A CASE STUDY


                         OFFICE OF WATER PROGRAMS



        ttstown \ £   N.J.

                    Atlantic City
                  Ocean City
                Wild wood
                ape May
             ape Hcnlopen
             Rrhaboth Beach

                Abstract  	 .....  t
            I.  Introduction:   Scope of the report  	  1
           II.  Summary of  findings  and recommendations 	  2
          III.  Diary of the spill	5
           IV.  Special subjects	17
                A. Oil spill preparedness—Delaware River Basin  ....  17
                B. Oil spill preparedness—Regional Response Team  ...  18
                C. Oil containment and cleanup technology 	  20
                D. Facilities and  assistance at Base Gloucester  ....  24
                E. Public relations—news media 	  26
                F. Relations with  Berks Associates  	  26
                G. Effects  on ecology	27
            V.  Exhibits	28
           VI.  Slide Display	33

                     "OIL ON THE SCHUYLKILL"
1.  Page 34 - Slide R-17
      Correct caption to read,  ".  .
.  by Berks Associates .  .  ."
2.  Page 39 - Slides A-35 and A-33.
      Captions should be reversed.
3.  Pages 45-47 - all Slides
      Correct captions to read,  ".  .
   at Fort Miflin Pier.1

                      A CASE  STUDY
On November 13, 1970,  3 million gallons   of waste  crankcase sludge
oil  spilled into  the Schuylkill  River   in  Pennsylvania.   This
document  depicts  the breadth and rapid  development  of  events and
actions  taken  as a result    of this  major  oil  spill   incident.

this was the first time the  revolving  fund was utilized  and action
taken  under the imminent  threat  provisions  of  the   Water Quality
Improvement Act of 1970.  The report attempts to project, by using
a case study format, potential problems   that could be encountered
by an  On-Scene Commander  and his team   in similar   spills.   The
Schuylkill  case  may  serve  as a reference point   around  which
effective response efforts may be planned.

This  presentation  is  based  on
the  Documentation  and  Critique
of  the  Schuylkill  River  Spill
of  November  13,  1970  prepared
by Altenburg,  Kirk  and Company,
Inc., Thompson's Point, Portland,
Maine 04102 for the Federal Water
Quality Administration under Con-
tract l-PO-000687.

               SECTION I.  INTRODUCTION:
                 SCOPE OF THE REPORT

This survey is intended to document all significant facts
relating to the Schuylkill River oil spill of November 13,

The report documents the pre-spill history of the spill
originator, the immediate causes and effects of the spill,
operational methods and techniques used in the clean-up
operation and disposal methods.

Sources of information include:

    1.  The National Contingency Plan for Oil and Hazardous
        Materials, June 1970.

    2.  A complete file of Sitreps (situation reports)
        originating at the Operations Room of the Regional
        Response Team at the United States Coast Guard,
        Gloucester City, New Jersey.

    3.  Daily logs kept by staff personnel of the RRT.

    4.  Aerial photographs of the polluted area supplied
        by the U.S.C.G. Photo Service, Third Coast Guard
        District, Governors Island, New York, New York.

    5.  Extensive interviews conducted personally or by
        telephone with approximately 20 of the key personnel
        associated with the clean-up effort.

    6.  News clippings from papers in the cities of
        Philadelphia, Reading, Pottsville, and Phoenixville
        for a period of one month beginning November 13.

    7.  Personal observations of the members of the
        Documentation Team who were on the site from
        17 Nov to 22 Nov.

Most .of the statements of fact in this report can be backed
up by one or more of the sources quoted above.Where sub-
stantiation was not available, statements believed to be
true were identified by the phrase "it was reported that....
Opinions and judgments of the Documentation personnel are
readily identified as such and are based on nearly three
years of experience in oil spill control work including two
major oil spills.


                     AND RECOmiENDATIONS

A.  Findings

    The Schuylkill River Spill was the first occasion for a
    Regional Response Team to enter the scene in accordance
    with the National Contingency Plan of June, 1970 and the
    Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970.

    It was also the first time that the F.W.Q.A. supplied an
    On Scene Commander to a major spill under the Plan.

    Conclusions by members of the Documentation Team are listed
    herewith in approximately the order that the conclusions were

        1.  There was a very regrettable delay in discovering
            the spill and in notifying F.W.Q.A. and the Coast

        2.  Once notified, both Coast Guard and F.W.Q.A.
            responded promptly, effectively and in accordance
            with the Contingency Plan.

        3.  Cooperation and assistance by the Coast Guard Base
            at Gloucester City, New Jersey was complete and

        4.  The Regional Response Team of 4 persons accepted
            its responsibility and became an effective leader
            of the response effort without loss of time.

        5.  Resources of the Delaware River Basin were not
            well organized or equipped to respond to a major
            oil spill, although the beginnings of a good
            cooperative effort were apparent.

        3.  Additional staffing of the RRT is essential to
            cope with the work, load imposed by the first
            phases of a major spill.

        7.  Oil spill contractors available in the area could
            only .supply a minimum of skills and equipment for
            the clean-up effort.

        8.  The spill originator had very little capability  to
            assist the clean-up effort beyond closing  the broken
            dikes and redistributing the  load in the lagoons on
            his property.


    SECTION II:.  (continued)

        9.   Clean-up operations  are  very  difficult  in a
            Metropolitan Area  where  traffic  and buildings
            interfere with  movement  of  equipment.

       10.   Aerial  survey facilities are  essential  for planning
            a clean-up effort  spread over a  wide  area.

       11.   Effective communications systems linking  field
            operations with the  RRT  Operation Base  are essential.

       12.   Everyone knows  how to  report  a fire but very few
            people  know how to report an  oil spill.

       13.   The OSC and his staff  were  conscious  of the  costs
            of a clean-up effort and made periodic  reviews  of
            the funds committed  and  results  obtained.

       14.   Use of  a Coast  Guard Base for Operations  Headquarters
            was very effective and other  Coast Guard  Bases  should
            be prepared for a  similar effort.

       15.   The Public Relations effort was  handled effectively.
            This resulted in unusually good  coverage  by  the
            news media.

       16.   Short range damage to  the ecology was minimal,  but
            long range effects have  yet to be determined.

       17.   When the RRT ceased  operations on 25  NOV  the waters
            of the  Schuylkill  and  Delaware Rivers were more than
            95% clear of the spill.

       18.   The RRT staff would  have been far less  effective if
            it had  been operating  on its  own without  the support
            of Base Gloucester personnel.

B.  Recommendations;

        1.   The RRT staff should be  expanded to  include

            a.  An  operations  specialist  to  back  up the  OSC
                on  equipment deployment and  technology.

            b.  A capable secretary

            c.  A contract  specialist to  handle  business
                arrangements with  contractors and to  assist
                with transportation, housing and  communications
                problems, and  to keep daily  estimates of costs


SECTION II:  (continued)

    2.  Specific responsibility for entrys in the "Commanders
        Log" should be maintained on a 24 hour basis.

    3.  The RRT should assemble an "emergency kit" so that
        the most necessary equipment for field operations
        can be hand-carried by members of the Team when they
        respond to a call.  Maps, writing materials,  cameras,
        tape recorder, portable typewriter and walkie-talkies
        should be considered.

    4.  Major attention should be given to organizing the
        resources of the major oil terminal areas for prompt
        and effective reaction to oil spills anywhere in the
        area.  This should include

        a.  Education of the entire populace on the need for
            immediate alarm in case of a spill.

        b.  Specific notification to all State Agencies
            that there is a National Contingency Plan and
            a provision for RRT action.

    5.  The inter-dependence of the containment and clean-
        up operations (of booms and skimmers) should be
        emphasized to all operators of oil spill equipment.

    6.  Each RRT should have a file of USCGS maps covering
        coastline and river basins in its area so that the
        staff could study these maps for possible trap-basin
        sites while enroute to the scene.  Careful study of
        these maps can disclosa potential areas for boom-and-
        skimmer installations, and would save precious time
        in positioning the available equipment.

    7.  Study of Documentation reports on all major spills
        should be a "must" assignment for all personnel
        assigned to an RRT.

              SECTION  III.   DIARY  OF THE

0.1.^0.0  Berks Assoc. patrol of dikes, due to several days
       of heavy rain, stopped"because rain had stopped."

03:00  (Est.) Rain resumed, raising level of contents in
       diked lagoon holding petroleum residue and storm
       water.  Lagoon contents (estimated at 3,000,000
       gallons of oil and water mix) overflowed dike,
       broke through and spilled into Schuylkill River
       approximately 3 miles west of Pottstown, Pennsylvania.

07i00  Berks Assoc. employee on way to work noticed oil in
       river at Pottstown bridge.  Gave alarm.  Berks
       personnel reacted with bulldozer and manpower to
       close leaks in dikes.  (Exhibits 1. and 2.)

07:15  Berks Assoc. notified Pennsylvania Department of

QQ^OO  Leaks closed in dikes.  (According to Berks personnel
       interviewed 19 Nov)

08:00-09:00  During this period Berks personnel notified
       State officials, who did not notify Coast Guard
       or F.W.Q.A.

       COMMENT: Notification of the spill should have gone
       to F.W.Q.A. and/or the Coast Guard at the earliest
       possible moment after alerting the waterworks group.
       The time lost was critical.  With prompt notification,
       booms could have been effective well upstream of the
       Philadelphia area.

15:00  About 15:00 there was a radio broadcast heard by Paul
       Preuss of Clean Waters, Inc. who called Gloucester
       City, New Jersey (Base Gloucester) Coast Guard at
       15:30 and also notified F.W.Q.A. in Washington, D.C.

15:30-22:00  During this period, word of the spill spread
       rapidly, and the following actions were reported by
       various groups:

       F.W.Q.A. offices were alerted at Washington, D.C.,
       Edison, N.J., and Philadelphia.  The Regional


SECTION III.  (continued)

       Response Team was activated.  A call was made to
       offer help to Pennsylvania Department of Health
       but none was requested.  Call to Commander Dash
       at Base Gloucester authorized hiring a contractor
       to combat spill.  Personnel of the Regional
       Response Team departed New York area for Philadelphia
       by auto, with instructions that F.W.Q.A. would
       provide the On Scene Commander, and Mr. Howard
       Lamp'l of F.W.Q.A., Edison, N.J., was designated.

       Executive Officer at Base Gloucester took prompt
       action to contact Pennsylvania Department of Health
       and the Regional Response Team in New York (Office
       of Intelligence and Law, 3rd District U.S.C.G. at
       Governors Island, New York) in accordance with
       National Contingency Plan.  (Oil and Hazardous
       Materials.)  He also dispatched a patrol to observe
       progress of the oil (reported to have reached
       Conshohocken area) and contacted Underwater Tech-
       nics of Camden, New Jersey, for manpower and
       equipment to start booming operations to contain
       the spill.

       Base Gloucester designated an "Operations Room" in
       HQ building and began to equip it for use by the
       OSC and his staff.

       Coast Guard patrol reported oil covered river bank
       to bank in Fairmount Park area and that inlets to
       Philadelphia Water Supply had been closed before
       oil reached them.

       At 18:30 Executive Officer of Base Gloucester con-
       ferred with Mr. Stith of Underwater Technics at
       Market Street Bridge, sent patrol to find sites
       along river where equipment could be placed.  District
       Chief of Philadelphia Fire Department assisted.  Most
       of river bank unsuitable due to highways on West
       side and railway on East bank.  Sites surveyed at
       Market Street Bridge, Getty Oil Co. grounds, Grove
       Ferry Bridge, and Gibsons Point.

       At 21:30 selected Gibsons Point site for first attempt
       at placing plastic booms.  41' Coast Guard boat
       assisted this attempt and found fast current, and
       excessive amounts of debris in river to be major
       obstacles to operation.  Booms placed across the


SECTION III.  (continued)

       current at 22:55 broke repeatedly due to fast current
       and accumulation of debris.

       At 22:00,  returned  to Base Gloucester to brief OSC
       and his staff upon  their arrival.

       Under wajt er Technics « Inc. the contractor hired about
       16:00, assembled boom, vacuum truck,  rigging and
       gear and a crew and met Commander Dash at 18:30
       near Market Street  Bridge and assisted in selection
       of a first site for working the booms.  (Exhibit 3.)

22 :OQ  RRT personnel arrive at Gloucester Base (Gloucester
       City Coast Guard Base, Gloucester City, N.J.)  Howard
       Lamp'l and Leo McCarthy of F.W.Q.A.,  Edison, N.J.,
       and Commander Robert Hanson, U.S.C.G., and Lt. JG.
       Clow, U.S.C.G., New York District.  Oil reported to
       have reached Delaware River.

       F.W.Q.A. assumed OSC responsibility.   Howard Lamp'l.

22;30  Base Gloucester activated, phone ordered and heli-
       copter requisitioned for 14 NOV.

22:45  Three vacuum trucks of Underwater Technics at spill
       clean-up sites and  3 more on the way from Atlantic-
       Richfield, who offered to process oil recovered from

22:^5  First boom deployed across current at Gibsons Point
       parted due to strong current.  It was repaired and
       parted again at 23:38.

       COMMENT:  The river current of 3K or more was
       immediate warning that boom containment would be
       unsuccessful.  Initial effort should have been to
       use diversion technique and steer the oil and
       debris into back waters or coves for removal oper-
       ations as was later done successfully at Penrose
       Avenue Bridge and Fort Miflin.

23; 15  Captain of Port (Coast Guard) issued Notice to
       Mariners closing the Schuylkill River to marine

24:00  Briefing and planning conference continued until
       01:00 14 NOV.  Off  base accommodations for RRT
       personnel arranged  by Base Gloucester.


SECTION III.  (continued)


07:25  Reported that two additional attempts to place boom
       across river resulted in parting of boom.  (Met-
       Pet boom.)

07j^45  F.W.Q.A. PR man (William Palmer) arrived at Base

08;00  Paul Preuss (Clean Waters, Inc.) on scene with

09:10  Helo overflight observed 30,000 gal. (est.) of oil
       in Delaware River.  65 miles of Schuylkill and
       Delaware rivers polluted, est. 100% covered.  5%
       very dark oil.  Plans to boom Schuylkill at Penrose
       Ave. Bridge, divert oil and debris into cove at
       W. bank, remove with crane and vac trucks.  Plan
       to spread straw upstream of Penrose Ave.  Mass
       of debris in Lock 60 discovered by helo.observers.

11^00  Light pollution reported in Mantua Creek and Woodbury
       Creek due to tidal action.  Clean waters, Inc.,
       assigned to boom  those creeks.  River current est.
       3K.  COE Team dispatched to check dike at Berks

12:00-14:QO  Conference  of RRT.  Search for more boom.

_14_:-4j>  F.W.Q.A. mobile laboratory arrives from Edison,
       N.J.  Biologist dispatched to check damage to fish
       or wildlife.

       Kenneth Biglane,  of the Federal Water Quality
       Administration Headquarters in Washington, over-
       flew the spill area with a Pennsylvania State
       Department of Health official to survey the extent
       of the problem.

15:30  Conference with State officials.

       Meeting of National Response Team in Washington
       to consider fiscal problem of this spill.

       NOTE:  23 additional personnel signed in from F.W.Q.A.,
       U.S.C.G., Corps of Engineers, State Agencies, Contractors,
       Delaware River Basin Commission, and News Media.

17:OQ  Boom at Penrose Ave. reported functioning with some
       success as a diversion boom.


SECTION III.  (continued)

       Philadelphia Municipal water  supply inlets in
       Schuylkill closed before oil  entered.

       Cost of clean-up initially estimated at $1,000,000.
       NRT asked for advice on funding.   Amount to be
       spread among several sources.

       Coast Guard personnel from Base Gloucester con-
       tinued to serve as contact between Operations
       Room and various field activities.

       Report that Atlantic-Richfield will receive and
       reprocess any oil recovered from the spill.

18:00  Additional contractor on site.  Metro Oil at
       Fort  Miflin, Clean Waters, Inc.  upstream and at
       New Jersey shore.

       Estimate (by contractor) that 23,000 gal. of oil
       had been pumped by vac. truck near Penrose Bridge.

       Fairmount Park area boomed to protect park wild
       fowl refuge.  (Canadian Geese.)  ASPCA and other
       societies active to assist that situation.

       Oil observed on Delaware River 15 miles below Phila.

       News items that Berks Assoc.  had a previous record
       of polluting the Schuylkill River.

       Large amount of debris in river is a major obstacle
       to oil removal.

       COMMENT:  In its first full day of operations, the
       RRT made its presence felt and accomplished meaningful
       progress in
       -  Sealing off the source of the spill and initiating
          steps to prevent recurrence.
       -  Marshalling manpower and equipment to prevent
          spread of spill into sensitive areas along
          Schuylkill and starting clean-up.
       -  Coordination of many agencies.
       -  Communications and Public Relations.
       -  At least 24 visitors to Operations Room were


SECTION III.  (continued)


09:00  Oil still flowing at source.  Only 10% black oil
       now apparent in Schuylkill.  90% thin film.  Corps
       of Engineers barge placed at Penrose Avenue Bridge
       to anchor one end of boom.  This worked okay .(Exhibit  4.)

       Base Gloucester boats surveying shoreline.  Moderate
       contamination noted.

       Booming completed at Mantua Creek and Woodbury Creek
       on New Jersey shore.  (Exhibits 5.  and 6.)

       Helo flight could not survey Darby Creek areas in
       approach pattern to Philadelphia International
       Airport.  Control tower would not permit.

12:15  Dr. Maurice Goddard of Pennsylvania State Forest
       and Waters Administration authorized use of snag
       boat "Sheriff" through November 16.  Operating
       funds a problem.

16:00  No serious damage to ecology reported as yet.
       Fouling of Tinicum Island and Cedar Swamp in
       Claymount Area reported.

16:08  LCDR. Dash reports "Sheriff" on scene and function-
       ing well on debris removal.  Excellent cooperation
       from Corps of Engineers.  (Gordon Dilley, Philadelphia
       District and Mr. Hittener at Fort Miflin.)

       Oil at Ft. Miflin reported  5" thick ahead of boom.
       Some booms later became tangled due to debris.  Lee
       Green, spill master for Metro Oil, operating vacuum
       truck with 2 small skimmers.  Oil recovered 800 to
       900 gallons.  Expected operations to be ineffective
       after dark.

       Pockets of oil reported at  Market Street Bridge and
       Grey's Ferry Avenue Bridge.

14:30  National Response Team -  second meeting on fiscal

18:00  At least 16 visitors interviewed at Operations Room,
       Base G.


SECTION III.  (continued)

16:59  First report from COE personnel at Berks Assoc.
       that a third dike is filled to danger" point.
       State Health Department asked to lower level in
       that lagoon.

       Two tank trucks dispatched to Berks Assoc. by OSC
       to pump over-loaded lagoon, which contained residue
       with high acid content.

       Planning underway for a disposal area for oil soaked


08:56  Underwater Technics to spread straw upstream from
       Penrose Bridge.

09^08  Booming completed at Woodbury and Mantua.

11:30  No CG Helo available.  Pennsylvania Air National
       Guard provided a helo at 11:30.

       Coast Guard National Strike Force personnel arrived
       on scene as observers to assist anywhere.

       Civil Defense reports 40-60,000 gallon trucks were
       available for waste if needed.

       River 80% covered above Philadelphia.

12:30  National Strike Force observers assigned to liason
       duty at Berks Assoc. and upper area of Schuylkill

       Straw being spread at Wissahicken Creek using a
       straw gun.

       Debris being delivered to Warren Sand and Gravel
       in Falls Township, New Jersey for disposal.

       Estimate 30,000 gallons now skimmed.  130 people

22:00  Kurt Young of Worthington Corp. arrived with one
       Mop-Cat and 2 debris baskets.

       At least 13 visitors interviewed at Operations Room.


SECTION III.  (continued)


08:30  Some oil still entering river at source.  Debris
       still a major problem with booming and skimming

       Lt. Kangeter of Base Gloucester observing Mop-Cat
       operations.  Mop-Cat not self sufficient - needs
       shore based crane for debris removal support.

       Coast Guard tugs dispatched to aid in debris
       removal at Penrose Bridge.

       Bird lovers offer to wash geese and feed birds at
       Fairmount Park.

       Berks Assoc. notified of responsibilities by tele-
       gram from Mr. Klashman, F.W.Q.A., Director of N.E.

       Filter fence being set up below Douglasville.

       4 pumps dispatched to Berks lagoons.  Total capacity
       of 212,000 gph.  Lagoon level to be lowered in
       anticipation of more rainfall.

       Limited traffic authorized through boom on Schuylkill.
       One hour notice required.

       Straw spreading discontinued on lower Schuylkill.

       Plans for Pennsylvania State Health Department to
       monitor dikes at Berks Assoc. in event of serious

18:00  At least 19 visitors interviewed.


08:00  Oil still entering river at Douglasville.

       Level of oil in lagoons lowered 21 below top.
       Pumping continues.

       D. W. Reynolds of Documentation Team arrives on
       scene and begins reconnaissance of area.

       Light oil observed from Ben Franklin Bridge to 4 miles
       below Delaware Memorial Bridge.  Source unknown.


SECTION III.   (continued)

       State  Department of Health announces a drive to
       identify and regulate all waste oil storage lagoons
       in Pennsylvania.  Estimates that there may be 1000
       of these lagoons.  Airplane survey being used to
       spot these lagoons.

13:00  Construction of filter fence proceeding.  Heavy
       debris pile-up reported against boom at confluence
       of Schuylkill and Delaware Rivers.  Debris reported
       collecting at an upstream lock site.  (Later identi-
       fied as Lock 60.)

       W. M.  Altenburg of Documentation Team arrives on scene,

       No skimmers in use on Schuylkill River.  Two reported
       in use by Metro Oil in Ft. Miflin on the Delaware.

       Debris disposal site not satisfactory due to great
       distance from clean-up site.  New dump being sought.

18:00  At least 9 visitors interviewed.


08:00  Some oil still entering Schuylkill at Douglasville.
       Lagoon level has been lowered.  Debris in river
       still  a problem to clean-up operations.

08;30  Documentation Team personnel start inspection of
       spill  and clean-up operations.  On site inspections
       made at Penrose Bridge, Fort Miflin, Spring Garden
       Street Bridge, Filter Fence at Pottstown, Spill
       Site at Douglasville and Lock 60 at Montclair.
       See Section IV for comments on operations.

09:QO  Radio  "beepers" leased from communication suppliers
       for signalling contractors in field.  This provided
       better communication to field personnel when needed.

13:00  Report received that State of Delaware concerned
       about  future ability of Berks Assoc. to handle
       waste  oil collected in Delaware.

15:00  NRT reviews situation at lagoon and requests by
       Pennsylvania State Officials for Federal funds to
       remove lagoon contents.  Decision by NRT that
       imminent threat of further spill has been eliminated,


SECTION III.  (continued)

       and no further removal of material needed at present.

16:00  Offers of extra vehicles from GSA and other Govern-
       ment agencies in Philadelphia area.  Report that
       pockets of oil along shores of Schuylkill have
       been cleaned out by water hoses so that oil can
       go downstream to boomed areas.

18:00  At least 16 visitors interviewed.


Q8;QO  Flow of oil on Schuylkill very light.

09:QO  Possible incineration of lagoon contents being
       explored by OSC with local equipment manufacturer.

       Documentation Team conducting personal interviews
       and telephone interrogation with State officials,
       Base Gloucester personnel, Philadelphia City
       officials and contractor personnel.

       Report received from Corps of Engineers concurring
       with estimate from Raymond International, that
       dikes at Berks Assoc. would probably have failed
       a second time if level of contents had not been

       Second boom being installed at Spring Garden Street
       Bridge.  Possibility of booming above the dam was

02:00  Report that Metro Oil clean-up operations not needed
       beyond this date.

       Debris removal continuing at Fort Miflin and Penrose
       Avenue Bridge.  Debris held in coves by booms.

23:45  Notice to Mariners opened lower Schuylkill to traffic.


08:00  Mr. Al Bromberg, F.W.Q.A., Edison, N.J., relieves
       Howard Lamp'l as OSC for week-end.

       Documentation continues interviews with Coast Guard


SECTION III.  (continued)

       personnel at Base Gloucester.

       Booms removed at Mantua and Woodbury Creeks in

       Second boom cancelled at Spring Garden Street Bridge.

       Estimate by contractor that debris clean-up can be
       completed at Penrose Avenue on Monday or Tuesday.

       General consensus that river is relatively clean
       and operations can be phased out in near future.

11:30  Some oil clinging to riverbanks.  No decision on how
       to clean up river banks.   (Exhibit  7.)

       Helo flight also shows Delaware River much improved.
       Report that most debris arriving at Spring Garden
       Street is free of oil.

12:00  Report that debris pick-up at Lock 60 was continuing
       by Philadelphia Water Department.  When completed,
       oil would be picked up by an oil spill contractor.


08:00  Documentation Team personnel departed Philadelphia
       area after checking Penrose Bridge site where 80%
       of debris had been removed.

       Filter fence at Douglasville reported functioning
       effectively.  Absorbent material renewed as necessary.

       Only one downstream boom in position - at Spring
       Garden Street.

       Helo overflight reports very little oil evident on
       river.  Pockets at Lock 60 and Penrose Avenue still
       to be cleaned-up.

       Contractors operations reduced over week-end to
       avoid overtime costs.


08:00  Oil reported stopped at source.  Delaware River
       reported clean.  Very little oil evident on Schuylkill,
       mostly in Phoenixville area.


SECTION III.  (continued)

       Plans reported to remove Filter Fence on 24 Nov,
       finish debris clean-up at Penrose Avenue, Lock 60
       (Black Rock Dam.)

       RRT to de-activate on 25 Nov.  Situation to be
       monitored by Philadelphia office of F.W.Q.A.

18:00  Estimate that 4 contractors and Corps of Engineers
       have accumulated costs of $122,603 to date.  Does
       not include direct costs incurred by F.W.Q.A. and

       828 tons of Oil Soaked Debris reported removed from
       Schuylkill by Underwater Technics.  Cost estimate
       to incinerate lagoon contents being considered.


08:45  Mr. Lamp'1 and Mr. Palmer, F.W.Q.A., enroute Federal
       Court Hearing on emptying of Berks Assoc. Lagoons.

13:25  Pennsylvania Rivers and Forests Department notified
       to secure operation of snag boat "Sheriff."


08:00  Overflight reports less than 10% oil at any point
       in Schuylkill, Delaware clean and no oil from source,

       Mr. Horowitz, Philadelphia F.W.Q.A., on site as
       OSC for  last stages of clean-up.

       Total contractor costs now estimated at $130,881
       as of 24:00, Nov 23.

       Last boom removed at Spring Garden Street Bridge.

       News report that an agreement was reached to
       strengthen dikes at Berks Assoc. pending eventual
       disposition of the contents.  Agreement approved by
       Federal  Court Judge.

       RRT on-site activities ceased as of 12:00 this date.


                SECTION  IV:   SPECIAL  SUBJECTS

A.  Oil Spill Preparation in Delaware River  Basin

    In the very early stages of this  clean-up  operation it
    was evident that the many resources  of the Delaware River
    Basin were not well  organized  to  mount an  effective effort
    against a major oil  spill.

    The beginnings of an organization were apparent.   The 10
    major oil terminal operators had  formed  the "Oil  Control
    Coordinating Committee"  and had assembled  some items of
    equipment at their various bases.  Early in the operation
    they offered 1250' of curtain  type containment boom.  The
    equipment was used,  cleaned, and  repaired  by Base Gloucester
    before returning it  to the committee.

    Most of the State agencies involved  were aware of the
    potential dangers of a major oil  spill and they cooperated
    willingly in most instances with  the RRT.

    The spill was first  discovered by Berks  Assoc. personnel.
    However, those personnel and personnel of  the water districts
    on the upper Schuylkill  River  (Exhibit 8.) and in Philadelphia
    who took prompt action to close the  inlets to their water
    supply systems failed to notify either the Coast  Guard or
    the F.W.Q.A.

    This oversight is hard to explain in view  of the  publicity
    that has attended these  major  spills.  It  may be  that detailed
    instructions had not reached these agencies through official
    channels because the ramifications of this particular spill
    went beyond the areas normally affected  by a spill in tidal
    waters.  In any event steps should be taken to insure that
    peripheral agencies  understand their responsibilities under
    such circumstances.   The delay caused by this oversight was
    approximately 10 hours on 13 NOV  (from 7:30 a.m.  to 3:30 p.m.)
    and the time lost permitted the oil  to cover such a wide
    area that all opportunity of confining  it  near the source
    was irrevocably lost.

    During the clean-up, cooperation  was offered by many State
    agencies and used effectively. The  snag boat "Sheriff" was
    of great value in combatting floating debris.  A  team from
    the Philadelphia Water District removed  debris caught in the
    dead water at Lock 60.  (Exhibits 8. and 9.)  Government
    Agencies (GSA, Corps of  Engineers, Air Force, National
    Security Commission  and others) offered  equipment and


    SECTION IV:  (continued)

    In summary the cooperation by individuals and departments
    was of a high order as soon as the problem was understood
    and the specific needs were recognized.

    Admittedly it is not possible to instruct a large metro-
    politan area in all facets of a major oil spill.  However,
    a public relations program illustrating the aid and assistance
    which could be useful might be good material for a TV program
    on the subject.

    As far as could be determined, there were no skimmers avail-
    able in the area except two small skimmers used by Metro Oil
    in their operation at Fort Miflin.

    In Summary:  the Delaware River Basin area (including the
    Schuylkill river course) should take steps to activate a
    more effective plan and to marshal1 additional equipment
    against the possibilities of a future spill.  Most important
    of all, prevention measures should be started wherever there
    is a potential for a spill of oil or hazardous materials.

B.  Oil Spill Preparedness - Regional Response Team

    The National Contingency Plan for Oil and Hazardous
    Materials dated June, 1970 provides a comprehensive and
    authoritative background for the response of Government
    agencies to an oil spill situation.

    This plan has been distributed to the concerned agencies
    of the Federal Government and its implication is beginning
    to be thoroughly understood.

    It was obvious that Coast Guard personnel at Base Gloucester
    were aware of this plan and prepared to implement it to the
    extent that their normal duties, special training, and
    equipment would permit.

    Personnel of the RRT seemed to be thoroughly familiar
    with the plan and their operations on the scene conformed
    to the text and to the spirit of the document.

    It was fortunate that the personnel assigned to the RRT in
    the New York area could draw upon an extensive background
    in combatting oil spills.  The OSC was Mr. Howard Lamp'l of
    the F.W.Q.A. at Edison, New Jersey.  He has participated in
    clean-up activities at several major spills and is acquainted


SECTION IV:  (continued)

with many of the contractors available to the Northeast
Region of the F.W.Q.A.  Commander Robert Hanson of the
Third District Coast Guard in New York has observed oil
spill operations and has broad experience with Coast Guard
reaction to emergency situations.

The make-up of the RRT included a public relations man from
the F.W.Q.A. and a staff assistant for Commander Hanson.

A staff of four is a bare minimum for the job at hand.
Additional personnel were needed in the first two or three
days for communication, transportation, housing, and liaison
with field personnel.  A competent secretary for the staff
would have been invaluable.  There should also have been
someone on the team in addition to the OSC who could pro-
vide detailed instruction for contractors and their personnel
in adapting equipment to the infinite variety of situations
encountered in a major spill.

On this assignment Mr. Lamp1! had the technical knowledge
of equipment and its use but he was initially overloaded to
a serious degree by the diverse requirements for decisions
on a host of other subjects.

It was indeed fortunate that many of the requirements noted
above were filled on short notice by visiting personnel
summoned from New York or Washington or by those personnel
from Base Gloucester who were immediately available to work
with the RRT effort.

The need for legal assistance is a case in point.  There
is always the possibility that legal action may be necessary
to spur the spill originator into effective action for immedi-
ate spill control or for long range action to prevent recurrence
of a spill.  On this occasion it was necessary to lay the
background for legal action to recover government clean-up

Provision is made in the National Contingency Plan for the
OSC to request legal action from the F.W.Q.A. region involved.

In this incident such action was required, it was provided
immediately and effectively from the Northeast Region of
F.W.Q.A. and with a minimum of demand on the time of the
OSC.  Consequently, he was not diverted excessively from
his primary responsibilities by the legal aspects of the


SECTION IV:  (continued)

In our experience we have often seen the threat of legal
action become a deterrent to the close cooperation which
should exist between the OSC and the spill originator.
Consequently, in the interests of good relations between
the OSC and the spill originator it seems desirable that
the OSC be divorced as far as possible from apparent
involvement in legal activities and their punitive impli-
cations .

In summary:  the RRT staff on this operation performed
admirably although it was overloaded with detail.  As con-
stituted, it contained a bare minimum of the manpower and
skills necessary for effective operation and many of those
skills could not be employed to their best effect because
of the overload of detail in the first 3 or 4 days of the

Oil Containment and Clean-up Technique

As previously noted, the ten hour delay in notifying the
Coast Guard and the F.W.Q.A. made immediate spill control
impossible on the upper reaches of the Schuylkill.

By the time the first contractor arrived on the scene in
the lower Schuylkill, (about 18:00 on 14 NOV) problems
had developed which rendered all phases of the work diffi-
cult and made rapid clean-up almost impossible.  Those
factors were:

    1.  The bore of the spill (that is, the black core of
        sludge which contained the heaviest concentration
        of pollutants) was far downstream from the spill

    2.  The bore of the spill was extended over 10 to
        30 miles of water course - perhaps more.

    3.  Normal spread of the oil had extended to both
        banks of the spill for a distance of 40 miles
        or more.

    4.  By the time equipment could have reached the upper
        Schuylkill (after the 10 hour delay) the bore of
        the spill had passed that area, the source of the
        spill had been closed off, and only thin films
        remained to be picked up.


SECTION IV:   (continued)

Other factors called for  the utmost care In the use of
equipment.  Several of these factors were not immediately
recognized.   In fact, some were only apparent after several
days of the  operation.

These were:

    1.  The  Schuylkill river, swollen by heavy rains, was
        running at a rate of 3 knots or more at most portions
        of its course.

    2.  The  natural catch basins and back-waters where
        relatively low current flow could be expected had
        not  been surveyed and charted for spill purposes.

    3.  The  large volume of debris dislodged by the floods
        was  a major hindrance to normal operations of equip-
        ment.  (Debris shown in the boom in Exhibit 10 was
        later pushed into the cove in the foreground for
        removal by crane.)

    4.  The  spilled oil (in concentrated form) may have
        had  a Specific Gravity very close to 1.  Company
        personnel reported it to be .95 or more.  If so,
        its  rate of rise would be very slow and the
        effectiveness of booms and skimmers would be
        adversely affected, but this was not on the record
        until 18 NOV when it was reported to the Documentation

    5.  From Douglasville (the spill source) to the Delaware,
        access to the river banks was either difficult or
        impossible for heavy equipment, trucks and personnel.
        Extensive search was needed to find even a few spots
        in the Philadelphia area where shore-based operations
        could be effective.

Had the above factors been known and understood, better
sites could  have been chosen for clean-up operations and
equipment could have been deployed to greater effect.

For example:

    1.  Lock 60 at Mont Clare was an almost ideal trap
        basin.  Without any effort on anyone's part,
        substantial quantities of oil and debris collected


SECTION IV:  (continued)

        in the approaches to the abandoned lock.  (See
        Exhibit 9.)

        If a diversion boom could have been installed to
        reach from the East end of the Black Rock Dam to
        a point 1500' upstream on the West Bank river before
        the spill reached that point, it is probable that
        upwards of 80% of the oil could have been trapped
        in Lock 60.  (Exhibit 11.)  Actually, two barriers
        would be required.  A debris barrier should be
        upstream of the diversion boom to prevent damage
        by logs and branches.

        Obviously, the time delay factor nullified that
        opportunity, but it should be kept in mind as a
        possible permanent defense against other spills.

    2.  Efforts to "contain" the spill in booms strung
        across the lower Schuylkill were fruitless.  Excessive
        current, plus debris, broke booms repeatedly.  The
        change to the diversion boom pattern used success-
        fully at Penrose Bridge should have been made as
        soon as the rapid current was noticed.  (See
        Exhibit 4.)

        The first attempt to "contain" the spill by use
        of a boom was not effective, damaged equipment,
        used up manpower and spent money to no avail.
        This is because the true function of a boom in a
        moving oil spill situation is not yet thoroughly

        The boom should be used primarily to assist the
        clean-up operation by urging the oil into areas
        where skimmers or vacuum pumps can be used effectively.

        Containment cannot be divorced from clean-up.  A
        boom strung across a flowing stream or tidal creek
        (as at Woodbury Creek in Exhibit 6.) will collect
        a pool of oil as shown in the photo.  As increasing
        amounts of oil are collected in the pool, skimming
        can be effective if proper equipment is available.
        If such equipment is not used, the pool of oil soon
        expands beyond the capacity of the boom to contain
        it, seepage occurs under the boom and the oil con-
        tinues downstream.  The booms shown did perform a


SECTION IV:  (continued)

        useful function in preventing some quantities of
        oil in the Delaware (in the foreground of the picture)
        from proceeding upstream of Woodbury Creek under
        the influence of tidal action in the Delaware.

        Considerable training of personnel is needed to
        spread the doctrine that clean-up is the objective
        of the operation, not just containment.  The placing
        of the very first boom should have been done at a
        spot where clean-up operations were feasible.

    3.  If the spilled oil did, in fact, have a very high
        specific gravity, it would be very slow to rise to
        the surface and separate from the water after being
        submerged by turbulence in the rapid current.

        Consequently, the booms placed in rapid current under
        the Spring Garden Street Bridge had little opportunity
        to collect oil pools (though some debris was collected
        at that point) and there is no record of any skimming
        operation at those booms.

        Just above the Spring Garden Street Bridge is the
        Fairmount Dam, (Exhibit 3.) and upstream of the
        dam the river is wide, deep and has very slow surface
        current for a distance of several hundred yards.

        This pool above the dam would have been an ideal
        place for oil to rise to the surface of the water.
        A diversion boom placed in that area would have had
        ideal conditions for collecting a large pool of oil
        suitable for effective skimming.

        Access to the water was readily available on the
        East bank of the river at that point.

    4.  The Filter Fence placed at the Douglasville Bridge
        just below the spill site worked effectively to
        absorb the thin film of oil flowing along the
        West Bank of the Schuylkill at that point.

        Construction of the Filter Fence started on 17 NOV
        and it was not reported complete until 21 NOV or
        22 NOV.  Rigging the fence in the fast flowing river
        was slow and costly in view of the minimum amount
        of surface oil flowing at the time.


SECTION IV:  (continued)

    5.  The operations at Penrose Bridge (Exhibit 4.)  and
        at Ft. Miflin were well sited and effective.  In
        each case, diversion booms were placed to lead the
        oil and oil soaked debris out of the river current
        and into a quiet backwater where clean-up operations
        could be effective.  At Penrose Bridge, clamshell
        buckets removed 828 tons of oil soaked debris  and
        loaded it into trucks.  At Fort Miflin, 2 small
        skimmers removed over 23,000 gallons of oil from
        the pool and a crane removed debris.

    6.  Disposal of oil-soaked debris was finally concen-
        trated at a dump site near Gloucester City, N.J.
        The site was approved by the New Jersey Health
        Department for the purpose.  Recovered oil was
        delivered to the Atlantic-Richfield refinery in
        Pennsylvania.  Disposal of residue still in the
        Lagoons at Berks Associates is planned but the
        method is undecided as yet.

In Summary:  the contractors who operated the booms and
clean-up equipment responded promptly to the emergency, they
worked long hours under difficult conditions so that clean-
up of the oil available to them on the Schuylkill was  nearly

Their efforts were severely handicapped by the 10 hours
delay at the start of the emergency.  Each contractor  had
his own ideas on procedure and the use of equipment could
have been improved if there had been more consultation with
the OSC or someone else on his staff who understood advanced
techniques of booming, skimming and disposal.

Nevertheless, the clean-up was effected and for a total
estimated cost far less than has been incurred in many
smaller spills.

Facilities and Assistance Supplied by Base Gloucester

(Gloucester City, New Jersey) Coast Guard Base is 4
nautical miles from the confluence of the Schuylkill and
Delaware Rivers and on the New Jersey shore.

The commanding officer of Base Gloucester is Captain Of
The Port of Philadelphia.  The authority of the Captain
Of The Port Office plus the local knowledge of the area,
the expertise of the base personnel and the facilities


SECTION IV;   (continued)

available were invaluable to this operation.

When the RRT was activated on the afternoon of 14 NOV Base
Gloucester took fast action to provide an Operations Room
equipped with desks, phones, map and blackboard facilities.

By the time RRT personnel arrived arrangements had been
made for Base Gloucester's patrol boats for river transpor-
tation on the Delaware and to the head of navigation on the
Schuylkill.  Base personnel had been dispatched on reconnais-
sance missions to locate  the approaching oil and initial
contacts had been made with contractors who could assist
in the oil spill clean-up operations.

Reservations were available for housing and transportation
of the RRT personnel and  the beginnings of a communication
network had been arranged for keeping in touch with the
Federal and State agencies, the public and others involved
in the spill operations.   The effect of this preparatory
effort made it possible for RRT personnel to devote immedi-
ate attention to the requirements of the spill situation
and only a minimum amount of their time was diverted to
non-productive activities.  Subsequent to the arrival of
the RRT personnel, Base Gloucester continued to supply
personnel, equipment, and facilities to assist the clean-
up effort.

Helicopter flights over the area were performed by Coast
Guard aircraft based in New York.  This had one drawback
in that the aircraft assigned to this mission were not
authorized to land at Base Gloucester's heliport for
technical reasons.  This  necessitated a 40 minute trip
to or from the Philadelphia International Airport for
personnel making the overflights.

It would have been far more effective to have chartered
a commercial helicopter and permitted it to operate from
the heliport at Base Gloucester.  Such an arrangement could
have provided immediate transportation for one or two
knowledgeable observers on each flight and would have had
the additional advantage  that a smaller helicopter could
have landed at many spots close to clean-up operations.
The cost of such charter  could well have been less than
the direct operating cost of the flights dispatched from
New York.


    SECTION IV:  (continued)

    One minor deficiency in the Operations Room was the absence
    of a detailed map of the Schuylkill River above the head of
    navigation.  U.S.C.G.S. maps were requisitioned for this
    purpose and were delivered about 21 NOV.  Over-the-counter
    purchase could have provided this valuable information at
    a much earlier point in the operations.

    In summary the contribution by Base Gloucester personnel
    was so significant that other Coast Guard bases should
    be prepared for similar duty, when and if the need arises.

E.  Public Relations

    Public Relations problems have often become a major prob-
    lem to the On Scene Commander (or his counterpart) on
    other spills.  In this situation, the OSC and his PR staff
    personnel made effective contact with local news media on
    14 NOV and maintained good relations.  Daily press releases
    were accurate and concise.  Telephone requests for information
    were answered promptly and completely.

    The results were evident in the excellent newspaper coverage
    which was comprehensive and accurate.  It avoided any hys-
    terical pronouncements or premature conclusions.

    Presence of a competent PR man on the RRT staff is most
    desirable and proved its worth on this occasion.  PR
    problems did not become an undue burden on the On Scene

F.  Relations With the Spill Originator

    Berks Associates, Douglasville, Pennsylvania, is a producer
    of lubricating oils reclaimed from waste crank-case oils
    gathered from filling stations in the Pennsylvania, Dela-
    ware, New Jersey area.

    As such, it performs a useful service and is an example of
    the potential for effective recycling of industrial wastes.

    Unfortunately, the site chosen for long term storage of
    the 5% or 10% (by volume) of unusable residue was a
    hazardous site within 60* of the bank of the Schuylkill
    River.  (Exhibits 1. and 2.)  The dikes which contained
    the residue were not leak proof, there was no effective
    method for draining rain water from the lagoons, and
    an overflow finally took place with disastrous results.


SECTION IV:  (continued)

The company's monitoring of the dikes was not continuous,
even during the extended rain which preceded the spill.

The potential danger was realized by the Pennsylvania State
Board of Health which required a "safety" lagoon dike to be
installed a few weeks before the spill, but the "safety"
dike failed to hold in the emergency.

The company's immediate reaction to repairing the dike was
fast and as effective as could be expected.  The company
had very few resources, fiscal, personnel or equipment-wise
to contribute to the clean-up effort.

Unfortunately, the owner did not put on a good show of
cooperative effort.  The record shows that company repre-
sentatives invited to take part in post-spill conferences
on two or more occasions failed to attend, although the
owner of Berks Assoc. did contact the OSC by 'phone.

Furthermore, Berks Associates had been cited for 26
violations of pollution laws since 1951, and the State
Department of Sanitary Engineering reported that corrective
action had been unsatisfactory in most cases.

Legal action against the company was started (or preparation
for it was started) by both the State and the Federal Govern-
ment at an early date.  F.W.Q.A. legal work started Sunday,
15 NOV.

The company's immediate response was to file for bankruptcy
and the final adjudication of the company's payment of
clean-up costs is months away.

Effects on. Ecology

The petroleum residue spilled into the Schuylkill River
was known to contain high concentrations of polluting
chemicals.  Consequently all agencies were concerned about
the possible damage to the ecology of the region.  The
ecological forces of the Pennsylvania Department of Health
initiated a program of sampling the river conditions and
the mobile laboratory of the F.W.Q.A. from Edison, New Jersey
took samples of the river water plus a careful sampling of
the materials remaining in the breached lagoons at Berks


SECTION  IV:   (continued)

Apparently the rapid current in the river  moved the
dangerous  materials from  the Schuylkill  into the Delaware
and eventually out to  sea before major damage could be
done  to  the river bottom  and banks of  the  Schuylkill.

Some  pollution was obvious at Tinicum  Island in the
Delaware and in marshes along the New  Jersey shore of
the Delaware below Philadelphia.

By the time the RRT ceased operation the consensus of
opinion  was that no severe short-range damage was apparent.

Samples  of the spilled material analyzed at the laboratory
in Edison, New Jersey  indicated a high content of phenols
and a lead content of  2 to 5 milligrams  per liter.  Such
concentrations would normally make the river water unfit
for irrigation or other farm uses.

However, there were indications that the spilled materials
were  highly miscible in water and the  concentrations
measured may eventually have little effect.  Long-range
effect on  the ecology  obviously requires time for its
accurate evaluation and is thus beyond the scope of this
          1.  Plant and lagoons of Berks Associates,
             Douglassville, Pennsylvania  	 29
          2.  Breaks in dikes and area of riverbank pollution	29
          3.  The lover Schuylkill River from Fairmont Dam to
             confluence with Delaware River 	 30
          4.  Corps of Engineers barge and boom placement at
             Penrose Avenue Bridge 	 30
          5.  Boom at Mantua Creek, N.J	30
          6.  Booms at Woodbury Creek, N.J.	30
          7.  Riverbank pollution leaching into Schuylkill River  .... 31
          8.  The Upper Schuylkill River.  West Philadelphia to
             Douglassville  	 31
          9.  Debris in Lock 60 (Black Rock Dam)	.  . 32
         10.  Debris Cleanup  at Penrose Bridge  	 32
         11.  Black Rock Dam and Lock 60 at Mont Clare
             (Phoenixville, Pa.)	32

                                                                 EXHIBIT 1.—
                                                                 Refinery plant
                                                                 and lagoon of
                                                                 Berks Associates
                                                                 on Schuylkill
                                                                 River,  Douglas-
                                                                 ville,  Pa.
EXHIBIT 2. — Breaks in dikes, and area of riverbank pollution.

   EXHIBIT 3.— The lower Schuylkill
   River from Fairmont Dam to confluence
   with Delaware River.
EXHIBIT 4.— Corps of Engineers
barge and boom placement at Penrose
Avenue Bridge.
   EXHIBIT 5.— Boom at Mantua Creek,
EXHIBIT 6.— Booms at Woodbury
Creek, N. J.

                                               EXHIBIT 7.— Riverbank pollution
                                               leaching into Schuylkill River.
EXHIBIT 8. — The upper Schuylkill River from West Philadelphia to Douglasville.

Debris in Lock 60 (Black Rock
                                                 • \ A
    EXHIBIT 10. — Oil and debris cleanup at
    Penrose Avenue Bridge.
                                  EXHIBIT 11. ~ Black Rock
                                  Dam and Lock 60 at Mont Clare
                                  (Phoenixville, Pa.).

                      SLIDE DISPLAY
      Berks Associates at Douglassvllle 	 33
      Bridge at Douglassville  	 37
      Lock 60 - Black Rock Dan	38
      Boon at Spring Garden Street Bridge  .... 40
      Diversion Boon at Penrose Avenue
           Bridge	41
      Cleanup operations at Penrose
           Avenue Bridge  	 42
      Cleanup operations at Fort Mylin
           Pier .          	              .45
SLIDE R-16. — Berks Associates plant on Schuylklll River at
Douglassvllle, Pennsylvania.  Refinery in foreground, lagoons in

SLIDE R-17. — Oil storage  lagoons  at  refinery  plant
operated by Douglas Associates on Schuylkill  River.
Schuylkill River on left.
SLIDE R-18. — Oil storage  lagoons.   In  foreground  is  the  Schuylkill  River
and area of oil spill over  riverbank  and into  the river.

SLIDE A-27. — Dike at oil storage lagoon containing used oil with sulphuric
acid residues.
SLIDE A-28. — Location of first overflow showing  fresh earth  in  repaired  area.
Lagoon contained oil with lead residues.

 SLIDE A-29.  — Bottom of "safety" lagoon.   Dike in background.
      v  i
 SLIDE A-31. — Location of second overflow from "safety" dike.  Man is
 standing on fresh earth repair site.

SLIDE A-22. — Downstream half of filter
fence being assembled.
                                                     SLIDE A-25. — Bridge at
                                                     Douglassville from which
                                                     filter fence was suspended.
SLIDE A-23. — Upstream half
of filter fence.  Note rapid
current of river.
SLIDE A-24. — Upstream fence in place, deflected by current of river.

 SLIDE  A-32.  — Lock  60,  Black  Rock  Dam, Mont  Clare, Pennsylvania,  showing
 oil  and  debris collected in  the  abandoned  lock.
 SLIDE A-34. — Upstream entrance to Lock 60.


SLIDE A-35. — 011-and-debris rake  (center,  right) built on  site.
Control ropes are being pulled from the left.
SLIDE A-33. — The large, floating debris rake, now pulled up to shore,
is cleaned out with long-handled rakes.

   SLIDE A-20.  —  Boom  at  Spring  Garden  Street Bridge.
  SLIDE D-14.  —  Some  of  the  oil and debris  collected by boom at
  Spring  Garden Street Bridge.

                                        SLIDE R-7. — Diversion boom
                                        trailing from Corps of
                                        Engineers  barge moored near
                                        Penrose Avenue Bridge.
 SLIDE R-20.  — Diversion boom,
 looking upstream.
SLIDE A-5. — Current under bulge in diversion boom.

 SLIDE A-6. — Operations at Penrose Avenue Bridge, work boat
 pulling boom in place.
 SLIDE A-2. — Oil and debris accumulation at Penrose Avenue Bridge

                                                 SLIDE D-4. — Work boat In
                                                 oil and debris near boon at
                                                 Penrose Avenue Bridge site.
                           SLIDE A-3.  — Oil and debris  accumulation  near Penrose
                           Avenue Bridge.
SLIDE A-4. — Debris pickup near Penrose Avenue Bridge.

SLIDE D-l. — Oil and debris in pile near
Penrose Avenue Bridge.
 SLIDE A-9.  — Oil and debris is loaded on truck for disposal,

 SLIDE A-12. — Operations at Fort Mylin Pier showing boom on water
 and crane (right).
SLIDE A-13. — Oil and debris accumulation at Fort Mylin Pier.

SLIDE D-6. — Oil and debris accumulation  at  Fort Mylin Pier.  Oil
skimmers at left.
SLIDE A-15. — Oil skinnier  sucks  up oil at Fort Mylin Pier.

SLIDE A-14. — Oil Is pumped from skimmers to nearby tank  (shown
below) at Fort Mylin Pier.
                                                   SLIDE A-16. — Portable
                                                   separating tank at Fort
                                                   Mylin Pier.