police
power to be sufficient basis for the assertion of juris-
d i cti on to engage in any and all phases of rad i at i on pro-
tection. An increasing number of States, either because they
consider agreements with the AEC essential to their programs
or because they look upon them as merely advantageous, are
becoming agreement States. In these jurisdictions the police
power is supplemented by the statutory assurance from Con-
gress that no conflicting action of the Federal Legislature
is likely to oust the legal authority of the State.
"From the administrative point of view, the basis for
State and local action also is clear. No matter how in-
genious theorists become in bui Iding a separate category
for nuclear activities, it remains true that State and local
governments—not the Federal Government-i nspect structures,
issue and enforce sanitary codes, provide service and regu-
lation in the field of industrial hyoiene, fight fires, and
patrol highways. Whenever the results of nuclear activity
impinge on any of these areas, as they must constantly do,
the State and local governments are the only ones in a position
748
-------
to act. They may do so with more or less skill, depending
on their training and resources. They may do so more or
less effectively, depending at least in part on the degree
of specific authority to deal with nuclear-related matters
conferred by State and local law. But they will act, or
the public will be unnecessarily exposed to danger."
Earlier this month, 48 states were represented at the Conference
of State Directors of Radiation and Safety Control Program. I do not
have the permission to speak for this group. However, you have heard
the remarks of the preceding speaker who is President of this organi-
zation, and you can see that he is inclined to support the State role
as presented above. I hope the Conference of State and Territorial
Officers will accept the report of this Conference of State Directors
of Radiation and Safety, one part of which appears under the heading
of Radiation Control Nationally and a sub-heading, "Ionizing Radiation—
State Control," and reads, "The States are responsible for uncontrolled
radiation sources in the environment as an unexpected result of a Plow-
share project."
The respective states should have no fear of accepting the re-
sponsibility granted them under the Federal Constitution whether or
not they have an AEC/State Agreement or whether they have a complete
radiological health program. The State/Public Health Service relation-
ship and support for this program is the same as it is for any other
state program in protecting the health of the public. If the problem
is too large to handle with the state resources, assistance will be
furnished on request from the Public Health Service.
In regard to Plowshare in particular, each respective state would
like to be a partner in this enterprise, with industry and the AEC being
the other partners. We do not consider ourselves equal partners for all
of the negotiations. However, after the detonation and particularly
if it is in our State, the State may have a major role. In being a
partner, we expect to be called into the planning meetings as early as
possible, and I might say the earlier we are involved, the sooner will
the project become a reality. The states should notify the PHS through
its regional office and have this organization present at the first
orientation meeting and most of the following meetings. After the first
meeting, the State and PHS will prepare a draft of the cooperative plan
to follow. This plan will be reviewed, modified, and updated frequently
by both parties.
The success or failure of a proposed Plowshare project in any
State will be determined by the public relations role executed by the
State. This role will be more effectively executed if the State is
informed early and can adequately and appropriately inform the local
health authorities who will get the right story to the local press and
residents as soon as possible. Yesterday Herb Parker stated he
wasn't sure which radiation protection group the general public will
trust. The local health group has been the protector for health and
749
safety for so long the odds are in favor of their gaining the con-
fidence of the local people and thereby effecting a good public
relations program which will lend public support to the project,
and as Abraham Li ncoIn sai d, "Wi th pub Ii c support you can do anythi ng
and without it you can do very little." This quotation is most
applicable to Plowshare, and I repeat: If the AEC will include the
States as a partner in the early talking and planning stage of Plow-
share projects the chances of their becoming a reality are better
than the odds in most of the activities in this city and the accom-
plishments will be realized much sooner.
I thank you for your devoted attention through the last phase
of th i s semi nar.
750
-------
QUESTION FOR SIMON KINSMAN
I. From James Payne:
What analysis do you run on the sewage effluents and why?
ANSWER:
The California Radiological Monitoring Program Includes the sampling
of 20 sewage treatment plants throughout the state. Analyses of sewage
samples, effluent and sludge, for alpha and beta activity provide a
means of monitoring to insure that industrial radioactive wastes dis-
charged into sewerage systems do not exceed prescribed limits. The
surveillance of sewage assumes greater Importance as isotope licensees
become more numerous and as the quantity per user increases.
Water used by a city enters the city as domestic drinking water and
leaves the city as sewage. If the city adds no radioactivity to the
sewage, the radiological content of the domestic water and sewage
should be the same. Therefore, interest centers around the difference
in yearly averages between the radioactivity in the sewage effluent
and the domestic water influent, and the ratio of sewage radioactivity
to domestic water radioactivity. For example, two cities might have
the followi ng:
City
Water
A 10 pCi/l
B 10 pCi/l
Sewage
15 pCi/l
80 pCi/l
Oi fference Ratio
5 pCi/l 1.5
70 pCi/l 8
Obviously, something is happening to city B that should be investigated
while city A appears to be normal. In 1967 these ratios, in California
cities that were sampled, ranged from 1,0 to 7.8 and the differences
from 0.4 pCi/l to 37.4 pCi/l.
The present policy In California is that no city should discharge to the
uncontrolled environment a sewage effluent containing more than IxlO"^
yCi/ml (100 pCi/liter) above the domestic water entering the city. In
practice, the Bureau of Radiological Health of the California State
Department of Public Health becomes concerned when the discharge values
are one third of the maximum permissible value of 100 pCi/liter. An
increase to this concentration indicates that some or several discharges
are releasing too much radioactivity into the sewerage system. These
discharges may be in excess of California's Radiation Control Regulations
which are compatible with 10 CFR 20. A fol[owup to determine the source
of this Increase in radioactivity enables us to determine licensee
compIi a nee or non-compIi anee wIth our reguI ati ons.
751
DISCUSSION OF HIGHLIGHTS AND
CLOSING REMARKS
Dr. Raymond T. Moore
Acting Director, BRH
U. S. Public Health Service
RockviIle, Maryland
Summarizing four full days and 38 pages of a technical symposium is an
herculean task. It would be impossible, in the few minutes allowed me, to
dwell adequately on each of the papers presented. Rather, I would like to
review some reasons why we thought this symposium was both timely and
necessary.
First and foremost in our mind was the need to emphasize the health and
safety aspects. While our laboratory in Las Vegas and a few states have been
deeply involved in Plowshare, the public health aspects were not widely known.
Up to now there had been no forum where we and our colleagues could exchange
ideas or views relating to the public health aspects of the Plowshare Program.
We considered it important to present the results and analyses of
relevant studies of Plowshare activities conducted by various organizations.
We believed it important to include discussions of air blast and ground
motion effects as well as the transport of radioactivity for these are also
of public health concern.
We attempted, and I believe succeeded, in bringing people of diverse
interests and views together. In our opinion, it was necessary to bring into
focus those problem areas where more research or information is needed.
Several of the speakers emphasized two major problems of concern. The
more important of these is the need for declassificat ion of certain Plow-
share information. I believe you will be faced with resistance to the Plow-
share Program from scientists and the general public as long as such data
is kept under security wraps. People want to know the facts and be able to
render their own judgment. Congressman Hosmer spoke of that in his excel-
lent speech at the banquet Tuesday evening. He proposed that the AEC take
steps to separate the Plowshare development activities from weapons
development.
Dr. Carlyle Thompson indicated the other problem by noting the need of the
states for public funds to monitor the environment after Plowshare events.
Some way must be found to support state programs financially in order that
they may gear up adequately to support industrial Plowshare projects.
752
-------
I believe we have had a successful symposium. I am told the registra-
tion is in excess of 600. The success is due to you who have participated,
Each session was fully attended. I have never been to a meeting where so
many have stayed to the last as you have. Thank you.
753
-------