ENVIRON
CRISIS
IN THE GULF
...-
TIIK U.S. RESPONSE
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January 21, 1991
NOTE TO ALL EPA LIBRARIANS
From: Danielle
Immediate
Communications, Education, and Public Affairs
Enclosed are two copies of "Environmental Crisis in the
Gulf: The U.S. Response" prepared by the Gulf Task Force Office.
Please add this booklet to your reference library. For
additional information on the booklet, please contact Hank Roden
of the Gulf Task Force Office at 202-260-2482.
-------
The federal departments and agencies identified here are among those who have contributed
human and scientific resources to evaluating or limiting the impact of Iraq's environmental
terrorism in the Gulf. They also contributed to the creation of this booklet.
DEPARTMENT OF
L\BOR
Occupational Safety
and Health
Administration
DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION
( >'. Coast Guard
i 7-^7 s
X
DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
AGENCY
NATIONAL
SCIENCE
Foi NDATION
DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND
Hi MAN SERVICES
Centers for Disease
Control
Food and Drug
Administration
Public Health
DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY
rVJASA
NATIONAL
AERONAITICS AND
SPACE
ADMINISTRATION
DEPARTMENT OF
THE INTERIOR
fish and Wildlife
Service
DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
Army Corps of
Engineers
Army Environmental
Hygiene Agency
DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE
Rational Oceanic
and Atmospheric
Administration
National Institute of
Standards and
Technology
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ENVIRONMENTAL
CRISIS
IN THE GULF
THE U.S. RESPONSE
U.S. efforts in the Gulf were requested by and conducted in cooperation with the
allied Gulf states, under the aegis of various national, regional, and international
organizations, including: the United Nations Environmental Programme; the
World Health Organization; the World Meteorological Organization; the Inter-
national Maritime Organization; the International Oceanographic Commission;
King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals/Research Institute; the Saudi
Arabia Meteorological and Environmental Protection Administration; and the
Kuwait Environmental Protection Department, Other nations and organizations
also provided technical, material, and financial assistance.
Printed on Recycled Paper
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Muscle and steel icork to cap a gushing veil.
Photo /'v Sdiftstiao Stilgado, \lagiiiim Photos.
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Introduction
On November 5, 1991, the last oil fire in Ku-
wait was extinguished, bringing to a close a dra-
matic period of achievement. Extinguishing and
capping these wellheads had been Kuwait's highest
economic, environmental, and health priority be-
cause of feared regional and global consequences.
International cooperation, skill, and expertise re-
sulted in a more rapid end to one part of this
environmental catastrophe.
Attacks on the environment began in late Janu-
ary, 1991, when the Iraqi government ordered
millions of barrels of crude oil released into the Gulf
from tankers and oil terminals located off the coast
of occupied Kuwait. Less than a month later, as
Iraq's armies were driven from that country, they
blew up hundreds of Kuwaiti oil wells, setting most
of them ablaze.
In every war there is damage to the environ-
ment. But discharging the oil and ignitingthe wells
had neither economic nor military benefit. The
Iraqi government waged war against the envi-
ronment itself , producing images of blackened wa-
ters and skies now burned into the memory of the
world community.
This booklet answers the questions most often
asked by Americans about potential effects of this
disaster on the environment and on the health of
residents of the Gulf region, including American
military and civilian personnel stationed there.
The booklet briefly describes work performed by
U.S. government agencies, in cooperation with
allied Gulf nations and the international commu-
nity, to try to assess, limit, and remedy the damage
caused by Iraq's environmental terrorism.
Since April 1991, officialU.S. actions have been
in concert with international programs responding
to the oil release and addressing atmospheric prob-
lems from the burningfires. Private U.S. compa-
nies helped to extinguish the fires, clean up refuse,
repair damage from the war and Iraqi vandalism,
and respond to the Gulf oil release.
Even as the air, sea, and ground battles were
waged in January and February 1991, the United
States, through its multi-agency Emergency Re-
sponse Team and other units, began mapping the
spread of the oil discharges andmobilizingscientific
teams to evaluate and mitigate environmental
damage in the Gulf. Some of the data collected are
still being analyzed, and more are being gathered.
Some findings reported here should therefore be
considered preliminary.
While outside of the scope of this report, the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers must be cited for its work
in helping to rebuild Kuwait's infrastructure in-
cluding restoration of roads, electrical power, sewer
and water systems, the airport, and public build-
ings. Without these basic systems and the efforts of
the Corps, the environmental efforts described be-
low would have been difficult to achieve as quickly.
-------
1991: March
April
May
June
July August September October November
The unprecedented number of oil fires challenged fire-fighting resources at the outset, but
as more crews were brought in, and new techniques honed, the flames were snuffed out far
more quickly. Graphic by Jean Wisenbaugh.
HOW LONG DID IT
TAKE TO PUT OUT THE
FIRES?
About nine months - far faster than many had
expected. The rate at which the fires were
extinguished climbed from one every few days in
the early weeks to seven a day in the fall.
On February 15, 1991, the retreating Iraqi
army began systematically dynamiting oil wells,
storage tanks, refineries, and other facilities lo-
cated in seven oil fields north and south of Kuwait
City (see map). Approximately three-quarters of
the facilities in these fields—a total of 749—were
either set on fire, turned into oil gushers or other-
wise damaged. An estimated nine hundred mil-
lion barrels were burned or spilled onto the land
during these 9 months, enough oil to supply the
United States for 50 days.
Firefighting teams from the United States,
Canada, Kuwait, and later other nations, worked
steadily to douse the fires and cap the gushing
wells. The work was made even more difficult by
explosives surrounding the wells and by the scar-
city of water, which had to be pumped in from
miles away.
Nonetheless, once the equipment was in place
and the firefighting teams gained more experi-
ence, the work progressed far faster than originally
expected. (Some had estimated it would take up to
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•
BAGHDAD
IRAQ
AFGHANISTAN
IRAN
KUWAIT I
CITY KUWAIT
BAHRAIN
SAUDI
ARABIA
DHAHRAN'
",
QATAR
RIYADH
ABU
DHABI
240 miles
UNITED ARAB
EMIRATES
PAKISTAN
DUBAYY BULF OF
OMAN
•
MUSCAT
OMAN
s
C3
five years to control the fires.) While by mid-May,
just 80 of the burning wells had been extinguished,
half were out by August, and by early November,
the last of the fires were doused.
With over 80% of the world's oil-fire fighting
expertise in Kuwait, this disaster spawned ingenu-
ity and competition among the international teams.
Tested methods were measured against new tech-
nologies including jet engines mounted on tanks
to "blow" the fires out and liquid nitrogen to
displace oxygen, suffocating the flames.
HOW WIDESPREAD WAS
THE POLLUTION FROM
THE FIRES?
The consensus of the international scientific
community is that airborne emissions from the
fires primarily affected southern Kuwait and a
200 mile stretch of eastern Saudi Arabia. Ef-
fects beyond the Gulf region have been slight.
As the fires burned, they threw soot particles,
chemical pollutants, and other emissions into the
air. Carried aloft by the force of the heat, these
emissions drifted away in dense plumes of smoke.
Most of the large, heavier droplets of unburned
oil, fell out of the smoke plume quickly and did not
-------
U.S. government officials,
including EPA Administrator
William K. Reilly, above,
survey the blazing oil fields.
Photo by EPA.
Wind patterns generally
moved the smoke plume,
accentuated at right, over
the southern desert region.
Graphic by Jean Wisenbaugh.
IRAQ
KUWAIT
DHAHRAN
SAUDI
ARABIA
IRAN
BAHRAIN
QATAR
UNITED ARAB
EMIRATES
YEMEN
J^^M^Bh
OMAN
240 miles
travel tar from the oil fields. Other, lighter pollut-
ants were blown hundreds ot miles by winds.
Because Iraqi troops had stolen most of Kuwait's
air pollution monitoring equipment and destroyed
its major laboratories, scientists from the United
States and several other nations rushed equipment
to the scene soon after the fires were set. Science
teams from England and the U.S. sampled the
contents of the smoke by flying aircraft with
sophisticated instruments as near to the fires as
they safely could (within a few hundred yards) and
as far away as 600 miles from the source of the
smoke. Ground stations throughout the Gulf re-
gion also took air samples. Kuwaiti stations were
supplemented by equipment from France, Ger-
many, Japan, Norway, and the United States.
During the spring and summer, prevailing winds
from the north and breezes off the Gulf generally
kept the plumes aloft and moving south over the
desert, away from Kuwait City, the nearest popu-
lation center. The plumes combined and were
carried over eastern Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.
The smoke dimmed sunlight, apparently pro-
ducing cooler regional temperatures for a period.
Bahrain, for example, experienced its coldest May
in 35 years with temperatures more than 7.2° F
below average for that month. As the fires were
extinguished, however, this local cooling effect
diminished.
Not long after the fires were set, "black snow"
reportedly fell in the Kashmir region of northern
India, and sooty rain was reported in nearby Iran.
There were reports of very small amounts of soot
particles high in the air over Hawaii and Wyo-
ming, but these anecdotal observations could not
be positively linked to the Kuwait fires. Overall,
there has been no clear evidence that the oil tire
-------
emissions traveled beyond the region in signifi-
cant amounts. Combustion products from the
fires may still be detectable in trace amounts at
great distances, however, as they were expected to
remain in the atmosphere for several weeks.
Some computer models predicted that sulfur
dioxide from the fires could lead to acid rain in
Kuwait, Iran, and even as far away as China. The
lack of rainfall in the Gulf during the time when
the fires were burning minimized that potential
problem.
While new emissions are no longer spewing
into the atmosphere now that the fires have been
extinguished, pollution already deposited may still
be blown around by winds. Monitoring of the
region's air quality and weather must continue.
HAS SMOKE FROM THE
OIL FIRES AFFECTED
GLOBAL CLIMATE?
There is no evidence that the emissions reached
altitudes hiffh enough to be carried by winds
around the globe.
Material that reaches the stratosphere can be
dispersed around the globe by high-altitude winds.
But satellite images, along with observations and
air sampling from aircraft, have shown that the oil
fire smoke generally rose to altitudes of 12,000 to
Stratosphere
"Troposphere
13,000 feet, with a maximum observed height of
19,000 feet, well below the 40,000-foot lower
limit of the stratosphere. As one researcher from
the National Center for Atmospheric Research
put it, "As large as the smoke looks, and as ugly as
it is, it's still pretty small on a global scale."
By contrast, smoke from the June 1991 erup-
tion of Mt. Pinatubo in the Philippines lofted
millions of tons of sulfur dioxide and dust well into
the stratosphere, where it has spread around the
globe. Mt. Pinatubo's material is expected to re-
main in the stratosphere for years, possibly even
having a very slight worldwide cooling effect.
Some parts of the world may witness particularly
vibrant sunsets as a result of sunlight reflecting off
the dust particles.
For the oil fires, however, research proved false
an initial speculation that plumes would self-loft
into the stratosphere causing cooling analogous to
the "nuclear winter" scenario. There are several
reasons why emissions from the oil fires did not
reach these altitudes. They were not thrown up-
ward with great enough force, as in the case of a
Particles from the 1991
explosion of the Filipino
volcano, Mt. Pinatubo,
reached the stratosphere
and spread around the
globe. The oil fires' smoke
particles did not reach
heights necessary for a
global effect. Graphic by Jean
Wisenbaugh.
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Under a desert sun partially masked by smoke from oil fires, a U.S. scientist installs air-
monitoring equipment atop a plane. In the spring of 1991, specially equipped aircraft flew over
the Gulf region to examine air pollutants and wind patterns as part of an international, multi-
agency environmental assessment. Two planes were supplied by the University of Washing-
ton and the National Center for Atmospheric Research, through a U.S. National Science
Foundation program conducted with the assistance of the National Geographic Society.
Another aircraft, supplied by the Department of Energy, sampled the plumes a month later
during different meteorological conditions. In addition, a helicopter, supplied and operated by
the Saudi Arabian Air Force, lifted off from Kuwait City airport, carrying scientists from the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Environmental Protection Agency, Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia. The multi-national team flew next to blazing wells to gather emission
samples later evaluated by a number of U.S. government scientists. Photo by National
Institute of Science and Technology.
volcanic explosion. The smoke plumes also were
not sufficiently warmed by absorbing solar energy,
which would have lotted them higher into the
atmosphere.
In the first tew months after the fires were set,
the fires were adding carbon dioxide to the atmo-
sphere at an estimated three percent of the world-
wide industrial emission rate. This rate dropped as
more and more fires were extinguished. The fires'
carbon dioxide output, according to atmospheric
scientists, was too small and temporary to contrib-
ute significantly to any worldwide "greenhouse
effect/'
DID THE EMISSIONS
POSE AN IMMEDIATE
HEALTH THREAT TO
PEOPLE IN THE GULF
REGION?
.lir quality measurements taken while I lie fires
n-ere burning shoiced no acute threat to the
general population, although fine particles in
the air did pose an increased risk of respiratory
problems for some groups. Fortunately, be-
cause of prerailing icinds. there u-ere no long
periods of exposure to high concentrations of
pollutants.
-------
Smoke plumes occasionally darkened skies over
Kuwait City (left), but on most days, the skies over the
city were relatively clear (below). Photos by Steve Levy,
EPA.
At the request of the Saudi government, the
U.S. InteragencyAir AssessmentTeam (USIAAT)
was dispatched to the Gulf soon after the fires were
started to assess the immediate, acute health threat.
This "quick look," conducted from March through
May 1991, involved researchers from several U.S.
government agencies. The team sampled air near
the burning wells, flew instrumented airplanes
into smoke plumes, and sampled the air at various
locations in the path of the smoke, including
population centers in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
Based on this limited preliminary study, the
team publicly reported in April that emissions
from the oil fires were not immediately life-threat-
ening. The ingredients of the smoke plumes varied
from fire to fire, but in general they were the same
pollutants one might find in the exhaust of a
poorly functioning automobile: soot particles; or-
ganic compounds; trace metals; and gaseous pol-
lutants such as sulfur dioxide, hydrogen sulfide,
and carbon monoxide.
The USIAAT paid particular attention to mea-
suring hydrogen sulfide, sulfur dioxide, and fine
soot particles in the smoke, which are known acute
health hazards at high concentrations. The two
chemical pollutants with the greatest potential
-------
PM-10
Kuwait
Los Angeles
EPA Standard
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
Note: PM-10 is measured in micrograms per cubic meter. This is the average for April to June 1991.
S02
Kuwait
Los Angeles
EPA Standard
400
10
15
20
30
NO,
Kuwait
Los Angeles
EPA Standard
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Note: SOj and N0; are measured in parts per billion. These are the average for April to September 1991.
Air monitoring in Kuwait City showed some anomalies: some pollutant levels were lower
this spring than the year before, apparently because the Iraqi invasion had stopped most
industrial activity and civilian vehicle use. These charts compare the levels of fine particulates
(PM-10), sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen dioxide for the 1991 April to September average in
Kuwait City to Los Angeles' 1989 levels and to EPA standards for annual average 24-hour
readings. A very high PM-10 reading in Kuwait City is usual for that region, the result of
blowing dust and sand.
health hazard—hydrogen sulfide and sulfur diox-
ide—were determined to be present in concentra-
tions below the harmful levels established by EPA
for the United States, both near the source of the
fires and at locations sampled downwind. The
USIAAT measured high concentrations of par-
ticles in the smoke, however, which remained a
cause for concern while the fires were burning.
Under certain weather conditions these fine par-
ticles can cause respiratory problems for individu-
als with asthma and other obstructive lung dis-
eases, as well as other "high-risk" population
groups—including the elderly, children, and preg-
nant women.
Subsequent studies supported the findings of
the USIAAT. An air sampling mission in May
and June, sponsored by the U.S. National Science
Foundation (NSF), found that hydrogen sulfide
was being burned quickly in the fires, as it did not
appear in significant concentrations in the smoke.
As for sulfur dioxide, the NSF team measure-
ments showed small amounts but not enough to
cause a significant acute health threat to popula-
tions in the path of the smoke, since winds tended
to reduce the concentration.
The USIAAT also reviewed Saudi and Kuwaiti
air quality and meteorological data, and evaluated
the local health care system's ability to deal with
potential acute effects from the fires. The U.N.
prepared an interagency strategy for air monitor-
ing in the area and air quality is still being moni-
tored continuously at sampling stations through-
out the Gulf region.
The number of air quality and weather moni-
toring stations are to be increased beyond what
was in place prior to the hostilities and the 15 to 20
portable stations left behind by the U. S. air assess-
10
-------
ment team. In addition, an "early warning sys-
tem," developed by the U.S. National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration and other agencies
was placed in Kuwait to alert the local population
if severe pollution levels posed a significant health
threat. Public education programs also were cre-
ated to inform local citizens about potential haz-
ards from airborne pollutants.
WITH ALL THOSE
POLLUTANTS IN THE
SMOKE, WHY WEREN'T
MORE HEALTH
PROBLEMS REPORTED?
The most severe levels of pollution were found in
the plumes far above ground level, and weather
patterns generally kept the smoke away from
population centers.
Early in the crisis, there were predictions from
some observers that the fires would have cata-
strophic health effects. But the nature and amount
of pollution in the smoke, the behavior of the
plumes in the atmosphere, and local weather con-
ditions served to limit the impact of the fires on the
human population.
The largest particles and oil droplets from the
IF THINGS HAD BEEN DIFFERENT...
Even though there is no evidence to date that smoke from the
Kuwaiti oil fires created acute health problems, air pollution can be
deadly under certain conditions.
In October 1948, severe pollution over the town of Donora,
Pennsylvania resulted in 20 deaths—17 in a single 14-hour period.
A high pressure area kept winds to a minimum for several days
straight, allowing a cold, dense fog containing sulfur dioxide, fine
particles, and carbon monoxide to linger in the industrial valley
where Donora is located.
A more severe episode occurred in London in December 1952,
when a thick, four-day fog resulted in thousands of deaths due to
inhalation of particles and sulfur dioxide.
In both these cases, dense, polluted air remained trapped over
a populated area for several days. Fortunately, this was never the
case in Kuwait. Prevailing winds effectively dispersed smoke from
the oil fires during the time when most of the wells were burning,
and most fires were extinguished before the beginning of the winter
season when weather inversions would have been more likely to
cause extended periods of stagnant air over Kuwait City. Also, a
key pollutant in the Donora and London episodes—sulfur diox-
ide—did not appear in high concentrations in the smoke over the
Gulf.
fires fell out of the smoke relatively near to the
burning wells, in areas that were largely uninhab-
ited. The spread of other, lighter airborne pollut-
ants was determined by daily and seasonal local
weather patterns. Winds thinned the smoke,
thereby reducing the concentration of pollutants,
and also kept the plume away from Kuwait City.
Breezes from the Gulf itself helped protect other
shoreline population centers. Thus, Kuwait City
rarely was exposed to the plume for more than 48
hours at a time, even though the nearest oil field is
less than two miles from the city's suburbs.
11
-------
U.S. advisors examine a radar film showing the placement and movement of oil spills.
Photo by U.S. Coast Guard.
WHAT ABOUT LONG-
TERM HEALTH
EFFECTS?
The unique nature of the situation—intermit-
tent exposure to pollution from a large yet
declining number of fires—will make long-term
health assessments extremely difficult. Research
and health studies are continuing.
Long-term health effects from air pollution are
determined primarily by the amount of exposure,
which considers not only the concentration of a
pollutant, but the length of time individuals are
exposed to it. There were only a few days in which
the population was subjected to high levels of
pollution from the fires.
One problem in identifying long-term effects is
that natural or normal "background" causes of
disease and mortality first have to be factored out.
Fine soot particles from the fires are of major
concern because they can penetrate deeply into the
lungs. But since Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are
prone to sandstorms, the air normally carries ex-
tremely high levels of airborne particulates. Re-
searchers must first examine long-term health
data on the local population to find what is "usual"
before determining if there have been changes
from the fires. For example, Kuwaitis are known
to have a high incidence of asthma.
Scientists also must have a full understanding
12
-------
of which substances actually reached the people,
and in what amounts. As part of the World Health
Organization's plan for dealing with effects of the
oil fires, a formal study is being conducted in
Kuwait to determine whether local populations
are being exposed to higher levels of fine particles
in the air.
Included in the particulate matter emitted by
the oil fires were polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons
and trace metals such as nickel, chromium and
vanadium, which are known or suspected cancer-
causing agents. These were detected in small
amounts in smoke and soils near the source of the
fires, but not at sampling stations located down-
wind.
WHAT ABOUT THE
HEALTH OF U.S.
TROOPS AND
CIVILIANS?
There has been no evidence of fire-related
health problems occurring among U.S. military
or civilian personnel assigned to the region.
A survey by the U.S. Navy of 2,700 Marines
serving in the Gulf theater found no increase in
sick call rates based on proximity to the fires.
Similarly, initial results from a survey of 2,500
U.S. Department of Defense employees in the
Left, a U.S. Coast Guard
plane tracks an oil slick to
help local officials plan
control and cleanup
operations.
All oil spills are not the
same in their chemical
makeup. A U.S. scientist
(below) scoops up oil
samples for analysis to
assist in evaluation of how
the spill will affect the
environment. Photos by U.S.
Coast Guard.
-------
Date
1991
1979-80
1991
1983
1983
1978
1979
1989
SOME MAJOR OIL SPILLS
Spill /Location Estimated volume in
millions of gallons
Gulf War, Kuwait/Persian Gulf (On Land)
Ixtoc I, Mexico
Gulf War, Persian Gulf (On Water)
Nowruz Oil Field, Persian Gulf
Castillo de Bevtiler, South Africa
Amoco Cadiz, France
Aegean Captain, Tobago
Exxon Valdez, Alaska
4204200
139428
252-336
80-185
50-80
67-76
49
10.8
region did not indicate a significant likelihood of
long-term health effects. Military personnel gen-
erally are not in those groups considered to be
highly susceptible to the effects of pollution—the
very young, the elderly and those with severe
asthma.
The U.S. Army is continuing its air monitoring
activities, in addition to the civilian monitoring at
existing regional sampling stations, as long as U.S.
military personnel are in the region. Furthermore,
new civilian and military personnel being assigned
to the area, including those conducting environ-
mental research, are being examined before depar-
ture from the U.S. to determine the status of their
health. They will be examined again after their
stay in the Gulf region to determine if the pollu-
tion has any health effects. Naturally, as the fires
were extinguished, the potential for such effects
diminished.
HAS THE OIL IN THE
GULF BEEN CLEANED
UP?
Over a million barrels of oil were removed from
the Gulf by April. One third of the total released
is estimated to have evaporated. Despite this
record recovery of surface oil and significant
evaporation, much of the oil sank, and about
400 miles of the western shoreline of the Gulf is
contaminated with congealed oil.
In January 1991, Iraq dumped an estimated six
to eight million barrels of oil into the upper Gulf
from tankers and terminals located off the coast of
Iraq and Kuwait. Military actions produced some
smaller additional spillage.
Taken as a whole, the Gulf release ranks among
the largest in history, up to 30 times the amount of
oil spilled in the 1989 Exxon Valdez accident. A
substantial amount of soot and oil from the well
fires also fell into the Gulf waters while the fires
were burning, adding to the pollution from the oil
spill. The total amount of contaminants and their
effects are unknown.
The then-ongoing war limited but did not
prevent all actions to stop the flow of oil at the time
of release: Kuwaiti employees at the Mina Al
Ahmadi facility secretly closed the valves to one
group of storage tanks to prevent release of mil-
lions of additional barrels of oil. Later, coalition
14
-------
aircraft were able to use "smart bombs" to cut off
much of the flow from the Mina Al Ahmadi
facility off Kuwait, the source of the main release.
The released oil, carried by tides and currents
and driven by prevailing winds, moved southward
to Saudi Arabia. Shortly after the oil was first
detected, that country requested technical assis-
tance from the United States, which sent a U.S.
Coast Guard-led team to the Gulf to help assess
the oil slick's magnitude and impact. Despite the
hostilities, daily overflights by scientists and the
military, satellite imagery and onshore sightings
helped track the oil's progress, and U.S. advisors
assisted Saudi officials in planning a response
strategy.
The slick covered an estimated 600 square
miles of sea surface. Under the provisions of Saudi
Arabia's National Oil Spill Contingency Plan, the
highest priority for early protection was the desali-
nation plant at Jubayl. The largest such facility in
the world, Jubayl provides the Saudi capital of
Riyadh with 80 percent of its water. Work crews
successfully protected the plant by installing booms
around inlet areas and skimming oil from the
surface. The crews also were able to protect other
desalination plants, power plants, and oil facilities
designated as high priorities.
The initial clean-up operations were aimed at
recovering free-floating oil from the water's sur-
face. Using skimming vessels under contract to the
Saudi-owned oil company, ARAMCO, crews
isolated sections of the spill and scooped an un-
precedented 1.4 million barrels of oil from the
waters by mid-April. One third of the oil released
is thought to have evaporated naturally from the
surface of the water. Much sank to the bottom of
the Gulf.
Additional oil contain-
ment, cleaning, and
absorption material was
brought to the Gulf (left).
Some booms protected
inlets for critical water
desalination plants (below).
A record amount of oil was
scooped up, but much
remains. Photos by U.S.
Coast Guard.
-------
Oil sullies Gulf beaches.
Photo by Jim Lukoski, Black
Star.
Along the western shoreline, crews contracted
by the Saudi government, using containment
booms trom several nations and guidance from the
Coast Guard and ARAMCO, scavenged oil from
bays where it collected naturally and built berms
extending out from the shore to capture even
more. The crews dug trenches to trap oil riding in
on tides, and pumped the collected oil into con-
tainment pits. Despite these efforts, oil contami-
nated much ot the shoreline, with the area be-
tween Safaniya and Abu Ali Island in Saudi Arabia
bearing the worst pollution. On this stretch of the
coast, which also was severely affected by a spill
trom an oil field in 1983, tarballs appear on the
beaches, and oil mixing with sand forms an asphalt
crust a foot thick in some places.
The Gulf waters take more than five years to
flush naturally through the Straits of Hormuz, and
background levels of oil pollution in the Gulf are
high. Even before the 1991 release, many beaches
showed evidence of earlier contamination. Ac-
cording to a 1983 estimate, a quarter of a million
barrels of oil are accidentally spilled every year into
the Gulf through normal operations.
In late March 1991, the Saudi Arabian Meteo-
rology and Environmental Protection Adminis-
tration signed contracts with private corporations
to begin clean-up operations along the coast, but
absent significant funding from international do-
nors, little change is expected.
WHAT HAS BEEN THE
EFFECT ON THE GULF'S
ECOSYSTEMS?
The western shore of the Gulf is severely pol-
luted. Assessment of the ecological damage is
continuing and the full effects may not be
known for years.
The coastal waters of the western Gulf are
shallow, with wide intertidal zones—regions be-
tween high and low tides—that are contaminated
with oil.
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The rich ecosystem in these shallow waters
includes salt marshes, mangrove swamps, beds of
sea grass, and intertidal mud flats where fish and
animals feed on algae. Coastal wetlands and is-
lands provide nesting areas for many native and
migratory birds, including flamingos and the en-
dangered Socotra Cormorant. The oil also threat-
ened shellfish, turtles, and coral.
Due to the size of the release and the impossi-
bility of a full response during the war, many
ecologically sensitive areas could not be protected.
There were private wildlife rescue projects that
saved some fowl and turtle nesting areas, but many
shore birds fell victim to the oil slick. Some species
of wildlife in the Gulf have shown remarkable
resiliency following major oil spills in the past.
Unfortunately, the most heavily polluted salt
marshes are unlikely to survive, which surely will
reduce bird populations. While coral in shallow
water shows the black stain of oil that sank below
the surface, coral in deeper water apparently are
not severely contaminated. Deep water fish are
expected to fare better than marine life that spawns
and feeds in shallow water.
Following a section-by-section examination of
the coastline by Saudi and U.S. scientists, a data-
base ranking the most ecologically sensitive areas
along the coast has been prepared as a guide for
As fires burn in the
distance, oil from unfired but
damaged wells coats desert
grasses. New growth of
plantlife was evident in
some areas within months,
but the long-term effects are
unknown. Photo by Abbas,
Magnum Photos.
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Oil that sank coats coral; prognosis unknown. Photo by Dr. Sylvia Earle, NOAA.
clean-up operations. Saudi environmental authori-
ties are considering different strategies for clean-
ing up the oil, including the possible use of fertil-
izers to enhance the work of natural microbes that
break down oil.
WHAT OTHER
ENVIRONMENTAL
DAMAGE HAS THERE
BEEN?
Oil pooling on the ground near the burning
icells, rate seicage pouring into the Gulf, and
disruption of desert plant life and surface soil
are additional ecological concerns facing the
region.
Millions of barrels of crude oil (estimates range
from 10 to 100 million barrels) spilled onto the
ground from wells damaged but not successfully
ignited by the Iraqis. The spills formed ponds,
some of which were ignited by nearby burning
wells, adding more smoke and pollutants to the air
and blackening the desert in the immediate vicin-
ity
Near the source, a large amount of the oil
remained unburned, forming more pools. Some
oil, baked by nearby fires, hardened into asphalt on
the surface. Some of it seeped into the sand, but
indications are that the oil has not seeped deep
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Environmental problems included oil pools, fires, and the
debris of war (left). Unexploded munitions continue to be a
special hazard for clean-up crews and the civilian population.
Photo by Ken Stroech, EPA.
Below, a NOAA Scientist (at left), confers with local
officials on monitoring the environmental damage. Photo by
Dr. Sylvia Earle, NOAA.
enough to reach freshwater underground aquifers.
Kuwaiti officials are surveying the oil pools to
assess potential ecological damage and possibili-
ties for recovering the oil. The unhardened pools
also represent a continuing hazard to wildlife,
particularly for birds who mistake the oil ponds for
water.
In addition, unburned oil droplets from the
smoke have coated mangroves and other wild
plants in southeast Kuwait. The level of plant
mortality and the ability of the plants to recover are
not yet known; in some areas new growth already
has been spotted.
Also uncertain is the extent of the damage to
the desert surface. The damage comes not only
from oil, but also from the movements of thou-
sands of heavy military vehicles and from the Iraqi
Army's digging of trenches. One concern is that,
because the desert's natural crust has been broken
by these multiple impacts, more severe sandstorms
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and movement of sand dunes could result.
The disposal of unexploded military munitions and of
chemicals from damaged industrial plants created further
burdens, as did Iraqi sabotage of sewage treatment plants,
which increased the amount of raw sewage dumped into
the Gulf until the plants could be repaired. Massive
amounts of waste still litter the landscape and range from
asbestos construction debris to PCB's from damaged
power stations.
WHAT ROLE WILL GULF
NATIONS AND THE UNITED
STATES PLAY IN THE
CONTINUING
ENVIRONMENTAL AND
HEALTH ISSUES?
The Gulf nations have taken responsibility for clean-up
and recovery operations; the United States continues
to provide technical assistance in accordance with
international response plans and requests from gov-
ernments in the region.
U.S. government efforts have evolved from initial
emergency response to helping Kuwait and Saudi Arabia
address medium- and long-term recovery. For example,
the United States helped reestablish and expand air
quality and weather monitoring systems so that local
authorities were alerted about possible incidents of severe
air pollution. Those authorities could then take, or urge
residents to take, actions to reduce the pollution levels or
exposure.
The U.S. offered this technical assistance in part
because Kuwait's scientific infrastructure was severely
damaged during the Iraqi occupation. The United States
supplied Kuwait with monitoring equipment to replace
equipment stolen or destroyed by Iraq, and has provided
considerable scientific expertise as well. By October 1991,
the U.S. government had spent nearly S10 million on
health and environmental protection activities in the
Gulf. (This amount does not include the time of U.S.
personnel.)
Although scientists have preliminary data on the ef-
fects of the fires and oil discharges, there is more to be
learned. For example, the U.S. has proposed sending
public health experts to the area to try to determine the
effects oil soot and droplets may have on local food
supplies, including marine life. Other U.S. government
personnel are advising Kuwaiti scientists measuring the
amount of small particles, outdoors and indoors, that
could be inhaled by local residents. U.S. government
agencies also may be involved in more scientific research
on the effects of the shoreline oil. A complete understand-
ing of the severity of the threats to public health and the
environment will take many months, even years.
This investment of U.S. government time and re-
sources to date reflects the concern of our citizens for the
human health and environment of Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia. When all is said and done, by helping the Gulf
region respond to this disaster, the community of nations
can learn new strategies and new methods for coping with
future environmental crises. If we do, and if we encourage
new modes of regional and international cooperation,
then we will have drawn what benefits we could from this
human and environmental tragedy.
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This booklet mas produced by the U.S. Gulf Task Force.
Photo by Jim Lukoski, Black Star. Cover photo by Bruno Barbey, Magnum Photos.
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