OIL ON THE SCHUYLKIL
A CASE STUDY
DIVISION OF OIL AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
V
x
OFFICE OF WATER PROGRAMS
\
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
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SPILL ORIGIN
*
ttstown \ £ N.J.
Philadelphia
Wilmington
Atlantic City
Ocean City
Wild wood
ape May
ape Hcnlopen
Rrhaboth Beach
MD.
CONTENTS
Abstract ..... t
I. Introduction: Scope of the report 1
II. Summary of findings and recommendations 2
III. Diary of the spill 5
IV. Special subjects 17
A. Oil spill preparedness—Delaware River Basin .... 17
B. Oil spill preparedness—Regional Response Team ... 18
C. Oil containment and cleanup technology 20
D. Facilities and assistance at Base Gloucester .... 24
E. Public relations—news media 26
F. Relations with Berks Associates 26
G. Effects on ecology 27
V. Exhibits 28
VI. Slide Display 33
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CORRECTIONS
to
"OIL ON THE SCHUYLKILL"
1. Page 34 - Slide R-17
Correct caption to read, ". .
. by Berks Associates . . ."
2. Page 39 - Slides A-35 and A-33.
Captions should be reversed.
3. Pages 45-47 - all Slides
Correct captions to read, ". .
at Fort Miflin Pier.1
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OIL ON THE SCHUYLKILL
A CASE STUDY
ABSTRACT
On November 13, 1970, 3 million gallons of waste crankcase sludge
oil spilled into the Schuylkill River in Pennsylvania. This
document depicts the breadth and rapid development of events and
actions taken as a result of this major oil spill incident.
this was the first time the revolving fund was utilized and action
taken under the imminent threat provisions of the Water Quality
Improvement Act of 1970. The report attempts to project, by using
a case study format, potential problems that could be encountered
by an On-Scene Commander and his team in similar spills. The
Schuylkill case may serve as a reference point around which
effective response efforts may be planned.
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This presentation is based on
the Documentation and Critique
of the Schuylkill River Spill
of November 13, 1970 prepared
by Altenburg, Kirk and Company,
Inc., Thompson's Point, Portland,
Maine 04102 for the Federal Water
Quality Administration under Con-
tract l-PO-000687.
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SECTION I. INTRODUCTION:
SCOPE OF THE REPORT
This survey is intended to document all significant facts
relating to the Schuylkill River oil spill of November 13,
1970.
The report documents the pre-spill history of the spill
originator, the immediate causes and effects of the spill,
operational methods and techniques used in the clean-up
operation and disposal methods.
Sources of information include:
1. The National Contingency Plan for Oil and Hazardous
Materials, June 1970.
2. A complete file of Sitreps (situation reports)
originating at the Operations Room of the Regional
Response Team at the United States Coast Guard,
Gloucester City, New Jersey.
3. Daily logs kept by staff personnel of the RRT.
4. Aerial photographs of the polluted area supplied
by the U.S.C.G. Photo Service, Third Coast Guard
District, Governors Island, New York, New York.
5. Extensive interviews conducted personally or by
telephone with approximately 20 of the key personnel
associated with the clean-up effort.
6. News clippings from papers in the cities of
Philadelphia, Reading, Pottsville, and Phoenixville
for a period of one month beginning November 13.
7. Personal observations of the members of the
Documentation Team who were on the site from
17 Nov to 22 Nov.
Most .of the statements of fact in this report can be backed
up by one or more of the sources quoted above.Where sub-
stantiation was not available, statements believed to be
true were identified by the phrase "it was reported that....
Opinions and judgments of the Documentation personnel are
readily identified as such and are based on nearly three
years of experience in oil spill control work including two
major oil spills.
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SECTION II: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
AND RECOmiENDATIONS
A. Findings
The Schuylkill River Spill was the first occasion for a
Regional Response Team to enter the scene in accordance
with the National Contingency Plan of June, 1970 and the
Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970.
It was also the first time that the F.W.Q.A. supplied an
On Scene Commander to a major spill under the Plan.
Conclusions by members of the Documentation Team are listed
herewith in approximately the order that the conclusions were
developed.
1. There was a very regrettable delay in discovering
the spill and in notifying F.W.Q.A. and the Coast
Guard.
2. Once notified, both Coast Guard and F.W.Q.A.
responded promptly, effectively and in accordance
with the Contingency Plan.
3. Cooperation and assistance by the Coast Guard Base
at Gloucester City, New Jersey was complete and
effective.
4. The Regional Response Team of 4 persons accepted
its responsibility and became an effective leader
of the response effort without loss of time.
5. Resources of the Delaware River Basin were not
well organized or equipped to respond to a major
oil spill, although the beginnings of a good
cooperative effort were apparent.
3. Additional staffing of the RRT is essential to
cope with the work, load imposed by the first
phases of a major spill.
7. Oil spill contractors available in the area could
only .supply a minimum of skills and equipment for
the clean-up effort.
8. The spill originator had very little capability to
assist the clean-up effort beyond closing the broken
dikes and redistributing the load in the lagoons on
his property.
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SECTION II:. (continued)
9. Clean-up operations are very difficult in a
Metropolitan Area where traffic and buildings
interfere with movement of equipment.
10. Aerial survey facilities are essential for planning
a clean-up effort spread over a wide area.
11. Effective communications systems linking field
operations with the RRT Operation Base are essential.
12. Everyone knows how to report a fire but very few
people know how to report an oil spill.
13. The OSC and his staff were conscious of the costs
of a clean-up effort and made periodic reviews of
the funds committed and results obtained.
14. Use of a Coast Guard Base for Operations Headquarters
was very effective and other Coast Guard Bases should
be prepared for a similar effort.
15. The Public Relations effort was handled effectively.
This resulted in unusually good coverage by the
news media.
16. Short range damage to the ecology was minimal, but
long range effects have yet to be determined.
17. When the RRT ceased operations on 25 NOV the waters
of the Schuylkill and Delaware Rivers were more than
95% clear of the spill.
18. The RRT staff would have been far less effective if
it had been operating on its own without the support
of Base Gloucester personnel.
B. Recommendations;
1. The RRT staff should be expanded to include
a. An operations specialist to back up the OSC
on equipment deployment and technology.
b. A capable secretary
c. A contract specialist to handle business
arrangements with contractors and to assist
with transportation, housing and communications
problems, and to keep daily estimates of costs
incurred.
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SECTION II: (continued)
2. Specific responsibility for entrys in the "Commanders
Log" should be maintained on a 24 hour basis.
3. The RRT should assemble an "emergency kit" so that
the most necessary equipment for field operations
can be hand-carried by members of the Team when they
respond to a call. Maps, writing materials, cameras,
tape recorder, portable typewriter and walkie-talkies
should be considered.
4. Major attention should be given to organizing the
resources of the major oil terminal areas for prompt
and effective reaction to oil spills anywhere in the
area. This should include
a. Education of the entire populace on the need for
immediate alarm in case of a spill.
b. Specific notification to all State Agencies
that there is a National Contingency Plan and
a provision for RRT action.
5. The inter-dependence of the containment and clean-
up operations (of booms and skimmers) should be
emphasized to all operators of oil spill equipment.
6. Each RRT should have a file of USCGS maps covering
coastline and river basins in its area so that the
staff could study these maps for possible trap-basin
sites while enroute to the scene. Careful study of
these maps can disclosa potential areas for boom-and-
skimmer installations, and would save precious time
in positioning the available equipment.
7. Study of Documentation reports on all major spills
should be a "must" assignment for all personnel
assigned to an RRT.
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SECTION III. DIARY OF THE
SPILL AND CLEAN-UP OPERATIONS
FRIDAY, 13 NOV 70
0.1.^0.0 Berks Assoc. patrol of dikes, due to several days
of heavy rain, stopped"because rain had stopped."
03:00 (Est.) Rain resumed, raising level of contents in
diked lagoon holding petroleum residue and storm
water. Lagoon contents (estimated at 3,000,000
gallons of oil and water mix) overflowed dike,
broke through and spilled into Schuylkill River
approximately 3 miles west of Pottstown, Pennsylvania.
07i00 Berks Assoc. employee on way to work noticed oil in
river at Pottstown bridge. Gave alarm. Berks
personnel reacted with bulldozer and manpower to
close leaks in dikes. (Exhibits 1. and 2.)
07:15 Berks Assoc. notified Pennsylvania Department of
Health.
QQ^OO Leaks closed in dikes. (According to Berks personnel
interviewed 19 Nov)
08:00-09:00 During this period Berks personnel notified
State officials, who did not notify Coast Guard
or F.W.Q.A.
COMMENT: Notification of the spill should have gone
to F.W.Q.A. and/or the Coast Guard at the earliest
possible moment after alerting the waterworks group.
The time lost was critical. With prompt notification,
booms could have been effective well upstream of the
Philadelphia area.
15:00 About 15:00 there was a radio broadcast heard by Paul
Preuss of Clean Waters, Inc. who called Gloucester
City, New Jersey (Base Gloucester) Coast Guard at
15:30 and also notified F.W.Q.A. in Washington, D.C.
15:30-22:00 During this period, word of the spill spread
rapidly, and the following actions were reported by
various groups:
F.W.Q.A. offices were alerted at Washington, D.C.,
Edison, N.J., and Philadelphia. The Regional
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SECTION III. (continued)
Response Team was activated. A call was made to
offer help to Pennsylvania Department of Health
but none was requested. Call to Commander Dash
at Base Gloucester authorized hiring a contractor
to combat spill. Personnel of the Regional
Response Team departed New York area for Philadelphia
by auto, with instructions that F.W.Q.A. would
provide the On Scene Commander, and Mr. Howard
Lamp'l of F.W.Q.A., Edison, N.J., was designated.
Executive Officer at Base Gloucester took prompt
action to contact Pennsylvania Department of Health
and the Regional Response Team in New York (Office
of Intelligence and Law, 3rd District U.S.C.G. at
Governors Island, New York) in accordance with
National Contingency Plan. (Oil and Hazardous
Materials.) He also dispatched a patrol to observe
progress of the oil (reported to have reached
Conshohocken area) and contacted Underwater Tech-
nics of Camden, New Jersey, for manpower and
equipment to start booming operations to contain
the spill.
Base Gloucester designated an "Operations Room" in
HQ building and began to equip it for use by the
OSC and his staff.
Coast Guard patrol reported oil covered river bank
to bank in Fairmount Park area and that inlets to
Philadelphia Water Supply had been closed before
oil reached them.
At 18:30 Executive Officer of Base Gloucester con-
ferred with Mr. Stith of Underwater Technics at
Market Street Bridge, sent patrol to find sites
along river where equipment could be placed. District
Chief of Philadelphia Fire Department assisted. Most
of river bank unsuitable due to highways on West
side and railway on East bank. Sites surveyed at
Market Street Bridge, Getty Oil Co. grounds, Grove
Ferry Bridge, and Gibsons Point.
At 21:30 selected Gibsons Point site for first attempt
at placing plastic booms. 41' Coast Guard boat
assisted this attempt and found fast current, and
excessive amounts of debris in river to be major
obstacles to operation. Booms placed across the
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SECTION III. (continued)
current at 22:55 broke repeatedly due to fast current
and accumulation of debris.
At 22:00, returned to Base Gloucester to brief OSC
and his staff upon their arrival.
Under wajt er Technics « Inc. the contractor hired about
16:00, assembled boom, vacuum truck, rigging and
gear and a crew and met Commander Dash at 18:30
near Market Street Bridge and assisted in selection
of a first site for working the booms. (Exhibit 3.)
22 :OQ RRT personnel arrive at Gloucester Base (Gloucester
City Coast Guard Base, Gloucester City, N.J.) Howard
Lamp'l and Leo McCarthy of F.W.Q.A., Edison, N.J.,
and Commander Robert Hanson, U.S.C.G., and Lt. JG.
Clow, U.S.C.G., New York District. Oil reported to
have reached Delaware River.
F.W.Q.A. assumed OSC responsibility. Howard Lamp'l.
22;30 Base Gloucester activated, phone ordered and heli-
copter requisitioned for 14 NOV.
22:45 Three vacuum trucks of Underwater Technics at spill
clean-up sites and 3 more on the way from Atlantic-
Richfield, who offered to process oil recovered from
river.
22:^5 First boom deployed across current at Gibsons Point
parted due to strong current. It was repaired and
parted again at 23:38.
COMMENT: The river current of 3K or more was
immediate warning that boom containment would be
unsuccessful. Initial effort should have been to
use diversion technique and steer the oil and
debris into back waters or coves for removal oper-
ations as was later done successfully at Penrose
Avenue Bridge and Fort Miflin.
23; 15 Captain of Port (Coast Guard) issued Notice to
Mariners closing the Schuylkill River to marine
traffic.
24:00 Briefing and planning conference continued until
01:00 14 NOV. Off base accommodations for RRT
personnel arranged by Base Gloucester.
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SECTION III. (continued)
SATURDAY. 14 NOV 70
07:25 Reported that two additional attempts to place boom
across river resulted in parting of boom. (Met-
Pet boom.)
07j^45 F.W.Q.A. PR man (William Palmer) arrived at Base
Gloucester.
,•'
08;00 Paul Preuss (Clean Waters, Inc.) on scene with
absorbents.
09:10 Helo overflight observed 30,000 gal. (est.) of oil
in Delaware River. 65 miles of Schuylkill and
Delaware rivers polluted, est. 100% covered. 5%
very dark oil. Plans to boom Schuylkill at Penrose
Ave. Bridge, divert oil and debris into cove at
W. bank, remove with crane and vac trucks. Plan
to spread straw upstream of Penrose Ave. Mass
of debris in Lock 60 discovered by helo.observers.
11^00 Light pollution reported in Mantua Creek and Woodbury
Creek due to tidal action. Clean waters, Inc.,
assigned to boom those creeks. River current est.
3K. COE Team dispatched to check dike at Berks
ASSOC.
12:00-14:QO Conference of RRT. Search for more boom.
_14_:-4j> F.W.Q.A. mobile laboratory arrives from Edison,
N.J. Biologist dispatched to check damage to fish
or wildlife.
Kenneth Biglane, of the Federal Water Quality
Administration Headquarters in Washington, over-
flew the spill area with a Pennsylvania State
Department of Health official to survey the extent
of the problem.
15:30 Conference with State officials.
Meeting of National Response Team in Washington
to consider fiscal problem of this spill.
NOTE: 23 additional personnel signed in from F.W.Q.A.,
U.S.C.G., Corps of Engineers, State Agencies, Contractors,
Delaware River Basin Commission, and News Media.
17:OQ Boom at Penrose Ave. reported functioning with some
success as a diversion boom.
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SECTION III. (continued)
Philadelphia Municipal water supply inlets in
Schuylkill closed before oil entered.
Cost of clean-up initially estimated at $1,000,000.
NRT asked for advice on funding. Amount to be
spread among several sources.
Coast Guard personnel from Base Gloucester con-
tinued to serve as contact between Operations
Room and various field activities.
Report that Atlantic-Richfield will receive and
reprocess any oil recovered from the spill.
18:00 Additional contractor on site. Metro Oil at
Fort Miflin, Clean Waters, Inc. upstream and at
New Jersey shore.
Estimate (by contractor) that 23,000 gal. of oil
had been pumped by vac. truck near Penrose Bridge.
Fairmount Park area boomed to protect park wild
fowl refuge. (Canadian Geese.) ASPCA and other
societies active to assist that situation.
Oil observed on Delaware River 15 miles below Phila.
News items that Berks Assoc. had a previous record
of polluting the Schuylkill River.
Large amount of debris in river is a major obstacle
to oil removal.
COMMENT: In its first full day of operations, the
RRT made its presence felt and accomplished meaningful
progress in
- Sealing off the source of the spill and initiating
steps to prevent recurrence.
- Marshalling manpower and equipment to prevent
spread of spill into sensitive areas along
Schuylkill and starting clean-up.
- Coordination of many agencies.
- Communications and Public Relations.
- At least 24 visitors to Operations Room were
interviewed.
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SECTION III. (continued)
SUNDAY. 15 NOV 70
09:00 Oil still flowing at source. Only 10% black oil
now apparent in Schuylkill. 90% thin film. Corps
of Engineers barge placed at Penrose Avenue Bridge
to anchor one end of boom. This worked okay .(Exhibit 4.)
Base Gloucester boats surveying shoreline. Moderate
contamination noted.
Booming completed at Mantua Creek and Woodbury Creek
on New Jersey shore. (Exhibits 5. and 6.)
Helo flight could not survey Darby Creek areas in
approach pattern to Philadelphia International
Airport. Control tower would not permit.
12:15 Dr. Maurice Goddard of Pennsylvania State Forest
and Waters Administration authorized use of snag
boat "Sheriff" through November 16. Operating
funds a problem.
16:00 No serious damage to ecology reported as yet.
Fouling of Tinicum Island and Cedar Swamp in
Claymount Area reported.
16:08 LCDR. Dash reports "Sheriff" on scene and function-
ing well on debris removal. Excellent cooperation
from Corps of Engineers. (Gordon Dilley, Philadelphia
District and Mr. Hittener at Fort Miflin.)
Oil at Ft. Miflin reported 5" thick ahead of boom.
Some booms later became tangled due to debris. Lee
Green, spill master for Metro Oil, operating vacuum
truck with 2 small skimmers. Oil recovered 800 to
900 gallons. Expected operations to be ineffective
after dark.
Pockets of oil reported at Market Street Bridge and
Grey's Ferry Avenue Bridge.
14:30 National Response Team - second meeting on fiscal
problems.
18:00 At least 16 visitors interviewed at Operations Room,
Base G.
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SECTION III. (continued)
16:59 First report from COE personnel at Berks Assoc.
that a third dike is filled to danger" point.
State Health Department asked to lower level in
that lagoon.
Two tank trucks dispatched to Berks Assoc. by OSC
to pump over-loaded lagoon, which contained residue
with high acid content.
Planning underway for a disposal area for oil soaked
debris.
MONDAY. 16 NOV 70
08:56 Underwater Technics to spread straw upstream from
Penrose Bridge.
09^08 Booming completed at Woodbury and Mantua.
11:30 No CG Helo available. Pennsylvania Air National
Guard provided a helo at 11:30.
Coast Guard National Strike Force personnel arrived
on scene as observers to assist anywhere.
Civil Defense reports 40-60,000 gallon trucks were
available for waste if needed.
River 80% covered above Philadelphia.
12:30 National Strike Force observers assigned to liason
duty at Berks Assoc. and upper area of Schuylkill
River.
Straw being spread at Wissahicken Creek using a
straw gun.
Debris being delivered to Warren Sand and Gravel
in Falls Township, New Jersey for disposal.
Estimate 30,000 gallons now skimmed. 130 people
working.
22:00 Kurt Young of Worthington Corp. arrived with one
Mop-Cat and 2 debris baskets.
At least 13 visitors interviewed at Operations Room.
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SECTION III. (continued)
TUESDAY. 17 NOV 70
08:30 Some oil still entering river at source. Debris
still a major problem with booming and skimming
operations.
Lt. Kangeter of Base Gloucester observing Mop-Cat
operations. Mop-Cat not self sufficient - needs
shore based crane for debris removal support.
Coast Guard tugs dispatched to aid in debris
removal at Penrose Bridge.
Bird lovers offer to wash geese and feed birds at
Fairmount Park.
Berks Assoc. notified of responsibilities by tele-
gram from Mr. Klashman, F.W.Q.A., Director of N.E.
Region.
Filter fence being set up below Douglasville.
4 pumps dispatched to Berks lagoons. Total capacity
of 212,000 gph. Lagoon level to be lowered in
anticipation of more rainfall.
Limited traffic authorized through boom on Schuylkill.
One hour notice required.
Straw spreading discontinued on lower Schuylkill.
Plans for Pennsylvania State Health Department to
monitor dikes at Berks Assoc. in event of serious
rainstorm.
18:00 At least 19 visitors interviewed.
WEDNESDAY. 18 NOV 70
08:00 Oil still entering river at Douglasville.
Level of oil in lagoons lowered 21 below top.
Pumping continues.
D. W. Reynolds of Documentation Team arrives on
scene and begins reconnaissance of area.
Light oil observed from Ben Franklin Bridge to 4 miles
below Delaware Memorial Bridge. Source unknown.
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SECTION III. (continued)
State Department of Health announces a drive to
identify and regulate all waste oil storage lagoons
in Pennsylvania. Estimates that there may be 1000
of these lagoons. Airplane survey being used to
spot these lagoons.
13:00 Construction of filter fence proceeding. Heavy
debris pile-up reported against boom at confluence
of Schuylkill and Delaware Rivers. Debris reported
collecting at an upstream lock site. (Later identi-
fied as Lock 60.)
W. M. Altenburg of Documentation Team arrives on scene,
No skimmers in use on Schuylkill River. Two reported
in use by Metro Oil in Ft. Miflin on the Delaware.
Debris disposal site not satisfactory due to great
distance from clean-up site. New dump being sought.
18:00 At least 9 visitors interviewed.
THURSDAY. 19 NOV 70
08:00 Some oil still entering Schuylkill at Douglasville.
Lagoon level has been lowered. Debris in river
still a problem to clean-up operations.
08;30 Documentation Team personnel start inspection of
spill and clean-up operations. On site inspections
made at Penrose Bridge, Fort Miflin, Spring Garden
Street Bridge, Filter Fence at Pottstown, Spill
Site at Douglasville and Lock 60 at Montclair.
See Section IV for comments on operations.
09:QO Radio "beepers" leased from communication suppliers
for signalling contractors in field. This provided
better communication to field personnel when needed.
13:00 Report received that State of Delaware concerned
about future ability of Berks Assoc. to handle
waste oil collected in Delaware.
15:00 NRT reviews situation at lagoon and requests by
Pennsylvania State Officials for Federal funds to
remove lagoon contents. Decision by NRT that
imminent threat of further spill has been eliminated,
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SECTION III. (continued)
and no further removal of material needed at present.
16:00 Offers of extra vehicles from GSA and other Govern-
ment agencies in Philadelphia area. Report that
pockets of oil along shores of Schuylkill have
been cleaned out by water hoses so that oil can
go downstream to boomed areas.
18:00 At least 16 visitors interviewed.
FRIDAY. 20 NOV 70
Q8;QO Flow of oil on Schuylkill very light.
09:QO Possible incineration of lagoon contents being
explored by OSC with local equipment manufacturer.
Documentation Team conducting personal interviews
and telephone interrogation with State officials,
Base Gloucester personnel, Philadelphia City
officials and contractor personnel.
Report received from Corps of Engineers concurring
with estimate from Raymond International, that
dikes at Berks Assoc. would probably have failed
a second time if level of contents had not been
lowered.
Second boom being installed at Spring Garden Street
Bridge. Possibility of booming above the dam was
discussed.
02:00 Report that Metro Oil clean-up operations not needed
beyond this date.
Debris removal continuing at Fort Miflin and Penrose
Avenue Bridge. Debris held in coves by booms.
23:45 Notice to Mariners opened lower Schuylkill to traffic.
SATURDAY. 21 NOV 70
08:00 Mr. Al Bromberg, F.W.Q.A., Edison, N.J., relieves
Howard Lamp'l as OSC for week-end.
Documentation continues interviews with Coast Guard
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SECTION III. (continued)
personnel at Base Gloucester.
Booms removed at Mantua and Woodbury Creeks in
N.J.
Second boom cancelled at Spring Garden Street Bridge.
Estimate by contractor that debris clean-up can be
completed at Penrose Avenue on Monday or Tuesday.
General consensus that river is relatively clean
and operations can be phased out in near future.
11:30 Some oil clinging to riverbanks. No decision on how
to clean up river banks. (Exhibit 7.)
Helo flight also shows Delaware River much improved.
Report that most debris arriving at Spring Garden
Street is free of oil.
12:00 Report that debris pick-up at Lock 60 was continuing
by Philadelphia Water Department. When completed,
oil would be picked up by an oil spill contractor.
SUNDAY. 22 NOV 70
08:00 Documentation Team personnel departed Philadelphia
area after checking Penrose Bridge site where 80%
of debris had been removed.
Filter fence at Douglasville reported functioning
effectively. Absorbent material renewed as necessary.
Only one downstream boom in position - at Spring
Garden Street.
Helo overflight reports very little oil evident on
river. Pockets at Lock 60 and Penrose Avenue still
to be cleaned-up.
Contractors operations reduced over week-end to
avoid overtime costs.
MONDAY. 23 NOV 70
08:00 Oil reported stopped at source. Delaware River
reported clean. Very little oil evident on Schuylkill,
mostly in Phoenixville area.
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SECTION III. (continued)
Plans reported to remove Filter Fence on 24 Nov,
finish debris clean-up at Penrose Avenue, Lock 60
(Black Rock Dam.)
RRT to de-activate on 25 Nov. Situation to be
monitored by Philadelphia office of F.W.Q.A.
18:00 Estimate that 4 contractors and Corps of Engineers
have accumulated costs of $122,603 to date. Does
not include direct costs incurred by F.W.Q.A. and
U.S.C.G.
828 tons of Oil Soaked Debris reported removed from
Schuylkill by Underwater Technics. Cost estimate
to incinerate lagoon contents being considered.
TUESDAY. 24 NOV 70
08:45 Mr. Lamp'1 and Mr. Palmer, F.W.Q.A., enroute Federal
Court Hearing on emptying of Berks Assoc. Lagoons.
13:25 Pennsylvania Rivers and Forests Department notified
to secure operation of snag boat "Sheriff."
WEDNESDAY. 25 NOV 70
08:00 Overflight reports less than 10% oil at any point
in Schuylkill, Delaware clean and no oil from source,
Mr. Horowitz, Philadelphia F.W.Q.A., on site as
OSC for last stages of clean-up.
Total contractor costs now estimated at $130,881
as of 24:00, Nov 23.
Last boom removed at Spring Garden Street Bridge.
News report that an agreement was reached to
strengthen dikes at Berks Assoc. pending eventual
disposition of the contents. Agreement approved by
Federal Court Judge.
RRT on-site activities ceased as of 12:00 this date.
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SECTION IV: SPECIAL SUBJECTS
A. Oil Spill Preparation in Delaware River Basin
In the very early stages of this clean-up operation it
was evident that the many resources of the Delaware River
Basin were not well organized to mount an effective effort
against a major oil spill.
The beginnings of an organization were apparent. The 10
major oil terminal operators had formed the "Oil Control
Coordinating Committee" and had assembled some items of
equipment at their various bases. Early in the operation
they offered 1250' of curtain type containment boom. The
equipment was used, cleaned, and repaired by Base Gloucester
before returning it to the committee.
Most of the State agencies involved were aware of the
potential dangers of a major oil spill and they cooperated
willingly in most instances with the RRT.
The spill was first discovered by Berks Assoc. personnel.
However, those personnel and personnel of the water districts
on the upper Schuylkill River (Exhibit 8.) and in Philadelphia
who took prompt action to close the inlets to their water
supply systems failed to notify either the Coast Guard or
the F.W.Q.A.
This oversight is hard to explain in view of the publicity
that has attended these major spills. It may be that detailed
instructions had not reached these agencies through official
channels because the ramifications of this particular spill
went beyond the areas normally affected by a spill in tidal
waters. In any event steps should be taken to insure that
peripheral agencies understand their responsibilities under
such circumstances. The delay caused by this oversight was
approximately 10 hours on 13 NOV (from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.)
and the time lost permitted the oil to cover such a wide
area that all opportunity of confining it near the source
was irrevocably lost.
During the clean-up, cooperation was offered by many State
agencies and used effectively. The snag boat "Sheriff" was
of great value in combatting floating debris. A team from
the Philadelphia Water District removed debris caught in the
dead water at Lock 60. (Exhibits 8. and 9.) Government
Agencies (GSA, Corps of Engineers, Air Force, National
Security Commission and others) offered equipment and
services.
-17-
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SECTION IV: (continued)
In summary the cooperation by individuals and departments
was of a high order as soon as the problem was understood
and the specific needs were recognized.
Admittedly it is not possible to instruct a large metro-
politan area in all facets of a major oil spill. However,
a public relations program illustrating the aid and assistance
which could be useful might be good material for a TV program
on the subject.
As far as could be determined, there were no skimmers avail-
able in the area except two small skimmers used by Metro Oil
in their operation at Fort Miflin.
In Summary: the Delaware River Basin area (including the
Schuylkill river course) should take steps to activate a
more effective plan and to marshal1 additional equipment
against the possibilities of a future spill. Most important
of all, prevention measures should be started wherever there
is a potential for a spill of oil or hazardous materials.
B. Oil Spill Preparedness - Regional Response Team
The National Contingency Plan for Oil and Hazardous
Materials dated June, 1970 provides a comprehensive and
authoritative background for the response of Government
agencies to an oil spill situation.
This plan has been distributed to the concerned agencies
of the Federal Government and its implication is beginning
to be thoroughly understood.
It was obvious that Coast Guard personnel at Base Gloucester
were aware of this plan and prepared to implement it to the
extent that their normal duties, special training, and
equipment would permit.
Personnel of the RRT seemed to be thoroughly familiar
with the plan and their operations on the scene conformed
to the text and to the spirit of the document.
It was fortunate that the personnel assigned to the RRT in
the New York area could draw upon an extensive background
in combatting oil spills. The OSC was Mr. Howard Lamp'l of
the F.W.Q.A. at Edison, New Jersey. He has participated in
clean-up activities at several major spills and is acquainted
-18-
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SECTION IV: (continued)
with many of the contractors available to the Northeast
Region of the F.W.Q.A. Commander Robert Hanson of the
Third District Coast Guard in New York has observed oil
spill operations and has broad experience with Coast Guard
reaction to emergency situations.
The make-up of the RRT included a public relations man from
the F.W.Q.A. and a staff assistant for Commander Hanson.
A staff of four is a bare minimum for the job at hand.
Additional personnel were needed in the first two or three
days for communication, transportation, housing, and liaison
with field personnel. A competent secretary for the staff
would have been invaluable. There should also have been
someone on the team in addition to the OSC who could pro-
vide detailed instruction for contractors and their personnel
in adapting equipment to the infinite variety of situations
encountered in a major spill.
On this assignment Mr. Lamp1! had the technical knowledge
of equipment and its use but he was initially overloaded to
a serious degree by the diverse requirements for decisions
on a host of other subjects.
It was indeed fortunate that many of the requirements noted
above were filled on short notice by visiting personnel
summoned from New York or Washington or by those personnel
from Base Gloucester who were immediately available to work
with the RRT effort.
The need for legal assistance is a case in point. There
is always the possibility that legal action may be necessary
to spur the spill originator into effective action for immedi-
ate spill control or for long range action to prevent recurrence
of a spill. On this occasion it was necessary to lay the
background for legal action to recover government clean-up
costs.
Provision is made in the National Contingency Plan for the
OSC to request legal action from the F.W.Q.A. region involved.
In this incident such action was required, it was provided
immediately and effectively from the Northeast Region of
F.W.Q.A. and with a minimum of demand on the time of the
OSC. Consequently, he was not diverted excessively from
his primary responsibilities by the legal aspects of the
case.
-19-
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SECTION IV: (continued)
In our experience we have often seen the threat of legal
action become a deterrent to the close cooperation which
should exist between the OSC and the spill originator.
Consequently, in the interests of good relations between
the OSC and the spill originator it seems desirable that
the OSC be divorced as far as possible from apparent
involvement in legal activities and their punitive impli-
cations .
In summary: the RRT staff on this operation performed
admirably although it was overloaded with detail. As con-
stituted, it contained a bare minimum of the manpower and
skills necessary for effective operation and many of those
skills could not be employed to their best effect because
of the overload of detail in the first 3 or 4 days of the
effort.
Oil Containment and Clean-up Technique
As previously noted, the ten hour delay in notifying the
Coast Guard and the F.W.Q.A. made immediate spill control
impossible on the upper reaches of the Schuylkill.
By the time the first contractor arrived on the scene in
the lower Schuylkill, (about 18:00 on 14 NOV) problems
had developed which rendered all phases of the work diffi-
cult and made rapid clean-up almost impossible. Those
factors were:
1. The bore of the spill (that is, the black core of
sludge which contained the heaviest concentration
of pollutants) was far downstream from the spill
site.
2. The bore of the spill was extended over 10 to
30 miles of water course - perhaps more.
3. Normal spread of the oil had extended to both
banks of the spill for a distance of 40 miles
or more.
4. By the time equipment could have reached the upper
Schuylkill (after the 10 hour delay) the bore of
the spill had passed that area, the source of the
spill had been closed off, and only thin films
remained to be picked up.
-20-
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SECTION IV: (continued)
Other factors called for the utmost care In the use of
equipment. Several of these factors were not immediately
recognized. In fact, some were only apparent after several
days of the operation.
These were:
1. The Schuylkill river, swollen by heavy rains, was
running at a rate of 3 knots or more at most portions
of its course.
2. The natural catch basins and back-waters where
relatively low current flow could be expected had
not been surveyed and charted for spill purposes.
3. The large volume of debris dislodged by the floods
was a major hindrance to normal operations of equip-
ment. (Debris shown in the boom in Exhibit 10 was
later pushed into the cove in the foreground for
removal by crane.)
4. The spilled oil (in concentrated form) may have
had a Specific Gravity very close to 1. Company
personnel reported it to be .95 or more. If so,
its rate of rise would be very slow and the
effectiveness of booms and skimmers would be
adversely affected, but this was not on the record
until 18 NOV when it was reported to the Documentation
Team.
5. From Douglasville (the spill source) to the Delaware,
access to the river banks was either difficult or
impossible for heavy equipment, trucks and personnel.
Extensive search was needed to find even a few spots
in the Philadelphia area where shore-based operations
could be effective.
Had the above factors been known and understood, better
sites could have been chosen for clean-up operations and
equipment could have been deployed to greater effect.
For example:
1. Lock 60 at Mont Clare was an almost ideal trap
basin. Without any effort on anyone's part,
substantial quantities of oil and debris collected
-21-
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SECTION IV: (continued)
in the approaches to the abandoned lock. (See
Exhibit 9.)
If a diversion boom could have been installed to
reach from the East end of the Black Rock Dam to
a point 1500' upstream on the West Bank river before
the spill reached that point, it is probable that
upwards of 80% of the oil could have been trapped
in Lock 60. (Exhibit 11.) Actually, two barriers
would be required. A debris barrier should be
upstream of the diversion boom to prevent damage
by logs and branches.
Obviously, the time delay factor nullified that
opportunity, but it should be kept in mind as a
possible permanent defense against other spills.
2. Efforts to "contain" the spill in booms strung
across the lower Schuylkill were fruitless. Excessive
current, plus debris, broke booms repeatedly. The
change to the diversion boom pattern used success-
fully at Penrose Bridge should have been made as
soon as the rapid current was noticed. (See
Exhibit 4.)
The first attempt to "contain" the spill by use
of a boom was not effective, damaged equipment,
used up manpower and spent money to no avail.
This is because the true function of a boom in a
moving oil spill situation is not yet thoroughly
understood.
The boom should be used primarily to assist the
clean-up operation by urging the oil into areas
where skimmers or vacuum pumps can be used effectively.
Containment cannot be divorced from clean-up. A
boom strung across a flowing stream or tidal creek
(as at Woodbury Creek in Exhibit 6.) will collect
a pool of oil as shown in the photo. As increasing
amounts of oil are collected in the pool, skimming
can be effective if proper equipment is available.
If such equipment is not used, the pool of oil soon
expands beyond the capacity of the boom to contain
it, seepage occurs under the boom and the oil con-
tinues downstream. The booms shown did perform a
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SECTION IV: (continued)
useful function in preventing some quantities of
oil in the Delaware (in the foreground of the picture)
from proceeding upstream of Woodbury Creek under
the influence of tidal action in the Delaware.
Considerable training of personnel is needed to
spread the doctrine that clean-up is the objective
of the operation, not just containment. The placing
of the very first boom should have been done at a
spot where clean-up operations were feasible.
3. If the spilled oil did, in fact, have a very high
specific gravity, it would be very slow to rise to
the surface and separate from the water after being
submerged by turbulence in the rapid current.
Consequently, the booms placed in rapid current under
the Spring Garden Street Bridge had little opportunity
to collect oil pools (though some debris was collected
at that point) and there is no record of any skimming
operation at those booms.
Just above the Spring Garden Street Bridge is the
Fairmount Dam, (Exhibit 3.) and upstream of the
dam the river is wide, deep and has very slow surface
current for a distance of several hundred yards.
This pool above the dam would have been an ideal
place for oil to rise to the surface of the water.
A diversion boom placed in that area would have had
ideal conditions for collecting a large pool of oil
suitable for effective skimming.
Access to the water was readily available on the
East bank of the river at that point.
4. The Filter Fence placed at the Douglasville Bridge
just below the spill site worked effectively to
absorb the thin film of oil flowing along the
West Bank of the Schuylkill at that point.
Construction of the Filter Fence started on 17 NOV
and it was not reported complete until 21 NOV or
22 NOV. Rigging the fence in the fast flowing river
was slow and costly in view of the minimum amount
of surface oil flowing at the time.
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SECTION IV: (continued)
5. The operations at Penrose Bridge (Exhibit 4.) and
at Ft. Miflin were well sited and effective. In
each case, diversion booms were placed to lead the
oil and oil soaked debris out of the river current
and into a quiet backwater where clean-up operations
could be effective. At Penrose Bridge, clamshell
buckets removed 828 tons of oil soaked debris and
loaded it into trucks. At Fort Miflin, 2 small
skimmers removed over 23,000 gallons of oil from
the pool and a crane removed debris.
6. Disposal of oil-soaked debris was finally concen-
trated at a dump site near Gloucester City, N.J.
The site was approved by the New Jersey Health
Department for the purpose. Recovered oil was
delivered to the Atlantic-Richfield refinery in
Pennsylvania. Disposal of residue still in the
Lagoons at Berks Associates is planned but the
method is undecided as yet.
In Summary: the contractors who operated the booms and
clean-up equipment responded promptly to the emergency, they
worked long hours under difficult conditions so that clean-
up of the oil available to them on the Schuylkill was nearly
100%.
Their efforts were severely handicapped by the 10 hours
delay at the start of the emergency. Each contractor had
his own ideas on procedure and the use of equipment could
have been improved if there had been more consultation with
the OSC or someone else on his staff who understood advanced
techniques of booming, skimming and disposal.
Nevertheless, the clean-up was effected and for a total
estimated cost far less than has been incurred in many
smaller spills.
Facilities and Assistance Supplied by Base Gloucester
(Gloucester City, New Jersey) Coast Guard Base is 4
nautical miles from the confluence of the Schuylkill and
Delaware Rivers and on the New Jersey shore.
The commanding officer of Base Gloucester is Captain Of
The Port of Philadelphia. The authority of the Captain
Of The Port Office plus the local knowledge of the area,
the expertise of the base personnel and the facilities
-24-
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SECTION IV; (continued)
available were invaluable to this operation.
When the RRT was activated on the afternoon of 14 NOV Base
Gloucester took fast action to provide an Operations Room
equipped with desks, phones, map and blackboard facilities.
By the time RRT personnel arrived arrangements had been
made for Base Gloucester's patrol boats for river transpor-
tation on the Delaware and to the head of navigation on the
Schuylkill. Base personnel had been dispatched on reconnais-
sance missions to locate the approaching oil and initial
contacts had been made with contractors who could assist
in the oil spill clean-up operations.
Reservations were available for housing and transportation
of the RRT personnel and the beginnings of a communication
network had been arranged for keeping in touch with the
Federal and State agencies, the public and others involved
in the spill operations. The effect of this preparatory
effort made it possible for RRT personnel to devote immedi-
ate attention to the requirements of the spill situation
and only a minimum amount of their time was diverted to
non-productive activities. Subsequent to the arrival of
the RRT personnel, Base Gloucester continued to supply
personnel, equipment, and facilities to assist the clean-
up effort.
Helicopter flights over the area were performed by Coast
Guard aircraft based in New York. This had one drawback
in that the aircraft assigned to this mission were not
authorized to land at Base Gloucester's heliport for
technical reasons. This necessitated a 40 minute trip
to or from the Philadelphia International Airport for
personnel making the overflights.
It would have been far more effective to have chartered
a commercial helicopter and permitted it to operate from
the heliport at Base Gloucester. Such an arrangement could
have provided immediate transportation for one or two
knowledgeable observers on each flight and would have had
the additional advantage that a smaller helicopter could
have landed at many spots close to clean-up operations.
The cost of such charter could well have been less than
the direct operating cost of the flights dispatched from
New York.
-25-
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SECTION IV: (continued)
One minor deficiency in the Operations Room was the absence
of a detailed map of the Schuylkill River above the head of
navigation. U.S.C.G.S. maps were requisitioned for this
purpose and were delivered about 21 NOV. Over-the-counter
purchase could have provided this valuable information at
a much earlier point in the operations.
In summary the contribution by Base Gloucester personnel
was so significant that other Coast Guard bases should
be prepared for similar duty, when and if the need arises.
E. Public Relations
Public Relations problems have often become a major prob-
lem to the On Scene Commander (or his counterpart) on
other spills. In this situation, the OSC and his PR staff
personnel made effective contact with local news media on
14 NOV and maintained good relations. Daily press releases
were accurate and concise. Telephone requests for information
were answered promptly and completely.
The results were evident in the excellent newspaper coverage
which was comprehensive and accurate. It avoided any hys-
terical pronouncements or premature conclusions.
Presence of a competent PR man on the RRT staff is most
desirable and proved its worth on this occasion. PR
problems did not become an undue burden on the On Scene
Commander.
F. Relations With the Spill Originator
Berks Associates, Douglasville, Pennsylvania, is a producer
of lubricating oils reclaimed from waste crank-case oils
gathered from filling stations in the Pennsylvania, Dela-
ware, New Jersey area.
As such, it performs a useful service and is an example of
the potential for effective recycling of industrial wastes.
Unfortunately, the site chosen for long term storage of
the 5% or 10% (by volume) of unusable residue was a
hazardous site within 60* of the bank of the Schuylkill
River. (Exhibits 1. and 2.) The dikes which contained
the residue were not leak proof, there was no effective
method for draining rain water from the lagoons, and
an overflow finally took place with disastrous results.
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SECTION IV: (continued)
The company's monitoring of the dikes was not continuous,
even during the extended rain which preceded the spill.
The potential danger was realized by the Pennsylvania State
Board of Health which required a "safety" lagoon dike to be
installed a few weeks before the spill, but the "safety"
dike failed to hold in the emergency.
The company's immediate reaction to repairing the dike was
fast and as effective as could be expected. The company
had very few resources, fiscal, personnel or equipment-wise
to contribute to the clean-up effort.
Unfortunately, the owner did not put on a good show of
cooperative effort. The record shows that company repre-
sentatives invited to take part in post-spill conferences
on two or more occasions failed to attend, although the
owner of Berks Assoc. did contact the OSC by 'phone.
Furthermore, Berks Associates had been cited for 26
violations of pollution laws since 1951, and the State
Department of Sanitary Engineering reported that corrective
action had been unsatisfactory in most cases.
Legal action against the company was started (or preparation
for it was started) by both the State and the Federal Govern-
ment at an early date. F.W.Q.A. legal work started Sunday,
15 NOV.
The company's immediate response was to file for bankruptcy
and the final adjudication of the company's payment of
clean-up costs is months away.
Effects on. Ecology
The petroleum residue spilled into the Schuylkill River
was known to contain high concentrations of polluting
chemicals. Consequently all agencies were concerned about
the possible damage to the ecology of the region. The
ecological forces of the Pennsylvania Department of Health
initiated a program of sampling the river conditions and
the mobile laboratory of the F.W.Q.A. from Edison, New Jersey
took samples of the river water plus a careful sampling of
the materials remaining in the breached lagoons at Berks
Associates.
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SECTION IV: (continued)
Apparently the rapid current in the river moved the
dangerous materials from the Schuylkill into the Delaware
and eventually out to sea before major damage could be
done to the river bottom and banks of the Schuylkill.
Some pollution was obvious at Tinicum Island in the
Delaware and in marshes along the New Jersey shore of
the Delaware below Philadelphia.
By the time the RRT ceased operation the consensus of
opinion was that no severe short-range damage was apparent.
Samples of the spilled material analyzed at the laboratory
in Edison, New Jersey indicated a high content of phenols
and a lead content of 2 to 5 milligrams per liter. Such
concentrations would normally make the river water unfit
for irrigation or other farm uses.
However, there were indications that the spilled materials
were highly miscible in water and the concentrations
measured may eventually have little effect. Long-range
effect on the ecology obviously requires time for its
accurate evaluation and is thus beyond the scope of this
report.
EXHIBITS
1. Plant and lagoons of Berks Associates,
Douglassville, Pennsylvania 29
2. Breaks in dikes and area of riverbank pollution 29
3. The lover Schuylkill River from Fairmont Dam to
confluence with Delaware River 30
4. Corps of Engineers barge and boom placement at
Penrose Avenue Bridge 30
5. Boom at Mantua Creek, N.J 30
6. Booms at Woodbury Creek, N.J. 30
7. Riverbank pollution leaching into Schuylkill River .... 31
8. The Upper Schuylkill River. West Philadelphia to
Douglassville 31
9. Debris in Lock 60 (Black Rock Dam) . . 32
10. Debris Cleanup at Penrose Bridge 32
11. Black Rock Dam and Lock 60 at Mont Clare
(Phoenixville, Pa.) 32
-28-
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EXHIBIT 1.—
Refinery plant
and lagoon of
Berks Associates
on Schuylkill
River, Douglas-
ville, Pa.
EXHIBIT 2. — Breaks in dikes, and area of riverbank pollution.
29
-------
EXHIBIT 3.— The lower Schuylkill
River from Fairmont Dam to confluence
with Delaware River.
EXHIBIT 4.— Corps of Engineers
barge and boom placement at Penrose
Avenue Bridge.
EXHIBIT 5.— Boom at Mantua Creek,
N.J.
EXHIBIT 6.— Booms at Woodbury
Creek, N. J.
30
-------
EXHIBIT 7.— Riverbank pollution
leaching into Schuylkill River.
EXHIBIT 8. — The upper Schuylkill River from West Philadelphia to Douglasville.
31
-------
EXHIBIT 9.
Dam).
Debris in Lock 60 (Black Rock
• \ A
'
32
EXHIBIT 10. — Oil and debris cleanup at
Penrose Avenue Bridge.
EXHIBIT 11. ~ Black Rock
Dam and Lock 60 at Mont Clare
(Phoenixville, Pa.).
-------
SLIDE DISPLAY
Berks Associates at Douglassvllle 33
Bridge at Douglassville 37
Lock 60 - Black Rock Dan 38
Boon at Spring Garden Street Bridge .... 40
Diversion Boon at Penrose Avenue
Bridge 41
Cleanup operations at Penrose
Avenue Bridge 42
Cleanup operations at Fort Mylin
Pier . .45
SLIDE R-16. — Berks Associates plant on Schuylklll River at
Douglassvllle, Pennsylvania. Refinery in foreground, lagoons in
background.
33
-------
SLIDE R-17. — Oil storage lagoons at refinery plant
operated by Douglas Associates on Schuylkill River.
Schuylkill River on left.
SLIDE R-18. — Oil storage lagoons. In foreground is the Schuylkill River
and area of oil spill over riverbank and into the river.
34
-------
SLIDE A-27. — Dike at oil storage lagoon containing used oil with sulphuric
acid residues.
SLIDE A-28. — Location of first overflow showing fresh earth in repaired area.
Lagoon contained oil with lead residues.
35
-------
SLIDE A-29. — Bottom of "safety" lagoon. Dike in background.
v i
SLIDE A-31. — Location of second overflow from "safety" dike. Man is
standing on fresh earth repair site.
36
-------
SLIDE A-22. — Downstream half of filter
fence being assembled.
SLIDE A-25. — Bridge at
Douglassville from which
filter fence was suspended.
SLIDE A-23. — Upstream half
of filter fence. Note rapid
current of river.
SLIDE A-24. — Upstream fence in place, deflected by current of river.
37
-------
SLIDE A-32. — Lock 60, Black Rock Dam, Mont Clare, Pennsylvania, showing
oil and debris collected in the abandoned lock.
SLIDE A-34. — Upstream entrance to Lock 60.
38
-------
SLIDE A-35. — 011-and-debris rake (center, right) built on site.
Control ropes are being pulled from the left.
SLIDE A-33. — The large, floating debris rake, now pulled up to shore,
is cleaned out with long-handled rakes.
39
-------
SLIDE A-20. — Boom at Spring Garden Street Bridge.
SLIDE D-14. — Some of the oil and debris collected by boom at
Spring Garden Street Bridge.
40
-------
SLIDE R-7. — Diversion boom
trailing from Corps of
Engineers barge moored near
Penrose Avenue Bridge.
SLIDE R-20. — Diversion boom,
looking upstream.
SLIDE A-5. — Current under bulge in diversion boom.
41
-------
SLIDE A-6. — Operations at Penrose Avenue Bridge, work boat
pulling boom in place.
SLIDE A-2. — Oil and debris accumulation at Penrose Avenue Bridge
site.
42
-------
SLIDE D-4. — Work boat In
oil and debris near boon at
Penrose Avenue Bridge site.
SLIDE A-3. — Oil and debris accumulation near Penrose
Avenue Bridge.
SLIDE A-4. — Debris pickup near Penrose Avenue Bridge.
43
-------
SLIDE D-l. — Oil and debris in pile near
Penrose Avenue Bridge.
SLIDE A-9. — Oil and debris is loaded on truck for disposal,
44
-------
SLIDE A-12. — Operations at Fort Mylin Pier showing boom on water
and crane (right).
SLIDE A-13. — Oil and debris accumulation at Fort Mylin Pier.
45
-------
SLIDE D-6. — Oil and debris accumulation at Fort Mylin Pier. Oil
skimmers at left.
SLIDE A-15. — Oil skinnier sucks up oil at Fort Mylin Pier.
-------
SLIDE A-14. — Oil Is pumped from skimmers to nearby tank (shown
below) at Fort Mylin Pier.
SLIDE A-16. — Portable
separating tank at Fort
Mylin Pier.
47
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