PA
United States
Environmental Protect ion
Agency
Air
Region H Office
26 Federal Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10007
EPA 902/4-79-007
December 1979
THE SOCIETAL COSTS
OF CONGESTION IN
NEW YORK CITY
WITH APPENDICES
-------
THE SOCIETAL COSTS OF CONGESTION
IN
NEW YORK CITY
(WITH APPENDICES)
Submitted to
Environmental Protection Agency
Air Programs Branch
Air and Hazardous Materials Division
Region II
26 Federal Plaza
New York, New York 10007
Contract No. 68-02-2860 Task Order No. 1
EPA Project Officer: John N. Filippelli
Submitted by
Citizens for Clean Air Inc.
32 Broadway
New York, New York 10004
December 1979
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This report was prepared as an account of work
sponsored by the United States Government.
Neither the United States nor the United States
Environmental Protection Agency, nor any of
their employees, makes any warranty, express or
implied, or assumes any legal liability or
responsibility for the accuracy, completeness,
or usefulness of any information, apparatus,
product, or process disclosed, or represents
that its use would not infringe privately owned
rights. Reference herein to any specific com-
mercial product, process, or service by trade
name, mark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not
necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement,
recommendation, or favoring by the United States
Government or any agency thereof. The views and
opinions of authors expressed herein do not
necessarily state or reflect those of the United
States Government or any agency thereof.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION 1
PART I 3
1. Horses to Transit
2. Flooded With Cars
3. Profiting From Congestion
4. "Body Crushed Against Body"
PART II 18
1. Manhattan
2. Changing Patterns of Travel
3. The Midtown Commons
4. The Cost of Auto/Highway Travel
5. Some Costs of Congestion
PART III 38
1. To Gather, To Collect, To Heap Up,
To Congest
2. Managing Traffic and Transit
3. Delivering the Goods
4. Uniform Tolls and Free Fares
5. The Pedestrian Option
6. Plus Ca Change...
EPILOGUE: COMMONS SENSE 54
FOOTNOTES 57
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 62
APPENDICES
1 .' An Estimate of Some Direct and Indirect Costs
of Highway Transportation in Manhattan, New York
City, the Tri-State Region and the United States
for 1978
2. A Study of Travel Times and Speeds in Midtown
Manhattan
3. Annotated Bibliography
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Page
Table 1. Driving Speeds for Selected
Metropolitan Areas for 1972 20
Figure 1. Patterns of Travel to the CBD 24
Table 2. Highway Transportation Costs for 1978 30
Table 3. Existing and Proposed Tolls
for Access to Manhattan 46
Figure '2. Pedestrianizing the Borough
of Manhattan 49
Figure 3. Pedestrianizing the Lower Manhattan CBD..50
- ii -
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INTRODUCTION
Traffic congestion is the common cold of cities and as seemingly
incurable.
In Paris, London, Los Angeles, Singapore, Tokyo - in almost all
the large cities of the world - moving and commuting are commonplace
hardships. In Cairo, where vehicles still encounter occasional live-
stock, a blue haze suffuses even the side streets and the traffic
fatality rate is many times that of New York City. In Teheran, a New
York Times reporter wrote that before the revolution congestion preven-
ted friends from dining together, lovers from sleeping together, and
the suddenly ill from arriving at hospitals. In Lagos, Nigeria, traffic
police have from time to time been ordered to publicly whip moving
offenders as examples. Madrid, faced with an influx of a million cars
a day and a thick veil of smog, has decided to relieve the pressure by
building an entirely new city on its northern outskirts.
New York City is no exception. In Manhattan, particularly in midtown,
the daily crush is unequaled among American cities in volume, variety,
and intensity. It induces more pollution and imposes more societal and
economic costs on its inhabitants than any other locality in the
country- People, private cars, buses, taxis, motorcycles, bicycles,
trucks of all shapes and sizes, pushcarts, repair crews, construction
workers, and the specially priviliged compete for space along arteries
so overcrowded that the word "transportation" no longer fully describes
what is taking place.
Almost perversely, no one knows what this congestion costs though
its causes, characteristics and effects have been studied for more than
70 years. "Pollutants may be quantified to parts per billion,"
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complained one engineer, "but the costs of congestion are not quantified
at all." Nor is there general agreement about what the term means.
Like "art", congestion has come to stand for a commonplace experience
of extraordinary complexity. Yet because urban congestion is an
imposition, by definition, upon multitudes of people, its costs, in
New York as elsewhere, are considerable.
Because they are largely unknown, they are largely ingored: by
government planners who annually dispense millions of public dollars
and alter lifestyles by their policies; in the countless daily decisions
made by businesses that have no way of calculating how much of their
time, labor, maintenance and depreciation are chargeable to congestion;
and by families that have no way of understanding the effects on their
health and budgets of living in heavily congested areas.
This report is an attempt to address some of these issues - in
particular, it is an attempt to begin to attach a price to the
congestion in midtown Manhattan and to describe how such analyses can
be made. Part I describes how Manhattan's congestion has grown and
changed with the shaping of the city. Part II looks at transportation
patterns in Manhattan as they currently exist, with emphasis on midtown,
and then examines both the costs of traveling by motor vehicle and the
additional costs incurred as a result of the city's chronic congestion.
Part III recommends ways of relieving this congestion and equitably
distributing the costs of moving about in New York City.
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PART I
1. Horses to Transit
Manhattan has always been congested - and so badly and so
consistently that many view congestion as a necessary evil, part and
parcel of the city's growth, a negative indicator of an-otherwise
vigorous economy. Long before automobiles decisively shifted the burden
of moving about from transit companies to individual drivers,
Manhattan's great streets were famous for their tumult. Overhead rail-
ways, unpaved surfaces, horses, raised tracks, waves of immigrants,
and a galloping technology little concerned with personal comfort all
mitigated against orderly movement.
Throughout the Nineteenth Century, commercial drays and private
coaches clogged the city's thoroughfares; the harbor was dense with
ferries and vessels of every, available kind. Everyone, except the
wealthy, walked to work. Those who commuted from Brooklyn ferried across
the East River, then walked. But the presence of dray animals, singly
and in teams, and the crudity of the streets and their density made an
excursion of any length into an expedition. Polluted air, even then,
was a major irritant though much of it was caused by the stabling and
excretia of many thousand horses.
In 1827, a 12-seat open stagecoach called The Accomodation gave
New Yorkers their first taste of public transit. For a modest fare, a
passenger was able to travel as far north as Bleecker Street which
2
marked the beginning of suburban Greenwich Village. Four years later,
more advanced horse-drawn coaches called Omnibuses (from the Latin "for
all") began regular runs. Though slow and awkward, they quickly became
popular and by mid-century dominated an important new Manhattan
- 3 -
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industry - public transit.
Private coaches, horse-drawn rail cars, commercial haulers and
pedestrians all claimed the same limited streets. The results were
disastrous. One chronicler wrote that "lower Broadway was so over-
crowded with omnibus traffic that a person could cross the street only
at risk of life and limb." Another wrote that "It takes more skill
to cross Broadway...than to cross the Atlantic in a clamboat." Still
others described the thoroughfare as "A serried mass of seething
humanity" or as a place where "even the nimblest of New Yorkers stands
3
on the curbstone and lays out a plan before marching across..."
The opinion, was universal.. Editorialists raged and newspapers
routinely published schemes for reducing the congestion but conditions
only worsened. Innovation, congestion, expansion and more innovation
followed each other in a tireless cycle: by the turn of the century
New Yorkers were using and testing river ferries, 8-seat winter sleighs,
elevated railways (both cable and steam powered), electric railways,
trolley cars with overhead and underground wires, and a secretly built
and Tammany scuttled Broadway subway propelled by a giant electric fan.
Manhattan, rapidly spreading north, became a jungle of pedestrians,
coaches, horses, noise, dirt, elevateds, tracks, mud, wires, and iron.
Every new transit scheme seemed to peak at the moment the ribbon was
cut to inaugurate its service, presaging a new round of optimism and
disappointment. Bodies and goods were successfully borne but rarely in
comfort and rarely as efficiently as stockholders had promised - or had
been promised. Only the route to public disenchantment was swiftly
crossed, and the cause was always related to the overcrowding of streets
by vehicles and of vehicles by people.
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Writers began to apply "congestion" to the language of traffic as
well as medicine and biology. The new usage proved all too appropriate.
"People are packed into them (street railways) like sardines in a box
with perspiration for oil...like smoked hams in a corner grocery,"
complained one contemporary.
Yet it was more than physical comfort that angered the public. From
the beginning, congestion was understood to be the end product of
political corruption and incompetent planning. The April 16, 1359 New
York Times, for example, complained that omnibus franchises were
giveaways because of what they cost the city in street maintenance and
that transit proposals were routinely made without:
"reference to any comprehensive system, and the whole machinery
of lobbying, and of grinding committees is set to work to carry
out these ruinous plans...The consequence is the carrying out
of scheme after scheme, no one having any relation to the
other.4.with the least amount of public accomodation.""
Again and again, the New York press complained about the lack of
a comprehensive transportation plan, warning that a chaotic city filled
with chaotic transit systems would result.
Indeed, New York grew rapidly and anarchically. Between 1860 and
1901, 1,000 miles of railway track were laid within the city and,
while population increased by about 30 percent every ten years, rider-
o
ship increased twice as fast.
Even the definition of the city was changing. In 1864, 42nd Street
was a northern boundary with everything beyond a wasteland inhabited by
squatters. In 1883, the Brooklyn Bridge and its state-of-the-art cable
car railway opened for business and profoundly changed travel in and
between Brooklyn and Manhattan. In 1898, the City of Brooklyn became the
Borough of Brooklyn as the City established its current boundaries.
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By then traffic, including cattle, constantly jammed the Brooklyn Bridge
at levels far higher than anticipated.
Meanwhile, the Broadway omnibuses had been replaced by horse cars
in 1885, which were replaced by cable cars in 1893, which were replaced
by electric cars in 1901. And by that year, 1901, the pattern of New
York's creeping paralysis was becoming clear. The October issue of the
Street Railway Journal observed that the worst congestion in the city
was located, respectively, at the intersections of Broadway, 34th
Street and Sixth Avenue; Fourth Avenue and 23rd Street; Columbus Circle;
and Broadway and 23rd Street. The Journal also reported that public
transit lines were running at capacity all day long and that midday
traffic was always heavy because of the city's shopping and entertain-
Q
ment facilities. A population of 3.5 million people was making more
1.1 billion passenger trips per year.
It was widely believed about this time that New York was congested
largely because its thoroughfares were still clotted with horses and
their unwieldy loads. One 1908 study estimated that they cost the city
$100 million a year in sanitation and related expenses. In less
abstract terms, this meant disposing of 912 million pounds of manure,
22 million gallons of urine, and 1,500 carcasses. But horses were on the
way out, giving way before electric trains and gasoline powered vehicles.
In 1904, New York welcomed its first practical subway; in 1905, the
first motor bus route in the country was established along Fifth Avenue.
And automobiles, privately owned and driven (itself a revolutionary
change), were appearing in greater numbers and proportions. Apart from
their anticipated sanitary virtues, they were expected to eliminate
congestion and "the nervousness, distraction, and strain of modern
12
metropolitan life."
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But the reality was treacherous. By 1915, motor vehicles were
causing so many accidents that New York City began to maintain traffic
statistics. In December 1915, The World, summarizing the city's data,
reported that 18,223 traffic accidents had occured that year and resulted
in 21,723 injuries and 612 deaths.13
The figures also showed that 90 percent of all the traffic measured
in the city lay within Manhattan and that the number 6f city auto
licenses had increased by 270 percent since 1910 while the accident -rate
had increased by 893 percent. Rush hour congestion was blamed for much
of the increase. With more than 100,000 cars licensed in the city, New
Yorkers were beginning to realize that the new century's cure for
arterial congestion was only a more virulent strain of the disease
itself.
2. Flooded With Cars
By the mid-Twenties, congestion had become severe enough to warrant
front page newspaper coverage. Clocking traffic jams and blaming them
on poor roads even became a sort of editorial sport. But the coverage
only reflected what readers were experiencing. Streets and avenues were
swamped by an established cacophony of autos, trucks, carts, jitneys,
trolleys, buses, elevateds, railways and people. Roads were too few -.
and narrow; in terrible condition within the city and unpaved outside.
In fact, from 1918 to 1932 New York City did not construct a single
14
mile of arterial road within its boundaries.
In 1934 Robert Moses rose to municipal power - and maintained
that power for the next 34 years, until 1968. So extensive was his
influence during this era, that the history of the city's transportation
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(and congestion) can justifiably be divided into three periods: Before
Moses, During Moses, and After Moses.
During Moses, New York experienced an explosion of highway building
such as no city in the world had ever seen. Moses built the Major
Deegan, Van Wyck, Sheridan, Bruckner, Gowanus, Prospect, Whitestone,
Clearview, Throgs Neck, Cross-Bronx, Brooklyn-Queens, Nassau, Staten
Island and Long Island Expressways; the Belt Parkway, the Brooklyn-
Battery Tunnel, the Hudson River Drive, and the West Side Highway; and
the Triborough, Verrazano, Throgs Neck, Marine, Henry Hudson, Cross Bay,
and Bronx-Whitestone Bridges - and the list is incomplete. By 1964,
he was responsible for 899 miles in the New York region, more than
twice the amount any other American metropolis even possessed.
For this entire tenure, Moses insisted one of his primary goals
was to relieve congestion.
Moses, appeared to maintain a distance from public transit but this
posture concealed an antipathy from which the region's transit systems
have yet to recover. For example, Moses deliberately built expressways
with overpasses too low for passenger buses. He dismantled elevateds
and trolley lines without replacing them. He diverted enormous funds
from transit to highway uses, and he obstructed public transit funding
efforts.
The result was congestion raised to grand guignol, a tragic parody
of planning. "By building his highways, Moses flooded the city with
cars," wrote Robert Caro in his extraordinary biography:
"by systematically starving the subways and the suburban
commuter railroads, he swelled that'flood to city-destroying
dimensions. By making sure that the vast suburbs, rural and
empty when he came to power, were filled on a sprawling, low-
density development pattern relying primarily on roads instead
of mass transportation, he insured that that flood would
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continue for generations...His highways and bridges and
tunnels were awesome...but no aspect of those highways and ,g
bridges and tunnels was as awesome as the congestion on them."
For years no one questioned Moses when he said one of his goals
was to alleviate congestion. He was even considered a major authority
on its relief despite the fact that his highways, bridges and tunnels
routinely jammed without visible draining any traffic from the routes
they were intended to free. In retrospect, it seems like a- kind of mass
hallucination in which an entire populace refused to believe the
evidence of its own experience.
The only event which successfully decreased New York's congestion
during this period was World War II. Gas and tire rationing, shortages,
conscription, and the freeze on commercial auto production reduced
traffic to tolerable levels. But it only seemed to make the shock that
much greater when, following the war, congestion skyrocketed to new and
intimidating levels. The public was outraged but confused. Meanwhile,
assembly lines in Detroit began to pour 25,000 cars a day into an
apparently bottomless market, and one which Robert Moses was paving
the way for in New York.
A curiousity of the era is an article Moses wrote entitled "The
19
Problem of Midtown Traffic." "At most," explained Moses, "we can
put an embargo on further mistakes," whereupon he proposed a plan to
deal with the sudden onset of postwar congestion in midtown. His
recommendations included zoning reforms, the provision of off-street
loading facilities, synchronized traffic lights, stricter enforcement
of existing regulations, night truck deliveries, arcades to create new
lanes and sidewalk space, selective vehicle exclusion, restrictions on
taxi cruising, and the installation of parking meters.
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Sensible, progressive, prophetic; the article is a virtual preview
of the transportation control plans that would begin to be written 37 years
later to fulfill the requirements of the 1970 Clean Air Act. But Moses'
article only served as a prelude for a follow-up article entitled "The
Highway Maze."20 This time, Moses outlined for the public his postwar
highway program. It was a song of cement and its scale overwhelmed any
thoughts he may have given to decongesting midtown. Boasted Moses:
"...we shall have the finest collection of land bridges, intersections,
clover leaves, chicken guts, ever conceived since Daedalus built the
labyrinth for Minos of Crete, a 'mighty maze'." Moses neglected to
mention that Daedalus' maze was designed to confuse and trap anyone
unfortunate enough to enter.
3. Profiting From Congestion
As New York's highway builders long ago learned, congestion can be a
profitable business. Though studies often neglect the enormous profits
congested arteries generate, bodies such as the Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey and powers such as Moses did not, though they
proclaimed themselves to be above such concerns. Moses, for example,
wrote that his program to relieve midtown congestion could only be
implemented "in the teeth of powerful and bitter opposition, the
f\ -t
opposition which makes money out of congestion."
He meant himself, for it was his network of toll roads, bridges
and tunnels - controlled largely through his chairmanship of the
Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority - that grovided the economic
base for his influence. In 1941, the Authority's annual income was $8
million. By 1967, it was $75 million, exclusive of its capitalization
22
potential. The flow of coins from the morass of highway projects
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purportedly designed to relieve congestion was worth not millions but
billions of dollars to both Triborough and its chief rival, the Port
Authority.
In 1953, Triborough1s surplus was $500 million while the Port•
23
Authority's surplus was $700 million. Traffic, meanwhile, had by then
23
increased by more than 450 percent over pre-war levels. The year 1953
is noteworthy because it marks one of the few attempts to estimate how
much congestion costs in dollars and cents.
The effort was by a businessman's association called the Citizens
Traffic Safety Board, Inc. which published a study entitled, "The Cost
25
of Traffic Congestion and Traffic Accidents in the City of New York."
Though it shied from analyses, the report concluded that congestion was
then costing the city's people and businesses $1 billion a year. This
is equivalent to $2.4 billion in 1978 dollars.
The study was based on a financial survey of more than 200
businesses, many of which operated both inside and outside of the city
and were thus able to compare their expenses in both areas. Congestion
was operationally defined as that level of crowding over and above
normal traffic conditions. Unfortunately, "normal levels" were not
defined. Costs were ascribed to congestion by deducting normal level
costs. In this manner the Board concluded that congestion was responsible
in 1953 for $350 million in additional wages, $100 million in retail
sales losses, $175 million in accelerated vehicle depreciation, $75
million in additional fuel bills, $57 million in extra taxi fares, and
$70 million in additional vehicle repairs and maintenance, plus a host
of further costs.
Other attempts to quantify the cost of the city's congestion were
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9fi
made by the Regional Plan Association (RPA) in 1924, the City
2 Q
Club of New York in 1973,27 and Citizens for Clean Air in 1976. RPA
estimated that congestion cost New York $465 million in 1924, with
half the total accruing in Manhattan. But this was based largely on
an extrapolation of figures prepared for other cities.
The City Club's study estimated that roadway congestion cost New
Yorkers $1 billion a year, recalling the conclusion, of the earlier
Citizens Board, and warned that there was still a tremendous latent
demand for auto travel in the city and in the greater metropolitan
area. It recommended a variety of remedies including the establishment
of hack stands to replace taxi cruising, reforms in truck delivery
and traffic management practices, public transit improvements, vehicle
restrictions and additional vehicle charges.
The study also included a consideration of the societal costs
imposed by congestion, which it noted were "the most difficult to
quantify, but the heaviest in their impact on the public." Its analysis
was limited to a look at vehicular air pollution but it reflected a
growing public concern about the effect of congestion on the city's
environmental quality.
In 1976 Citizens for Clean Air investigated these "difficult to
quantify" costs. The study was the first attempt to price the cost to
New York City of congestion-induced air, water, and noise pollution,
increased stress and the subsidies that support unrestrained vehicle
use. It also outlined a methodology by which such costs could be
quantified and concluded that congestion was costing New York City
$2 billion a year.
In the mid-Fifties, societal impacts, such as those produced by
air pollution and stress, counted for little, if anything, in the
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public's perception of the problem. As the Citizens Board study illus-
trates, congestion was seen as a serious problem because of its effect
on vehicle life, accident rates, and the efficient conduct of business.
The solution was widely believed to be more highways and more parking
space.
But those who built and financed highways and garages were aware
that congested facilities were a highly profitable and reliable source
of revenue. In 1959, for example, Dun & Bradstreet stated that "the
success of toll facilities...is largely dependent upon the adequacy of
the approaches and connecting highways. Thus...every improvement in
this system of highways... is likely to increase to some extent the
29
traffic on those facilities." Dun & Bradstreet, therefore, recommended
that more highways be built so as to better service the toll facilities.
4. "Body Crushed Against Body"
The rules changed as the stakes increased. In January 1955, the
Triborough and Port Authorities published a "Joint Study of Arterial
Facilities." Previously rivals, the two authorities had recognized
their mutual interests and were now proposing to build an unprecedented
series of bridges and expressways. These projects would enlarge and
service their existing toll empire, criss-cross every borough and reach
30
into Long Island and New Jersey.
The Joint Program was a virtual blueprint to exploit the metro-
politan area's enormous reserves of energy and industry. As Robert Caro
concluded, "The two giant authorities were dividing the po-tential
profits from the city's traffic as if congestion were a large and
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. ,,31
succulent pie.
They largely succeeded. From 1955 to 1965, Triborough alone spent
$755 million in Joint Program road projects and nothing on public
transit. The federal and state governments spent $1.2 billion on Joint
Program highway projects and nothing on public transit. The regional
commuter railroads, unable to compete, slid toward bankruptcy. The
city's subway system adopted "deferred maintenance," a euphemism for
neglect, as policy. By 1965, the Joint Program had resulted in 439
miles of new metropolitan roadway and not one inch of new commuter rail
or subway track.
One of the finest public transportation systems in the world was
becoming one of the worst. Enough transit patrons to populate an
additional city had been pressed either to switch from transit travel
to travel by automobile or to abandon New York-entirely. Meanwhile,
congestion reached new heights - not because population was increasing,
as had been assumed, but because commuters were moving out of reach of
rail, bus and subway systems and into the scattered suburbs. Private
cars provided the only means of going to and from work and the Joint
Program's 439 miles of highways made the trip seem practical and
appealing. Naturally congestion grew worse, especially in the central
business districts.
Though the Joint Program accelerated this trend, it had already
been well underway. In 1951, the Regional Plan Association reported
that auto commuting into New York City had increased by 321 percent
since 1930 while total commuting had only increased by 19 percent and
while the number of families in the areas surrounding the city had
32
increased by only 50 percent. RPA made the implications of these
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increases graphically clear by pointing out that "The automobiles
required to transport the equivalent of one trainload of commuters use
about four acres of parking space in Manhattan." RPA explained that
such space is about eight times the size of Grand Central Station's
main concourse or equal to all the parking capacity along one side of
Fifth Avenue from Washington Square to 68th Street.
In 1977, RPA updated its figures with startling results. The
Association reported that between 1950 and 1975 New York City had lost
324,000 people, 438,000 jobs below 60th Street in Manhattan, and 606
million annual subway rides. Nevertheless, 177,000 more people were
entering Manhattan's central business district by car each workday.
"Congestion" was becoming a euphemism.
One result of the discovery of these trends, which were not con-
fined to New York, was that relieving urban congestion became a federal
concern. The 1970 Clean Air Act and the Environmental Protection
Agency's establishment of air quality standards reflected findings that
vehicular congestion was responsible to a significant degree for urban
air pollution. New York City, which suffered from some of the nation's
worst congestion and most polluted air, responded by developing a
34
Transportation Control Plan in 1973. Its purpose was to enable the
city to achieve national air quality standards by relieving traffic
congestion. Its premise was that automotive activity must be limited
while corresponding improvements were made in public transit systems.
For perhaps the first time, a major American city had declared war on
congestion by holding that unrestricted auto use and the construction
of more highways and parking lots were part of the problem not the
solution.
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Unfortunately, the Plan was never put into effect. After the city
and the state adopted it, and after EPA approved it, the new city
administration of Mayor Abraham Beame went not into action but into
court. The ensuing legal actions outlasted Beamefs tenure and ended
with the Supreme Court. Though the city lost at every step, it successfully
avoided taking any action to relieve congestion during those years.
Throughout the period, the Plan never received widespread public
support. Few New Yorkers understood its full scope and requirements
while numerous special interest groups strongly opposed specific sections.
Federal agencies, for their part, did little to educate the public or
build a constituency while city and state agencies actively fought the
Plan and frequently misrepresented its requirements and likely effects.
In 1977 Congress amended the Clean Air Act, having recognized
that New York and other states were stonewalling the requirements of the
Act. The Amendments included new requirements for the states to revise
their transportation and air quality plans with the full participation
of the public. The goal this time around was to establish a planning
process that would produce plans to relieve congestion that could be
implemented. One section, known as the Moynihan/Holtzman Amendment, was
crafted to require New York City to improve its mass transit systems. By
passing it, the Congress acknowledged for the first time that decent
transit systems reduce urban congestion and air pollution.
New York's response was a new planning process coordinated by the
Tri-State Regional Planning Commission and directed by the State Department
of Transportation. On January 29, 1979, the bulk of the new plan was
presented at a public hearing; 134 speakers testified against it, most
recommending that it be disapproved by EPA and rewritten. No one
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testified in its behalf. On March 16, the State presented the transit
element of the plan for public hearing. The results were almost identical
and included a denunciation by Congress-woman Elizabeth Holtzman,
the ammendment's co-sponsor.
As of this writing, the full Plan is awaiting action by EPA.
Whatever the outcome, the reality is that transportation and planning
for transportation in New York City long ago entered a crisis from
which it has yet to emerge. No'new .highways .are no.w under construction;
the Second Avenue subway has been all but abandoned while other
new lines face financial difficulties. Moses1 empire has been fragmented
among a host of other agencies so that the City lacks a comprehensive
policy. The subways, meanwhile, have continued their decline only to
be joined by the city's infrastructure of bridges, highways and local
35
streets.
After more than 100 years and five generations of verbal, financial,
technological and behavioral acrobatics in the name of the relief of
congestion, New York City remains at a standstill. Writers and travelers
still refer to "cattle cars" and "sardine cans". Nor does it matter
whether the vehicles in question are autos, trains or buses; even the
best choice seems only the least evil. In 1975 Robert Caro described
conditions in 1974:
"...men and women pushed and shoved like irritable animals,
rushing for seats as animals rush for a food trough, for
without a seat they would have to stand - body crushed
against body, strangers' smells in their nostrils, strangers'
breath in their faces - in a press so dense that there could
exist in it neither comfort nor dignity nor manners."-^6
And there it stands.
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PART II
1. Manhattan
Despite its problems, Manhattan still possesses many advantages.
Centered within one of the finest harbors in the world, surrounded by
navigable rivers, its 22.9 square miles consist of rock formations
ideally suited to support skyscrapers and dense development.
These characteristics still shape Manhattan life. Though it has
but .3 percent of the metropolitan area's land, it encompasses 8 percent
of its population, 12 percent of its floor space, and 30 percent of its
jobs. It supports a residential population of 1.5 million and a daily
commuter and visitor influx of 2.85 million. The transportation
infrastructure that services these 4.35 million people includes 533 miles
of highways and and streets, 16 waterway bridges, four tunnels, 224
miles of subway and elevated track, plus many miles of underground
walkway.
All of this is at the center of a 27-county, three state region
that includes more than 18 million people. Like New York City, the
region has declined in past years in employment and in the quality of
its services. Its population, while steady, has shifted considerably;
outer areas have grown while many city neighborhoods have seen poorer
residents replace their middle class predecessors. Unless planning
priorities change, these trends are expected to continue.
Manhattan is the region's most congested and diverse county but
it is only the island's southern half that is a Central Business District
(CBD). From the Battery to 60th Street, river to river, the daily crush
is as dramatic and traumatic as any in America. Servicing this CBD on a
24-hour basis are 20 of the city's 28 subway routes, five commuter
railroads, 56 private and Transit Authority bus routes, the major intra-
- 18 -
-------
- 19 -
city bus companies, several thousand taxis, and a vast array of local
38
and regional facilities. Grand Central Station, the Port Authority
Bus Terminal, Pennsylvania Station, the major subway complexes at 14th,
34th and 42nd Streets, and more than 70 other underground stations
transport millions of passengers, house tens of thousands of businesses,
and weave together almost all of the city's systems for moving people
and goods.
Pennsylvania Station, for example, serves as a terminal for AMTRAK,
Penn Central, and the Long Island Rail Road. Overhead is Madison Square
Garden and its attached office tower. Herald Square, a major regional
shopping district, lies only a block to' the west. The station itself is
serviced by three bus routes, all the West Side subway lines and the PATH
rail system to New Jersey. The Port Authority Bus Terminal stands five
blocks to the north. Though undergoing a major expansion, it is already
the largest facility of its kind in the world and houses 184 loading
bays, parking for cars, and direct access to subway lines and the
Lincoln Tunnel.
Despite this wealth of facilities, Manhattan is still an island
with a limited number of entry points. Sixteen bridges, four tunnels,
and one ferry service comprise its links with the mainland and the
city's other boroughs. All are used by motor vehicles.
And all of Manhattan's transportation facilities, vehicle and rail,
suffer from severe congestion. A 1975 study of driving speeds for cars
and buses in 26 cities found conditions most congested in the New York
metropolitan area.^ Table 1, drawn from this report, illustrates the
extent of the problem here. Within Manhattan, congestion is even worse.
In 1973, the Manhattan Auto Study reported that driving speeds in the
island's CBD averaged 7 miles per hour with truck and bus speeds at
-------
TABLE 1; DRIVING SPEEDS FOR SELECTED METROPOLITAN AREAS IN 197i
Rush Hour Bus
Average Highway
Metropolitan Area
Cleveland
Philadelphia
Phoenix
San Diego
Houston
Detroit
Denver
Kansas City
Los Angeles
New Orleans
St. Louis
Seattle
Atlanta
Baltimore
Boston
Chicago
Miami
Milwaukee
Minneapolis
Pittsburgh
San Francisco
Dallas
Indianapolis
Portland
Buffalo
New York (including Newark)
Source: Council on Municipal
Reoort. Vnl i M~ *
Transit Soeed
15 mph
15
15
15
14
14
13
13
13
13
13
13
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
11
i r\
10
9
Performance, Municipal
Driving Speed
28 mph
24
31
36
31
36
31
37
33
36
32
27
28
25
32
25
24
25
26
26
29
31
35
33
27
22
Performance
- 20 -
-------
- 21 -
6 and 4 mph, respectively.40 A later study by Citizens for Clean Air
recorded an average midtown driving speed of 5.5 mph, with specific
avenues measuring as low as 2.4 mph.*
2. Changing Patterns of Travel
Midtown is that part of the Central Business District from 30th
to 60th Streets, river to river. Only three square miles in size, it
supports more than 1.3 million daily trips, more than 1.1 million
workers, more than 400,000 daily subway riders, more than 110,000
residents, and more than 600,000 cars, trucks, taxis and buses during a
/ O
typical weekday. It is the nation's busiest, densest locale. As the
city government is well aware:
"It is the employment center for much of New York City, the
shopping and commercial center - and the cultural and enter-
tainment center as well. Access is easy. Almost every major
transportation facility is either located within the area or
passes through it.
"With its concentration of activities, its network of trans-
portation systems and its diversity of users, the Midtown area
is a microcosm of the problems facing the City...which is beset
with the need to maintain the flow of vehicles and users without
overloading the existing transit systems and streets, and to
remain dynamic and profitable.'""
However, while trains carry most of midtown's travelers, autos
dominate its landscape. In 1978, the Department of City Planning profiled
midtown1s weekday drivers. ^ It found that about 86,000 workers commute
to the area by private car and that on a day-long basis private cars
comprise 60 percent of the number of vehicles entering the area (another
25 percent are taxis, 12 percent are trucks, and 3 percent are buses).
The study also found that 70 percent of midtown's auto commuters
are professionals: owners of businesses, managers, doctors, lawyers,
businessmen, and the like. The masculine suffix is appropriate since
* See Appendix 2.
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- 22 -
more than three-quarters of all of midtown's drivers are men - men with
an average age slightly over 40 and an average family income of $24,500.
Over the years, highway congestion to and in midtown and the CBD
has increased both relatively - in terms of the percentage of commuters
using vehicles rather than transit - and absolutely; that is, the actual
number of vehicles competing for space. As in other cities, the mass
transit systems have lost enormous numbers of riders to private autos.
Similarly, much of the freight that once came to town by rail now
comes b-y truck.
This increase in vehicle travel has been so inexorable that only the
exigencies of history and physical collapse seem to have offered
impediments. World War II halted auto production, imposed gasoline
rationing and drafted thousands of would-be commuters. In 1974, the Arab
oil embargo, the recession and the closing of much of the West Side
Highway had a similar, if briefer and lesser, impact. The Tri-State
Regional Planning Commission has succintly summarized these changes in
travel. "Between the years 1924 and 1947," wrote the Commission's planners:
"the total number of people entering the CBD increased substan-
tially to a peak of 3.7 million. However, since 1948, person
trips have been declining slightly, with some exceptions,
leveling off to 2.8 million people in 1976 and 1977- Conversely,
the number of motor vehicles entering the Manhattan CBD has grown
since 1924 to a high of 660,000 daily vehicle entries in 1973.
Subsequently, motor vehicle entries dropped to a 1976 low of
615,000. However, 1977 shows a rebound to pre-1973 numbers with
an increase to 645,000 vehicles entering."^5
The subway system, meanwhile, had essentially stopped expanding
during the Forties. Under Mayor Laguardia the individual lines were
bought from their private .owners and unified into a single network.
But in the next decade these lines began to lose riders. At its peak
in 1948, the subway system carried 2,389,000 people into the CBD
every full weekday. By 1977, the amount had slid by 38 percent to
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- 23 -
1,487,000.46
The declining job base in Manhattan is responsible for much of the
decrease in the overall amount of travel to the CBD, But it has never
been enough to offset the increases in driving and congestion. For
example the shift from transit to autos is clearly apparent during the
city's rush hours, when the impact of job losses on traffic should be
strongest. Between 1948 and 1977 transit ridership into the CBD during
the morning rush dropped by 25 percent. Auto, taxi and truck traffic
into the CBD during this same period increased by 23 percent. Moreover,
the number of people entering the CBD during the morning rush has
remained stable when expressed as a fraction of all those who'enter
during a 24 hour period. Figure 1 illustrates the changes in these
travel patterns.
A declining auto occupancy rate further contributed to the impact
of private cars. In 1948 the rate was 1.69 passengers per vehicle.
47
By 1977 the rate had crawled down to 1.43.
As these figures illustrate, vehicle travel in the CBD is increasing
both absolutely and relative to the number of people actually traveling.
Fewer people are using transit and more people are driving. However,
these trends have not gone so far as to make their impacts irreversible.
The city's extensive transit systems are in place and available as
alternatives to autos. Though in disrepair, they still transport the
vast majority of the CBD's workforce and can be renovated for far less
than the cost of equivalent new facilities. As energy grows more expensive,
such renovation should look increasingly attractive.
-------
10
Hi
«
4J
-j
(3
^i
01
I
°I-I
i-
E—
I
•-C
O
CM •
— CO
r»
cn «
—i C
O
i— I -i-f
a tc
> ec
c
- CO
O C
BS -I-
I C
J3 C
: a.
O
W5
- 24 -
FIGURE 1. PATTERNS OF TRAVEL TO THE CBD
O
I
a
ai
u
3.0
2.
2.
1.
1.4
1.2
1.0
Autos/Taxis/Trucks -6
.4
.2
Total Trips to CBD
Millions of People
3.8
3.6
2.7
^2-348
$ \
* i
* i
i
33
1V24 32
.52
^3.69
* %
i
% ^
•I
K.66
62
40
15 3 . 3 1 — 3 . 2 9
.81
.83
56
2.98
.88
2.85
^ g^
Br 'A
•>.
\ § ^
gi
.85
63
71 73 74 76
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- 25 -
3. The Midtown Commons
Like a shared pasture subjected to overgrazing, the CBD (with
midtown in particular) is subjected to more use than it can adequately
support. Fixed by geography, beseiged by vehicles of all sorts,
constricted by the habits of priviliged motorists, lacking the funds for
decent maintenance and repair, midtown's streets and avenues are becoming
less efficient and more congested with every passing year. Yet the nature
of its congestion is different from the kind experienced on highways.
Given clear weather, a drive through midtown includes encounters with
pedestrians, police, jaywalkers, other drivers and passengers, truckers,
utility and construction workers, cyclists, and local merchants and
peddlers. The variety of the city's life doesn't stop at the curb, and
the density of the city's traffic encourages it in the streets.
None of this makes stop and go traffic pleasant but a drive through
midtown reveals much about the quality of traffic management in the area.
What is most apparent is that the direct cause of a great deal of midtown's
congestion is the failure by the city to 'sufficiently enforce basic
traffic regulations. Moving violations are only rarely given while meter
maids and tow truck patrols have a limited and visibly weak effect.
There are about 61,000 off-street parking spaces in midtown and on-
street parking is either prohibited or severely limited during workdays.
Indeed, there are only about 800 free spaces and 670 metered spaces in
49
all of midtown: a plethora of restrictions and the annual issuance
of tens of thousands of parking summons theoretically protects the remaining
curb space. Yet it is exceedingly difficult to find even an illegal
parking space during the day-
All of this helps to create in the CBD a Darwinian atmosphere in
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- 26 -
which aggressive, competitive, hurried driving and parking is considered
not only normal but necessary. New York drivers long ago learned that the
most efficient way to drive in Manhattan is to always take an opening and
never give an inch. As one result, they are each other's worst impediments.
For example, drivers parking at curbs actively obstruct traffic,
sometimes blocking two moving lanes at once. This blockage increases
substantially during peak traffic hours. Truck drivers often double park
even when curb space is available to insure that no else can block them
in. Similarly, drivers (aware that traffic rules are fitfully enforced)
routinely block intersections and jump red lights. These two simple
violations occur so frequently that they cause considerable CBD congestion
and interfered with a Planning Department study of traffic flow in 1978.
(The City's Traffic Department believes that traffic agents, stationed at
intersections, could control these violations and speed the flow by up to
40 percent. Indeed, their presence may help explain why midtown traffic
moves faster 'during rush hours, when they are on the job, than during
midday, when they are not.)
There are other factors. Roadway deterioration, to cite one, has
become a major headache with many routes barely passable in good weather
and impassable in bad weather. Drainage is often poor and major arteries,
such as the FDR Drive routinely flood out and turn rush hours into chaos.
Potholes are epidemic and vary in size from shallow depressions to axle-
cracking pits. During seasonal changes, they reach crisis proportions.
The City claims it fills in more than one million per year but since this
averages out to 2,800 per day the claim is probably an exaggeration.
Whatever the true repair level may be, the streets are still so badly
pitted that British Leyland recently sent a team of experts to reproduce
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- 27 -
New York's potholes for -use at the company's British proving grounds.
Potholes are largely products of heavy truck-use, often in violation
of city rules, and sloppily filled utility cuts. According to the City's
Bureau of Highway Operations, there are about 200,000 such openings each
year for necessary underground repair. Each opening disrupts traffic for
the hours or days it is in progress. Much of this is unavoidable. But
each time a street is opened, its entire structure is weakened. This makes
the rest of the street more susceptible to pothole formation. If the cut
is poorly repaired - as the Comptroller's office indicates is common -
the street surface is further weakened. Again, the results are more potholes,
more damage and more delay. Construction blockages are more chronic.
Occasionally entire streets will be closed for a day or two. Often
streets will be partially blocked for months at a time.
But vehicles, not roads, still cause most of Manhattan's congestion
problems - and of all vehicles taxis may be the most impeding. About
3,500 of the city's 11,787 medallion cabs work midtown during normal
weekdays. They often account for up to 75 percent of the vehicles >on given
streets. Since they carry 175,000 passengers per day in midtown alone,
they combine the carrying capacity of a transit mode with the congesting
and polluting qualities of autos. Their impact is further increased by
their drivers' intensely competitive habits and because they rarely park
during the busiest hours.
Other kinds of vehicles create other problems. Bus and truck drivers,
for example, create a multiplier effect in their wake when they drive
aggressively. The size and slowness of their vehicles and the regularity
with which they straddle lanes perceptibly slows those that follow.
Even bicyclists, though relatively few, tend to follow their own
rules. This is partly explained by the city's general disregard for
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- 28 -
cyclists' needs and by the dangerous conditions that exist. The city has
begun to address this problem by providing bike lanes on the Queens-
borough Bridge, Broadway, Sixth Avenue and elsewhere. But as bike use
in the city increases, as seems likely, there will almost certainly
be a heightened competition for lane space and a corresponding increase
in injuries.
Pedestrians, tightly packed and perpetually jaywalking, impede
traffic most frequently along the streets and avenues that service
major shopping, entertainment and transportation facilities. However,
the jammed state of the roads and the disproportionate space and
services given over to vehicles encourage jaywalking and pedestrian
crowding. As a result, a walk in the CBD can easily take twice as long
as it should because of narrow sidewalks, heavy traffic, long lights
and blocked crosswalks.
Manhattan's decayed streets and poorly managed traffic did not
create its congestion but they have helped to increase it to levels
that seriously harm the value and utility of the Island's transportation
facilities, and undermine the area's economy.
4. The Cost of Auto/Highway Travel
It is well known that New York City has the largest public transit
system in the country. Less well known is that the city also has the
country's most extensive highway network, exceeding even Los Angeles'.
But the great age of road construction has ended and today that network
and its traffic cost the city more in maintenance than taxpayers appear
to be willing to pay for.
The case against autos is not new but its quantification is.
Intense vehicular traffic - such as New York's - brings with it high
-------
- 29 -
accident rates, air pollution and noise levels. It requires enormous
subsidies from all levels of government. It increases the wear and
tear on the urban infrastructure, and the cost of its maintenance
and repair. It diverts money from more equitable public transit
expenditures and distorts municipal planning. It moves people and
goods about the city - but at a very high price. And, of course, it
hogs increasingly expensive petroleum resources: this now has profound
foreign policy implications and helps fuel the drive toward using
nuclear energy and coal for power generation.
For 1978, the cost of auto and taxi travel in Manhattan was $1.5
billion just for the passengers traveling by these modes; for all of
New York City, the cost was $3.21 billion. Indirect costs added
*
$590 million to the Manhattan tab and $2.27 billion to the City's total.
"Indirect" in this sense refers to the costs incurred because of auto-
motive air pollution, medical problems, governmental subsidies, traffic
accidents, and the value of lost time. A summary of these costs
appears in Table 2.
Economists and planners frequently call such factors "externalities".
Too often, this is little more than a euphemism for factors they cannot
quantify or would prefer to ignore. In terms of autos, leaving such
factors out of calculations is a way of concealing the true costs of
this type of transportation.
Careful analysis of highway transportation in New York, for example,
reveals that motorists do not pay their own way, even for the costs of
road construction and maintenance. Though the highway lobby boasts that
gasoline taxes and the Interstate Trust Fund cover all costs, drivers
receive extensive public subsidies. This is because road charges - such
* See Appendix 1.
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-30 -
TABLE 2. HIGHWAY TRANSPORTATION COSTS FOR 1978
Direct User Costs
Private Cars
Taxis /Livery
Buses
Freight Modes
DIRECT. TOTAL:
Indirect Costs
Subsidies
Unpaid Travel
Time
Traffic
Accidents
Air Pollution
INDIRECT TOTAL:
TOTAL COSTS:
(Billions
Manhattan
$ .37
.54
n/a
1.50
n/a
.10
1.58
.19
.21
$2.08
n/a
of Dollars)
New York
City
$2.61
.80
.48 '
4.43
$8.32
.46
2.51
.83
.38
$4.18
$12.50
Tri-State
Region
$17.41
.95
.83
12.55
$31.74
1.00
n/a
2.85
.47
n/a
n/a
United States
$193.3
2.0
5.5
159.5
$360.3
9.4
n/a
45.4
6.0
n/a
n/a
Source: Appendix 1. An Estimate of Some Direct and Indirect Costs of
Highway Transportation in Manhattan, New York City, the Tri-
State Region, and the United States for 1978.
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- 31 -
as taxes and tolls - do not fully pay for such expenses as highway
police, safety measures, road and vehicle administration, planning,
design, bond debt interest, and debt administration.
In New York State, this direct public subsidy works out to about
one third of the total highway bill. For 1973, this meant that the
amount of property taxes devoted to highway expenses was $266 million.
The competitive edge these subsidies help >autos maintain over other
kinds of transit, such as railroads, forces the government to also
subsidize - indeed, prop up - other modes; again, rail in particular.
Another example: auto related air pollution cost the nation about
$5.75 billion in 1975. This was the price suggested by the National
Academy of Sciences for the 4,000 deaths and four million sick days it
52
estimated that air pollution caused. Calculations based on New York's
population lead to the conclusion that New York City's 'Share is about
$700 million and that the region's share is $1.7 billion - exclusive of
*
suffering. In 1978 dollars, these figures are equivalent to $6.7
billion, $845 million, and $2.1 billion, respectively.
The cost of air pollution is high because the term refers to a
great many pollutants, with each class responsible for a variety of
medical problems. Automobile exhaust is similarly complex and contains
varying amounts of several of the major pollutants. Indeed, "Motor
vehicles supply 75 - 95 percent of the carbon monoxide, 90 percent of
the airborne lead, one half of the hydrocarbons and nitrogen dioxides,
and 40 - 50 percent of the respirable fine particles found in urban
air."53
All of these substances reach high concentrations in New York,
* See Appendix 1.
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- 32 -
with automobiles the single greatest source for many of them and an
important contributing source for many others. Carbon monoxide affects
human health by depriving the body of oxygen. Exposure in a closed
area, such as a garage, can quickly kill a person; exposure in an open
area, such as midtown, can cause dizziness, loss of motor responses,
headaches and fatigue - and" at levels which are not uncommon in dense
traffic. Pregnant women, people with heart disease, anemia and
respiratory problems are especially vulnerable to carbon monoxide's
harmful effects.
Lead is emitted into the air by vehicles because it is used as a
gasoline additive. Monitors have recorded ambient lead levels in the
54
CBD in excess of permissible levels. Exposure to this pollutant,
which exists as tiny, respirable particles, can damage the central
nervous system and cause behavioral and genetic changes. Severe
poisoning can induce a host of illnesses, from mental retardation to
death. But chronic exposure can cause symptoms that often go unrecognized
and that are difficult to link to lead as a source. These include minimal
brain damage, hyper-activity, and in utero impairments.
Fortunately New York City has taken a leadership role in addressing
the issue of atmospheric lead. In 1971 the City adopted legislation
that cut the allowable lead content of gasoline. This action reduced
ambient lead levels by nearly 80 percent in most sections of the city.
Hydrocarbons is a class name for more than 1,000 different
compounds, many of which have been associated with cancer and leukemia
in high concentrations. They are emitted mainly from combustion
processes of all kinds. With sunlight as a catalyst, they combine with
nitrogen oxides to form smog and its constituents: ozone, aldehydes,
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- 33 -
and peroxyacylnitrate (PAN). Apart from their degenerative -effect on
respiratory systems, these constituents are also believed to contain
a number of carcinogens. Moreover, nitrogen dioxide is itself capable
of causing long-term respiratory problems at levels that have been
measured in New York.
Particulate matter essentially means dust: particles of soil, soot,
grime, chemicals, liquids, in general anything smaller than 44 microns
(a micron is 0.000039ths of an inch). The particulate matter that is
harmful to health is usually smaller than five microns. At this size,
particles stay aloft for relatively long periods of time and are
easily respirable. They are especially prevalent in cities where they
can be generated by almost any activity including construction,
demolition, traffic and transit.
Particulates reduce visibility, corrode metals and clothing, and
seriously damage health, especially in combination with sulfur dioxide.
The entire respiratory system is vulnerable and people with diseases
such as bronchitis and asthma are chronically suseptible to high
concentrations.
One variety of this pollutant that is likely to increase in New York
is the particulate matter emitted from diesel engines. This material
consists of more than 10,000 different compounds, some of which are
known to cause cancer, some of which are suspected to, and others of
which are just plain toxic. Diesels emit from 15 to 60 times as
much of this material as engines using unleaded gasoline. Unlike other
auto pollutants it is still' unregulated, though the federal government
is now in the process of researching the health impacts of particulate
matter and developing appropriate emissions standards.
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- 34 -
The automobile industry is substantially increasing its production
of diesel powered passenger cars partly as a way of preserving larger
model cars. This anticipated increase
in the number of diesels on the road threatens to make diesel particu-
late pollution a serious issue. Should a public health problem
materialize, New Yorkers would bear the impact quickly and intensely.
Manhattan, in particular, is already thick with diesel fumes from
thousands of trucks and municipal and private fleets of 7,000 badly
maintained transit buses. In addition, the city's taxi fleet is
considering converting to diesel engines. Given the area's congestion
and density, these conditions strongly suggest that the City should
be actively working to regulate diesel emissions within its boundaries
before this problem fully matures and adds to the pollution burden New
Yorkers already face.
Driving itself still kills and injures more people than most wars.
Nationally, this meant more than 50,000 deaths in 1978, about 4 million
injuries, and more than 22 million damaged vehicles. The societal cost
for this carnage was $45.44 billion, mostly in foregone earnings.
In New York there were 656 deaths, about 97,000 injuries, and more
than 400,000 damaged vehicles in 1978 as a result of traffic accidents.
The pricetag? About $828 million. However, crime-ridden the subway
system is or appears to be, the danger is nowhere near the automotive
accident rate.
These are only examples. There are many other costs that cannot
yet be quantified. The salt-used to de-ice roads corrodes bridges and
other structures, adding tens of millions to their repair and mainten-
ance costs. In New York City such corrosion helped doom the West Side
* See Appendix 1.
*
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- 35 -
Highway and is now eating away at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Drive
and some of the city's other major routes and bridges.^7 The salt
also seeps into water tables, contaminating them and necessitating
expensive treatment plants. Meanwhile, crankcase oil drainings seep
into water resources: the New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation has reported that one third of the oil found in the
region's waters comes from highway run-off.
Understanding the exact impact of congestion is more difficult
than understanding the costs of vehicle travel but it is an important
starting point in designing strategies to relieve congestion that make
economic sense and do not merely transfer the burden.
5. Some Costs of Congestion
The cost of congestion is the amount by which congestion increases
existing burdens and expenses. This figure has always been difficult
to calculate because the effects of congestion are spread so broadly.
Congestion increases air pollution, travel time, noise levels, and
personal stress. It causes accidents. It disrupts the delivery of bus,
fire, ambulance, police, sanitation and trucking services while
increasing their expense. It increases fuel consumption, engine wear,
and roadway deterioration. It discourages commuters- from working in
Manhattan and encourages businesses to leave.
In the New York metropolitan area, the costs of these increased
expenses runs to billions of dollars every year.
In New York City alone, congestion costs more than $1 billion per
year. Studies in 1953 and 1973 each concluded that this figure was a
58
conservative estimate of the city's loss. Citizens for Clean Air's
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- 36 -
present work includes an effort to understand the value of wasted time. It
concluded that congestion cost drivers and passengers in New York Cxty
&
$562 million for the 260 business days of 1978. Breaking this down, it
was found that, in terms of time lost, private car drivers and
passengers lost:
$ 48.7 million in midtown,
$151.3 million in Manhattan, and
$475.3 million in New York City;
that taxi and livery passengers lost:
$ 49.3 million in midtown,
$ 63.7 million in Manhattan, and
$ 77.9 million in New York City;
and that bus passengers lost:
$ 27.9 million in midtown,
$ 32.2 million in Manhattan, and
$ 38.5 million in New York City.
The cost to the public for the congestion it experienced while using
these modes of transportation thus amounted to:
• $126 million in midtown
$247 million in Manhattan, and
$592 million in New York City.
The amounts are estimates of the value of more than 493,000 man-hours
lost to congestion for each workday in 1978.
In terms of wasted fuel, an earlier study by Citizens for Clean
Air estimated that motorists and taxi drivers in Manhattan wasted about
59
18.5 million gallons of gasoline in 1975 because of traffic congestion.
In 1975 this equaled about $12.1 million, assuming a price of 65.4 cents
per gallon. With gas now at or above a dollar a gallon, the value such
waste represents is far more significant.
Most of these costs are equally applicable to the city's business
Work in progress.
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- 37 -
community. A great many of the motorists in Manhattan are professional
drivers; many others use vehicles for work related purposes, including
commuting. All businesses depend on the city's transportation
facilities for getting and shipping goods, employee commutation, and.
customer access. Many businesses, such as messinger and delivery firms,
premise their livelihood on their ability to take advantage of the
city's streets and unique transit network. The business community is
well aware of its dependence on these -facilities and of the higher
costs that Manhattan's conditions impose but it is also pessimistic
about the ability of the city, indeed anyone, to reduce these costs,
particularly in the crucial area of goods movement.
The above factors are only indices of the full cost of congestion
but they are clearly a cause for concern. Were congestion's full costs
more precisely known and considered seriously in transportation policy
forums, their effect would almost certainly be to change the way
transportation is planned and carried out.
-------
PART III
1. To Gather, To Collect, To Heap Up. To Congest
Throughout New York's history, invention has-been the mother of
congestion. Though trolleys are better than omnibuses, bridges than
ferries, subways than elevateds, and paved roads than no roads, each
innovation, after an initial period of naive delight, has only seemed to
make it more difficult for people to move about. The speed of crosstown
traffic has not improved for more than 100 years. Yet the myth that
technology can eliminate urban congestion never died. Meanwhile that
very congestion has taken on the trappings and momentum of the
technology that promised to end it.
Numbers are an easy way of calculating losses and gains but they
never fully explain. What happens, for example, to the quality of a city's
life when movement becomes unbearable while remaining essential? Do things
fall apart or do people become like things?
"A city is the most complex artifact produced by mankind," wrote
George Nelson who designed the first pedestrian mall:
"an organism that lives, breathes and dies. If more and more
cities have bad breath today, this is merely another example
of getting what we pay for. What we want is unlimited private
mobility: the price is congestion and pollution...
"In this contest, the city has to give way since everyone
wants the highways. There is no question of good or bad, but
rather the observation of a transformation unprecedented in
its scope and violence. The image presented by this aspect of
the city is that of a society completely materialistic in its
values, fundamentally uninterested in planning, wasteful in
its handling of resources (the city is a vital resource), and
oblivious of such concerns as quality of life."^
2. Managing Traffic and Transit
The most detailed program for reducing New York's City's congestion
- 38 -
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can be found in New York's now abandoned 1973 Transportation Control
62
Plan. Its various sections describe, evaluate and relate to each
other dozens of reforms in traffic management, transit improvements and
goods movement that are as relevent today as when the plan was approved.
The traffic management reforms are explicitly intended to reduce
congestion and vehicle mileage within the city, particularly in Manhattan.
They would have the additional effect of improving overall street and
traffic conditions. Any of a number of actions could achieve these goals
but to be effective they need to be implemented in an integrated manner.
Thus a workable program, drawing on the 1973 plan, should include as a
minimum the following reforms:
* Strict, continuing enforcement of existing traffic regulations.
* Restrictions on taxi cruising, particularly in midtown.
* Restrictions on parking in Manhattan combined with increased
parking opportunities outside Manhattan.
* Restrictions on the use of passenger cars in the CBD.
* The establishment of special crosstown Manhattan through streets.
* Increases in. express bus service and the establishment of
exclusive bus lanes that reduce the need for commutation by passenger car.
* The restricting of certain streets to essential vehicles.
* The establishment of a uniform toll into Manhattan and the
elimination of commuter discounts on Port Authority bridges and tunnels.
* Rebuilding streets for pedestrians, particularly in areas that
are congested enough (with people as well as vehicles) to warrant that
they be closed to cars and improved for people.
* The institution of attractive and publicly acceptable transit
alternatives to automobile use.
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Strict enforcement of traffic regulations is the key to making this
or any similar program work. New regulations and traffic arrangements
will be useless unless they are enforced. The present enforcement level
is inadequate and contributes in no small measure to current congestion.
Parking regulations must be similarly enforced. On-street parking is
now illegal in almost all of Manhattan's CBD yet illegally parked cars
constitute major traffic impediments. Insufficient staff and budgets are
chronic problems but the city's episodic and usually short-lived crack-
downs involving one or more regulations are simply not sufficient.
Because taxis constitute an inordinate amount of the CBD's traffic,
they also inordinately contribute to its congestion. Creating a widespread
network of cab stands in conjunction with curbs on cruising would
contribute significantly to improving Manhattan's traffic flow, again
particularly in midtown. The 34 midtdwn cab stands that have recently
been created are worthwhile but unlikely to generate changes in taxi
traffic patterns without recourse to complementary restrictions. Banning
passenger cars from the CBD would have an even greater impact but would
be extremely difficult to implement. Limiting their access, however,
would not be impossible. Reducing the number of parking spaces in the
CBD, shifting the remaining spaces to the area's periphery or outside
the island, and limiting access to specific streets are all workable
alternatives.
Establishing a uniform toll for entry into Manhattan would serve
a number of purposes. It would reduce the number of vehicles entering
Manhattan, raise substantial new funds for transit, and more equitably
distribute the costs of transportation. This action is discussed in
greater detail below. Eliminating the Port Authority's commuter discounts
would serve similar purposes. A commuter discount only makes sense if
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the Authority's bridges and tunnels are under-utilized. However, the
contrary situation exists, and they are overcrowded precisely because
of commuter travel patterns: it is commuters that cause the Authority
its heaviest expenses for the provision of lane space and maintenance.
None of these actions individually will induce a major diminution
of traffic into and within Manhattan. To work properly, they must be
implemented systematically and together with a program of improvements
in the city's public transit systems. Any such program should increase
the transit systems' carrying ability, attractiveness, ease of use and
comfort. This means changes in management as well as in the capital
plant. Many of the reforms necessary to such a program have already
been initiated on a limited basis. These include changes in fare
structures, efforts to stagger working hours through employer cooperation,
and changes in bus routes to reflect truer travel patterns. A number of
studies in these areas are also underway. While simple in theory, many
available measures are difficult to implement because of the plethora
of city and state agencies that must participate, and because of the
complexity of the city's physical plant.
An additional failing is that the Metropolitan Transportation
Authority does not aggressively market its services nor provide sufficient
practical information about how to use them. The MTA's Transit Authority
has recently taken some steps in this> area. It has developed and
distributed free of charge a new map of the subway system and embarked
on new signage and advertising programs. The map is a genuine improve-
ment. The Authority should distribute similar maps for its bus routes.
The signage program is intended to key the subways' colors and codes to
the new map. The marketing campaign, unfortunately, is superficial and
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unconvincing.
Part of the MTA's problem is that years of neglect, budget cuts,
and "deferred maintenance" have left the city with a decrepit, broken-
down product. Indeed, management reforms will have little impact -
however well implemented - unless the city begins a major program of
rehabilitation, increased maintenance,and capital improvements for
its subway and bus systems. Numerous studies have detailed the
enormous capital needs of the transit systems and describe sensible
expenditure programs. Conservative estimates have placed these needs
at from $20 - $40 billion over the next ten years. Unfortunately,
only a small portion of these funds can be expected to materialize.
As a result, the condition of the city's transit infrastructure and,.
therefore, of the system itself is likely to continue to deteriorate
and remain for many an unacceptable alternative to driving.
3. Delivering the Goods
The manner in which trucks operate within the city, their size
and pattern of movement all contribute to the city's congestion and
the environmental costs associated with it, particularly air pollution.
This need not be the case. But trucking operations in the city continue
to be characterized by excessively high total mileage relative to the
ton-miles of service provided, by relatively small loads, and by a
serious lack of parking space and loading facilities.
The best way for the city to resolve these problems would be by
consolidating much existing truck activity and by providing alternate
modes of freight transport. This means rail and water routes. Yet the
city, as the nation, has been experiencing inexorable reductions
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in these modes with corresponding increases in truck use. The trend
is environmentally and economically unsound, particularly for New York
City, four of whose boroughs are islands. Policies that would result
in replacing 200 trucks by one train, in floating more goods across
the harbor, or in creating rail freight access directly across the
Hudson and East Rivers are badly needed. Apart from their contribution
to congestion levels, the city's reliance on trucks is an important
factor in the high cost of living in New York: the cost of moving
goods into the New York area is far above the nationwide average.
Improvements in truck traffic need not wait for the development
of new rail and water routes. Significant progress can be made through
a number of practical management reforms. Among those that offer
promise are the consolidation of existing terminal facilities, changes
in delivery hours, and the provision of adequate off-street loading
space.
Consolidating terminal facilities in the city offers an immediate
return in terms of reduced truck mileage. Changing delivery hours from
high traffic daytime periods to later, less congested hours is more
problematic because of the strong industry opposition such plans arouse
and because of the extra labor costs they incur. Providing off-street
loading spaces is less controversial but requires a serious commitment
by the city to design such spaces, set them aside and, in effect, to
begin redistributing the use of its street space. Yet such facilities
would take many trucks off the street and relieve them of the burden
of jockeying for on-street.and often illegal spaces.
A great deal of interagency and industry cooperation is needed to
pursue any of these reforms but the returns should be worthwhile. The
cost of inaction is already a burden New Yorkers could well do without.
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4. Uniform Tolls and Free Fares
New York's 1973 Transportation Control Plan required the city to
begin tolling its 12 free East and Harlem River bridges, in combina-
tion with other transportation reforms. This action is still an
attractive way to reduce congestion while improving the island's
overall environment.
Twenty bridges and tunnels connect Manhattan with the world.. The
Port Authority collects tolls on the George Washington Bridge and the
Lincoln and Holland Tunnels. The Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority
collects tolls on the Triborough Bridge, the Henry Hudson Bridge Cat
the northern tip of Manhattan) , and the Queens Midtown and Battery
Tunnels. A large portion of these monies is diverted from transportation
needs to subsidize projects such as the World Trade Center, the Port
Authority's planned industrial parks, and other port and area
development plans.
But 12 East and Harlem River bridges are not. tolled, even though
they funnel a debilitating stream of 415,000 vehicles per day into
Manhattan's overloaded streets and highways. Moreover, these bridges
are rapidly deteriorating and require considerable sums to maintain
and rehabilitate. That they are not tolled is testimony to the
political clout of motorists.
Few traditions have withstood economic forces as well as this no
tolls policy. However, it perpetuates an inequitible aspect of the
city's transportation policy: the motorists using these East and Harlem
River bridges are a priviliged group: unlike subway and bus riders,
unlike all other persons entering and leaving Manhattan, they pay no
toll, fee or fare to contribute to the costs of maintenance and operation,
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A more productive and- equitable policy would be to incorporate
all of Manhattan's entrance routes into a single, comprehensive system
having a uniform toll of $3 for passenger autos and an escalating toll
for trucks. The truck toll could range from $6 to $18 depending on
axle number, with the scale increasing by $3 for each axle. Existing
tolls for buses should be eliminated; motorcycles could be tolled
$1.50; trailers for passenger autos could be tolled from $5 to $9,
again depending on axle number. Table 3 lists these existing and
suggested tolls.
A preliminary analysis by Citizens for Clean Air indicates that
the establishment of this toll structure would generate about $565
million a year while only negligibly increasing the overall cost in
region of freight and personal transportation. The analysis also shows
that these uniform tolls would:
* Adequately subsidize the city's entire bus and subway system.
* Reduce passenger car trips to Manhattan by more than 78,000
per day.
* Increase average vehicle speeds in Manhattan by about 17 percent.
* Save the public and .the business community more than $160
million per year in congestion related time expenses.
* Reduce gasoline use by about 70 million gallons a year.
* Reduce the city's air pollution and cut its related health
costs by about $29 million a year.
* Stimulate about $28 million a year in increased transit fare
revenues.
The key to making such a policy work would be to use the funds
generated to improve Manhattan's street and transit environment. For
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TABLE 3. EXISTING AND PROPOSED TOLLS FOR ACCESS TO MANHATTAN
Vehicle
Classification
PA Tolls:
G.W. Bridge,
Lincoln &
Holland Tunnels
TBTA Tolls:
Triborough Edge.,
Queens Midtown &
Battery Tunnels
Proposed Tolls
For All Routes
Into & From
Manhattan
Passenger Cars
Cash Toll
30 Day Commuter
Ticket
Carpool Ticket
25 Trip Ticket
Book
Motorcycles
Passenger Cars &:
1 axle trailer
2 axle trailer
3 axle trailer
Buses
2 axle
3 axle
4 axle
•Light Trucks
Heavy Trucks
2 axle
3 axle
4 axle
5 axle
6 axle
Additional axles
$1.50
1.00 @
.50
1.35 @
" $ .75
$2.25
2.25
2.25
$2.00
2.00
2.00
$1.50
$2.25 - $3.00
3.00
4.50
6.00
6.00
Based on
Vehicle Comb.
$1.50
n/a
n/a
n/a
$1.50
$2.40
3.20
4.50
$3.00
4.50
6.00
$1.50
$3.00
4.50
6.00
7.50
9.00
$1.50 @
$ 3.00
n/a
n/a
n/a
$ 1.50
$ 5.00
7.00
9.00
free
free
free
$ 3.00
$ 6.00
9.00
12.00
15.00
18.00
$ 3.00 <§
Source: Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.
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example, the funds would be enough to turn Manhattan Island into a
free transit zone; that is, to eliminate all bus and subway fares for
travel within the island. This would increase the attractiveness
of Manhattan's transit systems and further reduce' congestion. Benefits
to the tourist and entertainment industries would also be substantial.
5. The Pedestrian Option
Combining uniform tolls with a no fare policy within Manhattan
would also give the City the means and the incentive to implement a
series of visionary yet sensible proposals by George Haikalis of
the Tri-State Regional Planning Commission.
Haikalis' proposals center around restructuring and restricting
auto use in Manhattan as a means of reducing congestion while improving
the environment for pedestrians and transit riders. "The notion is
advanced," writes Haikalis, "that perhaps a new balance may be struck,
with more street space for people, and somewhat less for vehicles."
In "Towards an Auto-Free Manhattan," written in 1974, Haikalis
proposed closings that would reduce street mileage in Manhattan by
about 15 percent and vehicle mileage by about 25 percent. Figure 2,
drawn from this report, shows suggested street patterns. Haikalis'
plan recommends closing such major north/south avenues as Third,
Lexington, Madison, portions of Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Broadway
from Inwood to the Battery. The major commercial streets would also
be converted for pedestrian use. These include all of 42nd and parts
of 14th, 34th and 59th Streets. The longest, most continuous and
heavily traveled arteries would be retained for vehicles as well as
all of the streets in the industrial and warehousing districts.
Haikalis emphasized that his proposal "is not intended as a
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punishment for auto, taxi and truck users, but only as a redistribution
and reallocation of scarce resources."
Haikalis has also proposed creating extensive pedestrian oases in
especially dense parts of Manhattan such as midtown, downtown and
68
Greenwich Village. Figure 3 shows his recommendations for lower
Manhattan. The focus of this plan is the financial district. Vehicles
would be excluded from all of Wall Street and along Broadway from
Worth Street, which is above City Hall, to Bowling Green. Additional
street closings in the area would allow the existing public plazas of
the World Trade Center, the U..S. Steel Building and the Marine Midland
Bank to be unified into a single pedestrian system.
Haikalis recommends similar plans for Broadway at midtown, Fifth
Avenue, 42nd Street and Lexington Avenue. "These four arteries," he
writes, "contain the busiest, most overcrowded, and least comfortable
pedestrian environments anywhere in the U.S. Creating pedestrian malls
along these avenues will revolutionize the appearance of midtown.
restoring and stabilizing the commercial and entertainment complex
that is to vital to the city's health."
These plans also recognize the need for tolls on the East and
Harlem River bridges. But Haikalis goes a step further and suggests
changes in the patterns of traffic to and from "Manhattan. Specifically,
he recommends converting the Queens Midtown and Battery- Tunnels into
one-way inbound facilities, the Brooklyn and Queensboro Bridges- into
one-way outbound facilities, the Manhattan Bridge into a two-way route
for trucks only, and restricting the Williamsburg Bridge to bicyclists,
pedestrians and transit vehicles. Tolls would only be collected
. , ,70
inbound.
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- 49 -
FIGURE 2. PEDESTRIANIZING THE BOROUGH OF MANHATTAN
Pavement Retained
Pavement
Released for
Pedestrian Use
Borough of Manhattan
Scale
5,000' 0
5,000'
Source: Geo'rge Haikalis, "Towards an Auto Free Manhattan. An Alter
native Strategy & a Proposed Study," Analysis Notes, Tri-
State Regional Planning Commission, Dec. 1974.
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- 50 -
FIGURE 3. PEDESTRIANIZING THE LOWER MANHATTAN CBD
Pavement
Retained for
Vehicular Movement
'Lower Manhattan CBD
Scale in Feet
0 500 1,000'
Pavement
Retained for
Pedestrian Use
Source: George Haikalis, "Auto-Free Zones in CBDs and an Example
for Lower Manhattan," Interim Technical Report 4447-3306,
Tri-State Regional Planning Commission, Dec. 1974.
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- 51 -
Haikalis estimates this arrangement would reduce auto traffic
into Manhattan and within the CBD and encourage greater transit use
while generating nearly $100 million in new annual revenues. He
also points out that this plan, or any similar rerouting, would
require little or no new construction and, therefore, no major
investment of capital.
6. Plus Ca Change...
Plus ca change, plus c'est meme chose; the more things
change, the more they stay the same. New Yorkers grudgingly adjust
to the congestion of their city, some even profit from it, but its
stubborn presence has become emblematic of the failure of government
to resolve the problems posed by transportation in an urban setting.
As New York has grown, its congestion and the costs associated with
it have also grown, though their characteristics have altered.
Over the last decades, for example, there has been a decisive
shift away from mass transit to private autos. Similarly, much of the
freight that once traveled to New York by rail now arrives by truck.
Though the total number of people entering the CBD has remained stable
since the early Sixties, the number of entering autos and taxis has
increased year by year. Meanwhile, auto occupancy rates have decreased.
This means that fewer people now use more vehicles, relatively and
absolutely, to travel into the CBD than ever before.
Manhattan's population has always followed Manhattan's transpor-
tation. In its early days, transit lines were built with enough
capacity to allow fairly dense residential development. This encouraged
the city's rapid expansion, particularly in the first decades of this
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century. The mass transit lines were privately owned but the mode was
en masse. Private cars were relatively few and roads were inadequate.
Conditions changed. Auto, truck and highway technologies matured;
the city acquired no longer profitable private transit lines; more
people purchased their own cars. After World War II, the automobile
emerged as the dominant mode of transportation. Highways became the
new axes around which development grew. For a time affluence increased
steadily. The middle class drove its new cars over new roads and out
of the city to be replaced by poorer people who traveled less but
depended more on transit systems - buses and subways.
Many of those who moved out of the city continued to work, shop
and play in the city, especially in Manhattan. Moreover, the island
was changing from a blue-collar manfacturing locale into a white-
collar corporate center. This conformed with the largely white-collar
character of many of the city's suburbs. Since the vast majority of
white collar jobs begin at 9 a.m. and end at 5 p.m., congestion during
these commuter rush hours increased significantly. Yet none of the
city's newer suburbs were dense enough to justify public transit. This
further increased the pressure to drive into the city for all purposes.
There is no evidence to indicate these trends can be simply or
easily reversed: people will not abandon their cars merely because
available transit facilities have been improved. However, congestion
and its associated economic and environmental costs are not inevitable.
But what is needed is a broad, frontal attack on the very transportation
practices that the city and the state have encouraged and nourished
over the preceding years.
Such a. program must consist of policies that restrict the entry
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and operation of vehicles in Manhattan, especially within the CBD
and during peak hours. It must provide for massive improvements in the
quality of the city's existing public transit systems in order to
provide acceptable transportation alternatives. It must begin to
pedestrianize congested districts in Manhattan by connecting existing
plazas and pedestrian areas. This would permit alternate transit modes
- such as bicycles, trolleys and shuttle buses - and obviate the need
for passenger cars. It must include financial incentives and a more
equitable distribution of the costs of transportation such as would be
partially achieved by a uniform Manhattan entrance toll. It must
include extensive public education and marketing campaigns; in effect,
a major transportation consciousness raising. Most importantly, it must
include personal commitments and leadership by the city's chief
elected officials, particularly the Mayor.
Congestion has always proved intractable in Manhattan. The
borough's density, the variety of transportation modes that co-exist
within it, and the way that the city's transportation needs cross
all demographic, geographic, cultural and political lines are
constants in New York's equation. Today, however, the city must also
deal with the continuing deterioration of its transportation infra-
structure, the difficult financial constraints resulting from its near
bankruptcy, and the impact of the growing energy crisis.
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EPILOGUE: COMMONS SENSE
"The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a
pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman
will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons.
Such an arrangement may work reasonably satsifactorily for
centuries because tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the
numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying capacity
of the land. Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning,
that is, the day when the long-desired goal of social stability
becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent logic of the
commons remorselessly generates tragedy."71
Manhattan's Central Business District is a contemporary commons.
Its streets, avenues, highways and parking fields are limited facilities
abused through chronic overuse. Its congestion is the most visible
byproduct of this historic pattern. But unlike the classic scenario of
Garret Hardin, this particular commons has been subject for many years
to certain kinds of restrictions. Parking, traffic, zoning and
environmental regulations are numerous, complicated,-and subject to
differing interpretations and degrees of enforcement. However, except
for the City's Transportation Control Plan, they share the belief that
vehicular access to the CBD may properly be regulated but should not
be denied or discouraged. This approach seeks to moderate the
undesirable impacts of street use, particularly congestion, by
weighing public against private interests on a scale ranging from
city-wide to block by block. As one result, there are more than 250
different parking situations, each covered by a specific regulation.
These and other laws regulating the streets are in turn enforced with
varying degrees of laxity and severity: one month there will be a
crackdown on illegal parking in midtown, another month there will be
a crackdown on drivers who block intersections, a third month will
witness an effort to eliminate double and triple parking by truck
- 54 -
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drivers. The point is that the size and complexity of this body of law,
the budgetary limitations and competing demands placed on enforcement
agencies, as well as day to day political considerations, all combine
to mitigate against an effective husbandry of Manhattan's limited
street space.
The increasing domination of this space by automotive traffic has
exacerbated demands on its use and may well have tipped the balance
toward a physical collapse that will have severe economic repercussions.
Arthur Laffer, the economist, uses an arch-shaped curve to show that
if a government sets the tax rate at zero, no revenue will be collected
and that if the tax rate is 100 percent, again, the government will
collect no revenue, so completely would such a levy discourage open
economic activity. Laffer concludes that the tax rate which generates
the most .revenue for the government is not 100 per cent but somewhere
between zero and 100 percent.
The problem of determining this rate is analogous to the problem
of regulating street use. If there are no pedestrians and no vehicles,
there is no congestion. However, no one is benefiting from the
existence of the streets. At the other extreme, if every lane, every
street and every intersection in Manhattan were occupied by bumper to
bumper traffic and by body to body crowds of pedestrians, no one would
be able to move. The system would break down and, again, no one would
benefit. The ideal, the maximum benefit a society can gain from the
use of its public rights of way, is somewhere between these extremes.
At present, however, traffic in Manhattan may have reached a level at
which each additional vehicle entering the street system costs society
more than it benefits its individual occupants or owners. For any
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single vehicle these costs are so small as to perhaps be unmeasureable
in a realistic sense. But traffic in Manhattan is a matter of hundreds
of thousands of vehicles and millions of people. The sum of the
incremental societal costs imposed by so many vehicles upon a street
network where the government is incapable of adequately managing their
flow and servicing their needs is a serious social dilemma. At its
heart is the quandary posed by a commons: what is good for an individual
is not necessarily good for all.
Much of this report has dealt with the technical means for coping
with this problem as it applies to traffic congestion in Manhattan.
But the solution itself is not technical. It involves changes in
values, changes in attitudes about public facilities, and changes in
the way we apportion, use, share and protect limited resources. These
changes can only be suggested here with the emphasis that the means
for implementing them are available. Congestion in Manhattan has reached
a point at which its effective regulation requires changes in our
attitudes about how streets and automobiles should be used. These are
fundamental social issues, not mechanical breakdowns amenable to a
technological fix. Until they are confronted and resolved as social
issues, congestion in Manhattan and the many costs associated with it
are not likely to decline.
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FOOTNOTES
1. McNally, John, Westway: Winners and Losers. Unreported Impacts of
the Project in Industry, Real Estate and Government Finance,
report prepared for Westside Action for Repair Now, New York,
1978, Section VI.
2. Miller, John Anderson, Fares, Please! From Horsecars to Stream-
liners, D. Appleton-Century Co., New York, 1941.
3. Ibid.. p.13, first chronicler; other quotes from Bettman, Otto L.,
The Good Old Days - They Were Terrible, Random House, New York,
1974, pp. 22, 18, 23, respectively.
4. McCullough, David, The Great Bridge, Simon and Schuster, New York,
1972, pp. 139-140.
5. Miller, op. cit., p. 70.
6. Editorial, "City Railways/Necessity of a Settled System for
Building Railroads in the City," New York Times, April 6, 1859, p. 2.
7. Frank R. Ford, "Traffic Conditions of New York City,1 Street Rail-
way Journal, Vol. 18, No. 4, Oct. 1901, pp. 225-248.
8. Ibid., p. 228.
9. Ibid.. p. 240.
10. Ibid.
11. Flink, James J., The Car Culture, The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge,
1975, p. 34.
12. Thomas Conyngton, "Motor Carriages and Street Traffic," Scientific
American Supplement, Vol. 48, July 1, 1899.
13. Beazall, W.P., A Survey of Traffic Conditions in New York City,
The Press Publishing Co., The New York World, 1916.
14. Caro, Robert, The Power Broker. Robert Moses and the Fall of New
York, Random House, Vintage Books, New York, 1975, p. 329.
15. Ibid.. p. 6.
16. Ibid., p. 940.
17. Ibid., pp. 318, 897-898, 901, 918, 931-939.
18. Ibid., pp. 19-20.
19. Robert Moses, "The Problem of Midtown Manhattan Traffic," New
York Times Magazine. Nov. 4, 1945.
20. Robert Moses, "The Highway Maze," New York Times Magazine, Nov.
11, 1945.
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- 58 -
21. Robert Moses, "The Problem of Midtown Traffic," op. cit.
22. Caro, op. cit., p. 715.
23. Ibid., p. 922.
24. Ibid., p. 920.
25. Citizens Traffic Safety Board, The Cost of Traffic Congestion and
Traffic Accidents in the City of New York. Sept. 1953.
26. Regional Plan Association, Regional Plan of New York and Its
Environs, 1924.
27. City Club of New York, "Manhattan Auto Study," Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution of the Committee on Public
Works, U.S. Senate, 93rd Cong., Sec. Session, Part 3, Wash. D.C.,
May 1-2, 1974, pp. 821-1060.
28. Ketcham, Brian, Societal Cost Accounting; A New Tool for Planners
- The Auto Vs. t¥e City, Citizens for Clean Air, Inc., New York,
Oct. 1976.
29. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., Municipal Credit Survey - TBTA, April
30, 1959, p. 30.
30. Caro, op. cit., p. 925.
31. Ibid., p. 926.
32. Regional Plan Association, New York's Commuters - Trends of
Commuter Transportation in the New York Metropolitan Region 1930-
1950. Bulletin 77, New York, July 1951.
33. Regional Plan Association, Power for the MTA: An Examination of
Future Ridership. Service and Electric Power Requirements for
Metropolitan Transportation Authority Facilities. Bulletin 126,
New York, June 1977.
34. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, New York
City Metropolitan Area Air Quality Implementation Plan Transpor-
tation Controls, New York, April 1973.
35. Several reports document this problem. In particular, see: New
York City Department of City Planning, A New Direction in Transit,
Dec. 1978; New York City Planning Commission, Capital Needs and
Priorities for the City of New York. 1979; New York City Office
of the Comptroller, Rebuilding During the 1980's. May 7, 1979;
Brian Ketcham and Stan Pinkwas, "That's The Way the City Crumbles,"
Village Voice. Sept. 18, 1978.
36. Caro, op. cit.. p. 931.
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- 59 -
37. West Side Highway Project, Final Environmental Impact Statement,
New York, Jan. 4, 1977, p. 41.
38. Midtown Manhattan; New York City Center Transportation Improvement
Project Final Report, N.Y.C. Planning Commission and Tri-State
Regional Planning Commission, 1974.
39. Council on Municipal Performance, Municipal Performance Report,
Vol. 1, No. 6. Figures in this report are based on data from the
Department of Transportation's 1974 National Transportation Study.
40. City Club of New York, op. cit.
41. No footnote.
42. Midtown Manhattan, op. cit.
43. Ibid., Section E.
44. Crossley Surveys, Inc., Midtown Auto Driver Study, New York City
Department of City Planning and New York City Department of
Transportation, Oct. 1978.
45. Tri-State Regional Planning Commission, Hub-Bound Travel 1977,
Internal Technical Report 1205 & 1206, Nov. 1978, p. 1.
46. Ibid., p..3.
47. Ibid., p. 10.
48. Edwards and Kelcey, Midtown Transportation Factbook: Midtown
Manhattan Circulation and Surface Transit Study, prepared for the
New York City Department of Transportation and the New York City
Department of City Planning, Nov. 1978, p. 11-12.
49. Ibid., p. 11-19.
50. Analysis of New York City Sidewalk and Roadway Claims, audit
prepared for the New York City Office of the Comptroller, May
5, 1977.
51. Midtown Manhattan, op. cit.
52. National Academy of Sciences, Air Quality and Automotive Emissions
Control, Sept. 1974. Estimations made with 1975 dollars.
53. Natural Resources Defense Council, An Assessment of New York City's
Transportation Service and Its Impact on Business and Health,
Eric Goldstein, Editor, July 12, 1978, p. 31. Also on the health
effects of air pollutants see:
The Seventh Annual Report of the Council on Environment, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Wash., D.C., Sept. 1976;
Effects of Chronic Exposure to Low-Level Pollutants in the
Environment, prepared for the Subcommittee on Environment and the
Atmosphere, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash., D.C.,
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- 60 -
Nov. 1975;
Lester B. Lave and Eugene P- Seskin, Air Pollution and Human
Health, published for Resources for the Future by the Johns
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1977;
American Medical Association, The Physicians Guide to Air
Pollution, OP-400, 1973.
54. Natural Resources Defense Council, ibid., p. 69.
55. Citizens for Clean Air and Environmental & Resources Technology,
Final Report to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(on) Nonpassenger Automobile Average Fuel Economy Safety Standards
Model Years 1980-81, Docket No. FE-77-05, Notice 15 Feb. 7, 1978.
56. Brian Ketcham and Stan Pinkwas, "Diesel Kill You," Village Voice,
June 19, 1978.
57. Ned Steele, "Queensboro Closing - Race Against Disaster," New York
Post, Aug. 7, 1979. Also see Footnote 35.
58. Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs and "Manhattan Auto
Study", op. cit.
59. Ketcham, Brian, Societal Cost Accounting, op. cit., Table 4.
60. William H. Crowell and Arnold J. Bloch, Impact of Transportation
Control Plans on the Economy of the Manhattan Central Business
District. Volume 1: Business Community Survey, prepared for the
Center for Regional Technology of the Polytechnic Institute of
New York for the Tri-State Regional Planning Commission, May 1978.
61. George Nelson, "The City As Mirror and Mask," MANtransFORMS; An
International Exhibition on Aspects of Design, Cooper-Hewitt
Museum, New York, Oct. 1976, pp. 89-90.
62. N.Y.S. Department of Environmental Conservation, op. cit.. in
particular Chapters 1,3 and 5.
63. See Footnote 35.
64. N.Y.S. Department of Environmental Conservation, op. cit. ,
Chapters 3 and 5.
65. Ketcham, Brian, A $3.00 Toll Around Manhattan Island: A Preliminary
Assessment of Its Social and Economic Benefits, Citizens for Clean
Air, March 1979.
66. Haikalis, George, "Towards An Auto-Free Manhattan. An Alternative
Strategy & A Proposed Study," Analysis Notes, Tri-State Regional
Planning Commission, June 1974.
67. Ibid., p. l.
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- 61 -
68. Haikalis, George, "Auto-Free Zones in CBDs and An Example for
Lower Manhattan," Interim Technical Report 4447-3306, Tri-State
Regional Planning Commission, June 1974.
69. Haikalis, George, "Is Westway the.Best Way?", Memorandum, Tri-
State Regional Planning Commission, July 28, 1978, p. 15.
70. Haikalis, George, "For Whom the Bridge Tolls?", Analysis Notes,
Tri-State Regional Planning Commission, January 1976.
71. Hardia, Garrett, "The Tragedy of the Commons," Exploring New
Ethics for Survival: The Voyage of the Spaceship Beagle, Penguin
Books, Inc., Baltimore, 1972, pp. 251-264.
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- 62 -
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS : A number of people generously contributed their
time, their insights and their resources during the preparation of
this report. Allen Wasserman and George Haikalis of the Tri-State
Regional Planning Commission, Bob Rickles of the Institute for Public
Transportation, and William Hoppen gave us valuable critical readings
of early drafts. Sam Schwartz and Robert McCarthy of the New York City
Department of Traffic shared with us their knowledge about the city's
traffic conditions. Harry Turton of General Motors provided us with
useful technical data on fuel consumption and vehicle speeds. Fred
Mackerodt of Fred Mackerodt & Associates and Herb Williamson of Volkswagen
of America contributed the use of necessary data gathering equipment;
and Kevin Ryan, Peter Lehman and Juliet Lesser performed a host of editorialj ,
typing and reproduction tasks. We would also like to thank the J.M. Kaplan
Fund and The New York Community Trust for their support for earlier
Clean Air work that provided the basis for many of the calculations used
in the present report.
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THE SOCIETAL COSTS OF CONGESTION IN NEW YP7.K CITY
APPENDIX 1
AN ESTIMATE OF SOME DIRECT AND INDIRECT COSTS
OF HIGHWAY TRANSPORTATION IN MANHATTAN,
NEW YORK CITY, THE TRI-STATE REGION,
AND THE UNITED STATES FOR 1978
December 1979
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CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES .ii
INTRODUCTION ...... 1
FIGURE 1 2
How New Yorkers Spend Their Highway Dollar
DIRECT COSTS 3
Direct User Expenditures 3
Private Car Expenditures 3
Taxicab/Livery Expenditures 5
School Bus Expenditures 7
Local Bus, Subway
and Commuter Rail User Expenditures 7
Intercity Bus and Rail, Aviation
and Marine User Expenditures 8
Freight Transportation User Expenditures 8
INDIRECT COSTS 9
Transportation Subsidies 9
The Cost of Unpaid Travel Time 12
Vehicle Occupancy 12
Value of Time 13
Structure of New York City Taxi Fares
- And Taxi Meters 14
Calculation of Taxi Fares 15
Traffic Accident Costs 16
Air Pollution Costs 18
TABLES 1 - 20 20
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LIST OF TABLES
1. Summary of Highway Transportation Costs for 1978
2. Direct User Costs of Transportation for 1978 by Mode
3. The Nation's Estimated Passenger Bill, 1965 - 1975
4. The Nation's Estimated Freight Bill, 1965 - 1975
5. The Nation's Projected Passenger Bill, 1976 - 1982
6. The Nation's Projected Freight Bill, 1976 - 1982
7. CA) Operating Costs for Private Cars
CB) Percentage of Direct Operating Costs Saved by Buying a Used Car
8. Gross National Product Implicit Deflators
9. Ownership Costs Per Mile
10. Miles Traveled Per Weekday in the Tri-State Region
11. Tunnel Crossings by Day of Week
12. Local Bus Expense and Revenue Data and Projections
13. Freight Expenditures Allocated by Mode in the Tri-State Region
14. Estimated 1978 Highway and Bus Subsidies
15. VMT by Mode in New York City
16. Highway Vehicle Hours in NYC - By Mode and Per Business Day
17. Dollar Value Per Hour of Vehicle Travel in NYC
18. Annual Value of Business Day Travel Time on Highways
19. Societal Costs of Highway Accidents: Injuries, Deaths
and Property Damage
20. Costs of Automotive Air Pollution
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INTRODUCTION
This is an accounting within the limits of available information of
the estimated 1978 costs of highway-related transportation for Manhattan,
New York City, the Tri-State Region and the United States. Cost estimates
include both direct consumer expenditures and indirect costs such- as
subsidies and the externalities related to traffic congestion, traffic
accidents and air pollution. In New York City, the magnitude of these
indirect highway costs matches the sum of direct costs for all non-highway
transportation.
No attempt is made to place a value on traffic noise, vehicle-related
water pollution, aesthetic values and the like, although we believe such
costs are significant and worthy of investigation as the full cost of all
modes of transportation is more fully developed and understood.
Figure 1 and Table 1 summarize both the Direct Costs (i.e. User
Expenditures) and many of the Indirect or Societal Costs involved in
highway movement of people and goods. They show, where data is available
or calculations are feasible, such costs for Manhattan, New York City, the
Tri-State Region (see Table 10 for a list of counties in the Region) and the
United States. Table 2 augments this with non-highway direct expenditures.
The text and following tables explain how our calculations are made and
provide additional detail.
For consistency, all large dollar figures are in billions of dollars.
For brevity, we designate this by using the capital letter "B" after the
appropriate number; e.g., $0.6B means six hundred million dollars.
Common abbreviations we have used in this report include NYC (New York
City), TSR (Tri-State Region), GNP (Gross National Product), mph (miles per
hour), VMT (Vehicle-Miles Travelled, per weekday unless indicated otherwise)
CBD (Central Business District; in Manhattan this means south of 60th Street
and ITR (Interim Technical Report, an internal publication of the Tri-State
Regional Planning Commission).
- 1 -
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FIGURE 1; HOW NEW YORKERS SPEND THEIR HIGHWAY DOLLAR
Passenger Costs
l?re,ieht Costs
Hidden Costs
Private
Cars
Taxis
Buses
Subsidies
Unpaid
Travel Time
Accident Costs
Air Pollution
Every dollar spent for highway transportation in New York City is split
three ways; 31 cents are used for oat of pocketiipersonal expenses, 35
cents are spent on the shipping of goods, and 34 cents are hidden costs.
They represent taxes paid to subsidize highways and buses, losses due to
accidents, time spent traveling during business hours, and the costs of
air pollution.
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- 3 -
DIRECT COSTS
Direct User Expenditures
The righthand column in Table 2 lists by mode the estimated 1978 direct
user expenditures for transportation in the United States. These are
projected using a least-squares exponential regression of the 1965-1976
data in the Transportation Association of America's "Transportation Facts
and Trends, Thirteenth Edition - 1976, July 1977," pp. 4-5, and the April" 1978
Quarterly Supplement. Tables 3 and 4 summarize the TAA data. Tables 5 and 6
present the TAA's 1976 projections plus our exponential projections for the
1977-1982 period. Table 2's righthand column contains in rearranged format
the 1978 projections from Tables 5 and 6. The left and middle columns in
Table 2 show our estimates of New York City and Regional expenditures,
which are developed in the following six sections. Table 2 also displays some
non-highway user expenditures to place highway costs in perspective. However,
the corresponding societal costs are not developed in this paper.
Private Car Expenditures
Private car costs in New York City and the Tri-State Region are developed
from the Hertz Car Leasing Division's nationwide data (Table 7) and EPA
data on mileage by model year (Table 1-5,. "Mobile Source Emission Factors,"
Jan., 1978). We judge Hertz's analysis to be superior to that in Tri-State's
ITR 2104 ("Typical Automobile Operating Costs in the Tri-State Region," Feb.
1975) because of Tri-State's simplistic approach to details. However, we
rely on Tri-State for estimates of charges for tolls and parking/garaging
(0.45 and 2.35 cents per mile, respectively). GNP implicit deflators (Table
8) are used to restate Hertz's current-dollar costs for each model yeaf in
terms of third quarter 1978 dollars.
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Available literature shows that a domestic car's first owner
(be it person or corporation) trades it in when it is between 3.57 and
4.2 years old. Used cars are generally held for an average of 3.23 years.
Our approach requires integer values; by assuming trade-ins, the calculated
operating cost is underestimated. First and second owners are assumed to
own cars for three years each. Third and subsequent owners are assumed to
bear identical operating costs for each year that the car remains in service.
The major source of the "second-hand effect" is the reduced annual
depreciation taken by the new owner.
Each model year's cost per mile is multiplied by the fraction of
annual VMT chargeable to that model year (pre-1970 cars being aggregated
with 1970 cars) and these products are summed to obtain a typical private
car operating cost of 24.83 cents per mile.
The VMT per 1973 weekday (Table 10) are derived from Tri-State's Highway
Evaluation Model for the Region using linear interpolation between Tri-State's
1970 and 1980 projections and making corrections with further Tri-State
data to separate out taxis, trucks and buses.
Because VMT are traditionally measured on weekdays (when
congestion is most intense in CBDs), annualization would be exaggerated by
using 365 days as a multiple. Like the NYC Department of Traffic, we use
Manhattan CBD tunnel trips (which are tolled and thus counted) as a tool for
establishing the travel rates in the Manhattan CBD on weekends and, therefore,
for the entire week. According to Table 11, the week's vehicle count
ranges from 6.46 to 6.80 times the average of the weekday count at the
four tunnels (rather than 7 times). The weighted average is 6.69. Multiplying
this by 365 and dividing by 7 yields 349 effective VMT-weekdays per year.
With this figure, we can now calculate private car user expenditures
for Manhattan, New York City and the Tri-State Region by multiplying the
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- 5 -
private car VMT for each geographic area by 24.83 cents per mile and by 349
travel days per year. The results are $0.37B, $2.61B, and $17.41B, respectively,
(Performing the same calculations with NYC Dept. of Air Resources 1973 Private
Car VMT data yields $0.41B for Manhattan and $2.62B for New York City.)
Taxicab/Livery User Expenditures
According to a private communication from Murray Rosensweig, vice-president
of Eden Transportation Systems, Inc. (the city's largest taxi fleet), the
2,500 taxis still operated by fleets (as opposed to the burgeoning mini-
fleets) gross an average of $70 on the day shift and $80 on the night shift,
*
exclusive of tips and regardless of the day of the week; the utilization
rate averages about 92% % day and night. The annual gross for fleet taxis,
assuming that tips run about 15%, is $0.15B.
Tri-State's ITR 1312, "Taxi Travel Survey Methodology and Findings,"
June 1978, uses 1977 data to show that owner/drivers and mini-fleet operators
behave much the same, averaging 68 fares per day compared to 122 for the
two-shifted fleet cabs. Since no formal data has been published on taxi
revenues, we used the proportion of fares-per-day to calculate that these 9,300
privately owned taxis gross $0.26B per year. We adjusted for the fact that
owner/mini-drivers drive only 6 days a week.
Table 10 of ITR 1312 indicates that 79.3% of all identifiable fare trips
by New York City medallion^taxis _p'ccur entirely within Manhattan and are,
therefore, fully chargeable to Manhattan. An additional 5.6% begin and 3.6%
end in Manhattan; these latter are thus half chargeable to Manhattan since a
trip's costs should be charged half to its origin and half to its destination.
Only one trip in 1,000 leaves the city so the total New York City, medallion
gross of $0.40B can be fully charged to New York City, with $0.34B charged
to Manhattan. We have assumed that trip charges are uniformly distributed
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- 6 -
regardless of borough of origin or destination. This slightly exaggerates
the Manhattan share where many trips are relatively short.
ITR 1312 also refers to "about 20,000" non-medallion livery vehicles
in New York City. There is no reliable data on these essentially unregulated
vehicles which specialize in serving non-midtown areas where demand is too
light to attract the high-investment medallion taxis. State registration data
is weak because many livery owners use out-of-the-city addresses to obtain
insurance at lower rates. In addition, many liveries are worked only part
time. A 1972 report from the New York City Taxi & Limousine Commission
("The Non-Medallion Industry: A Transportation Phenomonen," Michael Lazar,
project director) lists $250 to $300 as the range for weekly grosses.
Updating this with the GNP Implicit Deflator (1.5356), we estimate that the
annual gross is $22,000 per vehicle and that the annual citywide gross is
$0.4B, of which perhaps half is chargeable to Manhattan.
While livery vehicles include chauffer-driven limousines that are for hire
(and that are identifiable by the letter 'Z' in their license plates), there is
yet another category of livery - gypsy cabs. These are private cars that are used
to carry passengers for hire in contravention of their registration rules and
insurance policies. Although there is no accurate data available for gypsy cab
activity, it is included in the Private Car category because that is how such
vehicles are registered.
Although Tri-State's VMT data shows zero taxi/livery mileage outside the city,
there clearly is some. According to Tri-State's Technical Bulletin ("Findings of a
Taxi Survey," Vol. 4, No. 3, April 1963), taxi VMT in the Region outside New York
City was 24.2% of city taxi VMT in 1963. Assuming that the proportion has not
changed in the last 15 years and that user expenditures are proportional to taxi
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- 7 -
VMT, we calculate an outside the city taxi expenditure of $0.15B, which brings
the Tri-State Regional total to $0.95B, nearly half of the separately estimated
national figure.
School Bus Expenditures
According to Nicolas Pileggi's "Warily We Roll Along on Our Way to School"
(New York magazine, June 19, 1978), New York City spent $0.073B in 1977 to
transport 133,000 students to public schools, about $550 per student. We assume
1978 costs will be the same.
For that part of the Tri-State Region outside of New York City, unpublished
Tri-State statistics show that $60,867,308 was spent in New Jersey's 10 Tri-State
Region counties to transport 373,130 pupils in 1976-1977 ($163.13 per pupil) and
that $17,844,564 was spent in 52 Connecticut town and rural school districts to
transport 188,432 pupils in 1976-1977 ($94.70 per pupil).
Based on a least-squares power regression of data in Table VII of Tri-
State 's ITR 1206 ("Public Transportation Operational and Financial
Statistics in the Tri-State Region - 1976," June 1978), we estimate that
1.3 million pupils will be transported by school bus throughout the Region
in 1978. Subtracting the total students from the city, New Jersey and
Connecticut leaves 600,000 for the remainder of the Region within New York
State. However, busing cost data are not available for these students.
Estimating costs at $130 per pupil for a total of $0.078B, the Regional
total comes to $0.23B. This is exclusive of the cost of busing students
to private schools, for which we found no data.
Local Bus, Subway and Commuter Rail User Expenditures
Tri-State's ITR 1206 reports Regular Route Revenue for 1973-1976.
Least-squares exponential regressions yield the 1978 estimates shown in
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- 8 -
Table 12. Note that subsidies are not included. Regular Route Revenue is
the direct expenditure by users. Half of Commuter Rail is charged to New
York City, specifically Manhattan, because most passenger trips
are to or from Manhattan: the other half would be charged to the suburban
end of the trip.
Intercity Bus and Rail, Aviation and Marine User Expenditures
The 1978 national projections of the TAA's historical data for these
categories are allocated to the City and the Region on a per capita basis.
A more rigorous breakdown is beyond the scope of this report. Using 1976
population data from Tri-State (1,416,700 for Manhattan, 7,453,600 for New
York City, and 18,437,800 for the Region), assuming zero growth in the past
two years, and comparing these figures with the Census Bureau's latest 1978
United States figure of 217,941,000 yields the following per capita user
expenditure percentages: 0.65% for Manhattan, 3.42% for New York City,
and 8.46% for the Region.
Freight Transportation User Expenditures
Freight costs in the Tri-State Region are allocated to modes using the
proportions in Robert T. Wood's paper for Tri-State, "The Urban Freight
System: Why It Doesn't Work Better," which was delivered at the 1973
International Physical Distribution Management Conference, Tokyo. The
Manhattan and New York City shares of the Region's costs are apportioned
in accordance with the inter-county matrix of 1961-1964 freight movement
in Tri-State's ITR 4105-6591 ("Application of the Input-Output Technique
to Regional Freight Forecasting," Dec. 1968), which is the latest compre-
hensive data available. This report gives annual tonnage totals for truck
and for all freight. We assume that costs are proportional to tonnage and
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- 9 -
that the proportions have remained unchanged since 1968. Freight forwarding
is charged to local trucking and the operation of traffic departments is
split equally between railroads and trucking. See Table 13.
INDIRECT COSTS
Transportation Subsidies
Highway subsidy figures are taken from the Federal Highway Adminis-
tration's Feb. 9, 1978 Press Release 10-78, Table HF-11, which details
government funds available for highway construction and maintenance in
excess of fees and user taxes at all levels: federal, state, county
and the like.
For 1978, the FHWA's forecast for all levels of government is: $1.860B
for property taxes and assessments; $6.652B for general fund appropriations;
$1.915B for investment income, less an estimated $1.090B placed in
reserves; and, at the federal level only, $0.02IB for miscellaneous taxes
and fees. (At state and local levels, this latter category includes sales
tax revenues which are already counted in user expenditures as direct
costs.) The total forecast is thus $9.36B. When apportioned to Manhattan,
New York City and the Tri-State Region on a per capita basis, the results
are: $0.061B, $0.320B, $0.792B, respectively. Data for a more rigorous
analysis are unavailable.
The only other government subsidy for highway sector operations for
which information is available is for local bus use. The amount can be
determined by taking the excess of total expenses over total revenues
(from Table 12). The expenses are paid somehow and the extent by which they
exceed farebox collections constitutes a subsidy. We used Total Revenues
instead of Regular Route Revenues so that the subsidizing effect of transit
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- 10 -
advertising and other revenues, if any, is excluded here.
Using least-squares regressions on Tri-State's 1973-1976 data in ITR
1206, the projected subsidies (excess of expenses over total revenues)
for bus operations in 1978 are $0.09IB for New York City and $0.153B for
the Region (Table 12). The midtown and Manhattan shares of the New York City
figure can be apportioned per bus VMT (8.85% and 28.47%, respectively, on
a 24-hour weekday basis). The resulting figures are $0.008B for midtown and
$0.026B for Manhattan.
The above considers operating subsidies but there is also the matter of
capital subsidies. Again, information is skimpy. For the 1977-1978 fiscal year,
the NYC Transit Authority's capital budget included $0.0487B for the bus system.
Because farebox receipts do not even cover the operating budget, these capital
expenditures are totally subsidized and, therefore, indirect expenses to the users
Since we do not have capital budget data for other bus activities within
the region, we estimate the total at $0.050B. We use the same 8.85% and 28.47%
figures for bus capital items as were used to assign bus operating expenses
to midtown and Manhattan; this yields respective amounts of $0.004B
and $0.014B.
The Cost of Unpaid Travel Time
Table 15 presents data excerpted from the NYC Department of Mr Resources'
automotive modeling data base. It presents VMT by vehicle mode during
the hours noted on classes of roadway as well as overall average speeds
(regardless of mode) for four sections of Manhattan and for the four other
boroughs for a weekday in 1973. These data are used to calculate the unpaid
time spent in highway travel in each geographic area except midtown
Manhattan's arterial and local streets; for these latter, see below.
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- 11 -
Our calculations consider only the morning and evening rush "hours"
on expressways and only the "business day" (7 a.m. to 6 p.m.) on arterial
and local streets. Since data is available for the expressways in the outer
boroughs only for the morning rush hours, the morning delays are assumed
to be duplicated in the evening. Note that the rush "hour" is longer in the
outer boroughs. Other time periods are omitted because the value of a person's
time when he or she is neither working nor commuting may be lower and is
certainly not easily computed. Since it does have some value, this is an
extremely conservative omission.
The Dept. of Air Resources' Automotive Modelling Data (Table 15)
presents only one average speed for all modes (private car, taxi/livery,,
truck or bus) in each time and territory. On crowded
streets, it is evident to even a casual observer that buses do
not keep up with private cars and taxis. Since it is demonstrated below
that buses are higher value vehicles than taxis and cars, it is conservative
to neglect this disparity. This we have done except for midtown Manhattan's
arterial and local streets where we were able (see Appendix 2) to gather
our own passenger car speed data and thereby estimate bus speeds. Our test
of a 7-mile loop connecting 57th Street with Fifth and Sixth Avenues
yielded a 7 a.m. to 6 p.m. business day average speed of only 5.5 mph. We
estimate that buses, which comprise 3.97% of the business day VMT, average
4.5 mph and that trucks, which comprise 16.53%, average 5.5 mph.
For midtown Manhattan we have used our data for passenger cars and
taxis and our estimates for buses and trucks. For the rest of the city,
we used the Department of Air Resources' automotive modeling data
presented in Table 15.
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- 12 -
Vehicle Occupancy
According to the NYC Department of Transportation, private cars average
1.6 occupants: the driver plus 0.6 passenger. The national average is 1.5.
According to Tri-State's ITR 1312, New York City taxi fare-carrying trips
average 1.38 passengers and make up 57% of taxi mileage. This yields an
effective average load of 0.79 passenger. In the absence of formal data,
non-medallion livery vehicles are presumed to have the same characteristics
as taxis.
Buses average 12 passengers in New York City. This is based on a
comparison of passenger-mile and bus-mile totals in Tri-State's ITR 1206.
Since the driver of a taxi/livery or a bus is being paid for his or
her time, this cost is already included in direct expenditures. However,
since drivers of private cars are not paid, the value of their time will
be included in these calculations.
Value of Time
According to Tri-State's Highway Evaluation Model, the average worker
in the Tri-State Region was paid $5.35 per hour in October-November 1975.
According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics' Northeast Regional
Employment Cost Index, increases between then and March 1978 amounted to
15.5%, bringing the rate to $6.16 per hour. Assuming that the 1973
percentage of the population employed in the Tri-State Region remains at
44.7% and accepting that the value of the time of unemployed dependents
is a burden on wage earners, the average value of time is $6.18 x 0.447 =
$2.76 per hour. However, this figure is conservative since
children are under-represented in private car occupancy during the
school day portion of the business day, especially in midtown.
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- 13 -
This $2.76/hour value is assigned to both- drivers and passengers in
private cars, even though they make no out-of-pocket expenditures. (Other
costs of congestion delays - such as increased fuel consumption and
accelerated brake and transmission wear - are covered in direct
expenditures though they are not separately identified.)
Judging by their fares, taxi passengers appear to value their time
more highly. According to the Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, the
industry group representing fleet operators, the typical New York City
taxi trip takes between 7 and 15 minutes. Using the median value, a
typical trip in midtown Manhattan at the 5.5 mph speed we observed (see
Appendix 2) would, therefore, travel just over 1 mile in 11 minutes, or
11.5 minutes if we include 30 seconds for seeking the taxi.
By contrast, walking is slower but costs nothing. Equating taxi
fares with the time saved relative to walking yields a value for
that time. (We are ignoring the health benefits of walking as a factor;
since any such benefits would add to the value of the time considered,
this is a. conservative omission.)
An average walk at 2.5 mph means that 1 mile would take 24 minutes.
This rate allows for delays on crowded sidewalks and occasional red lights.
A 1 mile taxi ride thus saves 12.5 minutes for 1.38 passengers. We
calculate (see below) that a typical midtown Manhattan taxi trip
costs $2.25, including tip, and that each passenger's time is being saved
at a cost of (and is therefore worth) $7.83 per hour.
Outside of midtown, an 11 minute ride would cover 2.61 miles at
14.25 mph (a VMT weighted non-midtown average taxi/livery speed derived
from Table 15). Such a trip would cost $3.00, including tip (see below).
If this distance could be walked at 3 mph, the taxi would be saving its
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- 14 -
1.38 passengers 41.2 minutes, indicating that each passenger's time is
worth $3.17 per hour.
Similar calculations to determine the value of a bus passenger's
time yields $2.78 per hour. This is less than 1% more than the $2.76
per hour wage-based estimate used for motorists. We have used the latter
figure in order to remain conservative in our calculations.
Since buses average 12 passengers (at 24 hours, 7 days a week), buses
have a time value 7.5 times greater than passenger cars. During "business
days" it should be even higher but an analysis of time-specific bus load
factors was beyond the scope of this study.
Structure of New York City Taxi Fares - And Taxi Meters
In New York City, where taxi charges are determined by a taxi meter,
the fare is not as simply calculated as the display rate suggests. The
official rate card on the dashboard reads "75
-------
- 15 -
Mechanically, the meter receives inputs from its clock and its
speedometer. Each, drives through an overrunning clutch so that the meter is
driven by the faster of the two inputs with the fare displayed in dime
increments. This type of meter is now decades old. When it was introduced,
the Police Department's Hack Bureau (predecessor of the Taxi Commission)
may well have overlooked its generous definition of waiting time.
i
However, because waiting time is so structured, a simple trip over
a known distance (such as 20 blocks along a midtown avenue, exactly 1 mile]
almost always costs more than the $1.35 one would calculate from the posted
fare. In addition, the meter may legally read as much as 2.8% fast on
distance and 10% fast on waiting time, tolerances well within the adjustment
accuracy of a taxi meter.
Calculation of Taxi Fares
To calculate the expected fare for the 1.008 mile, 11 minute typical
taxi trip in midtown Manhattan, where business day traffic is unremittingly
stop and go, we assume that half the distance is covered with the taxi
moving faster than 8.57 mph and half slower: also, that the fast stretch,
when only distance drives the meter, is covered at an average speed of 12
mph. Even though actual speeds will vary continuously, it is reasonable
to split the trip into these two modes for analytical purposes.
The first charge is the 75c meter drop. Looking first at the fast mode,
there will be 100 increments at l/7th, 2/7ths and 3/7ths of a mile distances
for a meter reading of $1.05. Since the meter only records dime increments,
a charge of 5$ for the additional 1/14 mile in the fast mode is stored
within the meter.
-------
- 16 -
The slow mode occupies 8.5 minutes of the trip. Including the stored
5C, this brings the final meter reading to $1.95. A reasonable tip would
be 30 C, bringing the total cost to $2.25. (In New York City, there is no
charge for additional passengers.)
—. - i
We calculate that a typical trip length outside midtown is 2.61 miles,
using the same 11 minute estimate and deriving a VMT-weighted average speed
for taxi/livery vehicles of 14.25 mph from Table 15. The fare for such a
trip should be $2.65, assuming very few stops and delays and between 45
and 100 seconds spent at under 8,57 mph. With tip, the total cost could
be as low as $3.00.
Traffic Accident Costs
In her "Societal Costs of Motor Vehicle Accidents - 1975" (published
by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Dec. 1976),
Barbara Faigin offers two basic criteria for identifying loss components:
"(1) resources consumed in the repair of damage to people and vehicles
that could be shifted in the long run to welfare-producing activfties
and (2) the consumption losses of individuals and society at large caused
by losses in production and the ability to produce."
The first category simply consists of the many bills that must be
paid by victims, successors, insurance companies, and the like. The second
category essentially represents the present value of the foregone future
earnings together with an opportunity-cost evaluation of home, family and
community services provided outside the paid cost period. This category
ranges from 4% to 27% of the total costs of injuries that are not a threat
to life but from 83% to 96% of the total costs of injuries that are.
The total figures for both categories are $287,174 per fatality,
-------
- 17 -
$3,185 per injury for a weighted average of a range of injuries, and
$520 per vehicle for property damage only (PDO) accidents. Using a GNP
implicit deflator factor of 1.2074 to convert these 1975 costs to 1978
third quarter dollars yields $346,735, per fatality, $3,846 per injury, and
$623 per vehicle involved in a PDO accident.
We ignore any local differences in wages, medical or repair costs
and assume, in the absence of useful-lacal data and despite the lower
speeds typical of New York City, that the distribution of levels of injury
severity is the same as for the nation.
For the city and Manhattan, we assume that 1978 will equal 1977 in
its number of deaths and injuries due to traffic accidents as reported by
the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles on Form MV 144a. For the
Region as a whole, we use Tri-State's Highway Evaluation Model,
interpolating between the 1970 and 1980 estimates of 2,274 and 3,031
fatalities, respectively, to arrive at 2,940 for 1978. We assume that
injuries and PDO vehicle counts are in the same proportion to fatalities
as is the case nationwide; again, in the absence of local data.
PDO accidents can only be estimated since New York State requires a
police report only if property damage per accident exceeds $200 (in 1978
the figure was raised to $400). In a personal communication, Jack Yasnowsky,
acting director of the Office of Program Planning at the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, gave us the following national vehicle
figures for 1975: 45,700 fatalities, 4 million injuries, and 22 million
vehicles in PDO accidents. (The national ratio of injuries to fatalities
is thus 87.5:1; for New York City, it is 106.7:1. This difference seems
consistent with the city's lower average speeds and, therefore, lower
impact energies.) Assuming that""the total number of PDO vehicles (reported
-------
- 18 -
officially or not)' in Manhattan and New York City is in the same proportion
to the combined total of deaths and injuries as it is nationally, then there
were 104,000 PDO vehicles in Manhattan and 362,000 in New York City in 1975.
The city's MV-144a forms report only 19,309 and 97,660 PDO vehicles for
Manhattan and citywide, respectively, but we suspect the difference reflects
-both the disinclination to fill out the forms and the $200 threshold.
Table 19 tabulates the total societal (direct plus indirect) costs of
traffic accidents in Manhattan, New York City, the Tri-State Region, and the U.S.
Air Pollution Costs
An updated and revised extension of Kenneth A. Small's approach
("Estimating the Air Pollution Costs of Transport Modes," Journal of
Transport Economics and Policy, May 1977, pp. 109-132) is used in a work
in progress by the authors of this report. In it we estimate the costs
to human health and property imposed by automotive air pollution in
Midtown, in Manhattan, in New York City and in the Tri-State Region.
Small's assumption that urban air is uniformly polluted is used to
estimate Tri-StateTs portion of nationwide costs on a per capita basis.
However, for assignments of costs within Tri-State, we created instead a
simple model based on average speeds-in five specific areas and on .the
resulting average emissions per vehicle-mile travelled. Generated from
this model are emissions costs for the five specific areas:
* Midtown Manhattan
* The rest of the CBD (Downtown and the Valley)
* The rest of Manhattan (Uptown)
* The rest of New York City (Brooklyn, Queens, The Bronx and
Staten Island)
-------
- 19 -
* The rest of the Tri-State Region.
These area costs are then summed to produce costs which are displayed in
Table 20 for the CBD, Manhattan, New York City and the Region.
-------
- 20 -
THE COSTS OF CONGESTION
APPENDIX 1
TABLES 1-20
-------
TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF HIGHWAY TRANSPORTATION COSTS FOR 1978
(Billions
of Dollars)
New York
Manhattan City
DIRECT COSTS (USER EXPENDITURES)
Passenger Modes
Private Cars $
Taxicabs /Livery
School Buses
Local Buses
Intercity Buses
SUBTOTAL:
Freightd 1
TOTAL DIRECT COSTS:
INDIRECT COSTS
Subsidies6
Unpaid Travel Time 1
Traffic Accidents5
Air Pollution11
.37 $2.61
.54 .80
.07
.37
.04
3,89
.50 4.43
8.32
.10 .46
•58 2.51
.19 .83
.21 .38
Tri-State
Region
$17.41
.95
.23
.50
.10
19.19
12.55
31.74
1.00
2.85
.47
U.S.A*
$193.3
2.0
2.9
1.4
1.2
200.8
159.5
360.3
9.4+
45.4
6.0
TOTAL INDIRECT COSTS:
Indirect Costs as a Percent
of Total Costs
2.08
4.18
33%
TOTAL HIGHWAY TRANSPORTATION COSTS:
$12.50
a. Tables 3-6
b. Tables 7-11
c. Table 12
d. Table 13
e. Table 14
.f. Tables 15-18
g. Table 19
h. Table 20
-------
TABLE 2: DIRECT USER COSTS OF TRANSPORTATION FOR 1978 BY MODE
Passenger Services
Private Car3
Taxi b
School Bus
Local BusC'S
Intercity Bus
Subtotal:
Subway/Rapid |aild'g
Commuter Rail
Intercity Raile
Air6
Marine
Subtotal:
TOTAL:
% by Roadway
Freight Services
Highway
Rail
Marine
Pipeline
Air
TOTAL:
GRAND TOTAL
% by Roadway
New York
City
$2.61
.80
.07
.37
.04
3.89
.54
.12
.01
1.02
.01
1.61
5.50
7B.Z
$4.43
.15
.42
.02
.15
5.16
$10.66
78%
(Billions of Dollars)
Tri-State
Region United States
$17.41
.95
.23
.50
.10
19.. 19
.55
.25
.03
2.57
.03
3.43
22.62
85%
$12.55
.53
1.54
.06
.55
15.23
$37.85
84%
$193.3
2.0
2.9
1.4
1.2
200. 8
.8
.2
.3
29.6
.3
31.2
232.0
87%
159.5
21.3
10.0
2.6
2.4
195.8
$427.8
84%
a. Tables 7-11.
b. See Text.
c. Table 12.
d. Tri-State's ITR 1206, Table VI. Data for 1073-1975 was projected to 1978
using linear least-squares regression.
e. National data assigned per capita.
f. Table 13.
g. The Transportation Association of America's data presents Local Bus and
Transit as a single entry. Its projected 1978 national value is 2.2. We
estimate the bus and subway portions as 1.8 and 0.8 , respectively.
-------
TABLE 3; THE NATION'S ESTIMATED PASSENGER BILL*
(Billions of Dollars)
Private Transportation
Automobile
New & Used Cars
Tires, Tubes, Accessories
Gasoline & Oil
Tolls
Insurance (less claims)
Interest on Debt
Registration Fees
Operator's Permit Fees
Repairs, Greasing, Washing,
Parking, Storage, Rent
SUBTOTAL:
1965 1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
Air
TOTAL, PRIVATE MODES:
For Hire Transportation
Local Bus & Transit
Taxi
Railroad Commutation
School Bus
Intercity Bus
Intercity Rail
Air
Marine
TOTAL, FOR HIRE:
GRAND TOTAL:
$30.4
3.8
19.6
.5
2.8
3.5
1.1
.1
8.1
70.0
1.4
71.4
1.4
.9
.1
.7
.6
.5
4.3
.3
8.9
80.3
$29.9
4.0
21.3
.6
3.3
3.9
1.3
.2
8.7
73.1
1.8
74.9
1.5
.9
.1
.8
.7
.4
4.8
.3'
9.6
84.5
$29.1
4.2
22.7
.6
3.6
4.0
1.3
.2
9.4
75.0
1.8
76.8
1.6
1.0
.1
.9
.7
.4
5.7
.3
10.7
87.5
$35.5
4.6
24.6
.7
3.5
4.2
1.4
.2
10.4
85.1
2.1
87.2
1,6
1.3
.2
1.0
.1
.3
6.7
.3
12.0
99,2
$37.0
5.1
27.2
.7
3.5
4.6
1.5
.2
11.7
91.5
2.6
94.1
1.6
1.4
.2
1.1
.7
.3
8.0
.3
13.6
107.7
$32.7
5.4
29.3
.8
4.3
4.7
1.2
.2
13.2
92.3
2.6
94.9
1.7
1.4
.2
1.2
.8
.3
8.5
.3
14.4
109.3
$42.0
6.0
31.2
.8
5.6
4.8
1.7
.2
14.7
107.1
3.1
110.2
1.7
1.5
.2
1.3
.8
.2
9.4
.3
15.5
125.7
$47.0
6.7
33.2
.9
6.2
5.6
1.8
.2
16.4
117.9
3.5
121.4
1.7
1.5
.2
1.5
.8
' .2
10.8
.3
17.1
138.5
$51.4
7.5
37.1
.9
6.0
6.5
2.0
.2
18.1
129.8
4.1
133.9
1.8
1.5
.2
1.6
.9
.3
11.8
.3
18.4
152.4
$44.2
8.1
48.5
.9
5.8
7.3
2.0
.3
20.8
137.8
4.4
142.5
1.9
1.6
.2
1.9
1.0
.4
13.8
_3
21.0
163.3
$48.6
8.9
52.1
1.0
4.3
7.5
2.1
.3
23.7
148.2
4.7
154.4
2.0
1.6
.2
2.2
1.0
.3
15.0
22.6
175.6
* Excerpted from tile Transportation Association of America's "Transportation Facts & Figures, Thirteenth Edition —
1976," July 1977, T> - 5.
-------
TABLE 4; THE NATION'S ESTTMATffn FREIGHT BILL
Highway
Intercity Trucking
Local Trucking
Buses
SUBTOTAL:
Rail
Marine
Domestic
International
SUBTOTAL:
Oil Pipe Line
Air
Domestic
International
SUBTOTAL:
Freight Forwarders & REA
Other Shipper Costs
Loading & Unloading
Operation of Traffic Depts.
SUBTOTAL:
GRAND TOTAL:
1965
$23.6
23.0
.1
46.7
9.9
1.7
2.1
3.;8
1.1
.4
.3
.7
.5
1.1
.3
1.4
64.0
1966
$26.6
22.9
.1
49.6
10.4
1.7
2.5
4.2
1.1
.5
.4
.9
.5
1.1
.3
1.4
68.1
(Billions of Dollars)
1967 1968 196Q
$28.9
24.5
.1
53.5
10.1
1.7
2.6
4.3
1.2
.5
.5
1.1
.5
1.1
.3 ..
1.4
72.1
$30.0
27.9
.1
58.0
10.7
1.7
2.9
4.6
1.2
.6
.5
1.1
.5
1.1
.3
1.4
77.5
$31.4
30.4
.1
61.9
11.3
1.7
3.0
4.7
1.3
.7
.5
1.2
.5
1.1
.4
1.5
82.3
1970
$33.6
35.5
.1
69.2
11.9
1.9
3.2
5.1
1.4
.7
.5
1.2
.4
1.1
.4
1.5
90.5
1971
$37.6
41.6
.1
79.3
12.7
2.0
3.2
5.2
1.5
.8
.5
1.3
.3
1.1
.4
1.5
101.8
1972
$41.7
50.3
.1
92.1
13.1
2.1
3.5
5.6
1.6
.8
.6
1.5
.3
1.1
.4
1.5
115.8
1973
$44.7
57.7
.1
102.5
14.8
2.3
4.5
6.8
1.7
1.0
.6
1.6
.4
1.3
.4
1.7
129.5
1974
$48.8
58.8
.1
107.7
16.9
2.8
5.3
8.0
1.9
1.0
.7
1.7
.5
1.3
.5
1.8
138.6
1975
$47.3
64.6
.2
112.0
16.3
2.8
4.9
7.7
2.2
1.1
.8
1.8
.4
1.3
.5
1.8
142.6
* Columns may appear not to add due to rounding. Original Table is in millions of dollars.
-------
TABLE 5; THE NATION'S PROJECTED PASSENGER BILL
(Billions of Dollars)
1976*
Private Transportation
Automobile
New & Used Cars
Tires, Tubes, Accessories
Gasoline & Oil
Tolls
Insurance (less claims)
Interest on Debt
Registration Fees
Operator's Permit Fees
Repairs, Greasing, Washing,
Parking, Storage, Rent
SUBTOTAL:
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982"
Air
TOTAL, PRIVATE MODES:
For Hire Transportation
Local Bus & Transit
Taxi
Railroad Commutation
School Bus
Intercity Bus
Intercity Rail
Air
Marine
TOTAL, FOR HIRE:
GRAND TOTAL:
$63.9
9.9
55.2
.9
6.2
7.8
2.4
.3
26.3
172.9
5.1
178.0
2.2
1.5
.2
2.4
1.1
.4
13.3
n/a
25.1
$60.3
10.6
59.0
1.1
6.8
8.5
2.5
.3
28.7
127.8
6.4
184.2
2.1
1.9
.2
2.6
1.1
.3
15.3
n/a
23.5
$64.3
11.6
64.9
1.1
7i3
9.2
2.6
.3
32.0
193.3
7.3
200.6
2.2
2.0
.2
2.9
1.2
.3
17.3
n/a
26.1
$68.6
12.6
71.5
1.2
7.8
9.9
2.8
.4
35.7
210.5
8.2
218.7
2,3
2.1
.2
3.3
1.2
.3
19.6
n/a
29.0
$73.1
13.8
78.7
1.3
8.3
10.7
3.0
.4
39 . 9
229.2
9.3
238.5
2,4
2,2
.3
3.6
1.3
.3
22.2
n/a
32.3
$78.0
15.1
86.6
1.3
8.9
11.5
3.2
.4
44.5
249.5
10.5
260.0
2.4
2.4
.3
4.0
1.3
.3
25.1
n/a
35.8
$83.1
16.6
95.4
1.4
9.5
12.4
3.4
.4
49.6
271.8
12.0
283.8
2,5
2.5
.3
4.5
1.4
.2
28.4
n/a
40.0
199.0
207.1
226.7
247.7
270.8
295.8
323.6
* Projected by The Transportation Association of America, "Transportation Pacts and Trends, Quarterly
i „" Jan. 19, 1978.
-------
TABLE 6; THE NATION'S PROJECTED FREIGHT BILI
Highway
Intercity Trucking
Local Trucking
Buses
SUBTOTAL:
Rail
Marine
Domestic
International
SUBTOTAL:
Oil Pipe Line
Air
Domestic
International
SUBTOTAL:
Freight Forwarders & REA
Other Shipper Costs
Loading/Unloading Freight Cars
Operation of Traffic Depts.
SUBTOTAL:
GRAND TOTAL:
(Billions of Dollars)
1976* 1977 1978
$ 56.0
74.5
.2
130.7
18.5
3.5
5.4
8.9
2.5
1.2
.8
2.0
.5
jht Cars 1.4
ipts. .6
2.0
165.2
$ 59.0
84.4
.2
143.6
18.7
3.3
6.0
9.3
2.5
1.4
.9
2.3
.4
1.3
.6
1.9
178.7
$ 63.6
94.9
.2
158.7
19.8
3.5
6.5
10.0
2.6
1.5
.9
2.4
.4
1.3
.6
1.9
195.8
1979
$ 68.7
106.7
.2
175.6
21.0
3.7
7.0
10.7
2.9
1.6
1.0
2.6
.4
1.4
.6
2.0
215.2
1980
$ 74.1
135.1
.2
194.4
22.2
3.9
7.7
11.6
3.1
1.8
1.1
2.9
.4
1.4
.7
2.1
236.7
1981
$ 79.8
135.1
.3
215.2
23.6
4.3
8.3
12.6
3.4
2.0
1.1
3.1
.4
1.4
.7
2.1
260.4
1982
$ 86.2
152.0
.3
238.5
25.0
4.5
9.1
13.6
3.6
2.2
1.2
3.4
.4
1.5
.8
2.3
286.8
* Projected by The Transportation Association of America, "Transportation Facts and Trends, Quarterly
Supplement," Jan. 19, 1978.
-------
TABLE 7
A) OPERATING COSTS FOR PRIVATE CARS*
Model Year
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970
1960
1950
Cents Per Mile**
33.1
30.1
28.1
27.2
23.8
20.2
19.7
18,7
19.0
14.4
10.9
B) PERCENTAGE OF DIRECT OPERATING COSTS SAVED BY BUYING A USED CAR*
Age of Car at
Second or Third Purchase Percent Saved
1 year 10%
2 30
3 48
4 51
5 52
6 53
7 53
* Data supplied by Hertz Car Leasing Division; refers to a typically
equipped new car at the currently dominant size.
** In current dollars and assuming car is driven 10,000 miles per year
for three years, then sold.
-------
TABLE 8: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IMPLICIT DEFLATORS
1978, Third Qtr.
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970
Relative to 1972
Inversely
Relative to 3Q78
153.46
141.29
133.88
127.18
116.20
105.92
100.00
96.02
91.36
1.0000
1.0868
1.1470
1.2074
1.3215
1.4498
1.5356
1.5993
1.6808
* U.S. Department of Commerce Library, NYC.
-------
TABLE 9: OWNERSHIP COSTS PER MILE
Model
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970
Current Year
Dollar Cnfita
$ .331
.301
.281
.272
.238
.202
.197
,187
& Earlier .190
GUP Deflator
Relative to
Third Qtr. 1978
1.0000
1.0868
1. 1470
1.2074
1.3215
1.4498
1.5356
1.5993
1.6808
Seconds Third
Hand Effect3
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.52
0.52
0.52
0.47
0.47
0.47
1978 Cost
Per Mile
$ .331
.327
.322
.171
.164
.152
.142
• Hi
.150
Model
Year
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970 &
Earlier
1978 Cost Per Mile
Including Parking,
Garaging & Tolls
$ .359
.355
.350
.199
.192
.180
.170
.169
.178
Fraction of Annual
VMT Driven by Cars
of Each Model_YearC
.106
.142
.133
.123
.108
.092
.077
.064
.155
Portion of 1978 Cost
Per Mile Chargeable
to Each Model Year
$ .0381
.0504
.0466
.0245
.0207
.0166
.0131
.0108
.0276
Total $ .2483
b.
c.
Hertz Car Leasing Division Data. We assume that first and second
owners retain cars for 3 years each, and that third owners retain
cars for 4 years. Hertz omits the costs of parking and tolls which
are 2.35 and 0.45 cents per mile, respectively, according to Tri-
State's ITR 2104.
Assumes all previous model year costs to be the same as 1970.
Table 1-5, "Mobile Source Emission Factors," U.S. EPA, Jan. 1978.
Entry for 1970 model year includes all previous model years.
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TABLE 10: MILES TRAVELED PER WEEKDAY IN THE TRI-STATE REGION
Manhattan
Bronx
Brooklyn
Queens
Staten Island
NEW YORK CITY
Nassau
Suffolk
Westchester
Rockland
Putnam
Dut chess
Orange
NEW YORK SUBURBS
NEW YORK STATE
Hudson
Essex
Bergen
Passaic
Morris
Union
Somerset
Middlesex
Monmouth
Ocean
NEW JERSEY
Southwestern
G. Bridgeport
Valley
South Central
C. Naugatuck
Housatonic
CONNECTICUT
TRI-STATE
REGION
1978 VMT*
6,430,886
6,091,653
8,494,421
14,440,146
2,977,130
38,434,218
18,993,617
24,704,907
14,243,616
4,705,240
1,677,008
6,658,652
8,536,112
79,519,107
117,945,325
5,073,859
10,990,108
15,470,725
6,780,737
9,118,716
8,151,722
6,415,122
13,173,762
9,346,816
n/a
85,321,562
7,234,841
4,727,164
1,197,278
10,168,387
4,673,152
3,433,886
31,434,698
234,709,585
Percent VMT
By Private Cars**-
68.69%
81.80
74.00
89.00
87.10
91.18
90.70
91.57
92.33
91.28
91.28
91.28
84.20
88.50
89.56
88.60
90.99
89.84
90.61
89.94
91.28
a/a :
90.80
90.51
90. go-
go. 90
90.99
91.18
Private Car
VMT Per Day
4,417,376
4,982,972
6,285,872
12,851,730
2,593,080
31,131,030
17,318,380
22,407,351
13,042,879
4,344,348'
1,530,773
6,078,018
7,791,763
72,513,512
103,644,542
4,272,189
9,726,246
13,855,581
6,007,733
8,297,120
7,323,507
5,812,742
11,848,482
8,531,774
n/a
75,675,374
6,569,236
4,278,556
1,088,326
9,243,064
4,252,101
3,131,017
28,562,300
207,882,216
**
Uses linear interpolation of 1970-1980 data in the Tri-State Regional
Planning Commission's Highway Evaluation Model.
Tri-State Regional Planning Commission, personal communication.
-------
TABLE 11: TUNNEL CROSSINGS BY DAY OF ¥EEK
Percentage of Average Weekday Tunnel Trips*
Lincoln
Day of Week
Sunday
Monday
Tuesday
Wednesday
Thursday
Friday
Saturday
TOTAL:
0.82
0.94
0.98
1.02
1.02
1.04
0.93
6.75
0.87
0.94
0.97
1.00
1.02
1,06
0.94
6.80
Oo81
0.94
0.97
1.01
1.03
1.04
0.88
6.68
0.71
0.94
0.97
1.00
1.03
1.06
0.75
6.46
Average Weekday
Crossings 101,451 64,663
65,881
52,444
* New York City Department of Traffic.
-------
TABLE 12: LOCAL BUS EXPENSE AND REVENUE DATA AND PROJECTIONS
f
Bus Transit
Year New York City Tri-State Region
TOTAL EXPENSES
1973 .355 .562
1974 .402 .642
1975 .432 .683
1976 .422 .668
1978 (p) .461 (a) .730 (c)
TOTAL REVENUE
1973 .311 .501
1974 .313 .527
1975 .341 .561
1976 .341 .549
1978 (p) .370 (b) .577 (d)
REGULAR ROUTE REVENUE
1973 .301 .449
1974 .309 .465
1975 -331 .484
1976 .338 .486
1978 (p) .366 (a) .500 (d)
(p) Projections are based on best fitting least-squares
regressions (a: linear; b: exponential;, c: Logarithmic;
d: power) on the 1973-1976 data shown in Table VI in the
1977-1978 editions of Tri-State's ITR 1206, "Public
Transportation Operational and Financial Statistics in
the Tri-State Region."
-------
TABLE 13; FREIGHT EXPENDITURES ALLOCATED BY MODE IN-THE TRI STATE-REGION
(Billions of Dollars)
Mode
Intercity Trucking
Local Trucking
Rail
Marine
Pipeline
Air
TOTAL:
1978 Projections for U.S.
$63.6 + 0.2a + 0.2d = $64.0
94.9 + 0.4b + 0.2d - 95.5
19.8 + 1.3C + 0.2d = 21.3
10.0
2.6
2.4
$195.8
Regional % of....
National Total
2.3%
11.6
2.5
15.4
2.3
22.9
Tri-State
Region
$ 1.47
11.08
.53
1.54
,06
= 55
$15.23
NYC % of
Regional Total
35.3%
35.3
27.3
27.3
27.3
27.3
New York
City***
$ .52
3.91
.15
.42
.02
.15
$5.16
Manhattan
$ .18
1.32
.03
.08
.003
.03
$1.64
* See Table 6
** Wood, R,T. "The Urban Freight System: Why It Doesn't Work Better," 1973, International Physical
Distribution Management Conference, Tokyo.
*** Costs are allocated to New York City and Manhattan in accordance with the data in Tri-State'a ITR
4105-6591, "Application of the Input-Output Technique to Regional Freight Forecasting," Dec, 1968.
a. Bus freight is treated the same as Intercity Trucking.
b. Forwarders are treated the same as Local Trucking.
c. The loading/unloading of freight cars Is charged to rail.
d. The cost of the operation of traffic departments is divided equally between Local and Intercity
Tirucking and Rail.
-------
TABLE 14: ESTIMATED 1978 HIGHWAY AND BUS SUBSIDIES
(Billions of Dollars)
New York Tri-State
Manhattan City Region
Percent of U.S. population. 0.65Z 3.42% .8.46%
Expenditures at all levels
of government for high-
way construction and
maintenance in excess
of user fees and user
taxes. $ .061 $ .320 $ .792
Local bus operating
subsidy (excess of
total expenses over
total revenues). .026 .091 .153
Capital subsidy for bus
operation. .014 .049 .050
TOTAL: $ .101 $ .,4~60 $ ..995
U.S.A.
100%
$9.36
n/a
n/a
$9.36+
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TABLE 15: VMT BY MODE IN NEW YORK CITY a
Location & Time of Day
Manhattan Above 60th St.
Arterial & Local, 7am-6pm
Expressway, 7-9am
Expressway, 4-6pm
Mldtown Manhattan
Arterial & Local, 7am-6pm
Expressway, 7-9am
Expressway, 4-6pm
Manhattan, Canal to 30th St.
Arterial & Local, 7am-6pm
Expressway, 7-9am
Expressway, 4-6pm
Downtown Manhattan
Arterial & Local, 7am-6pm
Exp res sway, 7-9 am
Expressway, 4-6pm
The Bronx
Local, 7am-6pm
Arterial, 7am-6pnu
Expressway, 6-9am
Brooklyn
Local, 7am-6pm
Arterial, 7 am-6pm
Expressway, 6-9am°
Queens
Local, 7am-6pm
Arterial, 7am-6pm
Expressway, 6-9am-D
Staten Island
Lo cal, 7am-6pm
Arterial, 7am-6pm
Expressway, 6-
Autos
506,823
246,230
267,102
299,093
65,176
67,984
279,590
63,655
64,700
138,701
37,684
37,660
259,324
594,110
562,335
651,767
1,340,476
596,424
1,053,843
2,115,597
1,246,225
338,067
655,443
104,369
Weekday VMT
Taxi /Li very
352,010
24,452
26,446
232,468
5,743
3,659
110,725
8,909
9,012
13,364
3,595
2,562
36,246
84,216
38,598
167,587
344,346
27,658
31,284
62,705
17,701
2,579
4,740
72
By Mode
- Trucks
174,786
2,955
3,013
110,533
2,328
2,045
127,446
1,573
1,605
38,176
2,202
2,265
45,559
104,541
- 56,965
222,672
457,884
39,889
210,114
421,794
57,042
54,230
105,099
25,323
Buses
43,810
184
220
26,546
1,184
1,128
16,955
58
55
5,744
29
30
6,090
13,976
6,807
26,134
53,739
4,111
25,181
50,549
8,748
3,538
6,857
568
Average
Speed
.iSEj^
12.3-
15.4
15.0
6.5'
14.0
16.4
9.3
18.6
15.6
7.1
30.3
33.3;
10.0
17.8
31.4
9.2
15.3
29.6
10.2
16.9
30.6
13.4
23.5
34.9
Y°rk Clty Division of Air Resources Automotive Modeling
Since evening rush hour data is unavailable for the outer boroughs, morning
rush hour VMT will be doubled in subsequent calculations.
See Appendix 2 and discussion in text about midtown speeds.
-------
TABLE 16; HIGHWAY VEHICLE HOURS IN NYC - BY MODE AND PER BUSINESS DAY
Mode
Private Car
Taxi/ Li very
Bus
Midtown
Arterial/Local
54,381a
42,267a
4,827b
Rest of
Manhattan
1,148,517
47,643
6,382
Rest of
New York City
662,938
61,738
. 15,079
a. Speeds of 5.5 mph, as observed (See Appendix 2), are used for
private cars and taxis.
b. We estimate 4.5 mph for buses in midtown.
-------
TABLE 17: DOLLAR VALUE PER HOUR OF VEHICLE TRAVEL BY MODE IN NYC
Mode
Private Car
Taxi/Livery
Value Per
Passenger-Hour
$2.76
$3.17
Average
Occupancy
1.6
0.79
Value Per
Vehicle-Hour
$4.416
$2.504
($7.83 in Midtown)
($6.186 in Midtowi
Bus
$2.76
12.0
$33.12
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TABLE 18: ANNUAL VALUE OF BUSINESS DAY TRAVEL TIME ON HIGHWAYS5
(Billions of Dollars)
Mode
Midtown
Arterial/Local
Rest of
Manhattan
Rest of
New York City
Private Car
$.0624
$1.3187
$.7612
Taxi/Livery
.0680
.0310
.0402
Bus
.0416
.0550
.1298
Totals:
$.1720
$1.4047
$.9312
a. 260 business days per year.
All of
Manhattan
$1.5767
All of
New York City
$2.5079
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TABLE 19: SOCIETAL COSTS OF HIGHWAY ACCIDENTS, INJURIES,
Number of Deaths
Number of Injuries
Societal Costs
Deaths
Injuries
PDO Vehicles
TOTAL SOCIETAL COST:
DEATHS & PROPERTY DAMAGE FOR
(Billions of Dollars)
Manhattan New York City
156? 656^
es 18,970b 97,142b
hides 104,000 362,000
$ .054b $ .227
.073 .374
.065 .227
1978
Tri-State Region3
2,940
250,875
1,380,000
$1.019
.965
.866
U.S.A.
46,87'
4,000,001
22,000,001
$16.25
15.38
- 13.81
$ .192
$ .828
$2.850
$45.44
a. Fatalities projected from Tri-State Highway Evaluation Model. Injuries and PDO
vehicle count assumed to be in the same proportion to U.S.A. totals as deaths.
b. Actual 1977 data; remaining figures are estimates for 1978. See Text.
c. Based on 1975 National Safety Council Data in "Accident Facts"; with more vehicles
on the road in 1978, this may be conservative.
d. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, "Societal Costs of Motor Vehicle
Accidents - 1975," Washington, D.C., Dec. 1976. Area totals are based on value
assumptions of $346,735 per death, $3,846 per injury, and $628 per PDO vehicle.
See Text for details.
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TABLE 20: COSTS OF AUTOMOTIVE AIR POLLUTION
(Billions: of Dollars)
Pollutant
Hydrocarbons
Carbon Monoxide
Nitrous Oxides
Sulfur Oxides
Particulate
Matter
Subtotal:
Pollutant
Hydrocarbons
Nitrous Oxides
Sulfur Oxides
Mid town
$.00353
.0444
.0040
.0058
.0418
.0995
Midtown
$.0013
.0071
.0015
Health Costs
Manhattan
$.00993
.0675
.0113
.0110
.0793
.1790
Property Costs
Manhattan
$.0037
.0201
.0043
New York
York
$.02753
.0919
.0317
.0185
.01332
.3029
New York
York
$.0102
.0560
.0122
Tri-State
Region
$.03253
.0996
.0410
.0222
.1589
.3542
Tri-State
Region
$.0120
.0560
.0306
Particulate Matter3
Subtotal:
TOTAL COSTS:
$.0099
$.1094
$.0281
$.2071
$.0784
$.3813
$.1140
$.4682
a. Omitted from calculations-
-------
THE SOCIETAL COSTS OF CONGESTION IN NEW YORK CITY
APPENDIX 2
A STUDY OF TRAVEL TIMES AND SPEEDS IN MIDTOWN MANHATTAN
December 1979
-------
CONTENTS
Page
Introduction 1
Map Of Route 2
Definitions 3
General Observations 4
Comparison With New York City
Traffic Department Data 6
Comparison With West Side Highway Project Data 7
Congestion As An Urban Experience .- 8
Conclusions And Recommendations 12
Footnotes 14
Figures (1 - 23) 16
-------
FIGURES
1. Average Speed On Midtown Loop Plotted Against Time Of Day
2. Average Speed Westbound On 57th Street Plotted Against Time Of Day
3. Average Speed Eastbound On 57th Street Plotted Against Time Of Day
4. Average Speed Southbound On Fifth Avenue Plotted Against Time Of Day
5. Average Speed Northbound On Sixth Avenue Plotted Against Time Of Day
6. Net Accumulation In Manhattan Of Queensboro Bridge Users Plotted Against Time Of
7. Average Speed Westbound On 57th Street Plotted Against Net Accumulation
8. Average Speed Eastbound On 57th Street Plotted Against Net Accumulation
9. Fuel Economy As A Function Of Average Speed In Midtown Manhattan Traffic
10. Comparison Of Traffic Dept. Data With Observed Hourly Average Speeds
On 57th Street Westbound Between Second And Eighth Avenues
11. Comparison Of Traffic Dept. Data With Observed Hourly Average Speeds
On 57th Street Eastbound Between Eighth And Second Avenues
12. Comparison Of Traffic Dept. Data With Observed Hourly Average Speeds
On Fifth Avenue Southbound Between 57th And 34th Streets
13. Comparison Of Traffic Dept. Data With Observed Hourly Average Speeds
On Sixth Avenue Northbound Between 34th And 57th Streets
14. Comparison Of WSHP Data With Observed Hourly Average Speeds
On 57th Street Westbound Between Second And Fifth Avenues
15. Comparison Of WSHP Data With Observed Hourly Average Speeds
On 57th Street Westbound Between Fifth And Sixth Avenues
16. Comparison Of WSHP Data With Observed Hourly Average Speeds
On 57th Street Westbound. Between Sixth Avenue And Broadway
17. Comparison Of WSHP Data With Observed Hourly Average Speeds
On 57th Street Eastbound Between Broadway And Sixth Avenue
18. Comparison Of WSHP Data With Observed Hourly Average Speeds
On 57th Street Eastbound Between Sixth And Fifth Avenues
-------
19. Comparison Of WSHP Data With Observed Hourly Average Speeds
On 57th Street. Eastfaound Between Fifth And Second Avenues
20. Comparison Of WSHP Data With Observed Hourly Average Speeds
On Fifth Avenue Southbound Between 57th And 42nd Streets'
21. Comparison Of WSHP Data With Observed Hourly Average Speeds
On Fifth Avenue Southbound Between 42nd And 34th Streets
22. Comparison Of WSHP Data With Observed Hourly Average Speeds
On Sixth Avenue Northbound Between 34th And 42nd Streets
23. Comparison Of WSHP Data With Observed Hourly Average Speeds
On Sixth Avenue Northbound Between 42nd And 57th Streets
-------
INTRODUCTION
In November 1977, Citizens for Clean Air spent 48 hours driving a passenger
car in midtown Manhattan under a variety of weather and traffic conditions.
Our goal was to collect data which would help us:
* Determine average speeds and fuel economy on selected midtown Manhattan
streets, and
* Determine whether the two 1972 traffic analyses by the New York City
Traffic Department and the West Side Highway Project (WSHP) report higher
speeds in midtown than is now the case.
We designed a 7.00 mile loop based on four straight arterial legs suggested
by the Traffic Department, and on which it and the WSHP had substantial data. Two
legs ran east and west on 57th Street between Second and Eighth Avenues, two ran
south and north on Fifth and Sixth Avenues between 34th and 57th Streets.
Connecting links (see map, p. 2) were selected to create a loop for the sake of
driving convenience. Times were recorded at the start and finish of each arterial
leg and at many intermediate points. The centers of intersections were used
as measurement points for time and distance.
Our methods were taken directly from Traffic Dept. procedures. The intermediate
measurements for segments of the arterial legs were necessary for comparing
~ "~ " ' ' J ":
our data with the WSHP's.
The legs and segments varied in length. The legs measured 1.055 miles on
57th Street and 1.150 miles on each of the two avenues. The segments ranged from
0.192 mile between Fifth and Sixth to 0.750 mile between 42nd and 57th Streets.
1
We measured running times, distances and fuel consumed. For easy
comprehension and comparison with published data, we will discuss average speeds
(miles per hour), although our calculations and statistical tests were performed -
except as noted - on the travel time rate (minutes per mile).
The Traffic Dept. cooperated with us by placing rubber hose traffic counters
- 1 -
-------
- 2 -
North
MAP OF TEST ROUTE
-------
- 3 -
on the Queensboro Bridge and on three sides of the 57th Street/Fifth Avenue
intersection. The counters accumulated and recorded east, west, and south-
bound vehicle crossings at 15-minute intervals.
Weather conditions ranged from terrible to excellent. Monday and Tuesday
were days of extraordinarily heavy and persistent rain. According to the
National Weather Service, 5.29 inches of rain fell between 7 a.m. and 4 p.m.
on Tuesday. The following days' weather ranged from drizzly to clear -
DEFINITIONS
The Loop is the full 7.00-mile route shown in the Map.
Leg refers to 57th Street between Second and Eighth Avenues, and to Fifth
or Sixth Avenue between 34th and 57th Streets.
Segments are portions of legs; for example, 57th Street between Sixth Avenue
and Broadway.
Travel Time Rate is the inverse of average speed. For a specific event, it
is the travel time in minutes- divided by the length in miles. Travel time rates
may be averaged conventionally, whereas speeds should not be.
Net Accumulation in Manhattan of Queensboro Bridge users refers to the sum
of all vehicle crossings into Manhattan via the Bridge minus the outbound
crossings. The starting point for obtaining this figure is 5 a.m. of a given day.
This is the time at which inflow begins to exceed outflow.
Average speed data supplied by the Traffic Dept. and the WSHP rounds down
all times of day to the preceding hour; e.g., a run starting at 9:34 a.m. is
referred to only as the 9-10 a.m. period. We call this latter time a Clock Hour.
-------
- 4 -
GENERAL OBSEBVATIONS
* Speeds varied substantially, whether measured on the complete loop,
its arterial legs, or on segments of the latter. This is best understood by
referring to Table I (p. 5) and Figures 1-5. The only indication that
Tuesday's extraordinary rain affected traffic was the high midday speeds on
Fifth Avenue (Fig. 4). This may have been because so. few shoppers ventured out.
9
* On 57th Street, traffic moved significantly faster during the morning
and evening rush hours than during midday (Figs. 2 and 3) . The possible
causes of this include the fact that pedestrian and taxi activity have strong
2
midday peaks and that parking lots are most nearly filled during midday.
* Speeds on the two Avenues were significantly higher than on 57th Street.
* No correlation was found on any leg between average speed and the
pertinent 15-minute traffic counts.
* A strong correlation was found between average speeds on 57th Street
and the net accumulation in Manhattan of Queensboro Bridge users (Figs. 6 - 8).
* Despite our equipment's limitations, we found strong correlation
between^ fuel economy (mpg)_ and speed (mph). The linear regression line in
Figure 9 covers 61 data pairs. However, the best correlation was discovered
by taking the reciprocals of both variables. Including an outlying 62nd data
point, the correlation coefficient was 0.91. The equation wass6
_i o 0286 + °'238
MPG U.UZBb +
-------
- 5 -
TABLE I. SUMMARY OF AVERAGE SPEEDS
Number Minimum Harmonic Maximum
Of Runs Speeds Mean Speeds Speeds
Weekday Runs
Between 7 a.m. and 6 p.m.
Complete Loops 14 4 ..2 mph 5~5 aph 7.4-mph
57th Street Westbound 25 2.4 411 9.8
57th Street Eastbouud 27 2.6 5.3 13..1
Fifth Avenue 23 4.8 7.3 12.8
Sixth Avenue 23 3.0 8.1 13.4
All Weekday Runs
Complete Loops 21 4.2 6.0 11.3
57th Street Westbound 33 2.4 4.6 11.5
57th Street Eastbouud 32 2.6 5.6 13.1
Fifth Avenue 30 4.8 8.3 28.0
Sixth Avenue 30 3.0 8.6 28.8
Sunday Morning Runs
Complete Loops 2 13.7 14.2 14.7
57th Street Westbound 2 11.4 12.5 13.9
57th Street Eastbound 2 12.1 14.3 17.4
Fifth Avenue 2 27.6 27.6 27.6
Sixth Avenue 2 23.9 26.8 30.4
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- 6 -
COMPARISON WITH NEW YORK CITY TRAFFIC DEPARTMENT DATA
The New York City Traffic Department provided us with summary sheets of
58 runs in each direction on 57th Street, 130 runs on Fifth Avenue, and 125
runs on Sixth Avenue. They were originally compiled in July and August, 1972
for the Madison Avenue Mall Study. The data consisted of travel times (to
the nearest tenth of a minute) between Second and Eighth Avenues on 57th Street,
and between 34th and 57th Streets on Fifth and Sixth Avenues. Times of day
were identified only by the hour long periods during which a run started; e.g.,
5-6 p.m., 6-7 p.m., etc.
Sorting our data similarly, we plotted hourly averages of observed average
speeds between 8 a.m. and 7 p.m. for both sets of data (Figs. 10 - 13). The
Student's t distribution test was applied to data on each arterial for each of
the 37 hours in which we made two or more runs. Qur measurements of average
speeds were significantly lower (P<.05) than the Traffic Department's in
13 of the 37 comparisons (and higher in none).
Two additional analyses were made, one using matched pairs of hourly
average speeds and the other using an unweighted average of all runs starting
between 8 a.m. and 7 p.m. In both cases we found that our observations on 57th
Street westbound and on Sixth Avenue show vehicles in 1977 moving significantly
slower (P<.05) than the Traffic Department's 1972 data indicate.
Finally, 11 hourly comparisons were tested using matched pairs of data
from each of the four arterials.. In three of the 11 hours (10-11 a.m., noon-
1 p.m., and 3-4 p.m.), the observed data showed traffic moving slower than
the Traffic Department's data indicated. It is noteworthy that two of these
three hours are during midday when traffic, especially on 57th Street, is at
its slowest.
But what explains the increases in travel times on the major arteries we
-------
- 7 -
observed in midtown Manhattan? Was it driving style? One of the authors
did all the weekday driving. Our consensus was that he drove more aggressively
than an average driver. This could tend to reduce travel times.
Have traffic counts increased since the Traffic Department's 1972 surveys?
The Department's own 60th Street cordon counts indicate that vehicle entries
actually declined. Since peak vehicle accumulation in Manhattan south of
60th Street declined by more than 5% between Oct. 1973 and Oct. 1975, travel
times in midtown should be less than in 1972, not greater, as was observed.
Was it weather? We do not believe so since the day to day variations (see
Figs. 2 - 5) do not single out either Monday or Tuesday as a slow day but, if
anything, the opposite.
Had traffic management declined? We observed very few traffic control
agents and traffic cops during our runs. Their ability to regulate spillover
at key intersections is an important tool for keeping dense traffic from
congesting. The City's financial problems led to devastating personnel cuts
that were in effect by late 1977, and we believe that the observed increases
in travel times in midtown Manhattan are a direct result of these decreases in
traffic control personnel.
COMPARISON WITH WEST SIDE HIGHWAY PROJECT DATA
The 1972 data from Parsons Brinkerhoff Quade & Douglas, Inc. for the West
Side Highway Project is available only on maps which show average speeds in ranges
(&.5 mph, 6-10 mph, 11-15 mph, etc.) for various segments of Manhattan arterials.
There are three such maps covering the "A.M. Peak Period", the "Off Peak Period",
and the "P.M. Peak Period". These terms refer to 7 to 9 a.m., 10 a.m. to 3 p.m.,
and 4 to 6 p.m., respectively.
The segments were between 34th, 42nd and 57th Streets on Fifth and Sixth
Avenues; and between Second, Fifth and Sixth Avenues, Broadway and Eighth Avenue
-------
- 8 -
on 57th Street. We omitted the brief segment from Broadway to Eighth Avenue from
our comparison because the Project's maps were illegible.
We plotted hourly averages of the average speeds we observed on these
segments, together with boxes representing the ranges of the WSHP data (Figs. U
We assumed that the Project's quoted ranges were rounded from actual ranges
of 0 - 5.499 mph, 5.5 - 10.499, etc.
' We then computed unweighted averages of our hourly figures for each of
these periods and compared them with the WSHP data ranges. In the resulting 30
comparisons of the 10 segments for each of three time periods, the
averages of our observations indicate traffic was slower than the lower limit
of the WSHP ranges in 12 instances, faster than the upper limit in 3 instances,
and within the range in 15 instances.
While this is an impressive discrepancy, we are unable to test its
statistical significance because we do not have the Project's actual averages,
standard deviations and number of runs.
The reasons for the discrepencies are discussed above in the comparison
with Traffic Department data.
CONGESTION AS AN URBAN EXPERIENCE
It was our secondary goal to collect some impressions about congestion as an
urban experience: what it means to drive and survive in heavy traffic. We wanted
a broader, more human perspective from which to analyze the quantitative data
we were also gathering. Too often, traffic studies appear to be written in a
vacuum from which relevant human behavior has been excluded because of the
difficulty or impossibility of precisely measuring it.
We observed thac:
* The failure of the City to enforce its own most basic traffic regulations
-------
- 9 -
directly caused most of the instances of congestion we experienced in the area
we were studying. This failure is exemplified by the drastic decline in
personnel assigned to control traffic at intersections.
* Drivers who ignored red lights or who entered intersections they could
not immediately leave were a major cause of congestion. In this regard, studies
by the City's Traffic Dept. indicate that traffic control agents at intersections
increase the vehicle flow through those intersections by 30 to 40%. Th^ir presence
may help explain why rush hour traffic moves faster than midday traffic.
* Drivers in the act of parking at curbs actively obstruct traffic, sometimes
blocking two moving lanes at once. This increases substantially during peak
congestion periods but the accumulated effect is difficult to measure.
* Off-street parking facilities also frequently impede traffic. When the
rate at which cars arrive to be parked exceeds the ability of a given facility's
staff to store them, a queue forms. We often observed such queues, particularly
in midday on 57th Street, reach out into the street and block a full lane of
traffic. We suspect this - combined with extensive_.illegaj._.p_arking - is one
reason our 57th Street segment between Fifth and Sixth Avenues showed average
speeds of 2 mph between noon and 2 p.m.
* Illegally parked cars remove complete lanes of traffic from use: many
of these are parked by so-called priviliged parkers - doctors, diplomats, and
federal, state and city employees. Double parked trucks grossly impede those
faced with having to maneuver around them.
* Street openings and construction blockages constitute a continual cause
of congestion. According to the City's Bureau of Highway Operations, there are
200,000 such openings annually throughout the city for necessary underground
work and repair. While some open and close within a few hours, others last for weeks.
-------
- 10 -
* Pot holes slow all vehicles, threaten and actually damage some of them,
and sometimes cause drivers to swerve suddenly and disrupt the traffic flow.
* There are a number of midtown intersections with apparently intractable
problems. For example, the City allows a left turn off 57th Street westbound onto
Lexington Avenue. This removes half of 57th Street's westbound capacity at that
point but forbidding such a turn might only transfer the problem to another
intersection.
* There is a multiplier effect created by aggressively driven buses and
large trucks which try to maneuver through heavy congestion as if they were
small cars. Though they often cut and swerve successfully-, their size, their
slowness and the frequency with which they straddle two lanes creates greater
delays for those vehicles behind them than ordinary cars driven equally
aggressively.
* Taxis cause a great deal of midtown's congestion because of their number
(11,787 medallions). About 3,000 of these can be found in the midtown core area
at any given time during the 7 a.m. to 6 p.m. working day. Occasionally, they
make up as much as three-quarters of the vehicle traffic on a given street.
Their impact is exacerbated by their drivers' intensely competitive, undisciplined
behavior and the city's failure to enforce pertinent regulations.
* Traffic congestion in midtown is not always the impersonal, alienating
experience it seems and which freeway congestion far more frequently is. To slowly
proceed through a series of choked midtown streets is to engage in a series of
brief encounters with pedestrians, police, jaywalkers, fellow drivers and
passengers, truckers, utility and construction workers, and street and news peddlers
For the most part, such encounters consist of eye contacts, verbal exchanges,
non-verbal signaling, flirtations, exhortations, and the like. But the amount
and variety of this activity suggests that midtown urban congestion, at least in
Manhattan, may have unique sociological characteristics that would reward
-------
- 11 -
further, more formal, study.
* Professional drivers, because they are on midtown streets for hours at
a time, are more exposed to exhaust fumes than pedestrians. Because they are in
the street and nearer to tailpipes, they are exposed to more concentrated
pollutants.
* Pedestrians frequently jaywalk but it is the jammed state of traffic,
with frequent blockages of pedestrian crossings, that encourages much of the
jaywalking. Pedestrians also frequently jump signal changes en masse. We,
therefore, recommend an analysis of the possible benefits of well-placed
pedestrian crossings at mid-block points along 57th Street, particularly between
Fifth and Sixth Avenues, as well as at other major crosstown arterials.
* Bicyclists, though relatively few in number, tend to create their own
driving rules, disproportionately jeopardizing themselves and pedestrians. This
is partly explainable, though not excusable, by the dangerous conditions which
exist for cycling. However, since cyclists seem to seek out and take advantage
of the interstices of moter vehicle traffic, and since they are still a tiny
minority, the effect they have on motor vehicle traffic is very small and perhaps
negligible.
* Congestion debilitates the driving quality of those who are trapped in it -
which, of course, tends to increase the congestion. Specifically, this results
in more instances of rash action, bad judgement, and selfish and anarchistic
behavior. While it may be impossible to quantify the effects of such stress
related patterns on traffic speed and mileage, they almost certainly have some
impact and should be examined in more detail in this regard.
* Finally, we learned that rush hour traffic streams move significantly
faster than midday traffic. This may be due to the presence in midtown of more
vehicles between the rush hours than at any other time of day. While many of these
-------
- 12 -
vehicles are parked on-street and off-street, legally and illegally, they continue
to impede traffic because of the lane space they occupy and the congestion they
generate within garages, congestion which spills over into streets.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
We believe there may be an upper limit to the number of vehicles Manhattan
can accomodate before the congestion which they create costs more in delays and
fuel than the economic benefit of their presence.
This, iii.turn, suggests there is a need to:
* Define congestion, both- qualitatively and quantitatively, in a way that
would allow its costs and benefits to be measured and compared.
* Develop a method by which Manhattan (and other municipalities) could simply
and quickly monitor congestion levels to determine those times, places, and/or
conditions at which intense vehicle use is more harmful than productive. For example
it may eventually be possible to assign "congestion ratings" to impediments such
as utility cuts. Such ratings would numerically describe the impact on times and
speeds of a given impediment on traffic within a given range.
* Either limit vehicle entries into Manhattan or adopt other measures which
would prevent the costs of intensive vehicle use from overwhelming its benefits,
* Inaugurate a full scale data collection effort on a broad variety of
Manhattan and city streets. Our limited work in midtown suggests that New York's
street traffic data base is inaccurate and inadequate.
Because these figures have been used in the past to assess the impact of
travel on air quality and because of the disparity between our and their findings,
it is our preliminary conclusion (pending further study) that the WSHP and the
City's Bureau of Air Resourses, using Traffic Dept. data, have underestimated
.New York City's air pollution problem, perhaps by as much as a factor of two or thi
-------
- 13 -
We, therefore, also recommend that all participating city, state and federal
agencies undertake to fully characterize air pollution in Manhattan; specifically,
as part of the ongoing revision of the city's air pollution Transportation Control Plan.
The decisions made using this base affect not only the way traffic is managed
but the city's very economy. It is vital that traffic data therefore be accurate and
it is our belief that accuracy in this area requires significantly more field
observation and data gathering than is currently the norm. A meaningful improvement
will require the preparation of speed and time maps, their correlation against
vehicle flows, and the development of New York City capacity/speed curves.
-------
- 14 -
FOOTNOTES
1. We used a 1977 Honda Accord with semi-automatic transmission and 14,000
miles on the odometer, a Kent-Moore "Electrotest" Electric Gas-per-Mile Gauge,
and a Digitime watch which displayed hours, minutes and seconds. Distances were
scaled from the United States Geodetic Survey 1:24,000 map entitled "Central Park,
N.Y. - N.J." and checked with Traffic Dept. measurements and odometer readings.
The data gathering team consisted of the authors. Times, mileages
and driving conditions were recorded, as were traffic impediments and their
apparent causes. Times of day were entered on worksheets in a bottom-up format
to simplify subtractions to obtain travel times for each loop, leg or segment. We
conducted our data gathering daily from Monday, Nov. 7, 1977, to Friday, Nov. 11,
from about 8 a.m. to 3 p.m. Baseline data for relatively uncongested operation was
obtained by making runs on the following Sunday between 10 and 11 a.m. when
traffic was light.
2. We frequently found - on our westbound, midday trips across 57th Street -
a queue of cars lined up in the righthand "moving" lane and waiting to enter the
basement garage at 9 West 57th Street. As a result, we averaged as little as 2 mph
between Fifth and Sixth Avenues. When a parking lot is nearly full, as this was,
internal retrieval and parking is impeded and service time increases. We suspect that
as service at nearly full parking lots and garages deteriorates, illegal street
parking becomes more tempting, regardless of its traffic impeding nature.
3. Although Traffic Dept. data on Queensboro Bridge crossings was available
only from Thursday onward, the negative direction of the correlations is
significant with 95% confidence.
4. We calculated fuel consumption by using the Honda's odometer (which read
1% high) to measure the distance, traveled on 0.1 gallon of gasoline, the amount
-------
- 15 -
contained in the fuel meter's glass container between two scribed lines - We
frequently completed the mile-plus legs before consuming that much gasoline. In
several such cases, we estimated the amount of fuel consumed and ended the fuel
test because we had originally expected to find differences in the amount of
fuel used on the avenues and streets. (Separate analyses of our data from 57th
Street and the two Avenues did not show statistically significant differences (P< .05)
in the fuel/speed relationship.) We noted the time and odometer readings for the
start and finish of each fuel run in order to calculate the average speed on the actual
distance during which the measured fuel was consumed. The nature of the meter
prevented us from getting fuel data for the complete loop or for any particular
distance. A continuous flow device with a cumulative readout like an odometer,.
which would have enabled us to do that, is available from Fluidyne Instrumentation
for $4,995.
! *
5. We intentionally omitted one outlying data point (27.2 mpg at 22.2 mph)
from the linear regression analysis because it changes the slope 21% and cuts the
r^ to .81. That particular run was made in extremely light traffic between 11 p.m.
and midnight and involved very few stops and starts; it was mostly a cruise in the
25 to 35 mph range. The results of that run, incidently, are close to the EPA's
city mileage rating (26 mpg at 19. 6 mph).
6. A predictive formula developed at General Motors Research Laboratories
("Estimates of Fuel Savings Through Improved Traffic Flow in Seven U.S. Cities,"
GMR-2801, M.F. Chang, A.J. Horowitz, Aug. 18, 1978) produces values within 25%
of the desired relationship in Equation 1:
0.0234 +-°'308
MPG
This formula is constructed around the idle fuel consumption rate and test weight. We
estimated the idle consumption at 0.05 gallon (h the burette) in 12 minutes, used a
published figure of 2,018 Ibs. for the Accord, and added 480 Ibs. for the 3 occupants.
-------
- 16 -
FIGUHES (L - 23)
-------
Each line represents 1 complete loop. The length Indicates
the duration of the drive around the loop.
Sun.
5 a.m.6
3 9 10 11 noon 1234567
Time of Day (Length of bar indicates duration of run)
Fig. 1. AVERAGE SPEED ON MIDTOWN LOOP PLOTTED AGAINST TIME OF DAY
10 11 midnight
-------
30
25
20
•O
01 i c
0) 13
p.
en
10
0
Tues.
Thurs,
5 a.m. 6
8
8 9 10 11 noon 1234 567
Time of Day (as recorded crossing Fifth Avenue)
Fig. 2. AVERAGE SPEED WESTBOUND ON 57th STREET^ PLOTTED AGAIHST TTME OW r>AV
10
11 raldnlg
-------
30 H
25
20
M
3
o
01
01
15
•a
a)
a>
P.
c/i
at
t>o
& 10
Mon
Tues.
Thurs.
Thurs?
0
5 'a.m. 6
9 10 11 noon 1234 5678
Time of Day (as recorded crossing FJ.fth Avenue)
Fig. 3. AVERAGE SPEED EASTBOUND ON 57th STREET PLOTTED AGAINST TIME OF DAY
(from Eighth Avenue to Second Avenue)
10 11 midnight
-------
Sun.
Tues.
Mon.
Fri.
i 23^56
10 11 noon 1 *
Time of Day (as recorded crossing 57th Street)
10
11 midnigh
-------
30 r
Sun
25
20
15
10
Tuea.'I
Mon.
Thurs.
0
5 a.m. 6
10 11 noon 123456
Time of Day (as recorded crossing Fifth Avenue)
10 11 midnight
Fig. 5. AVERAGE SPEED NORTHBOUND ON SIXTH AVENUE PLOTTED AGAINST TIME OF DAY
(from 34th Street to 57th Street)
-------
Fri,
6 a.m.
Jl mldnigh
-------
30
25
20
15
The null hypothesis that Speed Is not correlated with Accumulation
can be rejected at the 99% confidence level.
x Accumulation
10
0
6 78 9 10 Jl 12 13
Net Vehicle Accumulation In Thousands of Queensboro Bridge Users in Manhattan Since 5 a.m.
15
-------
30 ..
25
20
The null hypothesis that Speed Is not correlated with Accumulation
can be rejected at the 99% confidence level.
15
10
Speed = 17.3 - 0.98 x Accumulation
r2 - .73
n = 10
0
67 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Met Vehicle Accumulation in Thousands of Queensboro Bridge Users In Manhattan Since 5 a.m.
15
-------
28
24
20
g
60
16
12
§
(this point has been purposely
omitted from the linear
regression analysis)
Fuel Economy = 5.54 + 1,46 x Speed
r - .85
n =61
The null hypothesis that fuel economy is not
correlated with Speed can be rejected at the 99.9%
confidence level.
0
8 12 16
Average speed (miles/hour)
20
24
Fig. 9. FUEL ECONOMY AS A FUNCTION OF AVERAGE SPEED IN MIDTOWN MANHATTAN TRAFFIC
-------
Observed data
_«... Traffic Dept. data
* The difference in average speeds for this hour is significant at the .05 level.
Both the average of all hourly averages and the average of all runs
are significantly lower than Traffic Dept.'s data at the.05 level.
10 11 noon 1234567 89 10 11 midnight
Time of Day (at start of run)
-------
Observed data
mmmmmm Traffic Dept. data
* The difference in average speeds for this hour is significant at the .05 level.
5a.m. 6
10 11 noon 12345
Time of Day (at start of run)
8
Fig. tl. COMPARISON OF TRAFFIC DEPT. DATA WITH OBSERVED HOURLY AVERAGE SPEEDS
ON 57th STREET EASTBOUND BETWEEN EIGHTH AND SECOND AVENUES
10
11 midnight
-------
Observed data
Traffic Dept. data
* The difference in average speeds for this hour is significant at the .05 level.
5 a.m. 6
10 11 noon 123
Time of Day (at start of run)
8
10
11 midnight
-------
Observed data
______ Traffic Dept. data
* The difference in average speeds for this hour is significant at the .05 level.
Both the average of all hourly averages and the average of all runs
are significantly lower than Traffic Dept. data at the .05 level.
5 a.m. 6
Fig. 13.
9 10 11 noon 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I
Time of Day (at start of run)
COMPARISON OF TRAFFIC DEPT. DATA WITH OBSERVED HOURLY AVERAGE SPEEDS
ON SIXTH AVENUE NORTHBOUND BETWEEN 34th AND 57th STREETS
10 11 midnight
-------
•Hourly averages of observed 1977 data
Illlllllll Upper
and
Lower limits of speed ranges quoted by Westside
Highway Project for 1972
Ullllllllllllllllk-
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii
illllllllllllllllti
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiu iimiiminmui"
JlilillllillllllllllllimiimilllimiUlll
5 a.m. 6
I
2
10 11 noon
Time of Day
T»MPARTSON OF WSHP DATA WITH OBSERVED HOURLY AVERAGE SPEEDS
10 11 midnight
-------
Hourly Averages of observed 1977 data
Illllllllll UPP<"
and
Illllllllll Lower limits of speed ranges quoted
by Westside Highway Project for 1972
iiiimmiimiii!
(iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii
niiimiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiniinimiiiiiiiiiin
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii
5 a.m. 6
8
10
jiliiiiiiiiinimiiiimiimiimiiimmii
11
noon 1 2 3 A 5 6 7
Time of Day
Fig. 15. COMPARISON OF USHP DATA WITH OBSERVED HOURLY AVERAGE SPEEDS
ON 57th STREET WESTBOUND BETWEEN FIFTH AND SIXTH AVENUES
8
10
11 midnight
-------
Hourly averages of observed 1977 data
lllllllllll Upper
and
Illllillll Lower limits of speed ranges quoted
by Westside Highway Project for 1972
uiiiiiiiiiiuiiiii iiiiiimiiiiiiui
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiim
jmimimmmmiiuiHiiiimuiiiiimt
a-m- b 7 8 9 10 11 noon 123456789 10 11 midnight
Time of Day
Fig. 16. COMPARISON OF WSHP DATA WITH OBSERVED HOURLY AVERAGE SPEEDS
ON 57th STREET WESTBOUND BETWEEN SIXTH AVENUE AND BROAnUAY
-------
• Hourly averages of observed 1977 data
Illlllll Upper
and
IIIIIIIH Lower limits of speed ranges quoted
by Westside Highway Project for 1972
Illllllllllllllllll
Illllllllllllllllll
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
Illllllllllllllllll
liiiiiiiiilliiliillilililiiliiiiimiijllliiii
Illllllllllllllllll
5 a.m. 6
Fig. 17.
10 11 noon 1234567
Time of Day
COMPARISON OF WSHP DATA WITH OBSERVED HOURLY AVERAGE SPEEDS
ON 57th STREET EASTBOUND BETWEEN BROADWAY AND SIXTH AVENUE
10 11 midnigt
-------
Hourly Averages of observed 1977 data
Illlllllll
and
Illlllllll Lower limits of speed ranges quoted
by Westside Highway Porject for 1972
IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII)
UllllllllilllllKI
uiimimimiiiii
Jiiiimiiiimiiiiiiimmiiiiiiiiiiiimiii
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiinn
5 a.m. 6
jiniiiinuiimmnmiimmmiiiiimii
8 9 10 11 noon 1234567
Time of Day
Fie. 18. COMPARISON OF WSHP DATA WITH OBSERVED HOURLY AVERAGE SPEEDS
10 11 midnlgl
-------
Hourly averages of observed 1977 data
Illlllllllll Upper
a&d
Illlllllllll Lower limits of speed ranges quoted
by Westside Highway Project for 1972
iimmmiiiHt
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii giuiiuiiuiuiiuiiiiiiiimlminiiiiiiui iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii
5 a.m. 6
8 9
Fig. 19.
nimmnmnm
10
11 noon 1234567
Time of Day
COMPARISON OF WSHP DATA WITH OBSERVED HOURLY AVERAGE SPEEDS
ON 57th STREET EASTBOUND BETWEEN FIFTH AND SECOND AVENUES
10 11 midnighi
-------
30
25
20
Hourly averages of observed 1977 data
JIIIIIIIIII
and
IIIIIIIIE Lower limits of speed ranges quoted
by Westside Highway Project for 1972
15
Illlllllllllllllllj
10
iimiiiiiiiiiiiiif
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii uiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii
5 a.m. 6
8
6
9 10 11 noon 12345
Time of Day
Fig. 2O. COMPARISON OF WSHP DATA WITH OBSERVED HOURLY AVERAGE SPEEDS
8
10 11 midnigl
-------
Illllllllllllllll
minimum
Hourly averages of observed 1977 data
Illllllll
and
Illllllll Lower limits of speed ranges quoted
by Westside Highway Project for 1972
iiimimiiiiimiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiimiiii iiimiiiimmiiii
iiiiiiimiiiiiiiiiiiiimiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii
5 a.m. 6
8 9 10 11 noon 1234567
Time of Day
Fig. 21. COMPARISON OF WSHP DATA WITH OBSERVED HOURLY AVERAGE SPEEDS
ON FIFTH AVENUE SOUTHBOUND BETWEEN 42nd AND 34th STREETS
10 11 midnigl
-------
Hourly averages of observed 1977 data
HIIIIIIIIIIIIHW
Illlllll
and
Illllllll Lower limits of speed ranges quoted
by Westslde Highway Project for 1972
JltllllllllllW""1
Hlllllllllllllllll
imiiiuiiiiiiinmiiimmimmiiniim ninuuuiuiun1
10
5 a.m. 6
10 11 noon 1
Time of Day
___ „„ „«,„» «ATA WITH OBSEIMmn HOimTV AwR»AOT
8
10 11 mldnlgl
-------
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiin
iliimmmmm
•Hourly averages of observed 1977 data
Illlllll Upper
and
Illllllll Lower limits of speed ranges quoted
by Westside Highway Project for 1972
iiiiiimmiiiiiiimiiiiimiiiiiiiiiiiimi
IlllllllllllllliU
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiimiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii
iiiiiiiimiiimii
5 a.m. 6
Fig. 23.
10 11 noon 1234567
Time of Day
COMPARISON OF WSHP DATA WITH OBSERVED HOURLY AVERAGE SPEEDS
ON SIXTH AVENUE NORTHBOUND BETWEEN 42nd AND 57th STREETS
8
10 11 midnigh
-------
THE SOCIETAL COSTS OF CONGESTION IN NEW YORK CITY
APPENDIX 3
AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
December 1979
-------
American Urban Malla. A Compendium. Wash., B.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing
Office, 1977.
Statistical and visual summary of pedestrian improvement projects in
JTorta America. Includes municipal demographics , legislative and
financial particulars, implementation summaries, and individual or
agency contacts for each mall project discussed in t^ b
Ayres, Stephen M. , and others. "Health Effects of Exposure to High
Concentrations of Automotive Emissions: Studies in Bridge and Tunnel
Workers in New York City," Arch. Environ.,.,, Health, , Tel. 27 * Sept. 1973,
pp. 168-178.
Evaluation of the health effects of high concentrations of automotive
emissions on 550 New York bridge and tunnel workers. Findings include
suggested presence of diseases of the small respiratory passages ia.
almost all the workers studied and increased airway resistance in
one third of the group.
Beazall, W. P.' A Survey of Traffic Conditions in New York City.
Hew York: The Press Publishing Co., The New York World, 1916.
Reprint of a series of articles from The World summarizing the city's
first major traffic data gathering effort. Emphasis on motor vehicle
congestion and accident rates.
- 1 -
-------
- 2 -
Bellomo, Salvatore J., Sally D. Liff and Elizabeth Yu. "Interrelati,
ship of Parking Actions to Energy Consumption and Air Pollution,"
Proceedings, Trans-oortation Facilities Workshop: Passenger, Freight
and Parking, Few York City, May 1974. New York: American Society
of Chemical Engineers, 1975, pp. 215-228.
Discusses short range, labor intensive transportation strategies for
urban areas to help reduce energy consumption, congestion and air
pollution; and to improve transportation, safety and other environne]
amenities. Strategies include traffic flow improvements, car pooling
pricing, and energy restrictions.
Bergamasco, 3., M. Gilli and Giovanni Rossi. "Changes in cortical
responsivity to multisensorial stimuli during exposure to urban
traffic noise," Acta Oto-Laryngologrica, Suppl. 339, 1976, pp. 24-2I
Preliminary study on the effects of traffic noise on cortical respon
sivity (EEG) to acoustic and visual stimuli. The findings from 20
normal 18-35 year old subjects exposed to a 10 minute road noise
tape recording show a striking decrease in evoked auditory but not
visual potentials.
-------
- 3 -
Better Towns With Leas Traffic. Wash., D.C.: Organization for
• . — - .
Economic Cooperation and Development Publications Center, 1975.
Proceedings of the Better Towns with less Traffic Conference in Paris
in April 1975. Includes case studies of seven towns which limit motor
traffic to improve the environment: Uppsala, Bologna, Singapore,
Nagoka, Munich, Besancon and Nottingham. Also summarizes specialised
sessions dealing with parking, traffic limitation, cyclists and pedes-
trians, para-transit planning, financing and implementing urban
transport policies, and economic and energy implications.
Bhatt, Eiran U. Vaat Can Ve Do About Urban Traffic Congestion?
A Pricing Approach. Wash., B.C.: The Urban Institute, April 1976.
Study of various congestion pricing techniques and their feasibility,
in both practical and political terms. Considers toll booths,
supplementary licenses, self-cancelling stickers, automatic vehicle-
identification systems, and vehicle meters.
Bhatt, Ziran, Ronald Kirby and Michael Beesley. A Transportation
Improvement Program for Congested Areas. Wash., B.C.: The Urban.
Institute, Feb. 1976.
An examination of congestion pricing as'a means of reducing congestion.
Includes look at legal aspects, previous efforts and equity. Proposes
demonstration program for urban areas that would combine charges for
using congested streets with incentives for-using high occupancy nodes.
-------
"Britain Is Missing the Bus," The Economist. Vol. 258, No. 6914«
Feb. 28, 1976.
Describes decline in use of British bus services from 1964-74 and
corresponding rise in auto travel; also, the measures undertaken
to reverse these trends and their failure.
Brown, Gerald R. "Influence of Park-and-Ride- Factors in Modal Shif
Planning," Trans-portation Research Board Trans-portation Research
Record. Ho. 557, 1975, pp. 15-20.
Investigates park-and-ride facilities and municipal parking policis
as means of controlling the nodal split in urban areas. Concludes
that a park-and-ride facility can be a useful planning tool if
properly designed.
Brugger, Robert L. "Taxi Cruising in Midtown Manhattan," Traffic
Engineering. Tol. 45, So. 5, May 1975, p. 26.
A study of the effects of carbon monoxide pollution by cruising ta
Pound that taxis in midtown contribute about 8 tons of CO (or 25$
the total found in the air) from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. with about 8$
attributable to unoccupied cabs. Recommends additional taxi stand
-------
- 5 -
"Capacity and Quality of Service," Transportation Research Record.
So. 538. Wash., B.C.
Collection of seven papers covering: comfort and 'flow characteristics
for pedestrian facilities such as walkways', escalators and moving
walks; weaving section design; the application of computer analysis
to interchange design; methods' for determining intersection capacities;
off-line signal optimization techniques; a. photooptic system to record
vehicle position; and the impact of lower national speed limits.
Caprio f Raphael J., Harry I. Margulis and Morris M. Joselow. "lead
Absorption in Children and Its Relationship to Urban Traffic Densities,"
Arch. Environ. Health. Yol. 28, April 1974, pp. 195-197.
Sxamines the relationship between blood/lead levels in children and
household location with respect to distance from major arterials and
traffic density in newark, K.J. Pound that the proportion of children
vith levels suggesting lead poisoning more than doubled in the sample
living in areas exposed to vehicle densities above 24,000 vehicles
per average weekday.
*
California State Transportation Board. California Transportation
Plan - Recommended Statewide Transportation Goals. Policies and
Objectives. Sacremento, CA: March 1977.
•
The policy element of the California State Transportation Plan,
Deals with goals, policies and objectives, including implementation
strategies.
-------
- 6 -
Carnegie Mellon University Transportation Research Center. The
a
Pittsburgh Parking Strike. Springfield, VA: National Technical
Information Service, Dec. 1972.
Examines impact of 1972 strike by parking lot employees which close:
80?5 of the area's parking capacity. Concludes that large numbers o
auto commuters were able to continue commuting through public trans
and car pooling. Notes low absenteeism rates and looks at effects <
retail sales, entertainment, and civic attitudes.
Caro, Robert. The Power Broker. Robert Moses and the Pall of New
York. New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1975.
Extensive information throughout on congestion by both private and
public modes but most particularly in Chapters 39 and 4-0. Includes
historical, institutional and financial analyses of its causes; alsc
very useful index.
Cesario, Prank J. "Emissions Implications of Traffic Reductions,"
APCA Journal. Vol. 25, No. 9. Sept. 1975, p. 957.
Technical report on the indirect reduction of vehicle emissions whi
results from alleviating traffic congestion. Uses carbon monoxide
emissions as a case in point.
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Christiansen, Dennis^ I. and Ronald W. Holder. "Off-Street Loading
• ,
Space for Downtown Buildings," Texas Trans -a. Res.. Vol. 10, No. 1,
Jan. 1974, pp. 5-7.
Argues that off-street loadings for downtown buildings can reduce
traffic congestion and enhance commerce, that space must be adequate
for needs and allow good accessibility, and that design is important,
Agrees with space requirements proposed by 3.M. Whitlock and J.G.
Schoon for Dallas' Central Business District: 1.4-loading spaces
per 100,000 sq. ft. for major office complexes.
Citizens Traffic Safety Board. The Cost of Traffic Congestion and
Traffic Accidents in the City of New York. New York: Sept. 1953.
Early attempt to quantify the cost of congestion to New Tork City
through a survey of its business community. Concluded the cost was
$1 billion per year exclusive of environment-related factors.
City Club of New York. "Manhattan Auto Study," Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution of the Committee on Public
Works, United States Senate. Ninety-Third Congress, Second Session,
Part 3, Wash.,.D.C., May 1-2, 1974, pp. 821-1060.
Analysis and quantification of the cost of New York City's congestion,
which it concluded was 51 billion per year, including air pollution
related expenses. Recommends a series of remedies based on traffic
management reforms, new highways and parking lota.
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Cohen, Sheldon, David C. Glass and Jerome E. Singer, "Apartnent
Noise, Auditory Discrimination, and Reading Ability in Children,"
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 9, So. 5, Sept. 1973,
pp. 407-422.
Examines the relationship between the auditory and -verbal skills of
73 children in Grades 2-5 and the noise level of their homes, with
expressway traffic as the principal source of noise. Results suggest
long-term behavioral effects in auditory responsiveness despite
noise adaptation.
Collins, M.S. "Efficient and Economic Use of Existing Urban Road
Hetworka Having Regard to Consideration of the Environment," Journal
of the Institute for Manici-pal Engineering. Vol. 101, Ho. 10, Oct. 19'
pp. 262-268.
Examines possible methods of achieving planned traffic restraint
and concludes that unplanned restraint or restraint by congestion
is the most likely outcome.
Colt, Rosanne J. Problems in Implementing Roadway Pricing. Wash., D.C.
Transportation Research Board, 1974, Report No. 'ERB/TRR-74/494.
Examines problems related to roadway pricing, including legal issues,
methods of price restraint, the collection problems of congestion
pricing and automatic vehicle identification; also, analyses the
effects of a 25/» parking tax imposed in San Francisco from 1970 to
1972.
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Grain, John L., and Sydwell D. Flynn. Southern California Rapid
Transit District 1974 Strike la-pact Study. Menlo Park, CA:
Blgelow-Crain Associates, Jan. 1975, Report No. BST-CC4.
Describes the effect of a. labor strike on the Los Angeles area
public transportation system from Aug. 12 to Oct. 18, 1974.
Concludes that although the system only carries 2 to 3# of the
area's weekday person trips, there were impacts on traffic
congestion, nobility and commerce. Evaluates in detail nine
particular areas including business and auto traffic.
Crowe11, William H., Jlichael Gerrard and Granville Bewail* Social,
3conomie, and Environmental Impacts of Selected Transoortation
Strategies. New York: Council on the Environment of New York City,
1975.
Examination of the probable impacts of five typical transportation
control plan strategies: reducing parking by banning or pricing
mechanisms, the creation of exclusive lanes for buses or carpools
with fringe parking facilities, carpooling, traffic management
improvements, and a ban on taxi cruising. Focus is on major east
coast cities.
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Die Volkswirtschaftlichen Kosten des Strassenverkehrs, "Den
Buergern 45 Milliarden DM Wert. (The Costa for Passenger Car
traffic. Worth 45 Million DM to the Citizens.)," Umwelt.
Duesseldorf, W. Germany, Yol. 3, ITo. 2, 1973, pp. 30-31.
Estimates that the social costs of passenger car traffic (for
cleaning devices, for reducing lead pollution, for road construction
for noise and exhaust pollution damages, for congestion time loss,
and for accident injuries) amounts to S15 Million in West Germany.
Also compares air pollution problems of W. Germany with southern
California. In German.
Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission. Philadelphia Central
Easiness District Parking Rate Bzijerlnent. Springfield, TA:
National Technical Information Service.
Report of experiment Involving two downtown garages at which rates'
were changed to favor short term, non-commuter parking at the
expense of all day, commuter parking. Findings indicated success."
Business and turnover at both garages increased. Performed as part
of DOT's Urban Corridor Demonstration Program.
Dienemann, Paul P., and Armando M. lago. Bzternal Costs and Benefit;
Analyses, Northeast Corridor Transportation Project (ffSCTP).
Bethesda, MD: Resource Management Corp., Dec. 1969.
Quantifies the costs and benefits of alternative Northeast Corridor
transportation system impacts on noise, air pollution, aesthetics,
air and highway congestion, safety, and employment.
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DeLeuw, Gather & Co. and the Urban Institute. Characteristics of
Urban Transportation Systems. A Handbook for Transportation Planners.
•Springfield, VA: National Technical Information Service, May 1975.
fieference source for the performance characteristics or urban
transportation systems: commuter, rapid and light rail; local'and
rapid bus transit; the auto-highway system; and pedestrian assistance
and people mover systems. Studies their speed, capacity, operating
costs, energy consumption, pollution, capital costs, and accident
frequencies.
Edholm, 3., and B. Kolsrud. "Travel-Actuated Charging: A New
Technique for Eoad Pricing," Traffic.Engineering Control; Vol. 14,
No. 16-17, Aug./Sept. 1974, pp. 739-743.
Proposes charging drivers according to the social costs they produce
as a way of reducing"' congestion. The author's system is based on
the features of a journey's time-distance relationship in congested
traffic.
Energy and Environmental Analysis, Inc. Development of a Prototype
Parking Management Plan. Wash., B.C.:' EPA Office of Transportation
and land Use Policy, Nov. 1975.
A parking management plan for the Washington metropolitan area.
Includes impact analysis on air quality, mass transit, energy use
and urban amenities. The B.C. Core, Rosslyn, Silver Spiing and
Centreville were studied in detail.
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European Economic Community Report. "Study of Environmental Pollut
and Environmental Injuries by Traffic in Urban Areas - Noise and
•Exhaust Gases - Summarizing Overview." Verein Deuteher Ingenleurp,
Dusseldorf, V. Germany, March 1974.
Part of an extensive study by nations of the European Community on
the theoretical and practical problems of urban street use. The
purpose is to develop a methodology to calculate the costs of
reducing noise and exhaust pollution in urban areas to desired
levels. In German.
Faigin, Barbara Moyer. Societal Coats of Motor Vehicle Accidents -
1975. Wash., B.C.: national Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
Dec. 1976.
Revision of a similar study in 1972. Quantification of the various
societal costs imposed by motor vehicle accidents. Considers pro-
duction losses, medical care, and the costs of funerals, lawyers,
courts, accident investigations, insurance, vehicle damage, traffic
delays, property damage, and non-quantifiable factors such as pain
and suffering.
Federal Highway Administration. Improving Urban Mobility - Through
Better Transportation Management. Wash., B.C.: PHWA, May 1975.
Discusses low cost traffic engineering and public transit techniques
which can improve urban mobility. Techniques include better manageo
of existing systems, bus lanes, bus streets, intersection priorities
fringe parking, and ride sharing.
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federally Coordinated Program of Research and Development in Highway
Transportation. Volume 2; Reduction of Traffic Congestion and
-Improved Operational Efficiency. Wash., D.C.: Federal Highway
Administration, Jan. 1975, Report No. FEWA/RD-FCP-003.
Seaearch concerned with improving the design of new highway facilities
and improving the efficiency of existing ones by encouraging more
people to travel per vehicle and by improving the denand/capacity
relationship through signal timing and traffic routing techniques.
.Argues that one cause of congestion is motorists' lack of knowledge
of alternative routes.
Pord, Frank R. "Traffic Conditions of Sew York City," Street
Railway Journal. Vol. 18, Ho. 4, Oct. 1901, pp. 225-243.
Statistical Report on New York City traffic, particularly the public
^transit modes, and the extensive congestion which existed even in
1901« Includes maps and illustrations.
par^all- "landing Delay Costs at Airports: A Simulation of
;j!±rst-Come-Fir3t-Served and Two -Priority Classes," Information Journal.
iVo-1. 3, Ho. 1, Peb. 1975, PP. 88-98.
-JL -computer simulation technique for calculating average delay costs,
marginal delay costs, aw* taxes — along with the results for typical
.-dally cycles with different peak hour traffic intensities. Presents
-^the case for rationing capacity through pricing and provides a method
-ox" performing the necessary calculations.
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Handbook for Pedestrian Action. Wash., B.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing
Office, 197.7.
Bationale economics and techniques for pedestrian zoning policies.
Hartmann, H.P. "Carbon Monoxide - Occurence, Concentration, Effects
on Man: A Review," Clean Air. Yol. 6, tfo. 2, Feb. 1972, pp. 2-7.
Reviews effects of CO on people: threshold levels, ambient air lave
in cities, poisoning symptoms, CO levels in traffic, safety standard
etc.
Harris, Hillary. Organism. New York: Phoenix Pilas, Inc., 1975.
16mm film.
Twenty minute filia examining the relationship between living tissue
and urban structures. Extensive time lapse photography visually
demonstrates repeated 24-hour congestion patterns, pedestrian
and vehicle.
Baseman, R.H. "Crigantism and pollutions: The Impact of Environmental
Pollution on the Internal Milieu-Psychology," Revue de Madecine
PsvehosonatiQue et de Psychologic Medicale, Vol. 13, Ho. 4, Winter 19'
PP. 373-389.
Suggests pollution is a natural brake on the excessive growth of
well-fed populations, that pollution is proportional to the populatioj
density, and that the present situation requires a population policy
that will seek quality rather than quantity. Also that: gigantism,
mechanization, bureaucracy, noise, growing conformity and lack of
imagination combine to undermine emotional..defensesf interfere with
circulatory systems (human and social), and disrupt interpersonal
communication.
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Highway Research Board. Citizen Participation in Transportation
* ^^^^^^^^^^^"^•^^"^^^"^^^^^"^•^^^^^•^••^•^^•••"^^^••^•^^•^•^•^^•••^••^•^•^M™
Planning. Wash., B.C.: HEB, 1973, Special Report 142.
Report of a conference on transportation planning and citizen
participation organized by the Highway Research Board, plus papers
and a conference report on both topics as applied in Boston.
Hirst, Eric. Pollution Control Energy Costs. Detroit: American
Society of Mechanical Engineers, Winter Annual Meeting, 1973.
Paper 73-WA/3ner.-7.
Examines the energy needed for or saved by several environmental
protection strategies. Areas considered include urban passenger
traffic and air pollution control. Concludes that relatively little
is required to meet the environmental needs he assumes. Analyzed
scenarios include (1) a 10# shift from urban auto traffic to public
transit, (2) adoption of automobile pollution control devices which
meet clean air standards, and (3) the redesign of automobiles to
improve fuel economy,
Hoover, A. and Walter and Robert M. Albrecht. The Use of Panelists
as Substitutes for Tasieab Drivers _in Carbon Monoxide Es-nosure (Final
Report). New York: Columbia University Division of Environmental.
Health Sciences, Environmental Protection Agency and Coordinating
Research Council, Inc., July 1973. Report EPA-650/1-74-001.
Analyses of breath and blood samples from 30 pairs of taxi drivers
and panelists who drove in New York City traffic for 8 hours on two
consecutive days. Findings indicate that both drivers and panelists
attained similar carboxyhemoglobin levels - both smokers .and non-snokers.
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,. 16 r.
International Trade Commission. The Fuel Sffieiency Incentive Tax
Proposal; Its Imoact Upon the Future of the U.S. Passenger Autoaob
Industry. Wash., D.C.: U.S. GovW- Ezdntia«^£fi»» 1977.
Prediction of the impact of President Carter's proposed Fuel Sffici
incentive tax on the donestic auto industry.
Interplan Corporation, Joint,. Strategies for Urban Transportation.
Air Quality and Energy Conservation. Wash., D.C.: Urban Mass
Transportation Administration , Jan. 1975.
Report of a joint effort by the Urban Mass Transportation Adninistr
the Environmental Protection Agency and the Federal Snergy Administ
tion to develop an approach to resolve the problems of traffic
congestion, air pollution and petroleum shortages. Includes prir,ci
strategies and their relationships to each other; also, evaluation
of 54 specific actions and two proposed joint action programs.
Jordan, D. , and others. Effective Citizen, Participation in Trans-
portation Planning. Volume 1 ; Conwjmnitv Involvement Processes.
Volume II; A Catalog of Techniques. Wash., B.C.: Federal Highway
Administrat ion , 1 976 .
Guide for organizing or monitoring citizen participation in
transportation planning. Describes 37 citizen participation
techniques and how they relate to the transportation planning
process, itself divided into 19 sequential steps. Techniques
include: advocacy planning, charrette, hotlines, surveys,
workshops, and advisory committees; also, eight case studies
Of their application.
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Senton, Edith. Car Pools (A Bibliography with Abstracts). Springfield,
7A: National Technical Information Service, Dec. 1977.
Studies of the feasibility, methodology and benefits of urban car
pooling. Contains 71 entries, including items-on congestion,
pollution, energy conservation, community hitchhiking, and exclusive
lanes.
Zeyani, Barbara Ibarra, and Evelyn S. Putnam. Transportation Srstea
Management: State-of-the-Art. Wash., B.C.: U.S. (Jovt. Printing
Office, Sept. 1976.
State-of-the-art information on 31 actions in seven categories:
improving vehicle flow, preferential treatnent of high-occupancy
vehicles, reducing peak period travel, parking management, promoting
non-auto or high-occupancy aut.o use, transit and paratransit service
improvements, and transit management improvements. §unisaries of
actions include advantages and disadvantages, implementation
guidelines, costs, and inter-relationships.
Eulash, Damian. Parking Taxes for Congestion Relief; A Survey of
Related Bsnerience. Urban Institute, Wash., B.C.: Urban Institute,
1974.
Examines the impacts of several changes in areawide parking prices
and looks at additional areas where sharp parking price differentials
already existed.
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lane, R. and D.H. Hodgkinson. "Permit System for Traffic Restraint,"
Traffic Engineering Control, Vol. 17, No. 3, Mar. 1976,. pp. 94.97.
Discusses the need for and the objectives of traffic restraint in
the centers of large cities as well as alternative methods of contruj.
Concludes that parking controls cannot achieve its stated objectives.
Also describes a control system suitable for midtown which relies or.
the distribution of permits to selected users and the purchase of
permits by occasional users.
levinsohn, David M. , and James T. 'McQueen. A Procedure for Bstiaati^
Automobile Fuel Consumption on Congested Urban Roads. Final Report.
Wash., B.C.: National Bureau of Standards, Technical Analysis Divisic
Aug. 1974.
Proposes a procedure based on vehicle characteristics and roadway
operating conditions, with an example application.
Pisch, Oscar, and Donald A. Hanson. Optiieal Inner City Redevelopment
Vith Congestion Costa. Hew York: Institute of Electrical and 31'ectr
Engineers, Nov. 1974, Pap. ?P3.6, pp. 827-628.
Beport of IEEE Conference on Decisions and Control. Offers optimal
housing and traffic desities for the fixed inner ring of a city.
Includes costs of congestion. Argues that the optimal plan differs
from & free market redevelopment plan.
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, M.J., and E. Akcelik. "Route Control - Simulation Experiments,"
Transportation Research. Vol. 11, Bo. 1, Feb. "1977, pp. 25-31.
Investigates the potential tine savings of using route control
techniques in an urban network of streets where the dominant control
mechanism is the traffic signal. Distinguishes between user and
system optimizing solutions. Uses three networks and five origin-
destination flow patterns in simulation experiments with a stochastic,
semi-macroscopic traffic model, a partial loading assignment model,
and a tree-building signal optimization algorithm.
Manos, B.E., and G.?, Fisher. "An Index of Air Pollution and Its
Relation to Health," Journal of the Air Pollution Control Association,
7ol. 9, Bo. 1, May 1959, pp. 5-11.
An index of cities ranked according to air pollution., based on general
sources including automobiles. The index is correlated with mortality
by several causes «r.»5 using several age/race/sex breakdowns and other
socio-economic and urban characteristics. Findings indicate that
four causes of death produce a large number of high positive correlations
with various air pollution indices. They are (1) malignant esophagus
stomach neoplasms; (2) ma "H gT-ion-fc neoplasms of the trachea, bronchus
lung; (3) arteriosclerotic heart disease, including coronary
disease; p-n«* (4) chronic endocarditis and other myocardial degeneration.
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May, A.D. "Traffic Management and Restraint by Parking Control in
•
Greater London," Highway Research Record. Ho. 474, 1973, pp. 19-30.
Describes parking control systems for traffic restraint in Greater
London and recommends that control be attempted predominently by
pricing. Suggests a 15$ reduction can be achieved in auto commuting
to Central London.
Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments. Parking Management
Policies and Auto Controls. Springfield, 7A: National Technical
Information Service, Feb. 1976.
Examines parking management programs as a vay of meeting air quality
standards in Washington. Includes legal, administrative and instit-i
tional perspectives on four particular programs. Concludes rate
regulation and supply-restraint policies pose serious implementation
problems; looks toward downtown auto control zone as a more successf
approach.
Mitchell, Hoger S. Effects of Air Pollution on Euman lungs.' Boulde:
Colo.: Air-Water Pollution Proceeding, Summer Workshop, Aug. 1970,
PP. 505-512.
Describes the sources and effects of air pollution on human lungs.
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Kltre Corporation. Simplified Bstinatora for Benefit Assessment of
Bus Priority Systems (Traffic Signal Preemption). Springfield, 7A:
Hational Technical Information Service, Aug. 1975.
Study of simplified estimators for simulation studies of bus priority
systems; in particular, bus travel time and intersection capacity
estimators. States that such estimators increase insight into bus
priority systems and aid in their application to other situations.
Mitre Corporation. Unconditionally Preemptive Bus'_Priority System:
SiiTnrnary of Simulation Results. Sprinfield, VA: National Technical
Information Service, July 1975.
Report on simulation runs of an urban network traffic model used to
elevate a bus priority system algorithm that automatically gives a
green signal to buses approaching an intersection. System was found
to substantially improve travel tine for a variety of buses with
disrupticn of oxher traffic.
Mitre Corporation. Overview of Experimental Bus Priority Systems.
Springfield, 7A: National Technical Information Service, Mar.. ^975.
Report on the results of bus priority strategies tested in eight
different cities, including: "Leicester, Eng.; Bern, Switz.;
Washington, B.C.; and Derby, Eng. Discussion of different techniques
and approaches, and comparison of results.
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Morrall, John, and Nicholas Finn. "Transit Policy and Operations ir
Europe and Canada," Traffic Quarterly. Vol. 29, No. 3, July 1975, j
Compares Canadian and European city transit systems to determine
relationships between city planning policy, city structure, and suet
transit -variables as parking, traffic, land, use, zoning, transit fir
restraints, ridership, vehicle mileage, transit priorities, access i
transit facilities, fare systems, communications and marketing.
Concludes that Europe's larger transit riderships are the result of
more innovative attitudes by the responsible transportation authorii
National Technical Information Service. Joint Strategies for Urban
Transportation, Air Quality and Energy Conservation: Joint Action
Programs. Springfield, YA: NTIS Report PB-244 473, Dec. 1974 (378)
An integrated approach for solving the problems created by traffic
congestion, air pollution, and gasoline shortages. Strategies and
actions are summarized and ranked to assess their impact on six
short and long range sub-goals: better auto alternatives, better
vehicle flow, less auto use, lower travel demand, lower vehicle
emissions, and lower petroleum consumption. Also describes two
synergistic joint action programs.
New Jersey Department of Transportation. Manhattan C3D - North Hers
Corridor Joint Use ?ark-and-Ride. Springfield, VA: National Techni
Information Service, ?eb. 1975.
Summarises work performed for the Urban Corridor Demonstration Progr
Includes methodology for developing park-and-ride facilities using
parking lots at shopping centers, drive-in theaters and factories.
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New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. Kew York City
Metropolitan Area Air Quality Implantation Plan Transportation Controls
New York: April 1973.
New York's official response to the requirements of the 1970 Clean Air
Act and subsequent EPA ambient air quality standards. Describes a
aeries of traffic and transit strategies to improve air quality by
reducing vehicle congestion. Plan was approved but never implemented.
\
Oran, Pa.chard L. Transportation System Management; Bibliography of
Technical Reports. Wash., D.C.: DMTA, Office of Policy and Program
Development, May 1976.
Bibliography of more than 150 reports divided into nine sections
dealing with low capital, short range, and policy oriented improvements.
Categories include Preferential Treatment for High Occupancy Vehicles,
Transit Improvements and Management, Pooling and Paratransit,
Pedestrians and Bicycles, Traffic Operations, Parking Management,
and Demand Management.
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development. Interim
Synthesis Report, Traffic Policies to Improve the Urban Environment.
Phase I Case Studies; Besancon. Gothenbum. London. Nagoya, Nottingham,
Singapore. Paris: 02CD, May 1977.
Summary and comparison of the transportation policy approaches of the
six cities of the title. Includes city by city evaluation of results,
costs and financing problems, implementation processes, and institutional
contexts.
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Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development. Urban.Traff
Koise. Strategy for an Improved Environment. Paris: OECD, 1971.
Assessment of traffic noise control methods. Includes characterizat
of varieties of urban traffic noise, costs of abatement, effects on
human bodies and activities, control methods, and survey of European
control practices.
Ostfeld, Adrian M., and David D'Atri. "Psychophysiological Response
to the Urban Environment." International Journal of Psychiatry jr.
Medicine. Tol. 6, 1975.
Examines the relationship of urbanization to bodily changes and
chronic diseases; in particular, stress as defined by crowding.
Includes discussion of the psychophysiological effects of driving
in traffic.
Parsonson, Peter S. A Feasibility Study of a System' for Monitoring
the Road-User Cost of.Urban Traffic Congestion. Technical Memorandum
Georgia Institute of Technology. School of Civil Engineering, Sept. 1
Project: EPR-PR-15, GHD-7004.
Describes a method of measuring road—user cost due to congestion
utilizing a Marbelite Traffic Data Compiler, Robert Winfrey's road-
user costs tables, and a computer program developed by the Federal
Highway Administration.
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Patrassi, Angelo. "I Problem! Delia Congestione Del Trafflco S Dei
Pehdolari Bella Pianificazione Dei Serviai Hetropolitani 3 Ferroviari"
fEroblems of Traffic Congestion and of Commuters in the Planning of
Metropolitan and Hailroad Services")-, Ing. Ferrov.. Vol.. 29, Ho. 5,
PP. 17-22.
Views individual autos as the nain cause of traffic congestion in
urban areas and considers remedies, particularly the S73tem adopted
by the British Transport Commission for London which separates urban
transit from suburban and regional systems. Also compares short
distance and inter-city commuter services. In Italian.
Peat, Mas-wick, Mitchell, and Co. A guide to Parking Systems Analysis.
Wash., B.C.: Federal Highway Administration, Oct. 1S72.
Describes procedures for systems analysis of parking facility planning.
Includes case study and appendices describing component programs.
Pinnell-Anderson-tfilshire & Associates, Inc. Traffic Control,Systems
Handbook. ¥ash., D.C.: Federal Highway Administration, Office of
Development, Implementation Division, Dec. 1975.
Basic principles of planning, designing and implementing traffic
surveillance and control systems for urban streets and freeways.
Includes a compendium of the existing technology and separate chapters
'on computers and communication techniques.
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Proven Ways to Reduce Congestion, Society of Automotive Engineers,
Pap. 700190 for meeting Jan. 12-16, 1970.
Describes traffic engineering techniques and methods used by Detror
to reduce congestion and speed traffic flow. Finds best results an
obtained by using several methods on a single street and that lack
of funds to apply remedies is a major cause of the congestion still
remaining.
Public Technology, Inc. Center City 3nvironcent and Transportation:
local government Solutions. Wash., B.C.: Urban Consortium for Tech:
Initiatives, Dec. 1977.
Description of how seven cities - Buffalo, Detroit, Houston, los Arise.
Sew York, San Francisco, and Seattle - use innovations in transportai
and pedestrian movement in downtown revitalization efforts. Eighlis'r
techniques include: preferential parking, protected residential area
pedestrian malls, free transit within limited areas, and people mover
R. H. Pratt Associates, Inc. A Study of low Cost Alternatives to
Increase the Effectiveness of Existing Transportation Facilities -
Results of Case Studies and Analysis of Busvav Atrolications. Wash.,
Federal Highway Administration, Jan. 1973.
Report on seven operating exclusive bus lane projects. Three operate
as contraflow freeway facilities, three as contraflow lanes on arteri.
streets, and one as a specially constructed lane. Concludes that
exclusive bus lanes can move more people faster than competing modes.
Discusses technical, institutional .and operational aspects; federal
funding; and the potential for bus lanes in five diverse urban enviroi
ments.
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- 27 -
R.H. Pratt Associates, Inc. A Study of low Cost Alternatives to
Increase the Effectiveness of Eslating Transportation Facilities -
Results of Survey and Analysis of Twenty-one low Cost Technicues.
Wash., B.C.: Pederal Highway Administration, Jan. 1973.
The techniques evaluated are rated according to their potential
effectiveness. Includes evaluation of costs, effects on the disadvan-
taged, environmental and safety factors, viability and traveler
response; also, case studies.
Regional Plan Association. Urban Densities for Public Transportation.
New York: EPA, May 1976.
Study of the relationships "between land use and transportation.
Provides a framework for evaluating a variety of public transit modss
as they apply to a variety of land use arrangements, including cost
of service factors.
Remak, Roberta, and Sandra Rosenbloom. Solutions to ?eak Period
Traffic Congestion. Volume 1; State-of-the-Art Survey. Wash., B.C.:
Transportation Research Board, Dec. 1974.
Interim report of a study to identify solutions to urban area traffic
congestion. Vol. 1 discusses 11 major categories of techniques,
including: staggered and flexible work hours, shortened work weeks,
pricing and regulatory mechanisms, access restrictions, land-use
planning, marketing, carpooling and ride sharing, communications in
lieu of travel, and vehicle design. Extensive annotated bibliography,
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RemaJc, Roberta, and Sandra Rosenbloom. Solutions to Peak Period
Traffic Congest ion. Volume II: Options for Current Programs.
Wash., B.C.: Transportation Research Board, Aug. 1975.
Interim report of a study to identify solutions to urban area traffi
congestion. Vol. II consists of eight packages of mutually support!
techniques with limited cost/benefit analyses. Includes recommendat
for applying them to central business districts, urban freeways,
corridors, and a variety of other roadway situations. Concludes tha
state-of-the-art impact assessment methodology is crude, ill-defined
and in need of serious investigation.
Robertson, Dennis I., and others. Traffic Control and Transuortati!
Systems. Proceedings. Second International Systiositm on Traffic Cc:
and Trans-poration Systems. Monte Carlo. Monaco. Sept. 197*1. Hew Yo:
American Blsevier Publishing, 1974.
Fifty-seven papers on the most recent advances in automation and
control as applied to transportation with emphasis on systems aspec-
Includes papers on: urban traffic control, bus control systems, am
urban transportation systems on segregated tracks. Some papers in
French with English abstracts.
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Samimi, Behzad, and Hassan Nanbakhsh, Human Exposure to Excessive
.rl.e-v.ela . of Carbon Monoxide Due to Traffic .Congestion, in the-'.City of
Tehran. International Conference on Environmental Sensing and
Assessment, Joint Conference Corn-prising the International Sytaposiua
on Environmental Monitoring and the Third Joint Conference on Sensing
Environmental Pollution, las Vegas, Hev., Sept. 1975. Hew York:
Institute of -Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 1976, Pap. 35-37.
Finds significant negative correlations between average CO concentration
and the average speed of motor vehicles on cross-city trips, between
CO concentration and wind speed, and between CO concentration and
visibility reduction.
Scardino, Charles A., and G. Scott Rutherford. The Energy Crisis -
Observed C-asoline Price Elasticities in Three American Cities.
Presented at the Air Pollution Control Association Annual Meeting,
68th, Boston, MA, June 1975, Pap. 75-11.3.
Analysis of gasoline price elasticities in Boston, Denver and ^ ^
Washington, B.C. in the face of proposed gasoline taxes to reduce
auto exhaust pollution and save energy. Monitored vehicle miles
traveled, public transit, auto occupancy, air quality and gasoline
sales, availability and price in each city. Variables found adequate
for describing short-term reactions to increased gasoline taxes were
found inadequate for formulating programs for achieving and maintaining
• air quality.
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- 30 -
Shanks, Scott G.,Jtobert R. Eippler _and_ P_.N, Formica. Urban Transfer
tation Strategies Model. Winter Simulation Conference, Annual Procee
Waah., B.C., Jan. 1974, Vol. J..,._??•_ .338^348.
Simulation model for -evaluating the effects of urban transportation
strategies on vehicle use. The interaction of factors such as park!
and public transit availability, and the degree of roadway ccngestio
are evaluated by simulated, runs which estimate citizen reaction to
various mixes and the degree of change in choice of transit mode.
Results can be quantified in terms of pollution levels.
Schoon, John S., and Herbert S. Levinson. "New Concepts in Urban
Parking," ASC5 Transportation Engineering Journal, Vol. 100, He. II
pp. 611-623.
Reviews parking policy options for major metropolitan areas as they
relate to demand, trans it-service extensions, and community preferej
also, a public participation process which involves continuous revii
of alternatives and programs.
Silence, Steiner M. "Procedures for Measuring the Activity Level
and the Parking Demand of the CBD," Highway Research Record. Ho. 4*
1973, pp. 9-18.
Discusses delimiting the Central Business District and procedures
for "measuring activity level and parking demand. Alternatives
considered include bus improvements, parking innovations, and revis
time patterns.
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- 31 -
Simons, N. Jr., C.V. Hamilton, R.D. leis, and B.S. Cheany. Urban
Goods Movement Program Design. Final Report. Wash., B.C.: Urban
Mass Transit Administration, June 1972, Project: UMTA-IT-Q6-0029.
Assessments of programs and projects to improve commodity transportation
within urban areas. Considers high costs, traffic congestion, pollution,
land use, and institutional arrangements in terms of their effects on
shippers, carriers, consignees, and the general public.
Smith, T., R. Graves and T. Kelvin. "The Cash Value of Motorway
Pollution," Civil Bngineering Public Works Review. Vol. 66, Ho. 777,
Apr. 1971, pp. 377-381.
Survey of a neighborhood near a recently completed segment of
London's Ringway 1 to assess how much motorway pollution was worth
to people actually suffering from it. Concludes the cash value of
the nuisance caused by this particular east London motorway is minute
compared with its estimated traffic benefits.
Sterman, Brian P., and Joseph L. Schofer. "Factors Affecting the
Reliability of Urban Bus Services," ASCS Transportation Engineering
Journal. Vol. 102, So. 1, Feb. 1976, pp. 147-159.
Tests the inverse of the standard deviation of point-to-point travel
time as a measure of the reliability of bus service in the Chicago
area. Reliability was found to be significantly decreased by increasing
route length, increasing intensity of intersection control (particularly
traffic signal density), increasing traffic volume, and - less certainly
increasing passenger loadings. Suggests strategies for improving
reliability.
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,= 32 -
Techniques of Improving Urban Conditions by Restraint of fload Traff
Wash.., D.C.: Office of Economic Cooperation and Development Public;
tlons Center.
Proceedings of a symposium held in Cologne, Germany in Oct. 1971.
Papers cover objectives of traffic restraint, traffic flow and netw<
planning, parking controls and bus priority techniques, road pricin,
end methods of evaluating and comparing traffic restraint technique:
Todorovic, Pavle. "Air Pollution and Traffic Safety," Bxperlentia.
Supplement. Vol. 20, 1974, pp. 55-60.
Studies on the influence of carbon monoxide and nitrogen ozide
concentrations along city streets and inside motor vehicles on
driving abilities. Reports extremely high levels of pollution
and evidence that they exert a strong effect; also, that concentrat:
inside vehicles in some cases exceeded the maximum allowed values
for safe working conditions. Performed in Belgrade.
transportation and Traffic Engineering Handbook. 1975. Arlington,
YA: Institute of Traffic Engineers, 1975.
A revision of the 1965 Third Edition emphasizing total and balanced
transportation planning. Updates essential facts about vehicles,
highways and drivers; discusses other transportation modes and
innovations such as computer applications and traffic surveillance
techniques. Stresses need for traffic engineers to improve street
efficiency by increasing street capacity while actively working to
•
decrease auto travel demand by aiding alternative modes. Individual
chapters on such areas as urban traffic characteristics, travel flo^*
theory, parking, regional transportation planning, and environmental
considerations.
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- 33 -
Transportation Research Board. Better Use of listing Transportation
Facilities. Vash.tD.C.: TSB, Special Heport 153.
Eeports results of an Aug. 1974 conference in Jacksonville, Pla.
Papers discuss applying management techniques to transportation,
freeway metering and control, park-and-ride facilities, bus strategies,
traffic signal improvements, facility improvements and maintenance,
highway safety, and pricing and work schedule changes to reduce peak
period demand.
U.S. Department of Transportation. Priority Technique3 for High
Occupancy Vehicles. State-of-the-Art Overview. Cambridge, -MA.:
U.S. DOT, Transportations Systems Center, Technology Sharing Program
Office, Nov. 1975.
An overview of available techniques including implementation
guidelines, decision **icir:tr criteria, discussion of impacts, and
characteristics of freeway and arterial/street priority applications.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Transportation Controls to
Reduce Automobile Use and Improve Air Quality in Cities. The Need.
the Options, and Sffects on Urban Activity. Wash., D.C.: SPA Office
of Policy Analysis, Nov. 1974.
Discusses methods of reducing auto use (parking management, transit
laproveiaents, carpooling, bicycling, etc.), their effectiveness, the
background and status of transportation control regulations, the
economic and social effects of reduced auto use, and the relationship
of transportation controls to other aspects of transportation planning
and decision making.
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- 34 -
Urban Institute. Parking Taxes as Roadway Prices: A Case Study ol
the San Francisco 3xnerience, Wash., D.C.: The Urban Institute,
March 1974, Pap. 1212-9.
Examines imposition of a 25% parking tax in San Francisco from 1970
to 1972. Finds tax had little impact on congestion, air pollution
and energy use but reduced parking lot profits.
Urban Institute. Parking Taxes for Congestion Relief: A Survey of
Related 3xnerience. Wash., B.C.: The Urban Institute, Mar. 1974,
Pap. 1212-1.
Examines the likely impacts of parking taxes on travel patterns.
Finds that past efforts hare had little effect and that work-trip
parking demand is inelastic. Concludes.that such a policy, by itsel:
will not effectively reduce congestion, air pollution or energy use.
Urban Mass Transportation Administration. Transit Marketing Managese:
Handbook. Wash., B.C.: UMIA, Office of Transit Management, Kov. 197!
April 1976.
Study and guide based on surrey of more than 100 transit systems in
several countries with personal visits to many. Objectives are to
assist transit professionals in developing a marketing approach and
structure, and to examine transit marketing as it already exists.
Includes separately available chapters on Marketing Organization,
User Information Aids, Market ing'Plan, and Pricing.
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35 -
Urban Mass Transportation Administration and Federal Highway Administration
Transportation System Management* Surroleaentary Indorsation on
Development and Implementation of TSM Plans. Wash., B.C.: UMTA, Dec. 1975
Question and Answer discussion of the Transportation System Management
requirement: federal intent, local response, available planning and
technical assistance, and the relationship of the TSM Plan to other
transportation planning activities.
Ury, Eans.Z.., Herman M. Perkins and John P.. Goldsmith. "Motor Vehicle
Accidents and Vehicular Pollution in los Angeles," Arch. Environ. Health,
7ol. 25, No. 5, Sov. 1972, pp. 314-322.
Compares los Angeles motor vehicle accident (M7A) frequencies with
ambient air levels of oxidents (OX) and carbon monoxide. Finds a
statistically significant association for OZ and M7A but not between
CO and M7A.
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An A^lyaia of the Scoromic
Toorhees, Alan K. & Associates, Inc.
Impact of Motor Vehicle Us* Restriction- 1n Ration to Federal
A^»nt Air Quality Standards. Springfield, VA: National Technical
Information Service, Sept. 1973.
A cost-effectiveness methodology for evaluating transportation contr
strategies to achieve ambient air quality objectives using Baltimore
and Boston as case studies. Requires explicit identification of the
air pollution reduction potentials of alternate control strategies
as well as the costs incurred by public agencies, users, and other
interest groups. Results indicate the relative average cost per urJ
of emission reduction for each alternative. Vehicle use restaints
discussed include vehicle- free, zones, parking bans, gasoline ration:1
pricing policies, better transit service and lower fares, staggered
work hours, tazes, improvements in traffic flow, and increased
parking costs.
Toorhees, Alan M. & Associates, Inc. Guidelines to Reduce Energy
Consumption Through Transportation Actions. Springfield, 7A:
National Technical Information Service, May 1974.
Summarizes low-cost, short-term transportation actions and estimate
their potential for reducing energy consumption. Includes institut
legal, socio-economic and environmental considerations; also, packa
actions in groups and presents guidelines for applying them to urba
areas of differing sizes. Concludes such actions may reduce energy
consumption by improving vehicle efficiency, causing modal shifts, *
and reducing travel demand.
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- 37 -
Vilbur Smith & Associates, and others. Bus Rapid Transit Options for
Densely Developed Areas. Wash., B.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing Office,
Feb. 1975.
Describes and evaluates bus rapid transit systems in dense urban
areas* Assesses options, costs, services, community impacts, and
available technology.
Winett, Richard A. "Behavior Modification and Social Change," Journal
of Professional Psychology. Tol. 5, Ho. 1, Aug. 1974, pp. 24-4-250.
Describes behavior modification techniques such as contingency systems,
token economies, gr|d behavioral analyses that can effectively pronpt
social change. Practical applications are proposed for regulating
natural resources, traffic problems, school integration, and environmental
design as well as a methodology for studying programs on the community
level. Cautions that such programs must be under citizen control
to avoid the possibility of coercion.
.Yabroff, I., »n^ others. The Role of Atmos-oheric Carbon Monoxide
In Vehicle Accidents (Final Report). Menlo Park, CA: Standard
Research Institute, Feb. 1974.
Authors find that attempts to relate high levels of atmospheric CO
or blood carboxyhemoglobin to accidents suggest that driver fatalities
have higher levels of COEb t^an drivers not involved in accidents; the
degree to.which this is due to smoking rather than atmospheric CO
absorption is not known. Describes a plan using correlation analysis
to more fully establish the degree to which atmospheric CO contributes
.to vehicle accidents and includes a literature search in this regard.
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TECHNICAL REPORT DATA
(Please read Instructions on the reverse before completing)
REPORT NO.
EPA 902/4-79-007
3. RECIPIENT'S ACCESSION NO.
TITLE AND SUBTITLE
The Societal Costs of Congestion in New York
City (with Appendices)
5. REPORT DATE
December 1979
6. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION CODE
AUTHOR(S)
Brian T. Ketcham, P.E., Stan Pinkwas',
Stephen F. Wilder
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NO.
PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS
Citizens For Clean Air, Inc.
32 Broadway
New York, New York 10004
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.
11. CONTRACT/GRANT NO.
68-02-2860
2. SPONSORING AGENCY NAME AND ADDRESS
United States Environmental Protection Agency
Region II, Air Programs Branch
26 Federal Plaza
New York, New York 10007
13. TYPE OF REPORT AND PERIOD COVERED
Final
14. SPONSORING AGENCY CODE
5. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
16. ABSTRACT
This is a study of the problem of vehicular congestion on the island of
Manhattan with emphasis on its Central Business District. It defines the
nature of Manhattan's congestion, traces its growth over the past century,
assesses its costs, and evaluates various abatement strategies. The
approach is in the manner of a case study of the impact of street congestion
on the economic, social and environmental health of the city's residents.
Abatement strategies considered include several dealing with traffic
management and goods movement, uniform bridge tolls, free transit fare
zones, and the development of extensive pedestrian areas.
KEY WORDS AND DOCUMENT ANALYSIS
DESCRIPTORS
b-IDENTIFIERS/OPEN ENDED TERMS
c. COSATI Field/Group
accident data,
air pollution, automotive emissions,
cost analysis, environmental impact,
environmental policy, pedestrian malls,
toll bridges, traffic engineering,
traffic flow, transportation.
air pollution control,
central business district
Manhattan,
New York City,
traffic control
transportation alterna-
tives, transportation co^ts
fields 5,6, & 13
8. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT
Release Unlimited.
19. SECURITY CLASS (Tl
Unclassified
r Report/
176
20. SECURITY CLASS (Thispage)
Unclassified
22. PRICE
EPA Form 2220-1 (Rev. 4-77) PREVIOUS EDITION is OBSOLETE
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