EPA-520/3-73-008
HN-8147.4
HAZARDS EVALUATION OF NUCLEAR
FACILITY RELATED
TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENTS
by
B. J. Garnck, Project Director
O. C. Baldonado, Principal Investigator
C. V. Hodge
J. H. Wilson
Pn.'pared for
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
RockviUe, Maryland ;>08S?
Under
Contract No. 68-01-0555
August 197'*
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HAZARDS EVALUATION OF NUCLEAR
FACILITY RELATED
TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENTS
by
B. J. Garrick, Project Director
0. C. Baldonado, Principal Investigator
C. V. Hodge
J. H. Wilson
Prepared for
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Rockville, Maryland 20852
Under
Contract No. 68-01-0555
August 1973
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EPA Review Notice
This report has been renewed by the EPA and
approved for publication. Approval does not
signify that the contents necessarily reflect the
views and policies of the EPA, nor does mention
of trade names or commercial products con^ti-
tute endorsement or recommendation for use,.
ii
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FOREWORD
The analyses presented in this report were
made for the Office of Radiation Programs,
Environmental Protection Agency, by Holmes and
Narver, Inc., under contract. This report rep-
resents one of the first efforts to quantitatively
assess the potential impact of the transportation
of radioactive materials associated with the nuclear
power industry through the year 2020. Technical
data from numerous sources were collected and
analyzed to produce the results reported herein.
While not all of the radiological aspects of trans-
portation analyzed in the report are covered in the
detail which may be ultimately necessary, each area
has received sufficient analysis to provide infor-
mation useful in environmental impact statement
reviews and other activities of the Agency. The
results of this study will also provide an input
into a planned EPA review of the need for additional
protection standards for the transportation of
radioactive materials.
Publication is made at this time so that the
report will be available as a resource to the
scientific community and the public generally.
Because of the intended uses, the study may be of
considerable interest to a large number of persons;
therefore, it is likely that interested parties may
wish to comment on the report, or certain aspects
of it. Comments may be submitted to the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, Office of Radiation
Programs, Washington, D.C. 20460
f.D. Rowe, Ph.D.
Deputy Assistant Administrator
for Radiation Programs
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ABSTRACT
A study was undertaken to determine the hazards from accidents to
shipments of spent fuel, recycled plutonium, high level radioactive
solidified waste, and noble gas between nuclear power reactors,
chemical processing plants, fuel fabrication plants, and a Federal
waste repository. Annual shipping data for these materials were
projected for the period 1970 to 2020. In a given year, the shipping
data was mapped by means of a fault tree model of the shipping
containers, an empirical dispersion model, and a health effects
model into a hazard vector with components denoting radiation
released, environmental dose, population dose, lethal cases, and
nonlethal effects.
Under the assumptions used in this study, the time variations of the
maximum hazards are described as follows, using the annual population
exposure to risk as the key index. For pure truck.transportation,
plutonium shipment accident exposure from severe accidents varies
from 0. 03 man-rems in 1980 down to 0. 001 man-rems in 1990 and then
up to 0. 8 man-rems in 2020. For pure rail transportation, solid •waste
shipments present the greatest hazard in severe accidents varying from
0. 0002 man-rems in 1990 to 0. 004 man-rems in 2020. The least
exposure results from pure truck shipment of spent fuel, ranging from
7 x 10~9 man-rems in 1970 to 1 x 10~5 man-rems in 2020 and pure rail
shipment of noble gas, ranging from 1 x 10~" man-rems in 1980 to
1 x 10 man-rems in 2020.
This report was submitted in fulfillment of Project No. 621901,
Contract No. 68-01-0555, under the sponsorship of the Environmental
Protection Agency.
111
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CONTENTS
Section Page
I CONCLUSIONS 1
II RECOMMENDATIONS 5
III INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 7
Introduction 7
EPA Objectives for the Study 7
Feature Contributions of the Study 8
Study Methodology 9
Elements Included in the Study 1Z
Organization of Study 15
IV THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 17
PICTURE TO YEAR 2020
Population Growth in the United States 19
Energy Demand in the United States 24
Expected Ways to Meet Demand by Fossil and 24
Nuclear Fuel
Reactor Types and Characteristics 24
Expected Percentage Supplied by LWR, HTGR, 35
and LMFBR
Expected Number and Location of Fuel 35
Reprocessors in the United States
Expected Number and Location of Waste 41
Repositories
V NUCLEAR TRANSPORTATION FORECASTS 43
(1970 TO 2020)
Nuclear Fuel Picture 43
Radioactive Waste Picture 46
VI METHODOLOGY FOR ACCIDENT HAZARD 73
ANALYSIS
Radiation Sources Associated with 73
Transportation Accidents
Probability of Accidents 74
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
Section
Probability (Fault Tree Simulation Model)
of Container Rupture in Accidents
Fraction of Cargo Likely To Be Released in
An Accident
Radiation Doses from Accident Releases
(Radiation Dispersion Model)
Exposure to Radiation 109
Consequences of Radiation Absorption from 110
Accident Releases (Health Effects Model)
Hazard Vector Field 112
VII CASE EVALUATIONS OF ACCIDENTAL HAZARDS 117
Analysis of Transportation Hazards by 134
Accident Severity
Analysis of Transportation Hazards by Cargo 14f
Effect of Varying Transport Mix 148
Analysis of Accidents by Severity and 153
Dispersion Media
Effect of Changing Release Probabilities 162
Effect of Changing Population Distribution 168
Hazards of a Single Accident 168
VIII ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 173
IX REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 175
References 175
Bibliography 177
X GLOSSARY 187
VI
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FIGURES
Figure
1 Overall Organization of Evaluation of Hazard from
Accidents in the Nuclear Power Transportation
Industry
2 Detailed Organization of Evaluation of Hazard from 11
Accidents in the Nuclear Power Transportation
Industry
3 Nuclear Electric Plants 18
4 Modified Federal Power Commission National Power 20
Survey Regions
5 The Effect of Fertility on the Projected United 21
States Population
6 Projection of Per Capita Energy Consumption in the 25
United States
7 Projection of Energy Demand in the United States 26
8 Nuclear Power Plants' Contribution to Installed 27
Capacity and Energy Demand
9 Typical Material Balance Flow Sheet of a PWR 32
10 Equilibrium Material Balance Flow Sheet of an HTGR 33
11 Equilibrium Material Balance Flow Sheet of an 34
LMFBR
12 Electrical Contributions of Various Reactor Types 37
13 Projection of Reprocessing Load and Capacity in the 40
United States
14 Projections of Shipped Tonnage of Spent Fuel 52
15 Projections of Shipped Tonnage of Fissile Plutonium 53
16 Projections of Shipped Volume of High Level Radio- 54
active Solidified Waste
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FIGURES (continued)
Figure
17 Projections of Shipped Radiation of Noble Gases 55
18 Comparison of Projections of Annual Number of 69
Shipments
19 Comparison of Projections of Annual Radiation 70
Shipped
20 Projected Variation of Number of Shipment-Miles 71
in Time
21 Simplified Schematic Diagram of Spent Fuel Shipping 79
Container
22 Fault Ti-ee Diagram for Spent Fuel Shipping Container 80
23 Simplified Schematic Diagram of Plutonium Shipping 81
Container
24 Fault Tree Diagram for Plutonium Shipping Container 82
25 Simplified Schematic Diagram of Shipping Container 83
for High Level Radioactivity Solidified Waste
26 Fault Tree Diagram for Shipping Container for High 84
Level Radioactivity Solidified Waste
27 Simplified Schematic Diagram of Fission Product 85
(Noble) Gas Shipping Container
28 Fault Tree Diagram for Fission Product (Noble) Gas 86
Shipping Container
29 Graphical Representation of Dose and Population 11-1
Distributions at the Scene of An Accident
30 Comparison of Risk to Exposure for Different Accident 135
Severities in 100 Percent Truck Transportation of
Spent Fuel
31 Comparison of Risk to Exposure for Different Accident 136
Severities in 100 Percent Rail Transportation of
Spent Fuel
32 Comparison of Risk to Exposure for Different Accident 137
Severities in 100 Percent Truck Transportation of
Recycled Plutonium
Vlll
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FIGURES (continued)
Figure Pag'
33 Comparison of Risk to Exposure for Different Accident 138
Severities in 100 Percent Rail Transportation of
Recycled Plutonium
34 Comparison of Risk to Exposure for Different Accident 139
Severities in 100 Percent Truck Transportation of
High Level Radioactive Solid Waste
35 Comparison of Risk to Exposure for Different Accident 140
Severities in 100 Percent Rail Transportation of High
Level Radioactive Solid Waste
36 Comparison of Risk to Exposure for Different Accident 141
Severities in 100 Percent Truck Transportation of
Noble Gas
37 Comparison of Risk to Exposure for Different Accident 142
Severities in 100 Percent Rail Transportation of
Noble Gas
38 Comparison of Risk to Exposure for Severe Accidents 144
to Different Materials. Transportation is By Trucks
Only.
39 Comparison of Risk to Exposure for Severe Accidents 145
to Different Materials. Transportation is by Rails
Only.
40 Comparison of Risk to Exposure for Severe Accidents 146
to Different Materials. Transportation is by 20 Percent
Trucks, 75 Percent Rails, and 5 Percent Barges.
41 Comparison of Risk to Exposure for Severe Accidents 147
to Different Materials. Transportation is by 25 Percent
Trucks, 70 Percent Rails, and 5 Percent Barges.
42 Comparison of Exposure to Risk of Severe Accidents to 149
Spent Fuel Shipments in Different Transport Mixes
43 Comparison of Exposure to Risk of Severe Accidents to 150
Recycled Plutonium Shipments in Different Transport
Mixes
IX
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FIGURES (continued)
Figure Page
44 Comparison of Exposure to Risk of Severe Accidents 151
to High Level Radioactive Solid Waste Shipments in
Different Transport Mixes
45 Comparison of Exposure to Risk of Severe Accidents 152
to Noble Gas Shipments in Different Transport
Mixes
x
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TABLES
Table Pag
1 Summary of Hazard Vectors for Study of Transportation 3
of Nuclear Materials
2 Projected Population of the United States 22
3 Projected Population Density of the United States 23
4 Annual United States Electrical Energy Requirements 28
5 Projected Regional Distribution of Central Station 29
Nuclear Steam Power Plants
6 Characteristics of Typical PWRs, HTGRs, and 31
LMFBRs
7 Contribution of the LWR, HTGR, and LMFBR to the 36
United States Nuclear Electric Power Generating
Capacity
8 Actual Reprocessing Load 38
9 Projected Regional Distribution of Multipurpose 39
Reprocessing Plants
10 Annual Nuclear Fuel (U, Pu) Picture 45
11 Annual Volume Commitment of High Level Radioactive 47
Solidified Waste
12 Annual Radioactivity Generation of High Level 48
Radioactive Waste
13 Annual Shipping Data for Low and Intermediate Level 50
Radioactive Solid Waste
14 Comparison of High, Low, and Chosen Estimates of 57
Shipped Tonnage of Spent Fuel
15 Annual Shipping Data for Spent Fuel 58
16 Comparison of High, Low, and Chosen Estimates of 59
Shipped Tonnage of Recycled Fissile Plutonium
17 Annual Shipping Data for Plutonium 60
18 Comparison of High, Low, and Chosen Estimates of 62
Shipped Volume of High Level Radioactivity
Solidified Waste
XI
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TABLES (continued)
Table
19 Annual Shipping Data for High Level Radioactive
Solid Waste
20 Comparison of High, Low, and Chosen Estimates 64
of Shipped Radiation of Fission (Noble) Gases
21 Annual Shipping Data for Noble Gas 65
22 Approximate Average Shipping Distances 66
23 Summary Annual Waste Transportation Picture 68
24 Accident Probabilities 76
25 Probability of Physical Conditions in Accidents 77
26 Fault Tree Probabilities for Spent Fuel Shipping 87
Container Under Accident Conditions of Light Severity
27 Fault Tree Probabilities for Spent Fuel Shipping 88
Container Under Accident Conditions of Medium
Severity
28 Fault Tree Probabilities for Spent Fuel Shipping 89
Container Under Severe Accident Conditions
29 Fault Tree Probabilities for Plutonium Shipping 90
Container Under Accident Conditions of Light Severity
30 Fault Tree Probabilities for Plutonium Shipping 91
Container Under Accident Conditions of Medium
Severity
31 Fault Tree Probabilities for Plutonium Shipping 92
Container Under Severe Accident Conditions
32 Fault Tree Probabilities for High Level Radioactivity 93
Solidified Waste Shipping Container Under Accident
Conditions of Light Severity
33 Fault Tree Probabilities for High Level Radioactivity 94
Solidified Waste Shipping Container Under Accident
Conditions of Medium Severity
34 Fault Tree Probabilities for High Level Radioactivity 95
Solidified Waste Shipping Container Under Severe
Accident Conditions
XI1
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TABLES (continued)
Page
Fault Tree Probabilities for Fission Product (Noble) 96
Gas Shipping Container Under Accident Conditions of
Light Severity
36 Fault Tree Probabilities for Fission Product (Noble) 97
Gas Shipping Container Under Accident Conditions of
Medium Severity
37 Fault Tree Probabilities for Fission Product (Noble) 98
Gas Shipping Container Under Severe Accident
Conditions
38 Release Probabilities for Shipping Containers Involved 99
in Accidents
39 Significant Failure Modes and Probabilities for Shipping 100
Containers Subject to Severe Accidents
40 Release Fractions During Accidents 108
41 Summary of Hazards Analysis Model 113
42 Annual Shipping Data for Spent Fuel 118
43 Annual Shipping Data for Plutonium 119
44 Annual Shipping Data for Solid Radioactive Waste 120
45 Annual Shipping Data for Noble Gas 121
46 Accident Probabilities Per Million Vehicle Miles 122
47 Release Probabilities for Given Accidents 123
48 Release Fractions During Accidents 124
49 Average Population Density Factors 125
50 Annual Hazard Vectors for Medium Severity Spent 126
Fuel Accidents
51 Annual Hazard Vectors for Severe Spent Fuel Accidents 127
52 Annual Hazard Vectors for Medium Severity Plutonium 128
Accidents
53 Annual Hazard Vectors for Severe Plutonium Accidents 129
54 Annual Hazard Vectors for Medium Severity Solid 130
Radioactive Waste Accidents
XI11
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TABLES (continued)
Annual Hazard Vectors for Severe Solid Radioactive
Waste Accidents
56 Annual Hazard Vectors for Medium Severity Noble Gas 132
Accidents
57 Annual Hazard Vectors for Severe Noble Gas Accidents 133
58 Analysis of Truck Accidents Involving Spent Fuel by 154
Severity and Dispersion Medium
59 Analysis of Rail Accidents Involving Spent Fuel by 155
Severity and Dispersion Medium
60 Analysis of Truck Accidents Involving Plutonium by 156
Severity and Dispersion Medium
61 Analysis of Rail Accidents Involving Plutonium by 157
Severity and Dispersion Medium
62 Analysis of Truck Accidents Involving Solid Radioactive 158
Waste by Severity and Dispersion Medium
63 Analysis of Rail Accidents Involving Solid Radioactive 159
Waste by Severity and Dispersion Medium
64 Analysis of Truck Accidents Involving Noble Gas 160
by Severity and Dispersion Medium
65 Analysis of Rail Accidents Involving Noble Gas by 161
Severity and Dispersion Medium
66 Comparison of Release Probabilities 163
67 Comparison of Release Probability Calculations for 164
Spent Fuel Shipping Containers
68 Comparison of Release Probability Calculations for 165
Plutonium Shipping Containers
69 Comparison of Release Probability Calculations for 166
High Level Radioactive Solid Waste Shipping Containers
70 Comparison of Release Probability Calculations for 167
Noble Gas Shipping Containers
71 Impact of Single Shipping Accident 170
xiv
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SECTION I
CONCLUSIONS
This study concerns transportation accident hazards in the nuclear power
industry. While understanding that the nuclear power industry will grow-
over the next 50 years, some assumptions had to be made about the timely
introduction of plutonium recycling programs, breeder reactor generators,
fuel processing facilities, and waste disposal facilities in order to
quantitatively describe the magnitude and rate of growth of the nuclear
economy in time. Essentially all the information that was found on
industry projections was derived from studies made at the Oak Ridge
National Laboratory. The results of a computer program written at
Oak Ridge that evaluates the growth of the industry on an economically
competitive basis were particularly useful to this study.
This study treats only the transportation of spent fuel, fissile plutonium,
high level radioactive solidified waste, and noble gas as significant
movements of hazardous materials. The greatest shipping requirements
in the year 2020 will be for the transportation of plutonium. Between
8 and 22 million shipment-miles will be required for plutonium then,
while the requirements for spent fuel lie in the range of 6 to 14 million
shipment-miles. In contrast, between 2. 1 and 2. 3 million shipment-
miles will be required for solid waste movements and 0. 7 to 1.0 million
shipment-miles for noble gas shipping.
The evaluation of the radiation released from a container involved in an
accident required a number of assumptions. Essentially five items of
information were necessary to this evaluation: the amount of radiation
carried in the container, the probability of the transport vehicle encountering
an accident, the probability that the container encounters a rupturing force
during the accident, the probability that the force is great enough to break
the container, and the fraction of the contained radiation that will actually
be released. An exhaustive supply of data with which to quantify these
items is not available, so the numbers that were used for these items
are by no means well established. In particular, difficulty was encountered
in determining the probability of breaking force occurring in light and
medium severity accidents. The accident severity classifications used
in this study were arbitrarily based on collision velocity and duration of
fires. By regulations, the shipping containers are required to withstand
even severe accidents without loss of contents.
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Five different components of a so-called hazard vector were discussed
for each type of radioactive material. These components are the expected
annual number of curies released from accidents, the number of acre-
rems of environmental exposure (equivalent to the human absorption for
a population density of one person per unit area), the number of man-rems
of human exposure, the expected number of lethal cases resulting from
the dose, and the number of nonlethal cancers resulting from the dose.
The results for the growth of these hazard vectors are summarized in
Table 1. For clarity, only the numbers for the years 1980, 2000, and
2020 are given in Table 1, although hazard vectors for every fifth year
of the 50-year period from 1970 to 2020 were calculated.
Under the assumptions made in this study, the projections to year 2020
indicate that the greatest hazards will result from pure truck shipments
of plutonium and pure rail shipments of solid waste. The least hazards
come from noble gas shipments in any transport mode mix, and the
hazards from spent fuel shipments are intermediate.
Parametric studies were made to determine the effects of varying the
mix of transport modes, the population density distribution, and the
release probabilities of the containers. The results of the transport mix
study indicate that from a safety point of view, hauling spent fuel and solid
waste only by trucks is preferable, while hauling plutonium and noble gas
only by rail cars is preferable to some other mix of rails, trucks, and
barges.
The population density distribution was assumed to be uniform over
isodose areas and to vary along a transport link. Such a distribution
affects the calculations in this study in a linear manner. Each link distri-
bution can be characterized by a multiplicative factor that modifies the
average population density.
The release probabilities enter the calculation in a linear manner. Thus,
inclusion of inferior containers in some parts of the transportation industry
affects the resultant hazards linearly. Consequently, the accuracy of the
release probability calculations are critical.
Lastly, an assessment of the hazards to be expected from an accident to a
representative shipment was performed. The population distribution, the
release fraction, and the method of calculating lethal and injurious effects
of radiation absorbed by human beings are critical elements of this
calculation. Assuming a right-of-way of about 1,000 feet, in which
only two persons per square mile are found and a population density of
5 times the average outside the right-of-way area, about 70,000 man-rems
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF HAZARD VECTORS FOR
STUDY OF TRANSPORTATION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS
a,b, c
Material
Spent Fuel
Recycled
Plutonium
High Level
Radioactive
Solid Waste
Noble Gas
Year
1980
2000
2020
1980
2000
2020
1980
2000
2020
1980
2000
2020
Curies
Transported
1. 02E+10
8.43E+10
1. 92E+11
5. 04Ef8
2. 13E+8
9. 56E + 8
5. OOE + 6
2. 74E + 9
1. 02E+10
3. 15E + 7
1. 84E+8
3. 11E+8
Expected
Curies
Released
1.44E-6
9.48E-6
2. 16E-5
5. 48E-7
1. 85E-7
8. 32E-7
3. 04E-7
1.46E-4
4. 98E-4
4. 81E-3
2.46E-2
3. 80E-2
Expected
Acre-
Rems
5. 15E-6
3. 39E-5
7. 74E-5
1. 02E-3
3. 46E-4
1. 55E-3
1. 08E-6
5. 24E-4
1. 78E-3
1. 25E-6
6.40E-6
9. 87E-6
Expected
Man-
Rems
1. 63E-5
1. 34E-4
3. 81E-4
3. 23E-3
1. 36E-3
7. 65E-3
3. 43E-6
2.07E-3
8. 78E-3
3. 94E-6
2. 52E-5
4. 87E-5
Expected
Fatalities
2. 71E-8
2. 23E-7
6. 36E-7
5. 39E-6
2. 27E-6
1. 28E-5
5. 72E-9
3. 44E-6
1. 46E-5
6. 57E-9
4. 21E-8
8. 11E-8
Expected
Nonlethal
Cancers
8. 14E-10
6. 69E-9
1. 91E-8
1. 62E-7
6. 82E-8
3. 83E-7
1. 71E-10
1. 03E-7
4. 39E-7
1. 97E-10
1. 26E-9
2. 43E-9
The transport mix assumed is 20 percent trucks, 75 percent rails, and 5 percent barges.
All accident severities are included.
A population distribution is used such that 26. 3 times the average population density in a
particular year is exposed.
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are expected from an accident to a solid waste shipment. This estimate
is the maximum single accident hazard. Accidents to plutonium and spent
fuel shipments produce 16,000 and 20,000 man-rems, respectively, and
a noble gas shipment accident yields 110 man-rems.
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SECTION II
RECOMMENDATIONS
Concerning the advisability of continuing a transportation program against
beginning a program of constructing nuclear parks to minimize trans-
portation requirements, the results of this study are not strongly conclusive.
The probable hazard from transportation accidents appears to be acceptably
low, but the consequences of an accident if it occurs are rather high.
As to minimizing the accident hazards, the results of this study support
a recommendation to optimize the shipping schedules so that routes avoid
population centers, shipments avoid violent weather conditions, shipment
capacities be maximized while release fractions be minimized, the use of
trucks be minimized, the shipment velocity be minimized, and the thermal
insulation of containers be maximized. All these practices must be balanced
at least partly against economic costs, and supposedly they are all in current
effect.
Further studies would be profitable in the areas of fault tree determination
of release probabilities, severity analysis of release fractions, real world
dispersion, and dose response effects on health. These studies would not
only be profitable for nuclear material transport processes, but also would
benefit analysis of transportation of all hazardous materials.
Emphasis should be given to analyzing transportation accident statistics
to determine probabilities of encountering particular physical conditions,
e. g. , crushing forces, shearing and stretching tensions, vibrations,
excessive heat, pressure, puncturing impulses, etc. Material strength
studies should be devoted to the determination of the probabilities that the
physical forces will be large enough to break the containers. Conceivably
these studies would incorporate test data already obtained with theoretical
inquiries.
Little data exists of release fraction. This number is particularly frustrating
since a light severity accident can produce a serious release and a severe
accident can produce only a minor release or no release. Materials studies
would be of use here, since the problem essentially is a determination of
the bonding strength of a solid matrix.
Many dispersion models currently exist, but research in this area should
still be encouraged.
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Research in the health effects of radiation should be definitely encouraged,
since the data base for dose response curves is small, because so many
complicating factors exist, and because the ambient radiation levels from
probable accidents will grow.
Similar studies to this one should be encouraged on a regional level. The
demography and shipping distance data would have to be better established
than in this study, however, for the hazards evaluations in a region to be
of high value. Also, the projection of size, timing, and location of nuclear
facilities would have to be obtained for the region under study. Some of
the data used in this report would be useful in this regard, but a computer
code similar to the economic model projection code in use at Oak Ridge
National Laboratory would also be useful.
All these studies will undoubtedly contribute to a more accurate assessment
of radiation hazards. The question is -whether greater accuracy is worth-
while. The subject of radiation hazards is great enough in the public eye
to justify the expenditure of time and money to conduct these studies. In
addition, the studies would, or could, also contribute to technical know-
ledge in cask design for other hazardous materials, to a greater under-
standing of biological and physical processes, and to certain aspects of
social research. For these reasons, the recommendations are proffered.
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SECTION HI
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
The energy demands of the United States are increasing. Traditional
energy sources are being depleted, and this fact means that there will
be an increase in the fraction of energy supplied by nuclear fuel. By the
year 2020, nuclear fuel will provide as much as three-fourths of the
electrical power of the United States. Electrical power represents as
much as one-third of the total energy requirements of the country.
The increased use of nuclear fuel will result in more mining, fuel
enrichment, fuel fabrication, fuel reprocessing, and nuclear waste
disposal. The facilities required to carry out these activities will
not necessarily be located within the same area. It will be necessary,
therefore, to transport the nuclear fuel in a variety of forms and levels
of radioactivity as it goes through the fuel cycle. An increase in total
transportation of nuclear fuel and radioactive materials is anticipated.
Radiation hazards are expected during transportation.
The radiation burden consists of a fixed and a probable component. The
fixed radiation burden consists of effects from routine, accident-free
operation. The probable burden is that associated with accidents. The
purpose of this study is to assess the hazards from the probable burden
of nuclear facility related transportation accidents.
EPA OBJECTIVES FOR THE STUDY
The responsibility for assessing and minimizing the detrimental environ-
mental impact from most of man's activities rests with the EPA. As a
part of these responsibilities, EPA has undertaken the assessment of the
total environmental impact resulting from the production of nuclear power.
The transportation of nuclear materials may represent a significant fraction
of the total impact resulting from the nuclear power industry. As the nuclear
transportation industry grows, a larger burden of radioactivity will have to
be borne by the public and the environment. Thus, more regulatory controls
will be required; and since the EPA is charged with the responsibility of
protecting the environment, they are interested in assessing the magnitude
of the radiation burden. The purpose of the present study is to help the EPA
gain base information to use in establishing policies for the government of
the transportation of radioactive materials generated by the nuclear power
industry.
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In the present study, the radiation burden from transportation accidents
and its consequences are analyzed. A subsequent study of the routine
shipment radiation burden and consequences is in process. These two
studies will help identify any potential transportation impacts which may
be considered unacceptable. Steps may then be taken to minimize these
impacts.
The question naturally arises: If the radiation burden from transportation
is excessive, would it be better to cluster nuclear facilities on the same
sites or on nearby sites than to pursue a more random siting policy? If
the clustering course is adopted, then size is an added constraint to those
already limiting the choice of sites. As it is, finance, security, radiation
level, cooling capability, land area, visibility, and power transmission
must be considered before a suitable site can be used. Other questions
come up in connection with minimizing risks and hazards. For instance,
decisions must be made as to whether the shielding and impact resistance
of shipment containers are sufficient.
Additional objectives of the present study are to obtain a perspective of
important variables and to document the useful literature. In particular,
accident frequencies, container designs, and variations in usage of the
transport modes of trucks, rail cars, and barges are investigated. The
pertinent studies that are documented may be divided into two categories:
predictions on the transportation systems leading to the environmental
impact and assessments of the effects of those impacts.
FEATURE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY
Several items which differentiate the study from others are listed as
follows:
1. Of several assessments of the environmental impact of transportation
accidents, the present study involves shipments of radioactive material.
2. The work represents an extension of the scope of the AEC "Environ-
mental Survey of Transportation of Radioactive Materials to and from
Nuclear Power Plants" by treating transportation accidents to the year 2020.
3. Fault tree analysis is used to evaluate, in the absence of accident
experience, the probability with which a transportation accident results
in a release of radiation or a release of radioactive material.
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4. A parametric model of the nuclear power transportation industry is
established to allow future studies and updating.
5. The hazard from nuclear transportation accidents is formulated
quantitatively in terms of a hazard vector field.
The methodology developed has been applied in other areas involving safety
and reliability. The study begins from a projected transportation picture
and generates the environmental impact of radiation releases during
accidents. By changing parameters related to the transport modes,
transport paths, shipping containers, and properties of the shipped
materials, a series of environmental impact scenarios are simulated.
STUDY METHODOLOGY
The method used in this study is essentially a mapping mechanism. Figure 1
contains a diagram which illustrates the overall action of the mapping. The
idea is to map a function, the amount of radioactive material being shipped,
into a vector space which quantitatively describes the hazards. The amount
of material being shipped is a function of several variables concerning the
nuclear power and transportation industries.
Risk is the probability that existing conditions will lead to accidents that
result in damage or loss. The consequence of these conditions is an
important ingredient of hazard. In fact, hazard is taken to be the risk
times the consequence. Values of hazard and risk depend upon the accidents,
the container designs, the materials being shipped, the radiation doses
resulting from these accidents and releases, and the health damage caused
by these releases.
The overall view described by Figure 1 is given in more detail in Figure 2.
A series of calculations produce the final mapping. First, the radioactivity
of the material being shipped is calculated from such variables as the
number and power of nuclear generators, the capacity of chemical processors,
the number of metric tons of fuel burned and the isotope composition of the
residues. Second, the probability of radiation release from a given accident
is calculated by means of fault tree analysis. Third, the radiation released
from probable accidents is calculated by means of a dispersion model. The
results of this calculation are estimates of the dose to the environment
(area-dose) measured in units such as acre-rems, and the whole body dose
to the population measured in man-rems. Finally, an estimate of the lethal
and injurious effects of the radiation to humans is generated by a health
effects model.
-------
o
Materials Modes
Spent Fuel Trucks
Recycled Plutonium Trains
High Level Radio- Barges
active Solid Waste
Fission Product
Gases
Data
Nuclear Facilities
Transport Modes (Acci-
dent Probabilities)
Transport Routes
Radioactive Materials
Container Designs
Population Density
Nuclear
Reactors
Waste
Repositories
Chemical
Proces sors
Fuel
Fabricators
V
Mapping Methodology
A
Nuclear Power Transportation
Industry
Fault
Tree
Simulation
A A
Radiation
Dispersion
Model
Radiation Released
Area-Dose
Person-Dose
Fatalities
Injuries
Hazard Vector Field
Health
Effects
Model
FIGURE 1: OVERALL ORGANIZATION OF EVALUATION OF HAZARD FROM ACCIDENTS
IN THE NUCLEAR POWER TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY
-------
Nuclear Industry Transportation Network Data Inputs
Radiation
Dispersion
Model
Health
Effects
Model
Nuclear Facilities
Nuclear Reactors
Chemical Processing Plants
Fuel Fabrication Plants
Waste Repositories
Transportation Modes
Trucks
Trains
Barges
Materials
Spent Fuel
Recycled Plutonium
High Level Radioactive Solid
Waste
Fission Product Gases
Number of Facilities
Power of Generators
Capacity of Processors
Isotope Composition of
Materials
Storage Policies
Radioactivity of Materials
to Be Shipped
Capacity of Shipments
Distance Between Facilities
Accident Frequencies by
Transport Modes
Container Designs
Population Density
Fault Tree
Simulation
Model
Mapping
Methodology
Radiation
Released
Hazard Vector
Field
FIGURE 2: DETAILED ORGANIZATION OF EVALUATION OF HAZARD FROM
ACCIDENTS IN THE NUCLEAR POWER TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY
11
-------
The fault tree simulation model is based on the representation of the
shipping container as a series of barriers that are breached with some
computable probability. The use of a barrier model in a fault tree is a
way to calculate the conditional probability that radioactive material is
released, given that an accident has occurred. These fault trees require
input data in the form of probabilities with which elementary events occur.
Examples of elementary events are occurrence of puncture force greater
than that which the barrier can withstand, or failure of a seal due to heat
from a nearby fire. Such data are obtained from laboratory or field tests,
distribution functions, statistical tabulations for similar events, and
theoretical estimates. Once the fault tree has been completely drawn
with elementary probabilities, the probability of the top event (release
probability in this case) can be computed by Boolean algorithm or Monte
Carlo simulation. Here the Monte Carlo method is used.
The radiation dispersion model of Figures 1 and 2 is an empirical linear
relationship between the logarithm of radiation dose from the accident and
the logarithm of area ultimately affected after diffusion and material
transport. The population density is required to convert the environmental
dose into the population dose.
The health effects model is derived from the collection of information on
man's response to radiation. Although the body of information on this
subject is not conclusive, the guide for low levels of radiation presently
used by the EPA is used for this study. The absolute values of dose
response in this guide are that one million person-rems absorbed annually
will produce an excess of cases over other causes equal to the following:
1. 200 fatalities if the dose is to the whole body.
2. 200 nonlethal cancers if the dose is to the whole body.
3. 300 serious effects if the dose is restricted to the reproductive organs.
ELEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE STUDY
Nuclear facilities which produce radioactive materials requiring trans-
portation are confined in this study to the following:
1. Nuclear power reactors.
2. Chemical processing plants.
12
-------
3. Fuel fabrication plants.
4. Radioactive waste repositories.
The means of transportation which are considered in this study are:
1. Motor freight.
2, Rail freight.
3. Barge freight.
Significant radiation burdens are expected to arise from transport of
the materials:
1. Spent fuel.
2, Recycled plutonium.
3. High level radioactive solidified waste.
4. Fission product gases.
Results of the analysis are represented in a five component vector field
called the hazard vector field. Its components indicate:
1. The number of curies released from an accident.
2. The number of acre-rems of dose irradiated from the accident to
the environment.
3. The number of man-reins of absorbed dose.
4. The number of fatalities resulting from the absorbed dose.
5. The number of injuries resulting from the absorbed dose.
In this study, a hazard vector is obtained for the continental United States.
This vector is studied for the period 1970 to 2020. A hazard vector is
generated at 5-year intervals, beginning in 1970. A different hazard vecror
is obtained upon varying the following parameters:
13
-------
1. Capacities of shipments.
2. Number of shipments.
3. Average distance between facilities.
4. Transport mode mix.
5. Material cargo.
6. Physical nature of accidents.
7. Accident severity.
8. Container breachment probabilities.
9. Fraction of cargo released after container rupture.
10. Dispersion conditions.
11. Population density distribution.
12. Health dose responses.
The possible impact from transportation accidents in a nuclear power
system is treated on an average basis. The use of regional uniform
population densities and average distances between facilities is considered
to be adequate for the assessment of accident hazard, since accidents are
discrete, random events. The burden from radiation exposure during
routine shipments, i. e. , shipments free of accidents, is of a more
continuous nature, and thus would require more detail in the spatial
distribution of facilities and population.
In the present hazard analysis of accidents, the principal parameters
varied are population density, transport mode mix, material cargo, and
accident severity.
The severity of accidents is divided into light, medium, and severe
categories. These classifications are arbitrary functions of the relative
velocity of colliding vehicles and of the time duration of fires associated
with accidents.
14
-------
ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
In analyzing the potential hazards and risks associated -with radiation
release from nuclear transportation accidents, five steps can be identified.
First, a reasonable picture of the United States nuclear industry from 1970
to 2020 is required. This information is used in the second step to predict
the amount and type of nuclear material transportation required. The third
step is to determine the occurrence probabilities for the various types of
accidents which can lead to release of radiation. Evaluation of the hazards
based upon the amount of radiation released in each accident is the fourth
step of the study. The fifth step consists of parametric studies of the hazards.
15
-------
SECTION IV
THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR INDUSTRY
PICTURE TO YEAR 2020
To accurately evaluate the environmental impact of accidents occurring
during transportation of nuclear material, it is necessary to know the
numbers, origins, and destinations of the shipments; the types of vehicles
and shipping containers used; and the expected population densities along
the routes. These parameters are dependent on projections of the
development of the nuclear industry and the population during the 50
years covered by this study.
The aspects of the nuclear industry which are considered are:
1. The magnitude of the installed nuclear power capacity.
2. The relative contributions of each type of reactor to this capacity.
3. The long term disposal (or storage) policies for radioactive waste.
4. The economics of the fuel cycle.
Projections should be reevaluated periodically to make use of the most
recent data. An example of an updated projection is given in Figure 3.
This figure shows the AEC's forecasts of the nuclear generating capacity
in the decade 1970 to 1980. The first estimate was made in 1962. The
forecast 'was revised in 1964, 1966, 1967, and 1969; each time it was
revised upward.
In the 50-year period of this study, society may change its pattern of
energy consumption because of its desire to protect the environment.
Technological breakthroughs may occur -which will change the under-
lying assumption of the projections. The assumptions made are
derived from opinions of scientists and engineers who work in the
various areas. These limitations should be borne in mind when drawing
any conclusions from this report.
The development of the United States nuclear industry over the next
50 years will be governed primarily by the demand for electrical
energy. Military and scientific influences on the development of the
nuclear industry are expected to be small compared to the influence
of the domestic needs for more energy. In this section, the following
aspects of the nuclear industry for the next 50 years are discussed:
17
-------
THOUSAND MEGAWATTS
200
1970
1975
AS ESTIMATED
IN
170-
1980
•1969
1967
1966
1964
1962
ESTIMATED
INSTALLED
CAPACITY
Reference: "The Nuclear Industry - 1970," U. S. Atomic
Energy Commission
FIGURE 3: NUCLEAR ELECTRIC PLANTS
-------
1. Total energy demand in the United States between 1970 and 2020.
2. Ways in which the energy demand will be met.
3. Numbers, sizes, and types of nuclear facilities needed to support
the nuclear energy requirements.
These items will be discussed for each of the six U. S. Federal Power
Commission (FPC) National Power survey regions shown in Figure 4.
These regions were modified slightly to follow state lines except for
the areas around Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and St. Louis, Missouri.
The Pittsburgh area is included in the East Central region and the
St. Louis area is included in the West Central region. The boundary
of these two areas corresponds to the Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Areas.
POPULATION GROWTH IN THE UNITED STATES
The most obvious of the forces governing energy demand is the growth
of the United States population. Table 2 shows the population of the
United States in 1970 and the projected populations through the year
2020. This projection is based on an average of 2, 775 children per 1, 000
women at end of child bearing and a net annual immigration of 400, 000.
This birth rate is higher than that recently released by the Census Bureau.
They report a rate of 2, 040 children per 1, 000 women (Reference 3).
Figure 5 shows how the population projections are affected by the birth
rate. The Census Bureau's latest estimate for the year 2000 is shown
by the bar on Figure 5.
The population of the United States is expected to increase significantly
during the next 50 years. The population in 2020, based on current
projections, will be about 79 percent higher than in 1970. Thus, if the
per capita energy demand remains constant, an increase of 79 percent
in the overall energy demand is expected by the year 2020.
Population density is more suitable for calculating population risks than
the population itself since the radiation dosage is dependent on the spatial
dispersion of radiation or radioactive material. The exposure to risk
is calculated from the product of dose as a function of area, the area
itself, and the population density. The United States population density
projections are derived from Table 2 and displayed in Table 3.
19
-------
Cs)
o
FIGURE 4
MODIFIED FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION NATIONAL POWER SURVEY REGIONS
-------
LOGO
900
800
700 -
in
I 600
BIRTH RATE
O (3, 100 children/1,000 women)
D (2, 775 children/1, 000 women)
V (2, 450 children/1,000 women)
Q (2, 110 children/1, 000 women)
1972 Census
Bureau Estimate
(Reference 3)
10Q
IV 60
1970
1980
1990
Year
2000
2010
2020
FIGURE 5: THE EFFECT OF FERTILITY ON THE PROJECTED
UNITED STATES POPULATION
(Reference 4)
21
-------
TABLE 2: PROJECTED POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES
a
IN)
tM
Year
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
Percent
Growth
1970-2020
Population in Modified FPC Regions,
Millions b
North-
east
52. 0
55.4
58. 8
63. 1
67.4
70. 0
72. 6
76. 6
80. 5
85. 0
89. 5
72
East
Central
32. 2
34. 0
35.9
38. 3
40. 7
42. 0
43. 3
45. 3
47. 3
49. 8
52.4
63
South-
east
33.4
35. 6
37. 9
40. 6
43. 3
45. 0
46. 8
49. 5
52. 1
54. 5
56. 9
70
West
Central
26. 8
28.4
29. 9
32. 0
34. 1
35.6
37. 0
38. 2
39.5
42. 0
44.6
67
South
Central
24. 5
26. 2
27. 8
29. 8
31.9
33. 2
34.4
36.4
38. 3
39. 8
41. 2
68
West
34. 9
38. 9
42. 6
47. 0
51. 5
54. 8
58. 0
63. 7
69.4
74. 8
80. 3
130
Total
Population,
millions
204
218
233
251
269
281
292
310
327
346
365
79
Derived from data for individual states in Reference 2.
FPC Regions, modified to follow State boundaries (with the exception of the Pittsburgh
and St. Louis areas). The population for the various states (Reference 2) were projected
separately for each region. The west population includes Alaska and Hawaii.
-------
TABLE 3: PROJECTED POPULATION DENSITY OF THE UNITED STATES
t\J
LO
Year
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
Population Density in Modified FPC Regions
Persons/Square Mile
North-
east
290. 6
309. 6
328. 6
352. 6
376. 7
391. 2
405. 7
428. 1
449. 9
475. 0
500. 2
East
Central
158. 3
167. 2
176. 5
188. 3
200. 1
206. 5
212. 9
222. 8
232. 6
244. 9
257. 7
South-
east
87. 1
92. 8
98. 8
105. 8
112. 9
117. 3
122. 0
129. 0
135. 8
142. 1
148. 3
West
Central
56. 1
59.4
62. 6
67. 0
71.4
74. 5
77.4
79.9
82. 7
87. 9
93. 3
South
Central
41. 5
44. 3
47. 0
50.4
54. 0
56. 2
58. 2
61. 6
64. 8
67. 3
69.7
West*
28. 5
31. 6
34. 8
38. 5
42. 2
44. 9
47. 5
52. 2
56. 9
61.4
65.9
National
Average*
67. 2
72. 1
76.9
82. 8
88. 6
92.4
96. 0
102. 0
108. 0
114. 0
120. 0
*Not including Alaska or Hawaii area or population.
-------
ENERGY DEMAND IN THE UNITED STATES
The standard of living and life style in the United States requires large
amounts of energy for each person. It has been estimated that while
having 6 percent of the world's population, the United States consumes
one third of the world's annual production of electrical energy.
Figure 6 shows the treiid in energy demand per person in the United
States projected over the next 50 years. It can be seen from this
figure that the per capita demand will almost double by 2020.
The combination of increasing population and per capita energy demand
is expected to cause a large increase in the demand for energy. This is
shown in Figure 7. The total energy requirements will more than
double over the next 50 years, with the demand for electrical energy
contributing the largest portion of that growth. The electrical require-
ments projected to the year 2020 are presented in Table 4. The numbers
in the second column in Table 4 correspond to the "Total Electric"
curve of Figure 7. The third column in Table 4 lists the power at peak
load to the year 2020. The effects of recent concern for the environment
on the projections of energy demand is uncertain at this time and is not
considered in this report.
EXPECTED WAYS TO MEET DEMAND BY FOSSIL AND NUCLEAR FUEL
The major role of nuclear fuel in satisfying the energy demands of the
United States will be helping to provide adequate electricity. This role
is shown in Figure 7 by the way the "Nuclear Electric" curve approaches
the "Total Electric" curve. This same information is shown by
the upper curve in Figure 8. Nuclear energy should supply over 80
percent of electrical energy requirements for the United States by the
year 2020. The lower curve in Figure 8 shows the percent of generating
capacity supplied by nuclear fuel. About 71 percent of the installed
electrical power capacity in 2020 will be nuclear fueled. The nuclear
power projections for the six FPC regions of Figure 4 and for the
contiguous United States during the next 50 years are presented in
Table 5.
REACTOR TYPES AND CHARACTERISTICS
Current designs of nuclear fueled electrical generating plants include
two types of reactors -- converters and breeders. Both contain
fissionable and fertile material. Fertile materials are isotopes which
after capturing a neutron become fissionable material; for example,
24
-------
600
219.0
100.0
500
182. 5
nj
4-"
• H
a,
rd
u
400
Q
^
0)
PH
300
PH
160.0
146.0
0)
fin
M
rt)
0)
120.0
109. 5
100.0
DH
a
§ 200
CO
fl
o
O
^
tuO
(I)
rt
H
a
o
80.0 a,
100
73.0
60.0
36.5
CO
pj
tuO
fH
-------
pq i.
10
1970
2020
FIGURE 7: PROJECTION OF ENERGY DEMAND
IN THE UNITED STATES (References 4, 5)
26
-------
Percent Total Energy
Demand That Is
Electrical
Percent Total Energy
Demand That Is Nuclear
Electrical
1970
2020
FIGURE 8: NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS' CONTRIBUTION TO INSTALLED
CAPACITY AND ENERGY DEMAND (Reference 5)
27
-------
TABLE 4: ANNUAL UNITED STATES ELECTRICAL
ENERGY REQUIREMENTS (Reference 5)
N>
00
Year
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010*
2015*
2020*
Annual Electrical
Energy Use
109 Kw-Hour
1, 603
2, 220
2,972
4, 167
5,459
7, 319
9,650
12, 200
14, 900
18, 300
21, 300
Power Peakload
106 Kw
336
463
628
904
1, 197
1, 585
2,090
2, 620
3, 130
3, 730
4, 260
*Graphical extrapolation.
-------
TABLE 5: PROJECTED REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF CENTRAL
STATION NUCLEAR STEAM POWER PLANTS (Reference 5)
tv
Calendar
Year
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010*
2015*
2020*
FPC Region
North-
east
(
3
14
27
54
99
159
243
290
383
462
519
East
Central
Capacity of r-
0
5
10
23
49
81
121
218
285
396
515
South-
east
luclear Stea
0
12
33
66
111
182
274
330
427
513
590
West
Central
m Power PI
1
8
20
38
67
111
167
224
302
382
456
South
Central
ants, GWe (1s
0
1
7
22
46
75
113
210
229
311
397
West
Jet)
1
5
17
42
81
132
200
289
384
481
563
Total
United
States
5
45
114
245
453
740
1, 118
1, 562
2,010
2, 545
3, 040
*Graphical extrapolation.
-------
U238 after capture becomes Pu . Both of the reactor types generate
energy from fission and convert the fertile material into fissionable
material, but the breeders produce more fissionable material than
they consume. Reactors can also be classified by the coolant used
to remove the heat and by the neutron energy at which the fissions
occur. Most converters are light water thermal reactors (LWR).
That is, they are cooled by light water and the neutrons are at
thermal energy (0. 025 ev). Another converter type is the high
temperature gas cooled reactor (HTGR). For this reactor type, the
coolant is helium gas. The breeders which are currently in the
design stage are cooled by a liquid metal such as sodium. The energy
of the neutrons which cause fission is about 10 Mev. These breeders
are called liquid metal fast breeder reactors (LMFBR). The LWRs
may be further classified by two designs and two uses of fuel. The
two designs are the Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) and the Boiling
Water Reactor (BWR). LWRs can utilize enriched uranium as the
fissionable material and be designated as LWR-U or they can utilize
a combination of unenriched uranium and plutonium which was
produced from fertile material and be designed as LWR-U, Pu.
Characteristics for the PWR-U; PWR-U, Pu; HTGR; and LMFBR types
of reactors are listed in Table 6. These are expected to remain typical
for the next 50 years. Proposed designs of LMFBRs have been submitted
to the AEC by General Electric (GE) and Atomics International (AI).
Data for the two designs are given in Table 6.
Fuel cycles for different reactor designs are pictured in Figures 9
through 11, and include all steps from ore mining to temporary storage
of waste products. From the point of view of radiation safety in
transportation, the most important links are those between reactors
and chemical processing plants, between processors and waste repositories,
between processors and fuel fabrication plants, and between fabricators
and reactors. In this report, freight shipments along these links are
divided into spent fuel, recycled plutonium, high level radioactive solidified
waste, and fission product (noble) gas movements.
A possible source of electrical energy which still awaits a technological
breakthrough is the fusion reactor. When it is developed, it will be an
important part of the energy picture because of its clean operation, fuel
recycling capability, huge fuel reservoir represented by the oceans,
capability of direct conversion of fusion energy into electricity, and
material decomposition possibilities. Since a workable fusion reactor
is not foreseen for at least twenty years, the current study does not
attempt to consider its potential contribution.
30
-------
TABLE 6: CHARACTERISTICS OF TYPICAL PWRs, HTGRs, AND LMFBRs (Reference 5)
Electric Power, MWe (Net)
Thermal Power, MWt
Average Specific Power, MW /Metric Ton
Average Burnup, MWd/Metric Ton
Refueling Interval, Daysc
Steady State Charge
Th, Kg
U-233, Kg
U-235, Kg
Total U, Kg
Fissile Pu, Kg
Total Pu, Kge
Total (U+Pu), Kg
Total (U-!-Pu+Th), Kg
Steady State Discharge
Th, Kg
U-233, Kg
U-235, Kg
Total U, Kg
Fissile Pu, Kgd
Total Pu, Kge
Total (U+Pu), Kg
Total (U+Pul-Th), Kg
PWR-U
1, 000
3, 077
37. 5
32, 873
365. 25
875. 2
27, 350
243.4
26, 137
180. 1
254. 9
26, 392
PWR-U,Pua
1, 000
3, 077
37. 5
32, 873
365. 25
651. 8
26, 909
270. 3
441. 0
27, 350
191. 0
25, 869
273. 1
445. 5
26, 314
HTGRb
1, 160
3, 000
80. 65
94, 264
365. 25
8,434
217
433
865.4
9299.4
7,819
219. 3
64. 1
541.4
2. 1
10. 0
551.4
8, 370
LMFBR
AI
1, 002
2,400
50. 18
37, 098
364
34
17, 163
1, 196
1, 663
18, 826
22
16, 213
1, 395
1,918
18, 131
GE
1, Oil
2,417
53. 76
41,792
385
34
16, 720
786
1,093
17, 813
24
15, 603
1, 111
1,467
17, 069
PWR with self-sustaining Pu recycle.
Based upon full power and fuel charged.
At 80 percent load factor.
Pu-239 + Pu-241.
Pu-238 + Pu-239 + Pu-240 + Pu-241 + Pu-242.
Burnup per metric ton of fuel charged.
-------
OO
IS)
.248 U
Ore
146.391 I
.5% Loss
U,O0 MILL SITE
-J O
146. 391 U
CONVERSION
.732 U
Loss
145.659 U
Normal Feed . 711%
FABRICATION
. 254 r
Z.475 U
49.505 U
5% Recycle
1.015 U
Z% Recycle
FUEL PREPARATION
50.774 U
3.490 U
47. Z84U at 2.548%
Enrichment
Flow Rates in Metric
Tons/Yr at 85% Reactor
Load Factor
46.782 U
2. 548% Enrichment
REACTOR
1,000 MWe
3,077 MWt
Burnup = 20,333
Discharge Assay
1.016% U235
MWD
45,448 U
. 341 Pu
. 977 F.P.
I .016 Other
CHEMICAL REPROCESSING
44.994 U
CONVERSION
44.859 U
1% Loss
.454 U
. 003 Pu
Storage
S.977 F.P.
.338 Pu |
.016 Other
76, 14% Fissile
.3% Loss
. 135 U
1.016% Enrichment
FIGURE 9: TYPICAL MATERIAL BALANCE FLOW SHEET OF A PWR (Reference 6)
-------
MAKE-UP (Fissile) . IK U
U235 .211
238 .014
.225
Pu Np F. P.
.003 .005 .807
2 or \ - PARTICLE ELEMENT
.436 U 10. 328 Th
1, 000 MWe
2, 320 MWt
Equilibrium Burnup
MWD
.807 F. P.
^_ . 005 Np
.003 Pu
Flow Rates in Mflric' Tnns/Vc'ar
at H'S'?, Rt-attor l.no'l Factor
FIGURE 10: EQUILIBRIUM MATERIAL BALANCE FLOW SHEET OF AN HTGR (Reference 6)
-------
uo
Core and Axial Blanket 1 1 . S4K U
.793 U
5% Recycle
BLANKET FAB.
15.864 U
. 325 U
2% Recycle
. 081 U
.5% Loss
BLANKET FUEL PREP.
16. 270 U
6.942 U
FUEL PREP.
1.118 U
Depleted UFj 22. 094 U
. 054 U
.011 Pu
. S°-'o Loss
. 035 U
.011 Pu
.5% Loss
CORE FAB.
6.768 U
2. 223 Pu
CORE FUEL PREP.
. 3% U235
Note: Assumes Availability of Depleted U
at . 3% U235.
Flow Rates: Metric Tons/Year at
B5% Reactor Load Factor
2. 101 Pu
. 338 U
.111 Pu
5% Recycle
. 139 U
. 046 Pu
2% Recycle
2.280 Pu
21.388 U
2. 101 Pu
(70. 95% Fissile Pul
REACTOR
1, 000 MWe
2, 500 MWt
MWD
Burnup ———
Core 80,000
Axial Blanket 2, 500
Radial Blanket 8,100
. 477 U
.157 Pu
20.309 U
2. 348 Pu
.832 F.P.
(72.66% Fissile Pu)
CHEMICAL REPROCESSING
.208 U
. 025 Pu
1% Loss
Storage
.832 F.P.
Storage
. 200 Pu
Storage
20. 578 U
FIGURE 11: EQUILIBRIUM MATERIAL BALANCE FLOW SHEET OF AN LMFBR (Reference 6)
-------
EXPECTED PERCENTAGE SUPPLIED BY LWR, HTGR, AND LMFBR
The increased demand for nuclear fueled electrical energy during the
next 50 years will probably be met by the reactor types discussed in the
previous section. Their expected relative contributions are shown in
Table 7 and Figure 12 (Reference 5). The LWR should continue to be
a significant electrical energy source for the remainder of this century.
However, the bulk of the nuclear fueled generating capacity after the
year 2000 will probably be supplied by the LMFBR. The HTGR should
also play an important role. Of the installed nuclear electrical generating
capacity in the year 2020 it is projected that 65 percent will be supplied
by the LMFBR, 19 percent by the HTGR, and 16 percent by the LWR.
EXPECTED NUMBER AND LOCATION OF FUEL REPROCESSORS IN
THE UNITED STATES
In the three fuel cycles (Figures 9 through 11) an important step is
chemical fuel reprocessing. In this operation, the spent fuel from the
reactor is put through a chemical process to separate the fission
products and the cladding material from the still-fissionable material.
The latter includes the original fuel which has not fissioned and the
material newly created by the capture of neutrons by fertile material.
The still-fis sionable material is usually recycled. The fission products
and the cladding materials are classified as radioactive waste and are
(or will be) shipped to disposal and repository facilities. The fuel
reprocessing load in the United States is projected to the year 2020 in
Table 8. This table shows the reprocessing loads expected from LWR-U
facilities; LWR-U, Pu facilities; HTGRs; and LMFBRs. It is
anticipated that between 1990 and 1995, recycling of plutonium fuel for
LWRs will cease. Many of the reprocessing plants expected to handle
these loads will be able to handle reactor fuel from HTGRs and LMFBRs
as well as LWRs. The anticipated increase in the number of fuel
reprocessing plants for each FPC region over the next 50 years is
shown in Table 9. The distribution of plants will follow the geographical
distribution of nuclear reactors.
In Figure 13, the reprocessing load (Table 8), reprocessing capacity
(Table 9), and installed generating capacity (Table 7) projections are
compared. On a national basis the capacity of the reprocessors is
always expected to exceed the reprocessing load. However, the load
in a given FPC region may exceed the capacity in that region. An
example of this is the South Central region. From Table 9 it can be
seen that the first reprocessor should begin operation in the South
Central region in 2003. Until then the spent fuel will have to be
shipped to reprocessors in other regions.
35
-------
TABLE 7: CONTRIBUTION OF THE LWR, HTGR, AND LMFBR
TO THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR ELECTRIC POWER GENERATING
CAPACITY (Reference 5)
Year
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010b
2015b
2020b
Power Capacity (10 MWe)
LWR
5(100)a
45(100)
112(98)
210(86)
345(76)
476(64)
546(49)
533(34)
520(26)
500(20)
490(16)
HTGR
0
0
2(2)
35(14)
93(21)
151(20)
202(18)
273(18)
350(17)
455(18)
590(19)
LMFBR
0
0
0
0
15(3)
113(16)
370(33)
756(48)
1, 140(57)
1, 590(62)
1,960(65)
Total
5
45
114
245
453
740
1, 118
1, 562
2, 010
2, 545
3, 040
Number in parenthesis is percent of total.
b
Graphical extrapolation.
-------
1970
1980
1990
2000
Year
2010
2020
FIGURE 12: ELECTRICAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF VARIOUS REACTOR
TYPES (Reference 5)
37
-------
TABLES: ACTUAL REPROCESSING LOAD (Reference 5)
00
Year
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010*
2015*
2020*
Annual Load (Metric tons /year)
LWR-U
0
850
2, 126
3, 568
7, 284
10,478
11,042
10, 642
10, 100
9,300
8,400
LWR-Pu
0
0
269
1, 184
366
0
0
0
0
0
0
HTGR
0
0
7
169
590
1, 040
1,415
1, 812
2, 190
2, 560
2, 900
LMFBR
0
0
0
0
175
1,470
5, 123
10, 679
16,510
22,740
29, 700
Total
0
850
2,402
4,921
8,415
12, 988
17, 580
23, 133
28, 800
34, 600
41, 000
^Graphical extrapolation.
-------
TABLE 9: PROJECTED REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF MULTIPURPOSE REPROCESSING PLANTS
WEST CENTRAL
Capacity
(MT/Yr)
300
6, 000
Fuel
Type
LWR
LWR
HTGR
LMFBR
Operating
Life
1973-1986
1992-2006
WEST
Capacity
(MT/Yr)
3, 000
6, 000
Fuel
Type
LWR
HTGR
LMFBR
LWR
HTGR
LMFBR
Operating
Life
1990-2004
2002-2016
EAST CENTRAL
Capacity
(MT/Yr)
3, 000
6, 000
Fuel
Type
LWR
LMFBR
LWR
HTGR
LMFBR
Operating
Life
1983-1997
2000-2014
SOUTH CENTRAL
Capacity
(MT/Yr)
6, 000
Fuel
Type
LWR
LMFBR
Operating
Life
2003-2017
NORTHEAST
Capacity
(MT/Yr)
300
780
3, 000
6, 000
Fuel
Type
LWR
LWR
LWR
LWR
LMFBR
Operating
Life
1966-1974
1974-1988
1987-2001
1998-2012
SOUTHEAST
Capacity
(MT/Yr)
1, 500
1, 500
6, 000
6, 000
Fuel
Type
LWR
HTGR
LWR
LWR
HTGR
LMFBR
Operating
Life
1976-1990
1980-1994
1995-2009
2005-2019
-------
icr
8
6
4
10
nj £
0)
w ,
d 4
o
H
u
•H
^1
•4-i
10'
10
Reprocessing
Capacity,
MT/YR
Reprocessing
Load
Installed
Generating
Capacity,
GWe
10'
8
6
4
10-
4
O
•H
O
Ctf
U
bO
fi
• i-t
•j-i
a)
In
(1)
a
a>
O
0)
-P
W
10'
10J
1970 1980 1990 2000 Z010
Year
2020
FIGURE 13: PROJECTION OF REPROCESSING LOAD AND CAPACITY
IN THE UNITED STATES (Reference 5)
40
-------
EXPECTED NUMBER AND LOCATION OF WASTE REPOSITORIES
All commercial high-level waste will originally be sent to a retrievable
surface storage facility. Such facilities might be located at the AEC's
facilities, such as Hanford, Oak Ridge, or Nevada. They are expected
to be used primarily as holding facilities until such time as more
permanent waste management methods are available.
Permanent waste repositories are in the development stage. One
location in southeastern New Mexico is being examined as a possible
site. A first coring sample of the salt bed information is expected to
be taken in 1973 to allow a choice to be made between sites in New
Mexico and Kansas. It is not anticipated that pilot plant operations
will be started prior to 1982, while regular operation of the facility
on a nonexperimental basis is not expected to take place before 1993.
It is anticipated that if this project is successful and the salt formation
disposal technique becomes publicly accepted, at least one other national
disposal site will be in operation by the year 2020 (Reference 14).
Ocean dumping will not be utilized extensively as a waste deposit scheme
because of difficulty in proving that ocean dumping is not harmful; the
almost impossible recovery of the materials once dumped; the difficulty
of imposing appropriate environmental controls; and Public Law 92-532,
which prohibits ocean disposal of high level radioactive waste.
To obtain a definite transportation scenario, however, this study assumes
that a repository will begin operation in 1980 in southeastern New Mexico.
41
-------
SECTION V
NUCLEAR TRANSPORTATION FORECASTS
(1970 TO 2020)
NUCLEAR FUEL PICTURE
Forecasts of the growth of the nuclear power industry in the United States
in the next 50 years indicate that the volume of radioactive material
produced by the nuclear power generation process will increase.
The principal components of this material are:
1. Spent fuel elements containing radioactive fission products, plutonium,
and uranium.
2. Plutonium separated from spent fuel and incorporated into new fuel
elements to be charged to nuclear reactors.
3. Fission products separated from spent fuel in the form of highly
radioactive liquids (1-2. 5 x 10"* Ci/liter) requiring containment for
103 -106 years.
4. Fission products separated from spent fuel in the form of liquids
of low and intermediate level radioactivity (<10 Ci/liter and 10 -1 Ci/
liter) requiring evaporation and/or ion exchange treatment.
5. Fission product gases separated from spent fuel.
In this study, shipments of spent fuel, recycled plutonium, solidified forms
of highly radioactive liquid wastes, and fission product gases (principally
noble gases) are treated as the significant hazards. The low and inter-
mediate level wastes involve a greater number of shipments, but the risk
of accidental radiation hazards from these shipments is disregarded in
this study because of the low radioactivity involved. A possible manage-
ment strategy for the gaseous wastes is to store them temporarily and
then release them to the atmosphere. The longest lived component of
fission gases is Kr-85, which has a half life of 10. 7 years, so 107 years
of temporary storage would be required for a reduction of radioactivity
level to about 0. 1 percent of the original level. In this study, the premise
is adopted that such release provides an unacceptable solution, and ship-
ments of fission gases are assumed to be part of the transportation scenario.
43
-------
The number of shipments of these significantly hazardous materials is
expected to increase from about 200 in 1975 to perhaps 60, 000 in 2020.
As more power reactors, processing plants, fuel fabrication plants, and
waste repositories are built, the average shipping distance for the waste
will decrease. However, the number of shipment-miles is not expected
to decrease since the number of shipments outweighs the distance factor.
This point will be discussed later.
Estimates to the year 2020 of the amount of fuel which will be used by
the different nuclear reactors are presented in Table 10. The data in
Table 10 is a revision of previously reported estimates (References 12
and 13). The latest estimates were generated by the Oak Ridge Systems
Analysis Code, which was not available for the first projection (Reference
12).
This latest forecast assumes the introduction of fast breeder reactors
(represented in Table 10 by the LMFBR column) in about 1987. Up until
that time the use of LWRs will grow and recycling of Pu for use as LWR
fuel is expected to be economically advantageous. After introduction of
LMFBRs, the Pu recycling operation will be curtailed, but LWRs will be
an increasing power source until about 1995, after which time they will
fall into disuse. After 1995, the power burden is expected to fall on the
fast breeders and the increasingly favorable HTGR. Overall, the total
amount of fuel fabricated is expected to triple between 1975 and 1980 from
1, 600 metric tons (MT) to 4, 600 MT. It is expected to triple again by
1990 to 11, 800 MT and a third time by 2015 to 37, 600 MT. The amount
of irradiated fuel that is to be processed •would experience similar growth.
Shipments of plutonium are of special interest because this material is
highly toxic and highly radioactive. In Table 10 data for the years between
1978 and 1990 are described in detail to show the plutonium reprocessing
cycle for the LWR more clearly. In this table, the data in the columns
marked LWR-U refer to the amounts of uranium used in LWRs. The data
in the columns labeled LWR-Pu refer to the amounts of plutonium used
in LWRs in the recycling program. No plutonium is included in the HTGR
columns, but plutonium is counted in the LMFBR columns. From Table 6
the averages betweenAI and GE follow-on designs give 7.48 percent of
the "Fabricated" numbers and 9. 59 percent of the "Processed" numbers
as plutonium.
All the numbers for processed fuel in Table 10 represent quantities of
uranium, plutonium, and thorium in the spent fuel that is shipped to
the reprocessing plant. Since startup cycles and recycling of fuel intro-
duce nonuniformities in the amount of radiation exposure, the numbers
44
-------
TABLE 10: ANNUAL NUCLEAR FUEL (U, Pu) PICTURE (Reference 5)
Year
1970
1975
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010b
2015b
2020b
Fuel (Metric Tons)
LWR-U
Fabricated21
403. 2
1, 566. 2
2,276.9
2, 987. 6
3,545.8
4,796.7
6, 722.0
8,404. 5
10, 141. 2
11, 759.0
11,417. 9
9, 745.8
8, 000. 0
6, 300.0
4, 600.0
Processed
15. 0
566.9
1,406. 5
1,937.0
2, 661. 3
3,020. 5
3,9-11. 3
5, 222. 1
6, 912. 2
10,279.8
11, 107. 3
10, 287. 2
9,400.0
8, 600. 0
7, 200. 0
LWR-Pu
Fabricated
775. 3
801. 2
1, 163. 0
1,085. 5
542. 7
180. 9
Proces sed
113. 5
494. 9
876. 1
985. 1
762.6
381. 3
HTGR
Fabricated
117.4
316. 3
507. 7
698.4
913. 8
1,089. 7
1,429.2
1, 854.4
2, 293. 6
2,800. 0
3, 300. 0
3, 800. 0
Processed
4.5
29.7
102. 6
227. 5
392. 3
869.0
1, 308. 5
1, 664. 0
2, 000. 0
2,400. 0
2,800. 0
LMFBR
Fabricated
225. 9
580.4
3, 179.7
7,814. 3
14,467.8
21,000.0
28,000.0
35, 000. 0
Processed
112.7
1, 165. 0
4,453. 2
9, 671. 1
14, 800. 0
20, 000. 0
25,200.0
Total
Fabricated
403. 2
1, 566. 2
3, 502. 2
4,585. 9
5,025. 1
6,389. 9
7,963. 1
9,725. 1
11,811. 3
16, 367. 9
21, 086. 6
26,507. 2
31,800. 0
37, 600. 0
43,400.0
Processed
15.0
566.9
1,406. 5
2,050. 5
3, 160. 7
3,926. 3
4,999.0
6,212. 2
7,798.5
12, 313.8
16,869. 0
21,622. 3
26, 200.0
31,000. 0
35,200.0
Processed tonnage data is prorated to uniform burnup of 33, 000 megawatt-days per metric ton of uranium.
Approximations to linear extrapolations after year 2005.
-------
for processed fuel in Table 10 are calculated under the assumption that
all the fuel is irradiated by the same amount, i. e. , 33, 000 megawatt-days
exposure.
RADIOACTIVE WASTE PICTURE
Generation of Waste
Analysis of waste treatment processes for LWR, HTGR, and LMFBR fuel
has led to figures of merit for specific volumes of solid waste produced
from each metric ton of uranium (MTU) charged to the reactors. They are:
Specific Solid Waste
Reactor Type (ft3/MTU)
LWR 2
HTGR 6
LMFBR 3
Calculated values for the volumes of wastes actually committed from the
processors are given in Table 11.
An industry-wide projection of the amount of radioactivity generated by
the processing of high level waste is given in Table 12. The total amount
is projected to increase from 2. 5 x 10° Curies (2. 5 MCi) to 9. 1 MCi
between 1975 and 1980, to 35. 25 MCi by 1990, and to 148. 3 MCi by 2005.
For at least two reasons, no liquid wastes are considered in the trans-
portation picture (Reference 14). As a policy, the AEC restricts disposal
practices for liquid wastes that have high levels of radioactivity.
Consequently, the transportation of highly radioactive liquid wastes is
prohibited. The other reason is economic —adequate liquid container
fabrications are too expensive to admit the notion of transporting liquids.
Solid wastes consist of solidified aqueous products, solvent cleanup
materials, cladding hulls, alpha contaminated solids, and fission products.
The fission products and part of the other wastes are classified as high
level radioactive wastes. The alpha contaminated waste may be partitioned
into low level and intermediate level segments.
46
-------
TABLE 11: ANNUAL VOLUME COMMITMENT OF
HIGH LEVEL RADIOACTIVE SOLIDIFIED WASTE (Reference 5)
Year
1973
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010*
2015*
2020*
Waste Volume (Cubic Feet)
LWR
100.0
1, 700.0
4,789. 6
9, 504.0
15, 300.6
20, 956.2
22, 083.0
21, 284.4
20, 500.0
19, 700.0
18, 900.0
HTGR
0.0
0. 0
39.6
1, 015.8
3, 537.6
6, 240.6
8,490.6
10, 872.6
13, 200. 0
15, 600.0
18, 000.0
LMFBR
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
526.2
4,408.8
15, 369. 3
32, 035.2
48, 600. 0
65, 200. 0
81, 800.0
Total
100. 0
1, 700. 0
4, 829.2
10, 519.8
19, 364.4
31, 605. 6
45, 942. 9
64, 192.2
82, 300. 0
100, 500.0
102, 500.0
* Approximations to linear extrapolation after year 2005.
47
-------
TABLE 12: ANNUAL RADIOACTIVITY GENERATION OF
HIGH LEVEL RADIOACTIVE SOLIDIFIED WASTE (Reference 5)
Year
1973
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010*
2015*
2020*
9
Radioactivity (10 Curies)
LWR
0. 128
2.501
9. 102
20. 008
32.364
45. 344
48. 994
45. 377
41.8
38.2
34.6
HTGR
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.277
1.800
3.986
6.002
7.633
9.2
10.8
12.4
LMFBR
0.0
0. 0
0. 0
0.0
1.085
11.374
43.820
95.257
146.6
197.0
248.4
Total
0.128
2.501
9. 102
20.284
35.249
60.705
98.816
148.267
197.6
246.0
295.4
r Approximations to linear extrapolation after year 2005.
48
-------
A projection of the amount of solid wastes of low and intermediate levels
of radioactivity (<1 Ci/liter of liquid from which the solid was formed)
which will be shipped over the next 50 years is given in Table 13. As
indicated above, these solids are not included as a significant radioactive
transport hazard.
Gaseous wastes are products of fission. The principal nuclides are
Kr-85, Xe-131m, and 1-131, with the radiation from Kr-85 outweighing
that from the other gases. After a year's cooling time, a metric ton of
uranium fuel contains 0. 0108 MCi of Kr-85, with the other nuclides
standing in the ratio (Reference 8):
Kr:Xe:I= l:10-9:1.83xlO-12.
The amount of iodine gas radiation becomes insignificant, so the terms
fission product gas and noble gas are used interchangeably. Of the fission
gases, Kr is the least chemically hazardous in terms of human health
and has a half life of 10. 7 years. Consequently, the gas could be ventilated
to the atmosphere after being stored to allow radioactive decay.
Such releases would not provide a satisfactory solution to the radiation
burden that is forecast from the production of fission gases. Transport
of gaseous wastes from reactors or fuel reprocessing centers to repositories
where they may be held in long term storage would be more satisfactory.
Research is being conducted to find a feasible method of entraining the
gases in a solid matrix for transport purposes. When such solidification
processes are available, the shipments of gases would be counted as ship-
ments of high level radioactive solid wastes. Such shipments would probably
be safer than shipments of pressurized cylinders of gas since the amount
of gas released in an accident would be much less.
For purposes of estimating the risk, the management of gaseous waste is
assumed to include transport of gases in pressurized cylinders, and not
to involve controlled releases of the gases produced in fission or chemical
processes.
Shipping of Significant Nuclear Materials
The major factors in transportation of nuclear materials are:
1. Spent fuel shipped from power reactor to chemical processing plant.
2. Recycled plutonium shipped from processor to fuel fabricator.
49
-------
TABLE 13: ANNUAL SHIPPING DATA FOR LOW AND INTERMEDIATE
LEVEL RADIOACTIVE SOLID WASTE (Reference 7)
Year
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
Number of Shipments
Alpha
Contaminated
Wastes
>!<
1
*
350
700
1, 000
1, 800
2, 500
3, 100
3, 800
4,400
5, 000
Cladding
Hulls
*'-
T-
0
*.<*
T-
2
54
150
280
650
990
1,250
1, 500
1, 750
2, 000
Nonalpha
Contaminated
Solids
•J*
T-
17
111*
6,700
10, 000
13, 900
22, 000
30, 000
33, 000
36, 000
39, 000
42, 000
Intermediate
Level Alpha
Contaminated
Solids
*
4
^i^
•"i"
21
1, 730
2, 300
2,900
7, 000
10, 600
12, 000
14, 000
16, 000
18, 000
* Values of 1, 000 MT and 6, 000 MT for wastes shipped in 1970 and
1975 were taken from Reference 1, 1971. These wastes were assumed
to include no high level wastes. It was assumed further that these wastes
were shipped in ATMX-500 rail cars of 90, 000 Ib. capacity (Reference 11).
The shipments were then partitioned among the columns as follows:
5% alpha, 1% hulls, 76% nonalpha, 18% intermediate. This distribution
agrees approximately with the 1980 and 1985 distributions.
50
-------
3. Radioactive solids transported from processor to repository.
4. Gaseous wastes transported from reactor or processor to repository.
Currently, between 50 and 600 MT of fuel are being discharged from power
reactors in the United States (References 1 and 12). From estimates made
at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (References 5, 12, 13, 17, and 19), from
50 to 660 MT of uranium and plutonium will be shipped in the form of spent
fuel elements in 1973. Seventeen MT of fuel for LWRs were estimated to
be discharged for the plutonium recycling program in 1973 (Reference 12)
and from 4 to 9 MT of fissile plutonium are expected to be recovered in
1975 (References 12, 20, and 17). Consequently, between 4 and 9 MT
fissile Pu will be shipped in 1975. Only 100 to 300 MT of high level radio-
active solidified wastes are expected to be generated by the reprocessing
plants in 1973 (References 5, 12, and 13), but this amount of waste is not
expected to be transported to a Federal repository until 1983. The radio-
activity associated with this amount of waste is estimated to be 130 to 210
MCi. An estimate of about 1. 7 MCi (Reference 10) has been made for the
radioactivity represented by the production of fission (principally noble)
gases in 1970. These gases are separated from the spent fuel mass in
the chemical processing plants and are either held for radioactive decay
or released at large stack heights for atmospheric dissipation. Shipments
of these gases to repositories are assumed for this study.
Projections of shipments of these materials are studied in Figures 14
through 17. Shipments of all materials are expected to monotonically
increase with time, with the exception of recycled plutonium. According
to some estimates of the future movements of this material, the use of
recycled plutonium in LWRs will decrease between 1985 and 1990, and
the shipments of plutonium for LMFBRs will increase beginning about
1987. Consequently, a minimum appears in these curves for the year
1995.
In all the projections, approximate envelope curves were drawn to represent
high and low possible magnitudes of shipments. Practically none of the
estimates found in the literature or by personal communication extended
to the year 2020. The later years of a projection were treated by linear
extrapolation.
In Figure 14, the expected annual metric tonnages of spent fuel movements
are shown. The oldest curve (Reference 12, ORNL-4451) indicates the
shape of the curve is irregular and that the weight of spent fuel shipped
will approximately increase eightfold in the period 1970 through 1985,
51
-------
N>
• Reference 5 (Estimates of Actual Shipments)
A Reference 5 (Rated 33, 000 MWd exposure)
• Reference 12 (ORNL-4451
©Reference 13 (Private Communication)
Reference 17 (Private Communication)
Q Reference 18 (Shaw's Letter)
Linear Extrapolation
Approximate Envelopes
1980
1990
2000
2010
Year
FIGURE 14: PROJECTIONS OF SHIPPED TONNAGE OF SPENT FUEL
2020
-------
Ul
00
Reference 5 (Calculated
from Fabricated Fuel
Reference 5 (Rated
33,000 MWd Exposure) •
• Reference 12 (ORNL-4451)
©Reference 1 3 (Priv. Comm.]
Reference 17 (Private
Communication)
Q Reference 18 (Shaw's
Letter)
Linear Extrapolation
Approximate Envelopes
2020
FIGURE 15: PROJECTIONS OF SHIPPED TONNAGE OF FISSILE PLUTONIUM
-------
•n
bo
• H
ffi
CO
o
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
• Reference 5 (Private Communication)
• Reference 12 (ORNL-4451)
©Reference 13 (Private Communication)
^Reference 17 (Private Communication)
-—Linear Extrapolation
•—Approximate Envelopes
High Envelope is Linearization
of Generated Volume Estimates
from Reference 12.
1970
2020
FIGURE 16: PROJECTIONS OF SHIPPED VOLUME OF HIGH LEVEL RADIOACTIVE
SOLIDIFIED WASTE
-------
Ul
350
300
w
£250
0)
200
U
xD
O
o
•rH
-1^
ni
•r-f
Td
n)
150
100
ex
ex
•H
m
50
1970
AReference 7 (Lecture)
x Reference 17 (Private Communication)
©Reference 10 (ORNL-TM-3515) Assumed.
Shipments 10 Years After Generation
— Linear Extrapolation
— Approximate Envelopes
2020
FIGURE 17: PROJECTIONS OF SHIPPED RADIATION OF NOBLE GASES
-------
double during 1985 to 2000, and double again by 2020. A. more recent
estimate based on a computerized model of the nuclear economy, which
model evidently was not available for the ORNL-4451 estimate (Reference
5, private communication), shows that the growth rate will not be quite
as strong from 1970 to 1995, but will be stronger after 1995.
Probably the most applicable curve is the projection of shipped tonnage at
rated exposure (33, 000 MWd). This curve is linearly extrapolated in
Figure 14 to represent the most suitable estimate of spent fuel shipments
from 1970 to 2020. A table summarizing the shipment numbers for this
estimate and for the high and low estimates is given in Table 14. For the
most part, the high and low envelopes are straight lines passing through
appropriate points of the data curves.
In Table 15, the shipments of spent fuel for the chosen estimate are
described with different parameters. The radioactivity of the fuel is
estimated using the factor 5x10 Ci/MT. The number of casks depends
on the reactor mix in which the fuel is used and is here determined by an
average cask capacity. No distinction is made for the differences in
weights that may be transported by different modes. The mileage figures
are based on Table 22 which will be discussed and shown later.
In Figure 15, the expected annual metric tonnage of recycled plutonium
shipments are shown. As mentioned before, a minimum occurs in some
projections because the LWR-Pu recycling program is expected to terminate
near the time that the LMFBR usage increases. For the chosen estimate,
the minimum occurs near 1990. The chosen estimate is calculated from
the fuel fabrication data in Reference 5. Before 1985, only the LWR-Pu
data is counted. After 1985, the LWR-Pu values are added to 7. 5 percent
(average of GE and AI designs) of the LMFBR fuel loadings.
Table 16 compares the chosen estimate with high and low estimates. Values
of radioactivity and numbers of shipments used to describe the chosen
projection of recycled plutonium transportation are included in Table 17.
No distinctions of shipment capacities between transport modes are assumed
in Table 17. The shipping distance data are obtained from Table 22.
In Figure 16, the expected annual shipped volumes of high level radioactivity
solidified waste are shown. The chosen estimate is synonymous with the
low estimate. For the high estimate, the values of Reference 12 (ORNL-4451)
for the amounts of high level waste generated annually were linearized. Of
course, the shipments are assumed to occur 10 years after generation, so
the high estimate of shipments is rather arbitrary.
56
-------
TABLE 14: COMPARISON OF HIGH, LOW, AND CHOSEN ESTIMATES
OF SHIPPED TONNAGE OF SPENT FUEL
Year
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
Low
Estimate
0
300
1, 800
4, 300
7 , 500
10, 700
14, 100
17, 500
21,400
25, 800
32, 200
Chosen
Estimate
15
567
2, 050
4,474
7,798
12, 134
16, 869
21, 622
26, 200
31, 000
35, 200
High
Estimate
0
1,400
4, 000
7, 200
12, 500
20, 000
29, 000
39, 000
49, 000
60, 000
70, 400
--"Reference 5, rated exposure of 33,000 M\V d.
-------
TABLE 15: ANNUAL SHIPPING DATA FOR SPENT FUEL
CO
Year
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
Spent Fuel
(Metric Tons)
15
567
2, 050
4,474
7,798
12, 314
16, 869
21, 622
26, 200
31, 000
35, 200
b
Radioactivity
(109 Curies)
0. 07
2.84
10.25
22. 37
39. 00
61.57
84. 34
108. 11
131.00
155.00
176.00
Number of
Casks
5
191
934
1, 612
3,297
7,463
10, 224
12, 100
16, 000
19, 000
21,400
d
Distance
(Miles)
700
600
500
450
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
Shipping Units
(106 Cask-Miles)
0.003
0. 115
0.467
0.806
1.483
2.985
4.089
4.805
6.400
7.600
8.600
a Obtained from Total Processed column of Table 10, this report. The upper limit numbers
for the period 1970-1985 are obtained from Reference 1, 1971.
Assume 5 x 10° Ci/metric ton.
° Based upon an average of 3. 133 to 1. 65 metric tons of fuel/cask.
Based on assumption of uniform geographical distribution of plants.
-------
TABLE 16: COMPARISON OF HIGH, LOW, AND CHOSEN
ESTIMATES OF SHIPPED TONNAGE OF
RECYCLED FISSILE PLUTONIUM
Year
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
Low
Estimate
(MT)
0
0
20
90
210
110
390
750
1, 040
1, 170
1,500
Chosen*
E stimate
(MT)
0
0
801. 2
542. 7
43.5
238.5
586. 1
1, 085. 1
1,575
2, 100
2,625
High
Estimate
(MT)
0
0
270
1, 360
390
520
1, 200
1,930
2,640
3, 360
4, 080
^Reference 5, calculated from fuel fabrication projection.
59
-------
TABLE 17: ANNUAL SHIPPING DATA FOR PLUTONIUM
a
o
Year
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
Plutonium
(Metric Tons)
-
801. 2
542. 7
43. 5
238.5
586. 1
1085. 1
1575
2100
2625
c
Radioactivity
(109 Curies)
-
0. 504
0. 341
0. 016
0. 087
0.213
0. 395
0. 573
0. 765
0.956
Number of
Shipments
-
10, 680
7, 234
580
3, 179
7, 813
14,464
20, 995
27, 993
34,991
Shipping
Distance
(Miles)
700
600
500
450
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
Number of
106
Shipment - Mile s
-
5. 34
3.26
0.23
1.27
3. 12
5. 78
8.40
11. 20
14. 00
Plutonium considered to be shipped from chemical processing plants to fuel fabrication plants
in dry solid form. These shipments are identical in quantity, though not in form with shipments
from fabricators to reactors, since no losses are assumed during fabrication. The movements
of plutonium from reactors to processors are accounted for in spent fuel shipments.
Amount of plutonium shipped assumed to be equal to amount fabricated for recycle in LWRs. In
LMFBRs (after 1985) amount of plutonium is taken to be 7. 5 percent (average of GE and AI designs)
of fuel fabricated.
° Based on 0.6285x10 Ci/MT for LWRs, representing 33,000 MWd/MT exposure and 150 days
decay. In LMFBRs (after 1985), based on 0. 3641xl06Ci/MT, representing mixed core and
blanket fuel exposed to 41, 200 MWd/MT and 90 days decay.
Based on 2.5 kg Pu per container and 30 containers per shipment, or 13. 33 shipments per MT.
Q
Average distance between processors and fabricators; assumed to be equal to average distance
between reactors and processors.
-------
Generally, all the estimates for high level solid waste shipping have
similar curvature. The highest estimate (References 7 and 17) has
from 2 to 3 times as much volume being shipped in 1990 and 2000 as
does the lowest estimate (References 5 and 13). The chosen projection
indicates that the volume will increase fivefold in the period 1985 to 1990,
double during 1990 to 1995, double during 1995 to 2000, increase by
150 percent during 2000 to 2005, increase by another 150 percent by 2010,
and increase at a rate of about 20, 000 ft^ every 5 years thereafter.
The comparison between high, low, and chosen projections of high level
solidified waste shipping is given in Table 18. The description of waste
transportation in terms of radioactivity, number of containers, number
of shipments, and shipping distance is given in Table 19. As with the
other tables of this kind, no distinctions in shipment capacities by trans-
port mode are made and the distance data are obtained from Table 22.
In Figure 17, the expected annual shipped radiation of fission gases are
shown. The most complete estimate in the literature refers to the amount
of radiation generated in North America in the era 1970 to 2000 (Reference 10).
For perspective, this curve is displayed in Figure 17 under the assumption
that the radiation was shipped 10 years after generation.
The other estimates for noble gas are linearizations based on projections
made for the years 1980, 1990, and 2000. The chosen estimate is taken
from Reference 7, and after 2000 is assumed to be lower than the "low"
estimate.
Generally, one would expect the radiation carried by shipments of noble
gas to increase at a rate of about 50 to 130 MCi every 10 years. Tables
comparing the estimates and giving additional transportation data for the
chosen projection for noble gas are presented in Tables 20 and 21.
To facilitate discussion of the next 50 years in the nuclear transportation
industry for the United States, a uniform geographical distribution of power
reactors and fuel fabricators is assumed. Current plans include three
processing plants, one in western New York, another in northern Illinois,
one in South Carolina, and a repository for which a location has not yet
been determined (Reference 14). To obtain an idea of the distance of
shipments to the repository, the location which has been discussed for
southeastern New Mexico was assumed. Additional processing plants
may be built in the west and south central Federal Power Corn-mission
survey regions, beginning service in 1990 and 2003, respectively. Based
on these assumptions, the approximate mileage figures for different types
of radioactive material shipments are summarized in Table 22.
61
-------
TABLE 18: COMPARISON OF HIGH, LOW, AND CHOSEN ESTIMATES
OF SHIPPED VOLUME OF HIGH LEVEL RADIOACTIVITY
SOLIDIFIED WASTE
Year
1970
1975
1983
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
Low
Estimate
(103 ft3)
0
0
0. 1
1. 7
4. 83
10. 52
19. 365
31. 61
45. 945
64. 195
82.445
Chosen*
Estimate
(103 ft3)
0
0
0. 1
1. 7
4.83
10. 52
19. 365
31. 61
45. 94
64. 195
84.445
High
Estimate
(103 ft3)
0
0
9. 73
18. 315
26. 9
36.45
46.0
55. 55
65. 1
74. 65
84. 2
* Reference 5
62
-------
TABLE 19: ANNUAL SHIPPING DATA FOR HIGH LEVEL RADIOACTIVE
SOLID WASTEa (Reference 5)
o
Year
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
Volume
(103ft3)
0
0
. 05
1. 70
4. 83
10. 52
19. 36
31. 60
45.94
64. 19
82. 40
Radioactivity
(109 Curies)
0
0
. 005
. 178
. 651
1. 506
2. 742
4. 496
6. 364
8. 309
10. 250
No. of
Containers
0
0
1
271
769
1,676
3, 084
5, 033
1, 316
10, 222
13, 121
No. of
£
Shipments
0
0
1
23
65
140
257
420
610
852
1,094
Shipping
Distance
(Miles)
-
-
2, 500
2, 500
2, 200
2, 200
2,200
2, 200
2, 000
2, 000
2, 000
No. of 106
Container-
Miles
0
0
0
. 678
1. 922
3. 687
6. 784
11. 072
16. 095
20.444
26. 242
No. of 106
Shipment-
Miles
0
0
. 002
. 057
. 143
. 308
. 565
. 924
1. 220
1. 704
2. 188
Assumed to have decayed 10 years before shipment.
Based on 6. 28 ft3 solid waste/container (nominally 1 ft diameter, 10 ft long).
Based on twelve containers/shipment.
-------
TABLE 20: COMPARISON OF HIGH, LOW, AND CHOSEN ESTIMATES
OF SHIPPED RADIATION OF FISSION (NOBLE) GASES
Year
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
Low
Estimate
(106 Ci)
0
10
32
60
110
140
190
240
290
340
390
Chosen*
Estimate
(106 Ci)
0
0
32
63
106
144
184
218
252
284
311
High
Estimate
(106 Ci)
0
10
32
60
120
190
260
330
400
470
540
Reference 7.
64
-------
TABLE 21
ANNUAL SHIPPING DATA FOR NOBLE GAS (Reference 7)
Ul
Year
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
No. of
Cylinders
-
-
175
350
590
800
1, 020
1, 210
1, 400
1, 580
1, 730
Radioactivity
(109 Curies)
-
-
. 032
. 063
. 106
. 144
. 184
. 218
. 252
. 284
. 311
No. ofb
Shipments
-
-
30
59
99
134
170
202
234
264
289
Shipping
Distance
(Miles)
-
-
2, 500
2, 500
2, 200
2, 200
2, 200
2, 200
2, 000
2, 000
2, 000
No. of 106
Shipment -
Miles
-
-
. 075
. 147
. 217
. 294
. 374
.444
.468
. 528
. 578
a
Based on . 18 x 10° curies/cylinder.
Based on six cylinders/shipment.
-------
TABLE 22: APPROXIMATE AVERAGE
SHIPPING DISTANCES
Year
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
Distance (Miles)
Spent Fuel
and Recycled Plutonium
700
600
500
450
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
Fission Product Gas
and Solid Waste
-
-
2, 500
2, 500
2, 200
2, 200
2, 200
2, 200
2, 000
2, 000
2, 000
b
Assigned data for the assumed uniform geographical distribution of
power reactors in the continental United States.
Processing plants assumed in western New York, northern Illinois,
South Carolina, center of West Federal Power Commission (FPC)
Survey Region, and center of South Central FPC Survey Region.
Repository assumed built in 1980 in southeastern New Mexico. The
distances between facilities are approximate assignments.
66
-------
A summary of data giving the number of shipments for the four significantly
hazardous materials and for low level radioactive wastes is displayed in
Table 23. These shipments are determined from container sizes and
are not dependent on the capacities of different transport modes. If the
data in this table are eventually realized, quite a transportation industry
will evolve. An average of 31. 9 shipments per day of highly radioactive
material would be made in 1980. This number would decrease to 11. 1
in 1990, but then would grow to 50. 6 in 2000, 104. 6 in 2010, and 163. 6 in
2020. While the number of shipments of low level wastes increases from
about 9, 000 in 1980 to about 67, 000 in 2020, its ratio to the number of
high level shipments increases from about 0. 8 to about 1. 1 in the same
time interval.
Of the high level shipments, solid wastes and fission gases are practically
insignificant components in numbers, compared to the spent fuel and
plutonium components. The growth of a breeder economy is reflected in
the ratio of spent fuel shipments to plutonium shipments. In 1980 this
ratio is 0. 1, in 1990 it is 5. 7, and in 2000 it is 1. 3. Of course, these
numbers are dependent on shipment capacities, which might be changed
as regulation policy changes. These results are illustrated in Figure 18.
The amounts of radiation carried with the annual number of shipments
are compared in Figure 19. The greatest radiation is carried by the
spent fuel by at least a factor of 10.
A plot (Figure 20) of the shipment-miles data in Tables 15, 17, 19, and
21 shows that the increase in gas transportation is approximately linear,
with the number (0. 075 x 10° shipment-miles) increasing eightfold between
1980 and 2020. Spent fuel transportation can be roughly characterized by
two linear growth segments. The 1970 figure (0.003 x 10° shipment-miles)
increases sixtyfold by 1985, and the 1985 amount increases by a factor of
6 by 2020 (9. 3 x 10 shipment-miles). The transportation of solid wastes
is influenced by the spent fuel situation, increasing by a factor of 40 in
two roughly linear growth segments from 0. 06 x 10° shipment-miles in
1980 to 2. 2 x 10 shipment-miles in 2020. As indicated above, plutonium
shipment-miles exhibit a minimum because the LMFBR production begins
about the time that LWR recycling of plutonium ends.
The 1980s decade should witness a decrease by a factor of about 20 in
plutonium shipment-miles, but the period from 1990 to 2020 should
experience an increase in this quantity by a factor of about 60. Both
changes should be approximately linear as indicated in Figure 20.
67
-------
TABLE 23: SUMMARY ANNUAL WASTE TRANSPORTATION PICTURE
Year
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
Low Level Radioactivity*
(Number of Shipments)
22
147
8, 834
13, 150
18,080
31,450
44, 590
49, 350
55,300
61, 150
67, 000
High Level Radic
(Number of Shi]
Spent Fuel
(I)
5
191
934
1, 612
3, 297
7,463
10, 244
12, 100
16, 360
19,697
23, 334
Plutonium
(II)
10,680
7, 234
580
3,179
7,813
14,464
20,995
27,993
34,991
Solid Wastes
(III)
1
23
65
140
257
420
610
852
1,094
aactivity
Dments)
Fission Gases
(IV)
_ _ _
30
59
99
134
170
202
234
264
289
Sum
(I + 11 + 111 + IV)
5
191
11, 645
8, 928
4,041
10, 916
18,484
27, 186
38, 199
48,806
59, 708
QO
* Low level radioactivity wastes inchade compacted quantities of both alpha contaminated and nonalpha
contaminated refuse for both low and intermediate radioactivity levels. Cladding hulls, which are
assumed to contain 0. 05 percent of Pu in the fuel, are also included.
-------
10"
1970 1980
1990 2000
Year
2010 2020
FIGURE 18: COMPARISON OF PROJECTIONS
OF ANNUAL NUMBER OF SHIPMENTS
69
-------
10"
ro
0)
u
r-
o
i—i
i—i
i—i
oi
rt
CO
o
n)
O
Pn
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Year
FIGURE 19; COMPARISON OF PROJECTIONS
OF ANNUAL RADIATION SHIPPED
70
-------
• Spent Fuel
* Noble Gas
©Solid Waste
Plutonium
1970
2020
FIGURE 20: PROJECTED VARIATION OF NUMBER OF SHIPMENT-MILES IN TIME
-------
SECTION VI
METHODOLOGY FOR ACCIDENT HAZARD ANALYSIS
Release of radioactivity is a hazard associated with the transportation of
radioactive materials. It may occur routinely or accidentally. Evaluation
of the accidental hazard depends on the probability of the occurrence of
an accident severe enough to cause release and on the evaluation of the
consequences of the release to the environment in the area of the accident.
The hazard of transportation accidents involving a cargo of a particular
radioactive material may be calculated from the following quantities:
1. Number of curies of radiation carried in the shipment.
2. Probability of the shipment encountering an accident.
3. Probability that the accident results in a release of radioactivity or
radioactive material.
4. Fraction of the cargo that is actually released.
5. Dose absorbed by a single person from the released part of the cargo.
6. Population distribution.
7. Health response to the absorbed dose.
RADIATION SOURCES ASSOCIATED WITH
TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENTS
The number of curies Q carried in all the shipments of a particular material
in a particular year by a particular transport mode is calculated from the
product
where
q = the number of curies per shipment
S = the number of shipments
b = the fraction of shipments attributed to a transport mode
73
-------
£ = the index distinguishing radioactive cargoes
j = the index distinguishing the year of shipment
m = the index distinguishing transport modes
These data are listed in Tables 15, 17, 19, and 21 for spent fuel, recycled
plutonium, high level radioactive solidified wastes, and noble gases.
Referring to Figure 1, these data for Q represent the intersection of
the transportation and nuclear power generating industries.
PROBABILITY OF ACCIDENTS
The fraction P(A;S) giving the number of accidents that can be expected from
a given number of shipments in given transport modes is calculated from
the product
P(AtS)£Jkms = d£jkams
where
d = the distance traveled by the shipment
a - the accident probability per unit distance
k = the index distinguishing intervals of the transport route link
that are described by different values of uniform population
density
s = the index distinguishing accident severities.
Data for the shipping distances as functions of cargo and time are given in
Table 22. Accident probability data will be discussed below.
Several government agencies continually accumulate statistics on accidents
occurring in the major transportation systems in the United States. These
accident statistics are expressed in terms of units which are products of
the transportation units and unit distance of travel, such as ton-miles or
shipment-miles. The accident statistics are observed fractions of all
shipments that result in accidents. These fractions are interpreted as
the probabilities that accidents occur.
74
-------
In a recent AEC report (Reference 8), the recent accident statistics were
conveniently classified by transport mode and by accident severity. The
severity grades of minor, moderate, severe, extra severe, and extreme
were obtained from various combinations of the relative velocities of
colliding vehicles and the duration of fires. In the present study, the
minor accidents are called light, the moderate accidents are called
medium, and the three severe categories are lumped together and called
severe. Consequently, the severe accident probabilities in this study are
the sums of probabilities for severe, extra severe, and extreme conditions
given in the AEC report. The resultant modal and severity analysis of
accident probabilities are given in Table 24.
PROBABILITY (FAULT TREE SIMULATION MODEL)
OF CONTAINER RUPTURE IN ACCIDENTS
The fraction of accidents resulting in ruptures of the shipping containers
is determined from fault tree analysis of the shipping containers. This
fraction is called the release probability and is denoted by r£rns' -^
discussion of the fault tree methodology follows.
All accidents are considered to involve certain physical conditions,
namely:
1. Impact
2. Puncture
3. Fire
4. Vibration
These conditions occur with different probabilities according to accident
severity. Table 25 gives the modal and severity analysis of these physical
conditions.
Inhibit conditions must be met for these probable physical conditions to
cause failure of the shipping containers. That is, the forces generated
by impact, puncture, or explosion must be of sufficiently large magnitude
to break the container. Other possible modes of failure include human
error, manifest in improper closure, and equipment reliability, such as
valve and seal defects.
75
-------
TABLE 24: ACCIDENT PROBABILITIES
Accident
Severity
Light
Medium
Severe
Collision
Velocity
(mi/hr)
0-30
0-50
0-30
30-70
50-70
0 to > 70
30 to >70
>70
Duration
of Fire
(hr)
1
1/2-1
0 to>l
Accident Probability
(accident/shipment/10 mi)
Transport Mode
Truck
1.3
0.3
0.008
Rail
0.73
0.079
0. 0015
Barge
1.7
0.044
0.0016
76
-------
TABLE 25: PROBABILITY OF PHYSICAL CONDITIONS IN ACCIDENTS
Physical Condition
by Accident Severity
Light Severity Accidents
Impact Occurs
Puncture Force Occurs
Q
External Heat Source Nearby
Vibration Occurs
Medium Severity Accidents
Impact Occurs
Puncture Force Occurs
External Heat Source Nearby
Vibration Occurs
Severe Accidents
Impact Occurs
Puncture Force Occurs
External Heat Source Nearby
Vibration Occurs
Probabilities by
Transport Mode
Truck
0. 221
0. 008
0.014
0. 5
0.423
0. 066
0. 0016
0. 5
0. 159
0. 022
0. 0002
0.5
Rail
0. 123
0.410
0. 0128
0. 5
0. 067
0. 224
0. 002
0. 5
0. 02
0. 066
0. 0002
0.5
Barge
0.9
0.0605
0.05
0. 08
0.0099
0. 05
0.02
0. 0007
0. 05
Impact probabilities for trucks and railroads are derived from data in
Appendix A, Reference 8, for collisions light: 0-32 mph; medium:
32-52 mph; severe: > 52 mph.
Puncture probabilities are interpreted as the probability of overturns
and derailments given in Appendix A, Reference 8.
External heat source nearby is interpreted as the probability of fires
in accidents given in Appendix A, Reference 8.
Vibration probabilities are assigned values used in Reference 15.
77
-------
The events and conditions which singularly or in combination, can cause
a rupture are the inputs to the fault tree. If two or more events are
required, they are input to an AND gate. If only one of several events
is required, it is input to an OR gate. Conditions that establish a level
of force, temperature, etc. required for an event to cause a failure are
called inhibit gates. They provide a logical connection between the event
and its magnitude.
Each shipping container presents several barriers to the rupturing
forces of an accident. For example, from inside to outside spent fuel is
contained in a series of envelopes: cladding, cavity walls, shielding
material, and outer walls of casket. Simplified schematic diagrams for
the types of containers considered in this study are shown in Figures 21,
23, 25, and 27. These containers are here categorized by the radioactive
materials they hold.
The calculation of the probability that radioactive material will leak from
a container rupture in an accident must take into account the likelihood that
each barrier will be breached and also the likelihood that physical events
such as those listed above -will occur. Such a calculation is made possible
by fault tree analysis.
In Figures 22, 24, 26, and 28, fault tree diagrams are presented for each
type of container. Probability values for the different elementary events
for different severities of accidents for each material container are
presented in Tables 26 through 37. The events are keyed by number
between the fault tree diagrams and the probability tables.
The release probability rnms ^s calculated for each container 9. , transport
mode m, and accident severity s by means of a computer program called
CONREP (Reference 16) in conjunction with a subroutine called LOGIC,
•which describes the fault tree. Results of the calculation are given in
Table 38. As noted in Tables 26, 29, 32, and 35, the physical inhibit
gate probabilities (e. g. , probability that impact is great enough to break
the container, temperature is great enough, etc. ) are assumed to be zero
for accident conditions of light severity. Examination of the fault trees in
Figures 22, 24, 26, and 28 shows no container failure under these assump-
tions. Consequently, the study of risks by accident severity may as well
be limited to the medium and severe ranges of severity.
The CONREP code evaluates the fault tree probability by making a Monte
Carlo selection of chains of elementary events by which the container can
fail. The most significant fault tree paths for severe accidents are listed
in Table 39.
78
-------
Valve Housing
Casket Wall
Shielding (Uranium or Lead)
Cavity Wall
Fuel Cavity with Coolant
Typical Fuel Element with
Cladding Intact
•Bolted, Gasketed, and
Shielded Closure
V
Vanes for Heat
Radiation
Energy Absorbing—<•
Structure (Both Ends)
FIGURE 21: SIMPLIFIED SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF SPENT
FUEL SHIPPING CONTAINER
79
-------
£
1
ach o!
sket
^
1
Breach of
c.
FIGURE 22: FAULT TREE DIAGRAM FOR SPENT FUEL SHIPPING CONTAINER
-------
Pressure
Vessel
10 Liter Polyethylene
•Bottle Enclosed In A
Polyvinyl Chloride Bag
Point Where
Two Drums
Welded
Together
Drum Closure
(Ring)
Steel Drums
Insulation
FIGURE 23:
SIMPLIFIED SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF PLUTONIUM
SHIPPING CONTAINER
8L
-------
FIGURE 24: FAULT TREE DIAGRAM FOR PLUTONIUM SHIPPING CONTAINER
-------
Lead Shield
•Carbon Steel Casket
With Coolant Channels
Gasketed Closure
T— Waste Can
(Typical)
Cavity Filled With
Water and Energy
Absorbing Fins
(Both Ends)
FIGURE 25: SIMPLIFIED SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF SHIPPING
CONTAINER FOR HIGH LEVEL RADIOACTIVITY
SOLIDIFIED WASTE
83
-------
00
FIGURE 26: FAULT TREE DIAGRAM FOR SHIPPING CONTAINER FOR
HIGH LEVEL RADIOACTIVITY SOLIDIFIED WASTE
-------
Cooling
Water
Cooling J
Coils
Gas
Cylinder
(Typical)
3/4 Inch Steel Casket Wall
With External Insulation
Filled With Steel Raschig
Rings and Water
FIGURE 27: SIMPLIFIED SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF FISSION
PRODUCT (NOBLE) GAS .SHIPPING CONTAINER
85
-------
FIGURE 28: FAULT TREE DIAGRAM FOR FISSION PRODUCT (NOBLE) GAS SHIPPING CONTAINER
-------
TABLE 26: FAULT TREE PROBABILITIES FOR SPENT FUEL SHIPPING
CONTAINER UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS OF LIGHT SEVERITY3
ID
Number
1
*>
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
2b
27
28
29
30
31
Input Event Name
Vibration Occurs
Vibration > Cladding Design
Vibration > Cavity Design
Vibration > Casket Design
Vibration > Closure Design
Impact Occurs
Impact > Cladding Design
Impact > Cavity Design
Impact > Casket Design
Impact > Closure Design
Puncture Force Occurs
Puncture Force > Cavity Design
Puncture Force > Casket Design
Puncture Force > Closure
Design
Coolant Leaks Outb
Coolant Channels Not Filled
External Heat Source Nearby
Pressure > Cladding Design
Pressure > Cavity Design
Pressure > Casket Design
Pressure > Closure Design
Temperature > Cladding Design
Temperature > Cavity Design
Temperature > Casket Design
Temperature > Closure
Design
Defective Seal
Seal Improperly Closed
Drain or Vent Line Failure
Pressure Relief Valve Failure
Casket Closure Fails to Close
Casket Closure Seal Defective
Transport Mode .
Truck
0.5
0
0
0
0
0.221
0
0
0
0
0. 008
0
0
0
0. 5 E-6
0. 3 E-4
0. 014
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0. 5 E-3
0. 5 E-3
0. 1 E-2
0. 1 E-2
0.5 E-3
0. 5 E-3
Rail
0. 5
0
0
0
0
0. 123
0
0
0
0
0.410
0
0
0
0. 5 E-6
0.3 E-4
0. 0128
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0. 5 E-3
0.5 E-3
0. 1 E-2
0. 1 E-2
0. 5 E-3
0. b E-3
Barge
0. 05
0
0
0
0
0. 90
0
0
0
0
--
0
0
0
0. 5 E-6
0. 3 E-4
0. 0605
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0. 5 E-3
0.5 E-3
0. 1 E-2
0. 1 E-2
0. 5 E-3
0. 5 E-3
For light severity accidents, all inhibit gate probabilities for physical
conditions such as impact, puncture, pressure, temperature, and
vibration are arbitrarily assigned values of zero.
For light severity accidents, all probabilities related to human error or
equipment failure under nonaccident conditions are arbitrarily assigned
the same values as for severe accidents.
-------
TABLE 27: FAULT TREE PROBABILITIES FOR SPENT FUEL SHIPPED
CONTAINER UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS OF MEDIUM SEVERITY3"
ID
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
Input Event Name
Vibration Occurs
Vibration > Cladding Design
Vibration > Cavity Design
Vibration > Casket Design
Vibration > Closure Design
Impact Occurs
Impact > Cladding Design
Impact > Cavity Design
Impact > Casket Design
Impact > Closure Design
Puncture Force Occurs
Puncture Force > Cavity Design
Puncture Force > Casket Design
Puncture Force > Closure
Design
Coolant Leaks Out"
Coolant Channels Not Filled
External Heat Source Nearby
Pressure > Cladding Design
Pressure > Cavity Design
Pressure > Casket Design
Pressure > Closure Design
Temperature > Cladding Design
Temperature > Cavity Design
Temperature > Casket Design
Temperature > Closure
Design
Defective Seal
Seal Improperly Closed
Drain or Vent Line Failure
Pressure Relief Valve Failure
Casket Closure Fails to Close
Casket Closure Seal Defective
Transport Mode
Truck
0.5
0. 3 E-7
0. 15 E-6
0. 15 E-6
0.75 E-7
0.423
0.2 E-3
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-2
0. 1 E-5
0. 066
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-3
0. 5 E-6
0.3 E-4
0. 0016
0.3 E-3
0. 3 E-3
0. 3 E-3
0. 3 E-3
0. 1 E-5
0. 1 E-5
0. 1 E-4
0. 1 E-4
0.5 E-3
0.5 E-3
0. 1 E-2
0. 1 E-2
0.5 E-3
0.5 E-3
Rail
0.5
0.4 E-7
0.2 E-6
0.2 E-6
0. 1 E-6
0. 067
0.2 E-3
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-2
0. 1 E-5
0.224
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-3
0.5 E-6
0.3 E-4
0. 002
0. 5 E-2
0.5 E-2
0.5 E-2
0.5 E-2
0. 1 E-5
0. 1 E-5
0. 1 E-4
0. 1 E-4
0.5 E-3
0. 5 E-3
0. 1 E-2
0. 1 E-2
0.5 E-3
0. 5 E-3
Barge
0.05
0. 1 E-7
0.5 E-7
0. 5 E-7
0.25 E-7
0.08
0.2 E-3
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-2
0. 1 E-5
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-3
0.5 E-6
0.3 E-4
0.0099
0.01
0.01
0.01
0. 01
0. 1 E-5
0. 1 E-5
0. 1 E-4
0. 1 E-4
0.5 E-3
0. 5 E-3
0, 1 E-2
0- 1 E-2
Ci.l" E-3
0.5 E-3
For medium severity accidents, all inhibit gate probabilities
conditions such as impact, puncture, pressure, temperature
vibration are arbitrarily assigned values equal to 10 percent
corresponding values for severe accidents.
See footnote b, Table 26. The same assignment is made for medium
severity accidents.
for physical
, and
of the
-------
TABLE 28: FAULT TREE PROBABILITIES FOR SPENT FUEL ..SHIPPING
CONTAINER UNDER SEVERE ACCIDENT CONDITIONS'"
ID
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
Input Event Name
Vibration Occurs
Vibration > Cladding Design
Vibration > Cavity Design
Vibration > Casket Design
Vibration > Closure Design
Impact Occurs
Impact > Cladding Design
Impact > Cavity Design
Impact > Casket Design
Impact > Closure Design
Puncture Force Occurs
Puncture Force > Cavity Design
Puncture Force > Casket Design
Puncture Force > Closure
Design
Coolant Leaks Out
Coolant Channels Not Filled
External Heat Source Nearby
Pressure > Cladding Design
Pressure > Cavity Design
Pressure > Casket Design
Pressure > Closure Design
Temperature > Cladding Design
Temperature > Cavity Design
Temperature > Casket Design
Temperature > Closure
Design
Defective Seal
Seal Improperly Closed
Drain or Vent Line Failure
Pressure Relief Valve Failure
Casket Closure Fails to Close
Casket Closure Seal Defective
Transport Mode
Truck
0.5
0. 3 E-6
0. 15 E-5
0. 15 E-5
0. 75 E-6
0. 159
0. 2 E-2
0. 1 E-2
0. 1 E-l
0. 1 E-4
0. 022
0. 1 E-2
0. 1 E-2
0. 1 E-2
0. 5 E-6
0. 3 E-4
0.2 E-3
0. 3 E-2
0. 3 E-2
0. 3 E-2
0. 3 E-2
0. 1 E-4
0. 1 E-4
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-3
0.5 E-3
0. 5 E-3
0. 1 E-2
0. 1 E-2
0. 5 E-3
0. 5 E-3
Rail
0.5
0.4 E-6
0. 2 E-5
0. 2 E-5
0. 1 E-5
0. 020
0.2 E-2
0. 1 E-2
0. 1 E-l
0. 1 E-4
0. 066
0. 1 E-2
0. 1 E-2
0. 1 E-2
0. 5 E-6
0. 3 E-4
0. 2 E-3
0.05
0. 05
0. 05
0. 05
0. 1 E-4
0. 1 E-4
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-3
0.5 E-3
0. 5 E-3
0. 1 E-2
0. 1 E-2
0.5 E-3
0.5 E-3
Barge
0. 05
0. 1 E-6
0. 5 E-6
0. 5 E-6
0. 25 E-6
0. 02
0. 2 E-2
0. 1 E-2
0. 1 E-l
0. 1 E-4
0. 1 E-2
0. 1 E-2
0. 1 E-2
0. 5 E-6
0. 3 E-4
0.7 E-3
0. 1
0. 1
0. 1
0. 1
0. 1 E-4
0. 1 E-4
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-3
0. 5 E-3
0. 5 E-3
0. 1 E-2
0. 1 E-2
0. 5 E-3
0. 5 E-3
For severe accidents, all inhibit gate probabilities for physical conditions
such as impact, puncture, pressure, temperature, and vibration and
all probabilities related to human error or equipment failure under
nonaccident conditions are assigned values used for similar events in
the container analyses of Reference 15.
-------
TABLE 29: FAULT TREE PROBABILITIES FOR PLUTONIUM SHIPPING
CONTAINER UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS OF LIGHT SEVERITY3"
ID
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Input Event Name
Puncture Force Occurs
Puncture Force > Bag Design
Puncture Force > Bottle Design
Puncture Force > Pressure
Vessel Design
Puncture Force > Drum Design
External Heat Source Nearby
Temperature > Bag Design
Temperature > Bottle Design
Temperature > Pressure
Vessel Design
Temperature > Drum Design
Impact Occurs
Impact > Bag Design
Impact > Bottle Design
Impact > Pressure Vessel
Design
Impact > Drum Design
Vibration Occurs
Vibration > Bottle Design
Vibration > Pressure Vessel
Design
Vibration > Drum Design
Pressure > Bottle Design
Pressure > Pressure Vessel
Design
Pressure > Drum Design
Bottle Cap Fails to Close
Properly"3
Cap Threads Worn and Fail
Pressure Vessel O-Ring Fails
Transport Mode
Truck
0.008
1.0
0
0
0
0. 014
1.0
0
0
0
0. 221
1. 0
0
0
0
0. 5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0. 5 E-3
0.5 E-3
0. 5 E-3
Rail
0.410
1. 0
0
0
0
0.0128
1. 0
0
0
0
0. 123
1.0
0
0
0
0.5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0. 5 E-3
0.5 E-3
0.5 E-3
Barge
1.0
0
0
0
0.0605
1.0
0
0
0
0.90
1.0
0
0
0
0. 05
0
0
0
0
0
0
0. 5 E-3
0.5 E-3
0.5 E-3
b
See footnote a, Table 26. Exception for polyvinylchloride bag, which
is assumed to be easily ruptured.
See footnote b, Table 26.
90
-------
TABLE 30: FAULT TREE PROBABILITIES FOR PLUTONIUM SHIPPING
CONTAINER UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS OF MEDIUM SEVERITY21
ID
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Input Event Name
Puncture Force Occurs
Puncture Force > Bag Design
Puncture Force > Bottle Design
Puncture Force > Pressure
Vessel Design
Puncture Force > Drum Design
External Heat Source Nearby
Temperature > Bag Design
Temperature > Bottle Design
Temperature > Pressure
Vessel Design
Temperature > Drum Design
Impact Occurs
Impact > Bag Design
Impact > Bottle Design
Impact > Pressure Vessel
Design
Impact > Drum Design
Vibration Occurs
Vibration > Bottle Design
Vibration > Pressure Vessel
Design
Vibration > Drum Design
Pressure > Bottle Design
Pressure > Pressure Vessel
D e s i gn
Pressure > Drum Design
Bottle Cap Fails to Close
Properly
Cap Threads Worn and Fail
Pressure Vessel O-Ring Fails
Transport Mode
Truck
0.066
1.0
0. 3 E-4
0. 5 E-4
0. 1 E-3
0. 0016
1. 0
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-5
0. 1 E-4
0.423
1. 0
0. 5 E-3
0. 1 E-2
0. 03
0. 5
0. 3 E-7
0. 3 E-7
0. 15 E-6
0. 3 E-3
0. 3 E-3
0. 3 E-3
0. 5 E-3
0. 5 E-3
0. 5 E-3
Rail
0. 224
1. 0
0. 3 E-4
0.5 E-4
0. 1 E-3
0. 002
1.0
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-5
0. 1 E-4
0.067
1. 0
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-2
0. 03
0. 5
0.4 E-7
0.4 E-7
0.2 E-6
0.5 E-2
0. 5 E-2
0. 5 E-2
0. 5 E-3
0. 5 E-3
0. 5 E-3
Barge
1. 0
0. 3 E-4
0. 5 E-4
0. 1 E-3
0. 0099
1. 0
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-5
0. 1 E-4
0. 08
1.0
0. 5 E-3
0. 1 E-2
0. 03
0. 05
0. 1 E-7
0. 1 E-7
0. 5 E-7
0. 01
0.01
0. 01
0. 5 E-3
0. 5 E-3
0.5 E-3
a See footnote a, Table 27. Exception for polyvinylchloride bag, which
is assumed to be easily ruptured.
b See footnote b, Table 27.
91
-------
TABLE 31: FAULT TREE PROBABILITIES FOR PLUTONIUM SHIPPING
CONTAINER UNDER SEVERE ACCIDENT CONDITIONS*
ID
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Input Event Name
Puncture Force Occurs
Puncture Force > Bag Design
Puncture Force > Bottle Design
Puncture Force > Pressure
Vessel Design
Puncture Force > Drum Design
External Heat Source Nearby
Temperature > Bag Design
Temperature > Bottle Design
Temperature > Pressure
Vessel Design
Temperature > Drum Design
Impact Occurs
Impact > Bag Design
Impact > Bottle Design
Impact > Pressure Vessel
Design
Impact > Drum Design
Vibration Occurs
Vibration > Bottle Design
Vibration > Pressure Vessel
Design
Vibration > Drum Design
Pressure > Bottle Design
Pressure > Pressure Vessel
Design
Pressure > Drum Design
Bottle Cap Fails to Close
Properly
Cap Threads Worn and Fail
Pressure Vessel O-Ring Fails
Transport Mode
Truck
0. 022
1. 0
0. 3 E-3
0. 5 E-3
0. 1 E-2
0.2 E-3
1. 0
0. 1 E-2
0. 1 E-4
0. 1 E-3
0. 159
1. 0
0. 5 E-2
0. 1 E-l
0. 3
0. 5
0.3 E-6
0. 3 E-6
0. 15 E-5
0. 3 E-2
0. 3 E-2
0. 3 E-2
0.5 E-3
0. 5 E-3
0. 5 E-3
Rail
0. 066
1. 0
0. 3 E-3
0. 5 E-3
0. 1 E-2
0. 2 E-3
1.0
0. 1 E-2
0. 1 E-4
0. 1 E-3
0. 020
1. 0
0. 1 E-2
0. 1 E-l
0. 3
0.5
0.4 E-6
0.4 E-6
0.2 E-5
0. 05
0. 05
0. 05
0. 5 E-3
0. 5 E-3
0.5 E-3
Barge
—
1. 0
0. 3 E-3
0. 5 E-3
0. 1 E-2
0. 7 E-3
1.0
0. 1 E-2
0. 1 E-4
0. 1 E-3
0. 02
1. 0
0. 5 E-2
0. 1 E-l
0.3
0. 05
0. 1 E-6
0. 1 E-6
0. 5 E-6
0. 1
0. 1
0. 1
0. 5 E-3
0. 5 E-3
0. 5 E-3
-See footnote, Table 28.
92
-------
TABLE 32: FAULT TREE PROBABILITIES FOR HIGH LEVEL
RADIOACTIVITY SOLIDIFIED WASTE SHIPPING CONTAINER UNDER
ACCIDENT CONDITIONS OF LIGHT SEVERITYa
ID
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
Input Event Name
Vibration Occurs
Vibration > Can Design
Vibration > Closure Design
Vibration > Cask Design
Impact Occurs
Impact > Can Design
Impact > Closure Design
Impact > Cask Design
Puncture Force Occurs
Puncture Force > Can Design
Puncture Force > Closure
Design
Puncture Force > Cask Design
Coolant Leaks Outb
Coolant Channels Not Filled
External Heat Source Nearby
Temperature > Can Design
Temperature > Closure
Design
Temperature > Cask Design
Pressure > Can Design
Pressure > Closure Design
Pressure > Cask Design
Transport Mode
Truck
0.5
0
0
0
0.221
0
0
0
0.008
0
0
0
0.5 E-6
0. 3 E-4
0. 014
0
0
0
0
0
0
Rail
0.5
0
0
0
0. 123
0
0
0
0.410
0
0
0
0.5 E-6
0. 3 E-4
0, 0128
0
0
0
0
0
0
Barge
0.05
0
0
0
0.90
0
0
0
0
0
0
0. 5 E-6
0.3 E-4
0.0605
0
0
0
0
0
0
'See footnote a, Table 26.
See footnote b, Table 26.
93
-------
TABLE 33: FAULT TREE PROBABILITIES FOR HIGH LEVEL
RADIOACTIVITY SOLIDIFIED WASTE SHIPPING CONTAINER UNDER
ACCIDENT CONDITIONS OF MEDIUM SEVERITYa
ID
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
I 8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
L 21
Input Event Name
Vibration Occurs
Vibration > Can Design
Vibration > Closure Design
Vibration > Cask Design
Impact Occurs
Impact > Can Design
Impact > Closure Design
Impact > Cask Design
Puncture Force Occurs
Puncture Force > Can Design
Puncture Force > Closure
Design
Puncture Force > Cask Design
Coolant Leaks Outb
Coolant Channels Not Filled
External Heat Source Nearby
Temperature > Can Design
Temperature > Closure
Design
Temperature > Cask Design
Pressure > Can Design
Pressure > Closure Design
Pressure > Cask Design
Transport Mode
Truck
0. 5
0. 15 E-6
0.75 E-7
0. 15 E-6
0.423
0. 1 E-5
0. 1 E-5
0. 1 E-2
0. 066
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-3
0. 5 E-6
0. 3 E-4
0.0016
0. 1 E-5
0. 1 E-4
0. 1 E-4
0. 3 E-3
0. 3 E-3
0. 3 E-3
Rail
0.5
0.2 E-6
0. 1 E-6
0. 2 E-6
0. 067
0. 1 E-5
0. 1 E-5
0. 1 E-2
0.224
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-3
0. 5 E-6
0. 3 E-4
0. 002
0. 1 E-5
0. 1 E-4
0. 1 E-4
0.5 E-2
0. 5 E-2
0. 5 E-2
Barge
0.05
0. 5 E-7
0.25 E-7
0.5 E-7
0.08
0. 1 E-5
0. 1 E-5
0. 1 E-2
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-3
0. 5 E-6
0.3 E-4
0.0099
0. 1 E-5
0. 1 E-4
0. 1 E-4
0.01
0.01
0. 01
See footnote a, Table 27.
'See footnote b, Table 27.
94
-------
TABLE 34: FAULT TREE PROBABILITIES FOR HIGH LEVEL
RADIOACTIVITY SOLIDIFIED WASTE SHIPPING CONTAINER UNDER
SEVERE ACCIDENT CONDITIONS*
ID
Numb e r
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
Input Event Name
Vibration Occurs
Vibration > Can Design
Vibration > Closure Design
Vibration > Cask Design
Impact Occurs
Impact > Can Design
Impact > Closure Design
Impact > Cask Design
Puncture Force Occurs
Puncture Force > Can Design
Puncture Force > Closure
Design
Puncture Force > Cask Design
Coolant Leaks Out
Coolant Channels Not Filled
External Heat Source Nearby
Temperature > Can Design
Temperature > Closure
Design
Temperature > Cask Design
Pressure > Can Design
Pressure > Closure Design
Pressure > Cask Design
Transport Mode
Truck
0. 5
0. 15 E-5
0. 75 E-6
0. 15 E-5
0. 159
0. 1 E-4
0. 1 E-4
0. 1 E-l
0. 022
0. 1 E-
0. 1 E-2
0. 1 E-2
0. 5 E-6
0. 3 E-4
0. 2 E-3
0. 1 E-4
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-3
0. 3 E-2
0. 3 E-2
0. 3 E-2
Rail
0. 5
0.2 E-5
0. 1 E-5
0. 2 E-5
0. 02
0. 1 E-4
0. 1 E-4
0. 1 E-l
0. 066
0. 1 E-
0. 1 E-2
0. 1 E-2
0. 5 E-6
0.3 E-4
0. 2 E-3
0. 1 E-4
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-3
0. 5 E-l
0. 5 E-l
0. 5 E-l
Barge
0. 05
0. 5 E-6
0.25 E-6
0.5 E-6
0. 02
0. 1 E-4
0. 1 E-4
0. 1 E-l
0. 1 E-
0. 1 E-2
0. 1 E-2
0.5 E-6
0. 3 E-4
0. 7 E-3
0. 1 E-4
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-3
0. 1
0. 1
0. 1
*See footnote, Table 28.
95
-------
TABLE 35: FAULT TREE PROBABILITIES FOR
FISSION PRODUCT (NOBLE) GAS SHIPPING CONTAINER
UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS OF LIGHT SEVERITYa
ID
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
Input Event Name
Vibration Occurs
Vibration > Cylinder Design
Vibration > Cask Design
Vibration > Closure Design
Impact Occurs
Impact > Cylinder Design
Impact > Cask Design
Impact > Closure Design
Puncture Force Occurs
Puncture Force > Cylinder Design
Puncture Force > Cask Design
Puncture Force > Closure Design
Coolant Leaks Outb
Coolant Channels Not Filled
External Heat Source Nearby
Pressure > Cylinder Design
Pressure > Cask Design
Pressure > Closure Design
Temperature > Cylinder Design
Temperature > Cask Design
Temperature > Closure Design
Cylinder Valve Malfunction
Cylinder Valve Not Tightened
Cask Vent Malfunction
Transport Mode
Truck
0. 5
0
0
0
0.221
0
0
0
0. 008
0
0
0
0. 5 E-6
0. 3 E-4
0.014
0
0
0
0
0
0
0. 1 E-2
0.7 E-3
0. 1 E-2
Rail
0.5
0
0
0
0. 123
0
0
0
0.410
0
0
0
0. 5 E-6
0. 3 E-4
0. 0128
0
0
0
0
0
0
0. 1 E-2
0.7 E-3
0. 1 E-2
Barge
0.05
0
0
0
0.9
0
0
0
--
0
0
0
0. 5 E-6
0.3 E-4
0. 0605
0
0
0
0
0
0
0. 1 E-2
0.7 E-3
0. 1 E-2
See footnote a, Table 26 .
See footnote b, Table 26 .
96
-------
TABLE 36: FAULT TREE PROBABILITIES FOR
FISSION PRODUCT (NOBLE) GAS SHIPPING CONTAINER
UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS OF MEDIUM SEVERITY3-
ID
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
Input Event Name
Vibration Occurs
Vibration > Cylinder Design
Vibration > Cask Design
Vibration > Closure Design
Impact Occurs
Impact > Cylinder Design
Impact > Cask Design
Impact > Closure Design
Puncture Force Occurs
Puncture Force > Cylinder Design
Puncture Force > Cask Design
Puncture Force > Closure Design
Coolant Leaks Outb
Coolant Channels Not Filled
External Heat Source Nearby
Pressure > Cylinder Design
Pressure > Cask Design
Pressure > Closure Design
Temperature > Cylinder Design
Temperature > Cask Design
Temperature > Closure Design
Cylinder Valve Malfunction
Cylinder Valve Not Tightened
Cask Vent Malfunction
Transport Mode
Truck
0. 5
0. 3 E-7
0. 15 E-6
0. 75 E-7
0.423
0. 1 E-3
0. 5 E-2
0. 1 E-5
0. 066
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-3
0. 5 E-6
0. 3 E-4
0. 0016
0. 3 E-3
0. 3 E-3
0. 3 E-3
Rail
0. 5
0.4 E-7
0.2 E-6
0. 1 E-6
0. 067
0. 1 E-3
0. 5 E-2
0. 1 E-5
0.224
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-3
0. 5 E-6
0. 3 E-4
0. 002
0. 5 E-2
0. 5 E-2
0. 5 E-2
0. 1 E-5 : 0. 1 E-5
0. 1 E-4
0. 1 E-4
0. 1 E-2
0. 7 E-3
0. 1 E-2
0. 1 E-4
0. 1 E-4
0. 1 E-2
0.7 E-3
0. 1 E-2
Barge
0. 05
0. 1 E-7
0. 5 E-7
0. 25 E-7
0. 08
0. 1 E-3
0. 5 E-2
0. 1 E-5
--
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-3
0. 5 E-6
0. 3 E-4
0. 0099
0. 01
0. 01
0. 01
0. 1 E-5
0. 1 E-4
0. 1 E-4
0. 1 E-2
0. 7 E-3
0. 1 E-2
See footnote a, Table 27.
See footnote b, Table 27.
97
-------
TABLE 37: FAULT TREE PROBABILITIES FOR
FISSION PRODUCT (NOBLE) GAS SHIPPING CONTAINER
UNDER SEVERE ACCIDENT CONDITIONS"
ID
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
Input Event Name
Vibration Occurs
Vibration > Cylinder Design
Vibration > Cask Design
Vibration > Closure Design
Impact Occurs
Impact > Cylinder Design
Impact > Cask Design
Impact > Closure Design
Puncture Force Occurs
Puncture Force > Cylinder Design
Puncture Force > Cask Design
Puncture Force > Closure Design
Coolant Leaks Out
Coolant Channels Not Filled
External Heat Source Nearby
Pressure > Cylinder Design
Pressure > Cask Design
Pressure > Closure Design
Temperature > Cylinder Design
Temperature > Cask Design
Temperature > Closure Design
Cylinder Valve Malfunction
Cylinder Valve Not Tightened
Cask Vent Malfunction
Transport Mode
Truck
0. 5
0. 3 E-6
0. 15 E-5
0. 75 E-6
0. 159
0. 1 E-2
0. 05
0. 1 E-4
0. 022
0. 1 E-2
0. 1 E-2
0. 1 E-2
0. 5 E-6
0. 3 E-4
0. 2 E-3
0. 3 E-2
0. 3 E-2
0. 3 E-2
0. 1 E-4
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-2
0. 7 E-3
0. 1 E-2
Rail
0. 5
0.4 E-6
0. 2 E-5
0. 1 E-5
0. 02
0. 1 E-2
0. 05
0. 1 E-4
0. 066
0. 1 E-2
0. 1 E-2
0. 1 E-2
0. 5 E-6
0. 3 E-4
0. 2 E-3
0. 05
0. 05
0. 05
0. 1 E-4
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-2
0. 7 E-3
0. 1 E-2
Barge
0. 05
0. 1 E-6
0. 5 E-6
0. 25 E-6
0. 02
0. 1 E-2
0. 05
0. 1 E-4
--
0. 1 E-2
0. 1 E-2
0. 1 E-2
0. 5 E-6
0. 3 E-4
0. 7 E-3
0. 1
0. 1
0. 1
0. 1 E-4
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-3
0. 1 E-2
0. 7 E-3
0. 1 E-2
-See footnote, Table 28.
98
-------
TABLE 38: RELEASE PROBABILITIES FOR
SHIPPING CONTAINERS INVOLVED IN ACCIDENTS
Material
Spent Fuel
Plutonium
High Level
Solid Waste
Noble Gas
Accident
Severity
Light
Medium
Severe
Light
Medium
Severe
Light
Medium
Severe
Light
Medium
Severe
Transport Mode
Truck
0
0. 15E-9
0. 19E-8
0
0. 30E-7
0. 30E-5
0
0. 50E-8
0. 23E-7
0
0. 26E-6
0. 93E-5
Rail
0
0. 16E-9
0. 33E-7
0
0. 25E-8
0. 16E-6
0
0. 11E-6
0. 13E-5
0
0.44E-6
0. 11E-4
Barge
0
0. 13E-7
0. 15E-5
0
0. 22E-7
0. 11E-5
0
0. 20E-5
0. 15E-4
0
0. 22E-5
0. 20E-4
99
-------
TABLE 39: SIGNIFICANT FAILURE MODES AND PROBABILITIES
FOR SHIPPING CONTAINERS SUBJECT TO SEVERE ACCIDENTS
o
o
Material
Container
Spent
Fuel
Spent
Fuel
Transport
Mode
Truck
Rail
ID
Number
6
7
9
27
6
7
26
28
17
18
19
21
16
18
19
20
16
18
19
21
Event Description
Impact Occurs
Impact > Clad
Impact > Casket
Improper Seal
Impact Occurs
Impact > Clad
Defective Seal
Vent Line Failure
Heat Nearby
Pressure > Clad
Pressure > Cavity
Pressure > Closure
Coolant Channels
Not Filled
Pressure > Clad
Pressure > Cavity
Pressure > Casket
Coolant Channels
Not Filled
Pressure > Clad
Pressure > Cavity
Pressure > Closure
Event
Probability
0. 159
0.002
0. 01
0. 0005
0. 159
0.002
0.0005
0. 001
0.0002
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.00003
0.05
0.05
0. 05
0. 00003
0.05
0. 05
0.05
Probability of
Completing Chain
0. 16 E-8
0. 16 E-9
0.25 E-7
0. 38 E-8
0. 38 E-8
Release
Probability
0. 19 E-8
0. 33 E-7
-------
TABLE 39 (continued)
Material
Container
Spent
Fuel
Plutonium
Transport
Mode
Barge
Truck
ID
Number
17
18
19
21
17
18
19
20
11
12
13
14
15
11
12
14
15
23
11
12
14
15
24
Event Description
Heat Nearby
Pressure > Clad
Pressure > Cavity
Pressure > Closure
Heat Nearby
Pressure > Clad
Pressure > Cavity
Pressure > Casket
Impact Occurs
Impact > Bag
Impact > Bottle
Impact > Vessel
Impact > Drum
Impact Occurs
Impact > Bag
Impact > Vessel
Impact > Drum
Failed Bottle Cap
Impact Occurs
Impact > Bag
Impact > Vessel
Impact > Drum
Failed Cap Threads
Event
Probability
0.0007
0. 1
0. 1
0. 1
0. 0007
0.05
0. 05
0. 05
0. 159
1.0
0. 005
0.01
0.3
0. 159
1.0
0. 005
0. 3
0.0005
0. 159
1. 0
0. 005
0.3
0. 005
Probability of
Completing Chain
0. 7 E-6
0. 7 E-6
0. 24 E-5
0.24 E-6
0.24 E-6
Release
Probability
0. 15 E-5
0. 30 E-5
-------
TABLE 39 (continued)
o
ro
Material
Container
Plutonium
Plutonium
Transport
Mode
Rail
Barge
ID
Number
11
12
13
14
15
11
12
14
15
23
11
12
14
15
24
6
7
20
21
22
6
7
20
21
22
Event Description
Impact Occurs
Impact > Bag
Impact > Bottle
Impact > Vessel
Impact > Drum
Impact Occurs
Impact > Bag
Impact > Vessel
Impact > Drum
Failed Bottle Cap
Impact Occurs
Impact > Bag
Impact > Vessel
Impact > Drum
Failed Cap Threads
Heat Nearby
Temperature > Bag
Pressure > Bottle
Pressure > Vessel
Pressure > Drum
Heat Nearby
Temperature > Bag
Pressure > Bottle
Pressure > Vessel
Pressure > Drum
Event
Probability
0. 020
1.0
0. 001
0. 01
0.3
0. 020
1. 0
0.01
0.3
0.0005
0.02
1.0
0. 01
0.3
0.0005
0. 0002
1. 0
0. 05
0.05
0. 05
0.0007
1. 0
0. 1
0. 1
0. 1
Probability of
Completing Chain
0. 6 E-7
0. 3 E-7
0.3 E-7
0.25 E-7
0.7 E-6
Release
Probability
0. 16 E-6
-------
TABLE 39 (continued)
Material
Container
Plutonium
High Level
Solid Waste
Transport
Mode
Barge
(Cont'd)
Truck
ID
Number
11
12
13
14
15
5
6
8
15
19
21
15
19
20
1
2
5
8
Event Description
Impact Occurs
Impact > Bag
Impact > Bottle
Impact > Vessel
Impact > Drum
Impact Occurs
Impact > Can
Impact > Cask
Heat Nearby
Pressure > Can
Pressure > Cask
Heat Nearby
Pressure > Can
Pressure > Closure
Vibration Occurs
Vibration > Can
Impact Occurs
Impact > Cask
Event
Probability
0. 02
1.0
0. 005
0.01
0. 3
0. 159
0. 00001
0. 01
0. 0002
0.003
0. 003
0. 0002
0.003
0.003
0.5
0.0000015
0. 159
0. 01
Probability of
Completing Chain
0.3 E-6
0. 16 E-7
0. 18 E-8
0. 18 E-8
0. 12 E-8
Release
Probability
0. 11 E-5
0.23 E-7
o
oo
-------
TABLE 39 (continued)
Material
Container
High Level
Solid Waste
High Level
Solid Waste
Noble Gas
Transport
Mode
Rail
Barge
Truck
ID
Number
15
19
21
15
19
20
15
19
20
15
19
21
5
6
7
5
6
17
5
6
18
Event Description
Heat Nearby
Pressure > Can
Pressure > Cask
Heat Nearby
Pressure > Can
Pressure > Closure
Heat Nearby
Pressure > Can
Pressure > Closure
Heat Nearby
Pressure > Can
Pressure > Cask
Impact Occurs
Impact > Cylinder
Impact > Cask
Impact Occurs
Impact > Cylinder
Pressure > Cask
Impact Occurs
Impact > Cylinder
Pressure > Closure
Event
Probability
0.0002
0.05
0.05
0.0002
0.05
0.05
0.0007
0.1
0. 1
0.0007
0. 1
0. 1
0. 159
0.001
0.05
0.159
0.001
0.003
0.159
0.001
0.003
Probability of
Completing Chain
0. 5 E-6
0. 5 E-6
0.7 E-5
0.7 E-5
0.8 E-5
0.48 E-6
0.48 E-6
Release
Probability
0.13 E-5
0. 15 E-4
-------
TABLE 39 (continued)
Material
Container
Noble Gas
Noble Gas
Transport
Mode
Truck
(Cont'd)
Rail
ID
Number
5
7
9
10
9
10
18
9
10
17
5
6
17
5
6
7
5
6
18
Event Description
Impact Occurs
Impact > Cask
Puncture Occurs
Puncture > Cylinder
Puncture Occurs
Puncture > Cylinder
Pressure > Closure
Puncture Occurs
Puncture > Cylinder
Pressure > Cask
Impact Occurs
Impact > Cylinder
Pressure > Cask
Impact Occurs
Impact > Cylinder
Impact > Cask
Impact Occurs
Impact > Cylinder
Pressure > Closure
Event
Probability
0. 159
0. 05
0. 022
0.001
0.066
0.001
0.05
0.066
0.001
0.05
0.02
0.001
0. 05
0.02
0.001
0. 05
0.02
0.001
0.05
Probability
Completing Chain
0. 17 E-6
0. 33 E-5
0. 33 E-5
0. 1 E-5
0. 1 E-5
0. 1 E-5
Release
Probability
0.93 E-5
0. 11 E-4
o
Ul
-------
TABLE 39 (continued)
Material
Container
Noble Gas
Transport
Mode
Barge
ID
Number
15
16
18
15
16
17
5
6
18
5
6
17
5
6
7
Event Description
Heat Nearby
Pressure > Cylinder
Pressure > Closure
Heat Nearby
Pressure > Cylinder
Pressure > Cask
Impact Occurs
Impact > Cylinder
Pressure > Closure
Impact Occurs
Impact > Cylinder
Pressure > Cask
Impact Occurs
Impact > Cylinder
Impact > Cask
Event
Probability
0. 0007
0. 1
0.1
0. 0007
0. 1
0. 1
0.02
0.001
0. 1
0.02
0.001
0. 1
0.02
0.001
0.05
Probability of
Completing Chain
0. 7 E-5
0. 7 E-5
0.2 E-5
0.2 E-5
0. 1 E-5
Release
Probability
0.20 E-4
-------
FRACTION OF CARGO LIKELY TO BE
RELEASED IN AN ACCIDENT
Considering maximum credible severity of accidents, one might assume
the following scenarios:
1. Spent Fuel: Loss of coolant in spent fuel cask; fuel rods broken or
perforated so that all the noble gas contained in the fuel rod plenum
escapes.
2. Plutonium: Shipped in the form of a solid, part of the contents
spill out of the ruptured cask.
3. High Level Solid Waste: Part of the glassy matrix is shattered into
fine particles upon impact and escapes through the opened cask.
4. Noble Gas: Shipped in pressurized cylinders, all the gas is released
when both the cylinders and cask break.
The ratio of fission gas radiation to total radiation of fission products and
fissile material in an LWR fuel element is about 11 x 103 Ci/4. 5 x 10 Ci,
or about 2 x 10"3. The ratio varies to . 001 for LWR-Pu and LMFBR fuels
and . 0128 for HTGR fuel. The fraction . 001 was chosen as the severe
release fraction for spent fuel.
Plutonium is expected to be shipped in solidified form, probably as
pellets of PuC>2. A shipment of plutonium is thus quite similar to a
shipment of solid waste. The severe accident release fraction for
plutonium is arbitrarily set to 0. 001.
Solidified waste release fractions are difficult to estimate, but since more
nuclides will probably be involved in a release of solid waste than in a
release of spent fuel, the severe release fraction is arbitrarily set at
5 times the spent fuel value.
Gaseous fission products are assumed in this study to be transported in
pressurized cylinders, although technology may be found in the future to
allow shipping of gases in solid matrices. The severe release fraction for
noble gases is thus assumed to be unity.
Release fractions for light and medium severity releases are estimated
as fractions of the severe release fractions. The results are tabulated
in Table 40.
107
-------
TABLE 40: RELEASE FRACTIONS DURING ACCIDENTS
Material
Spent Fuel
Recycled Plutonium
Solid Waste
Noble Gas
Accident Severity
Light
q
1 x 10~V
1 x 10"9
Q
1 x 10 7
1 x 10"2
Medium
-6
1 x 10 °
1 x ID'6
-6
1 x 10
5 x 10"1
Severe
-3
1 x 10
1 x 10"3
3
5 x 10
1
108
-------
RADIATION DOSES FROM ACCIDENT RELEASES
(RADIATION DISPERSION MODEL)
The dose D absorbed by biota surrounding the site of an accidental release
decreases with increasing distance from the release site. In particular,
the dose is considered as a function of the area around the accident. A
certain meteorological condition, which is assumed to describe the capability
of the atmosphere to disperse the released radiation or radioactive material,
is modeled by the empirical linear logarithmic relation:
£nDQ . (A{] = -0.93001 anAi + UnQ£jmsK£- 13.895),
where
A = the area surrounding the accident in which the dose
equals or exceeds D
K^ = dose coefficient for material H , in (rem- m^)/(Ci- sec)
i = an index distinguishing concentric circular isopleths
bounding areas which absorb different amounts of radiation
Q „. = the source in curies (Ci) from an accident of severity s
0 T TT1 S
involving material Hin year j in transport mode m.
The above equation is an approximation to data given in Appendix B of
Reference 8 for the Pasquill weather stability class D. The dose is given
in rems.
EXPOSURE TO RADIATION
The exposure of human beings to radiation risk is quantified by the product
of the dose and the number of people near the accident scene who may
reasonably be expected to absorb the radiation. For convenience, knowledge
of the population density distribution near the accident is used to determine
the number of human absorbers likely to be present. Consequently, the
exposure to risk is written
x£jmski = D£jms(Ai) AiPjki
where
X = the exposure to risk (population dose)
p = the population density.
109'
-------
If the population density is one person per unit area, then the exposure to
risk of that person is the product of dose and area. Alternatively, the
area-dose product may be interpreted as the exposure to risk of the
environment. The human-dose product may then be found from the area-
dose product by multiplying by a nonunity population density.
The probable numbers of people in the vicinity of an accident are based on
census data. Using the national average values for population density
presented in Table 3, the distribution in terms of multiples of the population
density is derived from some assumptions. First, the population density
is assumed to be independent of isopleth area A^. Secondly, the fraction
of a transport link expected to lie in rural or urban areas is assumed to be
given by the 1980 projection of population density distribution within 50 miles
of a reactor (Reference 8, Appendix B). A graphical representation of
the areal and linear population distributions is given in Figure 29.
Under these assumptions, the level of risk to exposure may be calculated
from a simplified formula:
x - = En E. D • (A-) A- P-, •
£jms k i £jms i i jki
= E1 p., E. D.. (A.) A.
k jk i £jms i i
= (0. 255 x 1 + 0. 561 x 10 + 0. 174 x 100 + 0. 01 x 300)
p-E- °0 • (A-) A-
j i &jms i i
= 26. 3 p.T). D . (A.) A
j^i £jms i' i
CONSEQUENCES OF RADIATION ABSORPTION FROM
ACCIDENT RELEASES (HEALTH EFFECTS MODEL)
A quantitative and qualitative description of the effects on human health of
absorbed radiation is still a subject of research. Available data includes
the response of small animals, of diseased persons, and of persons exposed
to high levels of radiation, such as the atom bombs exploded in World War II.
The human health response to low levels of radiation, such as are being
discussed in this report, is complicated by the requirements of large
irradiated populations to study; by the long time delay between radiation
exposure and appearance of neoplasms; by difficulty in distinguishing
radiation imposed cancers from cancers produced from other causes or
from background radiation; and because cancer susceptibility is a widely
varying function of age, sex, genetic constitution, diet, personal habits,
socioeconomic factors, and other variables (Reference 24).
110
-------
Transport Link
1
Isopleth i
A., D>D., p>Pi
Isopleth i-1
Site of Accident
a. Definition of Isopleth Areas.
CO
d
0!
P
d
o
• H
-(->
tti
r-l
1, 000
300
tuO
R>
O
m
i — i
a
•r-t
-M
100
10
1
0
| 9(- c
*r i
i i i i i
i
—-.010
1 1 1 I
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1.0
Fraction of Distance Along Transport Link
b. Population Distribution Along
Transport Link.
FIGURE 29: GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF DOSE
AND POPULATION DISTRIBUTIONS AT THE
SCENE OF AN ACCIDENT
111
-------
For low levels of radiation, the absolute hazards (difference between
hazards of irradiated and nonirradiated populations) can be estimated
from linear relationships between health effects and absorbed dose.
The EPA Office of Radiation Programs is currently using a straight
line with slope of 200 excess cases/lO^ exposed persons/year/rem
to estimate the number of fatalities and nonlethal cancers resulting
from chronic whole body exposure to low levels of ionizing radiation.
Their straight line describing the effects from plutonium irradiation
has one-fourth this slope. Plutonium emits alpha particles, which are
readily stopped by clothing or skin and therefore poses no external
hazard. Additionally, the health hazard from ingested plutonium is
slight. However, the hazard from inhaled plutonium is quite serious.
These guidelines are used in this report to estimate the number of
nonlethal cancers.
For high levels of radiation, such as might be absorbed by persons
near a transport accident release, the number of lethal cases is
estimated by the LD5Q/60 measure. Recent studies indicate that
LD5Q/60 (dose resulting in 50 percent demise of the absorbing popula-
tion within 60 days) lies between 243 and 300 rads (Reference 23). The
number of fatalities is determined in this report by dividing half the
expected number of man-rems by the larger value for LD5o/60» assuming
an RBE factor of unity.
HAZARD VECTOR FIELD
The assessment of hazard from transportation accidents related to the
nuclear power industry is characterized by the following five quantities
which are conceptually considered as the components of a vector:
1. Amount (Ci) of radiation likely to be released from transport
accidents.
2. Exposure to risk of environment (area-dose or acre-rems).
3. Exposure to risk of humans (population-dose, or man-rems).
4. Expected number of fatalities resulting from population-dose .
5. Expected number of nonlethal cancers resulting from population-dose.
The various components are calculated from formulae already given. The
calculations and symbols are summed up in Table 41.
112
-------
TABLE 41: SUMMARY OF HAZARDS ANALYSIS MODEL
Hazard
Vector
Component
Description
Formula
Q . 1
£jmks
Likely number of curies (Ci) released
in year j from transport accident of
severity s involving material £ and
mode m and occurring in route link
segment k.
Q ." 1 = Q . P(A|S) r f
£jmks £jm £jkms £ms £s
X
(1)
£jms
Exposure to risk of environment
(radiation absorbed by single human
or equivalent in environment, whence
the superscript (1), measured in
area-dose quantities (acre-rems).
X(1) =Y>. (A.) A
£jms *—' £jms i i
i
X .
£]ms
Exposure to risk of human population,
measured in population-dose quantities
(man-r ems).
X . = D . (A.) A. p.
£jms t—J £jms i i i
i
£jms
Expected number of fatalities
resulting from population-dose.
F . = 0.5 X . /LDcn .,n
£jms £jms 50/60
C
£jms
Expected number of nonlethal cancers
resulting from population-dose.
C = X man-rem x 200 nonlethal
xjms £jms
cancers/10 man-rem/year
-------
TABLE 41 (continued)
Hazard
Vector
Subf actors
Description
Fo rmula
Q£jm
Likely number of curies (Ci) trans-
ported of material £ in year j by
mode m.
£jm q£ £j m
Number of curies in material &
loaded in a single shipment.
Number of shipments of material £
made in year j.
m
Fraction of number of shipments
hauled by mode m.
P(A|S)
£jkms
Probability that a shipment of
material £ by mode m in year j
•will encounter an accident of
severity s in link segment k.
P(A|S) .. = d
1 £jkms
a
£jk ms
£jk
Distance traveled by shipment of
material £ in year j on link
segment k.
ms
Probability of transport mode m
encountering an accident of
severity s in a unit of distance
traveled.
-------
TABLE 41 (continued)
Hazard
Vector
Subf actors
Description
Formula
Urns
Probability that an accident of
severity s involving transport
mode m will result in a rupture of
the shipping container for
material £.
Monte Carlo simulation of shipping
container fault tree.
'Us
Fraction of a cargo of material £
released to the environment in an
accident of severity s.
•
£jms
(A.)
Dose of radiation absorbed by a
person in area A^ by means of
dispersion of radiation or radio-
active material from a. transport
accident site.
D
£jmsk
£
Spent Fuel
Plutonium
Solid Waste
Noble Gas
* v -13.895A -0.93001
I . , K e A.
£jmks £ i
K.(rem*m /Ci/sec)
7. 30 E+2 (Reference 8)
3.81 E+5 (Reference 22)
7.30 E+2 (Reference 8)
5.30E-2 (Reference 8, 10)
A.
Area bounded by concentric (with
accident site) circular isopleth i
over which the radiation dose is
D „ ., (A.) or greater.
£jmsk i
-------
TABLE 41 (continued)
Hazard
Vector
Subfactors
Description
Formula
Pi
Population density in isopleth
area A..
i
LD
50/60
Lethal dose, usually measured in
rad, -which, if absorbed by each
member of the exposed population,
•will result in 50 percent fatality
to the population within a time
period of 60 days of the accident
dose.
Indices
£
j
m
k
s
i
Material of shipment cargo; type of shipping container.
Year in -which shipments are performed.
Transport mode.
Segment of transport link.
Severity of accident.
Isopleth area.
-------
SECTION VII
CASE EVALUATIONS OF ACCIDENTAL HAZARDS
Several computer calculations have been made to study the effect of
varying several of the parameters in the transportation model. Hazard
vectors were computed for the following sets of case variables:
1. Annual hazards for every fifth year from 1970-2020.
2. Single shipment hazards based on year 1990 as representative.
3. Hazards pertaining to each type of material shipping container.
4. Hazards pertaining to several mixes of transport modes.
5. Hazards pertaining to each accident severity.
6. Hazards associated with nuclear shipments in high, low, and
chosen estimates.
For convenience, the shipping data for each of the four materials -
spent fuel, recycled plutonium, high level radioactive solidified waste,
and noble gas - for the chosen projection are collected in Tables 42
through 45. Data for accident probabilities, release probabilities,
release fractions, and population densities are repeated in Tables 46
through 49. Computer printouts of the hazard vectors for medium and
severe accidents, for an assumed population distribution, and for an
assumed mix of transport modes then follow.
In the fault trees pertaining to shipping containers under accident
conditions of light severity, the inhibit gate probabilities for various
physical conditions breaking the containers were set to zero. As a
result, no failure mode is described by these fault trees. Consequently,
the release probabilities in light severity accidents are effectively
assumed to be zero, and the hazard becomes zero. No further
discussion of light accidents is admitted under these premises.
Hazard vectors for a transport mix of 20 percent trucks, 75 percent
railroads, and 5 percent barges are presented in Tables 50 through 57
for the chosen estimate of shipping data. A population density of 26. 3
times the average population density for a given year is used to allow
117
-------
TABLE 42: ANNUAL SHIPPING DATA FOR SPENT FUET
oo
YMr^ AMOJMT
SHI =>PFP
IP 70
197^
19MO
I9ft=>
1 99n
199s.
?oo n
?OAS
?01 K f"i -^ •
?ift??.
?7noo.
3PSOO.
00
00
00
no
oo
00
Or\
1 _}
00
01
00
PAQIO^C1 1
VI TY
MJMHEH Clf-
SH! HP I M^
(I0»<»9 COPIES) ShlRMtNTb Ui S T A'-iCh ( |vi
•
ft.
1 U.
??•
39.
61 •
tU £*. .
r*i •* •
10H.
13S.
16?.
r>70
H40
250
370
000
S70
"^A H
~J *T I '
110
000
^00
S
19}
934
1ft I?
3?97
7463
1 (\?? h
1 \ ' *- * *
1?1 00
1 6 -I ft 0
I9h47
700
ft n n
mio
4SO
400
4 0 0
4 0 0
400
4 0 0
400
v I TS
IBS00. 00
( 1 (HUJft '1M
. n
? . 4 3 c.
/.. . o 9 r
. M 7 r,
. T V.
-------
TABLE 43: ANNUAL SHIPPING DATA FOR PLUTONIUM
YFAi-1 AKD JM
C,H T apf- r}
] q 7 f o . o n
1 9 ,' S 0 . 0 'i
i q P ^ n n i . V r
1 Q « s s 4 ? . 7 P
1 Q 'I." 4 .* . ^ n
]VC/^ ?^H.^n
/? 0 T • r^ *> . ] r
? n r '. i o o T . ] ,- ,
? P ] ] S 7 S . P i
?0lr- ^100. P 0
?p?' 3*S?T . o n
o An TO AC (-1 v'lTV
( 1 0 <» * '> C i-1 k I F S )
i) .000
O.oo n
. ^ 0 4
. ^l
.Pl«5
.087
• zn
.3^S
.e>ri
.7^^
.'^Sft
ivj^np..) (if.'
s ~( i P v f \ r s
0
r
1 O^flf)
7?34
Sftn
31 79
7^1 ?
1 44h4
?0'->^S
?749 ^
34V9)
, iSfu^rf (M1LF5) (lf'iH>8 UVIT v
f) 0 . 0 0 P
0 0 . 0 0 0
400 1 .2 7 7
400 3. 1? ^
^o n S.7^?1
400 H•3 ^ Q
^00 11 . 1 ^7
4 n f, }3.^'^^
-------
TABLE 44: ANNUAL SHIPPING DATA FOR SOLID RADIOACTIVE WASTE
YEfiP
I97f
1975
198:'
19P=;
1f\(\r-
9 or,
199S
2001
? 0 ') '>
20] )
?n]S
20?^
AMO JM7
SHIPPFP
0.0"
0,00
.OS
1 .70
/ C3 pT
*V » M 4
10.*?
1^.36
31 .ftr.
4S.94
ft4.19
«?.4n
WAOIOACI IVITY
(I0a*9 C^HIfS)
0.000
U.OOO
.005
• 17R
. a* C 1
• r> " j^
1.50ft
«%74?
«*,496
h.364
H.I 0 9
] 0.2SO
NUMBFW OF
SHlPMtNTS
n
0
1
23
£>c~,
O J
140
?S7
4?0
«S)0
85?
10^4
SHI HP JMG
DiSTA^Ofc. t^lLF^)
0
0
2500
2500
jpn()
p_ '. . ' ' V
^200
2200
2200
2000
2000
2000
ShJPPIMO JM
U0**6 UM1T M
O.OO''
0 . o o r
.00?
.057
. 1 4T
• 1 ~ ^
. ^<0«
.565
.Q?4
1 .??r
1.704
?.1^R
-------
TABLE 45: ANNUAL SHIPPING DATA FOR NOBLE GAS
YpAP
1970
}975
198")
19RS
1990
1995
?00r>
20nc.
201 o
201^
20?n
AMOJNT P
SHIPPED (
0.00
o .on
175.00
350 , on
S90 .on
ft o o . o o
1020.00
1210,00
1400,00
1SRO.OO
17TO.OO
AnIOAcI I^TTY
10»^9 CUPIP5)
o.onn
0 • 0 0 0
.032
• 0*3
• 106
.144
.1R4
.218
.252
.284
.31 1
NU^HF^ o
SHlPMfl\JT
n
fi
3n
59
94
1 H
1 70
2n2
234
264
?89
Ff- I Mf, .)•- j f s
^ ;J\i] T v I ._P S)
0 0 . n o r
0 n . n o n
.n 7*
2 S n 0 . i f 7
2200 . 21p
2200
2200
2200
2000
20 no
2000
-------
TABLE 46: ACCIDENT PROBABILITIES PER MILLION VEHICLE MILES
ACCIDENT TRANSPORTATION
_ TVPE TRUCK RAIL, BARGE
ro
LIGHT J.3000E*00 79JOOoF~Ol 1.7000E+00
MEDIUM 3.0000E.-01 7,9000^-02 4.4000E-02
SEVERE B.OOOOE-03 1
-------
TABLE 47: RELEASE PROBABILITIES FOR GIVEN ACCIDENTS
MATERIAL
TYPE
ACCIDENT
TYPE
TRANSPORTATION Mf-TnOD
TRUCK KAIL HARGE
NOR|_E GAS
SOLID RADIOACTIVE WASTE
SPENT FUEL
PLUTONIUM
LIGHT
0.
SEVERE
).1000E-OS
LIGHT
MEDIUM
SEVERE
LIGHT
MEDIUM
SEVERE
LIGHT
MEDIUM
SEVERE
0.
S.OnooE-09
2.3000F--J8
0.
1.5000E-10
1.9no°E-09
0.
3.0001E-OR
3.000^^-06
0,
1 .1000E-07
1 .3000E-06
0.
1 .6000E-10
3.3onnE-o«
n.
?.5000E-09
1 .6000E-07
0
?_
\
0
l
l
0
?
I
t
•ooooF-nft
•SOOOE-05
•
•JOOOF-OR
.soooF-nis
•
•?cooF-nq
• lorjoE-nf.
-------
TABLE 48: RELEASE FRACTIONS DURING ACCIDENTS
MATERIAL
TYPE
NOBLE GAb
RADIOACTIVE
FUEL
)
1
1
1
LIGHT
.OOOOE-0?
•OOOOE-U9
•OOOOK-09
. OOOOE-OQ
ACCI
s
1
1
1
[)£>
MF
.P
. fi
• 0
n
(i
ft
T T
OOF..
o o E
OOE
YPfc
-
01
06
Oh
5
1
1
« 0 0 0 0 f
. 0 0 0 n E
. o o o o E
-03
-n3
- 0 3
-------
TABLE 49: AVERAGE POPULATION DENSITY FACTORS
n>wSiTY
1^90 « M » b
? o o s i f V . o
2 0 ] 0 1 "I H . l.»
? U 1 S 1 1 4 . U
?U?0 1?f'»vJ
-------
TABLE 50: ANNUAL HAZARD VECTORS FOR MEDIUM
SEVERITY SPENT FUEL ACCIDENTS
POPULATION DENSIT? : 26.3 TIMES AVERAGE HENS! I Y
TRANSPORT MIK ; ^u PcT TRACKS, 7S HCl H A IL
MATERIAL TYPE ! St^tNT FUfL
ACCIDENT SEVERITY I MEDIUM
tNJ
YEAR
1970
1975
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
?015
2020
CURIES
2.2370E+10
3.9nooE*10
6.l57oE*10
1»3500E*11
1»6250E*11
1.9250E*!!
REP. PER
SHIPMENT 1.1«29E*07
OUANTITTFS
EXPECTED
RELEASEU
l.1 3
5.949HE-11
2.9233E-12
1 .9H33E-11
3.28H7E-11
5.4]47E-11
1.763)E-10
2,!9BhE-lO
2-11
3« .
4»l63nE-l
-------
TABLE 51: ANNUAL, HAZARD VECTORS FOR SEVERE SPENT FUEL ACCIDENTS
POPULATION DENSITY i 26.3 TT^ES AVEHAuF
TRANSPORl MIX I 20 PCT TRACKS* 7S PCT
M^TEWUL TYPE » S^NT FUPL
ACCIDENT SEVERITY J SEVERE
BARGES
-J
YEAR
1970
1975
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
?015
2020
CURIES
7.0000E*07
1 .0250E+1P
3«QOOOE*10
8.434oE*10
1.35QOE+11
REP. PER
SHIPMENT 1.]
QUANTITIES
EXPECTED
RELEASED
5E-Oh
4, ^ 21 n E - 0 3
1 . M 1 3L-0^
. Oil OE-05
4.
5. 1703E-0&
S.7041E-05
9. ^l^E-OS
1
EXPECTED EXPECTED
"ATALI MES MOiLE THAI.
2. 710HE-D8
5.7331E-08
1.S652E-Q7
3.0339E-o7
4.0114E-n7
6.
H. 13?sE-10
E-13
-------
TABLE 52: ANNUAL HAZARD VECTORS FOR MEDIUM SEVERITY PLUTONTTTM ACCIDENTS
P3»U> ATlUM (•F.'VSITf ; ?-S,3 TIMfc
TPANSPOW! Mix t 0
1.7932E- 1
1
0
2.4983E-10
3.3354E-10
£>.pf-cT:;"i)
ACRE «-"MS
7. 079lt->oP
3« 21'/IE-"'7
7.77R9E-A7
EXPECTED
FATALITIES
o.
o.
2.P453E-0?
6.3933K-09
1.36?1E-13
n.
o.
R.099HE-!;
b. "11 OftE-I ":
2.37«nE-l?
?«* i I
1 •45ur>iL-1
-------
TABLE 53: ANNUAL HAZARD VECTORS FOR SEVERE PLUTONIUM ACCIDENTS
POPULATION DENSITY : 2ft,3 TIMES AVERAGE n
TRANSPORT MIX : tio PCT TRUCKSt 75 PCT RAILROADS*
MftTERlAL TYPE ! PLUTONIUM
ACCIDENT SEVERITY ! SEVERE
5 PCT BARGES
ro
YEAR
1970
1975
1985
199Q
CARIES
0.
0.
l.6000E»fl7
3.9500E+OP
5.7300E*08
7.6500E+0&
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
«FP. PER
SHIPMENT 2.7S86E*04
QUANTITIES
EAPFCTED
0.
o.
5.4782E-0/
3.3358E-0/
1.39)3E-OH
8.31?9E-0/
?.398BE-1I
n.
0»
6.MOOE-Q4
EXPECTED
0.
0.
9.4S33E-05
5.3
4. 1 ?h«E-Ol
EXPECTED
FATALITIES
o.
0.
B.9347E-0'
2.2727E-06
4.4780E-06
b.B780E-n6
.?750E-05
2.716SE-10
EXPECTFO
0.
o.
1.059TE-07
2.907QE-0"
3.8PS1 E>07
H. 1
-------
TABLE 54: ANNUAL HAZARD VECTORS FOR MEDIUM SEVERITY
SOLID RADIOACTIVE WASTE ACCIDENTS
DENSITY : ^is.l TTMFS AVERAGE O
TRANSPORT >-llX : to PCT TRUCKS. 7s PCT ^ a
MATERIAL TVPF : SULIO RADIOACTIVE *A5TK
ACCIDENT SEVERITY :
PCT HAHGES
OJ
o
YEAR
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
CURIES
0.
0.
5.0000E+06
8.3090E*09
1.0?5oE*10
REP. PF.R
SHIPMENT 1.001SE»07
QUANTITIES
EAPFCTFD
0.
?.78B8E-lO
1.7035E-0/
4.9]05E-10
ACRE RFMS
1 .U13E-Q?
1.0] 43E.-06
1.0336E-06
]. '55BE-09
EXPECTED
FATALITIES
o.
o.
IOE-10
3.1607E-09
7.5024E-09
1 .(1340E-08
1 .3426E-08
FXPEcTEn
CAMCERS
0.
0.
1.5739E-13
2.Q777E-11
5.0125E-11
9.4R?OE-11
1 .6519E-1Q
2.2507E-1I)
3.1019E-10
3.1964E-13
-------
TABLE 55: ANNUAL, HAZARD VECTORS FOR SEVERE
SOLID RADIOACTIVE WASTE ACCIDENTS
POPULATION DENSITY : ?f>.3 TIMES AVERAGE °>FNST
TRANSPORT MIX : ^-o PCT TRACKS, 7S PC f
MATERIAL TYPF : SULII) RADIOACTIVE *ASTE
ACCIDENT SEVERITY :
YEAR
1970
1975
I960
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
CURIES
8.3090E*09
1.0250F+10
REP. PER
SHIPMENT 1.00l*>E*o7
QUANTITIES
EXPECTED C
-------
TABLE 56: ANNUAL HAZARD VECTORS FOR MEDIUM
SEVERITY NOBLE GAS ACCIDENTS
TUN OFMSIM : ?_b,3 TiMfeS AVEHA'JE MhNSlTY
MIX : e!o PCT TRUfKS^ 7L PCT rt A 1 LKr>4 US ,
MiTTUIflL TYPF ! NOHlF" GAS
ACCIDENT SEVERITY t
PCT
YEAR
1970
1975
1985
1990
1995
0.
0.
3.
6.
•0''
•07
•08
1.4400E*Of<
1.8360E+08
2«l78oE*Op
2.5200E*0R
2»844oE*Ofc!
3»1 HoE*08
2005
2010
2015
2020
«EP. PER
SHIPMENT 1.0727E*Q6
QUANTITIES
EAPFCTED CUKIES
RELEA5EU
o.
o.
FXPECTtr
1 .4316E-U2
o.
n.
f.. ln75E-n7
] .&303E-08
o.
n.
1.
4.
1 .
1.
EXPECTED
FATALITIES
o.
0.
F.APECTFH
2.0597E-08
3.4443E-08
3.9fe9flE-nti
1.1107E-10
JCFRS
n.
n.
2»n78iE-;
7.78H?E-ir«
8.673RE-10
!• 1909E-09
-------
TABLE 57: ANNUAL HAZARD VECTORS FOR SEVERE NOBLE GAS ACCIDENTS
POPULATION OFMSIT? ; ?« 37fj5F.-r. 7
i .2741E-0-
4. 077 IE-;/'.
MAM Kp M S
0.
n.
?. 1
FXPECTEP
FATALITIES
o.
o.
EXPECTED MlNqER
4. I
1.15R5E-10
o.
n.
i«
?. 1676E-1 0
4 » B fi S S E - 1 0
6<,4'ic'?l:-i 0
«. 1P37E-1T
i . n ? 7 R E - 0
3.47S5E-1?
-------
for a variation in population distribution along a typical transport link.
Reasoning behind this factor was given in Section VI.
The components of the hazard vectors were calculated from formulas
discussed in Section VI. The estimates of fatalities were determined
from the LD 59/60 estimate of 300 rads. Assuming a radiological
biology equivalence factor of unity, the number of fatalities (half the
population in 60 days) is obtained by dividing the number of man-rems
by 600. For estimates of nonlethal effects, the EPA guide of 200
nonlethal cancers per 1, 000, 000 man-rems per year was used.
ANALYSIS OF TRANSPORTATION HAZARDS
BY ACCIDENT SEVERITY
Graphical comparisons of expected man-rems for different accident
severities are given in Figures 30 to 37. In Figures 30 and 31, the
results for spent fuel are plotted. All the spent fuel is assumed to be
shipped by trucks in Figure 30 and is assumed to be shipped by rail in
Figure 31. Similar comparisons are made in Figures 32 and 33 for
recycled plutonium, in Figures 34 and 35 for high level radioactive
solid waste, and in Figures 36 and 37 for noble gas.
In the case of spent fuel, the medium severity curve for truck transport
is 10 times greater than that for rail transport. The severe curve for
rails is about 3 times higher than the severe curve for trucks. The
difference between the medium and severe curves for trucks is about
a factor of 300, with the greater exposure to risk being represented
by the severe accidents. The annual severe truck exposure varies
from 7 x 10~9 man-rems in 1970 to 2 x 10~5 man-rems in 2020.
In the case of plutonium, both curves for rails are about 0. 01 as high
as the curves for trucks. About a factor of 10"3 separates the severe
and medium curves for each mode. The annual severe truck exposure
decreases from 3 x lO'2 man-rems in 1980 to 1 x 10~3 man-rems in
1990, but then increases to about 0. 8 man-rems in 2020.
In the case of solid waste, the severe curve for truck transport is 10 times
greater than that for rail transport. The medium curves differ by about
a factor of 4, with the truck curve lower. The severe truck curve is
about 600 times higher than the medium truck curve. The annual severe
truck exposure varies from 1 x lO"7 man-rems in 1980 to 3 x 10'4 man-
rems in 2020.
134
-------
iai7s: igfea iss igo isas: 2pco! 20^5 20
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FIGURE 30: COMPARISON OF RISK TO EXPOSURE
FOR DIFFERENT ACCIDENT SEVERITIES IN 100 PERCENT
TRUCK TRANSPORTATION OF SPENT FUEL
135
-------
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FIGURE 31: COMPARISON OF RISK TO EXPOSURE
FOR DIFFERENT ACCIDENT SEVERITIES IN 100 PERCENT
RAIL TRANSPORTATION OF SPENT FUEL
136
-------
FIGURE 32: COMPARISON OF RISK TO EXPOSURE
FOR DIFFERENT ACCIDENT SEVERITIES IN 100 PERCENT
TRUCK TRANSPORTATION OF RECYCLED PLUTONIUM
137
-------
FIGURE 33: COMPARISON OF RISK TO EXPOSURE
FOR DIFFERENT ACCIDENT SEVERITIES IN 100 PERCENT
~RAIL TRANSPORTATION OF RECYCLED PLUTONIUM
138
-------
FIGURE 34: COMPARISON OF RISK TO EXPOSURE FOR
DIFFERENT ACCIDENT SEVERITIES IN 100 PERCENT TRUCK
TRANSPORTATION OF HIGH LEVEL RADIOACTIVE SOLID WASTE
139
-------
SEVERE
1 N1TTT
i97LlS7S| 1930' 191
FIGURE 35: COMPARISON OF RISK TO EXPOSURE FOR
DIFFERENT ACCIDENT SEVERITIES IN 100 PERCENT RAIL
TRANSPORTATION OF HIGH LEVEL RADIOACTIVE SOLID WASTE
140
-------
i9?s iga 1955
1 1 1.
1995 2000 20p5 2010 20^5 2020
! YEAR
FIGURE 36: COMPARISON OF RISK TO EXPOSURE
FOR DIFFERENT ACCIDENT SEVERITIES IN 100 PERCENT
TRUCK TRANSPORTATION OF NOBLE GAS
141
-------
1970 1975 I960 1985 1980 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
1 : ' YEfiR ; : | j [
FIGURE 37: COMPARISON OF RISK TO EXPOSURE
FOR DIFFERENT ACCIDENT SEVERITIES IN 100 PERCENT
RAIL TRANSPORTATION OF NOBLE GAS
142
-------
In the case of noble gas, both the rail curves are nearly coincident,
and both the truck curves are higher than the rail curves. The medium
truck curve is about twice as high and the severe truck curve is about
4 times as high. The annual truck severe exposure varies from5xlO~6
man-rems in 1980 to 6 x 10-5 man-rems in 20ZO.
ANALYSIS OF TRANSPORTATION HAZARDS BY CARGO
Graphical comparisons of material container performance characteristics
are shown in Figures 38 through 41. The ordinate in each graph is the
expected number of man-rems absorbed from releases resulting from
severe accidents. In Figure 38, only trucks are assumed to be used;
and in Figure 39, only rails are assumed to be used. In Figure 40,
a mix of 20 percent trucks, 75 percent rails, and 5 percent barges is
assumed; and in Figure 41, a mix of 25 percent trucks, 70 percent
rails, and 5 percent barges is assumed.
In the case of all truck transportation, the risk to exposure during the
period 1985 to 2020 from the different materials descends in the order:
plutonium, solid waste, noble gas, and spent fuel. In 2020, plutonium
is expected to give about 0.08 man-rems, solid waste about 3 x 10
man-rems, noble gas about 6 x 10~5 man-rems, and spent fuel about
2 x 10-5 man-rems. The ratio between spent fuel and solid waste and
the ratio between spent fuel and noble gas can be explained by the ratios
in the release fractions given in Table 48, except for a factor of 3.
In the case of all rail transportation, the risk to exposure during the
period 1990 to 2020 from the different materials descends in the order:
solid waste, plutonium, spent fuel, and noble gas. In 2020, solid waste
is expected to give about 3 x 10~3 man-reins, plutonium about 9 x 10~4
man-rems, spent fuel about 7 x 10~5 man-rems, and noble gas about
1 x 10-5 man-rems.
In the case of the transport mix, 20 percent trucks, 75 percent rails,
and 5 percent barges, the risk to exposure during the period 1988 to
2020 from the different materials descends in the order: solid waste,
plutonium, spent fuel, and noble gas. This order is the same as for all
truck transportation; but in this scenario, the plutonium curve lies closer
to the solid waste variation. In 2020, the expected number of man-rems
are: 9 x 10"3 for solid waste, 7 x 10~3 for plutonium, 4 x 10"4 for spent
fuel, and 2 x 10-5 for noble gas.
143
-------
- PLUTONIUM
-] SOLID WASTE
FIGURE 38: COMPARISON OF RISK TO EXPOSURE
FOR SEVERE ACCIDENTS TO DIFFERENT MATERIALS.
TRANSPORTATION IS BY TRUCKS ONLY.
144
-------
FIGURE 39: COMPARISON OF RISK TO EXPOSURE
FOR SEVERE ACCIDENTS TO DIFFERENT MATERIALS.
TRANSPORTATION IS BY RAILS ONLY.
145
-------
-SOLID WASTE-
FIGURE 40: COMPARISON OF RISK TO EXPOSURE
FOR SEVERE ACCIDENTS TO DIFFERENT MATERIALS.
TRANSPORTATION IS BY 20 PERCENT TRUCKS,
75 PERCENT RAILS, AND 5 PERCENT BARGES.
146
-------
FIGURE 41: COMPARISON OF RISK TO EXPOSURE
FOR SEVERE ACCIDENTS TO DIFFERENT MATERIALS.
TRANSPORTATION IS BY 25 PERCENT TRUCKS,
70 PERCENT RAILS, AND 5 PERCENT BARGES,
147
-------
By altering the portions of trucks and rails in the transport mix to
25 percent trucks and 70 percent rails, not much happens to the cargo
comparison. The number of man-rems expected in 2020 changes to:
9 x ID'3 for solid waste, 1 x 10~2 for plutonium, 4 x 10-4 for spent
fuel, and 2 x 10"^ for noble gas. Evidently the mix which depends less
on trucks is preferable.
EFFECT OF VARYING TRANSPORT MIX
To facilitate the comparison of hazards for transport systems employing
different portions of trucks, rails, and barges, graphs showing this
comparison are given in Figures 42 through 45. Each graph compares
the exposure to risk from severe accidents for the use of all trucks,
all rails, a mix of 20 percent trucks, 75 percent rails, and 5 percent
barges, and a mix of 25 percent trucks, 70 percent rails, and 5 percent
barges.
In the case of spent fuel shipments, the greatest exposure to risk comes
from the two mixes of transport modes. The expected number of man-
rems from the 20-75-5 mix is only slightly less than from the 25-70-5
mix. The risk to exposure using only rails is about 5 times smaller
than the mix risks and the risk to exposure using only trucks is about
3 times smaller than the rail risk. From this comparison, one can
conclude that truck transportation is preferable for spent fuel.
In the case of plutonium shipments, the greatest exposure to risk is
derived from the use of all trucks. The safest scenario is with all rail
transport. Quantitatively, the expected annual number of man-rems in
2020 is about 0. 08 for all trucks, 0. 01 for the 25-70-5 mix, 0. 008 for
the 20-75-5 mix, and 0.0008 for all rails.
In the case of shipments of high level radioactive solid waste, the
greatest risk to exposure is provided by the use of the transport mixes,
with the 20-75-5 curve only slightly displaced below the 25-70-5 curve.
The risk from all rails is about one-third as large as with the mixes, and
the risk from all trucks is about 10 times smaller than the rail risk.
The expected annual number of man-rems from the 25-70-5 mix varies
from 4 x 10~6 in 1980 to 9 x 10'3 in 2020.
In the case of noble gas shipments, the greatest exposure to risk is
derived from the use of all trucks, and the least exposure is from the
use of all rails. The expected annual number of man-rems in 2020 is
148
-------
SYMBOL TRANSPORT MIX
TRUCK RAlL BARGE
YEfflR:
FIGURE 42: COMPARISON OF EXPOSURE TO RISK
OF SEVERE ACCIDENTS TO SPENT FUEL SHIPMENTS
IN DIFFERENT TRANSPORT MIXES
149
-------
TRANSPORT MIX
TRUCK RAIL BARGE
FIGURE 43: COMPARISON OF EXPOSURE TO RISK
OF SEVERE ACCIDENTS TO RECYCLED PLUTONIUM
SHIPMENTS IN DIFFERENT TRANSPORT MIXES
150
-------
SYMBOL TRANSPORT MIX
TRUCK RAIL BARGE -
FIGURE 44: COMPARISON OF EXPOSURE TO RISK OF
SEVERE ACCIDENTS TO HIGH LEVEL RADIOACTIVE SOLID
WASTE SHIPMENTS IN DIFFERENT TRANSPORT MIXES
151
-------
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..' . ..I. .L...1 I ..
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FIGURE 45: COMPARISON OF EXPOSURE TO RISK
OF SEVERE ACCIDENTS TO'NOBLE GAS SHIPMENTS
IN DIFFERENT TRANSPORT MIXES
152
-------
6x10 5 for all trucks, 3xlO"5 for the 25-70-5 mix, ZxlO"5 for the 20-75-5
mix, and 1x10-5 for all rails.
Given the validity of the fault trees and release fractions, one would
conclude from this analysis that all truck transportation is preferable,
from a safety point of view, for shipments of spent fuel and solid waste,
and all rail transportation is preferable for shipments of plutonium and
noble gas.
ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENTS
BY SEVERITY AND DISPERSION MEDIA
An accident summary for each of the materials for total usage of trucks
and rails is presented in each of Tables 58 through 65. In Tables 58
and 59, the expected annual number of accidents and the expected number
of releases in air or water are tabulated for spent fuel shipments. In
Table 58, only trucks are assumed for transport, and in Table 59, only
rails are assumed for transport. Similar analyses are given in Tables 60
and 6.1 for recycled plutonium, in Tables 62 and 63 for high level radio-
active solid waste, and in Tables 64 and 65 for noble gas.
The basis for this kind of analysis is simply the product of the number
of shipment-miles and the accident probability for the given accident
severity and transport mode. The basis for the water-air dispersion
medium analysis rests with observations of previous nuclear transporta-
tion accidents (Reference 21).
The numbers of accidents given in these tables can be construed as
accident rates, with 1 year as the basic unit of time. Looking at
Table 58 for spent fuel, the 1980 numbers, for example, are meaningless
if literally interpreted as the number of accidents expected to occur in the
whole year, since these numbers are proper fractions and the number of
accidents can only be integral. The numbers should be taken to mean
the annual accident rate; i. e. , the expected number of light accidents
(0. 6071) should be interpreted to mean that one light accident is
expected to occur in the reciprocal (I/. 6701 = 1.49) number of years.
In the case when only trucks are used for transport, Table 58 indicates
that in 2020 spent fuel shipments are expected to encounter 12. 13 light
accidents per year; 2. 8 medium accidents per year, and 0. 075 severe
accidents per year. One expects that at that time an accident serious
enough (i. e. , the severe category) to possibly cause a rupture of the
spent fuel cask will occur sometime in an interval of 13.4 years.
153
-------
TABLE 58: ANALYSIS OF TRUCK ACCIDENTS INVOLVING SPENT
FUEL BY SEVERITY AND DISPERSION MEDIUM
MIX : l»u Pr.T TRUCKS* !) PC F RAlL«os» n PCT HaRGF.S
MATERIAL TYPE : SPhMT FUEL
YEAR MO OF
SHIPMENTS
I 97o
1975
]990
]985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
5
191
934
161?
3297
7463
10224
12100
1 h 36 ft
) 9697
23334
EXPFLTfO ACCIDENTS
EXPECTED NUMBER OF- ACCIDENTS
LIGHT MEDIUM SEVERE TOTAL
9.4302F-U1
?.«ocoF.-o5
9.
3,
5.'
1
3,'
3«!
7.
. 5
txpFClED NUMBER OF RFLEASE INCIDENTS
AIM KAlFH TOTAL
1.
4.
1.813HE-12
?.~
S,
1 .
1.
1 .
3.0600E-1]
3.<
6.796HE-15
IS94E-U b
5H83E-11 7,9<,i
'.8113E-
4,3S69E-
7.9392E-
1.7971E-
11
11
11
'10
3.939SE-10
-------
TABLE 59: ANALYSIS OF RAIL ACCIDENTS INVOLVING SPENT FUEL
BY SEVERITY AND DISPERSION MEDIUM
MIX : 0 PrT TWUC.KS, ] no PC'
TYPF : S^h^T F'JPL
HAHGtb
en
01
yFAR NO OF
SHIPMENTS
1.97Q S
197^ 1^1
1995
?000
2olo
2015
2020
3297
7463
11224
LIGHT
MEDIUM
3.689 Jlr-'j?
00 3.23()Ht-Ol
3.S332F*UO 3.8?3t>t-ol
00
6. R }
OP ACCIDENTS
S . £ ^ 0 fi t - 0 *>
1 » 7 ] ^ (i E - o 4
1 . 0 H M f - 0 3
1 . * 7 H ? £, - 0 3
g. d ] ^ r, t - r» 3
} • I p-! ^ F- - 0 2
1 « 4 p f-, n £. - o ?
T f)T u L
?.d'»*>7f:-ijl
*un
OF KFLFASF.
4.5944 E- 1.3
1 .B722E-12
1 .63-iSF-ll
TOTAL
2.1749F-13
L-l 0
-i n
-------
TABLE 60: ANALYSIS OF TRUCK ACCIDENTS INVOLVING PLUTONIUM
BY SEVERITY AND DISPERSION MEDIUM
MIX : UMl PI-T T
MATERIAL TYPF ! PLUTONIUM
i, per
o PCT
YEAP NO OF
SMJPMFNTS
n
o
i 06*0
19R5
1995
2roc
2005
2020
3179
7ft 13
?0995
?7993
34991
L TGHT
FXPFCTEO
MEDIUM
0.
0.
4, 7 6 S 41:
EXPECTFD ACCIDENTS
31- ACCIDENTS
7.5P13E+UO 1.73S/t+01
*U1
00
0 ,
n,
4 .
TOTAL
0
-0? S. _
-u3 J.7i,,At-.
1 »i) t / 'ii-tj? ?_• o4
-------
TABLE 61: ANALYSIS OF RAIL ACCIDENTS INVOLVING PLUTONIUM
BY SEVERITY AND DISPERSION MEDIUM
TRANSPORT MIX ; o PCf THICKS, 10" PC I H4lL*OA[>St 0 PCT BARGES
MATERIAL TYPE t PLUTONIUM
YEAR NO Of
SHIPMENTS
1970
1975
1980
1985
1995
2000
2005
2nlo
2nl5
2p2o
0
0
10680
3179
7813
14464
20995
27993
34991
EXPECTED NUMBER 0^ ACCIOFNTS
LIGHT MEDIUM SEVERE
EXPECTED ACCIDENTS
TOTAL
o.
o.
3.8982E+00
1.6936E-01
9.2R?7E"01
4.2P35E+00
6«l3o5E*00
8»l74oE*00
l»02l7E*Ol
0.
0*
2.57i7t-ol
6.6344k-ol
8.845WE.-01
Oo
0»
4.B829E-Q3
3»*8ooE-o4
1.9074E-03
8.6784E-03
1.2597E-0?
0.
0.
l.b8n4E-ul
9.Q7R3E+UO
EXPECTED NUMBER OF REuEASF TNClDENiTS
AIR WATER TOTAL
o.
n.
6.54B4E-12
3.5892E-I1
1.6330E-10
3.1&05E-10
3.9506E-10
0.
0.
7.5363F-H
3.2742E-1?
8.1652E-H
1.1852E-10
1.9753E-10
1.oi^nE-10
5.563?E"10
1.3673E-09
3.6741E-0?
4.8988E-Q9
6.
-------
TABLE 62: ANALYSIS OF TRUCK ACCIDENTS INVOLVING SOLID
RADIOACTIVE WASTE BY SEVERITY AND
DISPERSION MEDIUM
TRANSPORT MIX • KIO Pel TRUCKS, 0 PCr QAJL.«nADS» 0 PCT rtARGES
L TYPF ; SULIO kAHTOftcTIVF
CO
YFAR
1970
]Q75
]9fl0
1985
l<99o
1995
2000
2005
2" 10
2015
2020
NO 0F
SHIPMENTS
EXPECTED
LTGHT
n o.
o o.
73 7.<
65 '1 a859oE-u!
140 4
?=»? 7
430 I
6lo 1
852 2
ExpfCTF.n
Or ACCIDENTS
bFv/FHF.
Ie7250fc-02
6»564yt-01 3
n,.
0 o
SUMIAWY
09
1.J632E-0? 2t
EAPFCTEO NUMHE.H OF
AIR " /
os
0.
6.2*71E-12
0.
n«
7,
TNCI DEN IS
TTT&L
2
3.3463E-11 l.'-.7ji.F-n
0039E-10
-------
TABLE 63: ANALYSIS OF RAIL ACCIDENTS INVOLVING SOLID
RADIOACTIVE WASTE BY SEVERITY AND
DISPERSION MEDIUM
TRANSPORT MM : „ PCT TRUCKS, mo per
MATFPTAL
o PCT HARGES
Ul
YEAR NO OF
SHIPMENTS
1970
1975
1985
I99n
1995
2000
2005
2olO
?0l5
2n2o
LTGHT
F.XPECTF_n
EXPECTED NUMRER OF ACCIDENTS
0 0.
0 o.
\ 1
?3 4.1975F-02
65 1.0439E-01
140 2.24«*E-01
4.1P74F-01
0.
o,
1.9750t-04
o.
0 •
•02 ?.l4bOt-04
~0? 4 i
-0? 8.'
-0? 1 .
TOTAL
I.V734F+UO
EApr.CTEn MUMHFR "F RFLFASF TNCIF'FNTS
AIM
n.
\ . M61E-1?
B..
WATER
9.Hl(S3E-ll 4
?.1143E-ln 1
3.H812E-10 1
f- -1 o
3.17HE-10
TOTAL
n.
n.
1.5215E-09
1.2771E-09
1 .8131E-08
-------
TABLE 64: ANALYSIS OF TRUCK ACCIDENTS INVOLVING NOBLE GAS BY
SEVERITY AND DISPERSION MEDIUM
TRANSPORl MIX ! 100 PCT
MATERIAL TYPE : MOMl.F GAS
n PCT L}A
0 PCT MARGES
YFAH NO OF
SHIPMENTS
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
?005
2010
2nl5
0
0
30
"59
99
134
1 7o
20?
234
2^4
0.
0.
9,
1 «
f>_.
3,
4 •
5.
6 .
ft .
EXPECTED ACCIDENTS
LTOHT
FXPECTED NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS
ME01UM
0.
0.
U? 2.2500t-o2
1.9J7SF-01 4.4?SOt-02
n.
o.
5.777?E-y] 1.333?t-o]
0,
0,
1.1«OOE-03 2.
6.534ot-02 1.7424E-03 3,
8,8440t-0? ?
3.
289 7.514QE-01 1.734l)t-01 4.<>p40E-o3
TOTAL
EXPECTFf) MUMHF^ OF BELFAST
ATM
0.
0.
2, 141SE-09
2.8985E-09
3.6773E-09
4.3695E-09
4.601SE-09
5.AB30E-09
0.
0.
1 . 0 7 0 7 F - 0 9
2.1R47E-09
2.5957F-()9
TOTAL
n.
o.
1.1430E-Q8
7.1323E-QB
-------
TABLE 65: ANALYSIS OF RAIL ACCIDENTS INVOLVING NOBLE GAS BY
SEVERITY AND DISPERSION MEDIUM
MIX : ii PCf TROfKS. ino PCl" KAIL*OMOS»
MATERIAL TYPE ; NUHl.t
HA«bES
YEAR MO OF
SHIPMENTS
EXPECTKD ACCIDENTS
EXPECTED NUMHF.R Of- ACCIDENTS
LTOHT
TOTAL
1970
1975
1980
1985
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2P20
n o.
n o •
30 5.'
59
99 1.5B99E-01
134 2.1520F-01
170 2.7302E-U1
202 3.P441F-01 3.S)0Ht-0?
234
OOE-04
)boE-04
7.U200E-Q4
3.R544E-U1
289
4.5ftftift-02
n.
1. I^SSF- ,1
I . 7lS<3 If" -Jl
(f.J^^'-Ul
3.03l3h-ul
i.oni^F-oi
i.7QJ1E-01
>U1
MUfiRFrJ (IF RFLFrtSF TMCIDENlS
» WATFH TOTAL
n. n. n.
o. o. o.
2.4«ol':-lii 1.240?F-lr 3.'
4.M7HnE-in 2.439nF-io 7.Sc>nHE-o9
7.^029E-io 3.^014^-10 l.tl^>4E-OB
9.7493E-10 4.MK7F-10 l.SlllE-QH
1.2Jft9E-()9 6.l843E-m 1.9J71E-OB
].4697f-o9 7.34B4F-]n ?,
1.5477E-09 7.73H(SF-lo ?,
1.7<»6lE-o9 H./3o7E-]n '.
1.9H5E-09 9.SS7SE-10 ?,
-------
The other tables indicate that for all truck transportation in 2020,
plutonium shipments are expected to encounter 0. 112 severe accidents
per year, solid waste 0.0175, and noble gas 0.0046. These numbers
with all rail transportation in 2020 are 0. 014 severe accidents per year
with spent fuel, 0. 021 for plutonium, 0. 0033 for solid waste, and
0. 00087 for noble gas. From this criterion, one would say that all rail
transportation of all the materials is safer than all truck transportation,
and that the materials rank in safety as follows: plutonium is least safe,
spent fuel is next safe, solid waste is safer yet, and noble gas is most
safe.
The number of accidents resulting in releases dispersing through air
and through water is a very small number in all cases. The largest
number of truck accidents resulting in release in air s'hould occur with
plutonium (3 x 10"8 releases per year) in 2020. The largest number of
rail accidents resulting in release in air should occur with either solid
waste or noble gas (2 x 10~" releases per year) in 2020. The largest
number of truck accidents resulting in releases in water is expected to
be with plutonium (2 x 10" releases per year) in 2020. Finally, the
largest number of rail accidents expected to result in water releases
should happen to noble gas (1 x 10~° releases per year).
EFFECT OF CHANGING RELEASE PROBABILITIES
A hypothesis was formulated that the fault tree probabilities pertaining
to the occurrence of impact, puncture, and heat were not a function of
accident severity. Some of the inhibit gate probabilities were also
assumed to be different than the values given in Tables 26 through 37.
The new release probabilities for severe accidents were calculated
from the fault tree. The release probabilities for light and medium
severity accidents were then obtained from the severe accident release
probabilities by arbitrary ratios. The resultant release probabilities
are compared in Table 66 with the release probabilities obtained in
Section VI. The new release probabilities are significantly higher than
those from Section VI, and thus the new numbers describe shipping
containers that are considerably inferior to the Section VI containers.
A comparison of curies released from both qualities of containers will
give a measure of importance of the tightness of the containers compared
to, say, the frequency of accidents.
In Tables 67 through 70, calculations of partial hazard vectors calculated
with the new release probabilities for severe accidents and for a
20-75-5 transport mix are compared with similar partial hazard vectors
calculated with the release probabilities obtained from Section VI,
162
-------
TABLE 66: COMPARISON OF RELEASE PROBABILITIES
Material
Spent Fuel
Plutonium
High. Level
Radioactive
Solid Waste
Noble
Gas
Accident
Severity
Light
Medium
Severe
Light
Medium
Severe
Light
Medium
Severe
Light
Medium
Severe
Transport Mode
Truck
Superior
Container
0
0. 15E-9
0. 19E-8
0
0. 3E-7
0. 3E-5
0
0. 5E-8
0.23E-7
0
0. 26E-6
0. 93E-5
Inferior
Container
0.32E-4
0. 65E-3
0. 13E-1
0.9E-6
0. 18E-4
0. 36E-3
0. 12E-2
0.48E-2
0.48E-1
0.82E-3
0.33E-2
0. 33E-1
Rail
Superior
Container
0
0. 16E-9
0. 33E-7
0
0.25E-8
0. 16E-6
0
0. 11E-6
0. 13E-5
0
0.44E-6
0. 11E-4
Inferior
Container
0.32E-5
0. 65E-4
0. 13E-2
0. 57E-7
0. 12E-5
0.23E-4
0. 6E-3
0.24E-2
0.24E-1
0. 18E-3
0.73E-3
0.73E-2
Barge
Superior
Container
0
0. 13E-7
0. 15E-5
0
0. 22E-7
0. 11E-5
0
0.2E-5
0. 15E-4
0
0.22E-5
0.2E-4
Inferior
Container
0.24E-4
0.48E-3
0.96E-2
0. 65E-6
0. 13E-4
0.26E-3
0. 12E-2
0.48E-2
0.48E-1
0. 8E-3
0. 32E-2
0. 32E-1
-------
TABLE 67: COMPARISON OF RELEASE PROBABILITY
CALCULATIONS FOR SPENT FUEL SHIPPING CONTAINERS
Transport Mix: 20 percent Trucks, 75 percent Railroads, 5 percent Barge;
Accident Severity: Severe
Year
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
Represen-
tative Per
Shipment
Quantitie s
Curies
0. 70 E+08
0. 28 E+10
0. 10 E + ll
0. 22 E+ll
0. 39 E+ll
0. 62 E+ll
0. 84 E+ll
0. 11 E+12
0. 14 E+12
0. 16 E+12
0. 19 E+12
0. 12 E+08
Inferior Container
Expected
Curies
Released
0. 56 E-03
0. 19 E-01
0. 58 E-01
0.11 E+00
0. 18 E+00
0. 28 E+00
0. 38 E+00
0.49 E+00
0. 61 E+00
0. 74 E+00
0. 88 E+00
0. 54 E-04
Expected
Acre-Rems
0. 19 E-02
0. 70 E-01
0. 21 E+00
0.41 E+00
0. 63 E-01
0.99 E+00
0. 14 E+01
0. 18 E + 01
0. 22 E+01
0.26 E+01
0. 31 E+01
0. 19 E-03
Superior Container
Expected
Curies
Released
1. 38 E-08
4. 79 E-07
1.44 E-06
2. 83 E-06
4. 38 E-06
6. 92 E-06
9.48 E-06
1. 21 E-05
1. 52 E-05
1. 83 E-05
2. 16 E-05
1. 33 E-09
Expected
Acre-Rems
4. 93 E-08
1. 72 E-06
5. 16 E-06
1. 01 E-05
1. 57 E-05
2.48 E-05
3.40 E-05
4. 35 E-05
5. 44 E-05
6. 54 E-05
7. 75 E-05
4. 76 E-09
b
Release probabilities recalculated under different assumptions and assignments and
given in Table 66 of this report describing an inferior container.
Release probabilities obtained from fault tree analysis described in Section VI
and tabulated in Table 47 of this report describing a superior container.
-------
TABLE 68: COMPARISON OF RELEASE PROBABILITY
CALCULATIONS FOR PLUTONIUM SHIPPING CONTAINERS
Transport Mix: 20 percent Trucks, 75 percent Railroads, 5 percent Barg
Accident Severity: Severe
es
Year
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
Represen-
tative Per
Shipment
Quantities
Curies
0
0
0. 50 E+9
0 . 34 E+9
0. 16 E+8
0. 87 E48
0. 21 E+9
0.40 E+9
0. 57 E+9
0.77 E+9
0. 96 E+9
0. 28 E+5
a
Inferior Container
Expected
Curies
Released
0
0
0. 72 E-4
0.44 E-4
0. 18 E-5
0. 10 E-4
0. 24 E-4
0.45 E-4
0. 66 E-4
0. 88 E-4
0. 11 E-3
0. 32 E-8
Expected
Acre-Rems
0
0
0. 14 E+0
0. 83 E-l
0. 34 E-2
0. 19 E-l
0.46 E-l
0. 88 E-l
0. 12 E + 0
0. 16 E+0
0. 20 E + 0
0. 57 E-5
Superior Container
Expected
Curies
Released
0
0
0. 55 E-6
0. 33 E-6
0. 14 E-7
0. 76 E-7
0. 18 E-6
0. 34 E-6
0. 50 E-6
0. 66 E-6
0. 83 E-6
0. 24 E-10
Expected
Acre-Rems
0
0
0. 10 E-2
0. 62 E-3
0. 26 E-4
0. 14 E-3
0. 34 E-3
0. 64 E-3
0. 93 E-3
0. 12 E-2
0. 15 E-2
0.45 E-7
Release probabilities recalculated under different assumptions and assignments and
given in Table 66 of this report describing an inferior container.
Release probabilities obtained from fault tree analysis described in Section VI
and tabulated in Table 47 of this report describing a superior container.
-------
TABLE 69: COMPARISON OF RELEASE PROBABILITY
CALCULATIONS FOR HIGH LEVEL RADIOACTIVE
SOLID WASTE SHIPPING CONTAINERS
Transport Mix: 20 percent Trucks, 75 percent Railroads, 5 percent Barges
Accident Severity: Severe
Year
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
Represen-
tative Per
Shipment
Quantities
Curies
0
0
0. 50 E+07
0. 18 E+09
0. 65 E+09
0. 15 E+10
0. 27 E+10
0.45 E+10
0. 64 E+10
0. 83 E+10
0. 10 E+ll
0. 10 E+08
a
Inferior Container
Expected
Curies
Released
0
0
0. 53 E-02
0. 19 E+00
0. 60 E+00
0. 14 E+01
0. 25 E+01
0.42 E+01
0. 54 E+01
0. 70 E+01
0. 86 E+01
0. 93 E-02
Expected
Acre-Rems
0
0
0. 19 E-01
0. 67 E + 00
0.22 E+01
0. 50 E+01
0.91 E+01
0. 15 E+02
0. 19 E+02
0.25 E+02
0. 31 E+02
0. 34 E-01
Superior Container
Expected
Curies
Released
0
0
3. 03 E-07
1. 08 E-05
3.47 E-05
8.04 E-05
1.46 E-04
2.40 E-04
3. 09 E-04
4. 03 E-04
4. 97 E-04
5. 34 E-07
Expected
Acre-Rems
0
0
1. 09 E-06
3. 87 E-05
1.25 E-04
2. 88 E-04
5. 25 E-04
8. 60 E-04
1. 11 E-03
1.44 E-03
1. 78 E-03
1. 92 E-06
Release probabilities recalculated under different assumptions and assignments and
given in Table 66 of this report describing an inferior container.
Release probabilities obtained from fault tree analysis described in Section VI
and tabulated in Table 47 of this report describing a superior container.
-------
TABLE 70: COMPARISON OF RELEASE PROBABILITY
CALCULATIONS FOR NOBLE GAS SHIPPING CONTAINERS
Transport Mix: 20 percent Trucks, 75 percent Railroads, 5 percent Barges
Accident Severity: Severe
Year
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
Represen-
tative Per
Shipment
Quantities
Curies
0
0
0. 32 E+8
0. 63 E+8
0. 11 E+9
0. 14 E+9
0. 18 E + 9
0. 22 E+9
0. 25 E+9
0. 28 E+9
0. 31 E+9
0. 11 E+7
a
Inferior Container
Expected
Curies
Released
0
0
0. 30 E+l
0. 60 E+l
0. 90 E + l
0. 12 E + 2
0. 15 E+2
0. 18 E+2
0. 19 E+2
0. 22 E+2
0. 24 E+2
0. 91 E-l
Expected
Acre-Rems
0
0
0. 78 E-3
0. 16 E-2
0. 23 E-2
0. 32 E-2
0.40 E-2
0.48 E-2
0. 50 E-2
0. 56 E-2
0. 62 E-2
0. 23 E-4
Superior Container
Expected
Curies
Released
0
0
0. 24 E-2
0.49 E-2
0. 73 E-2
0. 99 E-2
0. 13 E-l
0. 15 E-l
0. 16 E-l
0. 18 E-l
0. 19 E-l
0. 74 E-4
Expected
Acre-Rems
0
0
0. 64 E-6
0. 13 E-5
0. 19 E-5
0. 26 E-5
0. 33 E-5
0. 39 E-5
0.41 E-5
0.46 E-5
0. 50 E-5
0. 19 E-7
Release probabilities recalculated under different assumptions and assignments and
given in Table 66 of this report describing an inferior container.
Release probabilities obtained from fault tree analysis described in Section VI
and tabulated in Table 47 of this report describing a superior container.
-------
In the case of spent fuel, the expected annual number of curies released
for the inferior container is on the order of 10 + 5 higher than for the
superior container. This result reflects the great use of rails in the
transport mix, since the ratio of inferior to superior release probabilities
for severe rail accidents is about 10+5, while it is 10+"7 for truck and
10+3 for barge.
Similarly, the number of curies released from the inferior container
compared to the superior container is about 10^ for plutonium, about
10 for solid waste, and about 10^ for noble gas.
EFFECT OF CHANGING POPULATION DISTRIBUTION
The role of the population density distribution is discussed in Section VI.
As long as the population density is assumed to be the same for all
areas bounded by isodose contours, the exposure to risk may be
calculated by multiplying the average population density by a factor
derived from the linear distribution along the transport route. Such
a distribution is shown in Figure 29, and it yields a factor of 26. 3. If
some other distribution is assumed, then the factor is different. For
example, if 10 percent of the transport distance passes through an urban
area of population density that is 21 times as large as the average
density and 90 percent of the route lies in the average density area,
then the factor is 0. 1 x 21 + 0. 9 x 1 = 3. Use of this factor reduces the
calculations of expected man-rems, expected fatalities, and expected
injuries by a factor of 3/26. 3 = 0. 114.
HAZARDS OF A SINGLE ACCIDENT
The probability of an accidental release of radiation from a shipment
of radioactive material is small. Yet when an accident does occur, the
consequences can be great. It is, thus, of interest to assess the
magnitude of the hazard of a single accident. In the model, an actual
accident can be described by setting the accident probability equal to
one. To obtain a measure of the maximum hazard, the release
probability can then also be set to one. The hazard associated with any
other release probability then can be found by multiplying the maximum
hazard by that release probability.
It is not realistic to consider a uniform population density distribution
around the scene of an accident. Assuming that the shipment has a
right-of-way of about 1, 000 feet in which only two persons are found in
168
-------
every square mile, and that the population density in the area bounded
by the isopleths at 10'1 mi2 and 102 mi2 is 5 times the average
population density, the exposure to risk becomes:
6 9
X£ = E D£(A.) A. (2) + E D£ (A.) A. (5p)
i=7
(See Table 41 for an explanation of the symbols. ) Setting the release
probability r equal to unity and using the release fractions for severe
accidents given in Table 40, the expected hazards are calculated for the
source carried in a representative shipment and an average population
density of 100 persons per square mile. The results are tabulated in
Table 71.
The expected number of fatalities are calculated with the LD5Q/60 guide
under the assumption that the fatalities occur shortly after the accident
release, -when radiation levels are high. The expected number of non-
lethal cancers are calculated with the EPA guides under the assumption
that the cancers are produced by chronic exposure to low levels of
radiation.
A representative shipment of curies of radiation is given in Table 71 by
the quotient of curies released and release fraction. Typical shipment
radiation capacities are spent fuel ~10 Ci, plutonium ~10 Ci, solid
waste ~10^Ci, and noble gas ~10 Ci. Given the assumed release fractions,
accidents to solid waste and spent fuel yield radiation releases of about
10 Ci. The release from a plutonium shipment accident is 1, 000 times
less severe, but the release from a noble gas shipment accident is 10 times
more severe. Due to the differences in dose coefficient, however, the
noble gas release presents the smallest health hazard, even though it
involves the most radiation of all the materials.
The key index of the hazard vector for a single accident is the expected
number of man-rems. Inspecting the values in Table 71 for this index,
the materials are ordered -with respect to danger as solid waste, plutonium,
spent fuel, and noble gas. The first three materials present nearly equal
hazards (~10 man-rem), but noble gas yields only 1 percent of that hazard.
The index of greatest interest is the anticipated number of fatalities result-
ing from an accident. From Table 71, the shipment of solid waste produces
169
-------
TABLE 71: IMPACT OF SINGLE SHIPPING ACCIDENT
Material
Spent Fuel
Recycled
Plutonium
High Level
Radioactive
Solid Waste
Noble Gas
Expected
Curies
Released
0. 12 E5
0. 28 E2
0. 50 E5
0. 11 E7
Expected
Acre-
Rems
0.42 E5
0.51 E5
0. 18 E6
0. 28 E3
Expected
Man-
Rems
0. 16 E5
0. 20 E5
0. 70 E5
0. 11 E3
Expected
Fatalities
26. 7
33. 3
116. 7
0. 2
Expected
Nonlethal
Cancers
3. 2
4. 0
14. 0
0. 02
* Assumptions: Accident probability = 1.
Release probability = 1.
The population density in the immediate area of the
accident (0. Imi ) is 2 persons / mi^, and is
500 persons /mi^ outside this area.
Source = Representative Curies/Shipment
Severe accident release fractions (Table 21):
Spent Fuel: IE- 3
Plutonium: 1 E - 3
Solid Waste: 5E-3
Noble Gas: 1
170
-------
nearly 117 lethal cases if 0. 5 percent of its radiation cargo leaks out in
an accident and is absorbed by the assumed spatial distribution of people.
Spent fuel and plutonium produce nearly 27 and 34 lethalities, respectively,
•with 0. 1 percent of their radiation cargoes. Noble gas is least dangerous,
yielding less than one fatality even when all its radiation is absorbed.
171
-------
SECTION VIII
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Many individuals and organizations contributed to this study.
Special thanks are extended to W. Brobst of the U. S. Atomic
Energy Commission and to J. Nichols and L. Shappert of the
Oak Ridge National Laboratory for their help.
The cooperation of John Russell, the Project Officer assigned
to the project by the Environmental Protection Agency, in
supplying us "with the necessary documents and project direction
is gratefully acknowledged.
173
-------
SECTION IX
REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
REFERENCES
1. "The Nuclear Industry, 1969, 1970, 1971, "U.S. Government
Printing Office.
2. "Statistical Abstracts of the United States, 1972, "U.S.
Government Printing Office, July, 1972.
3. Los Angeles Times, December 18, 1972.
4. "Civilian Nuclear Power, 1967 Supplement to the 1962 Report to
the President," U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, February,
1967.
5. Nichols, J. P. , Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Personal
Communication, March, 1973.
6. "Reactor Fuel-Cycle Costs for Nuclear Power Evaluation,"
WASH-1099, December, 1971.
7. Blomeke, J. O. , "Magnitude of the Waste Management Problem, "
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Lecture given at UCLA, July,
1972.
8. "Environmental Survey of Transportation of Radioactive Materials
to and from Nuclear Power Plants, " Directorate of Regulatory
Standards, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, December, 1972.
9. Air Force Systems Command Manual, June, 1963.
10. Nichols, J.P., andF.T. Binford, "Status of Noble Gas Removal
and Disposal," ORNL-TM-3515, August, 1971.
11. "Proceedings Third International Symposium: Packaging and
Transportation of Radioactive Materials, Richland, Washington, "
CONF-710801, August 16 to 20, 1971.
175
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12. "Siting of Fuel Reprocessing Plants and Waste Management
Facilities," ORNL-4451, July, 1971.
13. Nichols, J.P. , et al., Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Personal
Communication, October, 1973.
14. Brobst, W.A. , Division of Waste Management and Transportation,
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Personal Communication.
15. Garrick, B. J. , et al. , "A Risk Model for the Transport of
Hazardous Materials," Holmes & Narver, Inc., HN-204,
August, 1969.
16. Baldonado, O. C. , "CONREP User's Manual, " Holmes & Narver,
Inc., HN-70-983, May, 1970.
17. Nichols, J.P., L. B. Shappert, F. T. Binford, A. R. Irvine,
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Personal Communication,
February, 1973.
18. Shaw, Milton, Director of Reactor Development and Technology,
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Communication to AEC
Chairman Glenn T. Seaborg, January 5, 1971.
19. Shappert, L. B. , Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Personal
Communication.
20. "Forecast of Growth of Nuclear Power," WASH-1139, January,
1971.
21. Patterson, D. E. , et al. , "A Summary of Incidents Involving
USAEC Shipments of Radioactive (Materials), 1957-1961,"
TID-16764, November, 1962, and supplements for years 1962
to 1964.
22. Russell, J. L. , Environmental Protection Agency, Personal
Communication.
23. Lushbaugh, C.C., F. Comas, C.L. Edwards, G. A. Andrews,
"Clinical Evidence of Dose-Rate Effects in Total-Body Irradiation
in Man, " in The Proceedings of a Symposium on Dose Rate in
Mammalian Radiation Biology, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, April 29
to May 1, 1968.
176
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24. The Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of
Ionizing Radiation, Report of the Advisory Committee on the
Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiations, Division of Medical
Sciences, National Academy of Sciences National Research
Council, November, 1972.
25. Blomeke, J. O. , J. P. Nichols, "Commercial High-Level
Waste Projections, " Oak Ridge National Laboratory,
ORNL-TM-4224, May, 1973.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Besides the documents specifically referenced, the following were
valuable sources of background information. They have been divided
into several categories for convenience, but it is realized that most
could be put into more than one category.
Accident Information
"Accident Facts," National Safety Council, Chicago, Illinois, 1968.
"A Summary of Industrial Accidents in USAEC Facilities 1965-66, "
TID-5360 (Supplement 6), December, 1967.
Brobst, W. A. , "The Probability of Transportation Accidents, " Paper
given at Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board, 14th Annual
Explosives Safety Seminar, New Orleans, Louisiana, November 10,
1972.
Guthrie, C. E. , and J. P. Nichols, " Theoretical Possibilities and
Consequences of Major Accidents in U^S ancj pu239 Fuel Fabrication
and Radioisotope Processing Plants," ORNL-3441, April, 1964.
Kelly, O.A., and W. C. Stoddart, "Highway Vehicle Impact Studies -
Tests and Mathematical Analyses of Vehicle, Package, and Tie-Down
Systems Capable of Carrying Radioactive Material," ORNL-NSIC-61,
February, 1970.
"Operational Accidents and Radiation Exposure Experience Within the
USAEC 1943-1970," WASH-1192 (UC-41), Fall, 1971.
"1965-1966 Accidents of Large Motor Carriers of Property, " Bureau
of Motor Carrier Safety, U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal
Highway Administration, August, 1967.
177
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"1967 Accidents of Large Motor Carriers of Property, " Bureau of
Motor Carrier Safety, U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal
Highway Administration, December, 1968.
"1970 Accidents of Large Motor Carriers of Property, " Bureau of
Motor Carrier Safety, U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal
Highway Administration, March, 1972.
"1970 Accidents of Class 1 Motor Carriers of Passengers, " Bureau
of Motor Carrier Safety, U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal
Highway Administration, March, 1972.
"1970 Analysis of Motor Carrier Accidents Involving Vehicle Defects
or Mechanical Failure," Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety, U.S.
Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration,
March, 1972.
"1970 Analysis of Accident Reports Involving Fire, " Bureau of Motor
Carrier Safety, U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal
Highway Administration, March, 1972.
Accident Bulletins 135 (1966), 139 (1970), and 140 (1971) Federal
Railroad Administration, Department of Transportation.
Leimkuhler, F. F. , "Trucking of Radioactive Materials: Safety
versus Economy on Highway Transport, " NYO-9773, June, 1963.
Stewart, K. B. , "Rail Accident Statistics Pertinent to the Shipment
of Radioactive Materials, " HW-76299, January 21, 1963.
Containers and Shipping
Brooksbank, R. E. , and W. H. Carr, "Material Form for Maximum
Safety in the Shipment of Alpha-Emitting Materials, " ORNL-4554,
April, 1970.
"Chlorine Manual, " The Chlorine Institute, Inc. , New York, New
York, Fourth Edition, 1969.
Davis, C.R. , andB.R. Granich, "A Spent Fuel Shipping System for
Large HTGR Plants, " Gulf-GA-A1218 1, Gulf General Atomic Company,
October 27, 1972, Paper presented at the American Nuclear Society
Winter Meeting, Washington, D.C., November 13 to 17- 1972.
178
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"Directory of Shipping Containers for Radioactive Materials, " U.S.
Atomic Energy Commission, October, 1969.
Doshi, K. D. , "Structural Integrity of Shipping Containers For
Radioactive Materials - Part V: An Analytical Study of Longitudinal
Vehicle Collisions, " NYO-2539-4, November, 1965.
"Investigation of Low Level Radioactive Waste Containers in an
Accident Environment. Part 1: Survey of Transport and Disposal
Procedures; Part 2: Structural Integrity of Typical Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Containers, " SWRI-1262-4, 1965.
Nussbaumer, D. A. , "AEC Regulations for the Packaging of
Radioactive Materials for Transport," Conference on Transportation
of Radioactive Material, University of Virginia, October 26 to 28,
1969.
"Packaging of Radioactive Material for Transport, " (Including
revisions of February 25, 1964) 10CFR71.
Perona, J. J. , and R. S. Dillon, and J. O. Blomeke, "Design and
Safety Considerations of Shipping Solidified High Level Radioactive
Wastes, " ORNL-TM-2971, December, 1970.
Perona, J. J. , and J. O. Blomeke, "A Parametric Study of Shipping
Casks for Solid Radioactive Wastes , " ORNL-TM-3651, February,
1972.
"Proceedings of the Second International Symposium on Packaging
and Transportation of Radioactive Materials, Gatlinburg, Tennessee,
CONF-681001, October 14 to 18, 1968.
"Radioactive Materials and Other Miscellaneous Amendments,"
Department of Transportation Hazardous Materials Regulations
Board, Federal Register Vol. 33, No. 194, October 4, 1968.
Shappert, L. B. , "Irradiated Fuel Shipping - Today and Tomorrow, "
ANS Transactions, June, 1969.
"Shipping Container Testing Program: Report of Conference Held
at John Hopkins University," TID-7635, May 2 to 3, 1962.
Simens, H. G. , and A. C. Cornish, "Shipping Radioactive Materials, '
Bechtel Corporation, October, 1971.
179
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"Study in International Traffic of Radioactive Materials, " WASH-2808,
1966.
"Summary Report of AEC Symposium on Packaging and Regulatory
Standards for Shipping Radioactive Material, Germantown, Maryland, "
TID-7651, December 3 to 5, 1962.
Thisell, W. J. , and J. W. Langhaar, "Static and Impact Tests on 15-Ton
Cask for Shipping Irradiated Fuel, "DP-843, August, 1963.
"Transportation of Radioactive Materials," Office of Hazardous Materials,
Newsletter, 2, No. 8, February, 1972.
Shappert, L. B. , "Cask Designers' Guide - A Guide for the Design,
Fabrication, and Operation of Shipping Casks for Nuclear Applications, "
ORNL-NSIC-68, February, 1970.
Waste Management
Barnes, R. G. , "Nuclear Power Reactor Wastes and Our Environment, "
General Electric Company, CONF 700440-1, April 1, 1970.
Bell, M. J. and R. S. Dillon, "The Long-Term Hazard of Radioactive
Wastes Produced by the Enriched Uranium, 238Pu-U, and 233U-Th Fuel
Cycles," ORNL-TM 3548, November, 1971.
Belter, W. G. , "Advances in Radioactive Waste Management Technology -
Its Effect on the Future U. S. Nuclear Power Industry, " U. S. Atomic
Energy Commission, A/CONF. 28/P/868, 1964.
Belter, W. G. , "U. S. Operational Experience in Radioactive Waste
Management (1958-1963), " U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, A/CONF.
28/P/869, 1964.
Blomeke, J. O. , and F. E. Harrington, "Management of Radioactive Wastes
at Nuclear Power Stations, " ORNL-4070, February, 1969.
Blomeke, J. O. , and J. J. Perona, "Storage, Shipment, and Disposal of
Spent Fuel Cladding, " ORNL-TM-3650, January, 1972.
Claiborne, H. C., "High-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal by Transmutation,
ANS Transactions, June, 1972.
180
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Culler, F. L. , "Technical Status of the Radioactive Waste Repository -
A Demonstration Project for Solid Radioactive Waste Disposal, " ORNL-
4680, April, 1971.
Dillon, R. S. , J. J. Perona, and J. O. Blomeke, "A Model for the Economic
Analysis of High-Level Radioactive Waste Management, " ORNL-4633,
November, 1971.
Eisenbud, Merril, "Management of Radioactive Wastes, " Environmental
Radioactivity, Chapter 12, McGraw-Hill Book Co. , New York, New York,
1963.
Fineman, Phillip, "Progress in Waste-Disposal Research and Development,"
Power Reactor Technology and Reactor Fuel Processing 10, No. 1, pp. 85
to 92, Winter, 1966 to 1967.
McElroy, J. L. , A. G. Blasewitz, and K. J. Schneider, "Status of the
Waste Solidification Demonstration Program, " Nuclear Technology, 12,
pp. 69 to 82, September, 1971.
Parker, F. L. , "Recent Developments in and Future Plans for Radioactive
Waste Management in the United States of America, " September, 1967.
"Proceedings of AEC-Contractor Nuclear Materials Management Meeting
at the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Berkeley," CONF-661011, 1967.
"Project Salt Vault - A Demonstration of the Disposal of High-Activity
Solidified Wastes in Underground Salt Mines, " ORNL-4555, April, 1971.
"Radioactive Solid Waste Volume Reduction Facility: Los Alamos Scientific
Laboratory, New Mexico (EIS), " Atomic Energy Commission, Environ-
mental Impact Statement, PB 206 8080f, April 26, 1972.
"Radioactive Waste Repository Project: Technical Status Report for Period
Ending September 30, 1971," ORNL-4751, December, 1971.
Rupp, A. F. , "A Radioisotope-Oriented View of Nuclear Waste Management, "
ORNL-4766, May, 1972.
181
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Smith, J. M. , and J. E. Kjemtrup, "BWR-Developments in Nuclear Plant
Effluent Management, " General Electric Company, paper presented at
the American Power Conference, April, 1972.
Wolkenhauer, W. C., "The Controlled Thermonuclear Reactor as a Fission
Product Burner, " ANS Transactions, June, 1972.
Transportation
Shappert, L. B. , and R. S. Burns, "Indexed Bibliography on Transportation
and Handling of Radioactive Materials, " ORNL-NSIC-33 (UC -80-Reactor
Technology), June, 1967.
Seagren, R. D. , and L. B. Shappert, "Indexed Bibliography on Transportation
and Handling of Radioactive Materials-2, " ORNL-NSIC-84, January, 1971.
"First Annual Report of the Secretary of Transportation on Hazardous
Materials Control. Hazardous Materials Transportation Control Act of
1970," Calendar Year 1970.
"Second Annual Report of the Secretary of Transportation on Hazardous
Materials Control. Hazardous Materials Transportation Control Act of
1970," Calendar Year 1971.
Conference on Transportation of Radioactive Material Held in Charlottesville,
Virginia, on October 26 to 27, 1970, Virginia University, October, 1970.
Gibson, R. (Ed. ), Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials, Pergamon
Press, Inc., New York, 1966.
"Southern Governors' Conference on Transportation of Nuclear Spent Fuel,"
CONF 700207, 1970.
"Special Study: Risk Concepts in Dangerous Goods Transportation Regulations,
National Transportation Safety Board, NTSB-STS-71-1, January 27, 1971.
Thompson, J. T. , "The Transportation of Highly Radioactive Materials
A Review of Current Research, " NYO-9774, October, 1963.
Yadigaroglu, G. , et al. , "Spent Fuel Transportation Risks, " Nuclear News,
pp. 71 to 75, November, 1972.
182
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Heinisch, R. , "Transportation of Nuclear Fuel Material in the United
States, " Nuclear Assurance Corporation, 1970.
Miscellaneous
Allen, R. E. , "Radiation Surveillance Networks, " WASH-1148 (UC-41),
November, 1969.
n
Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant, Environmental Report," Docket No. 50-332,
Allied-Gulf Nuclear Services, November 5, 1971.
Clark, H. K. , "Handbook of Nuclear Safety, " Savannah River Laboratory,
DP-532, 1961.
"International Conference and Exhibition on a World Review of Nuclear
Reactors and Radioisotopes, Montreal, Canada," CONF-670522, May 28
to 31, 1967.
"Safety Evaluation by the Division of Materials Licensing USAEC in the
Matter of General Electric Company, Midwest Fuel Recovery Plant, Grundy
County, Illinois," Docket No. 50-268, October 6, 1967.
"Environmental Considerations Related to the Proposed Operation of the
Midwest Fuel Recovery Plant, Morris, Illinois," Draft Detailed Statement
by the Division of Radiological and Environmental Protection, USAEC,
General Electric Company, Docket No. 50-268, March, 1972.
"Midwest Fuel Recovery Plant, Morris, Illinois, Applicants Environmental
Report," General Electric Company, NEDO-14504, June, 1971.
"Response to AEC Staff Questions Regarding Applicant's Environmental
Report, Midwest Fuel Recovery Plant, Morris, Illinois," General Electric
Company, NEDO-14504-1, October, 1971.
"Applicant's Environmental Report (Supplement 1) Midwest Fuel Recovery
Plant, Morris, Illinois," General Electric Company, NEDO-14504-2,
November, 1971.
"Midwest Fuel Recovery Plant, Morris, Illinois, Design and Analysis, "
General Electric Company, Santa Clara, California, Docket 50-268-1,
November 21, 1966.
183
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"Power Plant Siting and Environmental Protection, " Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Communications and Power of the Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce - HR 92nd Congress, Parts 1, 2, and 3, May, 1971.
"Radioactive Waste Processing and Disposal, " Division of Waste Manage-
ment and Transportation, USAEC, Technical Information Center, TID-3311,
Supplement 3, April, 1972.
"Safety Research Programs in the United States for Specific Nuclear Reactor
Types," Nuclear Safety, 12, No. 5, September to October, 1971.
Slade, David H. , (Ed.), "Meteorology and Atomic Energy 1968, " U. S.
Atomic Energy Commission, TID-24190, July, 1968.
Welfare, F. G. , "The Oak Ridge Systems Analysis Code (ORSAC) User's
Manual," ORNL-TM-3223, February, 1972.
Wilfert, G. L. , "Spent Reactor Fuel - Reprocessing Requirement, Isotope
Content, and Transportation, " BNWL-389, Battelle Northwest Laboratory,
1967.
"Handy Railroad Atlas of the United States, " Rand McNally and Company,
Chicago, Illinois, 1971.
"Environmental Survey of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle-Fuels and Materials, "
Directorate of Licensing, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, November, 1972.
Power Requirements
"The Growth of Nuclear Power 1972-1985," WASH-1139, Revision 1,
December, 1971.
"FPC's 1970 National Survey Forecasts: A Doubling of Nuclear Power
Capacity over 1964 Projection, " Nuclear Industry, Atomic Industrial Forum,
pp. 11 to 12, April, 1972.
Weinberg, Alvin P. , "Social Institutions and Nuclear Energy, " Science,
177, pp. 1085 to 1090, June 9, 1972.
"Potential Nuclear Power Growth Patterns, " WASH-1098, December, 1970.
184
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Reactor Types
"Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor Demonstration Plant-Environmental
Statement," WASH-1509, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, April, 1972.
Ash, E. B. , "Unique Features of a Sodium-Cooled Fast Breeder Reactor, "
Combustion, pp. 53 to 66, June, 1970.
Colby, L. J. , R. C. Dahlberg, and S. Jaye, "HTGR Fuel and Fuel-Cycle
Summary Description, " Gulf General Atomic Company, GA-10233, May 25,
1971.
Fortescue, P., "A Reactor Strategy: FBR's and HTGR's, " Nuclear News,
pp. 36 to 39, April, 1972.
Sedan, W- H. , "HTGR Spent-Fuel Shipping Costs, " General Atomics
Division, GAMD-7979, 1967.
Sedan, W. H. , "HTGR Long-Term Spent Fuel Storage Costs, " General
Atomics Division, GAMD-7994, 1967.
"National HTGR Fuel Recycle Development Program Plan, " ORNL-4702,
August, 1971.
185
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SECTION X
GLOSSARY
Accident Probability - Fraction of shipments observed to encounter accidents;
usually expressed in reciprocal distance units.
Accident Severity - Qualitative scale for magnitude of accident characteris-
tics. Accidents are grouped into light (minor), medium (moderate), and ^
severe classes of severity. For truck and rail transport modes, the relative
collision velocity and the duration of fires provide a basis for a quantitative
classification. For barge freight, the duration of fires provide a meaningful
basis for severity analysis.
AND Gate - Connection in fault tree requiring at least two events to occur
simultaneously.
Area-Dose - Dose absorbed by single human being in a unit area around the
accident source. Interpreted as exposure to environment; usually expressed
in acre-rems.
Consequence - Magnitude of effects, such as loss or damage, resulting from
undesirable events.
Fault Tree - Logical relation between elementary events, such as occurrence
of impact, puncture, excessive heat, vibration, or human error, potential
barriers for these events, and an ultimate undesirable event, such as rupture
of a shipping container.
Hazard - Product of risk and consequence.
Hazard Vector - Description of accident hazards using the components denot-
ing the number of curies released, the expected area-dose, the expected
population dose, the expected number of excess lethal cases, and the expected
number of excess injuries (such as nonlethal cancers). The hazard vector is
a function of a number of system variables, including time, geographical
location, population distribution, radioactive commodity, transport mode,
container technology, and route characteristics.
Inhibit Gate - Potential barrier to elementary event connected to the elemen-
tary evenTwith the logic of an AND gate. For example, if the elementary
event is impact to a container, the inhibit gate condition on the magnitude of
the impact must be satisfied before the container ruptures from impact.
187
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LD5Q/60 ~ Lethal dose causing demise of 50 percent of exposed population
within 60 days of accident.
OR Gate - Connection in fault tree requiring only one of several events to
occur.
Population-Dose - Dose absorbed by population of human beings near the
accident source, A measure of exposure to risk; usually expressed in
man-rems or person-rems.
Radiation Dose Radiation absorbed by receptors, such as human beings;
usually expressed in rems if the absorbers are men or animals.
Release Fraction - Part of cargo that is released through the container
rupture caused by an accident and dispersed through environment.
Release Probability Probability that a shipping container will rupture.
It is evaluated by means of fault tree analysis of the component barriers of
the container.
Release Severity Release associated with an accident of the given severity.
Unfortunately, a severe accident does not necessarily imply a release of
large magnitude. In this report, release fractions, which are not -well-
known, have been assigned values, based on engineering judgment, that do
vary directly with increasing magnitude of accident severity.
Risk - Probability that undesirable events, such as an accident to a shipment
of radioactive material, will occur.
*U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1973 546-311/109 1-3
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