SWRHL-51r
FINAL REPORT OF OFF-SITE SURVEILLANCE
FOR THE
FAULTLESS EVENT, January 19, 1968
by the
Southwestern Radiological Health Laboratory
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Public Health Service
Consumer Protection and Environmental Health Service
April 1969
This surveillance performed under a Memorandum of
Understanding (No. SF 54 373)
for the
U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
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LEGAL NOTICE
This report was prepared as an account of Government sponsored
work. Neither the United States, nor the Atomic Energy Commission,
nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission:
A. makes any warranty or representation, expressed or implied,
with respect to the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of the in-
formation contained in this report, or that the use of any information,
apparatus, method, or process disclosed in this report may not in-
fringe privately owned rights; or
B. assumes any liabilities with respect to the use of, or for damages
resulting from the use of any information, apparatus, method, or pro-
cess disclosed in this report.
As used in the above, "person acting on behalf of the Commission"
includes any employee or contractor of the Commission, or employee
of such contractor, to the extent that such employee or contractor of
the Commission, or employee of such contractor prepares, dissemin-
ates, or provides access to, any information pursuant to his employ-
ment or contract with the Commission, or his employment with such
contractor.
048
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SWRHL-51r
FINAL REPORT OF OFF-SITE SURVEILLANCE
FOR THE
FAULTLESS EVENT, JANUARY 19, 1968
by the
Southwestern Radiological Health Laboratory
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Public Health Service
Consumer Protection and Environmental Health Service
^) April 1969
CN
b- Copy No. 48
O
f^
pv Margaret M. Snow
O Technical Reports Unit, SWRHL
^ Las Vegas, Nevada
This surveillance performed under a Memorandum of
Understanding (No. SF 54 373)
for the
U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
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INTRODUCTION
The Faultless Event of Operation Crosstie was an underground nuclear
test conducted at 1015 hours PST on January 19, 1968, by the Law-
rence Radiation Laboratory at the Central Nevada Supplemental Test
Area (CN-STA).
In accordance with the AEC-PHS Memorandum of Understanding,
an environmental surveillance and community information program
was conducted in the off-site area by the PHS Southwestern Radi-
ological Health Laboratory(SWRHL) during the test period.
This report describes the procedures and results of that operation.
PRE-EVENT ACTIVITIES
Milk and Water Sampling
Eight months prior to the Faultless Event and in support of CN-STA
operations, the SWRHL began an extensive survey of the human and
milk cow population distribution in and around Central Nevada.
During June, July and August, 1967, the Nevada counties of Elko,
Eureka, Lander, Lincoln, Nye and White Pine, and the Utah coun-
ties of Box Elder and Tooele were surveyed. This information was
then collated and published in a directory listing all human and milk
cow population locations and citing their azimuth and distance from
the CN-STA.
In addition to the 36 routine milk sampling stations maintained on a
continuous basis around the Nevada Test Site(NTS) special milk
sampling stations were established at Battle Mountain, Beowawe,
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Currie, Elko, Montello and Wells, Nevada, five months prior to
the Faultless Event(Figure 1). Water sampling stations were
also added to the routine NTS off-site network at Battle Mountain,
Carlin, Currie, Elko, Oasis, Ruby Valley and Wells, Nevada,
and Wendover, Utah(Figure 2). Milk and water samples were
collected monthly at the additional stations. The routine NTS
off-site stations provided monthly sample information covering
years preceding the event.
Air Sampling and Dosimetry
Six months prior to the Faultless Event, SWRHL expanded its
routine NTS off-site air surveillance and dosimetry programs to
include the outlying areas north and northeast of CN-STA. Per-
manent air sampling stations were established at Blue Eagle
Ranch, Currie, and Duckwater, Nevada, increasing surveillance
capabilities to 109 routine stations operating in the off-site
areas (Figure 3). Twenty-two air samplers in Central Nevada,
including the off-site areas adjacent to NTS, were operating with
charcoal cartridges in addition to the particulate filters rou-
tinely used in the SWRHL air sampling stations.
Supplemental to the normal dosimetry network for NTS, dosimetry
stations with five film badges and three thermoluminescent
dosimeters per station were added at Battle Mountain, Carlin,
Currie, Dunphy, Elko, Halleck, Oasis, Ruby Valley and Wells,
Nevada, and Wendover, Utah(Figure 4). These thermoluminescent
dosimeters were changed on the same monthly schedule as the
routine NTS off-site dosimetry network. Four days prior to the
event, 15 special TLD stations with two dosimeters each were
established at five-mile intervals from 25 miles north of Currant
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MILK SAMPLING STATIONS
Environmental Surveillance Program
Figure 1. Location of Milk Sampling Stations.
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WATER SAMPLING STATIONS
Environmental Surveillance Program
Figure 2. Location of Water Sampling Stations.
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AIR SURVEILLANCE NETWORK STATIONS
Environmental Surveillance Program
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FILM BADGE AND T.L.D. STATIONS
Environmental Surveillance Program
Figure 4. Location of Dosimetry Stations.
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to 40 miles south, of Currant, providing more comprehensive sur-
veillance of the populated areas which include Blue Eagle Ranch,
Currant, Duckwater and Nyala, Nevada. Additionally, a network
of 27 Eberline RM-11 gamma exposure rate recorders was oper-
ating in the off-site areas during Faultless activities.
Ground Motion
Owners and occupants of all man-made structures within a 55-mile
radius of the Faultless Event site and of certain buildings in the
towns of Austin, Ely, Eureka, McGill and Tonopah were contacted
to obtain permission for structural inspections. This structural
analysis, performed by an engineering firm, provided reference
data for postshot studies of ground motion and for investigations
of damage, if any occurred. SWRHL, conducted a survey during the
five months prior to January 1968, of all mining operations with-
in approximately 100 miles of CN-STA to determine their location
and schedule of operation during the event.
One day before Faultless, persons in Belmont and Eureka were
cautioned to remain clear of free-standing walls; owners were
advised to empty elevated water storage tanks located at Barley
Creek Ranch and Blue Eagle Ranch; and residents of the Stone
House Ranch in Monitor Valley and the R. O. Incorporated Ranch
near Round Mountain were alerted to hazards of possible rock
falls from stone buildings.
Community Information Centers
Five days prior to the Faultless Event, SWRHL, personnel established
community information centers in Austin, Ely, Eureka, Round
Mountain and Tonopah, Nevada. These centers, equipped with tele-
phones and remaining open during normal working hours, conducted
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concentrated public information programs to keep the respective
areas informed of Faultless activities. The Faultless activity
schedule was posted at major business establishments and all
appropriate AEC announcements were coordinated through local
news media. Information Center personnel, responsible for
maintaining liaison with local officials and other representatives,
provided information and advice on effects from test operations.
Persons were advised that high structures might amplify ground
motion and were cautioned that no one should occupy precarious
positions during detonation when ground motion might startle him
or otherwise endanger his safety. Requests from residents were
honored whenever possible. In compliance with requests at
Eureka, SWRHL representatives presented two showings of films
on AEC nuclear testing, one for local school children and another
for the general public. SWRHL personnel were also available for
public information and other coordinate services in Alamo, Beatty,
Caliente, Goldfield and Pioche during the week previous to the
Faultless Event.
General Adjustment Bureau(GAB) personnel were located in the
communities named above and were introduced to local authorities
through the Community Information Centers. Inquiries subject
to GAB review and consideration were also forwarded from the
Information Centers.
Medical and Veterinary Services
A PHS veterinary officer and a PHS medical officer were avail-
able at the site to investigate any reported incident or complaint
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relating to Faultless operations. One week prior to the Faultless
Event, the medical officer established liaison with medical per-
sonnel at CN-STA, Ely, Erueka, and Tonopah, advising them of
his association with Faultless and volunteering his assistance
should he be needed. Prior to detonation, the veterinary officer^
accompanied by a SWRHL, monitor, manned a station inside the
controlled area 18 miles east of surface ground zero where two
shepherds were tending their flock.
Three beef cattle and two deer from Hot Creek Valley were sacri-
ficed during the week prior to the Faultless Event, and necropsies
were performed for histopathological analysis and radioassay.
Results from these analyses were recorded for reference, and
similar postshot sampling was anticipated had any radioactivity
been released by the Faultless Event.
EVENT DAY ACTIVITIES
Aerial and Ground Monitoring
Aerial radiological surveillance for the Faultless Event was supplied
by three PHS monitors in a PHS aircraft equipped for tracking and
sampling radioactive airborne debris.
Forty-four SWRHL personnel held field assignments for the Fault-
less experiment. Twenty-eight ground monitors were stationed
in the off-site areas on January 19 to perform environmental
monitoring and sampling in the event of a radioactive release.
Personnel with two-way radio-equipped vehicles were also standing
by at the 10 active mining areas within 50 miles of the project site
and at the open pit mines near Ruth, Nevada. These personnel
notified the miners of Faultless operations, suggested they remain
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above ground at the time of detonation, and remained at the mines
after detonation to report any mine damage.
Roadblocks and Evacuations
Six SWRHL safety personnel assumed locations on-site about 22 miles
distant along an arc from 250 to 45 from ground zero at 1600 hours
on January 19. This boundary was established to allow evacuation of
the immediate test area during execution of the experiment. The
SWRHL personnel were teamed with firemen employed by McKenzie
Construction Company to maintain continuous vigilance of entry
roads; they remained on station through the afternoon of January 19.
A SWRHL monitor evacuated the residents of Hot Creek Ranch from
this exclusion area in accordance with an agreement made previously
between the AEC and the ranch owner.
SWRHL personnel evacuated residents and other occupants on
January 19, prior to execution of Faultless, from buildings at the
Blue Jay Highway Maintenance Station, the Currant Creek Main-
tenance Station and Warm Springs. A drilling crew working at the
Western Oil Lands site in Railroad Valley was cleared from the
drill rig one hour before detonation and returned to the rig 15 min-
utes following detonation.
SWRHL monitors assisted by Nevada State Highway Patrolmen,
established roadblocks at 0900 hours on January 19 at Lockes and
two miles south of the Blue Jay Maintenance Station to close
Highway 6. Concurrently, screening stations were established at
Currant and Warm Springs to notify travelers that this span of
highway was closed. These station locations are shown in Figure 5.
Upon closure, this span of Highway 6 was patrolled by two SWRHL
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11
PHS
PHS
PHS
, y-\
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'PHS\1
i PHS
i /
GROUND ZERO
LOCKES RANCH
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~~J3'"~''yCpHS """^->C1HOT CREEK RANCH
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PHS and STATE
HIGHWAY PATROL!
Awsi
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PHS and STATE
HIGHWAY PATROL
BASE CAMP
PHS and STATE
HIGHWAY
WARM SPRINGS
Figure 5. Location of Coordinated Roadblocks and Screening Stations.
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monitors beginning from both roadblocks to ensure that no travelers
were on the road. Immediately following detonation, the monitors
retraveled the road to determine its safety for public travel. The
highway was reopened at 1130 hours.
Roadblocks were also set up by Security personnel of Wackenhut
Services, Incorporated(WSI).
A PHS monitor assisted by Nevada Highway Department personnel,
closed Highway 6 from 0950 to 1030 hours on January 19, through
the Horse Range at Currant because of the possibility of falling
rocks in the pass.
RESULTS
No radioactivity above normal backgrourid levels was detected
off-site by ground and aerial monitoring teams, by stationary
gamma rate recorders, or in any environmental samples after
the detonation or during subsequent sample recovery operations.
Minor rock fall resulting from Faultless ground motion was noted
in the Tripp Veteran open pit mine near Ruth. No damages or
effects other than ground motion were reported at any of the other
mine locations.
CONCLUSIONS
Since no fresh fission products were detected in any environmental
sample collected off-site, and no air samples contained levels of
gross beta activity above the expected background, it is concluded
that no detectable radioactive contamination of the off-site area
resulted from this event.
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DISTRIBUTION
1-15 SWRHL, Las Vegas, Nevada
16 Robert E. Miller, Manager, AEC/NVOO, Las Vegas, Nevada
17 R. H. Thalgott, Test Manager, AEC/NVOO, Las Vegas, Nevada
18 Henry G. Vermillion, AEC/NVOO, Las Vegas, Nevada
19 Chief, NOB/DASA, AEC/NVOO, Las Vegas, Nevada
20 Harry Jordan, LASL, Los Alamos, New Mexico
21 D. W. Hendricks, AEC/NVOO, Las Vegas, Nevada
22 Mail & Records, AEC/NVOO, Las Vegas, Nevada
23 Martin B. Biles, DOS, AEC, Washington, D. C.
24 Director, DMA, AEC, Washington, D. C.
25 John S. Kelly, DPNE, AEC, Washington, D. C.
26 Philip W. Allen, ARL/ESSA, AEC/NVOO, Las Vegas, Nevada
27 Gilbert Ferber, ARL/ESSA, Silver Spring, Maryland
28 - 32 Charles L. Weaver, BRH, PHS, Rockville, Maryland
33 Regional Representative, PHS, BRH, Region IX, San Francisco, Calif.
34 Bernd Kahn, BRH, RATSEC, Cincinnati, Ohio
35 Northeastern Radiological Health Lab. , Winchester, Mass.
36 Southeastern Radiological Health Lab. , Montgomery, Ala.
37 W. C. King, LRL, Mercury, Nevada
38 H. L. Reynolds, LRL, Livermore, Calif.
39 William E. Ogle, LASL, Los Alamos, New Mexico
40 Victor M. Milligan, REECo, Mercury, Nevada
41 Byron Murphey, Sandia Corporation, Albuquerque, New Mexico
42 R. H. Wilson, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York
43 - 44 DTIE, AEC, Oak Ridge, Tennessee
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